Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC: The Elixir of Democracy and Individuality 9783110560145, 9783110559798

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Evangelos Alexiou Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC

Evangelos Alexiou

Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC The Elixir of Democracy and Individuality

ISBN 978-3-11-055979-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-056014-5 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-055995-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2020934318 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Photo of the fresco „The Orator Demosthenes“, Austrian Parliament © Mike Ranz Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

| In memoriam of my parents Vassilios Alexiou (1933–2016) Eleni Alexiou (1935–1993) and for Maro Kavafaki

Prologue When one considers the literary conceptions, the genres of literature or the history of ideas of the Greeks, which not only left a decisive and catalytic mark on European thinking and literature but had an influence well beyond the borders of Europe, on global civilisation and literature, one cannot but bring to mind the epic (and its successor, the novel), tragedy and comedy, history and philosophy. On the other hand, there is a wealth of texts by Attic orators and on the Greek theory of rhetoric, works which, almost subconsciously, have left an indelible mark on language and expression and, by extension, our way of thinking even to this day. However, this may only be perceived after careful examination and thinking. The limited (at first glance) interest in practical and theoretical rhetoric could be attributed to the modern poetics of genius (Geniekult) which used the term “rhetorical” in a dismissive sense, connoting “sterile”, “uninspired”, “cold” and “soulless”. In the past and even to this day, scientific discourse often distinguishes (to the detriment of the field itself) between practical oratory – the extant speeches of the Attic orators – and theoretical rhetoric – conceptions and treatises on the art of discourse – leading to the loss of the direct correlation between practical speaking and theoretical debate over language and rhetoric. This work aims to bridge this gap in research into Greek antiquity in a diverse manner. It is not only a comprehensive contribution to the study of the Attic orators on the basis of diligent examination of secondary sources and the context of the society and political life of the 4th century BC, but takes a broader approach to the contacts between orations and other contemporary literary genres, raising questions as regards the juxtaposition between the written word and improvisation or the relationship between individuality and the political community – questions that are exceptionally interesting as regards other genres of literature and literary practices beyond rhetoric. In this book, the so-called minor Attic orators are evaluated systematically for the first time alongside the major representatives of the art of oration: Demosthenes and Isocrates. In fact, recent findings, such as fragments of Hyperides’ speeches in the Archimedes Palimpsest, are taken into account. The inclusion of theoretical disputes on the art of discourse in the rhetorical handbooks of Anaximenes and Aristotle, and (more importantly) the underlining of the major role played by Isocrates, whose position during the dispute with philosophy in the 4th century BC is framed in a clear context, are major contributions of this study. The educational benefits are increased manifold if one considers that important passages of rhetorical speeches are repeatedly commented upon and central concepts are explored. Evangelos Alexiou, Professor of Ancient Greek Literature at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, is an acclaimed expert in ancient Rhetoric. His works on Isocrates were released to international acclaim, while his contribution to the Handbuch der https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-202

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griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit (Munich 2014, pp. 734–859) on the Attic orators and the rhetorical art, from which this book sprang, is a unique, comprehensive analysis of the material. Bernhard Zimmermann Professor of Classics Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Author’s Preface This book is a revised and slightly abbreviated form of my monograph on the rhetoric of the 4th century BC, which was published in modern Greek in 2016 (Η ρητορική του 4ου αι. π.Χ. Το ελιξίριο της δημοκρατίας και η ατομικότητα, ed. Gutenberg, Athens). New bibliographic sources for this English edition were used only in isolated cases. According to a chreia attributed to the philosopher Antisthenes, when a father asked him what, in his view, he ought to teach his son, Antisthenes responded: “If he is to live with the gods, philosophy; if he is to live with men, rhetoric” (Stob. Anth. 2.31.76 = Antisth. VA 173 Giann.: Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, “εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα”). This response may provide a simple but apt dividing line between the idealised (if not utopian) philosophical discourse and a more practical rhetoric as the component of a realistic but often contradictory human world. The central belief is that rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is integrally linked to the human community and constitutes an exceptional means of human communication. The gift of speaking well, natural eloquence, was considered a virtue already by Homer’s era, but the tremendous power of speaking was most successfully framed by Gorgias, the formidable orator and sophist of the 5th century BC: “Speech is a powerful lord” (82 B11.8 D.-K.: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν). Since antiquity, rhetoric has dominated almost every field of human activity: the political, the professional, the interpersonal, the literary, the scientific, the educational. For example, the need of politicians in modern parliamentary democracy to convince, to move, to enthuse, to stir anger in their audience is reflected in their handling of speaking and the acting accompanying the words. Major statesmen were deemed charismatic due to their rhetorical skills – and it is noteworthy that our contemporary diverse and liberal culture searches in the rhetoric of classical antiquity for communication models.1 The broader the freedom of speech, the more determining a factor the presence of rhetoric in public life: in this frame of mind, rhetoric and democracy are almost synonymous concepts, constituting a hendiadys. This concerns the first part of the subtitle of this work. Rhetoric is the elixir of democracy; parrhēsia and isēgoria, the famous concept of “who wishes to speak” (τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται),2 are integral components of the Athenian democracy of classical antiquity. Public speaking drives and revitalises democratic ideology. It is not that the rhetorical art ceased to play an important role during the Hellenistic or the Imperial period – far from it; since its first appearance, rhetoric has never been divorced from human activity, neither written nor verbal communication. However, its vital || 1 See e.g. C. Marsh, Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations. An Isocratean Model, New York 2013. 2 See Demosth. 18.170; 18.191; Aesch. 1.23; 1.27; 3.4; Aristoph. Acharn. 45; Thesmoph. 379; Eccles. 130. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-203

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political space was the democracy of city-states, and the arrival of Hellenistic monarchy set limits and restrictions on the art. It is precisely this dimension that the second part of the subtitle refers to, the role of individuality in the 4th century BC, defined by A. Dihle as the “emancipation of the individual” (Emanzipation des Individuums).3 In the twilight of the classical period, the value system of the city-state was called upon to address individuality in a multi-factorial relationship, whether in order to curb the ambitions of high-profile individuals – both within and beyond the city walls – or in order to include them in the ideology of the city – or surmount them. At this point, rhetoric plays a vital role as a psychagogic art, i.e. the art of “leading the souls through speech”, or, as it is defined herein, “a mirror of everyday ethics”: at times the orator identifies with the audience and at others distances himself from them – but what remains constant is the bipolar relationship between orator and audience, which is always vibrant and present. In no other ancient literary text is contact between the author and the audience as direct as it is in rhetorical speeches. The orator, as an individual personality, is driven by the audience, and rhetorical texts reflect the thoughts of both the orator and the audience in a two-way relationship where individuality is conversant, juxtaposed or identified with the many. Therefore, rhetorical texts serve as our best source for what K. Dover, in particular, established as “popular morality”;4 this is a practical ethical way of thinking, a non-theoretical ethical code, whether it concerns politicians, orators or everyday individuals, such as heirs and courtesans. A number of topics touched upon herein refer to the rhetorical texts: the dispute between rhetoric and philosophy and the central role played by Isocrates and Plato, the argument between Isocrates and Alcidamas over the primacy of the written or the spoken word, the rhetorical handbooks of Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Aristotle, the competitive ambitions of the individual and the cooperative values of the citystate, according to the classic distinction by A.W.H Adkins,5 the judicial rhetoric of Isaeus, Demosthenes, Apollodorus, Hyperides, Dinarchus and its connotations, the prosecutions of Lycurgus and the values he defends, the innovations of Isocrates and his contribution to the development of the rhetorical art, the monarchic ideology and the emergence of new states – particularly Macedon and its kings – as opposed to the “hard line” of anti-Macedonian figures such as Demosthenes, Hegesippus and Hyperides or the conciliatory and, at times, novel political directions adopted by Isocrates, Aeschines and Demades.

|| 3 A. Dihle, Studien zur griechischen Biographie, 2. ed., Göttingen 1970, 39. 4 K. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Oxfοrd 1974. 5 A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Oxford 1960. See also A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece, London 1972.

Author’s Preface | XI

This book is based on my contribution on rhetoric in the 4th century BC to the 2nd volume of Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike, edited by B. Zimmermann and A. Rengakos for the series Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft (VII,2, ed. C.H. Beck, Μunich 2014). With such a starting point, I was faced with a dilemma: should this monograph include the rhetoric of the 5th century, particularly Andocides, Antiphon and Lysias, the three orators listed in the canon of the ten Attic orators who, based on the distinction made in the German handbook, were included in the previous period? Although there are no impermeable, strictly demarcated time limits in literature or intellectual and social phenomena, in general, I finally decided not to overreach, but to focus on the rhetoric of the 4th century BC, providing merely an introductory summary of the development of this important genre until that time, making specific note of the logographer Lysias. By following this convention, I believe I was able to further illuminate the subsequent time period, the 4th century BC, which is often overshadowed by the 5th century BC and has been far less explored. Following the recent rare (in terms of classical philology) discovery of fragments of the “New Hyperides” through the Archimedes Palimpsest, I was presented with the proposition and challenge of dedicating myself more than usual to the “minor” Attic orators of the 4th century BC, whose reception in antiquity was pitted against the masters of rhetoric, Isocrates and Demosthenes. For this purpose, various rhetorical passages were added, translated and interpreted, while I increased my focus on the interpretation of values, terms and concepts, a research area that has not benefited from systematic attention in scholarship. An effort was made to bring Isocrates, that last great sophist of the Classical era, a “rival” of Plato and a major theoretician of 4th-century rhetoric, to the forefront of the theoretical discussion of rhetoric. At this point, I would like to express my gratitude to Professors A. Rengakos and B. Zimmermann, who entrusted me with tackling 4th-century rhetoric in the German handbook on Ancient Greek literature. Antonios Rengakos made interesting observations and, with his characteristic directness and vigour, repeatedly provided me with printed and electronic aids. I would also like to warmly thank Bernhard Zimmermann for his willingness to author a prologue to this book. I must also thank my colleagues Kostas Apostolakis, Maria Vasiloudi, and Aggelos Kapellos, who willingly complemented gaps in my bibliography. The hospitable environment of the Library of the Department of Classics in Thessaloniki, as well as the well-endowed Libraries in Saarbrücken and Freiburg (Germany) contributed in various ways in the completion of this work. I would like to reiterate my gratitude to the Library of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens; thanks to its high standards and specifications, my need to resort to libraries abroad is always diminished. I also owe the warmest thanks to my friend and colleague Vassiliki Papathanasiou, who stood at my side throughout the duration of this endeavour, to Daniel Webber, who undertook the arduous task of translating this text into English, to the De

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Gruyter publishing house for its willingness to publish this book, and to my numerous colleagues and friends for their invaluable observations and exhortation to proceed with the English-language edition of my monograph. Finally, I must thank my wife and children, for tolerating me all these years; deep in thoughts and with my nose buried in books, I find myself unable to record anything worthy of their love on paper. They are the ones I love the most, they know me and I know them. A few years ago, my beloved father Vassilios Alexiou passed away (1933– 2016). He was a wonderful man, with genuine warmth and a remarkably positive attitude towards life. All I have achieved to this day, I owe to him. This book is dedicated to his memory and to that of my mother, Eleni Alexiou (1935–1993). Lastly, I would also like to dedicate this book to Maro Kavafaki; in recent years, acting with maternal affection, she has found the way to bring my internal world to the surface, to appease and soothe me, ceaselessly reminding me of my mission as a philologist. I would like to end this preface with the hope that my study might contribute to what I call “dialectical humanism” in classical philology – that is, to the modern understanding of classics and the need to better comprehend the present through the past, far removed as such from sterile philological historicism as idealisation of antiquity. I find Nietzsche’s eloquent turn of phrase in his heretical essay Wir Philologen inspiring and appropriate (transl. J.M. Kennedy): Philology as the science of antiquity does not, of course, endure for ever; its elements are not inexhaustible. What cannot be exhausted, however, is the ever-new adaptation of one’s age to antiquity; the comparison of the two. If we make it our task to understand our own age better by means of antiquity, then our task will be an everlasting one.

Thessaloniki, November 2019 Evangelos Alexiou

Contents Prologue |VII Author’s Preface | IX 1  1.1  1.2  1.2.1  1.3  1.3.1  1.3.2 

The Development of Rhetoric | 1  The Origins of Rhetoric and the “Mirror Effect” | 1  Rhetoric and Democracy: Judicial - Deliberative speeches | 8  Lysias’ For Mantitheus (16) | 11  Epideictic Speeches | 17  The Rhetorical Encomium: Gorgias - Isocrates | 17  The Funeral Speeches | 21 

2  2.1  2.2 

Theoretical Debate concerning Rhetoric | 26  Plato - Isocrates | 26  Alcidamas - Isocrates | 43 

3  3.1  3.2  3.2.1 

Rhetorical Handbooks | 53  Rhetoric to Alexander or Anaximenes’ Ars Rhetorica | 53  Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric | 59  The Isocratean Quotations | 73 

4  The Canon of Attic Orators and Other Orators | 79  4.1  The Necessary Conventions | 79  4.2  Non-Canonical Orators | 83  4.2.1  Apollodorus | 84  4.2.1.1  Against Neaera (59) | 85  4.2.2  Hegesippus | 89  4.2.3  Demades | 91  5  Isocrates | 96  5.1  Life | 96  5.2  Work | 100  5.2.1  Research Trends and the Isocratean Ideology | 100  5.2.2  The Speeches | 105  5.2.2.1  On the Team of Horses (16) | 105  5.2.2.2  Helen (10) - Busiris (11) | 110  5.2.2.3  Evagoras (9) | 114  5.2.2.4  Against the Sophists (13) | 121  5.2.2.5  Antidosis (15) | 122  5.2.2.6  Panegyricus (4) | 129 

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5.2.2.7  5.2.2.8  5.2.2.9  5.3  5.4 

Areopagiticus (7) - On the peace (8) | 133  To Philip (5) | 137  Panathenaicus (12) | 142  Style | 145  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 152 

6  Demosthenes | 159  6.1  Life | 159  6.2  Work | 165  6.2.1  Research Τrends and the Ιssue of Αuthenticity | 165  6.2.2  The Speeches | 167  6.2.2.1  Against Aphobus 1 (27) | 168  6.2.2.2  Against Conon (54) | 169  6.2.2.3  For Phormion (36) | 171  6.2.2.4  Against Leptines (20) - Against Androtion (22) - Against Timocrates (24) | 172  6.2.2.5  Against Aristocrates (23) | 175  6.2.2.6  Against Meidias (21) | 178  6.2.2.7  On the Symmories (14) | 181  6.2.2.8  For the Megalopolitans (16) - On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15) | 183  6.2.2.9  Philippics (4, 6, 9, 10) - Olynthiacs (1, 2, 3) - On the Chersonese (8) | 184  6.2.2.10  On the False Embassy (19) | 193  6.2.2.11  Funeral Speech (60) | 195  6.2.2.12  On the Crown (18) | 197  6.3  Style | 200  6.4  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 205  7  7.1  7.2  7.2.1  7.2.2  7.2.3  7.3  7.4 

Aeschines | 212  Life | 212  The Speeches | 215  Against Timarchus (1) | 216  On the False Embassy (2) | 221  Against Ctesiphon (3) | 224  Style | 229  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 232 

8  8.1  8.2  8.2.1 

Isaeus | 235  Life | 235  Work | 236  Contract Οratory | 236 

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8.2.2  8.2.2.1  8.3  8.4 

The Speeches | 238  On the Estate of Cleonymus (1) - On the Estate of Menecles (2) - On the Estate of Ciron (8) - On the Estate of Hagnias (11) | 239  Style | 242  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 244 

9 Lycurgus | 246  9.1  Life | 246  9.2  Work | 247  9.2.1  The Relentless Prosecutor | 247  9.2.2  The Speeches | 248  9.2.2.1  Against Lysicles - Against Autolycus | 249  9.2.2.2  Against Leocrates | 249  9.3  Style | 254  9.4  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 256  10 Hyperides | 258  10.1  Life | 258  10.2  The Speeches | 261  For Euxenippus | 262  10.2.1  For Lycophron | 264  10.2.2  10.2.3  Against Athenogenes | 265  10.2.4  The New Hyperides: Against Diondas | 267  10.2.5  Against Demosthenes | 269  10.2.6  The Funeral Speech and Hyperides’ Innovations | 270  10.3  Style | 274  10.4  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 277  11 Dinarchus | 280  11.1  Life | 280  11.2  The Speeches | 281  11.2.1  Against Demosthenes (1) | 283  11.2.2  Against Aristogeiton (2) | 285  11.2.3  Against Philocles (3) | 286  11.3  Style | 287  11.4  Transmission of the Text - Reception | 289  12

Summary - Conclusions | 292

Bibliography | 311 General Index | 341 

1 The Development of Rhetoric 1.1 The Origins of Rhetoric and the “Mirror Effect” I should begin this study with an apt statement by M. Gagarin (2007, 9): “Oratory lies at the heart of Greek culture from its beginning”. Rhetoric is one of the key aspects of Greek culture, and skilled orators appear throughout every period of Ancient Greek literature.1 References are already found in the Homeric era to natural eloquence, the impression this caused on the audience, as well as the social recognition of those who handled the spoken word well. The natural gift of speaking well was considered a virtue. In the Iliad, the phrase uttered by Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων (10.443), reflects the ancient ideal of being skilled in both words and deeds. The silver-tongued Nestor, with words sweeter than honey (1.248–249), and the comparison between the rhetorical ability of Menelaus and Odysseus (3.212–214), with the former appearing as a man of few words in contrast to the verbose Odysseus, with words like snowflakes, are characteristic examples. The three speeches addressed to Achilles in order to convince him to return to battle are considered examples of rhetorical eloquence (10.225 ff.).2 In Hesiod, the deity Peitho is the daughter of Ocean (Theog. 349; cf. Op. 73); furthermore, in the beginning of the Theogony, the gift of speaking well is described as a wonderful gift of the Muses (81– 84).3 The turning point in the development of rhetoric is the transition from natural talent to a systematic art, consisting of theory and practice, teaching and cultivation

|| 1 See C. Carey, Observers of Speeches and Hearers of Action. The Athenian Orators, in: O. Taplin (ed.), Literature in the Greek and Roman Worlds. A New Perspective, Oxford 2000, 192–216. Cf. M. Erler/ C. Tornau, Einleitung: Was ist antike Rhetorik, in: Erler/Tornau (2019) 1–16. 2 Cf. Kennedy (1994) 13–14; J.E. Hessler, Rede und die Entwicklung der Redekunst vor den Sophisten, in: Erler/Tornau (2019) 17–53, esp. 21ff. For a lively scientific debate concerning the relationship between Homer and rhetoric, cf. G.A. Kennedy, The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer, AJPh 78 (1957) 23–35; A.J. Karp, Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric, Arethusa 10 (1977) 237–258; P. Toohey, Epic and Rhetoric, in: Worthington (1994) 153–175; N.P. Bezantakos, Η ρητoρική της oμηρικής μάχης, Athens 1996, 25–33. See also M. Gagarin, Background and Origins. Oratory and Rhetoric before the Sophists, in: Worthington (2007) 27–36; H.M. Roisman, Right Rhetoric in Homer, in: Worthington (2007) 429–446; S. Dentice Di Accadia Ammone, Omero e i suoi oratori. Techniche di Persuasione nell’Iliade, Berlin/Boston 2012. 3 Cf. R.G.A. Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy. A Study of Peitho, Cambridge 1982, 36–48; F. Solmsen, The Gift of Speech in Homer and Hesiod, TAPhA 85 (1984) 1–15; J. Kirby, Rhetoric and Poetics in Hesiod, Ramus 21 (1992) 34–60; E. Stafford, Worshipping Virtues. Personification and the Divine in Ancient Greece, London 2000, 111–145; J. Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Oxford 2000, 4–7; B. Breitenberger, Aphrodite and Eros. The Development of Erotic Mythology in Early Greek Poetry and Cult, New York/London 2007, 117–135; J. Strauss Clay, Hesiod’s Rhetorical Art, in: Worthington (2007) 447–457. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-001

2 | The Development of Rhetoric

of rhetorical techniques and methods. There are no scientifically documented dates due to a paucity of testimonies. The terminus technicus technē rhētorikē is first encountered in Plato (Gorg. 449c; Phaedr. 260c).4 Should one, due to this fact, seriously object to the early categorisation of rhetoric as an art, as expressed by T. Cole (1991) and E. Schiappa (1999),5 and attribute the “independence” of rhetoric to Plato and Aristotle for succeeding in distinguishing it from other cognitive areas? Furthermore, is modern scholarship legitimately entitled to diametrically opposed extreme views, where, on one hand, rhetoric existed as an art long before the authoring of rhetorical handbooks6 and, on the other that it had not achieved independence even in the age of Plato, but was still in rather a twilight stage?7 This is precarious ground, allowing for a number of conjectures, but the fact that technē rhētorikē is not encountered as a terminus technicus prior to Plato does not mean it was discovered by Plato. Contradictory ancient testimonies on the views of Aristotle name Empedocles of Acragas8 and the Sicelians Corax and Tisias9 as the inventors of rhetoric. Although Empedocles must have been a formidable orator, his role was aggrandized in antiquity as he was Gorgias’ teacher and it was only natural that this new art be attributed to him. His poetical and philosophical style gave credence to the effort to identify the potential philosophical origins of rhetoric.10 However, the Syracusan Corax and his pupil Tisias (likely the same person) are alleged to have authored the first handbook of rhetoric.11 Precisely what this handbook contained is not certain; in all likelihood,

|| 4 Cf. M. Erler, Platon, in: H. Flashar (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike, II,2, Basel 2007, 498. Cf. E. Schiappa, Did Plato coin rhetorike, AJPh 111 (1990) 457–470; N. O’Sullivan, Plato and the kaloumene rhetorike, Mnemosyne 46 (1993) 87–89 (response by Schiappa in: Mnemosyne 47, 1994, 512–514); G.J. Pendrick, Plato and rhetorike, RhM 141 (1998) 10–23; Pernot (2000) 38–41. See also R. Mariss, Alkidamas. Über diejenigen, die schriftliche Reden schreiben, oder über die Sophisten. Eine Sophistenrede aus dem 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Eingeleitet und kommentiert, Münster 2002, 96 ff. 5 See, however, the diverging views of E. Schiappa, Afterword: Persistent Questions in the Historiography of Early Greek Rhetorical Theory, in: R. Reames (ed.), Logos without Rhetoric. The Arts of Language before Plato, Columbia SC 2017, 133–142; E. Schiappa, The Development of Greek Rhetoric, in: MacDonald (2017) 33–42, esp. 34. Against the early categorisation of rhetoric as art, see A. Ford, Sophists without Rhetoric. The Arts of Speech in Fifth-Century Athens, in: Y.L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, Leiden 2001, 85–109. For more recent interpretations regarding ancient rhetoric, cf. Gagarin (1994) 46–68; Halliwell (1994) 222–243; Kennedy (1994) 7 note 3; Wardy (1996) and for a summary view Poulakos (2007) 16–24. 6 J. Fredal, Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens. Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes, Carbondale 2006; R.A. Knudsen, Homeric Speech and the Origins of Rhetoric, Baltimore 2014. 7 Liebersohn (2011) 22. 8 Diog. Laert. 8.57; 9.25; Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. 7.6. 9 Cic. Brut. 46; cf. Quint. Inst. or. 3.1.8. 10 Cf. Rapp (2002) I 208. 11 See Plato Phaedr. 273c; Arist. Rhet. 1402a 18; Soph. el. 183b 31; Cic. Brut. 46; Kennedy (1963) 58– 61; Eisenhut (1990) 11–12; Usher (1999) 3. As regards the likelihood of these two individuals being the

The Origins of Rhetoric and the “Mirror Effect” | 3

this was not a systematic handbook such as those of the 4th century, but mainly models of speeches in various judicial cases. This is by no means odd, given that the fall of monarchy in Syracuse and the establishment of democracy in 467 BC were accompanied by several trials where the importance of the new art began emerging.12 Interest is primarily focused on teaching the eikos (“that which is reasonable or likely”). However, the attachment to the central role played by ek tou eikotos arguments in early rhetoric dictates a cautious approach, as our information mainly stems from opponents of rhetoric, such as Plato.13 Interest in such arguments is unquestionable, but their importance was inflated by opponents of rhetoric in order to support the criticism that orators were exclusively concerned with what was likely and not necessarily with what was true. Plato provides us with a typical example of the technique of teaching that which is likely in relation to early Sicilian rhetoric (Phaedrus 273b-c; cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a 17–20): The case is as follows: a feeble (asthenēs) yet brave (andrikos) man assaulted a strong (ischyros) yet cowardly (deilos) man and robbed him. Both appear in court. Neither must speak the truth. On the one hand, the coward must prove that the brave man had accomplices, so as not to admit his cowardice, while on the other the brave man must refuse this and assert that, being feeble, he could not have committed the offence. In this example, the parties in the case are presenting arguments not on the basis of actuality but on the basis of the “likelihood” of one version of events or another.14 This is where one might find the roots of sophistic argumentation for which orators often gave the impression of lacking in integrity. The tradition around the court dispute between Corax and Tisias concerning the non-payment of the teacher by the pupil, which led to the expulsion of both parties from the court, strengthens this very contention.15

However, the fact that rhetoric and its origins were at the centre of theoretical discussions in the 4th century BC, in contrast to the silence of the past, acquires particular value: irrespective of whether or not the various assertions concerning the origins of rhetoric are correct, they bear indisputable witness to the importance placed by intellectuals – both sophists and philosophers – on rhetorical theory and practice in the 4th century BC. This century cannot be considered the originator of the rhetorical art, but does serve as its main field of action: it contributed so decisively to its growth that the art of speaking achieved a remarkable triumph, especially during this period and

|| same person, see T. Cole, Who was Corax?, ICS 16 (1991) 65–84 (= Carawan 2007, 37–59); Kennedy (1994) 34. 12 See Kennedy (1963) 58–61; Eisenhut (1990) 11–12; Usher (1999) 3. See also E. Robinson, Democracy in Syracuse, 466–412, HSCP 100 (2000) 189–205. Cf. the objections by Schiappa (1999) 34–45. 13 See Gagarin (1994) 46–68. Cf. E.A. Gondos, Auf dem Weg zur rhetorischen Theorie. Rhetorische Reflexion im ausgehenden fünften Jahrhundert v. Chr., Tübingen 1996, 85–88. 14 Cf. Gagarin (1994) 50–52. 15 Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. 2.96–99; Sopater Ad Hermog. 5.6–7 Walz.

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despite philosophical criticism. In short, the 4th century is permeated by rhetoric both as a form of political and judicial dispute and as a key literary genre.16 This context also includes an important function of rhetorical texts, which I define as the “mirror effect” of Athenian society.17 This means that rhetoric, as a psychagogic art, i.e. the art of “leading the souls through speech”, has a tremendous effect on listeners and also redefines itself, reflecting and reverberating the “soul” of the public to the point where it is often difficult to tell apart the orator and the audience.18  Orators exist through their audience, and rhetorical texts depict the relationship between orator and audience. Gorgias gained renown for the meticulous aesthetics of his speech and his stirring of passions. The sophist stresses the psychological, wholly passionate effect of speech, both poetic and prosaic, on listeners in his Encomium of Helen (82 Β11.9; 11.14 D.-K.).19 Additionally, Plato, who was opposed to his contemporaneous sophistical rhetoric and only accepted philosophical rhetoric based on logic and scientific knowledge, defines rhetoric, under the effect of the Gorgianic psychagogic power of speech, as the art of “leading the souls through speech” (Phaedrus 261a: ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων; cf. 271c).20 Aristotle, too, subjected the psychology of passions and emotions to strictly scientific analysis (Rhetoric 1378a 19 ff.) and insisted on their categorisation using scientific criteria. Stirring passions dominates judicial and deliberative speeches: the judgments of judges and listeners are decisively impacted by shifting passions (cf. Rhetoric 1354b 8–13; 1356a 14–16).21

|| 16 Cf. Görgemanns (1987) 8; K. Wojciech, The Place of Oratory in Fourth-Century Politics and Culture, in: G. Martin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Demosthenes, Oxford 2018, 45–57. 17 See E. Alexiou, Die Spiegelfunktion der isokratischen Rhetorik. Der lakonisierende Schüler und die Pleonexie großen Stils, in: M. Tziatzi et al. (eds.), Lemmata. Beiträge zum Gedenken an Christos Theodoridis, Berlin/Boston 2015, 73–90. Cf. K. Piepenbrink, Public Opinion and the Arenas of Debate, in: G. Martin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Demosthenes, Oxford 2018, 61–71. 18 Cf. P. Harding, Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-Century Athens, Phoenix 41 (1987) 25–39. See also the interesting questions raised in relation to Demosthenes’ oration On the Crown (18) by Yunis (2000) 97–118 (= Carawan 2007, 372–390). Demosthenes’ Against Meidias (21) is, in the view of W. Will, Demosthenes, Darmstadt 2013, 95, a reflection upon morals (Sittenspiegel). 19 82 Β11.14 D.-K.: oὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων oἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, oἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, oἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, oἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσoς κατέστησαν τoὺς ἀκoύoντας, oἱ δὲ πειθoῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγoήτευσαν. Cf. C. Segal, Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos, HSCPh 66 (1962) 99–155; V. Hunter, Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology, Hermes 114 (1986) 412–429; H. Yunis, Writing for Reading. Thucydides, Plato, and the Emergence of the Critical Reader, in: H. Yunis (ed.), Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece, Cambridge 2003, 190–191; Alexiou (2010) 86–87. 20 Cf. Yunis (1996) 201–207; H. Yunis, Plato Phaedrus, Cambridge 2011, 10–14. 21 Cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, 2. ed., London 2002, 9–18, 93–114; Konstan (2006); W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, in: Worthington (2007) 117–118; S. Leighton, Passions and Persuasion, in: G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle, Chichester UK 2009, 597– 611; J. Dow, Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Oxford 2015; D. Konstan, Ancient Views of Emotions, in: A. Chaniotis et al. (eds.), A World of Emotions. Ancient Greece, 700 BC–200 AD, New York 2017, 38–49.

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From this perspective, a close connection between rhetorical texts and everyday morality is vital. Research into popular morality, such as the classic study by K. Dover (1974),22 has helped us better perceive the limits of this non-theoretical morality. A number of passions, such as orgē, eleos, hybris, phthonos, etc. permeate rhetorical texts that focus on political reality.23 Further semantic fields are those of polypragmosynē and pleonexia,24 or, on the contrary, those of sōphrosynē and apragmosynē.25 Moreover, euphemistic phrases appear, which in rhetorical texts almost stereotypically accompany the defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotamoi (405 BC), a decisive event for the outcome of the Peloponnesian War.26 Following the various oligarchic conspiracies of the late 5th century BC, the frequent use of adjectives such as misopolis or misodēmos (“he who hates the polis or the demos”), philopolis or philodēmos (“he who loves the polis or the demos”) supports the view that placing emphasis on virtues and categorically condemning vices was considered a basic component of political life. W.R. Connor (1971, 106) is justified in maintaining that “these developments of language mark the emergence of a new hierarchy of values in the Greek city, one that emphasizes civic virtues and devotion to the well-being of the whole city”.27

|| 22 Cf. J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, London 1958; L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, Stanford 1962; W. den Boer, Private Morality in Greece and Rome. Some Historical Aspects, Leiden 1979; G. Herman, Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens, Cambridge 2006; Bers (2009) 77–98. 23 Cf. Allen (2000) esp. ch. 7 and 8; D. Konstan/N.K. Rutter (eds.), Envy, Spite and Jealousy. The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, Edinburgh 2003; D. Konstan, Rhetoric and Emotion, in: Worthington (2007) 411–425; P.W. Ludwig, Anger, Eros, and Other Political Passions in Ancient Greek Thought, in: R.K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Chichester UK/Malden MA 2009, 294–307; E. Sanders, Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens. A Socio-Psychological Approach, Oxford 2014, esp. 79–99; E. Sanders, Persuasion through Emotions in Athenian Deliberative Oratory, in: E. Sanders/M. Johncock (eds.), Emotion and Persuasion in Antiquity, Stuttgart 2016, 57–73; E.M. Harris, How to “Act” in an Athenian Court. Emotions and Forensic Performance, in: S. Papaioannou et al. (eds.), The Theatre of Justice. Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric, Leiden/Boston 2017, 223–242; Spatharas (2019). 24 See Balot (2001); Roisman (2005) 130–162. 25 See H. North, Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca NY 1966; Dover (1974) 66–69; L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian, Oxford 1986; A. Rademaker, Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint. Polysemy & Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Term, Leiden 2005; Roisman (2005) 176–185. 26 Lys. 2.58; 12.43; 16.4; 21.9; Isocr. 4.119; 7.64; 12.99; Demosth. 23.212; See E. Lévy, Athènes devant la défaite de 404. Histoire d’une crise idéologique, Paris 1976, 40–42; Todd (2007) 468. Cf. Wolpert (2002); Clarke (2008); Steinbock (2013); A. Kapellos, Xenophon and the Execution of the Athenian Captives at Aegospotami, Mnemosyne 66 (2013) 465–468; A. Kapellos, Lysias 21. A Commentary, Berlin/Boston 2014, 98–99; A. Kapellos, Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War, Berlin/Boston 2019, 217–254. 27 Cf. also B.L. Cook, Athenian Terms of Civic Praise in the 330s. Aeschines vs. Demosthenes, GRBS 49 (2009) 31–52. See also J. Roisman, The Rhetoric of Social and Political Values, in: G. Martin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Demosthenes, Oxford 2018, 233–245.

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Additionally, the vocabulary of orators, such as Isocrates, is less removed from everyday language than that of Plato and Aristotle. The adjectives misodēmos (“he who hates the demos”), misanthrōpos (“he who hates people, particularly human communication”) and hyperēphanos (“arrogant, insolent”) are negatively assessed as anti-democratic characterisations (Isocr. 15.131). Oligarchikos and misodēmos are used together ([Andoc.] 4.16), as are ponēros, adikos and misodēmos (Din. 3.22) or misodēmos and misathēnaios (Lycurg. Leocr. 39). Demosthenes (45.68) gives an example of misanthrōpia as the behaviour of a man walking along a wall with a sullen face to whom no one speaks (cf. the misanthrōpia of a law in Demosth. 18.112). How strongly hyperēphania leads to arrogance is indicated in Demosthenes’ speech Against Meidias (21.198–199): Meidias’ self-importance, which extends not only to his fortunes but also to his rhetorical abilities, makes him insufferable to others: all others are social outcasts, beggars, not even human (Roisman 2005, 92–94).28 If one considers the importance of approachability for a democratic politician, then misanthrōpia and hyperēphania are undemocratic concepts. On the other hand, philanthrōpia proves the extent to which conceptual shifts adapt to the political ideals of the city-state. The concept initially denotes the “man-loving ways” of the gods (Aesch. Prom. 11: φιλανθρώπoυ δὲ παύεσθαι τρόπoυ; cf. Aristoph. Peace 392; Plat. Symp. 189c– d). Over time, the concept underwent a process of democratisation: it defines universal human values, which include proximity to society as a whole, within the framework of a civil society. In the 4th century BC, it became an eminently democratic virtue: it denotes “friendly, human, democratic behaviour among equals”; the term is found 71 times in the Demosthenic corpus alone.29 Parallels are drawn between the city and a family, and between citizens and relatives ([Demosth.] 25.89: τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε συγγενικῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως). However, its older definition is preserved in monarchic ideology and indicates “amicable condescension by one of higher social class” (Isocr. 2.15: φιλάνθρωπoν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ φιλόπoλιν; 5.114; 5.116; Epist. 5.2; 7.12; cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. 1.4.1; 8.2.1; 8.7.25), and it is with this definition that philanthrōpia is widely used during the Hellenistic era, e.g. Polybius 5.11.6; cf. OGI 90.12; SIG3 456.32. Another characteristic example is philotimia (“ambition”).30 During its historical development, this concept is rarely encountered before the late 5th century BC, yet occurs frequently

|| 28 Cf. J. Ober, Power and Oratory in Democratic Athens. Demosthenes 21, Against Meidias, in: Worthington (1994) 85–108 (= E.W. Robinson [ed.], Ancient Greek Democracy. Readings and Sources, Malden MA/Oxford 2004, 232–247). 29 Cf. M.R. Christ, Demosthenes on Philanthropia as a Democratic Value, CPh 108 (2013) 202–222. On philanthrōpia, see S. Tromp de Ruiter, De vocis quae est φιλανθρωπία significatione atque usu, Mnemosyne 59 (1932) 271–306; Dover (1974) 200–205; O. Hiltbrunner, Humanitas (φιλανθρωπία), RAC 16 (1994) 711–752; M. Sulek, On the Classical Meaning of Philanthropia, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 39 (2010) 385–408; J. Holton, Philanthropia, Athens, and Democracy in Diodorus Siculus, in: M. Canevaro/B. Gray (eds.), The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought, Oxford 2018, 177–207. 30 On philotimia, see E. Alexiou, Ruhm und Ehre. Studien zu Begriffen, Werten und Motivierungen bei Isokrates, Heidelberg 1995, 47–49; Alexiou (2010) 68–69; (2013) 47–73; E. Alexiou, Competitive Values in Isocrates and Xenophon. Aspects of Philotimia, in: M. Tamiolaki (ed.), Special Issue. Xenophon and Isocrates. Political Affinities and Literary Interactions, Berlin 2018, 114–133. Cf. J. de Romilly, Les Phéniciennes d’Euripide ou l’actualité dans la tragédie grecque, RPh 39 (1965) 28–47, esp. 35 ff.; Dover (1974) 229–234; D.M. MacDowell, Demosthenes Against Meidias (Oration 21), Oxford 1990, 378–379; P. Wilson, The Athenian Institution of Choregia. The Chorus, the City and the Stage,

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during the 4th century BC. It primarily denotes one’s motive for accolades, excellence, glory. Aristotle is faced with difficulty in incorporating it in his doctrine of the mean (Eth. Nic. 1107b 27–34), because the word has at times a positive and at times a negative connotation in everyday language. The sophists also examined the concept theoretically, as concluded from Protagoras’ Peri philotimias (80 B8c D.-K. = Diog. Laert. 9.55). The term is first encountered in Pindar, used in a political context and bearing a negative connotation: ἄγαν φιλoτιμίαν μνώμενoι ἐν πόλεσιν ἄνδρες· / ἱστᾶσιν ἄλγoς ἐμφανές (Plut. De coh. ira 457Β = fr. 210 Snell/Maehler: “(But worst of all are) men who in the cities too eager for ambition, they cause manifest grief”31). Its negative connotation in the late 5th century BC is linked to the rise of personal ambitions to the detriment of the city. In Euripides, Philotimia as a personified deity is characterised as the worst of deities (Phoen. 531: κακίστη δαιμόνων). Thucydides links it to the poor politics of Pericles’ successors in Athens (2.65.7: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλoτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη) and to pleonexia in the civil dispute that occurred in Korkyra (3.82.8: διὰ πλεoνεξίαν καὶ φιλoτιμίαν). On the other hand, Thucydides uses it with a positive connotation when stating that “the love of honour alone is untouched by age” (2.44.4: φιλότιμoν ἀγήρων μόνoν), while Xenophon contends that philotimia is the noble motivation to perform deeds of honour and renown (Mem. 3.3.13). In Hieron 7.3, philotimia distinguishes humans from animals, and men in particular. Demosthenes declares his generosity in liturgies (18.257): in this instance, the concept is used metonymically, indicating the action that serves the pursuit of honour (cf. 19.339; 20.82; 22.73; 45.66; 60.3). Aeschines speaks of the concept of “spurious honour” (3.45: ψευδοῦς φιλοτιμίας; cf. 3.23; Demosth. 8.71). In Isocrates, the concept, along with rage and envy, is characteristic of Homeric heroes and expresses individual competitive values (12.81). The competitive element can be discerned in Evagoras (9.3), where philotimos is linked to megalopsychos, almost as a hendiadys. The new, positive connotation of the concept during the 4th century is encountered in Τo Philip (5.110): as part of a trifecta of values, philotimia is placed alongside primarily intellectual-moral virtues, such as phronēsis and dikaiosynē (καὶ τῇ φρoνήσει καὶ τῇ φιλoτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ δικαιoσύνῃ). Isocrates treats it as a virtue and this evolution is documented by honorary inscriptions from the mid-4th century BC, expressing the desire of the city to incorporate ambition in a set of cooperative values, so that it is not spent on personal interest but channelled towards social contribution; IG IΙ31, 338.13–14: καλῶς καὶ φιλoτίμως; IΙ31, 416.20–21.32

|| Cambridge 2000, 144–197; Balot (2001) 160 ff., 210 ff.; Liddel (2007) 165 ff.; J. Roisman, Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest, in: Worthington (2007) 402–405. 31 Transl. W.H. Race, Pindar II. Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments, Cambridge MA/London 1997. 32 Cf. D. Whitehead, Competitive Outlay and Community Profit. Φιλoτιμία in Democratic Athens, C&M 34 (1983) 55–74; D. Whitehead, Cardinal Virtues. The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens, C&M 44 (1993) 65–75; Veligianni-Terzi (1997) 211–212, 272–278, 293–306; C. VeligianniTerzi, Φιλοτιμία, in: A.-F. Christidis (ed.), A History of Ancient Greek. From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity, Cambridge 2007, 1130–1136.

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1.2 Rhetoric and Democracy: Judicial - Deliberative speeches For democracy, rhetoric served as an “elixir of life” since its inception.33 Through rhetoric, the concept of isēgoria became a reality and orators were established as an integral component of direct democracy.34 Although Athens was not the only Greek city with democratic institutions, this is where the rhetorical art flourished.35 Democratic Athens placed the power of speech at the centre of all political and judicial decisions, with significant consequences: the desire of politically active citizens to be convincing before the Athenian Assembly and the courts signals the key role played by rhetoric in democratic procedures. The teaching of rhetoric is vital for preparing Athenian citizens to actively participate in public affairs,36 and this is the vocation of the sophist Protagoras as a central point of the technē politikē (Plato Protagoras 318e–319a: τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν oἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτoῦ oἰκίαν διoικoῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατoς ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. “What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters ‒ how best to manage one’s household, and in public affairs ‒ how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in political debate and action”. Transl. S. Lombardo/K. Bell in: Cooper 1997). The combination of words and actions is the foremost skill of the kalos kagathos and the ultimate objective of education.37 Following the end of the Peloponnesian War and the collapse of Athens in 404 BC, political life was in turmoil. New political forces, visions of statehood and monarchs on the periphery of the Greek world were instrumental for the ambiguity of the 4th century BC in terms of internal and foreign policy;38 it was this century which, through traditional ties with the political ideology of the city-state and through its own trailblazing dynamism, gave new impetus to the growth and role of rhetoric. Isocrates’ political-deliberative speeches Panegyricus (4; 380 BC) and To Philip (5; 346 BC) focus on the political ideal that the orator tenaciously pursued for over 50 years:

|| 33 Bleicken (1995) 461. 34 Hasskamp (2005) 25. Cf. Sinclair (1988); Ober (1989). See also R.K. Balot, Free Speech, Courage, and Democratic Deliberation, in: I. Sluiter/R.M. Rosen (eds.), Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/Boston 2004, 233–259; E.M. Harris, Rhetoric and Politics, in: MacDonald (2017) 53–62. 35 See Ε.W. Robinson, Democracy beyond Athens. Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age, Cambridge 2011; H. Yunis, Political Uses of Rhetoric in Democratic Athens, in: J.P. Arnason et al. (eds.), The Greek Polis and the Invention of Democracy. A Politico-Cultural Transformation and its Interpretations, Chichester UK 2013, 144–162. 36 For the political dimension of rhetoric, see Rapp (2002) I 197–204. 37 Cf. Plat. Prot. 326b; Phaedr. 273e; [Alcib. 2] 140e; Isocr. 15.191; 15.266; 5.13; Epist. 3.2; 9.8; Lys. 16.21; [Andoc.] 4.37; Demosth. 21.190; [26.8]; Xen. Mem. 1.2.15; 4.2.1; 4.2.4. 38 Welwei (1999) 258 ff.; Hornblower (2002) 197 ff.; Buckler 2003; Welwei (2011) 325 ff.; Worthington (2014).

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concord amongst Greeks and war against the Persians.39 However, at the same time as Athens in the first speech and Philip II of Macedon in the second embody the hopes of Isocrates for the realisation of the Pan-Hellenic ideal, Demosthenes, on the other side, unleashed his rhetorical genius in the political arena, in the Assembly and as a diplomat, envisioning the revival of the Athenian past of the 5th century BC, with political engagement against the superpower of Macedon.40 Although political parties with registered members, in the contemporary meaning of the term, did not exist in antiquity, in recent years there has been a proliferation of a specific view in scholarship: that a form of political or ideological collaboration took place among the top politicians-orators of the era, e.g. among the anti-Macedonians Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, and was reflected in their rhetorical speeches.41 The fall of the Thirty and the restoration of Athenian democracy (403 BC) was accompanied by several trials, where the role of logographers, professionals who authored judicial speeches for a fee, was confirmed.42 Judicial rhetoric, either in private or in public political life (dikē: private suit, graphē: public suit) – surprised as modern scholarship may be at the wealth of extant judicial speeches – is a defining aspect of the rhetorical art of the 4th century BC,43 from its inception until the final orator of the canon of the ten Attic orators, Dinarchus. It should be stressed that under Attic law, there was no concept of absolutely private space and life, and private conduct could always stir public interest. At times, public figures were pilloried in court. Aeschines’ speech Against Timarchus (1) is a classic case of conversion of the personal into the public and political.44

|| 39 G. Dobesch, Der panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v. Chr. und der Philippos des Isokrates. Untersuchungen zum korinthischen Bund, I, Vienna 1968; M. Weissenberger, Isokrates und der Plan eines panhellenischen Perserkrieges, in: Orth (2003) 108–110; F. Pownall, The Panhellenism of Isocrates, in: W. Heckel et al. (eds.), Alexander’s Empire. Formulation to Decay, Claremont CA 2007, 13–25; T.L. Papillon, Unity, Dissociation, and Schismogenesis in Isocrates, in: R. Reames (ed.), Logos without Rhetoric. The Arts of Language before Plato, Columbia SC 2017, 11–18. 40 See Sealey (1993); Worthington (2013). On deliberative oratory, see Usher (2007) 220–235. 41 See E.M. Burke, Contra Leocratem and De corona. Political Collaboration?, Phoenix 31 (1977) 330– 340; L. Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation. Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens, Stuttgart 2000, 224 note 89; J. Herrman, Hyperides’ Against Diondas and the Rhetoric of Revolt, BICS 52 (2009) 175–185; S.C. Todd, Hypereides against Diondas, Demosthenes on the Crown, and the Rhetoric of the Political Failure, BICS 52 (2009) 161–174; L. Horváth, Der Neue Hypereides. Textedition, Studien und Erläuterungen, Berlin 2014, 165–176. 42 See M. Lavency, Aspects de la logographie judiciere attique, Leuven 1964. Cf. Todd (1993). For rhetoric and the law, see Johnstone (1999); Harris/Rubinstein (2004); E. Volonaki, Creating Responsibility. Assigning Blame for the Thirty, in: Edwards/Reid (2004) 33–51; Lanni (2006); Cooper (2007) 203–219; Sickinger (2007) 286–302; Bers (2009); Wohl (2010). 43 See M. Gagarin, Rhetoric and Law, in: MacDonald (2017) 45: “The art of logography reached its peak”. 44 Cf. Liddell (2007) 154–155, 213–214; Carey (2014) 37; Efstathiou (2014) 237 ff.

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At the same time, a negative attitude grew towards the vocation of logographer.45 Due to financial hardship, Isocrates was initially forced to practice this vocation, but without feeling particularly proud of this fact. In his work, he endeavours to elaborately conceal this fact (see 15.45–50). Aeschines uses the word logographos as an insult against Demosthenes (1.94; 2.180; cf. 2.165). Two vital issues emerge: whether some form of collaboration between the logographer and the litigant was required (Dover 1968) or whether the logographer wrote the speeches himself (Usher 1976). Although a degree of collaboration is to be expected when tackling the issue, it is most likely that the logographer wrote the speech on his own and the litigant delivered it.46 The second concern regarding the character of the Athenian legal system, democratic ideology and the role of rhetoric is more ideologically charged. Were legal proceedings dominated by competitive and violent values (Cohen 1995; Christ 1998, 160 ff.; cf. Christ 2006; 2012, particularly chapter 3), or did the cooperative values of clemency and prudence play the leading part (Herman 2006, 155 ff.)?47 The answer to this question has similar elements to the classic distinction made by Α.W.H. Adkins between cooperative and competitive values, as regards the stratification of Greek values over time from Homer until the classical era.48 Such overly formal distinctions cannot define a society as a whole; they are always present to a lesser or greater extent,49 but serve as a broad field of reference al-

|| 45 Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 257c; Demosth. 19.246; 19.250; Hyper. In Athen. c. 2(3); Din. 1.111. See also Dover (1968) 155–156; Hansen (1999) 194; Hesk (2000) 216–217; Whitehead (2000) 286–287. 46 Cf. MacDowell (2009) 3–4, who refers to Theophr. Char. 17.8; Cic. De or. 1.231 and Plut. De garrul. 504C. See also Todd (1990) 165–166; Worthington (1993) 67–72. 47 Cf. Liddel (2007), as well as the criticism of M.R. Christ (BMCR 2008.03.44). For the criticism of Christ against G. Herman see BMCR 2007.07.37, as well as Herman’s response (BMCR 2007.09.21). For different approaches, see also G. Herman, How Violent Was Athenian Society?, in: R. Osborne/ S. Hornblower (eds.), Ritual, Finance, Politics. Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis, Oxford 1994, 99–117; G. Herman, Honour, Revenge and the State in Fourth-Century Athens, in: W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform?, Stuttgart 1995, 43–60; Lanni (2006), esp. 27–31; M.R. Christ, Helping and Community in the Athenian Lawcourts, in: R.M. Rosen/I. Sluiter (eds.), Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/Boston 2010, 205–232. 48 Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Oxford 1960. Thus, Homeric society functions according to the aristocratic code of ethics and is dominated by competitive values, such as honour and the desire for distinction and excellence. On the contrary, cooperative values such as justice and prudence play a secondary role, gradually surfacing with the emergence of the city-state, but without competitive values ever losing their potency. Cf. also A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece, London 1972. 49 See D.L. Cairns, Aidos. The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, Oxford 1993; B. Williams, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley 1993; C. Gill, Greek Thought, Oxford 1995, 20–27; D.L. Cairns, Values, in: J. Gregory (ed.), A Companion to Greek Tragedy, Oxford 2005, 305–320.

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lowing one to understand the synthesis between a moral subject and external influences in ancient Greek thought, whether this concerns individual personalities or city-states, which are considered as individual entities. Certain speeches, such as Demosthenes’ Against Conon (54), appear to support both possibilities (Wohl 2010, 71 ff.). On the other hand, judicial disputes that concerned public cases served as an important weapon in the struggle for political advancement. Procedures initiated against unlawful decrees (graphai paranomōn) enabled the revision of decisions and the neutralisation of political opponents.50

1.2.1 Lysias’ For Mantitheus (16) In the framework of this book and for the reasons set out in the preface, I will not focus comprehensively on the orator Lysias,51 save some specific remarks: in Plato’s Phaedrus, the references to the logographer (228a; 258d; 278c) clearly demonstrate his literary reputation; Lysias is “the most prolific and successful speechwriter before Demosthenes” (Usher 1999, 54). The recognition of his oratory skill – well-established even in antiquity – is mainly based on two virtues: his sparse, graceful style and the profiling of speakers, the renowned concept of ēthopoiia.52 This served primarily rhetorical purposes. It is not the language that changes. It is the general spirit of his speaking, his style, which reflects the speaker’s personality in such a manner that even negative elements do not draw him as disagreeable; in other words, Lysias perfectly adapts his speeches to the character of the individuals delivering them. Dionysius of Halicarnassus cannot find a single person without personality and vivacity in Lysias’ speeches (Lys. 8, p. 15 Us.-Rad.: ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν εὑρεῖν δύναμαι παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι τούτῳ πρόσωπον οὔτε ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον). Certain aspects of Lysias’

|| 50 See Wolff (1970); Hansen (1974); Yunis (1988) 361–382; Sundahl (2003) 127–156; Hasskamp (2005) 131 ff.; M. Gagarin, Law, Politics, and the Question of Relevance in the Case On the Crown, ClAnt 31 (2012) 293–314; K. Kapparis, Athenian Law and Society, London/New York 2019, 38. 51 Cf. Todd (2007); Τ. Paulsen, Rhetorik: 2.9. Lysias, in: B. Zimmermann (ed.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. I: Die Literatur der archaischen und klassischen Zeit, Munich 2011, 439–445. 52 Dion. Hal. Lys. 8, p. 15 Us.-Rad.: ἀποδίδωμί τε οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην ἀρετήν, καλουμένην δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἠθοποιΐαν. See recently T. Schirren, Lysias ethographos, in: Erler/Tornau (2019) 185–214. For ēthopoiia, cf. particularly W.L. Devries, Ethopoiia. A Rhetorical Study of the Τypes of Character in the Orations of Lysias, Baltimore 1892; W. Motschmann, Die Charaktere bei Lysias, Munich 1905; Kennedy (1963) 135–136; Usher (1965) 99–119; H.-M. Hagen, Ethopoiia. Zur Geschichte eines rhetorischen Begriffes, Erlangen 1966, esp. 5–11; Dover (1968) 76 ff.; C. Carey, Rhetorical Means of Persuasion, in: Worthington (1994) 26–45; E. Hall, Lawcourt Dramas. The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory, BICS 40 (1995) 49–50; K. Bruss, Persuasive Ethopoeia in Dionysius’ Lysias, Rhetorica 31 (2013) 34–57; A. Kanali, H ἠθοποιία στα ρητορικά προγυμνάσματα. Προϊστορία και εννοιολογικές προσεγγίσεις, Thessaloniki 2013 (Master’s thesis).

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art will be highlighted in his speech For Mantitheus,53 which focuses on the speaker’s ēthos and provides significant support for the promotion of one’s personality through one’s personal judgments.54 Lysias’ speech For Mantitheus (16) is a characteristic example of ēthopoiia.55 The case the speech concerns is as follows: Mantitheus is an Athenian citizen possibly chosen by lot to serve as a member in the Boule of five hundred. The outgoing Boule was charged with conducting the dokimasia, a procedure for judging the new candidates.56 The requirements for holding office included an honourable social life and democratic ethos. During this procedure, someone clearly lodged an objection against Mantitheus, asserting that he had served as a member of the cavalry under the rule of the Thirty. This is because his name had been included in a list (16.6: σανίδιον) containing the names of everyone who had served in the cavalry during that period. These cavalrymen held oligarchic beliefs and supported the Thirty against the democrats. One can speculate that Mantitheus was given the opportunity to mount a defence during a different session and sought the help of Lysias, who wrote the extant speech. From the overall speech, it is concluded that Mantitheus did not actively espouse oligarchy and turn against democracy; however, there are indications of oligarchic leanings which are based – beyond the specific charge – on his participation in the cavalry (16.13), his sui generis appearance, wearing long hair (16.18: εἴ τις κομᾷ),57 his

|| 53 Greek text used: C. Carey, Lysiae orationes cum fragmentis, Oxford 2007. 54 For the following interpretation of Lysias’ For Mantitheus, see E. Alexiou, Λυσίας Ἐν βουλῇ Μαντιθέῳ δοκιμαζομένῳ ἀπολογία (16): η ἠθοποιία ενός Αθηναίου με ολιγαρχικές συμπάθειες, Hellenica 51 (2001) 25–41. 55 Usher (1965) 108: “His is the richest of Lysias’s speech in explicit characterisation, i.e. characterisation by means of the speaker’s own statements about himself”. Cf. C.D. Adams, Lysias, Selected Speeches. Edited with Introduction, Notes and Appendices, Oklahoma 1970 (= New York 1905), 140: “No speech of Lysias offered a better opportunity for his peculiar skill in fitting the speech to the man”; M. Weissenberger, Die Dokimasiereden des Lysias (or. 16, 25, 26, 31), Frankfurt M. 1987, 24–83; Usher (1999) 93–94; K. Apostolakis, Λυσίου Ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου. Η στρατηγική της ηθοποιίας, Philologos 103 (2001) 75–93; A. Kapellos, In Defence of Mantitheus. Structure, Strategy and Argumentation in Lysias 16, BICS 57 (2014) 23–47. 56 Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 45.3: δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς τοὺς τὸν ὕστερον ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύσοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας. Aristotle also provides us with information on the questions posed to candidates during the dokimasia (55.3–4). See J.H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, I-III, Leipzig 1905–1915, 269–285; Harrison (1968–1971) II 200–207; MacDowell (1978) 167–169; G. Adeleye, The Purpose of the Dokimasia, GRBS 24 (1983) 295–306; V. Hunter, Gossip and the Politics of Reputation in Classical Athens, Phoenix 44 (1990) 299–325, esp. 311 ff.; Todd (1993) 285–289; M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, Berkeley 1986, 50–62; Hansen (1999) 222–224; M.B. Sakellariou, Η αθηναϊκή δημοκρατία, Heraklion 1999, 190–191; Hasskamp (2005) 91–95. 57 Hamaker’s correction κομᾷ instead of the transmitted τολμᾷ has been adopted by modern editors. Long hair was a Lacedaemonian trait. See Arist. Rhet. 1367a 30–31: ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευ-

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aristocratic origins (16.20) and his reputation and ambition (16.20). Lysias unquestionably exploits the lack of tangible evidence in profiling the speaker’s character; he outlines just the vital points and does so in such a manner so as to ingratiate the speaker to the democratic members of the Boule. Thus, the prooimion (16.1–3) is the appropriate point to establish the speaker’s ēthos, and Lysias makes the greatest possible effort to present Mantitheus as a citizen organically linked to the city and democracy.58 The prothesis (proposition, 16.3) is of particular importance: For Mantitheus 16(3) ἀξιῶ δέ, ὦ βουλή, ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτο μόνον ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ὡς εὔνους εἰμὶ τοῖς καθεστηκόσι πράγμασι καὶ ὡς ἠνάγκασμαι τῶν αὐτῶν κινδύνων μετέχειν ὑμῖν, μηδέν πώ μοι πλέον εἶναι. ἐὰν δὲ φαίνωμαι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετρίως βεβιωκὼς καὶ πολὺ παρὰ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δέομαι ὑμῶν ἐμὲ μὲν δοκιμάζειν, τούτους δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι χείρους εἶναι. πρῶτον δὲ ἀποδείξω ὡς οὐχ ἵππευον οὔδ’ ἐπεδήμουν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, οὐδὲ μετέσχον τῆς τότε πολιτείας. For Mantitheus 16(3) I do not claim any special merit, members of the Council, if I demonstrate to you merely that I am loyal (eunous) to the existing constitution and have been compelled to share in the same dangers as you. But if it is clear that I have lived an orderly life (metriōs) in other respects also, contrary to the opinions (doxa) and the statements of my enemies, I ask you to approve me at my dokimasia and to think worse of my opponents. I shall demonstrate first that I did not serve in the cavalry, and was not even present in Athens, under the Thirty, nor did I have a share in the constitution that existed at that time. (Transl. S.C. Todd 2000)

The phrase εὔνους εἰμὶ τοῖς καθεστηκόσι πράγμασι (“loyal to the existing constitution”) dominates the beginning of the paragraph. The kathestēkota pragmata indicate democracy, while eunoia (“goodwill”) and kakonoia (“ill will”) are mainstays of the political vocabulary of the era. The oligarchic author of Pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians churlishly links eunoia with the ignorance and baseness of democrats, while linking kakonoia with the virtue and wisdom of the prudent oligarchs (1.7). The increasingly frequent use of the concept is important for the purpose of underlining the patriotic attitude of a citizen at a time when social contribution was not

|| θέρου γὰρ σημεῖον. It was adopted by Athenians with Lacedaemonian sympathies and was often satirised in comedy (Aristoph. Nub. 14–15; Equ. 580). The verb κομᾶν (“let the hair grow long”) and the name κομήτης (“wearing long hair”) have oligarchic connotations and are indicative of aristocracy. See Herod. 5.71; Aristoph. Lysistr. 561; Vesp. 463–466; W. Donlan, The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece. Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., Lawrence KS 1980, 160–162. Cf. the objections by D.D. Leitao, Adolescent Hair-growing and Hair-cutting Rituals in Ancient Greece, in: D.B. Dodd/C.A. Faraone (eds.), Initiation and Ancient Greek Rituals and Narratives, London/New York 2003, 109–129, esp. 124 ff. 58 For the categorisation of a speaker as a “type” acceptable to the audience, see the enlightening views of D.A. Russell, Ethos in Oratory and Rhetoric, in: C. Pelling (ed.), Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature, Oxford 1990, 197–212, esp. 198–203.

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considered self-evident.59 In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the orator’s eunoia is encountered alongside concepts such as agathos, aretē, phronēsis, epieikēs (1366a 11; 1378a 8; 1378a 12) and contributes to the orator’s credibility and successful persuasion. The verb ἠνάγκασμαι in Lysias’ For Mantitheus (16.3) serves the same purpose. It concerns Mantitheus’ internal need to participate in the dangers facing the city, stemming from a feeling of duty.60 Mantitheus adds his overall social life as proof by employing the phrase περὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετρίως βεβιωκώς (“to have lived an orderly life in other respects”). The expression originates from the heart of ancient Greek moral thinking and has clear political implications; it calls to mind a moderate, democratic behaviour, contrary to the arrogance and hybris of the Thirty and their followers.61 In this instance, Mantitheus embodies the kalos kagathos ideal. The phrase metriōs bebiōkōs is repeated in 16.11 as honesty, integrity (epieikeia), which refers to rhetorical theory. Aristotle maintains that the ēthos tou legontos, one of the three types of technical proofs (entechnoi pisteis), is directly related to the confidence of the orator and the effect of an epieikēs speaker on his audience (Rhetoric 1356a 4–7). This basic rhetorical principle applies to outlining the character of Mantitheus. Lysias focuses his defence strategy on the honesty of Mantitheus, not on stirring passions clashing with the character presented by his client. Mantitheus’ integrity is expressed in two areas that were interlinked for ancient citizens: a forthright private and public life (Carey 2014, 41). Mantitheus did not waste his parents’ fortune, he married off his sisters, and caused no friction or complaints. His behaviour in public life was similar, characterised by temperance in indulgences and pleasure, as well as avoidance of involvement in judicial disputes. A litigious, multifarious Athenian involved in political strife, judicial disputes or even slander would be unpopular, in contrast to a moderate citizen. In his commendation of a moderate Athenian, D. Lateiner discerns a virtually common topos in texts of that era.62

|| 59 This explains the emergence of adjectives such as philodēmos, misodēmos, philopolis, and misopolis, a development interpreted as follows by Connor (1971) 105: “What is common to all these developments is an ostensible transfer of primary loyalties from individuals, relatives, or friends, to the city or its citizenship”. 60 This is the sole correct explanation of the verb. Due to use of the perfect tense ἠνάγκασμαι, it has been supported that the verb refers to the past and the adverse position of Mantitheus under the rule of the Thirty or, on the contrary, to the present and the risks of a future oligarchy. See in detail in M. Weissenberger, Die Dokimasiereden des Lysias (or. 16, 25, 26, 31), Frankfurt Μ. 1987, 28 note 80. However, these interpretations essentially function against Mantitheus’ argumentation. 61 See Demosth. 18.321: δύο δ’, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν φύσει μέτριον πολίτην ἔχειν δεῖ … ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῇ πόλει προαίρεσιν διαφυλάττειν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ καιρῷ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὔνοιαν; cf. Aeschin. 3.168. The hybris of the Thirty is opposed to democratic moderation, Lys. 12.21–22; Isocr. 4.110–114; 8.108; N.R.E. Fisher, Hybris, Warminster 1992, 121–130, esp. 127 ff. 62 D. Lateiner, The Man Who Does not Meddle in Politics. A Topos in Lysias, CW 74 (1982) 1–12.

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Nevertheless, Lysias was fully aware of the contradictory nature of Athenian society at the time.63 This is because the commendation of a citizen who refrains from engaging in political strife or judicial disputes is juxtaposed with an appearance of ignoring the demos, i.e. this would raise suspicion concerning his politics and engender the risk of accusation of oligarchic beliefs. On the contrary, slander may have been distasteful, but was politically less suspicious, appearing to be more “democratic”. The sycophant in Aristophanes’ Wealth (850–958) declares his belief that he is acting in favour of the state, characterising himself as chrēstos kai philopolis (900), i.e. an honest fellow and good citizen.64 In On the Peace (8.133), Isocrates castigates the Athenian habit of considering sycophants to be democrats and kaloi kagathoi to be oligarchs, while in Antidosis (15.318) he criticizes the suspicion of Athenians against socially illustrious citizens who were able to be benefactors – a suspicion accompanied by charges of oligarchia kai lakōnismos.65 Similarly, in Lysias’ speech Defence Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy (25), the speaker angrily presents the personal benefits reaped by sycophants under the democratic regime; their attitude twice led to the establishment of oligarchy.66 Therefore, Mantitheus systematically avoids emotionally charged words: the terms sykophantēs, oligarchia, and oligarchikos do not occur a single time in the speech. The brief exposition of his life (16.10–12) sets any personal or political confrontations aside, while key importance is placed on his contribution to the city during periods of military danger (16.13–17). His patriotic conscience and the traditional arena for showcasing an agathos, a virtuous and able citizen, are described with effortless ease.67 At his own initiative, he requested to be struck from the roll of cavalrymen, whose life was not in danger, and to fight alongside the plēthos (16.13),68 he || 63 One characteristic example is the relationship between Athens and Alcibiades, succinctly condensed by Aristophanes in the phrase (Frogs 1425): ποθεῖ μέν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεται δ’ ἔχειν (“the city yearns for him, but hates him, too, yet wants him back”). With the mercurial, sceptical Athenian demos on the one hand, and a charismatic but similarly contradictory leader on the other. 64 Similarly, v. 907: τῶν τῆς πόλεώς εἰμ’ ἐπιμελητὴς πραγμάτων. See E. Lévy, Athènes devant la defaite de 404: histoire d’une crise idéologique, Paris 1976, 233–238, esp. 237: “à la limite, le choix est non plus entre s’interesser à la vie publique ou se montrer inutile à la cité mais entre rester ̒tranquille’ ou agir en sycophante”. 65 Cf. 8.122–123; 15.150–153; 15.164; 15.230; 15.286; 15.309. For the position of aristocrats and conflict in Athenian democracy, see Ober (1989) 248–292; J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule, Princeton 1998, 248–289. 66 See 25.27: διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντας ὀλιγαρχία δὶς κατέστη. Cf. 25.3 and T.M. Murphy, Lysias 25 and the Intractable Democratic Abuses, AJPh 113 (1992) 543–558, esp. 554 ff. 67 See summarily and with additional bibliography in Alexiou (2010) 73–74. 68 The use of the term plēthos (“the commons”) rather than hoplitai (“heavy-armed foot-soldiers”) has the psychological effect of associating Mantitheus with the democrats. Cf. M. Weissenberger, Die Dokimasiereden des Lysias (or. 16, 25, 26, 31), Frankfurt M. 1987, 62 note 164. For Mantitheus’ patriotism, see also the enlightening analysis of K. Apostolakis, Λυσίου Ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου. Η στρατηγική της ηθοποιίας, Philologos 103 (2001) 84 ff.

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offered money of his own volition (16.14), he voluntarily fought on the front line (16.15) and brought any ambitions on his part in line with the common good (16.16– 18). Finally, all Mantitheus claims is that, irrespective of his origin or beliefs, all his actions were in benefit of the homeland. Through the phrase τοὺς φιλοτίμως καὶ κοσμίως πολιτευομένους, it is indicated that Mantitheus’ personal ambitions did not aim at personal benefit, but were always associated with the common good (16.18). The co-existence of philotimōs and kosmiōs alludes to an ambition of constancy and prudence: For Mantitheus 16(18) τῶν τοίνυν ἄλλων στρατειῶν καὶ φρουρῶν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀπελείφθην πώποτε, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον διατετέλεκα μετὰ τῶν πρώτων μὲν τὰς ἐξόδους ποιούμενος, μετὰ τῶν τελευταίων δὲ ἀναχωρῶν. καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φιλοτίμως καὶ κοσμίως πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἴ τις κομᾷ, διὰ τοῦτο μισεῖν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα οὔτε τοὺς ἰδιώτας οὔτε τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως βλάπτει, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κινδυνεύειν ἐθελόντων πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ὠφελεῖσθε. For Mantitheus 16(18) I have never been found wanting in any of the other campaigns and garrisons. Instead, I have always managed to begin the expeditions in the front rank and retreat with the rearguard. You ought to examine those who play an ambitious but responsible role (philotimōs kai kosmiōs) in the city on these criteria, and not dislike a person simply because he wears his hair long (koman). Such habits harm neither individuals nor the city as a community, but you all benefit from those who are willing to face danger against the enemy. (Transl. S.C. Todd 2000)

Mantitheus’ long hair and odd appearance, which were suspect to his democratic compatriots, are contrasted to his social contributions, which took place within the context of military campaigns, but are described not as isolated incidents, but as an indication of kalokagathia, Mantitheus’ continuous contribution to the city. Mantitheus himself admits that he was an aristocrat who – at least in his youth – was quite ambitious, stating that was unduly enterprising as a young man (18.20: φιλοτιμότερον τοῦ δέοντος), an attitude he attributes to the political tradition of his family and his desire for political action. With Adkins’ distinction between competitive and cooperative values as a reference point (see above note 48), it is clear that, without altering the basic traits of the speaker and disparaging Mantitheus’ competitive desire for distinction and excellence, Lysias shifts the focus towards an absolutely legitimate cooperative sphere: the citizen’s contribution to the city. This attitude on the part of Lysias appears to be a mainstay of rhetorical texts of the 4th century BC: the rise of the individual personality with its competitive values coincided with the endeavour to include it in the cooperative values of the city.

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1.3 Epideictic Speeches The third category of rhetorical genre, epideictic, that is, speeches meant for “display” – whether it concerns a private or public celebratory event – expresses rhetorical virtuosity, which focuses on the aesthetics of speech and leaves a marked impression on the audience.69 The effect of the city-state ideology on this type of oration is abundantly clear in Isocrates’ Panegyricus (4.45–46; 380 BC), wherein Athens is lauded as a continuous festal assembly (panēgyris) that grants boundless glory; alongside the athletic feats of speed and strength, Athens was also home to competitions of rhetoric, intellect and numerous other activities, with illustrious prizes for the winners.70

1.3.1 The Rhetorical Encomium: Gorgias - Isocrates During the 4th century BC, there was broad debate concerning the relationship between poetic and prosaic language, with the difference between poetry and prose being found to be sizeable. Aristotle is severely critical of the Gorgianic style, establishing dividing lines between poetry and prose as regards linguistic form (Rhetoric 1404a 24–29):71 ἐπεὶ δ’ oἱ πoιηταί, λέγoντες εὐήθη, διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκoυν πoρίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τoῦτo πoιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετo λέξις, oἷoν ἡ Γoργίoυ, καὶ νῦν ἔτι oἱ πoλλoὶ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τoὺς τoιoύτoυς oἴoνται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τoῦτo δ’ oὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρα λόγoυ καὶ πoιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. Since the poets, while speaking sweet nothings, seemed to acquire their reputation through their lexis, a poetic style came into existence (in prose as well), for example, that of Gorgias. Even now, the majority of the uneducated think such speakers speak most beautifully. (Transl. G. Kennedy 2007)

Nevertheless, the rhetorical encomium is critical in straddling the relationship between poetry and prose, as prior to the sophist Gorgias of Leontinoi (490–385 BC), the pre-eminent epideictic orator, this genre appears to have been solely poetic.72 This

|| 69 Cf. Carey (2007) 236 ff.; Pepe (2013); Pernot (2015). 70 See C. Eucken, Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen, Berlin/New York 1983, 153–155. 71 Cf. Rapp (2002) II 818–820. See also R. Graff, Prose versus Poetry in Early Greek Theories of Style, Rhetorica 23 (2005) 303–335. 72 See K. Dover, Aristophanes Clouds, Oxford 1968, 237: “enkõmion and enkõmiazein are freely used in the fourth century of formal praise in prose or verse, but in fifth century usage enkõmion is especially a poem celebrating someone’s victory”. Cf. Pind. Ol. 2.47; 10.77; 13.29; Pyth. 10.53; Nem. 1.7; Hesiod Erga 344; Aristoph. Nub. 1205; Plat. Lys. 205d–e. As regards the etymology of the word ἐγκώμιoν, there were two prevailing views in antiquity, which were the same for the word κωμῳδία: the

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sophist was the first to turn towards rhetorical demonstration during private or public ceremonies. As an ambassador of his city, he and Tisias visited Athens (427 BC) in order to request aid against Syracuse. According to Diodorus Siculus (12.53.3), Gorgias’ appearance before the Athenian public left a great impression: “By the novelty of his speech he filled the Athenians, who are by nature clever (euphyeis) and fond of dialectic (philologoi), with wonder”. However, the very next line underlines a change in preference of style over time, as the Gorgianic style had fallen out of favour (12.53.4: νῦν δὲ περιεργίαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ φαίνεται καταγέλαστα πλεονάκις καὶ κατακόρως τιθέμενα).73 Gorgias gained renown for the meticulous aesthetics of his speech and his effect on stirring passions. With rhetorical demonstration, he placed the power of logos at the very centre of his teachings (Dressler 2014, 37–41). The power of speech is tremendous. In the Encomium of Helen, he asserts that speech is “a powerful lord” (82 B11.8 D.-K.: δυνάστης μέγας): εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὧδε. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι. But if speech (logos) persuaded her and deceived her soul, not even to this is it difficult to make answer and to banish blame, as follows. Speech is a powerful lord (dynastēs megas) that with the smallest and most invisible body accomplishes most godlike works. It can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity. (Transl. G. Kennedy 2007)

The embellished style with the Gorgianic figures (Γοργίεια σχήματα) of antithesis, parison and paromoiōsis aims at impressing listeners.74 Gorgias’ sizeable contribution lies in the combination of poetic and prosaic language, the amalgamation of poetry and prose (Norden 1915, 73). Considering that Gorgias’ speeches were primarily intended for

|| word originated either from κώμη (see [Hermog.] Prog. 7.2 Patillon; Aphth. Prog. 8.1 Patillon) or from κῶμoς (Theon Prog. 9.109 Pat.-Bol.; Nicol. Prog. 49.10–12 Felten). For the development of encomium, see in brief M. Vallozza, Enkomion, HWRh 2 (1994) 1152–1160. 73 Cf. C. de Jonge, Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature, Leiden/Boston 2008, 332–340. 74 Dion. Hal. Demosth. 4, p. 135 Us.-Rad.; 5, p. 138 Us.-Rad.; Diod. 12.53.4; cf. Xenoph. Symp. 2.26: Γoργίεια ῥήματα. See e.g. Gorgias 82 B11.19 D.-K.: oὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέoν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀτύχημα νoμιστέoν. In this instance, we encounter antithesis (oὐχ ... ἀλλά), parison or isokōlon (same number of words, same syntactical structure) and paromoiōsis or paromoion (similar aural result with homoioteleuton μεμπτέoν, νoμιστέoν and parēchēsis of τ and μ). Cf. Rapp (2002) I 209–204. However, M.-P. Noël, Gorgias et l’“Invention” des ΓΟΡΓΙΕΙΑ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ, REG 112 (1999) 193–211 expressed reservations regarding their use, stressing the role played by the Atiticists, primarily Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in their identification with Gorgias.

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declamation, which is heavily based on oral poetic tradition, E. Schiappa’s characterisation of Gorgias as a “prose rhapsode” is quite apt.75 The sophist aspires to affect the listener psychologically, to achieve the transmission of a specific emotional charge from the orator to his audience, and considers the commixture of poetic and prosaic language as the appropriate means to impress. Two of Gorgias’ epideictic speeches remain extant in their entirety: the Defence of Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen; both concern mythological themes and are examples of rhetorical virtuosity, exhausting all probative avenues of supporting a subject. Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen is classified as a paradoxical speech, but not an extreme example of the category.76 It stands out for the audacity of the sophist’s plan to rebut the charges against the woman whose moral nature had, since the time of Stesichorus, been questioned more than that of any other woman.77 However, while the subject is mythological, a common trope in epideictic oratory,78 Gorgias’ argumentation is not at all based on mythical incidents.79 Firstly, Gorgias establishes the basic principle that Helen’s departure for Troy was to be expected (82 B11.5 D.-K.: εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι). Helen cannot be blamed for this act, which was due: a) either to the will of fate and the decisions of the gods; b) or to violence; c) or to the power of persuasion; d) or to the power of love (82 B11.6 D.-K.). Gorgias then analyses each of the above arguments, and concludes that Helen’s action should not be condemned as a mistake (hamartēma) but regarded as a misfortune (19: atychēma). At the end, he admits that his speech was a plaything (paignion). Gorgias does not present other facts from the myth in order to prove Helen’s innocence, nor does he attempt to alter the tradition, as Stesichorus did in his Palinode. The Encomium of Helen is the model of a defence speech, which could be used in any similar instance, following minor amendments. In fact, this speech by Gorgias gave his pupil Isocrates the opportunity to compete against and even correct his teacher. In his Helen (10.14) (approximately 385 BC), Isocrates observes that his predecessor’s speech was an apology, which was contrary to the rhetorical principles of the

|| 75 Schiappa (1999) 98–102. 76 See D.M. MacDowell, Gorgias. Encomium of Helen, Bristol 1982; T. Buchheim, Gorgias von Leontinoi. Reden, Fragmente und Testimonien, Hamburg 1989, esp. 159–173; D. Spatharas, Gorgias. An Edition of the Extant Texts and Fragments with Commentary and Introduction, Glasgow 2001 (PhD Thesis), esp. 97–194; S. Constantinidou, Logos into Mythos. The Case of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, Athens 2008; R. Blondell, Helen of Troy. Beauty, Myth, Devastation, Oxford 2013, 164–181; J. Schollmeyer, Gorgias’ Lobrede auf Helena. Literaturgeschichtliche Untersuchungen und Kommentar (forthcoming). 77 Helen was first overtly accused of adultery in an excerpt from Hesiod (176 M.-W.): ὣς δ’ Ἑλένη ᾔσχυνε λέχoς ξανθoῦ Μενελάoυ. For the charges expressed by Stesichorus and then refuted in his Palinode, see Plat. Phaedr. 243a; Isocr. 10.64. Helen appears as an ambiguous figure in tragedy as well, particularly in Euripides (Andr. 229 ff.; Hec. 265 ff.; Tr. 766 ff., 969 ff.; Or. 129 ff., 1110 ff.). 78 Apart from Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes (82 B11a D.-K.), see also Alcidamas’ Odysseus, Against the Treachery of Palamedes (Radermacher 1951, 135–141) or Antisthenes’ Ajax (VA 53 Giann.) and Odysseus (VA 54 Giann.). 79 See P. Kalligas, Οι λόγοι του Γοργία Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιoν, Ὑπὲρ Παλαμήδoυς ἀπoλoγία, Deucalion 36 (1981) 276; E.V. Haskins, Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle, Columbia SC 2004, 14–16; J.A.E. Bons, Gorgias the Sophist and Early Rhetoric, in: Worthington (2007) 37–46, esp. 41 ff.

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encomium. He chose to author a true encomium to Helen, his point of reference being beauty (kallos).

The ideals of the polis were exceptionally powerful in the late 5th century and early 4th century BC, but at the same time individuality was continuously growing, resulting in the tug-of-war between democratic ideology and the ambitions of the individual being reflected in the texts of the era, the chief concern being the subordination of individuality to the public interest.80 Alcibiades, Lysander, Cyrus the Younger (the brother of Artaxerxes), Adrastus’ funeral oration in Euripides’ Suppliants (860–917), the monarchic ideology of the 4th century BC, and other figures, such as Socrates, give prominence to individual personality. According to A. Dihle (1970, 39), this is the “emancipation of the individual” (Emanzipation des Individuums).81 The decisive step was taken by Isocrates, who emerged as a successor and reformer of epideictic oratory during the 4th century BC. As regards style, the rhetorician stresses the differences between poetry and prose (Evagoras 9.8–11), but welcomes an approach to the two, whereby an epideictic oration would surpass the plain style of judicial oration (15.46–47; cf. 13.16). At the same time, two major requirements for the realisation of the encomium Evagoras (9; around 370 BC) were the promotion of individuality and the decrease in the value of myths.82 In research, the encomium is recognised as a watershed moment, because the position of the mythical lauded figure, such as Helen in those of Gorgias and Isocrates, was now held by a contemporary historical figure, namely Evagoras I, a recently deceased Cypriot king (Alexiou 2010, 28 ff.). Isocrates does not limit himself to praising an individual act, but extols the virtues of Evagoras as a whole by examining all his actions. Origins of the endeavour can be found in the encomium of Alcibiades in Isocrates’ judicial speech On the Team of Horses (mainly 16.25–42, around 396/395 BC), which proves the close relationship between judicial and epideictic oratory,83 and the encomium of Cyrus the Younger in Xenophon’s Anabasis (1.9). However, there was a key difference: both are short texts and do not constitute self-contained encomia ‒ they form part of larger works. There were also developments in the justification of honorific decrees, mainly since the mid-4th century BC, when the characterisation anēr agathos was gradually enriched with additional expressions indicating duration and continuation, while the formulation of the justification includes numerous ethical properties of the individual

|| 80 Cf. the fine notes by D. Spatharas, Φθόνος, ρητορική και lifestyle στην κλασική Αθήνα, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 93–96 (cf. also Spatharas 2019, 124–129). 81 Cf. P. Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, Cambridge 2009, 91–106. 82 Buchcheit (1960) 69–74. 83 See Alexiou (2011) 316–336.

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being lauded.84 Following the study of four honorific decrees that are extensive and describe specific achievements in the form of an encomium, K. Rosen (1987, 286) reaches the following conclusion in reference to Isocrates’ Evagoras: “It is almost as if the four inscriptions aim at realising what Isocrates had requested forty years earlier. In the preface to Evagoras, he condemns those who only wish to hear hymns to mythical heroes”.

1.3.2 The Funeral Speeches The funeral oration (epitaphios logos), as a collective commendation of the fallen, is a particular type of epideictic discourse. Of the classical funeral speeches, only 5 are extant: Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.35–46, concerning the Peloponnesian War), Lysias’ Epitaphios (2, concerning the Corinthian War 395–387 BC), Plato’s Menexenus (236d ff., around 387/386 BC), Demosthenes’ Epitaphios (60, 338 BC, following the battle of Chaeronea) and Hyperides’ Epitaphios (322 BC, concerning the Lamian War).85 In The Invention of Athens. The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, Cambridge MA/London 1986 (= L’invention d’Athènes. Histoire de l’oraison funèbre dans la cité classique, Paris 1981), N. Loraux clearly showed how the funeral speech functioned as a political institution and exponent of the city-state. The Epitaphios genre is permeated by collective, impersonal presentation and ‒ despite any variations ‒ preserves a traditional, formal arsenal of topoi from which the orator draws. Nevertheless, new ideas directly related to highlighting the individual could not but have affected funeral speeches. Hyperides’ Funeral Oration, dated at a later time (322 BC), praises not only the unnamed fallen, but mainly the general Leosthenes both specifically and comprehensively – a noteworthy indication of the above development.86

|| 84 IG II31, 430.6–12: χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζων διατετέλεκεν … τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν ἔχων διατελεῖ; 359.22–23: ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ δικαιoσύνης; 416.27: δικαίως καὶ φιλoτίμως; see E. Nachmanson, Zu den Motivformeln der griechischen Ehreninschriften, Eranos 11 (1911) 180–196; D. Whitehead, Cardinal Virtues. The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens, C&M 44 (1993) 37–75; VeligianniTerzi (1997) 219–224, 228–246. 85 Certain excerpts of a Funeral Speech by Gorgias are also extant (82 B5a-6 D.-K.). Concerning the genre of funeral speeches, see Kennedy (1963) 154–166; Ziolkowski (1981); Loraux (1986); Prinz (1997); Frangeskou (1999) 315–336; Usher (1999) 349–352; Herrman (2004); Christ (2006) 125–128; Carey (2007) 240–246; Todd (2007) 149–157, 210–274; Clarke (2008) 309–313; Yoshitake (2010) 359–377; J.L. Shear, Their Memories Will Never Grow Old. The Politics of Remembrance in the Athenian Funeral Orations, CQ 63 (2013) 511–536; Steinbock (2013) 49–58; Roisman (2015) 278 ff. 86 Cf. Usher (1999) 336; J. Hesk, Types of Oratory, in: Gunderson (2009) 158; J. Herrman, Hyperides Funeral Oration. Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Oxford 2009, 21–24; L. Petruzziello, Epitafio per i caduti del primo anno della guerra lamiaca: (PLit.Lond. 133v) Iperide. Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento, Pisa/Rome 2009, 52–92, 205–215.

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The prooimion of the Funeral Speech in Thucydides is indicative of the debate over the role of the orator when praising the fallen, as well as the relationship between orator and audience, in contrast to the pioneering views of Isocrates in his encomium Evagoras (9), i.e. an encomium concerning a contemporary historical figure:87 Thucydides 2.35(1) οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένοις ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρκοῦν ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ γενομένων ἔργῳ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμάς, οἷα καὶ νῦν περὶ τὸν τάφον τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὁρᾶτε, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι. (2) χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ὅ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατὴς τάχ’ ἄν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἃ βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοί εἰσι περὶ ἑτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν· τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. (3) ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρὴ καὶ ἐμὲ ἑπόμενον τῷ νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἑκάστου βουλήσεώς τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον. Thucydides 2.35(1) Most of those who have spoken here on previous occasions have commended the man who added this oration to the ceremony: it is right and proper (kalon), they have said, that there should be this address at the burial of those who died in our wars. To me it would seem enough that men who showed their courage in actions should have their tribute (timai) too expressed in actions, as you can see we have done in the arrangements for this state funeral; but the valour (aretai) of these many should not depend for credence on the chance of one man’s speech, who may speak well or badly. (2) It is not easy to find the right measure (metriōs eipein) of words when one cannot quite rely on a common perception of the truth (dokēsis tēs alētheias). Those in the audience who are aware of the facts and are friends of the dead (xyneidōs kai eunous) may well think that the speaker’s account falls short of what they know and wish to hear; and the inexperienced (apeiros) may be jealous, and think there must be exaggeration, if told of anything beyond their own capacity (physis). Eulogies (epainoi) of others are tolerated up to the point where each man still thinks himself capable of doing something of what he has heard praised: beyond that lies jealousy and therefore disbelief. (3) But since this institution was sanctioned and approved by our predecessors, I too must follow the custom and attempt as far as possible to satisfy the individual wishes and expectations of each of you. (Transl. M. Hammond in: Hammond/Rhodes 2009)

The prooimion remains true to the context of a primarily rhetorical topos of funeral speeches. The orator commends the scale of the subject, i.e. the achievements of the fallen, as something chalepon or adynaton, i.e. underlines the difficulty or impossibility of a worthy speech, the axiōs eipein.88 The so-called Bescheidenheitstopik, i.e. the deliberate reduction of rhetorical capabilities, is reflected in the contrast between

|| 87 See in detail E. Alexiou, Das Proömium des isokrateischen Euagoras und die Epitaphienreden, WJ 33 (2009) 31–52. 88 See Ziolkowski (1981) 69 and, more generally, Pernot (1993) 664–667. Astute observations made by T. Krischer, Die enkomiastische Topik im Epitaphios der Perikles, Mnemosyne 30 (1977) 122–134.

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words and actions: the funeral speech falls short of the skill of the fallen or cannot express their actions in worthy terms (Lys. 2.1; cf. Demosth. 60.1; concerning Athens’ benefactions, Hyper. Epit. c. 2[4]). Pericles, expressing the motif of the difficulty facing the orator, contrasts the oration to the other funeral honours and favours the latter, particularly when praising the fallen is directly predicated on the orator’s skills, while the visible works of public burial do not impair their memory. What is noteworthy in Pericles’ speech is that from the orator’s difficulty to praise the fallen in a worthy manner (axiōs eipein) springs a metriōs eipein, the orator’s need to aim for proper moderation between excess and deficit, i.e. to achieve the most objective presentation possible. This is because great importance is placed on a third factor standing between the orator and his subject, which is praise for the fallen – and that factor is the live audience and their reactions. Pericles favours the direct relationship between actions (i.e. the other funeral expressions) and honour, because words, being at a disadvantaged position, are subject to the ignorance and envy of the listeners. The dokēsis tēs alētheias (“the impression of the truth”)89 emphatically refers to the reception of the speech by the audience. H. Flashar90 correctly contends that Pericles is interested in the truth of the presentation, but it must be stressed that the main emphasis is not placed on truth itself, but on the acceptance of the speech – or, more correctly, the acceptance of the truth of the speech – by the audience, which is why the speaker comments extensively on the passions of his listeners. The listeners are distinguished into two categories and, despite their common mistrust, react in completely different manners: on the one hand, the knowledgeable, favourable listener (ὅ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατής) will assess the praise as falling short of his high expectations, whereas the inexperienced and envious listener (ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον) will find the praise to be excessive, beyond his expectations. The importance of this second category, in particular, is attested by the subsequent digression concerning envy.91 Praise is tolerable only to the point where the

|| 89 Even if one were to favour a different translation of the phrase dokēsis tēs alētheias, such as “the subjective opinion that something is true” (J. Grethlein, Gefahren des λόγος. Thukydides’ Historien und die Grabrede des Perikles, Klio 87, 2005, 48 note 33), the same conclusion remains. Cf. A. Tsakmakis, Leaders, Crowds, and the Power of the Image. Political Communication in Thucydides, in: A. Rengakos/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, Leiden/Boston 2006, 186: “The recipient of the image is the measure of evaluation”. 90 H. Flashar, Der Epitaphios des Perikles. Seine Funktion im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides, Heidelberg 1969, 13. 91 This section is longer than the one concerning the ξυνειδώς. Cf. J. Kakridis, Der thukydideische Epitaphios. Ein stilistischer Kommentar, Munich 1961, 5. The motif of envy is repeated in the epilogue (2.45.1): φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον. On phthonos, see P. Walcot, Envy and the Greeks. A Study of Human Behaviour, Warminster 1978; Ober (1989) 205–214; D.L. Cairns, The Politics of Envy. Envy and the Equality in Ancient Greece, in: D. Konstan/N.K. Rutter (eds.), Envy, Spite and Jealousy. The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, Edinburgh 2003, 235–252; Konstan (2006) 111–128; E.

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listener believes that he would be in a position to act in a similar manner and deserve that praise, but anything exceeding it leads to envy and is not considered credible. This basic anthropological view of the ancients regarding the envious aspect of human nature since the archaic era (Pind. Pyth. 7.19; fr. 94a.8–9 Sn.-M.; Herod. 3.80.3; Thuc. 3.84.2) was aptly expressed by Alcibiades prior to the Sicilian Expedition (6.16.3): “And again, although whatever display I made in the city, by providing choruses or in any other way, naturally causes jealousy among my townsmen (τoῖς μὲν ἀστoῖς φθoνεῖται φύσει)”. It is surprising that at the end of the prooimion – and despite his objections – Pericles decides to respect the custom of the funeral speech and satisfy all the desires and expectations of his audience to the greatest possible extent. Despite sharing the same starting point as Pericles, Isocrates adopts a different attitude in the proem to his encomium Evagoras (9.6–7), which is already characterised in the Scholia (Evag. 1, p. 121 Dind. = I 242 Mand.) as epitaphios and enkōmion: Isocrates Evagoras 9(6) νῦν δὲ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀθυμήσειεν, ὅταν ὁρᾷ τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐπέκεινα γενομένους ὑμνουμένους καὶ τραγῳδουμένους, αὑτὸν δὲ προειδῇ, μηδ᾿ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετάς, μηδέποτε τοιούτων ἐπαίνων ἀξιωθησόμενον; τούτων δ᾿ αἴτιος ὁ φθόνος, ᾧ τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθὸν πρόσεστιν, ὅτι μέγιστον κακὸν τοῖς ἔχουσίν ἐστιν. οὕτω γάρ τινες δυσκόλως πεφύκασιν, ὥσθ᾿ ἥδιον ἂν εὐλογουμένων ἀκούοιεν, οὓς οὐκ ἴσασιν εἰ γεγόνασιν, ἢ τούτων, ὑφ᾿ ὧν εὖ πεπονθότες αὐτοὶ τυγχάνουσιν. (7) οὐ μὴν δουλευτέον τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας τοῖς οὕτω κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ἀμελητέον, τοὺς δ᾿ ἄλλους ἐθιστέον ἀκούειν, περὶ ὧν καὶ λέγειν δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἄλλως τ᾿ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιδόσεις ἴσμεν γιγνομένας καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὐ διὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐπανορθοῦντας καὶ τολμῶντας ἀεί τι κινεῖν τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων. Isocrates Evagoras 9(6) As it is, who would not become discouraged when he sees that those who lived at the time of the Trojan War and earlier are celebrated in song and on the tragic stage but realizes that he will never be thought to deserve such praises (epainoi), not even if he should surpass their virtues? Envy (phthonos) is responsible for this, and envy is only good in that it is the greatest evil (kakon) for those who possess it. For, some individuals are so grudging that they take more pleasure in hearing praise for those of whose existence they are uncertain than for those from whom they have benefited. (7) But sensible men (noun echontes) must not become slaves to those with such perverse thoughts (kakōs phronountes) but must disregard them and accustom others to hear about those whom it is just to praise, particularly as we know that progress (epidoseis) in the arts and in all other things is not due to those who adhere to the status quo but to those who make improvements and dare always to change things that are wrong. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Under the effect of the Thucydidean funeral oration, Isocrates also touches upon the envy of the audience concerning the eulogy of a contemporary historical figure, but in the context of the new debate of the 4th century BC, with individuality brought to

|| Sanders, Pathos Phaulon. Aristotle and the Rhetoric of Phthonos, in: I. Sluiter/R.M. Rosen (eds.), Kakos. Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/Boston 2008, 255–281; E. Eidinow, Envy, Poison, and Death Women on Trial in Classical Athens, Oxford 2016, esp. 147–149.

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the forefront, he adopts a more decisive, aggressive stance than Pericles: he categorically denounces envy of great acts, and extols individual achievements with rhetoric as the most appropriate means for bestowing glory. Envy (phthonos) is a disease and its sole benefit is that it is the greatest evil for those who possess it (9.6; 15.13; Demosth. 20.140). Isocrates is innovating and as such is asking a learned orator to cast aside ignorant, envious listeners who prefer to hear the praises of mythical figures and, compelled by virtuous motives, to accustom others to listen to the praises of contemporary men. This is the only way to achieve progress in rhetoric or any other art. Therefore, through Isocrates, a new, central, pedagogical role is thrust upon orators who, contrary to the Thucydidean Funeral Speech, are charged with instructing the listeners in attending to the praises of contemporary figures.

2 Theoretical Debate concerning Rhetoric 2.1 Plato - Isocrates In the epilogue to Euthydemus (305c–d), Plato refers to those who place themselves at the border-ground between philosophy and politics, declaim their wisdom and consider philosophers to be the sole obstacle to the achievement of their goals: Euthydemus (305c) ΣΩ. oὗτoι γάρ εἰσιν μέν, ὦ Κρίτων, oὓς ἔφη Πρόδικoς μεθόρια φιλoσόφoυ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πoλιτικoῦ, oἴoνται δ’ εἶναι πάντων σoφώτατoι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δoκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πoλλoῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδoκιμεῖν (305d) ἐμπoδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι oὐδένας ἄλλoυς ἢ τoὺς περὶ φιλoσoφίαν ἀνθρώπoυς. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι. Euthydemus (305c) Socr. These are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus describes as occupying the no-man’s-land (methoria) between the philosopher and the statesman. They think that they are the wisest (sophōtatoi) of men, and that they not only are (einai) but also seem (dokein) to be so in the eyes of a great many, so that no one else keeps them from enjoying universal esteem (305d) except the followers of philosophy (philosophia). Therefore, they think that if they place these persons in the position of appearing to be worth nothing, then victory in the contest for the reputation of wisdom (sophia) will be indisputably and immediately theirs, and in the eyes of all. (Transl. R.K. Sprague in: Cooper 1997)

In all likelihood, Plato is most likely subtly referring to Isocrates.1 We find ourselves at the crux of the dispute between philosophy and rhetoric, with both its inception and climax taking place in the 4th century BC. The key figures in this dispute are Plato and Isocrates;2 the former, as the pupil of Socrates, juxtaposes philosophy, the supreme science, and knowledge originating from the dialectical search for an absolute, timeless truth against rhetoric, which is based on what is reasonable and likely (eikos). The latter, as the pupil of Gorgias and the advocate of a renewed sophistical movement, places the art of rhetoric at the very centre of education, which is integrally linked to the social and political presence of citizens and aims not only at specific rhetorical education but primarily at ethical cultivation.

|| 1 Schofield (2008) 49. Cf. W.H. Thompson, The Phaedrus of Plato, London 1868, 170–183; de Vries (1959) 40–46; Eucken (1983) 48–49; S. Dušanić, Isocrates, the Chian Intellectuals, and the Political Context of the Euthydemus, JHS 119 (1999) 1–16; E. Heitsch, Der Anonymos in Euthydem, Hermes 128 (2000) 392–404 (= Gesammelte Schriften II, Munich/Leipzig 2001, 145–157). 2 See Ν.D. Dimitriadis, Ανατoμία της Ρητoρικής. Η “διαφωνία” Πλάτωνoς και Ισoκράτoυς, Athens 1983 and M. Leff, Isocrates, Tradition, and the Rhetorical Version of Civic Education, in: Poulakos/ Depew (2004) 235–254. Cf. Eucken (1983); Perkins (1984) 49–66; Cooper (1985) 77–96; Vickers (1988) 83–159; Wardy (1996); Nightingale (2000) 172–185; Zingg (2017) 122–132. See also the concerns raised by H. Yunis, Plato’s Rhetoric, in: Worthington (2007) 75–89 and Wareh (2012) 55–75. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-002

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The Platonic critique of rhetoric must be understood as a reaction to the general political conditions of the period. In his Seventh Letter, Plato describes his decision to dedicate himself to a theoretical life (vita contemplativa), disenchanted with the volatile active life (vita activa) of his time (325e–326b). The conviction and execution of his teacher Socrates (399 BC) by the democracy restored after the dictatorship of the Thirty was an exceptionally painful experience for Plato. In the seventh book of the Republic, the image of the cave symbolises the educational course of philosophers, who abandon all human honours and accolades in order to dedicate themselves to the ideal of agathon (514a ff.; 517c; 519d). Power belongs by right to the “philosopherkings” who, under the adverse political conditions of the time, are the necessary requirement for the birth of the ideal state: political power and philosophy must coincide (473c–e; Görgemanns 1994, 154). On the contrary, democracy, along with timocracy, oligarchy and tyrannis, are misguided constitutions (544c). In Gorgias, rhetoric is the central topic of discussion3. Invoking the technē model, which is not based on ordinary practical application but on general rules and certain knowledge, Plato raises the question of what the activity of the sophist Gorgias, defined as technē rhētorikē (449c), actually entails. In this case, rhetoric is subjected to extreme criticism: when repeatedly asked by Socrates about the greatest good that rhetoric may offer, Gorgias invokes the freedom granted by the power of persuasion in the law-courts, in the Boule and in the Assembly, with the orator subjugating the audience (452e).4 For Plato, rhetoric is not based on a true foundation, but is merely a producer of persuasion (πειθοῦς δημιουργός), without taking right and wrong into consideration (453a; 454e).5 By axiomatically stating that practicing a technē requires knowledge thereof, Socrates states that rhetoric is nothing more than habitude (tribē). Rhetoric does not pursue the truth, therefore it is not technē, but a mere empeiria in pursuit of praise and gratifying people (462c: χάριτός τινoς καὶ ἡδoνῆς ἀπεργασίας). Thus, politicians do not pursue the public interest through rhetoric, but their selfinterest (502e–503a):

|| 3 On Plato’s relationship with rhetoric, see Erler (2007) 498–506; M. Erler, Platon und seine Rhetorik, in: M. Erler/C. Tornau (eds.), Handbuch Antike Rhetorik, Berlin/Boston 2019, 313–337. 4 In Philebus 58b, Protarchus recalls Gorgias’ repeated maxim that the art of persuasion surpasses all others, making all things subject to itself, not by force, but by their free will (πάντα γὰρ ὑφ’ αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι’ ἑκόντων ἀλλ’οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν). 5 Cf. Nightingale (1995) 50–51. For Plato’s critique of rhetoric, see Kennedy (1989) 188–190; Rapp (2002) I 212–223; R.C.A. Higgins, “The Empty Eloquence of Fools”. Rhetoric in Classical Greece, in: J.T. Gleeson/R.C.A. Higgins (eds.), Rediscovering Rhetoric. Law, Language, and the Practice of Persuasion, Sydney 2008, 3–44; Dressler (2014) 69–72. See also J.S. Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias’ Art of Rhetoric (Gorgias 456c–457b), Ph&Rh 34 (2001) 355–363; R. Barney, Gorgias’ Defense. Plato and his Opponents on Rhetoric and the Good, SJPh 48 (2010) 95–121. Cf. the effort to alleviate the differences between Plato and the sophists in M. McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, Cambridge 2007 and D.D. Corey, The Sophists in Plato’s Dialogues, Albany NY 2015.

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Gorgias (502e) ΣΩ. πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὑτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, (503a) χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; Gorgias (502e) Socr. Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what is best (beltiston), with the single aim of making the citizens as good as possible by their speeches, or are they, like the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the common weal (koinon) to their own personal interest (idion), behave to these assemblies as to children, (503a) trying merely to gratify (charizesthai) them, nor care a jot whether they will be better or worse in consequence? (Transl. W.R.M. Lamb 1925)

Through an impressive formal analogy, Plato mocks the new art and ranks it among the four parts of flattery (kolakeia; 464b–465e):6 Gorgias (464b) ΣΩ. φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. (464c) ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη ‒ οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη ‒ τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, (464d) καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ’ εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, (464e) λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, (465a) ὦ Πῶλε ‒ τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω ‒ ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖ’ ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον. (465b) τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν’ οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι (465c) ‒ ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις ‒ ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δ’ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ

|| 6 Cf. Dalfen (2004) 236 ff.; J. Moss, Pleasure and Illusion in Plato, PhPhenR 72 (2006) 503–535; J. Moss, The Doctor and the Pastry Chef. Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias, Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007) 229–249.

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γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, (465d) καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε ‒ σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος ‒ ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· (465e) ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Gorgias (464b) Socr. Now let me see if I can explain my meaning to you more clearly. There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul (psychē), I call politics (politikē); the other, which concerns the body (sōma), though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic (gymnastikē) and medicine (iatrikē). Under politics I set legislation (nomothetikē) in the place of gymnastic, and justice (dikaiosynē) to match medicine. (464c) In each of these pairs, of course ‒ medicine and gymnastic, justice and legislation ‒ there is some intercommunication, as both deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences. Now these four, which always bestow their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery (kolakeutikē) which, I do not say with knowledge, but by speculation, divides herself into four parts, and then, insinuating herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which she has crept, (464d) and cares nothing for what is the best (beltiston), but dangles what is most pleasant (hēdiston) for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value. Thus cookery (opsopoiikē) assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which of the two, the doctor or the cook, understands the question of sound and noxious foods, (464e) the doctor would starve to death. Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace, (465a) Polus ‒ for here I address you ‒ because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art (technē), but a habitude (empeiria), since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is irrational: if you dispute my views, I am ready to give my reasons. (465b) However, as I put it, cookery is flattery disguised as medicine; and in just the same manner self-adornment (kommōtikē) personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. Well, to avoid prolixity, I am willing to put it to you like a geometer (465c) ‒ for by this time I expect you can follow me: as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry (sophistikē) to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric (rhētorikē) to justice. But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them. For indeed, if the soul were not in command of the body, but the latter had charge of itself (465d), and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself were the judge, forming its own estimate of them by the gratifications they gave it, we should have a fine instance of what Anaxagoras described, my dear Polus, ‒ for you are versed in these matters: everything would be jumbled together, without distinction as between medicinal and healthful and tasty concoctions. Well now, you have heard what I state rhetoric to be ‒ (465e) the counterpart of cookery in the soul, acting here as that does on the body. (Transl. W.R.M. Lamb 1925)

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The four true arts that heal the best part of the body and soul correspond to four false arts as parts of flattery. Based on the above, the analogies between the true arts and the false arts are formally recorded as follows (Rapp 2002, I 216; Erler 2007, 500): Tab. 1: Plato’s Gorgias: True and False Arts

body

soul

true arts

false arts

gymnastikē

kommōtikē

iatrikē

opsopoiikē

nomothetikē

sophistikē

dikaiosynē

rhētorikē

The true arts are considered to be nomothetikē (“legislation”) and dikaiosynē (“justice”), dedicated to healing the soul, as well as iatrikē (“medicine”) and gymnastikē (“gymnastic”), aiming at physical well-being. The images (εἴδωλα; 463 d–e) of the true arts, constituting parts of flattery, appear to be ‒ as regards the soul ‒ sophistikē (“sophistry”) and rhētorikē (“rhetoric”) and ‒ as regards the body ‒ opsopoiikē (“cookery”) and kommōtikē (“self-adornment”).7 Cookery, as opposed to medicine, pretends to know what is best to eat, but aims at the pleasant and is thus deceitful. In the above passage, Plato quips that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, the doctor would starve to death (464d–e). Similarly, the pale imitation of gymnastic is self-adornment, characterised by Plato as rascally and deceitful (465b: κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλή), as it deceives men by forms and colours, resulting in extraneous rather than natural beauty. Rhetoric, as opposed to justice, deceives and flatters the soul, as cookery does to the body; it is directed wholly against the moral improvement of the audience.8 The subsequent thought is that rhetoric provides the means to deceive one’s fellow man and to manipulate the audience in someone’s favour. Polus, the pupil of the sophist Gorgias, is surprised to hear Socrates maintain that, if faced with the choice, he would prefer to suffer wrong than to do it, and draw a parallel between the power of an orator and that of an absolute despot, who can do anything in his interest in the city without being subject to any control, who can kill, exile and do everything at his own discretion (469b–c). This concept is reminiscent of pleonexia on a large scale (τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν), as presented by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic (343e–344c): Thrasymachus defines tyrannis as the most complete injustice (τελεωτάτη ἀδικία), which makes the doer of injustice happiest. Furthermore, in

|| 7 Cf. Erler (2007) 500. 8 Cf. Sprute (1992) 29–45.

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Phoenissae Euripides ranks Eteocles among the representatives of tyranny and, on the contrary, Jocasta among the advocates of equality and justice (536–538). While Eteocles prefers justice for less important matters, when faced with the dilemma between dikaiosynē and tyrannis, he is in favour of pleonexia on a large scale (524–525: εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι / κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τἄλλα δ’ εὐσεβεῖν χρεών).9 It is no accident that Xenophon presents Critias, one of the Thirty, as a typical advocate of greed and violence (Mem. 1.2.12: πλεονεκτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος); Critias cynically asserts (Hell. 2.3.16) that it is impossible for people who want to gain power not to put out of the way those who would be best able to exterminate them. Callicles similarly propagates the natural rule of might in affairs of state (Gorg. 482c ff.; 491b ff.).10 The fact that in this context major Athenian orators and statesmen of the past, such as Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles and, more importantly, Pericles (515b ff.; 517b ff.) present themselves as simple servants of the state rather than educators of citizens proves the gravity of Plato’s struggle against rhetoric. The discussion focuses particularly on Pericles whose involvement in politics, in Plato’s view, not only did not improve the moral level of citizens but, on the contrary, corrupted them (515e): “Pericles has made the Athenians idle (argoi), cowardly (deiloi), talkative (laloi), and avaricious (philargyroi), by starting the system of public fees”. In this context, a true statesman who exercises the true technē politikē in pursuit of a better policy aiming not at what is most pleasant for the audience but at what is best for them is Socrates himself (521d–e).11 Menexenus, as a model funeral speech, is also subject to the debate concerning rhetoric. The quotations by Aristotle (Rhetoric 1367b 8–9; 1415b 30–31) confirm its authenticity. However, it is a paradoxical speech,12 especially when Socrates, a detractor of rhetoric, is alleged at a future time, thirteen years after his death, to have given a funeral speech in honour of the Athenians who fell during the Corinthian War (following the Peace of Antalcidas of 387/386 BC),13 which he supposedly heard from Aspasia of Miletus, the second wife of Pericles. It is hard to draw the line between solemnity and levity (Eucken 2003, 44–55). While the patriotic topoi retain the traditional formality of funeral speeches and may be considered to be fully solemn, the

|| 9 Cf. Eteocles’ turn of phrase (509–510): ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας / τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε. Callicles uses the concept of anandria in a similar context in Gorgias (492a). See the apposite remarks by J. de Romilly, Les Phéniciennes d’Euripide ou l’actualité dans la tragédie grecque, RPh 39 (1965) 28–47, esp. 35–41. Cf. C. Amiech, Les Phéniciennes d’Euripide. Commentaire et traduction, Paris 2004, 359; Alexiou (2013) 53; (2015) 77–78. 10 Cf. Dalfen (2004) 136–137. 11 Cf. Erler (2007) 501. 12 Görgemanns (1994) 67: “Absurdität”; Schofield (2008) 48: “satirical composition”. Cf. C.H. Kahn, Plato’s Funeral Oration. The Motive of the Menexenus, CPh 58 (1963) 220–234. 13 According to Menexenus 234b, the candidates to give the actual funeral speech are named as the orators Archinus and Dion.

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introductory dialogue between Socrates and Menexenus, a young, wealthy Athenian, is catalytic for the interpretation of the speech and, as a derisive context, has many characteristics that would allow for Menexenus to be interpreted as a parody, following Plato’s critique of rhetoric in Gorgias. The following passage is highly indicative (234c–235b):14 Menexenus (234c) ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Μενέξενε, πολλαχῇ κινδυνεύει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθνῄσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ταφῆς καλῆς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς τυγχάνει, καὶ ἐὰν πένης τις ὢν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ ἐπαίνου αὖ ἔτυχεν, καὶ ἐὰν φαῦλος ᾖ, ὑπ’ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐπαινούντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου λόγους παρεσκευασμένων, οἳ οὕτως καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, (235a) ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγοντες, κάλλιστά πως τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες, γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐγκωμιάζοντες κατὰ πάντας τρόπους καὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἔτι ζῶντας ἐπαινοῦντες, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε, ὦ Μενέξενε, γενναίως πάνυ διατίθεμαι ἐπαινούμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἑκάστοτε ἐξέστηκα ἀκροώμενος καὶ κηλούμενος, (235b) ἡγούμενος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα μείζων καὶ γενναιότερος καὶ καλλίων γεγονέναι. Menexenus (234c) Socr. Indeed, dying in war looks like a splendid fate in many ways, Menexenus. Even if he dies a pauper (penēs), a man gets a really magnificent funeral, and even if he was of little account (phaulos), he gets a eulogy too from the lips of experts, who speak not extempore but in speeches worked up long beforehand. They do their praising so splendidly (235a) that they cast a spell (goēteuein) over our souls, attributing to each individual man, with the most varied and beautiful verbal embellishments, both praise he merits and praise he does not, extolling the city in every way, and praising the war-dead, all our ancestors before us, and us ourselves, the living. The result is, Menexenus, that I am put into an exalted frame of mind when I am praised by them. Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man ‒ (235b) I’m convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden. (Transl. P. Ryan in: Cooper 1997)

This is an ironic apostrophe where citizens enjoy honour and praise after their death, even if they were worthless during the rest of their lives (234c; Yoshitake 2010, 362– 363), with irony towards the traditional exaltation of the city, the fallen and the ancestors, which bewitches the soul (235a). According to Menexenus, Socrates seems to be deriding the orators (235c: προσπαίζεις τοὺς ῥήτορας), claiming that he was taught the speech by Aspasia as an instructor of rhetoric and was nearly flogged whenever he forgot the words while learning it (236b–c). Aspasia is also referred to as the instructor of Pericles (235e) and the author of his renowned funeral oration (236b). || 14 In “Irony and Plato’s Menexenus”, AC 81 (2012) 13–30, D. Engels casts doubt on the unity between the ironic introductory dialogue and the serious funeral speech that ensues, putting forth the assumption that the two parts of the speech were written by different authors. N. Pappas and M. Zelcer recently presented a provocative position on Menexenus as an improvement on Pericles’ Thucydidean Funeral Speech (Politics and Philosophy in Plato’s Menexenus. Education and Rhetoric, Myth and History, London/New York 2015; cf. also their articles in H. Parker/M. Robitzsch [eds.], Speeches for the Dead. Essays on Plato’s Menexenus, Berlin/Boston 2018). However, see also the correct objections raised by C. Eucken (BMCR 2015.07.17).

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What is the relationship between Menexenus and Isocrates’ Panegyricus (4; 380 BC), which repeats funeral speech motifs? Modern scholarship is divided: the impact of the Epitaphioi of that period on Menexenus, a speech integrally linked to the Corinthian War (395–387/386 BC), suggest an earlier date.15 On the contrary, C.W. Müller (1991, 140–156) believes that Menexenus should be dated later than Panegyricus and is marked by Plato’s ironic reaction against Isocrates.16 The former appears to be the most likely possibility. Whereas in Menexenus (235c) the orator is in the difficult position of speaking almost unprepared, invoking the usual chalepon motif (“difficult”, signaling a Hindernismotiv) of very recent assignment (ἐξ ὑπογύου, “off-hand, on the spur of the moment”), Isocrates repeats this ἐξ ὑπογύου (4.13) in order to consciously deride this attitude adopted by orators giving funeral speeches. In Phaedrus Plato’s dispute with rhetoric takes place on a different level. Plato does not categorically reject rhetoric; he argues against sophistic rhetoric, which was prevalent during his era. A number of popular sophists and orators of the Sicilian tradition are cited on the basis of contemporary handbooks on rhetoric (266d–267d): Gorgias of Leontini, Theodorus of Byzantium (cf. 261c), Euenus of Paros (presented as a sophist in Apology 20b ff.), Tisias of Syracuse, Polos of Acragas (a interlocutor of Socrates in Gorgias), Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (cf. 261c) and Licymnius of Chios.17 All these rhetoricians in the late 5th and early 4th century BC employ exhaustive terminology with respect to the parts of an oration and compete with each other through the formulation of technical terms and neologisms. In Plato’s view, what interests an orator is not actual facts but eikos (“what is likely”): traditional rhetoric ranks likelihood higher than the truth (273c).18 However, while Plato criticizes the sophistic rhetoric of his time for being catastrophic and full of flattery, in Phaedrus he ascribes a new role to rhetoric if philosophy, through a new form of rhetoric, is to have any chance of achieving its political and educational mission (Yunis 2007, 75).19 While rhetoric is characterised in Gorgias as πειθοῦς δημιουργός (454e), it is defined as ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων in Phaedrus, that

|| 15 See Tsitsiridis (1998) 41–52; fine argumentation can also be found in Eucken (2010) 131–145. Cf. D. Hasskamp, Oligarchische Willkür - demokratische Ordnung. Zur athenischen Verfassung im 4. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 2005, 69; Schofield (2008) 48. 16 Cf. Heitsch (2008) 183–190. Erler (2007) 163 presents both possibilities but considers the latter to be more likely. For a parallel interpretation of the two speeches with Greek cultural tradition as the point of reference, see E.V. Haskins, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Cultural Memory. Rereading Plato’s Menexenus and Isocrates’ Panegyricus, RSQ 35 (2005) 25–45. 17 Cf. Fuhrmann (1960) 122–144; Heitsch (1997) 152–158; Noël (2012) 59–70. 18 See Erler (2007) 500. Cf. E. Heitsch, Wege zu Platon. Beiträge zum Verständnis seines Argumentierens, Göttingen 1992, 117–126. 19 Cf. Η. Yunis, Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in Plato, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, Hildesheim 2009, 17–26.

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is, the art of “leading the soul through speeches” (261a; 271c). The concept of psychagōgia is initially related to raising (dead) souls, i.e. by ritual or magic, and its use was transposed from magic ceremonies to poetry and rhetoric, as its use causes a foreign object to undergo a desired process.20 Plato recalls contemporary rhetorical concepts, such as the Gorgianic psychagogic force (82 B11.9–14 D.-K.) in order to juxtapose them against his own personal beliefs and lay a new foundation for rhetoric.21 The psychagōgia of Plato, as the leading of the soul, requires that the speaker be able to replace the auditor’s current beliefs, which are likely to be conventional, with entirely new ones, for example, beliefs that could be sufficiently transformative to make possible an attachment to philosophy (Yunis 2011, 13). Furthermore, logōn technē based only on doxa and not on alētheia is ridiculous, and not an art at all (262c: γελoία and ἄτεχνoς). True rhetoric is based on logic and requires cognitive competence (Erler 2007, 503). In Plato’s view, this craft must be uniform and the speech must be organised like a living being. It must have a beginning, middle and end co-existing in harmony (264c). Orators must know the souls of their listeners and which parts of their soul are touched by each speech (271d–272a). Therefore, rhetorical composition is joined by psychology. The distinction of nature into body and soul, as formally developed by Plato in Gorgias through the example of true arts and their imitations, also applies to Phaedrus, whereas rhetoric is equiparated to medicine (270b; cf. Vegetti 1995, 97–122). Both medicine and rhetoric must function not only on the basis of empirical technique but also through technē, so that the former can impart health and strength to the body and the latter give the soul peithō and aretē through proper discourses and training. Since rhetoric aims at guiding the soul, it must have a psychological foundation. Μ. Erler (2007, 499) aptly identifies an anthropological grounding of rhetoric in this approach. In contrast to the technical form of his contemporary rhetoric, Plato turns towards a psychological direction of rhetoric on a philosophical-dialectical basis (271c–272a):22 Phaedrus (271c) ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, (271d) τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διῃρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς

|| 20 Hellwig (1973) 33. For the transposition of psychagōgein from magic ceremonies (Aesch. Pers. 687; Eurip. Alc. 1128; Plat. Leg. 909b; Plut. De ser. num. vind. 560F) to poetry and rhetoric, see J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Harvard MA/London 1975, 15. 21 See Hellwig (1973) 24–42, esp. 33 ff. Cf. Murray (1988) 279–289; Heitsch (1994) 219–234; Trampedach (1994) 186 ff.; Yunis (1996) 201–207. 22 Cf. Kennedy (1994) 39–43; Fuhrmann (1995) 32–33; Yunis (1996) 172–210; (2007) 75–89; H. Yunis, Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2009) 229–248; H. Yunis, Argument and Form, Philosophy and Rhetoric in Phaedrus, in: M. Erler/J.E. Hessler (eds.), Argument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie, Berlin/Boston 2013, 179–190.

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τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, (271e) μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὧν τότε ἤκουεν λόγων συνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχῃ οἷος ὑφ’ οἵων πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς ᾖ διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, (272a) ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ᾗ προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ, ταῦτα δ’ ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ’ οὔ. Phaedrus (271c) Socr. Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul (psychagōgia), (271d) whoever intends to be a rhetorician (rhētorikos) must know how many kinds of soul there are. Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such a sort; hence some people have suchand-such a character and others have such-and-such. Those distinctions established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many kinds of speech, each of such-and-such a sort. People of such-and-such a character are easy to persuade by speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with suchand-such an issue for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are difficult to persuade for those particular reasons. The orator must learn all this well, (271e) then put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life. Otherwise he won’t be any better off than he was when he was still listening to those discussions in school. He will now not only be able to say what kind of person is convinced by what kind of speech; on meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself (272a) that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of character (physis) he had learned about in school ‒ to that he must now apply speeches of such-and-such a kind in this particular way in order to secure conviction (peithō) about such-and-such an issue. When he has learned all this ‒ when, in addition, he has grasped the right occasions for speaking and for holding back; and when he has also understood when the time is right for Speaking Concisely (brachylogia) or Appealing to Pity (eleinologia) or Exaggeration (deinōsis) or for any other of the kinds of speech he has learned and when it is not ‒ then, and only then, will he have finally mastered the art (technē) well and completely. (Transl. A. Nehamas/P. Woodruff in: Cooper 1997)

It should be noted that Isocrates is mentioned by name at the end of Phaedrus (278e– 279b): Plato claims that young Isocrates has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character and a greater predisposition towards philosophy (φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ).23 Despite the dispute between Isocrates and Plato, this praise must most likely be considered sincere.24 This

|| 23 Cf. Erler (2009) 86. 24 Cf. Erbse (1971) 183–197; Alexiou (2010) 14; Wareh (2012) 68, 92; in part, Görgemanns (1994) 28 note 22; Erler (2007) 217; Schofield (2008) 51. For the opposite view, i.e. that this is an ironic apostrophe, see de Vries (1969) 17; Heitsch (1997) 218–225, 257–262; Roth (2003) 258–259; Yunis (2011) 243– 244; Zingg (2017) 132. On this matter, see also Howland (1937) 151–159; de Vries (1953) 39–45; (1971) 387–390; Ries (1959) 92–94, 130–132; Coulter (1967) 225–236. Finally, interesting questions are raised by M. Laplace, L’hommage de Platon à Isocrate dans le Phèdre, RPh 62 (1988) 273–278; R.B. Rutherford, The Art of Plato, London 1995, 250–251; M. Laplace, Des rapports du Phèdre de Platon avec l’Éloge d’Hélène et le Panégyrique d’Isocrate, Hermes 139 (2011) 165–178.

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is supported by Isocrates’ departure from the technical, formalistic rhetoric of the sophists and by his humanistic education. The work of Isocrates will be examined comprehensively in Chapter 5, but his different views with respect to Plato will be examined in this section. In his autobiographical speech Antidosis (15), Gorgias’ pupil proudly defends his personal career as an author of political speeches and a teacher of rhetoric (Sonnabend 2002, 61) and sets the borders between himself and his contemporary philosophers, with a clear insinuation concerning the Socratic philosophers (15.84–85): Antidosis 15(84) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφρoσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιoσύνην πρoσπoιoυμένων πρoτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστερoι καὶ χρησιμώτερoι φανεῖμεν ὄντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλoῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἀγνooυμένην, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν δὲ τoύτων ἀντιλεγoμένην, ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμoλoγoυμένην. (85) κἀκείνοις μὲν ἀπόχρη τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τινὰς τῇ δόξῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνηθῶσιν εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν ὁμιλίαν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ’ ἐμαυτόν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρῶμαι πείθειν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοί τ’ εὐδαιμονήσουσιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλάξουσιν. Antidosis 15(84) It should be evident that I am more truthful and useful (alēthesteroi kai chrēsimōteroi) than those who claim to turn people toward self-restraint (sōphrosyne) and justice (dikaiosynē). For they exhort people to a virtue (aretē) and to a wisdom (phronēsis) unrecognized by others and debated over by themselves, whereas I exhort them to one acknowledged by everyone (homologoumenē). (85) They are pleased with themselves if they can attract pupils into their company by their reputations, whereas I shall never be seen inviting anyone to follow me; instead, I try to persuade the whole city to undertake activities which will lead to their own happiness and will free the rest of the Greeks from their present evils. (Transl. J.L. Too in: Mirhady/ Too 2000)

In this case, Isocrates challenges the educational activity of the philosophers. He admits that the latter promise sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē, but exhort listeners to a virtue that is either ignored by the rest of the world or the content of which is disputed by them, while he stands out as an early theroetician of “common sense” and “public opinion”.25 Through the concept of homologoumenē aretē (“popular morality”), he propounds the moral dimension of his rhetoric, juxtaposing it against Platonic philosophy. His worldview is based on predominant traditional values and represents popular morality (Dover 1974) which is not only reproduced but adapted to the ideas of his era concerning the presence of man as an individual and political entity. For Isocrates, adherence to homologoumenē aretē is not an expression of incapacity of

|| 25 See Alexiou (2007) 1–14. Haskins (2004) 124 uses the term “popular culture” to characterise the background of Isocrates’ speeches. Cf. Walter (1996) 434–440; S. Halliwell, Philosophical Rhetoric or Rhetorical Philosophy? The Strange Case of Isocrates, in: B.D. Schildgen (ed.), The Rhetoric Canon, Detroit 1997, 107–126; Schiappa (1999) 162–184. See also T. Reinhardt, Rhetoric and Knowledge, in: Worthington (2007) 370–371.

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deeper moral thought, but an established principle of his rhetorical logōn paideia. This passage (15.84) notably focuses on the more true and more profitable content of Isocrates’ teachings (ἀληθέστεροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι). The latter concept explains the former: for Isocrates, what is useful and politically profitable is true. Through his rhetoric, he exhorts the entirety of his city towards a form of politics that will result in prosperity for Athenians and will deliver the rest of the Greeks from their tribulations. Isocrates’ ideology focuses on social contributions and is intensely utilitarian in nature. In the proem to his exhortative speech Nicocles (3.2–5), Isocrates refutes Plato’s beliefs concerning rhetoric, i.e. that it grants the means for greed in order to deceive one’s fellow man. The two key-words are aretē and pleonexia. The latter is a predominant expression of individual competitive motives.26 The seriousness of Isocrates’ approach to philosophical criticism is attested by the fact that pleonektein in judicial disputes is included ‒ approximately 20 years later ‒ in the fictitious charge against rhetorical acitivity (15.30) and its defence in Antidosis 15.253–257 repeats the praise of logos in Nicocles 5–9. According to Isocrates, logos is considered a recognised agathon in the sense of popular morality. The handling of logos is similar to that of other common goods, such as wealth, strength and courage which, depending on their usefulness and use, undergo a varied interpretation, either positive or negative. By analogy, Isocrates justifies the rhetorical pursuit of advantage, provided it takes place within the context of justice (3.2: μετ’ ἀρετῆς πλεονεκτεῖν; cf. 15.281–285). The chief tenet of Isocratean rhetoric is clear: it is not logos that is harmful; its use by man is exclusively responsible for any adverse consequences it might entail. In this spirit, Isocrates does not extirpate individual competitive values (e.g. the desire for success and excellence), which had been deeply rooted in Greek society since the Homeric era, but condemns the blind pursuit of competitive desires. In fact, in Antidosis 15.275–285 he expounds on his educational ideas for desirable philotimia (“ambition”) and fair pleonexia (“gaining an advantage”), where the pursuits of the individual and the state are not done away with altogether, but are distinguished from the arbitrary behaviour of unjust pleonexia (15.281–285; see below Chapter 5.2.2.5). The most sound expression of this core belief of Isocrates may be encountered in Panathenaicus (12.223): “Τhings do not of their own nature either help or harm us, but that the manner in which they are used and employed by men is the cause of all that happens to us” (οὐχ αἱ φύσεις αἱ τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτ’ ὠφελοῦσιν οὔτε βλάπτουσιν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὡς αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις ἁπάντων ἡμῖν αἴτιαι τῶν συμβαινόντων εἰσίν). The nature of things is unchanging. There cannot be a contradictory natural property (12.224: “It is not conceivable that each thing should have a nature

|| 26 For pleonexia, see Weber (1967), esp. 134–154; K.S. Frank, Habsucht (Geiz), RAC 13 (1986) 226– 246; C. Bouchet, La ΠΛΕΟΝΕΞΙΑ chez Isocrate, REA 109 (2007) 475–489; Alexiou (2010) 99–100; (2013) 47–73; (2015) 73–90.

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which itself is contrary to itself and not the same”). The fact that what benefits one harms another proves that the way we approach things serves as a touchstone ‒ and this depends on each individual.27 It is important that by introducing objective criteria regarding the nature of things, Isocrates reaches an anthropocentric criterion as regards the effects of our actions: the sophistic principle of man as the measure of all things (Protagoras 80 B1 D.K.: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν) is transformed into a moral expression of individuals, who are ultimately and exclusively responsible for their actions. Therefore, the charges brought against rhetoric are immaterial, as they do not touch upon the natural property of logos, which is good; the charges must be brought against the baseness of those who misuse speech and harm their fellow man. Based on the above, in Nicocles (3.5–9; cf. 15.253–257) ‒ and focusing on logos ‒ Isocrates presents an outline for cultural evolution, moving from a primitive state of affairs to a human society that reaches its pinnacle with eu phronein and eu legein as the defining features of an educated man: Nicocles 3(5) νῦν δ’ ἀμελήσαντες τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον περὶ ἑκάστου διορίζεσθαι πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς λόγους δυσκόλως διάκεινται, καὶ τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασιν ὥστ’ οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τοιούτῳ πράγματι δυσμενῶς ἔχοντες ὃ πάντων τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιόν ἐστιν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις οἷς ἔχομεν οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων διαφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ τῷ τάχει καὶ τῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδεέστεροι τυγχάνομεν ὄντες· (6) ἐγγενομένου δ’ ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν ἂν βουληθῶμεν, οὐ μόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ᾠκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕρομεν, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ δι’ ἡμῶν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. (7) οὗτος γὰρ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐνομοθέτησεν· ὧν μὴ διαταχθέντων οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ ἦμεν οἰκεῖν μετ’ ἀλλήλων. τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐγκωμιάζομεν. διὰ τούτου τούς τ’ ἀνοήτους παιδεύομεν καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δοκιμάζομεν· τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα, καὶ λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ νόμιμος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς εἴδωλόν ἐστιν. (8) μετὰ τούτου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἀγωνιζόμεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων σκοπούμεθα· ταῖς γὰρ πίστεσιν αἷς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πείθομεν, ταῖς αὐταῖς ταύταις βουλευόμενοι χρώμεθα, καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μὲν καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ πλήθει λέγειν δυναμένους, εὐβούλους δὲ νομίζομεν οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἄριστα περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαλεχθῶσιν. (9) εἰ δὲ δεῖ συλλήβδην περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τῶν φρονίμως πραττομένων εὑρήσομεν ἀλόγως γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν διανοημάτων ἁπάντων ἡγεμόνα λόγον ὄντα, καὶ μάλιστα χρωμένους αὐτῷ τοὺς πλεῖστον νοῦν ἔχοντας. Nicocles 3(5) As it stands, those who neglect to make this distinction in each case are ill disposed to all discourse (logoi), and they have erred to such an extent that they do not notice that they are opposed to such an activity which, of all the qualities of human nature, is the cause of all the greatest goods. In other respects, we do not differ from other living beings, and we are inferior to many in speed, strength, and other resources. (6) But since we have the ability to persuade

|| 27 Cf. Roth (2003) 231.

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one another and to make clear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (technai). Speech (logos) is responsible for nearly all our inventions. (7) It legislated in matters of justice and injustice, and beauty and baseness, and without these laws, we could not live with one another. By it we refute the bad and praise the good; through it we educate the ignorant and recognize the intelligent. We regard speaking well to be the clearest sign of a good mind, which it requires, and truthful, lawful, and just speech we consider the image (eidōlon) of a good and faithful soul. (8) With speech we fight over contentious matters, and we investigate the unknown. We use the same arguments by which we persuade others in our own deliberations; we call those able to speak in a crowd ‘‘rhetorical’’ (rhētorikoi); we regard as sound advisers (eubouloi) those who debate with themselves most skillfully about public affairs. (9) If one must summarize the power (dynamis) of discourse, we will discover that nothing done prudently occurs without speech (logos), that speech is the leader (hēgemōn) of all thoughts and actions, and that the most intelligent (noun echontes) people use it most of all. (Transl. J.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Isocrates extols logos, both speech and thought, as the key distinguishing feature between animals and men and as a touchstone for all human achievements, even in terms of morality (3.6–7). The goals of Isocratean rhetoric are not limited to training in the field of rhetoric, but are always embedded in the social and political presence of citizens and coincide with the goal of kalokagathia. For Plato, rhetoric is merely the image (Gorg. 463d: εἴδωλον) of a true technē, whereas for Isocrates it is the image (εἴδωλον) of one’s overall personality. It is only with this comprehensive cultivation of human personality, in a humanistic spirit, that one may perceive how speech can serve as the finest symbol of proper thought (τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον) and how discourse which is true, lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul (λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ νόμιμος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς εἴδωλόν ἐστιν; Alexiou 2018, 87–103). Therefore, apart from specific training in rhetoric, the goal is to achieve practical thinking, sound judgment and a moral attitude. Rhētorikoi are those who speak before an audience; eubouloi are those who can converse with themselves in an exceptional manner. Isocrates transforms speech into a cultural and humanistic force that exceeds the borders of the school, the court room and everyday politics (Stroh 2009, 136). Jaeger (1959, III 151) aptly speaks of a “hymn to logos”.28 This fusion of morality and rhetoric indicates considerable progress over the formalistic rhetoric of the sophists and Gorgias in particular (Heath 2017, 78–79).

|| 28 A fitting characterisation can be found in Steidle (1952) 277: “logos Schöpfer der Kultur”. For the “hymn to logos”, see Eucken (1983) 252–254; C. Eucken, Zum Konzept der πολιτικοὶ λόγοι bei Isokrates, in: Orth (2003) 38–39; Ueding (1995) 22–23; Haskins (2004) 87–95; Y.L. Too, Rehistoricizing Classicism. Isocrates and the Politics of Metaphor in Fourth-Century Athens, in: J.I. Porter (ed.), Classical Pasts. The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome, Princeton/Oxford 2006, 107–108; Too (2008) 16, 214–217; Dressler (2014) 41–43; Reckermann (2018) 81 ff. For similarities and differences between Isocrates and the myth of Plato’s Protagoras (320c–322d), see Poulakos (1997) 9–25. For the theories concerning culture during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, see R. Müller, Die Entdeckung der Kultur. Antike Theorien von Homer bis Seneca, Düsseldorf/Zurich 2003, esp. 212–219.

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Through his rhetorical epideixis, Gorgias placed the power of speech at the very centre of his teachings. Logos is “a powerful lord” (δυνάστης μέγας, 82 B11.8 D.-K.). The extraordinary power of logos is a guideline of sophistic persuasion which, however, being dynastic speech, is often interwoven with the violent achievement of personal interests and the so-called “rule of might” (Pedrique 2011).29 The Isocratean speech is dynamis, but it is not violent. The “dynastic” conception of the sophists’ logos is supplanted by the “hegemonic” logos of Isocrates. Logos is the hēgemōn of the thoughts and actions of men and it predominantly characterises those with the greatest intellectual skills (3.9).30 Therefore, logos is transformed into a cultural symbol from which all goods spring forth.31 In conclusion, the positive, linear evolution of humanity from a primitive into a developed society on the basis of logos is valid. Logos also plays a crucial role in Panegyricus (4), with Athens, a vibrant cultural centre in the ancient world, as a point of reference. Athenian culture is found to be pioneering, Athens holds all types of contests (athletic, intellectual, rhetorical) with the greatest prizes (4.45) and is called a “festival throughout all time” (4.46: πανήγυρις ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα) offering incomparable glory.32 Isocrates establishes a direct link between the cultural influence of Athens and his humanistic educational ideal which is defined as philosophia in Isocreatean terminology and is, ultimately, a terminus technicus for Isocratean rhetoric (4.45–50): Panegyricus 4(45) καὶ γὰρ θεάματα πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα κέκτηται, τὰ μὲν ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλοντα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας εὐδοκιμοῦντα, τὰ δ’ ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις διαφέροντα· καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰσαφικνουμένων ὡς ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστ’ εἴ τι ἐν τῷ πλησιάζειν ἀλλήλοις ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, καὶ τοῦθ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς περιειλῆφθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ φιλίας εὑρεῖν πιστοτάτας καὶ συνουσίαις ἐντυχεῖν παντοδαπωτάταις μάλιστα παρ’ ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ἔτι δ’ ἀγῶνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ ῥώμης ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἁπάντων, καὶ τούτων ἆθλα μέγιστα. (46) πρὸς γὰρ οἷς αὐτὴ τίθησιν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδόναι συναναπείθει· τὰ γὰρ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν κριθέντα τοσαύτην λαμβάνει δόξαν ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαπᾶσθαι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων αἱ

|| 29 For the link between peithō and bia, see Aesch. Agam. 385; Plat. Gorg. 517b; Leg. 711c, 863b; Demosth. 17.23; 21.40; Plut. Tim. 19.3. Cf. Suda π 1436 s.v. πειθανάγκη· ἡ μετὰ βίας πειθώ. Cleon is characterised by Thucydides 3.36.6 as βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν and πιθανώτατος. See also K.S. Rothwell, Politics and Persuasion in Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, Leiden 1990, 30–31 with note 30; E. Stafford, Worshipping Virtues. Personification and the Divine in Ancient Greece, London 2000, 132; W. Blösel, Themistokles bei Herodot. Spiegel Athens im fünften Jahrhundert. Studien zur Geschichte und historiographischen Konstruktion des griechischen Freiheitskampfes 480 v. Chr., Stuttgart 2004, 286. 30 For Isocrates’ “hegemonic” logos in contrast to the sophists’ “dynastic” logos, see J. Poulakos, Rhetoric and Civic Education. From the Sophists to Isocrates, in: Poulakos/Depew (2004) 69–83. 31 Eucken (1983) 168, 252–254. For the contrast between peithō and bia, see Thuc. 4.87.2; 6.54.4; Eurip. Suppl. 347; Plat. Resp. 548b; Xenoph. Symp. 8.20; Plut. Flam. 2.3; Sol. 16.2; Mar. 29.3; Dem. 32.7; Praec. reip. 801E. Cf. Arist. Eth. Eud. 1224a 13–15: δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων; 1224a 39; R.G.A. Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy. A Study of Peitho, Cambridge 1982, esp. 58–63. 32 This passage is best analysed by Eucken (1983) 153–155.

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μὲν ἄλλαι πανηγύρεις διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου συλλεγεῖσαι ταχέως διελύθησαν, ἡ δ’ ἡμετέρα πόλις ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις πανήγυρίς ἐστιν. (47) φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἣ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασεν καὶ πρός τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσεν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράϋνε καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τάς τε δι’ ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας διεῖλεν καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι, τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσιν, (48) συνειδυῖα μὲν ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ζώων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν διηνέγκαμεν, ὁρῶσα δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταραχώδεις οὔσας τὰς τύχας ὥστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὖ φρονούσης ἔργον ὄντας, (49) καὶ τούς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτῃ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθερίως τεθραμμένους ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρείας καὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσκομένους, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνομένους, καὶ τοῦτο σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἑκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδεδειγμένον, καὶ τοὺς λόγῳ καλῶς χρωμένους οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν δυναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐντίμους ὄντας. (50) τοσοῦτον δ’ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ’ οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας. Panegyricus 4(45) For it has many very fine displays, some outstanding for their expense, others notable for their artistry, still others superior in both these regards. The number of people who visit our city is so great that if there is any benefit in simply gathering together, our city has gained this too. In addition, here especially one can find the most dependable bonds of friendship and join groups of all sorts; one can also see contests not only of speed (tachos) and strength (rhōmē) but also of speech (logos) and thought (gnōmē) and all other activities, not to mention the greatest prizes for all these. (46) In addition to the prizes our city offers, it persuades others to give similar ones, for what is judged best by us has such weight that it is approved by all people. Apart from this, other panegyric festivals are held only at long intervals and end quickly, whereas our city is a festival (panēgyris) for all time for those who come. (47) Moreover, our city revealed philosophia, which has helped to discover and establish all these institutions. It has taught us about public affairs, made us gentle towards one another, showed us which misfortunes come through ignorance and which through necessity, and taught us to guard against the former and to endure the latter nobly. The city has also honored the power of discourse (logos); everyone desires it and is envious of others who have it. (48) The city knew that we alone of all animals possessed logos as part of our nature and therefore used this advantage to become superior in all other ways. The city also saw that in other matters, fortune is so confused that often the wise have troubles and the foolish prosper. But common people have no share in discourse that is fine and artistic, since this is the task of an intelligent mind, (49) and those who appear wise (sophoi) or foolish (amatheis) differ most in this way. Further, those who are raised from the very beginning like free men (eleutheriōs tethrammenoi) are not known so much for their courage or wealth or other such good qualities, as they become particularly distinguished for what they say, and this has become the surest sign (symbolon) of each person’s education. Those who use discourse well not only have authority in their own cities but are also honored among other cities. (50) Our city has so far surpassed other men in thought and speech that students of Athens have become the teachers of others, and the city has made the name “Greek” seem to be not that of a people but of a way of thinking; and people are called Greeks because they share in our education (paideusis) rather than in our birth. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004 with modifications)

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With logos at the epicentre, Isocrates constructs a cultural hierarchy from a primitive state into a human society, with Athens placed at its peak. In Panegyricus (4.47), when the orator invokes the verbs συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασεν (“has helped to discover and establish”) with respect to philosophia as a life-giving force, he means the contribution of rhetoric to the leading role played by Athens, which included a number of benefactions such as the fruits of the earth and the Eleusinian mysteries (4.28–33), the establishment of colonies (4.34–37), the cultural evolution of Greece (4.39–41) and Athens as a festival for all time (4.45–46).33 In 4.48–50, Isocrates extols logos, both speech and thought, as the key distinguishing feature between animals and men. Intellectual cultivation entails a more moderate and mild character in citizens that is integrally linked to rhetoric. The capacity for phronein kai legein is an assessment criterion both for the individual and for the city as a whole. Those with the conviction of a free man (τοὺς ἐλευθερίως τεθραμμένους) do not win recognition through their courage, wealth or other advantages, but through their speech. Artful rhetorical speeches go a step further, as they do not characterise all men, but only educated ones (ψυχῆς εὖ φρoνoύσης ἔργoν ὄντας). Logos is the most reliable criterion for one’s education. By employing the metaphor (4.49) σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἑκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδεδειγμένον, Isocrates describes this criterion as an officially recognised symbol of one’s education. In other words, eu legein and eu phronein, i.e. Isocratean education, are transferred from the individual to the city, and rhetorical education is underlined as proof of the intellectual superiority of Athens. This idealised image of Athens as a cultural city is a continuation of the Thucydidean maximum in Pericles’ Funeral Speech characterising Athens as the “school of Hellas” (2.41.1: τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσις; cf. Isocr. 4.50: οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν).34 It is remarkable how integrally linked Athens is to Isocrates’ humanistic educational ideal. In Antidosis (15.249) Peithō is worshipped as a deity, while in 15.293 ff. the personified city of Athens is ascribed the role of a teacher of oratory (295: didaskalos) and, in Isocrates’ view, the finest orators are pupils of the city (296). Due to the liberal mentality of its citizens, || 33 See in detail E. Buchner, Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates. Eine historisch-philologische Untersuchung, Wiesbaden 1958, 45–65. 34 On the question of whether the passage concerns the expansion of Greek education and a type of cosmopolitanism on the part of Isocrates or, on the contrary, the shrinking of Greek education to just Athenian education, it is a fact that Isocrates unquestionably extols Athenian education (see J. Jüthner, Isokrates und die Menschheitsidee, WS 47, 1929, 26–31 = F. Seck [ed.], Isokrates, Darmstadt 1976, 122–127), which promotes the educational process, but without isolating itself or remaining static. In this sense, as a starting point, Athenian education is expanded into Greek education, allowing for the prospect of a “barbarian” being transformed, through Athenian and ‒ by extension ‒ Greek education, into a Greek in terms of culture (cf. Isocr. 9.66; Alexiou 2010, 162–163 with additional bibliography). An appropriate turn of phrase can be found in R. Hariman, Civic Education, Classical Imitation and Democratic Policy, in: Poulakos/Depew (2004) 227: “At the same time he was making the art of rhetoric thoroughly Athenian, Isocrates was hellenizing Athens”.

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which includes a mild and moderate temper, Athens is called the “capital of Hellas” (299: ἄστυ τῆς Ἑλλάδος). It is clear that the rhetorical education of Isocrates incorporates moral and cultural values related on all levels to the social status of citizens and the highlighting of their intellectual and moral values. This is a system of traditional morality of the city and of externalisation of homologoumenē aretē. Isocrates is not moved by Socrates’ dialectic; he only recognises a preparatory value in the theoretical study of geometry, astronomy, music and grammar, without justifying their inclusion in the term philosophia (15.265–268; 12.26–28). According to Isocrates, the pursuit of epistēmē, the true knowledge of words and actions (by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say) is contrary to human nature; education aims at proper judgment (doxa) through which one can achieve the best possible result (15.271). Isocratean rhetoric is education of an intensely practical nature. Proper judgment is the characteristic of a man who has received Isocratean education.35 It is remarkable how self-evident Isocrates believes the link between einai and dokein to be. For Plato, public life is in so irremediable confusion that the two concepts coinciding is rendered infeasible. In the ninth book of the Republic (592a–b), Plato envisions a utopian republic which, in his words, exists as an example in heaven, but nowhere on earth. This thought is alien to Isocratean ideology. Isocrates advocates for this, the earthly world, with all its contradictions, successes and failures.36 In To Philip (5.12) he ironically addresses those who draw up legal codes and constitutions that are useless to actual political life. He intractably and optimistically believes that his ideals will come to pass and projects his idealised views onto the glorious Athenian patrios politeia. Since a healthy society existed in the past, Isocrates is optimistic that, under certain conditions, it could exist once more.

2.2 Alcidamas - Isocrates During the 4th century BC, there was also an increase in disputes concerning rhetoric between sophists and orators. The Athenian orator and politician Polycrates (440– 370 BC) authored an Accusation of Socrates and a Defence of Busiris. These two nonextant speeches provoked a strong reaction: in his own Busiris (11.4–8), Isocrates severely criticises Polycrates for boasting of tackling exceptionally difficult topics. We

|| 35 Cf. 12.30: πεπαιδευμένoυς … τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχoντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πoλὺ στoχάζεσθαι τoῦ συμφέρoντoς. See Steidle (1952) 276. Cf. K. Held, Die Doxa in der Pädagogik des Isokrates, in: K. Helmer et al. (eds.), Spielräume der Vernunft. Jörg Ruhloff zum 60. Geburtstag, Würzburg 2000, 106–142. 36 As beautifully put by de Romilly (1958) 101: “We all take after him, in some way or other!”

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must also consider Lysias’ non-extant Defence of Socrates (Cic. De or. 1.231; Diog. Laert. 2.40; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 836B) as another reaction against Polycrates. Polycrates is linked to certain paradoxical encomia concerning Helen, Clytemnestra, cooking pots, pebbles, salt and mice (Arist. Rhet. 1401b 15; Alexand. Peri rhētor. aph. III 3.10 Spengel; Radermacher 1951, 128–132). These encomia belong to paignia, a type of oration, which remained a much-loved rhetorical exercise since Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and throughout antiquity.37 The more paradoxical (para doxan) the topic, the greater the attestation of the orator’s rhetorical skill. An additional example of rhetorical dispute concerns Zoilus of Amphipolis (400– 330 BC), a pupil of Polycrates known as ὁμηρομάστιξ (“scourge of Homer”). He belonged to the Cynics, which is why he acquired the sobriquet κύων ῥητορικός (Aelian. Var. hist. 11.10). His unchecked criticism of his contemporaries included Isocrates (Kata Isokratous; see Suda π 130 s.v. Zoilos). Certain paradoxical encomia, such as the Encomium of Polyphemus or the Encomium of the People of Tenedos (Radermacher 1951, 198–200), are also attributed to him. According to F. Blass (1887–1898, II 376), neither Zoilus nor Polycrates “could attain, due to the playful bombast of their encomia, the heights reached by Isocrates with his serious encomia”. However, at the level of sophistic rhetoric, the dispute between Alcidamas and Isocrates is fundamental. Both were pupils of Gorgias and were active in Athens during the 4th century BC, holding different beliefs in regard to the ideal rhetorical art. Alcidamas was a proponent of orality and autoschediazein (“to improvise”). He is opposed to excessive use of the written word and, on this point, is in agreement with Plato, who similarly criticises writing from a philosophical perspective in Phaedrus (274c ff.). In the past, scholarship focused excessively on the mutual criticism of Alcidamas and Isocrates and endeavoured to identify the sequence of their speeches in order to interpret them as critique and response, as attack and defence or counterattack.38 At times, an attempt was made to extend this criticism to others.39 Contemporary scholarship, with minor variations, generally agrees that in his speech On Those who Write Written Speeches, or On Sophists, Alcidamas turns against Isocrates, || 37 Such paignia were beloved progymnasmata during the so-called second sophistic period. These include the Encomium of Hair by Dio Chrysostom, which finds a reply in the extant Encomium of Baldness by the Christian Synesius. Other works attributed to Dio include the Encomium of a Parrot (Synes. Dion 2.1; Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.487 Κayser) and the Encomium of a Gnat (Synes. Dion 3.9), while the corpus of Lucian includes the Encomium of a Fly. For paradoxical speeches in antiquity, see E. Talbot, De ludicris apud veteres laudationibus, Paris 1850; Burgess (1902) 89–261, esp. 157–166; Peace (1926) 27–42; G. Anderson, The Second Sophistic. A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire, London/ New York 1993, 171–199; Pernot (1993) 20, 532–546; Nightingale (1995) 100–102; D. Marsh, Lucian and the Latins. Humor and Humanism in the Early Renaissance, Ann Arbor 1998, 148–180. 38 See Spengel (1828) 173–174; Reinhardt (1873) 7–16; Van Hook (1919) 89–94; Barwick (1966–1967) 220–221. 39 See G. Teichmüller, Literarische Fehden im vierten Jahrhundert vor Chr., I, Breslau 1881, 81–99. Walberer (1938) 22–39 conjectures that the invective of Isocrates is against Lysias.

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but perceives their rivalry less as intransigent attacks in the form of “arguments counter-arguments” (Muir 2001, xiv) and primarily as propagandistic speeches in favour of each orator’s views.40 Life: According to the meagre, subsequent information available, Alcidamas, the son of Diocles, lived during the first half of the 4th century BC. He was born in Elaea, in Aeolis (Athen. 13.592c; Suda α 1283 s.v. Alkidamas). He studied under Gorgias and is alleged to have later inherited his school (Suda γ 388 s.v. Gorgias). Aeschines, who was also a proponent of improvisation, is alleged to have been his pupil, but nothing is certain (Suda ι 347 s.v. Aischines). Demosthenes, too, is alleged to have been the recipient of his instruction and art, although this information should be treated cautiously ([Lucian] Demosth. Enc. 12; Suda δ 454 s.v. Demosthenes). If we assume that Alcidamas’ Messenian Speech is related to Isocrates’ Archidamus,41 then the terminus post quem of his death is approximately 365 BC. Work: According to his own admission, Johannes Tzetzes (12th century) had read numerous works by Alcidamas (Chiliad. 11.737–744). Today, two full texts are attributed to him: the speech On Those who Write Written Speeches, or On Sophists, which has been considered authentic since the time of L. Spengel (1828) 173–174 and J. Vahlen (1863) 507–511, and the speech Odysseus, Against the Treachery of Palamedes, the authenticity of which is disputed,42 as it seems stylistically removed from Alcidamas’ style. This is a fictitious judicial speech dedicated to a mythological subject, most likely in response to Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes: Odysseus accuses his friend Palamedes of betraying the Greeks to the Trojans. However, while Gorgias exploits all the capabilities of arguments ek tou eikotos in order to prepare a defence speech, Alcidamas focuses on character assassination (diabolē; Edwards 2007, 49), a technique further developed by Isaeus, Demosthenes and Dinarchus. The speech On Sophists (approximately 390 BC) is very important for rhetorical theory. Alcidamas opposes the proponents of the written word and favours autoschediazein. Of the Messenian Speech only fragments remain. This was a deliberative speech that, contrary to Isocrates’ philolaconian speech Archidamus, proposes peace and the liberation of the Messenians. The speech may have been a rhetorical exercise (Muir 2001, xviii). Certain paradoxical encomia written by Alcimadas are known to us by their titles: On Nais (Athen. 13.592c), Encomium of Death (Cic. Tusc. 1.116; Menand. Diaer. epid. 346.17–19).43 Of greater literary interest is his poem titled Mouseion, referred to by Stobaeus who reproduces two lines (4.52.22: ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον, / φύντα δ᾽ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο περῆσαι; cf. their repetition in 4.52.30 in relation to Theognis 425 ff.), also encountered in the extant version (dating back to the 2nd century AD) of the legendary Contest between Homer and

|| 40 Cf. O’Sullivan (1992) 23–24; Usener (1994) 3, 16, 113–119; Hammerstaedt (1996) 1222–1225; Mariss (2002) 53–55; Zingg (2017) 133–137. 41 See Spengel (1828) 7. Cf. Vahlen (1861) 506; Avezzù (1982) 82–83. 42 For a view in favour of authenticity, see Muir (2001) xii-xviii; otherwise, O.A. Baumhauer, Alcidamas, Brill’s New Pauly 1 (2002) 448. Cf. N. O’Sullivan, The Authenticity of [Alcidamas] Odysseus. Two New Linguistic Considerations, CQ 58 (2008) 638–647. 43 If the phrase ἢ τοῦ is deleted from Menander’s text, then an Encomium on Poverty must be attributed to Proteus the Cynic (2nd century AD). Cf. D.A. Russell/N.G. Wilson, Menander Rhetor. Edited with Translation and Commentary, Oxford 1981, 249; Avezzù (1982) 68.

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Hesiod in honour of Amphidamas in Chalkis, where Hesiod was the victor. Following the pioneering study by a young F. Nietzsche and papyrus fragments44 that resoundingly confirmed the correctness of his view, it is now considered a proven fact that a version of the narrative of the contest between the two champions of epic poetry was included in Alcidamas’ Mouseion. The motif common to both Mouseion and the speech On Sophists may have been improvisation (Vogt 1959, 193–221; 1962, 103–111): Alcidamas possibly clarified the art of improvisation through renowned examples of poets, philosophers and legislators (Avezzù 1982, 86; Muir 2001, xx). Information on the authoring of Technē Rhētorikē (reference is made in Plut. Demosth. 5.7 to the rhetorical arts of Alcidamas) is questionable.45 Alcidamas’ style did not attract major enthusiasts in antiquity. Although Cicero (Tusc. 1.116) characterises him as a top-tier ancient orator (rhetor antiquus in primis nobilis) and extols the “wealth of his eloquence” (ubertas orationis), Aristotle (Rhetoric 1405b35–1406b14) draws almost all his examples of τὸ ψυχρόν, a style devoid of grace, from Alcidamas, who adopted the affected, poetic style of Gorgias: ponderous compounds, unfamiliar words (glosses), inappropriate epithets and excessive metaphors (O’ Sullivan 1992, 32– 42).

Through his criticism of the written word and his exhortation in favour of articulate improvisation, Alcidamas stands in contrast to Isocrates (Eucken 1983, 121). The speech On Sophists is defined by the author in the opening as a fictitious judicial speech, an accusation against written speeches (2). Thus, in the probatio (3–28), Alcidamas lays the charge against his competitors, and defends his own rhetoric art in the refutatio (29–33). Those men who devote their lives to writing may be called poets rather than sophists (2: πολὺ δικαιότερον ἂν ποιητὰς ἢ σοφιστὰς προσαγορεύεσθαι). Recalling the Gorgianic link between metre and poetry (82 B11.9 D.-K.: τὴν πoίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νoμίζω καὶ ὀνoμάζω λόγoν ἔχoντα μέτρoν), Alcidamas considers rhythm a characteristic of written speeches (16–17). Alcidamas juxtaposes meticulous, rhythmic written speeches, which he censures as immobile and inflexible, against vibrant extemporaneous speeches. Autoschediazein is a key concept in extempore speeches and is first employed by Alcidamas as a terminus technicus for rhetoric.46 Alcidamas || 44 F. Nietzsche, Der Florentinische Tractat über Homer und Hesiod, ihr Geschlecht und ihren Wettkampf, RhM 25 (1870) 528–540; 28 (1873) 211–249. See also J.P. Mahaffy, The Flinders Petrie Papyri, I, Dublin 1891, 70 Nr. 25; J.G. Winter, A New Fragment on the Life of Homer, TAPhA 56 (1925) 120–129; Β. Mandilaras, A New Papyrus Fragment of the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, in: M. Capasso (ed.), Papiri letterari greci e latini, Galatina 1992, 55–62. For the contribution of F. Nietzsche, see J.I. Porter, Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future, Stanford 2000, 239–241, 318 note 164; Mariss (2002) 21–24. On a version of the text prior to Alcidamas, as it emerges from Aristophanes (Peace 1282–1283; contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in Frogs 830 ff.), see N.J. Richardson, The Contest of Homer and Hesiod and Alcidamas’ Mouseion, CQ 31 (1981) 1–10; R.M. Rosen, Aristophanes’ Frogs and the Contest of Homer and Hesiod, TAPhA 134 (2004) 295–322. 45 Mariss (2002) 25. Otherwise, see Avezzù (1982) 54–58, 91–92. 46 Mariss (2002) 143. Cf. Hammerstaedt (1996) 1221–1225; W. AX, Improvisation in der antiken Rhetorik, in: M. Gröne et al. (eds.), Improvisation. Kultur- und lebenswissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Freiburg 2009, 63–78. The concept first occurs in Thucydides (1.138.3) in reference to Themistocles’ abilities and has a positive connotation but in a non-rhetorical context. See S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, I, Oxford 1991, 223.

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scorns written epideictic speeches (On Sophists 9–14, 16, 30, 33–34) and praises the contribution of improvisation to deliberative and judicial speeches. Extemporaneous speaking (9: ἐκ τοῦ παραυτίκα) is necessary for the needs that arise in public and private life, while authors of written speeches cannot meet the requirements of democratic everyday life. This is proven by the fact that even professional authors of judicial speeches avoid pedantic precision and imitate the style of extempore speakers, as this is the only way they can achieve reliability (13). The concept of akribeia (“precision”)47 overlies all the properties that characterise a written speech (Mariss 2002, 177): this is defined as the excessive and exhaustive deliberation of epideictic speeches, which is not in harmony with the requirements of eloquent improvisation of everyday life.48 The charge brought by Alcidamas against his opponents, i.e. that they cannot improvise and have a weak voice (15: ἀφωνότερον εἶναι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν; 16: τῶν ἰσχνοφώνων) must be considered as a clear polemic against Isocrates who, by his own admission (5.81; 12.9–10; cf. [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 837A), was physically unable to appear before a crowd and had a weak voice.49 In contrast to Alcidamas, Isocrates is an advocate for the diligence and systematic care of an epideictic speech, as defined through the stylistic terminus technicus akribeia and synonymous concepts.50 An orator can precisely expound upon a topic or deliberate on a speech (8.80; cf. 13.17; 12.246). The concept of akribeia concerns – apart from harmonious, rhythmic structure – the aesthetic integrity of epideictic speeches, the judicious selection of words, the finish and the purity of the style (5.4: ἀκριβῶς καὶ καθαρῶς). Isocrates rejects autoschediazein (13.9), while the stylistic terminus technicus is used in 4.11 to describe epideictic speeches as exceptionally carefully composed (λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοι). In the proem to Panegyricus (4.11–14), Isocrates favours deliberate care of the style of an epideictic speech in contrast to extempore speaking: judicial speeches require simplicity, while epideictic speeches require precision. The former is easier and does not require particular care and art, while the latter is harder and is considered superior: Panegyricus 4(11) καίτοι τινὲς ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις, καὶ τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασιν ὥστε τοὺς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν πεποιημένους πρὸς τοὺς

|| 47 For the concept of akribeia, see Kurz (1970) 32–34, 154–163. Cf. M. Gagarin, The Orality of Greek Oratory, in: E.A. Mackay (ed.), Signs of Orality. The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World, Leiden 1999, 163–180; J. Schloemann, Spontaner und vorbereiteter Vortrag. Hypokrisis im dritten Buch der aristotelischen Rhetorik, Philologus 144 (2000) 206–216; T.A. van Berkel, Voiced Mathematics. Orality and Numeracy, in: N.W. Slater (ed.), Voice and Voices in Antiquity. Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, 11, Leiden/Boston 2017, 321–350. 48 Cf. On Sophists 13, 14, 16, 20, 25, 33, 34. 49 Cf. Barwick (1960) 220; Avezzù (1982) 78; Eucken (1983) 124; Edwards (2007) 48. 50 Cf. Wersdörfer (1940) 95–96, 138; Usher (1990) 151–152; Bons (1993) 162–165; Hammerstaedt (1996) 1224–1225. See also Kurz (1970) 32–34. Cf. the concepts of technikōs, philoponōs in Isocr. 4.48; 6.100; 9.73; 13.12; Epist. 6.6. See Alexiou (2000) 174–176.

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ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων σκοποῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁμοίως δέον ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὺς μὲν ἀφελῶς, τοὺς δ’ ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ἢ σφᾶς μὲν διορῶντας τὰς μετριότητας, τὸν δ’ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενον λέγειν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν. Panegyricus 4(11) Nonetheless, some criticize speeches that are beyond ordinary citizens (idiōtai) and are too carefully composed. They have so misjudged things that they analyze elaborate speeches by comparing them to those written for trials about private contracts, as if the two types must be similar, when in fact one is plain, and the other is demonstrative, or as if they themselves observe the middle course while those who know how to speak precisely (akribōs) cannot speak simply (haplōs). (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

Epideictic speeches are superior to judicial speeches as they are the outcome of toil and precision, and result in a greater benefit to society. In 4.12, the τῶν εἰκῇ λεγoμένων (“carelessness of phrase”) is clearly an allusion against the proponents of extemporaneous speaking and, by extension, a simplistic style.51 In Evagoras (9.41), Isocrates, as is his custom, transposes concepts from rhetorical instruction to political life (Alexiou 2010, 128 ff.). The Cypriot king Evagoras, as a representative of Isocratean diligence and rhetorical education, rejects autoschediazein in political affairs which, in combination with oligōrein (“being negligent or indifferent, not dedicating oneself to a task”; 7.46; 7.51; 8.96), has negative connotations: it is the lack of systematic, diligent care for public affairs (oὐκ ᾠήθη δεῖν ὀλιγωρεῖν oὐδ’ αὐτoσχεδιάζειν).52 Through epimeleia tēs psychēs and phronēsis, a fundamental value on the Isocratean scale of values,53 Isocrates connotes a relationship between Evagoras and the Isocratean philosophia, which complements his exceptional inherent gifts54

|| 51 Cf. under the influence of Isocrates [Demosth.] 61.2: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ λεκτικοῖς τῶν λόγων ἁπλῶς καὶ ὁμοίως οἷς ἂν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά τις εἴποι πρέπει γεγράφθαι, τοῖς δ᾿ εἰς τὸν πλείω χρόνον τεθησομένοις ποιητικῶς καὶ περιττῶς ἁρμόττει συγκεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πιθανούς, τοὺς δ᾿ ἐπιδεικτικοὺς εἶναι προσήκει (“Works intended for a listening audience should be written simply, much the same as someone might say something off the cuff, but those that are designed to last for a long time should be composed poetically and elaborately. For the former should persuade but the latter should display the author’s talent”. Transl. I. Worthington 2006). 52 Cf. respectively Xenophon Memorabilia 3.5.21 concerning the lack of preparation on the part of the generals: τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν oἱ πλεῖστoι αὐτoσχεδιάζoυσιν. 53 Isocr. 15.209; 15.271; 15.293–294; 2.51; 9.80; 5.110; 12.127; 12.204. See Steidle (1952) 261 ff.; Mikkola (1954) 203–205; H. Wilms, Techne und Paideia bei Xenophon und Isokrates, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1995, 214, 219 ff., 268 ff.; T. Poulakos, Isocrates’ Civic Education and the Question of Doxa, in: Poulakos/ Depew (2004) 56 ff.; D. Depew, The Inscription of Isocrates into Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy, in: Poulakos/Depew (2004) 166 ff. 54 Cf. Sykutris (1927) 32; Schiappa (1999) 171; otherwise, D.K. Mason, Studies in the Evagoras of Isocrates, Chapel Hill 1975, 80 and Eucken (1983) 265–266, who focus on Evagoras’ inherent abilities and not on systematic education. However, Isocrates believes these two to be interconnected and inseparable. See 15.185: τοῖς καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις διενεγκοῦσιν; cf. 15.187.

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and allows him, like a recipient of Isocratean education,55 to face everyday adversity in any situation (9.42–43). The Isocratean educational ideal of constant care and systematic adherence to a task is best expressed through the Athenian general Timotheus, a pupil of Isocrates (15.128). Isocrates is proud of his pupil, who did not achieve success following a single stroke of good fortune (μιᾷ τύχῃ), as was the case with the Spartan Lysander at the naval Battle of Aegospotamoi, but always acted correctly and prudently (ὀρθῶς ἀεὶ πράττων καὶ νoῦν ἐχόντως) in varied difficult circumstances. The conflict between Alcidamas and Isocrates is not limited to rhetorical theory and practice, but is based on the deep opposition between a traditionally oral culture (orality) and the emergent contender for primacy during the 4th century BC, the written word (literacy).56 In the two passages below (Isocrates Evagoras 9.73 and Alcidamas On Sophists 27), both authors attempt to compare literature and the visual arts ‒ we will later add Plato’s views as well ‒ in order to solidify their specific views: Isocrates Evagoras 9(73) ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ Νικόκλεις, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν εἶναι καλὰ μνημεῖα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων εἰκόνας, πολὺ μέντοι πλείονος ἀξίας τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, ἃς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄν τις μόνον τοῖς τεχνικῶς ἔχουσιν θεωρήσειεν. (74) προκρίνω δὲ ταύτας πρῶτον μὲν εἰδὼς τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει τοῦ σώματος σεμνυνομένους ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ φιλοτιμουμένους· ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τοὺς μὲν τύπους ἀναγκαῖον παρὰ τούτοις εἶναι μόνοις παρ’ οἷς ἂν σταθῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξενεχθῆναί οἷόν τ’ ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσθαι, παρ’ οἷς κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν εὐδοκιμεῖν· (75) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πεπλασμένοις καὶ γεγραμμένοις οὐδεὶς ἂν τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ὁμοιώσειεν, τοὺς δὲ τρόπους τοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ τὰς διανοίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐνούσας ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν μιμεῖσθαι τοῖς μὴ ῥᾳθυμεῖν αἱρουμένοις, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῖς εἶναι βουλομένοις. Isocrates Evagoras 9(73) Nicocles, I think that statues (eikones) of bodies are fine memorials (mnēmeia), but that images of deeds and of character (dianoia) are worth much more, and one can observe these only in skillfully produced speeches. (74) I prefer these, first because I know that noble men pride themselves not so much on bodily beauty as they desire to be honored (philotimeisthai) for their deeds and their wisdom. Second, statues (typoi) necessarily remain among those who set them up, but speeches can be conveyed throughout Greece, published in gatherings of men of good sense, and can be welcomed by those whose respect is worth more than that of all others. (75) In addition to these things, there is the fact that no one would be able to make their own body resemble a statue or a painting, but it is easy for those who wish to take the trouble and are willing to be the best to imitate (mimeisthai) the character (tropoi) and thoughts (dianoiai) of others that are represented in speeches. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

|| 55 See 12.30: τoὺς καλῶς χρωμένoυς τoῖς πράγμασι τoῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην πρoσπίπτoυσι. Cf. 2.39; Roth (2003) 100–101. 56 Görgemanns (1987) 175. Cf. R. Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens, Cambridge 1989; R. Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, Cambridge 1992. See also J. Sickinger, Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens, Chapel Hill 1999; C. Pébarthe, Cité, démocratie et écriture. Histoire de l’alphabétisation d’Athènes à l’époque classique, Paris 2006.

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Alcidamas On Sophists (27) ἡγοῦμαι δ’ οὐδὲ λόγους δίκαιον εἶναι καλεῖσθαι τοὺς γεγραμμένους, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴδωλα καὶ σχήματα καὶ μιμήματα λόγων, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν κατ’ αὐτῶν εἰκότως ἂν δόξαν ἔχοιμεν, ἥνπερ καὶ κατὰ τῶν χαλκῶν ἀνδριάντων καὶ λιθίνων ἀγαλμάτων καὶ γεγραμμένων ζῴων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῦτα μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων ἐστί, καὶ τέρψιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἔχει, χρῆσιν δ’ οὐδεμίαν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ παραδίδωσι, (28) τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ γεγραμμένος λόγος, ἑνὶ σχήματι καὶ τάξει κεχρημένος, ἐκ βιβλίου θεωρούμενος ἔχει τινὰς ἐκπλήξεις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ἀκίνητος ὢν οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς κεκτημένοις παραδίδωσιν. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντων καλῶν ἀληθινὰ σώματα πολὺ χείρους τὰς εὐπρεπείας ἔχοντα πολλαπλασίους ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τὰς ὠφελείας παραδίδωσιν, οὕτω καὶ λόγος ὁ μὲν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς διανοίας ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα λεγόμενος ἔμψυχός ἐστι καὶ ζῇ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἕπεται καὶ τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀφωμοίωται σώμασιν, ὁ δὲ γεγραμμένος εἰκόνι λόγου τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν ἔχων ἁπάσης ἐνεργείας ἄμοιρος καθέστηκεν. Alcidamas On Sophists (27) I do not even think it is right to call written texts “speeches” (logoi): rather, they are like images (eidōla) or outlines (schēmata) or representations (mimēmata) of speeches, and it would be reasonable to view them in the same way as bronze statues or stone sculptures or pictures of animals. Just as these are representations of real bodies ‒ they are a joy to look at but of no real use in people’s lives ‒ (28) in the same way a written speech, which has just one form and arrangement, may have some striking effects when viewed in a book, but for a particular occasion is of no help (ōpheleia) to those who have it because it cannot change (akinētos). And just as real bodies are less attractive in appearance than beautiful statues, but for practical purposes are many times more helpful, so too a speech spoken extemporaneously from one’s own mind is animated (empsychos) and alive and corresponds to actual events, just like a real body, whereas a written text by nature resembles the image (eikōn) of a speech and is totally ineffective. (Transl. M. Gagarin, in: Gagarin/Woodruff 1995)

The three arguments employed by Isocrates in the above passage (9.73–75) to prove the superiority of a rhetorical encomium over an honorary statue are indicative of his views: a) kaloi kagathoi men mainly focus their ambition on deeds and intellect, not on physical beauty; b) statues remain fixed where they are erected, while rhetorical speeches can be disseminated in Greece and broadly recognised by wise men; c) in contrast to the fitness of the body, only the character and thoughts of a person, as described in rhetorical speeches, can be easily imitated.57 When Isocrates speaks of immobile statues (τοὺς μὲν τύπους ἀναγκαῖον παρὰ τούτοις εἶναι μόνοις παρ’ οἷς ἂν σταθῶσιν. The word typos meaning “statue” first appears in Herod. 2.106.2; 2.138.2; 2.153; see LSJ s.v.), he is influenced by a motif most notably encountered in the opening lines to Pindar’s Fifth Nemean Ode (1–2: οὐκ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ’, ὥστ’ ἐλινύσοντα ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ’ ἐπ’ αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος / ἑσταότα).58 The choral lyric poet juxtaposes his poetic art against sculpture and its || 57 For an analysis of Isocrates’ argumentation, see in detail Alexiou (2000) 103–117; (2010) 172–181; Benediktson (2000) 35–37. 58 Cf. I.L. Pfeijffer, Three Aeginetan Odes of Pindar. A Commentary on Nemean V, Nemean III, & Pythian VIII, Leiden 1999, 62, 99–108; D.T. Steiner, Images in Mind. Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, Princeton 2001, 136–145; A.P. Burnett, Pindar’s Songs for Young Athletes of Aigina, Oxford 2005, 63–64; Alexiou (2010) 177.

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motionless achievement. The key concept of the passage is elinysonta, statues that “stand motionless”, in contrast to hymns, which Pindar characterises as mobile works of art (2–3: γλυκεῖα ἀοιδά, / στεῖχ’ ἀπ’ Aἰγίνας διαγγέλλοισα). According to Pindar, poetry is able to travel everywhere and recount how Pytheas honoured Aegina and the heroes of his country through his victory. In a similar passage from the Second Isthmian Ode (46), Pindar declares his belief that his hymns were not composed to stand idle: οὐκ ἐλινύσοντας αὐτοὺς ἐργασάμαν. The ironic statement of Simonides (PMG 581) concerning a stone inscription and the belief that it could last forever is characteristic. On the contrary, it could be easily destroyed by hand. Isocrates transposes the motif from poetry to rhetoric (9.74). The diffusion of the glory of the encomium’s subject over time and through space is the advantage of the “mobile” word, i.e. poetry and prose (ἐξενεχθῆναι … διαδοθέντας). The resemblance of the views held by Pindar and Isocrates concerning the diffusion and recognition of their art is no accident. It originates from the orator’s conscious effort to compete with poetry and, in this sense, take over its role.59 In the proem to Evagoras (9.9–11), as an early example of literary criticism, Isocrates aims, despite the advantages of poetry in terms of metre and rhythm, to eulogise good men in prose with equal success (11: τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εὐλογεῖν μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις ἐγκωμιαζόντων). Thus, Isocrates appears to be competing with poetry, writing exceptional epideictic speeches and addressing listeners who, through the dissemination of his written speeches ‒ in contrast to immobile statues ‒ can recognise both the form and the moral-educational content of his art. In fact, Isocrates refers to Pindar by name in Antidosis (15.166) in order to complain to his fellow citizens that he received less recognition than the poet in question, despite surpassing Pindar in the praise of his city. The motif of “motionless or soulless” works of art is also raised by Alcidamas and Plato in the thematic category of “orality - literacy”. While Isocrates considers epideictic speeches to be mobile works of art, in the above passage (On Sophists 27–28) Alcidamas compares the written word ‒ as opposed to the spoken word and the ability to extemporise ‒ to statues and paintings, which give aesthetic pleasure but have no

|| 59 See Jaeger (1959) III 121; R. Johnson, The Poet and the Orator, CPh 54 (1959) 173–176; T. Papillon, Isocrates and the Greek Poetic Tradition, Scholia 7 (1998) 41–61. For a comparison between Pindar and Isocrates’ Evagoras, see also E.J. Conrotte, Pindare et Isocrate, le lyrisme et l’éloge funèbre, Le Musée Belge 2 (1898) 168–187; G. Fraustadt, Encomiorum in litteris Graecis usque ad Romanan aetatem historia, Leipzig 1909, 62–63; B. Gentili, Poesia e pubblico nella Grecia antica. Da Omero al V secolo, Rome/Bari 1984, 214 ff.; W.H. Race, Pindaric Encomium and Isocrates’ Evagoras, TAPhA 117 (1987) 131–155; M. Vallozza, Alcuni motivi del discorso di lode tra Pindaro e Isocrate, QUCC 64 (1990) 43–58, esp. 49 ff.; A. Ford, The Price of Art in Isocrates. Formalism and the Escape from Politics, in: T. Poulakos (ed.), Rethinking the History of Rhetoric. Multidisciplinary Essays in Rhetorical Tradition, Boulder 1993, 31–52, esp. 48 ff.; W.H. Race, Rhetoric and Lyric Poetry, in: Worthington (2007) 509– 525, esp. 515 ff.

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benefit whatsoever (τέρψιν μέν … χρῆσιν δ’ οὐδεμίαν). Alcidamas focuses his perspective (as does Isocrates) on the lack of verve and benefit when comparing rhetorical speeches to art monuments, the difference being that Alcidamas does not limit these two weaknesses of art monuments, as Isocrates does, to the visual arts, but extends them to written speeches, which are not real speeches but imitations and poor copies of speeches (εἴδωλα καὶ σχήματα καὶ μιμήματα λόγων).60 Plato, too, equates the written word with painting (Phaedrus 275d–276a), characterising it as an image of the living and breathing philosophical word (τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως).61 The concordance between Alcidamas and Plato’s Phaedrus as regards the criticism of the written word must ‒ according to the generally accepted later dating of Plato’s Phaedrus (after 370 BC) ‒ be attributed to Plato’s views deriving from Alcidamas.

|| 60 Cf. Eucken (1983) 121–140; Friemann (1990) 301–315; Kullmann (1990) 317–334; Usener (1994) 106– 119 and the particularly insightful remarks by Mariss (2002) 266–280. 61 Cf. Heitsch (1997) 193–199. In summary, R. Geiger, Literarische Aspekte der Schriften Platons, in: C. Horn/J. Müller/J. Söder (eds.), Platonhandbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung, Stuttgart 2009, 363–386, esp. 376 ff. See also M. McCoy, Alcidamas, Isocrates and Plato on Speech, Writing, and Philosophical Rhetoric, AncPhil 29 (2009) 45–66.

3 Rhetorical Handbooks 3.1 Rhetoric to Alexander or Anaximenes’ Ars Rhetorica Of the number of rhetorical handbooks of the 4th century BC, one of the two extant in their entirety is Rhetoric to Alexander,1 which, although included in the Corpus Aristotelicum, remains a philological enigma to this day, both in terms of dating (prior or subsequent to Aristotle’s Rhetoric) and in terms of its origin: the prevalent view is that the text was most likely written by the 4th-century rhetorician and historian Anaximenes of Lampsacus (c. 380–320 BC). In recent editions, the work is either attributed to Anaximenes as Ars Rhetorica (Fuhrmann 2000) or, more reluctantly, to Ps.-Aristotle as Rhètorique à Alexandre (Chiron 2002) due to the ancient correlation of the text with Aristotle.2 Anaximenes of Lampsacus was a rhetorician and historian of the second half of the 4th century BC, a pupil of the Cynic Diogenes and of the orator Zoilus of Amphipolis (Diog. Laert. 6.57; Suda α 1989 s.v. Anaximenes). It is recorded that he was a tutor of Alexander the Great and accompanied him on his campaigns. In fact, it is noted that he saved his homeland when threatened by the rage of Alexander due to its pro-Persian leanings (Paus. 6.18.2 ff.). Highly skilled in improvisation (Paus. 6.18.6: αὐτοσχεδίως), Anaximenes wrote judicial and deliberative speeches (Dion. Hal. Isae. 19, p. 122 Us.-Rad.). His non-extant Encomium of Helen was more of an apologia rather than an encomium of Helen (Hypoth. Isocr. Hel.). Of his historical works, Hellenica, Philippica and a third work titled On Alexander, only fragments survive (FGrH 72). The libelous parody Tricaranus (“the three-headed”), containing strong political criticism of Athens, Sparta and Thebes, is indicative of his enmity against the Isocratean Theopompus (Paus. 6.18.5).

The work Rhetoric to Alexander is transmitted in approximately 30 manuscripts under the name of Aristotle (none of them dating prior to the 14th century) and was thus named due to a prefatory letter-dedication to Alexander that was possibly forged at a later date.3 The end of the letter (1421b 2–3) makes reference to the technai, authored by Aristotle for Theodectes, as well as the work of the Syracusan Corax. This information, too, is suspect. In the past, the text was considered to have been a rhetorical handbook authored by an ancient rhetorician, e.g. Corax, or a compilation authored by a Peripatetic philosopher;4 nevertheless, the names found in the letter do not necessarily mean

|| 1 Greek text used: Fuhrmann (2000). 2 Cf. Mayhew/Mirhady (2011) 461 note 1. See also Chiron (2007) 101–103; (2011) 236–262. 3 See Chiron (2002) liii-lxvi; also P. Chiron, La lettre dédicatoire apocryphe mise en tête de la Rhétorique à Alexandre. Un faux si impudent?, in: S. Mimouni (ed.), Apocryphité. Histoire d’un concept transversal aux religions du Livre. En hommage à P. Geoltrain, Turnhout 2002, 51–76. 4 Cf. Brzoska (1894) 2089. Wendland (1905) 30 ff. assumes that Theodectes might be a common source of both Rhetoric to Alexander and Aristotle’s Rhetoric. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-003

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anything other than that the handbook is part of a tradition dating back to ancient sophistic (Kennedy 1963, 116). Diogenes Laertius (5.22–27) does not include the work in the Aristotelian corpus. Following the scholar Erasmus (in 1531 AD), the first to reject Aristotle’s authorship, Petrus Victorius (Pier Vettori, in 1548 AD) attributed Rhetoric to Alexander to Anaximenes of Lampsacus.5 Anaximenes published a rhetorical handbook (Dion. Hal. Isae. 19, p. 122 Us.-Rad.) and, according to Quintilian (Inst. or. 3.4.9), classified rhetorical speeches into two genres (judicial and demegoric) and seven species, including the exetastikon eidos (an examination speech intended to identify contradictions), which is not encountered elsewhere in ancient literature. The lexical coincidences of the sources and the corresponding classification of rhetorical speeches at the beginning of Rhetoric to Alexander into three genres (1.1; the epideictic genre is probably a subsequent addition) and seven species, including the exetastikon eidos, are significant indications for attributing the text to Anaximenes.6 In any event, a quotation by Athenaeus (11.508a) strengthens the view that the forged letter that Aristotle supposedly addressed to Alexander was placed prior to the text by the 3rd century AD at the latest. Syrianus (In Hermog. comm. II, p. 11 Rabe; mid-5th century AD) presents the beginning of the text under Aristotle’s name. Recent scholarship has included much conjecture on the history of the text in antiquity, with no certain results.7 However, it is generally admitted that the text dates to about 340 BC. Reference (Rhet. Alex. 8.8) to the aid granted by the Corinthians to the Syracusans under Timoleon against the Carthaginians (343 BC) constitutes a terminus post quem, while the Papyrus Hibeh 26 (between 285 and 250 BC),8 which includes a long excerpt, proves that the text was written before 300 BC (terminus ante quem). Although the text generally lacks accuracy and a systematic structure that would ensure the unhindered, harmonious connection between its independent components, the overall structure consists of three discernible sections that primarily serve the specific topics being covered and not the text in its entirety. The first section (Chapters 1–5) is based on the distinction between the rhetorical genres (genē) of demegoric (dēmēgorikon), epideictic (epideiktikon del. Spengel) and judicial (dikanikon), and examines the seven species (eidē) they comprise in pairs, i.e. exhortation (protreptikon), dissuasion (apotreptikon), praise (enkōmiastikon), condemnation (psektikon), accusation (katēgorikon), defence (apologikon) and the unique examination (exetastikon). This last species might be the reminiscence of an older classification (Mirhady 2007, 8) and is either autonomous or forms part of the other species (1.1; cf. 37.1). The focus of this exploration is the

|| 5 Chiron (2007) 102. On this matter see Spengel (1828); (1862) 604–646 and the systematic approach by Fuhrmann (1965) 681 ff. 6 Fuhrmann (1965) 143 ff.; otherwise, Buchheit (1960) 191 ff. 7 Cf. Patillon (1997) 104–125; Chiron (2007) 101–104; (2011) 236–262. 8 B.P. Grenfell/A.S. Hunt, The Hibeh Papyri, I, London 1906, 114–138.

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effectiveness of the seven rhetorical species, either separately or in terms of their functional interconnection. Compared to Sicilian rhetoric,9 which focused on examples of judicial speeches pertaining to various legal cases, and to subsequent pre-Aristotelian manuals, which Aristotle criticises for their excessive focus on judicial speeches (Rhetoric 1354b 22–29), we now see added to the judicial the demegoric speech and praise and condemnation (Kroll 1940, 1053).10 The three fields where rhetoric is applied, i.e. public speaking, judicial speeches and private gatherings (Rhet. Alex. 1.2), have already been encountered in Alcidamas (On Sophists 9) and Plato (Phaedrus 261a–b; cf. Sophist 222c) as likely sources.11 The second section (Chapters 6–28.4) includes general rhetorical means applicable to all rhetorical species. After listing them in Chapter 6, the author addresses one issue after the other, often using his own special terminology: the proofs (pisteis) 7–17; more specifically, 7–14,7 the primary rhetorical means of persuasion which, without being defined using a special terminus technicus, are described as originating from the actual words, acts, and personalities (αἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; Aristotle calls them entechnoi pisteis): the plausible (eikos), the example (paradeigma), the evidence (tekmērion), the enthymeme (enthymēma; as an indication of contradictions; enthymemes generally refer to inconsistencies and contradictions in a broad sense, not just in the opponent’s words or between the opponent’s words and the stated facts, as is the case with the tekmēria.12 However, Aristotle provides different definitions13), the maxim (gnōmē), the sign (sēmeion) and the necessary proof (elenchos). Moreover, the passages from 14.8–17.2 contain a description of the various supplementary proofs (defined by the author as epithetoi pisteis14 and by Aristotle as atechnoi pisteis), such as the reputation of the speaker or the speaker’s own opinion (doxa tou legontos; cf. below note 20), testimony (martyriai), testimony under torture (basanos), and oath (horkos). This is followed by the anticipation of the opponent’s objections (prokatalēpsis, Ch. 18), the requests of the speakers with regard to the audience (aitēmata, Ch. 19), as well as the brief recapitulation (palillogia, Ch. 20). Starting with Chapter 21, which tackles irony (eirōneia), the structure becomes volatile and at times confusing (Fuhrmann 1960, 14). Without using the common concept of lexis for the stylistic evaluation of a rhetorical speech, the author lays down “a wholly embryonic teaching of expression” (Kroll 1940, 1054; Ch. 22–28.4): teachings on how to adopt an elegant style, how to lengthen a speech and how to speak briefly, on proper names, on the construction of words in a sentence, on clarity of expression and on the Gorgianic figures (antithesis, parisōsis, and paromoiōsis).

|| 9 Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 273c; Arist. Rhet. 1402a 18; Soph. el. 183b 31; Cic. Brut. 46. 10 Cf. Isocr. 13.19; Barwick (1966–1967) 231. 11 Cf. Barwick (1966–1967) 219–220; for a more comprehensive approach, Mariss (2002) 150–152; cf. Mirhady (2008) 398–399. 12 See Chiron (1998) 349–391, esp. 362 ff.; Calboli Montefusco (2007) 105–121. 13 In Aristotle (Rhetoric 1356b 4–6), the enthymēma, as a productive syllogism, constitutes the main type of logical argument. The tekmērion (Rhet. 1357b 1–21) is an irrefutable piece of evidence. This corresponds to the elenchos encounted in Rhet. Alex. 13.1–4 (Mirhady 2007, 12). Cf. Grimaldi (1972) 103–115; (1980) 383–398; Sprute (1982); Anderson (2000) 44–48; Rapp (2002) I 323–335, II 223–240. 14 The term is possibly linked to the written testimony of evidence starting in the early 4th century BC. Witnesses no longer gave oral testimony, but their depositions were recorded and then read and confirmed by the witnesses present. On this matter, see M. Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge 2008, 188–190. Cf. Mirhady (2007) 4; M. Kraus, Aristotle on the Arts of the Spoken Word. Correlations between his Rhetoric and Poetics, in: B.F. Pereira/M. Várzeas (eds.), Retórica e Teatro, Porto 2010, 99; Kraus (2011) 268.

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The third section (Chapters 28.5–37) focuses on taxis, the structure of a rhetorical speech. This is the best part of the text, skilfully drafted and boasting a clear architectural structure. The author is illuminating on the composition of a rhetorical speech as a whole. The particularity of this section is that the basic classification is in harmony with the seven rhetorical species set out in the first section. The introduction (prooimion), report (apaggelia, diēgēsis), proof/confirmation (bebaiōsis), anticipation of the opponent’s arguments (prokatalēpsis) and recapitulation (palillogia, epilogos) are not classified independently, but are examined as a whole, one after the other, first in relation to dissuasion and exhortation, then praise and condemnation, then prosecution and defense, and, finally, the examination species (eidos exetastikon). The epilogue of the text (Chapter 38) is markedly Isocratean in tone: achieving persuasion does not only depend on the rhetorical speech, but also on the orator’s social life: “The ability to speak well leads to sound understanding which itself leads to virtue” (Chiron 2007, 97); rhetorical and practical life are treated as a single concept.

Compared to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the first impression one forms is that the author of Rhetoric to Alexander takes a superficial, trite approach to rhetoric due to the absence of any theoretical discussion whatsoever. However, the question of a “superficial or in-depth approach” appears to be an erroneous starting point for a modern evaluation of the text, as the author himself does not aim at any abstraction. Timmerman/ Schiappa (2010, 128) are correct in asserting: “The Rhetoric to Alexander has also suffered from the inevitable comparison to Aristotle’s Rhetoric”. It is not a theoretical treatise in terms of conception or goals. It aims at rhetorical practice and direct application: “The exclusive goal is to achieve success, to persuade the audience, with no thought as to what is fair or unfair, true or false ‒ but without a hint of hypocrisy either” (Görgemanns 1987, 196).15 M. Fuhrmann (1960) considers Rhetoric to Alexander as the first instance of utilitarian literature, classifying it as a “systematic textbook” (das systematische Lehrbuch). It is a summary of the rhetorical art of the era that does not aspire to provide a theoretical overview of the rhetorical system, which is why it borders on a sophistical-rhetorical training text (Fuhrmann 1960, 131; Noël 2012, 59–70). For example, there is no Aristotelian-type definition of rhetoric (the expression technē rhētorikē is not even used in the text) and even when the author comments on the use of probability (eikos) arguments among rhetorical evidence (7.4– 14), this rhetoric is clearly classified in the context of the sophistic tradition, untouched by the concerns expressed by Plato (Phaedrus 272e–273c) or Aristotle (Rhetoric 1402a 17–20). However, this is precisely why the work is valuable. It systematises everyday rhetorical practice and lays down rhetorical rules seldom encountered elsewhere. The unique examination species (eidos exetastikon, Chapters 5 and 37; see 5.1: ἡ ἐξέτασίς ἐστι προαιρέσεων ἢ πράξεων ἢ λόγων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐναν-

|| 15 Cf. the extreme wording of Braet (1996) 348: “opportunism”, and Chiron (2002) ix: “amoralisme”. Calboli Montefusco (2007) 105 ff. with note 6 is justified in ascribing a relevant value to these views, stressing a similar discourse in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

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τιουμένων ἐμφάνισις. “Investigation [exetasis] is the elucidation of choices or acts or words that contradict each other or the rest of the person’s life”. Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mayhew/Mirhady 2011)16 is reminiscent of the examination of candidates before taking public office (dokimasia) or the institutional procedure of accountability (euthynai), whereby everyone holding public office in Athens had to account for their actions at the end of their term (Chiron 2007, 97).17 The practical dimension of these technical rules, under the “scrutiny of public speakers” (dokimasia rhētorōn),18 is attested by examples from the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes:19 Aeschines Against Timarchus 1(195) ὧν πρὶν τὴν συνηγορίαν ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς βίους ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθε, καὶ τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὰ σώματα ἡμαρτηκότας μὴ ὑμῖν ἐνοχλεῖν, ἀλλὰ παύσασθαι δημηγοροῦντας κελεύετε· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νόμος τοὺς ἰδιωτεύοντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πολιτευομένους ἐξετάζει. Aeschines Against Timarchus 1(195) Before you listen to their speeches in support of Timarchus, remember their way of life. Tell the ones who have done wrong to their own bodies not to pester you but to stop addressing the people; for the law does not examine (exetazein) the conduct of private citizens but of public men. (Transl. C. Carey 2000) Aeschines Against Timarchus 1(196) τὰ μὲν οὖν παρ’ ἐμοῦ δίκαια πάντα ἀπειλήφατε· ἐδίδαξα τοὺς νόμους, ἐξήτασα τὸν βίον τοῦ κρινομένου. Aeschines Against Timarchus 1(196) You have had from me all you could justly demand. I have informed you of the laws, I’ve examined the defendant’s way of life. (Transl. C. Carey 2000) Demosthenes On the Crown 18(232) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ εἰπεῖν ὀκνήσω, ὅτι ὁ τὸν ῥήτορα βουλόμενος δικαίως ἐξετάζειν καὶ μὴ συκοφαντεῖν οὐκ ἂν οἷα σὺ νῦν ἔλεγες, τοιαῦτα κατηγόρει. Demosthenes On the Crown 18(232) I have no hesitation in making the next point. Anyone who wants to judge (exetazein) a politician honestly and to refrain from malicious prosecution would not level the kind of charges that you did in your speech just now. (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

|| 16 See in detail Pepe (2013) 92–102. 17 Cf. M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, Berkeley 1986, 50–62; J. Bleicken, Die athenische Demokratie, 4. ed., Paderborn 1995, 321–329; M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Structures, Principles, and Ideology, 2. ed., London 1999, 222– 224; D. Hasskamp, Oligarchische Willkür - demokratische Ordnung. Zur athenischen Verfassung im 4. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 2005, 91–95. 18 For this special form of dokimasia, see D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London 1978, 174; S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law, Oxford 1993, 116; D.M. MacDowell, The Athenian Procedure of Dokimasia of Orators, in: Wallace/Gagarin (2005) 79–87; L. Cagliardi, The Athenian Procedure of Dokimasia of Orators. A Response to Douglas M. MacDowell, in: Wallace/Gagarin (2005), 89–97; Α. Εfstathiou, Το ιδιωτικό και το δημόσιο στη δοκιμασίαν ῥητόρων στην Αθήνα των κλασικών χρόνων, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 231 ff. 19 Mirhady (2008) 405–407; Pasini (2011) 336–356. Cf. Spengel (1862) 643; Maffi (1985) 29–43.

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Furthermore, the doxa tou legontos,20 which, in Rhetoric to Alexander 14.8–9, is strangely classified among the artless proofs (conversely, in Aristotle’s Rhet. 1356a 2 the ēthos tou legontos is ranked among the technical proofs), refers to rhetorical practice and might be indicative of Isocratean influence. Isocrates invests in the good reputation of the orator, who must appear to be honourable and to have the esteem of his fellow-citizens in all aspects of his life (15.278: δόξαν ὡς ἐπιεικεστάτην) and not just during the rhetorical speech, as Aristotle contends (Rhetoric 1356a 8–10). This Isocratean influence is documented in the epilogue to the text: Rhetoric to Alexander (38.2) χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι μὴ μόνον περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον τὸν αὑτοῦ, διακοσμοῦντα ταῖς ἰδέαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις· συμβάλλεται γὰρ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον παρασκευὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸ πείθειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ δόξης ἐπιεικοῦς τυγχάνειν. Rhetoric to Alexander (38.2) We must be disciplined not only in speeches but also in life by ordering ourselves according to the norms that have been stated. Life preparation contributes both to persuasion and to gaining an honest reputation (doxa epieikēs). (Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mayhew/Mirhady 2011)

Rhetoric to Alexander transmits tangible, comprehensible information and does not comment on the problems of rhetorical handbooks until that time or include a systematic theory; nevertheless, instances of technical concordance with or differentiation from Aristotelian terminology are very useful for the history of the literary genre during the 4th century BC. The two handbooks have a similar structure: Aristotle’s work also begins with the rhetorical topoi, followed by the rhetorical presentation and, finally, the structure and parts of a rhetorical speech (Barwick 1966, 231; cf. Kennedy 1963, 117); at a first level, the terminology (mainly of judicial speeches) deriving from contemporary rhetorical practice is similar. There is lexical correspondence not only in words but in more extended phrases (Rhet. Alex. 29.1: καθ’ ὅσον τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν εὔνους ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι and Arist. Rhet. 1415a 34–35: τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὔνουν ποιῆσαι; Rhet. Alex. 29.4: ὑπὲρ μεγάλων ἢ φοβερῶν ἢ τῶν ἡμῖν οἰκείων … δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ ἡδέα and Arist. Rhet. 1415b 1–2: προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν). Such correspondence may indicate a common source (Mirhady 1991; 2007)21 or constitute mutual loans that must be interpreted in terms of both dating and content

|| 20 The word doxa may mean “opinion” or “reputation”. As the two versions need not be mutually exclusive – the opinion of an orator may or may not favour his reliability – the analogies with Aristotle’s ēthos tou legontos and Isocrates’ doxa tou legontos are evident. See Alexiou (2010) 17, 88. Barwick (1966–1967) 222 and Noël (2011) 334–335 are correct. Mirhady (2011) 301 assumes that the phrase doxa tou legontos is related to the language of Attic decrees. Cf. Kraus (2011) 263–279. 21 Mirhady (1991; 2007) considers Theodorus of Byzantium (late 5th – early 4th century BC), listed by Plato (Phaedr. 266e–267a) and Aristotle (Rhet. 1400b 15–16) among the authors of rhetorical handbooks, a likely source. Plato attributes a fine distinction between the parts of a rhetorical speech to

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(Chiron 2011). It is most likely that both works sprung from the tradition of the rhetorical teaching and practice of the 4th century BC, from which they draw their information, which explains the concordance of form and content. On the other hand, the major differences, such as the more advanced Aristotelian theory on logical argumentation (enthymēmata) or the different definitions of the termini technici used by the two authors, have attracted the interest of contemporary scholarship, which has recently turned to Rhetoric to Alexander with greater focus than in the past.22

3.2 Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric In the 4th century BC, despite criticism on the part of philosophers, rhetoric had tremendous appeal and the development of Isocrates’ school could not but have struck Aristotle, who, parodying a line from Euripides’ Philoctetes, stated: “It were base to keep silence and let Isocrates speak” (αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσoκράτην δ’ ἐᾶν λέγειν). Ancient testimonies acknowledge Aristotle’s teaching of rhetoric in the afternoon as competition against Isocrates’ school.23 This testimony may be apocryphal, but lends credence to the idea of the grand success of rhetoric and the dispute between orators and philosophers concerning the content of the best education, which was clearly not limited to the rivalry between Isocrates and Plato but extended to their pupils as well. In Evagoras 9.74, Isocrates defends his epideictic speeches, which can be disseminated throughout Hellas, be published and welcomed in the discussions of enlightened men.24 The beginning of Speusippus’ Letter to Philip of Macedon (1) refers to a broader discussion of Isocrates’ speeches: παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀναγνωσθέντoς ἐν διατριβῇ τoῦ σoὶ πεμφθέντoς ὑπ’ Ἰσoκράτoυς λόγoυ. The phrase en diatribēi is indicative of a serious, systematic occupation with Isocratean speeches at

|| him: introduction (prooimion), narration (diēgēsis), testimony (martyriae), proofs (tekmēria), probabilities (eikota), confirmation (pistōsis), further confirmation (epipistōsis), refutation (elenchos), further refutation (epexelenchos). Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1414b 13; R.N. Gaines, Theodorus Byzantius on the Parts of a Speech, in: R. Reames (ed.), Logos without Rhetoric. The Arts of Language before Plato, Columbia SC 2017, 19–29. Aristotle (Soph. el. 183b 29) ranks him as third, following Tisias and Thrasymachus, when expounding on the evolution of rhetoric. As none of the speeches of this instructor and practitioner of rhetoric is extant (evaluated in E. Drerup, Untersuchungen zur älteren griechischen Prosaliteratur, Leipzig 1901, esp. 332 ff.), it is impossible to confirm Mirhady’s hypothesis. 22 Pasini (2006) 181–202; Calboli Montefusco (2011) 280–292; Piazza (2011) 305–318; Pepe (2013) 85 ff., 118 ff. 23 Quint. Inst. or. 3.1.14: postmeridianis scholis Aristoteles praecipere artem oratoriam coepit, noto quidem illo, ut traditur, versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus: “turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere”. Cf. Philod. Peri rhēt. (P. Herc. 832) c. xlviii 36 (ΙΙ,50 Sudhaus); Cic. De or. 3.141; Diog. Laert. 5.3 (erroneously referring to Ξενoκράτην instead of Ἰσoκράτην). The verse in Euripides’ Philoctetes read: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρoυς δ᾿ ἐᾶν λέγειν (fr. 796 Kann.). 24 See Alexiou (2010) 178–179.

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the Academy.25 It is clear that there was a sense of rivalry between pro-Macedonian orators and pro-Macedonian philosophical schools. With the Isocratean speech To Philip as a point of reference, Speusippus, a nephew of Plato and his successor in heading the Academy, accuses Isocrates of omissions when listing the services rendered to Greece by Philip II and his forebears, as well as failure to refute the allegations made against the king of Macedon (2). According to Speusippus, Isocrates failed to adequately stress Philip’s descent from Heracles, who was an Athenian citizen (3), used impious and unworthy leaders as examples (10), and sent Philip a speech that had been originally written for the Spartan Agesilaus, then for Dionysius I of Syracuse and later yet for Alexander of Pherae, adding, removing and changing certain elements depending on the recipient (13). Through his polemical views, Speusippus endeavoured to limit the influence of Isocrates and his pupils on the Macedonian court, but without great success.26 One such pupil was, for example, Python of Byzantium, who represented Philip’s politics in Athens in 344/343 BC (Demosth. 18.136; Epist. 2.10; [Demosth.] 7.20; 7.23).27 According to Diogenes Laertius (4.2), who invokes an earlier reference, Speusippus was the first to divulge what Isocrates called the secrets of his art (τὰ καλούμενα ἀπόρρητα).28

In Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue of Aristotelian works (5.22), On Rhetoric, or Gryllus appears fifth. It is likely that in this work, authored shortly after 362 BC when Gryllus, the son of Xenophon, perished at the Battle of Mantinea, the young Aristotle expressed some type of criticism against Isocrates.29 Aristotle is alleged to have referred to innumerable authors of encomia and epitaphs upon Gryllus, who wrote, in part at least, to gratify his father (Diog. Laert. 2.55); in fact, one of these is attributed to Isocrates (καὶ Ἰσοκράτην Γρύλλου φησὶ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι). Combined with a reference by Quintilian (Inst. or. 2.17.4), it is conjectured that the work of Aristotle contained a criticism of rhetoric as an art – however, there is no further information available.30 Additionally, Aristotle’s Protrepticus may be interpreted as a reaction to

|| 25 See A.F. Natoli, The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II. Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary, Stuttgart 2004, 111–112. Cf. Wareh (2012) 134–195; E. Zingg, Isokrates Archidamos. Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar, I-II, Düsseldorf 2017, 141–149. 26 According to Ι. Worthington, By the Spear. Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire, Oxford 2014, 24, Speusippus could not have achieved any particular success through this letter, precisely because it was aimed against Isocrates, whom Philip favoured. Cf. M.M. Markle, Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip. A Study of Isocrates’ Philippus and Speusippus’ Letter to Philip, JHS 96 (1976) 80–99; I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, New Haven/London 2008, 122. 27 See T.T.B. Ryder, Demosthenes and Philipp II, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator, London/New York 2000, 73–74; J. Fündling, Philipp II von Makedonien, Darmstadt 2014, 114. 28 See J. Engels, Antike Überlieferungen über die Schüler des Isokrates, in: W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates. Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers, Trier 2003, 179–180. 29 Kennedy (1963) 83–84; cf. Chroust (1965) 576–591. 30 See Rapp (2002) I 232–235; Flashar (2006) 115, 202–203.

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Isocrates’ Antidosis.31 Defences of Isocrates, authored by his son Aphareus and his pupil Cephisodorus of Athens – who was the most truly “Isocratean” pupil (γνησιώτατος ἀκουστής), according to Dion. Hal. Isocr. 18, p. 86 Us.-Rad. – which are not extant, confirm the reciprocity of criticism.32 On the other hand, the fact that Aristotle draws most of the stylistic examples in his Rhetoric from the Isocratean corpus supports the acknowledgement of Isocrates as a master of artful prose. Furthermore, given the moral dimension of Isocratean rhetoric and the practical dimension of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, unequivocal approaches are no longer permitted. Two important studies by E.V. Haskins (2004) and T. Wareh (2012) support the call for more systematic occupation with the “Isocrates - Aristotle” issue.33 The fact that Aristotle was familiar with earlier rhetorical handbooks firstly emerges from his non-extant work Technōn Synagōgē, the existence of which is affirmed by ancient catalogues of the works of Aristotle (in Diog. Laert. No 77; in Vita Hesychii No 71). Cicero informs us (De invent. 2.6; De or. 2.160) that the work contained a summary of and commentary on handbooks by earlier writers, starting with Tisias. Apart from this work, questions had already been raised since antiquity as to the authorship of the rhetorical handbook titled Theodecteia, referred to by Aristotle in the third book of his Rhetoric (1410b 3), i.e. whether it was authored by his friend Theodectes or by Aristotle himself (Quint. Inst. or. 2.15.10; Val. Max. 8.14.3). Η. Diels (1886) fervently asserted that Theodecteia was an early rhetorical work by Aristotle. However, the title Technēs tēs Theodektou Synagōgē included in the catalogue of Aristotelian works, indicates that it is a collection (as inferred by συνάγειν) of teachings by Theodectes – Aristotle could not have compiled his own work.34 Therefore, when Aristotle refers to Theodecteia in his Rhetoric, it is most likely that he is referring to the work of Theodectes himself or to a compilation of his teachings drawn up by Aristotle. There is consensus as to its contents: close affinity has been identified with the third book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (particularly Chapters ΙΙΙ 13–19), where Aristotle bases his views on Theodecteia.

|| 31 Cf. P. von der Mühll, Isokrates und der Protreptikos des Aristoteles, Philologus 94 (1939–1940) 259–265; Flashar (2006) 168 ff. See also I. Düring, Aristotle’s Protrepticus. An Attempt at Reconstruction, Göteborg 1961, 20–23, 33–35; G. Schneeweiss, Aristoteles Protreptikos. Hinführung zur Philosophie. Rekonstruiert, übersetzt und kommentiert, Darmstadt 2005, 29–30. 32 Dion. Hal. Isocr. 18, p. 85–86 Us.-Rad.; Αthen. 2.60d–e; 3.122b; 8.354c; Euseb. Praep. evang. 14.6.9–10. Cf. Wareh (2012) 103–111; H. Baltussen, The Peripatetics. Aristotle’s Heirs, 322 BCE–200 CE, London/New York 2016, 99. 33 See also W. Benoit, Isocrates and Aristotle on Rhetoric, RSQ 20 (1990) 251–259; C. Balla, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle on Rhetoric, Rhizae 1 (2004) 45–71. 34 The noun synagōgē deriving from synagein (“bring together, join, collect, compile”) indicates the common trait of different aspects of a foreign art, the parts of which Aristotle compiled. Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 265d; Blass (1887–1898) II 443–444; F. Solmsen, Drei Rekonstruktionen zur antiken Rhetorik und Poetik, Hermes 67 (1932) 133–154, esp. 144 ff.; Radermacher (1951) 202–203; Kennedy (1963) 80–81; Barwick (1966–1967) 47–55; Chroust (1964) 58–72; Rapp (2002) I 224–228; Flashar (2006) 226–227.

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Theodectes (c. 400–340 BC)35 was an orator and tragic poet from Phaselis on Lycia. He came to Athens at an early age and studied under Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle (Suda θ 138 s.v. Theodektes). The Suda (θ 139) refers to a son of the same name who had literary interests – therefore, a certain degree of confusion of the two might be possible. Theodectes first worked as a logographer and teacher, turning to tragic poetry after 360 BC. Fifty tragedies are attributed to him. As a prominent orator, he participated in the contest organised by Artemisia II, Queen of Caria, in honour of her dead husband Mausolus, Satrap of Caria (352 BC). Theodectes successfully entered the contest with his historical tragedy Mausolus (Suda θ 138; Gell. 10.18.6–7). It is recorded that he was a close friend of Alexander the Great (Plut. Alex. 17.9).

Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric (henceforth Rhetoric)36 is the second major extant rhetorical handbook of the 4th century BC. As this technical work, much like the other surviving Aristotelian treatises, resulted from within Aristotle’s school, it has the character of a text of lectures for personal use by Aristotle and his school.37 In terms of style, the handbook is reminiscent of lecture notes and suggestive, as it revolves around keywords, rendering its study and dating difficult. Readers are faced with inconsistencies, differences, stylistic and methodological breaches, various historical allusions, reconfigurations and updates on later scholarly lectures. Although there are strong indications in favour of earlier dating, it is practically impossible – with respect to non-homogenised text – to precisely identify a single period of authoring. It is without question that the Rhetoric was not authored in a uniform manner, and its dating could be related to Aristotle’s first stay at Plato’s Academy (367–347 BC), his travels after the death of Plato (347–335 BC) and his second stay in Athens (335–323 BC). The indications for an early dating include: the stylistic and conceptual proximity of the Rhetoric (books I and II) to the Topics, major parts of which were written very early; the Rhetoric as a reaction to Isocrates and his school, as competition between the two reached its climax until 350 BC; silence regarding Demosthenes’ speeches, although the hesitant attitude of Aristotle and the early Peripatos towards Demosthenes could also be linked to political (pro-Macedonian - anti-Macedonian) or literary causes (see below Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 5.4); there are chronological indications for the period prior to 350 BC, while events and persons appearing in the third book, with sporadic exceptions, do not extend beyond 347 BC (cf. Düring 1966, 121–122). Subsequent occurrences referred to in the text (e.g. 1386a 14: the death of Diopeithes after 341 BC; reference to Isocrates’ speech To Philip, 346 BC, etc.)38 prove that Aristotle continued to work on the text, making additions and revisions. Chapters II 23 and 24 were written anew or wholly added at a later date.

|| 35 See Blass (1887–1898) II 441–447; E. Matelli, Teodette di Faselide, retore, in: D.C. Mirhady (ed.), Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric. Essays in honor of W.W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden/Boston 2007, 169– 186; Wareh (2012) 94–98. See also FGrH 1026 F48 with the commentary of J. Bollansée, p. 395–398. 36 Greek text used: Ross (1959). 37 However, Kullmann (1998) 455 believes that it was a text intended solely to be read. 38 Cf. Rapp (2002) I 180.

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Finally, the older view that such a gradual creation of the text provides strong support for a genetic-analytical approach to the Rhetoric, whereby stages and evolution in Aristotle’s thinking can be discerned (Schichtenanalyse),39 is faced with great reservations at present and has, in essence, become outdated.40 The Rhetoric consists of three books (Ι-ΙΙΙ). The first and second make up the pure technē rhētorikē oriented towards the means of persuasion and methods of evidence. The first book focuses on rhetorical speech and its types, the second on the means of persuasion and their effects, and the third on expression, i.e. the linguistic form (lexis) and structure (taxis) of rhetorical speech. Compared to books Ι and ΙΙ, book ΙΙΙ appears to be autonomous, particularly when the declarations of the first two books do not set the tone for the themes of the third. The ancient catalogues of Aristotelian works include a text titled Peri lexeōs. In fact, the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius includes two books for this text (5.24), corresponding to the two sections of the third book of the Rhetoric. Such an interpretation strengthens the view concerning the initial autonomy of the third book, but does not answer the question of whether the unification of the Rhetoric was attempted by Aristotle himself or by a subsequent editor, e.g. Andronicus of Rhodes (Wisse 1989, 333–336; Rapp 2002, II 801 ff.). The first chapter of book Ι expounds on the Aristotelian idea of a rhetoric oriented towards dialectic: rhetoric is a counterpart (antistrophos) of dialectic. In the second chapter (1355b 35– 39), Aristotle distinguishes between non-technical (atechnoi) and technical proofs (entechnoi pisteis): the former, i.e. laws (nomoi), witnesses (martyres), contracts (synthēkai), tortures (basanoi) and oaths (horkoi), exist independently from the rhetorical art (and are briefly analysed in I 15), while the latter are based on theory and are distinguished into three parts (1356a 1–4): in the character of the speaker (ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος), in disposing the listener in some way (ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως), and in the speech itself (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ), i.e. the argumentation of persuasion. These three technical means of persuasion form the basis for the entire edifice of the first two books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Rapp 2002, I 173). As regards logical persuasion, it is in harmony with Aristotelian logic and distinguished into deductive and inductive arguments, the rhetorical terms used being etnthymēmata and paradeigmata. The enthymēma41 is defined as rhetorical syllogism, and the paradeigma as rhetorical induction (1356b 2–6: καλῶ δ’ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ῥητορικήν). According to Aristotle, the enthymeme is the strongest of rhetorical proofs (1355a 7–8: κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων) and the “body” of persuasion (1354a 15: σῶμα τῆς πίστεως). The third chapter contains a classification of rhetorical speeches into three genres: the deliberative (genos symbοuleutikon), the judicial (genos dikanikon) and the epideictic (genos epideiktikon). Each genre has some type of ethical-political content, an element that must be attributed to the philosophical nature of Aristotle’s text: deliberative speech focuses on what is advantageous and what is harmful, judicial speech on what is just and what is injust, while epideictic speech on what is honourable and what is shameful (1358b 20–29). The means of persuasion are so dominant in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

|| 39 Cf. Jaeger (1923); Solmsen (1929); Tessmer (1957). 40 See Grimaldi (1972) 18–52; Raphael (1974) 153–167; Sprute (1982) 23–27; Wörner 1990 (26–29); Rapp (2002) Ι 314–319. 41 See H. Meier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles. Aristoteles. II: Die logische Theorie des Syllogismus und die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik, Tübingen 1900 (new ed. Leipzig 1936), 474–501; Grimaldi (1972) 83–103; Sprute (1982); Ryan (1984); Burnyeat (1994) 3–55; (1996) 88–115; Anderson (2000) 44–48; Rapp (2002) I 323–335, 355–362, II 223–240.

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that the remainder of the first books focuses on the three types of rhetorical speech with the point of reference being the rhetorical topoi, which aid reasoning (in the following order: in deliberative speech I 4–8, in epideictic speech I 9 and in judicial speech I 10–15). The first chapter of book ΙΙ once again raises the question concerning the other two means of persuasion: ēthos or persuasion by the character of the speaker and pathos or appeals to emotions (1377b 23–24: καὶ αὑτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν). Firstly, Aristotle comments on the attitude of the orator, whose credibility is based on practical wisdom (phronēsis), virtue (aretē) and goodwill (eunoia, 1378a 8); secondly, the audience must also be brought to a specific emotional state, which is why orators must be familiar with the emotions and the means for inducing them. The various emotions are presented in ΙΙ 2–11 in the following order: anger (orgē), calmness (praotēs), friendliness (philia), enmity (echthra), hate (misos), fear (phobos), confidence (tharsos), shame (aischynē), shamelessness (anaischyntia), kindliness (charis), unkindliness (acharistia), pity (eleos), being indignant (nemesan), envy (phthonos), emulation (zēlos). The next characterological chapters (ΙΙ 12–17) are not related to the ēthos tou legontos but to the listener: criteria such as age, origin, wealth and power are means of assistance in the persuasive method that is based on emotions (Rapp 2002, I 174–175). Chapters ΙΙ 18–26 serve as the antipode to the first book. The first book presents the rhetorical topoi, which are important for the persuasive process and are particular to each type of rhetoric speech, i.e. the deliberative, the epideictic and the judicial, whereas the second book presents general rhetorical topoi (paradeigmata, gnōmai, enthymēmata) which orators can use in all types of rhetorical speeches. Chapters 1 through 12 of book ΙΙΙ focus on the style (lexis) of prose. Compared to books I and II, this is “the How in contrast to the What of Rhetoric” (das Wie zum Was der Rede; Rapp 2002, I 175). The phrase “the virtue of style” (1404b 1: ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι) is important for formulating a theory of linguistic form: aretē does not only indicate excellence of style but also has functional value: it is “a desired property, because it is valuable for achieving the goal” (Görgemanns 1987, 205). This definition is reminiscent of a similar one given in the Poetics (1458a 18: λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι), an indication of the similarities between the two texts that have often been categorised as related (Rapp 2011, 154). The basic themes of these chapters of the 3rd book of the Rhetoric are: metaphor (metaphora), gracelessness (ta psychra), simile (eikōn), grammatical correctness (hellēnizein), expansiveness (onkos), conciseness (syntomia), appropriateness (prepon), rhythm (eurhythmon), period (periodos), paratactic style (lexis eiromenē), periodic style (lexis katestrammenē), antithesis (antithesis), parisosis (parisōsis), paromoiosis (paromoiōsis), and urbanities (asteia). The remaining chapters of the 3rd book (III 13–19) concern the arrangement (taxis) of rhetorical speech, contain the parts of a rhetorical speech and are exceptionally autonomous compared to the rest of the work: the proem (prooimion), the prejudicial attack (diabolē), the narration (diēgēsis), the proofs (pisteis), interrogation (erōtēsis), humor (geloia) and the conclusion (epilogos). The Rhetoric 1420a 8 ends with a literary allusion to Lysias’ speech Against Eratosthenes (12.100): εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε (“I have spoken; you have listened, you have [the case], you judge”). The schematic diagram of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is, according to Fuhrmann (1995, 147 with minor modifications), as follows: I 1 Introduction: Means of persuasion as the subject of the Rhetoric 2 Divisions: A. Non-technical and technical means of persuasion (atechnoi, entechnoi pisteis) B. Types of technical means of persuasion: 1. Persuasion by character (ēthos) 2. Appeals to emotions (pathos) 3. Logical or apparently logical arguments (enthymēmata) C. Topics

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  II

III

1. Specific topics 2. Common topics 3–15 Specific topics 3 The three Species of Rhetoric 4–8 a) Deliberative speeches 9 b) Epideictic speeches 10–14 c) Judicial speeches 15 d) Appendix: non-technical means of persuasion 1–11 The emotions as means of persuasion 12–17 The character as means of persuasion 18–26 Common topics 1–12 Prose style 13–19 Arrangement (the parts of a rhetorical speech)

The juxtaposition between rhetoric and philosophy in the 4th century BC unquestionably played a major role in Aristotle’s systematic engagement with rhetoric. In Plato’s Gorgias, rhetoric does not seek the truth and is, therefore, not a technē, but a simple experience (empeiria) aiming at the gratification and pleasure of the audience (462c: χάριτός τινoς καὶ ἡδoνῆς ἀπεργασίας). Plato mocks the new art, which he characterises as flattery (kolakeia). In Phaedrus, Plato, in contrast to the technical form of his contemporary rhetoric, turns towards a psychological direction of rhetoric on a philosophical-dialectical basis.42 The consequences of Plato’s thinking took shape in Aristotle (Krapinger 2005, 38–50). His Rhetoric was based on dialectic and psychology. As the work of a philosopher, it focuses on both concepts, attempting to conceive and present them as a single organic entity. However, Aristotle adopted his teacher’s views only in part: on one hand, he subjected rhetoric and, in particular, the means of persuasion and psychology of emotions, to strict scientific analysis and made a tremendous effort to systematise them using scientific criteria; in this sense, Plato and Aristotle are in the same camp: they advocate a rhetoric based on well-founded knowledge, faced with the representatives of a purely opportunistic skill in the use of rhetorical means to stir emotions (Flashar 2004, 328).43 On the other hand, Aristotle categorises rhetoric as a formalistic art and rejects Plato’s view that orators must be philosophers. Plato, instead, believes that the ideal rhetoric aims at the truth and denounces an orientation towards what is probable, while for Aristotle rhetoric, much like the dialectic expounded upon in the Topics, remains firmly in the sphere of what is likely. This is not

|| 42 Regarding Plato’s relationship with rhetoric, see Chapter 2.1 above and, summarily, M. Erler, Platon, in: H. Flashar (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike, II,2, Basel 2007, 498–506. 43 For an emphatic view on the dependence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Plato’s views, see L. Spengel, Über die Rhetorik des Aristoteles, Abh. Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-Hist. Kl., Munich 1851, 12: “Wer sollte auch in dessen ausführlicher Lehre der πάθη und ἤθη II 1–17 die ψυχαγωγία des Platon verkennen?”

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substantiated, spherical knowledge of nature, as is the case with Plato (Phaedrus 269d–274b; cf. Erler 2007, 503). Furthermore, ethical behaviour is not approached from the perspective of a philosophically documented characterology; this is another instance where Aristotle provides effective means for persuading one’s audience. Therefore, account must always be taken of both a theoretical and a practical, utilitarian purpose of the Rhetoric. Its philosophical turn must always be taken into account, but not overemphasised (against Garver 1994). This is because Aristotle authored a philosophical rhetoric, not a philosophy of rhetoric. Compared to Rhetoric to Alexander, which contains no theoretical remarks on the art of speaking, Aristotle’s Rhetoric begins with the ascertainment of a correlative relationship between dialectic and rhetoric: Rhetoric (1354a 1–11) ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ· ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης· διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδῷ ποιεῖν· δι’ ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι. Rhetoric (1354a 1–11) Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, up to a point, try both to test and uphold an argument (as in dialectic) and to defend themselves and attack (others, as in rhetoric). Now among the general public, some do these things at random and others through an ability acquired by habit, but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be possible to do the same by (following) a path; for it is possible to observe the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art (technē). (Transl. G. Kennedy 2007)

The concept of antistrophos (“counterpart, coordinate”), stemming from the relationship between the strophe and antistrophe in Greek choral lyric, where the metrical pattern of a strophe is repeated with different words in the antistrophe (Kennedy 2007, 30 note 4), indicates that neither dialectic, as a method for examining the nature of things, nor rhetoric, as a method for the effective use of speech, are independent fields or necessarily assume knowledge of any technical subject. In Gorgias Plato ranks rhetoric among the four parts of flattery: justice is antistrophos to medicine (464b) just as rhetoric, the false form of justice, is to cookery (465c). Aristotle, by using the same concept of antistrophos, rejects this analogy. Rhetoric and dialectic are two methodologies that co-exist in the common knowledge of people to a lesser or greater extent. Consequently, rhetoric is to the effective approach to an audience

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what dialectic is to philosophical argumentation itself.44 Subsequently, the rhetorical art is defined as the ability, in each case, to discover the (possibly) persuasive, i.e. the possible means of persuasion (1355b 25–26: ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν). This passage indicates that, compared to the Gorgianic tradition of rhetoric as a producer of persuasion (Plat. Gorg. 453a: πειθοῦς δημιουργός), a philosopher’s rhetoric focuses on the theory of possibility (Rapp 2002, II 135), while other passages of the Rhetoric also point towards the realistic, practical dimension of persuasion as an objective of rhetoric (1377b 21: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική; 1382a 18–19). Aristotle’s Rhetoric repeatedly stresses how much the philosopher distances himself from a purely technical, formalistic rhetoric. He distinguishes his work from the rhetorical handbooks until that time, which either do not discuss enthymemes or discuss matters external to the subject (exō tou pragmatos), focusing exclusively on how to psychologically influence judges (1354a 11–31) or favouring judicial speeches and theories on their parts, such as the proem and the narration (1354b 16–29). These were handbooks by famous sophists, certain of whom are named in Plato’s Phaedrus (266d–267d).45 Even when discussing the arrangement of a rhetorical speech, Aristotle castigates his contemporary writers on rhetoric (1414a 37: νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως; 1414b 17: κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες) either for adhering to a formalised, stereotypical arrangement that is unsuitable for all types of rhetorical speech, or for attempting scholastic subdivisions in their handbooks, as did, for example, Theodorus of Byzantium and Licymnius of Chios.46 Rhetoric (1414b 13–18) ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ [ἡ] ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγον-

|| 44 For an interpretation of the passage, see Cope/Sandys (1877) I 1–5; Grimaldi (1980–1988) I 1–6; Brunschwig (1996) 34–55; B. McAdon, Rhetoric is a Counterpart of Dialectic (Ἡ ῥητoρική ἐστιν ἀντίστρoφoς τῇ διαλεκτικῇ), Ph&Rh 34 (2001) 113–149; Rapp (2002) I 236–273, II 19–25; Kennedy (2007) 27–31, esp. 30 with note 4; Rapp (2012) 591; C. Rapp, Der Streit zwischen Rhetorik und Philosophie. Aristoteles, in: M. Erler/C. Tornau (eds.), Handbuch Antike Rhetorik, Berlin/Boston 2019, 350. 45 Reference is made to Gorgias of Leontini, Theodorus of Byzantium, Euenus of Paros, Tisias of Syracuse, Polos of Acragas, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Licymnius of Chios. Cf. Fuhrmann (1960) 122–144; E. Heitsch, Platon Phaidros. Übersetzung und Kommentar, 2. ed., Göttingen 1997, 152–158; Mirhady (2007) 6–7. In the non-extant Technōn Synagōgē, Aristotle must certainly have made further contributions on this matter; cf. C. Cooper, Forensic Oratory, in: Worthington (2007) 203–205. 46 For Theodorus of Byzantium, see above, note 21 to this Chapter. Licymnius of Chios was a dithyrambic poet and orator who lived around 400 BC. His reference in Plato’s Phaedrus (267c) indicates that he was taught by Polos, a pupil of Gorgias (cf. Suda π 2170 s.v. Polos). He cared for the form of speech with Gorgianic sophistication (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1405b 6–7). Aristotle calls him anagnōstikos (Rhet. 1413b 12–14), i.e. his dithyrambs were better suited to being read than delivered; cf. Blass (1887– 1898) I 85–86.

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τα καὶ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους. Rhetoric (1414b 13–18) If one continues making such divisions as the followers of Theodorus make, there will be another diēgēsis, both the epidiēgēsis (supplementary narration) and prodiēgēsis (preliminary narration) and elenchos (refutation) and epexelenchos (supplementary refutation), but one should attach a name only when speaking of a distinct species and difference; otherwise, the category becomes empty and laughable, like those Licymnius created in his Art, (speaking of) “wafting” and “wandering” and “ramifications”. (Transl. G. Kennedy 2007)

On the contrary, Aristotle’s Rhetoric systematises the theory of the art of speaking with deductive thought, commentary and justification. The word enthymēma is a characteristic example of conceptual systematisation. For example, in Isocrates, the term “enthymeme” only appears in the plural and is not yet a terminus technicus: it indicates thought, a figment (Evagoras 9.10, corresponding to τὰς διανoίας, 9.11; Soph. OC 292–295; Xenoph. Anab. 6.1.19–21),47 while it is encountered more as a stylistic ornament rather than a logical term in Against the Sophists 13.16: καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικῖλαι (cf. 12.2; 15.47).48 In Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 10.1–2) the enthymēma is a briefly worded thought that is based on inconsistencies and contradictions. In Aristotelian theory, the enthymeme is a dominant concept for grasping rhetoric as analogous to dialectic (Allen 2007, 355). C. Rapp aptly summarises Aristotelian thinking as follows: “Since listeners, by their nature, have the ability to identify what is true, they are most easily persuaded when they think that something has been demonstrated” (Rapp 2002, I 357). The enthymēma is central to rhetorical argumentation; as a rhetorical syllogism, usually brief in length, it is the main type of logical argument (Rhet. 1356b 4–6; cf. 1395b21–1397a6). It originates either from probabilities (ex eikotōn) or from signs (ek sēmeiōn, Rhet. 1357a 32; cf. Anal. pr. 70a 10–24). Aristotle thus describes anew and specifies a pre-existing concept as a “rhetorical syllogism” using vocabulary stemming from dialectic (Rapp 2002, II 224). The established distinction among three species of entechnoi pisteis in the history of rhetoric is also attributed to Aristotle. While Anaximenes classifies the doxa tou legontos among the non-technical means of persuasion (epithetoi pisteis) (Rhet. Alex. 14.8–9), Aristotle considers the ēthos tou legontos to be an independent, crucially important technical proof (Hellwig 1973, 234; Flashar 2004, 329): Rhetoric (1356a 1–13) τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ

|| 47 Similarly, in Alcidamas (On Sophists 19); see Mariss (2002) 105. 48 Cf. H. Wersdörfer, Die ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ des Isokrates im Spiegel ihrer Terminologie, Leipzig 1940, 110; S. Usher, The Style of Isocrates, BICS 20 (1973) 39–67, esp. 40; Alexiou (2010) 83.

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δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων, τίθεμεν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος. Rhetoric (1356a 1–13) Of the pisteis provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the character (ēthos) of the speaker, and some in disposing (diatheinai) the listener in some way, and some in the speech (logos) itself, by showing or seeming to show something. (There is persuasion) through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence (axiopistos); for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly (than we do others), on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt (amphidoxein). And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion (prodedoxasthai) that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the handbook writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness (epieikeia) on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion. (Transl. G. Kennedy 2007)

Apart from rhetorical handbooks, which Aristotle studied systematically, a crucial role was also played by rhetorical practice in Athenian democracy, which Aristotle’s Rhetoric considers, accepts or adapts accordingly. With respect to the ēthos tou legontos, persuasion through character consists of the appearance of a credible speaker before the audience, i.e. the judges or the demos.49 In order to achieve credibility, an orator must demonstrate wisdom, virtue and goodwill (1378a 8: phronēsis, aretē, eunoia; Rapp 2012, 604). These three qualities practically express faith in Athenian democracy: Athenian audiences were particularly sensitive to one’s attitude towards democracy, and the 4th century BC, a time of elevation of the individual, highlighted the need for the unequivocal expression of cooperative values and faith in democratic ideals much more intensely. Consequently, Aristotle pays attention to rhetorical practice and systematises something with which audiences are traditionally familiar. According to W. Fortenbaugh (2007, 115–116), Aristotle “is not breaking new ground”. Already in Thucydides (2.60.5–6), Pericles presents himself before the Athenians as a politician second to none in the knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, a patriot who is incorruptible (γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων), i.e. someone who fulfils all three Aristotelian requirements for achieving credibility: he has wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Lysias’

|| 49 On ēthos, see Süss (1910) 125–147; Hellwig (1973) 251–279; C. Gill, The Ethos/Pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism, CQ 34 (1984) 149–166; Wisse (1989) 9–76; Sprute (1991) 281–290; Fortenbaugh (1992) 207–244; Schütrumpf (1993) 12–17; C. Carey, Rhetorical Means of Persuasion, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action, London/New York 1994, 26–45; Fortenbaugh (1996) 147–168; (2007) 114–117.

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unparalleled ability to suitably present the personalities of his clients (ēthopoiia) so as to ensure their acceptance by the Athenian judges is similar to the foregoing (Dion. Hal. Lys. 8, p. 15 Us.-Rad.: ἀποδίδωμί τε οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην ἀρετήν, καλουμένην δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἠθοποιΐαν). Rhetorical practice in Athenian democracy allows Aristotle to theorise the paradeigma, which corresponds to induction, and to distinguish between examples that relate past events and those that invent something new, such as the comparison (parabolē) or the Aesopic and Lybian fables (1393a 28–31; cf. Kennedy 1963, 98–99). Orators had always invoked examples, whether mythical or historical, without aiming at historical accuracy, depending on the objectives of each speech.50 Thus, there was an established rhetorical tradition prior to Aristotle, and his observations from his association with people in the agora or on political rhetorical practice served as the basis for his theoretical views. At the same time, precisely because Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a handbook that aims at systematisation, rhetorical practice – which is directly related to Athenian democracy – may prove to be broader, more multi-factorial or diverse than Aristotle’s teachings (cf. Kremmydas 2016, 41–78). Thus, in practice, the ēthos tou legontos highlighted by Aristotle concerns not just the orator, but also the audience and the speech itself (Russell 1990, 198). Furthermore, inartificial proofs (1375a 22 ff.) initially do reflect rhetorical practice: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths do exist, they are not invented by the orator.51 However, according to Aristotle, if a written law does not augur well for the outcome of a case, then one must invoke fairness (to epieikes) as being more just, i.e. ius aequum as opposed to ius strictum, or, contrary to the written laws which often vary, the immutability of natural law (1375a 25 ff.). On the other hand, in Hyperides’ speech Against Athenogenes, Epicrates argues differently: he does not dispute written Athenian law, which is integrally linked to justice, but disputes the contract, because it is unfair; this means that the contract contradicts the fair written law, which he considers to originate from the eminently democratic Solon (c. 6[13]; c. 10[21–22]).52 Democracy and the law are indissociable and are much more decisive in determining rhetorical argumentation than Aristotle’s theoretical teachings.

|| 50 See K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtsschreibern bis Demosthenes, Paderborn 1936; S. Perlman, The Historical Example, its Use and Importance as Political Propaganda in the Attic Orators, SH 7 (1961) 150–166; M. Nouhaud, L’utilisation de l’histoire par les orateurs attiques, Paris 1982; B. Steinbock, Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse. Uses and Meanings of the Past, Ann Arbor 2013; J. Grethlein, The Value of the Past Challenged. Myth and Ancient History in the Attic Orators, in: J. Ker/C. Pieper (eds.), Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/Boston 2014, 326–354. 51 Cf. C. Carey, “Artless” Proofs in Aristotle and the Oratots, BICS 39 (1994) 95–106 (= E. Carawan [ed.], Oxford Readings in the Attic Orators, Oxford 2007, 229–246). 52 See J.P. Sickinger, Rhetoric and the Law, in: Worthington (2007) 296.

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Also of interest are emotions (pathē). As Aristotle’s Rhetoric expounds on behaviours, characters and virtues, the ēthē, aretai and pathē are directly interrelated: according to Aristotle, rhetoric develops alongside dialectic and ethics (1356a 25–26: τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας). Orators must be able not only to draw logical conclusions, but to also have knowledge on characters, virtues and emotions. Nevertheless, orators are not required to either ponder or investigate emotions. According to H. Flashar (2004, 329; cf. Rapp 2012, 593), Aristotle does not attempt to establish an overall psychological basis of rhetoric influenced by a cosmological dimension, as Plato had required. His systematic engagement with emotions reflects the balance between the philosophical and the rhetorical approach: the systematic, detailed classification of emotions is in line with the practical objective of stirring emotions, which had been key in rhetoric since the time of Gorgias.53 Aristotle identified both directions when defining emotions (1378a 19–21): “The emotions are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure”. Transl. G. Kennedy 2007 (ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή). The second part of this definition is indicative of the “systematic” Aristotle, who associates emotions with experiencing pain and pleasure, resulting in positive and negative effects.54 The first part, respectively, is indicative of the social reality of Athenian democracy. The manipulation of emotions through persuasion plays a key role in judicial and deliberative speeches: these are decisions by the judges and the listeners whose emotions can be altered, thus affecting their judgment. Aristotle recognises the importance of a social reality of which he nevertheless complains repeatedly: friendliness (philein), hostility (misein) and self-interest (sympheron) may prevent one from seeing the truth adequately, while one’s private pleasure or grief may cast a shadow on one’s judgment (1354b 8–11; cf. 1356a 15–16; Konstan 2007, 415).55 The stylistics of the 3rd book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric also highlights his relationship with his era, especially since he adopts a stance with respect to contemporary

|| 53 82 B11.14 D.-K.: oὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων oἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, oἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, oἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, oἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσoς κατέστησαν τoὺς ἀκoύoντας, oἱ δὲ πειθoῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγoήτευσαν. 54 However, Aristotle does not distinguish between “pain or pleasure” and, therefore, it remains debatable whether specific emotions cause both, only one or only the other. For the mixture of emotions, see Konstan (2007) 414–415. Cf. Frede (1996) 258–285, esp. 278; Striker (1996) 286–302, esp. 291; J. Dow, Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Oxford 2015, 131 ff. 55 Cf. also Fortenbaugh (2002) 9–18, 93–114; (2007) 117–118; Konstan (2006); (2007) 413–419; Leighton (2009) 597–611.

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debate around the relationship between poetry and prose.56 The Gorgianic style, which supported the idea of poetic prose, is harshly criticised (1404a 24–29). The poetic style is not suited to prose, it is not appropriate (1404b 5). Clarity of prose style and civic oratory are achieved through proper words that are firmly established in the day-to-day lives of citizens (1404b 6: τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα).57 The virtue of style being sought must “be clear”, and neither flat nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate (1404b 1–4: ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι … καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν). The doctrine of the mean is typically Aristotelian: Aristotle speaks of one virtue, not four, placed at the middle point (as is proper) between two negatives. It is here that C. Rapp identifies the Platonic tradition and the standard for its developed form in Aristotelian ethical treatises.58 It is certain that this Aristotelian conception is the origin of the teachings of Theophrastus and subsequent rhetoric on the four virtues of style (aretai lexeōs): correctness (hellēnismos), clarity (saphēneia), propriety (prepon), and artistic treatment (kataskeuē or kosmos).59 In Chapter 12 of book III of the Rhetoric, Aristotle systematises ‒ anew through the doctrine of the mean ‒ the divide between the written and the spoken word, a key point of contention between Isocrates and Alcidamas.60 Under the pronounced influence of Isocrates,61 Aristotle stylistically distinguishes between the written (graphikē) and the agonistic style (lexis agōnistikē): precision is appropriate to the written style, whereas the agonistic style is most performative (1413b 8–9: ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη). Therefore, akribeia plays a smaller role in demegoric speeches and a larger role in epideictic speeches, whereas judicial speeches are situated at the mean (1414a 8–28). When Aristotle contends that the style of an epideictic speech is “most like writing” (1414a 18: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη), it is quite likely that he bore Isocrates’ written epideictic

|| 56 The differences between poetry and prose are considered to be significant. Cf. Gorgias 82 B11.9 D.-K.; Plato Menexenus 239b and particularly Isocrates Evagoras 9.8–11; Alexiou (2010) 79–89. See also R. Graff, Prose versus Poetry in Early Greek Theories of Style, Rhetorica 23 (2005) 303–335. 57 In Isocrates, proper words (referred to by Aristotle as kyria onomata) are called tetagmena or politika onomata (9.9–10). See Alexiou (2010) 81–82. 58 Rapp (2002) II 824–825. Cf. D.S. Hutchinson, Doctrines of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric and Ethics, Apeiron 21 (1988) 17–52. On clarity cf. C. Rapp, Sprachliche Gestaltung und philosophische Klarheit bei Aristoteles, in: M. Erler/J.E. Hessler (eds.), Argument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie, Berlin/Boston 2013, 283–303, esp. 289 ff. 59 Cf. Cic. Orator 79; Solmsen (1941) 43–44; Wehrli/Wöhrle/Zhmud (2004) 537; N. Wiater, Rhetorik. 2: Hellenistische Rhetorik, in: B. Zimmermann/A. Rengakos (eds.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der Klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit, Munich 2014, 862–863. 60 See above Chapter 2.2. 61 See Panegyricus 4.11–13. Cf. E.M. Cope, An Introduction of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. With Analysis, Notes and Appendices, London/Cambridge 1867, 328 note 1; R. Graff, Reading and the Written Style in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, RSQ 31 (2001) 23; Pepe (2013) 215.

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speeches in mind. Otherwise, it is reasonable for N. Loraux and C. Rapp62 to question why Aristotle does not differentiate between the funeral orations, delivered in honour of the fallen, and the written epideictic speeches of Isocrates. Finally, the issue of whether or not an Aristotelian orator serves moral purposes (a point of controversy) can most likely be answered through the doctrine of the mean: between the two extreme views ‒ the Rhetoric serves as a “realm of amoralism if not immoralism” (Oates 1963, 335) or as a tool to discover what is good, what is exceptional and what is just (Wörner 1990, 282) – it is preferable to focus on the use of the Rhetoric, the affinity of which to other useful human goods, such as strength, health, wealth, and military strategy, is underlined by Aristotle (1355b 1–7). Rhetoric is considered to be neutral; more correctly, it is a human good: “For by using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm”. Transl. G. Kennedy 2007 (ἄν τις ὠφελήσειεν τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως). One can only hope that persuasion is not used for the achievement of nefarious purposes (1355a 31: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν).63

3.2.1 The Isocratean Quotations The three genres of rhetorical speeches (judicial, deliberative and epideictic) had already become established by the time of Aristotle, but the philosopher systematised rhetorical practice and the origin of this triple distinction was already attributed to him during antiquity (Quint. Inst. or. 3.4.1; cf. Grimaldi 1980–1988, I 79–80). Most importantly, Aristotle recognises deliberative and particularly epideictic speeches,64 as compared to the previous single-minded preoccupation with judicial speeches, acknowledging the role played by Isocrates. Despite the competition between them, Isocrates seems to have been a major influence on Aristotle, and it is worth examining the particular aspects of his presence in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, combined with the resounding absence of Demosthenes.65 Firstly, it must be stressed that approaching the subject from the perspective of competition between philosophy and rhetoric can lead to diametrically opposed

|| 62 Cf. N. Loraux, The Invention of Athens. The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, Cambridge MA/ London 1986, 224; Rapp (2002) II 938–939. 63 Cf. Day (2007) 389–391. For a neutral assessment of the Rhetoric, see Engberg-Pedersen (1996) 116–141; Rapp (2009) 591–593; E. Cohen de Lara, Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Persistence of the Emotions in the Courtroom, in: L. Huppes-Cluysenaer/N.M.M.S. Coehlo (eds.), Aristotle on Emotion in Law and Politics, Berlin 2018, 385–399. 64 Cf. Buchheit (1960) 116 ff.; Pernot (1993) 25–30; Pepe (2013) 144 ff. 65 For comprehensive details on all that follows, see E. Alexiou, Isokrateszitate in der aristotelischen Rhetorik und das “Schweigen” über Demosthenes, Hermes 144 (2016) 401–418.

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views, as the following two statements reveal. The most recent belongs to V. Bers “Evidently Aristotle was not on good terms with Isocrates, so I would expect him or his people to get sarcastic, a tone we note from time to time in the Rhetoric”.66 On the contrary, Ι. Düring claimed that “Aristotle’s extant Rhetoric proves, however, that he had a high opinion of Isocrates; his own style betrays a marked influence from Isocrates; he has much in common with him in his social and historical outlook”.67 This final view is confirmed and expanded through the following scientific data. Isocrates is the only orator included in the canon of Attic orators who is systematically referred to by Aristotle and, in fact, 13 times by name. The Isocratean quotations consist of one or more lines,68 a single word,69 as well as paraphrases or various comments and allusions.70 Aristotle refers to the following Isocratean speeches by name: Panegyricus (4), Helen (10), To Philip (5), On the Peace (8), Antidosis (15). Additionally, he also simply quotes passages, without indicating their origin, either from the foregoing speeches or from Evagoras (9), while at least one quotation (1392b 11– 12) must be attributed to a judicial speech belonging to Isocrates’ logographic activity. In this case, the name Εὔθυνος – and the varia lectio Εὐθύνους found in manuscripts and adopted by R. Kassel in his edition of Aristotle’s Rhetoric – refer to Isocrates’ extant judicial speech Against Euthynus (21). With respect to the transmission of the Isocratean text, Aristotle must be used carefully, as many quotations are most likely given from memory; however, Aristotelian readings must not be excluded a priori. When remarking on the rhetorical topos ek kriseōs (locus ab auctoritate; Rhetoric 1398b 21–26), i.e. when invoking the judgment of a third person contributes towards supporting the rhetorical argument, Aristotle (1399a 1–6) quotes three examples from Isocrates: the judgment of Theseus regarding Helen (10.38), the judgment of the three goddesses regarding the Trojan prince Paris (10.46) and the judgment of Conon regarding Evagoras (9.52). The final quotation from Evagoras is of interest for textual criticism: Ἰσoκράτης φησίν· “Κόνων γoῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τoὺς ἄλλoυς παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν”. The general Conon consciously chose among many options to take refuge with Evagoras I, the king of Cyprus, following the defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotamoi. The manuscript tradition of Isocrates is as follows: codex Γ, which, following its discovery by I. Bekker in 1823, was considered a codex optimus, offers the reading δυστυχήσας τῆς πόλεως; this was corrected by the second corrector Γ2 as δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως,

|| 66 V. Bers, Performing the Speech in Athenian Courts and Assembly. Adjusting the Act to fit the Bema?, in: C. Kremmydas et al. (eds.), Profession and Performance. Aspects of Oratory in the GrecoRoman World, London 2013, 30. 67 Ι. Düring, Aristotle on the Biographical Tradition, Göteborg 1957, 389. 68 Arist. Rhet. 1392b 11–12; 1399a 1–6; 1399b 10–11; 1409b33–1410a17; 1411b 11–19; 1412b 3–12; 1414b 30–35. 69 Arist. Rhet. 1411a 30 (Isocr. 5.12): the quotation is cited due to the expression τοὺς συντρέχοντας. 70 Arist. Rhet. 1368a 18–22; 1401a 8–13; 1414b 19–30; 1418a 29–33; 1418a33–34; 1418b 23–27.

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a reading also encountered in the so-called vulgata-manuscripts Λ and Θ, as well as in Ε which descends from Γ. Nevertheless, the δυστυχήσας of Γ, without the πόλεως, is quoted by Aristotle. At the same time, Isocratean passages give credence to this reading ‒ 5.67: Κόνων δὲ δεδυστυχηκώς; 5.62: ἀτυχήσας (sc. Κόνων) ... πλεύσας δ᾿ εἰς Κύπρoν. The addition of the phrase τῆς πόλεως most likely intruded into the text due to precaution on the part of the scribe, as it is followed by τῇ πόλει. The scribe anticipated the subsequent τῇ πόλει. The problem found in the relationship between Aristotle and the Isocratean text becomes more interesting upon examining the lengthier Isocratean quotation in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, originating from the orator’s stylistically supreme speech Panegyricus (4; 380 BC). During the examination of the period in cola (divided or contrasted; 1409b33–1410a23), a sequence of 10 quotations from the Panegyricus are encountered: 4.1; 4.35–36; 4.41; 4.48; 4.72; 4.89; 4.105; 4.149; 4.181; 4.186. The first is fully in line with the manuscript tradition of Isocrates, while the other nine either tally or present minor differences. If one considers that the speech consists of 189 paragraphs, it is noteworthy that the quotations come from every section of the speech and in sequence; in other words, these are not isolated quotations, meaning that Aristotle had either systematically studied and memorised the Isocratean speech or had a manuscript to consult.71 A number of Isocratean quotations in the Rhetoric indicate that the Isocratean style is consistent with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, whereby the virtue of style (aretē lexeōs) must be clear (saphēs) and appropriate (prepousa, 1404b 1–5). When expounding on urbanities (asteia), an Isocratean quotation from To Philip 5.73 is used to support the contrast between war and peace (1410b 29–31), four Isocratean quotations (5.12-Rhet. 1411a 29–30; 4.151-Rhet. 1411b 11; 4.172-Rhet. 1411b 13–14; 4.180Rhet. 1411b 16–17) constitute successful expressions of metaphor by analogy, two examples from To Philip (5.10-Rhet. 1411b 27–28; 5.127-Rhet. 1411b 28–29) indicate activity (energeia) and, in particular, the capability of activity and effectiveness, while the homōnymia (a phonetic coincidence with different meaning) is used as an example of a witticism or urbanity (Rhet. 1412b 4–12): the word  archē has a dual significance, meaning both “beginning” and “power”  (Isocr. 4.100; 5.61; 8.101), i.e. hegemonic power was the beginning or root of evil (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν).  When describing the parts of a rhetorical speech in Book ΙΙΙ, Aristotle begins with the epideictic speech (Rhet. 1414b 19 ff.), another example of the influence of Isocrates. The philosopher refers to the exordium of the Helen as an example of lack of unity between the exordium of an epideictic speech and its main subject (1414b 24–28). It is no coincidence that the text then focuses on Gorgias and Isocrates in order to indicate how the exordia of epideictic speeches are formed (1414b 30 ff.).

|| 71 Cf. Rapp (2002) II 880.

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Aristotle ascertains an analogy between encomia and deliberative speeches: “Praise (epainos) and deliberations (symboulai) are part of a common species (eidos) in that what one might propose in deliberation becomes encomia when the form of expression is changed” (1367b 37–39).72 A phrase from Evagoras 9.45 is used as an example of facile conversion of advice (oὐ δεῖ μέγα φρoνεῖν ἐπὶ τoῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τoῖς δι’ αὑτόν) into praise (μέγα φρoνῶν oὐκ τoῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχoυσιν ἀλλὰ τoῖς δι’ αὑτόν; Rhet. 1368a 3–7). Moreover, Aristotle is a proponent of the habit of Attic orators – and Isocrates in particular – to link advice with invective, as is the case, for example, against the Lacedaemonians in the Panegyricus (4.122–128-Rhet. 1418a 31– 32) or against the general Chares in On the Peace (8.27; 8.61-Rhet. 1418a 32–33). Synkrisis (comparison) indicates the superiority of the individual being lauded and is predominantly found in rhetorical encomia. Isocrates applies synkrisis pros endoxous as a technique of rhetorical auxēsis (amplificatio),73 and Aristotle enhances this rhetorical practice: “And if you do not have material enough with the man himself, compare him with others, which Isocrates used to do because of his lack of experience in speaking in court. One should make the comparison with famous people; for the subject is amplified and made honorable if he is better than (other) worthy ones” (Rhet. 1368a 19–22: κἂν μὴ καθ᾿ αὑτὸν εὐπoρῇς, πρὸς ἄλλoυς ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσoκράτης ἐπoίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν74 τoῦ δικoλoγεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξoυς συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπoυδαίων βελτίων).75 A particular role is played in the Isocratean encomium by “embedded encomia”, i.e. the encapsulation of one encomium in a different encomium. Such examples are: the encomium of Theseus (10.18–38), of Paris (10.41–48), of the Egyptians and of Pythagoras (11.20–29), of the Athenian general Timotheus (15.101–139) and of Agamemnon (12.74–87). Aristotle is familiar with this Isocratean technique, too: “In epideictic one should interweave the speech with praise, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in somebody (to praise)” (Rhet. 1418a 33–34: ἐν δὲ τoῖς ἐπιδεικτικoῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγoν ἐπεισoδιoῦν ἐπαίνoις, oἷoν Ἰσoκράτης πoιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει). Isocrates’ speeches contain passages where fictitious individuals, usually pupils or friends of Isocrates, address Isocrates himself in either direct or indirect speech.

|| 72 The translations from the Rhetoric of Aristotle are by G. Kennedy (2007). Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 3.7.28; P. Chiron, La Rhétorique d’Aristote et la littérature, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, Hildesheim 2009, 31–32; Pernot (2015) 93–94. 73 On auxēsis, see O. Navarre, Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote, Paris 1900, 301–311; W. Plöbst, Die Auxesis (Amplificatio). Studien zu ihrer Entwicklung und Anwendung, Munich 1911; Palmer (1934) 39–43; Buchheit (1960) 15–26; Kennedy (1971) 60–72; B. Bauer, Amplificatio, HWRh 1 (1992) 445–471; Pernot (1993) 675–680; Anderson (2000) 67. 74 Contrary to most editors, Kassel favours the reading συνήθειαν. See Rapp (2002) II 429. 75 Similarly, Anax. Rhet. Alex. 3.7; Menand. De epid. 421.8–10 Russ.-Wils.: δεῖ γὰρ καλoῦ καλλίoνα ἀπoδεικνύναι ἢ ὁτῳoῦν ἐνδόξῳ ἐφάμιλλoν, oἷoν ἢ τῷ Ἡρακλέoυς βίῳ τὸν βίoν αὐτoῦ ἢ τῷ Θησέως παραβάλλoντα.

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This refers to recording the ēthos tou legontos, either of the orator himself or his opponents, and is related to rhetorical figures such as hypophora (subjectio), where questions and answers included in a rhetorical speech in the form of a dialogue serve the refutation of potential objections.76 Aristotle acknowledges the importance of these “dialogical scenes”77 through which the orator obviates objections, criticism, envy or prolixity: “In regard to ethos, since there are sometimes things to be said about oneself that are invidious or prolix or contradictory, and about another that are abusive or boorish, it is best to attribute them to another person, as Isocrates does in the Philippus and in the Antidosis” (1418b 23–27: εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει). The fact that Aristotle makes no reference to the longest dialogical scene in Isocrates’ final speech, Panathenaicus 12.200–265, which involves a dialogue between Isocrates and a laconophile former pupil of his, strongly indicates that Aristotle’s Rhetoric dates before 339 BC, the year Panathenaicus was published, and that Aristotle did not focus on this speech in potential subsequent revisions. The peripatetic tradition was based on the Isocratean literary model, which expressed the Aristotelian mean. Theophrastus, a pupil of Aristotle, wrote the text On Style (Peri lexeōs) systematically focusing on stylistic issues under the influence of Isocrates.78 This recognition of the rhetorician is even more important if one considers that the earlier Peripatetics criticised Demosthenes who, from the 1st century BC onwards, was considered the orator par excellence. The overall silence of Aristotle in his Rhetoric with respect to the speeches of Demosthenes may be an indication of the earlier authoring of the text, when Demosthenes was not yet playing an active role on the political scene of Athens, or of an absence of published speeches by Demosthenes; however, this interpretation ex silentio has limited force on its own. It cannot be considered coincidental that the only certain reference to Demosthenes (Rhetoric 1401b 31–34)79 is recognised in a quotation of the pro-Macedonian orator Demades,

|| 76 See H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study, Leiden 1998, 341–343. 77 See Isocr. 7.56–59; 8.57; 5.17–23; 15.141–149; 12.200–265. Cf. E. Alexiou, Die Kommunikation mit dem Publikum. Dialogszenen bei Isokrates, WJA 25 (2001) 85–98. 78 W.W. Fortenbaugh et al., Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, II, Leiden 1992, fr. 688, 692; W.W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Commentary 8: Sources on Rhetoric and Poetics, Boston 2005, 292. Cf. Kennedy (1989) 194. 79 The name “Demosthenes” occurs twice more in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: in the first case, it involves an unknown judicial dispute with no quotation (1397b 7). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Epist. Amm. 12, p. 277–278 Us.-Rad.) believes that this is the renowned trial On the Crown and dates the Rhetoric after 330 BC, which is less likely; cf. Grimaldi (1980–1988) II 347–348. In the second case (Rhet. 1407a 6– 8), it is a quotation not found in the extant corpus of Demosthenes and is attributed to the 5th-century

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who considered the policy of Demosthenes as the root of all evil. The political background of the era (pro-Macedonians - anti-Macedonians) has unquestionably played a role in the positive evaluation of the pro-Macedonian Isocrates and the negative evaluation of the anti-Macedonian Demosthenes.80 Furthermore, Demosthenes’ type of rhetorical skill does not appear to be in line with the literary standards of Aristotle, contrary to those of Isocrates. Demosthenes’ eloquence falls under the agonistic style (lexis agōnistikē), which supports oral delivery, as opposed to the Isocratean written style (lexis graphikē) that corresponds to written speeches (1413b 8–9).81 Delivery (hypokrisis), on which Demosthenes – more than anyone else – placed exceptional importance, sits on the opposite of Aristotle’s view in the Rhetoric (1403b 33–34) that the ascent of theatrical recitation of rhetorical speeches is directly linked to the corruption of political morals.82 According to Aristotle (1404a 12–16), delivery functions like acting: Acting is a matter of natural talent and depends less upon art (φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον), but in regard to style it has an artistic element (περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον).83 Based on the foregoing – regardless of any differences between Isocratean and Aristotelian theory concerning philosophy and rhetoric or the competition between their schools – Aristotle acknowledges Isocrates as an incomparable master of the written word and his tremendous contribution to the evolution of rhetorical style, particularly with regard to epideictic speeches. In the peripatetic tradition, Isocrates and not Demosthenes served as a stylistic standard.

|| Athenian general of the same name. Cf. J.C. Trevett, Aristotle’s Knowledge of Athenian Oratory, CQ 46 (1996) 371–379. 80 Cf. M. Edwards, Rhetoric and Technique in the Attic Orators and Aristotle’s techne rhetorike, in: J. Roe/M. Stanco (eds.), Inspiration and Technique. Ancient to Modern Views on Beauty and Art, Bern 2007, 35–47; M. Edwards, Dionysius and Isaeus, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 48–49. 81 Cf. H. Yunis, Demosthenes On the Crown, Cambridge 2001, 18. 82 Cf. V. Bers, Genos Dikanikon. Amateur and Professional Speech in the Courtrooms of Classical Athens, Cambridge ΜΑ/London 2009, 56–57. Cf. J. Walker, On the Deinos Logos of On the Crown, in: J.J. Murphy (ed.), Demosthenes’ On the Crown. Rhetorical Perspectives, Carbondale 2016, 151. 83 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1414a 15–16: ἀλλ’ ὅπου μάλιστα ὑπόκρισις, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι; C. Cooper, Philosophers, Politics, Academics. Demosthenes’ Rhetorical Reputation in Antiquity, in: Ι. Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator, London/New York 2000, 226.

4 The Canon of Attic Orators and Other Orators 4.1 The Necessary Conventions Engaging with the rhetorical art of the 4th century BC through the interpretation of the speeches of several orators is subject to important conventions that require some form of legitimacy. In this context, I would note two such conventions: focusing on the representative and the formation of the so-called “Canon of the Ten Attic Orators”. The first convention is literary in nature: this work will subsequently limit itself to specific representatives of rhetoric, despite the fact that this genre was so important for the literary production of the 4th century BC that anyone authoring literary texts was obligated to follow rhetorical forms, procedures and rules. For example, Plato’s dialogues are exceptional literary texts, stylistically elaborate and examples of a Platonic model of philosophical rhetoric, in the context of the dispute with established views concerning rhetoric.1 Certain dialogues contain rhetorical speeches (Phaedrus, Symposium), while others, such as the Apology of Socrates and Menexenus, can be perceived as products of traditional rhetoric (Kennedy 1963, 125; Erler 2007, 498, 501). Of the works of Antisthenes, the pupil of Socrates, two brief epideictic speeches survive, Ajax and Odysseus, which, in the form of opposed arguments (antilogiai), address the conflict between the two Homeric heroes concerning the arms of Achilles (VA 53, 54 Giann.; cf. Döring 1998, 271). Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is difficult to categorise as belonging to a single literary genre: Cicero refers to it as Cyri vita et disciplina (Brutus 112), while Diogenes Laertius characterises it as an enkōmion (6.84).2 It is a fictional, laudatory biography of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian empire, which, as an early “Mirror of Princes” (Fürstenspiegel), focuses on the education of an ideal leader.3 Xenophon’s Agesilaus is an encomium to the Spartan king, influ-

|| 1 Cf. Erler 2009, 89; Η. Yunis, Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in Plato, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, Hildesheim 2009, 17–26. 2 See in detail E. Alexiou, Εστιάζοντας στον πρωταγωνιστή: το βιογραφικό εγκώμιο του Κύρου στην Ξενοφώντος Κύρoυ Παιδεία, EEThess (philol) 9 (2000–2001) 7–44. 3 Cf. B. Due, The Cyropaedia. Xenophon’s Aims and Methods, Aaarhus 1989; J. Tatum, Xenophon’s Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus, Princeton 1989; D.L. Gera, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique, Oxford 1993; C. Mueller-Goldingen, Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyroupädie, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1995; M. Reichel, Herrschaftswechsel und Generationenfolge in Xenophons Kyrupädie, in: T. Baier/M. Amerise (eds.), Die Legitimation der Einzelherrschaft im Kontext der Generationenthematik, Berlin/New York 2008, 26–27; B. Zimmermann, The Historical Novel in the Greek World. Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, in: G.A. Karla (ed.), Fiction on the Fringe, Leiden/Boston 2009, 95–103; M. Tamiolaki, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Tentative Answers to an Enigma, in: Flower (2017) 174–194; M. Tamiolaki, Emotion and Persuasion in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, Phoenix 70 (2016) 40– 63; N. Humble, Xenophon and the Instruction of Princes, in: Flower (2017) 416–434. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-004

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enced by Isocrates’ encomium Evagoras. Both texts are dedicated to recently deceased leaders and are accompanied by the same idealising trends of their authors (Sonnabend 2002, 46 ff.). However, the thematic approach in Xenophon’s Agesilaus is simpler, compared to the more complex narrative structure of Isocrates’ Evagoras.4 The narrative section where the actions of Agesilaus are set forth (1–2) is followed by the systematic description of his virtues, such as piety (eusebeia) (3), justice (dikaiosynē) (4), prudence (sōphrosynē) (5), courage (andreia) (6.1–3) and wisdom (sophia) (6.4–8). Agesilaus loved his country (philopolis) and the Greeks (philellēn) (7), was a master of urbanity (to euchari) (8) and stood apart from the imposture (alazoneia) of the Persian king (9). His deeds and character are recapitulated in chapters 10 and 11. The encomium Evagoras (9) follows the narrative chronological exposition of Evagoras’ deeds from his birth until his death. The virtues of the Cypriot king are summarised at the beginning of the encomium (9.22–24): during childhood, he was characterised by beauty (kallos), bodily strength (rhōmē), prudence (sōphrosyne), to which courage (andreia), wisdom (sophia) and justice (dikaiosyne) were added when he grew into a man. His exceptional physical traits are underlined by a number of achievements, from time he ascended to the throne until his death (9.25–72). His deeds are recapitulated in sections 9.66–69.

Rhetoric also provided new impetus to historiography. The historians Theopompus of Chios and Ephorus of Cuma are considered to be renowned pupils of Isocrates (Engels 2003, 182).5 Additionally, Timaeus of Tauromenion, Psaon of Plataea and Sosigenes mark the influence of rhetoric on the development of Hellenistic historiography (Dion. Hal. Din. 8, p. 308 Us.-Rad.).6

|| 4 Alexiou (2010) 40–41; P. Pontier, Praising the King’s Courage. From the Evagoras to the Agesilaus, in: M. Tamiolaki (ed.), Special Issue. Xenophon and Isocrates. Political Affinities and Literary Interactions, Trends in Classics 10, Berlin 2018, 101–113. Cf. M. Vallozza, Enkomion, HWRh 2 (1994) 1154; N.A. Livingstone, A Commentary on Isocrates’ Busiris, Leiden 2001, 116–117; F. Pownall, Lessons from the Past. The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose, Michigan 2004, 32–35; M. Reichel, Xenophon als Biograph, in: M. Erler/S. Schorn (eds.), Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit, Berlin/New York 2007, 30–31; S. Schorn, Biographie und Autobiographie, in: B. Zimmermann/A. Rengakos (eds.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der Klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit, Munich 2014, 700–701; J. Dillery, Xenophon. The Small Works, in: Flower (2017) 195–219, esp. 202 ff; C. Tuplin, Xenophon, Isocrates and the Achaemenid Empire. History, Pedagogy and the Persian Solution to Greek Problems, in: M. Tamiolaki (ed.), Special Issue. Xenophon and Isocrates. Political Affinities and Literary Interactions, Trends in Classics 10, Berlin 2018, 46–53. See also D. Krömer, Xenophons Agesilaos. Untersuchungen zur Komposition, Berlin 1968. 5 Contrary to M.A. Flower, Theopompus of Chios. History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century B.C., Oxford 1994, 43–50. 6 See C. Baron, Timaeus of Tauromenium and Hellenistic Historiography, Cambridge 2012, 170 ff.; J. Thornton, Oratory in Polybius’ Histories, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 21–42; C. Scardino, Historiographie, in: B. Zimmermann/A. Rengakos (eds.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der Klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit, Munich 2014, 617, 631–635, 651–652; N. Wiater, Polybius on Speeches in

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The second convention concerns the “Canon of the Ten Attic Orators”. This canon of the ten Attic orators, who served as stylistic and formalistic models, sprung from critiques and literary engagements of Alexandrian philology7 as well as scholastic rhetoric tradition (Robling 2007, 85–86). Despite ambivalence with regard to the number and names of the orators, the number “ten” is encountered in Quintilian (Inst. or. 10.1.76; cf. Luc. Scyth. 10) and in Pseudo-Plutarch (Lives of the Ten Orators, 1st/2nd century AD) accompanied by the following names: Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Dinarchus. These orators were active in Athens from the late 5th century BC to the late 4th century BC. The precise origin and dating of this canon is disputed (potential authors include Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarchus, Apollodorus of Pergamum, and Caecilius).8 A.E. Douglas (1956) dates its origin to the 2nd century AD, while J.C. Smith (1995) turns towards the Alexandrian scholars of the 3rd/2nd century BC. Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not appear to be familiar with this canon, while the text of Pseudo-Plutarch refers to Caecilius of Calacte in Sicily, an Atticist rhetorician and critic of the Augustean Age;9 therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Caecilius may have been the first to create or confirm and propagate the canon (Worthington 1994, 244 ff.).10 The

|| Timaeus. Syntax and Structure in Histories 12.25A, CQ 64 (2014) 121–135; E. Alexiou, Tόπος ἐγκωμιαστικός (Polybius 10.21.8). The Εncomium on Philopoemen and its Ιsocratic Βackground, in: Ν. Miltsios/M. Tamiolaki (eds.), Polybius and his Legacy. Tradition, Historical Representation, Reception, Berlin/ Boston 2018, 241–255. 7 A central role must have been played around 200 BC by Hermippus of Smyrna, who lived in Alexandria and is considered the most important source for a collection of biographies (koinai historiai) of the late Hellenistic period of the 2nd or 1st century BC; see C. Cooper, The Development of the Biographical Tradition on the Athenian Orators in the Hellenistic Period, Diss. University of British Columbia 1992. Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to these biographies (Epist. Amm. 3, p. 260 Us.-Rad.); cf. Engels (2003) 186–187. 8 Cf. J. Brzoska, De canone decem oratorum Atticorum quaestiones, Breslau 1883; Ν. Ο’Sullivan, Caecilius, the Canon of Writers, and the Origins of Atticism, in: W.J. Dominik (ed.), Roman Eloquence. Rhetoric in Society and Literature, London 1997, 32–49; Pernot (2000) 57–59; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 6–10. 9 These are not only references to Caecilius by name; see E. Ofenloch, Caecilii Calactini Fragmenta, Leipzig 1907, xxii-xxiii. For the sources and planning of the text of Pseudo-Plutarch, cf. L.V. Pitcher, Narrative technique in the Lives of the Τen Οrators, CQ 55 (2005) 217–234; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 17–29. As regards the scientific discussion concerning the relationship between Pseudo-Plutarch’s Lives of the Ten Orators and the information of Photius, see R. McComb, The Tradition of Pseudo-Plutarch’s Lives of the Ten Orators in Photius’ Bibliotheca, Diss. Chapel Hill 1991; R.M. Smith, Photius on the Ten Orators, GRBS 33 (1992) 159–189; J. Schamp, Les vies des dix orateurs attiques, Fribourg 2000. 10 In the latter case, the actual originator of the “Canon of the Ten Attic Orators” might well have been Apollodorus of Pergamum (1st century BC), who taught Caecilius and wrote a non-extant Art of Rhetoric. Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 9.1.12; R. Nicolai, La storiografia nell’educazione antica, Pisa 1992, 250– 339; P.E. Easterling, A Taste for the Classics, in: T.P. Wiseman (ed.), Classics in Progress, Oxford 2002, 22 ff.

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Suda names one of his works as Peri tou charaktēros tōn deka rhetorōn (Suda κ 1165 s.v.). The ten orators were established as Atticist models, standing against Asianism. The tension between Atticism and Asianism may be why the canon ends with Dinarchus and excludes other figures such as Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 350–280 BC), a proponent of a middle ground between Atticism and Asianism (Cic. De or. 2.95; Orat. 92).11 According to Quintilian, he was practically the last Attic orator (Inst. or. 10.1.80). While the ten Attic orators making up the canon owe their survival to this choice, today only part of their literary work remains available. The first issue raised is that of the publication of extant rhetorical speeches and the correspondence between the oral and written versions. Orators such as Aeschines only published a small part of the speeches they delivered, possibly following revisions. On the contrary, the Demosthenic corpus is far larger, but how, when and in what form it took shape (whether or not it contains revised rhetorical speeches) remains unanswered. Furthermore, due to the limitations of the manuscript or papyrus transmission, we can only hope to possess a truly exemplary, representative selection. According to ancient testimonies, numerous rhetorical speeches were considered spurious, but even in this case, there must be considerable losses: Pseudo-Plutarch (Lives of the Ten Orators) refers to 60 speeches by Antiphon (833C), 425 by Lysias (836A), 60 by Isocrates (838D) and 64 by Dinarchus (850E). Today, only a small portion of this literary production is extant. Most importantly, the ten Attic orators are recorded as just a small selection from a large number of masters of language, with catastrophic consequences for the rest. According to Ι. Worthington (1994, 247), this selection “has proved a disaster for the survival of works by those who missed out”. Ancient testimonies (Cic. De or. 2.92; Brut. 36) indicate that numerous speeches by various Greek orators were in circulation in the 1st century BC. There is scattered information on many theoreticians and practitioners of rhetoric outside the canon of the ten Attic orators, but hardly any of their writing survives. In most cases, we know little besides their names. We should first refer to the Isocrateans: Aphareus, the adopted son of Isocrates, who wrote deliberative and judicial speeches ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839C), Isocrates of Apollonia (Suda ι 653 s.v. Isokrates; θ 138 s.v. Theodektes), Naucrates of Erythrae (Dion. Hal. Isae. 19, p. 122 Us.-Rad.), Theodectes of Phaselis (Suda υ 138 s.v.; Gell. 10.18.6–7), Philiscus of Miletus (Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 2, p. 259 Us.-Rad.; Isae. 19, p. 122 Us.-Rad.), Cephisodorus of Athens, who defended his teacher from Aristotle’s criticism (Dion. Hal. Isocr. 18, p. 86; Isae. 19, p. 122 Us.Rad.), Lacritus ([Demosth.] 35.15),12 Coccus of Athens (Quint. Inst. or. 12.10.21; Suda κ 1915 s.v.),

|| 11 Worthington (1994) 258; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 9–10. Nevertheless, the “Canon of the Ten Attic Orators” (canon decem oratorum) and other such nomenclatures are recent, being traced back to D. Ruhnken (about 1768). See M. Asper, Kanon, HWRh 4 (1998) 872; S.L. Schein, “Our Debt to Greece and Rome”. Canon, Class and Ideology, in: L. Hardwick/C. Stray (eds.), A Companion to Classical Receptions, London 2008, 82. 12 Cf. FGrH 1026 F54, with the commentary of J. Bollansée, p. 426–427.

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Python of Byzantium (Demosth. 18.136; [Demosth.] 7.20; Aeschin. 2.125),13 Leodamas of Acharnae ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 837D; Demosth. 20.146; Aeschin. 3.138),14 Aeschines of Arcadia (Diog. Laert. 2.64), Anaxagoras (Diog. Laert. 2.15), Straton (Diog. Laert. 5.61) and others. There were also politicians and orators: Phocion, a general and orator (Plut. Phoc. 5, 9, 10, 20 ff.; Demosth. 10.3–5), Polyeuctus of Sphettus (Plut. Phoc. 9.9; Arist. Rhet. 1411a 21), Diophantus (Demosth. 19.86; 19.297), Hegesippus of Sounion (Demosth. 9.72), Aristophon (Plut. Phoc. 7.5), Demades (Suda δ 414 s.v.), Aristogeiton, who was called “the dog” (κύων;15 [Demosth.] 25.40; Pollux V 65; Suda α 3912–3913 s.v., where a list of his speeches can be found, although information about him is confusing; Quint. Inst. οr. 12.10.22; Plut. Phoc. 10; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850E. Three speeches against him are extant, two under the name of Demosthenes [25, 26] and one of Dinarchus [2]), Pytheas (one of Demosthenes’ prosecutors in the Harpalus affair; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 846C; cf. Plut. Demosth. 27.5; Phoc. 21.2; Suda π 3125 s.v.), Menesaechmus (Lycurgus’ opponent and successor as financial administrator; Dion. Hal. Din. 11, p. 316 Us.-Rad.), and Philinus (Harpocr. s.v. ἐπὶ κόρρης). Finally, reference must be made to orators who were active at the turn of the 4th century to the 3rd century BC: Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Theophrastus and a prolific writer, philosopher and orator (Cic. De off. 1.3; a list of his works can be found in Diog. Laert. 5.80–81);16 following Aristotle and Theophrastus, he wrote two books On Rhetoric wishing to eradicate the enmity between philosophy and rhetoric (Wehrli/Wöhrle/Zhmud 2004, 599). Subsequently, there was Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes (Cic. De οr. 2,23; Brut. 286; [Plut.] Vit.dec. or. 840D, 847C), at whose proposal the Athenians erected a statue in honour of Demosthenes in 280/279 BC; he viciously attacked pro-Macedonian politicians such as Demetrius of Phalerum (Polyb. 12.13–14). There was also Stratocles (Demosth. 37.48), the main prosecutor of Demosthenes in the Harpalus affair, who referred to the speaker’s platform as the “golden harvest” (Plut. Praec. rer. reip. 798E),17 Glaucippus, son of Hyperides (Plut. Phoc. 4.2), and Charisius (Cic. Brut. 286).

4.2 Non-Canonical Orators At this point, Apollodorus, Hegesippus and Demades deserve a deeper analysis. If ancient and contemporary critics are right, then rhetorical speeches by the two first orators intruded quite early into the Demosthenic corpus, while the third was not included in the “Canon of the Ten Attic Orators”, despite further information on his work having been transmitted.

|| 13 Between 350 and 340 BC, he remained in the service of Philip II. Cf. Sealey (1993) 172–173. 14 Cf. Roisman/Worthington (2015) 154. 15 See K. Apostolakis, Ιδιωτικά σκάνδαλα και δημόσια εικόνα. Ο Αριστογείτων στο στόχαστρο της δικανικής ρητορείας ([Δημ.] 25 και 26), in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 201–230. 16 See W.W. Fortenbaugh/E. Schütrumpf, Demetrius of Phalerum. Text, Translation and Discussion, New Brunswick NJ 2000; L. O’Sullivan, The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE. A Philosopher in Politics, Leiden/Boston 2009, esp. 232–240. 17 However, see also the re-assessment of Stratocles in A.J. Bayliss, After Demosthenes. The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens, London/New York 2011, 152–186.

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4.2.1 Apollodorus Apollodorus (394–after 343 BC), the son of the banker Pasion,18 was an Athenian antiMacedonian politician and an ally of Demosthenes. He became involved in judicial disputes with Phormion, an accountant, treasurer and finally lessee of the bank of Apollodorus’ father, who acquired the rights of an Athenian citizen and, following the death of Pasion and in accordance with the injunction in his will, married his wife (Demosth. 36.34). Through eight judicial speeches transmitted under the name of Demosthenes, we are able to follow a number of trials where the principal protagonist is the litigious and supercilious Apollodorus, the eldest son of Pasion. It is important that these rhetorical speeches reflect Athenian society during the mid-4th century BC. Demosthenes wrote the speech For Phormion (36), and quite possibly the speech Against Stephanus 1 (45), which was delivered by Apollodorus.19 The other six speeches present stylistic similarities and therefore belong to the same author; subsequent to the stance expressed by A. Schaefer (1966–1967, III,2 184–193),20 the following generally stand as speeches by Apollodorus himself: Against Stephanus 2 (46), Against Timotheus (49), Against Polycles (50), Against Callippus (52), Against Nicostratus (53), and Against Neaera (59). The speech Against Evergus and Mnesibulus (47) should most likely be added to the above, as it is not associated with Apollodorus’ judicial disputes but is stylistically consistent with his other judicial speeches.21 The Alexandrian Callimachus is most likely responsible for the inclusion of Apollodorus’ speeches in the Demosthenic corpus.22 While past scholarship continually compared Apollodorus to Demosthenes and, due to stylistic weaknesses and a certain lexical rigidity, downgraded him to a third-

|| 18 See Trevett (1992). Pasion, initially a slave to two bankers (Demothenes 36.43) and subsequently a bank owner and an established Athenian citizen, is known from Isocrates’ Trapeziticus (17). 19 Contrary to Plutarch’s testimony (Demosth. 15.1) and the communis opinio, see MacDowell (2009) 120. 20 Cf. Kennedy (1963) 246–249; Trevett (1992) 50–110; Kapparis/Christodoulou (2008) 23–24. 21 See Schaefer (1966–1967) ΙΙΙ,2 193–199. Cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,1 547–549; Karvounis (2008) 39; MacDowell (2009) 136–141. Harpocration (s.v. ἐκαλίστρουν) considers Dinarchus the likely author of the speech; see Worthington (1992) 12. For the legal matter, see V. Wohl, Law’s Cosmos. Juridical Discourse in Athenian Forensic Oratory, Cambridge 2010, 98–112. 22 See E. Drerup, Antike Demosthenesausgaben, Philologus Suppl. 7, Leipzig 1899, 546–548; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 35 with note 113. For the inclusion of Apollodorus’ speeches in the Demosthenic corpus and a comparison to Dilts’ last critical edition, see K. Kapparis, The Transmission of Apollodoros and the Edition of Mervin Dilts, in: J. Grusková/Η. Bannert (eds.), Demosthenica libris manu scriptis tradita. Studien zur Textüberlieferung des Corpus Demosthenicum, Vienna 2014, 107– 128, who ends his text with the wish for an independent edition of Apollodorus’ speeches (p. 127): “One would hope that in our lifetime we will see his most famous quotation ‘We have courtesans for pleasure, concubines for the daily care of our bodies, and wives to give us legitimate children and take care of our household’ printed not as Pseudo-Demosthenes 59.122, but as Apollodoros 7.122”.

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rate orator (Kennedy 1963, 247; cf. Blass 1887–1898, III,1 539 ff.), contemporary scholarship focuses more on the particularities of his style and the content of his speeches, refraining from comparisons to other orators. His frequent repetitions, long-winded and participle-laden sentences, his parentheses and numerous details are reminiscent of the everyday spoken word and, as he does not aim for the accuracy and formality of the written word, his speeches constitute vibrant, realistic depictions of everyday life (Trevett 1992, 63–64, 106–107; Kapparis/Christodoulou 2008, 26–27). 4.2.1.1 Against Neaera (59) Numerous references to the social, religious and sexual life of Athens with particular cultural value can be found in the speech Against Neaera (59),23 dating back to approximately 342 BC. One cannot but agree with K. Kapparis: “The modern reader may sometimes wonder whether the elderly woman who appeared before an Athenian court in the late 340s B.C.E. could ever imagine that intimate details of her life would be widely studied and much discussed in the coming millennia”.24 It is not only the speech Against Neaera that has been the subject of systematic research in recent years;25 there is great interest in the actual story of Neaera in the context of gender studies focusing on sexuality and prostitution as well as the legal, financial and social conditions of women living in Athens in the 4th century BC.26 In reality, Neaera was merely the excuse for Apollodorus to act, through his brother-in-law Theomnestus, as a synēgoros (“supporting speaker”; cf. Rubinstein 2000) against Stephanus of Eroiadae – his political opponent since 349/348 BC, not to be confused with the defendant in the speeches Against Stephanus, the son of Menecles from Acharnae. Theomnestus, as the official prosecutor, brought a public action (graphē xenias) against Neaera for unlawfully exercising rights that belonged solely to Athenian citizens (59.13–17):27 according to the charge, Neaera was not Athenian, but a foreigner who, contrary to the law, was living with Stephanus, pretending

|| 23 Greek text used: Dilts (2002–2009). 24 K. Kapparis, review of Hamel (2003), Journal of the History of Sexuality 13 (2004) 104–105. For a likely effect on the Anecdota of Procopius of Caesarea, see D. Spatharas, Liaisons Dangereuses. Procopius, Lysias and Apollodorus, CQ 62 (2012) 846–858. 25 Carey (1992); Kapparis (1999); Brodersen (2004); Kapparis/Christodoulou (2008); V. Bers, Demosthenes 59. Against Neaera, in: M. Gagarin (ed.), Speeches from Athenian Law, Austin 2011, 144 ff. (= V. Bers, Demosthenes, Speeches 50–59, Austin 2003, 151 ff.). 26 Hamel (2003); Schuller (2008) 57–64; Gilhuly (2009) 29–57; E.E. Cohen, Athenian Prostitution. The Business of Sex, Oxford 2015; Kapparis (2017) esp. 243–247. For the documents of the speech, see M. Canevaro, The Documents in the Attic Orators. Laws and Decrees in the Public Speeches of the Demosthenic Corpus, Oxford 2013, 181–208. 27 Cf. A. Kurihara, Personal Enmity as a Motivation in Forensic Speeches, CQ 53 (2003) 473–474; C. Patterson, Athenian Citizenship Law, in: M. Gagarin/D. Cohen (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to

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to be married to him; furthermore, Stephanus seems to have facilitated her by committing various unlawful acts and defrauding the city: for example (59.13), he enrolled her children from other men in the phratries and deme and gave a daughter of Neaera from an unknown man in marriage, making her out to be his own daughter. The judicial dispute covers both personal and political differences between pro-Macedonian and anti-Macedonian circles.28 The outcome of the trial is not known. From a rhetorical standpoint, the speech is an apt subject for Aristotle’s criticism of the controversial methods employed by the rhetoricians of his time (Rhet. 1354a 11 ff.), who neglect proof through argumentation and exploit calumny and emotions in order to foster the anger, envy or charity of the judges. Apollodorus knows how to present to the jury a convincing, captivating narrative (59.33–38):29 Against Neaera 59(33) ἀφικόμενος τοίνυν δεῦρο ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀσελγῶς καὶ προπετῶς ἐχρῆτο αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ δεῖπνα ἔχων αὐτὴν πανταχοῖ ἐπορεύετο ὅπου πίνοι, ἐκώμαζέ τ’ ἀεὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ, συνῆν τ’ ἐμφανῶς ὁπότε βουληθείη πανταχοῦ, φιλοτιμίαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν πρὸς τοὺς ὁρῶντας ποιούμενος. καὶ ὡς ἄλλους τε πολλοὺς ἐπὶ κῶμον ἔχων ἦλθεν αὐτὴν καὶ ὡς Χαβρίαν τὸν Αἰξωνέα, ὅτε ἐνίκα ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος τὰ Πύθια τῷ τεθρίππῳ ὃ ἐπρίατο παρὰ τῶν παίδων τῶν Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου, καὶ ἥκων ἐκ Δελφῶν εἱστία τὰ ἐπινίκια ἐπὶ Κωλιάδι. καὶ ἐκεῖ ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ συνεγίγνοντο αὐτῇ μεθυούσῃ καθεύδοντος τοῦ Φρυνίωνος, καὶ οἱ διάκονοι οἱ Χαβρίου τράπεζαν παραθέμενοι. (34) καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, τοὺς ὁρῶντας ὑμῖν καὶ παρόντας μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. καί μοι κάλει Χιωνίδην Ξυπεταιόνα καὶ Εὐθετίωνα Κυδαθηναιᾶ. ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ {Χιωνίδης Ξυπεταιών, Εὐθετίων Κυδαθηναιεὺς μαρτυροῦσι κληθῆναι ὑπὸ Χαβρίου ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, ὅτε τὰ ἐπινίκια εἱστία Χαβρίας τῆς νίκης τοῦ ἅρματος, καὶ ἑστιᾶσθαι ἐπὶ Κωλιάδι, καὶ εἰδέναι Φρυνίωνα παρόντα ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ τούτῳ ἔχοντα Νέαιραν τὴν νυνὶ ἀγωνιζομένην, καὶ καθεύδειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ Φρυνίωνα καὶ Νέαιραν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοὶ ἀνισταμένους τῆς νυκτὸς πρὸς Νέαιραν ἄλλους τε καὶ τῶν διακόνων τινάς, οἳ ἦσαν Χαβρίου οἰκέται.} (35) Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀσελγῶς προὐπηλακίζετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Φρυνίωνος καὶ οὐχ ὡς ᾤετο ἠγαπᾶτο, οὐδ’ ὑπηρέτει αὐτῇ ἃ ἐβούλετο, συσκευασαμένη αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ὅσα ἦν αὐτῇ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου περὶ τὸ σῶμα κατεσκευασμένα ἱμάτια καὶ χρυσία, καὶ θεραπαίνας δύο, Θρᾷτταν καὶ Κοκκαλίνην, ἀποδιδράσκει εἰς Μέγαρα. ἦν δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὗτος ᾧ Ἀστεῖος μὲν ἦν ἄρχων Ἀθήνησιν, ὁ καιρὸς δ’ ἐν ᾧ ἐπολεμεῖθ’ ὑμεῖς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸν ὕστερον πόλεμον. (36) διατρίψασα δ’ ἐν τοῖς

|| Ancient Greek Law, Cambridge 2005, 287–289. See also G. Thür, Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens. Die Proklesis zur Basanos, Vienna 1977, 219 note 21; R. Osborne, The Elasticity of Athenian Law, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 32–41, esp. 38 ff. 28 Carey (1992) 4–8; Trevett (1992) 149–150; Kapparis/Christodoulou (2008) 11–15. Cf. also N.K. Rauh, Prostitutes, Pimps, and Political Conspiracies during the Late Roman Republic, in: A. Glazebrook/ M.M. Henry (eds.), Greek Prostitutes in the Ancient Mediterranean, 800 BCE–200 CE, Madison 2011, 210–213. 29 See K. Kapparis, Narrative and Performance in the Speeches of Apollodoros, in: S. Papaioannou et al. (eds.), The Theatre of Justice. Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric, Leiden/Boston 2017, 283–303, esp. 303.

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Μεγάροις δύ’ ἔτη, τόν τ’ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος καὶ Ἀλκισθένους ἐνιαυτόν, ὡς αὐτῇ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐργασία οὐχ ἱκανὴν εὐπορίαν παρεῖχεν ὥστε διοικεῖν τὴν οἰκίαν (πολυτελὴς δ’ ἦν, οἱ Μεγαρεῖς δ’ ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ μικρολόγοι, ξένων δὲ οὐ πάνυ ἐπιδημία ἦν αὐτόθι διὰ τὸ πόλεμον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας λακωνίζειν, τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ὑμᾶς ἄρχειν· εἰς δὲ τὴν Κόρινθον οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτῇ ἐπανελθεῖν διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐκράτους καὶ τοῦ Τιμανορίδου, ὥστ’ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι), (37) ὡς οὖν γίγνεται ἡ εἰρήνη ἡ ἐπὶ Φρασικλείδου ἄρχοντος καὶ ἡ μάχη ἡ ἐν Λεύκτροις Θηβαίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, τότε ἐπιδημήσαντα Στέφανον τουτονὶ εἰς τὰ Μέγαρα καὶ καταγαγόμενον ὡς αὐτὴν ἑταίραν οὖσαν καὶ πλησιάσαντα αὐτῇ, διηγησαμένη πάντα τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ τὴν ὕβριν τοῦ Φρυνίωνος, καὶ ἐπιδοῦσα ἃ ἐξῆλθεν ἔχουσα παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐπιθυμοῦσα μὲν τῆς ἐνθάδε οἰκήσεως, φοβουμένη δὲ τὸν Φρυνίωνα διὰ τὸ ἠδικηκέναι μὲν αὐτή, ἐκεῖνον δὲ ὀργίλως ἔχειν αὐτῇ, σοβαρὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγωρον εἰδυῖα αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον ὄντα, προΐσταται Στέφανον τουτονὶ αὑτῆς. (38) ἐπάρας δὲ αὐτὴν οὗτος ἐν τοῖς Μεγάροις τῷ λόγῳ καὶ φυσήσας, ὡς κλαύσοιτο ὁ Φρυνίων εἰ ἅψοιτο αὐτῆς, αὐτὸς δὲ γυναῖκα αὐτὴν ἕξων, τούς τε παῖδας τοὺς ὄντας αὐτῇ τότε εἰσάξων εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ὡς αὑτοῦ ὄντας καὶ πολίτας ποιήσων, ἀδικήσει δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων, ἀφικνεῖται αὐτὴν ἔχων δεῦρο ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων, καὶ παιδία μετ’ αὐτῆς τρία, Πρόξενον καὶ Ἀρίστωνα καὶ θυγατέρα, ἣν νυνὶ Φανὼ καλοῦσιν. Against Neaera 59(33) Next, Phrynion came here to Athens, with Neaera. He carried on with her in an unruly and reckless way (aselgōs kai propetōs). He would take her along everywhere to eat and drink, and he was always partying with her. He would openly take his pleasure with her whenever and wherever he wanted, showing off to onlookers just how loose he was with her. He visited many men for entertainment with the woman, including Chabrias of the deme Aexone, when he threw a party to celebrate his victory in the four-horse chariot race at the Pythian Games in the archon year of Socratides. He had bought the team of horses from the sons of Mitys of Argos, and when he came back from Delphi, he gave a victory dinner in Colias. There she got drunk, and many men were intimate with her while Phrynion slept ‒ even Chabrias’ slaves who were present to serve the refreshments. (34) As witnesses to the truth of what I am saying, I will provide men who were there and saw what happened. Please call up Chionides of the deme Xupete and Euthetion of the deme Cydathenaeum. (Deposition) Chionides of the deme Xupete and Euthetion of the deme Cydathenaeum testify that Chabrias invited them to dinner when he gave a party celebrating his victory in the chariot race, and they were entertained at Colias. They know that Phrynion was present at that dinner and had with him Neaera, the woman now on trial; that they themselves fell asleep, and also Phrynion and Neaera; and that they noticed, during the night, that men got up and went to Neaera, including some of the attendants, slaves of Chabrias. (35) Now, since she was badly (aselgōs) mistreated by Phrynion, and not loved as she expected she would be, and since he did not do her bidding, Neaera gathered things from his house and as much clothing and jewelry as he had given her, and also two slave girls, Thratta and Coccaline, and escaped to Megara. This was in the year when Asteius was archon, when you were for the second time at war with the Spartans. (36) She spent two years in Megara, the year of Asteius’ archonship and the next year, when Alcisthenes was archon. Her work as a prostitute was not bringing in enough money for her to run her household, since she was a big spender, and the Megarians are cheap and fussy; also, there wasn’t much foreign traffic because the Megarians had sided with Sparta, and you had control of the sea. Neaera could not return to Corinth, since the terms of her being set free by Eucrates and Timanoridas prohibited her from working there.

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(37) But when peace came, during the archonship of Phrasicleides and the Spartans and the Thebans fought the Battle of Leuctra, Stephanus went to Megara and established relations with Neaera as his mistress (hetaira) and had sex with her. She told him everything that had happened, including how Phrynion had mistreated her, and she gave him what she had taken from Phrynion when she left him. She was eager to have her home here in Athens but was afraid because she had wronged Phrynion: he was angry with her, and she knew his violent and disrespectful manner. She made Stephanus her protector (prostatēs). (38) In Megara, Stephanus inflamed her emotions with his braggadocio, saying that Phrynion would be sorry if he touched her, that he would take her himself as his wife, that he would introduce the children she already had to the phratries as his own sons and make them citizens, that nobody would do her wrong. So he brought her from Megara to Athens, along with her three children, Proxenus, Ariston, and a daughter, whom they now call Phano. (Transl. V. Bers 2003)

The above passage is exceptionally colourful and illuminating, providing a realistic depiction of everyday life, which may be the reason for the linguistic problems in the long period describing how Neaera met Stephanus in Megara (59.36–38), which scholars had highlighted as well-known stylistic shortcomings of Apollodorus.30 In terms of content, this is the part of the speech describing infamous moments from the life of Neaera as a hetaera (59.18–49), whose experiences were not unknown to the Athenian public (see e.g. Philetaerus Kynagis PCG 9.5, between 370 and 365 BC). Despite taking place between 390 and 370 BC, i.e. long before the trial, these actions are described in titillating detail (Patterson 1994, 205)  – with specific mention of Phrynion’s engagement in sexual intercourse with Neaera in public view (59.33)31 – in order to offend the morality of the judges. In the conclusion of the speech (59.110– 111), the judges are asked what their wives, daughters or mothers would say if Neaera was acquitted; the prosecutor’s harsh attacks escalate and his objective becomes clear: Neaera is not to be convicted due to the objective requirements of the law, which are exceptionally hard to prove, but due to the prudence expected of Athenian women.32 I. Worthington is right: “This is great dramatic immediacy!”:33 Against Neaera 59(110) τί δὲ καὶ φήσειεν ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος εἰσιὼν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκ’ ἢ θυγατέρα ἢ μητέρα, ἀποψηφισάμενος ταύτης, ἐπειδὰν ἔρηται ὑμᾶς “ποῦ ἦτε;” καὶ εἴπητε ὅτι “ἐδικάζομεν;” “τῷ;” ἐρήσεται εὐθύς. “Νεαίρᾳ” δῆλον ὅτι φήσετε (οὐ γάρ;) “ὅτι ξένη οὖσα ἀστῷ συνοικεῖ παρὰ τὸν νόμον, καὶ ὅτι τὴν θυγατέρα μεμοιχευμένην ἐξέδωκεν Θεογένει τῷ βασιλεύσαντι, καὶ αὕτη ἔθυσε τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἄρρητα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῷ Διονύσῳ γυνὴ ἐδόθη”, καὶ τἄλλα διηγούμενοι τὴν κατηγορίαν αὐτῆς, ὡς εὖ καὶ μνημονικῶς καὶ ἐπιμελῶς περὶ ἑκάστου κατηγορήθη.

|| 30 Cf. Kapparis/Christodoulou (2008) 27. 31 On this matter, see Davidson (1997); McClure (2003). 32 See Glazebrook (2005) 161–187. Cf. A. Glazebrook, The Bad Girls of Athens. The Image and Function of Hetairai in Judicial Oratory, in: C.A. Faraone/L.K. McClure (eds.), Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World, Madison 2006, 125–138, esp. 129–130. 33 See I. Worthington, Audience Reaction, Performance and the Exploitation of Delivery in the Courts and Assembly, in: S. Papaioannou et al. (eds.), The Theatre of Justice. Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric, Leiden/Boston 2017, 17.

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(111) αἱ δὲ ἀκούσασαι ἐρήσονται “τί οὖν ἐποιήσατε;” ὑμεῖς δὲ φήσετε “ἀπεψηφίσμεθα”. οὐκοῦν ἤδη αἱ μὲν σωφρονέσταται τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργισθήσονται ὑμῖν, διότι ὁμοίως αὐταῖς ταύτην κατηξιοῦτε μετέχειν τῶν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν· ὅσαι δ’ ἀνόητοι, φανερῶς ἐπιδείκνυτε ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται, ὡς ἄδειαν ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων δεδωκότων· δόξετε γὰρ ὀλιγώρως καὶ ῥᾳθύμως φέροντες ὁμογνώμονες καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοῖς ταύτης τρόποις. Against Neaera 59(110) If you acquit this woman, what will each of you say when you return home to your wife or daughter or mother when they ask you, “Where were you?” You answer, “We were judging a case.” The next question will be, “Who was on trial?” Of course you’ll answer, “Neaera. The charge was that she is a foreigner who lived with an Athenian as married to him, in violation of the law, and that she gave her daughter, a corrupted woman, to Theogenes when he became Basileus; and that she performed the secret, holy sacrifices for the city and was made the wife to Dionysus.” And you will go through the rest of the accusations against her, recalling how well and memorably and carefully each of the charges was presented. (111) When they hear this, they will ask, “Well, what did you do?” And you will say, “We acquitted her.” At once, the most upright (sōphronestatai) of the women will be angry with you for having thought it proper that this woman share the city and its religion on an equal basis with them. As for the women with less sense, you will plainly be directing them to do whatever they want, since you and the laws have granted them immunity. You will seem to be reckless, lazy, and in sympathy (homognōmones) with Neaera’s way of life. (Transl. V. Bers 2003 with modifications)

4.2.2 Hegesippus Hegesippus of Sounion was one of the staunchest opponents of Philip II of Macedon (μισοφίλιππος; Scholia Aeschin. 1.126, p. 27; 1.147, p. 30 Dilts). His political career spanned from 360 to 340 BC (Roisman/Worthington 2015, 36–37). While part of an Athenian delegation to Philip34 (possibly in 343 BC), he irked the king (Demosth. 19.331). He is quite likely the author of the speech On Halonnesus, which was delivered in 342 BC and is transmitted in the corpus of Demosthenes (No 7; cf. Libanius Hypothesis; McCabe 1981 is also in favour of this view according to stylistic criteria). At the time, Philip sent delegations to Athens as well as a letter in which he expressed various reconciliation proposals, including the option of giving the island of Halonnesus to the Athenians, but his opponents in Athens were powerful enough to dispute his right to dispose of what he did not own, and focused on the connotations of the words διδόναι and ἀποδιδόναι (“give” and “return”) or λαμβάνειν and ἀπολαμβάνειν (“take” and “take back”) (On Halonnesus 7.5–6).35 Hegesippus’ speech appears particularly one-dimensional, without the broad perspective of a politician of Demosthenes’ stature (MacDowell 2009, 345–346). Examples of irony and sarcasm can be found (7.16;

|| 34 Cf. T.T.B. Ryder, Demosthenes and Philipp II, in: Worthington (2000) 73–75. 35 Cf. the criticism of Aeschines on the semantic differentiation of these concepts (3.83) and their mockery in comedy (Plut. Demosth. 9; Athen. 6.223d–e). See also Will (2013) 123.

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7.35; 7.44; 7.45).36 The conclusion expressed by A. Schaefer (1966–1967, II 439) is apt: “The speech is better characterised as the polemical criticism of an attorney rather than the public speech of a politician”.37 The following passages38 are indicative of Hegesippus’ irony towards Philip’s letter and the attitude of his Athenian proponents, and highlight the differences between the Athenians of the time: On Halonnesus 7(34) ὑμῖν δ’ ἐν τῇ νῦν ἐπιστολῇ ὑπισχνεῖται, ἐὰν τοῖς μὲν αὑτοῦ φίλοις καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγουσι πιστεύητε, ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς διαβάλλοντας αὐτὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τιμωρήσησθε, ὡς μεγάλα εὐεργετήσει. (35) τὰ μέντοι εὐεργετήματα τοιαῦτα ἔσται· οὔτε τὰ ὑμέτερα ὑμῖν ἀποδώσει (αὑτοῦ γάρ φησιν εἶναι), οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ οἰκουμένῃ αἱ δωρεαὶ ἔσονται, ἵνα μὴ διαβληθῇ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀλλ’ ἄλλη τις χώρα καὶ ἄλλος, ὡς ἔοικε, τόπος φανήσεται, οὗ ὑμῖν αἱ δωρεαὶ δοθήσονται. On Halonnesus 7(34) In the present letter he promises that if you trust his friends who speak on his behalf, and punish us who slander (diaballein) him to you, he will grant you great benefits (euergetein). (35) The benefits will be as follows: he will not give you your possessions back ‒ for he says that they belong to him ‒ nor will the gifts exist in the inhabited world, to avoid his getting a bad name with the Greeks, but some other territory and place, it seems, will appear, where these gifts will be given to you. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011) On Halonnesus 7(44) καὶ οὕτως ὑβριστικῶς ὑμῖν κέχρηται ὥστε φησίν, ἂν μὴ ’θέλωσιν διαδικάζεσθαι οἱ Καρδιανοί, αὐτὸς ἀναγκάσειν, ὡς ὑμῶν γ’ οὐκ ἂν δυναμένων οὐδὲν ἀναγκάσαι Καρδιανοὺς ὑμῖν ποιῆσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε, αὐτός φησι τοῦτ’ ἀναγκάσειν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι. ἆρ’ οὐ μεγάλα φαίνεται ὑμᾶς εὐεργετῶν; (45) καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστολήν τινες εὖ ἔφασαν γεγράφθαι, οἳ πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ἢ Φίλιππος μισοῖντο. ἐκεῖνος μέν γε ἑαυτῷ κτώμενος δόξαν καὶ μεγάλ’ ἀγαθὰ ἅπαντα καθ’ ὑμῶν πράττει· ὅσοι δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες μὴ τῇ πατρίδι, ἀλλὰ Φιλίππῳ εὔνοιαν ἐνδείκνυνται, προσήκει αὐτοὺς ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κακοὺς κακῶς ἀπολωλέναι, εἴπερ ὑμεῖς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐν τοῖς κροτάφοις καὶ μὴ ἐν ταῖς πτέρναις καταπεπατημένον φορεῖτε. On Halonnesus 7(44) And Philip has treated you so insultingly that he says that if the Cardians refuse to go to arbitration (diadikazesthai), he will compel them, as if you would be quite unable to compel them to do so; since you are unable, he says that he will compel them: does he not seem to be doing you a great favour (euergetein)? (45) Some people say that this letter is well written: people whom you should hate even more than you hate Philip. He at any rate is acting against you in every way, after he has won for himself a good reputation and many assets. But all those Athenians who show goodwill not to their own country but to Philip are villains, and deserve to be destroyed most vilely by you – if, that is, you carry your brains in your temples and not trampled down in your heels. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

Dionysius of Halicarnassus identifies certain characteristics of Lysias’ style in this speech by Hegesippus, i.e. that it is precise and detailed, but lacking in Demosthenic variation (exallagē), the dignified language (semnologia) and the rhetorical brilliance

|| 36 See Trevett (2011) 115–116. 37 Cf. Sealey (1993) 178: “legalistic and tiresome”. 38 Greek text used: Dilts (2002–2009).

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(deinotēs; Demosth. 13, p. 157 Us.-Rad.). Libanius’ assessment is harsher (Hypothesis): slack and dissolute expression (aneimenē kai dialelymenē), while the conclusion, from which the second passage above is taken and which contains harsh attacks against the Athenian supporters of Philip, is characterised as hybris and loidoria without measure. It is questionable whether the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech On the Agreement with Alexander (17) was authored by Hegesippus, as claimed in antiquity (Scholia Demosth. 17, I p. 195 Dilts),39 as there are considerable stylistic differences compared to the previous speech. Nevertheless, Libanius (Hypothesis) attributes the speech to Hyperides (cf. Scholia Demosth. 17, I p. 195 Dilts).40 Indications concerning both language and content that were reinforced after the discovery of part of Hyperides’ speech Against Diondas seem to verify the latter assumption.41

4.2.3 Demades Demades (c. 380–319 BC) was a self-taught orator. He did not study with a teacher, he was a proponent of improvisation and placed great importance on rhetorical practice and everyday experience. In fact, he proudly contended that the Athenian speaker’s platform was his teacher above all other teachings (Stob. 3.29.91: Δημάδης ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς αὐτοῦ διδάσκαλος γεγονὼς εἴη, “τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων” ἔφη “βῆμα”, ἐμφαίνων, ὅτι ἡ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐμπειρία κρείττων πάσης σοφιστικῆς διδασκαλίας ἐστίν). Information on his political activity can be found in the writings of ancient authors, the Suda (δ 414–415 s.v. Demades), and a number of inscriptions.42 Demades, son of Demeas of Paeania, was initially a follower of Demosthenes’ politics, but his major political activity began after the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), when he adapted to the new order; he then became a strong advocate for reconciliation between Athens and Philip ΙΙ, and was a mediator among the leaders of pro-Mac-

|| 39 According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosth. 57, p. 251 Us.-Rad.), this is not a speech by Demosthenes. Cf. R.D. Milns, The Public Speeches of Demosthenes, in: Worthington (2000) 205. 40 Cf. C. Gibson, The Agenda of Libanius’ Hypotheses to Demosthenes, GRBS 40 (1999) 191–192, 195– 196. 41 See I. Whitehead, Hypereides, the Forensic Speeches. Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Oxford 2000, 7 note 26, 89, 218, 257, 258; J. Herrman, Hyperides’ Against Diondas and the Rhetoric of Revolt, BICS 52 (2009) 175–185; L. Horváth, Bemerkungen zur Rede XVII im Corpus Demosthenicum. Hypereides als Verfasser (?), in: J. Grusková/Η. Bannert (eds.), Demosthenica libris manu scriptis tradita. Studien zur Textüberlieferung des Corpus Demosthenicum, Vienna 2014, 73–80. 42 Collected by Oikonomidis (1956) 105–129.

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edonian party for peace between Athens and Alexander the Great following the destruction of Thebes (335 BC).43 For this action, he was honoured with a bronze statue in the agora and sitēsis in the Prytaneion, although Lycurgus, with the help of Polyeuctus of Sphettus, brought an action against him for putting forward an illegal decree (Din. 1.101; Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 820F; Apsines Ars rhet. Ι 387 Spengel; in Suda λ 825 s.v. Lykourgos reference is made to a speech Against Demades). In 324 BC he proposed divine honours for Alexander (Athen. 6.251b; Aelian. Var. hist. 5.12); subsequently, he became involved in the case of Alexander’s treasurer Harpalus and, finally, was instrumental in the imposition of the death penalty on Demosthenes and Hyperides. Following the Battle of Crannon (322 BC), he dominated Athenian politics (Worthington 1992, 131) and, along with Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum, led the pro-Macedonian government in Athens. However, he met his end at the hands of the Macedonian general Cassander, who executed him and his son, Demeas, in 319 BC (Plut. Demosth. 31.6; Phoc. 30.10). Ancient accounts depict Demades as an opportunistic demagogue: Din. 1.101: πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ δεινῶν καὶ παρανόμων ὧν Δημάδης γέγραφε (“Despite the many scandalous and illegal measures which Demades has proposed”); 1.104: ὁ μὲν προειρηκὼς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν, καὶ ὁμολογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ λήψεσθαι (“He has given warning in the Assembly of his desperate character and admits that he takes bribes and will continue to do so”); Diod. 10.9.1: διαβεβαιούμενος ὅτι δεῖ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὅρκων αἱρεῖσθαι (“And Demades affirmed that in the case of oaths, as in all other affairs, the most profitable course is the one to choose”); Plut. Phoc. 1.1–3: Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ, ἰσχύων μὲν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις διὰ τὸ πρὸς χάριν πολιτεύεσθαι Μακεδόνων καὶ Ἀντιπάτρου, πολλὰ δὲ γράφειν καὶ λέγειν ἀναγκαζόμενος παρὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ ἦθος, ἔλεγε συγγνώμης ἄξιος εἶναι, πολιτευόμενος τὰ ναυάγια τῆς πόλεως … Δημάδης μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ναυάγιον τῆς πόλεως (“Demades the orator, who was powerful at Athens because he conducted affairs so as to please Antipater and the Macedonians, and was forced to propose and favour many measures which were at variance with the dignity and character of the city, used to say that he was excusable because he was in command of a shipwrecked state … Demades, indeed, was himself but wreckage of the state”);44 30.5–6: Δημάδης δὲ τῷ πλούτῳ καὶ παρανομῶν ἐκαλλωπίζετο (“Demades made a great parade of his wealth, even though he was violating the laws to do so”); De cup. div. 525C: αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα ἐδημαγώγει, καὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας μικρὸν ἡγούμενος τῆς ἀσωτίας ἐφόδιον ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐπεσιτίζετο (“For Demades himself played the demagogue to fill his belly, and regarding Athens as no adequate provision for his prodigality laid in

|| 43 Brun 2000, 55 ff., 71 ff. Cf. Diod. 17.15.3–5; Arrian 1.10.3–6; Plut. Demosth. 23.6; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841E, 847C, 848E. See also A.B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, Oxford 1980, 92–96; Will (1983) 37–47; Williams (1989) 22 with note 17; Sealey (1993) 204–205; Lehmann (2004) 190–191; Will (2013) 158. 44 Transl. B. Perrin, Plutarch, Lives, vol. 8, Cambridge MA/London 1919.

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supplies from Macedon as well”);45 Suda δ 414: Δημάδης, Ἀθηναῖος, ῥήτωρ, καὶ δημαγωγὸς πανοῦργος καὶ εὐτυχής (“Demades, an Athenian, an orator, and a demagogue unscrupulous and fortunate”).

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle endeavoured to strictly distinguish between the role of the three entechnoi pisteis during rhetorical persuasion (Rhet. 1356a 1–13); however, the example of Demades indicates that the bilateral conjunction of the ēthos tou legontos with both rhetorical eloquence in general and everyday Athenian life is far more complex than the systematic nature of a handbook. The overall image of an irreproachable private and public life46 is a strong incentive for the assessment of a person and the highlighting of one’s personality touches upon the overall social presence of orators, a fact that outweighs the strict distinctions of Aristotle’s entechnoi pisteis. This explains why Demades’ assessment in antiquity is so ambivalent. Plutarch is a characteristic example: on one hand, he writes of statues of Demades, which the Athenians erected during his lifetime and later had ignominiously melted down into chamber-pots, clearly as an indication of excessive, false honours towards a reprobate (Praec. ger. reip. 820F) and, on the other, he extols Demades’ exceptional natural gift in extempore oration, even surpassing the studied preparations of Demosthenes (Plut. Demosth. 10.1). Past scholarship is in line with the above, as it stressed the inconsistency between the tainted morals of the Athenian politician and his rhetorical prowess: “If only Demades had the conviction and serious goals, Athens could not have wanted for a better leader” or “Demades had the genius but not the character” (Blass 1887–1898, III,2, 273, 278).47 There is consensus regarding Demades’ rhetorical skill at present, but the first part of the above-mentioned assertions was disputed by P. Brun (2000),48 who endeavoured to re-assess and restore Demades as a highly active politician, colourfully describing him as an important diplomat and closely connecting his political activity with the interests of Athens. From a modern perspective, this is a sound approach, but we must not overlook the social appearance of individuality in ancient thought, irrespective of the importance of its political actions. This is where the doxa tou legontos of Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 14.8–9; 38.2) and of Isocrates (5.26; 15.278), which is not limited to rhetorical speeches but encompasses the overall social presence of a citizen, touches upon the heart of Athenian politics. || 45 Transl. P. De Lacy/B. Einarson, Plutarch Moralia, vol. 7, Cambridge MA/London 1959. 46 See L. Athanassaki/T. Nikolaidis/D. Spatharas (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014. 47 Cf. Schaefer (1966–1967) ΙΙΙ 20–33. 48 Cf. Williams (1989) 19–30 and I. Worthington, Demades-Re-Examined, CR 52 (2002) 41–42. See also F.W. Mitchel, Demades of Paeania and IG II2 1493, 1494, 1495, TAPhA 93 (1962) 219–221; N.G.L. Hammond/G.W. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, II, Oxford 1979, 605–606; Worthington (1992) 130– 131; (2013) 307 with note 47.

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According to Cicero (Brutus 36) and Quintilian (Inst. or. 12.10.49), Demades left no written speeches – at least, none in circulation in the 1st century BC. The 14 titles of his speeches listed in Cod. Laur. 56.1 appear to be subsequent rhetorical exercises (de Falco 1954, 41–42). Even the fragments of the speech On the Twelve Years transmitted under his name are currently considered to be spurious and to have been authored during the Hellenistic era.49 The speech, which does not live up to Demades’ fame and borrows turns of phrase from other orators, defends Demades’ politics after the Battle of Chaeronea, but the limits of the fictitious period cannot be precisely determined. J.O. Burtt (1954, 334) believes that this concerns the twelve years after the Battle of Chaeronea, from 338 to 326 BC. However, as the orator appears to be ultimately arguing his case in court concerning a grave charge, this seems more in line with his proposal for divine honours for Alexander the Great, which met with strong opposition; therefore, Ι. Worthington (1991) proposes the subsequent 12–year period: from 335 to 323 BC.50 His collection of witty sayings and anecdotal repartees, the so-called Demadeia,51 records his semi-poetical rhetoric, which satisfies the Aristotelian requirements (Rhet. 1410b 6 ff.) concerning urbanities (asteia) and elements that draw the approval of listeners: metaphor, allegory and hyperbole are indicative of a natural talent, not a studied rhetorical art. A collection of his sayings must have been formed quite early (Demetrius’ On Style 282).52 Certain examples are worthy of mention: Demades likened the strength of Macedon without Alexander to the Cyclops after his blinding (Demetr. On Style 284 = fr. 15 de Falco: ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις, ἀπολωλεκυῖα τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, τῷ Κύκλωπι τετυφλωμένῳ). Immediately after news of Alexander’s death circulated, he emphatically warned the Athenians: “Alexander is not dead, men of Athens; or the whole world would have smelled his corpse”53 (Demetr. On Style 283 = fr. 53 de Falco: οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· ὦζε γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ). Even a charge of bribery could not stem his glib repartee: “Does it seem wonderful to you that you have gained a talent by speaking? I was paid ten talents by the king for holding my tongue” (Gell. 11.10.6 = fr. 66 de Falco: mirum tibi videtur, si tu loquendo talentum quaesisti? ego, ut tacerem, decem talenta a rege accepi). When Demades was trying to address his Athenian audience and he failed to get their attention, he asked if he might tell them an Aesop’s fable. The audience agreed, so Demades began his story. “The goddess Demeter, a swallow, and an eel were walking together down the

|| 49 Cf. Roisman/Worthington (2015) 39. 50 Cf. Brun (2000) 31–33. 51 Cf. Cic. Orat. 90: e quibus (sc. Atticis) tamen non omnes faceti … Demades praeter ceteros fertur, Demosthenes minus habetur. The authenticity of Demades’ sayings is currently disputed. See Brun (2000) 32–33, 132–133; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 40 with note 137. For the authenticity of the majority of sayings is de Falco (1954) 42–88. 52 Cf. N. Marini, Demetrio. Lo stile. Introduzione, traduzione e commento, Rome 2007, 286–287. 53 Transl. D.C. Innes, Demetrius On Style, in: S. Halliwell et al., Aristotle Poetics, Longinus On the Sublime, Demetrius On Style, Cambridge MA/London 1995, 309–525.

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road. When they reached a river, the swallow flew up in the air and the eel jumped into the water”. Demades then fell silent. The audience asked, “And what about the goddess Demeter?” “As for Demeter,” Demades replied, “she is angry at all of you for preferring Aesop’s fables to politics!”54  (Aesop 96 Chambry = fr. 22 de Falco: ἐρομένων δὲ αὐτῶν “ἡ οὖν Δήμητρα τί ἔπαθεν;” ἔφη· “κεχόλωται ὑμῖν, οἵτινες τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἐάσαντες Αἰσώπειον μῦθον ἀκούειν ἀνέχεσθε”).

|| 54 Transl. L. Gibbs, Aesop’s Fables, Oxford 2002.

5 Isocrates 5.1 Life Ancient sources concerning Isocrates’ life, alongside individual references by numerous authors, primarily consist of the remarks of Hermippus of Smyrna (FGrH 1026 F42–54),1 a biographical summary by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isocr. 1, p. 54–56 Us.-Rad.), the Vita of Isocrates in the Pseudo-Plutarchan Lives of the Ten Orators (836Ε–839D), an excerpt from an anonymous Vita of an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (No 3543, 2nd century AD),2 the references of Philostratus (Vit. soph. 1.503–506 Kayser), an anonymous Vita attributed to Zosimus of Ascalon, as well as the biographical entries and list of works found in Photius (Bibl. 159; 260) and in the Suda (ι 652 s.v. Isokrates). The uniform tradition in subsequent treatises must be attributed to Hermippus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Caecilius of Calacte in Sicily. Important information concerning his life is drawn from the work of Isocrates himself, including Antidosis (15), which he published in 354/353 BC at the age of 82 (15.9), and which is considered a comprehensive autobiographical work (Misch 1949–1950, 158; Schorn 2014, 731–732). With Panathenaicus (12.3) as a point of reference, where we learn that Isocrates was 94 years old during the Panathenaea held in 342 BC, his birth is placed in 436 BC. The calculations found in ancient biographies were most probably based on these indications (Usher 1990, 2–3). Isocrates was one of the longest-lived authors of antiquity, living close to 100 years (436–338 BC). Over the course of his life, he bore witness to the events of a century, from just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War until after the victory of Philip II at the Battle of Chaeronea. He came from a wealthy family. His father, Theodorus of Erchia, owned a flute factory and ensured that his children received a careful upbringing and education (cf. 15.161). Isocrates’ later education owes much to his teachers, the most important of whom were the sophists of the late 5th century: Protagoras (Suda π 2958 s.v.), Prodicus, Gorgias and Tisias (Dion. Hal. Isocr. 1, p. 54 Us.-Rad.). With respect to Tisias, there are strong reservations on chronological grounds (Usher 1990, 3). His relationship to Gorgias, however, is indisputable. Although Isocrates does not mention him as a teacher, he does provide detailed information about his life and his earnings from teaching in Thessaly3. Cicero reports Isocrates’ tutelage in Thessaly under Gorgias (Orator 176), while Quintilian refers to Isocrates as the most renowned of Gorgias’ pupils (Inst. or. 3.1.13: clarissimus Gorgiae auditorum). There is even information that upon the tomb of Isocrates, there was a

|| 1 With the commentary of J. Bollansée, p. 367–427. Cf. J. Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings. A Reappraisal, Leuven 1999, 82–90. 2 See A.K. Bowman et al., The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, L, London 1983, 88–93. 3 Cf. Münscher (1916) 2152. See Isocr. 15.155–156. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-005

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tablet, having poets and his schoolmasters on it, and among the rest, Gorgias inspecting a celestial globe – a strong indication of the close ties between the two men ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838D). The role played by Socrates is unclear: In Plato’s Phaedrus (278e– 279b) Isocrates is called Socrates’ hetairos, while according to Zosimus he was Socrates’ pupil (I 211 Mand.). The account that Isocrates wore mourning garb after Socrates’ death is apocryphal ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838F). According to certain evidence, which is confirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isocr. 1, p. 54 Us.-Rad.), Isocrates was the pupil of the moderate politician Theramenes, who was assassinated by the Thirty, but this is more indicative of political support and beliefs shared by the two men rather than a “teacher - pupil” relationship. Due to financial hardship after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Isocrates initially (c. 402–390 BC) worked as a logographer, an occupation he stopped exercising later in life, as he did not find it particularly flattering. He makes no mention of this fact in his work. The Athenian scholar would turn against judicial speeches and place them at a lower rank in terms of rhetorical art and social benefit (15.3; 15.38; 15.40; 15.42; 15.45–50; 15.228; 12.1, 12.11; 13.6; 10.7; 4.11; 4.78). According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isocr. 18, p. 86 Us.-Rad.), Isocrates’ activity as a logographer brought his rivalry with Aristotle to the forefront, as the latter claimed that many bundles (desmai) of Isocrates’ forensic speeches were available from the booksellers; on the contrary, his adoptive son Aphareus contended that his father wrote no speeches for the law-courts. Dionysius rejects both views as extreme (and it must be stressed that he attributes ill intentions to Aritostle), adopting a middle path, which is the most likely and is attested by Cephisodorus, Isocrates’ pupil and defender: Isocrates wrote some speeches for the law-courts, but not many (γεγράφθαι λόγους τινὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰς δικαστήρια οὐ μέντοι πολλούς). In any event, the fact that 6 judicial speeches by Isocrates survive is a strong indication in favour of his logographic activity.4 After 390 BC, around the time his school was founded, Isocrates had been recognised as a towering figure in issues of education and publicism. Due to his weak voice and physical inability to appear before crowds (12.10), he shied away from the podium and addressed his audience through the written word, while teaching his pupils a comprehensive curriculum of rhetorical and political education that aimed at getting them to speak well and think right (euboulia; 3.8; 15.256; cf. Russell 1967, 132: “a school of citizenship”). He placed key importance on ponein (“toil, labour”), equating intellectual activity to serious toil and considering his pupils as tangible examples of successful efforts and high standards (15.247; 15.285; 15.289; 9.78; 4.186; 12.11). His most renowned pupils include the Athenian general Timotheus, son of Conon, to whom Isocrates dedicated a dramatic apologetic encomium in Antidosis (15.101–139).

|| 4 Nevertheless, according to Papillon (2007) 59, these judicial speeches could be considered to have been rhetorical exercises.

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For fifty years, written epideictic speeches and teaching at his rhetorical school constituted Isocrates’ fields of activity, which have nothing to do with the disappointment of an active person or with an undemocratic attitude, as is sometimes argued in literature5. The rhetorician’s ambition is a very personal characteristic and key factor for the interpretation of his work6. As Isocrates himself declares in Panathenaicus, his physical inability to appear before the public did not force him to sink into obscurity or utter oblivion (adoxos kai aphanēs, 12.10–11):7 Panathenaicus 12(10) οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἀμφοτέρων ἐγενόμην τῶν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἐχόντων παρ’ ἡμῖν, φωνῆς ἱκανῆς καὶ τόλμης, ὡς οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν· ὧν οἱ μὴ τυχόντες ἀτιμότεροι περιέρχονται πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν ἄξιοί τινος εἶναι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐκτείσειν τὸ καταγνωσθὲν ἐλπίδες ὕπεισιν, οἱ δ’ οὐδέποτ’ ἂν τὴν φύσιν μεταβάλοιεν. (11) οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀθυμήσας περιεῖδον ἐμαυτὸν ἄδοξον οὐδ’ ἀφανῆ παντάπασι γενόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι διήμαρτον, ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ πονεῖν καὶ γράφειν ἃ διανοηθείην κατέφυγον, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς ληροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, δι’ ἃ προσήκειν ᾠόμην μοι τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμᾶσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων, ὅσῳ περ περὶ μειζόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ’κεῖνοι τοὺς λόγους ἐποιούμην. Panathenaicus 12(10) For as much as any other citizen I know, I lacked both things that possess the greatest power among you, a strong voice and confidence before the public. Those who lack these are more dishonored (atimoteroi) in their public reputation than those who are in debt to the state. For the latter can still hope to pay off their fine, but the former have no hope of changing their nature. (11) Nonetheless, I was not discouraged about these things and did not allow myself to lose my reputation or my visibility entirely (adoxos kai aphanēs), but because I lost the chance to take part in politics, I took refuge in study and work (philosophein kai ponein) and writing down my thoughts, choosing not to treat trivial things like private contracts or things that others babble on about, but the affairs of Greeks (hellēnika) and kings (basilika) and our city (politika). In this way I thought it would be more appropriate if I received more honor (timasthai)

|| 5 Thus in Heilbrunn (1975) 157; cf. Β. Campbell, Thought and Political Action in Athenian Tradition. The Emergence of the Alienated Intellectual, History of Political Thought 5 (1984) 17–59, esp. 39 ff., 49 ff.; D. Steiner, The Tyrant’ Writ. Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece, Princeton 1994, 187; Too (1995) 74–112; Y.L. Too, Privileging the Written Word. The Constructions of Authority in Isocrates and Xenophon, in: Tamiolaki (2018) 218–239, esp. 219–223. Blank (2017) 263–290 interprets the Isocratean apragmosynē as a symbol of aristocratic intellectualism in fourth-century Athens. See also T. Blank, Innere Kritiker und welche Umwelt? Intellektuelle zwischen Dissidenz und Systemstabilisierung im Athen des 4. Jahrhunderts, in: I. Jordovic/U. Walter (eds.), Feindbild und Vorbild. Die athenische Demokratie und ihre intellektuellen Gegner, Berlin 2018, 70–106. Cf. nevertheless Haskins (2004) 17 (= Logos and Power in Sophistical and Isocratean Rhetoric, in: Poulakos/Depew 2004, 91): “Yet unlike other literary apragmones of his generation, especially Plato and other Socratics, Isocrates adopts the quietist stance in order to reinvent democratic rhetoric, not to disavow its legitimacy altogether”. Cf. Ober (1998) 249. 6 Alexiou (1995) 132 ff.; (2010) 21. See also To Philip 5.12; Buchheit (1960) 43–45; Nightingale (2000) 178. 7 The excerpts of Isocrates’ speeches are based on the Greek text of Benseler/Blass (1878–1879) and Mathieu/Brémond (1928–1962). For Evagoras the Greek text used is Alexiou (2010).

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than those who spoke in public just as the subjects of my discourse were more serious and more noble than theirs. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004 with modifications)

Isocrates addressed his audience through the written word and adopted the ambition of a successful orator, as set forth in his rhetorical-educational system (15.276): φιλoτίμως διατεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ λέγειν εὖ is a creative ambition aiming at the aesthetic appearance of a speech and at tackling important issues. In To Nicocles (2.43), Isocrates praises the advisory role played by the ancient poets Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides. Isocrates adhered to this role of a counsellor (through the written word and his teaching, not in the Assembly like Demosthenes) with absolute consistency in almost every speech he wrote, whether he addressed pupils, monarchs or entire political communities. The paradigm is so central to Isocratean ideology – and not merely a rhetorical topos – that Isocrates systematically shapes, uses and converts his speeches into educational examples with an exhortative purpose, similar to the hypothēkai of the poets of old.8 The concept of the ideal political leader, internal political stability, unity between the Greeks and the campaign against the Persians (the Pan-Hellenic ideal) are the key issues in his political reflections. He pursued these goals with exceptional consistency throughout his life, addressing not only his homeland of Athens for their realisation (Panegyricus [4], Areopagiticus [7], On the Peace [8]) but also powerful figures of his era, whom he often idealises in his works: Nicocles (To Nicocles [2], Nicocles [3], Evagoras [9]), Dionysius I of Syracuse (Letter 1), the Spartan Archidamus III, son of Agesilaus (Archidamus [6], Letter 9), and Philip II of Macedon (To Philip [5], Letters 2, 3). Isocrates went through an unpleasant experience shortly before 356 BC, when he found himself in a judicial dispute with Lysimachus under the legal process of antidosis (the exchange of properties)9 and finally forced to undertake the trierarchy (according to [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839C). These legal proceedings served as the inspiration

|| 8 Cf. Collins Edwards (2010) 377–400; J.H. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy. The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, Oxford 2015, 219–228. 9 Antidosis was a legal procedure in ancient Athens that was activated when a citizen refused to perform a liturgy (leitourgia: a public service for the state), considering it disproportionate to his financial capabilities. He could then name a different, richer fellow citizen who would either undertake the service or exchange his property with the first party. The most comprehensive information on antidosis can be found in the speech Against Phaenippus (42) of the Demosthenic corpus. See K. Apostolakis, The Rhetoric of an Antidosis: [D.] 42 Against Phaenippus, Ariadne 12 (2006) 93–112; K. Apostolakis, [Δημοσθένους] Πρὸς Φαίνιππον περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, Athens 2009, 33 ff.; K. Apostolakis, Liturgies and the Rhetoric of Law in Fourth-Century Athens. A Case Study on an Antidosis ([Dem.] 42), in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 219–233 (on the authenticity of the speech, see MacDowell [2009] 147–151). Cf. V. Gabrielsen, The Antidosis Procedure in Classical Athens, C&M 38 (1987) 7–38; M.R. Christ, Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens, TAPhA 120 (1990) 147–169; P.V. Stanley, Release from Liturgical Service in Athens, Laverna 4 (1993) 26–44; M. Della Libera, ΑΝΤΙΔΟΣΙΣ, Patavium 5 (1997) 17–47.

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for the fictional speech Antidosis, written a few years later (354/353 BC), an account of Isocrates’ overall educational and political work (Too 2008, 1–8). At an older age, Isocrates married Plathane, who, according to ancient sources, was the widow or daughter of the sophist Hippias of Elis (according to F. Blass 1887– 1898, II 71 this was another Athenian orator by the same name)10 and adopted the youngest of her three sons, Aphareus (Dion. Hal. Isocr. 18, p. 85 Us.-Rad.; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838A–D; Suda α 4556 s.v. Aphareus). His health failing (by his own statement, he stopped writing Panathenaicus for three years due to illness; 12.266–270), he died shortly after the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) and was interred at the family tomb in Cynosarges. The report that he voluntarily refused to eat and died due to starvation is most probably apocryphal ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838Β).11

5.2 Work 5.2.1 Research Trends and the Isocratean Ideology Isocrates’ rhetorical prowess enjoys timeless recognition: the purity of his Attic diction and his artful style, combined with systematic avoidance of hiatus. However, the preoccupation of scholars with the form of his rhetoric had an adverse effect on the judgment of its content, which was summarised in the assertion that Isocrates was a wordsmith, a rhetorician and nothing more.12 German scholarship in the late 19th and early 20th century, characterised by a fixation on Platonic philosophy, treated Isocrates as a “poor relation”.13 With respect to Antidosis (15.217), Wilamowitz (1955, 239 note 1) contends that Isocrates “like everyone else, acted in the pursuit of profit and honour”. G. Teichmüller (1881, 285) was far stricter when outlining the various characters of Isocrates and Plato: the former stands out for his intemperate, vain character that is impressed by the acclamation of the audience, while the latter for his moral rigour, his scientific strength and his religious spirit. Isocrates’ views, whereby an orator cannot neglect the content of a speech in favour of its form (4.4; 5.4, 5.94; 12.86–87; 15.276), were not taken into consideration as serious assertions. || 10 Cf. Roisman/Worthington (2015) 158–159. 11 Cf. Weissenberger (2005) 980; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 155–156. 12 The most extreme wording of this view can be found in B.G. Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, V, Berlin 1851, 404: “Isokrates ist ein durchaus schlechter, kümmerlicher Schriftsteller, einer der gedankenlosesten, armseligsten Geister. Er hat sich eine Kunst gebildet, aber eine Kunst des Scheins, der Worte und der Art des Redens, und noch mehr der Redensarten, nicht der Gedanken”. 13 The doubly negative traditional criticism of Isocrates is aptly worded by A.D. Bloom, The Political Philosophy of Isocrates, Diss. Chicago 1955, 3–4: “Isocrates’ anomalous position is the consequence of the fact that when he is looked upon as an advocate of the same pursuits as Demosthenes, he is found wanting; and when he is measured up against Plato, he appears trivial. Because he has eluded pigeonholing, his thought is almost never taken seriously anymore”.

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It would take decades until scholars, from the mid-20th century onwards, expressed a different evaluation to the work of Isocrates. The chapter “Isocrates defends his Paideia” in W. Jaeger (1959, III 199–225) is indicative of a gradual development, placing greater importance on the content of Isocrates’ speeches than in the past. However, according to Jaeger (1959, III 225), one can discern the influence of Plato, who recognised “dry” formalism as the principal shortcoming of rhetorical education and had a suspensive effect on a purely technical form of rhetoric. Η. Mikkola (1954) was the first to attempt a systematic and autonomous approach to Isocrates’ ideology. Despite the hesitant review of Ε. Buchner (Gnomon 28, 1956, 354–355), since then important works have been published which, in line with the rhetorical prowess and political beliefs of the rhetorician,14 aimed at highlighting his ideology in an unprejudiced light. In this sense, Isocrates is currently undergoing a renaissance. The studies of W. Steidle (1952), J. de Romilly (1958) and K. Ries (1959) were the starting point for a process that culminated in the monograph of C. Eucken (1983). With the dispute between philosophy and rhetoric as his starting point, Eucken approached Isocrates by examining his views in comparison to those of his contemporary philosophers. From the 1990s onwards, research on Isocrates flourished with the study of numerous social and literary approaches to his work.15 The commentaries of N. Livingstone in Busiris (2001), S. Zajonz in Helen (2002), P. Roth in Panathenaicus (2003), Y.L. Too in Antidosis (2008), P. Böhme in Against the Sophists (2009), E. Alexiou in Evagoras (2010) and E. Zingg in Archidamus (2017) are the fruit of this renaissance. Isocrates’ written speeches represent the new trend of the 4th century BC towards literacy and were intended to be published, whether in smaller or larger circles, from the outset. Therefore, they mostly take on the form of political pamphlets (Sonnabend 2002, 35). In Evagoras (9.74), Isocrates, in continuation of the opening ot Pindar’s Fifth Nemean Ode (1–2),16 likens epideictic speeches to moving art monuments which, contrary to “motionless statues”, can travel throughout Greece, be published and

|| 14 The rhetorician’s political ideas, particularly his stance towards democracy and the Pan-Hellenic ideal, contrary to Demosthenes’ Athens-centric views, never ceased attracting the interest of scholars – depending on the perspective of each historical period. See Mathieu (1925); Bringmann (1965); Bearzot (1980) 113–131; Grieser-Schmitz (1999); Hall (2002) 207–210; Orth (2003); Konstan (2004) 107– 124; Pownall (2007) 13–25. 15 Usener (1994); Alexiou (1995); Masaracchia (1995); Too (1995); Poulakos (1997); Nicolai (2004); Poulakos/Depew (2004); Wareh (2012). On the various directions adopted by modern Isocratean research, see Thraede (1998) 1027–1048; Papillon (2007) 58–74. 16 For the motif in Pindar and the dispute between Isocrates, Alcidamas and Plato concerning the comparison between written and oral word, see Chapter 2.2 above.

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welcomed in the discussions among enlightened men. Through ekpheresthai, diadidonai or ekdidonai, it is made clear that readers are called upon to consider epideictic speeches as written and published:17 Evagοras 9(74) ὅτι τοὺς μὲν τύπους ἀναγκαῖον παρὰ τούτοις εἶναι μόνοις παρ’ οἷς ἂν σταθῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξενεχθῆναί οἷόν τ’ ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσθαι, παρ’ οἷς κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν εὐδοκιμεῖν. Evagοras 9(74) Second, statues (typoi) necessarily remain among those who set them up, but speeches (logoi) can be conveyed throughout Greece, published in gatherings of men of good sense, and can be welcomed by those whose respect is worth more than that of all others. (Transl. Y.L.Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

The characterisation of Isocrates’ speeches as politikoi (15.46: λόγους, οὐ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ’ Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικούς; 15.260: ὅτι περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἡμεῖς ὄντες) is based on the latitude of the term politikos: it defines the relationship with citizens, “that which originates from or belongs to citizens” (2.21: τῶν oἴκων τῶν πoλιτικῶν), and, by extension, political or public life (4.113: τῶν πoλιτικῶν πραγμάτων). In Evagoras (9.10) the politika onomata are, similar to the tetagmena onomata (9.9; corresponding to the kyria onomata of Aristotle Rhet. 1404b 6, 31; Poet. 1457b 1–3),18 the words in the everyday lives of citizens that are in common usage and characterise prose, whereas the term politikos is also indicative of a suitable or able statesman (9.48). Thus, Isocrates’ politikoi logoi comprise a special category of rhetorical speeches that encompass political ideas and a broad educational programme. They have a civilising aim, primarily intended to provide moral education rather than simple technical-rhetorical education.19 According to Y.L. Too (1995, 10–35), this is the cohesive element of the overall Isocratean corpus. Therefore, the common categorisation of Isocratean speeches into judicial, deliberative and epideictic, in an effort to adapt them to Aristotle’s teachings regarding the three genres of rhetorical speeches (Rhet. 1358b 6–8), is often misleading and must be used carefully and as a convention, particularly when dealing with a rhetorician who does not strictly differentiate between the genres of rhetorical speeches or who, to be more precise, intermixes them. The quote by Quintilian concerning Isocrates’ belief that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory is indicative of the foregoing (Inst. or. 3.4.11: Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit).

|| 17 Cf. 5.7; 5.11; 5.85; 5.149; 12.4; 12.233; 15.87; 15.193; Epist. 6.4; Usener (1994) 66, 120–137; Too (1995) 127; Pinto (2003) 141 with note 68; Nicolai (2004) 179. Hudson-Williams (1949) 66–67 underlines, alongside their written form, the public reading of Isocrates’ speeches. 18 Eucken (2003) 34–42. Cf. Alexiou (2010) 123–125. 19 Cf. Poulakos (1997) 4–5; Livingstone (1998) 272; Usher (1999) 298; Nicolai (2004) 34 notes 78, 79.

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Isocrates is one of the two leading figures in the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric in the 4th century BC. Faced with Plato’s philosophy, characterised by a dialectical search for an absolute, timeless truth, Isocrates presents himself as the advocate of a renewed sophistic movement and representative of the traditional values of everyday morality (homologoumenē aretē, 15.84). The guidelines of this type of thinking are his driving force and apply both to his character and to his rhetorical education (Alexiou 2007, 1–14; Zingg 2017, 84). His moralising and civilising tendency so defines the aim of his speeches that Isocrates himself promotes through his political commitment the new responsibility of the individual, whether this generally concerns the use of logos, which, being “hegemonic” – in contrast to the “dynastic” logos of the sophists – is treated as a supreme good and cultural symbol (“hymn to logos” in 3.5–9; logos as eidōlon psychēs in 3.7; 15.255; symbolon pistotaton in 4.49 and Athens as a perpetual panēgyris in 4.46; see in detail above Chapter 2.1), whether it specifically concerns the authoring of an encomium, where the orator is called upon to surpass the collective praise of the whole polis found in a funeral oration (epitaphios logos) and to extol a contemporary historical figure without resorting to envy (9.5–7), or a politician who, depending on his values, may cause benefit or harm, irrespective of the constitution (12.132–133). In this sense, the Isocratean corpus reflects ideas characterised by cohesiveness and consistency, regardless of whether this involves advice towards the political community, such as Panegyricus (4), Areopagiticus (7) and On the Peace (8), or the encomium of a monarch, such as Evagoras (9), or exhortation of a monarch, such as To Nicocles (2) and To Philip (5).20 In Isocratean thinking, it is not the political system or the institutions acting as safeguards, but an “aristocracy of values” that is integrally linked with the leaders as bearers of these values. The following passage from Panathenaicus (12.132–133) clearly depicts this approach: Isocrates distinguishes three types of constitution (oligarchy, democracy and monarchy), but with respect to their success or failure, he focuses not on their institutional differences but on the skills and moral values of the political leaders, i.e. whether or not they pursue their own interests at the expense of the city:21 Panathenaicus 12(132) ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ τὰς μὲν ἰδέας τῶν πολιτειῶν τρεῖς εἶναι μόνας, ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατίαν, μοναρχίαν, τῶν δ’ ἐν ταύταις οἰκούντων ὅσοι μὲν εἰώθασιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καθιστάναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄριστα καὶ δικαιότατα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατήσειν, τούτους μὲν ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πολιτείαις καλῶς οἰκήσειν καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· (133) τοὺς δὲ τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ πονηροτάτοις ἐπὶ

|| 20 Cf. Davidson (1990) 31. Livingstone (1998) 271 aptly notes that Isocratean speeches “have a consistent moral and intellectual tone and create a strong impression of unity”. 21 Cf. Eucken (1983) 226–227; Morgan (2003) 189–190; Konstan (2004) 120; Weissenberger (2005) 981; S. Forsdyke, The Uses and Abuses of Tyranny, in: R.K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Chichester UK/Malden MA 2009, 242.

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ταῦτα χρωμένους, καὶ τῶν μὲν τῇ πόλει συμφερόντων μηδὲν φροντίζουσιν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς αὑτῶν πλεονεξίας ἑτοίμοις οὖσιν ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν, τὰς δὲ τούτων πόλεις ὁμοίως οἰκήσεσθαι ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων πονηρίαις· τοὺς δὲ μήθ’ οὕτω μήθ’ ὡς πρότερον εἶπον, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὲν θαρρῶσιν, τούτους μάλιστα τιμῶντας τοὺς πρὸς χάριν λέγοντας, ὅταν δὲ δείσωσιν, ἐπὶ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ φρονιμωτάτους καταφεύγοντας, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους ἐναλλὰξ τοτὲ μὲν χεῖρον, τοτὲ δὲ βέλτιον πράξειν. Panathenaicus 12(132) I assert, however, that there are only three forms of government (politeiai): oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy. Those who live in such governments and who generally put in charge of the government and other matters the most capable (hikanōtatoi) citizens who will oversee affairs in the best and most just manner, these men will have the best life in each type of government, both for themselves and in their relations with others. (133) The ones, however, who enlist the worst and most daring men (thrasytatoi kai ponērotatoi) for these positions, the kind who do not consider the interests of the city but are ready to endure whatever they must for their own advantage (pleonexia), the cities of these people will be managed in a way similar to the baseness of those in charge of it. A third group, different from the two groups I have mentioned, who, when they are confident, honor those who say what they want to hear (pros charin legontes) but when fearful, run to those who are the best and wisest (beltistoi kai phronimōtatoi), will do well or ill alternately. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

Isocrates is a characteristic example of the elevation of individuality in the 4th century BC: he places his political ideas above the established institutions, expressing the end of one era (the classical city-state) and the ideological precursor of another (the Hellenistic monarchy). As an individual, Isocrates expresses his concerns through rhetoric without refuting or being restricted by the city-state. “Athenian patriotism is linked to the idea of a Pan-Hellenic community” (Görgemanns 1987, 110).22 For Isocrates, as an Athenian, this was not contradictory but liberating. In fact, Isocrates himself, more than any other, extolled the intellectual achievements of Athens (Panegyricus [4], Panathenaicus [12]) and addressed his city on the attainment of the Pan-Hellenic ideal (Panegyricus), boasted of his trierarchies and other liturgies in favour of Athens (Antidosis 15.145), but did not hesitate to castigate Athens when its citizens did not respond to his exhortations, turning towards Philip II of Macedon and criticising both his city and the orators leading its citizens away: To Philip 5(129) ἐγὼ δ’ εἰ μὲν πρὸς ἄλλους τινὰς πρότερον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὑτοῦ τὴν τρὶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσασαν, δὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἅπαξ δ’ ἀπὸ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, ὡμολόγουν ἂν πλημμελεῖν· νῦν δ’ ἐκείνην μὲν φανήσομαι πρώτην ἐπὶ ταῦτα προτρέπων ὡς ἠδυνάμην μετὰ πλείστης σπουδῆς, αἰσθανόμενος δ’ ἔλαττον

|| 22 For Isocrates’ Pan-Hellenic ideal, which called for concord amongst the Greeks and war against the Persians, see Kessler (1911); Dobesch (1968); É Lévy, Athènes devant la défaite de 404. Histoire d’un crise idéologique, Paris 1976, 157–162; M.A. Flower, From Simonides to Isocrates. The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century Panhellenism, ClAnt 19 (2000) 65–101; M. Weissenberger, Isokrates und der Plan eines panhellenischen Perserkrieges, in: Orth (2003) 108–110; Pownall (2007) 13–25; Bouchet (2014) 132–178.

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αὐτὴν φροντίζουσαν τῶν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος μαινομένων ἐκείνην μὲν εἴασα, τῆς δὲ πραγματείας οὐκ ἀπέστην. To Philip 5(129) Now, if I had undertaken to discuss these things with anyone else before approaching my own country (patris), which has freed Greece on three occasions, twice from the barbarians and once from the Spartans, I would admit that I had made a mistake. But it will be clear that I encouraged Athens first with all the energy I could, but when I saw that the city thought less of my advice than the opinions of those who rant and rave (mainomenoi) in the Assembly, I gave up on Athens but would not give up on my plan. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

5.2.2 The Speeches Of the 60 orations attributed to Isocrates in antiquity, Dionysius of Halicarnassus recognises 25 and Caecilius 28 as authentic ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838D). Today, 21 speeches (including 6 judicial speeches) and 9 Letters are extant.23 Certain fragments, including sections of a supposed Technē Rhētorikē and Apophthegmata of Isocrates, raise concerns and there is no certainty (Brodersen 2003, 169–174; cf. Walker 2011, ch. 2 and 3). Quintilian does refer to a rhetorical handbook by Isocrates, but also expresses concerns over its authenticity (Inst. or. 2.15.4). Isocrates’ advice discourse To Demonicus (1), which was much-read during the Middle Ages (Münscher 1919, 2195–2196), exhibits linguistic and stylistic differences compared to the other speeches and is presently considered (with major or minor reservations) as not authentic.24 This is a collection of advice from the 4th century BC which, if not originating from Isocrates himself, certainly came from his school. 5.2.2.1 On the Team of Horses (16) Six judicial speeches are extant from the period Isocrates worked as a logographer (c. 402–390 BC): On the Team of Horses (16), Trapeziticus (17), Against Callimachus (18), Aegineticus (19), Against Lochites (20), Against Euthynus (21). These speeches are temporally close to the corpus of Lysias and provide an abundance of information on issues of the period following the fall of the Thirty (e.g. the speech Against Callimachus, an example of paragraphē, is, for the most part, a defence of amnesty; see Wohl 2010, 205), but ‒ with the exception of the speech On the Team of Horses ‒ bear little relation

|| 23 See summarily Roth (2019) 231–247. For the Letters, see particularly J.S. Garnjobst, The Epistles of Isocrates. A Historical and Grammatical Commentary, Diss. University of California 2006; R.G. Sullivan, Classical Epistolary Theory and the Letters of Isocrates, in: C. Poster/L.C. Mitchell (eds.), LetterWriting Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present. Historical and Bibliographic Studies, Columbia SC 2007, 7–20. 24 See Usher (1999) 311–312. For a view in favour of authenticity, see Sandys (1868) xxxi-xl. Cf. T. Blank, Pseudo-Isocrates Ad Demonicum, in: W. Wilson (ed.), The Library of Wisdom. An Encyclopedia of Ancient Sayings Collections (forthcoming).

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to the epideictic and political speeches of Isocrates’ later career. Isocratean research has not paid great attention to them to date and tends to ignore them.25 On the Team of Horses (396/395 BC; cf. Flacelière 1961, 95) is, at first sight, a judicial speech prepared for a court case of Alcibiades the younger, son of the famous Athenian general Alcibiades.26 Alcibiades the younger delivered the speech against an Athenian citizen named Tisias, who sought legal recourse against him, claiming compensation. According to the charge, Alcibiades the elder had deprived Tisias of a team of four racehorses to win a triple victory at Olympia of 416 BC.27 However, the speech, as it survives to date (the section that concerns the court case is missing: testimonies, evidence, proofs), consists of so many laudatory motifs that it finally resembles an encomium to the Athenian general. It contains a considerable number of rhetorical topoi, lexical phrases and political ideas of Isocrates encountered in later speeches. In this sense, the speech is particularly valuable. It is certified that an apology and an encomium co-existed, leading to the conclusion that the genos dikanikon, predating it, played a crucial role in the development of the prose encomium. The controversial personality of Alcibiades clearly made a great impression on Isocrates. Thus, at an early stage in his authorial career, the rhetorician took the opportunity to display ‒ in the context of an apology ‒ his encomiastic skills and to shed light on the pisteis ek tou biou through an encomium of a historical personality. This step was formative in the evolution of the encomium (Alexiou 2011, 329 ff.); it shows, on one hand, how an encomium derives from an apology while, on the other, that the judicial genre had a direct effect on the authoring of a self-contained encomium of a historical personality, as was subsequently the case with Evagoras. Alcibiades was an exceptionally ambitious and controversial figure, and by attempting to author an encomium of the Athenian politician, Isocrates took a decisive position in the moral and political discussion of the era concerning the dangers of personal ambition. Thucydides links philotimia to the poor politics of Pericles’ successors in Athens (2.65.7: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλoτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη) and with pleonexia || 25 See Whitehead (2004) 151–186. Cf. the fine introduction by D. Spatharas, Ισοκράτης Κατὰ Λοχίτου, Athens 2009, 15–29. Cf. also D.C. Mirhady, Isocrates 20. Against Lochites, in: M. Gagarin (ed.), Speeches from Athenian Law, Austin 2011, 110–114. A brief analysis of the speeches can be found in Usher (1999) 118–126; Classen (2010) 4–28. 26 For the subsequent analysis of On the Team of Horses, see Alexiou (2011) 316–336 for further details. Cf. B. Eck, Alcibiade dans le Sur l’Attelage d’Isocrate, in: C. Bouchet/P. Giovanelli-Jouanna (eds.), Isocrate. Entre jeu rhetorique et enjeux politiques, Lyon 2015, 33 ff. On the polarity between Alcibiades’ supporters and his opponents, see D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens. A Study in Literary Presentation, Oxford 1999; D. Stuttard, Nemesis. Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens, Cambridge MA/ London 2018, 301–302. 27 On the case, cf. Plutarch (Alcibiades 12) and Diodorus Siculus (13.74). Tisias is probably the general of 417/416 BC. See S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, III, Oxford 2008, 229. Cf. D. Gribble, Alcibiades at the Olympics: Performance, Politics and Civic Ideology, CQ 62 (2012) 45–71.

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in the civil dispute that occurred in Korkyra (3.82.8: διὰ πλεoνεξίαν καὶ φιλoτιμίαν).28 This was a flagrant pursuit of personal interests which, being linked to power and violence, were limited to individual self-aggrandizement. In Memorabilia (1.2.12–14) Xenophon characterises Alcibiades and Critias as the most ambitious of all Athenians (φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων), wishing to control everything and have the most glorious names. In the context of the charge that Socrates associated with morally dubious individuals, Alcibiades is characterised as akratestatos and hybristotatos. His inclination towards tyranny was an ongoing charge against him and anyone encountering Alcibiades could not ignore his unchecked ambition.29 In Pseudo-Andocides’ speech Against Alcibiades 4.13, his notorious weaknesses, summarised in the concepts of pleonexia and hyperēphania, are invoked to prove Alcibiades’ aversion towards democracy. Therefore, Isocrates is fully aware that On the Team of Horses is addressed to a democratic audience ‒ whether real or imaginary ‒ and includes an encomium of a personality repeatedly accused of undemocratic views. The general principle he follows is to highlight the close ties between Alcibiades and the traditional values of the polis, but without downplaying the competitive values of an exceptional individual.30 Firstly, Alcibiades’ ancestors, including Cleisthenes, the reformer of the Athenian constitution, symbolise the glorious patrios politeia and the idealised democracy before the Persian Wars (16.26–27): On the Team of Horses 16(26) καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ Κλεισθένης, ὁ μὲν πρὸς πατρός, ὁ δὲ πρὸς μητρὸς ὢν πρόπαππος τοῦ πατρὸς τοὐμοῦ, στρατηγήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς κατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἐξέβαλον, (27) καὶ κατέστησαν ἐκείνην τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐξ ἧς οἱ πολῖται πρὸς μὲν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως ἐπαιδεύθησαν ὥστε τοὺς βαρβάρους τοὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλθόντας τὴν Ἑλλάδα μόνοι νικᾶν μαχόμενοι, περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης τοσαύτην δόξαν ἔλαβον ὥσθ’ ἑκόντας αὐτοῖς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐγχειρίσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τηλικαύτην τὸ μέγεθος ἐποίησαν καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις κατασκευαῖς ὥστε τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὴν ἄστυ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἶναι καὶ τοιαύταις ὑπερβολαῖς εἰθισμένους χρῆσθαι δοκεῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

|| 28 For the concept of philotimia and its historical evolution, see above Chapter 1.1 with literature. Cf. R. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, Princeton 2001, 138–139. For the terms philotimia and pleonexia in Thucydides, see the distinction made by P. Huart, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’oeuvre de Thucydide, Paris 1968, 388. 29 See Thuc. 6.15.4: ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι; 6.16.4: ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι; 6.28.2; 6.61.1–4; Demosth. 21.143; [Plat.] Alc. Ι 105a–e; Alc. II 141b; Plut. Alc. 16.7; 34.7–35.1; Nepos Alc. 7.3. Cf. J.R. Seager, Alcibiades and the Charge of Aiming at Tyranny, Historia 16 (1967) 6–18; M. Palmer, Love of Glory and the Common Good. Aspects of the Political Thought of Thucydides, Lanham 1992, 93–97; M.F. Williams, Ethics in Thucydides. The Ancient Simplicity, Lanham 1998, 229–230; L. Mitchell, Tyrannical Oligarchs at Athens, in: S. Lewis (ed.), Ancient Tyranny, Edinburgh 2006, 178– 187; M. Munn, The Mother of the Gods, Athens, and the Tyranny of Asia. A Study of Sovereignty in Ancient Religion, Berkeley/Los Angeles 2006, 319–324. 30 J.R. Seager is justified in asserting in “Alcibiades and the Charge of Aiming at Tyranny”, Historia 16 (1967) 11: “Isocrates makes no attempt to deny that Alcibiades was unique”.

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On the Team of Horses 16(26) In the end, my father’s grandfathers on his father’s and mother’s sides, Alcibiades and Cleisthenes, took over generalship of the exile community, restored the people, and banished the tyrants (tyrannoi). (27) They then established the democracy, as a result of which the citizens were so well educated in bravery (andreia) that they fought and defeated the foreigners by themselves when they came against all of Greece. They also earned such a reputation for justice (dikaiosynē) that the Greeks willingly put the command at sea in their hands, and they made their city so great in importance through its power and other assets that those who claim Athens is Greece’s capital (asty tēs Hellados) and are accustomed to making such exaggerations as these appear to be speaking the truth. (Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mirhady/ Too 2000)

A dominant concept in this passage is ἐπαιδεύθησαν (“they were educated”); citizens were trained in bravery through the establishment of an ideal constitution by the ancestors of Alcibiades. This educational process implemented by political leaders is repeated in the exposition of an idealised Athenian democracy before the Persian Wars in Panegyricus (4.82; analysed thoroughly in paragraphs 75–81).31 Isocrates does not focus generally on the city’s education, as is the case with Thucydides in the Epitaphios of Pericles (2.36 ff.), but on the spirit of political leaders who acted as educators. They trained their descendants, educated their people and paved the way for victory over the Persians. The idea of the politician-educator is central for Isocrates (2.31: τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθoς ὁμoιoῦται τoῖς ἄρχoυσιν)32 and the moral legitimisation of Alcibiades is achieved in On the Team of Horses (16) through Pericles, to whom exceptional virtues are attributed, to so superlative a degree (16.28: sōphronestatos, dikaiotatos, sophōtatos) that Alcibiades acquires similar morals and is linked to encomium of his ancestors (ὑπὸ τοιούτοις ἤθεσιν ἐπιτροπευθῆναι καὶ τραφῆναι καὶ παιδευθῆναι). Alcibiades’ antecedents cultivated his spirit, much like political leaders educated citizens before the Persian Wars. Therefore, Alcibiades is a child of Athens and his personal achievements were highly beneficial for the city, as a result of mega phronein (16.29: οὕτω μέγ’ ἐφρόνησεν ὥστ’ ᾠήθη δεῖν δι’ αὑτὸν καὶ τἀκείνων ἔργα μνημονεύεσθαι). The concepts of mega phronein and megalophrosynē mean “greatness of mind with self-confidence” and express intense competitive pursuits. One who is megalophrōn aims at high-minded but not infeasible goals (2.25), and the main question for Isocrates is justified or unjustified megalophrosynē.33 The fact that self-confidence engenders risks if interpreted as arrogance is well-known to Isocrates through the case || 31 Alexiou (2011) 322–323. 32 Cf. 9.48; 10.37; 8.126. This focus on the ēthos of politicians is also confirmed through an argumentum e contrario: in On the Peace, Isocrates castigates the Athenian politicians who succeeded the glorious ancestors of the Persian Wars (8.75; 8.122). 33 Cf. 9.27; 9.45; 9.46; 3.35; 4.25; 4.170; 5.4; 5.71; 8.50; 7.7; 7.73; Alexiou (2010) 108–109. For the hazards of megalophrosynē and its association with hybris when it exceeds the limits, cf. N.R.E. Fisher, Hybris. A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece, Warminster 1992, 319–327; D.L. Cairns, Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big, JHS 116 (1996) 1–32.

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of his pupil Timotheus (15.131), but mega phronein is not incompatible with democracy when it expresses the spirit of a free man. Thus, Theseus wishes for his fellow citizens to be mega phronountes and for their virtue, in the sense of the development of their personalities in public life, to be supported by the active action of highminded citizens, not to be douleuontes, i.e. to express the passivity and indifference of a slave, both literally and metaphorically (10.35; cf. the servile behaviour of Persian officers in 4.151). Therefore, Alcibiades’ outstanding achievements are in harmony with the city: Alcibiades was selected by the general Phormion as one of the best men (16.29–30) and won the prize of valour (30: aristeiōn axiousthai; reminiscent of the Homeric aien aristeuein Il. 6.208; 11.784). Alcibiades outperformed everyone at the Olympic Games (16.33) but Isocrates stresses that any success he achieved honoured the city throughout all Greece (16.32: ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα). As to the matter of the regime, where any democratic Athenian would raise reasonable objections against Alcibiades, Isocrates presents an individual that was the sole obstacle to the city’s internal and external enemies (16.5; 16.37; 16.40). According to the laudatory topos of monos ē prōtos, the city’s overall progress is represented as the result of a single man’s actions.34 The negative element, on the contrary, are the enemies of the city and democracy in particular. In fact, Alcibiades is transformed into its defender from the oligarchs (16.36: τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους εὑρήσεθ’ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν στασιάσαντας, ἐκεῖνον δ’ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύοντα). This is not different from the idealised expression of cooperative ambition found in Panegyricus (4.79): “Their public spirit was such that when they divided into factions (staseis) against each other, they did so not in order that whichever group destroyed the other (tous heterous apolesantes) would rule over the remainder but in order to see which group would be the first to treat the city well (agathon poiēsantes)” (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004). Even regarding the charges of Alcibiades’ monarchical pursuits, Isocrates’ response stems from his belief in the self-limitations of a leading figure. This is a key point of Isocratean ideology: responsibility is not placed on institutions, but derives from an outstanding personality of an individual who undertakes his responsibilities, whether this is a politician such as Alcibiades or a rhetorician such as Isocrates. Alcibiades deserved the monarchy more than anyone else, yet consciously chose to be on equal footing with his fellow citizens:35 On the Team of Horses 16(38) καίτοι πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν δυσκόλως εἶχον ὡς πρὸς τυραννεῖν ἐπιβουλεύοντα, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦντες, ἀλλ’ ἡγούμενοι τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμ’ ὑπὸ

|| 34 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1368a 10–11: χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [ὃ] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν; Anax. Rhet. Alex. 3.2; Theon Progymn. 9, p. 110 Pat.-Bol.; L. Pernot, La rhétorique de l’éloge dans le monde gréco-romain. I: Histoire et technique, II: Les valeurs, Paris 1993, 705–708. On the motif in funeral speeches, see Lys. 2.20; Demosth. 60.10–11. 35 Cf. the same concept in On the Peace 8.89 and [To Demonicus] 1.38.

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πάντων ζηλοῦσθαι, δύνασθαι δ’ ἂν ἐκεῖνον μάλιστα διαπράξασθαι. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν αὐτῷ πλείω χάριν ἔχοιτε, ὅτι τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν μόνος τῶν πολιτῶν ἄξιος ἦν ταύτην ἔχειν, τῆς δὲ πολιτείας ἴσον ᾤετο δεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μετεῖναι. On the Team of Horses 16(38) And yet many of the citizens disliked him, suspecting that he was plotting a tyranny (tyrannein). They did not see this in his actions, but they thought that everyone aspired to take this step and that he was the most capable of carrying it through. Τherefore, it would be just to give him thanks, because while he alone of the citizens was worthy (axios) of this charge, he believed others must have an equal share in the political order. (Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

It is made clear that in the context of the moral-political discussion in the late 5th century BC on the hazards of ambition, Isocrates makes a clear choice: he does not discount individual ambition, but endeavours to lead it in positive, cooperative directions for the good of the polis. This idea, which is clearly expressed in On the Team of Horses, would become a key concept in Isocrates’ subsequent speeches and rhetorical education. This is, therefore, a different approach from the one adopted in Euripides’ Phoenissae by Eteocles who, in the context of large-scale greed,36 wishes for monarchy at all costs, equating ambition with tyrannical power (524–525: εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι / κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τἄλλα δ’ εὐσεβεῖν χρεών). Reacting to both of these concepts, Jocasta advocates for equality and justice (531–532): τί τῆς κακίστης δαιμόνων ἐφίεσαι / Φιλοτιμίας, παῖ; μὴ σύ γ’· ἄδικος ἡ θεός. Philotimia, as a personified diety, serves as a metonym for honour, the object of ambition, and is synonymous to Tyrannis (cf. 506: τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν Τυραννίδα).37 Isocrates, on the contrary, proposes a way where competitive and cooperative values are not mutually exclusive, and this will also apply to foreign policy. 5.2.2.2 Helen (10) - Busiris (11) Where On the Team of Horses (16) is an embedded encomium within a judicial speech, Helen (10), Busiris (11) and Evagoras (9) are three self-contained encomia dedicated to three individuals, the first two to mythical figures and the third to a historical figure.

|| 36 See generally E. Alexiou, Die Spiegelfunktion der isokratischen Rhetorik. Der lakonisierende Schüler und die Pleonexie großen Stils, in: M. Tziatzi et al. (eds.), Lemmata. Beiträge zum Gedenken an Christos Theodoridis, Berlin/Boston 2015, 73–90. 37 The synonymity of the two terms is also highlighted by D.J. Mastronarde, Euripides Phoenissae. Edited with Introduction and Commentary, Cambridge 1994, 299. Cf. J. de Romilly, Les Phéniciennes d’Euripide ou l’actualité dans la tragédie grecque, RPh 39 (1965) 28–47, esp. 35–41; C. Amiech, Les Pheniciennes d’Euripide. Commentaire et traduction, Paris 2004, 350, 357; Alexiou (2013) 47–73; (2018) 114–133.

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All three were written after 390 BC,38 at a time when Isocrates had already founded his school. Helen and Busiris belong to the paradoxical speeches of praise. The Helen encomium plays a programmatic role on many levels, and Helen truly becomes Isocrates’ muse. In the prooimion (10.1–11) Isocrates solidifies his position; he turns against purely theoretical philosophical pursuits, requesting a turn away from this hair-splitting (10.4: terthreia)39 and exhorting the pursuit of truth, which, for Isocrates, always extends to the practical aspect of everyday political life (τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν αἷς πολιτευόμεθα, τοὺς συνόντας παιδεύειν; cf. Mikkola 1954, 80–90). Since absolute knowledge is attainable solely for superficial matters, it is preferable to conjecture reasonably about useful things (10.5: περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν) than to have precise knowledge of what is useless for living (περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι).40 The fact that, following this proem, Isocrates would then write an encomium of Helen is initially surprising. Aristotle disputes the unity of the speech and the proem (Rhetoric 1414b 24–28). It is clear that this is a rhetorical exercise in epideictic speech, closely associated with Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen.41 It is precisely because there had been such a speech that Isocrates was given the opportunity to compete against and correct his teacher. In the development of the rhetorical encomium, Isocrates’ criticism is significant. The rhetorician praises his predecessor for the choice of topic, but remarks that the speech was an apology, which is contrary to the rhetorical principles of the encomium (10.14: φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι περὶ αὐτῆς, τυγχάνει δ’ ἀπολογίαν εἰρηκὼς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκείνῃ πεπραγμένων). At the same time ‒ and this is fully characteristic of Isocrates ‒ he presents major moral and political ideas in the speech. Irrespective of the reason to choose the topic, the Helen is transformed into a “pedagogical manifesto”.42 Consequently, the unity between the proem and the main part of the encomium is much more substantial than Aristotle contended. A key role in the encomium of Helen is played by the extensive praise of Theseus (10.18–38). This introduction of an embedded encomium within another encomium is a well-known rhetorical

|| 38 Helen dates to approximately 385 BC, Busiris between 388 and 375 BC, and Evagoras around 370 BC. For a good summary of the research see Livingstone (2001) 40–47. 39 See Hesych. s.v. τερθρεία· λογομαχία. ἀπάτη. φλυαρία. φληναφία. Cf. Suda τ 344 s.v. τερθρεία· ἡ λεπτολογία. In Against the Sophists (13.8), Ιsocrates uses the terms adoleschia and mikrologia in a similar context. Cf. 15.262 and Dressler (2014) 179 and 206. 40 Cf. Flacelière (1961) 20; Eucken (1983) 44–74; Alexiou (2007) 3–4. 41 For Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and its relation to Isocrates’ Helen, see in particular Buchheit (1960) 30–34, 54–64; Braun (1982) 158–174; Eucken (1983) 74–80. See also Poulakos (1986) 300–307; Bons (1996); Papillon (1996) 377–391; Zajonz (2002); C. Calame, The Abduction of Helen and the Greek Poetic Tradition. Politics, Reinterpretations and Controversies, in: U. Dill/C.Walde (eds.), Antike Mythen, Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen, Berlin/New York 2009, 645–661, esp. 652–654; R. Blondell, Helen of Troy. Beauty, Myth, Devastation, Oxford 2013, 222–246. 42 Tuszyńska-Maciejewska (1987) 289. Cf. Blank (2013) 13.

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technique.43 Other such cases are the praise of Paris (10.41–48), of the Egyptians and Pythagoras (11.20–29), of the Athenian general Timotheus (15.101–139) and of Agamemnon (12.74–87). Isocrates uses the myth of Helen’s abduction by Theseus44 as an opportunity to praise the mythical hero and, through him, Helen. Theseus is described as a fully formed personality replete with every virtue. Helen established her power over Theseus’ aretē and sōphrosynē (10.38). Isocrates’ continuous reference to moral virtues is no accident; he is attempting to link Helen’s aesthetic beauty with internal virtues, and uses the concept of kallos in a broader sense.45 Kallos becomes the dominant topic of the speech, while the morally dubious behaviour of Helen is not touched upon at all. Kallos is characterised as the most venerated, most honoured, and most divine quality (10.54: semnotaton, timiōtaton and theiotaton). However, aesthetic beauty is yet again associated with moral beauty, as Isocrates characterises aretē as the most beautiful of qualities (kalliston tōn epitēdeumatōn). Isocrates’ argumentation is indicative of how he treats the mythical past46. As underlined by G. Schmitz-Kahlmann,47 there is an increase in Isocrates’ use of myth. However, the rhetorician’s stance towards myth is selective and interpretative: he chooses those elements that can be associated with his pedagogical and political goals, and interprets them in such a way so as to project his personal ideas onto them. Characteristic examples are the mythical encomium motifs of Athens in Panegyricus (4.54–70), as well as the laudatory digressions concerning Theseus in Helen (10.18–38), Heracles in To Philip (5.109–112) and Agamemnon in Panathenaicus (12.74– 87). At the end of Helen, the titular figure essentially becomes a forerunner of the Pan-Hellenic ideal:48 Helen 10(67) πολὺ δὲ πλείω τὰ παραλελειμμένα τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν. χωρὶς γὰρ τεχνῶν καὶ φιλοσοφιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὠφελειῶν, ἃς ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰς ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν Τρωϊκὸν ἀνενεγκεῖν, δικαίως ἂν καὶ τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς βαρβάροις Ἑλένην αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοιμεν. εὑρήσομεν γὰρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας δι’ αὐτὴν ὁμονοήσαντας καὶ κοινὴν στρατείαν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ποιησαμένους, καὶ τότε πρῶτον τὴν Εὐρώπην τῆς Ἀσίας τρόπαιον στήσασαν.

|| 43 See Arist. Rhet. 1418a 33–34: ἐν δὲ τoῖς ἐπιδεικτικoῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγoν ἐπεισoδιoῦν ἐπαίνoις, oἷoν Ἰσoκράτης πoιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει. Cf. J. Poulakos, Argument, Practicality, and Eloquence in Isocrates’ Helen, Rhetorica 4 (1986) 12 note 37; Alexiou (1998) 287–289; S. Constantinidou, Logos into Mythos. The Case of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, Athens 2008, 105–106; Alexiou (2010) 26–28. 44 Cf. Apollod. 3.128; Plut. Thes. 31–34; Paus. 1.41.4; 3.18.15; Diod. 4.63.1–5. 45 Cf. Bons (1996) 200–201. 46 For Isocrates’ relationship to myth, see P.B. Wagner, Isokrates und der Mythos, Vienna 1968; S. Usener, Isocrates’ Busiris. Verschriftlichung des Mythos und Verantwortung des Autors, in: W. Kullmann/J. Althoff (eds.), Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur, Tübingen 1993, 247–262, esp. 260–262; Τ.L. Papillon, Isocrates and the Use of Myth, Hermathena 160 (1996) 9– 21; Gotteland (2001); A. Masaracchia, Isocrate e il mito, in: Orth (2003) 150–168. 47 G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates, Leipzig 1939, 39–84. 48 See G.A. Kennedy, Isocrates’ Encomium of Helen. A Panhellenic Document, TAPhA 89 (1958) 77– 83. In Panegyricus 4.159, the Trojan War serves as the standard ‒ in the context of the Pan-Hellenic ideal ‒ for a new war of the Greeks against the Persians (cf. 12.42; 12.74–87); Mathieu (1925) 54–55; Alexiou (1998) 289–294; Gotteland (2001) 213–229; M. Weissenberger, Isokrates und der Plan eines panhellenischen Perserkrieges, in: Orth (2003) 102.

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Helen 10(67) What I have left out is far more than what has been said. Aside from arts (technai) and philosophiai and the other benefits that might be attributed to her and to the Trojan War, we may justly believe that Helen is the reason we are not enslaved to the foreigners (barbaroi). We shall discover that the Greeks formed a common mind and created a shared military force against the foreigners because of her, and that then for the first time Europe set up a trophy of victory (tropaion) over Asia. (Transl. D.C. Mirhady with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

The encomium of Helen distinctively shows how Isocrates interprets myths and combines elements of his rhetorical education with the mythical past. The second example is Busiris (11). According to the Hypothesis, it is one of Isocrates’ four encomia.49 Isocrates harshly criticises Polycrates, who is proud (11.4: megalauchoumenos) of having tackled particularly difficult topics, such as the Defence of Busiris and the Accusation of Socrates. The criticism is twofold, extending to both form and content.50 Polycrates confuses praise with both the apology and the accusation. Not only did he not repudiate Busiris’ crimes, such as sacrificing foreigners, but he also imputed cannibalism to him. Isocrates admits that these are trivial matters (11.9), but wishes to show Polycrates how to write a proper praise (epainos) and apology (apologia). The encomium comprises §10–29, while the apology §30–43.51 According to Isocratean pedagogical values,52 Busiris is transformed into a founder of the Egyptian monarchy and culture. Isocrates applies the basic principle of rhetorical auxēsis: δεῖ τoὺς μὲν εὐλoγεῖν τινὰς βoυλoμένoυς πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν αὐτoῖς τὰ πρoσόντ’ ἀπoφαίνειν, τoὺς δὲ κατηγoρoῦντας τἀναντία τoύτων πoιεῖν (11.4: “Τhose who want to eulogize people must point out more good attributes than they actually have, and those who want to prosecute them must do the opposite”. Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mirhady/Too 2000).53 Anaximenes makes a similar statement (Rhet. Alex. 3.1): συλλήβδην μὲν oὖν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶδoς πρoαιρέσεων καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων ἐνδόξων αὔξησις καὶ μὴ πρoσόντων συνoικείωσις (“In short, the species of praise

|| 49 Διὸ καὶ ὁ λόγoς oὗτoς τῶν τεσσάρων ἐγκωμίων ἐστίν (p. 115 Dind. = I 234 Mand.). Which are these four encomia? If we count Evagoras, Helen and Busiris, then the fourth must be Panathenaicus as an encomium of Athens; at least, that is how Photius characterises it (Bibl. 159.102a 18–19). However, it seems that ancient scholars excluded Panathenaicus because in the Hypothesis of Against the Sophists (p. 116–117 Dind. = I 235 Mand.) this speech is referred to as one of the four encomia; according to the classification of ancient rhetoricians, the enkōmion as a genre also included epainos and psogos; see Nicolaus Progymn. 54.1–6 Felten. 50 See in detail Alexiou (2011) 333–334. Sykutris (1927) 46–48 mainly insists on the content, while Buchheit (1960) 45–53 on the form. 51 See Livingstone (2001) 14–21. 52 Papillon (2001) 73–93, esp. 86 ff. introduces the term “hypodeictic” (from hypodeiknynai) instead of “epideictic” to stress the primary instructive goal of Isocrates’ speeches, inter alia, in the use of myths. 53 Cf. Panegyricus 4.8 (τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ πoιῆσαι καὶ τoῖς μικρoῖς μέγεθoς περιθεῖναι) and Panathenaicus 12.36 (τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ῥᾴδιoν τoῖς λόγoις αὐξῆσαι).

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is an amplification of reputable choices, acts, and words and an appropriation of those that are not present”. Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mayhew/Mirhady 2011). With respect to Isocrates’ stance towards myths, it must be stressed that the rhetorician continues the criticism that began in the 6th century BC quite vocally by Xenophanes, who accused Homer and Hesiod of human moral failings that they attributed to the gods, such as theft, adultery and fraud.54 According to Isocrates, theft, adultery, being slaves to humans, their eating their children, castrating their fathers, tying up their mothers are just a few of the unholy acts that the poets attributed to the gods (11.38–39). The following passage (11.40–41) contains Isocrates’ religious belief that such speeches are not worthy of imitation; on the contrary, both the gods and their descendants are morally blameless: Busiris 11(40) ὥστ’, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ μιμησόμεθα τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων, οὐδὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακηγορίας νομοθετήσομεν, τῆς δ’ εἰς τοὺς θεούς παρρησίας ὀλιγωρήσομεν, ἀλλὰ φυλαξόμεθα καὶ νομιοῦμεν ὁμοίως ἀσεβεῖν τούς τε λέγοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτοῖς. (41) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότας οὐδεμιᾶς ἡγοῦμαι κακίας μετασχεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτούς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φῦναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ διδασκάλους γεγενῆσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἄλογον, εἰ τῆς μὲν ἡμετέρας εὐπαιδίας εἰς τοὺς θεούς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναφέρομεν, τῆς δὲ σφετέρας αὐτῶν μηδὲν αὐτοὺς φροντίζειν νομίζοιμεν. Busiris 11(40) Therefore, if we are sensible, we will not imitate their stories. And when we make laws about defaming one another we will not make light of loose talk against the gods either. We will stay on guard and hold that those who say such things and those who believe them commit impiety (asebein) equally. (41) I believe that neither the gods nor their offspring share in evil (kakia). They have all the virtues (aretai) by nature and have become leaders and teachers of the finest conduct for the rest of us. It is unreasonable to attribute the cause of our children’s blessings (eupaidia) to the gods but to believe that they take no thought of their own. (Transl. D.C. Mirhady in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

5.2.2.3 Evagoras (9) Isocrates’ ambitious endeavour in Evagoras (9; c. 370 BC) extends far beyond a limited critique of his peers, as was the case with Helen and Busiris; the encomium Evagoras, following the recognition of its importance by Ι. Bruns (1896, 115–126) and its first systematic analysis by J. Sykutris (1927), is considered a ground-breaking innovation in the development of the rhetorical encomium for two main reasons: a) because the mythical figure being praised has been replaced by a contemporary historical figure, and b) because it is an early example of the coupling of an epideictic speech with the

|| 54 21 B11 D.-K.: πάντα θεoῖσ’ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίoδός τε, / ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώπoισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγoς ἐστίν, / κλέπτειν μoιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλoυς ἀπατεύειν.

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moral improvement of the recipients.55 In the proem of the speech, Isocrates is proud of the first prose encomium of a contemporary figure, the deceased king of Cyprus, Evagoras I: Evagoras 9(8) oἶδα μὲν oὖν, ὅτι χαλεπόν ἐστιν, ὃ μέλλω πoιεῖν, ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων ἐγκωμιάζειν. σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων πoλλῶν καὶ παντoδαπῶν λέγειν τoλμῶσιν oἱ περὶ τὴν φιλoσoφίαν ὄντες, περὶ δὲ τῶν τoιoύτων oὐδεὶς πώπoτ’ αὐτῶν συγγράφειν ἐπεχείρησεν. Evagoras 9(8) I know that what I am about to do is difficult ‒ praising (enkōmiazein) a man’s excellence through a speech (dia logōn). The greatest proof of this is that those who concern themselves with philosophia venture to speak on many other subjects of every different kind, but none of them has ever attempted to write on this matter. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

In the proem (9.5) Isocrates criticises the lack of encomia of exceptional contemporaries. Bruns (1896, 119) recognises the recipients of this criticism as historiographers, such as Thucydides and his imitators, who focused not on individuals but on historical events, while Sykutris (1927, 39–41) speculates that Isocrates is mainly addressing orators of Epitaphioi. It is certain that Isocrates is addressing his peers and that the relation between the encomium and the funeral speeches is unquestionably much closer than that with historiography. The ἄλλοι (9.5) are generally οἱ δυνάμενoι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργα κoσμεῖν, poets and prose writers, and especially oἱ περὶ τὴν φιλoσoφίαν ὄντες (9.8), sophists and orators, or through them an entire political community evaluating someone as agathos; they are called upon to extol the achievements of outstanding contemporaries. Therefore, the illumination of a contemporary individual personality in Evagoras stems from two basic literary sources: the Epinician odes of choral poetry and the Funeral Speeches, as collective praise for the fallen (Alexiou 2010, 32–37). It is no accident that in the Scholia (Evag. 1, p. 121 Dind. = I 242 Mand.) Evagoras is characterised as an epitaphios and enkōmion.56 As regards choral poetry and complying with the tradition of the great lyric poets Pindar and Bacchylides, Isocrates considers it his duty to bestow praise upon Evagoras that is worthy of his deeds. Similar to Pindar extolling outstanding achievements,

|| 55 See Alexiou (2010) 28–37. Cf. J. Poulakos, Isocrates’ Use of Narrative in the Evagoras. Epideictic Rhetoric and Moral Action, QJS 73 (1987) 318–319; Walker (2011) 119–120; Pernot (2015) 3. Too’s remark (1995) 149 note 82 that both Helen and Evagoras belong to the category of paradoxical encomia is misplaced. 56 Cf. Menand. De epid. 419.1–3 Russ.-Wils. In Stephanus In art. rhet. comm. 302.1 (Rabe) Evagoras is characterised as an epitaphios. The two sections of the Epitaphios absent in Evagoras, are, according to the Scholia (Evag. 1, p. 121–122 Dind. = I 241–242 Mand.), the thrēnētikon in the proem and the paramythētikon in the epilogue.

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so that they do not dwell in deep darkness (Nemean 7.12–13),57 so does Isocrates transfer this duty from poetry to rhetorical speech (9.4: ἀείμνηστον ἂν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν Εὐαγόρου παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσειεν).58 The affinity between the views of Pindar and Isocrates stems from the rhetorician’s conscious endeavour to compete against poetry and take over its role. Despite the advantages of poetry in terms of metre and rhythm, Isocrates contends to write an equally successful encomium in a prose speech (9.11: τoὺς ἀγαθoὺς ἄνδρας εὐλoγεῖν μηδὲν χεῖρoν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τoῖς μέτρoις ἐγκωμιαζόντων). Competition against poetry, which is repeatedly encountered in the main part of the encomium (9.36; 9.40; 9.65), attests to the fact that, in the struggle between poetry and rhetoric, the rhetorician is claiming first prize. As to the origins of Epitaphioi, it is interesting how Isocrates contends with them: in Evagoras (9.6), the reference to the listeners’ envy continues a prevalent motif in the proem to Thucydides’ Epitaphios (Thuc. 2.35.2). Pericles favours the direct relationship between deeds and honour because rhetoric, being at a disadvantaged position, is subject to the ignorance and envy of the listeners. Isocrates, on the contrary, takes more aggressive action: he denounces envy of great acts, and extols individual achievements with rhetorical discourse as the most appropriate means for bestowing glory (9.1–4). The responsibility is transferred from the expected reactions of the audience to the active instructive role of the orator (9.7).59 The Cypriot king is idealised in Evagoras: Isocrates does begin with historical facts, but chooses and interprets them in such a way so that, ultimately, he does not present a historical person but a political ideal.60 Isocrates persistently combines the

|| 57 Cf. Olymp. 10.3; 11.4–8; Pyth. 3.114–115; Bacch. 1.181–184; 3.90–98. 58 According to Τ. Krischer, Die Stellung der Biographie in der griechischen Literatur, Hermes 110 (1982) 63, Evagoras constitutes rhetorical heroic poetry (rhetorische Heldendichtung). Cf. Race (1987) 131–155; Vallozza (1990) 43–58, esp. 49 ff.; Ford (1993) 31–52, esp. 48 ff.; Papillon (1998) 41–61, esp. 45–46 and 50–51; Vallozza (1998) 121–130; Alexiou (2000) 104–109; W.H. Race, Rhetoric and Lyric Poetry, in: Worthington (2007) 509–525, esp. 515–516; Alexiou (2010) 35–36, 177–178. 59 See in detail Alexiou (2009) 31–52 and Chapter 1.3.2 above. 60 See E. Alexiou, The Rhetoric of Isocrates’ Evagoras. History, Ethics and Politics, in: C. Bouchet/ P. Giovanelli-Jouanna (eds.), Isocrate. Entre jeu rhetorique et enjeux politiques, Lyon 2015, 47–61. On “Isocrates and history” see K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtsschreibern bis Demosthenes, Basel 1935; G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates, Leipzig 1939; Perlman (1961) 150–166; Welles (1966) 3– 25; Hamilton (1979) 290–298; Nouhaud (1982); M. Fox/N. Livingstone, Rhetoric and Historiography, in: Worthington (2007) 552–553; R. Nicolai, Verità della storia e verità del paradigma. Riflessioni su Isocrate (con un’appendice platonica), in: A.I. Bouton-Touboulic/F. Daspet (eds.), Dire le vrai. Actes de la Journée d’études du XLIIe Congrès de l’APLAES, Bordeaux 2012, 9–37; J. Grethlein, The Value of the Past Challenged. Myth and Ancient History in the Attic Orators, in: J. Ker/C. Pieper (eds.), Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/Boston 2014, 326–354; J. Marincola, Rethinking Isocrates and Historiography, in: G. Parmeggiani (ed.), Between Thucydides and Polybius. The Golden Age of Greek Historiography, Washington DC 2014, 39–61. For a comparison between Isocrates and Thucyd-

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competitive values of an aristocrat of the Homeric type with the cooperative virtues of a citizen of a city-state. Apart from Isocrates’ personal beliefs, this combination also reflects the aristocratic values of choral poetry and the political virtues of a funeral speech. The following passages are typical of Isocrates’ systematic endeavour to underline the exceptional virtues of an individual without eclipsing the values of the polis: Ι. Evagoras 9(3) εὑρήσομεν γὰρ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ μεγαλοψύχους τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐ μόνον ἀντὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινεῖσθαι βουλομένους, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀποθνῄσκειν εὐκλεῶς αἱρουμένους, καὶ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς δόξης ἢ τοῦ βίου σπουδάζοντας, καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἀθάνατον τὴν περὶ αὑτῶν μνήμην καταλείψουσιν. Evagoras 9(3) We shall discover that ambitious and noble (philotimoi kai megalopsychoi) men not only wish to be praised for such things but that they prefer to die gloriously (eukleōs) rather than to live, that they are concerned about honor rather than livelihood, and that they do everything possible to leave behind an immortal memory of themselves. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

The prooimion of Evagoras is reminiscent of archaic burial customs. The adjective philotimos (“ambitious”) is indicative of the archaic (in origin) view of one’s fame as exceeding time and death. It expresses individual competitive pursuits and is associated with megalopsychos, almost as a hendiadys (for philotimia cf. Chapter 1.1 above). ΙΙ. Evagoras 9(23) τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταῖς διήνεγκεν, (24) ὥσθ᾽ ὁπότε μὲν αὐτὸν ὁρῷεν οἱ τότε βασιλεύοντες, ἐκπλήττεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἡγουμένους οὐχ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν ἐν ἰδιώτου μέρει διαγαγεῖν, ὁπότε δ’ εἰς τοὺς τρόπους ἀποβλέψειαν, οὕτω σφόδρα πιστεύειν ὥστ’ εἰ καί τις ἄλλος τολμῴη περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνειν, νομίζειν Εὐαγόραν αὑτοῖς ἔσεσθαι βοηθόν. Evagoras 9(23) He excelled in the virtues (aretai) of body and soul to such a degree (24) that, when those who ruled at the time saw him, they were terrified and feared for their power. They thought that such an individual could not conduct his nature (physis) as a private citizen; when they considered his character (tropoi), they were confident that if anyone else dared to harm them, Evagoras would come to their aid. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Evagoras’ monarchical claims are based on the superiority of his nature (physis) that translates into megalophrosynē (9.27). However, Isocrates does not endorse the blind || ides, cf. C. Brunello, La verità supera la meraviglia. Poesia e prosa a confronto nell’Evagora di Isocrate, Prometheus 39 (2013) 69–86. On the “Intentional History” in Isocrates see Brunello (2015) 73– 131 (with my review in Histos 11, 2017, 22–28). See also generally L. Pearson, Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators, CPh 36 (1941) 209–229; D. Allroggen, Griechische Geschichte im Urteil der attischen Redner des vierten Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Freiburg 1972; F. Pownall, Lessons from the Past. The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose, Michigan 2004, 24 ff.; Α. Εfstathiou, Οι ρητορικοί λόγοι ως ιστορικές πηγές, Platon 58 (2012) 120–135; B. Steinbock, Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse. Uses and Meanings of the Past, Ann Arbor 2013; Blank (2014).

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prevalence of competitive desires. The tropoi externalise a man’s character and express moral virtues that are reflected in Evagoras’ piety and avoidance of injustice. Thus, Isocrates wishes to praise not only the megalophrosynē of a hero of the Homeric type, but also the cooperative virtues of the citizen of a polis with the avoidance of civil strife. Isocrates links Evagoras’ monarchical ambitions to piety and justice (9.26: hosiōs kai dikaiōs). The “Canon of the Two Virtues” (Zweitugendkanon; Dihle 1968) calls for piety towards the gods and justice towards fellow men, thus constituting the twofold legitimisation of Evagoras’ power. ΙΙΙ. Evagoras 9(46) ὅλως οὐδὲν παραλείπων ὧν προσεῖναι δεῖ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑκάστης πολιτείας ἐξειλεγμένος τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ δημοτικὸς μὲν ὢν τῇ τοῦ πλήθους θεραπείᾳ, πολιτικὸς δὲ τῇ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης διοικήσει, στρατηγικὸς δὲ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους εὐβουλίᾳ, μεγαλόφρων (v.l. τυραννικὸς) δὲ τῷ πᾶσι τούτοις διαφέρειν. Evagoras 9(46) On the whole, he lacked none of the necessary requisites for monarchs, but he selected the best from each form of government (politeia). He was democratic (dēmotikos) in his service of the people; public-minded (politikos) in his government of the whole city state; a military strategist (stratēgikos) in his management of dangers, and high-minded (megalophrōn) (v.l. an absolute ruler [tyrannikos]) by excelling in all these qualities. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Isocrates invests not in a specific form of government, but in an “aristocracy of values”.61 Evagoras’ power is guided by the quintessence of every form of governance. Isocrates is not interested in precise political terminology, but in the moral and political progress of a leader, regardless of the form of governance. He uses the term politeia broadly in this instance to mean every form of governance, be it political or military, without strictly distinguishing between constitutions. Even if the term dēmotikos is indicative of democracy and the varia lectio tyrannikos (instead of megalophrōn) of monarchy, the additions of politikos (“an able and principled politician”) and stratēgikos (“an able general”) do not point towards a specific regime but to forms of governance. IV. Evagoras 9(50) νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον μεταπεπτώκασιν ὥσθ’ ἁμιλλᾶσθαι μὲν οἵτινες αὐτῶν δόξουσιν φιλέλληνες εἶναι μάλιστα, παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντας παρ’ ἡμῶν, χαίρειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς κτήμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, πλείους δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἄλλην παίδευσιν ἐν τούτοις τόποις διατρίβειν, ἢ παρ’ οἷς πρότερον εἰωθότες ἦσαν. καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν Εὐαγόραν αἴτιον εἶναι προσομολογήσειεν. Evagoras 9(50) Now things have changed so much that they compete to see who will be considered the most friendly to the Greeks (philellēnes), and the majority of them marry our women to

|| 61 See Alexiou (2010) 135–136; (2015a) 50–51. Cf. also Morgan (2003) 189 and 209 note 25. In Panathenaicus (12.131), Isocrates emphatically underlines the importance of a democracy that makes use of the rules of aristocracy (δημοκρατίαν … ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένην).

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produce children. They delight in Greek goods and Greek institutions rather than in their own, and more of those who concern themselves with music and other aspects of education spend time here than in their former cities. No one would fail to agree that Evagoras deserves credit for all these things. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

According to Isocrates, the descent of Cyprus into barbarism included enmity towards the Greeks, economic decline and lack of power. Greek education, which Evagoras brought to Cyprus, was a touchstone. Given that Isocrates is unfamiliar with the concept of cultural relativism and his starting point is the cultural superiority of the Greeks over barbarians, the result of Evagoras taking power in Salamis (Cyprus) was an economic boom (9.47–48), cultural refinement (9.49), a pro-Greek stance and a flourishing of the arts (9.50). Cultural progress from a primitive to a socially evolved form is linear and optimistic. The model used in Isocrates’ description is the evolution of Greece under the influence of Athens in Panegyricus (4.39–50). R. Jebb62 rightly stresses that: “Evagoras was the champion of Hellenism against barbarism at this outpost”. V. Evagoras 9(51) τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πολλοὶ καὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τὰς αὑτῶν πατρίδας ἀπολιπόντες ἦλθον εἰς Κύπρον οἰκήσοντες, ἡγούμενοι κουφοτέραν καὶ νομιμωτέραν εἶναι τὴν Εὐαγόρου βασιλείαν τῶν οἴκοι πολιτειῶν. Evagoras 9(51) Many distinguished Greeks left their own countries to live in Cyprus because they thought that Evagoras’ kingship would be easier to bear (kouphotera) and more lawful (nomimōtera) than their constitutions at home. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Isocrates describes an idealised reign of Evagoras, standing opposed to tyrannical monarchy. Evagoras’ governance was kouphotera (“easier to bear”) and nomimōtera (“more lawful, more equitable”) than the forms of government in Greece.63 This statement has a singular emotional and political charge: Isocrates invokes democratic values so that even a democratic audience would acknowledge the protagonist of the encomium as an ideal leader. The model is the description of Theseus’ governance of Athens following the Synoikismos of Attica in Helen (10.35–36; Alexiou 1995, 111; 2010, 142–143; cf. Atack 2018, 186–187). After the liberation of his fellow citizens from a tyrannical monarchy, which was not limited to liberation from external bonds but to the development of a personality with high self-confidence, the government was offered to Theseus by his fellow citizens in recognition of his superiority in every aspect (10.36: ἡγoύμενoι [sc. oἱ πoλῖται] πιστoτέραν καὶ κoινoτέραν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνoυ μoναρχίαν τῆς αὑτῶν δημoκρατίας). The pistoteran kai koinoteran in Helen correspond to || 62 R. Jebb, The Attic Orators, London 1875, II 113. 63 The term kouphoteran is a hapax legomenon in Isocrates. The term politeiai does not indicate general governance in this instance, but constitutions and especially democracies. Cf. 4.125; 7.70; Epist. 6.11. See also Harpocration s.v. πoλιτεία· ἰδίως εἰώθασι τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆσθαι oἱ ῥήτoρες ἐπὶ τῆς δημoκρατίας, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τε ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς.

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the kouphoteran (v.l. koinoteran) kai nomimōteran in Evagoras. The Cypriot king did not acquire monarchical power on the basis of democratic legitimisation, as was the case with Theseus (see Eucken 1983, 97; Zajonz 2002, 206–207), but the practical expression of his reign reflects the same values (cf. To Nicocles 2.8). Isocrates thus aims to bridge the gap between the demos and the aristocratic elite and, by extension, between democracy and monarchy. VI. Evagoras 9(72) ὥστ’ εἴ τινες τῶν ποιητῶν περί τινος τῶν προγεγενημένων ὑπερβολαῖς κέχρηνται, λέγοντες ὡς ἦν θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἢ δαίμων θνητός, ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν ῥηθῆναι μάλιστ’ ἂν ἁρμόσειεν. Evagoras 9(72) If any poets employ hyperbole with regard to any figure from the past, and say that he was a god among men, or a mortal spirit (daimōn), all such phrases would suitably be said about Evagoras’ character. (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

The final makarismos (9.70–72) compares Evagoras to the demigods of the past, ending in a type of apotheosis. The phrase θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἢ δαίμων θνητός is the culmination of the praise heaped upon Evagoras. This conclusion, like Isocrates’ other similar apostrophes of equation with the divine in Evagoras (9.29; 9.39; 9.70), stems from poetic mythical models (Hom. Il. 24.258; Hesiod Op. 141; Eurip. Alc. 1003; Antiph. fr. 207.5 Κ.-Α.) and must be interpreted as techniques of amplification in the effort to compare a prose encomium to poetry ‒ however, they also contribute to the creation of a political ideological background that was significant for the subsequent Hellenistic monarchy.64 In the epilogue of Evagoras (9.73–81), almost reminiscent of a poetic ring composition (Race 1987, 149), Isocrates once again addresses Nicocles, the son of the deceased monarch, and touches upon the subject raised in the proem, concerning the superiority of encomia over the other events honouring the memory of Evagoras (9.4). The rhetorician compares skilfully produced speeches to honorific statues and asserts the superiority of the former due to the dissemination of the glory bestowed on the encomium’s subject and the moral-educational benefits of such speeches (9.73–75). He then exhorts Nicocles (9.76–81) to imitate his father, who serves as an exemplum. Therefore, the encomium of Evagoras takes on the form of advice to Nicocles, which is in line with the practical counsel to the new monarch found in the advice speeches To Nicocles (2) and Nicocles (3).65 The link between the three speeches is that they are part of the spirit of searching for an ideal leader and derive from the political debates

|| 64 See in detail Alexiou (2010) 170–172. 65 For the analogy between epainos and symboulai see Arist. Rhet. 1367b 37–39. Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 3.7.28; Pernot (2015) 93–94. There is lexical and conceptual correspondence among the three speeches (Evagoras - To Nicocles - Nicocles): 9.41 = 2.10–14; 2.21, 9.42 = 2.23; 3.52–53, 9.43 = 2.15; 3.35, 9.44 = 2.22; 2.28; 2.34, 9.45 = 2.19; 2.24; 2.30; 3.47, 9.46 = 2.16; 2.25, 9.47 = 2.9; 3.31, 9.47–48 = 3.32; 3.63, 9.48 = 2.31, 9.49–50 = 3.35.

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of the time, which are realistic approaches in contrast to the idealistic form of the philosopher-king found in Plato’s Republic. Isocrates authors an early “Mirror of Princes” (Fürstenspiegel)66 and C. Eucken (1983, 269; 2003, 39) is correct in contending that the three Cypriot speeches make up a Cypriot trilogy concerning state power. 5.2.2.4 Against the Sophists (13) In the speech Against the Sophists (13; 390 BC), which, along with the proem of Helen, plays a programmatic role, Isocrates develops his pedagogical programme in contrast to his competitors in the philosophical and rhetorical camp. From the very beginning of the speech (13.1), the περὶ τὴν φιλoσoφίαν διατρίβoντες are those systematically engaging in the education of youth. For Isocrates, the term philosophia does not have the special Platonic meaning of a metaphysical science. Its origins lie in the earlier use of the term (Herod. 1.30.2; Thuc. 2.40.1) and means the pursuit of knowledge through intellectual preoccupation, specifically education associated with teaching methods. Due to the primary role of logōn paideia in a humanistic pedagogical ideal expressed through eu phronein and eu legein and not through specialised knowledge, Isocrates attributes to rhetoric the greatest benefit for educating people, and characterises his rhetorical teaching as philosophia, using the term frequently ‒ but not exclusively ‒ as a terminus technicus (15.183; 15.271): in this instance, philosophoi are the teachers and pupils of rhetorical education (Alexiou 2010, 81).67 In Against the Sophists (13.14–18) Isocrates harshly criticises his competitors, philosophers and orators alike, because they make excessive and infeasible promises to their pupils. Isocrates himself takes a moderate position: the role of education is important for naturally gifted students, but cannot surmount natural origins (cf. 15.189; Böhme 2009, 164–168): Against the Sophists 13(14) αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἁπάντων ἐν τοῖς εὐφυέσιν ἐγγίγνονται καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὰς ἐμπειρίας γεγυμνασμένοις· (15) ἡ δὲ παίδευσις τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους τεχνικωτέρους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ζητεῖν εὐπορωτέρους ἐποίησεν· οἷς γὰρ νῦν ἐντυγχάνουσι πλανώμενοι, ταῦτ’ ἐξ ἑτοιμοτέρου λαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ἐδίδαξεν, τoὺς δὲ καταδεεστέραν τὴν φύσιν ἔχoντας ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθoὺς ἢ λόγων πoιητὰς oὐκ ἂν ἀπoτελέσειεν, αὐτoὺς δ’ ἂν αὑτῶν πρoαγάγoι καὶ πρὸς πoλλὰ φρoνιμωτέρως διακεῖσθαι πoιήσειεν.

|| 66 See P. Hadot, Fürstenspiegel, RAC 8 (1972) 555–632, esp. 574. According to W. Eder, Monarchie und Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Die Rolle des Fürstenspiegels in der athenischen Demokratie, in: W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform?, Stuttgart 1995, 153–173, the “Mirrors of Princes” of the 4th century BC serve as instructive exhortations towards aristocrats to take on a new political role. 67 Cf. Mikkola (1954) 201–203; Eucken (1983) 14–18; Nightingale (1995) 13–59; D.M. Timmerman, Isocrates’ Competing Conceptualization of Philosophy, PhRh 31 (1998) 145–159; Schiappa (1999) 168– 184; Walker (2000) 29; Livingstone (2007) 15–34; Too (2008) 23–26; Timmerman/Schiappa (2010) 43– 66.

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Against the Sophists 13(14) Abilities in speaking and all the other faculties of public life are innate in the well-born and developed in those trained by experience. (15) Education (paideusis) can make such people more skillful and better equipped at discovery. It teaches those who now hit upon things by chance to achieve them from a readier source. But it cannot fashion either good debaters (agathoi agōnistai) or good speechwriters (logōn poiētai) from those who lack natural ability, although it may improve them and make them more intelligent in many respects. (Transl. C.D. Mirhady in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

At the same time, Isocrates insists both on innovation in rhetoric (13.13: kainōs echein) and the exemplary role played by the teacher himself, who, apart from teaching, must also serve as an example to be emulated by his pupils, for only then will they become better and more pleasant orators (13.17–18). 5.2.2.5 Antidosis (15) Antidosis (15; 354/353 BC) “is the most important work for the understanding of Isocrates’ education” (Usher 1999, 318).68 Formally, it is a fictional judicial defence speech imitating Plato’s Apology of Socrates, but it essentially becomes self-praise of Isocrates’ educational and political achievements. The speech is presented by Isocrates as an image (eikōn) of his thoughts and of his whole life, an autobiographical monument (mnēmeion) more noble than bronze statues (15.7; cf. Nicolai 2004, 97–99; Schorn 2014, 731–732). Isocratean philosophia is education of an intensely practical nature. According to Isocrates, the pursuit of epistēmē, true knowledge of words and deeds, lies contrary to human nature; education, on the other hand, aims at a healthy opinion (doxa) and this is the home of the sophoi as possessors of the powers of conjecture and philosophoi as pupils of rhetorical education:69 Antidosis 15(271) ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδεῖμεν ὅ τι πρακτέον ἢ λεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν. Antidosis 15(271) Since human nature (physis) cannot attain knowledge that would enable us to know what we must say or do, after this I think that the wise (sophoi) are those who have the ability to reach the best opinions (doxai) most of the time, and philosophoi are those who spend

|| 68 Cf. Haskins (2004) 39: “If the Republic is a demonstration of the underpinnings of Plato’s educational reform, Antidosis is manifesto of Isocratean paideia”. As to the title Peri tēs antidoseōs or Peri antidoseōs, see P.M. Pinto, The Title of Isocrates’ Antidosis, Hermes 140 (2012) 362–368, for a view in favour of the first version of the Vulgata-manuscripts. 69 Cf. 12.30; Steidle (1952) 276; Wilms (1995) 231; Livingstone (1998) 268–269; T. Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, Oxford 2005, 83. See also K. Held, Die Doxa in der Pädagogik des Isokrates, in: K. Helmer et al. (eds.), Spielräume der Vernunft. Jörg Ruhloff zum 60. Geburtstag, Würzburg 2000, 106–142; Nightingale (2000) 177–179; T. Poulakos, Isocrates’ Use of Doxa, Ph&Rh 34 (2001) 61–78; Papillon (2007) 61–62, 70.

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time acquiring such an intelligence as quickly as possible. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Isocrates’ rhetorical education embodies moral and cultural values related on all levels to the social status of the orator and citizen. He preaches not merely a set of internal moral values ‒ one similar to that of Plato would appear exceptionally limited and abstract to Isocrates ‒ but a system of traditional ethics of the city and externalisation of the homologoumenē aretē (Alexiou 2007, 1–14). At the end of the speech, Isocrates equates his rhetorical education with the spirit and character of Athens (15.293–294). The indications of Athenian superiority are neither military preoccupations nor rule of law, but phronein and legein, the chief characteristics of Isocratean education. Athens is called the capital of Hellas (asty tēs Hellados) and Athenians are the unquestionable leaders in the field of education (15.299–302). The theoretical validation of these views is attested in Antidosis 15.275–285.70 From the outset, the direct underlining of one’s social success according to the rules of practical ethics is striking. Isocrates first sets forth the desires and motivations that young pupils of rhetoric must have before their natural predisposition may grow and develop: Antidosis 15(274) ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τοιαύτην μὲν τέχνην, ἥτις τοῖς κακῶς πεφυκόσιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωφροσύνην ἐνεργάσαιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε νῦν οὐδεμίαν εἶναι, τούς τε τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιουμένους περὶ αὐτῶν πρότερον ἀπερεῖν καὶ παύσεσθαι ληροῦντας πρὶν εὑρεθῆναί τινα παιδείαν τοιαύτην, (275) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ αὐτούς γ’ αὑτῶν βελτίους ἂν γίγνεσθαι καὶ πλείονος ἀξίους εἰ πρός τε τὸ λέγειν εὖ φιλοτίμως διατεθεῖεν καὶ τοῦ πείθειν δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐρασθεῖεν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῆς πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμήσαιεν, μὴ τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνοήτων νομιζομένης, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐχούσης. Antidosis 15(274) I think that an art that can produce self-control (sōphrosynē) and justice (dikaiosynē) in those who are by nature badly disposed to virtue (aretē) has never existed and does not now exist, and that those who previously made promises to this effect will cease speaking and stop uttering nonsense before such an education (paideia) is discovered. (275) In my view, people improve and become worthier if they are interested in speaking well (legein eu), have a passion for being able to persuade (peithein) their audience, and also desire advantage (pleonexia) ‒ not what foolish people think it is but that which truly has this power. (Transl. Y.L.Too in: Mirhady/ Too 2000)

The first goal is rhetorical prowess (legein eu - philotimōs diatethēnai), the second is convincing listeners (peithein dynasthai - erasthēnai) and the third is achieving personal interests (pleonexias - epithymēsai). The motif of philotimia, which Isocrates welcomes here, is expressed in the orator’s decision to write discourses which are worthy of praise and honour (15.276: λόγους ἀξίους ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς).

|| 70 For a comprehensive analysis of this passage, see Alexiou (1995) 55–67.

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This is Isocrates’ decisive answer to Plato’s criticism of rhetoric. In Plato’s Gorgias, rhetoric is merely a producer of persuasion (peithous dēmiourgos), without considering what is just and injust (454e), and is directed against the moral improvement of listeners (502e). In fact, the sophist Polus equates the power of an orator to that of a despot (469b–c). Isocrates also provides negative examples from everyday rhetorical practice. In On the Peace he condemns the depravity of orators who serve their personal interests at the expense of the state (8.124–125),71 and is aware that listeners often applaud an undeserving speech. This leads orators to preparing speeches that are pleasing to the audience (8.5). However, this finding is primarily instructive rather than accusatory. In Antidosis 15.276 Isocrates recognises objective value in the choices of a future orator which, through the concept of axios, become attached to the content of rhetorical speeches. The orator will not select topics that are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, but rather those which are great and honourable, devoted to the welfare of man and our common good (15.276: μεγάλας καὶ καλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων). The terms of philanthrōpos and koinos emerge as dominant concepts in Isocratean rhetoric, while the pairing between philotimia and legein eu and between peithein and erasthēnai indicate the aesthetic version of a creative passion.72 This is not the destructive passion of courtesans, with which the desire for tyrannical power is compared (8.103), but the creative pursuit of persuasion through kalokagathia. Subsequently (15.277) the choice of the appropriate subject matter is expanded: the actions of men. A pupil of rhetoric must ‒ in terms of the evidence relevant to his topic ‒ select the actions that are the most illustrious and advantageous and carefully contemplate and appraise them (theōrein kai dokimazein). Therefore, apart from the ability to speak well (eu legein), pupils must also develop their intellectual capabilities (eu phronein), not just for the purposes of a specific oration, but also for other actions of their lives.73 In this framework of social views, it is expected that Isocrates’ educational goals would coincide with the generally accepted values of kalokagathia (15.278–280). A man who wishes to persuade will not neglect aretē, but will try to establish a most honourable reputation among his fellow-citizens:

|| 71 Cf. the simile of orators and scorpions in Aristophanes (Thesmoph. 529–530): ὑπὸ λίθῳ γὰρ παντί που χρὴ / μὴ δάκῃ ῥήτωρ ἀθρεῖν. Rhētōr instead of skorpios. 72 Cf. 10.54 ff.; Eucken (1983) 93. For a negative rhetorical philotimia that is compared to a catastrophic passion, full of jealousy and envy, see 15.244–246. 73 The direct link between logōn paideia and political life is confirmed in Letter 6.7 ff. Each stage of preparing a successful oration is described (σκέψασθαι, διαπρακτέον ἐστίν, εὕρωμεν καὶ διακριβωσώμεθα, ζητητέον τὰς ἰδέας), corresponding the process by which political leaders select a proper course of action (νοῦν ἐχόντως, μετὰ πολλῆς προνοίας λογίσησθε καὶ βουλεύσησθε, τὰς πράξεις τὰς καθ’ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν σκεπτέον). These ideas held by Isocrates must have been, according to his own words, broadly accepted during his era (Letter 6.7). Cf. J.S. Garnjobst, The Epistles of Isocrates. A Historical and Grammatical Commentary, Diss. University of California 2006, 61–67.

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Antidosis 15(278) καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ὁ πείθειν βουλόμενος ἀμελήσει τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μάλιστα προσέξει τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως δόξαν ὡς ἐπιεικεστάτην λήψεται παρὰ τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀληθεστέρους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν εὖ διακειμένων λεγομένους ἢ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν διαβεβλημένων, καὶ τὰς πίστεις μεῖζον δυναμένας τὰς ἐκ τοῦ βίου γεγενημένας ἢ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πεπορισμένας; ὥσθ᾽ ὅσῳ περ ἄν τις ἐρρωμενεστέρως ἐπιθυμῇ πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀσκήσει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις εὐδοκιμεῖν. (279) καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν οἰέσθω τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας γιγνώσκειν ὅσην ἔχει ῥοπὴν εἰς τὸ πείθειν τὸ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἀρέσκειν, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντας μόνους ἀγνοεῖν τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας δύναμιν. πολὺ γὰρ ἀκριβέστερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἴσασιν. Antidosis 15(278) Moreover, anyone who wishes to persuade others will not neglect virtue but will devote even more attention to ensuring that he achieves a most honorable reputation (doxa epieikestatē) among his fellow citizens. Who could fail to know that speeches seem truer when spoken by those of good name than by the disreputable, and that arguments acquire more authority when they come from one’s life than from mere words. The more ardently someone wants to persuade his audience, the more he will strive to be a gentleman (kalos kagathos) and to have a good reputation (eudokimein) among the citizens. (279) Let none of you think that everyone else knows how it supports the cause of persuasion if one can please the jury, and that the devotees of philosophia alone are ignorant of the power of goodwill (eunoia). They know this far more acutely than others. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Of the means of persuasion, the eunoia (“goodwill”) of listeners, which is based on the orator’s good reputation (doxa epieikestatē), is highly effective. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, one of the three entechnoi pisteis is the ēthos tou legontos74 ‒ however, Isocrates does not favour the technical aspect of rhetorical proofs, but the pedagogical aims that are deeply rooted in the city-state. Aristotle contends that the orator’s appearance as epieikēs (“fair-minded”) should result from the speech itself and not from any preconceived idea of the speaker’s character (Rhetoric 1356a 9–10: διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα). Aristotle wishes for oratory to be self-sufficient and separate from the orator’s overall social presence.75 Isocrates associates rhetorical training with the creation of kalos kagathos in all its expressions, through the cultivation of a politically active citizen taking part in Athenian democracy. This is why the effect of a good reputation is not limited to oration but extends to actions (15.280: praxeis). A man’s deeds also depend on the judgment of his fellow-citizens, and the good reputation of a citizen is as important for his political life as an orator’s reputation is for achieving persuasion.

|| 74 See Arist. Rhet. 1356a 1 ff.; 1366a 10–12; 1378a 8 ff. Anaximenes classifies the doxa tou legontos among the non-technical means of persuasion (epithetoi pisteis) (Rhet. Alex. 14.8–9). 75 Cf. J. Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero, Amsterdam 1989, 35–36; J.M. Cooper, Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in: D.F. Furley/A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays, Princeton 1994, 197 with note 9; C. Rapp, Aristotle on the Moral Psychology of Persuasion, in: C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oxford 2012, 596–597. For a comparison between Isocrates and Aristotle touching upon similar topics, cf. Haskins (2004) 11–30, 81– 107; T. Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, Oxford 2005, 81; Wareh (2012) 21–111.

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It is no accident that in 15.281–285, during the discussion over pleonexia (“advantage”),76 the focus is only on politicians ‒ rhetoric is set aside. It is clear that Isocrates is attempting to educate his audience, to shape public opinion by incorporating a controversial competitive value into his rhetorical education. Isocrates admits that this is the subject causing him the most difficulty (15.281: πλεονεξίαν … δυσχερέστατον τῶν ῥηθέντων).  True pleonexia characterises those who are pious towards the gods and fair towards their fellow men. It is a descriptive definition of the “Canon of the Two Virtues” hosiōs kai dikaiōs (15.282).77 Isocrates contends that the proper meaning of the words has been reversed78, as some consider those who commit offences for small gain with no regard for their bad reputation as “getting the advantage” (pleonektikoi) instead of those who are the most pious towards the gods and the most righteous towards their fellow-citizens (15.283–284). With the term pleonexia Isocrates justifies the desire for success and excellence, provided this takes place within the context of justice: τοὺς ὁσιωτάτους καὶ δικαιοτάτους, οἵπερ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν κακῶν πλεονεκτοῦσι. Thus, Isocrates turns against the sophistic equation of justice with the advantage of the superior (Plato Republic 338c: τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῂς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι). His view is different from the extreme position of the sophist Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, who preaches the superiority of the strong over the weak (483d; 491d), without ascribing any moral value to the former; on the contrary, it is the unmanliness of the many that praises sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē (492a ff.). Isocrates, on the other hand, approaches the Socratic view that one must manage the state and one’s house temperately and justly (Meno 73a: σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως). It is clear that the individual’s social esteem is dominant in Isocrates’ rhetorical education. The distinction between einai and dokein, a key issue in the discourse of Plato, who suffered it first-hand in the case of his teacher, is not truly of concern to Isocrates. However, the fact that he is aware of the difficulties involved at times in the need to bring an individual’s skills in line with the mandates of the polis is proven by the case of his pupil, the general Timotheus, son of Conon.79 In a dramatic digression

|| 76 For the concept of pleonexia in Isocrates, see Alexiou (2013) 47–73; (2015) 73–90. Cf. H.-O. Weber, Die Bedeutung und Bewertung der Pleonexie von Homer bis Isokrates, Bonn 1967, 134 ff.; C. Bouchet, La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate, REA 109 (2007) 475–489; V. Azoulay, Isocrate et les élites. Cultiver la distinction, in: L. Capdetrey/Y. Lafond (eds.), La cité et ses élites. Pratiques et représentations des formes de domination et de contrôle social dans les cités grecques, Bordeaux 2010, 21–22. 77 See Dihle (1968). Cf. 9.26; 9.38; 3.2; 3.13; 12.124; 12.183; 12.204; 14.2; 15.321. 78 Cf. 12.240–242 and Thuc. 3.82. See Alexiou (2015) 87–88 and C. Schubert, Die Macht des Volkes und die Ohnmacht des Denkens. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mentalität und Wissenschaft im 5. Jahrhundert v.Chr., Stuttgart 1993, 178–179; Ober (1998) 273–276. 79 For the digression concerning Timotheus, see Alexiou (1995) 68–87; (2007) 9–11. Cf. Heilbrunn (1967) 197–211; Ober (1998) 268–277; Nicolai (2004) 102–103; Τοο (2008) 153–156; J.H. Collins, Exhortations to Philosophy. The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, Oxford 2015, 236–239.

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in Antidosis (15.101–139), Isocrates composes an apologetic encomium of the Athenian general and his pupil, who was naturally endowed to become kalos kagathos (15.138), i.e. to stand out for the sake of his homeland and Greece as agathos stratēgos and phronimos (15.117), but was unable to win the eunoia of his fellow-citizens and the orators poised against him. Isocrates is proud of his pupil’s accomplishments, which are based on his moral-intellectual skills and Isocratean education. The comparison to Lysander’s sole success at Aegospotamοi is characteristic: a good general is not one who achieves success by an act of good fortune, like Lysander (μιᾷ τύχῃ), but one who, repeatedly and whilst burdened with numerous difficult responsibilities, acts correctly and with good sense, like Timotheus (15.128: ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν καὶ δυσκόλων πραγμάτων ὀρθῶς ἀεὶ πράττων καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντως διατετέλεκεν). The ultimate goal of Isocratean rhetorical education, based on doxa, applies precisely to this assertion: to be able, through holding a healthy opinion, to achieve the best possible result.80 However, Timotheus did not receive the recognition he deserved from the city. Isocrates defends his pupil, but does not condemn Athens for its judgment; in fact, he defends the city as well (15.130). He first refers to the ignorance and turmoil of everyday life, which hindered the proper judgment of his fellow-citizens; at the same time, focusing anew on individual responsibility, he turns his attention to one of his pupil’s weaknesses: Antidosis 15(131) ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὔτε μισόδημος ὢν οὔτε μισάνθρωπος οὔθ’ ὑπερήφανος οὔτ’ ἄλλ’ οὐδὲν ἔχων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, διὰ τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην τὴν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ μὲν συμφέρουσαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρείας τῶν ἀεὶ προσπιπτόντων οὐχ ἁρμόττουσαν, ἅπασιν ἔδοξεν ἔνοχος εἶναι τοῖς προειρημένοις· οὕτω γὰρ ἀφυὴς ἦν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπείαν ὥσπερ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν. (132) καίτοι πολλάκις καὶ παρ’ ἐμοῦ τοιούτους λόγους ἤκουσεν, ὡς χρὴ τοὺς πολιτευομένους καὶ βουλομένους ἀρέσκειν προαιρεῖσθαι μὲν τῶν τε πράξεων τὰς ὠφελιμωτάτας καὶ βελτίστας καὶ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ἀληθεστάτους καὶ δικαιοτάτους, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παρατηρεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἐπιχαρίτως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἅπαντα φανήσονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες· ὡς οἱ τούτων ὀλιγωροῦντες ἐπαχθέστεροι καὶ βαρύτεροι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις. Antidosis 15(131) He did not hate the common people, nor was he a misanthrope, or arrogant, and he did not have any other such vice. But because of his greatness of mind (megalophrosynē), which was suited to generalship but inappropriate to day-to-day demands, everyone thought he was guilty of all the faults I have mentioned, for he was as unsuited by nature to the cultivation of other men as he was talented in his management of public affairs. (132) Often he heard me say such things as: ‘‘those who wish to engage in public life and be well liked (hoi politeuomenoi kai boulomenoi areskein) must choose the best and most useful deeds, and the truest and most just words; in addition, however, they must consider carefully how they can be seen by others to say and do everything graciously and benevolently (epicharitōs kai philanthrōpōs), for those who

|| 80 See 15.271 and 12.30.

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give little thought to these matters appear to their fellow citizens to be rather difficult and intolerable.” (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

Timotheus’ megalophrosynē (“greatness of mind with self-confindence”) is itself a cherished value. Isocrates acknowledges its importance in the context of the contemporary elevation of individuality. Timotheus’ megalophrosynē was useful for his military successes, but unsuitable for domestic political life, as it could easily be misinterpreted as an undemocratic and anti-social, oligarchical attitude: the terms misodēmos (“he who hates the demos”), misanthrōpos (“he who hates people, particularly human communication”) and hyperēphanos (“arrogant, insolent”) have clearly negative connotations and are perceived as eminently anti-democratic adjectives (15.131).81 According to Isocrates, megalophrosynē had to be counterbalanced with an approach to public opinion. The lexical arrangement τοὺς πολιτευομένους καὶ βουλομένους ἀρέσκειν almost self-evidently results in a link between the words: “men who are in public life must express the desire to be well-liked”. They must appear gracious and benevolent (epicharitōs kai philanthrōpōs) in everything they say and do. Isocrates recognises tremendous power in having the favour of public opinion, a power even able to surpass the truth itself (15.134: eunoia).82 Timotheus had to become more democratic, win the favour of the crowd and the orators, but he was by nature unsuited in courting the favour of men (15.131: ἀφυὴς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπείαν; cf. 15.138). Despite Isocrates’ exhortations, Timotheus found this aspect of democratic political life alien. As a realist, Isocrates takes a different road to that of Plato: he overcomes the problem of Timotheus without recanting his faith in the homologoumenē aretē of the polis. The example of Timotheus expresses the individuality of his era. Through his megalophrosynē, the general was in a position to rid himself of the dominion of the polis. In his research into the Aristotelian megalopsychos (“magnanimous”), H. Kirsche found similarities between this figure and individuals of the 4th century BC appearing in the works of Isocrates (Alcibiades, Nicocles, Evagoras, Philip) and Xenophon (Agesilaus, Cyrus the Great).83 Evagoras is emphatically called megalopsychos.84 Nicocles is instructed to be megalophrōn (2.25; 2.30), while Philip is also mega phronōn (5.41). One might easily add Timotheus to this list due to his megalophrosynē (15.131).

|| 81 See above Chapter 1.1 and Alexiou (1995) 80 ff. Cf. the link between megalophrosynē and hyperopsia (“haughtiness”) in 12.242. 82 See de Romilly (1958) 92–101. 83 See H.G. Kirsche, Megalopsychia. Beiträge zur griechischen Ethik im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Göttingen 1952, 41–57. Cf. R.A. Gauthier, Magmanimité. L’ideal de la grandeur dans la philosophie paienne et dans la théologie chrétienne, Paris 1951, 21–36; F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt und kommentiert, 7. ed., Berlin 1979, 371–372; J. Procopé, Hochherzigkeit, RAC 15 (1991) 765–795; H.J. Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, Oxford 2012, 121–142. 84 See 9.3: τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ μεγαλοψύχους. Cf. 9.45; 9.59; [1.32]; Epist. 2.20.

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However, what sets the Aristotelian figure apart from the ideas of Isocrates is its self-sufficiency. The kalokagathia of the Aristotelian megalopsychos does not depend on the judgment of his fellow-men or political and social reality. As he places little value on honour or any other external good, he is thought to be haughty (Eth. Nic. 1124a 20: hyperoptēs).85 Due to his estimates being correct, he is justified in despising other people (Eth. Nic. 1124b 5–6: δικαίως καταφρονεῖ; cf. 1232b 9). Philanthrōpia is wholly absent. This is not the Isocratean ideal. Nicocles is instructed to be philanthrōpos kai philopolis (2.15), Evagoras is described as having been (9.43), and in the case of Timotheus, the need to balance megalophrosynē and philanthrōpia is absolutely vital (15.133). Isocrates does not accept the estrangement of the individual from the homologoumenē aretē of the polis. Terms such as philanthrōpos and epicharis clearly prove that Isocrates aims at contact with society as a whole. Consequently, Isocrates does not only represent generally accepted social and ethical values of popular morality, but wishes to take a stand with respect to the problems of his era and to shape public opinion. The teacher aspires to restore the relationship between the individual and the political community. 5.2.2.6 Panegyricus (4) Isocrates, the most important political publicist, is a bonafide moralist.86 He does not focus on the precise observation of the natural laws that govern the functioning of human nature, like Thucydides, a representative of Realpolitik, but believes in the prospect of the moral improvement of individuals and states. He does not dismiss the objective of success and power, but identifies justice as the best means for achieving success. If one approaches Isocrates from the perspective of seeking the deeper psychological motivations for power, as J. de Romilly does,87 then one will deem the historian Thucydides clearly superior; however, if one considers Isocrates an active member of the Athenian polis and of the Pan-Hellenic community, endeavouring to teach his listeners, then the rhetorician stands out as an eminent teacher and advisor. Isocrates carries concepts from logōn paideia over to political life and develops his ethical ideas and orations where political issues are predominant: such orations are

|| 85 Cf. E.A. Schmidt, Ehre und Tugend. Zur Megalopsychia der Aristotelischen Ethik, AGPh 49 (1967) 149–168, esp. 164 ff. 86 Cf. C.H. Wilson, Thucydides, Ιsocrates and the Athenian Empire, G&R 13 (1966) 54–63; Gillis (1969) 321–348; E. Rummel, Examination of Isocrates’ Moral Ideas and their Background, Toronto 1976; Too (1995) 206–221; Grieser-Schmitz (2003) 111–127; J.A.E. Bons, Isocrates on Being Religious and Moral Conduct, in: A. Lardinois et al. (eds.), Land of Dreams. Greek and Latin Studies in Honour of A.H.M. Kessels, Leiden/Boston 2006, 259–266; K.R. Chase, Constructing Ethics through Rhetoric. Isocrates and Piety, QJS 95 (2009) 239–262. For this “principle of consistency” in Isocrates cf. Morgan (2004) 125–154. 87 J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, Oxford 1963, 361–362 (= Thucydide et l’impérialisme athénien, Paris 1947).

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Panegyricus (4; 380 BC, a laborious task, taking over 10 years to write; Dion. Hal. De comp. verb. 208, p. 133 Us.-Rad.; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 837F), Plataicus (14; 373 BC) and Archidamus (6; 366 BC), expressing anti-Theban sentiments (cf. Usher 1999, 306– 309), Areopagiticus (7; 358/7 or 355/354 BC), On the Peace (8; 355 BC), and To Philip (5; 346 BC). Isocrates firmly believes that ethics, education and politics are integrally interconnected. In the proem of Panegyricus (4.1–3), influenced by the older views of Xenophanes (21 B2 D.-K.) and Euripides (Autolycus fr. 282 Kann.), Isocrates castigates the overestimation of athletic performances compared to intellectual achievements.88 However, Isocrates’ criticism is not directed against the agonistic ideal that permeates the Panegyricus (4.43–46; 4.85–99).89 In this speech, which focuses on his favourite topic, i.e. unity among the Greeks and war against the Persian “barbarians”,90 Isocrates matches his wits against his peers who spoke on the same subject. Consequently, Panegyricus is at the centre of a timeless rhetorical contest in which Isocrates is claiming first prize (4.3: athlon, doxa). In this case, the rhetorician is alluding to forerunners of the Pan-Hellenic ideal, such as Gorgias and Lysias.91 He identifies the best speeches as those that deal with important affairs, that best display the abilities of orators and that benefit their listeners (4.4).

|| 88 Isocrates begins his Panegyricus with thaumazein (“to wonder at”), similar to Gorgias (82 B7 D.K.), who also begins his Olympicus with thaumazein, but with a different meaning (“to admire”). Aristotle recognised the different position of Isocrates (Rhet. 1414b 30–35). See J. Dillery, Words of Wonder: Initial Θαυμάζειν in Isocrates, Xenophon, and Related Texts, in: Tamiolaki (2018) 77–100. 89 See Eucken (1983) 142–152; Alexiou (2010) 185. Cf. D.G. Kyle, Athletics in Ancient Athens, Leiden 1987, 127–131, 134–135; N. Pechstein, Euripides Satyrographos. Ein Kommentar zu den euripideischen Satyrspielfragmenten, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1998, 56–85; I. Mangidis, Euripides’ Satyrspiel Autolykos, Frankfurt M. 2003, esp. 14 f., 19–63. 90 For Isocrates, barbarians are physei polemioi kai patrikoi echthroi (4.184; 12.163; see M. Mühl, Bάρβαρoι φύσει πoλέμιoι, Philologische Wochenschrift 41, 1921, 71–72; Grieser-Schmitz 2003, 122–127; Bouchet 2014, 178–194). Isocrates is not influenced by the views of sophists such as Antiphon concerning equality between Greeks and barbarians (87 B44 B col. 2.10–15 D.-K.). On Greeks and barbarians, see J. Jüthner, Hellenen und Barbaren. Aus der Geschichte des Nationalbewußtseins, Leipzig 1923; E. Hall, Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy, Oxford 1989; A. Dihle, Die Griechen und die Fremden, Munich 1994, esp. 49 ff.; M. Miller, Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century B.C., Cambridge 1997; P. Briant, History and Ideology. The Greeks and the Persian Decadence, in: T. Harrison (ed.), Greeks and Barbarians, New York 2002, 193–210. 91 Similar ideas are encountered in Gorgias’ Olympicus and Epitaphios (on the speeches’ content, see Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.493–494 Κayser = 82 A1 D.-K.). A fragment from Gorgias’ Epitaphios (Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.494 Κayser = 82 B5b D.-K.: τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ τὰ δὲ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους), is repeated almost verbatim in Isocrates’ Panegyricus (4.158). Lysias’ Olympiacus (33.3) and Epitaphios (2.54–60) also contain early examples of Pan-Hellenic views, which influenced Isocrates. Cf. Mathieu (1925) 23–28; Buchner (1958) 16–26; Eucken (1983) 144.

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Isocrates extols the overall character of Athenian cultural supremacy over Panhellenic festivals, presenting the city as the vibrant cradle of civilisation and a perpetual panēgyris ‒ a “festival throughout all time” (4.46: ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα). In continuation of Nicocles (3.5–9), in Panegyricus (4.48–50) Isocrates extols logos, rational and oral, as the key difference between men and beasts, as well as the surest sign of each person’s education (4.49: σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἑκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδεδειγμένον). Eu legein and eu phronein, i.e. Isocratean rhetorical education, distinguish the intellectual superiority of Athens, which is a teacher to other cities and the torch-bearer of Greek education (see in detail above Chapter 2.1). As the educator of Greeks, Athens essentially takes on an individual role that matches the moral-pedagogical role played by the political leaders of yore. Thus, Isocrates creates an idealised patrios politeia ‒ of both Athens and Sparta ‒ before and during the Persian Wars where, contrary to the contemporary excessive personal ambitions at the expense of the polis, leaders-educators cultivated the morals of citizens, leading to outstanding achievements: in the Panegyricus, the Persian Wars are depicted as a standard of laborious teaching on the part of political leaders, who trained the citizens of both cities ‒ the use of the dual poleoin is characteristic ‒ in virtue (4.75 ff.).92 Politicians become educators and their character is the key point of discussion:93 Panegyricus 4(75) πλείστων μὲν οὖν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους καὶ μεγίστων ἐπαίνων ἀξίους ἡγοῦμαι γεγενῆσθαι τοὺς τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος προκινδυνεύσαντας· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου τούτου γενομένων καὶ δυναστευσάντων ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τοῖν πολέοιν δίκαιον ἀμνημονεῖν· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ προασκήσαντες τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους καὶ τὰ πλήθη προτρέψαντες ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ χαλεποὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς τοῖς βαρβάροις ποιήσαντες. (76) οὐ γὰρ ὠλιγώρουν τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδ’ ἀπέλαυον μὲν ὡς ἰδίων, ἠμέλουν δ’ ὡς ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλ’ ἐκήδοντο μὲν ὡς οἰκείων, ἀπείχοντο δ’ ὥσπερ χρὴ τῶν μηδὲν προσηκόντων· οὐδὲ πρὸς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔκρινον, ἀλλ’ οὗτος ἐδόκει πλοῦτον ἀσφαλέστατον κεκτῆσθαι καὶ κάλλιστον, ὅστις τοιαῦτα τυγχάνοι πράττων ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε μέλλοι μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμήσειν καὶ τοῖς παισὶν μεγίστην δόξαν καταλείψειν. (77) οὐδὲ τὰς θρασύτητας τὰς ἀλλήλων ἐζήλουν, οὐδὲ τὰς τόλμας τὰς αὑτῶν ἤσκουν, ἀλλὰ δεινότερον μὲν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι κακῶς ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκούειν ἢ καλῶς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀποθνῄσκειν, μᾶλλον δ’ ᾐσχύνοντ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἢ νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν. Panegyricus (4.75) I think that those responsible for the most benefits and worthy of the greatest praise (epainoi) are those who risked their lives for Greece. But we should also not forget those who lived before the Persian Wars and held power in each of these cities (poleoin), for they prepared (proaskein) those who followed and turned the people to virtue (aretē) and made them fierce opponents of the barbarians. (76) They did not scorn the common good, either by profiting from it like it was their own property or by neglecting it like it was someone else’s concern; rather, they cared for it like it was their own, although they kept an appropriate distance, as is

|| 92 One would be hard-pressed to agree with the conjecture of Grieser-Schmitz (1999) 124 that the reference to Sparta is due to a political-tactical manoeuvre on the part of Isocrates. 93 On the idea of the politician as educator, cf. 2.31; 2.37; Morgan (2004) 125–154.

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fitting for something that does not belong to them. They did not judge their happiness in terms of money but thought that a person obtained the surest and most noble wealth if he did the sorts of things that would bring him a particularly good reputation (eudokimein) and produce the greatest glory for his children. (77) They did not emulate the rashness of others or practice their own daring but thought that it was more terrible to have a bad reputation (kakōs akouein) among the citizens than to die nobly for the city; they were more ashamed at the city’s errors than we are now at our own mistakes. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004 with modifications)

While Thucydides considers pleonexia and philotimia the root of all evils when describing the civil dispute on Corcyra (3.82.8), Isocrates considers the struggle (staseis) between political factions as a competition in favour of society as a whole (4.79: τὰς στάσεις ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους … ὁπότεροι φθήσονται τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν τι ποιήσαντες). Finally, Isocrates transfers individual political leadership within cities, which is closely associated with cooperative values, to foreign policy, clearly alluding to the politics of his era. In the following passage, there is a marked difference between hēgemones, a term that expresses beneficial and fair leadership, and despotai, which connotes cruel tyranny and is rejected (Alexiou 1995, 109 ff.): Panegyricus 4(80) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων διῴκουν, θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίζοντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν οἰόμενοι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τυραννεῖν αὐτῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἡγεμόνες ἢ δεσπόται προσαγορεύεσθαι καὶ σωτῆρες, ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεῶνες ἀποκαλεῖσθαι, τῷ ποιεῖν εὖ προσαγόμενοι τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ βίᾳ καταστρεφόμενοι, (81) πιστοτέροις μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ νῦν τοῖς ὅρκοις χρώμενοι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ὥσπερ ἀνάγκαις ἐμμένειν ἀξιοῦντες, οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις μέγα φρονοῦντες ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ σωφρόνως ζῆν φιλοτιμούμενοι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξιοῦντες γνώμην ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς ἥττους ἥνπερ τοὺς κρείττους πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἴδια μὲν ἄστη τὰς αὑτῶν πόλεις ἡγούμενοι, κοινὴν δὲ πατρίδα τὴν Ἑλλάδα νομίζοντες εἶναι. Panegyricus (4.80) In the same spirit they managed the affairs of others, tending to their interests (therapeuein) but not treating them arrogantly (hybrizein); they thought that they should lead them as generals but not rule them as tyrants, and they wanted to be addressed as leaders (hēgemones) more than as despots (despotai), to be called saviors rather than destroyers, and to lead the other cities through their good deeds rather than subduing them by force. (81) They kept their word more faithfully than we keep our oaths, and they honored treaties as if it were the natural thing to do. They did not so much exult in their political power as they sought honor (philotimeisthai) by living prudently, and they thought they should have the same attitude toward the weak as they expected the strong to have toward them, supposing that their own cities were their private communities and that Greece was their common homeland (koinē patris). (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

In fact, it is noteworthy that Isocrates endeavours to attach a positive connotation to both the term and the concept of philotimia, since, in the context of the agonistic ideal that permeates the Panegyricus, the Persian Wars became a field of competition between Athens and Sparta, i.e. which of the two cities would offer the most services to the Greeks:

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Panegyricus 4(85) ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν οἵ θ’ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι φιλοτίμως πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ καλλίστων ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἐφιλονίκησαν, οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ἀλλ’ ἀνταγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι νομίζοντες, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν βάρβαρον θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὁμονοοῦντες, ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτης αἴτιοι γενήσονται, περὶ τούτου ποιούμενοι τὴν ἅμιλλαν. Panegyricus 4(85) To be sure, our ancestors and the Spartans have always been rivals (philotimōs echein), but during that time, they competed for the noblest goals, considering themselves not enemies (echthroi) but competitors (antagōnistai); they did not curry the favor of the barbarians in hope of enslaving the Greeks, but joining together for their common security, they conducted their rivalry about who would achieve that security. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

5.2.2.7 Areopagiticus (7) - On the peace (8) In Areopagiticus (7; 358/357 or 355/354 BC), Isocrates speaks out against the radical democracy of his era, considering it as the root of a host of misfortunes for both the domestic and the foreign policy of Athens. On the contrary, he preaches in favour of an idealised patrios politeia of the era of Solon and Cleisthenes, considering it to be the most democratic and most beneficial for the city (7.17: ἧς οὐκ ἂν εὕροιμεν οὔτε δημοτικωτέραν οὔτε τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον συμφέρουσαν). He describes the status in Athens under the oversight of the Areopagus with approbation (7.37–49) before comparing it to the sad present (7.50–55; Pownall 2018, 144).94 However, the foregoing ideas acquire clearer moral connotations in On the Peace (8; 355 BC). Isocrates directs his opprobrium at the experience of Athenian and Spartan authoritarianism. For the rhetorician, it is practically self-evident that ‒ when obtaining and exercising power ‒ individuals and state entities are surrounded by a similar set of motivations and ambitions interpreted from a psychological and ethical perspective.95 In Thucydides, Pericles considers, according to the code of competitive values, the greatest dangers as a prerequisite for the greatest honours (1.144.3: ἔκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων … μέγισται τιμαί), while employing archaic terminology to associate toil with the honour of power (2.63.1: μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν). Pericles condemns the politics of apragmosynē and fashions an image of an

|| 94 Cf. E. Ruschenbusch, ΠΑΤΡΙOΣ ΠOΛΙΤΕΙΑ. Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in der Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung des 5. und 4. Jh., Historia 7 (1958) 398–424. Cf. Mathieu (1925) 146– 148; Bringmann (1965) 75–95; P.J. Rhodes, Appeals to the Past in Classical Athens, in: G. Herman (ed.), Stability and Crisis in the Athenian Democracy, Stuttgart 2011, 13–30, esp. 26 ff.; Atack (2018) 171–194. 95 See the interesting discussion, albeit from different approaches, between P. Low, Interstate Relations in Classical Greece. Morality and Power, Cambridge 2007, esp. 129–174, and M.R. Christ, The Limits of Altruism in Democratic Athens, Cambridge 2012, esp. Chapter 4. Cf. the review by R.W. Wallace (BMCR 2013.11.37).

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Athens Tyrannis.96 Misos and phthonos towards one in command are expected and are juxtaposed against the splendour of the present and the glory of the future (2.64.4–5). The meaning of his discourse is clear in its competitive wording: τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν· ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται (2.64.5). In other words: whoever commands cannot but be envied and hated. Athenian imperialist politics is presented as violent and arbitrary power. State power has different connotations in Isocrates.97 The Thucydidean deterministic conception of power is transformed into the deterministic view of a disease that is in full conflict with the temperance of the two cities in the past. The Athenian and Spartan hegemonies (archē) were tyrannical powers that violated human and divine justice and finally suffered the calamities they caused unto others (8.91; 8.100; 8.105). The thalassocracy led to turmoil among the Athenians and laid waste to the democracy of their ancestors (8.64). The rhetorician draws a distinction between the prudent politicians of the Persian Wars, namely Aristides, Themistocles and Miltiades, and unworthy politicians such as Hyperbolus and Cleophon, as well as Isocrates’ contemporary orators (8.75). The thalassocracy led the renowned Athenian regime to absolute moral decay (8.77: akolasia). This much sought-after power corrupts, is a difficult thing to manage, and drives those who are enamoured by it mad, much like courtesans, who cause love but destroy their lovers (8.103). Eran (“passionate desire”), a predominant concept in the semantic field of greed and ambition, is likened to a disease that has afflicted both cities (8.103–104). When Isocrates draws a parallel between the desire for monarchy and the desire for power at sea (8.111–115), he is not criticising monarchy or kingship as regimes, but the wide-spread concept of a hated tyrant dominated by the monarch’s fear when faced with the hatred of his subjects and the manipulation of citizens.98

|| 96 Thuc. 2.63.2: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. Cf. 1.122.3; 1.124.3; 3.37.2. See also Euphemus’ quotation in 6.85.1. Cf. W.R. Connor, Tyrannis Polis, in: J.H. D’Arms/J.W. Eadie (eds.), Ancient and Modern. Essays in Honor of Gerald F. Else, Ann Arbor 1977, 95–109; K.A. Raaflaub, Polis Tyrannos. Zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher, in: G. Bowersock et al. (eds.), Arktouros. Hellenic Studies presented to B.M.W. Knox, Berlin 1979, 237– 252; C.J. Tuplin, Imperial Tyranny. Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Metaphor, in: P. Cartledge/ F.D. Harvey (eds.), CRUX. Essays presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, London 1985, 348–375; J.V. Morrison, Reading Thucydides, Columbus OΗ 2006, 136–141. 97 See in detail Alexiou (2015b) 349–368. 98 See 10.33–34; 8.143; Epist. 6.12. See also Herod. 3.80.5; Eurip. Ion 621–628; Phoen. 531–585; Plato Resp. 565d–569c; Gorg. 469c–e; Arist. Polit. 1285a 27–29; 1295a 19–23; 1311a8–1312b34. Cf. V.J. Rosivach, The Tyrant in Athenian Democracy, QUCC 59 (1988) 43–57, esp. 54 note 29; N.R.E. Fisher, Hybris. A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece, Warminster 1992, 346–349; P. Barceló, Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechenland, Stuttgart 1993, 272–273; R. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, Princeton 2001, 53–55; I. Jordovic, Anfänge der Jüngeren Tyrannis. Vorläufer

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Therefore, Isocrates’s response to Thucydidean Realpolitik is interpreted as a counterpoint to the political ideology of the Thucydidean Athens Tyrannis. The rhetorician does not dismiss competitive values on the basis of a Platonic approach to virtue as an end unto itself.99 He opposes the polypragmosynē of Athenian foreign policy, which he equates to injustice (adikia), and preaches in favour of aretē and the pursuit of the goodwill (eunoia) of the Greeks as the best means for achieving good. The progress of Athens is predicated on ceasing to desire power at sea (8.64), but not on abandoning all ambition. Based on the universal human desire for an advantage and superiority, the centre of gravity shifts to assessing the most expedient means (8.28). Isocrates favours a “just pleonexia” in foreign policy, in the same manner as it is described as a key principle of rhetorical education in domestic politics (15.281– 285). Pleonektein (“to get an advantage”) is vox media: its positive or negative meaning depends on the aim and methods one employs to achieve it.100 Isocratean arguments for a “just pleonexia” reflect the rhetorician’s practical political thinking and humanistic education. Competitive values remain exceptionally strong, but Isocrates considers their connection to cooperative values to be feasible, and advocates for aretē ‒ and especially justice towards the Greeks ‒ as the sole policy that guarantees pleon echein:101 On the peace 8(28) ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν ἅπαντες μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος καὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ εἰδέναι δὲ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἐπὶ ταῦτα φερούσας, ἀλλὰ ταῖς δόξαις διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ δέοντος δυναμένας, οἱ δ’ ὡς οἷόν τε πλεῖστον τοῦ συμφέροντος διαμαρτανούσας. (29) ὅπερ καὶ τῇ πόλει συμβέβηκεν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέν, ἢν τὴν θάλατταν πλέωμεν πολλαῖς τριήρεσι καὶ βιαζώμεθα τὰς πόλεις συντάξεις διδόναι καὶ συνέδρους ἐνθάδε πέμπειν, διαπράξεσθαί τι τῶν δεόντων· πλεῖστον δὲ διεψεύσμεθα τῆς ἀληθείας. ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἠλπίζομεν, οὐδὲν ἀποβέβηκεν, ἔχθραι δ’ ἡμῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ δαπάναι μεγάλαι γεγόνασιν· εἰκότως· (30) καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἐκ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης πολυπραγμοσύνης εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους κινδύνους κατέστημεν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δικαίαν τὴν πόλιν παρέχειν καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ μὴ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν παρ’ ἑκόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐλάβομεν. ὧν νῦν ἀλογίστως καὶ λίαν εἰκῇ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον καταφρονοῦμεν. (31) εἰς τοῦτο γάρ τινες ἀνοίας ἐληλύθασιν, ὥσθ’ ὑπειλήφασι τὴν μὲν ἀδικίαν ἐπονείδιστον μὲν εἶναι, κερδαλέαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν καθ’ ἡμέραν συμφέρουσαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην εὐδόκιμον μέν, ἀλυσιτελῆ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον δυναμένην τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτήν, (32) κακῶς εἰδότες ὡς οὔτε πρὸς χρηματισμὸν οὔτε πρὸς δόξαν οὔτε πρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν οὔθ’ ὅλως πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδὲν ἂν συμβάλοιτο τηλικαύτην δύναμιν ὅσην περ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ μέρη ταύτης. τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οἷς

|| und erste Repräsentanten von Gewaltherrschaft im späten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Frankfurt M. 2005, 197–198; Pownall (2018) 137–153. 99 See Plato Republic 363a: οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις. In Antidosis (15.217), Isocrates adopts an intensely realistic approach in summarising pleasure (hēdonē), profit (kerdos) and honour (timē) as the aims of human desires. 100 Cf. C. Bouchet, La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate, REA 109 (2007) 475–489, esp. 480: “ambivalence du terme”. See also Alexiou (2010) 99–100; (2015) 73–90. 101 Cf. 8.7; 8.17; 8.26; 8.30; 8.33–34; 8.58; 8.83; 8.96; 8.100; 8.119. See also 2.24: μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλεονεκτεῖν; 3.2: δι’ ὧν ἄν τις μεθ’ ἀρετῆς πλεονεκτήσειεν; 15.282; 15.284.

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ἔχομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τούτοις κτώμεθα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὠφελείας, ὧν δεόμενοι τυγχάνομεν· ὥσθ’ οἱ τῆς αὑτῶν διανοίας ἀμελοῦντες λελήθασι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἅμα τοῦ τε φρονεῖν ἄμεινον καὶ τοῦ πράττειν βέλτιον ὀλιγωροῦντες. (33) θαυμάζω δ’ εἴ τις οἴεται τοὺς τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀσκοῦντας καρτερεῖν καὶ μένειν ἐν τούτοις, ἐλπίζοντας ἔλαττον ἕξειν τῶν πονηρῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡγουμένους καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις πλέον οἴσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πέπεισμαι τούτους μόνους ὧν δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ὧν οὐ βέλτιόν ἐστιν. On the peace 8(28) It seems to me that all people desire their own advantage and want to have more than others, but they do not know (eidenai) what to do to achieve these goals, and they differ in their judgment (doxa) about this. Some have opinions that are reasonable and can figure out what they need, while others have opinions that completely miss their true advantage. (29) This is what has happened to the city, for we think that if we sail the sea with many triremes and compel cities to pay contributions and send delegates here, we will get what we need; but we deceive ourselves completely. Nothing that we hoped for has come about; instead, we have hostility, wars, and huge expenses. And this is no surprise. (30) As a result of our meddling (polypragmosynē), we found ourselves in the gravest dangers before, whereas, by showing our city to be just, offering aid to those who were wronged, and not being greedy for others’ property, we became the leader of the Greeks with their consent. But now we scorn that kind of behavior and have for some time, both illogically and quite rashly. (31) Some have become so foolish that although they consider injustice (adikia) to be reprehensible, they think it is profitable and useful for daily life; similarly, they consider justice (dikaiosynē) to be praiseworthy but not profitable, more beneficial to others than to the just themselves. (32) They do not know that nothing contributes as strongly to material gain, to reputation, to whatever one must do, or to overall prosperity than excellence (aretē) and its parts. Through the goods that we have in our soul we gain the other advantages that we find we need. Thus, those who neglect their minds do not realize that they are disregarding their ability both to think better and to act more nobly than others. (33) I am amazed if anyone thinks that those who cultivate piety (eusebeia) and justice (dikaiosynē) persist and persevere in them from a hope that they will have less than the wicked rather than with the thought that both among the gods and humans they will gain more than others. I am persuaded that these alone gain the advantage that they need, while others gain only what is worse. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

The Thucydidean hatred felt by subjects towards their ruler (2.64.5) and the deos (“fear”) invoked by the Athenians at the Congress at Sparta (Thuc. 1.75.3; 1.76.2) is replaced by the hatred felt by the rulers themselves towards violent despotic rule (8.142: μισῆσαι μὲν ἁπάσας τὰς τυραννικὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας), while the desire for monarchical power is replaced by the desire for a constant hegemony (8.144: ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης ἡγεμονίας), which is dependent on obtaining the eunoia of the Greeks and eudokimein.102 || 102 See 8.19; 8.23; 8.32; 8.77 ff., 8.93 ff., 8.104; 8.115; 8.135; 8.140–141; 8.144. de Romilly (1958) 92– 101; Bringmann (1965) 58–74; Davidson (1990) 20–36; Α.Ν. Michelini, Isocrates’ Civic Invective: Acharnians and On the Peace, TAPhA 128 (1998) 124; P. Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens, Cambridge 2010, 262–264; Papillon (2017) 17; A. Reckermann, Überzeugen. Rhetorik und politische Ethik in der Antike, Hamburg 2018, 93 ff. For the differentiation between the positive concept of hēgemōn and one who holds authoritarian archē, cf. Buchner (1958) 20, 39–41, 117–119, 150– 151. See also Balot (2014) 152 ff.

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5.2.2.8 To Philip (5) Isocrates addressed Philip II of Macedon first with the deliberative speech To Philip (5; 346 BC) and then with two letters, Letter 2 (around 343 BC) and Letter 3 (338 BC, after the Battle of Chaeronea). The extensive speech To Philip (consisting of 155 paragraphs) is a typical example of a written rhetorical speech, the main recipient of which, being addressed directly to the king of Macedon, is Philip, followed by the pupils of Isocrates and, in the form of an open letter, the people of Athens:103 Isocrates returns to the basic political plan presented in the Panegyricus in 380 BC: unity amongst the Greeks and war against the Persians.104 In To Philip, Isocrates establishes the consistency with which he transfers concepts from rhetorical education to politics. What an audience is to an orator or what the political community is to a citizen of the city-state, the Pan-Hellenic community is to the King of Macedon. Isocrates draws a parallel between his individual rhetorical action, as a superlative advisor whose innovative discourse exceeds the bounds of his city, and the role of Philip II as the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces against the Persians. The concepts of symboulos and symbouleuein systematically reappear in the speech.105 In fact, in 5.105, Isocrates ascribes this advice to Philip’s ancestors. In 5.113, Isocrates draws a parallel between his words (logos) and the deeds of Philip’s ancestors (erga), thus affirming through his rhetoric what Philip’s ancestors affirmed through their deeds. The rhetorician bases his arguments on the development of two scales of merit: one intellectual and the other political-military (5.81–82). On the scale of political administration and active political engagement, he ranks himself at the lowest grade (aphyestatos), yet in the intellectual scale he holds an exceptionally lofty position

|| 103 Irrespective of Isocrates’ educational goals and the other recipients of the speech, the main recipient of To Philip is the king of Macedon. See Wendland (1910) 133–136; Kessler (1911) 45–47; Buchner (1958) 151; Dobesch (1968) 25–26; Grieser-Schmitz (1999) 197–198; (2003) 115; A.F. Natoli, The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II. Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary, Stuttgart 2004, 90– 91, 93–94. For various other interpretations suggested see Heilbrunn (1967) 130–187 (the speech is interpreted as an allegory of Isocrates’ struggle against philosophy); M.M. Markle, Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip. A Study of Isocrates’ Philippus and Speusippus’ Letter to Philip, JHS 96 (1976) 86–89 (the main recipient is the Athenian public; the Athenian public as well as Philip, according to S. Perlman, Isocrates’ Philippus - a Reinterpretation, Historia 6, 1957, 306–317); S. Usher, Isocrates. Paideia, Kingship, and the Barbarians, in: H.A. Khan (ed.), The Birth of European Identity. The Europe-Asia Contrast in Greek Thought 490–322 B.C., Nottingham 1994, 140 (the speech is primarily addressed to Greek public opinion); R.-B. Essig, Der offene Brief. Geschichte und Funktion einer publizistischen Form von Isokrates bis Günther Grass, Würzburg 2000, 23–42 (it is an open letter). For a good overview of the research, see Blank (2014) 454–457. 104 See 5.9; 5.11; 5.84; 5.93. 105 5.9; 5.14; 5.16; 5.18; 5.55; 5.57; 5.82; 5.83; 5.88; 5.89; 5.94; 5.136; 5.152; 5.154; 5.155. Cf. E. Alexiou, Ρητορική και ιδεολογία. Ο Φίλιππος Β΄ της Μακεδονίας στον Ισοκράτη και σε συγχρόνους του, Thessaloniki 2015 (only available online).

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above others (οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολελειμμένοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς προέχουσι τῶν ἄλλων).106 As he excels in the field of intellect, so does Philip excel in the field of military action (5.14–16). The pre-eminently singular capacity of the Macedonian king enabling him to heed the advice of Isocrates is his freedom from the bounds of the polis and its laws and constitutions, combined with his wealth and power which are ideal for persuading (peithein) and for compelling (biazesthai). The former concerns the Greeks, while the latter the barbarians: To Philip 5(14) ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἑώρων τοὺς ἐνδόξους τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὑπὸ πόλεσι καὶ νόμοις οἰκοῦντας, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πράττειν πλὴν τὸ προσταττόμενον, ἔτι δὲ πολὺ καταδεεστέρους ὄντας τῶν ῥηθησομένων πραγμάτων, (15) σοὶ δὲ μόνῳ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης δεδομένην καὶ πρέσβεις πέμπειν πρὸς οὕστινας ἂν βουληθῇς καὶ δέχεσθαι παρ’ ὧν ἄν σοι δοκῇ καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν ἡγῇ συμφέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον ὅσην οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ μόνα τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὧν οἶμαι καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα προσδεήσεσθαι. (16) μέλλω γάρ σοι συμβουλεύειν προστῆναι τῆς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον. ἡ μὲν οὖν περιβολὴ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν. To Philip 5(14) Rather, I saw all the other men of good reputation living in cities with constitutions and laws such that it was impossible for them to do anything except what those laws and constitutions prescribed. And furthermore, they also were not at all up to the tasks I will mention. (15) To you alone fortune (tychē) has given the power (dynamis) to send delegates to whomever you wish, to receive delegates from whomever you wish, and to say whatever you think best. In addition, you have obtained wealth and power such as no other Greek has, and these alone are naturally suited both for persuading and for compelling. What I am about to suggest will require, I believe, both of these, (16) for I am about to advise you to stand at the head of a Greek alliance (prostēnai) and lead a Greek campaign against the barbarians. Persuasion (peithein) will be useful with the Greeks; compulsion (biazesthai) will be advantageous against the barbarians. This, then, is the goal of the whole discourse. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

Therefore, Philip II of Macedon embodies Isocrates’ long-standing hopes for the realisation of the Pan-Hellenic ideal (5.16: προστῆναι)107 since his city did not meet his expectations (5.12–14; 5.129): he must unite the Greeks, win their favour and lead the war against the Persians (5.68; 5.79; 5.127; 5.136; 5.145; Dobesch 1968, 205). The rhe-

|| 106 The terms apoleipesthai and proechein originate from the athletic sphere and connote competition. In 9.79–81, Nicocles strives in the field of education like a runner (τῶν δρομέων οὐ τοῖς ἀπολελειμμένοις), while Isocrates plays the role of an active spectator. For images from athletic games cf. 10.23; 2.11; 4.43–44; 4.85; [1.12]; Alexiou (2010) 221–222. 107 The verb prostēnai means political and military power and attributes a leadership role to Philip. However, it does not in any case mean hegemonic power of Philip over Greece. As C. Bouchet correctly interprets the verb (2014, 88–90 and generally on Philip and hegemony 85–97), Philip is represented by Isocrates as the guarantor of concord amongst the Greeks and as a military leader in the war against the barbarians.

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torician once again attempts to conflate the fields of competitive and cooperative values. The terms eunoia, eudokimein, koinos, pistos, euergesiai, philanthrōpia, praotēs, as well as the doxa and epainos of Philip due to his benefactions towards the Greeks are the fixed, repeated motifs of the speech.108 Isocrates exhorts Philip, who was famous for his ambition,109 to take on the role of a benefactor in the context of a proGreek view (5.109–115; Alexiou 1995, 118–130; Papillon 2007, 68). This is the only way to perceive his exhortation at the end of the speech, where he clearly distinguishes between three areas: the Greeks, the Macedonians and the barbarians (5.154: τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν). By referring to Philip’s genealogical descent from Heracles (5.76–77)110 Isocrates wishes to influence the Macedonian king’s opinion and place his advice on the same level as that of Philip’s mythical progenitor who, as an εὐεργέτης ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος (5.76), serves as an exemplar.111 It is Philip’s duty to safeguard the eunoia he bequeathed to his descendants (5.77). This is not the goodwill of the many towards the leader but, on the contrary, the favourable disposition of one’s personality towards the many, which is also well-known in rhetorical theory. According to Aristotle, in order for an orator to produce credibility, he must display wisdom (phronēsis), virtue (aretē) and goodwill (eunoia) (Rhetoric 1378a 8). E. Skard asserts that the phrase τὴν εὔνοιαν … διαφυλάττειν is a reference to the official language of the city, as it is a standard phrase encountered in honorific decrees when one is praised for his goodwill towards the city.112 This is important, as it proves that Isocrates does not distance

|| 108 Εunoia: 5.6; 5.68; 5.77; 5.86; 5.95; 5.114; 5.136; eudokimein: 5.79; 5.116; 5.123; 5.140; koinos: 5.7; 5.10; 5.13; 5.69; 5.80; pistos: 5.80; 5.92; euergetēs: 5.20; 5.32; 5.36; 5.37; 5.76; 5.116; 5.140; 5.154; philanthrōpia: 5.114; 5.116; praotēs: 5.116; doxa: 5.13; 5.14; 5.68; 5.79; 5.114; 5.118; 5.134; 5.145; 5.149; epainos: 5.134; 5.135; 5.140; 5.144; 5.148. 109 See e.g. Demosthenes 18.66–67. Cf. 2.5–8; 2.15–21; 4.49; 6.7; 9.10; 10.2. On Philip II, see N.G.L. Hammond, Philip of Macedon, London 1994; I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, New Haven/London 2008; I. Worthington, By the Spear. Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire, Oxford 2014; J. Fündling, Philipp II von Makedonien, Darmstadt 2014; C.J. King, Ancient Macedonia, London/New York 2018, 70–106. 110 On Heracles in Macedon, see P. Iliadou, Herakles in Makedonien, Hamburg 1998 (especially regarding patrōos Heracles at the royal palace in Aegae on p. 58, 205–206). Cf. M. Mari, Traditional Cults and Beliefs, in: R.J. Lane Fox (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD, Leiden/Boston 2011, 455. See also J. Engels, Macedonians and Greeks, in: J. Roisman/I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Chichester UK 2010, 90–91. Speusippus also insists on Philip’s descent from Heracles in his Letter to Philip (3). Cf. S. Müller, Philip II, in: J. Roisman/I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Chichester UK 2010, 175. 111 Cf. Papillon (1996) 11–12; (2001) 87–88; Gotteland (2001) 47; Blank (2014) 490–492. 112 E. Skard, Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: Euergetes-Concordia, Oslo 1932, 32, 57–58. Cf. IG II31, 316.9–11: διαφυλάττουσιν τὴν εὔνοιαν; 346.15–16: διατελεῖ εὔνους ὢν τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cf. Demosth. 18.8: εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ; 18.321; Lys. 22.11; Isocr. 16.25; 16.41; 8.51; See also D.

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himself from the fixed values of the city-state, but provides new impetus for them in the context of a Pan-Hellenic community. Philip is characterised as both high-minded (μέγα φρονῶν) and a lover of Hellas (φιλέλλην).113 The two concepts are complementary (5.41; 5.71; 5.122). The centre of gravity of Isocratean thought rests on the direction of Philip’s ambition, not on ambition itself. To Philip 41 affirms the consistency with which Isocrates ascribes a justified megalophrosynē114 to the Macedonian king: To Philip 5(41) χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μέγα φρονοῦντας καὶ τοὺς διαφέροντας μὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἃ καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἄν τις καταπράξειεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοις οἷς μηδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπιχειρήσειε πλὴν τῶν ὁμοίαν σοὶ καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐχόντων. To Philip 5(41) Those who have high ambitions and superior talents must not attempt to accomplish things that any average person might do but only those that no one else would attempt, except those who are your equal in natural ability and power. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

In Isocrates’ speech, Philip is not exhorted to relinquish his competitive ambitions, but to satisfy them in such a way so as to demonstrate goodwill towards the Greeks and win their favour as a benefactor. This is yet another case where Heracles is utilised as the most impressive example of a correct ambition (5.109 ff.). Heracles is not praised for his labours, which would emphasise his strength of body, but for his wisdom (phronēsis), ambition (philotimia) and justice (dikaiosyne) (5.110). The placement of the competitive concept of philotimia between two pre-eminently cooperative values attests to Isocrates’ attempt to purge it from the context of competitive individual self-affirmation and associate it with intellectual and ethical cooperative values that are expressed through social contribution. Isocrates invokes the conciliation among the Greeks and the campaign against Troy as an expression of the aforementioned three values. Heracles ended civil disputes and the other afflictions plaguing the Greeks, and showed the coming generations with whom and against whom it was their duty to go to war (5.111). This was the “first Trojan War”, Heracles’ expedition against Troy, which he sacked, when Laomedon tricked him, having promised him his divine horses if he rescued his daughter || Whitehead, Cardinal Virtues. The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens, C&M 44 (1993) 37–75, esp. 52 ff. 113 The term philellēn is generally applied to both non-Greeks (Xenoph. Ages. 2.31; Diod. 1.67.9; Ael. Var. Hist. 9.1) and Greeks (Xenoph. Ages. 7.4). Isocrates calls the Athenians philellēnes for their services to the Greeks (4.96; 12.241; cf. the Cypriots in 9.50). The pre-eminent philellēn is Homer, Scholia bT K 14–16 Erbse: ἀεὶ γὰρ φιλέλλην ὁ πoιητής. On the concept of philellēn, see J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellénisme et Impérialisme. Αspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate, Paris/Rome 1988, 497–526, esp. 498 note 9 and 506–507; P. Parsons, Φιλέλλην, MH 53 (1996) 110–111; J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellenism, Brill’s NewPauly 11 (2007) 19–21. 114 Cf. 9.27; 9.45; 9.46; 3.35; 4.25; 4.170; 5.4; 5.71; 8.50; 7.7; 7.73; Alexiou (2010) 108–109.

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Hesione from the sea monster (Iliad 5.638–642; 5.648–651).115 Isocrates contrasts Heracles’ achievement with the subsequent Trojan War fought by the Homeric heroes, and finds it to be superior due to the brevity of his achievement and his limited military forces (To Philip 5.111–112). In rhetorical terminology, this is a synkrisis pros endoxous, similar to other examples encountered in Isocrates,116 and its purpose is auxēsis (amplificatio), to amplify the achievement of Philip’s progenitor. Moreover, both the expeditions against Troy foreshadow the new expedition of Philip against the Persians. It is impossible to imitate Heracles in all his exploits, but Philip can come close to his purposes in terms of quality of the spirit, which corresponds to the moral-mental qualities of Heracles: phronēsis, philotimia and dikaiosynē (5.110), as well as philanthrōpia and eunoia towards the Greeks (5.114), and praotēs (“gentleness”), which, as a pre-eminently cooperative value, is contrasted with chalepotēs (“harshness”), authoritarian and violent behaviour (5.116). As an educator, Isocrates encourages Philip (5.113) to imitate not alien examples (allotria paradeigmata), but one in his own family (oikeion). This motif emphatically resurfaces ‒ in similar terms ‒ in the peroration of Evagoras (9.77), where Nicocles, the son of Evagoras and the new monarch, accepts the exhortation to imitate not alien examples (allotria) but members of his own family (oikeia), i.e. his father and other ancestors.117 Furthermore, in Helen the titular heroine is praised because, among other things, she was the reason why the Greeks became united and waged a common expedition against the barbarians (10.67).118 Lastly, in Panegyricus (4.159) the Trojan War is the model, in the context of the Pan-Hellenic ideal, for a Pan-Hellenic military campaign against Persia (cf. 12.42). In the following passage (5.127), Philip, who, unlike others, is not subject to the bonds of the polities and laws of the polis and enjoys untrammelled freedom (aphetos), is called as a citizen of Greece as a whole and must act as its benefactor: To Philip 5(127) διὸ καὶ σοὶ νομίζω συμφέρειν οὕτως ἀνάνδρως διακειμένων τῶν ἄλλων προστῆναι τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. προσήκει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀφ’ Ἡρακλέους πεφυκόσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν στέργειν, ἐν ᾗ τυγχάνουσι κατοικοῦντες, σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγενημένον ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ὁ γεννήσας ὑμᾶς, καὶ κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὁμοίως, ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα σπουδάζεις.

|| 115 Cf. Pind. Isthm. 6.24–56; Soph. Aj. 1299–1303; Apollod. 2.103–104; 2.134–138; Gotteland (2001) 239–244. This expedition also appears as an exceptional mythical example in Evagoras (9.16). 116 Cf. the comparison between Athens and Sparta (4.85–99), Evagoras and Cyrus the Great (9.37– 38) or Evagoras and the heroes of the Trojan War (9.65; cf. 4.83). This is an example of the rhetorical technique of amplification (auxēsis; Arist. Rhet. 1368a 21–22: δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξoυς συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπoυδαίων βελτίων). See Alexiou (2010) 116. 117 Cf. Anax. Rhet. Alex. 32.3: λαμβάνειν δὲ δεῖ τὰ παραδείγματα οἰκεῖα τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὰ ἐγγύτατα τοῖς ἀκούουσι χρόνῳ ἢ τόπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ τοιαῦτα, τῶν ἄλλων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ γνωριμώτατα. 118 See Kennedy (1958) 77–83.

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To Philip (5.127) Therefore, I think that it will be advantageous for you, since everyone else is so cowardly, to take the lead in this war against the King. And just as it is fitting for all the other descendants of Heracles and those who are tied to a particular government and its laws (politeia kai nomoi) to love that city in which they live, so it is fitting for you, who were born free of worldly concerns (aphetos) to think of all Greece as your homeland (patris), as did your ancestor, Heracles, and to take risks on its behalf, just as you would for everything that is especially important to you. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

5.2.2.9 Panathenaicus (12) Panathenaicus, the final speech of Isocrates (12; 339 BC), is characterised by Photius (Bibl. 159.102a 18–19) as an encomium of Athens and ancestors, but touches upon a large number of subjects. The fact that a man of 97 years was able to write such a speech, 272 paragraphs long, is impressive, while the persistence of past scholarship119 to identify linguistic weaknesses in the speech due to the rhetorician’s advanced age has fallen out of favour. Firstly, the approbation of the mythical hero Agamemnon (12.74–87) is of interest. Agamemnon is presented as the pre-eminent Homeric hero, and Isocrates identifies him as the national leader of a Pan-Hellenic expedition. While in the past it was vehemently asserted that the encomium of Agamemnon in Panathenaicus was a veiled exhortation to the Macedonian king Philip II,120 contemporary scholars are more sceptical.121 The encomium condenses Isocrates’ educational and political ideas. It is worthwhile comparing Isocrates’ views on his rhetorical activities (12.1–4; 12.11– 14) with the role of Agamemnon as the commander-in-chief of the Greeks. Agamemnon was the only man deemed worthy to lead the armies of all Greece (12.76: ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδoς στρατηγός). Isocrates’ excellence in the field of rhetoric is comparable (12.13: τῶν λόγων ἡγεμόνα). Isocrates spurned discourses that were mythic or full of wonders and fictions (12.1: μυθώδεις, τερατείας καὶ ψευδoλoγίας μεστoύς). Agamemnon was indifferent to exploits which are extravagant and spectacular and of no benefit to others (12.77: τὰ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τερατώδη καὶ μηδὲν ὠφελoῦντα τoὺς ἄλλoυς). Through the power he obtained, he avoided any act to the expense of the Greeks; he achieved concord among them and engaged in an expedition against the barbarians, and no one in his time or later led a more noble campaign or one more beneficial to the Greeks (12.78). Similarly, Isocrates’ speeches call for unity among the Greeks and war against the Persians as the most honourable, important and advantageous deeds (12.14). It is understood that Isocrates is projecting his own ideas onto the mythical past and drawing a parallel between his role as a Pan-Hellenic orator

|| 119 Blass (1887–1898) ΙΙ 325–326; Münscher (1916) 2219. 120 Cf. Blass (1887–1898) ΙΙ 321; P. Wendland, Beiträge zur athenischen Politik und Publicistik des vierten Jahrhunderts. 1: König Philippos und Isokrates, Berlin 1910, 147–153. 121 Roth (2003) 131–135. Cf. Race (1978) 175–185; J. Signes Codoñer, El Panatenaico de Isócrates. 1: El excursus de Agamenón, Emerita 64 (1996) 137–156.

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and the military activities of the mythical king. “Isocrates sees himself as belonging in the company of the great statesmen of the past and the present” (Gagarin 2002, 118; cf. Too 1995, 132–140). The key innovation of Panathenaicus can be found in its final section, describing a discussion and dispute of the teacher’s speech by an unknown Spartan sympathiser and former student of Isocrates (12.200–265).122 Predecessors of this extensive “dialogical scene” are encountered in Isocrates’ other speeches, yet none this long (7.56– 59; 8.57; 15.141–149; 5.17–23). Both the presence and the interpretation of this dialogical scene in Panathenaicus continue to confound contemporary scholarship.123 In any event, the speech sheds light on the atmosphere of discussions at Isocrates’ school, under the influence of sophistic antilogies, and could be interpreted as the result of the active relationship between rhetorical speeches and their audience, which is the rhetorician’s aim (Alexiou 2001, 85–98; cf. Vallozza 2016, 109–126). The Pro-Spartan student is the most vibrant indication of what L. Collins Edwards (2010, 383) defines as “innovative imitation”: a student trained by Isocrates must both imitate Isocrates but also innovate. Contrary to Isocrates’ opponents, the agelaioi sophistai (“common, ordinary”),124 who simply recount or imitate the works of others (12.18–19; cf. 12.263), the Laconist interlocutor is an advanced, astute student who demonstrates his critical thinking by regarding Panathenaicus as a speech of double meaning (12.240: λόγους ἀμφιβόλους); he contends that while the speech ostensibly praises peace-loving Athens, as many would agree, it actually praises the warlike Sparta and pleonexia, a view few would adopt (12.241–242): Panathenaicus 12(241) οἷός περ ὁ λόγος ὁ διαναγνωσθείς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ πεποίηκας τοὺς μὲν σοὺς προγόνους εἰρηνικοὺς καὶ φιλέλληνας καὶ τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἡγεμόνας, Σπαρ-

|| 122 Of the many names suggested for this individual, the historian Theopompus is the most likely candidate; see Roth (2003) 219–222. 123 For the various interpretations of this “dialogical scene”, see Kröner (1969) 102–121; M. Erler, Hilfe und Hintersinn. Isokrates’ Panathenaikos und die Schriftkritik im Phaidros, in: L. Rossetti (ed.), Understanding the Phaedrus. Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Augustin 1992, 122–137; V. Gray, Images of Sparta. Writer and Audience in Isocrates’ Panathenaicus, in: A. Powell/S. Hodkinson (eds.), The Shadow of Sparta, London/New York 1994, 223–271; M. Hillgruber, Die Kunst der verstellten Rede. Ein vernachlässigtes Kapitel der antiken Rhetorik, Philologus 114 (2000) 3–21, esp. 5–7; Alexiou (2001) 85–98; Roth (2003) 215–269; P. Roth, Die Dialogszene im Panathenaikos, in: Orth (2003) 140–149; Nicolai (2004) 114–118; Livingstone (2007) 31–34; K. Bruss, Searching for Boredom in Ancient Greek Rhetoric. Clues in Isocrates, Ph&Rh 45 (2012) 312–334, esp. 326 ff.; D. Murphy, Isocrates and the Dialogue, CW 106 (2013) 311–353, esp. 349 ff.; Blank (2014) 563 ff.; Brunello (2015) 133–162; Alexiou (2015) 73–90; (2019) 321–322. 124 The rhetorician’s dismissive disposition is aptly underlined by Adamantios Korais (Ἰσοκράτους λόγοι καὶ ἐπιστολαὶ μετὰ σχολίων παλαιῶν, ΙΙ, Paris 1807, 179), who, remarking on the word τῶν ἀγελαίων, interprets it as follows: τῶν εὐτελῶν, τῶν φαύλων, τῶν χυδαίων. See in detail Alexiou (2019) 305–327.

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τιάτας δ’ ὑπεροπτικοὺς καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ πλεονέκτας, οἵους περ αὐτοὺς εἶναι πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν. τοιαύτην δ’ ἑκατέρων ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν εὔνους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει, τοῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς φθονεῖν καὶ δυσμενῶς ἔχειν, ἔστιν δ’ οὓς ἐπαινεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ θαυμάζειν, (242) καὶ τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς ἀγαθὰ μείζω τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες τῶν τοῖς προγόνοις τοῖς σοῖς προσόντων. Panathenaicus 12(241) Such, in fact, was the discourse that was just read, in which you made your own ancestors peaceloving, devoted to the Greeks, and the leading supporters of equality among cities but made the Spartans haughty (hyperoptikoi), warlike (polemikoi), and interested in gain (pleonektai), just like all people assume them to be. But although each city has this sort of a nature, the Athenians being praised by all and appearing to be well disposed toward the people, while most envy the Spartans and are hostile toward them, there are nonetheless those who praise and admire them (242) and have the courage to say that they, in fact, have more good qualities than your ancestors possessed. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

Subsequently, the pro-Spartan former student distinguishes between the “smallscale” pleonexia of petty crooks who break private contracts and deceive and cheat, and who come off worse in all circumstances due to their bad reputation, and the “large-scale” pleonexia of the Spartans and kings and tyrants (τὰς δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν πλεονεξίας καὶ τὰς τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τὰς τῶν τυράννων), which is something people pray for and that all people want, yet those who have such power are abused and cursed (12.243–244). These views, which recall the Isocratean terminology in Antidosis 15.281–284, reflect the discussion of “large-scale” pleonexia and the blind pursuit of individual competitive pursuits, as expounded on by Polus and Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, by Thrasymachus in the Republic and by Eteocles in Euripides’ Phoenissae (Alexiou 2015, 73–90).125 Regardless of whether or not Isocrates’ student correctly interpreted the preceding speech (based on Isocrates’ firm views on just pleonexia, the most likely answer is no), it is remarkable that the discourse ends with an aporia: Isocrates extols the nature and diligence of the student ‒ clearly because his criticism is pioneering and he is innovating, contrary to those who simply imitate or listen to others126 ‒ but does not reveal whether or not his student was correct (12.265). Nevertheless, the fact that Isocrates included this argumentation in his speech is a strong indication, on one hand, of the impact of traditional competitive values, such as monarchical power and large-scale pleonexia, on pro-oligarchical factions of the 4th century BC, and, on the other, of the “mirror effect” of Isocratean speeches as exponents of different ideologies of public opinion.

|| 125 See also Roth (2003) 247–249; Blank (2014) 574–575. 126 In Panathenaicus, this concerns not only Isocrates’ rivals (12.18–19; 12.263) but also his pupils. The end of the Laconist student’s speech causes the tumultuous applause of the other pupils (12.264), yet Isocrates’ speech had also won his pupils’ approbation (12.229). It is clear that his pupils do not represent a critical audience, as Isocrates would have liked.

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5.3 Style The idea of poetic prose already existed since Gorgias, who impressed the Athenians in 427 BC (Diod. 12.53.3); however, there are significant differences between poetry and prose in the 4th century BC.127 On one hand, Isocrates demarcates these differences and, on the other, he attempts, through his epideictic speeches, to approach poetic discourse but without going to extremes. Evagoras (9.9–11) contains “the earliest explicit contrast between poetic and prosaic language” (Dover 1997, 96): Evagoras 9(9) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ’ αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι καὶ διαλεγομένους καὶ συναγωνιζομένους, οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσιν, καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν· (10) τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ’ ἀποτόμως καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς μόνον καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν χρῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δ’ οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν ὥστ’, ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. (11) γνοίη δ’ ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης, ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ὅμως δὲ καίπερ τοσοῦτον πλεονεκτούσης τῆς ποιήσεως, οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ἀλλ’ ἀποπειρατέον τῶν λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εὐλογεῖν μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις ἐγκωμιαζόντων. Evagoras 9(9) Many decorations (kosmoi) have been granted to poets. They can write of gods interacting with humans, conversing and fighting alongside whomsoever they wish, and they can portray this not only with conventional language (tetagmena onomata) but also with exotic words, new terms, and metaphors, not neglecting anything but embellishing their compositions with every figure (eidos). (10) Such devices do not exist for prose writers; they must use with precision (apotomōs) only words and arguments in current use and must keep to their topic. In addition, the former compose everything with meter and rhythm; the latter have no share in these things which have such great grace that they persuade (psychagōgein) their audiences by their fine rhythms and proportions, even if the style and arguments are inelegant. (11) One might recognize their power from the following (consideration): if some well-regarded poem were to keep its words and ideas while losing its meter, it would appear to fall far short of the opinion (doxa) we now have of it. Still, although poetry has such a great advantage, we must not hesitate to attempt prose speeches to see if good men may be praised by such speeches just as well as by those who celebrate them in songs and meter. (Transl. Y.L. Too with modifications in: Mirhady/ Too 2000)

The passage precisely identifies the characteristics of poetic language (Alexiou 2010, 79–89). Isocrates begins with the view (9.9) that poetry has an advantage over prose in the interaction between gods and men and the use of aesthetic decorations to impress

|| 127 See Arist. Rhet. 1404a 24–29; 1405a 6–8; Plat. Menex. 239b; Alexiou (2010) 79–89. See also R. Graff, Prose versus Poetry in Early Greek Theories of Style, Rhetorica 23 (2005) 303–335.

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listeners. Isocrates acknowledges that poets are entitled to use exotic words (xena onomata), new terms (kaina), metaphors (metaphorai) and any other means for embellishing their poetry with every figure. In contrast to the stylistic adornments of poetry, prose focuses on the precise relationship between words and ideas. The tetagmena onomata are everyday, standard, conventional words that are found in prose. One synonym is politika onomata (9.10). Similarly, Aristotle contends that the poetic style (ποιητικὴ λέξις) is not appropriate to prose, there is an absence of prepon (Rhet. 1404b 5), and that the clarity of prosaic language is achieved through use of proper words (1404b 6: σαφῆ μὲν πoιεῖ τὰ κύρια; corresponding to the tetagmena onomata of Isocrates). Furthermore, the apotomōs (“with precision”), aided by the anankaion (“necessary”), marks a “strict” and “clear” distinction between poetry and prose. At the same time, the enthymēma is encountered only in the plural and does not constitute a terminus technicus yet; it expresses the idea, the thought (9.10; it corresponds to dianoiai 9.11).128 It must be stressed that, despite his assertions of the superiority of poetry over prose, Isocrates attempts to enervate it in terms of both aesthetic results and content. Thus, he identifies that poetry has a psychological advantage over prose only thanks to metre and rhythm, even if it is lacking in terms of style and content (9.11). Gorgias takes a characteristic position on the relationship between metre and poetry (82 B11.9 D.-K.): τὴν πoίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νoμίζω καὶ ὀνoμάζω λόγoν ἔχoντα μέτρoν. Gorgias proves his position on the exceptional power of speech (82 B11.8 D.-K.: λόγoς δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν) through the impact of poetry on stirring emotions. Isocrates uses the same argument but in a critical fashion ‒ essentially, the advantage of poetry is not one of content, but solely one of metre ‒ thus wishing to diminish the power of poetic language and justify his attempt to compare it to prose. This is also implied by psychagōgein, i.e. that poetry bewitches listeners (9.10); one discerns behind this phrase the fine irony of Isocrates, as the aesthetic beauty of poetry is not necessarily compatible with useful content, but merely aims at satisfying an audience.129 In Το Nicocles (2.48–49) Isocrates asserts that whoever wishes to please the masses must seek out not the most profitable discourses but those which most abount with fictions (mythōdestatoi). The typical examples given are Homer and tragedy. Homer’s poetry and the first inventors of tragedy recognised human nature

|| 128 Cf. Wersdörfer (1940) 110; Usher (1973) 40; Roth (2003) 77–78. 129 Isocrates never uses the terms goēteia (“juggling”), mageia (“magic”) or kēlein (“charm”), while it is no accident that rhetorical theorists of the 4th century BC do not adopt the Gorgianic views on the link between rhetoric and magic. See J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Harvard MA/London 1975, 47–66, esp. 55; C. de Jonge, Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature, Leiden/Boston 2008, 335–337. The negative connotation of the concept of psychagōgein in this passage is also apparent to Olympiodorus (In Plat. Gorg. comm. 33.1 Westerink), who imputes demagogic intentions to poets. Cf. R. Jackson/K. Lycos/H. Tarant, Olympiodorus. Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias, Leiden 1998, 223 note 621.

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(physis) and presented subjects that were pleasant to audiences. Homer recounted the contests and wars of the demigods in myths, while tragedy rendered the myths in contests and actions on stage. Isocrates reaches the following conclusion, once again invoking psychagōgein: “Since they have these examples, those who wish to persuade (psychagōgein) their audiences have been shown that they must steer clear of reprimand and advice (nouthetein kai symbouleuein) and say such things they see will be most delightful to crowds” (Transl. Y.L. Too in: Mirhady/Too 2000). Isocrates’ epideictic discourse does not dismiss pleasing the audience, but this pleasure must be combined with important content (see 4.4; Poulakos 1997, 76–77). The assertions made by Isocrates in Evagoras on the differences between poetic and prosaic language are intentionally excessive. His words do not stem from the desire for “pure literary criticism”130 but from the rhetorician’s conscious attempt to compete against poetry and particularly choral lyric poets of the past, especially Pindar and Bacchylides, and to take over their role (9.11). Therefore, Isocrates focuses his interest on the greatest possible difficulty (this is the chalepon, Hindernismotiv)131 in order to underline his originality.132 Thus, the escalation of the advantages of poetry does not lead Isocrates to resignation, but to competition against it and the creation of a new type of prosaic language, the encomium of contemporary historical figures.133 The originality of the Isocratean style involves an approximation of prosaic to poetic language, so that epideictic speeches exceed the stylistic level of judicial speeches (Atkins 1952, 128), in line with the doctrine of Aristotelian mean and absence of excess: Isocrates did not appropriate poetic vocabulary, instead using the most conventional and familiar words (Dion. Hal. Demosth. 4, p. 135–136 Us.-Rad.), but aimed for the splendour, the dignity and the beauty of Thucydides and Gorgias. He adopted the motifs, style and didactic tone of poetry in order to approach it, compete against it and surpass it.134

|| 130 See S. Perlman, Quotations from Poetry in Attic Orators of the Fourth Century B.C., AJPh 85 (1964) 160. 131 9.8: χαλεπόν ἐστιν; cf. Race (1987) 136 note 16: “χαλεπόν is the standard prose word signalling a Hindernismotiv”. See however, the critical view of Vallozza (2011) 145 note 48. It is possible that Isocrates influenced the proem to Xenophon’s Agesilaus 1.1: oἶδα μέν, ὅτι τῆς Ἀγησιλάoυ ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης oὐ ῥᾴδιoν ἄξιoν ἔπαινoν γράψαι, ὅμως δ’ ἐγχειρητέoν. 132 This technique is correctly identified by Anonymous in Comment. in Hermog. De id. 7.906 Walz (= I 406 Mand.): ὁ μέντoι ΄Iσoκράτης διὰ τὸ συμφέρoν αὐτῷ μόνoις τoῖς πoιηταῖς φησι ταῦτα πρoσεῖναι, ἵνα ἑαυτόν, φησί, σεμνύνῃ, εἰ διὰ μόνων πoλιτικῶν λέξεων ἐγκωμιάζειν Eὐαγόραν δύναται; cf. Buchheit (1960) 67: “Übertreibung in höchster Form”; Usener (1994) 61–63. 133 Cf. Haskins (2004) 20: “Isocrates enumerates these advantages as an implicit promise to surpass the poets, a gesture that is reminiscent of Gorgias’ boast in the Helen”. On Isocrates as the creator of a new type of prosaic language that competes against poetry, see Nicolai (2004) 49–54. 134 Cf. Dion. Hal. Isocr. 2, p. 57 Us.-Rad.: περιόδῳ … ῥυθμοειδεῖ πάνυ καὶ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι τοῦ ποιητικοῦ μέτρου; Cic. De or. 3.173; Orat. 190; Usher (1973) 54; Too (1995) 33–34; Papillon (1998) 41–61;

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In Antidosis (15.46–48), Isocrates distinguishes between judicial and epideictic speeches, stressing the superiority of the latter due to, inter alia, approaching the grace of poetic language: Antidosis 15(46) εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἳ τῶν μὲν προειρημένων οὐκ ἀπείρως ἔχουσιν, γράφειν δὲ προῄρηνται λόγους, οὐ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ’ Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικούς, οὓς ἅπαντες ἂν φήσειαν ὁμοιοτέρους εἶναι τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγομένοις. (47) καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν. ὧν ἅπαντες μὲν ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μέτροις πεποιημένων, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ μαθηταὶ γίγνεσθαι βούλονται, νομίζοντες τοὺς ἐν τούτοις πρωτεύοντας πολὺ σοφωτέρους καὶ βελτίους καὶ μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν δυναμένους εἶναι τῶν τὰς δίκας εὖ λεγόντων. (48) συνίσασι γὰρ τοὺς μὲν διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀγώνων γεγενημένους, τοὺς δ’ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐκείνων τῶν λόγων ὧν ἄρτι προεῖπον τὴν δύναμιν εἰληφότας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν δικανικοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν μόνην ἀνεκτοὺς ὄντας ἐν ᾗπερ ἂν ἀγωνιζόμενοι τυγχάνωσιν, τοὺς δ’ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐντίμους ὄντας καὶ δόξης ἐπιεικοῦς τυγχάνοντας. (49) ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μέν, ἢν ὀφθῶσιν δὶς ἢ τρὶς ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων, μισουμένους καὶ διαβαλλομένους, τοὺς δ’ ὅσῳ περ ἂν πλείοσι καὶ πλεονάκις συγγίγνωνται, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον θαυμαζομένους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰς δίκας δεινοὺς πόρρω τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄντας, τοὺς δ’ εἰ βουληθεῖεν ταχέως ἂν ἑλεῖν καὶ τούτους δυνηθέντας. Antidosis 15(46) Some people experienced in the forms I have mentioned did not choose to write speeches for private contract suits but ones of a political character (politikoi) pertaining to Hellas to be delivered in panegyric assemblies. Everyone would agree that these are more like musical and rhythmical compositions (meta mousikēs kai rhythmōn) than those uttered in the lawcourts. (47) They set out events with a more poetic and complex style (lexis poiētikōtera kai poikilōtera) and seek to employ grander and more original enthymemes, and in addition, they dress up the whole speech with many other eye-catching figures of speech (ideai). The whole audience enjoys when they hear these as much as poetic compositions, and many wish to study them, for they think that those who are at the forefront of this kind of composition are much wiser (sophōteroi) and better (beltious) and can be more useful (ōphelein) than those who are eloquent in legal matters. (48) They recognize that the latter have gained their experience in legal contests through political meddling, but the former have developed their skill in the speeches which I just described through their pursuit of wisdom (philosophia). Moreover, those who appear to be skilled in juridical speech are tolerated only on the day they happen to be pleading, whereas the others are well regarded and highly respected in all public gatherings all the time. (49) In addition, if the former are seen twice or three times in the lawcourts, they are hated and criticized, whereas the latter are more admired the more often they appear and the more people hear them. Finally, those who are skilled (deinoi) at legal speeches have no ability for those other speeches, while the others, if they wished, could quickly pick up forensic pleading. (Transl. D.C. Mirhady with modifications in: Mirhady/Too 2000)

|| Walker (2000) 25. On prose rhythm in the Isocratean period, see Usher (2010) 82–95; Zingg (2017) 255– 364.

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Isocrates uses similar terminology in Against the sophists (13.16) in order to bring rhetoric and poetry closer: τoῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μoυσικῶς εἰπεῖν  (“to speak the words rhythmically and musically”). The labour of Isocrates is associated with the grace and musicality of epideictic oratory as a result of laborious and careful selection of words and sentences (9.73: ἀκριβέστερον καὶ φιλοπονώτερον; Epist. 6.6: ἐπιχαρίτως καὶ μουσικῶς καὶ διαπεπονημένως). One predominant concept is akribeia (“precision”), which encompasses the harmonious, rhythmic structure, the aesthetic integrity of epideictic speeches, the judicious selection of words, the finish and the purity of the style (5.4; 13.17; 12.246). Isocrates defends the systematic preparation of his speeches (see 4.11) against the widespread criticism of his contemporaries, such as Alcidamas (On Sophists 13, 16, 25), of the excessive and detailed elaboration of Isocrates’ epideictic oratory.135 Isocrates is considered the “father of the periodic style” (Görgemanns 1987, 108). Large, beautifully composed and balanced periods that stand out for being rounded and containing strong rhythms, the clarity of his structure and the avoidance of hiatus are the chief characteristics of his rhetorical art and had already been successfully identified in antiquity: Dion. Hal. Isocr. 2 (p. 57 Us.-Rad.) ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ oὗτoς τὴν εὐέπειαν ἐκ παντὸς διώκει καὶ τoῦ γλαφυρῶς λέγειν στoχάζεται μᾶλλoν ἢ τoῦ ἀφελῶς. τῶν τε γὰρ φωνηέντων τὰς παραλλήλoυς θέσεις ὡς ἐκλυoύσας τὰς ἁρμoνίας τῶν ἤχων καὶ τὴν λειότητα τῶν φθόγγων λυμαινoμένας περιίσταται, περιόδῳ τε καὶ κύκλῳ περιλαμβάνειν τὰ νoήματα πειρᾶται ῥυθμoειδεῖ πάνυ καὶ oὐ πoλὺ ἀπέχoντι τoῦ πoιητικoῦ μέτρoυ, ἀναγνώσεώς τε μᾶλλoν oἰκειότερός ἐστιν ἢ χρήσεως. τοιγάρτοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιδείξεις τὰς ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς θεωρίαν φέρουσιν αὐτοῦ οἱ λόγοι, τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις ἀγῶνας οὐχ ὑπομένουσι. Dion. Hal. Isocr. 2 (p. 57 Us.-Rad.) For this orator seeks beauty of expression (euepeia) by every means, and aims at polish rather than simplicity. He avoids hiatus, on the ground that this breaks the continuity of utterance and impairs the smoothness of the sounds. He tries to express his ideas within the framework of the rounded period, using strong rhythms which are not far removed from those of verse (poiētikon metron), thus rendering his work more suitable for reading (anagnōsis) than for practikal use. For the same reason his speeches will bear recitation on ceremonial occasions, and private study, but cannot stand up to the stresses of the assembly or the law-courts. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

These are the virtues that canonised Isocrates as a classical author (Βlass 1887–1898, ΙΙ 136)136 and due to which the rhetorician served as a literary model for Aristotle and

|| 135 On akribeia and the dispute between Isocrates and Alcidamas, see above under Chapter 2.2 with additional bibliography. 136 Cf. Dover (1997) 177. See also Wersdörfer (1940) 95–96, 138; Usher (1990) 151–152; Bons (1993) 162–165; J. Hammerstaedt, Improvisation, RAC 17 (1996) 1224–1225; Konstantinopoulos (2014) 96–121. Also important is the research by D. Kurz, ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ. Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den Griechen bis Aristoteles, Göppingen 1970, esp. 32–34. On the avoidance of hiatus, see G.E. Benseler, De hiatu in

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his Peripatetics. His speeches contain the Gorgianic figures of antithesis, parisōsis and paromoiōsis (one impressive example can be found in 9.44–46), but not to the excessive degree that characterises the work of his teacher, as this style had become obsolete in the 4th century BC and was criticised (Aristotle Rhetoric 1404a 24–29). In his narrations (diēgēseis), Isocrates avoids detailed descriptions and while he touches only upon key points, he finds it easy to segue to a different topic (paraleipsis or praeteritio).137 One characteristic example can be found in 4.97, where Isocrates avoids describing the Battle of Salamis in detail (cf. 9.31). The frequency of the almost stereotypical phrase τί δεῖ λέγοντα διατρίβειν; (“Why should I spend time in speaking?”; 2.45; 3.35; 4.97; 6.21; 10.59; 12.105; 12.201; 14.7; 20.10), which is not limited just to military conflicts, indicates that this is a pre-eminent rhetorical principle on the brevity of narrations. Quintilian ascribes this principle to the Isocratean school (Inst. or. 4.2.31). While Aristotle stresses its necessity in epideictic oratory (Rhetoric 1416b 22–23), he places the main emphasis on the mean (1416b 34–36: metriōs). Consequently, the following remark by S. Usher (1990, 172) on Isocrates is correct: “His chosen periodic style, with his emphasis on architecture and measured progress, was illsuited to the writing of graphic narrative”. Isocrates often invokes age as a hindrance to writing a successful oration; he either contrasts it with his stylistic and rhetorical performance at a younger age, or asks for the audience’s indulgence for his prolixity ‒ or even courageously declaims his decision to overcome this obstacle (9.73; 15.9; 15.51; 15.59; 5.12; 5.27–28; 5.83–85; 5.110; 5.149; 12.1; 12.3–4; 12.88; 8.141).138 Isocrates’ need to communicate with his audience is yet another key requirement for comprehending his writing, as successfully shown by S. Usener (1994). In To Philip (5.25–27), Isocrates acknowledges the disadvantages of a written speech or one intended to be read publicly,139 not in terms of content, but in terms of agonistic weakness, i.e. the communication of his views and their intake by the recipient; there is an absence of doxa tou legontos, the influence of the orator’s personality and the directness of the spoken word:140

|| oratoribus Atticis et historicis Graecis, Freiberg 1841; Zingg (2017) 236–242. However, the universality of this rule in the structure of Isocratean texts must not be overestimated; see Worp-Rijksbaron (1997) 277–281; S. Martinelli-Tempesta, Gnomon 78 (2006) 594–595; Papillon (2007) 66–67. 137 See H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study, Leiden 1998, 393–394. 138 Cf. J. Roisman, The Rhetoric of Manhood. Masculinity in the Attic Orators, Berkeley 2005, 210– 212. 139 Cf. Hudson-Williams (1949) 65–69. See also R. Thomas, Prose Performance Texts. Epideixis and Written Publication in the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries, in: H. Yunis (ed.), Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece, Cambridge 2003, 186–187. 140 Cf. Epist. 1.3: ἀπόντος γὰρ τοῦ γράψαντος ἔρημα τοῦ βοηθήσοντός ἐστιν. See also W.V. Harris, Ancient Literacy, Cambridge MA/London 1989, 92; Bons (1993) 162–164; Usener (1994) 106–109. On

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To Philip 5(25) καίτοι μ’ οὐ λέληθεν, ὅσον διαφέρουσιν τῶν λόγων εἰς τὸ πείθειν οἱ λεγόμενοι τῶν ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, οὐδ’ ὅτι πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν τοὺς μὲν περὶ σπουδαίων πραγμάτων καὶ κατεπειγόντων ῥητορεύεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν καὶ πρὸς ἐργολαβίαν γεγράφθαι. (26) καὶ ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐγνώκασιν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἀποστερηθῇ τῆς τε δόξης τῆς τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις γιγνομένων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τῆς σπουδῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, καὶ μηδὲν ᾖ τὸ συναγωνιζόμενον καὶ συμπεῖθον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν προειρημένων ἁπάντων ἔρημος γένηται καὶ γυμνός, ἀναγιγνώσκῃ δέ τις αὐτὸν ἀπιθάνως καὶ μηδὲν ἦθος ἐνσημαινόμενος ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἀπαριθμῶν, (27) εἰκότως, οἶμαι, φαῦλος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. To Philip 5(25) Still, I am not unaware of how much spoken discourses differ in their persuasive power from discourses that are read. I know that everyone assumes that spoken discourses concern serious and pressing matters, while written discourses are composed for display and for obtaining a commission. (26) And this view is not unreasonable. When a discourse lacks the authority of the speaker (doxa tou legontos) and his voice and the variations that occur in oral presentations (rhētoreiai) as well as the crucial sense of timing (kairos) and the seriousness of the speaker toward the issue, when there is nothing to help the discourse present its case persuasively but it is empty and stripped of everything that I just mentioned, and when someone reads it unconvincingly and does not inject any personality (ēthos) into it, as if he were simply counting, (27) then I think that the discourse would naturally seem worthless to the hearers. (Transl. T.L. Papillon 2004)

Aristotle reaffirms this view, contending that the written style is most exact, while the agonistic style is very much a matter of delivery (Rhetoric 1413b 8–9: ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη). In order to offset these difficulties, Isocrates employs a number of techniques of the written word to communicate with the recipients of his speeches; these include direct or indirect addresses, rhetorical questions, hypothetical objections, embedded dialogical scenes and publication of his speeches.141 For example, discussions with students and friends of the school, whether in direct or indirect speech, are recorded in actual or imaginary “dialogical scenes” in the Isocratean corpus and offset the difficulties of the written word, serving to underline the ēthos tou legontos, whether that of the orator himself or his opponents (Alexiou 2001, 85–98; cf. Vallozza 2016, 109–126). Aristotle also successfully identified the importance of these scenes whereby an orator, avoiding to speak about himself, steers clear of objections, contradictions, envy142 or prolixity, and makes reference to Isocrates (Rhetoric 1418b 23–27).

|| the unsuitability of Isocratean speeches to be delivered, cf. Dion. Hal. Isocr. 13, p. 73 Us.-Rad.: according to the philosopher Hieronymus there is an absence of animation and intensity of feeling (pathētikon kai empsychon). Cf. also R. Graff, Reading and the Written Style in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, RSQ 31 (2001) 19–44; J. Schloemann, Entertainment and Democratic Distrust. The Audience’s Attitudes toward Oral and Written Oratory in Classical Athens, in: I. Worthington/J.M. Foley (eds.), Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece, Leiden 2002, 133–146. 141 Cf. Lentz (1989) 122–135; A. Jähne, Kommunikative Umsetzung gesellschaftlicher Problematik bei Isokrates, Philologus 135 (1991) 131–139; Usener (1994) 20–46, 120–137; (2003) 18–33. 142 Cf. D. Spatharas, Self-Praise and Envy. From Rhetoric to the Athenian Courts, Arethusa 44 (2011) 199–219.

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Such a scene can be found in To Philip (5.17–23). Isocrates announces to his students his intention to send to the Macedonian king Philip II a speech not just displaying his talent or extolling the wars fought by Philip. Initially, his students were dismayed, considering that, having taken leave of his senses because of his old age, he decided to send a speech to Philip, a man who ‒ due to his achievements ‒ considers that he is second to none when offering counsel to himself (5.18). In this “dialogical scene”, the students do not criticise the content of the speech, of which they are not yet aware, but their teacher’s intention to send Philip a speech that is neither a display nor an encomium. However, when Isocrates read the speech to his students a few days later, their sentiments were fully reversed, i.e. they approved of the speech and Isocrates’ endeavour (5.23). Therefore, it is the speech itself that first convinces Isocrates’ students and will subsequently convince Philip. This way, Isocrates essentially responds not only to his students’ objections but primarilary to any objections on Philip’s part. This is an artful captatio benevolentiae around 346 BC, when Philip was dynamically expanding his conquests throughout Greek territories. Similarly, in Antidosis (15.141–149), an unknown friend addresses Isocrates, examining the rhetorician’s life and deeds. The rhetorician thus defends his life and avoids the poor impression that self-praise would leave upon readers. Such “dialogical scenes” are also encountered in Areopagiticus (7.56–59), On the Peace (8.57), while the longest example can be found in Panathenaicus (12.200–265).

5.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception The manuscript transmission of Isocrates, which consists of over 100 codices,143 is distinguished into two major branches: the first comprises the codex Urbinas 111 (Γ, 9th c., with five correctors Γ1-Γ5), from which Vaticanus 936 (Δ, around 1300) and Ambrosianus O 114 (E, 14th c.) descend. The second branch comprises the so-called Vulgatamanuscripts, which were used prior to the discovery of Γ, the most important of which are: Vaticanus 65 (Λ, 1063 AD), Laurentianus 87.14 (Θ, 13th c.), Parisinus 2932 (Π, 15th c.) and Laurentianus 58.5 (Ν, 15th c.). Apart from the above manuscripts, on which contemporary critical editions are based, there are many other more recent ones of lesser value.

|| 143 On the manuscript tradition of Isocrates, see H. Buermann, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Isokrates. I: Die Handschriften der Vulgata. II: Der Urbinas und seine Verwandtschaft, Progr. Berlin 1885–1886; E. Drerup, De codicum Isocrateorum auctoritate, Leipzig 1894; Drerup (1906); G. Pasquali, Storia della tradizione e critica del testo, 2. ed., Florence 1962, 294–302; A. Carlini/D. Manetti (eds.), Studi sulla tradizione del testo di Isocrate, Florence 2003; Pinto (2003) esp. 15–29; M. Vallozza, Note al testo dell’Evagora di Isocrate, Eikasmos 21 (2010) 133–146; M. Vallozza (ed.), Isocrate. Per una nuova edizione critica, Florence 2017; Zingg (2017) 9–31. 133 papyri must be added (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue). Cf. also M. Landfester (ed.), Geschichte der antiken Texte, Stuttgart/Weimar 2007, 334–335; S. Martinelli Tempesta, Nota sulla tradizione manoscritta del corpus isocrateo, in: Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini (CPF). Testi e lessico nei papiri di cultura greca e latina. I.2: Cultura e Filosofia (Galenus - Isocrates), Florence 2008, xviii-xxx.

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Regarding the text of Isocrates, the old saying of L.E. Sandys (1868, xxi) still applies: “The text of Isocrates is perhaps in a sounder condition than that of any Greek author”.144 The main problem with the manuscript tradition is the characterisation of Γ as the codex optimus. The manuscript was discovered by I. Bekker and used in the edition of Oratores Attici: Isocrates (Oxford 1823); its validity was further affirmed following the edition of E. Drerup (1906). It was thenceforth exceptionally difficult to dispute its superiority over the Vulgata-mss. However, individual objections145 were finally expressed in the study by F. Seck (1965), who compared the medieval manuscripts to the papyri and re-contextualised the problem: neither Urbinas 111 (Γ) can have absolute effect, nor can the writings of the Vulgata-mss be excluded a priori. Both branches originate from the independent traditions of equally old hyparchetypes. In 1988, C.A. Hope discovered a wooden codex in Egypt containing the speeches To Demonicus, To Nicocles and Nicocles. Its publication by K.A. Worp and A. Rijksbaron (1997)146 confirmed Seck’s hypothesis, as it exhibits a large variety of readings that often differ from the Urbinas (Γ). The final conclusion is that there is no affirmation of preference for either branch of the manuscript tradition, and they recommend the eclectic method on a case by case basis. In the critical edition of Isocrates, B.G. Mandilaras (2003) bases his work on codex Γ, which he regards as superior to the others, but does not adopt the characterisation of codex optimus.147 Isocrates’ school of rhetoric was the most successful of his era. It had a decisive impact on the development of rhetoric as a genre, the educational system of antiquity and the stylistic norms of the rhetorical art. After Isocrates, rhetoric remained an integral part of the educational curriculum.148 Aristotle and the early Peripatetics did

|| 144 Cf. J. Sykutris, Gnomon 6 (1930) 349: “In reality, the text of this orator leaves very little room for conjecture”. 145 See B.P. Grenfell, The Value of Papyri for the Textual Criticism of Extant Greek Authors, JHS 39 (1919) 29–30; Η. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 264–266. 146 The editors assign the siglum Ψ to it and consider that its treatment must be similar to that of medieval manuscripts rather than a papyrus (Worp/Rijksbaron 1997, 7). Cf. G.J. Boter, Mnemosyne 53 (2000) 732–736, esp. note 1; P.M. Pinto, PKell III Gr. 95, in: CPF I.2 (2008) 252–257. 147 Attention is required at certain points of the critical apparatus of the Mandilaras edition, such as the correctors of Γ. On the serious problems of the Mandilaras edition, see the review of S. MartinelliTempesta, Gnomon 78 (2006) 583–596. Cf. Zingg (2017) 29 note 114. A new critical edition of Isocrates is being prepared by S. Martinelli-Tempesta in the Oxford series, the text of which is already used in the commentary of Zingg (2017). 148 See H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité, Paris 1948, 19, 131–147; M.I. Finley, The Heritage of Isocrates, in: M.I. Finley, The Use and Abuse of History, London 1975, 193–214; L. Gualdo Rosa, La fede nella “paideia”. Aspetti della fortuna europea di Isocrate nei secoli XV e XVI, Rome 1984; Livingstone (1998) 263–281; Hariman (2004) 217–234. Cf. Voliotis (1988).

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not conceal their preference for the epideictic speeches of Isocrates, regarding Demosthenes with skepticism. Aristotle acknowledged Isocrates as the premier virtuoso of the written word and his tremendous contribution to the development of rhetorical style, particularly with regard to epideictic oratory. Most of the stylistic examples in his Rhetoric come from Isocrates.149 After his death, several authors wrote about his life and pupils (Phaenias of Eresus, Idomeneus of Lampsacus, Philiscus of Miletus), but there is scant information (Engels 2003, 183). The fragments transmitted by Hermippus of Smyrna are examples of Alexandrian scholarship. He wrote two texts titled Peri Isokratous in one book and Peri tōn Isokratous mathētōn in at least two (perhaps three) books (FGrH 1026 F42– 54); according to Pseudo-Plutarch, Isocrates had a total of one hundred pupils (Vit. dec. or. 837C). This is probably an exaggeration, but at least 41 names have been verified.150 In Antidosis (15.93), Isocrates himself already names his first eight students who were crowned by Athens with golden crowns. The most important of these was the ninth, the general Timotheus, to whom he dedicates an apology-encomium (15.101–139); he is also referred to as a pupil of Isocrates by Pseudo-Demosthenes in Eroticus (61.46). The transmission of Isocrates’ written speeches, such as the Panegyricus, must have decisively contributed to the rapid increase in the number of his pupils: Theopompus of Chios (first an orator, subsequently a historian; Quint. 10.1.74; Dion. Hal. Epist. Pomp. 6, p. 244 Us.-Rad.), Ephorus of Cuma (a historian), Nicocles of Salamis in Cyprus (a monarch) are some of his best-known non-Athenian pupils who were active in the fields of literature and politics. According to biographical sources, his most renowned pupils include Isaeus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Aeschines and Demosthenes,151 as well as poets such as Theodectes of Phaselis. These accounts are not uniform and not always reliable; some must be attributed to the discussions of the teachers of major figures of classical antiquity and the trend to seek out important individuals behind them. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: Isocratean rhetoric set the bar very high; since then, “all literary genres (both prosaic and poetical) surrendered to the unyielding demand for elegant rhetorical form.” (Münscher 1919, 2223).

|| 149 See above Chapter 3.2.1; M. Vallozza, Isocrate nel Peripato, in: R. Pretagostini/E. Dettori (eds.), La cultura ellenistica. L’opera letteraria e l’esegesi antica, Rome 2004, 231–244; Alexiou (2016) 401– 418. 150 See P. Sanneg, De schola Isocratea. Pars prior, Nordhausen 1867. Cf. J. Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings. A Reappraisal, Leuven 1999, 82–90; Engels (2003) 175–194; M. Pinto, L’école d’Isocrate. Un bilan, in: C. Bouchet/P. Giovanelli-Jouanna (eds.), Isocrate. Entre jeu rhetorique et enjeux politiques, Lyon 2015, 324; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 151. 151 According to Hermippus (FGrH 1026 F45 and 49), Demosthenes was not a regular pupil of Isocrates. Cf. Engels (2003) 186.

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Cicero remarks that eminent personalities sprang from the school of Isocrates like the Trojan Horse.152 He calls him pater eloquentiae (De or. 2.10) as well as magnus orator et perfectus magister (Brut. 32). Dionysius of Halicarnassus – a proponent of unity between rhetoric and philosophy – regards Isocrates’ speeches as the best introduction to ethics, politics and practical philosophy (Isocr. 4, p. 60–61 Us.-Rad.): κράτιστα γὰρ δὴ παιδεύματα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς Ἰσοκράτους ἔστιν εὑρεῖν λόγοις. καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας οὐχὶ μέρος τι τῆς πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλ’ ὅλην αὐτὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν ῥήτορα διὰ χειρός. καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, μηδ’ ἀφ’ ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυπον ἕξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακελευσαίμην ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι προαίρεσιν. The best possible lessons (paideumata) in virtue are to be found in the discourses of Isocrates: I therefore affirm that the man who intends to acquire ability in the whole field of politics, not merely a part of that science, should make Isocrates his constant companion. And anyone who is interested in true philosophy (alēthinē philosophia), and enjoys studying its practical as well as its speculative branches, and is seeking a career by which he will benefit (ōphelein) many people, not one which will give him a carefree (alypos) life, would be well advised to follow the principles which this orator adopts. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

According to Dionysius, Isocrates was the most distinguished of those who flourished during that era as the teacher of the most eminent youths in Athens and in Greece at large (Isocr. 1, p. 55 Us.-Rad.). His grandeur is likened to the art of Polycleitus and Phidias, and is possibly attributed to a naturally high-minded character or a similar inclination towards the grand and admirable (Isocr. 3, p. 60 Us.-Rad: σεμνὸν καὶ θαυμαστόν).153 Aelius Aristides adopts the views of Isocrates and attempts to imitate him,154 while the Roman emperor Julian assesses the rhetorician’s ethical exhortations superior to those of king Solomon (Against the Galileans 224C-D). However, there are sporadic criticisms of monotony in the Isocratean periodic and instructive style, which cannot be compared to the charm of Lysias (Dion. Hal. Isocr. 3, p. 59; 13, p. 73 Us.-Rad.; Demosth. 21, p. 176 Us.-Rad.; Hermog. De id. 2.11, p. 397 Rabe). Plutarch mocks his fastidiousness (De gl. Ath. 350C–351A) and cites the

|| 152 De oratore 2.94: cuius e ludo tamquam ex equo Troiano meri principes exierunt. On the influence of Isocrates on Cicero and later authors, see H.M. Hubbell, The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides, Yale 1913; S.E. Smethurst, Cicero and Isocrates, TAPhA 84 (1953) 262–320; E. Laughton, Cicero and Greek Orators, AJPh 82 (1961) 27–49; A. Weische, Ciceros Nachahmung der attischen Redner, Heidelberg 1972; Too (2006) 121; K. Tempest, Hellenistic Oratory at Rome. Cicero’s Pro Marcello, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 306. On the reception of Isocrates in general, cf. Thraede (1998) 1037–1048; W. Orth, Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen Isokrates-Rezeption, in: Orth (2003) 1–6. 153 Cf. N. Wiater, The Ideology of Classicism. Language, History, and Identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Berlin 2011, 65 ff. 154 Cf. Aelius Aristides 2(45).395; 2(45).398; 2(45).403 and Isocrates 3.5–9; 15.253–257.

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joke that his pupils kept on studying with him till they were old men, as if they were to practise their arts and plead their cases before Minos in Hades (Cato maj. 23.2). In On the Sublime 38.2, Pseudo-Longinus mocks Isocrates’ phrase in the proem of Panegyricus (4.8) on the power of rhetoric (“such is the power of language that it can extenuate what is great, and lend greatness to what is little”), considering this flourish to be like a signal hung out to warn his audience not to believe him. Isocrates was unquestionably a pioneer on numerous levels: he completed the evolution of the written prosaic language (Vollender der griechischen Kunstprosa; Norden 1915, 113) and claimed first prize in the competition between poetry and rhetoric. His art influenced those came after him as a literary model. By promoting the written word, Isocrates became “the first individual who could be termed a ‘writer’ in the modern sense of the term” (Lentz 1989, 123) and is classified in the tradition of a literary rhetoric.155 When Isocrates himself quotes his past written speeches word-forword in Antidosis (15.59; 15.66; 15.73), he treats them as examples of a well-rounded classical writer (Jaeger 1959, ΙΙΙ 202). In Evagoras he presents himself as a trail-blazing innovator who wrote the first encomium of a contemporary historical figure, and the influence of this encomium on the evolution of the genre vindicates him; texts such as Xenophon’s Agesilaus and Cyropaedia or Pseudo-Demosthenes’ Eroticus (61) are the first examples of a tradition that owes much to Isocrates’ Evagoras. We are aware of numerous encomia of Gryllus, the son of Xenophon who fell at the Battle of Mantinea (362 BC), one of which is attributed to Isocrates (Diog. Laert. 2.55).156 Isocrates refers to encomia of Archidamus, his father and the entire Spartan royal family (Epist. 9.1). Theopompus of Chios and Lamachus of Smyrna allegedly wrote encomia of Philip II and Alexander the Great (FGrH 115 F255–257; Plut. Demosth. 9.1), Theodectes an encomium of Alexander of Epirus (B XXXVII 2 Rad.), and Aesopus an encomium of Mithridates VI Eupator (FGrH 187a).157 An encomium contest was organised by Artemisia II following the death of her husband Mausolus in 352 BC (Gell. 10.18.6; cf. [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838B). One of the participants was named Isocrates, possibly a pupil of the rhetorician, hailing from Apollonia (see Suda ι 653 s.v. Isokrates; θ 138 s.v. Theodektes). The historian Theopompus, allegedly a pupil of Isocrates, is named as the winner of the contest. The encomium tradition would continue in subsequent centuries, until the panegyrical

|| 155 Cf. Ν. Livingstone, Isocrates. Philosophy as Refined Civic Discourse, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac, and Arabic Worlds, Hildesheim 2009, 43–54; R.L. Enos, Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle, Anderson SC 2012 (rev. ed. of 1993), 143–175, esp. 167 ff. 156 The Encomium of Gryllus was likely written by Isocrates and not his pupil by the same name from Apollonia. Cf. Brodersen (2003) 169 notes 1 and 3. 157 Cf. Pernot (2015) 24.

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speeches in the honour of emperors, imitating the style of Isocrates’ Evagoras.158 Isocrates thus put his own words into action: Evagoras 9(7) καὶ τὰς ἐπιδόσεις ἴσμεν γιγνομένας καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὐ διὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐπανορθοῦντας καὶ τολμῶντας ἀεί τι κινεῖν τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων. Evagoras 9(7) Progress (epidoseis) in the arts and in all other things is not due to those who adhere to the status quo but to those who make improvements and dare always to change things that are wrong. (Transl. Y.L. Τοο in: Mirhady/Too 2000).

Isocrates’ moral rhetoric was extricated from the formalistic technique of the sophists, but it is not a philosophy of the Platonic type, a metaphysical science. Isocrates is not interested in the transmission of the absolute knowledge of beings, nor did he even consider it feasible. His rhetoric is always based on a correct opinion (doxa) and social norms (homologoumenē aretē); the vita contemplativa lies beyond his worldview. The promotion of individual personality and its role within and beyond the political structures of the city-state are key pursuits in his rhetorical and educational work. Isocrates does not aim at one conflicting with the many, but at achieving harmony between competitive and cooperative values, while underlining the personal responsibility of orators in the correct use of the art of rhetoric. As a cultural force, Isocratean rhetoric includes eu legein and eu phronein, and represents the classical humanistic ideal of harmonious development of one’s personality which, through Cicero and the Renaissance, became deeply rooted in European values to this day. Isocrates is “truly an example, if not the prototype of the humanistic educational

|| 158 See C. Kremmydas, Hellenistic Oratory and the Evidence of Rhetorical Exercises, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 151. See also H. Hunger, Prooimion. Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden, Vienna 1964, 49, 144; H. Hunger, Aspekte der griechischen Rhetorik von Gorgias bis zum Untergang von Byzanz, Vienna 1972, 15; H. Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, I, Munich 1978, 159, 208; Voliotis (1988) 110–111; T. Hägg/P. Rousseau, Introduction. Biography and Panegyric, in: T. Hägg/P. Rousseau (eds.), Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, Berkeley 2000, 2–3.

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ideal”.159 Even the Pan-Hellenic ideal, which he served throughout his life with singular perseverance, became a reality, albeit in a way quite different and more violent than the rhetorician’s moral beliefs.160 Although Isocrates’ curriculum, in the context of the dispute between philosophy and rhetoric, remains contested, there are strong indications that the renaissance of Isocrates since the late 20th century has paved new roads for research into his work that exceed the limits of classical philology. His prominent position in the transition from the orality to literacy and his insistence on political visions beyond the borders of the traditional city-state161 are interwoven with a conception of rhetoric which, in our contemporary multi-aspected and liberal culture, seeks out Isocratean models.162

|| 159 Steidle (1952) 283–284: “wirklich ein, vielleicht sogar der Prototyp des humanistischen Bildungsideals”. Cf. Norden (1915) 796–802; H.L. Hudson-Williams, A Greek Humanist, G&R 9 (1940) 166–172; A. Burk, Die Pädagogik des Isokrates als Grundlegung des humanistischen Bildungsideals, Würzburg 1923; Jaeger (1959) III 105; M. Fuhrmann, Die antike Rhetorik. Eine Einführung, 4. ed., Zurich 1995, 27–28; J.M. Day, Rhetoric and Ethics from the Sophists to Aristotle, in: Worthington (2007) 384–386; R. Nicolai, La fortuna del modello educativo di Isocrate. Da Cicerone alla tarda antichità, SemRom 12 (2009) 289–309; W. Stroh, Die Macht der Rede. Eine kleine Geschichte der Rhetorik im alten Griechenland und Rom, Berlin 2009, 126–143; Wareh (2012) 197–208. 160 Cf. J. Fündling, Philipp II von Makedonien, Darmstadt 2014, 147. In Letter 3.6, following the Battle of Chaeronea, Isocrates expresses his satisfaction with the outcome of events, possibly because the ultimate objective of the Persian expedition had become a priority. On the other hand, the contradictory account that Isocrates starved himself to death after the defeat at Chaeronea ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 838Β) may be nothing more than the moral dimension of his politics which did not come to pass, and the attempt of his son, Aphareus, and his associates to restore and lionise Isocrates. Cf. Blass (1887–1898) ΙΙ 96–98; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 156. 161 J. de Romilly, Isocrates and Europe, G&R 39 (1992) 2–13; cf. Hariman (2004) 231. 162 See C. Marsh, Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations. An Isocratean Model, New York 2013; Cf. J.R. Muir, Is our History of Educational Philosophy Mostly Wrong? The Case of Isocrates, Theory and Research in Education 3 (2005) 165–195; C. Marsh, Millennia of Discord. The Controversial Educational Program of Isocrates, Theory and Research in Education 8 (2010) 289–303.

6 Demosthenes 6.1 Life Regarding the biographical sources on Demosthenes, A. Lesky’s remark remains true (1966, 596): “As a result of the fame which Demosthenes enjoyed in antiquity, there are fairly abundant sources available for him”. As political oratory found its supreme manifestation in Demosthenes and the orator’s life is so closely linked to his political career, the most important sources for his life are both his own speeches and those of his contemporaries (Aeschines, Hyperides and Dinarchus).1 To these one should add the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 844A–848D), two texts by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (On the Style of Demosthenes and First Letter to Ammaeus), Plutarch’s Life of Demosthenes,2 the commentaries by scholiasts such as Didymus (P. Berol. 9780, second half of the 1st century BC),3 the Life of Demosthenes by Libanius with the Hypotheses to the orations of Demosthenes,4 the Vita by Zosimus of Ascalon, an anonymous Vita, as well as the entries found in Photius (Bibl. 265) and the Suda (3 entries δ 454, 455, 456). Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Paeania and Cleoboule, was born, despite conflicting information found in sources, around 384 BC in Athens (Demosth. 30.15; 21.154).5 His mother’s unclear origins from the Scytho-Greek kingdom of Bosporus later gave rise to his political opponents reviling him as “Scythian” and as a “Scythian barbarian who speaks Greek” (Aeschin. 3.172: Σκύθης βάρβαρος ἑλληνίζων τῇ φωνῇ; Din. 1.15), but this does not mean that Demosthenes was not a genuine Athenian with full rights as a citizen (Badian 2000, 13). He came from a wealthy family ‒ his father owned a sword-making factory (μαχαιροποιός; Plut. Demosth. 4.1), but died when Demosthenes was seven years old. His three legal guardians, Aphobus, Demophon and Therippides, misappropriated and squandered the family estate, so upon becoming an adult and being free of their guardianship, Demosthenes became involved in serious trials where rhetoric was the most important means in the fight for his inheritance.

|| 1 On the problems concerning the historical reliability and accuracy of orations, see Worthington (1991) 55–74; I. Worthington, History and Oratorical Exploitation, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action, London 1994, 109–129; Buckler (2000) 148 ff. 2 See A. Lintott, Plutarch Demosthenes and Cicero, Oxford 2013 and generally B.L. Cook, The Biographic Tradition, in: Martin (2018) 297–308, esp. 299 f. 3 See Pearson/Stephens (1983); Harding (2006); Trevett (2011) 22–24. 4 See Gibson (1999) 171–202. 5 MacDowell (1990) 370–371; (2009) 18–19. See also Davies (1971) 123–126. On ancient information, see summarily Schaefer (1966–1967) III,2 38–57. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-006

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When Demosthenes was trained in rhetoric is uncertain – perhaps even before he became an adult (Demosth. 30.6), studying with the learned and experienced logographer Isaeus, who specialised in inheritance law (Dion. Hal. Isae. 1, p. 93 Us.-Rad.; Plut. Demosth. 5.6; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 844B). Isocrates is also mentioned as Demosthenes’ teacher ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 844B), but the direct “teacher - pupil” relationship was already disputed in antiquity (Plut. Demosth. 5.6–7). The account (attributed to Hermippus) that Plato was also his teacher is even less likely (Plut. Demosth. 5.7; cf. Gell. 3.13); Demosthenes may have read Plato’s works (Cic. Brut. 121), but studying under him appears to be a later invention.6 On the contrary, Thucydides must have exerted considerable influence on Demosthenes (Dion. Hal. Thuc. 53, p. 412: Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατὰ πολλά; cf. 55, p. 417 Us.-Rad.). Ancient anecdotes concerning Demosthenes’ steps to overcome his bodily deficiencies (e.g. indistinctness and lisping in his speech), such as elocution exercises or speaking in front of a large looking-glass, support his tenacity and willpower to surmount his weaknesses and improve his delivery, including diction, voice and gestures (Plut. Demosth. 11). It is unclear whether the nickname Βάτ(τ)αλος (Aeschin. 1.126; 1.131; 1.164; 2.99; Demosth. 18.180) is associated with stammering or has sexual connotations (MacDowell 2009, 19). Our knowledge of Demosthenes’ family later in life is scant. He apparently married the daughter of Heliodorus, a cleruch from Samos, but we do not know when. There is similarly sparse information concerning two sons and a daughter. The daughter passed away in 336 BC while still a child ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 847C). Regarding the trials concerning his patrimony, certain speeches survive: the speech Against Aphobus 1 (27) and the rebuttal to his defence, Against Aphobus 2 (28; additionally, the defence 29 Against Aphobus for Phanus), and the two speeches Against Onetor 1 and 2 (30 and 31). Although Demosthenes recovered but a small portion of his estate (363 BC), his success against Aphobus was enormous and his reputation as a successful logographer became established for the future. At the same time, he attracted the attention of Athenians and paved the way for his political career; however, he also made enemies of Aphobus’ friends, such as the ill-tempered Meidias (28.17; 21.78–79; cf. Lehmann 2004, 47). As a logographer, he apparently enjoyed great appeal, as it emerges from the large number of speeches for private trials found in the Demosthenic corpus (27–58), although a considerable number are not authentic. Apart from working as a logographer, he also taught rhetoric (Aesch. 1.117: ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν; 1.170 ff.), but never founded a school. It is reported that in 366 BC, the young Demosthenes was among the audience at the important political trial against Callistratus of Aphidnae.

|| 6 See Yunis (1996) 237–277; Pernot (2006) 21–60; MacDowell (2009) 21–22, 408–409; Roisman/ Worthington (2015) 215.

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The statesman Callistratus delivered an exceptional defence and he and his co-defendant, the general Chabrias, were acquitted. Regardless of whether or not this anecdotal account concerning Callistratus inspired young Demosthenes’ political career (Plut. Demosth. 5.4–5; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 844B), Demosthenes participated in civil trials since the middle of the decade between 460 and 450 BC, which marked his entry in the Athenian political arena (Against Androtion [22], 355 BC;7 Against Leptines [20], 354 BC; Against Timocrates [24], 352 BC). In 354/353 BC, Demosthenes gave his first deliberative speech before the Athenian Assembly: On the Symmories (14). This gives rise to questions concerning the line of politics he followed: whether his speeches at the beginning of his political career indicate that he was a supporter of Eubulus, the statesman who governed affairs in Athens at that time,8 and whether Demosthenes himself represented, according to A. Schaefer (1966–1967, I 449), “higher state ethics compared to the favoured of the era”. In classical Athens, there were no political parties with registered members in the present-day sense,9 but conflicting political circles with different political approaches, depending on shifting circumstances.10 Demosthenes definitely did not belong to the close political circle of Eubulus (Carlier 1990, 81; cf. Papillon 1998, 105– 111); it is most likely that he initially held similar political views, while his early political-deliberative speeches also reflect personal motivations.11 Demosthenes’ autonomous political biography, which coincides with Athenian political history, began in 353 BC. Demosthenes was a proponent of his city’s active foreign policy: On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15), For the Megalopolitans (16), Against Aristocrates (23). Since 357 BC, Athens was at war with Philip II of Macedon due to the taking of Amphipolis (Diod. 16.8.2), but the speech Philippic 1 (4; 352/351 BC)12 marks the start of Demosthenes’ continual struggle against the danger from the north and the ever-expanding Macedon;13 this struggle, through which Demosthenes

|| 7 Cf. the earlier dating of 358/357 or 357/356 BC in Lewis (1997) 230 ff. 8 See Schwartz (1893) 30–31, 50–51; Kennedy (1963) 215; H. Bengtson, Griechische Geschichte, 5. ed., Munich 1977, 315; Wooten (2008) 8; Worthington (2013) 89–91. Cf. G.L. Cawkwell, Eubulus, JHS 83 (1963) 47–67; C. Karvounis, Political Career, in: Martin (2018) 323–324. 9 See M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Structures, Principles, and Ideology, 2. ed., London 1999, 277–287; Will (2013) 41–42, 44; Worthington (2013) 36. 10 See J. Engels, Lykurgos’ Speech Against Leocrates. Creating Civic Identity and Educating Athenian Citizens, in: B. Alroth/C. Scheffer (eds.), Attitudes towards the Past in Antiquity. Creating Identities, Stockholm 2014, 22. 11 See Badian (2000) 23–26; Lehmann (2004) 70–75. 12 On the dating Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 4, p. 261 Us.-Rad.; cf. Sealey (1955) 81 ff.; G.L. Cawkwell, The Defence of Olynthus, CQ 12 (1962) 122–127; Milns (2000) 206; Wooten (2008) 11 with note 12; MacDowell (2009) 211–213; Trevett (2011) 69. For a view in favour of 349 BC, see Schwartz (1893) 1–56, esp. 34 ff. 13 See J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London 1976; G.W. Griffith, The Reign of Philip Second, in: N.G.L. Hammond/G.W. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, II, Oxford 1979, 203–315;

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wished to awaken the Athenians from their awkward passivity and actively contribute to the political decisions of his city, would affect the entirety of his life. The three Olynthiac speeches (1–3) are dated during the war for Olynthus in Chalcidice (349/348 BC). This was followed by the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC), “the crucial episode in Demosthenes’ political career” (Ryder 2000, 58): Demosthenes, along with the bestknown of his political opponents, Aeschines, participated in the peace mission to Philip.14 In To Philip (5), written during the same period, Isocrates exhorts the Macedonian king to unite the Greeks and make war against the Persians. Initially, Demosthenes was in favour of peace (On the Peace [5]), but the political winds soon shifted: Demosthenes accused Aeschines of fraud and bribery due to his role in brokering the Peace of Philocrates (On the False Embassy [19], 343 BC; cf. MacDowell 2000, 1–22). Philip II developed his military and political influence through an active expansionary policy, and Demosthenes engaged in frenzied political activity to stage a front against him. This period, “the climax of Demosthenes’ career” (die hohe Zeit des Demosthenes, Lesky 1966, 604; Will 2013, 138), which led to the mother of all battles, the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), gave rise to the next three speeches, Philippic 2, 3, 4 (6, 9, 10) and On the Chersonese (8). Demosthenes achieved the creation of a broad antiMacedonian front (18.237); the creation of an alliance was the pinnacle of his political achievements, but could not mitigate the defeat at Chaeronea. It would be a mistake to interpret this alliance, as W. Jaeger did, as national unification of the Greeks at the hour of supreme danger (Jaeger 1938, 172–173). According to Demosthenes’ Athenscentric beliefs, had the alliance won, Athens would have become a defining force among Greek states (18.306; Lehmann 2004, 164; cf. Weissenberger 2019, 215–229).15 Critically, Demosthenes yet again takes a different approach to that of Isocrates: Demosthenes’ political ideals were guided by the traditionally leading role that Athens played in Greece and not Isocrates’ Pan-Hellenic ideal.

|| N.G.L. Hammond, Philip of Macedon, London 1994; I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, New Haven/London 2008; S. Müller, Philip II, in: J. Roisman/I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Chichester UK 2010, 166–185; R. Lane Fox, Philip of Macedon. Accession, Ambitions and Self-Presentation, in: R. Lane Fox (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD, Leiden/Boston 2011, 335–366; J. Fündling, Philipp II von Makedonien, Darmstadt 2014; I. Worthington, By the Spear. Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire, Oxford 2014; C.J. King, Ancient Macedonia, London/New York 2018, 70–106. Cf. Karvounis (2002) 45 ff. On the issue of “Demosthenes - Philip”, see in detail Ryder (2000) 45–89; Will (2013). 14 For the rivalry between Demosthenes and Aeschines, see Buckler (2000) 114–158. For Demosthenes and prominent Athenian Politicians as Aeschines, Hyperides and Lycurgus, see N. Sawada, Alleis and Foes (I). Aeschines, Hyperides, Lucurgus, in: Martin (2018) 337–351. 15 Cf. Will (2013) 145: “Demosthenes had lost a fight: the fight for hegemony (Kampf um die Hegemonie)”.

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Despite the military defeat and the political change brought about by new conditions following the victory of the Macedonians,16 Demosthenes enjoyed sufficient prestige among the most acclaimed statesmen to be the one selected to give the Epitaphios (60; around late 338 BC) in honour of the fallen at Chaeronea (Samotta 2010, 88–95). From his words, it emerges that he considered this assignment to be a particular honour (18.285; cf. Plut. Demosth. 21.2; Liddel 2007, 221): On the Crown 18(285) πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἡ πόλις, Αἰσχίνη, καὶ προείλετο καὶ κατώρθωσεν δι’ ἐμοῦ, ὧν οὐκ ἠμνημόνησεν. σημεῖον δέ· χειροτονῶν γὰρ ὁ δῆμος τὸν ἐροῦντ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ συμβάντα, οὐ σ’ ἐχειροτόνησε προβληθέντα, καίπερ εὔφωνον ὄντα, οὐδὲ Δημάδην, ἄρτι πεποιηκότα τὴν εἰρήνην, οὐδ’ Ἡγήμονα, οὐδ’ ἄλλον ὑμῶν οὐδένα, ἀλλ’ ἐμέ. On the Crown 18(285) Through me, Aeschines, the city pursued and realized many important, noble objectives, which it has not forgotten. Consider this. At the time of those events, the people were to elect a citizen to speak at the public funeral. Though you were a candidate, you were not elected, in spite of your pleasing voice. Demades was not elected, though he had just concluded the peace, and neither was Hegemon or any other of your group, but I was. (Transl. Η. Yunis 2005)

After Chaeronea, Demosthenes had to adapt to the new conditions, but remained active in both domestic and international politics.17 He triumphantly announced the news of Philip’s death (Aeschin. 3.77; 3.160; Plut. Demosth. 22.1–2), although the sacking and destruction of Thebes by Alexander, the son of Philip (335 BC), ended any plans for further resistance. Through Demades’ diplomatic involvement, Alexander abandoned his initial demand for Demosthenes’ extradition (Diod. 17.15.3–5).18 In 336 BC, shortly before the death of Philip (Aeschin. 3.219), Ctesiphon proposed that Demosthenes be publicly honoured with a golden crown during the Dionysia for his services to the city. Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon for illegal proposal and the trial, which underwent extended postponement, finally took place in 330 BC. Both Aeschines’ prosecution (Against Ctesiphon [3]) and Ctesiphon’s defence by Demosthenes, the renowned speech On the Crown (18), survive in full. The outcome of the trial was a triumph for Demosthenes, as Aeschines did not receive even one fifth of the votes cast (Plut. Demosth. 24.2; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840C).19

|| 16 The peace negotiations with Philip II were taken over by Aeschines, Demades and Phocion. See Demosth. 18.282; 18.285; Ryder (2000) 83. 17 Cf. Davies (1971) 137. 18 Cf. Arrian 1.10.3–6; Plut. Demosth. 23.6; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841E, 847C, 848E; A.B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, Oxford 1980, 92–96; Sealey (1993) 204– 205; Lehmann (2004) 190–191. 19 On the trial, see Wankel (1976) 8–41; E.M. Harris, Law and Oratory, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action, London 1994, 130–150, esp. 142 ff.; Buckler (2000) 145–147; W. Schuller, Der Kranzprozeß des Jahres 330 v. Chr. oder: Der Abgesang auf die Klassische Polis, in: L.

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During the subsequent period (330–324 BC), Demosthenes would not take centre stage, but it would be an exaggeration to consider these years to be “blank pages in Demosthenes’ life” (Bengtson 1983, 299; for a correct view, see Lehmann 2004, 204).20 The Harpalus affair is testament to his political power. In 324 BC, Harpalus, the imperial treasurer of Alexander, found refuge in Athens, was first arrested and then escaped through bribery.21 Demosthenes was one of the politicians suspected of bribery (Diod. 17.108.8); he was charged by a total of ten prosecutors, including his former political ally Hyperides (Against Demosthenes; cf. also Dinarchus’ Against Demosthenes). Demosthenes was fined 50 talents and imprisoned, but soon escaped and found refuge in Troizen. He insisted on his innocence (Epist. 2.2; 2.14–16; 3.37–38; 3.43). After Alexander’s sudden death, he returned triumphantly to Athens, following a decree introduced by Demon of Paeania, a cousin of Demosthenes (323 BC; Plut. Demosth. 27.3 ff.), and participated in an anti-Macedonian movement against Antipater. Following defeat in the Lamian War (322 BC),22 he was sentenced to death at the proposal of Demades.23 He committed suicide in the temple of Poseidon at Calauria (modern-day Poros) to avoid arrest (Plut. Demosth. 29–30; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 846F– 847B; [Lucian] Demosth. Enc. 49). The conclusion expressed by I. Worthington (2000c, 107) is apt: during the era of Alexander, “Lycurgus played a significant role in the city’s finances, but it was Demosthenes who dictated the most important policy: foreign affairs”. Several years after this death (280/279 BC or perhaps already by 281/280 BC), at the initiative of his nephew Demochares, the Athenians erected a statue to honour him, bearing the legendary epigram, the origins of which are the subject of dispute: εἴπερ ἴσην γνώμῃ ῥώμην Δημόσθενες ἔσχες, / οὔποτ’ ἂν Ἑλλήνων

|| Burckhardt/J. v. Ungern-Sternberg (eds.), Große Prozesse im antiken Athen, Munich 2000, 190–200; MacDowell (2009) 382–397; Will (2013) 171–173; Worthington (2013) 294–309. 20 Cf. Worthington (2000b) 90–113. Will (2013) 161–168, 179 ff. is in favour of a political turn in Demosthenes’ thinking after 335 BC, engaging in covert diplomacy of conciliation with Alexander. 21 Regarding this prominent case, see E. Badian, Harpalus, JHS 81 (1961) 16–43; S. Jaschinski, Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck der Flucht des Harpalos, Bonn 1981; Will (1983) 113–127; Carlier (1990) 261–268; I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, Ann Arbor 1992, 41– 77; I. Worthington, The Harpalus Affair and the Greek Response to the Macedonian Hegemony, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Ventures into Greek History. Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond, Oxford 1994, 307–330; C.W. Blackwell, In the Absense of Alexander. Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority, New York 1999; W. Eder, Die Harpalos-Affäre, in: L. Burckhardt/ J. v. Ungern-Sternberg (eds.), Große Prozesse im antiken Athen, Munich 2000, 201–215; Lehmann (2004) 206–216; Worthington (2013) 310–325. 22 Diod. 18.17.3–5. See F.W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia, III, Oxford 1988, 108–117; O. Schmitt, Der Lamische Krieg, Bonn 1992. 23 Cf. P. Brun, L’orateur Démade. Essai d’histoire et d’historiographie, Bordeaux 2000, 118 ff.

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ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών (“If only your strength had been equal, Demosthenes, to your wisdom, never would Greece have been ruled by a Macedonian Ares”).24

6.2 Work 6.2.1 Research Τrends and the Ιssue of Αuthenticity Contrary to the scholarly Isocrates, who favoured moralistic, comprehensive solutions to overcome problems within and beyond his city, the promotion of individuality in Demosthenes’ case originates from a different basis: emphasis is placed on the active, practical functioning of the individual within conflicting political factions and synergies. Isocrates is the teacher, while Demosthenes is the politician. In Demosthenes’ case, the individual guides and energises society as a whole on the practical political scene. Unlike Isocrates, Demosthenes does not wish to educate Athens but to see Athens take direct action and for his rhetoric to serve practical action. Demosthenes led or enjoyed the favour of the majority of the Athenian demos, or struggled to win it over or lost the demos to political opponents. In this sense, Demosthenes’ life, political career and rhetorical prowess are integrally linked to each other. The overall engagement with Demosthenes in the monumental studies undertaken in the 19th century by A. Schaefer and F. Blass was succeeded – following certain milestones in the 20th century25 – by extensive activity in the present day: since the end of the 20th century, a number of monographs have focused on Demosthenes as an orator and politician.26 It appears that Demosthenes and his oratory have been rediscovered.

|| 24 See Plut. Demosth. 30.5; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 847A, 847D, 850F. See in detail R. von den Hoff, Die Bildnisstatue des Demosthenes als öffentliche Ehrung eines Bürgers in Athen, in: C. Mann et al. (eds.), Rollenbilder in der athenischen Demokratie. Medien, Gruppen, Räume im politischen und sozialen System, Wiesbaden 2009, 193–220; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 269–271; N. Luraghi, Stairway to Heaven. The Politics of Memory in Early Hellenstic Athens, in: Canevaro/Gray (2018) 32–34. Cf. Lehmann (2004) 20 ff.; Worthington (2013) 337–339. 25 Pickard-Cambridge (1914); Clémenceau (1926); Cloché (1937); Jaeger (1938). 26 Sealey (1993); Worthington (2000); Lehmann (2004); MacDowell (2009); Samotta (2010); Will (2013); Worthington (2013); Brun (2015). Cf. summarily T. Paulsen, Demosthenic Scholarship, in: Martin (2018) 7–18.

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A total of 61 speeches are attributed to Demosthenes, along with a collection of stock deliberative Prooimia27 and six Letters, which – with the exception of the inauthentic Letter 5 – Demosthenes addressed to the Athenians from exile.28 Discounting speech No 12, which is a Letter of Philip, speeches 1 through 17 are deliberative speeches for the Assembly, 18 through 26 and 59 are judicial speeches for public suits (δίκαι δημόσιαι; the most usual type: γραφαί), 27 through 58 are judicial speeches for private suits (δίκαι ἴδιαι), while 60 and 61 are epideictic speeches. According to Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. dec. or. 847E), Demosthenes wrote 65 authentic speeches, a number that more or less corresponds to his currently extant speeches. The fact that these, particularly the judicial ones, partly include a number of inauthentic speeches has been considered less or more likely already since antiquity. It is universally accepted that speeches 46, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 59 originate from Apollodorus (and possibly speech 47), while the speech Against Stephanus 1 (45) was most likely written by Demosthenes for Apollodorus. It is difficult to definitively resolve the problem of the authenticity of each speech, primarily when stylistic arguments are asserted (Blass 1887–1898, III,1 471–473; statistical analysis in McCabe 1981). A writer’s style may often vary or evolve, therefore such analyses should be used with caution (MacDowell 2009, 9). In certain cases, such as Against Theocrines (58) containing an attack against Demosthenes himself (particularly 58.39–44), the inauthenticity appears to be selfevident. Of the Assembly speeches, On Halonnesus (7) is ascribed to Hegesippus, while On the Agreement with Alexander (17) is also considered inauthentic. The authenticity of On Organisation (13) and the Response to the Letter of Philip (11) is also questionable. The Eroticus (61) is almost certainly not his work and most likely originates from the Isocratean school.29 Nevertheless, the issue of the authenticity of the orations is further complicated if one considers the publication of the extant speeches. I. Worthington is in favour of the revision of the speeches delivered, while J. Trevett holds a different view: Demosthenes did not publish his speeches and the works available to us are the unrevised drafts of certain Demosthenic deliberative speeches that became accessible to the

|| 27 Cf. Rupprecht (1927) 365–432 ; R. Clavaud, Démosthène, Prologues, Paris 1974, 13–25; Yunis (1996) 247–257; Worthington (2006); H. Bannert, Zur Sammlung der Prooimien des Demosthenes, in: Grusková/Bannert (2014) 95–106. 28 Cf. Goldstein (1968); R. Clavaud, Démosthène, Lettres et Fragments, Paris 1987; I. Worthington, The Authenticity of Demosthenes’ Sixth Letter, Mnemosyne 56 (2003) 585–589; Worthington (2006); G. Westwood, Nostalgia. Politics and Persuasion in Demosthenes’ Letters, in: E. Sanders/M. Johncock (eds.), Emotion and Persuasion in Antiquity, Stuttgart 2016, 75–90. 29 There is literary recall from Lysias’ Eroticus (in Plato’s Phaedrus) and Isocrates’ Evagoras. Cf. R. Clavaud, Démosthène, Discours d’apparat (Épitaphios, Éroticos), Paris 1974; Worthington (2006) 38 ff. For the influence of Isocrates’ Evagoras cf. Alexiou (2010) 29, 102–103, 128, 129–130. Roisman (2005) 85–87 interprets the speech from a sociological perspective.

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public just after his death.30 The ring composition, symmetrical structure and meticulous crafting of several speeches are strong indications of revision, yet cannot be generalised or be considered definitive evidence (MacDowell 2009, 8). Furthermore, in the case of an orator who placed such importance on rhetorical delivery (hypokrisis), ex post improvements could not have significantly altered the initial form of a speech that was, in any case, painstakingly prepared. The creation of the corpus of Demosthenic speeches could perhaps be attributed to the orator Demochares, a nephew of Demosthenes, and his anti-Macedonian followers around 300 BC, while spurious speeches, such as those of Apollodorus, intruded later into the corpus.31

6.2.2 The Speeches Demosthenic oratory begins with the judicial speeches32 and it is noteworthy that amongst the Attic orators, most judicial speeches available to us can be found in the corpus of Demosthenes, some for public suits and most for private ones. According to H.J. Wolff (2007, 93), Demosthenes embodies the very model of an advocate of the era, with his judicial speeches painting a realistic picture of judicial practices and serving as a rich source for the understanding of Attic law (cf. Schaefer 1966–1967, I 342). For the “litigious Athenian”,33 the professionalism of a logographer is a vital prerequisite in the rhetorical battle before the court which – in contrast to the aristocratic past – consisted of at least 210 judges in private suits and at least 501 in public suits.34 Demosthenes’ logographic activity helped him make ends meet and make friends in the courts of the Athenian democracy. His clients were friends and belonged to the same social class. However, the occupation of logographer did not meet with any particular social acclaim – Isocrates makes no mention of it at all – and it is no accident

|| 30 See Worthington (1991) 55–74 and Trevett (1996) 425–441. Regarding the scientific debate, cf. M.H. Hansen, Two Notes on Demosthenes’ Symbouleutic Speeches, C&M 35 (1984) 55–70; Tuplin (1998) 276–320; Milns (2000) 207–209. For a good summary, see Hajdú (2002) 46–49. Demosthenes’ reputation in antiquity might explain why many of his deliberative speeches have survived; cf. I. Worthington, Why we have Demosthenes’ Symbouleutic Speeches. A Note, in: F.C. Gabaudan/J.V.M. Dosuna (eds.), Dic Mihi, Musa, Virum. Homenaje al Professor Antonio López Eire, Salamanca 2010, 709–713; J. Trevett, Authenticity, Composition, Publication, in: Martin (2018) 419–430. 31 See L. Canfora, Textgeschichte des Demosthenes im Wandel der Jahrhunderte, in: Grusková/Bannert (2014) 21–52, esp. 48 ff., who agrees with Trevett’s view (p. 48) concerning the non-revision of the Demosthenic speeches. Cf. also K. Kapparis, The Transmission of Apollodoros and the Edition of Mervin Dilts, in: Grusková/Bannert (2014) 107–128. 32 Greek text used: Dilts (2002–2009). 33 See M.R. Christ, The Litigious Athenian, Baltimore 1998. 34 See C. Cooper, Forensic Oratory, in: I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, Malden MA/Oxford 2007, 207.

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that Aeschines mocks Demosthenes by referring to him as logographos and “Scythian” (2.180: τῷ λογογράφῳ καὶ Σκύθῃ; cf. 1.94; 2.165). In this context, the judicial speech Against Zenothemis (32), delivered by a cousin of Demosthenes named Demon in a private suit, is of particular interest. This was a complex case concerning attempted fraud. The speaker admitted that he was supported by Demosthenes, but also cites the orator’s words that since he began speaking on public affairs, he never once intervened in any private case (32.32: μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν πρᾶγμ’ ἴδιον προσεληλυθέναι). This means that, for Demosthenes, being a statesman was far more important than an advocate; nevertheless, accepting the above statement at face value would be highly questionable. 6.2.2.1 Against Aphobus 1 (27) Demosthenes’ judicial speeches for private suits are characterised by a convincing depiction of his clients’ personalities, clarity of narration and argumentation, plainness of thinking and, finally, familiarity with Attic law. The severity and unequivocal rhetorical forcefulness of his demegoric speeches are not yet to be found. Recent scholarship identified an additional characteristic feature: compared to his predecessors (Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus), Demosthenes was the first to encompass the Aristotelian artless proofs (pisteis atechnoi) – recorded testimonies or documents – into his thinking with such success.35 In his early judicial speeches concerning the settlement of his estate, the young Demosthenes adhered to the logographic rules transmitted to him by Isaeus. This is why M. Delaunois (1951, 177–189) distinguished between an initial logical structure (plan logique) and a subsequent psychological structure (plan psychologique) in Demosthenes’ speeches. Against Aphobus 1 (27), a suit against his guardian, is a successful example of this logical structure.36 The four typical parts of a judicial speech are easily discernible: prooimion (1–3), diēgēsis (4–6), pistis – distinguished into kataskeuē (probatio; 7–48) and anaskeuē (refutatio; 49–59) – and epilogos (60–69). For a twenty-year-old who rapidly learned the basic rules of rhetoric, the speech is a “remarkable product” (Kennedy 1963, 209). At times, the Isocratean model of long periods can be identified, e.g. in the long period found in the epilogue (27.60–61):37 Against Aphobus 1 27(60) τοσαύτης τοίνυν οὐσίας μοι καταλειφθείσης ὅσην ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠκούσατε, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους πρόσοδον αὐτῆς φερούσης πεντήκοντα μνᾶς, ἐξὸν τούτοις τοῖς ἀπληστοτάτοις οὖσι χρημάτων, καὶ εἰ μὴ μισθοῦν τὸν οἶκον ἠβούλοντο, ἀπὸ μὲν τούτων τῶν προσιόντων,

|| 35 Mirhady (2000) 181–204. Cf. M. Canevaro, The Documents in the Attic Orators. Laws and Decrees in the Public Speeches of the Demosthenic Corpus, Oxford 2013. See also M. Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge 2008, 188 ff. 36 In fact, a view was put forth in antiquity that Demosthenes’ speeches claiming his estate were written by Isaeus ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839F). 37 Blass (1887–1898) III,1 147; Usher (1999) 175.

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ἐῶντας ὥσπερ εἶχεν κατὰ χώραν, ἡμᾶς τε τρέφειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν, καὶ ὅσα ἐξ αὐτῶν περιεγίγνετο, ταῦτα προσπεριποιεῖν, (61) τὴν δ’ ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἐνεργὸν ποιήσασιν, οὖσαν ταύτης διπλασίαν, αὑτοῖς τε, εἰ χρημάτων ἐπεθύμουν, μέτρια ἐξ αὐτῶν λαβεῖν, ἐμοί τε σὺν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τὸν οἶκον ἐκ τῶν προσόδων μείζω ποιῆσαι, τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐποίησαν, ἀποδόμενοι δ’ ἀλλήλοις τὰ πλείστου ἄξια τῶν ἀνδραπόδων, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν ἀφανίσαντες, ἐμοῦ μὲν ἀνεῖλον καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πρόσοδον, σφίσι δ’ αὐτοῖς οὐ μικρὰν ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν κατεσκευάσαντο. Against Aphobus 1 27(60) Although such substantial property was left to me as you heard at the beginning, producing 50 minas as the income of one-third of it, and these men with their insatiable desire for money (aplēstotatoi chrēmatōn), even if they didn’t want to lease the estate, could from that income, while leaving the assets just as they were, have paid both for my maintenance and for the city’s taxation and have saved up the surplus from that in addition, (61) and by investing the rest of the property, which was double that amount, could have taken moderate amounts from it for themselves, if they had a desire for money, and at the same time, besides preserving my capital, could have increased my estate from the income, yet they did none of those things. Instead, by selling to one another the most valuable of the slaves and making away with others entirely, they deprived me of even the existing income and procured no small income for themselves out of my property. (Transl. D.M. MacDowell 2004)

It should be stressed that Demosthenes does not pursue originality in his private speeches, but a smooth sequence of arguments and a harmonious structure. This style might seem bland and monotonous at times, as is the case with Isaeus, but there are examples of individual, emotionally charged apostrophes (27.66–69: ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ πάντων ταλαιπωρότατος ... δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ … μέγα δ’ ἂν οἶμαι στενάξαι τὸν πατέρ’ ἡμῶν. Cf. the unusually forceful opening 28.1: ἠγανάκτησα). 6.2.2.2 Against Conon (54) Based on the foregoing, it is no surprise that the much-read speech Against Conon (54)38 contains no stylistic trace of “the individual Demosthenic stamp” (Usher 1999, 245). The closing turn of phrase (54.44: οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅ τι δεῖ πλείω λέγειν· οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἀγνοεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων) could already be found in Isaeus (7.45; 8.46). Demosthenes wrote the speech for Ariston, a young man who brought a suit against Conon for mistreatment and, more specifically, for assault and battery (dikē aikeias; Kapparis 2019, 217). In Aristotelian terminology, Demosthenes focuses on the ēthos tou legontos, the credible impression left by a speaker on listeners, and not on rhetorical contrivances. The private judicial speech does not have a complex structure; its strength stems from ēthopoiia, the underlining of the trustworthy and plausible personality of the speaker (Carey/Reid 1985, 73). According to F. Blass (1887–1898, III,1 459; cf. Carey 1994, 42–43), this is “a true model of a private speech” (ein wirkliches

|| 38 See Doherty (1927); Carey/Reid (1985).

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Muster einer Privatrede).39 The vivid narration and clear exposition of facts are appropriate for the prudent and moderate Ariston, who makes continual references to his opponent’s hybris (over 20 in number).40 In fact, the speech begins with a reference to hybris: Against Conon 54(1) ὑβρισθείς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ παθὼν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τουτουὶ τοιαῦτα, ὥστε πολὺν χρόνον πάνυ μήτε τοὺς οἰκείους μήτε τῶν ἰατρῶν μηδένα προσδοκᾶν περιφεύξεσθαί με, ὑγιάνας καὶ σωθεὶς ἀπροσδοκήτως ἔλαχον αὐτῷ τὴν δίκην τῆς αἰκείας ταυτηνί. Against Conon 54(1) I was assaulted, gentlemen of the jury, and at the hands of Conon, the man here, I suffered injuries so severe that for a very long time neither my family nor any of the doctors expected I would survive. But when I unexpectedly recovered and was out of danger, I initiated this private case for battery (dikē aikeias) against him. (Transl. V. Bers 2003)

Offending one’s honour through hybris is of crucial importance for rhetorical strategy and the position of the individual within the political community: it emerges as a much more major offence than bodily injury. According to Aristotle (Rhetoric 1378b 23–24), there is hybris when, through words or deeds, there is shame to the sufferer for the sole purpose of the selfish gratification of the person who gives insult. It is a clear expression of contempt and belittlement of the other’s personality, as well as (a fact that must be stressed in the context of the role played by individuality in ancient Athens) an attack against the primacy of the political community, i.e. private violence appears as a threat to the public interests of democracy.41 Carey (2014, 33–34) correctly contends that the plaintiff “handles the case from beginning to end as if it were a graphē hybreōs” (cf. Bers 2003, 66). Hermogenes praises the terse narration of the speech, which is successful without rhetorical ornaments (De invent. 2.7, p. 123 Rabe: γυμνὰ γάρτοι λεγόμενα πλέον

|| 39 Cf. Morford (1966) 241–248; M. de Brauw, Listen to the Laws Themselves. Citations of Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory, CJ 97 (2001–2002) 161–176, esp. 163 ff. Regarding the practical importance of ēthos as proof, see A. Lanni, Relevance in Athenian Courts, in: Gagarin/Cohen (2005) 121 ff. 40 On hybris, see D.M. MacDowell, Hybris in Athens, G&R 23 (1976) 14–31; M. Gagarin, The Athenian Law against hubris, in: G. Bowersock et al. (eds.), Arktouros. Hellenic Studies presented to B.M.W. Knox, Berlin 1979, 229–236; Carey/Reid (1985) 75–76; MacDowell (1990) 263–265; N.R.E. Fisher, The Law of hybris in Athens, in: P. Cartledge et al. (eds.), Nomos. Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society, Cambridge 1990, 123–145; D. Cohen, Sexuality, Violence and the Athenian Law of hubris, G&R 38 (1991) 171–188; N.R.E. Fisher, Hybris. A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece, Warminster 1992; D. Cairns, Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big, JHS 116 (1996) 1–32; V. Farenga, Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece. Individuals Performing Justice and the Law, Cambridge 2006, 186–188; S. Dmitriev, The Protection of Slaves in the Athenian Law against hubris, Phoenix 70 (2016) 64–76; Kapparis (2019) 223–225. 41 See Cohen (2005) 222; Wohl (2010) 71–82.

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ἰσχὺν ἔλαβεν, ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἐκόσμει λόγοις), while Dionysius of Halicarnassus compares Against Conon to Lysias’ Against Tisis and finds the speeches equal, to the extent that it is hard to discern who wrote each speech (Dion. Hal. Demosth. 13, p. 156 Us.-Rad). 6.2.2.3 For Phormion (36) Although the ēthos tou legontos, as a proof, mainly focuses on the defence of a single individual,42 in the speech For Phormion (36; 350/349 BC), which belongs to the series of judicial escapades of the litigious and supercilious Apollodorus, son of the banker Pasion, two personalities are outlined: those of Phormion and Apollodorus. The real interest in the speech concerns the speaker’s endeavour to clarify the divergent code of honour of the social class of former slaves to a court consisting of Athenian citizens of a higher social class (Görgemanns 1987, 126). The wealthy Phormion, who rose from the ranks of slave to become an Athenian citizen by wedding the widow of the banker Pasion, in accordance with the will left by the latter, was clearly unable to either write or deliver the speech, as he could not speak Greek correctly (36.1: τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ λέγειν; cf. 45.30: σολοικίζει τῇ φωνῇ). His place was taken over by a friend, as his advocate (synēgoros), possibly Demosthenes himself,43 who presents Phormion as a reliable, active man, while tarnishing the character of Apollodorus44 – a busy man, who also descended from a manumitted slave and lacks moral virtues (36.57–58): For Phormion 36(57) τοσαῦτα τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φορμίων χρήσιμος γεγονὼς καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλοῖς ὑμῶν, καὶ οὐδένα οὔτ’ ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ κακὸν οὐδὲν εἰργασμένος, οὐδ’ ἀδικῶν Ἀπολλόδωρον τουτονί, δεῖται καὶ ἱκετεύει καὶ ἀξιοῖ σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνδεόμεθα οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι ταῦθ’ ὑμῶν. ἐκεῖνο δ’ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ. τοσαῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρήμαθ’ ὑμῖν ἀνεγνώσθη προσηυπορηκώς, ὅσ’ οὔθ’ οὗτος οὔτ’ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς κέκτηται. πίστις μέντοι Φορμίωνι παρὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι καὶ τοσούτων καὶ πολλῷ πλειόνων χρημάτων ἐστίν, δι’ ἧς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ὑμῖν χρήσιμός ἐστιν. (58) ἃ μὴ προῆσθε, μηδ’ ἐπιτρέψητε ἀνατρέψαι τῷ μιαρῷ τούτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, μηδὲ ποιήσητε αἰσχρὸν παράδειγμα, ὡς τὰ τῶν ἐργαζομένων καὶ μετρίως ἐθελόντων ζῆν τοῖς βδελυροῖς καὶ συκοφάνταις ὑπάρχει παρ’ ὑμῶν λαβεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ χρησιμώτερα ὑμῖν παρὰ τῷδε ὄντα ὑπάρχει.

|| 42 Cf. S. Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy. The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens, Austin 1999, 94; L. Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation. Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens, Stuttgart 2000, 195. 43 Cf. Din. 1.111. 44 Cf. E. Volonaki, Οικογένεια, καταγωγή και πολιτική λοιδορία στην κλασική Αθήνα, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 195–196.

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For Phormion 36(57) Phormion, men of Athens, has done all those services for the city and for many individuals among you. He’s never done anyone any harm in either private or public matters ‒ nor has he defrauded this man Apollodorus. So he asks and entreats and claims that he should be acquitted, and we, his friends (epitēdeioi), join in this request. There’s something else that you should hear. According to the testimonies read to you, men of Athens, Phormion has procured for you larger sums than either he or anyone else possesses. But then he has credit with those who know him for such large sums and for far greater ones, and that enables him to provide both for himself and for you. (58) Don’t sacrifice all this, and don’t allow that scoundrel (miaros) to upset it. Don’t set a disgraceful example (aischron paradeigma), showing that horrible malicious accusers (bdelyroi kai sykophantai) are permitted by you to take the money of men who work and are content to live modestly (metriōs). That money is much more useful to you in Phormion’s hands. (Transl. D.M. MacDowell 2004)

It emerges from the speech Against Stephanus 1 (45.6) that the outcome of the trial was a great success for Demosthenes’ client. However, it is precisely this point which makes clear the morally ambiguous ethics of a logographer that would permit him to switch sides. During a new trial involving Apollodorus, Demosthenes most likely wrote the speech Against Stephanus 1 (45), this time defending Apollodorus against Stephanus of Acharnae, a former defence witness of Phormion. Aeschines would fiercely accuse Demosthenes of untrustworthiness (2.165). Plutarch (Demosth. 15.2) ironically notes that Demosthenes sold knives from his arsenal to both parties, but it appears that political reasons were also at play, since Apollodorus was also a staunch supporter of the anti-Macedonian faction in Athens (Lesky 1966, 598).45 The forceful, personal attacks found in both speeches are noteworthy. 6.2.2.4 Against Leptines (20) - Against Androtion (22) - Against Timocrates (24) With the exception of the suits concerning his estate when he was very young, it was the first time that Demosthenes appeared in person before the court to deliver the speech Against Leptines (20; 354 BC) during a public political trial (Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 4, p. 260 Us.-Rad.; cf. Plut. Demosth. 15.3). The speech was delivered in the context of a public suit for proposing an inexpedient law (graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai),46 with Demosthenes appearing against Leptines, who, due to economic distress after the end of the Social War (357–355 BC), proposed the repeal of exemptions

|| 45 Cf. Lehmann (2004) 45–46, as well as the critique of Will (2013) 37 with note 11, who recognises the pragmatism of a realist logographer of the 4th century BC in Demosthenes’ switch in sides. One should also consider the criticism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isae. 4, p. 97 Us.-Rad.), i.e. that the speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes, even when the cases are just and true, raise suspicion due to their rhetorical contrivances. 46 The γραφὴ παρανόμων (“indictment for illegality”) concerned general decrees, while γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι (“indictment for bringing an inexpedient law”) exclusively concerned laws. See Kremmydas (2012) 45–50. The suit was brought by Bathippus, regarding whom no other information is known, and, following his death, by his son, Apsephion.

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from liturgies and taxes (ateleia) for everyone, save the descendants of the Tyrannicides. Demosthenes wished to help Ctesippus (20.1), son of the esteemed general Chabrias who was killed at the battle of Chios (357/356 BC); the law concerned him. It is clear that in Against Leptines (20), already at the outset of his political career and by way of a self-portrait (Lehmann 2004, 73; Will 2013, 51), Demosthenes defends the democratic ideology of the reciprocal relationship between euergesia and charis, whereby granting an honour is presented as an acknowledgement of a beneficence and is considered a powerful incentive in practical ethics. H. Bolkestein calls the “principle of reciprocity as a cornerstone of the social relations of the Greeks”. It is an oft-encountered rhetorical argument.47 Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 1.7) includes reciprocity in the agraphon ethos that defines what is just: “to honour one’s parents, do good to one’s friends and return good to one’s benefactors (τοῖς εὐεργέταις χάριν ἀποδιδόναι)”. Xenophon (Cyrop. 1.2.7) makes reference to the Persians’ aversion to ingratitude (acharistia), as it leads to neglect toward one’s gods, country, parents and friends. Additionally, in Cyropaedia 8.3.49, returning a benefaction is a distinguishing feature setting man aside from all other animals.48 This principle is also acknowledged in the official language of the city; IG IΙ31, 400.9–10: ὅτι ὁ δῆμoς χάριτας ἀπoδίδωσιν τoῖς εἰς ἑαυτὸν φιλoτιμoυμένoις; IG IΙ31, 378.18–20; 452.12–14. In Against Leptines (20), Demosthenes’ arguments attempt from the very outset to identify the individual with the democratic city and its tradition: repealing the law would benefit the city (20.1).49 Timē and philotimia permeate the speech in its entirety (Kremmydas 2012, 8–11; Canevaro 2016, 77–97).50 Demosthenes strongly defends the

|| 47 H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum, Groningen 1967, 158. Cf. A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome, New York/London 1968, esp. 26–48; P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique, Paris 1976, 185–373; A.S. Henry, Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees, Hildesheim/New York 1983; P. Gauthier, Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs, Paris 1985; P. Millet, The Rhetoric of Reciprocity in Classical Athens, in: C. Gill et al. (eds.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece, Oxford 1998, 227–253; P. Liddel, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens, Oxford 2007, 160–182. On the principle of reciprocity in interstate relations, see P. Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens, Cambridge 2010, 185–214. 48 Cf. Isocr. 8.14; 12.202; 15.60; 15.95; 15.287; 16.15; 16.35; 16.38; 18.58; 18.62; 18.67; Epist. 4.9; Demosth. 20.116; 20.154; 21.160; Andoc. 2.18; Lys. 2.19; Arist. Eth. Nic. 1123b 35–36. 49 On the argumentation of the speech, see Kremmydas (2007) 30–52; MacDowell (2009) 156–167. For the legal case, see Canevaro (2016) 12–32; M. Canevaro, The Procedure of Demosthenes’ Against Leptines: How to Repeal (and Replace) an Existing Law, JHS 136 (2016) 39–58; M. Canevaro, Laws against Laws. The Athenian Ideology of Legislation, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 271–292. 50 20.5; 20.10; 20.41; 20.69; 20.82; 20.103; 20.155. On the “democratisation” of the concept of philotimia, see D. Whitehead, Competitive Outlay and Community Profit. Φιλoτιμία in Democratic Athens, C&M 34 (1983) 55–74; D. Whitehead, Cardinal Virtues. The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens, C&M 44 (1993) 37–75; R. Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual. Homer and Tragedy in

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value of the honours bestowed by the city and cites Athenian ancestors who granted honours to good men (chrēstoi; 20.116) or laws that honour benefactors and punish those who harmed the city (20.154). Tax exemptions are given equal status to other honours, such as bronze statues being erected or the right to dine in the Prytaneum being bestowed; these are honorary acknowledgements and not merely financial benefits. There is complimentary mention of ateleia and the bronze statue of the general Conon,51 whose achievements are assessed as superior to those of Themistocles (20.68–74).52 The achievements of the general Chabrias are then recounted (20.75– 86). The speech is not dominated by a forceful attack against his opponent; emphasis is placed on the favourable, sympathetic character of an advocate of the democratic bestowal of honours upon the city’s benefactors. Dionysius of Halicarnassus considers this speech as the most elegant and attractive of all of Demosthenes’ speeches (Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 4, p. 260 Us.-Rad.: χαριέστατος ἁπάντων τῶν λόγων καὶ γραφικώτατος). In the following excerpt, Demosthenes argues for the superiority of honours bestowed within a democracy (20.15–17): Against Leptines 20(15) νομίζω τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἄμεινον ἂν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος βουλεύσασθαι, εἰ κἀκεῖνο μάθοιτε, ὅτι ᾧ μόνῳ μείζους εἰσὶν αἱ παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρεαὶ τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν διδομένων, καὶ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖται νῦν τῷ νόμῳ. τῇ μὲν γὰρ χρείᾳ τῇ τῶν εὑρισκομένων τὰς δωρεὰς οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔχοντες μάλιστα δύνανται τιμᾶν· πλούσιον γὰρ ὃν ἂν βούλωνται παραχρῆμ᾽ ἐποίησαν· τῇ δὲ τιμῇ καὶ τῇ βεβαιότητι τὰς παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρεὰς εὑρήσετ᾽ οὔσας βελτίους. (16) τό τε γὰρ μὴ μετ᾽ αἰσχύνης ὡς κολακεύοντα λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἰσηγορίᾳ δοκοῦντα ἄξιόν τινος εἶναι τιμᾶσθαι τῶν καλῶν ἐστι, τό τε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἑκόντων θαυμάζεσθαι τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου λαμβάνειν ὁτιοῦν κρεῖττον εἶναι δοκεῖ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβος τῆς παρούσης χάριτος, παρὰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἀδεῶς ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἔχειν ὑπῆρχε τὸν γοῦν ἄλλον χρόνον. (17) ὁ τοίνυν τὴν πίστιν ἀφαιρῶν τῶν δωρεῶν νόμος, οὗτος, ᾧ μόνῳ κρείττους εἰσὶν αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν δωρεαί, τοῦτ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖται. καίτοι τῶν ἁπασῶν ἧς ἄν τινος πολιτείας τὸ κομίζεσθαι τοὺς εὔνους τοῖς καθεστῶσιν χάριν ἂν ἐξέλῃς, οὐ μικρὰν φυλακὴν αὐτῶν ταύτην ἀφῃρηκὼς ἔσει. Against Leptines 20(15) Judges, I think that you will make a better decision about the issue before you if you bear the following in mind: the only advantage that awards granted by a democracy (para tōn dēmōn dōreai) have over those granted by other forms of government is now being removed by this law. In terms of the material benefits enjoyed by those who receive awards, tyrants and oligarchic regimes are in the best position to grant honors: they make anyone whom they want wealthy right away. But in terms of honor (timē) and reliability (bebaiotēs), you will find the awards granted by democracies superior. (16) Instead of accepting a shameful reward for flattery, what is honorable is to receive honors because one is thought to deserve them where there is freedom of speech (isēgoria). The unforced admiration of one’s peers is recognized to be more valuable than any favor accepted from a tyrant (despotēs). Under a tyranny, fear of the

|| the Developing City-State, Oxford 1994, 194–206; P. Wilson, The Athenian Institution of Khoregia, Cambridge 2000, 191–192; Alexiou (2010) 68–69; (2018) 115–116. 51 Cf. Isocr. 9.52–57; Alexiou (2010) 143–150, esp. 149. 52 See J. Hesk, Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2000, 45–49.

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future outweighs any enjoyment in the present; in your city, by contrast, the person who receives an award has had nothing to worry about, at least until now. (17) Well, by destroying the confidence in our awards, this law destroys the only advantage that makes your awards more valuable. Take any form of government in the world: surely if you abolish the practice of showing gratitude (charis) to its supporters, you will have destroyed an important means of protecting it. (Transl. Ε.Μ. Harris 2008)

The speeches Against Androtion (22) and Against Timocrates (24), two charges for illegal decrees (graphai paranomōn), are contemporaneous; Demosthenes wrote them for a prosecutor named Diodorus, who, together with Euctemon, brought charges initially against Androtion and subsequently against his friend Timocrates. Androtion was a politically active student of Isocrates and author of an Atthis.53 The two speeches conceal the desire for revenge: Timocrates was a confidante of Aphobus, one of the guardians of Demosthenes, who later supported Meidias, a personal enemy of Demosthenes (Badian 2000, 24; cf. Lehmann 2004, 70–72).54 6.2.2.5 Against Aristocrates (23) The title “From Logography to Politics” (Papillon 1998, 102–104) is an apt characterisation for the speech Against Aristocrates (23), brought against an illegal decree proposed by Aristocrates (352 BC), as the references to Athenian politics in the Thracian region and patriotic passion at the end of the speech would be well-suited to Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches (cf. Hermog. De id. 2.10, p. 385–386 Rabe). There is common ground with Against Leptines in terms of the theme of honours, this time as a critique of excessive honours and corrupt orators (23.201; 23.210). This is the flipside of the same coin. The charge is brought against Aristocrates’ proposal to protect Charidemus from Oreos (Euboea), a mercenary commander of Cersobleptes, King of Thrace, with the following content: “If any person put Charidemus to death, he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies” (23.16: ἂν γὰρ ἀποκτείνῃ τις Χαρίδημον … ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων εἶναι). The case does not exude personal hatred. Demosthenes composed the speech on account of Euthycles of Thria, and he may have personally believed that protecting Charidemus would be to the detriment of Athenian interests, while a weak and divided Thracian kingdom would benefit Athens.55 The speech is a good example of the attempt to stir goodwill (benevolentia) towards the speaker and ill will (malevolentia) against Charidemus (e.g. 23.6: κακονούστατον ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων) in the judges. Although the speech could overall be considered mild, there are passionate passages

|| 53 FGrH 324. Cf. P. Harding, Androtion’s Political Career, Historia 25 (1976) 186–200; P. Harding, Androtion and the Atthis, Oxford 1994; Burke (2002) 171–172 note 33. 54 G.O. Rowe, Anti-Isocratean Sentiment in Demosthenes’ Against Androtion, Historia 49 (2000) 278–302 identifies a political polemic against the Isocratean circle. 55 Similar ideas are expressed in 16.4; see Papillon (1998) 92–93.

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where the listeners, in accordance with Aristotle’s teachings (Rhetoric 1356a 14–15), are brought to a state of particular emotional charge. This is made clear by the strong rhetoric concerning Charidemus’ unworthiness (negative ēthos; 23.144–186) or the comparison between the contemporary, immoderate honours of politicians, plentiful and grandiose, and the splendour of the city in the past, during the frugal living conditions of towering figures such as Themistocles and Miltiades (23.196–211). Additionally, the speech is a good source for homicide trials and relation between law and politics.56 The three following passages are indicative of how Demosthenes, as an individual, addresses his audience, castigates poor practices and vies with the past and present of Athens. The reference to an excess of honours and the underlining of the different conditions of the past reflect the negative shift in Athenian society, primarily with regard to contemporary politicians and orators, who make poor use of their power. If Plato focused on becoming entirely removed from this poor rhetorical practice, in the case of Demosthenes everything contributes towards an impressive, selfassured, dynamic rhetoric of one before many, regardless of whether it is the demos in its entirety or fellow orators: “To be chosen first among honest and respectable men is a much greater honour than a bronze statue” (23.197), or “In the past, the people were the master of the politicians, but now they are their servants”57 (23.209): Against Aristocrates 23(197) ἔστι δὲ σώφροσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν βουλομένοις σκοπεῖν πολὺ μείζων τιμὴ τῆς χαλκῆς εἰκόνος τὸ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κεκρίσθαι πρῶτον. (198) καὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ἔργων τῶν τότε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδενὸς ἀπεστέρησαν ἑαυτούς, οὐδ᾽ ἔστ’ οὐδεὶς ὅστις ἂν εἴποι τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν Θεμιστοκλέους, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαραθῶνι μάχην Μιλτιάδου, ἀλλὰ τῆς πόλεως. νῦν δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοὶ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὡς Κέρκυραν εἷλε Τιμόθεος καὶ τὴν μόραν κατέκοψεν Ἰφικράτης καὶ τὴν περὶ Νάξον ἐνίκα ναυμαχίαν Χαβρίας· δοκεῖτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἔργων τούτων παραχωρεῖν τῶν τιμῶν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς αἷς δεδώκατ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστῳ τούτων. Against Aristocrates 23(197) In the eyes of reasonable men with an eye on the truth, to be chosen first among honest and respectable (kaloi kagathoi) men is a much greater honor (timē) than a bronze statue (chalkē eikōn). (198) They did not deny themselves credit, men of Athens, for any of their achievements. There is no one who would say that the naval victory at Salamis belonged to Themistocles but not to the Athenians, that the battle at Marathon belonged to Miltiades but not to the city. But as it is now, men of Athens, many say that Timotheus captured Corcyra, that Iphicrates destroyed the cohort, that Chabrias won the naval battle at Naxos. You seem to be

|| 56 See V. Wohl, Jurisdiction and Jurisprudence. The Topography of Law in Demosthenes 23 Against Aristokrates, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 234–248. 57 On this antithesis between past and present, see C. Carey, Bashing the Establishment, in: E. Sanders/M. Johncock (eds.), Emotion and Persuasion in Antiquity, Stuttgart 2016, 34–35.

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yielding your credit for these achievements by the excessive honors you have granted to each of these men for these victories. (Transl. Ε.Μ. Harris 2018) Against Aristocrates 23(201) οὐ μόνον δ᾽ αὕτη τῆς πόλεως ἡ δωρεὰ προπεπηλάκισται καὶ φαύλη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαι διὰ τὴν τῶν καταράτων καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρῶν ῥητόρων, τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα γραφόντων ἑτοίμως, πονηρίαν, οἳ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν πεποίηνται τῆς αὑτῶν αἰσχροκερδείας ὥστε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν δωρεάς, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ κομιδῇ φαῦλα ἀποκηρύττοντες, οὕτω πωλοῦσιν ἐπευωνίζοντες καὶ πολλοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν λημμάτων γράφοντες πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται. Against Aristocrates 23(201) Not only has this reward of the city but all awards have been dragged though the mud and become worthless because of the depravity (ponēria) of the cursed (kataratoi) and godforsaken politicians ready to propose decrees like this. Their greed (aischrokerdeia) has grown so excessive that they sell your honors and awards at bargain prices like men who auction off cheap trinkets, making whatever proposals they wish to many for the same markup. (Transl. Ε.Μ. Harris 2018) Against Aristocrates 23(209) τότε μὲν γὰρ τῷ κυρίῳ τῶν φόρων γενομένῳ τάξαι Ἀριστείδῃ οὐδὲ μιᾷ δραχμῇ πλείω τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελευτήσαντ’ αὐτὸν ἔθαψεν ἡ πόλις· ὑμῖν δέ, εἴ τι δέοισθε, χρήματα ὑπῆρχε κοινῇ πλεῖστα τῶν πάντων Ἑλλήνων, ὥσθ’ ὁπόσου χρόνου ψηφίσαισθ’ ἐξιέναι, τοσούτου μισθὸν ἔχοντες ἐξῇτε. νῦν δ’ οἱ μὲν τὰ κοινὰ διοικοῦντες ἐκ πτωχῶν εὔποροι καὶ πολλοῦ χρόνου τροφὴν ἄφθονόν εἰσιν ἡτοιμασμένοι· ὑμῖν δὲ οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ἐφόδι’ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ἀλλ’ ἅμα δεῖ τι ποιεῖν, καὶ πόθεν οὐκ ἔχετε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἦν δεσπότης τῶν πολιτευομένων, νῦν δ᾽ ὑπηρέτης. (210) αἴτιοι δ᾽ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράφοντες, καὶ συνεθίζοντες ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν καταφρονεῖν, ἕνα δ᾽ ἢ δύο θαυμάζειν ἀνθρώπους. εἶθ᾽ οὗτοι κληρονομοῦσι τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολαύετε, ἀλλὰ μάρτυρές ἐστε τῶν ἑτέρων ἀγαθῶν, οὐδενὸς ἄλλου μετέχοντες ἢ τοῦ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. καίτοι πηλίκον τί ποτ’ ἂν στενάξαιεν οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι, οἱ ὑπὲρ δόξης καὶ ἐλευθερίας τελευτήσαντες, καὶ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἔργων ὑπομνήματα καταλιπόντες, εἰ ἄρα αἴσθοινθ’ ὅτι νῦν ἡ πόλις εἰς ὑπηρέτου σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήλυθεν, καὶ Χαρίδημον εἰ χρὴ φρουρεῖν βουλεύεται; Χαρίδημον; οἴμοι. Against Aristocrates 23(209) When Aristides had the power to assess the amount of tribute, his property did not increase by one drachma, but after he died, the city gave him a public burial. If you needed anything, there was more money in the public treasury than in all the rest of Greece. Thus, when you went on campaign, you had wages sufficient to last the whole time you decreed for the campaign. Now, the men who manage our public affairs go from poverty to riches and supply themselves with plentiful livelihood for a long time. But you do not have enough money in the public treasury to supply even a day’s travel expenses. No, every time you need to do something, you do not have the resources to do it. In the past, the people (dēmos) were the master (despotēs) of the politicians, but now they are their servants (hypēretēs). (210) The people who propose decrees like this one are responsible: they have gotten you into the habit of losing confidence in yourselves and admiring one or two men. Then these men have inherited your glory and success, but you derive no benefit from even the smallest thing. You are the witnesses to other people’s success and without a share in anything but your own deception. Yet how would the men of the past mourn, men who died for glory and freedom and left behind memorials of many noble deeds, if they should see that the city has now fallen into the position and role of a servant and is debating whether to act as bodyguard for Charidemus? My god, Charidemus! (Transl. Ε.Μ. Harris 2008)

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6.2.2.6 Against Meidias (21) The speech Against Meidias (21) brings the quarrel between Demosthenes and his rich political rival Meidias to the forefront. Meidias had already demonstrated his hostility since the time of the suits concerning Demosthenes’ estate, to the point of publicly striking Demosthenes in the face, years later, at the Dionysia (348/347 BC). Demosthenes immediately filed a provisional charge via the procedure of probolē and achieved a first sentencing of Meidias, before initiating a public criminal prosecution, most likely for assault or personal violence (graphē hybreōs), but it is uncertain whether a public trial took place and whether the speech was delivered.58 Aeschines facetiously cites an extra-judicial settlement between the two for the low amount of thirty minas (3.52; cf. Plut. Demosth. 12.6), but this information provided by Demosthenes’ political rival might have limited credibility. The speech is truly “one of the first monuments of exceptional and dynamic rhetoric” (Blass 1887–1898, III,1 339), reaching a level similar to that of a Philippic speech. This view concerns both the content and the form of the speech. While Meidias would have preferred the dispute to remain a private case, Demosthenes leveraged the violence against him during a public festival to present the violence as hybris and impiety (asebeia).59 Compared to Against Conon (54), this speech further elaborates on the same topic: a public hybris and an offence to one’s honour of the highest magnitude.60 “The difference is one of scale” (Carey 2014, 35). No other ancient text features more instances of the word hybris: 124 (Fisher 2017, 116). The sole motive for Meidias’ act, according to Demosthenes, was hybris (21.181). The case took on a serious domestic political dimension, as it concerns all citizens, even each and every judge. Meidias is not just antisocial and violent towards a fellow citizen, but is also a characteristic example of the political attitude of a social class within the Athenian democracy: he represents the violence and undemocratic behaviour of the rich who scoff at the laws, their fellow citizens and the democratic ethos (Will 2013, 95–102). Therefore, the rhetoric of Demosthenes, as an individual, surpasses the person who suffered the insult and represents the city as a community. Demosthenes

|| 58 See MacDowell (1990) 23–28. For various opinions, see Erbse (1956) 135–152; Harris (1989) 117– 136; Ober (1994) 91–92; Fredal (2001) 255–256; Harris (2008) 84 ff.; A. Wolpert/K. Kapparis, Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens. Sources for Athenian History, Indianapolis 2011, 80–81; Worthington (2013) 156–158. 59 MacDowell (1990) 16 ff. For interpretations of the oration, see Cohen (1991) 155–164; Wilson (1991) 164–195; Rowe (1993) 397–406; Ober (1994) 85–108; Cohen (1995) 90–101; Fredal (2001) 251–267; D. Cohen, Crime, Punishment, and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens, in: Gagarin/Cohen (2005) 217 ff.; Roisman (2005) 92–94. Cf. also G. Xanthakis-Karamanos, Δημοσθένους Κατὰ Μειδίου, 2. ed., Athens 1989. 60 Cf. Aristotle’s definition of hybris (Rhet. 1387b 23–30); C. Brüggenbrock, Die Ehre in den Zeiten der Demokratie. Das Verhältnis von athenischer Polis und Ehre in klassischer Zeit, Göttingen 2006, 215– 216.

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equates himself to the democracy and his rhetoric is an expression of the democracy and its laws (21.112: οὐ μέτεστι τῶν ἴσων οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους τοῖς λοιποῖς ἡμῖν; 21.123: οὐκ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄξιόν ἐστ᾽ ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ βαρέως φέρειν, ὑμῖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις παριδεῖν, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὀργιστέον; 21.142: πᾶσιν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τιμωρητέος ὡς κοινὸς ἐχθρὸς τῇ πολιτείᾳ; cf. Cohen 1995, 112–113). It should be stressed that Demosthenes even invokes a “good” form of phthonos, the justified indignation of the judges towards his opponent, along with hatred (misos) and anger (orgē; 21.196).61 V. Wohl (2010, 188) correctly contends that Demosthenes succeeds in creating a “metonymic network” that integrally links four institutions: the judges, the demos, the law and the city. Demosthenes’ dynamic rhetoric in his speech Against Meidias is evident in the following evocative apostrophes, where he addresses the judges, defending both individual restrictions before the law and the power that the judges draw from the laws: “The laws are strong through you and you through the laws” (21.224).62 The educational dimension of Isocrates as a teacher, who primarily defends the “aristocracy of values” that is integrally linked with the leaders, regardless of political constitution, is replaced by the political community of democracy and its safeguards, which are none other than the laws and the citizens who uphold them: Against Meidias 21(169) ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πολλοὶ πολλὰ κἀγάθ᾽ ὑμᾶς εἰσιν εἰργασμένοι, οὐ κατὰ τὰς Μειδίου λειτουργίας, οἱ μὲν ναυμαχίας νενικηκότες, οἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰληφότες, οἱ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως στήσαντες τρόπαια· (170) ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐδενὶ πώποτε τούτων δεδώκατε τὴν δωρεὰν ταύτην οὐδ᾽ ἂν δοίητε, ἐξεῖναι τοὺς ἰδίους ἐχθροὺς ὑβρίζειν αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ, ὁπόταν βούληται καὶ ὃν ἂν δύνηται τρόπον. οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι· τούτοις γὰρ δὴ μέγισται δέδονται δωρεαὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ μεγίστων. οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἠνέσχεσθε, εἰ προσέγραψέ τις ἐν τῇ στήλῃ “ἐξεῖναι δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζειν αὐτοῖς ὃν ἂν βούλωνται·” ὑπὲρ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τούτου τὰς ἄλλας ἔλαβον δωρεάς, ὅτι τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ἔπαυσαν. Against Meidias 21(169) I am aware that many men have provided you with many benefits, not on the scale of Meidias’ liturgies, but men who have won victories in naval battles, captured cities, or set up many fine battle trophies for the city. (170) Nevertheless, you have never given any of these men (nor should you) this award: the power for each of them to abuse (hybrizein) their personal enemies whenever he wishes and in whatever way he can. Not even to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who received the most important awards from you because they performed the most important deeds. And you would not have put up with it if someone had written another

|| 61 Cf. E. Sanders, Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens. A Socio-Psychological Approach, Oxford 2014, 93–94; D. Spatharas, Φθόνος, ρητορική και lifestyle στην κλασική Αθήνα, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 107 ff. (cf. Spatharas 2019, 123 ff.); E. Eidinow, Envy, Poison, and Death Women on Trial in Classical Athens, Oxford 2016, 127 ff.; D. Spatharas, The Mind’s Theatre. Envy, Hybris and Enargeia in Demosthenes’ Against Meidias, in: Papaioannou et al. (2017) 201–222. See also Demosth. 28.18; 37.52; Lys. 27.11; Isae. 6.60–61; Isocr. 4.184; 18.51; Aeschin. 3.42. 62 Cf. H. Yunis, The Rhetoric of Law in Fourth-Century Athens, in: Gagarin/Cohen (2005) 207.

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clause on their stēlē giving them also “the power to abuse (hybrizein) whomever they wish.” In fact, they received these other awards precisely because they stopped people from committing abuse. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2008) Against Meidias 21(224) ἡ δὲ τῶν νόμων ἰσχὺς τίς ἐστιν; ἆρα ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀδικούμενος ἀνακράγῃ, προσδραμοῦνται καὶ παρέσονται βοηθοῦντες; οὔ· γράμματα γὰρ γεγραμμένα ἐστίν, καὶ οὐχὶ δύναιντ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἐστιν; ὑμεῖς ἐὰν βεβαιῶτ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ παρέχητε κυρίους ἀεὶ τῷ δεομένῳ. οὐκοῦν οἱ νόμοι τε ὑμῖν εἰσιν ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοῖς νόμοις. (225) δεῖ τοίνυν τούτοις βοηθεῖν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν αὑτῷ τις ἀδικουμένῳ, καὶ τὰ τῶν νόμων ἀδικήματα κοινὰ νομίζειν, ἐφ᾽ ὅτου περ ἂν λαμβάνηται, καὶ μήτε λειτουργίας μήτ᾽ ἔλεον μήτ᾽ ἄνδρα μηδένα μήτε τέχνην μηδεμίαν μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν εὑρῆσθαι, δι᾽ ὅτου παραβάς τις τοὺς νόμους οὐ δώσει δίκην. Against Meidias 21(224) And what makes the laws strong? Will they come running and be there to help someone if he is wronged and cries out? No: the laws are only written letters, and they could not do this. What then gives them strength? You do if you confirm them and make them valid each time someone asks. So the laws (nomoi) are strong (ischyroi) through you and you through the laws. (225) One must therefore defend them just as the victim of injustice defends himself and treat offenses against the laws as threats to the community, no matter what someone is caught doing. Neither liturgies, nor pity, nor any man, nor any skill should be found to allow someone who violates the laws to escape punishment. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2008 with modifications)

This speech contains all types of rhetorical figures that characterise passionate oratory: anaphora, antistrophē (or epiphora), anadiplōsis, asyndeton, polysyndeton, hypophora, antithesis, paronomasia.63 There are also examples of sarkasmos to be found (e.g. 21.198–201). Pseudo-Longinus (On the Sublime 20.1–3) cites paragraph 72 of Against Meidias as an effective example of simultaneous combination of several figures, resulting in a staggering speech with an exceptionally powerful effect characterised by force, conviction and beauty: On the Sublime 20(1) ἄκρως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ σύνοδος τῶν σχημάτων εἴωθε κινεῖν, ὅταν δύο ἢ τρία οἷον κατὰ συμμορίαν ἀνακιρνάμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐρανίζῃ τὴν ἰσχὺν τὴν πειθὼ τὸ κάλλος, ὁποῖα καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν Μειδίαν, ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει συναναπεπλεγμένα τὰ ἀσύνδετα. “πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνια οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιτο ἑτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ.” (2) εἶθ᾽ ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἰὼν στῇ (ἐν στάσει γὰρ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν, ἐν ἀταξίᾳ δὲ τὸ πάθος, ἐπεὶ φορὰ ψυχῆς καὶ συγκίνησίς ἐστιν), εὐθὺς ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα μεθήλατο ἀσύνδετα καὶ ἐπαναφοράς· “τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρός, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ὡς δοῦλον.” οὐδὲν ἄλλο διὰ τούτων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἢ ὅπερ ὁ τύπτων ἐργάζεται, τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν δικαστῶν τῇ ἐπαλλήλῳ πλήττει φορᾷ. (3) εἶτ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν πάλιν ὡς αἱ καταιγίδες ἄλλην ποιούμενος ἐμβολήν “ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης” φησί· “ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτα ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους, ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι· οὐδεὶς ἂν ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλων δύναιτο τὸ δεινὸν παραστῆσαι”. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν ἐπαναφορῶν καὶ ἀσυνδέτων πάντη φυλάττει τῇ συνεχεῖ μεταβολῇ· οὕτως αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τάξις ἄτακτον καὶ ἔμπαλιν ἡ ἀταξία ποιὰν περιλαμβάνει τάξιν.

|| 63 See in detail Blass (1887–1898) III,1 339–341.

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On the Sublime 20(1) The combination of several figures often has an exceptionally powerful effect, when two or three combined cooperate, as it were, to contribute force, conviction, beauty. Thus, for instance, in the speech against Midias the asyndeta are interwoven with the figures of repetition and vivid presentation. “For the aggressor may do many injuries, some of which the victim could not even describe to anyone else – by his manner, his look, his voice.” (2) Then to prevent the speech coming to a halt by running over the same ground – for immobility expresses inertia, while emotion, being a violent movement of the soul, demands disorder – he leaps at once into further asyndeta and anaphoras. “By his manner, his looks, his voice, when he strikes with insult, when he strikes like an enemy, when he strikes with his knuckles, when he strikes you like a slave.” Here the orator does just the same as the aggressor, he belabours the minds of the jury with blow after blow. (3) Then at this point he proceeds to make another onslaught, like a tornado. “When it’s with his knuckles, when it’s a slap on the face,” he says, “this rouses, this maddens a man who is not accustomed to insult. Nobody could convey the horror of it simply by reporting it.” Thus all the time he preserves the essence of his repetitions and asyndeta through continual variation, so that his very order is disordered and equally his disorder involves a certain element of order. (Transl. W.H. Fyfe/D. Russell 1995)

In summary, H.J. Wolff (2007, 93–94) provides an apt remark concerning Demosthenes as a logographer: “Whether the situation demanded an explicit presentation, ethical tirades performed with the highest pathos, or even dubious rhetorical tricks, in every respect Demosthenes was a master”. 6.2.2.7 On the Symmories (14) During the time of Against Meidias (348/347 BC), Demosthenes had already become an experienced statesman; he had delivered deliberative speeches and was actively involved in Athenian politics. It is impossible to grasp the thrilling effect of Demosthenes’ public speeches without comprehending the particular passion accompanying his beliefs since the outset of his political career and the witty force of his argumentation. The theme and content of his speeches play a decisive role: “The rhetorical means, such as the clear structure of concepts, the linguistic form of the speech and the technique of delivery were subordinated to (and served) the content, and were used according to circumstances and the message he desired to convey” (Unte 1985, 302). Regardless of the form of these political speeches ‒ whether the extant speeches were actually delivered or, on the contrary, were revised ‒ one must not overlook the fact that, in contrast to Isocrates who shied away from the Athenian Assembly and delivered no speeches, Demosthenes stood up before 6000 or even more listeners64 and holding their attention required particular skill and courage (Milns 2000, 209). With the speech On the Symmories (14; concerning contribution groups of wealthier Athenians assessed together for the purposes of taxation), Demosthenes wishes to dissuade the Athenians from a war against the Persians, and proposes the reform of

|| 64 See M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes, Oxford 1987, 14–19.

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the naval boards; this was his first deliberative speech before the Athenian Assembly (354/353 BC).65 In fact, in the prooimion the young Demosthenes defends his mobilisation over the matter and chooses his own practical manner over an impractical epideictic rhetoric: “Those who praise your ancestors, men of Athens, seem to me to have chosen to deliver speeches that will find favour with you (logos kecharismenos) but do no benefit to those whom they praise” (14.1; cf. Usher 1999, 209–210). Demosthenes is motivated by action and the word egō appears at least 13 times in the speech, reflecting the self-confidence of his thinking.66 While there are no indications that the Athenians adopted his reform plans, through this political involvement the orator established his position as a “political counsellor” in Athenian politics.67 Based on his extant speeches, this was the most active role played by a politician representing the vita activa during the 4th century BC. The orator does not present himself as an educator of public opinion, like Isocrates, but as an active politician-orator, who exhorts not only his homeland but all southern Greeks to action. Although the Thucydidean style of the speech,68 characterised by a paucity of strong emotion, is stiff at times, his balanced antitheses (14.8; 14.15) and gentle irony are striking, as in the case of the following excerpt, where Demosthenes’ “ego” is strongly present (14.24; cf. 14.38–39): On the Symmories 14(24) ὑπὲρ δὲ χρημάτων καὶ πόρου φανεροῦ τινὸς ἤδη παράδοξον μὲν οἶδα λόγον μέλλων λέγειν, ὅμως δ’ εἰρήσεται· πιστεύω γάρ, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς σκοπῇ, μόνος τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ γενησόμενα εἰρηκὼς φανεῖσθαι. ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι μὴ λέγειν νυνὶ περὶ χρημάτων· εἶναι γὰρ πόρον, ἂν δέῃ, μέγαν καὶ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃν ἂν μὲν ἤδη ζητῶμεν, οὐδ’ εἰς τόθ’ ὑπάρχειν ἡγησόμεθ’ ἡμῖν· οὕτω πολὺ τοῦ πορίσαι νῦν ἀποσχήσομεν· ἐὰν δ’ ἐῶμεν, ἔσται. τίς οὖν ἔσθ’ οὗτος ὁ νῦν μὲν οὐκ ὤν, ὑπάρξων δ’ εἰς τότε; αἰνίγματι γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦτό γε. ἐγὼ φράσω. On the Symmories 14(24) As regards the source of funds, what I am about to say is paradoxical (paradoxon), I admit, but I shall say it nevertheless. For I am confident that on a correct assessment of the matter, I alone will be seen to have spoken the truth and to have anticipated what will happen in the future. I (egō) say that we do not need to talk about money now, since you have a source of funds, if you need it, that is great and fine and honorable. But if we look for it now, we shall reach the conclusion that it will not exist for us even in the future ‒ so far short will we fall of making provision for the present. If on the other hand we leave it alone now, it will be there for us later. What is it that does not exist now but will exist in the future? It is like a riddle ‒ which I shall now explain. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

|| 65 Cf. Drakonaki-Kazantzaki (2004). On the political speeches of Demosthenes, see summarily E.M. Harris, Speeches to the Assembly and in Public Prosecutions (Dem. 1–24), in: Martin (2018) 365–388. 66 Cf. Pearson (1976) 114. 67 Regarding the “self-reflexive reference” in the speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15.6), referring to the speech On the Symmories, see Mader (2007) 348–349. 68 Cf. Pearson (1964) 97; however, for a critical view, see Milns (2000) 211.

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6.2.2.8 For the Megalopolitans (16) - On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15) With the speech For the Megalopolitans (16; 352 BC), Demosthenes makes a proposal to the Athenians that combines Realpolitik and ethics. He is in favour of the request of Arcadians from Megalopolis for an alliance with Athens and their protection against the Spartans. The ethical dimension in foreign policy dominates this speech; it is the traditional ethos of Athens to help those who are weaker (16.14–15: τοὺς ἀδικουμένους σῴζειν; 16.32: μὴ προέσθαι Μεγαλοπολίτας, μηδ᾽ ἄλλον ἁπλῶς μηδένα τῶν ἐλαττόνων τῷ μείζονι). However, in the case at hand, both justice and self-interest are on the same side: the long-term interests of Athens require striking a balance of power between Sparta and Thebes (16.10): “We should always find out what is right and then do it, but at the same time we should ensure that this coincides with our own interests!” (δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν μὲν καὶ πράττειν ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια, συμπαρατηρεῖν δ᾽ ὅπως ἅμα καὶ συμφέροντα ἔσται ταῦτα).69 In the speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15)70 Demosthenes puts forth the axiomatic view ‒ which is very familiar to the Old Oligarch in Pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians (3.10–11) ‒ that democracies in other cities are more beneficial for the democratic Athens than oligarchies (Demosth. 15.14–20). Therefore, it is in Athens’ interest to support the Rhodian democrats against those who favour oligarchy in order to restore democracy to the island. The structure of the speech is clear, and the variety of concepts focuses on the crux of his argumentation that forms the backbone of the speech. Two proems from the collection of Demosthenes’ Prooimia (24 and 26) exhibit similarities with the case of the Rhodians and may have been written during the same period (MacDowell 2009, 222–223). At the same time, there is a marked increase in sharpness and contrasts (15.5–6: the politics of Demosthenes’ opponents - his own; 15.6–8: justified claims - unjustified attack; 15.23: duty - shame).71 Demosthenes does not write a commendation of democracy as such, as Pericles did in the Thucydidean Funeral Speech, but, by contrasting political systems, defines the interest of Athens (Will 2013, 65). In fact, this contrast leads to a paradox (15.17–18) that reflects the principal concept of the speech advocating for approaching those in favour of democracy: “I think it a greater advantage that all the Greeks should be your enemies under democracy than your friends under oligarchy”:

|| 69 Cf. Sealey (1993) 129–130; Worthington (2013) 99–103. On the subject of “justice - interest”, see P. Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens, Cambridge 2010, 155 ff. 70 The dating of the speech is disputed: in favour of 351/350 BC are Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 4, p. 261 Us.-Rad.; Radicke (1995) 33–43; Karvounis (2002) 175–192; MacDowell (2009) 219. In favour of 352 BC are F. Focke, Demosthenesstudien, Stuttgart 1929, 18–21; Jaeger (1938) 230; Lesky (1966) 601; Carlier (1990) 87; R. Lane Fox, Demosthenes, Dionysius, and the Dating of Six Early Speeches, C&M 48 (1997) 187 ff. 71 See Radicke (1995) 54–55.

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On the Freedom of the Rhodians 15(17) ὁρᾶτε δὲ κἀκεῖνο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι πολλοὺς ὑμεῖς πολέμους πεπολεμήκατε καὶ πρὸς δημοκρατίας καὶ πρὸς ὀλιγαρχίας. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἴστε καὶ αὐτοί· ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν πρὸς ἑκατέρους ἔσθ’ ὑμῖν ὁ πόλεμος, τοῦτ’ ἴσως ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς λογίζεται. ὑπὲρ τίνων οὖν ἐστίν; πρὸς μὲν τοὺς δήμους ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων, οὐ δυνηθέντων δημοσίᾳ διαλύσασθαι ταῦτα, ἢ περὶ γῆς μέρους ἢ ὅρων ἢ φιλονικίας ἢ τῆς ἡγεμονίας· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων οὐδενός, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας· (18) ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμ᾽ εἰπεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγεῖσθαι συμφέρειν δημοκρατουμένους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν ἢ ὀλιγαρχουμένους φίλους εἶναι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρους ὄντας οὐ χαλεπῶς ἂν εἰρήνην ὑμᾶς ποιήσασθαι νομίζω, ὁπότε βουληθείητε, πρὸς δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχουμένους οὐδὲ τὴν φιλίαν ἀσφαλῆ νομίζω· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως ὀλίγοι πολλοῖς καὶ ζητοῦντες ἄρχειν τοῖς μετ᾽ ἰσηγορίας ζῆν ᾑρημένοις εὖνοι γένοιντ᾽ ἄν. On the Freedom of the Rhodians 15(17) Consider too, men of Athens, that you have fought many wars against both democracies (dēmokratiai) and oligarchies (oligarchiai). That much you know, but perhaps none of you has thought about what you were fighting for in each case. For what, then? Against democracies you were fighting either over private claims, which you could not resolve in public, or over the division of land or border disputes or out of rivalry or over leadership. But against oligarchies you fought not over any of these things but for a form of government (politeia) and for freedom (eleutheria). (18) And so I would say, without hesitation, that in my opinion it would be better for all the Greeks to be at war with you, so long as they are democrats, than for them to be friendly to you and oligarchs. For I believe that you would have no difficulty in making peace with free men, whenever you wish, but with oligarchs I do not think that even friendship can be secure, since there is no way that the few (oligoi) can be well disposed to the many (polloi), or that those who seek to rule others can be well disposed to those who have chosen to live on terms of political equality (isēgoria). (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

6.2.2.9 Philippics (4, 6, 9, 10) - Olynthiacs (1, 2, 3) - On the Chersonese (8) When Eratosthenes says that often in his speeches Demosthenes was like one frenzied, bacchanal (Plut. Demosth. 9.4: παράβακχος), one turns one’s attention to those literary and historical monuments through which Demosthenes, from 350 BC until the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), put forth the need for active and consistent Athenian policy against Philip II of Macedon. The four Philippics (4, 6, 9, 10), the three Olynthiacs (1, 2, 3) and the speech On the Chersonese (8) focus on stemming the northern risk with passion and fascinating dedication. With the Third Philippic, Demosthenes reaches the summit of his career as a political orator (Lesky 1966, 604), while the following phrase from the Second Philippic (6.25) is an exceptional reflection of his political beliefs: “Every king and tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law” (βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος). As an active politician who imposes his will through his rhetoric, Demosthenes’ views become immediately apparent through the content of his public speeches. R.D. Milns (2000, 215–216) grouped the common themes framed by the large pluralism of Demosthenic literary means: a) Demosthenes employs aggressive, piercing force to

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rouse his fellow citizens from their apathy and exhorts them to imitate their ancestors;72 b) by playing the role of the unpleasant counsellor, he stands opposed to an audience used to flattery;73 the bribery and corruption of orators are linked;74 c) he mounts an attack against the exceedingly ambitious and deceitful character of Philip (though one cannot overlook the underlying acknowledgement of his great achievements) and the foolishness of states that believe his promises;75 d) he warns of the risk of the war coming to Attica if the Athenians do not take drastic action in the north.76 In the First Philippic (4; 352/351 BC), Demosthenes employs fiery rhetoric to pillory the political apathy of the Athenians, contrasting it to Philip’s restless activity. He uses few arguments, which are repeated in numerous variations and focus on the main theme. Through the use of asyndeton, rhetorical question, anadiplōsis, anaphora, hypophora, etc., Demosthenes expresses his established intention to present the benefits for Athens and his revulsion towards the indolence of his fellow citizens, not from the perspective of interest, but as the only option at a time of supreme danger.77 The dramatic exposition of facts using direct speech (Wooten 2008, 63–64)78 is made clear in the passage below (4.10–11), conveying a strong emotional charge: First Philippic 4(10) πότ᾽ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πότε ἃ χρὴ πράξετε; ἐπειδὰν τί γένηται; ἐπειδὰν νὴ Δία ἀνάγκη τις ᾖ. νῦν δὲ τί χρὴ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡγεῖσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μεγίστην ἀνάγκην τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσχύνην εἶναι. ἢ βούλεσθε, εἰπέ μοι, περιόντες αὑτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, “λέγεταί τι καινόν;” γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τι καινότερον ἢ Μακεδὼν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν; (11) “τέθνηκε Φίλιππος;” “οὐ μὰ Δία, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσθενεῖ”. τί δ᾽ ὑμῖν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν. First Philippic 4(10) When, men of Athens, when will you do what is needed? What are you waiting for? For some necessity (anankē) to arise, by Zeus? What, then, should we call the present developments? For, I believe, the strongest necessity for free men (eleutheroi) is shame

|| 72 Cf. 2.13; 3.23–28; 6.8–12; 8.50–51; 9.41–46. 73 See 1.16; 3.32; 4.51; 8.69; 9.4–5; 9.63–65; 10.54. For Demosthenes as a “counsellor”, see J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, Princeton 1989, 318–324; Yunis (1996) 257–268; G. Mader, Praise, Blame and Authority. Some Strategies of Persuasion in Demosthenes, “Philippic” 2, Hermes 132 (2004) 56–68; G. Mader, Dramatizing Didaxis. Aspects of Demosthenes’ “Periclean” Project, CPh 102 (2007) 155–179. 74 See 2.14; 4.18; 5.12; 8.61–66; 9.36–47. 75 See 1.12–13; 2.5–8; 2.15–21; 4.49; 6.20–25; 9.10; 9.56–62; 10.2; 10.58. 76 See 1.15; 1.25; 3.8–9; 6.35; 8.43–47; 10.3. On the “Attica under attack” motif, see recently S. Schmidt-Hofner, Visions of Attica, in: Martin (2018) 191–205. 77 See G. Kennedy, The Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative Oratory, TAPhA 90 (1959) 137. Cf. G. Rowe, Demosthenes’ First Philippic. The Satiric Mode, TAPhA 99 (1968) 362; Pearson (1976) 119. For a stylistic discussion of the speech, see Wooten (2008) 10–16. 78 Cf. V. Bers, Speech in Speech. Studies in Incorporated “Oratio Recta” in Attic Drama and Oratory, London 1997.

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(aischynē) at their situation. Or, tell me, do you wish to go around asking each other, “Is there any news?” What could be graver news than that a Macedonian is waging war on Athens and is in control of the affairs of Greece? (11) “Is Philip dead?” “No, by Zeus, but he is sick.” What difference does it make to you? Even if something were to happen to him, you would soon create another Philip (heteros Philippos), if this is how you apply yourselves to the situation, since even he has not prospered by reason of his own strength as much as because of our neglect (ameleia). (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

In the three Olynthiacs (349/348 BC),79 Demosthenes seeks active military support for the metropolis of Olynthus in Chalcidice, which was attacked by Philip. According to G.A. Lehmann (2004, 110), the three texts are not manifestos or general political declamations of the Isocratean type, but are directly related to the political and military situation of that era.80 In the First Olynthiac (1), Demosthenes urgently follows up on the argumentation of the First Philippic (4) regarding the unwillingness of the Athenians to take action; he uses emotional arguments (Sanders 2016, 60–66) and underlines the naïveté of those who cannot grasp that the war will move from Chalcidice to Attica if they remain idle (1.15: τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν; 1.17: εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ἡμῖν ἡ στρατεία γένηται). This is a recurring motif in Demosthenes’ demegoric-deliberative speeches (cf. 4.11: ameleia; 4.17; 9.5: rhathymia, ameleia; 6.3: argōs echein).81 Demosthenes’ views of Philip stress the contrast between Philip’s restless activity or greed (philopragmosynē) and the Athenians’ apathy (1.14). W. Will (2013, 87) correctly identifies the negative signature Thucydidean concepts (e.g. Thuc. 3.82.8) such as pleonexia (“greed”) and philotimia (“ambition”; cf. all other Demosthenic speeches in general 2.18: philotimia; 4.42: polypragmosynē; 2.23: ponōn; 8.11: proteros pros tois pragmasi; 6.13: pleonexia; 10.2: aselgeia kai pleonexia).82 At the same time, he emphatically stresses the fortune that Philip does not deserve and which is morally reprehensible (1.23: ἅνθρωπος ὑβριστής). “Philip’s power is not based on justice” (MacDowell 2009, 231). Moral indignation over the perjuring Philip

|| 79 On the sequence of the three speeches, see C. Eucken, Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen Reden, MH 41 (1984) 193–208; C.J. Tuplin, Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus, Historia 47 (1998) 276–320, esp. 276–291; Karvounis (2002) 304–305 note 1. For a view against the traditional sequence, see J.R. Ellis, The Order of the Olynthiacs, Historia 16 (1967) 108– 112. 80 Cf. H. Erbse, Zu den Olynthischen Reden des Demosthenes, RhM 29 (1956) 364–380 (= Schindel 1987, 214–232). 81 On this pax duello mixta-motif, see 4.25–26; 8.5–9; 8.39; 8.58–59; 9.6–7; 9.8–14; 9.17; 10.11; 10.56; 10.60–61; Mader (2005) 11–35. 82 Isocrates, on the other hand, in his To Philip (5) attempts to attribute a positive connotation to Philip’s ambition through his role as a benefactor to all Greeks. Philip is called upon to imitate his mythical ancestor, Heracles, and associate his competitive philotimia with cooperative values, such as phronēsis and dikaiosynē (5.110). Cf. Alexiou (1995) 118–130; (2018) 119–120 and Chapter 5.2.2.8 above.

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can also be found in the Second Olynthiac (2.10): “It is impossible, quite impossible, men of Athens, that a criminal and perjurer and liar should acquire power that is securely based; rather, such things last for a moment or a short time”. Short, incessant rhetorical questions also succeed one another in the Τhird Olynthiac (3.16–17):83 Τhird Olynthiac 3(16) τίνα γὰρ χρόνον ἢ τίνα καιρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ παρόντος βελτίω ζητεῖτε; ἢ πότε ἃ δεῖ πράξετε, εἰ μὴ νῦν; οὐχ ἅπαντα μὲν ἡμῶν προείληφε τὰ χωρία ἅνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ καὶ ταύτης κύριος τῆς χώρας γενήσεται, πάντων αἴσχιστα πεισόμεθα; οὐχ οὕς, εἰ πολεμήσαιεν, ἑτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦσιν; οὐκ ἐχθρός; οὐκ ἔχων τὰ ἡμέτερα; οὐ βάρβαρος; οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν εἴποι τις; (17) ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν πάντ᾽ ἐάσαντες καὶ μόνον οὐχὶ συγκατασκευάσαντες αὐτῷ, τότε τοὺς αἰτίους οἵτινες τούτων ζητήσομεν; οὐ γὰρ αὐτοί γ’ αἴτιοι φήσομεν εἶναι, σαφῶς οἶδα τοῦτ’ ἐγώ. Τhird Olynthiac 3(16) What occasion or opportunity, men of Athens, do you seek that will be better than the present one? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has this man not taken all our territories? If he becomes master of this land, shall we not suffer the utmost ignominy? Are those people, whom we promised to support if they were to go to war, not now at war with him? Is he not our enemy (echthros)? Does he not possess what is ours? Is he not a foreigner (barbaros)? Can anyone find words to describe him? (17) But, by the gods, after we have neglected everything and all but helped him in his preparations, are we now to inquire who was responsible for this state of affairs? For we shall not admit that we are responsible ‒ that I know for certain! (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

The Second Philippic (6) is dated to 344/343 BC (Dion. Hal. Epist. Amm. 10, p. 269–270 Us.-Rad.), three years after the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC). The proem of the speech (6.1–6) could preface any other Philippic oration (cf. MacDowell 2009, 330). Demosthenes’ rhetoric reflects the dominant trends in the Athenian scene and his own individual role within a pluralism of emotions and hesitation: there is a predominance of sharp contrasts between words or accusations against Philip and Athenian decisions that are never implemented, between orations concerning Philip’s terrifying actions and specific proposals that are not brought up before the public due to fear, between the Athenians who are only skilled in words and Philip who is skilled in action (sarkasmos) and, finally, between those who trust Philip and those who follow Demosthenes, who considers Philip an enemy (6.6: ἐχθρὸν ἡγοῦμαι Φίλιππον). It is noteworthy that Demosthenes invokes ‒ as is customary for orators ‒ historical examples84

|| 83 Cf. Usher (1999) 225; Milns (2000) 212–213. 84 Cf. K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtsschreibern bis Demosthenes, Basel 1935; L. Pearson, Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators, CPh 36 (1941) 209–229; S. Perlman, The Historical Example, its Use and Importance as Political Propaganda in the Attic Orators, SH 7 (1961) 150–166; D. Allroggen, Griechische Geschichte im Urteil der attischen Redner des vierten Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Freiburg 1972; M. Nouhaud, L’utilisation de l’histoire par les orateurs attiques, Paris 1982; R.D. Milns, Historical Paradigms in Demosthenes’ Public Speeches, Electronic Antiquity 2.5 (1995); Witte (1995) 41–69; Steinbock (2013); J. Grethlein, The Value of the

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and addresses the glorious Athenian ancestors: he describes the heroic stance of the Athenians during the Persian Wars who ‒ contrary to Alexander I of Macedon, the Thebans and the Argives ‒ did not serve their own personal interests at the expense of the rest of the Greeks (6.11; cf. Milns 2000, 214–215; Steinbock 2013, 144 ff.):85 Second Philippic 6(11) εὑρίσκει γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀκούει τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους προγόνους, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν Ἑλλήνων ὥστε αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἡνίκ᾽ ἦλθεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτων πρόγονος περὶ τούτων κῆρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους καὶ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πράξαντας ταῦθ᾽ ἃ πάντες ἀεὶ γλίχονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ᾽ οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι), τοὺς δὲ Θηβαίων καὶ Ἀργείων προγόνους τοὺς μὲν συστρατεύσαντας τῷ βαρβάρῳ, τοὺς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐναντιωθέντας. Second Philippic 6(11) For he finds it recorded, I think, and hears it said that your ancestors, when they had the chance to rule the rest of Greece on condition that they obey the King, not only rejected this proposal, when Alexander, the ancestor of these people, came as a herald on this matter, but chose to abandon (eklipein) their land and endured suffering (pathein) anything at all, and subsequently did things that everyone longs to tell but no one has been able to recount worthily, which is why I too will omit them, and rightly so ‒ for their deeds (erga) are greater than anyone could do justice to in words (logos) ‒ whereas the Thebans’ ancestors campaigned with the foreigner (barbaros), and the Argives did not resist. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

The apostrophē in 6.20–25, i.e. turning away from the regular audience and addressing a difference audience, is particularly interesting: Demosthenes quotes a section of a previous speech delivered in Argos and Messene. Η. Lausberg (1998, 338) stresses that this technique has an emotive effect on the regular audience, as it externalises the orator’s passion and transcends the boundaries of the ordinary “orator - audience” relationship. The theme of this apostrophe is “free states - tyrants”.86 The rhetorical questions culminate in an impressive Priamel87 (Wooten 2008, 133–134): Second Philippic 6(24) “ἓν δέ τι κοινὸν ἡ φύσις τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἐν αὑτῇ κέκτηται φυλακτήριον, ὃ πᾶσι μέν ἐστ᾽ ἀγαθὸν καὶ σωτήριον, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς πλήθεσι πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ἀπιστία. ταύτην φυλάττετε, ταύτης ἀντέχεσθε· ἂν ταύτην σῴζητε, οὐδὲν μὴ

|| Past Challenged. Myth and Ancient History in the Attic Orators, in: J. Ker/C. Pieper (eds.), Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/ Boston 2014, 326–354. 85 See also C. Carey, Propaganda and Competition in Athenian Oratory, in: K.A.E. Enenkel/I.L. Pfeijffer (eds.), The Manipulative Mode. Political Propaganda in Antiquity. A Collection of Case Studies, Leiden/Boston 2005, 65–100. 86 See Ryder (2000) 72; Worthington (2013) 197. Cf. J.W. Leopold, Demosthenes on Distrust of Tyrants, GRBS 22 (1981) 227–246. 87 Regarding the poetic origins of the Priamel technique, see T. Krischer, Die logischen Formen der Priamel, GB 2 (1974) 79–91; W.H. Race, The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius, Leiden 1982; Ν. Georgatzoglou, Το Priamel στην αρχαϊκή λυρική ποίηση: υφολογικές-ερμηνευτικές παρατηρήσεις, Hellenica 55 (2005) 219–238. On the use of Priamel in the proem of Isocrates’ Evagoras (9.1–4), see Alexiou (2010) 67.

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δεινὸν πάθητε. τί ζητεῖτ᾽;” ἔφην. (25) “ἐλευθερίαν; εἶτ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾶτε Φίλιππον ἀλλοτριωτάτας ταύτῃ καὶ τὰς προσηγορίας ἔχοντα; βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος. οὐ φυλάξεσθ᾽ ὅπως”, ἔφην, “μὴ πολέμου ζητοῦντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι δεσπότην εὕρητε;” Second Philippic 6(24) “But there is one safeguard with which all right-thinking people are naturally endowed, and which is a benefit and a source of salvation for everybody, but particularly for democracies in their dealings with tyrants. What is this? Mistrust (apistia). Guard it; hold onto it. If you keep it, you will avoid disaster. (25) What do you seek?” I said. “Freedom? Then do you not see that Philip’s very titles are inimical to this? Every king (basileus) and tyrant (tyrannos) is an enemy of freedom (eleutheria) and an opponent of law. You should be on your guard,” I said, “lest, in seeking to escape war, you find yourselves saddled with a master (despotēs).” (Transl. Trevett 2011)

The speeches On the Chersonese (8) and Philippic 3 and 4 (9 and 10) are dated to 341 BC; all three speeches must have been written within a few months of each other, during the same intense, dramatic era. The two Philippics exhibit certain particularities. For example, there are two versions of the Third Philippic (9), a short and a long one. Compared to the AFY manuscripts, passages are either missing from the most authoritative manuscript S (e.g. 9.6–7; cf. Dilts 2002–2009, I xvi with note 29) or were added in the margins. It is unclear whether Demosthenes produced two versions (the most likely explanation) or whether the passages were added by a scholar at a later stage to clarify the content.88 The authenticity of the Fourth Philippic (10) was disputed due to extensive verbatim repetitions ‒ as well as altered or omitted words, phrases or sentences ‒ from On the Chersonese (8.36–67 occurs anew in two parts as 10.11–27 and 10.55–70), though after the discovery of the papyrus fragment of Didymus’ On Demosthenes (P. Berol. 9780 in 1901) its authenticity is broadly accepted today.89 Nevertheless, there can be but conjecture on whether the speech was delivered and in which form.90 The speech On the Chersonese (8) was precipitated by the actions of the Athenian general Diopeithes in Thrace, whom Demosthenes defends, but essentially underlines the role of Athens at the very centre of the anti-Macedonian resistance. This role is established on a fundamental difference between military monarchy and democracy. Philip is portrayed as kakonous and an echthros of the city (both concepts have a political connotation, as they refer to advocates of oligarchy), but primarily as an

|| 88 See summarily Wooten (2008) 167–173, who maintains that Demosthenes delivered the longer version of the speech. Cf. Sandys (1900) lix–lxvii; P. Treves, La composition de la troisième Philippique, REA 42 (1940) 354–364; Pearson (1976) 150–151; Bühler (1978) 59–77. 89 See A. Körte, Zu Didymos’ Demosthenes-Commentar, RhM 60 (1905) 388–416. Summarily Hajdú (2002) 44–46 and the appendix 451–471. See also Trevett (2011) 177–178. In Dilts’ edition (2002–2009) the speech is considered authentic. 90 On various such conjectures see S.G. Daitz, The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and the Philippica quarta of Demosthenes, CPh 52 (1957) 145–162; Carlier (1990) 200; I. Worthington, The Authenticity of Demosthenes’ Fourth Philippic, Mnemosyne 44 (1991) 425–428; Trevett (1996) 436–437.

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enemy of the free constitution: “Οn nothing in the world is (Philip) more bent than on its destruction” (8.40). Demosthenes, Athens and democracy make up an integrally linked web; the orator, as an individual, is the timeless mirror of democracy and his city, beyond the specific moment in time. The city and everything it symbolises speak through Demosthenes (8.39–41): On the Chersonese 8(39) πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γνῶναι, ὅτι τῇ πόλει Φίλιππος πολεμεῖ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην λέλυκεν (καὶ παύσασθε περὶ τούτου κατηγοροῦντες ἀλλήλων) καὶ κακόνους μέν ἐστι καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐδάφει, (40) προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τοῖς μάλιστ᾽ οἰομένοις αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι (εἰ δὲ μή, σκεψάσθων Εὐθυκράτη καὶ Λασθένη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, οἳ δοκοῦντες οἰκειότατ᾽ αὐτῷ διακεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν προὔδοσαν, πάντων κάκιστ᾽ ἀπολώλασιν), οὐδενὶ μέντοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβουλεύει καὶ σκοπεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἓν τῶν πάντων, ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει. (41) καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἰκότως τρόπον τινὰ πράττει· οἶδεν γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων γένηται κύριος, οὐδὲν ἔστ᾽ αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατῆσθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν ποτε συμβῇ τι πταῖσμα, ἃ πολλὰ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἥξει πάντα τὰ νῦν συμβεβιασμένα καὶ καταφεύξεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς. On the Chersonese 8(39) First, men of Athens, you must fully acknowledge that Philip is at war with our city and has broken the peace – and please stop accusing each other about this – and is malignly hostile (kakonous kai echthros) to the entire city down to its very foundation, (40) and, I should add, to all its inhabitants, including those who most think that they are doing him a favor. And if they do not believe me, let them consider the Olynthians Euthycrates and Lasthenes, who seemed to be on terms of intimacy with him, but who, after they betrayed their city, suffered a worse fate than anyone. But it is against our constitution (politeia) that he is most at war, and towards its overthrow (katalyein) that his plots and policies are above all directed. (41) And in a sense it is reasonable for him to do so. For he is well aware that even if he gets control of everyone else, he will be unable to possess anything securely, so long as you are a democracy; and if ever some slip occurs – and there are many slips that may befall a man – all those places that he has now forced into union will come and seek refuge with you. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

Demosthenes perceives democracy as an exceptionally broad and defining rule of life (Lehmann 2004, 159) which allows him, at the end of the speech and contrary to the opportunism of other politicians,91 to voice fierce remarks concerning the responsibility of orators (8.72). His role as a counsellor and primarily as a representative of the values of the city and its past transcends everyday rhetorical practice; didactic mandates concerning the need for beneficial and unpleasant rhetoric are expressed using almost Isocratean terminology. The difference is that Demosthenes portrays himself as the embodiment of this type of practical political rhetoric: “The city must prosper through the policies proposed by its good citizens (τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι), and everyone must always advocate what is best, not what is easiest (τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, μὴ τὸ ῥᾷστον). Nature will move towards the latter of its own accord;

|| 91 Cf. 8.10; 8.61; 8.64–67; 8.69–73; Worthington (2013) 217.

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towards the former, the good citizen must lead the way, teaching through his words”. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011). In the Third Philippic (9) this pattern of thinking is expanded and it is remarkable how Demosthenes, as an active political orator, positions himself so decisively opposite a society that has become indolent, and how he succeeds in establishing his divergent personal opinion before a democratic audience in the 4th century BC (Görgemanns 1987, 135). Demosthenes’ deinotēs reaches a true climax and evidences the present-day reputation of a passionate orator who prevailed over the demos in the Assembly and was not swayed by the crowd. The city that Demosthenes represents is not the Athens of his era, but Athens as a whole, including all of its history, removed from and transcending the flatteries of contemporary rhetorical practice to which the audience was addicted. Demosthenes does not attempt to win over the crowd; he believes that he is able to raise their awareness faced with the ultimate danger, fiercely and directly criticising the habits of his fellow citizens (9.3–4): Third Philippic 9(3) ἀξιῶ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄν τι τῶν ἀληθῶν μετὰ παρρησίας λέγω, μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ’ ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι. σκοπεῖτε γὰρ ὡδί. ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἄν τις οἰκέτας ἴδοι παρ’ ἡμῖν μετὰ πλείονος ἐξουσίας ὅ τι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβουλεύειν παντάπασιν ἐξεληλάκατε. (4) εἶθ’ ὑμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐκ τούτου ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκούουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν οὕτω διάκεισθε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· εἰ δ’ ἃ συμφέρει χωρὶς κολακείας ἐθελήσετ’ ἀκούειν, ἕτοιμος λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάνυ φαύλως τὰ πράγματ’ ἔχει καὶ πολλὰ προεῖται, ὅμως ἔστιν, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν βούλησθε, ἔτι πάντα ταῦτα ἐπανορθώσασθαι. Third Philippic 9(3) I ask you, men of Athens, not to be at all angry with me if I speak freely in telling the truth. Look at it like this: You believe so strongly that in other areas freedom of speech (parrhēsia) should be granted to all inhabitants of the city that you have allowed foreigners and slaves to share in it, and many slaves here can be seen saying whatever they like with greater freedom than is enjoyed by the citizens of some other states, but you have entirely banished freedom of speech when it comes to the giving of advice (symbouleuein). (4) The result is that in meetings of the Assembly, you are spoiled (tryphan) and easily flattered (kolakeuesthai), and listen to everything with an ear to your own pleasure, but in your public policy and in the reality of the situation, you are already in deadly danger. If this is your disposition even now, there is nothing I can say to you. But if you wish to hear what is to your advantage, without any flattery (kolakeia), I am ready to speak. Even if our situation is desperate and much has been squandered, nevertheless it is still possible to set matters right (epanorthōsasthai), if you are willing to do what is needed. (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

Demosthenes subsequently repeats his main tenets concerning Philip’s consistent aggressiveness and the Athenians’ passivity (9.26–35), and provides practical counsel, culminating in the role of Athens as a leading force in a broad defensive alliance

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(9.47–75).92 At this point, it is worth drawing a contrast between Demosthenes and Isocrates: with his Pan-Hellenic ideal, Isocrates exhorts Philip, due to his Greek origins through his mythical ancestor Heracles, to be a benefactor for the Greeks, to reign over the Macedonians and to extend his power over the barbarians (To Philip 5.154). Starting from a completely different perspective, Demosthenes also focuses on the Pan-Hellenic dimension, in the sense that the Macedonians pose an extreme danger to the Greeks (9.20: περὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐν κινδύνῳ μεγάλῳ καθεστώτων). In this case, Philip becomes a barbarus barbarorum (Will 2013, 128): not only is he no Greek nor even a barbarian, but a wretched Macedonian (ὄλεθρος Μακεδών), whence it was never yet possible to buy a decent slave (9.31). The speech is exceptionally against Philip, with fierce characterisations, in contrast to Isocrates’ exhortations towards Philip.93 The Fourth Philippic (10) is the picture of the entire world, as conceived by Demosthenes (Will 2013, 129). Philip’s supporters crave tyranny and have prevailed everywhere, while Athens is the only democratic city (10.4). Philip, the enemy, will never desist from wronging everyone and placing everything under his power, unless someone restrains him (10.10): and it is Demosthenes who takes on this task. He once again fiercely criticises the foreign policy being followed: the traditional interests of Athens, which included serving as a champion for the Greeks and helping the oppressed (10.46), have been sold and exchanged for misconceived leisure and inaction (10.53– 54):94 Fourth Philippic 10(53) ἀλλ’ ὅμως εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη καὶ τοσαύτας δυναστείας διῃρημένων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων, εἰ δεῖ τἀληθῆ μετὰ παρρησίας εἰπεῖν, τὰ παρ’ οὐδέσι τούτων ἀρχεῖα καὶ βουλευτήρια ἐρημότερ’ ἄν τις ἴδοι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἢ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν, εἰκότως· οὔτε γὰρ φιλῶν οὔτε πιστεύων οὔτε φοβούμενος οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν διαλέγεται. (54) αἴτιον δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἕν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὑμῖν μεταθεῖναι), ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἐκ παντὸς ἡμαρτημένα τοῦ χρόνου, ὧν τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐάσας, εἰς ὃ πάντα τείνει λέξω, δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν, ἂν λέγω τἀληθῆ μετὰ παρρησίας, μηδὲν ἄχθεσθαι. πέπραται τὰ συμφέροντ’ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν καιρῶν, καὶ μετειλήφατε ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν, ὑφ’ ὧν κεκηλημένοι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ πικρῶς ἔχετε, ἕτεροι δὲ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχουσιν. Fourth Philippic 10(53) Nevertheless, at a time when Greece is split into so many factions and tyrannies, the candid truth is that there is no city whose magistrates’ office and Council Chamber

|| 92 Cf. Ryder (2000) 78. 93 Such abuse is not uncommon in the context of rhetorical loidoria or diabolē (see below note 105). Regarding the attitude of southern Greeks towards Macedonians and the political dimensions of their differences, see in detail Ι. Xydopoulos, Κοινωνικές και πολιτιστικές σχέσεις των Μακεδόνων και των άλλων Ελλήνων. Συμβολή στην έρευνα της γραμματειακής και επιγραφικής παραδόσεως για την αρχαία Μακεδονία, 2. ed., Thessaloniki 2006, esp. 47–98; E. Alexiou, Ρητορική και ιδεολογία. Ο Φίλιππος Β΄ της Μακεδονίας στον Ισοκράτη και σε συγχρόνους του, Thessaloniki 2015 (only available online). 94 This is a similar criticism expressed approximately a century earlier, shortly before the start of the Peloponnesian War, by the Corinthians to the Spartans (Thuc. 1.69–70).

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take less interest in the affairs of Greece than ours ‒ as indeed one might expect, since no one is motivated by affection or trust or fear to speak to us. (54) There is no single explanation for this situation, men of Athens ‒ if there were, it would be easy for you to change it ‒ but numerous errors of various kinds have been made over a long period. Passing over their individual details, I shall tell you where they are heading ‒ and I ask you not to be annoyed with me if I speak the truth frankly (meta parrhēsias). Whenever an opportunity has arisen, our advantage (sympheronta) has been sold, and you have accepted in return leisure (scholē) and tranquility (hēsychia), which bewitch you so that you do not feel bitter toward those who are injuring you, and others take the honors (timai). (Transl. J. Trevett 2011)

6.2.2.10 On the False Embassy (19) The judicial speech On the False Embassy (19; 343 BC), written during the great political struggle of Demosthenes, was directed against his opponent, Aeschines, due to his non-transparent conduct in the peace delegation sent to Philip to negotiate the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC). Rhetoric, politics and personal conflicts between the two predominant orators of the political scene graphically illustrate an ambiguous political context. This is Demosthenes’ longest speech and its structure presents difficulties: it is noteworthy that, while the speech could have ended with §181, a second, long section follows from §182 to §343. The question concerning the version of the speech presently extant is answered differently in two recent commentaries: Τ. Paulsen (1999, 431–446) contends that the speech was revised before being published, while D. MacDowell (2000, 26) believes that what we have available is a draft of the speech to be delivered at the trial. This second view originates from F. Blass and was supported even in antiquity: “However, according to some, the discourse On the False Embassy has been left in outline (en hypomnēmasi) and has not been written for publication (ou pros ekdosin) in so far as the editing had proceeded” (Phot. Bibl. 265.491b).95 This view is supported by the fact that, while Philocrates has been condemned in Aeschines’ speech (2.6), in Demosthenes’ speech he is still under prosecution, a fact that Demosthenes would be hard-pressed to omit in a subsequent revision of the speech (19.114–115; 19.116 ff.; 19.138; 19.145; 19.229 ff.; 19.328). In terms of the structure of the speech, it is interesting how Demosthenes, due to lack of judicially usable evidence, selects a complex structure by doing away with chronological order, on one hand, and frequently repeating the charge of bribery (over 90 times), on the other, transforming it into a key theme (Leitmotiv-Technik).96 The description of the indignities an Olynthian captive suffered at a symposium in || 95 See Blass (1887–1898) III,1 364; Trevett (1996) 425–441; MacDowell (2009) 334. For the revision, however, of both speeches (Demosthenes 19 and Aeschines 2) before publication, see T. Hubbard, Getting the Last Word. Publication of Political Oratory as an Instrument of Historical Revisionism, in: E.A. Mackay (ed.), Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greco-Roman World, Leiden 2008, 183– 200, esp. 195 ff. 96 See Paulsen (1999) 481 ff., 521 ff. Cf. M. Delaunois, Le plan rhétorique dans l’éloquence grecque d’Homère à Démosthène, Brussels 1958, 128–129.

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Macedon is graphic and vivid (19.196–198; cf. Worthington 2013, 205), while the topos on traitors provides for dignity and ceremony (258–267; Blass 1887–1898, III,1 365). The following passage is highly indicative regarding those who betrayed cities in Chalcidice: On the False Embassy 19(267) πεντακοσίους δ’ ἱππέας προδοθέντας ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγουμένων ἔλαβεν αὐτοῖς ὅπλοις ὁ Φίλιππος, ὅσους οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων. καὶ οὔτε τὸν ἥλιον ᾐσχύνοντο οἱ ταῦτα ποιοῦντες οὔτε τὴν γῆν πατρίδα οὖσαν, ἐφ’ ἧς ἕστασαν, οὔτε ἱερὰ οὔτε τάφους οὔτε τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένην αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἔργοις· οὕτως ἔκφρονας, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ παραπλῆγας τὸ δωροδοκεῖν ποιεῖ. ὑμᾶς οὖν, ὑμᾶς εὖ φρονεῖν δεῖ τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ κολάζειν δημοσίᾳ. On the False Embassy 19(267) Five hundred cavalry along with their arms were surrendered by their own commanders and seized by Philip, which is more than any single man has ever taken. The light of the sun engendered no shame in the men who did these deeds, nor did the native soil on which they stood, nor the temples, nor the graves, nor the humiliation that such actions were bound to bring forth afterwards. Such madness and insanity, Athenians, comes of corruption (dōrodokein). You, therefore, you the people must come to your senses, and instead of permitting such behavior, you must punish (kolazein) it publicly. (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

One unique trait of this speech compared to the rest of the Demosthenic corpus is the use of poetic quotations in response to Aeschines’ speech Against Timarchus (1). Demosthenes quotes and interprets poetic passages quoted by Aeschines (19.243–245) and adds two of his own, one from Sophocles’ Antigone (19.246–250) and one from Solon’s Eunomia (19.251–258), to admonish Aeschines.97 At the same time, he scornfully lampoons his opponent’s theatrical endeavours as an actor in the past (19.246; 19.337).98 In technical terms, this is a judicial speech, but the political element is patently obvious and integrally linked with the defendant’s personal guilt. In fact, the speech does not end with the recapitulation of the evidence, as is customary in judicial rhetoric; instead, Demosthenes recounts the actions and intentions of Philip (19.315–324) or directs sarcastic remarks towards Aeschines regarding his voice and acting, as is clear in the following passage (19.337–339): On the False Embassy 19(337) καίτοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· πάνυ γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω, ὡς καθυποκρινούμενον ὑμᾶς. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖτε ἀτοπώτατον ἁπάντων ἂν ποιῆσαι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν τὰ Θυέστου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ κακὰ ἠγωνίζετο, ἐξεβάλλετε αὐτὸν

|| 97 Cf. S. Perlman, Quotations from Poerty in Attic Orators of the Fourth Century B.C., AJPh 85 (1964) 156–172; Pearson (1976) 172–173; P.E. Easterling, Actors and Voices. Reading between the Lines in Aeschines and Demosthenes, in: S. Goldhill/R. Osborne (eds.), Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy, Cambridge 1999, 154–165; Buckler (2000) 133; M. Edwards, The Orators and Greek Drama, in: A. Markantonatos/E. Volonaki (eds.), Poet and Orator. A Symbiotic Relationship in Democratic Athens, Berlin/Boston 2019, 330–331. 98 See Buckler (2000) 136–137. Cf. A. Serafim, Attic Oratory and Performance, New York/London 2017, 81–90, esp. 86 ff.

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καὶ ἐξεσυρίττετε ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων καὶ μόνον οὐ κατελεύετε οὕτως ὥστε τελευτῶντα τοῦ τριταγωνιστεῖν ἀποστῆναι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ μεγίστοις τῆς πόλεως πράγμασι μυρί’ εἴργασται κακά, τηνικαῦθ’ ὡς καλὸν φθεγγομένῳ προσέχοιτε. (338) μηδαμῶς· μηδὲν ὑμεῖς ἀβέλτερον πάθητε, ἀλλὰ λογίζεσθ’ ὅτι δεῖ κήρυκα μὲν ἂν δοκιμάζητε, εὔφωνον σκοπεῖν, πρεσβευτὴν δὲ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀξιοῦντά τι πράττειν δίκαιον καὶ φρόνημ’ ἔχονθ’ ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν μέγα, πρὸς δ’ ὑμᾶς ἴσον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Φίλιππον μὲν οὐκ ἐθαύμασα, τοὺς δ’ αἰχμαλώτους ἐθαύμασα, ἔσωσα, οὐδὲν ὑπεστειλάμην. οὗτος δ’ ἐκείνου μὲν προὐκυλινδεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παιᾶνας ᾖδεν, ὑμῶν δ’ ὑπερορᾷ. (339) ἔτι τοίνυν ὅταν μὲν ἴδητε δεινότητ’ ἢ εὐφωνίαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ χρηστοῦ καὶ φιλοτίμου γεγενημένον ἀνθρώπου, συγχαίρειν καὶ συνασκεῖν πάντας δεῖ· κοινὸν γὰρ ὑμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ’ ἀγαθὸν γίγνεται· ὅταν δ’ ἐπὶ δωροδόκου καὶ πονηροῦ καὶ παντὸς ἥττονος λήμματος, ἀποκλείειν καὶ πικρῶς καὶ ἐναντίως ἀκούειν, ὡς πονηρία δυνάμεως δόξαν εὑρομένη παρ’ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐστίν. On the False Embassy 19(337) In fact, perhaps I need to add a word about his voice. I hear he takes considerable pride in it and expects to overwhelm you with his delivery. In my view, it would be the most peculiar behavior on your part if, when he portrayed the sufferings of Thyestes and the heroes of Troy, you stopped him by driving him noisily from the theater and practically stoning him to the point where he gave up his career playing bit parts, yet when he has wreaked such disaster (kaka) not on stage but upon the city’s most important, communal interests, you pay him heed because of his beautiful voice. (338) Do not do it. Do not be so foolish. Rather, consider this: when you examine candidates for the office of herald, you must look for someone with a good voice (euphōnos), but when you examine candidates to serve as envoy and to promote the city’s interests, you must look for someone who is honest, who is really proud to represent your interests but is content to be your equal ‒ as indeed I did not respect Philip, but I did respect the prisoners of war and saved them, sparing no effort. But this man groveled before Philip, sang paeans, and scorns you. (339) In addition, when you find cleverness (deinotēs) or vocal brilliance (euphōnia) or some similar distinction in an honest (chrēstos) and magnanimous (philotimos) person, you should all share in the satisfaction and training, for it will be a common benefit to all the rest of you. But when you find this quality in a corrupt (dōrodokos) and wicked (ponēros) person, one who cannot resist any chance at gain, you should all shut him out and listen to him with rancor and animosity, because wickedness (ponēria) that has acquired in your eyes the status of authority is destructive to the city. (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

Furthermore, Demosthenes does not draw a distinction between what is just and what is of interest to the city (the word sympherein occurs 21 times). It is no accident that the final sentence of the speech lauds Aeschines’ potential conviction as an example for citizens and all other Greeks to avoid (19.343: τιμωρησαμένους παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι πᾶσι, καὶ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν).99 6.2.2.11 Funeral Speech (60) The Epitaphios (60; around late 338 BC)100 in honour of the fallen at Chaeronea follows a standard structure, shaped over the course of the long tradition of funeral speeches: || 99 Cf. Usher (1999) 237. 100 Against the authenticity is Blass (1887–1898) III,1 404–406. For the authenticity is Sykutris (1928) 241–258. Cf. Loraux (1986) 10, 346 notes 62 and 63; Worthington (2003) 152–157; Roisman (2005)

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the orator’s inability to deliver the speech (1–3), praise for the ancestors (4–14), praise for the fallen, the last war and the constitution (15–26), an excursus concerning the accomplishments of the Athenian tribes (27–31), a beatitude for the fallen, to be now seated beside the gods below (32–34), ending with consolation for the relatives of the deceased (35–37). Stylistically, the text is wholly different from Demosthenes’ publicdeliberative speeches. There is no rich argumentation, personal identification or fiery passion, accompanied by the corresponding rhetorical figures (Sykutris 1928, 255– 256). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosth. 44, p. 228 Us.-Rad.) characterised the speech as vulgar, empty and puerile (ὁ φορτικὸς καὶ κενὸς καὶ παιδαριώδης), while G. Kennedy (1963, 164) wished Demosthenes had never written such a speech. However, nothing in the content contradicts the authenticity of the speech: Demosthenes equates his politics with that of the deceased (60.18; cf. similarly 18.20), while the final defeat must be attributed not to a lack of convictions but to a deity (daimōn) or chance (tychē):101 Epitaphios 60(19) ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν μάχη γίγνηται, τοῖς μὲν ἡττᾶσθαι, τοῖς δὲ νικᾶν· οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι δ’ εἰπεῖν ὅτι μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ τελευτῶντες ἑκατέρων ἐν τάξει τῆς μὲν ἥττης οὐ μετέχειν, νικᾶν δ’ ὁμοίως ἀμφότεροι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρατεῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὡς ἂν ὁ δαίμων παραδῷ, κρίνεται· ὃ δ’ εἰς τοῦτο ἕκαστον ἔδει παρασχέσθαι, πᾶς ὁ μένων ἐν τάξει πεποίηκεν. εἰ δὲ θνητὸς ὢν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἔσχεν, τῇ τύχῃ πέπονθε τὸ συμβαῖνον, οὐχὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥττηται τῶν ἐναντίων. Epitaphios 60(19) Whenever a battle takes place, one side must win and the other must lose. However, I would not hesitate to say that I think that those who die at their posts on either side do not share in defeat but are equally victorious on both sides. For among the living victory is decided by divine dispensation (daimōn), but every man who stands firm in battle has done what he ought to do to achieve this end. But if ‒ being only human ‒ he meets his destiny, his misfortune is due to chance (tychē), but his opponents did not defeat his spirit (psychē). (Transl. I. Worthington 2006)

The excursus concerning the actions of various tribes is original (Usher 1999, 351), while the language of the speech is characteristically Demosthenic. Demosthenes was not an epideictic orator, like Isocrates, and one might speculate that he was forced to adapt to the requirements of this type of oration. Nevertheless, if one should consider the speech to be spurious, one must answer the apt question posed by J. Sykutris (1928, 257): Is it likely that “a counterfeiter, who presents himself as Demosthenes and

|| 68 note 14; Worthington (2006) 24–25; J. Herrman, The Authenticity of the Demosthenic Funeral Oration, AAntHung 48 (2008) 171–178; J. Grethlein, The Greeks and their Past. Poetry, Oratory, and History in the Fifth Century BCE, Cambridge 2010, 107; Roisman (2015) 280. 101 Cf. 60.21: ὁ πάντων κύριος δαίμων, ὡς ἐβούλετο, ἔνειμε τὸ τέλος; 60.31; 18.194: οὔτε τῆς τύχης κύριος ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη τῶν πάντων; 18.200; 18.207: τῇ τῆς τύχης ἀγνωμοσύνῃ; 18.253–255; Roisman (2005) 71; J. Herrman, Hyperides Funeral Oration. Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Oxford 2009, 17.

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who wishes and is able to write like Demosthenes, would have forgone the distinguishing hallmarks of Demosthenic eloquence?” The currently prevailing view in scholarship is worded by I. Worthington (2013) 262: “It was a fitting eulogy to those who died at Chaeronea”.102 6.2.2.12 On the Crown (18) A. Lesky (1966, 605) is correct: with the speech On the Crown (18), dated to 330 BC, Demosthenes delivered “the real and lofty Epitaphios to Athens’ fight for freedom under unusual conditions”. Since antiquity, this speech has been considered as the most exquisite work of the rhetorical art (Unte 1985, 293). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De comp. verb. 204, p. 130 Us.-Rad.: ὃν ἐγὼ κράτιστον ἀποφαίνομαι πάντων λόγων) and Cicero (Orat. 133) award it the “first prize”. It has the best and most harmonious structure of all of Demosthenes’ speeches (Dion. Hal. Demosth. 14, p. 158 Us.-Rad.). In recent years, following H. Wankel’s monumental commentary (1976), three more commentaries have been published.103 Formally, Demosthenes defended Ctesiphon, whom Aeschines had prosecuted six years earlier of submitting an illegal motion for Demosthenes to be awarded a crown for his services to Athens in the theatre at the Dionysia; in actuality, the speech was a full account and autobiographical exposition of the orator’s politics, similar to Isocrates’ speech Antidosis (15). However, while the Antidosis was a written, fictional speech that was never delivered during a trial, On the Crown is an actual public speech. According to Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon (3), both the presentation of a crown to a public official still serving his term and not yet held accountable (3.12: εὐθύνας δοῦναι) and the location of the honour, i.e. the theatre, were illegal (3.34); additionally, according to Aeschines, Demosthenes did not deserve this crown (3.50:  εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔπαινοι ψευδεῖς). In juridical terms, Demosthenes’ position was weak, which is why the orator does not begin with the legal issue, but includes it in the account of his politics, shifting the focus from the illegality of the decree to his overall life and general policy in Athens.104 From a rhetorical perspective, this was exceptionally ingenious, as it shifted

|| 102 Cf. Roisman/Worthington (2015) 226; I. Worthington, The Epitaphios, Erotikos, Prooimia, and Letters, in: Martin (2018) 402. Will (2013) 148–149 considers the speech authentic and attributes the style to political circumstances, which dictated reticence after the Battle of Chaeronea. Philip’s name is not to be found in the Funeral Speech. 103 Zürcher (1983); Usher (1993); Yunis (2001). 104 See Blass (1887–1898) III,1 424–425; Wankel (1976) 41 ff. On the legal issue, cf. Cawkwell (1969) 163–180; Harris (1995) 143–145; Sawada (1996) 57–84. For a view opposing a strict distinction between legal and political arguments, see M. Gagarin, Law, Politics, and the Question of Relevance in the Case On the Crown, ClAnt 31 (2012) 293–314. Cf. also P.J. Rhodes, Keeping to the Point, in: E.M. Harris/L. Rubinstein (eds.), The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece, London 2004, 137–158; Herman (2006) 148–149.

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the audience’s attention to a subject more advantageous to him: “Demosthenes does not argue for the crown on the basis of law or justice” (Yunis 2001, 15). The harsh, personal attacks (the terminus technicus being diabolē or loidoria)105 against Aeschines’ parents, ancestors and sexual debauchery, which were commonplace in judicial speeches and evolved in Attica judicial rhetoric into an “art of insult” (Kunst des Schimpfens; Görgemmans 1987, 142; Will 2013, 173), are striking: e.g. 18.128: ὦ κάθαρμα; 18.129–130; 18.209: ὦ κατάρατε καὶ γραμματοκύφων … τριταγωνιστά; 18.258–259; 18.265.106 However, the speech reaches its moral and stylistic climax through the political seriousness and thrilling passion with which Demosthenes defends the politics of honour and patriotism until 338 BC as the only politics worthy of Athens and its history. The defeat at Chaeronea was the result of the will of the gods (18.192: ὡς ἂν ὁ δαίμων βουληθῇ),107 while a politician can only be responsible for his own convictions (ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις αὐτὴ τὴν τοῦ συμβούλου διάνοιαν δηλοῖ). Demosthenes, as an individual and the foremost exponent of political rhetoric, is portrayed as a symbol of the timeless city of Athens. He wishes to make it clear that, despite the unfortunate outcome of the war against Philip, Athens had no alternative; based on the character of the city, its resistance and consistent struggle for liberty were mandated by its name and tradition.108 The result of this tradition is the following Demosthenic paradox: even if it had known the outcome of this struggle beforehand, Athens would still have been morally obligated to follow its fate:

|| 105 The terms are semantically related: diabolē is undermining the opponent’s character, usually in a roundabout manner, while loidoria is a direct attack using insults in order to humiliate the opponent. See Hunter (1990) 299–325; Apostolakis (2014) 208 note 21. 106 Cf. Wankel (1976) 688–690; Worthington (2013) 304–305. See also G.O. Rowe, The Portrait of Aeschines in the Oration On the Crown, TAPhA 97 (1966) 397–406; A.R. Dyck, The Function and Persuasive Power of Demosthenes’ Portrait of Aeschines in the Speech On the Crown, G&R 32 (1985) 42– 48; Cohen (1995) 79–80; Roisman (2005) 98–101; E. Volonaki, Οικογένεια, καταγωγή και πολιτική λοιδορία στην κλασική Αθήνα, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 181 ff.; D.J. Mirhady, Ethos in on the Crown, in: Murphy (2016) 114–129. For a more reserved view see P. Harding, Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-Century Athens, Phoenix 41 (1987) 30–31; Herman (2006) 144–145. Cf. in general Carey (1994) 31–32. 107 Demosthenes repeatedly invokes the concepts of daimōn, theos and tychē and vests himself in the garb of a tragic hero; see 18.192–194; 18.199–210; 18.252; Wankel (1976) 908–910; Yunis (2001) 15. 108 Cf. 18.231; 18.254; 18.306; R.A. Katula, Crafting Nostalgia. Pathos in On the Crown, in: Murphy (2016) 130–147, esp. 140 ff.; Weissenberger (2019) 229. Of course, this does not negate the fact that Demosthenes’ perspective was often one-dimensional and that polarisation led to extremes, when Demosthenes’ propaganda considered political opponents to be traitors in service to Philip (18.296: ἐπιλείψει με λέγονθ’ ἡ ἡμέρα τὰ τῶν προδοτῶν ὀνόματα. Cf. the words philippizein and philippismos; 18.176; 18.294). See G. Barthold, Athen und Makedonien. Studien zum Vokabular der politischen Propaganda bei Demosthenes und seinen Gegnern, Tübingen 1962, 72–73; Will (2013) 176–177.

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On the Crown 18(199) ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολὺς τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἔγκειται, βούλομαί τι καὶ παράδοξον εἰπεῖν. καί μου πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν θαυμάσῃ, ἀλλὰ μετ’ εὐνοίας ὃ λέγω θεωρησάτω. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἅπασι πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντα γενήσεσθαι καὶ προῄδεσαν πάντες καὶ σὺ προὔλεγες, Αἰσχίνη, καὶ διεμαρτύρου βοῶν καὶ κεκραγώς, ὃς οὐδ’ ἐφθέγξω, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀποστατέον τῇ πόλει τούτων ἦν, εἴπερ ἢ δόξης ἢ προγόνων ἢ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος εἶχε λόγον. (200) νῦν μέν γ’ ἀποτυχεῖν δοκεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃ πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὅταν τῷ θεῷ ταῦτα δοκῇ· τότε δ’ ἀξιοῦσα προεστάναι τῶν ἄλλων, εἶτ’ ἀποστᾶσα τούτου Φιλίππῳ, προδεδωκέναι πάντας ἂν ἔσχεν αἰτίαν. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα προεῖτο ἀκονιτί, περὶ ὧν οὐδένα κίνδυνον ὅντινα οὐχ ὑπέμειναν οἱ πρόγονοι, τίς οὐχὶ κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ; μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεώς γε, μηδ’ ἐμοῦ. On the Crown 18(199) Since Aeschines insists vehemently on how things have turned out, I wish to say something rather paradoxical (paradoxon). No one, by Zeus and the gods, should be astonished if my argument is extreme; rather, it should be examined sympathetically. If what was going to happen was clear to all in advance, and all knew in advance, and if you, Aeschines, spoke out in advance and shouted and shrieked in protest, you who uttered not even a sound, not even in those circumstances should the city have abandoned its policy, if indeed it valued its reputation (doxa) or its forebears (progonoi) or future ages. (200) True, the city seems to have failed in its objectives, which is the common lot of all mankind when god (theos) so decides. But if it claimed to be the leader of the rest of Greece and then abandoned that claim to Philip, it would have been guilty of betraying (prodedōkenai) all Greeks. For if the city chose to surrender without a fight the position that our forefathers faced every danger to acquire, who would not have spat on ‒ you? Not, indeed, on the city, nor on me! (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

The famous, passionate oath to the dead of the Persian Wars perfectly matches this conviction:109 On the Crown 18(208) ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι, μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπ’ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἑτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασι κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἡ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαψεν, Αἰσχίνη, οὐχὶ τοὺς κατορθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντας μόνους. δικαίως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργον ἅπασι πέπρακται· τῇ τύχῃ δέ, ἣν ὁ δαίμων ἔνειμεν ἑκάστοις, ταύτῃ κέχρηνται. On the Crown 18(208) But you were not wrong, no, you were not, Athenians, to take on danger for the sake of the freedom (eleutheria) and safety (sōtēria) of all ‒ I swear by your forefathers who led the fight at Marathon, by those who stood in the ranks at Plataea, by those who fought aboard ship at Salamis and Artemisium, and by the many other brave (agathoi) men who lie in the public tombs, all of whom the city buried, deeming them all equally worthy of the same honor, Aeschines, not just those among them who were successful or victorious. Rightly so, for they all performed the task required of brave men, and they each met with the fortune (tychē) conferred on them by god (daimōn). (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

Overall, Demosthenes, similar to a tragic hero (Yunis 2000, 97 ff.), takes responsibility for the course of the city. Through his rhetoric, he is an active participant, a guide and

|| 109 See Wankel (1976) 959–961; Yunis (2001) 226; Pernot (2006) 178 ff. Cf. [Long.] De subl. 16.2.

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a shaper of its fate. His political struggle was, first and foremost, a struggle for the honour of Athens. Timē, this aristocratic-in-origin value of Greek moral thought, is consistently applied in the collective praise of a democratic city and now, this politician-orator, a member of this city, undertakes to mount its defence. However, Demosthenes’ secret admiration of Philip, who, due to his ambition, does precisely what the Athenians cannot do, is especially striking in the following passage (18.66–68): On the Crown 18(66) τί τὴν πόλιν, Αἰσχίνη, προσῆκε ποιεῖν ἀρχὴν καὶ τυραννίδα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁρῶσαν ἑαυτῷ κατασκευαζόμενον Φίλιππον; ἢ τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἔδει λέγειν ἢ γράφειν τὸν Ἀθήνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο πλεῖστον διαφέρει), ὃς συνῄδειν μὲν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆς ἡμέρας ἀφ’ ἧς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀνέβην, ἀεὶ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλείω καὶ χρήματα καὶ σώματα ἀνηλωκυῖαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι συμφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν ἕκαστοι, (67) ἑώρων δ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὅ τι βουληθείη μέρος ἡ τύχη τοῦ σώματος παρελέσθαι, τοῦτο προϊέμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ζῆν; (68) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε οὐδεὶς ἂν εἰπεῖν τολμήσαι, ὡς τῷ μὲν ἐν Πέλλῃ τραφέντι, χωρίῳ ἀδόξῳ τότε γε ὄντι καὶ μικρῷ, τοσαύτην μεγαλοψυχίαν προσῆκεν ἐγγενέσθαι ὥστε τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸν νοῦν ἐμβαλέσθαι, ὑμῖν δ’ οὖσιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην ἐν πᾶσι καὶ λόγοις καὶ θεωρήμασι τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετῆς ὑπομνήμαθ’ ὁρῶσι τοσαύτην κακίαν ὑπάρξαι, ὥστε τῆς ἐλευθερίας αὐτεπαγγέλτους ἐθελοντὰς παραχωρῆσαι Φιλίππῳ. On the Crown (18.66) What, Aeschines, should the city have done when it saw Philip building towards empire (archē) and tyranny (tyrannis) over the Greeks? And what was an adviser (symboulos) in Athens ‒ for that makes all the difference ‒ obliged to say and propose? During all my time until the day I myself stepped onto the speaker’s platform, I knew that our country always fought for the first prize in honor (timē) and glory (doxa) and had expended more money and men in pursuit of honor (philotimia) and the common good than all the other Greeks had expended on their own behalf. (67) Yet I also saw that in pursuit of power (archē) and domination (dynasteia), Philip, our opponent in the struggle, had his eye knocked out, his collarbone broken, his hand and leg maimed, in fact that he readily sacrificed any part of his body that fortune might take so that afterwards he might live in honor and glory. (68) Indeed, no one would have dared assert that a man raised in Pella, a small, obscure place at the time, would become so bold (megalopsychia) as to desire rule over the Greeks and to make that his purpose, or that you ‒ Athenians! ‒ who every day behold reminders of the valor of your forebears in all manner of speeches and monuments, would be so cowardly as to surrender your freedom to Philip voluntarily. (Transl. H. Yunis 2005)

6.3 Style Demosthenes left his mark on 4th-century BC rhetoric ‒ “His third Philippic (9) … and his speech On the Crown (18) … are probably the greatest examples of symbouleutic and forensic oratory we have today” (Worthington 2000a, 5). In On the Crown 18.277, Demosthenes devotes his rhetorical art to benefiting the city: “If I do have some experience of this kind, you will all find that I always use it in the public domain to advance your interests and never to oppose them or in pursuit of private ends (ὑπὲρ

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ὑμῶν ἀεὶ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ καθ’ ὑμῶν οὐδ’ ἰδίᾳ)”. The style and language of his speeches serve the content (Unte 1985, 302).110 In contrast to Isocrates, Demosthenes’ rhetoric did not break new literary ground or engage in moral-philosophical preoccupation. Demosthenes did not cultivate rhetoric as an end in itself, but as a means for action and results (Edwards 1994, 40: “not the products of art for art’s sake”; cf. Görgemanns 1987, 124). The value of a Demosthenic speech is not predicated on the aesthetic result of rhetorical virtuosity, but on its effectiveness. In this sense, special Demosthenic rhetorical figures belong to the agonistic style (lexis agōnistikē), which is clearly distinguished in rhetorical handbooks from the written epideictic style (lexis graphikē).111 Demosthenes has two unique traits: firstly, delivery (hypokrisis), to which Demosthenes attributed great significance, more than any other orator of his era (to the question “what is the first thing in oratory”, he allegedly gave the same answer three times: “hypokrisis”),112 and which, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was vital, primarily for political speeches (Demosth. 53, p. 244 Us.-Rad.); and, secondly, the careful preparation of a speech, while extemporaneous speaking is relegated to second place. It is unfortunate that the realistic delivery of a Demosthenic speech is unknowable to us today, as it also was to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, delighted by reading a Demosthenic speech, wondered about the far greater effect of oral delivery to a contemporary audience:113 Dion. Hal. Demosth. 22 (p. 177 Us.-Rad.) ὅταν μέν τινα τῶν Ἰσοκράτους ἀναγινώσκω λόγων, εἴτε τῶν πρὸς τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας γεγραμμένων ἢ τῶν (add. Aujac) ἐν ἤθει σπουδαῖος γίνομαι καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐσταθὲς ἔχω τῆς γνώμης, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν σπονδείων αὐλημάτων ἢ τῶν Δωρίων τε κἀναρμονίων μελῶν ἀκροώμενοι. ὅταν δὲ Δημοσθένους τινὰ λάβω λόγων, ἐνθουσιῶ τε καὶ δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε ἄγομαι, πάθος ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλαμβάνων, ἀπιστῶν, ἀγωνιῶν, δεδιώς, καταφρονῶν, μισῶν, ἐλεῶν, εὐνοῶν, ὀργιζόμενος, φθονῶν, ἅπαντα

|| 110 On Demosthenes’ style, cf. Ronnet (1951); Usher (1993) 19–28; Yunis (2001) 17–26. However, for an indispensable view, see Blass (1887–1898) III,1 65–225. 111 See Arist. Rhet. 1413b 8–9. Cf. Yunis (2001) 18. 112 [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 845B; Cic. Brut. 142; De or. 3.213; Orat. 56. Additionally, the account that Demosthenes delivered many lines and delivered them aloud also underlines the importance of rhetorical delivery (Plut. Demosth. 11.1). Cf. Schaefer (1966–1967) II,1 329–339. See also C. Cooper, Demosthenes. Actor on the Political and Forensic Stage, in: C.J. Mackie (ed.), Oral Performance and its Context, Leiden 2004, 145–161; Bers (2009) 50–51; M. Edwards, Hypokrites in Action. Delivery in Greek rhetoric, in: C. Kremmydas et al. (eds.), Profession and Performance. Aspects of Oratory in the Greco-Roman World, London 2013, 17; I. Worthington, Audience Reaction, Performance and the Exploitation of Delivery in the Courts and Assembly, in: Papaioannou et al. (2017) 13–25; A. Serafim, “Conventions” in/as Performance. Addressing the Audience in Selected Public Speeches of Demosthenes, in: Papaioannou et al. (2017) 26–41; A. Serafim, Attic Oratory and Performance, New York/ London 2017, 113–136. 113 Cf. Milns (2000) 210. This legendary account is also the origin of the anecdote concerning Aeschines, who allegedly extolled the effectiveness of Demosthenes’ rhetoric before the Rhodians. Cf. Vit. Aeschin. 3.3–4, p. 5–6 Dilts; Cic. De or. 3.213; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840D; Pernot (2006) 5 note 1.

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τὰ πάθη μεταλαμβάνων, ὅσα κρατεῖν πέφυκεν ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης· διαφέρειν τε οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ τῶν τὰ μητρῷα καὶ τὰ κορυβαντικὰ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσιά ἐστι, τελουμένων, εἴτε ὀσμαῖς ἐκεῖνοί γε εἴτε ἤχοις εἴτε τῶν δαιμόνων πνεύματι αὐτῶν κινούμενοι τὰς πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐκεῖνοι λαμβάνουσι φαντασίας. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ ἐνεθυμήθην, τί ποτε τοὺς τότε ἀνθρώπους ἀκούοντας αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ταῦτα πάσχειν εἰκὸς ἦν. ὅπου γὰρ ἡμεῖς οἱ τοσοῦτον ἀπηρτημένοι τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα πεπονθότες οὕτως ὑπαγόμεθα καὶ κρατούμεθα καί, ὅποι ποτ’ ἂν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος ἄγῃ, πορευόμεθα, πῶς τότε Ἀθηναῖοί τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤγοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθινῶν τε καὶ ἰδίων ἀγώνων, αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ἐκείνου τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ τῆς ἀξιώσεως, ἧς εἶχε, τὴν αὐτοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ παράστημα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεικνυμένου, κοσμοῦντος ἅπαντα καὶ χρωματίζοντος τῇ πρεπούσῃ ὑποκρίσει, ἧς δεινότατος ἀσκητὴς ἐγένετο, ὡς ἅπαντές τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν λόγων, ὧν ἄρτι προηνεγκάμην, οὓς οὐκ ἔνι τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐν ἡδονῇ ὡς ἀνάγνωσμα διελθεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσι, πῶς αὐτοὺς ὑποκρίνεσθαι δεῖ, νῦν μὲν εἰρωνευόμενον, νῦν δὲ ἀγανακτοῦντα, νῦν δὲ νεμεσῶντα, δεδιττόμενόν τε αὖ καὶ θεραπεύοντα καὶ νουθετοῦντα καὶ παρορμῶντα καὶ πάνθ’, ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ἡ λέξις, ἀποδεικνύμενον ἐπὶ τῆς προφορᾶς. εἰ δὴ τὸ διὰ τοσούτων ἐγκαταμισγόμενον τοῖς βυβλίοις πνεῦμα τοσαύτην ἰσχὺν ἔχει καὶ οὕτως ἀγωγόν ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἦ που τότε ὑπερφυές τι καὶ δεινὸν χρῆμα ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων. Dion. Hal. Demosth. 22 (p. 177 Us.-Rad.) Whenever I read a speech of Isocrates, wether it be forensic, political (or epideictic), I become serious and feel a great tranquillity of mind, like those listening to libation-music played on reed-pipes or to Dorian or enharmonic melodies. But when I pick up one of Demosthenes’s speeches, I am transported: I am led hither and thither, feeling one emotion after another ‒ disbelief, anguish, terror, contempt, hatred, pity, goodwill, anger, envy ‒ every emotion in turn that can sway the human mind. I feel exactly the same as those who take part in the Corybantic dances and the rites of Cybele the Mother-Goddess, and other similar ceremonies, whether it is because these celebrants are inspired by the scents, , or sound or by the influence of the deities themselves, that they experience many and various sensations. And I have often wondered what on earth those men who actually heard him make these speeches could have felt (paschein). For if we, who are so far removed in time and unaffected by the events, are so carried away and overpowered that we follow wherever the speech leads us, how must the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks have been excited at the time by the orator addressing them on live and personal issues, using all his prestige to display his own feelings and to bare his soul, and adding beauty and colour to every word with the appropriate delivery (hypokrisis), of which art he was, as everyone agrees, the most brilliant exponent (deinotatos askētēs). This faculty can be seen in the actual passage I have just quoted. No one can pick it up and read it at will and for diversion, since the words themselves tell what actions must accompany their readings: the reciter must feign now irony, now indignation, now rage, now fear, now solicitude, now admonition, now exhortation; everything, in fact, which the words require, he must portray in his delivery. If, then, the spirit with which Demosthenes’s pages are still imbued after so many years possesses so much power and moves his readers in this way, surely to hear him delivering his speeches at the time must have been an extraordinary and overwhelming experience. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

The legendary accounts of biographical sources, such as Demosthenes’ tutelage under actors (Plut. Demosth. 7) or diction exercises (by placing pebbles into his mouth, as recounted by Demetrius of Phalerum, or that he delivered speeches before a large looking-glass, Plut. Demosth. 11), are closely associated with hypokrisis. On the other

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hand, the assiduity with which he prepared his speeches before appearing in the Assembly is also attested anecdotally: the orator Pytheas once told him scoffingly that his arguments smelt of lamp-wicks (Plut. Demosth. 8.4). It is also recounted that Demosthenes looked to Pericles as an example for preparing his speeches, seeking to emulate his formal style and bearing (Plut. Demosth. 9.2). There is intense debate on whether Pericles, as a politician-educator of the demos, had an even greater influence on the content of Demosthenes’ speeches.114 In his early speeches (until 359 BC), Demosthenes was mainly influenced by Isaeus and Isocrates: he strictly avoids hiatus, even between cola; its avoidance in middle-period speeches (after 355 BC) is more rational, while Demosthenes’ personal style tolerates hiatus at the end of a colon.115 From a rhetorical perspective, his private judicial speeches are not particularly innovative (Usher 1999, 277); however, there is a distinct evolution in Demosthenes’ public speeches, achieving the Aristotelian mesotēs ‒ a balance between logic and emotion ‒ in the Third Philippic.116 The stylistic differences include a pluralism and variety of the Demosthenic style, which is hard to pin down precisely. Demosthenes’ particularity concerns the possession and use of the best traits, drawing from all types of style (charaktēres tēs lexeōs).117 This is why Demosthenes is paralleled with the mythical Proteus and his ability to assume every kind of shape (Dion. Hal. Demosth. 8, p. 144 Us.-Rad.). Characteristic examples include the interchange between Isocratean prolixity and Lysianic brevity (Blass 1887–1898, III,1 152) and the wording of complex thoughts through dramatic brevity and condensation, i.e. the rapid movement (tachos, Dion. Hal. Thuc. 53, p. 412 Us.-Rad.), force and intensity of his public speeches, which must be traced to Thucydides. Like Thucydides, Demosthenes prefers articular infinitives; Dionysius of Halicarnassus draws the first examples from the speech On the Symmories (Thuc. 54, p. 414 Us.-Rad., e.g. 14.13: ἐκ μὲν τοῦ καλεῖν ἤδη τὸ δεῖσθαι … ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μετὰ τοῦ παρεσκευάσθαι). However, Demosthenes did not appropriate the bizarre, strange and artificial language of Thucydides.118 The only shortcoming of the Demosthenic style,

|| 114 Cf. Yunis (1997) 247–268 (also the reviews by R. Osborne, CQ 47, 1997, 102–103; G.O. Rowe, AJPh 118, 1997, 634–637; J. Hesk, JHS 119, 1999, 183); G. Mader, Dramatizing Didaxis: Aspects of Demosthenes’ “Periclean” Project, CPh 102 (2007) 155–179. 115 Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 9.4.35–37. Regarding Quintilian’s literary critique of Demosthenes, see Wooten (1997) 187 ff. 116 Wooten (2010) 1–22. Cf. Pearson (1964) 95–109; (1975) 214–230. 117 Dion. Hal. Demosth. 8, p. 143–144 Us.-Rad.; Cic. Orat. 23; cf. Anastassiou (1966) 9. For a critique of Dionysius’ remarks, see C.W. Wooten, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Hermogenes on the Style of Demosthenes, AJPh 110 (1989) 576–588; C.W. Wooten, Rhetorical Technique, in: Martin (2018) 407– 417. 118 See Dion. Hal. Thuc. 53, p. 412–413 Us.-Rad.

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which had already been identified in antiquity, is the absence of ready wit (eutrapelia) or charm (charis; Dion. Hal. Demosth. 54, p. 247 Us.-Rad.: πάσας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡ Δημοσθένους λέξις λείπεται εὐτραπελίας, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ καλοῦσι χάριν).119 The terminus technicus used by ancient critics to define the particularity of Demosthenic rhetoric is deinotēs (Dion. Hal. Isae. 20, p. 123–124 Us.-Rad.: τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος, ἣν οὐθείς ἐστιν ὃς οὐ τελειοτάτην ἁπασῶν οἴεται γενέσθαι; cf. Demosth. 10, p. 149 Us.-Rad.; Din. 6, p. 305 Us.-Rad.). The term means “intensity, forcefulness”, closely linked with Demosthenes’ commitment and internal dedication to political struggle. The stylistic part of deinotēs depends on forceful thought (Walker 2016, 149). Cicero (Orat. 234) calls Demosthenes’ words “thunderbolts” (fulmina), while G. Clémenceau (1926, 64) also referred to Demosthenes’ “cannonades”. In contrast to Isocrates, who primarily aims at the ēthos of readers, Demosthenes stands out for his ability to stir pathos; in the quoted passage by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see above p. 201–202: Demosth. 22, p. 177 Us.-Rad.), the literary critic is gripped by a type of divine passion of mystical ceremonies when he reads a Demosthenic speech, which can provoke fear, hatred, pity, goodwill, rage, envy, etc. This practical success is also achieved through rhetorical figures that enliven the speech; these include rhetorical questions (e.g. 18.282; 19.334), numerous epanalepses, antitheses (a characteristic example is the rhetorical auxēsis [amplificatio] in the description of the antithesis between Meidias’ hybris and the philanthropic nature of the law aiming to protect the many in 21.56–61; cf. Pearson 1976, 107), aposiopeses (18.3: οὐ βούλομαι δυσχερὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου; Yunis 2001, 20), metaphors, syncrises and images (from the maritime sphere 9.69; 18.194; from sports 2.28; 3.2; 4.5; from medicine 9.39),120 asyndeta, anaphoras, i.e. repetition of the first word (19.331: ταῦτα … ταῦτα … ταῦτα; 19.72: ὧν ... ὧν ... ὧν), paradoxes (9.5: καὶ παράδοξον μὲν ἴσως ἐστὶν ὃ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀληθὲς δέ; cf. Wooten 2008, 145), sarcasm and irony (4.41; 8.36; 9.3; cf. Ronnet 1951, 143–145). F. Blass’ discovery (1887–1898, III,1 105 ff.) of the “law” of avoidance of a succession of three or more short syllables

|| 119 Regarding Demosthenes’ inability to jest, cf. [Long.] De subl. 34.3; Plut. Comp. Demosth.-Cic. 1.4; Cic. Orat. 90; Quint. Inst. or. 6.3.2. Philocrates’ joke (Demosth. 19.46), that Demosthenes drinks water while he drinks wine, alludes to a morose man, as Demosthenes himself interprets the quote (6.30: λέγοντας ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ὕδωρ πίνων εἰκότως δύστροπος καὶ δύσκολός εἰμί τις ἄνθρωπος). Cf. Aristoph. Equ. 85 ff. and Paulsen (1999) 111. 120 Cf. 10.6: ἡμεῖς δ’… ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀνεγερθῆναι δυνάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἤ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις (“We can not even wake ourselves up but are like people who have drunk mandrake juice or some other such drug”; for Demosthenes’ medical language see Das 2019, 340–367, esp. 355f.). Cf. the comparison of the sycophants to wild beasts in 18.322 (ὥσπερ θηρία). See also Ronnet (1951) 147–182; Milns (2000) 213; Hajdú (2002) 120–122; MacDowell (2009) 407. On Demosthenes’ style, see also R.L. Enos, Demosthenes’ Style. Lexis in On the Crown, in: Murphy (2016) 173–203.

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is a further unique trait of Demosthenes in the difficult matter of prose rhythm (tribrach law, Tribrachys-Gesetz).121

6.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception The Demosthenic corpus has been transmitted in 258 manuscripts.122 The most important among them are the following: the oldest codex S (Parisinus 2934, 9/10th c.), A (Monacensis 485, 10th c.), F (Marcianus 416, 10th c.), Y (Parisinus 2935, 10th c.), P (Laurentianus plut. 59.9, 10th c.) and Q (Marcianus 418, 11th c.). The conjecture that an edition of Demosthenes’ work by Atticus, the friend of Cicero, served as the archetype for the medieval manuscript transmission is no longer accepted.123 Ever since Ι. Bekker used codex S for his edition of Oratores Attici: Demosthenes (Oxford 1823), this was considered the codex optimus over codices A F Y. The dispute,124 which in fact led to the completely opposite direction of the devaluation of S against the other three manuscripts, has resulted in the present-day conclusion that a unilateral preference for one or more codices is not justifiable. Even Didymus’ papyrus, which contains a commentary on Demosthenes and is closer to codex S, does not definitively favour one or the other manuscript transmission (Harding 2006, 40). The most recent editor of Demosthenes supports the eclectic method on a case by case basis (Dilts 2002– 2009, I xvi). Finally, the older strict consistency with avoiding hiatus ‒ even contrary

|| 121 Cf. W. Bartschelet-Massini, Neue Versuche zum demosthenischen Prosarhythmys, in: H.U. Cahn/E. Simon (eds.), Tainia. Roland Hampe zum 70. Geburtstag, I, Mainz 1980, 503–528; McCabe (1981). For a view against the absolute application of the rule, see K. Dover, The Evolution of Greek Prose Style, Oxford 1997, 175 with note 35. 122 See L. Canfora, Inventario dei manoscritti greci di Demostene, Padua 1968, 31–67. Cf. G. Pasquali, Storia della tradizione e critica del testo, 2. ed., Florence 1962, 269–294; Wankel (1976) 63–82; MacDowell (1990) 38–85; Sealey (1993) 222–223; MacDowell (2000) 30–55; Dilts (2002–2009) I v-xx; Grusková/Bannert (2014); G. Martin, Transmission of the Corpus Demosthenicum, in: Martin (2018) 463–470. Additionally, 198 papyri (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue). Cf. also M. Landfester (ed.), Geschichte der antiken Texte, Stuttgart/Weimar 2007, 196–198. 123 See W. Christ, Die Attikusausgabe des Demosthenes, Munich 1882, 153–234; J.H. Lipsius, Zur Textgeschichte des Demosthenes, Leipzig 1893, 1–23. 124 See H. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 262–264; D. Irmer, Zum Primat des Codex S in der Demostheneskritik. Untersuchungen an den Reden 1 bis 10 des Corpus Demosthenicum, Hamburg 1961; D. Irmer, Beobachtungen zur Demosthenesüberlieferung, Philologus 112 (1968) 43–62; D. Irmer, Zur Genealogie der jüngeren Demostheneshandschriften. Untersuchungen an den Reden 8 und 9, Hamburg 1972, 95–99. However, for a view contrary to Irmer, see Bühler (1978) 59–77.

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to manuscript transmission ‒ is no longer followed, with scriptio plena frequently preferred.125 L. Pernot (2006) chose the apt title L’Ombre du Tigre (“The Tiger’s Shadow”) to characterise Demosthenes’ reception.126 His opponent, Aeschines, even while exiled on Rhodes, referred to him as thērion (Vit. Aeschin. 3.3–4, p. 5–6 Dilts; cf. Aeschin. 2.20; 2.34; 3.182), while the sobriquet “tiger” was given to the French statesman G. Clémenceau, who admired Demosthenes and wrote a book about him (1926). Irrespective of how one interprets Demosthenes’ reception as an orator and a politician, one thing is certain: the ever-shifting legend around Demosthenes’ name from antiquity to the present day is worthy of his rhetorical art and tumultuous political career. The frontal personal attacks by his opponents, full of animosity, aim to underscore the contrast between his character and his rhetorical power; for Aeschines, this contrast is expressed through the words “eloquent of speech, infamous of life” (3.174: δεινὸς λέγειν, κακὸς βιῶναι), while Demades compares his rhetorical virtuosity to the destructive consequences of Helen’s beauty (fr. 3 de Falco: ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης κάλλος ἐπ᾽ ἀπωλείᾳ τῶν ἡρώων ἐγίνετο, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἐν τῷ λέγειν δύναμις ἐπ᾽ ἀπωλείᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ηὐξήθη). Nevertheless, even these statements do not impugn his rhetorical skills, and his reputation as an orator is acknowledged essentially from the outset (Anastassiou 1966, 55 ff.). In the Athenian diplomatic delegation to Philip before the Peace of Philocrates, everyone – even Philip ‒ expected an exceptional speech of Demosthenes (Aeschin. 2.34). If one considers the statement that Hermippus attributes to the orator Aesion, a contemporary of Demosthenes, to be genuine, this would be an early indication of the importance of Demosthenes’ written speeches: when read aloud, they are deemed superior to the speeches of older orators in point of arrangement and power (Plut. Demosth. 11.4).127

|| 125 Dilts (2002–2009) I xvii-xviii; cf. also the editor’s different view (Dilts 2002–2009, II viii) in favour of scriptio plena when encountering differences in the primary manuscripts. 126 On Demosthenes’ reception from antiquity until modern times, see also C.D. Adams, Demosthenes and his Influence, London 1927; V. Buchheit, Demosthenes, RAC 3 (1957) 712–735; U. Schindel, Demosthenes im 18. Jahrhundert, Munich 1963; P. Harding, Demosthenes in the Underworld. A Chapter in the Nachleben of a Rhetor, in: Worthington (2000) 246–271; L. Pernot, La survie de Démosthène et la contestation de la figure de l’orateur dans le monde gréco-romain, CRAI 146 (2002) 615–636; Lehmann (2004) 220–228; Samotta (2010) 115–122; Will (2013) 195–204; A. Düren, Die Rezeption des Demosthenes von den Anfängen bis ins 17. Jh., I-II, Bonn 2014; L. Canfora, Afterlife (Antiquity and Byzantine Era), in: Martin (2018) 431–451; A.J.L. Blanshard, Afterlife (Modern Era), in: Martin (2018) 453–462. 127 See the differences between Drerup (1923) 71–72 and Anastassiou (1966) 65 note 2. On the other hand, the political importance of Demosthenes, as it emerges from the limited references to him in epigraphic records, is out of keeping with the rich literary accounts. See S.D. Lambert, The Only Extant Decree of Demosthenes, ZPE 137 (2001) 55–68, esp. 67 ff. (= S.D. Lambert, Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1 BC. Epigraphical Essays, Leiden 2012, 249–272): “less politically significant than one would gather from literary sources”.

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The political background (pro-Macedonians - anti-Macedonians), the rivalry between rhetoric and philosophy, and the focus of Demosthenes’ rhetorical virtuosity on hypokrisis seem to have contributed to the Early Peripatos’ critical views of Demosthenes. However, precisely how Demosthenes was evaluated, as a representative of practical rhetoric contrary to an established peripatetic tradition with an Isocratean orientation, does not emerge accurately.128 The silence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric regarding Demosthenes – the sole certain reference (Rhet. 1401b 31–34) comes from Demades, who considers the policy of Demosthenes as the cause of all evils – is followed by the statement of Theophrastus (Plut. Demosth. 10.2) that Demosthenes was worthy of the city (ἄξιος τῆς πόλεως), but Demades was too good for the city (ὑπὲρ τὴν πόλιν). The quote follows Plutarch’s general statement regarding the fact that Demades’ natural gifts and ability to extemporise are considered superior to Demosthenes’ studied preparations. Demetrius of Phalerum criticises Demosthenes’ hypokrisis (Plut. Demosth. 11.3), a trait for which he was later praised extensively. This criticism stems from the Aristotelian view (Rhet. 1403b 33–34) that the rise in theatrical rhetorical delivery is directly linked to the corruption and decline of political ethics. Phocion, Demosthenes’ political opponent, won the esteem of Demetrius of Phalerum (cf. Plut. Demosth. 14).129 Rhetoric and politics are integrally linked to each other, and political causes often determine the evaluation of both the sender and the receiver of rhetorical speeches: Demades, Demetrius of Phalerum and Phocion were under Macedonian influence. On the contrary, Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares, following whose decree ‒ which survives as “the founding text of the Demosthenic legend” ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850F–851C; Will 2013, 197) ‒ the Athenians erected a statue in honour of Demosthenes in 280/279 BC, vehemently attacked pro-Macedonian politicians, such as Demetrius of Phalerum (Polyb. 12.13–14), and remained true to his uncle’s example.130

|| 128 See above Chapter 3.2.1. and E. Alexiou, Isokrateszitate in der aristotelischen Rhetorik und das “Schweigen” über Demosthenes, Hermes 144 (2016) 401–418. Cf. Μ. Edwards, Rhetoric and Technique in the Attic Orators and Aristotle’s techne rhetorike, in: J. Roe/M. Stanco (eds.), Inspiration and Technique. Ancient to Modern Views on Beauty and Art, Oxford 2007, 35–48; J. Walker, On the Deinos Logos of On the Crown, in: Murphy (2016) 151. According to Cooper (2000) 226, Theophrastus’ view was highly critical. For a different view see M. Lossau, Untersuchungen zur antiken Demosthenesexegese, Berlin 1964, 36–52. 129 Drerup (1923) 30 ff.; Cooper (2000) 232; Will (2013) 196; N. Wiater, Rhetorik. 2: Hellenistische Rhetorik, in: B. Zimmermann/A. Rengakos (eds.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der Klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit, Munich 2014, 866. Cf. H.J. Gehrke, Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt, Munich 1976; L. Tritle, Phocion the Good, London 1988. On Phocion, cf. the questions of A.J. Bayliss, After Demosthenes. The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens, London/New York 2011, 129–151. There are also personal reasons: reportedly, Himeraeus, the brother of Demetrius of Phalerum, prosecuted Demosthenes in the Harpalus affair ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 846C). 130 Cf. F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, II, Oxford 1967, 355 ff.; Will (2013) 197.

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Whether criticised or praised, it appears that Demosthenes cast a long political and literary shadow very early.131 His speeches were studied and discussed extensively, and not just at schools of rhetoric. In the 3rd century BC, Cleochares of Myrlea, an admirer of Demosthenes, compares Isocrates’ rhetoric to that of Demosthenes, and likens the discourses of Demosthenes to the bodies of soldiers, connoting a militant, seasoned rhetoric, while those of Isocrates to the bodies of athletes, i.e. academic exercise and a fine spectacle, but not vibrant rhetorical practice (see Phot. Bibl. 176.121b).132 Cato the Elder benefited from Demosthenes’ rhetorical prowess (Plut. Cato maj. 2.5; Diod. 34.33.3), while the Stoic philosopher Panaetius (2nd century BC) applauds the moral content of Demosthenes’ speeches when they do aim not at what is pleasantest (ἥδιστον) or easiest (ῥᾷστον) or most profitable (λυσιτελέστατον) (Plut. Demosth. 13.6), but at what is honourable and fitting (τὸ καλὸν καὶ πρέπον). At this point one can discern the traces of a philosophical direction that led to the account of Demosthenes’ tutelage under Plato. The philosopher Charmadas (Cic. De or. 1.85–90) did not consider Demosthenes to be a natural talent, therefore he could not but have been a student at the Academy.133 On the other hand, the difficulty in separating the rhetorical from the political evaluation of Demosthenes is proven by the historian Polybius, who, in the 2nd century BC, generally praises Demosthenes, but opposes a passage from On the Crown (18.295), which is negative towards a number of Peloponnesian politicians (18.14: κατὰ πολλά τις ἂν ἐπαινέσας ἐν τούτῳ μέμψαιτο); more specifically, he accuses Demosthenes of having an Athens-centric perspective and does not consider the war against Macedon to be a Pan-Hellenic affair.134

|| 131 See C. Kremmydas, P. 9781 and the Early Reception of Demosthenes, BICS 50 (2007) 19–48. Cf. also C.W. Wooten, A Rhetorical and Historical Study of Hellenistic Oratory, Chapel Hill 1972; C. Kremmydas, Hellenistic Oratory and the Evidence of Rhetorical Exercises, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 139–163; M. Canevaro, Demosthenic Influences in Early Rhetorical Education. Hellenistic Rhetores and Athenian Imagination, in: Canevaro/Gray (2018) 73–91. 132 In [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 845D and in Photius Bibl. 265.493b 24–29 the same comparison is attributed to Philip II of Macedon. It is reported that Philip was made aware of Demosthenes’ public speeches (it is characteristic that Photius speaks of Demosthenes’ written speeches, which the Macedonian king received and read [ἐδέξατο καὶ ἀνέγνω]), and admired Demosthenes’ rhetorical prowess, stating that if he had heard his speeches, he too would have voted in favour of him. Cf. Drerup (1923) 94–95; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 224–225. On the athletic simile, see M. Golden, Demosthenes and the Social Historian, in: Worthington (2000) 172–174. 133 Cf. Cic. Orat. 15; Plut. Demosth. 5.7; Cooper (2000) 240. On the account concerning Plato, see in detail Pernot (2006) 21–60. 134 Cf. Wankel (1976) 1247–1248; J. Thornton, Oratory in Polybius’ Histories, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 42; Will (2013) 176.

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Demosthenes was also not ignored by Hellenistic scholars and his work was catalogued.135 Hermippus wrote a biography of the orator around 200 BC.136 Philological and historical issues were also discussed by Didymus (second half of the 1st century BC), who refers to his predecessors (P. Berol. 9780 c. 2.2–3; 7.11–14; 11.10–14; 11.14– 17; 13.16–18).137 Nevertheless, Alexandrian scholars mainly focused their scientific endeavours on poets. Demosthenes’ supreme recognition was established from the 1st century BC onwards under the influence of Atticist principles. Demosthenes has since been considered as the pinnacle of ancient rhetoric. Cicero refers to him as the best of the Attic orators, the perfectus orator (Brut. 35; cf. De or. 1.260: summa vis dicendi; De opt. gen. or. 13: princeps oratorum; Brut. 141).138 Cicero recounts the anecdotes regarding the primacy of rhetorical delivery (Brut. 142) and the legendary acknowledgement of Demosthenes by Aeschines in Rhodes (De or. 3.213). This key idea was shared with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who underlines Demosthenes’ deinotēs (Dion. Hal. Isae. 20, p. 123–124 Us.-Rad.) and the general opinion of Demosthenes during that era (cf. Diod. 18.13.6: ὁ κορυφαῖος τῶν Ἀθήνησι ῥητόρων). Demosthenes, therefore, became a rhetorical exemplum (Plin. Epist. 9.26.8). In the 2nd century AD, the key tenet of Hermogenes of Tarsus seems almost self-evident: Demosthenes wrote the best practical rhetorical speeches (De id. 2.10, p. 381 Rabe: ἄριστός τε γὰρ πολιτικῶν λόγων ὁ Δημοσθενικός, ὅ τε αὖ Δημοσθενικὸς λόγος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄριστος) and perfectly joined all the types of style of a rhetorical speech: Hermog. De id. 1.1 (p. 215 Rabe) ἔστιν οὖν ὁ μάλιστα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῦτον μεταχειρισάμενος τὸν τρόπον τὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ καταποικίλας τὸν αὑτοῦ διηνεκῶς οὐκ ἄλλος τις κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν ἢ Δημοσθένης· διὰ τοίνυν τούτου καὶ τῶν παρὰ τούτῳ λεκτέον ἂν εἴη δήπουθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν ἁπασῶν τοῦ λόγου. Hermog. De id. 1.1 (p. 215 Rabe) Now, the man who, more than anyone else, practiced this kind of oratory and was continuously diversifying his style is, in my opinion, Demosthenes. Therefore

|| 135 Drerup (1923) 43–44; Anastassiou (1966) 82–83. Cf. the remarks of Dion. Hal. Din. 10, p. 312; Demosth. 13, p. 157 Us.-Rad.; Harpocr. s.v. ἐνεπίσκημμα. 136 See Drerup (1923) 65 ff.; J. Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings. A Reappraisal, Leiden 1999, 88. 137 See Cohn (1903) 458; Gibson (2002) 32–33. Cf. Harding (2006); F. Montana, Hellenistic Scholarship, in: F. Montanari et al. (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship, Leiden/Boston 2015, 175. See also Lossau (1964); R.D. Milns, Didymea, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Ventures into Greek History. Essays in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond, Oxford 1994, 70–88; B.K. Braswell, Didymos of Alexandria Commentary on Pindar. Edited and Translated with Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and a Critical Catalogue of Didymos’ Works, Basel 2013, 67–80; H. Maehler, Demosthenes-Kommentare auf Papyrus. Eine vorläufige Übersicht, in: Grusková/Bannert (2014) 53–72. 138 Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 6.3.1; 10.1.76; 10.2.24; 12.2.22; 12.10.73.

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if we discuss him and what is found in his work, we shall in effect have discussed all types of style (ideai). (Transl. C.W. Wooten 1987)

The Lucianic corpus includes an Encomium of Demosthenes. From the age of Dionysius of Halicarnassus onwards, Demosthenes was the most-read orator. He is referred to as ὁ ῥήτωρ, similar to Homer being referred to as ὁ ποιητής (Phot. Bibl. 239.319a 15–16).139 The orator Libanius (4th century AD) continued the excited support for Demosthenes; he wrote an Encomium of Demosthenes (Prog. 8.5) and a Synkrisis of Demosthenes and Aeschines (Prog. 10.3), while important information can be found in the Hypotheses regarding 58 orations of the Demosthenic corpus.140 The numerous Scholia encountered in Demosthenic manuscripts corroborate the view that Demosthenes was widely studied and admired in the Byzantine centuries (Dilts 1983–1986; cf. Gibson 2002, 21). Cicero felt, from a rhetorical and political perspective, as the true successor of Demosthenes.141 His second Philippic imitates Demosthenes’ On the Crown, while the Athenian orator’s politics inspired the entire corpus of Cicero’s 14 Philippics against Marcus Antonius (43 BC). The imperial biographer Plutarch compares Demosthenes to Cicero in his Parallel Lives, but Demosthenes’ biography is not one of pure praise. Plutarch’s biographies are not encomia, nor do they paint an idealised picture of their subjects. While Plutarch acknowledges Demosthenes’ rhetorical virtuosity, which is reminiscent of that of Pericles (Plut. Demosth. 6.5; 9.2), he also adopts certain of the charges found in his sources, such as cowardice and bribery (Demosth. 14, 20, 23).142 It should be stressed that Plutarch also wrote a biography of Phocion, a political rival of Demosthenes, portraying him as a philosophically well-oriented hero (Lehmann 2004, 26–27).

|| 139 Cf. [Long.] De subl. 12.4; 34.4; Hermog. De id. 1.2, p. 228; 2.4, p. 238; 2.7, p. 257 Rabe; Bompaire (1984) 14–26; I. Rutherford, Canons of Style in the Antonine Age, Oxford 1998, 61–63. 140 Libanius’ following phrase (Prog. 4.3.1) summarises his admiration for Demosthenes: ἔστι μὲν τὸ χρησιμώτατον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ῥητορική, τῶν δ᾽ αὖ ῥητόρων τὸ κεφάλαιον Δημοσθένης. See A.J. Quiroga Puertas, Demosthenes’ Moral and Legal Arguments in Libanius’ Declamations, in: E. Amato/F. Citti/B. Huelsenbeck (eds.), Law and Ethics in Greek and Roman Declamation, Berlin 2015, 287– 306. 141 Cf. W. Stroh, Die Nachahmung des Demosthenes in Ciceros Philippiken, in: W. Ludwig (ed.), Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron, Entretiens Hardt 28, Geneva 1982, 1–40; W. Stroh, Ciceros demosthenische Redezyklen, MH 40 (1983) 35–50; Wooten (1983). 142 See A. Lintott, Plutarch Demosthenes and Cicero, Oxford 2013. On Demosthenes and Cicero, see also C.C. de Jong, Demosthenes versus Cicero. Intercultural Competition in Ancient Literary Criticism, in: C. Damon/C. Pieper (eds.), Eris vs. Aemulatio. Valuing Competition in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/ Boston 2019, 300–323.

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Therefore, it is exceptionally difficult to evaluate the political performance of a personality of Demosthenes’ magnitude,143 who, with his passion for the strength and honour of Athens, depending on the selective affinities of each era, was at times lauded as a martyr for liberty and a patriotic hero, and at times vilified as a representative of nearsighted, parochial patriotism. The ambiguous image of Demosthenes as a politician ‒ and not as an orator ‒ historically tallies with the rise and fall of his life. After the fall of Constantinople, Cardinal Bessarion translated Demosthenes’ First Olynthiac into Latin and, addressing European leaders, urged them to start a new war of liberation against the Turks (1470).144 Even in the 20th century, Demosthenes was regarded by Clémenceau (1926) as a pre-eminent patriot and supreme statesmen; on the contrary, Drerup145 takes an extremely negative view of Demosthenes as a fanatic and a chauvinist. More recently, Lehmann (2004) recounts the life of Demosthenes as a struggle for liberty, in contrast to Will (2013), who demystifies it, presenting Demosthenes the statesman as a pragmatist whose career was intertwined with the opportunities and constraints of Athenian democracy. Brun (2015) regards Demosthenes as a convinced patriot who died for his ideas, but far removed from any idea of martyrdom. Apart from any dispute concerning the correctness of his politics, which, post eventum, would appear unrealistic, I would prefer to conclude the examination of Demosthenes with the following thoughts by W. Jaeger (1938, 5): “To overlook the importance of Plato’s endeavor as a factor in history on the mere ground that his ideal state could not be realized, is certainly no more false than to deny the historical greatness of Demosthenes’ death struggle to maintain the actual polis, simply because sober reason shows us that it was hopeless”.

|| 143 Even the philosopher Hegel, who considered Demosthenes’ struggle to have run contrary to a historical necessity, ranks him among the great Greek individuals (die großen griechischen Individuen); G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, Werke 18, Frankfurt M. 1986, 181. 144 See Bessarion, Demosthenis Olynthica I., Paris 1470. Cf. V. Pappas, The First Political Printed Book in Europe: The Epistolae et Orationes Contra Turcos by Cardinal Bessarion, Mediterranean Chronicle 2 (2012) 189–209. 145 E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik. Demosthenes und seine Zeit, Paderborn 1916.

7 Aeschines 7.1 Life The most important biographical sources regarding the life of the premier rival of Demosthenes are the rhetorical speeches of Aeschines himself, as well as those of Demosthenes. However, as these speeches exhibit a mutual manipulation of facts, exaggerations and personal attacks against each other’s families and forebears, the biographical information in question must be utilised with caution.1 These sources are also the origin of subsequent biographies of Aeschines: the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 840A–841A), the biography of Philostratus (Vit. soph. 1.507–510 Kayser), an anonymous Vita, one Life attributed to a certain Apollonius, two entries in Photius (Bibl. 61 and 264) and a further two in the Suda (ι 347, 348 s.v. Aischines). The dates of Aeschines’ birth and death are not accurately recorded. Due to dissent regarding the references in the speech Against Timarchus (1.49 and 1.109), the date of Aeschines’ birth is placed between 399 and 396 BC or more likely around 390 BC, while that of his death around 322 or 315 BC, respectively.2 Son of Atrometus of Cothocidae and of Glaucothea, daughter of Glaucus of Acharnae, Aeschines had two brothers named Philochares and Aphobetus (2.149). His father came from a phratry that participated in the same sacrifices as the old sacerdotal genos of the Eteobutadae (2.147), but this fact alone did not constitute any particularly great honour. He came from a lower middle-class urban family of no great social significance. His father lost his fortune during the Peloponnesian War, was exiled during the reign of the Thirty and served as a mercenary in Asia Minor. Whether or not he actually contributed to the restoration of democracy, as Aeschines claims (2.78; 2.147), is questionable.3 Subsequently, the bankrupt Atrometus practised the occupation ‒ of no particular social status ‒ of schoolmaster (Demosth. 19.249). Aeschines was educated at his father’s school and may have helped him in his teaching (Demosth. 18.265). His broad literary knowledge must be attributed to this education (Fisher 2001, 12). He occasionally worked as a state hypogrammateus (“under-secretary”; Demosth. 18.261) and as a tragic actor (Demosth. 18.180; 19.247; 19.337); despite Demosthenes’ fierce attacks (18.129; 18.209; 18.262; 19.200; 19.241) that he was supposedly a tritagōnistēs (“third actor”) and was a failure in performing roles such as those of Cresphontes or Creon or

|| 1 See the chapter in Harris (1995) 7–16 “Whom to Believe?”. 2 See Lewis (1958) 8 (in favour of an earlier date); also in agreement is Davies (1971) 545–546. For a later date is Harris (1988) 211–214. Cf. Lane Fox (1994) 136–137; Worthington (2013) 151. 3 Schaefer (1966–1967) I 217–218; Harris (1995) 23; Fisher (2001) 9 with note 22. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-007

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Oenomaus, he must have enjoyed particular success beside actors like Theodorus and Aristodemus.4 E.M. Harris (1995, 32) described the different backgrounds of the two political rivals, whose personalities and views are typical of the contradictions and conflicts of Athenian foreign policy: Demosthenes came from a rich family and took on state liturgies at a very young age; as well as receiving a traditional education, he studied under the orator Isaeus, enjoyed notable success in his literary endeavours and entered the political arena at quite a young age. Aeschines came from an impoverished family, did not work as a logographer, owed his rhetorical performance primarily to his natural talents, and entered politics at a late age. These were two very different personalities whose common ground was rhetorical prowess and who were dominated by a rivalry that surpassed their personal differences. With respect to Aeschines’ teachers, there was much conjecture even during antiquity; reference is made to Socrates and Plato (Vit. Aesch. 2.6, p. 4; 3.6, p. 6 Dilts), Isocrates (Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.509 Kayser; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840A), Leodamas ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840B) or Alcidamas (Suda ι 347 s.v. Aischines). At the same time, the currently prevalent opinion that Aeschines was self-taught had already been voiced in antiquity. Contrary to Demosthenes, he received no rhetorical education, and his natural talent is underlined ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840F: οἱ δ᾽ εἶπον μηδὲ μαθητεῦσαί τισι τὸν Αἰσχίνην; Dion. Hal. Demosth. 35, p. 206 Us.-Rad.: ἀνὴρ λαμπροτάτῃ φύσει περὶ λόγους χρησάμενος; Phot. Bibl. 61.20b: ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ὥσπερ αὐτοφυὴς καὶ αὐτοσχέδιος).5 Aeschines himself is proud of his natural talent (2.41: τὴν φύσιν μακαρίζων; cf. 3.228). The question regarding his political activity is answered as follows: through his success as an actor, a type of “pre-school education for politics” (Weissenberger 2004, 581) that must not be underestimated,6 and through his participation in military campaigns (between 366 and 348 BC), through his political clerkship and through a profitable marriage to the daughter of the wealthy Philodemus (Aeschin. 2.150; Demosth. 18.312), Aeschines entered politics as the confidant of powerful politicians such as Phocion and Eubulus,7 who later supported him (343 BC) during the trial on the parapresbeia (“false embassy”; Aeschin. 2.184).

|| 4 Demosthenes’ facetious statements are unreliable and serve rhetorical purposes; cf. A. PickardCambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens, 2. ed. (revised by J.P.A. Gould/D.M. Lewis), Oxford 1968, 134 note 1; Paulsen (1999) 243; Buckler (2000) 138–139; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 177–178. 5 Cf. Kindstrand (1982) 67–75. 6 One good example is the actor Aristodemus, with whom Aeschines worked. He was a successful envoy to Philip II (Aeschin. 2.15–16; 2.19; 2.52). Cf. Buckler (2000) 139; Fisher (2001) 15. 7 See Sealey (1993) 117; Harris (1995) 37 ff. On Eubulus, see G.L. Cawkwell, Eubulus, JHS 83 (1963) 47–67. On Phocion, see H.J. Gehrke, Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt, Munich 1976; L. Tritle, Phocion the Good, London 1988. Demosthenes also cites Aristophon (18.162; 19.291), but Harris (1995) 155 is sceptical of this reference.

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The most important chapter of Aeschines’ political career spanned from 348 to 338 BC. After the sack of Olynthus by Philip II of Macedon, he appeared for the first time before the Assembly and supported a proposal by Eubulus (348 BC; Aeschin. 2.79; Demosth. 19.10; 19.303–307). During the conflict with Macedon and after initial vacillation, he served the interests of Athens with a political plan which ‒ contrary to Demosthenes’ aggressive, military plan ‒ aimed at reaching a compromise with Philip and at achieving co-existence between Athens and Macedon (Ramming 1965). He participated in various ambassadorial delegations and contributed decisively as an Athenian envoy to the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC).8 A short while later, Demosthenes accused him of corruption and bribery. The charge was initially dismissed, as Aeschines mounted a successful defence by bringing a suit against his prosecutor, Timarchus (1, Against Timarchus), while the civil trial concerning the diplomatic delegation took place three years later (343 BC).9 Both speeches On the False Embassy (2, Aeschines; 19, Demosthenes) are extant. There was no direct evidence of Aeschines’ guilt (MacDowell 2000, 27–28; cf. Buckler 2000, 135–137) and he was acquitted, but with a scant majority of 30 votes and despite support from Eubulus, Phocion and Nausicles (Aeschin. 2.184; Demosth. 19.290; Plut. Demosth. 15.5; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840C). Rhetorical texts serve as an exceptional mirror of the Athenian democracy of contradictions; given the inadequate legal bases of Demosthenes, the voting result (with a scant majority) is an indication of the polarisation of Athenian society at the time (Lehmann 2004, 151) and of the predominant anti-Macedonian attitude ‒ otherwise it would be hard to justify the unclear outcome.10 In any event, in 339 BC Aeschines was appointed the representative of Athens (pylagoros, -goras; Aeschin. 3.114–115; Demosth. 18.149) at the Delphic Amphictyony.11 After the decisive Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), Aeschines participated in the Athenian peace delegation to Philip, along with the pro-Macedonian Demades and Phocion, to achieve a peace with moderate terms (Aeschin. 3.227: ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως ἐπρεσβεύομεν; Demosth. 18.282).12

|| 8 Cf. G.L. Cawkwell, Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates, REG 73 (1960) 416–438; Harris (1995) 63–77; Buckler (2000) 119–127; A. Efstathiou, The Peace of Philocrates. The Assemblies of 18th and 19th Elaphebolion 346 B.C., Historia 53 (2004) 385–407; summarily Worthington (2013) 175–176. 9 See MacDowell (2000) 1–22. 10 According to Will (2013) 120, who portrays Demosthenes (as a politician) predominantly as deriving from the capabilities and weaknesses of the Athenian democracy, the voting result means that at least part of the Athenian demos retained their critical faculties. 11 He was subsequently replaced by Hyperides. See Ramming (1965) 94–96; Harris (1995) 126; Will (2013) 115. 12 Cf. Demosth. 18.285; Ryder (2000) 83; Will (2013) 143–144.

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In 336 BC, Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon for his proposal to publicly crown Demosthenes as illegal. This was the climax of the rivalry between the two men. However, the political trial took place in just 330 BC,13 and both Aeschines’ prosecution speech (3, Against Ctesipnon) and Demosthenes’ defence speech (18, On the Crown) are extant. The outcome of the legal battle with Demosthenes is striking, in the midst of Macedonian dominance: Aeschines was roundly defeated (not receiving even a fifth of the votes) and was forced to leave Athens, his political career in ruins ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840C; Plut. Demosth. 24.3).14 He travelled first to Ephesus, then to Rhodes and finally to Samos, where he died. Dubious biographical accounts endeavour to associate him with the founding of the Rhodian school of rhetoric (see Kindstrand 1982, 75–84).

7.2 The Speeches The extent of Aeschines’ extant work is another area where he differs from his political rival: numerous and varied speeches by Demosthenes survive, as compared to just three by Aeschines. This is not due to the unforeseeable coincidences of the manuscript tradition, but to Aeschines himself; the orator was not a logographer and published few speeches as a politician. The three authentic extant speeches Against Timarchus (1), On the False Embassy (2) and Against Ctesiphon (3)15 quite likely comprise the entirety of his literary output and concern his clash with Demosthenes. One spurious speech, attributed to Aeschines, the Delian Oration ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840E) is not extant, while twelve Letters attributed to him are also considered spurious. These are Atticist products, and one of them (10) is of literary interest. It concerns the seduction of a young woman by Cimon, the narrator’s travelling companion, who

|| 13 This postponement was not exceptional. See L. Horváth, The Postponement of the Trial by Jury in Athens. The Timing of the Graphe Paranomon, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 132–145. The initiative may have belonged to Aeschines; see Harris (1995) 140 ff., 173–174. Cf. G.L. Cawkwell, The Crowning of Demosthenes, CQ 19 (1969) 170 ff.; Worthington (2000a) 96; (2013) 294–295. For a different view, see N. Sawada, Athenian Politics in the Age of Alexander the Great. A Reconsideration of the Trial of Ctesiphon, Chiron 26 (1996) 60 ff. For a reserved view, see Will (2013) 171. 14 On the trial, see Wankel (1976) 8–41; E.M. Harris, Law and Oratory, in: Worthington (1994) 130– 150, esp. 142 ff.; Buckler (2000) 145–147; W. Schuller, Der Kranzprozeß des Jahres 330 v. Chr. oder: Der Abgesang auf die Klassische Polis, in: L. Burckhardt/J. v. Ungern-Sternberg (eds.), Große Prozesse im antiken Athen, Munich 2000, 190–200; MacDowell (2009) 382–397; Will (2013) 171–173; Worthington (2013) 294–309. 15 Greek text used: Dilts (1997).

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took advantage of a local custom near the river Scamander ‒ a tragicomic tale, a true Milesian novel.16

7.2.1 Against Timarchus (1) Against Timarchus (1), a prosecution against Timarchus, a political ally of Demosthenes and a “hardline anti-Macedonian orator” (Worthington 2012, 188; cf. Demosth. 19.284–286), concerns the judicial dispute that took place in 346/345 BC17 and is the result of rivalry involving Aeschines, Demosthenes and their supporters after the Peace of Philocrates. Past scholarship scorned this speech due to its subject matter. A. Hug’s view is typical (1874, 442): “Ιf we discount the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Neaera, no other ancient Greek oration is as immersed in squalor”; even more recently, G. Kennedy (1963, 238) attributes the absence of any English-language commentary to “distaste for the subject matter”. However, in recent years, the speech has been the subject of systematic study. Commentaries were published18 and, as in the case of Apollodorus’ Against Neaera to which Against Timarchus bears similarities, there are numerous references to social and sexual life in Athens: the speech is an important source for homosexuality and male prostitution19 and, in this sense, a legal rarity in Attic oratory.20 Against Timarchus is part of the procedure of dokimasia rhētorōn (“scrutiny of public speakers”),21 whereby Aeschines brought a public suit against Timarchus;

|| 16 E. Rohde, Über griechische Novellendichtung und ihren Zusammenhang mit Orient, Leipzig 1876, 67 (= as an appendix to E. Rohde, Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer, Darmstadt 1960). Cf. C. Stöcker, Der 10. Aischines-Brief. Eine Kimon-Novelle, Mnemosyne 33 (1980) 307–312. On [Aeschines’] Letters cf. V. Martin/G. de Budé, Eschine. Discours II, Paris 1952, 133 ff. 17 See E.M. Harris, The Date of the Trial of Timarchus, Hermes 116 (1985) 376–380; H. Wankel, Die Datierung des Prozesses gegen Timarchos (346/345), Hermes 116 (1988) 383–386; Fisher (2001) 6–8. 18 See Natalicchio (1998); Fisher (2001). Cf. Carey (2000) 18 ff.; A. Wolpert/K. Kapparis, Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens. Sources for Athenian History, Indianapolis 2011, 227 ff.; C. Carey, Trials from Classical Athens, 2. ed., London/New York 2012, 164 ff. 19 See in detail Fisher (2001) 25–53; E.E. Cohen, Athenian Prostitution. The Business of Sex, Oxford 2015, esp. 71–72; K. Kapparis, Prostitution in the Ancient Greek World, Leiden/Boston 2017, 188–209, 247–253. 20 Cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,2 192–193; K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, Cambridge MΑ 1978, 29–30; Usher (1999) 280. See also D. Cohen, Law, Sexuality and Society. The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens, Cambridge 1991, 176–180. 21 See Fisher (2001) 157–158; D.M. MacDowell, The Athenian Procedure of Dokimasia of Orators, in: Wallace/Gagarin (2005) 79–87; L. Cagliardi, The Athenian Procedure of Dokimasia of Orators. A Response to Douglas M. MacDowell, in: Wallace/Gagarin (2005) 89–97; Hasskamp (2005) 126–129. For a parallel drawn with the eidos exetastikon of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander (with a reference to Aeschines’ Against Timarchus), see D.C. Mirhady, The Disappearance and Reappearance of Exetasis, Mouseion 8 (2008) 405 ff.; G. Pasini, The ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος of the Rh. Al. and Parallels in

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those involved in a number of offences, such as maltreatment of their parents, cowardice during war, squandering their property and prostitution, had to be barred from exercising their civic rights (1.27–30): Against Timarchus 1(27) ἃ συνιδὼν ὁ νομοθέτης διαρρήδην ἀπέδειξεν οὓς χρὴ δημηγορεῖν καὶ οὓς οὐ δεῖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. καὶ οὐκ ἀπελαύνει ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος, εἴ τις μὴ προγόνων ἐστὶν ἐστρατηγηκότων [υἱός], οὐδέ γε εἰ τέχνην τινὰ ἐργάζεται ἐπικουρῶν τῇ ἀναγκαίᾳ τροφῇ, ἀλλὰ τούτους καὶ μάλιστα ἀσπάζεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾷ “τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται”. (28) τίνας δ᾽ οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν; τοὺς αἰσχρῶς βεβιωκότας· τούτους οὐκ ἐᾷ δημηγορεῖν. καὶ ποῦ τοῦτο δηλοῖ; “δοκιμασία”, φησί, “ῥητόρων· ἐάν τις λέγῃ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἢ τὴν μητέρα, ἢ μὴ τρέφων, ἢ μὴ παρέχων οἴκησιν·” τοῦτον οὐκ ἐᾷ λέγειν. νὴ Δία καλῶς γε, ὡς ἔγωγέ φημι. διὰ τί; ὅτι εἴ τις, οὓς ἐξ ἴσου δεῖ τιμᾶν τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰς τούτους ἐστὶ φαῦλος, τί ποτε, φησίν, ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πείσονται οἱ ἀλλότριοι καὶ ἡ πόλις ὅλη; (29) καὶ τίσι δεύτερον ἀπεῖπε μὴ λέγειν; “ἢ τὰς στρατείας”, φησί, “μὴ ἐστρατευμένος, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῷ προσταχθῶσιν, ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀποβεβληκώς”, δίκαια λέγων. τί δή ποτε; ἄνθρωπε, τῇ πόλει ὑπὲρ ἧς τὰ ὅπλα μὴ τίθεσαι ἢ διὰ δειλίαν μὴ δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπαμῦναι, μηδὲ συμβουλεύειν ἀξίου. τρίτον τίσι διαλέγεται; “ἢ πεπορνευμένος”, φησίν, “ἢ ἡταιρηκώς”· τὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει πεπρακότα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ῥᾳδίως ἡγήσατο ἀποδώσεσθαι. (30) τέταρτον τίσι διαλέγεται; “ἢ τὰ πατρῷα”, φησί, “κατεδηδοκώς, ἢ ὧν ἂν κληρονόμος γένηται”· τὸν γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν οἰκίαν κακῶς οἰκήσαντα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως παραπλησίως ἡγήσατο διαθήσειν· καὶ οὐκ ἐδόκει οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἰδίᾳ μὲν εἶναι πονηρόν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ χρηστόν, οὐδ᾽ ᾤετο δεῖν τὸν ῥήτορα ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα τῶν λόγων ἐπιμεληθέντα πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ βίου. (31) καὶ παρὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, κἂν πάνυ κακῶς καὶ ἁπλῶς ῥηθῇ [λόγος], χρήσιμα τὰ λεγόμενα ἡγήσατο εἶναι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· παρὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου βδελυροῦ, καὶ καταγελάστως μὲν κεχρημένου τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, αἰσχρῶς δὲ τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν κατεδηδοκότος, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εὖ πάνυ λεχθῇ συνοίσειν ἡγήσατο τοῖς ἀκούουσι. Against Timarchus 1(27) With this in mind, the legislator explicitly declared who should address the people and who should not speak in the Assembly. He does not expel a man from the platform if his ancestors have not served as generals, nor if he works at some trade to provide for the necessities of life; indeed, he especially welcomes these men, and this is why he repeatedly asks: “Who wishes to speak? (tis agoreuein bouletai)” (28) Which men, then, did he think should not speak? People who have lived a life of shame ‒ these are the ones he does not allow to address the people. And where does he state this? When he says: “The scrutiny of public speakers (dokimasia rhētorōn): if anyone who beats his father or mother or does not keep them or provide a home speaks in the Assembly”; this man he does not allow to speak. A fine rule, by Zeus, in my personal opinion. Why? Because if anyone mistreats the ones he should honor on a level with the gods, what sort of treatment, says the legislator, will people unconnected with him, and indeed the city as a whole, receive from him? (29) And who are the next ones he forbids to speak? “Or anyone,” he says, “who has not performed all the military service he is ordered to, or has thrown away his shield,” and rightly. Why exactly? Mister, when you do not take up arms for the city or because of cowardice (deilia) cannot protect it, do not presume to give it advice (symbouleuein). Who are the third group he addresses? “Or anyone who has been a prostitute (peporneumenos),” he says, “or has sold himself (hētairēkōs).” For the man who has willfully sold his own body would, he thought, casually sell out the interests of the city. (30) Who are the fourth

|| Aeschnines’ Against Timarchus and Demosthenes’ On The False Embassy, Rhetorica 29 (2011) 336– 356.

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group he addresses? “Or anyone who has squandered his paternal estate,” he says, “or any other property he has inherited.” For he considered that the man who has mismanaged his private household would treat the city’s interests in much the same way; and the legislator could not conceive that the same individual could be worthless in private life and useful to the public good, nor did he believe that a public speaker should come to the platform fully prepared in his words and not in his life. (31) He believed that statements from a good and decent (kalos kagathos) man, even when expressed in a clumsy or simple way, would be of advantage to the hearers, while those from an unprincipled man who had treated his own body with contempt and disgracefully squandered his ancestral property would not benefit the hearers even when expressed with great eloquence. (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

Aeschines accuses Timarchus of squandering his property and neglecting his blind uncle (1.42; 1.95 ff.; 1.102 ff.), but the charge of prostitution, which is punishable by disenfranchisement (1.21), becomes a dominant topic of the speech and is accompanied by associated concepts (pornos, porneuesthai, hetairein). The case of Timarchus vividly illustrates the risks of individuality in the Athenian democracy when it was the subject of polemic by its opponents due to a controversial private life and when a number of social factors became intertwined. This serves as the basis for the successful strategy employed by Aeschines, who systematically fails to mention the political background of the trial and builds his speech on Timarchus’ suspect reputation (Fisher 2001, 53 ff.).22 However, as the defendant’s notorious private life took place far in the past and he had engaged in significant political activity at the time of the trial, Aeschines attempts to protect himself from the charge of sycophancy;23 he did not slander a fellow citizen, but the motives for his prosecution are associated with the interest of the city as a whole, the laws, the judges and himself (1.2: βοηθῆσαι τῇ τε πόλει πάσῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμαυτῷ). This is why Aeschines emphatically stresses that Timarchus’ further political activity harms the city and that he himself is appearing as a prosecutor for the first time, therefore he is not quarrelsome and slanderous, and that he himself suffered abuse by Timarchus and is, consequently, defending himself (1.1: sykophanteisthai; cf. 1.3; Fisher 2001, 119–120).24

|| 22 Cf. C. Carey, Style, Persona and Performance in Aeschines’ Prosecution of Timarchus, in: Papaioannou et al. (2017) 265–282. 23 On sycophants, see R. Osborne, Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens. Sykophancy and the Sykophant, in: Cartledge/Millet/Todd (1990) 83–102; D. Harvey, The Sykophant and Sykophancy. Vexatious Redefinition?, in: Cartledge/Millet/Todd (1990) 103–121; V.J. Hunter, Policing Athens. Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420–320 B.C., Princeton 1994, 125–129; M.R. Christ, The Litigious Athenian, Baltimore/London 1998; Hansen (1999) 194–196. 24 This is Aeschines’ response to the objection of not having prosecuted Timarchus previously. Cf. Demosth. 19.287. Similarly [Demosth.] 59.41–43. Cf. J. Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, London 1997, 267. On Aeschines’ argumentation concerning the priority of the laws (1.4; cf. 3.6) and his personal motive as a rebuttal of the charge of calumny, see D.S. Allen, The World of Prometheus. The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens, Princeton 2000, 152–153, 180–181. Cf. also A. Kurihava, Personal Enmity as a Motivation in Forensic Speeches, CQ 53 (2003) 464–477.

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From a perspective of modern law, one cannot but wonder how a judicial case with exceptionally weak evidence and, due to its subject matter, a hard-to-prove charge focuses on a noteworthy equation of rhetoric, ethics, law and democracy. Aeschines’ rhetoric provides deeper insights into the relationship between private and public life in Athens in the 4th century BC.25 Timarchus would be condemned for his reputation in the past and an issue of moral behaviour with numerous implications. This gives Aeschines the right to warn of the risks associated with an argument that is not supported by an upright life (1.179: λόγον ἄνευ χρηστοῦ βίου; cf. 1.30–31; Wohl 2010, 44–45). A critically important component is “public opinion” and, while Isocrates was its theoretical representative, Aeschines places exceptional trust in it in practice. The final ruling of the judges is not essentially based on any evidence other than a self-evident poor reputation.26 For Aeschines, phēmē (“reputation, rumour”) functions automatically, a true report spreads of its own accord through the city (1.127: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πλανᾶται) and, as attested by the poets Homer, Euripides and Hesiod, is a personified deity,27 a true (apseudēs) witness in the political community (1.125–131; cf. 2.145). Timarchus’ sobriquet was known to all and there was no need for witnesses (1.130: ποῖος Τίμαρχος; ὁ πόρνος;): Against Timarchus 1(127) ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Δημόσθενες, περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀναθημάτων καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν καὶ τῶν κτημάτων καὶ πάντων ὅλως τῶν ἀφώνων πολλοὺς καὶ παντοδαποὺς καὶ οὐδέποτε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀκούω λόγους λεγομένους· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔτε καλαὶ οὔτε αἰσχραὶ πράξεις, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ προσαψάμενος αὐτῶν καὶ παρατυχών, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς αὑτοῦ δόξης λόγον παρέχει· περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον [καὶ λόγον] καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀψευδής τις ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πλανᾶται φήμη κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ διαγγέλλει τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰς ἰδίας πράξεις, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μαντεύεται περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. (128) καὶ οὕτως ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ οὐ πεπλασμένον ὃ λέγω, ὥσθ᾽ εὑρήσετε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς προγόνους φήμης ὡς θεοῦ μεγίστης βωμὸν ἱδρυμένους, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον πολλάκις ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι λέγοντα πρὸ τοῦ τι τῶν μελλόντων γενέσθαι· “φήμη δ᾽ εἰς στρατὸν ἦλθε” καὶ πάλιν τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἀποφαινόμενον τὴν θεὸν ταύτην οὐ μόνον τοὺς ζῶντας ἐμφανίζειν δυναμένην, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ὅταν λέγῃ· “φήμη τὸν ἐσθλὸν κἀν μυχῷ δείκνυσι γῆς”. (129) ὁ δ᾽ Ἡσίοδος καὶ διαρρήδην θεὸν αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι, πάνυ σαφῶς φράζων τοῖς βουλομένοις συνιέναι· λέγει γάρ· “φήμη δ᾽ οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα λαοὶ πολλοὶ φημίξωσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή”. καὶ τούτων

|| 25 See V. Hunter, Gossip and the Politics of Reputation in Classical Athens, Phoenix 44 (1990) 299– 325, esp. 321 ff.; A. Efstathiou, Το ιδιωτικό και το δημόσιο στη δοκιμασίαν ῥητόρων στην Αθήνα των κλασικών χρόνων, in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 231–254, esp. 237 ff. 26 Cf. D. Cohen, Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens, Cambridge 1995, 110–111. See also S. Lape, The Psychology of Prostitution in Aeschines’ Speech against Timarchus, in: C.A. Faraone/L.K. McClure (eds.), Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World, Madison 2006, 139–160. 27 See E. Alexiou, Ruhm und Ehre. Studien zu Begriffen, Werten und Motivierungen bei Isokrates, Heidelberg 1995, 19–20; R. Parker, Athenian Religion. A History, Oxford 1996, 155–156, 233, 237; E.J. Stafford, Worshipping Virtues. Personification and the Divine in Ancient Greece, London 2000, 10– 11.

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τῶν ποιημάτων τοὺς μὲν εὐσχημόνως βεβιωκότας εὑρήσετε ἐπαινέτας ὄντας· πάντες γὰρ οἱ δημοσίᾳ φιλότιμοι παρὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς φήμης ἡγοῦνται τὴν δόξαν κομιεῖσθαι· οἷς δ᾽ αἰσχρός ἐστιν ὁ βίος, οὐ τιμῶσι τὴν θεὸν ταύτην· κατήγορον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον ἔχειν ἡγοῦνται. (130) ἀναμνήσθητε οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τίνι κέχρησθε φήμῃ περὶ Τιμάρχου. οὐχ ἅμα τοὔνομα λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα εὐθὺς ἐρωτᾶτε· “ποῖος Τίμαρχος; ὁ πόρνος;” ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μάρτυρας παρειχόμην περί τινος, ἐπιστεύετ᾽ ἄν μοι· εἰ δὲ τὴν θεὸν μάρτυρα παρέχομαι, οὐ πιστεύσετε; ᾗ οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐπισκήψασθαι. Against Timarchus 1(127) Myself, Demosthenes, where dedicatory offerings and houses and possessions, in short all voiceless objects, are concerned, I hear many tales of all sorts and never consistent. For they have no capacity for noble or base action; it is the man who happens to become associated with them, whoever he may be, who furnishes the common account according to the scale of his own reputation. But where men’s lives and actions are concerned, of its own accord (apo tautomatou) a true report (apseudēs phēmē) spreads through the city announcing an individual’s conduct to the public at large, and often predicting future events, too. (128) This statement is so patently true and uncontrived that you will find that both our city and our ancestors established an altar to Report as a goddess of very great power. You will find that Homer often says in the Iliad before some event that was about to happen: “Report came to the host,” and that Euripides declares that this goddess is able to reveal the character not only of the living, whatever it may be, but also of the dead, when he says: “Report declares the noble man, even when hidden in the ground.” (129) And Hesiod actually describes her explicitly as a goddess. His words are quite clear for anyone who is willing to understand them. He says: “Report in no wise dies away completely, if many people utter it. She, too, then, is a god.” And you will find that people who have lived decent lives are admirers of these poems. For all men who have public ambitions (philotimoi) believe that they will win their reputations from good report (agathē phēmē). But people whose lives are base do not respect this god. They see in her their undying accuser (athanatos katēgoros). (130) So recollect, gentlemen, the report you have encountered concerning Timarchus. Isn’t it the case that as soon as the name is uttered you ask the question: “Which Timarchus? The whore (pornos)?” So then, if I were offering witnesses, you would believe me. Yet if I offer the god as witness, will you not believe, when in all piety one cannot charge her with false testimony? (Transl. C. Carey 2000 with modifications)

“The trial was essentially over before it began” (Wohl 2010, 47; cf. Aeschin. 1.79). Timarchus was convicted to atimia, i.e. deprivation of his civic rights (Demosth. 19.257; 19.284; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841A), and one cannot but ultimately agree with N. Fisher (2001, 67) regarding the judges’ decision: “They believed it to be right to impose higher standards of civic, familial, and sexual morality on those active in political life”.28 Aeschines’ oration Against Timarchus is called upon to serve moral-educational purposes and, in this sense, is in line with Apollodorus’ Against Neaera.

|| 28 Cf. N. Fisher, The Bad Boyfriend, the Flatterer and the Sykophant. Related Forms of the Kakos in Democratic Athens, in: I. Sluiter/R.M. Rosen (eds.), Kakos. Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/Boston 2008, 185–231.

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7.2.2 On the False Embassy (2) According to W. Jaeger (1938, 165–166), “there are no more appalling documents evidencing the wildness of justice in the fourth-century Athenian democracy than these two speeches with the same title: On the False Embassy”. The two speeches, (prosecution by Demosthenes, defence by Aeschines) concerning the political trial held in 343 BC, contain clear contradictions, manipulation of facts and selective use of evidence by both sides (Paulsen 1999, 446–467).29 However, we are very fortunate to be able to compare the two speeches. A number of indications lead to the conclusion that Aeschines’ On the False Embassy (2) was revised after the trial in order to be published.30 Demosthenes accused Aeschines of bribery and treason during the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC) and, due to insufficient evidence, preferred a complex speech structure, the prevailing concept being the charge of bribery. Aeschines’ defence is primarily a substantiated exposition of the facts (Buckler 2000, 140).31 Its length is less than half of that of Demosthenes’ speech, while its structural principle is the complete opposite: the articulation of arguments is simple and clear, with facts presented in chronological sequence. In the narration, argumentation and rebuttal of the charge, Aeschines introduces himself as a loyal citizen who has nothing to hide.32 With respect to the unfortunate outcome of events, luck was on Philip’s side, and he represented the interests of Athens through his rhetoric, thus exhibiting all due loyalty to the city (Aeschin. 2.118: ἡ μὲν τύχη καὶ Φίλιππος ἦσαν τῶν ἔργων κύριοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίας καὶ τῶν λόγων; cf. 2.131). Demosthenes would later use the same argument regarding the outcome of the Battle of Chaeronea (18.194: οὔτε τῆς τύχης κύριος ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη τῶν πάντων; 18.303; cf. Usher 1999, 286). Aeschines defends his policy of peace towards the Macedonians, and condemns those who support a policy of war and more war (polemon ek polemou). In fact, he associates his own stance with democracy: peace preserves democracy, while war destroys it (2.176–177): On the False Embassy 2(176) πάλιν δὲ σωφρόνως πολιτευθέντες καὶ τοῦ δήμου κατελθόντος ἀπὸ Φυλῆς, Ἀρχίνου καὶ Θρασυβούλου προστάντων τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὸ “μὴ μνησικακεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους” ἔνορκον ἡμῖν καταστησάντων, ὅθεν σοφωτάτην ἅπαντες τὴν πόλιν ἡγήσαντο εἶναι,

|| 29 Cf. C. Kremmydas, The Discourse of Deception and Characterization in Attic Oratory, GRBS 53 (2013) 51–89. 30 Negative references, i.e. passages not encountered in Demosthenes (such as Aeschin. 2.10; 2.124), might suggest the incorporation of extemporaneous oral arguments in written form of the speech; see in detail Paulsen (1999) 431 ff.; Buckler (2000) 125; T. Hubbard, Getting the Last Word. Publication of Political Oratory as an Instrument of Historical Revisionism, in: E.A. Mackay (ed.), Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greco-Roman World, Leiden 2008, 183–200, esp. 195 ff. 31 Cf. Harris (1995) 117–118. 32 Cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,2 202: “einfach und kunstlos”; Paulsen (1999) 75 ff., 524–525.

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(177) κἀνταῦθα ἀναφύντος τοῦ δήμου καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἰσχύσαντος, ἄνθρωποι παρέγγραπτοι γεγενημένοι πολῖται καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀεὶ προσαγόμενοι καὶ πόλεμον ἐκ πολέμου πολιτευόμενοι, ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ τὰ δεινὰ τῷ λόγῳ προορώμενοι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς φιλοτίμους καὶ λίαν ὀξείας ἐρεθίζοντες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολέμοις ὅπλων οὐχ ἁπτόμενοι, ἐξετασταὶ δὲ καὶ ἀποστολεῖς γιγνόμενοι (παιδοποιούμενοι δὲ ἐξ ἑταιρῶν, ἄτιμοι δ’ ἐκ συκοφαντίας), εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους [ἡμῶν] κινδύνους τὴν πόλιν καθιστᾶσι, [καὶ] τὸ μὲν τῆς δημοκρατίας ὄνομα οὐ τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κολακείᾳ θεραπεύοντες, καταλύοντες δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐξ ἧς ἡ δημοκρατία σῴζεται, συναγωνιζόμενοι δὲ τοῖς πολέμοις ἐξ ὧν ὁ δῆμος καταλύεται. On the False Embassy 2(176) Once political order had returned and the democracy had been restored from Phyle, Archinus and Thrasybulus became the popular leaders and bound us by oath “to bear no grudge against each other,” and as a result the world thought our city exceptionally wise (sophōtatē). (177) At this point, when the democracy had sprung up afresh and recovered its original strength, persons who had had themselves fraudulently enrolled as citizens constantly attracted to themselves the corrupt element in the city and pursued a policy of war and more war (polemon ek polemou politeuomenoi). In peace they spoke of danger they foresaw and tried to stir up ambitious (philotimoi) and over-hasty minds, while in war they never lifted a weapon but got themselves made army auditors (exetastai) and naval inspectors (apostoleis). These are men who father children on their mistresses, men disfranchised for malicious prosecution (sykophantia). And they are placing the city in extreme danger. They support the name of democracy not with their conduct but with flattering words (kolakeia); they are trying to destroy the peace that keeps democracy (dēmokratia) safe, while they champion the wars that destroy democracy. (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

This is dynamic rhetoric, which, interspersed ‒ as is the case with Demosthenes ‒ with irony, sarcasm and personal attacks (diabolē), aims to humiliate the opponent. The contrast between Demosthenes’ grandiose promises and his lifeless performance before Philip is characteristic: On the False Embassy 2(21) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐκ ἐν τοιούτοις ἦμεν λόγοις [οἱ συμπρέσβεις], ἀλλ’ ὅλην τὴν πορείαν ἠναγκαζόμεθα Δημοσθένην ὑπομένειν ἀφόρητον ὄντα καὶ βαρὺν ἄνθρωπον· ὃς διασκοπούντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι χρὴ λέγειν [ἡμᾶς τῶν συμπρέσβεων], καὶ Κίμωνος εἰπόντος ὅτι φοβοῖτο μὴ δικαιολογούμενος περιγένοιτο ἡμῶν ὁ Φίλιππος, πηγὰς δὴ λόγων ἔχειν ἀφθόνους ἐπηγγέλλετο καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ πολέμου τοιαῦτα ἐρεῖν ἔφη ὥστε ἀπορράψειν τὸ Φιλίππου στόμα ὁλοσχοίνῳ ἀβρόχῳ καὶ πείσειν Ἀθηναίους μὲν καταδέξασθαι Λεωσθένην, Φίλιππον δ’ Ἀθηναίοις Ἀμφίπολιν ἀποδοῦναι. On the False Embassy 2(21) Besides, this was not the kind of conversation in which we engaged; in fact, for the whole journey we had to put up with Demosthenes, an unbearably tedious man. When we were reflecting on what we should say and Cimon said that he was afraid that Philip’s presentation of his case would get the better of us, Demosthenes promised that he had unlimited (aphthonoi) founts of argument and would make such a case for our claims about Amphipolis and the outbreak of the war that he would sew up Philip’s mouth with a dry reed and persuade the Athenians to take back (katadexasthai) Leosthenes and Philip to restore (apodounai) Amphipolis to Athens. (Transl. C. Carey 2000) On the False Embassy 2(34) ῥηθέντων δὲ καὶ τούτων καὶ ἑτέρων λόγων, ἤδη καθῆκεν εἰς Δημοσθένην τὸ τῆς πρεσβείας μέρος καὶ πάντες προσεῖχον ὡς ὑπερβολάς τινας δυνάμεως ἀκουσόμενοι λόγων· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, ὡς ἦν ὕστερον ἀκούειν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους αὐτοῦ

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ἐξήγγελτο ἡ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ὑπερβολή. οὕτω δὲ ἁπάντων διακειμένων πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο προοίμιον σκοτεινόν τι καὶ τεθνηκὸς δειλίᾳ καί, μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει τοῦ λόγου. (35) ἰδὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς διέκειτο, θαρρεῖν τε παρεκελεύετο καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, διὰ τοῦτο [οἴεσθαί] τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ’ ἡσυχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὡς προείλετο. ὁ δέ, ὡς ἅπαξ ἐταράχθη καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων διεσφάλη, οὐδ’ ἀναλαβεῖν ἔτι αὑτὸν ἐδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν ταὐτὸν ἔπαθεν. ὡς δ᾽ ἦν σιωπή, μεταστῆναι ἡμᾶς ὁ κῆρυξ ἐκέλευεν. On the False Embassy 2(34) After these and other arguments, it was now Demosthenes’ turn to play his part in the mission, and all paid close attention, expecting to hear perfect examples of verbal skill (for his extravagant claims had been reported to Philip himself and his associates [hetairoi], as we heard later). With all listening so intently, this creature (thērion) uttered an obscure prologue in a voice dead with fright (deilia), and after a brief narration of earlier events, suddenly fell silent and was at a loss for words, and finally abandoned his speech. (35) Seeing the state he was in, Philip encouraged him to take heart (tharrein) and not to suppose that he had suffered a complete catastrophe, like an actor in the theatre; he should calmly and patiently recollect his arguments and make the speech he had planned. But Demosthenes, once he had become confused and had lost his place in his notes (ta gegrammena), was now unable to recover; he tried once more to speak, and the same thing happened. In the ensuing silence the herald asked us to withdraw. (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

There are also Aeschines’ facetious remarks concerning the occupation of logographer,33 the “Scythian” origins of Demosthenes’ mother (2.180: τῷ λογογράφῳ καὶ Σκύθῃ), as well as the questions posed to his opponent concerning his rhetorical aesthetics, voice and sexual orientation (2.88; 2.99; 2.151; 2.156–157).34 One of the many interesting sections of the speech (2.172–177) is the direct quote of a passage from the orator Andocides (3.3 ff.), where Aeschines attempts to favour peace over war, invoking historical examples. As was commonplace in the 4th century, the orator uses history in the service of his own personal goals.35 Regarding the relationship between the individual and the political community, the semantic distinction attempted between phēmē and sykophantia/diabolē (2.145) is important, whereby only the former expresses society as a whole and develops automatically, functioning in the interest of society whereas the latter is initiated by a specific individual for the purpose of defamation.36 Therefore, Aeschines’ assertions

|| 33 On Demosthenes as a logographer, see Yunis (1996) 242–247. 34 See N. Worman, Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2008, 213–274. Cf. V.J. Hunter, Gossip and the Politics of Reputation in Classical Athens, Phoenix 44 (1990) 299–325; S. Halliwell, Laughter in Greek Culture, CQ 41 (1991) 279–299; C. Carey, Comic Ridicule and Democracy, in: Osborne/Hornblower (1994) 69–84; Easterling (1999) 154–166. 35 See Perlman (1961) 150–166; Nouhaud (1982); Steinbock (2013). 36 On the importance of rumour in Aeschines’ argumentation, see S. Gotteland, La rumeur chez les orateurs attiques. Vérité ou vraisemblance?, AC 66 (1997) 89–119, esp. 93–94, 107, 112–118. Cf. S. Gotteland, Rumeur et politique dans la cité grecque à l’époque classique, Hypothèses 1 (2000) 267–279.

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aim at equating himself with healthy public opinion and appearing as the representative of beneficial reputation and not malicious accusations: On the False Embassy 2(145) εὖ δ’ ἴστε, ὦ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι πλεῖστον διαφέρει φήμη καὶ συκοφαντία. φήμη μὲν γὰρ οὐ κοινωνεῖ διαβολῇ, διαβολὴ δὲ ἀδελφόν ἐστι [καὶ] συκοφαντίᾳ. διοριῶ δ’ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον σαφῶς. φήμη μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτόματον ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς προφάσεως λέγῃ τινὰ ὡς γεγενημένην πρᾶξιν· συκοφαντία δ’ ἐστίν, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς εἷς ἀνὴρ αἰτίαν ἐμβαλὼν ἔν τε ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἁπάσαις πρός τε τὴν βουλὴν διαβάλλῃ τινά. καὶ τῇ μὲν φήμῃ δημοσίᾳ θύομεν ὡς θεῷ, τῶν δὲ συκοφαντῶν ὡς κακούργων δημοσίᾳ προβολὰς ποιούμεθα. μὴ οὖν σύναγε εἰς ταὐτὸν τὰ κάλλιστα τοῖς αἰσχίστοις. On the False Embassy 2(145) You may be sure, men of Athens, that there is an enormous difference between common report (phēmē) and malicious accusation (sykophantia). Common report has no connection with slander (diabolē), but malicious accusation is slander’s sister. I shall clarify the difference between them. Common report is when the mass of citizens of their own accord (automaton) with no ulterior motive talk of an event as real; malicious accusation is when one individual presents an accusation to the general public and slanders someone at every Assembly and in the Council. We sacrifice to Report publicly as a goddess, while we bring charges against sykophants publicly as criminals. Don’t mix the most noble of things (kalliston) with the most disgraceful (aischiston). (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

7.2.3 Against Ctesiphon (3) Aeschines’ third speech, Against Ctesiphon (3; 330 BC) for the trial held thirteen years after the speech On the False Embassy (2) illustrates the particularities of the practical rhetoric of the era which, as the art of persuasion, is judged by the results it bears. This is indicated by Aeschines’ abject failure, as he was unable to win even one fifth of the votes (Plut. Demosth. 24.2; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840C). Therefore, the speech failed in its mission and, regardless of the intentions and exceptional rhetorical presence of Aeschines, the attack against Demosthenes gave rise to the defence speech On the Crown (18), which remains to this day “the finest example of Classical Oratory” (Carey 2000, 162). Consequently, the two speeches reflect not only the views of Athenian society or segments of public opinion, but also the personal competition between two first-class orators, speaking before a democratic audience, each defending his overall politics and personal profile. This is an agōn logōn between two men and two directions for Athenian foreign policy. Understandably, Aeschines’ speech cannot be interpreted independently; it has to contend with Demosthenes’ defence speech, and this contention affects all subsequent interpretations. Ctesiphon proposed that Demosthenes be awarded a crown for his services to the city. Aeschines’ charge of submitting an illegal motion (graphē paranomōn) concerns the awarding of a crown to a public official who has not been held accountable for his office, and the presentation of the crown in the theatre during the Dionysia (3.12; 3.34). Furthermore, according to the charge, Demosthenes does not deserve such an accolade (3.50).

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The clear structure of the speech reveals Aeschines’ main goal: first the illegalities of Ctesiphon’s proposal are presented, accounting for just one fifth of the speech (3.9–48), followed by the most important section (3.49–176; §49: ἐφ’ ᾧ μάλιστα σπουδάζω), i.e. the question of Demosthenes’ worthiness. The remainder (3.177–260) is an epilogue in the broad sense (Blass 1887–1898, III,2 190). From a legal perspective, despite any ambiguities, Aeschines’ position was well-founded.37 However, the role of the individual outweighs the legal dimension. Aeschines did not limit himself to this dimension, as he pursued the overall condemnation of Demosthenes’ politics, which he distinguishes into four periods: until the Peace of Philocrates (3.58–78), until the outbreak of the second war with Philip (3.79–105), until the Battle of Chaeronea (3.106–158), and until the present (3.159–167). Contrary to Aeschines’ two previous speeches, which concerned contemporaneous events, Against Ctesiphon (3) concerns the past and Aeschines’ enmity towards his political rival (Carey 2000, 162). His oration is permeated by the personal element: “His aim was to restore his own prestige by damaging Demosthenes’ reputation” (Harris 1995, 147). The proem is already dominated by a tragic element and the moralistic tendencies of Aeschines, which are also encountered in Against Timarchus (1): he underlines the strength of the laws (3.1: τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν δικαίων) and their key role in democracy, in contrast to tyrannies and oligarchies that depend on the character of their leaders (3.6: διοικοῦνται δ᾽ αἱ μὲν τυραννίδες καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις).38 When tackling the main case (3.49–50), Aeschines vehemently challenges Demosthenes’ role towards the city, his supposed aretē and andragathia, his words and deeds, i.e. the reasoning for Ctesiphon’s honorary decree (εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔπαινοι ψευδεῖς).39 The entire speech leads to the conclusion that Demosthenes’ military policy and “villainous” character are responsible for the disasters in Athens and Greece. In an emotionally charged passage where he recounts the calamities that befell the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, Aeschines concludes that they all occurred after Demosthenes became involved in politics. The intense excerpt (3.133 ff.) is finally reinforced with the authority of a quote from Hesiod’s Works and Days (240 ff.):

|| 37 On the legal aspects of the issue, cf. Gwatkin (1957) 129–141; Wankel (1976) 41 ff.; U. Schindel, Doppeltes Recht oder Prozeßtaktik? Zu Aischines’ Erster und Dritter Rede, Hermes 106 (1978) 100– 116. For a different view, see E.M. Harris, Law and Oratory, in: Worthington (1994) 141–148; Harris (1995) 143–145. For a reserved view, see Buckler (2000) 147. Gagarin (2012) 293–314 argues against the strict distinction between legal and political arguments. 38 See Harris (1995) 142; Usher (1999) 288. A similar line of argumentation, albeit with different connotations in favour of an “aristocracy of values”, is used by Isocrates in Panathenaicus 12.132–133. 39 See B.L. Cook, Athenian Terms of Civic Praise in the 330s. Aeschines vs. Demosthenes, GRBS 49 (2009) 31–52. Cf. P. Liddel, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens, Oxford 2007, 174–175.

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Against Ctesiphon 3(133) Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται, εἰ καὶ δικαίως, περὶ τῶν ὅλων οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευσάμενοι, ἀλλὰ τήν γε θεοβλάβειαν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως, ἀλλὰ δαιμονίως κτησάμενοι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ οἱ ταλαίπωροι, προσαψάμενοι μόνον τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ κατάληψιν, οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ποτὲ ἀξιοῦντες ἡγεμόνες εἶναι, νῦν ὁμηρεύσοντες καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς ἐπίδειξιν ποιησόμενοι μέλλουσιν ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον ἀναπέμπεσθαι, τοῦτο πεισόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ὅ τι ἂν ἐκείνῳ δόξῃ, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κρατοῦντος καὶ προηδικημένου μετριότητι κριθησόμενοι. (134) ἡ δ᾽ ἡμετέρα πόλις, ἡ κοινὴ καταφυγὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἣν ἀφικνοῦντο πρότερον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αἱ πρεσβεῖαι, κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν εὑρησόμενοι, νῦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἀγωνίζεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ὅτου Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν. εὖ γὰρ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητὴς ἀποφαίνεται. λέγει γάρ που παιδεύων τὰ πλήθη καὶ συμβουλεύων ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς πονηροὺς τῶν δημαγωγῶν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι. Against Ctesiphon 3(133) And Thebes, Thebes, our neighbor city, has been snatched from the middle of Greece in a single day; justly, it may be, since their whole policy was mistaken, but their blindness (theoblabeia) and folly (aphrosynē) came not from a human but from a superhuman source (daimoniōs). And the poor Spartans, who became involved in these events only at the beginning with the seizure of the temple, who once claimed to be leaders (hēgemones) of Greece, are about to be sent to Alexander as hostages and make an exhibition of their calamity, to suffer, both individually and as a country, whatever he chooses, and to have their fate decided by the mercy of a victor they have wronged. (134) And our city, the universal refuge of the Greeks (koinē kataphygē tōn Hellēnōn), which previously received embassies from the rest of Greece, each looking to find protection for their individual cities from us, now no longer competes for the leadership (hēgemonia) of Greece but is already struggling for our country’s soil. And this has been our fate since Demosthenes came to political prominence. The poet Hesiod expresses himself well on situations like this. He says at one point, as he seeks to educate the masses and advise the cities, that they should not tolerate corrupt (ponēroi) demagogues. (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

The disaster at Chaeronea was an “exceptionally appropriate starting point” (Wankel 1966, 45) for the rhetorical climax of the speech (3.152–158).40 Aeschines begins with a passionate paradox (Usher 1999, 291–292), where he unusually blends praise with blame: the fallen deserve praise for their bravery, yet the man who led them to their deaths does not deserve a crown of honour, but condemnation. There is an exceptionally vivid description of the painful emotions of the relatives of the dead when a crown is presented at the theatre to the person responsible for their woes, or, similarly, the emotions of the tearful Thebans when they remember the destruction of their city. The judges are encouraged to create personalised images of Thebes and the Thebans (O’Connell 2017, 128–130). According to Aeschines, one must beware the evil destiny and bad luck of Demosthenes, who proved himself the curse of Greece (3.157: alitērios). Finally, Aeschines reverses the role assumed by Demosthenes as counsellor

|| 40 Schaefer (1966–1967) III 240; Yunis (2001) 12–13; Worthington (2013) 298. Cf. Wilson (1996) 322– 323.

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(symboulos) to the city, since he ruined everyone who trusted him, whether private citizen or city (3.156–158): Against Ctesiphon 3(156) μὴ πρὸς τοῦ Διὸς καὶ θεῶν ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τρόπαιον ἵστατε ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διονύσου ὀρχήστρᾳ, μηδ᾽ αἱρεῖτε παρανοίας ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μηδ᾽ ὑπομιμνῄσκετε τῶν ἀνιάτων καὶ ἀνηκέστων κακῶν τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Θηβαίους οὓς φεύγοντας διὰ τοῦτον ὑποδέδεχθε τῇ πόλει, ὧν ἱερὰ καὶ τέκνα καὶ τάφους ἀπώλεσεν ἡ Δημοσθένους δωροδοκία καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον· (157) ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τοῖς σώμασιν οὐ παρεγένεσθε, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γε διανοίαις ἀποβλέψατ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς συμφοράς, καὶ νομίσαθ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἁλισκομένην πόλιν, τειχῶν κατασκαφάς, ἐμπρήσεις οἰκιῶν, ἀγομένας γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας εἰς δουλείαν, πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους, πρεσβύτιδας γυναῖκας ὀψὲ μεταμανθάνοντας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κλαίοντας, ἱκετεύοντας ὑμᾶς, ὀργιζομένους οὐ τοῖς τιμωρουμένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τούτων αἰτίοις, ἐπισκήπτοντας μηδενὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον στεφανοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην τὴν συμπαρακολουθοῦσαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φυλάξασθαι. (158) οὔτε γὰρ πόλις οὔτ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἰδιώτης οὐδεὶς πώποτε καλῶς ἀπήλλαξε Δημοσθένει συμβούλῳ χρησάμενος. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε εἰ ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς πορθμέας τοὺς εἰς Σαλαμῖνα πορθμεύοντας νόμον ἔθεσθε ἐάν τις αὐτῶν ἄκων ἐν τῷ πόρῳ πλοῖον ἀνατρέψῃ, τούτῳ μὴ ἐξεῖναι πάλιν πορθμεῖ γενέσθαι, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοσχεδιάζῃ εἰς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τὸν δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνατετροφότα, τοῦτον ἐάσετε πάλιν ἀπευθύνειν τὰ κοινά; Against Ctesiphon 3(156) No, in the name of Zeus and the gods, I beg you, men of Athens, do not set up a trophy to your own defeat in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus. Do not convict the Athenian people of madness (paranoia) in the presence of all of Greece. Do not remind the wretched Thebans, who were exiled because of him and who have been given refuge in our city, of their incurable and irreparable sufferings (kaka), when their temples and children and tombs have been destroyed by Demosthenes’ corruption (dōrodokia) and the king’s gold. (157) But since you were not there in person, witness their disasters with your mind’s eye and imagine that you can see their city being captured, the demolition of the walls, the burning of the houses, the women and children being led away to slavery, old men, old women learning late in life to forget their freedom, weeping, begging you, angry not at the people who were taking revenge on them but at the men responsible for these events, solemnly instructing you under no circumstances to crown the curse of Greece (tēs Hellados alitērios) but to be on your guard against the evil destiny (daimōn) and the bad luck (tychē) that dogs the man’s footsteps. (158) For no city nor private individual ever turned out well for relying on the advice of Demosthenes (symboulos). As for yourselves, men of Athens, in the case of ferrymen who carry people to Salamis, you passed a law that if any of them accidentally capsizes a boat during the crossing, he is barred from working as a ferryman again, to prevent anyone from taking chances with Greek lives; so are you not ashamed at the prospect of allowing this man, who has totally capsized Greece and our city, to steer public policy again? (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

The comparison between Demosthenes and Thersites, used to underscore the absurdity of the honour proposed for Demosthenes, is exceptionally vivid: it would be like the Homeric character of Thersites being crowned (3.231). Apart from the common

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personal attacks against Demosthenes’ private life, origins, occupation as a logographer or sexual depravities (3.171–174; cf. the paraleipsis41 in 3.51–53), culminating with the phrase “eloquent of speech, infamous of life” (3.174: δεινὸς λέγειν, κακὸς βιῶναι), there are also references to his undemocratic stance (3.168–170)42 and cowardice during the Battle of Chaeronea. The accusation of desertion (3.155: τὸν ἄνανδρον καὶ λελοιπότα τὴν τάξιν)43 is in absolute opposition with the honorary crown. Aeschines’ rhetoric is very forceful but, compared to Demosthenes’ On the Crown, falls short in terms of esteem. The speech is highly personal against Demosthenes and offers no alternatives, no vision for Athens.44 The court judgment was not based on the legal dimension; it was a purely political judgment (rein politische Entscheidung; Wankel 1976, 15). Demosthenes’ struggle for the primacy and scale of Athens won the moral justification that Aeschines’ prosecution lacked among his fellow citizens. The Athenians did not consider Demosthenes as the root of all evil, which is why they granted him the honour of delivering the funeral speech in honour of the fallen at Chaeronea. In an instance of eidōlopoiia, i.e. the presentation of deceased interlocutors (3.259; Usher 1999, 293), Aeschines addresses Themistocles and the Athenian ancestors of the Persian Wars, who would have vehemently opposed the conferral of an honour on Demosthenes:45 Against Ctesiphon 3(259) ὑμεῖς δὲ Δημοσθένην, οὐ κομίσαντα τὸ ἐκ Μήδων χρυσίον, ἀλλὰ δωροδοκήσαντα καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν κεκτημένον, χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ μέλλετε στεφανοῦν. Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τελευτήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων οὐκ οἴεσθε στενάξειν, εἰ ὁ μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ὁμολογῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀντιπράττειν στεφανωθήσεται; Against Ctesiphon 3(259) But you are proposing to give a golden crown to Demosthenes, who did not bring gold from the Medes but took bribes from them (dōrodokein) and still has the money even now. Don’t you think Themistocles and the men who died at Marathon and Plataea and the

|| 41 Paraleipsis (praeteritio), whereby the orator, while touching upon the key points, refrains from expounding on a topic and facilitates the transition to a different one. See H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study, Leiden 1998, 393–394. 42 See Wankel (1976) 655. 43 Cf. 3.159; 3.175–176; 3.181; 3.187; 3.244; 3.253. On the charge and its interpretation, see Lane Fox (1994) 135–155; Buckler (2000) 147; Yunis (2001) 245 and particularly M.R. Christ, The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2006, 132–142. 44 See, already, Schaefer (1966–1967) III 251, who wonders why Aeschines conceals his political beliefs and does not openly argue in favour of friendship with the Macedonian king. Cf. Harris (1995) 142: “without a vision of Athens’ future”; Usher (1999) 293. 45 Cf. F. Hobden, Imagining Past and Present. A Rhetorical Strategy in Aeschines 3, Against Ctesiphon, CQ 57 (2007) 490–501; M. Edwards, Hypokrites in Action. Delivery in Greek rhetoric, in: C. Kremmydas et al. (eds.), Profession and Performance. Aspects of Oratory in the Greco-Roman World, London 2013, 21–22; G. Westwood, The Orator and the Ghosts. Performing the Past in Fourth-Century Athens, in: Papaioannou et al. (2017) 57–74, esp. 61 ff.

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very graves of our ancestors will groan aloud, if a man who admits to plotting with the barbarians against the Greeks receives a crown? (Transl. C. Carey 2000)

Demosthenes seized the argument and swore an oath with even greater passion to the dead of the Persian Wars, who served as models for the fight for liberty (18.208).46  Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon was an exceptional speech, but Demosthenes’ On the Crown was even better. The political agōn logōn ended in Demosthenes’ favour, and Aeschines could no longer remain in Athens.

7.3 Style Dionysius of Halicarnassus believed that Aeschines was second to none, save Demosthenes: Dion. Hal. Demosth. 35 (p. 206 Us.-Rad.) ὧν ἦν Αἰσχίνης ὁ ῥήτωρ, ἀνὴρ λαμπροτάτῃ φύσει περὶ λόγους χρησάμενος, ὃς οὐ πολὺ ἂν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων καὶ μετὰ Δημοσθένην μηδενὸς δεύτερος ἀριθμεῖσθαι. Dion. Hal. Demosth. 35 (p. 206 Us.-Rad.) One of these was the orator Aeschines, a man with a brilliant natural talent for speaking, who, it is thought, would probably have been comparable in ability with the other orators, and second to none after Demosthenes. (Transl. S. Usher 1974– 1985)

This assessment also confirms the anecdote ‒ encountered frequently and in various versions in bibliographical sources ‒ concerning Aeschines’ rhetorical skill as well as the admiration he himself expressed for the rhetorical prowess of his opponent, Demosthenes ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 840D–E; Vit. Aeschin. 3.3–4, p. 5–6 Dilts; Cic. De or. 3.213). His activity as an actor undoubtedly helped him cultivate his natural rhetorical talent: memory, body language, voice, performance.47 However, his written rhetorical skills must not be underestimated; his rhetorical prowess is formidable (Görgemanns 1987, 148). According to Philostratus (Vit. soph. 1.482 Kayser), it is precisely because he wished for his legacy not to fall short of the elaborate speeches of Demosthenes || 46 See Yunis (2001) 226. Cf. L. Pernot, L’Ombre du Tigre. Recherches sur la réception de Démosthène, Naples 2006, 178 ff. 47 Cf. Aeschin. 2.157; 3.21; 3.228; Demosth. 18.129; 18.259–260; 18.308; 19.199; 19.216. See also P. Ghiron-Bistagne, Recherches sur les acteurs dans la Grèce ancienne, Paris 1976, 158–159; E. Hall, Lawcourt Dramas. The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory, BICS 40 (1995) 46–49; Fisher (2001) 15; Worthington (2013) 152. On the similarities between performance in the theatrical stage and in the law courts, see A. Duncan, Performance and Identity in the Classical World, Cambridge 2006, 58–89; E. Hall, The Theatrical Cast of Athens. Interactions between Ancient Greek Drama and Society, Oxford 2006, 383–386; Papaioannou et al. (2017); A. Serafim, Attic Oratory and Performance, New York/London 2017. On Aeschines’ oral delivery as assessed by Demosthenes, see V. Schulz, Die Stimme in der antiken Rhetorik, Göttingen 2014, 87–89.

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that he left behind him only such speeches as he had composed with care (ἵνα τῶν Δημοσθένους φροντισμάτων μὴ πολλῷ λείποιτο; cf. Usher 1999, 279–280). This does not mean that Aeschines, being naturally gifted, aimed at stylistically delicate rhetoric characterised by artful and complex rhetorical figures; his assiduity mainly aims at clarity (saphēneia)48 which, as a rhetorical technique, is considered a fundamental merit of his style (Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.510 Kayser: σαφηνείας φῶς; Dio Chr. 18.11; Photius Bibl. 61.20b 8–10; Bibl. 264.490a 35–37: γλυκύς τε καὶ καθαρὸς καὶ εὐκρινὴς καὶ τῇ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων σαφηνείᾳ σεμνυνόμενος). The two different aspects of his rhetorical prowess are distinctly Aeschinean: sublimity and grandeur on one hand, forcefulness, vehemence and harshness on the other (Philostr. Vit. soph. 1.510 Kayser: ἁβρὰ σεμνολογία καὶ τὸ ἐπίχαρι σὺν δεινότητι; Dion. Hal. De imit. 31.5.5, p. 212 Us.-Rad.: πομπικὸς ἅμα καὶ δεινός … σφοδρός; Cic. Orat. 110: splendore verborum; De or. 3.28: sonitum Aeschines; De opt. gen. or. 17: acer et doctus; Photius Bibl. 61.20b 1–2: τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὴν σεμνότητα τῶν πλασμάτων).49 Aeschines masterfully uses figures as asyndeton, polysyndeton (3.4; 3.8), poetic words (1.158: ἀκλεέστατα; 2.180: ἀείμνηστος; 3.77: βουθυτεῖν; 3.228: κηλεῖν; 3.245: πανύστατος), metaphors (2.183; 3.69; 3.191), maxims (gnōmai) (1.48: οὕτω γὰρ χρὴ καθαρὸν εἶναι τὸν βίον τοῦ σώφρονος ἀνδρός, ὥστε μηδ’ ἐπιδέχεσθαι δόξαν αἰτίας πονηρᾶς; 2.149: τὸ γὰρ ψευδὲς ὄνειδος οὐ περαιτέρω τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀφικνεῖται; 3.133) and poetic quotations50 in service of the grandeur of the speech. This style, characterised by beautiful and fine-sounding words, bears some similarity to Isocrates’ style (Kindstrand 1982, 33). The proems to the speeches Against Timarchus (1) and Against Ctesiphon (3) contain a tragic element alongside moral decorum. Generally speaking, Aeschines shows a tendency towards exaggeration (Blass 1887–1898, III,2 230; see 2.159; 3.212; 3.253) that can lead to the other extreme: his characteristic, extreme severity is deployed in attacks against his enemies, with almost every reference to Demosthenes being accompanied by a denigrating term originating from comedy (κέρκωψ, παιπάλημα, παλίμβολον, κίναιδος, ἀνδρόγυνος, θηρίον, κίναδος, κάθαρμα, κόλαξ, δείλαιος, μισότεκνος, πατὴρ πονηρός).51 Aeschines’ strength is not based on logical, evidentiary arguments, but on the imposing presen-

|| 48 See C.W. Wooten, Clarity and Obscurity in the Speeches of Aeschines, AJPh 109 (1988) 40–43. 49 See Kindstrand (1982) 65: “Striving for what is stately and grand, which contrasts with the emotional and violent side of his style”. 50 Aeschines includes various quotations from Homer, Hesiod and Euripides in his speeches: 1.128– 129; 1.141–153; 2.158; 3.135; 3.184–185. Cf. Perlman (1964) 156–172; Easterling (1999) 154–166; Ford (1999) 231–256; M. Edwards, The Orators and Greek Drama, in: A. Markantonatos/E. Volonaki (eds.), Poet and Orator. A Symbiotic Relationship in Democratic Athens, Berlin/Boston 2019, 330–331. 51 Cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,2 226–227; Usher (1999) 294–295. On the personal element cf. T.B.L. Webster, Art and Literature in Fourth-Century Athens, London 1954, 98–100.

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tation and exuberance of his expression. Powerful figures of speech, such as the combination of anaphora, antistrophē (or epiphora), asyndeton and homoioteleuton (3.202: ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καλεῖς, ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καλεῖς, ἐπὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καλεῖς),52 frequent questions and answers (1.28–29; cf. 3.186), emotional apostrophes towards the judges (2.152; 2.180 ff.) or passionate descriptions and visual imagination (O’Connell 2017, 128–130), such as the destruction of Thebes (3.157: κλαίοντας, ἱκετεύοντας ὑμᾶς, ὀργιζομένους; cf. 3.137; 3.160; “Don’t you think the graves of our ancestors will groan aloud [stenaxein]” in 3.259 is highly characteristic), are indicative of rhetorical prowess similar to that of Demosthenes. This similarity becomes readily apparent in passages that give the impression of a crowded canvas (Pearson 1975, 229; see 2.70–71; 3.3–4). However, it must be stressed that Aeschines does not systematically serve this type of rhetoric, and this is why his oratory appears less vivid and evocative at times than that of his opponent (cf. Dion. Hal. De imit. 31.5.5, p. 212 Us.-Rad.: ἀτονώτερος μὲν τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ; cf. Hermog. De id. 2.11, p. 399 Rabe: ἀμελέστερος δὲ καὶ ἀτονώτερός πως). Aeschines avoids hiatus, but not as systematically as once claimed (on this matter, see Dilts 1994, 367 ff.), and seems to prefer the figure kata arsin kai thesin (negation and affirmation) (1.3: οὔθ’ ἡ πόλις αἰτία οὖσα Τιμάρχῳ οὔθ’ οἱ νόμοι οὔθ’ ὑμεῖς οὔτ’ ἐγώ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἑαυτῷ; 1.5; 2.43; 2.155; 3.220). Photius’ following remarks concerning Aeschines’ style are highly accurate: Photius Bibl. 61.20b ἔστι δὲ ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ὥσπερ αὐτοφυὴς καὶ αὐτοσχέδιος, οὐ τοσοῦτον διδοὺς τὴν τέχνην ἀποθαυμάζειν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὅσον τὴν φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὅσα δεινότητος ἔχεται, ταῦτα ἔστιν εὑρεῖν παρὰ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἃ φύσεως μᾶλλόν ἐστι δείγματα. περί τε γὰρ τὴν ὀνομασίαν ἐστὶν ἀφελὴς καὶ εὔσημος, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων σύνθεσιν οὔτε ἄγαν ἄτονος ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης, οὔτε πεπιεσμένος καὶ συνεσφιγμένος ὥσπερ ὁ Λυσίας· πνεύματι δὲ καὶ τόνῳ οὐδὲν Δημοσθένους ἀπολείπει· σχήματι δὲ κέχρηται διανοίας τε καὶ λέξεως, οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τι σὺν τέχνῃ λέγειν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι. διὸ καὶ ἀπανοῦργός πως ὁ λόγος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ὡς τὰς ἐν πλήθει ῥητορείας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους μάλιστα ἐμπρέπων· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρήμασιν οὐδὲ ἐνθυμήμασι συνεχής τις καὶ λίαν ἐκβεβιασμένος. Photius Bibl. 61.20b His style is as it were spontaneous (autophyēs) and impromptu (autoschedios), inviting admiration not so much for his art as for his natural talent (physis). In his speeches one can find all the signs of rhetorical power (deinotēs) and all the indications which are more a mark of natural ability. In the choice of words he is simple and clear, while the structure of the speeches is not lacking in energy, as in Isocrates, nor compressed and suffocated, as in Lysias. In spirit and virgour he does not fall short of Demosthenes. He employs figures of thought and speech not to give an appearance of art but to meet the requirements of the underlying facts. So his style has an uncomplicated air (apanourgos), very suitable both for addresses to the public and for private occasions. His demonstrations and methods of argumentation are used intermittently and without being unduly forced. (Transl. N.G. Wilson 1994)

|| 52 The passage is quoted by Demetrius (On Style 268) as another example of deinotēs.

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7.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception Ten medieval manuscripts serve as the codices primarii of the manuscript transmission of Aeschines53 and all other codices depend on them. Six of these (β) comprise the standard medieval tradition (Diller 1979, 35) and derive from a common archetype: Angelicus 44 (a, 13th c.), Vaticanus 64 (V, 1269/1270 AD), Parisinus suppl. 660 (x, 14th c.), Parisinus 3003 (m, 15th c.), Parisinus 2930 (g, 15th c.), Laurentianus 57.45 (L, 15th c.). These are joined by Coislinianus 249 (f, 10th c.), Ambrosianus G 69 sup. (409) (D, 15th c.), particularly for Aeschines’ first speech, Parisinus 2998 (k, 13/14th c.) for the second and third speech, and Parisinus 2996 (i, 13th c.) only for the second speech. This is an open tradition and none of the ten independent primary codices is superior. Despite Demosthenes’ attacks and harsh apostrophes during a long political struggle, he himself acknowledges the strength of Aeschines’ voice (18.313: λαμπροφωνότατος; 19.126: εὔφωνος) and his rhetorical skills in general (18.242: δεινότης; 19.126: σοφὸς καὶ δεινός), and verifies the grandeur and solemnity of his speeches with an ironic or even critical undertone (18.133: σεμνολόγου; 19.255: σεμνολογεῖ).54 The engagement of Demetrius of Phalerum (Vit. Aeschin. 3.6, p. 6 Dilts) and Hermippus (Vit. Aeschin. 3.7, p. 6 Dilts = FGrH 1026 F85 with commentary p. 562–569) with Aeschines appears to have been biographical in interest. Didymus wrote a commentary on his speeches,55 but Aeschines began to enjoy genuine acclaim mainly among literary critics and Atticists. Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives a positive account of Aeschines, whereby Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines provided the best examples of practical rhetoric

|| 53 See M. Heyse, Über die Abhängigkeit einiger jüngerer Aeschineshandschriften, Bunzlau 1904; M. Heyse, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Reden des Aeschines. Erster Teil: Die Handschriften der ersten Rede, Ohlau 1912; H. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 267–268; R. Roncali, Lista die manoscritti di Eschine Licurgo Lisia, Bari, Università, Facoltà di lettere e filosofia, Annali 14 (1969) 381–387; Diller (1979) 34–64; Dilts (1997) vii-xxiii (and the review by M. Weissenberger, Gnomon 73, 2001, 14–17). 50 papyri must be added to these (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue). Cf. H. Wankel, Zum Aischinestext (mit den neuen Papyri), ZPE 113 (1996) 27–34; G. Martino, Sul testo di Eschine, SIFC 93 (2000) 71–98; M.R. Dilts, Ancient Variants in the Manuscripts of Aeschines, in: C.-F. Collatz et al. (eds.), Dissertatiunculae criticae. Festschrift für Günther Christian Hansen, Würzburg 1998, 39–51; E. Esposito, Aeschines, in: Commentaria et lexica Graeca in papyris reperta (CLGP), I.1.1 (Aeschines Alcaeus), Leipzig 2004, 3–11. 54 See Kindstrand (1982) 17–23; Usher (1999) 294 with note 37. 55 See Cohn (1903) 458–459; B.K. Braswell, Didymos of Alexandria Commentary on Pindar. Edited and Translated with Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and a Critical Catalogue of Didymos’ Works, Basel 2013, 80–81; E. Dickey, The Sources of our Knowledge of Ancient Scholarship, in: F. Montanari et al. (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship, Leiden/Boston 2015, 510. 

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(Dion. Hal. Isae. 20, p. 124 Us.-Rad.: τελειοτάτη ῥητορικὴ καὶ τὸ κράτος τῶν ἐναγωνίων λόγων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔοικεν εἶναι; De ant. or. pr. 4, p. 7 Us.-Rad.: Δημοσθένης Ὑπερείδης Αἰσχίνης, οὓς ἐγὼ τῶν ἄλλων ἡγοῦμαι κρατίστους; cf. Blass 1887–1898 III,2 188). Dionysius focuses on Aeschines’ brilliant natural gifts (Demosth. 35, p. 206 Us.-Rad.: λαμπροτάτῃ φύσει). Comparing his speech to that of Demosthenes (De imit. 31.5.5, p. 212 Us.-Rad.) he considers it less forceful (ἀτονώτερος), but considers his choice of vocabulary magnificent and highly skilful (πομπικὸς ἅμα καὶ δεινός). At this point, too, he favours natural skill (καὶ οὐ πάνυ μὲν ἔντεχνος, τῇ δὲ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εὐχερείᾳ κεχορηγημένος). He may have actually written a special treatise on Aeschines, but it is sadly lost. Cicero translated Aeschines’ speech Against Ctesiphon (3) alongside Demosthenes’ On the Crown (18) into Latin and called them “the most famous orations of the two most eloquent Attic orators” (De opt. gen. or. 14; cf. De rep. 4.11.13: vir eloquentissimus). Aeschines was included in the canon of the ten Attic Orators, and Caecilius of Calacte in Sicily wrote a Synkrisis of Demosthenes and Aeschines (Suda κ 1165 s.v.). Aeschines’ recognition as an orator is attested by the favourable assessments of Quintilian (Inst. or. 10.1.77; 12.10.23), Dio Chrysostom (18.11) and Philostratus (Vit. soph. 1.510 Kayser). From the rich Scholia (Dilts 1992) it is concluded that Aeschines was widely read in the Byzantine period. This is indirectly proven by Photius, who states that some called Aeschines’ three speeches “graces” (charites) due to the charm of their style and their number (Bibl. 61.20a). The sole exception is Hermogenes, whose stylistic critique of Aeschines is ultimately unfavourable (De id. 2.11, p. 399 Rabe); he considers Aeschines’ style to be pompous and excessive (σοφιστικὸς καὶ γαῦρος), using grandeur and the sort of beauty that is produced by figures; while he depends quite a lot on the style that reveals a modest character, there is an absence of confidence and sincerity (διὰ τὸ μὴ πεποιθότως μηδὲ ἀληθινῶς προφέρεσθαι τὸν λόγον).56 According to the above, A. Lesky’s aphorism (1966, 608) regarding Aeschines, i.e. that “Demosthenes’ most violent opponent, was borne into history in the latter’s wake; otherwise this politician and orator would not have caused much of a stir”, is a black-and-white approach inconsonant with Aeschines’ rhetorical and political importance. His critical assessment as a politician seems to have affected his evaluation as an orator, and both are integrally linked with the corresponding assessment of his opponent. It is no accident that Α. Schaefer (1966–1967, Ι 258), in reference to Hermogenes, disparages Aeschines and claims that his words lack truth. Nevertheless, the present-day assessment of Aeschines must be much more detached: Aeschines was a formidable orator, exceptionally gifted by nature, but faced with an even more formidable opponent. For proponents of rhetorical and political confrontation, the compe-

|| 56 See Kindstrand (1982) 48–55.

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tition between the two is a blessing, as are the extant pairs of speeches. Their juxtaposition reflects an exceptional agōn logōn between two supreme orators-politicians involved in the politics of the era. Aeschines and Demosthenes came of age within the Athenian democracy and addressed the same Athenian audience, striving to persuade the public of two different political models, with various degrees of success. Both are characterised by the polarising rhetoric and politics of the 4th century BC, which were interdependent with their mercurial audience. The fact that they were frequently called upon, whether jointly or separately, to represent Athenian interests is proof of the leading role both men played. Aeschines was a patriot who served the interests of his city from his own perspective and with a plan which, like that of Isocrates, aimed at reaching a compromise with Macedon. From a realistic perspective and seen post eventum, this plan was more successful than Demosthenes’ military plan, but it neither enthused his fellow citizens nor was equal to the historic tradition of Athens. Ultimately, I must agree with E.M. Harris (1995, 148): “Yet whatever his shortcomings, Aeschines certainly did not deserve to be grouped with those who had betrayed the freedom of the Greeks”.

8 Isaeus 8.1 Life Biographical information concerning Isaeus, the “legal expert” among the Attic orators (Edwards 2007, 2), is rather scant. This may be explained by the fact that Isaeus did not engage in any political activity, and there are no speeches concerning his own private suits. Like Antiphon and Lysias, he was a professional logographer (Jebb 1893, II 265). The sources available regarding his life is a text by Dionysius of Halicarnassus titled Isaeus, the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 839E–F), Harpocration (s.v. Isaios), a Vita of the manuscripts (Genos Isaiou), entries in Photius (Bibl. 263) and the Suda (ι 620 s.v. Isaios). The origin of certain information is attributed to Hermippus of Smyrna and Demetrius of Magnesia (Harpocr. l.c.). The dates of his birth and death are unknown. His earliest extant speech (5) is dated to 389 BC, while his latest (12) to 344/343 BC, therefore he must have been born between 415 and 410 BC. His father’s name was Diagoras. Dionysius of Halicarnassus is unable to decide (Isae. 1, p. 93 Us.-Rad.: ὡς μέν τινες ἱστοροῦσιν, Ἀθηναῖος ἦν τὸ γένος, ὡς δ᾽ ἕτεροι γράφουσι, Χαλκιδεύς) whether Isaeus hailed from Athens or from Chalcis in Euboea (cf. Harpocr. s.v. Isaios). Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. dec. or. 839E) notes he was Chalcidian by birth and later came to Athens. It is likely that Isaeus, like Lysias, was a metic and therefore did not become involved in politics.1 The duration of his activity as a logographer (between 390 and 340 BC) tallies with the information that he was a pupil of Isocrates and a teacher of Demosthenes (according to Hermippus,2 as recounted by Dion. Hal. Isae. 1, p. 93 Us.-Rad: διήκουσε μὲν Ἰσοκράτους καθηγήσατο δὲ Δημοσθένους; cf. [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839F; 844B–C; Plut. Demosth. 5.6). Demosthenes’ speeches claiming his estate prove the close relationship between Isaeus and Demosthenes, who adopted his rules for logographic activity. In fact, it is reported that the orator Pytheas, a rival of Demosthenes, accused the latter of having devoured the whole of Isaeus, including his rhetorical technique (Dion. Hal. Isae. 4, p. 96–97 Us.-Rad.: τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐκείνου τέχνας σεσίτισται) or, according to others, that Isaeus himself wrote the speeches concerning Demosthenes’ patrimony ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839F). On the other hand, the information that Isaeus associated with philosophers (Dion. Hal. Isae. 1, p. 94 Us.Rad.: συνεγένετο δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν φιλοσόφων) is questionable and, due to the orator’s profile, it is unlikely that this was for the purpose of philosophical training.

|| 1 See Blass (1887–1898) II 487; Weissenberger (2005) 949; for a reserved view, see Edwards (2007) 1. 2 FGrH 1026 F45 with the commentary by J. Bollansée, p. 378–382. Cf. J. Bollansée, Hermippos of Smyrna and his Biographical Writings. A Reappraisal, Leuven 1999, 87 ff.; J. Engels, Antike Überlieferungen über die Schüler des Isokrates, in: W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates. Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers, Trier 2003, 185–186. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-008

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8.2 Work 8.2.1 Contract Οratory Isaeus is the pre-eminent example of professional judicial rhetoric, which casts a light on the civic habits of the litigious Athenians of the era. The rhetorical prowess of a logographer adheres to the rules of the Athenian democracy of the courts and, therefore, his success depends on the successful outcome for his clients. His speeches do not portray conflicting political aspects of Athenian foreign policy, as in the case of Demosthenes and Aeschines, but rather everyday life in Athenian society in its various forms. Rhetoric is in the service of society as a whole when it defends the rights of a party in legal proceedings. The ethical dimension of such a rhetorical success of contracts does not appear to have been a question for Isaeus himself, but was of concern to his contemporaries and remains a concern in the present. The starting point for reflection can be found in the remarks by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whereby Isaeus’ contemporaries accused him of chicanery and deception, i.e. that he attempted to deceive judges using any means, and that his speeches gave rise to the suspicion of guile instead of truth and justice: Dion. Hal. Isae. 3 (p. 96 Us.-Rad.) καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀντίδικον διαπονηρεύεται, τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς καταστρατηγεῖ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ παντὸς πειρᾶται βοηθεῖν. Dion. Hal. Isae. 3 (p. 96 Us.-Rad.) He blackens his opponent’s character, outgenerals the jury with his stratagems and tries by every means to help his client’s case. (Transl. S. Usher 1974– 1985) Dion. Hal. Isae. 4 (p. 96–97 Us.-Rad.) ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξα παρὰ τοῖς τότε γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης, ὡς δεινὸς ἁνὴρ τεχνιτεῦσαι λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο διεβάλλετο. δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν ἀρχαίων τις ῥητόρων ἐν τῇ Δημοσθένους κατηγορίᾳ Πυθέας, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. πονηρίαν γὰρ τῷ Δημοσθένει καὶ κακίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πᾶσαν ἐνοικεῖν φήσας, κατὰ τόδε τὸ μέρος οἷον εἰς διαβολὴν ἐπιτίθησιν, ὅτι τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐκείνου τέχνας σεσίτισται. καὶ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τὴν διαβολὴν ταύτην εἶχεν ἑκάτερος. ἐμοὶ γοῦν οἱ μὲν Ἰσαίου τε καὶ Δημοσθένους λόγοι, κἂν περὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ δικαίας συνταχθῶσιν ὑποθέσεις, ὕποπτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῆς πολλῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως ἕνεκα, οἱ δὲ Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Λυσίου παντὸς μάλιστα δίκαιοί τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς, κἂν μὴ τοιαῦτα τὰ πράγματα ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι κακοῦργον οὐδὲν ἐπιφαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν ἐλεύθεροί τινες καὶ ἀφελεῖς. Dion. Hal. Isae. 4 (p. 96–97 Us.-Rad.) Isaeus had a reputation among his contemporaries for chicanery (goēteia) and deception (apatē), and for being clever at devising speeches for the worse cause, and was accused of doing so. This charge is proved, in my opinion, by Pytheas, one of the early orators, in his prosecution of Demosthenes. After saying that all the villainy of the human race resided in that orator, he confirms his point by adding, as a further jibe, that Demosthenes had digested the whole of Isaeus, including his rhetorical technique (technai). And indeed this charge was not wide of the mark in the case of both these orators: for even when the cases they are presenting are genuine and just, the speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes seem to me at least

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to be suspect because of their great rhetorical skill (epitechnēsis); whereas those of Isocrates and Lysias seem the most genuine and just of all, even when the facts of the case suggest otherwise, because they display nothing malicious in their presentation, but are straightforward and simple. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985) Dion. Hal. Isae. 16 (p. 114 Us.-Rad.) τοῦ Λυσίου μὲν δή τις ἀναγινώσκων τὰς διηγήσεις οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπολάβοι λέγεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην ἢ πονηρίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια φέρει, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν τῆς τέχνης, ὅτι τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν Ἰσαίου διηγημάτων τοὐναντίον ἂν πάθοι, μηδὲν ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτοφυῶς καὶ ἀπραγματεύτως λέγεσθαι μηδ᾽ εἴ τινα ὡς ἔτυχε γενόμενα εἴρηται, ἐκ κατασκευῆς δὲ πάντα καὶ μεμηχανημένα πρὸς ἀπάτην ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ κακουργίαν. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἂν καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ λέγοντι πιστεύσειεν ἄν, τῷ δὲ μηδ᾽ ἂν ἀληθεύῃ, χωρὶς ὑποψίας προσέξει. Dion. Hal. Isae. 16 (p. 114 Us.-Rad.) Any reader of Lysias’ narratives would suppose that no art or dishonesty had gone into their composition, but they are written in accordance with nature and truth. He would not know that this illusion is itself the product of an art whose greatest achievement was to imitate nature. In the case of Isaeus’ narratives he would receive the opposite impression, that not a single statement was spontaneous or unconsidered, not even when it described something as it actually happened, but that everything was artfully designed and contrived to mislead (apatē), of for some other sinister purpose (kakourgia). Thus a mendacious client of Lysias might be believed, whereas a client of Isaeus, even if he speaks the truth, will not be heard without suspicion. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

This assessment does not criticise the genre of judicial rhetoric as a whole, but Isaeus specifically and, by extension, Demosthenes, contrary to the simple and natural speeches of Lysias, to whose style there is similarity, although Dionysius also identifies differences: the judicial speeches of Lysias and Isocrates, even in problematic cases, exude natural honesty, whereas the speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes, even when the cases are just and true, raise suspicion due to their rhetorical contrivances. These views affected the evaluation of Isaeus as an “immoral logographer” who abuses the law until recently, as in the case of the commentary of W. Wyse (1904) containing strong scepticism. However, modern scholarship on Isaeus follows a different, less biased direction, with more balanced evaluations of his logographic activity, removed from a polarising black-and-white approach. An attempt is made to strike a balance between the actual facts, Attic law and the rhetorical art: on the one hand, Isaeus is a primary source on Attic law, particularly inheritance law, familial relations and social life in Athens, while on the other he earns a particular place in the development of rhetoric (Griffith-Williams 2013).3 Through a style of rhetoric that aims at persuading judges

|| 3 The commentary by B. Griffith-Williams addresses speeches 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Isaeus, which were written for diadikasiai, i.e. legal proceedings in an inheritance dispute with no prosecutor and defendant, where numerous individuals raise claims on the inheritance; cf. [Demosth.] 43.7–8 and 48.29–30. On the recent, more positive assessment of Isaeus, see Avramović (1997); Ferrucci (1998); Cobetto Ghiggia (2002); Ferrucci (2005); Edwards (2006) 67–80; (2007); (2008) 41–54; R. Hatzilambrou,

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and is familiar with their psychology, Isaeus takes particular account of the third type of Aristotelian technical proofs (entechnoi pisteis), emotions (pathē), considers the judges’ biases and plays a clearly defined role, without any moral assessments. G. Kennedy (1963, 141) is correct: “His sole object is to solve a rhetorical and legal problem, to effect persuasion out of given materials”.4

8.2.2 The Speeches According to Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. dec. or. 839F), Isaeus left behind him 64 speeches, of which 50 were genuine, as well rhetorical handbooks (technai). There is no further information on the rhetorical handbooks; of his speeches, almost all the titles are known, ten are extant in full, No 11 survives in fragmented form, while of the excerpts of the remaining speeches, Dionysius of Halicarnassus transmitted the longest one (Isae. 17, p. 116–120 Us.-Rad.) from the speech On Behalf of Euphiletus. In modern editions it is numbered as No 12. Isocrates highlights the superiority of his epideictic speeches in terms of their form, subject-matter and social benefit, dismissively noting (4.11; 15.38; 15.276) those orators who write judicial speeches and live off private disputes (apo tōn symbolaiōn). Isaeus was such an orator: his logographic activity exclusively served practical purposes of livelihood, and his speeches belong to the judicial genre (Dion. Hal. Isae. 2, p. 94 Us.-Rad.: γένους μὲν δὴ λόγων ἑνὸς ἀσκητὴς ἐγένετο τοῦ δικανικοῦ). Almost all his extant speeches (1–11), save one (12), concern inheritance disputes. However, the speech On Behalf of Euphiletus (12) and the excerpts of non-extant speeches indicate that Isaeus also had other legal interests. Euphiletus took legal action against the deme of Erchia on the ground that he was unjustly excluded from the citizenship.5 From the other 11 extant speeches appearing at the top of the list, it emerges that Isaeus had specialised in inheritance matters (klērikoi logoi) at the centre of a number of legal proceedings, with variety in the types of suit (1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10: diadikasiai [“actual inheritance claims”]; 2, 3, 6: pseudomartyriai [“prosecutions for false testimony”]; 5: dikē engyēs [“prosecution of a surety”]; 11: eisangelia kakōseōs orphanou

|| Abuse of Inheritance Law in Isaios?, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 336–351. 4 See also B. Griffith-Williams, Would I Lie to You? Narrative and Performance in Isaios 6, in: S. Papaioannou et al. (eds.), The Theatre of Justice. Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric, Leiden/Boston 2017, 56: “An Athenian trial was a competition between opposing litigants, won by the side that put forward the more persuasive version of events”. Cf. Wevers 1969, 95; Hatzilambrou (2014) 137–166. 5 Cf. A. Wolpert/K. Kapparis, Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens. Sources for Athenian History, Indianapolis 2011, 73–74. See Kapparis (2005) 71–113 in general.

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[“prosecution for maltreatment of an orphan”]). Their subject-matter is somewhat complex and requires specialised legal knowledge.6 Isaeus serves as a rich source on legal disputes. His speeches touch upon issues such as the validity of wills, legitimate and illegitimate family members, the claims of heirs, the legitimacy of testamentary or inter vivos adoption, the intentions of deceased individuals. 8.2.2.1 On the Estate of Cleonymus (1) - On the Estate of Menecles (2) - On the Estate of Ciron (8) - On the Estate of Hagnias (11) From a modern perspective, one is struck by ancient legal conditions and wonders which arguments could be used to contest the validity of a will.7 A prime example is the well-prepared speech On the Estate of Cleonymus (1),8 written for the testator’s two uterine nephews. Due to their close familial relation to the testator, the nephews raised a claim against their opponents, who similarly support their claim on a will drafted in their favour. Isaeus searches for “the will behind the will” (Wohl 2010, 262), i.e. he does not question the authenticity of the will, but exhorts the judges to pass a ruling not on the basis of the actual will but of the intentions of the testator, which are identified as his general attitude towards his relatives and, therefore, his desire not to injure them (1.12–13, esp. 13: καίτοι χρὴ θεωρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἔργων μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκ τῶν διαθηκῶν). The contrast between the actual will and the testator’s general intentions towards his relatives, which are called upon to supersede any will, is clear in the following characteristic passages from the speech. In fact, in the first excerpt (1.17) the speaker considers that, if familial closeness and love towards the deceased are given priority, no other arguments need be advanced regarding the justified claims to an estate (cf. Usher 1999, 130):9 On the Estate of Cleonymus 1(17) ἡγοῦμαι μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, πᾶσι τοῖς τῶν κλήρων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὅταν ἀποφήνωσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῷ γένει προτέρους ὄντας καὶ τῇ φιλίᾳ τῇ πρὸς τὸν τετελευτηκότα, περίεργον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους λόγους λέγειν. On the Estate of Cleonymus 1(17) I think then, gentlemen, that when anyone laying claim to an estate can prove, as we can, that they are nearer the deceased both in kinship and in friendship, it is superfluous to advance other arguments. (Transl. M. Edwards 2007)

|| 6 On the legal stake of these trials, see Edwards (2007) 5–10; Griffith-Williams (2013) 3–25. 7 Cf. Wevers (1969) 107. On the problems relating to the validity of wills, see M. Hardcastle, Some Non-legal Arguments in Athenian Inheritance Cases, Prudentia 12 (1980) 11–22; Avramović (1997) 54 ff.; Christ (1998) 222–223; Lanni (2005) 117; (2006) 51; M. Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge 2008, 200–201 and particularly Wohl (2010) 257–268. 8 Greek text used: Forster (1927). 9 Cf. J.M. Lawless, Law, Argument and Equity in the Speeches of Isaeus, Diss. Brown Univ. 1991. See also Christ (1998) 194 ff.; Edwards (2010) 168.

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On the Estate of Cleonymus 1(41) χρὴ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἀλήθειαν, ὅπερ ποιεῖτε, τοῖς κατὰ γένος ψηφίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ διαθήκην ἀμφισβητοῦσι. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γένους οἰκειότητα πάντες ἐπιστάμενοι τυγχάνετε, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ψεύσασθαι· διαθήκας δ᾽ ἤδη πολλοὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπέφηναν, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν οὐ γενομένας, ἐνίων δ᾽ οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένων. (42) καὶ νῦν ὑμεῖς τὴν μὲν συγγένειαν καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν ἡμετέραν, οἷς ἡμεῖς ἀγωνιζόμεθα, ἅπαντες ἐπίστασθε· τὰς δὲ διαθήκας, αἷς οὗτοι πιστεύοντες ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν, οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν οἶδε κυρίας γενομένας. ἔπειτα τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν συγγένειαν εὑρήσετε καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀντιδίκων ὁμολογουμένην, τὰς δὲ διαθήκας ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀμφισβητουμένας· οὗτοι γὰρ τὸ ἀνελεῖν αὐτὰς ἐκείνου βουλομένου διεκώλυσαν. On the Estate of Cleonymus (1.41) You should vote, gentlemen, as you do, on grounds of kinship and the true facts of the case in favor of those whose claims are based on kinship (genos) rather than a will (diathēkē). You all know the connection of kinship, and it’s impossible to lie about this to you, but many before now have produced false wills, some of them complete forgeries, some made by people who were misguided. (42) In this case you all know the kinship and relationship on which we base our claim, but none of you knows that the will is valid on which our opponents rely in falsely accusing us. Moreover, you will find that our kinship is admitted even by our opponents, yet the will is contested by us, since they prevented its annulment when he wanted this. (Transl. M. Edwards 2007)

The speech On the Estate of Menecles (2) was written in defence of an adoption inter vivos, not by will, against the claims of a brother of the deceased.10 The opponent contends that the adoption is invalid because his brother, Menecles, was not in full possession of his faculties or had been influenced by a woman when he wrote it (2.1: παρανοῶν ἢ γυναικὶ πειθόμενος; 2.19; cf. [Demosth.] 46.14). Isaeus defends the validity of the adoption using eikos-arguments: Menecles lived for a further 23 years after the adoption and never regretted his action (2.15); even the speaker’s opponents affirm his claim, as they clearly treated him as Menecles’ son (2.38–40):11 On the Estate of Menecles 2(38) ὅτι τοίνυν ὁ Μενεκλῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐποιήσατό με οὐ παρανοῶν οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πειθόμενος, βούλομαι ὑμῖν καὶ αὐτοὺς τούτους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι, [καὶ] ἐμοὶ μαρτυροῦντας ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ λόγῳ, ἐξ ὧν ἔπραξαν αὐτοί, ὅτι ἐγὼ τἀληθῆ λέγω. τὰς γὰρ διαλύσεις φαίνονται πρὸς ἐμὲ ποιησάμενοι ἀμφότεροι οὗτοι, καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸν Μενεκλέα, καὶ ὀμόσαντες ὅρκους καὶ ἐγὼ τούτοις. (39) καίτοι εἴ γε μὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐγεγένητο ἡ ποίησις, μηδὲ κληρονόμος ἦν ἐγὼ τῶν Μενεκλέους ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων δεδοκιμασμένος, τί ἔδει αὐτοὺς ὀμνύναι ἐμοὶ ἢ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ λαμβάνειν ὅρκους; οὐδὲν δήπου. οὐκοῦν ὁπότε ἐποίησαν ταῦτα, φαίνονται αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἐμοὶ μαρτυροῦντες ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐποιήθην [ἡ ποίησις] καὶ δικαίως εἰμὶ κληρονόμος τῶν Μενεκλέους. (40) ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶμαι καταφανὲς ὑμῖν ἅπασι τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι, ὡς καὶ παρὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν ὅτι Μενεκλῆς οὐ παρεφρόνει, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οὗτος νυνί, ὅς γε ποιησάμενος τῆς ἔχθρας διάλυσιν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ ὀμόσας ὅρκους πάλιν νῦν ἥκει τὰ ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ ὀμοθέντα παραβάς, καὶ ἀφελέσθαι με ἀξιοῖ ταυτὶ τὰ λοιπά, οὕτως ὄντα μικρά.

|| 10 On the adoption, see L. Rubinstein, Adoption in IV. Century Athens, Copenhagen 1993. 11 On this argument, cf. 3.55; 6.12; 7.18; 8.14. See also Huchthausen (1965) 241–262; Roisman (2005) 36–37; Edwards (2007) 39.

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On the Estate of Menecles 2(38) Next, gentlemen, to prove that Menecles was neither out of his mind (paranoōn) nor under the influence of a woman when he adopted me, I want to produce as witnesses my opponents themselves, who testify that I am telling the truth not in word (logōi) but in deed (ergōi), by their own conduct. For both of them clearly carried out the reconciliation with me, not with Menecles, and swore oaths to me as I did to them. (39) Yet if the adoption had not been carried out legally and I had not been recognized as the heir to Menecles’ property by my opponents themselves, why did they need to swear to me or receive oaths from me? Surely they didn’t. Therefore since they did this, it is clear that they themselves testify that I was legally adopted and am the rightful heir to Menecles’ property. (40) I think it’s clear to you all that even my opponents agree that it’s not Menecles who was insane (paraphronein) but rather my opponent who is now, since despite settling the hostility between us and swearing oaths, he has now come forward again in violation of his agreements and oaths and thinks I should be deprived of these remnants of the estate, small though they are. (Transl. M. Edwards 2007)

The speech On the Estate of Ciron (8) is, according to F. Blass (1887–1898, II 555), a true model of Isaeus’ rhetorical art (ein Musterstück von Isaios’ Beredsamkeit) – a view that contemporary scholars share.12 Isaeus has to contend with a difficult inheritance dispute with no will. He is defending the interests of a grandson of the deceased Ciron on his daughter’s side against a nephew on his last wife’s side. Behind this nephew lies Diocles of Phlya, Ciron’s brother-in-law, who is essentially the main opponent. He and his followers dispute the legitimate issue of the daughter (8.1; 8.20). The alternation between simple and elaborate rhetoric (as in the prooimion 8.1–5 and the prothesis 8.6), the logical layout, where what must be proven is always declared and is then shown to have been proven (Blass 1887–1898, II 559; cf. 8.6; 8.14–15; 8.28–29; 8.30), and a rhetorically severe personal attack against Diocles’ licentiousness, with ad hominem arguments until the abrupt conclusion of the speech (8.36–46),13 which uncommonly ends with Diocles’ adultery, clearly illustrate the characteristics of Isaeus’ oratory. How the opponents’ refusal to produce Ciron’s slaves for questioning and the addition of accumulated questions and eikos-arguments lead to the desired conclusion becomes clear in 8.28 through the figure of hypophora (Edwards 1994, 34; cf. Usher 1999, 143):14 On the Estate of Ciron 8(28) πόθεν χρὴ πιστεύεσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα; οὐκ ἐκ τῶν μαρτυριῶν; οἶμαί γε. πόθεν δὲ τοὺς μάρτυρας; οὐκ ἐκ τῶν βασάνων; εἰκός γε. πόθεν δ᾽ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις; οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ φεύγειν τοὺς ἐλέγχους; ἀνάγκη μεγάλη. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξειε γνησίαν οὖσαν θυγατέρα Κίρωνος τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμὴν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδεικνύς;

|| 12 According to Wyse (1904) 587, “a model of rhetorical method”. Cf. Usher (1999) 140; Edwards (2007) 132. 13 Cf. Ferrucci (2005) 204 ff.; Roisman (2006) 21–22; Griffith-Williams (2013) 95–96; Hatzilambrou (2014) 158. Two other speeches by Isaeus are directed against Diocles (fr. 8: Against Diocles, for Hybris and fr. 9 Thalheim: Against Diocles, Concerning a Plot of Land). 14 Hypophora (subjectio) is a rhetorical figure where questions and answers appear in an oration for the purpose of rebutting objections, whether by the speaker himself or his opponents. See H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study, Leiden 1998, 341–343.

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On the Estate of Ciron 8(28) Why should you believe what I have said? Shouldn’t you because of the testimony (martyriai)? I certainly think so. Why should you believe the witnesses? Shouldn’t you because of the torture (basanoi)? It’s certainly reasonable. Why should you disbelieve the words of our opponents? Shouldn’t you because they declined the tests? That’s an absolute necessity. How then could anybody prove more clearly that my mother is Ciron’s legitimate daughter than by doing so in this way? (Transl. M. Edwards 2007)

The speech On the Estate of Hagnias (11) has two unique features: the first, not encountered elsewhere in Attic oratory (Usher 1999, 154), is found in the proem, where the speaker reads and immediately comments on the laws, clearly in an effort to impress the judges and demonstrate that the written law is on his side: “I’ve read you the laws for this reason, because according to the first of these, my opponent maintains that the boy is entitled to half the estate, a claim that is not true” (11.1: διὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἀνέγνων τοὺς νόμους, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἰσχυρίζεται τῷ παιδὶ τοῦ ἡμικληρίου προσήκειν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγων). The second concerns the fact that one can follow this challenging case from the side of the opponents, as this speech is associated, in the context of a number of trials, with the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Macartatus in Regard to the Estate of Hagnias (43).15

8.3 Style The literary critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus parallelises the oratory of Lysias and Isaeus, as if they were two Plutarchan Parallel Lives: he first identifies the obvious similarities between the two, such as the purity, precision, clarity, vividness, conciseness and aptness of expression before moving on to the fine differences in their style (Isae. 2–4, p. 94–97 Us.-Rad.): Isaeus surpasses Lysias in skilful composition, but lacks the Lysianic charm.16 At the same time, these differences make Isaeus a forerunner of Demosthenes: Dion. Hal. Isae. 3 (p. 95 Us.-Rad.) καθαρὰ μὲν καὶ ἀκριβὴς καὶ σαφὴς κυρία τε καὶ ἐναργὴς καὶ σύντομος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πιθανή τε καὶ πρέπουσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις στρογγύλη τε καὶ δικανικὴ οὐχ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἡ Ἰσαίου λέξις τῆς Λυσίου, καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἄν τις αὐτὴν διαγνοίη. διαφέρειν δὲ ἐκείνης δόξειεν ἂν ἐν τοῖσδε· ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἀφελής τε καὶ ἠθικὴ μᾶλλόν ἐστι σύγκειταί τε φυσικώτερον καὶ ἐσχημάτισται ἁπλούστερον ἡδονῇ τε καὶ χάριτι πολλῇ κεχορήγηται. ἡ δὲ Ἰσαίου τεχνικωτέρα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς Λυσίου τήν τε σύνθεσιν περιεργοτέρα

|| 15 See Thompson (1976); C.A. Cox, Household Interests. Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens, Princeton 1998, 3–10; Roisman (2006) 27–28. 16 On Isaeus’ style, cf. Blass (1887–1898) II 497–528; C.A. Robertson, Tropes and Figures in Isaeus, Princeton 1901; W.W. Baden, The Principal Figures of Language and Figures of Thought in Isaeus, Baltimore 1906; Denommé (1974); Edwards (1994) 32–33; (2007) 3–4; Μ. Edwards, Dionysius and Isaeus, in: C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford 2013, 43–49; Konstantinopoulos (2014) 124 ff.; Hatzilambrou (2018) 35–41.

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τις καὶ σχηματισμοῖς διειλημμένη ποικίλοις, ὅσον τε ἀπολείπεται τῆς χάριτος ἐκείνης, τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχει τῇ δεινότητι τῆς κατασκευῆς καὶ πηγή τις ὄντως ἐστὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους δυνάμεως (cf. Dion. Hal. Isae. 12–13, p.107–111 Us.-Rad.; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 839F). Dion. Hal. Isae. 3 (p. 95 Us.-Rad.) The language of Isaeus is pure, precise, clear, standard, vivid and concise, and also persuasive, appropriate to the subject and suitable for use in the lawcourts in the same degree as that of Lysias; and in all these respects is indistinguishable from it. It would seem to differ, however, in the following ways: the language of Lysias is plainer (aphelēs) and has a stronger moral flavour (ēthikē); its composition is more natural and the figures which it contains are simpler; and it is generously endowed with grace and charm (charis). That of Isaeus would seem to suggest more technical skill (technikōtera) and attention to detail (akribestera) than that of Lysias: its structure is more elaborate and interspersed with a variety of figures. It compensates for its lack of Lysianic charm (apoleipetai tēs charitos) by that brilliant artistic resource (deinotēs tēs kataskeuēs) which makes it the real spring from which the rhetorical power of Demosthenes flows. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

Therefore, Isaeus falls between the simple and natural expression of Lysias and the eloquence and complexity of the synthetic thinking of Demosthenes; in this sense, S. Usher (1999, 170) correctly contends that Isaeus is “a very individual orator”. His strength lies in the evidencing and logical processing of fine legal argumentation in complex legal disputes. These include: simple and concise narrations (6.4; 10.3), repetitions (3.37 and 3.39; 3.45 and 3.48), rhetorical questions (1.11; 4.20; 6.62–65; 7.40– 41; 8.14; 9.26),17 partial release from the common structure of a judicial speech (at times the prooimia are long and meticulous, as in the case of speeches 8 and 10, while at other short or abrupt, as in the case of speeches 3, 4, 9 or 11), outbursts of rage or bitter irony, as in the case of speech 8 (On the Estate of Ciron) against Diocles or in speech 5 (On the Estate of Dicaeogenes) against Dicaeogenes (thus 5.35–47, esp. 45– 47): On the Estate of Dicaeogenes 5(45) διὰ τί οὖν ἀξιώσεις σου τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀποψηφίσασθαι, ὦ Δικαιόγενες; πότερον ὅτι πολλὰς λῃτουργίας λελῃτούργηκας τῇ πόλει, καὶ πολλὰ χρήματα δαπανήσας σεμνοτέραν τὴν πόλιν τούτοις ἐποίησας; ἢ ὡς τριηραρχῶν πολλὰ κακὰ τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσω καὶ εἰσφορὰς δεομένῃ τῇ πατρίδι εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσενεγκὼν μεγάλα ὠφέληκας; ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέν σοι τούτων πέπρακται. (46) ἀλλ᾽ ὡς στρατιώτης ἀγαθός; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐστράτευσαι τοσούτου καὶ τοιούτου γενομένου πολέμου, εἰς ὃν Ὀλύνθιοι μὲν καὶ νησιῶται ὑπὲρ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς ἀποθνῄσκουσι μαχόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, σὺ δέ, ὦ Δικαιόγενες, πολίτης ὢν οὐδ᾽ ἐστράτευσαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως διὰ τοὺς προγόνους ἀξιώσεις μου πλέον ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν τύραννον ἀπέκτειναν. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐκείνους μὲν ἐπαινῶ, σοὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡγοῦμαι τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μετεῖναι. (47) πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἵλου ἀντὶ τῆς ἐκείνων δόξης τὴν ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν κτήσασθαι, καὶ ἐβουλήθης μᾶλλον Δικαιογένους καλεῖσθαι ὑὸς ἢ Ἁρμοδίου, ὑπερι-δὼν μὲν τὴν ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν, καταφρονήσας δὲ προεδριῶν καὶ ἀτελειῶν, ἃ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονόσι δέδοται. ἔτι δὲ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐκεῖνος καὶ Ἁρμόδιος οὐ διὰ τὸ γένος ἐτιμήθησαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν, ἧς σοι οὐδὲν μέτεστιν, ὦ Δικαιόγενες.

|| 17 Cf. Denommé (1974) 138–146.

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On the Estate of Dicaeogenes 5(45) On what grounds, then, do you think the jurors should acquit you, Dicaeogenes? Because you’ve performed numerous public services for the city and enhanced the majesty of their city by spending a lot of money? Or because as trierarch you’ve inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and by contributing taxes for the war bestowed great benefits on your country when it was in need? But you have done none of these things. (46) Or because you are a good soldier? But you haven’t served in the course of this great long war, during which Olynthians and islanders are dying fighting the enemy in defense of this land, but you, Dicaeogenes, have not served at all, even though you are a citizen. But perhaps you will claim to have an advantage over me through your ancestors, because they killed the tyrant. I honor them, but I don’t think you share one bit of their valor. (47) First, you chose to possess our property (ousia) instead of their glory (doxa), and you were willing to be called son of Dicaeogenes rather than of Harmodius, disdaining the right to dine in the Prytaneum and despising the seats of honor and tax exemptions granted to their descendants. Further, the great Aristogeiton and Harmodius were honored not through their birth (genos) but through their bravery (andragathia), in which you do not share at all, Dicaeogenes. (Transl. M. Edwards 2007)

Isaeus lacks the light, pleasant tone of Lysias; ēthopoiia does not naturally flow forth from the speaker’s character, while the ostensible simplicity is part of the evidentiary procedure and the orator’s art (Edwards 1994, 32). Isaeus avoids hiatus but not as strictly as his teacher, Isocrates.

8.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception The most important manuscript for the medieval transmission of Isaeus (11 speeches) is, as is the case with Antiphon (6 speeches), Andocides (4 speeches), Lycurgus (Against Leocrates) and Dinarchus (3 speeches), the codex Crippsianus Mus. Brit. Burneianus 95 (A, 13/14th c.), from which all other more recent manuscripts descend. Regarding Isaeus’ two first speeches, there is also the codex Ambrosianus D 42 sup. (Q, 13/14th c.), which, compared to A, provides a text of lesser value.18 The publication of so many judicial speeches in antiquity, in contrast to the far fewer deliberative and epideictic speeches, is striking. It is firstly due to educational and practical purposes: judicial speeches served as prime examples of speeches, primarily for training orators and secondarily for everyday judicial practice; one of the reasons may be the different procedures followed in the law-courts and in the Assembly (Harris 2017, 56); it may also be attributed to pure reading pleasure, as it emerges from a particular preference of the readership of antiquity (Görgemanns 1987, 82–83).

|| 18 Cf. Thalheim (1903) v-x; Wyse (1904) i-lxi; Forster (1927) xiv-xvi; H. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 266. See also G. Prato, I manoscritti greci die secoli XIII e XIV. Note paleografiche, in: D. Harlfinger/G. Prato (eds.), Paleografia e codicologia greca. Atti del II Colloquio Internazionale I, Alessandria 1991, 131–149. 2 papyri must be added to these (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue).

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In any event, Isaeus was not particularly favoured. Although his inclusion in the canon of the ten Attic Orators is a testament to his recognition, his post-Classical reception is rather meagre, due to his absence from the political scene and, primarily, the subject-matter of his speeches.19 The singular treatise of Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Isaeus is integrally linked to Demosthenes: the “teacher - pupil” relationship ensured his legacy (Dion. Hal. Isae. 1, p. 93 Us.-Rad.: Δημοσθένους καθηγησάμενος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα γενόμενος περιφανής; cf. 20, p. 123–124 Us.-Rad.: τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος … τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς παρασχεῖν). We are aware of a commentary by Didymus (Harpocr. s.v. γαμηλία and πανδαισία)20 and the favourable assessment of Hermogenes, who ranks Isaeus alongside Lysias and Hyperides, after Demosthenes, among the representatives of the haplōs politikos logos, in the sense of the clear and persuasive style of practical rhetoric (De id. 2.11, p. 395–397 Rabe).

|| 19 Cf. Jones (1779) iii, v; Griffith-Williams (2013) 25–27. 20 Cf. Cohn (1903) 458; B.K. Braswell, Didymos of Alexandria Commentary on Pindar. Edited and Translated with Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and a Critical Catalogue of Didymos’ Works, Basel 2013, 77, 83; F. Montana, Hellenistic Scholarship, in: F. Montanari et al. (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship, Leiden/Boston 2015, 174.

9 Lycurgus 9.1 Life According to F. Mitchel (1965, 192) “the story of Athens in the age of Alexander is really an account of Lycurgus’ administration”. The most important biographical sources for the renowned administrator of Athenian finances, politician and orator are the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 841A–844A), to which the text of the posthumous honorific decree honouring Lycurgus in 307/306 BC, at the proposal of Stratocles, is appended (851F–852E); the same inscription is extant in fragmentary form (IG II2 457). The Pseudo-Plutarchan Life is also the origin of entries in Photius (Bibl. 268) and in the Suda (λ 825 s.v. Lykourgos). Certain information is also drawn from Demosthenes’ Third Letter.1 On the basis of the Hypothesis of the 25th speech in the Demosthenic corpus (Against Aristogeiton 1), Lycurgus’ birth is dated a few years before 384/383 BC. Lycurgus was the son of Lycophron, belonging to the noble priestly family of the Eteobutadae ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841B); his noteworthy religious privileges and interests must be attributed to this lineage (Humphreys 1985, 199 ff.). Lycurgus’ grandfather, also named Lycurgus, was killed by the Thirty and his grandson, despite his aristocratic origins, remained a faithful supporter of democracy. Lycurgus was reportedly taught by Plato and Isocrates ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841B).2 Like Isocrates, it seems that Lycurgus was ill-equipped to deliver orations before an audience (Engels 2008, 17); nevertheless, he was uncommonly diligent in addressing this shortcoming, particularly with regard to speaking extempore ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 842C: ἐμελέτα δὲ καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας, οὐκ εὖ πρὸς τὰ αὐτοσχέδια πεφυκώς). It is uncertain whether he participated in an Athenian diplomatic mission to the Peloponnesians, accompanied by Demosthenes, for mobilisation against the Macedonians in 343 BC (Demosth. 9.72; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841E; Harris 2001, 156 note 8), but his important political activity began immediately after the defeat at Chaeronea (338 BC). For twelve consecutive years, from 338 to 326 or from 336 to 324,3 Lycurgus determined the state administration, financial and construction policy of Athens ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841B, 852B; cf. Diod. 16.88.1; Hyper. fr. 118 Jensen; Demosth. Epist.

|| 1 On Lycurgus’ biography, see Engels (2008) 13–28. 2 Cf. J. Engels, Antike Überlieferungen über die Schüler des Isokrates, in: W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates. Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers, Trier 2003, 185, 189–194. 3 See Faraguna (1992) 197–205; cf. Davies (1971) 351; Harris (2001) 156; Worthington (2013) 307 note 49. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-009

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3.2) with remarkable success; his achievements include military equipment, a construction programme to beautify Athens, as well as religious and cultural measures.4 The erection of statues of the three great tragic poets and the codification of the texts of their plays in an official version to avoid interpolated verses are linked to Lycurgus’ religious and moral beliefs, originating from the gnomic content of the poetic tradition. In his extant speech Against Leocrates, Lycurgus quotes passages from Homer, Euripides and Tyrtaeus, which highlight not only the contrast between ancient virtue and Leocrates’ current guilt, but also the need for poetry to play an exemplary role in the present.5 Near the end of his life (around 324 BC), he was subjected to accusations regarding his administration ‒ accusations which, after his death, would burden his children whom Demosthenes, while in exile, defended vehemently ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 842Ε; Demosth. Epist. 3).

9.2 Work 9.2.1 The Relentless Prosecutor Lycurgus, “the most august of the Attic Orators” (Usher 1999, 324), enjoyed great repute and esteem among his contemporaries, with the reputation of being an individual of singular integrity. He was neither a logographer nor became involved in private suits, but brought many charges and, due to his strong sense of duty, became a sort of public prosecutor and proved to be exceptionally stern (Diod. 16.88.1: βίον δ’ ἐζηκὼς ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ περιβόητον πικρότατος ἦν κατήγορος). He would not hesitate to request the strictest of punishments – it was said that he anointed his pen not with ink but with death ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841E: οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ θανάτῳ χρίοντα τὸν κάλαμον κατὰ τῶν πονηρῶν) – and, according to F. Blass (1887–1898, III,2 104), “discipline and prosperity within the city were to Lycurgus what liberty and a powerful position of the state abroad were to Demosthenes”. Despite his predilection for domestic politics, he did not shy away from foreign policy. Due to his anti-Macedonian action, he

|| 4 See Mitchel (1965) 189–204; F.W. Mitchel, Lykourgan Athens: 388–322, Semple Lectures 2, Cincinnati 1970; E.M. Burke, Lycurgan Finances, GRBS 26 (1985) 251–264; A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great, Cambridge 1988, 204–215; J. Engels, Anmerkungen zum ökonomischen Denken im 4. Jahrh. v.Chr. und zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Lykurgischen Athen, MBAH 7 (1988) 90–132; (1992) 5–29; Faraguna (1992); Parker (1996) 242–255; B. Hintzen-Bohlen, Die Kulturpolitik des Euboulos und des Lykurg. Die Denkmäler- und Bauprojekte in Athen zwischen 355 und 322 v. Chr., Berlin 1997. On a number of inscriptions from Lycurgus’ age see C. Schwenk, Athens in the Age of Alexander the Great. The Dated Laws and Decrees of the Lykourgan Era 338–322 B.C., Chicago 1985. 5 See Lycurg. Leocr. 92, 100, 103, 107, 109; J. Grethlein, The Value of the Past Challenged. Myth and Ancient History in the Attic Orators, in: J. Ker/C. Pieper (eds.), Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/Boston 2014, 343; Volonaki (2019) 281–301.

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was among the orators and generals whose extradition Alexander demanded after the sack of Thebes (Diod. 17.15.3–5; Arrian 1.10.3–6; Plut. Demosth. 23.4; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 841E).6 Lycurgus’ political and rhetorical action, like Demosthenes, focused on highlighting the power of Athens. His reform programme aimed at restoring the past splendour of Athens, and his rhetoric served this very purpose. Certain indications lead to the conclusion that Lycurgus’ speech Against Leocrates and Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown were the result of a political collaboration between the two men in the late 330s BC.7 In 324 BC, shortly before his death, he opposed the conferral of divine honours upon Alexander ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 842D). Regarding his strictness when addressing the unruly Athenian demos, his following phrase is recounted: “O you Corcyraean whip, how many talents are you worth?” ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 842D: ὦ Κερκυραία μάστιξ, ὡς πολλῶν ταλάντων εἶ ἀξία).

9.2.2 The Speeches If Isaeus was challenged as to the immoral dimension of his judicial rhetoric, Lycurgus was an exponent of the exact opposite: he was a stern orator and politician-educator who never occupied himself as a logographer and who used, among other things, rhetoric as a means for teaching his fellow citizens in practice.8 Thus, he is ranked between the theoretical educational work of Isocrates and the political action of Demosthenes. Of the 14 or 15 speeches attributed to him during antiquity, only one has survived in full: Against Leocrates. From the scant fragments of his other speeches, it is concluded that they concerned religious matters, state affairs,

|| 6 Cf. A.B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, Oxford 1980, 92– 96; R. Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time. A Study in Defeat, New York 1993, 204–241; G.A. Lehmann, Demosthenes von Athen. Ein Leben für die Freiheit: Biographie, Munich 2004, 190–191. On Lycurgus’ historical views against Macedon, see G. Wirth, Lykurg, Philipp und Athen. Mutmaßungen zu einigen turbulenten Wochen griechischer Geschichte, ΑΑWW 113 (1996) 63–110; G. Wirth, Lykurg und Athen im Schatten Philipps II, in: W. Eder/K.-J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), Volk und Verfassung im vorhellenistischen Griechenland, Stuttgart 1997, 191–225; Wirth (1999) 30–53; Will (2013) 162. 7 See Burke (1977) 330–340; Vielberg (1991) 64 ff.; Allen (2000) 28; Steinbock (2011) 312. For a different view, see Harris (1995) 153–154. On a “political factionalism” between Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, see J. Herrman, Hyperides’ Against Diondas and the Rhetoric of Revolt, BICS 52 (2009) 175 ff. Cf. also J.E. Atkinson, Macedon and Athenian Politics in the Period 338 to 323 BC, AC 24 (1981) 37–48; N. Sawada, Athenian Politics in the Age of Alexander the Great. A Reconsideration of the Trial of Ctesiphon, Chiron 26 (1996) 57–84. 8 Cf. E. Volonaki, Dynamics of Forensic Oratory in Late Fourth Century BC, in: N. Gutenberg/ P. Riemer (eds.), Detailstudien zur Fakten- und Theoriegeschichte der europäischen Rhetorik, Berlin 2018, 105–116.

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morality and administration.9 These were not private speeches (except for two speeches defending himself in cases concerning accountability), but public suits dated after 340 BC. 9.2.2.1 Against Lysicles - Against Autolycus The speeches Against Lysicles and Against Autolycus are directly or indirectly linked to the Battle of Chaeronea, “the ultimate testing-ground of the calibre of all patriotic Athenians” (Whitehead 2006, 143). Both defendants, the unfortunate general Lysicles and the Areopagite Autolycus, were convicted ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 843D; Lucurg. Leocr. 53).10 A passionate excerpt from the first speech, Against Lysicles (Diod. 16.88.2 = fr. 12.1 Conomis), is indicative of Lycurgus’ reputation as a “relentless prosecutor” (Schaefer 1966–1967, III,2 218) of those who showed cowardice or failed to discharge their duties during that period: ἐστρατήγεις, ὦ Λύσικλες, καὶ χιλίων μὲν πολιτῶν τετελευτηκότων, δισχιλίων δ᾽ αἰχμαλώτων γεγονότων, τροπαίου δὲ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἑστηκότος, τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης δουλευούσης, καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων γεγενημένων σοῦ ἡγουμένου καὶ στρατηγοῦντος τολμᾷς ζῆν καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλειν, ὑπόμνημα γεγονὼς αἰσχύνης καὶ ὀνείδους τῇ πατρίδι. You were a general, Lysicles, and after a thousand citizens died and two thousand were captured, after a trophy was erected to mark the defeat of the city, and all Greece fell into slavery, and after all these events took place under your command and generalship, you have the audacity to live and look on the light of day and thrust your way into the marketplace, when you serve as a reminder of our country’s shame (aischynē) and reproach (oneidos). (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001)

9.2.2.2 Against Leocrates In Against Leocrates,11 his only speech that has survived intact, Lycurgus refers to Against Autolycus (Leocr. 53: ἀλλὰ μὴν Αὐτολύκου γε ὑμεῖς κατεψηφίσασθε), a fact that indicates the thematic affinity between the two speeches. Upon receiving news of the disaster at Chaeronea and under the threat of a potential Macedonian invasion of Attica, the Athenian citizen Leocrates abandoned the city and returned after a long stay abroad – initially on Rhodes and subsequently in Megara as a metic for 5 or 6 years – to Athens for reasons unknown. The patriotic prosecutor Lycurgus did not forget the affair and immediately brought a charge against him for treason (prodosia),

|| 9 The fragments are collected in Conomis (1970) 91–120. 10 Cf. Will (1983) 22–23. 11 Greek text used: Malcovati (1966) and Conomis (1970).

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in the framework of the procedure of eisangelia (“impeachment”).12 The case was tried in 331/330 BC,13 shortly before Demosthenes’ trial regarding the honorific crown; in his speech On the Crown (18), Demosthenes also addresses the consequences of Chaeronea. In the end, Leocrates was acquitted following a tied vote (Aeschin. 3.252: καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία ψῆφος μετέπεσεν, ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἂν ἢ ἀπέθανεν).14 The content of the speech Against Leocrates and the result of the vote clearly reflect the climate in Athens following the defeat at Chaeronea and the need for balance between two opposing trends: “the competing social goods of enhanced coordination”, on the one hand, and “a credible commitment to legal rules” (Ober 2008, 185), on the other. Lycurgus recites the emergency laws then in force (Leocr. 16: ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ τείχη κατακομίζειν, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς τάττειν εἰς τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν οἰκούντων Ἀθήνησι, καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ. “The people voted to bring the women and children in from the countryside behind the walls and to have the generals assign for guard duty any Athenians and the rest of those resident in Athens in whatever way they saw fit”; 53: ἔτι δὲ ὁ δῆμος, δεινὸν ἡγησάμενος εἶναι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐψηφίσατο ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ προδοσίᾳ τοὺς φεύγοντας τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος κίνδυνον, ἀξίους εἶναι νομίζων τῆς ἐσχάτης τιμωρίας. “Moreover, the people of Athens thought the situation serious and voted that those who fled the danger threatening the country were guilty of treason and deserved the harshest punishment”) and Hyperides’ decree (37: ἀκούετε τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς πεντακοσίους καταβαίνειν εἰς Πειραιᾶ χρηματιοῦσαν περὶ φυλακῆς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἔδοξε, καὶ πράττειν διεσκευασμένην ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ τῷ δήμῳ συμφέρον εἶναι. “You hear the decree, gentlemen: it is resolved that the Council of 500 take up arms and go down to Piraeus to make plans about protecting the city and should be prepared to do whatever it thinks is in the people’s best interests”. Transl. E.M. Harris 2001).

However, it remains unknown when these laws entered into force and, therefore, the legal basis of the charge was not absolutely sound.15 The prosecutor does not rule ac-

|| 12 Our main source regarding the public charge under the procedure of eisangelia is Hyperides (For Euxenippus c. 22[7]–23[8]). See Hansen (1975); D. Whitehead, Hypereides, the Forensic Speeches. Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Oxford 2000, 186–189; E. Volonaki, Abuse of the Eisangelia in the Latter Half of the Fourth Century BC, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 293–314. 13 In favour of 331 BC are Harris (2001) 159 note 1; Whitehead (2006) 132 note 2; in favour of 330 BC are Steinbock (2011) 280 note 1; Will (2013) 170; Engels (2014) 22. 14 Against this communis opinio is J. Sullivan, Second Thoughts on Aisckhines 3.252, G&R 49 (2002) 1–7; cf. however E. Bianchi, Ancora su Eschine, III 252, Dike 5 (2002) 83–94. 15 Cf. Rehdantz (1876) 13–14; Petrie (1922) 28–29; Durrbach (1932) 26–27; Burtt (1954) 10; Kennedy (1963) 250–251; Hansen (1975) 108; D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London 1978, 178– 179. For a different view see Worthington (2013) 292–293.

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cording to the letter of the law, and encourages the judges to supplement the legislative shortcomings through their judgment, acting not only as judges (dikastai) but also as legislators (nomothetai) (Leocr. 9). On the other hand, the Athens of that era was not seeking the hegemonic position of the past, but its identity in the vast Macedonian kingdom which, following Alexander’s victory at the decisive Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, extended to India.16 It is this very identity that the emblematic Lycurgus embodies. The fact that half the judges were convinced of Leocrates’ guilt on the basis of a legally weak charge and with regard to an act that took place eight years earlier is a strong indication of Lycurgus’ rhetorical skills, his influence on Athenian society of the era and the impact of his patriotic sentiments.17 Lycurgus combines the Isocratean insistence for orators to maintain an honourable reputation throughout their lives (Isocr. 15.278) with the Platonic priority placed upon virtue.18 As there is no personal enmity between Lycurgus and the defendant, the orator attempts to obviate the charge of sycophancy: Against Leocrates (31) χωρὶς τοίνυν τούτων Λεωκράτης ἀναβοήσεται αὐτίκα ὡς ἰδιώτης ὢν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ συκοφάντου δεινότητος ἀναρπαζόμενος. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἡγοῦμαι πάντας ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι ὅτι τῶν μὲν δεινῶν καὶ συκοφαντεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων ἔργον ἐστὶν ἅμα τοῦτο προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ζητεῖν τὰ χωρία ταῦτα, ἐν οἷς τοὺς παραλογισμοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ποιήσονται, τῶν δὲ δικαίως τὰς κρίσεις ἐνισταμένων καὶ τοὺς ἐνόχους ταῖς ἀραῖς ἀκριβῶς ἀποδεικνύντων τἀναντία φαίνεσθαι τούτοις ποιοῦντας, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς.19 Against Leocrates (31) Aside from this, Leocrates will soon shout out that he is a private citizen (idiōtēs) and a victim trapped by the clever skills (deinotēs) of a politician and an unscrupulous prosecutor. But all of you realize, I think, that it is typical of clever men who try to bring baseless charges (sykophantein) to anticipate this objection and look for topics where they can confuse and distract their opponents. But men who bring honest charges and show precisely how defendants are subject to the herald’s curse clearly act very differently, just as we have. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001)

There are no personal attacks, which were frequent in trials, since it is not the individual being denounced, but the act, regardless of the perpetrator: destruction is the death of a city (Leocr. 61: πόλεώς ἐστι θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι). Lycurgus skilfully handles piety at the very opening of the speech, stating that the charge is righteous and just (1: δικαίαν καὶ εὐσεβῆ) – indeed, piety holds a paramount position until

|| 16 Cf. Will (2013) 171. 17 Cf. Engels (2014) 23. 18 On Plato and Lycurgus, see R.F. Reneham, The Platonism of Lycurgus, GRBS 11 (1970) 219–231; Allen (2000) 29 ff. 19 Cf. Against Leocrates 3, 5, 6; Allen (2000) 12 ff.; (2000a) 157–160.

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the end.20 However, this does not support the view of M. Vielberg (1991, 68) that Lycurgus was less a pious priest and more a magnificent virtuoso of oratory. His overall moral character and life confute such an approach. His maxims, aphorisms and general doctrine (e.g. 3–4: “Three things are most responsible for guarding and protecting the democracy and the city’s prosperity: first, the system of laws [ἡ τῶν νόμων τάξις]; second, the vote of the judges [ἡ τῶν δικαστῶν ψῆφος]; and third, the trial, which brings crimes under their control [ἡ τούτοις τἀδικήματα παραδιδοῦσα κρίσις]”; 10: “There are two main factors in the education of young men, the punishment imposed on those who do wrong [ἥ τε τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία] and the rewards given to men of virtue [ἡ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διδομένη δωρεά]; 92: “The first thing the gods do to evil men is to lead their minds [διάνοιαν] astray”; 94: “I believe, gentlemen, that divine providence watches over all human affairs and especially the reverence [εὐσέβειαν] we show our parents, the dead, and the gods themselves; rightly so.” Transl. E.M. Harris 2001), his long poetic quotations (100–110),21 his historical examples (69–74; 83–89; 90–93), the renowned Ephebic Oath22 or the Oath of the Greeks at Plataea (75–79; 80–82), the penalties for traitors (110–123; 128–130) impart solemnity, seriousness and splendour to the speech, justifying Lycurgus’ role as a patriotic prosecutor driven by sincere piety. In the excerpt below, it is clear how the praise for the fallen at Chaeronea and the splendour of Athens require the punishment of Leocrates (47–51): Against Leocrates (47) ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπήντησαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις τῆς Βοιωτίας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας μαχούμενοι, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ τὴν χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν προέμενοι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αὑτῶν ἀνδρείαν ἀσφαλεστέραν φυλακὴν εἶναι νομίζοντες τῶν λιθίνων περιβόλων, τὴν δὲ θρέψασαν αὑτοὺς αἰσχυνόμενοι περιορᾶν πορθουμένην, εἰκότως· (48) ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς φύσει γεννήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ποιητοὺς τῶν πατέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν ἅπαντες ταῖς εὐνοίαις, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς χώρας τὰς μὴ φύσει προσηκούσας, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον ἐπικτήτους γενομένας καταδεέστερον διάκεινται. τοιαύταις δὲ γνώμαις χρησάμενοι, καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν ἐξ ἴσου τῶν κινδύνων μετασχόντες, οὐχ ὁμοίως τῆς τύχης ἐκοινώνησαν· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ζῶντες ἀπολαύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τελευτήσαντες τὴν δόξαν καταλελοίπασιν, οὐχ ἡττηθέντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποθανόντες ἔνθαπερ ἐτάχθησαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀμύνοντες. (49) εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ παραδοξότατον μὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀληθὲς δέ, ἐκεῖνοι νικῶντες ἀπέθανον. τὰ γὰρ ἆθλα τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐστίν, ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀρετή· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπάρχει. ἔπειτα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἡττῆσθαι τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις μὴ πτήξαντας τὸν τῶν ἐπιόντων φόβον. μόνους γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καλῶς ἀποθνῄσκοντας οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἡττῆσθαι δικαίως φήσειε· τὴν γὰρ δουλείαν φεύγοντες εὐκλεᾶ θάνατον αἱροῦνται. (50) ἐδήλωσε δὲ ἡ τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετή· μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ἁπάντων τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐλευθερίαν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν σώμασιν εἶχον. ἅμα γὰρ οὗτοί τε τὸν βίον μετήλλαξαν καὶ τὰ

|| 20 Against Leocrates 5, 8, 15, 17, 25–26, 27, 44–45, 65, 76–78, 79–82, 85, 88, 91–93, 94–100, 113–114, 127, 128–129, 136–137, 142–144, 146–148, 149–150. Cf. Petrie (1922) xxiii; E. Malcovati, Licurgo, in: Marzi/Leone/Malcovati (1977) 804; Parker (1996) 251–253; Whitehead (2006) 144. 21 Cf. Allen (2000) 11: “The passage is unparalleled in Attic oratory”. 22 On the “ephebic ideology” in the speech see Steinbock (2011) 279–317; (2013) 93–94.

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τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς δουλείαν μετέπεσεν· συνετάφη γὰρ τοῖς τούτων σώμασιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία. ὅθεν καὶ φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἐποίησαν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ πολεμοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας προκινδυνεύοντες. ὥστε, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐκ αἰσχυνθείην εἰπὼν στέφανον τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι τὰς ἐκείνων ψυχάς. (51) καὶ δι᾽ ἃ οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐπετήδευον, ἐπίστασθε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τιμᾶν· εὑρήσετε δὲ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς ἀθλητὰς ἀνακειμένους, παρ᾽ ὑμῖν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντας. καὶ τοιούτους μὲν ἄνδρας οὐδ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον, τοὺς δὲ τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νενικηκότας εὐπετῶς πολλαχόθεν ἔστι γεγονότας ἰδεῖν. ὥσπερ τοίνυν τοῖς εὐεργέταις μεγίστας τιμὰς ἀπονέμετε, οὕτω δίκαιον καὶ τοὺς τὴν πατρίδα καταισχύνοντας καὶ προδιδόντας ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωρίαις κολάζειν. Against Leocrates (47) These men stood against the enemy on the borders of Boeotia and fought for the freedom of the Greeks. They did not place their hopes for safety in fortifications, nor did they let the enemy destroy their land. Instead, they thought that courage (andreia) was a firmer bulwark (phylakē) than walls of stone, and they were ashamed to see the land that nourished them put to the torch. Rightly so. (48) Just as all fathers do not feel the same degree of affection for their adopted sons as they do for their natural children, so too men feel less attachment to land that does not naturally belong to them but has been acquired later in their lives. With these thoughts in mind they faced their share of dangers equal to the best, but they did not have the same share of success. They derived no benefit from their bravery (aretē) while alive, but when they died, they bequeathed us their fame (doxa). They were not defeated but died where they were ordered to stand, defending our freedom. (49) I must tell you something paradoxical (paradoxotaton) yet still true: these men died victorious. The reason is that in death they won both freedom (eleutheria) and valor (aretē), which for good men are the prizes of war (athla tou polemou). Furthermore, one cannot say that they were defeated, since they did not cower in fear when the enemy attacked. No one would have the right to say that men who died nobly in war have been defeated, since they chose a noble death and avoided slavery. (50) The valor of these men made this fact clear. They alone of all men held the freedom of Greece (Hellados eleutheria) in their hands. These men departed from life at the same time that Greece passed into slavery; the freedom of the rest of Greece was buried along with their bodies. They have taught the entire world this lesson by fighting not for themselves but by facing danger to secure our common freedom. As a result, gentlemen, I would not be ashamed to say that their lives are our country’s crown of glory (stephanos). (51) Their conduct was not without reason, because you, men of Athens, alone of all the Greeks, know how to honor good men. In other places you will find statues of athletes erected in the marketplace; in your city you will see statues of successful generals and men who have killed tyrants. It is not easy to find even a few men of this kind in all of Greece, whereas it easy to see men who have won contests for a wreath – they are in many places. Just as you award the greatest honors (megistai timai) to your benefactors, so too justice demands that you punish (kolazein) with the most extreme penalties (eschatai timōriai) those who have betrayed and brought shame on our country. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001)

Due to his leading role in society, Lycargus feels obligated, as an active politician and orator who educates citizens, to apply the rules of the political community and the broad range of Leocrates’ obligations towards that community (“the concept of civic obligation”; Liddel 2007, 106; cf. Scholz 2009, 187). This stance is reminiscent of the views of his teacher, Isocrates, who, painting an idealised picture of the political leaders before the Persian Wars, presents them as politicians-educators (4.75: οἱ προασκήσαντες τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους καὶ τὰ πλήθη προτρέψαντες ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν). Lycurgus

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applies these views in practice. The peroration of Against Leocrates (149–150) does not feature the frequent apostrophe of orators towards the judges for compassion or rage; the personified inanimate objects of the Attic land (prosōpopoiia) beg for help.23 Through this rhetorical technique, Lycurgus, the “disinterested, rational prosecutor” (Allen 2000, 23) asks that he be heard to have spoken not with his own voice, but with the voice of all nature (Allen 2000a, 159; cf. Steinbock 2011, 311–312): Against Leocrates (149) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τῇ πατρίδι βοηθῶν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποδέδωκα τὸν ἀγῶνα ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὔτε τὸν ἄλλον τούτου βίον διαβαλὼν οὔτ᾽ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οὐδὲν κατηγορήσας· ὑμῶν δ᾽ ἕκαστον χρὴ νομίζειν τὸν Λεωκράτους ἀποψηφιζόμενον θάνατον τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ἀνδραποδισμὸν καταψηφίζεσθαι, καὶ δυοῖν καδίσκοιν κειμένοιν τὸν μὲν προδοσίας, τὸν δὲ σωτηρίας εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρεσθαι τὰς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀναστάσεως τῆς πατρίδος, τὰς δὲ ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐδαιμονίας. (150) ἐὰν μὲν Λεωκράτην ἀπολύσητε, προδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ψηφιεῖσθε· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, διαφυλάττειν καὶ σῴζειν τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρακελεύσεσθε. νομίζοντες οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἱκετεύειν ὑμῶν τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ δένδρα, δεῖσθαι τοὺς λιμένας τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως, ἀξιοῦν δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεὼς καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς, παράδειγμα ποιήσατε Λεωκράτη, ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν κατηγορημένων, [καὶ] ὅτι οὐ πλέον ἰσχύει παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔλεος οὐδὲ δάκρυα τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων καὶ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίας. Against Leocrates (149) By defending our country, our temples, and our laws, I have conducted this case in a fashion both just and correct, without attacking the rest of this man’s life or making irrelevant charges (exō tou pragmatos). Each of you must now realize that a vote to acquit Leocrates is a vote to condemn our country to death (thanatos) and destruction (andrapodismos). There are two urns placed before you, one for treason (prodosia), the other for survival, and you are casting your votes either to destroy our country or to keep it safe and prosperous. (150) If you acquit Leocrates, you will vote to betray the city, the temples, and the fleet; if you put him to death, you will encourage the defense and protection of the country, its revenues, and its prosperity. Imagine then, men of Athens, that the land and the trees are imploring (hiketeuein) you; the harbors, the shipsheds, and the city walls are asking you (deisthai); and the temples and the shrines are pleading (axioun) with you to defend (boēthein) them. Make an example out of Leocrates; remember the charges against him, for pity and tears do not have a stronger claim than the preservation of the laws and the people. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001)

9.3 Style The emotional amplificatio which aims to inflame averseness towards things that are unjust, cruel or hateful is called deinōsis (Quint. Inst. or. 6.2.24; 8.3.88; 9.2.104; Lausberg 1998, 117, 207) and ancient stylistics acknowledged this trait of Lycurgus. The

|| 23 Cf. F. Hobden, Imagining Past and Present. A Rhetorical Strategy in Aeschines 3, Against Ctesiphon, CQ 57 (2007) 500–501; G. Westwood, The Orator and the Ghosts. Performing the Past in FourthCentury Athens, in: S. Papaioannou et al. (eds.) The Theatre of Justice. Aspects of Performance in Greco-Roman Oratory and Rhetoric, Leiden/Boston 2017, 69–71. See in general J. Gould, Hiketeia, JHS 93 (1973) 74–103; F.S. Naiden, Ancient Supplication, Oxford 2006.

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tendency to exaggerate crimes is consistent with the seriousness and solemnity of his oratory, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus considers it worthy of imitation (De imit. 31.5.3, p. 212 Us.-Rad.: τούτου χρὴ ζηλοῦν μάλιστα τὰς δεινώσεις). The culmination of the city’s supreme danger and Leocrates’ crime are presented very vividly, juxtaposed against the praise for the fallen (Leocr. 37–51) or the exceptional achievements of the Athenian ancestors (69–74), as is clear in the following concluding passage: Against Leocrates (74) καίτοι οἴεσθ᾽ ἄν, εἰ τῇ Λεωκράτους διανοίᾳ χρησάμενοι πάντες ἔφυγον, τούτων ἄν τι γενέσθαι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων, ἢ ταύτην ἂν ἔτι τὴν χώραν κατοικεῖν ὑμᾶς; χρὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινεῖτε καὶ τιμᾶτε, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς μισεῖν τε καὶ κολάζειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ Λεωκράτην, ὃς οὔτε ἔδεισεν οὔτε ᾐσχύνθη ὑμᾶς.24 Against Leocr. (74) Do you think any of these fine deeds would have happened or that you would still live in this country if they thought like Leocrates and fled? Just as you praise and honor good men (agathoi), in the same way you must punish cowards (kakoi), especially Leocrates, who neither feared nor respected you. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001)

Lycurgus is relentless and his sermon-like speech is serious; the religious topoi and poetic quotations are in service of admonishment. At times, they are repeated and impart a sense of bombast, but make up the unique “Lycurgan spirit” (Engels 2014, 26), a patriotic, didactic speech concerning the duties of a citizen (102): Against Leocrates (102) οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιτάττουσιν ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν. Against Leocrates (102) The laws because of their brevity do not teach (didaskein) but merely order (epitattein) what one should do; the poets, on the other hand, by representing human life and selecting the noblest deeds, persuade (sympeithein) men by using both reason and clear examples. (Transl. E.M. Harris 2001).

Lycurgus is not characterised by the passionate, penetrating force of Demosthenes or the light-hearted mood of Hyperides; epideictic oratory is appropriate to his nature.25 The influence of his teacher, Isocrates, is clear in the use of abstract plural nouns (εὔνοιαι, φόβοι), the connection of synonyms (ἐπαινεῖν - τιμᾶν, μισεῖν - κολάζειν, ἀκλεής - ἄδοξος) or the syntax of his sentences (Leocr. 3: ἐβουλόμην δ᾽ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστι τῇ πόλει εἶναι τοὺς κρίνοντας ἐνταῦθα τοὺς παρανομοῦντας, οὕτω καὶ φιλάνθρωπον αὐτὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπειλῆφθαι - Isocr. 8.36: ἠβουλόμην δ᾽ ἄν, ὥσπερ προσῆκόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν, οὕτω πρόχειρον εἶναι πεῖσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀσκεῖν αὐτήν). In fact, there are phrases or rhetorical topoi that originate from Isocrates (Leocr. 72: τοιαύταις χρώμενοι γνώμαις - Isocr. 4.82: τοιαύταις

|| 24 Cf. Against Leocrates 17, 21, 25–26, 121. 25 Cf. Edwards (1994) 57–58; Usher (1999) 327–328.

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διανοίαις χρώμενοι; Leocr. 49: ἔπειτα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἡττῆσθαι - Isocr. 4.92: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε θέμις εἰπεῖν ὡς ἡττήθησαν); however, Lycurgus did not adopt the beautifully structured architecture and carefully composed periods of the Isocraean style – in Lycurgus, serious content always takes precedence over form (Weissenberger 2005, 935). In this sense, the uniformity of his tenor, which aims at grandiosity, often sounds monotonous.26

9.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception The speech Against Leocrates is transmitted in 7 manuscripts. The most important are the codex Bodleianus Ms. Auct. T. 2. 8. (N, 14th c.), which includes a section of the speech, and primarily the Crippsianus Mus. Brit. Burneianus 95 (A, 13/14th c.), from which the other five manuscripts descend. Both codices most likely descend from one non-extant archetype.27 While a Life of Lycurgus appears to have been written quite early – already by the 4th century BC by the Isocratean Philiscus (according to Olympiodorus In Plat. Gorg. Comm. 215.23–24 Westerink: ὁ Φιλίσκος τὸν βίον γράφων τοῦ Λυκούργου) – references in ancient sources are few. With the exception of the positive references of his contemporary Hyperides (Pro Euxen. c. 26[12]: “Lycurgus ... is second to no one in Athens in his ability to speak and has a reputation among speakers for being moderate and fair (metrios kai epieikēs)” and Cicero (De or. 2.94; Brut. 36), there are also noteworthy literary reviews by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De imit. 31.5.3, p. 212 Us.-Rad.: διὰ παντὸς αὐξητικὸς καὶ διηρμένος καὶ σεμνός, καὶ ὅλως κατηγορικὸς καὶ φιλαλήθης καὶ παρρησιαστικός· οὐ μὴν ἀστεῖος οὐδὲ ἡδύς, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖος) and Dio Chrysostom (18.11: “he [sc. Lycurgus] has a lighter touch than those others and reveals a certain simplicity and nobility of character in his speeches [ἐλαφροτέρῳ τούτων ὄντι καὶ ἐμφαίνοντί τινα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἁπλότητα καὶ γενναιότητα τοῦ τρόπου]”; cf. Quint. Inst. or. 12.10.22), who look back to the standards of the classical era and acknowledge Lycurgus as a model of rhetoric (Blass 1887–1898, III,2 117). Hermogenes is yet again an exception, making a – rather unsubstantiated – attribution of sophistic, superficial deinotēs to Lycurgus’ grandeur:

|| 26 Cf. Harris (2001) 158: “At its best, his style conveys deep sincerity and a strong religious conviction; at his worst, Lycurgus is repetitive and bombastic”. See also Whitehead (2006) 148: “the stuffy (and monotonous) moral lecture, the sermon”. 27 Cf. Durrbach (1932) liii-liv; H. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 266; Malcovati (1966) 46–51; Conomis (1970) v-xvii; E. Malcovati, Licurgo, in: Marzi/Leone/Malcovati (1977) 821–826; Engels (2008) 9. 3 papyri must be added to these (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue).

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Hermog. De id. 2.11 (p. 402 Rabe) ὁ τοίνυν Λυκοῦργος πολιτικὸς μέν ἐστιν εἴπερ τις ἕτερος, πλὴν ἴσως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀφέλειαν ἤθους ἕνεκα, πολὺ δὲ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχει χωρὶς ἐπιμελείας· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν πως τῷ Δεινάρχῳ. τῇ δὲ λέξει καὶ πολὺ τραχύτερός ἐστιν· ὅθεν φημὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὴν φαινομένην, οὐ μὴν οὖσαν ὡς ὄντως δεινότητα ἔχειν· τοπικώτεροι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ καὶ καταδρομὴν ἔχοντες ἔστιν οὗ κατὰ τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων πραγμάτων. χρῆται δὲ πολλαῖς πολλάκις καὶ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ἐπὶ μύθους καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ ποιήματα φερόμενος, ἃ δὴ τῆς φαινομένης ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὰ δεινότητος. Hermog. De id. 2.11 (p. 402 Rabe) The style of Lycurgus is typical of practical oratory, except that he does not use the style that reveals Character through Simplicity; but his speeches have other qualities in addition to those that are associated with practical oratory. There is a lot of Asperity (trachy) and Vehemence (sphodron) in his speeches, and these passages are not tempered by a well-wrought style. If they were, he would be indistinguishable from Dinarchus. But in his choice of diction the style of Lycurgus is much harsher, which is why I argue that it also possesses the kind of Force that seems to be forceful but is not really. For Lycurgus’ speeches use commonplaces more than those of Dinarchus and sometimes use stronger invective in the handling of the points that he makes. He often uses many digressions, indulging in myths, history, and poems, and this also typical of the sort of Force that only appears to be forceful (phainomenē deinotēs). (Transl. C.W. Wooten 1987)

10 Hyperides 10.1 Life The main source on the life of the “finest orator” (der ausgezeichnetste Redner; Blass 1887–1898, III,2 1) is the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 848D–850B). Additional information can be drawn from his speeches and those of his contemporaries and subsequently from Athenaeus, Photius (Bibl. 266) and the two entries in the Suda (υ 294, 295 s.v. Hyperides).1 Son of Glaucippus, of the deme of Collytus, Hyperides was born in Athens in 390/389 BC (it emerges from IG II34, 33a-c [= II2 1924] that in 330/329 BC he was a public arbitrator [diaetētēs] and therefore sixty years of age) and died 322 BC. He came from a wealthy family, undertook costly liturgies (we know of three in 340/339 BC; cf. Worthington 1999, 28) and, like Demosthenes, occupied himself as a professional logographer and politician. His statement that he never prosecuted any private citizen but, in fact, helped some of them (For Euxenippus c. 38[28]: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἰδιώτην οὐδένα πώποτε ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἔκρινα, ἤδη δέ τισι καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐδυνάμην ἐβοήθησα) is probably exaggerated, but he did often appear in court as the synēgoros (supporting speaker; cf. Rubinstein 2000) to support a party in proceedings. Plato (Diog. Laert. 3.46; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 848D; Suda υ 294 s.v. Hyperides) and Isocrates (Athen. 8.341e; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 837D and 848D; Suda l.c.)2 reportedly taught him, but Hyperides’ way of thinking and lifestyle have less to do with philosophy, while Isocrates’ influence can mainly be identified in Hyperides’ Funeral Speech. In terms of lifestyle, Hyperides was the complete opposite of Lycurgus; contrary to Lycurgus’ strict, Spartan life, the well-known bon viveur Hyperides led a rich private life full of frolic3 and was satirised in comedies due to his gastronomic indulgences and relations with courtesans:

|| 1 Cf. in particular the fragments of Hermippus (FGrH 1026 F46–47 with the commentary by J. Bollansée, p. 382–394) on Hyperides’ transgressions and his death. On Hyperides’ biography, see M. Marzi, Iperide, in: Marzi/Leone/Malcovati (1977) 9–24; Worthington 1999 (27–30); Cooper (2001) 61– 65 and particularly Engels (1993). 2 Cf. Engels (1993) 15–17; J. Engels, Antike Überlieferungen über die Schüler des Isokrates, in: W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates. Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers, Trier 2003, 185, 188–194. See also J. Fairweather, Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers, AncSoc 5 (1974) 262– 263. 3 Cf. [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849D: καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια καταφερής. His maxim is also memorable (fr. 207 Jensen): Ὑπερείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μὴ μαθόντα τὰ καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ (“The orator Hyperides said that one cannot live a good life if one does not taste the beautiful things in life”). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-010

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Athenaeus 8.341e: καὶ Ὑπερείδης δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ ὀψοφάγος ἦν, ὥς φησι Τιμοκλῆς ὁ κωμικὸς ἐν Δήλῳ διηγούμενος τοὺς παρὰ Ἁρπάλου δωροδοκήσαντας (“And Hyperides the orator was also a glutton, according to the comic author Timocles in Delos [fr. 4], in his discussion of the people Harpalus bribed”. Transl. S. Douglas Olson 2006–2012); 13.590c–d: Ὑπερείδης δ᾽ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκ τῆς πατρῴας οἰκίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀποβαλὼν Γλαύκιππον Μυρρίνην τὴν πολυτελεστάτην ἑταίραν ἀνέλαβε, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐν ἄστει εἶχεν, ἐν Πειραιεῖ δὲ Ἀρισταγόραν, Φίλαν δ᾽ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, ἣν πολλῶν ὠνησάμενος χρημάτων εἶχεν ἐλευθερώσας, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ οἰκουρὸν αὐτὴν ἐποιήσατο, ὡς Ἰδομενεὺς ἱστορεῖ. ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑπὲρ Φρύνης λόγῳ Ὑπερείδης ὁμολογῶν ἐρᾶν τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ οὐδέπω τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀπηλλαγμένος τὴν προειρημένην Μυρρίνην εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν εἰσήγαγεν (“The orator Hyperides threw his son Glaucippus out of their ancestral home and took up with the extremely expensive courtesan Myrrhine. He kept her in the city; Aristagora in the Piraeus; and Phila [a woman he had purchased for a large sum of money and then set free, and whom he had later made his housekeeper] in Eleusis, according to Idomeneus [FGrH 338 F14a]. In his speech On Behalf of Phryne [fr. 171 Jensen], Hyperides admits that he was in love with her and had by no means escaped these feelings when he moved the Myrrhine mentioned above into his house”. Transl. S. Douglas Olson 2006–2012).

Nevertheless, the foregoing did not stop Hyperides, “a flamboyant figure, a man of contrasts” (Cooper 2001, 65), from becoming an uncompromising politician who became involved in public affairs at a young age, bringing suits against Aristophon (362 BC)4 and Autocles (360 BC). However, the decisive step in his career was a charge of high treason brought against Philocrates using the procedure of eisangelia, in relation to the Peace of Philocrates of 346 BC between Athens and Philip II (Demosth. 19.116: ὅτ᾽ εἰσήγγελλεν Ὑπερείδης Φιλοκράτην; cf. Hyper. Pro Euxen. c. 39[29]; Demosth. 19.150; Lehmann 2004, 150–151).5 Philocrates fled to avoid the trial and was sentenced to death in absentia (Aeschin. 2.6; 3.79). Hyperides emerged as the most important orator of the anti-Macedonian faction, second only to Demosthenes (Schaefer 1966–1967, II 324). As a bold and skilled orator, Hyperides was chosen to replace Aeschines, who had been initially chosen by the demos, as Athens’ representative, first before the Delphic Amphictyony in relation to a dispute with Delos over control of the temple of Apollo on the island (343/342 BC; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850A; Demosth. 18.134),6 and subsequently on Chios and Rhodes. In 338 BC, he and Demomeles proposed the awarding of a crown to Demosthenes for his services to the homeland, and subsequently succeeded in rebutting the charge brought by Diondas for an illegal proposed decree (graphē paranomōn), which won less than a fifth of the votes ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 848F; Demosth. 18.222–223; Will 2013,

|| 4 Cf. C. Cooper, Hypereides, Aristophon, and the Settlement of Keos, in: C. Cooper (ed.), Epigraphy and the Greek Historian, Toronto 2008, 31–56. 5 The charge brought by Demosthenes against Aeschines dates back to the same period. See D.M. MacDowell, Demosthenes On the False Embassy (Oration 19). Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Oxford 2000, 21–22. 6 Cf. G. Ramming, Die politischen Ziele und Wege des Aischines, Erlangen 1965, 94–96; Engels (1993) 74–80; Will (2013) 115.

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164). As a member of the Boule of 500, Hyperides, like Lycurgus, did not participate in the Battle of Chaeronea against the Macedonians (Lucian Parasit. 42; cf. Lycurg. Leocr. 37). Following the battle, he proposed the famous decree setting extreme measures to protect the city from Philip II: granting slaves their freedom, giving citizenship to foreigners, and restoring privileges to the disenfranchised (Lycurg. Leocr. 36 ff., particularly 41: τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους).7 Hyperides defended his decree against Aristogeiton’s charge of an illegal decree (fr. 27–39 Jensen) with the following words: “It was not I, but the battle of Chaeronea, that proposed the decree” ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849A: οὐκ ἐγὼ τὸ ψήφισμα ἔγραψα ἡ δ’ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχη). After the end of the war, his politics remained anti-Macedonian and he did not hesitate to bring a charge against Demades, the representative of the pro-Macedonian faction (fr. 76–86 Jensen). Accounts differ on whether he was among the orators whose extradition Alexander demanded after the destruction of Thebes (Arrian 1.10.4; Diod. 17.15; Plut. Phoc. 17.2; Demosth. 23.4).8 It is certain that, along with Demosthenes and Lycurgus, Hyperides played a pivotal role in the subsequent years. However, a rift was created between him and Demosthenes much later by the trial concerning the Harpalus affair in 324/323 BC,9 when Hyperides was among the ten state prosecutors opposing his old political ally (Against Demosthenes c. 21; 38).10 After the death of Alexander (in June 323 BC), he decisively supported the plans of general Leosthenes to revolt against the Macedonians; this was a struggle that led him to once again join forces with Demosthenes. By merit of his rhetorical prowess and antiMacedonian politics, he was tasked with delivering the – mostly – extant Funeral Speech for the fallen during the first victories of the Lamian War (Diod. 18.13.5: ὁ μὲν δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸν ἐπιτάφιον ἔπαινον εἰπεῖν προσέταξεν Ὑπερείδῃ τῷ πρωτεύοντι τῶν ῥητόρων τῇ τοῦ λόγου δεινότητι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἀλλοτριότητι; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849F; Herrman 2009, 13).11

|| 7 Cf. W. Will, Athen und Alexander. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Stadt von 338 bis 322 v.Chr., Munich 1983, 8–10; T.T.B. Ryder, Demosthenes and Philip II, in: I. Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator, London/New York 2000, 82–83; Lehmann (2004) 175–176; I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, New Haven/London 2008, 155; Will (2013) 141. Cf. M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, III (T 67), Brussels 1983, 67–68. 8 Cf. A.B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, Oxford 1980, 92– 96; C. Cooper, A Note on Antipater’s Demand of Hyperides and Demosthenes, AHB 7 (1993) 130–135. 9 See above Chapter 6.1 note 21. 10 Cf. Dinarchus 2.6; Wirth (1999) 99–145. Cf. also the criticism against Hyperides due to this action in [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 848E; [Lucian] Demosth. enc. 31. 11 Cf. Schmitt (1992); W. Lindsay Adams, Alexander’s Successors to 221 BC, in: J. Roisman/I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Malden ΜΑ/Oxford 2010, 209–210.

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Following the victory of the Macedonians at Crannon in Thessaly (322 BC), Hyperides, like Demosthenes, was forced to flee Athens and was sentenced to death in absentia, following a proposal by Demades.12 In Aegina or, according to other sources, in Hermione, he was captured by Antipater and brutally executed ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849A–C; Plut. Demosth. 28.4; Phoc. 29.1; [Lucian] Demosth. enc. 31; Suda υ 294 s.v. Hyperides and α 2704 s.v. Antipatros).

10.2 The Speeches In antiquity, 77 speeches by Hyperides were known to exist, of which 52 were considered genuine ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849D). Among the 72 or 7313 titles known to us (the speech Against Timandros must now be added to his corpus), most are judicial speeches, while there is only one epideictic speech and 15 deliberative speeches. Six speeches concern courtesans, including the defence speech For Phryne, with which the famous anecdote regarding the courtesan’s beauty revealed before the judges is associated (Athen. 13.590d–591a; cf. fr. 171–180 Jensen):14 Athenaeus 13(590d) ὁ δὲ Ὑπερείδης (590e) συναγορεύων τῇ Φρύνῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἤνυε λέγων ἐπίδοξοί τε ἦσαν οἱ δικασταὶ καταψηφιούμενοι, παραγαγὼν αὐτὴν εἰς τοὐμφανὲς καὶ περιρήξας τοὺς χιτωνίσκους γυμνά τε τὰ στέρνα ποιήσας τοὺς ἐπιλογικοὺς οἴκτους ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως αὐτῆς ἐπερρητόρευσεν δεισιδαιμονῆσαί τε ἐποίησεν τοὺς δικαστὰς τὴν ὑποφῆτιν καὶ ζάκορον Ἀφροδίτης ἐλέῳ χαρισαμένους μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ ἀφεθείσης ἐγράφη μετὰ ταῦτα ψήφισμα, μηδένα οἰκτίζεσθαι τῶν λεγόντων ὑπέρ τινος μηδὲ βλεπόμενον (590f) τὸν κατηγορούμενον ἢ τὴν κατηγορουμένην κρίνεσθαι. ἦν δὲ ὄντως μᾶλλον ἡ Φρύνη καλὴ ἐν τοῖς μὴ βλεπομένοις. διόπερ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως ἦν αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν γυμνήν· ἐχέσαρκον γὰρ χιτώνιον ἠμπείχετο καὶ τοῖς δημοσίοις οὐκ ἐχρῆτο βαλανείοις. τῇ δὲ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων πανηγύρει καὶ τῇ τῶν Ποσειδωνίων ἐν ὄψει τῶν Πανελλήνων πάντων ἀποθεμένη θοἰμάτιον καὶ λύσασα τὰς κόμας ἐνέβαινε τῇ θαλάττῃ· καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς Ἀπελλῆς (591a) τὴν Ἀναδυομένην Ἀφροδίτην ἀπεγράψατο. καὶ Πραξιτέλης δὲ ὁ ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐρῶν αὐτῆς τὴν Κνιδίαν Ἀφροδίτην ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπλάσατο.

|| 12 Cf. Engels (1993) 379 ff., 392 ff.; P. Brun, L’orateur Démade. Essai d’histoire et d’historiographie, Bordeaux 2000, 118–123. 13 If the speech Pros tous Antipatrou presbeis is not identical to Rhodiacus, then we now know 73 titles. See recently K. Fleischer, Eine neue Hypereidesrede aus Herculaneum. Gegen die Gesandten des Antipatros (PHerc. 1021, Kol. 11+12), ZPE 207 (2018) 21–38. 14 Cf. Engels (1993) 67 ff.; Cooper (1995) 303–318; O’Connell (2013) 90–116; Roisman/Worthington (2015) 257–258. See also J. Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes. The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens, London 1997, 133–135; P. Dimakis, Orateurs et hétaïres dans l’Athènes classique, in: P. Dimakis (ed.), Éros et droit en Grèce classique, Paris 1998, 43–54; W. Schuller, Die Welt der Hetären. Berühmte Frauen zwischen Legende und Wirklichkeit, Stuttgart 2008, 64–66; K. Gilhuly, The Feminine Matrix of Sex and Gender in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2009, 180–183; E.E. Cohen, Athenian Prostitution. The Business of Sex, Oxford 2015, 62–63; K. Kapparis, Prostitution in the Ancient Greek World, Leiden/Boston 2017, 258–261.

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Athenaeus 13(590d) Hyperides (590e) spoke in support of Phryne, and when his speech accomplished nothing, and the jurors seemed likely to convict her, he brought her out in public, ripped her dress to shreds, exposed her chest, and at the conclusion of his speech produced cries of lament (epilogikoi oiktoi) as he gazed at her, causing the jurors to feel a superstitious fear of this priestess (hypophētis) and templeattendant (zakoros) of Aphrodite, and to give in to pity rather than put her to death. Afterward, when she had been acquitted, a decree was passed to the effect that no speaker was to lament on another person’s behalf, and that no accused man or women was to be put on display (590f) while their case was being decided. The parts of Phryne’s body that were not seen were actually the most beautiful. As a consequence, it was not easy to get a glimpse of her naked, because she used to wear a tunic that clung to her body, and avoided the public baths. But at the Eleusinia and the Posidonia festivals, with all the Greeks watching, she took off her robe, let down her hair, and entered the sea; Apelles (591a) drew the inspiration for his “Aphrodite Rising from the Sea” from her. So too the sculptor Praxiteles, who was in love with her, used her as the model for his “Cnidian Aphrodite”. (Transl. S. Douglas Olson 2006– 2012).

Considering Hyperides’ exceptional reputation in antiquity, it is unfortunate that, due to the fragmentary nature of his extant speeches, we have but a limited view of his rhetorical art. Apart from the brief speech For Euxenippus, which has survived in full, the speeches For Lycophron, Against Philippides, Against Athenogenes, Against Demosthenes, Against Diondas, Against Timandros and the Funeral Speech survive as smaller or larger fragments through papyrus discoveries or the Archimedes Palimpsest. It has not been directly proven whether the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech On the Agreement with Alexander (17) belongs to Hyperides, as Libanius conjectures (Hypothesis; cf. Scholia Demosth. 17, I p. 195 Dilts; Phot. Bibl. 265.491a). Indications concerning both language and content that were reinforced after the discovery of part of Hyperides’ speech Against Diondas seem to verify the latter assumption.15

10.2.1 For Euxenippus The defence speech For Euxenippus16 received particular praise from modern critics. 17 In this speech, Hyperides defended the wealthy and elderly Euxenippus against the charge brought by Polyeuctus using the procedure of eisangelia, i.e. that he supposedly gave an erroneous interpretation of a dream during his incubation in Amphiaraus’ temple concerning the allocation of lands in Oropus among the ten tribes, an

|| 15 See Whitehead (2000) 7 note 26, 89, 218, 257, 258; Herrman (2009a) 175–185. 16 The following excerpts of For Euxenippus, For Lycophron, Against Athenogenes, Against Demosthenes and the Funeral Speech are based on the Greek text of M. Marzi in Marzi/Leone/Malcovati (1977). 17 E.g. by J. Girard, Études sur l’eloquence attique. Lysias, Hyperide, Démosthène, 2. ed., Paris 1884, 163–164; Blass (1887–1898) III,2 66; de Falco (1947) 54–55; Burtt (1954) 464; Oikonomidis (1958); Whitehead (2000) 160–161.

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issue that arose following the Battle of Chaeronea. The prosecutor was supported by the stern orator Lycurgus (c. 26[12]: οὐ Λυκοῦργον ἐκάλεις συγκατηγορήσοντα;) and Polyeuctus’ speech was possibly permeated by a similar high-minded passion. Hyperides’ approach to the charge was completely different and commensurate to his rhetorical art; the facts had already been put forth by the other advocates, and he feels free to point out the opponent’s inconsistencies and other weakness, in accordance with Anaximenes’ requirements concerning examination (exetasis; Rhet. Alex. 5.1: ἡ ἐξέτασίς ἐστι προαιρέσεων ἢ πράξεων ἢ λόγων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐναντιουμένων ἐμφάνισις; cf. Curtis 1970, 32–34; Whitehead 2000, 160). With a dispassionate,18 brief, terse and symmetrical speech, Hyperides downplays and lampoons the court case (the rhetorical terminus technicus is diasyrmos), viewing it as an abuse of the law. This speech is our main source on eisangelia (“impeachment”) due to serious injury to the public good (c. 22[6]–23[8]),19 but the law cannot formally be applied to the case of the wealthy and elderly Euxenippus because, regardless of what he proposed, he was a public citizen and not an orator, as required by the law (c. 23[8]: ῥήτωρ ὢν μὴ λέγῃ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων; 40[30]: ἰδιώτην δ᾽ ὄντα κρίνεις ἐν τῇ τοῦ ῥήτορος τάξει; 47[38]). Furthermore, Polyeuctus’ charge is not based on the spirit of the law either, as Euxenippus is a harmless man. Hyperides presents himself as a legal expert and an experienced politician, who may have wished to benefit politically from the case (c. 37[27]–39[29]; cf. Usher 1999, 333–335): For Euxenippus (27) ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὦ Πολύευκτε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ὅθεν κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιο. καίτοι σε ἐχρῆν, ἐπείπερ προῄρησαι πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ δύνασαι, μὴ τοὺς ἰδιώτας κρίνειν μηδ᾽ εἰς τούτους νεανιεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐάν τις ἀδικῇ, τοῦτον κρίνειν, στρατηγὸς ἐάν τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττῃ, τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλλειν· παρὰ γὰρ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι βλάπτειν τὴν πόλιν, ὅσοι ἂν αὐτῶν προαιρῶνται, οὐ παρ᾽ Εὐξενίππῳ οὐδὲ τῶν δικαστῶν τούτων οὐδενί. (28) καὶ οὐ σὲ μὲν οὕτως οἴομαι δεῖν πράττειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρημαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἰδιώτην οὐδένα πώποτε ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἔκρινα, ἤδη δέ τισι καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐδυνάμην ἐβοήθησα. τίνας οὖν κέκρικα καὶ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθέστακα; Ἀριστοφῶντα τὸν Ἁζηνιέα, ὃς ἰσχυρότατος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγένηται· (καὶ οὗτος ἐν τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ δύο ψήφους ἀπέφυγε·) (29) Διοπείθη τὸν Σφήττιον, ὃς δεινότατος δόκει εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· Φιλοκράτη τὸν Ἁγνούσιον, ὃς θρασύτατα καὶ ἀσελγέστατα τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρηται· τοῦτον εἰσαγγείλας ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ὧν Φιλίππῳ ὑπηρέτει κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εἷλον ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ καὶ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἔγραψα δικαίαν καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, “ῥήτορα ὄντα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τἀναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ”. For Euxenippus (27) It seems to me, Polyeuctus, that there is nothing you would exclude as grounds for an accusation. And yet, since you have chosen to enter politics, and, by Zeus, you are certainly good at it, you should not prosecute private citizens (idiōtai) or go after them like

|| 18 Cf. Rubinstein (2000) 169–170. 19 Hansen (1975); Whitehead (2000) 186–189; Volonaki (2019) 293–314.

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some young kid, but you should prosecute (krinein) a politician if he commits a crime, or impeach (eisangellein) a general if he does not do what he should. These are the men who have the power to harm the city, if they so choose, not Euxenippus or any of these jurors. (28) It’s not that I am advising you to act in this way, having conducted my own political career differently, but I have never in my life prosecuted a private citizen, and in fact I have helped several individuals as much as I could. Tell me, whom have I prosecuted or brought to trial? Aristophon of Hazenia, who had become extremely powerful politically – he was acquitted in this court by just two votes. (29) Then there was Diopeithes of Sphettus, reputedly the most dangerous man in the city; and Philocrates of Hagnus whose political conduct had been insolent and wanton. I impeached this fellow for the services he rendered to Philip against the city, and I secured his conviction in court; and I drew up an impeachment (eisangelia) that was just and based on the law, namely, that “he was a politician who was not giving the best advice to the Athenian people because he took money and gifts from those who were acting against the interests of the people.” (Transl. C. Cooper 2001)

10.2.2 For Lycophron The circumstances are similar in the defence speech For Lycophron concerning the charge brought under the procedure of eisangelia by Ariston against Lycophron for adultery. The structure of the speech is clear, but it unfortunately survives in fragments. Lycurgus spoke once again (c. 3[3]) and tried to amplify the importance of the case; Lycophron is portrayed in the charge as a serial adulterer who is responsible for subverting the constitution, as undermining morality and breaking the laws means undermining democracy (c. 10[12]: καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν αἰτιᾷ ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον παραβαίν[ον]τα τοὺς νόμους).20 In Hyperides’ speech, Lycophron, a man over fifty years of age, presents himself as a simple, honest man: he diminishes the importance of the case and lampoons Ariston as an irreverent sycophant (c. 3[2]: ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης; diasyrmos);21 he then employs an eikos-argument in order to rebut the charge of immoral behaviour during the bridal procession (c. 5[5]–6[7]) and makes references to his life in the past (c. 12[15]–15[18]). The following passage presents Lycophron’s peaceable life in the political community as a typical example of a sound citizen with a good reputation, who was never embroiled in court disputes and was honoured by the hippeis (c. 11[14]–15[18]): For Lycophron (14) τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν ἄνδρες δικασταὶ καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται καὶ καταψεύδεσθαι, ὑμᾶς δ’ οἶμαι δεῖν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγόρου διαβολῶν περὶ ἐμοῦ δικάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ βίου ὃν βεβίωκα ἐξετάσαντας· λαθεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον οὐκ ἔνι οὔτε πονηρὸν ὄντα οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἐπιεικῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος μάρτυς ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ τρόπου ἀκριβέστατος, (15) ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν οἵα αὕτη [ἐστ]ίν.

|| 20 Cf. Lycurgus fr. 63 Conomis; Whitehead (2000) 129. 21 See Whitehead (2000) 64–65. Cf. Curtis (1970) 65; S. Salomone, Osservazioni sull’orazione iperidea per Licofrone, Maia 25 (1973) 55–63.

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ὅσα μὲν γὰρ [τῶ]ν ἀδικημάτων [ἐν ἁ]πάσῃ τ ἡλικίᾳ [τῇ το]ῦ ἀνθρώπου [ἐνδέ]χεται ἀδικῆ[σαι, τα]ῦτα μὲν δεῖ [σκοπεῖ]ν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ [ἐγκλή]ματος οὗ ἂν [ἔχῃ τις· μο]ιχεύειν [δ᾽ οὐκ ἐνδέ]χεται ἀπὸ [πεντήκο]ντα ἐτῶν [ἄνθρωπον,] ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πά[λαι τοιοῦ]τός ἐστιν, ὃ δειξάτωσαν οὗτοι, ἢ ψευδῆ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰκὸς εἶναι. (16) ἐγὼ τοίνυν ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν διατρίβων ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον οὔτε αἰτίαν πονηρὰν οὐδεμίαν πώποτ᾽ ἔλαβον, οὔτ᾽ ἔγκλημά μοι πρὸς οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν γέγονεν, οὐδὲ πέφευγα δίκην οὐδεμίαν, οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον δεδίωχα, ἱπποτροφῶν δὲ διατετέλεκα φιλοτίμως τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ· ἐστεφάνωμαι δ᾽ ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων πάντων ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν συναρχόντων. (17) ὑμεῖς γάρ με ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ πρῶτον μὲν φύλαρχον ἐχειροτονήσατε, ἔπειτα εἰς Λῆμνον ἵππαρχον, καὶ ἦρξα μὲν αὐτόθι δύ᾽ ἔτη τῶν πώποθ᾽ ἱππαρχηκότων μόνος, προσκατέμεινα δὲ αὐτόθι τὸν τρίτον ἐνιαυτόν, οὐ βουλόμενος πολίτας ἄνδρας ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν εἰσπράττειν τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἀπόρως διακειμένους. (18) καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοι τῷ χρόνῳ ἔγκλημα μὲν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐνεκάλεσεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ, στεφάνοις δὲ τρισὶν ἐστεφανώθην ὑπὸ τοῦ δ[ήμ]ου τοῦ ἐν Ἡφαισ[τί]ᾳ καὶ ἑτέροις ὑ[πὸ] τοῦ ἐν Μυρίνῃ· ἃ [χρ]ὴ τε-κμήρια ὑμῖν ε[ἶν]αι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα, ὡς ψευδεῖς κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ αἰτίαι εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν Ἀθήνησι πονηρὸν ἐν Λήμνῳ χρηστὸν εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ὑμεῖς ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄντα με ἀπεστέλλετε ἐκεῖσε, παρακατατιθέμενοι δύο πόλεις τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν. For Lycophron (14) So, gentlemen of the jury, Ariston can tell whatever lies he likes, but I think you should make your decision about me not on the basis of the prosecution’s slanders (diabolai) but after reviewing my whole life. For it’s impossible, in a democracy such as yours, for anyone within the city, whether bad or good, to escape detection, but the past is the most reliable witness of any man’s character, especially against charges like these. (15) Crimes that can be committed at any time in a man’s life should be considered in light of the specific accusation raised against him. But adultery (moicheuein) is not something that a man can begin to commit after fifty. Either he has been a seducer for a long time, and let my accusers prove that of me, or the accusation is probably false. (16) Now then, gentlemen of the jury, I have spent my whole life with you in the city, and during that time never once have I been subject to a single accusation of wrongdoing or accused any other citizen, or been a defendant or prosecutor in any lawsuit, but I have devoted my entire life to breeding horses, with enthusiasm (philotimōs) that went well beyond my energy and means. I have been awarded a crown for bravery (andragathia) by all the cavalry and by my fellow officers. (17) You, gentlemen of the jury, elected me first as Phylarch, then as Hipparch at Lemnos. I was the only Hipparch to hold office there for two years, and I stayed on for a third year, not wanting to be rash in demanding pay for the cavalry from citizens who were in financial straits. (18) During that time no one on the island brought a charge against me, either private or public, but I was crowned three times by the people of Hephaestia and other times by the people of Myrine. This should be the proof you need in this trial, that the charges against me are false. It’s impossible for a man who is bad (ponēros) in Athens to be good (chrēstos) in Lemnos, nor did you hold such a low opinion of me, when you dispatched me there and placed in my charge two of your own cities. (Transl. C. Cooper 2001 with modifications)

10.2.3 Against Athenogenes Vivid descriptions and masterful tactics dominate the speech Against Athenogenes for a dikē blabēs (“a private action for damage to property”) to redress an injustice concerning a purchase contract, involving slaves, debts, homosexuality and a courte-

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san.22 The characterisation of the speaker, Epicrates, is exceptional (“a model of characterization”; Cooper 2001, 67; cf. menandrische Ethopöie; Wilamowitz 1923, 64)23 and a testament to the grace and simplicity of Hyperides’ judicial speeches, in line with Lysias’ virtues. In contrast to the metic Athenogenes, dismissively referred to as a logographer and marketplace-type and worst of all, an Egyptian (c. 2[3]: ἄνθρωπον λογογράφον τε καὶ ἀγοραῖον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον Αἰγύπτιον),24 Epicrates is presented as a naive man with passions. The excerpt below presents the foolishness – almost intentional in its presentation – with which the speaker describes how he was deceived by a woman he fell in love with (c. 1[1–3]): Against Athenogenes (1) εἰπόντος δέ μου πρὸς αὐτὴν τά τε [πραχθέ]ντα, καὶ ὅτι μοι Ἀθηνογένης χαλε[πὸς] εἴη καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοι τῶν μετρίων [συγ]χωρεῖν, τοῦτον μὲν ἔφη ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον [εἶν]αι, ἐμὲ δ᾽ ἐκέλευε θαρρεῖν· αὐτὴ γάρ μοι [πά]ντα συναγωνιεῖσθαι. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔλεγεν [σπο]υδάζουσά τε τῷ ἤθει ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα, [καὶ] ὀμνύουσα τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, ἦ μὴν [με]τ᾽ εὐνοίας τῆς ἐμῆς λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ [πάση]ς ἀληθείας, (2) ὥστ᾽ ἐμὲ ὦ ἄνδρες δικα[σταί (ῥηθ]ήσεται γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθές) ταῦ[τα π]επεῖσθαι. οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξίστησιν [ἀνθρώπου] φύσιν ἔρως, προσλαβὼν γυναι[κὸς πανουργ]ίαν. ἐκείνη γοῦν φενακίζουσα [ἅπαντ]α ταῦτα προσπεριέκοψε[ν α]ὑτῇ [ὡς δὴ] εἰς παιδίσκην τριακοσίας δραχμὰς [εὐν]οίας ἕνεκα. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὦ ἄνδρες δι[κασ]ταὶ οὐ[δ]ὲν θαυμαστόν με ὑπὸ Ἀν[τιγόν]ας τὸν τρόπον τουτονὶ παιδαγω[γηθῆ]ναι, (3) γυναικὸς ἣ δεινοτάτη μὲν [τῶν] ἑταιρῶν ὥς φασιν ἐφ᾽ ἡλ[ικί]ας ἐγένε[το, διατ]ετέλεκε δὲ πορνοβοσκοῦσα. Against Athenogenes (1) When I told her what had happened, how Athenogenes was hostile to me and was not willing to make any compromise, she said that he was always like this and told me not to worry; she would help me out in everything. (2) She seemed quite earnest when she said this, and she swore the most solemn oath, that she had my best interests at heart and was speaking the whole truth. The result was, to tell you the truth, gentlemen of the jury, that I believed her words. This is how passion (erōs), so it seems, unbalances a man’s nature (physis), when it enlists a woman’s trickery. At any rate, by this deception, she wheedled out of me an additional three hundred drachmas for her kindness, allegedly to buy a girl. (3) Perhaps, gentlemen of the jury, it comes as no surprise that I was toyed with in this way by Antigone. The woman, they say, was the most treacherous hetaira of her day and now remains in the business as a brothel keeper. (Transl. C. Cooper 2001)

Apart from the outline of the speaker’s character, the fact that this naive speaker, in a civil trial, equates the written laws with justice and democracy is of particular interest for the relationship between the individual and the political community. Epicrates || 22 Cf. E.E. Cohen, Athenian Prostitution. The Business of Sex, Oxford 2015, 170–171; K. Kapparis, Prostitution in the Ancient Greek World, Leiden/Boston 2017, 254–255. 23 See also L. Horváth, Hypereides’ Rede gegen Athenogenes und die zeitgenössische Komödie, WS 120 (2007) 25–34. 24 On the disparaging characterisations of logographos (“professional speechwriter”), agoraios (“marketer”, but metaphorically meaning “ignorant and uneducated”; cf. Plat. Prot. 347c; Aristoph. Equ. 218; Aves 1015; Phot. Lex. α 233 Theodoridis; de Falco 1947, 156) and Aigyptios (“Egyptian”, but metaphorically meaning “rascal”; cf. the verb aigyptiazein Aristoph. Thesmoph. 922; Cratinus fr. 406 K.-A.), cf. Whitehead (2000) 286–287.

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does not dispute the written law as an expression of justice but the validity of a contract which, being unfair, is contrary to the spirit of the law, which requires just agreements (c. 6[13]: τά γε δίκαια ὦ βέλτιστε· τὰ δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κύρια εἶναι).25 He supports the strength of the law, which was written not by lovers and fraudsters, but by the greatest democrat of all, Solon (c. 10[21]: ὁ δημοτικώτα[τος] Σόλων). This is unquestionably “the most famous contract case from classical Athens” (Lanni 2006, 163).26 Pseudo-Longinus (On the Sublime 34.3) extols Hyperides’ performance, marking him as superior to Demosthenes when the latter attempts to be charming (epicharis); in fact, he makes reference to his speech Against Athenogenes: “If Demosthenes had tried to write the little speech on Phryne or Athenogenes, he would have been an even better advertisement for Hyperides (ἔτι μᾶλλον ἂν Ὑπερείδην συνέστησεν)”.

10.2.4 The New Hyperides: Against Diondas The speech Against Diondas of the “New Hyperides”, as transmitted in the Archimedes Palimpsest, is of great political interest regarding the domestic political conditions of Athens, with Macedon after the Battle of Chaeronea as a point of reference. This is most likely Hyperides’ defence speech against Diondas’ charge for an illegal proposal for the awarding of an honorific crown to Demosthenes. Due to certain allusions (e.g. concerning the Battle of Chaeronea 176r 5; the destruction of Thebes 173v 25–26; Alexander’s demand for military support 174v 21–25) the speech is dated to around 334 BC.27 Hyperides addresses Diondas as a quarrelsome sycophant who worked for Philip II and brought fifty indictments, primarily against anti-Macedonian politicians (145r 9–12; 174v 27 ff.; 175v 1 ff.). The passage below is enlightening: Against Diondas (145r 3 ff.) καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὥσπερ τοὺς γράφοντας οἴεσθε δεῖν κολάζειν, ἐάν τις ἀσύμφορόν τι τῷ δήμῳ γράφῃ, οὕτως καὶ τοὺς τὰς γραφὰς γραφομένους ἐξετάζετε· οὐκ ἔλαττον γάρ ἐστιν ἀδίκημ[α] τὸ τὰ τῷ δήμῳ συμφέροντα ἐμποδίζειν γραφὰς ἐνιστάν(τα) τοῦ τὰ παράνομα γράφειν. Διώνδας δὲ νῦν ἐν πεντήκοντα γραφαῖς, ἃς ἐγράψατο, κατὰ μὲν τῶ(ν) ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου πολιτευομένων οὐδεμίαν πώποτε γραφὴν ἀπήνεγκεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐβλασφήμησεν οὐδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν, τοῖς δὲ τἀναντία ἐκείνῳ πολιτευομένοις λοιδορούμεν(ος)

|| 25 See recently M. Gagarin, Abuse Is in the Eye of the Beholder, in: C. Carey et al. (eds.), Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts, Leiden/Boston 2019, 17–31, esp. 24 ff. 26 Cf. Cooper (2001) 87–89; Cohen (2005) 296; Roisman (2005) 168–170; (2006) 32–34; Carey (2012) 136–137. See also the discussion of the legal matter in Christ (1998) 221–223; Johnstone (1999) 28 ff.; Harris (2013) 175–212, esp. 199 ff. and, generally, P.C. Millet, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, Cambridge 1991. 27 Cf. Carey et al. (2008) 2–3; Horváth (2014) 10–23.

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διατελεῖ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγώνων. ἐγράψατο δὲ Χαρίδημον μέν, ὃν νῦν ἐγκωμιάζει μὴ ποιεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς ἔλαβεν τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ [δήμ]ου, βουλόμενος (144v) διαπράξασθαι [οὐδὲν ὧν ἐ]δ[ίωκ]εν [ἠ]δικηκότα. Λυκοῦρ(γον) δὲ οὐ μόνον παρανόμων ἐδίωξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβείας πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Δημοσθένη τε πλείους ἢ πέντε καὶ δέκα γραφὰς ἐγράψατο, κατ’ ἐμοῦ δὲ τρεῖς τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπήνεγκεν. καὶ νῦν εἰς τοῦτο ἀναιδείας ἐλήλυθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἐᾷ ὑμᾶς χρῆσθαι οὔτε οἷς ὁ δῆμ(ος) ὁμογνώμων ἐγένετο, οὓς ἐγὼ προεβούλευσα, οὔτε τῇ τοῦ δικαστηρίου γνώσει, πρὸς δὲ τούτο[ι]ς οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ καιροῦ ἀκούειν λέγοντ(ος) οὗ χωρὶς οὐδὲν τῶν πάντ(ων) χρήσιμόν ἐστιν. Against Diondas (145r 3 ff.) And yet, jurors, just as you think it necessary to punish movers of decrees, if someone proposes something that is not beneficial to the demos, so also must you evaluate people who bring indictments (graphas graphesthai). For it is no less a crime to obstruct the interests of the demos by bringing indictments than by bringing illegal legislation (paranoma graphein). Diondas now in fifty indictments (pentēkonta graphai) which he has laid has never yet filed any indictment against those who pursue Philip’s political interests, nor has he even verbally abused even one of them, but against those who pursue political policies opposed to Philip, Diondas persistently utters insults in all the trials. He indicted Charidemus, whom he now eulogises, for failing to perform the actions for which he received his reward from the demos, though he did not want (144v) him to carry out any of the acts for which he was prosecuting him as a criminal. But he not only prosecuted Lycurgus for illegal legislation, but also for impiety before the King Archon. And against Demosthenes he brought more than fifteen indictments; against me he filed three on the same day. And now he has reached such a level of effrontery that he won’t allow you to adopt the people on whom the demos agreed, the ones I proposed, nor the decision of the court, nor on top of this to listen to anyone speaking about the situation (then), without which there is no use in anything. (Ed. and Transl. C. Carey 2008)

The Christian apologist Eusebius (Evangelical Preparation 10.3.14–15), quoting the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyrius, acknowledges similarities between Demosthenes and Hyperides, and accuses the latter of plagiarism, having copied Demosthenes in his speech Against Diondas: Eusebius Evangelical Preparation 10.3.(14) “ἐπεὶ δὲ τοὺς κλέπτας ἔδοξεν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ὑμῖν”, φησίν, “εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀγαγεῖν, μηνύω καὐτὸς Ὑπερείδην τὸν καλὸν πολλὰ παρὰ Δημοσθένους κεκλοφότα ἔν τε τῷ Πρὸς Διώνδαν λόγῳ κἀν τῷ Περὶ τῶν Εὐβούλου δωρεῶν. (15) καὶ ὅτι μὲν ὁ ἕτερος παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου μετέθηκε πρόδηλον· συγχρονούντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὑμῶν μὲν ἂν εἴη ἔργον”, φησίν, “ὦ Ἀπολλώνιε, ἐκ τῶν χρόνων ἀνιχνεῦσαι τὸν κλέπτην. ἐγὼ δὲ ὑποπτεύω μὲν τὸν ὑφῃρημένον εἶναι τὸν Ὑπερείδην· ἀδήλου δὲ ὄντος ὁπότερος, ἄγαμαι μὲν Δημοσθένην, εἰ λαβὼν παρὰ Ὑπερείδου πρὸς δέον διώρθωσε· μέμφομαι δὲ τὸν Ὑπερείδην, εἰ λαβὼν παρὰ Δημοσθένους πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον διέστρεψε”. Eusebius Evangelical Preparation 10.3.(14) “But since,” says he, “it has seemed good to you, I know not how, to bring forward the plagiarists, I myself also inform against the charming Hyperides as having stolen many things from Demosthenes, both in the speech Against Diondas and in the one Concerning the bribes of Eubulus. (15) And that one of them has borrowed from the other is manifest: but as they were contemporaries it must be your task, Apollonius,” says he, “to track the plagiarist from the dates. Now I suspect that the one who has stolen is Hyperides: but as it is uncertain which it was, I admire Demosthenes, if he borrowed from Hyperides and made appropriate corrections; but I blame Hyperides if he borrowed from Demosthenes, and perverted it for the worse.” (Transl. E.H. Gifford 1903)

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However, the significant lexical and conceptual correspondence between Hyperides’ speech Against Diondas and Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown (18; attributing the outcome of the Battle of Chaeronea to tychē, Hyper. Diond. 176v 2–8 - Demosth. 18.192–194; 18.300; the contribution of Athens to the Persian Wars, Hyper. Diond. 176v 8–17 - Demosth. 18.237–238; the Athenians’ warm reception by the Thebans, Hyper. Diond. 137r 1–6 - Demosth. 18.215) suggests a common defence strategy and political or ideological collaboration between Demosthenes and Hyperides (see Rubinstein 2000, 224 note 89).28 J. Herrman went a step further: he conjectures a “political factionalism” (2009a, 179) of anti-Macedonian orators, such as Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, in the late 330s BC. Hyperides, who focuses – more than Demosthenes – on events after the Battle of Chaeronea, thus prepares the resistance against the Macedonians. In any event and regardless of the interpretations dictated by the role of important anti-Macedonian politicians after the rule of Macedon had been established, the speech Against Diondas sheds new light on the image of Hyperides as “the leader of the most radical anti-Macedonian faction at Athens after the defeat of Chaeronea” (Milns 2000, 205).

10.2.5 Against Demosthenes The speech Against Demosthenes, a prosecution speech in the Harpalus affair, survives in highly fragmentary form, but the uncompromising character of Hyperides still shines through. He sarcastically addresses his old political ally and condemns his avarice which led him to compromise with Alexander (c. 25). There is a sharp contrast between the eminent Demosthenes of old, who served as a role model, and the sixty-year-old man now standing accused by young men of bribery (c. 20–22):29 Against Demosthenes (c. 20) εἶτα σὺ περὶ [φιλ]ίας πρὸς ἐμὲ τολ[μήσεις αὐτίκα μά]λα [λέγειν;] … (21) [ταύτην τὴν φιλίαν διέ]λυσας αὐ[τό]ς, ὅ[τε χρ]υσίον κατὰ τῆς [πατρ]ίδος ἔλαβες καὶ [μετ]εβάλου· καὶ κατα[γέλα]στον μὲν σαυ[τὸν] ἐποίησας, κατῄ[σχυν]ας δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν [ἔμπρ]οσθεν χρόνων [τῶν α]ὐτῶν τί σοι προ[ελομέ]νους· καὶ ἐξὸν [ἡμῖν] λαμπροτάτοις [εἶναι] παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ [καὶ τὸ]ν ὑπόλοιπον [βίον ὑ]πὸ δόξης χρη[στῆς πα]ραπεμφθῆν[αι, ἅπα]ντα ταῦτα ἀνέτρ[εψας, κα]ὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνει νυνὶ τηλικοῦτ[ος] ὢν ὑπὸ μειρακίων κρινόμενος περὶ δωροδοκίας. καίτοι ἔδει τοὐναντίον ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ [εἴ] τι προπετέστερον (22) ἔπραττον ἐπιτιμᾶσθαι καὶ κολάζεσθαι. νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν.

|| 28 Cf. Carey et al. (2008) 3; Horváth (2009) 182–222; Todd (2009) 161–174; M. Edwards, Le palimpseste d’Archimède et le nouvel Hypéride, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, Comptes Rendus, Paris 2010, 753–768; L. De Martinis, I democrati ateniesi dopo Cheronea alla luce del nuovo Iperide, Aevum 86 (2012) 39–62; Worthington (2013) 200; Engels (2014) 246 ff.; Horváth (2014) 165–176. 29 Cf. Worthington (1999) 196–197; Lehmann (2004) 214–215.

270 | Hyperides

Against Demosthenes (c. 20) So do you dare to me of our friendship, (21) You yourself destroyed it when you accepted bribes against your country and changed sides. You made yourself a laughingstock and disgraced those who had previously supported your policy. When we could have had the highest renown among the people and been honored for the rest of our lives, you overturned everything. And you are not ashamed, even now at your age, to be tried for bribery (dōrodokia) by mere boys. It should have been the exact opposite: you should have taught (paideuesthai) the younger politicians; you should have criticized and punished them for anything that they did too recklessly. (22) But now we see the opposite: the young are teaching decency to men over sixty. (Transl. C. Cooper 2001)

10.2.6 The Funeral Speech and Hyperides’ Innovations Hyperides’ Epitaphios (322 BC) for the fallen during the first year of the Lamian War is a personal, historical, and emotional speech (Kennedy 1963, 166), and the political ideals of the anti-Macedonian orator are presented clearly: freedom and autonomy against Macedonian tyranny (c. 8[20]–9[25]). In recent years, two commentaries on the speech have been published.30 From a stylistic perspective, it is a very well structured epideictic speech, “full of art and beauty” (voll Kunst und Schönheit; Blass 1887– 1898, III,2 94; cf. the praise of Pseudo-Longinus in On the Sublime 34.2: τὸν δ’ Ἐπιτάφιον ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ὡς οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος, διέθετο), and there is obvious Isocratean influence on the periods, the symmetry, the composition and the selection of words. However, it seems that Hyperides’ teacher also affected the content of the speech. In the proem to the encomium Evagoras (9.5–8), which draws on the tradition of funeral speeches (Alexiou 2009, 31–52),31 Isocrates bemoans the lack of encomia to contemporary exceptional men (9.5: ἐχρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς ἐφ’ αὑτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γεγενημένους), but also criticises those listeners who, out of envy (phthonos), pleasantly listen to encomia to mythical figures and not their contemporaries (9.6); he, instead, favours encomia written for contemporary figures and is proud of his innovation. Hyperides seems to have emulated his teacher in this respect, too; as an innovator, he wrote “the most remarkable epitaphios in Greek literature” (Usher 1999, 337). The exposition of the wars fought by the Athenian ancestors – typical for this literary genre – is omitted; instead, the achievements of contemporaries are put forth, while the general Leosthenes becomes a dominant figure in the speech. The individual holds a key position alongside the city, and his praise serves as an encomium to the other soldiers as well (c. 6[14–15]; 9[24 ff.]). The passage below is characteristic (c. 4[9]–9[24]):

|| 30 Herrman (2009); Petruzziello (2009). Cf. Binder (2007) 247–264. 31 Cf. E. Alexiou, Der Euagoras des Isokrates. Ein Kommentar, Berlin 2010, 30 ff., 66–79.

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Funeral Speech (9) ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον. (10) Λεωσθένης γὰρ ὁρῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν τεταπεινωμένην καὶ [ὥσπερ] ἐπτη[χυ]ῖαν, κατεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ [τῶν] δωροδοκούντων παρὰ Φι[λίπ]που καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου κατὰ [τῶν] πατρίδων τῶν αὑτῶν, [καὶ τ]ὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν [δεομέ]νην ἀνδρός, τὴν δ᾽ Ἑλλά[δα πᾶ]σαν πόλεως, ἥτις προστῆ[ναι δυν]ήσεται τῆς ἡγεμονίας, [ἐπέδ]ωκεν ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ [πατρί]δι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἕλλησ[ιν] εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· (11) καὶ ξενικὴν μὲν δύναμιν στησάμενος, τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἡγεμὼν καταστὰς τοὺς πρώτους ἀντιταξαμένους τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίᾳ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας καὶ Εὐβοέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους αὐτῶν ἐνίκησε μαχόμενος ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ. (12) ἐντεῦθεν δ᾽ ἐλθὼν εἰς Πύλας καὶ καταλαβὼν τὰς [πα]ρόδους, δι᾽ ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐ[πὶ τ]οὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐ[πο]ρεύθησαν, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ [τὴν] Ἑλλάδα πορείας Ἀντίπατρον ἐκώλυσεν, αὐτὸν δὲ [κα]ταλαβὼν ἐν τοῖς τόποις τού[τοι]ς καὶ μάχῃ νικήσας, ἐπολι[όρ]κει κατακλείσας εἰς Λαμίαν· (13) Θετταλοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας καὶ [Αἰ]τωλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ὧν Φίλιππος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀκόντων ἡγούμενοι ἐσεμνύνοντο, τούτων Λεωσθένης ἑκόντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔλαβεν. συνέβη δ᾽ αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων ὧν προείλετο κρατῆσαι, τῆς δὲ εἱ[μαρ]μένης οὐκ ἦν περιγενέ[σθαι.] (14) δίκαιον δ᾽ ἐστὶν μὴ μ[όνον] ὧν ἔπραξεν Λεωσθέν[ης ζῶν] χάριν ἔχειν αὐτῷ πρ[ώτῳ, ἀ]λλὰ καὶ τῆς ὕστερον [γενομέν]ης μάχης μετὰ τ[ὸν ἐκείνο]υ θάνατον, καὶ τῶν [ἄλλων ἀγ]αθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ σ[τρατείᾳ τ]αύτῃ συμβάντων [τοῖς Ἕλ]λησιν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς ὑπὸ [Λε]ωσθένους θεῖσιν θεμελίοις οἰκοδομοῦσιν οἱ νῦν τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις. (15) καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ με τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν [μη]δένα λόγον ποιεῖσθαι, [ἀλλὰ] Λεωσθένη μόν ἐγκω[μιάζ]ειν. συμβαίνει γὰρ [τὸν Λε]ωσθένους ἔπαινον [ἐπὶ ταῖ]ς μάχαις ἐγκώμιον [τῶν ἄλ]λων πολιτῶν εἶναι· το[ῦ μὲν] γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καλ[ῶς ὁ στρα]τηγὸς αἴτιος, τοῦ δὲ νι[κᾶν μαχ]ομένους οἱ κινδυν[εύειν ἐθ]έλοντες τοῖς σώμασ[ιν· ὥστ]ε ὅταν ἐπαιν[ῶ τὴν γ]εγονυῖαν νίκην, ἅμα τ[ῇ Λε]ωσθένους ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ [τὴν τ]ῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμ[ιάσ]ω. (16) τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν δικα[ίως] ἐπαινοίη τῶν πολιτῶ[ν το]ὺς ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ [τε]λευτήσαντας, οἳ τὰς ἑα[υτῶ]ν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆ[ς τῶ]ν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, [φα]νερωτάτην ἀπόδειξιν τ[αύτ]ην ἡγούμενοι εἶναι τοῦ [βούλ]εσθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι [τὴν] ἐλε[υθερ]ίαν περιθεῖναι τὸ μαχομ[ένους] τελευτῆσαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆ[ς. (17) μ]έγα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετ[ο εἰ]ς τὸ προθύμως ὑπὲρ τῆς [Ἑλλά]δος ἀγωνίσασθαι τὸ ἐν τῇ [Βοιω]τίᾳ τὴν μάχην τὴν π[ροτέραν] γενέσθαι. ἑώρων γὰ[ρ τὴν μὲν π]όλιν τῶν Θηβαίων οἰκτ[ρῶς ἠφα]νισμένην ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, [τὴν δὲ ἀ]κρόπολιν αὐτῆς φρουρου[μένην] ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων, τὰ δὲ σώματα τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἐξηνδραποδισμένα, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἄλλους διανεμομένους, ὥστε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα αὐτοῖς τὰ δεινὰ ἄοκνον π[αρ]εῖχε τόλμα εἰς τὸ κινδυνεύειν [πρ]οχείρως. (18) ἀλλὰ μὴν τήν γε π[ερὶ Π]ύλας καὶ Λαμίαν μάχην γεν[ομέν]ην οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνδο[ξον γεν]έσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἧς [ἐν Βοιω]τοῖς ἠγωνίσαντο, οὐ μόνον [τῷ μαχο]μένους νικᾶν Ἀντίπατρον [καὶ τοὺς σ]υμμάχους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τόπῳ, [τῷ ἐ]νταυθοῖ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν μ[άχην.] ἀφικνούμενοι γὰρ οἱ Ἕλλη[νες ἅπα]ντες δὶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰς [τὴν Πυλ]αίαν θεωροὶ γενήσοντ[αι] τῶν ἔργων τῶν π[επρα]γμένων αὐτοῖς· ἅμα γὰρ εἰς τὸ[ν τό]πον ἁθροισθήσονται καὶ τῆ[ς το]ύτων ἀρετῆς μνησθήσοντ[αι. (19) ο]ὐδένες γὰρ πώποτε τῶν γεγονότων οὔτε περὶ καλλιόνων οὔτε πρὸς ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε μετ᾽ ἐλαττόνων ἠγωνίσαντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν πλῆθος ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν πολὺν ἀριθμὸν τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρίνοντες. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθεσαν, τὴν δ᾽ εὐδοξίαν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων ἴδιον στέφανον τῇ πατρίδ[ι περι]έθηκαν. (20) Ἄξιον τοίνυν συλλογίσασθαι καὶ τί ἂν συμβῆναι νομίζομεν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον τούτων ἀγωνισαμένων. ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἑνὸς μὲν δεσπότου τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον ἅπασαν εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ τῷ τούτου τρόπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης χρῆσθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα; συνελόντα δ᾽ εἰπεῖν τὴν Μακεδόνων ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ μὴ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου δύναμιν ἰσχύειν παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις, ὥστε μήτε γυνακῶν μήτε παρθένων μήτε παίδων ὕβρις ἀνεκλείπτους ἑκάστοις καθεστάναι. (21) φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ νῦν [ἤδη]· θυσίας μὲν ἀνθρώποις γ[ιγνο]μένας ἐφορᾶν, ἀγάλμ[ατα δὲ] καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ναοὺς τοῖ[ς μὲν] θεοῖς ἀμελῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώ[ποις] ἐπιμελῶς συντελούμενα, καὶ τοὺς των οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν ἡμᾶς ἀναγκαζομένους. (22) ὅπου δὲ τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς ὅσια διὰ τὴν Μακεδόνων τόλμαν ἀνῄρηται, τί τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους χρὴ νομίζειν; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν

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παντελῶς καταλελύσθαι; ὥστε ὅσῳ δεινότερα τὰ προδοκώμεν᾽ ἂν γενέσθαι κρίνομεν, τοσούτῳ μειζόνων ἐπαίνων τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀξίους χρὴ νομίζειν. (23) οὐδεμία γὰρ στρατεία τὴν στρατευομένων ἀρετὴν ἐνεφάνισεν μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν γεγενημένης, ἐν ᾗ γε παρατάττεσθαι μὲν ὁσημέραι ἀναγκαῖον ἦ, πλείους δὲ μάχας ἠγωνίσθαι διὰ μιᾶς στρατ[είας] ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας πληγὰς λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ, χειμώνων δ᾽ ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέ[ρα]ν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας το[σαύ]τας καὶ τηλικαύτας οὕτως [ἐγ]κρατῶς ὑπομεμνηκένα[ι, ὥσ]τε καὶ τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπὸν [εἶν]αι φράσαι. (24) τὸν δὴ τοιαύτας καρτερίας ἀόκνως ὑπομεῖναι τοὺ πολίτας προτρεψάμενον Λεωσθένη, καὶ τοὺς τῷ τοιούτῳ στρατηγῷ προθύμως συναγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασχόντας ἆρ᾽ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόδειξιν εὐτυχεῖς μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ζῆν ἀπόλειψιν ἀτυχεῖς νομιστέον; οἵ τινες θνητοῦ σώματος ἀθάνατον δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν τὴν κοινὴν ἐλ[ευ]θερίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβεβαίωσαν. Funeral Speech (9) I will begin first with the general, as I should. (10) Leosthenes saw that all of Greece was on its knees and seemed to be cowering, corrupted by men who were bribed by Philip and Alexander to work against their own countries. He realized that our city needed a man, just as Greece needed a city, that could assume leadership (hēgemonia), so he gave himself to his country and his city to Greece for the sake of freedom. (11) He raised a mercenary force, took command of the Athenian army, and in a battle in Boeotia defeated those who from the beginning opposed Greek freedom, the Boeotians, the Macedonians, the Euboeans, and their allies. (12) From there he reached Thermopylae and occupied the pass through which the barbarians once marched to attack the Greeks. He checked Antipater’s advance into Greece and, surprising him in that area, defeated him in battle, forced him to take refuge in Lamia, and began a siege of the city. (13) He made allies of the Thessalians, the Phocians, the Aetolians, and all the others in the region. Philip and Alexander prided themselves in commanding men who were unwilling to serve; Leosthenes took command of the same men, who were ready and willing. He managed to accomplish the goals he set for himself, but he could not overcome fate. (14) It is right to express our gratitude (charis) to Leosthenes first and foremost for the deeds he achieved in his lifetime but also for the battle that was fought after his death and for all the other benefits the Greeks derived from that campaign. For it is on the foundations laid by Leosthenes that men today build their future successes. (15) Let no one think I am not saying anything about the other citizens and praising only Leosthenes. In fact, to praise (epainos) Leosthenes for these battles is also to pay tribute (enkōmion) to the rest of the citizens. A general may be responsible for a well-devised strategy, but victory in battle depends on those willing to risk their lives. So when I praise the victory we won, I shall be commending both Leosthenes’ leadership and the bravery of the others at the same time. (16) For who would not have good reason to praise those citizens who died in this war, who gave their lives for the sake of Greek freedom, and who believed that the clearest proof of their desire to preserve freedom for Greece was to die fighting on its behalf? (17) An important event that contributed to their eagerness to fight for Greece was the battle that took place earlier in Boeotia. They saw that the city of Thebes had been wretchedly destroyed into oblivion, the acropolis garrisoned by Macedonians, the inhabitants reduced to slavery, and their land parceled out to others. These terrible sights that they saw with their own eyes gave them an undaunted courage to face danger readily. (18) But the battle that took place near Thermopylae and Lamia has proven no less glorious for them than when they fought in Boeotia, not only because they defeated Antipater and his allies in battle but also because the battle was located there. For all the Greeks who gather twice a year for the Amphictyonic Council will see the deeds they accomplished, and as soon as they gather at that spot, they will recall their courage. (19) Never did men fight for a more noble prize against stronger enemies with fewer allies. They believed there was strength in courage (aretē) and superiority in bravery (andreia), not in a large

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number of bodies. They secured freedom (eleutheria) for all Greece to share in, but the glory (eudoxia) of their deeds is a crown (stephanos) they won for our country alone. (20) Now then, it is worth considering, what do we think would have happened, if these men had not fought as duty required? Would not the whole inhabited world be subject to a single master? And would not Greece be forced to regard his capricious behavior as law? In short, Macedonian arrogance (hyperēphania) and not the power of justice (tou dikaiou dynamis) would prevail among all people; no woman, no girl, no child would be safe from the endless violations (hybreis) forced on each and every one of them. (21) That is clear from what we have been forced to endure up to now: sacrifices are made to men, and while statues, altars, and temples to the gods are neglected, those to men are carefully cultivated. We ourselves are forced to honor their slaves as heroes. (22) When respect for the gods has been destroyed by Macedonian arrogance, what can we expect would have happened to human respect? Would it not have been utterly destroyed? The more frightening we think the consequences would have been, the greater, we must realize, is the praise those who have died deserve. (23) No campaign displayed the courage (aretē) of its soldiers more than this last one. Daily they were forced to prepare for battle, to fight more engagements on a single campaign than the blows all other soldiers have endured in the past, to withstand with such resolve the extremes of winter and the lack of daily necessities that were so great and so severe that it is difficult to describe in words. (24) Such were the hardships (karteriai) that Leosthenes urged his fellow citizens to endure without flinching, and they themselves readily offered to fight alongside such a great general. Should we not consider it their good fortune (eutycheis) that they displayed their courage rather than their bad fortune (atycheis) that they lost their lives? For the price of their mortal bodies they gained immortal glory, and by their personal courage they secured universal freedom for the Greeks. (Transl. C. Cooper 2001 with modifications)

The figure struck by the general Leosthenes is indicative of the new order of things, which introduces readers to the central role of individuality during the Hellenistic era. When Leosthenes is compared to the heroes of the Trojan War and deemed superior (c. 12[35]: ὥστε οἱ μὲν μετὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν πόλιν εἷλον, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος μόνης πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐταπείνωσεν), one may discern a direct model in Isocrates’ Evagoras 9.65 (οἱ μὲν γὰρ μεθ’ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος Τροίαν μόνην εἷλον, ὁ δὲ μίαν πόλιν ἔχων πρὸς ἅπασαν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπολέμησεν). Hyperides’ epitaphios logos elevates individuality to an institution primarily equated with the values of the city-state and is an impressive innovation in the funeral speech genre at the twilight of the 4th century BC.32

|| 32 Cf. Hess (1938); Loraux (1986) 111–113; K. Prinz, Epitaphios Logos. Struktur, Funktion und Bedeutung der Bestattungsreden im Athen des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt M. 1997, 272 ff., esp. 277; V. Frangeskou, Tradition and Originality in Some Attic Funeral Orations, CW 92 (1999) 316 with note 8; G. Wirth, Der Epitaphios des Hypereides und das Ende einer Illusion, in: R. Kinsky (ed.), Diorthoseis. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hellenismus und zum Nachleben Alexanders des Großen, Munich/ Leipzig 2004, 41; J. Roisman, Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest, in: I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, Malden ΜΑ/Oxford 2007, 397 with note 23; Herrman (2009) 21–24; Petruzziello (2009) 52–92, 205–215.

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10.3 Style Hyperides received the most favourable criticism by Pseudo-Longinus (On the Sublime 34.1–4), who deems him superior to Demosthenes in terms of the number of his rhetorical merits. Hyperides is compared to a pentathlete (pentathlos), who exhibits many remarkable virtues without being the champion in a single one. Hyperides’ numerous strengths may be wanting in elevation (amegethē): for example, he does not possess the force and intensity of Demosthenes and no one feels terror when reading Hyperides, but his speech is full of grace, a sweet and pleasant form, inimitable charm (charites, glykytēs, to epaphroditon), properties that make up the rich palette of his rhetoric: simplicity, wit, irony, jests, biting satire with fun: On the Sublime 34(1) εἰ δ’ ἀριθμῷ, μὴ τῷ μεγέθει κρίνοιτο τὰ κατορθώματα, οὕτως ἂν καὶ Ὑπερείδης τῷ παντὶ προέχοι Δημοσθένους. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ πολυφωνότερος καὶ πλείους ἀρετὰς ἔχων, καὶ σχεδὸν ὕπακρος ἐν πᾶσιν ὡς ὁ πένταθλος, ὥστε τῶν μὲν πρωτείων ἐν ἅπασι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγωνιστῶν λείπεσθαι, πρωτεύειν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. (2) ὁ μέν γε Ὑπερείδης πρὸς τῷ πάντα ἔξω γε τῆς συνθέσεως μιμεῖσθαι τὰ Δημοσθένεια κατορθώματα καὶ τὰς Λυσιακὰς ἐκ περιττοῦ περιείληφεν ἀρετάς τε καὶ χάριτας· καὶ γὰρ λαλεῖ μετὰ ἀφελείας, ἔνθα χρή, καὶ οὐ πάντα ἑξῆς [καὶ] μονοτόνως, ὡς ὁ Δημοσθένης λέγεται, τό τε ἠθικὸν ἔχει μετὰ γλυκύτητος [ἡδὺ] λιτῶς ἐφηδυνόμενον· ἄφατοί τε περὶ αὐτόν εἰσιν ἀστεϊσμοί, μυκτὴρ πολιτικώτατος, εὐγένεια, τὸ κατὰ τὰς εἰρωνείας εὐπάλαιστρον, σκώμματα οὐκ ἄμουσα οὐδ’ ἀνάγωγα, κατὰ τοὺς Ἀττικοὺς ἐκείνους ἅλας ἐπικείμενα, διασυρμός τε ἐπιδέξιος καὶ πολὺ τὸ κωμικὸν καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς εὐστόχου κέντρον, ἀμίμητον δὲ εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπαφρόδιτον· οἰκτίσασθαί τε προσφυέστατος, ἔτι δὲ μυθολογῆσαι κεχυμένως καὶ ἐν ὑγρῷ πνεύματι διεξοδεῦσαί τι εὐκαμπὴς ἄκρως, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὰ μὲν περὶ τὴν Λητὼ ποιητικώτερα, τὸν δ’ ἐπιτάφιον ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ὡς οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος, διέθετο. (3) ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀνηθοποίητος, ἀδιάχυτος, ἥκιστα ὑγρὸς ἢ ἐπιδεικτικός, ἁπάντων ἑξῆς τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ τὸ πλέον ἄμοιρος, ἔνθα μὲν γελοῖος εἶναι βιάζεται καὶ ἀστεῖος, οὐ γέλωτα κινεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ καταγελᾶται, ὅταν δὲ ἐγγίζειν θέλῃ τῷ ἐπίχαρις εἶναι, τότε πλέον ἀφίσταται. τό γέ τοι περὶ Φρύνης ἢ Ἀθηνογένους λογίδιον ἐπιχειρήσας γράφειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἂν Ὑπερείδην συνέστησεν. (4) ἀλλ’ ἐπειδήπερ, οἶμαι, τὰ μὲν θατέρου καλά, καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ὅμως ἀμεγέθη, “καρδίῃ νήφοντος ἀργὰ” καὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἠρεμεῖν ἐῶντα (οὐδεὶς γοῦν Ὑπερείδην ἀναγινώσκων φοβεῖται), ὁ δὲ “ἔνθεν ἑλὼν” τοῦ μεγαλοφυεστάτου καὶ ἐπ’ ἄκρον ἀρετὰς συντετελεσμένας, ὑψηγορίας τόνον, ἔμψυχα πάθη, περιουσίαν ἀγχίνοιαν τάχος, ἔνθα δὴ καίριον, τὴν ἅπασιν ἀπρόσιτον δεινότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα, φημί, ὡς θεόπεμπτά τινα δωρήματα (οὐ γὰρ εἰπεῖν θεμιτὸν ἀνθρώπινα) ἀθρόα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἔσπασεν, διὰ τοῦτο οἷς ἔχει καλοῖς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ νικᾷ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὡσπερεὶ καταβροντᾷ καὶ καταφέγγει τοὺς ἀπ’ αἰῶνος ῥήτορας· καὶ θᾶττον ἄν τις κεραυνοῖς φερομένοις ἀντανοῖξαι τὰ ὄμματα δύναιτο ἢ ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις ἐκείνου πάθεσιν. On the Sublime 34(1) If achievements were to be judged by the number of excellences and not by their greatness (megethos), Hyperides would then be altogether superior to Demosthenes. He has greater variety of voice and his excellences are more numerous. He may almost be said to come a good second in every competition, like the winner of the Pentathlon (pentathlos). In each constest he loses to the professional champion, but comes first of the amateurs. (2) Besides reproducing all the virtues of Demosthenes, except his skill in word arrangement, Hyperides has embraced all the excellences (aretai) and graces (charites) of Lysias. He talks plainly, where necessary, does not speak always in the same tone, as Demosthenes is said to do, and has the power of characterization, seasoned moreover by simplicity and charm. Then he has an untold

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store of polished wit, urbane sarcasm, well-bred elegance, supple turns of irony, jests neither tasteless nor ill-bred, well-dressed with wit like the Attic masters, clever satire, plenty of pointed ridicule and well-directed fun, and in all this a quite indescribable charm (epaphroditon). Nature endowed him fully with the power of evoking pity and also with a superb flexibility in narrating myths copiously, and pursuing a theme with fluency. His story of Leto, for instance, is in a more poetical vein, while his Funeral Oration is as good a piece of epideictic composition as anyone could produce. (3) Demosthenes, on the other hand, has no gift of characterization or of fluency, is far from facile, and no epideictic orator. In fact he has no part in any one of the qualities we have just mentioned. When he is forced into attempting a jest or a witty passage, he rather raises the laugh against himself; and when he tries to approximate charm (epicharis), he is farther from it than ever. If he had tried to write the little speech on Phryne or Athenogenes, he would have been an even better advertisement for Hyperides. (4) But nevertheless I feel that the beauties of Hyperides, many as they are, yet lack grandeur (amegethē); “inert in the heart of a sober man,” they do not trouble the peace of the audience. No one feels frightened while reading Hyperides. But Demosthenes no sooner “takes up the tale” than he shows the merits of great genius in their most consummate form, sublime intensity, living emotion, redundance, readiness, speed – where speed is in season – and his own unapproachable vehemence (deinotēs) and power (dynamis): concentrating in himself all these heaven-sent gifts – it would be impious to call them human – he thus uses the beauties he possesses to win a victory over all others that even compensates for his weaknesses, and out-thunders, as it were, and outshines orators of every age. You could sooner open your eyes to the descent of a thunderbolt than face his repeated outbursts of emotion without blinking. (Transl. W.H. Fyfe/D. Russell 1995)

Hyperides has the ability to imbue his judicial speeches with simplicity, naturalness, latitude, a kind of natural spontaneity (cf. Edwards 1994, 61) as in, for example, the speech For Euxenippus, which opens with the same simple, natural phrase as the speech Against Demosthenes (Pro Euxen. c. 18[1]: ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; In Demosth. c. 1); the peroration is also brief and terse, with an apostrophe to Euxenippus, which is also encountered in the middle of the speech: “I have helped as much as I can” (Pro Euxen. c. 49[41]: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν σοὶ Εὐξένιππε βεβοήθηκα ὅσα εἶχον; cf. 38[28]: ἤδη δέ τισι καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐδυνάμην ἐβοήθησα). This intentional diminution of his personal abilities, in the sense of the admission that he can offer no further help, is indicative of an honest character – and Hyperides’ strength is ēthos, not pathos. This is why he diminishes and lampoons his opponents’ impassioned speeches. This ostensible simplicity is also an example of rhetorical prowess (Dion. Hal. De imit. 31.5.6, p. 213 Us.-Rad.: δοκῶν ἁπλοῦς οὐκ ἀπήλλακται δεινότητος): For Euxenippus c. 19[3]: νυνὶ δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει πάνυ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν (“But today, what’s happening in the city is absolutely ridiculous”); c. 31[19]: κολακείαν ψευδῆ κατηγορῶν Εὐξενίππου, μῖσος καὶ ὀργὴν αὐτῷ συλλέξειν παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν (“By falsely accusing Euxenippus of flattery, you will arouse the hatred and anger of the jurors against him”); Against Demosthenes c. 7: ἡ γὰρ] σὴ ἀπόνο[ια ὦ Δημό]σθενες ὑπ[ὲρ ἁπάντων] τῶν ἀδικούντων νῦν προκινδυνεύει καὶ προαναισχ[υν]τεῖ (“Your madness, Demosthenes, has put you ahead of all criminals in the danger you face and your shameless behavior”. Transl. C. Cooper 2001). On the rhetorical terminus technicus diasyrmos cf. Alexander De figur. III p. 26 Spengel: διασυρμὸς δ᾽ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἀξιοπίστως διασύροντες, ὡς Ὑπερίδης ἐπὶ Δημοσθένους (c. 3), καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς

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ἦν σοι ὁ δούς, καὶ πῶς; (“diasyrmos is defined as reliably mocking someone, as Hyperides does in Against Demosthenes [c. 3], and you malign the Council, by publishing challenges and asking in the challenges, how you came by the gold, who gave it to you, and where?”).

Hyperides is not particularly diligent in avoiding hiatus or selecting his vocabulary, which often draws on common language, comedy, everyday life or the lives of courtesans, thus paving the way for the Hellenistic koinē;33 however, his speeches are superior in freshness and naturalness (Blass 1887–1898, III,2 29). The comparison of orators to snakes is exceptionally vivid: Harpocr. s.v. παρεῖαι ὄφεις (= fr. 80 Jensen) ὁ δὲ Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Δημάδου γράφει ταυτί “εἶναι δὲ τοὺς ῥήτορας ὁμοίους τοῖς ὄφεσι· τούς τε γὰρ ὄφεις μισητοὺς μὲν εἶναι πάντας, τῶν δὲ ὄφεων αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἔχεις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀδικεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρείας αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἔχεις κατεσθίειν”. Harpocr. s.v. παρεῖαι ὄφεις (= fr. 80 Jensen) In his speech Against Demades, Hyperides writes the following: “The orators are like snakes in that all snakes are hateful; but whereas some snakes like adders are harmful to men, others like brown snakes eat the adders.” (Transl. C. Cooper 2001 with modifications)

Epicrates, a client of Hyperides, sharply and ironically teases his opponent, Athenogenes, by calling him logographos (In Athenog. c. 2[3]), except the tease also applies to Hyperides himself (cf. Colin 1946, 184 note 1); irony and sarcasm are used to liken the changes in direction by Demosthenes – who, in fact, dares accuse Hyperides of the dissolution of their friendship – to the rapidly shifting currents of the strait of Euripus between Boeotia and Euboea (In Demosth. c. 20: οὐδέποτε γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μέ[ν]ων εἰκότως φί[λους] τοὺς ἀπ᾽ Εὐρίπου κ[έ]κτηται; cf. on the proverbial parable Aeschines 3.90 regarding Callias of Chalcis).34 However, Hyperides’ speeches are free of harsh attacks and abusive statements against the private lives of opponents, which are frequently encountered in Aeschines and Demosthenes. Brevity is also a hallmark of the Funeral Speech, but the fact that Hyperides embellishes the speech with antitheses, parisoses and paromoioses (c. 7[18]: ἁθροισθήσονται - μνησθήσονται; c. 8[21]: ἀμελῶς - ἐπιμελῶς; c. 9[24]: εὐτυχεῖς - ἀτυχεῖς), quasi-poetic adjectives (c. 7[17]: ἄοκνον τόλμαν; c. 14[42]: εὐδοξίαν ἀγήρατον) and images, authoring such a beautiful epideictic speech, does not lead to the conclusion that it is an exception compared to the rest of his corpus, as J. Herrman contends (2009, 26). The Funeral Speech responds in the best way to the needs of the epideictic genre, and must be considered as yet another expression of the diverse gifts of a pentathlete, as attested in the following image, comparing the city of Athens to the sun (c. 2–3[5]):

|| 33 Cf. U. Pohle, Die Sprache des Redners Hypereides in ihren Beziehungen zur Koine, Leipzig 1928. 34 Cf. Edwards (1994) 61; Worthington (1999) 32.

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Funeral Speech (5) ὥσπερ [γὰρ] ὁ ἥλιος πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμ[ένη]ν ἐπέρχεται, τὰ[ς μὲν] ὥρας διακρίνων [εἰς τὸ π]ρέπον καὶ καλῶ[ς πάντα καθ]ιστάς, τοῖς δὲ σ[ώφροσι καὶ ἐπ]ιεικέσι τ[ῶν ἀνθρώπ]ων ἐπιμ[ελούμενος κ]αὶ γεν[έσεως καὶ τροφῆ]ς καὶ [καρπ]ῶν κ[αὶ τῶν ἄ]λλων ἁ[πά]ντων τῶν εἰς τὸν β[ίο]ν χρησίμων, οὕτως καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελε[ῖ το]ὺς μὲν κακοὺ κολάζο[υσα, τοῖς] δὲ δικαίος β[οηθοῦσα], τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀ[ντὶ τῆς ἀδι]κίας ἅπασιν [ἀπονέμουσα, τ]οῖς δὲ ἰδί[οις κινδύνοις κα]ὶ δαπάναι[ς κοινὴν ἄδει]αν τοῖς Ἕλλη[σιν παρασκευ]άζουσα. Funeral Speech (5) As the sun covers the whole of the inhabited earth, dividing the seasons appropriately, setting everything in harmonious order and looking after men who are wise and good, providing for their birth and upbringing, for the fruits of their labor and for all the other necessities of life, so too does our city never fail to punish the wicked, help the just, equality to all in place of injustice, and at its own personal and expense ensure the of Greece. (Transl. C. Cooper 2001)

10.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception Until recently, Hyperides was “entirely the child of Egypt” (Lumb 1921, 155). Six speeches came to light on papyri (Ardenianus, Νο 1233, Londiniensis, Νο 1234, Parisinus, Νο 1235 and Stobartianus, Νο 1236 Mertens-Pack3) in the 19th century (since 1847): the speech For Euxenippus, which is extant, and the speeches For Lycophron, Against Philippides, Against Athenogenes, Against Demosthenes and the Funeral Speech, which have survived in fragmentary form.35 While Photius had read various speeches by Hyperides (Bibl. 266.495b) and, until even the 16th century, according to the humanist Johannes Brassicanus (in 1525), a manuscript of Hyperides was reportedly kept at the library of Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary (1443–1490),36 there was no medieval manuscript transmission of Hyperides until the early 21st century. Following the reading of the Archimedes Palimpsest (dating back to the 10th century), fragments of two speeches by Hyperides, Against Diondas and Against Timandros, were identified (in the year 2000), opening a new chapter in the orator’s manuscript tradition.37 The hypothesis of the premier expert on the Attic orators, F.

|| 35 Cf. Jensen (1917) v-xxiv; Colin (1946) 51–65; Worthington (1999) 39–41; Whitehead (2000) 1–4; Petruzziello (2009) 11–24. 36 See C. Babington, Fragments of Hyperides Existing in Hungary in the XVIth Century, Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology 1 (1854) 407–408; Kenyon (1906) iii; Colin (1946) 52; L. Horváth, The Lost Medieval Manuscript of Hyperides, AAHung 38 (1998) 165–173. 37 See summarily Horváth (2014) vii-xi, 69–81, 184–186. Cf. N. Tchernetska, New Fragments of Hyperides from the Archimedes Palimpsest, ZPE 154 (2005) 1–6; N. Tchernetska et al., New Readings in the Fragment of Hyperides’ Against Timandros from the Archimedes Palimpsest, ZPE 162 (2007) 1–4; Carey et al. (2008) 1–19; Netz et al. (2011) II 289–310. Cf. also Horváth (2008) 27–34; L. Horváth, Note to Hyperides in Timandrum, AAHung 48 (2008) 121–123; P. Easterling, Fata Libellorum. Hyperides and the Transmission of Attic Oratory, AAHung 48 (2008) 11–17; W. Luppe, Zwei Textvorschläge zu Hypereides’ Rede Πρὸς Τίμανδρον im neu entzifferten Palimpsest-Codex, ZPE 167 (2008) 5; R. Janko, Some Νotes on the Νew Hyperides (Against Diondas), ZPE 170 (2009) 16; Petruzziello (2009) 25–33; G.

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Blass (1887–1898, III,2 25–26), who, in the late 19th century, considered the absence of a manuscript of Hyperides to be a pure coincidence, was decisively confirmed, and his wish became a reality: “Perhaps one day a finding will come to light that will allow us to get to know the orator to a better extent than the Egyptian papyri allow” (Mag eines Tages ein derartiger Fund gemacht werden, der uns den Redner noch besser, als die Aegyptischen Papyrus, kennen lernt). Hyperides’ rhetorical prowess was already acknowledged during his own era (cf. the comic poet Timocles in Athenaeus 8.341f: ὅ τ’ ἐν λόγοισι δεινὸς Ὑπερείδης) and his reputation grew even larger after his death, to the point where some considered him superior even to Demosthenes ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849D; Phot. Bibl. 266.495b).38 In the Hellenistic era, we know that Didymus concerned himself with Hyperides (Harpocr. s.v. ὀξυθύμια; cf. Cohn 1903, 459; Montana 2015, 174), while the so-called Rhodian school tried to imitate his charm and the rest of his rhetorical power (Dion. Hal. Din. 8, p. 308 Us.-Rad.). Hyperides was esteemed by Cicero (along with Demosthenes in De or. 1.58: perfectos homines in dicendο et perpolitos; cf. Brut. 36, 67–68, 138, 285; Acad. 1.11), possessing, in fact, the ready wit and charm that Demosthenes lacks (Cic. Orat. 90: facetus; cf. Dion. Hal. De imit. 31.5.6, p. 213 Us.-Rad.: χάριτος μεστός, while regarding Demosthenes, Demosth. 54, p. 247 Us.-Rad.: πάσας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡ Δημοσθένους λέξις λείπεται εὐτραπελίας, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ καλοῦσι χάριν; cf. Pseudo-Long. De subl. 34.3). According to Quintilian (Inst. or. 10.1.77), Hyperides has charm and point (dulcis in primis et acutus; cf. acumen in Cicero De or. 3.28; Orat. 110). Messala Corvinus translated the speech For Phryne into Latin.39 For Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hyperides, along with Demosthenes and Aeschines, comprise the highest point of perfection of the rhetorical art (Isae. 20, p. 124 Us.-Rad.: τελειοτάτη ῥητορική; cf. De ant. orat. 4, p. 7 Us.-Rad.: τῶν ἄλλων κρατίστους). However, the criteria applied by ancient literary critics were not uniform, depending, rather, on the era and personality of each critic. Furthermore, rhetoric as an art is not always subject to the same assessments. Apart from the highly favourable views of Pseudo-Longinus on Hyperides’ numerous merits, similar to a pentathlete (On the Sublime 34.1) and of Philostratus, who considers Hyperides to be Isocrates’

|| Ucciardello, Hyperides in the Archimedes Palimpsest. Palaeography and Textual Transmission, BICS 52 (2009) 229–252; L. Horváth, Hyperidis contra Diondan. Editio critica, AAHung 50 (2010) 389–400; N. Tchernetska/N. Wilson, The Palimpsest in Context, in: Netz et al. (2011) I 251–253; Engels (2014) 237–251. 38 According to Photius, some attributed to Hyperides the renowned epigram ascribed to Demosthenes, changing the name (Bibl. 266.495b: εἴπερ ἴσην γνώμῃ ῥώμην Ὑπερείδης εἶχεν, οὔποτ᾽ ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών). On the reception of Hyperides cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,2 23–26; de Falco (1947) 34–42; M. Marzi, Iperide, in: Marzi/Leone/Malcovati (1977) 30–34; Worthington (1999) 30–31; Whitehead (2000) 10–18. 39 Quint. Inst. or. 10.5.2: id Messalae placuit, multaeque sunt ab eo scriptae ad hunc modum orationes, adeo ut etiam cum illa Hyperidis pro Phryne difficillima Romanis subtilitate contenderet; cf. 1.5.61.

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most illustrious student (Vit. soph. 1.506 Kayser: ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου πολλοὶ μέν, ἐλλογιμώτατος δὲ Ὑπερείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ), there is interest in the assertions of Dio Chrysostom and Hermogenes, as they reach different verdicts concerning the orator, despite their common starting point. Dio considers Demosthenes and Lysias to be the finest orators, yet advises students of rhetoric to read Hyperides and Aeschines, as they are simpler and easier to grasp, while the beauty of their diction is not inferior: Dio Chrysostom 18(11) τῶν γε μὴν ῥητόρων τοὺς ἀρίστους τίς οὐκ ἐπίσταται, Δημοσθένην μὲν δυνάμει τε ἀπαγγελίας καὶ δεινότητι διανοίας καὶ πλήθει λόγων πάντας τοὺς ῥήτορας ὑπερβεβληκότα, Λυσίαν δὲ βραχύτητι καὶ ἁπλότητι καὶ συνεχείᾳ διανοίας καὶ τῷ λεληθέναι τὴν δεινότητα; πλὴν οὐκ ἂν ἐγώ σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι τὰ πολλὰ τούτοις ἐντυγχάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ Ὑπερείδῃ τε μᾶλλον καὶ Αἰσχίνῃ. τούτων γὰρ ἁπλούστεραί τε αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ εὐληπτότεραι αἱ κατασκευαὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐκείνων λειπόμενον. Dio Chrysostom 18(11) When it comes to the orators, however, who does not know which are the best (aristoi) – Demosthenes for the vigour of his style, the impressiveness of his thought, and the copiousness of his vocabulary, qualities in which he surpasses all other orators; and Lysias for his brevity, the simplicity and coherence of his thought, and for his well concealed cleverness. However, I should not advise you to read these two chiefly, but Hypereides rather and Aeschines; for the faculties in which they excel are simpler, their rhetorical embellishments are easier to grasp, and the beauty (kallos) of their diction is not one whit inferior to that of the two who are ranked first. (Transl. J.W. Cohoon)40

However, for an Atticist like Hermogenes, who seeks literary standards, Hyperides’ careless choice of words and swollen grandeur, which is stiff, rough and not in line with a style that reveals character and purity, are cause for an unfavourable critique: Hermogenes De id. 2.11 (p. 396–397 Rabe) ὁ δ᾽ Ὑπερίδης τὸ μὲν ἐπιμελὲς ἥκιστα ἔχει, διὸ καὶ ἧττον δυνατὸς εἶναί πως δοκεῖ· μέγεθος δὲ αὐτῷ ἐστιν ὑπέρογκον, σκληρὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ κεκραμένον, ὥστε μὴ σφόδρα εὖ τῷ ἠθικῷ τε καὶ καθαρῷ κεκρᾶσθαι … ἴδιον δὲ Ὑπερίδου τὸ καὶ ταῖς λέξεσιν ἀφειδέστερόν πως καὶ ἀμελέστερον χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ὅταν “μονώτατος” λέγῃ καὶ “γαλεάγρα” καὶ “ἐκκοκκύζειν” καὶ “ἐστηλοκόπηται” καὶ “ἐπήβολος” καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. Hermogenes De id. 2.11 (p. 396–397 Rabe) The Style of Hyperides is hardly carefully wrought, which is why in some ways it does not seem to be very powerful. But there is swollen Grandeur in his speeches, and the grand passages are stiff and not well integrated into the rest of the speech. They are not, in other words, well blended with the style that reveals Character and with Purity … And it is typical of Hyperides to use words freely (apheidesteron) and carelessly (amelesteron), as when he says “onliest” and “weasel-trap” and “crow like a big cock” and “he had himself blacklisted” and “got his hands on”. There are other examples. (Transl. C.W. Wooten 1987 with modifications)

|| 40 J.W. Cohoon, Dio Chrysostom, II, Cambridge MA/London 1939.

11 Dinarchus 11.1 Life The rhetoric of the classical era reaches its endpoint with Dinarchus: he is the last Attic orator with at least one entire speech surviving, and the only orator in the canon of Attic orators who remained active until the first decade of the 3rd century BC. The main source on his life is the text by Dionysius of Halicarnassus titled On Dinarchus, written as an appendix of his works on other orators for the purpose of distinguishing between his genuine and spurious speeches. Dionysius obtained the most important information from Dinarchus’ (now lost) speech Against Proxenus, which the orator delivered himself, at an advanced age and concerning a personal affair, in 292/291 BC. To this we must add the Pseudo-Plutarchan Life (Vit. dec. or. 850B–E), Photius (Bibl. 267) and the Suda (δ 333 s.v. Deinarchos); all derive from Dionysius of Halicarnassus.1 In fact, the Suda confuses the orator Dinarchus with a Corinthian politician of the same name (cf. Shoemaker 1968, 55–59). Dinarchus, son of Sostratus, was born, according to the calculations of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Din. 4, p. 303 Us.-Rad.), around 361/360 BC in Corinth and came to Athens around 340/339 BC (Worthington 1992, 5; 342 BC according to Blass 1887– 1898, III,2 294), shortly before the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), in which he participated (fr. 48.2 Conomis). In Athens, he had close relations with the Peripatetic School and mainly with Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum, which is why Dionysius of Halicarnassus concludes that there was a “teacher - pupil” relationship (Din. 2, p. 299 Us.-Rad.; also [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850C). Dinarchus, being a metic, like Lysias and, most likely, Isaeus, did not pursue an independent political role despite his rhetorical talent;2 that is why he began occupying himself as a logographer in 336/335 BC. His logographic activity was so well regarded that he was assigned the authoring of three prosecution speeches for one of the ten prosecutors in the Harpalus affair (324/323 BC),3 against Demosthenes, Aristogeiton and Philocles. This case was “the turning-point in his career” (Worthington 1999, 20). By merit of his rhetorical talent and connections with powerful men, his reputation and esteem reached their peak after the death of Alexander the Great (323

|| 1 On Dinarchus’ biography, see Shoemaker (1968); Worthington (1992) 3–10; (1999) 19–20; (2001) 3–4. 2 See D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977. 3 Din. 1.51; 2.6; Hyper. In Demosth. c. 38, possibly Himeraeus or Menesaechmus; cf. Burtt (1954) 168; Worthington (1992) 53; (2013) 317. Six of the ten prosecutors were the following: Hyperides, Pytheas, Menesaechmus, Procles (or Patrocles; Schaefer 1966–1967, III 329 note 1; both might be a corruption of Stratocles, see E. Badian, Harpalus, JHS 81, 1961, 32 note 113), Stratocles, Himeraeus (cf. Din. 1.1; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 846C; Phot. Bibl. 265.494a). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-011

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BC), primarily during the age of Demetrius of Phalerum (317–307 BC), who was appointed governor of Athens by the Macedonian Cassander.4 He amassed a significant fortune thanks to his successful logographic activity, his legal expertise and his proMacedonian sentiments (Dion. Hal. Din. 2, p. 299–300 Us.-Rad.; [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850C). After the capture of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes (307 BC) and the fall of Demetrius of Phalerum, Dinarchus was accused of collaborating with Antipater and Cassander, and fled to Chalcis, without appearing before the court. He returned to Athens 15 years later thanks to the mediation of Theophrastus (292/291 BC).5 A short while later, he appeared once before the court, bringing an action against Proxenus, accusing him of deceiving him in order to abstract his fortune. How a metic could deliver a judicial speech regarding a personal affair is explained as follows by Ι. Worthington (1992, 8–9): either he acquired the rights of an Athenian citizen at some point, or he appeared before the metic court, presided over by the polemarch (cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 58.2: δίκαι δὲ λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν πολέμαρχον] ἴδιαι μὲν αἵ τε τοῖς μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς ἰσοτελέσι καὶ τοῖς προξένοις γιγνόμεναι). The second possibility is the most likely. Of the speech Against Proxenus only a fragment survives (Dion. Hal. Din. 12, p. 318 Us.-Rad. = fr. 48 Conomis). There is no information on the remainder of his life, and the year 292/291 BC is the terminus post quem for his death.

11.2 The Speeches The number of speeches attributed to Dinarchus in antiquity was substantial. According to Demetrius of Magnesia (Dion. Hal. Din. 1, p. 299 Us.-Rad.), they numbered 160 private and public judicial speeches. Dionysius of Halicarnassus acknowledges 61 as genuine and includes titles and opening phrases in his list (Din. 10, p. 311–312 and 12, p. 317–319 Us.-Rad.).6 Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. dec. or. 850E; cf. Phot. Bibl. 267) acknowledges 64 speeches as genuine, but attributes certain of these to Aristogeiton; the number of speeches in the Suda (δ 333 s.v. Deinarchos) is either 160 or 60, with the latter being the more likely possibility. The transmission of Dinarchus’ speeches is further complicated when one considers that four speeches attributed to Dinarchus (Against Boeotus 1, Against Mantitheus [= Against Boeotus 2], Against Theocrines in Dionysius of Halicarnassus Din. 10, p. 311–312 and Din. 13, p. 319–320 Us.-Rad., who rules out the authorship of Dinarchus for the first two; furthermore, Against Evergus and Mne-

|| 4 See L. O’Sullivan, The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE. A Philosopher in Politics, Leiden/Boston 2009. 5 [Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 850D; cf. Dion. Hal. Din. 2, p. 300 Us.-Rad. 6 On the number of genuine speeches by Dinarchus, see Shoemaker (1968) 68–78; Worthington (1992) 10–12 with note 26; cf. also Blass (1887–1898) III,2 306–307; Nouhaud/Dors-Méary (1990) vii.

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sibulus in Harpocration s.v. ἐκαλίστρουν) are found under Nos 39, 40, 58 and 47, respectively, in the Demosthenic corpus.7 Three speeches are extant: Against Demosthenes (1), Against Aristogeiton (2) and Against Philocles (3). The first is complete, with the exception of minor lacunae (1.33–34; 1.64; 1.82), while the other two are missing the end. Short fragments of the other speeches survive (Conomis 1975, 73–151). The unfavourable stylistic reviews of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the complicated manuscript transmission of Dinarchus’ works ensured in large measure that research on this orator remains limited to this day.8 All three extant speeches concern trials related to the Harpalus affair (324/323 BC) and are prosecution speeches. They provide significant information on this notorious case,9 which became associated with charges of corruption among Athenian politicians. Among other things, they are intertwined with the debate in Athens over Alexander’s decree on the return of exiled individuals and his desire for divine honours,10 and they comprise, along with the Hyperides’ fragmentary speech Against Demosthenes11 and certain references in Demosthenes’ Letters,12 our contemporary sources on these issues. The three speeches were written for the trials held after the written indictment of the Areopagus which, on the motion of Demosthenes and through the procedure known as apophasis,13 conducted a six-month inquiry into the charges of bribery and treason (Din. 1.45; cf. Worthington 1992, 209–210).14

|| 7 Cf. Worthington (1992) 12. 8 The standard work in contemporary research is the commentary by Worthington (1992), which stands out primarily for the processing of historical extensions, as indicated by the title. See the review by D.M. MacDowell, CR 44 (1994) 269–271 and particularly by J. Engels, Gnomon 68 (1996) 324– 330. 9 See above Chapter 6.1 note 21. 10 Cf. Din. 1.94; Hyper. In Demosth. c. 31–32; Worthington (1992) 262–265. See also G.A. Lehmann, Alexander der Große und die “Freiheit der Hellenen”. Studien zu der antiken historiographischen Überlieferung und den Inschriften der Alexander-Ära, Berlin 2015, 145–172. 11 See Worthington (1999) 94 ff., 184 ff.; I. Whitehead, Hypereides, the Forensic Speeches. Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Oxford 2000, 353 ff. 12 Such as, for example, Epist. 3.31; 3.37; 3.42. On Demosthenes’ Letters, see J. Goldstein, The Letters of Demosthenes, New York 1968; I. Worthington, Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 61, Prologues, Letters. Translated with Introduction and Notes, Austin 2006, 99 ff. 13 Cf. Din. 1.4; 1.6; 1.68; 1.82–83; Hyper. In Demosth. c. 1, 2, 8, 34. On the legal procedure of apophasis see Hansen (1975) 39–40; Wallace (1989) 113–119, 198–201; Worthington (1992) 357–362; Lanni (2006) 57–59. 14 See also Wallace (1989) 199–200.

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11.2.1 Against Demosthenes (1) Dinarchus’ complete speech Against Demosthenes (1)15 is a deuterology and, although it emerges from the speech that Stratocles, the first prosecutor, discussed the indictment of the Areopagus and the facts of the case (1.1; cf. 1.20; 1.21), it is striking that this speech does not aim at directly arguing in favour of Demosthenes’ guilt, but at further whipping up the judges’ rage against Demosthenes (1.2: οὐ γὰρ ἵν᾽ ἐνοχλῶμεν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν, δὶς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν; cf. Lanni 2006, 58). The speaker considers that the judges, despite the just indictment of the Areopagus, often give more weight to leniency (1.55: τῇ συγγνώμῃ πλέον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀπονέμοντες; cf. 1.57) and recounts a number of examples. However, the judges must play a different role: they must function like the Erinyes, the august goddesses (semnai theai) in the case of the mythical Orestes, i.e. as associates of the Areopagus (1.87).16 The predominant characteristic of the speech is the harsh, passionate attack against the defendant (cf. Usher 1999, 345). The charged, dynamic tenor of Dinarchus is similar in style to that of Demosthenes. With loanwords from the speeches of Aeschines against Demosthenes (Dinarchus calls him “Scythian”, 1.15: τὸν δὲ κατάπτυστον τοῦτον καὶ Σκύθην, as does Aeschines 3.172; cf. also the phrase τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον Din. 1.77 - Aeschin. 3.157; the poor tychē of Demosthenes Din. 1.30–33; 1.77; 1.91; 1.93 - Aeschin. 3.114; 3.135; 3.155; the misfortune of Thebes 1.18–21 and 24 - Aeschin. 3.133; the cowardice of Demosthenes at Chaeronea, Din. 1.81: λιπὼν τὴν τάξιν ᾤχετ’ ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε - Aeschin. 3.181: Δημοσθένης ὁ νυνὶ τὴν τάξιν λιπών; cf. 3.148; 3.152; 3.155; 3.175),17 Demosthenes and his political career come under fierce attack as causes of the disaster and humiliation suffered. With sarcasm and irony, Dinarchus lampoons Demosthenes’ decree for an inquiry against himself (1.83: λέγε δὴ πάλιν ὃ Δημοσθένης κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔγραψε).18 Historical examples, such as the general Timotheus (1.14–16), the calamity of Thebes (1.24; 1.74; cf. Steinbock 2013, 212 ff.), Thrasybulus or Cephalus (1.25; 1.39), culminate in the passionate aphorism that good or poor advisers and leaders determine the happiness or misfortune of the state (1.72– 77): Against Demosthenes 1(72) ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, παρὰ τί οἴεσθε τὰς πόλεις τοτὲ μὲν εὖ τοτὲ δὲ φαύλως πράττειν; οὐδὲν εὑρήσετ᾽ ἄλλο πλὴν παρὰ τοὺς συμβούλους καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας. ἐπιβλέψατε δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν. ἐγένετο πόλις, ἐγένετο μεγίστη· καὶ τίνων τυχοῦσ᾽ ἡγεμόνων καὶ στρατηγῶν; ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν πρεσβύτεροι, παρ᾽ ὧνπερ κἀγὼ τοὺς λόγους ἀκούων

|| 15 Greek text used: Conomis (1975). 16 See D.S. Allen, The World of Prometheus. The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens, Princeton 2000, 23. 17 See M.R. Christ, The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2006, 132–142. 18 Cf. Edwards (1994) 67.

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ἐρῶ, ὅτε Πελοπίδας, ὥς φασιν, (73) ἡγεῖτο τοῦ ἱεροῦ λόχου καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐστρατήγει καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων· τότε τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην ἐνίκησεν ἡ τῶν Θηβαίων πόλις, τότ᾽ εἰς τὴν ἀπόρθητον νομιζομένην εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν εἰσέβαλον, κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διεπράξαντ᾽ ἔργα, Μεσήνην τετρακοσιοστῷ ἔτει κατῴκισαν, Ἀρκάδας αὐτονόμους ἐποίησαν, ἔνδοξοι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἦσαν. (74) πότε δ᾽ αὖ τοὐναντίον ταπεινὰ καὶ τοῦ φρονήματος ἀνάξια διεπράξαντο; ὅτ᾽ ἐδωροδόκει μὲν λαμβάνων χρήματα παρὰ Φιλίππου Τιμόλαος ὁ τούτου φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ξένοις τοῖς εἰς Ἄμφισαν συλλεγεῖσι Πρόξενος ὁ προδότης ἐγένετο, ἡγεμὼν δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος κατέστη Θεαγένης, ἄνθρωπος ἀτυχὴς καὶ δωροδόκος ὥσπερ οὗτος. τότε διὰ τρεῖς γ᾽ ἀνθρώπους οὓς εἶπον ἅπασ᾽ ἡ πόλις μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπώλετο καὶ συνδιεφθάρη. οὐ γὰρ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀληθὲς τὸ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αἰτίους ἁπάντων γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πολίταις. (75) θεωρήσατε δὴ πάλιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξετάσαντες. ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἦν μεγάλη καὶ ἔνδοξος παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἀξία, μετά γε τὰς ἀρχαίας ἐκείνας πράξεις, ὅτε Κόνων, ὡς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι λέγουσιν, ἐνίκησε τὴν ἐν Κνίδῳ ναυμαχίαν, ὅτ᾽ Ἰφικράτης ἀνεῖλε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μόραν, ὅτε Χαβρίας ἐν Νάξῳ κατεναυμάχησε τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων τριήρεις, ὅτε Τιμόθεος τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν ἐνίκησε. (76) τότ᾽ ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε οἱ μὲν πρότερον ὄντες λαμπροὶ διὰ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐκείνων ἤθεσι τραφέντες ταπεινοὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἧκον, δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων σωτηρίας, ὁ δὲ καταλυθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων δῆμος διὰ τοὺς τότε γενομένους παρ᾽ ἡμῖν συμβούλους πάλιν ἡγεμὼν ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, δικαίως οἶμαι, στρατηγῶν μὲν τοιούτων τετυχηκὼς οἵων εἶπον ἀρτίως, συμβούλους δ᾽ ἔχων Ἀρχῖνον καὶ Κέφαλον τὸν Κολλυτέα. μία γὰρ αὕτη σωτηρία καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐστί, τὸ προστατῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων τυχεῖν. (77) διόπερ ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι δεῖ ταῦθ’ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντας καὶ λογιζομένους, μὴ μὰ Δία τὸν πλείω χρόνον τῆς Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας καὶ ἀτυχίας κοινωνεῖν, μηδ’ ἐν τούτῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχειν, μηδ’ οἴεσθαι ἀπορήσειν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν προγόνων λαβόντας ὀργὴν τὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ κλέπτην εἰλημμένον καὶ προδότην, τὸν οὐκ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀφικνουμένων χρημάτων, τὸν εἰς τὰς δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ἐμβεβληκότα τὴν πόλιν, τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον ἀποκτείναντας ἐξόριστον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ποιῆσαι, καὶ μεταβαλέσθαι τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἐᾶσαι, καὶ προσδοκῆσαι τούτων γενομένων βέλτιον πράξειν. Against Demosthenes 1(72) Athenians, what do you think is the reason cities sometimes prosper and sometimes fare badly? You will find no reason other than their advisers and leaders (symbouloi kai hēgemones). Look at Thebes. It was a city, and it was among the greatest. When was this? Under what leaders and generals? All the older men, from whom I heard the story I will tell you, would agree that it was (73) when Pelopidas, they say, led the Sacred Band, and Epaminondas was general with his colleagues. Then Thebes won the battle of Leuctra, then they invaded the land of the Spartans, which, it was thought, was inviolable, and during that time they performed many great deeds: they founded Messene in the four hundredth year, they made the Arcadians autonomous, and they were highly regarded (endoxoi) by all. (74) But when did the opposite apply? When were their achievements meager (tapeina) and unworthy (anaxia) of their spirit? When Timolaus, this man’s friend, was bribed and took money from Philip, and Proxenus the traitor was in charge of the mercenaries levied for Amphissa, and Theagenes, a man of misfortune and open to bribery, just like this man, led the phalanx. Then the entire city was destroyed and obliterated together with the rest of Greece because of the three men I mentioned. For it is not false but only too true that the leaders (hēgemones) are responsible for all the citizens’ fortunes, whether good or the opposite. (75) Think again in the same way about our own city. Our city was great (megalē), highly esteemed (endoxē) by the Greeks and worthy (axia) of our ancestors, and after those deeds from the past, when Conon, as our elders say, won the naval battle at Cnidus, when Iphicrates destroyed the Spartan company, when Chabrias defeated the

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Spartan triremes at sea off Naxos, and when Timotheus won the naval battle at Corcyra. (76) At that time, Athenians, at that time the Spartans, who before were famous (lamproi) because of their leaders and had been reared according to their principles, came humbly (tapeinoi) to our city, beseeching our ancestors for safety. The democracy they had subverted was again made the leading power of Greece, thanks to the advisers (symbouloi) we then had, and I think rightly so, for we had such generals as I have just been talking about and had Archinus and Cephalus of Collytus as advisers. For there is only one means of safety for a city or a nation: to obtain brave men (andres agathoi) and wise advisers (symbouloi spoudaioi) as leaders. (77) Athenians, if you recognize and consider these things, then, by Zeus, you should have no more to do with Demosthenes’ venality (dōrodokia) and ill fortune (atychia). Do not place your hopes of safety on this man, and do not think you will lack brave men and wise advisers. Take up the anger (orgē) of your ancestors, and have this robber (kleptēs) and traitor (prodotēs), who has been caught in the act, executed and his body cast beyond the borders ‒ this traitor, who does not keep his hands off the money brought into the city, who has brought the city to the most calamitous misfortunes, and who is a plague for Greece (tēs Hellados alitērios). Allow the fortune (tychē) of the city to change, then look forward to a better lot. (Transl. I. Worthington 2001)

11.2.2 Against Aristogeiton (2) Harsh, personal attacks against the defendant are also the hallmark of the speech Against Aristogeiton, the protagonist of which is the sycophant and demagogue known to us from speeches Nos 25 and 26 of the Demosthenic corpus.19 Evidentiary argumentation is once again absent. Already in the proem, there is a clear “hyperbolic description” (Usher 1999, 347) of Aristogeiton’s character: according to the speaker, he is the most disreputable of all men in the city, indeed in the whole of mankind (Din. 2.1: ὁ γὰρ πονηρότατος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων). The speech serves as yet another example of the position of individuality in the Athenian society of the late 4th century BC: private and public life are integrally linked to each other and reflect upon the ēthos of both the speaker and the defendant. Contrary to the moderate, sober speaker, a number of ungodly acts by the morally reprehensible Aristogeiton are described in the darkest possible terms, such as neglecting his duties towards his father (2.8; 2.18–19):20 Against Aristogeiton 2(18) ἀντὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γονέας εὖ ποιεῖν κακῶς οὗτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα πεποίηκεν· ὅτε δ’ ὑμεῖς ἐστρατεύεσθε πάντες, οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ· τοσοῦτον δ’ ἀπολέλοιπε τοῦ πατρὸς μνῆμά τι ἔχειν ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι δεῖξαι, ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐκεῖ τὰ νομιζόμεν’ ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ· τῶν δ’ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων εἰσφερόντων ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, οὗτος οὐδὲ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ ὧν ὦφλεν τὸ ἀργύριον ἅπαν ἐκτέτεικεν. (19) ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν,

|| 19 See, characteristically, K. Apostolakis, Ιδιωτικά σκάνδαλα και δημόσια εικόνα. Ο Αριστογείτων στο στόχαστρο της δικανικής ρητορείας ([Δημ.] 25 και 26), in: L. Athanassaki et al. (eds.), Ιδιωτικός βίος και δημόσιος λόγος στην ελληνική αρχαιότητα και στον διαφωτισμό. Μελέτες αφιερωμένες στην Ιωάννα Γιατρομανωλάκη, Heraklion 2014, 201–230, esp. 228. 20 See Roisman (2005) 56, 181; Liddel (2007) 215–218.

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ἐναντία τοῖς νόμοις ἅπασι πράττων διατετέλεκε, καὶ τοῦτον μόνον ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ τοῖς ἐζητηκόσι καὶ εἰδόσιν ἀποπέφαγκεν· οὐ γὰρ παρ’ ἐκείνης ὑμεῖς πυθόμενοι τοῦτον ἴστε πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀκριβῶς οἶδε τὴν τούτου πονηρίαν. ὥστε τὸ πολλάκις λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, ὅτι περὶ μὲν τούτου τὴν ψῆφον ὑμεῖς μέλλετε φέρειν, περὶ δ’ ὑμῶν οἱ περιεστηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. Against Aristogeiton 2(18) Instead of looking after his parents, he abused his own father. When all of you were serving in the army he was in prison. And, Athenians, not only can he not point to any memorial to his father but also when his father died in Eretria Aristogeiton did not even give him a proper burial. Although other Athenians are contributing money from their private resources, he has not paid all the money he owes for his public debts. (19) In a nutshell, he has continued to live in contravention of all the laws, and in his case alone the Council of the Areopagus has reported someone whom you had already investigated and knew the facts. You did not learn he is a wicked criminal (ponēros kai adikos) from the Council – each one of you already knew the full details of his corruption (ponēria). And so the statement made many times rings true in this context: while you are about to pass judgment on this man, the spectators and everyone else are passing judgment on you. (Transl. I. Worthington 2001)

11.2.3 Against Philocles (3) Philocles was also accused of taking a bribe from Harpalus. The prosecutor’s style is, once again, excessive. There is a predominance of vicious attacks against Philocles, accompanied by numerous abusive appellations (3.18: μιαρὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ προδότην; the same context with τὸν κατάπτυστον τοῦτον καὶ Σκύθην in 1.15). It is obvious that this name-calling aims at inciting emotions in the judges, who are obligated not to let such criminals get away. Of particular interest is the point where the speaker attempts to distinguish between a group of corrupt orators and generals, on the one hand, and the demos on the other, as the demos has to stand against them and prove that it has not been corrupted along with them. In this sense, the relationship between orator and the political community is not univocal; the speaker intentionally establishes a common front, consisting of justice, the “healthy” rhetoric he propounds and the demos, against the reprobate exponents of rhetoric: Against Philocles 3(19) ἃ χρὴ λογισαμένους ὑμᾶς πάντας ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τῶν παρόντων καιρῶν ἀναμνησθέντας, οἳ πίστεως οὐ δωροδοκίας δέονται, μισεῖν τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀνελεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία, καὶ δεῖξαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτι οὐ συνδιέφθαρται τὸ τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τισιν, οὐδὲ δουλεύει ταῖς δόξαις, εἰδότας ὅτι μετὰ μὲν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίας ῥᾳδίως ἀμυνούμεθα, θεῶν ἵλεων ὄντων, ἐάν τινες ἡμῖν ἀδίκως ἐπιτίθωνται, μετὰ δὲ δωροδοκίας καὶ προδοσίας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τούτοις κακῶν, ἃ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις πρόσεστιν, οὐδεμί’ ἂν πόλις σωθείη. Against Philocles 3(19) Athenians, you must all consider these things and bear in mind the present circumstances, which cry out for loyalty (pistis), not venality (dōrodokia). You must hate wrongdoers (ponēroi), you must eradicate such creatures (thēria) from the city, and you must show all mankind that the majority of the people have not been corrupted by a handful of orators

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and generals and are not slaves to their reputation. They know that with justice (dikaiosynē) and harmony (homonoia) among ourselves, we shall easily defend ourselves, if the gods are willing, against anyone unjustly attacking us. No city can survive with bribery (dōrodokia) and treason (prodosia) and other similar evils in it, as are practiced by these men. (Transl. I. Worthington 2001)

Two final remarks: firstly, it is noteworthy that the historical example of the general Timotheus in this speech (3.17–18) is repeated verbatim from the first speech (1.14– 15). Secondly, the insults against the opponent are excessive, confirming, as a conclusion, the view of Edwards (1994, 66) regarding all three speeches of Dinarchus: “the invective is overdone”.

11.3 Style A sober approach to Dinarchus’ stylistic particularities is offered by Usher (1999, 346): “Combinations of different influences make Dinarchus’ style a heady cocktail, not without individual colour, but also marking his position at the end of a long tradition”. Dinarchus was unquestionably a highly skilled orator, but was greatly influenced and stands at the end of a long tradition. The diverse influences did not preclude him from leaving his own personal mark, but it is inconspicuous. Dionysius of Halicarnassus puts forth the view that Dinarchus neither discovered nor perfected a style of rhetoric, but, as an imitator of Lysias, Hyperides and predominantly Demosthenes, he is ranked lower: Dion. Hal. Din. 1 (p. 297 Us.-Rad.) περὶ Δεινάρχου τοῦ ῥήτορος οὐδὲν εἰρηκὼς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφεῖσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε εὑρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτῆρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὑρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνη καὶ Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν. Dion. Hal. Din. 1 (p. 297 Us.-Rad.) I said nothing about the orator Dinarchus in my writings on the ancient orators because he was neither the inventor of an individual style (charaktēr), as were Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, nor the perfecter (teleiōtēs) of styles which others had invented, as I judge Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides to have been. (Transl. S. Usher 1974– 1985) Dion. Hal. Din. 5 (p. 304 Us.-Rad.) καιρὸς ἤδη καὶ περὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος αὐτοῦ λέγειν. ἔστι δὲ δυσόριστον. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτε κοινὸν οὔτ’ ἴδιον ἔσχεν οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀγῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Λυσίου παραπλήσιος ἔστιν ὅπου γίνεται καὶ τοῖς Ὑπερείδου καὶ τοῖς Δημοσθένους λόγοις. Dion. Hal. Din. 5 (p. 304 Us.-Rad.) It is time to turn to his style. It is difficult to define (dysoriston), for he possessed no quality common to all his oratory, or any individual characteristic, either in his private or in his public speeches, but in some places he shows a close resemblance to Lysias, in others to Hyperides, and in others to Demosthenes. (Transl. S. Usher 1974–1985)

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Due to his coarse imitation of the Demosthenic style, he was called a “rustic Demosthenes” (Dion. Hal. Din. 8, p. 309 Us.-Rad.: ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης) or a “gingerbread Demosthenes” (Hermog. De id. 2.11, p. 399 Rabe: κρίθινος Δημοσθένης). Dionysius of Halicarnassus stresses that Dinarchus is inferior to Demosthenes particularly in regard to his sense of proportion (symmetria), occasion (kairos) and appropriateness (prepon), but admits that he was the finest of Demosthenes’ imitators (Din. 8, p. 308 Us.-Rad.). Dinarchus’ style is characterised by clearness of expression, intensity, passion and irony, with frequent use of hyperbolic invective and coarse words21. He favours participial syntax, at times in large Isocratean periods (the most extreme example can be found in 1.18–21; cf. 1.1–2; 3.1), asyndeton (as in 1.39), and a particularly vivid apostrophē (1.83 in the form of an interrogation: ἔγραψας σὺ τοῦτο Δημόσθενες; ἔγραψας; οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν. ἐγένεθ’ ἡ βουλὴ κυρία σοῦ προστάξαντος; ἐγένετο. τεθνᾶσι τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρες; τεθνᾶσι; cf. 1.100), the accumulation of epanalēpsis (1.28: μισθωτός - μισθωτός; 1.40: ἐκεῖνοι - ἐκεῖνοι), even prosōpopoiia (employing this figure of speech to give voice to inanimate objects), which conforms to the passion and is reminiscent of Lycurgus: Against Demosthenes 1(109) πολὺ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐλεήσαιτε τὴν χώραν, ἣν οὗτος εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους καθίστησιν τοιαῦτα πράττων, ἣ τοὺς ἐξ ἑαυτῆς γεγενημένους ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύει, παραστησαμένη τὰ ὑμέτερα τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας, τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν προδότην καὶ σῴζειν ἑαυτήν (“You would far more justly feel pity for the land, which this man lays open to danger by doing such things, which beseeches you who are born of it, by your wives and children, to punish the traitor and save it”. Transl. I. Worthington 2001). Against Philocles 3(13) οὐχ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεοῖντ’ ἂν εἰκότως παρ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι· πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ· ἀλλ’ οἱ προδοθέντες ἂν ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους, εἴ τιν’ οὗτος παρέλαβε καιρόν· ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ Ἀκτὴ καὶ οἱ λιμένες εἰσὶ καὶ τὰ νεώρια, ἃ οἱ πρόγονοι κατασκευάσαντες ὑμῖν κατέλιπον (“Athenians, those sorts of men could not rightly be pitied by you ‒ not by any means ‒ but rather those whom Philocles would have betrayed if he had had the chance, and among these are the promontory and the harbors and the dockyards, which your ancestors constructed at great cost and left for you”. Transl. I. Worthington 2001). Cf. Lycurgus Against Leocrates (150) νομίζοντες οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἱκετεύειν ὑμῶν τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ δένδρα, δεῖσθαι τοὺς λιμένας τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως, ἀξιοῦν δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεὼς καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς (“Imagine then, men of Athens, that the land and the trees are imploring you; the harbors, the shipsheds, and the city walls are asking you; and the temples and the

|| 21 Thus 1.15: κατάπτυστον καὶ Σκύθην; 1.16: τὸ κάθαρμα; 1.18: τὸν μιαρὸν ἄνθρωπον; 1.21: ὁ μιαρὸς καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδής; 1.40: κινάδη; 1.41: δωροδόκον καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην; 1.47: ἐπιωρκηκώς, κατάρατος, ἐξηπατηκώς; 1.50: ὦ μιαρὸν θηρίον; 1.77: τὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην; 1.92: τοῦ μιαροῦ καὶ γόητος; 1.97: ἄπιστον, ἄχρηστον; 1.103: προδότης καὶ δωροδόκος. Cf. 2.1; 2.4; 2.10; 2.12; 2.14–15; 2.19; 3.1; 3.3; 3.6; 3.14; 3.16–19; 3.22.

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shrines are pleading with you to defend them”. Transl. E.W. Harris 2001. Cf. also Leocr. 17; Blass 1887–1898, ΙΙΙ,2 330).

Dinarchus borrows excessively from other orators, such as Aeschines and Demosthenes, yet it is doubtful whether one should accuse him at this point of lack of originality and plagiarism.22 Lexical and conceptual correspondence among the orators of the era, such as Demosthenes and Hyperides (On the Crown and Against Diondas) or almost verbatim repetitions (such as between Andocides 3.3 ff. and Aeschines 2.172– 177) or within the corpus of the same orator (e.g. Isocrates 2.5–9 and 15.252–257 or Demosthenes 8.36–67 and 10.11–27; 10.55–70) were not uncommon, and Dinarchus may have taken advantage of pre-existing rhetorical topoi.23 On the other hand, Ι. Worthington (1992, 27–39, 339–355; cf. 1999, 24–26) attempted to redeem Dinarchus in relation to the negative critiques of the communis opinio, which, already by antiquity, ascribed a lack of symmetry, order, mental leaps and an absence of logical sequence to him.24 However, he reached the exact opposite view: he perceives a fine, complex and meticulous ring composition in Dinarchus’ possibly revised speeches, which supports his rhetorical competence.25 As only one of Dinarchus’ speeches survives in full, Worthington’s conjecture can be neither confirmed nor dismissed, and remains the subject of justified reservations to this day.26

11.4 Transmission of the Text - Reception Dinarchus’ three speeches are transmitted in 7 codices. The most important of among them are Crippsianus Mus. Brit. Burneianus 95 (A, 13/14th c.) and Bodleianus Ms. Auct. T. 2. 8. (N, 14th c.). The first, from which the other five manuscripts descend, also includes speeches by Antiphon, Andocides, Isaeus and Lycurgus, while the second contains speeches by Antiphon and a section of Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates. Both manuscripts most likely descend from a non-extant archetype.27 || 22 See Schaefer (1966–1967) III 339–340. Cf. Jebb (1893) II 374. 23 Worthington 1992, 24. On Dinarchus’ style, cf. Shoemaker (1968) 480–488. 24 See Dion. Hal. Din. 8, p. 309 Us.-Rad.: λείπεται τῇ συμμετρίᾳ; Hermog. De id. 2.11, p. 398 Rabe: ἧττον ἐπιμελὴς ὁ λόγος; cf. Blass (1887–1898) III,2 320 ff.; J.F. Dobson, The Greek Orators, London 1919, 302–307; Kennedy (1963) 256: “disorganized excitement”; Nouhaud/Dors-Méary (1990) xvi; Edwards (1994) 65. 25 Cf. Worthington (1992) 36: “The more complex the ring composition, the more sophisticated the writing style”. 26 Cf. the reviews by D. MacDowell, CR 44 (1994) 270; J. Engels, Gnomon 68 (1996) 326–327; C. Tuplin, CR 51 (2001) 389. See also Usher (1999) 345 note 64; MacDowell (2009) 8; D.M. Timmerman/E. Schiappa, Classical Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse, Cambridge 2010, 159– 160. 27 3 papyri must be added to these (according to the Mertens-Pack3 electronic catalogue). On the manuscript transmission of Dinarchus and the papyri, see H. Erbse, Überlieferungsgeschichte der

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Dinarchus’ inclusion in the canon of the ten Attic Orators supports his recognition in antiquity. At the same time, though, it is an ambiguous accolade.28 According to the favourable view of Demetrius of Magnesia, Dinarchus was not inferior to Hyperides in terms of charm (Dion. Hal. Din. 1, p. 298 Us.-Rad.: οὐδὲν ἀπολείπων τῆς Ὑπερείδου χάριτος), while Cicero ranks him among the great Attic orators and compares him to the subsequent generation (De or. 2.94–95; Brut. 36). On the other hand, Quintilian makes no mention of him whatsoever. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Din. 1, p. 297 Us.-Rad.) does acknowledge Dinarchus’ fame due to the brilliance of his oratory (ἐπὶ δεινότητι λόγων), but equates it chronologically with the decline of the rhetorical art after the death of Alexander the Great – in other words, Dinarchus benefited from the death or exile of the other orators (Dion. Hal. Din. 2, p. 299-300 Us.-Rad.). Hermogenes passes a more favourable verdict on Dinarchus, considering him an imitator of Demosthenes, but he too stresses that his art was more superficial than true (μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ ἔστι δεινὸς): Hermog. De id. 2.11 (p. 398 Rabe) ὁ δὲ Δείναρχος πολιτικὸς ὢν ὡς οἷα σαφὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ πιθανὸς πολὺ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τραχὺ κατά τε τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὴν μέθοδον· κατὰ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν ἧττόν ἐστι σφοδρός, κατὰ μέντοι τὰ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον σχήματα, κῶλα, συνθήκας, ἀναπαύσεις, ῥυθμούς, καὶ πάνυ σφοδρός τε καὶ τραχύς ἐστι· διὸ καὶ ἧττον ἐπιμελὴς ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, γοργὸς μέντοι καὶ δεινὸς οὐ μετρίως· μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ ἔστι δεινὸς διὰ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης μᾶλλον μετέχειν δεινότητος. καθόλου τε ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐμφαινόμενον ἔχει πολὺ τὸ Δημοσθενικὸν διὰ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ γοργὸν καὶ σφοδρόν, ὥστ᾽ ἤδη τινὲς καὶ προσπαίζοντες αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀχαρίτως κρίθινον Δημοσθένην εἰρήκασι. (cf. De id. 2.11, p. 402 Rabe). Hermog. De id. 2.11 (p. 398 Rabe) Since Dinarchus was a practicing orator, his style is very clear and unaffected and persuasive. It also has a lot of Vehemence and the Asperity that is produced by the thought and the approach. His diction is not very vehement, although in his use of figures, clauses, word order, cadences, and rhythms, all of which are related to the diction, his style is very vehement and harsh. That is why it is also less carefully wrought. But it is quite rapid and forceful, although it seems to be more forceful (deinos) than it really is because this is the sort of Force that he uses. Generally speaking, Dinarchus employs a style that appears to be very Demosthenic, mainly because it is harsh (trachy) and rapid (gorgon) and vehement (sphodron). Some critics, not inappropriately, have said jokingly that he is a “gingerbread (krithinos) Demosthenes”. (Transl. C.W. Wooten 1987)

Dinarchus was by no measure a second-class orator, but his rhetoric is indicative of a turning point in the evolution of this literary genre, in a rapidly changing world. Rhetoric would gradually follow different paths and called upon to adapt to the political developments of the Hellenistic era. These were certainly not sudden rifts in civic

|| griechischen klassischen und hellenistischen Literatur, in: H. Hunger et al., Geschichte der Textüberlieferung der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literatur, I, Zurich 1961, 266; Conomis (1975) v-viii; Nouhaud, M./Dors-Méary, L. (1990) xxii-xxv; Worthington (1992) 79–82; (1999) 38–39. 28 Cf. Worthington (1992) 14.

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life,29 but classical rhetoric, as an elixir of democracy, whose energetic and vibrant force served as an important means for political debate, would diminish in significance and grandeur and would thenceforth be recalled as a classical exemplary literary standard.30

|| 29 See C. Kremmydas/K. Tempest, Introduction. Exploring Hellenistic Oratory, in: Kremmydas/ Tempest (2013) 1–17; M. Canevaro/B. Gray (eds.), The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought, Oxford 2018. On rhetoric in the Hellenistic era, see J. Bayliss, After Demosthenes. The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens, London/New York 2011, 94–128; N. Wiater, Rhetorik. 2: Hellenistische Rhetorik, in: B. Zimmermann/A. Rengakos (eds.), Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der Klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit, Munich 2014, 860–886; B. Beer, Rhetorik des Hellenismus. Von Theophrast bis Philodem, in: M. Erler/C. Tornau (eds.), Handbuch Antike Rhetorik, Berlin/Boston 2019, 361–381. 30 Cf. J.I. Porter, Feeling Classical. Classicism and Ancient Literary Criticism, in: J.I. Porter (ed.), Classical Pasts. The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome, Princeton 2006, 301–352; C. de Jonge, Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature, Leiden/Boston 2008, 9–20; N. Wiater, The Ideology of Classicism. Language, History, and Identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Berlin 2011. Cf. also L. Kim, Archaizing and Classicism in the Literary Historical Thinking of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in: J. Ker/C. Pieper (ed.), Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World, Leiden/Boston 2014, 357–387.

12 Summary - Conclusions Ι. While information on the origins of rhetoric is mainly drawn from its opponents, such as Plato, it is noteworthy that the origins, nature and role of rhetoric were at the focus of theoretical discussions in the 4th century BC. They bear indisputable witness to the importance intellectuals – both sophists and philosophers – placed on rhetorical theory and practice. The 4th century BC cannot be considered the prōtos heuretēs of rhetoric, but does serve as its main field of action: it contributed so decisively to its growth that the art of speaking achieved a remarkable triumph, especially during this period and despite philosophical criticism. For democracy, rhetoric served as an “elixir of life” since its inception. Democratic Athens placed the power of speech at the centre of all political and judicial decisions: the desire of politically active citizens to be convincing before the Athenian Assembly and the courts signals the key role played by rhetoric in democratic Athenian procedures. The teaching of rhetoric was vital for preparing Athenian citizens to become active participants in public affairs. Besides democracy, which remained the key constitution of Athens, new political forces, visions of statehood and monarchs on the periphery of the Greek world were instrumental for the ambiguity of the 4th century BC in terms of internal and foreign policy. Isocrates’ political-deliberative speeches Panegyricus (4; 380 BC) and To Philip (5; 346 BC) focus on the political ideal that the orator tenaciously pursued for over 50 years: concord amongst Greeks and war against the Persians. At the same time, Demosthenes unleashed his rhetorical genius in the opposite direction, envisioning the revival of the Athenian past of the 5th century BC, with patriotic engagement against the superpower of Macedon. Although political parties, in the modern meaning of the term, did not exist in antiquity, a form of political or ideological collaboration is recorded among the top politiciansorators of the era, e.g. among the anti-Macedonians Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, and was reflected in their orations. Rhetorical texts take on a “mirror effect” of Athenian society. This means that rhetoric, as a psychagogic art, i.e. the art of “leading the souls through speech”, has a tremendous effect on listeners and also redefines itself, reflecting and reverberating the “soul” of the public, to the point where it is often difficult to tell apart the orator and the audience. Stirring passions dominates judicial and deliberative speeches; the judgments of judges and listeners are decisively impacted by shifting passions (Aristotle Rhetoric 1354b 8–13; 1356a 14–16). From this perspective, a close connection between rhetorical texts and everyday morality is vital. Research into popular morality, such as that of K. Dover, has helped us better perceive the limits of this non-theoretical, practical morality. A number of passions, such as orgē, eleos, hybris, phthonos, etc., permeate rhetorical texts that focus on political reality. Further semantic fields are those of polypragmosynē and pleonexia, or, on the contrary, those of sōphrosynē

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-012

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and apragmosynē. Following the various oligarchic conspiracies of the late 5th century BC, the frequent use of adjectives such as misopolis, misodēmos, philopolis or philodēmos and the positive connotation ascribed to competitive values such as philotimia support the view that the rise of the individual with its competitive values coincided with the endeavour to include it in the cooperative values of the city. Judicial rhetoric, either in private or in public political life, is a defining aspect of the rhetorical art of the 4th century BC, from its inception until the final orator of the canon of the ten Attic orators, Dinarchus. The answer to whether legal proceedings were dominated by competitive values, such as those of desire for success and excellence (D. Cohen; M.R. Christ) or by cooperative values of clemency and prudence (G. Herman) has similar elements to the classic distinction made by Α.W.H. Adkins between cooperative and competitive values, as regards the stratification of Hellenic values over time from Homer until the classical era. Such overly formal distinctions cannot define a society as a whole; they are always present to a lesser or greater extent, but serve as a broad field of reference allowing one to understand the synthesis between a moral subject and external influences in ancient Greek thought. Certain speeches, such as Demosthenes’ Against Conon (54), appear to support both possibilities. On the other hand, judicial disputes that concerned public cases served as an important weapon in the struggle for political advancement. Procedures initiated against unlawful decrees (graphai paranomōn) enabled the revision of decisions and the neutralisation of political opponents. The ideals of the city were exceptionally powerful in the late 5th century and early 4th century BC, but at the same time individuality was continuously growing. The decisive step was taken by Isocrates, who emerged as a reformer of epideictic oratory during the 4th century BC. The encomium Evagoras (9) is recognised as a watershed moment, because the position of the mythical lauded figure was now held by a contemporary historical figure, namely Evagoras I, a Cypriot king. Isocrates does not limit himself to praising an individual act but extols all the virtues of Evagoras that emerge through his actions. The epitaphios logos functioned as a political institution and exponent of the citystate. The funeral speech is permeated by collective, impersonal presentation and preserves a traditional, formal arsenal of common topoi and motifs from which the orator draws. Nevertheless, new ideas directly related to the promotion of individuality could not but have affected funeral speeches. Hyperides’ Funeral Speech, dated at a later time (322 BC), praises not only the unnamed fallen, but mainly the general Leosthenes both specifically and comprehensively – a decisive innovation. ΙΙ. The dispute between philosophy and rhetoric became established during the 4th century BC. The key figures are Plato and Isocrates; the former, as the pupil of Socrates, juxtaposes philosophy, the supreme science, and knowledge originating from the dialectical search for an absolute, timeless truth (epistēmē) against rhetoric, which is based on what is reasonable and likely (eikos). The latter, as the pupil of Gorgias and

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advocate of a renewed sophistical movement, places rhetoric at the very centre of education, which is based on opinion (doxa) and integrally linked to the social and political presence of citizens. In Plato’s Gorgias, rhetoric is subjected to extreme criticism: for Plato, rhetoric is not based on a true foundation, but is merely a producer of persuasion (peithous dēmiourgos), without taking right and wrong into consideration (454e). Through an impressive formal parallelism, Plato mocks the new art and ranks it among the four parts of kolakeia (464b–465e). Rhetoric deceives and flatters the soul, as cookery does to the body; it is directed wholly against the moral improvement of the audience. It provides the means to deceive one’s fellow man and manipulate the audience. The criticism of rhetoric is in line with the general discussion of pleonexia at the time, as expounded on by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, Callicles in Gorgias or Eteocles in Euripides’ Phoenissae. Menexenus, as a model funeral speech, is also subject to the debate concerning rhetoric. The introductory dialogue between Socrates and Menexenus, a young, wealthy Athenian, as a derisive context, has many characteristics that would allow for Menexenus to be interpreted as a parody, following Plato’s critique of rhetoric in Gorgias. In Phaedrus, a new role is ascribed to rhetoric: in contrast to the technical form of his contemporary rhetoric, Plato turns towards a psychological direction of rhetoric on a philosophical-dialectical basis. The definition of rhetoric as peithous dēmiourgos (Gorg. 454e) is now replaced by psychagōgia dia logōn, i.e. the art of “leading the soul through speeches” (Phaedr. 261a; 271c). Orators must know the souls of their listeners, which parts of their soul are touched by each speech (271c– 272a). Isocrates’ opposition to Plato begins from the limits he himself set in his autobiographical speech Antidosis (15.84–85): Isocrates stands out as an early theoretician of common sense and public opinion. Through the concept of homologoumenē aretē (“popular morality”), he propounds the moral dimension of his rhetoric, juxtaposing it against Platonic philosophy. His worldview is based on predominant traditional values and represents popular morality. For Isocrates, adherence to homologoumenē aretē is not an expression of incapacity for deeper moral thought, but an established principle of the rhetorical logōn paideia. For Isocrates, what is useful and politically profitable is true. Through his rhetoric, he exhorts the entirety of his city towards a form of politics that will result in prosperity for Athenians and will deliver the rest of the Greeks from their tribulations. In the proem to his exhortative speech Nicocles (3.2–5), Isocrates refutes Plato’s beliefs concerning rhetoric, i.e. that it grants the means for pleonexia in order to deceive one’s fellow man. The chief tenet is clear: it is not logos that is harmful; its use by man is exclusively responsible for any adverse consequences it might entail. The sophistic principle of man as the measure of all things (Protagoras 80 B1 D.-K.: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος) is transformed into a moral expression of individual personality, which is ultimately and exclusively responsible for its actions.

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Isocrates extols logos, both speech and thought, as the key distinguishing feature between animals and men and as a touchstone for all human achievements, even in the moral dimension (3.6–7). Discourse is the finest symbol of proper thought and discourse which is true, lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul (λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ νόμιμος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς εἴδωλόν ἐστιν). This single conception of morality and rhetoric indicates considerable progress over the formalistic rhetoric of the sophists and Gorgias in particular. Gorgias placed the power of speech at the very centre of his teachings: speech is a “a powerful lord” (82 B11.8 D.-K.: δυνάστης μέγας). The “dynastic” conception of the sophists’ logos is supplanted by the “hegemonic” logos of Isocrates. Logos is the hēgemōn of the thoughts and actions of men and it predominantly characterises those with the greatest intellectual skills (Isocr. 3.9). The Isocratean speech is dynamis, but it is not violent. Therefore, logos is transformed into a cultural symbol from which all goods spring forth. With logos at the heart of the Panegyricus (4.45–50), Athens is depicted as a vibrant cultural centre in the ancient world. Isocrates establishes a direct link between the cultural influence of Athens and his humanistic educational ideal which is defined as philosophia in Isocreatean terminology and is, ultimately, a terminus technicus for Isocratean rhetoric. During the 4th century BC, competition and disputes concerning rhetoric between sophists and orators were increasing in number. The conflict between Alcidamas and Isocrates is fundamental, based on the deep opposition between a traditionally oral culture and the emergent contender for primacy, the written word. Both were pupils of Gorgias and were active in Athens during the 4th century BC, holding different beliefs in regard to the ideal rhetorical art. Through his criticism of the written word and his exhortation in favour of eloquent improvisation, Alcidamas stands in contrast to Isocrates. In his declamation On Sophists, Alcidamas juxtaposes meticulous, rhythmic written speeches, which he censures as immobile and inflexible, against vibrant extemporaneous speeches. Alcidamas employs autoschediazein (“to improvise”) as a terminus technicus for rhetoric. Alcidamas scorns written epideictic speeches and praises the contribution of improvisation to deliberative and judicial speeches. In contrast to Alcidamas, Isocrates is an advocate for the diligence and systematic care of an epideictic speech, as defined through the stylistic terminus technicus akribeia and synonymous terms. The concept of akribeia (“precision”) concerns – apart from harmonious, rhythmic structure – the aesthetic integrity of epideictic speeches, the precise selection of words, the finish and the purity of the style (5.4). Isocrates rejects autoschediazein (13.9) and highlights the superiority of written epideictic speeches (4.11–14). ΙΙΙ. Of the number of rhetorical handbooks circulating in the 4th century BC, one of the only two extant in their entirety is Rhetoric to Alexander; the work is included in

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the Aristotelian corpus, but the text was most likely written by Anaximenes of Lampsacus (c. 380–320 BC). It is a systematic handbook that does not provide a theoretical overview of rhetoric, but systematises everyday rhetorical practice and lays down rhetorical rules. Instances of technical concordance with or differentiation from Aristotelian terminology are very useful for the history of the literary genre during the 4th century BC. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the second major extant rhetorical handbook of the 4th century BC. Aristotle subjected rhetoric and, in particular, the means of persuasion and psychology of emotions, to strict scientific analysis; on the other hand, he categorised rhetoric as a formalistic art and rejected Plato’s view that orators must be philosophers. Aristotle acknowledged Isocrates as the premier virtuoso of the written word and his tremendous contribution to the evolution of rhetorical style, particularly with regard to epideictic speeches. In the peripatetic tradition, Isocrates and not Demosthenes served as a stylistic standard. Apart from rhetorical handbooks, which Aristotle studied systematically, a crucial role was also played by rhetorical practice in Athenian democracy, which Aristotle’s Rhetoric takes into consideration, potentially accepts or adapts accordingly. The issue of whether or not an Aristotelian orator serves moral purposes (a point of controversy) is answered in a neutral manner: “For by using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm” (Rhetοric 1355b 6–7: ἄν τις ὠφελήσειεν τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως). One can only hope that persuasion is not used for the achievement of nefarious purposes (1355a 31). IV. Rhetoric was so important for the literary production of the 4th century BC that anyone authoring literary texts was obligated to follow rhetorical forms, procedures and rules. Plato’s dialogues are exceptional literary texts, stylistically elaborate and examples of a Platonic model of philosophical rhetoric. Certain dialogues contain rhetorical speeches (Phaedrus, Symposium), while others, such as the Apology of Socrates and Menexenus, can be perceived as products of traditional rhetoric. Of the works of Antisthenes, the pupil of Socrates, two brief epideictic speeches survive, Ajax and Odysseus, which, in the form of opposed arguments (antilogiai), address the conflict between the two Homeric heroes concerning the arms of Achilles. Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is a fictional, laudatory biography of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian empire, as an early “Mirror of Princes” (Fürstenspiegel). Xenophon’s Agesilaus is an encomium to the Spartan king, influenced by Isocrates’ encomium Evagoras. The “Canon of the Ten Attic orators” includes orators who were active in Athens from the late 5th century BC to the late 4th century BC. Caecilius of Calacte in Sicily, a critic of the Augustan Age, may have been the first to create or confirm and propagate the canon. There is scattered information on many other theoreticians and practitioners of rhetoric outside the canon of the ten Attic orators, but hardly any of their writing survives. Therefore, we must focus on the representative and in the canon of

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the ten Attic orators. Nevertheless, the non-canonical Apollodorus, Hegesippus and Demades deserve deeper analysis. Apollodorus (394–after 343 BC) was an Athenian anti-Macedonian politician and an ally of Demosthenes. Through eight judicial speeches included in the Demosthenic corpus – of which six (Against Stephanus [46], Against Timotheus [49], Against Polycles [50], Against Callippus [52], Against Nicostratus [53], and Against Neaera [59]) are attributed with less or more certainty to Apollodorus himself – we are able to follow a number of trials with Apollodorus as the protagonist. These rhetorical speeches vividly reflect Athenian society during the mid-4th century BC. More specifically, numerous references to the social, religious and sexual life of Athens with important cultural value can be found in the speech Against Neaera (59; around 342 BC), concerning the notorious former courtesan from Corinth and her life, with all its titillating details. It is not only the speech Against Neaera that has been the subject of systematic research in recent years; there is great interest in the actual story of Neaera in the context of gender studies focusing on sexuality and prostitution as the legal, financial and social conditions of women living in Athens in the 4th century BC. Hegesippus of Sounion was one of the staunchest opponents of Philip II of Macedon (μισοφίλιππος; Scholia Aeschin. 1.126, p. 27; 1.147, p. 30 Dilts). While part of an Athenian delegation to Philip (possibly in 343 BC), he irked the king (Demosth. 19.331). He is quite likely the author of the speech On Halonnesus (7), which was delivered in 342 BC and is transmitted as part of the Demosthenic corpus. Nevertheless, Hegesippus’ speech appears particularly one-dimensional, without the broad perspective of a politician of Demosthenes’ stature. Ancient accounts depict Demades (c. 380–319 BC) as an opportunistic demagogue and past scholarship is in line with the above, as it stressed the inconsistency between the tainted morals of the Athenian politician and his rhetorical prowess. There is universal consensus regarding Demades’ rhetorical skill even today, yet modern researchers (P. Brun) are endeavouring to restore Demades as a highly active politician: he is considered an important diplomat and his political activity is closely linked to the interests of Athens. V. Isocrates was one of the longest-lived figures of antiquity (436–338 BC). After 390 BC, around the time his school was founded, Isocrates had been recognised as a towering figure in issues of education and publicism. His written speeches represent the new trend of the 4th century BC towards literacy and were initially intended to be published, whether in smaller or larger circulation. In Evagoras (9.74), Isocrates, in continuation of the opening to Pindar’s Fifth Nemean Ode (1–2), likens epideictic speeches to moving art monuments which, contrary to motionless statues, can travel throughout Greece, be disseminated and broadly recognised by wise men. The concept of the ideal political leader, internal political stability, unity among the Greeks and the campaign against the Persians are the key issues in his political reflections.

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Isocrates is a characteristic example of a rhetorician-scholar of the 4th century BC. He places his political ideas above the institutions of the status quo, expressing the end of one era (the classical city-state) and the ideological precursor of another (the Hellenistic monarchy). Athenian patriotism is linked to the idea of a Pan-Hellenic community. For Isocrates, as an Athenian, this was not contradictory, but liberating. The promotion of individuality and its role within and beyond the political structures of the city-state are innovative pursuits in his rhetorical and educational work. Contrary to Plato, Isocrates does not aim at one conflicting with the many, but at achieving harmony between competitive and cooperative values, while underlining the personal responsibility of orators in the correct use of rhetorical art. As a cultural force, Isocratean rhetoric includes eu legein and eu phronein, and represents the classical humanistic ideal of harmonious development of one’s personality which, through Cicero and the Renaissance, became deeply rooted in European values to this day. His moralising and civilising tendency so defines the aim of his speeches that Isocrates himself includes in his political commitment the new responsibility of the individual, whether this generally concerns the use of logos, which, being “hegemonic” – in contrast to the “dynastic” logos of the sophists – is treated as a supreme good and cultural symbol, or specifically the authoring of an encomium, where the rhetorician is called upon to surpass the collective praise for the city-state, or the starring role played by a politician who, depending on his values, can either do good or do harm, irrespective of the political system in which he is active (12.132–133). Thus, individuality is the focal point of interest beyond any given institutional framework. In this sense, the Isocratean corpus reflects ideas characterised by cohesiveness and consistency, regardless of whether this involves advice towards the political community, such as Panegyricus (4), Areopagiticus (7) and On the Peace (8), or the encomium of a monarch, such as Evagoras (9), or exhortation of a monarch, such as To Nicocles (2) and To Philip (5). In Isocratean thinking, it is not the political system or the institutions acting as safeguards, but an “aristocracy of values” that is integrally linked with the leaders as bearers of these values (12.131–133). In On the Team of Horses (16), Isocrates takes the opportunity to turn an apology into an encomium and to shed light on the pisteis ek tou biou through an encomium of the renowned Athenian general Alcibiades. In the context of the moral-political discourse during the late 5th century BC on the hazards of ambition, Isocrates makes a clear choice: he does not discount the competitive ambition of the individual, but endeavours to lead it in positive, cooperative directions for the good of the person and of the city. Irrespective of the reason to choose the topic, Helen (10) is transformed into a “pedagogical manifesto”. Kallos becomes the dominant topic of the speech, while the dubious behaviour of Helen is not touched upon at all. In the ground-breaking encomium Evagoras (9), Isocrates persistently combines the competitive values of an aristocrat of the Homeric type with the cooperative virtues of a citizen of a citystate.

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In his autobiographical speech Antidosis (15), Isocrates’ rhetorical education incorporates moral and cultural values related on all levels to the social status of the orator and citizen (15.275–285). The distinction between einai and dokein, a key issue in the discourse of Plato, who suffered it first-hand in the case of his teacher, does not seem to be truly of concern to Isocrates. However, the fact that he is aware of the difficulties involved in the need to bring his skills in line with the mandates of the polis is proven by the case of his pupil, the general Timotheus (15.101–139). While Isocrates praises his student for his performance, he does not accept the estrangement of the individual from the homologoumenē aretē of the polis. Concepts such as philanthrōpos, epicharis and eunoia prove that Isocrates aims at contact with society as a whole and not a rift. Isocrates carries concepts from logōn paideia over to political life and develops his ethical ideas in rhetorical speeches where political issues are predominant. In Panegyricus (4), where attention is systematically brought to the Pan-Hellenic ideal, which called for unity among the Greeks and war against the Persians, Isocrates extols the overall character of Athenian cultural supremacy: eu legein and eu phronein, i.e. Isocratean rhetorical education, distinguish the intellectual superiority of Athens, which is a teacher to other cities and the torch-bearer of Greek education (4.50). Isocrates creates an idealised patrios politeia – of both Athens and Sparta – before and during the Persian Wars where, contrary to the contemporary excessive personal ambitions at the expense of the polis, leaders-educators cultivated the morals of citizens, leading to outstanding achievements in the Persian Wars (4.75 ff.). Politicians became educators and their character is the key point of discussion. In Areopagiticus (7), Isocrates speaks out against the radical democracy of his era, considering it as the root of a host of misfortunes for both the domestic and the foreign policy of Athens, and preaches in favour of an idealised patrios politeia of the era of Solon and Cleisthenes, considering it to be the most democratic and most beneficial for the city. In On the Peace (8), Isocrates’s response to Thucydidean Realpolitik is interpreted as a counterpoint to the political ideology of the Thucydidean Athens Tyrannis. The rhetorician does not dismiss competitive values on the basis of a Platonic approach to virtue as the sole purpose of moral action. He opposes the polypragmosynē of Athenian foreign policy, which he equates to injustice (adikia), and preaches in favour of aretē and the pursuit of the goodwill (eunoia) as the best means for achieving good. In To Philip (5), what an audience is to an orator, the Pan-Hellenic community is to the King of Macedon. Philip II of Macedon embodies Isocrates’ long-standing hopes for the realisation of the Pan-Hellenic ideal; he is called upon to imitate his mythical ancestor Heracles and to become the euergetēs of the Greeks, to unite them, win their favour and lead the war against the Persians. Isocrates is considered the “father of the periodic style”: long, beautifully composed and balanced periods that stand out for being rounded and containing strong rhythms, the clarity of his structure and the avoidance of hiatus are the chief characteristics of the art of his discourse, and had already been successfully identified in

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antiquity. The originality of the Isocratean style involves an approximation of prosaic to poetic language, so that epideictic speeches exceed the stylistic level of judicial speeches, in line with the doctrine of the Aristotelian mean and absence of excess. His prominent position in the transition from orality to literacy and his insistence on political visions beyond the borders of the traditional city-state are interwoven with a conception of rhetoric which, in our contemporary multi-aspected and liberal culture, seeks out Isocratean models. VI. In Demosthenes (384–322 BC), political oratory found its supreme manifestation, and the orator’s life is closely linked to his political career. Contrary to the scholarly Isocrates, who favoured moralistic, comprehensive solutions to overcome problems within and beyond his city, Demosthenes begins from a different starting point: emphasis is placed on the active, practical functioning of the individual within conflicting political factions and synergies. Isocrates is the teacher, while Demosthenes is the politician. In Demosthenes’ case, the individual guides and energises society as a whole on the practical political scene. Demosthenic oratory begins with the judicial speeches and it is noteworthy that among the speeches written by Attic orators, the most judicial speeches available to us can be found in the corpus of Demosthenes, some for public suits and most for private ones. Demosthenes embodies the very model of an advocate of the era, with his judicial speeches creating a realistic picture of judicial practices and serving as a rich source for the understanding of Attic law. In Against Conon (54), hybris is condemned as a clear expression of contempt for the other’s personality and, at the same time, an attack against the primacy of the political community itself. Against Meidias (21) further elaborates on the same topic. The sole motive for Meidias’ act, according to Demosthenes, was hybris (21.181). Meidias’ personality is not just antisocial and violent towards a fellow citizen, but is also a characteristic example of the political attitude of an entire social class: he represents the violence and undemocratic behaviour of the rich who scoff at the laws and the democratic ethos. Demosthenes thus equates himself to the democracy and his rhetoric is an expression of the democracy and its laws. In Against Leptines (20), Demosthenes defends the democratic ideology of the reciprocal relationship between euergesia and charis, whereby granting an honour is presented as an acknowledgement of a benefaction and is considered a powerful incentive in practical ethics. It is impossible to grasp the thrilling effect of Demosthenes’ public speeches without comprehending the particular passion accompanying his beliefs since the outset of his political career. In the speech On the Symmories (14), the word egō appears at least 13 times, reflecting the self-confidence of his thinking. With the speech For the Megalopolitans (16), Demosthenes makes a proposal to the Athenians that combines Realpolitik and ethics. In the speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15), Demosthenes puts forth the axiomatic view that democracies are more beneficial for the democratic Athens than oligarchies (15.14–20).

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When Eratosthenes compares Demosthenes’ overpowering emotion with Bacchic frenzy (Plut. Demosth. 9.4: παράβακχος), one ponders those literary and historic monuments through which Demosthenes, from 350 BC until the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), put forth the need for active and consistent Athenian policy against Philip II of Macedon. Demosthenes’ political ideals were guided by the traditionally leading role that Athens played in Greece and not by Isocrates’ Pan-Hellenic ideal. The four Philippics (4, 6, 9, 10), the three Olynthiacs (1, 2, 3) and the speech On the Chersonese (8) focus on stemming the danger from the north and the ever-expanding Macedon with passion and fascinating internal mobilisation. This struggle, through which Demosthenes wished to awaken the Athenians from their awkward passivity and actively contribute to the political decisions of his city, would affect the entirety of his life. The Third Philippic (9) is considered the pinnacle of political rhetoric, while the following phrase from the Second Philippic (6.25) is an exceptional reflection of Demosthenes’ political beliefs: “Every king and tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law”. Despite the military defeat and the political change brought about by new conditions following the victory of the Macedonians, Demosthenes’ esteem contributed enough to be selected among the most acclaimed statesmen as the one to deliver the Epitaphios (around late 338 BC) in honour of the fallen at Chaeronea. The judicial speech On the False Embassy (19; 343 BC), written during the great political struggle of Demosthenes, was directed against his opponent, Aeschines. Rhetoric, politics and personal conflicts between the two predominant orators of the political scene graphically illustrate an ambiguous political context. However, the speech On the Crown (18; 330 BC) was a full account and autobiographical exposition of the orator’s politics, similar to Isocrates’ speech Antidosis. Demosthenes became a symbol of the timeless city of Athens. Despite the unfortunate outcome of the war against Philip, Athens had no alternative; based on the character of the city, its resistance and consistent struggle for liberty were a duty dictated by its name and tradition. Demosthenes left his mark on rhetoric in the 4th century BC. He did not cultivate rhetoric as an end in itself, but as a means for action and results. Consequently, the value of a Demosthenic speech is not predicated on the aesthetic result of rhetorical virtuosity, but on its effectiveness. Special Demosthenic rhetorical figures belong to the agonistic style (lexis agōnistikē), which is clearly distinguished in rhetorical handbooks from the written epideictic style (lexis graphikē). Demosthenes has two unique traits: firstly, delivery (hypokrisis), to which Demosthenes attributed great significance, more than any other orator of his era, and, secondly, the careful preparation of a speech, while extemporaneous speaking is relegated to second place. The terminus technicus used by ancient critics to define the particularity of Demosthenic rhetoric is deinotēs. The concept means “intensity, forcefulness”, closely linked with Demosthenes’ commitment and internal dedication to political struggle. In contrast to Isocrates, who primarily focuses on the ēthos of readers, Demosthenes stands out for his ability to stir pathos.

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Irrespective how one interprets Demosthenes’ reception, one thing is certain: the ever-shifting legend around his name from antiquity to the present day is worthy of his rhetorical art and tumultuous political life. Whether criticised or praised, Demosthenes’ speeches were studied and discussed extensively, and not just at schools of rhetoric. Demosthenes’ supreme recognition as an orator became established in the 1st century BC under the influence of Atticist principles. Cicero felt as the true successor of Demosthenes. On the other hand, the ambiguous image of Demosthenes as a politician – and not an orator – historically tallies with the rise and fall of his life. With his passion for the strength and honour of Athens, depending on the selective affinities of each era, Demosthenes was at times lauded as a martyr for liberty and a patriotic hero, and at times vilified as a representative of near-sighted, parochial patriotism. VII. The backgrounds of Demosthenes and his political opponent Aeschines (390–315 BC) differ as follows: Demosthenes came from a rich family and took on state liturgies at a very young age; apart from receiving a traditional education, he studied under the orator Isaeus, enjoyed notable success in his logographic activity and entered the political arena at quite a young age. Aeschines came from an impoverished family, did not work as a logographer, owed his rhetorical performance primarily to his natural talents, and entered politics at a late age. These were two very different personalities whose common ground was rhetorical prowess and who were dominated by a rivalry that surpassed that personal differences. The most important chapter of Aeschines’ political career spanned from 348 to 338 BC. During the conflict with Macedon, Aeschines served the interests of Athens with a political plan which – contrary to Demosthenes’ aggressive, military plan – aimed at reaching a compromise with Philip and at achieving co-existence between Athens and Macedon. Aeschines was not a logographer and published few speeches during his political career. The three genuine extant speeches Against Timarchus (1), On the False Embassy (2) and Against Ctesiphon (3) quite likely comprise the entirety of his literary output and concern his clash with Demosthenes. Against Timarchus (1), a prosecution speech against a political ally of Demosthenes, is the result of a rivalry involving Aeschines, Demosthenes and their supporters after the Peace of Philocrates (346 BC). The speech is an important source for homosexuality and male prostitution and, in this sense, a rarity in Attic oratory. The case of Timarchus is indicative of the risks of individuality in the Athenian democracy when it was the subject of polemic due to a controversial private life and when a number of social factors became intertwined. It is this precise fact that serves as the basis for the successful strategy employed by Aeschines, who systematically fails to mention the political background of the trial and builds his speech on Timarchus’ suspect reputation. A critically important component is “public opinion” and, while Isocrates was its theoretical representative, Aeschines places exceptional trust in it in practice.

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The two speeches On the False Embassy (2), bearing the same name (prosecution by Demosthenes, defence by Aeschines) and concerning the political trial held in 343 BC, contain clear contradictions, manipulation of facts and selective use of evidence by both sides. Aeschines defends his policy of peace towards the Macedonians, and condemns those who support a policy of war and more war, associating his own stance with democracy: “Peace preserves democracy, while war destroys it” (2.177). Regarding the relationship between the individual personality and the political community, the semantic distinction attempted between phēmē and sykophantia/diabolē (2.145) is important, whereby only the former expresses society as a whole and develops automatically, functioning in the interest of society, whereas the latter is initiated by a specific individual for the purpose of defamation. Therefore, Aeschines’ assertions aim at equating himself with healthy public opinion and appearing as the representative of beneficial reputation and not malicious accusations. Aeschines’ third speech, Against Ctesiphon (3; 330 BC), is a prosecution speech against Ctesiphon for submitting an illegal motion for Demosthenes to be awarded a crown for his services to the homeland. Aeschines’ speech cannot be interpreted independently; it has to contend with Demosthenes’ defence speech On the Crown (18) and this contention affects all present-day interpretations. The two speeches reflect not only the views of Athenian society or segments thereof, but also the personal competition between two first-class orators, speaking before a democratic audience, each defending his overall politics and personal profile. Aeschines’ activity as an actor unquestionably helped him cultivate his natural talent: memory, body language, voice, performance. The two different aspects of his rhetorical prowess are distinctly Aeschinean: on the one hand, seriousness and splendour, and, on the other, forcefulness and intense aggressiveness. Generally speaking, Aeschines shows a tendency towards hyperbole, which can lead to deploying extreme severity in attacks against his enemies, with almost every reference to Demosthenes being accompanied by a denigrating term originating from comedy. Aeschines and Demosthenes came of age within the Athenian democracy and are characteristic examples of the polarising rhetoric of the 4th century BC, being interdependent with their mercurial audience. The fact that they were frequently called upon, whether jointly or separately, to represent Athenian interests is proof of the leading role both men played. Aeschines was a patriot who served the interests of his city from his own perspective and with a plan which, like that of Isocrates, aimed at reaching a compromise with Macedon. From a realistic perspective and seen post eventum, this plan was more successful than Demosthenes’ military plan, but it failed to enthuse his fellow citizens and proved unequal to the historical tradition of Athens. VIII. Isaeus, the legal expert among the Attic orators (415/410–after 340 BC) is the preeminent example of professional judicial rhetoric, which casts a light on the civic habits of the litigious Athenians of the 4th century BC. Individuality is subordinate to the rules of the Athenian democracy of the courts, and therefore its success depends

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on the successful outcome for its clients. Isaeus’ speeches do not portray conflicting political aspects of Athenian foreign policy, as in the case of Demosthenes and Aeschines, but rather everyday life in Athenian society in its various forms. The starting point for reflection on the moral dimension of Isaeus’ rhetoric can be found in the remarks by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isae. 3–4, p. 96–97 Us.-Rad.), whereby Isaeus’ contemporaries accused him of chicanery and deception, i.e. that he gave rise to the suspicion of guile instead of truth and justice. These views affected the evaluation of Isaeus as an immoral logographer (W. Wyse), although contemporary scholarship (B. Griffith-Williams) attempt to strike a balance between the actual facts, Attic law and the rhetorical art; on the one hand, Isaeus is a primary source on Attic law, particularly inheritance law, familial relations and social life in Athens, while on the other he earns a particular place in the development of rhetoric. Through a style of rhetoric that aims at persuading judges, driven by their psychology, Isaeus plays a clearly defined role: to resolve a rhetorical and legal matter without any moral assessments. It is likely that Isaeus, like Lysias, was a metic and therefore did not become involved in politics. Almost all his extent speeches (1–11), save one (12), concern inheritance disputes (logoi klērikoi). His speeches touch upon legal issues such as the validity of wills, legitimate and illegitimate family members, the claims of heirs, the legitimacy of testamentary or inter vivos adoption, the intentions of deceased individuals. From a modern perspective, one is struck by ancient legal conditions and wonders which arguments could be used to contest the validity of a will. The well-planned speech On The Estate of Cleonymus (1) was written for the testator’s two uterine nephews. Due to their close familial relation, they raised a claim against their opponents, who similarly support their claim on a will drafted in their favour. Isaeus searches for “the will of the testator”, i.e. he does not question the authenticity of the will, but exhorts the judges to judge it not on the basis of the actual will but of the intentions of the deceased person, which are reflected in his general attitude towards his relatives and, therefore, his desire not to injure them. The speech On the Estate of Menecles (2) was written in defence of an inter vivos and not a testamentary adoption, against the claims of a brother of the deceased. The speech On The Estate of Ciron (8) concerns a difficult inheritance dispute with no will. He is defending the interests of a grandson of the deceased Ciron on his daughter’s side against an opponent on his last wife’s side. The literary critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus first identifies the obvious similarities between Lysias and Isaeus, such as the purity, precision, clarity, conciseness, vividness and aptness of expression before moving on to the fine differences in their style (Isae. 2–4, p. 94–97 Us.-Rad.): Isaeus surpasses Lysias in skilful composition, but lacks the Lysianic charm. Therefore, Isaeus falls between the simple and natural expression of Lysias and the eloquence and complexity of the synthetic thinking of Demosthenes. His strength lies in the evidencing and logical processing of fine legal

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argumentation in complex legal disputes. Although his inclusion in the canon of the ten Attic orators is a testament to his recognition, his post-Classical reception is rather meagre, due to his political indolence and primarily the subject-matter of his rhetorical speeches. The singular treatise of Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Isaeus is integrally linked to Demosthenes: the “teacher - pupil” relationship ensured his legacy. IX. If Isaeus, as a logographer, was challenged as to the immoral dimension of his judicial rhetoric, Lycurgus (384/383–324 BC), the sole orator of the canon of the ten Attic orators of aristocratic origins, was an exponent of the exact opposite: he embodies the relentless orator and politician-educator who never occupied himself as a logographer and who used, among things, rhetoric as a means for teaching his fellow citizens in practice. Thus, he is ranked between the theoretical educational work of Isocrates and the political rhetoric of Demosthenes. For twelve consecutive years, from 338 to 326 or, most likely, from 336 to 324 BC, Lycurgus determined the state administration, financial and construction policy of Athens with remarkable success; his achievements include military equipment, a construction programme to beautify Athens, as well as religious and cultural measures. The erection of statues of the three great tragic poets and the codification of the text of their plays in an official version to avoid interpolated verses are linked to Lycurgus’ religious and moral beliefs, originating from the gnomic content of the poetic tradition. The most august of the Attic orators enjoyed great repute and esteem among his contemporaries, with the reputation of being an individual of singular integrity. He did not become involved in private suits, but brought many charges and, due to his strong sense of duty, became a sort of public prosecutor and proved to be exceptionally stern. Despite his predilection for domestic politics, he did not shy away from foreign policy. Due to his anti-Macedonian action, he was among the orators and generals whose extradition Alexander demanded after the sack of Thebes (335 BC). Lycurgus’ political and rhetorical action, like that of Demosthenes, focused on highlighting the power of Athens. His reform programme aimed at restoring the past splendour of Athens, and his rhetoric served this very purpose. Discipline and prosperity within the city were to Lycurgus what liberty and a powerful position of the state abroad were to Demosthenes. Certain indications lead to the conclusion that Lycurgus’ speech Against Leocrates and Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown were the result of a political collaboration between the two men in the late 330s BC. In his sole extant speech, Against Leocrates, Lycurgus turns against Leocrates, an Athenian citizen who, upon receiving news of the disaster at Chaeronea, abandoned the city and returned after a long stay abroad. Lycurgus charged him with treason in the framework of the procedure of eisangelia (“impeachment”). The speech Against Leocrates clearly reflects the climate in Athens following the defeat at Chaeronea and the need for balance between two opposing trends: social cohesion and obedience to the laws. There are no personal attacks, which were frequent in trials, since it is not the individual being denounced, but the act, regardless of the perpetrator: “It is death

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for a city to be laid desolate” (Leocr. 61: πόλεώς ἐστι θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι). Lycurgus skilfully handles piety, which plays a predominant role throughout the speech. This stance is reminiscent of the views of his teacher, Isocrates, who, painting an idealised picture of the political leaders before the Persian Wars, presents them as politicians-educators. Lycurgus applies these views in practice. The emotional amplificatio which aims to inflame averseness towards things that are unjust, cruel or hateful is called deinōsis and ancient stylistics acknowledged this trait of Lycurgus. The tendency to magnify crimes is consistent with the seriousness and solemnity of his oratory, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus considers it worthy of imitation (De imit. 31.5.3, p. 212 Us.-Rad.). Lycurgus is a relentless prosecutor and his sermon-like speech is serious; the religious topoi and poetic quotations are in service of admonishment. X. Hyperides (390/389–322 BC), like Demosthenes, occupied himself as a professional logographer and politician. As a man of constrasts, Hyperides was the complete opposite of Lycurgus: the well-known bon viveur Hyperides led a rich private life full of frolic, while emerging as an uncompromising politician and the most important orator of the anti-Macedonian faction, second only to Demosthenes. While Hyperides enjoyed an exceptional reputation in antiquity, we have but a limited view of his rhetorical art. Among the 72 or 73 titles known to us, most were judicial speeches, while there was only one epideictic speech and 15 deliberative speeches. Six speeches concern courtesans, including the defence speech For Phryne, with which the famous anecdote regarding the courtesan’s beauty revealed before the judges is associated (Athen. 13.590d–591a). Apart from the brief speech For Euxenippus, which has survived in full, the speeches For Lycophron, Against Philippides, Against Athenogenes, Against Demosthenes, Against Diondas, Against Timandros and the Funeral Speech survive as smaller or larger fragments through papyrus discoveries or the Archimedes Palimpsest, the so-called “New Hyperides”. In For Euxenippus, a dispassionate, brief, terse and symmetrical speech, Hyperides downplays and lampoons the court case (the rhetorical terminus technicus is diasyrmos), viewing it as an abuse of the law. This speech is our main source on eisangelia (“impeachment”) due to serious injury to the public good. In the defence speech For Lycophron, the titular individual, a man over fifty years of age, presents himself as a simple, honest man; he diminishes the importance of the case and lampoons Ariston as an irreverent sycophant (c. 3[2]: ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης). Vivid description and masterful tactics also dominate the speech Against Athenogenes for a dikē blabēs (“a private action for damage to property”) to redress an injustice concerning a purchase contract, involving slaves, debts, homosexuality and a courtesan. Apart from the outline of the speaker’s character, there is interest in the fact that even this naive speaker, in a civil trial, equates the written laws with justice and democracy. Epicrates does not dispute the written law as an expression of justice but the validity of a contract which, being unfair, is contrary to the spirit of the law, which requires just

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(dikaia) agreements (c. 6[13]). He supports the strength of the law, which was written not by lovers and fraudsters, but by the greatest democrat of all, Solon (c. 10[21]). The speech Against Diondas of the “New Hyperides” is of political interest regarding the domestic political conditions of Athens after the Battle of Chaeronea. The significant similarities between Against Diondas and Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown suggest a common defence strategy and political collaboration between Demosthenes and Hyperides. The speech Against Demosthenes, as prosecution speech in the Harpalus affair, survives in extremely fragmentary form, but the uncompromising character of Hyperides still shines through. He sarcastically addresses his old political ally (c. 12 ff.) and condemns his avarice which led him to compromise with Alexander. Hyperides’ Funeral Speech (322 BC) elevates individuality to an institution primarily equated with the collective values of the Athenian democracy and is an impressive innovation. The exposition of the wars fought by the Athenian ancestors – typical for this literary genre – is omitted; instead, the achievements of contemporaries are put forth, while the general Leosthenes becomes a dominant figure in the speech. When Leosthenes is compared to the heroes of the Trojan War and deemed superior (c. 12[35]), one may discern a direct model in Isocrates’ Evagoras 9.65. In the proem to the encomium Evagoras (9.5–8), Isocrates criticises those who wish to write encomia only to mythical figures; he, instead, favours encomia written for contemporary figures and is proud of his innovation. Hyperides seems to have emulated his teacher in this respect and, as an innovator, wrote the most remarkable funeral speech in Greek literature. Hyperides received the most favourable criticism by Pseudo-Longinus (On the Sublime 34.1–4): due to his numerous merits, he is compared to a pentathlete (ὡς ὁ πένταθλος), who exhibits many remarkable virtues without being the champion in a single one. Hyperides’ rhetorical prowess was already acknowledged during his own era, and his reputation grew even larger after his death, to the point where some considered him superior even to Demosthenes ([Plut.] Vit. dec. or. 849D; Phot. Bibl. 266.495b). XI. The rhetoric of the classical era reaches its endpoint with Dinarchus (361/360– after 292/291 BC): he is the only orator in the Attic canon who remained active until the first decade of the 3rd century BC. Dinarchus being a metic, like Lysias and, most likely, Isaeus, did not pursue an independent political role despite his rhetorical talent; that is why he began occupying himself as a logographer. His logographic activity was so well regarded that he was assigned the authoring of three prosecution speeches in the Harpalus affair (324/323 BC) against Demosthenes, Aristogeiton and Philocles. His reputation and esteem reached their peak after the death of Alexander the Great (323 BC), primarily during the age of Demetrius of Phalerum (317–307 BC), who governed Athens as the confidant of the Macedonian Cassander. Three speeches are extant: Against Demosthenes (1), Against Aristogeiton (2) and Against Philocles (3). The first is complete, with the exception of minor lacunae, while

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the other two are missing the end. All three speeches concern trials related to the Harpalus affair and are prosecution speeches. They provide significant information on this notorious case, which became associated with charges of corruption among Athenian politicians. Dinarchus’ complete speech Against Demosthenes (1) is a deuterology. The predominant characteristic of the speech is the harsh, passionate attack against the defendant. With loanwords from the speeches of Aeschines against Demosthenes, Demosthenes and his political career come under fierce attack as causes of the disaster and humiliation suffered. Personal attacks against the defendant are also the hallmark of the speech Against Aristogeiton (2). The speech serves as yet another example of the position of the individual in the Athenian society of the late 4th century BC: private and public life are integrally linked to each other and reflect upon the ēthos of both the speaker and the defendant. Contrary to the moderate, sober speaker, a number of ungodly acts by the morally reprehensible Aristogeiton are described in the darkest possible terms. The prosecutor’s style in the speech Against Philocles (3) is, once again, excessive. There is a predominance of vicious attacks against Philocles, accompanied by numerous abusive appellations. The speaker draws a distinction between a group of corrupt orators and the demos, as it has to stand against them and prove that it has not been corrupted along with them. In this sense, the relationship between orator and the political community is not univocal; the speaker intentionally establishes a common front consisting of justice, the “healthy” rhetoric he propounds and the demos against certain reprobate exponents of rhetoric. Dinarchus’ style is characterised by clearness of expression, intensity, passion and irony, with frequent use of hyperbolic invective and coarse words. Dinarchus was unquestionably a highly skilled orator, but was greatly influenced and stands at the end of a long tradition. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Din. 1, p. 297 US.-RAD.) does acknowledge Dinarchus’ fame due to the brilliance of his oratory but equates it with the decline of the rhetorical art after the death of Alexander the Great (Dion. Hal. Din. 2, p. 299–300 Us.-Rad.). XII. Rhetoric, as a literary genre, underlines more than any other the vibrant relationship between the author and his audience or readers. The bipolar relationship “orator - audience” leads to the vivacious applause or disapproval by the audience, and makes the individual directly and permanently subject to the judgment of the political community. The historian Thucydides insistently raises the issue of the relationship between the one and the many in democracy, extolling Pericles as a true leader of a regime that was nominally a democracy but, in actuality, government in the hands of one individual (2.65.9–10). The various dimensions of this relationship in the 4th century BC are recorded both in the professional and political sectors served by orators themselves as individuals and in the ideas of Attic society reflected in their texts. Concepts, values, behaviours and attitudes before the court or the Assembly paint the picture of

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a diverse Athenian society with intense fluctuations, polarising views, political collaborations and complaints, with rhetorical texts serving as its living mirror. On the one hand, individuality in private and public life, and, on the other, the democratic framework of the city-state in civic life or foreign policy seem to have been twin forces, at times in harmony and at times in conflict, but always aware that the existence of either required the existence of the other. The interaction between orator and audience, the emotions and distrust of the many faced with the excellence of the one, and the drive and passion of the one, as an advisor and political leader, is the quintessence of rhetoric in the 4th century BC. Towards the end of the 4th century BC, rhetoric began following different paths, adapting to the new historical requirements of the Hellenistic era. As the art of persuasion, it naturally continued to exist in every aspect of literary endeavour, and there were no extreme rifts in politics. However, classical rhetoric, which was the elixir of democracy, lost its significance and grandeur, precisely because the vital space of its political momentum no longer existed. It was this very space that gave the opportunity to the individual, regardless of his origins and financial power, to convince the many as their equal, and to expect that he could determine the course of the political community through the power of his discourse.

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ΧΙ Dinarchus Blass, F. (1887–1898): Die attische Beredsamkeit, I-III,1–2, 2. ed., Leipzig. Burtt, J.O. (1954): Minor Attic Orators. II: Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hyperides, Cambridge MA/ London. Conomis, N.C. (1975): Dinarchus Orationes, Leipzig. Edwards, M. (1994): The Attic Orators, London. Hansen, M.H. (1975): Eisangelia. The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century BC and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians, Odense. Harris, E.M. (2001): Lycurgus, in: I. Worthington/C. Cooper/E.M. Harris, Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus. Translated, Austin, 153–218. Jebb, R.C. (1893): The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos, I-II, 2. ed., London. Kennedy, G.A. (1963): The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton. Kremmydas, C./Tempest, K. (eds.) (2013): Hellenistic Oratory. Continuity and Change, Oxford. Lanni, A. (2006): Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens, Cambridge. Liddel, P. (2007): Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens, Oxford. MacDowell, D.M. (2009): Demosthenes the Orator, Oxford. Marzi, M./Feraboli, S. (1995): Oratori Attici Minori. II: Antifonte, Andocide, Dinarco, Demade, Turin. Nouhaud, M./Dors-Méary, L. (1990): Dinarque Discours, Paris. Roisman, J. (2005): The Rhetoric of Manhood. Masculinity in the Attic Orators, Berkeley. Schaefer, A. (1966–1967): Demosthenes und seine Zeit, I-III, Append. III,2, Hildesheim (I-III reprint of the 2. ed., Leipzig 1885–1887; III,2 reprint of the 1. ed., Leipzig 1858). Sealey, R. (1993): Demosthenes and his Time. A Study in Defeat, New York. Shoemaker, G. (1968): Dinarchus. Traditions of his Life and Speeches with a Commentary on the Fragments of the Speeches, Diss. Columbia University. Steinbock, B. (2013): Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse. Uses and Meanings of the Past, Ann Arbor. Usher, S. (1974–1985): Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The Critical Essays, I-II, Cambridge MA/London.

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General Index Academy 60, 62, 208 acharistia 64, 173 Achilles 1, 79, 296 adikia, adikos 6, 30–31, 38, 39, 73, 110, 134 n. 96, 135‒136, 183, 252, 296, 299 adoption 239, 240, 304 adoxos 98 Adrastus 20 adultery 19 n. 77, 114, 241, 264 advocate 167‒168, 171, 263, 294 Aegina 51, 261 Aegospotamoi, Battle of 5, 49, 74, 127 aeimnēstos 116, 230 Aelianus 44, 92 Aelius Aristides 155 Aeschines 7, 9, 10, 45, 57, 81, 82, 89 n. 35, 154, 159, 162, 163, 168, 172, 178, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201 n. 113, 206, 209, 212‒ 234, 236, 259, 276, 278, 279, 283, 289, 301, 302‒303, 304, 308 –and Alcidamas 45, 213 –and Demosthenes 10, 57, 81, 154, 159, 162‒163, 168, 178, 193‒200, 206, 212‒ 215, 221‒230, 231, 232, 233, 301, 302, 303 –and Dinarchus 81, 159, 283, 289 –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 229, 232‒ 233 –and Hermogenes 233 –and Hyperides; see Hyperides –and Isocrates 213, 219, 225 n. 38, 230, 234 –and Leodamas 213 –and Philip 162, 193, 214, 221‒222 –and Philostratus 229‒230 –and Photius 212, 230, 231, 233 –and Plato 213 –and Socrates 213 –and Timarchus 214, 216‒220, 302 –atonōteros 231, 233

–charites 233 –euphōnos 232 –lamprophōnotatos 232 –pompikos hama kai deinos 230, 233 –semnologos 230, 232 –sophistikos kai gauros 233 –sophos kai deinos 232 –tragic actor 194, 212–213, 229, 303 –tritagōnistēs 198, 212 –Against Timarchus (1) 9, 57, 160, 194, 212, 214, 215, 216‒220, 225, 229 n. 47, 230, 259, 302 –On the False Embassy (2) 193, 206, 213, 214, 215, 221‒224, 302, 303 –Against Ctesiphon (3) 14 n. 61, 159, 163, 197, 214, 215, 224‒229, 230, 233, 250, 259, 283, 302, 303 –[Delian Oration] 215 –[Letters] 215‒216 Aeschines of Arcadia 83 Aeschylus 46 n. 44 Aesion 206 Aesop 70, 94–95 Aesopus (pro-Mithridatic author) 156 Agamemnon 76, 112, 142 agathos 14, 15, 20, 39, 51, 115, 127, 270; see also kalos kagathos Agesilaus 60, 79‒80, 99, 128, 147 n. 131, 156, 296 agōn logōn 224, 229, 234 agonistic ideal 130, 132 agoraios 266 n. 24 agraphon ethos 173 aigyptiazein, Aigyptios 166 n. 24 aischrokerdēs 177, 288 n. 21 aischynē 64, 185, 186, 249 aitēmata 55 akleēs 230 akolasia 134 akratēs 107

|| For reasons of consistency, all Greek words are provided in transliterated form, regardless of their appearance in the foregoing text. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110560145-014

342 | General Index

akribeia, akribēs 47, 48, 72, 149, 242, 243, 295 –akribesteron kai philoponōteron 149 alazoneia 80 Alcibiades 15 n. 63, 20, 24, 105‒110, 128, 298 Alcibiades (son) 106 Alcidamas 19 n. 78, 43‒52, 55, 68 n. 47, 72, 149, 213, 295 –and Aristotle 46, 55, 72 –and Demosthenes 45 –and Dinarchus 45 –and Gorgias 19 n. 78, 44, 45, 46, 295 –and Isaeus 45 –and Isocrates 43‒52, 68 n. 47, 72, 101 n. 16, 149, 295 –and Plato 51‒52, 55, 101 n. 16 –Encomium of Death 45 –Messenian Speech 45 –Mouseion 45–46 –Odysseus, Against the Treachery of Palamedes 45 –On Nais 45 –On Those who Write Written Speeches, or On Sophists 44–45, 46‒52, 55, 68 n. 47, 149, 295 alētheia, alēthēs 23, 34, 36‒37, 39, 111, 125, 204, 242, 295 alēthinos 50, 155, 233 Alexander I of Macedon 188 Alexander III of Macedon (the Great) 53, 62, 92, 94, 156, 163, 164, 246, 248, 251, 260, 267, 280, 282, 290, 305, 307, 308 Alexander of Epirus 156 Alexander of Pherae 60 Alexander Peri rhetorikōn aphormōn 44 allegory 94, 137 n. 103 ambition, ambitious 6–7, 13, 16, 20, 37, 50, 98, 99, 106‒107, 109, 110, 117, 118, 131, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 185, 186, 200, 220, 222, 298; see also philotimia Amphictyony 214, 259 Amphidamas 46 amplificatio; see auxēsis anadiplōsis 180, 185 anaischyntia / shamelessness 64, 275 anandria 31 n. 9 anankē 40 n. 31, 41, 185 anaphora 180, 181, 185, 204, 231

Anaxagoras (or.) 83 Anaximenes of Lampsacus 53‒59, 68, 93, 113, 125 n. 74, 173, 263, 296 –and Aristotle 53‒59, 68, 125 n. 74, 295‒ 296 –and Hyperides 263 –and Isocrates 56, 58, 68, 93, 113–114, 125 n. 74 –and Theopompus 53 –Ars Rhetorica (Rhetoric to Alexander) 53‒ 59, 66, 68, 76 n. 75, 93, 109 n. 34, 113‒ 114, 125 n. 74, 141 n. 117, 173, 216 n. 21, 263, 295‒296 –Encomium of Helen 53 –Hellenica 53 –On Alexander 53 –Philippica 53 –Tricaranus 53 Andocides 81, 107, 168, 173 n. 48, 223, 244, 289 –[Against Alcibiades] (4) 6, 8 n. 37, 107 andragathia 225, 244, 265 andreia 80, 108, 253, 272 andrikos 3 androgynos 230 Andronicus of Rhodes 63 Androtion 175 anger 64, 86, 179, 202, 275, 285; see also orgē Antalcidas, Peace of 31 anthropocentric criterion 38 antidosis 99 n. 9 antilogiai 79, 296 Antipater 92, 164, 261, 272, 281 Antiphon 81, 82, 130 n. 90, 168, 235, 244, 289 Antisthenes 79, 296 –Ajax 19 n. 78, 79, 296 –Odysseus 19 n. 78, 79, 296 antistrophē (or epiphora) 180, 231 antistrophos 63, 66‒67 antithesis 18, 55, 64, 150, 180, 182, 204, 276 apaggelia 56 aphanēs 98 Aphareus 61, 82, 97, 100, 158 n. 160 aphetos 141‒142 Aphobetus 212 Aphobus 159, 160, 168‒169, 175

General Index | 343

aphyēs 128, 137 apoleipesthai 138 n. 106, 243 Apollodorus 83‒89, 166, 167, 171, 172, 216, 220, 297 –Against Neaera; see Demosthenes Apollonius (grammarian) 212 Apollodorus of Pergamum 81 apologikon eidos; see rhetorical species apology / apologia 19, 106, 111, 113, 154, 298 apophasis 282 aposiopesis 204 apostrophe / apostrophē 32, 35 n. 24, 169, 179, 188, 231, 232, 254, 275, 288 apotheosis 120 apotomōs 146 apotreptikon eidos; see rhetorical species apragmosynē 5, 98 n. 5, 133, 293 Apsephion 172 n. 46 archē 75, 134, 136 n. 102, 200 Archidamus III (son of Agesilaus) 99, 156 Archimedes Palimpsest 262, 267, 277, 306 Archinus 31 n. 13 Areopagus 133, 282, 283 aretē 14, 21 n. 84, 34, 36, 37, 43, 64, 69, 103, 112, 114, 123, 124, 128‒129, 131, 135‒ 136, 139, 157, 225, 253, 272, 273, 294, 299 –homologoumenē 36‒37, 43, 103, 123, 128‒129, 157, 294, 299 –kalliston tōn epitēdeumatōn 112 aretē lexeōs (virtue of style) 64, 72, 75 –hellēnismos 72 –kataskeuē or kosmos 72 –prepon, prepousa 72, 75 –saphēneia, saphēs 64, 72, 75, 146 Argos 188 argument passim –ad hominem 241 –e contrario 64 n. 32 –eikos 3, 56, 240, 241, 264 Aristarchus 81 Aristides 134, 177 aristocracy, aristocratic 10 n. 48, 13, 14 n. 57, 15 n. 65, 16, 98 n. 5, 103, 117, 118, 120, 121 n. 66, 167, 179, 200, 225 n. 38, 246, 298, 305 –aristocracy of values 103, 118, 179, 225 n. 38, 298 Aristodemus 213

Aristogeiton 83, 260, 280, 281, 285‒286, 307‒308 Ariston (prosecutor, Demosth.) 169‒170 Ariston (prosecutor, Hyper.) 264, 306 Aristophanes 15, 13 n. 57, 17 n. 72, 46 n. 44, 204 n. 119, 266 n. 24 –Frogs 15 n. 63 –Peace 6, 46 n. 44 –Thesmophoriazusae 124 n. 71, 266 n. 24 –Wealth 15 Aristophanes of Byzantium 81 Aristophon 83, 213 n. 7, 259 Aristotle 2, 4, 6, 12 n. 56, 14, 17, 31, 53‒54, 56, 58, 59‒78, 82, 83, 86, 93, 111, 125, 150, 152, 154, 170, 207, 296 –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Anaximenes; see Anaximenes –and Demosthenes 62, 73, 77‒78, 154, 169, 170, 171, 176, 203, 207, 296 –and Isocrates 6, 58, 59, 60‒61, 62, 68, 72‒73, 73‒78, 97, 102, 111, 125, 130 n. 88, 139, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153–154, 296, 300 –and Plato 2, 6, 56, 59 n. 21, 62, 65‒66, 71, 72, 296 –doctrine of the mean 7, 72, 73, 75, 147, 300 –Art of Rhetoric 3, 4, 7, 14, 17, 31, 46, 53‒ 54, 55, 56, 58, 59‒78, 86, 93, 102, 109 n. 34, 111, 112 n. 43, 120 n. 65, 125, 130 n. 88, 139, 141 n. 116, 146, 150, 151, 170, 176, 178 n. 60, 201 n. 111, 207, 292, 296 –Athenaion Politeia 12 n. 56 –Nicomachean Ethics 7, 129, 173 n. 48 –On Rhetoric, or Gryllus 60 –Peri lexeōs 63 –Poetics 64, 102 –Prior Analytics 68 –Protrepticus 60‒61 –[Rhetoric to Alexander]; see Anaximenes Ars Rhetorica –Sophistical Refutations 2 n. 11, 55 n. 9, 59 n. 21 –Technēs tēs Theodektou Synagōgē 61 –Technōn Synagōgē 61, 67 n. 45 –Topics 62, 65 arrogance 6, 14, 108–109, 128, 132; see also alazoneia

344 | General Index

art of insult (Kunst des Schimpfens); see diabolē Artemisia II 62, 156 asebeia, asebēs 114, 178, 288 n. 21 Asianism 82 Aspasia of Miletus 31, 32 Assembly 8, 9, 27, 92, 99, 161, 166, 181, 182, 191, 203, 214, 244, 292, 308 asteia 64, 75, 94 asthenēs 3 astronomy 43 asyndeton 180, 185, 204, 230, 231, 288 ateleia 173, 174 Athenaeus 54, 89 n. 35, 92, 258, 259, 261‒ 262, 278, 306 Athenian, Athens passim –asty tēs Hellados 107‒108, 123 –Athens Tyrannis; see tyranny –didaskalos 42 –tēs Hellados paideusis 42 atimia, atimos 98, 220 Atrometus 212 Atticism 81, 82, 209, 215‒216, 232, 279, 302 Atticus 205 atychein, atychēs 75, 272, 273, 276 audience passim Autocles 259 Autolycus 249 autoschediazein, autoschedios 44, 45, 46‒ 47, 48, 53, 213, 231, 246, 295 auxēsis (amplificatio) 76, 113‒114, 120, 141 with n. 116, 204, 254, 306 axios 110, 123‒124, 131, 207, 250 –axiōs eipein 22, 23 barbaros 42 n. 34, 59 n. 23, 104‒105, 112‒ 113, 119, 130, 131, 133, 138, 139, 141, 142, 159, 187, 188, 192, 228‒229 basanos 55, 63, 241‒242 basileus 144, 184, 189 Bathippus 172 n. 46 bebaiōsis 56 benefaction, benefactor 15, 23, 42, 139, 140, 141, 173‒174, 186 n. 82, 192, 253, 300; see also euergesia benevolentia 175 Bescheidenheitstopik 22–23 Bessarion 211

bia, biaios 27 n. 4, 31, 40 n. 29 and 31, 138 blame 102, 226 Boeotia 252, 253, 272, 276 bouthytein 230 Busiris 113‒114 Caecilius of Calacte 81, 96, 105, 233, 296 –Peri tou charaktēros tōn deka rhētorōn 82 –Synkrisis of Demosthenes and Aeschines 233 Callias of Chalcis 276 Callicles 31, 126, 144, 294 Callimachus 84 Callistratus of Aphidnae 160‒161 Canon of the Ten Attic Orators 9, 74, 81‒82, 83, 233, 245, 280, 290, 293, 296‒297, 305, 307 Canon of the Two Virtues (Zweitugendkanon); see hosiōs kai dikaiōs captatio benevolentiae 152 Carthaginians 54 Cassander 92, 281, 307 Cephalus 283 Cephisodorus 61, 82, 97 Cersobleptes 175 Chabrias 161, 174, 176, 284 Chaeronea, Battle of 21, 91, 94, 96, 100, 137, 158 n. 160, 162, 163, 184, 195, 197, 198, 214, 221, 225, 226, 228, 246, 249, 250, 252, 260, 263, 267, 269, 280, 283, 301, 305, 307 Chalcidice 162, 186, 194 Chalcis 147, 235, 276, 281 chalepon or adynaton 22, 33, 147 chalepotēs 141 character assassination 45; see also diabolē Chares 76 Charidemus 175‒176, 177 charis, charites 64, 104, 173, 174, 175, 204, 233, 242, 243, 272, 274, 300 Charisius 83 Charmadas 208 Chios 33, 67, 80, 154, 156, 173, 259 chrēstos 15, 174, 195, 219, 265 Cicero 46, 61, 79, 94, 96, 155, 157, 197, 201 n. 112, 204, 205, 209, 210, 230, 233, 256, 278, 290, 298, 302 Cimon 215

General Index | 345

Cimon (Athenian general) 31 Ciron 241‒242, 304 Cleisthenes 107, 133, 299 Cleoboule 159 Cleochares of Myrlea 208 Cleophon 134 Clytemnestra 44 Coccus 82 codex optimus 74, 153, 205 collaboration ideological / political 9, 248, 269, 292, 305, 307, 309 Collytus 258 common sense 36, 294 comparison 1, 51 n. 59, 56, 70, 76, 101 n. 16, 116 n. 60, 125 n. 75, 127, 141 n. 116, 176, 204 n. 120, 208 n. 132, 227, 276 competition 17, 59, 62, 73, 78, 116, 132, 138 n. 106, 147, 156, 224, 238 n. 4, 274, 295, 303 condemnation 54, 55, 56, 226 confidence 14, 64, 233 Conon (Athenian general) 74, 97, 126, 174, 284 Conon (defendant) 169–171 Constantinople 211 contract 63, 70, 98, 144, 148, 236, 265, 267, 306 cookery 30, 66, 294; see also opsopoiikē Corax 2, 3, 53 Corcyra 132, 176, 248, 284, 285 Corinth, Corinthian 54, 192 n. 93, 280, 297 Corinthian War 21, 31, 33 corruption 78, 185, 207, 214, 227, 282, 286, 308 courage 37, 41, 42, 80, 181, 253, 272, 273; see also andreia courtesan 84 n. 22, 124, 134, 258‒259, 261‒262, 276, 297, 306; see also hetaira Crannon, Battle of 92, 261 Creon 212 Cresphontes 212 Critias 31, 107 Ctesiphon 163, 197, 215, 224, 225, 303 Ctesippus 173 cultural evolution 38, 42 cultural relativism 119 cultural superiority, supremacy 119, 131, 299

cultural symbol 40, 103, 295, 298; see also logos culture 1, 39 n. 28, 40, 42 n. 34, 49, 113, 158, 295, 300 –popular 36 n. 25 Cynics 44, 45 n. 43, 53 Cynosarges 100 Cyprus 74, 115, 119, 154 Cyrus the Great 79, 128, 141 n. 116, 296 Cyrus the younger 20 daimōn 120, 196, 198 n. 107, 199, 227 daimoniōs 226 decrees 11, 20, 58 n. 20, 92, 139, 164, 172 n. 46, 175, 197, 207, 225, 246, 259, 282, 293 –Demosthenes’ decree 283 –Hyperides’ decree 250, 260 deilaios 230 deilos 3, 31 deinos, deinotēs 91, 148, 191, 195, 202, 204, 206, 209, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 243, 251, 256‒257, 260, 275, 278, 279, 290, 301 deinōsis 35, 254–255, 306 delivery 78, 151, 160, 167, 181, 195, 201 with n. 112, 202, 207, 209, 229 n. 47, 301; see also hypokrisis Delos 259 Demades 77‒78, 83, 91‒95, 163, 164, 206, 207, 214, 260, 261, 276, 297 –and Alexander 94, 163 –and Demosthenes 77‒78, 91, 163, 164, 206, 207, 261 –and Hyperides 260, 261, 276 –and Lycurgus 92 –and Phocion 214 –Demadeia 94–95 –[On the Twelve Years] 94 Demeas 91 Demeas (son of Demades) 92 dēmēgorikon genos; see rhetorical genres Demetrius of Magnesia 235, 281, 290 Demetrius of Phalerum 82, 83, 92, 202, 207, 232, 235, 280, 281, 307 –On Rhetoric 83 Demetrius On Style 94, 231 n. 52 Demetrius Poliorcetes 281 Demochares 83, 164, 167, 207

346 | General Index

democracy passim Demomeles 259 Demon of Paeania 164, 168 Demophon 159 demos 5, 6, 15 with n. 63, 69, 120, 128, 165, 176, 177, 179, 191, 203, 214 n. 10, 248, 259, 268, 286, 308 Demosthenes 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 45, 57, 62, 73, 77, 78, 83, 84, 89, 91, 99, 159‒211, 212‒ 215, 216, 221‒223, 224‒229, 230, 231, 232‒233, 234, 235, 236‒237, 242, 243, 245, 246‒247, 248, 250, 255, 258, 260, 261, 267, 268, 269‒270, 274, 276, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283‒285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292, 296, 297, 300‒303, 304‒305, 306, 307, 308 –and Aeschines; see Aeschines –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Alexander 163‒164, 260, 269, 307 –and Apollodorus 84, 171‒172, 216 –and Aristotle; see Aristotle –and Cicero 197, 204, 209‒210, 233, 278, 302 –and Demades; see Demades –and Dinarchus 45, 81, 159, 282‒285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 307‒308 –and Dio Chrysostom 279 –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 174, 196, 197, 201‒202, 203, 209‒210, 229, 233 –and Εratosthenes 184, 301 –and Hermogenes 170‒171, 209‒210, 245, 290 –and Hyperides 9, 81, 154, 159, 164, 232, 258, 259, 260, 261, 267, 268‒270, 274‒ 275, 276, 278, 287, 292, 306‒307 –and Isaeus 45, 81, 154, 160, 168, 169, 213, 235, 236, 237, 242‒243, 245, 304‒305 –and Isocrates 9, 73, 78, 81, 99, 100 n. 13, 101 n. 14, 154 with n. 151, 160, 162, 165, 168, 179, 181, 182, 192, 196, 201, 208, 248, 255, 292, 296, 300, 301 –and Lycurgus 9, 81, 154, 247‒248, 250, 255, 260, 269, 292, 305 –and Lysias 11, 81, 168, 279, 287 –and Meidias 6, 160, 175, 178‒181, 204, 300 –and Pericles 183, 203, 210 –and Philip 9, 161‒163, 184‒200, 206, 301 –and Plato 160

–and Thycydides 160, 182, 183, 203 –anandros kai leloipōs tēn taxin 228, 283 –Bat(t)alos 160 –counsellor / symboulos 182, 185, 190, 198, 200, 226‒227, 283 –deinos legein, kakos biōnai 206, 228 –deinotēs 191, 204, 209, 301 –ho koryphaios tōn Athēnēsi rhētorōn 209 –ho rhētōr 210 –hypokrisis 78, 167, 201, 202, 207, 301 –perfectus orator 209 –Skythēs 159, 168, 223, 283, 286, 288 n. 21 –symbol of the timeless city of Athens 198, 301 –tēs Hellados alitērios 226, 227, 283, 285 –thērion 206, 223, 288 n. 21 –tragic hero 199, 211, 302 –Olynthiac 1 (1) 162, 186, 211, 301 –Olynthiac 2 (2) 162, 187, 301 –Olynthiac 3 (3) 162, 187, 301 –Philippic 1 (4) 161, 184, 185‒186, 301 –On the Peace (5) 162 –Philippic 2 (6) 162, 184, 187‒189, 301 –[On Halonnesus] (7) 60, 89‒90, 166, 297 –On the Chersonese (8) 162, 184, 189‒191, 301 –Philippic 3 (9) 162, 184, 189, 191‒192, 200, 203, 246, 301 –Philippic 4 (10) 162, 184, 189, 192‒193, 301 –[Response to the Letter of Philip] (11) 166 –[Letter of Philip] (12) 166 –On Organisation (13) 166 –On the Symmories (14) 161, 181‒182, 203, 300 –On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15) 161, 182 n. 67, 183‒184, 300 –For the Megalopolitans (16) 161, 183, 300 –[On the Agreement with Alexander] (17) 91, 166, 262 –On the Crown (18) 4 n. 18, 6, 7, 57, 60, 77 n. 79, 139 n. 112, 162, 163, 197‒200, 208, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 229 n. 47, 269, 289, 301, 303, 305, 307 –On the False Embassy (19) 89, 162, 193‒ 195, 212, 214, 216, 220, 221, 229 n. 47, 259, 297, 303 –Against Leptines (20) 161, 172‒175, 300

General Index | 347

–Against Meidias (21) 4 n. 18, 6, 159, 178‒ 181, 300 –Against Androtion (22) 161, 175 –Against Aristocrates (23) 161, 175‒177 –Against Timocrates (24) 161, 175 –[Against Aristogeiton 1] (25) 6, 83, 247 –Against Aphobus 1 (27) 160, 168‒169 –Against Aphobus 2 (28) 160 –Against Aphobus for Phanus (29) 160 –Against Onetor 1 (30) 159, 160 –Against Onetor 2 (31) 160 –Against Zenothemis (32) 168 –For Phormion (36) 84, 171‒172 –Against Boeotus 1 (39) 281 –Against Boeotus 2 (40) 282 –[Against Macartatus in Regard to the Estate of Hagnias] (43) 237 n. 3, 242 –Against Stephanus 1 (45) 6, 84, 85, 166, 172 –[Against Stephanus 2] (46) 84, 85, 166, 240, 297 –[Against Evergus] (47) 84, 281‒282 –[Against Timotheus] (49) 84, 166, 297 –[Against Polycles] (50) 84, 166, 297 –[Against Callippus] (52) 84, 166, 297 –[Against Nicostratus] (53) 84, 166, 297 –Against Conon (54) 11, 169‒171 –Against Theocrines (58) 166, 178, 281, 293, 300 –[Against Neaera] (59) 84, 85‒89, 166, 216, 218 n. 24, 220, 297 –Epitaphios (60) 21, 22, 23, 163, 195‒197, 301 –[Eroticus] (61) 23, 48 n. 51, 109 n. 34, 154, 156, 166 –Letters (1‒6) 60, 166, 246‒247, 282 –Prooimia 166, 183 Demosthenes (Demosthenes’ father) 159 –machairopoios 159 dēmotikos 118 deos 136 despotēs 132, 174, 177, 189 diabolē / loidoria 45, 64, 192 n. 93, 198 n. 105, 222, 223, 224, 265, 303 –art of insult (Kunst des Schimpfens) 152, 198 diadidonai 102 diadikasiai 237 n. 3, 238 Diagoras 235

dialectic(al) 18, 26, 34, 43, 63, 65‒67, 68, 71, 103, 293, 294 dialogical scenes; see Isocrates diasyrmos 263, 264, 275‒276, 306 diathēkē 240 diatribē, diatribein 59‒60, 102, 121, 150 Dicaeogenes 243‒244 Didymus 159, 189, 205, 209, 232, 245, 278 diēgēsis / narration 56, 59 n. 21, 64, 67, 68, 150, 168, 170, 221, 243 dikaios, dikaiosynē 7, 21 n. 84, 29, 30‒31, 36, 80, 108, 118, 123, 126, 136, 140, 141, 186 n. 82, 273, 286, 287; see also hosiōs kai dikaiōs dikanikon genos; see rhetorical genres dikastēs 169, 236, 251, 252, 275 dikē 9 –aikeias 169, 170 –blabēs 265, 306 –dēmosia 166 –engyēs 238 –idia 166 Dinarchus 9, 45, 81, 82, 83, 84 n. 21, 244, 281‒291, 293, 307‒308 –and Aeschines; see Aeschines –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 280, 281, 282, 287, 288, 289 n. 24, 290, 308 –and Hermogenes 257, 288, 289 n. 24, 290 –and Hyperides 81, 159, 164 –and Lycurgus; see Lycurgus –and Lysias 81, 280, 287, 307 –agroikos Dēmosthenēs 288 –hyperbolic description / invective 285, 288, 308 –krithinos Dēmosthenēs 288 –mallon de einai dokei ē esti deinos 290 –Against Demosthenes (1) 92, 164, 282, 283‒285, 288 with n. 21, 307‒308 –Against Aristogeiton (2) 282, 285‒286, 288 n. 21, 307–308 –Against Philokles (3) 6, 282, 286‒287, 288 with n. 21, 307‒308 –Against Proxenus 280, 281 Dio Chrysostom 233, 256, 279 –Encomium of a Gnat 44 n. 37 –Encomium of a Parrot 44 n. 37 –Encomium of Hair 44 n. 37

348 | General Index

Diocles of Phlya 241, 243 Diodorus (prosecutor) 175 Diodorus Siculus 18, 92, 106 n. 27, 145, 161, 163, 164, 207, 208, 247, 249, 260 Diogenes Laertius 2 n. 8, 7, 53, 54, 59 n. 23, 60, 61, 63, 79, 156, 258 Diogenes the Cynic 53 Dion (orator) 31 n. 13 Diondas 259, 267 Dionysia 163, 178, 197, 224 Dionysius I of Syracuse 60, 99 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 11, 18 n. 74, 61, 70, 77 n. 79, 81, 90, 91 n. 39, 96, 97, 105, 146 n. 129, 147, 148 n. 134, 149, 151 n. 140, 155, 156, 159, 171, 172 n. 45, 174, 196, 197, 201‒202, 203, 204, 209, 210, 213, 229, 230, 231, 232‒233, 235, 236–237, 238, 242‒243, 245, 255, 256, 275, 278, 280, 281, 282, 287‒288, 290, 304, 305, 306, 308 Diopeithes 62, 189 doctrine of the mean; see Aristotle dokēsis tēs alētheias 22, 23 dokimasia 12, 13, 57 –dokimasia rhētorōn 57, 216, 217 dokimazein 124 dōrodokia, dōrodokos 194, 195, 227, 228, 259, 269‒270, 284, 285, 286‒287, 288 n. 21 doxa 13, 34, 43, 44, 58, 122, 125, 127, 130, 136, 139, 145, 157, 199, 200, 244, 253, 294 –tou legontos 55, 58, 68, 93, 125 n. 74, 150–151 dynasteia 136, 200 dystychein 74‒75 echthra, echthros 64, 130 n. 90, 133, 179, 180, 184, 187, 189, 190 Egypt, Egyptian 76, 112‒113, 153, 266, 277‒ 278 eidōlon 38‒39, 50, 52, 103, 295 –eidōlon psychēs; see logos eidōlopoiia 228 eikēi 32, 48, 66 eikōn 49, 50, 64, 122, 176 eikos 3, 26, 33, 55, 56, 240, 241, 264, 293; see also argument einai-dokein 26, 43, 126, 299 eirōneia 55

eisangelia 250, 259, 262, 263‒264, 305, 306 –kakōseōs orphanou 238‒239 ekdidonai 102 ekpheresthai 102 Elaea (Aeolis) 45 elenchos 55, 59 n. 21, 67, 68 eleos / pity 5, 18, 35, 64, 180, 202, 204, 254, 261, 262, 292 Eleusinian mysteries 42 eleutheria 177, 184, 189, 199, 200, 234, 253, 260, 273 eleutheriōs 41 emancipation of the individual (Emanzipation des Individuums) 20 emotions 4, 15, 19, 64, 65, 71, 86, 119, 146, 169, 176, 182, 185, 186, 187, 201‒202, 203, 225, 226, 230 n. 49, 231, 238, 254‒ 255, 270, 286, 296, 301, 306, 309 Empedocles of Acragas 2 emulation 64, 122, 203, 270, 307; see also zēlos encomium / enkōmion 4, 17, 18, 19, 20‒21, 22, 24, 44, 45, 50‒51, 53, 60, 76, 79‒80, 97, 103, 106‒110, 110‒114, 113 n. 49, 114‒ 121, 127, 142, 152, 154, 156‒157, 210, 270, 272, 293, 296, 298, 307 –embedded 76, 110, 111‒112 –paradoxical 19, 44, 111, 115 n. 55 –prose encomium 106, 115, 120 enkōmiastikon eidos; see rhetorical species enthymēma 55 with n. 13, 59, 63, 64, 68, 146 envy 7, 23‒25, 64, 77, 86, 103, 116, 124 n. 72, 151, 204, 270; see also phthonos epainos 76, 113 with n. 49, 120 n. 65, 139 with n. 108, 271, 272 epanalēpsis 204, 288 epexelenchos 59 n. 21, 67, 68 Ephesus 215 Ephorus of Cuma 80, 154 epicharis, epicharitōs 127, 128, 129, 230, 267, 275, 299 Epicrates 70, 266‒267, 276, 306‒307 epideiktikon genos; see rhetorical genres epideixis 40 epidiēgēsis 67, 68 epieikeia, epieikēs 14, 58, 69, 70, 111, 125, 256

General Index | 349

Epinician odes 115 epiphora; see antistrophē epipistōsis 59 n. 21 epistēmē 43, 122, 293 epitaphios logos; see speech equality 31, 110, 130 n. 90, 144, 184, 277 eran 134 Erasmus 54 Eratosthenes 184, 301 Erchia 96, 238 Erinyes 283 Eteobutadae 212, 246 Eteocles 31, 110, 144, 294 ethics 10 n. 48, 71, 123, 130, 155, 161, 172, 173, 183, 207, 219, 300 ēthopoiia 11 with n. 52, 12 with n. 55, 70, 169, 244, 266 ēthos 12, 13, 64, 77, 108 n. 32, 151, 176, 204, 275, 285, 301, 308 –tou legontos 14, 58 with n. 20, 64, 68‒69, 70, 77, 93, 125, 152, 169, 171 Euboea 175, 235, 276 euboulia, euboulos 8, 38‒39, 97 Eubulus 161, 213, 214 eucharis 80 Euctemon 175 eudokimein 49, 125, 131, 132, 136, 139 with n. 108, 135 n. 99 Euenus of Paros 33, 67 n. 45 euergesia, euergetēs 90, 139, 173, 253, 299, 300 eunoia, eunous / goodwill 13‒14, 21 n. 84, 22, 64, 69, 125, 127, 128, 135, 136, 139, 141, 175, 202, 204, 299 Euphemus 134 n. 96 Euphiletus 238 euphyēs 18, 121 eurhythmos 64, 145, 149 Euripides 7, 19 n. 77, 20, 31, 46 n. 44, 59, 130, 144, 219, 230 n. 50, 247, 294 –Autolycus 130 –Philoctetes 59 with n. 23 –Phoenissae 31, 110, 144 –Suppliants 20 Euripus 276 eusebeia 31, 80, 110, 136, 251, 252 Eusebius 61 n. 38, 268 Euthycles of Thria 175 euthynai 57, 197

Euthyno(u)s 74 eutrapelia 204, 278 eutychēs 93, 273, 276 Euxenippus 250 n. 12, 258, 262‒264, 275, 277, 306 Evagoras I (king of Cyprus) 20, 48, 74, 80, 114‒121, 128, 129, 141, 293 ex hypogyou 33 exetasis 57, 263 exetastikon eidos; see rhetorical species exō tou pragmatos 67, 254 false embassy; see parapresbeia fear 64, 134, 136, 187, 204; see also deos, phobos flattery 28, 29, 30, 33, 65, 66, 185, 191, 222, 275, 294; see also kolakeia freedom 27, 138, 141, 174, 177, 184, 189, 197, 199, 234, 253, 260, 270, 273, 301; see also eleutheria funeral speech; see speech Gaugamela 251 geloios 34, 64, 67 gender studies 85, 297 genetic-analytical approach (Schichtenanalyse) 63 geometry 43 Glaucippus (Hyperides’ father) 258 Glaucippus (Hyperides’ son) 83, 259 Glaucothea 212 glory 7, 17, 25, 40, 51, 116, 120, 134, 200, 244, 273; see also doxa gnōmē 41, 55 goēs, goēteia 32, 146 n. 129, 236, 288 n. 21 goodwill; see eunoia Gorgias 2, 4, 17‒21, 21 n. 85, 27, 30, 33, 39‒40, 44, 45, 46, 67 n. 45, 71, 75, 96‒97, 130, 144, 145, 146, 148, 293, 295 –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Aristotle 17‒18, 67, 72, 75 –and Isocrates 17–21, 26, 36, 39‒40, 44, 75, 96‒97, 111, 130 with n. 88, 145, 146, 147 with n. 133, 293, 295 –and Plato 27 –Gorgianic figures (Gorgieia schēmata) 18, 55, 150 –Gorgianic style 17, 18, 72 –prose rhapsode 19

350 | General Index

–Defence of Palamedes 19, 45 –Encomium of Helen 4, 18, 19–20, 44, 111 –Epitaphios 130 n. 91 –Olympicus 130 n. 91 grammar 43 graphē 9, 268 –hybreōs 170, 178 –nomōn mē epitēdeiōn theinai 172 with n. 46 –paranomōn 11, 172 n. 46, 175, 224, 259, 293 –xenias 85 greed 31, 37, 110, 134, 177, 186; see also pleonexia Gryllus 60, 156 gymnastic / gymnastikē 29–30 Harmodius-Aristogeiton 179, 243‒244 Harpalus 83, 92, 164, 207 n. 129, 259, 260, 269, 279, 282, 286, 307, 308 Harpocration 83, 84 n. 21, 119 n. 63, 209 n. 135, 235, 245, 276, 278, 282 haughtiness; see hyperopsia hēdonē 71, 135 n. 99, 191 hēgemōn, hēgemonia 38–40, 132, 136 with n. 102, 226, 272, 284, 295 Hegesippus 83, 89‒91, 297 –and Demosthenes 89‒91, 297 –and Hyperides 91 –and Philip 89‒90, 297 –misophilippos 89, 297 Helen 19 with n. 77, 20, 44, 53, 74, 110‒113, 141, 206, 298 Heliodorus 160 hellēnizein 64, 72, 159 Heracles 60, 112, 139 n. 110, 139‒142, 186 n. 82, 192, 299 Hermione 261 Hermippus of Smyrna 81 n. 7, 96, 154 with n. 151, 160, 206, 209, 232, 235, 258 n. 1 –Peri Isokratous 154 –Peri tōn Isokratous mathētōn 154 Hermogenes 170–171, 209–210, 233, 245, 256‒257, 279, 290 Hesiod 1, 19 n. 77, 46, 99, 114, 219, 225‒ 226 –Theogony 1 –Works and Days 1, 17 n. 72, 120, 225‒226 Hesione 141

hetaira, hetairein 88, 217‒218, 259, 266 hetairos 97, 223 hiatus 100, 149 with n. 136, 203, 205‒206, 231, 244, 276, 299–300 Hieronymus 151 n. 140 Himeraeus 207 n. 129, 280 n. 3 Hindernismotiv 33, 147 with n. 31; see also chalepon Hippias of Elis 33, 67 n. 45, 100 Homer 1, 10, 37, 44, 45‒46, 109, 114, 140‒ 141, 142, 146–147, 219‒220, 247, 293 –ho poiētēs 210 homoioteleuton 18 n. 74, 231 homōnymia 75 homosexuality 216, 265, 302, 306 honour 7, 10 n. 48, 23, 27, 32, 92, 93, 94, 100, 110, 116, 123, 124, 129, 133, 135 n. 99, 163, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175‒176, 178, 197, 198, 200, 211, 226, 227, 228, 248, 282, 300, 302; see also timan, timē horkos; see oath hosiōs kai dikaiōs (Canon of the Two Virtues) 118, 126 hybris, hybristēs, hybrizein 5, 14, 91, 107, 108 n. 33, 132, 170, 178‒180, 204, 292, 300 hyperbole 94, 120, 303 Hyperbolus 134 Hyperides 9, 81, 91, 92, 154, 162 n. 14, 164, 232, 245, 250 n. 12, 255, 258‒279, 292, 306‒307 –and Aeschines 81, 154, 159, 162 n. 14, 214 n. 11, 232, 259, 278, 279 –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dinarchus; see Dinarchus –and Dio Chrysostom 279 –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 232–233, 278, 287 –and Hermogenes 245 –and Isocrates; see Isocrates –and Lycurgus 9, 81, 154, 162 n. 14, 248 n. 7, 255, 256, 258, 260, 263, 264, 269, 292, 293, 306 –and Philocrates 259 –and Phryne 259, 261‒262, 267, 274, 275 –and Plato 258 –and Pseudo-Longinus 267, 270, 274‒275, 278, 307 –charites, glykytēs, to epaphroditon 274

General Index | 351

–charitos mestos 278 –dulcis in primis et acutus 278 –Hyperides’ decree 250, 260 –New Hyperides 267, 306, 307 –pentathlos 274, 276, 278, 307 –Against Athenogenes 70, 262, 265‒267, 274, 275, 277, 306 –Against Demosthenes 164, 260, 262, 269‒ 270, 275‒276, 277, 282, 306, 307 –Against Diondas 91, 262, 267‒269, 277, 289, 306, 307 –Against Philippides 262, 277, 306 –Against Timandros 261, 262, 277, 306 –Epitaphios 21, 258, 260, 262, 270‒273, 276‒277, 293, 306, 307 –For Euxenippus 250 n. 12, 258, 262‒264, 275, 277, 306 –For Lycophron 262, 264‒265, 277, 306 –For Phryne 259, 261‒262, 267, 274, 275, 278 hyperopsia, hyperoptēs 128 n. 81, 129, 144 hypodeictic-epideictic 113 n. 52 hypogrammateus 212 hypokrisis 78, 167, 201, 202, 207, 301 hypophora (subjectio) 77, 180, 185, 241 with n. 14 hypothēkai 99 iatrikē / medicine 28‒30, 34, 66, 204 Idomeneus of Lampsacus 154 Ill will 13, 175; see also kakonoia image 27, 30, 39, 42, 49, 50, 52, 122, 133, 138 n. 106, 204, 226, 276‒277, 295 impeachment; see eisangelia improvisation; see autoschediazein individuality 20, 24‒25, 93, 104, 128, 165, 170, 218, 273, 285, 293, 298, 302, 303‒ 304, 307, 309 inheritance 159, 160, 237 with n. 3, 238, 241, 304 –inheritance law; see Isaeus injustice 30, 39, 63, 118, 124, 135, 136, 180, 265, 277, 299, 306; see also adikia innovative imitation 143 irony 32, 55, 89, 90, 146, 182, 202, 204, 222, 243, 274, 276, 283, 288, 308 Isaeus 45, 81, 154, 160, 168, 169, 172 n. 45, 203, 213, 235‒245, 248, 280, 289, 302, 303‒305, 307

–and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 160, 235, 236‒237, 238, 242–243, 245, 304‒305 –and Hermogenes 245 –and Isocrates 81, 154, 168, 203, 235, 237, 238, 244 –and Lycurgus 81, 154, 168, 203, 235, 237, 238, 244 –and Lysias 81, 235, 237, 242‒243, 244, 245, 304‒305 –inheritance law 160, 237, 238, 241, 304 –klērikoi logoi 238, 304 –legal expert 235, 303 –On the Estate of Cleonymus (1) 239‒240, 304 –On the Estate of Menecles (2) 240‒241, 304 –On the Estate of Dicaeogenes (5) 243‒244 –On the Estate of Ciron (8) 169, 241‒242, 243, 304 –On the Estate of Hagnias (11) 242 –On Behalf of Euphiletus (12) 238 isēgoria 8, 174, 184 Isocrates 6, 7, 8‒9, 10, 15, 17‒21, 22, 24‒ 25, 26, 33, 35‒43, 43‒52, 58 with n. 20, 59, 60‒61, 62, 68, 72‒73, 73‒78, 80, 82, 93, 96‒158, 162, 165, 175, 179, 181, 182, 186 n. 82, 192, 196, 197, 201, 203, 204, 208, 219, 230, 234, 237, 238, 244, 248, 253, 255, 270, 292, 293‒295, 296, 297‒ 300, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306 –and Aeschines; see Aeschines –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Anaximenes; see Anaximenes –and Aristotle; see Aristotle –and Cicero 96, 148 n. 34, 155, 157, 298 –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 61, 96, 97, 105, 130, 148 with n. 134, 149, 151 n. 140, 155, 156, 237 –and Gorgias; see Gorgias –and Hyperides 81, 154, 258, 270, 278‒ 279, 307 –and Isaeus; see Isaeus –and Lycurgus 81, 154, 246, 248, 253‒254, 255‒256, 305, 306 –and Lysias 35, 44 n. 39, 81, 105, 130 n. 91, 155, 166 n. 29, 168, 237

352 | General Index

–and Philip 9, 60, 99, 104‒105, 128, 137‒ 142, 152, 162, 186 n. 82, 192, 299, 301 –and Pindar 50‒51, 101 with n. 16, 102, 115‒ 116, 147, 297 –and Plato 6, 26‒43, 51‒52, 59, 100‒101, 103, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 135, 157, 246, 251, 258, 293‒295, 298, 299 –and Quintilian 96, 102, 105, 150 –and Socrates 26, 43, 97, 126, 299 –and Theramenes 97 –and Thucydides 21‒25, 42, 108, 115, 116, 129, 132, 133‒136, 147, 299 –and Timotheus 49, 76, 97, 109, 112, 126‒ 129, 154, 299 –classical author 150 –dialogical scenes 77, 151–152 –father of the periodic style 149, 299 –Isocratean quotations 73‒78 –logōn paideia 37, 121, 124 n. 73, 129, 294, 299 –Pan-Hellenic ideal 9, 99, 101 n. 14, 104 with n. 22, 112 with n. 48, 130, 138, 141, 158, 162, 192, 299, 301 –pater eloquentiae 155 –politikoi logoi 102, 148 –principle of consistency 129 n. 86 –Vollender der griechischen Kunstprosa 156 –[To Demonicus] (1) 105, 109 n. 35, 153 –To Nicocles (2) 99, 103, 108, 120 n. 65, 146, 153, 298 –Nicocles (3) 37‒40, 99, 103, 120 n. 65, 131, 153, 294‒295 –Panegyricus (4) 8‒9, 17, 33, 40‒42, 47‒ 48, 74, 75, 76, 99, 103, 104, 108, 109, 112, 119, 129‒133, 141, 154, 253, 255‒256, 292, 295, 298, 299 –To Philip (5) 8‒9, 43, 60, 62, 74, 99, 103, 104‒105, 112, 130, 137‒142, 150‒151, 152, 162, 186 n. 82, 192, 292, 298, 299 –Archidamus (6) 45, 99, 101, 130 –Areopagiticus (7) 99, 103, 130, 133, 152, 298, 299 –On the Peace (8) 15, 74, 76, 99, 103, 108 n. 32, 109 n. 35, 124, 130, 152, 255, 298, 299 –Evagoras (9) 20‒21, 22, 48‒51, 59, 68, 72 n. 57, 76, 80, 99, 101‒102, 103, 110, 114‒ 121, 138 n. 106, 145‒148, 156–157, 166 n.

29, 188 n. 87, 270, 273, 293, 296, 297, 298, 307 –Helen (10) 19–20, 74, 75, 76, 101, 109, 110‒113, 119‒120, 133‒136, 141, 298 –Busiris (11) 76, 101, 110, 113‒114 –Panathenaicus (12) 7, 37‒38, 76, 77, 96, 98, 101, 103‒104, 112, 118 n. 61, 142‒145, 152, 225 n. 38, 298 –Against the Sophists (13) 101, 121‒122, 149 –Plataicus (14) 130 –Antidosis (15) 15, 36‒37, 42‒43, 48 n. 54, 49, 58, 61, 74, 77, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 121, 122‒129, 144, 148‒149, 152, 197, 294, 299, 301 –On the Team of Horses (16) 20, 105‒110, 298 –Trapeziticus (17) 84 n. 18, 105 –Against Callimachus (18) 105 –Aegineticus (19) 105 –Against Lochites (20) 105 –Against Euthynus (21) 74, 105 –Letters (1–9) 99, 105, 137, 150 n. 140 –[Apophthegmata] 105 –[Technē Rhētorikē] 105 Isocrates of Apollonia 82, 156 n. 156, 156 ius 70 –aequum 70 –strictum 70 Jocasta 31, 110 Julian 155 justice 10 n. 48, 29, 30‒31, 36, 37, 66, 70, 80, 108, 110, 118, 123, 126, 129, 134, 135‒ 136, 140, 183, 186, 198, 221, 236, 266‒ 267, 273, 286, 287, 304, 306, 308; see also dikaiosynē kainos 122, 145, 146 kakonoia, kakonous 13, 175, 189, 190 kallos 20, 80, 112, 279, 298 kalokagathia, kalos kagathos 8, 14, 15, 16, 39, 50, 124, 125, 127, 129, 176, 218 kata arsin kai thesin 231 kataptystos 283, 286, 288 n. 21 kataratos 198, 286, 288 n. 21 katēgorikon eidos; see rhetorical species katharma 177, 198, 288 n. 21 kēlein 146 n. 129, 230

General Index | 353

kerdos 135 n. 99 kerkōps 230 kinados 230, 288 n. 21 kinaidos 230 kingship 119, 134 koinos 28, 119‒120, 124, 139 with n. 108 –koinai historiai 81 n. 7 kolakeia, kolax 28‒30, 65, 191, 222, 230, 275, 294 kolazein 194, 253, 255 koman 12 n. 57, 16 kommōtikē 29–30 kosmiōs 16 kouphos 119‒120 Lacritus 82 lakōnismos 15 Lamachus of Smyrna 156 Lamian War 21, 164, 260, 270 Laomedon 140‒141 law 6, 7, 27, 63, 70‒71, 85‒86, 88, 123, 129, 138, 141‒142, 160, 167, 168, 172‒173, 174, 176, 178‒180, 184, 189, 198, 204, 218, 219, 225, 237, 242, 250‒251, 252, 255, 263, 264, 266‒267, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306‒307; see also inheritance law legein (eu) 38, 42, 121, 123, 124, 131, 157, 298, 299 Leitmotiv-Technik 193 Leocrates 247, 249‒254, 255, 305 Leodamas 83, 213 Leosthenes 21, 260, 270‒273, 293, 307 Leptines 172‒175 lexis 17, 55, 63, 64, 72, 78, 148, 201, 301 –agōnistikē 72, 78, 151, 201, 301 –charaktēres tēs lexeōs 203 –eiromenē 64 –graphikē 72‒73, 78, 151, 201, 301 –katestrammenē 64 –poiētikē 146, 148 –see also aretē lexeōs Libanius 89, 91, 160, 210, 262 –Encomium of Demosthenes 210 –Hypotheses 89, 91, 159, 210, 262 –Life of Demosthenes 159 –Synkrisis of Demosthenes and Aeschines 210 liberty 198, 211, 229, 247, 301, 302, 305; see also eleutheria

Licymnius of Chios 33, 67 with n. 45 and 46, 68 life private-public 9, 14, 47, 93, 218‒219, 228, 259‒260, 285, 293, 302, 306, 308, 309 listener passim –apeiros 22‒23 –xyneidōs kai eunous 22‒24; see also eunoia literacy 49, 51, 101, 158, 297, 300 literary criticism 51, 147 literature-visual arts 49‒52 litigious 14, 84, 167, 171, 236, 303 liturgies 7, 99 n. 9, 104, 173, 213, 258, 302 locus ab auctoritate; see topos ek kriseōs logographer / logographos 9–10, 11, 62, 74, 97, 105, 160, 167‒168, 172 with n. 45, 175, 181, 213, 215, 223, 228, 235, 236, 237, 238, 247, 248, 258, 266 with n. 24, 276, 280, 281, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307 logos passim; see also speech –amphibolos 143 –apo tōn symbolaiōn 238 –axios epainou kai timēs 123‒124 –cultural symbol 40, 103, 295, 298 –dynastēs megas 18, 40, 295 –dynastic-hegemonic 40, 103, 295, 298 –eidōlon psychēs 39, 103, 295 –haplōs politicos 245 –hymn to logos 39, 103 –klērikos; see Isaeus –logōn paideia; see Isocrates –paradoxos; see speech / paradoxical –poetic-prosaic 4, 17, 18, 19, 145–146, 147 with n. 133, 155, 156, 300 –politikos; see Isocrates –Schöpfer der Kultur 39 n. 28 –symbolon pistotaton 41‒42, 103, 131 –oral-written 43‒52, 72‒73, 78, 82, 85, 94, 97, 98, 99, 101‒102, 137, 151‒152, 154, 156, 197, 201, 206, 221 n. 30, 295, 296, 297, 301 loidoria; see diabolē [Longinus] On the Sublime 156, 180, 199 n. 109, 204 n. 119, 210 n. 139, 267, 270, 274‒275, 278, 307 [Lucian] –Encomium of a Fly 44 n. 37

354 | General Index

–Encomium of Demosthenes 45, 164, 210, 260 n. 10, 261 Lycophron 264‒265, 306 Lycurgus 9, 81, 92, 154, 164, 244, 246‒257, 258, 260, 263, 264, 269, 288‒289, 292, 305‒306 –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dinarchus 81, 257, 288‒289 –and Dio Chrysostom 256 –and Dionysius of Halicarnassus 255, 256 –and Hermogenes 257 –and Hyperides; see Hyperides –and Isaeus; see Isaeus –and Isocrates; see Isocrates –and Plato 246, 251 –kerkyraia mastix 248 –pikrotatos katēgoros 247 –Against Autolycus 249 –Against Leocrates 244, 247, 248, 249‒ 254, 256, 288–289, 305 –Against Lysicles 249 lyric poetry 50–51, 66, 115‒116, 147 Lysander 20, 49, 127 Lysias 11–16, 21, 35, 44 with n. 39, 64, 70, 81, 82, 90, 105, 130, 155, 168, 235, 236‒ 237, 242‒243, 244, 245, 266, 274, 279, 280, 287, 304, 307 –and Demosthenes; see Demosthenes –and Dinarchus; see Dinarchus –and Hegesippus 90 –and Isaeus; see Isaeus –and Isocrates; see Isocrates –ēthopoiia 11 with n. 52, 12 with n. 55, 69– 70 –Epitaphios (2) 21, 23, 109 n. 34, 130 n. 91 –Against Eratosthenes (12) 64 –For Mantitheus (16) 8 n. 37, 11‒16 –Defence Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy (25) 15 –Olympiacus (33) 130 n. 91 –Against Tisis 171 –Defence of Socrates 44 –Eroticus 166 n. 29 Lysimachus 99 Macedon, Macedonian 9, 60, 92, 94, 137‒ 142, 152, 161‒165, 192 with n. 93, 194, 207, 208 with n. 132, 214‒215, 221‒222, 234, 246, 248 n. 6, 249, 251, 260‒261,

267, 269, 270, 281, 292, 299, 301, 302, 303, 307 –pro-Makedonian / anti-Makedonian 9, 60, 62, 77, 78, 83, 84, 86, 92, 162, 164, 167, 172, 189, 207, 214, 216, 247‒248, 259, 260, 267, 269, 270, 281, 292, 297, 305, 306 magic / mageia 34 with n. 20, 146 n. 129 makarismos 120 malevolentia 175 Mantinea, Battle of 60, 156 Mantitheus 11‒16 Marcus Antonius 210 martyriai / testimony 55, 59 n. 21, 63, 242 Mausolus 62, 156 medicine; see iatrikē mega phronein, megalophrosynē 108‒109, 117‒118, 127‒129, 140 megalaucheisthai 113 Megalopolis 183 megalopsychia, megalopsychos 7, 117, 129, 200 Meidias 6, 160, 175, 178‒181, 204, 300 Menecles 240‒241, 304 Menelaus 1, 19 n. 77 Menesaechmus 83, 280 n. 3 Menexenus 31‒32, 294 Messala Corvinus 278 Messene 45, 188 metaphor / metaphora 42, 46, 64, 75, 94, 109, 146, 204, 230, 266 n. 24 metic 235, 249, 266, 280, 281, 304, 307 metrios 13, 14 with n. 61, 48, 150, 172, 256 –metriōs eipein 22, 23 miaros 172, 286, 288 n. 21 Milesian novel 216 Miltiades 31, 134, 176 Minos 156 mirror effect 4‒7, 144, 292 Mirror of Princes (Fürstenspiegel) 79, 121, 296 misanthrōpos 6, 127‒128 misathēnaios 6 misodēmos 5, 6, 14 n. 59, 127‒128, 293 misopolis 5, 14 n. 59, 293 misos 64, 134, 136, 179, 275 misoteknos 230 Mithridates VI Eupator 156 mnēmeion 49, 122

General Index | 355

monarchic(al), monarchy 3, 6, 8, 20, 99, 103‒104, 109‒110, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 134, 136, 141, 144, 154, 189, 292, 298 monument 52, 101‒102, 122, 178, 184, 297, 301 morality 5, 39, 43, 88, 103, 220, 249, 264, 292, 295 –popular morality 5, 36, 37, 129, 292, 294 music / mousikē 43, 118‒119, 148, 149 myth / mythos 19, 20, 21, 25, 45, 70, 95, 110, 112‒113, 114, 120, 139, 141 n. 115, 283, 293, 299, 307 –mythōdestatos 147 narration; see diēgēsis Naucrates 82 Nausicles 214 Neaera 85‒89, 297 nemesan 64 Nestor 1 Nicocles 99, 120, 128, 129, 138 n. 106, 141, 154 nomimos 39, 119‒120, 295 nomothetikē 29–30 oath / horkos 55, 63, 70, 92, 132, 199, 229, 252 –Ephebic Oath 252 –of the Greeks at Plataea 252 –to the dead of the Persian Wars 199, 229 Odysseus 1, 45 Oenomaus 213 oligarchy / oligarchia 5, 6, 12 with n. 57, 13, 14 n. 60, 15, 27, 103‒104, 109, 128, 144, 174, 183‒184, 189, 225, 293, 300 oligōrein 48, 127, 186 Olympiodorus 147 n. 129, 256 Olynthus 162, 186, 193, 214 onoma 72 n. 57, 102, 145‒146, 149, 198 n. 108, 230 –kainon 146 –kyrion 72 n. 57, 102 –politikon 72 n. 57, 102, 146 –tetagmenon 72 n. 57, 102, 145‒146 –xenon 146 opsopoiikē 28‒30 orality 44, 49, 51, 158, 300 oration; see speech orator, oratory; see rhetoric

Oreos 175 Orestes 283 orgē 5, 64, 179, 191, 275, 285, 292 Oropus 262 Paeania 91, 159, 164 paidariōdēs 196 paideuein, paideusis 41‒42, 43 n. 35, 108, 111, 118‒119, 121‒122, 131, 155, 269‒270 –tēs Hellados paideusis; see Athens paignion 19, 44 with n. 37 pain 71 with n. 54, 226 paipalēma 230 Palamedes 19, 45 palillogia 55, 56 palimbolon 230 Panaetius 208 Pan-Hellenic ideal; see Isocrates panēgyris 17, 40‒41, 103, 131 panystatos 230 parabolē 70 paradeigma 55, 63, 64, 70, 172, 195 –allotrion 141 –oikeion 141 with n. 117 paradox / paradoxon 182, 183, 198, 199, 204, 226, 252, 253 paragraphē 105 paraleipsis (praeteritio) 150, 228 with n. 41 parapresbeia / false embassy 162, 193‒ 195, 213, 214, 215, 221‒224, 301, 302‒303 Paris 74, 76, 112 parison / parisōsis 18 with n. 74, 55, 64, 150, 276 parody 32, 53, 59, 294 paromoion / paromoiōsis 18 with n. 74, 55, 64, 150, 276 paronomasia 180 parrhēsia 191, 192, 193, 256 Pasion 84, 171 passion 4, 5, 14, 18, 23, 124 with n. 72, 134, 175‒176, 180, 181, 184, 188, 191, 196, 198, 199, 204, 211, 226, 229, 231, 249, 255, 263, 266, 275, 283, 288, 292, 300, 301, 302, 308, 309; see also emotion, pathos pathos 64, 71, 204, 238, 275, 301 Patrocles 280 n. 3 peithein, peithō 1, 4 n. 19, 27, 33, 34, 35, 42, 58, 67, 71 n. 53, 73, 123‒124, 125, 138, 151, 240, 255, 294

356 | General Index

–and bia 40 n. 29 and 31 –peithous dēmiourgos; see rhetoric Peloponnesian War 5, 8, 21, 96, 97, 192 n. 94, 212 performance 130, 150, 211, 213, 222, 229, 267, 299, 302, 303 Pericles 7, 21‒25, 31, 32 with n. 14, 42, 69, 106, 108, 116, 133‒134, 183, 203, 210, 308 –philopolis, chrēmatōn kreissōn 69‒70 –sōphronestatos, dikaiotatos, sophōtatos 108 period / periodos 64, 75, 88, 148 n. 134, 149, 150, 156, 168, 256, 270, 288, 299 Peripatos 53, 62, 77, 78, 150, 153‒154, 207, 280, 296 Persian Wars 107, 108 with n. 32, 131, 132, 134, 188, 199, 228, 229, 253, 269, 299, 306 persuasion 14, 19, 27 with n. 4, 40, 55, 63‒ 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 93, 124, 125 with n. 74, 138, 224, 238, 294, 296, 309; see also peithō Phaenias of Eresus 154 phēmē 219‒220, 224 –and sykophantia/diabolē 223, 303 Phidias 155 philanthrōpia 6, 124, 127‒128, 129, 139 with n. 108, 141, 204, 255, 299 philellēn 80, 118, 140 with n. 113, 143 Philetaerus 88 philia 64 Philinus 83 Philip II (of Macedon) 9, 60, 82 n. 13, 89, 90, 91, 96, 99, 104, 128, 137‒142, 152, 156, 161‒162, 163, 166, 184‒195, 197 n. 102, 198 with n. 108, 200, 206, 208 n. 132, 213 n. 6, 214, 221‒224, 225, 259, 260, 267, 297, 299, 301, 302 –ambitious 139, 140, 185, 186 with n. 82, 200 –euergetēs 139 with n. 108, 299 –olethros Makedōn 192 philippismos, philippizein 198 n. 108 Philiscus of Miletus 82, 154, 256 Philochares 212 Philocles 280, 286‒287, 288, 307, 308 Philocrates, Peace of 162, 187, 193, 206, 214, 216, 221, 225, 259, 302 philodēmos 5, 14 n. 59, 293

Philodemus (Aeschines’ father-in-law) 213 philologos 18 philopolis 5, 14 n. 59, 15, 69, 80, 129, 293 philosophy / philosophia 3‒4, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40‒42, 43, 48, 52, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73‒74, 78, 79, 83, 98, 100, 101, 103, 111, 113, 115, 121, 122‒123, 125, 148, 155, 157, 158, 201, 207, 208, 210, 211 n. 143, 235, 258, 268, 292, 293‒294, 295, 296 Philostratus 44 n. 37, 96, 130 n. 91, 213, 229, 230, 233, 278‒279 philotimia, philotimos 6‒7, 16, 21 n. 84, 37, 49, 106‒107 with n. 28, 110, 117, 123, 124 with n. 72, 128 n. 84, 132‒133, 140, 141, 173 with n. 50, 186 with n. 82, 195, 200, 220, 222, 265, 293 phobos 4 n. 19, 18, 64, 71 n. 53, 117, 255 Phocion 83, 92, 163 n. 16, 207, 210, 213, 214 Phocylides 99 Phoenix 1 Phormion (accountant) 84, 171‒172 Phormion (Athenian general) 109 phortikos 196 Photius 81 n. 9, 96, 113 n. 49, 142, 159, 193 208 with n. 132, 210, 212, 213, 230, 231, 233, 235, 246, 258, 262, 277, 278 with n. 38, 280, 281, 307 phronein (eu), phronēsis 36, 39, 38, 42, 48, 64, 69, 108, 109, 121, 122‒123, 124, 131, 139, 140, 141, 157, 186 n. 82, 298, 299 Phryne 259, 261‒262, 267, 275, 306 Phrynion 87‒88 phthonos 5, 23‒24, 25, 64, 179, 270, 292 physis 22, 35, 117‒118, 121‒122, 140, 144, 147, 188‒189, 213, 231, 237, 266 Pindar 7, 50‒51 with n. 59, 101 with n. 16, 115‒116, 147, 297 pisteis 14, 55, 63, 64, 68, 69, 93, 125, 168, 238 –atechnoi 55, 64, 168 –ek tou biou 106, 298 –entechnoi 14, 55, 63, 64, 68, 93, 125, 238 –epithetoi 55, 68, 125 n. 74 pistos 39, 42, 119, 131, 139 with n. 108, 295 pistōsis 59 n. 21 pity; see eleos plagiarism 268, 289

General Index | 357

Plataea 80, 199, 228, 252 Plathane 100 Plato 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 26‒43, 44, 49, 52, 58 n. 21, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 79, 97, 100, 101, 103, 122 n. 68, 123, 124, 126, 128, 135, 144, 157, 160, 176, 208, 211, 213, 246, 251, 258, 292, 293‒294, 296, 298, 299 –and Alcidamas; see Alcidamas –and Aristotle; see Aristotle –and Gorgias; see Gorgias –and Isocrates; see Isocrates –Apology of Socrates 33, 79, 122, 296 –Euthydemus 26 –Gorgias 27‒31 with n. 9, 32, 33, 34, 65, 66, 124, 126, 144, 294 –Letter (7) 27 –Menexenus 21, 31‒33, 72 n. 56, 79, 145 n. 127, 294, 296 –Phaedrus 2, 3, 4, 10 n. 45, 11, 19 n. 77, 33‒ 36, 44, 52, 55 with n. 9, 56, 58 n. 21, 61 n. 34, 65, 66, 67 with n. 46, 79, 97, 166 n. 29, 294, 296 –Philebus 27 n. 4 –Protagoras 8, 39 n. 28, 266 n. 24 –Republic 27, 30, 40 n. 31, 43, 121, 122 n. 68, 126, 134 n. 98, 135 n. 99, 144, 294 –Symposium 6, 79, 296 pleasure 14, 18, 51, 65, 71 with n. 54, 84 n. 22, 87, 135 n. 99, 147, 191, 244 pleonexia 5, 7, 37, 104, 106‒107, 123, 126, 132, 135, 143‒144, 186, 292, 294 –just 135, 144 –large-scale 30‒31, 144 –small-scale 144 plēthos 15 with n. 68 Plutarch 84 n. 19, 93, 106 n. 27, 155–156, 159, 172, 207, 210, 242 –[Lives of the Ten Orators] passim poetry 34, 46, 50‒51, 62, 115‒116, 117, 120, 145‒150, 148, 149, 156, 188 n. 87, 230, 247, 276, 300, 305 –and metre 46, 51, 146 –and prose 17, 18, 20, 51, 62 with n. 56, 72, 145‒148, 155 –poetic language 145, 146, 147, 148, 300 –poetic quotations 50, 194, 219, 230 with n. 252, 255, 306 –see also lyric poetry

polemarch 281 polis 5, 20, 103, 107, 110, 117, 118, 129, 138, 141, 211, 299 politeia 103‒104, 118, 119 n. 63, 141‒142, 184, 190 –patrios politeia 43, 107, 131, 133, 299 politikos 72 n. 57, 98, 102, 118, 146, 148, 245, 257, 290 –politikē technē; see technē –politikoi logoi; see Isocrates Polos of Acragas 33, 67 n. 45 and 46 Polybius 6, 83, 207, 208 Polycleitus 155 Polycrates 43‒44, 113 –Accusation of Socrates 43, 113 –Defence of Busiris 43, 113 Polyeuctus 83, 92, 262, 263 polypragmosynē 5, 135, 136, 186, 292, 299 polysyndeton 180, 230 ponein, ponos 97, 98, 133, 186 ponēria, ponēros 6, 103, 104, 177, 195, 226, 230, 247, 265, 285, 286 popular morality; see morality porneuesthai, pornos 217‒220 Porphyrius 268 praeteritio; see paraleipsis praise 17 n. 72, 23‒25, 32, 37, 51, 54‒55, 76, 102, 103, 111, 112, 113‒114, 115, 120, 122, 123, 131, 143, 144, 152, 196, 200, 226, 252, 255, 272, 293, 298 praotēs 64, 139 with n. 108, 141 precision 47‒48, 72, 146, 149, 295, 304; see also akribeia prepon 64, 68, 72, 75, 146, 208, 288 Priamel 188 proairesis 14 n. 61, 56, 198, 263 probolē 178 Procles 280 n. 3 Prodicus of Ceos 26, 33, 67 n. 45, 96 prodiēgēsis 67, 68 prodosia, prodotēs 198 n. 108, 249, 250, 254, 285, 286‒287, 288 with n. 21 proechein 138 n. 106 proem / prooimion 13, 21‒24, 56, 59 n. 21, 64, 111, 117, 168, 182, 241, 243 profit 100, 135 n. 99, 147, 208, 294 progymnasmata 44 n. 37 prokatalēpsis 55, 56 prose passim

358 | General Index

–and poetry; see poetry –prose encomium; see encomium –prose rhapsode; see Gorgias –prose rhythm; see rhythm prosōpopoiia 254, 288 prostēnai 138 with n. 107 prostitution 85, 216, 217, 218, 297, 302 Protagoras of Abdera 7, 8, 33, 38, 67 n. 45, 96, 294 Protarchus 27 n. 4 Proteus 203 Proteus the Cynic 45 n. 43 Proxenus 281 Psaon of Plataea 80 pseudomartyriai 238 psogos 113 n. 49 psychagogic / psychagōgein, psychagōgia 4, 33‒34 with n. 20, 35, 65 n. 43, 145, 146‒147, 292, 294 –psychagōgia dia logōn; see rhetoric psychē 4 n. 19, 18, 29, 39, 42, 71 n. 53, 103, 117, 196, 295 –eidōlon psychēs; see logos –epimeleia tēs psychēs 48 psychological, psychology 4, 15 n. 68, 19, 34, 65, 67, 71, 129, 133, 146, 168, 238, 294, 296, 304 psychron 46 public opinion 36, 126, 128, 129, 137 n. 103, 144, 182, 219, 224, 294, 302, 303 pylagoros, -goras 214 Pythagoras 76, 112 Pytheas (of Aegina) 51 Pytheas (orator) 83, 203, 235, 280 n. 3 Python of Byzantium 60, 83 Quintilian 54, 60, 81, 82, 94, 96, 102, 105, 150, 203 n. 115, 233, 278, 290 Realpolitik 129, 135, 183, 299, 300 religion, religious 85, 100, 114, 246, 247, 248, 255, 256 n. 26, 297, 305, 306 Renaissance 157, 298 reputation 11, 13, 55, 58 with n. 20, 124‒ 126, 144, 160, 167 n. 30, 191, 199, 206, 218, 219, 224, 225, 247, 249, 251, 256, 262, 264, 278, 280, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307 rhetoric, oratory passim

–and medicine 30, 34, 66 –and philosophy 2, 3‒4, 26‒43, 52, 59, 65‒ 66, 67, 71, 73‒74, 78, 79, 83, 100, 103, 121, 155, 157, 158, 201, 207, 292, 293, 294, 296 –and poetry 34 with n. 20, 51, 116, 147‒ 148, 149, 156; see also poetry and prose –art of rhetoric; see technē –empeiria 27, 29, 65 –kolakeia 28‒30, 65, 294 –literary rhetoric 156 –peithous dēmiourgos 27, 33, 67, 124, 294 –psychagōgia dia logōn 4, 33, 294 –rhetorical question 151, 185, 187, 188, 204, 243 –rhetorical topoi; see topoi –Sicilian rhetoric 3, 33, 55 –tribē 27 rhetorical genres / genē 17, 54, 63, 73, 102, 154 –dēmēgorikon 54 –dikanikon 54, 63, 106 –epideiktikon 54, 63 –symbouleutikon 63 rhetorical heroic poetry (rhetorische Heldendichtung) 116 n. 58 rhetorical species / eidē 54‒55, 56, 65, 76 –apologikon 54 –apotreptikon 54 –enkōmiastikon 54, 113‒114 –exetastikon 54, 56, 216 n. 21 –katēgorikon 54 –protreptikon 54 –psektikon 54 rhētorikos 35, 39 –rhētorikē technē; see technē Rhodes, Rhodian 63, 183‒184, 206, 209, 215, 249, 259 –Rhodian School 215, 278 rhōmē 3 8, 40, 41, 80, 164, 185, 278 n. 38 rhythm 46, 47, 51, 64, 116, 145, 146, 148 with n. 134, 149, 205, 290, 295, 299 –prose rhythm 148‒149 with n. 134, 205 ring composition 120, 167, 289 with n. 25 rumour 219, 223 n. 36; see also phēmē Salamis (Cyprus) 119, 154 Salamis, Battle of 150, 176, 199 Samos 160, 215

General Index | 359

saphēneia, saphēs 64, 72, 75, 146, 230, 242, 290 sarcasm / sarkasmos 89, 180, 187, 204, 222, 276, 283 scriptio plena 206 with n. 125 sculpture 50‒51 self-confidence 108‒109, 119, 182, 300 self-reflexive reference 182 n. 67 sēmeion 13 n. 57, 39, 55, 115 semnologein, semnologia 90, 230, 232 semnos 155‒156, 230, 256 sexual, sexuality 85, 88, 160, 198, 216, 220, 223, 228, 297 shame 64, 170, 174, 183, 185‒186, 194, 249, 253; see also aischynē shamelessness; see anaischyntia Sicilian Expedition 24 Sicilian rhetoric; see rhetoric Simonides 51 slave 84 n. 18, 109, 114, 171, 191, 192, 241, 249, 260, 265, 306 Social War 172 Socrates, Socratic 20, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 44, 79, 97, 98 n. 5, 107, 113, 122, 126, 213, 293, 294, 296 Solomon 155 Solon 70, 133, 194, 267, 299, 307 sophia, sophos 26, 41, 80, 108, 122, 148, 222 sophist / sophistēs, sophistikē 3, 4, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27 with n. 5, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40 with n. 30, 43, 44‒47, 51‒52, 54, 56, 67, 96, 100, 103, 115, 121‒122, 124, 126, 130 n. 90, 143, 157, 292, 294, 295, 298 –agelaioi sophistai 143 Sophocles 194 sōphrōn, sōphrosynē 5, 36, 80, 89, 108, 112, 123, 126, 132, 221, 230, 292 Sosigenes 80 Sostratus 280 soul 4, 18, 29‒30, 32, 34‒35, 39, 117, 292, 294, 295; see also psychē Sparta, Spartan 49, 53, 60, 79, 99, 131 with n. 92, 132‒133, 134, 136, 141 n. 116, 143‒ 144, 156, 183, 192 n. 94, 258, 296, 299 speech, oration passim; see also logos –deliberative 4, 8‒9, 45, 47, 53, 63, 64, 65, 71, 73, 76, 82, 102, 137, 161, 166‒167 with

n. 30, 175, 181, 182, 186, 196, 244, 261, 292, 295, 306 –epideictic 17‒25, 47‒48, 51, 54, 59, 63, 64, 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 98, 101‒102, 106, 111, 113 n. 52, 114‒115, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 154, 166, 182, 196, 201, 238, 244, 255, 261, 270, 276, 293, 295, 296, 297, 300, 301, 306 –funeral / epitaphios 20, 21‒25, 31‒33, 42, 73, 103, 108, 109 n. 34, 115‒116 with n. 56, 117, 130 n. 91, 163, 183, 195‒197, 228, 258, 260, 262, 270‒273, 276‒277, 293, 294, 301, 306, 307 –judicial 4, 9‒11, 20, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 82, 84, 97, 102, 105, 106, 110, 122, 147, 148, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 193, 194, 198, 203, 236, 237, 238, 243, 244‒245, 261, 266, 275, 281, 292, 293, 295, 297, 300, 301, 303, 305, 306 –paradoxical 19, 31, 44 with n. 37, 45, 111, 115 n. 55 Speusippus, Letter to Philip 59‒60 with n. 26, 139 n. 110 statues 49‒52, 83, 92, 93, 101‒102, 120, 122, 164‒165, 174, 176, 207, 247, 297, 305 –motionless or soulless 50‒52, 101‒102, 297 Stephanus of Acharnae 84, 85, 166, 172 Stephanus of Eroiadae 85‒89 Stesichorus 19 Stobaeus 45, 91 stratēgikos 118 Stratocles 83 with n. 17, 246, 280 n. 3, 283 Straton 83 strophe-antistrophe 66 structure 18 n. 74, 47, 54‒56, 58, 63, 80, 149, 150 n. 136, 167, 169, 181, 183, 193, 195‒196, 197, 221, 225, 243, 256, 264, 270, 295, 299 –logical (plan logique) 168 –psychological (plan psychologique) 168 style 11, 17, 18, 20, 45, 46, 47‒48, 55, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 90, 94, 100, 145‒152, 154, 156, 157, 166, 169, 182, 197 n. 102, 200‒205, 209‒210, 229‒231, 233, 237‒238, 242‒244, 245, 254‒256, 257, 274‒277, 279, 283, 286, 287‒289, 290,

360 | General Index

295, 296, 299, 300‒301, 304, 308; see also lexis subjectio; see hypophora Suda 40 n. 29, 44, 45, 53, 62, 67 n. 46, 82, 83, 91, 92, 93, 96, 100, 111 n. 39, 156, 159, 212, 213, 233, 235, 246, 258, 261, 280 sycophant / sykophantēs 15, 172, 204 n. 120, 218, 222, 223, 224, 251, 264, 267, 285, 303, 306 symbolaio 48, 98, 102, 148, 238 synagein, synagōgē 61 with n. 34, 67 n. 45 synēgoros 85, 171, 258 Synesius, Encomium of Baldness 44 n. 37 synkrisis 76, 210, 233 –pros endoxous 76, 141 Syracuse 3, 18, 33, 60, 67 n. 45, 99 Syrianus 54 tachos 41, 203 tapeinos 64, 72, 113 n. 53, 271, 284, 285 taxis 56, 63, 64, 228, 252, 283 technē 27 with n. 4, 29, 34, 35, 39, 61, 65, 66, 157, 160, 235 –logōn technē 34 –politikē 8, 31 –rhētorikē / art of rhetoric 2, 26, 27, 42 n. 34, 46, 56, 59, 62, 63, 81 n. 10, 105, 157 tekmērion 55 with n. 13, 59 n. 21 terthreia 111 with n. 39 testament; see will testimony; see martyriai thalassocracy 134 tharsos 4 n. 19, 64, 71 n. 53 thaumastos 58, 156 Thebes 53, 92, 163, 183, 226, 231, 248, 260, 267, 283, 305 Themistocles 31, 46 n. 46, 134, 174, 176, 228 Theodecteia 61 Theodectes 53 with n. 4, 61, 62, 82, 154, 156 Theodorus (actor) 213 Theodorus (Isocrates’ father) 97 Theodorus of Byzantium 33, 58 n. 21, 67 with n. 45 and 46, 68 Theognis 45, 99 Theomnestus 85 Theophrastus 72, 77, 83, 207 with n. 128, 280, 281

–On Style 77 Theopompus of Chios 53, 80, 143 n. 122, 154, 156 theōrein 67, 124, 239 theos 110, 114, 136, 145, 198 n. 107, 199, 217, 219‒220 –theos en anthrōpois ē daimōn thnētos 120 Theramenes 97 therapeia, therapeuein 118, 127, 128, 132, 133 Therippides 159 Thersites 227 Theseus 74, 76, 109, 111‒112, 119‒120 Thirty Tyrants 9, 12, 14 with n. 60 and 61, 27, 31, 97, 105, 212, 246 Thrace 175, 189 Thrasybulus 221, 222, 283 Thrasymachus of Chalcedon 30, 33, 59 n. 21, 67 n. 45, 144, 294 Thucydides 7, 21‒25, 32 n. 14, 40 n. 29, 42, 46 n. 46, 69, 106‒107 with n. 28, 108, 115, 116 with n. 60, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 148, 160, 182, 183, 186, 203, 299, 308 Timaeus of Tauromenion 80 timan, timē 22, 133, 135 n. 99, 173, 174, 176, 177, 192, 193, 200, 253, 255 Timarchus 9, 57, 214, 216‒220, 302 timocracy 27 Timocrates 175 Timoleon 54 Timotheus 49, 76, 97, 109, 112, 126‒129, 154, 176, 283, 284, 285, 287, 299 Tisias (Athenian citizen) 106 with n. 27 Tisias of Syracuse 2, 3, 18, 33, 59 n. 21, 67 n. 45, 96 topoi 14, 21, 22, 31, 58, 64, 99, 106, 194, 255, 289, 293, 306 –topos ek kriseōs 74 –topos of monos ē prōtos 109 tragedy 19 n. 77, 62, 146‒147 treason 194, 198 n. 108, 221, 249, 250, 252, 254, 259, 282, 285, 287, 288, 305; see also prodosia tribes 196, 262 tribrach law (Tribrachys-Gesetz) 205 Troizen 164 Trojan Horse 155

General Index | 361

Trojan War 24, 112 n. 48, 113, 140‒141 with n. 116, 273, 307 tropoi 49, 117‒118 Troy 19, 140‒141, 273 tychē 49, 76, 127, 138, 196 with n. 101, 198 n. 107, 199, 200, 221, 227, 252, 269, 283, 285 tyranny / tyrannis, tyrannos 27, 30‒31, 107 with n. 29, 108, 109‒110, 118, 119, 124, 132, 134 with n. 96, 135, 136, 144, 174‒ 175, 184, 188‒189, 192, 200, 225, 243, 253, 270, 301 –Athens Tyrannis 134, 135, 299 Tyrtaeus 247 Tzetzes Johannes 45 unmanliness 126; see also anandria values 5, 6, 7, 10 with n. 48, 36, 43, 48, 103, 107, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 129, 140, 190, 225 n. 38, 273, 293, 294, 298, 299, 307, 308 –aristocracy of values; see aristocracy –competitive 7, 10 with n. 48, 16, 37, 107, 108, 110, 117, 118, 126, 133‒134, 135, 139, 140, 144, 157, 186 n. 82, 293, 298, 299 –cooperative 7, 10 with n. 48, 16, 69, 109, 110, 117, 118, 132, 135, 139, 140, 141, 157, 186 n. 82, 293, 298 Victorius Petrus 54 violence 10, 19, 31, 40, 107, 134, 136, 141, 158, 170, 178, 230 n. 49, 233, 295, 300 virtue 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 20, 36, 64, 69, 71, 72, 75, 80, 108, 109, 112, 114, 117‒118, 123, 126, 131, 135, 139, 171, 247, 251, 252,

266, 274, 293, 298, 299, 307; see also aretē vita 27, 61, 79, 96, 159, 212, 235 –activa 27, 182 –contemplativa 27, 157 wealth 37, 42, 64, 73, 92, 96, 131‒132, 138, 159, 171, 181, 213, 258, 262, 263, 294 will / testament 84, 239, 240, 241, 304; see also diathēkē wisdom 13, 26, 36, 64, 69, 80, 139, 140, 148, 165 Xenophanes 114, 130 Xenophon 7, 31, 60, 80, 107, 128, 173 –Agesilaus 79‒80, 140 n. 113, 147 n. 131, 156, 290 –Anabasis 20, 68 –[Constitution of the Athenians] 13, 183 –Cyropaedia 6, 79, 156, 173, 296 –Hellenica 31 –Hieron 7 –Memorabilia 7, 31, 48 n. 52, 107 –Symposium 18 n. 74, 40 n. 31 zēlos 64, 110, 131, 255 Zoilus of Amphipolis 44, 53 –homēromastix 44 –kyōn rhētorikos 44 –Encomium of Polyphemus 44 –Encomium of the People of Tenedos 44 –Kata Isokratous 44 Zosimus of Ascalon 96, 97, 159