Global Politics in the Human Interest 9781685855642

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Global Politics in the Human Interest

FOURTH

EDITION

Global Politics in the Human Interest M E L GURTOV

LYN

NE

R I E N N E R PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gurtov, Melvin. Global politics in the human interest / Mel Gurtov.—4th ed. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-820-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. International relations. 2. International economic relations. 3. World politics—1989- I. Title. JZ1305.G87 1999 327.1'01—dc21 98-47373 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

For my daughters, Alia, Marci, and Ellene ". . . in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you."

Contents

List of Tables Preface 1

Crisis and Interdependence in Contemporary World Politics Global Insecurity, 1 A Brief Report on the State of the Planet, 4 Interdependence, 7 And Now, Globalization, 11 New World Order? 13

2

Realism and Corporate Globalism in Theory and Practice The Realist Perspective, 23 Corporate Globalism and the World Economy, 31 Rivals or Partners? 46 Case Study 1: Postwar Planning for the "American Century," 55 Case Study 2: The Gulf War for a New World Order, 60 Case Study 3: Capitalist Dominoes— The Mexican and Asian Financial Crises, 66

3

World Politics in Global-Humanist Perspective The Search for a Third Way, 75 Values, Methods, Measurements, Objectives, 77 The Oppressed, 94

4

The Third World and the Fourth: Human Rights, Environmental Decline, and Underdevelopment Defining the "Third World," 111 A Third World Country Profile, 117 Case Studies of Crisis and Renewal, 136: China, 136; South Africa, 144; South Korea, 151; Brazil, 158

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The United States and Russia: Empires in Transition The Military Crisis of the (Former) First World, 165 The Nuclear Danger in the Cold War Era, 167 The Arms Race After the Cold War, 185 The Human Costs of the Nuclear Game, 197 Russia, Past and Present, 197 The United States, 206 The Price of Being Number One, 212

165

6

Europe and Japan in a Multipolar World The New Meaning of Power, 217 Toward a United Europe, 223 The Changed Strategic Picture, 225 Case Study: Japan Between Interdependence and Dependence, 229

217

7

In the Human Interest: An Agenda for Transforming World Politics Lessons for the Future, 243 Thinking Globally, 247 The Prospects for Humanity, 281

Notes Bibliography Index About the Book

243

285 353 379 399

Tables

1.1 1.2

The Reshaping of World Politics Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations (1998)

14 21

2.1 2.2 2.3

Alternative Values Alternative Norms and Structures The Fifty Largest U.S. Multinationals (1997)

25 26 36

4.1 4.2

Distribution of World Income Among People Global Income Disparity Between Rich and Poor People (1988) Income Distribution in the Third World

114

U.S. and USSR/Russia Nuclear Arsenals, 1983 and 1993 Major Post-Cold War and Related Earlier International Treaties Governing Weapons of Mass Destruction Known Nuclear Tests of the Declared Nuclear Powers, 1945-1998

172

4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3

ix

116 118

187 191

Preface

This book continues my effort to understand and communicate how the world really works and for whom. It is not a book for the fainthearted, for the superpatriot, for those w h o believe they are reading "all the news fit to print" or w h o believe that governments know best. It is for those w h o believe in the notions of global citizenship and global responsibility, and further, for those w h o believe that the individual can (and must) make a difference. The book is also for the professor and student w h o want something beyond a standard introduction to international relations—many fine ones e x i s t — a n d w h o specifically want to probe deeply, from a nongovernmental, humane-values perspective, to the heart of world politics. For them, I o f f e r one interpretation of the causes and remedies for global inequality and environmental destruction. In doing so, I try to synthesize the work of many specialists from many fields. M y debt to them is enormous, and I again extend my thanks here. A word to students on this occasion: One message the book hopes to c o n v e y is that the tools for independent evaluation of c o m p l e x international issues are easily at hand. It starts with becoming a systematic reader of a quality national newspaper. The facts are there; a k n o w l e d g e a b l e interpretation of them by the global citizen is the reader's job. The number of quality newspapers keeps dwindling, but w e still have the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal. A l l of them, and virtually all major world newspapers, are now online. Political science and other social science students should not neglect the business pages (regrettably, there are no " l a b o r " pages), where much of the long-term n e w s is being made. Then, a visit to the library's current periodicals section is in order to become familiar with the leading journals of scholarship and opinion. Next, one should compile and periodically explore the Web sites of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations ( N G O s ) , and

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government agencies. Some textbooks already carry such lists. By taking a look at the sources f o r this book, it should b e c o m e clear h o w valuable newspapers, journals, and the Internet are for research. Concerning the Internet, I must add that it is no substitute for scholarly books and articles. I advise my students to use the Internet as a supplement for up-to-date documentation (statistics, speeches, and the like), but not as the primary place to conduct research. Libraries exist for that purpose. If they continue to be neglected by students, and u n d e r f u n d e d by school administrators and legislators, they will eventually go out of business. And that will be a setback of e n o r m o u s proportions for anyone who does critical work in public and international policy. One other thing: I was drawn to a newspaper report in June 1995 and a later b o o k about the discovery in France of the Chauvet cave paintings, which date back at least 30,000 years. T h e s e colorful and detailed drawings of m a m m o t h s and other creatures forced archaeologists to reexamine the notion that art developed linearly, f r o m crude to increasingly sophisticated. To think that the earliest art rivals that of contemporaries, and that art apparently develops in fits and starts! Our species has d e v e l o p e d that way, too. Questions such as who is advanced and who is b a c k w a r d , what is civilized behavior and what is not, which practices should be preserved and which abandoned, do not have obvious answers. In this era of globalization, it is more important than ever that we resist t h e m and inquire where they c o m e f r o m and w h o m they serve. H o p e f u l l y , this b o o k will provide you with new w a y s of thinking about and a n s w e r i n g the tough questions. I wish to thank R e n a t o Corbetta and Z h o u Hang f o r research assistance on this latest edition, and Milton Leitenberg for his usual generosity in sharing ideas and materials. I am also grateful to Françoise D e m a y and Doris C l a n a h a n f o r their w o n d e r f u l help with c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and other kinds of office support. And many thanks to Jody Berman for a w o n d e r f u l j o b of editing.

M.G.

1 Crisis and Interdependence in Contemporary World Politics

This dominant culture set the tone and standard for most of Shikasta. For regardless of the ideological label attaching to each national area, they ail had in common that technology was the key to all good, and that good was always material increase, gain, comfort, pleasure. . . . And all this time the earth was being despoiled. The minerals were being ripped out, the fuels wasted, the soils depleted by an improvident and short-sighted agriculture, the animals and plants slaughtered and destroyed, the seas being filled with filth and poison, the atmosphere was corrupted. . . . These were maddened creatures, and the small voices that rose in protest were not enough to halt the processes that had been set in motion and were sustained by greed. By the lack of substance-of-we-feeling. —Doris Lessing, Re: Colonised

Planet 5,

Shikasta

One atom in this universe cannot move without dragging the whole world along with it. There cannot be any progress without the whole world following in the wake, and it is becoming every day clearer that the solution of any problem can never be attained on racial, or national, or [other] narrow grounds. —Swami Vivekananda

Global Insecurity S o m e o n e o n c e d e f i n e d f a n a t i c i s m as " r e d o u b l i n g y o u r e f f o r t s w h e n y o u h a v e lost sight of y o u r o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e . " T h e b l i n d p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l sec u r i t y f i t s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of f a n a t i c i s m p e r f e c t l y . A s s t a t e l e a d e r s i n v e s t m o r e a n d m o r e p o l i t i c a l , h u m a n , a n d e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s in w e a p o n s , aid p r o g r a m s , a l l i a n c e s , a n d t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , t h e s e c u r i t y of p e r s o n s , s o c i e t i e s , a n d t h e p l a n e t as a w h o l e a c t u a l l y s e e m s to d e c l i n e . In t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y a d v a n c e d c o u n t r i e s of t h e First a n d S e c o n d W o r l d s , i n s e c u r i t y is m a i n l y r e f l e c t e d in a c u t e a n x i e t y a b o u t t h e e f f i c a c y

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of political systems and frustrations about any s y s t e m ' s ability to deliver the " g o o d l i f e " except at very high social and ecological costs. In the underdeveloped countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds, where three-fourths of the world's population live, insecurity takes a more basic form: the daily quest for survival. (The four " w o r l d s " are depicted in Table 1.1, p. 14.) T h e causes and consequences of this pervasive insecurity, and the extent to which its d i f f e r e n t f o r m s are interrelated and m u t u a l l y reinforcing—the degree, f o r example, to which the quest for security in the industrialized world takes place largely at the e x p e n s e of the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d world, yet also has profound economic and social impact at h o m e — a r e the principal subjects of this study. The reasons are simple: T h e human costs of global insecurity are staggering; the narrow understanding of "national security" by most state leaders keeps these costs high and mounting; the penetration of every aspect of world politics (such as alliances, the ecosystem, global finance and trade, and p e o p l e ' s m o v e m e n t s and exchanges) by this global crisis has created great f o r e b o d i n g but equally great hesitancy to take bold remedial action; and, as a result, the prospects for planetary survival itself are not optimistic. State leaders everywhere invariably seek to put the best possible face on their own situations, and many serious scholars persist in arguing that h u m a n k i n d will resolve t o d a y ' s p r o b l e m s just as it resolved y e s t e r d a y ' s . Indeed, e v e n t s since the Berlin Wall c a m e d o w n on N o v e m b e r 9, 1989, gave some cause for optimism. G e r m a n reunification was completed less than a year later. M a s s i v e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s challenged the legitimacy of single-party states f r o m China to C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , and in most cases toppled them. The creation of a single market among the twelve countries of the European C o m m u n i t y (EC), now the European Union (EU), was set to start in 1993. This radical alteration of the m a p of E u r o p e took place against the background of revolutionary changes in S o v i e t - U . S . relations. Soviet President Mikhail G o r b a c h e v , w h o s e " n e w t h i n k i n g " essentially discarded the old rules of the Cold War game, was the single most important figure. His mid-1990 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., with President George Bush continued U . S . - S o v i e t arms talks that had already led to the first actual reductions, and destruction, of nuclear w e a p o n s in the postwar period. The peacekeeping role of the United Nations revived, with missions in diverse locations such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Namibia. Prominent human-rights activists were freed f r o m captivity, including Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years in South African prisons. These events, w h e n c o m p a r e d with the baleful character of international relations only a decade earlier, appeared to herald a new era of peace and security. Then, war and preparations for war dominated world politics, topped by the intense nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and a long list of civil and interstate conflicts in Africa,

Crisis and

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3

the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Driven by this short-term comparison, some commentators were quick to proclaim the "end of history," in the sense that the demise of the Soviet empire and the seeming victory of Western liberalism in Eastern Europe had opened the way to a stable, if rather boring, epoch devoted mainly to technological development. 1 T h e end of history? The b r e a k u p of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of ethnic and religious nationalism in central E u r o p e and central Asia quickly revived history. A new world order? So President B u s h declared following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis (see Chapter 2 ) — I r a q ' s invasion and annexation of Kuwait—in August 1990. The contention of this book is that although the ideological battles of the Cold War have largely been replaced by e c o n o m i c competition and have led to a lessening of international tensions, a global crisis remains when international and national security issues are evaluated from a planetary and long-term perspective. Proclamations of victory in the Cold War and of a new order may be politically s a t i s f y i n g in some circles; but they are no substitute for analysis, particularly when they ignore the quality of life in the underdeveloped world and the multitude of threats to global environmental security. As we will see in the r e m a i n d e r of this chapter, in spite of some positive signs of international cooperation, global insecurity is deepening and is beyond quick technological or diplomatic fixes. T h e urgency of d e v e l o p i n g a global approach to security w a s first pressed by U Thant, then secretary-general of the United Nations, in 1969: I do not w i s h to s e e m overdramatic, but I can o n l y c o n c l u d e from the information that is available to m e as Secretary-General, that the M e m b e r s of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a v e perhaps ten years left in w h i c h to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a g l o b a l partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to d e f u s e the population e x p l o s i o n , and to supply the required m o m e n t u m to d e v e l o p m e n t efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next d e c a d e , then I very m u c h fear that the p r o b l e m s I h a v e m e n t i o n e d will h a v e reached s u c h s t a g g e r i n g proportions that they will be b e y o n d our c a p a c i t y to control.2

In its essentials, the secretary-general's warning has c o m e true. Although planetary extinction has thus far been averted, the depth and scale of the problems U Thant cited have indeed increased to nearly unmanageable proportions. By 1992, as the next section begins to document, Maurice Strong spoke of a "civilizational crisis" as he opened the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ( U N C E D , the so-called Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Few government or major corporate leaders have shared U T h a n t ' s or S t r o n g ' s sense of urgency; most have acknowledged one or another aspect of a global crisis but have not considered

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that the p r o b l e m s are s y m p t o m a t i c of a c o n t a g i o u s a n d p o t e n t i a l l y fatal disease. L i f e , and politics, g o on as b e f o r e . It is i n d e e d s t r a n g e that at o n e and the s a m e t i m e , m o n u m e n t a l leaps of s c i e n t i f i c c r e a t i v i t y o c c u r f o r the b e n e f i t of h u m a n k i n d w h i l e political l e a d e r s stick to tired f o r m u l a s a n d o u t d a t e d r i t u a l s in p u r s u i t of selfinterest. T h e practice of politics has not kept pace either with scientific adv a n c e s or with g l o b a l e c o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , military, and social c h a n g e s . U T h a n t appealed f o r a " g l o b a l p a r t n e r s h i p " b e c a u s e he believed the f u t u r e of the h u m a n s p e c i e s itself w a s i m p e r i l e d . B u t the g o v e r n m e n t s he add r e s s e d w e r e not (and c l e a r l y still are n o t ) r e a d y to i n t e g r a t e g l o b a l c h a n g e s into n a r r o w l y n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s . A n d t h e r e i n lies a crisis of our times that is e q u a l l y as b u r d e n s o m e as any U T h a n t d e s c r i b e d : a crisis of political will in the n a t i o n - s t a t e s y s t e m . T h e e m p h a s i s t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k is on i n f o r m a t i o n , e x p l a n a t i o n , and a r g u m e n t . T h i s c h a p t e r b e g i n s with s o m e basic f a c t s about the g l o b a l crisis that are e s s e n t i a l to u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g the c h a n g e d s h a p e of world p o l i t i c s — i t s interdependence d u r i n g , and globalization after, the Cold War. I introduce the t w o schools of thought that d o m i n a t e writing and t h i n k i n g about w o r l d p o l i t i c s — R e a l i s m and C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s m — a l o n g with a third school, Global H u m a n i s m , the values and analytical m e t h o d of w h i c h I use t h r o u g h o u t the p r e s e n t study. In C h a p t e r 2, R e a l i s m a n d Corp o r a t e G l o b a l i s m are critically e x a m i n e d . T h r e e c a s e studies of e f f o r t s to r e s h a p e the w o r l d o r d e r b a c k u p the d i s c u s s i o n of h o w R e a l i s m a n d Corp o r a t e G l o b a l i s m both c o m p e t e a n d c o l l a b o r a t e in the real w o r l d . C h a p t e r 3 e l a b o r a t e s on G l o b a l H u m a n i s m as an a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h spec i f i c r e l e v a n c e to g l o b a l h u m a n and e n v i r o n m e n t a l n e e d s . T h e T h i r d and F o u r t h W o r l d s ' o p p r e s s e d are given special attention here, f o r they constitute the global m a j o r i t y . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n sets the stage f o r a m o r e s p e c i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i n s e c u r i t y f r o m a h u m a n - i n t e r e s t p o i n t of v i e w , in the T h i r d and F o u r t h W o r l d s ( C h a p t e r 4), in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a ( C h a p t e r 5), and in E u r o p e a n d J a p a n ( C h a p t e r 6). T h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r is p o l i c y oriented: It lays out an a g e n d a f o r c h a n g e s a d d r e s s e d to the m a i n f e a t u r e s of the global crisis.

A Brief Report on the State of the Planet In 1992 m o r e t h a n 1,600 of the w o r l d ' s leading scientists, i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r i t y of the living N o b e l s c i e n c e laureates, signed a " W a r n i n g to H u m a n ity." T h e s t a t e m e n t b e g a n by o b s e r v i n g that " h u m a n b e i n g s and the natural w o r l d are on a collision c o u r s e . . . [that] m a y so alter the living w o r l d that it will be u n a b l e to sustain life in the m a n n e r that w e k n o w . " 3 D u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g year, t w e n t y l e a d e r s of the w o r l d ' s m a j o r f a i t h s j o i n e d in a

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Declaration of a Global Ethic that c o n d e m n e d violence, "in particular . . . aggression and hatred in the n a m e of religion," and urged that " d i s a r m a ment is the c o m m a n d m e n t of the t i m e s . " 4 T h e scope of the global crisis that so alarmed distinguished groups like these b e c o m e s apparent f r o m the following figures: • Over 2 billion people in the Third World (including four out of five persons living in rural areas) do not have access to clean water. Forty percent of the w o r l d ' s population lives in areas with severe water shortages. A rough estimate by the World Bank and U N E S C O is that about half of them (a billion people) are chronically malnourished. 5 • Despite advances in world literacy, there remain thirty-four countries with over 80 percent illiteracy. 6 • Approximately 1.2 billion people, overwhelmingly in the Third World, were living in absolute poverty in 1989 and 1.3 billion in 1 9 9 5 — f i g u r e s equivalent to the population of China. Their incomes generally range between $ 2 0 0 and $ 4 0 0 a year. They live in countries with the w o r l d ' s largest and fastest-growing populations. 7 • The world population, according to the World Bank, is expected to be well over 6 billion by 2000 and over 8 billion by 2025, even though fertility rates are declining e v e r y w h e r e . In the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s it was c o m m o n place to say that world population was growing by "another M e x i c o " (80 million) annually, w h e r e a s by 1990 the p h r a s e had c h a n g e d to " a n o t h e r Bangladesh," or about 100 million people every year. 8 • At current rates of depletion, by the year 2 0 0 0 the Third W o r l d ' s forests, especially in tropical zones, will be reduced by one-half (thus intensifying an already serious shortage of firewood for fuel). Approximately one plant species of every eight—12.5 percent of approximately 270,000 species so far identified—is threatened with extinction. 9 One-third less topsoil will be available for food production. Already, world food reserves have shrunk to only a forty d a y s ' supply, f r o m over 100 days in I960. 1 0 • T h e d e v e l o p e d - w o r l d states currently account f o r m o r e than fourf i f t h s of the w o r l d ' s i n c o m e but only o n e - f o u r t h of its population. (The U n i t e d States, with about 6 percent of the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n , c o n s u m e s over 30 percent of its total product.) By contrast, the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d states account for three-fourths of the world's population but less than onef i f t h of its income. • Military s p e n d i n g w o r l d w i d e roughly d o u b l e d in twenty years, reaching $940 billion in 1985—well over $2 billion a day. Over 80 percent of that amount was spent by the two superpowers. Since 1987, global arms spending has declined, but in 1994 it was still around $700 billion a year. 11 • Third World g o v e r n m e n t s , especially those under military rule, buy about three-quarters of all m a r k e t e d w e a p o n s . W o r l d w i d e , the value of

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arms purchases has declined dramatically in the 1990s; but developing countries still made arms agreements worth over $25 billion in 1994. 12 They are paying for the arms with their own scarce resources and with money borrowed from the banks and governments of the developed countries, to which the Third World owed close to $1.1 trillion by the end of 1987. 13 • Alternative uses of tiny fractions of the w o r l d ' s military spending could produce m e a n i n g f u l change in education, health care, and nutrition. For example, the cost of one new nuclear submarine (about $1.5 billion) could educate 160 million schoolchildren in twenty-three developing countries. About $3 billion is estimated to be enough to enable the poorest countries to begin moving toward food self-sufficiency. Similar small amounts could probably prevent the deaths each year of about 15 million children f r o m malnutrition, dehydration, and other easily curable conditions. 1 4 • M o r e and more people are m o v i n g into cities. The UN predicts 47 percent of the world's population will be urbanized by 2000. Third World cities will grow 160 percent between 1990 and 2 0 3 0 and will include seventeen of the twenty-one largest cities in the world. Urban environmental quality, accordingly, is declining rapidly. A c o m p r e h e n s i v e study of air pollution reveals health-threatening problems in all twenty of the w o r l d ' s largest cities, Mexico City being the worst. 1 5 • T h e w o r l d ' s displaced population is rising at an a s t o u n d i n g rate, mainly because of war, poverty, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l decline. About 2,700 people become "political r e f u g e e s , " r e f u g e e s in their own country, or economic migrants every day.16 • T h e estimated n u m b e r of people with HIV, the virus that c a u s e s A I D S , has risen dramatically. In 1993 it was 14 million people; in 1996, 22 million; and in 1997, 30 million, of w h o m 2.3 million were e x p e c t e d to die. There will be 5.8 million new HIV infections each year, 1 7 and the World Bank expects an explosion of AIDS cases in a number of " e m e r g i n g m a r k e t " countries such as China, India, and Ukraine. 1 8 • Malaria, once thought to have been wiped out, is on the rise again. " B e t w e e n 300 million and 500 million people now get malaria each year, and someone dies of it about every 15 seconds—mostly children and pregnant women. During the last decade, malaria has killed about 10 times as m a n y children as all wars c o m b i n e d have in that period." A $5 m o s q u i t o net, beyond the reach of most poor people who suffer from malaria, is considered to be the single best preventive measure. 1 9 • T h e n u m b e r of active a r m e d conflicts has decreased since 1989. 2 0 Still, "at the b e g i n n i n g of 1996, there were m o r e than forty violent ethnopolitical c o n f l i c t s under way, at least one of them in every world region." Most such conflicts are not the direct consequence of ethnic grievances; they primarily reflect political and e c o n o m i c inequalities as well as overt discrimination by governments. 2 1

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7

Statistics and facts of these magnitudes may be difficult to absorb at one sitting. But they give an immediate sense of what a global perspective on world politics does: It highlights the multidimensional and transnational character of a common crisis. And that is why we turn next to the phenomena of interdependence and globalization.

Interdependence U.S. citizens demonstrate in Washington, D.C., and across college campuses for human rights in South Africa. Genocidal wars in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda prompt proposals for a permanent UN court to prosecute crimes against humanity. A financial crisis in Asia roils markets worldwide as well as threatens widespread unemployment and social chaos throughout the region. The Indian government briefly arrests the chair of the board of Union Carbide, then sues the company in a U . S . court, after a catastrophic gas leak from the company's branch plant in Bhopal kills over 3 , 7 0 0 people and injures 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A worldwide emergency food relief effort begins in Ethiopia and Sudan after a B B C broadcast dramatizes the fact that several million people are starving to death. An Islamic terrorist group proclaims: "Let them know that sooner or later we shall reach the heart of the White House, the Kremlin, the Elysée, 10 Downing Street." A Japanese study of the effects of a major earthquake in downtown Tokyo predicts catastrophic consequences for the world's finances, inasmuch as Japan has become the top creditor nation in the world. These events of the 1980s and 1990s have one thing in common: They reflect the increasingly complex and transnational character of world politics. The line that once so neatly divided domestic from foreign affairs and foreign from global affairs is now much harder to find. Issues that once were the exclusive prerogative of governments, such as air and water pollution, now are matters of international diplomacy and sometimes social activism. Large numbers of ordinary people are being affected by world affairs as never before. Not only are advances in global information technology helping to create awareness of that fact, but as the cost of acquiring information dwindles, far greater numbers of people will have opportunities to affect world affairs. Even the older patterns of inter- and fniranational relations, in which conflict is the dominant feature, have new meaning today. Whether we are talking about wars between states, such as Iran and Iraq; or power plays by major governments, such as the U.S. intervention in Central America and the Soviet Union's pressure on East Germany to resist closer economic ties with West Germany; or nationalist and separatist struggles in Sri Lanka, Spain, and Ireland; or territorial disputes, such as the war between Great

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Interest

Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands—the consequences of such conflicts carry well beyond their effects on the contestants. They crisscross national boundaries to involve not only other g o v e r n m e n t s but also other e c o n o m i e s , ways of life ( c o n s u m e r prices, cultures, f o o d supplies, civil liberties, jobs), even natural environments. The global a g e n d a has t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e larger, more diverse, and more ominous. We need additional tools to analyze it. International affairs is still politics, of course; but political science is no longer sufficient for the study of international affairs. E c o n o m i c s is equally important, specifically, international political economy, the study of the social consequences of national and international economic developments. In addition, biology (studying, for example, acid rain), anthropology (the demise of native cultures in the face of modernization), sociology (the international division of labor), feminist studies ( w o m e n on the global assembly lines of transnational corporations), religion (the universal values of diverse spiritual paths), even sports ( f r o m U . S . - C h i n a P i n g - P o n g d i p l o m a c y to terrorism and fraternalism at the Munich and Los A n g e l e s O l y m p i c G a m e s ) — a l l have a place in the study of world politics. The transnational p h e n o m e n o n requires an interdisciplinary approach to do justice to world politics. And that is the approach of this book. I use the tools and insights of m a n y disciplines in order to explore world politics in its fullest, global sense: across national b o u n d a r i e s , inside as well as outside societies, at m a n y different levels of social activity (governing elites, races, ecological systems, e c o n o m i c classes, and b u r e a u c r a c i e s , f o r example). Since the United States, despite all its vulnerabilities occasioned by global politicaleconomic changes, is still the w o r l d ' s most influential actor, I e m p h a s i z e its policies and behavior more so than any other state's. T h e principal perspective used in the study is referred to as Global H u m a n i s m . It c o m b i n e s t w o a p p r o a c h e s . O n e is a set of humane values and norms.22 These enable us to examine national policies, ideologies, social forces, and institutions e v e r y w h e r e f r o m the particular standpoint of the needs and interests of the planet, c o n s i d e r e d as a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y and as an ecological system. Global H u m a n i s m attempts to provide political and ethical standards that can be applied consistently to evaluating politics in and between all social systems. T h e other approach is political economy. As applied to international politics, and as it is used here, 2 3 political economy focuses on the ways certain systems (such as world capitalism and imperialism) and structures (such as transnational corporations and military-industrial complexes) often decisively influence the distribution of wealth and power within and between nations, and therefore the character of national and international security. Taken together, these approaches enable us to identify and account f o r perhaps the most prominent feature of world politics in our time: inequality.

Crisis and

Interdependence

9

How the world works to the detriment o f the disadvantaged, who benefits from that process, and what such a disequilibrium means for the human condition are central to this study. " W e are stranded . . . between the inadequacy of the nation-state and the emerging imperative o f global community," former U . S . Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said. 2 4 World politics today might be characterized as proceeding simultaneously along two tracks, with the distance between them getting wider all the time. T h e first track consists of the traditional statecraft o f power politics, o f which Kissinger has long been a highly visible exponent. T h e " e n g i n e " that propels movement along this track is commonly known as Realism, a philosophy or paradigm of national interest that we will critically examine shortly. Running along the second track is G l o b a l i s m , which interprets world politics in terms o f transnational forces. Globalism, as we shall see, takes two politically quite distinct forms, one Corporate (reflecting the interests of transnational organizations) and one Humanist (reflecting the human interest within a global community: human rights in the broadest sense). In either form, Globalism contends that politics-as-usual within the framework of c o m peting national interests at the least cannot cope with the kinds of planetwide problems cited by U Thant. At the most, Global Humanism argues, Realism promotes violence and risks ecological suicide. Yet, there is growing agreement between these two perspectives that world politics is highly interdependent and becoming more so all the time. No event in recent memory brought home this evolving perception more than the nuclear power plant disaster at Chernobyl, near Kiev, in the former Soviet Union (now Ukraine), in April 1986. T h e Soviet leadership had to answer to the world, as well as to its own citizens, for the accident, the worst in the history o f nuclear power. Leaders of individual states o f course looked to their own interests in commenting on Chernobyl—either out of concern about radioactive fallout or out o f a desire to exploit S o viet troubles for their own political benefit. But no one, including Soviet and U . S . leaders, could avoid Chernobyl's global meaning. General S e c retary (later President) Mikhail Gorbachev said it created the need for international monitoring and reporting o f nuclear accidents. President Ronald Reagan said Chernobyl showed that some issues have implications that transcend the national interest. They and other state leaders seemed to accept that, when it c o m e s to species survival, Realist politics is severely handicapped. "Interdependence" is shorthand for the transnationalization of world politics—not just events but also ideas, institutions, and decisions. It is a phenomenon that draws societies, and particular groups within societies, closer together, with both positive and negative consequences. As will be discussed later, Realists and Globalists differ about the precise implications

10

Global Politics

in the Human

Interest

of interdependence for the policies that states should pursue. They also differ about w h o s e interests (those of states? of c o r p o r a t i o n s ? of particular classes? of persons?) interdependence ought to serve, and about the ways that the various interdependent factors relate to one another. But that interdependence is the central new ingredient in world politics is now widely acknowledged. Interdependence has a n u m b e r of connotations that are worth spelling out. C o n s i d e r the term first in the sense of "mutual d e p e n d e n c e . " Relationships between states today typically are highly unequal and sometimes dependent. Yet the dependence is often mutual rather than one-sided. T h e U.S. economy, for example, is no longer as autonomous and uniquely powerful as it was at the end of World War II, when the dollar, backed by gold, was the only international currency. In 1985 the United States b e c a m e a debtor nation for the first time since 1914: Its financial obligations to fore i g n e r s — f r o m such things as investments and securities h o l d i n g s — e x ceeded foreign obligations to the United States. Moreover, U.S. industry has b e c o m e highly dependent on foreign oil, metals, and minerals; one in every f i v e industrial j o b s d e p e n d s on exports abroad; and one in every three f a r m acres produces for export. Second, consider interdependence as it describes the world e c o n o m y as a single integrated unit. No longer are we talking about capitalist versus socialist (or market versus n o n m a r k e t ) systems. Today, virtually all the major socialist economies are deeply enmeshed in the global capitalist system of trade, investments, and lending. It was Western banks and not the Soviet Union that bailed Poland out of virtual b a n k r u p t c y in 1982; their help is crucial to R u s s i a ' s economic stability in the 1990s. Mitsubishi, Pan A m e r i c a n , and Occidental P e t r o l e u m , not state trading c o m p a n i e s , were among the key early financiers of C h i n a ' s drive for industrial modernization. E v e n a closed socialist e c o n o m y such as North K o r e a ' s , with total world trade just over $2 billion, cannot survive without international f o o d and financial assistance. A third way of defining interdependence is in terms of global threats that seem beyond the capacity of states to control through traditional diplomacy. Terrorism, famine, ecological disasters, nuclear proliferation, and the eradication of whole species of plants and animals are examples. They suggest the need for global collective action, which may include the formation of global regimes to perform tasks that require global cooperation. Fourth, interdependence may also be thought of as the spillover, typically u n i n t e n d e d , of o n e c o u n t r y ' s (or r e g i o n ' s ) p r o b l e m s into another. " D o m e s t i c " issues b e c o m e s transnational ones. T h e Chernobyl disaster raised Soviet requirements for imported food, reduced Soviet food exports, pushed up world oil prices, put a damper on nuclear arms talks, and caused the biggest one-day drop in stock prices Wall Street had ever experienced.

Crisis and Interdependence

11

T h e accident also c o n t i n u e s killing and poisoning people in U k r a i n e and other c o u n t r i e s . 2 5 E c o n o m i c and political r e f u g e e s stream across national borders in search o f j o b s or safety from war. A c i d rain from one r e g i o n ' s industrial pollution damages another country's lakes and forests, as central Europe's have S w e d e n ' s . Pesticides banned for use in the United States are exported for use in Central A m e r i c a — o n l y to spill back when c o f f e e beans containing the pesticides are imported. Yet a fifth way to c o n c e p t u a l i z e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is as the interrelationship o f s e e m i n g l y d i s c o n n e c t e d p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c p h e n o m e n a . T h e so-called greenhouse e f f e c t is c o m m o n l y cited to illustrate this type o f interdependence. T h e rapid buildup o f carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere as the result o f unprecedented l a r g e - s c a l e use o f fossil fuels ( c o a l , petroleum, and natural gas), c o m b i n e d with the destruction o f forests, may be responsible for a warming o f the earth's temperature. M a n y scientists warn that climatic c h a n g e s would have serious c o n s e q u e n c e s for food production, world trade, human health, population m o v e m e n t , and even the stability o f the polar ice cap. A second e x a m p l e is the interdependent linkages a m o n g hunger, o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , d e f o r e s t a t i o n , d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n

(the

turning o f potentially productive land into desert), and government d e b t — all c o m m o n features o f underdeveloped, dependent e c o n o m i e s . Finally, interdependence is manifest in the growing number and political importance o f transnational m o v e m e n t s and institutions. State-to-state diplomacy remains a fixture in international politics. B u t it is now supplemented, and in s o m e c a s e s even displaced or upstaged, by the activities o f n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s (NGOs), f o r e x a m p l e , to p r o m o t e human rights and p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e a s s i s t a n c e ; by popular m o v e m e n t s for s o c i a l change (such as the antinuclear, e c o l o g i c a l , and w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t s that c o o r d i n a t e e f f o r t s around the world); by transnational r e l i g i o u s , worker, and p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t s ( s u c h as C a t h o l i c liberation t h e o l o g y ,

labor

unions, and G r e e n P a r t i e s in E u r o p e and North A m e r i c a ) ; by powerful transnational corporations ( T N C s ) , banks, and financial institutions (such as the World B a n k and the International M o n e t a r y Fund [ I M F ] ) ; and o c casionally by individuals who act as transnational a g e n t s — w o r l d citizens, in e f f e c t — s u c h as the R e v e r e n d J e s s e J a c k s o n when he traveled to S y r i a , in the midst o f his 1 9 8 4 presidential campaign, to negotiate for the release o f an A m e r i c a n pilot.

And Now, Globalization Interdependence o f whatever variety has one c o m m o n consequence: It limits the nation-state's ability to conduct business without reference to any but its own interests. W h e n that limitation cuts deeply enough to have lasting

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Interest

e f f e c t s on, for e x a m p l e , a c o u n t r y ' s culture, l a n g u a g e (speak English, please!), 2 6 social values, tastes, political processes, public policies, treatment of minorities, and market behavior, we have globalization.21 Though the word itself (and equally, internationalization) is n o w so widely used that it may indeed amount to "globaloney," 2 8 its intention is to describe a serious matter: the integrating and homogenizing effects that occur when national b o u n d a r i e s are penetrated by p o w e r f u l f o r c e s acting above the state level. T h e s e f o r c e s are usually e c o n o m i c , driven by the T N C and multilateral lending institutions such as the I M F that seek to regularize and stabilize world finance and trade in their own interests. In the abstract, globalization is neutral. It can p r o m o t e social justice and cooperation within and between countries, such as public-private and international alliances on e d u c a t i o n , j o b retraining, unionization, energy c o n s e r v a t i o n , and t e c h n o l o g y sharing. T h r o u g h globalization, or in response to it, social forces such as protest m o v e m e n t s , ethnic minorities, and N G O s can gain in their ability to c o m b a t or m o d e r a t e economic, environmental, m a j o r i t a r i a n , and other threats f r o m a b o v e . 2 9 Or, globalization can primarily be the "global shopping mall," o f f e r i n g ever-greater opportunities for the richest countries and c o r p o r a t i o n s to marketize the world at the expense of the poorest economies and social groups, the state, and whole cultures. 3 0 At the extreme, the c o n s e q u e n c e s can be dire. Benj a m i n R. Barber captured these in "Jihad Vs. M c W o r l d " : the f o r m e r f u n damentalist, violent, and opposed to any intrusion of the m o d e r n world, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan; the latter, universalist, commercial, and devoted to market conformism. 3 1 T h e question b e c o m e s one of values as m u c h as e c o n o m i c s . F r o m a d o m i n a n t - c u l t u r e perspective, globalization may a p p e a r to be an irresistible and righteous f o r c e capable of p r o p e l l i n g societies into m o d e r n i t y — t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y equivalent of m a k i n g " b a c k w a r d " societies " a d v a n c e d , " which was fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the new global way of life sounds suspiciously like a homogenization of U.S. culture and values, fit only for people with m o n e y to burn. Maurice Strong has said: The globalisation of capitalism is producing a new and universalising culture symbolised by C N N , brand-name consumer products like CocaCola, M c D o n a l d ' s and Levis, pop music, shopping malls, international airports, hotel chains and conferences. For the privileged minority w h o participate fully in this culture, it provides an exciting and expanding range of new opportunities and experiences. But for the majority, particularly in the non-Western world who live on its margins, and feed on its crumbs, it is often seen as alien and intimidating. Caught up in the dynamics of modernisation of which they are more victims than beneficiaries, it is no wonder that many react with anxiety and rejection, seeking refuge and identity in their own traditional values and cultures. 3 2

Crisis and

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13

Such a lopsided division of the fruits of globalization promises a future no more democratic, pluralist, equitable, or environmentally sustainable than that offered by globalization's fundamentalist opponents. Unless we are content (and in this book we are not) to say that there will always be winners and losers when wrenching e c o n o m i c changes occur, we need to speak of alternative meanings of development—human development—and alternative meanings o f s e c u r i t y — h u m a n security. 3 3 T h e s e meanings are discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. They are alternatives because they look upon inequality, conflict, insecurity, and destruction o f the natural order not as inevitabilities of interdependence and globalization but as consequences of the way world power is structured and the social values that predominate. If, instead, commonplace global values such as equal justice for all, the sanctity of life, respect for cultural diversity, and nonviolence were universalized, interdependence and globalization would probably look quite different from "Jihad Vs. M c W o r l d . " And that was indeed the promise of the end of the Cold War and a "new world order."

New World Order? George Bush characterized the G u l f War as an "opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule o f law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct o f n a t i o n s . " 3 4 Soon afterward, however, events conspired to end talk in the United States about a new order. Civil strife and humanitarian crises around the world revealed just how disorderly the p o s t - C o l d War world was likely to be. But the phrase stuck, and the meaning o f a new world order continued to be debated worldwide. The idea seems to have gained acceptance that the end o f the Cold War has indeed resulted in important rearrangements o f the world political economy. What are these rearrangements? How new and substantial are they? 3 5 Our first step is to identify the major global trends of the 1990s that may be redefining the international order. S o m e countertrends and qualifications are then discussed, briefly here and more thoroughly in later chapters. • Structurally, world politics is increasingly multipolar but with the United States first among equals, as Table 1.1 indicates. Political and economic power is more widely dispersed than at any time since the end o f World War II. Even though the United States is the only superpower, Russia remains a first-rank military power, despite the fact that its e c o n o m y is in shambles. Japan and the E U , led by Germany, no longer belong in the S e c o n d World. They are now e c o n o m i c superpowers with growing international responsibilities. The Second World still consists o f industrialized

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Table 1.1 The Reshaping of World Politics Cold War Era (1945-1990)

Post-Cold War Era ( 1 9 9 0 - )

First World

U.S., USSR

Second World

Industrialized Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand

Third World

Oil-exporting economies High-income economies

U.S.—"superpower" EU, Japan—economic superpowers Russia—military power Canada, Australia, New Zealand (first tier); industrialized Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine), Israel (second tier) Oil-exporting economies East Asian NICs, e.g., South Korea Latin American NICs, e.g., Mexico Indonesia, El Salvador, Nigeria, Iraq, Algeria Other former USSR republics, Africa/other Latin American, South Asian, Middle Eastern states Extremely impoverished countries, e.g., Haiti, Somalia, Bangladesh, North Korea

Middle-income economies Low-income economies "Fourth World" economies

Fourth World

countries that have political clout but not on a par with the EU or Japan. In contrast with the previous era, these countries now all have (or are developing) market economies—international financiers call Hungary, Poland, and Turkey "emerging markets"—and make political decisions with decreasing reference to old allies. As for the Third World, under which it once was convenient (if not entirely accurate) to place all under- or lessdeveloped countries, a more complex representation is required in the post-Cold War period. South Korea, for example, was regarded as the first Third World country to attain First World economic status until the 19971998 Asian financial crisis undermined Korea's economy. China is the world's most rapidly developing country, a major trading state, and a regional power. Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand are also being hailed as emerging markets for investors yet have serious deficiencies in what I will call "human development." However, several new states, once part of the Soviet Union, are impoverished; but even some of them influence their regions' affairs. Fourth World countries in a sense are new to the "new order," reflecting rising global poverty and increasing disparities between rich and poor states. They have extremely weak, aid-dependent economies and are the most politically fragmented underdeveloped countries. Some of them (e.g., Somalia and Afghanistan) are considered "failed" or "quasi" states. Fourth World countries have virtually no influence over regional or global decisions unless, like North Korea, they develop a nuclear weapon.

Crisis and

Interdependence

15

Although multipolarity and the unique status of the United States are generally accepted, analysts differ on other aspects of the p o s t - C o l d War structure. S o m e U . S . analysts argued that the G u l f War had provided the United States with a "unipolar m o m e n t " when it could be the decisive force in any international conflict in which it chose to engage itself. 3 6 Other observers have reclassified the world order into two worlds ("global c o r e " and "global periphery") 3 7 and anywhere from three ( U . S . - E U - J a p a n ) to five (adding China and Russia) poles, depending on the issue. For still another authority, even though nation-states are still the most important actors in world politics, the key to future international conflict lies with global " c i v i l i z a t i o n s " — m a j o r transnational cultures such as Islamic, neoConfucian, and Western. 3 8 While each o f these alternative formulations has merit, none captures a critical political reality of the post-Cold War world: the struggle for global authority between multipolarity and unipolarity. The views of the United States, the only superpower, reflect that struggle. They were decisive in shaping the international community's response to Iraq's aggression in 1990, genocide in B o s n i a and Rwanda, political upheaval in Haiti beginning in 1993, financial chaos in Mexico and Asia, the question who would succeed Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN secretary general, and nuclearweapons development in North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Yet only the United States is so consistently prepared to act unilaterally on major international issues regardless of other countries' reluctance or o p p o s i t i o n — such as to use force, as happened against Iraq in 1996 and again in 1999; to resolve disputes over trade (Japan, E U , China) and narcotics ( M e x i c o ) with threatened sanctions; and to persist in linking trade concessions to democratization in the Third World. No other country lectures other governments on how they should run their economies (as the United States did to Japan and Indonesia in 1 9 9 8 ) ; how they should define and implement human rights (from China to Nigeria); or where their ( E u r o p e ' s ) companies should not invest (Iran and Cuba). When it comes to intractable disputes, such as between Israel and Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) and in Northern Ireland, it is the United States that is called upon to mediate. In short, one superpower dominates the international stage, is the pacesetter in international diplomacy, and often (but by no means always) acts as it pleases. And it does so without worrying about double standards, such as not paying a good part of its UN dues while making full use of the UN's peacekeeping operations, 3 9 and preaching arms control while being the world's leading arms seller. • Powerful e c o n o m i c and social forces continue to erode the sovereignty and power of the nation-state. Borders have b e c o m e increasingly porous and have even been wiped out or rearranged by global e c o n o m i c forces; transboundary environmental problems; and ethnic, religious, and

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cultural ties. Nationalism on behalf of the nation-state, while still a powerful u n i f y i n g force, is again under assault f r o m n u m e r o u s " n a t i o n s " dem a n d i n g ethnic or cultural autonomy. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y was provided by two developments: the collapse of socialism, which (as a u n i f y i n g vision that inspired the Russian Revolution) had sought to provide a new basis of national loyalty and international legitimacy; and sharp e c o n o m i c decline in much of the world. These forces unleashed long-suppressed ethnic and cultural antagonisms and aspirations. Transnational loyalties have also g r o w n . O n e is to the transnational (or multinational) corporation. C o r p o r a t e Globalists m a i n t a i n that the nation-state is an anachronism, that in an interdependent world e c o n o m y opportunities are market-driven and can best be fulfilled by the T N C . But the e c o n o m i c p r o m i n e n c e of the C h i n e s e , Jews, Indians, and other geographically dispersed groups demonstrates a different primary loyalty—to "tribes" that have staked their futures on values such as educational excellence, thrift, and family. 4 0 A third force is the n u m e r o u s national and international global-change organizations. According to Global Humanists, these N G O s are not only influencing debate on m a j o r issues, such as disarmament and the environment; they often also provide settings for diversifying and universalizing the values and ideas that underlie such debate. 4 1 These challenges to the nation-state have not, however, lessened either the appeal or the f o r c e f u l n e s s of sovereign statehood. The n u m b e r of new states rose sharply a f t e r the Cold War e n d e d . F i f t e e n w e r e carved out of the Former Soviet Union alone. There were 167 states in 1988 (compared with 51 in 1945) and 183 (Eritrea in the Horn of A f r i c a being the last) by 1993. Even though n a t i o n a l i s m turned against the multicultural state, b r i n g i n g d o w n the U S S R and Yugoslavia in 1991, n e w political leaderships created new states or reestablished old ones, o f t e n on the basis of shared ethnicity. In the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet collapse permitted the recovery of lost s o v e r e i g n t y and led to attempts to kick out Russian minorities. Elsewhere, the new nationalism was a vehicle to r e m o v e historic rivals (as in S e r b i a ' s " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g " of M u s l i m s in B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a ) ; to gain i n d e p e n d e n c e (as in Georgia, Ukraine, and the other F S U republics); to revise borders (as in the struggle b e t w e e n largely Christian A r m e n i a and M u s l i m A z e r b a i j a n over the enclave of N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h inside A z e r b a i j a n ' s border); or to restrict immigration (as in G e r m a n y and F r a n c e — s e e Chapter 6). • Unprecedented opportunities are available f o r national economic renewal because of increased global interdependence in science, technology, trade, and investment. T h e world e c o n o m y is a single capitalist system. At least in theory, with e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n replacing Cold War c o m p e t i tion, interdependence and globalization of markets ought to be able to propel national economies to higher levels of p e r f o r m a n c e .

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But several countertrends are apparent. Trade protectionism has intensified, making global trade arrangements more difficult to negotiate and enforce. Regional trading areas such as the E U , the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) , Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( A P E C ) , and Greater China (southeast coastal China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) have become preferred routes to national prosperity. Moreover, real economic power in world affairs has not dispersed. It remains vested in the N o r t h — North America, Japan, and Europe—measured not just in terms of output and income levels but equally in terms o f worldwide cultural influence, scientific papers and methods, technological solutions, telecommunications ownership, and political practices. Hence, the prospects for economic renewal continue to leave most of the underdeveloped South out of the picture. Table 1.1 (p. 14) shows this further erosion o f some underdeveloped countries, primarily in Africa, by putting the "Fourth World" of about forty countries in a class by itself. The intensifying competition for markets and profits has redefined the national interest. In the name o f globalization, national e c o n o m i c policy has become synonymous with the downsizing of work forces and corporate megamergers. German businesses, in defiance of traditional practice, are increasingly exporting j o b s to sustain " g r o w t h " ; U . S . and European businesses are casting o f f workers to satisfy stockholders and stay c o m petitive; and corporate mergers in and among Japanese, European, and U . S . firms are at record levels, greatly reducing competition in virtually every industrial and service sector. Meanwhile, "economic diplomacy" has supplanted ordinary diplomacy: Trade, technology, and investment interests, and opportunities to earn hard currency now dominate over strategic calculations in high-level decisionmaking, even when the transactions have military applications. (These matters are detailed in Chapters 2 and 5.) • Military power is growing less salient to national and international security as other, global factors c o m e into play. T h e s e include environmental protection, energy resources and needs, economic management and productivity, scientific and technological innovation, and access to information. The ability to invest in these other sources o f power was greatly enhanced by the end o f the Cold War. Important reductions in national military-industrial complexes were made beginning in 1 9 9 0 , such as in the active-duty forces of the United States, its European allies, Russia, and China; in U . S . and Russian nuclear-weapon stockpiles; in the real defense spending of those forces (China excepted); in employment at the world's largest arms-manufacturing firms; and in the value of conventional arms exports worldwide. The new order has not meant demilitarization, however. Wars on every scale continue to be fought even as UN peacekeeping forces were able to bring about cease-fires and temporary political settlements (e.g., in Cambodia,

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M o z a m b i q u e , Haiti, and Angola), more responsive forms of government appeared in a number of countries, and a few long-lasting conflicts, such as in Guatemala ( 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 9 6 ) and Northern Ireland ( 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 9 8 ) , were eventually settled. 4 2 T h e confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories continued, despite agreements reached in 1993 and 1995 on limited self-rule for the Palestinians and Israeli troop withdrawals. Civil wars resumed or escalated in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Congo, and the Sudan. Losses of life in these conflicts were enormous, and most of them continue whether or not there is UN mediation or monitoring. 4 3 But the most typical, and even more deadly, internal conflicts of the 1990s were along ethnic lines: the Turkish and Iraqi wars on the Kurds (over 100,000 deaths since 1961); Russia's intervention in Chechnya to prevent secession (around 50,000 deaths from 1994 to 1996); the Hutu slaughter of over a half-million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda ( 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 ) ; the Tutsi slaughter of about 170,000 Hutus in Burundi (1988-1995); and "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia, for the most part by Serbian forces against Muslims in Bosnia. 4 4 Serbia's aggression reduced that country to rubble; historic Sarajevo became the Beirut of the 1990s. Over 250,000 people died and close to 2 million became refugees. The peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993 into Czech and Slovak republics was thus the exception to the rule of violent means to change. As in the old order, too, international violence has been fueled by the spread of nuclear-weapons and missile technology and by a hyperactive international arms market (see Chapter 5). Led by the United States, the five permanent members of the Security Council—the very governments whose leadership is essential to a new military o r d e r — r e m a i n the m a j o r a r m s sellers. One c i r c u m s t a n c e that has c h a n g e d , as Asia d e m o n s t r a t e s , is the extent to which e c o n o m i c opportunities now drive a r m s spending and sales. Military budgets have risen along with gross national product ( G N P ) in several Asian states, including Japan. Until the late 1990s, conventional arms p u r c h a s e s had c l i m b e d dramatically a m o n g the " n o u v e a u x r i c h e s " governments, notably China but also Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea. A r m s sales by s o m e of these same g o v e r n m e n t s as well as the m a j o r industrial powers have continued to rise, especially to the Middle East. 4 5 • Superpower rivalry in the Third World has been replaced, sometimes by cooperative approaches to international security, sometimes by inaction. During the Gulf War President Bush expressed the hope that Iraq's defeat would demonstrate the value of United Nations peacekeeping in a n e w world order. In fact, prospects have been greatly enhanced for U N peacekeeping and more generally for strengthening international agreements on global issues such as human rights and the environment. By 1998, as Table 1.2 shows (p. 21), the U N was carrying out fifteen p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, at a cost (as of 1995) of roughly $3.6 billion annually. Altogether, of

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forty-eight peacekeeping operations since 1947, twenty-nine began in the 1990s. The figures reflect a huge post-Cold War upsurge in resort to the UN. 4 6 Expectations were that the UN was finally in a position to keep the peace through collective security, just as its founders had intended in 1945. But the peacekeeping function has not evolved into collective security, with the exception of the international coalition formed against Iraq. One reason is the end of the Cold War: Great-power interests no longer collide over ideology; territorial gains for East or West no longer count; and the balance of power is not normally at stake. Big powers are reluctant to act forcibly or are divided on whether and how to do so, as happened in Rwanda (see Chapter 7) and in Bosnia (see Chapter 6). In this twilight zone, there is room now for outrageous international behavior by petty zealots and terrorist organizations to pursue their objectives, which are often narrowly nationalistic and delusional. Among many examples, we may cite the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who sought to dismember Bosnia and went so far as to capture hundreds of UN peacekeepers in mid-1995 in response to the UN mission's efforts to stop the bombing of civilians; the campaign of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria to kill allegedly pro-Western journalists (forty-six were killed in the course of civil warfare that claimed around 3 0 , 0 0 0 lives between 1992 and 1995); 4 7 Burma's junta, S L O R C (the State Law and Order Restoration Council), 4 8 helped along with Chinese arms and kept afloat with opium and heroin profits; North Korea's leaders, who in 1994 defied the International Atomic Energy Agency ( I A E A ) ' s efforts to inspect its nuclear-power plants for diversion of plutonium to making bombs; Laurent Kabila, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire)'s new leader, whose forces probably massacred Rwandan Hutu refugees and then prevented various UN missions from investigating the massacres (as many as a quartermillion refugees are missing, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata), and who seems determined to re-create the oneparty state of Mobutu Sese Seko; 4 9 the terrorist organizations that exploded a bomb under the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993, released sarin nerve gas (and was also researching biological weapons) in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, and in April 1995 planted a bomb that destroyed the federal office building in Oklahoma City; and finally, Saddam Hussein, Iraq's leader, who (as we shall see in the next chapter) was discovered by UN inspectors to have had an active program to develop weapons of mass destruction ( W M D ) : nuclear, biological, and chemical. In a second area of security, human-rights conditions improved in Eastern Europe and a number of countries elsewhere with the end of the Cold War. But economic and political upheavals laid the groundwork for severe human-rights problems in many places. 5 0 To give only a sampling, in the early 1990s there was widespread police brutality in India, Pakistan,

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and Egypt; brutal government repressi