Global Politics in the Human Interest 9781685855642

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Global Politics in the Human Interest

FOURTH

EDITION

Global Politics in the Human Interest M E L GURTOV

LYN

NE

R I E N N E R PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gurtov, Melvin. Global politics in the human interest / Mel Gurtov.—4th ed. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-820-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. International relations. 2. International economic relations. 3. World politics—1989- I. Title. JZ1305.G87 1999 327.1'01—dc21 98-47373 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

For my daughters, Alia, Marci, and Ellene ". . . in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you."

Contents

List of Tables Preface 1

Crisis and Interdependence in Contemporary World Politics Global Insecurity, 1 A Brief Report on the State of the Planet, 4 Interdependence, 7 And Now, Globalization, 11 New World Order? 13

2

Realism and Corporate Globalism in Theory and Practice The Realist Perspective, 23 Corporate Globalism and the World Economy, 31 Rivals or Partners? 46 Case Study 1: Postwar Planning for the "American Century," 55 Case Study 2: The Gulf War for a New World Order, 60 Case Study 3: Capitalist Dominoes— The Mexican and Asian Financial Crises, 66

3

World Politics in Global-Humanist Perspective The Search for a Third Way, 75 Values, Methods, Measurements, Objectives, 77 The Oppressed, 94

4

The Third World and the Fourth: Human Rights, Environmental Decline, and Underdevelopment Defining the "Third World," 111 A Third World Country Profile, 117 Case Studies of Crisis and Renewal, 136: China, 136; South Africa, 144; South Korea, 151; Brazil, 158

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The United States and Russia: Empires in Transition The Military Crisis of the (Former) First World, 165 The Nuclear Danger in the Cold War Era, 167 The Arms Race After the Cold War, 185 The Human Costs of the Nuclear Game, 197 Russia, Past and Present, 197 The United States, 206 The Price of Being Number One, 212

165

6

Europe and Japan in a Multipolar World The New Meaning of Power, 217 Toward a United Europe, 223 The Changed Strategic Picture, 225 Case Study: Japan Between Interdependence and Dependence, 229

217

7

In the Human Interest: An Agenda for Transforming World Politics Lessons for the Future, 243 Thinking Globally, 247 The Prospects for Humanity, 281

Notes Bibliography Index About the Book

243

285 353 379 399

Tables

1.1 1.2

The Reshaping of World Politics Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations (1998)

14 21

2.1 2.2 2.3

Alternative Values Alternative Norms and Structures The Fifty Largest U.S. Multinationals (1997)

25 26 36

4.1 4.2

Distribution of World Income Among People Global Income Disparity Between Rich and Poor People (1988) Income Distribution in the Third World

114

U.S. and USSR/Russia Nuclear Arsenals, 1983 and 1993 Major Post-Cold War and Related Earlier International Treaties Governing Weapons of Mass Destruction Known Nuclear Tests of the Declared Nuclear Powers, 1945-1998

172

4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3

ix

116 118

187 191

Preface

This book continues my effort to understand and communicate how the world really works and for whom. It is not a book for the fainthearted, for the superpatriot, for those w h o believe they are reading "all the news fit to print" or w h o believe that governments know best. It is for those w h o believe in the notions of global citizenship and global responsibility, and further, for those w h o believe that the individual can (and must) make a difference. The book is also for the professor and student w h o want something beyond a standard introduction to international relations—many fine ones e x i s t — a n d w h o specifically want to probe deeply, from a nongovernmental, humane-values perspective, to the heart of world politics. For them, I o f f e r one interpretation of the causes and remedies for global inequality and environmental destruction. In doing so, I try to synthesize the work of many specialists from many fields. M y debt to them is enormous, and I again extend my thanks here. A word to students on this occasion: One message the book hopes to c o n v e y is that the tools for independent evaluation of c o m p l e x international issues are easily at hand. It starts with becoming a systematic reader of a quality national newspaper. The facts are there; a k n o w l e d g e a b l e interpretation of them by the global citizen is the reader's job. The number of quality newspapers keeps dwindling, but w e still have the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal. A l l of them, and virtually all major world newspapers, are now online. Political science and other social science students should not neglect the business pages (regrettably, there are no " l a b o r " pages), where much of the long-term n e w s is being made. Then, a visit to the library's current periodicals section is in order to become familiar with the leading journals of scholarship and opinion. Next, one should compile and periodically explore the Web sites of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations ( N G O s ) , and

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government agencies. Some textbooks already carry such lists. By taking a look at the sources f o r this book, it should b e c o m e clear h o w valuable newspapers, journals, and the Internet are for research. Concerning the Internet, I must add that it is no substitute for scholarly books and articles. I advise my students to use the Internet as a supplement for up-to-date documentation (statistics, speeches, and the like), but not as the primary place to conduct research. Libraries exist for that purpose. If they continue to be neglected by students, and u n d e r f u n d e d by school administrators and legislators, they will eventually go out of business. And that will be a setback of e n o r m o u s proportions for anyone who does critical work in public and international policy. One other thing: I was drawn to a newspaper report in June 1995 and a later b o o k about the discovery in France of the Chauvet cave paintings, which date back at least 30,000 years. T h e s e colorful and detailed drawings of m a m m o t h s and other creatures forced archaeologists to reexamine the notion that art developed linearly, f r o m crude to increasingly sophisticated. To think that the earliest art rivals that of contemporaries, and that art apparently develops in fits and starts! Our species has d e v e l o p e d that way, too. Questions such as who is advanced and who is b a c k w a r d , what is civilized behavior and what is not, which practices should be preserved and which abandoned, do not have obvious answers. In this era of globalization, it is more important than ever that we resist t h e m and inquire where they c o m e f r o m and w h o m they serve. H o p e f u l l y , this b o o k will provide you with new w a y s of thinking about and a n s w e r i n g the tough questions. I wish to thank R e n a t o Corbetta and Z h o u Hang f o r research assistance on this latest edition, and Milton Leitenberg for his usual generosity in sharing ideas and materials. I am also grateful to Françoise D e m a y and Doris C l a n a h a n f o r their w o n d e r f u l help with c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and other kinds of office support. And many thanks to Jody Berman for a w o n d e r f u l j o b of editing.

M.G.

1 Crisis and Interdependence in Contemporary World Politics

This dominant culture set the tone and standard for most of Shikasta. For regardless of the ideological label attaching to each national area, they ail had in common that technology was the key to all good, and that good was always material increase, gain, comfort, pleasure. . . . And all this time the earth was being despoiled. The minerals were being ripped out, the fuels wasted, the soils depleted by an improvident and short-sighted agriculture, the animals and plants slaughtered and destroyed, the seas being filled with filth and poison, the atmosphere was corrupted. . . . These were maddened creatures, and the small voices that rose in protest were not enough to halt the processes that had been set in motion and were sustained by greed. By the lack of substance-of-we-feeling. —Doris Lessing, Re: Colonised

Planet 5,

Shikasta

One atom in this universe cannot move without dragging the whole world along with it. There cannot be any progress without the whole world following in the wake, and it is becoming every day clearer that the solution of any problem can never be attained on racial, or national, or [other] narrow grounds. —Swami Vivekananda

Global Insecurity S o m e o n e o n c e d e f i n e d f a n a t i c i s m as " r e d o u b l i n g y o u r e f f o r t s w h e n y o u h a v e lost sight of y o u r o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e . " T h e b l i n d p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l sec u r i t y f i t s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of f a n a t i c i s m p e r f e c t l y . A s s t a t e l e a d e r s i n v e s t m o r e a n d m o r e p o l i t i c a l , h u m a n , a n d e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s in w e a p o n s , aid p r o g r a m s , a l l i a n c e s , a n d t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , t h e s e c u r i t y of p e r s o n s , s o c i e t i e s , a n d t h e p l a n e t as a w h o l e a c t u a l l y s e e m s to d e c l i n e . In t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y a d v a n c e d c o u n t r i e s of t h e First a n d S e c o n d W o r l d s , i n s e c u r i t y is m a i n l y r e f l e c t e d in a c u t e a n x i e t y a b o u t t h e e f f i c a c y

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of political systems and frustrations about any s y s t e m ' s ability to deliver the " g o o d l i f e " except at very high social and ecological costs. In the underdeveloped countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds, where three-fourths of the world's population live, insecurity takes a more basic form: the daily quest for survival. (The four " w o r l d s " are depicted in Table 1.1, p. 14.) T h e causes and consequences of this pervasive insecurity, and the extent to which its d i f f e r e n t f o r m s are interrelated and m u t u a l l y reinforcing—the degree, f o r example, to which the quest for security in the industrialized world takes place largely at the e x p e n s e of the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d world, yet also has profound economic and social impact at h o m e — a r e the principal subjects of this study. The reasons are simple: T h e human costs of global insecurity are staggering; the narrow understanding of "national security" by most state leaders keeps these costs high and mounting; the penetration of every aspect of world politics (such as alliances, the ecosystem, global finance and trade, and p e o p l e ' s m o v e m e n t s and exchanges) by this global crisis has created great f o r e b o d i n g but equally great hesitancy to take bold remedial action; and, as a result, the prospects for planetary survival itself are not optimistic. State leaders everywhere invariably seek to put the best possible face on their own situations, and many serious scholars persist in arguing that h u m a n k i n d will resolve t o d a y ' s p r o b l e m s just as it resolved y e s t e r d a y ' s . Indeed, e v e n t s since the Berlin Wall c a m e d o w n on N o v e m b e r 9, 1989, gave some cause for optimism. G e r m a n reunification was completed less than a year later. M a s s i v e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s challenged the legitimacy of single-party states f r o m China to C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , and in most cases toppled them. The creation of a single market among the twelve countries of the European C o m m u n i t y (EC), now the European Union (EU), was set to start in 1993. This radical alteration of the m a p of E u r o p e took place against the background of revolutionary changes in S o v i e t - U . S . relations. Soviet President Mikhail G o r b a c h e v , w h o s e " n e w t h i n k i n g " essentially discarded the old rules of the Cold War game, was the single most important figure. His mid-1990 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., with President George Bush continued U . S . - S o v i e t arms talks that had already led to the first actual reductions, and destruction, of nuclear w e a p o n s in the postwar period. The peacekeeping role of the United Nations revived, with missions in diverse locations such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Namibia. Prominent human-rights activists were freed f r o m captivity, including Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years in South African prisons. These events, w h e n c o m p a r e d with the baleful character of international relations only a decade earlier, appeared to herald a new era of peace and security. Then, war and preparations for war dominated world politics, topped by the intense nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and a long list of civil and interstate conflicts in Africa,

Crisis and

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3

the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Driven by this short-term comparison, some commentators were quick to proclaim the "end of history," in the sense that the demise of the Soviet empire and the seeming victory of Western liberalism in Eastern Europe had opened the way to a stable, if rather boring, epoch devoted mainly to technological development. 1 T h e end of history? The b r e a k u p of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of ethnic and religious nationalism in central E u r o p e and central Asia quickly revived history. A new world order? So President B u s h declared following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis (see Chapter 2 ) — I r a q ' s invasion and annexation of Kuwait—in August 1990. The contention of this book is that although the ideological battles of the Cold War have largely been replaced by e c o n o m i c competition and have led to a lessening of international tensions, a global crisis remains when international and national security issues are evaluated from a planetary and long-term perspective. Proclamations of victory in the Cold War and of a new order may be politically s a t i s f y i n g in some circles; but they are no substitute for analysis, particularly when they ignore the quality of life in the underdeveloped world and the multitude of threats to global environmental security. As we will see in the r e m a i n d e r of this chapter, in spite of some positive signs of international cooperation, global insecurity is deepening and is beyond quick technological or diplomatic fixes. T h e urgency of d e v e l o p i n g a global approach to security w a s first pressed by U Thant, then secretary-general of the United Nations, in 1969: I do not w i s h to s e e m overdramatic, but I can o n l y c o n c l u d e from the information that is available to m e as Secretary-General, that the M e m b e r s of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a v e perhaps ten years left in w h i c h to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a g l o b a l partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to d e f u s e the population e x p l o s i o n , and to supply the required m o m e n t u m to d e v e l o p m e n t efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next d e c a d e , then I very m u c h fear that the p r o b l e m s I h a v e m e n t i o n e d will h a v e reached s u c h s t a g g e r i n g proportions that they will be b e y o n d our c a p a c i t y to control.2

In its essentials, the secretary-general's warning has c o m e true. Although planetary extinction has thus far been averted, the depth and scale of the problems U Thant cited have indeed increased to nearly unmanageable proportions. By 1992, as the next section begins to document, Maurice Strong spoke of a "civilizational crisis" as he opened the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ( U N C E D , the so-called Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Few government or major corporate leaders have shared U T h a n t ' s or S t r o n g ' s sense of urgency; most have acknowledged one or another aspect of a global crisis but have not considered

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that the p r o b l e m s are s y m p t o m a t i c of a c o n t a g i o u s a n d p o t e n t i a l l y fatal disease. L i f e , and politics, g o on as b e f o r e . It is i n d e e d s t r a n g e that at o n e and the s a m e t i m e , m o n u m e n t a l leaps of s c i e n t i f i c c r e a t i v i t y o c c u r f o r the b e n e f i t of h u m a n k i n d w h i l e political l e a d e r s stick to tired f o r m u l a s a n d o u t d a t e d r i t u a l s in p u r s u i t of selfinterest. T h e practice of politics has not kept pace either with scientific adv a n c e s or with g l o b a l e c o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , military, and social c h a n g e s . U T h a n t appealed f o r a " g l o b a l p a r t n e r s h i p " b e c a u s e he believed the f u t u r e of the h u m a n s p e c i e s itself w a s i m p e r i l e d . B u t the g o v e r n m e n t s he add r e s s e d w e r e not (and c l e a r l y still are n o t ) r e a d y to i n t e g r a t e g l o b a l c h a n g e s into n a r r o w l y n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s . A n d t h e r e i n lies a crisis of our times that is e q u a l l y as b u r d e n s o m e as any U T h a n t d e s c r i b e d : a crisis of political will in the n a t i o n - s t a t e s y s t e m . T h e e m p h a s i s t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k is on i n f o r m a t i o n , e x p l a n a t i o n , and a r g u m e n t . T h i s c h a p t e r b e g i n s with s o m e basic f a c t s about the g l o b a l crisis that are e s s e n t i a l to u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g the c h a n g e d s h a p e of world p o l i t i c s — i t s interdependence d u r i n g , and globalization after, the Cold War. I introduce the t w o schools of thought that d o m i n a t e writing and t h i n k i n g about w o r l d p o l i t i c s — R e a l i s m and C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s m — a l o n g with a third school, Global H u m a n i s m , the values and analytical m e t h o d of w h i c h I use t h r o u g h o u t the p r e s e n t study. In C h a p t e r 2, R e a l i s m a n d Corp o r a t e G l o b a l i s m are critically e x a m i n e d . T h r e e c a s e studies of e f f o r t s to r e s h a p e the w o r l d o r d e r b a c k u p the d i s c u s s i o n of h o w R e a l i s m a n d Corp o r a t e G l o b a l i s m both c o m p e t e a n d c o l l a b o r a t e in the real w o r l d . C h a p t e r 3 e l a b o r a t e s on G l o b a l H u m a n i s m as an a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h spec i f i c r e l e v a n c e to g l o b a l h u m a n and e n v i r o n m e n t a l n e e d s . T h e T h i r d and F o u r t h W o r l d s ' o p p r e s s e d are given special attention here, f o r they constitute the global m a j o r i t y . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n sets the stage f o r a m o r e s p e c i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i n s e c u r i t y f r o m a h u m a n - i n t e r e s t p o i n t of v i e w , in the T h i r d and F o u r t h W o r l d s ( C h a p t e r 4), in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a ( C h a p t e r 5), and in E u r o p e a n d J a p a n ( C h a p t e r 6). T h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r is p o l i c y oriented: It lays out an a g e n d a f o r c h a n g e s a d d r e s s e d to the m a i n f e a t u r e s of the global crisis.

A Brief Report on the State of the Planet In 1992 m o r e t h a n 1,600 of the w o r l d ' s leading scientists, i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r i t y of the living N o b e l s c i e n c e laureates, signed a " W a r n i n g to H u m a n ity." T h e s t a t e m e n t b e g a n by o b s e r v i n g that " h u m a n b e i n g s and the natural w o r l d are on a collision c o u r s e . . . [that] m a y so alter the living w o r l d that it will be u n a b l e to sustain life in the m a n n e r that w e k n o w . " 3 D u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g year, t w e n t y l e a d e r s of the w o r l d ' s m a j o r f a i t h s j o i n e d in a

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Declaration of a Global Ethic that c o n d e m n e d violence, "in particular . . . aggression and hatred in the n a m e of religion," and urged that " d i s a r m a ment is the c o m m a n d m e n t of the t i m e s . " 4 T h e scope of the global crisis that so alarmed distinguished groups like these b e c o m e s apparent f r o m the following figures: • Over 2 billion people in the Third World (including four out of five persons living in rural areas) do not have access to clean water. Forty percent of the w o r l d ' s population lives in areas with severe water shortages. A rough estimate by the World Bank and U N E S C O is that about half of them (a billion people) are chronically malnourished. 5 • Despite advances in world literacy, there remain thirty-four countries with over 80 percent illiteracy. 6 • Approximately 1.2 billion people, overwhelmingly in the Third World, were living in absolute poverty in 1989 and 1.3 billion in 1 9 9 5 — f i g u r e s equivalent to the population of China. Their incomes generally range between $ 2 0 0 and $ 4 0 0 a year. They live in countries with the w o r l d ' s largest and fastest-growing populations. 7 • The world population, according to the World Bank, is expected to be well over 6 billion by 2000 and over 8 billion by 2025, even though fertility rates are declining e v e r y w h e r e . In the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s it was c o m m o n place to say that world population was growing by "another M e x i c o " (80 million) annually, w h e r e a s by 1990 the p h r a s e had c h a n g e d to " a n o t h e r Bangladesh," or about 100 million people every year. 8 • At current rates of depletion, by the year 2 0 0 0 the Third W o r l d ' s forests, especially in tropical zones, will be reduced by one-half (thus intensifying an already serious shortage of firewood for fuel). Approximately one plant species of every eight—12.5 percent of approximately 270,000 species so far identified—is threatened with extinction. 9 One-third less topsoil will be available for food production. Already, world food reserves have shrunk to only a forty d a y s ' supply, f r o m over 100 days in I960. 1 0 • T h e d e v e l o p e d - w o r l d states currently account f o r m o r e than fourf i f t h s of the w o r l d ' s i n c o m e but only o n e - f o u r t h of its population. (The U n i t e d States, with about 6 percent of the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n , c o n s u m e s over 30 percent of its total product.) By contrast, the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d states account for three-fourths of the world's population but less than onef i f t h of its income. • Military s p e n d i n g w o r l d w i d e roughly d o u b l e d in twenty years, reaching $940 billion in 1985—well over $2 billion a day. Over 80 percent of that amount was spent by the two superpowers. Since 1987, global arms spending has declined, but in 1994 it was still around $700 billion a year. 11 • Third World g o v e r n m e n t s , especially those under military rule, buy about three-quarters of all m a r k e t e d w e a p o n s . W o r l d w i d e , the value of

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arms purchases has declined dramatically in the 1990s; but developing countries still made arms agreements worth over $25 billion in 1994. 12 They are paying for the arms with their own scarce resources and with money borrowed from the banks and governments of the developed countries, to which the Third World owed close to $1.1 trillion by the end of 1987. 13 • Alternative uses of tiny fractions of the w o r l d ' s military spending could produce m e a n i n g f u l change in education, health care, and nutrition. For example, the cost of one new nuclear submarine (about $1.5 billion) could educate 160 million schoolchildren in twenty-three developing countries. About $3 billion is estimated to be enough to enable the poorest countries to begin moving toward food self-sufficiency. Similar small amounts could probably prevent the deaths each year of about 15 million children f r o m malnutrition, dehydration, and other easily curable conditions. 1 4 • M o r e and more people are m o v i n g into cities. The UN predicts 47 percent of the world's population will be urbanized by 2000. Third World cities will grow 160 percent between 1990 and 2 0 3 0 and will include seventeen of the twenty-one largest cities in the world. Urban environmental quality, accordingly, is declining rapidly. A c o m p r e h e n s i v e study of air pollution reveals health-threatening problems in all twenty of the w o r l d ' s largest cities, Mexico City being the worst. 1 5 • T h e w o r l d ' s displaced population is rising at an a s t o u n d i n g rate, mainly because of war, poverty, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l decline. About 2,700 people become "political r e f u g e e s , " r e f u g e e s in their own country, or economic migrants every day.16 • T h e estimated n u m b e r of people with HIV, the virus that c a u s e s A I D S , has risen dramatically. In 1993 it was 14 million people; in 1996, 22 million; and in 1997, 30 million, of w h o m 2.3 million were e x p e c t e d to die. There will be 5.8 million new HIV infections each year, 1 7 and the World Bank expects an explosion of AIDS cases in a number of " e m e r g i n g m a r k e t " countries such as China, India, and Ukraine. 1 8 • Malaria, once thought to have been wiped out, is on the rise again. " B e t w e e n 300 million and 500 million people now get malaria each year, and someone dies of it about every 15 seconds—mostly children and pregnant women. During the last decade, malaria has killed about 10 times as m a n y children as all wars c o m b i n e d have in that period." A $5 m o s q u i t o net, beyond the reach of most poor people who suffer from malaria, is considered to be the single best preventive measure. 1 9 • T h e n u m b e r of active a r m e d conflicts has decreased since 1989. 2 0 Still, "at the b e g i n n i n g of 1996, there were m o r e than forty violent ethnopolitical c o n f l i c t s under way, at least one of them in every world region." Most such conflicts are not the direct consequence of ethnic grievances; they primarily reflect political and e c o n o m i c inequalities as well as overt discrimination by governments. 2 1

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7

Statistics and facts of these magnitudes may be difficult to absorb at one sitting. But they give an immediate sense of what a global perspective on world politics does: It highlights the multidimensional and transnational character of a common crisis. And that is why we turn next to the phenomena of interdependence and globalization.

Interdependence U.S. citizens demonstrate in Washington, D.C., and across college campuses for human rights in South Africa. Genocidal wars in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda prompt proposals for a permanent UN court to prosecute crimes against humanity. A financial crisis in Asia roils markets worldwide as well as threatens widespread unemployment and social chaos throughout the region. The Indian government briefly arrests the chair of the board of Union Carbide, then sues the company in a U . S . court, after a catastrophic gas leak from the company's branch plant in Bhopal kills over 3 , 7 0 0 people and injures 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A worldwide emergency food relief effort begins in Ethiopia and Sudan after a B B C broadcast dramatizes the fact that several million people are starving to death. An Islamic terrorist group proclaims: "Let them know that sooner or later we shall reach the heart of the White House, the Kremlin, the Elysée, 10 Downing Street." A Japanese study of the effects of a major earthquake in downtown Tokyo predicts catastrophic consequences for the world's finances, inasmuch as Japan has become the top creditor nation in the world. These events of the 1980s and 1990s have one thing in common: They reflect the increasingly complex and transnational character of world politics. The line that once so neatly divided domestic from foreign affairs and foreign from global affairs is now much harder to find. Issues that once were the exclusive prerogative of governments, such as air and water pollution, now are matters of international diplomacy and sometimes social activism. Large numbers of ordinary people are being affected by world affairs as never before. Not only are advances in global information technology helping to create awareness of that fact, but as the cost of acquiring information dwindles, far greater numbers of people will have opportunities to affect world affairs. Even the older patterns of inter- and fniranational relations, in which conflict is the dominant feature, have new meaning today. Whether we are talking about wars between states, such as Iran and Iraq; or power plays by major governments, such as the U.S. intervention in Central America and the Soviet Union's pressure on East Germany to resist closer economic ties with West Germany; or nationalist and separatist struggles in Sri Lanka, Spain, and Ireland; or territorial disputes, such as the war between Great

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Interest

Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands—the consequences of such conflicts carry well beyond their effects on the contestants. They crisscross national boundaries to involve not only other g o v e r n m e n t s but also other e c o n o m i e s , ways of life ( c o n s u m e r prices, cultures, f o o d supplies, civil liberties, jobs), even natural environments. The global a g e n d a has t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e larger, more diverse, and more ominous. We need additional tools to analyze it. International affairs is still politics, of course; but political science is no longer sufficient for the study of international affairs. E c o n o m i c s is equally important, specifically, international political economy, the study of the social consequences of national and international economic developments. In addition, biology (studying, for example, acid rain), anthropology (the demise of native cultures in the face of modernization), sociology (the international division of labor), feminist studies ( w o m e n on the global assembly lines of transnational corporations), religion (the universal values of diverse spiritual paths), even sports ( f r o m U . S . - C h i n a P i n g - P o n g d i p l o m a c y to terrorism and fraternalism at the Munich and Los A n g e l e s O l y m p i c G a m e s ) — a l l have a place in the study of world politics. The transnational p h e n o m e n o n requires an interdisciplinary approach to do justice to world politics. And that is the approach of this book. I use the tools and insights of m a n y disciplines in order to explore world politics in its fullest, global sense: across national b o u n d a r i e s , inside as well as outside societies, at m a n y different levels of social activity (governing elites, races, ecological systems, e c o n o m i c classes, and b u r e a u c r a c i e s , f o r example). Since the United States, despite all its vulnerabilities occasioned by global politicaleconomic changes, is still the w o r l d ' s most influential actor, I e m p h a s i z e its policies and behavior more so than any other state's. T h e principal perspective used in the study is referred to as Global H u m a n i s m . It c o m b i n e s t w o a p p r o a c h e s . O n e is a set of humane values and norms.22 These enable us to examine national policies, ideologies, social forces, and institutions e v e r y w h e r e f r o m the particular standpoint of the needs and interests of the planet, c o n s i d e r e d as a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y and as an ecological system. Global H u m a n i s m attempts to provide political and ethical standards that can be applied consistently to evaluating politics in and between all social systems. T h e other approach is political economy. As applied to international politics, and as it is used here, 2 3 political economy focuses on the ways certain systems (such as world capitalism and imperialism) and structures (such as transnational corporations and military-industrial complexes) often decisively influence the distribution of wealth and power within and between nations, and therefore the character of national and international security. Taken together, these approaches enable us to identify and account f o r perhaps the most prominent feature of world politics in our time: inequality.

Crisis and

Interdependence

9

How the world works to the detriment o f the disadvantaged, who benefits from that process, and what such a disequilibrium means for the human condition are central to this study. " W e are stranded . . . between the inadequacy of the nation-state and the emerging imperative o f global community," former U . S . Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said. 2 4 World politics today might be characterized as proceeding simultaneously along two tracks, with the distance between them getting wider all the time. T h e first track consists of the traditional statecraft o f power politics, o f which Kissinger has long been a highly visible exponent. T h e " e n g i n e " that propels movement along this track is commonly known as Realism, a philosophy or paradigm of national interest that we will critically examine shortly. Running along the second track is G l o b a l i s m , which interprets world politics in terms o f transnational forces. Globalism, as we shall see, takes two politically quite distinct forms, one Corporate (reflecting the interests of transnational organizations) and one Humanist (reflecting the human interest within a global community: human rights in the broadest sense). In either form, Globalism contends that politics-as-usual within the framework of c o m peting national interests at the least cannot cope with the kinds of planetwide problems cited by U Thant. At the most, Global Humanism argues, Realism promotes violence and risks ecological suicide. Yet, there is growing agreement between these two perspectives that world politics is highly interdependent and becoming more so all the time. No event in recent memory brought home this evolving perception more than the nuclear power plant disaster at Chernobyl, near Kiev, in the former Soviet Union (now Ukraine), in April 1986. T h e Soviet leadership had to answer to the world, as well as to its own citizens, for the accident, the worst in the history o f nuclear power. Leaders of individual states o f course looked to their own interests in commenting on Chernobyl—either out of concern about radioactive fallout or out o f a desire to exploit S o viet troubles for their own political benefit. But no one, including Soviet and U . S . leaders, could avoid Chernobyl's global meaning. General S e c retary (later President) Mikhail Gorbachev said it created the need for international monitoring and reporting o f nuclear accidents. President Ronald Reagan said Chernobyl showed that some issues have implications that transcend the national interest. They and other state leaders seemed to accept that, when it c o m e s to species survival, Realist politics is severely handicapped. "Interdependence" is shorthand for the transnationalization of world politics—not just events but also ideas, institutions, and decisions. It is a phenomenon that draws societies, and particular groups within societies, closer together, with both positive and negative consequences. As will be discussed later, Realists and Globalists differ about the precise implications

10

Global Politics

in the Human

Interest

of interdependence for the policies that states should pursue. They also differ about w h o s e interests (those of states? of c o r p o r a t i o n s ? of particular classes? of persons?) interdependence ought to serve, and about the ways that the various interdependent factors relate to one another. But that interdependence is the central new ingredient in world politics is now widely acknowledged. Interdependence has a n u m b e r of connotations that are worth spelling out. C o n s i d e r the term first in the sense of "mutual d e p e n d e n c e . " Relationships between states today typically are highly unequal and sometimes dependent. Yet the dependence is often mutual rather than one-sided. T h e U.S. economy, for example, is no longer as autonomous and uniquely powerful as it was at the end of World War II, when the dollar, backed by gold, was the only international currency. In 1985 the United States b e c a m e a debtor nation for the first time since 1914: Its financial obligations to fore i g n e r s — f r o m such things as investments and securities h o l d i n g s — e x ceeded foreign obligations to the United States. Moreover, U.S. industry has b e c o m e highly dependent on foreign oil, metals, and minerals; one in every f i v e industrial j o b s d e p e n d s on exports abroad; and one in every three f a r m acres produces for export. Second, consider interdependence as it describes the world e c o n o m y as a single integrated unit. No longer are we talking about capitalist versus socialist (or market versus n o n m a r k e t ) systems. Today, virtually all the major socialist economies are deeply enmeshed in the global capitalist system of trade, investments, and lending. It was Western banks and not the Soviet Union that bailed Poland out of virtual b a n k r u p t c y in 1982; their help is crucial to R u s s i a ' s economic stability in the 1990s. Mitsubishi, Pan A m e r i c a n , and Occidental P e t r o l e u m , not state trading c o m p a n i e s , were among the key early financiers of C h i n a ' s drive for industrial modernization. E v e n a closed socialist e c o n o m y such as North K o r e a ' s , with total world trade just over $2 billion, cannot survive without international f o o d and financial assistance. A third way of defining interdependence is in terms of global threats that seem beyond the capacity of states to control through traditional diplomacy. Terrorism, famine, ecological disasters, nuclear proliferation, and the eradication of whole species of plants and animals are examples. They suggest the need for global collective action, which may include the formation of global regimes to perform tasks that require global cooperation. Fourth, interdependence may also be thought of as the spillover, typically u n i n t e n d e d , of o n e c o u n t r y ' s (or r e g i o n ' s ) p r o b l e m s into another. " D o m e s t i c " issues b e c o m e s transnational ones. T h e Chernobyl disaster raised Soviet requirements for imported food, reduced Soviet food exports, pushed up world oil prices, put a damper on nuclear arms talks, and caused the biggest one-day drop in stock prices Wall Street had ever experienced.

Crisis and Interdependence

11

T h e accident also c o n t i n u e s killing and poisoning people in U k r a i n e and other c o u n t r i e s . 2 5 E c o n o m i c and political r e f u g e e s stream across national borders in search o f j o b s or safety from war. A c i d rain from one r e g i o n ' s industrial pollution damages another country's lakes and forests, as central Europe's have S w e d e n ' s . Pesticides banned for use in the United States are exported for use in Central A m e r i c a — o n l y to spill back when c o f f e e beans containing the pesticides are imported. Yet a fifth way to c o n c e p t u a l i z e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is as the interrelationship o f s e e m i n g l y d i s c o n n e c t e d p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c p h e n o m e n a . T h e so-called greenhouse e f f e c t is c o m m o n l y cited to illustrate this type o f interdependence. T h e rapid buildup o f carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere as the result o f unprecedented l a r g e - s c a l e use o f fossil fuels ( c o a l , petroleum, and natural gas), c o m b i n e d with the destruction o f forests, may be responsible for a warming o f the earth's temperature. M a n y scientists warn that climatic c h a n g e s would have serious c o n s e q u e n c e s for food production, world trade, human health, population m o v e m e n t , and even the stability o f the polar ice cap. A second e x a m p l e is the interdependent linkages a m o n g hunger, o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , d e f o r e s t a t i o n , d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n

(the

turning o f potentially productive land into desert), and government d e b t — all c o m m o n features o f underdeveloped, dependent e c o n o m i e s . Finally, interdependence is manifest in the growing number and political importance o f transnational m o v e m e n t s and institutions. State-to-state diplomacy remains a fixture in international politics. B u t it is now supplemented, and in s o m e c a s e s even displaced or upstaged, by the activities o f n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s (NGOs), f o r e x a m p l e , to p r o m o t e human rights and p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e a s s i s t a n c e ; by popular m o v e m e n t s for s o c i a l change (such as the antinuclear, e c o l o g i c a l , and w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t s that c o o r d i n a t e e f f o r t s around the world); by transnational r e l i g i o u s , worker, and p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t s ( s u c h as C a t h o l i c liberation t h e o l o g y ,

labor

unions, and G r e e n P a r t i e s in E u r o p e and North A m e r i c a ) ; by powerful transnational corporations ( T N C s ) , banks, and financial institutions (such as the World B a n k and the International M o n e t a r y Fund [ I M F ] ) ; and o c casionally by individuals who act as transnational a g e n t s — w o r l d citizens, in e f f e c t — s u c h as the R e v e r e n d J e s s e J a c k s o n when he traveled to S y r i a , in the midst o f his 1 9 8 4 presidential campaign, to negotiate for the release o f an A m e r i c a n pilot.

And Now, Globalization Interdependence o f whatever variety has one c o m m o n consequence: It limits the nation-state's ability to conduct business without reference to any but its own interests. W h e n that limitation cuts deeply enough to have lasting

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Interest

e f f e c t s on, for e x a m p l e , a c o u n t r y ' s culture, l a n g u a g e (speak English, please!), 2 6 social values, tastes, political processes, public policies, treatment of minorities, and market behavior, we have globalization.21 Though the word itself (and equally, internationalization) is n o w so widely used that it may indeed amount to "globaloney," 2 8 its intention is to describe a serious matter: the integrating and homogenizing effects that occur when national b o u n d a r i e s are penetrated by p o w e r f u l f o r c e s acting above the state level. T h e s e f o r c e s are usually e c o n o m i c , driven by the T N C and multilateral lending institutions such as the I M F that seek to regularize and stabilize world finance and trade in their own interests. In the abstract, globalization is neutral. It can p r o m o t e social justice and cooperation within and between countries, such as public-private and international alliances on e d u c a t i o n , j o b retraining, unionization, energy c o n s e r v a t i o n , and t e c h n o l o g y sharing. T h r o u g h globalization, or in response to it, social forces such as protest m o v e m e n t s , ethnic minorities, and N G O s can gain in their ability to c o m b a t or m o d e r a t e economic, environmental, m a j o r i t a r i a n , and other threats f r o m a b o v e . 2 9 Or, globalization can primarily be the "global shopping mall," o f f e r i n g ever-greater opportunities for the richest countries and c o r p o r a t i o n s to marketize the world at the expense of the poorest economies and social groups, the state, and whole cultures. 3 0 At the extreme, the c o n s e q u e n c e s can be dire. Benj a m i n R. Barber captured these in "Jihad Vs. M c W o r l d " : the f o r m e r f u n damentalist, violent, and opposed to any intrusion of the m o d e r n world, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan; the latter, universalist, commercial, and devoted to market conformism. 3 1 T h e question b e c o m e s one of values as m u c h as e c o n o m i c s . F r o m a d o m i n a n t - c u l t u r e perspective, globalization may a p p e a r to be an irresistible and righteous f o r c e capable of p r o p e l l i n g societies into m o d e r n i t y — t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y equivalent of m a k i n g " b a c k w a r d " societies " a d v a n c e d , " which was fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the new global way of life sounds suspiciously like a homogenization of U.S. culture and values, fit only for people with m o n e y to burn. Maurice Strong has said: The globalisation of capitalism is producing a new and universalising culture symbolised by C N N , brand-name consumer products like CocaCola, M c D o n a l d ' s and Levis, pop music, shopping malls, international airports, hotel chains and conferences. For the privileged minority w h o participate fully in this culture, it provides an exciting and expanding range of new opportunities and experiences. But for the majority, particularly in the non-Western world who live on its margins, and feed on its crumbs, it is often seen as alien and intimidating. Caught up in the dynamics of modernisation of which they are more victims than beneficiaries, it is no wonder that many react with anxiety and rejection, seeking refuge and identity in their own traditional values and cultures. 3 2

Crisis and

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13

Such a lopsided division of the fruits of globalization promises a future no more democratic, pluralist, equitable, or environmentally sustainable than that offered by globalization's fundamentalist opponents. Unless we are content (and in this book we are not) to say that there will always be winners and losers when wrenching e c o n o m i c changes occur, we need to speak of alternative meanings of development—human development—and alternative meanings o f s e c u r i t y — h u m a n security. 3 3 T h e s e meanings are discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. They are alternatives because they look upon inequality, conflict, insecurity, and destruction o f the natural order not as inevitabilities of interdependence and globalization but as consequences of the way world power is structured and the social values that predominate. If, instead, commonplace global values such as equal justice for all, the sanctity of life, respect for cultural diversity, and nonviolence were universalized, interdependence and globalization would probably look quite different from "Jihad Vs. M c W o r l d . " And that was indeed the promise of the end of the Cold War and a "new world order."

New World Order? George Bush characterized the G u l f War as an "opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule o f law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct o f n a t i o n s . " 3 4 Soon afterward, however, events conspired to end talk in the United States about a new order. Civil strife and humanitarian crises around the world revealed just how disorderly the p o s t - C o l d War world was likely to be. But the phrase stuck, and the meaning o f a new world order continued to be debated worldwide. The idea seems to have gained acceptance that the end o f the Cold War has indeed resulted in important rearrangements o f the world political economy. What are these rearrangements? How new and substantial are they? 3 5 Our first step is to identify the major global trends of the 1990s that may be redefining the international order. S o m e countertrends and qualifications are then discussed, briefly here and more thoroughly in later chapters. • Structurally, world politics is increasingly multipolar but with the United States first among equals, as Table 1.1 indicates. Political and economic power is more widely dispersed than at any time since the end o f World War II. Even though the United States is the only superpower, Russia remains a first-rank military power, despite the fact that its e c o n o m y is in shambles. Japan and the E U , led by Germany, no longer belong in the S e c o n d World. They are now e c o n o m i c superpowers with growing international responsibilities. The Second World still consists o f industrialized

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Table 1.1 The Reshaping of World Politics Cold War Era (1945-1990)

Post-Cold War Era ( 1 9 9 0 - )

First World

U.S., USSR

Second World

Industrialized Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand

Third World

Oil-exporting economies High-income economies

U.S.—"superpower" EU, Japan—economic superpowers Russia—military power Canada, Australia, New Zealand (first tier); industrialized Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine), Israel (second tier) Oil-exporting economies East Asian NICs, e.g., South Korea Latin American NICs, e.g., Mexico Indonesia, El Salvador, Nigeria, Iraq, Algeria Other former USSR republics, Africa/other Latin American, South Asian, Middle Eastern states Extremely impoverished countries, e.g., Haiti, Somalia, Bangladesh, North Korea

Middle-income economies Low-income economies "Fourth World" economies

Fourth World

countries that have political clout but not on a par with the EU or Japan. In contrast with the previous era, these countries now all have (or are developing) market economies—international financiers call Hungary, Poland, and Turkey "emerging markets"—and make political decisions with decreasing reference to old allies. As for the Third World, under which it once was convenient (if not entirely accurate) to place all under- or lessdeveloped countries, a more complex representation is required in the post-Cold War period. South Korea, for example, was regarded as the first Third World country to attain First World economic status until the 19971998 Asian financial crisis undermined Korea's economy. China is the world's most rapidly developing country, a major trading state, and a regional power. Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand are also being hailed as emerging markets for investors yet have serious deficiencies in what I will call "human development." However, several new states, once part of the Soviet Union, are impoverished; but even some of them influence their regions' affairs. Fourth World countries in a sense are new to the "new order," reflecting rising global poverty and increasing disparities between rich and poor states. They have extremely weak, aid-dependent economies and are the most politically fragmented underdeveloped countries. Some of them (e.g., Somalia and Afghanistan) are considered "failed" or "quasi" states. Fourth World countries have virtually no influence over regional or global decisions unless, like North Korea, they develop a nuclear weapon.

Crisis and

Interdependence

15

Although multipolarity and the unique status of the United States are generally accepted, analysts differ on other aspects of the p o s t - C o l d War structure. S o m e U . S . analysts argued that the G u l f War had provided the United States with a "unipolar m o m e n t " when it could be the decisive force in any international conflict in which it chose to engage itself. 3 6 Other observers have reclassified the world order into two worlds ("global c o r e " and "global periphery") 3 7 and anywhere from three ( U . S . - E U - J a p a n ) to five (adding China and Russia) poles, depending on the issue. For still another authority, even though nation-states are still the most important actors in world politics, the key to future international conflict lies with global " c i v i l i z a t i o n s " — m a j o r transnational cultures such as Islamic, neoConfucian, and Western. 3 8 While each o f these alternative formulations has merit, none captures a critical political reality of the post-Cold War world: the struggle for global authority between multipolarity and unipolarity. The views of the United States, the only superpower, reflect that struggle. They were decisive in shaping the international community's response to Iraq's aggression in 1990, genocide in B o s n i a and Rwanda, political upheaval in Haiti beginning in 1993, financial chaos in Mexico and Asia, the question who would succeed Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN secretary general, and nuclearweapons development in North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Yet only the United States is so consistently prepared to act unilaterally on major international issues regardless of other countries' reluctance or o p p o s i t i o n — such as to use force, as happened against Iraq in 1996 and again in 1999; to resolve disputes over trade (Japan, E U , China) and narcotics ( M e x i c o ) with threatened sanctions; and to persist in linking trade concessions to democratization in the Third World. No other country lectures other governments on how they should run their economies (as the United States did to Japan and Indonesia in 1 9 9 8 ) ; how they should define and implement human rights (from China to Nigeria); or where their ( E u r o p e ' s ) companies should not invest (Iran and Cuba). When it comes to intractable disputes, such as between Israel and Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) and in Northern Ireland, it is the United States that is called upon to mediate. In short, one superpower dominates the international stage, is the pacesetter in international diplomacy, and often (but by no means always) acts as it pleases. And it does so without worrying about double standards, such as not paying a good part of its UN dues while making full use of the UN's peacekeeping operations, 3 9 and preaching arms control while being the world's leading arms seller. • Powerful e c o n o m i c and social forces continue to erode the sovereignty and power of the nation-state. Borders have b e c o m e increasingly porous and have even been wiped out or rearranged by global e c o n o m i c forces; transboundary environmental problems; and ethnic, religious, and

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cultural ties. Nationalism on behalf of the nation-state, while still a powerful u n i f y i n g force, is again under assault f r o m n u m e r o u s " n a t i o n s " dem a n d i n g ethnic or cultural autonomy. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y was provided by two developments: the collapse of socialism, which (as a u n i f y i n g vision that inspired the Russian Revolution) had sought to provide a new basis of national loyalty and international legitimacy; and sharp e c o n o m i c decline in much of the world. These forces unleashed long-suppressed ethnic and cultural antagonisms and aspirations. Transnational loyalties have also g r o w n . O n e is to the transnational (or multinational) corporation. C o r p o r a t e Globalists m a i n t a i n that the nation-state is an anachronism, that in an interdependent world e c o n o m y opportunities are market-driven and can best be fulfilled by the T N C . But the e c o n o m i c p r o m i n e n c e of the C h i n e s e , Jews, Indians, and other geographically dispersed groups demonstrates a different primary loyalty—to "tribes" that have staked their futures on values such as educational excellence, thrift, and family. 4 0 A third force is the n u m e r o u s national and international global-change organizations. According to Global Humanists, these N G O s are not only influencing debate on m a j o r issues, such as disarmament and the environment; they often also provide settings for diversifying and universalizing the values and ideas that underlie such debate. 4 1 These challenges to the nation-state have not, however, lessened either the appeal or the f o r c e f u l n e s s of sovereign statehood. The n u m b e r of new states rose sharply a f t e r the Cold War e n d e d . F i f t e e n w e r e carved out of the Former Soviet Union alone. There were 167 states in 1988 (compared with 51 in 1945) and 183 (Eritrea in the Horn of A f r i c a being the last) by 1993. Even though n a t i o n a l i s m turned against the multicultural state, b r i n g i n g d o w n the U S S R and Yugoslavia in 1991, n e w political leaderships created new states or reestablished old ones, o f t e n on the basis of shared ethnicity. In the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet collapse permitted the recovery of lost s o v e r e i g n t y and led to attempts to kick out Russian minorities. Elsewhere, the new nationalism was a vehicle to r e m o v e historic rivals (as in S e r b i a ' s " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g " of M u s l i m s in B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a ) ; to gain i n d e p e n d e n c e (as in Georgia, Ukraine, and the other F S U republics); to revise borders (as in the struggle b e t w e e n largely Christian A r m e n i a and M u s l i m A z e r b a i j a n over the enclave of N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h inside A z e r b a i j a n ' s border); or to restrict immigration (as in G e r m a n y and F r a n c e — s e e Chapter 6). • Unprecedented opportunities are available f o r national economic renewal because of increased global interdependence in science, technology, trade, and investment. T h e world e c o n o m y is a single capitalist system. At least in theory, with e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n replacing Cold War c o m p e t i tion, interdependence and globalization of markets ought to be able to propel national economies to higher levels of p e r f o r m a n c e .

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Interdependence

17

But several countertrends are apparent. Trade protectionism has intensified, making global trade arrangements more difficult to negotiate and enforce. Regional trading areas such as the E U , the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) , Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( A P E C ) , and Greater China (southeast coastal China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) have become preferred routes to national prosperity. Moreover, real economic power in world affairs has not dispersed. It remains vested in the N o r t h — North America, Japan, and Europe—measured not just in terms of output and income levels but equally in terms o f worldwide cultural influence, scientific papers and methods, technological solutions, telecommunications ownership, and political practices. Hence, the prospects for economic renewal continue to leave most of the underdeveloped South out of the picture. Table 1.1 (p. 14) shows this further erosion o f some underdeveloped countries, primarily in Africa, by putting the "Fourth World" of about forty countries in a class by itself. The intensifying competition for markets and profits has redefined the national interest. In the name o f globalization, national e c o n o m i c policy has become synonymous with the downsizing of work forces and corporate megamergers. German businesses, in defiance of traditional practice, are increasingly exporting j o b s to sustain " g r o w t h " ; U . S . and European businesses are casting o f f workers to satisfy stockholders and stay c o m petitive; and corporate mergers in and among Japanese, European, and U . S . firms are at record levels, greatly reducing competition in virtually every industrial and service sector. Meanwhile, "economic diplomacy" has supplanted ordinary diplomacy: Trade, technology, and investment interests, and opportunities to earn hard currency now dominate over strategic calculations in high-level decisionmaking, even when the transactions have military applications. (These matters are detailed in Chapters 2 and 5.) • Military power is growing less salient to national and international security as other, global factors c o m e into play. T h e s e include environmental protection, energy resources and needs, economic management and productivity, scientific and technological innovation, and access to information. The ability to invest in these other sources o f power was greatly enhanced by the end o f the Cold War. Important reductions in national military-industrial complexes were made beginning in 1 9 9 0 , such as in the active-duty forces of the United States, its European allies, Russia, and China; in U . S . and Russian nuclear-weapon stockpiles; in the real defense spending of those forces (China excepted); in employment at the world's largest arms-manufacturing firms; and in the value of conventional arms exports worldwide. The new order has not meant demilitarization, however. Wars on every scale continue to be fought even as UN peacekeeping forces were able to bring about cease-fires and temporary political settlements (e.g., in Cambodia,

18

Global Politics

in the Human

Interest

M o z a m b i q u e , Haiti, and Angola), more responsive forms of government appeared in a number of countries, and a few long-lasting conflicts, such as in Guatemala ( 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 9 6 ) and Northern Ireland ( 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 9 8 ) , were eventually settled. 4 2 T h e confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories continued, despite agreements reached in 1993 and 1995 on limited self-rule for the Palestinians and Israeli troop withdrawals. Civil wars resumed or escalated in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Congo, and the Sudan. Losses of life in these conflicts were enormous, and most of them continue whether or not there is UN mediation or monitoring. 4 3 But the most typical, and even more deadly, internal conflicts of the 1990s were along ethnic lines: the Turkish and Iraqi wars on the Kurds (over 100,000 deaths since 1961); Russia's intervention in Chechnya to prevent secession (around 50,000 deaths from 1994 to 1996); the Hutu slaughter of over a half-million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda ( 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 ) ; the Tutsi slaughter of about 170,000 Hutus in Burundi (1988-1995); and "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia, for the most part by Serbian forces against Muslims in Bosnia. 4 4 Serbia's aggression reduced that country to rubble; historic Sarajevo became the Beirut of the 1990s. Over 250,000 people died and close to 2 million became refugees. The peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993 into Czech and Slovak republics was thus the exception to the rule of violent means to change. As in the old order, too, international violence has been fueled by the spread of nuclear-weapons and missile technology and by a hyperactive international arms market (see Chapter 5). Led by the United States, the five permanent members of the Security Council—the very governments whose leadership is essential to a new military o r d e r — r e m a i n the m a j o r a r m s sellers. One c i r c u m s t a n c e that has c h a n g e d , as Asia d e m o n s t r a t e s , is the extent to which e c o n o m i c opportunities now drive a r m s spending and sales. Military budgets have risen along with gross national product ( G N P ) in several Asian states, including Japan. Until the late 1990s, conventional arms p u r c h a s e s had c l i m b e d dramatically a m o n g the " n o u v e a u x r i c h e s " governments, notably China but also Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea. A r m s sales by s o m e of these same g o v e r n m e n t s as well as the m a j o r industrial powers have continued to rise, especially to the Middle East. 4 5 • Superpower rivalry in the Third World has been replaced, sometimes by cooperative approaches to international security, sometimes by inaction. During the Gulf War President Bush expressed the hope that Iraq's defeat would demonstrate the value of United Nations peacekeeping in a n e w world order. In fact, prospects have been greatly enhanced for U N peacekeeping and more generally for strengthening international agreements on global issues such as human rights and the environment. By 1998, as Table 1.2 shows (p. 21), the U N was carrying out fifteen p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, at a cost (as of 1995) of roughly $3.6 billion annually. Altogether, of

Crisis and

Interdependence

19

forty-eight peacekeeping operations since 1947, twenty-nine began in the 1990s. The figures reflect a huge post-Cold War upsurge in resort to the UN. 4 6 Expectations were that the UN was finally in a position to keep the peace through collective security, just as its founders had intended in 1945. But the peacekeeping function has not evolved into collective security, with the exception of the international coalition formed against Iraq. One reason is the end of the Cold War: Great-power interests no longer collide over ideology; territorial gains for East or West no longer count; and the balance of power is not normally at stake. Big powers are reluctant to act forcibly or are divided on whether and how to do so, as happened in Rwanda (see Chapter 7) and in Bosnia (see Chapter 6). In this twilight zone, there is room now for outrageous international behavior by petty zealots and terrorist organizations to pursue their objectives, which are often narrowly nationalistic and delusional. Among many examples, we may cite the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who sought to dismember Bosnia and went so far as to capture hundreds of UN peacekeepers in mid-1995 in response to the UN mission's efforts to stop the bombing of civilians; the campaign of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria to kill allegedly pro-Western journalists (forty-six were killed in the course of civil warfare that claimed around 3 0 , 0 0 0 lives between 1992 and 1995); 4 7 Burma's junta, S L O R C (the State Law and Order Restoration Council), 4 8 helped along with Chinese arms and kept afloat with opium and heroin profits; North Korea's leaders, who in 1994 defied the International Atomic Energy Agency ( I A E A ) ' s efforts to inspect its nuclear-power plants for diversion of plutonium to making bombs; Laurent Kabila, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire)'s new leader, whose forces probably massacred Rwandan Hutu refugees and then prevented various UN missions from investigating the massacres (as many as a quartermillion refugees are missing, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata), and who seems determined to re-create the oneparty state of Mobutu Sese Seko; 4 9 the terrorist organizations that exploded a bomb under the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993, released sarin nerve gas (and was also researching biological weapons) in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, and in April 1995 planted a bomb that destroyed the federal office building in Oklahoma City; and finally, Saddam Hussein, Iraq's leader, who (as we shall see in the next chapter) was discovered by UN inspectors to have had an active program to develop weapons of mass destruction ( W M D ) : nuclear, biological, and chemical. In a second area of security, human-rights conditions improved in Eastern Europe and a number of countries elsewhere with the end of the Cold War. But economic and political upheavals laid the groundwork for severe human-rights problems in many places. 5 0 To give only a sampling, in the early 1990s there was widespread police brutality in India, Pakistan,

20

Global Politics

in the Human

Interest

and Egypt; brutal government repressions in Burma and Iraq; crackdowns on dissidents in Tibet (China), Kenya, and Syria; excessive official use of force against f o r e i g n populations, such as M e x i c a n s w o r k i n g or seeking work in the United States and Palestinians in Kuwait; and forced repatriations of people seeking refuge, such as of Haitians by U.S. authorities and of Vietnamese "boat p e o p l e " f r o m Hong K o n g . Even in Western Europe, sudden instability in 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 led to a number of race-based attacks on immigrants, feeding a wave of intolerance that reminded some observers of E u r o p e ' s darkest hours in the 1930s. Environmental security did receive a major boost f r o m the new order with the c o n v e n i n g of the Earth S u m m i t . For the first time, policies and guidelines to implement "sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t " — t h e m a n a g e m e n t of environmental protection and economic development in ways that benefit present and future g e n e r a t i o n s — w e r e adopted at the largest-ever summit meeting of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. 5 1 For all its achievements, the conference still reflected the ability of the industrial powers, especially the United States, to control the environmental agenda. No b r e a k t h r o u g h s occurred on aid to the Third World in exchange for protecting forests and other resources of global importance; and many aspects of "environmental justice," such as w o m e n in development, h i g h - c o n s u m p t i o n lifestyles in the North, the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, and debt relief, were lightly touched upon if at all. • "Civil societies" have replaced authoritarian forms of government in a n u m b e r of countries, notably in the FSU and Eastern Europe, but also in parts of the Third World. (See, for e x a m p l e , the case studies of South Korea and South A f r i c a in Chapter 4.) The political r e f o r m s in these countries usually did not c o n f o r m to Western models of competitiveness, pluralism, and accountability. In fact, democratically elected governments in the p o s t - C o l d War era have o f t e n acted with total disregard for constitutional liberal traditions such as the rule of law, shared powers, and respect for civil liberties. 5 2 In a n u m b e r of countries, t h e r e f o r e , dictators were replaced and the worst abuses of power were eliminated, but "civil societies" did not actually materialize. Democratization, which was heralded as the wave of the f u t u r e as the 1990s began, f a d e d f r o m view by d e c a d e ' s end. F r o m postSoviet central Europe (Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, and Belarus) to Latin A m e r i c a (Mexico, Venezuela, P e r u , G u a t e m a l a ) , A f r i c a (including Ivory Coast, Z a m b i a , K e n y a , Algeria, a n d Nigeria), and Asia (Cambodia), democratic experiments were overwhelmed by a multitude of pressures. One of them was the persistence of authoritarian political cultures and traditions. In Africa, for instance, the failure of democratization was attributed to the unwillingness of longtime p o w e r h o l d ers to allow system change:

Crisis and

21

Interdependence

All across a continent that was swept dramatically by the winds of multiparty politics at the turn of the decade, incumbents have been rewriting the rules of the g a m e , bullying opponents and restricting the press so as to be able to hold onto p o w e r regardless of their popularity or the s u c c e s s of their programs. 5 3

A second reason for democratization's limited run may be traced to economic globalization. Newfound wealth has turned political leaders into

Table 1.2

O n g o i n g U N P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s (1998) Starting Date

Function

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

1948

Monitor cease-fires.

1949

Monitor cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir. Monitor buffer zone. Monitor separation of forces (Syria and Israel). Establish buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. Monitor buffer zone.

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)

1994

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)

1995

1964 1974 1978 1991 1991 1993

1995

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)

1996

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)

1997

1997

1998

Monitor cease-fire and hold referendum. Monitor cease-fire and border (Georgia and Abkhazia); law enforcement training. Maintain cease-fire (government and opposition); integrate opposition forces into military. Preventive border monitoring in Macedonia. Civil-political assistance (monitor and train law enforcement personnel). Monitor demilitarization of Prevlaka peninsula (Croatia). Mediation and implementation of peace accords; monitor integration of rebel (UNITA) group. Police capacity-building.

Police capacity-building; internal security assistance.

Sources: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs Report, "United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," September 1992, p. 12; Center for International Relations, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, "Comprehensive List of UN Peace-keeping Operations," June 3, 1998, online.

22

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in the Human

Interest

oligarchs, and vice-versa. The scale of official corruption, greed, and criminal behavior is staggering in the 1990s. B e t w e e n 1995 and 1998, for instance, financial scandals in o f f i c i a l d o m c a u s e d political upheavals in Italy, France, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, C o l o m b i a , Venezuela, and Peru. Russian politics, as pointed out in C h a p t e r 5, has b e c o m e overwhelmed by m o n e y e d interests. Bribery and kickbacks are standard practices in international business, and experts say that large-scale foreign investment in e m e r g i n g e c o n o m i e s is a m a j o r reason that corruption in general costs an astounding $167 billion a year. 5 4 Even some of China's notorious "princelings," the sons and daughters of senior party and military leaders, could not be spared when payoffs to them were exposed. Old-time and new leaders alike, such as Mobutu of Zaire, the Salinas family in Mexico, President Suharto in Indonesia, Radovan Karadzic (the Bosnian Serb leader who was declared a war criminal), F r a n j o T u d j m a n (president of Croatia), and the Bhutto family in Pakistan, exploited their power to amass great fortunes. 5 5 Trafficking and smuggling in drugs, nuclear materials, and weapons, and the virtual enslavement of w o m e n , children, and migrant workers were frequently in the n e w s thanks to an expanding number of drug cartels, crime syndicates, and (in Burma, China, and Mexico) the military's involvement. 5 6 The M a f i a now goes by many names, with Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Indian, and other national variations. Not surprisingly, the countries considered by international businesses to be the most corrupt are also prominent among those where democracy has failed. 5 7 Third is the nationalities question. As Serbia showed, appeals to selfdetermination could be used to extinguish the rights of others. In some former Soviet-bloc states, including Ukraine, Tajikistan, Lithuania, Azerbaij a n , and Albania, f o r m e r C o m m u n i s t s returned to p o w e r on the heels of separatism and civil war. And in Russia, with a parliament dominated by o f f i c i a l s f r o m the C o m m u n i s t period, "civil s o c i e t y " c o n s i d e r a b l y stretched reality. P e o p l e evidently yearned for strong-willed authority to c o m b a t violence and the worst e f f e c t s of marketization; and " r e f o r m e d " C o m m u n i s t Party leaders were often able to convince voters they were the best people for the j o b . E l s e w h e r e — e . g . , Nigeria and N i c a r a g u a — t h e results of d e m o c r a t i c elections were frustrated by rulers or factions determined to resist change. Our concluding assessment of the new world order can be brief. The new order is new in some ways, disturbingly old in others. It contains positive directions for humankind, but it has already revealed tendencies to great destructiveness. Thus, it has not transformed the contradictory character of interdependence. There remains a yawning gap between the end of the Cold War and the onset of a truly new o r d e r — o n e that, in its institutions, structure, and political consensus, can respond to the global crisis of security.

2 Realism and Corporate Globalism in Theory and Practice

The Realist Perspective The process of globalization under way in the world needs to be oriented in the direction of equity and solidarity to avoid the marginalization of people and groups. . . . Will everyone be able to take advantage of a global market? Will everyone at last have a chance to enjoy peace? Will relations between states become more equitable or will economic competition and rivalries lead humanity toward even greater instability? —Pope John Paul II's 1998 New Year's message

Throughout the postwar years, Realism has reigned as the dominant way of looking at the world among state leaders and their advisers. 1 Indeed, it might be said that its predominance coincides with the beginning of the nation-state system at Westphalia in 1648. But Corporate Globalism, centered in the United States, Japan, and the other major industrialized countries that are home to the world's largest corporations, has become a powerful force in its own right in the second half of the twentieth century. Realism speaks to the interests of state power, Corporate Globalism to the market needs of transnational institutions, mainly business and finance. 2 In the next two sections, I want to assess these two perspectives with specific reference to the global crisis and the issues of interdependence they raise. With the help of case studies of postwar U.S. economic planning and the Gulf War, I hope to show that—despite important differences of emphasis—Realism and Corporate Globalism embrace common values and aims, many of which run counter to the human interest. For Realists, power is the essential ingredient of politics. It is the instinctive goal of persons (who are considered to be naturally evil-minded and aggressive); and it is the unavoidable objective of nations (since international relations is a jungle). The best leaders seek to maximize their 23

24

Global Politics in the Human

Interest

country's power, believing that the "national interest" is thereby served. The standard operating precepts of Realist diplomats are to construct and defend a stable balance of power among rival states; to evaluate the costs and benefits of state actions in strictly national terms; to operate on the basis of what is, not what has been or might be; to disregard expressions of good intentions by other leaders; to trust no one (not even allies) and nothing, other than the justness of one's own national cause; and to rely on coercion rather than moral suasion, diplomatic agreements, international law, or an open, democratic decisionmaking process to protect and enforce one's interests. Table 2.1 displays what seem to be the principal values that guide the social behavior of Realists, Corporate Globalists, and Global Humanists. While there undoubtedly would be some differences between Realists in different socioeconomic systems—for example, Realists in the West would say they value individualism and liberty, whereas socialist Realists would give priority to collectivism and social c o n f o r m i s m — I maintain that in general Realists everywhere share most o f the values listed. Clearly, the emphasis is on authoritativeness: decisiveness, competitiveness, and elitism. Transferred to the level o f official work ("Institutional"), these values are typically expressed in a determination to defeat the opponent (other bureaucracies and other states) in the " g a m e of nations," and thus to preserve the "national interest." But on closer examination, we find that there is nothing "national" about this interest. In any political system, the "national interest" usually defines the political-economic priorities of an elite—that set of interests which it decides national power ought to promote. Realist leaders (as well as Corporate-Globalist leaders) do not usually count cooperation, participation, accountability, and social responsibility among the values they apply to national or international politics. 3 With the onset of globalization, those kinds of social values are even more likely to be sacrificed to competitive, marketplace values. Different values thus help to distinguish the national interest from the "human interest." S o do different norms, or standards o f national action (see Table 2.2). R e a l i s m ' s essence is system-maintaining: It seeks to preserve a status quo favorable to the national interest, but it is amenable to change so long as the underlying structure of power is retained. " T h e m versus us" is a classic Realist norm that U . S . Realists used to justify the Vietnam War. 4 But some Realists disputed the idea that the war threatened the global balance o f power, while others came to believe that the benefits of the war no longer justified the costs. In spite of these differences, Realists, like their Corporate-Globalist counterparts, concur on the need to preserve the "rules of the g a m e " by which the system itself (capitalism, socialism, pan-Arabism) maintains hegemony. The Brandt Commission Report in 1977 on North-South issues offers an excellent example o f system maintenance through system reform. T h e report sought to convince Realist leaders in the North that concessions to

Realism and Corporate

25

Globalism

Table 2.1 Alternative Values

Personal

Institutional

Realist

Corporate-Globalist

Global-Humanist

action adaptation aggressiveness ambition amorality competition disingenuousness elitism invulnerability leadership loyalty materialism perseverance power pragmatism progress success toughness

action adaptation aggressiveness ambition amorality competition disingenuousness elitism invulnerability leadership loyalty materialism perseverance power pragmatism progress success toughness

androgyny appropriateness authenticity community compassion cooperation diversity enoughness equality harmony honesty idealism integrity morality naturalness nonviolence personal power responsibility self-reliance service spirituality spontaneity tradition trust vulnerability

bargaining competition control diffused accountability flexibility gamesmanship hierarchy influence mission order pluralism prestige racism secrecy security sexism stability "standard operating procedures" team play winning worst-case planning

access bigness consumption control diffused accountability efficiency growth hierarchy influence laissez-faire loyalty order profit racism secrecy sexism specialization (division of labor) stability team play technological solutions

accountability appropriate technology autonomy collectivity decentralization democratic management equal opportunity and rewards networking openness participation shared power (empowerment) small scale voluntary simplicity

the underdeveloped South in terms of trade, loans, and aid were a matter of mutual advantage—and the report implied that failure to respond to the South's demands for a "new international economic order" (NIEO) might lead to a traumatic global upheaval. By couching its appeal in terms of

26

Table 2.2

Norm

Structure

Global Politics in the Human

Interest

Alternative Norms and Structures Realist

Corporate-Globalist

Global-Humanist

alliance system bad faith model balance of power credibility crisis m a n a g e m e n t hegemony independence intervention national interest national mission national security nationalism protectionism rules of g a m e "them versus u s " violence

capitalism collective security deregulation diplomacy expansion global culture and market integration interdependence (economic) international division of labor laissez-faire management multilateralism open door peace (but violenceaccepting) rule of law transnationalism trickle-down development

basic needs decentralization disarmament ecopolitics h u m a n rights interdependence (ecological and ethical) international law international regimes NGOs nonintervention "one world" (global c o m m o n s ) peace self-determinism sustainable development

system-maintaining (power blocs)

system-maintaining (liberal order)

system-transforming (world order)

very modest policy changes in the global economic system, the Brandt Commission clearly hoped to persuade Realist readers of the sensibility of its recommendations. Realism is a paradigm of the philosophy, strategy, and objectives that define the national security state, that complex of institutions, special interests, and powerful bureaucracies that govern all societies. And for the "national security manager" who runs the system, as Richard Barnet observes, "the basic premise . . . is that international politics is a game." 5 A game has stakes, rules, winners, and losers. Peace is threatening to Realists, not because it is undesirable in the abstract, but because it is inherently suspect: Since conflict, not harmony, is believed to characterize the "real world," the national interest is better served by emphasizing positions of strength based on military power rather than diplomacy in resolving disputes. As Henry Kissinger once wrote, "No idea could be more dangerous" than that peace "can be aimed at directly as a goal of policy." 6 International security in Realist terms is the ability to deter or neutralize threats to national power, rendering them harmless. Hence the Realists' constant emphasis on stability and order, preferably through a balance of power among the major states. But a balance of power, as early "idealists"

Realism

and Corporate

Globalism

27

like N o r m a n Angell (writing in the first d e c a d e of the twentieth century) first o b s e r v e d , is inherently unstable. In the a b s e n c e of c o m m o n values and ideas, states will seek superiority, not balance, with their rivals. 7 To speak of a new p o s t - C o l d War "equilibrium," therefore, only makes sense to those few governments that m a k e the rules and whose interests can be satisfied by orderly c h a n g e . 8 For the rest, equilibrium is likely to be bitterly contested among the m a j o r p o w e r s t h e m s e l v e s as well as b e t w e e n them and weak states or political m o v e m e n t s . In such circumstances, Realists may resort to other devices, such as military and economic alliances, containment, threats of e c o n o m i c sanctions, spheres of influence, dependent relationships with weak states, or anything else that ensures hegemony and promotes manageability and a m e a s u r e of predictability in the system as a whole. Should these m e t h o d s fail, the m a i n t e n a n c e of e m p i r e requires that Realists be prepared to use force (to "up the ante" and play "hardball," as they like to say). Destabilization of o p p o n e n t s , w h o s o m e t i m e s include friendly governments, comes first, by exerting external and internal pressures such as embargoes, suspension of credits, disinformation campaigns, support of political and military opponents, and impositions of sanctions. Next up the ladder are unilateral interventions and intimidation using military power to weaken or eliminate those whose actions are believed to undermine a major p o w e r ' s sphere of influence. For example, Soviet forces backed the Communist Party coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and intervened directly in 1968. M o s c o w m a i n t a i n e d about 1 million soldiers along the border with China for about twenty years. Soviet tanks crushed uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956; they lurked in the background when the Solidarity m o v e m e n t of Polish workers threatened to topple C o m m u n i s t authority in 1981. Soviet forces also intervened in Afghanistan ( 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 9 ) and in the 1990s in C h e c h n y a , Tajikistan, and Georgia. U.S. forces were sent to L e b a n o n (1958), the D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c (1965), Vietnam ( 1 9 6 5 1973), and Grenada (1984) to prevent the " d o m i n o e s " f r o m falling in those regions. In P a n a m a (1989) U.S. forces intervened to seize a dictator and bring him to the United States for trial. Indirect U.S. pressure proved sufficient to cause changes of government in Iran (1953), G u a t e m a l a (1954), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and Australia (1975). T h e C h i n e s e have proved they can practice Realist politics, too. In 1979, their troops crossed into Vietnam in order, their leaders said, to "teach a l e s s o n " to their once close allies. And in 1996 C h i n a ' s military c o n d u c t e d a series of missile tests near Taiwan to intimidate its leaders and dissuade them f r o m seeking independence. In every one of these cases, state leaders j u s t i f i e d their actions by clothing t h e m in doctrines of national interest. To Realists, principles of sovereignty and self-determination have their limits when national security

28

Global Politics in the Human

Interest

is believed threatened. But is there really any essential difference between, say, the Brezhnev Doctrine that was used to rationalize Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, on the basis that Czech political liberalization might infect the rest of Eastern Europe, and the U . S . - b a c k e d overthrow of C h i l e ' s Salvador Allende in 1973, on the basis that (as Secretary of State Kissinger said then) " w e [shouldn't] have to stand back and watch a country go C o m m u n i s t because of the irresponsibility of its own p e o p l e " ? 9 Just as the Czechs dared to talk about democracy, the Chilean people had the audacity to elect a socialist president, leading President Richard Nixon to decide that Chile should be "squeezed until it ' s c r e a m e d . ' " 1 0 " R e a s o n s of state" tend to sound the same everywhere. Indeed, self-righteous doctrines of the "just w a r " are a m o n g the hallmarks of Realist politics. And herein lies the essential flaw of Realism itself. For, clearly, if all states live by the iron law that might m a k e s right and that success is the only arbiter of action, then international politics is indeed a j u n g l e governed only by survival of the most heavily a r m e d — a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even disastrous uses of f o r c e — t h e United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in A f g h a n i s t a n , China in V i e t n a m — d i d not lead great powers to reassess interventionism. Realism thus contributes to p e r p e t u a t i n g the disorderly world that j u s t i f i e s itself, in the m a n n e r of a doctor who keeps a patient on medication in order to ensure f u t u r e visits. Little room is left for developing alternatives to p o w e r politics and limiting the reach of a g g r a n d i z i n g states. Even in the p o s t - C o l d War p e r i o d , w h e r e international hardball is m o r e likely to be played multilaterally rather than unilaterally, the conclusion may be the same. T h e invasion of Haiti to oust a military dictatorship in 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) use of air power against the Serbs in 1995, and sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan in 1998 for their nuclear-weapon tests all had United Nations approval. Yet such uses of force and pressure were not necessarily justified by that approval. Each case had its own background that might have made the use of force and sanctions avoidable. And in each case the actions taken mainly served national, not global, objectives. National security thus c o n f l i c t s directly with global security: T h e search for absolute security that preoccupies Realist leaders intensifies interstate violence and legitimizes o p e n - e n d e d military s p e n d i n g and buildups. " E n o u g h " is never enough. James Woolsey, on being appointed director of (U.S.) Central Intelligence in 1993, d e f e n d e d his $ 3 0 billion p o s t - C o l d War budget by saying, "Yes, we have slain a large d r a g o n [the U S S R ] . But we live now in a j u n g l e filled with a b e w i l d e r i n g variety of poisonous snakes. And in m a n y ways, the dragon was easier to k e e p track of." 1 1 M a n y other b u r e a u c r a t i c leaders shared this m i x t u r e of C o l d War nostalgia for the predictable e n e m y and zeal to protect an a g e n c y that thrives on threats to national security. Inasmuch as "costs and b e n e f i t s " are

Realism

and Corporate

Giobalism

29

w e i g h e d in t e r m s of state p o w e r , ordinary c i t i z e n s o f t e n are left out of the e q u a t i o n . "In politics the nation and not h u m a n i t y is the u l t i m a t e f a c t , " as H a n s M o r g e n t h a u , the m o s t - c i t e d Realist, o n c e c o n c e d e d . 1 2 A s w e will see in C h a p t e r 5, R u s s i a n and U.S. citizens h a v e paid dearly f o r their g o v e r n ments' extravagant national-security programs. P e r h a p s it is a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t h o w d i f f i c u l t it m u s t be f o r R e a l i s t s to adapt to an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t world s y s t e m . T h e m o r e t r a n s n a t i o n a l politics b e c o m e s , the less relevant (and e f f e c t i v e ) are policies based on one-sidedly p r o m o t i n g the n a t i o n a l interest. W h i l e R e a l i s t s persist in i n t e r p r e t i n g the w o r l d in strategic c h o i c e s and capabilities, the key issues are increasingly d e v e l o p m e n t a l and c o m p e l m u t u a l c o o p e r a t i o n . T h u s , R e a l i s m did not ant i c i p a t e the S o v i e t a t t e m p t to f e n d off c o l l a p s e by a d o p t i n g p e r e s t r o i k a , R u s s i a ' s e f f o r t s to d e m o c r a t i z e , and C h i n a ' s d e c i s i o n to e m b r a c e an o p e n door, m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d d e v e l o p m e n t path. Political leaders there r e c o g n i z e d their c o u n t r i e s ' b a c k w a r d n e s s and i n c a p a c i t y and c h o s e to break with the past. In d o i n g so, b o t h c o u n t r i e s m o v e d c l o s e r to l o n g - s t a n d i n g e n e m i e s in the West. D o m e s t i c n e e d s chiefly m o t i v a t e d those historic d e c i s i o n s , not (as R e a l i s m w o u l d h a v e it) p o w e r politics. 1 3 A s secretary of state, H e n r y K i s s i n g e r o n c e lectured a C h i l e a n f o r e i g n minister, e v e n b e f o r e A l l e n d e ' s election, that " n o t h i n g i m p o r t a n t can c o m e f r o m the S o u t h . H i s t o r y h a s n e v e r b e e n p r o d u c e d in the S o u t h . T h e a x i s of history starts in M o s c o w , goes to B o n n , c r o s s e s o v e r to W a s h i n g t o n , and then g o e s to T o k y o . " 1 4 It is as if the strategic b a l a n c e is the only g a m e in t o w n , and small states can only be bit p l a y e r s in it. R e a l i s t s typically underestimate the e n o r m o u s i m p a c t that d e v e l o p m e n t s in the T h i r d W o r l d h a v e o n w o r l d politics, b e g i n n i n g with political and e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m (as in L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d A f r i c a ) , e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m (as in M i d d l e E a s t oil), a n d t r a d e (the e m e r g e n c e of P a c i f i c R i m c o u n t r i e s s u c h as S o u t h K o r e a a n d T a i w a n as t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o m p e t i t o r s ) . T h e y a l s o o v e r e s t i m a t e , as in K i s s i n g e r ' s r e m a r k a b o v e , the ability of b i g p o w e r s to c o n t r o l a n d m a n i p u l a t e T h i r d World politics. T h e U n i t e d States, f o r e x a m p l e , c o u l d n o m o r e d e t e r m i n e the o u t c o m e of V i e t n a m ' s , C u b a ' s , I r a n ' s , or s o u t h e r n A f r i c a ' s r e v o l u t i o n s t h a n the S o v i e t U n i o n a n d R u s s i a c o u l d d i c t a t e the c o u r s e of e v e n t s in C h i n a , A f g h a n i s t a n , or the H o r n of A f r i c a . E x c e s s i v e attention to military and i d e o l o g i c a l issues, and the p e r s i s tent belief that " h i s t o r y " b e l o n g s to the great p o w e r s , h a v e d i v e r t e d the res o u r c e s of the m a j o r p o w e r s f r o m o t h e r a r e a s b e s i d e s a r m a m e n t s that a f f e c t n a t i o n a l security a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e . " I m p e r i a l o v e r s t r e t c h , " as P a u l K e n n e d y ' s m o n u m e n t a l history s h o w s , i n v a r i a b l y u n d e r m i n e s the real security of the states that e n g a g e in it. 1 5 It r e d u c e s s p e n d i n g that m i g h t satisfy p e o p l e ' s basic needs: f o o d , e m p l o y m e n t , housing, security, and sense of s e l f - w o r t h . T h e a r m s race also r e d u c e s available f u n d s f o r m o d e r n i z i n g i n d u s t r y and i m p r o v i n g soil q u a l i t y and p r o d u c t i v i t y . N o r c a n any military

30

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in Ike Human

Interest

i n v e s t m e n t in security stave off e n v i r o n m e n t a l pollution, trade i m b a l a n c e s , e n e r g y shortages, and i n d e b t e d n e s s ; in fact, it m a y e x a c e r b a t e t h e s e problems. N a t i o n a l p o w e r is n o longer m e a s u r a b l e in purely or e v e n primarily m i l i t a r y t e r m s . T o d a y , p o w e r is a l s o f o o d , i n f o r m a t i o n , e n e r g y , c a p i t a l , s k i l l s — c o m m o d i t i e s that are o f t e n m o r e easily m o v e d a n d m a n i p u l a t e d globally by t r a n s n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s than by g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e p u r p o s e of s t a t e c r a f t is to e n s u r e a s o c i e t y ' s security against potential e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s . But in an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t world, that task entails far m o r e than the d i p l o m a c y of w a r and peace. F a m i n e , u n e m p l o y m e n t and j o b f l i g h t , toxic w a s t e d u m p i n g , and m a s s i v e r e f u g e e flows m a y threaten societies from without and within simultaneously. R e a l i s m ' s response, h o w e v e r , o f t e n takes the f o r m of crisis m a n a g e m e n t . W h a t really a m o u n t to global p r o b l e m s are treated e p i s o d i c a l l y , as n a r r o w political p r o b l e m s b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t s , p r o b l e m s to be c o n t a i n e d , o f t e n until the next eruption. T h u s , w e had the e n e r g y and inflation crises in the 1970s, the recession and u n e m p l o y m e n t crises in the early 1980s, the f o o d and debt crises in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , and the f i n a n c i a l crisis in the 1990s. P e r c e p t i o n of the g l o b a l crisis in t e r m s of s e p a r a t e , t i m e - b o u n d , n a t i o n a l m i n i c r i s e s , h o w ever, can only m a k e the r e s p o n s e to crisis i n a d e q u a t e , like p u t t i n g B a n d A i d s on g a p i n g w o u n d s . O n e r e a s o n R e a l i s t s p r e f e r to treat the s y m p t o m s of g l o b a l d i s o r d e r rather than search f o r basic c u r e s is that they r e c o g n i z e and f e a r the revolutionary potential of d e e p e r structural c h a n g e . Aid p r o g r a m s , a r m s sales, f o o d relief, and r e p r e s s i o n of unrest are m o r e a p p e a l i n g as political tools than are p r o g r a m s that a d d r e s s f u n d a m e n t a l inequities in l a n d h o l d i n g , political p o w e r , law, and i n c o m e . K i s s i n g e r r e c o g n i z e d the u n d e r l y i n g issue w h e n he said, w i t h r e f e r e n c e to h u m a n r i g h t s , " M a k i n g [ h u m a n r i g h t s ] a v o c a l o b j e c t i v e of our f o r e i g n policy i n v o l v e s great d a n g e r s : You run the risk of either s h o w i n g y o u r i m p o t e n c e or p r o d u c i n g r e v o l u t i o n s in f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s — o r b o t h . " 1 6 B e t t e r to c o n t r i b u t e to state security at the t o p and p l a c a t e r e p r e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s than take c o n c r e t e steps to e n h a n c e the security of billions of p e o p l e at the b o t t o m . T h i s a p p r o a c h to " s o l v i n g " p r o b l e m s is a f a m i l i a r o n e in any s y s t e m w r e n c h e d by c o n v u l s i v e , s o m e t i m e s violent, and a l w a y s u n p r e d i c t a b l e c h a n g e . But if we accept that states exist to serve h u m a n c o m m u n i t i e s , such an a p p r o a c h is politically a n d m o r a l l y irresponsible. Centralized, elite-managed, efficiency-minded, technical m e c h a n i s m s s e e m q u i t e i n a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s i d e r i n g the s i z e a n d d e p t h of h u m a n i t y ' s crisis. Until the outbreak of World War I, Realist state leaders could usually count on b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r politics to keep the lid on u n w a n t e d violence. W h e n the balance was shattered by two world wars, an uneasy East-West cond o m i n i u m dominated by the superpowers took its place. By the p o s t - V i e t n a m W a r era in 1975, h o w e v e r , that s t r u c t u r e w a s a l r e a d y c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y

Realism and Corporate Globalism

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i m b a l a n c e , disunity, and fragility in relationships among allies. I d e o l o g i cal a l l e g i a n c e s were proving insufficient, in the West, to resolve trade disputes (such as b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n ) , p r e s e r v e unity in N A T O , or prevent Western and E a s t e r n E u r o p e from having c o m m e r c i a l dealings. Old allies o f the United States like C a n a d a and M e x i c o b e c a m e b o l d e r in their c r i t i c i s m s o f U . S . i n t e r v e n t i o n s and e n e r g y and e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l i c i e s . A l l i a n c e s p i e c e d t o g e t h e r by the U n i t e d S t a t e s during the C o l d War, such as the S o u t h e a s t A s i a T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( S E A T O ) , the Central T r e a t y Organization ( C E N T O ) , and A N Z U S ( A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d , and the United S t a t e s ) , were all r e d u c e d to i n s i g n i f i c a n c e . On the S o v i e t side, the Warsaw P a c t , even before the c r u m b l i n g o f C o m m u nist authority in Eastern E u r o p e , was w e a k e n e d by the S o l i d a r i t y r e s i s tance in Poland, Eastern E u r o p e ' s substantial financial and t e c h n i c a l dep e n d e n c e on Western b a n k s and trading f i r m s ( l e a d i n g Hungary and Poland to sign up with the I M F ) , and the S o v i e t s ' own poor administrative and e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e . T h r e e lessons might have been learned from these discordances. O n e was that superpowers could not give orders and e x p e c t to have them followed as they o n c e were. World politics was already b e c o m i n g multipolar. S e c o n d was that military superiority was not proving as d e c i s i v e as in the past in ensuring control o f events. W h e n Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1 9 9 0 (the s e c o n d c a s e study), t h e r e f o r e , it was a test o f R e a l i s m ' s viability in the p o s t - C o l d War era. " W e are striking a blow for the principle that might does not m a k e r i g h t , " said President B u s h (on August 15, 1 9 9 0 ) as U . S . f o r c e s were d e p l o y e d in S a u d i A r a b i a . T h e third l e s s o n , in K i s s i n g e r ' s words, was that " f r a g m e n t a t i o n " and " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " would be the c h i e f c o n t e n d i n g f o r c e s in e f f o r t s to c o n s t r u c t a new world order, and that no g o v e r n m e n t was really well equipped to handle such c o m p l e x i t i e s . 1 7 T h e c a s e study o f the M e x i c a n and Asian financial crises illuminates his point.

Corporate Globalism and the World Economy " A l l freedom is dependent on freedom o f e n t e r p r i s e , " said President Harry S Truman. " T h e w h o l e world should adopt the A m e r i c a n system. . . . T h e A m e r i c a n s y s t e m can survive in A m e r i c a only if it b e c o m e s a world syst e m . " 1 8 T h e globalization o f U . S . capitalism has surely e x c e e d e d T r u m a n ' s h o p e s : T h e s t o c k value o f f o r e i g n direct ( p r i v a t e ) i n v e s t m e n t s

(FDI)

abroad by U . S . - b a s e d corporations has c l i m b e d from about $ 1 2 billion in the late 1 9 4 0 s to o v e r $ 4 0 0 b i l l i o n in 1 9 9 3 , nearly doubling the

1980

value. T h e s e c o m p a n i e s have accumulated profits in e x c e s s o f $ 2 5 0 billion in that p e r i o d . 1 9 B y the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , in line with an e x p l o s i o n o f investing worldwide, U . S . F D I was running j u s t under $ 1 0 0 billion a year, portfolio

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equity investments (stocks and bonds) abroad were over $66 billion annually, and yearly profits f r o m investment income were over $180 billion. 2 0 What began as a very tentative postwar corporate expansion now is a global movement of capital, technology, labor, information, and culture in which U.S. transnational corporations play the leading, but not dominating, part. T h e importance of foreign trade and investment to U.S. political and b u s i n e s s leaders was well r e c o g n i z e d as early as the 1920s, w h e n the United States fully e m e r g e d as a m a j o r player in the international economy. Even before World War II ended, as the first case study shows, systematic planning began f o r overseas expansion. Investments abroad then were considered highly risky, and foreign trade f r o m domestic industries was the preferred route. Now, foreign investment is considered a business necessity. The corporation lives or dies by expansion in the global marketplace; banks depend on making overseas loans; individual investors count on " e m e r g i n g m a r k e t s " for current and retirement income. Besides, the profit margin on investments and interest on loans are considerably larger abroad than at h o m e . T h e risks of loss have increased, and terms of investment are less favorable to T N C s than before; but the tax rates and general conditions of operation (especially in times of recession at h o m e or high labor costs) are superior. N o wonder, then, that the top ten U.S. banks had 169 percent of their equity (about $44 billion) tied up in loans to the Third World in the early 1980s. 2 1 Or that the investment pattern of General M o t o r s , the w o r l d ' s largest c o r p o r a t i o n , is c h a n g i n g — f r o m the United States, where it had been spending around $5 billion a year to u p g r a d e plants, to M e x i c o , China, and other Third World locales, where investments are about $4 billion a year but in new plants for auto assembly and parts. U n s k i l l e d , low-cost labor, cheaper-to-build structures, no strikes, and a huge market of new car customers are what count at G M . 2 2 T h e key to success f o r Corporate Globalists is the f r e e flow of goods, skills, and services around the world. M a n a g e m e n t , not national security, is the governing ideology. Only then, they maintain, can o p t i m u m conditions f o r expansion be assured. Competition without hindrance f r o m governments is, as Table 2.2 suggests, an essential norm of Corporate Globalism. M a k i n g the world " s a f e f o r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " was the m a i n r e a s o n that in 1972 David R o c k e f e l l e r , chair of the board of Chase M a n h a t t a n B a n k , initiated f o r m a t i o n of o n e of the b e s t - k n o w n and most influential Corporate-Globalist organizations, the Trilateral Commission. 2 3 C o m p o s e d of representatives f r o m business, media, politics, and labor in the United States, Western E u r o p e , and Japan, the Trilateral C o m m i s sion gained attention during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, w h e n a sizable n u m b e r of its m e m b e r s (including Carter himself, Vice President Walter M o n d a l e , Special Assistant f o r National Security Z b i g niew Brzezinski, and Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal) took

Realism

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office. No conspiracy here, but merely a concentration of Corporate Globalists in one administration. (Under Ronald Reagan, Trilateralists were many fewer, but included Vice President George Bush, D e f e n s e Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Secretary of State G e o r g e Shultz, showing that Corporate Globalism spans the political spectrum.) The Trilateralists' objective: to promote intercapitalist cooperation through the removal of barriers to trade and investment among the three m a j o r regions represented in the organization and in the socialist and underdeveloped countries as well. For C o r p o r a t e Globalists, however, interdependence has a particular meaning: augmenting the p o w e r of the global corporations and, if necessary, decreasing that of governments. Not accidentally, the Trilateral C o m mission was f o u n d e d soon a f t e r President Nixon shocked the c o r p o r a t e community in 1971 when he announced a n u m b e r of steps to halt and reverse the U.S. trade deficit, including taking the dollar off the gold standard and imposing a surtax on imports. To Corporate Globalists, such protectionist steps are poison; they c o m p r o m i s e the free flow of currency and trade. Later, beginning in 1974 and extending into the 1990s, new obstacles to world trade emerged: recessions, the formation of regional markets, increasing p r o t e c t i o n i s m , and the inability of the m a j o r trading states in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regime to resolve disputes over lowering trade barriers. T N C leaders have usually been able to turn these adverse developments into opportunities, however. First, in 1995 state and corporate leaders replaced GATT with the World Trade O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W T O ) , which is c o m p o s e d of 133 m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s and occupies G A T T headquarters in G e n e v a . W T O ' s chief advantage over G A T T is a binding dispute resolution m e c h a n i s m that promises to resolve accusations that a state e n g a g e s in unfair trade practices. For global corporations, W T O fits its agenda perfectly. 2 4 With over 200,000 affiliates, T N C s dominate global exports of goods and services. In fact, about one-half of the exports of the m a j o r e c o n o m i e s are actually intra-TNC (usually intra-firm) transactions. 2 5 W T O not only promises less contentiousness between governments over trade policies, less friction bet w e e n regional trade g r o u p s such as the E U and N A F T A (the United States, C a n a d a , and M e x i c o ) , and liberalization of regulations governing F D I . It will p r o b a b l y also m e a n (and so f a r has meant) that w h e n o n e country argues that its trade is being restricted by another country's environmental and labor standards, W T O will resolve the matter in favor of the t r a d i n g interest. 2 6 Nor will T N C s h a v e to pay m u c h heed to w o r k e r s ' rights, for W T O makes no assurances to the millions of workers, increasingly skilled, 2 7 w h o s e j o b s are being lost to c o r p o r a t e " r e s t r u c t u r i n g " as global trade competition intensifies. R e s t r u c t u r i n g relates to the second m a j o r option: T N C s and T N B s (transnational banks) h a v e accelerated c r o s s - b o r d e r joint venturing and

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m e r g e r s , often with more profitable c o m p e t i t o r s . The trend began in the 1980s when, f o r e x a m p l e , Chrysler and General Motors invested in Mitsubishi, Honda, and Isuzu in Japan; and joint production enterprises were f o r m e d , such as b e t w e e n G M and Toyota and between U.S. Steel and K o r e a ' s Pohang Steel. Joint ventures such as these became the norm, not only cross-nationally but also intranationally, by T N C s headquartered in the same country. Now, under the pressures of globalization for companies and banks to cut costs, raise profits, boost earnings for investors, and take a d v a n t a g e of a looser regulatory e n v i r o n m e n t , strategic alliances and m e g a m e r g e r s are the name of the game. In the first category, we find N E C Corporation of Japan and Samsung Electronics of South Korea agreeing in 1995 to collaborate in making microcomputer chips so as to improve their c o m p e t i t i v e position with the industry leader, Intel, in the United States. M e g a m e r g e r s are especially noteworthy: A r o u n d $ 5 0 0 billion worth of corporate mergers and acquisitions are taking place worldwide every quarter, in other words, $2 trillion a year. A m o n g these, cross-border mergers are still in the minority, with annual transactions that a m o u n t to several hundred billion dollars. 2 8 If the U.S. situation is any guide, however, they h a v e a c c o u n t e d f o r more than half of all FDI since 1995. 2 9 The e f f e c t is contagious: Once one T N C does it, others in the same industry are sure to follow. In the a u t o m o t i v e industry, for e x a m p l e , no sooner did D a i m l e r Benz A.G. announce its acquisition of Chrysler Corporation in 1998, in a r e c o r d - b r e a k i n g $39 billion deal, than the British firm of Vickers P.L.C. agreed to a $ 7 1 0 million takeover of its R o l l s - R o y c e division by Volkswagen A.G. A third trend among T N C s is to create various types of production networks or commodity chains. Here, the truly global corporation carries the integration of operations among parent and affiliates to a higher level, by creating a division of labor, f r o m m a n u f a c t u r i n g to advertising, within the f i r m itself. 3 0 The objective, as always, is increased efficiency, higher profits, m a n a g e m e n t flexibility, and control f r o m the top. We can see the diff e r e n t w a y s such integration works, for e x a m p l e , in Nike C o r p o r a t i o n ' s production and marketing of athletic shoes, in the Korean automobile ind u s t r y ' s expansion f r o m domestic to international markets, 3 1 and in the c h a n g i n g production patterns of Japanese T N C s . Since the mid-1980s, the lower value of the yen has f o r c e d Japanese T N C s to m o d i f y their investment pattern and location around Asia. The pattern has changed f r o m lowcost m a n u f a c t u r i n g to labor- and t e c h n o l o g y - i n t e n s i v e production netw o r k s , using J a p a n e s e and local affiliates; and the location has c h a n g e d f r o m South Korea and Taiwan alone to the emerging-market e c o n o m i e s of Southeast Asia such as Thailand and Malaysia. Unlike U.S. T N C s , Japanese T N C s seek flexibility in meeting market d e m a n d and want to avoid (as in 1998) a sudden collapse of local markets. In e f f e c t , they export their production processes to subcontractor companies. 3 2

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Fourth, T N C s have f o r m e d business ties with " r e g i o n - s t a t e s " — l a r g e consumer markets that straddle borders, such as the Pearl R i v e r D e l t a that is the geographic hub o f Greater China. B y targeting regional-transnational markets, T N C s and their l o c a l partners hope to appeal o v e r the heads o f government bureaucrats who seek to regulate t h e m . 3 3 Fifth, as is discussed below, T N C s have taken advantage o f the widening flows o f skilled and migrant labor across frontiers. All these efforts reveal the exceptional maneuverability o f T N C s as they seek to expand markets and defend themselves against competing corporations and governments. Rapid growth in transnational business has had the most striking results for the U . S . e c o n o m y . It has literally internationalized industry, cutting deeply into the o n c e dominant role o f the United States in world trade. W h i l e the shares o f world trade o f Western Europe and J a p a n rose sharply (to about 3 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ) , that o f the United States declined just as sharply (from nearly 17 percent o f world exports in 1 9 5 0 to j u s t under 10 percent in 1 9 8 2 ) . B y the end o f the 1 9 8 0 s , the U . S . share had r e c o v e r e d to 1 3 . 5 p e r c e n t , the w o r l d ' s largest, with West G e r m a n y j u s t behind at 13 percent and J a p a n third at 10 p e r c e n t . 3 4 This ranking continued into the late 1 9 9 0 s , with the new element being the rise o f the East A s i a n e c o n o m i e s , notably C h i n a and South K o r e a , to positions among the top dozen trading states. 3 5 Nevertheless, imports into the United States had so far e x c e e d e d exports as to plunge the country into a s e e m i n g l y p e r m a n e n t b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t d e f i c i t . T h e d e f i c i t on current accounts was $ 1 5 6 billion in 1 9 8 6 ; currency revaluations in the late 1 9 8 0 s , which had the e f f e c t o f cheapening U . S . exports, brought the deficit down to $ 6 5 billion in 1 9 9 1 , but it was b a c k up to $ 8 4 billion in 1 9 9 2 , $ 1 1 5 billion in 1 9 9 3 , and $ 1 4 8 b i l l i o n in 1 9 9 5 . R o u g h l y two-thirds o f the U . S . trade d e f i c i t is a c c o u n t e d f o r by n e g a t i v e trade b a l a n c e s with C h i n a and Japan. Earnings by U . S . T N C s on investments abroad have been able to m a k e up somewhat for the outflow o f dollars brought about by the trade deficit. T h e s e earnings amounted to $ 7 4 billion in 1 9 9 5 . T h e i r branch plants overseas, which today handle o v e r one-third o f all U . S . e x p o r t s simply in goods traded a m o n g t h e m , a l l o w T N C s to leapfrog o v e r t a r i f f walls and other national impediments to U . S . exports. B y the early 1 9 7 0 s , U . S . government i n c o m e f r o m the returned profits o f T N C branch plants began to e x c e e d i n c o m e f r o m e x p o r t s by d o m e s t i c c o m p a n i e s . 3 6 J u s t h o w s i g n i f i cantly T N C s depend on o v e r s e a s operations can b e gauged f r o m the fact that in 1 9 8 0 , s i x t e e n o f the top fifty U . S . T N C s earned h a l f or m o r e o f their revenue a b r o a d . 3 7 A s T a b l e 2 . 3 s h o w s , by 1 9 9 7 , the n u m b e r had c l i m b e d to t w e n t y - t w o o f the top fifty. S a l e s by T N C b r a n c h plants as a whole are " t h r e e to four times the value o f U . S . e x p o r t s , " j u s t as foreignowned firms in the United States " n o w account for m o r e than h a l f o f U . S . exports and a third o f its i m p o r t s . " 3 8 As the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f C o c a - C o l a ,

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Table 2.3 The Fifty Largest U.S. Multinationals (1997) Rank

Company

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Exxon General Motors Mobil Ford Motor IBM Texaco General Electric Chevron Hewlett-Packard Citicorp Philip Morris Cos. Procter & Gamble E.I. du Pont de Nemours American International Group Motorola Coca-Cola Intel Xerox Dow Chemical Johnson & Johnson United Technologies Digital Equipment PepsiCo Eastman Kodak Compaq Computer Chrysler Amoco Chase Manhattan Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Sara Lee Merrill Lynch J. P. Morgan & Company Bristol-Myers Squibb Kimberly-Clark Colgate-Palmolive RJR Nabisco Gillette Goodyear Tire & Rubber McDonald's Merck CPC International International Paper Aflac Alcoa American Home Products UAL Texas Instruments Pfizer Crown Cork & Seal Wal-Mart Stores

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Foreign Revenue ($US millions) 89,608 51,000 48,533 48,104 46,552 31,385 23,361 22,220 21,379 19,772 19,628 17,682 16,525 14,991 12,600 (E) 12,449 12,179 12,038 11,264 10,721 10,080 9,436 9,197 8,515 8,428 8,226 7,971 7,932 7,556 7,387 7,150 6,754 6,614 6,470 6,263 6,170 6,117 6,103 6,096 5,989 5,962 5,915 5,849 5,815 5,753 5,600 5,451 5,365 5,005 5,002

(E)

(E) (E)

(E)

Total Revenue

Percent Foreign

116,728 164,069 72,267 146,991 75,947 59,205 79,179 47,798 38,420 32,605 54,553 35,284 38,349 28,205 27,973 18,546 20,847 20,621 20,053 21,620 23,512 14,563 31,645 15,968 18,109 61,397 32.726 24,421

76.8 31.1 67.2 32.7 61.3 53.0 29.5 46.5 55.6 60.6 36.0 50.1 43.1 53.2 45.0 67.1 58.4 58.4 56.2 49.6 42.9 64.8 29.1 53.3 46.5 13.4 24.4 28.9

14,236 18,624 25,011 15,866 15,065 14,108 8,749 17,063 9,698 13,113 10,687 19,829 9,844 20,143 7,100 13,061 14,088 16,362 9,940 11,306 8,332 104,859

53.1 39.7 28.6 42.6 43.9 45.9 71.6 36.2 63.1 46.5 57.0 30.2 60.6 29.4 82.4 44.5 40.8 34.2 54.8 47.5 60.1 4.8

Source: Forbes (www.forbes.com), April 1998. Note: (E) = estimate. Footnoted qualifications in the original chart have been omitted.

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w h i c h h a d f o r e i g n r e v e n u e of o v e r $ 1 2 billion in 1997, said: " W e u s e d to be an A m e r i c a n c o m p a n y with a large i n t e r n a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s . N o w w e are a large i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p a n y with a s i z a b l e A m e r i c a n b u s i n e s s . " 1 9 J a p a n e s e C E O s c a n say the s a m e t h i n g , t h o u g h w i t h d i f f e r e n t c o n n o tations. In 1995, the v a l u e of J a p a n ' s o v e r s e a s m a n u f a c t u r e s s u r p a s s e d its e x p o r t s f o r t h e first t i m e . T h i s w a s l a r g e l y m a d e p o s s i b l e by s u r g i n g inv e s t m e n t s in A s i a , w h i c h a c c o u n t e d f o r o v e r 6 0 p e r c e n t ( a b o u t $ 8 5 b i l l i o n ) of J a p a n e s e m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n v e s t m e n t s a b r o a d . A c t u a l l y , t h o u g h , t h e s e inv e s t m e n t s m e r e l y r e p r e s e n t " r e v e r s e i m p o r t s " f o r J a p a n , as so m u c h of J a p a n ' s t r a d e with A s i a i n v o l v e s s e n d i n g m a c h i n e r y and p a r t s to its p l a n t s there f o r e v e n t u a l sale back to J a p a n of f i n i s h e d g o o d s . A l r e a d y , o v e r s e a s p r o d u c t i o n a c c o u n t s f o r c l o s e to 10 p e r c e n t of all J a p a n e s e m a n u f a c t u r i n g as their T N C s s e e k t h e h i g h e r p r o f i t s that a c c r u e f r o m g o i n g a b r o a d . N o longer d o e s the J a p a n e s e c o n s u m e r b u y d o m e s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d t e l e v i s i o n sets, V C R s , a n d o t h e r c o m m o n e l e c t r o n i c s i t e m s ; m o s t s u c h i t e m s a r e m a n u f a c t u r e d by J a p a n ' s n e i g h b o r s . 4 0 T h e p r o m i n e n c e of g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i o n s in the w o r l d e c o n o m y can be f u r t h e r g a u g e d by n o t i n g their m a r k e t d o m i n a n c e and size. In b a n k i n g , the top 2 0 T N B s h a v e o v e r $8 trillion in assets, r o u g h l y e q u a l to the g r o s s national p r o d u c t ( G N P ) of the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d J a p a n c o m b i n e d . T h e t o p 100 T N C s , of a r o u n d 3 7 , 0 0 0 p a r e n t f i r m s w o r l d w i d e , " h e l d $ 3 . 4 t r i l l i o n in g l o b a l a s s e t s in 1 9 9 2 " a n d " c o n t r o l a b o u t o n e - t h i r d of t h e w o r l d F D I s t o c k . " T h a t stock is g r o w i n g at the rate of $ 2 7 5 billion a y e a r , with a b o u t 7 0 p e r c e n t of it a c c o u n t e d f o r by f i r m s in the T r i l a t e r a l c o u n t r i e s . 4 1 T N C s not o n l y a c c o u n t f o r the vast m a j o r i t y of w o r l d t r a d e . M o r e c r i t i c a l l y , a m e r e 15 of t h e m , and in m o s t c a s e s o n l y 3 to 6, c o n t r o l w o r l d t r a d e in all b a s i c c o m m o d i t i e s , f r o m f o o d to m i n e r a l s . 4 2 W h e n t h e i r total s a l e s are m a t c h e d a g a i n s t the G N P of states, T N C s (led by G e n e r a l M o t o r s , R o y a l D u t c h / S h e l l , and E x x o n ) o c c u p y 37 of the t o p 100 p l a c e s . 4 3 Transnational investments and loans have always gone mainly into m a n u f a c t u r i n g and f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s in the richest e c o n o m i e s , not into the T h i r d W o r l d . 4 4 W i t h t h e rise of C h i n a a n d o t h e r e m e r g i n g m a r k e t s , h o w e v e r , that s i t u a t i o n is r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g . 4 5 C a s e s t u d y 3 in t h i s c h a p t e r b r i n g s that p o i n t out. I n d e e d , o n e of the c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i o n s is that their c a p i t a l m o s t l y o r i g i n a t e s in and e n d s u p in the s a m e f e w places. Since 1984 the United States has been the preferred country in w h i c h to i n v e s t b e c a u s e of h i g h interest rates a n d p r o f i t m a r g i n s o n c a p ital. A s a result, f o r e i g n h o l d i n g s of U . S . a s s e t s — o v e r $2 trillion in 1989, a p p r o a c h i n g $ 4 trillion today, m a i n l y in p r i m e real e s t a t e , s e c u r i t i e s , f a r m l a n d , and b u s i n e s s e s — i n c r e a s e d f a r m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n U . S . o w n e r s h i p of f o r e i g n a s s e t s . T h a t is h o w t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b e c a m e a net d e b t o r in 1 9 8 5 — t o t h e t u n e of $ 6 6 3 b i l l i o n by the e n d of 1989 a n d a r o u n d $1 trillion in the l a t e 1 9 9 0 s . 4 6 B r i t a i n , J a p a n , a n d C a n a d a w e r e t h e l e a d i n g s o u r c e s of i n v e s t m e n t s in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . S o m e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

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r e a c t e d with t h e s a m e a l a r m as T h i r d World l e a d e r s to this s u p p o s e d loss of c o n t r o l o v e r the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m y . O t h e r s s a w the large i n f l u x of fore i g n m o n e y as j u s t a n o t h e r s i g n of the t i m e s — g l o b a l e c o n o m i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e — o r as a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e U . S . e c o n o m y that not only h e l p e d l o w e r t h e b u d g e t d e f i c i t but a l s o f i n a n c e d m u c h of t h e g r o s s inv e s t m e n t in U . S . b u s i n e s s m o d e r n i z a t i o n . 4 7 A s this s u g g e s t s , t h e l o c u s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l a n d p r o d u c t i o n is g r a d u a l l y , but i n e x o r a b l y , m o v i n g a w a y f r o m the United States. At the start of the 1980s, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s h o m e b a s e f o r 4 2 p e r c e n t of T N C s , f o l l o w e d by the U n i t e d K i n g d o m (14.5 p e r c e n t ) , N e t h e r l a n d s (7.8 p e r c e n t ) . West G e r m a n y (7.4 p e r c e n t ) , a n d J a p a n (7.3 percent). 4 X But a d e c a d e later Fortune m a g a z i n e ' s list of t h e t o p " G l o b a l 5 0 0 " T N C s s h o w e d U . S . and British f i r m s d o w n to 31 p e r c e n t and 8 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , of the total. J a p a n e s e f i r m s had risen to 23 p e r c e n t , with G e r m a n and F r e n c h f i r m s at 6 p e r c e n t e a c h . 4 4 Of the 100 largest t r a n s n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s , 6 7 w e r e U . S . - b a s e d in 1963. 58 in 1971. 4 7 in 1979, 2 5 in 1990, 5 " a n d (see T a b l e 2.3) only 22 in 1997. J a p a n e s e T N C s n o w h e a d the top 100 list with 30, inc l u d i n g 5 of the t o p 10. and G e r m a n T N C s h o l d 15 s p o t s . In b a n k i n g , U . S . - b a s e d t r a n s n a t i o n a l s , led by C i t i c o r p , B a n k of A m e r i c a , a n d C h a s e M a n h a t t a n , held 4 4 of the top 100 p o s i t i o n s ( a n d 5 3 p e r c e n t of all bank deposits) in 1956. By 1978, h o w e v e r , the U.S. p o s i t i o n had s l i p p e d to 15 of the t o p 100 p o s i t i o n s and 15 p e r c e n t of d e p o s i t s . 5 1 A n d in the 1990s, s t i f f e r c o m p e t i t i o n and m e r g e r s a m o n g E u r o p e a n and J a p a n e s e b a n k s f u r t h e r red u c e d the U.S. p o s i t i o n . In 1995 J a p a n e s e b a n k s o c c u p i e d 15 of the t o p 2 0 T N B p o s i t i o n s by a s s e t s ; C h a s e M a n h a t t a n , by v i r t u e of b e i n g b o u g h t by C h e m i c a l B a n k i n g , w a s l a s t . 5 2 S t a t e - a n d p r i v a t e l y o w n e d c o m p a n i e s in E u r o p e , A s i a , a n d Latin A m e r i c a h a v e also e m e r g e d to c o m p e t e with f i r m s of t h e T r i l a t e r a l c o u n t r i e s — t h r e e S o u t h K o r e a n c o n g l o m e r a t e s , f o r ins t a n c e , rank a m o n g the t o p 100 T N C s , a l t h o u g h t h e s e t o g e t h e r c l a i m only a tiny p e r c e n t a g e of all direct i n v e s t m e n t a b r o a d . I n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to the g r o w t h of T N C s h a s b e e n t h e e x p a n d e d inf l u e n c e of m u l t i l a t e r a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , n o t a b l y t h e I M F a n d t h e World B a n k . C o m m a n d i n g m u l t i b i l l i o n - d o l l a r b u d g e t s , t h e y are the k e y ins t i t u t i o n a l l i n k s b e t w e e n the T r i l a t e r a l s t a t e s on t h e o n e side a n d b o r r o w ing c o u n t r i e s on the o t h e r . 5 1 T h e B a n k ' s f u n c t i o n s i n c l u d e l o w - i n t e r e s t l o a n s a n d a s s i s t a n c e on e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s p r o p o s e d by und e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s in t w o c l a s s e s : t h o s e a b l e to p a y n e a r - m a r k e t interest rates, and the poorest, which are eligible for interest-free loans.54 E a c h y e a r the B a n k c o m m i t s b e t w e e n $ 2 0 b i l l i o n a n d $ 2 5 b i l l i o n in l o a n s , a b o u t d o u b l e the f i g u r e f o r 1981; s o m e $ 6 billion g o e s to the p o o r e s t c o u n tries. G o v e r n m e n t s a n d g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s r e c e i v e the l o a n s , w h i c h are t h e n used to c o n t r a c t with p r i v a t e f i r m s on d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . In r e c e n t y e a r s , r e s p o n d i n g to w i d e s p r e a d c r i t i c i s m of its d i s a s t r o u s r e c o r d of l o a n s

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f o r d a m s t h a t d i s p l a c e d (or w o u l d h a v e d i s p l a c e d ) m i l l i o n s of r u r a l p o o r and led to p o p u l a r p r o t e s t s , the B a n k h a s e m p h a s i z e d s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s s u c h as r e f o r e s t a t i o n , p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l , a n d f a m i l y p l a n n i n g . 5 5 D e c i s i o n s on B a n k p o l i c y a n d p r o g r a m s rest w i t h its s h a r e h o l d e r c o n t r i b u t o r s , 4 5 p e r c e n t of w h i c h are the s e v e n m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s — t h e G r o u p of 7, o f t e n n o w the G r o u p of 8 to i n c l u d e R u s s i a — h e a d e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h a 17 p e r c e n t s h a r e . T h u s , in an o r g a n i z a t i o n of 180 m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n a n d d o e s w i e l d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e , i n c l u d i n g a v e t o p o w e r on s o m e m a t t e r s a n d the ability to s t e e r b u s i n e s s in the d i r e c t i o n of U . S . b a n k s . T h e I M F . w h o s e initial r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w e r e to h e l p c o u n t r i e s k e e p their i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a y m e n t s in b a l a n c e and their e x c h a n g e rates stable, has g a i n e d n o t o r i e t y in the p r e s e n t e r a of g l o b a l i n d e b t e d n e s s by m a k i n g its " s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t " l o a n s c o n d i t i o n a l on m a j o r c h a n g e s in social a n d e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s by the r e c i p i e n t g o v e r n m e n t . F o u n d e d in 1946 w i t h t h i r t y - n i n e m e m b e r s , the F u n d n o w h a s 182 m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s that by 1997 h a d p a i d in o v e r $ 2 0 0 billion. 5t > T h e U . S . share is $ 3 8 b i l l i o n , w h i c h a g a i n g i v e s it p r e d o m i n a n t v o t i n g p o w e r : 18.25 p e r c e n t , as c o m p a r e d with 5.67 p e r c e n t each f o r G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n and 5 . 1 0 p e r c e n t e a c h for F r a n c e and Britain. ( T h e q u o t a d i s t r i b u t i o n is a l s o r e f l e c t e d in the F u n d ' s l e a d e r ship: T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the p r e s i d e n t is an A m e r i c a n , and the m a n a g i n g d i r e c tor is a E u r o p e a n . ) I M F loans and c r e d i t s , w h i c h t a k e t h e f o r m of special d r a w i n g r i g h t s ( S D R s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t the a v e r a g e w o r t h of the f i v e m a j o r contributors' currencies), have grown astronomically. They were around $ 4 billion in 1970, $ 1 4 b i l l i o n in 1980, and $ 5 7 b i l l i o n ( 4 4 b i l l i o n S D R ) in 1998. S i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , d i r e c t aid in g r a n t s a n d l o a n s by the i n d u s t r i a l ized states to the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s h a s d e c l i n e d f r o m 5 5 p e r c e n t to less t h a n 2 0 p e r c e n t of w o r l d w i d e e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e . T h e r e is n o i o n g e r a f r e e l u n c h , a n d m o n e y is p o w e r . P r i v a t e capital f l o w s h a v e largely t a k e n t h e p l a c e of aid, e s p e c i a l l y in the 1990s as i n d e b t e d n e s s has s o a r e d a n d t h e e n d of the C o l d W a r h a s l i f t e d t h e lid o n m a n y e c o n o m i e s . 5 7 Priv a t e s o u r c e s a c c o u n t e d f o r 77 p e r c e n t ( $ 1 8 4 b i l l i o n ) of all f i n a n c i n g to S e c o n d and T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s in 1995, a n d 85 p e r c e n t ( $ 2 4 3 b i l l i o n ) in 1996. F D I a n d p o r t f o l i o e q u i t y h a v e b e c o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t in s u c h f i n a n c i n g — t o g e t h e r , t h e y w e r e o v e r $ 1 2 7 b i l l i o n in 1995 a n d $ 1 5 4 b i l l i o n in 1996. T h a t still m a k e s t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the m u l t i l a t e r a l a g e n c i e s ( i n c l u d i n g v a r i o u s r e g i o n a l b a n k s s u c h as t h e A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) and their commercial b a n k p a r t n e r s c r i t i c a l in k e e p i n g S e c o n d a n d T h i r d W o r l d e c o n o m i e s a f l o a t . In 1995, f o r i n s t a n c e , m u l t i l a t e r a l a g e n c i e s d i s p e n s e d $ 1 1 . 1 billion a n d c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s $ 2 6 . 5 b i l l i o n . W i t h t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g a m o u n t of d e v e l o p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e tied to d e c i s i o n s in c o r p o r a t e - s t y l e b o a r d r o o m s ,

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p o l i t i c s is i n e s c a p a b l e . A s o n e j o u r n a l i s t q u i p p e d , r e f e r r i n g to t h e n e w p r o m i n e n c e of a c o u n t r y ' s c r e d i t r a t i n g s : " Y o u c o u l d a l m o s t say that w e live a g a i n in a t w o - s u p e r p o w e r w o r l d . T h e r e is t h e U . S . a n d t h e r e is M o o d y ' s , " r e f e r r i n g to M o o d y ' s I n v e s t o r s S e r v i c e . Inc., w h i c h g r a d e s countries' investment climate.58 T h e I M F and the W o r l d Bank c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s the s e r v a n t s of the g o v e r n m e n t s that p r o v i d e their o p e r a t i n g b u d g e t s . Yet they c l a i m to m a k e l o a n s a n d o f f e r a d v i c e on strictly e c o n o m i c c r i t e r i a . But t h e s e c l a i m s d o not s t a n d up to the e v i d e n c e . , 9 T h e p r e p o n d e r a n t role of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e o t h e r G r o u p of 8 m e m b e r s in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s e n s u r e s that their p r e f e r e n c e s will be f u l l y aired and p r o b a b l y f o l l o w e d . In e s s e n c e , those are t h e s a m e as t h e p r e f e r e n c e s of t h e t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d b a n k s : s t a b l e , o r d e r l y g r o w t h , o p e n - m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s , a n d a f o c u s on e x p o r t s . N e c e s s a r i l y , the I M F and the W o r l d B a n k a l s o f a v o r s a f e c l i m a t e s f o r inv e s t m e n t , w h i c h t y p i c a l l y m e a n s a " d i s c i p l i n e d " (i.e.. n o n u n i o n ) l a b o r f o r c e , n o strikes, g o v e r n m e n t s c o m m i t t e d to law and order, tax a d v a n t a g e s , l i m i t e d l a b o r a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n s f o r f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s , and s t r o n g s u p p o r t of the p r i v a t e sector, w h i c h f a v o r s the w e a l t h i e s t local e n t r e p r e n e u r s . S i n c e the g o v e r n m e n t s t h e s e T N C s a n d m u l t i l a t e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s d e a l with u s u a l l y a r e r u n n i n g b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s d e f i c i t s a n d a r e d e e p l y in d e b t , the r e c o m m e n d e d p o l i c y (if they w a n t a l o a n ) is to s h a r p l y c u t b a c k on s o c i a l w e l f a r e s p e n d i n g , s t e p u p e x p o r t s to e a r n f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e , and o p e n the m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d s e r v i c e s s e c t o r s to f o r e i g n intere s t s . A s w e will see in t h e third c a s e study, s u c h a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n f r o m the I M F or the B a n k directly s e r v e s the interests of T N C s , w h i c h d o m i n a t e the e x p o r t i n g industries, and c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s , w h i c h can buy u p g o v e r n m e n t d e b t at a d i s c o u n t and will m a k e f o r e i g n l o a n s o n l y b e c a u s e the disc i p l i n e the I M F i m p o s e s on l e n d e r s a f f o r d s a h e d g e against their d e f a u l t . 6 0 T h e I M F ' s r e c e n t h i s t o r y of m o v i n g f r o m f a c i l i t a t o r to l e n d e r a l s o h e l p s a c c o u n t f o r its i n c r e a s i n g l y p o l i t i c a l role. W h e n the f i x e d - r a t e s y s t e m of i n t e r n a t i o n a l e x c h a n g e , u n d e r w h i c h all c u r r e n c i e s w e r e p e g g e d to the U . S . dollar, c o l l a p s e d in 1971, the I M F a b a n d o n e d its o r i g i n a l m i s s i o n of h e l p i n g c o u n t r i e s b r i n g their i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a y m e n t s into b a l a n c e . M a j o r c h a n g e s in t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y — t h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n d e b t c r i s i s of t h e 1980s, the s h i f t of the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n and E a s t e r n E u r o p e to m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s , t h e l a r g e l o a n s in 1995 to bail out M e x i c o ( $ 1 7 b i l l i o n ) a n d R u s s i a ( $ 6 . 2 b i l l i o n ) , a n d t h e E a s t A s i a c u r r e n c y c o l l a p s e of t h e late 1 9 9 0 s — a l l e m p o w e r e d t h e I M F to b e c o m e a s o c i o e c o n o m i c e n g i n e e r . In e a c h s t a g e , t h e F u n d u s e d t h e h e a v y h a n d of t h e l e n d e r t o p r o d t h e b o r r o w e r , not a l w a y s s u c c e s s f u l l y , to a d o p t e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s f a v o r a b l e to t h e m a j o r e c o n o m i e s a n d their T N C s . T h e A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t h a s b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e to I M F i n f l u e n c e . In E g y p t in 1997, a n e w land law t o o k e f f e c t . T h e law o v e r t u r n e d t h e p r a c t i c e , d a t i n g f r o m the 1950s, of f r e e z i n g rents on land o w n e d by ( o f t e n

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a b s e n t e e ) l a n d l o r d s . W h e r e a s b e f o r e p o o r t e n a n t s c o u l d e x p e c t to p r o d u c e e n o u g h f o r t h e i r f a m i l i e s , a n d e v e n p a s s o n r e n t a l c o n t r a c t s to c h i l d r e n , n o w they w o u l d h a v e to pay w h a t e v e r l a n d l o r d s c h a r g e d or m o v e on. " T h e E g y p t i a n P a r l i a m e n t a p p r o v e d the c h a n g e s in the a g r i c u l t u r a l law in 1992, l a r g e l y at t h e b e h e s t of the W o r l d B a n k a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d , but t h e c h a n g e s did n o t b e g i n to t a k e e f f e c t until [ 1 9 9 7 ] . " 6 1 T h e m a i n r e a s o n r e p o r t e d f o r this t r a n s f e r of w e a l t h to the rich w a s the E g y p t ian g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n s i s t e n c e , c l e a r l y e c h o i n g the I M F ' s p r e f e r e n c e , that f a r m e r s p r o d u c e m o r e f o r e x p o r t and p r o f i t . T h e m o r e likely result: f a r m e r r e s i s t a n c e , o u t b r e a k s of v i o l e n c e , and a rush to the cities in s e a r c h of e m p l o y m e n t . A n d in I v o r y C o a s t , the I M F f o r c e d the g o v e r n m e n t to get o u t of t h e c o m m o d i t i e s b u s i n e s s — w h i c h i n c l u d e s the n u m b e r - o n e e x p o r t c r o p , c o c o a — a n d p r i v a t i z e s t a t e - r u n c o m p a n i e s in basic s e r v i c e s , such as w a t e r and t e l e p h o n e , in o r d e r to o b t a i n loans. F r o m the I M F ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s w e r e e s s e n t i a l to cut g o v e r n m e n t s ' c o s t s in s u b s i d i e s and b u r e a u c r a c y . But as A f r i c a n o f f i c i a l s s a w t h i n g s , the Ivory C o a s t e x p e r i e n c e a g a i n s h o w e d h o w their e c o n o m i e s w e r e b e i n g t a k e n o v e r by the I M F . and h o w m u c h m o r e o n e r o u s the t e r m s of a loan w e r e c o m p a r e d with loans to A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . N o r h a s the I M F ' s a n d W o r l d B a n k ' s r e c o r d s in s u b S a h a r a n A f r i c a d e m o n s t r a t e d that s o - c a l l e d a u s t e r i t y p r o g r a m s a c t u a l l y result in h i g h e r i n c o m e s o r G N P . h : In the u p p e r r e a c h e s of big c a p i t a l , w h a t o t h e r s m i g h t r e g a r d as s e l f s e r v i n g is j u s t i f i e d as p r o m o t i n g g l o b a l w e l l - b e i n g . C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s see i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as an o p p o r t u n i t y not o n l y f o r p r o f i t - m a k i n g but a l s o l o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in the T h i r d W o r l d . T h e y h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y lab e l e d T N C s " e n g i n e s of d e v e l o p m e n t " that t r a n s f e r t e c h n o l o g y , m a n a g e m e n t skills, and capital to industrialize a g r a r i a n societies, f u e l g r o w t h , univ e r s a l i z e i n f o r m a t i o n , p r o m o t e p r o d u c t i v i t y , and e x t r a c t r a w m a t e r i a l s f o r e x p o r t . A n d as the m o v i n g f o r c e b e h i n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e a n d p r i v a t e fin a n c e , T N C s are f u r t h e r r e g a r d e d by C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s as c o n t r i b u t i n g i m p o r t a n t l y to w o r l d p e a c e . 6 3 In c r i t i c i s m of p r o t e c t i o n i s t s e n t i m e n t , o n e T N C e x e c u t i v e has said: " R e t r e a t i n g to f o r t r e s s A m e r i c a i s n ' t the a n s w e r . If w e e r e c t w a l l s , w e i n v i t e a b a t t l e . A n d t h e r e is e n o u g h t e n s i o n in t h e w o r l d t o d a y w i t h o u t i n s t i g a t i n g t r a d e w a r s . W o r l d p e a c e , and its e c o n o m i c handmaiden—international trade and d e v e l o p m e n t — a r e far better served by an o p e n a n d f r e e flow of i n v e s t m e n t . " 6 4 T N C s a r e a l s o r e g a r d e d as " t r a n s m i s s i o n b e l t s " of c o r p o r a t e - g l o b a l v a l u e s a n d c u l t u r e : c o m p e t i t i o n , g r o w t h , m a t e r i a l i s m , f r e e d o m of e n t e r p r i s e , e f f i c i e n c y , d e r e g u l a t i o n . In t h e i r p a t h b r e a k i n g b o o k o n T N C s a n d their "global m a n a g e r s , " Richard Barnet and Ronald Miiller quote these w o r d s of an I B M e x e c u t i v e : For b u s i n e s s p u r p o s e s , the b o u n d a r i e s that separate o n e nation f r o m another are n o m o r e real than the equator. T h e y are m e r e l y c o n v e n i e n t

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d e m a r c a t i o n s of e t h n i c , l i n g u i s t i c , a n d c u l t u r a l e n t i t i e s . T h e y d o not d e fine b u s i n e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s or c o n s u m e r trends. O n c e m a n a g e m e n t unders t a n d s a n d a c c e p t s t h i s w o r l d e c o n o m y , its v i e w o f t h e m a r k e t p l a c e — a n d its p l a n n i n g — n e c e s s a r i l y e x p a n d . T h e w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e h o m e c o u n t r y is no longer v i e w e d as a series of d i s c o n n e c t e d c u s t o m e r s and prospects for its p r o d u c t s , b u t a s a n e x t e n s i o n of a s i n g l e m a r k e t . 6 : 1

We s e e h e r e the k i n d of t h i n k i n g that c r e a t e d the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n in the p r e v i o u s c e n t u r y and m o t i v a t e d c r e a t i o n of the s i n g l e E u r o p e a n m a r k e t a n d N A F T A trade b l o c s : c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of l a r g e - s c a l e o p e r a t i o n s , r a t i o n a l ization of m a r k e t s t r a t e g y and labor, the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e s of s t a t e m a n a g e r s to t h o s e of b u s i n e s s m a n a g e r s . A s B a r n e t and Mtiller say, the C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s ' p o w e r c o m e s not f r o m a g u n but " f r o m c o n t r o l of the m e a n s of c r e a t i n g w e a l t h on a w o r l d w i d e s c a l e . " 6 6 To be sure, this b o r d e r l e s s - w o r l d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n m a y be an A m e r i c a n m y t h , and it p r o b a b l y o b s c u r e s i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s in p e r s p e c t i v e a n d c o r p o r a t e s t r a t e g i e s a m o n g T N C l e a d e r s of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t i e s . 6 7 T h a t is p r o b a b l y w h y m e r g e r s of c o r p o r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s a n d m a n a g e m e n t s t y l e s are not a u t o m a t i c s u c c e s s e s and are not pref e r r e d o v e r m e r g e r s or b u y o u t s b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l f i r m s . J a p a n e s e a n d G e r m a n h e a d s of T N C s n o d o u b t look to a d v a n c e their o w n c o u n t r i e s ' as well as their f i r m s ' i n t e r e s t s w h e n trade p o l i c y in W T O o r E U is d i s c u s s e d , or w h e n i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s a b o u t , say. S o u t h e a s t A s i a or C h i n a are m a d e . A s j u s t o n e e x a m p l e , in 1996 C h i n e s e f i r m s w e r e f o u n d to be p r o d u c i n g p i r a t e d v e r s i o n s of m u s i c and v i d e o r e c o r d i n g s that w e r e c a u s i n g an estim a t e d loss of $2 billion in r o y a l t i e s f o r U . S . a f f i l i a t e s of B e r t e l s m a n n A . G . a n d S o n y C o r p o r a t i o n . W a s h i n g t o n p r e s s u r e d the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t to c l o s e d o w n the f a c t o r i e s . But at the h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e t w o c o m p a n i e s in G e r m a n y and Japan, the view was totally different. They wanted to cont i n u e d o i n g b u s i n e s s with C h i n a and t h e r e f o r e w e r e not at all i n t e r e s t e d in g o i n g a l o n g w i t h U . S . p r e s s u r e tactics. T h e i r r e s p o n s e to the s i t u a t i o n w a s d i c t a t e d not by their U . S . s u b s i d i a r i e s ' i n t e r e s t s but b y the p r o m i s e of C h i n e s e a u t h o r i t i e s to t h r o w m o r e b u s i n e s s E u r o p e ' s and J a p a n ' s w a y . 6 8 S o c o r p o r a t e n a t i o n a l i t y d o e s m a t t e r . But the g l o b a l view, the big picture, seems even more important. W h e n Third World e c o n o m i c nationali s m s u r g e d b e g i n n i n g in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , b e h i n d c a l l s f o r a " n e w i n t e r n a tional economic order" (NIEO), some Corporate Global leaders reacted s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y . 6 9 T h e i r c o n c e r n w a s t h a t u n l e s s s o m e of the N I E O ' s a g e n d a w a s a d o p t e d , s u c h as i m p r o v e d t e r m s of trade and d e b t r e d u c t i o n , g l o b a l u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d lead to m o r e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s r a t h e r t h a n m o r e c u s t o m e r s . T h o s e d a y s n o w s e e m l o n g past: D r a m a t i c c h a n g e s in the w o r l d e c o n o m y since the 1970s h a v e e n h a n c e d the T N C s ' o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g e c o n o m i e s . O n e c h a n g e is the w a y the w o r k f o r c e can be m o b i l i z e d . At o n e e n d of t h e s c a l e , that of s k i l l e d t e c h n i c a l p e o p l e , T N C s

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h a v e b e e n a b l e to f o r g e n e t w o r k s of r e s e a r c h e r s , e n g i n e e r s , a d v e r t i s e r s , and o t h e r s p e c i a l i s t s w h o w o r k in o f f i c e s l o c a t e d t h r o u g h o u t the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s a n d , i n c r e a s i n g l y , in e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t c o u n t r i e s s u c h as I n d i a . W i t h a d v a n c e d l a b o r a t o r i e s a n d c o m p u t e r s a n d h i g h pay s c a l e s , T N C s h a v e n o t r o u b l e r e c r u i t i n g t a l e n t e d T h i r d W o r l d p e o p l e , too. A s t h e s e s p e c i a l i s t s c o n t r i b u t e to t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d m a r k e t i n g of h i g h t e c h n o l o g y p r o d u c t s , it h a s b e e n a r g u e d , they b e c o m e I B M or V o l k s w a g e n p e o p l e r a t h e r t h a n A m e r i c a n s or G e r m a n s . 7 0 At the o t h e r e n d , that of u n skilled l a b o r . T N C s h a v e p r o f i t e d f r o m the e n o r m o u s i n c r e a s e in m i g r a n t w o r k e r s b r o u g h t a b o u t by p o v e r t y , r e c e s s i o n s , p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , and political u p h e a v a l s . A 1992 r e p o r t e s t i m a t e d that t h e r e are "at least 35 m i l l i o n p e o p l e f r o m d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s [ w h o ] h a v e t a k e n u p r e s i d e n c e in t h e North in the past three d e c a d e s ' ' and that their n u m b e r s are i n c r e a s i n g by 1.5 m i l l i o n a year. 7 1 At o n e t i m e these " e c o n o m i c m i g r a n t s " w e r e c o n c e n trated in t h r e e r e g i o n s — M e x i c a n s in the United S t a t e s , north A f r i c a n s and s o u t h e r n E u r o p e a n s in W e s t e r n E u r o p e , and A s i a n s in the M i d d l e East oilp r o d u c i n g states. N o w o n e also f i n d s V i e t n a m e s e in S o u t h K o r e a , I n d o n e sians in T a i w a n , F i l i p i n o s and I r a n i a n s in J a p a n , and R u s s i a n s , T u r k s , a n d R o m a n i a n s in the E U c o u n t r i e s . T N C s are not j u s t u s i n g this c h e a p , u n o r g a n i z e d l a b o r as it c o m e s t h e i r w a y ; t h e y are a l s o , a n d e s p e c i a l l y , i n v e s t ing ( o f t e n in e l e c t r o n i c s a s s e m b l y ) w h e r e it i s — f o r e x a m p l e , J a p a n e s e p l a n t s in I n d o n e s i a a n d T h a i l a n d , T a i w a n e s e a n d H o n g K o n g p l a n t s in s o u t h e a s t c o a s t a l C h i n a , and U . S . p l a n t s in the b o r d e r a r e a with M e x i c o . F u r t h e r t y i n g t o g e t h e r the w o r l d m a r k e t is c o n t r o l of i n f o r m a t i o n . E v e r since the d a y s of c o l o n i a l e m p i r e s , i n f o r m a t i o n — f i n a n c i a l , legal, m a r k e t ing, a d v e r t i s i n g , labor, n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s — h a s b e e n c e n t r a l to the a c q u i s i tion of w e a l t h w o r l d w i d e . 7 2 T o d a y , t h e a d v e n t of m i c r o p r o c e s s o r s h a s g r e a t l y a c c e l e r a t e d the p a c e of i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g a n d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of its c o n t r o l in the m a j o r g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . I B M , T e x a s I n s t r u m e n t s , A T & T , a n d M c G r a w - H i l l d o m i n a t e in c o m p u t e r s , d a t a p r o c e s s i n g , a n d t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e t e c h n o l o g y f o r w h i c h is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y in t h e d e v e l o p e d w o r l d . 7 3 W e s t e r n n e w s a g e n c i e s ( A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s in the U n i t e d States, R e u t e r s in B r i t a i n , and A g e n c e F r a n c e - P r e s s e in F r a n c e ) s u p p l y 9 0 p e r c e n t of all the f o r e i g n n e w s in the m e d i a of t h e n o n s o c i a l i s t w o r l d . 7 4 Western book publishers, film companies, advertising agencies, and radio a n d t e l e v i s i o n c o r p o r a t i o n s d o m i n a t e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m a r k e t s a b r o a d as they d o at h o m e . 7 ' ' C o n t r o l of t h e s e m a r k e t s h a s b e c o m e h i g h l y c o n c e n trated: A m e r e five c o n g l o m e r a t e s — t w o U.S., one French, one G e r m a n , and one Australian—exercise extraordinary influence over publishing and e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a . 7 6 S a t e l l i t e s f o r b r o a d c a s t i n g , d a t a t r a n s m i s s i o n , a n d rem o t e s e n s i n g of g e o p h y s i c a l c h a n g e s w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s are m a i n l y u n d e r the c o n t r o l of t h e r i c h e s t e c o n o m i e s , w h i c h a l s o u s e 9 0 p e r c e n t of t h e i r g e o stationary orbit.77

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G l o b a l i z a t i o n h a s i m p a c t e d m e d i a a n d t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s as it h a s e v e r y o t h e r industry, by c o n t r i b u t i n g f u r t h e r to the p o w e r of m u l t i n a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s . By early 1997, W T O had o p e n e d t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to c o m p e tition, s p a r k i n g a flood of a l l i a n c e s and j o i n t v e n t u r e s b e t w e e n the c o r p o rate m e d i a g i a n t s . 7 8 M a n y c r o s s e d b o r d e r s , s u c h as R u p e r t M u r d o c h ' s N e w s C o r p o r a t i o n , b a s e d in S y d n e y — i t s m a n y h o l d i n g s i n c l u d e Star T V ( H o n g K o n g ) , t h e London Times a n d The Sun ( B r i t a i n ) , a n d F o x B r o a d c a s t i n g a n d 2 0 t h C e n t u r y F o x s t u d i o s ( U . S . ) — a n d B e r t e l s m a n n A . G . of G e r m a n y , w h i c h in 1998 t o o k o v e r R a n d o m H o u s e , s o m e t i m e s c a l l e d the c r o w n j e w e l of U . S . p u b l i s h i n g . But t h e r e w e r e a l s o m e d i a m e g a m e r g e r s w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s , s u c h as b e t w e e n T i m e - W a r n e r and T u r n e r B r o a d c a s t i n g , a n d Walt D i s n e y w i t h C a p i t a l C i t i e s - A B C , t h u s f o r m i n g t h e t w o largest m e d i a c o n g l o m e r a t e s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . For the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , W T O w a s an u n m a t c h e d o p p o r t u n i t y to use n a t i o n a l d e r e g u l a t i o n of t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to e x p o r t d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and o t h e r A m e r i c a n v a l u e s " t o try to o p e n u p s o c i e t i e s . " as a t o p o f f i c i a l s a i d . 7 9 S t a t e t e l e p h o n e m o n o p o l i e s f r o m G e r m a n y to J a p a n w e r e f o r c e d into c o m p e t i t i o n in a m a r k e t e s t i m a t e d at $ 6 0 0 b i l l i o n a n d 4 3 m i l l i o n c u s t o m e r s as the n e w a g r e e m e n t p e r m i t t e d f o r e i g n f i r m s to o w n local c o m p a n i e s . ( M C I C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o r p o r a t i o n a n d B r i t i s h T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e a r l y j o i n e d f o r c e s in a $ 2 2 - b i l l i o n m e r g e r , but the a g r e e m e n t fell t h r o u g h . ) Sprint C o r p o r a t i o n allied w i t h F r a n c e T é l é c o m a n d D e u t s c h e T e l e k o m , a n d A T & T with the E u r o p e a n s ' U n i s o u r c e . 8 0 C o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of N A S A spy s a t e l l i t e s o p e n e d the h e a v e n s to g i a n t c o r p o r a t i o n s in t h e s a m e w a y t h e y h a d to m i l i t a r y power.81 S u c h c o n c e n t r a t e d c o n t r o l of c o m m u n i c a t i o n c h a n n e l s a n d i n f o r m a tion m e a n s p o w e r : the r e t e n t i o n , f o r sale or m a n i p u l a t i o n , of m a r k e t d a t a ; the d e f i n i t i o n of n e w s , i d e a s , a n d i m a g e s ; the m o l d i n g of p o l i t i c a l and social c h o i c e s ; and the e x p o r t of h o m o g e n i z e d W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l v a l u e s . It is t h e k i n d of p o w e r that s e r v e s R e a l i s t a n d C o r p o r a t e - G l o b a l i s t i n t e r e s t s e q u a l l y w e l l , e n h a n c i n g a large s t a t e ' s l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t the c o n s u m e r s t a t e and building profits and market control for a giant corporation. To Third W o r l d a n d m a n y S e c o n d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , it s m a c k s of c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m , a n o t h e r f o r m of d e p e n d e n c e , in this c a s e on ( m a i n l y U . S . ) e n t e r t a i n m e n t , n e w s e q u i p m e n t a n d r e p o r t s , s a l e s t e c h n i q u e s , and e d i t o r i a l t r a i n i n g — a l l of w h i c h a r e i n f u s e d w i t h the p e r s p e c t i v e s and b i a s e s of t h e i r c o u n t r y of o r i g i n . T h e T h i r d W o r l d is t h e r e f o r e i n s i s t i n g o n a " n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l information o r d e r " ( N I I O ) . At issue here, as w i t h the N I E O , is t h e p r e s u m e d right of T N C s a n d their g o v e r n m e n t s to s e a r c h f o r and t r a n s m i t d a t a a c r o s s n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r s ( t h e " f r e e f l o w of i n f o r m a t i o n " ) as a g a i n s t the p r o c l a i m e d right of T h i r d a n d S e c o n d W o r l d states to p r o t e c t t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y and identity, to m a k e d a t a - g a t h e r i n g a c c o u n t a b l e to s o m e a u t h o r ity, and to s h a r e in the f r u i t s of the i n f o r m a t i o n e x p l o s i o n . 8 2

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T h e r e is a third p l a y e r in the struggle o v e r i n f o r m a t i o n " r i g h t s " : p e o ple. T h e t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s r e v o l u t i o n has clearly e x p a n d e d the scope of political e x p r e s s i o n and has broad i m p l i c a t i o n s for h u m a n rights. In C h i n a at the time of the T i a n a n m e n c r a c k d o w n on d i s s e n t e r s in 1989, f a x e s a n d e-mail m e s s a g e s sent by students e n a b l e d the world to k n o w what C h i n a ' s l e a d e r s d e s p e r a t e l y h o p e d to h i d e . In 1996, the S e r b ( Y u g o s l a v ) g o v e r n m e n t r e f u s e d to accept the results of local e l e c t i o n s and t h e n s i l e n c e d an opposition radio station w h e n it b e c a m e the principal source of u n c e n s o r e d n e w s . T h a n k s to publicity on the Internet, the station was able to get b a c k in b u s i n e s s . A n d in B u r m a , the m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e p r e s s i o n led the d e m o c r a t i c opposition to establish an Internet site, called the Free B u r m a Coalition, as the essential m e a n s of getting i n f o r m a t i o n into and out of the country. An official with o n e h u m a n - r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n said: " C y b e r s p a c e s p a w n e d the m o v e m e n t to restore h u m a n r i g h t s to B u r m a . T h e p r o l i f e r a tion of i n f o r m a t i o n has put B u r m a h i g h e r on the U.S. policy a g e n d a than it ever would have been o t h e r w i s e . " 8 3 P e o p l e resisting C h i n e s e o p p r e s s i o n in Tibet and the I n d o n e s i a n a r m y in East T i m o r l i k e w i s e h a v e w e b sites. Of course, so do g o v e r n m e n t s . Still, r e p r e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s that s e e k to limit a c c e s s to c o m p u t e r s , m o d e m s , and satellite d i s h e s must c o n t e n d with technology that they t h e m selves rely on. In a w o r d , the Internet h a s b e c o m e i n d i s p e n s a b l e to acquiring i n f o r m a t i o n . In p o p u l a r h a n d s , it m a y a l s o c o n s t r a i n the e x c e s s e s of global c o r p o r a t i o n s . In a n u m b e r of i n s t a n c e s i n v o l v i n g l a b o r a b u s e s by s u b c o n t r a c t o r s of m a j o r T N C s — s u c h as N i k e ' s suppliers in V i e t n a m , Walt D i s n e y ' s in Haiti, and v a r i o u s c a r p e t m a k e r s in Pakistan and B a n g l a d e s h w h o use child l a b o r — t h e I n t e r n e t w a s a p o w e r f u l tool of h u m a n r i g h t s organizations for e x p o s i n g the c o m p a n i e s and c h a n g i n g s o m e of their practices. To one observer, this " s p o t l i g h t p h e n o m e n o n " h a s c h a n g e d the calculus of i n t e r n a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s . C h e a p l a b o r a n d other low c o s t s of o v e r seas p r o d u c t i o n m u s t n o w be m e a s u r e d against the s o m e t i m e s h i g h e r costs of a d v e r s e publicity b a c k h o m e . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to this view, T N C s m a y actually be in the p r o c e s s of promoting h u m a n rights they h a d o n c e b e e n repressing in p a r t n e r s h i p with o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s . 8 4 B u t such a c o n c l u s i o n s e e m s m u c h too o p t i m i s t i c . For e v e r y d i s c o v e r e d and c o r r e c t e d h u m a n - r i g h t s a b u s e to w h i c h a T N C is a party, t h e r e are d o u b t l e s s t h o u s a n d s m o r e that g o u n d e t e c t e d ; T N C s and m e d i a c o n g l o m e r a t e s , a f t e r all, share a n u m b e r of interests. A n d f o r e v e r y c o m p a n y that p u l l s out of a c o u n t r y , such as the s e v e r a l w e l l k n o w n g a r m e n t f i r m s that h e e d e d criticism of their i n v e s t m e n t s in B u r m a , h u n d r e d s if not t h o u s a n d s stay put. S o m e t i m e s e v e n a g l a r i n g m e d i a spotlight d o e s not w o r k , as w h e n (see b e l o w ) n i n e activists w e r e h a n g e d in N i g e r i a o n t r u m p e d - u p c h a r g e s in 1996. N o r d o e s c o r r e c t i n g o n e a b u s e m e a n that other a b u s e s in the s a m e place of business will also be corrected,

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as Nike's much-heralded reforms in Vietnam showed. 8 5 The spotlight phenomenon, moreover, tends to be as temporary as today's news: It quickly moves on to the next story, leaving the workers' plight behind. Unless some means of systematic verification is put in place, who is to say that a corrected abuse will stay that way? The assets and global organization of TNCs give them formidable power. Not all governments that allow in foreign capital are dependent on them, however. 86 Interdependence has widened but also diffused corporate power, above all in East Asia where Japanese and other TNCs have set up production and assembly plants. 87 There, governments have improved their bargaining terms with TNCs by steering foreign investors into industries that promote exports and by placing limits on their ownership shares. Even then, export-led industrialization in East Asia has generally been financed mainly by local capitalists and banks, which have formed their own powerful conglomerates. 8 8 Three of the four East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) (Singapore is the exception) have relied much less than the Latin American NICs (Brazil and Mexico) on foreign direct investment for capital. These qualifications may only prove the rule, however—and will be weakened because of the IMF's conditions for loans to South Korea and Indonesia in 1997 and 1998. Wherever they become established, TNCs acquire considerable political and economic power by virtue of the extensiveness of their operations. They hold a particular advantage over host governments because of their control of labor markets in manufacturing. 89 The fact that the presence of foreign-based TNCs is less direct and dominating than in previous decades is not equivalent to saying that they now exert significantly less influence.

Rivals or Partners? One thing the conflict over trade, investment, and information dependence shows is that Globalists understand the politics of interdependence much better than Realists. They know that people, as customers, can be brought into line far more efficiently by changing their tastes, habits, and ways of thinking than they can if treated as potential revolutionaries who have to be forcibly suppressed. Coca-Cola, powdered milk, Levi's, and CNN make more sense than a machine gun if one wants to get people willingly to adopt a particular way of life. Gunboat diplomacy represents old-style international politics; domination of information, advertising, entertainment, and philanthropy is the new style. Greater political openness in China, it can be safely predicted, will more likely occur because of the Internet and Star TV than because of pressure tactics by Western governments. This sizable difference in perspective was often on display during the Cold War. Corporate Globalists in the West at the heads of TNCs and in

Realism and Corporate Globalism

47

government c o m m e r c i a l bureaucracies tangled with government and military leaders over e c o n o m i c relations with the socialist countries. Interests in e x p a n d i n g m a r k e t s , p r o m o t i n g trade, and helping the b a l a n c e o f payments clashed with the R e a l i s t s ' fears o f helping the e n e m y ' s e c o n o m y and giving away state secrets. T N C s often were forced to abandon business opportunities, but s o m e t i m e s they ignored g o v e r n m e n t d i r e c t i v e s when the profit was irresistible. A f t e r all, c o r p o r a t e leaders have always taken the position that global business is more farsighted and adaptable than states. It can work with people o f any political s t r i p e — a s it has shown from A n gola to C h i n a . 9 0 Indeed, said an international banker during P o l a n d ' s debt crisis in the 1 9 8 0 s , " W h o knows which political system works? T h e only test we care about is: C a n they pay their b i l l s ? " 9 1 With the waning o f the Cold War, Corporate G l o b a l i s t s see even less r e l e v a n c e either for R e a l i s m ' s g e o p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e or, in the United S t a t e s , its more recent c o n c e r n about " r o g u e s t a t e s . " G l o b a l c o n f l i c t and competition, they b e l i e v e , will center on the big three e c o n o m i c c e n t e r s — W a s h i n g t o n , B o n n , and T o k y o . 9 2 L i b e r a l i z i n g trade and investment policies, and preventing trading b l o c s from b e c o m i n g discriminatory, are at the top o f the C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s ' agenda. T h e y h a v e b e e n behind e f f o r t s , therefore, to reform the I M F and strengthen the W T O . B y implication, although g o v e r n m e n t s direct these r e g i m e s , T N C s are the key instruments for securing and distributing their benefits. T h e s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e o f T N C leaders c o m e s from their b e l i e f that in a world whose future depends on markets and technology, superior management on a world scale will be decisive. Harvard University's R o b e r t R e i c h , secretary o f labor under President B i l l Clinton, has written a forceful presentation o f this view. National e c o n o m i c interests, GNP, and the nationality o f corporate headquarters do not matter much any more. Products, like firms, are increasingly the sum o f many parts and many minds from many c o u n t r i e s : " g l o b a l enterprise w e b s , " in R e i c h ' s phrase. T h e J a p a n e s e car and the A m e r i c a n tank are things o f the past. Nor is " f o r e i g n " ownership o f " n a t i o n a l " property, such as S o n y ' s purchases o f C B S R e c o r d s and C o l u m b i a Pictures in the late 1 9 8 0 s , important. In a single world e c o n o m y , what c o u n t s is the c r e a t i v i t y and adaptability o f individual f i r m s w h o s e staffs, spread out around the g l o b e , add v a l u e to the m a r k e t . C o r p o r a t e leaders assertedly care little about nationality: " I was asked the other day about United States c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and I replied that I d o n ' t think about it at all. W e at N C R think o f ourselves as a g l o b a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e c o m p a n y that happens to be headquartered in the United S t a t e s . " 9 3 G o v e r n m e n t s b e c o m e the Corporate G l o b a l i s t s ' e n e m y when they interfere with transnational m a n a g e m e n t , such as by i m p o s i n g tariffs and surcharges on imports, subsidizing h o m e industries, f o r c i n g their own T N C s to m a k e investments on "national s e c u r i t y " grounds that dollars and cents do not justify, placing sanctions and embargoes on trade with particular

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countries, enacting controls against capital and j o b flight, nationalizing foreign businesses, threatening to repudiate external debts, and forming cartel-like organizations (such as the eleven-member Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or O P E C ) to recapture control o f precious resources. To some Corporate Globalists, these interferences by home and host countries undermine the national interest and international security just as surely as a popular uprising strikes fear in the hearts o f Realists. Corporate leaders further argue that government interference with global business is useless, and sometimes contradictory. Take some recent cases of sanctions: During the second term of Bill Clinton, when containing repressive rogue states had a high priority, sanctions were imposed on Burma, banning U . S . investments and preventing the Unocal Corporation from carrying out contracts for gas field explorations. The U . S . Congress also enacted sanctions that affected certain companies doing business with Cuba, Libya, and Iran. Sanctions against China were debated as well. In the Burma case, Unocal pointed out the contradiction in the Clinton administration's policy between " e n g a g i n g " China through extensive economic ties and punishing Burma. T h e company also noted that, as with Iran, sanctions would only hurt U.S. businesses; French and other energy companies would happily step in. 9 4 In addition, no U.S. ally, least of all Japan (which buys about 17 percent of Iran's annual production), was willing to cooperate on Iran. As for Cuba and Libya, European and Latin American businesses and governments alike protested, forcing Clinton (who, largely for domestic political reasons, supported the sanctions) to abandon implementing them. Confronted with these assessments, Realists retort that T N C s are often the culprits when the smooth functioning of the global system is upset. They export j o b s and capital abroad instead of investing at home. They use tax havens and other tricks o f the transnational trade to avoid making their full contribution to national treasuries. They increase a nation's dependence on strategic minerals by going abroad to find them rather than searching for them at home. They fail to appreciate that the domestic political setting in which Realist state managers operate sometimes requires a positive response to demands for protection of home industry and j o b s . They get in the way of traditional diplomacy, and they even compromise national security by contributing to the economies of, and turning over high technology to, enemy states and potential rivals. W h e n M c D o n n e l l Douglas Aircraft's president for China operations said, " W e ' r e in the business of making money for our shareholders. If we have to put j o b s and technology in other countries, then we go ahead and do it," we can be sure that state leaders in Washington no less than U.S. unions winced. 9 5 All of this carping may give the false impression that Corporate Globalists and Realists are deadly adversaries. Indeed, there is a school of thought that suggests that T N C s are essentially "on their o w n " in world

Realism and Corporate

Globalism

49

p o l i t i c s — p o w e r f u l , a u t o n o m o u s f o r c e s that (Realist) g o v e r n m e n t s ought to leash b e f o r e they get any m o r e out of control than is already the case. To the contrary, I argue that the t w o parties c a n n o t d o w i t h o u t each other despite o c c a s i o n a l clashes over particular issues. To be sure, states and T N C s p e r f o r m d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s in d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics that inevitably bring t h e m into c o n t e n t i o n . E a c h j e a l o u s l y g u a r d s its s o v e r e i g n t y and r e s e n t s i n t e r f e r e n c e in its d o m a i n . But these c o n f l i c t s s h o u l d not obscure their overall s y m b i o t i c relationship. A f t e r all, c o r p o r a t e globalization is a matter of dollars, cents, and politics. E x c h a n g e rates, i n t e n s i f i e d c o m petition, p r o t e c t i o n of property, barriers to trade a n d i n v e s t m e n t , T N C and T N B mergers and acquisitions, promotion of sales a b r o a d — i n none of these areas can international b u s i n e s s proceed without g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t . 9 6 As D o r e m u s and c o l l e a g u e s c o n v i n c i n g l y a r g u e , the w o r k of c r e a t i n g trade r e g i m e s , W T O b e i n g the latest e x a m p l e , s h o w s that T N C s " d e p e n d e d not on s o m e a u t o m a t i c m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m p r o m o t i n g d e e p structural c o n v e r gence, but on p a i n s t a k i n g and o f t e n p a i n f u l political n e g o t i a t i o n . " 9 7 At the level of values (Table 2.1) there is little to d i s t i n g u i s h Realists and C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s . For w h e t h e r serving the state or the c o r p o r a t i o n , s u c c e s s f u l R e a l i s t s a n d C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s t e n d to be f a s c i n a t e d w i t h p o w e r , h i g h l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , loyal, elitist, c o m p e t i t i v e , s e c u r i t y - m i n d e d , and a n x i o u s to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l . Both g r o u p s set high store on o r d e r and stability, a l t h o u g h for d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s : for Realists, to m a i n t a i n state security against d i s s i d e n t s ; for C o r p o r a t e Globalists, to e n s u r e an open m a r ket. Finally, the v a l u e s that both g r o u p s cultivate and r e w a r d , at both the p e r s o n a l a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c l e v e l s , are the s a m e : a " c a n - d o " p r a g m a t i s m , f i r m r e s o l v e , m a c h o t o u g h n e s s , s e c r e t i v e n e s s , a d i s d a i n for d e m o c r a c y , 9 8 and s o m e t i m e s racial and sexual biases. A revealing insight to the consensual w o r l d v i e w of Realists and C o r p o rate Globalists has been provided by t w o writers for Der Spiegel." Behind closed doors in San Francisco, s o m e of the world's most p o w e r f u l men gathered in 1996. Their vision for the next m i l l e n n i u m is " 2 0 / 8 0 " : T w e n t y percent of the population will be able to p r o d u c e all the g o o d s and services for the other 8 0 percent. N o m o r e m i d d l e class; people will either " h a v e lunch or be l u n c h , " one U.S. executive suggested. So the m a j o r challenge as these men see it is h o w to keep all those r e d u n d a n t workers occupied. S o m e c o m bination of w e l f a r e — b u t not f r o m c o r p o r a t i o n s — a n d m i n d - d e a d e n i n g entert a i n m e n t — " t i t t y t a i n m e n t , " suggested Z b i g n i e w Brzezinski, f o r m e r national security adviser to President J i m m y C a r t e r — i s one answer. It is a d a r k vision, too dark to d a r e articulate publicly. Yet it is o n the record f r o m those w h o are s h a p i n g the next c e n t u r y f o r the 80 and the 2 0 p e r c e n t : a vision f o u n d e d o n p e o p l e as surplus c o m m o d i t i e s , d o o m e d to m i n d l e s s tasks that will k e e p t h e m f r o m challenging the new p a r a d i g m of globalization. O t h e r s t u d i e s d o c u m e n t the r a p p o r t b e t w e e n R e a l i s t s a n d C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s in the c a s e of r e p r e s s i o n of labor in the P h i l i p p i n e s a n d o t h e r

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Third World countries. Third World leaders and T N C managers formed friendships on the basis of shared values and mutual interests in controlling workers: to maintain state and business security, and to make a fortune f r o m low-wage production. 1 0 0 The same situation seems to exist in the maquiladora assembly plants along the U . S . - M e x i c o border. T N C s and the two governments all look to benefit from NAFTA, which by eliminating tariffs promises to promote both U.S. investment in Mexico and "Mexican" trade (i.e., TNC exports). The attraction is Mexico's low wages and poorly enforced environmental and labor protections. 1 0 1 Even though differences between Realists and Corporate Globalists emerge when we refer to global norms (Table 2.2), these tend to obscure the important ways in which mutually supportive ties have formed between the two groups in order for each to achieve its own ends. "Live and let live" seems to be their common credo. And why not? As numerous studies have pointed out, governments benefit from T N C operations in many ways, including: •

TNC remittances of their overseas profits, which help to balance a government's international payments; • The ability to reward, punish, and thus influence small states, which major governments acquire by virtue of T N C , IMF, and World Bank loans and investments (the kind of leverage the United States has long exercised in Latin America); • The access and control TNCs provide governments over the extraction and marketing of strategic resources, such as oil, natural gas, and precious metals; • Support from corporate lobbies and media when dealing with critics of government policies, such as human rights violations in countries where both T N C s and governments want to continue doing business; 1 0 2 • The bonds forged by Corporate-Globalist officials with political and military elites abroad (sometimes by bribery), which create opportunities for their governments to acquire intelligence, strengthen friendships, and neutralize enemies; and • The transmission through these corporate bodies of political and cultural norms, for example, the "American (Japanese, French) way of life." The deal cuts both ways: Realist practices also make vital contributions to the corporate way of life, promoting and protecting T N C investments. The "safe climate for investment" that Corporate Globalists often require includes the military backing they sometimes call upon or like to have near at h a n d — s u c h as protection of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during

Realism and Corporate

51

Globalism

international tensions in 1 9 8 7 and 1 9 9 0 . It may also involve e c o n o m i c retaliation g o v e r n m e n t s can use or threaten against countries that do not fairly treat " t h e i r " T N C s or that seek to weaken a T N C ' s investment position relative to that o f local firms. And a safe c l i m a t e most d e f i n i t e l y means the personal i n v o l v e m e n t o f s e n i o r g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s to strike huge business deals on b e h a l f o f their nationals. O n c e it b e c a m e clear that the f o r m e r S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s o f Central A s i a situated around the C a s p i a n S e a . such as Azerbaijan and Kazakstan, were sitting atop hundreds o f billions o f dollars' worth o f oil and natural gas, a veritable gold rush ensued. Oil company executives and former and present government officials from several countries (the United States, China, Iran, R u s s i a ) descended on the area, attracted not j u s t by the potential profits but j u s t as much by the g e o p o l i t i c a l b o n a n z a — a n alternative to r e l i a n c e on O P E C ' s oil and a c h a n c e to influence the political c o m p l e x i o n o f the entire r e g i o n . 1 0 3 G o v e r n m e n t s are not only facilitators for T N C s ; they often

create

market opportunities for them. For instance, their " a i d " to food-poor countries may be tied to the purchase o f T N C m a c h i n e r y , p r o c e s s i n g equipment, and seeds, or to g r o w i n g cash crops that can be c o n s u m e d l o c a l l y (such as t o b a c c o ) or exported (from avocados to strawberries). Promoting its own nationals' trade, private investment, and loans is part o f a foreign embassy's

business. G o v e r n m e n t s

also f a c i l i t a t e o v e r s e a s

investment

through favorable tax policies (such as the U . S . foreign tax credit and deferred tax on repatriated profits); insurance against nationalization o f foreign assets (as in the U . S . O v e r s e a s Private Investment Corporation); legislation

to deny bilateral

and multilateral

aid to a g o v e r n m e n t

that

nationalizes private investments (the H i c k e n l o o p e r and G o n z a l e z amendments o f the U . S . C o n g r e s s ) ; antitrust relief (which enabled the m a j o r U . S . oil c o m p a n i e s to b e c o m e dominant in the M i d d l e E a s t ) ; direct subsidies (such as o f the nuclear and oil industries in the United States and agricultural exports in Europe); deregulation and nonregulation o f production and c o m m e r c e (oil in the first c a s e ; the " d u m p i n g " o f unsafe and unproven products abroad in the second c a s e ) ; removal o f bureaucratic obstacles to corporate sales (such as the Clinton administration's approval o f militarily sensitive t e c h n o l o g i e s and information to C h i n a for its aerospace program); privatization o f formerly state-owned enterprises (such as C h i n a ' s search for foreign partners for its bankrupt state-owned enterprises [ S O E s ] and even s o m e military-owned enterprises; or, in Haiti f o l l o w i n g the U . S . military intervention, pressure on the government by Washington and the foreign-aid c o m m u n i t y to sell o f f state enterprises as a condition o f international a s s i s t a n c e , the p r o b a b l e b e n e f i c i a r i e s b e i n g the

international

b a n k e r s and T N C s ) ; 1 0 4 and n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in those c o r p o r a t e p r a c t i c e s (such as transfer pricing and E u r o d o l l a r market b o r r o w i n g ) that c o s t national treasuries and taxpayers huge sums o f money.

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One does not find corporations complaining about these benefits—nor about domestic law that is typically e n f o r c e d loosely to permit multibillion-dollar mergers and acquisitions among the largest corporations; interlocking directorates among the biggest banks, insurance companies, energy corporations, and related institutions; tax-deductible lobbying and research; and personnel m o v e m e n t s between the private and public sectors that (as in the case of U.S. military officers who m o v e from the Pentagon to military industries) smack of conflicts of interest. Nor do T N C s quarrel with direct government interventions in their behalf, as when the t h e n - W e s t German government came to the rescue of its industrial giant, A E G Telefunken; or when Washington decided to bail out Lockheed Aircraft, Chrysler Corporation, and Continental-Illinois National Bank when they declared bankruptcy; or when President Carter froze and then permitted Chase Manhattan Bank to seize $6 billion in Iranian assets during the 1979 hostage crisis; or when President Reagan, despite his opposition to the Polish g o v e r n m e n t ' s crushing of Solidarity, floated an agricultural loan to Warsaw rather than see it default on its $27 billion debt to U.S. and other banks; or w h e n the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t in 1984 aided the transnational banks with an $8.4 billion increase in its c o m m i t m e n t to the IMF, enabling several Latin American g o v e r n m e n t s to m a k e p a y m e n t s to the banks and thus (in the strange world of international finance) qualify for additional loans and a rescheduling of old ones; or when the G e r m a n government, in 1995, awarded Dow Chemical a subsidy of nearly $7 billion to enable Dow to take over a giant petrochemical complex in the former East Germany, the second largest bailout in Europe, behind F r a n c e ' s $9.3 billion to keep Crédit Lyonnais, E u r o p e ' s largest bank, afloat; or, finally, when twenty-eight g o v e r n m e n t s in the Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t ( O E C D ) j o i n e d with the World B a n k and the I M F in pushing through rules to combat bribery in business dealings, a c o m m o n practice that T N C s finally decided it was in their interest to regulate because it limits economic growth. 1 0 5 T N C s and g o v e r n m e n t officials traditionally cultivate close ties with political and economic elites who, out of self-interest, welcome foreign aid and investment and the arms to protect them (and themselves). T h a n k s to these elites, special foreign-trade zones o f f e r i n g labor, tax, and tariff concessions are available to T N C s in m a j o r ports (such as M a s a n , Korea; K a o h s i u n g , Taiwan; and S h e n z h e n , C h i n a ) f o r product assembly and export. The same intimacy m a y exist in a g o v e r n m e n t ' s direct support of h o m e g r o w n b u s i n e s s e s , a partnership m o d e l m a d e f a m o u s by J a p a n and widely considered to be a principal factor in the dynamic economic growth of South Korea and other Asian states. The state's careful nurturing of these conglomerates has today yielded world-class T N C s bearing names such as Hitachi, Toyota, S a m s u n g , and D a e w o o . But excessive state-corporate closeness was also a factor in Asia's currency crisis.

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Sensitivity in s o m e societies to large-scale foreign investment does on o c c a s i o n lead to expressions o f e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m . 1 0 6 B u t most Corporate G l o b a l i s t s treat such resistance as a cost o f doing business. T h e y have c o n f i d e n t l y a s s e r t e d — a n d the e v i d e n c e supports t h e m — t h a t , on b a l a n c e , elites in underdeveloped countries can be " c o - o p t e d into senior d e c i s i o n m a k i n g roles in the m a n a g e m e n t structure o f the international e c o n o m y . " " F o r the most part," this writer, a U . S . State Department o f f i c i a l , candidly admits, " T h i r d World elites are even less c o m m i t t e d to human equality as a g e n e r a l condition o f humanity than we are. T h e y are talking about g r e a t e r equality b e t w e e n s t a t e s . " 1 0 7 S o long as C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s and R e a l i s t s can keep the dialogue over g l o b a l p r o b l e m s at the level o f governments and the elites who run them, and away from people's needs, they believe they have a lockhold on the future. That c o n c l u s i o n points to another: the often unholy alliance between T N C s and g o v e r n m e n t s to undermine, or simply ignore, human rights in host c o u n t r i e s . T h e o p p r e s s i v e c o n d i t i o n s under which women and c h i l dren work throughout A s i a for Nike, Esprit, R e e b o k , and numerous other clothing manufacturers are by now well p u b l i c i z e d . 1 0 8 In B u r m a , the aforementioned T N C s , U n o c a l and its French partner, Total, were charged with using e s s e n t i a l l y slave labor d r a g o o n e d by the S L O R C . T h e T N C s not only denied the charge; they pleaded i g n o r a n c e — t h e y didn't want to know where their money c a m e from or to what purpose its profits were put—and n o n i n v o l v e m e n t — t h e y didn't regard human rights as any o f their business. C h e v r o n ' s oil production in A n g o l a practices avoidance: Oil workers live and work in a secluded e n c l a v e , guarded by Angolan soldiers and totally d i v o r c e d from A n g o l a ' s desperate poverty and political c o r r u p t i o n — c o r ruption that evidently is fed by the skimming o f oil profits by government o f f i c i a l s . 1 0 9 Or take U . S . - C h i n a relations: T h e opportunity to sell C h i n a nuclear power plants, c o m m e r c i a l aircraft, and supercomputers evidently has priority over C h i n a ' s appalling treatment o f prisoners, which includes arbitrary detention o f dissidents, sales abroad o f goods produced by prison labor, and sales to f o r e i g n e r s o f organs transplanted from e x e c u t e d priso n e r s . 1 1 0 S h e l l I n t e r n a t i o n a l , the m a j o r f o r e i g n oil c o m p a n y in N i g e r i a , also revealed its priorities when the government defied international critic i s m and hanged nine dissidents, including K e n S a r o - W i w a , in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 5 . He was a prominent writer w h o had led his O g o n i p e o p l e in e n v i r o n m e n t a l protests against S h e l l ' s o p e r a t i o n s . S h e l l holds a 2 5 percent stake in a $ 3 . 8 billion natural gas project in Nigeria. It is widely rumored to h a v e c l o s e relations with the military g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h in 1 9 9 6 was voted as the w o r l d ' s most corrupt in a survey o f international

busi-

n e s s e s . 1 1 1 In response to the hangings, the United States announced rather mild sanctions against Nigeria. Not only did S h e l l j o i n with various organizations representing T N C s in protesting the sanctions; it announced that it would be developing new offshore oil fields for N i g e r i a . 1 1 2 S u m m i n g up

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the corporate attitude on such matters, the president of Levi Strauss & C o m p a n y said (in explaining a reversal of a previous decision not to invest in China because of h u m a n - r i g h t s violations): "Levi Strauss is not in the h u m a n rights business. But to the d e g r e e that h u m a n rights a f f e c t s our business, we care about it." 1 1 3 The head of Levi Strauss is apparently correct: T N C s do protest when business is hurt by a " r i g h t s " issue. W h e n the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t announced in 1996 that its official news agency would have to approve (i.e., censor) information f r o m Dow Jones, Reuters, and other news services, the c o m p a n i e s , j o i n e d by the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , strenuously o b j e c t e d . But protests even in those c i r c u m s t a n c e s are not certain. S o m e c o r p o r a t i o n s prefer not to bite the hand that feeds them out of larger market considerations. T h u s , Rupert M u r d o c h politely accepted B e i j i n g ' s insistence that British Broadcasting C o r p o r a t i o n n e w s be r e m o v e d f r o m his Star T V broadcasts; and w h e n the f o r m e r (and last) British governor of H o n g K o n g , C h r i s t o p h e r Patten, wrote a manuscript under contract to one of M u r d o c h ' s publishing houses that was highly critical of China, M u r d o c h refused to allow its publication. In the China pirating case mentioned earlier, non-U.S. corporations, concerned to protect their market position, decided not to join in Washington's protest. I have discussed some of the c o m m o n values, norms, objectives, and practices of Corporate-Globalist and Realist leaders. These have spawned several m a j o r criticisms (listed below) of Corporate Globalism. But they are also criticisms of Realism, for without the involvement of their h o m e governments, or their g o v e r n m e n t s ' willingness to turn a blind eye, T N C s would probably have been reluctant to act in the way they are accused. S o m e of the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 show that these criticisms, for the most part, hold true. Briefly, then, transnational commercial institutions (businesses, banks, and multilateral aid agencies) are said to have: •

•

•

•

Drawn Third World governments into a debt crisis, from which the only p e r m a n e n t e s c a p e is a total o v e r h a u l i n g of the global credit structure; Put profit ahead of m e e t i n g the h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t needs of the societies they have assisted or invested i n — o f t e n with the result of p r o m o t i n g social and e c o n o m i c inequalities, e n v i r o n m e n t a l destruction, and dependent national development; Likewise, with respect to the h o m e countries of T N C s , ignored the h u m a n c o n s e q u e n c e s of taking j o b s , capital (including t a x p a y e r s ' money), and technology abroad; Served instead the strategic and e c o n o m i c interests of elite groups in the d e v e l o p e d countries, the United States in particular, by

Realism and Corporate

•

•

•

•

Globalism

55

attaching conditions to loans that go beyond normal business prudence to incorporate political considerations detrimental to social underclasses; Taken out of the host countries (in the case of TNCs) far more than they have contributed to their betterment, as seen in the limitations on technology transfers, the slight improvements in employment, the weakening of local business, or the actual beneficiaries of profits and products; In the process of creating a global market and culture, contributed to the undermining of people's identities (whether with nation, tribe, or some other community) and to the intensifying of global conflict (for example, by promoting landlessness, poverty, hunger, and refugee flight); Incorrectly perceived the global crisis of underdevelopment as a matter of lifting Third World countries out of debt and their peoples out of poverty, when in fact what is needed is not more welfare ("aid") through external intervention but more empowerment of people to be self-reliant—not more "growth" from above but more equity from below; and Refused, finally, to confront the implication of these failings for global political-economy as a whole: that system reforms of the kind Corporate Globalists (and Realists, too) typically propose cannot touch the deep structural roots of the crisis, which begin with gross inequities of power and consumption in the industrially advanced countries and extend to privileged elites in the underdeveloped countries.

This last is the point of departure for the discussion of Global Humanism in Chapter 3.

Case Study 1: Postwar Planning for the "American Century" By all accounts, postwar United States represented the most extraordinary concentration of national power in history. World War II had claimed the lives of some 15 million soldiers and 65 million civilians, over 3 percent of the world's population. Europe and Asia were in ruins. But the United States, Pearl Harbor and many casualties aside, had not been touched by the war. In fact, its economy had benefited in several ways, including the start of systematic government-business cooperation on military production, the large-scale entry of women into the work force, and an unrivaled degree of productivity and production. Two years after the war, in 1947,

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the United States accounted for half of total world output; it also held nearly 65 percent of the world's gold currency, making the dollar central to all economic transactions. Finally, the United States had a nuclear monopoly: the "secret" (or so its leaders thought) of the atomic bomb and, obviously, the willingness to use it. Henry Luce, magnate of Time magazine, had every reason to argue that the rest of the twentieth century should belong to the United States. The dollar and the bomb were considered the foundation of the "American century" by the policy planners who, well before the end of the war, met to outline the future. 1 1 4 Each element represented an essential tool for remaking the postwar world. For Corporate Globalists, the dollar meant free trade and export-led growth, the integration of world markets, the primacy of Europe (including a revived Germany) as a market for U.S. goods, hostility to national socialist experiments in Western Europe, and, within the United States, big business and small government. For U.S. Realists, the bomb represented the ability to contain Moscow, rebuild Europe's defenses (NATO, in 1948), and centralize military-scientificindustrial cooperation at home. Heavily influenced by Roosevelt's New Deal, however, the Realist camp leaned toward big government, antitrust actions to undermine big business, and priority to U.S. capitalist goals (such as full employment) over foreign economic expansion. The working out of a compromise agenda that could incorporate both Realist and Corporate-Globalist priorities took place roughly between 1944 and 1947. Both the Marshall Plan for European recovery and President Truman's aid program to Greece and Turkey to contain international communism symbolized a historic synthesis. Multilateralism and anticommunism, as Alan Wolfe has observed, made for a new and enduring political consensus: Once anticommunism was grafted onto the multilateralism program, the political logjam in the United States was broken. Free trade, an inherently elitist notion, transformed itself into an ideology with mass appeal when it adopted anticommunism as its rationale. Every one of the limitations of the free-trade position could be overcome by an emphasis on the threat that the Soviet Union posed to the United S t a t e s . " 5

In emphasizing that the shaping of the postwar world was equally the handiwork of Realists and Corporate Globalists, I should further note the different but compatible lessons each "side" brought to its task. For Realists, the main lessons of two world wars were that there is no appeasement of aggression and that military preparedness prevents war. Their key untouchable item was (and remains) the military budget, and their central accomplishment in the years prior to the Korean War was National Security Council document NSC-68, which called for a major U.S. rearmament program to

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and Corporate

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deter the presumed and exaggerated Soviet threat. For the Corporate Globalists, on the other hand, the world wars had taught that closed national markets led directly to the Great Depression. Only open e c o n o m i e s in an open world market could prevent a repeat of that experience and the rise of fascism in Europe that f o l l o w e d it. Their greatest a c h i e v e m e n t was the 1944 Bretton W o o d s (New H a m p s h i r e ) C o n f e r e n c e , at which the m a j o r capitalist allies agreed to create a new international financial system to ensure currency and trade stability. The plan was U.S.-made by government and business leaders who had earlier carved out a "Grand A r e a " strategy of global trade. The strategy called for creating two new institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, in each of which the United States would have more than a third of the votes. How was it possible for Corporate Globalists to accept anticommunism and r e a r m a m e n t — " m i l i t a r y K e y n e s i a n i s m " (government p u m p - p r i m i n g through heavy spending on arms), as Fred Block has called it? Or for the Realists to swallow world e c o n o m i c integration? A f t e r all, each agenda would be expensive and would orient the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t toward a different set of priorities, one international and one national. The brief a n s w e r is that liberal (or "Cold War") internationalism, as Wolfe's above quoted remark indicates, satisfied the main constituencies of both groups. Within the U.S. Congress, for instance, European recovery promised new markets and jobs based on expanded U.S. exports. The Marshall Plan would not be a g i v e a w a y p r o g r a m . For the e m e r g i n g breed of Cold Warriors, in C o n g r e s s and in the administration, the plan meant a tough but also cost-effective stance against the Russians. In the country's higher circles, the combination of the Marshall Plan and containment had additional significance: European dependence on American military equipment for their defense; undermining of powerful C o m m u n i s t - b a c k e d labor m o v e m e n t s and of national socialism; the sealing off of Western E u r o p e f r o m Soviet penetration; and the first step toward E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i c ( C o m m o n Market) and military (NATO) integration. It was the kind of "growth c o a l i t i o n " that liberals and conservatives could get behind. A n d once the country was hit by the " R e d scare" tactics of the far R i g h t — t h e attacks on the U.S. Foreign Service for "losing" China; charges of atomic spying for the Russians; and Senator Joseph M c C a r t h y ' s allegations of a pro-Soviet conspiracy in high places—the era of isolationism was over. A quick look at the key individual actors and what they said in these pivotal years is instructive. T h e guiding principle of the o p e n door was succinctly stated by Secretary of State J a m e s F. B y r n e s in A u g u s t 1945: "In the field of international relations we have joined in a cooperative endeavor to construct an expanding world economy based on the liberal principles of private enterprise, n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and reduced barriers to trade." 1 1 6 A f t e r G e o r g e C. Marshall b e c a m e secretary, he argued (in his

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address of June 5, 1947, to inaugurate the Marshall Plan) that it was "logical that the United States would do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace." This m a d e perfect sense to the international corporate community, which, in the words of one leading bank executive, was " e x t r e m e l y troubled about the f u t u r e of f r e e enterprise" in noncommunist Europe. To him the Marshall Plan to provide $17 billion in e c o n o m i c aid w a s "a smart g a m b l e " because it would enable those who might otherwise take the socialist path "to play the game under the rules we adhere to." 1 1 7 But sending money abroad did not make nearly as good sense to Realists as did tough talk about the Russians. It was one thing for Truman to wax euphoric about the mission of U.S. capitalism and quite another, politically, to say: "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the m a k i n g . Only one language do they unders t a n d — ' h o w many divisions have y o u ? ' " " 8 One of his key advisers, Clark C l i f f o r d (a later secretary of d e f e n s e ) , had given him the c o n s e n s u s of opinion in T r u m a n ' s inner circle that "the language of military p o w e r is the only language which disciples of power politics understand." Clifford advised that the United States, with its military superiority, "should entertain no proposal for disarmament or limitation of armament as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists." 1 1 9 Here was a prescription for rea r m a m e n t — n o t merely the $13 billion military budget of 1950 but, as one of the chief architects of N S C - 6 8 , Paul Nitze, was even then urging, a $50 billion budget (which was adopted three years later). By early 1947 a general agreement had been reached within the U.S. elite that both elements of liberal internationalism—multilateralism and a n t i c o m m u n i s m — w o u l d be needed to ensure a " p e a c e f u l " future. On the eve of T r u m a n ' s c o n t a i n m e n t address to Congress, his secretary of def e n s e , James Forrestal, told him that since "the R u s s i a n s would not respond to anything except p o w e r " — a bow to Realism—the only option was to bring government and big business—the Corporate Globalists—together "in a single t e a m , " deterring the Russians and uplifting the Europeans in one coordinated effort. 1 2 0 This neat division of labor was not cemented, however, until the onset of war in Korea. The U.S. e c o n o m y went into a recession late in 1948, and there was resistance to increasing imports of European goods. C o n g r e s s was in no m o o d to r e f i n a n c e the Marshall Plan. T h e administration unveiled a new rationale for sending more money to Europe: to provide a def e n s i v e umbrella, in NATO, f o r the reconstruction of E u r o p e . This approach also did not have lasting effectiveness; economic problems at h o m e and abroad continued. The Korean War, and NSC-68, finally bailed out the Marshall Plan and gave liberal internationalism clear sailing. For the war

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d e m o n s t r a t e d the d o c u m e n t ' s wisdom in urging a rapid U.S. military buildup as part of an overall political and e c o n o m i c o f f e n s i v e to counter the Soviet peril. N S C - 6 8 argued that "the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history." A "total strugg l e " would be n e c e s s a r y — b o t h for e c o n o m i c reasons, to develop "a successfully functioning [trade and aid] system among the free nations"; and for military reasons, to restore world order, lest the United States be "overc o m e " by the forces of totalitarianism. 1 2 1 The postwar partnership of Realism and Corporate G l o b a l i s m in the United States has had profound consequences, some of which have already been hinted at and others of which are explored in later chapters. Most fundamentally, the partnership gave birth to the national-security state—a j o i n i n g of military-industrial interests with a nationalistic, expansionist great-power ideology. Protecting and promoting national security became the rallying cry. This structural p h e n o m e n o n , which can be found in many other political-economic systems, spurred ever higher U.S. military spending on behalf of allies and led to a number of direct and indirect U.S. interventions against " c o m m u n i s m . " But the economic costs of these activities—in reduced productivity, inflation, the flight of gold-backed dollars abroad, and the m i l i t a r y ' s absorption of scientific k n o w - h o w — q u i c k l y began to erode the U.S. c o m p e t i t i v e a d v a n t a g e in f o r e i g n trade. T h e EU and Japan caught up with and then surpassed the United States as societies on the leading edge of technology and skills. Before the first Eisenhower administration was over, it was clear that national security would have to mean not merely arms buildups and interventionism but also the expansion of private enterprise abroad. A business-government alliance representing both parties was crafted under Eisenhower to develop a "world e c o n o m y " strategy specifically oriented to fighting c o m m u n i s m with transnational capitalism. 1 2 2 Eisenhower premised pursuit of national security on his awareness of h o w interdependent the U.S. e c o n o m y had b e c o m e with the world economy. Twenty years later, in the Carter administration, A n d r e w Young, amb a s s a d o r to the United Nations, marked the p r o f o u n d impact that Corporate Globalism was having on Realism when he said that the "rightful role [of the United States is] as the senior partner in a w o r l d w i d e c o r p o r a tion." 1 2 3 But the war in Vietnam lay in the background. With its enormous costs in blood and treasure, the Vietnam War c h a l l e n g e d the R e a l i s t C o r p o r a t e - G l o b a l i s t a s s u m p t i o n that the United States could indefinitely f i n a n c e both " g u n s " ( a n t i c o m m u n i s t crusades a b r o a d ) and " b u t t e r " (domestic well-being within an ever growing global market). Since Vietnam, the " s e n i o r p a r t n e r ' s " position in the world e c o n o m y has gone through m a n y convolutions. As other industrialized countries b e c a m e competitive with the United States in h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y exports, " a noticeable shift in

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emphasis [took place] in U.S. trade policy, from a concern with more ambitious (and ambiguous) global objectives to a focus on more identifiable and short-term national economic interests." 124 The shift was propelled by other developments too: the oil "crisis" of the early 1970s; recessions in the mid-1970s and early 1980s; and the Reagan administration's monetary and fiscal policies, which resulted in a strengthening of the dollar that made U.S. exports uncompetitive and contributed to the first of many huge trade deficits with Japan. 125 The end result was to politicize trade policy as never before: Protectionist pressures from the Congress and business rose, which were countered by demands from abroad (especially Japan and Europe) for the United States to restructure its economy if it expected them to be more hospitable to U.S. exports. The "American century" was replaced by a tripolar world economic order, and the struggle for market position on a global basis was on.

Case Study 2: The Gulf War for a N e w World Order The search for a new world order has a long history. Its most ominous expressions occurred in Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, where "new order" meant the subordination of occupied countries to fascism. The more common pattern was the effort of state leaders ever since the inter-worldwar period to set new community-wide rules that might prevent another breakdown of the international system. The story just told about the reshaping of the world economy fits the second pattern, as does the U.S.-led response to Iraq's aggression in August 1990. Our analysis will be confined to exploring the mixture of motives and events that brought the war against Iraq to a head in January 1991. In those several months, a classic tale of Realism and Corporate Globalism unfolded: the search for a balance of power, the importance of territory and sovereignty, competition for control of a vital resource, efforts to trade arms for influence, historic and personal animosities, duplicity and megalomania, and ordinary people and cultures caught between destructive nationalist forces. The Gulf War, like any other, was the consequence of a commingling of historic grievances, contemporary political and economic forces, and precipitating events. But the crucible of all these factors was the eightyear-long Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which Iraqi president Saddam Hussein instigated. Iraq, a major oil producer, emerged from the war with a $40 billion debt despite help from the West (see below) and substantial aid from its Arab neighbors and OPEC partners, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Saddam chafed at Iraq's weakness and secretly took steps to develop a nuclear weapon. But he depended heavily on oil revenues to finance his

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ambitions. T h e Saudi and Kuwaiti royal f a m i l i e s , with vast financial holdings, no war debt, and Western partners to k e e p m o l l i f i e d , were not inc l i n e d to raise oil p r i c e s . In 1 9 9 0 S a d d a m a c c u s e d K u w a i t o f purposely overproducing oil to reduce Iraq's i n c o m e . He railed at Kuwaiti and Saudi " i n g r a t i t u d e " for Iraq's s a c r i f i c e in containing the Iranian fundamentalist revolution o f Ayatollah K h o m e i n i . T h e n Saddam resurrected an old claim to K u w a i t i territory: I r a q ' s and K u w a i t ' s borders drawn by the British colonialists were unjust, in particular in K u w a i t ' s northeast, where the rich R u m a l a oil fields are situated. S a d d a m ' s i m p l i c a t i o n was c l e a r : Iraq by right ought to be the power in the Gulf; the fat sheikhs next door, dependent on the A m e r i c a n s , could hardly pretend to regional l e a d e r s h i p . 1 2 6 On the face o f it, Iraq seemed to be the perfect opponent o f the United States. It was hostile to Israel, receptive to S o v i e t aid, interested in higher oil prices, and intensely n a t i o n a l i s t i c — a l l positions contrary to traditional U . S . policy. Iraq's dictatorship seemed out o f step with the winds o f democratic

change

that

were

sweeping

through

Eastern

Europe.127

Yet

throughout the Iran-Iraq war, U . S . policy, while o f f i c i a l l y neutral, had c o v e r t l y leaned toward Iraq. Not only were arms shipped via third c o u n tries; satellite and other i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n was shared, all without the knowledge o f the U . S . C o n g r e s s . T h e idea was to contain Iran's revolution and produce a m o r e pliant P a l e s t i n i a n attitude toward negotiating with the Israelis. B y the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , however, the United States was selling arms to Iran, too. T h e strategic assessment, endorsed by President R e a gan, was that arming Iran would thwart the S o v i e t s , to whom the Iranians had turned when it b e c a m e impossible for Iran to purchase arms from U . S . allies. ( R e a g a n also hoped, as the subsequent I r a n - C o n t r a investigation brought out, to gain Iran's release o f U . S . h o s t a g e s . ) In I r a q ' s c a s e , arms and other militarily useful items were sold directly ( s o m e t i m e s in violation o f the A r m s Exports Control A c t ) and indirectly, through third parties such as E g y p t . 1 2 8 D e s p i t e c o n c e r n s in s o m e quarters, including the P e n t a g o n , about how the " d u a l - u s e " military equipment might be used; despite Iraq's systematic abuses o f human rights, including the e x e c u t i o n o f political opponents and the use o f c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s against the K u r d i s h minority; and despite the State Department's listing o f Iraq as a terrorist state, U . S . national security dictated continuing a c l o s e but l o w - p r o f i l e relationship with S a d d a m . N a t i o n a l security also depended on the c o o p e r a t i o n o f big b u s i n e s s . U . S . - I r a q trade grew to $ 1 . 5 billion in 1 9 8 9 , and the U . S . - I r a q B u s i n e s s F o r u m , w h i c h included o f f i c i a l s o f several m a j o r U . S . c o r p o r a t i o n s and banks, self-interestedly functioned as an unofficial lobby for the Iraqi gove r n m e n t . 1 2 9 T h e U . S . State Department gave its b l e s s i n g to all manner o f e x p o r t s to Iraq, s e e i n g them as e n c o u r a g i n g I r a q ' s f r i e n d l i n e s s , helping moderate its human-rights abuses, and increasing U . S . business p r o f i t s . 1 3 0

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Nor were U.S. agencies and businesses alone in avidly providing Iraq with whatever it wanted. Soviet, French, Chinese, and British firms, among others, concluded major arms deals with Iraq during the 1980s. George Bush inherited, and built on, the U.S. policy of courting Saddam. Nothing would be done to antagonize Saddam and upset the always tenuous balance of forces in the Middle East. Washington was fully aware o f Iraq's emerging missile and chemical warfare capabilities, yet it took steps that strengthened both. First, the United States again encouraged allies, including Saudi Arabia, to sell Iraq conventional and other arms, partly to offset Soviet and Chinese sales. " B e t w e e n 1981 and 1 9 8 8 , Iraq purchased an estimated $ 4 6 . 7 billion worth of arms and military equipment from foreign suppliers, the largest accumulation ever of modern weapons by a Third World country." 1 3 1 Second, the United States itself fostered dual-use exports: " F r o m 1985 to 1990, [it] approved 771 licenses to export $1.5 billion in advanced equipment to Iraq—much of it useful for civilian and military f u n c t i o n s . " 1 3 2 Third, the United States extended $5 billion in guaranteed agricultural credits to Iraq, a good portion of which was knowingly diverted to military purchases. 1 3 3 These and other transactions by foreign companies gave Iraq missile and chemical warfare technologies that came back to haunt Washington once the war started. 1 3 4 Befriending Iraq in the conviction "the enemy of an enemy is a friend" continued until nearly the moment Iraq launched its attack on Kuwait. On July 2 5 , 1990, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq politely refrained from warning Saddam about Iraq's massing of troops near the Kuwait border; but she did make certain to ask him to " e x a m i n e the possibility of not charging too high a price for o i l " ! 1 3 5 Bush, despite a warning from his secretary o f state that U.S. military technology had contributed to Iraq's arms buildup, wrote a personal message to Saddam three days later that also proffered friendship and avoided mention o f the Iraqi f o r c e s . 1 3 6 Iraq's invasion must have sent shock waves through official Washington. War came in two stages. The first was Bush's decision in early August to send air and ground forces to Saudi Arabia under Operation Desert Shield, which was described as a defensive mission to protect the kingdom from a possible push by Iraqi forces beyond Kuwait. This action occurred as the UN Security Council passed the first of a dozen resolutions c o n demning Iraq's aggression and calling for various steps to isolate Iraq and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. 1 3 7 Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure were relied on to force Iraq's compliance. But as U . S . forces e x panded and were joined by other countries' forces, the odds in favor o f a military attack against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and against Iraq itself rose markedly. In November 1 9 9 0 Bush announced that "the coalition [of twenty-eight states] has an adequate offensive military option." A little more than two months later, that option was used; Desert Shield b e c a m e Desert Storm.

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Even though Bush and others in his administration acknowledged that the sanctions were working, 1 3 8 other interests apparently moved him to use f o r c e for a swift victory. Clearly, leadership of the new world order was primary among them. " T h e Gulf War put this new world [order] to its first test. And . . . we passed that test," Bush told Congress after the war. What was the test? It was w h e t h e r or not the only s u p e r p o w e r was willing (as Bush put it) to "protect [its] vital interests" in a "still d a n g e r o u s " world full of "regional instability [that] can be global." 1 3 9 The war was also a test of the U.S. m i l i t a r y ' s p o s t - C o l d War doctrine, which viewed places like Iraq as ideal d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of "mid-intensity c o n f l i c t " against heavily armed Third World o p p o n e n t s . 1 4 0 Finally, the war also tested the United States' ability to pursue its interests under a U N mandate, something that the Cold War and Soviet vetoes had often prevented. Bush could act as the United States saw f i t — f o r although all U.S. and coalition military actions were taken under blanket authority provided by the Security Council resolutions, they were exclusively under U.S. c o m m a n d . Other "vital" U.S. interests were the traditional ones. Robert Dole, a leading Republican senator, spelled one of them out: "o-i-1." By seizing the Kuwaiti oil fields, Iraq gained control of 7 percent of world oil output. Not that the United States had a critical dependence on Middle East oil; it relied on the region for about 11.5 percent of its supplies in 1990. But protecting the O P E C monarchs had long been part of the deal, struck by several U.S. presidents, in return f o r an assured supply of oil at r e a s o n a b l e prices. Another interest, critical to o-i-1, was the balance of power. T h e failed attempts to maintain it in the p a s t — b y containing A r a b nationalism, selling arms to buy influence, and supporting the monarchies regardless of their authoritarianism—did not stop Washington f r o m trying again. On this occasion, Realism was d o u b l e - e d g e d : It sought to restore the balance of p o w e r by r e m o v i n g Iraq f r o m K u w a i t and i m p o s i n g u n p r e c e d e n t e d controls on Iraq's nuclear- and chemical-weapons programs; but it also (as in the early 1980s) sought to keep Iraq whole, a counterweight to Iran, which helps explain why in F e b r u a r y 1991 the United States did not destroy Iraq's army, attempt to drive S a d d a m f r o m power, or support Kurdish ind e p e n d e n c e . T h e c o n s u m m a t e idea behind Desert Storm was to preserve the rules of the nation-state system, the liberal order, not to unleash uncontrollable new forces that might alter the Middle East map. 1 4 1 Short-term political circumstances probably also played a role in U.S. decisionmaking. Bush may have thought he could hardly let U.S. forces sit for a year or more in the desert while economic sanctions took their toll on Iraq's economy. The lesson he evidently drew from Vietnam was that he either had to use military power or lose it—and perhaps the next election, too. As Bush said after the war, the United States "kicked the Vietnam synd r o m e " by defeating Iraq. (His "nightmare scenario" was that Iraq might at the final hour agree to withdraw from Kuwait in return for small territorial

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g a i n s — e n o u g h to turn B u s h ' s v i c t o r y into S a d d a m ' s . ) T h a n k s t o the largely secret U . S . - S a u d i a r r a n g e m e n t s of the p r e v i o u s d e c a d e , he h a d the p r e p o s i t i o n e d b a s e s and e q u i p m e n t to apply f o r c e massively, and he d i d . 1 4 2 But he also had a n x i o u s coalition p a r t n e r s w h o s e support w o u l d inevitably e r o d e with t i m e . O n e s u c h p a r t n e r w a s the U S S R , w h i c h m a d e a lastm i n u t e p e a c e p r o p o s a l to Iraq not to the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' liking. Finally, the w a y s B u s h and S a d d a m H u s s e i n c o m m u n i c a t e d w i t h each o t h e r and with the world increased the probability of war. E a c h p o r t r a y e d the o t h e r in the d e m o n i c t e r m s typical of Realist l e a d e r s . B u s h said Sadd a m w a s " w o r s e than Hitler," just a n o t h e r one of those " r e n e g a d e r e g i m e s and u n p r e d i c t a b l e r u l e r s , " while S a d d a m r e f e r r e d to B u s h (and the U n i t e d States) as " t h e Great S a t a n " and said he l o o k e d f o r w a r d to " t h e m o t h e r of all b a t t l e s . " A n y p o s s i b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for S a d d a m to retreat via n e g o t i a tions were b l o c k e d by B u s h ' s insistence on n o c o n c e s s i o n s and n o n e g o t i a t i o n s . 1 4 3 I n s t e a d , B u s h talked a b o u t h o w S a d d a m w a s " g o i n g to get his ass k i c k e d , " m a c h o l a n g u a g e sure to e n g a g e S a d d a m ' s a t t e n t i o n . B o t h l e a d e r s w e r e on s o m e t h i n g of a c r u s a d e — B u s h f o r the n e w w o r l d o r d e r , S a d d a m for A r a b p r e e m i n e n c e — a n d , in that sense, w a n t e d w a r m o r e than peace. S t r a t e g i c " s t a b i l i t y " a n d b u s i n e s s interests g a v e R e a l i s t s a n d C o r p o rate G l o b a l i s t s p l e n t y of r e a s o n s to use f o r c e against Iraq in 1991. In that, they s u c c e e d e d ; the Gulf War turned out not to be " a n o t h e r V i e t n a m , " except in Iraq. 1 4 4 But in the p r o c e s s , these f o r c e s t r a m p l e d o v e r multilateral and n o n v i o l e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s , c o n s i s t e n t r e c o u r s e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a n d s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . C o l l e c t i v e security, and a n e w order, w o u l d h a v e b e e n better served, it has been suggested, if a multinational p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e had b e e n d i s p a t c h e d by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l to K u w a i t prior to A u g u s t 1990.145 A f t e r the Iraqi i n v a s i o n , g e n u i n e l y c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e d U N , not U.S., c o m m a n d of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and the w a r ' s p o l i t i c a l a g e n d a . 1 4 6 H a d s a n c t i o n s not b e e n so q u i c k l y a b a n d o n e d , h o w e v e r , w a r m i g h t h a v e been a v o i d e d . T h e r e w a s e v i d e n c e they had w o r k e d in the past and w e r e w o r k i n g a g a i n s t I r a q . 1 4 7 N o r w e r e n e g o t i a t i o n s g i v e n a c h a n c e , such as a F r e n c h p r o p o s a l to c o n v e n e a M i d d l e East p e a c e c o n f e r e n c e o n I s r a e l ' s o c c u p a t i o n of the West B a n k and G a z a — w h i c h w a s also in violation of international law and U N r e s o l u t i o n s — i n e x c h a n g e f o r I r a q ' s withd r a w a l f r o m K u w a i t . T h e will to w a r s e e m s to h a v e o v e r w h e l m e d all these possibilities. In c o n s e q u e n c e , w o r l d politics was not m u c h c h a n g e d by t h e war. To b e sure, I r a q ' s w a r - m a k i n g p o t e n t i a l w a s g r e a t l y r e d u c e d , the K u r d s in northern Iraq (but not in Turkey, a U.S. ally) were placed under U N protection, B u s h initiated talks on c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s t r a n s f e r s to the M i d d l e East, and the first head-to-head discussions b e t w e e n Israeli and Palestinian representatives began. But these were small steps indeed. T h e g n a w i n g a n d

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growing divisions in the Middle East between rich and poor, authoritarian r e g i m e s and p o w e r l e s s publics, m a j o r i t i e s and minorities all r e m a i n e d . Oil-rich states continued to take advantage of the failure of oil-dependent states to shift to energy conservation and r e n e w a b l e energy sources. And in payment, the United States led the way in selling record levels of arms to Middle East allies during and after the Gulf War. 1 4 8 T h e war was, in fact, a bonanza for U.S. arms manufacturers, one of whose representatives openly said that the "best thing about [the Gulf War] is that it established A m e r i c a n w e a p o n r y as the standard f o r the region for m a n y years to come."149 Above all, S a d d a m ' s regime, and perhaps other regimes, 1 5 0 evidently failed to learn the lessons that the United States had hoped the war would teach. Saddam was d e f a n g e d , but neither disarmed nor deterred. Not only was he able to rebuild Iraq's conventional arms industry; it is probable that Iraq is still researching and d e v e l o p i n g w e a p o n s of mass destruction ( W M D ) . T h o u g h obliged by a 1991 Security Council resolution, which it accepted, and subsequent promises to open Iraq to international verification that it no longer has W M D , the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t has without doubt systematically lied about the w e a p o n s it was working on b e f o r e the Gulf War, which included germ w e a p o n s and nerve gas; 1 5 1 the kind, number, and location of W M D it hid f r o m inspectors; and what its elite W M D research groups have been working on since 1991. 1 5 2 Consistently, Iraqi officials have dissembled when faced with evidence of violations by the U N Special Commission ( U N S C O M ) inspectors. These violations have been just one of several reasons for the periodic renewal of tensions b e t w e e n Iraq and the United States since 1993. U.S. forces have struck Iraqi targets on several occasions and warned of unilateral military action on others. Saddam has lived on the edge. Despite U.S. threats, severe e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s , and w i d e s p r e a d h u m a n - r i g h t s violations, he has been able to solidify his rule. 1 5 3 Although the U N ' s trade s a n c t i o n s were partly r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s u f f e r i n g of ordinary Iraqis, w h i c h includes widespread malnutrition a m o n g children, 1 5 4 most of the blame could be laid at S a d d a m ' s doorstep: lavish new quarters built for the ruling elite; new presidential palaces for himself; and continued heavy military spending, some of it m a d e possible by widely reported illegal oil sales (with U.S. k n o w l e d g e ) to Turkey and other neighbors. For its part, the United States has had no policy other than to keep the pressure on Sadd a m , such as by refusing to lift the limitations on Iraqi oil sales. This hardline a p p r o a c h has f o u n d little support, except f r o m Britain, a m o n g the other p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council. France, Russia, and C h i n a all have large b u s i n e s s deals p e n d i n g with Iraq; they have looked to end or soften sanctions as soon as possible and put the weapons proliferation issue on the back burner. Thus, in contrast with U.S. willingness to

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conduct d i p l o m a c y with other rogue states and rivals that have active W M D programs, namely, Iran, North Korea, and China, W a s h i n g t o n has treated Iraq as a permanent enemy, much as the USSR was. It has thus explicitly and openly defied the presumed new global norm of multilateralism. 1 5 5 The "unipolar m o m e n t " for breaking with the past has ended up by re-creating it.

Case Study 3: Capitalist Dominoes—The Mexican and Asian Financial Crises Economically, the top story in the p o s t - C o l d War era is emerging markets. Mexico and Indonesia were slated to be among them, m o v i n g up the ladder f r o m l o w - i n c o m e d e v e l o p i n g countries to NICs and ultimately, like South Korea, perhaps even to O E C D m e m b e r s h i p . G l o w i n g growth f o r e casts for these m a r k e t s were c o m m o n p l a c e , right up to the time things came apart. 1 5 6 But the currency collapse was only a part of the story; the rest of it had to do with strategic interests. By briefly focusing on the experiences of these three countries, we can highlight a number of troubling features of Realist and C o r p o r a t e - G l o b a l i s t practices w h e n it c o m e s to planning for the p o s t - C o l d War era. (A f u l l e r e x a m i n a t i o n of South Korea's political and economic development is in Chapter 4.) Mexico's rise came to a crashing halt on December 20, 1994, when its new president, Ernesto Zedillo, announced that the value of the peso had plunged, setting off an e c o n o m i c crisis that threatened to put M e x i c o in default on its massive bond and other international obligations. By M a r c h 1995 the peso's value had plunged to about 18 cents (it was worth 29 cents on December 19), and the Mexican stock market went into a tailspin. T h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t took the lead in organizing a financial rescue plan. It committed $12 billion of a total international credit line to Mexico, under the IMF's management, of around $50 billion. U.S. and international banking officials talked about saving the peso the way they used to talk about saving friendly governments f r o m c o m m u n i s m : the need to prevent falling dominoes ("avoiding contagion effects to other emerging markets"), to uphold U.S. credibility ("the feeling in the rest of the world would be that we are a nation in disarray, a country incapable of addressing a crisis"), and to preserve international system order ("the potential f o r global f i n a n c i a l apocalypse"). 1 5 7 T h e crisis was also an opportunity to publicize the point that all globalization is local, f o r any American with investments had to be concerned about M e x i c o ' s fate. 1 5 8 The story of the M e x i c a n peso is not, however, about an u n e x p e c t e d economic emergency. Nor is it f u n d a m e n t a l l y about the esoteric w o r l d of b o n d s and interest rates. Far d e e p e r issues of global and national i m p o r t

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were (and still are) involved. The inequitable pattern of M e x i c o ' s development; the unresolved contradictions of its internal political crisis; the continuation of the 1980s debt crisis in new forms; the weak foundations of NAFTA; and the perils of privatization, export-led growth, and overreliance on foreign investment to finance it—these were the issues that made an international crisis of the peso's decline and the U.S. effort to rescue it. In the 1980s, Mexico became a leading Third World debtor country as it sought to overcome a multitude of economic p r o b l e m s by borrowing. From 1982 on, Mexican authorities were engaged in constant negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department over how (and whether) to discharge the country's debt obligations. Specifically, the burning issue was what social costs—increasing poverty, inflation, lower domestic output, and unemployment—the Mexican government was willing to pay in order to satisfy the lenders' demands. Those came down to three: liberalize tariffs and investment laws, cut the budget, and privatize SOEs. 1 5 '' It was the usual structural adjustment package that, by the late 1990s, would make Mexico the single largest borrower in the I M F ' s history. The pain of the I M F ' s medicine was felt mainly by the poorer segments of the population: cuts in food subsidies and support of agriculture, with consequent price rises and reduced consumption; 1 6 0 a further widening of the gap between rich and poor; 1 6 1 a significant increase in the n u m b e r of poor people; negative growth in real wages; and no noticeable progress in land reform and other government programs in the 1990s that were supposed to help alleviate poverty. 1 6 2 However, opportunities opened up for wealthy Mexicans and foreign businesses to make fortunes, sometimes in questionable ways, particularly from the sell-off of state enterprises. 1 6 3 N A F T A , which got under way in 1993, offered a way out of M e x i c o ' s development dilemma: how to attract foreign capital, promote exports, create j o b s , and avoid f e e d i n g social unrest f r o m the I M F ' s victims. Both Mexican exports to and imports from the United States went on a steep upward climb. By the end of 1994 Mexico had matched Japan as the numbertwo market for U.S. products. Transnational corporations f r o m the United States, Japan, and the E U flocked to Mexico in anticipation of the end of most tariffs and other trade-limiting barriers. 1 6 4 C o m p a r i n g 1980 with 1995, M e x i c o ' s trade (as a percentage of gross domestic product [GDP]) and private capital inflow approximately doubled. 1 6 5 T h e Clinton administration was predicting the creation of 100,000 n e w j o b s in the United States (and only several thousand jobs lost) due to N A F T A , though its figures were c h a l l e n g e d by the U.S. labor m o v e m e n t and other sources. 1 6 6 M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m i c restructuring was cited by some U.S. bank executives as an e x a m p l e of how the debt crisis had been d e f u s e d through an adroit combination of financial instruments to reduce debt and e n c o u r a g e privatization. But while a glorious f u t u r e for M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m y was being

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t r u m p e t e d , and the M e x i c a n president ( f r o m 1988 to 1994), Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was being feted as a hero of free-marketization, a different picture was unfolding: a widening trade deficit (from an $8 billion surplus in 1985 to a $15 billion deficit in 1993); 1 6 7 increasing debt (roughly $120 billion, about half of which was owed to U.S. stock and bond holders and around $18 billion to U.S. banks); 1 6 8 and excessive reliance for capital to offset these deficits on sales to foreigners of very large a m o u n t s of risky short-term g o v e r n m e n t bonds, p e g g e d to the peso-dollar e x c h a n g e rate, rather than on FDI as in other countries. There were warnings f r o m U.S. officials (but evidently not the IMF) to the Salinas g o v e r n m e n t of i m p e n d i n g financial trouble. 1 6 9 But those only b e c a m e known later. At the time, both the Bush and Clinton administrations evidently sought to hide M e x i c o ' s troubles. Had it been widely known that the Mexican peso was greatly overvalued, M e x i c o ' s suitability as a partner in NAFTA would have been in doubt, and Congress might never have approved the agreement. An overvalued currency means weakened ability to generate exports, offer profitable returns and opportunities to foreign investors, and keep poor workers f r o m migrating (north, in M e x i c o ' s case). It also lowers expectations of larger markets and more j o b s for the m a j o r e c o n o m i e s (here, the United States). According to one source, "the central demand of U.S. fund managers [was] that Mexico keep the peso artificially i n f l a t e d " so as to give both M e x i c a n businesses and foreign investors advantages in the conversion of pesos to dollars. 1 7 0 The actual peso crisis ought to have occurred long before 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 ; that it did not is tribute to the c o m b i n e d behind-the-scenes e f f o r t s of the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t and international lenders, which always recognized that the p e s o ' s collapse would have devastating c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r the M e x i c a n system. Clearly, f r o m the standpoint of international business interests alone, a quick and g e n e r o u s response to the peso crisis was preordained. M e x ico's economy was too important, the size of its debt was too large, and the possibility of Z e d i l l o ' s declaring a debt moratorium was probably real e n o u g h . 1 7 1 It was a financial d o m i n o . But the stakes went b e y o n d economics, as the a b o v e - q u o t e d c o m m e n t s about contagion e f f e c t s implied. M e x i c o ' s political stability was the f u n d a m e n t a l concern. At the start of 1994, Indians of Mayan descent, long impoverished and neglected by the central government, began an insurrection in Chiapas state under the leadership of the Zapatista m o v e m e n t . In addition, two top-ranking m e m b e r s of the ruling party (PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institucional) were assassinated later in the year; one of them was the P R I ' s presidential candidate. W h e n Zedillo was chosen to replace him and was elected in December, he ordered the army to m o v e against the Zapatistans. 1 7 2 These events turned out to be only the tip of the iceberg. By 1998, eleven states showed evidence

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of popular unrest over repression orchestrated by local officials and their police or gangster hirelings. In short, a corrupt, violent, and traditionally authoritarian political system was tottering, and unless it was shored up, not only would foreign investors abandon Mexico; the United States would have a civil war on its southern border. In one year, M e x i c o thus went from being an emerging market to becoming a virtual ward of the United States and the IMF. Foreign monitoring of its bank-lending policies to prevent runaway inflation, and placing oil and petrochemical export earnings in escrow (in a New York bank) in case of default, were only the most public (and demeaning) of M e x i c o ' s sacrifices to stay afloat. 1 7 1 To survive and satisfy its foreign creditors, the Mexican government, which is to say the PRI and the richest Mexicans it represents, had to clamp down on the Zapatistas and other opposition forces; the situation in Chiapas has been volatile ever s i n c e . 1 7 4 The government also had to cooperate intensively with the U . S . border patrol to prevent a new wave of illegal emigration, prevent a recession that tight money policies might create, and limit capital flight. As many political observers foresaw, the bailout drew M e x i c o more closely within the U . S . orbit, not only in its economic policies, but also in sensitive political areas such as drug trafficking and prosecution along the border. In short, the penalty for M e x i c o ' s skewed " e m e r g e n c e " was a further erosion of sovereignty and surrender of the only recently imagined possibility of sustained economic growth. The government had to impose another round of austerity and structural adjustment, just as in the early 1980s, involving (in the I M F ' s words) " w a g e , price, and credit restraint," "acceleration in export growth," and further privatization. 1 7 5 That meant more bad news for Mexico's rural poor and for workers, who were devastated by the erosion of the peso's value and had no social safety net to rely on. M e x i c o was able to repay the $ 1 2 . 5 billion it had borrowed from the United States ahead of schedule, in January 1997; but that spelled no relief for most M e x i c a n s . 1 7 6 T h e long-term importance o f the peso crisis is that it sharpened the focus on the M e x i c a n political system's serious defects, which had been overlooked (especially in the United States) in the rush to liberalize and privatize the country's economy. Corruption is at the heart of M e x i c o ' s failure either to democratize or to develop in equitable ways. First, it is intimately connected with the drug trade, which flourishes because senior figures in the national police, the military, and state government are part of the trafficking network. 1 7 7 Second, corruption and drug dealing have crippled the legal system, which has been described by one Mexican law professor as "immersed in the routine violation of every basic principle. Nothing is respected. Prosecutors rig evidence and judges sell verdicts according to the highest bidder." Drug traffickers seem to have an especially easy time evading the law, as arrests and trials often are a sham.

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With graft and lack of accountability endemic in the system from top to bottom, it is no wonder Mexicans have the least confidence of any Latin American population in their legal system. 1 7 8 Third and most important, corruption has perhaps irretrievably harmed the political economy. It has stifled political competition, notwithstanding the reasonably fair presidential election of 1994 and the ending of the PRI's control of the legislature in 1997. 1 7 9 It has enabled well-connected people to lay claim to political offices. It has helped to perpetuate economic inequality: "Excluding African countries, Mexico has the largest gap between rich and poor of all but six nations in the world, U.N. and World Bank figures show." 1 8 0 And corruption has played an important role in the repression of minorities, such as in Chiapas, and in the violence of political life. By the late 1990s, Mexico's Realist and Corporate-Globalist saviors were touting its rehabilitation as an emerging market; but deep down, senior officials in the United States and probably elsewhere reportedly believed they were watching a powderkeg. 1 8 1 Mexico is politically and economically far out of balance, and its best hope would seem to lie in a grassroots movement for democracy and social justice. 1 8 2 The Mexico bailout forced international financial leaders to ponder the prospect of additional defaults by Third World countries. As Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, said, "In today's world, Mexico became the first casualty . . . of the new international financial system." 183 How many more casualties waited in the wings? The answer came soon enough in East Asia. This was supposed to be the era in which market forces would determine economic and social outcomes. The Asian financial crisis showed otherwise. Why, beginning roughly in mid-1996 and extending into early 1998, did the very same economies that had been extolled for their consistently high growth rates and technological leaps forward—economies that had seemingly shown the virtuousness of "Asian values" such as discipline, order, and hierarchy—suddenly become so vulnerable? A reasonable short answer might be "a potent mix of globalization, poor governance and greed." 1 8 4 These factors betrayed structural problems common to fast-growing economies. First, the Asian countries were done in by easy money—domestically, by loosely regulated banks too quick to lend, thus driving up the price of real estate beyond all reason; internationally, as in Mexico, by overreliance on foreign portfolio and direct investments, in the latter case from Japan. Very large sums of money poured into the so-called Asian tigers in the 1990s: $318 billion from European banks, $ 2 6 0 billion from Japan, $46 billion from the United States, plus another $38 billion in mutual-fund investments and around $50 billion in foreign investment. 185 Few investor institutions could see beyond the prospects of huge profits to the possibility of overextension. For the recipients—including Thailand, the first "domino"

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to fall in 1 9 9 7 , and I n d o n e s i a — t h e s e funds provided a temporary escape from serious e c o n o m i c problems. B u t they also created dependence on foreign funds to c o v e r mounting trade d e f i c i t s ; and h e n c e they represented debts and vulnerability. W h e n J a p a n e s e investors in particular shifted to other A s i a n l o c a t i o n s in the early 1 9 9 0 s , T h a i l a n d had to fall b a c k on short-term financial devices, and corrupt practices, to raise money. It faced the same debt crunch that M e x i c o faced. Investors fled and the currencies took a d i v e . 1 8 6 T h e story was different in the details but not the fundamentals in South K o r e a . 1 8 7 T h e r e , an e c o n o m y that had grown spectacularly on the strength o f exports and c l o s e s t a t e - b i g business ties, but nor foreign investment, confronted new obstacles in the 1 9 9 0 s . Trade c o m p e tition intensified, e s p e c i a l l y with C h i n e s e exports and J a p a n e s e multinationals in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , c a u s i n g very large d e f i c i t s . T h e United States pressed K o r e a to reduce trade and investment barriers. K o r e a ' s dominant business c o n g l o m e r a t e s , chaebol,

began to lose their competitive edge and

in some cases their viability as labor and other costs j u m p e d . T h e state and its ruling party, always politically beholden to the chaebol

and dependent

on its e c o n o m i c predominance, ignored market discipline in favor o f huge bailout loans, e n g i n e e r e d via friendly banks. T h e banks wound up with $ 1 0 0 billion or so in unrepayable debts. Corruption and c r o n y i s m , as well as the w a v e l i k e e f f e c t s o f the c u r r e n c y c r i s i s that started in T h a i l a n d , brought the house down by the end o f 1 9 9 7 . A second basic factor in the currency collapse was poor g o v e r n a n c e . T h o u g h the state in A s i a is often assumed to be the guiding force in disciplining the e c o n o m y , f o l l o w i n g the J a p a n e s e m o d e l , it was rather the weakness

o f government regulations that helped catapult these states into

e c l i p s e . 1 8 8 T h a t w e a k n e s s opened the doors wide to c o m m e r c i a l transactions based mainly on personal relationships and p a y o f f s a m o n g g o v ernment leaders, bureaucrats, and business tycoons; and it made possible the o w n e r s h i p o f k e y b u s i n e s s e s and state m o n o p o l i e s on the basis o f blood and friendship t i e s — a s in the case o f Indonesian President Suharto's six children and various c r o n i e s . S u c h c o z i n e s s also led to bad business d e c i s i o n s , such as redundant production, showpiece construction projects, and huge debt run-ups. S o m e Asian leaders, notably M o h a m e d bin Mahathir o f Malaysia, fumed about the nefarious influence o f Western currency speculators and other moneyed interests who, he insisted, manipulated the financial crisis so as to cut the Asian tigers down to manageable size. B u t while such talk had a receptive audience in s o m e parts o f A s i a , especially as it made the I M F and the United States convenient targets, it really seemed to amount to an effort to deflect attention from the greed, lack o f accountability, and dependence on foreign capital o f many Asian economies. How governments and international agencies handled the Asian financial crisis is instructive. T h e y not only intervened when markets failed; the I M F converted a problem into an opportunity for the T N C s and T N B s . In

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Korea, instead of "providing a temporary bridge loan and then organizing the banks into a negotiating group," 1 8 9 the I M F chose a direct approach: a $57 billion bailout (including an initial c o m m i t m e n t of $17.2 billion to which the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and several governments contributed) of Korea's failing banks and chaebol. One can only assume the I M F took the interventionist course at the behest of Washington, which initially had decided against m a k i n g a direct loan to Korea. It reportedly saw the m a j o r U.S. banks (which were far less exposed in Korea than were J a p a n ' s ) and T N C s as the ideal replacements for bankrupt Korean institutions. Moreover, an active U.S. role was considered strategically necessary given the importance of South Korea's political stability to U.S. security interests in N o r t h e a s t Asia. 1 9 0 Foreign c o r p o r a t i o n s and banks such as Chase Manhattan, J. P. Morgan, and Citicorp finally got access rights to the Korean e c o n o m y that Korean leaders had long denied them, such as the right of majority ownership of corporations and partnership in bank m e r g e r s and takeovers. 1 9 1 T h e chaebol had lost so m u c h value, and so m a n y Korean banks had gone belly-up, that there was little resistance to these new sources of dollars and yen. Korean labor laws that safeguarded against layoffs would have to change as well. In keeping with long-standing I M F and g o v e r n m e n t practices, workers, not bankers and corporate executives, were m a d e to pay for bad management decisions. Korean unions were told to prepare their workers f o r massive l a y o f f s such as Korea had not seen in d e c a d e s due to a c o m i n g credit squeeze and the insistence on work force d o w n s i z i n g . With thousands of c o m p a n i e s having already closed their doors in 1997 and m a n y more m o v i n g in that direction, restructuring was the n a m e of the g a m e . President-elect K i m D a e J u n g , w h o m organized labor had supported f o r the presidency, and w h o had p r o m i s e d that no j o b s would be lost in exchange for I M F help, had to backtrack even before taking office. No layoffs, no loans, said the IMF. Budget-cutting and limitations on e c o n o m i c growth were other IMF-dictated steps that would primarily impact working families. 1 9 2 T h e rapid d o w n f a l l of I n d o n e s i a ' s economy, like that of M e x i c o and South Korea, was treated by the I M F and the United States as a strategic decision. 1 9 3 Indonesia was too big to be allowed to fail economically, and it was too important politically to be allowed to descend into chaos. As Indonesia unraveled in 1998, U.S. officials engaged in a war-room-style debate (with the P e n t a g o n ' s participation) about Indonesia's potential social instability if prices c o n t i n u e d to rise. T h e r e was grave Vietnam-era talk about the global s t a k e s — t h e I M F ' s credibility, a test of U.S. leadership, and dominoes falling if Indonesia were to go under. Suharto, under pressure f r o m student and other d e m o n s t r a t o r s to step d o w n , r e s p o n d e d by reinventing himself as a radical nationalist who was resisting the foreign

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devils seeking to run Indonesia's economy. 1 9 4 Largely lost in the contest of wills was the repressive Indonesian political system built around Suharto and the armed f o r c e s that was designed to stifle the broad-based opposition aroused by the c o u n t r y ' s c r u m b l i n g e c o n o m y . Remarkably, Suharto did step down in M a y 1998 under pressure f r o m his military and the United States, leaving the running of the country to his vice president, a crony of his without credibility among activists and perhaps the military as well. I n d o n e s i a ' s political stability remained precarious m i d w a y through 1998, with the World Bank predicting that 4 0 percent of the population would have incomes below the poverty iine and that the country would require around $50 billion in emergency loans to support the Indonesian rupiah (whose value had shrunk by 80 percent) and subsidies to the poor. A few Corporate Globalists took the I M F to task for "forc[ing] f u n d a mental structural and institutional reforms on countries." 1 9 5 But the more c o m m o n view was of a triumph on a par with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. It was not just that the creditor banks avoided having to pay for their mistakes, which w o u l d have required (for e x a m p l e ) bearing the costs of bad loan decisions and m a k i n g lending and other policies more o p e n . 1 9 6 Perhaps the largest victory of all was articulated by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve: the presumed discrediting of the Asian model of late or state capitalism. When Asian economies were growing at 10 percent a year, he said, their " f a u l t y " economic structures could not be d e m o n s t r a t e d . Now, one can see "a c o n s e n s u s t o w a r d s the . . . Western f o r m of f r e e - m a r k e t capitalism as the m o d e l which should govern how each individual country should run its e c o n o m y . " 1 9 7 With socialism also buried, only the A m e r i c a n model was left standing. Asian g o v e r n m e n t s probably disagreed; but in any case, some reversed themselves and opted to join the W T O . T h e y needed the money. " T h e difference f r o m just two years ago," L a w r e n c e H. S u m m e r s , the U.S. deputy treasury secretary, said, "is that in m a n y countries the p r o b l e m has shifted f r o m m a n a g i n g capital to attracting capital." Another senior U.S. official noted that "these are countries that f o r two d e c a d e s have f o l l o w e d the J a p a n e s e m o d e l — k e e p a tight control on your financial institutions and you control your economy." Now, he said, "they have discovered the dark side of that strategy," the risks of ignoring sound lending practices. 1 9 8 Was the triumphalism warranted? If, under I M F and U.S. prodding, Asian leaders carry out promised policy and structural changes that will permanently alter the way they do business, Western and Japanese globalists will have every reason to gloat—and profit. The crisis is clearly a major opportunity for U.S. investors. 1 9 9 Another possibility is that the troubled economies will emulate Taiwan, which underwent a similar period of painful adjustment in the 1980s. Taiwan bounced back to new heights in the 1990s by investing heavily in product innovation (in electronics and semiconductors) and labor,

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and by imposing restraints on big business. 2 0 0 Or, finally, all parties may c h o o s e the course of least harm and try to m u d d l e through with part-way measures. But as the fallout f r o m the crisis spread to South Africa, Russia, and Brazil between mid-1998 and early 1999, a n u m b e r of proponents of globalization were led to wonder if the I M F ' s medicine had worsened the disease. Lost amid the tumult of stock market tailspins and strategic calculations was the fact that the financial crisis became a human-rights crisis. 2 0 1 Hardest hit were the poor; no social safety net for them. In Indonesia, for instance, prices of household commodities skyrocketed; people in outlying islands reportedly were reduced to eating just about anything that grew. In urban areas, sometimes violent protests were often directed at the minority C h i n e s e population that d o m i n a t e s the entrepreneurial class. In South Korea, the traditional family structure was undermined by salarymen suddenly turned out of work and ashamed to admit it to their families. Korean w o m e n p r o f e s s i o n a l s were the first to be laid off by their c o m p a n i e s . In Thailand, Indonesia, and other countries, rural people bore the brunt of une m p l o y m e n t . Migrant workers were the first to be laid off; families sold daughters to brothels to earn money; and workers who had graduated from s w e a t s h o p s returned to them or f a c e d having no work at all. 2 0 2 As U.S. strategic planners were well aware, the real possibility existed that an unresolved financial crisis, u n p r e c e d e n t e d u n e m p l o y m e n t , and widespread despair could turn into an ugly series of social upheavals.

3 World Politics in Global-Humanist Perspective

Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. . . . Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly. — M a r t i n Luther King, Jr. Truth is the austerity

of our

times. — S r i Ramakrishna

The Search for a Third Way The Chinese word for "crisis" consists of two characters, the first (wei) meaning danger, the second (Ji), opportunity. The contemporary global crisis, as we have seen, holds within it many seeds of danger, including the undeniable potential for species destruction. But from another angle, every danger can also be an opportunity to transcend and transform the crisis. If Global Humanism can be remembered for just one thing, it is this dialectical understanding of the global crisis in terms of its two opposing elements. The Global-Humanist outlook accepts neither the unalterable "givens" of Realism nor the inequitable one-world future of Corporate Globalism. Rather, it persists in the conviction that doomsday is a real possibility that humanity can yet overcome. A number of Realists and Corporate Globalists have acknowledged the need of new concepts and values to deal effectively with global problems. "Something beyond nationalism is slowly taking root in the world," a former senior U.S. official and foundation president wrote in 1977; "the signs of a developing sense of common human destiny are present." 1 A World Bank director said that "what the world badly needs today is a new vision

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for this ailing planet." 2 North-South, the report of the Brandt Commission, agreed. Generations of people are needed, said the report, who will be "more concerned with human values than with bureaucratic regulations and technocratic constraints." 3 Clearly, thinking about international politics is evolving. But whether such movement will be fast enough to head off one or another kind of global catastrophe is very much in doubt. The margin of survival is sometimes very thin, as was apparent at the height of the nucleararms race in the early 1980s; and the number of state and corporate leaders who determine the fate of the planet is very small. For Global Humanists, the central question is, Who speaks for the planet? "Could we," as the late Professor Roy Preiswerk inquired, "study international relations as if people mattered?" 4 To do so requires directing attention to the human and environmental consequences of global interdependence, fixing accountability for decisions, and increasing local-level involvement in policymaking. These objectives pervade Global-Humanist analysis, whose core element is the primacy of the human interest above any other—state, ideological, economic, or bureaucratic. The human interest f r a m e s the main issues in world politics that Global Humanism studies. Professor Yoshikazu Sakamoto has defined them in terms of four interrelated world crises of our times: human rights, participation (democracy), conflict, and underdevelopment (including destruction of the environment). 5 These crises shape the priorities of the global agenda: investigating and seeking to change conditions of oppression and repression; defining the inequalities among states, classes, and persons; critically assessing policies justified by "national security"; and weighing the human and environmental consequences of economic growth. By devoting considerable space later in the chapter to the personal experiences of various political figures, I hope to make these crises come alive for the reader. To speak of priorities is to draw attention to their underlying values and norms. In contrast with Realism and Corporate Globalism, which claim to be merely frameworks for understanding the international system, Global Humanism openly acknowledges the principal values and norms that determine its orientation. The task of defining core or preferred values has not been an easy one: 6 It has required coming to grips with cultural and class biases that reinforce one's awareness of how differently blacks and whites, intellectuals and workers, Third World and industrialized world, socialists and capitalists interpret the world. Nevertheless, initial efforts have been made (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for one such effort). We can now explore how these values and norms enable us to analyze crisis and change in global politics.

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Values, Methods, Measurements, Objectives In this section I explore Global H u m a n i s m ' s distinguishing characteristics, which might be divided according to eight main beliefs and approaches: 1. Certain values are primary: peace—meaning the m i n i m i z a t i o n of violence and the institutionalization of nonviolent ways to resolve conflict; social and economic justice—movement toward equity in reward and opportunity for all without the imposition of arbitrary distinctions; political justice—civil liberties guaranteed in law and fact; ecological balance— including resource c o n s e r v a t i o n and e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection; and humane governance—popular participation in, and the accountability of, government. 7 Although these "preferred values" grew out of a multinational f o r u m called the World Order M o d e l s Project in the late 1960s, they are m o r e than the handiwork of intellectuals. A number of international documents to which most of the world's states adhere enshrine these values, such as the Nuremberg Principles derived f r o m the Nazi war crimes trials (1945); the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights (1948); the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 8 T h e U N C o m m i s s i o n on H u m a n Rights provides an o n g o i n g , though often politicized, f o r u m for assessing i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of these covenants and augmenting their coverage. 9 H u m a n e values also underpin the UN D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m ' s ( U N D P ) periodic reports. T h e s e use a " h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t i n d e x " to rank countries on the basis of how well they fulfill basic human-security needs such as literacy, life expectancy, access to clean water, and an adequate diet. In addition, interviews with leading thinkers of all political persuasions and diverse cultures have found that there are shared values or ethics—such as love, fairness, truthfulness, and respect for life—that fit within the global-humanist paradigm. 1 0 2. These values carry with them a set of positive assumptions about the nature of humankind and optimism about the prospects for humane change. Although it is tempting to explain Global-Humanist optimism with reference to the Idealism of the 1920s and after (see below), there is more substantial philosophical bulk to it. Among its diverse sources are humanist psychology (e.g., the works of Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers); Eastern philosophy and spirituality, as well as Western syntheses of them (e.g., Zen Buddhism, Taoism, mysticism, Gandhian satyagraha or "truth f o r c e , " and the writings of J. N. K r i s h n a m u r t i , Carl

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Jung, and Alan Watts); early and more recent feminist writings (from Rosa Luxemburg to Kate Millett); the physical and social sciences (e.g., the works of Margaret Mead, Ashley Montagu, Rene Dubos, Fritjof Capra, E. F. Schumacher, Carl Sagan, and Kenneth Boulding); and political philosophers and economists across the spectrum, from Karl M a r x ' s "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" to Thomas Jefferson's community democracy and John Stuart Mill's essay "On Liberty." From this eclectic (and sometimes contradictory) collection comes a positive conception of humanity, conviction in the human potential for cooperative living, and an understanding of politics that integrates spiritual and material development. Global Humanism, in direct contrast to Realism, assumes that human beings are by nature good-hearted, peaceful, sharing, and infinitely creative; that lawful, equitable, cooperative societies that live in harmony are realizable, and, in fact, have already been c r e a t e d ; " that narrow nationalism—belief in permanent enemies, intractable conflicts, and competition for p o w e r — i s the product of social conditioning that can be redirected into trusting behavior patterns; 1 2 that the differentness of peoples and cultures should be celebrated as one of the most enriching features of human existence; that our personal insecurities in large measure account for our fear of differentness, our defensiveness, and our reluctance to trust others ("We have met the enemy and they is us," in the comic character Pogo's classic formulation); and, therefore, that the struggle for power and profit that goes on at the international level is very much a struggle within each person to determine just what it is that makes us feel secure. 3. Global Humanism has an explicitly normative approach to politics: "It seeks to shape and inspire a world movement for systemic change, and is not content with understanding how the present system operates." 1 3 With Karl Marx, Global Humanists contend that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." System transformation, not simply reform, is the Global Humanists' ambition. The nation-state is the key world political structure to be transformed, although whether its authority should devolve to smaller political units, be supplanted by international regimes or even a world government, or coexist with a new global structure is a matter of ongoing debate among Global-Humanist theorists. 4. Global Humanism is prompted by both idealism and a hardheaded political-economic concern about structural violence. Idealism as a school of political philosophy exerted its greatest influence between the two world wars. It was an effort to direct moral outrage and political reforms at those national institutions that were believed responsible for war-making. To combat state rivalries and aggression, Idealism emphasized the development of a system of international collective security and the realization of

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n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e K e l l o g g - B r i a n d P a c t of 1928 war as an i n s t r u m e n t of national policy, the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , World War II, the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and the U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n R i g h t s w e r e all p r o d u c t s of I d e a l i s m ' s s e a r c h f o r the c o n d i t i o n s

79 outlawing and, a f t e r of H u m a n of p e a c e .

Global H u m a n i s m retains I d e a l i s m ' s moral content, its o p t i m i s m about h u m a n n a t u r e , and its s u s p i c i o n s of b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r , s t a t e - c e n t r i c p o l i tics. It also shares I d e a l i s m ' s p r e e m i n e n t c o n c e r n a b o u t p e a c e . But G l o b a l H u m a n i s m takes these c o n c e r n s several steps further. P e a c e is not m e r e l y the a b s e n c e of war. E v e n if all the c o n f l i c t s currently g o i n g o n a r o u n d the w o r l d w e r e m i r a c u l o u s l y to c e a s e t o m o r r o w , v i o l e n c e w o u l d still be the o r d e r of the day for m o s t of the w o r l d ' s p e o p l e . G l o b a l p r o b l e m s such as p o v e r t y , h u n g e r , e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e s t r u c t i o n , t e r r o r i s m , and the a r m s r a c e point to additional, e q u a l l y p r e v a l e n t and m a l e v o l e n t f o r m s of v i o l e n c e — and to the need f o r a n a l y z i n g their structural roots, w i t h o u t regard to the political or e c o n o m i c c h a r a c t e r of states. W h y a structural a p p r o a c h ? B e c a u s e the m o s t c o m m o n e x p l a n a t i o n s of inequity, oppression (both visible and " i n v i s i b l e " ) , 1 4 and violence within and b e t w e e n s o c i e t i e s — i n t e r m s of p e r s o n a l , b u r e a u c r a t i c , or social a n d cultural p r a c t i c e s — w h i l e u s e f u l , are o f t e n s u p e r f i c i a l . T h e y d o not p r o b e d e e p l y e n o u g h into the m e c h a n i s m s and institutions that tend to p e r p e t u a t e c o n d i t i o n s of inequality. G l a r i n g and w i d e n i n g g a p s exist w o r l d w i d e bet w e e n the w e a l t h y a n d the i m p o v e r i s h e d , the w e l l - f e d a n d the m a l n o u r ished, the h e a v i l y a r m e d and the p h y s i c a l l y w e a k — a l l despite overall i n c r e a s e s in p r o d u c t i o n , i n c o m e , and k n o w l e d g e . U n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w p o v erty, the a r m s race, or authoritarian rule b e c o m e so institutionalized in societies as to be i m m u n e to m e r e r e f o r m c a n s i g n i f i c a n t l y a d v a n c e a n a l y s i s of p r o b l e m s and the search f o r their solution. 5. Precisely b e c a u s e o p p r e s s i o n is so u n i v e r s a l w h i l e the m e a n s of att a i n i n g p e r s o n a l and g r o u p security are so i n e q u i t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d , G l o b a l H u m a n i s m takes a critical look at the policies f o r national security of state l e a d e r s h i p s . W h a t it f i n d s is that as their o b j e c t i v e p o w e r i n c r e a s e s , states, r e g a r d l e s s of their s o c i a l s y s t e m s , will e m b r a c e i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p a n s i v e c o n c e p t i o n s of their n a t i o n a l - s e c u r i t y " n e e d s . " U l t i m a t e l y , as w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t U n i o n , the e n t i r e g l o b e m u s t be s e c u r e d in o r d e r f o r n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s to f e e l c o n f i d e n t a b o u t d o m e s t i c security. T h i s w a s p r e c i s e l y the point of P o p e J o h n Paul I I ' s e n c y c l i c a l letter in 1988. H e said that the g r e a t e s t o b s t a c l e to e n d i n g u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t w a s " a n u n a c c e p t a b l y e x a g g e r a t e d c o n c e r n f o r s e c u r i t y " o n the part of the U . S . a n d S o v i e t b l o c s , " [ e a c h of w h i c h ] h a r b o r s in its o w n w a y a t e n d e n c y t o w a r d imperialism."15 W h e n state l e a d e r s g l o b a l i z e their q u e s t f o r security, real p l a n e t a r y a n d n a t i o n a l security s u f f e r s . At h o m e , the e c o n o m i c a n d social c o s t s of m a i n t a i n i n g a world o r d e r f a v o r a b l e to constant " g r o w t h " (of c o n s u m p t i o n ,

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output, and profit, for example) become increasingly difficult to justify politically, even in the most closed societies. Abroad, interventions, arms sales, dependent economic and military relationships, the export of inappropriate development models, and the extraction of food and other critical resources by the industrialized countries add to the impoverishment and instability of the underdeveloped world. Global Humanism offers an alternative approach to national and international security. It rejects the inevitability of war, permanent enemies, and permanent crisis. It seeks to bring the needs of national security into line with the needs of the global community, in particular the Third World's powerless and marginalized. It seeks to bridge the chasm between cultures—established by the language as well as the materiality of dominance—that Edward Said so poignantly describes in his classic study of Orientalism: the kind of mind-set about the "other" that stereotypes, dehumanizes, and justifies superiority over "them." 1 6 To inject realism into its idealism, Global Humanism looks for points of identity and mutual interest between different communities—between nation-states and international regimes, between workers at home and workers abroad, and between cultures in and across borders. The objective is to make the world safe for diversity in the process of transforming it along equitable lines. 1 7 Peacemaking is therefore a crucial long-term project. Conflict may be unavoidable and can even serve positive ends; but when noble causes turn to violence, winning at all costs becomes the cause. Nor is violence automatically appropriate in response to the violence of others. Fortunately, the literature and mechanisms for peacefully resolving international disputes are growing rapidly, with creative ideas not only on negotiation and mediation strategies but also on formats (such as problem-solving workshops, confidence-building measures, and preventive deployments of troops) that may nip potentially violent conflicts in the bud and even transform adversarial relationships. Herbert Kelman, a pioneer in bringing communities of Arabs and Israelis together in workshops, has written: It is necessary to move beyond influence strategies based on threats and to expand and refine strategies based on promises and positive incentives. Conflict resolution efforts, by searching for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties, create opportunities for mutual influence by way of responsiveness to each other's needs. . . . Parties can encourage each other to negotiate seriously by reducing both sides' fears—not just, as more traditional strategic analysts often suggest, by increasing their pain.18 The attractiveness of Kelman's approach is its positiveness and concern to address the security and identity needs of all sides to a conflict. The format for doing so necessarily will vary with the circumstances. Recent international responses to conflict have rarely displayed such sensitivity; the

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incentives have favored either doing too little or too much. C o m m i t m e n t s and resources f o r exploring a p e a c e f u l , early resolution of conflict have usually been absent. Without being naive about what peacemakers can accomplish in an era of intense civil conflict, G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t ideas and values can fill the gaps in traditional diplomacy. 6. G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t analysis seeks to go beyond left and right, state and society, us-versus-them dichotomies. Liberal capitalism and state socialism have b e c o m e increasingly irrelevant tools for accurately explaining, much less resolving, global crises of human rights. 1 9 To be sure, each has made major contributions to human security: liberalism's emphasis on intellectual freedom, the rule of law, and the rights of the individual, for example: and socialism's emphasis on collective rights, the redistribution of the social product, and the creation (as Cuba and China once attempted) of a "new person" motivated by service to the community. But in the name of free enterprise and liberal political goals, regimes on the right c o m m o n l y downgrade or dispense with social and economic justice, exploit the environment on behalf of p o w e r f u l local and foreign interests, and promote crass commercialism that numbs people's awareness of their basic spiritual, cultural, and economic needs. In leftist and fundamentalist systems, collective welfare typically b e c o m e s a vehicle of state tyranny, extraconstitutional oppression of "the masses," and enforced conformity to rigid, unassailable bureaucracies. The state hierarchy represents correct thinking, and economics serves politics. The results are often great inefficiencies, unmotivated and poorly rewarded workers, a sharp gap in privileges between elites and everyone else, and the ruthless suppression of dissent. A l o n g s i d e these contradictions between theory and practice are several disturbing similarities between many market and statist systems. Both accept the widespread alienation of w o r k i n g p e r s o n s and d i s c r i m i n a t e against w o m e n , ethnic minorities, and h o m o s e x u a l s . N a t i o n a l i s m s that take primary loyalties away f r o m the state, religious, or ethnic center are considered threats. Both overcentralize control of t e c h n o l o g y and resources, resist the devolution of p o w e r to c o m m u n i t y levels, waste precious resources, and have increasingly remote f o r m s of governance. Leaderships in these systems are materialist and rationalist: " T h e contemporary apostles of abundance through mastery of nature are as likely to be found at the c h a m b e r of c o m m e r c e as at the Central C o m m i t t e e of the Soviet C o m m u n i s t party," wrote Richard Barnet. 2 0 The promise of satisfying peop l e ' s basic needs, which are usually d e f i n e d in strictly material terms, often b e c o m e s a smokescreen behind which elite politics goes on as usual. M e a n w h i l e , both types of s y s t e m s cling to c o n c e p t s of national security that ensure perpetuation of the war system and global underdevelopment. As J o h a n Galtung has o b s e r v e d of capitalism and socialism, they are equally capable of p u r s u i n g imperialist policies, that is, m a i n t a i n i n g the

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core c o u n t r y ' s dominance over its partners in the periphery through unequal and dependent ties. 2 1 Beyond left and right may lie both a new political synthesis and a new realism. The synthesis would m e a n adapting socialist, liberal-capitalist, and other ideas: hence, the values of social and economic justice (from socialism) and political justice ( f r o m liberalism); the positive role of the state in promoting social well-being; the preference (under capitalism) for adjudicated, nonviolent change, but the acceptance (under socialism) of violent alternatives when oppression reaches unbearable proportions; the upholding of individual rights (as under capitalism), but the use of class analysis (as under socialism) to discern how self-interest can b e c o m e a weapon of mass exploitation; the enormous potential of capital and technological movement worldwide to uplift societies, and their equal propensity for manipulation to create scarcity, destroy ecosystems, and " d e v e l o p " some societies at the expense of others. Thus, at every step of humanist political analysis, we pause to ask who benefits? and who loses? as the result of this or that social condition and change. The new realism would lie in "thinking g l o b a l l y " (or interdependently) f r o m an ethical f o u n d a t i o n . Mass i m p o v e r i s h m e n t , the terror of m o d e r n w e a p o n s , and the w i d e s p r e a d deprivation of universally recognized human rights cannot be effectively dealt with as discrete social science " p r o b l e m s " that are best left to national decisionmakers to work out. T h e s e are interconnected global p h e n o m e n a that d e m a n d a global response, both out of self-interest—in the sense suggested by Martin Luther King, Jr., that " w h a t e v e r a f f e c t s one directly affects all i n d i r e c t l y " — a n d out of p r o f o u n d moral c o n c e r n "to shape the relationships and rules of practice which will support our c o m m o n needs f o r security, w e l f a r e and safety," as Catholic bishops declared during the nuclear arms race. 2 2 Vaclav Havel, the author and human-rights activist who became the first president of p o s t - C o l d War Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic), clearly articulated the new realism when he emphasized the global implications of p o s t - c o m m u n i s m . As important as it is to measure progress in democracy and prosperity in the new Europe, he said, the real challenge lies in creating a "new politics" of global responsibility, "before it is too late." We must rehabilitate our sense of ourselves as active human subjects, and liberate ourselves from the captivity of a purely national perception of the world. Through this "subjecthood" and the individual conscience that goes with it, we must discover a new relationship to our neighbors, and to the universe and its metaphysical order, which is the source of the moral order. 23 7. Thus, Global-Humanist realism is activist: "not to conform with what is happening, but to be able to see what our present options mean, what could result f r o m them, and what changes we have to envisage, drastic as

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they may be." 2 4 Popular national and transnational m o v e m e n t s for social c h a n g e , such as the G r e e n s in Europe, the antinuclear m o v e m e n t , the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , and alternative energy groups, are considered part of an important trend in world politics. At their best, these organizations are generally characterized by political diversity, c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n e change, and decentralized organizational structure. They are prompted by a vision of greater self-reliance and local control of resources and decisions. They hold out the promise of a global future that remains interdependent but is less tightly linked economically, much less militarized, and more attuned to the necessary balance of human and natural forces. T h e imagined f u t u r e world of the humanist-activist is a radical one, in the sense of the radical as "one who is permanently alerted to a gap between what is and what should be, between the suffering, waste, untruth and peril of the present, and the joy, plenitude, significance and security of a possible future." 2 5 A persistent theme in the writings of two great social critics of the twentieth century. Hannah Arendt and Herbert Marcuse, was that the conduct of politics was frequently based on the lie. Truth for them was indeed "the austerity of our t i m e s . " Arendt saw in the big lie an essential feature of totalitarianism, in which the public realm was explicitly cut off from the mass by the manipulation of thought and symbols by leaders. Such domination of the mind is at once more possible and more subtle in an age of advanced telecommunications; and while there are opportunities f o r extending d e m o c r a c y via the " i n f o r m a t i o n h i g h w a y , " the ever-enlarging corporate control of media, the ceaseless drumbeat of cons u m e r i s m in every m e d i u m , and the substitution of entertainment for information lead in the opposite direction. Fulfilling that h u m a n e vision is another matter. T h o s e w h o p r o m o t e social change must overcome a problem that has bedeviled social activists e v e r y w h e r e : the tendency to replicate precisely those rigidities of leadership, such as fear of opposition, d o g m a t i c thinking, sexism, and elitism, that they fought to overthrow. Any " n e w " system is not new if it replaces the old guard with political structures and institutions that are just as oppressive, as Khomeini demonstrated in Iran. The Brazilian educator of the poor Paolo Friere is eloquent on this point, warning us about manipulative leaders who use revolutions to postpone genuine social transformation: In the revolutionary process, the leaders cannot utilize the banking method [of education—i.e., telling people what they should know] as an interim measure, justified on grounds of expediency, with the intention of later behaving in a genuinely revolutionary fashion. They must be revolutionary—that is to say, dialogical—from the outset. 26 Friere is really talking about democracy: a system's openness to change, respect for diversity of cultures and opinions, and receptivity of leaders to p e o p l e ' s involvement in their own destiny (self-determination). He invites

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us to reject authoritarianism of all stripes, to support a high level of political participation by citizens, and to resist the notion of limited d e m o c r a c y — t h e idea, put f o r w a r d with equal v e h e m e n c e by industrialized and Third World state and corporation leaders, that too m u c h popular participation is a dangerous thing. 8. How should we measure human progress? The indicators consulted by Global-Humanist analysts differ markedly f r o m those used by Realists and C o r p o r a t e Globalists. T h e f o r m e r look for signs of qualitative advances in well-being for popular m a j o r i t i e s and in the e n v i r o n m e n t . M i c h a e l J. Sullivan has done this in a c o m p e n d i u m that ranks states and regions in terms of their progress toward f u l f i l l i n g the five G l o b a l H u m a n i s t values. 2 7 T h e latter p r e f e r gross m e a s u r e m e n t s of state or corporate achievement, with e m p h a s i s on the bottom line: p o w e r and profit. N o wonder that the two groups cannot have a constructive dialogue about political and social trends; they are like two ships passing in the night. M a k i n g use again of our four global crises (human rights, democracy, conflict, and underdevelopment), we can illustrate the wide disparity in measurements that inform these opposing views of global issues. T h e gulf in interpreting progress in human rights was most clearly revealed in the late 1970s, w h e n President Carter a n n o u n c e d that h u m a n rights a c h i e v e m e n t would be a cardinal element of his f o r e i g n policy. C a r t e r ' s policy had the great merit of putting h u m a n rights on the global agenda. But it ran into two f o r m i d a b l e problems. O n e was that the traditional U.S. e m p h a s i s on individual civil liberties clashed with the Third W o r l d ' s and the socialist c o u n t r i e s ' insistence that collective e c o n o m i c rights should take precedence. Second was a glaring contradiction in U.S. policy itself. W h e n it came to choosing between human rights and national security, such as on the question of whether or not to sell a r m s to a rep r e s s i v e but e c o n o m i c a l l y and strategically important g o v e r n m e n t , national security invariably won out. And the U.S. record on h u m a n rights, several governments charged, was hardly exemplary. W h a t emerged out of that period was the not surprising discovery that governments interpret human rights in self-serving w a y s — t o promote their o w n domestic and international interests while u n d e r m i n i n g the interests of adversaries, w h e t h e r ideological foes abroad or ethnic minorities at h o m e . No government spoke for human beings or the sacredness of other living things. Every government invoked " h u m a n rights" but in fact upheld itself as the sole source and arbiter of "rights." Each g o v e r n m e n t ' s list of acceptable rights was not only very partial—liberty, social justice, a multiparty system, a new international e c o n o m i c order, d i s a r m a m e n t — b u t s e e m e d designed to respond to any other g o v e r n m e n t ' s list. 2 8 T h e w h o l e process was a classic e x a m p l e of Realist self-righteousness garbed in humanitarian verbiage.

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Nor did the debate i m p r o v e with Cold War ideology out of the way. E f f o r t s , led by the United States, to press concern for h u m a n rights were met with charges, mostly f r o m Asia, of Eurocentrism, cultural insensitivity, and cultural relativism. The argument was that other cultures, such as in C o n f u c i a n Asia and the Muslim arc extending f r o m Egypt to Indonesia, o f f e r values, organizing ideas for society, and a h u m a n - r i g h t s agenda wholly different from (but as valid as) the West's. In East Asia, it was said, the strong d e v e l o p m e n t a l state c o m b i n e s high-speed e c o n o m i c growth with delayed d e m o c r a c y . Civil liberties and individual f r e e d o m s may be poorly developed in law and the political culture, but the paternalistic state meets p e o p l e ' s needs by providing an e x p a n d i n g economy. Furthermore, "Asian values" such as community and social harmony are culture-specific and cannot be nurtured or safeguarded in the same way as Western values. Finally, according to this view, Western concepts of rights and values are unacceptable impositions: They violate state sovereignty and give importance to some ideas, such as protection of wildlife and clean air, that ought not be on a par with economic growth. T h e d e b a t e over Asian values o b s c u r e d m o r e than it revealed. Once again, the real issue was only superficially philosophy and principally politics, an attempt to use " c u l t u r e " to d e f l e c t attention away f r o m government abuses of power. 2 9 That human rights can be well served by prosperity, that equitable, sustainable, basic-needs focused economic development is a human right, and that governments resent being lectured to are important f o r the industrialized world to hear. But: There is no necessary contradiction b e t w e e n political liberties and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ; social justice can be promoted by both. Asia contains n u m e r o u s cultures anyway, making it dubious to speak of " A s i a n " values. What ought to matter is not the origin of particular values and norms but their suitability for addressing specific needs, such as protection of speech for minorities or of property rights f o r those victimized by corruption. 3 0 In fact, as one prominent Asian leader observed, f r e e d o m and democracy are part of Asia's heritage and are not the exclusive province of the West. 3 1 Thus, the hidden agenda m a y actually be the role of the state: " W h a t begins as an endorsement of the value of c o m m u n i t y and social h a r m o n y e n d s in an assertion of the s u p r e m e status of the r e g i m e and its l e a d e r s . " 3 2 W h e n S i n g a p o r e ' s Lee K u a n Yew advised the Philippine government that the key to his country's d e v e l o p m e n t was order and discipline, was he promoting Asian values or was he j u s t i f y i n g the authoritarian one-party state he h e a d e d f o r over a q u a r t e r - c e n t u r y ? 3 3 I n c o m e s and businesses have flourished in Singapore, but not political f r e e d o m s . There is not, and probably cannot be, a definitive, universally acceptable list of h u m a n rights. Yet a n u m b e r of covenants broadly defining the scope of human rights have been widely endorsed by governments. Needless

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to say, endorsement and implementation are two entirely different matters. B y relying on governments rather than independent bodies to initiate action and ensure compliance, the covenants limit legal options for citizens, especially the poor and women. National experiences are too diverse, moreover, to expect agreement among state leaders on which rights have priority. (Is it more important to end hunger or arbitrary arrests?) Nevertheless, a few guidelines concerning human-rights priorities can be suggested. First, they should be rights fundamental to all political systems, that is, divorced from a particular ideological preference. Ending racism, violence against women and children, starvation, and ethnic cleansing are especially important o b j e c t i v e s in this category. Second, they should have universal applicability and not be specific to a culture. Third, they should take account of the different levels at which human rights are threatened— global, state, and individual. Fourth, they should include nonmaterial as well as material human needs. Finally, they should be specific enough to point to political action that will realize them—not just, for example, the right to a healthy life, but the right to live in conditions that are "sustaina b l e " for future generations. Fouad A j a m i 3 4 and Richard F a l k ' 5 have proposed somewhat different lists of " c o r e " human rights. A j a m i ' s are: • The right to survive; hence the concern with the war system and with nuclear weaponry; • • •

The right not to be subjected to torture; The condemnation of apartheid; and The right to food.

Falk's list comprises five categories o f rights: •

B a s i c human needs ("food, housing, health, and education");

•

B a s i c decencies (including freedom from "genocide, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and execution, or their threat"); • Participatory rights ("including choice of political leadership, o f j o b , of place of residence, of cultural activity and orientation"); • Security (the right to "minimal physical well-being and survival," including " e c o l o g i c a l security"); and • Humane governance ("the rights o f individuals and groups to live in societies and a world that realizes the rights depicted in [Falk's four rights listed above]"). E x c e p t for the absence o f nonmaterial (spiritual, emotional) needs from A j a m i ' s list, and the unimplementable nature of Falk's fifth item, it would seem that both listings satisfy the five criteria laid out above. They flow

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clearly out of the writers' c o m m o n c o m m i t m e n t to G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t values. Perhaps most important, the rights they propose neither draw from nor depend for their implementation upon government or party sanction. They rest instead upon an interpretation of the h u m a n interest, the most profound of which, given the nature of the global crisis, is security. T h e crisis of democracy, or participation, should likewise be m e a sured with due regard for ideological and cultural biases. Should we talk only about p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s and exclude social and economic democracy? Global Humanists think not. It is important, using the Western tradition, to m e a s u r e d e m o c r a t i c progress in terms of political competition, press f r e e d o m , constitutional rights and duties, and the manner and extent of representation. It is equally important to identify signs of participation and accountability elsewhere than in the formal institutions of g o v e r n m e n t . Grassroots d e m o c r a c y in the workplace and the c o m m u nity is vital, too, and in some societies is more m e a n i n g f u l to p e o p l e ' s livelihoods than elections and constitutions. Access to public services, such as health care; p e o p l e ' s involvement in local decisionmaking groups, such as educational boards; restrictions on ownership, m a n a g e m e n t , and political activity in corporations, such as mass media; and u n o f f i c i a l but influential channels of communication between people and their leaders— these, too, should count as democratic practices. Finally, we should take account of when a p p e a r a n c e s of d e m o c r a c y are a cover for an undemocratic reality. During the Cold War such facades were readily identifiable—on the left, in "people's democracies" of the Soviet type; on the right, in authoritarian regimes, such as in El Salvador and South Vietnam, that were backed by the United States. But there is another regime type that transcends the Cold War era, what Eqbal A h m a d calls the "neo-fascist state." One finds it throughout the Third World and in parts of the S e c o n d — a state in which terror and repression, sometimes backed by foreign powers, are critical elements for enforcing the authority of a highly concentrated elite. Preventing political association, not merely punishing it, is a m o n g the neofascist state's central p u r p o s e s . 3 6 E x a m p l e s are Argentina under military rule in the 1970s, Iran under Shah Reza Pahlevi and under Khomeini, Greece after the generals' coup in 1967, C a m b o d i a under Pol Pot (the K h m e r Rouge) and Hun Sen (the C a m b o d i a n P e o p l e ' s Party), p o s t - A l l e n d e Chile ( 1 9 7 3 - 1 9 8 9 ) , South A f r i c a u n d e r apartheid, Haiti under the Duvaliers ( 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 8 6 ) and thereafter, Paraguay under A l f r e d o Stroessner ( 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 8 9 ) , the Israeli-occupied West Bank, some of the postSoviet republics, and the B u r m a , Nigeria, Iraq, and Yugoslavia dictatorships in the 1990s. In all these places, democracy was or is still fervently preached by state leaders even as their internal security forces c o m m i t uns p e a k a b l e horrors. R e g i m e s of this type are c o m m e n d e d by their f o r e i g n allies, w h o typically e x c u s e certain " e x c e s s e s " in repression. During the

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Cold War they argued that "stability" had to be the first order of business in a country beset by ( " c o m m u n i s t , " "capitalist," or some other) "terrorists." 3 7 Today, though some neofascist states are considered "rogue states," others, for example in Central Asia and the Middle East, are treated kindly because the first order of business is business. The Global-Humanist approach measures conflict, the third global crisis, in the manner of a doctor holistically examining a patient. Armed disputes and structural violence are symptoms of a planetwide disease whose consequences extend well beyond the usual toll of human casualties, territory gained or lost, incidences of war and terrorist acts, e f f e c t s on the balance of power, and w e a p o n s in national arsenals. It is appropriate to speak, rather, of the epidemiology of global violence—the full psychological, social, ecological, and other human costs of conflict and preparation for conflict. 3 8 W h a t the Physicians for Social Responsibility, an international group f o u n d e d in the United States, has said about nuclear conflict applies to international violence generally: It is the world's numberone public health problem. Listed here are some of the consequences of conflict that an epidemiological approach calls for us to consider: • The trade-offs of global militarization: What could the money spent on w e a p o n s buy in jobs, nonmilitary research and production, and health care? What does it cost in labor productivity, indebtedness, and environmental damage? The discussion in Chapter 5 of the social costs of the arms race for the United States and the FSU/Russia provides some answers. But the consequences of high military spending are far more severe for underdeveloped countries. Military spending, armed forces, and military imports in the Third World have declined overall in the 1990s; but for the poorest countries, the military burden has added to indebtedness, drained socialwelfare budgets, and undermined economic performance, just as before. 3 9 • The number of persons trapped in the war machine—as combatants in civil wars and international conflicts; as regular or reserve soldiers (as the 1990s began, roughly 26 million people were under arms worldwide; by 1995, there were still over 22 million soldiers); 4 0 as employees involved in military research, p r o d u c t i o n , and administration; as citizens living under military-controlled g o v e r n m e n t s , of which there were sixty-four in 1989-1990; 4 1 as refugees fleeing war, dictatorship, and other f o r m s of oppression; and as potential victims: The tiny (by t o d a y ' s standards) atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 killed about 210,000 people, whereas the energy yield of the global nuclear stockpile in the mid-1980s was 18 million tons of TNT, roughly equivalent to a million Hiroshimas, and a decade later was still 8 million tons. 4 2 • The psychological and ecological damage that has been, and might be, done as the result of mass violence: Nuclear anxiety in the 1980s is an

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example. Studies f o u n d a high incidence of dread about nuclear war that extended to school-age children, in the Soviet Union as m u c h as in the United States. 4 3 M o r e research on the traumatic e f f e c t s of c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and enforced uprooting to escape war needs to be done. We k n o w a good deal, for e x a m p l e , about the Vietnam War's devastating psychological consequences for U.S. GIs. But one wonders about the w a r ' s e f f e c t s on the minds of the Vietnamese, particularly those who withstood U.S. b o m b i n g that was "the equivalent of o n e Nagasaki b o m b per week for seven and a half years. 4 4 Internal wars in the 1990s have added to the psychological dimensions of the war crisis by their sexual and other specific abuses of w o m e n and children. Military units in a n u m b e r of such c o n f l i c t s — A f g h a n i s t a n , Bosnia, Algeria, and R w a n d a , for e x a m p l e — s p e c i f i c a l l y targeted w o m e n and f e m a l e children. T h e aims of the attackers evidently were to spread fear, to reduce the size of the rival ethnic group's next generation, and simply to humiliate and brutalize. Such crimes were h o r r e n d o u s e n o u g h in Bosnia that an international tribunal for the first time declared organized sexual abuses war crimes. 4 5 Other atrocities during these conflicts, such as torture, f o r c e d witnessing of violence against o n e ' s family and village, forced resettlement, and prolonged internment in r e f u g e e camps, traumatized large n u m b e r s of w o m e n and children, as well as m e n . In addition, increasing n u m b e r s of children are being pressed into military service in internal wars. 4 6 The environmental costs of war are staggering, and often overlooked. T h e ferocious bombing of Vietnam m a d e that country an ecological catastrophe. Its d i m e n s i o n s were captured by some U.S. scientists in a study appropriately entitled " T h e Cratering of V i e t n a m . " 4 7 In the Gulf War, K u w a i t ' s desert and shoreline were also devastated by mines, oil fires, bombs, and oil spills (an estimated 1 billion barrels). 4 8 During C a m b o d i a ' s civil war, officials on both sides evidently sold off the c o u n t r y ' s tropical timber, its most valuable resource, leaving it with half the forest cover it had in 1970. 4 9 Only recently have governments and scientists begun to pay attention to how w a r f a r e a f f e c t s plant and animal life, the land's p r o d u c tivity, water quality, and incidences of disease. Chemical warfare, although b a n n e d by international a g r e e m e n t s , was used by the United States (as A g e n t O r a n g e ) in Vietnam to defoliate forest canopy, and by the Iraqis against Iran and their own Kurdish minority in the 1980s. And there is more: The ecology of war should also take into account the much-discussed p h e n o m e n o n of "nuclear w i n t e r " (the potentially catastrophic e n v i r o n m e n t a l e f f e c t s of a m u l t i m e g a t o n nuclear e x c h a n g e ) , 5 0 experimentation by some m a j o r powers with manipulation of the environm e n t f o r military p u r p o s e s , and the public health e f f e c t s of highly toxic military wastes. The production of nuclear and other weapons in military

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reactors is one m a j o r source of these wastes. 5 1 It will take an estimated $3.4 billion to clean up fifty years of n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s production in the U n i t e d States. 5 2 A n o t h e r source is military bases, where e n v i r o n m e n t a l standards, if they exist at all, do not apply. O f t e n , as in eastern Germany, the extent of the toxic-waste problem does not become apparent until the bases are closed d o w n . 5 3 The last of our four global crises, underdevelopment, may provide the clearest case of how differently Realists and Corporate Globalists, on the one hand, and Global Humanists, on the other, perceive and evaluate a central issue in world politics. For the former, development and underdevelopment can everywhere be measured in terms of gross production and average distribution, using indicators such as gross national product, gross profit, per capita income, total exports and imports, and, in centrally planned economies, production targets. Such indicators can be useful general guides to e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e , but they have been roundly criticized for many years. A m o n g other things, they distort the real-world picture of losers and beneficiaries from economic growth. Gross and average m e a s u r e m e n t s typically draw attention from the mass of impoverished people to w h o m economic benefits rarely trickle down. They discount the ecological and e n v i r o n m e n t a l (including public health) c o n s e q u e n c e s of economic growth, with respect both to the costs of production and the cons e q u e n c e s of c o n s u m p t i o n . Furthermore, an increase in a gross measure such as G N P may not be the most desirable kind of growth in a society filled with m a l n o u r i s h e d , unhealthy, uneducated people. T h e question should be production and consumption for w h o m , of what, and with what effects? Overall, Global Humanists seek to inject equity, social justice, and environmental considerations into their calculations of development. A truly developed society, as distinct from one that is growing, would have low infant mortality; a small percentage of population below the poverty level; low (and declining) pollution levels; high (and increasing) access to public services for all citizen, gender, and age groups; and high levels of educational access and a c h i e v e m e n t for each age group. 5 4 (The U N D P ' s h u m a n development index and Sullivan's global values f r a m e w o r k enable countries to be ranked using these criteria.) 5 5 Prosperity would be distributed f r o m the bottom up rather than f r o m the top down, focusing on basic h u m a n needs and not on f u r t h e r enriching the privileged few. T h e s e p r e s e n t - t i m e criteria would be governed by a larger " s u s t a i n a b l e v i s i o n " based on principles such as stewardship of resources, global community, appropriate scale, and sufficiency. 5 6 Hence, Global H u m a n i s t s want to k n o w what percentage of a national budget serves public services, military programs, and interest on external debts. How are people taxed, how has the value of money changed, and who might be subsidizing w h o m ? They

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will take a close look at exports and imports: Are f o o d and other c o m modities capable of being produced at home being imported, or exported despite a local need? D o local or f o r e i g n entrepreneurs control f o r e i g n trade, and which sectors of it? To what extent is export promotion serving human development needs such as employment as opposed to elite needs? Global Humanists are also concerned about social-group differences: What is the gap in income, protein c o n s u m p t i o n , health and educational benefits, and life expectancy between the richest and the poorest segments of the population, between men and w o m e n , between urban and rural dwellers, and between majority and minority ethnic g r o u p s ? They also want to know about the quality of goods p r o d u c e d , how they are distributed internally, how profits are shared, what the cost of waste is, what real purchasing power (after inflation) is, how the type of production affects e m p l o y m e n t (is it capital- or labor-intensive?), how much energy is consumed by particular kinds of production, to what extent social justice is reflected in company management and j o b retraining, and what the social costs of production are in terms of pollution, resource extraction (such as valuable timberland), and workplace health and safety. W h e r e transnational corporations are involved, Global Humanists also will inquire into their impact on e m p l o y m e n t and small business, the extent of technology sharing with the host country, the amount of profit reinvested and repatriated, and the relevance of the goods or services produced to the needs of an underdeveloped economy. Ecopolitics—assessing the environmental costs of growth and the simultaneous underdevelopment of both economies and e n v i r o n m e n t — e s p e cially needs study. W h e t h e r one is speaking of ecological destruction in the poorest countries ( d o c u m e n t e d , for instance, by the Chilean political economist Osvaldo Sunkel) 5 7 or in the First and Second Worlds, the costs are high and quickly mounting. In the Third and Fourth Worlds, taking our cue f r o m Sunkel, we need to explore problems such as a great intensification and large shifts in the exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, as well as intensive technological change; a considerable spatial redistribution of human activities and in particular massive urbanization and industrial concentration; and a new, vastly expanded, and highly concentrated process of generation of industrial, agricultural and urban wastes, pollution, and contamination. 58 A f r i c a in particular has been an ecological n i g h t m a r e of e x p a n d i n g deserts, contracting rain forests, eroding soil, reduced rainfall, and shifting climate zones. The extent to which misguided aid p r o g r a m s and agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t models imported f r o m the outside, as well as traditional A f r i c a n f a r m i n g practices, are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r this d e v a s t a t i o n is urgent to explore.

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Transnational corporations contribute to the ecological devastation of Third and Fourth World countries by encouraging farming f o r export and by setting up factories there that pollute the environment or b e c o m e dumping grounds for pesticides and, as the case study of South A f r i c a will note, other toxic wastes. 5 9 Industries whose output of wastes goes beyond permissible levels in their h o m e countries find safe havens abroad, encouraged by local authorities eager for foreign investment and perhaps open to a bribe. The pesticide leak at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in D e c e m b e r 1984 seems to be one such instance of a p o l l u t i o n - d u m p i n g tragedy. Its lessons about fair compensation to the victims, adequate information to the host country and community, and sharp limits on the export of extremely dangerous processes and technologies have not been learned nearly f i f t e e n years later. 6 0 C a n a d a continues to sell Third World customers a type of nuclear reactor that has been shut down at h o m e because of numerous safety problems. 6 1 Nor can the state be exonerated when the poor are victimized by environmental disasters. Just weeks before Bhopal, an explosion in Mexico City of liquefied gas tanks owned by the government oil corporation, P e m e x , killed about 4 5 0 slum-dwellers. The shipment of h a z a r d o u s waste and rubbish f r o m industrialized to cash-poor countries is b e c o m i n g increasingly routine. 6 2 In the industrialized countries, m e a n w h i l e , we likewise find ecological nightmares and neardisasters. The names of Three Mile Island, Love Canal, and Stringfellow in the United States; of Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, sites of nuclear disasters in 1957 and 1986; of Seveso, Italy, scene of a m a j o r dioxin spill in 1976; of G e r m a n y ' s treasured forests, where one in three trees has now been damaged by acid rain—these evidently represent only the tip of an ecocidal iceberg. Finally, Global-Humanist analysis of underdevelopment considers the costs and b e n e f i t s , f r o m a human-interest standpoint, of alternative production, c o n s u m p t i o n , and investment patterns. In what ways can more self-reliant, a u t o n o m o u s d e v e l o p m e n t take place? (Since any concept of d e v e l o p m e n t may be v i e w e d as m a n a g e m e n t by and d e p e n d e n c e on outsiders, should it be abandoned as an unwarranted interference in people's basic right to autonomy and in their self-determined efforts at cultural regeneration?) 6 3 How might a better balance between economic growth and environmental protection be achieved? (Is it possible, or desirable, to "bala n c e " a rapidly deteriorating global environment against the incessant dem a n d s of rich and poor countries for higher levels of production and consumption?) What needs to happen politically, as well as economically, in order for people's basic needs to be met? How can foreign trade and aid be altered so that they serve, rather than are merely served by, the working population? These kinds of questions will probably only be asked by analysts w h o accept the necessity of political transformation. Until now, the

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dominant models of modernization e m p l o y e d in the West and adopted in much of the Third World reflected Western capitalism's own development, stressing the virtues of the private sector, bigness, and stable, steady-state politics. There is undoubtedly merit to the argument that such models have been directly e n c o u r a g e d in the United States and e l s e w h e r e by government and foundation research support. 6 4 This review of the Global-Humanist methodology has emphasized the special importance of human-centered values, norms, and assumptions to the definition, not to mention the analysis and potential solution, of global political problems. The methodology has emerged alongside and has been shaped significantly by the global crisis. The consequences of that evolution are both positive and negative. It has shown the n e e d — i n d e e d , the urg e n c y — t o break down intellectual barriers to cross-disciplinary research and to science with ethical content, it has helped to redirect political inquiry to human beings while raising critical questions about prevailing categories of political-economic analysis, including models of development, definitions of national security and human rights, and left-right ideological distinctions. It has infused the notion of " i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " with new meaning—not simply "interconnectedness" or "multilateralism," but shared insecurities about life on a planet facing simultaneous threats f r o m rampant expansionism. Finally, Global H u m a n i s m reflects an optimism about the human prospect that may point to entirely different ways of providing f o r h u m a n security, concrete and potential e x a m p l e s of which are mentioned in the last chapter. On the negative side. Global H u m a n i s m must take account of several important criticisms. Realists take aim at its excessive idealism and dee m p h a s i s of interstate p o w e r politics. T h e y remind us that as much as world politics has b e c o m e infused with greater complexity, its d o m i n a n t actors remain states locked in competition with one another. From Corporate Globalists c o m e s the charge that Global H u m a n i s m is anticapitalist and disregards the many positive contributions transnational corporations m a k e to both national and international well-being. The global corporation can be a positive force for material progress and global exchange. The radical Left, on the other hand, often considers Global H u m a n i s m too " s o f t " on capitalism, reformist rather than revolutionary, and (in agreement with the Realists) u n j u s t i f i a b l y idealistic about the prospects f o r h u m a n e change. All three groups of critics take Global H u m a n i s m to task—rightly, in my v i e w — f o r failing thus f a r to propose a coherent world or national policy a g e n d a to effect the transition " f r o m here to t h e r e , " that is, f r o m global crisis to global community. Criticism of Global H u m a n i s m has also c o m e f r o m the Third World. S o m e g r o u p s c o m m i t t e d to a new international e c o n o m i c order see the b a s i c - n e e d s a p p r o a c h as yet another f o r e i g n (Western) intervention in

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Third World affairs, or at least as a diversion f r o m the central task (as they see it) of rectifying inequitable trade and investment relations between underdeveloped and industrialized states. Others in the Third World express misgivings about Global H u m a n i s m ' s equal emphasis on social-economic and political justice (and its concern about human rights generally), seeing that, too, as an ill-informed intervention. And there is hostility to any implication that the Third World, having already sacrificed its d e v e l o p m e n t to the industrialized world's, should now cut its economic growth in order to contribute to reversing global ecological p r o b l e m s such as pollution, toxic waste, and resource scarcity. Finally, Global H u m a n i s m must contend with controversy within its own diverse ranks. One prominent issue is sustainable development, a norm that is intimately associated with a planetary perspective but eludes clear definition. Having got sustainable development onto the global agenda and into mainstream dialogue on development, Global Humanists must grapple with some difficult questions. Do humans and nature, including wildlife, have equal priority? Should the object of environmental protection be the return to a pristine era? Is it appropriate to use violence to protect natural resources? Is management of the environment antithetical to protecting nature and the cultures living in harmony with it? Exactly how much, if any, growth is sustainable? And taking account of the vast differences in quality of life between indigenous peoples, rich and poor in the Third World, and citizens of the industrialized world, sustainability for whom? How well Global H u m a n i s m , in theory and practice, responds to these criticisms and issues may be judged in the remaining chapters. But no picture of the global crisis, and no debate about its acute dimensions, would be complete without hearing the voices of the oppressed. Exploitation, the Brazilian scholar F e r n a n d o Henrique C a r d o s o tells us, has precipitated a worldwide struggle for equity and security that reflects a "crisis of values." That crisis must be resolved if there is ever to be "another development." 6 5

The Oppressed They c o m e f r o m everywhere, these voices. F r o m the slums of Sao Paulo, the streets of P r a g u e , the Indian reservations and black ghettos of the United States, the far provinces and major cities of China, the underground of M o s c o w , the torture c h a m b e r s of Argentina and Paraguay and El Salvador. T h e y speak as o n e across time, ideologies, and academic theories. For oppression has b e c o m e transnationalized: " W e are c a u g h t in an inescapable network of mutuality," as Martin Luther King, Jr., once said. Thus, as Gandhi constantly reminded his followers, not only is the inhuman

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treatment of o n e person an injustice to all; the manner of response to injustice is also a m e s s a g e to the world. 6 6 The significance of these m e s s a g e s reaches far beyond the individuals who speak or write them. We cite the personal statements because they are authentic: They c o m e from direct experience. In global perspective, however, they are anything but personal: They speak for the oppressed everywhere, in all four "worlds." Each individual story is different; only for the sake of analytical convenience are the voices grouped together. The power of the testimony dramatizes why Global Humanism regards human security as the e s s e n c e of the global crisis. Here, then, are the oppressed.

Poverty Over 1 billion people live in absolute poverty. Until the Chinese Revolution triumphed in 1949, absolute poverty had been the lot of ordinary Chinese for millennia. Said Mao Zedong in 1958: The outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are "poor and blank." This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written. 67 Mao understood the revolutionary potential of poverty from personal experience. Although born into a relatively well-off peasant family, he described (in his only autobiographical account) how he came to question the right of people w h o did not work the land to own it and make the peasants work for them. Then, "an incident occurred in Hunan [his h o m e province] which influenced my w h o l e life": There had been a severe famine that year, and in Changsha thousands were without food. The starving sent a delegation to the civil governor, to beg for relief, but he replied to them haughtily, "Why haven't you food? There is plenty in the city. I always have enough." When the people were told the governor's reply, they became very angry. They held mass meetings and organized a demonstration. They attacked the Manchu yamen, cut down the flagpole, the symbol of office, and drove out the governor. [A subsequent promise of change was not fulfilled.] . . . A new governor arrived, and at once ordered the arrest of the leaders of the uprising. Many of them were beheaded and their heads displayed on poles as a warning to future "rebels." This incident was discussed in my school for many days. It made a deep impression on me. . . . I never forgot it. I felt that there with the rebels were ordinary people like my own family and I deeply resented the injustice of the treatment given to them. 6 8

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In P o r t u g u e s e - c o n t r o l l e d G u i n e a in the 1 9 6 0 s , o n the o t h e r hand, ano t h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y leader, A m i l c a r C a b r a l , f o u n d that a m o n g the i m p o v e r i s h e d , t h e u r b a n w o r k e r s h a d the g r e a t e s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l .

He

wrote: As f a r as G u i n e a is c o n c e r n e d , the idea of the national liberation struggle w a s born not abroad but in our own country, in a milieu w h e r e people were subjected to close and incessant exploitation. M a n y p e o p l e say that it is the peasants w h o carry the burden of exploitation: this m a y be true, but . . . it is easier to c o n v i n c e the w o r k e r s and the people e m p l o y e d in the town w h o earn, say, 10 e s c u d o s a day for a j o b in which the E u r o p e a n earns b e t w e e n 30 and 50 that they are b e i n g s u b j e c t e d to m a s s i v e exploitation and injustice, because they can s e e . 6 9 V. S. N a i p a u l h a s a c h i e v e d w o r l d w i d e r e n o w n a s a n o v e l i s t . B o r n in Trinidad o f H i n d u p a r e n t s , h e w e n t to I n d i a to f i n d that the c o u n t r y ' s g r e a t h u m a n r e s o u r c e s w e r e b e i n g a b s o r b e d b y the past, e s p e c i a l l y p o v e r t y . H i s is a c h r o n i c l e o f d e s p a i r : In the village [in Bihar] I went to, only one family out of f o u r had land; only one child out of f o u r went to school; only one man out of f o u r had w o r k . For a w a g e c a l c u l a t e d to k e e p him only in f o o d for the day he worked, the e m p l o y e d man, hardly exercising a skill, using the simplest tools and s o m e t i m e s n o tools at all, did the simplest agricultural labor. C h i l d ' s w o r k ; and children, being c h e a p e r than m e n , were p r e f e r r e d ; so that, suicidally, in the midst of an o v e r p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h no o n e recognized . . . , children were a source of wealth, available for hire a f t e r their eighth year for, if times were g o o d , fifteen rupees, a dollar fifty (U.S.), a month.70 E n d i n g c h r o n i c p o v e r t y a n d a c h i e v i n g h u m a n r i g h t s are o n e a n d t h e s a m e s t r u g g l e . N e l s o n M a n d e l a h a s b e e n d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d in this s t r u g g l e f o r m o s t o f h i s l i f e . A l e a d i n g f i g u r e in the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l

Congress

( A N C ) , M a n d e l a w a s i m p r i s o n e d b y the S o u t h A f r i c a n a u t h o r i t i e s in 1 9 6 2 . H e f i n a l l y w a s r e l e a s e d in F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 0 , u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e s c r i b e d in t h e n e x t chapter. M a n d e l a o f f e r e d h i s v i s i o n o f the n e w S o u t h A f r i c a in a s p e e c h to the U . S . C o n g r e s s d u r i n g a t r i u m p h a n t tour o f N o r t h A m e r i c a in m i d - 1 9 9 0 : To deny any person their h u m a n rights is to challenge their very h u m a n ity. To i m p o s e on t h e m a wretched life of hunger and deprivation is to deh u m a n i z e t h e m , but such has been the terrible f a t e of all black p e r s o n s in our country under the s y s t e m of apartheid. T h e extent of the deprivation of millions of p e o p l e has to be seen to be believed. T h e injury is m a d e that [much] m o r e intolerable by the o p u l e n c e of our white c o m p a t r i o t s and the d e l i b e r a t e distortion of the e c o n o m y to feed that o p u l e n c e .

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The process of the reconstruction of South African society must and will also entail the transformation of its economy. We require an economy that is able to address the needs of all the people of our country, that can provide food, houses, social security and everything that makes human life human, that makes life joyful and not a protracted encounter with hopelessness and despair. . . . The ANC holds no ideological positions which dictate that it must adopt a policy of nationalization. But, the ANC also holds the view that there is no self-regulating mechanism within the South African economy which will, on its own, insure growth with equity. . . . We must also make the point, very firmly, that the political settlement and democracy itself cannot survive unless the material needs of the people, the bread and butter issue, are addressed as part of the process of change and as a matter of urgency. 71 Racism Few societies in the world are like Japan's: racially or ethnically h o m o g e neous. Virtually none, including J a p a n ' s , is without racial or ethnic bias that presents a major social problem. (In J a p a n ' s case, it is the presence of large numbers of Koreans and children of mixed marriages with gaishin, foreigners.) Following are two accounts of racism, the first by the Black Muslim activist preacher in the United States Malcolm X, and the second by the black student activist in South Africa Steve Biko. Both were murd e r e d — M a l c o l m X in his pulpit in 1964, Biko by prison guards in 1977. First, Malcolm X: The white people I had known marched before my mind's eye. From the start of my life. The [Michigan] white people always in our house after the other whites I didn't know had killed my father . . . the white people who kept calling my mother "crazy" to her face and before me and my brothers and sisters, until she finally was taken off by white people to the Kalamazoo asylum . . . the white judge and others who had split up the children . . . white youngsters I was in school with, and the teachers—the one who told me in the eighth grade to "be the carpenter" because thinking of being a lawyer was foolish for a Negro . . . the whites who piled into the Negro speakeasies for a taste of Negro soul . . . the social workers . . . the Middlesex County Court people . . . the judge who gave me ten years. 72 Next, Biko, who was an early exponent of black consciousness: It is not surprising, therefore, that in South Africa, after generations of exploitation, white people on the whole have come to believe in the inferiority of the black man, so much so that while the race problem started as an offshoot of the economic greed exhibited by white people, it has now become a serious problem on its own. White people now despise black people, not because they need to reinforce their attitude and so

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j u s t i f y their p o s i t i o n o f p r i v i l e g e but s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e that b l a c k is i n f e r i o r a n d b a d . T h i s is the b a s i s u p o n w h i c h w h i t e s are w o r k i n g in S o u t h A f r i c a , a n d it is w h a t m a k e s S o u t h A f r i c a n s o c i e t y racist. . . . B l a c k C o n s c i o u s n e s s d e f i n e s the s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y . . . . W e m u s t s e e k t o r e s t o r e t o the b l a c k m a n the g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e w e u s e d t o g i v e to h u m a n r e l a t i o n s , the h i g h regard for p e o p l e and their property and f o r l i f e in g e n e r a l ; to r e d u c e the t r i u m p h o f t e c h n o l o g y o v e r m a n and the m a t e r i a l i s t i c e l e m e n t that is s l o w l y c r e e p i n g i n t o o u r s o c i e t y . T h e s e are essential features of our black culture to w h i c h w e c l i n g . Black culture a b o v e all i m p l i e s f r e e d o m o n o u r part t o i n n o v a t e w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to white values.73

Patriarchy C h i n e s e w o m e n , M a o r e p o r t e d in 1927, w e r e s h a c k l e d not only by the " t h r e e s y s t e m s of a u t h o r i t y " that d o m i n a t e d m e n : political, clan, and relig i o u s . T h e y w e r e " a l s o d o m i n a t e d by the m e n (the a u t h o r i t y of the h u s b a n d ) " ; a l t o g e t h e r , " f o u r thick r o p e s b i n d i n g the C h i n e s e p e o p l e . " B u t M a o saw, e a r l i e r than m o s t , that the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the rural e c o n o m y w o u l d u n d e r m i n e m a l e d o m i n a t i o n ; w o m e n ' s participation in labor, he bel i e v e d , w o u l d s h a k e " t h e w h o l e f e u d a l - p a t r i a r c h a l i d e o l o g y " to its f o u n d a t i o n s . 7 4 To an extent it did; but even in C h i n a , o n e of the f e w c o u n t r i e s in w h i c h w o m e n h a v e m a d e m a j o r gains in social and e c o n o m i c standing, s e x - b a s e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is still w i d e s p r e a d . T h e reality for w o m e n is that neither " l i b e r a t i o n " into the w o r k f o r c e nor w o r l d w i d e a d o p t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of f e m a l e e q u a l i t y (in the U N C h a r t e r ) h a s e l i m i n a t e d patriarchy. In a c o m p r e h e n s i v e survey of the status of w o m e n w o r l d w i d e , R u t h L e g e r Sivard c o n c l u d e d : " W h e t h e r in the e c o n o m y , e d u c a t i o n , health, or g o v e r n m e n t , t h e r e is no m a j o r field of activity and n o c o u n t r y in w h i c h w o m e n h a v e attained equality with m e n . " 7 5 In d e v e l o p e d a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s of e v e r y political t e n d e n c y , w o m e n g e n e r a l l y e a r n f a r less t h a n m e n , eat less, are less w e l l e d u c a t e d (and m o r e likely to be illiterate), a d v a n c e p r o f e s s i o n a l l y less o f t e n than m e n , are politically f a r less r e p r e s e n t e d in l e g i s l a t u r e s and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s , are less h e a l t h y , h a v e s h o r t e r life s p a n s , a n d e n j o y m a n y f e w e r legal rights in m a r r i a g e , p r o p e r t y relations, and the w o r k p l a c e . A b o u t the o n l y area in w h i c h w o m e n g e n e r a l l y h a v e m o r e than m e n is their total daily work load. W h e n K i m C a m p b e l l b e c a m e C a n a d a ' s first f e m a l e p r i m e m i n i s t e r in 1993, she a p p r o p r i a t e l y o b s e r v e d , " T h e r e ' s a C h i n e s e p r o v e r b that w o m e n h o l d u p half the sky. Yeah, the h e a v i e r h a l f . " 7 6 Still, M a o ' s p o i n t a b o u t the i m p o r t a n c e of the w o r k p r o c e s s as the basis both of w o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n and their p o t e n t i a l liberation h a s merit. It e m e r g e s in this a c c o u n t by D o m i t i l a , the w i f e of a B o l i v i a n t i n - m i n e worker:

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We w o m e n , the c o m p a ñ e r a s of the m e n , work with t h e m in the j o b that t h e y ' r e involved in. We w o m e n were raised f r o m the cradle with the ideas that w o m e n were m a d e only to cook and take care of the kids, that w e are incapable of a s s u m i n g important tasks, and that we s h o u l d n ' t be a l l o w e d to get i n v o l v e d in politics. But n e c e s s i t y m a d e us c h a n g e our lives. F i f t e e n years a g o , in a period of t r e m e n d o u s p r o b l e m s f o r the w o r k i n g class [in the mines], a g r o u p of seventy w o m e n organized to win f r e e d o m for their c o m p a ñ e r o s w h o were leaders and had been imprisoned for d e m a n d i n g higher wages. The w o m e n got e v e r y t h i n g they asked for, a f t e r a ten-day h u n g e r strike. And f r o m then on they decided to organize in a group which they called " H o u s e w i v e s ' C o m m i t t e e of Siglo X X . " 7 7

Such activism is far from the norm. In Women in the Global Factory, Annette Fuentes and Barbara Ehrenreich describe the exploitation of cheap, abundant, docile female labor by transnational corporations. These women, usually young, single, and willing to do repetitive assembly-line work, make ideal employees. "Young male workers are too restless and impatient to be doing monotonous work with no career value," a personnel manager in Taiwan is quoted as saying. "If displeased they sabotage the machines and even threaten the foreman. But girls, at most they cry a little." 78 Women workers supposedly can be relied on not to protest unsafe, unhealthy work conditions; and when, as commonly happens, they contract a work-related illness—such as, in South Korean factories, conjunctivitis and other eye diseases caused by working with microchips—they are easily replaced. 79 Hence they feel trapped, like the Taiwanese factory worker who said: I ' v e sold five years of my youth to the c o m p a n y . I need a rest f r o m this b r a i n n u m b i n g work for t w o or three w e e k s . But there is n o w a y I can leave without quitting or taking a big loss. T h e r e are so m a n y regulations you feel you are tied up with ropes till you c a n ' t b u d g e an inch. And I ' v e given them five years of my life! 8 ^

The women's movement has been one of the major political forces for change in recent years, notably in the United States and Western Europe. The late Petra Kelly personified modern-day feminism as one of the spokespersons of the German Greens: W o m e n must c h a n g e their c o n s c i o u s n e s s , break f r o m the patriarchal circle and free t h e m s e l v e s f r o m such ill-suited ideas as those of the m a s c u line, patriarchal and nuclear society. All too long we h a v e been told that to gain equal c h a n c e s and equal opportunities, we m u s t accept the equal rights and e q u a l d u t i e s of m e n . But it c a n n o t be e m a n c i p a t i o n , to stand b e s i d e m e n in the various national armies and learn to shoot and learn to kill. It cannot be e m a n c i p a t i o n to learn how to operate a n u c l e a r reactor or to be able to sit in a nuclear silo and control the control b o a r d . 8 1

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Underdevelopment: Colonialism,

Imperialism,

and

Neocolonialism

S o m e o f the p e o p l e w e h a v e q u o t e d , s u c h as M a o , C a b r a l , a n d D o m i t i l a , l i n k e d their e x p e r i e n c e s o f o p p r e s s i o n to a broader, s y s t e m i c p h e n o m e n o n : the u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f their c o u n t r i e s b y c o l o n i a l i s m ,

neocolonialism,

or i m p e r i a l i s m . ( T h e r e are a l s o p e r s o n s w h o e x p l i c i t l y r e f u s e d to d o s o , s u c h as S t e v e B i k o . ) I n d i a ' s first p r i m e m i n i s t e r , J a w a h a r l a l N e h r u , w r o t e at l e n g t h a b o u t B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l d o m i n a t i o n o f h i s c o u n t r y . H i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w B r i t i s h rule e v o l v e d i n t o a " n e w i m p e r i a l i s m , " in w h i c h l o c a l l a n d l o r d s a n d o f f i c i a l s b e c a m e t i e d i n t o the a u t h o r i t y and c l a s s s t r u c t u r e o f E n g l a n d , a p p l i e s t o d a y in a n u m b e r o f n o n c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n s : We find that the British, the most a d v a n c e d people in E u r o p e at the time, ally t h e m s e l v e s in India with the most b a c k w a r d and c o n s e r v a t i v e classes. T h e y bolster up a d y i n g feudal class; they create landlords; they s u p p o r t the h u n d r e d s of d e p e n d e n t Indian rulers in their s e m i - f e u d a l states. . . . And they tried to m a k e India a purely agricultural country prod u c i n g raw materials for their industries. To prevent factories g r o w i n g up in India they actually put a duty on machinery entering India. . . . T h e object of this was to help British cotton goods f r o m L a n c a s h i r e to c o m p e t e with Indian textiles. In this way modern industry grew slowly in India. T h e richer classes in India cried out m o r e and m o r e for industrial d e v e l o p m e n t . . . . [After World I] this growth of industrial conditions created a class of industrial w o r k e r s w h o w o r k e d in the city factories. The workers in the factories soon found that the slightly higher w a g e did not go very far. E v e r y t h i n g cost m o r e in the cities; altogether the cost of living w a s m u c h higher. T h e p l a c e s w h e r e they had to live w e r e w r e t c h e d h o v e l s , filthy, d a m p and dark and insanitary. T h e i r w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s w e r e also bad. . . . S o m e t i m e s , in very despair, they had a s t r i k e — t h a t is, they s t o p p e d w o r k . But they were w e a k and f e e b l e , and could easily be crushed by their wealthy e m p l o y e r s , b a c k e d o f t e n by the [colonial] g o v e r n m e n t . 8 2 E q u a l l y p o w e r f u l is the portrait o f the p s y c h o l o g y o f c o l o n i a l i s m b y F r a n t z F a n o n , a b l a c k p s y c h o l o g i s t w h o g a i n e d f a m e f o r h i s w o r k in F r e n c h a n d p o s t i n d e p e n d e n t ( 1 9 5 8 ) A l g e r i a . In t e s t i m o n y that,

again,

e c h o e s in m a n y o t h e r Third W o r l d a c c o u n t s , F a n o n w r o t e : T h e w e l l - k n o w n principle that all men are equal will be illustrated in the c o l o n i e s f r o m the m o m e n t that the native c l a i m s that he is t h e e q u a l of the settler. O n e step m o r e , and h e is ready to f i g h t to be m o r e than the settler. . . . T h e native d i s c o v e r s that his life, his breath, his beating heart are the s a m e as those of the settler. He f i n d s out that the settler's skin is not of any m o r e value than a n a t i v e ' s skin; and it m u s t be said that this discovery shakes the world in a very necessary manner. All the new, revo l u t i o n a r y a s s u r a n c e of the native s t e m s f r o m it. For if, in fact, m y life is worth as m u c h as the settler's, his glance no longer shrivels me up nor

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freezes me, and his voice no longer turns me into stone. I am no longer on tenterhooks in his presence; in fact, I don't give a damn for him. . . . The total result looked for by colonial domination was indeed to convince the natives that colonialism came to lighten their darkness. The effect consciously sought by colonialism was to drive into the natives' heads the idea that if the settlers were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation, and bestiality. 83 For India, for Algeria, for over fifty countries after World War II, independence was the great quest of nationalist leaders. S o m e of them, like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, were inspired by earlier anticolonial struggles in the West. On September 2, 1945, the day the world war o f f i c i a l l y ended in Asia, Ho and his c o l l e a g u e s issued a declaration of Vietnamese independence that began with the words of the A m e r i c a n Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. "Nevertheless," the Vietnamese document continues, for more than eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the stand of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice. In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty. They have en-forced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, Center, and the South of Viet-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united. They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots; they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood. 8 4 Nationalism as antiforeignism has been a frequent rallying cry across the Third World: "India shall be a nation! N o foreigners of any sort! Hindu and M o s l e m and Sikh and all shall be one! Hurrah! HuiTah for India! Hurrah! Hurrah!" 85 But it has happened all too often that independence from foreign rule has merely substituted internal for external exploitation: domestic instead of (or in addition to) foreign capital, local police and bureaucratic tyrants instead of foreign-trained ones, a h o m e g r o w n dictator in place of a colonial regent. And the oppression continues: old wine in new bottles. Fouad Ajami has written: An earlier generation of Third World nationalists came to learn the traumatic lesson that the liberal values of the West were not for export and that those who valued nationalism for themselves denied it to others. Now the same lesson has to be learned about Marxism. Marxist internationalism is a thin construct: behind the ideological masks can be seen the ageold desire of powerful men and societies to hoard and to dominate. 8 6 N o o n e has captured this n e o c o l o n i a l i s m more grippingly than the Kenyan writer N g u g i wa T h i o n g ' o in his novel Petals of Blood—so much

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so that Ngugi was thrown in jail shortly after the book's publication in 1977. His novel is a tale of great hopes for independent Kenya betrayed by greed, blind ambition, and the persistence of a colonialist mentality among the powerful. A black lawyer sums up for Ngugi the case against the new masters: I look back on the w a s t e d c h a n c e s , on the m i s s e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s : on the hour, the day, the p e r i o d , w h e n , at the c r o s s r o a d s , w e took t h e w r o n g turning. . . . We could have done anything, then, because our p e o p l e were behind us. But we, the leaders, chose to flirt with the molten g o d , a blind, deaf m o n s t e r w h o has p l a g u e d us f o r h u n d r e d s of years. We r e a s o n e d : w h a t ' s wrong is the skin-colour of the people w h o ministered to this god. . . . So we g o on b u i l d i n g the m o n s t e r and it g r o w s and waits for m o r e , and now we are all slaves to it. At its shrine we kneel and pray and hope. Now see the o u t c o m e . . . dwellers in Blue Hills [Nairobi's elite suburbs], those who have taken on t h e m s e l v e s the priesthood of the ministry to the blind god . . . a t h o u s a n d acres of land . . . a million acres in the h a n d s of a priest, while the congregation m o a n s for an acre! and they are told: it is only a collection f r o m your sweat. . . . M e a n w h i l e , the god g r o w s big and fat and shines even brighter and whets the appetites of his priests, for the m o n s t e r has, through the p r i e s t h o o d , decreed only one ethical c o d e : G r e e d and a c c u m u l a t i o n . 1 ask myself: is it fair, is it fair, our c h i l d r e n ? 8 7

By 1990 such anguish had found expression in a major political opposition rooted in concern about one-person and one-party rule, corruption, and political repression. Kenya, the largest recipient in Africa of U.S. and British aid and long touted for its political stability and friendliness to U.S. strategic interests, suddenly caught the winds from Eastern Europe. Kenya loomed not as an example of democratic development but as another neofascist state. 88 The betrayal of independence does not require a colonial past, as with Kenya and India. Neocolonialism is typically associated with an influx of foreign capital and the creation, as in Brazil, of close political, military, and economic ties between local and foreign elites. The consequence of this dependence is, again, underdevelopment. It is depicted here by a Brazilian labor leader, Luis Inacio da Silva, popularly known as Lula: We k n o w that the e c o n o m i c situation of the country is bad. We k n o w that there is w i d e s p r e a d h u n g e r and starvation a m o n g our people. We d o not plant b e a n s a n y m o r e ; w e d o not plant rice a n y m o r e ; w e d o not p r o d u c e f o o d a n y m o r e . We are building a r m a m e n t s , nuclear plants, missiles. Behind this is not the will to d e v e l o p Brazil. T h e objective is to satisfy the polluted m i n d s of the military w h i c h rules this country [until late 1984]. T h e y say they want to m a k e Brazil a world power. A country is not p o w e r f u l by the quantity of arms and b o m b s it p r o d u c e s . A country is not developed by the a m o u n t of tanks and machine g u n s it possesses. A country is p o w e r f u l and d e v e l o p e d w h e n its p e o p l e are healthy, e d u c a t e d , are

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proud of their multiracial ethnicity. W h e n the p e o p l e have a full stomach, housing, and health, then the country is d e v e l o p e d . 8 9

Evidently, many Brazilians agreed with L u l a ' s analysis: In 1989 he narrowly missed winning the presidential election as head of the Brazilian Workers' Party, and was its candidate again in 1994. Religion Persecution of people for their religious beliefs is one of the oldest forms of oppression. It has taken a new twist in Latin America today: As the Catholic Church has increasingly aligned itself with the poor, the apparatus of state repression has turned on the priests. But to many in the Third World, organized religion has more commonly been a tool of oppression, forming what Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o refers to as the "Holy Trinity": "Christianity, Commerce, Civilization: the Bible, the Coin, the Gun." 9 0 I will cite from both kinds of experiences, beginning with Ali Shariati, an opponent (and victim) of the S h a h ' s Iran, and one of contemporary Iran's greatest spiritual-political philosophers: From Palestine to Iran, from Egypt to China and throughout all parts of the earth where there was civilization, w e had to carry the loads of stones to construct temples, palaces, and graves. A g a i n in the name of charity, the representatives of the "gods" and the s u c c e s s o r s of the prophets began to loot us. Again, in the name of holy war, w e were pushed into the battlefields. We had to s a c r i f i c e our i n n o c e n t children for the "gods," temples, and idols! M y friend, for t h o u s a n d s of years, our destiny b e c a m e w o r s e than yours. Three-fifths of the wealth in Iran went to the M o b e d a n s [clergy] in the name of the gods. We b e c a m e their servants and slaves. Four-fifths of the wealth in France w a s taken from us by the c l e r g y m e n of G o d . T h e Pharoah c l e r g y m e n and spiritual teachers of religions h a v e a l w a y s been successful. . . . I d o not k n o w w h e r e to g o ! Where should I g o ? S h o u l d I g o to the Mobedans? H o w could I return to those t e m p l e s w h i c h were built to enslave m e ? S h o u l d I j o i n those w h o claim to be e x a m p l e s of our national f r e e d o m but in e s s e n c e are attempting to gain their inhuman privileges of the past? T h e m o s q u e s are no better than those t e m p l e s ! 9 1

Shariati found sanctity in Islam; but one can imagine his continuing agitation had he lived to see the oppressive form Islam took under Khomeini's revolution, which Shariati supported. A religious revolution of a different sort began in Latin America in 1968 at an extraordinary conclave of bishops. 9 2 These meetings in Medellin, Colombia, inaugurated by Pope Paul, set in motion what has now become known as liberation theology: a historic reversal of the Catholic

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C h u r c h ' s role in Latin America, f r o m f i r m supporter of established politicale c o n o m i c authority to proclaimed ally of the destitute. T h e price of this prof o u n d shift m a y be seen in A r g e n t i n a , Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador. T h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s were particularly notorious in the 1960s and 1970s for their arrests, tortures, k i d n a p p i n g s , and m u r d e r s of Christian ecclesiastic and lay leaders. T h e o f f i c i a l charge, predictably, was that those priests who s u p ported land r e f o r m and peasant organization were C o m m u n i s t s . (Through its support of these g o v e r n m e n t s and of right-wing elements in the church, the U.S. Central Intelligence A g e n c y was deeply involved in the repression.) M o r e recently, the c e n t e r of antichurch activity was El Salvador. T h e m u r d e r in 1980 of A r c h b i s h o p Oscar R o m e r o of San S a l v a d o r was the c e n tral e v e n t in a v e r i t a b l e r e i g n of terror against the c h u r c h . T h e r e is little d o u b t that R o m e r o w a s m u r d e r e d by a right-wing death squad; other m u r d e r s and k i d n a p p i n g s of c h u r c h people were linked to o f f i c i a l S a l v a d o r a n security f o r c e s . A P e r u v i a n liberation t h e o l o g i a n said of R o m e r o ' s d e a t h : " B e f o r e R o m e r o the C h u r c h t e n d e d to say: these C h r i s t i a n s died for political not religious reasons. H e w a s killed not b e c a u s e he d e f e n d e d the rights of the C h u r c h , but b e c a u s e he d e f e n d e d the rights of the p o o r . " 9 3 Yet w i t h i n the c h u r c h itself, the issue of h o w f a r a n d in what w a y s priests should be " p o l i t i c a l " r e m a i n s controversial. Father L e o n a r d o B o f f , a Brazilian, c l a s h e d r e p e a t e d l y with the Vatican b e c a u s e of his radical int e r p r e t a t i o n and p r a c t i c e of c h u r c h d o c t r i n e . He went so f a r as to c h a r g e that the c h u r c h h i e r a r c h y h a d itself v i o l a t e d h u m a n rights. In o n e of his books, Boff presented a radical-humanist agenda for liberation theology that has r e s o n a t e d t h r o u g h o u t Latin A m e r i c a : The long-range Christian strategy is to achieve a liberation that guarantees a self-sustained development that meets the real needs of the people, and not the consumerist needs of rich countries and groups associated with those countries. . . . [We should] recognize the privileged status of the poor as the new and emerging historical subject which will carry on the Christian project in the world. The poor, here, are not understood simply as those in need; they are in need but they are also the group with a historical strength, a capacity for change, and a potential for evangelization. The Church reaches out to them directly, not through the state or the ruling classes. Thus, we are no longer speaking of a Church for the poor but rather a Church of and with the poor. From this option for and insertion among the poor the Church begins to define its relationship with all other social classes. It does not lose its catholicity; its catholicity becomes real and not merely a matter of rhetoric. 94

State

Terror

J a c o b o T i m e r m a n is a J e w w h o f o r a n u m b e r of years p u b l i s h e d o n e of the m a j o r n e w s p a p e r s in B u e n o s A i r e s , A r g e n t i n a . In the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s h e was i m p r i s o n e d f o r n e a r l y t w o y e a r s . T h i s w a s a d a r k c h a p t e r in A r g e n t i n a ' s

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history, during which successive military j u n t a s authorized the abduction, torture, and " d i s a p p e a r a n c e " of at least 9 , 0 0 0 and possibly as many as 30,000 persons. An u n k n o w n n u m b e r of infants were taken at birth f r o m their mothers, who were killed, and given to childless military families. 9 5 T i m e r m a n ' s testimony speaks directly to the evils of the neofascist state: The members of the Argentine military claim impunity in the unleashing of brutality, insisting that the war against [Communist] terrorism was imposed upon them, in which case methods matter less than destiny. . . . In Nazi Germany, the Jews were guilty through birth, the liberals through weakness and corruption, the Communists through ideology. The same equation of guilt proved suitable for the enemy of the Argentine military. . . . How can a nation reproduce in every detail, though employing other forms, in every argument, though employing other words, the same monstrous crimes [of the Nazis] explicitly condemned and clearly expounded so many years before? That is the Argentine mystery. 9 6

The presidency of Raul Alfonsin, who took office in December 1983, brought some measure of justice to Argentina. Although many perpetrators of evil were not prosecuted, leading f i g u r e s in three j u n t a s were imprisoned and compensation was given to some families of desaparecidos (the disappeared). By contrast, human-rights organizations in Chile have experienced tougher going as they seek justice for the murders and tortures of thousands of followers of Salvador Allende. Many of the bodies are only now being discovered. But these groups have to contend with the continuing p o w e r of the military and its f o r m e r c o m m a n d e r in chief and head of state, A u g u s t o Pinochet. Although the Chilean people voted in 1989 against his continuing in o f f i c e , Pinochet was able to push through an a m n e s t y law that f o r g i v e s all political c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d b e f o r e 1978. Pinochet and his cronies will probably never be brought to trial in C h i l e — at this writing he may face trial in Spain as an international criminal—but at least the dead can be reclaimed as patriots, not terrorists, and the arbitrary p o w e r of the state can be ended. As one of the leading voices of h u m a n rights in Chile, Roberto Garreton Merino, has said: From 1973 until now, we have lived always counting how many were dead and how many were detained. If a moment came when there were fewer dead and fewer detained, we always said, "Ah, the situation is better for human rights." But that was a deeply erroneous statement. The problem is not one of numbers. The problem is w h o decides w h o lives and who dies, who is in jail and who is free. If Pinochet could kill with impunity, it was the same thing as actually doing it. On December 14, 1989, when we elected [Patricio] Ay 1 win President, all that changed. . . . What we will have in Chile is what exists in any civilized country: Every citizen knows that the state cannot violate his rights with impunity. . . . I would like to reach the moment when Chileans feel that if the doorbell rings at 5 A.M., they will be certain that it is only the milkman. 9 7

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Terror was a daily reality in El Salvador, too. A rough estimate is that 5 0 , 0 0 0 people died in the civil war there from 1979 to 1992, the overwhelming majority at the hands of death squads and official government forces. In Manlio Argueta's compelling novel of El Salvador, One Day of Life, we experience the immediacy of this terror as we live, at close range, with a peasant family. Not only do we become familiar with their fears, outrage, and ultimate courage; we also see the repression from the perpetrator's standpoint, that of a pure fascist out to pacify the opposition at any cost, just as his gringo instructors taught him. In the sequence cited below, two soldiers confront a peasant woman with the barely living body of her husband, whose " c r i m e " is that he was a member of a peasant association. She denies knowing him to protect her granddaughter: " I don't know what my g r a n d d a u g h t e r has been up to. 1 only know that she is a child w h o has other ambitions b e c a u s e we old people are half dead; we have allowed you to kill us slowly. But w e ' v e c o m e to o u r senses while it's not too late. M y g r a n d d a u g h t e r is alive and you are not g o i n g to kill her slowly. . . . S h e lives for all o f us, she breathes f o r us, she is being born while we are in our death throes; it is also possible that she will save u s . " I d o n ' t know h o w I uttered these w o r d s . . . . I h a v e to c l o s e m y e y e s to be a b l e to s p e a k . S o a s not to s e e y o u , J o s e , s o y o u r inspiration c a n r e a c h m e better. P r i v a t e M a r t i n e z : " W e w a n t y o u to look in this m i r r o r . T h a t ' s h o w y o u ' r e g o i n g to end up, all o f y o u w h o d o n ' t l o v e the r i c h , b e c a u s e the e n e m i e s o f d e m o c r a c y h a v e p o i s o n e d y o u r hearts . . . s o y o u ' l l hate the rich p e o p l e . " A d o l f i n a : " I f you d o n ' t h a v e a n y t h i n g else to d o , if y o u h a v e enj o y e d g i v i n g all o f this a b u s e , y o u m a y g o eat the g e n t l e m a n you h a v e hanging there." T h e b u c k p r i v a t e : " S i r , d o n ' t let t h e m be so d i s r e s p e c t f u l . If y o u w a n t , I'll take c a r e o f this b i t c h . " P r i v a t e M a r t i n e z : " D o n ' t butt into w h a t ' s none o f y o u r business. T h e girl is r i g h t . " 9 8

There is no truly accurate figure on the number of victims of official terrorism. Considering the many ways in which a person can be victimized—from apprehension to murder—it is difficult to imagine how high the figures might be. What can be reported is that as the 1990s began, fifty-eight military-controlled governments and thirty civilian governments in the Third World were practicing torture and other forms of official violence occasionally or frequently." Denial of Political

Freedoms

The government of the former Czechoslovakia was a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the government of China did not sign until 1998, and Burma has not signed. But a number of

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basic individual freedoms have been denied in all three societies, as they are in much of the world. F o l l o w i n g are protests of such restrictions in those countries. The first is by Charter 77, a group o f broad participation formed in 1977 "to work individually and c o l l e c t i v e l y for respect for human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia and the world." One of its leading members was President Vaclav Havel, w h o was quoted earlier. The second protest was written by Wei Jingsheng, a young Chinese electrician. His sharply worded essays on democracy in the late 1970s, during the brief flourishing of "Democracy Wall" in Beijing, earned him a fourteen-year prison sentence that ended in 1993. Repeated democratic outbursts since then led to re-arrests that only ended when the Chinese government allowed him to go to the United States in 1998. The third statement c o m e s from Aung San Suu Kyi, winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize and the leading figure in Burma's struggle for democracy. A s head of the National League for Democracy, she was placed under house arrest in 1989 as the SLORC sought to head off what would be, in May 1990. a massive victory at the polls for the democratic m o v e m e n t . The S L O R C refused to accept the election results and carried out a ruthless crackdown instead, during which the N L D ' s other key figures were arrested. The Czech statement reads in part: [Publication of the international human-rights covenants], however, is at the same time an urgent reminder of the many fundamental human rights that, regrettably, exist in our country only on paper. The right of free expression . . . , for example, is quite illusory. Tens of thousands of citizens have been prevented from working in their professions for the sole reason that their views differ from the official ones. They have been the frequent targets of various forms of discrimination and chicanery on the part of the authorities or social organizations; they have been denied any opportunity to defend themselves and are practically the victims of apartheid. . . . Freedom of speech is suppressed by the government's management of all mass media, including the publishing and cultural institutions. No political, philosophical, scientific, or artistic work that deviates in the slightest from the narrow framework of official ideology or esthetics is permitted to be produced. Public criticism of social conditions is prohibited. Public defense against false and defamatory charges by official propaganda organs is impossible. . . . False accusations cannot be refuted, and it is futile to attempt rectification or to seek legal redress. Open discussion of intellectual and cultural matters is out of the question. . . . Religious freedom . . . is systematically curbed with a despotic arbitrariness: Limits are imposed on activities of priests, who are constantly threatened with the revocation of government permission to perform their function; persons who manifest their religious faith either by word or action lose their jobs or are made to suffer other repressions; religious instruction in schools is suppressed, et cetera. 1 0 0 Wei Jingsheng's words anticipated the June 4, 1989, pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing:

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W h a t is true d e m o c r a c y ? It m e a n s the right of the people to c h o o s e their o w n representatives to work according to their will and in their interests. . . . F u r t h e r m o r e , the p e o p l e must also h a v e the p o w e r to r e p l a c e their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n y t i m e so that these r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c a n n o t go on dec e i v i n g others in the n a m e of the people. This is the kind of d e m o c r a c y e n j o y e d by p e o p l e in E u r o p e a n and A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . . . . In C h i n a , h o w e v e r , if a person e v e n c o m m e n t s on the already d e a d G r e a t H e l m s m a n M a o Z e d o n g or the Great M a n without peers in history, jail will be ready for him with open door. . . . H o w to maintain d e m o c r a t i c order is a d o m e s t i c p r o b l e m requiring solution by the people t h e m s e l v e s , and there is no need for the privileged o v e r l o r d s to worry about it. . . . Let me respectfully remind these g e n t l e m e n : We want to be masters of our own destiny. We need no gods or e m p e r o r s . We d o not believe in the e x i s t e n c e of any savior. We want to be masters of the world and not i n s t r u m e n t s used by autocrats to carry out their wild ambitions. We want a m o d e r n lifestyle and d e m o c r a c y for the people. F r e e d o m and h a p p i n e s s are our sole objectives in accomplishing modernization. Without this fifth m o d e r n i z a t i o n [along with industrial, agricultural, scientific, and military m o d e r n i z a t i o n ] all others are merely another promise. . . . So, the m o d e r n i z a t i o n of the p e o p l e ' s lives requires the m o d e r n i z a tion of the social s y s t e m — d e m o c r a c y . A s long as there is d e m o c r a c y , there is a possibility as well as opportunity to realize equal r i g h t s . 1 0 1

Though released from house arrest in 1995, Aung San Suu Kyi continues to be closely guarded and to have her movements restricted. Most Burmese are Buddhists, and as the following passage from meetings with various Hsayadaw (holy teachers) indicates, Buddhism exerts a powerful influence on her political thought and practice. U P a n d i t a spoke of the i m p o r t a n c e of samma-vaca or right s p e e c h . Not o n l y should one speak only the truth, o n e ' s speech should lead to harm o n y a m o n g beings, it should be kind and pleasant and it should be bene f i c i a l . . . . T h e Hsayadaw also urged m e to cultivate sati, m i n d f u l n e s s . Of the five spiritual f a c u l t i e s , saddha (faith), viriya ( e n e r g y ) , samadhi ( c o n c e n t r a t i o n ) and panna ( w i s d o m ) , it is only sati that can n e v e r be in e x c e s s . E x c e s s i v e f a i t h w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t w i s d o m leads to blind faith, while excessive w i s d o m without sufficient faith leads to undesirable cunning. Too m u c h energy c o m b i n e d with weak concentration leads to restl e s s n e s s while strong c o n c e n t r a t i o n without sufficient energy leads to ind o l e n c e . But as for sati, one can never have too m u c h of it. . . . In P r o m e a Hsayadaw told m e to keep in m i n d the hermit S u m e d h a , w h o s a c r i f i c e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of early liberation for himself a l o n e and u n d e r w e n t m a n y lives of striving that he m i g h t save others f r o m s u f f e r ing. So must you be p r e p a r e d to strive for as long as might be n e c e s s a r y to achieve good and justice, exhorted the v e n e r a b l e Hsayadaw. Of the words of w i s d o m I g a t h e r e d d u r i n g that j o u r n e y a c r o s s central B u r m a , those of a ninety-one-year-old Hsayadaw of Sagaing are particularly m e m o r a b l e . He sketched out for m e tersely how it w o u l d be to w o r k for d e m o c r a c y in B u r m a . "You will be attacked and r e v i l e d f o r

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engaging in honest politics," pronounced the Hsayadaw, "but you must persevere. Lay down an investment in dukkha [suffering] and you will gain sukha [bliss]." 1 0 2

Ecocide N o group has b e e n m o r e d e e p l y a f f e c t e d by e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n than the North A m e r i c a n Indian. T h e I n d i a n ' s w a y o f l i f e , spiritually and materially, is i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m nature. T h a t way h a s b e e n s u b j e c t e d to rel e n t l e s s a s s a u l t by w h i t e " c i v i l i z a t i o n . " f r o m p o l l u t i o n o f a n c i e n t w a t e r s and lands to uranium p o i s o n i n g and strip-mining. L i k e A f r i c a n , S o u t h e a s t A s i a n , and L a t i n A m e r i c a n tribes, the North A m e r i c a n Indians are f o r c e d to fight a r e a r g u a r d a c t i o n to d e f e n d t h e i r h o m e l a n d s . N o w m a n y n o n Indian c o m m u n i t i e s are c o m i n g to r e c o g n i z e that the g l o b a l issue o f e c o l o g i c a l s u i c i d e — e c o c i d e — i s not e x c l u s i v e l y tribal; it c a n b e as c l o s e as their own b a c k y a r d s . F o l l o w i n g are t w o Indian appeals: T h e first w a s written by Hopi leaders to P r e s i d e n t N i x o n p r o t e s t i n g s t r i p - m i n i n g

on I n d i a n lands by a

t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s u b s i d i a r y ; the s e c o n d is t h e " H a u d e n o s a u n e e S t a t e m e n t to the W o r l d — M a y 1 9 7 9 , " p a s s e d in the S i x N a t i o n s C o u n c i l o f the I r o q u o i s . Today the sacred lands where the Hopi live are being desecrated by men who seek coal and water from our soil that they may create more power for the white man's cities. This must not be allowed to continue for if it does, Mother Nature will react in such a way that almost all men will suffer the end o f life as they now know it. The Great Spirit said not to allow this to happen even as it was prophesied to our ancestors. . . . Your government has almost destroyed our basic religion which actually is a way of life for all our people in this land of the Great Spirit. 1 0 3 A n d from the I r o q u o i s : Brothers and Sisters: Our ancient homeland is spotted today with an array of chemical dumps. Along the Niagara River dioxin, a particularly deadly substance, threatens the remaining life there and in the waters which flow from there. . . . The fish of the Great Lakes are laced with mercury from industrial plants, and fluoride from aluminum plants poisons the land and the people. Sewage from the population centers is mixed with P C B s and PBs in the watersheds of the Great Lakes and the Finger Lakes, and the waters are virtually nowhere safe for any living creature. . . . Only a people whose minds are twisted beyond an ability to perceive truth could act in ways which will threaten the future generations of humanity. . . . In our territories, we continue to carry out our function as spiritual caretakers of the land. In this role as caretakers, we cannot, and will not, stand idly by while the future o f the coming generations is being systematically destroyed. 1 0 4

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These many v o i c e s of the oppressed speak eloquently f o r themselves. In G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t perspective, they take on added s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h e y originate in heartfelt concern, not political doctrine. In some cases, ideolo g y systematized this concern, but it did not replace it. F u n d a m e n t a l l y , these are protests against greed, injustice, indecency, intolerance, and narrow vision, human and systemic weaknesses that are universal. T h e y reinf o r c e the importance of values. They also reinforce the importance of understanding structures of inequality at different social l e v e l s , including patriarchy, class, and the capitalist and socialist state. Finally, these e x p l a nations, appeals, protests—anguished v o i c e s a l l — h e l p to c l a r i f y why resistance of one kind or another remains such a fixture of c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d politics. A n d in understanding why, we b e c o m e able to r e s p o n d to the call for action of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, perhaps contemporary R u s sia's most prominent dissident: We have to condemn publicly the very idea that some people have the right to repress others. In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, w e are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousandfold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, w e are not simply protecting their trivial old age, w e are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new g e n e r a t i o n s . 1 0 5

4 The Third World and the Fourth: Human Rights, Environmental Decline, and Underdevelopment Multinational executives who have been watching one Latin American country after another pull back from the radicalism of the early 1970s today consider the region to be one of the world's major investment opportunities. . . . "It is all there—protein, minerals, forests, water" [says one executive], —Business

Week, August 9, 1976

Our nations must learn from the developed countries to avoid stumbling into the same pitfalls as they. It is absolutely essential that our creative endeavour should be directed towards the formulation of genuinely Latin American solutions. Hence there is no point in persisting in a race for development that takes no account of the values inherent in developed society. —Gustavo Lagos

Defining the "Third World" Anyone who has visited an underdeveloped country knows the scene: the sharp contrasts between rich and poor. At first sight, the modern capital city, with its international airport, skyscrapers, traffic jams, businesspeople, high-walled private homes, neon signs advertising luxury goods from every continent—and beggars, pollution, and shantytowns just beyond view of downtown. And then there is the rest of the country: unrelieved squalor, too many people for too little land, children with distended bellies, the most primitive technology, thatched-roof dwellings, a closeness to death. Destiny or politics? Merely two societies, one modern and advancing, the other backward and decaying; or a structurally unequal system, the smaller part feeding off the larger? The purpose of this chapter is to use the Global-Humanist approach in political economy to examine the crisis of human insecurity at closer range. I want to bring to life my previous generalizations about global problems, 111

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connecting them with the voices of the oppressed by presenting case studies of underdevelopment, environmental problems, and human rights in four countries: China, South Africa, Brazil, and South Korea. The first task, however, is to clarify what the "Third World" means and does not mean. Conventional definitions divide the 150 or so countries of t h e Third World a c c o r d i n g to a national a v e r a g e G N P per p e r s o n , y i e l d i n g high-, low-, and m i d d l e - i n c o m e categories. T h e merit of this division is that it e n a b l e s us to distinguish (as the World Bank d o e s ) the u p p e r - m i d d l e i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s ( a m o n g them, South A f r i c a , L i b y a , and N I C s such as Brazil) and the h i g h - i n c o m e oil e x p o r t e r s ( i n c l u d i n g Saudi A r a b i a and Kuwait) f r o m the most impoverished and unindustrialized countries of the Fourth World (such as B a n g l a d e s h , Ethiopia, and Haiti) and t h e lowerm i d d l e - i n c o m e g r o u p (such as E g y p t and T h a i l a n d ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , an average-income classification such as this falls short f r o m a human-interest point of view. T h o u g h it e v i d e n t l y is useful for international lending a g e n c i e s and transnational c o r p o r a t i o n s , since it assists them in m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s about loans and i n v e s t m e n t s , the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n says nothing about the quality of life and the distribution of social benefits within societies. Nor do a v e r a g e i n c o m e f i g u r e s provide m o r e than an inkling of the true dimensions of poverty and the capacity of g o v e r n m e n t s to tackle it. They do not convey m o n e y ' s true value—what it can actually buy in an e c o n o m y in which the cost of living may be s u b j e c t to wide d i s p a r i t i e s b e t w e e n rich and poor, high inflation, subsidies, state controls, or great urban-rural differences. 1 A second way to define the Third World is quintessentially Realist: It consists of the " d e v e l o p i n g " e c o n o m i e s in relation to the " d e v e l o p e d " ones, as measured by the value of their resources, markets, and strategic situation. Third World countries are then defined as either threats to or opportunities for furtherance of one developed country's or region's national interests. Consider, f o r e x a m p l e , the official U.S. view of recent years. 2 T h e Third World is threatening insofar as it has been fertile ground f o r revolutions, mass emigration, and ideological confrontations (Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea). It may display nationalistic hostility to U.S. investments, access to " v i t a l " resources such as oil, and military bases. As opportunity, the Third World's importance to standard U.S. interests goes far beyond the traditional geopolitical concern about allies and overseas bases. Third World countries p u r c h a s e 4 0 percent of U.S. exports; a c c o u n t f o r one of every twenty m a n u f a c t u r i n g j o b s and one of every five acres of f a r m production; host about one-quarter of all U.S. foreign investment and return one of every three dollars of overseas corporate profits; supply over 4 0 percent of all U.S. imports, including many valuable minerals (such as bauxite, tin, and cobalt) and cash crops (coffee, rubber, cocoa); and o f f e r T N C s cheap labor that allegedly reduces consumer costs for Americans.

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Here again, the human interest, except insofar as the U.S. lifestyle is concerned, is not taken into account. Who in the Third World benefits from all this trade and investment? What human price, at home as well as abroad, in the environment as well as the economy, is paid to preserve strategic and economic interests? This official version of the "Third World" is typically offered to justify economic and military programs before congressional and public audiences, and not in order to shape a consensus on behalf of the global poor. Then there is the Third World's own version of the "Third World." Not much is left of it; globalization has created sharp distinctions between its richer and poorer members and different strategies for surviving in a oneworld economy. There had been a time when "Third World" largely coincided with the countries—the so-called Group of 77 in 1964, 3 later as many as 120—that called for a new international economic order (NIEO) in trade and development. Their meetings were opportunities to denounce the inequities of the global (capitalist) system. Meetings of the Nonaligned States occasionally still take place, though without their former significance. The inequities, meanwhile, go on: for instance, the Third World's share of world production, which has barely changed in this century (about 16 percent), matched against its increasing proportion of world population (about 77 percent); 4 the Third World's failure to improve its share of global GNP and trade over the past twenty to thirty years; 5 the huge (and growing) disparity in shares of world income, reflected in Table 4.1, between the richest 20 percent and the remaining 80 percent of the world's people; the great gap in average personal income between the richest and poorest countries (a ratio of 65:1, or $19,542 to $301, in 1988); 6 ongoing difficulties in marketing primary products because of falling prices and rising protectionism in the industrialized world; 7 overall economic growth rates that, while increasing, cannot keep pace either with population growth or with what is economically necessary to narrow the income gap with the industrialized world; 8 and the devastating costs of repaying or postponing repayment of debts. The amount of money needed to stabilize and reverse these trends is enormous, as Maurice Strong said at the Earth Summit: about $625 billion a year, of which the industrialized world would need to contribute about $125 billion, or under 1 percent of GNP. 9 Yet, as a German observer correctly predicted, the end of the Cold War is likely to turn the First and Second Worlds' aid and investment money to Europe, not to the poorer Third World countries. 10 The Third World's shared sense of weakness and vulnerability is compounded by the widespread conviction in the Third World that advanced communications technology is further exploiting it. On one side come demands from the developed world's governments and TNCs for unimpeded access to Third World societies for advertising, television and radio

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Table 4.1 Distribution of World Income Among People P e r c e n t a g e S h a r e of World I n c o m e P e r c e n t a g e of World P o p u l a t i o n

1989

1980

1970

1960

Richest 20 S e c o n d 20 Third 20 F o u r t h 20 Poorest 20

82.7 11.7 2.3 1.9 1.4

76.3

73.9

70.2

1.7

2.3

2.3

Source: United N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m , Human leaf and table 3.1, p. 36.

Development

Report

1992, o v e r -

p r o g r a m m i n g , b a n k i n g and f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s , d a t a - g a t h e r i n g ( i n c l u d i n g n e w s ) and d i s s e m i n a t i o n , and s a t e l l i t e - r e s o u r c e m a p p i n g . F r o m a n o t h e r side, the m a j o r W e s t e r n n e w s a g e n c i e s t y p i c a l l y c o n v e y an i m a g e of the T h i r d World that stresses disaster and v i o l e n c e . Their " T h i r d W o r l d " c o n sists of c o u p s , m a s s starvation, the s t e r e o t y p i c restless natives w h o s e cultures and dignities have long been buried. P r o g r e s s in d e m o c r a c y and e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n n e v e r b e c o m e s the n e w s stories it w o u l d if it h a p p e n e d in the industrialized world. 1 1 But there is m o r e here than m e e t s the eye. H o w e v e r j u s t i f i e d d e m a n d s f o r N I E O and N I I O m a y be, they are m e a n t only to bring about equity between states. S t r e n g t h e n i n g state p o w e r is the n a m e of the g a m e . 1 2 E q u i t y within states is a n o t h e r matter: M a n y of the s a m e state leaders w h o m a k e e l o q u e n t calls f o r a n e w international o r d e r are last in line w h e n it c o m e s to b u i l d i n g n e w domestic o r d e r s that e m p h a s i z e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e and h u m a n rights, such as s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n for m i n o r i t i e s and f r e e d o m of s p e e c h and p r e s s . 1 3 At that point they are likely to hide b e h i n d a p p e a l s to n a t i o n a l i s m a g a i n s t f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e . T h e y s e e m to f e a r that the F i r s t W o r l d v i e w that c a p i t a l i s m p r o m o t e s d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s m i g h t be t r u e , h e n c e that e c o n o m i c g r o w t h s h o u l d be k e p t s e p a r a t e f r o m social equity. T h i s m a y e x p l a i n , f o r instance, w h y T h i r d World elites f r e q u e n t l y cite the w i d e n i n g i n c o m e g a p b e t w e e n rich and p o o r countries, but rarely the e v e n w i d e r i n c o m e g a p b e t w e e n rich a n d p o o r citizens in their o w n c o u n t r i e s ( s e e Table 4.2); or w h y s o m e T h i r d W o r l d g o v e r n m e n t s that h a v e p o o r r e c o r d s w h e n it c o m e s to p r o t e c t i n g n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t s ( s u c h as M a l a y s i a ) n e v e r t h e l e s s d e m a n d p a y m e n t f r o m the industrialized world f o r environmental protection.14 T h i r d W o r l d l e a d e r s in f a c t t e n d to u s e the s a m e s t a n d a r d s of s o c i a l p r o g r e s s , such as a v e r a g e i n c o m e and G N P , a n d the s a m e a r g u m e n t s in f a v o r of state p o w e r that are e m p l o y e d in the industrialized w o r l d . N I I O , w h i c h m i g h t l e g i t i m a t e l y be r a i s e d by T h i r d W o r l d l e a d e r s as a d e f e n s e a g a i n s t c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m , h a s also b e c o m e a d e v i c e f o r m u z z l i n g t h e

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press and minimizing political opposition. L i k e w i s e with N I E O : In some cases, André Gunder Frank asserts, N I E O has been merely a cover for mass repression. And since those w h o call for it represent a nation's dominant social and economic interests, any benefits from N I E O would go first to them, leaving the satisfaction of basic needs just where it now i s — i n the very distant future. 1 5 If anything, globalization has armed proponents of state p o w e r with a new justification. Regimes in weak states that are being squeezed by international pressures to liberalize economies and democratize politics, as well as by demands from citizens to meet basic needs, require increased coercive power if they are to make concessions. 1 6 That can be a recipe for disaster, since in most Third World countries, regimes govern without the rule of law, accountability, or military subordination to civil authority. " T h e state that once loomed as salvation and for which men and w o m e n fought and continue to do so has too often become an instrument o f terror and a means to self-enrichment," Fouad A j a m i concluded. 1 7 T h e N I E O version of the Third World is further weakened by important e c o n o m i c and political d i f f e r e n c e s within the underdeveloped community. S o m e countries, notably the O P E C members, are not shackled with debts or plagued by a population explosion. They have accumulated multibillion-dollar surpluses, have substantial investments in the United States and Europe, and import labor from Asia and elsewhere. Others, like the " f o u r little dragons" of the P a c i f i c Rim (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), have become exporters of cars, steel, and advanced electronics. (Three Korean chaebol rank among the top ten makers of memory chips.) These countries have high growth rates, large export surpluses, and high average personal i n c o m e s — h a r d l y the usual in the Third World. Politically, meanwhile, Third World unity remains largely a fiction. A l l may decry the arms race and at one time (during the Cold War) upheld nonintervention and nonalignment. But some Third World states have acquired or are believed to be d e v e l o p i n g nuclear weapons, take sides on international disputes, w e l c o m e the military aid or bases of the major powers, produce and export arms, and interfere in one another's internal conflicts. To talk of these contradictions in Third World affairs is not meant to diminish the justifiability of its demands and aspirations. A s already observed above (and further discussed below), even the most economically w e l l - o f f Third World states are militarily vulnerable and dependent. Those with oil; gas; cheap, labor-intensive consumer goods; and other commodities desired by the advanced e c o n o m i e s must a l w a y s remember that the larger e c o n o m i e s determine currency values and can quickly erect tariff and other barriers to imports. Some Third World governments have gained controlling interest over production and extraction of their resources. But a handful of transnational corporations dominate the marketing and distribution

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of f o o d , oil, and m o s t o t h e r g o o d s , not to m e n t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n and intern a t i o n a l credit. E v e n O P E C is a m e r e s h a d o w of its f o r m e r s e l f , a c a r t e l in d i s a r r a y . O P E C today o n l y p r o d u c e s a b o u t 4 0 p e r c e n t of the w o r l d ' s oil, c o m p a r e d with 65 p e r c e n t in 1973. Oil p r i c e s and t h e r e f o r e O P E C g o v e r n m e n t r e c e i p t s h a v e t u m b l e d s i n c e the 1980s. 1 8 In this study the point r e m a i n s , h o w e v e r , that such i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequities should not blind us to the internal i n e q u i t i e s that turn s t a t e l e a d e r s h i p s f r o m v i c t i m s i n t o victimizers. R a t h e r than d e f i n e the T h i r d World in t e r m s of state interests, d e v e l o p e d or u n d e r d e v e l o p e d , I c h o o s e a p l a n e t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e that e m b r a c e s human interests and structural p r o b l e m s . F r o m that p e r s p e c t i v e , the T h i r d W o r l d c o n s i s t s of that t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of h u m a n i t y — a n d e s p e c i a l l y the p o o r e s t 2 0 p e r c e n t of it ( d e p i c t e d in Table 4.2), w h i c h i n c l u d e s 8 p e r c e n t of the world p o p u l a t i o n that lives in F o u r t h World c o u n t r i e s — w h o s e basic survival needs, cultural and spiritual identities, traditional social structures, and quite possibly personal self-esteem have been badly e r o d e d by political and e c o n o m i c f o r c e s b e y o n d their control. T h e s e f o r c e s , both internal and e x t e r n a l to their c o m m u n i t i e s and c o u n t r i e s , h a v e p r o s p e r e d at their e x pense. T h e y f o r m part of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e national, regional, and ultimately global s y s t e m of p r o d u c t i o n , distribution, and control w h o s e p u r p o s e is to maintain and e x p a n d upon a f u n d a m e n t a l inequality. Regardless of h o w o n e c h a r a c t e r i z e s this s y s t e m — i m p e r i a l i s m , d e p e n d e n c e , u n e q u a l e x c h a n g e , a single (world capitalist) m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n , corporate t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s m — it a m o u n t s to basically the s a m e end result: T h e world w o r k s to b e n e f i t the f e w at the e x p e n s e of the many, as Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate. H o w that thesis gets p l a y e d out in the real T h i r d W o r l d r e q u i r e s f u r ther i n v e s t i g a t i o n . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the m a n y i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n u n d e r d e v e l o p e d countries, i m p o r t a n t g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s can and s h o u l d be m a d e about their political e c o n o m i e s and the quality of p e o p l e ' s lives. W h a t f o l l o w s is a synthesis of a typical T h i r d World c o u n t r y ' s internal and e x t e r n a l settings. H e r e and in the c o u n t r y s t u d i e s that f o l l o w we c a n see h o w and w h y the global crisis c o n t i n u e s .

Table 4.2 Global Income Disparity Between Rich and Poor People (1988)

Poorest 20 percent Richest 20 percent Ratio of Rich to Poor

Per Capita Income ($US)

Percentage of Total Income

163 22,808 140:1

0.5 79.0

Source: United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Program ( U N D P ) . Human 1992, table 3.3, p. 36.

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A Third World Country Profile • This typical Third World country has substantial poverty embedded in a clear class structure. Both are reflected in a huge income gap between the highest 10 to 20 percent and the lowest 40 percent of households, and in the concentration of landownership, the main source of wealth. Each of these features deserves additional comment. Income distribution sheds light on both North-South and intra-North, intra-South inequalities. An early example was provided by Gustavo Lagos, who compared income distribution in the United States and Latin America in 1971. Within each there were (and are) striking income inequalities: The top 20 percent of the U.S. population owned nearly 45.5 percent of the wealth, and in Latin America the same group owned nearly 63 percent. Between the United States and Latin America, income differences were even more striking: " T h e 5 percent group in the highest income bracket in the U.S. receives more in monetary terms than all the groups in Latin America put together; in other words, 10 million privileged inhabitants of the U.S. receive more than the entire Latin American population." 1 9 Brazil o f f e r s an astonishing illustration of inequality in the midst of great material abundance. (See Table 4.3.) Over half the national income is earned by 10 percent of the households, while the bottom 4 0 percent of households earns only 7 percent. The gap has been steadily widening for over twenty years. Yet Brazil is often touted for its high rate of growth and per capita income, and f o r the size of its modern industrial sector, which exports iron ore, steel, and autos, and now produces its own computers. Or take El Salvador, once considered a Fourth World country. There, average annual per capita income was $940 in the 1980s; it is around $1,600 today. But the skewed distribution of wealth remains due to land control: Perhaps 2,000 families (0.002 percent of the population) o w n 4 0 percent of the land, and 10 percent of the l a n d o w n e r s o w n 78 percent of the arable land. 2 0 T h e polarization of landed rich and landless p o o r contributed to civil war in the 1980s. What is happening in the Americas is happening in many parts of the Third World: T h e rich are getting richer, the poor poorer, and the middle class is b a c k i n g into poverty. 2 1 D e v e l o p m e n t fails to trickle d o w n as promised. While world output grew 40 percent f r o m 1985 to 1995, eightysix countries and about a quarter of the w o r l d ' s population, according to the UNDP, ended poorer than they began. 2 2 A n d the trend is c o n t i n u i n g : Around 25 million additional people a year join the ranks of the absolute poor, and overall, poverty is increasing at approximately the same rate as population growth, or 1.8 percent a year. 2 3 Certainly, income poverty has been r e d u c e d in m a n y countries, enough so that "by the end of the 20th century s o m e 3 - 4 billion of the w o r l d ' s p e o p l e will have e x p e r i e n c e d

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Table 4.3 Income Distribution in the Third World Percent Share of Household Income, by Percentile o f Household Groups

Lithuania Bangladesh Morocco Costa Rica Malaysia Brazil India Ghana South Africa Chile

L o w e s t 40%

Middle 4 0 %

Next 10%

Highest 10%

20.4 22.9 17.1 13.1 12.9 7.0 20.6 19.9 9.1 10.1

37.5 39.2 36.7 36.2 33.4 25.7 36.9 37.9 27.5 29.0

14.1 14.2 15.8 16.6 15.8 16.2 14.2 14.9 16.0 14.9

28.0 23.7 30.5 34.1 37.9 51.3 28.4 27.3 47.3 46.1

Source: World Bank 1997, table 5, pp. 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 . Dates of survey figures vary from the late 1980s to the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s .

substantial improvements in their standard of living." 24 India is a good example, having reduced the percentage of people in poverty from 50 to 33 during its fifty years of independence. But the number of poor has more than doubled in that time, to about 350 million, and that is quite apart from appalling figures on other dimensions of poverty, such as infant mortality and illiteracy. 25 "Even under fairly hopeful assumptions about economic recovery in the rest of the [1990s]," reported the World Bank in 1992, "the absolute number of poor in the world at the turn of the century will probably be higher than in 1985"—i.e., over 1.1 billion people. 2 6 It was, by about 200 million people. What these figures tell us, indicative of the structural character of poverty, is that faster growth of economies does not ensure a narrowing of income gaps. India and most of the countries in Table 4.3 all had respectable growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s; yet all except Costa Rica have serious inequalities of income distribution. In fact, in the absence of social and political changes that specifically improve the quality of life for working people (see the Korea case), the faster a Third World economy grows, the wider the income gap may become. A regional and national example will clarify the point. Latin America hailed privatization and open markets for having pushed annual economic growth rates from below 1 percent between 1988 and 1990, to an average of 3 percent or better over the next four years. But the harsh reality is that the percentage of Latin families living in poverty— that is, unable to afford even a minimum level of food, housing, and essential services—rose from 35 percent in 1980 to 39 percent in 1990, with 38 percent (192 million people) predicted for 2000. "The resumption of economic growth has been bought at a very high social price," a specialist

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with the Inter-American Development Bank confessed. 2 7 Chile, the darling of the development set—"the economic star of Latin A m e r i c a , " according to the New York Times, an " e m e r g i n g m a r k e t " country, and possibly the next m e m b e r of N A F T A — e p i t o m i z e s the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c growth and human development. 2 8 Despite improvement in the percentage of the population mired in poverty, Chile's income distribution (see Table 4.3) is a m o n g the worst in the Third World. A o n c e - v i b r a n t network of c o m m u n i t y services has given way to rampant c o n s u m e r i s m by the wealthy and the evisceration of the middle class. The stock market, foreign investment, and exports are doing quite well; but education, social security, and health care are now privatized, hurting the working class (which has seen its salaries cut) and the poor generally. All these changes reflect a basic reality: Chile's growth has overwhelmingly benefited the top 10 percent of the population at the expense of the rest. Thus the frequent references to "two Chiles." • This Third World country has high unemployment and underemployment in both the rural and urban areas. Rural dwellers constitute the core of the Third World's most destitute. They sit in the middle of what the International L a b o u r Organisation calls the worst global e m p l o y m e n t crisis since the Great Depression. 2 9 These are people w h o lose their land to powerful landlords, the onset of rural technology and a money economy, the transformation from growing food to exporting it, and drought. Peasants in these circumstances may have a choice to stay on in serfdom or as landless tenants, as in El Salvador and the impoverished northeast of Brazil. Or, as in China, massive migration to urban areas may occur. A combination of greater prosperity for some peasants as well as reduced government support of agriculture has pushed as many as 150 million people off the land and into the m a j o r cities in a desperate search for jobs. Mexican peasants, equally desperate, have c r o w d e d into the border area, w h e r e over 2,000 mostly U . S . - o w n e d assembly plants ( m a q u i l a d o r a s ) have been set up. T h e s e T N C s do provide e m p l o y m e n t — a b o u t a h a l f - m i l l i o n p e o p l e as of 1992. There already are nearly as many workers involved in the assembly of color televisions in T i j u a n a as there are in the entire United States. 3 0 And T N C s have reportedly brought M e x i c a n s into m i d d l e m a n a g e m e n t . But they also take advantage of labor (much of it female) that is as cheap as 55 cents an hour, virtually unregulated toxic waste disposal despite promises of a cleanup under NAFTA, 3 1 and the absence of pressures f r o m M e x i c o ' s government to improve the living conditions of its citizens. 3 2 In urban centers, technology also dispossesses. T h o u g h m a n y T N C s have shifted operations to the Third World precisely in order to take advantage of cheap, unorganized, unskilled labor, the largest of them find automation to be even more cost-effective. Yet a study of Kenya suggests to one scholar that the main reason f o r the p r e f e r e n c e of capital-intensive

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over labor-intensive p r o d u c t i o n is political: A Third World g o v e r n m e n t would rather have a large, p o w e r l e s s underclass struggling for its daily bread than have the rich, whose support is essential to regime survival, pay the true costs of its education, health care, and low-priced staples. 3 3 • Cities of the South are becoming the centers of underdevelopment. A historic shift in population is taking place worldwide f r o m rural to urban areas. In Third World countries, virtually all future population growth f r o m now on will probably take place in cities. 3 4 Seventeen of the w o r l d ' s twenty-one "megacities"—cities with populations over 10 million—are in the Third World. Thirteen of them are in Asia. "By 2025, Asia's urban population is expected to rise to nearly 2.6 billion people, which will be just over 50 percent of the world's total." 3 5 These figures translate into extraordinary social and environmental problems for urban authorities, such as in water, sanitation, and health services, as well as compound the demands on rural people and their environments. For as a UN study reminds us, urbanization in the Third World mainly means slums: O f e v e r y 1 0 0 n e w h o u s e h o l d s e s t a b l i s h e d in urban a r e a s in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g the s e c o n d h a l f o f the 1 9 8 0 s , 7 2 w e r e l o c a t e d in s h a n t i e s and s l u m s ( 9 2 out o f e v e r y 1 0 0 in A f r i c a ) . T o d a y , an e s t i m a t e d 1 . 2 b i l l i o n p e o p l e — a l m o s t 2 3 per c e n t o f the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n a n d 6 0 per c e n t o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s c i t y - d w e l l e r s — l i v e in s q u a t t e r s e t t l e m e n t s , o f t e n s h a n t y t o w n s m a d e f r o m c a r d b o a r d , p l a s t i c , c a n v a s or w h a t e v e r o t h e r m a terial is f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e . T h e n u m b e r o f urban h o u s e h o l d s in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t s a f e w a t e r i n c r e a s e d f r o m 138 m i l l i o n in 1 9 7 0 to 2 1 5 million by 1988, and those without adequate sanitation rose from 98 million to 3 4 0 m i l l i o n . 3 6

• The status of women is deplorably low. Women, as the Brandt C o m mission noted, suffer most in conditions of rural underdevelopment. They work in the h o m e and in the fields, often putting in longer hours than the males but at a fraction of m e n ' s pay and without education, training, health and safety protection, child care, or access to credit. Women are far more likely than men to be displaced by technology, to work for subsistence rather than cash, to be illiterate (two-thirds of about 950 million adult illiterates in the world are women), and to suffer from malnutrition. 3 7 U N I C E F (the U N Children's Fund) has reported that 585,000 w o m e n , mostly young and healthy, die each year during pregnancy or childbirth. Although the immediate cause is poor obstetric care, including lack of access to family planning, in sub-Saharan A f r i c a and other poverty-ridden regions the deeper cause is women's low status. 3 8 As is discussed below, women also bear the brunt of dangerous methods of population control. In some countries female children have literally been made to disappear. The status of women is therefore a sure indicator of how humane "development" really is.

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Women are undervalued in the work force and in their own families. As workers, they are at the center of global shifts of production to cheaplabor sites. The Mexican maquiladoras were just mentioned. Another example is Indonesia's textile industry, where thousands o f skilled young women sewers work for around $75 a month. This pittance has drawn Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwan capital and technology away from higher-wage countries, contributing to Indonesia's industrialization and export growth. 3 9 The families of these women traditionally do not value them any more than their employers: They strongly prefer male children. In some Asian countries, including China and India, families have gone to inhuman lengths to ensure their preference, such as widespread use of fetal scanners during pregnancy, abortions of unwanted girls, sale of female children, and female infanticide. These practices explain why so many females are "missing" in these countries' male-to-female population ratios. 4 0 Law (as in the Arab states), culture (such as Latin American machismo), and tradition (as in Africa) put the onus of harmful and discriminatory practices on women. Thus, the widespread practice in Islamic countries of enfibulation (removing a young woman's clitoris, sometimes called female circumcision) is traditionally justified by the need to inhibit her sexual desires; 4 1 Indian women are subject to criminal charges for prenatal tests to determine the sex of the fetus; 4 2 and in Afghanistan under the fundamentalist Taliban, repression of women, which is enforced by Muslim purity squads, applies in education, work, dress, contact, and many other aspects of social life. 4 3 The thinking behind such practices naturally extends to the political arena, where women are prevented from deepening their political involvement. Here we must talk about global trends and not only conditions in the Third World. With respect to the vote, only in New Zealand was women's suffrage achieved before early in the twentieth century. A survey by Susan J. Pharr has found that at the next level of political activity—participation in voluntary political work—women have gained marginal acceptability in very few countries (the United States, Russia, Scandinavia, and Britain). When it comes to holding high office, women have made exceedingly few inroads—fewer than 10 percent of all elective or appointive offices—anywhere in the world (and particularly in the Second and Third Worlds). 4 4 Perhaps most disturbing is that even when women do gain entry to political office, they tend to represent the same elite and class interests as their male counterparts. What has been written of Mexican women in politics may be generally true: "While women elites in M e x i c o deserve more political offices to represent their sex, they are no more representative of Mexican women than are male leaders of Mexican m e n . " 4 5 This leads to the further conclusion that the values of such women are not representative of rural, low-income, working-class female populations but instead are the

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same traditional o n e s held by male politicians. W o m e n in politics evidently must play by the same rules as the men. • Children are the first victims. Malnutrition, early death f r o m preventable diseases, and lack of education are three of the cruelest ways that poverty destroys children. Although marked progress has been made in reducing the gap between North and South in all these areas, children suffer at an alarming rate. For example, a child dies every eight s e c o n d s — 1 1 , 0 0 0 a d a y — f r o m malnutrition. 4 6 Another child dies every 2.5 s e c o n d s — o v e r 12 million a y e a r — f r o m illnesses that are easily preventable, such as pneum o n i a and diarrhea. 4 7 Most such deaths, of course, occur in the poorest countries of Africa and South Asia. Serious infections, such as from vitamin A deficiency that affect about 200 million children worldwide, could readily be treated with vitamin supplements. 4 8 Children between five and fourteen years of age are employed in great numbers—around 250 million, according to an extensive UN Labor Organization s u r v e y — e v e n where laws exist against it. 49 Poor parents need their children's income; expenses even for public schooling can be prohibitive; and in a competitive world economy, cheap child labor is in high demand. By one estimate, "at least 15% of all 10- to 14-year-olds in Asia work, more than anywhere else in the world except Africa." 5 0 The numbers of children kept out of school run into the tens of millions. In India, which seems to have the most child w o r k e r s , prostitution and A I D S are rampant; children of poor f a m i l i e s often are forced to become sex slaves. 5 1 • Because the quest for " g r o w t h " typically takes the form of top-down p r o d u c t i o n and distribution, the political system favors those already in positions of authority. Preserving the political-economic status q u o has priority over strategies for change, such as land reform and labor-intensive p r o d u c t i o n , that would feed and employ many more people. The Green Revolution that gained popularity with many Third World leaderships beginning in the 1960s illustrates this priority. The "revolution" worked ins o f a r as the new seed varieties significantly increased wheat and rice yields. India is a prime illustration of this success. But to succeed required large a m o u n t s of water, chemical fertilizer, and, of course, s e e d s — h e n c e also irrigation tubewells, capital, and mechanization. As a substitution of energy and money for land, the Green Revolution worked to the benefit of local p o w e r holders, their political patrons in the capital, and, in some countries, the T N C s that control international trade in fertilizer, seeds, and machinery. 5 2 T h e l a n d h o l d i n g system was preserved and in fact f u r t h e r consolidated, while peasants were forced onto marginal lands or forced to sell out to landlord-moneylenders. • By every indicator, people's basic needs are very far from being met, and the c o n s e q u e n t waste of human resources is e n o r m o u s . World Bank statistics show how m i s l e a d i n g it is to talk about average i m p r o v e m e n t s

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in ( f o r e x a m p l e ) T h i r d W o r l d h e a l t h a n d literacy, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e a b o u t 6 0 p e r c e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s p e o p l e live in t h e p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s ( s u c h as C h i n a ) . In t h o s e c o u n t r i e s , a c c o r d i n g to the U N D P , t h e average gap in lite r a c y and h e a l t h b e t w e e n T h i r d W o r l d and First W o r l d c o u n t r i e s h a s b e e n r e d u c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y o v e r t h e past t w o to t h r e e d e c a d e s . 5 3 F o r e x a m p l e , t h e g a p in i n f a n t d e a t h s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s w a s cut in half b e t w e e n 1960 a n d 1990, f r o m 123 to 61; in a c c e s s to s a f e w a t e r , t h e g a p w e n t f r o m 6 0 p e r cent of the p o p u l a t i o n d o w n to 32 p e r c e n t b e t w e e n 1975 a n d 1990; and in a d u l t l i t e r a c y , t h e g a p d r o p p e d to 3 3 p e r c e n t in 1 9 9 0 f r o m 4 9 p e r c e n t in 1970. But the bitter reality is t w o f o l d . First, the a v e r a g e F i r s t - T h i r d W o r l d g a p h a s widened o v e r t h e y e a r s in o t h e r a r e a s that p e r t a i n to literacy a n d h e a l t h , such as y e a r s of s c h o o l i n g , basic e d u c a t i o n e n r o l l m e n t , and the perc e n t a g e of the w o r l d ' s s c i e n t i s t s , t e c h n i c i a n s , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o u t l e t s . S e c o n d , w h e n w e look at p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y but not e x c l u sively low i n c o m e , we still find d i s t u r b i n g f i g u r e s . 5 4 N u m b e r s m a t t e r m o r e than g a p s . T h e i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y rate, w h i c h a v e r a g e s 7 p e r 1,000 b i r t h s in h i g h - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s , a v e r a g e s 6 9 in l o w - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s . It is 113 in M o z a m b i q u e , 169 in M a l a w i , 6 8 in I n d i a , 9 0 in P a k i s t a n , a n d 6 9 in B o livia. E v e n a m o n g u p p e r - m i d d l e - i r . c o m e c o u n t r i e s . B r a z i l ' s r a t e is 4 4 , S o u t h A f r i c a ' s is 50, and G a b o n ' s is 89. T h e p e r c e n t a g e of t h e p o p u l a t i o n in l o w - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s with a c c e s s to s a f e w a t e r is 83 in B a n g l a d e s h : but it is o n l y 4 9 in T a n z a n i a , 4 3 in N i g e r i a , 38 in V i e t n a m , a n d 27 in E t h i o p i a . A n d a m o n g u p p e r - m i d d l e - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s , t h e r a n g e i n c l u d e s 87 p e r c e n t in M e x i c o but only 6 4 p e r c e n t in A r g e n t i n a , l i k e w i s e with respect to a c c e s s to h e a l t h c a r e a n d p r e v a l e n c e of m a l n u t r i t i o n . 5 5 L o o k i n g this t i m e o n l y at the p o o r e r T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s , the p e r c e n t a g e of the p o p u l a t i o n with acc e s s to h e a l t h c a r e r u n s f r o m l o w s of 2 4 in A n g o l a and 25 in G h a n a , to 5 9 in T h a i l a n d , 67 in N i g e r i a , a n d 8 9 in J o r d a n . W h e n it c o m e s to t r e a t i n g an e p i d e m i c s u c h as A I D S , w h i c h is s h a t t e r i n g p o o r c o u n t r i e s as m o r e a n d m o r e p r e g n a n t w o m e n b e c o m e i n f e c t e d w i t h HIV, t h e a b s e n c e of h e a l t h care b e c o m e s a global n i g h t m a r e . 5 6 As for malnutrition, the p e r c e n t a g e s a m o n g c h i l d r e n u n d e r a g e f i v e a r e 8 4 in B a n g l a d e s h , 7 0 in N e p a l , 6 3 in I n d i a , 4 5 in E c u a d o r , a n d 3 9 in I n d o n e s i a . Finally, w h i l e m o s t of the N I C s h a v e s c h o o l e n r o l l m e n t s that are e q u a l to t h o s e of t h e a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s , that is h a r d l y the c a s e f o r c o u n t r i e s in l o w e r - i n c o m e g r o u p s . M o r e o v e r , w h e n it c o m e s to l i t e r a c y rates a n d e d u c a t i o n at all levels, i m p o r t a n t g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e s are the n o r m . We m u s t also c o n s i d e r that p r o g r e s s in e d u c a t i n g y o u n g p e o p l e in the T h i r d W o r l d t e n d s to b e o f f s e t by the b r a i n d r a i n f r o m the T h i r d W o r l d . P e o p l e with t h e rare o p p o r t u n i t y to d o a d v a n c e d s t u d i e s and r e s e a r c h will look f o r m o r e a t t r a c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s in t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . T h o s e w h o r e m a i n at h o m e c o n s t i t u t e a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l c o r e of s k i l l e d p e o p l e . F o r e x a m p l e , s c i e n t i f i c talent in the T h i r d World is a b o u t 9 5 out of 1 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s — i n a

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range from 157 in Asia to about 10 in Africa—compared with 285 in the industrialized market countries and 308 in Eastern Europe. The difference is even more marked between developing and developed countries (a ratio of about 1 to 14) in terms of persons engaged in research and development. 57 First World governments and TNCs like to focus on their efforts to rectify these imbalances through development aid. Aside from the flaws in aid programs (see below), we may also note how the developed countries use their commercial power to open up Third World markets at the expense of public health and well-being. The export of cigarettes, which are now universally understood to be an addictive drug, is a multibillion-dollar business for the major tobacco companies, and all the more so as the industry is finally being forced to pay at home for some of the health costs of smoking. In the name of free trade, and with the help of high-profile political figures, the U.S.-based tobacco TNCs led by Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Brown & Williamson have been able to pry open the door for their products around Asia, where smoking is already a leading cause of death. Experts foresee millions of new smokers and additional deaths from smoking as a result of the pressure tactics. The former U.S. Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, put it precisely when he said the U.S. government and TNCs were knowingly "exporting death and disease to the Third World." 5 8 Breaking the cycle of poverty and social decay is extremely difficult. The case studies of China and South Korea show different routes to largely positive outcomes. A third example, postrevolutionary Nicaragua, has been less successful but is noteworthy because of what was attempted and accomplished under highly adverse circumstances. The victory of the Sandinista movement in 1979 overthrew a forty-year-long dictatorship under the Somoza family. Nicaragua then fit perfectly the Third World profile of class domination of the economy, high indebtedness, widespread poverty, and desperate human needs. 5 9 But the Sandinistas' effort to transform these conditions met with armed resistance: a counterrevolution aided by the United States, which sought to overthrow the new government. Another round of civil war, which lasted until presidential elections in 1990, devastated Nicaragua's economy and society. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas can be credited with some important human-development achievements. They launched a series of mass mobilization campaigns to implement social democracy. 6 0 The illiteracy rate was sharply reduced, rural school construction was emphasized, and public health spending was increased to a striking 5 percent of GNP. Land reform was instituted to benefit small producers and end reliance on imported food. By the end of the 1980s, according to UN statistics, Nicaragua, despite a heavy military burden and very little outside aid, had also significantly reduced infant mortality and improved access to safe water and early schooling. 6 1 As of the

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m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , however, Nicaraguans still faced formidable barriers to improvements in human development. Rates of infant mortality and malnutrition continued to improve and compared favorably with those of its Central American neighbors. But the population was growing at over 3 percent annually, faster than before. And the country was saddled with external debt—over $ 9 billion in 1995, more than four times the debt in 1980 and nearly six times its GNP. Foreign aid accounted for almost half of GNP. 6 2 With its domestic politics still unstable, Nicaragua's social gains achieved through revolution remained vulnerable to powerful external forces. • This Third World country has very high population growth caused mainly by its underdevelopment. While rates of population growth have slowed worldwide, in seventy-four of the poorest countries, populations are expected to double over the next thirty years. In thirty-three countries, twenty-five o f which are in Africa, the fertility rate is still six children per w o m a n . 6 3 W h y ? It has been well established that impoverished families, facing high infant mortality, little and marginal-quality land to work, limited (if any) educational opportunity, traditional restrictions on women, and no health care or old-age security, will seek to have many children, particularly males. That way, they perpetuate the family, have more hands to work the soil, and ensure care of the elderly. 6 4 Hence, poverty is the main factor in the Third World's population explosion, and not the reverse. The poorest Third World countries have the highest birth rates as well as the highest incidences of infant mortality and malnutrition. And while high population growth certainly exacerbates poverty, it can also be reduced in spite of poverty. Unless development gives prominence to meeting basic needs, above all female education, even the most affluent Third World country will still have high population growth, centered in its poorest regions. In Brazil, for instance, the population is growing rapidly alongside malnutrition that affects nearly two-thirds o f the people. Food production is stagnant; yet Brazil exports soybeans, a major protein source. B y the same token, a relatively poor country, such as Cuba, "which has benefited women with improvements in health care and education and has the most equal income distribution in Latin America, has halved its birth rate since the 1959 revolution, a record unmatched" in Latin America. 6 5 Recent research has even more sharply pinpointed female education as the critical variable in determining fertility rates and population growth. In Costa R i c a , where adult literacy is 9 3 percent for both sexes, women are heavily involved in the work force, and the government has made significant investments in health care and other basic needs; family planning is widespread, and fertility rates have dropped sharply. Pakistani women have quite different prospects: very low social status, very high illiteracy ( 7 6 percent), and widespread poverty, especially in rural areas. T h e result is that the fertility rate

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is among the highest in Asia despite the availability of family planning services. 66 Demographic studies of regions of India and Kenya come to similar conclusions: "Women's status and education now appear to be far more significant than overall economic growth as a correlate of declining fertility." 67 These facts provide insight to the relationship between population growth and hunger. Checking the former, as in China's one-child-perfamily policy, or simply having low population density, may not prevent the latter. The land is capable of sustaining many more than the current world population, provided it is fairly distributed and wisely used. But in the absence of adequate land, fertilizer, water, credit, education, fair prices to producers, and a government policy of growing food for its own people first, additional hands will go on being created to attempt to bring forth the precious rice or wheat. If conditions of human development and agriculture were shaped with the family farmer in mind, the examples of China, Taiwan, and Cuba show that population growth would begin to slow down and agricultural production would increase dramatically. Unfortunately, checking population growth sometimes gets caught up in politics. Since the 1980s the U.S. government, influenced by religious fundamentalists, has sharply cut aid for overseas family planning programs. Because U.S. aid accounts for nearly half of all international support, the funding cuts may lead to many more births and abortions than Third World women would want. 68 Yet these same programs have also been pushed by the United States and other governments, international agencies, and TNCs whose interests were threatened by land reform. Population control—through, for instance, the U.S. aid program in Bangladesh, which once promoted sterilization of women with the enticement of gifts of cloth, an exchange more recently being urged upon poor Indian women by the government of Peru 69 —is often looked upon as an efficient way to prevent overpopulation from evolving into a revolution of the hungry. And it can be profitable: Health-threatening contraceptive devices such as the Dalkon Shield and Depo-Provera (which are barred from sale in the United States) were once sold by TNC branch plants abroad. These products not only enriched the manufacturers; they satisfied the home government's desire to increase exports, and they made money for the importing country's elite, some of whom invested in the company. 70 • This Third World country's economic objective is industrialization, increasingly through promotion of exports, often leading to the neglect of agriculture and, notably in Latin America, a dominant role for transnational business. We typically see an economy that, if it is especially poor, keeps to the traditional pattern of exporting primary products (usually only one or two) and importing the developed countries' processed and manufactured goods. The trade and investment practices of both capitalist and

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formerly socialist developed countries reinforce this pattern. 7 1 If the Third World country is already semi-industrialized, it probably has moved from the stage o f import-substituting to export-promoting manufactures and begun importing financial services and advanced technology. In either case, the country risks becoming dependent on foreign funds and market decisions, and going deeply into debt. Brazil and M e x i c o are striking examples. Both relied heavily on T N C investments in their early industrialization that centered on consumer goods for the local market. Later, in the 1970s, they began borrowing heavily abroad as they moved into exporting manufactured goods. (The contrasting story of some Asian NICs was noted in Chapter 2; but while they avoided dependence, their p o s t - 1 9 6 0 development came about under unusual conditions not found e l s e w h e r e . ) 7 2 T N C s often moved in, buying out or outcompeting local manufacturing firms, a process called denationalization. T h e electrical, pharmaceutical, and automobile industries in Brazil are early examples of this external (mostly U . S . ) domination; 7 3 computers are a current one. 7 4 In M e x i c o the leading opposition politician claimed that 7 5 , 0 0 0 local firms had been driven out of business by T N C s since 1 9 8 3 . He correctly predicted that passage o f N A F T A would further enlarge the T N C s ' power, leaving Mexican businesses with "nothing to gain because we have nothing to e x p o r t . " 7 5 T h e ensuing peso crisis can only intensify M e x i c o ' s reliance on foreign capital. In like manner, T N C s accounted for 9 0 percent o f Singapore's exports in 1 9 8 3 , 2 5 percent o f Taiwan's in 1 9 8 2 , and 18 percent of South Korea's in 197 8 . 7 6 Japanese T N C s are responsible for significant portions of the exports of Thailand, Indonesia, and other countries. The net result for both the poorest and some of the richest Third World economies is that they b e c o m e net importers of food and overall growth becomes unbalanced. 7 7 In the first instance, which characterizes much of Africa, agricultural diversification and productivity have been undermined by political and commercial opportunism, mainly on the part of local urban officials and traditional powerholders. 7 8 In the second, these same authorities have linked up with transnational business, banks, and their home government to give industrialization for export first priority. Foreign investors and banks get the red-carpet treatment: tax and other incentives to attract their money, supportive policies from the World B a n k and IMF, and official "development" aid—a fair proportion of which winds up in the pockets of local officials or in secret foreign bank a c c o u n t s — i n order to stimulate manufacturing and convert food-producing land to cash crops such as t o b a c c o and pineapples for export. Agriculture, once productive enough to meet local needs and generate a surplus for export, now must be supplemented by food imports (again, largely an American operation). 7 9 Hunger is a predictable result of agricultural neglect combined with rigid class structures. All other things being equal, there should be enough

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food for everyone, even under present conditions of increasing demand and lower production. 80 But production and distribution of food are not equal. Food may be prohibitively expensive (in the poorest countries, twothirds of a family's income will be spent just on food); fanners are underpaid, making them reluctant to produce; increasingly large quantities of farmland and food will be used for nonhuman purposes, such as for animal feed, to pay for imported oil, or exported to fatten a richer country's cattle; 81 and food imports, including aid (notably, the U.S. PL 480 program), have a history of winding up on the tables of the urban well-to-do and the military, or on the black market, rather than in the hands of the poor. 82 • The neglect of agriculture in the movement to export-led development has profoundly adverse ecological and environmental effects on natural resources as well as on human development. Time and again it has been shown that the small family farmer, in any society, is more likely than an absentee landlord or large agribusiness to take good care of the land. Topsoil erosion, conversion of prime farmland to nonagricultural uses, overuse of fertilizers and pesticides, and escalating land and produce prices (brought on by concentrated private or state landownership and energy-intensive production methods) are among the consequences of pushing family farmers off the land. 83 In ecopolitical terms these practices deepen dependence on foreign grain suppliers and worsen hunger. In the process, as seen throughout central Africa, farmers are displaced onto marginal land and once-fertile land turns to desert. It is commonplace for these kinds of environmental tragedies in the Third World to be blamed on overpopulation. Such a view seems invalid, and not only because there are plenty of examples of environmental decline in areas of low population. The pressures of population on natural resources are real enough—in the contest for space between densely populated Cairo and the Nile Delta, with the delta steadily losing ground to urbanization (farmers selling rich soil for making bricks, industrial and agricultural runoff, and siphoning of water for drinking); 84 in the fight to cleanse the sewage-choked but sacred Ganges River, home to a half-billion Indians; 85 in the seemingly impossible struggle of Ethiopia's people, nearly all subsistence farmers without ownership rights, to meet basic food requirements at a time of rapid population growth, increased reliance on emergency food aid, and severe degradation of soil and deforestation. 86 But population growth, to repeat an earlier point, is most often consequential, not causal: It arises out of underdevelopment and the sharply reduced choices that powerful actors impose on ordinary people. Those actors may be public, private, or a combination of the two—as in the conversion of forestland to pasture for cattle, which occurs in many parts of Latin America and Africa; 87 the clear-cutting of tropical forests by

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transnational timber companies; 8 8 the competition for good land in Kenya that the government exploited for its own political purposes; 89 or the extensive mining being conducted by one of the world's biggest TNCs with the military's protection in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia, with great damage to people and nature alike. 9 0 How people who depend on farming will react to these pressures on their traditional way of life cannot be predicted. They may, for example, cut down trees for firewood, which is often the main source of fuel. They may organize against the corporation or government that seeks to move them off the land, as in West Papua. They may seek unity with their ethnic group against another ethnic group believed to be responsible for their plight. All such responses may be rational in the face of perceived necessity; and all have the potential to become violent. 91 On the other hand, and more probable, environmental pressures and ecological tragedies may simply victimize people who have no recourse. Pesticide poisonings are a case in point. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that there are about a half-million cases a year in the Third World. Dumping pesticides, many of which are banned for use in the country of origin, is a common corporate practice. The health consequences for the workers who use them, and for the consumers of the products sprayed with them, do not seem to enter the corporate equation. 92 Here is another example of Sunkel's portrait of the "transnational style of development" referred to earlier. Growth without public accountability and austerity programs that favor transnational (export) businesses give short shrift to ecological considerations. 93 We conclude this section with the experience of postwar socialist Vietnam. It illustrates the interconnectedness of development, environment, and population growth, and the difficult policy choices that the government of a very poor country faces. The market reforms (doi moi) since 1975 have benefited many people, especially in the entrepreneurial south; but around four-fifths of the country, mostly in rural areas, lives below the poverty line. Poverty and high population growth have led to the destruction of forests, as large numbers of people who had been resettled in less populated areas have sought firewood. 9 4 More forest has been lost since the Vietnam War than during it. Total forestland declined from 4 0 percent in 1965 to 26 percent in 1994, and 4 0 percent of Vietnam is now classified as "bare land." 9 5 Soil erosion and forest fires are increasing. In the North, "growing food dependency" is becoming a reality. 96 With arable land dwindling, forests are also being threatened by the shift to cash crops (including coffee, sugar, and shrimp farming) and by new agricultural techniques (including extensive use of chemicals). These practices add to income but also promote soil erosion and contamination of fisheries and rice fields. 97 Vietnam is one of the world's major rice exporters; but as the

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g o v e r n m e n t looks f o r additional w a y s to earn hard currency, it faces a now-classic dilemma: "development"' via cash crops and industrialization; or conservation of the ecosystem and a renewed investment in rural people. • D e v e l o p m e n t that favors narrow state and elite interests in our hypothetical Third World country m e a n s a huge debt burden for all except the oil-exporting countries of O P E C . Although all of these oil-importing countries together bring in less oil than the United States, they have suffered the most f r o m the oil price hikes of the 1970s and after. As the 1980s began, these u n d e r d e v e l o p e d countries were paying 5.3 percent of their G N P just for oil, almost twice what they had paid only two years earlier. 9 8 T h e w o r l d w i d e recession at that time cut still more into these countries' ability to f i n a n c e imports. As a result, they had to borrow and borrow again in a desperate effort to pay for oil and other vital imports and to m a k e interest p a y m e n t s on existing debts. The big banks were far f r o m helpful: They had encouraged Third World countries to take advantage of c h e a p m o n e y during the high inflation of the late 1970s, at a time when they were awash in O P E C petrodollars. Since then, the banks have been faced with numerous big-ticket customers who cannot even make interest payments on their loans, let alone begin repaying the principal (which, by 1990, was over $1.3 trillion). M a n y Third World countries, but particularly the poorest of them, which have neither capital nor plentiful indigenous energy resources, have essentially m o r t g a g e d their f u t u r e s to the lending g o v e r n m e n t s and the m a j o r banks. In 1982, for example, Mexico owed $50.4 billion (31 percent of G N P ) ; Brazil, $47.6 billion (17 percent of GNP); South Korea, $20.4 billion (28.3 percent of G N P ) ; Argentina, $15.8 billion (29.5 percent of G N P ) ; Turkey, $15.9 billion (29.7 percent of GNP); and Egypt, $15.5 billion (52.8 percent of G N P ) . 9 9 By 1988 high interest rates and still more bailout loans had upped the ante dramatically. Mexico, for instance, now o w e d $88 billion (52 percent of G N P ) and Brazil over $100 billion (30 percent of GNP). 1 0 0 And by 1995 Mexico's debt was up to $165 billion (70 percent of G N P ) and B r a z i l ' s to $159 billion (down to 24 percent of G N P ) . 1 0 1 But at least these two, and South Korea, are large enough, and o w e e n o u g h , to maintain their c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s — t h a t is, to keep rolling over their loans and (as we have seen in Chapter 2) getting more. Not so most others, such as African states, where debt nearly doubled in the 1980s and is eating up almost all output. Interest and service p a y m e n t s on external debt take an ever larger share of an underdeveloped country's export earnings (e.g., about 24 percent of M e x i c o ' s exports, 177 percent of Turkey's, 208 percent of Egypt's, and 320 percent of A r g e n t i n a ' s in 1995). 1 0 2 The prospect of repayment is virtually nil even if (as has not been the rule) bank interest charges were to hold steady or decline. W h a t debt service means for the least-developed

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countries is this: Their governments and taxpayers pay more to service the debt than to support health and education. 1 0 3 Here is where the power of the I M F and the World Bank is felt, for they hold the keys to more credit and therefore, in most cases, the leverage to enforce cutbacks in socialwelfare spending as the price of credit. Third World leaders in M e x i c o and Indonesia, as we said, have shown their displeasure with such pressure, but the great majority o f them eventually a c c e d e — t o the delight o f the transnational banks and exporters. Historically as well as in the 1990s, the big losers from this "debt trap" are the middle and lower classes, whose cost of living rises while wages and government social spending are cut back sharply. 1 0 4 Small businesses also suffer. Unable to compete with foreign-owned corporations, they are often absorbed by them or go bankrupt. 1 0 5 The poor lose the most. O n e large-scale study o f the effects of I M F programs on Asian, African, and Latin American development in the first half of the 1980s is particularly revealing. Whereas a little more than half of the IMF-assisted countries were able to improve their balance-of-payments position, per capita growth stagnated or declined in 57 percent o f the countries studied; " r e a l " (inflation-corrected) investment by Third World governments stagnated or declined in 6 0 percent of the assisted countries; and, on average, I M F programs "tend[ed] to increase aggregate poverty, or in other words the number of people—and o f children—living below the poverty l i n e . " 1 0 6 Riots to protest IMF-mandated price increases on food and other necessities were frequent occurrences in the 1980s; they happened in M e x i c o . Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, and Venezuela, among other countries. It would be surprising if they did not happen again in Asia by 2 0 0 0 . Third World environments may also fall victim to debt. Forests, for example, may be virtually sold off to T N C s , as has happened in Brazil, Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Cambodia, and M a l a y s i a ) , central and West A f r i c a , and most recently the Russian F a r East. Dams are constructed to provide hydroelectric power and irrigation, in the process destroying local e c o s y s t e m s and uprooting hundreds of thousands o f people. T h e World B a n k financed three such projects in B r a z i l , India, and Indonesia, with calamitous results; thus it backed away from contributing to China's controversial Three Gorges Dam (discussed b e l o w ) . 1 0 7 And, as previously mentioned, environmental protection laws in the North may be weakened as indebted Third World governments, backed by T N C exporters, argue that such laws constitute barriers to trade in violation o f W T O rules. A common misperception about this cycle of indebtedness is that Third World countries are soaking up huge amounts of capital in loans and other forms o f aid and returning virtually nothing to lenders. T h e truth of the matter is quite different. For one thing, aid is meager and misdirected. Official development assistance ( O D A ) by developed-country governments to

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the Third World, while seemingly substantial at about $54 billion a year today, actually amounts to about 0.35 percent of their combined GNP. This is exactly half the U N ' s target (0.7 percent of G N P ) for O D A . (The United States in 1990 gave the most money, about $10.1 billion, but the smallest share of GNP, 0.19 percent. T h e share is even less now.) 1 0 8 T h e aid does not go to countries most in need: The ten poorest countries, with over 72 percent of the w o r l d ' s poor people, received a little more than one-fourth (26.8 percent) of O D A in 1990. Nor does it go mainly to basic human needs such as primary health care. Only 6.5 percent of O D A funds, and only 10 percent of aid f r o m multilateral agencies, went to basic-needs programs. 1 0 9 UNDP, whose money goes almost entirely to the poorest countries, is underfunded by the industrialized donor countries. Second, aid money has a curious habit of finding its way back to the lender. The wealthiest Third World citizens often deposit e n o r m o u s sums in the same foreign banks that m a d e loans to their governments. Mexico is a particularly striking case of such capital flight. 1 1 0 Furthermore, negative net transfers f r o m South to North have occurred every year since 1983. Third World debt payments have been flowing back to rich-country creditors, mostly to the World Bank and the IMF, in sums that totaled $242 billion net in 1989. 1 1 1 Not included in the amount is an estimated (in 1980) $14 billion a year in pollution costs essentially transferred f r o m North to South. 1 1 2 The trend of privatization in the 1990s has added to the reverse flow, as d e v e l o p m e n t banks have looked more to m a k i n g m o n e y for investors than to allaying the costs of indebtedness. 1 1 3 All this capital might have been used to p r o m o t e social well-being at even a m i n i m a l level; to create jobs (including jobs f r o m exports); to educate, train, and retain scientific talent; and to protect the environmental resource base. Instead, debt b e c o m e s a permanent element in the poverty cycle. T h e Philippines is a tragic case of how internal and external elites can bankrupt a political economy. 1 1 4 Internally, the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, which lasted f r o m 1966 to 1986, placed control of key sectors of agriculture, such as sugar and coconuts, under f a m i l y m e m b e r s and cronies. The rural poor was (and is) over 60 percent of the population. Externally, the export-led development model made the Philippines a virtual stepchild of the World Bank and the IMF. By 1986, w h e n M a r c o s was f o r c e d out by " p e o p l e p o w e r " in a presidential election, the c o u n t r y was the sixth largest recipient of World Bank f u n d s . T h e s e f u n d s helped give agribusiness multinationals like Del M o n t e and Castle and C o o k (Dole) pivotal positions in the Philippine e c o n o m y ; but they also contributed to soaring indebtedness and extraordinary corruption within the inner circle and in the military. Faced with rising political opposition and a guerrilla war, M a r c o s ' s r e g i m e operated under martial law for nine years, during which repression was widespread. The reform regime that followed under

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Corazon Aquino ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 2 ) never could recover from the awesome external debt—over $30 billion in 1990, or 65 percent of G N P — o r break the historic pattern of landholding inequality and environmental destruction. Under A q u i n o ' s successor, former general Fidel V. Ramos, the economy has made something of a turnaround. Foreign investors have returned, growth figures in the late 1990s are respectable, and the Philippines has avoided the most painful consequences of profligacy that its neighbors face. 1 1 5 But in a country still ruled by an oligarchy, 1 1 6 still heavily indebted, still bearing many signs of a basic-needs crisis, and still dependent on female migrant workers' remittances for foreign exchange, 1 1 7 it is much too early to say that the Philippines will escape the debt trap. Can a debt crisis such as plagues the Philippines be ended? U.S. policymakers have taken the lead in one kind of attempt—tying new loans or reduced debt to changes in the economic and social policies of Third World debtor nations. 1 1 8 First came the Baker Plan in 1985, named for then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker. It called for $29 billion in new loans to fifteen Third World countries from private and multilateral banks. When this call resulted, instead, in a retreat by the banks from new lending, B a k e r ' s successor, Nicholas F. Brady, proposed a new plan in 1990. Its essence was an outright reduction of a portion of the debt or interest in negotiations between the private banks and debtors, with the World Bank or the I M F financing the balance up to $25 billion. Under both plans, Third World governments had to restructure their economies to encourage foreign investment, savings on social spending, and the return of money that had been sent abroad. Once again, the global banks benefited most: Indebted governments continued paying them interest on accumulated debts, while the banks were able to reduce their risk, either by trading away old debts at a discount or by not lending new money. Meanwhile, Third World nations that wanted some debt reduction had to practice austerity economics in conformity with foreign needs, that is, by opening up their industrial sectors to competition from transnational corporations. As the new century dawns, the I M F and World Bank have finally acknowledged the importance of debt relief for the poorest countries. Fortyone of them owe $215 billion, about four times their debt in 1980. The idea is for the IMF to sell gold, invest the proceeds, and give these countries loans at very low interest. Meanwhile, the World Bank will grant debt-relief money from a trust fund established from its own profits, now running at $1 billion a year. 1 1 9 There are some catches, however. As the U N D P said in criticism of the new plan, "the relief will be selective—and often take three to six years to have e f f e c t . " 1 2 0 "Selective," inasmuch as about half of the poor countries will not be eligible, and only some will be able to have as m u c h as one-quarter of their debts written off. Moreover, debt relief will be implemented in stages and will still be contingent

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on p o o r c o u n t r i e s ' d r a m a t i c a l l y i m p r o v i n g their g o v e r n a n c e , b r i n g i n g in f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , and e a r n i n g m o n e y f r o m e x p o r t s — t h e u s u a l prescript i o n . 1 2 1 T h u s , f o r all the e x p r e s s i o n s of s y m p a t h y w i t h t h e T h i r d and Fourth W o r l d ' s plight, those w h o run the world e c o n o m y still have the attitude that b u s i n e s s is b u s i n e s s . • Repression becomes an indispensable tool of social order. In circ u m s t a n c e s of g r o s s a n d o b v i o u s i n e q u a l i t y , a T h i r d W o r l d r e g i m e inevitably falls back on police p o w e r to maintain itself. It h a s already alienated peasants, ethnic minorities, and the i m p o v e r i s h e d ; n o w it starts to lose m a n y traditional s u p p o r t e r s of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , such as local b u s i n e s s e s , the c h u r c h hierarchy, a n d s o m e t i m e s nationalist e l e m e n t s of the military. "Social d i s c i p l i n e " — i . e . , the national security or n e o f a s c i s t state discussed e a r l i e r — b e c o m e s the o r d e r of the d a y : v i g i l a n t i s m in the f o r m of d e a t h s q u a d s ; c e n s o r s h i p of the p r e s s and radio; d i s r u p t i o n a n d e l i m i n a t i o n of political o p p o s i t i o n and o r g a n i z e d labor. In the p o s t - C o l d War years, besides the usual e f f o r t s to d e s t r o y political o p p o n e n t s , we see the repressive r e g i m e acting to s t a m p out r e l i g i o u s f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s , as in A l g e r i a , or secular rivals to f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , as in Iran, or ethnic minorities, as in the form e r Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Turkey. Politics is e n c a p s u l a t e d within a s e e m ingly p e r m a n e n t state of s i e g e . F o r e i g n s u p p o r t (in a r m s , c o m p u t e r s , e c o n o m i c aid, and n u m e r o u s o t h e r m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d s u s t e n a n c e ) b e c o m e s increasingly critical to the r e g i m e ' s s u r v i v a l . 1 2 2 T h e m a r r i a g e of R e a l i s m and C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s m is e v i d e n t here, too, for the highest military s p e n d e r s in the T h i r d World receive, p r o p o r t i o n a l to p o p u l a t i o n , the biggest share of d e v e l o p m e n t a i d . 1 2 3 A s has already b e e n s u g g e s t e d , there are likely to be s e v e r e e c o n o m i c as well as civil-liberties c o s t s f r o m the shift to o u t r i g h t a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . T h e military s p e n d i n g that s u p p o r t s repression and o t h e r d e f e n s e f u n c t i o n s s i p h o n s off s c a r c e f u n d s — o n a v e r a g e , a b o u t 2 0 p e r c e n t of T h i r d W o r l d g o v e r n m e n t b u d g e t s and 5 p e r c e n t of G N P . 1 2 4 O n e c a r e f u l study c o n c l u d e s that " t h e e c o n o m i c e f f e c t s of m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e [in the T h i r d W o r l d ] have b e e n n e g a t i v e . . . . To the e x t e n t that military e x p e n d i t u r e d o e s prod u c e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , the p o o r e s t m e m b e r s of T h i r d World societies are the least likely to b e n e f i t f r o m that g r o w t h . " 1 2 5 It t h e r e f o r e m a k e s no sense, an A f r i c a n s c h o l a r h a s a r g u e d , to f u n n e l e c o n o m i c aid to a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s such as in G h a n a a n d N i g e r i a , b e c a u s e "elites h a v e simply carried out c o s m e t i c r e f o r m s to p l e a s e the d o n o r s and r e t a i n e d all the u s u a l ins t r u m e n t s of r e p r e s s i o n , m a n i p u l a t i o n , and intimidation f o r the d o m i n a t i o n of p o p u l a r f o r c e s a n d their c o m m u n i t i e s . " 1 2 6 • R e p r e s s i o n goes h a n d in h a n d with the f u r t h e r concentration of political power. T h e elite's b a s e and its apex narrow. In s o m e cases, it m a y ass u m e the f o r m of the a b s o l u t i s t state, as in Iran, Iraq, C a m b o d i a , N i g e r i a , and n u m e r o u s others. S h o u l d political order give way to social c h a o s , the military can be e x p e c t e d to step in to " s a v e the nation f r o m the p o l i t i c i a n s "

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and other "enemies of the people." Military coups have become a trademark of Third World politics: There were ninety of them (thirty-seven in Africa alone) from 1960 to 1982, resulting in an average of sixteen years of military rule. 1 2 7 Of the sixty-four military-dominated governments in 1989, fifty-nine resorted to repression and fifty to torture or other brutalities to stay in or close to power. 1 2 8 Not coincidentally, the most repressive Third World governments, often military-run, have been the major arms importers of recent years, mainly supplied by the FSU and the United States. 1 2 9 With the United States now dominating the arms-export scene, it has been found supplying weapons to one or both sides in forty-five ethnic and territorial conflicts around the Third World, many (again) involving military-backed or -run governments. 1 3 0 The new element in post-Cold War authoritarianism is narcopolitics: the incorporation of drug trafficking in state politics with the connivance—and to the profit—of state, ruling party, and military leaders. The drug trade takes corruption to another level; it not only subverts legal institutions, distorts the economy through investments of drug-related money, and promotes political violence, it can also undermine international security. In Mexico, many murders of journalists, kidnappings, and bank robberies are commonly linked to the drug trade. The Mexican army—the very force the United States was counting on in the joint war on drugs—is apparently deeply involved with drug lords. 1 3 1 Such lawlessness gives Mexico the look of E! Salvador in the 1970s. In Turkey, drug traders apparently operated as anti-Kurdish death squads for the government and its security organs. 1 3 2 Under Burma's junta, the country has become "the world's leading producer of heroin and opium" from its part of the Golden Triangle. By allowing some rebel forces to engage in opium growing, the government neutralized a major source of armed opposition. 1 3 3 It also contributed to an AIDS epidemic. 1 3 4 Drugs may be Burma's leading export, as well as a principal source of funds for domestic investment by members of the S L O R C and drug lords. 1 3 5 And in Colombia, a principal source of cocaine shipments to the United States, the drug cartel has sought to enlist peasants and antigovernment guerrillas in coca production and to buy the neutralization of political leaders. The U.S. military is involved with the Colombian army in aerial fumigation of the plantations, in the process displacing large numbers of peasants from the land. 1 3 6 • Indigenous peoples and cultures often bear the brunt of state repression and corporate exploitation. Given that indigenous peoples rarely have political representation, and in fact go to great lengths to avoid the reach of the state, it is hardly any wonder that intrusions into and takeovers of sacred lands, violations of human rights, despoiling of natural environments, and disruption of cultures occur around the Third World with little fanfare or outside protest. Governments normally protect states, not tribes, clans, or peoples. Previously, we have noted government repression of

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Indian groups in Mexico and Guatemala, and T N C investments that trampled on minority rights in West Papua, Ecuador, and Nigeria. Latin America alone has n u m e r o u s other e x a m p l e s in Brazil, Peru, C o l o m b i a , and Ecuador, to n a m e just a few. 1 3 7 In all of these instances, only the combination of indigenous peoples' organizing and support activities by N G O s prevented annihilation. • U n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t , war, and environmental degradation lead to the large-scale flight of people and their skills. T h e global r e f u g e e count includes the usual large numbers of people fleeing political persecution and war, such as those who escaped f r o m Afghanistan (over 3 million people), I n d o c h i n a (over 1.5 million), El S a l v a d o r (750,000), the Gulf War (2.8 million), and R w a n d a (2 million). A U N source estimates there are about 14 million to 16 million political r e f u g e e s . But there are also around 20 million to 25 million internally displaced people, r e f u g e e s in their own country. Because they do not cross a border, they do not fall within the responsibility of any international agency. 1 3 8 The largest and fastest-growing g r o u p is the 35 million or more " e c o n o m i c m i g r a n t s " f r o m " d e v e l o p i n g countries [who] have taken up r e s i d e n c e in the North in the past three d e c a d e s . " Their n u m b e r s are expanding at the rate of 1.5 million persons a year. 1 3 9 The new wave of refugees reflects the realities of the global political e c o n o m y : 700 million u n e m p l o y e d or underemployed people in the early 1990s, and 1 billion by 2 0 0 0 ; 1 4 0 rising population pressure on land and resources, as in Mexico and the Sudan, and in Indonesia's resettlement of 6 million people to outlying islands; 1 4 1 rapid urbanization, especially in Asia; g o v e r n m e n t s that are strapped f o r cash; 1 4 2 lack of full participation of w o m e n in d e v e l o p m e n t ; e n v i r o n m e n t a l calamities brought on by use of unsafe substances and technologies as well as by outright destruction of p e o p l e ' s s u r r o u n d i n g s ; 1 4 3 and social upheaval such as produced around 2 million r e f u g e e s in central Europe in 1990 alone, before the destruction in Bosnia. Migration is thus a function of structural violence; but for skilled professionals who find their way to North America and Western E u r o p e , it is also a perceived o p p o r t u n i t y for self-betterment. They are very unlikely to return to their native c o u n t r y — a gain f o r their a d o p t e d land but a costly loss in desperately needed skills for their homeland. This f a m i l i a r brain drain adds to the already m o n u m e n t a l h u m a n and social costs of underdevelopment and war.

Case Studies of Crisis and Renewal China: Revolution

and

Transformation

In a political fable familiar to every Chinese, M a o Zedong told in 1945 of "The Foolish Old Man W h o Removed the Mountains." Defying the skeptics,

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the old man announced he and later generations would keep digging until the two great mountains that obstructed his way were leveled. M a o ' s point was that China's underdevelopment could likewise be conquered: Today, t w o big mountains lie like a dead w e i g h t on the C h i n e s e people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese C o m m u n i s t Party has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and w e , too, will touch G o d ' s heart. Our G o d is none other than the m a s s e s of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can't these t w o mountains be cleared a w a y ? 1 4 4

The Chinese revolution won out four years later, and the equally difficult struggle began to implement the r e v o l u t i o n ' s objectives: the transformation of the economy, of the political culture, and of the international order. To appreciate the extraordinary c h a n g e s that have occurred in postrevolutionary China, and particularly i m p r o v e m e n t s in the quality of life of its 1.2 billion people, we must take account of what China looked like on the eve of the C o m m u n i s t victory. Its industry, transportation, and comm u n i c a t i o n s were in near-total disrepair. Inflation was r a m p a n t ; paper money was worthless. " G o v e r n m e n t " had reverted to the traditional system dominated by clans and landlords and their private military forces. Landlord-class control in rural China meant that, taking the country as a whole, about 10 percent of the rural families o w n e d just over half the land. 1 4 5 Poor and still poorer f a r m e r s were the mainstay of the p o p u l a t i o n , constantly victimized by the weather, landlord usury, exorbitant rent and land taxes, and extortion—all of which conspired to force the sale of children, f e m a l e powerlessness, hunger, illiteracy, indebtedness far into the future, and early death. Worst of all, poor peasants assumed these conditions were meant to be and were unalterable. 1 4 6 The first business of the Communist m o v e m e n t was to e m p o w e r peasants to believe in the possibilities of change for the better. Central to that o b j e c t i v e was the land question: l a n d o w n e r s h i p , organization, and increased production. For, as one witness wrote, "Without understanding the land question one cannot understand the Revolution in China, and without u n d e r s t a n d i n g the Revolution in C h i n a o n e c a n n o t understand the world." 1 4 7 B e f o r e 1949, the Chinese C o m m u n i s t Party ( C C P ) carried out a m o d e s t l a n d - r e f o r m and rent-reduction p r o g r a m in areas it controlled. The program mainly benefited poor and middle peasants at the expense of the landlord class. A f t e r w a r d , in the 1950s, the C C P instituted the Great L e a p Forward, a radical collectivization of the countryside, where 80 percent of the people still live. These p e o p l e ' s c o m m u n e s were part of a selfreliant e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t plan in which agricultural growth w o u l d feed into, and be e x p a n d e d by, heavy and light industry. E c o n o m i c growth was based o v e r w h e l m i n g l y on Chinese resources; f o r e i g n trade was kept

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small and in balance; and C h i n a ' s debts were paid off by the mid-1960s. State economic planning was highly centralized and inflexible, reflecting Soviet influence; but local initiative, by peasants and factory workers as well as party cadres, was strongly encouraged. Those w h o exemplified the revolution's ideals of self-reliance, initiative, thrift, and readiness to "serve the people" were held up as models of the "new socialist person." Converting revolutionary ideals to reality was regarded as a f u n d a mentally political problem and not merely a matter of economic management. The vehicle was class struggle through periodic mass m o v e m e n t s or campaigns. Their purposes were to sustain p e o p l e ' s devotion to the revolution, identify and weed out bureaucratic cadres and " b o u r g e o i s " intellectuals, and prevent China from becoming a "revisionist" socialist state like the U S S R . But the constant " c a m p a i g n s " not merely badly disrupted the e c o n o m y and education, caused social chaos, and depleted p e o p l e ' s morale; they also caused e n o r m o u s suffering. The " A n t i - R i g h t i s t Campaign" (1957), by official admission, incorrectly labeled 550,000 intellectuals as bourgeois opponents of the Communist Party and ruined their careers. Many committed suicide. It is now c o m m o n l y accepted that at least 20 million to 30 million people died of starvation and related causes during the Great L e a p Forward ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 2 ) . P e r h a p s a h a l f - m i l l i o n people died during the chaotic decade surrounding the "Great Proletarian Cultural R e v o l u t i o n " ( 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 6 ) , and untold tens of t h o u s a n d s more were erroneously accused of political crimes, persecuted, and sent into internal exile or to prison. 1 4 8 The Maoist faction was willing to accept these losses as the price of ensuring that future generations of Chinese would be reliable revolutionary successors. S o m e of M a o ' s comrades, notably Deng Xiaoping, came to disagree. Soon after M a o ' s death in 1976, they took charge. M a o ' s successors strove f o r social unity and e c o n o m i c stability. Beginning in 1979, they relaxed social controls; sharply de-emphasized (and then abandoned) class struggle; substituted market and material incentives (profits, bonuses, managerial autonomy) for ideological ones; dismantled the c o m m u n e s ; upheld individual achievement and specialization in education, the workplace, and m a n a g e m e n t ; and a n n o u n c e d an open door for foreign capital and technology. These steps to p r o m o t e production and expand the market extended into the military. A m a j o r p r o g r a m was undertaken to convert a significant share of military-industrial p r o d u c t i o n (by the late 1990s, this share was officially claimed to have reached 70 percent by value) to civilian goods. As part of the program, official military spending was kept low f o r several years, the military-industrial c o m p l e x w a s streamlined, and about 1 million troops were demobilized. 1 4 9 T h e economic reforms have cut deeply into the meaning of socialism. Though C h i n a ' s e c o n o m y remains subject to overall central direction, its driving forces are local and regional. Not only is there m o r e scope than

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ever before for individual and corporate initiative, for competence and professionalism, and for personal enrichment. Other forms of enterprise— private and collective—are growing more rapidly than the state sector and account for increasing proportions of China's commercial profit, employment, and tax revenues, not to mention consumer goods production and total industrial output ( 4 0 percent). State-owned enterprises, such as heavy industrial plants, now account for only 3 4 percent of total industrial output. Perhaps half o f them are deeply in debt, inefficient, and require huge subsidies to survive. Were it not for their large work forces (which, with their families, make up about 4 5 percent o f China's urban population), most would be disbanded. 1 5 0 Behind these shifts in economic strategy lay a broader vision. 1 5 1 Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues argued that China's security for the remainder of the century lay in rapidly increasing GNP, personal income, and technological levels. Economic strength had become the new basis of national power, they believed; the Cold War, especially after Gorbachev's accession to power, had largely abated, giving China a breathing space o f perhaps ten to fifteen years within which to catch up economically. Its leaders marveled at the dynamic growth of the four Asian NICs, but they also worried about falling further behind them. If China could acquire significant foreign capital, technology, and training, the country's development would be greatly accelerated. A stable China would become a force for world peace, and the age-old goal of integrating Hong Kong and Taiwan into China proper would be completed in Deng's lifetime. But just as this vision excluded destructive mass campaigns, it also denied the alternative of political pluralism. Deng condemned both of these political options, saying they would sentence China to endless social chaos that would sabotage the economic reforms. Like so many other authoritarian leaders, Deng—again with an eye to the experience of the Asian NICs (see the following South Korean case study)—believed that tight social controls were essential to economic development. Within strict limits, he was willing to entertain ideas for political reform, including removal of the C C P from government work and multicandidate elections at local levels. But Deng fully embraced Mao's principles of political centralization. Until the spring o f 1989, Chinese intellectuals were engaged in lively debate about how to democratize politics, including the CCP. They evidently enjoyed some high-level support, in particular from the party's general secretary, Zhao Ziyang. But it is now clear that ideas such as eliminating one-party rule, ending the system o f lifetime tenure in office, and vesting legislative power in China's parliament were unacceptable to Deng X i a o p i n g . To the contrary, they were attacked as examples of "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalism," and official campaigns against them were carried out in the 1980s. Thus did D e n g ' s reform program, with its

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almost singular emphasis on economics, differ (as we shall see in Chapter 5 ) from G o r b a c h e v ' s , setting the stage for the dramatic confrontation o f June 1989 in Tiananmen Square. 1 5 2 Defenders of the Chinese reform strategy emphasize the daunting demographic, social, and geographic problems facing any group of l e a d e r s — for instance, finding j o b s for a very youthful population (65 percent o f China's 1.1 billion people are under age thirty); raising the basic educational level (officially, China has 10 percent illiteracy); satisfying the demands for greater cultural and political autonomy of minority groups ( o f which fifty-five are officially recognized); and allowing for great (and growing) differences in land and water quality, mechanization, and income in rural areas. From this perspective, meeting people's basic needs is much more important to human rights in China than introducing Western-style democracy. Considering China's history of exploitation from within and without, this view of human rights is understandable if decidedly incomplete. S o cialism under Mao enabled huge numbers of people to have dignity, access to land, basic health care, and old-age insurance. It also earned China international respect. This foundation of impressive gains in social wellbeing has continued in the post-Mao period. As a recent World Bank report observed, China's high life expectancy (age sixty-five for men, sixty-nine for women), low infant mortality ( 3 4 per 1,000), universal primary education, and other social-welfare achievements are "enviable by much richer nations. . . . Consumption has more than doubled and the poverty rate has declined by 6 0 percent ( 2 0 0 million Chinese living in absolute poverty have been raised above the minimum poverty line)." 1 5 3 Chinese women are far from achieving equality with men; but the Chinese women's movement has made major gains in local-level leadership, e c o n o m i c opportunities and rewards, education, and family rights. The Marriage Law of 1950, revised in 1981, bestows a number of legal guarantees for women and children that are not found in many Western societies with respect, for instance, to marriage, divorce, and property disposition. Average rural incomes, thanks to the shift to a household-based economy, have risen dramatically, as have farm production and people's savings. Although generalizations about conditions in China and people's attitudes are always perilous, the observations of numerous visitors (myself included) and Chinese polls suggest that, on the whole, the great majority of Chinese welc o m e the social and e c o n o m i c reforms for the clear improvements they have made in the quality of their lives. The crushing of B e i j i n g student and worker demonstrations for democracy by P R C military forces on June 4 , 1989, cast a long shadow over these positive changes. These peaceful but politically charged gatherings had begun in mid-April and at their height numbered a million people. The

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fundamental demand, articulated by student leaders and televised worldwide, was not for the establishment o f a Western form of government but for an end to pervasive official corruption, a loosening of authoritarian government, and recognition of the students' patriotic motives. Urban workers of every description demonstrated in reaction to soaring inflation. Within the divided leadership, a majority eventually decided it could no longer tolerate the huge throngs, which included many party and government workers. China would not be allowed to become another Poland, in which an independent workers' movement had become powerful enough to gain control o f the government itself, ending Communist rule. Zhao Ziyang was dismissed and the tanks moved into the center of Beijing. Anywhere from several hundred to a few thousand people were killed, and about 1 0 , 0 0 0 people nationwide were reportedly arrested. T h e crackdown in B e i j i n g and several other cities was undoubtedly undertaken in full awareness that it would damage the P R C ' s international prestige, revive anxieties in Hong Kong and Taiwan about rejoining the mainland (as Hong Kong would in 1 9 9 7 , under a 1984 British-Chinese treaty), and lead to reduced overseas investment and tourism in China. All of these c o n s e q u e n c e s c a m e to pass, but they proved temporary. For a while international sanctions dried up China's sources of loans and turned many T N C s to other locations. Only four years after Tiananmen, however, the love affair with China resumed. Predictions were that China's economy, measured in terms of purchasing power, would b e c o m e the world's third largest by 2 0 0 0 . In regional terms " G r e a t e r C h i n a " was already as large an economy as France. Precisely in line with Deng Xiaoping's strategy, China was growing at breakneck pace, with the lead being taken by coastal areas using overseas Chinese capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan. China today is a major player in the world economy. In 1997, its total trade was $ 3 1 9 billion, of which $ 1 8 2 billion was in exports, making it the tenth largest trading country. Trade is now three times the share o f G D P ( 4 0 percent) that it was in 1980. Net foreign direct investment, which accounts for nearly one-half of P R C exports, exceeded $ 4 4 billion; and foreign exchange reserves were nearly $ 1 4 0 billion. 1 5 4 Increasingly, the country is relying on foreign capital: It has accumulated over $ 2 2 5 billion in F D I and over $ 2 8 billion in World Bank loans, a proportion that is quite different from that of the Asian economies in c r i s i s . 1 5 5 China's trade surpluses and low debt-service ratio add to its strong international position. This new reality for China has importance in domestic politics as well as in foreign and security policies. Domestically, China's rise enhances the leadership's self-confidence and its resistance to efforts by outsiders to pressure China into liberalizing its politics. Corporate Globalists are on China's side in arguing that market forces will eventually bring about political reforms, while Realists

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believe they need C h i n a ' s cooperation on global issues such as U N peacek e e p i n g and e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection. A n d because the leadership has thus far been able to deliver on promises of material gain for most people, political dissent in C h i n a is sporadic. Outside of Hong K o n g , a c o n stituency on behalf of human rights or political structural change does not exist. Public criticism of o f f i c i a l d o m , dissenting votes in parliament, the growth of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations, and civil suits have all increased; but these are for the most part tolerated or encouraged by C h i n a ' s leaders only in the e c o n o m i c and cultural arenas, where and when such acts promote their own agenda. Arbitrary arrests and detentions of political r e f o r m e r s , and h u m a n - r i g h t s dissenters—political, religious, ethnic, l a b o r — r e m a i n the rule. 1 5 6 T h e legacy of Tiananmen lingers, and the official view of the leadership—that, during the "disturbances," "had the Chinese G o v e r n m e n t not taken the resolute measures, then we could not have enjoyed the stability that we are enjoying today," as President Jiang Zemin said during a visit to China by President Clinton in June 1 9 9 8 — r e m a i n s unchanged from 1989. Nevertheless, some observers see movement in Chinese politics in the direction of civil society and eventual democratization. The fact that many C h i n e s e city g o v e r n m e n t s and the press now report pollution levels and their sources, for e x a m p l e , and that quite a few m e m b e r s of C h i n a ' s parliament opposed the Three Gorges Dam project, suggest a gradual widening of permissible limits of public dialogue. Along with political changes initiated by Deng X i a o p i n g — s u c h as the forced early retirement of senior party and g o v e r n m e n t officials, a two-term limit on their positions, the increasing role of the National P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s in l a w - m a k i n g , an increased n u m b e r of court cases and lawyers, and an overall decline in political repression—it is argued that governance in China is r e f o r m i n g even though Western-style democratization is not yet in evidence. 1 5 7 Even that m o d e s t a s s e s s m e n t may be prematurely optimistic, however. Improvements in governance have been made to promote efficiency and undermine factionalism; but the authoritarian party-state system and official corruption remain very m u c h intact. However, in areas of personal life meaningful to ordinary C h i n e s e , such as finding a j o b , not being subject to arbitrary fees, and saving for a h o m e of o n e ' s own, f r e e d o m s have e x p a n d e d beyond anything imaginable a decade or so ago. With respect to international affairs, Chinese and foreign specialists agree that the P R C , thanks largely to its economic transformation and the end of the Cold War, has never been as militarily secure as it is today. But there is disagreement among the latter about what that sense of security portends. 1 5 8 One school of thought is that China's economic rise and increasing nationalism spell trouble for its neighbors, starting with Taiwan, which to most governments is still a Chinese province. This school emphasizes

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China's rapidly increasing military spending, its improved weapons, and its revised doctrine that focuses on rapid deployment to nearby areas. A second school (to which my analysis belongs) does not dispute either the fact of China's assertive nationalism, represented in its military leaders, or its improved military capabilities. Nevertheless, the very same set o f domestic factors that accounts for better weapons and more military spending also constitutes barriers to aggressive external behavior. Nationalism is constrained by internationalism—China's dependence on regional and international order to carry out its economic reforms, and its need of technology and capital from the advanced countries, T N C s , and multinational lenders—as well as by its own limited resources and weaknesses in its defense-industrial base. T h e P R C is thus years away from becoming a first-rank military power, though that is no doubt its o b j e c t i v e . 1 5 9 The P R C has many unresolved territorial issues with its neighbors, most importantly Taiwan, whose government seeks higher international status, and island groups in the South China Sea, over which several governments claim sovereignty. China has deployed military forces in both cases; but it has also exercised restraint and engaged in dialogue. Moreover, looking around China's rim throughout the 1990s, we find that B e i jing has employed diplomacy far more than it has displayed force in relations with neighboring countries. It has systematically established, restored, and strengthened relations with all of them, including those such as Russia, India, and Indonesia that were conflict-ridden. Confidencebuilding measures have been put into place to enhance border security and promote economic interests, especially with the new Central Asian states that preside over oil and gas deposits to which China is buying access. Thus, the notion of a China threat is at best premature; a rising China needs cooperative international relations. In any event, it is beset by a multitude of internal p r o b l e m s — f r o m huge numbers of migrant workers and farmers protesting violently against taxes and fees to striking state workers, oppressed ethnic minorities, and drug traffickers—that will command the leadership's attention and resources. The principal challenges P R C leaders face for many years to come lie within. Many are a direct consequence of China's spectacular growth, and none are more daunting than environmental and ecological problems. One source is increased population pressure on cities, especially those in the special e c o n o m i c zones o f the coastal provinces, where rapid growth has been fueled by foreign investment. (Five o f the world's most polluted cities are in China, and pollution levels are well above W H O safety limi t s . ) 1 6 0 Urban and rural areas are competing for land and water, reducing farm acreage and raising fears o f food scarcity. 1 6 1 Other environmentdamaging sources are large-scale development projects such as the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, 1 6 2 clearing of forestlands, and industrial

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and agricultural pollution of air, water, and soil. In turn, environmental and ecological costs are being passed back to p e o p l e — i n the form of soil degradation for one, and significant rises in respiratory diseases and cancer for another. 1 6 3 Those costs must be counted against China's economic growth. Like other developing countries, China is a latecomer to environmental protection, and in the minds of some Western specialists, too late to recover its forests, farmland, or water table. These are only a few of the many worrisome features of China's rise. In a country that represents over one-fifth of world population, and is so large and diverse in population and resources, the impact of rapid growth could only be contradictory. S o m e of the forces it has unleashed, such as nationalism among southerners, widespread corruption, and the supplanting of party p o w e r by local interests, may prove uncontrollable. O n e of Deng Xiaoping's greatest achievements was to avoid a succession crisis by putting in place a team of party leaders strongly c o m m i t t e d to his vision before he died in 1997. They have inherited a China that has removed the two big mountains, and is at peace. But new m o u n t a i n s are rising before their eyes. South Africa: The Rise and Fall of the Apartheid

Regime

W h o could have predicted that South A f r i c a would be one of the few bright spots in the p o s t - C o l d War world order? A barbaric social system based on racial d o m i n a t i o n — a p a r t h e i d — w a s dismantled. In 1993 a new constitution with a bill of rights was written (parliament approved it in 1996), 1 6 4 the first all-races general election was held in April 1994, and South A f r i c a ' s black majority, headed by President Mandela, now governs. Such an extraordinary turn of events will not wipe out the past, which is outlined below; but it does turn a new page in A f r i c a ' s history: a peaceful transition to democracy. In the Republic of South A f r i c a , a white settler minority of under 5 million (mainly English and Dutch descendants) controlled all the instruments of power in a country of over 28 million Africans, 2.5 million persons of mixed race ("coloureds"), and over 800,000 Indians. In the face of mounting, increasingly violent resistance to its rule, the apartheid regime used every source of leverage at its d i s p o s a l — f r o m modest social reforms to indiscriminate terror—to maintain its p o w e r and recover international support. By 1990, significant elements of apartheid had been r e m o v e d under a reformist government. But the system itself was still intact. South Africa was a pariah in the international community. Pledged to support the UN Charter and Declaration of H u m a n Rights, it was consistently c o n d e m n e d by the organization for gross violations of their provisions. Blacks were not permitted to vote or hold political office. Until

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1986 their movements were restricted by the infamous pass laws, or influx control measures. These required that blacks carry small, passport-type identity books at all times, helping to restrict rural-to-urban migration. Persons without a pass book were arrested (on average, about 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 such arrests a year). T h e Group Areas Act, lack o f housing, and government " e m e r g e n c y " legislation ensured, however, that, pass laws or no, nonwhites stayed in residential and business areas the government designated for them. (Under its resettlement program, the government moved over 4 million nonwhites to new areas, many by force.) The still-larger official plan was to get Africans out of South Africa altogether. Ten Bantustans, or "homelands," were established within South African territory; four were proclaimed independent states but recognized as such only by South Africa. Africans were reduced in status to migrant workers, citizens without a country. 1 6 5 Blacks who sought to express their human rights in South Africa ran a high risk of imprisonment, and worse. A variety o f "internal security" acts legalized repression. Until recently, blacks who, for instance, protested or organized against apartheid or spoke out (in or outside the country) for economic sanctions against the government were guilty of subversion. At its discretion, the government could hold such persons without trial, charge, or communication with the outside. 1 6 6 Torture and isolation techniques were commonplace; several black leaders, such as Steve B i k o , died in prison. Members of the South African military regularly carried out "dirty tricks" operations, including torture and assassinations, designed to intensify inter- and intra-racial animosity. 1 6 7 In some cases, persons and groups critical of the government were silenced by a form o f internal exile known as banning. Rigid censorship laws made it extremely difficult for antiapartheid books to be sold or for those newspapers not intimidated by the government to report police detentions or quote black leaders without themselves being jailed. Arbitrary searches o f people's homes by the police occurred frequently. Denial o f basic human rights to blacks and others extended to economic and social injustices. They were severely restricted as to where they could do business or own land. The homelands to which they were confined comprise about 13 percent of the land; it is the least arable and most environmentally devastated in the country. 1 6 8 L a b o r unions were exclusively for blacks and were subject to strict government regulation. Only a few o f them had the funds or membership to be politically powerful. Racial segregation was extensive. It was complete in education and government and was only legally ended in public places and facilities in 1990. Segregation continued in small towns, however, either by making access too expensive for blacks or by converting facilities to private ownership, which the new law did not cover. Only in the early 1990s did the South

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A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t r e p e a l the G r o u p A r e a s A c t , the L a n d A c t ( w h i c h restricted b l a c k o w n e r s h i p of land and h o m e s ) , and the P o p u l a t i o n R e g i s t r a tion A c t ( w h i c h r e q u i r e d racial c l a s s i f i c a t i o n at birth), e a c h of w h i c h perp e t u a t e d s e g r e g a t i o n a n d inequality. R a c i a l i n j u s t i c e is m o s t d e e p l y r e f l e c t e d in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e c o n o m i c and social r e w a r d s and opportunities. South African whites typically e a r n e d ten t i m e s the pay of b l a c k s and held the top p o s i t i o n s in all ind u s t r i e s . T h e a v e r a g e S o u t h A f r i c a n w h i t e c o u l d e x p e c t to live t h i r t e e n y e a r s l o n g e r than a b l a c k , eat t w i c e as w e l l , and be o v e r f i f t y t i m e s m o r e l i k e l y to h a v e a c c e s s to a d o c t o r . An A f r i c a n c h i l d o n a v e r a g e r e c e i v e d a b o u t f i v e t i m e s less m o n e y f o r e d u c a t i o n (an i m p r o v e m e n t o v e r t h e 1 9 7 0 s , w h e n it w a s t w e n t y t i m e s less) a n d w a s a b o u t t w e n t y t i m e s m o r e likely t h a n a w h i t e c h i l d to die in i n f a n c y . 1 6 9 A p a r t h e i d c a n a l s o be m e a s u r e d in e n v i r o n m e n t a l t e r m s . S o u t h A f r i c a d i d m u c h to p r o t e c t w i l d l i f e but very little to p r o t e c t b l a c k s f r o m t o x i c w a s t e s , air p o l l u t i o n ( f r o m coal e m i s s i o n s ) , and lung d i s e a s e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m i n i n g . 1 7 " T o u n d e r s t a n d w h y the w h i t e m i n o r i t y c l u n g so t e n a c i o u s l y to a p a r t h e i d , w e m u s t b r i e f l y n o t e its o r i g i n s . 1 7 ' A p a r t h e i d e v o l v e d f r o m c o l o n i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n of n a t i v e l a b o r to the point w h e r e r a c i s m , like o t h e r f o r m s of i n h u m a n i t y , b e c a m e d e e p l y s t r u c t u r e d into the c o u n t r y ' s w a y of life. C o n t r a r y to b o t h t r a d i t i o n a l and M a r x i s t c o n c e p t s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , r a c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s in S o u t h A f r i c a w e r e n e i t h e r e a s e d n o r e r a s e d by e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . I n s t e a d , t h e y i n t e n s i f i e d as S o u t h A f r i c a d e v e l o p e d . T h i s o c c u r r e d p r i m a r i l y to a c c o m m o d a t e c h a n g e s in the e c o n o m y a n d the e m e r g e n c e of n e w s o c i a l c l a s s e s . B u t a p a r t h e i d w a s a l s o s t r e n g t h e n e d , as w e h a v e h e a r d B i k o e x p l a i n it, b e c a u s e r a c i s m t o o k on a l i f e of its o w n as w h i t e s c a m e to " a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e that b l a c k is i n f e r i o r a n d b a d . " In t h e m o d e r n era, apartheid, although f u n d a m e n t a l l y a cover for exploitive r a c i s m , b r o a d e n e d into a n a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g y d e s i g n e d to a p p e a l to all of the country's whites.172 T h e first w h i t e settlers c a m e to S o u t h A f r i c a in 1652 in the e m p l o y of t h e D u t c h E a s t I n d i a C o m p a n y . T h o s e w h o s t a y e d took u p f a r m i n g , g r a d ually p e n e t r a t e d t h e interior, a n d o u s t e d t h e n a t i v e s f r o m the best lands. In 1 8 0 6 t h e B r i t i s h o c c u p i e d t h e c a p e a n d b e g a n to c o l o n i z e it, p u s h i n g t h e D u t c h d e s c e n d a n t s (the B o e r s ) into A f r i c a n tribal lands, w h i c h t h e y s e i z e d a n d p r o c l a i m e d s t a t e s . In t h e 1800s, w h e n d i a m o n d s and g o l d w e r e d i s c o v e r e d in t h e s e r e g i o n s , the B r i t i s h i n v a d e d . W h a t had o n c e b e e n an agric u l t u r a l ( a n d l a r g e l y s u b s i s t e n c e ) e c o n o m y b a s e d on A f r i c a n l a b o r w a s d r a m a t i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d into a m i n i n g e c o n o m y b a s e d on f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , urbanization, and a cheap, reliable (therefore controlled) African work f o r c e . A f t e r S o u t h A f r i c a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m Britain in 1910, British inv e s t o r s and B o e r n a t i o n a l i s t s set a s i d e their c o n f l i c t s in a c o m m o n e f f o r t to m a i n t a i n w h i t e a u t h o r i t y , e x c l u d e A f r i c a n s f r o m the political p r o c e s s , a n d

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e n s u r e an adequate labor supply. All the restrictive race laws mentioned earlier flowed f r o m these objectives. South A f r i c a ' s leadership until 1994, based in the National Party, owed its political domination to successful appeals to white purity, nationalism, and a n t i c o m m u n i s m . As its leader said in 1948, after the party had won the general election and f o r m e d the first entirely A f r i k a n e r (Dutchdescended settler) government: [ W i l l ] t h e E u r o p e a n r a c e in t h e f u t u r e b e a b l e t o m a i n t a i n its r u l e , its p u r i t y a n d i t s c i v i l i z a t i o n , o r w i l l it f l o a t a l o n g u n t i l it v a n i s h e s f o r e v e r , w i t h o u t h o n o u r , in t h e B l a c k s e a o f S o u t h A f r i c a ' s n o n - E u r o p e a n p o p u lation'.' . . . W i l l t h e e v e r e n c r o a c h i n g a n d all d e s t r o y i n g c o m m u n i s t c a n c e r b e c h e c k e d , o r w i l l it b e f u r t h e r a l l o w e d t o u n d e r m i n e o u r f r e e d o m , our religion, our own South African nationhood and our European existence. o u r h o n o u r a b l e traditions and o u r racial and civil peace?17-1

Such an a g e n d a d e m a n d e d repressive m e t h o d s for its f u l f i l l m e n t . By the same token, it also invited resistance. With a logic c o m m o n to all repressive systems, exploitation in South A f r i c a met with increasing resistance, which set in motion more indiscriminate official violence, more restrictive laws, and better-organized resistance. Beginning with a strike of African mine workers in 1946, black resistance d e v e l o p e d principally along two lines. T h e A f r i c a n National Congress, founded in 1912 on a policy of noncooperation, for years waged a guerrilla war directed from its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. It sought to m a k e South Africa ungovernable through armed struggle in white areas and against black collaborators. Only after Nelson Mandela was freed in 1990 and the legal ban on the A N C was lifted did it a n n o u n c e it would suspend a r m e d struggle. Black trade unions were a second line of resistance. Representing upwards of 300,000 mine, food-processing, and metal workers, the unions focused on strikes and other j o b actions. 1 7 4 Overarching these two forces was the powerful voice of nonviolent resistance of the black c h u r c h , represented by the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize winner, A r c h b i s h o p D e s m o n d Tutu. Although Tutu distinguished his advocacy f r o m G a n d h i a n n o n v i o l e n c e , saying that one cannot turn the other cheek in the f a c e of Hitlerian tactics, he urged " p e a c e f u l c h a n g e " as the only alternative to " A r m a g e d d o n . " Tutu's m e s s a g e was until very late in the g a m e spurned by the South African leadership, but it was picked up by other whites w h o agreed that a bloody civil war would engulf the country unless substantial concessions were made to black interests. There were always South A f r i c a n whites, even in the parliament, who protested apartheid; f r o m 1985 on some of them, m a j o r business and political leaders, for the most part, defied the g o v e r n m e n t by meeting with A N C leaders. T h e concerns of these whites evolved with the economy, that

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is, to an emphasis less on state enforcement of racism than on the assurance of labor stability and continued foreign investment. 1 7 5 But their concept of social reforms stopped short of challenging the racial order. Unlike Tutu, who insisted (like all black political leaders) on the complete dismantlement of apartheid and acceptance of the one-person, one-vote principle, white liberals emphasized economic gains that would eventually trickle down to blacks. Evidently fearing "another Rhodesia"—there, whites lost political privileges when black revolutionaries turned out the ex-colonial regime and proclaimed the new state of Zimbabwe in 1 9 8 0 — these whites argued that only continued "growth" and foreign investment could create a just society. 1 7 6 In fact, economic expansion was crucial to the apartheid system, as becomes plain when we look at the role of foreign capital. The major transnational corporations and banks, principally British and U.S., did business in South Africa for all the usual reasons: a " s a f e " investment climate; high profitability (higher, in fact, than the worldwide average); cheap labor; and hard, convertible currency. 1 7 7 Retaining foreign business confidence was, certainly in the eyes of the white elites, the key to its continued predominance. "Another Rhodesia" to them meant not only a black revolution but, perhaps even more, the abandonment of foreign support, just as happened when Washington and London presided over the transfer of power in Zimbabwe. If most foreign, and especially U.S., investments and loans ceased or were withdrawn, the impact would be calamitous for the regime. A major source of investment capital would dry up (meaning over $4 billion in U.S. loans and investments alone); the regime's ability to repay its substantial foreign debt (about $ 2 4 billion in 1986) and support very large military and police forces (which absorbed roughly 20 percent of the state budget and accounted for about the same percentage of all Africa's military spending) would be undermined; loans from multilateral sources, such as South Africa had received from the IMF, would be cut off; important markets for South African exports would probably shrink; and critical sources of both advanced technology (in, for example, mining, automobiles, and especially computers, which had internal security applications) and fuel (from the major oil companies) would be lost. 1 7 8 Providing stability for foreign capital not only depended on the maintenance of apartheid in some form, it also required that governments support their corporations. In South Africa there was a happy marriage of Corporate Globalism and Realism for about fifty years. Pro-Western governments consistently supported investments and loans in South Africa for two primary reasons, both rooted in "national security": the strategic minerals that South Africa exports and the white minority regime's anticommunism. South Africa accounts for significant percentages of world production of a number of precious minerals, such as chromium (32 percent), gold (30 percent), manganese (16 percent), and the platinum group (48 percent). 1 7 9

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Equally significant amounts of these and other minerals are imported from South A f r i c a by the United States, such as 55 percent of its c h r o m i u m (used in making stainless steel), 49 percent of the platinum group of metals (used as catalysts in industry), and 39 percent of m a n g a n e s e (used in steelmaking). Pretoria relied on this d e p e n d e n c e for its political leverage to retain U.S. support. T h e economic d e p e n d e n c e of South A f r i c a ' s landlocked, labor-poor neighbors also helped its cause. But South A f r i c a ' s best asset was its vigorously anticommunist line, which always found a receptive audience among U.S. policymakers concerned about black revolutionaries' overrunning southern Africa. T h e overthrow of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and M o z a m b i q u e and of British colonialism in Rhodesia in the 1970s confirmed to U.S. officials the threat of "Soviet e n c r o a c h m e n t " on the wings of African nationalism. This fear fit perfectly with the South African regime's activities: its suppression of domestic political opponents (who were invariably labeled " c o m m u n i s t s " or "terrorists"); its armed intervention in Angola, a socialist neighbor; and its self-described role as a " b u l w a r k " of capitalist stability in Africa. 1 8 0 U.S. administrations f r o m Truman to R e a g a n therefore subscribed to the call f o r evolutionary, peaceful change in South Africa made by liberal whites there and by transnational businesses. Clearly, the intersection of business and "national security" interests explains that policy much better than concern about the fate of human rights for the majority population. 1 8 1 " C o n s t r u c t i v e e n g a g e m e n t " and "quiet d i p l o m a c y , " as U.S. policymakers variously termed their approach, were oriented to preserving U.S. stakes in South A f r i c a — a n d even expanding them, as in the case of nuclear-energy cooperation in the 1980s—while nudging the Pretoria regime to implement reforms sufficient to keep the social pot f r o m boiling over. By the mid-1980s, full-scale civil war in South A f r i c a had b e c o m e a real possibility. It was avoided mainly because international pressure induced the ruling party to change course by softening apartheid. Initially, the pressure came f r o m concerned citizens in the United States, Britain, and other countries whose T N C s were investing in South Africa. Responding to appeals f r o m Tutu, these citizens caused a n u m b e r of U.S. city and state g o v e r n m e n t s , universities, labor unions, and other institutions that owned the stocks and bonds of corporations doing business in South Africa to stop investing or divest altogether. The U.S. Congress also responded. Over the opposition of the Reagan administration, it mandated U.S. sanctions against South A f r i c a , such as a ban on new U.S. investments and on certain traded items. M o r e than half of the U.S. companies doing business in South Africa left the country, although many merely shifted ownership to local white-run affiliates. T h e sanctions, helped by an international oil boycott against South Africa, and the changes in Eastern Europe, worked. 1 8 2 Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the National Party selected Frederik W. d e Klerk as its new leader in September 1989. His strategy was to

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steer a midcourse between the complete dismantling of apartheid and the rigid opposition of white nationalists to any change at all. De Klerk sought to appeal to white and black moderates at home and abroad who would accept r e f o r m s as a substitute for a transition to a black-run government dominated by the ANC. Thus, for example, de Klerk's administration lifted the ban on the A N C in February 1990 and ordered M a n d e l a and other key leaders released; but it did not release all the country's political prisoners, w h o may have numbered 3,000 or more. It also e n d e d e m e r g e n c y rule in most provinces in 1990, but kept it in one. As just mentioned, it repealed some laws governing racial segregation while leaving the main ones intact. The process, thus begun, m o v e d fitfully t o w a r d a new governing structure and basis for citizenship. Late in 1991 direct negotiations between de Klerk's government and the A N C established Condesa, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, in which most other political forces also participated. The idea was to agree on a formula for a transition to a one-person, one-vote system, with guarantees of civil liberties and a new parliamentary structure. Then, early in 1992, de Klerk took a m a j o r gamble: He called for a whites-only r e f e r e n d u m on (as the ballot measure stated) "continuation of the r e f o r m process . . . which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation." During the campaign on the referendum, reformers warned of an economic catastrophe if it were rejected; the ANC, though angered by another whites-only vote, also urged a yes vote to avoid civil war. Apartheidist forces raised the usual alarms about a c o m m u n i s t South Africa with no place for whites. They, too, warned of a civil w a r — if the m a j o r i t y voted yes. T h e g a m b l e paid off: De Klerk won approval with 69 percent of the vote. Despite some violent incidents that might have derailed the Condesa process, it stayed alive. De Klerk acceded to the notion of a transitional administration that inevitably w o u l d be headed by Mandela. South A f r i c a ' s new federal structure goes h a l f w a y toward meeting the concerns of whites and b l a c k s — t h e former, for substantial autonomy for individual states, out of fear of the black majority; the latter, for a strong central g o v e r n m e n t , reflecting the 5 - t o - l ratio of b l a c k s to whites in the population. In such a scheme, the greatest threat to South A f r i c a n unity will no longer be white minority racism but tensions b e t w e e n center and state governments, both of which will be dominated by blacks. At the level of governance, the A N C surprised many observers with its resiliency, and in particular with the choice of white businesses and the military to work with it. 1 8 3 The greatest challenge was dealing with the violent past. Here, the g o v e r n m e n t c a m e up with a creative, and controversial, a p p r o a c h . It established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, headed by Archbishop Tutu, to hear testimony from former officials and others, in return for which the commission was e m p o w e r e d to grant immunity f r o m prosecution. By

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spring 1998 several thousand people had applied for amnesty. Though the commission was unable to get South A f r i c a ' s previous presidents, P. W. Botha ( 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 9 ) and de Klerk, to admit their personal responsibility for or full awareness o f assassinations, torture, and other terrorist acts, it succeeded at exposing details o f the work o f the security forces that clearly pointed to their culpability. 1 8 4 T h e A N C also admitted to having used torture and bombings against opponents, as Tutu insisted; and when the government tried to issue a blanket amnesty for A N C members, the supreme court rejected it, compelling some members to testify in return for individual amnesties. 1 8 5 Granting amnesty to killers and torturers, as also happened in Argentina and in Guatemala after its civil war, is never popular; but it has been fairly applied and seems essential for a society to heal and move on. L i k e w i s e , eliminating an oppressive s y s t e m is only the first step in a long rebuilding p r o c e s s . A p a r t h e i d ' s undoing m a r k s the start o f an e x tremely difficult and very expensive confrontation with underdevelopment. In a society h i s t o r i c a l l y b a s e d on d e e p - s e a t e d inequality, it will take e x traordinary r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s to bring nonwhite i n c o m e s , education, skills, health, housing, and environmental quality up to reasonable l e v e l s — e v e n with white c o o p e r a t i o n . 1 8 6 S c a r c e r e s o u r c e s will have to be allocated among a rising black urban population and rural b l a c k s o f different tribes. Whether or not a b l a c k - m a j o r i t y government can, without m a j o r violence, a c h i e v e the d o m e s t i c and international c o n s e n s u s n e c e s s a r y to transform South A f r i c a is the great challenge now b e f o r e it.

South

Korea:

The Successes

and Contradictions

of an "Economic

Miracle"

South K o r e a , along with B r a z i l , is one o f the most frequently cited e x a m ples o f s u c c e s s f u l capitalist e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in the Third World. B o t h have e n j o y e d periods o f high growth rates, both have high average i n c o m e s , and both rank at the top among N I C s in average levels o f health and e d u c a t i o n . T h e overall p e r f o r m a n c e o f S o u t h K o r e a — o f f i c i a l l y , the R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ( R O K ) , as distinct from the socialist D e m o c r a t i c People's R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ( D P R K ) in the N o r t h — i s all the m o r e impressive when we c o n s i d e r that its population is f i v e times less than B r a z i l ' s and that ever s i n c e the K o r e a n War ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 ) , national security has dominated political and e c o n o m i c affairs. But to call South K o r e a an " e c o n o m i c m i r a c l e " o f l a i s s e z - f a i r e capitalism and a model o f Third World development, as it frequently is c a l l e d , ignores s e v e r a l things: the preponderant role o f the state in m a n a g i n g the e c o n o m y , the s p e c i a l advantages that South K o r e a had as it moved into export-led d e v e l o p m e n t , and e c o n o m i c distortions, social inequities, and political w e a k n e s s e s that have a c c o m p a nied the country's dynamic growth and democratization.

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From 1962, the year in which the government in Seoul introduced its first five-year plan, to 1983, the G N P of South Korea rose from $2.3 billion to $75 billion. In fact, G N P grew an average of 12 percent a year in the 1980s. Per capita G N P rose f r o m $87 in 1962 to $1,800 in 1983. By 1989, G N P had reached $210 billion, or $4,968 per capita. 1 8 7 Prior to the currency crisis, these last figures had approximately doubled, so that the average Korean was earning just over $10,000 annually. A striking feature of this income increase is its relatively broad distribution; the income gap is nothing like B r a z i l ' s . A d d to these facts that average wages in Korea have risen dramatically over the past twenty years and that the level of educational attainment is unusually high (as is g o v e r n m e n t spending on education), and it a p p e a r s that the R O K leadership has found a way to achieve both rapid e c o n o m i c growth and social equity. The driving force behind this e c o n o m i c growth was the rapid expansion of industrial production for export, which was the cornerstone of the development strategy adopted in 1962 by the iron-fisted president, Park C h u n g H e e . As a result, the weight of the m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector in the e c o n o m y steadily increased, and exports m o v e d to skill-intensive goods such as electronics and textiles. Total export volume grew by 31.7 percent annually b e t w e e n 1965 and 1973, with m a n u f a c t u r e d goods (which now m a k e up over 90 percent of exports) leading the way. 1 8 8 The value of manufactured exports rose f r o m $15.3 million in the early 1960s to $24.4 billion in the early 1980s. By 1992 Korea was the fifteenth largest economy in the world and, with exports of $125 billion (in 1995), ranked eleventh in world t r a d e — t h e m a i n reasons for its elevation to m e m b e r s h i p in the O E C D , the "rich c o u n t r i e s ' club," in 1996, a first for a Third World country. Korea had followed the Japanese trading-state model to perfection (see the Japan case study in Chapter 6). Some of the reasons behind K o r e a ' s success as an exporter make it a d o u b t f u l m o d e l f o r other d e v e l o p i n g countries, however. As D u r n i n g wrote, "the foundations of equitable growth [in Korea] came before the export b o o m " in the f o r m of radical land reform in the late 1940s and heavy state investment in education in the early 1960s. 1 8 9 The Japanese colonial heritage of state-directed d e v e l o p m e n t is also generally acknowledged as an important source of rapid g r o w t h . As an ally of the United States throughout the Cold War, Korea received special treatment. U.S. economic aid alone a v e r a g e d $ 2 7 0 million a year, or 15 percent of South K o r e a ' s GNP, f r o m 1953 through 195 8. 1 9 0 Military aid (excluding sales) totaled $9.3 billion f r o m 1950 to 1979. 1 9 1 Finally, K o r e a received U.S. military and Japanese technology transfers, and preferential access to U.S. markets. This combination of self-made and externally created advantages is simply not duplicable in the 1990s.

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There are also complicating factors in evaluating the South Korean economic advances. One is the growing neglect of agriculture. South Korean peasants, once the backbone of the economy, have been hard hit by export-led development. Prior to 1962, peasants had benefited from a large-scale land-to-the-tiller program and state intervention to ensure adequate prices, fertilizer, and credit. Since then, state investment in agriculture has sharply declined, and so have agricultural production, employment, and income. The social consequences are by now familiar to us. 1 9 2 Peasants who were not forced into tenancy migrated to the cities, taxing the resources of government and industry. Between 1960 and 1982, South Korea's urban population leaped from 28 percent to 61 percent of the total population. 193 It is now 73 percent, and growing by 5 percent a year. 194 The actual distribution of income in South Korea may be much less equitable than the official statistics would suggest. The one-time leading voice of political opposition, Kim Dae Jung, who was elected president in 1997, has argued, for example, that the surveys used to develop the income data were biased by their exclusion of whole categories of the wealthiest and the poorest families. Furthermore, official figures reveal sizable changes in income share over time: up, for the top 20 percent of the population; down, for the bottom 20 percent. 195 As is the case elsewhere in Asia, relative income equality "may be a consequence not so much of equitable sharing in the fruits of economic growth as of very high levels of labor extraction among low-income workers and families." 1 9 6 The South Korean work force is unlimited in size, still largely unskilled, unfairly treated, and historically repressed. South Korean industry has one of the world's worst safety records, and its workers once had the world's longest workweek (fifty-four hours in the early 1980s, almost forty-seven hours today). Wages have indeed risen far faster than in any other industrializing country: "In just one decade, 1969-1979, real wages in Korea rose by more than 2 5 0 % . " 1 9 7 But until the 1990s, wage increases were always greatly exceeded by gains in labor productivity, and for the majority of workers they were offset by increases in the cost of living. It should also be kept in mind that wage levels took off from an extremely low starting point, as Korean industrialists (mostly meaning the chaebol) kept wages down in order to make the price of Korean exports more attractive. In short, workers have shared in Korea's industrial expansion, but they have also sacrificed much more than they have been rewarded. 198 This conclusion is even more applicable to Korean women workers. They constitute about half of the industrial work force, and from 70 to 90 percent of the work force in export industries such as electronics, clothing, and textiles. Their pay is about half that of men performing comparable

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work. Korea is a notoriously male-dominated society, and only in very recent years have w o m e n been able to m a k e significant social gains at the workplace and in the home. 1 9 9 The repression of labor in South Korea has also been a central aspect of export-led development under state direction. Korean governments have prided t h e m s e l v e s on being able to maintain a " d i s c i p l i n e d " work force, one willing to subordinate the improvement of wages and working conditions to company and national goals. Although the right to strike has been granted to all but public employees since 1961, the state has consistently intervened, often with brute force, to limit union activities in every sphere, including representation of workers (the government runs its own unions, as in socialist countries), collective bargaining, certification, and involvement in politics. 2 0 0 Clearly the Korean state's purpose has been to ensure that trade unions are "weak, dependent associations" of the companies, especially the chaebol that dominate industry. 2 0 1 The overthrow of the Chun Doo Hwan dictatorship in 1987 (see below) loosened some of the constraints on labor organizing. Unions have used the opportunity to gain ground. In the late 1980s over 1.7 million workers were organized in independent unions. L a b o r - m a n a g e m e n t disputes escalated, peaking at over 3,700 in 19 87. 2 0 2 Plants under the chaebol, such as Hyundai and D a e w o o , were especially hard hit by strikes, which usually were violent and led to arrests of union leaders. 2 0 3 But out of them came higher pay raises than ever b e f o r e — e n o u g h so that the chaebol m o v e d some manufacturing plants to lower-wage countries in Southeast Asia. K o r e a ' s e c o n o m y is closely tied to the fortunes of the chaebol. T h e top ten dominate sales, exports, and bank loans. In the 1990s, sales of the thirty largest chaebol accounted f o r about three-quarters of K o r e a ' s GNP. 2 0 4 Such a concentration of market and financial power points up the crucial role of the state in economic planning. As several specialists have emphasized, 2 0 5 the state, far f r o m being a neutral player in the e c o n o m y , has guided and nurtured industrial development through control of credit, protection of domestic firms f r o m competition with foreign investors and banks, d e c i s i o n m a k i n g on key investments, and various subsidies and awards to exporters. Korea may be a growth miracle, but it is certainly not a miracle of the f r e e market and competition. T h e chaebols' economic power translates into difficult times for Korean small businesses and, politically, into huge financial contributions to the ruling party that simultaneously corrupt the growth process and, as we are about to see, progress in democratizing. All these f a c t o r s — d e p r e s s e d wages, repression of labor, and government direction of the e c o n o m y — s h a p e d the role of T N C s in South Korea until the late 1990s. The main investing f i r m s have been Japanese (about 50 percent) and U.S. (27 percent). But because South Korea has relied for

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external capital on loans, mostly from U . S . sources, foreign investment has accounted for less than 6 percent of the total. 2 0 6 South Korean growth, as a result, has been financed with a high rate o f foreign indebtedness. In fact, at one time the R O K was the largest borrower in Asia and carried one of the world's highest external debts: $ 4 3 billion (53 percent o f G N P ) in 1 9 8 4 . High growth and export successes brought those figures down to $ 3 4 billion ( 1 4 percent of G N P ) by 1 9 9 0 . 2 0 7 In any case, Korea is not in the debt trap facing Brazil or M e x i c o . B e c a u s e of its exceptional ability to keep increasing exports through improvements in productivity, K o r e a ' s debt service ratio of under 11 percent (in 1 9 9 0 ) was fairly low. 2 0 8 Until the late 1980s, South K o r e a ' s enviable overall economic performance was managed in the confines o f the national security state. T h e country's spending on the military was substantial: over 6 percent of GNP (in North Korea it was about 22 percent) in the 1980s and over 35 percent of the government budget. Despite the Korean armistice o f 1 9 5 3 , armed clashes on land and at sea occurred periodically. Each Korea drew extensively on the resources of its major-power partners—the United States for the South, the U S S R and China for the North—to acquire the latest military hardware. A state of war existed throughout the peninsula, justifying not only arms buildups but also widespread domestic repression. The national-security state in South Korea comprised an extensive police and intelligence apparatus that employed the "communist threat" to intimidate, j a i l , and torture political opponents; to muzzle the press; and to keep intellectuals, students, and labor leaders in line. U . S . officials looked the other way, excusing the repression as necessary to maintain stability in the face o f the greater threat from the North. That attitude lent legitimacy to thirty-two years of military rule (from 1 9 6 0 to 1992), during which direct military intervention in politics was always p o s s i b l e — a s in 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0 , when General Chun Doo Hwan seized power and then ordered special forces to suppress a popular uprising in the city o f K w a n g j u . In short, South Korea was an authoritarian system, though much more open than North Korea, as evidenced by many years o f student demonstrations and the parliamentary and presidential elections since 1 9 8 4 . Not until the remarkable events of 1987 did democracy begin to have meaning in Korea. President Chun Doo Hwan had promised to step down at the end of his term in February 1 9 8 8 . T h e Olympic G a m e s scheduled to take place in Seoul in the summer o f 1988 would be a personal and national triumph. Chun's error was to assume that his successor as party leader would automatically also become the next president—that neither opposition leaders, such as K i m Dae Jung, nor Korean citizens and students could effectively challenge Chun's reliance on an electoral process that virtually ensured victory for the ruling elite. What actually happened is that student demonstrations throughout Korea for direct presidential elections were widely

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supported, notably by the middle class and the Buddhist, A n g l i c a n , and Catholic churches. W h e n the demonstrators were assaulted and gassed by the police and army, public sympathy went entirely over to the opposition m o v e m e n t . Even U.S. officials publicly questioned C h u n ' s legitimacy. In an extraordinary d e v e l o p m e n t , C h u n ' s heir-apparent, General Roh Tae Woo, pressured him not only to support a constitutional revision that would allow for direct elections but also to release some 2,000 political prisoners, to c o m m i t to honoring civil liberties, and to free Kim Dae Jung f r o m house arrest. Roh Tae Woo won the 1987 presidential election with a little more than one-third of the popular vote in a three-way race. 2 0 9 He scored some m a j o r international successes, including hosting the O l y m p i c G a m e s , opening trade relations with the socialist countries and diplomatic relations with the U S S R (1990) and China (1992), and making several overtures to North Korea that led in 1990 to the first exchanges of visits by prime ministers. North Korea became internationally isolated by virtue of its own rejection of Chinese- or Soviet-style r e f o r m s and by R o h ' s so-called Northern policy of f l e x i b l e ties with the D P R K ' s allies. In S e p t e m b e r 1991 P y o n g y a n g was forced to reverse its long-standing opposition to separate U N m e m b e r s h i p s for the two Koreas after China and the USSR agreed to support entry for both. Even more d r a m a t i c steps f o l l o w e d . In N o v e m b e r 1991, in line with U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms and reductions, all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were prepared for removal from South Korea. Roh then announced a NonN u c l e a r K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a Peace Initiative. U n d e r it the R O K f o r e s w o r e the m a n u f a c t u r e , p o s s e s s i o n , storage, d e p l o y m e n t , or use of nuclear weapons, and further stated it would not possess nuclear fuel and enrichment facilities. In the f o l l o w i n g t w o m o n t h s , the t w o Koreas c o n c l u d e d two u n p r e c e d e n t e d a g r e e m e n t s — o n e to reduce tensions (by p l e d g i n g nonaggression, an end to attempts at subversion, and increased family and other contacts); the other, a declaration of mutual, verifiable non-nuclear policies. 2 1 0 For North Korea, these a g r e e m e n t s were undertaken in the hopes of r e m o v i n g obstacles to U.S. and Japanese diplomatic recognition and thus to their capital and technology. For the South the a g r e e m e n t s would allay c o n c e r n s about the N o r t h ' s possible d e v e l o p m e n t of nuclear weapons, silence opposition criticism of Roh for not pushing harder f o r reu n i f i c a t i o n , and create the basis f o r an all-Korean solution to the p e n i n sula's security problem. N o n e of those hopes materialized, however: North Korea did not receive U.S. and J a p a n e s e diplomatic recognition and perhaps for that reason went ahead with its nuclear-weapons program; NorthSouth dialogue broke d o w n over widely different concepts of unification and over the nuclear issue; and thus, by 1993, relations were at a critical impasse in the midst of a new administration, that of Kim Young S a m . 2 "

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Though a strategic crisis was avoided by virtue of a U.S.-North Korean agreement in 1994 to freeze the DPRK's nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance and the opening of diplomatic ties, the cooperative spirit of 1991 in inter-Korean relations never returned. With his election in December 1992, Kim Young Sam became South Korea's first civilian president since 1960. He quickly made a number of bold moves away from the national-security state. To reduce domestic tensions and as gestures to North Korea, he released about 4 0 , 0 0 0 prisoners (including some who had been accused of consorting with the enemy), removed restrictions on business trips to the North, and released a longtime North Korean war prisoner. To emphasize the restoration of civilian government, Kim ousted several key military supporters of the old regime, civilianized the intelligence services, and removed them from domestic surveillance. (The much-abused national-security laws remain in place, however.) In the face of a trade deficit and a slowing of economic growth at home, Kim gave indications (which never materialized) of a willingness to open the Korean economy to more domestic and foreign competition rather than put the burden of sacrifice on labor's back. 2 1 2 That shortcoming was part of a larger issue that went to the heart of what Koreans call the "Korean disease": bribery in politics. The state's nurturing of big business through contracts and other advantages, and the chaebol chief executives' turnover of huge sums of money to Korean presidents, for their personal use and to support the ruling party's activities, had never been openly challenged under military rule. But the Kim administration's banking reforms exposed the fact that Roh Tae Woo had accumulated a slush fund of about $ 6 5 0 million in numerous bank and investment accounts; that he had made payoffs to the opposition as well as his own party; and that all the chaebol leaders had contributed to this private war chest. 2 1 3 Eight chaebol chairmen were indicted on bribery charges. 2 1 4 Roh became the first Korean president to be jailed on corruption charges. Chun Doo Hwan was also indicted and jailed. His trial, and the arrest of fourteen generals, provided an opportunity for Koreans to revisit the bitter legacy of Kwangju, where General Roh had led the troops, and the origins of Chun's 1979 coup. The sudden willingness of President Kim to turn on his predecessors was much less the consequence of his reform program, however, than it was a political calculation to reverse the tide of sentiment against his own governance, which still bore the marks of authoritarian leadership and distaste for multi-party politics. 2 1 5 In December 1997 Koreans went to the polls in the midst of an economic crisis and elected Kim Dae Jung, the first-ever member of the political opposition to win. Kim Dae Jung's presidency might have been a historic opportunity to create a new era in labor-management relations in Korea. Kim had long been an advocate of labor rights in the years of

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authoritarianism. But the financial crisis forced his hand. With the IMF insisting on restructuring the e c o n o m y and therefore cutting back on work f o r c e s — s o m e 37,000 companies went bankrupt during the crisis, including seven of the top thirty chaebol—Kim's representatives had to negotiate a t w o f o l d arrangement: organized labor's agreement to the elimination of 1 million to 2 million jobs, and agreement by the chaebol to f u n d j o b transition w e l f a r e payments. Essentially, K i m ' s incoming government had to do the I M F ' s dirty work for it; but it is far from clear that the agreements will hold. T h e chaebol, whose c o m m o n practice of borrowing heavily to f i n a n c e e x p a n s i o n was a principal reason for the currency crisis, have m o v e d slowly to pare d o w n their holdings. As of m i d - 1 9 9 8 , organized labor was threatening strikes in response to restructuring demands. The big winners, as noted in the Chapter 2 case study, were foreign investors. Kim said Korea needed foreign competition, and T N C s were welcome to open up the economy. 2 1 6 Foreign investors are responding to bargain-basement opportunities in banking and services, areas from which they had been excluded. The government itself is selling its interest in some m a j o r enterprises, such as Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (Posco). Korean e c o n o m i s t s and political leaders talk of recovery in two to three years, but as with other Asian countries, much depends on the fate of J a p a n ' s e c o n o m y because Japan is a vital trade partner and, for Korea, the m a i n source of technology f o r the auto and electronics industries. Economic recovery, moreover, d o e s not ensure political health: W h e t h e r the new government is able to cure the Korean disease of buying favors, prom o t e strong political and legal institutions, and o v e r c o m e the " w i n n e r takes all" temptation that typifies Korean politics r e m a i n s to be seen. Thus, just as Korea was basking in the glow of its newly accorded status as a First World country, the p r o p s of its s u c c e s s — c l o s e state-corporate bonds, export-led growth, and foreign capital d e p e n d e n c e — w e r e kicked out f r o m under it. Korea will recover, but the costs to Koreans and the political system are likely to run very high.

Brazil: Forests Versus

Debts

Tropical forests are a m o n g the e a r t h ' s most precious r e s o u r c e s — a n d among the most endangered. T h e y are home to a substantial proportion (at least half, perhaps as much as 90 percent) of all known plant, animal, and insect species—and probably to even more species that have yet to be catalogued. They are the source of spiritual and material sustenance and healing to the indigenous p e o p l e s w h o inhabit them; of rainfall that helps to regulate the e a r t h ' s climate; and of much of the e a r t h ' s o x y g e n supply. Large-scale depletion of tropical forests threatens all f o r m s of life, and thus the planet's biodiversity. A n d the threat is very real: In contrast with

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previous epochs, when approximately one species became extinct every year, today tropical deforestation "condemns at least one species of bird, mammal, or plant to extinction daily"211 It is thus one of many human actions that have accelerated species destruction almost beyond comprehension. 2 1 8 Tropical forests have fallen victim to both h u m a n need and greed. Population density, the clearing of land for planting, grazing, and transportation, and the seeming imperatives of national and regional economic growth have put enormous pressures on wet and dry forests alike. The best available assessment (in 1990) is that "the world is losing up to 20.4 million hectares of tropical forest annually," an amount equal to the area of Panama, and far greater than had been estimated a decade earlier by a U N agency. 2 1 9 Most of this loss is occurring in the tropical rain forests of Brazil, India, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Thailand, and B u r m a , at rates that vary from under 1 percent annually to an estimated 7.6 percent (in the case of Costa Rica). 2 2 0 A m o n g the long-term consequences of this destruction is global warming: It is now believed that tropical deforestation accounts for about one-third of all h u m a n - c a u s e d e m i s s i o n s of carbon dioxide. 2 2 1 Saving tropical forests, on the other hand, is a major contribution to combating global warming: They act as a carbon sink, absorbing huge amounts of carbon dioxide produced by the burning of fossil fuels. 2 2 2 The Brazilian case is worth special attention. Brazil's importance rests not only on its role in the world economy as a NIC. Brazil's rapidly growing population of 163 million, larger than Russia's, is equal to about half of the total population of Latin A m e r i c a . The tropical forests within and outside the A m a z o n region are the w o r l d ' s largest and may contain as m u c h as 22 percent of all flowering plant species alone. 2 2 3 Already, about 6 to 7 percent of the total rain forest is gone; and the smaller flooded portion, which is of unique scientific value, may be lost as soon as "the next d e c a d e . " 2 2 4 Preserving such an e n o r m o u s e n v i r o n m e n t a l and e c o n o m i c asset at a time of substantial external indebtedness and domestic inequalities has b e c o m e the country's overriding dilemma. Politically, Brazil may be better prepared to cope with it, having emerged f r o m a dark period of military rule (from 1964 to 1985), marked by extensive human-rights violations. But the political system remains unstable, violent, and corruptible; and " d e v e l o p m e n t " is more polarized than ever, with around 40 percent of the population in poverty and 60 percent of the wealth in the hands of 20 percent of the people. 2 2 5 Because of the sheer size of B r a z i l ' s e c o n o m i c , social, and environmental problems and possibilities, its future is a matter of global concern. The pressures to extract the A m a z o n ' s riches have been both external and internal. Tropical h a r d w o o d s are in great d e m a n d worldwide, with Japan, the United States, and other industrialized countries being the leading importers. For the Brazilian government, as for other tropical countries,

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forest products are a major source of foreign exchange income. Until very recently, Brazilian leaders chafed at suggestions from abroad that the Amazon be treated as a global resource, arguing that the country's huge external debt and development needs ruled out "foreign i n t e r f e r e n c e " in how Brazilians should control their forests. But the principal sources of B r a z i l ' s scheme to develop the Amazon region are internal. Most important among them are the social and demographic consequences of Brazil's underdevelopment. Poverty is especially pronounced in the densely populated northeast, where the rural poor have b e c o m e significantly poorer in recent years. Seventy percent of rural households in Brazil are landless or near landless; 1 percent o f landowners own 4 5 percent o f all farmland. 2 2 6 Huge numbers o f peasants flocked to Brazil's major cities beginning in the 1960s, driven by impossible dreams o f employment and homes. (Between 1960 and 1990, Brazil's urban population grew from 4 5 percent o f the total to over 7 5 p e r c e n t . ) 2 2 7 Instead, they added to already serious unemployment, homelessness, and slums. The Amazonia project thus provided the Brazilian government with a mechanism for channeling surplus labor, potential dissidents, and landpoor peasants out of Brazil's overcrowded cities. For these people, clearing the seemingly boundless forests loomed as a way out o f poverty, particularly after a severe drought hit the northeast. In the early 1 9 7 0 s , the planned construction o f the Transamazon Highway, which would stretch some 3 , 3 0 0 kilometers on an east-west axis, became a "safety valve . . . by creating access to the well-watered demographic void of A m a z o n i a . " 2 2 8 But many other interests were also involved. Amazonian development beckoned those who saw opportunities to profit from the unequaled natural resources in the region: cattle ranchers; tin, manganese, and gold miners; construction companies; and of course timber concerns. S o m e Brazilian civilian and military officials acted on fears of foreign intervention in the Amazon, great-power ambitions, and fulfillment o f the dream of national integration. 2 2 9 These factors converged disastrously with the willingness of international financial institutions, notably the World B a n k , to subsidize Amazonian development. During the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s the World B a n k provided loans totaling over $ 2 billion for electric power and road construction that directly or indirectly contributed to the Amazonia p r o j e c t . 2 3 0 Only in the late 1980s did Bank authorities admit publicly the great environmental and human damage that had resulted from spraying with Agent Orange, flooding the forest, and uprooting communities. 2 3 1 The overriding lesson of the project is that the search for short-term e c o n o m i c and social gain through an extractive and speculative form of development can lead to wanton destruction of the ecosystem and the human communities residing in it. 2 3 2 T h e costs of razing the Amazon region have far exceeded the gains. Mining, logging, and cattle ranching

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have depleted the land. Indian leaders have been killed with seeming impunity, and tribes have had their homelands come under legal challenge, as the government has responded to corporate interests in their lands. 2 3 3 The construction of roads and dams brought "civilization" into the interior but also resulted in ravaging fires, floods, and diseases previously unknown among tribal groups. In fact, these very activities brought the destruction of Amazonia to international attention. Forest fires in 1988 covered an area half the size of the United States. Vast clouds o f smoke were visible in satellite photos. In the same year, Francisco Chico Mendes, leader of the rubber-tree tappers, was killed by ranchers who evidently feared his successful organizing. Mendes's efforts to end highway construction into his region had attracted support among environmentalists in the United States and elsewhere. Worldwide criticism of Brazil's development policies in the Amazon eventually produced some positive outcomes. The fires were said to have caused President José Sarney great anguish. As a result, in October 1988 he suspended (and later ended) tax incentives to clear forestland. The rate of deforestation appeared to slow by 198 9 . 2 3 4 Brazil entered into arrangements with the United Nations and other groups to study the Amazon region and determine environmentally compatible land uses. International cooperation was recognized by the Brazilian government as being essential to managing the adverse consequences of deforestation, such as greenhouse emissions and species destruction. 2 3 5 Yet any optimism then about the future of Brazil's forests must now be tempered by subsequent developments. Large-scale development projects continue to be approved in the Amazon. Indigenous tribes remain very much at risk. Cattle ranchers continue burning the forests, oblivious to legal restrictions and contrary to government promises of greater rain forest conservation efforts. 2 3 6 Earlier optimism about slowing deforestation is gone; fires and other causes nearly tripled the amount of deforested land between 1990 and the mid-1990s. 2 3 7 Clearly, not developing the Amazon region is inconceivable to Brazilian political leaders. That would make sustainable development the most globally responsible option. One approach is to create forest biodiversity reserves—Costa Rica has become a leader in these—with offsetting reduction of Brazil's debt (so-called debtfor-nature swaps). Other alternatives are forest reserves, "extractive reserves" such as Chico Mendes advocated to protect traditional forest industries, 2 3 8 identification of plants with medicinal (and therefore also export) value, carefully monitored tree cutting, implementation of reforestation laws, and international assistance to compensate Brazil for lost revenue. If these measures fail, however, Brazil and the international community should take note of the drastic, but necessary, course taken by Thailand: a complete ban on logging to save its greatly shrunken forestland.

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Implementing reforms on a scale large enough to save A m a z o n i a and its cultures may d e p e n d on global a g r e e m e n t , given the interlinked and transnational character of the issues involved. At the Rio Earth S u m m i t , m a n y government leaders from the South sought such an agreement: In return for the S o u t h ' s acceptance of strict regulations on pollution, greenh o u s e gases, and forest c l e a r a n c e — p r o b l e m s that, as the South sees it, h a v e mainly occurred in the process of the North's e n r i c h m e n t — t h e industrialized countries would commit to paying (with d e v e l o p m e n t aid) for environmental protection and to making m a j o r revisions of the GATT system. Looking beyond Brazil at the situation for other exporters of tropical forest products, we can see the complexity of this idea and the reasons a forestry c o n v e n t i o n was rejected. Little has changed since Rio: G o v e r n ments resist restrictions on their lumber industries, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l groups insist on the strongest possible safeguards. 2 3 9 Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia also count heavily on exports of t i m b e r — r a w logs and p l y w o o d — f o r f o r e i g n exchange earnings and debt relief. Indonesia alone has 10 percent of the world's rain forests. Even though the governments of both countries have claimed to be attempting to limit the felling of trees to sustainable numbers, this is not happening, and may be unachievable, f o r several reasons. 2 4 0 Some have to do with government practices, such as lack of enforcement of cutting regulations, insufficient taxation of timber companies, and permissions for poor f a r m e r s to clear forested land for agriculture. Other obstacles arise f r o m conflict in villages for control of forest resources, which are a source of added income and therefore local power. International economics provides additional reasons: increasing timber d e m a n d in Japan, South Korea, the United States, and other countries; and high tariffs by Japan on processed wood, such as plywood, that compels exporting countries to cut d o w n more forest to earn more money. If Indonesia and Malaysia could add more value to the forest products they export, they presumably would not need to cut down as many trees as before. 2 4 1 At Rio, neither producing nor consuming states—and behind them the T N C s that extract, process, and m a r k e t tropical w o o d s — w e r e prepared to m a k e the concessions necessary to produce a sustainability-based agreement. The consequence of failure to restrain commercial logging became apparent in 1997 and again in 1998, when dense smoke f r o m forest fires on two Indonesian islands created serious health problems and caused s o m e deaths as far away as neighboring Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. T h e fires were helped along by drought brought on by the El Niño weather pattern. The Indonesian government blamed small-scale cultivators who clear land, plant, and m o v e on. In reality, the responsibility lies, as in Brazil, with government export and land-use policies, and corporate practices. T h e s e promote concentration of economic p o w e r in timber and agribusiness

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estates whose owners are politically well connected; unsustainable logging by the c o m p a n i e s and their foreign partners looking to increase exports; and deliberate setting of fires to clear land, either for planting or to make way for oil palm, which is a highly profitable export crop. 2 4 2 Even if an agreement on sustainable logging could be reached, questions arise about its desirability. It w o u l d be an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n governments, several of which have been k n o w n far more for their corruption in handling foreign aid money than f o r their c o m m i t m e n t to protecting environments and indigenous cultures. N G O s and indigenous peoples would be left out in the cold as government bureaucrats and transnational corporations defined sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t and bargained over profits. This limited arrangement has happened before. T h e Global Environmental Facility of the UN, begun in 1991 and j o i n t l y administered by the World Bank and two UN agencies, has an A m a z o n Pilot Program for sustainable development. But N G O s and c o m m u n i t y groups have not been consulted on use of the p r o g r a m ' s f u n d s , leading to suspicions the money will find its way into the usual pockets. 2 4 3 T h e situation is similar with respect to determining how the potentially great wealth f r o m medical and drug patents based on wild plant species is to be shared. One estimate puts the commercial value worldwide at $40 billion a year. 2 4 4 As two writers present in Rio observed in connection with the proposed treaty on biodiversity, Indian groups would probably be cut out of patent rights and royalties on the fruits of their knowledge of the medicinal value of tropical plants. "Instead, the biodiversity treaty would c o m p e l the industrialized nations to compensate Brazil and other governments of developing nations where the raw materials are f o u n d . " The large pharmaceutical firms headquartered in the industrialized countries would profit on the m a n u f a c t u r i n g end. 2 4 5 Can tropical forests be saved? T h e e x p e r i e n c e of Brazil, Indonesia, and other Third World countries makes plain that, as the Brundtland C o m mission wrote, "species conservation is tied to development, and the problems of both are more political than t e c h n i c a l . " 2 4 6 T h e d e v e l o p m e n t process itself, including international aid programs, needs to be redefined so that significant new employment, land reform, and a slowing of population growth are the results. President F e r n a n d o H e n r i q u e C a r d o s o was right to say that "Brazil is no longer an u n d e v e l o p e d country, it is an unjust country." 2 4 7 There is broad agreement that equitable solutions are only achievable with the participation of local p e o p l e in d e v e l o p m e n t planning. 2 4 8 In A m a z o n i a , that m e a n s r e s p e c t i n g the land rights, culture, and knowledge of the forests of various indigenous peoples and ensuring that they receive a fair proportion of income derived f r o m their knowledge and labor. In the northeast and other impoverished rural areas, where a growing movement of landless people has led to occupations of idle, privately owned land, the resentments of the poor need to be addressed with m e a n i n g f u l land

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reform, not violence. 249 Changes also are needed in the tariff policies and consumer demands of user countries. TNC extraction procedures need to be regulated to conform with rules of sustainability, strictly defined. Without wide-ranging changes such as these, Brazil and other states will continue to regard tropical forests as sources of debt relief and new wealth— until, that is, the forests are no more.

5 The United States and Russia: Empires in Transition

Security in the nuclear age means common security. Even ideological opponents and political rivals have a shared interest in survival. There must be partnership in the struggle against war itself. . . . International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction. —Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues If we [the United States and the Soviet Union] cannot end our now, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.

differences

—John F. Kennedy The Cold War is over. —George Bush, November 20, 1990

The Military Crisis of the (Former) First World The rise and fall of empires is a favorite theme of historians. The twentieth century has witnessed the passing of the British Empire, the destruction of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and most recently the breakup of the Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. At century's end, the United States stands alone as a superpower and, arguably, an empire, though in military and economic terms rather than in territory. This chapter explores Russia's transition from empire to incipient democracy, and the United States' from "free world" to multipolar world leader. The common theme is the arms race these two great powers conducted during the Cold War and the insecurity it bred: the costs it imposed on their societies, the dangers to which they and the world's peoples were exposed, and the

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enduring legacy of their competition—in the squandered opportunities to m o v e toward the elimination of nuclear weapons; in the o n g o i n g problem of proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological); in the largely unrestrained and profit-oriented conventional weapons trade; and in the tensions still evident in U . S . - R u s s i a n relations. The Cold War absorbed human, capital, and technological resources in the United States and the Soviet Union to a degree probably unmatched in history. By one count, world military spending from 1960 to 1990 was $21 trillion, of which perhaps $7 trillion was expended by the superpowers and another $1 trillion by U.S. and Soviet allies in NATO and t h e Warsaw Pact. 1 During the f o r t y - f i v e years of Cold War, their leaders consciously chose to make "national security"—preparedness for war—the highest priority, sacrificing h u m a n needs at h o m e and economic order abroad. As a United Nations report stated in 1982, "the world can either continue to pursue the arms race—or m o v e consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. The arms race and development are thus in a competitive relationship." T h e report cited President E i s e n h o w e r , w h o d r e w the same conclusion in 1953: " E v e r y gun that is made, every w a r s h i p launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in a final sense, a theft f r o m those who hunger and are not fed, f r o m those who are cold and are not clothed." 2 As the 1990s began, Soviet "new t h i n k i n g " in foreign policy, combined with U.S. budget deficits and the breakdown of Cold War alignments in Europe, laid the basis for a dramatic transformation of superpower relations. T h e June 1990 s u m m i t meeting in Washington, D.C., found the two g o v e r n m e n t s in unprecedented agreement. "We are proceeding f r o m the assumption that anything that is not good for the United States . . . will not be good for us either," said President Gorbachev. To which Secretary of State Baker replied: " W h i l e the Cold War might be characterized by the balance of terror, today I think U . S . - S o v i e t relations stand on the steadier ground of a balance of interests." This auspicious beginning to the p o s t - C o l d War period, which was followed in 1991 by even more dramatic e v e n t s — t h e end of G o r b a c h e v ' s rule, the collapse of the USSR and of the Warsaw Pact, and the first of several steps to r e d u c e nuclear arms (the Strategic A r m s Reduction Talks, or START)—seemed to set the stage for halting and even reversing the arms race. But despite m a j o r a r m s reductions, conventional as well as nuclear, the arms race did not stop. Nor did a so-called p e a c e dividend ever get passed along to U.S. or Soviet/Russian society. We may be able to learn why by looking back over the history of the U . S . - S o v i e t arms race and identifying the driving forces behind it. My analysis will give primary attention to nuclear weapons. In the late 1980s the n u m b e r of nuclear warheads and b o m b s in U.S. and Soviet arsenals p e a k e d at around 55,000,

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about 98 percent of the known worldwide total. 3 Roughly 20,000 of them were long-range (strategic) weapons. In line with commitments under START I, U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were reduced to several thousand operational warheads each by 1997 (see lower half of Table 5.1, p. 172). Under START II, ratified by the U.S. Senate but, as of 1999, not by the Russian Duma, the number on each side will be reduced to a maximum of 3,500 each. If START III is realized, each country will have no more than 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2007. 4 These reduced numbers still are very large in and of themselves and were only part of a total of 36,000 nuclear weapons in the possession of the Security Council Permanent Members (Perm 5) in 1998.5 They represent unimaginable destructive power, 6 which is, as always, subject to human and technological errors and irreversible political miscalculation. With nuclearweapons knowledge and capabilities already spread among many states, the nuclear danger remains real. The essential point is that even though Cold War numbers have changed, Cold War thinking about the role of weapons in creating security is still very much alive. Just as Albert Einstein said, "The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."

The Nuclear Danger in the Cold War Era The nuclear question is the subject of an enormous literature that is often complex and even surreal in its discussion of strategy, weapons physics and characteristics, and the outcome of a nuclear exchange. In global perspective, however, answering two questions may help us to rise above the clutter of numbers and arcane language: Do nuclear weapons in fact promote national security, military security in particular? Here, we accept the reality of these weapons and challenge their usefulness on their own terms. We then ask, What are the social and economic costs of escalating military expenses, nuclear and otherwise, and how do those costs affect the real security of great powers? Once again, we employ an expanded definition of what real security means. Dealing with the arms race inevitably begins with assumptions about the causes of war that should be explicitly stated. The Realists, for example, assume that the war system is a natural outgrowth of human beings' innate inhumanity and the corruption of the state system by, among other things, the enemy's expansionist ideologies. To them, nuclear weapons are a necessary evil, the logical outcome of technological sophistication that evolved to deter future (nuclear) war between the two great nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons paradoxically have both heightened and diminished the war crisis: Through mutual deterrence, they lend stability to the global balance of terror.

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I find this view neither logical nor factual. It tells us we should learn to live with a weapon that all agree must never be used and, if used, might well mean the end of life as we know it. It assigns technology, rather than political economy, the central role in driving the arms race. It perpetuates the myth that nuclear weapons are merely defensive. And it helps sustain the belief that nuclear w e a p o n s can be " c o n t r o l l e d , " when the evidence shows that even now, arms control is far behind the pace set by weapons development and strategies for using them. My view is that the nuclear-arms race had its roots in the domestic insecurity of the s u p e r p o w e r s . Possessed of a particular way of looking at the world (a global ideology), and harboring the kinds of values previously identified, state leaders in the f o r m e r First World were driven by selfpreservation and e x p a n s i o n i s m . The social systems over which they presided contain vested bureaucratic interests in national security—the military-industrial complex—that exist independently of any actual threats to national survival. The c o m b i n a t i o n of ideological self-righteousness, conflict-oriented values, and bureaucratic m o m e n t u m m a d e preparedness for war a d o m i n a t i n g feature of political life, regardless of the s y s t e m ' s economic structure. It led to deliberate exaggeration of the other side's capabilities ("We overstate the Soviets' force and we understate ours, and we therefore greatly overstate the imbalance," said f o r m e r U.S. Secretary of D e f e n s e Robert M c N a m a r a in 1982). 7 It created fears about the other side's intentions and lofty p r e s u m p t i o n s about o n e ' s o w n . It prompted planning for the worst case, which maximized opportunities for miscalculation and misperception of the other side's actions. Ultimately, Cold War politics generated an expansionist interpretation of the national interest, leading to ever larger military budgets, incentives to d e v e l o p m o r e deadly w e a p o n s , disincentives to negotiate arms reductions, increasingly tight identification of the work f o r c e , education, and popular culture with the military, restrictions on information and civil liberties in the n a m e of national security, and constant efforts to attract allies to o n e ' s side in the worldwide struggle against " t h e m . " As we witnessed in the U . S . - S o v i e t arms deadlock of the early 1980s, each side saw itself embarked on a noble crusade that of necessity was justified in stereotypic images. " W e " were always the epitome of virtue, while " t h e y " were evil incarnate: angels versus devils. T h u s , in 1977, President Leonid B r e z h n e v declared that the U S S R "will never embark on the path of aggression and will never lift its sword against other peoples" 8 —this, one year b e f o r e the invasion of A f g h a n i s t a n — w h i l e in 1983 President R e a g a n characterized the Soviet Union as the " f o c u s of evil in the modern world." Such mirror imagery has long been noted by psychologists; it was one element of mutual reinforcement of the superpowers' domestic insecurity, the specifics of which I c o m e to shortly.

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This way of looking at the phenomenon of war has specific relevance to understanding the purpose of nuclear weapons, the first question posed above. It suggests that politics, rather than either technology developing independently of political will or careful calculation of the number and character of weapons actually needed for national defense, is the driving force behind strategic weapons programs. 9 But still more fundamentally, this perspective leads us to question—and reject—the concept and morality of nuclear war itself. It is not thinkable. The central issue of nuclear weapons is not numbers and dollars, it is human life and the survival of the species. And what makes nuclear war unthinkable, as Jonathan Schell pointed out in The Fate of the Earth,10 is that it is not war at all. For war is governed and ended by political decisions, whereas the use of nuclear weapons presages the end of politics and the onset of a global medical, ecological, and social catastrophe without foreseeable end. At the height of the Cold War, enough nuclear weapons were at the disposal of the superpowers to incinerate every populated area in the two countries down to the level of a town of 1 , 5 0 0 people, and still have an ample reserve. The U.S. and Soviet arsenals included thousands of warheads in each part of their so-called strategic triad: long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles ( I C B M s ) , intercontinental bombers, and submarines. As Table 5.1 (p. 172) shows, this array of warheads was greater after the Cold War ended than beforehand. Any one of these parts—in fact, even the warheads delivered by a few submarines—could effectively obliterate another society. Figures inevitably vary on how many people might be killed instantly, die later of radiation poisoning, or be disfigured, genetically mutated, blinded, and so on. Comparisons with the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are absurd, since today's one-megaton bomb (1 million tons of T N T ) is equivalent in destructive power to eighty Hiroshimas. In addition, weather conditions and the number and location of the weapons dropped determine the extent of casualties. Suffice to say that had a U . S . - S o v i e t nuclear exchange occurred involving at minimum several thousand megatons of weapons, it would have caused appalling numbers of deaths—perhaps 2 0 0 million in the two countries alone—injuries in the range of 6 0 million persons, and disease and destruction of unparalleled, hence unimaginable, scope. 1 1 From a medical as well as a military standpoint, it would have been the "final epidemic." Even if a nuclear weapon is never again fired in anger, it already poses health and safety dangers. 1 2 People who live near the plants that produce its components—seventeen facilities in thirteen U.S. states and twelve nuclear reactors and other plants in the F S U — f a c e a multitude of hazards. The unsolved technical difficulties of storing or burying radioactive plutonium, U-235, and tritium guarantee periodic leakages of extremely toxic

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materials into the air and water. At the H a n f o r d N u c l e a r Reservation in southeastern Washington State, for instance, some of these leakages over a f o r t y - y e a r period, and without public k n o w l e d g e , have e m p t i e d into the C o l u m b i a River. H a n f o r d , along with two other m a j o r plants, has been shut down; but the cleanup bill for all of them may be $150 b i l l i o n . " Nuclear-waste disposal in Russia was far worse. Half of all that was ever produced for weapons w a s — a n d , some Russian scientists say, still is—simply buried underground near rivers, without containment shells. Leakages are occurring, p r o m p t i n g o n e r e n o w n e d U.S. physicist to call it "the largest and most careless nuclear practice that the human race has ever suff e r e d . " 1 4 The plants t h e m s e l v e s are a serious danger: Most of them, whether the seventy in the FSU and Eastern Europe or perhaps twenty in the United States, are old and unsafe. A Chernobyl-like m e l t d o w n is certainly repeatable. T h e United States and the EU have provided Ukraine with $3 billion to phase out C h e r n o b y l ' s three remaining reactors. And in the United States, n u m e r o u s accidents finally led the U.S. Department of Energy in 1988 to shut down all reactors that produce weapons-grade materials. According to a former assistant secretary of that agency, "a military culture" prevailed, "a bunker mentality" that always forced environmental and safety concerns to take a backseat to the m a x i m u m production of warhead material. 1 5 The changeover to processing nuclear waste has not led to a different mentality. 1 6 With its more recent decision to recycle plutonium f r o m nuclear w e a p o n s , including R u s s i a ' s , for use as fuel in civilian nuclear power plants, however, the department is again flirting with danger. 1 7 Yet official and, to a great extent, public debate on the nuclear issue was dominated until the 1990s by arguments about numbers: W h i c h side has more w e a p o n s , the biggest weapons, the highest military spending? Such arguments had merit when the United States had a nuclear m o n o p oly ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 ) and then clear superiority over the U S S R ( 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 6 2 ) . Once the USSR started to catch up, however, the numbers g a m e distorted far more than it revealed. For by then, according to Robert M c N a m a r a , in spite of maintaining a strategic superiority over the USSR of "at least three or f o u r to o n e " — e n o u g h to destroy a third of the Soviet p o p u l a t i o n and half its industry with only a fraction (about 4 0 0 b o m b s ) of the U.S. stockpile—the United States could still be "effectively destroy[ed]" by a Soviet retaliatory blow. 1 8 And that continued to be the case f o r the r e m a i n d e r of the Cold War. " W h a t in the n a m e of God is strategic superiority?" asked Henry Kissinger in 1974. " W h a t is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" 1 9 Indeed, what do you do with so many w e a p o n s ? M c N a m a r a and his boss, President Kennedy, were among those w h o recoiled at the unusable capability for overkill, particularly targeted against cities. Yet the change that came about was not to stop the production of nuclear w e a p o n s but to

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move toward a different mixture of targets. A "countercities" nuclear force became "countervalue" (directed mainly at economic targets) and still later " c o u n t e r f o r c e " (directed at military, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and political targets as well as economic assets). And as the n u m b e r of all these targets g r e w — to about 40,000 in the 1980s f r o m 2,600 in 1960 and 25,000 in 1974—the number of warheads and weapons needed to " c o v e r " the targets also mushr o o m e d . 2 0 The rationality of such planning had lost touch with reality: Many millions of civilians would still be killed even in the most selective nuclear attacks (since nonmilitary targets, after all, often are located near population centers); the n u m b e r of w a r h e a d s (ir. the hundreds) actually needed for deterring attack (convincing an enemy, that is, that it would be destroyed if it attacked the United States) was thousands f e w e r than the number available; and the targeting of several or more warheads on a single industrial plant, city, or other facility defied imagination. 2 1 Not only did target lists and weapons arsenals grow, they also, perhaps inevitably, became more refined. Military planners and scientists, foremost in the United States, began emphasizing the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. " M o r e " would have to be coupled with "better." And so for nearly two decades, the decisive military factor in the U . S . - S o v i e t strategic competition was the relative technical quality of the weapons: their accuracy, reliability for delivery, and vulnerability to attack. It was the advances in weapons technology, in which the United States always had an edge, that a c c o u n t e d for the d a n g e r o u s new threshold of the arms race in the early 1980s. 2 2 For despite the widely held view at the time, which this analysis shares, that the United States and the Soviet Union had roughly equivalent strategic striking p o w e r — e a c h side had enough to destroy the other several times over, and neither side had a usable margin of superiority over the other—they both deployed weapons that moved beyond deterrence of attack to potentially offensive capabilities. Let us look first at the weapons themselves. The top half of Table 5.1 provides a basic picture of the U . S . - S o v i e t nuclear standoff b e f o r e the Cold War ended. It tells us that the United States held a large lead in the number of strategic nuclear warheads it could deliver. But (not shown on the table) the Soviet Union had deployed many more strategic weapons, or l a u n c h e r s — 2 , 6 1 2 to 1,897—and therefore led in the total yield, or explosive power, of all its n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . T h e table also s h o w s that Soviet strength was in land-based I C B M s , which constituted about 73 percent of its strategic force. However, this advantage was offset by two characteristics of the U.S. strategic force: Roughly half of it was deployed on virtually invulnerable submarines; and all elements of the force were far more accurate than Soviet weapons, reflecting a crucial technological advantage that U.S. military leaders a c k n o w l e d g e d but rarely m e n t i o n e d in public discussions.

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Table 5.1 U.S. and USSR/Russia Nuclear Arsenals, 1983 and 1993 1983 USSR Total Warheads: 8,072

U.S. Total Warheads: 9,575

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Bombers

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Submarinelaunched ballistic missiles

Bombers

Total tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons: U.S. = 14,342; USSR = 6,795

1997 Russia Total Warheads: 6,758

U.S. Total Warheads: 8,111

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Bombers

ombers

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Submarinelaunched ballistic missiles

Total tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons: U.S. = 6,100; Russia = 10,918 Source: For 1983: Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, "U.S. and Soviet FirstStrike Capabilities." Washington, D.C., February 1984, pp. 2 - 3 . For 1997: Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 30.

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In D e c e m b e r 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a historic reduction of intermediate- and short-range missiles. The INF (Intermediate Nuclear F o r c e s ) Treaty provided for dismantling nearly 1 , 3 0 0 missiles deployed in Europe and the U S S R : Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles on the U . S . side and S S - 2 0 missiles on the Soviet side. These were especially destabilizing weapons because of their ten-minute flying time to targets in Europe. The I N F Treaty also set a precedent for the destruction o f nuclear missiles using on-site means of verification. But it hardly put a dent in the nuclear arms race itself. T h e treaty did not require the destruction of any nuclear warheads; did not restrict long-range missiles of any kind, nor the more than 2 , 0 0 0 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft stationed in Europe or the U S S R ; did not reduce the large number of nuclear weapons still on European soil (about 4 , 0 0 0 for the United States, 1,000 for the U S S R ) , not to mention hundreds deployed in Asia; and omitted the formidable British and French nuclear forces, which continued to be modernized and together had over 9 0 0 nuclear warheads. 2 3 T h e collapse of Communist authority in Europe subsequent to the INF Treaty put pressure on the U S S R and the United States to make further nuclear-weapon and conventional-force reductions in Europe. Yet the superpowers still had awesome destructive power at their command, in Europe and beyond, and still spent huge sums in the event o f a large-scale war in Europe. As late as 1991 U . S . policy to use nuclear weapons as a "last resort" in case of an attack on NATO members had not changed. Here was truly a classic case of how the internal dynamics of an arms race can outrun political developments. Then c a m e S T A R T , which provided for the first verified system of strategic arms reduction in both warheads and delivery vehicles. 2 4 Judged in a Cold War context, S T A R T I was impressive. Its elaborate verification process, using satellites and on-the-ground inspection, and its actual planned reduction o f U . S . strategic warheads by 2 0 to 25 percent, and S o viet warheads by 3 0 to 35 percent, were real achievements. But as a leadin to a new military order, the treaty left much to be desired, with loopholes similar to those in preceding treaties. For example, S T A R T permitted buildups in some strategic weapons categories and the modernization of others, for the most part leaving intact the most accurate weapons while disposing o f redundant weapons. T h e best that can be said o f the treaty is that, in a p o s t - C o l d War world, neither superpower, least o f all a cash-strapped Russia, was likely to use the loopholes for strategic advantage. Rather, S T A R T provided momentum toward larger cuts (see below). The nuclear competition was also more than the sum of its parts. The net strategic result o f nuclear-weapons development was to alter the logic that underpinned it: deterrence. Nuclear deterrence refers to the ability of one side to make a nuclear attack on it too costly for an opponent to contemplate

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rationally. In theory deterrence is achievable because the defending side can sustain a nuclear attack and still have the ("second-strike") capacity to retaliate devastatingly against valued targets of its opponent—population centers, industry, strategic and other military assets, and the leadership itself. But even in theory, deterrence is a weak reed on which to rest the planet's survival. It is largely a state of mind; there is no certainty about the military forces needed to deter an adversary until (possibly) after being attacked, at which point deterrence has failed. Precisely what deterred the Soviets from attacking the United States or its allies, and vice versa, was a matter of conjecture, of educated guesswork; and f r o m conjecture sprung the belief that increasing numbers and types of nuclear weapons were essential to deterrence. It was an irresistible logic for rationalizing continued research and development of additional nuclear warheads and weapons. For no one, the argument went, could be certain how much was enough to ensure deterrence. So much for theory. In the real world, deterrence was fast eroding because of the nuclear t e c h n o l o g y itself, with respect to the U . S . - S o v i e t competition and the proliferation of that technology worldwide. Deterrence rests on a certain stability akin to mind over matter, rational planning over technology run a m o k . In a deterrence relationship, what must work is confidence on all sides in the reality of deterrence. And this confidence is precisely what advances in nuclear weapons undermined, since the more accurate, destructive, and widespread nuclear weapons became, the more unpredictability of control and use they created. T h e overriding lesson of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 f o r those decisionmakers w h o lived through it was that deterrence was irrelevant: "What you had was two small groups of men in two small rooms, groping frantically in the intellectual fog, in the dark, to deal with a crisis that had spun out of control." 2 5 Each side, Soviet and A m e r i c a n , could only hope that the other was sane enough not to make a cataclysmic mistake and launch a nuclear weapon. Technological a d v a n c e s in strategic w e a p o n s during the 1980s evidently created in the m i n d s of some high-level leaders (particularly, but surely not exclusively, on the U.S. side) 2 6 a conviction in the ability to fight, contain, win, and survive a " l i m i t e d " nuclear war. Such careless thinking, even though discounted by other top U.S. officials (such as the c o m m a n d e r of NATO forces), alarmed m a n y in Western Europe, one potential locale of a nuclear exchange. Both Soviet and U.S. leaders periodically deplored the concept of a nuclear v i c t o r y — f o r m e r Soviet president Brezhnev, for instance, called it a " d a n g e r o u s m a d n e s s " that could only stem from a suicidal i m p u l s e 2 7 — b u t both sides nevertheless invested considerable resources in p l a n n i n g f o r a p o s t n u c l e a r f u t u r e : i m p r o v e d c o m munications a m o n g r e m a i n i n g national leaders, civil d e f e n s e , and postattack economic and social recovery. 2 8 Beyond limited nuclear war, w e a p o n s accuracy m a y also have m a d e more conceivable a nuclear first-strike, meaning the ability to decimate an

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opponent and not suffer a crippling retaliatory blow. One might think that the days were over when, as McNamara reported of the period just before the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the U . S . Air F o r c e could believe in its ability to carry out a disarming first-strike on the Soviet Union. 2 9 But technology reopened that possibility. Sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, which were not covered by any arms-control agreement before START, are highly accurate and very difficult for radar to detect because o f their smallness. If strategic targets can be pinpointed with weapons such as these, they could create in the minds o f national leaders the b e l i e f that using them first is preferable to waiting to be attacked. Use of such compact, remote-controlled, and deadly nuclear devices is no longer conceivable in a U . S . - R u s s i a conflict; but they may be tailor-made for leaders of other states or political movements. In fact, nine states already have cruise missiles in service, and several others are within technological reach of them. Deterrence theory has only textbook relevance in such circumstances. Deterrence was also subverted by accident. Cases of drug and alcohol abuse among U.S. missile personnel responsible for nuclear weapons were reported over the years. Computer failures became all too commonplace. For example, over 8 0 0 false alarms in the U . S . strategic warning system occurred between 1979 and 198 3 . 3 0 U.S. strategic forces went to high alert three times during a seven-month period in 1979 to 1 9 8 0 because of computer failures in the North American radar system. President Reagan was not notified o f the alerts, one of which left only four minutes for a decision on how to respond to a Soviet " a t t a c k . " 3 1 Over the years, accidents occurred involving nuclear weapons, though none in which a nuclear weapon was detonated. In 1981 the Pentagon reported on twenty-seven such accidents since 1 9 5 0 , most involving aircraft c r a s h e s . 3 2 S i x of the previous U.S. accidents occurred in foreign waters or over foreign territory. Deterrence theory takes no account of how one state's leaders may react to a reported nuclear accident in a highly tense period. T h e dangers of technical and human breakdowns were all the more ominous because of the decreasing time between a missile launch and its arrival on target. Submarines lying o f f a coastline can accurately deliver nuclear weapons in a few minutes. S o little time to distinguish between a real and an imagined threat may mean that the grave decision to execute a nuclear strike will be delegated to military officers on the spot or even " l o a d e d " into computers that automatically trigger a retaliation. Nor have later bilateral agreements involving the United States, Russia, and China to detarget nuclear missiles aimed at each other solved the problem, because missiles can be retargeted very quickly. T h e proliferation o f nuclear weapons added yet another uncertainty to the nuclear-war issue, perhaps a larger one than the U . S . - S o v i e t rivalry itself. Several states—Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Libya, Iraq, and Israel (all except the first of which secretly had amassed a small stockpile

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of w e a p o n s ) — w e r e closely tied to one of the s u p e r p o w e r s and were involved in hostile relations with neighboring countries. A conflict involving one or more of these undeclared nuclear states could have embroiled a superpower partner. Several instances have recently c o m e to light. In the late 1960s Israel's secret b u i l d u p of a n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s stockpile b e c a m e known to the United States. But Washington never pressured Israel, its key ally in the Middle East, to dismantle its facility or open it to international inspection. 3 3 W h e n , in June 1981, Israeli jets b o m b e d Iraq's French-built nuclear reactor, Washington expressed grave concern. A second case is South A f r i c a , w h o s e g o v e r n m e n t had assured the United States in 1977 that it had no intention of developing nuclear w e a p o n s . In fact, South Africa was successfully doing so, thanks to a nuclear-exchange agreement with Israel—South A f r i c a n uranium ore and a nuclear-test facility for Israeli scientific help in building a b o m b — t h a t had started during the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt. 3 4 Pakistan is a third case. Throughout the Cold War years, Pakistan was a key partner of U.S. intelligence agencies in surveillance operations against the U S S R and (in the 1980s) in funneling arms to A f g h a n i resistance fighters. The payoff for Pakistan was that its secret p r o g r a m to build a nuclear b o m b was well k n o w n to and supported by the United States, which in the 1980s allowed Pakistani agents to buy high-technology materials while certifying to Congress that Pakistan was a non-nuclear state. Not only did Pakistan develop a nuclear arsenal of six to ten weapons (a fact it finally disclosed in 1992); in May 1990 it apparently came perilously close to a nuclear exchange with India over the long-simmering Kashmir dispute. 3 5 International cooperation in the United Nations by Moscow and Washington officially was supposed to prevent the e m e r g e n c e of new nuclear states. Since the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its regulatory body, the IAEA, came into force, no non-nuclear m e m b e r state had gone nuclear. (The treaty is essentially a promise by signatories, numbering 185 in 1997, to "pursue negotiations" to end the arms race and achieve "nuclear d i s a r m a m e n t . " In exchange for agreeing not to acquire, m a n u f a c ture, or seek technical assistance concerning nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states are promised access to nuclear-energy technology. The agency's purpose is to inspect atomic facilities and e n s u r e that a d e q u a t e s a f e g u a r d s have been installed to prevent the diversion of n u c l e a r fuel to w e a p o n s m a n u f a c t u r e . ) But three of the six nuclear p o w e r s — C h i n a , France, and India—did not sign the treaty; and neither did five states that were developing or already secretly possessed nuclear w e a p o n s — A r g e n t i n a , Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa. The line between peaceful and military uses of atomic power, which once seemed clear to many, had actually been erased: " E v e r y known civilian route to bombs involves either nuclear power or materials and technologies

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whose possession, indeed whose existence in commerce, is a direct and essential c o n s e q u e n c e of nuclear f i s s i o n p o w e r . " 3 6 T h e I A E A was poorly equipped to deal with that problem. It lacked the e n f o r c e m e n t powers, the personnel, and the right of u n i m p e d e d access that would make it an effective oversight agency. W h e n , f o r e x a m p l e , Israel b o m b e d the Iraqi reactor, which the IAEA had inspected, the agency could neither punish Israel nor absolutely refute Israel's charge that Iraq was diverting nuclear fuel for bomb-making purposes. In fact, Iraq was. In the case of South Africa, over 100 IAEA inspections of its facilities failed to reveal what the government itself revealed in 1993: that it had produced six nuclear b o m b s b e t w e e n 1967 and 1990, when the program was scrapped. W h e n we take up the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 below, it will be noted that both those secret weapons programs used plutonium from civilian reactors. The related problems of theft and covert acquisition of p l u t o n i u m were even farther beyond the I A E A ' s ability to control. Several cases of theft were reported f r o m U.S. n u c l e a r plants, for instance. M o r e ominously, the international availability of plutonium was nearly out of control. O n e creditable estimate by the Nuclear Control Institute based in Washington, D.C., was that in the noncommunist countries alone there was enough plutonium in 1983 f r o m conventional nuclear power plants to produce "at least 6 0 0 0 bombs, if separated out of spent fuel in reprocessing plants." 3 7 As we shall see, a great deal of plutonium r e m a i n s potentially available despite nuclear-arms reductions. But the most grievous w e a k n e s s e s of the nonproliferation regime lay in the contradictory and hypocritical b e h a v i o r of the s u p e r p o w e r s , the United States in particular. Of all the N P T signatories, they were a m o n g the least responsible, for they failed to meet their c o m m i t m e n t under the treaty to take " e f f e c t i v e " steps toward an "early" end to the arms race and nuclear d i s a r m a m e n t . Yet they w a n t e d to universalize m e m b e r s h i p , supposedly to deny nuclear-weapons technology to the non-nuclear states. As Samuel Kim observed, "It is d i f f i c u l t to explain logically why nuclear weapons are good or safe in the hands of the great powers but bad or unsafe in the hands of the small p o w e r s . " 3 8 An e v e n greater hypocrisy is that the United States, in order to promote the faltering fortunes of its n u c l e a r - p o w e r industry and maintain good relations with Third World allies, provided several near-nuclear states with nuclear materials. It also looked the other way when, by hook or by crook, agents of these states surreptitiously exported such materials f r o m the United States or e l s e w h e r e . 3 9 Here we have another e x a m p l e of how Realism and Corporate Globalism c o m e together to u n d e r m i n e a vital global interest. The U.S. g o v e r n m e n t did not want U.S. corporations such as Westinghouse, General Electric, and Bechtel to lose out in the competition with French and German nuclear-energy companies; nor did it want to

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slap the hands of its "strategic" friends, the Israelis, the Argentines, the Pakistanis, and the South Africans. So Washington, as we observed, did virtually nothing to prevent their moving closer to, actually acquiring, or expanding a nuclear capability—and, in fact, the U.S. government sometimes facilitated matters. 40 Just how shortsighted such a policy can be was vividly illustrated in the Gulf War when, as the case study noted, the United States' European allies confronted an Iraqi army they had helped to acquire a nuclear capability. Thus, Washington and Moscow led the retreat from nonproliferation by their actual practices, weakening deterrence horizontally (among countries) as well as vertically (by types of weapons). 41 In such dismal circumstances, along came strategic nuclear defense to pose as an alternative to the mutual balance of terror. Both superpowers began investing heavily in space-based weapons that would be able to shoot down enemy satellites (ASATs) and direct powerful lasers or sensor rockets to knock out offensive missiles as they left the launching pad or were en route to targets. Ballistic-missile defense was hardly a novel idea; the antiballistic missile (ABM) to defend land-based missiles was a major political issue in the United States when it was first proposed in the mid1960s. But under President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), it emerged as the technological breakthrough that assertedly would solve the problems of deterrence. 42 For the purposes of this study, it may suffice to enumerate the most prominent criticisms of the SDI, or "Star Wars," concept. 4 3 First, its proponents admitted that it could not be totally effective against enemy missiles, as was originally claimed. A perfectly functioning strategic defense system can only protect against ICBMs, not submarines or bombers. Even at 99 percent effectiveness, the system's worthiness was suspect. A nuclear attack by a mere 1 percent of the Soviet (or U.S.) force—meaning perhaps 100 missiles—would have wreaked incalculable damage. Second, to the extent such a system was considered effective (that is, threatening) by the other side, it would surely be answered with deployments to offset it, such as submarines and cruise missiles, and by intensification of antisatellite weapons development to shoot the system down. A further escalation of the arms race, this time into space, and not negotiation from an inferior position was always the pattern of the U.S.-USSR competition. Strategic defense was later scaled back by budgetary pressures in the United States. But its emergence reveals how investment and faith in a new military technology can divert political leaders from dealing with the sources of international conflict. The supporters of SDI evidently believed that it at least forced the Soviets to negotiate more seriously on nuclear weapons and that even a smaller version would be worthwhile to deter "crazy states" or "terrorists" from launching a nuclear strike. (That is how it came to be a "theater" anti-missile defense system in Asia, presumably

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against North Korea, in the late 1990s.) Neither of these rationales was persuasive, however. The Soviet domestic crisis, whose proportions are the subject of the next section, and new thinking about international politics were the most important reasons for G o r b a c h e v ' s interest in arms control and arms r e d u c t i o n s , not fear of SDI. Dropping SDI would have been a more appropriate inducement to negotiating cuts in strategic weapons than pushing for its f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t . As f o r the prospect of " i r r a t i o n a l " Third World leaders or terrorists w h o might decide to launch a nuclear weapon, it would seem more e f f e c t i v e to have taken steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology in the first place than to have continued the costly and impossible search for a perfect defense. SDI came close to sabotaging the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, a critical element of arms control. The treaty prohibits the development, testing, and d e p l o y m e n t of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or m o b i l e land-based antimissile systems and their c o m p o n e n t s . Should Washington decide to develop ballistic-missile d e f e n s e outside the laboratory, it could literally open the skies to a whole new realm of arms competition. The belief that m o r e is better and certainty is achievable was one of the driving forces behind the Cold War. So were advances in weapons accuracy and survivability, as we have seen. A third force needs to be considered as well: the deep institutional stakes the United States and the Soviet Union had in maintaining the a r m s race, and the political uses to which nuclear w e a p o n s could be (because they were) put. On the institutional side, each social system created its own variation of the military-industrial complex. In the United States, 4 4 this grouping of public and private institutions is tightly interlocked: government agencies, the military services, and industries depend on one another for weapons research, planning advice, manufacturing, testing, and sales; many congressional districts are e c o n o m i c a l l y and politically d e p e n d e n t on military bases; and roughly 9 million people (including soldiers, veterans, D e f e n s e Department employees, and e m p l o y e e s of military-industrial contractors) depend on the military budget for their livelihoods. The process transforms national security into more c o m m o n p l a c e matters: careers, j o b s , profits, and therefore political back-scratching and manipulation. The Soviet/Russian system unites industrial and military leaders (and the C o m m u n i s t Party before 1992) in a similar common interest. Although " c o m p l e x " may not quite suit a society in which military affairs always has a central place, it does convey the inordinate role of military industries, research, and " n e e d s " in the Soviet economy. For example, military (including space) research and d e v e l o p m e n t ( R & D ) accounted f o r roughly one-half of all Soviet R & D ; military industries e m p l o y e d nearly 13 percent of all industrial w o r k e r s and accounted f o r almost one-third of total Soviet industrial production; and " 1 0 - 1 2 million people, or 15 to 18 percent of the labor force outside

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the armed f o r c e s , " depended on the military budget. The full costs of Soviet-era defense remain incalculable to this day, as they were beyond questioning or a belief in any need f o r precise measurement. 4 5 D e f e n s e planning determined industrial d e v e l o p m e n t rather than the other way around. Far f r o m being an isolated sector of the economy, the Soviet military-industrial c o m p l e x was the e c o n o m y ' s l i n c h p i n — a circumstance created and backed by the party and armed forces leaderships. 4 6 This explains why the " c o m p l e x " was behind the attempted overthrow of Gorbachev in August 1991; why as late as 1991 Soviet military spending was a staggering 52 percent of G N P ; and why under the Russian Federation's first president, Boris Yeltsin, it is one of the powerful centers of conservative resistance to reforms. 4 7 This situation of r e i n f o r c i n g interests, operating largely outside the rules of the civilian economy, amounted to a separate, state-run c o m m a n d system in both countries. 4 8 It enabled both sides to commit a large portion of their G N P to the military (from 1960 to the early 1980s, an average of 6.5 percent by the United States and at least 10.9 percent by the Soviet Union). 4 9 Each government devoted the bulk of its research f u n d s to military work (close to 70 percent in the United States). Each maintained huge military forces and numerous bases abroad during most of the 1980s: for the United States, about 2 million service personnel, of w h o m about 2 8 4 , 0 0 0 were at sea and 460,000 were stationed overseas in 360 major bases; and for the Soviet Union, about 3.6 million soldiers, of w h o m over 700,000 were stationed (or fighting) abroad in twenty-four countries. 5 0 And the superpowers controlled well over half the world market in arms exports. 5 1 C o m m a n d of such resources creates bureaucratic and economic p o w e r that is the essence of the national-security state. Secrecy is one measure of such power. T h e separate military e c o n o m i e s contained top-secret, socalled black w e a p o n s p r o g r a m s within them. On the U.S. side, s o m e of these p r o g r a m s were so tightly guarded that even their existence was rarely a c k n o w l e d g e d . 5 2 A n o t h e r m e a s u r e is the political and e c o n o m i c functions performed by military spending. Comparative research suggests that despite the great differences in the way U.S. and Soviet politics operated, military spending was used f o r similar purposes in both countries. 5 3 It r e s p o n d e d to the needs of a p o w e r f u l interest group, the military and civilian professionals w h o worked on national-security matters. It could be used to affect overall e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e and thus either to i n f l u e n c e elections (in the United States) or intraleadership disputes (in the U S S R ) . And in either society military spending was used as a quick fix to promote employment and increase or decrease consumer demand. A r m s exports, for e x a m p l e , a c c o u n t e d f o r over 5 percent of total U.S. exports and over 10 percent of Soviet exports in the 1980s. 5 4 For the Soviets, in fact, nearly half of their arms exports were either given away or artificially priced,

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suggesting the paramount importance o f keeping factories going rather than making money. 5 5 Add to this list the inevitable military service rivalries, which led each service to covet a strategic role and the budget to sustain it, and we have the key elements o f a deep-seated structural bias in favor of more weapons. In the United States, the high cost and profitability of weapons and military technology supplied added political and economic incentives for more arms. The latest-model Trident submarines cost over $ 1 . 5 billion each. T h e B - 2 " S t e a l t h " bombers had a price tag o f about $ 8 0 0 million each. Every ground-launched cruise missile cost over $ 6 million. 5 6 Contracts for such expensive weapons were dominated by the major military firms, companies such as General Dynamics and Lockheed (the main Trident contractors), Boeing (cruise missiles), and Northrup (the B - 2 ) that do the bulk o f their business with the Pentagon, including conventional arms, electronic components, and overseas sales. Cost overruns, government research and lobbying subsidies, and tax benefits add to the profit margins o f the weapons. And with hundreds of thousands of j o b s at stake and with the e c o n o m i c lifeline o f specific communities (such as Seattle, Washington) and entire states (such as California) tied to those j o b s , it is no wonder that the major military industries have always been politically active at election time. They have had every incentive to pressure legislators for more and better weapons regardless of the actual military need. Take Star Wars, for example. Most o f the major military contractors were the leading recipients of Star Wars research money and were on line to be the prime contractors if a strategic defense system was produced and deployed. They, along with many smaller research and production firms, viewed Star Wars as a golden opportunity to get ahead in scientific and profit competition. Potentially involving hundreds o f billions o f dollars, S D I soon followed the route of other weapons systems: the recruitment by military industry of former Defense Department officials to advise, direct, and sell its programs; the lobbying o f members of Congress and foreign governments to support S D I as sources of j o b s and research funds; and the awarding o f S D I contracts overwhelmingly to "states or districts whose Congressional representatives sit on committees with the most power over weapons acquisition and funding." 5 7 B y 1 9 9 2 , S D I had cost $ 2 9 billion, o f which $ 7 . 7 billion was wasted on projects begun and later dropped. 5 8 B a l listic-missile defense still cost $ 4 billion in 1998. "National security" is the inevitable rallying cry o f any militaryindustrial c o m p l e x . They are the worldwide code words for ensuring a lion's share o f a national budget—and for undermining those who might challenge high spending for defense. B e c a u s e the business of national security is, moreover, esoteric and secretive; because it is heavily influenced by leadership ideology; and because it contains so many imponderable,

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unpredictable factors that lead to worst-case planning, e n o u g h is never enough for "defense." Besides, national leaders sometimes believe, as Reagan said in an interview in 1982, that they can spend their opponents into submission. 5 9 Such wisdom is music to the ears of military-industrialists; it means a virtual blank check f o r w e a p o n s research and production. To j u d g e from the leaps in U.S. and Soviet military spending of the 1980s— an eight-year, $2.6 trillion b u i l d u p under R e a g a n ; annual Soviet military budgets of roughly 12 to 15 percent of total central g o v e r n m e n t spending—a blank check comes close to describing what the military-industrial complex received. In terms of nuclear w e a p o n s alone, from the 1940s to the mid-1990s, and thus e m b r a c i n g the entire Cold War period and a bit more, private experts calculate that the United States spent between $5.5 trillion and $5.8 trillion—a sum that d w a r f s nearly all other g o v e r n m e n t spending combined except welfare. 6 0 These institutional f o r c e s go far toward explaining the consistent surge forward of nuclear and overall military spending and d e p l o y m e n t . Still, the explanation is incomplete. It is not as though a technological monster was unleashed and then was subject only to the availability of dollars and rubles. Just as political priorities d e t e r m i n e d military spending, they also determined how nuclear weapons were used. True, nuclear weapons were built in hopes they would never be used in war. But U.S. presidents several times threatened to use them against other governments, mainly the Soviet U n i o n ' s and China's. Apparently the first instance was in 1948, when President Truman ordered atomic-capable bombers moved to bases in Britain during the first Berlin crisis. A second instance occurred in the final stages of the Korean War. According to President Eisenhower's memoirs, the United States conveyed to China its preparedness to employ nuclear b o m b s against it if the armistice talks dragged on. Had China violated the armistice with a "massive ground off e n s i v e , " he w a s prepared in 1954 to use n u c l e a r w e a p o n s against it. 61 Eisenhower also had tactical nuclear weapons sent to Taiwan in 1958 during a crisis with the P R C over the Taiwan Strait. President K e n n e d y ordered nuclear-armed B - 5 2 s to p r e p a r e f o r a strike against C h i n a in 1961 during the crisis over Laos. It is also well known that Kennedy considered using nuclear weapons against M o s c o w during the 1961 Berlin crisis and the missile crisis over C u b a in 1962. President Nixon revealed in a 1985 interview that he had considered using nuclear weapons four times during his tenure, including in the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh's independence, when he believed both the Soviets and the C h i n e s e were threatening to b e c o m e directly involved; and in 1973, w h e n Nixon concluded the Soviets were prepared to intervene on E g y p t ' s side in the war with Israel. On at least one of those o c c a s i o n s — t h e 1973 conflict in the Middle East, in which the Strategic Air C o m m a n d ' s B-52s were placed on

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full alert for twenty-nine d a y s — h e let Soviet leaders know he would use those weapons. 6 2 U.S. leaders privately pondered the nuclear option in several other conflicts. 6 3 So far as we know, Soviet leaders never directly threatened the United States with nuclear attack, although there is some evidence they tried to win U.S. approval of an attack on China's nuclear facilities in the early 1960s. 6 4 Atomic diplomacy has apparently been the peculiar mainstay of the United States. A policy of first-use of nuclear weapons was in force not only in case of a Soviet conventional attack in Europe but also (and still today) in the event of a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The belief persisted in high U.S. circles that nuclear weapons had an "extraordinarily salutary e f f e c t " for both superpowers in helping restrain conflicts between them. But such "restraint" merely channeled conflict into other countries at a high level of violence. 6 5 The political utility of nuclear weapons, which the three military services compete to control, 6 6 not only helps to account for their ongoing production (far beyond conceivable need), it also enables us to understand U.S. resistance to arms reductions. We can clearly date this resistance to the onset of Cold War internationalism in 1946 when (as was discussed in Chapter 2) a high-level government consensus evolved against nucleararms talks while the United States had a monopoly of mass-destruction weapons. The U.S. government was far from reaching an agreement with Moscow that might put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, as some scientists were urging. The prevailing view, epitomized by then Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower in a top-secret memorandum of January 1946, was that "if there are to be atomic weapons in the world, we must have the best, the biggest and the most." 6 7 The political effect of such advice, which Truman and all his successors accepted, was twofold. One was to present the Soviets with proposals for limiting nuclear arms or tests that they were certain to reject. Examples are the Baruch Plan of 1946 for internationalizing control of nuclear weapons, Eisenhower's proposals in 1955 for "open skies" and onsite inspection of nuclear facilities, and R e a g a n ' s proposals in the early 1980s for mutual cutbacks of launchers. Each of these offers would have been to the U.S. advantage and, in the Soviets' eyes, would have frozen the Soviets into an inferior position. When the Soviets finally accepted strategic inferiority in the START negotiations, the context of M o s c o w ' s decisionmaking had totally changed. Gorbachev badly needed an agreement to demonstrate his (and R u s s i a ' s ) authority over nuclear weapons at a time when the USSR's future was in the balance. The second political effect of the consensus on arms control was to reach agreement only with assurances to the military-industrial complex of support for the next generation of weapons. Agreements such as the

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Nuclear Test Ban of 1963, Strategic A r m s Limitation Talks (SALT) 1 in 1972, the Vladivostok agreement of 1974, and the never-ratified SALT II in 1979 were acceptable to the U.S. national-security establishment precisely because of their modesty: They left large loopholes for budgeting increases in weapons research, production, and deployment; for building up to specified limits; and for continued testing and replacement of nuclear weapons. The test ban, for instance, permitted underground explosions, of which there have been over 700 by the superpowers since the treaty was signed. SALT I largely limited antimissile systems, ICBMs, and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). At Vladivostok the Soviet and U.S. leaders (Ford and Brezhnev) put a cap on certain categories of strategic launchers and the number of them that could be fitted with multiple warheads (MIRV'd). SALT II and INF did much the same thing. 6 8 These loopholes represented the failure, born of bureaucratic pressures in both political systems, to bring about real arms control through bilateral force reductions. Developing new strategic weapons consistently had the highest priority. 6 9 All this is not to say that the Soviets acted on the basis of different rules of national and bureaucratic self-interest. Their having had to catch up in nuclear technology accounts in part for their rejection of various U.S. offers. But once they did catch up in second-strike (if not counterforce) capability, the argument of self-preservation was not so compelling. Some general Soviet arms-control proposals—such as for a mutual nuclear freeze on weapons testing, production, and deployment; for a U.S.-Soviet pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons; and for a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that would continue if the United States also declared one—were interesting and ought to have been pursued by U.S. leaders. But M o s c o w undermined its case with a rapid, strategically unjustifiable buildup to over 400 intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe. It seems safe to assume that a weapons lobby dominated nuclear p o l i c y m a k i n g there as here and, therefore, that arms control, not to mention arms reductions, would always be outpaced by weapons development. This circumstance, along with historic Soviet mistrust of the West (dating from allied intervention in the Russian Revolution) and the ideology and values of Soviet leaders before Gorbachev, accounts for the paranoid style of Soviet, as of U.S., nuclear policy. In summary, the superpowers' nuclear-weapons race brought the world to a dangerous threshold in the 1980s. During that period, w e a p o n s of mind-boggling destructive power were produced, refined, and deployed in unprecedented numbers by the superpowers. Yet, in answer to the first question raised in the beginning of this section, nuclear weapons were found to "serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless— except only to deter one's opponent from using them."10 The new decade

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began on a more hopeful note with an easing of Cold War tensions, not only in Europe but in many parts of the Third World. U.S. and Soviet national-security planners could no longer presume to have a blank check for defense. Suddenly the myths of Soviet economic growth and military superiority were exposed for the bureaucratic invention they largely were. By 1990, conventional wisdom among official U.S. Kremlinologists had completely reversed itself: "Communism" had failed, the Soviet Union was (as one newspaper put it) a "Third World economy with First World weapons," a Soviet attack on Western Europe was no longer conceivable, and the Soviets' very survival would depend on aid from the West. Indeed, the Cold War, at least in Europe, was over: "We have closed the book on World War II," said Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze on signing the agreement in September 1990 that formally ended the four-power occupation of Germany.

The Arms Race After the Cold War With the two superpowers no longer enemies, nuclear-war scenarios based on deterrence were rendered meaningless. "The only rationale for maintaining nuclear weapons in the future," wrote one analyst, "is to deter others from using them. Minimum deterrence is no longer Utopian." 71 This assessment seemed entirely appropriate after START. In September 1991 President Bush announced unilateral cuts in nuclear forces that were matched by Gorbachev in October. These cuts removed (and destroyed) all U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and at sea, as well as removed U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. Then, in January 1992, further reductions were announced: Bush canceled the Midgetman ICBM program and stopped production of the B-2 bomber and the MX ICBM, while President Yeltsin, in charge in Moscow, said production of two heavy bomber programs would be stopped and 130 ground and submarine missile launch systems would be destroyed. In all, the cuts in strategic weapons left the two sides with roughly equal numbers and the promise of further reductions. The U.S. Congress voted to provide the FSU with funds to destroy the tactical nuclear weapons Yeltsin had promised to dismantle, reflecting concern that otherwise they might come under the control of Russian, Ukraine, or other nationalists in the former Soviet republics in which the weapons were based. A second significant development of the immediate post-Cold War period was conventional-force reductions, mainly in central Europe. 72 The context of these changes was an entirely new Europe-wide security structure that is discussed in Chapter 6. Third, during 1992, for the first time in thirty years, no nuclear testing took place anywhere in the world. It

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became possible for two reasons: The Russians unilaterally ceased testing, and the U . S . Congress pushed through legislation on a nine-month testing moratorium that President Bush chose not to veto and President Clinton maintained. Fourth, the U . S . - R u s s i a agreements promoted either new or extended international steps to control weapons of mass destruction (see Table 5 . 2 ) . Two treaties are crucial to the future of nuclear weapons. In 1995, negotiations attended by nearly all the UN's membership led to an indefinite e x tension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was up for renewal. Hopes were high, especially among the non-nuclear states, that the nuclear-weapon states would agree, in exchange for indefinite extension, to a firm declaration on disarmament linked to a stage-by-stage review process. In the end, the conference approved extension; but agreements were not reached on plugging loopholes in the nonproliferation regime, cutting the nuclear-weapons stockpiles of the major powers, or (as discussed below) preventing further proliferation of weapon materials. 7 3 The conferees did decide to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty ( C T B T ) " n o later than 1 9 9 6 . " The UN General Assembly had called for negotiations on a ban as far back as December 1993. The treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions and thus poses a long-awaited barrier to weapons development, was concluded in September 1996. Once again, however, the U.S. view prevailed: Third World states were unable to secure commitments to disarmament or sharing of nuclear-energy technology. India was particularly adamant that the nuclear-weapon states agree to destroy their weapons within a specific time. Its objections kept the treaty from entering into force, since it had to be ratified by all forty-four nuclear-capable states, including India and Pakistan. 7 4 Instead, in 1998 those two countries defied the "nuclear club" and tested nuclear weapons. (See Table 5.3, p. 191.) Nevertheless, the C T B T ' s variety of verification methods for detecting violations of weapon-level magnitude, and provision for inspections of suspected nuclear test sites on short notice, provide some assurance against a nuclear breakout. 7 5 As important as these steps were, the question remains: How much o f a break with the past did they represent, with respect both to reliance on nuclear weapons for security and to beginning a reversal of the global arms race? Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed in 1985 that " a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be f o u g h t . " 7 6 Why, then, as 2 0 0 0 approached, were the five principal nuclear-weapon states still maintaining and refining very large arsenals at great cost, even as they and other states cooperated to ban chemical and biological weapons? The short answer to these questions is that the military-industrial complex in the United States, as well as in Russia and other nuclear-weapon states, 7 7 has survived cuts in forces and budgets, and changed political circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War. From the complex

18 7

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Table 5.2

Major P o s t - C o l d War and Related Earlier International Treaties G o v e r n i n g W e a p o n s of M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n

Treaty (Date)

Accessions (as of)

Chemical Weapons Convention (1993; in force 1997)

168 signed, 112 ratified (July 1998)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1995 extension)

185 signed (January 1997)

Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (1995)

10 countries signed; protocol not signed by PRC or U.S.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996)

146 signed (September 1997)

African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1996)

Needs 28 ratifications to enter into force; protocols on testing signed by Security Council Perm 5

Related Treaty (Date)

Accessions (as of)

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972)

157 ratified (November 1996)

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1986)

12; protocols on testing signed by Security Council Perm 5

Source: Stimson Center and United Nations web sites.

have emerged new justifications for holding onto nuclear weapons—and in the United States for maintaining high military spending in general and pushing military and nuclear sales abroad. In Washington since 1989, Pentagon heads, influential Realists in Congress, and the largest militaryindustrial firms have suffered some defeats—such as a number of military base closures, reductions in military personnel, and a sharp decline in procurement budgets for new weapons—but the essence of the "iron triangle" is intact. We see this in several concrete ways: • Military doctrine, influenced by the Gulf War but just as much by the Cold War, calls for a U.S. capability to respond militarily to "rogue states" and "regional peer competitors" (namely, Russia and China) at every level, including nuclear weapons; preparedness to fight two major wars simultaneously; and readiness to face a multitude of new threats, such as biological terrorism, information warfare, and narcotics smuggling. 78 The weapons "requirements" such a strategy generates can easily be seen as self-justifying. The National Defense Panel, a group of retired senior officers and civilians, said just that of the two-war strategy, calling

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it "a means of j u s t i f y i n g the current force structure—especially for those searching for the certainties of the cold war era." 7 9 • Military budgets, which averaged just under $ 3 0 0 billion a year f o r 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 2 under Bush, averaged around $260 billion a year in Clinton's first five-year military budget and call for the same amount annually beyond 2000. Official U.S. military spending in fiscal year 1996 was $ 2 6 4 billion, 33 percent of global official military spending. 8 0 Spending for nuclear weapons was around $35 billion a year in fiscal year 1998—a significant decline f r o m 1990, when it was $56 billion, but still one of the largest items in the total U.S. government budget. 8 1 • Military deployments, including nuclear weapons, still reflected the Cold War. In Asia Pacific, for e x a m p l e , total U.S. forces remain at 100,000. Though U.S. forces in Europe have been greatly reduced, nuclear w e a p o n s continue in 1998 to be stored at ten air bases around the continent, thus making the United States the only country that d e p l o y s such weapons beyond its borders. 8 2 • Arms control still follows the interests of the nuclear establishment. C T B T in the United States means more business, not less, for the weapons laboratories. At an estimated cost of $40 billion over ten years, g o v e r n ment scientists in the marvelously titled "Stockpile Stewardship P r o g r a m " will experiment with ways to e n s u r e the potency of stockpiled w e a p o n s and use computers to simulate nuclear tests. 8 3 But while c o m p u t e r simulations avoid the need for explosions, they open up a whole new industry: " v i r t u a l " w e a p o n s . From these, new w e a p o n s can be, and are being, designed. For e x a m p l e , p u r e - f u s i o n research has led to a miniaturized hydrogen b o m b , the B-61, that is intended to burrow into the c o m m a n d b u n k e r s of rogue state leaders. U.S. adherence to the C T B T and to arms reduction has c o m e into question. 8 4 For some critics, the i n f u s i o n of money into these programs was nothing more than a payoff for the complex's support of C T B T in the first place. 8 5 • Military-industrial political influence continues to be felt in several ways. Even though budgets for new weapons procurement declined 69 percent between 1985 and 1998, it is slated to be $60 billion a year well into the future. 8 6 And even as most of the major U.S. p r i m e c o n t r a c t o r s — t h e exception is L o c k h e e d M a r t i n — a r e shifting to civilian products f o r revenue, their leverage over the weapons-acquisition process actually seems to have increased. 8 7 Thanks to consolidation within the industry, weapons contracts have b e c o m e less competitive than ever, and prices of w e a p o n s are therefore unlikely to decline. Between 1992 and 1997, mergers valued at around $55 billion reduced the number of military prime contractors to three: Boeing, which acquired M c D o n n e l l Douglas; R a y t h e o n , which bought Hughes Electronics; and Lockheed, whose buyout of Martin Marietta and Loral has so far been thwarted by the Justice D e p a r t m e n t . The

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industries' diversification of production had the e f f e c t of reversing the flow of d e p e n d e n c e — f r o m their dependence on the Pentagon to the Pentag o n ' s dependence on them. ("We now think of the defense-industrial base as the U.S. industrial base," said Jacques Gansler, under secretary of def e n s e f o r acquisition and technology.) Decisions on which w e a p o n s to build may be determined more than ever before by the industries. • Arms exports and other military transfers have b e c o m e increasingly c o m m e r c i a l i z e d . As in the past, the overriding official j u s t i f i c a t i o n for arms sales is to p r o m o t e deterrence of national-security threats and regional stability. T h e reality, one suspects, is that the motives are increased market share and profits (dating f r o m a presidential directive in 1995 that explicitly linked arms sales to foreign-policy goals), political influence abroad, a desire to please the d e f e n s e contractors, and m a i n t e n a n c e of force structures and budgets. U.S. conventional arms sales have flourished in the p o s t - C o l d War years, buoyed by the P e n t a g o n ' s robust threat assessments mentioned above, increased subsidization of arms sellers, 8 8 reduced competition f r o m Moscow, and new buyers, such as in the rising e c o n o m i e s of East Asia. As already noted, the United States is far and away the d o m i n a n t source of conventional w e a p o n s sales to the Third World. From 1990 to 1997, the value of actual deliveries of U.S. conventional weapons to d e v e l o p i n g countries rose f r o m an annual $8.6 billion (1992) to $15.2 billion (1997), for a total of over $53 billion for the p e n iod, mostly (around 40 percent) to the Middle East. 8 9 U.S. small arms, which are not c o u n t e d in the c o n v e n t i o n a l - a r m s statistics, have b e c o m e even more popular than artillery and tanks, which may help explain U.S. resistance to an international treaty governing them. International smallarms sales are unregulated and difficult to track. M a n y are m a d e secretively by private companies under State Department licenses. One estimate is that they are r u n n i n g over $25 billion a year, o f t e n to police forces, crime syndicates, and rebel groups that have little regard for the lives of innocent civilians. 9 0 The latest windfall for U.S. arms sellers is NATO's enlargement—the inclusion of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in NATO. (See the next section on Russia f o r discussion.) All the major arms contractors lobbied heavily for expanding NATO, since the former Soviet satellites represent a huge new market for weapons and military technology—"a Marshall Plan for defense contractors," one U.S. senator said. Because of that and other military spending projects, according to one study, military industries outspent even the tobacco lobby in support of congressional candidates (nearly $27 million from 1991 to 1997), in addition to other political contributions. Yet such sums are tiny in comparison with the price tags of jet fighters, bombers, and telecommunications equipment. 9 1 Nor is this all, for as we will see shortly, many types of high technology with potential application to W M D

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have also been cleared for export by the United States and other governments, a perfect example of how state Realists grease the wheel for Corporate Globalists to the benefit of both. These trends, so consistent with Cold War patterns, pose far more serious problems than merely advancing careers and distorting the economy. The possession of nuclear weapons greatly in excess of any conceivable national-security purpose, reliance on them as an instrument of deterrence or retaliation, and the promotion of arms transfers to regions of conflict, are ethically wrong, contrary to professed interest in international peace and stability, and strategically dangerous. During the Cold War, it was possible to justify virtually any weapon in terms of the Enemy; but now, many of the same military and civilian officials—American, Russian, and others—who did the justifying are speaking the language of disarmament,92 Among the most compelling examples is the statement of December 1996 by retired Air Force General George Lee Butler, former head of the Strategic Air Command, and retired Army General Andrew Goodpaster, former commander of NATO. The statement, which called for "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations" as an "ultimate objective," was prompted by several concerns: the terribly slow progress of the United States and Russia in reducing nuclear weapons when their strategic mission had vanished; the failure of nuclear-weapon state leaders to "break free of the attitudes, habits, and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories"; the moral obligation to speak out on the continuing nuclear problem, "as a citizen of this planet"; and the increased risks of accidents and actual use by states and terrorists. Sixty other retired generals and admirals from nuclear-weapon states, including Russia, joined Butler and Goodpaster in urging that the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals be reduced to 2,000 strategic warheads as a first step. No country would benefit more than the United States by doing so, Butler said: It would save billions of dollars and take more Russian warheads out of circulation. 93 Though the specific recommendations of the antinuclear experts vary—for example, on whether zero nuclear weapons, a minimum force of 100 to 200 weapons, or 1,000 weapons should be the goal—there seems to be a consensus on several fundamental points. One is that possession of nuclear weapons for any purpose other than to deter their use by others is unacceptable. Second, the danger of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons is slim but real, notwithstanding nuclear detargeting agreements, and should be dealt with by taking nuclear forces off alert. 94 Third, instead of treating Russia and China as potential international rogues, policymakers should negotiate agreements with them that take many more nuclear warheads, launchers, and materials out of circulation, thus alleviating their as well as U.S. concerns. 9 5

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The contemporary W M D danger is double-edged: It embraces not only the weapons policies and programs of states, but also transfers to others the means of developing the weapons. A leading U.S. defense official said in 1998 that twenty countries are actively developing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. 9 6 And that says nothing about groups such as the Japanese sect, Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Tokyo in 1995 with its sarin gas attack in the subway. It also sought to secure nuclear technology from various places around the world, including Russia, Australia, and the United States. With huge financial resources at its disposal, the sect's ability to get what it wanted was limited only by sellers' suspicions. Against this background, the announcements by India and Pakistan in May 1998 that they had tested nuclear weapons—six tests by each—were a wake-up call for an international community that had become complacent about the nuclear peril. The two countries, which have fought three wars since 1947, became the sixth and seventh declared nuclear-weapon states. (See Table 5.3.) Their tests came fast on the heels of medium-range missile tests that indicated a mutual capability to hit any target in the other country and, for India, targets in China, too. 97 There should have been no surprise about these countries' possession of nuclear weapons. India conducted a "peaceful" atomic test in 1974 and was widely known to be continuing work on nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems; and the United States, as noted earlier, knew at least since 1983 about Pakistan's plan to make an "Islamic bomb." 9 8 More to the point, neither country's bomb program could have succeeded without sustained international assistance; and both programs (as well as the bomb-making programs of other undeclared nuclear powers such as Israel) took advantage of strategic alliances with a superpower. Chinese and U.S. nuclear assistance was indispensable to Pakistan's program. U.S. training and provision of a nuclear research reactor began in the 1950s, whereas PRC aid, such as weapon design and enriched uranium, has gone

Table 5.3 Known Nuclear Tests of the Declared Nuclear Powers, 1945-1998 Soviet Union

Britain

France

215 815

219 496

50 159

21 24

23 22

0 6

0 6

1,030

715

209

45

45

6

6

U.S. Atmospheric Underground Total

China

India

Pakistan

Sources: United Nations; Physicians for Social Responsibility; New York Times, September 11, 1996, p. A3, and various issues in May 1998.

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on f o r o v e r t w e n t y y e a r s . " A C a n a d i a n - m a d e n u c l e a r r e a c t o r , run w i t h h e a v y w a t e r f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d by U . S . - t r a i n e d s c i e n t i s t s , p r o d u c e d the p l u t o n i u m f o r I n d i a ' s first b o m b s — i n c l u d i n g the d e v i c e tested in 1974. 1 0 0 Several E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s ' t e c h n o l o g y c o n t r i b u t e d to I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r c o m p l e x in later years. 1 0 1 W h a t this a m o u n t s to is a pattern of d u plicity about the Indian and P a k i s t a n i n u c l e a r p r o g r a m s : N e i t h e r p r o g r a m ever had purely p e a c e f u l intentions, d e s p i t e official p r o m i s e s to suppliers; and in all p r o b a b i l i t y the s u p p l i e r g o v e r n m e n t s knew that f a c t s o m e w h e r e a l o n g the way if not f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . T h e s e latest tests u n d e r s c o r e d the f r a g i l i t y of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , t h e lack of a strong international will to punish p r o l i f e r a t o r s , and the continuing a n d e x p e n s i v e a l l u r e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , e v e n f o r t h o s e states t h a t s i g n e d the N P T e x t e n s i o n a n d the C T B T . Not o n e of the g o v e r n m e n t s w h o s e n u c l e a r a s s i s t a n c e w a s d i v e r t e d by India and P a k i s t a n to b o m b m a k i n g said a w o r d about the r e p e a t e d violations. W h e n r a t h e r mild international c r i t i c i s m of the tests w a s m a d e , India r e j e c t e d it as h y p o c r i t i c a l , rightly o b s e r v i n g that the U n i t e d States and o t h e r n u c l e a r p o w e r s h a d f a i l e d to live u p to their p r o m i s e in the N P T of w o r k i n g t o w a r d d i s a r m a m e n t . 1 0 2 O n l y a h a n d f u l of g o v e r n m e n t s i m p o s e d f i n a n c i a l s a n c t i o n s on I n d i a and P a k i s t a n — m a i n l y , b l o c k i n g bilateral and m u l t i l a t e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t aid, m o s t of w h i c h w a s r e l e a s e d soon after. T h e a b s e n c e of an o u t cry is not u n u s u a l : A m o n g the P e r m 5, F r a n c e and C h i n a s i g n e d both the N P T and the C T B T , but not b e f o r e c o n d u c t i n g final n u c l e a r tests in 1995. N o n e of t h e s e tests d r e w p a r t i c u l a r l y h a r s h r e a c t i o n s f r o m o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s . F r a n c e ' s s e q u e n c e of tests in the S o u t h P a c i f i c in 1995 a r o u s e d w o r l d w i d e protests, and C h i n a ' s tests p r o v o k e d U.S., J a p a n e s e , and s o m e o t h e r negative A s i a n reactions. But n o lasting sanctions w e r e applied in either case. T h e e f f e c t s of I n d i a ' s and P a k i s t a n ' s tests on the n u c l e a r - w e a p o n t r e a t i e s r e m a i n to be s e e n , f o r n e i t h e r c o u n t r y w a s a m e m b e r of e i t h e r treaty r e g i m e . A m o n g states that signed the N P T and its s a f e g u a r d s agreem e n t are s e v e r a l that are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d n u c l e a r w e a p o n - c a p a b l e . T h e s e i n c l u d e Iran, Iraq, L i b y a , N o r t h K o r e a , S o u t h K o r e a , a n d T a i w a n . T h e first f o u r h a v e all built or a c q u i r e d n u c l e a r t e c h n o l o g i e s and m a t e r i als that might be applied to d e v e l o p i n g a w e a p o n . 1 0 3 T h e i r f i r m a d h e r e n c e to t h e N P T is q u e s t i o n a b l e ; N o r t h K o r e a h a s a l r e a d y b a c k e d out o n c e . O n l y Taiwan and S o u t h K o r e a a m o n g this g r o u p are r e a s o n a b l y certain to h a v e a b a n d o n e d a n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s p r o g r a m , a n d t h e n o n l y b e c a u s e of U . S . p r e s s u r e to w h i c h the others are not s u s c e p t i b l e . 1 0 4 Israel is n o w the o n e r e m a i n i n g n o n - N P T , u n d e c l a r e d n u c l e a r - w e a p o n state. Israel did, h o w ever, sign the C T B T . S t e m m i n g p r o l i f e r a t i o n is h a r d e r t o d a y than e v e r b e f o r e i n a s m u c h as all the m a t e r i a l s f o r m a k i n g a n u c l e a r w e a p o n are a v a i l a b l e f o r a price.

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T h e f t , smuggling, and sales of nuclear plants, materials, technology, and e q u i p m e n t by private and state c o r p o r a t i o n s have greatly increased. T h e chaos of p o s t - S o v i e t R u s s i a is illustrative. As p a y c h e c k s have vanished, nuclear security has e r o d e d . A n u m b e r of c o m m e n t a t o r s , s o m e of them Russian, have said that everything is for sale in Russia. Russian institutions that h a n d l e nuclear m a t e r i a l s — r e s e a r c h laboratories, p o w e r plants, and storage facilities more so than military bases that actually house warh e a d s — a r e porous and lack accountability. T h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Energy has been c o o p e r a t i n g with the Russian Ministry of A t o m i c Energy (MINATOM) since 1994 to improve Russian security systems for weaponsusable material. 10 -'' But these agencies face a daunting challenge: the growing power of crime syndicates; the determination of M I N A T O M to protect its control over plutonium resources; the attractiveness of smuggling and jobs elsewhere (such as in China and Iran) for underpaid scientists; Russia's lack of money or technology to secure and track bomb-usable materials or tightly control their export; and the new for-profit orientation and autonomy of the arms-exporting industries. 1 0 6 We thus see that Russia's instability is of global consequence. W o r l d w i d e c o m m e r c e in plutonium is increasing. Despite p o s t - C o l d War r e d u c t i o n s of nuclear arms, which reduced existing w e a p o n s - g r a d e plutonium f r o m a r o u n d 2 7 0 metric tons to p e r h a p s only 70, p l u t o n i u m availability w o r l d w i d e was around 9 3 0 metric tons in 1995 "and is expected to nearly double in the next decade." 1 0 7 The United States, which in 1996 b e c a m e the only country to provide a public accounting of its plutonium holdings, imports, and exports (nearly a ton) to other countries, has 99.5 metric tons and Russia is thought to have 100 or so tons. 1 0 8 (The core of a nuclear weapon requires a mere 2 to 4 kilograms of p l u t o n i u m — 4 . 4 to 8.8 pounds.) Though the past U.S. practice of exporting plutonium for use in nuclear-power reactors has ended, there are other sources. Japan, for example, relies on nuclear power for energy using fast-breeder plutonium reactors. It imports r e p r o c e s s e d nuclear fuel f r o m France, but in a m o u n t s that s o m e observers believe exceed its actual and probable f u t u r e needs, raising the question whether Japan is stockpiling plutonium in the event of a decision to "go nuclear." 1 0 9 T h e means of p r o d u c i n g and delivering nuclear w a r h e a d s and other w e a p o n s of mass destruction also are m o r e easily available in the global marketplace of the 1990s. Sales by U.S. corporations to China, India, and Russia of supercomputers and aerospace technology with potential for military use (such as in nuclear test simulations, weapons design, and ballisticmissile p r o g r a m s ) a p p a r e n t l y have gone f o r w a r d with presidential approval, despite the strong official U.S. g o v e r n m e n t stance against proliferation and despite legal roadblocks. 1 1 0 Chinese general (state) corporations, m e a n w h i l e , are believed to have sold chemical precursors, nuclear

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materials, and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, despite promises to c e a s e . " 1 Russian firms have sold technology to India that could enable it to develop submarine-launched missiles, thus opening a new arena in t h e arms race with Pakistan. 1 1 2 Russian sales of nuclear reactors to Iran, a potential nuclear-weapon state, and to India (after its b o m b tests!) have g o n e forward despite U.S. protests. And North Korea, like Russia desperate f o r cash, has sold medium-range missiles and missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and E g y p t . 1 1 3 Clearly, it is not only the a m b i t i o n s of rogue states that are undermining proliferation; nuclear-weapon states and their corporations have selectively a b a n d o n e d n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n when it suited their interests. In a word, nonproliferation is another of those worthy causes that is bad for business. 1 1 4 Nonproliferation since the Cold War ended can count some successes: the a d h e r e n c e of C h i n a and France to the treaty regimes; the transfer to Russia of over 7 , 0 0 0 nuclear warheads f r o m Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine; the a g r e e m e n t with North Korea in 1994 that f r o z e its nuclear program; and the decisions of Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina to terminate their n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s programs. But the other side of the coin is more than enough to warrant great concern about the dangers posed by additional nuclear-weapon states. The danger has less to do with the supposedly irrational behavior of Third World leaders who might possess nuclear weapons; as Richard Betts's study of nuclear coercion has concluded, U.S. leaders had a " f a c i l e " understanding of them and never c a m e to grips with what it would mean actually to employ them if deterrence or intimidation failed. 1 1 5 Rather, the danger lies in two other directions. O n e is that n e w nuclear powers will probably increase tensions, either tempting neighboring non-nuclear states to go nuclear (for example, Japan and South Korea in the case of North Korea) or increasing the likelihood of nuclear w e a p o n s ' being used, perhaps preemptively (such as by Israel against Iraq). T h e second danger is that weak and isolated states, political m o v e ments, or terrorist groups may be more inclined than before to resort to a desperate act in the absence of mediation and incentives to act peacefully. When Pakistan and India came close to a nuclear conflict in 1990, only belated U.S. d i p l o m a t i c intervention corrected the m i s p e r c e p t i o n s of their general staffs. 1 1 6 Iraq and North Korea, on the other hand, have lost their m a j o r - p o w e r supporters. They have been treated as o u t l a w r e g i m e s and subjected to provocative military maneuvers and intrusive surveillance by their opponents. Their options to behave "responsibly" have been limited; going nuclear was a logical road to security, and may be again. The great tragedy of the nuclear game for developing countries is that it is expensive. As India and Pakistan are probably discovering, b e c o m i n g declared nuclear-weapon states is only the beginning of a long road already

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traveled, at s t u p e n d o u s cost, by the big p o w e r s — a road that includes choices of delivery systems, c o m m a n d and control, scientific investment, service rivalries, safety, and environmental destruction. 1 1 7 The daily lives of literally h u n d r e d s of millions of destitute people will be a f f e c t e d by those choices. Though the two governments criticized international sanctions on their nuclear tests, perhaps the real sanctions were self-imposed. Rather than blame "crazy states" for the problem of nuclear proliferation, it would seem wiser for the nuclear powers to concentrate on reducing and destroying nuclear w e a p o n s and setting an e x a m p l e of the increasing irrelevance of such w e a p o n s in c o n t e m p o r a r y international r e l a t i o n s . " 8 Three of the key officials who originally conceptualized U.S. nuclear strategy have m a d e just such a case. 1 1 9 If, as they argue, nuclear weapons never had a true military purpose during the Cold War, other than to deter other nuclear powers, they have no larger purpose after the Cold War. '"What this new [post-Cold War] era provides," they conclude, "is the opportunity to strive for truly collective security and an international rule of law. in which self-help by the use of military force for resolving conflicts among nations loses its legitimacy." 1 2 0 Reducing the dangers from chemical and biological weapons and conventional arms transfers c o n f r o n t s obstacles similar to those encountered in the nuclear area. Two obstacles stand out: the continuing proliferation of chemical weapons, in spite of treaty obligations; and the lack of international will to e n f o r c e adherence to treaties or close loopholes in arrangements. Treaties banning the development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of c h e m i c a l and biological w e a p o n s have been overwhelmingly endorsed by states, as Table 5.2 shows. Ten states may have active p r o g r a m s of both kinds: Iraq (at least prior to 1991), Iran, Syria, Libya, Israel, China, North Korea, Taiwan, India, and Pakistan. 1 2 1 Yet five of them have thus far signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, whereas eight of them (Syria and Israel are the exceptions) have ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). With the exception of Syria, these are all states that possess or have shown interest in having nuclear weapons. Most dangerously, these are countries grouped in close proximity—in the Middle East, South Asia, or East A s i a — a n d with active political disputes between them. Putting these elements together, there is every reason to believe that regardless of treaty adherence, these countries will continue working on producing chemical and/or biological weapons or maintaining a stockpile of them. Also cause for pessimism is that international sanctions for violations have been highly circumstantial. As previously noted, sanctions against Iraq have been sustained, but only because of discoveries made during exceptional UN surveillance. French, Chinese, and Russian business interests have periodically sought to influence lifting the

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sanctions. The U S S R had a clandestine biological-weapons program until 1 9 9 2 , Yeltsin revealed, in violation of the treaty it had signed. 1 2 2 O f course, Russia cannot be sanctioned for its predecessor's violation. C o m plicating matters further is that the B T W C , unlike the C W C , lacks obligatory inspection, verification, and enforcement procedures; the B T W C requires a complaint to the UN Security Council, which must agree to initiate an investigation. Unless enforcement of the treaties can b e c o m e automatic and thorough, a calamity such as Iraq's chemical-weapons attacks on Iran and the Kurds will happen again. With respect to conventional arms, outside of centra! Europe, efforts by the Perm 5 to curtail arms transfers, or at least make them more "transparent" (i.e., more open and subject to verification), have been feeble. T h e London guidelines o f O c t o b e r 1991, for instance, promised to " a v o i d transfers" that "prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict," "increase tension in a region," or "introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a r e g i o n . " 1 2 3 Yet, as was mentioned in the Gulf War case study, the United States and others sharply escalated sales of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and missile technologies to the Middle East long after Iraq's invasion. In the UN a Conventional Arms Register was established in which governments voluntarily list weapons sold and purchased. Although the major arms exporters are submitting reports, important data such as the value o f production, sales, and transfers of technologies with military applications are not recorded. The most recent, and most ambitious, effort to restrain arms exports is the Wassenaar Arrangement, which thirty-three states agreed upon in 1995. Its key provisions relate to reporting high-technology transfers with military applications. How much reporting actually takes place and how much restraint it puts on the arms trade remain to be seen. The glaring weakness of all arms-export control efforts is that they place no obligations on the weapons manufacturers and merchants, nor on their government subsidizers. As one specialist has remarked, both Cold War militarization and p o s t - C o l d War commercialization have contributed to the hot pursuit by arms lobbies of clients in the Third World. 1 2 4 The increasing demand for high-technology components in tanks, j e t s , and bombs (so-called smart weapons) has made their export harder to control because these are commercial technologies, and more desirable to export because they add greatly to their cost and therefore their export value. 1 2 5 The tragedy is multiple: The arms sales are made on the pretense that they promote regional and international security; they can only add to the destructiveness of a conflict; allocations for them c o m e at the expense of people's needs; and, considering that all the wars since 1945 have been conventional, " t h e single-minded focus o f the nonproliferation community on weapons o f mass destruction is m i s p l a c e d . " 1 2 6

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The Human Costs of the Nuclear Game President Eisenhower once said: "The military establishment, not productive of itself, necessarily must feed on the energy, productivity, and brainpower of the country, and if it takes too m u c h , our total strength declines." 1 2 7 This section examines the social costs of the arms race in terms of its direct i m p a c t — h o w military spending affects the Russian and U.S. e c o n o m i e s — a n d its indirect i m p a c t — h o w military s p e n d i n g siphons money away f r o m other social sectors in which h u m a n need is great and growing. Setting the stage for this undertaking are brief portraits of Russia and the United States.

Russia,

Past and

Present

The issue today is this: Either Soviet society will go forward along the path of profound changes that have been begun, ensuring a worthy future for our great multinational state, or else forces opposed to perestroika will gain the upper hand. In that case—let us face the facts squarely— dismal times would be in store for the country and the people. — M i k h a i l S. G o r b a c h e v , at a C o m m u n i s t Party c o n g r e s s , July 1 9 9 0

Assessing the current state of Russian affairs inevitably takes us back to March 1985, when leadership in the Soviet Union transferred to Mikhail Gorbachev. He soon unveiled a reform program based on two ideas: perestroika ( " r e f o r m a t i o n , " or " r e s t r u c t u r i n g " ) and glasnost ( " o p e n n e s s " ) . In his view, which proved to be accurate, the reforms would be as sweeping as the Bolshevik Revolution. In fact, the new Soviet leadership insisted (in direct contrast with C h i n a ' s reforms) that perestroika could only take root if greater social and political pluralism were permitted. Before noting what perestroika and glasnost promised, we need to take a hard look at Soviet political e c o n o m y before and immediately after Gorbachev took office. Against a background of underdevelopment, revolution, and two world wars, Soviet c o m m u n i s m achieved some remarkable gains for its p e o p l e — in e d u c a t i o n and health; in science, technology, and industrialization; in w o m e n ' s rights; and in improved educational and work opportunities for rural dwellers and ethnic minorities (who accounted for about 48 percent of the total population). The Soviet people went through some painful experiences, in war and politics, and yet attained a fairly high living standard in about seventy years. 1 2 8 But well before G o r b a c h e v ' s appearance, the Soviet system had f o r many years shown the strains of aging leadership, economic wastefulness, and environmental neglect. T h e price of maintaining empire and achieving military parity with the United States was extremely high, reaching (according to a Soviet source) about $1 trillion b e t w e e n

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1979 and 1 9 8 4 . 1 2 9 This figure presumably does not include the huge sums (perhaps $ 5 0 billion in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s ) paid beyond national defense to maintain Soviet military forces abroad and subsidize the economies o f Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Afghanistan, and Eastern E u r o p e . 1 3 0 R i c h in energy and mineral resources (such as oil, gas, coal, chromium, uranium), the Soviet economy was plagued by poor national economic management, inefficient allocation of labor, outdated industrial technology that wasted energy, transportation problems, and administrative inflexibility. Agricultural inefficiency was particularly important. Despite abundant cropland, Soviet agriculture was characterized by low productivity and rigid collectivization o f production. With the huge 1972 wheat deal with the United States, the U S S R became the world's largest grain importer. Mismanagement, low incentives to produce, inefficient use o f fertilizer, and inattention to soil erosion were responsible for low production; and, as in the United States, feeding grain to beef cattle added to Soviet requirements. 1 3 1 Consequently, the Soviet Union put m a j o r demands on the world's grain supply and upward pressure on grain p r i c e s . 1 3 2 It also paid for its grain with o i l — a n increasingly expensive trade that is converting Russia to an oil importer. Overall, the U S S R produced half as much as the United States in terms of G N P and allocated less than half as much per capita of G N P . 1 3 3 It was a small factor in world trade, with combined imports and exports about one-third that of the United States and also far below West Germany and J a p a n . 1 3 4 "In f a c t , " a Soviet economist wrote, "the Soviet Union lags behind the majority of developed countries in virtually every aspect o f personal consumption. . . . Per capita goods and services consumption in the U S S R is lower than anywhere else in Europe, save Albania, Turkey, and R o m a n i a . " Military spending cut deeply into the amount o f national inc o m e available for c o n s u m p t i o n . 1 3 5 Based on a wide range o f social and economic performance indicators put together by Ruth Leger Sivard, the Soviet Union on average ranked only nineteenth in the world, far below its number-two ranking as a military power. 1 3 6 Like other older industrialized countries, the U S S R emphasized rapid development of heavy industry with little regard for its environmental and ecological consequences. 1 3 7 Only after the start of glasnost did the full extent of the damage begin to be publicized. S o m e o f it is irreparable, as in the case of nuclear reactors. 1 3 8 Serious air and water pollution, such as affects every industrial city, required standards and controls that no prior Soviet leader was willing to consider. 1 3 9 An ecological map compiled within the U S S R Academy o f Sciences identified 2 6 percent o f the Soviet population in 123 cities as living within crisis a r e a s . 1 4 0 Among the most severely affected areas are around the Aral and Caspian Seas. The Aral, once the fourth largest inland body of water in the world, has been drained of

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nearly two-thirds of its water, mostly because of large-scale irrigation. Animal life in the sea basin has been extinguished, and a desert of salt and chemical residue was created that is blown into the air. The impact on humans includes increased illness, unemployment, and social problems for the towns that once thrived from the sea. 141 The Caspian Sea region has suffered from nearly the opposite effect: The sea level has increased since a dam was built in 1980 to block the flow to marshes. Within three years, the marsh regions, once rich in natural resources, had completely disappeared. 142 Human rights stood out as the Soviet system's greatest shortcoming. The worst excesses of the Stalinist political terror receded under Gorbachev. But the leadership's Gulag syndrome, captured in Solzhenitsyn's writings, continued into the mid-1980s: the internal exile of political opponents and peace activists; the tight control of religious, media, and artistic expression; the pervasiveness of the secret police; the rejection of free emigration for Jews and other groups. All these actions violated provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords signed with the United States and the European countries. The 100-odd Soviet citizens in the Helsinki Watch Committee who attempted to monitor their government's compliance were often officially silenced. Such widespread repression was attributable to an extremely insecure and conservative party leadership, one that was rigidly hierarchical, hostile to reform, and fearful of the working class in whose name it ruled—a privileged class bent on self-perpetuation. 1 4 3 A few other social problems deserve mention. As a multi-ethnic society, the Soviet Union shared with numerous other states, including the United States and Canada, unresolved problems stemming from "bilingualism, assimilation, ethnic intermarriage, affirmative action, regional autonomy . . . and the geographical mixing of ethnic groups through migration." 1 4 4 Political leadership typically was in the hands of Russians, not minority persons. The higher birth rate among non-Russians than among Russians evidently worried some Moscow officials. Soviet women made great strides beyond traditional roles; but discrimination was still widespread in employment, politics, and the home. 1 4 5 Social alienation, evidenced in widespread alcoholism (which affected over one-third of Soviet workers and had become the main public health problem) 1 4 6 and popular dissatisfaction with the limited avenues for upward mobility, was a major problem that the leadership acknowledged in its press commentaries. As previously noted, Soviet (and, for that matter, East European) socialism on a transnational level was, in the words of one critic, "increasingly an integral part of the capitalist world economy." 1 4 7 Promoting that trend was, in fact, part of Kissinger's announced strategy for achieving detente in the 1970s, a strategy welcomed by Brezhnev. 1 4 8 Although it petered out beginning in the second half of the Carter administration, when trade ties with the USSR were cut back, the longer-term development

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r e m a i n e d : a substantial growth in the importance to the Soviet and East E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i e s of trade and credit f r o m Western Europe and the United States. As traced by André G u n d e r Frank, 1 4 9 East-West trade was the fastest-growing segment of the socialist East European countries' total trade by the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s . The Soviets and their East E u r o p e a n partners in C O M E C O N (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) were importing technology and grain in return for fuel and raw materials. (In the Soviet case, these imports amounted to 35 percent of all imports in the early 1980s, c o m p a r e d with 20 percent in 1965.) 1 5 0 But this exchange became increasingly uneven and led to large annual trade deficits—in 1975, for example, a $4.8 billion deficit for the U S S R — t h a t were only partly reduced by a surplus in trade with the Third World. Financing their increasing imports f r o m the West put the C O M E C O N countries, the USSR included, in significant debt to West European and U.S. banks: over $58 billion in 1981. 1 5 1 Thus, in terms of debt and trade patterns, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe resembled the Third World NICs. They occupied a similar middle position in the so-called international division of labor. What we see here, in short, is an e c o n o m i c picture that was quite different from the military competition that until the mid-1980s had dominated in East-West relations. In keeping with the Corporate-Globalist vision of world order, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became increasingly interlinked with the global e c o n o m y — a t the very time when Realist anti-Soviet hard-liners such as emerged in the Reagan administration were emphasizing the military competition and the consequent need (which they attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to implement) to weaken C O M E C O N ' s access to Western credit and technology. These two quite distinctive approaches to dealing with the Soviets probably resembled infighting among factions in the Soviet leadership itself. For in the r e f o r m s launched by Gorbachev we see Realist and Globalist forces arrayed in a major contest over the U S S R ' s basic directions in society, economy, the arms race, and human rights. G o r b a c h e v ' s r e f o r m s sought to draw the USSR away f r o m the precipice of great-power obsolescence. 1 5 2 He appeared to be convinced that real Soviet security had been emasculated by official corruption, loss of individual effort and initiative, a stifling party-state hierarchy, excessive military spending, and intolerance of intellectuals. Without dismantling the party or state machinery, G o r b a c h e v challenged it to m a k e a radical c h a n g e in the way it did business. In G o r b a c h e v ' s first two years, many old-line officials were removed, a number of dissidents (some quite prominent, such as the physicist Andrei Sakharov) were freed, literature and film began to reflect a new realism (especially about the Stalin era), and the first steps were taken to m a k e state factories more a u t o n o m o u s and responsive to workers.

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After only five years in office, however, the honeymoon was over f o r Gorbachev. The p o w e r f u l forces of nationalism, personal f r e e d o m , political competition, and limited market socialism he had let loose c a m e back to haunt him. By 1990 Gorbachev was a politician struggling to retain control over a system on the verge of collapse, his popularity stronger abroad (as evidenced by his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize) than at home. G o r b a c h e v ' s revolution came under c h a l l e n g e on several d o m e s t i c fronts. Perestroika and glasnost upset long-established practices and patterns of authority. The two most p o w e r f u l bureaucracies, the C o m m u n i s t Party of 20 million and the armed forces, were forced to make sacrifices their leaders r e s e n t e d — f e w e r privileges, reduced p o w e r s and budgets, more internal d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . 1 5 3 R a d i c a l - r e f o r m i s t s and c o n s e r v a t i v e nationalists seized the unprecedented o p e n n e s s to c o n f r o n t the political leadership and even to organize against it. The new Soviet parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies, emerged as a center of lively d e b a t e — a n d pretenders to the throne. Sharp challenges also came f r o m the f i f t e e n republics, including Russia itself (which comprised about three-quarters of Soviet territory and half its population). The army was called upon to quell large-scale d e m o n s t r a t i o n s by Georgian and A r m e n i a n nationalists. By 1990 nearly all the republics had declared their i n d e p e n d e n c e in s o m e form f r o m Moscow. T h e Balkan states—Latvia, Lithuania, and E s t o n i a — also broke with Moscow; independence for them meant the restoration of the sovereignty taken away by the USSR in 1940. Perhaps the broadest antagonism appeared daily in the streets, f r o m a restive population d e m a n d ing more goods in the stores yet fearful of what a free market would do to prices and j o b security. Ironically in light of the prior history of Cold War politics, Gorbachev looked to Europe and the United States to help salvage perestroika and, in the process, perhaps even preserve the USSR as a "confederation" (in G o r b a c h e v ' s formulation) of states. G o r b a c h e v ' s perestroika e n j o y e d greater successes in foreign a f f a i r s than in the economy. He showed sensitivity to global problems that transcend class and national interests, such as the environment and (after Chernobyl) nuclear energy. He followed through on his assertions that "security can only be mutual" and that "there can be no security for the U S S R without security for the United States." T h e USSR m a d e important initiatives on nuclear arms control, reduced troops and weapons in Europe and on the China border (the latter paving the way in 1989 f o r the normalization of relations), and cooperated with the United States during the Gulf War and in the resolution of several Third World conflicts. Gorbachev cut the military budget substantially and tried to persuade Soviet military industries to convert to producing more for the civilian market. 1 5 4 Finally, glasnost allowed particular foreign policies to be reevaluated in the press and parliament. Even the legitimacy of past actions, such as the secret Nazi-Soviet

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pact of 1939 that led to the annexation of the Baltic states, and the interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, were challenged and overturned. Internally, however, the picture was grim. As Soviet analysts were the first to admit, the e c o n o m y was in worse shape in 1990 than it was b e f o r e G o r b a c h e v took over. Individual i n c o m e s improved; but e f f o r t s to b o o s t productivity, the transportation of goods f r o m farm to market, and the availability of ordinary c o n s u m e r items failed. The Soviet budget deficit stood at between $150 and $165 billion in mid-1989, and its national debt at nearly $500 billion. But Gorbachev, wary of the reactions of the public, the party, and w o r k e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , rejected the shock f o r m u l a used in Poland for switching immediately to a market economy. As a leader n o w subject to political forces, he f o u n d his every move toward the m a r k e t — such as supporting the leasing of property, private ownership of businesses, and joint ventures with foreign firms—open to resistance and subversion. In the end, it was G o r b a c h e v ' s inability to stave off revolt by the nonRussian republics and populations that did him in. Neither threats nor the use of force worked, and his f o r m u l a for dealing with them as sovereign entities under a new union came too late. Not only had several of the key republics already opted f o r sovereignty on their own terms; Yeltsin, w h o was elected to head the R u s s i a n r e p u b l i c ' s supreme soviet in May 1990, was spearheading a drive that would culminate in an independent R u s sia. 1 5 5 The old guard responded with a c o u p attempt in August 1991; but when it was put d o w n three days later, Yeltsin, not G o r b a c h e v ( w h o had been forced to leave M o s c o w ) , e m e r g e d as the hero. The U S S R rapidly dissolved as the c o u p accelerated the drive for i n d e p e n d e n c e of the Balkans, Ukraine, Russia, and most other republics. By late 1991, amidst acute economic problems in the Soviet Union—spiraling debt, a decline in G N P of 30 percent in 1991, the near bankruptcy of Soviet banks, and the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of f o o d and other c o m m o d i t i e s f r o m stores—even G o r b a c h e v ' s greatest supporters in E u r o p e and the United States held b a c k on aid and prepared to r e c o g n i z e the independence of the republics. Yeltsin thereupon led the formation of an alternative political structure: the C o m m o n w e a l t h of I n d e p e n d e n t States (CIS), which eleven of the t w e l v e republics joined. Gorbachev was forced to resign in December 1991; the Soviet flag ceased to fly o v e r M o s c o w . All ministries were turned o v e r to Russian authority, as was the U S S R ' s seat in the United Nations. Inevitably, Yeltsin, too, had to confront the harsh realities of a divided polity, a d y s f u n c t i o n a l e c o n o m y , and 60 years of central planning. L i k e Gorbachev, Yeltsin had to deal with powerful interest groups that had b e e n hurt by the r e f o r m s and the f o r e i g n - p o l i c y c h a n g e s — f o r m e r C o m m u n i s t Party officials (who represented over 80 percent of the Russian parliament even as the party b e c a m e illegal on the national level), military leaders of (now) a second-class power, captains of the armaments industries, and the

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heads of other state enterprises. Yeltsin was unmovable in his insistence on pushing ahead with privatization and centralizing authority in the n a m e of democracy. But in doing so he made some m a j o r concessions. He allowed foreign, especially U.S., advisers and organizations to b e c o m e deeply involved in e c o n o m i c and political planning, which "helped to create a system of tycoon capitalism run for the b e n e f i t of a corrupt political oligarchy." 1 5 6 W h e n faced with resistance in parliament, he simply ignored it, revealing a certain s h a l l o w n e s s of d e m o c r a t i c values. He acceded to the military-industrial c o m p l e x on slowing d o w n the conversion of military plants and stepping up arms exports, as previously mentioned. And on the environment, Yeltsin showed no inclination to m o v e dramatically against nuclear waste and fallout—the number-one problem in Ukraine as well as R u s s i a — o r to prevent the selling off of large tracts of Siberia's timberlands, with its virgin forests and rare species, to multinational corporations. 1 5 7 S o m e World Bank loans are being used f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l cleanup; but air pollution f r o m industrial discharges, and other problems, are so great and so long neglected that it will take many times the amount o f f e r e d to m a k e a dent in them. 1 5 8 During his 1992 visit to the United States, Yeltsin told the Congress: Russia has seen for itself that any delay in strengthening the foundations of f r e e d o m and d e m o c r a c y can throw the s o c i e t y far back. For us the o m i n o u s l e s s o n of the past is relevant today as never before. It was prec i s e l y in a devastated country, with an e c o n o m y in near-paralysis, that B o l s h e v i s m s u c c e e d e d in building a totalitarian regime, creating a gigantic war m a c h i n e and an insatiable military-industrial c o m p l e x . This must not be a l l o w e d to happen again. That is w h y e c o n o m i c and political reform are the primary tasks for Russia today.

R u s s i a ' s descent into dictatorship of the far left or far right has thus f a r been only narrowly avoided, however. Yeltsin's political obituary has been written m a n y times, as w h e n the c o m m u n i s t leader G e n n a d y Z y u g a n o v , w h o lost the 1996 presidential election to Yeltsin, said: " T h e state is bankrupt, the president is ill, the government is helpless and the D u m a is p o w e r l e s s . " 1 5 9 Yeltsin a s t o u n d e d observers by recovering his health, getting striking coal miners and nuclear-plant workers back to work, winning reelection until 2000, and making himself the indispensable man to Western g o v e r n m e n t s and investors. But the thicket of e c o n o m i c and social problems seemed impenetrable. 1 6 0 A report on health c a r e — " o u r No. 1 national security crisis," said Yeltsin—pointed out that reforms to address resource allocations and health-care priorities, thus eliminating i n e f f i c i e n c i e s and d e l i v e r i n g n e e d e d services, were beyond reach. Entrenched interests and f a m i l i a r ways of doing things m a d e r e f o r m s the subject of m u c h talk and e v e n more resistance. 1 6 1 State and personal finances have taken a beating:

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The ruble lost half its value between mid-1997 and mid-1998; the government was spending around one-third of its budget simply to make interest payments on its international debt; and f u n d s allocated by various government organs have never reached their destination, presumably having disappeared into private pockets. 1 6 2 As Yeltsin installed yet another team of advisers into o f f i c e in the spring of 1998, an observer listed the daunting tasks that c o n f r o n t e d it: "insuring that wages are paid on time and preventing insider deals in the auction of state businesses!;] . . . pushing through long-stalled legislation, like tax and land reform, cutting the budget and persuading Russians to pay their taxes." 1 6 3 On these and other domestic issues, Yeltsin must operate in the crossfire between the foreign financial c o m m u n i t y and strong-willed political opponents. B e t w e e n 1990 and 1996 Russia was pledged $ 1 4 0 billion in aid, with $91 billion disbursed, by multilateral lenders, led by the IMF, and governments. 1 6 4 The I M F lent an additional $10.2 billion for 1996 through 1998, and then around $17 billion more for 1998 through 1999. Every step of the way has been a struggle: The I M F has sought to impose its usual restructuring c o n d i t i o n s — s u c h as closing tax loopholes, reducing government debt, r e f o r m i n g agriculture and the banking system, and increasing privatization of state assets—but, influenced by Washington's determination that Yeltsin be kept afloat, it has loosened those conditions. Yeltsin thus has bargaining room that ordinary borrowers do not; Russia is an ally now. Moreover, as head of a f o r m e r superpower, he cannot be seen by fellow Russians to bend before the I M F ' s dictates; to do so exposes him to charges of a p p e a s e m e n t f r o m the x e n o p h o b i c right and the c o m m u n i s t s . Thus, the 1996 I M F loan was clearly timed to support Yeltsin's reelection campaign and deflate his domestic critics, even though he used part of the loan to provide workers with back pay. 1 6 5 In July 1998, when the I M F privately i n f o r m e d Russia that Yeltsin's d e f i c i t - r e d u c t i o n plan was insufficient and that the tax and banking systems still needed an overhaul before new loans could be floated, politics intervened again. Just a few weeks after a top I M F official had said that a $10 billion to $15 billion loan was "more than the I M F can give to one e c o n o m y , " Washington, on appeal f r o m Yeltsin, got the I M F to reverse itself. Yeltsin got the money he requested. 1 6 6 Having the money and being able to govern effectively and in keeping with democratic n o r m s are different matters in Russia today. Corruption, extortion, and the power of money to move politics have reached obscene proportions. The mafiya, comprising n u m e r o u s criminal gangs, d e f i n e s much of what h a p p e n s on a daily basis. In the upper reaches of politics, phrases such as "semi-criminal o l i g a r c h y " and "robber baron capitalism" are now c o m m o n l y used by Russian as well as foreign critics to define the system. 1 6 7 Not only democratization and a market economy but also public morale are being subverted by a greedy elite that increasingly d o m i n a t e s

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the political e c o n o m y . Such a " c o r p o r a t i s t " Russia, in which parties and the rule of law have not taken root, may pose serious p r o b l e m s for the c o u n t r y ' s full integration in the international community. A final matter of international c o n c e r n with d o m e s t i c roots is the Russian military and Russia's security. The sorry state of the Russian military since 1991—the demoralization of its leaders and its dramatic reduction in size, budget, and capabilities—poses potential dangers, including susceptibility to nationalist i n f l u e n c e s and reduced interest in a r m s control. 1 6 8 T h e disastrous Russian army intervention in C h e c h n y a ; the evisceration of the Far Eastern fleet; the cutting out of Russian influence over events in Korea and the Middle East; Russia's limited ability to protect fellow Slavs in Yugoslavia—all these are taken as signs of national decline. Nuclear weapons have become one of the few symbols of grandeur worth preserving, it seems, which will m a k e prompt Russian parliamentary approval of START II and III all the more difficult to obtain. The distress of some military leaders at Russia's reduction to second-class status has been a boon to the nationalists' cause. 1 6 9 They want to preserve R u s s i a ' s sphere of i n f l u e n c e (what it calls the "near a b r o a d " ) over its f o r m e r republics, prevent secessions such as C h e c h n y a ' s ( w h o s e exact status r e m a i n s in doubt since a peace treaty was signed in May 1997), protect ethnic Russians in the FSU, and even rewrite certain borders. Yeltsin seems to subscribe to the notion of Russia's special place in its former orbit, though not necessarily to the n a t i o n a l i s t s ' m e t h o d s f o r asserting it. 1 7 0 Apart f r o m C h e c h n y a , Russia has used military p o w e r to prevent secession in A b k hazia (Georgia), where the U N approved Russian e n f o r c e m e n t of a ceasefire; has kept troops stationed in Tajikistan; and has concluded agreements with some CIS m e m b e r s such as Belarus that amount to a regional policing power. 1 7 1 But Russia has been just as active in promoting regional economic integration to assure continued access to vital resources. N o t h i n g u n d e r m i n e d R u s s i a ' s relations with the West so m u c h as N A T O ' s a g r e e m e n t in 1997, p u s h e d by the United States, to e x p a n d its m e m b e r s h i p f r o m sixteen to nineteen countries. T h e Clinton administration contended that Russia had nothing to fear, that it was actually advant a g e o u s to Russia to have secure n e i g h b o r s , just as e n l a r g e m e n t was a proper reward to the new market economies of central Europe and an enc o u r a g e m e n t f o r them to d e m o c r a t i z e . R u s s i a n c o n c e r n s about having neighbors trained and armed as never before were dismissed as a "target of c o n v e n i e n c e f o r [ p o s t - C o l d War] Russian fears and r e s e n t m e n t s . " 1 7 2 To Yeltsin, however, NATO enlargement m a d e for a "cold peace": What's happening is that w e have just recently abandoned the b l o c divisions [in Europe]. N o w assume that some East European and Central European countries would join NATO and the border would m o v e immediately

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c l o s e r to R u s s i a , s o the s i t u a t i o n w o u l d a p p e a r to s u g g e s t that w e w o u l d a g a i n h a v e a b l o c s i t u a t i o n w i t h N A T O . Is it r e a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l l E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y ? N o , it is not. T h e s i t u a t i o n w i l l n o t b e c a l m . 1 7 3

G e o r g e K e n n a n , f o r m e r a m b a s s a d o r to R u s s i a and a u t h o r of the c o n t a i n m e n t d o c t r i n e , a g r e e d : It is " t h e b e g i n n i n g of a n e w c o l d w a r , " " a tragic m i s t a k e . " K e n n a n w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r o u b l e d by r e f e r e n c e in the U.S. Senate d e b a t e " t o R u s s i a as a c o u n t r y d y i n g to attack W e s t e r n E u r o p e . D o n ' t p e o p l e u n d e r s t a n d ? O u r d i f f e r e n c e s in the cold w a r w e r e with the Soviet C o m m u n i s t r e g i m e . A n d n o w w e are turning our b a c k s on the very p e o p l e w h o m o u n t e d the g r e a t e s t b l o o d l e s s r e v o l u t i o n in h i s t o r y to r e m o v e that Soviet r e g i m e . " 1 7 4 But K e n n a n and other critics were d r o w n e d out by the v o i c e s of a new R e a l i s m that saw an o p p o r t u n i t y to d o what c o n t a i n m e n t could n o t — e l i m i n a t e M o s c o w ' s i n f l u e n c e and put e m e r g i n g e c o n o m i e s in its place. Yeltsin e v e n t u a l l y a c c e d e d to N A T O e x p a n s i o n , which was f o r m a l i z e d in 1999. H e r e c o g n i z e d that p o w e r politics is still the n a m e of the g a m e : Either a c c e p t the n e w W e s t e r n h e g e m o n y or risk losing Western aid. T h e fact that R u s s i a was i n c l u d e d in a " P a r t n e r s h i p for P e a c e " with the United States, in a n e w N A T O - R u s s i a council and in the G r o u p of 7, could hardly d i s g u i s e the reality of its d i m i n i s h e d status or its a n g u i s h over U.S. d o m i nation.175 Russians had probably hoped for a more symmetrical relationship with the U n i t e d States and the EU in return f o r M o s c o w ' s c o o p e r a t i o n on m a j o r international issues. Instead, they saw R u s s i a n c o o p e r a t i o n being taken for g r a n t e d , R u s s i a n interests b e i n g i g n o r e d , R u s s i a n d e p e n d e n c e on loans being m a n i p u l a t e d . W h a t m a y c o m e of such dissatisfaction cannot be p r e d i c t e d ; but the W e s t e r n strategy of s t r e n g t h e n i n g R u s s i a ' s political and e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n w h i l e c o n t a i n i n g it i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y c o u l d be a recipe f o r a m u c h b r o a d e r nationalist revival than has o c c u r r e d so far. 1 7 6

The United

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How America illustrates birth, muscular youth, the promise, the sure fulfilment, the absolute success, despite of people—illustrates evil as well as good, The vehement struggle so fierce for unity in one's-self. . . —Walt Whitman, "Thoughts," 1860

T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a p p r o a c h e s the y e a r 2 0 0 0 a n a t i o n d e e p l y d i v i d e d bet w e e n w e a l t h and poverty, n e w and old e c o n o m i c and political f o r c e s , the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o w e r in the c e n t e r and its e v i s c e r a t i o n in the periphery. In a n a t i o n of such e x t r a o r d i n a r y diversity and s h i f t i n g m o o d s , it is a l w a y s h a z a r d o u s to i d e n t i f y t r e n d s . B u t the R e a g a n - B u s h y e a r s ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 2 ) w e r e s u c h a d i s t i n c t d e p a r t u r e f r o m the m o d e r a t e l i b e r a l i s m of p r e v i o u s

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administrations, R e p u b l i c a n as well as D e m o c r a t i c , that their imprint on U.S. political e c o n o m y has been more lasting than any previous period since Franklin R o o s e v e l t ' s New Deal. R e a g a n ' s crusade against c o m m u nism was not the new ingredient, even granting the vigorousness of its pursuit. What was new happened within the country: the determined effort to dismantle the welfare state, including its leading role in behalf of civil liberties, environmental protection, and equal opportunity; the alignment of conservative politics with New Right f u n d a m e n t a l i s m (the "Moral Majority"); the open identification of state p o w e r with big business and the wealthy class; the often doctrinaire application of supply-side economics to basic human problems such as workplace health and safety, unemployment, and education; and, as previously discussed, passage of the largest peacetime military b u d g e t s in U.S. history, alongside equally unprecedented budget deficits. For all his liberal credentials, Clinton proved loath to reverse the " R e a g a n R e v o l u t i o n . " His policies on the e n v i r o n m e n t , education, and w o m e n ' s rights reflected some effort to shore up eroded federal support; and in spirit at least, there was a rededication to the liberal precept of government responsibility for social needs. But just as the Clinton administration maintained Reagan-era levels of military spending, it accepted some key social policies, if only because they resonated with big business, a Republican-dominated Congress, and the public. Believing that economic growth's benefits really do trickle down to the lower classes, Clinton vigorously supported corporate downsizing and megamergers, led the d e m o lition of the welfare system, p r o m o t e d N A F T A with little regard for its labor and environmental consequences, and slashed budget deficits rather than address social (especially racial) inequalities. Clinton could claim to have resurrected the U.S. e c o n o m y , which on paper in 1998 was the world's strongest, with low inflation, low u n e m p l o y m e n t , and a fairly balanced budget. H o w e v e r , as one of his first cabinet o f f i c e r s , Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich, w h o m we previously encountered as a defender of globalization, said after leaving office, the Clinton administration seemed to have a b a n d o n e d the traditional social c o m p a c t u n d e r which e m p l o y e e benefits and real incomes rise in proportion to corporate profits. 1 7 7 Neither Clinton nor R e a g a n nor Bush created A m e r i c a ' s w i d e n i n g e c o n o m i c inequalities and social problems. But on their watch, the problems did intensify. O n e e x a m p l e is the United S t a t e s ' indebtedness. T h e national debt, as measured by U.S. government budget deficits, increased during R e a g a n ' s first term by about $750 billion, three times the increase under Carter. It reached about $2.6 trillion by the end of R e a g a n ' s tenure in 1988. By the time Bush left office, the federal debt topped $4 trillion, or over $ 1 6 , 0 0 0 f o r every m a n , w o m a n , and child. Interest on the debt absorbed 15 percent (almost $ 2 0 0 billion) of each y e a r ' s federal budget,

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which meant that it " e x c e e d f e d ] the total of all federal spending for education, science, law enforcement, transportation, housing, food stamps and w e l f a r e . " 1 7 8 U n d e r Clinton in 1996, the debt was over $5 trillion. Meanwhile, the U.S. international debt also skyrocketed. In 1986 it was roughly $ 2 5 0 billion and in 1989 was $ 6 6 3 billion. W h e n the U.S. foreign debt reached $1 trillion in 1992, it represented a crushing 15 percent of GNP. G r o w i n g poverty and wealth provide a second comparison. Although the existence of a "permanent underclass" in the United States was docum e n t e d in the 1960s (at the time of President Lyndon J o h n s o n ' s war on poverty), it grew by over one-third under Reagan and only slightly improved under Bush. In 1983, 35.3 million persons—roughly 15 percent of the total population—lived below the government-established poverty line. A striking 4 0 percent of those persons were children. The poverty rate was highest f o r blacks (35.7 percent) and Hispanics (28.4 percent) and their children. 1 7 9 Although by 1989 the poverty rate began a downward trend in some c a t e g o r i e s — f o r example, by 1996, 28.4 percent of black households were b e l o w the poverty line, a record l o w — t h e trend continued of the poorest 4 0 percent of households losing income and more children living in poverty. 1 8 0 In the late 1990s, over 20 percent of children lived in poverty despite government assistance, by far the highest rate of any developed country. 1 8 1 U n e m p l o y m e n t figures tell the same story: Overall official u n e m p l o y m e n t was about 6 to 7 percent in the mid- to late 1980s, and around 5 percent thereafter; but for n o n w h i t e s the rate was m u c h higher, including nearly 50 percent of young blacks. Working people also e x p e r i e n c e d declines: T h e real hourly wages of the bottom 40 percent of the population went down during the 1980s; and middle-class workers saw their standard of living erode (due either to increased work or a change to a l o w e r - w a g e " s e r v i c e " j o b ) such that a typical m i d - 1 9 9 0 s inflationadjusted income showed no improvement compared with 1973. 1 8 2 T h e structural nature of these growing class divisions is indicated by the fact that they took place at a time of increased wealth among the upper class and rising median income as a whole. A 1984 Federal Reserve Board study had f o u n d that the richest 2 percent of families collected about 15 percent of all income, and that the income share of the top 10 percent had risen to 33 percent. 1 8 3 Eight years later, i n c o m e concentration was even greater. 1 8 4 An O E C D study in 1995 f o u n d that the United States had the largest gap in after-tax income between rich and p o o r — 5 . 9 times—of any industrialized country. 1 8 5 T h e g a p would be far wider if wealth were measured rather than income, so as to include stocks, bonds, and business benefits. By that measure, the top 10 percent of the U.S. population in 1992 c o n t r o l l e d 67.2 percent of total wealth, leaving 32.8 percent f o r the rem a i n i n g 90 percent. 1 8 6 " T h e rising tide no longer lifts all b o a t s — o n l y yachts," quipped Ben A. Franklin, editor of The Washington Spectator.

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At a time of soaring stock market values, u n p r e c e d e n t e d c o r p o r a t e profits and top-tier salaries, world economic leadership, and no Cold War, one might think U.S. domestic achievements would match its number-one military ranking. But rising prosperity is not being distributed with human needs foremost in mind. 1 8 7 The fourth-best rating for literacy, for example, pertains to the most e l e m e n t a r y f o r m of education and not to f u n c t i o n a l (job-related) literacy, in which the United States ranks forty-ninth of 158 UN m e m b e r s . 1 8 8 In public health spending per person, the United States ranks eighth in the world, in infant mortality thirteenth, in life expectancy fourteenth, and in population per physician thirty-ninth. About 12 percent of the population (mostly the poor) lack medical insurance, which some specialists believe to be the key indicator of access to health care. 1 8 9 Skyrocketing health costs (especially for the elderly, w h o pay 20 cents of every dollar for health care) must also be taken into account. Finally, although U.S. environmental protection standards rank high on a global list, actual environmental quality is under severe threat f r o m the toxic wastes of commercial firms and military installations. Hunger, a basic cause of poor health, no longer affects only A m e r i c a ' s poor. In the most c o m p r e h e n s i v e report on hunger in 1985, a p h y s i c i a n s ' group called it a "public health epidemic." 1 9 0 By 1993, 26 million people were receiving food stamps, and the number of people (about 30 million) with below-minimum diets was 50 percent higher than in the mid-1980s. 1 9 1 Yet the United States ranks high in nutrition overall. Equally misleading is the education picture: The attractiveness of U.S. schools to non-American families belied the findings of national surveys, such as one in April 1983 by the National C o m m i s s i o n on Excellence in Education that said: "If an u n f r i e n d l y foreign p o w e r had attempted to impose on A m e r i c a the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might have viewed it as an act of war." In the 1990s, not m u c h i m p r o v e m e n t o c c u r r e d . The United States ranks ninth and tenth in the world, respectively, in public education spending per capita and per student; eighteenth in the percentage of school-age children in school; and thirty-ninth in the ratio of students to teachers. 1 9 2 Finally, regarding the status of women, the United States ranks only t w e l f t h a m o n g thirty-three countries on a gender-sensitive h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t scale. 1 9 3 A l t h o u g h w o m e n m a k e up nearly one-half of total university e n r o l l m e n t , that f i g u r e does not describe the failure of (maledominated) state legislatures to pass an equal rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the unlikelihood that a w o m a n (with or without a university degree) will earn a salary comparable to a m a n ' s (in the 1990s the median e a r n i n g s f o r w o m e n were still under 70 percent of m e n ' s earnings); and long-standing frustrations for w o m e n such as inadequate child-care facilities and unequal work and training opportunities, including professorships at the universities they attend.

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There are other social " e p i d e m i c s " in the United States, crime being principal a m o n g them. Lawlessness at every level—crime in the suites as well as crime in the streets; crime by and, especially, against c h i l d r e n — d o m i n a t e s all m e d i a and affects an increasing proportion of citizens. " [ 0 ] n e in four young people ages 10 to 16 queried nationwide in 1993 reported being assaulted or abused within the previous year," the New York Times reported. Such assaults are believed responsible for increased alcohol and drug use a m o n g youth, thoughts of suicide, and pregnancy rates that are among the highest in industrialized countries. 1 9 4 The overall crime rate is one of the w o r l d ' s highest, and the rate of imprisonment (455 persons per 100,000) exceeds South A f r i c a ' s (311) and is more than ten times Japan's. 1 9 5 A murder takes place every twenty-three minutes—also among the w o r l d ' s highest rates. 1 9 6 Women are especially vulnerable: The greatest public-health problem for women is abuse and violence, usually f r o m men they know. Yet white-collar crime is no less r a m p a n t — a n d several times more costly to society than street crime. These factors contribute to staggering problems of justice and administration. A telling c o m m e n t on social priorities as 2000 approaches is that in 1995, California's spending on prisons (around $4 billion, or just under 10 percent of the state's budget) exceeded spending on its two public university systems. 1 9 7 By 2000, it will cost U.S. taxpayers $100 million a day to incarcerate prisoners. 1 9 8 Almost inevitably, the rate of conviction and term of imprisonment vary greatly, often depending on the socioeconomic background and race of the defendant. As race relations have continued to deteriorate, the incarceration rate of black males has risen. Astoundingly, fully 7 percent of all adult black males are in prison; 1 9 9 at a half-million men, they exceed the number of blacks in college. 2 0 0 Finally, society is increasingly aware of the special p r o b l e m s associated with children: their neglect, abuse, abduction, and molestation, as well as their (equally criminal) impoverishment. These problems of personal insecurity have a counterpart in the econ o m i c d o m a i n . There, too, an entire m i d d l e s e c t o r — s m a l l businesses, small banks, the family f a r m — i s being squeezed and shrunk by economic forces that strengthen the upper stratum while weakening the lower level. T h e main elements of this concentration of benefits and power are: • Inequities in the tax s y s t e m — m u l t i b i l l i o n - d o l l a r tax breaks for the largest corporations for depreciation, investment, and research; far greater reliance f o r federal revenues on personal taxes than on corporate taxes; and the failure of numerous large corporations to pay any federal tax despite showing hefty profits; 2 0 1 • A b u s e of tax investment incentives by their largest beneficiaries, who use them either to absorb other businesses or to pay larger dividends to stockholders, in neither case benefiting the e c o n o m y ; 2 0 2

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• A record pace of large-scale corporate takeovers—$1 trillion worth in 1996, $1.5 trillion in 199 7 203 —leading to further concentration of control of manufacturing, health and financial services, and banking; • Increasing numbers of business failures, from the collapse and weakening of many major businesses to large numbers of small-business and farm closings. (At their height in the early 1980s, there were about 1,600 farm closings a week and farm debt stood at $215 billion.) 204 Seven of the top ten quarterly business losses in U.S. history occurred in 1992 and 1993, leading to huge work force reductions. 205 • The consistent deficits in the U.S. trade position, made so by longterm neglect to modernize basic industries and retool management and labor for a changing world economy. • The shaky position of the banking system, whose record postDepression failures and high interest rates in the 1980s reflected not only the huge demands of the federal government and indebted businesses but also federal deregulation policies and risky loans, such as those to Third World governments, amounting to over one and one-half times the major banks' total equity. 206 By 1990, hundreds of savings and loan institutions had failed, requiring at least $500 billion in government money to bail them out. Yet the banking industry as a whole reported record profits of $32 billion in 1992. "Who will bail out the United States?" President Ford once asked. 207 The enormous increase of the national debt under Reagan, the heavy obligation of interest payments on that debt, the high trade deficits, and increased foreign investments in the United States meant that by the late 1980s, the U.S. debt "exceeded all the Latin American megaborrowers put together." 208 So long as U.S. consumers use more than they are willing to pay for, they will be living dangerously—borrowing from abroad and paying interest, and borrowing from the future, when the approximately $6 trillion in government, business, and personal debts will have to be paid off. 2 0 9 Absent so far, largely thanks to economic troubles in Japan and Europe that make investing in the United States a safer bet, is the political will to make major changes in government spending and tax policies that would strengthen family security rather than corporate security. At some point, as economist Lester Thurow warned, "the party [on borrowed money] stops and the work of repayment begins. The larger the borrowing, the harsher the period of repayment. If one wants to know what happens when countries are forced to begin repayment, go to Mexico or Brazil and look." 2 ' 0 These critical observations should be considered in the context of both the American dream and the American reality. To many millions of people abroad, the United States still represents a land of opportunity and personal freedom. The ongoing, huge flow of refugees into the country attests

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to that. So do the large numbers of students and specialists, f r o m rich and poor countries alike, w h o seek (and find) their f o r t u n e s in the United States. They understand, even if many U.S. citizens do not, that a U.S. education is not only valuable but also a bargain investment in the economic d e v e l o p m e n t of w h i c h e v e r country they finally call home. 2 1 1 And the United States continues to possess e n o r m o u s talent, energy, and youthful dynamism, as W h i t m a n ' s poem says. Even its most vociferous critics give credit to the c o u n t r y ' s history of social activism and o p e n n e s s to dissent and cultural diversity. But the divisions within society and the e c o n o m y are growing; the a p p e a r a n c e s of wealth and p o w e r are both real and deceiving. At the political center is an absorption with preserving privileges and power and a striking lack of political imagination to break clear of old shibboleths, left and right, in search of a new consensus appropriate to real security in a world in crisis. Even after the Cold War, the costs of empire hang like a dead weight over the country, as they do over the former Soviet Union, obstructing opportunities to make such a break.

The Price of Being Number

One

We can now examine the direct and indirect costs of the arms race in light of the serious social and e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s in Russia and the United States. Because the availability of pertinent data is limited to the United States, the discussion will deal only with it. But in view of the similar rules of the g a m e that the military-industrial c o m p l e x e s in the two countries operate under, a reasonable assumption is that what is true about the impact of the arms race in the United States is even more true in Russia. Any discussion of the real costs of national security to a society must consider the full d i m e n s i o n of military spending. S o m e f i g u r e s f o r the United States and the FSU/Russia have already been given concerning the most obvious kinds of expenditures: weapons, armed forces, and bases at h o m e and abroad. But other line items should be added, such as nuclear energy, veterans' benefits, the military c o m p o n e n t of space programs, the military reserve, and interest p a y m e n t s on the national debt f r o m past wars. The defense department budgets of both countries hide these costs in the budgets of other agencies. W h e n they are added to the bottom line of national d e f e n s e , they account f o r very large p r o p o r t i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t spending. At the height of R e a g a n ' s military b u i l d u p , d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g was over 50 percent of all federal general spending out of tax revenues. 2 1 2 By fiscal year 1996, the real U.S. military b u d g e t was $ 4 9 4 billion, still about one-third of total g o v e r n m e n t budget outlays. 2 1 3 Consequently, although official U.S. military spending in the late 1990s has gone d o w n f r o m $300 billion-a-year levels, it is still four times that of Russia, equal to the military s p e n d i n g of the next six countries combined, and m a n y

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times larger than the combined military spending o f all U.S.-declared rogue states such as Iraq, Cuba, and North K o r e a . 2 1 4 The most glaring set o f e c o n o m i c c o n s e q u e n c e s of such profligate spending in the United States is in relation to indebtedness, interest rates, and taxes. Past and present military obligations have contributed far more than any other kind o f public spending to the U . S . national debt. 2 1 5 (Equally obvious to many observers is that only a sizable and sustained reduction in military spending can make a dent in the debt.) Economists generally agree that huge budget deficits drive up interest rates; and the military, having the largest claim on government borrowing, helps to keep interest rates high. Individual taxpayers are therefore hurt in two quite direct ways from high levels o f military spending. First, as consumers, they pay high interest on credit purchases, from home mortgages to clothing. Second, families pay a substantial proportion o f their income taxes for military spending. A second set of direct costs of military spending pertains to economic productivity and competitiveness internationally. Here is the point of direct conflict between U.S. political-military predominance and the erosion o f U . S . international e c o n o m i c hegemony. As Seymour M e l m a n , among many others, has frequently pointed out, the Pentagon's inefficient way of doing business over many years—and, one should add, the congressional toleration, if not encouragement, of it—was a major factor in the loss of industrial advantage to the Japanese and the West Europeans. Large cost overruns, lack o f competitive bidding on most prime contracts, seemingly endless amounts of money to spend, scandalous waste and o v e r c h a r g e s — and now concentration of military-industrial power in only three f i r m s — all add up to very expensive military equipment very inefficiently produced by a very large sector o f the e c o n o m y — i n short, low productivity and overpriced goods. It is no accident that the high-productivity societies are also the ones with relatively low military spending in relation to the G N P and strong international trade positions, such as Japan and the E U . 2 1 6 Low productivity and a poor trade position are also the result o f the previously noted drain o f U . S . research money and talent into military work. In 1982 U . S . research spending for nonmilitary purposes was only 1.9 percent o f the GNP, considerably less than for West Germany (2.6 percent) or Japan (2.5 percent). 2 1 7 Several years after the Cold War's end, the U.S. government is still devoting over one-half of its R & D spending (about $ 3 8 billion) to military programs, whereas in Europe, two-thirds goes into civilian research on the environment, transportation, and other critical areas. 2 1 8 Simon Ramo, former president of T R W , a major military contractor, puts the issue succinctly: "In the past thirty years, had the total dollars we spent on military R & D been expended instead in those areas of science and technology promising the most economic progress, we probably would

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be today where we are going to find ourselves arriving technologically in the year 2000." 2 1 9 Military work in the United States employs over 25 percent of all scientists and engineers, including 30 percent of all mathematicians, 25 percent of all physicists, 47 percent of all aerospace engineers, and 11 percent of all computer programmers. 2 2 0 "If the brightest engineers in Japan are designing video recorders and the brightest engineers in the United States are designing M X missiles," Lester Thurow observed, "then we shouldn't find it surprising that they conquer the video-recorder market" 2 2 1 —or, today, high-definition television. Military spending is a t w o - e d g e d sword in a third area: jobs. That it creates e m p l o y m e n t is self-evident. But the kind of e m p l o y m e n t created— skilled technical work for the most part—cannot tap into the m u c h larger pool of semiskilled and professional workers that nonmilitary e m p l o y m e n t can. Thus, several studies comparing the number of jobs brought about by every $1 billion of government spending found that money used in (for example) education, public transportation, and health and police services produces thousands more jobs than spending on military development. 2 2 2 While it is o f t e n argued on behalf of military spending that it contributes to the civilian sector through the technological s p i n - o f f s of research, notably aircraft and computers, there seem to be absolute limits to civilian applications. 2 2 3 In a word, the prospects for reducing u n e m p l o y ment in the United States, or anywhere else, are going to depend on the dev e l o p m e n t of civilian g o o d s and services. And w h e n it c o m e s to cutting into hard-core u n e m p l o y m e n t a m o n g the least-skilled, education and the expansion of h u m a n services, not military service or production, are the most effective remedies. The military's absorption of resources represents yet another large social cost. Murray L. W e i d e n b a u m , chairman of R e a g a n ' s Council of Economic Advisers, said in criticism of the 1980s military buildup: " W h a t worries m e is that these crash e f f o r t s rarely increase national security. They strain resources, create b o t t l e n e c k s . " 2 2 4 T h e U.S. m i l i t a r y ' s largescale consumption of strategic materials such as oil and chromium adds up to two unpleasant possibilities: the use of force to gain or preserve access to valuable resources, or U.S. g o v e r n m e n t and corporate a l i g n m e n t with oppressive regimes that supply the resources. U.S. energy policy has long been held h o s t a g e by a national-security strategy that relies heavily on M i d d l e East oil. By e m p h a s i z i n g c o n s u m p t i o n rather than c o n s e r v a t i o n , U.S. administrations allowed the trade deficit to climb and dependence on Persian Gulf oil to increase to the point of going to war over it in 1991. 2 2 5 Overall, then, a solution to the problem that would be in both the national and global interest would be to develop mineral and energy substitutes, to conserve and recycle, and to reduce the military's needs for w e a p o n s and resources.

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As E i s e n h o w e r ' s r e m a r k quoted earlier suggests, excessive military spending indirectly d r a w s h u m a n and material r e s o u r c e s away f r o m socially productive purposes. At precisely what point military spending bec o m e s excessive is, of course, always a matter of debate. But when national security is redefined in Global-Humanist terms, it b e c o m e s possible to see the transfer of resources f r o m military to civilian purposes as a contribution to defense. Widening income gaps, decreasing j o b security, childhood poverty, and a m e d i o c r e educational system surely count as indicators of declining real security f o r generations to c o m e . W h e n these and other socioeconomic problems can be traced to particular causes, such as unprecedented levels of military spending, there is reason for j u d g i n g the spending excessive and injurious to the national interest. When Eisenhower, in his farewell address, issued his famous warning about the military-industrial complex, he specifically included two other areas: civil liberties and democracy. "We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes." he said. "We should take nothing for granted." The warning is well taken. The shrouding of government activities with the mantle of national security has been detrimental to the A m e r i c a n way of life in m a n y instances, taking such form as secret warfare against other states; arming of governments that consistently violate the human rights and political liberties of their citizens; secretive contractual ties f o r military research between federal agencies and academic institutions; suppression of information that would embarrass and cause public criticism of government officials, rather than subvert national security; disinformation c a m p a i g n s designed to m o b i l i z e public and congressional opinion against government enemies abroad; the prosecution of prominent former employees-turned-critics; extra-constitutional actions designed to skirt the law and avoid congressional oversight; the denial of entry f r o m abroad of persons and f i l m s critical of U.S. policy; the insistence on a right of prior restraint on scientific and academic exchanges with persons f r o m rival countries; and the infiltration of groups that peacefully protest U.S. policy, such as churches that o f f e r e d sanctuary to r e f u g e e s f r o m Central America. T h e F o u n d i n g Fathers f o r e s a w this danger of the national-security state. "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at h o m e is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, f r o m abroad," James Madison said in 1798.

6 Europe and Japan in a Multipolar World

We want to belong to a Europe that is a friendly community of independent states, a stable Europe, a Europe that does not need protection from superpowers because it is capable of defending itself by constructing its own security system. —President Vaclav Havel

The New Meaning of Power W h e n the history of the twentieth century is written, w e can be certain that the rebirth of E u r o p e and J a p a n a f t e r W o r l d W a r II w i l l be a p r o m i n e n t chapter. One of its themes is f a m i l i a r : the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of w a r - r a v a g e d e c o n o m i e s into d y n a m i c centers of international b u s i n e s s . A n o t h e r theme, still in the m a k i n g , is l e s s f r e q u e n t l y noted: h o w p o l i t i c a l

economies

w h o s e f a t e s w e r e intertwined with the C o l d War competition h a v e asserted their i n d e p e n d e n c e and c o n t r i b u t e d to e a s i n g the w o r l d ' s m i l i t a r y , e c o n o m i c , and e c o l o g i c a l c r i s e s . A t the s a m e t i m e , J a p a n and E u r o p e are c a u g h t b e t w e e n the n e w d e m a n d s of the p o s t - C o l d W a r era and the burdens and o b l i g a t i o n s of the past. E u r o p e a n and J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c s h a v e g i v e n n e w m e a n i n g to p o w e r . T h e i r e c o n o m i c and social p e r f o r m a n c e has demonstrated what can be acc o m p l i s h e d w h e n m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are not p e r m i t t e d to b e c o m e dominant. T h i s is not to s a y that these countries are m i n o r participants in the g l o b a l arms race. J a p a n , F r a n c e , G e r m a n y , B r i t a i n , and Italy h a v e been right b e h i n d R u s s i a in m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g since the end of the C o l d War, and B r i t a i n , G e r m a n y , and F r a n c e c o n t i n u e to be i m p o r t a n t a r m s e x porters. 1 F r a n c e and B r i t a i n maintain strategic nuclear f o r c e s that continue to b e m o d e r n i z e d ; 2 and both c o u n t r i e s h a v e s i z a b l e , though d i m i n i s h i n g , standing and o v e r s e a s a r m i e s . 3

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On the other end of the spectrum, however, are mature economies that have relatively small military burdens. Japan officially spends about 1 percent (unofficially, it is more like 1.5 percent) of its $ 3 trillion G N P on the military. Its armed forces are well below their authorized strength o f 2 4 6 , 0 0 0 , and its arms exports are minuscule, on a par with G r e e c e ' s . 4 Now that the Warsaw Pact is a thing of the past, the eastern European states, which once were spending heavily on the military (led by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland), have also been able to lighten their burdens considerably. 5 Only the former Yugoslavia is an exception; but that could change as the United States pushes arms sales to NATO's new members. T h e heart of the matter is that, from 1 9 6 0 to 1 9 8 1 , while the United States was spending an average of 6.5 percent of its G N P on the military and the Soviet Union was spending 10.9 percent, their European allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact were spending, respectively, 3.7 percent and 3 percent of their G N P s . 6 The superpowers subsidized their partners' defense—the United States in that period accounted for two-thirds of NATO military outlays and the U S S R for about 9 0 percent of Warsaw Pact outl a y s 7 — a n d therefore also their economic growth. This sacrifice o f financial health for political allegiance continued to the end of the Cold War. From 1982 to 1991, the United States officially spent $ 2 . 7 9 trillion on the military, whereas the E C and Japan together spent $ 1 . 7 6 trillion. Europe and Japan thus accumulated over $1 trillion in additional spending power compared with the United States. 8 As we have just noted, the United States continues to have a high military burden, whereas Japan and Europe spend far less on national security. T h e international e c o n o m i c consequence was a decline in the U . S . trade balance in manufactured goods that became permanent in 1968. U . S . transnational firms moved to Europe, a powerful Eurodollar market emerged as more and more dollars found their way into European banking hands, and West European and Japanese industries began to outperform their U . S . counterparts. 9 Their industries became more productive, innovative, profitable, and better managed than the A m e r i c a n s ' . 1 0 T h e Soviets, meanwhile, watched as some economies become more efficient and flexible than their own, such as Hungary's, while others became massive headaches, such as Poland's. T h e Soviets' command-style system also bequeathed a legacy o f environmental pollution and political repression that is only now being addressed. Chapter 2 noted the increasing share of world exports being taken by Japan and what was then the European Economic Community ( E E C ; later simply E C ) o f West European states in the 1970s. Rapid growth in world trade in turn fueled overall economic growth. This relationship can be seen in figures for 1977, which indicate that international trade was 13 percent o f Japan's GNP, 24 percent of West Germany's, and 25 percent of Britain's,

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compared with only 6 percent of the U . S . GNP. 1 1 As European economic union gained momentum in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s (see below), the E C ' s share of world trade ( 1 8 percent) leaped ahead of the U . S . and Japanese shares (which were 17 percent and 9 percent, respectively). Particularly dynamic growth occurred in the trade o f the twelve E C countries with each o t h e r — it was nearly 6 0 percent o f the members' total foreign trade in 1 9 8 7 — a n d in E C trade with other developed West European economies. B y 1 9 8 5 , the E C had already become the world's largest trading b l o c . 1 2 S o m e elements of vulnerability accompany this e c o n o m i c strength. Dependence on foreign oil is one: T h e 1 9 7 9 oil shortages, for example, drained Western Europe, Canada, and Japan of about $ 4 0 0 billion in that year alone to pay for higher-priced oil and reduced e c o n o m i c activity. 1 3 These countries are also vulnerable to major recessions or inflations in the United States. The effects are always quickly felt, either in high unemployment and high interest rates, or in high unemployment and inflation ( " s t a g f l a t i o n " ) . 1 4 And that is why, since the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , European and Japanese leaders, as much as Third World leaders, have pushed the United States to reduce its enormous budget deficits. T h e i r economies are hurt by weaknesses in the U . S . economy, even though their exports are helped by Americans' huge appetite for European and Japanese products. Despite these vulnerabilities, the EU countries and Japan have proven quite adept at resisting U . S . pressures to reduce tariff and other barriers to trade, eliminate government subsidies (such as on European agricultural products) that may unfairly price exports, and substantially increase their shares o f military spending—all measures that U . S . administrations have argued would help reduce trade and budget deficits. Periodic, serious strains in the Western alliance have resulted from these perceived inequities. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, they inspired strong protectionist sentiment in the U . S . Congress and led to pressure from the president on Japan and the E U to open up their economies to a long list o f U . S . products. Neither side in the dispute would admit to exaggerating its claims and scapegoating the other. For the reality would seem to be that Japanese and European markets are much more protected against other countries' products (including Japan's against the E U ' s ) than they care to admit, 1 5 and that U.S. trade problems are much less the result of such protectionism than of m a c r o e c o n o m i c f o r c e s — l o w private savings, budget deficits, and high interest rates—that have fostered long-term U . S . neglect o f its industrial base. 1 6 The erosion of U . S . leadership and competitiveness in world trade has, as stressed above, coincided with its enormous investment in arms and global alliances. In Chapter 5 we observed the social and economic costs for both the United States and Russia of this investment. In contrast, Europe and Japan have put a significant portion of their savings on the military into

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long-term e c o n o m i c investment and social well-being. Consider, f o r instance, how R & D m o n e y is allocated. T h e United States spends m u c h more on scientific research, as a proportion of GNP, than any other industrialized country. Yet until 1993, U.S. industrial productivity ranked very low in c o m p a r i s o n , one reason clearly being the high proportion of f e d eral R & D invested in the military. 1 7 Industrial productivity in the United States was also hindered by failure to m o d e r n i z e e q u i p m e n t and production m e t h o d s , inefficient energy use, top-heavy m a n a g e m e n t geared to short-term p r o f i t - m a k i n g , and low capital i n v e s t m e n t — a l l opposite of what Japan and G e r m a n y e x p e r i e n c e d , particularly in basic industries (such as steel and auto). 1 8 When U.S. productivity surged ahead of Europe and Japan in 1993, it was to a considerable extent on the backs of labor: Europe and Japan looked for ways to maintain j o b security and benefits, w h e r e a s the largest U.S. f i r m s b e c a m e more e f f i c i e n t and profitable, by laying off workers and keeping wages stagnant. 1 9 The EU countries and Japan have always been k n o w n for their high quality of life: efficient, well-ordered societies, progressive e n v i r o n m e n tal policies, a cradle-to-the-grave health and w e l f a r e system (and high taxes to pay for it)—and for being leaders in most areas of human development. But the p o s t - C o l d War shift to globalization, the liberation of eastern Europe, and (for Japan) the bursting of the real estate bubble forced governments, businesses, and publics to reexamine traditional practices and values. It has been a p a i n f u l transition, full of unanticipated crises and setbacks. In Western E u r o p e the precipitating f a c t o r was a recession severe e n o u g h that in 1993 the E U suffered its first e c o n o m i c contraction since the peak of the oil crisis in 197 5. 2 0 About 22 million w o r k e r s — o n e in every n i n e — w e r e unemployed. Budget pressures and concerns about trade deficits were f o r c i n g every E u r o p e a n state to cut back on social w e l f a r e benefits. In France, for instance, u n e m p l o y m e n t went f r o m 9.4 percent in 1991 to 12.7 percent in 1996; combined with an aging society, it m a d e for very high social insurance costs that no one, least of all organized labor, wanted to give up. K n o w i n g that high-technology industries were losing their competitive edge, and that budgets would have to be pared in anticipation of a c o m m o n European currency by 1999, the French still quailed at the thought of embracing the American f o r m u l a for productivity: downsizing and privatization. T h e rise of the anti-immigration, anti-globalization right-wing National Front, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen (he won 15 percent of the vote in the 1995 presidential election), was in direct proportion to F r a n c e ' s high u n e m p l o y m e n t and low growth. 2 1 And so it was across Europe: Bleak times provided fertile ground for racism and discrimination against "foreigners," mainly economic refugees and migrant workers f r o m southern Europe, North Africa, and other poor

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regions. T h e i r cheap labor had fueled the rapid postwar r e c o v e r y o f G e r many, F r a n c e , B r i t a i n , and other E U countries. M a n y b e c a m e permanent residents. B u t in the early 1 9 9 0 s , at a time o f e c o n o m i c downturn, these workers b e c a m e c o n v e n i e n t p o l i t i c a l targets o f e x t r e m i s t groups and the o b j e c t o f restrictive legislation. T h e starting point was in G e r m a n y , which was already beset by two other financial and social problems: first, the une x p e c t e d l y high c o s t s o f rebuilding eastern G e r m a n y ; and, s e c o n d , the p r o b l e m s o f a c c o m m o d a t i n g unprecedented n u m b e r s o f r e f u g e e s (about 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 9 2 a l o n e ) from R o m a n i a and other f o r m e r C o m m u n i s t - b l o c c o u n t r i e s who had streamed into G e r m a n y after 1 9 8 9 . T h e s e

factors

pushed Germany and then F r a n c e , which was admitting about 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 foreigners a year, to pass laws greatly restricting immigration and a s y l u m . 2 2 G e r m a n a n t i f o r e i g n i s m and a n t i - S e m i t i s m , in s o m e i n s t a n c e s led by n e o - N a z i s , were e s p e c i a l l y p r o n o u n c e d in the c i t i e s o f the f o r m e r East G e r m a n y . F o r it is in the east that one finds the m o s t s e v e r e u n e m p l o y m e n t — 1 3 . 9 percent in 1 9 9 5 . R a p i d deindustrialization and loss o f output have been the rule since reunification in O c t o b e r 1 9 9 0 . Western G e r m a n y ' s privatization o f the formerly state-run eastern e c o n o m y left numerous people without property or j o b s . W i t h i n three years the eastern region went f r o m b e i n g a m a j o r industrialized country that was dependent on S o v i e t e c o n o m i c interests to b e i n g an i m p o v e r i s h e d b a c k w a t e r o f the new G e r man state. 2 3 In Eastern Europe, e c o n o m i c and social problems have been just as serious as in eastern G e r m a n y , and without the infusion o f western G e r m a n funds and t e c h n o l o g y that the east obtained. High u n e m p l o y m e n t , o n e third o f the region ( 1 2 0 million people) living in poverty, 2 4 a public-health c r i s i s , 2 5 and b e w i l d e r m e n t at the e n o r m i t y o f the c h a n g e s s i n c e c o m m u n i s m ' s d e m i s e c o e x i s t with n e w f o u n d f r e e d o m s , prosperity and c o n sumerism in m a j o r cities, and business opportunities. 2 6 Amidst such deepe n i n g d i v i s i o n s , d e m o c r a c y and c i v i l s o c i e t i e s c o u l d not m a g i c a l l y take root. E v e n where they appeared to do so, other d e v e l o p m e n t s interceded. O n e was the return to political p r o m i n e n c e o f a number o f remolded C o m munist Party o f f i c i a l s riding on the wings o f nationalism. Another was the ethnic c l e a n s i n g and other abuses o f human rights that erupted in s o m e o f the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v and S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s . A third d e v e l o p m e n t was the r e e m e r g e n c e o f a n t i - S e m i t i s m , in Poland and Hungary as in Germany. T o one degree or another, all these developments originated in the p o s t - C o l d War economic dislocations.27 T h e s e destabilizing trends c a m e at a time when Europe (and, to a lesser degree, J a p a n ) was dealing with long-standing, mostly transnational, environmental issues. " F o r e s t d e a t h , " as the G e r m a n s refer to acid rain, is e x tensive in both parts o f their country, as well as in S c a n d i n a v i a and Poland. S u l f u r d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s f r o m a united G e r m a n y will be the highest in

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Europe, f u r t h e r d a m a g i n g its n e i g h b o r s ' air. 2 8 Acid rain has also h a r m e d more than half the forests of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Greece, and Great Britain and has caused severe damage to fish in the lakes of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 2 9 Seventy percent of Czech and Slovak waters are officially considered heavily polluted, and 28 percent have no fish. 3 0 Last, several European countries (including Germany, Britain, and Italy), along with Japan, are m a j o r sources of carbon emissions that contribute to global warming. 3 1 In c o m p a r i s o n with Eastern E u r o p e , however, the West European states have the resources and the political will to take action at home and exert leadership internationally on issues such as global warming. 3 2 Germany, f o r e x a m p l e , is the w o r l d ' s fifth-largest carbon emitter because of its reliance on coal; but it reduced carbon emissions by over 10 percent in the first half of the 1990s through a combination of efficiency incentives, taxes, industrial restructuring, and public concern about climate change. 3 3 Eastern E u r o p e is an e n v i r o n m e n t a l disaster area, as e x e m p l i f i e d by Poland. Like the other onetime m e m b e r s of the Soviet bloc, Poland after World War II adopted the Soviet economic model that emphasized central planning, d e v e l o p m e n t of heavy and extractive industries, and collectivized agriculture. T h e c o u n t r y ' s health care and nutrition ranked high worldwide, but over time public services went into decline and created serious air and water pollution. 3 4 A 1985 report of the Polish A c a d e m y of Sciences offered the somber prediction that "the long limitation of investments may have in the near future social and ecological consequences on an unimaginable scale." 3 5 Indeed, P o l a n d ' s precarious environmental situation seriously threatens the c o u n t r y ' s f u t u r e . 3 6 Years of overexploitation of natural resources, emphasis on heavy industrialization to the exclusion of its environmental costs, bureaucratic indifference to environmental issues, and plain lack of environmental technology and e n f o r c e m e n t have taken their toll. Air pollution is among the most intense in Europe, though carbon emissions have been reduced. It is mainly caused by sulfur dioxide emissions f r o m industry that relies heavily on coal, f r o m automobiles (of which there are many more since socialism ended), and f r o m pollution f r o m the f o r m e r Czechoslovakia and G e r m a n y . T h e h a r m c a u s e d to public health includes high rates of cancer and infant m o r t a l i t y — 1 4 per 1,000 births, compared with 6 in Germany. 3 7 A Polish government test of f o o d s f o u n d (in 1979) that on average 20 percent were contaminated by air pollution and therefore unfit for h u m a n c o n s u m p t i o n . A b o u t 50 percent on a v e r a g e of the c o u n t r y ' s water has b e c o m e unusable for drinking or even for industrial use. As Poland and other East E u r o p e a n states adopt m a r k e t systems and give first priority to economic growth, their environmental problems may worsen. Like Third World e c o n o m i e s , Poland has a high external debt

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(about $ 4 2 billion in 1 9 9 5 ) that represents 3 6 percent o f G N P and 127 percent o f export e a r n i n g s . 3 8 It has a very inefficient, heavily state-subsidized energy system that needs reforming both to save m o n e y and cut down on carbon d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s . 3 9 T o top o f f the T h i r d World

comparison,

Poland in 1 9 9 0 accepted the I M F - a p p r o v e d s h o c k therapy, which kept inflation down and privatized many i n e f f i c i e n t state enterprises, but which also led to 11 percent u n e m p l o y m e n t and a public outcry against foreign c a p i t a l i s t s . 4 0 Short on capital and thus far getting very little e n v i r o n m e n tal aid from the W e s t — f o r e x a m p l e , to d e c o m m i s s i o n C h e r n o b y l - t y p e nuc l e a r r e a c t o r s — P o l a n d lacks the r e s o u r c e s to deal with e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s that its g o v e r n m e n t now a c k n o w l e d g e s . T h u s , even though democratization has opened up P o l a n d ' s political system to " g r e e n " v o i c e s , harsh e c o n o m i c realities impinge on its ability to create a healthier society.

Toward a United Europe J e a n M o n n e t , F r a n c e ' s architect o f European recovery after World War II, had a dream: to c r e a t e a strong E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i c union that would s o m e d a y e v o l v e into a p o l i t i c a l federation. As 2 0 0 0 nears, that dream is c l o s e to being realized. European cooperation has progressed from a limited partnership to f u l l - f l e d g e d e c o n o m i c union: the E u r o p e a n C o a l and S t e e l C o m m u n i t y ( E C S C ) o f six m e m b e r states ( F r a n c e , West G e r m a n y , Italy, the Netherlands, B e l g i u m , and L u x e m b o u r g ) in 1 9 5 2 ; the R o m e Treaties o f 1 9 5 8 , by which the same six nations established the European A t o m i c E n e r g y C o m m u n i t y and the E E C , or C o m m o n M a r k e t ; expansion o f the E E C in 1 9 7 3 to include B r i t a i n , D e n m a r k , and Ireland, in 1 9 8 2 G r e e c e , and in 1 9 8 6 S p a i n and Portugal ( b r i n g i n g the m e m b e r s h i p to twelve); and in 1 9 8 6 , the signing by " t h e T w e l v e , " the European C o m m u nity, o f the S i n g l e E u r o p e a n A c t . 4 1 B y the end o f 1 9 9 2 , the act was supposed to r e m o v e all barriers to the m o v e m e n t o f p e o p l e , c a p i t a l , g o o d s , and services, paving the way for e c o n o m i c and later political union o f 3 2 0 million people. T h e single-market plan was born o f e c o n o m i c motives: to eliminate all r e m a i n i n g internal barriers that were proving c o s t l y to further growth; to stop the fragmentation o f research and production in t w e l v e national markets and instead c r e a t e e c o n o m i e s o f s c a l e b a s e d on u n i f o r m standards, f e w e r regulations, and c o m b i n e d efforts; to increase E u r o p e ' s global c o m petitive power, and therefore global market share; and to increase savings, G N P , and e m p l o y m e n t . 4 2 T h e s e o b j e c t i v e s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t the interdepend e n c e o f E u r o p e ' s various domestic e c o n o m i e s with the global e c o n o m y — and the determination, therefore, to c o m b a t the perceived U . S . and Japane s e c h a l l e n g e s to E u r o p e ' s future prosperity. 4 3

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With a combined G N P over $6 trillion in 1998, the E U — a s it has been k n o w n since N o v e m b e r 1993—is a f o r m i d a b l e challenger for world economic leadership. Not only are EU exports more competitive worldwide, but also the E U will probably be able to m a n u f a c t u r e substitutes for previously imported p r o d u c t s — f o r e x a m p l e , c o m m u n i c a t i o n e q u i p m e n t and television programs. 4 4 The established trend is to "buy E u r o p e a n , " which has already led to a significant increase in intra-EU trade, notably in manu f a c t u r e d goods. Contrary to the widespread c o n c e r n a m o n g U.S. and Japanese T N C s that the E U would be closed to non-EU imports and to foreign investment, quite the opposite has been the case. The larger European market has led to expanded imports and increased investment and sales by U.S.- and Japanese-owned affiliates. 4 5 In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the single European market was to move toward c o m m o n policies in welfare and foreign policy. One reason this direction was considered necessary was that the breakdown of national economic barriers would place new d e m a n d s on transnational institutions such as the E u r o p e a n Parliament and Court of Justice. These were created under the E C S C and adapted by the C o m m o n Market countries. As a single Europe takes form, the parliament and court will be more frequently resorted to for legislation and the adjudication of disputes. Second, C o n t i n e n t a l i s m — a vision of Europe stretching " f r o m the Atlantic to the Urals" (in Charles de G a u l l e ' s words), a " c o m m o n h o m e " (in Gorb a c h e v ' s ) — i s taking hold. Although not every government accepts the full implication of this vision—Britain under Margaret T h a t c h e r consistently sought to preserve national s o v e r e i g n t y — t h e belief in one Europe is widely shared. In February 1992 the EC set a timetable for establishing a c o m m o n currency (the euro), central banking system, and c o m m o n citizenship under the Maastricht Treaty. Germany, with E u r o p e ' s most powerful currency, largest economy, and strongest bank, the Bundesbank, stands to benefit most f r o m further integration. But such benefits also strengthen G e r m a n y ' s identification with a united E u r o p e — a point m a d e by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the time of G e r m a n unification, and certainly one designed to calm fears f r o m Moscow to London about a resurgent Germany. E u r o p e 9 2 ' s train was delayed, though not derailed, by nationalism and economic stresses that began appearing in 1991. M a n y Europeans became skittish about surrendering national sovereignty under Maastricht. As regional e c o n o m i c woes increased, so did anxieties about tight integration. 4 6 For the harsh reality of currency union was that bringing government spending d o w n to 3 percent of GNP, which G e r m a n y had insisted on as one criterion of m e m b e r s h i p , would compel g o v e r n m e n t s , G e r m a n y ' s included, to slash social w e l f a r e and put working p e o p l e on the street. 4 7 But in the end Corporate Globalism scored another victory: French voters barely approved the treaty, and Danes voted for it only on the second try

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(in May 1993). The British House of Commons followed suit in midyear, but only after Britain, like Denmark, was exempted from provisions governing monetary and security cooperation. Reaching consensus on currency values proved especially vexing because of the Bundesbank's protection o f the mark, leading some observers to write that the whole Maastricht process was in danger of being overwhelmed by narrow national interests. 4 8 T h e strains of warfare in central Europe also played a part, for they revealed political differences among key states over a course of action and the E U ' s consequent inability to stop the violence around it (discussed in the next section). Britain's vote for Maastricht meant that all twelve members had ratified it, paving the way for implementation. T h e EU later voted to admit Finland. Sweden, Norway, and Austria in 1995; Norway declined. Several Eastern European states have also pressed for entry. 4 9 Russia will eventually be knocking on the door, provided its economy and currency can function reliably. Even though complete political integration is likely to be farther off than once appeared, the area of European economic unity has actually widened. T h e euro came out on schedule January 1, 1999, although only eleven countries (not Britain, Sweden, Denmark, or G r e e c e ) will initially use it. 5 0 A single central bank is next on the agenda, and there is talk of the euro becoming the dollar's rival as the world's principal reserve currency. 5 1

The Changed Strategic Picture Until the Gorbachev phenomenon swept over Eastern Europe, the Continent's long-standing concern had been its vulnerability to a conflict between the superpowers. As recently as the early 1980s, high-ranking U . S . officials were publicly mentioning Europe as the potential setting for a " l i m i t e d " nuclear e x c h a n g e that might result from an escalation o f conventional fighting with Soviet forces. Approximately 10 million NATO and Warsaw Pact soldiers were on duty in Europe at that time, and each side controlled thousands o f nuclear weapons all over the Continent intended for battlefield use. 5 2 This circumstance became the source o f constant tension within N A T O — t e n s i o n that reached a crescendo during the Reagan presidency. On one hand, Europeans were well aware from studies done within NATO dating back to 1955 that if nuclear weapons were used to defend against a conventional Soviet attack, all of Europe would eventually be destroyed. 5 3 European fears were running so high that then chancellor Helmut Schmidt o f West Germany remarked in 1981 that "in some situations it seems that Europeans are even more afraid o f the Americans than they are of the R u s s i a n s . " 5 4

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On the other hand, European leaders constantly questioned whether o r not the United States really would put its own cities at risk of a Soviet nuclear attack to defend its NATO allies. T h e more the United States and the Soviet Union built up so-called theater (medium-range) nuclear forces, the more that European confidence in the U.S. c o m m i t m e n t eroded. What Europeans wanted was ultimately impossible to provide: an ironclad promise f r o m the United States to d e f e n d t h e m to the death by providing "strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization." 5 5 The contradiction between fearing nuclear arms and believing in their deterrent value did not prove N A T O ' s undoing. But it did play an important part in promoting E u r o p e a n i n d e p e n d e n c e of action. In 1966 France left N A T O ' s joint c o m m a n d structure, although it r e m a i n e d a m e m b e r of the North Atlantic Council. (France rejoined the NATO c o m m a n d in 1995.) Spanish voters, in a 1986 referendum, decided to pull out of NATO's joint c o m m a n d and prohibit the stockpiling of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. U.S. nuclear deployments to Europe in 1983 gave new life to the nuclear disarmament movement in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and part of Eastern Europe. Massive demonstrations did not stop the deployments, but they did spur parliamentary oppositions in Western Europe to adopt antinuclear platforms. They also showed that popular support for groups like the Greens and the British C a m p a i g n for Nuclear D i s a r m a m e n t extended to the m i d d l e class. (These protests had better results in New Z e a l a n d , w h o s e g o v e r n m e n t decided in 1985 to bar U.S. n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d or nuclear-armed ships f r o m visiting its ports. The A N Z U S alliance was effectively reduced by one m e m b e r as a result.) Even in Eastern Europe, antinuclear sentiment was not restricted, as Moscow had hoped it would be, to opposing only U.S. missile deployments. Antiwar demonstrations, church meetings, and protests took aim at Soviet deployments as well, most strenuously in East Germany. 5 6 E u r o p e ' s rapid m o v e m e n t t o w a r d full integration, and the equally rapid disintegration of C o m m u n i s t authority in m u c h of Eastern E u r o p e , c h a n g e d the terms of d e b a t e about s e c u r i t y — f r o m " n a t i o n a l " to "contin e n t a l , " and f r o m military to e c o n o m i c . T h e fact that C o m m u n i s t Party dictatorships in Eastern E u r o p e were overthrown without challenge f r o m Soviet armed forces represented a dramatic departure with the past. Unified G e r m a n y pledged to r e m a i n a n o n - n u c l e a r m e m b e r of NATO. H u n gary pulled out of the Warsaw Pact and began dismantling Soviet missiles. Inside the Soviet Union, parliaments in many of the republics that declared their independence adopted antinuclear platforms. For a time, it appeared that military conversion p r o g r a m s , which started in Britain's d e f e n s e industry in the mid-1970s, might spread across the continent with the end of

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Cold War spending levels. But except for a few successful experiments in S w e d e n and Italy, conversion did not catch on; but stepping up arms exports did. 5 7 N e v e r t h e l e s s , with so many signs of the Cold W a r ' s disappearing, some European leaders, such as President Havel, talked—overoptimistically, as it turned out—about creating an entirely different security system. The new security structure contains three elements: the Conference on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), actually a series of c o n f e r e n c e s and resulting f o r m a l agreements—it began in 1973 with thirty-four states and in 1992 had fifty-one m e m b e r states (including some of the f o r m e r Central Asian republics of the U S S R ) ; the Treaty on C o n v e n t i o n a l A r m e d Forces in E u r o p e (CFE), which entered into force in 1991 with twenty-two signatories; and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, signed by t w e n t y - f i v e states. 5 8 Taken together, these instruments provided for large-scale troop and weapons withdrawals from central Europe, mostly by the Soviet/Russian army; extensive reduction and destruction of conventional arms; m a j o r reductions and redeployments of national armies, and reduction of military budgets; limitations on arms transfers; e x c h a n g e s of military data; and aerial and other kinds of monitoring of military activities, such as large exercises, to prevent surprise attacks or miscalculations. As impressive as these m e a s u r e s are, they do not amount to a fullfledged European security system. What the m e m b e r states accomplished were arms limitations and confidence-building measures within a defined zone of E u r o p e to reduce the danger of war across state boundaries. T h e a g r e e m e n t s , in c o m p a n y with earlier U . S . - R u s s i a strategic-weapons treaties, may justly be called "a triumph of a r m s c o n t r o l " and "a third m e t h o d [ c o m m o n security] for achieving security." 5 9 C F E and the other treaties introduced "predictability and assurance in military relationships" and brought a halt to the conventional arms race. But they neither demilitarized E u r o p e nor e q u i p p e d it to deal with wars within states or outside the established zone, especially once these broke out. 6 0 Would c o m m o n security apply in ethnic and other " n e w - o r d e r " conflicts? C S C E ' s first test, perhaps an unfair one given its timing—the onset of economic troubles in Western E u r o p e , the negotiations at Maastricht, the disintegration of the U S S R , and the Persian Gulf crisis—was the breakup of Yugoslavia. The critical m o m e n t may have been in 1991 when G e r m a n y took the ill-fated step of granting diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia. Here, a word must be said about G e r m a n y ' s role in p o s t - C o l d War Europe. As the most ardent supporter of European e c o n o m i c and political integration, G e r m a n y ' s views are necessarily critical in European security cooperation. But just as J a p a n ' s role in Asia Pacific is constrained by its past aggressions and c o n c e r n not to arouse ever-present suspicions about a

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nationalistic revival and its strategic intentions, so too is G e r m a n y ' s role in Europe. And in both cases, the strong tendency in foreign policy is to rely for leadership on the United States. Unlike Japan, Germany has not hidden behind its historical b u r d e n but instead has actively sought to o v e r c o m e it, notably by promoting c o o p e r a t i v e relations with France and Russia within the context of an e x p a n d i n g NATO and EU, as well as by contributing troops and materiel to UN p e a c e k e e p i n g missions. 6 1 In 1991, however, NATO enlargement was not yet an issue, the EU was still the EC, and G e r m a n contributions to peacekeeping (in the Gulf War) were limited to e q u i p m e n t while their constitutionality was challenged. G e r m a n y was still feeling its way in the new Europe and the world. G e r m a n y ' s decision to r e c o g n i z e the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the two Yugoslav republics has been sharply criticized for having misused the selfdetermination principle. Bonn, it is said, thereby pushed the button of ethnic violence. Instead of speaking out forcefully on behalf of human rights in Yugoslavia, it opened the way to Serbian attacks on Croatia and the ensuing ethnic cleansing. 6 2 Such a harsh j u d g m e n t is tempered in other accounts that paint a picture of collective failure: an absence of leadership, clear signals, and well-defined objectives on all sides, an unwillingness by any g o v e r n m e n t to put the h u m a n crisis in B o s n i a ahead of its own domestic political concerns, and missed opportunities for diplomacy and preventive military d e p l o y m e n t s by the UN or NATO before any of the parties, last of all Bosnia, w a s recognized as a separate state. 6 3 Not until August 1992 did the Security Council decide that the Bosnian situation was a "threat to international p e a c e and security," fourteen months after the war began. And only in 1994 did Bosnia become a national-security interest of the United States and its NATO partners, when bombing was used to force the Serbs to the bargaining table. The war in Bosnia showed the severe limitations of the p o s t - C o l d War security system, not just in Europe but also internationally: the inability of regional states and great powers to prevent large-scale, even genocidal violence in their midst. Lacking a c o m m o n enemy, C S C E and NATO m e m bers fell to disputing a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s about how, or whether, to act, while tens of thousands of innocent people died and even more became internal refugees. It was a moral as m u c h as a political failure. The inaction raised questions about the usefulness of C S C E and the U N as peacemakers (questions about peacekeeping c a m e later); about N A T O ' s reason for being; about whether " c o m m o n security" has meaning beyond d e f e n s e of national interests; and, for some observers, about the reality of a European community. 6 4 President Havel responded to his own optimism (in the quotation that begins this chapter) about E u r o p e a n security by calling Eur o p e ' s failure in the Balkans war every bit as great as its failure to respond to the Nazi and Soviet threats. 6 5

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Nor is the n i g h t m a r e over. In 1998, " a n o t h e r B o s n i a " loomed in the Yugoslav province of K o s o v o and the state of Macedonia. Both are inhabited by large n u m b e r s of ethnic Albanians, w h o comprise about 90 percent of K o s o v o ' s population and o n e - q u a r t e r of M a c e d o n i a ' s . In K o s o v o , the Serbian government of Yugoslavia launched intensive attacks against local guerrilla units and the villages that supported them in an effort to wipe out d r e a m s of statehood or linkage with Albania. W h o l e villages were destroyed; people sought r e f u g e across the Albanian frontier. Soldiers and a r m s f r o m Albania were put at the g u e r r i l l a s ' disposal. In M a c e d o n i a , which became independent in 1992 and to which the UN had sent a small peace-monitoring force to forestall conflict with Yugoslavia, the Albanian minority has borne the brunt of u n e m p l o y m e n t and ethnic bias. 6 6 Influenced by the K o s o v o guerrillas' actions, some Macedonian Albanians bec a m e c o n v i n c e d that the path of political a c c o m m o d a t i o n was closed. O n c e again, U.S. and E U p e a c e m a k i n g p r o v e d extremely difficult. This time, no one supported secession; nor, as 1998 ended, did anyone propose a preventive peacekeeping operation. In sum, E u r o p e a n integration and c o m m o n security are ideas w h o s e time has come; but they are not m o v i n g f o r w a r d in tandem. G e r m a n y ' s leadership is crucial to both; but as we will see with Japan, questions such as w h e t h e r it wants to lead, can lead, and in what way lead (lead within an e x p a n d e d E U ? in the context of N A T O ' s e n l a r g e m e n t ? at the risk of alienating Russia? autonomously of the United States?) have no clear ans w e r s yet. War in the B a l k a n s only provided negative lessons, one of w h i c h was a failure to bring both e c o n o m i c integration and c o m m o n security to bear on a collapsing situation. We must wait to see whether the idea of a single Europe can grow f r o m this experience.

Case Study: Japan Between Interdependence and Dependence Today's Japan has two faces: a country of highly advanced technology and computers and a land of traditional poetry where the masses treasure the simple, short-verse style poems whose form became established in ancient times. . . . These two dimensions of our culture, which might seem totally inconsistent at first glance, actually coexist quite well, blending into each other without a sense of contradiction.

—Ooka Makoto, "Antidote for Anomie: Poetry for the Computer Age" J a p a n presents the anomaly of being an economic superpower that depends f o r critical resources and military security on other countries. It has the w o r l d ' s second largest GNP, a per capita i n c o m e higher than that of the

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United States, and number-one status as a world lender. Japan is right behind G e r m a n y and the United States as the leading exporter, and it long since passed the United States as the leading foreign-aid donor a m o n g the m a j o r economies. As Japan makes what has been called its third structural e c o n o m i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n — f r o m textiles in the early 1900s, to heavy and chemical industries b e t w e e n the 1930s and the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , and n o w to k n o w l e d g e - i n t e n s i v e p r o d u c t i o n 6 7 — i t has d e m o n s t r a t e d , perhaps better than any other society, an ability to m a k e global e c o n o m i c interdependence work to its advantage. Yet Japan must still rely heavily on food and energy f r o m abroad and on the United States for protection f r o m attack under terms of a 1960 security treaty. As the only victim of atomic attack, Japan has a deeply ingrained "nuclear allergy" that has led it to forswear producing nuclear weapons even though it has the ability to do so. Article 9 of the J a p a n e s e constitution f o r b i d s w a r - m a k i n g as a national policy. This provision has been interpreted by successive governments to permit the maintenance of so-called S e l f - D e f e n s e Forces (along with U.S. bases), but to restrict their role to d e f e n s e of the h o m e islands to a distance of 1,000 miles, and to noncombat service in UN peacekeeping operations. As a result, although J a p a n ' s total military spending of around $54 billion ranks third in the world, it is a tiny percentage of GNP, leaving it with considerable added spending power. Observers have attributed the global surge of J a p a n e s e industry to many factors. 6 8 In the early postwar period, the imposition of a democratic system, partial elimination of the zaibatsu (finance-business combines) and their replacement by an interlocking g o v e r n m e n t - b i g b u s i n e s s - b a n k ing complex, and the establishment of a U.S. protectorate enabled Japan to concentrate on economic growth. Cold War politics ensured large U.S. and Southeast Asian markets f o r Japanese exports. Japan also took advantage of its being a latecomer to use the newest technologies in rebuilding its industrial base. Leftist labor unions were contained or crushed, providing a period of e n f o r c e d stability. D o m i n a t i o n of national politics by a single party, the Liberal Democrats (LDP), lent continuity to the political system. By the early 1960s, Japan was prepared to take off economically, moving quickly f r o m mere imitator and a b s o r b e r of technology to p r o d u c e r of some of the highest-quality goods on the world market. Spurred by the vision of Yoshida Shigeru, w h o w a s prime minister f r o m 1946 to 1954, Japan opted for a reactive foreign policy that included limited r e a r m a m e n t but e m p h a s i z e d the aggressive pursuit of e c o n o m i c growth and f o r e i g n exchange. In this strategy to win the p e a c e even t h o u g h having lost the world war, investment in human resources, high technology, and energy alternatives has been as critical a factor as any other. Incomes in Japan are extraordinarily equitable: T h e wide rich-poor gap in the United States has no

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counterpart in Japan; nor do the heads of Toyota and the other giant corporations command astronomical earnings. 6 9 T h e Japanese work force is the world's best educated, for example—although higher education as a whole does not encourage individual creativity. A paternalistic relationship between corporations and labor affords j o b security in the largest companies and promotes productivity. Japan's productivity increases in manufacturing can also be attributed to the accelerated introduction of new technologies by farsighted managers, advances in robotics, and the large number o f engineers (far more than in the United States) who go to work for private industry. 7 0 J a p a n ' s nonmilitary research and development spending—already about equal to that of the United States—likewise contributes to its commercial success. 7 1 The Japanese have a high rate of domestic savings that contrasts sharply with the U . S . penchant for buying on credit. A great deal of this money flows abroad in pursuit of higher returns than are available on investment at home. Energy-saving measures, such as extensive recycling of aluminum and use o f compact refrigerators, go along with investment in a diversity of energy sources, including nuclear power that accounts for roughly one-third of Japan's electricity. The quality of life in Japan is one of the highest in the world, reflecting a sense of national purpose that is seldom encountered elsewhere. Still, developments in the 1990s revealed that Japan has its share of social and political problems. Its political system, for example, has been described as an "elitist d e m o c r a c y . " 7 2 Except for brief periods when it lost its parliamentary majority in 1955 and 1993, the L D P has been the dominant party and kingmaker, in the tradition o f Asian politics. T h e L D P is a political machine with deep roots in the society, a highly loyal constituency, and the ability to get out the votes even (one might say, especially) in bad e c o nomic times. The opposition, by contrast, has consistently failed to take advantage of scandals, bureaucratic corruption, glaring incompetence, and unprecedented economic setbacks such as occurred beginning in the mid1990s. W h i l e the media railed, the L D P ruled. 7 3 In a country where consensus counts more than policy preferences, the possibility o f forming an effective opposition coalition, much less developing a two-party system, is still low. Democratic institutions exist; but they are constrained by the power of big business (which is helped by government regulation), by the bureaucrats who run the ministries, and by a self-perpetuating elite tied together by common schooling, intermarriage, and other social circumstances. Employment for many workers, mostly female and those in smaller firms, and farmers is not secured by lifelong tenure. An aging population and a declining work force pose serious future choices. T h e status of women remains low: Although Japan has the second-highest ranking in the world in overall human development, it ranks eighteenth among twentytwo industrialized countries on a " g e n d e r - s e n s i t i v e " b a s i s . 7 4 Women are

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p r a c t i c a l l y i n v i s i b l e in p a r l i a m e n t a n d in c e n t r a l m i n i s t r i e s . T h e cost of h o u s i n g a n d f o o d is a s t r o n o m i c a l , a n d the p r i c e of real e s t a t e b e c a m e so a b s u r d l y high that w h e n the balloon burst b e g i n n i n g in 1997 it helped trigger b a n k f a i l u r e s and a r e c e s s i o n . J a p a n has yet to r e c o v e r : T h e e s t i m a t e d value of bad b a n k loans k e e p s g o i n g up, and s e e m s to be well over $ 6 0 0 billion, or m o r e than 15 percent of G D P ; u n e m p l o y m e n t is a b o u t 4 p e r c e n t by J a p a n e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s , 7 percent by U.S. d e f i n i t i o n s ; h o u s e h o l d s a v i n g s are being hurt by low interest rates that will not be o f f s e t by p r o p o s e d i n c o m e tax cuts; and the G D P in f i s c a l year 1997 d e c l i n e d f o r the first t i m e in t w e n t y - t h r e e y e a r s , h a v i n g lost (based on a h u g e swing in the y e n ' s value) $2.6 trillion c o m p a r e d with 1995. 7 5 T h e notion of J a p a n as a v u l n e r a b l e country like any other c a m e as a s h o c k to m a n y p e o p l e . 7 6 Yet L D P leaders, d e s p i t e six c h a n g e s of p r i m e m i n i s t e r s in three y e a r s ( f r o m 1995 to m i d - 1 9 9 8 ) , s e e m e d to be in denial, relying on the old f o r m u l a of m u d d l i n g t h r o u g h . E n v i r o n m e n t a l issues are serious: Air pollution is h a z a r d o u s in the m a j o r cities; the failure of m a n u f a c t u r e r s and c o n s u m e r s in the p r o d u c t i o n a n d d i s p o s a l of r e c y c l a b l e g o o d s has c r e a t e d a t h r o w a w a y society with a h u g e g a r b a g e p r o b l e m ; 7 7 J a p a n is the only industrial nation without an antis m o k i n g c a m p a i g n or the r e q u i r e m e n t of e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t reports on m a j o r construction projects; land-use laws are strong w h e n it c o m e s to prot e c t i n g r i c e l a n d s , w e a k in p r o t e c t i n g f o r e s t s ; and J a p a n ' s o p p o s i t i o n to a w o r l d w i d e m o r a t o r i u m on c o m m e r c i a l w h a l i n g puts it a l m o s t in a class by itself. P o l i t i c i a n s h a v e l e a r n e d to tread c a u t i o u s l y on the r e f o r m of m a n y of these p r o b l e m s , so that w h e n P r i m e Minister M i y a z a w a Kiichi staked his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f u t u r e (in 1992) on m a k i n g J a p a n seikatsu-tai-koku, "a great p o w e r in t e r m s of quality of life," he and the L D P w e r e unable to deliver. At b o t t o m , J a p a n is a business society, not a c o n s u m e r society. 7 8 J a p a n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e h a s b e e n f u n d a m e n t a l l y s h a p e d by g e o g r a p h i c isolation, a strong ( s o m e m i g h t say e x a g g e r a t e d ) sense of vulnerability, and e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e s e i n f l u e n c e s a c c o u n t for J a p a n ' s s i n g l e - m i n d e d p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , as its i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n e r g y , t r a d e , and f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t policies show. J a p a n is highly r e s o u r c e - d e p e n d e n t : It relies on i m p o r t s f o r about 50 percent of its f o o d and over 85 percent of its total energy (including nearly 100 percent of its oil). Energy, therefore, is not just a c o m m o d i t y in trade but a strategic r e s o u r c e f o r J a p a n . A s s u r a n c e of its c o n t i n u e d supply m u s t be planned as part of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e e c o n o m i c strategy. T h a t explains why, in pursuit of its o w n energy needs, Japan has o f t e n run a f o u l of U.S. policies, w h e t h e r with r e s p e c t to M i d d l e East oil or Soviet gas or U . S . s u p p l i e s to Japan of nuclear f u e l and technology. 7 9 A s Japan f u r t h e r d e v e l o p s its k n o w l e d g e industries, its energy priorities will be c h a n g i n g . Electronic and microp r o c e s s o r g o o d s will be r e s e a r c h - i n t e n s i v e , t h e r e f o r e less r e s o u r c e - a n d

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energy-dependent (and less polluting) than previous kinds o f production, which until the 1998 financial crisis were being transferred abroad. In the immediate future, Japan will continue to rely heavily on oil and nuclear (including plutonium) imports to meet growing electricity demand. That spells trouble for meeting global standards for greenhouse gas emissions. 8 0 But in the longer run we can expect to see even greater stress being placed on energy efficiency and conservation, with which Japan has had considerable s u c c e s s , 8 1 and on vigorously exploring renewable energy sources, such as solar and geothermal. 8 2 Government and industry will not be alone in making such decisions. S i n c e the late 1 9 6 0 s , citizen-activists in local environmental and other protest groups in Japan have been instrumental in pushing an alternative energy agenda that reflects postindustrial values. 8 3 Trade and investment policies reflect a major contradiction in Japan's approach to foreign trade and investment: working for an open world economy, but putting Japanese e c o n o m i c interests first. T h e dominant view in Japan is that the contradiction is necessary. Resource dependence is one reason; it makes Japan vulnerable to the political stability and trading practices of others. 8 4 Another reason is that, while Japan enjoys a large surplus in trade with the United States, its senior partner, circumstance creates dependence on the openness of the U . S . market to Japanese products. Over one-quarter of Japan's exports go to the United S t a t e s — 2 7 percent in 1 9 9 6 — a s against about 11 percent of total U . S . exports that are shipped to Japan. When it comes to foreign involvement in Japan's e c o n o m y and to Japan's overseas investments, self-preservationism again prevails. Japanese leaders lean toward monopoly control rather than unfettered competition. They tend to promote the most efficient and technologically advanced firms, national and transnational. Foreign ownership of domestic companies and foreign access to financial and equity markets are severely restricted, whereas Japanese investment abroad is heavily promoted. 8 5 T h e figures confirm the success o f this strategy and the reasons for U . S . and European chagrin over Japan's "neomercantilism." For in comparison with the U . S . and E U economies, Japan's is indeed quite closed. Japan allows in only a fraction (4 percent in the 1 9 8 0 s ) of what it invests abroad; 8 6 it hosts a minuscule proportion of worldwide FDI; and foreign firms in Japan account for much smaller percentages of total sales and employment than do T N C s in other countries. " O n e - w a y g l o b a l i z a t i o n , " some specialists call it. 8 7 In Third World investment, mainly in East and Southeast Asia, Japanese firms offer a textbook example of comparative advantage. 8 8 They shift along with changes in individual countries' skills, wage levels, and production capabilities. Increasingly, the products of Japanese T N C subsidiaries are exported out o f Southeast Asia, either to Japan or elsewhere.

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J a p a n e s e t r a d e w o r k s in c o n j u n c t i o n with p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t a n d aid, m o r e o v e r : C a p i t a l - a n d s k i l l - i n t e n s i v e g o o d s are e x p o r t e d f r o m J a p a n ; J a p a n i m p o r t s p r o c e s s e d g o o d s f r o m the m o r e d e v e l o p e d A s i a n c o u n t r i e s a n d raw m a t e r i a l s f r o m the less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . Aid p r o g r a m s a n d t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s are l a r g e l y d e s i g n e d to p r o m o t e J a p a n e s e - f i n a n c e d exports and " d e v e l o p m e n t " p r o g r a m s that will assist J a p a n ' s overall trade by building n e w m a r k e t s f o r the next g e n e r a t i o n of J a p a n e s e p r o d u c t s . At the c o r p o r a t e and g o v e r n m e n t levels, these p r a c t i c e s seem to b e n e f i t h o m e and host c o u n t r y : For T h i r d World hosts, they fit with the usual desire f o r m o r e control o v e r f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , for greater e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i ties, and f o r i n c r e a s e d e x p o r t s of p r o c e s s e d g o o d s ; f o r J a p a n , t h e y m e a n access to land and labor that are in short supply at h o m e , and they c o m p e l the constant u p g r a d i n g of J a p a n e s e p r o d u c t i o n to m e e t c o m p e t i t i o n that its o w n i n v e s t m e n t s h a v e h e l p e d to c r e a t e . 8 9 T h u s , J a p a n e s e C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s m is as self-interested as any other. In b a n k i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , J a p a n is a m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r to the World B a n k a n d v a r i o u s r e g i o n a l m u l t i l a t e r a l b a n k s , such as the A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k . But J a p a n e s e c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s , the w o r l d ' s largest, hold only half or less of T h i r d W o r l d d e b t . T h i s r e f l e c t s their p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n v e s t i n g w h e r e capital is m o s t p r o f i t a b l e , in the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d w o r l d , r a t h e r t h a n w h e r e it is in d e s p e r a t e l y short supply. O n l y in 1987 did J a p a n i n d i c a t e a m a j o r new c o m m i t m e n t of f u n d s to Third World d e v e l o p m e n t . A s i a , w h e r e J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s are g r e a t e s t , gets the l i o n ' s s h a r e ( a l m o s t 6 0 p e r c e n t in 1990). 9 0 W h e n it c o m e s to d i r e c t i n g O D A to human priorities, J a p a n has o n e of the p o o r e s t r e c o r d s of any m a j o r a i d - g i v e r . 9 1 G i v e n the opportunity to use or d e n y its f o r e i g n aid on behalf of h u m a n rights, T o k y o has put c o m m e r c i a l or other national interests a h e a d of ethical p r i n c i p l e s . 9 2 T h e story is s i m i l a r on the e n v i r o n m e n t : J a p a n h a s had a f a r f r o m e x e m p l a r y r e c o r d in m o n i t o r i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of its O D A . J a p a n is the l e a d i n g i m p o r t e r of t r o p i c a l h a r d w o o d s , m o s t l y f o r u s e in h o u s i n g . T N C s such as M i t s u b i s h i h a v e b e c o m e n o t o r i o u s f o r their clearc u t t i n g of f o r e s t s in O D A - r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r i e s such as I n d o n e s i a a n d Malaysia.93 J a p a n ' s l e a d e r s h i p is u n c o m f o r t a b l y a w a r e of the c o u n t r y ' s j u n i o r status, e v e n t h o u g h it s e e m s to p r e f e r t h i n g s that w a y . F o l l o w e r s h i p of the U n i t e d States has f r e q u e n t l y p l a c e d c o n s t r a i n t s on J a p a n e s e f o r e i g n - p o l i c y i n d e p e n d e n c e . In the 1950s, f o r e x a m p l e , U.S. n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w e r e secretly stored in J a p a n , and in the 1960s, U.S. air b a s e s in J a p a n w e r e c r u cial to the b o m b i n g of N o r t h V i e t n a m . Until the start of U . S . - C h i n a diplom a c y in the 1970s, v a r i o u s J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t s h a d been u n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m the U n i t e d States to m i n i m i z e e c o n o m i c ties with the P R C . All t h e s e f o r m s of d e f e r e n c e to U . S . p o l i c y p o s e d d o m e s t i c political p r o b l e m s f o r J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s . D e p e n d e n c e o n the U n i t e d S t a t e s has a l s o put p r e s s u r e

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on Japan to increase military spending and foreign aid, and either liberalize its trade and domestic investment policies or f a c e rising barriers to Japanese exports to the United States. Occasionally, J a p a n ' s second-rank status has been reinforced by surprise moves by the United States, such as K i s s i n g e r ' s secret trip to China in 1971 and the " N i x o n s h o c k " the same year that i m p o s e d import surcharges and reduced U.S. exports of soybeans, a staple of the Japanese diet. Surprises make for resentment when, as in Japan's case, a nation is frequently told how valuable an ally it is and then is neither consulted nor informed in advance about key decisions. Since the Vietnam War, and especially since the waning of the Cold War, tensions between Japan and the United States have deepened even as joint consultations have increased. One writer contends that the f o c u s of U.S. c o n t a i n m e n t policy has actually shifted to Japan, driven by at least one factor that also inspired the U.S. policy of containing the Soviets: the insecurity brought about by the other side's sudden rise to p r o m i n e n c e . 9 4 On the Japanese side, meanwhile, the view has evolved that America's wants and demands are endless. Any concession leads to endless demands by U.S. congressmen and other groups for more. It f o l l o w s that the best way to respond to American pressure is to lengthen and complicate the solution of any problem, to find ways to slow down implementation while maintaining an overall friendly climate. 9 5

In one sense, U . S . - J a p a n e s e d i f f e r e n c e s are only natural, given the size of their trade (now over $ 1 8 0 billion a year) and of their direct investments in each other's economy. But this is no ordinary dispute: Japan's emergence as an economic superpower rivaling the United States has bec o m e a d o m e s t i c political issue in both countries, where it is interpreted either as h a v i n g c o m e about unfairly and at U.S. e x p e n s e or as having evolved out of the superiority of J a p a n ' s economic institutions and even its culture. The nagging issue in the relationship—but not necessarily the underlying cause of d i s s e n s i o n — i s the large trade i m b a l a n c e in J a p a n ' s favor. Japan has run a m e r c h a n d i s e trade surplus with the United States since 1975, when it was about $1.7 billion. Within three years the surplus was nearly three times as large and was approaching $20 billion in 1983. During the late 1980s the surplus climbed over $50 billion, where it has basically been " s t u c k . " (It was $45 billion in 1996.) Throughout, J a p a n ' s trade a d v a n t a g e has f o r m e d a significant, though diminishing, part of the total U.S. trade d e f i c i t — s i n c e the mid-1990s, about one-quarter of it, second in size only to the deficit in U . S . - C h i n a trade. Conversely, J a p a n ' s surplus with the United States has always been a significant part of its total trade surplus—one-half of it in 1993.

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T h e J a p a n e s e c l a i m , with c o n s i d e r a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that the root of the surplus lies not only in the o v e r v a l u e d U.S. dollar, and t h e r e f o r e in the p e r e n n i a l U . S . b u d g e t d e f i c i t s , but even m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y in the s u p e riority of their p r o d u c t s a n d the c o r p o r a t e m a n a g e m e n t that put t h e m o n the m a r k e t . T h e U.S. side r e s p o n d s , a l s o with s o m e j u s t i c e , that m a n y J a p a n e s e e x p o r t s h a v e been u n f a i r l y s u b s i d i z e d at the s a m e t i m e that i m ports to J a p a n w e r e b e i n g s y s t e m a t i c a l l y restricted. D u r i n g the R e a g a n adm i n i s t r a t i o n , the U n i t e d States m o v e d to redress the i m b a l a n c e , initially by urging v o l u n t a r y restraints on J a p a n e s e e x p o r t s to the United States, such as textiles and steel, and then by d e m a n d i n g a bigger share in J a p a n ' s m a r ket in such p r o d u c t s as s e m i c o n d u c t o r s . W h e n these steps f a i l e d , R e a g a n " e a r n e d the d u b i o u s distinction of b e i n g the first p o s t w a r p r e s i d e n t to imp o s e e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s on J a p a n " in the f o r m of r e t a l i a t o r y t a r i f f s on some Japanese imports.96 U . S . - J a p a n relations h a v e not been able to s u r m o u n t these e c o n o m i c issues. E a c h side has a g g r e s s i v e l y p u s h e d its v i e w as to the responsibility of the other, a n d the o t h e r ' s f a i l u r e to k e e p p r o m i s e s of p o l i c y c h a n g e s . F o r e i g n a n a l y s t s h a v e t a k e n u p the c a u s e of o n e or the o t h e r side. O n e writer, for e x a m p l e , has c o n c l u d e d that " t h e U . S . trade d e f i c i t is m o s t l y m a d e in A m e r i c a , " w h e r e the essential p r o b l e m is a loss of " c o n f i d e n c e in its ability to c o m p e t e on a level p l a y i n g f i e l d . " 9 7 A n o t h e r writer, long a resident in J a p a n , a d o p t s a " J a p a n , I n c . " (that is, Realist) m o d e l , c h a r g i n g that " i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m i n a t i o n in as m a n y i n d u s t r i a l a r e a s as p o s s i b l e is part of an u n c o o r d i n a t e d and n e v e r d e l i n e a t e d yet p o w e r f u l c a m p a i g n to m a k e the w o r l d s a f e for J a p a n . " 9 8 Nationalist p a s s i o n s h a v e been a r o u s e d on both sides of the P a c i f i c , s o m e t i m e s with racial o v e r t o n e s , such that the J a p a n e s e c h a l l e n g e is m a d e to s e e m like a n o t h e r Pearl H a r b o r in the U n i t e d States and the U . S . r e s p o n s e like the b u l l y i n g of an o c c u p y i n g p o w e r . In 1990, o p i n i o n p o l l s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e s h o w i n g m o r e public c o n c e r n a b o u t the " J a p a n e s e t h r e a t " than about the Soviet one. An a t t e m p t at o b j e c t i v i t y in this g r o w i n g c o n t r o v e r s y w o u l d point to c e r t a i n i n t r a c t a b l e f e a t u r e s of the U . S . - J a p a n r e l a t i o n s h i p that m a k e any short-term resolution i m p r o b a b l e . O n e such f e a t u r e is the p o s t w a r structure of J a p a n ' s e x p o r t - b a s e d e c o n o m y , w h i c h the U n i t e d States itself e n c o u r aged. D e e p - s e a t e d b u r e a u c r a t i c interests and cultural n o r m s are the u n d e r p i n n i n g s of a d e n s e policy n e t w o r k that insulates the J a p a n e s e m a r k e t f r o m o u t s i d e c o m p e t i t i o n . 9 9 A s e c o n d f e a t u r e is the p e r s i s t e n c e of the U . S . J a p a n trade deficit despite c h a n g e s by the J a p a n e s e and despite a fall in the d o l l a r ' s v a l u e that greatly i n c r e a s e d U.S. e x p o r t s to J a p a n and w o r l d w i d e f r o m 1987 until the late 1990s. U.S. c o n s u m e r s m a y hold the key, f o r U.S. imports f r o m J a p a n c o n t i n u e to o u t p a c e the g r o w t h of U.S. e x p o r t s . T h u s , e v e n t h o u g h J a p a n ( c o n t r a r y to U . S . p o l i t i c i a n s ' rhetoric) is a m a j o r , a n d g r o w i n g , m a r k e t f o r U.S. p r o d u c t s , the U.S. c o n s u m e r is willing to pay the

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higher cost of Japanese products. Insisting, as U . S . administrations from Reagan to Clinton have been, that Japan purchase more U . S . goods and comply with deficit-reduction targets seems to be an attempt to solve the problem at the U.S. consumer's e x p e n s e . 1 0 0 Resolving trade issues may ultimately depend on whether or not Japan assumes a larger-than-economic role in world affairs. For with the Cold War over, so is the principal reason for J a p a n ' s defense reliance on the United States. 1 0 1 Thus, global economic interdependence has merged with the absence of a Soviet threat to intensify a great debate, inside as well as outside Japan, concerning Japan's alleged lack of a grand strategy or clear sense of direction. The argument is that J a p a n ' s largely improvisational foreign policy ought to be replaced by one "commensurate with its enormous economic and technological strength." 1 0 2 Japan should directly contribute to collective security, a course it could legally have followed anytime since becoming a UN member but which its leaders deliberately chose to avoid. 1 0 3 Unless Japan breaks from its self-centeredness and foreign-policy dependency, it risks the increasing enmity o f other states and the undermining of its prosperity. Yet public opinion in Japan has not been prepared by L D P leaders to accept that argument. Overwhelmingly, the Japanese people believe domestic affairs should remain the government's top priority and Japan's role in the world ought to be kept limited to e c o n o m i c contributions. 1 0 4 One Japanese analyst has portrayed the debate in terms similar to those employed in this b o o k . 1 0 5 "Passivists," like many Realists, argue for a narrow pursuit of Japan's national interests, with continuing reliance on the United States for security. They emphasize Japan's weakness, a priority to domestic problems over foreign-policy assertiveness, and therefore a low-key, c a s e - b y - c a s e diplomacy. On the other side are the " a c t i v i s t s , " Japan's Corporate (and other) Globalists. Nakasone Yasuhiro, prime minister from 1982 to 1987, is their leading figure. They see the necessity for Japan to contribute directly to shaping a world community that is being most profoundly altered by economic interdependence. Japan must shake off the image of "Japan, I n c . " and become a force for peaceful cooperation and a new world order. Japan's ability to secure Middle East oil in the early 1 9 7 0 s , independently of U . S . policy, was a landmark for activists, who want to encourage Japanese international self-reliance whenever possible. S o m e activists advocate joint U . S . - J a p a n e s e management o f the world economy; others have been the driving force in J a p a n ' s largely behind-the-scenes promotion o f Asia P a c i f i c regional security dialogue. T h e central idea is to lend substance to Japan's global interests, take advantage o f its technological and commercial superiority, yet still rely on a close relationship with the United States.

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On balance, passivism still seems the best one-word characterization of Japan's foreign policy. Certainly, in the twenty-five years since the oil crisis, Tokyo can be seen acting in its own interests on various occasions, assuming more self-defense responsibilities, and "making a contribution" to the global community. On the first score, for example, Japan, along with Australia, has played a lead role since the early 1990s in Asia Pacific economic cooperation (now formalized as the A P E C forum o f twenty-one states) and regional political and security dialogue. 1 0 6 Tokyo has also sided with the E U in a number o f disagreements with Washington over its unilateralism. 1 0 7 On the second point, Japan has stepped up security cooperation with the United States, sometimes secretly as in the Cold War years. 1 0 8 The S D F has increased participation in joint military exercises, as well as in bilateral security dialogue with China and South Korea. In 1987 Japan's official military budget for the first time exceeded 1 percent of the GNP and, as previously mentioned, it contributes three-fourths of the cost of U . S . bases in Japan. Japan is a participant in the planned U . S . ballisticmissile defense system for East Asia, and in April 1996, at a summit meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, agreed to "New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation" that might, in a conflict, extend Japanese security responsibilities for the first time outside the scope of defense of the home islands. 1 0 9 Last, on the issue of global contributions, Japan can cite its substantial financial contribution to the regular UN budget (about 18 percent in 1998, rising to over 2 0 percent in 2 0 0 0 , second only to the United States' 25 percent); support of the UN coalition in the G u l f War; and parliamentary (Diet) approval in June 1992 of Prime Minister Miyazawa's peacekeeping operations ( P K O ) bill. In the G u l f War, Japan sent minesweepers and contributed $ 1 3 billion to U . S . war expenses. T h o s e actions were taken after much soul-searching in Tokyo. T h e P K O bill that followed was even more wrenching, because it allowed the government, for the first time in the postwar era, to dispatch up to 2 , 0 0 0 lightly armed soldiers for service in Cambodia under UN command. (A Japanese national then headed the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, itself an important new international undertaking.) As a constitutional amendment, P K O had been hotly debated since the previous fall, public opinion was divided, and China and South Korea, having experienced Japanese occupation during World War II, hotly criticized it. Under the bill's stringent terms, Japanese forces are allowed to fire only in self-defense and must be withdrawn from combat situations. Parliament's approval is required in each instance—and there have been several since—in which the government proposes to send troops abroad under the UN flag. S o m e o f these foreign-policy actions turn out to prove the point of a largely passive, reactive Japan. Its strengthened security cooperation with

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the United States has always c o m e in response to U.S. prodding. Neither the Gulf War support nor P K O was a Japanese initiative; both came in response to U.S. and other criticism, in the case of P K O about J a p a n ' s " c h e c k b o o k d i p l o m a c y " in the G u l f — i t s willingness to spend money but not lives in support of its overseas interests, unlike G e r m a n y , which has put soldiers and pilots in h a r m ' s way in p e a c e k e e p i n g operations. 1 1 0 Despite far more public discussion than ever before a m o n g Japanese officials and d e f e n s e intellectuals about independent policy options, most specialists agree that the bilateral relationship is still the linchpin of J a p a n ' s security policy. Second, e c o n o m i c regionalization, not nationalism, is the order of the day in Asia Pacific. Japan is a central player in the G r e a t e r China and Yellow Sea (Northeast Asia) trading areas and b e n e f i t s enormously f r o m both. Third, Japanese politics is rather immobile, as yet unable to d e v e l o p a uniquely J a p a n e s e d e f i n i t i o n of " n e w world order." In fact, as became evident on the use of foreign aid to promote human rights, Japan sometimes cannot even follow the lead set by others. T h e bottom line is that Japan does not want to lead. Nor, even with the end of the Cold War, is there much incentive to do so. Japan's careful, selfinterested role has served it, and the United States, well. And that role, we must k e e p in m i n d , was after all m a d e in A m e r i c a . T h e U.S. o c c u p a t i o n d e m a n d e d , and hence shaped, J a p a n ' s f o l l o w e r s h i p , nurtured its sense of inferiority, encouraged its singular devotion to e c o n o m i c superiority, and thus was the most significant outside factor in J a p a n ' s eviscerated sense of national purpose. So that while in theory Japan today has room to reconsider the alliance and constitutional restrictions on its foreign and military policies, in practice such steps could only happen under three improbable circumstances: if Washington were to decide to scale down the alliance f o r reasons of cost; if Japan experienced a crisis of c o n f i d e n c e in the willingness of the United States to protect it; or if the J a p a n e s e public or rightwing nationalists demanded that Japan finally b e c o m e a "normal nation." Devising a truly Japanese conception of national purpose has not yet h a p p e n e d . What if it did? W h a t would a " n o r m a l " Japan be like? N o longer bound to the United States, it would p r o b a b l y b e c o m e a nuclearw e a p o n state, m a n y Japanese analysts are convinced. There is another option, however, one that would m a k e J a p a n ' s place in world affairs unique even if it remained under the U.S. umbrella. It is the path of "active pacif i s m , " as s o m e younger J a p a n e s e politicians call it, a path worthy of the p e r m a n e n t U N Security Council seat Japan will eventually be granted. By virtue of having risen to First World status without p u r s u i n g h e g e m o n y , Japan might base its international role squarely on its capacity to do good with its e c o n o m i c and technological assets. 1 1 1 In the new order, constructive international activism can take place in n u m e r o u s n o n m i l i t a r y w a y s — s h a r i n g new t e c h n o l o g i e s to i m p r o v e the

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quality of life and environmental protection; focusing aid on the relief of Third World debt, poverty, and other sources of human misery; and becoming more active in regional and international diplomacy on disarmament and human rights. Japanese energy and environmental technology can be especially useful. For example, Asia has become the world's principal source of carbon dioxide emissions, mainly because of rapid industrialization by China and other developing economies that use coal-fired power stations. T h e s e emissions account for a large proportion o f global warming gases and pose a serious threat of transboundary acid rain. 1 1 2 Japanese technology can c o m e into play in a number of ways, including energy conservation and pollution controls on power plants. MIT1, the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has proposed funding a research and training center for energy conservation for the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) . In fact, M I T I is already working on new environmental technologies with Third World applications in areas such as air pollution and energy efficiency. 1 1 3 If, in addition, Japan were to increase O D A well above 0 . 2 8 percent of GNP (the 1995 level); if it were to increase the human-development component of O D A ; and if the government were to take steps to stop destruction of the rain forests by Japanese T N C s , Japan would be doing much to heighten its stature as a reliable supporter of Third World development. Generous policies such as those above would not only be departures from the past emphasis on e c o n o m i c self-interest. To be credible, they would also have to reflect, and require, a moral reevaluation, starting with a confrontation of the aggression and atrocities by the Imperial Army during World War II. Unlike Germany, the Japanese government has never forthrightly and unconditionally acknowledged responsibility for the past. For a number o f years, various senior officials have in fact minimized or even denied the Rape of Nanking in China and the kidnapping o f Korean "comfort w o m e n " to serve in army brothels, among other acts. 1 1 4 Japan's education ministry has hidden the barbarities of World War II from the textbooks of school children, so that history for most young Japanese ends in 1941. Even when a prime minister has made a frank apology to the victims, such as Hosokawa Morihiro did before the Diet in August 1993, or proposed to offer an official apology for the World War II aggression, as the government did in 1995, nationalists have risen up to quash these sentiments. 1 1 5 Japanese leaders cannot be expected to develop a new international outlook when the economy is reeling. In 1998, commentators from Tokyo to New York could not find language apocalyptic enough: impending " c o l lapse," " c a n c e r , " "another T i t a n i c , " even a return to the national-security state unless the economy can recover. 1 1 6 Japan's problems are real and kingsize; but so are its strengths. 1 1 7 Nearly all commentaries stress Japan's need to modernize the management of its economy so as to increase consumer

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c h o i c e s , improve public works, restructure the financial system, and open the society as well as the e c o n o m y to many more n o n - J a p a n e s e . With appropriate stimulus p a c k a g e s , J a p a n ' s government should be able to ride out the latest storm. B u t a s s u m i n g it d o e s , greater c h a l l e n g e s will still lie ahead: recovering a sense o f national identity and purpose, and developing the kind o f deeper democratization or c i v i c culture that e m p o w e r s the individual while preserving a tradition o f social h a r m o n y . 1 , 8

7 In the Human Interest: An Agenda for Transforming World Politics

Hate evil and love what is good; let justice well up as waters and eousness as a mighty stream.

right-

—Torah The only thing we have to fear is fear

itself. —Franklin D. Roosevelt

The ability to reach unity in diversity our civilization.

will be the beauty and the test of —Gandhi

Harold: You sure know how to get along with Maude: They're my species.

people.

—from the film Harold and

Maude

Lessons for the Future In his inspiring book on developing an "equilibrium economy," James Robertson proposes five possible futures for the major economies: "Business-As-Usual," a continuation of present-day policies and practices; "Disaster," a series of ecological and economic catastrophes; "Totalitarian Conservationist," in which neofascist regimes arise in response to massive crises; "Hyper-expansionist," the push for maximum growth with heavy emphasis on technological fixes; and "SHE," the preferred "Sane-HumaneEcological" alternative, which would "give top priority to learning to live supportively with one another on our small and crowded planet." 1 Like Robertson, I search here for a new realism that can address the multifaceted

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global crisis in positive w a y s — p o l i t i c a l l y pluralistic, e c o n o m i c a l l y j u s t , and ecologically sensitive. W h a t , in a nutshell, have we learned thus far? We can begin by offering three general lessons. One stems f r o m the enormity of the problems w e have c o v e r e d , their interconnectedness, and their t r a n s n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . These p r o b l e m s can probably only be ameliorated by global a p p r o a c h e s , and only resolved by global system change. Unless the overarching crisis of unfulfilled human needs is t r a n s f o r m e d — a n d s o o n — w e can expect violent u p h e a v a l s and e n v i r o n m e n t a l catastrophes to b e c o m e the n o r m in world politics. The need is urgent, as the Brandt Report said, for state leaders to develop a sense of global responsibility. 2 Second, world politics as 2000 approaches holds out modest hope of an evolution toward globally responsible behavior. Increasingly, it seems to be characterized by the absence of a center, strong decentralizing forces, and a global economy. The EU best represents the first trend, in spite of its recent problems: It has nurtured organizational cohesion without an authoritative head; and its mission is being accomplished by negotiation, not diktat. Elsewhere, meanwhile, we see the pull away from central authority: in the U S S R ' s breakup and Russia's fragmentation, in the d e m a n d s for autonomy and statehood of numerous nationalities and other minority groups within nation-states, in the declining importance of military alliances, and in the economic challenges of Japan and Germany to historical U.S. hegemony. This fissiparous world political system has been significantly caused and shaped by a single (capitalist) global economy. The failures of centrally planned economies on one hand, and the successes of various types of market and state capitalist systems on the other, do not mean the end of socialist experiments ( f r o m China to Scandinavia). But these d e v e l o p m e n t s do signal that all national e c o n o m i e s now must be responsive to a single set of rules and institutions governing global economic behavior. It is always possible that the current trend toward what Richard Rosecrance has called the trading state (which displays adaptability, entrepreneurship, and cooperativeness), and away f r o m the traditional territorial state, will be reversed. 3 One reading of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy is that a nation's rise to economic prominence almost inexorably leads it to attempt to seek military preeminence. Could we witness the revival of German and Japanese expansionism or their assertion of economic dominance? Some observers think so. But the opposite argument seems more plausible today: The encompassing web of global and regional interdependent relationships, the strength of democratic institutions, the destructive power of weapons (and their increasing irrelevance for offensive purposes), the scope of environmental and other d o m e s t i c p r o b l e m s , and the capacity of popular m o v e m e n t s and transnational organizations are so much more significant in world politics today than ever before. These facts

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of international life diminish incentives for the rise of new hegemonic powers. German and Japanese societies may very well have to deal with national chauvinist appeals again—calling, for example, for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, large military forces, and the recovery of greatness through international assertiveness. But in the enormously changed world of the 1990s, and against the background of failed violence by so many great powers, economically strong states are likely to continue pursuing economic and environmental paths to international recognition. Even rising undemocratic states such as China rely too heavily on the international system to provoke it with unbridled nationalism. If so, greater opportunities should emerge for the sharing of knowledge and resources with countries in the Second, Third, and Fourth Worlds. Our third lesson is that the process for achieving "idealistic" objectives—peace, environmental protection, the meeting of basic needs, the spreading of democracy—should be both humane and grounded in political reality. Neither the theoretical argument for Global Humanism nor the program for attaining it should dogmatically ignore the contributions that Realism and Corporate Globalism have to offer. The global crisis will not end by appeals to conscience; nor by excessive reliance on trust between ideological adversaries in the state system; nor, finally, by the development of elaborate models of new global institutions and world governments. It will end when consciousness of the human condition, the political will of national leaders, openness to increased trust, and new global structures cohere around concrete political-economic programs that have widespread popular support. That such changes are occurring can be seen not merely in the growing body of research and activity along GlobalHumanist lines, but just as importantly in the arguments of some Realist and Corporate-Globalist practitioners for human-interest policies such as major arms reductions, the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, negotiated and internationally verified settlement of disputes, energy conservation, and equity in North-South trade and investment ties. Realism, grounded in the values and practices of power politics, reminds us of the necessity to deal with the world as it is and not only with the world as we would like it to be. Corporate Globalism reflects the increasingly concentrated control by global corporations of the movement of food, energy, information, capital, and other tangibles of politicaleconomic power. Global changes will require the agreement and the skills of both governments and TNCs. The self-interest of each group—broadly speaking, promoting state sovereignty and maximizing profits—will need to be addressed even as change occurs that diminishes or undermines selfinterest. The overriding challenge to Global-Humanist thinking is how to respond to the legitimate security and market concerns of states and TNCs while meeting human needs, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, and

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protecting planetary environmental resources. The challenge is enormous since, as we observed in Chapter 2, the shift from Cold War ideological competition to p o s t - C o l d War economic competition has not reduced the sense among state and corporate leaders of playing for high stakes. Security for the most powerful countries and institutions is still the name of their game. Nevertheless, as threats to national security become primarily nonmilitary and transnational, or simply prove unmanageable, state leaders may feel compelled to invest proportionately more in cooperative responses. Heads of T N C s may be motivated to more equitable approaches to development as some of those same nonmilitary threats (such as debt, poverty, and official corruption) prove intractable. Growing pressures for national and regional control of resources and the emergence of popular movements for social and environmental justice may also change the calculus of TNCs. These general lessons are backed by several more specific ones that ought to be incorporated into a human-interest agenda: • A new world politics begins at home. The domestic enhancement of personal and collective well-being, improving human rights in the fullest sense, strengthens a leadership's ability and willingness to deal positively, and globally, with the great crises of our time. As Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, "America's own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully [basic human] rights have been carried out in practice for our citizens. For unless there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world." 4 The more a national leadership is able to create real security at home, the less is it likely to seek security through expansion abroad. 5 That is why the success of political and economic reform is important to the world and not only to Russian or Chinese citizens. • Mere increases in the means of global welfare (aid, food, refugee relief) not only are very unlikely to solve problems of inequity but are more likely to reinforce their structural foundations. Preventive approaches are preferable to constantly treating symptoms. Among them, increased selfreliance, in the First and Second Worlds as much as in the Third and Fourth Worlds, may be the single most important. G a n d h i ' s maxim that "there is enough for every m a n ' s need, but not enough for every m a n ' s greed" provides a sensible guideline. • Specific human-interest policies will need to reflect a diversity of ideas and priorities. No single formula or blueprint can adequately speak to the complexity of the human condition, no matter how humane its intent. Both public and private mechanisms and incentives will need to be considered in all societies. A strong role for government in social welfare, for example, which was so denigrated in U.S. domestic and foreign policy

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during the 1980s, may be essential to human development. 6 When it comes to the environment, however, government and private enterprise are likely to "balance" environmental protection with economic growth, with all-toopredictable results. For human development to be humane, environmental protection (of nature itself) and resource conservation need to be valued as public goods in their own right. Economic growth and trade need to meet, and promote, environmental standards as much as they should create jobs and lead to a higher quality of life. • Because state leaderships are likely to withhold support of humaninterest policies for as long as possible, the most decisive force for humane change will probably continue to be popular, broadly based national and transnational movements. But humane changes will certainly also occur at the personal, local (community, tribal), national, regional, and global levels. Education will be a crucial source for promoting global awareness and Global-Humanist values at each of these levels. The cumulative impact of all these efforts, not one of them alone, will determine the course of world political change. • Converting military-industrial complexes to research and production that meet human needs is essential to stopping the arms race. A m o n g the many groups whose support is necessary for a conversion program to work are those persons whose jobs would be directly affected by the elimination of weapons contracts. • Modest, workable programs that produce clearly beneficial results are preferable to grandiose schemes backed only by high ideals. Nor should the power of positive example be understated. Human-interest policies must widely be seen to serve everybody's interests rather than the interests of one segment of society, however numerous its members may be. • The various elements of the global crisis are primarily the result of interlinked national and transnational political-economic forces; they are not mainly caused by haphazard occurrences in nature, " b a c k w a r d " cultural traditions, the wrath of God, or some singularly nefarious political doctrine. Awareness of the political roots of the crisis is grounds for both pessimism and optimism: pessimism about the historically powerful interests that must be confronted if the global crisis is to be resolved; optimism that what has been made to happen can also be made to transform.

Thinking Globally In this section I put the above lessons to use in outlining a human-interest policy agenda. I want to take note of the many positive achievements in creating human security that have occurred, and are being created now, worldwide.

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Toward Humane

Economic and Social

Interest

Development

Humane development embraces values such as equity, self-reliance, e m powerment, dignity, love of nature, enoughness, and community; and norms such as decentralization, self-determination, and basic needs. To discuss development in these life-affirming terms is to cut to the heart of the question of inequitable distribution and wasteful use of resources, some of which (for example, oil) will run out in the next century at present rates of consumption. It is also to address directly issues of power, including globalization's overwhelming of indigenous cultures and the failure of male-dominated institutions to invest in women's futures. If development can be redefined to take account of both real and planned scarcities and of its human and environmental impacts around the planet, it may reward societies politically and economically. Humane development may be regarded as low-cost, preventive medicine for terrorism, ethnic conflict, and drug production 7 —and as a preferable alternative to counterterrorism, repression, and limitless growth. Implementing a " h u m a n e " definition of development raises a confounding question: Is "sustainability" enough to avert environmental catastrophe and ameliorate global poverty? Current and projected levels of production and consumption in the North are so high, some environmental systems (e.g., tropical forests) are so seriously threatened, and the gaps between rich and poor are so wide that a sustainable, conservationist approach to development may already be inadequate, even disastrous. 8 The World Bank's prognosis in 1992 is cause for alarm: U n d e r p r e s e n t p r o d u c t i v i t y t r e n d s , a n d g i v e n p r o j e c t e d p o p u l a t i o n inc r e a s e s , d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y o u t p u t w o u l d rise b y 4 - 5 p e r c e n t a y e a r b e t w e e n 1 9 9 0 a n d 2 0 3 0 a n d b y the e n d o f the p e r i o d w o u l d b e a b o u t f i v e t i m e s w h a t it is t o d a y . Industrial c o u n t r y o u t p u t w o u l d rise m o r e s l o w l y but w o u l d still triple o v e r the p e r i o d . W o r l d o u t p u t by 2 0 3 0 w o u l d b e 3 . 5 t i m e s w h a t it is t o d a y . . . . If e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l l u t i o n a n d d e g r a d a t i o n w e r e t o rise in s t e p w i t h s u c h a rise in o u t p u t , the r e s u l t w o u l d be a p palling environmental pollution and d a m a g e . Tens of m i l l i o n s more peop l e w o u l d b e c o m e s i c k or d i e e a c h y e a r f r o m e n v i r o n m e n t a l c a u s e s . W a t e r s h o r t a g e s w o u l d b e i n t o l e r a b l e , a n d tropical f o r e s t s a n d o t h e r natural h a b i t a t s w o u l d d e c l i n e t o a f r a c t i o n o f their current s i z e . 9

What the Bank does not quite say is that greatly increased production will presumably be needed to match increased consumption, a notion that has distorted "sustainable development" ever since the term was first introduced in the 1987 Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future. If, according to that report, sustainable development is nothing more than "meeting the n e e d s " of present and future generations, the world's poor have no hope at all. The North's "needs" to consume will, as before, quite

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simply devour the S o u t h — n o t just its e c o n o m i e s but also its cultures and value s y s t e m s . 1 0 T h e B a n k ' s optimism that the market and e c o n o m i c growth can produce a sustainable future is contradicted by its own projections of " a p p a l l i n g " c o n s e q u e n c e s if the world c o n t i n u e s to f o l l o w the d e v e l o p m e n t - a s - g r o w t h p a r a d i g m . That kind of d e v e l o p m e n t is not sustainable-, it poses immediate dangers to natural systems and basic h u m a n rights. We are therefore compelled to search for policies that will provide sufficiency in d e v e l o p m e n t , " e n o u g h in order to be more, to be fully h u m a n . " " A starting point might be to create a true global partnership f o r development, beginning by stopping profligate consumption in the North. The p a r t n e r s h i p would also seek ways to gain acceptance, even in the poorest countries, of the importance of avoiding malevolent patterns of energy use and growth, not only because of the real prospect of a global environmental collapse but also because protection of nature is in their own interest. The highest priority of humane development is fulfillment of the right to food. Once that right is accepted as a global priority—and it has taken the A f r i c a n f a m i n e s of the 1970s and 1980s to push world hunger to the top of the global agenda—it opens the door to debate about the politicale c o n o m i c forces behind hunger: unequal l a n d o w n e r s h i p , d e p e n d e n c e creating international aid p r o g r a m s , and o p p r e s s i v e national and transnational authorities. The previous discussion has addressed these questions in the context of global underdevelopment and environmental destruction. We can now turn to some policy implications of these findings. Setting the conditions for f o o d self-reliance may be the single most important h u m a n o b j e c t i v e in world politics today. Giving p e o p l e their own land offers hope of dramatic i m p r o v e m e n t s in public health; of ending control of food for profit and political extortion; of new opportunities f o r small farmers, farming communities, and women; of the restoration of ecologically sound, energy-conserving farm practices (such as minimization of soil erosion and labor-intensive irrigation and plowing); of curtailment of the export of protein and overuse of cropland for export purposes, and, instead, use of local resources for local needs; of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a better rural-urban balance in the resources provided by governments; and, finally, hope of reversal of the pattern of high population growth, une m p l o y m e n t , and migrations to cities and across borders that typically acc o m p a n i e s hunger. Such a f o o d - f i r s t or " h u m a n f a c e " d e v e l o p m e n t strategy would be frankly revolutionary, 1 2 which accounts for the resistance to it by numerous authoritarian governments, landed oligarchies, and, oftentimes, transnational corporations. E m b e d d e d in the issue of h u n g e r and land is opportunity. M a n y dev e l o p m e n t experts, including those in the World B a n k , now seem convinced that the single best investment that societies can m a k e to promote

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food production and reduce population pressure on the land is in the education of women. Even if looked at in purely dollars-and-cents terms, it is a remarkably cheap investment. 1 3 Projects to increase food production and bring down the fertility rate in southern India, Bangladesh, and Kenya converged in the conclusion that improving the status of women was the key to realizing both objectives. 1 4 In different ways, women took the lead in family planning. Equally important is what these studies did nor prove, namely, that development alone—increasing food production through the Green Revolution in India's case, raising incomes in B a n g l a d e s h ' s — w i l l stabilize populations and reduce hunger, or that poverty and religion are insuperable barriers to women's social activism. Clearly, the key factor in moving to a food self-reliance strategy is the attitude o f elites, their perception that, as a matter of self-interest and/or nationalism, ending hunger and malnutrition is vital to national security. Successful programs led by government agencies and by local and international N G O s can influence that perception. Home food production, such as Jamaica carried out in its "Grow Our Own F o o d " campaign, can sharply reduce malnutrition. 1 5 Lending money to low-income farmers, who repay the loan as their projects (the purchase of a cow, for instance, or a small shop) make a profit, has worked well in Bangladesh. There the Grameen Bank, which began as a private NGO, has over fifteen years grown into a widely dispersed lender to about 2 million of the poorest villagers, mostly women. The bank has achieved a near-perfect record o f loan repayments and has demonstrated that rural peasants know how to use credit to create income and increase their self-respect and living standards in the process. 1 6 It now has projects in five other countries, including the United States (the South Shore B a n k o f Chicago); and it has spawned a multibillion-dollar "microcredit" effort internationally, backed by the Clinton administration and a number o f other governments and corporations, to provide small loans to some 100 million more poor villagers. 1 7 Similarly in Zimbabwe, providing farmers with credit as well as a supply of high-yield seeds, fertilizer, and agricultural advisers has brought about dramatic production gains. 1 8 Shifting from large-scale governmental aid giving to people-topeople programs that teach food self-reliance is yet another approach; among the thousands of development NGOs, those that stress self-reliant development include O x f a m International, Grassroots International, the Plenty Project, and Church World Service. 1 9 There has in fact been a veritable explosion of development N G O s — Northern, Southern, and transnational, some mostly financed independently but many heavily supported by government aid. Altogether, their programs reach tens of millions of Third World peoples. According to one balanced assessment by an O x f a m (Britain) director, development NGOs vary widely in their effectiveness at influencing the adoption of a "just

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d e v e l o p m e n t " path that s t r e s s e s equity, e n v i r o n m e n t a l sustainability, and the a l l e v i a t i o n of p o v e r t y a m o n g the m o s t poor. N o t e w o r t h y a b o u t the N G O p h e n o m e n o n is that "in t e r m s of net transfers [of aid m o n e y ] . . . N G O s c o l l e c t i v e l y c o n t r i b u t e m o r e t h a n the W o r l d B a n k " ; a n d w h e r e a s this has c o m e a b o u t t h a n k s m o s t l y to i n c r e a s e d g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t of N G O s , not m o r e p r i v a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , it p r e s e n t s a great o p p o r t u n i t y to promote humane grassroots development.20 At the i n t e r n a t i o n a l level, a d m i n i s t e r i n g w o r l d e m e r g e n c y f o o d surp l u s e s — a n d d e v i s i n g a m e t h o d f o r c o m p u l s o r y f o o d c o n t r i b u t i o n s by those n a t i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s that c o n s u m e and t r a n s p o r t m o s t of the f o o d — i s a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e step. Tax r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g T N C s could be changed to reward those c o r p o r a t i o n s that invest in labor-intensive, energysaving technology, p r o m o t e w o m e n ' s and p e a s a n t s ' f a r m c o o p e r a t i v e s , and o f f e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t r a n s f e r r i n g p a t e n t and p r o d u c t i o n rights to local o w n e r s h i p . Foreign e c o n o m i c aid could be c o n d i t i o n e d on its use only for p u r p o s e s that p r o m o t e s e l f - h e l p in f o o d p r o d u c t i o n . Both international org a n i z a t i o n s and p r i v a t e n o n p r o f i t g r o u p s c o u l d d i s s e m i n a t e the f r u i t s of s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h in p l a n t p a t h o l o g y , e n e r g y c o n s e r v a t i o n , and p o s s i b l y biotechnology. 2 1 T h e b e n e f i t s w o u l d b e l o n g to c o u n t r i e s and r e g i o n s with the poorest r e s o u r c e s f o r f o o d p r o d u c t i o n , w h i l e the d i s c o v e r i e s w o u l d not be m o n o p o l i z e d f o r p r o f i t by T N C s , as has been the case with G r e e n Revolution seed varieties. Finally, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of satellite technology, w h i c h has thus far b e e n r e s i s t e d by the m a j o r p o w e r s that lead in its dev e l o p m e n t , c o u l d e n a b l e the p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s to gain a c c e s s to i n f o r m a tion on w e a t h e r and c r o p p r o s p e c t s f o r their o w n use. N o less i m p o r t a n t t h a n f o o d (and o t h e r k i n d s o f ) s e l f - r e l i a n c e in the T h i r d W o r l d is g r e a t e r s e l f - r e l i a n c e in the richest countries. One reason w a s given by the British e c o n o m i s t E. F. S c h u m a c h e r : " W e m u s t live simply that o t h e r s m a y s i m p l y l i v e . " 2 2 A s o n e a p p l i c a t i o n of that idea, c o n sider the p o p u l a r i t y of calling u p o n T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s to r e d u c e popu l a t i o n g r o w t h w h i l e e n c o u r a g i n g i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s to i n c r e a s e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e G e r m a n state of B r a n d e n b u r g , in fact, o f f e r e d a r e w a r d of $ 6 5 0 f o r e v e r y n e w c h i l d . T h e G e r m a n s , s u g g e s t e d o n e writer, w o u l d d o b e t t e r to give that s u m to T h i r d W o r l d f a m i l i e s , f o r " t h e a v e r a g e G e r m a n u s e s r o u g h l y 35 t i m e s m o r e r e s o u r c e s a n d p r o d u c e s r o u g h l y 3 0 t i m e s as m u c h waste as the a v e r a g e t h i r d - w o r l d e r . " 2 3 If h i g h - c o n s u m p t i o n countries w o u l d practice self-control, p e r h a p s p e o p l e in the S o u t h w o u l d be less susp i c i o u s of their m o t i v e s w h e n they talk about s i m p l e r living. First and S e c o n d World c o u n t r i e s c o u l d m a k e a m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to p r o m o t i n g a f o o d - f i r s t s t r a t e g y in the T h i r d W o r l d b y c h a n g i n g the w a y they treat f o o d and f o o d - p r o d u c i n g r e s o u r c e s . A c o n s e r v a t i o n i s t a p p r o a c h c o u l d be of l o n g - t e r m b e n e f i t to e v e r y o n e , but e s p e c i a l l y to the p o o r e s t c o n s u m e r s a n d s m a l l - s c a l e f a r m e r s , N o r t h and S o u t h . In the a b s e n c e of

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land and f o o d reforms in the North, the world will have to reckon with the anomaly of rising production amidst widening hunger, declining land quality, and further concentration of landownership and food distribution. S p e c i f i c c h a n g e s in the richest countries would include stable commodity prices, increased loans, and land tax advantages that give preference to the careful family farmer rather than absentee landowners and the largest commercial farms; increased domestic production of food (such as many f r u i t s and vegetables, fish, and beef) that is increasingly imported; réévaluation of the trend toward feeding animals food fit for human consumption; tax and other benefits to conserve soil and water and to prevent soil erosion, overuse of pesticides and fertilizer, and conversion of prime farmland to nonagricultural purposes; and increasing research support for and public interest in organic farming methods, grow-your-own-food programs, and new food-growing techniques (such as hydroponics, French intensive, and rooftop fisheries). 2 4 The practice, notably in U.S. foreign policy, of denying food aid to governments that oppose U.S. interests should be a b a n d o n e d ; it is u n w o r k a b l e and immoral. Finally, personal dietary changes in the food-rich countries away f r o m excessive meat consumption for protein can also be important. Aside f r o m the widely a c k n o w l e d g e d health b e n e f i t s , dietary c h a n g e s on a large scale could reduce the use of land in the underdeveloped countries for the grazing of beef cattle. Cattleraising is so resource-intensive that is has become unsustainable. 2 5 Food self-reliance is also the principal element of health self-reliance. Mass preventive health-care p r o g r a m s , in which China and Cuba pioneered, mobilize an entire society to ensure effective outreach. Prevention and social mobilization are now being emphasized by W H O and U N I C E F with dramatic results, especially a m o n g children and in war zones. 2 6 Even in the poorest A f r i c a n societies (Tanzania, G a m b i a , and Burkina Faso) early immunization and breast-feeding campaigns have been successfully implemented. 2 7 These programs provide both low-cost and effective, onthe-spot treatment of the basic childhood and adult illnesses that are m a j o r killers. People-to-people medical care programs such as Rainforest Health Project, f o u n d e d by a nurse in a small Minnesota c o m m u n i t y following a trip to the A m a z o n region, deliver basic care but also work with local shamans to promote and protect traditional healing practices. 2 8 T N C s , although often a conduit of health hazards, such as tobacco and pesticides, s o m e t i m e s play a positive role. Merck and C o m p a n y , a leading global p h a r m a c e u t i c a l company, d e v e l o p e d and then donated a drug that helps prevent river blindness, a c o m m o n affliction in many Third World c o u n tries. In the Andes mountain villages of southern Argentina and in C e a r â state in Brazil's northeast, other successful preventive health programs are being carried out where medical attention had previously been u n k n o w n . T h e s e p r o g r a m s include low-cost treatment, a pyramidal structuring of

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facilities, paramedical as well as professional providers, and an emphasis on basic health needs. W H O is already calling the Andes program a model for the Third World, and the Ceara program has cut the infant mortality rate by one-third in three years by relying on an army of health-care workers drawn from the local population. 2 9 Food and energy are intimately linked, as we have seen. T h e path of food self-reliance leads also to increased self-reliance in energy, along a "soft-energy path" popularized by Amory Lovins. 3 0 " S o f t - e n e r g y " sources (solar, geothermal, hydro, biogas, and wind energy) have major advantages over the " h a r d " path o f fossil fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal) and over nuclear energy. These soft sources are decentralized (many solar reflectors, for example, rather than a single giant utility), renewable and recyclable, job-producing, cost-effective, low- or nonpolluting, free o f major health and safety problems, and far less o f a drain on government treasuries and people's incomes because they do not require heavy subsidization. As with food self-reliance, the soft-energy path holds the promise—already fulfilled in many p l a c e s 3 1 — o f conserving precious global and local resources, strengthening community control, lowering user and government costs, and increasing productivity. In the Third World, where the increased cost of oil and petroleum products (notably fertilizer) has been far more burdensome than elsewhere, a shift to soft-energy sources would clearly bring major benefits. Dung could again be used solely as a fertilizer, rather than also as a fuel. T h e enormous increase in tree-cutting for firewood, leading to deforestation and desertification in Africa and other places, could be brought to a halt, particularly if (as in K e n y a ) fuel-saving stoves were also introduced to farmers. 3 2 The migration of peasant labor to the cities could begin to be reversed as machinery took a less prominent place in agriculture—and on the assumption increased food output would b e c o m e the local government's top investment priority. T N C investments in and transfers to the Third World o f energy-saving technology and techniques, which their home governments' tax and trade policies could influence, would strengthen the attractiveness there of soft-energy strategies. Photovoltaic solar cells, for example, will eventually become economical enough to electrify every Third World village, while other forms o f solar energy can provide for cooking and heating water. 3 3 T h e s e steps would likewise reduce the attractiveness o f the nuclear option, with its high price tag in dollars and, potentially, in lives. 3 4 Other underdeveloped countries may emulate the Philippines in deciding not to use nuclear power (a difficult choice in that particular case, because the plant had already been built at a total cost of over $ 2 billion). In the end an investment in food and energy self-reliance is an investment in national solvency: Fewer loans and less money spent on imported

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f o o d and fuel m e a n s more m o n e y available for r e i n v e s t m e n t and repayment of debts. C h i n a set an e x a m p l e of this approach when it adopted a self-reliant development strategy in 1958. Seven years later, it had repaid its debts to the Soviet Union. To be sure, few Third World countries have China's resources to carry out such a strategy. But many are in a position to experiment with selective delinking f r o m an international political economy d o m i n a t e d by Northern interests. This approach calls for increased South-South e x c h a n g e s , to the extent possible, in trade, transnational investments, technology and skills transfers, and even aid. 3 5 Delinking might also include alternatives to the r e p a y m e n t of debts, which have become a focal point of people's anger as human misery rises along with interest payments. During the 1980s, Bolivia and Ecuador put a moratorium on repayment. New governments in Peru and Argentina decided to limit repayment of external debts to a percentage of annual export earnings (in those cases, 10 and 30 percent, respectively). Brazil suspended payment of interest for a brief time. These actions forced several m a j o r international banks to increase their reserves to cover potential losses. In the end, however, only debt forgiveness seems realistic, especially if it can be linked to globally desirable actions by the debtor country rather than (as at present) to accepting structural r e f o r m s that f a v o r T N C s . In return, for example, for an underdeveloped c o u n t r y ' s establishment of tropical forest reserves, return of management of forest regions to indigenous peoples, large-scale reforestation, or switch to alternative fuels, the m a j o r banks and lending governments could unconditionally reduce or eliminate its external debt. 3 6 Selective delinking does not m e a n withdrawal f r o m the international system. Nor does it mean any less vigorous pursuit through North-South negotiations of more equitable trade, loan, aid, i n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g , and investment terms. But it does seek to minimize the worst consequences of international d e p e n d e n c e that c o m e f r o m orienting Third World exports, capital requirements, and productive capacities to the needs and d e m a n d s of remote capitals and boardrooms. Given the p o w e r f u l pull of a globally interdependent economy, h o w ever, even a widely practiced selective delinking strategy is unlikely to improve conditions in the Third World as much as self-reliant trends in the richest countries. We may see this as we look at energy issues again. There is encouraging news of m o m e n t u m in a self-reliant (and decentralized) direction in the North. Worldwatch Institute estimates that by 2000, 20 percent of the w o r l d ' s energy will c o m e f r o m r e n e w a b l e sources. 3 7 N u c l e a r power, though important to some m a j o r economies (for example, France, where it accounts for about 65 percent of total electricity, and Japan, about 30 percent), has b e c o m e tainted by Three Mile Island, C h e r n o b y l , and other major accidents. Orders for new plant construction have plummeted;

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there have been none in the United States since 1979. Throughout Europe and Canada, nuclear plants are either being phased out or dismantled. Unfortunately, weak nuclear sales in the industrialized world have led the major nuclear-plant exporting countries (the United States, Germany, and France) to push nuclear power in the Third World, such as China, adding "nuclear h a v e n s " to the list of dangerous exports that are subsidized by governments. Coal was once thought of as a potential bridging fuel between a dwindling supply of oil and a non-nuclear energy future. 3 8 World coal reserves are "roughly five times the world's proven reserves of o i l . " 3 9 Coal's relative abundance, its many energy uses (for electricity, heating, and power), and the possibilities for exploiting it in synthetic fuels make coal superior to nuclear power as an oil substitute. But coal poses serious environmental hazards due to strip mining, acid rain from the sulfur dioxide generated, and carbon dioxide buildup that is already warming the planet's temperature. In fact, the three countries with the largest coal reserves, the United States, Russia, and China, ought to have the biggest interest in moving away from fossil fuels, since their food-producing regions would be hardest hit by a global climate change. 4 0 Conservation is the second element of energy self-reliance. It has gained momentum in numerous countries: for example, the recycling of aluminum and steel in Japan and Norway; the building of more efficient automobiles, household appliances (the refrigerator in particular), and heat-conserving homes and offices in Japan and Western Europe; the reduction o f energy use in making steel, as in Italy and Spain; the shift to different fuels for automobiles, notably by Brazil to alcohol (creating, however, another set o f problems, namely, the use of food plants for fuel instead of for feeding people). As one authority has commented, the economic sensibility of energy conservation is enormous: A single decision in either the United S t a t e s — t o raise automobile fuel economy to 4 0 miles per gallon—or the Soviet U n i o n — t o produce steel as efficiently as Japan does—would save as much energy as Brazil now consumes. Just using the most efficient lights in the United States would save a third of U.S. coal-fired electric energy. 4 1

Conservation, moreover, produces j o b s while saving money for consumers and cutting down on bills for imported oil. T h e s e j o b s will c o m e from the new skills that will be in demand in resource management; from research, production, and construction of soft-energy facilities and equipment; and from increased consumer spending with money saved on energy bills. As one example, in the Ruhr region of Germany, employment patterns are changing as steel and coal, once the cornerstones of the economy, become uncompetitive. Today, businesses, local government, unions, and

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universities are combining talents to produce industrial environmental equipment (such as for water recycling) that is energy saving. 4 2 Similar stories are being heard from neighborhoods and communities throughout the United States, Canada, and E u r o p e — f o r example, in programs to weatherize homes, convert from oil to solar heating, cogenerate heat and steam for industry, and reduce energy costs in hospitals and businesses through simple conservation techniques. 4 3 In the process, these programs are also demonstrating a Global-Humanist alternative to supply- and demand-side economics: end-use analysis, an approach to developmental issues that asks what the objective is before assuming that more is better. 4 4 The third part of a program for humane development is environmental protection. As I have been stressing, protecting the earth is a daunting task for the fundamental reason that governments and peoples believe that the more an economy grows, the more development there will be. This export of the North's "transnational lifestyle" and development model, as Sunkel wrote, has created an environmental crisis of massive proportions. Solving it is equally monumental, as global warming illustrates. In the United States, Russia, Japan, and Germany, carbon emissions from industry, power plants, and automobiles account for about 39 percent of the global total. Fossil fuel use in the Third World now represents over onequarter of the world total; and as tropical forest destruction continues, and the industrialized countries (including Eastern Europe and the FSU) move away from fossil fuels, that proportion of carbon emissions will rise significantly. China alone, with its heavy reliance on coal for energy, accounts for 13 percent of the Third World's carbon emissions. 4 5 How to wean this diversity of economies away from expensive, highly polluting fossil fuels and onto the path of more efficient sources such as natural gas (in the short term) and sustainable sources such as solar energy and hydrogen gas (in the long term) is a major challenge. Many governments and industry leaders now recognize that global warming affects the quality of life everywhere, 4 6 but none has yet been willing to adopt the ambitious energy-efficiency and carbon-reduction targets that are essential to solving the problem. The immediate economic and social costs of reducing so-called greenhouse gases probably run quite high; yet the long-term gains for all societies from stabilizing the earth's climate would clearly seem to be far higher. 4 7 While action to reverse global warming and other environmental threats will need to take place at the national and regional levels, an international approach must be the centerpiece. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is just that. 4 8 It took five years to get there from the Framework Convention on Climate Change at Rio, and it represents an important, though far from perfect, effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions. The protocol requires emission reductions below 1990 levels of 8 percent by the EU, 7 percent by the United States, and 6 percent

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by Japan, a s s u m i n g their legislatures a p p r o v e the a g r e e m e n t . H o w e v e r , these and lesser d e d u c t i o n s by twenty-one other industrialized countries will not have to occur b e f o r e 2008; total r e d u c t i o n s by the thirty-eight countries will amount to just over 5 percent under 1990 levels, rather than 15 percent as the Europeans and many N G O s had called for; countries that exceed targets will be able to trade quotas with those that do not; and penalties for protocol violations have yet to be established but will not be automatic. 4 9 Considering that 1990 global emission levels worldwide will be greatly exceeded by 2008, Kyoto was a small step forward, limited by political bargaining in what needed to be accomplished. 5 0 The shift to a pollution-free, soft-energy path has only just begun; it will take considerable time to take hold worldwide and to become practical for large industries. M o r e immediate preventive and preservationist steps are called for. steps that would be sensible even if global e n v i r o n mental trends were to stabilize. Such steps include a multinational planet climate watch to detect and attribute the sources of changes, reforestation (such as the greenbelts in north China and Kenya) and other soil-protecting programs, improved water management, development of crops more resistant to climate change, and restoration of d a m a g e d or destroyed natural areas. 5 1 Setting aside large tracts of forestland that are rich in species and in potential medical benefits, as Costa Rica has done, should also be considered, being mindful that indigenous peoples and cultures are not further victimized by a well-intentioned e c o m a n a g e m e n t . 5 2 To avoid that result, one scholar has c o n c l u d e d a f t e r e x a m i n i n g forest m a n a g e m e n t in Asia, local c o m m u n i t y control of the land is essential. With that ingredient, a partnership with g o v e r n m e n t can be effective; without it, sustainable development is impossible. 5 3 But it is timely to consider even more drastic measures instead of adjustments of policies. These would include the outright prohibition of production of toxic chemicals and pesticides (unless demonstrated to be usable and disposable without danger to humans and wildlife); a global moratorium on forest clear-cutting, even on private lands, in ecologically endangered areas; ending government subsidies of energy resources (coal, oil, and nuclear power) that have been proven to have destructive environmental consequences, such as overuse of water, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers; 5 4 and national and international legislation that prohibits or at least heavily penalizes the export by corporations of dangerous chemicals (as well as products that contain them), chemical plants, or pollutants whose production in the home country has been banned. There should be no more Bhopals, just as surely as there should be no more Three Mile Islands and Chernobyls. Finally, substantial taxation, with the revenues used to promote environmental protection, is long overdue. A U N agency has outlined several types of taxes, such as on trade (e.g., in tropical h a r d w o o d ) , on pollution (e.g.,

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greenhouse gas emissions), and on consumption (e.g., on oil or c o a l ) . 5 5 T h e EU countries are already well advanced when it comes to environmental taxation. 5 6 Global environmental problems have spurred the greatest advances to date in international cooperation. 5 7 The first such effort was the 1972 Declaration o f the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. The conference set the parameters of all subsequent discussion by introducing the concept of "sustainable development" and setting up a global environmental monitoring agency. S p e c i f i c international agreements followed. T h e London Dumping Convention regulates the dumping o f radioactive wastes at sea. In 19B2 most o f the sixty-four parties to it (but not the United States, Britain, France, South Africa, or Switzerland) agreed to an indefinite moratorium on oceanic nuclear-waste disposal. The London signatories also agreed in 1 9 9 0 to ban the dumping of industrial waste at sea and recommended that a global mechanism be created to control marine pollution discharged on land. International disposal o f toxic waste was also the subject of a treaty signed at Basel in 1989, which, as of 1998, has 117 parties (again, not the United States). It bans the export of hazardous wastes to Third World countries. T h e Law of the Sea Treaty, signed by 119 nations in 1982, established an important globalist principle—that the planet's undersea wealth is the " c o m m o n heritage of mankind"—and a new implementing regime, the International Seabed Authority. 5 8 The treaty includes measures that hold states liable for pollution o f both territorial and international waters, that tax members for pollution cleanup, and that create a court for settlement of disputes. Its weaknesses are that the major maritime states (the United States, Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan) are not signatories—they all have reservations about the authority's jurisdiction over seabed minerals, and they have concerns about whether decisions will be made by consensus (as Third World states would prefer) or by weighted vote (as in the I M F and World Bank). Even without the major states, the Law of the S e a Treaty has been responsible for promoting cooperation on maritime boundaries and strengthening customary international law, such as on contiguous zones. 5 9 In 1987, concerns about the buildup o f chlorofluorocarbons ( C F C s ) in the atmosphere led to the signing o f the Montreal Protocol. It commits governments, over 150 of which have ratified, to reduce C F C production from aerosols, foam products, refrigerants, and other sources; these are important contributors to global warming as well as to depletion of the earth's ozone layer and increased skin cancers. A fund was established in 1 9 9 0 to enable Third World countries to obtain substitutes for C F C s . B y 1 9 9 5 , global C F C production had declined 7 6 percent compared with the peak year of 1 9 8 8 . T h e E U , Japan, the United States, and a number of Third World countries have entirely or nearly phased out C F C use. On the

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other hand, the FSU countries have reduced C F C s but not met targets, a black market in C F C s has arisen in Russia and a few other countries, and some of the largest Third World countries, such as China and India, have increased usage. If there is full compliance with the Montreal Protocol, the ozone shield should recover by the mid-twenty-first century. In the meantime. however, record levels of ultraviolet radiation are being reported over populated and agricultural areas of the planet, "a sobering reminder that although action eventually was taken, it came too late to avoid serious consequences for human and ecological health." 6 0 At least four important concepts for dealing effectively with global issues emerge from these latter two agreements. One is international management of the planet's " c o m m o n heritage," which ought to apply as well to food, energy, and other e n v i r o n m e n t a l and natural r e s o u r c e s — n o t to mention peace. Second, taxation of o f f e n d e r s is a useful way to punish other crimes against the c o m m o n heritage, such as toxic-waste disposal and acid rain, or for limiting against profit f r o m the c o m m o n s , such as exploitation of o f f s h o r e oil and tropical forests by T N C s . R e v e n u e s f r o m these violations could be used, as a group of Japanese environmental specialists has suggested, to set up an e n v i r o n m e n t a l trust f u n d . The f u n d would " p u r c h a s e " conservation rights in, for instance, m a j o r forests to prevent their exploitation. 6 1 A third concept is the establishment of an international court. If it could have absolutely binding authority to settle disputes and p r o s e c u t e o f f e n d e r s , it would be a model for dealing with numerous other forms of international conflict. Fourth is the indispensable role of independent scientists in the d e v e l o p m e n t of international public policy. As the lead-up to and amendments of the Montreal Protocol showed, hard scientific data is essential to tracking the course, causes, and remedies of environmental problems. 6 2 At the regional level there has also been progress on environmental protection. A reemergence of regional consciousness has occurred. In the United States it is referred to as bioregionalism, and in areas such as the Ozarks and the Great Lakes it takes activist political f o r m s such as preserving watersheds and developing environmental policy platforms. 6 3 In a different vein, the United States and Canada subscribe to a long-established dictum prohibiting the carryover of air pollution f r o m one country to the other. (It r e m a i n s to be seen, however, what c o n c r e t e action Washington and Ottawa take in accepting responsibility f o r acid rain and air pollution on both sides of the border.) 6 4 And in 1979, the t h i r t y - f o u r - m e m b e r Econ o m i c C o m m i s s i o n f o r E u r o p e (under the U N ) signed a C o n v e n t i o n on Transboundary Air Pollution. But this effort to "limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution" lacks the power needed to keep a m a j o r problem f r o m getting out of hand. T h e convention does not establish pollution standards, lacks an e n f o r c e m e n t m e c h a n i s m , and does

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not stipulate accountability (such as in payment of d a m a g e s ) for polluting states or their corporations. 6 5 The fourth c o m p o n e n t of equitable d e v e l o p m e n t is employment. Equitability in this case should begin with revision of e c o n o m i c indicators such as GNP. These should more accurately reflect who is producing in a society and at what social (including environmental) gain or cost. It seems particularly important to include the so-called informal sector: underground labor, unlicensed b u s i n e s s e s , housework, child care, volunteer l a b o r — o f t e n work done by w o m e n and/or by the marginally employed. In many Third World countries, these f o r m s of work are undervalued and officially d i s c o u r a g e d even though they account for substantial actual employment and national income. If supported with access to credit, the inf o r m a l sector could be an important source of business innovations and personal e m p o w e r m e n t . 6 6 We have already seen a few other ways in which the unemployment crisis in the Third and Fourth Worlds can be addressed, starting with the redirection of government investment into agriculture and of transnational corporate investment into labor-intensive, energy-saving, ecologically responsible activities. Another approach is work cooperatives, one notable example of which is the Mondragon Cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain. 6 7 There, one finds local economic independence and control that has successfully incorporated democratic decisionmaking and worker ownership. But e m p l o y m e n t is also a long-term structural p r o b l e m in the advanced economies. Their one-dimensional focus on international competitiveness and privatization has led to high unemployment, especially among the young and unskilled, and the exporting of jobs. The need is urgent for the United States, the EU, and Japan to reinvigorate their e c o n o m i e s through an o v e r h a u l i n g of public spending and tax priorities. A kind of legislative agenda based on h u m a n priorities would have to include, first, j o b retraining and corporate responsibility legislation to protect workers and c o m m u n i t i e s in transition; second, in the United States, sharp reductions in the military budget, particularly in new weapons procurement, nuclear weapons, and through cost efficiencies; third, tax incentives to corporations and banks that invest in j o b - c r e a t i n g , p r o d u c t i v i t y - i m p r o v i n g activities at h o m e — a n d disincentives to those that do not or that continue to invest in countries where labor is repressed and h u m a n rights are discounted; and, fourth, greatly increased public f u n d i n g of education, family f a r m i n g , small business, r e s o u r c e conservation, and r e n e w a b l e energy sources. An equitable approach to North-South differences over information is the fifth c o m p o n e n t of h u m a n e development. There appears to be room for bargaining. G o v e r n m e n t s in the South might accept that the electronic media cannot be kept out and that restrictions on press f r e e d o m s need to

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be loosened. But they have a right to expect that foreign reporters will be sensitive to their societies' cultures and histories (which might be assisted by enrolling reporters in local universities w h e n they arrive). Both sides would benefit f r o m improved reporting on the Third World, with more attention to long-term issues of underdevelopment and to positive efforts by governments and international agencies to deal with them. An international convention on media rights and responsibilities that lays out an agenda of mutual benefit might be in order.

Toward Common

Security

If movement ioward a durable peace is to begin, the starting point must be the development of incentives for states and groups to avoid war in their political conflicts. The end point is disarmament within a system of global security. In b e t w e e n , what must be constructed is what Karl D e u t s c h , in his classic study of Western European unity, called "a sense of c o m m u nity," meaning a shared belief that " c o m m o n security problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful c h a n g e . ' " 6 8 The nation-state system has a long way to go toward b e c o m i n g such a community. All its leaders pay lip service to the " p e a c e f u l settlement of disputes" but frequently resort to war and intervention to resolve conflicts. There has yet to emerge a shared perception a m o n g state leaders that international o r d e r — e c o n o m i c and social, not simply military—is in every society's best interests, and that maximizing armaments does not purchase real security or deter threats to it. Yet, unless state leaders have high conf i d e n c e in alternative means of protecting their legitimate security interests, they will not agree to steps toward d i s a r m a m e n t ; nor will they give consistent support to international p e a c e k e e p i n g and arms reductions, all of which depend to a great extent on trust. To create an agenda for moving to an alternative security system requires accepting certain fundamental premises. These flow f r o m the previous chapters' argument about the nature of the global crisis of international conflict. One is that our field of concern is the war system and not merely one country's military program. Another is that we must take account of the bureaucratic and economic forces in all societies that propel the arms race forward. A third premise is that system change will evolve out of a process of successful experiments that have popular support. Neither technical fixes (such as setting limits on types of missiles) nor ambitious rearrangements of the f u t u r e (such as global disarmament and world f e d e r a l i s m ) stand much chance of being widely accepted in the foreseeable future. A fourth premise is that alternatives to the arms race must address insecurity at several levels, including p e o p l e ' s deep pessimism and fear that to reduce a r m s will invite attack; mistrust b e t w e e n national, ethnic, and

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religious leaders built partly on long-standing grievances; and the structural violence of underdevelopment. Fifth, every change in global security policy should strengthen the ability of the global community to m o v e beyond state conflict t o w a r d new f o r m s of identification, representation, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , d e f e n s e , and conflict resolution. 6 9 This p r e m i s e f u r t h e r means that each c h a n g e should have real substance and not be mere window-dressing, as has often been the case with arms-control agreements. Last, our a g e n d a should rest on o p t i m i s m that war is not inevitable. Rather, war has b e c o m e obsolete. With a new vision, the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective f o r m s of inspection and control is achievable. 7 0 At Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, the discussion between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on eliminating nuclear warheads in Europe, reducing strategic weapons by one-half, and working t o w a r d a total test ban s h o w e d that what is considered Utopian one day can b e c o m e a serious topic the next. Only four years later, President Bush declared the Cold War over, and in the next year he and Yeltsin announced m a j o r reductions of nuclear forces. Promising steps to an alternative security system are presented here in terms of four key areas: c o m m u n i c a t i o n s between adversaries, military issues, nonmilitary issues, and the public's role. Communications. A helpful beginning to creating a m o m e n t u m for peace is for adversaries to agree to e m p h a s i z e the positive aspects of their relationship. At the height of the Cold War, for example, the U.S. and Soviet leaderships might have publicized the n u m e r o u s a g r e e m e n t s ( m a j o r and minor, over 100 in all) that they abided by. A noted international legal scholar r e m i n d s us of what Soviet and U.S. leaders ignored: " h o w much international law and obligation applied and were effectively observed between the United States and the Soviet Union even when their relations were most strained." 7 1 Like it or not, these adversaries trusted each other all the t i m e — t o fulfill obligations under exchange programs and business deals, to keep military and political flare-ups around the world f r o m escalating to a s u p e r p o w e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n , and especially to maintain nuclear weapons and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in a fail-safe condition. S o m e specific additional steps to facilitate c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n adversaries are: • Substantial increase in people-to-people exchange programs, involving both professionals and ordinary citizens. These would be supported by networks of coordinating groups in and between the countries or territories concerned. "Space bridges," which use satellites to link groups of children, musicians, doctors, and simply concerned citizens in hostile countries, exemplify the new possibilities that technology is opening up.

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• Expansion of the sister-city concept, which already has wide international acceptance. • Use o f a variety of negotiating and dialogue formats that have been developed to build trust and empathy, such as the Harvard Negotiating Project's approach that emphasizes interests over positions; Herbert Kelman's interactive problem-solving workshops in the Middle East; Raymond Cohen's work on cross-cultural sensitivity; and Harold Saunders' ideas for expanding the concept of negotiations to include an array of " p r e - " and " c i r c u m - " negotiating processes that are crucial to effective official talking. 7 2 All these approaches may involve high-level officials or ordinary citizens. Arab and Israeli negotiators, forced to deal with one another over a long period of time away from the public spotlight, came to new levels of understanding about each other's cultures, security priorities, and humanness. They accepted, at least in some part, the validity and legitimacy o f views that had previously been discounted as mere propaganda. "Everything that was security for us was dignity for them," said the c h i e f Israeli negotiator. In the end, mutual respect accelerated the peace process; but, to state the obvious, it did not assure a final settlement. 7 3 • Humanizing one's adversary. One of the unfortunate hallmarks of the Cold War competition was the invective, misrepresentation, and dehumanizing language that the Americans and the Russians employed in their public discourse. Former Ambassador George F. Kennan decried it as "the marks of an intellectual primitivism and naivete unpardonable in a great government." 7 4 Name-calling cannot build bridges, whereas agreements to use civil language and in other ways treat one's adversary as a human being just may. T h e above-mentioned Arab-Israeli talks in Oslo paved the way for the famous handshake in Washington between Yasir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin in 1993. When British prime minister Tony B l a i r shook hands with Gerry Adams, he said: " I treated Gerry Adams and the members o f Sinn Fein [the political wing of the Irish Republican Army] in the same way I treat any other human b e i n g . " T h e same principle, he added, should apply to the entire situation in Northern Ireland. 7 5 The gesture carried enormous symbolism and did indeed help push the Northern Ireland peace process to a successful conclusion. • Apologizing to those who have been wronged. In international affairs, as distinct from the personal realm, apologies are above all political acts, which make them rarities. Victors in wars and dictators never apologize; great powers and giant corporations, almost never. On a few o c c a sions, governments have apologized to their own people: Germany's Chanc e l l o r Willy Brandt went down on his knees in the Warsaw ghetto to apologize for the Holocaust; the Canadian government apologized to indigenous peoples for its maltreatment of them; the U . S . government apologized to Japanese Americans for interning them during World War II; and

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the government of Taiwan apologized to native-born Taiwanese for a m a s sacre that occurred when the mainland Nationalists took over the island. But when President Clinton apologized in 1998 for Washington's failure to respond to the unfolding genocide in R w a n d a four years earlier, it was the exception to the rule. D o e s a p o l o g i z i n g matter? Might not history h a v e changed if Washington had apologized to the Ayatollah for U.S. training and support of the SAVAK and other costly interventions in Iran's political life? Clinton's very personal apology to Rwandans gives reason to think he (and h o p e f u l l y the international c o m m u n i t y ) learned that the next t i m e genocide threatens, the response will be immediate and powerful. If J a p a n tomorrow o f f e r e d a credible, heartfelt apology for its aggressions and atrocities, might that not begin a process of healing, within as well as outside the country? Contrition is a uniquely human capacity. To a p o l o g i z e for having inflicted great pain and s u f f e r i n g on another people is the human thing to do. It d o e s not end discussion; to the contrary, it is the pathway to historical explanation and the precondition of policy change. A truthful apology signifies a desire to understand and to behave differently in the future. Military issues. T h e U . S . - S o v i e t record indicates that carefully written arms a g r e e m e n t s can build trust even in the tensest times. More than twenty related to nuclear arms, and as the Cold War ended, the two sides were in compliance with them. 7 6 Violations of arms agreements occur e v e n with the best verification system. But satellites and other verification technologies are now advanced e n o u g h to ensure that m a j o r violations (those that would give one side a clear strategic advantage) cannot be concealed. A c c e p t a n c e of on-site v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s is now almost u n i v e r s a l l y regarded as critical to s u c c e s s f u l a g r e e m e n t s . And they work, as w i t n e s s the discoveries of Iraq's W M D programs. As we saw in C h a p t e r 5, arms-limiting a g r e e m e n t s only scratch the surface of the arms race. T h e y tell us what negotiators considered w a s politically safe to do, not what the global interest indicated they ought t o do. Consequently, there is a long way yet to go before we can feel secure in a world awash with n u c l e a r and conventional w e a p o n s . Progress d e p e n d s most of all on the United States, as the only superpower. S o m e s p e c i f i c areas for negotiation and diplomacy are: • A multilateral declaration of no first-use of nuclear weapons. Parties making such a declaration would be agreeing to f o r g o the nuclear threat. (The Soviet government endorsed the no-first-use concept in 1981, as did the C I S m e m b e r s in 1991 and a n u m b e r of f o r m e r high-level U.S. o f f i cials.) 7 7 A necessary component of abandoning the option to initiate nuclear attack is for the nuclear great powers to move to minimum d e t e r r e n c e — n o

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more than a few h u n d r e d warheads. Such a small but highly accurate arsenal (for example, entirely based on submarines) would demonstrate that the only conceivable p u r p o s e of nuclear w e a p o n s is to deter their use by others. 7 8 It would also be a m a j o r step toward burying deterrence doctrine and reaching zero nuclear weapons.19 • An international convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons. The U N General A s s e m b l y has twice (in 1996 and 1997) called for "an early conclusion of a nuclear w e a p o n s convention prohibiting the development, p r o d u c t i o n , testing, d e p l o y m e n t , stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear w e a p o n s and providing for their elimination." 8 0 The model for such a ban is the C W C : It applies to all countries without exception; it contains tough verification and m o n i t o r i n g provisions; and it is c o m p r e hensive in coverage. In short, such a convention would at one blow eliminate an entire category of W M D and thus would go well beyond the N P T and the C T B T requirements. It would also prevent nuclear transfers to nu clear and n o n - n u c l e a r - w e a p o n states alike; and it would presumably stop laboratory work that could improve or redesign nuclear weapons. Clearly, too, the convention's breadth would make it unacceptable in terms of current U.S. nuclear policy. The convention would have to be accompanied by much stronger m o n i t o r i n g of nuclear plants than so far exists, and by an enforceable international agreement banning the production of all weaponsgrade fissionable material, plutonium exports, the use of plutonium for any purpose, and the r e p r o c e s s i n g of spent fuel f r o m civilian reactors. International specialists should also be brought together to find an acceptable final resting place for existing spent nuclear fuel. 8 1 Pending conclusion of the convention, a n u m b e r of sensible interim steps to reduce the danger of use of nuclear w e a p o n s have been proposed, such as separating warheads f r o m launchers, removing the cores f r o m warheads, and storing warheads far away f r o m launchers. • Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency within the United Nations, as the French g o v e r n m e n t first p r o p o s e d in 1978. Aside f r o m its e c o n o m i c development uses mentioned earlier, such a system could oversee military m o v e m e n t s and help verify arms agreements. Internationalization of satellite t e c h n o l o g y f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s is long overdue and represents a positive departure from proposals to " w e a p o n i z e " the heavens. • Creation of additional n u c l e a r - f r e e zones, which are areas ( f r o m cities on up to countries and regions) within which nuclear testing, manufacturing, acquisitions, deployment, transit, and storage may be prohibited. O v e r forty countries and regions f r o m Wales to Japan are n u c l e a r - f r e e . Treaties have also e s t a b l i s h e d outer space (in 1967), the Antarctic (in 1961), Latin A m e r i c a (in 1968), the South Pacific (in 1985), Southeast Asia (1955), and A f r i c a (1996) as nuclear-free, though not all in the same

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way. T h e challenge ahead is to m a k e nuclear-free those regions where tensions run highest and where some governments possess (or may soon possess) nuclear weapons: Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. 8 2 • Bilateral and multilateral p l e d g e s of mutual n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in the domestic affairs of other (namely, Third World) states. Pledges do not prevent conflict; but they may lessen the incentive to resort to a r m s or increase the incentive to stop fighting. O n e example is the regional agreement reached by Nicaragua, H o n d u r a s , Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala in August 1987 to implement cease-fires with opposing forces in their countries. They also agreed to end foreign military i n v o l v e m e n t and undertake democratic reforms as steps toward mutual respect for each state's s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Another approach is f o r the m a j o r p o w e r s to agree to noninvolvement in a conflict in which they have few tangible interests at stake. 8 3 In 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated just such an agreement in Angola. • Unilateral military initiatives, which may perform the same function as negotiated a g r e e m e n t s more efficiently, provided the other side reciprocates within a reasonable time. T h e moratorium on nuclear testing came about in this manner. Similarly, a government's unilateral declaration that it will reduce its military budget by a certain percentage, or refrain f r o m a particular military act (such as an arms transfer) if its o p p o n e n t also refrains, can create a positive atmosphere for reducing tensions and arsenals. • T h e creation of new or strengthened international institutions to monitor and enforce global standards of military (and nonmilitary) perform a n c e . 8 4 T h e new institution might be a United N a t i o n s D i s a r m a m e n t Agency to supervise adherence to military agreements, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology, with information drawn f r o m the kind of international satellite agency previously p r o p o s e d . C o n v e n t i o n a l arms transfers are particularly important for an international regime to monitor and restrict. T h e Perm 5, as the m a j o r arms sellers, must take steps beyond reporting. Individually, they should greatly reduce their arms transfers and end subsidies to their arms-exporting companies. Within the UN, the World Bank, and other international institutions, they should press for c o m m o n restrictions on arms transfers to governments that (for example) fail to sign or violate specified arms-control treaties. Development aid might be withheld f r o m governments that have very high military budgets. 8 5 Conversely, incentives might be created for Third World arms sellers not to sell arms, such as swapping debt or providing human-development aid. • Strengthening international capabilities for peacekeeping. As ethnic and other intrastate conflicts have moved to the top of the international security agenda, relying on collective security to combat them has lost its appeal a m o n g the m a j o r powers. They can find no strategic rationale to justify e n g a g e m e n t ; they are reluctant to c o n f r o n t their publics with the bill

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and the casualties; and they are loath to interfere in another country's chaotic affairs, either because it is a "failed state" such as R w a n d a that would require substantial nation-building resources (and here, the m a j o r powers are mindful of the quicksand that Somalia became in 1992-1993), or because the conflict is politically off limits, such as Russia in Chechnya or China in Tibet. Thus, despite the increased number of UN peacekeeping operations since the Cold War ended (refer again to Table 1.2), they remain the exception to the general rule of hands off. In most kinds of internal conflicts, that rule makes some sense, for they are far messier than an aggression of the Iraq-Kuwait type. Peacekeeping is, after all, intervention. Like all interventions, peacekeeping— that is, attempting to separate the combatants, save lives, and perhaps move the conflict into the peacemaking stage—risks charges of bias, logistical and financial problems, insensitive diplomacy, disagreements among the governmental and nongovernmental groups committed to helping, and then failure, at which point the use of or threat to use force (i.e., peace enforcement) may arise. 8 6 The three-year Bosnia mission called UNP R O F O R — U N Protection Force—involved all these pitfalls and many more besides. It can hardly be accidental, then, that peacekeeping operations have mainly been facilitative: acting as a buffer force, monitoring cease-fires, preventively deploying force, setting up and supervising elections, and engaging in fact-finding missions. When the operations have been more actively interventionist, such as efforts to coerce a solution or engage in nation-building, they have run into serious problems. The missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Cambodia all achieved their initial objectives but in the end were unable to create lasting settlements: Somalia and Haiti are still in disarray, and Cambodia's history since formation of a coalition government has been rife with corruption and violence. 87 Bosnia's future under the Dayton Accords looks bleak without a prolonged stay by NATO forces. Ideally, the best moment for peacekeeping is before violence breaks out. Chester Crocker speaks of "preemptive engagement in promoting negotiated alternatives to continued repression or expanding violence and upheaval." 8 8 Even more demanding is preventive diplomacy. 8 9 L u n d ' s study, which is a careful effort to specify the conditions for preventive action, actually shows why success is so unlikely. Prevention requires an unusual congruence of circumstances: harmony of interest among external parties and internal disputants, a convincing combination of carrots and sticks, and governing institutions in the warring territories strong enough to give legitimacy to moderating influences. In the end, facilitative operations would seem to stand the best chance of bringing about a negotiated peace, provided the warring parties want to negotiate. Simply put, political leaders have to want peace to get peace, as happened in Central America and (outside the UN) Northern Ireland. 9 0

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W i n s t o n Churchill once said, " T h e United Nations was set up not to get us to heaven, but only to save us f r o m hell." The trouble is, the nationstate system that the U N reflects has sometimes ignored " h e l l , " the unspeakable barbarities against whole populations that have resulted in huge n u m b e r s of deaths in a short amount of time. Ethnic cleansings, mass expulsions, deliberate starvation, systematic rapes, and other crimes against h u m a n i t y and war crimes represent a special category of internal conflict that d e m a n d humanitarian intervention. Here the concern is to save a great m a n y imperiled, innocent lives, not to keep contending forces apart. And here is precisely where the international community has failed so badly, as H a v e l said of Yugoslavia, and Clinton of R w a n d a . Certainly, h u m a n i t a r ian interventions face the same kinds of obstacles that ordinary peacek e e p i n g faces; good intentions are no substitute for clear objectives and adequate resources. Still, the UN system was established precisely to prevent new Holocausts; when political leaders see genocide directly ahead, is it not their duty to act? The tragedy of R w a n d a is, in a sense, civilizational: By now the evidence is o v e r w h e l m i n g that U N , French, U.S., A f r i c a n , and other leaders were forewarned of impending large-scale massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by Hutu militia. A UN observer mission was on the spot but had no authorization to intercede and was refused it. At least a h a l f - m i l l i o n people were slaughtered then, as were tens of t h o u s a n d s more w h o fled into n e i g h b o r i n g Zaire. In all, R w a n d a was avoidable. 9 1 In a truly new world order, the world c o m m u n i t y would not walk away f r o m mass violence on the basis of narrow calculations of national interest. The central problem may be the need to m a k e collective security g e n u i n e l y collective and global, and thus different f r o m p r e v i o u s U N peacekeeping missions. 9 2 The missing ingredient might be a permanent international peace force (IPF) acting under UN command in the event nonviolent measures fail to produce compliance with U N resolutions. The I P F concept dates back to the p o s t - W o r l d War II years. Under Chapter VII of the U N Charter (Article 43), m e m b e r states are s u p p o s e d to c o n c l u d e a " s p e c i a l a g r e e m e n t " to p r o v i d e the Security Council, w h e n called u p o n , with military f o r c e s and other assistance. Such a g r e e m e n t s have n e v e r b e e n m a d e . 9 3 W h e n U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l Boutros B o u t r o s - G h a l i proposed in July 1992 to establish a permanent peacekeeping f o r c e — o n e that would be composed of national contingents and have access to government intelligence on potential conflicts—only France's President François Mitterrand supported him. A p e r m a n e n t I P F would bring national military c o n t i n g e n t s together f o r training in advance of actual need. The force would act on behalf of the international c o m m u n i t y , not an individual g o v e r n m e n t or a regional organization. Its primary p u r p o s e would be rapid deployment to prevent or

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m i n i m i z e large-scale threats to h u m a n life, such as by creating s a f e h a v e n s for civilians. A s p e c i f i c t h r e s h o l d of v i o l e n c e w o u l d automatically trigger the d e p l o y m e n t . S e c o n d a r i l y , and not automatically, the I P F m i g h t be u s e d in select i n s t a n c e s of " p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t , " m e a n i n g the u s e of d e a d l y f o r c e to assert the w o r l d c o m m u n i t y ' s will. 9 4 T h e U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s m e m b e r s h i p w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e to be enlarged (such as by the a d d i t i o n of G e r m a n y and J a p a n ) and its v o t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s c h a n g e d , both to add legitimacy to a n y use of c o l l e c t i v e f o r c e and to p r e v e n t an easy v e t o of a proposed peace action.95 Inevitably, and appropriately, the c o n c e p t of the I P F m u s t a n s w e r to a large n u m b e r of p o l i t i c a l a n d e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s . To say that s u c h a f o r c e should be f o r m e d to p r e v e n t , or protect against, m a s s violence does not address the p r e c i s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s that w o u l d t r i g g e r its d e p l o y m e n t , the s c o p e of its m i s s i o n , the l i k e l i h o o d of its e f f e c t i v e n e s s , a n d p o s s i b l e a b u s e s of its a u t h o r i t y . 9 6 C r e a t i n g an a u t o m a t i c r e s p o n s e , f i n a n c i n g the IPF, and p u t t i n g it u n d e r U N c o m m a n d will raise o b j e c t i o n s by s o m e gove r n m e n t s , s t a r t i n g w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . U n l e s s e f f e c t i v e a n s w e r s are f o u n d to t h e s e issues, c o l l e c t i v e security will r e m a i n as d e p e n d e n t on national interests and geopolitical t h i n k i n g as it was in the C o l d War era. Nonrnilitari/

issues.

• Establishment of an international criminal court that is i n d e p e n d e n t of g o v e r n m e n t s . O v e r f i f t y y e a r s a f t e r the N u r e m b e r g trials of N a z i l e a d e r s , the time h a s c o m e to p r o s e c u t e g e n o c i d e and other c r i m e s against h u m a n ity. Since 1970, there h a v e been three universally a c k n o w l e d g e d instances of g e n o c i d e — t h e "killing f i e l d s " in C a m b o d i a , B o s n i a , a n d R w a n d a — a n d possibly a f o u r t h , G u a t e m a l a . 9 7 E x c e p t in a single i n s t a n c e in R w a n d a (see b e l o w ) , n o political l e a d e r with p r o b a b l e responsibility f o r m a s s s l a u g h t e r has been a p p r e h e n d e d and p r o s e c u t e d . In C a m b o d i a , the e f f o r t to p r e s e r v e national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n at all c o s t s led to a p a r d o n f o r o n e of the t w o t o p K h m e r R o u g e leaders, Ieng Sary, u p o n surrender to the central g o v e r n m e n t of f o r c e s l o y a l to h i m . H e w a s r e w a r d e d f o r his s u r r e n d e r w i t h p o l i t i c a l p o w e r — t h e s a m e m a n w h o o v e r s a w the d e a t h s of a r o u n d 1 m i l l i o n p e o p l e in the 1970s. 9 8 T h e s e n i o r K h m e r R o u g e leader, Pol Pot, w a s n e v e r a p p r e h e n d e d ; he d i e d in the j u n g l e a f t e r h a v i n g been tried and c o n v i c t e d (of policy e r r o r s , not w a r c r i m e s ) by his p e e r s . In B o s n i a , N A T O c o m m a n d e r s , c o n c e r n e d a b o u t an o u t b r e a k of v i o l e n c e , r e f u s e d to m a k e s e i z u r e of the B o s n i a n S e r b l e a d e r s part of their m i s s i o n , contrary to the s t r o n g u r g i n g s of the chief j u s t i c e of the ICJ, R i c h a r d G o l d s t o n e . E v e n t h o u g h the U N trib u n a l c r e a t e d to h a n d l e w a r c r i m e s in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a issued g e n o c i d e c h a r g e s against S e r b local c o m m a n d e r s , only o n e of the a c c u s e d w a s t a k e n into custody. S e r b military and political leaders r e m a i n e d at large. 9 9

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And in R w a n d a , although a tribunal to deal with war crimes committed by Hutus in N o v e m b e r 1994 was set up, its e f f o r t s were c o m p r o m i s e d in a different w a y — b y the c o n t i n u i n g genocidal f i g h t i n g b e t w e e n Hutus and Tutsis that spread, by 1996, into Zaire. As of spring 1998, only one trial had occurred (with a verdict not yet rendered), and thirty-five people had been indicted. Only one senior o f f i c i a l , the p r e m i e r of R w a n d a in M a y 1994 who had incited violence against Tutsis, had pleaded guilty to charges of genocide. 1 0 0 An international c o n f e r e n c e in R o m e d r a f t e d a treaty for an international criminal court in July 1998. Two outstanding issues emerged: the Security C o u n c i l ' s p o w e r to authorize charges of c r i m e s against h u m a n ity, and the scope of the c o u r t ' s jurisdiction. On the first, only Britain among the Perm 5 argued for a fully independent body that ought not be dependent on the Security Council's will. Most countries agreed. As to the second, the United States was again in the minority in wanting the court's work confined to genocide and not, for example, extended to include mass rape and other war crimes that soldiers might c o m m i t , or crimes against humanity such as waging aggressive war. The treaty passed, and it remains to be seen how countries like the United States that will not sign it will work within its contours. 1 0 1 • Increased use of citizen d i p l o m a t s — s o - c a l l e d Track II diplomacy. When hostages are taken and the lives of innocent persons having no o f f i cial responsibility are at stake, unofficial mediators w h o can appeal on hum a n e grounds may stand the best chance of succeeding. (Two e x a m p l e s : the Reverend Jesse Jackson's successful mission to Syria in 1984 to f r e e a d o w n e d U.S. pilot; and the e f f o r t s of Terry Waite, representing B r i t a i n ' s Anglican Church, to negotiate the release of h o s t a g e s taken in Beirut by radical Islamic groups.) J i m m y Carter proved to be an extremely effective diplomat after his presidency, playing the roles of mediator, elections supervisor, and diplomat in several conflict situations, such as in N a m i b i a , Nicaragua, and North Korea. • The conversion of significant portions of military industries to nonmilitary production. F u l l - f l e d g e d conversion is as p r o f o u n d an e c o n o m i c and social undertaking as the shift f r o m a c o m m a n d to a market economy. I d e f i n e " c o n v e r s i o n " as a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and c o n s c i e n t i o u s (i.e., irreversible) shift of g o v e r n m e n t r e s o u r c e s f r o m the military to the civilian sector—along with additional investment in the civilian sector—leading to the demilitarization of social and political life, and thus to socially useful, economically sensible, and environmentally sustainable uses of productive capacity. No society has attempted military conversion of such dimensions. Conversion in the United States and the EU countries has been highly localized—a shift to civilian production by a single c o m p a n y ' s management or by a community to save the defense facility and its workers. 1 0 2 Only in

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China has conversion been a matter of long-term national policy tied to economic development. Even then, conversion has not satisfied the other criteria, in particular demilitarization. It matters what "swords" are converted into, how and where they are produced, who produces them, and why they are being produced at all. 103 Conversion is not the production of products with dual (military and civilian) use, products that are polluting, or products that are just as obsolete and costly as those converted from. Nor is conversion the production of arms for export rather than for one's own military; nor mere economizing, such as by reducing the military budget or armed forces, retraining some military-industrial workers, or eliminating costly or redundant weapons systems. Some of these changes may be steps to conversion, but they are not conversion per se. Conversion is a strategic decision, requiring, as some specialists have noted, not only planning for industrial and occupational transitions but two other major shifts: in government spending priorities and in the restructuring of national-security interests and military forces. 104 Extensive post-Cold War military conversion thus further requires overcoming the same factors that lubricated the military-industrial complex during the Cold War: powerful alliances among politicians, industry, and the armed forces; opportunities for excessive profits under military contracts; the rallying cry of national security; and the dependence of individuals, industrial firms, communities, regions, and central governments on military contracts and arms exports. Even when some of these obstacles can be overcome, the costs of retooling assembly lines, developing product markets, and retraining workers may be prohibitive. Russia since 1991 is a classic case illustrating the interplay of all these factors to prevent serious conversion from occurring. The Cold War's demise has potentially freed up a "peace dividend" in the hundreds of billions of dollars that could be applied to jump-start conversion programs in thousands of communities. Such programs represent an unusual opportunity for government-business-labor partnerships to put people to work, which is essential as part of a larger national and community effort to plan for and shift to a nonmilitary economy. 105 Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War has also made available large numbers of demobilized soldiers who, by virtue of their organizational training and equipment, could also play a part in another element of conversion: environmental cleanup. 106 Since military forces are the largest polluters in every society, they might be placed under a special civilian agency with the assignment to dispose of their own as well as civilian toxic wastes and to decontaminate land. We come, finally, to the public's role. The pervasiveness of war, its terrifying costs, and the slowness and weakness of the negotiating process

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have brought increasing numbers of people into the peacemaking arena. Popular rather than bureaucratic will is pushing the agenda of a nonnuclear, nonviolent world forward. Some national leaders recognize this human-interest potential. President Eisenhower once declared that people may one day "want peace so badly that governments better get out of their way and let them have it." Years later President Reagan agreed, saying in a letter to Brezhnev: "Sometimes it seems that the governments [of our countries] get in the way of the people." When General George Lee Butler implored listeners to seize the time and contain the "nuclear beast," he said: "I want to record my strong conclusion that the risks entailed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave the prospects of their elimination solely within the province of governments." 1 0 7 The influence of citizens depends on education and involvement. • Education for a global citizenry. The incorporation of GlobalHumanist values into world politics is conceivable only when large numbers of people, whether they are in policymaking positions or not, adopt a global perspective on national issues. That means educating people to think globally, on behalf of one planet. 1 0 8 Although this is a long-term project, it is already well under way. In the United States, for example, global education has taken shape in the introduction of peace studies to curricula at every level, in the founding of new conflict-resolution programs (such as Harvard's Negotiation Project), in congressional funding of a U.S. Institute of Peace, and in a sizable increase in the number of teachers who use a global perspective in their courses. 109 • Demonstration of Global Humanism in everyday life. The role of global citizen is also evident on a day-to-day basis: in neighborhood and other decentralist programs of self-reliance and conservation (such as farmers' markets and household weatherization); in national and regional networks sharing information and ideas on environmental, economic, and other matters that are transnational in scope; in the many successful intentional communities that people have founded in urban as well as rural areas; in the increasing popularity of "socially responsible" investment programs (those that invest individuals' money only in companies that are engaged in ethical, environmentally sustainable practices); and in conscious efforts by untold thousands of people to lead simpler lives and (as is discussed further later on) cultivate their most human qualities. 1 1 0 As Paul Hawken reminds us, however, even the most progressive personal and business activities are likely to result in increased consumption. We who are privileged to live in postindustrial societies should therefore not delude ourselves that anything other than radical changes in the way businesses and public institutions operate will prevent large-scale environmental deterioration. 111

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• Exploration of preservative means of defense. 1 1 2 The peaceful transfers of power in Russia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Eastern Europe illuminate one o f the great challenges to our imagination: finding ways of protecting societies while minimizing the likelihood o f harming o t h e r s — and destroying what one hopes to protect. Nonviolent resistance has a rich history that may be as relevant to weapons issues as it is to defense against tyrannies and foreign interventionists. Scientists who today refine instruments o f war may tomorrow, working transnationally, develop nonprovocative instruments for repelling attack. In the meantime, it is left to citizens in threatened countries to act—and millions have, nonviolently, put their lives and positions on the line to say no to further violence. Civilian nonviolent resistance will not always be sufficient or successful. T h e army in Burma brutally cracked down on unarmed demonstrators in August 1988 and continues to rule with an iron hand. The Soviet government economically strangled Lithuania's attempt to restore its sovereignty in 1990. In Romania the new socialist party that won the election after the overthrow of the previous dictator, Nicolai Ceaucescu, was dominated by members of his supporting cast. Even in those cases, however, the resisters displayed a moral superiority and popular support that attracted worldwide sympathy—and laid the basis for future political change in their countries. Regardless of the outcome, the potential of "people power" and nonviolent defense against tyrannical regimes calls for systematic research that may help determine under precisely what conditions oppressive rule can be peacefully eliminated.

Toward Democracy

and Human

Rights

In most of the world, principles o f widespread political participation and accountable government (democracy, in short), respect for individual freedom and civil liberties, and adherence by public authority to domestic and international law are ignored. All forms of government give priority to order over law and central authority over grassroots democracy. T h e usual justification is either national security—a foreign threat, a r e b e l l i o n — o r the need to postpone constitutionalism (such as free elections) and the resumption o f civil liberties until economic and social justice has been implanted. Granted, in some cases threats to national security are real and economic and social development is a more immediate human need than, say, a free press. But the unpleasant reality is that governments that make a practice o f ignoring, postponing, or trampling upon human political rights are highly unlikely to mend their ways. Which may explain Thomas Jefferson's famous remark that " a little rebellion now and then is a good thing." Popular protests and movements for human rights have b e c o m e the global counterpart since the 1 9 7 0 s to revolution in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1960s.

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Contrary to the expectations o f many, persistent mass activism can produce results and yet remain nonviolent and nonideological. We saw this in the demonstrations in South K o r e a that forced a strong-armed regime to make major concessions to democratic procedures. In the Philippines in 1 9 8 6 , Roman Catholic bishops declared the Marcos regime lacked a "moral basis"; a citizens' boycott was organized against businesses owned by Marcos's cronies; people protected the ballot boxes and surrounded the tanks; soldiers and diplomats defected—and suddenly the dictator was gone. In Haiti, what had seemed to outsiders to be a passive acceptance of the Duvalier family's tyranny turned, seemingly overnight, into demonstrations and the dictator's r e m o v a l — a l l brought about largely by small clandestine networks of students supported by the church and slum dwellers. ( " T h e r e were no Communists, no capitalists behind [the movement]—just the people with a desire for c h a n g e , " said a teacher.) 1 1 3 During May 1992 in Thailand, students, civil servants, and workers of all descriptions took to the streets to protest an unelected general's assumption of the premiership. General Suchinda Kraprayoon evidently believed that yet another in a long history o f military takeovers would again prevail. (The previous year, Suchinda had led a coup to oust a civilian government.) Perhaps a few hundred people were killed during the ensuing onslaught by the Thai army, and many more "disappeared"; but eventually the people forced the general's resignation following the king's personal intervention. He used his moral force to insist that the two sides stop the destruction and amend the constitution in ways that limited the military's power. 1 1 4 Even the most tightly controlled societies are vulnerable: In the U S S R the voices of Solzhenitsyn, Medvedev, Sakharov, and other dissidents focused worldwide attention on human-rights abuses there. Demonstrating Chinese students, workers, and party members brought about a total reappraisal worldwide o f their country's reforms when the tanks rolled into Tiananmen in 1989. In Eastern Europe, by the end of 1990 not one C o m munist Party leader who had been in power the year before had survived the popular revolutions. E x c e p t in R o m a n i a , no shots were fired. O n c e Gorbachev made clear that Soviet forces would not intervene to save Communist Party rulers, people took matters in their own hands, crossing borders, demanding that officials resign, and calling for elections. Police and border guards were wise to get out of their way. T h e winds of change carried to Africa. From Ivory Coast to South A f r i c a and from Zambia to Zaire, one-party states were going out of business in 1990; constitutional governments and market economies were being promised. As has been remarked in connection with Africa and East Europe, however, authoritarianism does not die easily and in fact has made a comeback in the late 1990s.

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275

A s t h e s e stories of p e o p l e p o w e r and a t t e m p t s at d e m o c r a t i c c h a n g e u n f o l d , they raise an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n : W h a t a c c o u n t s f o r rising p o p u l a r d e m a n d s f o r m o r e d e m o c r a c y ? A n u m b e r of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s h a v e l o n g c o n t e n d e d that c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m i c g r o w t h is the chief p r e r e q u i s i t e . W i t h an e y e primarily to East A s i a , they see d y n a m i c c a p i t a l i s m as the basis f o r an e v o l u t i o n f r o m h e a v y - h a n d e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m to c o m p e t i t i v e political s y s t e m s . T h e end of the C o l d War has f o r t i f i e d their a r g u m e n t , f o r sociali s m ' s f a i l u r e s are b o u n d to s t r e n g t h e n c a p i t a l i s m ' s ability ( f o r e x a m p l e , in C h i n a ) to b e c o m e an e n g i n e of political p l u r a l i s m . In o t h e r w o r d s , h a r d line r e g i m e s of the right or the left will e v e n t u a l l y s u c c u m b to the m a r k e t ' s p o w e r ; once c a p i t a l i s m takes root, p r o s p e r i t y trickles d o w n , a c c e s s to e d u c a t i o n w i d e n s , a m i d d l e c l a s s d e v e l o p s , p o p u l a r distaste f o r c o n f o r m i t y and r e p r e s s i o n is a r o u s e d , a n d d e m o c r a c y t r i u m p h s . T h e trouble with this v i e w is that it o f f e r s a partial r e a d i n g of history, and of politics. G r a n t e d , capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t m a y bring large n u m b e r s of p e o p l e into the political p r o c e s s by ( f o r e x a m p l e ) e x t e n d i n g e d u c a t i o n b e y o n d the traditionally p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s e s and c r e a t i n g a g r e a t e r stake in the political p r o c e s s f o r an e m e r g i n g m i d d l e class. But as the e x p e r i e n c e s of K o r e a , T a i w a n , a n d H o n g K o n g show, o t h e r f o r c e s b e s i d e s c a p i t a l i s t g r o w t h , and other g r o u p s b e s i d e s the m i d d l e class, a c c o u n t f o r increasing d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . S t u d e n t s , industrial w o r k e r s , p e a s a n t s , civil servants, priests, and N G O s of m a n y kinds all fought long and hard for h u m a n , envir o n m e n t a l , and political rights in these countries. S o m e of these groups were helped and others (such as labor) victimized by e c o n o m i c growth. In South K o r e a , rapid industrialization was used to justify the national-security state. International factors, such as a history of U.S. occupation or (in the case of H o n g K o n g ) the T i a n a n m e n Square massacre and the looming transfer of authority f r o m Britain to C h i n a in 1997, gave impetus to ideas of f r e e d o m and d e m o c r a c y . So did w o r l d w i d e debate over the m e a n i n g of h u m a n rights. T h e l e s s o n of the A s i a n N I C s a n d e m e r g i n g m a r k e t s s u c h as M e x i c o m a y j u s t as easily be that capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t postpones d e m o c r a c y as that it p r o m o t e s it. In fact, that is precisely the strategy S i n g a p o r e and Ind o n e s i a a d o p t e d and that the P R C has a d a p t e d : G i v e p e o p l e greater m a t e rial r e w a r d s and they w o n ' t t a k e to the streets. U n d e r state g u i d a n c e , the s a m e capitalist g r o w t h that u n d o u b t e d l y h e l p e d f u e l p o p u l a r aspirations for c h a n g e in East A s i a ( i n c l u d i n g J a p a n ) and Latin A m e r i c a has a l s o laid the basis for undemocratic governance, extensive corruption, and environm e n t a l decay. T h e s e i n e q u i t i e s h a v e not e n d e d , precisely b e c a u s e d e m o c r a c y h a s not yet b e c o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d e v e n as e c o n o m i c g r o w t h c o n t i n u e s . In s h o r t , t h e r e is n o a u t o m a t i c p r o g r e s s i o n , n o n a t u r a l e v o l u t i o n f r o m c a p i t a l i s m to p l u r a l i s m . B u i l d i n g d e m o c r a c y is a f a r m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d p r o c e s s t h a n p l a n t i n g the s e e d s of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . M a r k e t e c o n o m i c s is the d o m i n a n t trend in

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the p o s t - C o l d War order, but its inequities and d i s l o c a t i o n s are as i m p o r tant to note as its b e n e f i t s . Both rising prosperity and u n e q u a l d e v e l o p m e n t may inspire social protest; neither m a y lead to greater p l u r a l i s m . T h e road to d e m o c r a c y , or s o m e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of it, contains m a n y d e t o u r s that can lead p o s t a u t h o r i t a r i a n societies astray. T h e simple lesson here m a y be that the fight for social justice, of which d e m o c r a t i c institutions are a part, d o e s not e n d with the o v e r t h r o w of a dictator. A s J e f f e r s o n o n c e said, " E t e r n a l vigilance is the price of liberty." P e o p l e are s t r u g g l i n g f o r d e m o c r a c y and h u m a n r i g h t s e v e r y w h e r e . S o m e have r e c e i v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e m e d i a attention and i n t e r n a t i o n a l recognition, w h i c h are i n d i s p e n s a b l e in p r e s s u r i n g g o v e r n m e n t s to c h a n g e . I think here, for e x a m p l e , of C h i n a ' s T i a n a n m e n d e m o n s t r a t o r s ; t w o leaders of East T i m o r ' s resistance to Indonesian rule, B i s h o p C a r l o s X i m e n e s Belo and Jose R a m o s - H o r t a , w h o were a w a r d e d the Nobel P e a c e Prize in 1996; the Dalai L a m a in Tibet ( w i n n e r of the 1989 prize), A u n g San Suu Kyi in B u r m a (the 1991 p r i z e ) , a n d R i g o b e r t a M e n c h u in G u a t e m a l a (the 1992 prize). By far, h o w e v e r , m o s t c i t i z e n s ' g r o u p s g o about their h e r o i c w o r k f o r social j u s t i c e w i t h o u t any o u t s i d e n o t i c e at all. A m o n g t h e m are the h u m a n - r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s in B u r u n d i , the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a , Central A m e r i c a , and n u m e r o u s o t h e r c o u n t r i e s that r e c o r d a n d r e p o r t v i o l a t i o n s by military and police forces; the G r a n d m o t h e r s of the Plaza de M a y o , pare n t s of the " d i s a p p e a r e d " c h i l d r e n d u r i n g A r g e n t i n a ' s " d i r t y w a r " f r o m 1976 to 1983; the w h i t e s of S o u t h A f r i c a w h o w o r k e d to e n d a p a r t h e i d ; m e m b e r s of m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l facilities w h o a t t e m p t to b r i n g h u m a n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g to the a r m s r a c e ; n e i g h b o r h o o d and c o m m u n i t y g r o u p s in Brazil that p r o t e c t street c h i l d r e n f r o m the attacks of p o l i c e a n d r i g h t - w i n g g a n g s ; the R o m a n C a t h o l i c b i s h o p s of C a n a d a and the U n i t e d States, w h o h a v e w r i t t e n a s t o n i s h i n g l y v i g o r o u s c r i t i c i s m s of e c o n o m i c i n j u s t i c e in their c o u n t r i e s ; a n d the S a r v o d a y a S h r a m a d a n a m o v e m e n t in Sri L a n k a , w h i c h since its f o u n d i n g in 1958 has been a village b a s i c - n e e d s d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m based on voluntarism and nonviolence. C o n s c i o u s l y or not, these d i v e r s e national g r o u p s a n d entities are part of a g r o w i n g transnational n e t w o r k . 1 1 5 C i t i z e n s in o n e part of the w o r l d are taking action on behalf of v i c t i m s of repression and injustice t h o u s a n d s of m i l e s away. T h e d i v e s t m e n t m o v e m e n t in the U n i t e d States that barred i n v e s t m e n t s of p e n s i o n f u n d s in S o u t h A f r i c a d u r i n g the a p a r t h e i d y e a r s w a s n o t e d earlier. A g r o u p called I N F A C T led m a n y o t h e r n a t i o n a l organ i z a t i o n s in a w o r l d w i d e b o y c o t t of the N e s t l é C o r p o r a t i o n , w h o s e p o w d e r e d m i l k w a s b e i n g w i d e l y u s e d in A f r i c a as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r m o t h e r s ' m i l k , with n u m e r o u s i n f a n t d e a t h s c a u s e d by c o m b i n i n g the p o w d e r e d m i l k with t a i n t e d water. N e s t l é e v e n t u a l l y a c c e d e d to a n e w m a r k e t i n g c o d e a d o p t e d by W H O , w h i c h " e s t i m a t e s that the d e a t h s of 1.5 m i l l i o n

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babies each year could be prevented if women breast-fed their infants." 1 1 6 Public awareness o f child labor in the production in underdeveloped countries of athletic wear, carpets, and clothing sparked media attention, some positive corporate responses in cooperation with unions and N G O s , 1 1 7 and nonprofit organizing in the consumer countries. In the latter category is Rugmark, an international group that puts a tag on carpets to certify that child labor was not used in making them. 1 1 8 And in Guatemala workers for C o c a - C o l a struck and occupied the factory, demanding improved conditions. Helped by a broad-based coalition of U . S . church and labor groups, which pressured the parent firm to take responsibility for conditions in its branch plant, the strike was equitably resolved. Then there are a number o f well-established transnational NGOs, some activist and confrontational, others nonpolitical in their efforts to promote human rights and related causes. Among the best known are two that have won Nobel Peace Prizes: Amnesty International, based in London, which issues periodic reports on political rights in particular countries and has successfully lobbied for the release of prisoners of conscience; and International Physicians for the Prevention o f Nuclear War, founded by Soviet and U . S . doctors. Another prize-winning human-rights group is Survival International, which operates worldwide in support of indigenous peoples. It received the Right Livelihood Award, which has been presented annually since 1 9 8 0 to individuals and groups that pioneer solutions to global p r o b l e m s . 1 1 9 Others are Greenpeace (nuclear-arms reductions and marine ecosystem preservation); International Physicians for S o c i a l Responsibility (the hazards o f the nuclear arms race); Poètes, Essayistes, Nouvellistes (P.E.N.—a writers' association devoted to freedom of expression); Human Rights Watch; Planned Parenthood (family planning); E N D (European Nuclear Disarmament, one of many Western European groups that galvanized mass protests of Soviet as well as U . S . nuclear-weapons deployments); People-to-People International (international exchange); Fellowship o f R e c o n c i l i a t i o n (Christian peace and human-rights organization); and Médicins sans frontières (Doctors Without Borders, which has been active throughout Africa during the hunger crises). Finally, we should include the Greens in Germany, which—as a political party—stands apart from the other groups. Its message of e c o l o g i c a l balance and socioeconomic restructuring to reflect human needs has been taken up by similar groups elsewhere in Europe (including R u s s i a ) and in the United S t a t e s . 1 2 0 Last, we should appreciate the generosity o f very wealthy individuals whose foundations fund work that benefits people and the planet— such as Sir John Templeton, founder of a large group of mutual funds, who gives an annual prize in religion; Ted Turner o f T i m e Warner and CNN, who awarded $1 billion to the UN in 1997; and George Soros, a financier, whose foundation has established o f f i c e s in over twenty-five countries,

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mostly in Eastern Europe, to p r o m o t e democratization by supporting the independent sector. A d v a n c i n g the rights of w o m e n has also become a matter of transnational c o n c e r n , as was dramatized in 1985 at Nairobi, Kenya, and in 1995 at Beijing, when w o m e n from all over the world convened to evaluate their p r o g r e s s and the long road yet to be traveled. Several international conv e n t i o n s to e n d discrimination against w o m e n have now been signed or ratified by the overwhelming majority of governments. But m a n y governm e n t s have not done either. M o r e to the point, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n persists, regardless of signatures and paeans of praise. 1 2 1 Clearly, h u m a n rights cannot be said to be advancing unless and until w o m e n ' s rights markedly advance. Central to w o m e n ' s rights is an end to discriminatory laws concerning the acquisition, sale, and inheritance of property, and equality with men in marriage and divorce. Also critical are passage and e n f o r c e m e n t of equal educational and economic opportunity laws, provision for child care for working w o m e n , and the right of w o m e n to vote and compete for any public o f f i c e . These are a m o n g the rights already e m b o d i e d in international conventions, but they need to be universalized and implemented. International, including corporate, assistance to w o m e n ' s businesses and cooperatives, as noted earlier, should strengthen the case for such laws. So should the appointment of many more w o m e n to positions in international organizations, which, by and large, have failed to put their own houses in order with respect to male-female balance. 1 2 2 With progress in these areas will c o m e increased (and equal) access to health care and food, acceptance of a w o m a n ' s right to choose an abortion, and a generalized appreciation of the burdens of w o m a n h o o d , especially in those parts of the Third World (the M u s l i m M i d d l e East) w h e r e w o m e n have almost s u b h u m a n status. W o m e n ' s rights are human rights, as the global w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t is now emphasizing. The problems w o m e n have experienced in securing their rights illustrates an inescapable fact of world politics: the failure of g o v e r n m e n t s to live up to their promises under international agreements, especially where human rights are concerned. It is easier for governments to engage in public posturing about h u m a n equality than to yield power, either to persons or to supranational bodies. In fact, there is a resurgence of cynicism, f r o m Globalists as well as Realists, about the usefulness, and even the desirability, of international g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations as vehicles of h u m a n e c h a n g e . 1 2 3 Insofar as critics are concerned that tyrannical p o w e r might be vested in a world organization, the cynicism is understandable. But most of their fears stem f r o m the presumed "failures" of the United Nations as a preserver of human rights (for example, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank) and f r o m the use of the General Assembly by Third World representatives

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as a forum for sometimes abusive criticism of the industrialized countries. Forgotten is the fact that international organizations like the UN can never be more effective than their m e m b e r s wish it to be. As Margaret Thatcher once remarked, the U N is merely a mirror of its members; they would do better to r e f o r m t h e m s e l v e s than curse the mirror if they d o n ' t like what they see. The United N a t i o n s ' revived peacekeeping role shows that only when states consistently resort to international institutions, use and abide by international law, and give international bodies greater powers and the means of enforcing their charters and the law is it reasonable to expect solutions to the global crisis to come f r o m the supranational level. T h e United S t a t e s ' practice e x e m p l i f i e s the inconsistency and selfinterestedness that characterize the way most states treat international law and treaties. In Latin America, for instance, the United States has consistently used force and threats to overthrow legitimate g o v e r n m e n t s or intervene in civil conflicts. Yet the United States is a signatory of the Treaty of the Organization of A m e r i c a n States (1948), which specifically prohibits any f o r m of interference in the internal affairs of states in the hemisphere. Its w o r l d w i d e a r m s shipments f r e q u e n t l y go to g o v e r n m e n t s that systematically violate h u m a n rights. U.S. air and naval attacks against Libya in 1986 were justified on the transparent ground of " f r e e d o m of the seas" when, in fact, they had no firm basis in international law. Its always qualified support of c o m p u l s o r y jurisdiction by the ICJ (under the Connolly A m e n d m e n t , which enables a president to withdraw cases he j u d g e s to be "essentially within the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n " of the United States) became a formal rejection in 1985 when the Reagan administration saw no other way to avoid losing a suit brought by Nicaragua over the CIA's mining of its harbors. In the 1980s the United States also withdrew f r o m UNE S C O , r e f u s e d to a p p r o v e the L a w of the Sea Treaty, voted against the World Health O r g a n i z a t i o n ' s ban on Nestlé infant f o r m u l a , and agreed to Senate ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention only with a reservation exempting the United States f r o m being sued in the ICJ for genocide. And in the 1990s t w o U.S. presidents chose to close off access to the United States for Haitian r e f u g e e s by boarding ships in international waters and forcibly repatriating people fleeing oppression. As noted, the Clinton administration has pressed for o b s e r v a n c e of h u m a n rights and e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection in some situations (e.g., Iraq and C u b a in the first instance, eliminating C F C s in the second), but not when e c o n o m i c interests w o u l d be u n d e r m i n e d (e.g., China, the Basel C o n v e n t i o n , and g r e e n h o u s e gases). Once again, a U.S. administration failed to vote consistently to e x p a n d the scope of international law and agreements, as C l i n t o n ' s showed by opposing a broad mandate for an international criminal court, a nuclear-weapons convention, and (see below) international treaties to ban land mines and ban or restrict the small-arms

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trade. S u c h b e h a v i o r d e m o n s t r a t e s a disregard for international cooperation that is e x t r a o r d i n a r y for a nation that prides itself on a historical c o m m i t m e n t to the rule of law. In terms of promoting the h u m a n interest, realism d e m a n d s recognition both of the deeply ingrained resistance of state leaders to supranational authority and of the increasing need for strengthening it. Even when it is not possible to put teeth into global agreements and o r g a n i z a t i o n s — such as in the Law of the Sea Treaty, the various human-rights covenants, and the International Court of Justice, none of which can c o m p e l adherence by s t a t e s — t h e establishment of global standards and of new structures may be worthy a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s in their own right. As the experience of the L a w of the Sea Treaty shows, sometimes the first step is to gain recognition of the need f o r global action, then to piece together the means of effective monitoring of the new a r r a n g e m e n t , and only later, building on a history of equity and goodwill, to close the loopholes by introducing reliable enforcement mechanisms. But practice has a way of o u t r u n n i n g theory. As m u c h as states and global c o r p o r a t i o n s will resist e n c r o a c h m e n t s on their authority, breakthroughs do occur that create p r e c e d e n t s and interesting possibilities f o r the f u t u r e of international law and institutions. T h e Indian g o v e r n m e n t ' s brief seizure of Union Carbide's top officer after the Bhopal tragedy is one such precedent. Another is India's (failed) attempt to bring its case b e f o r e a U.S. court. Imagine the prospect of several Scandinavian villages w h o s e lakes h a v e b e e n poisoned by acid rain taking the British g o v e r n m e n t to court. Or the citizens of two d i f f e r e n t countries, such as C a n a d a and the United States, joining in a collective suit against a polluting industry. Nor should the possibility be excluded that an enforceable code of behavior to which T N C s and host countries subscribe will evolve. C o m p a n i e s , economies, and persons could mutually benefit f r o m an agreement, under international auspices, that guaranteed the security of foreign investments in return for a s s u r a n c e s of a r e a s o n a b l e return on profits and t e c h n o l o g y transfer of fair economic, health, and safety practices, and of e n v i r o n m e n tal protections for the c o m m u n i t y . 1 2 4 Alternatively, N G O s , which h a v e sometimes been the only vehicles for ordinary people in c o n f r o n t i n g states and corporations, may one day achieve legal standing to enforce those protections on the c o m m u n i t y ' s behalf, as happened when a U.S. N G O represented an Ecuadoran c o m m u n i t y in a New York suit against Texaco's destructive oil spills. 125 Another prospect is that national courts may act where the ICJ cannot and governments will not. In 1985, for example, a federal appeals court in Washington, D.C., put pressure on Japan to respect a worldwide ban on the killing of w h a l e s by o r d e r i n g the United States to i m p o s e sanctions on Japanese fishermen. The court's decision scuttled a U . S . - J a p a n a g r e e m e n t

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that would have allowed the J a p a n e s e w h a l i n g industry to keep killing sperm whales f o r three additional years. In the not-too-distant f u t u r e , e n v i r o n m e n t a l - p r o t e c t i o n lawsuits may be based not on personal but on global injury, an e x p a n d e d version of the N u r e m b e r g Principle to cover large-scale violations of the ecosystem and human rights. In the meantime, it will be up to citizens and their global-minded representatives to keep the pressure on governments to use international law, organizations, and n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l m e c h a n i s m s (such as mediation and people-to-people exchanges) whenever possible. Governments need to be educated to lawfulness and constantly p r o m p t e d to practice what they preach about justice. Hence the importance, once more, of popular m o v e ments and voluntary organizations. But we should also keep in mind that citizen action against oppression has up until now not often been at the global level. Civil wars have been the norm. And whether these have toppled governments or led to the creation of new territories, they have all accepted the state as the appropriate vehicle f o r their rule. 1 2 6 Consequently, we see that among the obstacles to a new globalism is not only the weakness of global consciousness and recourse to law by state leaderships, but also a continuing identification with the state even by those who feel oppressed by it.

The Prospects for Humanity Ultimately, the future of the planet rests with individuals—those who, in their daily struggles to survive, create positive e x a m p l e s of courage and self-sacrifice that will e m p o w e r others; and those who use the fact of not having to struggle as a privileged opportunity to work for h u m a n betterment. Both kinds of persons reflect the best of human values and the best hope for humanity. If it is true, as Richard Falk says, that "the most revealing world order statement each of us makes is with his or her life," 1 2 7 then we are fortunate to have plenty of e x a m p l e s of people w h o have m a d e the planet a better p l a c e — a n d in the process demonstrated that individuals do make a difference. In an age when personal p o w e r exercised on behalf of humanity is i n f r e q u e n t l y a p p l a u d e d in the global media, we would do well to r e m i n d ourselves of those w h o have fought and are fighting for h u m a n rights; of the e n o r m o u s strides that have been m a d e in a very short time by the w o m e n ' s , environmental, civil rights, and liberation theology m o v e m e n t s ; of the w o r l d w i d e support for calls to restore ecological rationality and end the arms race, and the prominent place of religious institutions in catalyzing such support. Just a f e w c o n c e r n e d citizens were e n o u g h to inspire t r a n s f o r m i n g events such as the U N ' s International Year of Cooperation,

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the Partial Test Ban, the Bilateral Nuclear Freeze initiative, and the international convention to outlaw land mines. 1 2 8 Banning international sales of small arms could be the next Track II success story. 1 2 9 In short, world politics is too important to be left to diplomats. As Star Trek's Mr. Spock once observed, "We must acknowledge that the purpose of diplomacy is to prolong a crisis." Ordinary people acting to m a k e both their communities and the world more secure is one kind of individual e m p o w e r m e n t . Another kind has to do with shifts in individual values. In the United States, where this shift has been d o c u m e n t e d , 1 3 0 it seems to be occurring across the political and social spectrum. Its most r e m a r k a b l e f e a t u r e in world-political terms is that it displays a turn away f r o m many prominent Realist and Corporate Globalist values (such as c o m p e t i t i o n , materialism, quantity, individualism, and p o w e r ) and toward many G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t values (such as cooperation, spirituality, e n o u g h n e s s , c o m m u n i t y , and personal growth). Although too much can be made of the political direction and scope of this values shift, neither can it be considered spurious or ephemeral. W h e n large n u m b e r s of people f r o m all walks of life simplify their lifestyles (their needs) and change their values (their wants), and when they begin to participate in re-creating the substance of their c o m m u n i t i e s and businesses, national and eventually global politics must also change. Growth, e x p a n s i o n , and c o n s u m p t i o n , which have a l w a y s characterized state and corporate politics, have to be cast aside as national security is pressured to serve human security needs more directly. W h e n and whether such a dramatic transformation—and the prospects f o r universalizing it—will occur m a y finally d e p e n d on p e o p l e ' s beliefs and attitudes at least as much as on their energies. For the global crisis is psychological as well as material, and it starts with us. How much we believe in ourselves, whether or not we question our beliefs as well as othe r s ' , how important we really believe the crisis is, and how seriously we believe in one p e r s o n ' s ability to i n f l u e n c e i t — t h e s e , Roger Walsh eloquently tells us, are a m o n g the fundamental issues each of us must decide as we confront hunger, the arms race, and pollution. 1 3 1 It takes great inner strength in times of fear and uncertainty to hold to a positive vision of the future. Yet positiveness and hopefulness are essential to creating a h u m a n e world. As Patricia M i s c h e perceptively pointed out to an audience of peace workers: Many of us are not successful in our efforts for peace because secretly we don't really believe it can happen. Secretly, w e don't even know if we want it to happen. And if we do want it to happen, we don't know what a peace system would look like. We know what it is we're working against, but we don't know what it is we want to create. Our images of the future

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serve like magnets. If w e walk around o n l y with i m a g e s of destruction, w e [may] use our energies to bring about the very destruction w e f e a r . 1 3 2

The struggle for dominion that takes place at every level of human activity will surely remain with us for a very long time. But not necessarily forever, in the same forms, or with the same intensities or doomsday potential. Global H u m a n i s m contends that it is realistic to be optimistic, for we can stave off w o r l d w i d e collapse by calling forth the best that is within each of us. W h o in 1985 would have believed that the end of Soviet communism and the Cold War would occur within six years? The notion that such fundamental changes for the better do occur, and suddenly, is worth holding onto. T h e bottom line is that our age is but another phase in the universal evolutionary process. Like all ages that preceded it and all that will follow, this one holds out new opportunities for tapping the human potential. It is demonstrably true that everyone can achieve a fulfilling life, and that the earth can be kept green and b l u e — j u s t as true as humanity's ability to explore distant planets. T h e real question is whether enough of us will believe in that prospect and will dedicate our "lives and sacred f o r t u n e s " to realizing it. The opening pages of this study quoted the warning of then UN SecretaryGeneral U Thant about an i m p e n d i n g planetary crisis brought on by the arms race and underdevelopment. U T h a n t ' s plea was that people develop a "dual allegiance . . . to the human race as well as to our local c o m m u n i t y or nation." "I even believe," he concluded, "that the mark of the truly educated and imaginative person f a c i n g the twenty-first century is that he feels himself to be a planetary citizen." 1 3 3 P e r h a p s the best a r g u m e n t on behalf of space travel is that every astronaut and cosmonaut who has gazed at the planet from the m o o n and deep space has moved toward that dual allegiance. The last word belongs to one of them, Edgar Mitchell: N o man I k n o w of has g o n e to the m o o n that has not been a f f e c t e d in s o m e w a y that is similar. It is what I prefer to call instant g l o b a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Each man c o m e s back with a f e e l i n g that he is no longer o n l y an American citizen; he is a planetary citizen. He doesn't like things the w a y they are, and he wants to improve them.

Notes

Chapter One 1. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest. 2. Address of May 9, 1969, "Ten Crucial Years." United Nations Monthly Chronicle, p. ii. 3. World Scientists' Warning to Humanity, pamphlet published by the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 4. See The Oregonian (Portland), September 1, 1993, p. A4. 5. On water, see Ruth Leger Sivard, ed., World Military and Social Expenditures 1983: An Annual Report on World Priorities, p. 14; Richard J. Barnet, The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity, p. 195; United Nations report in New York Times, January 20, 1997, p. A6; Willy Brandt et al., North-South, A Program for Survival, p. 55. This last source, the Brandt Report, adds (again, p. 55): "Between 20 and 25 million children below the age of five die every year in developing countries, and a third of these deaths are from diarrhoea caught from polluted water." On hunger, see Brandt et al., p. 55, and Gerald O. Barney, ed., The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century, vol. 1, p. 17. 6. Brandt et al., p. 58. 7. Alan B. Durning, "Poverty and the Environment: Reversing the Downward Spiral," p. 20; Brandt et al., pp. 50-51; Kim Carney, "Development Aid: An Economist's Perception," International Journal on World Peace, p. 7; United Nations Development Program, "Overview of Human Development Report 1997," p. 2, online at www.undp.org. 8. Ivan L. Head, "South-North Dangers," Foreign Affairs, p. 77. 9. According to a long-term worldwide assessment that concluded in 1998; see New York Times, April 9, 1998, p.l 10. Barney, Global 2000: Twenty-First Century, p. 36 (on forests) and p. 38 (on species losses). See also Edward C. Wolf, "On the Brink of Extinction: Conserving the Diversity of Life," pp. 11, 14, and Lester R. Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, p. 96 (on food supplies). 11. Lester R. Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1986: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, p. 196; and Ruth Leger Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 11.

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12. R i c h a r d F. G r i m m e t t , Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994. In t e r m s of a r m s d e l i v e r i e s to T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s , the v a l u e was $14.4 billion. 13. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1983, p p . 1 0 - 1 1 ; S i v a r d , World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 12. 14. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1983, p. 5; B r a n d t et a l „ p. 14. 15. W o r l d B a n k , World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment, p. 2 7 ( h e r e a f t e r , World Development Report 1992); study b y the W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n and the U N E n v i r o n m e n t P r o g r a m r e p o r t e d in The Oregonian, D e c e m b e r 2, 1992, p. A 7 . 16. D a v i d K e e n , Refugees: Rationing the Right to Life, p. 3. 17. E s t i m a t e s b y U N m e d i c a l e x p e r t s : New York Times, N o v e m b e r 26, 1997, p. A6. 18. New York Times, N o v e m b e r 4, 1997, p. A 1 0 . 19. N i c h o l a s D. K r i s t o f , " M a l a r i a M a k e s a C o m e b a c k , and Is M o r e D e a d l y T h a n B e f o r e , " New York Times, J a n u a r y 8, 1997, p. A 7 . 20. B e t w e e n 1 9 8 9 a n d 1 9 9 4 t w o s p e c i a l i s t s r e c o r d e d a total of n i n e t y - f o u r a r m e d c o n f l i c t s w o r l d w i d e , w i t h 1 9 9 4 h a v i n g t h e l o w e s t n u m b e r of c o n f l i c t s ( f o r t y - t w o ) f o r t h o s e y e a r s . P e t e r W a l l e n s t e e n a n d M a r g a r e t a S o l l e n b e r g , " A f t e r the C o l d W a r : E m e r g i n g P a t t e r n s of A r m e d C o n f l i c t 1 9 8 9 - 9 4 , " Journal of Peace Research, pp. 3 4 5 - 3 6 0 . 21. Ted R o b e r t Gurr, " M i n o r i t i e s , N a t i o n a l i s t s , and E t h n o p o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t , " in C h e s t e r A. C r o c k e r a n d F e n O s i e r H a m p s o n , e d s . , Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, p. 54. H o w to c o u n t a r m e d c o n flicts is a m a t t e r of o p i n i o n . A c c o r d i n g to t h e C e n t e r f o r D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n ( " T h e World at W a r , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 27, n o . 1 [ 1 9 9 8 ] , p. 2), b e t w e e n 1989 a n d the start of 1998, the n u m b e r d e c l i n e d steadily f r o m t h i r t y - t h r e e to t w e n t y - o n e . 2 2 . H u m a n e v a l u e s a n d n o r m s , as k e y e l e m e n t s in t h e G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t (or " w o r l d o r d e r " ) p e r s p e c t i v e , a r e d i s c u s s e d in the f o l l o w i n g m a j o r w o r k s : R i c h a r d A. F a l k , A Study of Future Worlds ( t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n to w h i c h i n c l u d e s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e W o r l d O r d e r M o d e l s P r o j e c t ) ; R i c h a r d A. F a l k , S a m u e l S. K i m , a n d S a u l H. M e n d l o v i t z , e d s . , Toward a Just World Order, vol. 1; S a m u e l S. K i m , The Quest for a Just World Order; S a u l H . M e n d l o v i t z , e d . , On the Creation of a Just World Order; and J o h a n G a l t u n g , The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective. 2 3 . S e e R o b e r t A . I s a a k , International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change, p. 2. T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t e m p h a s e s to " i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o litical e c o n o m y , " r e f l e c t i n g n a r r o w e r or b r o a d e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of w h a t " p o l i t i c s " c o m p r i s e s . F o r a s e n s e of t h e d i v e r s i t y , s e e R. D a n W a l l e r i , " T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y Literature on N o r t h - S o u t h Relations: Alternative A p p r o a c h e s and Empirical E v i d e n c e , " International Studies Quarterly; J a m e s P e t r a s , Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World, ch. 1; a n d R o b e r t J. G i l p i n , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporations, c h . 1. 2 4 . K i s s i n g e r , q u o t e d in C h a r l e s W. K e g l e y , Jr., a n d E u g e n e R . W i t t k o p f , World Politics: Trend and Transformation ( 1 9 8 1 e d . ) , p. 2 9 . 2 5 . T o t a l d e a t h s f r o m t h e a c c i d e n t n o w s t a n d at n e a r l y 3 , 6 0 0 . T h e i m p a c t of r a d i a t i o n o n c h i l d r e n , n o t a b l y a h i g h i n c i d e n c e of t h y r o i d c a n c e r , has b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y s e v e r e . " C h e r n o b y l will b e w i t h us f o r e v e r , " said U k r a i n e ' s h e a l t h m i n i s t e r (New York Times, A p r i l 2 3 , 1998, p. A 5 ) . M e d i c a l s o u r c e s f r o m a r o u n d t h e w o r l d can o n l y g u e s s h o w m a n y a d d i t i o n a l p e o p l e will d i e , b e c o m e ill, or s u f f e r g e n e t i c d i s o r d e r s , in U k r a i n e , n e i g h b o r i n g B e l a r u s , a n d w o r l d w i d e , f r o m the r a d i a t i o n . S e e H a r v e y W a s s e r m a n , " I n t h e D e a d Z o n e : A f t e r m a t h of the A p o c a l y p s e , " The Nation.

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26. For a European view of English as the language of globalization, including on the World Wide Web, see Jeanne Peiffer, "The Plurilingual European Tradition as a Challenge to Globalization," in Inoue Nobutaka, ed., Globalization and Indigenous Culture. 27. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs, pp. 127-138. With reference to economics, Reinicke proposes that interdependence is macroeconomic in its consequences, and globalization is microeconomic. 28. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, pp. 13-14. 29. One example is the cooperation between U.S. and Mexican labor unions that has occurred as a direct result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Global environmental changes have also enhanced the influence of NGOs and other social activists vis-ä-vis the state; see Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca, eds., The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics. Grassroots responses to economic globalization are documented by Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up. 30. As in Barnet and Cavanagh. Global Dreams. 31. Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad Vs. McWorld," The Atlantic, pp. 53-63. 32. Maurice Strong, "The 'New South,'" The World Today, pp. 215-219. 33. United Nations, Human Development Report ¡994. 34. Speech of January 16, 1991, in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, p. 313. 35. For an excellent summary and evaluation of the issues, see Richard Falk, "In Search of a New World Model." Current History, pp. 145-149. 36. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, pp. 23-33. 37. Mohammed Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," in Crocker and Hampson, eds., pp. 37-51. Ayoob's formulation has merit in view of the stark and growing gaps in wealth and state capacity between the ever-smaller First World (core) and the ever-larger Third World (periphery). But the differences among the countries within each group are too many to ignore. 38. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, pp. 22-49. 39. As of mid-1998, the United States was in arrears by between $1 billion and $1.5 billion in payments to the regular and special (peacekeeping) budgets of the UN. Consequently, under the UN Charter, it was in danger of losing its vote in the General Assembly. New York Times, June 28, 1998, online. 40. See Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy. 41. This is the argument of Elise Boulding, "The Old and New Transnationalism: An Evolutionary Perspective," Human Relations, pp. 789-805. 42. In Guatemala, the war was largely the work of a ruthless military apparatus. About 150,000 people lost their lives, and another 50,000 people disappeared (New York Times, April 28, 1998, p. A8). Approximately 3,200 people were killed in Northern Ireland's violence. 43. The civil wars in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique since 1975 have caused around 1.7 million deaths; in Liberia (1990-1995), around 150,000 deaths; in Somalia (1988-1995), around 355,000 deaths; in Afghanistan since 1991, around 50,000; in Sudan (1984-1995), around 1.5 million. Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, pp. 18-19; Philip

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Christenson, "Fall of M o b u t u Is N o G u a r a n t e e of Peace," Los Angeles Times World Report, May 24, 1997, p. 5. 44. Figures f r o m Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, pp. 1 8 - 1 9 , and Center for D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n , " T h e World at War," The Defense Monitor, table 3, p. 4. 45. S t o c k h o l m I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e R e s e a r c h Institute, ed., SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, tables 8.1 and 8.2, pp. 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 . Since 1987 C h i n a has b e e n the f i f t h largest a r m s exporter, and J a p a n the fourth largest arms importer in the world. 46. By contrast, in 1988 the U N ' s annual p e a c e k e e p i n g budget w a s $230 million for five operations; and in 1992 the budget was about $1.7 billion for eleven peacekeeping operations. New York Times, January 6, 1995, p. A3. 47. New York Times, May 31, 1995, p. A6. 48. S L O R C , w h i c h has g o v e r n e d since 1988, r e d e s i g n a t e d itself the State Peace and D e v e l o p m e n t C o u n c i l . I use the original n a m e to avoid c o n f u s i o n , and out of d e f e r e n c e to the B u r m e s e p e a c e f o r c e s (which a l s o p r e f e r " B u r m a " to S L O R C ' s creation, M y a n m a r ) . 49. New York Times, April 10, 1998, p. A3; H o w a r d W. F r e n c h , " C o n g o Leader Losing Luster," New York Times, May 21, 1998, p. 1. 50. This s u m m a r y relies largely on reports of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations such as A f r i c a Watch, A s i a W a t c h , Helsinki Watch, and M i d d l e East Watch. T h e new world order hardly m a d e a dent in the kind or n u m b e r of h u m a n - r i g h t s abuses. 51. " S u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t " was initially discussed in 1972 at the first international c o n f e r e n c e on the e n v i r o n m e n t , the United N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t in S t o c k h o l m . Extensive e n v i r o n m e n t a l degradation over the next decade led to creation of the World C o m m i s s i o n on E n v i r o n m e n t and Development, chaired by the p r i m e minister of Norway, G r o H a r l e m Brundtland. Its report in 1983 ( p u b l i s h e d in 1987 as Our Common Future) p o i n t e d the way to the Earth S u m m i t by urging i m m e d i a t e action on sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . 52. Fareed Z a k a r i a , " T h e R i s e of Illiberal D e m o c r a c y , " Foreign Affairs, pp. 22-43. 53. Howard W. French, " A f r i c a ' s Ballot Box: Look Out for Sleight of H a n d , " New York Times, O c t o b e r 24, 1995, p. A3. See also F r e n c h ' s later report, "Sure, Africa's Troubled; But There Is Good N e w s , " New York Times, June 15, 1997, online. 54. Paul L e w i s , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i t y Takes Steps to C u r b C o r r u p t i o n , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 28, 1996, online. 55. M o b u t u b e c a m e e x c e p t i o n a l l y wealthy d u r i n g his thirty-odd years as the unchallenged ruler of Zaire. A civil war finally forced him into exile, and led to his death, at one of his French estates in 1997. Raul Salinas, brother of M e x i c o ' s president (Carlos Salinas de G o t a r i ) in the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , e v i d e n t l y r e c e i v e d p a y o f f s by cocaine traffickers in return for political favors. He was later arrested on corruption c h a r g e s and f o u n d to h a v e s t a s h e d m i l l i o n s of dollars in o v e r s e a s b a n k a c c o u n t s (Sam Dillon, " F u g i t i v e L a w m a n S p e a k s : H o w M e x i c o M i x e s Narcotics and Politics," New York Times, D e c e m b e r 23, 1996, p. 1). Suharto, w h o was f o r c e d to step d o w n in May 1998 after thirty-two years in o f f i c e , w a s an e x e m p l a r of crony capitalism, which enabled him and his family to amass a fortune once estimated at $30 billion (Philip S h e n o n , " F o r A s i a n N a t i o n ' s First Family, Financial E m p i r e Is in Peril," New York Times, January 16, 1998, p. 1). Karadzic and T u d j m a n , as various n e w s p a p e r s reported in 1997, w e r e essentially w a r p r o f i t e e r s w h o e n r i c h e d themselves and their supporters through control of the g o v e r n m e n t - r u n alcohol and cigarette market, and t h r o u g h prostitution and drug trafficking. T h e i r " g o v e r n m e n t s "

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m o r e c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e d a C h i c a g o m o b . A s f o r t h e B h u t t o f a m i l y ( s e e J o h n F. B u r n s , " B h u t t o C l a n L e a v e s T r a i l of C o r r u p t i o n , " New York Times, J a n u a r y 9, 1998, p. 1), B e n a z i r B h u t t o , w h o s e f a t h e r h a d s e r v e d as P a k i s t a n ' s p r i m e m i n i s t e r until his e x e c u t i o n , t w i c e w a s p r i m e m i n i s t e r h e r s e l f — t h e f i r s t f e m a l e to h e a d a M u s l i m c o u n t r y . S h e a n d h e r h u s b a n d s e e m to h a v e p r o f i t e d f r o m a n u m b e r of m u l t i m i l l i o n - d o l l a r b r i b e s p a i d b y f o r e i g n c o m p a n i e s and t h e n b a n k e d a b r o a d to facilitate d e a l s w i t h t h e P a k i s t a n i g o v e r n m e n t . 56. O n t h e i n v o l v e m e n t of o r g a n i z e d c r i m e in i l l e g a l i m m i g r a t i o n , see New York Times, J u n e 14, 1995, p. A 8 . 57. Voted m o s t c o r r u p t in 1 9 9 6 w e r e N i g e r i a , P a k i s t a n , K e n y a , B a n g l a d e s h , China, C a m e r o o n , Venezuela, Russia, India, and Indonesia. Barbara Crossette, " Y e a r l y S u r v e y of B u s i n e s s e s R a t e s N i g e r i a M o s t C o r r u p t , " New York Times, J u n e 2, 1996, o n l i n e , a n d New York Times, J u n e 3, 1996, p. A 4 . T h e o t h e r f a c e of the c o r r u p t i o n p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r , is that b u s i n e s s e s h a v e c o n t i n u e d to pay b r i b e s .

Chapter Two 1. A m o n g t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l R e a l i s t w r i t i n g s a r e E d w a r d H. C a r r , The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations; G e o r g e F. K e n n a n , Realities of American Foreign Policy, a n d H a n s J. M o r g e n t h a u , Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th rev. e d . F o r b r i e f r e v i e w s of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , s e e K e g l e y and W i t t k o p f ( 1 9 8 1 e d . ) , p p . 1 9 - 2 2 ; a n d R a y M a g h r o o r i , " I n t r o d u c t i o n : M a j o r D e b a t e s in I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " in R a y M a g h r o o r i a n d B e n n e t t R a m b e r g , e d s . , Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate, p p . 9 - 2 2 . 2. N o n c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m s s h o u l d a l s o b e c o n s i d e r e d to h a v e t h e i r C o r p o r a t e G l o b a l i s t s , h o w e v e r . T h e y w o u l d b e k e y f i g u r e s in socialist and c o m m u n i s t parties, state t r a d i n g c o m p a n i e s , a n d s i m i l a r p o w e r f u l b u r e a u c r a c i e s that o p e r a t e t r a n s n a tionally. Like their capitalist counterparts, these highly centralized organizations a r e also p r o p e l l e d by g l o b a l i s t i d e a s : t h e s p r e a d of m a r k e t s o c i a l i s t e c o n o m i c m o d els ( s u c h as C h i n a ' s ) , p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d t r a d i n g a r e a s . E x a m p l e s of t h e C o r p o r a t e - G l o b a l i s t w o r l d v i e w a r e in M a g h r o o r i a n d R a m b e r g , e d s . , Globalism Versus Realism; R i c h a r d J. B a r n e t a n d R o n a l d E . Miiller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations, p a r t 1; B a r n e t a n d C a v a n a g h , Global Dreams; a n d S t e p h e n G u i s i n g e r , e d . , Private Enterprise and the New Global Economic Challenge. 3. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h o w R e a l i s t a n d C o r p o r a t e - G l o b a l i s t i n t e r e s t s c o n v e r g e a r o u n d s i m i l a r v a l u e s is a m a j o r a d d r e s s b y U . S . S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e G e o r g e S h u l t z in O c t o b e r 1988. S h u l t z s a w t h e c h a n g i n g n a t u r e of the C o l d W a r as an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to s p r e a d its p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c v a l u e s — " t h e v a l u e s that h a v e m a d e us g r e a t " — w o r l d w i d e . " L e t u s not be s h y a b o u t it; t h e w o r l d is c a t c h i n g o n t o t h e A m e r i c a n w a y , " h e s a i d . " I t is not j u s t o u r s h i p t h a t will c a t c h t h e tide, it's a w h o l e f l e e t of s h i p s — a n d A m e r i c a is t h e f l a g s h i p of that f l e e t . " S u c h arr o g a n c e l e a v e s little r o o m f o r a c c e p t a n c e of c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y . T e x t in U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of P u b l i c A f f a i r s , " T h e E c o l o g y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C h a n g e , " Current Policy, no. 1120, p p . 1-4. 4. A s P r e s i d e n t L y n d o n B. J o h n s o n said in 1966: " T h e r e a r e 3 b i l l i o n p e o p l e in t h e w o r l d a n d w e h a v e o n l y 2 0 0 m i l l i o n of t h e m . We are o u t n u m b e r e d 15 to I. If m i g h t did m a k e r i g h t , they w o u l d s w e e p o v e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t a k e w h a t w e

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have. We h a v e what they w a n t . " Q u o t e d in R i c h a r d J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, p. 25. 5. Richard J. Barnet, Roots of War, pp. 9 5 - 9 6 . 6. H e n r y A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 244. 7. Lucian M. A s h w o r t h , " T h e Great Illusion and the New World Order: Norman A n g e l l ' s A p p r o a c h to World P e a c e and Its R e l e v a n c e to International R e l a tions in a P o s t - C o l d War World," paper presented at the annual c o n f e r e n c e of the International Studies Association, A c a p u l c o , M e x i c o , March 27, 1993, pp. 2 1 - 2 3 . 8. T h e e m p h a s i s on e q u i l i b r i u m may be f o u n d in Henry A. Kissinger, " T h e New World O r d e r , " in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos, pp. 173-181. 9. Kissinger, quoted in J a m e s Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government, p. vii. 10. H e n r y A. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 673. This, despite the U.S. a m b a s s a d o r ' s p r e d i c t a b l y p a r a n o i d a d m i s s i o n that " C h i l e voted c a l m l y to h a v e a Marxist-Leninist state, the first nation in the world to make this choice freely and knowingly." 11. Quoted in The Washington Spectator, April I, 1993, p. 2. 12. M o r g e n t h a u , p. 274. 13. For an excellent critique of Realism on the issue of d o m e s t i c forces that inspire l e a d e r s ' p r e f e r e n c e s , see A n d r e w M o r a v c s i k , " T a k i n g P r e f e r e n c e s Seriously: A Liberal T h e o r y of International Politics," International Organization. 14. S e y m o u r M . H e r s h , The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, p. 263. 15. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. 16. Kissinger, interviewed in " T h e Politics of H u m a n Rights," Trialogue, no. 19 (Fall 1978), p. 3. 17. Kissinger, " T h e N e w World O r d e r , " in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos. 18. T r u m a n , q u o t e d in N o a m C h o m s k y , American Power and the New Mandarins, p. 268. 19. F i g u r e s are f r o m D e x t e r F. Baker, " F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t — A T w o - W a y S t r e e t , " Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 4 8 , no. 14 ( M a y 1, 1982), pp. 4 4 6 - 4 4 8 ; John M. Stopford and John H. D u n n i n g , eds., The World Directory of Multinational Enterprises, 1982-83: Company Performance and Global Trends, table 1.2, p. 5; David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, p. 79; Murray W e i d e n b a u m in Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1988, p. 10; Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, table 1324, p. 789. 20. Meier, The International Environment of Business, pp. 126, 131, 133. 21. International Herald Tribune, March 22, 1983. 22. Keith Bradsher, " S u b t e x t of the G M Strike F o c u s e s on Global Strategy," New York Times, J u n e 23, 1998, online. 23. O n the Trilateral C o m m i s s i o n ' s o r i g i n s and d e v e l o p m e n t , see Holly K. Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, chs. 2 - 4 ; and L a u r e n c e S h o u p , The Carter Presidency, ch. 2. 24. See Salil S. P i t r o d a , " F r o m G A T T to W T O : T h e Institutionalization of World T r a d e , " pp. 2 3 1 - 2 3 4 . 25. R o b e r t B. R e i c h , The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21stcentury Capitalism, p. 114; Murray W e i d e n b a u m , " T h e Business R e s p o n s e to the Global M a r k e t p l a c e , " The Washington Quarterly. T h e o d o r e H. M o r a n ("Trade and

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I n v e s t m e n t D i m e n s i o n s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t , " in C r o c k e r a n d H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos, p. 157) r e p o r t s that " m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e s w e r e res p o n s i b l e f o r m o r e t h a n 7 5 p e r c e n t of U n i t e d S t a t e s m e r c h a n d i s e t r a d e , w i t h app r o x i m a t e l y 4 0 p e r c e n t of that t r a d e c o n s i s t i n g of i n t r a f i r m t r a n s a c t i o n s . " 2 6 . R u l i n g s in t h e W T O ' s b i n d i n g d i s p u t e r e s o l u t i o n p r o c e s s h a v e t h u s f a r c l e a r l y f a v o r e d t r a d e o v e r t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g p r o t e c t i o n of e n d a n g e r e d s p e c i e s . T w o e x a m p l e s c a n b e c i t e d . In t h e f i r s t , t h e U . S . C l e a n A i r A c t w a s ord e r e d c h a n g e d b e c a u s e it set s t a n d a r d s f o r g a s o l i n e that i m p o r t e d V e n e z u e l a n gas c o u l d not m e e t ( D a v i d E. S a n g e r , " W o r l d T r a d e G r o u p O r d e r s U . S . to A l t e r C l e a n A i r A c t , " New York Times, J a n u a r y 18, 1996, p. C I ) . T h e act w a s c o n s i d e r e d disc r i m i n a t o r y . A s e c o n d c a s e i n v o l v e d s h r i m p - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s s u c h as I n d i a . T h e y w o n a r u l i n g in A p r i l 1998 a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h h a d p r o h i b i t e d s h r i m p s c a u g h t by b o a t s w h o s e n e t s a l s o c a u g h t e n d a n g e r e d sea t u r t l e s . T h e U . S . a c t i o n w a s d e e m e d to r e s t r a i n t r a d e r a t h e r t h a n p r o p e r l y p r o t e c t an e n d a n g e r e d s p e c i e s ( E l i z a b e t h O l s o n , " T a r g e t P r a c t i c e in G e n e v a o n the G l o b a l T r a d e B o d y , " New York Times, M a y 16, 1998, p. C I ) . It m i g h t f u r t h e r be n o t e d that a l t h o u g h the W T O does have international environmental standards for exported products ( c a l l e d I S O 14,000), t h e s e a r e c o r p o r a t e d r i v e n and are not t h e result of c o n s u l t a t i o n or c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h e n v i r o n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . F o r b a c k g r o u n d , see F r e n c h , Costly Tradeoffs. 27. S e e K e i t h B r a d s h e r , " A m e r i c a n W o r k e r s W a t c h as B e s t J o b s G o O v e r s e a s , " International Herald Tribune, A u g u s t 29, 1995. 28. New York Times, O c t o b e r 31, 1995, p. 1. 29. New York Times, M a y 8, 1998, p. C I . 30. M e i e r , The International Environment of Business, p. 11. 31. S e e M i g u e l K o r z e n i e w i c z , " C o m m o d i t y C h a i n s and M a r k e t i n g S t r a t e g i e s : N i k e and the Global Athletic F o o t w e a r Industry," and H y u n g Kook Kim and SuH o o n L e e , " C o m m o d i t y C h a i n s a n d t h e K o r e a n A u t o m o b i l e I n d u s t r y , " b o t h in G a r y G e r e f f i a n d M i g u e l K o r z e n i e w i c z , e d s . , Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, p p . 2 4 7 - 2 6 5 , 2 8 1 - 2 9 6 . 32. R i c h a r d S t u b b s , " A s i a - P a c i f i c R e g i o n a l i z a t i o n and t h e G l o b a l E c o n o m y , " Asian Survey, pp. 7 9 1 - 7 9 3 . B y m i d - 1 9 9 8 , h o w e v e r , it w a s b e c o m i n g a p p a r e n t that a n u m b e r of J a p a n e s e c o m p a n i e s w e r e p u l l i n g in t h e i r h o r n s as c o n s u m e r s at h o m e t u r n e d a w a y f r o m b u y i n g a n d t h e w e a k y e n w a s m a k i n g o v e r s e a s o p e r a t i o n s less attractive. 33. I M F statistics f o r 1989, r e p o r t e d in The Oregonian, S e p t e m b e r 13, 1990, p. F2. 34. T h e chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e g i o n - s t a t e s is " e f f i c i e n t e c o n o m i e s of s c a l e in their consumption, infrastructure and professional services," writes Kenichi O h m a e , " T h e R i s e of t h e R e g i o n S t a t e , " Foreign Affairs, pp. 7 8 - 8 7 . 35. A s of 1996, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , G e r m a n y , a n d J a p a n still h e l d t h e t o p t h r e e p o s i t i o n s in w o r l d m e r c h a n d i s e e x p o r t s , w i t h r e s p e c t i v e s h a r e s of a r o u n d 11 p e r c e n t ( $ 8 1 7 b i l l i o n ) , 10 p e r c e n t ( $ 5 2 1 b i l l i o n ) , a n d 8 p e r c e n t ( $ 3 4 9 b i l l i o n ) . C h i n a (excluding Hong Kong) ranked eleventh ($151 billion) and South Korea twelfth ( $ 1 5 0 b i l l i o n ) . W o r l d T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n s t a t i s t i c s , o n l i n e at w w w . w t o . o r g . 3 6 . T h e s e s u r p l u s e s , as R o b e r t J. G i l p i n r e m i n d s u s in U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporations, p. 157, a r e q u i t e apart f r o m i n c o m e a n d f r o m p o r t f o lio i n v e s t m e n t s — s t o c k s , b o n d s , a n d t h e l i k e — w h i c h a m o u n t to s e v e r a l t i m e s the receipts f r o m direct investments. 37. Forbes, J u l y 7, 1980, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 0 6 . 38. M e i e r , The International Environment of Business, p. 9.

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39. John Huey, "The World's Best Brand," Fortune, May 31, 1993, pp. 4 4 - 5 4 . 40. Sumie Kawakami, "Exporting a Surplus," Far Eastern Economic Review. July 4, 1996, pp. 4 4 - 4 6 . 41. Meier, The International Environment of Business, pp. 8, 11 (based on the UN's World Investment Report for 1994), and table 4.5, p. 134. In 1994, the combined FDI of U.S.. EU, and Japanese firms came to $186.4 billion out of a total FDI of $233.5 billion. 42. John Cavanagh and Frederick Clairmonte, "The Transnational Economy: Transnational Corporations and Global Markets," table 6, p. 25. 43. Kegley and Wittkopf (1997 ed.), p. 193. 44. In 1990, 74 percent of foreign direct investment by U.S.-based companies, for instance, went into the developed economies. This was virtually the same proportion as in 1980. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, table 1324, p. 789. 45. In 1994, of total FDI received ($239.7 billion), industrialized countries accounted for 56 percent and developing countries 44 percent (including China's 14 percent). Meier, The International Environment of Business, table 4.5, p. 134. 46. The Oregonian, July 3, 1990, p. A10: Meier, The International Environment of Business, p. 174. 47. Weidenbaum, in Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1988, p. 10. 48. Stopford and Dunning, table 1.3, p. 6. 49. Fortune, July 27, 1992, p. 176. 50. John M. Stopford, ed., Directory of Multinationals, vol. 2, pp. 1501-1503. 51. Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1981, 4/p. 1. 52. International Herald Tribune, May 29, 1995. 53. Figures are from Cheryl Payer, The World Bank: A Critical Analysis, p. 15, and Charles F. Meissner, "Debt: Reform Without Governments," Foreign Policy, p. 90. 54. The basic facts on the World Bank are drawn from its web site: www.worldbank.org. A scholarly, detailed, and surprisingly critical history of the Bank and some of its activities, which the Bank itself commissioned, may be found in Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds., The World Bank: Its First Half Century. 55. Exemplifying the effort to change policy, the Bank decided not to help fund China's Three Gorges Dam project, the world's largest, and formed a World Dam Commission in 1998 to bring together NGOs, government, and industry representatives to advise on funding. (See G. Pascal Zachary, "World Bank Forces Battle of the Dams," Wall Street Journal, March 19, 1998.) For a detailed, longterm critique of the environmental impact of Bank projects, see Robert Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle Over the Environment, 1970-1995," in Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, eds., The World Bank, ch. 13. 56. Basic data on the IMF may be found on its web site: www.imf.org. 57. All the following figures are from Meier, The International Environment of Business, table 4.6, p. 142. 58. Thomas L. Friedman, "Don't Mess With Moody's," New York Times, February 22, 1995, p. A15. 59. Convincing cases are presented in Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, ch. 4; Payer, World Bank, pp. 19-21; and Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, ch. 10. 60. See Darrell Delamaide, Debt Shock: The Full Story of the World Credit Crisis, pp. 112, 227-228. As Meissner comments (p. 89), the efforts of Third World governments to restructure (postpone) their debts involve them in an elaborate

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g a m e . It c a n o n l y w o r k if, in r e t u r n f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t s ' o p e n i n g u p t h e i r e c o n o m i e s to f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s a n d i n c r e a s e d t r a d e , the t r a n s n a t i o n a l b a n k s g r e a t l y liberalize l e n d i n g p o l i c i e s , i n c l u d i n g a c a p o n interest rates. S o far, o n l y the debtors have been playing the game. 61. D o u g l a s J e h l , " E g y p t ' s F a r m e r s R e s i s t E n d of F r e e z e on R e n t s , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 27, 1997, p. A 5 . 6 2 . H o w a r d W. F r e n c h , " A f r i c a R e s e n t f u l a s A s i a R a k e s in A i d , " New York Times, M a r c h 8, 1998, o n l i n e . 6 3 . A s c h o l a r l y a r g u m e n t c a n c e r t a i n l y be m a d e that trade and p e a c e generally g o t o g e t h e r . ( S e e T h e o d o r e H. M o r a n , " T r a d e a n d I n v e s t m e n t D i m e n s i o n s , " in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , e d s . , Managing Global Chaos, p p . 1 5 7 - 1 5 8 , c i t i n g E d w a r d D. M a n s f i e l d , Power, Trade, and War ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1994). T h o u g h it is a c k n o w l e d g e d that trade m a y a l s o c r e a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , s u c h as d i s p u t e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t r a d e i m b a l a n c e s and t h e a d v e r s e e f f e c t s of F D I , the n o t i o n persists that c o u n t r i e s i n t e n s i v e l y i n v o l v e d in t r a d e learn to s u b o r d i n a t e their r i v a l r i e s . In the E u r o p e a n c o n t e x t , s u c h a v i e w c l e a r l y has m e r i t . O t h e r w i s e , the c a s e r e m a i n s o p e n : N o t e , f o r e x a m p l e , the t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d T a i w a n , and the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C h i n a , d e s p i t e s u b s t a n t i a l trade and i n v e s t m e n t r e l a t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , the t r a d e - p e a c e c o n n e c t i o n i g n o r e s e n v i r o n m e n t a l , labor, and r e s o u r c e c o m p o n e n t s of trade that c a n b e s o u r c e s of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t ; i g n o r e s the k i n d s of c o m m o d i t i e s t r a d e d ( s u c h as w e a p o n s a n d c o m p o n e n t s ) ; a n d i g n o r e s t h e i n t e r n a l d i m e n s i o n s of the trade r e l a t i o n s h i p (the e x p l o i t e d l a b o r used to c r e a t e g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s in trade, and the e f f e c t s o n h u m a n c o m m u n i t i e s of trade a n d F D I r e l a t i o n s ) . T h u s , t h e n o t i o n that trade b r i n g s p e a c e is t o o s i m p l i s t i c , t h o u g h c e r t a i n l y w e c a n c o n c e d e that i n t e n s i v e trade p r o b a b l y is a moderating factor in state r e l a t i o n s . 64. B a k e r , p. 4 4 6 . 65. Barnet and M ü l l e r , pp. 1 4 - 1 5 . 6 6 . B a r n e t a n d M ü l l e r , p. 15. 67. S u c h an a r g u m e n t is e f f e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t e d in a s t u d y of A m e r i c a n , G e r m a n , a n d J a p a n e s e T N C l e a d e r s by P a u l N. D o r e m u s et al., The Myth of the Global Corporation. 6 8 . D a v i d E. S a n g e r , " U . S . B l a m e s A l l i e s f o r U n d e r c u t t i n g Its C h i n a P o l i c y , " New York Times, J u n e 12, 1996, p. 1. 69. M a h b u b ul H a q , " N e g o t i a t i n g the F u t u r e , " Foreign Affairs, p. 4 1 6 . F o r a s i m i l a r v i e w f r o m a C a n a d i a n , see H e a d , Foreign Affairs, p p . 7 1 - 8 6 . 70. R e i c h , The Work of Nations. 71. U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m , Human Development Report 1992, pp. 5 4 - 5 5 . H e r e a f t e r , Human Development Report 1992. 72. S e e A n t h o n y S m i t h , The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World, pp. 7 3 - 7 7 . 7 3 . H e r b e r t I. S c h i l l e r , Who Knows: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500, pp. 3 0 - 3 3 . U . S . - b a s e d d a t a b a n k s h o l d a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s of all o r g a n i z e d d a t a b a s e s (Schiller, p. 36). A n d see H o w a r d H. F r e d e r i c k , Global Communications and International Relations, pp. 7 2 - 7 7 . 7 4 . A n t h o n y S m i t h , p. 73. 7 5 . A n t h o n y S m i t h , c h . 2. A s j u s t o n e e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r t h e t o p t e n m o v i e s in ten c o u n t r i e s , c o v e r i n g e v e r y c o n t i n e n t , d u r i n g a t y p i c a l w e e k in 1993: O u t of 100 p o s s i b l e s e l e c t i o n s , o n l y t w e n t y - f o u r w e r e n o t m a d e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . J u d g i n g f r o m the o t h e r titles, o n l y t w o o r t h r e e w e r e n o n - W e s t e r n . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l B o x O f f i c e , " Utne Reader, no. 5 7 ( M a y - J u n e 1993), p. 152. 76. B e n B a g d i k i a n , " L o r d s of t h e G l o b a l V i l l a g e , " The Nation.

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77. Frederick, p. 72. 78. The transnational media giants and their principal leaders are Bertelsmann A.G. (Reinhard Mohn; revenues of $14 billion in 1995), Viacom (Sumner Redstone; $11.3 billion), News Corporation (Rupert Murdoch; $9 billion), Time Warner (Ted Turner; $8.1 billion), and Advance Publications (Newhouse family; $5.3 billion). These and other leading conglomerates have controlling stakes in a wide range of media, including book publishing, television, newspapers, magazines, and software. See the special insert of The Nation, March 17, 1997. 79. David E. Sanger, "Playing the Trade Card," New York Times, February 17, 1997, p. 1. 80. New York Times, February 18, 1997, p. C I . 81. New York Times. February 10, 1997, online. 82. See Herbert I. Schiller, "Transnational Media: Creating Consumers Worldwide," Journal of International Affairs, pp. 47-58. 83. Nigel Holloway, "Caught in the Net," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 28, 1996, pp. 28-29, quoting a member of Human Rights Watch/Asia. 84. Debora L. Spar, "The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights," Foreign Affairs. 85. In the spring of 1998 Nike's head, Philip Knight, acknowledged the damage to Nike's reputation that attention to workplace abuses in Vietnam had caused, and vowed to make changes. He mentioned improvements in health and safety regulations, for instance, and allowing NGOs to inspect Nike plants. One thing he did not mention, however, was wages, which remain below $1 a day; nor did he promise that workers who protest conditions will not be punished. 86. Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, chs. 1 and 8; Steve Chan and Cal Clark, "Changing Perspectives on the Evolving Pacific Basin: International Structure and Domestic Processes," in Chan and Clark, eds., The Evolving Pacific Basin in the Global Political Economy: Domestic and International Linkages, pp. 1-26. 87. Thomas D. Lairson and David Skidmore, International Political Economy: The Struggle for Power and Wealth, pp. 269-270. 88. Danny Kin-Kong Lam and Ian Lee, "Guerrilla Capitalism and the Limits of Statist Theory: Comparing the Chinese NICs," in Chan and Clark, pp. 107-124; Haggard, pp. 193-206, 216-218. In the Korean case, if dependence was created, it was on foreign bank loans rather than foreign investments. Even then, these borrowings are nothing to compare with the heavy indebtedness to banks of Mexico and Brazil. See Haggard, p. 219, table 8.13. 89. Haggard, pp. 221-222. 90. For example, Gulf Oil (owned by Chevron) has for many years operated a refinery in Cabinda Bay, Angola, a socialist country. Despite pressure from U.S. conservatives to pull out of Angola, where the United States is assisting rebel forces seeking to overthrow its government, Gulf has stayed on. As the board chair and chief executive officer of Gulf Oil, James E. Lee, has said: "The experience of Gulf Oil in Angola underscores the fact that ideological commitments—whether Marxist, Centrist, or Capitalist—can coexist with a quite responsible and pragmatic approach to business relationships" ("To Live in Interesting Times," in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 48, no. 24 [October 1, 1982], p. 743). 91. Quoted in Delamaide, Debt Shock, p. 81. 92. C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs. 93. Gilbert Williamson, president of NCR Corporation (1989); quoted in Reich, The Work of Nations, p. 119.

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94. New York Times, February 1, 1997, p. 4. U.S. oil companies indeed complained about losing business because of the sanctions. But Stuart Eizenstat, under secretary of state for economic affairs, said, "This is a situation where the strategic interests of the United States are so great that they outweigh temporary advantages of American companies." Jane Perlez and Steven LeVine, "U.S. Oil Companies Chafe at Curbs on Investment in Iran," New York Times, August 9, 1998, online. 95. Quoted in Los Angeles Times World Report, December 17, 1995, p. 6. 96. Jeffrey E. Garten, "Business and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy. 97. Doremus et al., The Myth of the Global Corporation, p. 144. 98. See Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, pp. 113-115, on the need for greater "moderation" of democratic processes, including press freedom. 99. Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, The Global Trap. ch. 1. 100. David Kowalewski, "Asian State Repression and Strikes Against T r a n s n a t i o n a l , " in George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, eds., Dependence, Development, and State Repression, pp. 77-81. 101. See Hilary F. French, Costly Tradeoffs: Reconciling Trade and the Environment, paper no. 113, Worldwatch Institute, pp. 31-32. 102. When the matter of repression in China has come up in the U.S. Congress, for instance, both the Chinese and the U.S. governments have gotten vocal support for "engagement" from Boeing, Motorola, Nike, Caterpillar, and numerous other TNCs that have large stakes in China's rise. Beijing also learned from the worldwide reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown that it was advisable to hire professional lobbyists, which it did. See Ken Silverstein, "The New China Hands," The Nation. 103. See the New York Times for September 21, 1997, p. 1; October 11, 1997, p. A4; December 9, 1997, p. C7; and February 17, 1998, p. C I . And see Thomas Goltz, "The Caspian Oil Sweepstakes," The Nation, November 17, 1997, pp. 18-21.

104. New York Times, October 19, 1995, p. A7. 105. Paul Lewis, "International Community Takes Steps to Curb Corruption," New York Times. November 28, 1996, online. The O E C D ' s ruling is designed to prevent TNCs from taking tax deductions on bribes, which they had previously been able to do in some countries. The World Bank has vowed to blacklist companies and governments that engage in large-scale bribery. 106. On economic nationalism, see Petras, ch. 6, and Frank, p. 284. 107. Tom Farer, "The United States and the Third World: A Basis for Accommodation," Foreign Affairs, pp. 79-97. 108. See, for example, Bob Herbert columns in the New York Times of March 31 and June 27, 1997. 109. Suzanne Daley, "In War-Torn Angola, U.S. Oil Workers Live in Bubble of Peace," New York Times, June 25, 1998, online. 110. See, for example, Edmund L. Andrews, "German Company to Leave China Over Sales of Organs," New York Times, March 7, 1998, p. A5. The sale of prisoner-assembled goods and organs from executed prisoners was verified during a number of congressional hearings in 1998. 111. New York Times, June 2, 1996, online. 112. For background, see New York Times, November 16, 1995, p. A8; February 13, 1996, p. A l ; March 12, 1996, p. A6. 113. New York Times, April 9, 1998, p. C I . Coca-Cola and Eastman Kodak also "cared": They announced major new investments in China at the same time.

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For Levi Strauss, it was easy to evade responsibility, for it is a labor contractor, not a factory owner. Thus, responsibility for child and forced labor was placed on Chinese factory managers and the difficulties of policing them. Competitor multinationals such as Esprit, moreover, had already moved into China in the interim, evidently without any need to address moral arguments. 114. This account of postwar planning is largely based on Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States Internationa! Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present; Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, chs. 1 - 6 and 12-13; Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth, esp. pp. 9 - 3 1 ; Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, "Shaping a New World Order: The Council on Foreign Relations' Blueprint for World Hegemony," in Sklar, part 3, ch. 1; and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, pp. 60-65. 115. Wolfe, p. 114. 116. Byrnes, quoted in Kolko, p. 23. See similar quotes by Cordell Hull and Dean Acheson in Block, p. 40. 117. Quoted in Kolko, p. 24. 118. Truman to Byrnes, January 5, 1946, in Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950. p. 54. 119. Quoted in Barnet, Roots of War, p. 100. 120. Quoted in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 251-252. 121. NSC-68 is reproduced in full in John P. Glennon et al., eds., Foreign Relations of the United States 1950; vol. 1: National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy. The quoted portions are from pp. 262, 258-259, 262-263, in that order. 122. On Eisenhower's foreign economic policy, see Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare, pp. 293-309. 123. Quoted in Holly K. Sklar, "Trilateralism and the Management of Contradictions: Concluding Perspectives," in Sklar, p. 564. 124. Michael Mastanduno, "Trade Policy," in Robert J. Art and Seyom Brown, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for a New Role, p. 147. 125. Mastanduno, pp. 147-148. 126. For historical documentation, see Sifry and Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader, pp. 3 - 9 5 . Saddam's accusations and ambitions emerge with special clarity in his final meeting with the U.S. ambassador (July 25, 1990) before he launched his invasion: Sifry and Cerf, pp. 122-133. 127. For a full presentation of this background, see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, pp. 19-41. 128. The background to U.S. policy in the 1980s is in the President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report, pp. 102-123. On the United States and Iraq, see Seymour M. Hersh, "Aid to Iraq Approved by Reagan in 1982," The Oregonian, January 26, 1992, p. 1; Murray Waas and Douglas Frantz, "Bush, Reagan White Houses Armed Iraq with a Wink, Nod," The Oregonian, April 19, 1992, p. A8. 129. Joe Conason, "The Iraq Lobby: Kissinger, the Business Forum & Co.," in Sifry and Cerf, pp. 80-81. 130. See, for instance, Murray Waas, "What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas," in Sifry and Cerf, pp. 87-91. The Pentagon's objections to military-use exports to Iraq were overridden by the State and Commerce Departments.

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131. M i c h a e l T. K l a r e , " F u e l i n g t h e Fire: H o w W e A r m e d t h e M i d d l e E a s t , " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 20. 132. E l a i n e S c i o l i n o a n d M i c h a e l W i n e s , " B u s h ' s G l o r y F a d e s as I s s u e s o n Iraq R e m a i n , " New York Times, r e p r i n t e d in The Oregonian, J u n e 30, 1992, p. A 4 . 133. T h e r e v e l a t i o n c a m e f r o m a D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; s e e the New York Times r e p o r t in The Oregonian, A p r i l 27, 1992, p. A 6 . 134. A n u m b e r of B r i t i s h a n d F r e n c h c o m p a n i e s w e r e s i m i l a r l y i n v o l v e d d e s p i t e an o f f i c i a l e m b a r g o on a r m s s h i p m e n t s to I r a q . S e e D i l i p H i r o , " T h a t c h e r and M a j o r in t h e D o c k , " The Nation, J a n u a r y 4 / 1 1 , 1 9 9 3 , p p . 1 3 - 1 5 ; U . S . C o n g r e s s , O f f i c e of T e c h n o l o g y A s s e s s m e n t , Global Arms Trade, p. 24, n. 4 2 . 135. Text of the a m b a s s a d o r ' s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h S a d d a m in S i f r y a n d C e r f , pp. 1 2 2 - 1 3 4 . 136. O n B u s h ' s m e s s a g e , s e e S c i o l i n o a n d W i n e s , p. A 3 . T h e w a r n i n g f r o m J a m e s A. B a k e r III is r e p o r t e d by E l a i n e S c i o l i n o , " B a k e r T o l d O f f i c i a l s of Iraqi B u i l d u p . " New York Times, r e p r i n t e d in The Oregonian, S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 1992, p. A 1 6 . Yet b a c k in 1989 B a k e r h a d r e j e c t e d o b j e c t i o n s to a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t s to Iraq, w h i c h o t h e r U . S . o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d w e r e b e i n g u s e d to p u r c h a s e m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t . R u t h S i n a i , " D o c u m e n t s S h o w H o w B a k e r W o o e d I r a q ' s S u p p o r t , " The Oregonian, O c t o b e r 25, 1992, p. 1. 137. T e x t s in S i f r y a n d C e r f , p p . 1 3 7 - 1 5 6 . 138. In his s p e e c h of A u g u s t 8, 1990, cited p r e v i o u s l y , B u s h e x p r e s s e d c o n f i d e n c e that s a n c t i o n s w o u l d w o r k . A n d in a S e p t e m b e r 11, 1990, a d d r e s s to C o n g r e s s , B u s h said, " S a n c t i o n s will t a k e t i m e to h a v e their f u l l i n t e n d e d e f f e c t . " O t h e r s e n i o r a d v i s e r s a g r e e d , as did several f o r m e r o f f i c i a l s s u c h as Z b i g n i e w B r z e z i n s k i , P r e s i d e n t J i m m y C a r t e r ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a d v i s e r , a n d A d m i r a l W i l l i a m J. C r o w e , Jr., c h a i r m a n of t h e Joint C h i e f s of S t a f f f r o m 1985 to 1989. B u t in J a n u a r y , w h e n B u s h a n n o u n c e d the start of t h e m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n , he said t i m e h a d r u n o u t a n d the s a n c t i o n s h a d p r o v e n i n e f f e c t i v e . 139. A d d r e s s to C o n g r e s s o n S e p t e m b e r 11, 1990. 140. M i c h a e l T. K l a r e , " T h e P e n t a g o n ' s N e w P a r a d i g m , " in S i f r y a n d C e r f , pp. 4 6 6 ^ 7 6 . 141. As S t r o b e T a l b o t t w r o t e , " T h e o b j e c t i v e of D e s e r t S t o r m w a s , in its e s s e n c e , the d e f e n s e of t h e o l d , e s t a b l i s h e d o r d e r , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e status q u o a n t e . " I r a q w a s b a s i c a l l y t o l d , " S t a y o n y o u r o w n t e r r i t o r y , w r a p y o u r s e l f in t h e c l o a k of s o v e r e i g n t y , a n d y o u c a n d o a n y t h i n g y o u w a n t . " " P o s t - V i c t o r y B l u e s , " Foreign Affairs, p p . 59, 6 3 . 142. " F o r 4 3 d a y s d u r i n g t h e 1991 w a r t h a t r e v e r s e d I r a q ' s i n v a s i o n of K u w a i t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its a l l i e s l a u n c h e d 1 0 9 , 8 7 6 r a i d s o v e r Iraq a n d d r o p p e d 8 8 , 5 0 0 t o n s of b o m b s . It still t o o k a g r o u n d a s s a u l t b y 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s to f i n i s h the j o b . " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 1, 1998, p. 1. 143. T h e U . S . p o l i c y of " i m m e d i a t e , u n c o n d i t i o n a l a n d c o m p l e t e w i t h d r a w a l of all Iraqi f o r c e s f r o m K u w a i t " w a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y B u s h in t h e f i r s t m o m e n t s of D e s e r t S h i e l d . S e e his s p e e c h of A u g u s t 8, 1990, in S i f r y a n d C e r f , p. 198. O n s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s , s e e E l i z a b e t h D r e w , " W a s h i n g t o n P r e p a r e s f o r W a r , " in S i f r y a n d C e r f , p p . 1 8 0 - 1 9 3 . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e B a k e r t r a v e l e d t o G e n e v a in e a r l y J a n u a r y 1991 f o r a l a s t - d i t c h m e e t i n g w i t h T a r i q A z i z , I r a q ' s f o r e i g n m i n ister, B a k e r ' s h a n d s w e r e tied in a d v a n c e by B u s h ' s s t r i c t u r e s a g a i n s t n e g o t i a t i n g . T h a t l e f t t h e I r a q i s w i t h n o t h i n g to d i s c u s s e x c e p t t h e i r u n c o n d i t i o n a l w i t h d r a w a l from Kuwait. 144. T h e n u m b e r of I r a q i c i v i l i a n a n d m i l i t a r y d e a t h s in t h e w a r r e m a i n s in d i s p u t e . N e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n o r t h e I r a q i g o v e r n m e n t h a s m a d e p u b l i c its

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f i g u r e s . The ones usually m e n t i o n e d run f r o m a few thousand total deaths all the w a y up to 100,000 (Peter N. K o c h a n s k y , " U . S . A m b i g u o u s A b o u t Iraqis Killed D u r i n g Gulf War T h r e e Years A g o , " The Oregonian, August 1, 1993, p. A14). O n site investigations m a d e two things unmistakable: The war had an immediate e f f e c t on Iraqi children, for w h o m the death rate tripled (see the Harvard University study reported in The Oregonian, September 24, 1992, p. A16); and it had a long-term effect on Iraq's society and e c o n o m y because of the trade e m b a r g o and the b o m b i n g . 145. Bruce Russett and J a m e s S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World O r d e r , " Foreign Affairs, p. 71. 146. See M o h a m m e d Ayoob, " S q u a r i n g the Circle: Collective Security in a S y s t e m of S t a t e s , " in T h o m a s G. Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World, pp. 5 2 - 5 3 . w h e r e the argument is that "the U N was reduced to the role of an e n d o r s e m e n t a g e n c y " in the Gulf War. Russett and Sutterlin (pp. 6 9 - 8 3 ) add that the U N secretary-general was virtually cut off f r o m decisionmaking on the war and e v e n f r o m the i n f o r m a t i o n flow. 147. K i m b e r l y Elliott, Gary H u f b a u e r , and J e f f r e y Schott, " P l a y i n g the Econ o m i c Waiting G a m e with Iraq," Washington Post Weekly, D e c e m b e r 17-23, 1990, p. 23. 148. Within one year of Iraq's attack, U.S. arms sales of over $34 billion were m a d e to the r e g i o n , m o s t l y to Saudi A r a b i a . T h e f i g u r e e x c e e d e d all U.S. a r m s sales to the Middle East f r o m 1979 to 1988 (The Oregonian, June 11, 1991, p. A3). T h e s e and later sales, w h i c h brought the total to $41 billion, occurred after Bush (in M a y 1991) had a n n o u n c e d a Middle East A r m s Control Initiative designed to gain b i g - p o w e r support for bringing sales of " d e s t a b i l i z i n g " conventional w e a p o n s under control. See Klare, " F u e l i n g the Fire," p. 175. 149. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Arms Trade, p. 50. 150. O t h e r state l e a d e r s may h a v e learned t w o lessons f r o m the Gulf War: First, d e v e l o p and deploy nuclear or other W M D before deciding to c o n f r o n t a nuc l e a r p o w e r like the U n i t e d States; s e c o n d , give priority in military s p e n d i n g to rapid d e p l o y m e n t forces and high-tech weapons. 151. U N S O C inspections in J u n e 1998 revealed, a m o n g other things, that Iraq had loaded deadly V X nerve gas onto missile w a r h e a d s before the Gulf War. New York Times, June 24, 1998, online. 152. See, for instance, Barbara Crossette, "Iraqis Still D e f y i n g A r m s Ban, Departing U.N. O f f i c i a l S a y s , " New York Times, J u n e 25, 1997, online; Tim Weiner, "7 Years of Evasion, Tons of Illicit A r m s , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 11, 1997, p. A 6 ; W i l l i a m J. B r o a d and Judith Miller, " I r a q ' s D e a d l i e s t A r m s : P u z z l e s Breed F e a r s , " New York Times, February 26, 1998, p. A l . 153. See Eric R o u l e a u , " A m e r i c a ' s U n y i e l d i n g Policy Toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs. A f o r m e r D u t c h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r a u t h o r e d a report to the United Nations that cited a r o u n d 1,500 e x e c u t i o n s in Iraq in 1997, m o s t l y of the r e g i m e ' s o p p o nents. New York Times, April 14, 1998, p. 1. 154. U N agencies, relying mainly on Iraqi sources, estimated that one in every three Iraqi children is m a l n o u r i s h e d and that the infant mortality rate nearly doubled b e t w e e n 1991 and 1996. H a d a n i D i t m a r s , " I r a q i s ' S u f f e r i n g W i d e n s as U.N. S a n c t i o n s Drag O n , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 14, 1997, online. 155. T h e U.S. a m b a s s a d o r to the U N , M a d e l e i n e Albright, is said to have dec l a r e d : "We r e c o g n i z e this area [the P e r s i a n G u l f ] as vital to U.S. national interests, a n d w e will b e h a v e with others m u t i l a t e r a l l y w h e n we can and unilaterally w h e n w e m u s t " ( R o u l e a u , " A m e r i c a ' s U n y i e l d i n g P o l i c y Toward I r a q , " p. 6 7 ) — thus, the essential continuity b e t w e e n the Bush and Clinton policies.

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156. Barnet and Cavanagh, Global Dreams, pp. 355-356, on Mexico; and a report of the World Bank's projections for China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia in the New York Times, September 10, 1997, p. C7. 157. Quotations from Ken Silverstein and Alexander Cockburn, "The Killers and the Killing," The Nation, March 6, 1995, p. 308. 158. Thomas L. Friedman, writing in the New York Times, January 25, 1995; cited in Meier, pp. 223-224. Friedman was addressing members of the U.S. Congress who considered the Mexican peso crisis too far away to justify a large loan. 159. Except where otherwise indicated, this paragraph relies on Carlos M. Urzua, "Five Decades of Relations Between the World Bank and Mexico," in Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, eds., The World Bank, ch. 3; and Carlos Heredia and Mary Purcell, "Structural Adjustment and the Polarization of Mexican Society," in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, eds., The Case Against the Global Economy—And for a Turn Toward the Local, ch. 24. 160. Barnet and Cavanagh, p. 253. 161. In 1992, the lowest 40 percent of Mexico's households accounted for a mere 11.9 percent of all income, while the top 20 percent accounted for 55.3 percent (and the top 10 percent for 39.2 percent). World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, table 5, p. 223. 162. For figures on poverty and wages, and discussion of the antipoverty programs, see Urzua, table 3 - 1 , p. 56 and pp. 95-96. 163. Urzua, pp. 9 1 - 9 2 . Urzua adds (pp. 9 3 - 9 4 ) that by 1994, "Mexico had more billionaires than the United Kingdom and Italy." That was only possible at a time of economic stagnation, he concludes, because "those 'entrepreneurs' were earning rents from oligopolistic privatized industries and unregulated privatized monopolies." One such entrepreneur was President Salinas's brother, Raul, who evidently used his relationship with the president to secure an enormous amount of money and send it abroad. See Julia Preston, "Mexico's Elite Caught in Scandal's Harsh Glare," New York Times, July 13, 1996, online. 164. New York Times, October 8, 1995, p. iv-14. 165. World Development Report 1997, table 3, p. 219. 166. See Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, "NAFTA's Unhappy Anniversary," New York Times, February 7, 1995, p. A13. These writers report that "according to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, NAFTA has caused a net loss of 10,000 U.S. jobs." Since the agreement, many U.S. communities had lost businesses to Mexico; and some of those same businesses, once established in Mexico, violated Mexican environmental laws and replaced cheap labor with even cheaper labor. 167. Meier, table 5.8, p. 216. 168. Walker F. Todd, "Bailing Out the Creditor Class," The Nation, February 13, 1995, p. 193. 169. New York Times, March 14, 1995, p. A7. The World Bank also was concerned about Mexico's overreliance on foreign capital. Urzua, p. 106. 170. Silverstein and Cockburn, "The Killers and the Killing," p. 307. 171. Urzua, p. 104. 172. Sam Dillon, "Rebels Strike in 4 Mexico States, Leaving 13 Dead," New York Times, August 30, 1996, p. 1. In fact, by 1996 the Zapatistas, surrounded by superior military power, were persuaded to stop their rebellion. But insurgency itself did not stop; small guerrilla bands apparently belonging to a group called the Popular Revolutionary Army attacked Mexican army units in several states during 1996. As of mid-1998 the situation in Chiapas remained very tense, with renewal of military action by the government a distinct possibility.

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173. New York Times, February 22, 1995, p. C16; Urzúa, pp. 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . 174. E f f o r t s to reach a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t have thus far f a i l e d . T h e Z a p atistans h a v e set up a parallel g o v e r n m e n t in friendly villages, which the military has attacked. 175. IMF Survey, F e b r u a r y 6, 1995, q u o t e d in Meier, pp. 2 2 0 - 2 2 1 . In plain English, as David E. S a n g e r reported in the New York Times (February 22, 1995, p. C16), " T h e heart of the deal lies in requiring M e x i c o to pursue an extremely tight m o n e t a r y policy, s h r i n k i n g the c o u n t r y ' s m o n e y supply and p r e v e n t i n g it f r o m spending G o v e r n m e n t f u n d s to stimulate e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . For Mr. Zedillo, w h o only a few m o n t h s a g o w a s talking of creating a million new j o b s and sustaining a growth rate of 4 percent or m o r e , that m e a n s selling M e x i c a n s on a strict diet of austerity." 176. Julia Preston, "In M e x i c o , an U n e v e n R e c o v e r y , " New York Times, January 2, 1997, p. C13. 177. M e x i c o is one of the m o s t important transit points for narcotics s m u g gling into the United Stales. O v e r the years, while the traffic has increased, U.S. officials have b e c o m e c o n v i n c e d of the complicity of the M e x i c a n national police in it. Pressure on the Mexican g o v e r n m e n t resulted in shifting responsibility for apprehending d r u g - r i n g leaders to the army. But that step also proved useless when, in February 1997, the top M e x i c a n army official in charge of the anti-narcotics effort w a s arrested f o r taking bribes f r o m the leading d r u g - r i n g leader. New York Times, F e b r u a r y 22, 1997, p. 1. See also S a m Dillon and Craig Pyes. " D r u g Ties Taint 2 Mexican G o v e r n o r s , " New York Times, February 23, 1997. online. 178. New York Times, April 15, 1998, p. A12. 179. In l o w e r - h o u s e e l e c t i o n s , the PRI lost control for the first time since 1929. T h e m a i n o p p o s i t i o n , the Party of the D e m o c r a t i c R e v o l u t i o n , h e a d e d by C u a u h t é m o c C á r d e n a s Solorzano, w h o was elected m a y o r of M e x i c o City and has twice run for president, won 26 percent of the popular vote. 180. Anthony D e P a l m a , " G a p B e t w e e n M e x i c o ' s Rich and Poor Is W i d e n i n g , " New York Times, July 20, 1996, online. 181. " A f t e r insisting for years that M e x i c a n c o r r u p t i o n w a s an old a f f l i c t i o n b e i n g cured by a new g e n e r a t i o n of political leaders, senior A m e r i c a n o f f i c i a l s h a v e b e g u n to a c k n o w l e d g e that the g r o w i n g p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e of M e x i c o ' s drug t r a f f i c k e r s h a v e led to a l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t crisis so d e e p that it threatens the stability of [that] country." Tim G o l d e n , " M e x i c o and Drugs: Was U.S. N a p p i n g ? " New York Times, July 3, 1997, online. 182. For a similar view by a f o r m e r official under Salinas, see Juan Enriquez, " M e x i c o ' s Cycle of Failure," New York Times, March 11, 1997, p. A15. 183. Quoted in New York Times, February 23, 1995, p. C3. 184. N a y a n C h a n d a , " R e b u i l d i n g A s i a , " Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1998, pp. 4 6 ^ * 7 . 185. C h a n d a , p. 47. 186. M a r t i n H a r t - L a n d s b e r g , " T h e Asian Crisis: C a u s e s and C o n s e q u e n c e s , " Against the Current; Waiden Bello, " T h e End of the Asian M i r a c l e , " The Nation. J a p a n e s e b a n k s held 32 percent of A s i a ' s total debt of $ 3 8 9 billion in J u n e 1997. New York Times, January 28, 1998, p. C I . 187. I rely here m a i n l y on H a r t - L a n d s b e r g , Bello, and Lee S u - H o o n , " C r i s i s in Korea and the I M F C o n t r o l , " in K i m Eun Mee, ed., The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy. 188. C h a l m e r s J o h n s o n , " C o l d War E c o n o m i c s Melt A s i a , " The Nation. 189. Martin Feldstein, " R e f o c u s i n g the IMF," Foreign Affairs, p. 25.

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190. D a v i d E . S a n g e r , " U . S . J o i n s O t h e r N a t i o n s in N e w B a i l o u t P l a n f o r S o u t h K o r e a , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 25, 1997, o n l i n e . T h e I M F ' s v e r s i o n is, of c o u r s e , q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . S e n s i t i v e to c h a r g e s t h a t t h e M e x i c a n b a i l o u t really b a i l e d out U . S . i n v e s t o r s , it a r g u e d that its p o l i c i e s w e r e not d e s i g n e d to " p r o t e c t " any f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n or i n d i v i d u a l c r e d i t o r s b u t r a t h e r to s t a b i l i z e and r e s t r u c ture c o l l a p s i n g e c o n o m i e s . " F a c t s h e e t — I M F Bail O u t s : T r u t h a n d F i c t i o n , " J a n u ary 1998, o n l i n e at t h e I M F w e b site. 191. F o r an o v e r v i e w , see A n d r e w S h e r r y et al., " S t a t e of I n e r t i a , " Far Eastern Economic Review, D e c e m b e r 11, 1997, pp. 1 6 - 2 0 . T h e k e y s t u m b l i n g b l o c k for t h e f o r e i g n b a n k s w a s w h e t h e r t h e K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t itself w o u l d , as in L a t i n A m e r i c a ' s f i n a n c i a l crisis of t h e 1980s, g u a r a n t e e the n e w loans. E v e n t u a l l y , it did, in e x c h a n g e f o r r o l l o v e r s of s h o r t - t e r m i n t o l o n g e r - t e r m l o a n s . F o r g o v e r n m e n t s that, led b y the U n i t e d S t a t e s , j o i n e d the I M F b a i l o u t by p r o v i d i n g $ 1 0 billion in e m e r g e n c y l o a n s to K o r e a , the risk w a s m a i n l y p o l i t i c a l : T a x p a y e r s w o u l d not lake k i n d l y to a n o t h e r M e x i c o - s t y l e b a i l o u t , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n (in t h e U . S . c a s e ) t h e y had b e e n p r o m i s e d " n o t a n i c k e l " of their m o n e y w o u l d go to r e s c u i n g private investors a n d c r e d i t o r s f r o m the p r o d u c t of t h e i r o w n r i s k - t a k i n g . T h a t p r o m i s e h a d b e e n m a d e by t h e U . S . s e c r e t a r y of the t r e a s u r y , R o b e r t R u b i n . It p r o v e d i m p o s s i b l e to k e e p w h e n the K o r e a n w o n kept f a l l i n g , a n d it b e c a m e c l e a r that u n l e s s g o v e r n m e n t l o a n s w e r e p r o v i d e d to s u p p l e m e n t t h e I M F f u n d s , the K o r e a n b a n k s w o u l d d e f a u l t a n d a m a j o r U . S . ally in A s i a m i g h t b e d e s t a b i l i z e d . S e e D a v i d E. S a n g e r , " A s i a n C r i s i s M a y T a k e a P a i n f u l S t e p , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 29, 1997, o n l i n e . 192. T h e o n e v i c t o r y f o r l a b o r w a s w h e n K i m p r e s i d e d o v e r a h i s t o r i c t h r e e w a y s u m m i t of g o v e r n m e n t , b u s i n e s s , a n d u n i o n s . T h e y r e a c h e d an a g r e e m e n t to p e r m i t f u t u r e l a y o f f s in e x c h a n g e f o r i n c r e a s e s in t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s u n e m p l o y m e n t i n s u r a n c e f u n d (to 5 trillion w o n , or a b o u t $ 3 . 1 b i l l i o n ) and in c o r p o r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to their o w n w o r k e r s a f e t y nets. 193. D a v i d E. S a n g e r , " I n d o n e s i a n F a c e o f f : D r a w i n g B l o o d W i t h o u t B o m b s , " New York Times, M a r c h 8, 1998, o n l i n e . 194. S e e t h e i n t e r v i e w of t h e n o t e d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t and I n d o n e s i a s p e c i a l i s t , C l i f f o r d G e e r t z , in New York Times, M a y 9, 1998 o n l i n e . G e e r t z o b s e r v e d h o w the I M F ' s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h to S u h a r t o c l a s h e d w i t h c u s t o m a r y I n d o n e s i a n c o n f l i c t - a v o i d a n c e a n d p a r e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n of c h i l d r e n . 195. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , F e l d s t e i n , " R e f o c u s i n g t h e I M F , " p. 3 2 . F e l d s t e i n ' s c r i t i c i s m s w e r e that, as in R u s s i a , the I M F i n s i s t e d o n d e t a i l e d r e f o r m s in T h a i l a n d a n d I n d o n e s i a s u c h as s e t t i n g t h e p r i c e of c e r t a i n c o m m o d i t i e s and e n d i n g c o r r u p t i o n . In K o r e a ' s c a s e , he w r o t e that t h e I M F e x a g g e r a t e d the d e b t p r o b l e m and imp o s e d u n n e c e s s a r y limits o n c r e d i t a n d g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g . 196. A s B r i t a i n ' s C h a n c e l l o r of t h e E x c h e q u e r , G o r d o n B r o w n , a c k n o w l e d g e d at a m e e t i n g of E U a n d I M F o f f i c i a l s : " W e s h o u l d d o m o r e to p r o m o t e t r a n s p a r e n c y in all c o u n t r i e s a b o u t t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e e c o n o m i c policy, a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n s of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e b e t t e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e m a r k e t h a s , t h e less will b e t h e risk of s u d d e n m a r k e t r e a d j u s t m e n t s . " New York Times o n l i n e , F e b r u a r y 15, 1998. 197. New York Times, F e b r u a r y 13, 1998, p. C 2 . 198. D a v i d E . S a n g e r , " A s i a n N a t i o n s S t r i k e Deal o n T r a d e A g r e e m e n t , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 14, 1997, o n l i n e . 199. N i c h o l a s D . K r i s t o f , " A s i a ' s D o o r s N o w W i d e O p e n to A m e r i c a n B u s i n e s s , " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 1, 1998, o n l i n e . 2 0 0 . F o r a g o o d s u r v e y of t h e r e s p o n s e in T a i w a n to its n e i g h b o r s ' b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e s , s e e New York Times, F e b r u a r y 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 , p. C I . O n e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e

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between T a i w a n ' s economy and that of South Korea, Indonesia, and others in trouble is that small and medium-size businesses, not conglomerates, are the dominant form. 201. H u m a n Rights W a t c h / A s i a , " H u m a n R i g h t s Crisis in I n d o n e s i a : Statement to the S e n a t e Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e , S u b c o m m i t t e e on East Asia and Pacific A f f a i r s , " Washington, D.C., M a r c h 24, 1998, pp. 1 - 1 0 . 202. See, for e x a m p l e , Seth M y d a n s , "Thailand E c o n o m i c Crash Crushes the Working P o o r , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 15, 1997, p. A9.

Chapter Three 1. William P. Bundy, " E l e m e n t s of P o w e r , " Foreign Affairs, p. 26. 2. ul H a q , p. 417. 3. Brandt et al., pp. 8 - 1 1 . 4. Roy Preiswerk, "Could We Study International Relations as if People Mattered?" in Falk, Kim, and M e n d l o v i t z , pp. 1 7 5 - 1 9 7 . 5. S a k a m o t o , " T h e Global Crisis and Peace R e s e a r c h , " International Peace Research Newsletter, pp. 4 - 7 . 6. O n t h e s e values, see the i n t r o d u c t i o n to Falk, K i m , and M e n d l o v i t z , pp. 1 - 9 . For the application of these values to Latin A m e r i c a n political d e v e l o p m e n t , see G u s t a v o Lagos, "The Revolution of Being: A Preferred World M o d e l , " in Heraldo M u n o z , ed.. From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality, pp. 1 2 3 - 1 6 0 . 7. R i c h a r d Falk, "World O r d e r Values: Secular M e a n s and Spiritual E n d s . " 8. T h e s e d o c u m e n t s have been collected in U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Bureau of Public A f f a i r s , Selected D o c u m e n t s no. 5, Human Rights. On the record of ratification by g o v e r n m e n t s , see Kim, Just World Order, table 6.4, p. 232. 9. S e e the U N h u m a n rights w e b site for the most recent d o c u m e n t a t i o n : www.unhchr.ch/html. 10. R u s h w o r t h M. Kidder, " U n i v e r s a l H u m a n Values: F i n d i n g an Ethical C o m m o n G r o u n d , " The Futurist, pp. 8 - 1 3 . 11. See G e r a l d M i s c h e and Patricia M i s c h e , Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Straitjacket, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 and 3 0 - 3 3 , on the T a s a d a y s in the Philippines and the Iks in U g a n d a . Also relevant are the B u s h m e n of southern Africa. See, for example, Laurens van der Post, The Lost World of the Kalahari. 12. Carl Rogers (On Personal Power, ch. 7) offers many insights f r o m personcentered therapy that he has pioneered concerning c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g racially, economically, and politically different persons and groups. He refers, for instance, to the importance of perceiving others as humans, not symbols; of the unconditional acceptance of o t h e r s ' feelings; of listening closely as others express deep-seated rage. "It is being h u m a n which dissolves the barriers and brings closeness," he concludes. 13. Richard A. Falk, " C o n t e n d i n g A p p r o a c h e s to World O r d e r , " in Falk, Kim, and M e n d l o v i t z , p. 154. 14. R i c h a r d A. Falk, " O n I n v i s i b l e O p p r e s s i o n and World O r d e r , " in Falk, Kim, and M e n d l o v i t z , p. 44. 15. The Oregonian, February 20, 1988, p. A3. 16. E d w a r d W. Said, Orientalism, pp. 4 4 - 4 5 . 17. A s E l i s e B o u l d i n g has put it, there is a " n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m [that] not only i n c o r p o r a t e s the cultural, e c o n o m i c , and political diversity of that part of the Third World g e o g r a p h i c a l l y located in the South, it also i n c o r p o r a t e s and g i v e s a new visibility to the diversity of the T h i r d World internal to c o u n t r i e s of the

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N o r t h . " S h e argues that this respect for diversity and o p e n n e s s to d i f f e r i n g (nonE u r o p e a n ) values and solutions can especially be seen in the international w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , as well as in the peace and e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o v e m e n t s . Boulding, " T h e Old and N e w T r a n s n a t i o n a l i s m , " pp. 7 9 9 - 8 0 0 . 18. Herbert C. K e l m a n , " T h e I n t e r a c t i v e P r o b l e m - S o l v i n g A p p r o a c h , " in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos, p. 505. 19. F o u a d A j a m i , " H u m a n R i g h t s and World O r d e r P o l i t i c s , " w o r k i n g paper no. 4. Also see Hazel H e n d e r s o n ' s discussion of "flat-earth e c o n o m i c s , " which she c o n t e n d s is c o m m o n to m o d e r n - d a y capitalist and socialist t h o u g h t , in The Politics of the Solar Age: Alternatives to Economics, pp. 2 2 - 2 6 . 20. Barnet, Lean Years, p. 299. 21. S e e J o h a n G a l t u n g , " A Structural T h e o r y of I m p e r i a l i s m , " Journal of Peace Research, pp. 8 1 - 1 1 7 . 22. T h e pastoral letter of the National C o n f e r e n c e of Catholic Bishops appears in " T h e Challenge of Peace: G o d ' s P r o m i s e and Our R e s p o n s e , " Origins, p. 322. 23. " T h e P o s t - C o m m u n i s t N i g h t m a r e , " New York Review of Books, May 27, 1993, pp. 8 - 1 0 . 24. Preiswerk, in Falk, K i m , and Mendlovitz, p. 179. 25. Liam O ' S u l l i v a n , " T h e M o d e r n s : Herbert M a r c u s e and H a n n a h A r e n d t — 'Critics of the P r e s e n t , ' " in Brian R e d h e a d , ed., Plato to Nato: Studies in Political Thought, p. 184. 26. P a o l o Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra B e r g m a n R a m o s , p. 74. 27. M i c h a e l J. S u l l i v a n , III, Measuring Global Values: The Ranking of 162 Countries. 28. A j a m i , pp. 1 - 8 . 29. A m a r t y a Sen, " H u m a n Rights and Asian Values," The New Republic. 30. X i a o r o n g Li, ' " A s i a n Values' and the Universality of H u m a n R i g h t s , " Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy, p. 20. 31. K i m D a e Jung, "Is C u l t u r e Destiny? T h e Myth of A s i a ' s Anti D e m o c r a t i c Values," Foreign Affairs. 32. X i a o r o n g Li, p. 21. 33. "Discipline vs. D e m o c r a c y , " Far Eastern Economic Review, D e c e m b e r 10, 1992, p. 29. 34. A j a m i , pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 35. Richard A. Falk, " C o m p a r a t i v e Protection of H u m a n R i g h t s in Capitalist and Socialist Third World C o u n t r i e s , " in Falk, K i m , and Mendlovitz, pp. 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 . 36. Eqbal A h m a d , " T h e N e o - F a s c i s t State: N o t e s on the P a t h o l o g y of P o w e r in the T h i r d World," in Falk, K i m , and M e n d l o v i t z , pp. 7 4 - 8 3 . 37. F o r e x a m p l e s on the U . S . side of the p r e f e r e n c e f o r " s t a b i l i t y " in T h i r d W o r l d politics, see M e l v i n G u r t o v and Ray M a g h r o o r i , eds., Roots of Failure: United States Policy in the Third World, pp. 1 9 8 - 2 0 2 . 38. For e x a m p l e , see K i m , Just World Order, pp. 1 0 2 - 1 1 6 . 39. Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, pp. 1 0 - 1 3 . 40. Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures, ¡996, p. 10. 41. Sivard, World Priorities 1991, p. 19. 42. K i m , Just World Order, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 ; Sivard, et al., World Military and Social Expenditures, 1996, p. 20. A n o t h e r , perhaps m o r e concrete, w a y to p o n d e r the a l m o s t u n i m a g i n a b l e threat to h u m a n life posed by nuclear w e a p o n s is to consider the f o l l o w i n g : A single U . S . N a v y T r i d e n t D - c l a s s n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e (of w h i c h there are already several d e p l o y e d ) a r m e d with t w e n t y - f o u r Trident intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of w h i c h carries ten independently targetable ( M I R V ' d )

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warheads (for a total of 2 4 0 warheads), by itself can deliver the explosive power o f over 1 8 , 0 0 0 Hiroshimas. 4 3 . Newsweek, October 11, 1982, pp. 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ; Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1984, 6/p. 10. 4 4 . Amory B . Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, and Leonard Ross, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear B o m b s , " Foreign Affairs, p. 1175. 4 5 . Marlise Simons, " F o r First T i m e , Court Defines Rape As War C r i m e , " New York Times, June 28, 1996, online. Soldiers on all sides in Bosnia committed rape, but Serbs committed rapes the most frequently by far—an estimated 2 0 , 0 0 0 in 1992 alone. 4 6 . S e e , for example, UN Commission on Human Rights, " R i g h t s of the Child: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children," report of the secretary-general, March 11, 1996, online. 47. Arthur H. Westing and E. W. Pfeiffer, " T h e Cratering of Indochina," Scientific American, pp. 2 1 - 2 9 . Another summary of the ecological devastation is in Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Indochina, rev. ed., pp. 245-261. 4 8 . Joseph B . Treaster, " T o War Disasters Add Defiled D e s e r t , " New York Times, November 12, 1994, p. 4. 4 9 . Seth Mydans, "Illegal Logging Ravages Cambodian F o r e s t s , " New York Times, December 22, 1996, online. 50. On nuclear winter, see Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," Foreign Affairs, pp. 2 5 7 - 2 9 2 . Subsequently, an international research team reported that the worst long-term consequence o f nuclear winter would probably be mass starvation: Anywhere from I billion to 4 billion people might die as huge clouds of soot blot out the sun, bringing on global famine ( L o s Angeles Times, September 13, 1985, p. 5). 51. About 9 9 percent o f all high-level radioactive waste in the United States comes from military reactors. At one time, the Defense Department was producing roughly 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons a year o f nuclear waste. See Joel S. Hirschhorn, " T o x i c W a s t e , " Los Angeles Times, O c t o b e r 10, 1983, 2/p. 5; David E. Kaplan and Ida Landauer, "Radioactivity for the O c e a n s , " The Nation; and "Military Nuclear Wastes: The Hidden Burden of the Nuclear Arms R a c e , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 10, no. 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 1 - 8 . S e e Chapter 5 for further discussion. 52. Stephen Schwartz of the Brookings Institution, " T h e Hidden Costs of Our Nuclear Arsenal," June 30, 1998, online at www.brook.org. 53. A great deal o f land in the former East Germany was extensively contaminated, mainly by chemical weapons from World War II and by the Soviet occupation army. There is a public health problem for communities in the vicinity of the military camps. S i n c e Russia cannot pay the cleanup bill, Germany must. At the same time, the bases of G e r m a n y ' s own army in both parts of the country have been burying toxic substances. S o m e portion o f these toxic wastes are evidently being exported to " h a v e n s " such as Sweden, which has no standards for military waste either! Information from various German participants at a UN-sponsored international conference on conversion attended by the author in Dortmund, Germany, February 1992. 5 4 . Robert Theobald, Turning the Century: Personal and Organizational Strategies for Your Changed World, p. 2 2 4 . 55. For example, Human Development Report ¡992 ranks Canada and Japan first and second, and the United States sixth. The highest-ranking Third World countries are Barbados (twentieth), Hong Kong (twenty-fourth), and Cyprus (twenty-fifth).

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56. See Stephen Viederman, "Sustainable Development: What Is It and How Do We Get There?" Current History, pp. 1 8 0 - 1 8 5 . 57. Osvaldo Sunkel, "Development Styles and the Environment: An Interpretation of the Latin American Case," in Muñoz, pp. 9 3 - 1 1 4 . 58. Muñoz, p. 99. 59. The principal source on pesticide dumping is David Weir and Mark Schapiro, Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World. The Multinational Monitor reports an estimate of Oxfam International that " 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 pesticide poisonings, 6 , 7 0 0 of which are fatal, occur each year in the Third World" (in Robert Engler, "Technology Out of Control," The Nation, p. 489). 60. Ten years after the accident, " a half-million people are still seeking compensation and still suffering the effects of the gassing." Union Carbide is long gone, having sold off its interest. The company paid about one-twelfth of what the Indian government sought in settlement ( $ 4 7 0 million); but only $ 2 0 million of that amount was actually paid out, no UC official was ever brought to trial, and Indian judges settled fewer than half the claims (Krishnan Guruswamy, "Bhopal Gassing Victims Still Plead for Relief from Suffering," The Oregoman, November 27, 1994, p. A4). Meanwhile, toxic chemical accidents are on the rise worldwide. Several countries support the notion of prior informed consent when hazardous substances are being imported; but in India and elsewhere, business talks, such that regulations afford very little protection for communities even if governments are informed. Madhusree Mukerjee, "Toxins Abounding," Scientific American. 61. New York Times, December 3, 1997, p. 1. 62. North Korea and Vietnam, for example, have become repositories of German waste, the Philippines of Japan's, and China of Taiwan's. Taiwan's nuclear industry attempted to send low-level waste to North Korea in 1997, but the deal was discovered, protested by the South Korean government and Taiwan citizens, and canceled. 63. This is the provocative question posed by a distinguished Mexican writer, Gustavo Esteva, in "Regenerating People's Space," Alternatives, pp. 1 2 5 - 1 5 2 . 64. Irene L. Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World. The role of the major U.S. foundations in transmitting values and institutions to the Third World is well documented in Robert F. Amove, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad, especially the essay by Edward H. Berman, "Educational Colonialism in Africa: The Role of American Foundations, 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 4 5 , " pp. 1 7 9 - 2 0 2 . 65. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Towards Another Development," in Muñoz, pp. 2 9 8 - 3 0 0 . 66. Gandhi's concept is elaborated in Louis Fischer, ed., The Essential Gandhi: His Life, Work, and Ideas, p. 93. 67. Mao Zedong, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung, p. 500. 68. Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, pp. 1 2 8 - 1 3 0 . 69. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts, trans. Richard Handyside, pp. 6 2 - 6 3 . 70. V. S. Naipaul, India: A Wounded Civilization, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . 71. The Oregonian, June 27, 1990, p. A10. 72. Malcolm X , with Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, pp. 159-160. 73. Excerpted from Steve Biko, I Write What I Like (1978), in Falk, Kim, and Mendlovitz, pp. 25, 27, 31. 74. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xuan ji, pp. 3 1 - 3 2 . 75. Ruth Leger Sivard, ed., Women: A World Survey, p. 5. Women come closest to full-fledged equality, according to the UN, in the Scandinavian countries (led by Sweden) and in France. Human Development Report 1992, p. 21.

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76. The Oregonian, J u n e 15, 1993, p. A5. 77. Domitila Barrios de Chungara, with M o e m a Viezzer, Let Me Speak! Testimony of Domitila, a Woman of the Bolivian Mines, trans. Victoria Ortiz, pp. 4 0 - 4 1 . 78. See Annette Fuentes and B a r b a r a Ehrenreich, Women in the Global Factory, p. 13. 79. Fuentes and Ehrenreich, p. 20. 80. Fuentes and Ehrenreich, p. 16. 81. Petra Karin Kelly, " S p e e c h . S t o c k h o l m , S w e d e n , D e c e m b e r 9, 1982, on the Occasion of R e c e i v i n g the Alternative Peace Prize," m i m e o . 82. In Jawaharlal Nehru, Nehru on World History, Saul K. Padover, ed., pp. 109, 111-112. 83. F a n u n , The Wretched of the Earth, trans. C o n s t a n c e F a r r i n g t o n , pp. 44-45, 210-211. 84. In B e r n a r d B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-66, p. 141. 85. E. M. Forster, A Passage to India, p. 322. 86. Fouad A j a m i , " T h e Fate of N o n a l i g n m e n t , " Foreign Affairs, p. 383. 87. Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o , Petals of Blood, pp. 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 . 88. S u b s e q u e n t l y , when P r e s i d e n t Daniel arap Moi took a hard line against d e m o c r a c y - m i n d e d d i s s i d e n t s and o t h e r a d v o c a t e s of a m u l t i - p a r t y s y s t e m , relations b e t w e e n K e n y a and the West soured. Aid to K e n y a w a s s u s p e n d e d (it later was r e s u m e d ) until arap Moi agreed to legalize other parties. In late 1992 elections w e r e held and a r a p Moi w o n — a m i d s t c h a r g e s of election f r a u d . D e m o c r a c y in Kenya still has a very long way to go. 89. Luis I n a c i o da Silva, s p e e c h of A u g u s t 28, 1982, in Sao P a u l o State, taped by Ronald Chilcote; trans. C l a u d i a P o m p a n . 90. Ngugi, p. 88. 91. Ali Shariati, " R e f l e c t i o n s of a C o n c e r n e d M u s l i m : On the Plight of Oppressed P e o p l e s , " in Falk, Kim, and Mendlovitz, pp. 2 0 - 2 2 . 92. T h i s section relies on P e n n y L e r n o u x , Cry of the People: The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America—The Catholic Church in Conflict with U.S. Policy, especially pp. 3 7 - 3 9 , 463—470, and (concerning the C I A ) ch. 8. 93. Lernoux, p. xviii. 94. L e o n a r d o B o f f , Church: Charism and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church, trans. J o h n W. Diercksmeier, pp. 7 - 1 0 . 95. Noga Tarnopolsky, "Murdering Memory in Argentina," New York Times, December 12, 1994, p. A15. Five of the author's relatives were among those kidnapped. 96. J a c o b o T i m e r m a n , Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number, trans. Toby Talbot, pp. 155, 157. 97. Quoted in Claudia D r e i f u s , " F r e e d o m Is the Best R e v e n g e , " The Nation, p. 165. 98. M a n l i o Argueta, One Day of Life, pp. 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 . Argueta lives in exile in the United States. 99. Sivard, World Priorities 1989, p. 20. 100. " C h a r t e r 77: C z e c h G r o u p ' s Plea for H u m a n R i g h t s , " in Falk, K i m , and Mendlovitz, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . 101. J a m e s D. S e y m o u r , ed., The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979, pp. 52, 53, 67. 102. A u n g San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, pp. 1 5 9 - 1 6 1 . 103. In T. C. M c L u h a n , ed., Touch the Earth: A Self-Portrait of Indian Existence, p. 169.

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104. " H a u d e n o s a u n e e S t a t e m e n t to the World, M a y 1979," Akwesasne Notes. 105. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, trans. T h o m a s P. Whitney, pp. 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 . S o l z h e n i t s y n ' s reference in the quoted matter is to the Soviet failure to prosecute Nazi war criminals.

Chapter Four 1. Durning, "Poverty and the E n v i r o n m e n t , " pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 2. See G e o r g e M a r a t t a , " T h e Third World: Threat or O p p o r t u n i t y ? " Agenda ( A g e n c y for I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t ) , pp. 2 3 - 2 6 ; a d d r e s s by R i c h a r d L. McCall, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, O c t o b e r 14, 1980, in U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Current Policy, no. 235, s a m e date; and testim o n y of Secretary of State G e o r g e Shultz, F e b r u a r y 16, 1983, Current Policy, no. 454, s a m e date. 3. For b a c k g r o u n d , see A n d r é G u n d e r Frank, Crisis: In the World Economy, ch. 5. On the full range of the N I E O agenda, see Frank, pp. 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 . 4. World B a n k , World Development Report 1984, p. 6 ( h e r e a f t e r cited as World Bank 1984); Human Development Report 1992, table 3.7, p. 37. 5. Human Development Report 1992, table 3.7, p. 37. D e v e l o p i n g countries a c c o u n t e d for 15.9 percent of global G N P in 1960 and 15.8 percent in 1989; and for 18.9 percent of global trade in 1970 and 19.3 percent in 1989. In both cases, the respective shares for the least-developed countries declined by one-half. 6. Human Development Report 1992, table 3.3, p. 36. 7. Prices of p r i m a r y - p r o d u c t e x p o r t s fell about 4 0 p e r c e n t on a v e r a g e bet w e e n 1980 and 1987, w h e r e a s m a n u f a c t u r e d i m p o r t s into the T h i r d World h a v e been rising in cost. Durning, " P o v e r t y and the E n v i r o n m e n t , " pp. 3 6 - 3 7 . 8. Frank, pp. 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 . 9. S t r o n g , " C o n s e n s u s : If Not N o w , W h e n ? " International Herald Tribune, J u n e 1, 1992, p. 16. N o such aid c o m m i t m e n t was m a d e by the industrialized countries at the Earth S u m m i t . 10. W o l f g a n g Sachs, " W h a t N e x t ? The P o s t - C o l d War W o r l d , " Utne Reader, p. 92 (reprinted f r o m New Perspectives Quarterly [Spring 1990]). 11. A n t h o n y Smith, eh. 1; L a w r e n c e Weschler, " T h e Other D e m o c r a t i c Revolution of 1989," Utne Reader, pp. 3 8 - 4 4 . 12. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. 13. See R u p e r t E m e r s o n , " T h e Fate of H u m a n R i g h t s in the T h i r d W o r l d , " World Politics, pp. 2 0 1 - 2 2 6 , on the denial by T h i r d World s p o k e s p e r s o n s of ethnic and d e m o c r a t i c rights in their o w n countries. 14. Patricia A d a m s , " R i o A g e n d a : Soak the W e s t ' s T a x p a y e r s , " Asian Wall Street Journal, June 5 - 6 , 1992, p. 8. 15. Frank, p. 271. 16. M o h a m m e d Ayoob, "State M a k i n g , State B r e a k i n g , and State Failure," in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos, p. 47. 17. A j a m i , " T h e Fate of N o n a l i g n m e n t , " p. 370. 18. Beth Belton and D a v i d Lynch, " F e u d s , C h e a t i n g M a y Foil Plan to Raise P r i c e s , " USA Today, March 27, 1998, p. 1. T h e price of a barrel of oil is just above o n e - h a l f the 1974 price, a d j u s t e d f o r i n f l a t i o n . T h e m a i n r e a s o n s for O P E C ' s d e c l i n e are lack of c o o p e r a t i o n on p r o d u c t i o n q u o t a s , c h e a t i n g w h e n r e p o r t i n g

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production figures, competition from nonmember oil producing states, and improved assaying and drilling techniques. 19. Lagos, in Munoz, p. 130. Report 2 0 . T h e income figures are from World Bank, World Development 1990 (hereafter World Bank 1990), table 1, p. 178; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (hereafter World Bank 1997), table 1, p. 2 1 4 . A similar situation exists elsewhere in Central America. See Billie R. De Walt, " T h e Agrarian Bases of Conflict in Central A m e r i c a , " in Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring, eds., The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy, p. 50. 2 1 . A. Kent MacDougall, "In Third World, All but the Rich Are Poorer," Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1984, 6/pp. 1 - 3 ; Durning, pp. 15, 20. 2 2 . B a s e d on the Human Development Report 1996, as summarized in The Oregonian, July 16, 1996, p. A 4 . 23. From U N D P ' s "poverty c l o c k , " report 9 5 - 1 2 ( 1 9 9 6 ) , online. 24. "Overview of Human Development Report 1997, p. 2, online. 25. New York Times, August 14, 1997, p. A7. 26. World Bank 1992, p. 30. 2 7 . Nathaniel C. Nash, "Latin American Speedup Leaves Poor in the Dust," New York Times, September 7, 1994, p. 1. 2 8 . 1 rely for this paragraph on Marc Cooper, "Twenty-five Years After Allende: An A n t i - M e m o i r , " The Nation, March 23, 1998, pp. 1 1 - 2 3 ; and J a c k Epstein, " C h i l e ' s Economy Still B u s t l i n g , " Christian Science Monitor, D e c e m b e r 8, 1994, p. 8. 2 9 . UPI report in Korea Herald (Seoul), March 8, 1994, p. 9. 3 0 . New York Times, May 23, 1996, p. C I . 3 1 . Waste dumping and pollution are widely recognized as being responsible for illnesses on both sides o f the border that are far above the average. But after five years, "not a single environmental project" has been started under NAFTA's financing arrangement. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Pollution Puts People in Peril on the Border with M e x i c o , " New York Times, July 4, 1998, p. A7. 3 2 . Sandy Tolan, " C h e a p L a b o r Meets Industry Greed at M e x i c a n B o r d e r , " New York Times Magazine, excerpted in The Oregonian, August 1, 1 9 9 0 , p. A2; Sandy Tolan and Jerry Kammer, " L a x Environmental Enforcement Entices Some U . S . Companies to M e x i c o , " Utne Reader, pp. 46—47 (reprinted from Tucson Weekly, October 18, 1989); The Oregonian, May 17, 1992, p. R - l . 33. Barnet, Lean Years, p. 2 6 2 . 3 4 . B y 2 0 3 0 , cities are expected to grow by 160 percent, rural areas by only 10 percent. World Development Report 1992, p. 27. 35. World Resources 1990-91, p. 66. 3 6 . UN, World Social Situation in the 1990s, p. 103. 3 7 . O x f a m A m e r i c a , " S p e c i a l Report: Women in D e v e l o p m e n t , " pp. 1 - 8 ; John-Thor Dahlburg, "Closing the Education Gap for Women," Los Angeles Times World Report, April 16, 1994, p. 1. 3 8 . New York Times, June 11, 1996, p. A l ; Washington Post, June 15, 1996, p. A 1 9 . 39. Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), September 12, 1992, p. 13. 4 0 . Nicholas D. Kristof, "Ultrasound: B o y - B a b y Insurance," The Oregonian, July 2 2 , 1993, p. A l . 4 1 . Barbara Crosette, "Court B a c k s Egypt's Ban on Genital Cutting o f G i r l s , " New York Times, December 2 9 , 1997, online. In banning the practice, an Egyptian court denounced the notion that it was authorized by the Koran.

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42. J o h n F. B u r n s , " I n d i a Fights A b o r t i o n of F e m a l e F e t u s e s , " New York Times, August 27, 1994, p. A5. 43. See, for e x a m p l e , articles in the New York Times during early April 1998, when the e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r of U N I C E F , Carol B e l l a m y , visited A f g h a n i s t a n expressly to d e t e r m i n e the T a l i b a n s ' treatment of w o m e n . 44. See Susan J. Pharr, Political Women in Japan: The Search for a Place in Political Life, pp. 1 7 4 - 1 7 7 . 45. R o d e r i c A. C a m p , " W o m e n and Political L e a d e r s h i p in M e x i c o : A C o m parative Study of F e m a l e and M a l e Political Elites," Journal of Politics, p. 4 4 0 . 46. A c c o r d i n g to the World Food Program; see New York Times. N o v e m b e r 13, 1996, p. A5. 47. World Health O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W H O ) statistics; see J o h n - T h o r D a h l b u r g , " ' T h e i r s are the Silent D e a t h s , " ' Los Angeles Times World Report, D e c e m b e r 17, 1995. p. 1. 48. F r o m a U N I C E F study reported in New York Times, J u n e 12, 1995, p. A5. 49. New York Times, N o v e m b e r 12, 1996, p. 6. 50. G o r d o n Fairclough, "It Isn't Black and W h i t e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, March 7, 1996, pp. 5 4 - 5 7 . 51. Robert I. Friedman, " I n d i a ' s S h a m e , " The Nation. 52. For analyses of the G r e e n R e v o l u t i o n , see Susan G e o r g e , How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger, especially ch. 5; Betsy H a r t m a n n and J a m e s K. B o y c e , Needless Hunger: Voices from a Bangladesh Village, pp. 4 8 - 5 4 ; and Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. K u s u m N a i r ' s study In Defense of the Irrational Peasant: Indian Agriculture After the Green Revolution recounts the d i f f e r e n t results of the G r e e n R e v o l u t i o n for i n e f f i c i e n t rich l a n d o w n e r s and e f f i c i e n t small farmers. 53. Human Development Report 1992, p. 39. 54. World Bank 1997, tables 6 and 7, pp. 2 2 4 - 2 2 7 . Figures are for 1995. 55. World Bank 1997. table 6, p. 224. H e a l t h - c a r e f i g u r e s are for 1993; m a l nutrition f i g u r e s are for 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 5 . 56. L a w r e n c e K. Altman, " U . N . Reports 3 Million N e w HIV Cases Worldwide for ' 9 6 , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 28, 1996, online. 57. H e a d , p. 81. 58. T h e t o b a c c o i n d u s t r y ' s e f f o r t s are r e c o u n t e d in a four-part series starting with G l e n n F r a n k e l , " B i g T o b a c c o ' s Global R e a c h , " Washington Post, N o v e m b e r 17, 1996, online. On s m o k i n g in Asia and its health c o n s e q u e n c e s , see A n n e Piatt M c G i n n , " P r e v e n t i n g C h r o n i c D i s e a s e in D e v e l o p i n g C o u n t r i e s , " in L e s t e r R. B r o w n et al., eds., State of the World 1997, pp. 7 1 - 7 3 . 59. E x a m p l e s of these c o n d i t i o n s w e r e high malnutrition, over 50 percent illiteracy, high infant mortality, 30 percent of national i n c o m e held by 5 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n , e x t e n s i v e l a n d l e s s n e s s a m o n g p e a s a n t s , and control of all m a j o r sectors of the e c o n o m y by the S o m o z a family. See R i c h a r d H a r r i s and C a r l o s M . Vilas, eds., Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, pp. 2 9 9 - 3 0 2 . The class s y s t e m is d o c u m e n t e d in Peter Rosset and J o h n Vandermeer, eds., The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under Fire, pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 7 ; D e W a l t , in C o l e m a n a n d Herring, pp. 5 0 - 5 1 ; and Carlos M . Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America, pp. 5 6 - 8 1 , 1 0 1 - 1 1 6 , on rural and u r b a n c o n d i t i o n s . N i c a r a g u a ' s u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t did not, h o w e v e r , include significant foreign i n v e s t m e n t (Vilas, pp. 8 1 - 8 3 ) . 60. S e e R o s s e t and V a n d e r m e e r , pp. 3 4 1 - 3 4 6 . On the social and e c o n o m i c c h a r a c t e r and n a t u r e of the S a n d i n i s t a n p r o g r a m , see H a r r i s and Vilas; J o s e p h

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Collins et al., What Difference Could a Revolution Make? Food and Family in the New Nicaragua. 61. Human Development Report 1992, table 4, p. 134, and table 17, p. 160. 62. World Bank 1997, tables 4, 6, and 17, pp. 220, 224, 246. 63. From a study of the Population Institute in Washington, D.C., as reported in New York Times, December 31, 1997, p. A7. 64. For a brief review of the evidence on overpopulation and underdevelopment, see Garvin and Rosenbaum, pp. 18-25. Cultural factors, of course, such as the status gained from having more children, also are among the reasons behind large families. 65. MacDougall, p. 3. 66. Krishna Ghimire, "Population, Environment and Development," Tiempo, no. 12 (1997), online at 222. cru. uea. ac. uk:80. The female illiteracy rate comes from World Bank 1997, table 7, p. 226. 67. Timothy C. Weiskel, "Vicious Circles: African Demographic History As a Warning," Harvard International Review, p. 12. 68. Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Aid Cutbacks Endangering Population Programs, U.N. Agencies Say," New York Times, February 16, 1996, p. A6. 69. Calvin Sims, "Using Gifts As Bait, Peru Sterilizes Women," New York Times, February 15, 1998, online. 70. The politics of birth control in the Third World is treated by Mark Dowie, "The Corporate Crime of the Century," Mother Jones, pp. 23-38. 71. Frank, pp. 183-190. 72. These conditions included large amounts of U.S. aid and military protection for Korea and Taiwan, the availability of Chinese and European money in Hong Kong and Singapore, a previous industrial base, and an early reliance on labor-intensive exports made cheap by repression of workers. See Haggard, ch. 8. 73. An excellent case study of denationalization caused by TNC takeovers of local firms is by Richard S. Newfarmer, "TNC Takeovers in Brazil: The Uneven Distribution of Benefits in the Market for Firms," World Development, pp. 25—43. 74. Brazil's multibillion-dollar computer market, long insulated from foreign competition by high tariffs, is now open for the taking. A new law passed in October 1992 will enable IBM and other microcomputer leaders to compete with local producers. Although some laws that favor local producers and sellers remain on the books, there is no way they can compete with the quality or marketing options of IBM, Apple, and Compaq. James Bruce, "Brazil's New Computer Market," U.S./ Latin Trade, pp. 4 8 - 5 2 . 75. "Trade, Debt and Plunder in Mexico: An Interview with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas," Multinational Monitor, January/February 1991, pp. 25-27. 76. Haggard, table 8.11, p. 218. 77. Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 92-94. Some of the richer food-dependent countries today are in Asia: See Gary Gardner, "Preserving Global Cropland," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1997, p. 53. 78. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. 79. See Barnet, Lean Years, pp. 153, 156, 169. A U.S. Department of State publication notes: "The US accounts for more than 65% of world coarse grain trade, 50% of world wheat trade, and about 60% of trade in soybeans and soybean products, and is an important factor in the world market in meat, poultry, and fruits and vegetables" ("Agriculture in US Foreign Economic Policy," GIST, November 1981, p. 1).

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80. L e s t e r R. B r o w n , " F a c i n g t h e P r o s p e c t of F o o d S c a r c i t y , " in B r o w n et al., eds., Stale of the World 1997, p p . 2 3 - 2 6 . 81. B a r n e t , Lean Years, p p . 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 . In s o m e of the r i c h e s t c o u n t r i e s , as m u c h as t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of all g r a i n is f e d to l i v e s t o c k . S o is an i n c r e a s i n g a m o u n t of s o y b e a n s . T h a t m a k e s m e a t an e x t r e m e l y e x p e n s i v e s o u r c e of p r o t e i n , a n d o n e that literally t a k e s f o o d out of the m o u t h s of the poor. S e e B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 0 7 . 82. O n t h e c o r r u p t i o n , i n e f f i c i e n c y , a n d p o l i t i c s that b e d e v i l f o o d aid p r o g r a m s , s e e G e o r g e , How the Other Half Dies, c h . 8; F r a n c e s M o o r e L a p p e a n d J o s e p h C o l l i n s , Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity, pp. 3 2 8 - 3 3 9 ; a n d B a r n e t , Lean Years, p. 155. 83. B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 3 6 - 4 0 . 84. P e t e r T h e r o u x , " T h e I m p e r i l e d N i l e D e l t a , " National Geographic, pp. 8 - 9 . 85. A l e x a n d e r S t i l l e , " T h e G a n g e s ' N e x t L i f e , " The New Yorker ( J a n u a r y 1998), pp. 5 8 - 6 7 . 86. D o n a t e l l a L o r c h , " E v e n w i t h P e a c e a n d R a i n , E t h i o p i a F e a r s F a m i n e , " New York Times, J a n u a r y 3, 1996, p. A 3 . 87. O n the A m a z o n , s e e B r o w n et al., State of the World 1985, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 , a n d B a r n e t , Lean Years, p. 75. T h e loss of s p e c i e s is d o c u m e n t e d in W o l f , p. 14. 88. O n T N C c l e a r - c u t t i n g o p e r a t i o n s , s e e N o r m a n M y e r s , " T h e C o n v e r s i o n of T r o p i c a l F o r e s t s , " Environment, pp. 6 - 1 3 . 89. C o l i n H. K a h l , " P o p u l a t i o n G r o w t h , E n v i r o n m e n t a l D e g r a d a t i o n , a n d S t a t e - S p o n s o r e d V i o l e n c e : T h e C a s e of K e n y a , 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 3 . " 90. T h e gold and c o p p e r m i n i n g o p e r a t i o n s of F r e e p o r t I n d o n e s i a C o m p a n y , a subsidiary of Freeport M c M o R a n h e a d q u a r t e r e d in the United States, h a v e led to violence against i n d i g e n o u s peoples. See the reports of Survival International at its w e b site (twics. c o m / ~ b o y j a h / w e s t p a p u a / a c t i o n . html), as well as J o h n M c B e t h , " C o m p a n y U n d e r S i e g e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, J a n u a r y 25, 1996, pp. 2 6 - 2 8 . 91. T h e potential for c o n f l i c t arising out of e n v i r o n m e n t a l c h a n g e s , interacting with m a n y o t h e r f a c t o r s , is e x p l o r e d by T h o m a s F. H o m e r - D i x o n in, " O n the T h r e s h old: E n v i r o n m e n t a l C h a n g e s A s C a u s e s of A c u t e C o n f l i c t , " International Security. 92. S e e D a v i d Weir, " T h e B o o m e r a n g C r i m e , " Mother Jones, pp. 4 0 - 4 9 . T h e s e r i o u s h e a l t h p r o b l e m s b e i n g p o s e d by i m p o r t e d f o o d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s are d i s c u s s e d b y Jeff G e r t h a n d T i m W e i n e r , " I m p o r t s S w a m p U . S . F o o d - S a f e t y E f f o r t s , " New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 20, 1997, p. 1. 93. S u n k e l , in M u n o z , p p . 9 9 - 1 0 9 . 94. A v e r a g e p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h is 2 . 4 p e r c e n t a n n u a l l y n a t i o n w i d e , b u t m u c h h i g h e r in rural a r e a s , c r e a t i n g an e x p e c t e d p o p u l a t i o n of 8 0 m i l l i o n by 2 0 0 0 . J u d i t h B a n i s t e r , Vietnam Population and Dynamics, pp. 3 1 - 3 8 , 5 8 - 6 1 ; World Conservation M o n i t o r i n g C e n t r e ( B r i t a i n ) o n l i n e , " V i e t n a m , " c h . 2. T h a n k s to R o b e r t L e e p e r for research on Vietnam. 9 5 . W o r l d C o n s e r v a t i o n M o n i t o r i n g C e n t r e ( U K ) o n l i n e , V i e t n a m , c h . 2; World Bank Project Report, "Vietnam Forest Protection and Barren Lands Develo p m e n t , " W o r l d B a n k o n l i n e ; A l e x a n d e r S. M a t h e r , Global Forest Resources. 9 6 . M a r k S e i d e n , Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi in Comparative Perspective, p. 2 4 1 . N 97. A l a n Burnett, The Western Pacific: Challenge of Sustainable Growth, p. 80; M. H i e b e r t , " F o o d or F o r e s t s , " Far Eastern Economic Review, A p r i l 7, 1994, p. 4 8 . 9 8 . A l t h e a L. D u e r s t e n a n d A r p a d v o n L a z a r , " T h e G l o b a l P o o r , " in D a n i e l Yergin a n d M a r t i n H i l l e n b r a n d , e d s . , Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal, pp. 266-267.

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99. World Bank 1984, table 16, pp. 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 . 100. World Bank 1990, table 23, p. 223. 101. World B a n k 1997, table 17, p. 247. 102. World Bank 1997, table 17. pp. 2 4 6 - 2 6 7 . 103. New York Times, M a r c h 7, 1995, p. A6. 104. S u m m a r i e s f r o m c o u n t r y studies of the I M F in action may be f o u n d in Hayter, pp. 1 5 4 - 1 6 2 ; and Payer, Debt Trap, pp. 41—42. 105. For e x a m p l e , see the report on the World B a n k ' s impact on small businesses in Chile, in C y n t h i a B r o w n , " T h e High Cost of Monetarism in Chile," The Nation. 106. G i o v a n n i A n d r e a C o r n i a , " A d j u s t m e n t Policies 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 5 : E f f e c t s on Child W e l f a r e , " in C o r n i a et al., eds., Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, pp. 6 0 - 6 8 . The study was done for UNICEF. 107. See Peggy H a l l w a r d , " T h e Urgent Need for a C a m p a i g n Against Forced R e s e t t l e m e n t , " The Ecologist, pp. 4 3 - 4 4 ; Susan George, A Fate Worse Than Debt, ch. 10. 108. U N I C E F report in the New York Times, J u n e 12, 1995, p. A5. T h e U.S. share is still around $10 billion, but it represents a mere 0.15 percent of GNP. A s in the past, the S c a n d i n a v i a n countries and the Netherlands are the most g e n e r o u s , with levels a b o v e 0.80 percent of GNP. 109. All figures on aid are f r o m Human Development Report 1992, pp. 41 —45. 110. On capital flight, see J a m e s Henry, " W h e r e the M o n e y Went," The New Republic. 111. Human Development Report 1992, p. 45. 112. Jim M a c N e i l l et al., Beyond Interdependence, p. 21. 113. L o a n s that o n c e w e n t to g o v e r n m e n t s are now going to private businesses, using i n t e r m e d i a r i e s w h o o f t e n are f o r m e r banking and g o v e r n m e n t o f f i cials. E v e r y o n e but the p o o r p r o f i t s . Jeff G e r t h , "In P o s t - C o l d - W a r W a s h i n g t o n , D e v e l o p m e n t Is a Hot B u s i n e s s , " New York Times, May 25, 1996, p. 1. 114. Sources for this p a r a g r a p h include Robert A. M a n n i n g , " T h e Philippines in C r i s i s , " Foreign Affairs, p. 397; A m n e s t y International, Human Rights in the Philippines: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, pp. 4, 17; L a w y e r s C o m m i t t e e for H u m a n Rights, " S a l v a g i n g " Democracy: Human Rights in the Philippines; W a i d e n B e l l o , " U . S . S p o n s o r e d L o w - I n t e n s i t y C o n f l i c t in the P h i l i p p i n e s , " p. 86; W a i d e n Bello et al., Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines; Human Development Report 1992, tables 17 (p. 160) and 19 (p. 164); and World B a n k 1997. 115. There is even talk of ending I M F supervision. See, for example, Edward A. Gargan, "Last Laugh for the Philippines," New York Times, December 11, 1997, p. C I . 116. See " P r i d e and Privilege," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 12, 1994, p. 26. 117. The roughly 3.5 million Filipino workers abroad, the w o r l d ' s largest such g r o u p of foreign m i g r a n t w o r k e r s , send h o m e a n y w h e r e f r o m $3 billion to $6 billion annually, w h i c h is the g o v e r n m e n t ' s m a i n s o u r c e of f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e . See Jonathan Karp, " A N e w Kind of H e r o , " Far Eastern Economic Review, M a r c h 30, 1995, pp. 4 2 ^ 5 . 118. T h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s are based on J e f f r e y Sachs, " M a k i n g the Brady Plan W o r k , " Foreign Affairs; and J a m e s S. Henry, " D a n c e of Debt Isn't O v e r Yet," U.S. News & World Report, pp. 3 9 - 4 1 . 119. New York Times, J u n e 10, 1996, p. C2; S e p t e m b e r 30, 1996, p. C2.

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120. O v e r v i e w of the Human Development Report 1997, p. 10, o n l i n e . 121. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , J a m e s D. W o l f e n s o h n ( p r e s i d e n t of t h e W o r l d B a n k G r o u p ) , " T h e C h a l l e n g e of I n c l u s i o n , " a d d r e s s to t h e B o a r d of G o v e r n o r s , H o n g K o n g , S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1997. 122. M i c h a e l T. K l a r e has w r i t t e n o n b o t h S o v i e t a n d U . S . a r m s s a l e s to t h e T h i r d W o r l d . S e e " S o v i e t A r m s T r a n s f e r s to t h e T h i r d W o r l d , " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; a n d M i c h a e l T. K l a r e a n d C y n t h i a A r n s o n , Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad. 123. Human Development Report 1992, p. 4 5 . 124. W o r l d B a n k 1990, p. 17. 125. N i c o l e Ball, " M i l i t a r y E x p e n d i t u r e a n d S o c i o - E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t , " International Social Science Journal. 126. J u l i u s O . I h o n v b e r e , " T h e S t a t e . G o v e r n a n c e , a n d D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in A f r i c a : C o n s t r a i n t s a n d P o s s i b i l i t i e s , " Hunger TeachNet. p. 5. 127. S i v a r d . World Priorities 1983, p. 11. 128. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1991. p. 19. 129. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1991. p. 19. 130. W i l l i a m D. H a r t u n g , " N i x o n ' s C h i l d r e n : Bill C l i n t o n and the P e r m a n e n t A r m s B a z a a r , " World Policy Journal. 131. A m o n g m a n y s o u r c e s , see S a m D i l l o n , " F u g i t i v e L a w m a n S p e a k s : H o w M e x i c o M i x e s N a r c o t i c s a n d P o l i t i c s , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 23, 1996, o n line; T i m G o l d e n , " M e x i c a n M i l i t a r y H e l p s D r u g T r a f f i c k e r s , U . S . R e p o r t s S a y , " New York Times. M a r c h 26, 1998, o n l i n e . T h e c o n c e r n of t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t a n d b u s i n e s s e s w a s to c e r t i f y M e x i c o ' s c o m m i t m e n t to t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d r u g t r a d e . M e x i c o w a s c e r t i f i e d , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t that U.S. e m b a s s y a n d o t h e r o f f i c i a l s r e c e i v e d m a n y r e p o r t s of p a y o f f s to p o l i t i c i a n s by M e x i c a n d r u g lords. T h e r e p o r t s w e r e n e v e r i n v e s t i g a t e d by the e m b a s s y or the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a p p a r e n t l y to a v o i d a p o l i t i c a l u p h e a v a l in M e x i c o . T i m G o l d e n , " U . S . D e b a t e s S a n c t i o n s O v e r M e x i c a n D r u g T r a d e , " New York Times, A p r i l 27, 1997, o n l i n e . 132. S t e p h e n K i n z e r , " S c a n d a l L i n k s T u r k i s h Aides to D e a t h s , D r u g s , and Terr o r , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 10, 1996, p. 1. A n i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a h i g h w a y acc i d e n t led to e v i d e n c e of links b e t w e e n a h e r o i n ring a n d h i g h - r a n k i n g g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s a n d p o l i t i c i a n s of v a r i o u s p a r t i e s . T h e key r e a s o n f o r this u n h o l y a l l i a n c e a p p a r e n t l y w a s to a s s a s s i n a t e K u r d i s h l e a d e r s , in e x c h a n g e f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s looking the other way on heroin trafficking. 133. Bertil L i n t n e r , " N a r c o p o l i t i c s in B u r m a , " Current History. 134. S e e C h r i s t o p h e r S. W r e n , " H e r o i n P u t s B u r m a in C r i s i s O v e r A I D S , " New York Times, M a y 3, 1998, p. 1. 135. D e n n i s B e r n s t e i n a n d L e s l i e K e a n , " P e o p l e of t h e O p i a t e : B u r m a ' s D i c t a t o r s h i p of D r u g s , " The Nation. 136. D i a n a J e a n S c h e m o , " C o l o m b i a n C o c a C r o p s I n c r e a s e D e s p i t e U . S . E f f o r t s , " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 28, 1998, o n l i n e . 137. S e e D o n n a L e e Van C o t t , Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security. 138. R o b e r t a C o h e n a n d F r a n c i s M . D e n g , " E x o d u s W i t h i n B o r d e r s , " Foreign Affairs. 139. Human Development Report 1992, p p . 5 4 - 5 5 . 140. Human Development Report 1992, p. 54. 141. T h e r e s e t t l e m e n t p r o g r a m is d e s i g n e d t o p r e v e n t m i g r a t i o n t o J a v a , t h e main island and the most overcrowded. See Seth Mydans, "Indonesia Resettles P e o p l e to R e l i e v e C r o w d i n g on J a v a , " New York Times, A u g u s t 25, 1996, o n l i n e .

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142. M i g r a t i o n is o f t e n a s a f e t y v a l v e f o r g o v e r n m e n t s that c a n n o t p r o v i d e e m p l o y m e n t a n d s e e r e m i t t a n c e s f r o m t h e i r c i t i z e n s ' o v e r s e a s w o r k as a w a y to c o m p e n s a t e f o r l o w e x p o r t e a r n i n g s . Human Development Report 1992, p. 57. 143. See Jodi L. J a c o b s o n , Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability. 144. In M a o , Selected Readings, p. 3 2 1 . 145. L u c i e n B i a n c o , Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, trans. M u r i e l Bell, p. 95. 146. F o r an e y e w i t n e s s a c c o u n t , s e e A. D o a k B a r n e t t , China on the Eve of Communist Takeover, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 8 . 147. W i l l i a m H i n t o n , Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village, p. xii. 148. O n t h e A n t i R i g h t i s t C a m p a i g n , see F r e d e r i c k C. T e i w e s , " T h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d C o n s o l i d a t i o n of the N e w R e g i m e , 1 9 4 9 - 5 7 , " in R o d e r i c k M a c F a r q u h a r , e d . , The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng. p. 82. ( T h e p r o m i n e n t j o u r n a l i s t L i u B i n y a n , in his a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l A Higher Kind of Loyalty [p. 9 0 ] , s a y s " t h e a c t u a l f i g u r e [of w r o n g l y l a b e l e d " r i g h t i s t s " ] e x c e e d e d o n e m i l l i o n . " ) F o r the G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d , s e e J a s p e r B e c k e r . Hungry Ghosts: China's Secret Famine, w h e r e the f i g u r e of 3 0 m i l l i o n d e a t h s f r o m starvation is g i v e n ; a n d M a J i s e n , " T h e P o l i t i c s of C h i n a ' s P o p u l a t i o n G r o w t h , " Asian Perspective, where f i g u r e s of a n y w h e r e f r o m 17 million to 4 0 million e x c e s s d e a t h s are given by C h i n e s e a n d W e s t e r n a u t h o r i t i e s . A s for the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , see the d i s c u s s i o n in Harry H a r d i n g , " T h e C h i n e s e State in Crisis, 1 9 6 6 - 9 , " in M a c F a r q u h a r , ed.. The Politics of China, pp. 2 4 1 - 2 4 4 , w h e r e the e s t i m a t e of a h a l f - m i l l i o n d e a d is p r o p o s e d . 149. A m o n g t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to this d e f e n s e c o n v e r s i o n p r o g r a m is that e v e n as C h i n e s e d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i e s a r e p r o d u c i n g m o r e c o n s u m e r g o o d s , t h e y a r e a l s o e a r n i n g h a r d c u r r e n c y a n d a c q u i r i n g m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l high t e c h n o l o g y on the t h r i v ing i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r m s m a r k e t . F o r an o v e r a l l e v a l u a t i o n , see M e l G u r t o v , " S w o r d s i n t o M a r k e t S h a r e s : C h i n a ' s C o n v e r s i o n of M i l i t a r y I n d u s t r y to C i v i l i a n P r o d u c t i o n , " The China Quarterly, pp. 1 - 2 9 . 150. C h e n X i a o n o n g , " T h e C h i n e s e P u b l i c S e c t o r : H e a d i n g T o w a r d s Z e r o P r o f i t ? " China Focus, pp. 1, 4 - 5 ; Neil C. H u g h e s , " S m a s h i n g the Iron R i c e B o w l , " Foreign Affairs, p p . 7 0 - 7 1 . 151. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , D e n g X i a o p i n g , Fundamental Issues of Present-Day China; H a r r y H a r d i n g , China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao: a n d L o w e l l D i t t m e r , China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981. 152. D i t t m e r , ch. 8; Yan Jiaqi, " A C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d y of the F e a t u r e s of the Socialist P o l i t i c a l S y s t e m a n d P o s s i b l e R e f o r m s , " in M e l G u r t o v , ed., The Transformation of Socialism: Perestroika and Reform in the Soviet Union and China, c h . 5. 153. W o r l d B a n k , " C o u n t r y B r i e f : C h i n a " ( S e p t e m b e r 1997), o n l i n e ; W o r l d B a n k 1997, v a r i o u s t a b l e s . 154. China Daily ( B e i j i n g ) , J u n e 3, 1998, o n l i n e ; W o r l d B a n k 1997, t a b l e 3, p. 2 1 8 . 155. N i c h o l a r R. L a r d y , " C h i n a a n d t h e A s i a n C o n t a g i o n , " Foreign Affairs, p. 84. 156. H u m a n - r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s in C h i n a are m o n i t o r e d by China Rights Forum a n d N G O s s u c h as A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l , H u m a n R i g h t s W a t c h A s i a , a n d t h e L a w y e r s C o m m i t t e e f o r H u m a n R i g h t s . ( S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , the C o m m i t t e e ' s r e p o r t , Criminal Justice with Chinese Characteristics: China's Criminal Process and Violations of Human Rights, as well as t h e o f f i c i a l P R C p o s i t i o n o n h u m a n r i g h t s : L i u H u a q i u , " P r o p o s a l s f o r H u m a n R i g h t s P r o t e c t i o n a n d P r o m o t i o n , " Beijing Review, J u n e 2 8 - J u l y 4, 1993, pp. 8 - 1 1 . ) C h i n a h a s s i g n e d , a n d p r o m i s e d to ratify, the U N

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c o n v e n t i o n on e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l r i g h t s , w h i c h c o v e r s l a b o r o r g a n i z i n g . O n e p r o m i n e n t c r i t i c w h o w a s a b l e to get a h e a r i n g is B a o T o n g , w h o w a s Z h a o Z i y a n g ' s c h i e f of s t a f f until t h e c r a c k d o w n . S e e the i n t e r v i e w w i t h h i m in Washington Post, J u n e 3, 1998, o n l i n e . A h a n d f u l of o t h e r c r i t i c s , s u c h as Wei J i n g s h e n g , h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d to l e a v e the c o u n t r y . 157. S e e M i n x i n Pei, " I s C h i n a D e m o c r a t i z i n g ? " Foreign Affairs. 158. T h e s e f o l l o w i n g t w o p a r a g r a p h s rely o n M e l G u r t o v a n d B y o n g - M o o H w a n g , China's Security: The New Roles of the Military. 159. O n t h e C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y ' s w e a k n e s s e s , see, f o r e x a m p l e , D a v i d S h a m b a u g h , " C h i n a ' s M i l i t a r y : Real or P a p e r T i g e r ? " The Washington Quarterly. 160. E l i s a b e t h R o s e n t h a l , " C h i n a F i n a l l y C o n f r o n t s Its A i r - P o l l u t i o n C r i s i s , " New York Times, J u n e 14, 1998, o n l i n e . 161. B r o w n , " F a c i n g the P r o s p e c t of F o o d Scarcity," in B r o w n et al., eds., p. 28. 162. T h e d a m , w h i c h is s c h e d u l e d f o r c o m p l e t i o n by 2 0 0 9 , a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s ano t h e r aspect of the u n d e r s i d e of rapid e c o n o m i c g r o w t h in C h i n a : t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of r e s e t t l i n g o v e r a m i l l i o n p e o p l e . T h e e n o r m o u s e n e r g y p r o j e c t will u p r o o t s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 1.2 m i l l i o n a n d 1.6 m i l l i o n p e o p l e , a n d it is a l r e a d y c l e a r that the a u t h o r i t i e s f a c e a p e r h a p s u n m a n a g e a b l e p r o b l e m — w i t h the p o t e n t i a l f o r social u n rest if d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n s c a n n o t f i n d s u i t a b l e j o b s , land, and h o u s i n g . M o s t of t h e m f a c e very h a r d t i m e s , and if C h i n a ' s p r i o r h i s t o r y of r e s e t t l e m e n t to m a k e w a y f o r d a m s is any g u i d e , p o v e r t y is the p r o b a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e of m o v i n g . S e e W u M i n g , " D i s a s t e r in t h e M a k i n g ? " China Rights Forum. S p r i n g 1998, p p . 4 - 9 , a n d E r i k E c k h o l m . " R e l o c a t i o n s f o r C h i n a D a m Are F o u n d to L a g , " New York Times, M a r c h 12, 1998, p. A 8 . 163. T h e c o m b i n e d cost of lost a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d h u m a n health d u e to s u l f u r d i o x i d e a n d o t h e r c o n t a m i n a n t s is e s t i m a t e d at $ 5 4 billion a year, or a b o u t 8 p e r c e n t of C h i n a ' s G N P in 1995. A c i d r a i n m a y a f f e c t 2 9 p e r c e n t of the c o u n t r y , a c c o r d i n g to t h e C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t . S e e W o r l d B a n k , " C o u n t r y B r i e f : C h i n a , " online. 164. H i g h l i g h t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y be f o u n d in t h e New York Times, M a y 9, 1996, p. A 7 . It c o m e s f u l l y into e f f e c t w i t h n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s in 1999. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s f o r a g o v e r n m e n t a n d a s u p r e m e c o u r t that are r a c i a l l y a n d g e n der sensitive, and have respect for h u m a n rights; a bicameral legislature; a fiveyear term for the president; various powers reserved for the provinces; and a wide r a n g e of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s that i n c l u d e s a host of b a s i c n e e d s . 165. O n t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y l a w s u n d e r a p a r t h e i d , s e e L a w r e n c e L i t v a k , R o b e r t D e G r a s s e , and K a t h l e e n M c T i g u e , South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid, pp. 19-24. 166. T h i s is p r e c i s e l y w h a t h a p p e n e d in 1986, a f t e r t h e p a s s l a w s w e r e a b o l i s h e d to a p p e a s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n . A state of e m e r g e n c y g a v e t h e m i n i s t e r of l a w a n d o r d e r s w e e p i n g a n d u n c o n t e s t a b l e p o w e r s of a r r e s t , s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e , a n d c e n s o r s h i p in " u n r e s t a r e a s . " S o u t h A f r i c a n s o u r c e s c o n s e r v a t i v e l y e s t i m a t e d t h a t 2 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e , p e r h a p s o n e - t h i r d of t h e m c h i l d r e n , w e r e d e t a i n e d w i t h o u t c h a r g e d u r i n g t h e year. 167. T h e s e o p e r a t i o n s p r o b a b l y i n c l u d e d t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n of a n t i a p a r t h e i d l e a d e r s , i n f i l t r a t i o n of c i v i l r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d e f f o r t s to i n s t i g a t e b l a c k a g a i n s t - b l a c k v i o l e n c e . W h e n P r e s i d e n t d e K l e r k a n n o u n c e d in D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 that a n u m b e r of m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s w e r e b e i n g s u s p e n d e d or d i s m i s s e d , he as m u c h as a d m i t t e d to t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s . It m a r k e d a f u r t h e r b r e a k d o w n of t h e w h i t e r u l i n g e l i t e , w h i c h h a d a l w a y s b e e n f o r t i f i e d b y s t r o n g ties b e t w e e n t h e p o l i t i c i a n s , t h e military, and the security police.

316

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168. Durning, " A p a r t h e i d ' s E n v i r o n m e n t a l Toll," pp. 8 - 1 0 . 169. Patti W a l d m e i r ' s article in the Financial Times ( L o n d o n ) ; reprinted in The Oregonian, S e p t e m b e r 18, 1990, p. A2. 170. D u r n i n g , " A p a r t h e i d ' s E n v i r o n m e n t a l Toll"; J u d y C h r i s t r u p , " O f Apartheid and Pollution," Greenpeace, pp. 1 8 - 1 9 . 171. T h e origins of apartheid are treated in Phyllis M a c R a e , " R a c e and Class in Southern A f r i c a , " The African Review, pp. 2 3 7 - 2 5 8 ; and Stanley B. G r e e n b e r g , Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 3 4 - 3 7 . 172. G r e e n b e r g , pp. 6 - 1 2 , 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 . 173. Q u o t e d in L. E. N e a m e , The History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War. p. 73. 174. R e s i s t a n c e e f f o r t s are briefly r e v i e w e d in M i k e C a l a b r e s e and M i k e Kendall, "The Black A g e n d a for South A f r i c a , " The Nation, pp. 393, 4 0 6 ^ * 0 9 . 175. On white r e f o r m i s m , see G r e e n b e r g . pp. 2 6 - 2 7 ff.; and Litvak, D e G r a s s e , and McTigue, pp. 3 4 - 3 6 . 176. See, for e x a m p l e , Gavin W. H. Relly, "South A f r i c a : A Time for Patriot i s m , " Washington Post Weekly Edition, O c t o b e r 7, 1985, p. 29. Relly chairs the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n Corporation of South A f r i c a . 177. See Ann S e i d m a n and N e v a S e i d m a n , South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations, p. 6; and Desaix Myers, Labor Practices of U.S. Corporations in South Africa. 178. Litvak, DeGrasse, and M c T i g u e , pp. 4 3 - 6 1 . 179. Figures are for 1991; John E. Young, "Mining the Earth," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1992, table 7 - 2 , p. 104. 180. U.S. policy is r e v i e w e d by Kevin Danaher, In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.-South Africa Relations, pp. 8 0 - 8 3 . 181. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, for example, human rights in South Africa—the "racial issue," as it was termed—were only considered important "because other countries have made it so" and because apartheid could lead to violence "and greater involvement of the communist powers." See M o h a m e d A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39, p. 89. The quotations are from the once secret memorandum. 182. See the report of a bipartisan U.S. study of the sanctions in The Oregonian, February 9, 1990, p. A10. 183. Suzanne Daley, " A D i v o r c e of C o n v e n i e n c e , " New York Times, May 11, 1996, p. 5. Not all the news f r o m South A f r i c a was good. T h e r e were persistent reports of corruption and favoritism within the ranks of the A N C , for instance (see, for e x a m p l e , New York Times, O c t o b e r 9, 1996, p. 1), and of police i n c o m p e t e n c e ( S u z a n n e Daley, " S o u t h A f r i c a ' s P o l i c e Force Is Both Inept and C o r r u p t , " New York Times, March 25, 1997, online). 184. See, for instance, the testimony of a police torturer (New York Times, N o v e m b e r 9, 1997, online) and of a c o n v i c t e d police colonel (New York Times, J u n e 4, 1998, p. A l l ) . 185. S u z a n n e Daley, " P a r t y Led by M a n d e l a N o w O w n s U p to A t r o c i t i e s , " New York Times, May 13, 1997, p. A7; S u z a n n e Daley, " S o u t h A f r i c a n Court Voids Blanket A m n e s t i e s , " New York Times, M a y 9, 1998, online. 186. See the excellent survey of post-apartheid South A f r i c a ' s c h a l l e n g e s by Patti Waldmeir cited above, in The Oregonian, S e p t e m b e r 18, 1990, p. A 2 . 187. Korea Annual 1990, p. 199. 188. See H y u n g K o o k K i m and G u i l l e r m o Geisse, " T h e Political E c o n o m y of O u t w a r d L i b e r a l i z a t i o n : C h i l e a n d S o u t h K o r e a in C o m p a r a t i v e P e r s p e c t i v e , " Asian Perspective, p. 37.

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317

189. D u r n i n g , " P o v e r t y a n d the E n v i r o n m e n t , " p. 6 2 . i 90. A i i c e H. A m s d e n , Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, p. 39. 191. K l a r e a n d A r n s o n , p. 116. 192. G a v a n M c C o r m a c k , " T h e S o u t h K o r e a n E c o n o m y : G N P Versus t h e P e o p l e , " in M c C o r m a c k a n d M a r k S e i d e n , e d s . , Korea North and South: The Deepening Crisis, pp. 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . S e e a l s o P a r v e z H a s a n a n d D. C . R a o , Korea: Policy Issues for Long-Term Development. 193. W o r l d B a n k 1984, t a b l e 22, p. 2 6 1 . 194. Korea Annual 1990, p. 2 4 0 . 195. K i m D a e J u n g , Mass-Participatory Economy, p p . 3 6 - 3 7 . A m s d e n ( " T h e S o u t h K o r e a n E c o n o m y : Is B u s i n e s s - L e d G r o w t h W o r k i n g ? " in D o n a l d N. C l a r k , ed., Korea Briefing, 1992, p. 7 5 ) a l s o cites w o r s e n i n g i n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n , n o t i n g h o w it is h i d d e n in o f f i c i a l statistics by d e v i c e s s u c h as f a l s e - n a m e b a n k a c c o u n t s used by the rich as tax s h e l t e r s . In 1993 the n e w K i m Y o u n g S a m g o v e r n m e n t term i n a t e d this p r a c t i c e f o r t h e l a r g e s t a c c o u n t s . F o r a m o r e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w o n inc o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n , see II S a K o n g , Korea in the World Economy, p. 17. 196. F r e d e r i c C. D e y o , " S t a t e a n d L a b o r : M o d e s of Political E x c l u s i o n in East A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t , " in D e y o . e d . , The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, p. 197. 197. A m s d e n , p. 197. 198. M i c h a e l A. L a u n i s , " T h e S t a t e a n d I n d u s t r i a l L a b o r in S o u t h K o r e a , " Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, p. 9; A m s d e n , p p . 2 0 0 - 2 0 5 ; J a n g J i p C h o i , Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980, p p . 2 9 9 - 3 0 5 ; a n d M a r t i n H a r t - L a n d s b e r g , Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea. 199. S e e C h u n g m o o C h o i , " K o r e a n W o m e n in a C u l t u r e of I n e q u a l i t y , " in C l a r k , ed., Korea Briefing, 1992, pp. 9 7 - 1 1 6 . A c c o r d i n g to the h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t index in Human Development Report ¡992 (table 1.3, p. 21), K o r e a n f e m a l e s r e c e i v e only 65 p e r c e n t of the h u m a n i n v e s t m e n t b e n e f i t s of m a l e s . B y c o m p a r i s o n , in the P h i l i p p i n e s f e m a l e s r e c e i v e 7 8 p e r c e n t . S o m e p o s i t i v e legal c h a n g e s h a v e o c c u r r e d : T h e E q u a l i t y L a w of 1989 m a n d a t e s e q u a l pay f o r e q u a l w o r k at the s a m e w o r k site. T h e a m e n d e d F a m i l y L a w of 1991 g i v e s w o m e n e q u a l i t y in m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , child c u s t o d y a f t e r a d i v o r c e , a n d i n h e r i t a n c e s . Korea Annual 1990, p p . 244, 2 4 7 . 200. Choi, pp. 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 . 201. C h o i , p. 3 0 9 ; M a r k C l i f f o r d , Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea. 202. Korea Annual 1990, p. 2 4 4 . 2 0 3 . O n t h e s t r i k e s , s e e B e r n a r d S t e p h e n s , " L a b o r R e s u r g e n c e in S o u t h K o r e a , " The Nation. 2 0 4 . Los Angeles Times World Report, D e c e m b e r 17, 1995, p. 6. 205. A m s d e n , chs. 5 - 6 ; M. Shahid Alam, " T h e South Korean 'Miracle': Exa m i n i n g t h e M i x of G o v e r n m e n t a n d M a r k e t s , " The Journal of Developing Areas; Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and E c o n o m i c Performance: The Gove r n m e n t - B u s i n e s s R e l a t i o n s h i p in J a p a n , S o u t h K o r e a , a n d T a i w a n , " in D e y o , ed., pp. 1 3 6 - 1 6 4 ; K i m D a e J u n g , p p . 3 8 - 3 9 . 2 0 6 . L a u n i s , p. 4. 2 0 7 . T h e 1 9 8 4 f i g u r e is in A m s d e n , t a b l e 4 . 7 , p. 9 5 ; t h e 1 9 9 0 f i g u r e is in W o r l d B a n k 1992, t a b l e 21, p. 2 5 9 a n d t a b l e 24, p . 2 6 5 . 2 0 8 . W o r l d B a n k 1990, t a b l e 24, p. 2 6 5 . 2 0 9 . O n R o h T a e W o o ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , see M a n w o o L e e , The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990. C o n c e r n i n g h i s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , see

318

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Melvin Gurtov, "Korea in the Asia-Pacific Community: Adapting Foreign Policy to a New Era," in Ray E. Weisenborn, ed., Korea's Amazing Century: From Kings to Satellites, ch. 1. 210. Texts in Asian Perspective, vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1992), pp. 157-162. 211. See Mel Gurtov, "South Korea's Foreign Policy and Future Security: ImAffairs. plications of the Nuclear Standoff," Pacific 212. As one observer has written, Korea's economic woes are traceable partly to labor's successes at winning better working conditions, which is a victory for democratization, but also to increasing consumer spending and managerial complacency among the largest chaebol. Amsden, "The South Korean Economy," pp. 74-75. 213. On the scandal, see Far Eastern Economic Review. November 30, 1995, pp. 6 6 - 7 2 . 214. The total amount of payments made into the presidential slush fund by the eight men was $147.4 million. Several other chaebol were also accused of bribery but were not charged. Los Angeles Times World Report. December 17, 1995, p. 6. 215. The Korean Supreme Court eventually decided, in August 1996, to sentence Chun Doo Hwan to death and Roh Tae Woo to twenty-two years in prison. Even though it was widely expected that the two men would eventually be pardoned, which they were when Kim Dae Jung took office, Koreans were generally pleased with the outcome. The civilian democratic system had worked. But had it? At the very time of the sentencing, South Korean university students were fighting police on campuses all over the country, demanding reunification with the North. Over 3,000 students were arrested. President Kim fell back on the old canard that these students were "hooligans" and "communists" whom he vowed to pursue to the last. Still later, at the beginning of 1997, Korean workers staged the largest strike in the country's history in response to a secret, predawn law passed by the ruling party's legislators that allowed companies to fire workers to improve competitiveness. The strikes lasted about three weeks, at the end of which the strike leaders were arrested. Though on these occasions the students and workers seemed to lack popular support, the incident showed the limits of democracy and the ongoing tradition of the oppressive state. 216. Michael Schuman and Namju Cho, "Appealing to Foreign Investors Is Just the Beginning for Kim," Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1998, as reported by NAPSNet online, same date. 217. John C. Ryan, "Conserving Biological Diversity," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World ¡992, p. 9 (emphasis added). The figure for previous epochs is from Brundtland, p. 150. 218. Peter Raven, a leading U.S. botanist, contends that "we are losing plant and animal species at between 1,000 and 10,000 times the natural rate, and "at a moderate estimate, we are now likely to lose around 50,000 species a year over the next few decades." Raven, " A Time of Catastrophic Extinction: What We Must Do," The Futurist, p. 39. 219. Allen L. Hammond, ed., World Resources 1990-91: A Report by the World Resources Institute, p. 102. 220. Hammond, table 7.1, p. 102. 221. Hammond, p. 109. 222. The scientific proof of the carbon-sink effect was published in Science and reported in the New York Times, November 8, 1995, p. B7.

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223. Ryan, in Brown et al., eds., table 2 - 1 , p. 11. 224. Michael Goulding, "Flooded Forests of the Amazon," Scientific American, pp. 114-120. Flooded forests, which make up 3 percent of the Amazon rain forest, are home to an extraordinary diversity of wildlife, fish, and plants. Their uniqueness is due not only to differences with dryland forests but also to the enormous changes they probably have undergone to preserve species over time in flooded conditions. 225. Compare, for example, two equally distressing reports on political and social conditions four years apart: William R. Long, "Healing Brazil," Los Angeles Times World Report, April 16, 1994, p. 9, written at a time of rampant inflation; and Roger Cohen, "Brazil Pays to Shield Currency, and the Poor See the True Cost," New York Times, February 5, 1998, p. A l , written ir. a period of increasing foreign investment, privatization, and worry over the Asian financial crisis. Figures are from the latter article. As a further example of the concentration of wealth following elections in 1994, the richest Brazilians, some 460 families, were for the first time subjected to income taxes. Their combined wealth, the New York Times reported (November 10, 1994, p. 5), was equal to the GNP of Peru and Bolivia combined. 226. Durning, "Poverty and the Environment," pp. 19, 28; Josué de Castro, Death in the Northeast; Tad Szulc, "Brazil's Amazonian Frontier," in Andrew Maguire and Janet Welsh Brown, eds., Bordering on Trouble: Resources and Politics in Latin America, p. 200. 227. Hammond, table 17.2, p. 270. 228. Nigel J. H. Smith, Rainforest Corridors: The Transamazon Colonization Scheme, p. 13. 229. Besides Nigel J. H. Smith, see Stephen G. Bunker, Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State, especially ch. 3; and Szulc, in Maguire and Brown, pp. 194-199. 230. Nigel J. H. Smith, pp. 14-15; George, A Fate Worse Than Debt, p. 157. 231. George, A Fate Worse Than Debt, p. 157; Szulc, in Maguire and Brown, p. 221. In the same period the World Bank was financing a similar but larger-scale "resettlement" plan in Indonesia to make way for a dam. As in Brazil, the strategy was to move land-poor tribal people from a densely populated region to an outlying area with the lure of jobs and land. The more than 3.5 million people thus moved cleared and logged the tropical forests to such an extent that a visiting specialist was reminded of post-atomic Hiroshima. George, A Fate Worse Than Debt, pp. 157-160. 232. This is the important thesis also of Bunker. 233. See, for instance, Diana Jean Schemo, "Brazil Furor Over Ruling in the Death of an Indian," New York Times, August 14, 1997, p. A5; New York Times, January 10, 1996, p. 5, reporting the Brazilian government's rule changes allowing challenges to Indian reservation rights; and Diana Jean Schemo, "Brazil's Macuxi Indians Face Off Against Miners," New York Times, July 21, 1996, online. 234. Hammond, p. 103. 235. Hammond, p. 105. 236. The government requires that Amazon region landowners set aside 80 percent of their land as tropical forest. In 1998, Brazil promised, with support from the World Bank and the World Wildlife Fund, to place 10 percent of the Amazon under government protection, which compares to around 3 percent up until then. New York Times, April 30, 1998, p. A5. 237. New York Times, September 12, 1996, p. A3; October 12, 1995, p. A3; January 27, 1998, p. 3. Following the last report, Brazil's congress voted to give

320

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t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n a g e n c y t h e p o w e r to i m p o s e f i n e s o n those w h o d a m a g e the e n v i r o n m e n t . But s o m e legislators and e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s d e p l o r e d t h e w e a k n e s s e s in the bill. New York Times, J a n u a r y 29, 1998, p. A 8 . 2 3 8 . E x t r a c t i v e r e s e r v e s are s u s t a i n a b l y h a r v e s t e d and l o c a l l y m a n a g e d . T h e W o r l d B a n k e n d o r s e d the c o n c e p t , a n d by 1992 the B r a z i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t had c r e ated r e s e r v e s e m b r a c i n g o v e r 7 m i l l i o n a c r e s . B r e c h e r a n d C o s t e l l o , Global Village, p. 9 2 . 2 3 9 . New York Times, F e b r u a r y 22, 1997, p. 4. 2 4 0 . S e e G a r e t h P o r t e r , " T h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l H a z a r d s of A s i a P a c i f i c D e v e l o p m e n t , " Current History. 2 4 1 . A d a m S c h w a r z , " T r a d e f o r T r e e s , " Far Eastern Economic Review, J u n e 4, 1992, p p . 6 0 - 6 2 . 2 4 2 . K i r k R. S m i t h a n d M i c h a e l R. D o v e , " I n d o n e s i a n F i r e s : L e a d e r s in a H a z e , " Asian Wall Street Journal, D e c e m b e r 8, 1997 (in A P R E N e t @ N a u t i l u s . o r g ) ; New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 25, 1997, p. A l , a n d F e b r u a r y 2 3 , 1998, p. A3; Far Eastern Economic Review, M a r c h 19, 1998, pp. 2 2 - 2 3 . 243. S u s a n n a H e c h t and A l e x a n d e r C o c k b u r n , " R h e t o r i c and R e a l i t y in R i o , " The Nation, pp. 8 5 2 - 8 5 3 . 244. B r u n d t l a n d , p. 155. 2 4 5 . J o n C h r i s t e n s e n and J e r e m y N a r b y , " T r e a t y F a v o r s M u l t i n a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n s , " The Oregonian, J u n e 11, 1992, p. B 7 . 2 4 6 . B r u n d t l a n d , p. 153. 2 4 7 . C a r d o s o m a d e t h e s t a t e m e n t in his 1994 e l e c t i o n p l a t f o r m . S e e the New York Times e d i t o r i a l , F e b r u a r y 19, 1998, p. A 2 0 . 2 4 8 . S e e , f o r i n s t a n c e , W o r l d B a n k 1992, p p . 9 5 - 9 7 . a n d R y a n , in B r o w n et al., eds., p p . 1 7 - 1 9 . 2 4 9 . O n t h e L a n d l e s s W o r k e r s M o v e m e n t , see F a b i o L. S. P e t r a r o l h a , " B r a z i l : T h e M e e k W a n t t h e E a r t h N o w , " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; a n d Bill H i n c h b e r g e r , " L a n d of N o R e t u r n ? N o t B r a z i l , " The Nation. T h e m o v e m e n t d r a w s o n l i b e r a t i o n t h e o l o g y , p r o f e s s e s n o n v i o l e n c e , a n d s e e k s ( a n d has s o m e t i m e s r e c e i v e d ) g o v e r n m e n t s a n c t i o n f o r t h e land s e i z u r e s . In 1995 P r e s i d e n t C a r d o s o d e c r e e d the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of e s t a t e l a n d f o r t h e r e s e t t l e m e n t of a b o u t 3 , 6 0 0 p o o r f a m ilies, and p r o m i s e d that 4 0 , 0 0 0 f a m i l i e s w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y be r e s e t t l e d . B u t e x p r o p r i a t i o n s a r e e x p e c t e d to b e tied u p in l i t i g a t i o n f o r s o m e t i m e . New York Times, N o v e m b e r 13, 1995, p. A 4 .

Chapter Five 1. F i g u r e is in 1987 d o l l a r s . S i v a r d , World Military and Social Expenditures 1991, p. 11 ( h e r e a f t e r , World Priorities 1991); S i v a r d , World Priorities 1983, p. 6. T h e C e n t e r f o r D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , e s t i m a t e s that total U . S . m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g d u r i n g t h e C o l d War, in 1996 d o l l a r s , w a s $ 1 3 . 1 trillion. O n l i n e at w w w . c d i . o r g . 2. Q u o t e d by I n g a T h o r s s o n , " S t u d y o n D i s a r m a m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t , " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 4 1 . 3. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1989, p. 15. 4. T h e s t r a t e g i c w e a p o n s t o c k p i l e n u m b e r s f o r 1995 a r e f r o m t h e S t i m s o n C e n t e r w e b site ( w w w . s t i m s o n . o r g ) , " O p e r a t i o n a l S t r a t e g i c S t o c k p i l e s of the F i v e D e c l a r e d N u c l e a r P o w e r s . " C h i n a h a d a t o t a l of 2 8 4 s t r a t e g i c w a r h e a d s , B r i t a i n 2 9 6 , a n d F r a n c e 4 8 2 . T h e S T A R T III l i m i t s w e r e n e g o t i a t e d by P r e s i d e n t s C l i n t o n

Notes

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and Yeltsin in M a r c h 1997: See their joint s t a t e m e n t of M a r c h 21, 1997, in Helsinki at the s a m e w e b site. 5. Natural R e s o u r c e s D e f e n s e Council, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998, report, M a r c h 1998, online at www.nrdc.org. The figure includes stored tactical and deactivated strategic nuclear w a r h e a d s . 6. The m i d - 1 9 9 0 s stockpile "represents 7 2 7 times the 11 m e g a t o n s of e x p l o sive p o w e r used in this c e n t u r y ' s three m a j o r w a r s w h i c h killed 4 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o ple." Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 20. 7. Quoted in Milton Leitenberg, "The N u m b e r s G a m e or ' W h o ' s on F i r s t ? ' " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 27. 8. Quoted in P. E d w a r d Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Merritt, eds., Nuclear Strategy, Anns Control, and the Future, p. 166. 9. Two studies o f f e r excellent case histories of how political priorities, values, and a s s u m p t i o n s d e t e r m i n e d the d e v e l o p m e n t of n u c l e a r t e c h n o l o g y : G r e g H e r k e n ' s The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950; and Jonathan B. Stein's From H-Bomb to Star Wars: The Politics of Strategic Decision Making. 10. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth, pp. 1 8 9 - 1 9 3 . 11. Eric C h i v i a n et al., eds., Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War. p. 304. 12. " N u c l e a r B o m b Factories: T h e Danger Within," The Defense Monitor, vol. 18, no. 4 (1989), pp. 1 - 8 ; and " D e f e n d i n g the E n v i r o n m e n t , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 18, no. 6 (1989). pp. 1 - 8 . 13. New York Times, M a r c h 23, 1998, p. A 1 0 . Of 177 u n d e r g r o u n d s t o r a g e tanks at H a n f o r d , 149 are single-shell steel. Sixty-eight of those have leaked, and the rest are e x p e c t e d eventually to leak. Apparently, the Energy D e p a r t m e n t ' s experts for years were unwilling to look for e v i d e n c e of p l u t o n i u m seepage that they had long denied. N o w it will cost around $50 billion j u s t to p r o c e s s the p l u t o n i u m into solid form for ( h o p e f u l l y ) s a f e k e e p i n g . 14. William J. B r o a d , " N u c l e a r R o u l e t t e for R u s s i a : B u r y i n g U n c o n t a i n e d W a s t e , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 21, 1994, p. 1. T h e w o r d s q u o t e d w e r e by Henry W. Kendall, a Nobel laureate at the M a s s a c h u s e t t s Institute of Technology. 15. " N u c l e a r B o m b F a c t o r i e s : T h e D a n g e r W i t h i n , " The Defense Monitor, p. 3; Dick Russell, "In the S h a d o w of the B o m b , " pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . T h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , in its search for a safe, final repository for high-level radioactive waste, finally settled on an area near C a r l s b a d , N e w M e x i c o , in 1998. T h e site will have to be capable of holding the waste safely for 10,000 years, which may be insufficient time in any case. (The half-life of p l u t o n i u m is 2 4 , 0 0 0 years.) 16. M a t t h e w L. W a l d , " R e p o r t Faults E n e r g y D e p t . on M a n a g i n g N u c l e a r Site," New York Times, O c t o b e r 24, 1997, p. A 1 0 , c o n c e r n i n g the f i n d i n g s of an ind e p e n d e n t group, hired by the D e p a r t m e n t of Energy, at a nuclear plant in O h i o . 17. See the New York Times articles of J u n e 19, 1995, p. A 8 , and J a n u a r y 15, 1997, p. A l l . Besides m i x i n g plutonium with uranium for p o w e r plant f u e l , the Energy D e p a r t m e n t ' s p r o g r a m will also solidify a mixture of p l u t o n i u m and highly rad i o a c t i v e w a s t e f o r burial. Both m e t h o d s w e r e d e c i d e d u p o n with a v i e w to p r e v e n t i n g r e c o n v e r s i o n of the p l u t o n i u m f o r use in w e a p o n s , but c o n c e r n s r e m a i n about e n v i r o n m e n t a l and s a f e t y h a z a r d s , as well as a b o u t c o m m e r c i a l i z i n g weapons-grade plutonium. 18. Q u o t e d in Haley, Keithly, and Merritt, pp. 7 9 - 8 0 . 19. K i s s i n g e r w a s right, but f i v e years later h e r e c a n t e d this s t a t e m e n t . S e e Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, p. 212. 20. Los Angeles Times, A u g u s t 25, 1983, p. 4.

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2 1 . R i c h a r d C h e n e y , the s e c r e t a r y of d e f e n s e u n d e r P r e s i d e n t B u s h , r e p o r t e d l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e a b s u r d t a r g e t i n g f o r m u l a a n d r e d u c e d the n u m b e r of t a r g e t s t o 1 0 , 0 0 0 by 1989. G e n e r a l G e o r g e L e e B u t l e r , h e a d of U . S . s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s in t h e e a r l y 1 9 9 0 s , r e d u c e d t h e m f u r t h e r to 2 , 5 0 0 ( S t e v e Coll a n d D a v i d O t t a w a y , " T r y ing to U n p l u g t h e W a r M a c h i n e , " Washington Post, April 12, 1995). But the n o t i o n of 2 , 5 0 0 n u c l e a r targets d e f i e s the i m a g i n a t i o n j u s t as m u c h as d o e s 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 2 2 . T h e S o v i e t s w e r e a l w a y s p l a y i n g c a t c h - u p , b e c a u s e m o s t of the t e c h n o logical b r e a k t h r o u g h s in w e a p o n s d e s i g n ( f r o m the i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b o m b e r and t h e s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d m i s s i l e s to the m u l t i p l e - w a r h e a d and the c r u i s e m i s s i l e s ) w e r e U . S . - m a d e . S e e " U . S . - S o v i e t M i l i t a r y F a c t s , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 13, no. 6 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 1; a n d R. J e f f r e y S m i t h , " S o v i e t s D r o p F a r t h e r B a c k in W e a p o n s T e c h n o l o g y , " Science, pp. 1 3 0 0 - 1 3 0 1 . T h i s U . S . r e s e a r c h lead e x t e n d s to a r e a s c r i t i c a l to s p a c e - b a s e d s y s t e m s . S e e " S t a r W a r s : Vision and R e a l i t y , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 15, no. 2 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , p. 7. 2 3 . " A f t e r t h e I N F T r e a t y : U . S . N u c l e a r B u i l d u p in E u r o p e , " The Defense Monitor, v o l . 17, no. 2 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , pp. 1 - 8 . 24. T h i s p a r a g r a p h relies on R e g i n a C o w e n K a r p , " T h e S T A R T T r e a t y a n d t h e F u t u r e of S t r a t e g i c N u c l e a r A r m s C o n t r o l , " in S t o c k h o l m I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e , e d . , SIPRI Yearbook 1992, pp. 1 3 - 3 7 ; and Jasjit S i n g h , " W e a p o n s P r o l i f e r a t i o n in a D i s a r m i n g W o r l d , " in U n i t e d N a t i o n s I n s t i t u t e f o r D i s a r m a m e n t InR e s e a r c h , e d . , Proceedings of the Beijing Conference: Conference of Research stitutes in Asia and the Pacific (23-25 March 1992), pp. 2 8 - 3 2 . 2 5 . G e n e r a l G e o r g e L e e B u t l e r , in J o n a t h a n S c h e l l , " T h e G i f t of T i m e , " The Nation, p. 5 5 . B u t l e r a l s o said: "I will tell you that in the C u b a n m i s s i l e crisis, t h e fact that w e d i d n ' t g o to w a r h a d n o t h i n g to d o with d e t e r r e n c e . Talk to [ R o b e r t S . ] M c N a m a r a a n d o t h e r s . " S c h e l l did, a n d M c N a m a r a a g r e e d with B u t l e r ; see S c h e l l , " T h e G i f t of T i m e , " p. 26. 2 6 . F o r e v i d e n c e of past S o v i e t belief in n u c l e a r victory, see the s e l e c t i o n s in H a l e y , K e i t h l y , a n d M e r r i t t , p p . 1 3 8 - 1 5 7 . O n t h e U . S . side, s e e t h e q u o t a t i o n s in R o b e r t S c h e e r , With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, f o r e x a m p l e , p p . 2 5 3 , 2 6 1 - 2 6 2 ; Los Angeles Times, A u g u s t 15, 1982, p. 1 (on t h e P e n t a g o n ' s s e cret n u c l e a r - w a r p l a n s ) ; and " P r e p a r i n g f o r N u c l e a r War: P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s P r o g r a m , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 10, no. 8 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 2. 2 7 . B r e z h n e v ' s 1981 s t a t e m e n t is in H a l e y , Keithly, and M e r r i t t , p. 168. 2 8 . D e s m o n d B a l l of t h e A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y o f f e r e d p e r h a p s t h e m o s t d e c i s i v e r e b u t t a l of t h e logic of l i m i t e d n u c l e a r war. He e m p h a s i z e d t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h any u s e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s m i g h t o c c u r . I n s t e a d of a " r e l a t i v e l y s m o o t h a n d c o n t r o l l e d p r o g r e s s i o n f r o m l i m i t e d and s e l e c t i v e s t r i k e s " to l a r g e r att a c k s a n d c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , Ball o b s e r v e d t h e n u m e r o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s a p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d h a v e in m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t r o l . P e r f e c t r a t i o n a l i t y is h a r d to i m a g i n e when c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o m m a n d facilities have been disrupted or destroyed (and t h e s e are p r i o r i t y targets in a c o u n t e r f o r c e strategy, it will b e r e c a l l e d ) ; w h e n d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s h a v e b e c o m e c h a o t i c ; a n d w h e n p o p u l a r f e e l i n g s of c o n f u s i o n a n d h a t r e d h a v e r u n r a m p a n t . I n d e e d , as f o u r f o r m e r s e n i o r U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s c o n t e n d e d , " t h e r e is n o w a y f o r a n y o n e to h a v e any c o n f i d e n c e that [a s m a l l - s c a l e ] n u c l e a r a c t i o n will n o t l e a d to f u r t h e r a n d m o r e d e v a s t a t i n g e x c h a n g e s . " D e s m o n d B a l l , " C a n N u c l e a r W a r B e C o n t r o l l e d ? " in H a l e y , K e i t h l y , a n d M e r r i t t , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 1 3 ; B u n d y et a l „ p. 7 5 7 . 2 9 . Los Angeles Times, A p r i l 8, 1982, p. 13. 30. D e a n B a b s t , R o b e r t A l d r i d g e , a n d D a v i d K r i e g e r , Accidental Dangers of the "Star Wars" Proposal, p. 3.

Nuclear

War

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31. Robert C. Aldridge, "Fear Over U.S. ' W a r ' Computers," San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 1980, p. 34. President Carter was also nearly faced with the need for an instantaneous response to a false report. He, too, was not awakened by aides. See The Washington Spectator, September 1996, citing a new book by the then-CIA director, Robert Gates, From the Shadows. 32. The Pentagon's list of "Broken Arrows" was first published by Stephen Talbot, "The H-Bombs Next Door," The Nation, p. 145. 33. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. 34. Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 263-268. 35. Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker, March 19, 1993, pp. 56-69; U.S. State Department report cited in The Oregonian, March 18, 1992, p. A4. 36. Lovins et al., p. 1146 (their emphasis). 37. Walter C. Patterson. The Plutonium Business and the Spread of the Bomb, pp. 156-157. 38. Samuel S. Kim, Just World Order, p. 123. 39. These were krytrons, which are used in making nuclear triggers. See Charles William Maynes, "When Israel Jumped the Nuclear Firebreak," Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1985, 4/p. 2, and Harold Freeman, "Pakistan: Joining the Nuke Club." Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1985, 4/p. 2. Another case involving illegal nuclear technology exports to Pakistan broke in July 1987 and caused a rift in U.S.-Pakistani relations. 40. Samuel S. Kim, Just World Order, pp. 126-127, and Gurtov and Maghroori, pp. 4 2 - 4 4 . The Reagan administration's support of nuclear sales was concisely summarized by a senior State Department official: "To achieve our nonproliferation goals, we must also maintain a position as a leading and reliable nuclear exporter" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy, no. 434, November 17, 1982, p. 2). Such support, for example to the Philippines under Marcos, included substantial loans to Third World countries to finance nuclearplant construction—for instance, $5.8 billion from the U.S. Export-Import Bank as of 1982 (Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1982, 4/p. 1). 41. William Walker and Mans Lönnroth, "Proliferation and Nuclear Trade: A Look Ahead," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 29-33; Gerard C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Affairs. 42. Fred Charles Ikle, "Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?" Foreign Affairs, p. 824. 43. Among the numerous sources consulted for this evaluation of Star Wars, see William E. Burrows, "Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security," Foreign Affairs; "Star Wars: Vision and Reality," The Defense Monitor, pp. 1-8; Gary L. Guertner, "What Is Proof?" Foreign Policy, pp. 73-84; Babst, Aldridge, and Krieger, p. 3; New York Times, March 7, 1985, p. 1; and Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1985, p. 1. Illustrative of the pro-Star Wars position is Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition," Foreign Affairs. 44. The best source is Gordon Adams, The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting. See also Gurtov and Maghroori, pp. 35-36. 45. Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia's Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy, pp. 2 - 3 , 24. 46. Michael Renner, "Swords into Plowshares: Converting to a Peace Economy," pp. 13, 30; and International Herald Tribune, June 3, 1992, p. 2.

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47. See Carey G o l d b e r g and John Broder, "Putting Ax to Soviet Military." Los Angeles Times, S e p t e m b e r 10, 1991, p. A l , on the c o m p l e x ' s role in the coup; and, on Soviet military s p e n d i n g , see A l e x a n d e r K o n o v a l o v , " S p e c i f i c A s p e c t s of the Conversion Problem in the Evolving R u s s i a , " in A. Brunn et al.. eds., Conversion: Opportunities for Development and Environment, p. 176. 48. The point of Soviet and U.S. similarities is made in a special supplement to the Los Angeles Times, " S e r v a n t s or M a s t e r s ? Revisiting the Military-Industrial C o m p l e x , " July 10, 1983, p. 4. 49. Sivard, World Priorities 1983, p. 7. "At l e a s t " b e c a u s e by now experts agree that Soviet military spending averaged around 25 to 30 percent of G N P in the 1980s. A l e x a n d e r K o n o v a l o v , in B r u n n et al., pp. 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 ; M i l t o n L e i t e n b e r g , "Soviet Resources in the D e f e n s e Sector and Their Availability for E c o n o m i c Recovery," in Brunn et al., pp. 3 2 6 - 3 2 7 . 50. Sivard, World Priorities 1983, p. 9. 51. The c o m b i n e d U . S . - U S S R share of arms exports was about 74 percent in 1963, 67.5 percent in 1979, and 54.6 percent on average b e t w e e n 1980 and 1984 (U.S. A r m s Control and D i s a r m a m e n t A g e n c y , World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, p. 20). 52. See Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1985, p. 1, which f u r t h e r reported that research and d e v e l o p m e n t in the United States for classified military p r o g r a m s accounted for about 20 percent of total D e f e n s e Department spending. 53. T h o m a s R. C u s a c k and M i c h a e l Don Ward, " M i l i t a r y S p e n d i n g in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the P e o p l e ' s Republic of C h i n a , " Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 435—438. 54. U.S. A C D A , World Military Expenditures, p. 15. 55. Gaddy, The Price of the Past, p. 91. 56. The costs of m a j o r strategic w e a p o n s are given in " M o r e Bang, More Bucks: $ 4 5 0 Billion for Nuclear War," The Defense Monitor, vol. 12, no. 7 (1983), p. 9. 57. William Härtung and Rosy Nimroody, "Cutting U p the Star Wars Pie." The Nation, p. 201. See also Washington Post, O c t o b e r 20 and 21, 1985. p. 1. 58. Robert Burns, " B i l l i o n s G o n e D o w n Rathole of ' S t a r W a r s , ' " The Oregonian, May 25, 1992, p. A3. 59. Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1982, p. 2. 60. T h e figure c o v e r s 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 9 6 ; see Stephen S c h w a r t z , " T h e Hidden Costs of O u r N u c l e a r A r s e n a l , " w h i c h is an i n t r o d u c t i o n to his b o o k , Atomic Audit. A lower figure of $3.9 trillion, c o v e r i n g 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 9 5 , was produced in a study by the United States Nuclear Weapons C o s t Study Project (see New York Times, July 13, 1995, p. C I 8 ) . Both studies c o u n t e d a m u c h fuller range of costs than the Department of D e f e n s e c o u n t s , i n c l u d i n g n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s r e s e a r c h , d e v e l o p m e n t , prod u c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and control, e n v i r o n m e n t a l c l e a n u p , and testing. In all, the United States built about 7 0 , 0 0 0 nuclear w e a p o n s f r o m 1945 on. 61. Washington Times, D e c e m b e r 13, 1994. 62. Sources on U.S. " a t o m i c d i p l o m a c y " include Herken, pp. 2 5 9 - 2 6 2 ; Daniel Ellsberg, "Introduction; Call to M u t i n y , " in E. P. T h o m p s o n and Dan Smith, eds., Protest and Survive, pp. v - v i i ; G u r t o v and Maghroori, p. 39; Time, July 29, 1985, pp. 5 2 - 5 3 ; and Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 124. 63. President T r u m a n , for e x a m p l e , twice privately considered using the b o m b against the U S S R and C h i n a in 1952, during the Korean conflict ( R i v e r s i d e PressEnterprise, August 30, 1980, p. 1). K e n n e d y and J o h n s o n both weighed the idea of a joint U . S . - S o v i e t strike against C h i n e s e nuclear facilities (Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 210; J a m e s Fetzer, " C l i n g i n g to C o n t a i n m e n t : C h i n a P o l i c y , " in

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T h o m a s G . P a t e r s o n , e d . , Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, ¡961-1963, p. 178). N i x o n a n d K i s s i n g e r in 1 9 6 9 o r d e r e d s t u d i e s on u s i n g tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s in V i e t n a m , a c c o r d i n g to H e r s h , The Price of Power, pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 9 . F o r o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , s e e B e t t s ; E l l s b e r g , in T h o m p s o n a n d S m i t h , p p . v - v i i ; a n d W a l t e r P i n c u s , " U . S . R e p e a t e d l y C o n s i d e r e d U s e of N - B o m b s , " The Oregonian, July 29, 1985, p. 2. 64. B e t t s , p p . 7 9 - 8 1 . 65. Z b i g n i e w B r z e z i n s k i , " H o w t h e C o l d W a r W a s P l a y e d , " Foreign Affairs, p. 2 0 4 . B r z e z i n s k i w a s P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n t f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y affairs. 66. S e e P i n c u s , p. 2, on s e r v i c e c o m p e t i t i o n . 67. T h e m e m o r a n d u m is q u o t e d in P i n c u s , p. 2. 68. S e e R o b e r t C. J o h a n s e n , The National Interest and the Human Interest, pp. 3 8 - 5 6 ; " S A L T II: O n e S m a l l S t e p f o r M a n k i n d . " The Defense Monitor, vol. 8, no. 5 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , p p . 7 - 8 ; S i v a r d , World Priorities 1989, p. 14. 69. S e e M i l t o n L e i t e n b e r g , " U n i t e d S t a t e s - S o v i e t S t r a t e g i c A r m s C o n t r o l : T h e D e c a d e of D e t e n t e , 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 , and a L o o k A h e a d . " Arms Control, pp. 2 1 3 - 2 6 4 . 70. M c N a m a r a , " T h e M i l i t a r y R o l e of N u c i e a r W e a p o n s : P e r c e p t i o n s and Misp e r c e p t i o n s , " Foreign Affairs, p. 7 9 ( e m p h a s i s in o r i g i n a l ) . 7 1 . A d a m D a n i e l R o t f e l d , " I n t r o d u c t i o n : T h e F u n d a m e n t a l C h a n g e s a n d the N e w S e c u r i t y A g e n d a , " SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p. 9. 72. D u r i n g 1989 and 1990, large n u m b e r s of S o v i e t t r o o p s a n d w e a p o n s w e r e withdrawn, including 73,500 soldiers from Czechoslovakia, 49,700 from Hungary, p e r h a p s a q u a r t e r - m i l l i o n f r o m t h e C h i n a b o r d e r , a n d t h o u s a n d s of t a n k s f r o m c e n tral E u r o p e . A n o t h e r 3 7 0 , 0 0 0 S o v i e t o c c u p a t i o n f o r c e s in East G e r m a n y w e r e a l s o s t a r t i n g to h e a d h o m e . Paying f o r t h e s e w i t h d r a w a l s d e l a y e d t h e m ; t h e y w e r e a m a j o r d r a i n on t h e S o v i e t b u d g e t . O n t h e N A T O side, m e a n w h i l e , U . S . a n d E u r o p e a n a r m i e s w e r e b e i n g r e d u c e d by r o u g h l y 25 p e r c e n t at t h e start of t h e 1990s. 73. F o r e x a m p l e , the c o n f e r e n c e did not t a c k l e a n u m b e r of w e a k n e s s e s in t h e N P T r e g i m e that e m e r g e d f r o m N o r t h K o r e a ' s c o n d u c t d u r i n g its c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h S o u t h K o r e a a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in 1 9 9 3 a n d 1994. T h e s e i n c l u d e d t h e I A E A ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s in m a k i n g i n s p e c t i o n s a n d d e m a n d i n g " s p e c i a l " i n s p e c t i o n s ; d e a l i n g w i t h a m e m b e r that, like N o r t h K o r e a , d e c i d e s to w i t h d r a w f r o m the N P T o r to s u s p e n d its w i t h d r a w a l ; and t h e lack of a b a n o n p l u t o n i u m r e p r o c e s s i n g . T h e c o n f e r e n c e a l s o d i d not c o n f r o n t u n c e r t a i n t i e s in the M i d d l e E a s t o v e r I s r a e l ' s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and Iran's nuclear prospects; agreement on a policy of n o - f i r s t - u s e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , w h i c h C h i n a s o u g h t ; a n d e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e n u m b e r of n u c l e a r w e a p o n - f r e e z o n e s ( N W F Z s ) , s u c h as in t h e M i d d l e E a s t . O n t h e s e a n d o t h e r a s p e c t s of t h e c o n f e r e n c e , see Disarmament, vol. 2 8 , no. 3 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , w h i c h g i v e s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e v i e w f r o m a v a r i e t y of n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s . 74. F o r b a c k g r o u n d , see R e b e c c a J o h n s o n , " T h e I n - C o m p r e h e n s i v e Test B a n , " Scientists. The Bulletin of the Atomic 7 5 . S i d n e y D r e l l , " R e a s o n s to R a t i f y , N o t to S t a l l , " New York Times, J u n e 2, 1998, p. A 2 1 . S h o u l d I n d i a , P a k i s t a n , a n d o t h e r n o n m e m b e r states not sign and rati f y t h e C T B T , an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e is s c h e d u l e d f o r S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 9 to f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h to i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e treaty. 76. New York Times, N o v e m b e r 22, 1985. 7 7 . O n p o s t - S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g c u t s , see SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p p . 2 0 6 - 2 1 2 . G a d d y ( T h e Price of the Past, pp. 8 3 - 8 6 ) c o m m e n t s o n t h e a b i l i t y of t h e d e f e n s e e n t e r p r i s e s to " r e c o v e r " f r o m e f f o r t s t o p r i v a t i z e t h e m , a n d o n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s u n d e r Y e l t s i n of c o n v e r t i n g f r o m m i l i t a r y to c i v i l i a n p r o d u c t i o n , d e s p i t e savings on w e a p o n s procurement and reduced military production. Of about 5,000

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military industries in the FSU, only a little m o r e than 500 (including 4 6 0 in Russia) were actually tabbed for partial c o n v e r s i o n s of production. (See the K o n o v a l o v and Leitenberg essays in Brunn et al., pp. 1 7 5 - 1 8 2 and 3 2 5 - 3 3 3 ) . T h e a r m s industries are said to be engaged in the " m i n d l e s s pursuit of private g a i n " and are basically out of control. Stephen J. Blank, Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia, p. 19. 78. T h e lack of a significant d i f f e r e n c e between the Bush and Clinton strategies is noted in the New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 2, 1993. p. 1. The most recent Pentagon strategy rationale is by the secretary of d e f e n s e , William S. C o h e n , Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, M a y 1997 (online via w w w . d e f e n s e l i n k . m i l ) . U.S. nuclear doctrine since the Gulf War has been to deter or retaliate against othe r s ' use of w e a p o n s of mass destruction, or to use nuclear w e a p o n s in response to an invasion by certain non-nuclear states. See Steven Lee Myers, " U . S . ' U p d a t e s ' All-Out A t o m War G u i d e l i n e s , " New York Times, D e c e m b e r 8, 1997, p. A3; William M. Arkin, "N. P. T . — B a c k to G r o u n d Z e r o , " The Nation; and The Defense Monitor, vol. 24, no. 8 ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r , 1995), pp. 3 - 4 . 79. New York Times. D e c e m b e r 2. 1997, p. A16. 80. " O f f i c i a l " s p e n d i n g r e f e r s to g o v e r n m e n t - r e p o r t e d D e f e n s e D e p a r t m e n t figures, w h i c h , in the U.S. case, also include D e p a r t m e n t of Energy s p e n d i n g on nuclear weapons. Center for D e f e n s e Information, online. 81. On current and future spending, see Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. On n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s s p e n d i n g , see Schwartz, " T h e H i d d e n Costs of O u r N u c l e a r A r s e n a l , " p. 6, and his letter to the New York Times of J a n u a r y 14, 1997, p. A14. The Congressional Budget O f f i c e estimate for spending on "current U.S. nuclear forces and supporting activities" is $33 billion a year, whereas the Department of D e f e n s e estimates $13 billion. Jim Wolf, "Study: Pentagon Underestimates Nuclear C o s t , " Washington Times. April 21, 1998; N A P S N e t , April 22, 1998. 82. Natural Resources D e f e n s e Council, Taking Stock. 83. Walter Pincus, " N e w M e t h o d s Help Maintain Nuclear A r m s , " Washington Post, April 28, 1998. 84. William J. Broad, " N u c l e a r A r m s Builders Shift Role From D e v e l o p e r s to C a r e - T a k e r s , " New York Times, J a n u a r y 6, 1997, p. 1; Bill Mesler, "Virtual N u k e s — W h e n Is a Test Not a T e s t ? " The Nation; W i l l i a m J. B r o a d , " F u s i o n R e s e a r c h E f f o r t D r a w s F i r e , " New York Times, July 15, 1998, p. A5; M a t t h e w L. Wald, " U . S . Refits Nuclear B o m b to Destroy E n e m y B u n k e r s , " May 31, 1997, online. 85. William J. Broad, " N u c l e a r A r m s Builders Shift Role f r o m D e v e l o p e r s to C a r e - T a k e r s , " New York Times, January 6, 1997, p. 1. 86. " D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e B u d g e t for FY 1999," F e b r u a r y 2, 1998, D e f e n s e L I N K N e w s , online. 87. T h i s p a r a g r a p h relies on L e s l i e W a y n e , " T h e S h r i n k i n g M i l i t a r y C o m p l e x , " New York Times. February 27, 1998, p. C I . See also New York Times, March 10, 1998, p. C3. 88. T h e extensive direct and indirect ways that the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t provides incentives for arms sales abroad are e x a m i n e d by William D. Härtung, Welfare for Weapons Dealers: The Hidden Costs of the Arms Trade. 89. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of International Economic Statistics 1997, table 127, online; C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e report d i s c u s s e d in Tim Weiner, " R u s s i a and F r a n c e Gain on U.S. Lead in A r m s Sales, S t u d y S a y s , " New York Times, A u g u s t 4, 1998, o n l i n e . In the 1990s, R u s s i a n arms d e l i v e r i e s rank second at $3.4 billion. 90. R a y m o n d Bonner, " F o r U.S., G u n Sales Are G o o d Business," New York Times, June 6, 1998, p. A3. For background on the issue and international negotiations

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c o n c e r n i n g it, s e e M i c h a e l R e n n e r , Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament. R e n n e r (p. 11) g i v e s a r o u g h e s t i m a t e of $ 3 b i l l i o n a y e a r in i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e of s m a l l a r m s . W i t h C a n a d a a n d N o r w a y l e a d i n g t h e w a y , the first i n t e r n a t i o n a l m e e t i n g , i n v o l v i n g t w e n t y c o u n t r i e s , t o o k p l a c e in O s l o in m i d - 1 9 9 8 to d e a l w i t h l e g a l a n d i l l e g a l t r a f f i c in s m a l l a r m s . T h e s e w e a p o n s , s u c h as h a n d g u n s , h o w i t z e r s , and o t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s h a n d l e d b y o n e or a t e a m of sold i e r s , are t h e k i n d that f u e l n a t i o n a l i s t and e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d s o m e o t h e r m a j o r m i l i t a r y p o w e r s that p r o d u c e t h e s e w e a p o n s shied a w a y f r o m e n d o r s i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t to ban or limit t h e i r s a l e s . 91. K a t h a r i n e Q. S e e l y e , " A r m s C o n t r a c t o r s S p e n d to P r o m o t e an E x p a n d e d N A T O , " New York Times, M a r c h 30, 1998, p. A l . 92. O t h e r e x p e r t t e s t i m o n i e s a n d d o c u m e n t s that a d d r e s s t h e n u c l e a r d a n g e r and p r o p o s e m a j o r w e a p o n s r e d u c t i o n s and related c h a n g e s of n u c l e a r d o c t r i n e a n d p r a c t i c e are Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, J a n u a r y 1997 (an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m i s s i o n e s t a b l i s h e d in N o v e m b e r 1995 by t h e A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t ) , o n l i n e at w w w . d f a t . g o v . a u ; F e d e r a t i o n of A m e r i c a n S c i e n t i s t s , Report of the Nuclear Policy Review Project, 1997 (a g r o u p h e a d e d by M o r t o n H. H a l p e r i n that p o s e d q u e s t i o n s e s s e n t i a l to a r e v i e w of e x i s t ing U.S. n u c l e a r - w e a p o n s p o l i c y ) , d i s t r i b u t e d by N A P S N e t , F e b r u a r y 5, 1997, a n d a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e at w w w . f a s . o r g / s p p ; C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y a n d A r m s C o n t r o l , N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y of S c i e n c e s , The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy; a n d t h e i n t e r v i e w s in S c h e l l , " T h e G i f t of T i m e . " 93. T h e s e a n d r e l a t e d s t a t e m e n t s by Butler, and o f f i c i a l W a s h i n g t o n ' s tepid res p o n s e , w e r e c a r r i e d by N A P S N e t , D e c e m b e r 9, 1996, o n l i n e . 94. A s t u d y by P h y s i c i a n s f o r S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y p o i n t s to the b r e a k d o w n of R u s s i a n c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l as t h e r e s u l t of d i s a r r a y in t h e a r m e d f o r c e s as r e a s o n e n o u g h f o r c o n c e r n a b o u t a c c i d e n t a l or u n a u t h o r i z e d l a u n c h e s of n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s , w h i c h a r e still a u t o m a t i c a l l y t a r g e t e d at m a j o r U . S . p o p u l a t i o n c e n t e r s and m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s . New York Times, A p r i l 30, 1998, p. A 1 0 . 95. O n e o b s t a c l e to this idea is p r e c i s e l y the d i s a r r a y in the R u s s i a n military. F o r a n u m b e r of R u s s i a n s t r a t e g i s t s a n d p o l i t i c i a n s , a l a r g e n u c l e a r a r s e n a l is d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e it's all they have left to m a r k R u s s i a as a s u p e r p o w e r . D a v i d H o f f m a n , " D o w n s i z i n g a M i g h t y A r s e n a l : M o s c o w R e t h i n k s R o l e A s Its W e a p o n s R u s t , " Washington Post, M a r c h 16, 1998, o n l i n e . 96. Washington Post. J a n u a r y 29, 1998, p. A 7 . 97. F o r a g o o d o v e r v i e w , s e e J o z e f G o l d b l a t and P e t e r L o m a s , " D i s a r m a m e n t PerspecW a t c h : N u c l e a r N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n , t h e P r o b l e m S t a t e s , " Transnational tives, p p . 1 7 - 2 1 . O n t h e P a k i s t a n i a n d I n d i a n m i s s i l e c a p a b i l i t i e s , s e e New York Times, A p r i l 11, 1 9 9 8 , p. A 3 . T h e l i k e l i h o o d is that I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r t e s t s in 1 9 9 8 w e r e the r e s u l t of c o n c e r n a b o u t d e t e r r i n g C h i n a r a t h e r t h a n P a k i s t a n . A w e e k bef o r e the tests, I n d i a ' s n e w d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r h a d d e c l a r e d that C h i n a is I n d i a ' s " p o tential e n e m y N o . 1" (New York Times, M a y 12, 1998, p. A 1 0 ) . L a t e r , an u n n a m e d s e n i o r I n d i a n o f f i c i a l c o n f i r m e d that f a c t , s a y i n g : " O u r p r o b l e m is n o t P a k i s t a n , " h e s a i d . " O u r p r o b l e m is C h i n a . W e a r e not s e e k i n g p a r i t y w i t h C h i n a . We d o n ' t h a v e the r e s o u r c e s , a n d w e d o n ' t h a v e the will. W h a t we a r e s e e k i n g is a m i n i m u m d e t e r r e n t " ( N e w York Times, J u l y 7, 1998, o n l i n e ) . At the c o n c l u s i o n of t h e i r n u c l e a r - w e a p o n t e s t s , I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n d e c l a r e d that they h a d f i t t e d t h e i r m i s s i l e s with n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , t h o u g h this is not c e r t a i n . 9 8 . N o r m a n K e m p s t e r , " U . S . K n e w of P a k i s t a n i N - P r o g r a m , " Los Angeles (in The Oregonian, M a r c h 18, 1992, p. A 4 ) . 9 9 . T i m W e i n e r , " I n d i a - P a k i s t a n R e g i o n N o w A m o n g M o s t D a n g e r o u s , " New York Times, M a y 17, 1998, o n l i n e ; W e i n e r , " U . S . and C h i n a H e l p e d P a k i s t a n B u i l d

Times

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Notes

Its B o m b , " New York Times, June 1, 1998, p. A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, " U . S . Aides See Troubling Trend in China-Pakistan N u c l e a r Ties," Washington Post, April 1, 1996. 100. Victor Gilinsky and Paul L e v e n t h a l , " I n d i a C h e a t e d , " Washington Post, June 15, 1998. T h e head of the India p r o g r a m in 1974 has admitted to India's having lied about its intentions. 101. Tim Weiner, "India-Pakistan Region N o w A m o n g Most D a n g e r o u s . " 102. A spokesman for the ruling Hindu nationalist party whose leaders authorized the nuclear tests shortly after assuming office said: "The American position is hypocritical. They are sitting on a mountain of nuclear arms, and they are pontificating to India and the world [about nonproliferation]" (New York Times, May 14, 1998, p. A8). Pakistan probably agreed; but in any event its position has always been that it would not sign the N P T without India's signature. Both governments promised following their May 1998 nuclear-weapon tests that they would not conduct additional tests. And both might yet sign the C T B T under certain conditions. India, for example, might pledge not to undertake any further tests or transfer weapons technology if it were treated as a declared nuclear power like the Perm 5. But such a trade-off is improbable, because none of the Perm 5, especially China, wants to concede to India either the prestige or the opportunity to refine nuclear weapons that "declared" status confers. 103. North Korea received early help on its nuclear program f r o m the U S S R . W h e t h e r it actually p r o d u c e d a t o m i c b o m b s by 1994 is still d e b a t e d ; but most analyses s u g g e s t it had the technical capability and p l u t o n i u m to d o so. Iraq had acquired the technical expertise and t e c h n o l o g y to enrich u r a n i u m for eventually building perhaps f o u r b o m b s a year by the time of its defeat in 1991. 104. C o n c e r n i n g U.S. pressure on Taiwan to close d o w n a secret installation for extracting plutonium, see the New York Times report in The Oregonian, March 23, 1988, p. A9. T h e story of the U.S. discovery of T a i w a n ' s p r o g r a m , which continued in great secrecy into the late 1980s, is reported in the New York Times, December 20, 1997, p. A6. The U.S. accounting of its plutonium inventory referred to a b o v e indicated that T a i w a n had s h i p p e d 79 k i l o g r a m s to the U n i t e d States between 1978 and 1991, no doubt as a direct result of U.S. pressure. 105. U.S. I n f o r m a t i o n A g e n c y press release, "U.S. and Russia Work Jointly to Secure Nuclear M a t e r i a l s , " May 27, 1998; N A P S N e t , May 28, 1998. 106. See M i c h a e l R. G o r d o n and M a t t h e w L. Wald, " R u s s i a n C o n t r o l s on B o m b Material Are L e a k y , " New York Times, A u g u s t 18, 1994, p. 1, and, on the last point, Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia. 107. William J. Broad, " D e a d l y N u c l e a r Waste Piles U p with N o Clear Solution at H a n d , " New York Times, March 14, 1995, p. B7. T h e article quotes one nuclear p h y s i c i s t , Dr. A r j u n M a k h i j a n i , as s a y i n g , " E v e r y f o u r or f i v e years w e ' r e m a k i n g about as m u c h p l u t o n i u m in the civil sector as w e did d u r i n g the w h o l e cold war." 108. William J. Broad, "U.S., in First A t o m i c A c c o u n t i n g , S a y s It S h i p p e d a Ton of P l u t o n i u m to 39 C o u n t r i e s , " New York Times, February 5, 1996, p. 5. 109. See, for e x a m p l e , C h a r l e s S m i t h , " T o u c h y S u b j e c t , " Far Eastern Economic Review, S e p t e m b e r 29, 1994, pp. 1 6 - 1 7 . 110. Gary Milhollin, " S h o u l d We Sell S u p e r c o m p u t e r s to A l g e r i a ? " New York Times, April 24, 1998, p. A23. 111. For details, see Mel G u r t o v and B y o n g - M o o H w a n g , China's Security: The New Roles of the Military, ch. 7. 112. New York Times, April 27, 1998, p. 1. 113. Tim Weiner, " U . S . S a y s N o r t h K o r e a H e l p e d D e v e l o p N e w Pakistani Missile," New York Times, April 11, 1998, p. A3; R. J e f f r e y Smith, " A Feared Scenario A r o u n d the C o r n e r , " Washington Post, May 14, 1998, p. A29.

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114. E v e n w h e n t h e p o l i c y p r o m o t e s n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , it m a y p r i m a r i l y be a d o p t e d out of o v e r r i d i n g c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t . To k e e p C h i n e s e c o r p o r a t i o n s f r o m selling P a k i s t a n a n d Iran any m o r e n u c l e a r e q u i p m e n t and c h e m i c a l s that c o u l d be u s e d in w e a p o n s m a n u f a c t u r e , W a s h i n g t o n p r o m i s e d to u s e C h i n e s e s a t e l l i t e l a u n c h e r s — o n l y to find that w e a p o n s - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n had been given the C h i n e s e by t h e U . S . c o r p o r a t i o n s , w h i c h p r e v a i l e d o v e r the P e n t a g o n in w a n t i n g to use the l a u n c h e r s a n d c a p t u r e f u t u r e b u s i n e s s with B e i j i n g (New York Times, A p r i l 13, 1998, p. 1). W h e n W a s h i n g t o n tried to b l o c k R u s s i a ' s sale of t w o n u c l e a r r e a c tors to Iran, it p e r s u a d e d U k r a i n e to d r o p out of t h e s a l e — b y p r o m i s i n g U k r a i n e f o r e i g n aid and i n v e s t m e n t , a n d o b t a i n i n g the o p p o r t u n i t y to bid on n u c l e a r r e a c t o r c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e r e . M i c h a e l R. G o r d o n , " R u s s i a P l a n s to Sell R e a c t o r s to Iran D e spite U.S. P r o t e s t s , " New York Times, M a r c h 7, 1998, p. A 3 . 115. B e t t s , p. 2 1 3 . ! 16. H e r s h , " O n the N u c l e a r E d g e , " pp. 6 6 - 6 7 . 117. J o h n F. B u r n s , " I n N u c l e a r I n d i a , S m a l l S t a s h D o e s N o t an A r s e n a l M a k e , " New York Times, J u l y 26, 1998, o n l i n e . 118. See D a n i e l E l l s b e r g , " M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t II: T h e E n d of the T h r e a t of N u c l e a r War," Harvard Journal of World Affairs, pp. 1 - 1 6 . 119. C a r l K a y s e n , R o b e r t S. M c N a m a r a , a n d G e o r g e W. R a t h j e r . s , " N u c l e a r W e a p o n s A f t e r t h e C o l d W a r , " Foreign Affairs, p p . 9 5 - 1 1 0 . 120. K a y s e n , M c N a m a r a , a n d R a t h j e n s , p. 101. 121. M i l t o n L e i t e n b e r g , " B i o l o g i c a l W e a p o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l S a n c t i o n s a n d P r o l i f e r a t i o n , " Asian Perspective, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 . S e v e r a l of t h e s e s t a t e s h a v e o p e n l y a d m i t t e d to p o s s e s s i o n of o n e or b o t h c l a s s e s of w e a p o n s . F o r t h e m o s t r e c e n t status report on s u c h m a t t e r s , s e e t h e S t i m s o n C e n t e r w e b site ( w w w . s t i m s o n . o r g ) . 122. New York Times, J a n u a r y 15, 1998, p. A 9 . 123. Text in SIPR1 Yearbook 1992, p p . 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 . 124. W i l l i a m W. K e l l e r , " T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y of C o n v e n t i o n a l A r m s P r o l i f e r a t i o n , " Current History, p. 182. 125. A g o o d e x a m p l e is t h e U . S . d e c i s i o n in 1997 to lift the ban that the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d p l a c e d o n h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y w e a p o n s s a l e s to L a t i n A m e r i c a . L o c k h e e d M a r t i n a n d o t h e r U . S . a r m s e x p o r t e r s w e r e as h a p p y as L a t i n A m e r i c a n g e n e r a l s a b o u t the d e c i s i o n . S e e C a l v i n S i m s , " S o m e in L a t i n A m e r i c a F e a r End of U.S. Ban Will Stir A r m s R a c e , " New York Times, A u g u s t 3, 1997, o n l i n e . 126. Keller, " T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y of C o n v e n t i o n a l A r m s P r o l i f e r a t i o n , " pp. 179-180. 127. Q u o t e d in K e g l e y a n d W i t t k o p f ( 1 9 8 1 e d . ) , p. 3 4 4 . 128. S e e S i v a r d , World Priorities J991, t a b l e 3, p p . 5 4 - 5 5 . 129. F r o m S o v i e t s o u r c e s cited in G u o S i m i a n , ' " N e w P o l i t i c a l T h i n k i n g ' a n d the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s R e a d j u s t m e n t of Its A s i a n - P a c i f i c P o l i c y , " Comparative Strategy, p. 139. 130. F r a n c e s F u k u y a m a , " G o r b a c h e v a n d t h e T h i r d W o r l d , " Foreign Affairs, p. 7 1 8 . 131. B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, p p . 94, 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ; a n d B r o w n et a l „ State of the World 1985, p. 31. 132. B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, p. 9 7 . 133. T h i s o v e r v i e w is b a s e d o n J o h n P. H a r d t a n d D o n n a G o l d , " A n d r o p o v ' s E c o n o m i c F u t u r e , " Orbis. 134. W o r l d B a n k 1984, t a b l e 9, p. 2 3 5 . 135. S e r g e i G o r b u n o v , " T h e S o c i a l C o n s e q u e n c e s of E c o n o m i c R e s t r u c t u r i n g in the U S S R , " in G u r t o v , e d . , Transformation of Socialism, pp. 146-147. 136. S i v a r d , World Priorities 1991, t a b l e 3, p p . 5 4 - 5 5 .

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137. This section on the environment is based mainly on the research o f Christina Burnside. 138. See Don Hinrichsen, "Russian Roulette," Amicus Journal, pp. 3 5 - 3 7 ; Jay M. Gould, " C h e r n o b y l — T h e Hidden Tragedy," The Nation, pp. 3 3 1 - 3 3 4 . 139. See Brown et al„ State of the World 1985, pp. 51, 55 (on water), and p. 106 (on air pollution). 140. N. Zuyev, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, in Geographical, vol. 6 2 , no. 3 (March 1990), p. 14. 141. Michael Smith, " A Tale of Death and Destruction," Geographical, p. 13; Hammond, p. 171. 142. Ben E k l o f , Soviet Briefing: Gorbachev and the Reform Period, pp. 133- 134. 143. Daniel Singer, The Road to Gdansk: Poland and the USSR, pp. 7 8 - 8 0 , 115-117. 144. Ralph S. Clem, "Ethnicity and Its Implications," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 54. 145. On Soviet women, see Singer, pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 . 146. The problem o f alcoholism is discussed in Los Angeles Times, June 2, 1985, p. 25. 147. Frank, p. 182. 148. Frank, p. 3 1 8 . 149. Frank, pp. 6, 1 8 5 - 1 8 6 , 188. 150. Timothy J . Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, p. 9 2 . 151. Colton, p. 9 4 . 152. The main features of Gorbachev's program are drawn from press reports; from Stephen F. C o h e n ' s " S o v i e t i c u s " columns in The Nation (in particular the issue of May 3 1 , 1986, p. 7 5 0 ) ; from Robert C. Tucker, " W h e r e Is the Soviet Union Headed?" World Policy Journal; Shireen T. Hunter, "Nationalist Movements in Soviet A s i a , " Current History; Karen M. B r o o k s , " S o v i e t Agriculture Under Perestroika," Current History : and Transformation of Socialism, chapters by Herbert Ellison, R o l f H. W. Theen, Guy Houk, Alexander Parkanskiy, Alexander Nagorniy, and Judith Thornton. 153. On Gorbachev's struggle with the C P S U , see R o l f H. W. Theen, "PartyState Relations Under Gorbachev: From Partocracy to ' P a r t y ' S t a t e ? " in Gurtov, ed., Transformation of Socialism, ch. 4. 154. Renner, "Swords into Plowshares," pp. 3 0 - 3 6 . 155. For a full account of these events, see Martha Brill Olcott, " T h e Soviet (Dis)union," Foreign Policy, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 3 6 . 156. Janine R . Wedel, " T h e Harvard B o y s Do R u s s i a , " The Nation. T h e article studies the Harvard Institute for International Development, which the Clinton administration chose as a principal administrator of over $ 3 0 0 million in economic aid to Russia. The main beneficiaries o f the program appear to have been a few members o f the Russian elite and their U . S . colleagues. 157. An explosion o f radioactive waste in April 1993 at the once-secret Tomsk-7, a military facility about 1,700 miles east o f Moscow, underscored the ongoing problems o f dangerous nuclear reactors. The cost of dismantling or modernizing such plants, perhaps $ 1 0 billion to $ 2 0 billion, is, however, prohibitive (The Oregonian, May 21, 1992, p. A 7 ) . Huge quantities of radioactive waste have also been dumped into rivers, lakes, and oceans, such as the S e a o f Japan. Nuclear submarine reactors, for example, were once dumped into the Kara Sea inside the Arctic Circle. S e e Nicholas Lenssen, "Confronting Nuclear W a s t e , " in B r o w n , ed.,

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Slate of the World 1992, p. 5 3 ; a n d W i l l i a m J. B r o a d , " R u s s i a A c k n o w l e d g e s O c e a n D u m p i n g of N u c l e a r W a s t e , " The Oregonian, A p r i l 27, 1992, p. A 5 ( f r o m the New York Times). On Siberian timberland, see Antony Scott and David G o r d o n , " T h e Russian T i m b e r R u s h , " Amicus Journal, p p . 1 5 - 1 7 , a n d J o h n H. C u s h m a n , Jr., " L o g g i n g in S i b e r i a Sets O f f a B a t t l e in t h e U . S . " New York Times, J a n u a r y 30, 1996, p. A 3 . 158. New York Times, N o v e m b e r 9, 1994, p. A 5 . T h e B a n k f o u n d that the d i s c h a r g e s of s u l f u r d i o x i d e e x c e e d t h o s e in s e v e r a l E U c o u n t r i e s combined. 159. M i c h a e l S p e c t e r , " O c c u p a t i o n of a N u c l e a r P l a n t S i g n a l s A n g e r of R u s s ian W o r k e r s , " New York Times o n l i n e , D e c e m b e r 7, 1996. 160. On e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , see M a r s h a l l 1. G o l d m a n , " N e e d e d : A R u s s i a n E c o n o m i c R e v o l u t i o n , " Current History, p p . 3 1 4 - 3 2 0 ; a n d t h e c o l l e c tion of h i g h l y p e s s i m i s t i c e s s a y s by v a r i o u s R u s s i a n j o u r n a l i s t s in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 4 9 , no. 1 ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1993), pp. 1 2 - 4 6 . 161. M i c h a e l S p e c t e r , " C i t a d e l of R u s s i a ' s W a s t e f u l H e a l t h S y s t e m , " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 4, 1998, p. 1, r e v i e w i n g a m a j o r h o s p i t a l s y s t e m f o r t r e a t m e n t of t u b e r c u l o s i s in T o m s k . 162. New York Times, J u n e 3, 1998, p. A I O ; V e n y a m i n S o k o l o v , " T h e V i r u s in R u s s i a , " New York Times, J u n e 1, 1998, p. A 1 9 . S o k o l o v , a d i r e c t o r of R u s s i a ' s C h a m b e r of A c c o u n t s , t h e o v e r s i g h t a g e n c y f o r p u b l i c f u n d s , w r o t e that 4 5 p e r c e n t (not o n e - t h i r d ) of the state b u d g e t w a s b e i n g u s e d to s e r v i c e the d e b t . 163. M i c h a e l R. G o r d o n , " Y e l t s i n ' s N e w O u t s i d e r T e a m : Y o u n g , R e f o r m i s t and G r e e n , " New York Times, M a y 1, 1998, p. A 1 2 . 164. C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , Handbook of International Economic Statistics ¡997, t a b l e 125, o n l i n e . 165. R i c h a r d W. S t e v e n s o n , " I n B o r r o w i n g f r o m the I.M.F., D i d Yeltsin G e t a S w e e h e a r t D e a l ? " New York Times, M a r c h 11, 1996, p. 5. S e e a l s o New York Times, F e b r u a r y 23, 1996, p. A l . 166. New York Times. T h e I M F o f f i c i a l q u o t e d w a s S t a n l e y F i s c h e r , f i r s t deputy managing director. 167. S e e G r i g o r y Y a v l i n s k y , " R u s s i a ' s P h o n y C a p i t a l i s m , " Foreign Affairs, pp. 6 7 - 7 9 . 168. S e e B e n j a m i n L a m b e t h , " R u s s i a ' s W o u n d e d M i l i t a r y , " Foreign Affairs, M a r c h - A p r i l 1995. 169. A s the d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r , G e n e r a l P a v e l S. G r a c h e v , said in 1994: " N o t a s i n g l e a r m y in t h e w o r l d is in s u c h a c a t a s t r o p h i c state. I ask you [in p a r l i a m e n t ] to take this as a w a r n i n g . " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 19, 1994, p. 4. 170. K a r e n D a w i s h a , " R u s s i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y in t h e N e a r A b r o a d a n d B e y o n d , " Current History. 171. R u s s i a ' s p o l i c i n g e f f o r t is to s o m e d e g r e e s u b j e c t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l o v e r sight a n d g l o b a l n o r m s . Its m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a r e o f f i c i a l l y c a l l e d p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s (at t h e e n d of 1994, R u s s i a h a d o v e r 1 2 5 , 0 0 0 o u t s i d e its b o r d e r s ) , a n d it u s e s t h e m o f f i c i a l l y at t h e b e h e s t of t h e U N . 172. S e e the article b y t h e U . S . d e p u t y s e c r e t a r y of state, S t r o b e T a l b o t t , " R u s sia H a s N o t h i n g to F e a r , " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 18, 1997, p. A 1 5 . 173. New York Times, M a r c h 17, 1995, p p . A l , A 5 . T h e R u s s i a n v i e w w a s that bordering countries might have m o r e sophisticated forces and close-in bases ( w h i c h w o u l d n o t b e r e d u c e d ) , e v e n w i t h U . S . a s s u r a n c e s t h a t an e n l a r g e d N A T O w o u l d h a v e f e w e r s o l d i e r s . S e e New York Times, F e b r u a r y 21 a n d 22, 1997, p. 1. 174. Q u o t e d by T h o m a s L . F r i e d m a n , " N o w a W o r d f r o m X , " New York Times, M a y 2, 1998, p. A 2 3 .

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175. At a s u m m i t m e e t i n g of the C o n f e r e n c e on Security and C o o p e r a t i o n in E u r o p e in D e c e m b e r 1994, Yeltsin lashed out at the West, accusing the United States of wanting to dominate the world. New York Times, D e c e m b e r 6, 1994, p. A l . 176. O n e w e l l - k n o w n R u s s i a n c o m m e n t a t o r wrote: " T h e resolve to e x p a n d N A T O w i t h o u t a n s w e r i n g R u s s i a n w o r r i e s is p e r c e i v e d in M o s c o w , rightly or wrongly, as proof of the A m e r i c a n desire to take a d v a n t a g e of R u s s i a ' s present w e a k n e s s and to c o m p l e t e what A m e r i c a n s see as their victory in the cold war. . . . Eventually, instead of having Russia as a long-term partner, the United States risks c o n f r o n t i n g not n e c e s s a r i l y an e n e m y but a r u n a w a y train m o v i n g with g r o w i n g speed in an u n p r e d i c t a b l e d i r e c t i o n . " A l e k s e i K. Pushkov, " T h e Risk of Losing R u s s i a , " New York Times, January 21, 1997. p. A19. 177. See the i n t e r v i e w in New York Times, J a n u a r y 9. 1997, p. A 9 , and also R e i c h ' s " B r o k e n F a i t h , " The Nation. 178. Robert Pear, "Debt Puts C r i m p in C l i n t o n ' s Plans," The Oregonian. January 3, 1993, p. A 1 9 ( f r o m the New York Times). 179. Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1984, p. 5. and May 23, 1985. p. 1. 180. New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 30, 1997, p. A12. 181. Based on a c o m p a r a t i v e analysis done by the L u x e m b o u r g I n c o m e Study g r o u p and reported in the New York Times, June 1, 1996, p. 8. 182. A particularly poignant and accessible source on e c o n o m i c decline (and c o r p o r a t e g r e e d ) d u r i n g the 1980s is a special series by Donald L. Barlett and J a m e s B. Steele, " A m e r i c a : W h a t Went W r o n g ? " Philadelphia Enquirer, O c t o b e r 2 0 - 2 8 , 1991. It was later published as America: What Went Wrong? ( K a n s a s City, Mo.: A n d r e w s & M c M e e l , 1992). See also David M o b e r g , " D e c l i n e and Inequality A f t e r the G r e a t U - T u r n , " In These Times, pp. 7, 10. For the 1990s, see The Washington Quarterly, March 15 ( 1996, pp. l ^ t . 183. Los Angeles Times, O c t o b e r 4, 1984, 4/p. 2. 184. T h e top one-half percent of f a m i l i e s , a c c o r d i n g to the Federal R e s e r v e Board, in 1993 o w n e d 29 percent of total family net worth in the United States, an increase f r o m 24 percent in 1983. 185. As reported in the New York Times, O c t o b e r 27, 1995, p. C2. By other inc o m e m e a s u r e m e n t s , the gap between the richest and poorest 20 percent of the U.S. p o p u l a t i o n is about 13 to 1, only slightly better than in M e x i c o and t w i c e as unequal as Great Britain's. Michael Renner, " T r a n s f o r m i n g Security," in B r o w n et al., eds., State of the World 1997, p. 121. 186. New York Times, M a r c h 13, 1996, p. C I . 187. T h e r a n k i n g s that f o l l o w are f r o m Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 40. 188. Illiteracy has most recently been e x p l o r e d by Jonathan K o z o l , Illiterate America. K o z o l p r o p o s e s that 25 million A m e r i c a n s c a n n o t read (a m o r e c o m m o n l y used f i g u r e is about 10 million) and a n o t h e r 35 million can read only at a level b e l o w the ninth grade. 189. Riverside Press-Enterprise, D e c e m b e r 19, 1983, p. A3. 190. See Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1985, p. 10, concerning a report by a t w e n t y - s e v e n - m e m b e r Physician Task Force on Hunger. 191. B a s e d on a T u f t s University study; see The Oregonian, S e p t e m b e r 10, 1992, p. A 1 3 . 192. Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 40. 193. Human Development Report 1992, table 1.3, p. 21. 194. New York Times, J u n e 7, 1995, p. A14. 195. New York Times, February 11, 1992, p. A12.

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196. Nikki Meredith, " T h e M u r d e r E p i d e m i c , " Science '84, excerpted in Utne Reader, no. 8 ( F e b r u a r y - M a r c h 1985), p. 80. 197. New York Times, April 12, 1995, p. A l l . 198. C N N , March 18, 1998, citing a report in USA Today. 199. New York Times, D e c e m b e r 4, 1995, p. 8. 200. New York Times, February 11, 1992, p. A12. In 1998, the n u m b e r of people in U.S. prisons had climbed to 1.8 million. New York Times, March 15, 1999, p. A12. 201. In at least one of the first three years of the R e a g a n administration, m o r e than half of the 2 5 0 largest and most p r o f i t a b l e c o r p o r a t i o n s paid n o f e d e r a l inc o m e tax. O v e r that p e r i o d , the p r o f i t s of j u s t 128 of t h o s e c o r p o r a t i o n s totaled $57.1 billion" (Christopher H i t c h e n s , "Minority R e p o r t , " The Nation). 202. Bob Rebitzer, " R e p e a l of Unitary Tax: G i v e a w a y to Big B u s i n e s s ? " The Ec onomic Democrat. 203. In 1997, business m e r g e r s included 156 e a c h worth $1 billion or more. Leslie Wayne, "Wave of M e r g e r s Recasts the F a c e of B u s i n e s s , " New York Times, January 18, 1997, online. 204. Farm figures are f r o m D e b o r a h Lanner, "A Farm Bill for F a r m e r s , " The Nation. 205. At the top of the list w a s G M ' s loss of $21 billion in the first quarter of 1992, which led to a reduction of w o r k e r s to about one-half the 1985 n u m b e r (The Oregonian, July 28, 1993, p. G l ) . M o r e than a d o z e n Fortune 500 U.S. c o m p a n i e s , including G M , I B M , Sears, United Technologies, and Boeing, a n n o u n c e d layoffs of from 25,000 to 7 5 , 0 0 0 w o r k e r s during the winter of 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 . 206. International Herald Tribune, March 22, 1983. The f o l d i n g of some large banks, such as C o n t i n e n t a l Illinois, w a s in part attributable to poor lending practices in the Third World. 207. Quoted in D e l a m a i d e , p. 157. 208. Charles R. Morris, " T h e Soaring Dollar: Up, U p . . . and N o O n e Really K n o w s W h y , " Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1985, 5/p. 1. 209. Sidney Lens, "Will It Be the Crash Next T i m e ? " The Nation. 210. Lester C. Thurow, " A m e r i c a ' s E c o n o m y ' A i n ' t B r o k e , ' but Creeping Rust Is Taking Its Toll," Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1985, 5/p. 3. 211. For e x a m p l e , a b o u t 6 0 , 0 0 0 C h i n e s e and 7 0 , 0 0 0 J a p a n e s e s t u d e n t s h a v e enrolled in U.S. institutions of h i g h e r learning in recent years. M a n y of t h e m do advanced work in the sciences and engineering, fields U.S. students tend to avoid. A s a result, f o r e i g n students and f a c u l t y m a k e up as m u c h as one-half their total number. O n J a p a n e s e study abroad, see Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), April 25, 1992, p. 1. Foreign study and teaching in the United States is presented in Washington Post, S e p t e m b e r 2, 1987, p. A I ; Los Angeles Times, J a n u a r y 20, 1988, p. 1; and Washington Post, S e p t e m b e r 8, 1988, p. E l . 212. Paul Murphy, " T h e Military Tax Bite 1986." 213. Center for Defense Information and Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, both online. The total "real" military spending figure from CDI is based on $252 billion in the Defense Department budget, $12 billion in the Energy Department and other budgets, and $231 billion in military-related budgeting (foreign military aid, peacekeeping operations, veterans benefits, retirement funds, and interest on the national debt). 214. C e n t e r for D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n , online. Based on 1995 or 1996 official military s p e n d i n g figures. 215. B r o w n et al„ State of the World 1986, p. 200. Between 1980 and 1985, U.S. military expenditures grew by about $110 billion (in current dollars), whereas health payments increased about $11 billion and agricultural subsidies about $15 billion.

334

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216. S e y m o u r M e l m a n , " P r o f i t s Without P r o d u c t i o n : Deterioration in the I n d u s trial S y s t e m , " in S u z a n n e G o r d o n and D a v e M c F a d d e n , eds., Economic Conversion: Revitalizing America's Economy, pp. 1 9 - 3 2 . U . S . m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g is 4 . 3 p e r c e n t of G N P , w h e r e a s in t h e o t h e r N A T O c o u n t r i e s it is 2 . 4 p e r c e n t a n d in J a p a n is 1 p e r c e n t . S i v a r d et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 41. 2 1 7 . " M i l i t a r y R e s e a r c h a n d the E c o n o m y : B u r d e n or B e n e f i t , " The Defense Monitor, v o l . 14, no. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , p. 2. 2 1 8 . T h e U . S . f i g u r e s a r e f r o m t h e f i s c a l y e a r 1997 b u d g e t r e q u e s t ; C e n t e r f o r D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n , o n l i n e . O n E u r o p e , see S i v a r d et ai., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, p. 4 1 . 219. Q u o t e d in The Defense Monitor, v o l . 14, no. 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , p. 6. 2 2 0 . Los Angeles Times, s u p p l e m e n t , J u l y 10, 1983, p. 3. 2 2 1 . Q u o t e d in Los Angeles Times, s u p p l e m e n t , July 10, 1983, p. 12. 2 2 2 . " M i l i t a r y R e s e a r c h and the E c o n o m y , " The Defense Monitor, vol. 14, n o . 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , p p . 2 - 3 ; R o b e r t W. D e G r a s s e , Jr., " T h e M i l i t a r y E c o n o m y , " in G o r d o n and M c F a d d e n , e d s . , p p . 7 - 8 ; M a r i o n A n d e r s o n et al., " C o n v e r t i n g the A m e r i c a n E c o n o m y " ; Los Angeles Times, s u p p l e m e n t , J u l y 10, 1983, p. 13 ( c i t i n g a 1 9 8 3 study by t h e C o u n c i l o n E c o n o m i c P r i o r i t i e s ) . 2 2 3 . " M i l i t a r y R e s e a r c h a n d the E c o n o m y . " The Defense Monitor, vol. 14, n o . 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , pp. 5 - 7 ; D e G r a s s e , in G o r d o n a n d M c F a d d e n , eds., p. 12. 2 2 4 . Los Angeles Times, A u g u s t 27, 1982, p. 12. 2 2 5 . J o s e p h J. R o m m a n d A m o r y B. L o v i n s , " F u e l i n g a C o m p e t i t i v e E c o n o m y , " Foreign Affairs, p p . 4 5 - 6 2 . T h e s e w r i t e r s p o i n t out that "oil i m p o r t s a l o n e h a v e a c c o u n t e d f o r n e a r l y t h r e e - f o u r t h s of the U . S . trade d e f i c i t s i n c e 1970, or $1 t r i l l i o n t r a n s f e r r e d to O P E C n a t i o n s " ; that f r o m 1973 to 1986, h o w e v e r , e n e r g y c o n s e r v a t i o n a n d i n c r e a s e d u s e of r e n e w a b l e s o u r c e s c a u s e d oil i m p o r t s to d r o p e v e n as real G N P g r e w ; but that in t h e R e a g a n - B u s h y e a r s , " i m p o r t s of P e r s i a n G u l f oil s u r g e d m o r e t h a n s i x f o l d . . . . Yet h a d the n a t i o n s i m p l y k e p t s a v i n g oil as fast as [ b e f o r e ] , the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d not h a v e n e e d e d any P e r s i a n Gulf oil a f t e r 1985."

Chapter Six 1. O n a r m s e x p o r t s , see C e n t e r f o r D e f e n s e I n f o r m a t i o n , o n l i n e . In 1996 o f f i cial m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g w a s J a p a n , $ 5 4 billion; F r a n c e , $ 4 1 b i l l i o n ; B r i t a i n , $ 3 5 billion; G e r m a n y , $ 3 4 b i l l i o n ; C h i n a , $ 2 9 b i l l i o n ; a n d Italy, $ 1 6 b i l l i o n . F o r a r m s e x p o r t s ( b a s e d o n 1 9 9 3 f i g u r e s ) , see S i v a r d et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, t a b l e 2, p. 4 5 . 2. In fact, b e g i n n i n g in 1985, F r a n c e a n d the U n i t e d States u n d e r t o o k secret n u clear c o o p e r a t i o n r e l a t e d to w e a p o n s d e s i g n . W h e n the N P T w a s e x t e n d e d in 1995 a n d F r a n c e ' s s i g n a t u r e b e c a m e e s s e n t i a l , t h e f o c u s of c o o p e r a t i o n s h i f t e d to m a i n t a i n i n g the reliability a n d s a f e t y of F r a n c e ' s a r s e n a l and g i v i n g F r e n c h scientists acc e s s to U . S . w e a p o n s l a b o r a t o r i e s . B u t t h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e that F r a n c e w i l l not g a r n e r i n f o r m a t i o n o n w e a p o n s d e s i g n in t h e c o u r s e of s u c h c o o p e r a t i o n . S e e W i l l i a m D r o z d i a k a n d R. J e f f r e y S m i t h , " U . S . - F r e n c h N u c l e a r L i n k s G e t an A i r i n g , " Washington Post, S e p t e m b e r 20, 1995, a n d R. J e f f r e y S m i t h , " F r a n c e , U . S . Secretly E n t e r P a c t to S h a r e N u c l e a r W e a p o n s D a t a , " Washington Post, J u n e 17, 1996. 3. F r a n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , a n n o u n c e d p l a n s in 1995 to b r i n g its total a r m e d f o r c e s d o w n f r o m 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; to c o n v e r t t h e m into an a l l - v o l u n t e e r f o r c e

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by 2002; and to reduce forces stationed abroad (except in Germany), which currently number 37,000 (compared with 60,000 in 1987). See Craig R. Whitney, "Cold War Over, France Plans a Slim, Volunteer Military," New York Times, February 23, 1996, p. A3. 4. Sivard et al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, table 2, pp. 45^6. 5. See S1PRI Yearbook 1992, table 7A. 2, p. 259. 6. Sivard, World Priorities 1983, p. 7. See also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 384. 7. Sivard, World Priorities 1983, p. 7. 8. Based on figures in SIPRI Yearbook 1992, table 7A. 2, p. 259. 9. Block, pp. 134-163. 10. World Bank 1984, tables 2.2 and 2.4, pp. 16, 17. 11. Kegley and Wittkopf (1981 ed.), p. 172. 12. Isaak, pp. 96-98; Europe Without Frontiers: Completing the Internal Market. p. 34. 13. The figure, from a statement by the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, is cited in Barney et al., Global 2000: Implications for Canada, p. 58. 14. See Frank, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 , and David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power," Foreign Affairs. 15. See World Bank 1984, table 2.5, p. 18, for comparisons of nontariff barriers to imports from developed and developing countries. See also the testimony of Clyde V. Prestowitz in the U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human Rights, "Hearings: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific," pp. 204-211. The EC's exasperation over its trade deficits with Japan—about $16 billion in 1990, $25 billion in 1991, and $27 billion in 1992—is discussed in the Los Angeles Times World Report, April 9, 1994, pp. 1,11. 16. See the discussion in Meier, The International Environment of Business, pp. 227-228. 17. DeGrasse, in Gordon and McFadden, eds., p. 14. 18. Melman, in Gordon and McFadden, eds., ch. 2; Shepherd, in Guisinger, ed., ch. 4. 19. "Riding High," Business Week, October 9, 1995, pp. 134-137. These "downsides," as the source called them, were considered temporary; but they still existed in 1998. 20. For an excellent overview, see Craig R. Whitney, "Western Europe's Dreams Turning to Nightmares," New York Times, August 8, 1993, p. 1. 21. See Roger Cohen, "For France, Sagging Self-image and Esprit," New York Times, February 11, 1997, p. A l ; "A Survey of France," The Economist, November 25, 1995; and Daniel Bell, "The Future of Europe," Dissent, pp. 445-^152. 22. The German Bundestag voted in 1993 to restrict entry to those victims of oppression and war who could claim political asylum. The French parliament opted for a "zero immigration" policy. These measures, politically popular at home, reversed a tradition of openness to all refugees, whether political or economic. As for the immigrant workers with longtime residencies, they were denied citizenship in almost all cases. 23. John Hall and Udo Ludwig, "Creating Germany's Mezzogiorno?" Challenge, pp. 38—44; Alan Cowell, "Only Economic Jitters Unite Germans Now," New York Times, October 3, 1995, p. A5.

336

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24. Defined as below $4 a day; see UNDP, "Overview of Human Development Report ¡997," p. 2. 25. A U N I C E F report of August 1 9 9 4 said: " T h e morality and health crisis burdening most Eastern European countries since 1989 is without precedent in the European peacetime history of this century." Poverty, stress, environmental decline, and budget cuts account for this circumstance. In some places, people said the health-care system was better in communist days, and some of its worst features, such as bribery of doctors and nurses to obtain care, have gotten even worse under the post-communist system (Jane Perlez, " E a s t Europe's Health Care Is on the Danger L i s t . " New York Times, November 23. 1994. p. A l ) . Drug use and drug trafficking have also become serious problems. New York Times. June 5, 1995, p. 2. 26. See, for example. New York Times, October 7, 1994, p. A l . 27. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was due less to ethnic hatreds than to the country's unsuccessful adjustment to globalization and austerity programs imposed to deal with mounting debts. By the end o f the 1980s there was a sharp decline in living standards, high unemployment (especially among young people) and inflation, and widening regional economic differences. The middle class came apart. Ethnic differences came into play as people struggled to cope with the sacrifices they were forced to make. See Susan L. Woodward. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, pp. 5 0 - 5 7 . 28. Hammond, table 24.6, p. 24 (based on 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4 statistics). 2 9 . Hilary F. French, "Clearing the A i r , " in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1990, tables 6 - 3 and 6^1, pp. 105, 108. 30. Tom Waters, " E c o g l a s n o s t , " Discover, p. 52. 31. Christopher Flavin, " S l o w i n g Global W a r m i n g , " in Brown et al.. eds., State of the World 1990, table 2 - 1 , p. 19. 32. Flavin, in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1990, pp. 3 2 - 3 4 . In November 1990 eighteen Western European governments, representing about 19 percent of global carbon dioxide output, agreed to freeze carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels for the remainder of the decade. Some, including Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, also announced specific reduction targets and strategies. These actions finally found a positive response in the United States in 1993, when President Clinton reversed U.S. opposition at the Earth Summit not only to European proposals on greenhouse gas emissions but also to the biodiversity treaty the Europeans favored. The United States signed the treaty in June 1993 and agreed to roll back greenhouse gas emissions to the 1990 level by 2 0 0 0 . 33. Christopher Flavin, " T h e L e g a c y of R i o , " in Brown, ed., State of the World 1997, p. 11. 34. Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1986, p. 1. 35. The report is quoted in Jerzy Milewski et al., "Poland: Four Years After," Foreign Affairs, p. 3 4 5 . 36. John M. Kramer, " T h e Environmental Crisis in Poland," in Fred Singleton, ed., Environmental Problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, ch. 8. 37. World Bank 1997, table 6, p. 2 2 5 . 38. World Development Report 1992, tables 21 and 24, pp. 259, 2 6 7 . 39. World Bank 1992, p. 161; Marlise Simons, " E a s t Europe Still Choking on Air of the Past," New York Times, November 3, 1994, p. 1. 4 0 . Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, pp. 5 4 - 5 5 . Sachs was an adviser to the Polish government; Blaine Harden, "Walesa Assails Western Capitalists as Betrayers of Poland," The Oregonian, February 5, 1992, p. A6.

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4 1 . I n i t i a l l y , B r i t a i n h a d b e e n t h e p r i m e m o v e r in t h e c r e a t i o n of the s e v e n m e m b e r European Free Trade Association (EFTA), whose m e m b e r s n o w are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and Liechtenstein. Unlike t h e E C , E F T A a i m s o n l y at e l i m i n a t i n g t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s a m o n g its m e m b e r s a n d not a l s o at b e c o m i n g a p o w e r f u l e x p o r t b l o c ( I s a a k , p. 9 6 ) . E F T A b e c a m e l i n k e d w i t h t h e E C as a s i n g l e m a r k e t in 1991. 42. Europe Without Frontiers, p p . 9 - 1 5 ; P a o l o C e c c h i n i , The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market, pp. 1 - 6 8 , 9 7 - 9 8 . 4 3 . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a r t i c l e by C a r l o D e B e n e d e t t i of O l i v e t t i & C o . in Wall Street Journal, M a r c h 30, 1988. p. 19. 4 4 . Europe Without Frontiers, p. 4 7 . 4 5 . M e i e r , The International Environment of Business, pp. 2 4 7 , 2 5 2 . 4 6 . A n E U poll r e v e a l e d a E u r o p e - w i d e d r o p in s u p p o r t of E u r o p e a n u n i t y f r o m 7 2 to 4 8 p e r c e n t . W i l l i a m D r o z d i a k , " U n i t y D r i v e Is F a l t e r i n g in W e s t e r n E u r o p e , " Washington Post, J u l y 4, 1997. 47. E d m u n d L. A n d r e w s , " S t r i n g e n t R u l e s on E u r o C u r r e n c y C a u s e G r o w i n g T u r m o i l , " New York Times. J u n e 15, 1997, o n l i n e . 4 8 . W h i t n e y , " W e s t e r n E u r o p e ' s D r e a m s , " New York Times, A u g u s t 8, 1993; P e t e r G u m b e l , " G e r m a n y ' s N e i g h b o r s A r e B r i d l i n g at Its A p p a r e n t I n w a r d T u r n i n g , " Wall Street Journal, A u g u s t 3. 1993, p. A 1 0 . 4 9 . P o l a n d , H u n g a r y , a n d the C z e c h R e p u b l i c w e r e a d m i t t e d to t h e E C as adj u n c t m e m b e r s in t h e fall of 1991. T h i s e n t i t l e d t h e m to i m p r o v e d a c c e s s to a g r i c u l t u r a l m a r k e t s b u t not to the f r e e m o v e m e n t of w o r k e r s a c r o s s b o r d e r s . 50. N e v e r t h e l e s s , o t h e r s t e p s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a s i n g l e m o n e t a r y u n i o n a r e o c c u r r i n g , s u c h as a joint L o n d o n - F r a n k f u r t s t o c k e x c h a n g e t h a t w a s a n n o u n c e d in m i d - 1 9 9 8 . 51. New York Times, A p r i l 28, 1998, p. C I . In 1995 a n d 1996, 4 1 . 5 p e r c e n t of all f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e t r a n s a c t i o n s w e r e in U.S. d o l l a r s , a n d 5 8 . 9 p e r c e n t of f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y r e s e r v e s w e r e h e l d in d o l l a r s . T h e c o m p a r a b l e f i g u r e s w e r e 18.5 p e r c e n t and 15.5 p e r c e n t in the m a r k a n d E u r o p e a n c u r r e n c i e s , a n d 12 p e r c e n t a n d 6 p e r c e n t in t h e y e n . 52. W a l l a c e J. T h i e s , " T h e A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e , N u c l e a r W e a p o n s a n d E u r o p e a n A t t i t u d e s : R e e x a m i n i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n a l W i s d o m , " p. 50; M c N a m a r a , p p . 6 8 - 6 9 . 5 3 . M c N a m a r a , pp. 7 0 - 7 1 . O n e e s t i m a t e is b y P r o f e s s o r H e n r y K e n d a l l of t h e p h y s i c s d e p a r t m e n t at t h e M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e of T e c h n o l o g y . H e c a l c u l a t e d that a n u c l e a r w a r in E u r o p e in w h i c h 1,000 o n e - m e g a t o n w e a p o n s w e r e e x p l o d e d would cause over 200 million fatalities directly and would contaminate several m i l l i o n s q u a r e m i l e s — n o t c o u n t i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . S e e " N u c l e a r W a r in E u r o p e , " The Defense Monitor, v o l . 10, n o . 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 6. 54. Los Angeles Times, A u g u s t 30, 1981, p. 2. 55. K i s s i n g e r , q u o t e d in M c N a m a r a , p. 5 9 . 56. R o b e r t E n g l i s h , " E a s t e r n E u r o p e ' s D o v e s , " Foreign Policy, p. 4 4 . 57. R e n n e r , " S w o r d s i n t o P l o w s h a r e s , " p p . 4 0 - 5 8 . T h e m o d e l c o n v e r s i o n , o r a l t e r n a t i v e - u s e , p r o g r a m w a s d e v e l o p e d by w o r k e r s at L u c a s A e r o s p a c e , B r i t a i n ' s largest d e f e n s e industry; D a v e Elliott and Hilary Wainwright, " T h e Lucas Plan: T h e R o o t s of t h e M o v e m e n t , " in G o r d o n a n d M c F a d d e n , e d s . , p p . 8 9 - 1 0 7 . T h o u g h r e j e c t e d b y L u c a s m a n a g e m e n t , t h e " L u c a s P l a n " w a s a d a p t e d e l s e w h e r e in v a r i e d w a y s , s u c h as c o n v e r s i o n of a m i l i t a r y s h i p y a r d in L a n d s k r o n a , S w e d e n . T h e i d e a w a s , a n d r e m a i n s , to turn e x i s t i n g t e c h n o l o g y to c i v i l i a n p u r p o s e s a n d s a v e j o b s . S u z a n n e G o r d o n , " E c o n o m i c C o n v e r s i o n A c t i v i t y in W e s t e r n E u r o p e , " in G o r d o n a n d M c F a d d e n , e d s . , pp. 1 0 8 - 1 2 9 . A s the e x p e r i e n c e of t h e f o r m e r C z e c h o s l o v a k i a

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s h o w s , p o t e n t i a l e a r n i n g s f r o m a r m s sales a b r o a d h a v e t e n d e d to d i s p l a c e t h o u g h t s of r e d u c i n g a n d c o n v e r t i n g m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . M i l t o n L e i t e n b e r g , " D e f e n s e I n d u s t r y C o n v e r s i o n : T h e C a s e of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . " in B r u n n et al., p p . 312-314. 58. S e e SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p p . 4 7 7 ^ 9 5 . 59. M i c h a e l M a n d e l b a u m , " T h e P o s t - C o l d W a r S e t t l e m e n t in E u r o p e : A T r i u m p h of A r m s C o n t r o l , " Arms Control Today. 60. J o n a t h a n D e a n , Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security, p p . 3 0 6 - 3 1 9 . 61. S e e E l i z a b e t h P o n d , " G e r m a n y F i n d s Its N i c h e A s a R e g i o n a l P o w e r . " The Washington Quarterly. 6 2 . C a r l C a v a n a g h H o d g e , " B o t c h i n g the B a l k a n s : G e r m a n y ' s R e c o g n i t i o n of S l o v e n i a a n d C r o a t i a , " Ethics & InternationaI Affairs. T h e a u t h o r n o t e s that G e r m a n s u p p o r t of h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t h a v e p r e v e n t e d t h e e n s u i n g b l o o d b a t h ; " b u t such a policy w o u l d at least h a v e e n g a g e d the d e b a t e " a b o u t liberal c r i t e r i a a p p l i e d to e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m . S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in Y u g o s l a v i a w a s t h e easy, a n d w r o n g , c h o i c e . 6 3 . D e a n , Ending Europe's Wars, pp. 3 6 8 - 3 7 4 ; W o o d w a r d , Balkan Tragedy, pp. 1 4 8 - 1 6 2 . 64. T o n y Judt ( " E u r o p e : T h e G r a n d I l l u s i o n , " New York Review of Books) h a s w r i t t e n that t h e w a r in t h e B a l k a n s s h o w s that " t h e ' E u r o p e a n ' e d i f i c e is f u n d a mentally hollow, selfishly obsessed with fiscal rectitude and c o m m e r c i a l advant a g e . J u s t as t h e r e is n o e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , so there is, f o r t h e s e p u r p o s e s , no E u r o p e a n o n e e i t h e r . " 6 5 . D e a n , Ending Europe's Wars, p. 3 6 9 . 6 6 . O m i n o u s l y , s o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s s a w in t h e M a c e d o n i a n s i t u a t i o n all t h e i n g r e d i e n t s of B o s n i a o n t h e e v e of f u l l - s c a l e civil w a r : " t h e f o r m a t i o n of e x t r e m e n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s , the m e d i a d i v i d i n g into e t h n i c c a m p s a n d an e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n that w a s h o p e l e s s and l e f t a h u g e n u m b e r of p e o p l e h u n g r y and out of w o r k . " T h e w o r d s of an e t h n i c A l b a n i a n r e p o r t e r f o r the M a c e d o n i a n state r a d i o , in New York Times, M a y 11, 1998, p. A 6 . 6 7 . S e e K i y o s h i K o j i m a , Japan and a New World Economic Order, p p . 120-124. 68. R o b e r t S. O z a k i , " I n t r o d u c t i o n : T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y of J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , " in R o b e r t S. O z a k i a n d W a l t e r A r n o l d , e d s . , Japan's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic Security, p p . 2 - 5 ; K e n n e t h B. P y l e , "In P u r s u i t of a G r a n d D e s i g n : N a k a s o n e B e t w i x t t h e Past a n d t h e F u t u r e , " in P y l e , e d . , The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond? pp. 7 - 9 . 69. K e v i n S u l l i v a n , " J a p a n Q u e s t i o n s E c o n o m i c E q u a l i t y , " Washington Post, M a y 4, 1997. 7 0 . E z r a F. Vogel, " P a x N i p p o n i c a ? " Foreign Affairs, p. 7 5 3 . 71. Vogel, p. 7 5 4 . 72. Donald C. H e l l m a n n , " J a p a n e s e Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist D e m o c r a c y W i t h i n an A m e r i c a n G r e e n h o u s e , " in T a k a s h i I n o g u c h i a n d D a n i e l I. O k i m o t o , e d s . , The Political Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context, p p . 3 4 5 - 3 7 8 . 73. T h e e x a m p l e s a r e m a n y , b u t c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g e d i t o r i a l in t h e Japan Times ( T o k y o ) of N o v e m b e r 2 2 , 1996, c o n c e r n i n g the r e v e l a t i o n that the v i c e m i n ister of h e a l t h and w e l f a r e f r e e l y a c c e p t e d g i f t s in r e t u r n f o r political f a v o r s : " W i t h c o r r u p t i o n so r a m p a n t in the L D P a n d b u s i n e s s c i r c l e s , p e r h a p s it w a s o n l y a m a t ter of t i m e b e f o r e t h e b u r e a u c r a c y s u c c u m b e d to t h e t e m p t a t i o n s of a m o n e y - m a d society. . . . C i v i l s e r v a n t s w e r e not likely to w i t h s t a n d f o r e v e r the c o r r u p t i n g w e b

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spun so tirelessly by the politicians whom the public elected to the Diet. Even a reformed bureaucracy offers no permanent cure for a venal electorate and a corrupt Parliament." 74. Human Development Report 1992, p. 21. 75. Sam Jameson, "Cutting Open Japan." 76. See, for example, Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japanese Edgy, As if Awaiting Return of Godzilla," New York Times, April 12, 1995, p. A3. 77. "Japan: The Garbage Superpower—A Round-Table D i s c u s s i o n , " Japan Echo, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 8 6 - 9 2 . 78. S e e Andrew Pollack, "Deregulation in Japan: Too Many Rules, but Not for All," New York Times, November 16, 1996, online. 79. Charles K. Ebinger, "U.S.-Japanese Nuclear Energy Relations: Prospects for Cooperation/Conflict"; and Daniel K. Chapman, "USSR-Japan Energy Cooperation in Siberia: Implications for U.S.-Japanese Relations," both in Charles K. Ebinger and Ronald A. Morse, eds., U.S.-Japanese Energy Relations: Cooperation and Competition, pp. 1 4 7 - 1 6 2 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 9 . 80. Japan, on a per capita basis, produces 2.4 tons of carbon emissions, somewhat less than the average German's 2.9 tons and well below the average American's 5.3 tons. But Japan's carbon emissions have been growing by 8 percent a year in the 1990s, whereas the climate convention signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 called for bringing e m i s s i o n s down to the 1990 level by 2000. S e e Flavin, "The Legacy of Rio," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1997, pp. 11-12. 81. Teruyasu Murakami, "The Remarkable Adaptation of Japan's Economy," in Yergin and Hillenbrand, pp. 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 . Industry i n v o l v e m e n t in e m i s s i o n s reductions is noted in Christopher Flavin and Seth Dunn, "Responding to the Threat o f Climate Change," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1998, p. 123. 82. Richard J. Samuels, "The Politics of Alternative Energy Research and Development in Japan," in Morse, pp. 1 3 4 - 1 6 2 . 83. Joji Watanuki, "Japanese Society and the Limits of Growth," in Yergin and Hillenbrand, pp. 173, 1 7 8 - 1 8 2 . 84. Ronald A. Morse, ed., The Politics of Japan's Energy Strategy: Resources—Diplomacy—Security. 85. Robert S. Ozaki, The Control of Imports and Foreign Capital in Japan, chs. 4 - 5 .

86. Stopford and Dunning, tables 1.7 and 1.10, pp. 12, 15. In 1989 the figure for Japan was still about 4 percent: See "Foreign Investment in Japan Is Expected to Grow," Japan Report, vol. 36, no. 8 (August 1990), p. 5. 87. Doremus et al., The Myth of the Global Corporation, p. 77. 88. T h e following discussion is based mainly on Christopher H o w e , "China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region," The China Quarterly, pp. 6 6 2 - 6 9 3 . 89. Terutomo Ozawa, Multinationalism, Japanese Style: The Political Economy of Outward Dependency, ch. 7; David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid, ch. 6. 90. For recent figures, see Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), May 16, 1992, p. 27. A fine overall analysis of Japan's foreign-aid program is by Robert M. Orr, Jr., The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power. 91. In 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 , only 2.7 percent of total Japanese O D A went for human priorities such as basic education and safe drinking water. By comparison, the U.S. figure w a s 8.3 percent and Britain's was 8.8 percent. Human Development Report 1992, table 3.14, p. 43.

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92. F o u r such o p p o r t u n i t i e s h a v e arisen since 1989: the T i a n a n m e n c r a c k d o w n in C h i n a , r e p r e s s i o n in B u r m a , a b l o o d l e s s c o u p in T h a i l a n d , and the s u s pension of d e m o c r a c y in Peru (whose president is ethnically Japanese). See R o b e r t M. Orr, Jr., "Japan Winks at P e r u ' s C o u p , " Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), April 25, 1992, p. 7. 93. Richard A. Forrest, " J a p a n e s e Aid and the E n v i r o n m e n t , " The Ecologist, pp. 2 4 - 3 2 ; Karl S c h o e n b e r g e r , " W o o d - R e v e r i n g J a p a n A c c u s e d of P i l l a g i n g Forests," The Oregonian, D e c e m b e r 24, 1989, p. A5. 94. Islam, p. 172. 95. Vogel, p. 759. 96. Islam, p. 174. 97. Islam, p. 174. 98. Karel van W o l f e r e n , " T h e J a p a n P r o b l e m R e v i s i t e d , " Foreign Affairs, p. 48. 99. D a n i e l I. O k i m o t o , " P o l i t i c a l Inclusivity: T h e D o m e s t i c S t r u c t u r e of T r a d e , " in I n o g u c h i and O k i m o t o , eds., pp. 3 0 5 - 3 4 4 ; and Vogel, p. 760. On c u l tural n o r m s and values, see Ellen L. Frost, For Richer, for Poorer: The New U.S.-Japan Relationship, chs. 4 - 5 . 100. Islam, p. 179; Asian Wall Street Journal, editorial. June 29, 1993, p. 8. 101. See K i s h o r e M a h b u b a n i , " J a p a n A d r i f t , " Foreign Policy, pp. 1 2 6 - 1 4 4 ; C h a l m e r s J o h n s o n and E. B. Keehn, " T h e P e n t a g o n ' s Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs. 102. Fred C h a r l e s Ikle and T e r u m a s a N a k a n i s h i , " J a p a n ' s G r a n d S t r a t e g y , " Foreign Affairs, p. 81. 103. Kenneth B. Pyle, " J a p a n and the Future of Collective Security," in D a n n y U n g e r and Paul B l a c k b u r n , eds., Japan's Emerging Global Role, pp. 1 0 2 - 1 0 5 . Pyle's contention is that J a p a n e s e leaders since Yoshida have been devious and m a nipulative in interpreting Article 9 of the constitution, using it to avoid contributing to J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e and to international security e v e n t h o u g h they k n e w f u l l well that, legally, Japan could at any time h a v e cited U N m e m b e r s h i p as g r o u n d s for directly contributing to collective-security efforts. 104. Takashi I n o g u c h i , " F o u r J a p a n e s e S c e n a r i o s for the F u t u r e , " International Affairs, pp. 1 6 - 1 8 . 105. T h e debate is covered by Kei W a k a i z u m i , " J a p a n ' s D i l e m m a ; To Act or Not to A c t , " Foreign Policy. See also Pyle, in Pyle, ed., pp. 1 3 - 3 2 , and Inoguchi. 106. Yoichi F u n a b a s h i , Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC. 107. Recent e x a m p l e s are s w e e t e n i n g negotiations with Russia on NATO expansion by inviting its attendance at the " S u m m i t of the E i g h t " m a j o r e c o n o m i e s in June 1997; r e f u s i n g to accept any countries other than the C z e c h Republic, Poland, and Hungary into NATO; deciding to pay only $ 8 1 9 million of the United States' total debt to the U N of $1.2 billion, and attaching c o n d i t i o n s to the repayment; ref u s i n g to c o m m i t to s p e c i f i c g u i d e l i n e s on g r e e n h o u s e g a s e s to r e d u c e global warming; and rejecting an international ban, already j o i n e d by seventy-three c o u n tries, on the p r o d u c t i o n , stockpiling, use, and export of land mines. See Steven Erlanger, "Yeltsin B a s k s at S u m m i t ; S o m e E u r o p e a n s Are C o o l to U . S . , " New York Times, June 21, 1997, p. 5. 108. For e x a m p l e , by e x p o r t i n g military t e c h n o l o g y to the United States in violation of its a n n o u n c e d principles that forbid w e a p o n s exports. C h a l m e r s J o h n s o n , " J a p a n in Search of a ' N o r m a l ' R o l e , " Daedalus. 109. U n d e r the guidelines, the S D F would p r o v i d e logistical b a c k u p for U.S. forces in the event of regional "instability," which is generally p r e s u m e d to m e a n

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r e n e w e d c o n f l i c t on the K o r e a n p e n i n s u l a or ( m u c h m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y ) in the Taiwan Strait. H o w e v e r , J a p a n ' s precise c o m m i t m e n t to the g u i d e l i n e s has yet to be fully reviewed or acted u p o n in the Diet at this writing. 110. In fact, during 1995 the g o v e r n m e n t decided to cut the S D F (to 145,000), the s a m e day a n e w s p a p e r reported that it had rejected as unconstitutional a U.S. request d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s t e n s i o n s with North K o r e a for m i n e s w e e p e r s and a s q u a d r o n of a n t i s u b m a r i n e a i r c r a f t in support of U . S . naval o p e r a t i o n s . Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan to Cut O w n Military, Keeping G . I . ' s , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 29, 1995, p. A5. 111. See Frost, pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 1 ; M a s a h i d e S h i b u s a w a et al., Pacific Asia in the IWOs. especially ch. 7; and Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the N e w World O r d e r , " Foreign Affairs, pp. 5 8 - 7 4 ; and Robert A. Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future Prospects," Foreign Affairs, p. 32. 112. International Herald Tribune, J u n e 3, 1992, p. 2. 113. Jim J u b a k and M a r i e D ' A m i c o , " M i g h t y M I T I , " Amicus Journal, pp. 38—43. 1 14. Other actions include the slave-iabor conditions in many parts of Southeast Asia occupied by J a p a n e s e forces; and, most g r u e s o m e of all, the e x p e r i m e n tation by doctors of army unit 731 on living persons in Northeast China. By now there are a n u m b e r of scholarly sources for all these atrocities; but for a brief insight, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan C o n f r o n t i n g G r u e s o m e War Atrocity," New York Times, March 17, 1995, p. A l . Far f r o m being apologetic, s o m e senior J a p a n ese o f f i c i a l s have tried in recent years to j u s t i f y past c r i m e s by a r g u i n g that they took place during wartime; or, that the U.S. atomic b o m b i n g s and f i r e b o m b i n g of Tokyo were just as h o r r e n d o u s as the J a p a n e s e atrocities (or even, as the m a y o r of Nagasaki put it, as a w f u l as the H o l o c a u s t ) ; or, as a f o r m e r f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r said with reference to J a p a n ' s o c c u p a t i o n of Korea, that it was invited by the Koreans! Even the o f f e r to c o m p e n s a t e v i c t i m s has been tainted, as w h e n the H a s h i m o t o g o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d establishing a f u n d for the comfort w o m e n , but using private rather than official money. 115. H o s o k a w a o f f e r e d " o u r p r o f o u n d r e m o r s e and apologies for the fact that past J a p a n e s e actions, i n c l u d i n g a g g r e s s i o n and colonial rule, c a u s e d u n b e a r a b l e suffering and sorrow for so m a n y p e o p l e . " During 1995, however, the year marking the f i f t i e t h anniversary of the P a c i f i c war, in a l o n g - r u n n i n g d r a m a in parliam e n t , a r e s o l u t i o n of " r e g r e t " ( h a n s e i , m o r e precisely r e n d e r e d , p e r h a p s , as " i n t r o s p e c t i o n " than " r e m o r s e " ) w a s finally forged in the lower house. M u c h stronger expressions of contrition and c o n d e m n a t i o n were p r o p o s e d — a n outright " a p o l o g y " and r e c o g n i t i o n of J a p a n ' s " a c t s of a g g r e s s i o n " and " c o l o n i a l i s m " — b u t rightist politicians resisted. In the end the a d o p t e d resolution (which the u p p e r h o u s e rej e c t e d ) put J a p a n ' s official f e e l i n g s in the wider context of (Western) imperialism: " R e c a l l i n g m a n y acts of aggression and colonial rule in m o d e r n world history, we r e c o g n i z e and e x p r e s s d e e p r e m o r s e f o r these kinds of actions carried out by our c o u n t r y in the past. T h e y b r o u g h t u n b e a r a b l e pain to p e o p l e a b r o a d , p a r t i c u l a r l y in Asian c o u n t r i e s . " New York Times, J u n e 7, 1995, p. 1. 116. See A y a k o Doi, " T h e O t h e r P o i s o n in J a p a n ' s A i r , " Washington Post, March 26, 1995. 117. Jameson ("Cutting Open Japan"), a longtime correspondent and resident in Japan, reminds us of J a p a n ' s leadership in numerous high-technology industries; its strong manufacturing base (which still employs one-third of the work force, as against 18 percent in the United States); its continuing large trade surplus, over $100 billion in fiscal year 1997; and, in society, the absence of any of the distressing p r o b l e m s

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that a f f l i c t y o u n g e r a n d o l d e r A m e r i c a n s , s u c h as c r i m e , d r u g a b u s e , t e e n a g e p r e g n a n c y , g u n s in s c h o o l s , a n d high d i v o r c e r a t e s . 118. P a t r i c k S m i t h , " R e m e m b e r i n g J a p a n : A Bilateral H i s t o r y , " The Washington Quarterly, pp. 1 2 1 - 1 3 6 .

Chapter Seven 1. J a m e s R o b e r t s o n , The Sane Alternative: A Choice of Futures, p p . 1 6 - 2 9 , 80-81. 2. B r a n d t et al., p. 8. 3. R i c h a r d R o s e c r a n c e , The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. 4. Q u o t e d in M a r c u s G. R a s k i n , " P r o g r e s s i v e L i b e r a l i s m f o r t h e ' 8 0 s , " The Nation, p. 5 9 1 . 5. O n the e s s e n t i a l l y d o m e s t i c s o u r c e s of S o v i e t a n d A m e r i c a n security, s e e J o h n W. B u r t o n , Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis. 6. T h e U N D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m ' s h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t i n d e x (Human Development Report ¡992, cf. t a b l e 17, pp. 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 , and table 3 8 , p. 197) is r e v e a l ing in this r e g a r d . In t h o s e c o u n t r i e s that r a n k h i g h e s t in h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t — i n cluding the top twenty industrialized countries and the Asian N I C s — g o v e r n m e n t p l a y s a c e n t r a l role in social w e l f a r e , f o r e x a m p l e , in e d u c a t i o n a n d p u b l i c h e a l t h . C o u n t r i e s t h a t r a n k l o w e s t in h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , s u c h as P a k i s t a n a n d P e r u , s p e n d v e r y little on social w e l l - b e i n g . T h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s m a y s p e n d at least t w i c e as m u c h o n t h e m i l i t a r y . T h i s d o e s n o t s u g g e s t the n e c e s s i t y of b i g g o v e r n m e n t , s i n c e the m e r e f a c t of a large b u r e a u c r a c y a n d h i g h p u b l i c - s e c t o r s p e n d i n g ( o f t e n o n m o n e y - l o s i n g state e n t e r p r i s e s ) h a r d l y e n s u r e s h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , as w e s a w in t h e c a s e of B r a z i l . W h a t it does s u g g e s t is that w h e r e g o v e r n m e n t i n v e s t s in h u m a n a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e s o u r c e s , h u m a n n e e d s s t a n d the b e s t c h a n c e of b e i n g addressed. 7. In t h e v i e w of P i n o A r l a c c h i , e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r of t h e U N I n t e r n a t i o n a l D r u g P r o g r a m , t h e key to e l i m i n a t i n g c u l t i v a t i o n of o p i u m p o p p i e s a n d c o c a p l a n t s is p r o v i d i n g f a r m i n g f a m i l i e s w i t h t h e m e a n s of d e v e l o p i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e w a y of life, i n c l u d i n g s c h o o l s , h o s p i t a l s , a n d o t h e r c r o p s to g r o w . In t h e l o n g r u n , h e c o n t e n d s , t h e a l t e r n a t i v e will be f a r c h e a p e r t h a n m i l i t a r y i n t e r d i c t i o n of d r u g t r a f f i c k ers. S e e C h r i s t o p h e r S. W r e n , " U . N . A i d e W o u l d F i g h t D r u g s w i t h ' A l t e r n a t i v e D e v e l o p m e n t , ' " New York Times, J u n e 7, 1998, o n l i n e . 8. T h e " c o n c e p t u a l m a r r i a g e of ' e n v i r o n m e n t ' a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . . . a i m s at n e w l e v e l s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m o n i t o r i n g a n d c o n t r o l . It treats as a t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m w h a t a m o u n t s to n o less t h a n a c i v i l i z a t i o n a l i m p a s s e , n a m e l y that t h e l e v e l of p r o d u c t i o n a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d in t h e N o r t h — l e t a l o n e t h e rest of t h e g l o b e — i s n o t v i a b l e . " W o l f g a n g S a c h s , " E c o l o g y vs. E c o c r a c y , " Amicus Journal, p. 4. 9. W o r l d B a n k 1992, p. 9. 10. S e e the r e p o r t of t h e 2 0 5 0 P r o j e c t , in w h i c h m o s t l y d e v e l o p i n g - c o u n t r y res p o n d e n t s o f f e r v i e w s on sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t : Tanvi N a g p a l and C. Foltz, e d s . , Choosing Our Future: Visions of a Sustainable World. 11. D e n i s G o u l e t , " A u t h e n t i c D e v e l o p m e n t : Is It S u s t a i n a b l e ? " Hunger TeachNet. In G o u l e t ' s c o n c e p t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t s h o u l d h a v e six d i m e n s i o n s : e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a t e r i a l g o o d s , s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g , p o l i t i c a l f r e e d o m s , c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y , e c o l o g i c a l s o u n d n e s s , a n d m e a n i n g f u l living.

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12. Lappe and Collins, pp. 328-339; Cornia et al., chs. 6 and 9. 13. As the one-time chief economist of the World Bank and current top U.S. trade official, Lawrence H. Summers, has written, the estimated cost in the Third and Fourth worlds of educating female children is $2.4 billion, "less than onequarter of 1 percent of their gross domestic product." Summers, "Best Third World Investment? Girls' Education," The Oregonian, May 5, 1993. 14. See William K. Stevens, "Green Revolution Not Enough, Study Finds," New York Times, September 6, 1994, p. B9; John F. Burns, "Bangladesh Still Poor, Cuts Birth Rate Sharply," New York Times, September 13, 1994, p. A5; Weiskel, "Vicious Circles." 15. Bruce Stokes, Helping Ourselves: Local Solutions to Global Problems, p. 96. 16. "Credit to the Poor," The Newsletter from the International Center for Economic Growth, pp. 3, 7; The Oregonian, June 30, 1990, p. A10; Paul Ekins, A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Social Change, pp. 122-124; Michael Renner, "Transforming Security," in Brown et al., eds., State of the World ¡997, p. 129. 17. Paul Lewis, "Small Loans May Be Key to Helping Third World," New York Times, January 26, 1997, online. 18. Paul Harrison, The Greening of Africa: Breaking Through in the Battle for Land and Food, pp. 89-91. 19. Oxfam is headquartered in London; Oxfam America, its U.S. affiliate, is in Boston. Church World Service, in New York, is part of the National Council of Churches of Christ. Grassroots International is located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Plenty Project, which has won international recognition for its self-help teachings in Guatemala (and the South Bronx), is sponsored by The Farm in Tennessee, the largest intentional community in the United States. See Lillie Wilson, "The Plenty Project: Inside the Hippie Peace Corps," New Age. An excellent overview of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) is provided by David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st Century, ch. 10. 20. John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations, pp. 39-63, 208-211. 21. The unknowns surrounding biotechnology suggest the need for great caution in relying on such a technical fix to increase food production. A good discussion is in Amicus Journal, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1993). pp. 19-30. 22. Quoted in Duane Elgin, Voluntary Simplicity: Toward a Way of Life That Is Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich, p. 190. 23. Professor Paul Wapner of American University, Washington, D.C., letter to the New York Times, December 2, 1994, p. A14. 24. Land conservation programs are outlined in a study by the American Farmland Trust, "Future Policy Directions for American Agriculture," pp. 90-92. Brown et al., State of the World 1985, pp. 135-139, notes promising research currently being done on plants and crops to increase food yields, develop new strains, and improve hardiness. The Eugene (Oregon) Register-Guard of August 2, 1985, p. 2c, reports on new developments in hydroponics—growing food without soil. Plants thrive by being suspended in fertilizer solutions, and herbicides are not applied. 25. Feeding and grazing cattle require large amounts of grain, land, water, and fossil fuels, all of which contribute to desertification, hunger, and depletion of water tables. So long as meat-for-protein diets are the norm, and grain-fed beef is more profitable than healthy people, livestock will occupy a prominent place in the

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world political economy. A c o n c i s e review of findings on this issue is in " T h e Damage Done by C a t t l e - R a i s i n g , " Washington Spectator, January 15, 1993. pp. 1-3. 26. The UN claims to have already saved the lives of 1 million children (Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1985, pp. 1, 36). 27. Harrison, pp. 2 6 1 - 2 7 1 . 28. Margaret A. Haapoja, "Tropical Medicine: An Interview with Sadie Brorson," Hemispheres. 29. The Andes program is reported in Los Angeles Times, February 16, 1985, p. 1. On Brazil, see James B r o o k e , " B r a z i l i a n State Leads Way in Saving Children," New York Times, May 14, 1993, p. 1. 30. Amory B . Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace. 3 1 . Good, concise discussions o f " s o f t path" technologies are in Lovins. pp. 38—46; John J. Berger, Nuclear Power: Unviable Option, rev. ed., part II; Brown et al., State of the World 1985, ch. 8; and Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, ch. 9. Emphasis on small-scale energy technologies has been part of U.S. aid programs for about fifteen years. 32. See, for example, Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, p. 2 1 5 ; and Harrison, pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 5 . 3 3 . Lester R . Brown et al., "Picturing a Sustainable Society," in Brown, Slate of the World 1990, pp. 177, 179. 34. T h e economic, health, safety, and energy costs of the nuclear option are briefly discussed in Berger, chs. 3 - 7 ; Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 7 3 - 8 1 ; and Lovins, Lovins, and R o s s , pp. 1 1 4 9 - 1 1 5 3 . Less frequently noted are the potentially astronomical costs (not to mention safety hazards) o f decommissioning nuclear plants and disposing o f their waste products and equipment. One recent study by Cynthia Pollock ( " D e c o m m i s s i o n i n g : Nuclear P o w e r ' s Missing L i n k " ) observes that over 3 5 0 nuclear plants will need to be decommissioned worldwide by 2 0 2 0 ; the average lifetime o f each is only about thirty-one years. That cost alone could be anywhere from $ 5 0 million to $3 billion per plant. 3 5 . S e e the extensive discussion by Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Delinking North and South: Unshackled or U n h i n g e d ? " in Albert Fishlow et al., Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 4 4 . On Third World transnational firms, see the study by Sanjaya Lall, The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises. 36. T h e s e kinds of swaps evidently are much more complicated than they appear to be. There have been seventeen debt-for-nature swaps since 1987 that have resulted in the retirement o f about $ 1 0 0 million in external debt. But this is extremely small in relation to the debt problem. S e e World Bank 1992, p. 169. 3 7 . Estimate in Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, table 1 0 - 1 , p. 2 4 9 . 3 8 . On coal as a transitional fuel, see Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 8 1 - 8 5 . 3 9 . Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, p. 82. 4 0 . Kellogg and Schware, p. 1108. 4 1 . William U. Chandler, in Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1985, p. 149. 4 2 . Brown et al., eds., State of the World 1985, pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 . 4 3 . Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1986, p. 21. 4 4 . S e e " A Practical Alternative to Mindless G r o w t h ? " New Options, no. 15 (April 8, 1985), pp. 1 - 2 . 4 5 . Christopher Flavin, " T h e L e g a c y of R i o , " in Brown et al., State of the World 1997, table 1 - 2 , p. 11.

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4 6 . I n d u s t r i e s a f f e c t e d b y r e s t r i c t i o n s on g r e e n h o u s e g a s e m i s s i o n s n o l o n g e r f o r m a u n i t e d f r o n t in o p p o s i t i o n to g l o b a l w a r m i n g a g r e e m e n t s . H a r d - l i n e r s rem a i n ; but o t h e r s , like British P e t r o l e u m , a c c e p t t h e s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t l y to b e l i e v e s o m e p r e v e n t i v e a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g c o o p e r a t i v e s t e p s with e n v i r o n m e n t a l N G O s , is w a r r a n t e d . S e e W i l l i a m K. S t e v e n s , " O n G l o b a l W a r m i n g , S o m e in Ind u s t r y A r e N o w Y i e l d i n g , " New York Times, A u g u s t 5, 1997, o n l i n e . 4 7 . F l a v i n , in B r o w n et al., Slate of the World 1990, c h . 2, p r o v i d e s an e x c e l lent o v e r v i e w of t h e s o u r c e s and c o n s e q u e n c e s of g l o b a l w a r m i n g . 4 8 . F o r b a c k g r o u n d , see C h r i s t o p h e r F l a v i n a n d S e t h D u n n , " R e s p o n d i n g to the T h r e a t of C l i m a t e C h a n g e , " in B r o w n et al., e d s . . State of the World 1998, pp. 113-130. 4 9 . T h e s e a n d o t h e r c r i t i c i s m s by e n v i r o n m e n t a l N G O s are c o n t a i n e d in a report by D e r i c k A t i e n z a f r o m K y o t o via K y o d o N e w s S e r v i c e , D e c e m b e r 9. 1997, o n l i n e . M o r e u p b e a t c o m m e n t a r y is in C h a r l e y H a n l e y ' s r e p o r t f o r the A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s , D e c e m b e r 10, 1997, o n l i n e . 50. S e e e s t i m a t e s in F l a v i n . " T h e L e g a c y of R i o , " in B r o w n et al., e d s . , State of the World 1997, p. 13 51. K e l l o g g a n d S c h w a r e , p. 1104; M a r a n t o , p. 4 9 ; Seth Z u c k e r m a n , " L i v i n g A c c o r d i n g to N a t u r e , " The Nation. 52. W o l f g a n g S a c h s , " O n e W o r l d , " in S a c h s , e d . . Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, pp. 1 0 8 - 1 1 2 . 53. M a r c u s C o l c h e s t e r , " S u s t a i n i n g t h e F o r e s t s : T h e C o m m u n i t y - B a s e d A p p r o a c h in S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t A s i a , " Development and Change. 54. A w i d e r a n g e of N G O s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e c o l l e c t i v e l y c o n c l u d e d that g o v e r n m e n t e n e r g y s u b s i d i e s p r i m a r i l y b e n e f i t the r i c h , i n d i r e c t l y tax the poor, a n d c a u s e billions of d o l l a r s ' w o r t h of e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e s t r u c t i o n . S e e B a r b a r a C r o s s e t t e , " C r i t i c s S a y I n d u s t r i a l S u b s i d i e s H u r t E n v i r o n m e n t , " New York Times, J u n e 2 3 , 1997, o n l i n e . 55. Human Development Report 1992, p. 84. 5 6 . L e s t e r R. B r o w n a n d J e n n i f e r M i t c h e l l , " B u i l d i n g a N e w E c o n o m y , " in B r o w n et al., e d s . . State of the World 1998, pp. 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 . 57. " B y 1992, there were m o r e than nine hundred international legal instrum e n t s ( m o s t l y b i n d i n g ) that e i t h e r w e r e f u l l y d i r e c t e d to e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n or h a d m o r e t h a n o n e i m p o r t a n t p r o v i s i o n a d d r e s s i n g the i s s u e . " H a r o l d K. J a c o b son a n d E d i t h B r o w n Weiss, " S t r e n g t h e n i n g C o m p l i a n c e w i t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l A c c o r d s , " in P a u l F. D i e h l , e d . , The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, p. 3 0 5 . S o m e i m p o r t a n t a g r e e m e n t s not m e n t i o n e d in this c h a p t e r are t r e a t e d b y J a c o b s e n a n d W e i s s , s u c h as t h e W o r l d H e r i t a g e C o n v e n t i o n of 1972 c o n c e r n i n g d e s i g n a t i o n of h i s t o r i c sites, a n d t h e 1973 C o n v e n t i o n on I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e in E n d a n g e r e d S p e c i e s . 5 8 . S e e E l i s a b e t h M a n n B o r g e s e , " T h e L a w of t h e S e a , " Scientific American, pp. 4 2 ^ 1 9 . 5 9 . A. W. H a r r i s , " T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e a b e d A u t h o r i t y : E n f o r c e m e n t in I n t e r n a t i o n a l N e g o t i a t i o n s , " p a p e r p r e p a r e d f o r t h e a n n u a l c o n v e n t i o n of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , A c a p u l c o , M e x i c o , M a r c h 2 3 - 2 7 , 1993. T h e c o n v e n t i o n w a s r a t i f i e d b y t h e r e q u i r e d sixty s t a t e s a n d e n t e r e d i n t o f o r c e in 1994. 6 0 . H i l a r y F. F r e n c h , " L e a r n i n g f r o m t h e O z o n e E x p e r i e n c e , " in B r o w n et al., e d s . , State of the World 1997, p p . 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 a n d t a b l e 9 - 2 , p. 166. 6 1 . T h e J a p a n e s e p r o p o s a l is in Y o i c h i K a y a et al., " M a n a g e m e n t of G l o b a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l I s s u e s , " World Futures, p p . 2 2 3 - 2 3 1 . 62. F r e n c h , " L e a r n i n g f r o m the O z o n e E x p e r i e n c e . "

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63. Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. 64. Until recently, it had been widely a s s u m e d that only f a c t o r i e s and p o w e r plants on the U.S. side, m a i n l y in the O h i o River Valley, w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e . But more recent e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that the C a n a d i a n side may a l s o be a s o u r c e for some p o l l u t i o n . In any case, d e a l i n g with the g r o w i n g p r o b l e m will require exchanges of information and d o c u m e n t a t i o n that so far have not systematically occurred. See A n t h o n y D e P a l m a , "Pollution Flow B e t w e e n U.S. and C a n a d a Called M u t u a l , " New York Times, N o v e m b e r 11, 1997, p. A9. 65. T h e antipollution c o n v e n t i o n s are briefly discussed by A r m i n R o s e n c r a n z , "The P r o b l e m of T r a n s b o u n d a r y Pollution," Environment, pp. 1 6 - 1 7 . 66. A useful survey of the informal business sector in the Third World is by A. L a w r e n c e C h i c k e r i n g and M o h a m e d S a h l a d i n e , eds., The Silent Revolution: The Informal Sector in Five Asian and Near Eastern Countries. 67. See Utne Reader, no. 15 ( A p r i l - M a y 1986), pp. 2 4 - 3 3 . 68. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. 69. See Robert C. J o h a n s e n , "Toward an Alternative Security System: M o v i n g Beyond the Balance of P o w e r in the Search for World Security," pp. 3 3 - 3 6 . 70. Patricia Mische, " R e - V i s i o n i n g National Security: Toward a Viable World Security S y s t e m , " in C a r o l y n M. S t e p h e n s o n , ed., Alternative Methods for International Security, pp. 8 2 - 8 4 . 71. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, p. 113. 72. T h e H a r v a r d p r o j e c t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s are r e f l e c t e d in the w o r k s of R o g e r Fisher and William L. Ury, starting with Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. K e l m a n ' s , C o h e n ' s , and S a u n d e r s ' a p p r o a c h e s are conveniently available as chapters in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , eds., Managing Global Chaos. 73. Serge S c h m e m a n n , " N e g o t i a t o r s , A r a b and Israeli, Built F r i e n d s h i p f r o m Mistrust," New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 28, 1995, p. 1. O n c e B e n j a m i n N e t a n y e h u became prime minister of Israel, a very different domestic political climate and far t o u g h e r line on relations with the P L O took over. T h e situation is very tense and likely to b e c o m e m u c h m o r e so should Arafat, under pressure f r o m the PA, declare statehood. 74. G e o r g e F. K e n n a n , " O n Nuclear War," New York Review of Books, p. 10. Also see D o n a l d K e y s , " T h e N e g l e c t e d ' S o f t w a r e ' A s p e c t s of D i s a r m a m e n t , " in Ervin Laszlo and Donald Keys, eds., Disarmament: The Human Factor, p. 19. 75. New York Times, O c t o b e r 14, 1997, p. A8. 76. R. J e f f r e y S m i t h , "Scientists Fault Charges of Soviet C h e a t i n g , " Science. For a contrary view, see the U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t ' s " S o v i e t N o n c o m p l i a n c e with A r m s Control A g r e e m e n t s . " T h e list begins with the 1961 Antarctic Treaty and includes the Limited Test Ban (1963), treaties g o v e r n i n g outer space ( 1 9 6 7 ) and nuclear proliferation (1968), the Seabed A r m s Control Treaty (1971), the " h o t line" a g r e e m e n t s (1963 and 1971), the A B M Treaty and protocol (1972 and 1974), and the T h r e s h o l d Test Ban ( 1 9 7 4 ) and P e a c e f u l N u c l e a r E x p l o s i o n s ( 1 9 7 6 ) treaties limiting the size of u n d e r g r o u n d tests. 77. M c G e o r g e B u n d y , G e o r g e F. K e n n a n , R o b e r t S. M c N a m a r a , and Gerard Smith, " N u c l e a r Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs, pp. 7 6 6 - 7 7 7 . 78. For further discussion of no-first-use and m i n i m u m deterrence, including additional proposals for dealing with nuclear warheads, see Daniel Ellsberg, "Manhattan Project II," and Bundy, C r o w e , and Drell. " R e d u c i n g N u c l e a r D a n g e r . " 79. S e e the c o m m e n t s of Robert M c N a m a r a and J o s e p h R o t b l a t in Schell, " T h e Gift of T i m e , " pp. 2 5 - 2 8 .

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8 0 . T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g v o t e in f a v o r w a s 115 to 2 2 ( i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) w i t h 3 2 a b s t e n t i o n s . It w a s p r o m p t e d by a r u l i n g of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t of J u s t i c e ( I C J , t h e W o r l d C o u r t ) that the threat or use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s is c o n trary to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d t h e r u l e s of c o n f l i c t e x c e p t in s e l f - d e f e n s e , w h e n the s u r v i v a l of a c o u n t r y is at stake. S e e S c h e l l , " T h e G i f t of T i m e , " pp. 1 7 - 1 8 , a n d the L a w y e r s ' C o m m i t t e e on N u c l e a r P o l i c y ( U . S . ) " M o d e l N u c l e a r W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n , " o n l i n e at w w w . L C N P . org. O n e of t h e p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s to e l i m i n a t i n g nuc l e a r w e a p o n s is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a " b r e a k o u t " by a p r e v i o u s l y n o n w e a p o n state, w h i c h c o u l d t h e n b l a c k m a i l all o t h e r s t a t e s . B u t f o r m e r s e n i o r U . S . c i v i l i a n a n d m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s d i s c o u n t s u c h a threat, p o i n t i n g o u t ( f o r e x a m p l e ) that the b r e a k out state w o u l d be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e n e g a d e and w o u l d invite total d e s t r u c t i o n by all o t h e r s t a t e s . S e e , f o r i n s t a n c e , in S c h e l l , " T h e G i f t of T i m e . " p p . 23, 5 6 , the c o m m e n t s of G e n e r a l C h a r l e s H o r n e r and G e n e r a l G e o r g e L e e Butler. 81. P a t t e r s o n , p. 197; The Defense Monitor, vol. 24, n o . 8 ( S e p t e m b e r O c t o b e r , 1995), p. 58. 82. F o r an u p - t o - d a t e r e v i e w of n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e s , s e e Z a c h a r y S. D a v i s , " T h e S p r e a d of N u c l e a r - W e a p o n - F r e e Z o n e s : B u i l d i n g a N e w N u c l e a r B a r g a i n , " Arms Control Today. 83. S e e A l e x a n d e r L. G e o r g e , " C r i s i s P r e v e n t i o n R e e x a m i n e d , " in G e o r g e , ed.. Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, pp. 3 7 9 - 3 8 2 . 84. J o h a n s e n , " T o w a r d an A l t e r n a t i v e S e c u r i t y S y s t e m , " p. 4 5 . 85. N i c o l e B a l l , Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform? pp. 22, 6 6 67. 86. T h e l i t e r a t u r e on p e a c e k e e p i n g in all its d i m e n s i o n s is g r o w i n g rapidly. A g o o d start f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s of s u c c e s s a n d f a i l u r e is C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , e d s . , Managing Global Chaos, and J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h , e d . , Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. 87. S e e W i l l i a m S h a w c r o s s , " T r a g e d y in C a m b o d i a , " New York Review of Books, N o v e m b e r 14, 1996, p p . 4 1 - 4 6 . In J u l y 1998, p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s o b s e r v e d b y a m u l t i t u d e of f o r e i g n g r o u p s w e r e b e i n g h e l d in C a m b o d i a . 88. C h e s t e r A . C r o c k e r , " T h e V a r i e t i e s of I n t e r v e n t i o n : C o n d i t i o n s f o r S u c Global Chaos, p. 186. c e s s , " in C r o c k e r a n d H a m p s o n , e d s . , Managing 89. M i c h a e l S. L u n d , " E a r l y W a r n i n g a n d P r e v e n t i v e D i p l o m a c y , " in C r o c k e r and H a m p s o n , e d s . , Managing Global Chaos, c h . 26. 9 0 . P a u l F. D i e h l ( " T h e C o n d i t i o n s f o r S u c c e s s in P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s , " in D i e h l , e d . , The Politics of Global Governance, p. 170) t h u s o b s e r v e s that w e a r e left " w i t h s o m e t h i n g of a t a u t o l o g y : p e a c e k e e p i n g is s u c c e s s f u l o n l y w h e n all parties w i s h to s t o p f i g h t i n g . " C r o c k e r a g r e e s w i t h t h e m a i n p o i n t : "It is not an accident that m a n y of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' s u c c e s s e s in p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s h a v e o c c u r r e d in c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t p l a n : f o r e x a m p l e , El S a l v a d o r , C a m b o d i a , M o z a m b i q u e , a n d N a m i b i a " ( " T h e V a r i e t i e s of I n t e r v e n t i o n , " p. 195). T h e U N m i s s i o n in A n g o l a w o u l d b e a n o t h e r e x a m p l e t h o u g h a g r e e m e n t s h a v e b r o k e n d o w n a n u m b e r of t i m e s . T h e r e is at least an a g r e e d - u p o n g o v erning structure that f o r m s a basis for discussions and eventual settlement. See New York Times, M a y 24, 1998, o n l i n e . L a r g e - s c a l e v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t p e o p l e is not, of c o u r s e , the o n l y p o s t - C o l d W a r threat to international security. T h e r e is also the " w i l l f u l and serious destruction of the global e c o s y s t e m " (as p e r h a p s in B r a z i l ' s a n d I n d o n e s i a ' s rain f o r e s t s ) a n d " t h e acquisition by a c o u n t r y [such as Iraq], in c o n t r a v e n t i o n to treaty obligations, of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s or o t h e r w e a p o n s of m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n " ( J a m e s G. Sutterlin, " U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e c i s i o n m a k i n g : F u t u r e Initiatives f o r the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a n d t h e S e c r e t a r y -

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G e n e r a l , " in Weiss, ed., p. 122). D e a l i n g with these p r o b l e m s will take a p p r o a c h e s at once m o r e delicate than and m o r e f o r c e f u l than a p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n . 91. A m o n g the m a n y r e c a p i t u l a t i o n s of the R w a n d a d e b a c l e , see Milton L e i t e n berg, " R w a n d a and B u r u n d i G e n o c i d e : A C a s e S t u d y of N e g l e c t a n d I n d i f f e r e n c e , " in S a m u e l P. O l i n e r a n d P h i l l i p T. G a y , eds., Race, Ethnicity and Gender: A Global Perspective, c h . 13; P h i l i p G o u r e v i t c h , " T h e G e n o c i d e F a x , " The New Yorker; a n d t e s t i m o n y of Jeff D r u m t r a , U.S. C o m m i t t e e f o r R e f u g e e s , " R w a n d a : G e n o c i d e a n d the C o n t i n u i n g C y c l e of V i o l e n c e , " b e f o r e the H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , S u b c o m m i t t e e o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l O p e r a t i o n s and H u m a n R i g h t s , " M a y 5, 1998, o n l i n e via w w w . u s c r . o r g . 92. A y o o b , in W e i s s , e d . , p. 4 8 . 93. R u s s e t t a n d S u t t e r l i n , p p . 7 8 - 7 9 . In their v i e w e a c h use of a p e r m a n e n t U N f o r c e w o u l d still r e q u i r e a d v a n c e a p p r o v a l by the l e g i s l a t u r e s of p a r t i c i p a t i n g states and by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l itself. 94. J a m e s G. S u t t e r l i n ( " U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e c i s i o n m a k i n g : F u t u r e I n i t i a t i v e s f o r the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , " in W e i s s , e d . , pp. 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 ) u s e s " p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t " to r e f e r (as o n e e x a m p l e ) to a r m e d e n f o r c e m e n t of a c e a s e - f i r e that b r e a k s d o w n . H e c i t e s A r t i c l e 4 0 of the U N C h a r t e r as p r o v i d i n g justification. 95. S u t t e r l i n , in W e i s s , ed., p. 130. 9 6 . D a v i d C. H e n d r i c k s o n , " T h e E t h i c s of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , " Ethics and International Affairs, pp. 1 - 1 6 . 9 7 . In A p r i l 1 9 9 8 t h e R o m a n C a t h o l i c C h u r c h in G u a t e m a l a , h e a d e d b y B i s h o p G e r a r d i , i s s u e d a r e p o r t b a s e d on h u m a n - r i g h t s a b u s e s d u r i n g the l o n g civil w a r . T h e r e p o r t g a v e e s t i m a t e s of t h e c o n f l i c t ' s c a s u a l t i e s — 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 d e a d a n d 5 0 , 0 0 0 m i s s i n g — w h i c h w e r e m a i n l y ( 8 0 p e r c e n t ) attributed to the G u a t e m a l a n m i l itary. M o s t of the p e o p l e k i l l e d b e l o n g e d to I n d i a n tribes. Yet not a s i n g l e m e m b e r of t h e m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e . H u m a n - r i g h t s g r o u p s in Guatemala have, however, reportedly begun preparing criminal files against officers, p o s s i b l y i n c l u d i n g t h e c h a r g e of g e n o c i d e . S e e New York Times, M a y 9, 1998, o n l i n e . S o m e o b s e r v e r s w o u l d no d o u b t add a f i f t h c a s e of g e n o c i d e : the K u r d s at t h e h a n d s of S a d d a m H u s s e i n . 98. S h a w c r o s s , " T r a g e d y in C a m b o d i a , " New York Review of Books, N o v e m b e r 14, 1996. 99. New York Times, F e b r u a r y 14, 1995, pp. 1 - 2 . W h e n t h e D a y t o n A c c o r d s w e r e s i g n e d in N o v e m b e r 1995, t h e i n d i c t e d B o s n i a n S e r b l e a d e r s w e r e m e r e l y d e n i e d f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r ; n o o n e w a s o b l i g e d to turn t h e m o v e r to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l on w a r c r i m e s c h a r g e s . In f a c t , the t w o p r i n c i p a l l e a d e r s w e r e a b l e to m o v e a b o u t q u i t e f r e e l y a n d c o n t i n u e to e x e r c i s e authority. 100. New York Times, M a y 2, 1998, p. 1. 101. T h e final ( u n o f f i c i a l ) v o t e o n t h e d r a f t treaty, w h i c h m u s t n o w b e r a t i f i e d b y sixty g o v e r n m e n t s b e f o r e it c a n t a k e e f f e c t , w a s 120 in f a v o r , 7 a g a i n s t , a n d 21 a b s t a i n i n g . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a g r e e d o n l y to a c c e p t the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n in c a s e s of g e n o c i d e . A l e s s a n d r a S t a n l e y , " U . S . D i s s e n t s , but A c c o r d Is R e a c h e d o n W a r C r i m e C o u r t , " New York Times, J u l y 18, 1998, o n l i n e . 102. T h e c o n v e r s i o n (or m o r e u s u a l l y , d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ) of m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s h a s a d i s p u t e d r e c o r d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A P e n t a g o n s t u d y b a s e d m a i n l y o n c o n v e r s i o n e x p e r i e n c e s in t h r e e c o m m u n i t i e s p e r h a p s p r e d i c t a b l y f o u n d n o c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a t i o n a l o f f i c e to p r o m o t e o r f a c i l i t a t e s h i f t s t o n o n m i l i t a r y p r o d u c t i o n ( U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e , O f f i c e of t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e , O f f i c e of E c o n o m i c A d j u s t m e n t , a n d P r e s i d e n t ' s E c o n o m i c A d j u s t m e n t C o m m i t t e e , Economic Adjustment/Conversion). P a t r i c i a M i s c h e (in

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Stephenson, ed., p. 81), on the other hand, cites another Defense Department study of successful conversions in sixty-one U.S. communities. Both the problems and the opportunities presented by military conversion are clearly outlined in a case study by Joel S. Yudken, "Conversion in the Aerospace Industry: The McDonnellDouglas Project," in Gordon and McFadden, eds., pp. 130-143; and by Seymour Melman, "Successful Conversion Experiences," in Brunn et al., eds., pp. 338-344. For Europe, see Renner, "Swords into Plowshares"; Gordon and McFadden, eds.; and Paul Dunne and Sue Willett, "National Case Studies in Conversion: The United Kingdom," in Brunn et al., eds., pp. 209-230. 103. Kirkpatrick Sale, "Conversion to What: A Green View of Economic Planning," Utne Reader. 104. Marion Anderson et al., "Converting the American Economy." 105. An example of this coordinated effort is taking place in southern California, where an estimated 580,000 workers in military industries may be displaced. In Los Angeles County, local government, in cooperation with the California state legislature and private businesses, is looking at ways to retrain aerospace workers and develop new industries, such as the electric car (New York Times, March 2, 1992, p. 1). It remains to be seen how much support such projects receive from the federal government. 106. See Maj. Britt Theorin, "Military Resources to the Environment," in Brunn et al., pp. 247-251. 107. Remarks to the State of the World Forum, October 3, 1996. 108. Mische, in Stephenson, ed., pp. 75-76; Robert Muller, "A World Core Curriculum," Education Network News. 109. The widening interest in peace and global studies is reflected in Barbara J. Wien, ed., Peace and World Order Studies. 4th ed.; Robert Woito, To End War: A New Approach to International Conflict; and "Teaching for Peace," Christian Science Monitor supplement, January 31, 1986. 110. For the many ways in which to "think globally, act locally" can be understood, theoretically and practically, see Elgin; Stokes; Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement; Margo Adair, Working Inside Out: Tools for Change: Joan Bodner, ed., with the American Friends Service Committee, Taking Charge of Our Lives: Living Responsibly in a Troubled World; and Corinne McLaughlin and Gordon Davidson, Builders of the Dawn: Community Lifestyles in a Changing World. 111. Hawken, "A Declaration of Sustainability," Utne Reader, pp. 54-60. 112. On nonviolent defense, see Gene Sharp, "Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal," in Severyn T. Bruyn and Paula M. Rayman, eds., Nonviolent Action and Social Change. 113. Los Angeles Times, February 16, 1986, p. 19. 114. From various issues of Far Eastern Economic Review, May and June 1992, and C. Douglas Lummis, "People Power in Thailand: Long Parliament in the Streets," The Nation, June 22, 1992, pp. 858-860. 115. Global Education Associates of East Orange, New Jersey, is one organization that seeks to forge a transnational network. Patricia Mische, cited above, is its cofounder. Most of the other organizations listed can be found in Woito, pp. 539-604. 116. However, it now appears that the code, signed by nearly 200 countries, is being widely broken. Twenty-one companies are reportedly giving away free milksubstitute samples all around the world, from Poland to Thailand. New York Times, April 11, 1998, p. A6. 117. The Clinton administration has brokered an agreement with some of the leading apparel makers, human-rights NGOs, and unions to create a code of

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Notes

c o n d u c t . A m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the c o d e is s u p p o s e d to e n s u r e m o n i t o r i n g of o v e r s e a s s w e a t s h o p s a n d a l i v i n g w a g e , t h o u g h d e t a i l s of t h e s e m a t t e r s r e m a i n to b e w o r k e d o u t . S t e v e n G r e e n h o u s e , " A N e w A p p r o a c h to E l i m i n a t i n g S w e a t s h o p s , " New York Times, A p r i l 13, 1997, o n l i n e . 118. R u g m a r k w o r k s w i t h c a r p e t m a n u f a c t u r e r s in India a n d N e p a l to m o n i tor p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n t r i b u t e f e e s r a i s e d to s c h o o l s . T h e r e are, h o w e v e r , m a n y d i f f i c u l t i e s in m o n i t o r i n g c a r p e t p r o d u c t i o n . S e e t h e New York Times, O c t o b e r 16, 1997, p. B l . 119. P a u l E k i n s , a d i r e c t o r of the a w a r d , p r o f i l e s S u r v i v a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d m o s t of the o t h e r r e c i p i e n t s in A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Social Change. T h e b o o k is an e x c e l l e n t d i r e c t o r y of g l o b a l - c h a n g e a g e n t s . 120. O n the G r e e n s , c o n s u l t C a p r a and S p r e t n a k . 121. S i v a r d , Women: A World Survey, p p . 2 9 - 3 4 ; B r a n d t et al., p p . 5 9 - 6 2 ; E l l e n D o r s e y , " T h e G l o b a l W o m e n ' s M o v e m e n t : A r t i c u l a t i n g a N e w V i s i o n of G l o b a l G o v e r n a n c e , " in D i e h l . ed., ch 18. 122. T h e U N ' s p r o b l e m s a n d f a i l i n g s as a g e n d e r - c o n s c i o u s e m p l o y e r a r e c h r o n i c l e d in the New York Times, A p r i l 10, 1995, p. 1. 123. S h u m a n , p p . 2 9 - 3 5 . 124. S e e B l o n d , p p . 8 6 - 9 0 , for s u g g e s t i o n s of a c o d e of T N C c o n d u c t . 125. D i a n a Jean S c h e m o , " E c u a d o r e a n s Want T e x a c o to C l e a r T o x i c R e s i d u e , " New York Times, F e b r u a r y 1, 1998, o n l i n e . T h e spillage of oil, said by t h e p l a i n t i f f s to e x c e e d the Exxon Valdez d i s a s t e r , o c c u r r e d w h e n T e x a c o w a s e n g a g e d in a j o i n t v e n t u r e w i t h t h e E c u a d o r a n n a t i o n a l oil c o m p a n y . A m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the c o u r t m a y d e c i d e o n e of the i s s u e s r a i s e d in this b o o k : C a n a T N C t a k e a d v a n t a g e of ano t h e r c o u n t r y ' s l o w e r , or n o n e x i s t e n t e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t a n d a r d s , m a k e a p o l l u t i o n h a v e n of it, and h a v e n o o b l i g a t i o n to the p o p u l a t i o n that s u f f e r s ? C a n that p o p u lation sue in the T N C ' s h o m e t o w n , or d o e s it h a v e no r e c o u r s e at all? 126. H e d l e y B u l l , " T h e S t a t e ' s P o s i t i v e R o l e in W o r l d A f f a i r s , " Daedalus. 127. R i c h a r d A. F a l k , i n t r o d u c t i o n to F a l k , K i m , a n d M e n d l o v i t z , p. 14. 128. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , R a y m o n d B o n n e r , " H o w a G r o u p of O u t s i d e r s M o v e d N a t i o n s to B a n M i n e s , " New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 20, 1997, p. 4. T h e m o v e m e n t to b a n l a n d m i n e s w a s s t a r t e d by t w o A m e r i c a n s , w h o r e c e i v e d c r u c i a l s u p p o r t f r o m the C a n a d i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s did not sign the r e s u l t i n g treaty, w h i c h w a s s i g n e d in O t t a w a in D e c e m b e r 1997, m a i n l y b e c a u s e of its s t a t e d rel i a n c e on land m i n e s to d e f e n d S o u t h K o r e a f r o m i n v a s i o n . In t h e w a k e of the w a r s in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a a n d C a m b o d i a , a w o r l d w i d e m o m e n t u m g a t h e r e d in t h e m i d - 1 9 9 0 s to b a n l a n d m i n e s , w h i c h c l a i m r o u g h l y 2 5 , 0 0 0 l i v e s ( m o s t l y c i v i l i a n ) e v e r y year. T h e u s u a l e s t i m a t e is that t h e r e are a r o u n d 100 m i l l i o n l a n d ( a n t i p e r s o n n e l ) m i n e s w o r l d w i d e . In C a m b o d i a a l o n e , m i n e s p l a n t e d b y all sides a c c o u n t e d f o r m o s t of t h e c a s u a l t i e s and r e n d e r e d as m u c h as 5 p e r c e n t of the l a n d u n u s a b l e , t h u s a l s o c o n t r i b u t i n g to p r o b l e m s of r e s e t t l i n g r e f u g e e s . S e t h M y d a n s , " L i v i n g w i t h L a n d M i n e s : C a m b o d i a ' s D e a d l y T o l l , " New York Times, M a y 11, 1996, p. 4. 129. New York Times, July 13, 1998, o n l i n e . With C a n a d a a n d N o r w a y l e a d i n g the way, the first international m e e t i n g to deal with legal and illegal t r a f f i c in s m a l l a r m s took p l a c e in O s l o in m i d - 1 9 9 8 . T w e n t y c o u n t r i e s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d . T h e s e w e a p o n s , such as h a n d g u n s , h o w i t z e r s , and o t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s h a n d l e d b y o n e or a t e a m of soldiers, are t h e kind that f u e l nationalist and e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . O n c e m o r e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s and s o m e o t h e r m a j o r military p o w e r s that p r o d u c e s m a l l a r m s shied a w a y f r o m e n d o r s i n g an international a g r e e m e n t to ban or limit their sales. W i t h the u n e x p e c t e d s u c c e s s of the l a n d - m i n e treaty, W a s h i n g t o n is e s p e c i a l l y c o n c e r n e d that a so-called M a d i s o n A v e n u e a p p r o a c h , in w h i c h a h i g h - p r o f i l e c i t i z e n - l e d

Notes

351

c a m p a i g n a p p e a l s o v e r the h e a d s of the a r m s - c o n t r o l b u r e a u c r a c y , m i g h t just succeed. 130. A u s e f u l general discussion of a values shift is in B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 3 4 9 - 3 6 1 . T h a t a shift is taking place in the United States is e s t a b l i s h e d in d i f f e r e n t w a y s by several writers. See, for instance, Daniel Yankelovich, New Rules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down, p u b l i c o p i n i o n poll results; A r n o l d Mitchell, " C h a n g i n g Values and Lifestyles"; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Marilyn Ferguson, The Aquarian Conspiracy: Personal and Social Transformation in the 1980s; Tikkun, vol. 11, no. 3 ( M a y - J u n e 1996), pp. 11-12. The necessity of a values shift is cogently argued in an e x p a n d i n g n u m b e r of b o o k s , notably B r o w n , Building a Sustainable Society, pp. 3 4 9 - 3 6 1 ; Mark Satin, New Age Politics: Healing Self and Society; Theodore R o s z a k , Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society; and Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart. Finally, n o t h i n g i l l u m i n a t e s better than personal e x p e r i e n c e s of changed values and attitudes. Norie H u d d l e ' s Surviving: The Best Game on Earth c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r of i n t e r v i e w s with both w e l l - k n o w n and n o t - s o - w e l l - k n o w n people (including a few from outside the United States) on the critical question of redefining national security. 131. R o g e r Walsh, Staying Alive: The Psychology of Human Survival, ch. 11. 132. Los Angeles Times, S e p t e m b e r 26, 1984, 5/p. 1. 133. U Thant, View from the UN, p. 454.

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Index

Acid rain, 11, 92, 221, 222, 280 A d a m s , Gerry, 2 6 3 Afghanistan: abuse of w o m e n in, 89; civil war in, 18; as failed state, 14; peacekeeping missions in, 2; r e f u g e e s f r o m , 136; Soviet intervention in, 27, 28, 168; Taliban in. 12; w o m e n ' s status in, 121 Africa, 14tab. See also individual countries; conflict in, 2; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 91; health issues in, 6, 122 African National Congress, 96, 97, 147, 150 African Nuclear Free Z o n e Treaty (1996), 187tab Aid: conditions on, 5 4 - 5 5 , 251; d e v e l o p m e n t , 131, 132; direct, 39; diversion to military purposes, 62; e c o n o m i c , 251; grants, 39; loans, 39; private, 39; transnational c o m p a n i e s and, 51 ; to u n d e r d e v e l o p e d nations, 39 A I D S , 6, 122, 135 Air pollution, 6, 7, 144, 222, 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 Albania, 22 A l f o n s i n , Raul, 105 Algeria, 14tab, 20; abuse of w o m e n in, 89; colonialism in, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; repression in, 134; terrorism in, 19 Allende, Salvador, 28, 105 Alliances: corporate, 34; e c o n o m i c , 25, 34; Gulf War, 64; ideological, 31; military, 25, 62, 244; realism and,

25; t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n , 44; Western, 219 A m n e s t y International, 277 Angola, 53; civil war in, 18; colonialism in, 149; health care, 123; peacekeeping in, 17 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 179 A n t i - S e m i t i s m , 221 Apartheid, 86, 87, 96, 1 4 4 - 1 5 1 , 2 7 6 A P E C . See Asia-Pacific E c o n o m i c Cooperation Aquino, Corazon, 133 Arafat, Yasir, 15, 2 6 3 Arendt, H a n n a h , 83 Argentina: debt service, 130, 254; in Falkland Islands, 8; health issues, 252; military rule in, 87, 104, 105; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 175, 178; oppression in, 9 4 - 1 1 0 , 104, 105; water access, 123 A r m e d Islamic G r o u p , 19 A r m e n i a , 16, 2 0 A r m s . See W e a p o n s A r m s Exports Control Act, 61 A r m s race: costs of, 165, 166, 1 9 7 - 2 1 5 ; m a i n t e n a n c e of, 179; p o s t - C o l d War, 1 8 5 - 1 9 6 ; roots of, 168 Asia. See also individual countries; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 240; financial crisis in, 14, 7 0 - 7 4 ; h u m a n rights in, 85; International M o n e t a r y F u n d in, 7 1 - 7 2 ; World B a n k in, 72

379

380

Index

Asian Development Bank, 39, 72, 2 3 4 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 17 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2 4 0 Aum Shinrikyo, 191 Aung San Suu Kyi, 107, 108 Australia, 14tab, 27, 2 3 8 Aylwin, Patricio, 105 Azerbaijan, 16, 20, 2 2 . 51 Baker, James, 133, 166 Baker Pian, 133 Bangladesh, \4tab, 112; child labor in, 4 5 ; income distribution in, 1 1 8 t a b ; malnutrition in, 123; population, 5; water access, 123 Banking, 11; Asian Development Bank, 39, 72, 2 3 4 ; Bundesbank, 224, 2 2 5 ; central, 2 2 4 ; Grameen Bank, 2 5 0 ; Inter-American Development Bank, 39, 119; interlocking directorates in, 52; joint ventures, 3 3 - 3 4 ; regional, 39; regulations, 70; Third World loans, 32; transnational, 33, 37 Baruch Plan ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 183 Belarus, 2 0 Belgium, 2 2 3 Berlin Wall, 2 Biko, Steve, 97, 145, 146 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 187tab, 195, 196 Bioregionalism, 2 5 8 , 2 5 9 Blair, Tony, 2 6 3 Blumenthal, Michael, 32 Boff, Father Leonardo, 104 Bolivia: infant mortality in, 123; oppression in, 104 Bosnia, 16, 18, 2 2 8 , 267; abuse of women in, 89; genocide in, 14, 2 6 9 ; refugees from, 136 Botha, P.W„ 151 Boulding, Kenneth, 7 8 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 14, 2 6 8 Brady, Nicholas, 133 Brandt, Willy, 2 6 3 Brandt Commission, 24, 7 5 - 7 6 , 120, 244 Brazil, 112; Amazon development, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 ; Amazon Pilot Program, 163; Brazilian Workers' Party, 103;

debt service, 127, 130, 2 5 4 ; economic system, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 , 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 ; as emerging market. 14; energy programs, 2 5 5 ; environmental issues in, 131, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 ; exports, 125; financial crisis in, 74; food riots in, 131; health issues, 2 5 2 ; human rights in, 159; income distribution in, 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 , 11Stab. 152; infant mortality in, 123; investment in. 4 6 ; landholding in. 119; military rule in, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 ; neocolonialism in, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 ; nuclear development, 175; oppression in, 104; political system, 159; population growth, 125, 159; poverty in, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 , 159; repression in, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; social unrest in, 131; United States pressure on, 27; urbanization in, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 ; World Bank in, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 Bretton Woods Conference ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 57 Brezhnev, Leonid, 28, 168, 174, 184, 199, 272 Brezhnev Doctrine, 28 Brundtland Commission, 2 4 8 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 32, 4 9 Buddhism, 77, 108 Bundesbank, 225 Burkina Faso, 2 5 2 Burma, 273; deforestation in, 159; military government, 45; narcopolitics in, 135; National League for Democracy, 107; political system, 0, 107; repression in, 20, 45; sanctions on, 4 8 ; slave labor in, 53; State Law and Order Restoration Council, 19 Bush, George, 2, 3, 13, 33, 62, 63, 64, 68, 185, 186, 2 0 6 , 207, 2 0 8 , 2 6 2 Butler, George Lee, 189, 2 7 2 Byrnes, James F., 57 Cabral, Amilcar, 9 6 Cambodia, 20, 267; environmental issues in, 89, 131; genocide in, 7, 269; peacekeeping in, 2, 17; political system, 87; repression in, 134; UN Transitional Authority in, 2 3 8 Campbell, Kim, 9 8 - 9 9 Canada, 1 4 t a b ; criticism o f United

Index States, 31; energy programs, 256; investment in United States, 37; nuclear development, 192; nuclear sales, 92 Capital: attracting, 67, 73; controls against, 48; export of, 48; external. 155; flight, 54, 69; flows, 67; foreign, 46, 67, 71, 101, 138, 141, 146, 148; global movement of, 32; international, 38; investment, 148; management, 73; origination of, 37; private, 39; profit margins on, 37 Capitalism, 10, 81; globalization of, 12, 31; iiberal, 81; modernization patterns of, 93; robber baron, 204; transnational, 59; tycoon, 203; Western, 93; world, 8 Capra, Fritjof, 78 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 163 Carter, Jimmy, 32, 59, 84, 199, 207 Case studies: apartheid, 144-151; Brazil, 158-164; China, 136-144; dependence/modernization, 229-241; developing countries' financial crises, 66-74; economic "miracle," 151-158; environmental issues, 158-164; Gulf War, 60-66; Japan, 229-241; postwar United States, 55-60; revolution and transformation, 136-144; South Korea, 151-158 Catholicism, 103, 104, 276 Ceaucescu, Nicolai, 273 Central Treaty Organization, 31 CFE. See Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Change: economic, 42; resistance to, 22; social, 11, 39, 83; technological, 91 Charter 77, 107 Chechnya, 18, 27, 205, 267 Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), ISltab, 196 Chernobyl disaster, 9, 10-11, 170 Children: child labor, 45, 53, 122; crime against, 210; poverty and, 122; Third World, 122; violence against,

86 Chile: exports, 119; human rights in, 105; income distribution in, 118ta£>, 119; investment in, 119; oppression

381

in, 105; political system, 87; privatization in, 119; United States pressure on, 27, 28 China: AIDS in, 6; Anti-Rightist Campaign, 138; arms sales, 62; collectivization in, 137; communalization in, 138; consumer goods production, 139; democratization in, 142; dissent in, 142; economic system, 29, 137, 138, 139; energy programs, 255; environmental issues in, 131, 142. 143, 144, 240, 256, 259; Great Leap Forward, 137; Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 138; gross national product, 139; human rights in, 15, 53, 54, 142; investment in, 32, 141; landholding in, 119; land reform in, 137; life expectancy, 140; literacy rate, 140; military spending, 18, 142-143; modernization in, 10, 136-144; nationalism in, 142-143; non-governmental organizations in, 142; nuclear development, 175; nuclear testing, 191 tab, 192; oppression in, 94-110; patriarchy in, 98-99; political openness in, 46; political system, 107-108, 139; population growth in, 126; poverty in, 140; privatization in, 51; repression in, 142; revolution in, 136-144; sanctions on, 141; Soviet relations with, 27; state legitimacy in, 2; Tiananmen crackdown, 45, 140, 141, 276; trade balance, 141; trade shares, 35; weapons of mass destruction in, 66; women's status in, 121, 140; World Bank in, 141 Chun D o o H w a n , 154, 155, 156, 157 Churchill, Winston, 268 Clifford, Clark, 58 Clinton, Bill, 48, 68, 142, 186, 207, 237, 238, 250, 264, 268, 279 Cold War: alignments, 166; arms race and, 165-215; competition, 16-17; ideology of, 3; nuclear danger during,167-185 Collectivism, 24 Colombia: narcopolitics in, 135; political scandal in, 22; repression in, 135-136

382

Index

Colonialism, 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 C o m m u n i c a t i o n s : security and, 262-264 C o m m u n i s m , 59, 104, 148, 149, 185, 207, 221. 226 Competition: Cold War, 16-17; d e f e n s e against, 35; economic, 3; global, 47; intensification of, 49; market, 17; nuclear, 2; political, 70, 87; protection f r o m , 154; reduction of, 17; for resources, 60; technological, 29; trade, 71; unregulated, 32 C o m p r e h e n s i v e Test-Ban Treaty, 186, 187ta6, 188, 192, 265 C o n f e r e n c e on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 227, 228 Conflict: armed, 6; civil, 2, 13; c o n s e q u e n c e s of, 8 8 - 8 9 ; costs of, 88; ethnic, 6, 18, 248; genocidal, 7; global, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 ; of interest, 52; internal, 115; interstate, 2; midintensity, 63; national vs. global security, 28; nonviolent resolution, 77; political, 6; resolution, 8 0 - 8 1 ; trade, 46 Congo: civil war in, 18; genocide by, 19 C o n t a i n m e n t , 25 Continentalism, 224 Conventional A r m s Register, 196 C o n v e n t i o n on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 77 C o n v e n t i o n on Transboundary Air Pollution, 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 Corporate Globalism, 4; d e p e n d e n c e on Realism, 4 8 - 4 9 , 59; e c o n o m i c program, 57; Gulf War and, 64; institutional values in, 25tab; interdependence and, 33; m a n a g e m e n t strategies, 32; new world order and, 6 0 - 6 6 ; n o r m s of, 26tab; personal values in, 25tab; p o s t - C o l d War, 6 6 - 7 4 ; social values in, 24; theory and practice, 2 3 - 7 4 ; transnational c o m p a n i e s and, 9, 23, 46-47 Corruption, 22, 69, 70, 71, 85, 102, 144, 200 C o s t a Rica: deforestation in, 159; health care in, 125; income

distribution in, 118, 118tab; literacy in, 125; w o m e n ' s status in, 125 Council Forests Mutual E c o n o m i c Assistance, 200 Crime: against children, 210; against humanity, 268; official, 22; syndicates, 22; white-collar, 210 Croatia, 22, 227, 228 Crocker, Chester, 267 C S C E . See C o n f e r e n c e on Security and Cooperation in Europe CTBT. See C o m p r e h e n s i v e Test-Ban Treaty C u b a , 112; education in, 125; health care in, 125; investment in. 15; population growth in, 126; sanctions on, 48 C u b a n missile crisis, 175 Cultural: autonomy, 16, 140; bias, 76, 87; diversity, 212; imperialism, 44, 114; influence, 17; insensitivity, 85; regeneration, 92; relativism, 85; transmission, 50; values, 44 Culture: dominant, 12; global m o v e m e n t of, 32; indigenous, 20, 135-136, 248, 257, 263; political, 85; traditional, 12; transnational, 14; universal, 12 Currency: collapse, 40, 66, 71; c o m m o n , 220, 224; convertible, 148; crises, 69, 71, 127, 152; dollar, 10, 56, 60; flow of, 33; hard, 17, 130; inflation, 68; international, 10; overvaluation, 68; revaluation, 35; strengthening, 60; union, 224, 225; valuation, 34, 66, 115, 225 Czechoslovakia, 26; acid rain in, 222; environmental issues in, 222; military spending, 218; in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 189; oppression in, 94—110; political system, 106, 107; post-communist, 82; separation of, 18; Soviet intervention in, 28; state legitimacy in, 2 Dayton Accords, 267 Debt: delinking, 254; external, 48, 90; foreign, 148, 155; forgiveness, 254; interest on, 90; international, 10; moratoria, 68, 254; relief, 20;

383

Index

repayment, 130, 132; repudiation of, 48; service, 130, 131, 141; Third World, 54, 130-134; traps, 131, 133 Declaration of a Global Ethic, 5 Declaration of the United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t (1972), 258 Deforestation. See Forests de Gaulle, Charles, 224 Dehydration, 6 de Klerk, Frederik, 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 , 151 D e m o c r a c y Wall, 107 Democratization. 20; in C h i n a , 142; exporting, 44; grassroots, 87; limitations of, 20, 21; m e a s u r i n g , 87; in Mexico, 70; in Russia, 204; in South Korea, 155; Third World, 15; trade concessions and, 15 Deng Xiaoping, 138, 139, 140, 141. 142, 144 Desertification, 11 D e v e l o p m e n t : alternative m e a n i n g s of, 13; as-growth. 249; assistance, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 ; basic needs, 125; e c o n o m i c , 8, 38, 41, 85, 139, 2 4 8 - 2 6 1 ; engines of, 41; export-led, 128, 132; h u m a n , 13, 14, 54, 90, 119, 247; h u m a n e , 2 4 8 - 2 6 1 ; index, 77, 90; industrial, 130, 180; measuring, 90; models, 80; national, 54; social, 2 4 8 - 2 6 1 ; spiritual, 78; sufficiency in, 249; sustainable, 20, 94, 248, 249; transnational style, 129; trickle-down, 117-119; w o m e n in, 20 D i p l o m a c y : atomic, 183; c h e c k b o o k , 239; citizen, 270; e c o n o m i c , 17; gunboat, 46; preventive, 267; quiet, 149; realism and, 25; state-to-state, 11; traditional, 10, 48 D i s a r m a m e n t , 5, 58 Dole, Robert, 63 D o w n s i z i n g , 17, 72, 74, 2 0 7 Drugs, 15; cartels, 22, 135; narcopolitics, 135; official involvement in, 135; s m u g g l i n g , 22, 187; trafficking in, 22, 69, 143 D u b o s , Rene, 78 Earth S u m m i t (1992), 3, 20, 113, 162 East Timor, 45

Ecocide, 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 E c o n o m i c : alliances, 25; barriers, 224; change, 42; competition, 3; cooperation, 238; crises, 66; decline, 16; democracy, 87; dependence, 219; development, 8, 3 8 , 4 1 , 85, 139, 2 4 8 - 2 6 1 ; diplomacy, 17; expansion, 56; globalization, 2 1 - 2 2 ; growth, 90, 94; inequality, 6, 54, 70; integration, 57; investment, 220; justice, 77, 81, 82; liberalization, 69; migrants, 6, 43, 136; nationalism, 29, 42, 53; planning, 154; policy, 17; power, 13-14, 17, 46, 180; reform, 139, 143; regionalization, 239; renewal, 1 6 - 1 7 ; restructuring, 60, 67; sanctions, 25, 62, 63, 64; zones, 143 E c o n o m y : aid-dependent, 14; control of, 73; global, 244; high-income, 14tab; household- based, 140; market, 14; military, 180; oilexporting, I4tab; open, 57; political, 8 - 9 ; single global, 47, 244; subsistence, 146 Ecopolitics, 91 Ecuador: malnutrition in, 123; repression in, 104, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 Education, 247, 272; access to, 90; benefits, 91; costs of, 122; poverty and, 122; public, 209; spending, 6, 209; of w o m e n , 125, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 Egypt, 112; arms sales through, 61; debt service, 130; f o o d riots in, 131; h u m a n rights in, 20; International M o n e t a r y F u n d in, 4 0 - 4 1 ; land laws, 40—41; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 194; social unrest in, 131 Einstein, Albert, 167 Eisenhower, Dwight, 59, 166, 182, 183, 197, 272 El Salvador, 14tab, 87; i n c o m e distribution in, 117-119; landholding in, 119; oppression in, 9 4 - 1 1 0 ; r e f u g e e s f r o m , 136; state terror in,

106 E m p l o y m e n t . See also U n e m p l o y m e n t ; capital-intensive, 91; labor-intensive, 91; transnational c o m p a n i e s impact on, 91

384

Index

Energy: alternative, 83; conservation. 2 5 5 - 2 5 6 ; crises, 30; nuclear, 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ; resources, 17, 257; selfreliance, 252; soft, 252, 257 Environment: c h l o r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s in, 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 ; global w a r m i n g , 159, 222, 256, 258; greenhouse emissions, 161. 256; ozone in, 258, 259; urban quality of, 6 Environmental: considerations, 90; costs of war, 89; decline, 6, 128-130, 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 ; destruction. 54, 7 9 , 9 1 , 109-110, 133; exploitation, 81; growth costs, 91; justice, 20; protection, 17, 77, 144, 247, 2 5 6 - 2 6 1 ; regulations, 40; security, 20; technology, 240; transboundary problems, 16 Eritrea, 16 Estonia, 16, 201 Ethiopia, 112; water access, 123 Ethnic: autonomy, 16; bias, 97; cleansing, 16, 18, 86, 89, 228, 268; conflict, 6, 18; nationalism, 3; violence, 74, 228 Europe, Eastern, 14tab; d e p e n d e n c e on West, 31; e c o n o m i c problems, 221; environmental issues in, 222; h u m a n rights in, 19; market e c o n o m y in, 40; political liberalization in, 28; poverty in, 221; u n e m p l o y m e n t in, 221 Europe, Western: energy p r o g r a m s , 256; post-war, 2 1 7 - 2 2 9 European Atomic Energy C o m m u n i t y , 223 European Coal and Steel C o m m u n i t y , 223 European C o m m u n i t y . See European Union European Parliament, 224 European Union, 2; antiforeigner sentiment, 220; central banking in, 224; dependence on oil, 219; discrimination in, 220, 221; economic strength, 13, 59; expansion, 223, 225; exports, 218, 224; gross national product, 224; objectives, 223; security issues, 227; trade shares, 219; World Trade Organization and, 33

E x c h a n g e : earnings, 162; fixed-rate system, 40; foreign, 40. 160, 162: international, 40; rates. 49, 68; reserves, 141 Exports, 90, 91, 218. 224, 230, 233. 236; acceleration in, 69; agricultural, 92; barriers, 35; cash crop. 51; competition, 60; dangerous, 255, 257; dual-use, 62; global, 33; of jobs, 260; primary product, 126; promotion of, 67, 91; timber, 162 Famine, 10. 30. 249 Fanaticism, I Fanon, Frantz, 100 Fellowship of Reconciliation, 277 F e m i n i s m , 78 Fertility rates, 5 Feudalism, 137 First World: arms race and, 168; characteristics of, 14tab; preparedness for war in, 168 Food: assistance, 10; dependency, 129; dietary change and, 252; distribution inequities, 128; g r o w - y o u r - o w n , 252; hydroponic, 252; imports, 127. 128; production, 5, 11. 128, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 ; relief, 30; reserves, 5; right to, 249; self-sufficiency, 6, 249, 252; subsidies, 67; sufficiency, 127-128 Ford, Gerald, 184, 211 Forests: clearing, 143; depletion of, 5, 11, 158-164; fires, 129, 161, 162; protection of, 20; selloff to transnational companies, 131; timber sales, 89; unsustainable logging, 163 Forrestal, James, 58 Fourth World: characteristics of, 14tab; environmental issues in, 92; poverty in, 14; survival in, 2; unemployment in, 260 F r a m e w o r k Convention on Climate Change, 256 France: arms sales, 62, 217; corporate intervention by, 52; environmental issues in, 258; in European Coal and Steel C o m m u n i t y , 223; immigration into, 221; in International Monetary Fund, 39; military spending, 217; National Front in, 220; nuclear

Index

d e v e l o p m e n t , 175; nuclear testing, 191 tab, 192; political scandal in, 22; transnational c o m p a n i e s in, 38 Freud, S i g m u n d , 77 Friere, P a o l o , 83 F r o m m , Erich, 77 G a b o n , 123 Gambia. 252 Gandhi, M o h a n d a s , 9 4 - 1 1 0 , 243 GATT. See General Agreement of Tariffs a n d Trade General A g r e e m e n t of Tariffs and Trade. 3 3 , 162 G e n o c i d e , 7, 15, 18. 19, 77. 264, 269-270 Georgia, 2 7 Germany, 7; acid rain in, 92, 221; antiS e m i t i s m >n, 221; arms sales, 2 1 7 ; c o r p o r a t e intervention by, 52; d i s a r m a m e n t m o v e m e n t , 226; discrimination in, 221; e c o n o m i c strength, 13; e c o n o m i c system, 221; energy p r o g r a m s , 255; environmental issues in, 92, 256, 258; in European Coal a n d Steel C o m m u n i t y , 223; Europeain role, 228; financial p r o b l e m s in, 221; immigration into, 221; in International Monetary Fund, 39; j o b e x p o r t in, 17; military s p e n d i n g , 217; patriarchy in, 99; privatization in, 221; r e f u g e e s in, 221; r e u n i f i c a t i o n , 2, 221; social p r o b l e m s , 221; trade shares, 35; transnational c o m p a n i e s in, 38 Ghana: health care, 123; income distribution in, 118rai>,' political system, 134 Glasnost, 197, 201 Global: authority, 14; collective action, 10; community, 90, 2 6 1 - 2 7 1 ; c o m p e t i t i o n , 47; conflict, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 ; e c o n o m i c decline, 16; economy, 244; m a r k e t s , 34; periphery, 14; poverty, 14; responsibility, 82, 244; security, 1 - 4 ; sys tem c h a n g e s , 244; thinking, 2 4 7 - 2 8 1 ; trade, 17; trends, 13-22; u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t , 81; violence, 88; w a r m i n g , 159, 222, 256, 258

385

Global H u m a n i s m , 4, 8; activism in, 8 2 - 8 4 ; beliefs of, 7 7 - 9 4 ; challenges to, 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 ; criticisms of, 9 3 - 9 4 ; h u m a n interest and, 9; h u m a n rights in, 9; idealism in, 78; institutional values in, 25tab; m e a s u r e m e n t s , 7 7 - 9 4 ; n o r m s of, 26tab; objectives of, 7 7 - 9 4 ; p e a c e m a k i n g in, 80; personal values in, 25tab; political perspectives, 7 5 - 1 1 0 ; public services and, 9 0 - 9 1 ; security approaches, 80; system transformation in. 78; values, 77-94 Globalization, 11-13; of capitalism, 31; e c o n o m i c , 2 1 - 2 2 : media impact, 44; neutrality of, 12; t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and, 4 4 Goodpaster, Andrew, 189 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 2, 9, 139, 140, 166, 179, 180, 183, 185, 186, 197, 200, 201, 202, 224, 262, 274 G r a m e e n Bank, 2 5 0 G r a n d m o t h e r s of the Plaza de M a y o , 276 Great Britain: acid rain in, 222; arms sales, 62, 217; d i s a r m a m e n t m o v e m e n t , 226; environmental issues in, 258; in Falkland Islands, 8; in International Monetary Fund, 39; investment in United States, 37; military spending, 217; nuclear testing, 191 tab; transnational c o m p a n i e s in, 38 Greece: acid rain in, 222; aid to, 56; political system, 87 G r e e n h o u s e effect, 11, 256 Green Parties, 11, 83, 99, 226, 277 G r e e n p e a c e , 277 G r e e n Revolution, 122, 250 G r e e n s p a n , Alan, 70, 73 G r e n a d a , 27 G r o s s national product, 90, 112 G r o u p of 7, 39 G r o u p of 77, 113 G u a t e m a l a , 20; conflict in, 18; genocide in, 269; United States pressure on, 27 Guinea, 9 6 Gulf War, 3, 13, 18, 178; environmental costs of, 89;

386

Index

Operation Desert Shield, 62; Operation Desert Storm, 62 Haiti, 14 tab, 1 1 2 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 4 ; peacekeeping in, 17; political conflict in, 14; political system, 87; privatization in, 51; refugees from, 20; United States intervention in, 28, 51 Harvard Negotiating Project, 263, 272 H a u d e n o s a u n e e Statement to the World, 109 H a s h i m o t o Ryutaro, 238 Havel, Vaclav, 82, 107, 217, 227, 228, 268 Health issues: A I D S , 6, 122, 135; benefits, 91; malaria, 6; Rainforest Health Project, 252; spending for, 6; w o r k p l a c e , 91 H e g e m o n y , 25 Helsinki Accords (1975), 199 Helsinki Watch C o m m i t t e e , 199 H o Chi Minh, 101 H o n g Kong: exports, 115; integration with China, 139, 141; trade and. 17 H o s o k a w a Morihiro, 240 " H o u s e w i v e s ' C o m m i t t e e of Siglo X X , " 99 H u m a n rights, 7, 11, 30, 2 7 3 - 2 8 1 ; abuses, 45, 53, 6 4 - 6 5 ; activism, 2; categories of, 86; core, 86; crises of, 74, 81; defining, 15, 8 5 - 8 6 ; progress in, 84; violations, 104 H u m a n Rights Watch, 277 Hungary, 14tab, 226; anti-Semitism in, 221; e c o n o m i c system, 218; as e m e r g i n g market, 14; in International M o n e t a r y Fund, 31; in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 189; Soviet relations with, 27 Hun Sen, 87 I A E A . See International A t o m i c Energy Agency Idealism, 78, 79 Imperialism, 8, 44, 81, 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 , 137 Imports, 90, 91; f o o d , 127, 128; reverse, 37; surcharges on, 33, 47 I n c o m e : children's, 122; developed countries, 5; distribution, WAtab, 117-119; gaps in, 91, 113; increases in, 79; inequities in, 30, 116tab;

investment, 32; levels, 17; negative growth in, 67; per capita, 90, 116tab; retirement, 32; rural, 140 India: A I D S in, 6; colonialism in, 100; deforestation in, 159; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 92, 131, 259; G r e e n Revolution in, 122, 250; health issues in, 6, 122; h u m a n rights in, 19; income distribution in, 118fafr, infant mortality in, 123; malnutrition in, 123; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 14, 175, 177, 186, 191, 192, 194; nuclear testing, 191 tab; poverty in, 96, 118; sanctions on, 28, 192; w o m e n ' s status in. 121, 126 Individualism, 24 Indonesia, 14tab; deforestation in, 159; economic system, 73; environmental issues in, 131, 162, 234; exports, 162; financial crisis in, 71; International Monetary Fund in, 72; malnutrition in, 123; political system, 73; repression in, 73; social instability in, 72; trade deficits, 71; w o m e n ' s status in, 121; World Bank in, 73 Industrialization, 41; d e v e l o p m e n t and, 130; in East Asia, 46; export-led, 4 6 Inequality, 9; of c o n s u m p t i o n , 5 4 - 5 5 ; economic, 54, 70, 207; f o o d distribution, 128; landholding, 133; perpetuating, 79; of power, 5 4 - 5 5 ; social, 54, 91; tax, 210 INFACT, 276 Inflation, 30, 67, 219 Information, 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 ; access to, 45; acquisition of wealth and, 43; control of, 43, 44; d e p e n d e n c e , 46; domination of, 46; gathering, 43; global m o v e m e n t of, 32; restrictions on, 168; "rights," 44, 45; technology, 7; universalization of, 41; w a r f a r e , 187 Institutions: financial, 73; interlocking directorates in, 52; international, 158-164; lending, 12; multilateral, 12, 38, 39; public, 179; transnational, 23, 54 Inter-American D e v e l o p m e n t Bank, 39, 119 Interdependence: c o n s e q u e n c e s of, 76; defining, 7 - 1 1 ; globalization and,

Index

11-13; in investment, 1 6 - 1 7 ; as mutual d e p e n d e n c e , 10; politics of, 46; spillover effect in, 10-11; technological, 16-17; in trade, 16-17; in world politics, 1 - 2 2 Interest rates, 32, 37, 38, 130, 219 International Atomic E n e r g y Agency, 19, 177 International C o n v e n t i o n on the Elimination of All F o r m s of Racial Discrimination, 77 International Court of Justice, 224, 280 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 77, 106 International C o v e n a n t on E c o n o m i c , Social, and Cultural Rights, 77 Internationalism: Cold War, 57; liberal, 57, 58 International Labour Organisation, 119 International Monetary F u n d ; creation of, 57; expansion of i n f l u e n c e of, 38; in Indonesia, 72; in M e x i c o , 69; in Philippines, 132; political role, 40; reform of, 47; in South Korea, 72, 158; structural a d j u s t m e n t policies, 39; in Third World, 11, 31, 41, 67, 74, 127, 131, 133; in U n i o n of Soviet Socialist Republics, 204; United States influence on, 39, 4 0 International Physicians for Social Responsibility, 88, 2 7 7 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 277 International Satellite Monitoring Agency, 265 Internet, 45, 46 Interventionism, 59 Investment, 10; alternative, 92; barriers, 33, 49, 71; capital, 148; direct, 70, 141; e c o n o m i c , 220; equity, 32; facilitation of, 51; foreign, 22, 31, 32, 33, 35, 39, 40, 46, 51, 53, 67, 68, 69, 70, 112, 119, 141, 148, 154, 155, 158, 211; income, 32; individual, 32; interdependence in, 1 6 - 1 7 ; liberalization, 47, 67; m u t u a l - f u n d , 70; policies, 47; private, 51; profit margins on, 32; rural, 130; sensitivity to, 53; transnational, 37

387

Iran, 7; investment in, 15; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 192, 194; repression in, 134; sanctions on, 48; United States pressure on, 27; war with Iraq, 60, 61; w e a p o n s of mass destruction in, 66 Iraq, 3; aggressive stance of, 15; aid to, 62; in Gulf War, 7, 14tab, 31, 60; h u m a n rights in, 61, 64—65; international coalition against, 19; K u r d s in, 18, 61, 64, 89, 196; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 176, 177, 192; political system, 0; repression in, 20, 134; sanctions on, 62, 63, 64; war with Iran, 60, 61; w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction in, 19, 62, 6 4 - 6 5 Islam, 103 Isolationism, 57 Israel, \Atah, 15, 18; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 175, 176, 177, 178; West Bank occupation, 64, 87 Italy: energy p r o g r a m s , 255; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 92; in E u r o p e a n Coal and Steel C o m m u nity, 223; political scandal in, 22 Ivory Coast, 20, 2.74; International M o n e t a r y Fund in, 41; privatization in, 41 J a c k s o n , J e s s e , 11. 270 Japan, 14tab; as aid donor, 230; arms sales, 218; A u m Shinrikyo in, 191; d e p e n d e n c e on United States, 230, 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 ; e c o n o m i c strength, 13, 59; e c o n o m i c system, 230, 233; energy p r o g r a m s , 255; energy sources, 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 ; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 232, 240, 256, 258; exports, 37, 230, 233, 236; income distribution in, 230; in International M o n e t a r y Fund, 39; investment in, 233; investment in United States, 37; Liberal D e m o c r a t i c Party in, 230, 231; military spending, 18, 218, 230, 235, 238; m o d e r n i z a t i o n / d e p e n d e n c e , 2 2 9 - 2 4 1 ; n e o m e r c a n t i l i s m in, 233; overseas production, 37; political scandal in, 22; political system, 2 3 0 , 231; quality of life, 231; racism in, 97, 236; research and d e v e l o p m e n t in, 231; r e s o u r c e - d e p e n d e n c e , 232;

388

Index

sanctions on, 236; security policy, 239; Self-Defense Forces, 230; state-directed development, 152; technology use, 231; trade issues with United States, 235-237; trade shares, 35; transnational companies in, 38, 127, 233-234; unemployment in, 232; women's status in, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 Jefferson, Thomas, 78 Jiang Zemin, 142 John Paul II (Pope), 79 Johnson, Lyndon, 208 Jordan, 123 Jung, Carl, 77-78 Kabile, Laurent, 19 Karadzic, Radovan, 19, 22 Kazakstan, 51 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 79 Kelly, Petra, 99 Kennan, George, 206, 263 Kennedy, John F„ 165, 170, 182 Kenya, 20; agriculture in, 129; aid to, 102; colonialism in, 102; dissidents in, 20; labor market in, 119-120; political system, 102; women's status in, 126 Khmer Rouge, 87, 269 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 60, 87, 103 Kim Dae Jung, 72, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158 Kim Young Sam, 156, 157 King, Martin Luther Jr., 75, 82, 94-110 Kissinger, Henry, 9, 25, 28, 29, 30, 170, 199, 235 Kohl, Helmut, 224 Koop, C. Everett, 124 Korean War, 56, 58, 182 Kosovo, 229 Krishnamurti, J.N., 77 Kuwait, 3, 112; in Gulf War, 60, 61, 64; Rumala oil fields, 60 Kyoto Protocol (1997), 256, 257 Labor: child, 45, 53; control of, 50; discipline, 154; division of, 34; exploitation of, 146; global movement of, 32; low-cost, 32, 119, 146, 148, 221; markets, 46; migrant,

35, 43, 74, 143, 221; movements, 57; nonunion, 40; oppressive conditions of, 53; organized, 32; prison, 53; repression, 49-50, 154; skilled, 33, 35, 43; slave, 53; stability, 148; subsistence, 120; undergroudn, 260; unions, 11, 145, 147, 230; unskilled, 32, 119, 153; women's participation in, 98-99 Landholding, 54-55, 137; concentration of, 252; inequities in, 30, 133, 249; Third World, 119 Latin America, 20; Catholicism in, 103, 104; debt service, 40; exports, 126; newly-industrializing countries in, 46; poverty in, 118-119; privatization in, 118, 119 Latvia, 16, 20, 201 Law of the Sea Treaty ( 1982), 258, 280 League of Nations, 79 Lebanon, 27 Lee Kuan Yew, 85 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 220 Liberalization: economic, 69; investment, 47, 67; political, 28, 141; tariff, 67; trade, 47 Liberia, 18 Libya, 112; nuclear development, 192; sanctions on, 48 Life expectancy, 77, 140 Literacy, 5, 77, 118, 123, 140, 209; gender differences, 123; Third World, 123 Lithuania, 16, 20, 22, 118tab, 201, 273 London Dumping Convention (1982), 258 Luce, Henry, 56 Luxembourg, 223 Luxemburg, Rosa, 78 Maastricht Treaty, 224 McCarthy, Joseph, 57 Macedonia, 229 McNamara, Robert, 168, 170, 175 Malawi, 123 Malaysia, 114; economic development, 34; environmental issues in, 131, 162, 234; exports, 162; income distribution in, 118tab Malcolm X, 97

Index

Malnutrition, 5, 6, 6 4 - 6 5 , 120, 122, 1?3, 125, 250 Mandela, Nelson, 2, 96, 144, 147, 150 M a o Zedong, 95, 9 8 - 9 9 , 136, 138, 139, 140 Marcos. Ferdinand, 132, 274 Marcuse, Herbert, 83 Market(s): arms, 18: behavior, 12; competition, 17; c o n f o r m i s m , 12; consumer, 35; creation, 51; domestic, 34; economy, 14; e m e r g i n g , 6, 14. 32, 34, 37, 43, 69; expansion of, 35; global, 34; incentives, 138; integration, 56; labor, 46; local, 34; open, 49, 57; regional, 33; single, 2. 223; socialism, 201 Marshall. George C „ 5 7 - 5 8 Marshall Plan, 56, 57. 58 Marx, Karl, 78 Marxism, 101 Maslow, Abraham, 77 May, Rollo, 77 Mead, Margaret, 78 Media: censorship, 134; control of, 43, 83; freedom, 87; mass, 87; publishing, 44; Western, 4 3 Menchii, Rigoberta, 276 Mendes, Francisco C h i c o , 159 Mergers: corporate, 17, 34, 52; media, 44; transnational c o m p a n i e s , 4 9 Merino, Roberto, 105 Mexico, 14tab, 20; aid to, 66; capital flight in, 132; corruption in, 69, 70; criticism of United States, 31; debt service, 67, 127, 130; democratization in, 70; e c o n o m i c restructuring, 6 7 - 6 8 ; e c o n o m i c system, 69; as e m e r g i n g market, 14; environmental issues, 6, 92; environmental regulations in, 50, 119; exports, 67, 69; financial crisis in, 14, 40, 6 6 - 7 0 ; f o o d riots in, 131; imports, 67; inequitable d e v e l o p m e n t pattern, 67; International Monetary Fund in, 67, 69; investment in, 32, 46, 67, 69; labor market in, 50; landholding in, 119; m a q u i l a d o r a plants in, 50, 119, 121; narcopolitics in, 135; in North A m e r i c a n Free Trade Agreement, 67, 68; Partido Revolucionario Institucional in, 68;

389

political system, 67, 68, 69; population, 5; poverty in, 67; privatization in, 67, 69; repression in, 69; social unrest in, 131; structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s in, 67, 69; transnational c o m p a n i e s in, 67, 119, 127; water access, 123; w o m e n ' s status in, 121; World Bank in, 67; Zapatista m o v e m e n t in, 68, 69 Middle East, 14tab, 88; arms sales to, 6 4 - 6 5 ; conflict in, 3; status quo in, 64-65 Military: alliances, 25: budgets, 18; c o n t a i n m e n t , 57; control, 31; coups, 135; d e p l o y m e n t s , 188; doctrine, 1 8 7 - 1 8 8 ; economy, 180; force reductions, 17; integration, 57; political influence, 1 8 8 - 1 8 9 ; power, 17-18, 58; preparedness, 56; production. 55; rivalries, 181; security, 167; social costs, 88; spending, 5, 6, 28, 59, 134, 166, 168, 179, 180, 182, 188, 214; technology, 178, 189; transfers, 189, 196; wastes, 89, 90 Military-industrial c o m p l e x , 8, 59, 168, 179, 181, 182, 247; centralization of, 56; reductions in, 17 Mill, John Stuart, 78 Millett, Kate, 78 M o b u t u Sese Seko, 19, 22 M o n d a l e , Walter, 32 M o n n e t , Jean, 223 M o n t a g u , Ashley, 78 Montreal Protocol, 258, 259 M o r g e n t h a u , Hans, 29 M o r o c c o , 118 tab Mortality, infant, 118, 125, 209, 252 M o v e m e n t s : antinuclear, 83; d i s a r m a m e n t , 226; labor, 57; political, 11; protest, 12; for social c h a n g e , 83; transnational, 247; w o m e n ' s , 11, 83 M o z a m b i q u e : civil war in, 18; colonialism in, 149; infant mortality in, 123; p e a c e k e e p i n g in, 17 Multilateralism, 58 M u r d o c h , Rupert, 4 4 , 54 N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h , 16

390

Index

Naipaul, V.S., 96 N a k a s o n e Yasuhiro, 237 Namibia, 270; p e a c e k e e p i n g missions in, 2 Narcopolitics, 135 National C o m m i s s i o n on Excellence in Education, 209 National D e f e n s e Panel, 1 8 7 - 1 8 8 N a t i o n a l i s m , 16, 60, 75, 81, 142, 144, 147, 149, 201, 221, 224, 236, 245; as antiforeignism, 101; economic, 29. 42, 53; ethnic, 3; political, 29; religious, 3; Third World, 114 Nationalization, 48, 51 National Security Council, 56, 58, 59 Native A m e r i c a n s , 109 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nehru, Jawaharlal, 100 Neocolonialism, 100-103 Nepal, 123 Netherlands: d i s a r m a m e n t m o v e m e n t , 226; in European Coal and Steel C o m m u n i t y , 223; transnational c o m p a n i e s in, 38 N e w World Order, 6 0 - 6 6 N e w Zealand, 14tab, 226; w o m e n ' s status in, 121 N G O s . See N o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o , 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 , 103 Nicaragua, 270; aid to, 125; e c o n o m i c system, 124; elections in, 22; external debt, 125; political system, 124, 125; water access, 124 Nigeria, \Atab, 20, 53; elections in, 22; health care, 123; h u m a n rights in, 15, 4 5 ^ 1 6 ; political system, 0, 134; repression in, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; sanctions on, 53; water access, 123 Nitze, Paul, 58 Nixon, Richard, 28, 33, 182 Nobel Peace Prize, 107, 277 N o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations, 16, 280; in China, 142; d e v e l o p m e n t , 250, 251; h u m a n rights and, 11; indigenous g r o u p s and, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; transnational, 277 N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty, 176, 186, 187tab, 192, 265 North A m e r i c a n Free Trade A g r e e m e n t ,

17, 42, 119, 127, 207; M e x i c o and, 67, 68; tariff elimination in, 50; World Trade Organization and, 33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 56, 58, 218, 226, 228; e x p a n s i o n of, 189, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ; as new m a r k e t for military technology, 189; strikes on Serbs, 28; unity in, 31 Northern Ireland, 7, 15, 18, 2 6 3 North Korea, Utah, 112, 270; nuclear development in, 14, 19, 192, 194; relations with South Korea, 156, 157; socialist e c o n o m y in, 10; weapons of mass destruction in, 66 North-South (Brandt C o m m i s s i o n ) , 75-76 NPT. See Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear: accidents, 9, 10-11, 170, 175, 189, 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ; coercion, 194; deterrence, 167. 172, 174, 175, 184, 189, 226; energy, 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ; nonproliferation, 192, 193, 194; reactors, 169, 170; smuggling, 193 Nuclear Control Institute, 177 Nuclear Test Ban (1963), 184 Nuremberg Principles, 77, 281 O E C D . See Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t Ogata, Sadako, 19 O P E C . See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Open Skies Treaty (1992), 227 Oppression, 79, 9 4 - 1 1 0 ; colonialism and, 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 ; denial of political f r e e d o m , 1 0 6 - 1 0 9 ; ecocide and, 109-110; imperialism and, 100-103; neocolonialism and, 1 0 0 - 1 0 3 ; patriarchy and, 9 8 - 9 9 ; poverty and, 9 5 - 9 7 ; racism and, 9 7 - 9 8 , 144-151; religion and, 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 ; state terror and, 1 0 4 - 1 0 6 Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t , 52, 66, 152, 227 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 48, 51, 60, 63, 116 Pahlevi, Shah Reza, 87, 103 Pakistan: child labor in, 45; fertility rate in, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ; h u m a n rights in,

Index

19; infant mortality in, 123; literacy in, 125; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 14, 175, 176, 177, 178, 186, 191, 194; nuclear testing, 191 tab; poverty in, 125; sanctions on, 28, 192 Panama, 27 Paraguay: oppression in, 9 4 - 1 1 0 ; political system, 87 Park C h u n g Hee, 152 Partnership for Peace, 206 Paternalism, 85 Patriarchy, 9 8 - 9 9 Patten, Christopher, 54 Peacekeeping, 17, 18, 64, 228, 266-267 Peacemaking, 80, 228, 229, 267 People-to-People International, 277 Perestroika, 29, 197, 201 Peru, 20; debt service, 254; food riots in, 131; political scandal in, 22; population control in, 126; repression in, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; social unrest in, 131 Pesticides, 129, 257; exported, 11 Philippines: e c o n o m i c system, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 ; environmental issues in. 133; external debt, 132, 133; International Monetary Fund in, 132; labor repression in, 4 9 - 5 0 ; political opposition in, 132-133; World Bank in, 132 Pinochet, Augusto, 105 Planned Parenthood, 277 Poland, 14tab; acid rain in, 221; aid to, 52; anti-Semitism in, 221; bankruptcy of, 10; e c o n o m i c system, 218, 223; as emerging market, 14; environmental issues in, 222; exports, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 ; external debt, 52, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 ; health issues, 222; in International Monetary Fund, 31; military spending, 218; in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 189; Solidarity m o v e m e n t , 27, 31 Policy: economic, 17; fiscal, 60; foreign, 84; human-interest, 2 4 6 - 2 4 7 ; imperialist, 81; investment, 47; national, 17; public, 12; tax, 51; trade, 6 0 Political: analysis, 82; association, 87; autonomy, 140; centralization, 139;

391

competition, 70, 87; conflict, 6; culture, 85; diversity, 83; domination, 147; economy, 8 - 9 , 168; f r a g m e n t a t i o n , 14; f r e e d o m , 1 0 6 - 1 0 9 ; inequalities, 6; justice, 77; liberalization, 28, 141; liberty, 85; m o v e m e n t s , 11; nationalism, 29; openness, 46; opposition, 102, 115, 134; participation, 84; pluralism, 139, 275; power, 9, 1 3 - 1 4 , 46, 58, 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 ; processes, 12; reality, 245; r e f o r m , 20, 139, 141; r e f u g e e s , 6; repression, 102; scandals, 22; stability, 58, 72, 102; synthesis, 82; systems, 2; transformation, 92; transnational character of, 7; violence, 70, 135 Politics: crisis in, 1 - 2 2 ; Global H u m a n i s m perspectives on, 7 5 - 1 1 0 ; interdependence in, 1 - 2 2 , 46; international, 25, 76; multipolarity of, 1 3 - 1 4 ; normative approach to, 78; state-centric, 79; steady-state, 93; t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of, 2 4 3 - 2 8 3 ; transnationalization of, 9 Pol Pot. 87, 269 Population: control, 120, 126, 251; displaced, 6; fertility rates and, 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ; growth, 5, 43, 126; hunger and, 126; m o v e m e n t , 11; poverty and, 117-119; Third World, 113, 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ; world, 5 Poverty, 5 4 - 5 5 , 67, 79, 90, 9 5 - 9 7 , 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 , 2 0 7 - 2 0 8 , 221; absolute, 5, 95, 140; chronic, 96; fertility rates and, 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ; Fourth World, 14; global, 14; migrant labor and, 43; population growth and, 117-119; revolutionary potential of, 9 5 - 9 6 ; Third World, 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 P o w e r : abuses of, 85; b a l a n c e of, 25, 30, 60, 63, 79; concentration of, 55; corporate, 46; dispersal of, 1 3 - 1 4 ; distribution of, 8; e c o n o m i c , 13-14, 17, 4 6 , 180; inequities in, 30; m e a s u r i n g , 30; military, 1 7 - 1 8 , 58, 63; national, 24, 25, 30; political, 1 3 - 1 4 , 30, 46, 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 ; politics, 9, 58; purchasing, 91; state, 23, 114, 115; structures, 13; threats to, 25

392

Index

Privatization, 41, 51, 67, 69, 132, 203, 221 Production: agricultural, 126; alternative, 92; capital-intensive, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 ; control of, 115; costs of, 90; deregulation of, 51; food, 5, 11, 128, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 ; increases in, 79; knowledge-intensive, 230; laborintensive, 34, 119-120; l o w - w a g e , 50; military, 55; networks, 34; nonregulation of, 51; nuclear, 89; overseas, 37; social costs of, 91; technology-intensive, 34 Protectionism, 17, 33, 60, 219 Publishing, 44 Rabin, Yitzhak, 263 R a c i s m , 9 7 - 9 8 , 144-151 R a m o s , Fidel, 133 R a m o s - H o r t a , Jose, 276 Reagan, Ronald, 9, 33, 52, 60, 61, 149, 168, 175, 178, 182, 186, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 225, 262 R e a l i s m , 4; alliances in, 25; crisis m a n a g e m e n t in, 30; d e p e n d e n c e on C o r p o r a t e Globalism, 4 8 - 4 9 , 59; elitism in, 24; flaws in, 28; geopolitical perspective, 47; Gulf War and, 64; h e g e m o n y and, 27; institutional values in, 25tab; interdependence and, 29; interventions in, 26; military preparedness and, 56, 58; national interest and, 9, 24; national security and, 25; new, 82; new world o r d e r and, 6 0 - 6 6 ; n o r m s of, 26tab; nuclear w e a p o n s and, 167; peace and, 25; personal values in, 25tab; positions of strength in, 25; p o s t - C o l d War, 6 6 - 7 4 ; principles of sovereignty, 2 7 - 2 8 ; reduction in alternative spending, 2 9 - 3 0 ; selfdetermination and, 2 7 - 2 8 ; social b e h a v i o r in, 24; state p o w e r and, 23; system m a i n t e n a n c e in, 24; theory and practice, 2 3 - 7 4 ; Third World d e v e l o p m e n t s and, 29; use of f o r c e and, 25; violence and, 9 Recession, 30, 33, 43, 58, 60, 219 R e f u g e e s , 30, 5 4 - 5 5 , 136, 221, 228; forced internment of, 89; internal,

136; political, 6; repatriation of, 20 Reich, Robert, 47, 207 Religion, 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 Repression, 20, 30, 69, 73; of indigenous groups, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 , 161, 163; labor, 154; legalized, 145; political, 102; religion and, 103; state, 103; Third World, 115, 134-135 Resources, I ; competition for, 60; conservation of, 77, 247; control of, 81; distribution of, 248; energy, 17, 257; exploitation of, 1, 91; extraction of, 91; local, 249; protection of, 94; stewardship of. 90 Rhodesia, 148, 149 Right Livelihood Award, 277 Rockefeller, David, 32 Rogers, Carl, 77 Roh Tae Woo, 156, 157 Romania, 221, 273, 274 R o m e r o , Archbishop Oscar, 104 R o m e Treaty, 223 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 207, 243, 246 Russia, 14tab; Chinese relations with, 27; collectivization of production in, 198; corruption in, 22, 200; democratization in, 29, 204; economic stability, 10; energy programs, 255; environmental issues in, 92, 203, 256, 258, 259; financial crisis in, 40, 74, 204; health issues, 203; International Monetary F u n d in, 204; military power of, 13; oppression in, 9 4 - 1 1 0 ; privatization in, 203; relations with United States, 2; in transition, 1 6 5 - 2 1 5 R w a n d a , 136, 267; abuse of w o m e n in, 89; genocide in, 7, 14, 18, 264, 269, 270 S a d d a m Hussein, 19, 60, 61, 6 4 - 6 5 Sagan, Carl, 78 Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, 76 Sakharov, Andrei, 200 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 22, 68 Sanctions, 15, 25, 28, 47, 48, 236; economic, 53, 62, 63, 64; international, 141; trade, 47, 6 4 - 6 5 Sarney, José, 161 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 53

Index

Saudi Arabia, 112; arms sales, 62; in Gulf War, 60, 61 Schmidt, Helmut, 225 Schumacher, E.F., 78 Second World: characteristics of, 14tab; m a k e u p of, 1 3 - 1 4 Sector, informal, 260 Sector, m a n u f a c t u r i n g , 4 0 Sector, private, 40, 52, 93 Sector, public, 52 Sector, service, 40 Sector, state, 139 Security: alternative m e a n i n g s of, 13; attaining, 79; business, 50; collective, 19, 64, 78, 79; c o m m o n , 2 6 1 - 2 7 1 ; dialogue, 238; e n v i r o n m e n t a l , 20; e x a g g e r a t e d c o n c e r n for, 79; global, 1 - 4 , 28; h u m a n , 13, 77, 95; internal, 145; international, 3, 25; military, 142, 167; national, 1, 2, 25, 28, 4 7 , 48, 59, 61, 7 9 , 81, 84, 155, 166, 168, 181, 182, 250; needs, 77, 79; nuclear w e a p o n s and, 1 6 7 - 1 8 5 ; p e r s o n a l , 79; p r o t e c t i n g , 59; pursuit of, 1; state, 50; u n d e r d e v e l o p e d world a n d , 2 Serbia, 16. 18, 228, 229 Shariati, Ali, 103 S h e v a r d n a d z e , Eduard, 185 Shultz, George, 33 Singapore: exports, 115, 127; investment in, 46 Single E u r o p e a n Act, 223 Slovenia, 227 Social: activism, 7, 83, 212, 250; benefits, 112; change, 11, 39, 83; chaos, 134; class, 146; c o m p a c t s , 207; c o n f o r m i s m , 24; control, 138, 139; costs, 2; democracy, 87; d e v e l o p m e n t , 2 4 8 - 2 6 1 ; discipline, 134; groups, 91; harmony, 85; inequalities, 54; instability, 72; justice, 12, 70, 77, 81, 82, 85, 90, 91; needs, 207; order, 134; problems, 221; r e f o r m , 148; responsibility, 24; spending, 131, 133; systems, 168; transformation, 83; unrest, 67; values, 12, 13, 24; welfare, 40, 88, 140, 220, 224; well-being, 82 Socialism, 10, 47, 56, 57, 73, 81, 82,

393

138; collapse of, 16 Society, civil, 20 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 110, 199 Somalia, 14tab, 267; civil war in, 18; as failed state, 14 Soros, George, 277 South A f r i c a , 112, 274; A f r i c a n National C o n g r e s s in, 147, 150; a p a r t h e i d in, 1 4 4 - 1 5 1 , 276; B a n t u s t a n s in, 145; C o n d e s a in, 150; e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues in, 92, 258; exports, 148; f i n a n c i a l crisis in, 74; G r o u p A r e a s Act in, 145, 146; h u m a n rights in, 7, 145; i n c o m e distribution in, 118tab; i n f a n t mortality in, 123; i n v e s t m e n t in. 148; National Party in, 147; n u c l e a r d e v e l o p m e n t , 175, 176, 177, 178; o p p r e s s i o n in, 9 6 - 9 7 , 97; pass l a w s , 145; political s y s t e m , 87; P o p u l a t i o n R e g i s t r a t i o n Act, 146; p o v e r t y in, 96, 97; racism in, 97, 98, 1 4 4 - 1 5 1 ; r e p r e s s i o n in, 145, 147; s a n c t i o n s on, 149; t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o m p a n i e s in, 148; Truth and R e c o n c i l i a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n in, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 31 South Korea, 14tab; aid to, 152; chaebol in, 71, 72, 115, 153, 154, 157, 158; debt service, 130, 155; democratization in, 155; d o w n s i z i n g in, 72, 74; e c o n o m i c system, 14, 34, 71, 72, 1 5 1 - 1 5 8 , 154; exports, 71, 115, 127, 152, 155; financial crisis in, 14, 71, 152; gross national product, 152; i n c o m e distribution in, 152; International M o n e t a r y F u n d in, 72, 158; investment in, 153, 154, 155, 158; labor force, 153; military spending, 18, 155; N o n - N u c l e a r K o r e a n Peninsula Peace Initiative, 156; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 192; political scandals in, 22, 157; political system, 72, 151; relations with North Korea, 156, 157; state role in, 151, 153, 154; trade shares, 35; trading-state m o d e l , 152; urbanization in, 153; w o m e n ' s status in, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 ; World Bank in, 7 2

394

Index

South Pacific Nuclear Free Z o n e Treaty (1986), 187tab Spain: conflict in, 7; energy programs, 255 Sri Lanka, 7 START. See Strategic A r m s Reduction Talks State(s): authoritarian, 20, 84, 87, 134, 141, 142; benefits of transnational companies, 50; bureaucracy, 35; failed, 14, 267; hierarchy, 81; interests, 11; multicultural, 16; nation, 4, 9, 14, 15-16, 16; nationalsecurity, 59, 155; neo-fascist, 87, 88, 102, 105; new, 16; paternalistic, 85; power, 23, 114, 115; repression, 20, 45; rogue, 47, 66, 88, 187, 189, 213; single-party, 2; sovereignty, 85; terror, 104-106; tyranny, 81; welfare, 207 Strategic A r m s Limitation Talks, 184 Strategic A r m s Reduction Talks, 166, 167, 175, 183, 185, 205 Strategic D e f e n s e Iniative, 178, 181 Stroessner, A l f r e d o , 87 Structural a d j u s t m e n t programs, 39, 67, 69 Subsidies, 47, 154, 219; direct, 51; food, 67 Sudan, 18 S u m m e r s , L a w r e n c e , 73 Survival International, 277 Sweden, 11 Syria, 11, 270; dissidents in, 20; nuclear d e v e l o p m e n t , 194 Taiwan, 182; C h i n e s e intervention in, 27; e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , 34; e c o n o m i c system, 73, 74; exports, 115, 127; integration with China, 139, 141, 143; investment in, 73, 74; military spending in, 18; nuclear development, 192; patriarchy in, 99; population growth in, 126; trade and, 17 Tajikistan, 22; Soviet intervention in, 27 Tanzania: health issues, 252; water access, 123 Taoism, 77 Tariffs, 47, 52, 67, 162, 219

Tax, 90; concessions, 40, 52; consumption, 258; deferred, 51; havens, 48; incentives, 161; inequities, 210; policy, 51; pollution, 257; reform, 204; trade, 257 Technology: c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 113; competition in, 29; control of, 81; displacement by, 120; energy-saving, 252; environmental, 240; global m o v e m e n t of, 32; information, 7; innovations in, 17; interdependence in, 16-17; internationalization of, 251; military, 178, 189; missile, 18; need of, 143; satellite, 251; sharing, 91; transfers, 41, 152, 196; weapons. 171 Telecommunications, 43; alliances, 44; deregulation, 44; globalization and, 44; h u m a n rights and, 45; political expression and, 45 Templeton, Sir John, 277 Terrorism, 10, 19, 79, 89, 248; biological, 187; official, 1 0 4 - 1 0 6 Thailand, 112; corruption in, 71; currency crisis in, 71; deforestation in, 159; e c o n o m i c development, 34; as emerging market, 14; environmental issues in, 159; financial crisis in, 70, 71; health care, 123; military spending in, 18; political scandal in, 22; trade deficits, 71 Thatcher, Margaret, 224, 279 Theology, liberation, 11, 103, 104 Third World: aid to, 20; characteristics of, \Atab; children in, 122; criticisms of Global H u m a n i s m , 9 3 - 9 4 ; debt burdens, 1 3 0 - 1 3 4 ; debt service, 54; defaults by, 70; defining, 111-116; democratization in, 15, 114; d e v e l o p m e n t aid, 124; e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in, 41; e c o n o m i c nationalism in, 42; e c o n o m i c restructuring, 133; e c o n o m i c systems, 1 2 6 - 1 2 8 ; environmental issues in, 92, 94, 131; exports, 112, 1 2 6 - 1 2 8 ; h u m a n rights in, 53, 84; income distribution, 113, 117-119; International M o n e t a r y F u n d in, 133; investment in, 112; literacy in, 123; loans to, 32; modernization patterns

Index in, 93; Nationalism, 114; nuclear sales to, 92; population, 113, 125-128; poverty in, 117-119; production shares, 113; profile of, 117-136; realism and, 29; repression in, 115, 134-135; soft energy in, 252; superpower rivalry in, 18-19; survival in, 2; technology and, 113; transnational companies in, 112, 115-116. 124, 127; underdevelopment in, 120; unemployment in, 119-120, 260; urbanization in, 6, 120; women's status in, 120-122; World Bank in, 133 Tibet, 45, 267; dissidents in, 20 Timerman, Jacobo, 104, 105 Torture, 89, 135. 145, 151 Trade: balances, 35, 141, 235; barriers, 33, 49, 67, 71, 219; blocs, 42, 47, 219; capitalist systems of, 10; competition, 71; concessions, 15; conflict, 46; deficits, 33, 60, 68, 71, 211; disputes, 31; foreign, 32, 59; free, 56; global, 17; interdependence in, 16-17; international, 218; liberalization, 47; policy, 60; protectionism, 17; regional, 17; sanctions, 47, 64-65; shares, 35; stability, 57; weapons, 60, 166; zones, 52 Transnational companies, 8, 11, 12; commodity chains in, 34; earnings abroad, 35; effect on United States economy, 35; environmental issues by, 92; export domination of, 33; global movement and, 32; governmental benefits from, 50; human rights abuses and, 45; impact on employment, 91; in Japan, 127, 233-234; joint ventures, 33-34; labor and, 35; largest, 36tab; loyalty to, 16; in Mexico, 67, 119, 127; production networks in, 34, 43; recruitment by, 43; relations with region-states, 35; restructuring in, 33-34; in South Africa, 148; in Third World, 112, 115-116, 124, 127; value transmission by, 41; women in workforce, 99; world trade dominance by, 37; World Trade Organization and, 33

395

Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (1995), 187tab Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 23 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 227 Trilateral Commission, 32, 33, 38 Truman, Harry S„ 31, 56, 58, 182, 183 Tudjman, Franjo, 22 Turkey, \Atab; aid to, 56; debt service, 130; as emerging market, 14; Kurds in, 18; narcopolitics in, 135; repression in, 134: social unrest in, 131 Turner, Ted, 277 Tutu, Archbishop Desmond, 147, 148, 149, 150 Ukraine, 6, 9, 11, 14tab, 22, 170 Underdevelopment, 100-103 Unemployment, 30, 67, 136, 208, 219, 220, 260; Third World, 119-120 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: agriculture in, 198; arms sales, 62, 180; breakup of, 3; collapse of, 16; Council Forests Mutual Economic Assistance, 200; economic system, 200; environmental issues in, 198, 218; historical perspective, 197-206; human rights in, 199; intervention in Afghanistan, 168; market economy in, 40; military spending, 198; nuclear sales. 194; nuclear testing, 191 tab; nuclear weapons and, 167-215; perestroika and, 29; political system, 199; social problems, 199; trade deficits, 200; in transition, 165-215; women's status in, 199 United Nations, 79; Amazon Pilot Program, 163; Commission on Human Rights, 77; Conference on Environment and Development, 3; Development Program, 77, 90, 123, 132, 133; Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 5; General Assembly, 186, 265; Global Environmental Facility, 163; increase in resort to, 19; Labor Organization, 122; peacekeeping role, 2, 17, 18, 21 tab, 64, 142; Security Council, 18, 62, 64-65, 167, 196, 228, 268, 269;

396

Index

Special Commission, 6 4 - 6 5 United States: aid to Third World, 132; arms sales by, 18, 61, 6 4 - 6 5 , 135, 180, 196; Central American intervention, 7; Central Intelligence Agency, 28, 104; control of environmental agenda. 20; corporate intervention by, 52; crime in, 210; as debtor nation, 10; Department of Defense, 181; Department of Energy, 170, 193; Department of State, 61; Department of the Treasury, 67; economy of, 10; education in, 209, 212; energy programs, 255, 256; environmental issues in, 92, 209, 256, 258; erosion of leadership, 219; exports, 60, 61, 67; Federal Reserve, 70; foreign investment in, 37; Foreign Service, 57; governmentbusiness cooperation in, 55, 58; health issues, 209; historical perspective, 2 0 6 - 2 1 2 ; human rights in, 84; inequalities in, 207; international mediation by, 15; in International Monetary Fund, 39; Iran-Contra investigation, 61; literacy in, 209; military production in, 55; military spending, 207, 214; national debt, 2 0 7 - 2 0 8 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 ; National Security Council, 56, 58, 59; New Right in, 207; nuclear sales, 177, 178; nuclear testing, 191 tab; nuclear weapons and, 167-215; oppression in, 9 4 - 1 1 0 ; postwar planning, 5 5 - 6 0 ; poverty in, 208; racism in, 210; recession in, 58, 60; relations with Russia, 2; superpower status, 14, 165; trade shares, 35; in transition, 165-215; transnational companies and, 35, 38; unemployment in, 208; unilateral actions of, 15; w o m e n ' s status in, 209; in World Bank, 39 United States-Iraq Business Forum, 61 United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 77, 79, 144 Urbanization, 91, 119, 136, 146, 153, 158-164; Third World, 6, 120

U Thant, 3, 4 Values: Asian, 85: common, 25; cultural, 44; culture-specific, 85: dominant culture, 12; export of, 44; in Global Humanism, 7 7 - 9 4 ; humancentered, 76, 93; humane, 8: origin of, 85; preferred, 76, 77; primary, 77; shared, 77; social, 12, 13, 24; traditional, 12; transmission of, 41; Western, 85 Venezuela, 20; food riots in, 131; political scandal in, 22; social unrest in, 131 Vietnam, 112; Chinese intervention in, 27, 28; colonialism in, 101; exports, 129-130: human rights in, 46; independence in, 101; political system. 87; population growth. 129; poverty in, 129; refugees f r o m . 20; United States intervention in, 27. 28; water access, 123; weapons of mass destruction in, 89 Vietnam War, 59, 63; environmental costs of, 89; psychological costs of, 89 Violence: ethnic. 74, 228; failed, 245; forced witnessing of, 89; global, 88; inappropriateness of, 80; international, 18, 88; interstate, 28; migration and, 136; minimizing, 77; oppression and, 82; political, 70. 135; psychological damage from, 88-89; realism and, 9; structural, 78, 136; threshold, 269; against women and children, 86 "Warning to Humanity," 4 Warsaw Pact, 31, 218, 225, 226 Wassenaar Arrangement (1995), 196 Water: access to, 5, 77, 123; overuse, 257; pollution, 7, 144, 222; potable, 5; quality, 89; safe, 123 Watts, Alan, 78 Weapons: borrowing for, 6; buildups, 59; conventional, 17, 62, 189; developing countries and, 6; exports, 135, 180, 189, 203; manufacturing, 17; profitability of, 181; programs, 5 6 - 5 7 ; purchases of, 5; reductions, 166, 167, 183, 185; sales, 18, 30, 62,

Index

80, 115, 189; technology, 171; trade, 60, 166; "virtual," 188 Weapons, nuclear: a r m s talks, 2; arsenals, 171, 186; competition, 2; dangers of, 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 , 175; detargeting, 175; deterrent value of, 167, 172, 174, 175, 184, 189, 226; elimination of, 166, 189, 265; firstuse policy, 183, 264—265; h u m a n costs of, 1 9 7 - 2 1 5 ; international control of, 183; nuclear winter and, 89; politics of, 179, 183; production, 170-171; proliferation of, 10; purpose of, 169; realism and, 167; reductions, 2, 166, 167, 183, 185; second strike capacity, 174; security and, 1 6 7 - 1 8 5 ; space-based, 178; spread of violence and, 18; stockpiles, 17; Strategic D e f e n s e Iniative, 178, 181; survival and, 169; technical quality of, 171; testing, 28, 186, \9\tab; Third World d e v e l o p m e n t of, 60; threats to use, 182-183 Weapons of mass destruction, 166, 191, 195-196; in China, 66; control of, 186; in Iran, 66; in Iraq, 19, 62, 6 4 - 6 5 ; in North Korea, 66; in Vietnam, 89 Wei Jingsheng, 107 Weinberger, Caspar, 33 West Papua: agriculture in, 129; repression in, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 W H O . See World Health Organization W o m e n : abuse of, 89; in d e v e l o p m e n t , 20; discrimination against, 81; downsizing and, 74; education for, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 ; e n s l a v e m e n t of, 22; m o v e m e n t s for, 11, 83; oppression

397

of, 9 8 - 9 9 ; political participation by, 121-122; status of, 278; sterilization of, 126; suffrage, 121; Third World status, 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 ; violence against, 86; in workforce, 55, 9 8 - 9 9 Woolsey, James, 28 World Bank, 5, 11, 39, 40, 41, 112, 118, 127, 131, 203, 248, 249; in Brazil, 158-164; in China, 141; creation of, 57; e x p a n s i o n of influence of, 38; in Indonesia, 73; in Philippines, 132; in South Korea, 72; in Third World, 133; United States influence on, 39 World Health Organization, 129, 253, 276-277 World Order Models Project, 77 World Trade Organization, 33, 47. 73 Worldwatch Institute, 254 W T O . See World Trade Organization X i m e n e s Belo, Bishop Carlos, 276 Yeltsin, Boris, 180, 185, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 262 Yoshida Shigeru, 230 Young, Andrew, 59 Yugoslavia, 20, 218, 221; b r e a k u p of, 227, 228; genocide in, 7, 18; nationalism in, 16; repression in, 134 Zaire, 270 Z a m b i a , 20, 274 Zedillo, Ernesto, 66, 68 Z h a o Ziyang, 139, 141 Z i m b a b w e , 148, 250 Zyuganov, Gennady, 2 0 3

About the Book

This fourth edition of Global Politics has been revised to reflect the threats and opportunities posed by the c h a n g i n g world order, and provides facts and figures current through m i d - 1 9 9 8 . T h e use of a G l o b a l - H u m a n i s t framework to address four interrelated p r o b l e m s — h u m a n rights violations, war and armaments, sustainable development, and environmental destruct i o n — r e m a i n s a key feature of the book, which retains its practical bent, conveying how global politics affects the quality and content of p e o p l e ' s lives. MF,L GURTOV has been p r o f e s s o r of political science and international studies at Portland State University since 1986. His publications include China's Security: The New Roles of the Military, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (both c o a u t h o r e d with B y o n g - M o o Hwang), and Roots of Failure: U.S. Policy in the Third World (coauthored with Ray M a g h r o o r i ) . He is U.S. editor-in-chief of Asian Perspective, a quarterly journal of current affairs.

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