Get Things Moving!: FDR, Wayne Coy, and the Office for Emergency Management, 1941-1943 1438471378, 9781438471372

Citation preview

GET THINGS

MOVING!

Franklin Roosevelt memo to Wayne Coy, August 2, 1941. Source: Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. Accessed April 28, 2018, http://www.fdrlibrary. marist.edu/_resources/images/sign/fdr_32.pdf

GET THINGS

MOVING! -+9>H`UL *V` HUK [OL 6MÄJL MVY ,TLYNLUJ` 4HUHNLTLU[  ¶ 

MORDECAI LEE

Cover photo: Wayne Coy, Liaison Officer for Emergency Management and Special Assistant to the President. Source: “Trying This One for Size?” Washington Daily News, April 26, 1941, 8. Credit: Harris & Ewing Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ds-04257 Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2018 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lee, Mordecai. Title: Get Things Moving!: FDR, Wayne Coy, and the Office for Emergency Management, 1941–1943 / Mordecai Lee. Other titles: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Wayne Coy, and the Office for Emergency Management, 1941–1943 Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, [2018] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017053071 | ISBN 9781438471372 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438471389 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Coy, Wayne, 1903–1957. | United States. Office for Emergency Management—Officials and employees—Biography. | World War, 1939–1945— Economic aspects—United States. | Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882–1945—Friends and associates. | United States. Office for Emergency Management—History. | United States—Politics and government—1933–1945 Classification: LCC HC106.4 .L474 2018 | DDC 940.53/73092 [B] —dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017053071 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

In grateful appreciation to the Brookings Institution for the appointment as guest scholar (1972–74) and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (WI-5) for hiring me as his legislative assistant (1975–76). I held these two positions at the beginning of my professional life, but assumed academe and politics were mutually exclusive worlds and of no relevance or applicability to the other. I figured I would quickly have to pick one of the two for a longer-term career path. To my surprise, I was wrong. Academic training turned out to be quite helpful when I served in the Wisconsin State Legislature (1977–89), as was my political experience while in the academy (1997–2018). Who knew? •

Contents

Preface

ix

Abbreviations

xv

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management and Its Liaison Officer, September 1939–April 1941

23

Chapter 2 The Rise of Wayne Coy: Public Administration with Politics, 1935–Spring 1941

43

Chapter 3 Coy Begins as LOEM: “Wayne Coy, the President, and Three Motorcycles,” April–May 1941

65

Chapter 4 Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy, April–December 1941

83

Chapter 5 Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics, April–December 1941

101

Chapter 6 Coy as LOEM before the War: Management, April–December 1941

129

viii

Contents

Chapter 7 Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics, December 1941–May 1942

159

Chapter 8 Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management and Workday Routine, December 1941–May 1942

181

Chapter 9 Wearing Two Hats: Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director, May–October 1942

199

Chapter 10 Wearing Two Hats: Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes in the East Wing, October 1942–June 1943

217

Chapter 11 LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

233

Conclusion

243

Notes

257

Bibliography

335

Index

347

Preface

President Roosevelt was fuming. Unusual for him, this time he showed it. On June 22, 1941, Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union, Germany’s ally since August 1939. Notwithstanding the many ideological, economic, governmental, and geopolitical differences between the US and the USSR, they were now suddenly on the same side: opposition to Nazi Germany. If only based on the axiom that my enemy’s enemy is my friend, FDR immediately pivoted and wanted to provide maximum military supplies and other support for Stalin’s fight against Germany. Only a few weeks after the invasion, Harry Hopkins, FDR’s most trusted adviser, flew to Moscow to offer American support. Stalin accepted. Roosevelt endorsed fulfilling Stalin’s requests. (A reminder that Pearl Harbor was nearly half a year away.) It was now six weeks after Hitler’s invasion. Russia was reeling and seeing little of the American offer of military support. Roosevelt complained about that in a cabinet meeting on Friday, August 1. Angry about the runaround he felt the Russians were getting from the bureaucracy, the president told the Cabinet, “Well, I am going to put one of the best administrators in charge . . . and his job will be to see that the Russians get what they need.” On Saturday, he was clearing off his desk preparing for a two-week absence. In secret, he was sailing to rendezvous with Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland to coordinate their war efforts, even though the US was technically at peace with Germany. Knowing he would be gone for several weeks, the president wanted to be sure that aid to Russia would finally start flowing despite his absence. So first he had the White House operator track down the aide he had in mind (who was in Indiana visiting his son at summer camp), told him on the phone of this urgent assignment, and that he was to return to Washington immediately. When the staffer arrived back at the White House, he would find a presidential memo with

ix

x

Preface

the details of what FDR wanted done posthaste. On Saturday evening, just before leaving, the president dictated an uncharacteristically sharply worded memo on the subject for the aide. It included an unambiguous order to “get things moving!” Who was this aide Roosevelt trusted so much, who had already demonstrated the ability to deliver notwithstanding bureaucratically and politically difficult obstacles, and who had a legal scope of power to get this assignment done? Wayne Coy. Who?! When thinking about FDR’s most important civilian assistant in WWII, most historians would probably name James Byrnes. Byrnes had begun at the White House in October 1942, when he resigned from the Supreme Court to become the senior administration official for domestic economic policy. He headed a new agency called Office of Economic Stabilization, created by executive order. In May 1943, Roosevelt promoted Byrnes by expanding his jurisdiction, again by executive order, and gave him the title of director of the Office of War Mobilization (OWM). A month after that, FDR further added to Byrnes’s powers by appointing him to hold simultaneously another position as liaison officer of the Office for Emergency Management (LOEM). Byrnes wore these two “hats” for about half a year. In November 1943, Byrnes recommended to FDR that he did not need the LOEM role, and so the president discontinued it, though not the Office for Emergency Management (OEM) as an administrative entity. About a year after that, in October 1944, Congress insisted that Byrnes’s work be based on statutory power rather than executive orders. FDR, who preternaturally did not want Congress imposing on him legal strictures controlling how he organized the war effort, acquiesced and signed it into law. As a result, Byrnes’s legal title for the rest of the war became director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR). What history often overlooks is that when Byrnes became OEM’s liaison officer in June 1943, he was replacing someone. Roosevelt had appointed Wayne Coy as LOEM in April 1941. When Byrnes first arrived at the White House in October 1942, Coy had already been leading OEM for about a year and a half, a long time considering FDR’s fluid and ad hoc management style, especially during the war. Then, during Byrnes’s first assignment focusing on economic stabilization (October 1942 to May 1943), the two worked in tandem. Coy continued focusing on civilian war production and Byrnes on economic policy. It was not until June 1943, when Coy stepped down as LOEM, that Byrnes’s powers were expanded

Preface

xi

to include the LOEM duties. (Coy stayed on, solely as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, until January 1944.) History is right to view Byrnes as FDR’s domestic war czar. Sometimes he was even called the assistant president, including by FDR in 1944, though in quotation marks. Yet when the president named Coy as liaison officer for emergency management in April 1941, the position was so new and likely powerful that an Iowa newspaper editor wrote a column that Coy had become “an assistant president.”1 History has largely overlooked Coy’s work as Byrnes’s LOEM predecessor, especially during the period before Byrnes arrived at the White House and then when Byrnes’s initial presidential role was limited to domestic economic policy. Coy is practically unknown in the historical literature. This book seeks to recount and evaluate his role as a senior public administrator in the prewar production effort and then the wartime domestic mobilization. In 1942, Forbes named Coy as one of five members of FDR’s “most trusted behind-the-headlines team.”2 That year, another reporter called him the “spark plug” of the war effort.3 An editor’s note prefacing an article he wrote in Atlantic Monthly in April 1942 said he was “one of the key figures in our war effort” (Coy 1942b, 399). Another reporter described him that year as “rapidly gaining in influence” because he was a “keen analyst, [and] diagnostician of difficult situations” (Kiplinger 1942, 448). In 1943, a nationally syndicated columnist called Coy “the most important individual of all this city.”4 Two years after his appointment (quite a long time in FDR’s constantly changing organization chart), a magazine profile described him as “one of Washington’s most powerful behind-the-scenes figures.”5 In his war memoir, Bruce Catton (later a prizewinning popular historian of the Civil War) described Coy as “one of the President’s most trusted confidential aides” (1969, 70). Samuel Rosenman, author of the explanatory notes and commentary in FDR’s published papers, wrote that Coy “had the confidence of the President” (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 357). This book is about Wayne Coy’s role as Franklin Roosevelt’s liaison officer for emergency management in overseeing the American defense mobilization and production effort before Pearl Harbor and then during the war until mid-1943. The path to this study was quite unplanned. As in life, sometimes one is too close to something to see what others do. Without any larger intention, in several books I had nibbled around the edges of the Office for Emergency Management. A book about the Office for Government Reports included how it ended up as a component of OEM’s Office of

xii

Preface

War Information (OWI) (Lee 2005). Later I reported on OEM’s Division of Information, the PR office for all of OEM’s constituent agencies (2012). For a book about William H. McReynolds’s role as FDR’s administrative assistant for personnel management, I noted that he was also OEM’s (first) liaison officer (2016, 81–83). Some of my article-length research also brushed up against OEM, including FDR’s insistence on controlling all aspects of the civilian war effort, including its PR (2002), OEM’s field and regional offices (2007a), and OWI’s library (2007b). In February 2016, Harold Relyea, a scholar of the first rank on the managerial presidency, suggested that I had completed my apprenticeship and it was now time to tackle the central topic, OEM itself. He felt I should stop circling the subject and turn to face it head-on. I was startled by his idea because I had never considered doing that. Eventually I realized he was right, that the subject had not been adequately explored. Hence this book. My thanks to Harold for such great, eye-opening advice. I’m glad to acknowledge the many archivists and librarians who helped me. The major source of primary material came from visits to the Roosevelt Presidential Library (in Hyde Park, New York) and National Archives II (in College Park, Maryland). Other sources of in-person research were the Library of Congress’s Manuscript Division, its Newspaper & Current Periodical Reading Room (especially for its microfilm of the Washington Daily News), and the Microform and Electronic Resources Center (especially for its digitized and searchable database of the Washington Star). From afar, my queries were diligently answered by staffers at the Center for Legislative Archives (a unit of the National Archives), Yale’s University Archives, the Truman Presidential Library, the Government Documents Department of the Wisconsin Historical Society, the Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs Division, and the Hoover Institution Archives. My appreciation to all of the archivists and librarians who helped me. Also thanks to Elizabeth Hansen for her excellent research assistance at the Truman Library. Months after getting back from my last research trip to DC, I stumbled across a 1973 book citing an interview Coy did in 1943 with the historian of the Foreign Economic Administration (something of a successor to Lend-Lease). The book’s author had found it at the Washington National Records Center, the Archives’ records management service for departments and agencies. I submitted an email inquiry to the National Archives asking if the document could be located. After searching, archivists Cate Brennan and David Langbart shared with me the definitive bad news that the hard copy had been destroyed with other agency records. The State Department

Preface

xiii

might have it on microfilm, but most of its microfilms remained classified. It was possible, though not certain, that it might have been microfilmed as part of a different set. Typical of so many archivists I’ve worked with, they had a never-say-die attitude. Finally, Langbart found it on a different microfilm at the National Archives II site. Another obstacle: he said there was some administrative uncertainty about how to make a copy, including the need to formally declassify it. A few days later, he solved that. The quality was poor, he admitted, but beggars can’t be choosy. I was thrilled to obtain it and appreciative of his extra effort. The interlibrary loan staff at my home institution’s Golda Meir Library performed what looked like miracles to me, fulfilling almost all my requests, including for some obscure and unusual catalog items, sometimes held by only one library in the world. Through persistence and persuasion, they were able to obtain nearly every item I requested. My thanks to them, especially Beth Kucera. Also my thanks to the library’s Research Services unit for helping locate two very obscure newspaper items. A note on the referencing style used here. Generally, the parenthetical citation style of author-date is the most concise for references to published material. On the other hand, citations of archival and journalistic sources (especially when the latter are non-bylined) are briefest when referenced in chapter notes. In my previous SUNY Press book (on John Dewey’s People’s Lobby), I used both citation styles, depending on the category of the source. This dual referencing style is pragmatic, but a bit unorthodox. My thanks to SUNY Press for again permitting me to use this dual-referencing style. In general, all the SUNY Press staff were a pleasure to work with, but I must single out acquisitions editor Michael Rinella for his consistently encouraging and supportive role. As this is our third book together, he knew I was a worrier. Preemptively, he always kept me informed of the status of the project and greatly alleviated my seemingly reflexive anxieties. All authors should be so lucky to work with an editor like Michael. As always, all mistakes in the book are mine alone. Lots of people tried to show me the error of my ways. So I cheerfully confess that any remaining flubs or inaccuracies are solely my responsibility.

Abbreviations

AP

Associated Press (news wire service)

BOB

Bureau of the Budget (an agency in EOP)

CAS

Central Administrative Services (a division in OEM directly under the liaison officer)

CPA

Civilian Production Administration (successor to the War Production Board, publisher of WWII records and histories)

CR

Congressional Record

CSM

Christian Science Monitor (Boston-based afternoon newspaper)

CT

Chicago Tribune

DOI

Division of Information (a division in OEM directly under the liaison officer)

EO

Executive order

EOP

Executive Office of the President

FDR

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FDRL

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park (NY)

FEPC

Fair Employment Practice Committee (not Fair Employment Practices Committee) (a subunit in OEM)

FSA

Federal Security Agency (not Federal Security Administration)

FY

Fiscal Year. The federal fiscal year started on July 1 and ended on June 30 of the next calendar year. Fiscal years were named

xv

xvi

Abbreviations

by the year in which they ended. For example, FY 1941 started on July 1, 1940, and ended on June 30, 1941. In the 1970s, fiscal years were bumped forward by a quarter. They now start on October 1 and end on September 30. GPO

Government Printing Office

HC

Hartford [CT] Courant

HUAC

House Un-American Activities Committee

LOEM

Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (the official overseeing OEM)

NA II

National Archives, site II, College Park, Maryland

NDAC

National Defense Advisory Commission (sometimes Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense)

NYHT

New York Herald Tribune

NYT

New York Times

OEM

Office for Emergency Management (not Office of Emergency Management) (an agency in EOP)

OCD

Office of Civilian Defense (an agency in OEM)

OES

Office of Economic Stabilization (an agency in OEM)

OPA

Office of Price Administration (an agency in OEM until 1942)

OPM

Office of Production Management (an agency in OEM)

OWM

Office of War Mobilization

OWMR

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

SSP

Sidney Sherwood Papers, Truman Library

UK

United Kingdom, aka Great Britain

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WCP

Wayne Coy Papers, FDR Library

WMC

War Manpower Commission

WOC

Without Compensation (often confused with the slightly different personnel category of Dollar-a-Year men)

Abbreviations

xvii

WP

Washington Post

WPB

War Production Board (an agency in OEM, successor to OPM)

WS

Washington Star (afternoon newspaper, except Sunday)

WWI

World War I

WWII

World War II

Introduction

Wayne Coy in History: Literature Review As mentioned in the Preface, Wayne Coy is mostly remembered in the historical and academic literature for one incident, FDR’s memo to him to “step on it!” regarding military aid to the USSR (Burns 2006, 115; Bennett 1990, 32–33; Heinrichs 1988, 140; Herring 1973, 14). Beyond that event, Coy has only a minor presence in the literature, mostly limited to walk-on bit parts. He is mentioned in passing in published research, usually focusing on a particular policy issue or subject. They include (in reverse chronological order) the disabled (Jennings 2016, 235n75–76), overtime policies (Lee 2016, 107), African Americans (Lucander 2014, 33–36; Kryder 2000, 59–62, 74), civil defense (Roberts 2014, 359; Steele 1985, 93), labor unions (Sparrow 2014, 264; Lichtenstein 2003, 99, 168), OEM’s Division of Information (Lee 2012, 132–33), war bond sales (Kimble 2006, 36), New Deal lawyer Edward Prichard (Campbell 2004, 77, 95), conscientious objectors (Robinson 1996, 25), science R&D (Owens 1994, 534), the Philippines (Brands 1992, 371n19–21), biological warfare (Bernstein 1988, 292), price controls (Bartels 1983, 11n11), antitrust (Heath 1972, 309), postwar reconversion (Bernstein 1967, 163n7), arms production (Gulick 1971, 46), and headquarters-field relations (Carey 1944, 33). While fleeting, the catholic scope of these topics provide a strong indication of the multitude of issues in which Coy was personally involved, hinting at his role and suggesting to some degree his important, or at least active, presence at the crossroads of public policy in all those areas. Coy is also relatively invisible in postwar memoirs and biographies. In Byrnes’s two memoirs, he mentions Coy in only one of them and then only in his capacity as Bureau of the Budget (BOB) assistant director (Byrnes 1947;

1

2

Introduction

1958, 164, 184). Admiral Emory Land, head of the Maritime Commission and OEM’s War Shipping Administration, does not mention him (1958), nor do Attorney General Francis Biddle (1962) and production overseer Donald Nelson (1973). The memoir of White House aide Grace Tully (1949) does not mention him, and Sam Rosenman makes only one passing reference in a list of eight people who sometimes gave him suggestions for speech drafts (1972, 301). A biography of one of the early important figures in the arms mobilization, William Knudsen (Beasley 1947), does not mention Coy, and Sherwood’s in-depth look at the close working relationship between FDR and Hopkins (Coy’s mentor) only mentions Coy as a source, but not in the text (1950, xvii). Some key figures in the early professionalization of public administration who had formal or advisory positions in the war are also silent about Coy, though some make passing references to OEM (Gulick 1971, 76; Brownlow 1958; Fesler 1946, 11, 19).

Rationale for Book: Was Coy a Public Administrator? While largely ignored by the historical literature in public administration, Coy consciously and explicitly identified himself with the nascent practitioner profession of public administration and its academic discipline. He was active in the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). For example, Arthur Flemming, recently appointed by President Roosevelt to the US Civil Service Commission, invited Coy to attend early organizational meetings for the proposed Society for Public Administration scheduled to take place during the annual conference of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in DC in late December 1939.1 In 1941, Don K. Price, managing editor of the new Public Administration Review (PAR), asked Coy to review a draft article on the organization of the national defense effort to be sure it reflected the most up-to-date information.2 Three weeks after Pearl Harbor, Coy participated in a roundtable session on administration of the war at the joint ASPA/APSA annual conference in New York.3 In 1945, he was elected president of ASPA’s Washington, DC, chapter.4 A year later, Coy was appointed to ASPA’s National Council.5 At ASPA’s 1947 annual conference, he was on a panel discussing “The Chief Executive and Departmental Policies.”6 Coy also participated in several public administration–oriented panels at other APSA conferences, including the truncated conference in January 1943 and the next one in January 1944.7 After the war, he participated in

Introduction

3

a symposium on reorganization of the federal executive branch by contributing an article to the American Political Science Review (APSR). He argued that a president’s leadership of the executive branch required strengthening both the policy and management capabilities of the EOP. In particular, he advocated for creating an EOP office to mesh these separate policy and management perspectives when presenting options to the president for decision making (Coy 1946b). His association with public administration also extended beyond ASPA and APSA. For example, as LOEM, he occasionally attended meetings in DC of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council (CPA/SSRC).8 In April 1942, Louis Brownlow came to Coy’s office to meet with him.9 He was also on friendly terms with Professor Joseph Harris, who had been the staff director of the Brownlow Committee, and he corresponded with Harvard’s Carl Friedrich.10 Coy’s active interest in public administration was not limited to the academic side of the profession. In speeches to nonacademic audiences, whether practitioner-managers or lay citizens, Coy promoted this emerging new profession and sought to enhance its standing. Before Pearl Harbor, he delivered two addresses explaining his view of public administration. In September 1941, Coy spoke to the Society for Advancement of Management in Washington on “Organization for National Defense.” It was subsequently published in the society’s national journal, Advanced Management (Coy 1941d). The next month, he addressed a convocation at the University of Indiana on “The Men of Government: Keeping the American Government Democratic.” He discussed what public administration meant and its differences from business administration. His talk was considered so significant that it was published in Vital Speeches of the Day (Coy 1941c). After Pearl Harbor, Coy spoke to a special student convocation at Purdue University in March 1942 on “To Win the War and the Peace” (Coy 1942a). In it he talked about the importance of public administration. A few months later, he revised and expanded that speech into an article in Atlantic Monthly on “Teamwork in Washington: Conversion to War” (Coy 1942b). He argued that wartime public administration could not be perfect and that government would invariably make mistakes. The key was to focus on what was getting done, not what the relatively minor botches were. The article sparked extensive press coverage as a statement by the administration and led to editorial commentary as well. In August 1942, he spoke at another meeting of the Society for Advancement of Management on “Better Management in Wartime Government.”11

4

Introduction

Coy was comfortable discussing management in the abstract, sometimes presenting his philosophy of organizing management during the war. In 1942, he spoke to a conference of educators on the importance of organizing the federal government for war and staffing it with “trained public men.” He said that OEM had gradually evolved through “trial and error” and that there was a need for the war organization to engage in further “adaptation and development.” At this stage of the war, he argued, there was a need to shift the managerial focus from the reflexive orientation of US national needs to those of the United Nations as a whole (Coy 1942c). This pivot was needed as a counterpart to the new principle the allies were adopting in every war theater of one unified command. The supreme commander would have authority over all military formations regardless of country and service. Later in 1942, the president ruminated out loud with Coy about the difficulties of running the civilian mobilization effort. At the time, these efforts were splintered between many OEM agencies, such as the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the Office of Defense Transportation, along with many executive branch departments. After thinking about it, Coy sent FDR three memos proposing appointing a presidential manager over all those agencies. This officer would have direct line administrative powers and would exercise them in the name of the president. The new position would be the counterpart to James Byrnes, then the czar for economic stabilization; Harry Hopkins, who coordinated relations with the allies (especially Lend-Lease); and Admiral William Leahy, whom FDR appointed as his chief of staff for White House military matters. Coy suggested that a possible title for that position would be chief of staff of the Executive Office of the President. Again, he was trying to see the big picture and identify the abstract managerial needs for improving the civilian war mobilization (see chap. 10). After the war, Coy continued identifying himself with public administration. In 1951, in the formal biography he submitted to the US Senate when coming up for a reconfirmation hearing for another term on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he stated that he had “outstanding public administration experience” (US Senate 1951, 1). Similarly, in 1950, Somers described Coy as “an experienced public administrator who has held important posts in the Executive Office” (1969 [1950], 217). All these activities indicate that Coy viewed himself as a professional public administrator and he approached his governmental roles in that framework. In that respect, he is one of the group of Roosevelt’s senior administrators who were practitioners of the new profession in the post–Brownlow report

Introduction

5

era and who were building a template of the practice. Yet Coy’s contributions have largely been ignored by, or lost to, public administration history. The old orthodoxy of early public administration was about a politicsadministration dichotomy. The only thing public administrators were supposed to do was to execute and implement policies adopted by the political and elected institutions as efficiently as possible. After WWII the line shifted, with a new postwar consensus that administrators inevitably were, and should be, involved in policy making, not just implementation. Coy saw reality as going further. Without ever saying so specifically, he understood that part of the job of senior public administration was politics. To the theorists of public administration, this was strictly taboo. The normative exhortation of the literature expressly stated that politics was not something the ideal practitioner should do. Coy seemed to understand how impossible it was to separate them. As manager of a governmental organization, everything he was involved in had some element of politics embedded in it. Therefore, in part, this is an inquiry into what Coy actually did as a professional public administrator—not just in management or even beyond that in policy, but also in politics. For him—and, for that matter, any person operating at his level—policy, politics, and management were so inextricably intertwined that they could not be separated. This book recounts what for him was this trinity of the real world of public administration in his work in the prewar and wartime civilian mobilization. For example, in the rubric of public policy, did he seem to contribute to decision making, or was he merely yet another stop for a piece of paper moving toward the president? If so, then merely a paper shuffler? Was he only putting a light thumbprint of his own on proposals? Or, more substantively, was he a policy maker? A developer of policy options for the president? A coordinator of policy proposals? Perhaps sometimes, even the final policy decider (in the name of the president)? For this inquiry’s focus on Coy’s policy roles, a clarification is that this is not a study of the entirety of the scores of policy issues that he was somewhat involved in. Similarly, it does not track every substantive issue that crossed his desk, no matter what its gestational stage was at the moment, anywhere from incubation to final conclusion. Rather, the goal is an assessment and generalization of what role, if any, he had in policy. In particular, the focus is on the practice of public administration near the fuzzy boundary between policy and administration. In general, the field of public administration, especially as taught to graduate students seeking a professional degree, it is often presented as covering just about all levels

6

Introduction

of the management of governmental organizations, from entry-level junior managers and front-line supervisors all the way to the very top. And where does that top of professional and apolitical public administration end? At the highest level of a classified civil service position, the top of the permanent bureaucracy? Or the highest policy-making level serving at the pleasure of the chief executive of that agency? Or the very top of the pyramid, including elected officials (holding executive offices)? The professionalization of training programs in public administration in American universities seems to view public administration as largely synonymous with civil servants. Yet Brownlow and other earlier leaders in the effort to professionalize public administration were mostly interested in government management at the highest level possible, the president’s. If so, Wayne Coy was a public administration professional in the Brownlovian sense, working in the stratosphere of the public sector. He was their kind of guy. What exactly did he do? And, looking back, how did he do? While public administration has been insistent that in the real world of government, policy and administration cannot be separated, it has also asserted that professional public servants needed to stay as far away as possible from politics. A neutral civil service should be the tool of elected officials of the executive and legislative branches, not more than that. That was the role Harold Smith, FDR’s longtime BOB director, advocated for and claimed he took. He asserted that he and the staff of BOB were limited to serving the institutional presidency, not the partisan and political aspects of an individual president. Smith was influential in determining the values of the new profession of public administration. He considered himself a public administrator, was very active in the founding of ASPA, and was its second president. Before that, he served on the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. But Smith was not pure as the driven snow. For example, when he kept urging FDR to make a decision about reorganizing the wartime PR apparatus, his strongest private argument to the president was that the issue was about to explode politically (Lee 2005, 150–51). On another occasion, testifying on the BOB and EOP budgets before the House Appropriations Committee, Smith argued that as a presidential agency, the Office of Government Reports (OGR) qualified for direct appropriations and did not need to be authorized by Congress (67–68). This was essentially a political argument that he and FDR had developed beforehand to acquire funding for a politically controversial agency. In retrospect, and especially after historians

Introduction

7

read summaries of Smith’s near-daily conferences with FDR, the argument that BOB was an apolitical agency of public administration professionals is, at best, a hair-splitting absurdity. In the reality of presidential budgeting, Smith’s claimed role was really not a viable conception. However strained Smith’s assertion of BOB serving the presidency and not the president might be, an important difference between Coy and Smith was that Coy was a line administrator (albeit with fuzzy powers), while Smith was staff. Being out of that line of fire, it is easier to assert that staff services such as budgeting, HR, and auditing could be apolitical and merely responsive to whomever the political system installed at the head of the government and the appointed head of a department or agency. Even though the concept of a politics-administration dichotomy has descended into the arcane and Jesuitical arguments of the academy in the theoretical literature, the basic normative division is alive and well in the day-to-day reality of government. Yet the higher one gets in the bureaucracy, the closer one is to politicians and, invariably, political activities. Riccucci emphasized that her paradigmatic “execucrats” needed to have political skills along with six other characteristics (1995, chap. 8). Downs described the ideal bureaucratic statesman as the highest rung of public administration, just under that of pure political appointees (1994, 111). Where was Coy on this spectrum? Because he was a special assistant to the president, one would assume he would have some involvement in politics. Yet he also was the manager of the civilian war effort, so one would expect that he would seek to place OEM as far away from politics as possible. Just about everything Roosevelt did was controversial with the vocal conservative coalition on Capitol Hill; and to protect the integrity of the prewar and war effort, one would expect that Coy would try to stay as far away from politics as possible. Or maybe public administration at the highest levels of government is inherently about politics, ideology, and values? If so, how did Coy handle it vis-à-vis his duties as a public administrator? Also, from the perspective of public administration, did he try to be a more active manager and coordinator of OEM (unlike his predecessor, McReynolds, and successor, Byrnes)? How did he go about any effort to oversee the behemoth? What did he get involved in and what not? Was he merely a passive reactor to whatever got referred to him? Or perhaps was he an active manager trying to coordinate OEM? Did he truly manage OEM? This is a focus on bureaucratic politics and organizational management at the highest level, from the White House outward.

8

Introduction

Why Has Public Administration History Overlooked Coy? There are likely several reasons for the historical neglect of Coy’s professional record as a public administrator. First, Coy’s title of liaison officer for the Office for Emergency Management sounded at the time (and since then sounds to historians) innocuous and weak. That was exactly what FDR wanted. As part of his management style of ambiguity, duplication, and competition, he was a master of misdirection and misleading titles. For example, the WWII civilian intelligence agency was headed by the Coordinator of Information. (It later became the CIA.) When he wanted to create an exoskeleton for the executive branch to lead the prewar arms production effort, he called it an advisory commission. It did not even have a chairman or a presiding officer. On another occasion, FDR appointed McReynolds to head the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, hardly the title of someone who was to be the Civil Service Commission’s de facto boss (Lee 2016). Similarly, Coy’s title sounded like he was little more than a postal forwarding station. It did not come across as an impressive title, and it did not sound like it was a policy-making position. For example, in early 1942, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD, an agency within OEM) employed three civil service categories for liaising purposes: liaison officers, a principle liaison officer, and a man with the formal title of “Liaison Officer (Federal, State, and local relations)” (US Congress 1942a, 940, 942). At about the same time, OGR employed five liaison officers in its Liaison Section (US Congress 1942b, 1220). In terms of executive branch–wide statistics, the 1942 edition of the Congressional Directory listed eighteen other federal officials with the title of liaison officer and another four who worked in liaison offices. Using slightly different standards for listings, the US Government Manual in spring 1942 named thirteen liaison officers and four other liaison offices. Finally, the 1942 annual report from the Civil Service Commission to Congress of federal employees and officials it categorized as holding “administrative and supervisory positions” identified sixteen liaison officers and one more in a liaison office.12 If there were so many of them in the federal government, then surely they could not be very important. Being OEM’s liaison officer sounded similarly unimpressive. One reporter stated that Coy’s role as head of OEM was “only in a bookkeeping sense.”13 Another quoted Coy claiming that his new job was merely “a minor clerk in a major way.”14 A magazine profile noted that his position was “somewhat nebulous” and he was only “technically” the supervisor of all the agencies within OEM.15 A year after Pearl Harbor, a Washington Post

Introduction

9

columnist stated that “in no sense is it [OEM] capable of giving centralized direction of our war effort.”16 After the war, Hobbs asserted that Roosevelt considered that any advice from McReynolds or Coy “could be ignored with impunity and was most of the time” (1954, 187). This viewpoint has seemed stuck in nearly all subsequent historical and academic treatments of the subject. Second, Coy’s predecessor, McReynolds, indeed treated this liaison role as a nearly ministerial and informational one, largely as a passive observer who merely kept open the channels of communication between FDR and the prewar arms production effort. One news account referred to Coy as merely the “secretary” of OEM, parallel to McReynolds’s initial title and role at NDAC in 1940.17 Koistinen wrote generally of OEM’s “ineffectiveness” and blamed it squarely on the precedents McReynolds set. The post-McReynolds OEM continued to be “relatively unimportant” and “gradually became inactive after Pearl Harbor” (2004, 17). As a result of his conclusions about McReynolds and the early OEM, Coy is practically invisible from Koistinen’s history of the prewar and wartime economic mobilization. Similarly, after the war, Fesler characterized both McReynolds’s and Coy’s position as “merely” doing liaison (1946, 9). At most, OEM was a “super-coordinating” agency (11). Third, a seeming consensus of the academic and historical literature has been the view that OEM itself was unimportant. It was viewed as having no inherent or real hierarchical power traditionally associated with bureaucracy and organization charts. OEM was variously described as merely a legalistic “holding company” (Relyea 1997, 270; Harris 1946, 1146), a “fiction” (Hobbs 1954, 186), “a specious organization” (Sander 1989, 38), “a legal device” (Morstein Marx 1947, 21), and an “administrative sky-hook” (Rossiter 1949, 1209). According to Brownlow, it was an agency “which was to do little or nothing on its own” (1958, 457). Somers called it a “legal convenience” (1969, 208). To Emmerich, OEM was only a “tent device” to give an administrative home or outer skin to the many and fast-changing prewar and wartime agencies that FDR created, revised, and terminated through executive orders (1971, 60). At most, it was a “service agency” (71) housing some administrative specialists in such areas as HR and budgeting. Furthermore, OEM’s liaison officer “had no authority and could not act, either in his own name or in that of the President” (Somers 1969, 43). The true action, historians and public administrationists seemed to think, was in the work of particular mission-based agencies within OEM, whether they were focused on production, rationing, manpower, transporta-

10

Introduction

tion, or housing. The implication from the literature was that OEM per se was an unimportant administrative technicality. Immediately after the war, Gulick’s verdict on the administrative lessons of the war was that OEM was merely a “scheme,” evidently not meriting any further analysis (1948, 76). It was a flat and influential dismissal from a leading voice in the field (including serving on the Brownlow Committee). Thirty years later, Cuff pointedly observed that Gulick’s study “was not followed up” by any subsequent scholar (1978, 260n25). A biographer of one of Coy’s top lawyers sarcastically conveyed the unimportance of OEM, stating that Coy was “in charge of something called the Office of [sic] Emergency Management” (Parrish 2010, 58, emphasis added). A somewhat more textured assessment of OEM came from Grundstein. Yes, the original 1940 OEM “had only vague and insubstantial liaison and information clearance duties.” But in 1941 FDR revised OEM’s mandate, “establishing it as the parent agency through which he would coordinate, supervise and direct national defense activities” (1961, 45). The derogatory characterization of OEM as a mere holding company also deserves closer attention. The term, common in the business world, had a very different meaning from the way the literature has used it regarding OEM’s role in the public sector. In the for-profit world, a holding company had the power over and control of its subsidiary companies. Its unique feature was that the ownership of the holding company itself could be quite modest, yet it could control subsidiary corporations that individually were vastly larger financially. In fact, one of the fierce and successful battles of the New Deal was a law to limit the powers of holding companies of utilities (the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935). Therefore, if OEM is to be viewed as the public administration equivalent of a business holding company, then the term should suggest a connotation of power and control. This has not been the consensus historical view of OEM, which presents an assertion that a public sector holding company was not the counterpart to its powerful role in the corporate world. This book argues that Coy’s record as OEM’s leader suggests otherwise. The fourth likely reason that Coy and his service as LOEM have been relatively unacknowledged in the literature may be in part that he kept a relatively low visibility in the news media, although he was occasionally quoted and cooperated with several reporters seeking to write a feature on him. Generally, he was the kind of discrete presidential aide the Brownlow Committee had called for, a man (as they all were in those days) with “a passion for anonymity.” In mid-1941, a newspaper reporter described Coy as

Introduction

11

“little known to the public.”18 A year later, another reporter used Brownlow’s term to describe Coy as the “most ‘anonymous’ Roosevelt assistant” because, in part, he was very “tight-lipped” (Kiplinger 1942, 448). Another reporter focused on his low public profile, calling him “a White House confidant.”19 Coy did not seem to be motivated by gaining power over others or in court intrigues. He wanted the public administration of the defense effort to work efficiently and effectively, but he was not a micromanager and did not insist on being recognized as the boss of all OEM agencies. Rather, somewhat similar to his successor, Byrnes, Coy focused on problems. He was pragmatic and end-results oriented. After Roosevelt’s death, unlike many other FDR aides, Coy never sat for a detailed oral history interview. In two cases, he agreed to other historical interviews.20 In 1943, while still LOEM, he was interviewed by a historian at the Foreign Economic Administration (in part, the successor agency to the Lend-Lease program office) about his actions to implement FDR’s mid-1941 order to expedite military aid to the USSR (Milton 1943). In 1946, Herman Somers interviewed him for his dissertation (and subsequent book) on OWMR. Understandably, most of the interview focused on OWMR, particularly BOB director Smith’s frosty relationship toward Byrnes (Somers 1946). Nor did Coy write up his reminiscences, even though he was asked to do so in 1948 for the nascent FDR library. He pooh-poohed his contribution as not deserving much attention compared to others higher up in the Roosevelt White House: “I am very afraid that what I observed in the Government in those years is nothing more than a worms-eye view. Like most everyone else, I was inclined to think that I was the biggest ant on the log but I have discovered that many other people made very great contributions to the more important things that happened.”21 His only postwar writing on his wartime record was a two-page article in the New Republic on FDR’s order to rush aid to the USSR (1946a). Coy also wrote a more general article about the presidency in the American Political Science Review, but it understandably focused on the larger and somewhat abstract subject and was not a memoir per se (1946b). Fifth, Coy has received little attention because the historical consensus has been that the prewar and wartime mobilization was an unwieldly mess, an awkward Golem failing at efficiently harnessing the business sector and the civilian world. At the time, it was constantly under public criticism from the conservative coalition in Congress and by news commentators. That it was frequently reorganized by the president seemed to be confirmation of its failings. The phrase “the mess in Washington” became a shorthand that

12

Introduction

included the generalization of OEM as a failure. After a while, the term went from being a political criticism and accusation to a self-evident truth that needed no further documentation. Reflecting that historical consensus, Brands wrote that “the insufficient coordination of America’s war production impeded the efforts of the armies of the Grand Alliance” (2008, 819). Case closed. Why even study something when the historical verdict has already been settled and sealed? Elsewhere I have argued that the thenpolitical criticism has simply echoed down into history as accurate even though the economic mobilization was much more successful than those allegations. In particular, OEM looked complicated because the American political economy was complicated (2012, 202–6). In 2007, a non-American historian of WWII presented a revisionist conclusion, namely that the US was more successfully mobilized economically than Germany or England. Davies observed that “nothing could compare to the miracles achieved by the wartime economy of the USA” and that this was “spectacular” (2007, 34). Surely his conclusion can be interpreted backward to include giving some credit to OEM. Finally, it is possible that OEM’s legal status (and, consequently, Coy’s as LOEM) has led to an assumption about its relative unimportance. OEM’s existence did not derive from a law and had no statutory authorization. This was in stark contrast to its eventual quasi-successor, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR). OEM was established by an executive order that a president could subsequently change with the stroke of a pen. This was not a particularly strong or impressive anchoring in terms of formal status. It is little more than a short, facile jump to conclude that it (and he) could not have been very important substantively. Given the way the literature has downgraded the LOEM position and Coy’s record, there are also some published mistakes about it and him that writers should not have made. For example, Morstein Marx stated that “no successor was appointed” after Coy resigned as LOEM in 1943 (1947, 21). Similarly, Hobbs named the only LOEMs as McReynolds and Coy (1954, 186). Both are incorrect. FDR appointed Byrnes as LOEM, an office Byrnes held from June to November 1943. The purpose of this book is to revisit the heretofore unexamined premise and conventional wisdom that OEM as an administrative entity was unimportant, that the position of liaison officer for emergency management was similarly unimportant, and, in particular, the record of Wayne Coy as LOEM. The contention of the book is that a deeper examination of these questions suggests that public administration history had gotten it

Introduction

13

wrong. Historiography is practically revisionist at heart. It involves a new and fresh look at what has been accepted as the consensus and conventional wisdom. Concerning a wholly different aspect of WWII history (Nazi camp guard war crimes), Douglas made the argument that “a textured, granular analysis” was at the heart of good historical research, in particular if seeking to overturn the given narrative (2016, 226). Old generalizations may hold up, others may fall. Either way, new details add a fresh view of past events. In particular, the historical verdict on the unimportance of OEM and Coy’s service seems to have been frozen into the literature based on the hindsight of the first decade after the war. Then the subject seems largely to have been dropped, as though authoritatively finished. This historical inquiry reopens the question and examines if the short-term hindsight after the war got it right. It appears that the routine dismissal of OEM as a mere fiction, an administrative holding company, or little more than an organization chart on paper seems to have been maintained by an echo chamber of public administration historians accepting the conclusions of predecessors. With the verdict seemingly closed and done, there did not seem to be any justification to wade through thousands of pages of files in archival collections. As an outgrowth of that conventional wisdom, if OEM was unimportant per se, then that would carry over to whoever was theoretically at the top of the OEM pyramid, the liaison officer for emergency management. This inquiry tries to reopen this basic question and evaluate whether the given verdict has been accurate. It is an effort to develop a historical perspective from the ground up, from actual practice and documentation. Only then can generalizations be more than mere assertions.

Research Approach History is what we in the present choose to remember of the past. That leads to a tendency to read history backward (Lelyveld 2016, 11). Knowing how a particular story turned out, how do we assess a person’s record under the historical microscope? In the long run, were they right or wrong? These historical verdicts can be fluid and dynamic. For example, the retrospective views of Truman’s and Eisenhower’s presidencies have risen in the more recent historical evaluations than in the first few decades after they left the White House. Lelyveld’s observation also conveys how much history cherry-picks what it tells us. Historians focus on narratives of what is now

14

Introduction

considered important, as opposed to the larger range of issues that were being dealt with at the time. We microscopically examine evidence (or even straws in the wind) in minute detail of matters that later turned out to be of great significance. This approach is sometimes called back-shadowing. We skip lightly over everything else. It is almost as though we deliberately omit and then forget what we do not consider important at the current moment. This historiographic approach conveys a false sense of inevitability to the events that eventually occurred and the lack of any other possible path events could have taken. In particular, by reading history backward, we lose the benefit of a different perspective, namely of how things looked at that time. Given what a participant knew (or did not know), were his or her decisions about as good as one could expect when looking over his or her shoulder decades later? Were those decisions understandable, systematic, and as fact based as possible? Were they, to use Simon’s term, satisficing? Were they proceeding in a manner that was satisfactory and sufficient, albeit not perfect, because it was (and is) impossible to be 100 percent rational and have all the facts at hand (1997, 118–20)? Lincoln is famously quoted as saying that his approach to decision making was like that of a riverboat captain who navigated “point to point,” of being limited to what could be seen at that moment. Whatever might come around the bend politically and militarily was unknown and could only be dealt with after it came into sight (Donald 1995, 15). Cesarini’s revisionist history of the Holocaust was based on trying “to give the reader a sense of the contingent and chaotic course of what we know as history, but what was experienced at the time as a bewildering present and an uncertain future” (2016, xxxix). It is this perspective that I have tried to include when examining Coy’s work and record. Specifically, what, exactly, did he do? What, if any, were his contributions to the larger national and international goal of winning the war? In particular, given what he knew at that time, did he appear to make good decisions or bad? Was he adding value to the complex decision-making process that often landed on the president’s desk? Coy was part of an enormous undertaking, so an overall verdict on the totality of the prewar and wartime civilian mobilization cannot be placed solely and exclusively at his feet. Nonetheless, for a person near the top of a complex administrative machinery, does his record more than half a century later look creditable and constructive or mediocre and lamentable? Does he deserve historical attention or not? A good grade or a failing one?

Introduction

15

Given this methodological focus and the modest attention that the secondary literature has given Coy, I greatly benefited from three original and contemporaneous sources that—unlike secondary literature—are untainted by later perspectives, the imperative for narrative coherence, and histories built on the hindsight that authors had after the war ended. The contemporary sources I mostly relied on were archives, official federal publications, and journalism. By using a triangulation approach, those three sources helped reconstruct Coy’s role in the prewar and wartime civilian mobilization, sometimes on a day-to-day basis, even hour by hour in a few instances. A large collection of Coy’s personal papers was at the Roosevelt Presidential Library. It consisted of thirty-seven boxes, mostly from his EOP years. Another major collection was at the National Archives II, the depository for historical federal records. The holdings for the Office for Emergency Management (Record Group [RG] 214) included twenty-two boxes of the office records of the Liaison Officer for Emergency Management. Almost all of them related to Coy’s time in that position (even though two other people briefly held the same position before and after he did). That record group also included documents from the Division of Central Administrative Services (CAS), the entity under his direct supervision that provided staff services to almost all agencies in OEM. One referencing limitation related to Coy’s large number of memos to FDR. He rarely provided a subject line (“Re:”) identifying the issue at hand. The same was the case of almost all memos that FDR dictated for Coy. Therefore, for citation purposes, I was limited to the date of the memo and its location in the archives. It was slightly more common to find nonpresidential memos to or from Coy with the subject of the memo listed in its title. When it was available, I included it in the endnote. The papers of Sidney Sherwood at the Truman Presidential Library included his diary for the early months of 1942, while he briefly served as assistant liaison officer for emergency management. It is a compelling narrative of the thoughts and actions of Coy’s deputy, especially his comments about Coy himself. Because it is housed in the Truman Library (when his public service was higher profile), it appears that previous FDR researchers have overlooked Sherwood’s FDR-related material. The Roosevelt Library also had valuable material in other collections, including FDR’s Official Files (OF), the President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), President’s Personal File, Harold Smith Papers, and the Henry Morgenthau diaries (also now online). The Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress had the original (long)

16

Introduction

version of the Harold Ickes diary. Another primary source was Coy’s public statements, such as speeches to public audiences or articles he wrote. These, too, are contemporaneous sources that are valuable for reconstructing events and decisions. The second source was that of official federal documents, including formal presidential documents and congressional reports. In particular, congressional hearings conveyed a vivid sense of the times. Coy occasionally testified before Congress as LOEM, as did two of his senior staffers, the head of the Division of Central Administrative Services and the head of his legal staff. These hearing transcripts give a kind of “you are there” feeling of being in the room as they were happening: what issues were pressing at the time, how unfolding events looked at that moment, and the political thrust-and-parry minuet that occurs between the testifiers and committee members. At times, the issues being raised were institutional and reflected the inherent different perspectives of the executive and legislative branches. At other times they reflected political and ideological alliances and enmities or were about the “golden rule,” namely that whoever controls the money controls the rules for spending it. A third source was journalism. I realize that traditionally newspaper and magazine coverage is not viewed as a primary source of information. This, it seems to me, is a mistake. After all, coverage of events by the news media reflected how things looked at that time. Reporters had no way of knowing how the story would turn out eventually. This gives media coverage a fresh, at-the-moment perspective. Also, while reporters and syndicated opinion columnists might not have had access to all relevant information, public officials often did not either. Everybody was satisficing. Sometimes figures such as Coy were reacting to media coverage, making journalists more than merely being passive observers. Therefore, an effort to see Coy’s work in the present tense is reflected in contemporaneous news coverage and commentary. Certainly journalism is not an original source in the sense that archival and official documents are, but reportage is not a secondary source either. Generally, a secondary source would be a treatment that retrospectively investigates a subject matter, such as when the historian knows the rest of the story. This can distort a depiction of how things looked at the time, especially based on available information, politics, and public opinion. Journalism (including commentary) can be a helpful primary source of information, even if not an original source. Personal memoirs (or edited diaries) could allegedly be treated as primary sources, though, in a sense, they are secondary because they were

Introduction

17

written after events happened. While they can be helpful, they are subject to after-the-fact self-justification. Therefore, they need to be treated cautiously and with a certain amount of skepticism, in particular regarding controversial matters or the centrality of the teller to the events recounted.

Scope of the Book OEM encompassed practically the entire civilian effort in WWII from civilian defense to transportation to control of natural resources. It was just about everything the federal government did in WWII except the uniformed services. Therefore, it was important to determine clearly the scope of this inquiry. This is not intended to be a comprehensive history of OEM and all its line agencies per se. That would be tantamount to a complete history of the war effort sans the military. Rather, the focus is on the liaison officer role, although this inevitably slides into some discussion of OEM. The center of attention is the somewhat odd position of liaison officer for emergency management. (Sometimes in formal correspondence the title was listed as “Liaison Officer, Office for Emergency Management.” Some other documents used the term “Office of the Liaison Officer.”) In particular, this is a review of the person who held that title the longest, Wayne Coy. Given that Coy defined himself as a practitioner of the new profession of public administration, what specifically did he do in the spheres of policy, politics, and management? Coy had a predecessor and successor, neither of whom approached the job with the same energy and commitment that he did. Therefore, there is presented also a brief discussion of the first and third LOEMs. Coy had a small personal office, but directly supervised two horizontal OEM agencies. CAS provided routine staff services to most of the OEM agencies and the Division of Information (DOI) furnished PR services to most OEM agencies. When relevant to the story of Coy’s work, his supervision of these two horizontal silos is discussed. But this is not a comprehensive history of CAS, and I have separately written a biography of DOI (2012). Given the broad scope of OEM’s agencies, Coy inevitably was involved in most of the issues that arose in the civilian mobilization, both before Pearl Harbor and after. When identifying his roles in those policy areas, the focus is on what he did (or did not) do, rather than a comprehensive history of that particular substantive area. As presented at the beginning of this introduction, there is a decent literature of many of those specialized subjects. The question to be examined here is what his

18

Introduction

contact with that subject matter was and if that involvement was more in the nature of policy, politics, or management. Coy was frequently in touch with President Roosevelt. In those cases, the same question is examined: was he engaging in policy, politics, or management? With the focus being on the LOEM position, the period when Coy was both LOEM and assistant budget director (May 1942–June 1943) seeks to distinguish between his BOB work and his LOEM activities. In terms of clarity, I have adopted a “hat” metaphor as a shorthand way to convey this and to prevent confusion. During that time period, he wore two hats. That meant a study of his LOEM record would need to try to distinguish between his two-hatted roles, trying to tease out what he did wearing his LOEM hat. Sometimes that was easier said than done. There were other twohatted people at the time. In 1941, FDR appointed New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia to direct the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD). La Guardia continued wearing his mayoral hat as well. In fact, he was running for reelection, which was very important to him. Harold Ickes was another example of wearing two hats. Before the war, he was interior secretary and head of the Public Works Administration (PWA), a wholly separate agency. During the war (after losing PWA), he was the petroleum coordinator. Coy’s predecessor and successor also were two-hatted. McReynolds was LOEM and liaison officer for personnel management. Byrnes was both LOEM and director of the Office of War Mobilization (OWM). In a study of President Nixon’s 1973 super-secretaries, I also used this terminology (2010). Each wore two hats, as the secretary of a Cabinet department and, separately, as counsellor to the president with an office in the White House complex.

Disciplinary Foci and Audiences for the Book The audiences for this book are likely to be primarily those interested in American history, political science, and public administration. Some of the topics that the book addresses would be categorized as fitting in subdivisions of these disciplinary silos or as cross-disciplinary studies, such as political history, the presidency, presidential staffing, and history of the federal government. Other more specialized research areas that the book covers include those interested in the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and in WWII history. A relatively new practitioner profession and academic discipline is emergency management. Nowadays it is common to use the term, to see it mentioned in the media and in everyday use. The Federal Emergency

Introduction

19

Management Agency is a high profile and well-known agency (for good or, sometimes, bad). Most states, counties, and cities have emergency management departments and emergency management directors. In the academy, there are several peer-review academic journals, such as International Journal of Emergency Management, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, and Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. In 2008, I contributed a chapter on emergency media relations to a Disaster Management Handbook (Lee 2008a). The ASPA has a Section on Emergency and Crisis Management, which is a mix of professors and practitioners. As a relatively young field, emergency management does not yet appear to have a substantial historical literature. In the context of the gradual emergence of the field, FDR’s OEM and Coy’s service as LOEM are likely seminal events, showing the initial appearance of an activity called emergency management, even before WWII. Given the sparse literature, it is difficult to state definitively, but it appears that FDR and Brownlow should get the credit for inventing the term “emergency management,” that OEM was likely the first government agency with the term in its name, and that Coy probably was the first full-time government official with the term emergency management in his title. (His predecessor, McReynolds, wore two hats and served only briefly as LOEM.) If these tentative assertions are accurate, then this book covers the birth of emergency management in American government.

Structure of the Book: Chronology of Coy as a Public Administrator Involved in Policy, Politics, and Management The art of storytelling, since time immemorial, follows the sequential structure of a beginning, middle, and end. This recounting of the position of liaison officer for emergency management and the overlapping career of Wayne Coy is a good fit: what happened in 1941, what happened in 1942, and so on. But there were also some difficulties with a plain chronological narrative. One was of parallel story lines occurring at about the same time and not overlapping or being closely related to each other. Second, some stories did not respect a clean division of events by year or any other similar boundary. They extended over, say, both the beginning and the middle stages of the narrative. I have tried my best to cope with this historical messiness in several ways. For events on different subjects that occurred around the same time,

20

Introduction

there are separate, but parallel, chapters. The creation of the Office for Emergency Management (1939–40) and the invention of the position of liaison officer for emergency management (1941) were unrelated to Wayne Coy’s early career in public administration. Therefore, these are dealt with in separate chapters, respectively chapters 1 and 2. Those two story lines converge in chapter 3, when Coy became LOEM in April 1941. The book then divides his LOEM career into three chronological periods: chapters 4 to 6 cover his service before the US entered WWII (April–December 1941), chapters 7 and 8 cover his LOEM record for the first half-year of the war, and chapters 9 and 10 relate his work from mid-1942 to mid-1943, when he wore two hats, as LOEM and as assistant BOB director. The chronological chapters on Coy’s LOEM record are structured based on the analytic foci of policy, politics, and management. For someone at Coy’s level, many of his activities would surely overlap with and be interconnected to one or both of the other categories. Therefore, I have tried to recount Coy’s work by categorizing them roughly in these three rubrics. Understandably, sometimes it would be difficult to tease out this distinction. Generally, I tried to perceive any particular subject as being predominantly policy, more edging toward politics, or mostly as relating to some kind of managerial role in a large government organization. Generally, the rubric of public policy comprised substantive subjects of governmental attention. For problem X, shall we do this or shall we do that? Coy was deeply involved in such occurrences in various roles such as policy development, policy clarifier, policy monitor, or policy maker. As a result, his participation in policy was sometimes as a coordinator, sometimes as an honest broker between the president and executive branch agencies, and sometimes as a decider. At other times, it was evidently some kind of policy role, but his contribution to it was fuzzy in terms of facile categorization. The category of politics could be equally fuzzy. Politics, of course, is about elections. From time to time, Coy overtly participated in events that were election related. But is it politics to advise a president? Is it politics when interacting with senators, members of Congress, or governors? With the exception of shepherding key policy legislation through Congress, most interactions Coy had with elected officials (excluding the president) are treated here as fitting in a political role. However, the political realm is more than campaigns and elected officials. For example, Coy gave speeches and wrote articles that were widely covered and assumed to be statements of the administration that overtly or covertly sought to influence public opinion. Similarly, even though he was not a publicity hound compared

Introduction

21

to others in the capital, Coy agreed to a modest share of interviews when requested by reporters and columnists. Some were profiles, others were to explain administration activities. It is particularly striking that the take-noprisoners and gossipy Washington Merry-Go-Round syndicated column by Drew Pearson (and, at that time, Robert S. Allen) made consistently positive comments about Coy. In part, this could be explained by the columnists’ rough support for the New Deal, but not always. Presumably Coy was sometimes an unnamed source who was valued by columnists. Again, his media relations was likely to be motivated in part by the desire to channel public opinion in support of FDR and the war effort. Therefore, I generally included speeches, writings, and press coverage as part of Coy’s political role. Finally, management. At first blush, in contemporary society so dominated by business corporations, CEOs, and the C-suite of managers, we all seem to know what management is. But, perhaps a bit surprisingly, it can be a hazy area of endeavor when examined closely, especially in contradistinction to policy and politics. Theoretically, as OEM’s liaison officer, Coy was not OEM’s manager. Therefore, he did not have any explicit hierarchical powers over others below him in the organizational pyramid, unlike in his role as assistant FSA administrator or the duties of any secretary of a Cabinet department. In the line versus staff traditional distinctions of public administration at the time, he was staff, not line. Using the more contemporary lingo from business administration, he was in a functional role, not an operational one. So, theoretically, Coy would not have had much of a role as manager. But official titles could be deceiving, especially in President Roosevelt’s world. As mentioned above, the Coordinator of Information was the spy agency along with conducting overseas propaganda. The liaison officer for personnel management was the de facto boss of the CSC (Lee 2016). Therefore, setting aside official titles, was Coy a manager? After all, he was the most senior person at the Office for Emergency Management, the entity that encompassed practically all aspects of the prewar and wartime mobilization with the exception of the military. By examining specific examples of his activities vis-à-vis OEM agencies, his actual record should enable constructing a more authoritative picture of how much or how little he was a line and operational manager. For example, was he involved in arbitrating disputes between the various OEM agencies or between an OEM agency and other federal entities? Another approach can examine the work of CAS, which was under his direct management. It provided most OEM agencies with basic staff services, such as HR, budgeting, accounting, and auditing. Did

22

Introduction

Coy seem to be exercising direct or indirect management oversight through CAS? In any role or activity, was he seeking to neutralize the autonomizing imperative buried deep in the DNA of federal bureaucracies by favoring a centripetal orientation to his efforts? Cognizant of the artificiality of these distinctions between policy, politics, and management in some situations, I hope I got this slicing of the historical pie roughly right. It would be reasonable to disagree sometimes with some of my distinctions and categorizations. I made them with the clear knowledge that whichever rubric I placed them in, they often also related to one or both of the other analytic categories. This mixed approach was used in chronological chapters 4 to 6 to recount the messy splaying out of Coy’s LOEM work. Their internal structure might also help capture FDR’s fluid approach to governing and management, including his constant tinkering with structures, changes in personnel, overlapping roles, vagueness in delegations of power, and competition within his administration and White House for his favor. Having examined in detail Coy’s LOEM work in policy, politics, and management in 1941, the subsequent chronological chapters are on his work as LOEM in the first half-year of the war (chaps. 7–8) and while wearing the both hats as LOEM and assistant BOB director (chaps. 9–10). Chapter 9 covers the period before James Byrnes came to the White House and the next chapter after Byrnes resigned from the Supreme Court and was ensconced in the East Wing with major responsibilities. (The effort to distinguish between Coy’s LOEM and BOB roles and the rationale for dividing this time period into two chapters is presented in more detail in the second subchapter of chap. 9.) These chapters are somewhat less detailed, if only to avoid repetition of points already made. Rather, the focus is on relatively new activities or issues that were not covered in significant detail in preceding discussions. The last numbered chapter (11) covers the half-year in 1943 when Byrnes had a two-hatted role, one of which was LOEM, followed by Roosevelt’s subsequent abolition of the LOEM position, and a brief review of Coy’s post-LOEM career. The final section of the book is an effort to draw conclusions about the relatively odd position of liaison officer for emergency management that FDR had created and to evaluate Coy’s incumbency and record as LOEM, particularly vis-à-vis policy, politics, and management.

1

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management and Its Liaison Officer, September 1939–April 1941

Franklin Roosevelt had a well-honed, if idiosyncratic, philosophy of presidential management of the federal government. He insisted that as president, none of his constitutional powers as chief of the executive branch and commander-in-chief could be delegated and, furthermore, that he wanted to be sure that he was the one to make all important decisions (and, sometimes, the unimportant ones as well). He did not care about neat organization charts and did not try to assign responsibilities so as to avoid overlap, duplication, or confusion. In fact, he thrived on confusion. One administrative historian called FDR’s management philosophy “competitive administration” (Reeves 1973, 366). It was a public administration version of Darwinian survival of the fittest, with the strongest thriving and the weakest sinking. Roosevelt did not like firing anyone, especially not in person, but was quite bloodless and unsympathetic when subordinates fought among themselves. As far as he was concerned, that guaranteed they would have to come to him to resolve their disagreement (or not, whichever he preferred at the moment). On the other hand, management theorists in both business and public administration liked clear and clean organization charts and insisted on the principle that a manager’s authority must be commensurate with his (as they mostly were then) powers. Roosevelt, by contrast, could not have cared less about that. The best result would occur through the competition within his administration with him having the last word if he wanted it.

23

24

Get Things Moving!

Another element of the president’s managerial philosophy gradually came into clear view long before the US declared war in December 1941. There had been many major war events before Pearl Harbor and the entry of the US into WWII as a combatant. They included Japan’s gradual encroachment into China beginning in 1937, Hitler’s takeover of Austria in 1938, the Munich agreement about Czechoslovakia later that year, the signing of a nonaggression pact between Germany and the USSR in 1939 and quickly followed by a coordinated invasion of Poland, Hitler’s conquest of France in 1940, and his attack on Russia in mid-1941. FDR responded to these events by declaring a limited national emergency in September 1939 and then an unlimited national emergency in May 1941. During this period, he successfully obtained congressional approval for significantly increasing spending on national defense, expansion of the military, modifications in the Neutrality Act, Lend-Lease, and a peacetime draft. As to how to structure, organize, and manage these developments, it was his firm belief that the apparatus for national mobilization should be wholly under his control, with the ability for him to change it with the stroke of a pen. Without ever quite saying it clearly and out loud, he did not want the executive branch in the prewar period and then in wartime to be constrained by Congress. He did not want to have to ask Congress each time to create a statutory agency to administer a slice of the defense emergency. Who knew what Congress would or would not adopt? Roosevelt knew that the quip about the lawmaking process being as ugly as sausage making was quite true. There was a nearly certain predictability that Congress would want to put its thumbprint on such enactments. As a result, it was inevitable that he probably would not entirely like what reached his desk for signing or vetoing. And he most definitely did not want Congress on its own initiative to introduce and enact legislation creating statutory agencies that he did not even ask for. Roosevelt’s preferred alternative was to create agencies by executive order. After all, a law, once enacted by Congress, could only be changed by Congress. On the other hand, an executive order could be changed by simply signing another executive order. These were the lessons that FDR felt he had learned from his experience as President Wilson’s assistant secretary of the Navy during WWI. This managerial principle, of a presidentially controlled infrastructure to run the prewar and war emergency, was central to FDR’s decision making about public administration, no matter how much grumbling came from Capitol Hill. The key was to keep Congress from mucking up how he would manage a national defense emergency.

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

25

Creating the Office for Emergency Management, September 1939 This president-centric approach to the infrastructure of the national defense mobilization gradually emerged into view in 1939 and 1940. It was part of the last act of the monumental political fight over reorganizing the executive branch. FDR had created a President’s Committee on Administrative Management in early 1936. It was chaired by Louis Brownlow of the Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago. The other two members were Luther Gulick, head of the Institute of Public Administration in New York, and Charles E. Merriam, political science professor at the University of Chicago. The committee met quietly while Roosevelt was running for reelection. After winning the November 1936 election, the president worked closely with the Committee to frame and finalize its recommendations. FDR sent the committee’s report to Congress in early 1937. After a major political battle (coinciding with his plan to pack the Supreme Court—also called a “reorganization”), in April 1939, Congress passed a much more modest bill, giving a president a limited power to reorganize the executive branch. Those powers were subject to a legislative veto and could not supersede any extant statutory parameters controlling agencies and departments. The law also flatly excluded major portions of the executive branch from any reorganization (Lee 2016, 26–61). In conformance with his new, but limited, reorganization powers, Roosevelt sent his first reorganization plan to Congress in April 1939, proposing to create the Executive Office of the President. He said, in the accompanying message, that he viewed the central management tools of a president to be budgeting, planning, and personnel. Therefore, the component entities of the new EOP would include the Bureau of the Budget, then in the Treasury Department, re-creating the National Resources Committee (which he had established by executive order in 19351) into the National Resources Planning Board, and some kind of personnel management office that did not conflict with Congress’s ban on using his reorganization powers to touch the US Civil Service Commission (CSC) (US House 1939). Congress approved the reorganization plan (by not vetoing it), and it was to go into effect after July 1, 1939.2 But Roosevelt, who had a finely tuned antenna and fingertip feel for public opinion, politics, and congressional moods, did not act immediately. In part, he was preoccupied not only by world events, but also by deflecting a strong push from the military and big business that he approve an Industrial Mobilization Plan. That plan would, in case of war, centralize all civilian activities under one civilian

26

Get Things Moving!

czar, presumably a businessman, as Bernard Baruch had (somewhat) been in WWI. That person would be largely reporting to the military through its joint munitions board, not to the president (Lee 2005, chap. 4). So, in the late summer of 1939, FDR had on his mind the two subjects of reorganizing the presidency by activating EOP and national defense management in response to (or as an alternative for) the military’s Industrial Mobilization Plan. Soon they became intertwined. Roosevelt met with Brownlow to talk it over on July 31, August 28, and for lunch on August 30.3 Brownlow stated in his memoir that he suggested a dual organizational strategy. First, that any national defense effort be placed within EOP and therefore be directly accountable to the president. Second, lacking any statutory power to create such an entity in EOP, FDR could rely on the Council of National Defense, a Cabinet-level entity created by Congress in 1916 to run the US role in WWI. Congress had never repealed the law after the war was over. Brownlow suggested reviving the Council and then having it establish an advisory body, which would be under the de facto control of the president (1958, 424–27). Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and the subsequent declarations of war on Germany by France and the UK became the news peg for Roosevelt to justify activating a muscular, broadly structured, and unprecedented executive office. On September 8, he proclaimed a limited national emergency and then signed EO 8248, creating EOP. It contained five units: a new White House Office (for the six administrative assistants to the president authorized by the Reorganization Act4), BOB, National Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, and the Office of Government Reports (the former National Emergency Council). Buried in the text was a clause stating that EOP might contain a sixth entity: “in the event of a national emergency, or threat of national emergency, such office for emergency management as the President shall determine.” The names of the other five agencies were capitalized in the text, as formal and official titles, but the reference to an office for emergency management was not.5 FDR thus neatly finessed two issues: an unmistakable signal to the military that he would directly control any defense mobilization and a signal to Congress that the locus for doing so would be through executive orders, not statutes. Brownlow claimed authorship of the idea itself and the term to name the activity as well as the lower case wording in the executive order. It appears that he deserves the historical credit for inventing the term emergency management and institutionalizing it in government. It gradually grew to become commonplace in the American public sector. Brownlow also said

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

27

he had written the relevant section of the press release accompanying these actions. It stated: In the time of national emergency, domestic or foreign, the job of the President is even more difficult. In such periods it has always been found necessary to establish administrative machinery in addition to that required for the normal work of the Government. Set up in a time of stress, these special facilities sometimes have worked at cross purposes both within themselves and with the regular departments and agencies. In order that the Nation may not again be caught unaware, adequate resources for management should be provided in advance of such periods of emergency. Although these management facilities need be brought into action only when an emergency or serious threat of emergency exists, they must function in an integral relationship to the regular management arms of the President. (Morstein Marx 1947, 17) Brownlow characterized the low-key treatment of emergency management in the executive order as a success by FDR, akin to a magician putting a rabbit in the hat without anyone actually noticing. He went so far to claim that the emergency management topic “was so disguised in small print . . . that it occasioned no remark in the press” (1958, 429). That was more than an exaggeration; it was false. Portions of the press release paragraph above were quoted on the front pages of the Post, the Times, and the Chicago Tribune.6 In its day-after coverage, the Baltimore Sun said the subject was also discussed during follow-up briefing by Press Secretary Stephen Early: “Early’s remarks of yesterday led to the belief that, if and when the President deems it necessary to create such an office, he would select an experienced man to head it.”7 In one respect, Brownlow’s characterization about OEM as a rabbit disappearing into the hat was correct. The idea of an EOP agency to deal with a national defense emergency disappeared from discussion within days of the executive order. It was, after all, a stand-by idea, and there was no reason for further action or attention. This remained the case for nine months.

Activating the Office for Emergency Management, May 1940 Much happened in the world between the September 1939 executive order and late May 1940. Stalin invaded eastern Poland a few weeks after Hitler

28

Get Things Moving!

attacked from the west, France and the UK mobilized and stationed combat divisions behind France’s Maginot Line at its border with Germany, Germany conquered Denmark and Norway, Italy attacked Egypt from Libya, Stalin attacked and conquered Finland, Germany attacked France through Belgium, the British and French armies moved into Belgium to meet the German attack, Churchill became Great Britain’s prime minister, Germany launched a surprise second attack through the Ardennes forest and succeeded in cutting off French and British armies from France proper, and Japan intensified its invasion of China. A lot was also happening (or not happening, depending on one’s perspective) on the political front. Roosevelt was in the last full year of his second term. Unbelievably to some, he was thinking about violating the long-standing custom set by George Washington of a president serving only two terms. He was considering running for a third term. At this point, he did not say yes or no. He simply refused to comment on it. This created some chaos in the normal clock of presidential politics. If a president is not running for reelection, then the spring of the election year would be a time of intense campaigning by politicians seeking the nomination of their party. While primaries in those days were few and far between, there was much happening in every state in caucuses and conventions to select members of its delegation to the national convention scheduled for the summer. Roosevelt’s silence froze this normal life cycle of politics. The Democratic Party had many ambitious politicians who were salivating running as FDR’s successor and political heir. However, there was not much they could do without angering the president and his supporters throughout the party if they were to appear to be insulting FDR by openly campaigning and thereby assigning him the role of lame duck. Suddenly, in late May, Roosevelt sprang into action in terms of the national defense emergency. On May 25, 1940, he activated OEM by signing an administrative order. This was a legal and presidential novelty, as official documents called administrative orders had not existed heretofore. Roosevelt’s action conveyed that the legal status and purpose of this category of document would be as “a subset of directives used to detail further policy primarily established by executive orders” (Relyea 2008, 4). In this case, FDR’s administrative order brought OEM into existence and assigned it two specific responsibilities: • “clearance of information with respect to measures necessitated by the threatened emergency.”

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

29

• “liaison” between the president and new and old federal agencies “for the purpose of securing maximum utilization and coordination of agencies and facilities in meeting the threatened emergency.”8 The same day as the administrative order, the president also signed a letter assigning Administrative Assistant William McReynolds, already serving as liaison officer for personnel management, a second hat: “to have charge and direction of the Office for Emergency Management.”9 But FDR gave him no title for his role in OEM. McReynolds was most certainly not its director. A few months later, when the reference librarians of OGR’s US Information Service were preparing the next issue of the US Government Manual, they appeared to be a bit flummoxed by this key detail. After all, in government everyone occupying a position had a title to go along with it. So, for lack of anything better, the fall 1940 issue listed McReynolds as the “Head” of OEM.10 Similarly trying to finesse the awkwardness, when the Cabinet secretaries comprising the statutory Council of National Defense signed off on the actions the president requested of them, one of the documents declared McReynolds as “in charge of ” OEM (Beasley 1947, 239). McReynolds sometimes converted that phrase into a proper title, signing some official documents as “In Charge of The Office for Emergency Management.”11 The administrative order and letter of appointment were only two parts of an integrated passel of organizational actions by the president in late May, none of which—tellingly—entailed congressional action. (In a separate action, on May 31 he sent a message to Congress asking it to pass an additional national defense funding bill of about $1 billion.) At a press conference on May 28, Roosevelt announced that he had decided to create a governmental entity to oversee the national defense mobilization. He said it seemed “wisest” to rely on an already existing statute rather than “having to go and propose something entirely new in the way of legislation that would take weeks and months and a great deal of pro and con discussion, partisan and otherwise” (Roosevelt 1972, 15: 385). Specifically, he was reviving the WWI-era Council of National Defense, consisting of a statutorily defined membership of specific Cabinet secretaries. But he was only asking it to meet once, to approve creating an advisory commission of his choosing. The result was the establishment of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. (It quickly became known at the National Defense Advisory Commission [NDAC].) FDR clarified that McReynolds’s new second hat would carry the title of secretary of the Commission. When

30

Get Things Moving!

reporters pressed him about NDAC not having a chairman, he replied, “I do not know. Why bring up the subject?” Pressing him further, he—apparently improvising—said, “Let Mac be the chairman; he is the secretary. In other worlds, let the secretary call the meeting together. I do not know what the procedure will be. I do not think it will be formal” (394). So even if McReynolds convened meetings and chaired them, he clearly would not have power over the Commission or individual commissioners. NDAC was an exoskeleton for the legacy executive branch, comprising seven members who each oversaw the national defense mobilization in their areas, such as production, materials, transportation, prices, and agriculture. Working jointly and individually, commissioners would work to help coordinate and channel the existing statutory duties of relevant departments and agencies. The power that the Commission and commissioners had over executive branch agencies was unclear, as was who exactly their boss was given that there was no chairman or director. One of the new commissioners, William Knudsen, had been CEO of General Motors and thought he had a good understanding of management, hierarchy, power, and authority. He asked the president point blank a question that was an obvious one to a person coming from business administration: “Who is our boss?” A somewhat surprised FDR laughed and said, “Well, I guess I am” (Roosevelt 1972, 15: 419). It was a good introduction to the differences between business administration and public administration, as well as between orthodox public administration and Roosevelt’s version of it. Brownlow, who had been in on the planning, openly confessed that the new structure was “a monstrosity.” “The scheme didn’t please anybody particularly, except one man,” the president (1958, 431). As to what the relationship or link between NDAC and OEM was, it was initially left unclear, placed in the kind of Rooseveltian administrative fog that he preferred. A few days after this flurry of activity, the White House (probably the press secretary) clarified the minor detail that NDAC would administratively be placed within OEM.12 A wire service reporter, trying to convey to lay readers what that meant, wrote that this made NDAC “technically a branch of the White House.”13 In reality, it was more than just “technically” under the president’s oversight. It truly was. But the delayed timing, the way it came out, and all the other big news stories relating to national defense made it like a minor blip, and it was largely ignored. The minor details of public administration were simply boring to most of America, even to the political class in Washington. In general, the results of these interrelated presidential actions reflected FDR’s approach to management: his insistence on making all decisions, his

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

31

preference for improvisation and revising matters at the stroke of a pen, and his desire to keep Congress away from imposing statutory cement on organizational matters. It also reflected the political situation by keeping his option open to run for reelection and trying to straddle the political left and right. FDR was portraying his own centrality to national defense in the public’s mind, while at the same time keeping his actions relatively low-key. This was intentional, so as not to excessively alarm isolationists who stood ready to accuse him of warmongering or Republicans for politicizing national defense. Former President Hoover nonetheless criticized the new organizational setup as weak. Centralized and authoritative action was needed rather than a mere advisory multiperson entity.14 On the other hand, the president was also maneuvering around internationalists, who wanted the US to take a more activist and interventionist role in response to European war developments. Influential columnist Walter Lippmann condemned Roosevelt’s soothing packaging of his organizational decisions as trying to convey that they were merely “a sideshow” and nothing for the public to get too worried about. The NDAC-OEM infrastructure was “primitive and amateurish” and was based on the impotence of “negotiating and consulting.” He thought what was needed were “responsible commanders equipped with all necessary legal powers.”15 Hoover’s and Lippmann’s critiques help convey the political tightrope on which Roosevelt was tiptoeing and how facile his actions were in the middle of the domestic political wars of a presidential election year and a real war abroad. Through the summer and fall of 1940, NDAC functioned in fits and starts, sometimes relatively smoothly, sometimes not. Conflicts were inevitable between commissioners and between the Commission and the old-line departments and agencies, especially the Army and Navy. But it got FDR past the election.

Establishing the Liaison Role of the Office for Emergency Management, January 1941 Six months after activating OEM and now comfortably reelected to an unprecedented third term, Roosevelt faced a very different world situation. Between May and December 1940, the war situation had changed dramatically, certainly for the worse from his perspective. The German encirclement of British and French armies ended with the evacuation of most of the soldiers from Dunkirk, but leaving all military materiel behind; France had surrendered to Germany, leading to half of it being occupied and half

32

Get Things Moving!

under a supposedly autonomous government based in the city of Vichy; German aircraft began bombing the UK in what later was called the Battle of Britain; Germany, Italy, and Japan signed a tripartite agreement of alliance; British cargo ships were being sunk by German submarines in the Atlantic faster than they could be replaced; and Japan occupied French Indo-China. At a December press conference, Roosevelt said that “about a month ago it became apparent that we were coming to the end of the study period, and learned thereby certain needs. During the past month the various methods of organization to meet those needs have been studied” (Roosevelt 1972, 16: 372). It was time to upgrade and strengthen the civilian mobilization infrastructure he had created in May, but he continued with his firm approach that no action by Congress would be needed or sought and that there would be no “Czar or Poohbah” (16: 373) heading the new organization—he would continue to be the unstated boss. To emphasize that, he pointedly said the revised organization he would be creating would be within OEM, not a wholly new one (16: 375). The drafting of an executive order to supersede NDAC with a more cohesive organization (tentatively called the Office of Production Management) proved quite difficult. BOB prepared at least a dozen drafts to capture what Roosevelt wanted and what would be acceptable to key participants such as the two uniformed military services and the various Cabinet secretaries with statutory responsibilities overlapping with any central civilian mobilization organization (US BOB 1972, 53). There were the never-ending fights between big business versus labor unions and between fervent New Dealers versus technocrats. A vivid example of the intense internal fighting is described in the diary of Sidney Sherwood, who was assistant secretary of NDAC under McReynolds. Sherwood had a modest social relationship with the Roosevelts, emanating from a friendship between his mother and FDR’s. As a result, Sherwood was invited to the 1941 New Year’s Eve party at the White House.16 The day before, he had had tea with Eleanor Roosevelt and shared with her his concerns about how the latest draft of the executive order was shaping up. As a New Dealer, he feared that the rumors of the new structure giving control to business executives were true. She was sympathetic and wanted to help. At the White House dinner the next evening, his place card had on its back side a handwritten note of support and encouragement from Mrs. Roosevelt: “There’s nothing that you cannot do.” After dinner and entertainment, at 11:30 p.m., FDR retired to his office to get some work done before the New Year toast at midnight. At that point, Eleanor whispered to Sherwood: “Sidney, now is the chance—go in.” Sherwood

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

33

entered the president’s office and quickly told him his concerns about a post-NDAC structure. According to Sherwood, the conversation went this way (excerpted from his diary): Sherwood: You must have administrative control. There is a concerted effort to supersede you, your administration, and the government itself by “big business.” Their intent is to set up a Director General of Defense whereby “big business” can have complete control of the Defense Program and gain back what it thinks it has lost under your administration. FDR: I know it. Sherwood: I feel it is essential that you have your own men in control of the administration of the Office of Production Management. McReynolds is tops in Government administration. As your Administrative Assistant he should be in charge of administration of this office. FDR: There is a difference between administration and office management. Sherwood: Of course there is. I speak of office management. Policy can be controlled from the mail room, its Personnel Office, the Fiscal Office and the general services. You must have your own men in there and not outside business experts who know nothing about government administration. We have the administrative set-up [now through the NDAC secretary’s office] running all these defense units and we can run the office management of the new set up. FDR: Don’t worry, Sidney. I haven’t signed the order yet.17 This recounting (even if not word-for-word accurate) conveys how much was at stake, how Roosevelt was being lobbied on all sides, and all the hidden and overt political and economic agendas. No wonder BOB had difficulty finalizing an executive order after a dozen drafts. Finally, on January 7, 1941, FDR signed EO 8629.18 It created an Office of Production Management (OPM), largely superseding NDAC, though not entirely. OPM would be headed by a director general, promoting

34

Get Things Moving!

Knudsen from NDAC, and an associate director general, Sidney Hillman, a labor union official. They were expected to work in unison, even though Knudsen theoretically outranked Hillman. The executive order stated that OPM was “in” OEM, a detail Roosevelt stated at his press conference explaining the new structure (Roosevelt 1972, 17: 53). That day he also signed an administrative order “to expand the functions”19 of OEM, including: • assist the president to “coordinate and supervise and, in appropriate cases, direct the activities of agencies” in OEM. • “serve as a channel of communication” between the president and those agencies, including keeping the president “advised of their progress.” • “assemble and analyze information concerning additional measures that should be taken, and to assist in the preparation of recommendations for any necessary legislation.” • The activities of the growing number of emergency agencies “shall be coordinated in and through” OEM (emphasis added). The enumerated list included OPM and NDAC (and their subordinate bodies), which were within OEM, and the Defense Communications Board, which was not.20 This suggested a significantly wider and more powerful role for OEM, not even limited to entities within it and not limited to mere liaison, but rather being expanded to coordinate them all. (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 693–94) The administrative order also explicitly identified how OEM should implement these new responsibilities. It should provide “liaison facilities” and “the maintenance of routine office services required in the conduct of the work and activities” to entities within it.21 The significance of OEM’s expanded role became clearer in the subsequent weeks by further presidential actions. First, he strengthened McReynolds’s role, and, second, he expanded significantly the pan-OEM activities that would be under McReynolds’s direct supervision. The president’s actions indicated a recognition of the centrifugal forces inevitably affecting individual OEM components to seek maximal autonomy. To counterbalance such bureaucratic imperatives, he wanted a headquarters unit with explicit centripetal powers.

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

35

Appointing McReynolds as First Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, January 1941 On January 9, 1941, Roosevelt signed a letter to McReynolds appointing him liaison officer for emergency management. This gave McReynolds a title conveying more specifically his OEM role and superseding his “In Charge of ” quasi-title. The letter stated that the position of LOEM was to “assist me [the president] in carrying out my duties and responsibilities as head of the Office for Emergency Management.”22 As before, McReynolds continued wearing two hats, one as liaison officer for personnel management and the other as LOEM. (Formally, he continued to have the title of NDAC secretary, but the role of LOEM superseded it.) Shortly after becoming LOEM, McReynolds submitted an article on OEM to Public Administration Review (PAR). The article was an outgrowth of a panel on the (relatively) new EOP at the second annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) in Chicago in December 1940, concurrent with the much larger annual conference of the American Political Science Association (APSA). The panel included papers from senior officials of five EOP agencies, including BOB director (and founding ASPA member) Harold Smith.23 Opening and closing the session on EOP were Brownlow and Gulick, respectively, both members of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management and both largely responsible for EOP’s invention.24 The papers were then revised and submitted for publication as a symposium in PAR’s second issue. McReynolds did not submit the publication version of his paper until after January 9. By then, much had happened that needed to be updated from the December version of his paper, including the executive order creating OPM, the OEM administrative order, and his own appointment as LOEM. In the article, he largely recounted the options FDR claimed a president had and did not have in a national emergency, that OEM was the president’s effort to steer a middle course, and that OEM was an add-on to the existing Cabinet departments and agencies, not duplicating current executive branch work. McReynolds especially emphasized FDR’s point that he could not delegate his constitutional powers, such as by appointing some kind of czar who could make authoritative policy decisions without involving the president. Almost all his observations were in the past tense, and he did not indicate how he wanted to steer OEM as its new liaison officer. In the final paragraph of the article, he summarized non-controversially the benefits of OEM as “an administrative device” that

36

Get Things Moving!

was “sufficiently flexible to permit necessary changes in emphasis as the crisis unfolds” (1941, 138). Notwithstanding his cautious tone in the article, if anyone understood what Roosevelt could have meant by the title of liaison officer in his January 9 letter, it was McReynolds. By the time FDR appointed him LOEM, McReynolds had already served as liaison officer for personnel management for about a year and a half. As part of the long reorganization fight, FDR had wanted direct managerial control over the CSC, which at the time was an independent statutory agency that included the requirement for a bipartisan board. When Congress finally approved giving presidents some modest reorganization powers (subject to a legislative veto), it excluded many political sacred cows from the scope of a president’s reorganization authority, including the CSC. FDR figured out a work-around to get to closer to his goal. When he activated EOP in September 1939, he created a small new agency within it called the Liaison Office for Personnel Management. He then named McReynolds to head it, hence his title Liaison Officer for Personnel Management. (This was an additional title, concurrent with his position as administrative assistant to the president specializing in personnel and HR matters.) At the time, the president innocently described McReynolds’s new personnel title and role as merely communication and liaison. Who could be against that? FDR’s real charge to McReynolds was to subordinate the US Civil Service Commission and bend it to his will. McReynolds succeeded, and soon the CSC treated him as its de facto boss, clearing with him all major and even relatively minor policies and procedures. So in this case, the title of liaison officer masked true power over some federal activities (Lee 2016). Upon being given the new title of liaison officer for emergency management in January 1941, McReynolds theoretically could have interpreted the president’s assignment as similar to McReynolds’s role in personnel management. That approach would have made him the de facto boss of all entities within OEM. But he did not do that. Instead, he interpreted the new title more as an extension of his role as NDAC secretary, meaning that his work would be largely ministerial and passive.

Empowering the Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, February 1941 Even though McReynolds did not initiate asserting the full scope of the potential powers of his new LOEM position, the president took a further

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

37

step the next month to impose his vision of what the LOEM should and could do. Behind the scenes, ever since the cryptic reference in the January administrative order that OEM was to supervise some services and activities of OEM agencies, the White House had been working on fleshing out that assignment of power. In the first half of February, BOB’s Smith and Administrative Assistant James Rowe worked on a draft and submitted it to FDR. In mid-February, Sherwood sent FDR a memo with suggestions of “streamlining administratively the entire Defense set-up,” updating what he had told FDR on New Year’s Eve to reflect the executive order creating OPM, the administrative order elaborating on OEM’s role, and the LOEM appointment. The president replied to Sherwood on February 20 with a hazy and noncommittal observation that there was “merit in some of his [Sherwood’s] suggestions” and that he expected to “spend some time on the whole problem shortly.”25 Indeed, Roosevelt acted a week later. On February 28, 1941, he signed a letter to McReynolds.26 The letter was ostensibly a relatively routine presidential allocation of the discretionary national defense funding Congress had appropriated and delegated him all decisions about spending it. Use of the funds was subject to a formal administrative process. It was overseen by BOB (which recommended it to the president only if the bureau concurred), each allocation was signed by the president, and then the Treasury Department disbursed the funds to the agency. The Department submitted annual reports to Congress accounting for the discretionary money. The president’s allocation letter was for $2.65 billion for defense funding for the remaining four months of fiscal year (FY) 1941. The allocation letter was significant not only in the large amounts involved, but also because of the conditions FDR attached to the money. First, the entire amount was allocated to LOEM, not to NDAC (as had been the case in the past) or directly to the new OPM or other OEM agencies. Instead, the letter then spelled out the specific funding that McReynolds should in turn provide to individual OEM agencies. In addition to funding OPM and NDAC, several other relatively new entities were within OEM and therefore part of LOEM’s scope: the Division of Defense Housing Coordination27 and the Division of State and Local Cooperation. Major NDAC divisions receiving allocations in the letter were Labor, Agriculture, Price Stabilization, Transportation, and Consumer Protection. (These offices were gradually transferring to OPM.) The letter also gave LOEM authority to make adjustments and transfers of the allocation of the funding, subject to BOB approval (a common condition).

38

Get Things Moving!

Second, the letter directed McReynolds to establish a Division of Central Administrative Services (CAS). It would provide each OEM agency with the traditional support structure any federal agency routinely needed. Initially, the division would be responsible for all budgeting, accounting, and fiscal control within OEM. Furthermore, the division was empowered to provide other “personnel and general office services” to OEM agencies. In total, Roosevelt wrote that he wanted the new office to “facilitate the efficient operation” of all entities within OEM. These directives echoed some of Sherwood’s comments to the president on New Year’s Eve, namely that central services were tantamount to power and control. FDR’s allocation letter also specifically stated that the division would be under McReynolds’s “direction and supervision,” including appointing its personnel. This made clear how powerful the president wanted the liaison officer to be. No matter how much an OEM agency would seek autonomy and self-control, LOEM was not to delegate or decentralize these financial and personnel matters. Roughly, CAS looked in part like a mini-BOB, a central lever of power as demonstrated by BOB director Smith. In addition to controlling money, it would be the personnel/ HR office for all of OEM as well. This was a horizontal approach to providing support services for the vertical silos of OEM’s individual agencies. While it went against the traditional orthodoxy that each federal agency would have its own in-house administrative support services, it was an unusual effort to provide some degree of control and information to the LOEM. Third, the letter directed LOEM to create a Division of Information (DOI) to provide public relations services to all OEM agencies. Like CAS, this centralized PR office could be a major horizontal lever of power, controlling the public voice of the disparate and sometimes argumentative vertical silos of OEM agencies. McReynolds promptly named the PR director of NDAC, former reporter Robert Horton, to head DOI. It became, briefly, the largest public information office in the executive branch. By controlling the public voices of OEM agencies, FDR was giving LOEM some power to impose a degree of integration, harmony, and discipline on how the entire OEM family faced outward and looked to the public (Lee 2012). Fourth, the letter allocated to McReynolds’s office about a quarter of a million dollars for special projects and contingencies. It was quite explicit that the money was under his (or a successor’s) direct control. Funds were only “to be expended by the Liaison Officer for Emergency Management” for activities and needs he deemed important and justified. In total, with his January 7 administrative order and this February allocation letter, FDR had invested the new LOEM position as a powerful and central venue for overseeing the disparate activities of all OEM agencies.

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

39

McReynolds as LOEM, February–April 1941 McReynolds dutifully implemented all the directives embedded in the allocation letter. On March 1, he appointed Sherwood as CAS director. Sherwood was directed to supervise “the budget, finance, personnel, and office service operations” of all OEM agencies. As a result, Sherwood was expected to be involved “in handling the various administrative and operating questions” relating to all of OEM’s far-flung policy responsibilities and involvements.28 That day, McReynolds released an administrative memorandum to all OEM agencies (and as a public announcement) summarizing his actions to assume more direct control over OEM.29 Business Week used the recent developments as a news peg to run a favorable profile of McReynolds. It described him as an old hand in Washington who disliked politicians for their obsession with patronage jobs and who instead promoted the benefits of expanding the civil service. The magazine suggested that as head of OEM, “his influence is not to be sneezed at but he doesn’t control defense policies.” He had improved “the muddled defense organization” and now “holds the purse strings on all administrative expenses and selects office personnel.”30 Washington’s commentariat was abuzz about the significance of the latest changes at OEM. One columnist opined that FDR was “breathing official power” into the previously low-visibility OEM. As a result, he wrote, this will bring “all the reins of the defense program into Mr. Roosevelt’s hands, with Mr. McReynolds acting as coachman.” The writer also criticized FDR for making the changes in OEM through a letter, rather than a formal executive order. An executive order “would have to be issued for publication,” while a letter was a much lower-profile way to do things and could even be totally overlooked.31 Another columnist criticized the expansion of OEM’s central powers as “government to the nth degree,” but doubted McReynolds and his senior management team would now “really run the defense show.”32 A third columnist concluded that the recent changes in OEM and LOEM meant that “all the power and control of funds have been vested by a presidential order” in the hands of a small group of people, including McReynolds, as the “executive officer” of OEM.33 Some viewed this news as a proxy to the ongoing political war over control of the enormous amounts of money that the defense effort was spending. A conservative columnist discounted McReynolds as “unfitted for so vast a job” and warned that the real power behind the revitalization of OEM was Sherwood. Even though Sherwood was “almost an unknown,” he was a New Dealer who would stand up to the efforts by big business (embodied by

40

Get Things Moving!

the dollar-a-year executives working at OPM) to get control of the defense program.34 The same developments were applauded by a writer friendly to the administration, who said that the upgrading of OEM and appointment of Sherwood was intended “as an antidote to the machinations of certain ‘dollar-a-year men’ at OPM” and was “a rebuke and a shellacking” to big business. The New Deal had prevailed or, at least, had now counterbalanced and checkmated whatever political momentum business was gaining in getting control of the arms production and civilian defense mobilization.35 Nonetheless, OEM and LOEM McReynolds remained obscure, even to the White House press corps. When FDR created a price-control office within OEM in early April 1941, reporters asked him, “Would you give us about a paragraph on what the Office for Emergency Management is, who is on it, and what its function is?” FDR replied with a misleading and uninformative answer in the passive tense. After referring to the 1939 Reorganization Act and the creation of EOP, he said, “and then there was authorized at that time an emergency office in the Office of the President, not to be set up until and unless needed, and that was called the Office for Emergency Management.” The way he phrased it, it sounded like OEM “was authorized” explicitly by the statutory Reorganization Act (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 108–9). McReynolds continued going through the motions as LOEM. For example, using the power the president delegated to him, he made decisions about allotting funds to OEM’s divisions, in some cases “less than the estimate submitted by the Division” (US CPA 1946a, 146). CAS director Sherwood reported to him on the need to improve the progress reports that all OEM agencies submitted through LOEM to the president. It was important that the president (and the enhanced role of LOEM) get good, current, and valid updates. In general, he wanted McReynolds “to bring about greater unity of action” by OEM agencies. As a start, Sherwood suggested that McReynolds begin convening regular central staff meetings “to discuss major over-all defense problems.”36 But McReynolds’s heart was not in it. He knew it, and FDR did, too. As for McReynolds’s overall record, Koistinen was very critical. McReynolds “was not a leader, disliked the job, shunned publicity, could be petty and devious, stressed procedure and detail, and viewed himself more as the President’s eyes and ears than as an executive” (2004, 17). Koistinen further criticized McReynolds because “he thought in terms of bureaucracy and public administration,” rather than strong leadership for the national defense mobilization (31). While unduly harsh, these characterizations are

Inventing the President’s Office for Emergency Management

41

probably roughly right, though it would seem that whatever blame there was needed to be placed at FDR’s door because he had selected McReynolds and created an unwieldy administrative structure to his liking. Professor Joseph Harris, who had been the staff director of the Brownlow Committee, later was hired by McReynolds to do some consulting and reporting for OEM/ NDAC. While Harris praised McReynolds’s personnel expertise and LOPM record, he did not think highly of McReynolds at OEM. McReynolds “wasn’t a very imaginative sort of fellow” and “was not the kind of man who would think of jobs for his employees,” Harris recalled in an oral history (1983, 21, 79). Soon Washington was abuzz with rumors about another big shakeup in the defense organization. In late March, AP reported that “Roosevelt has under consideration an administrative realignment which would centralize national defense agencies under the Office of [sic] Emergency Management.” In particular, the president would soon name “an active director” of OEM to implement this.37 Another reporter wrote that “an administrative framework for the whole national defense effort has been worked out at last . . . At the top of the pyramid is the Office of [sic] Emergency Management” with a replacement for McReynolds, perhaps someone like senior insider (and New Dealer) Harry Hopkins.38 Coy’s name was being mentioned in the context of an OEM reorganization. Newsweek’s Periscope feature guessed that the president would remake OEM into a “Super-Defense Organization” that would be “the central clearinghouse” for the defense buildup and mobilization. The report speculated that one of the four major components of this strengthened OEM would be a new agency for civilian defense. It predicted that the head of this new home defense agency would “likely” be Wayne Coy, currently the assistant administrator of the Federal Security Agency.39 Similarly, at a speech in Buffalo in mid-April, the first lady discussed the upcoming unveiling of a home defense agency. She mentioned that many people were involved in planning it, but named only one of them: Wayne Coy.40 In retrospect, she was publicly hinting that Coy was about to emerge as a major figure in the national defense effort, likely in some relation to civil defense.

Peering Forward FDR’s multiple actions in 1940 and early 1941 to strengthen OEM, and particularly the scope and powers of the LOEM position, reflect the deteriorating

42

Get Things Moving!

international events and the sense that the war was getting closer to the US. That said, the president’s actions also suggest Roosevelt’s clear intention that OEM be a central component for dealing with whatever may have been coming, as well as an unstated dissatisfaction with McReynolds’s record of service. By then the president must have been thinking about a successor to McReynolds. The expansion of the LOEM role was no longer a good fit with the office holder. He had been outpaced by events. This paralleled FDR’s more public observation that NDAC no longer was a good fit for present conditions. In his words, this was the “end of the study period,” and it was time to adjust the national defense infrastructure to reflect the lessons learned, in this case by superseding NDAC with OPM (Roosevelt 1972, 16: 372). Other repercussions, such as changes in personnel, were also silently hanging in the air. No tinkering with titles and authority could change who McReynolds was or his style of management. Therefore, the changes in OEM and LOEM in this period can now be interpreted as FDR setting the framework for the next LOEM, someone who would fill the position with the authority FDR gave it and the initiative to do so. FDR was on the hunt for a successor to be everything he wanted for the new LOEM. Or, based on FDR’s competitive administration, someone who would try. Failure was an option, though the president would not have desired it or deliberately set someone up to fail. National defense was too important.

2

The Rise of Wayne Coy Public Administration with Politics, 1935–Spring 1941

Wayne Coy had been a rising star in the Roosevelt administration beginning in 1935, when Harry Hopkins, head of the newly created Works Progress Administration (WPA), named him WPA’s state director for Indiana.1 WPA had been created earlier that year to hire the unemployed to work. This was a politically attractive replacement for relief, often called the dole by opponents who criticized it because it supposedly simply paid people or gave them food. Hopkins was a pragmatic social worker and administrator who had worked with Governor Franklin Roosevelt when Roosevelt was seeking new approaches to relief, which at the time was solely funded by state and local governments. No matter how bad the Depression became, President Hoover consistently opposed federal involvement in relief, saying it was not a federal responsibility and that even in an emergency, he did not want to set such a precedent. When Roosevelt became president, he initially obtained congressional approval for temporary federal funding for relief, called the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). He named Hopkins to head it and asked him to get help to people as quickly as possible. Even before he had an office to move into, in the first few hours he distributed millions of dollars to state governments, eventually a hundred million dollars in the early months of the New Deal (Burns 1996, 196). Hopkins also created the Civil Works Administration (CWA) within FERA as an experiment during the severe winter of 1933–34 to shift those in need from relief to work. It was a modest effort at hiring the unemployed to engage in public improvement and infrastructure projects.

43

44

Get Things Moving!

WPA Indiana State Director and WPA Regional Director, 1935–37 As FERA director, Hopkins became familiar with the relief directors of the states, including Wayne Coy of Indiana. He was impressed with Coy’s efficiency and management. Coy was able to qualify for and distribute funding from various federal programs under varying rules. In particular, Coy was able to avoid the seemingly endless political charges in other states that federal relief funding was wasted, was spent on those who were lazy, that it hired employees based on partisan affiliation, or that its operations were corrupt.2 Hopkins’s “esteem for Coy’s ability”3 was demonstrated when WPA replaced FERA. Hopkins promptly hired Coy as the WPA director for Indiana (Kotlowski 2015, 316). Again, Coy had a knack for working the bureaucracy, qualifying Indiana quickly for many more projects and more funding than other states.4 This was a guy who could get things done, was an honest administrator, and was nimble enough to stay out of trouble with the news media while understanding the underlying political situation. In addition to managing the day-to-day administration of WPA in Indiana, Coy demonstrated an adeptness in (what would now be called) emergency management. In January 1937, the Ohio River flooded southern Indiana (and a much larger area in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys). Coy promptly reassigned five thousand WPA workers and one hundred boats to the flooded part of the state to assist in the evacuation.5 Lawrenceburg (in southeast Indiana) was so cut off that it could only communicate with him through the shortwave radio of the state police. It urgently requested that he send five hundred cots, coal, and food.6 Coy also showed (what would be considered at the time) a liberal orientation on racial issues. Fair racial treatment was not an automatic assumption in Indiana, and behaving that way could be politically harmful to white politicians. In general, southern Indiana had a strong Southern culture and orientation, hardly distinguishable from the attitude toward African Americans on the other side of the Ohio River. In the 1920s, the KKK of Indiana had been the largest of all state chapters and so influential that the governor and legislature were friendly to it. Ignoring all that, Coy allocated WPA funding specifically to provide jobs to thousands of African Americans, and “several projects in the state were designed especially for the benefit of members of the Race.”7 These included community centers in Muncie and Anderson, school grounds in Terre Haute, sewing projects employing 350 women, and 13 men and women working for the Federal

The Rise of Wayne Coy

45

Theatre Project, including six musicians and one “entertainer.”8 Now this was the kind of person the New Deal wanted and appreciated. Hopkins called him the “best state relief director” (Kiplinger 1942, 448). He quickly promoted Coy to be director of WPA’s Region 2, comprising Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky.9 (Coy wore three hats, continuing as Indiana’s relief director and WPA state director.) Albert Wayne Coy (he dropped the Albert early in life) had come to that place and time through a combination of hard work, smarts, and an interest in politics. An Indiana native, after graduating from Franklin College,10 he worked as a journalist and then bought a small weekly, the Delphi [IN] Citizen.11 As its publisher, editor, and reporter, he met many of Indiana’s leading citizens, including Democrat Paul McNutt, who eventually ran for governor in 1932. Coy and McNutt had a good rapport, and Coy jumped into politics headfirst. He was McNutt’s chief campaign aide. When McNutt won, he named Coy as his secretary (akin to the modern-day chief of staff).12 Given the severe unemployment and calls for state relief funding, McNutt quickly named Coy as director of the Governor’s Commission on Unemployment Relief. In that role, and then later as head of the state’s new Department of Public Welfare, Coy became the central funnel for federal funding from Hopkins’s FERA and CWA.13 Coy was also politically adroit. He understood the complex nexus of public administration on one side and politics on the other. They were linked beneath the surface, but not overtly and not too publicly. The first time Coy probably had personal contact with FDR was when the president went on a four-week tour of the country by train in the fall of 1935. Coy was on the train from Washington to Vincennes (IN) and briefed FDR on WPA’s activities in the region and on local politics.14 A few months later, FDR invited Coy and his wife to dinner at the White House, a distinct honor and a signal of being within the president’s view, especially for someone in so junior a position.15

Politics, 1936 In the summer of 1936, when Roosevelt was running for reelection, Coy had an unusually prominent and important assignment at the Democratic National Convention for a person of his modest political station. As a member of Indiana’s delegation to the convention, he was named to the Resolutions Committee, which would draft the party’s platform. The committee had one member from each state. Its membership included fifteen US senators,

46

Get Things Moving!

a governor, and a cabinet secretary.16 That Coy was their peer indicated his growing importance within the party. Furthermore, when Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY) was selected as chair of the subcommittee to draft the precise wording of the platform, he in turn picked eleven members from the full committee to serve on the subcommittee, including six other US senators and Coy.17 It was a confirmation of Coy’s growing reputation for competence, quiet work, and political sophistication. As part of the fall campaign, FDR engaged in an ostensibly nonpolitical visit to the Midwest to learn more about the impact of a drought. During his visit to Indianapolis, he “called attention to a score of Works Progress Administration projects by personal inspection.” He was also briefed on the drought in Indiana during a private conference with state officials, including Coy.18 Later that fall, Coy announced that he had recommended WPA funding for a city pool in Seymour and gave a public talk at Indiana University on how the new Social Security law was being implemented in Indiana.19 Parallel to his political role, Coy’s reputation as a public administrator was also rising. In 1936, the new Social Security Board hired Donald Stone of the nonprofit consulting group Public Administration Service (part of Brownlow’s Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago [Lee 2017]) to advise it on how to set up its organization and administration. In turn, Stone asked Coy to write an appendix for his report with detailed guidance on organizing field services, something Coy had done as state relief administer and then as WPA director.20 The difficulties of structuring, staffing, and overseeing field operations were the subject of intense interest in early public administration (Lee 2007a). That Coy already had a reputation as an admirable manager who had developed best practices for organizing field services indicates how fast he was rising in the ranks of professional practice as well as in the New Deal. From his experience in journalism, Coy had learned to be a fast and a clear writer, a skill public administration practitioners did not routinely have. In one of his last acts as a state public administrator, Coy successfully lobbied the Indiana State Legislature to keep politics out of county welfare agencies by shifting county directorships from political appointments to civil service positions (Reorganization 1937).21

Family, 1937 A personal tragedy happened in the Coy family in early 1937. Coy and Grace Elizabeth Cady met when they both attended Franklin College.

The Rise of Wayne Coy

47

They were married in 1927. Two years later, they had a boy, Stephen, and then, in 1935, another, Philip Wayne. In February 1937, twenty-month-old Philip was briefly left alone by his nursemaid. Having just learned how to open doors, he toddled to the bathroom door, opened it, and entered the bathroom. The tub had just been filled with very hot water to the level of two inches. He leaned over the tub and either fell or climbed in. His legs and one hand were severally burned. He died two days later. The cause of death was stated as absorption of poison from the burns.22 A year later, Mr. and Mrs. Coy had another son, Albert Wayne Jr.

The Philippines, 1937–39 By February 1937, Roosevelt had been reelected, and McNutt was a former governor. Having been an active supporter and campaigner for FDR, McNutt was hoping in return to get a major appointment for Roosevelt’s second term, perhaps even a Cabinet secretaryship. Instead, FDR appointed him as high commissioner of the Philippines, the archipelago that was controlled by the US (ever since the Spanish-American war), but that had a degree of self-government. For McNutt, the attraction was to gain foreign policy experience and be a big fish in a small (Filipino) pond, rather than a small fish in Washington’s large pond. For Roosevelt, the appointment not only paid back a political debt, but also involved future presidential politics. McNutt was hoping to run for president in 1940, assuming—like everyone else—that FDR would honor the tradition limiting presidents to two terms. With McNutt out of the country, it would be harder for him to construct a campaign apparatus and make ostensibly nonpolitical appearances around the country. This meant that if the president did eventually decide to run for a third term, he would not face a fait accompli of McNutt having already wrapped up a major bloc of committed delegate votes. FDR liked to keep his options both open and to himself. Upon appointment, McNutt promptly named Coy to be his personal aide in Manilla.23 McNutt (and Coy) served in the Philippines for about two years, returning to the US in June 1939. As part of his work there, Coy got to know General Douglas MacArthur officially and socially as well as an obscure aide-de-camp to MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower. But Coy was not totally in McNutt’s shadow (and political orbit). He had his own standing. For example, FDR briefly met with him alone at the White House when Coy was in DC in mid-1937, and again in mid-1938.24 While the

48

Get Things Moving!

president liked getting information from many sources, including outside of official channels (and especially political gossip), it was nonetheless unusual to have one-on-one meetings with an ostensibly lowly staffer serving abroad. McNutt’s return to the States in mid-1939 partly reflected his sense that he had done a full tour of duty and had earned the right to be allowed to depart and partly reflected his presidential aspirations. Washington was aflutter with political rumors, though the common assumption continued to be that no one would dare violate the two-term presidential tradition. Therefore, many ambitious Democratic politicians were quietly laying the groundwork for a campaign to win the party’s nomination the next year. McNutt was one of the leading contenders. (FDR persistently declined to comment one way or the other on his own plans.) Coy arrived in DC about a month before McNutt, ostensibly to smooth the way for McNutt’s return and establish the role McNutt would have once he was back. According to some reports, Coy’s patron, Hopkins, arranged for him to get a desk at BOB. There he worked on several projects, including the transfer of the jurisdiction over the Philippines from the War Department to the Interior Department and the formal reorganization plan (to submit to Congress and subject to its veto) to create the Federal Security Agency (FSA).25

Federal Security Agency, 1939–40 Part of FDR’s reorganization of the federal government in mid-1939 (in addition to creating EOP) was the formation of the FSA. In effect, it was a national welfare department, but the term welfare had a generally negative political connation, and congressional conservatives opposed creating a cabinet department with that mission. In their view, a department of social welfare “could only lead to a continuation of the welfare activities of the government, which should be stopped as soon as possible” (Brownlow 1958, 417). Hence the workaround was to create an entity through a reorganization plan, not a law, and with the term security in its title to reflect the recently created (and already popular) Social Security program. The president’s message accompanying Reorganization Plan No. I (the same plan that created EOP) stated that the goal of this new agency was to unify and coordinate federal programs “to promote social and economic security, educational opportunity, and the heath of the citizens of the Nation” (US House 1939, 5). The agency would have within it the Social Security Board,

The Rise of Wayne Coy

49

Employment Service, Office of Education, Public Health Service, National Youth Administration (NYA), and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).26 In July 1939, Roosevelt nominated McNutt as FSA administrator. When reporters asked the president about the political implications of the appointment for the 1940 presidential race, FDR responded with a “gibe” ever-so-slightly deflating any McNutt boom as well as those of a score of other potential candidates whom reporters speculated about in print.27 It was a signal that no ambitious Democratic politician who wanted to be on his good side should declare his candidacy until FDR announced he would not run. Given that the president would not announce his intentions for the foreseeable future, he was freezing in place the race for the Democratic nomination.28 A few days later, the president signed an executive order creating the position of assistant administrator of FSA.29 McNutt promptly named Coy to that position.30 The next day, the Post’s columnist for federal employees reported lightheartedly that “the complete office staff of the new administrator of the Federal Security Agency consisted at 10:35 a.m. yesterday of two persons,” McNutt and Coy. He quoted Coy saying that it would probably take about sixty days to staff up the office of the agency head through the usual civil service hiring and appointment procedures.31 Observing these events, one columnist praised Coy’s skills, noting that “Coy is not to be discounted. Slight of stature, . . . he is a quiet, tireless, effective worker.”32 The gossipy “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column reported that Coy knew before McNutt that FDR would offer McNutt the FSA job: “Coy was called to the White House and asked to inform McNutt. . . . Coy transmitted the information in a midnight long-distance telephone conversation.”33 Another example of Coy’s independent standing and dual political loyalties to FDR and McNutt was also quickly reported on. Hopkins (then secretary of commerce) invited McNutt and Coy over for Sunday brunch as soon as McNutt was appointed. That Coy was included indicated that Coy had his own stature within the administration and was not solely an appendage (let alone flunky) of his at-pleasure boss.34 Not everyone thought well of Coy’s political presence in DC. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes observed archly that “Coy is a very clever young fellow,” and he did not mean that as a compliment (Ickes 1974, 686).35 Ickes was especially touchy about rumors that Coy was close to Hopkins and that Coy was now bringing McNutt into Hopkins’s orbit, too. Ickes and Hopkins were competitors and peers in FDR’s administration, with Hopkins running the WPA and Ickes in charge of the Public Works Administration (PWA).

50

Get Things Moving!

WPA was oriented to hiring workers, while PWA focused on giving grants to state and local governments to finance infrastructure projects. While at FSA, Coy apparently acquitted himself creditably, focusing on policy and administration and eschewing self-promoting publicity, which he left for McNutt. He was the prototypical inside man, the number-two person managing the mundane and sometimes eye-glazing details of running a large organization on a daily basis, while the boss was a public figure engaging in external relations.36 Sometimes he was the outside man too. For example, replacing McNutt, Coy addressed the annual conference of state public health officers who were meeting in DC in May 1940.37 On another occasion, Coy testified on Capitol Hill, where he demonstrated a policy wonk’s comfort with the details of public policy. A Senate hearing was about which federal agency should have the lead role for industrial safety and health of workers. Coy spoke on behalf of FSA and its constituent bureau, the Public Health Service, and against assigning it to the Department of Labor. He fluently discussed such details as federal grant programs funded by Title IV of the Social Security Act and where the locus of occupational safety tended to be in state governments—public health departments. He made a point of explaining that the two agencies had in the past cooperated and even signed a memorandum of agreement a few years earlier on who would do what. Surely such cooperation and coordination were the best outcome. He came across as reasonable, well-informed, and noncombative (US Senate 1940, 101–8). In an oral history interview, a long-time senior Social Security official unloaded on McNutt while praising Coy: McNutt was in the difficult position of a man who was running for the presidency, and a man who’s running for the presidency when he is in public office is vulnerable to all sorts of political pressure. He has to accede to the favors that are wanted by the politician from Kansas. He needs the support of anyone who’s prominent in Kansas and can possibly carry that State for him. So, McNutt was in a difficult position. McNutt had a deputy in Wayne Coy who was a man of much greater capabilities than McNutt, a man of much broader and much greater integrity than McNutt. McNutt, it must be said, was not a man of integrity; McNutt was petty in many ways. (Corson 1967) Discounting the bureaucratic politics that might have been at play (centrifugal bureaus seeking autonomy and centripetal department heads seeking cen-

The Rise of Wayne Coy

51

tralization), the characterization reflects well on Coy’s low-key, cooperative, and nonauthoritarian approach to work in a large bureaucracy. Reflecting a similar perspective, a columnist for the Philadelphia Ledger said Coy’s “forte is horse sense and the mechanics of getting things done.”38 Inevitably, in the course of his work, Coy occasionally had some direct interactions with the White House and Roosevelt. For example, in May 1940, he wrote the president about looming shortages of skilled labor due to the impact of the arms production mobilization and the draft (Jennings 2016, 31, 235n62).

Health Coy was sidelined by major health problems in 1939–40, missing work for about four months. He had a serious kidney stone condition and was hospitalized at the federal Marine hospital in Baltimore in August 1939. He had an urgent operation to remove the kidney stone, but then needed three more because of infections compounded by pneumonia and streptococcus. In December, he “took a turn for the worse” and was briefly in critical condition.39 He needed to have thirty-four blood transfusions, and his weight dropped from 130 to 80 pounds, gradually recovering to 105.40 When he was finally released from the hospital in early February, he was so weak that he was brought home in an ambulance.41 Largely limited to bed rest, he began dictating work-related letters at home. By April he was back in the office, but initially only for an hour a day.42 Happy after finally returning to work full-time, he looked back and said, “I hated more than anything to be inactive.”43 Nowadays he would be called a workaholic.

Democratic Politics, Summer 1940 All Democratic pols were holding their breath in the spring and early summer of 1940.44 Was Roosevelt going to run again or not? Whether the answer was yes or no, when would he announce? There were several candidates, including McNutt, who were already conducting relatively active campaigns. A few stayed in the race after FDR said he would run again. For example, Vice President John Nance Garner, former House Speaker and conservative Democrat, had been VP for Roosevelt’s two terms but was unhappy with the leftist New Deal. He openly broke with FDR during the second term (over issues such as over the court-packing proposal) and ran for the 1940 nomination even before FDR announced his plans. Even if FDR sought

52

Get Things Moving!

the party nomination for a third term, that did not automatically mean the convention would nominate him. Garner thought the old-line traditionalists of the party, especially conservatives, southerners, and urban machine leaders, might reject Roosevelt either because of policy disagreements or fear that running for a third term would be such a political liability that he was likely to lose to the Republican nominee. From the sidelines, Coy was speculating about potential scenarios as much as everyone else was. Writing to DNC member Oscar Ewing, Coy thought FDR was not going to run, but that “occasionally I weaken in my belief that he will not be a candidate.” Assuming FDR did not run, Coy guessed that Garner would not be one of the two final choices in the convention because “Garner’s strength will occur on the early ballots and . . . he will not be in the running at the end.” Coy speculated that after multiple ballots, the last two candidates standing would be McNutt and Cordell Hull (secretary of state and former senator from Tennessee).45 The political ground shifted for everyone when Roosevelt finally hinted on July 16, 1940, just as the Democratic convention was convening, that he would accept the nomination for a third term. McNutt, a good politician, could already see the scenario that FDR was allowing to be played out: that the president would definitely run for a third term and was simply delaying any public announcement for as long as possible.46 So, about six weeks earlier, McNutt faced the obvious and announced that he would not be seeking the nomination and instead was supporting FDR for a third term.47 Naturally, Garner’s presidential campaign meant he would not be the VP candidate for the third term. Now that FDR was publicly seeking the nomination, if he got it, would FDR leave the VP choice to the convention or would he insist on selecting a running mate? Washington and Democratic politicos were again holding their collective breath. For McNutt, his nascent politicking while at FSA (and tentatively running for president) put him in good stead with many convention delegates. He was automatically assumed to be a strong candidate for the vice presidential nomination. As in 1936, Coy again attended the Democratic Convention. He was still in McNutt’s political inner circle. In the few days before Roosevelt made his preference for VP known, McNutt was actively campaigning. Then Roosevelt said he wanted secretary of agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, as his running mate. McNutt was urged by some party regulars to challenge Wallace. Up to this moment, Coy had for years been able to tiptoe through the political tulips, being loyal to McNutt and FDR. But now, for the first time, he was in a zero-sum situation. He had to jump in one direction or

The Rise of Wayne Coy

53

the other. There was no possibility of a “both of the above” option. He chose FDR. Pragmatist, Coy argued to McNutt that to challenge FDR’s preference was to ruin his standing with the vast majority of the party who liked Roosevelt. Politicians have long memories, and McNutt’s disloyalty to FDR would be long remembered. But McNutt hesitated. He let Robert Kerr of Oklahoma (later governor and senator) nominate him against Wallace. There was a roar of approval from many of the delegates and from the galleries, which were packed with McNutt supporters (allegedly using forged tickets the McNutt campaign had supplied). It was “one of the most dramatic moments of the convention” (Kotlowski 2015, 300). But despite the demonstration in his support, McNutt realized he could not challenge FDR. He went to the podium and tepidly withdrew, urging support for whomever FDR picked, managing not even to mention Wallace’s name. How to assess Coy’s behavior? McNutt’s biographer stated that throughout the convention, Coy had kept the Roosevelt campaign informed of what was going on in McNutt’s headquarters, which included the forged tickets. But Kotlowski was careful to conclude that Coy’s actions “do not prove that Coy had betrayed McNutt” (304, emphasis added). Rather, his interpretation was that Coy’s ultimate political loyalties were gradually shifting toward FDR. Given the circumstances, this was understandable. The convention ended the closeness between McNutt and Coy. From this point on, McNutt was very cool to Coy. With their FSA offices near each other, McNutt could “barely bear” being around “Coy-Boy” (316, quoting Booth Tarkington, emphasis in original). But McNutt could not fire him from FSA, even though Coy served at the pleasure of the agency administrator, because Coy now had the more weighty support from the president (and Hopkins). Coy’s political choices at the convention amounted to coming out from under McNutt’s shadow, where he had been for so many years. Now he had his own standing within the administration. This ended up giving Coy increasing independence of activity for involvement in subjects that were not necessarily solely in-house FSA matters. Coy had become a free agent or a de facto presidential aide from that point forward.

Public Administration and Politics, Fall 1940 Public administration, of course, does not stop just because it is the fall of a presidential election year. Furthermore, there was also a close correlation between policy and politics at Coy’s level. Also, McNutt, never much of a

54

Get Things Moving!

lover of humdrum administration, was gone from the office for long stretches when he was campaigning for FDR and other Democrats. That made Coy the acting administrator. Adding to the business at hand was the worsening urgency of the world situation and its impact on national defense. As a result, Coy increasingly interacted with the White House and EOP. For example, in August he worked with the White House on harmonizing legislation setting up the selective service system (aka the draft) and coordinating its impacts on FSA’s scope, such as preserving inductees’ social security status and the role of the US Employment Service regarding job protections for draftees.48 Coy eventually helped draft a message from the president to Congress on the matter. The essence of the president’s policy was that “the social gains of recent years, including insurance and other benefit rights, must be preserved unimpaired” (US House, 1940). Coy then briefed the press on the details of the message and its implications.49 In September, Coy was one of half a dozen senior officials who were invited to a long meeting with the president on draft-related issues. First, Roosevelt wanted to be sure that with the Army undergoing significant expansion, there would be no duplication or competition in areas such as vocational training. He preferred that CCC and NYA continue their current programs doing that. The Army, known for its stubborn and independent ways, saw it the same way. Next they talked about African American draftees. FDR wanted to know if the Army planned to limit African Americans to labor battalions. No, said the army. African Americans would be assigned to all of its activities, roughly reflecting their proportion in the general population. Furthermore, whites would also be assigned to labor battalions. According to Coy’s notes, “the President was greatly pleased to learn this information. It was contrary to what he had expected” from the conservative officer corps of the Army. (However, there was no change in the Army’s maintaining strictly segregated units.) Roosevelt said he thought there was a lot of public misunderstanding about the Selective Service and suggested a PR campaign to educate public opinion. The Army said it was indeed thinking of doing something along those lines. Hearing that, the president circled back to the first subject of the meeting. He said he hoped the PR campaign would include explaining the positive roles and contributions that NYA and CCC would be making to the new draft. No doubt this reflected a desire to see that his New Deal initiatives contributed to national defense, something particularly welcome in the months before an election. The fourth subject of the meeting was the effect of the Army’s mobilization on CCC camp directors. From its founding at the beginning of the

The Rise of Wayne Coy

55

New Deal, the Army had agreed to the new president’s request to assign a senior officer to direct each of the CCC camps. This created a culture of discipline, organization, and hard work in the camps. (The underlying political message conveyed “no loafers, they!”) Now that the Army was expanding rapidly, it was recalling the officers assigned to CCC and placing them on active duty. Who would succeed them? The head of the CCC said at the meeting that the replacements, lower-rated officers the Army did not particular want or need, were unsatisfactory. The president suggested that the replacements instead be the best of the CCC enrollees. Perhaps a special and temporary CCC camp should be created to train them for their new responsibilities? His suggestion was carried out, but it exploded as a political issue a few months after the election. A Republican member of Congress complained publicly that CCC had created a special camp for overprivileged and rich Ivy League college boys where they would not be subject to the normal rigors of the CCC. This was elitism and unfair to all the other CCC boys.50 It was un-American! The assertion was half-true in that some of the civilians with potential to replace Army officers were understandably better educated, had demonstrated leadership capacities, and had shown they knew how to learn. But, as is usual in politics, once an issue is initially framed, it is nearly impossible to reframe it. Coy lamely replied that it was a temporary camp reflecting an experiment in training CCC camp leaders and that no one was excluded from it because of his economic circumstances.51 Knowing the initial political impression could never be undone, the program was quickly and quietly shut down. The last subject of the president’s September meeting related to the increased costs involved in mechanical training of NYA and CCC boys for the burgeoning defense industry. It was more expensive in terms of staffing and machinery than other training programs. Therefore, if the current levels of funding for CCC and NYA were maintained, fewer boys would be accepted. FDR initially said he did not want to recommend increased funding (a potential political issue), but told OPM’s Sidney Hillman that he would be glad to revisit the issue later (impliedly after the election), especially if it was narrowly tailored to be of direct benefit to the manpower needs growing out of the sharp increase in arms production.52 At this point, Coy crossed over from public administration to politics. After the meeting with Roosevelt, Coy suggested that the White House put out a press release that the Army had told the president it would not limit African American draftees to labor battalions.53 No such release was made, probably because race issues were so touchy politically. Coy also suggested

56

Get Things Moving!

names of African American leaders to serve on an advisory committee to the Selective Service System on racial issues. He offered to clear their names with the Democratic National Committee to be sure none were active in the Republican Party.54 In late September, FDR convened a short meeting with African American leaders and civilian leaders of the Army and Navy.55 The new draft law, which he had signed just two weeks earlier, contained a clause barring racial discrimination in selection and training of draftees.56 African Americans were pleased with that. The meeting was intended in general to convey a positive message about treatment of African Americans in the military, a message that would be beneficial to the president’s campaign. But it boomeranged when the White House released a summary of the meeting that gratuitously included a statement that the military would continue to be segregated, implying that the African Americans at the meeting had agreed to this. (It did not come up.) Coy was apoplectic about that provocative, misleading, and unnecessary section of the release.57 In parallel, he also was very unhappy that the DNC’s Negro Division was not distributing to the African American press materials he had prepared on FDR’s second-term accomplishments for African Americans.58 He suggested that the DNC chairman personally ask Mrs. Mary McLeod Bethune to go on a speaking tour on behalf of the president’s reelection.59 In late October, another racial issue came into the public eye. It related to the firing of an African American in the employment service office in DC. After protests from African American groups, Coy stepped forward to tell the press that the man would be reinstated pending further review of the case by McNutt (after the election).60 That fall, Coy initiated another political effort to focus on the administration’s equal treatment of the races rather than on the status quo of segregation. Congress was in the midst of considering the First Supplemental Civil Functions Appropriation Bill of 1941, which included additional money for FSA. Coy talked with Louis Ludlow, a Democratic congressman from Indiana who was a senior member of the Appropriations Committee. (They knew each other from Indiana Democratic politics.) What about something banning racial discrimination in FSA? There already was such a clause in the new draft law, so how about adding it to the FSA appropriation bill too? It would cover all training programs of the NYA and Office of Education. Coy knew this was already FSA’s policy, but it never hurt to reinforce it by placing it in the law. They hatched the idea after the bill came out of committee, but just in time for floor debate. Indicating the hurry-up and last-minute nature of it, during the debate Ludlow submitted for the record

The Rise of Wayne Coy

57

a letter from Coy that was dated the same day. Ludlow said he had received it “a few moments ago.” In the letter, Coy stated the agency’s opinion that such an amendment was “highly desirable.” But, reflecting FDR’s effort to have a low profile on racial issues, Coy also was required to include in the letter the official position of the administration. This proposal “would not be at variance with the program of the President,” the phrase indicating the lowest level of official support, essentially neutral, not for, not against.61 It was the best Coy could wrangle out of BOB’s legislative clearance office. Given that the same antidiscrimination language had already been approved in the new draft law, Coy’s amendment was accepted by unanimous consent and signed into law.62 It generated positive coverage in the African American press, including front-page placement in the national weekly edition of the Chicago Defender, just weeks before the election—while the news was entirely ignored by the majority press.63 In the political situation of the time, that was a grand-slam home run in the ninth inning. Within the scope of FSA’s responsibilities, that autumn Coy was an increasingly public figure. He participated in a thirty-minute national radio broadcast on the importance of the school system in the context of the national defense emergency.64 He then repackaged his comments for a short column in the Washington Post (Coy 1940). He represented the agency at a conference cosponsored by NDAC on the interrelationship of the national defense mobilization and schoolchildren.65 On the inside, Coy oversaw the drafting of regulations relating to federal approval of state plans on education and training of defense workers and forwarded them to the White House for promulgation.66 He consulted with BOB director Harold Smith on the president’s views regarding which version of a pending hospital bill was supported by the administration. Smith checked with FDR and conveyed back to Coy what to support and what not to.67 By now Coy was operating at a higher level than the typical numbertwo person at an agency that was not even a Cabinet department. His involvements ranged widely in terms of roles and policy areas. He was beginning to float free of FSA’s boundaries and up to higher levels of public administration, which necessarily also involved policy making and politics. For example, the president named him to a six-person committee to “help coordinate plans for conscription of man power” to the military for the draft that was about to start.68 Evidently, having coordinated the FDR’s message to Congress on harmonizing Social Security and the draft and having participated in the meeting FDR convened with Army officers earlier that month, Coy was increasingly viewed by the president as an expert on the

58

Get Things Moving!

draft, not just on how it impacted FSA. In another non-FSA role, in the fall or early winter of 1940, Coy advised NDAC member Knudsen what to say at a Senate hearing to deflect efforts by Congress to meddle in the national defense mobilization, especially the priorities program (Catton 1969, 70).69 By now, Coy was interacting frequently with NDAC commissioners and staff, who were located in the Federal Reserve building. He asked for lunchroom privileges at the building because “it is very convenient to see them at luncheon[s].”70 Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles, shrewdly avoiding getting caught in any political or bureaucratic crossfire, told Coy it was up to Sidney Sherwood, assistant NDAC secretary, to decide.71 Capping Coy’s overlapping administrative and political roles that fall was his involvement in FDR’s formal dedication of the new buildings of the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Coy oversaw the preparations for the event and submitted information that FDR might want to include in his remarks.72 This was a major event, with an audience of three thousand, and it took place on Thursday, October 31, with the election the following Tuesday. Nonetheless, the White House categorized the ceremony as “non-political.” Given that designation, Roosevelt’s dedication speech was broadcast live on a national radio network. As the highest-ranking federal official overseeing NIH (a unit of the Public Health Service, itself within FSA), Coy presided at the event and introduced the president. He was the only other person to address the crowd, using the occasion to review the achievements of the Public Health Service.73 Following protocol, when FDR began his speech, he said, “Mr. Coy, Dr. Thompson [NIH director], and the Governor of Maryland, Governor O’Connor, ladies and gentlemen.” He emphasized the importance of NIH to the national defense effort, saying that “we cannot be a strong nation unless we are a healthy nation.” He also pointed out that NIH’s medical research “recognized no distinctions of race, creed or color.” The president made a highly political comment, replying to ongoing attacks from doctors and conservatives that the New Deal was planning to socialize medicine. He said that “neither the American people nor their Government intends to socialize medical practice any more than they plan to socialize industry” (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 525–26). In addition to the live national radio broadcast of his speech, FDR’s nonpolitical appearance was front-page news in major newspapers, such as the New York Times, Baltimore Sun, and Los Angeles Times.74 It was another political home run for Coy, separate from the substantive significance of the event regarding expanding and professionalizing federal public administration in the fields of health and medicine.75

The Rise of Wayne Coy

59

The President’s Utility Player, November 1940–March 1941 The world situation continued to deteriorate after Roosevelt’s election to an unprecedented third term. Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia joined the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The London Blitz by German bombers intensified and also attacked Coventry, demolishing the cathedral there. Supplies to the UK were nearly choked off by German subs, sinking 215,000 tons of supplies on British ships in just a two-day period. The UK, standing virtually alone against Germany, asked the US for a significant increase in financial and military aid. FDR replied with a statement at a December press conference that “the best immediate defense of the United States is the success of Great Britain in defending herself ” (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 604). A few weeks later, he declared that the US should become the Arsenal of Democracy. The next month he proposed the Lend-Lease program to Congress. After a showdown fight between isolationists and internationalists, Congress passed it in early March. Just in the nick of time, too. The UK was in such dire straits that FDR asked that the bill be dispatched to him by special courier as soon as it passed, and he signed it ten minutes after it arrived. He then immediately signed the paperwork to release aid to the UK and Greece (Lee 2012, 227n68). During this period, Roosevelt also tightened limits on exports to Japan and called for American military support for any country promising its citizens the Four Freedoms he had enunciated. A few months after the election, a DC-based wire service reporter wrote that Coy “was rapidly attaining today inner recognition here as one of the chief ‘idea men’ of the administration.”76 Hopkins and the president were seeing in Coy some talents they prized. First, he was a committed New Dealer and had something of a social worker’s empathy (even though he was not trained as one) for government helping people. Second, he was honest to a fault. As WPA’s regional director, he was never entangled in the routine political accusations by the conservative coalition that the federal relief program was corrupt, partisan, or incompetent. Third, even though he had come up in the wake of Paul McNutt’s political star, in the politics of 1940, Coy did not hesitate to choose political loyalty to FDR over McNutt. After winning reelection, FDR shifted his attention to strengthening the civilian defense effort by superseding NDAC with OPM, strengthening OEM, and upgrading LOEM (chap. 1). He wanted to be sure that his people, New Deal people, were running as much of the mobilization effort as possible—not businessmen, not military men. There would be no czar,

60

Get Things Moving!

either. One conservative columnist captured the mood of the administration: “Their contention has been that the whole defense effort should be conducted through the ordinary governmental channels, with New Dealers rather than businessmen bossing the job.”77 During this time period, the president continued adding to OEM’s portfolio of new or reorganized agencies, including the Priorities Board,78 the National Defense Mediation Board,79 and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply.80 Roosevelt was also thinking about the health and social services aspect of the defense mobilization. Who should be in charge of that, and how should it be organized? Coy was in on these high-level conversations. In mid-November, he prepared a letter for McNutt’s signature to the president. If indeed FSA was about to be delegated as the lead for these issues, then it “can be more effective in the discharge of its defense responsibilities if it is housed with the Defense Commission,” in the new Social Security building. (NDAC had been expanding rapidly, and the Federal Reserve building no longer could accommodate the square footage it now needed.) McNutt’s letter to the president noted that “Mr. Coy, of this office, has discussed this matter at some length with” LOEM McReynolds.81 On November 28, the president arranged for the Cabinet members of the (WWI era) Council of National Defense to approve formally the appointment of McNutt as the coordinator of “all health, medical, welfare, nutrition, recreation, and other related fields of activity affecting the national defense.” This would be a second hat for McNutt, who would continue as FSA administrator. The White House released the news on December 3.82 Conservative columnist Frank Kent denounced it, claiming “the administration plans to take over and operate the social life of the soldiers and sailors of our vastly expanded armed forces as a big and practically exclusive New Deal project.”83 Coy’s central lead role in this new presidential assignment became apparent publicly a few days later when he, rather than McNutt, addressed the annual conference of the American Public Welfare Association to explain the implications of the president’s action. Coy used the same theme he had helped develop for FDR’s September message to Congress, namely that “we must not sacrifice basic social gains in efforts to further national defense.” He reassured the audience that the new office created by Roosevelt and headed by McNutt would seek to maximize coordination and cooperation with the current social service infrastructure. He said that “existing public and private welfare facilities should be utilized before creating any new social service agencies to meet problems caused by defense efforts.”84 Coy’s expanded role in the national defense effort also led to his membership on

The Rise of Wayne Coy

61

an Army “morale committee” with two senior Army officers and two other civilians.85 In that capacity, he worked on formalizing the role of the USO in providing recreational facilities for uniformed personnel (including a ban on segregation) and on hiring an African American staffer to assist the USO in programming for African Americans.86 By now, Coy was becoming omnipresent around the White House and a kind of utility player for the administration. The new national defense role FDR assigned FSA gave Coy further rationale to be involved in nearly the full scope of the civilian mobilization and even some aspects of the military. FDR met with McNutt, Coy, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and Admiral Chester Nimitz for an hour on February 8, 1941. They likely discussed coordinating what the military services would do and what FSA would do regarding social services to uniformed personnel.87 On another occasion, Coy submitted to the president some materials for possible inclusion in his annual January budget message.88 Still actively involved as assistant FSA administrator, Coy was closely supervising a sharp pivot by FSA’s component agencies to a national defense focus. He was making sure that all FSA units were maximizing their energies to the defense mobilization (US FSA 1941, 7–8; 1942, 81–93). CCC now shifted to training its enrollees for semiskilled positions where there was a high need, such as mechanics, road and bridge construction, drivers, the trades, and radio operators.89 The US Employment Service identified 218,000 of the unemployed registered with it who were qualified for the 500 most sought-after categories of vacancies in national defense industries.90 The Office of Education worked with 64 engineering schools to offer 250 condensed training programs for skills in short supply, including designers, inspectors, engineers, and industrial supervisors.91 Serving on a committee to recommend CCC’s future direction, at one point he requested to meet with FDR to get the president’s views so that those preferences could be baked into any report the committee might finalize.92 Coy also was in increasingly closer contact with Mrs. Roosevelt. In one case, Coy told her how FSA’s NYA could assist with one of her interests, career guidance for youth.93 In another, given her high profile and ongoing efforts for African Americans, he discussed with her personally the possibility of federal funding for the construction of new buildings for Howard University’s dental and engineering schools. Such spending could be justified, he told her, “on the basis of national defense.”94 On another occasion, the First Lady’s social secretary called to invite Coy to lunch with her at the White House.95 Eleanor Roosevelt’s growing relationship with him was vividly

62

Get Things Moving!

demonstrated at a social occasion in mid-December. The sub-headline in the Post said it all: “Mrs. Roosevelt, with Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Coy as Guests, Heads Long List of Patrons Who Turn Out for Stokowski Concert.” Before heading to the concert hall, “the trio dined at the White House.”96 A few days later, the society section of the big Sunday paper published photos from that concert. In the middle of the top row of the pictures was one of Eleanor Roosevelt, Mrs. Coy, and Mr. Coy (in black tie).97 Given that everything in Washington was political, the message of Coy’s importance in the administration, or at least to the president’s wife, could not have been clearer. After the inauguration, Coy and his wife were in a larger group for dinner at the White House with Mrs. Roosevelt followed by an informal session on coordinating and promoting social welfare.98 Coy’s daily schedules and call lists for March and April 1941 (just before his LOEM appointment) indicate the wide scope of his activities and contacts. From the White House and EOP, he had phone calls from or to Hopkins, OGR director Mellett, James Rowe (administrative assistant), Grace Tully, Missy LeHand, and General Watson. Coy was working especially closely with the powerful BOB. In addition to his frequent contacts with director Smith, during this period Coy also worked with Donald Stone (who handled management improvement) and Bernard Gladieux (who handled reorganization). In the larger scope of the executive branch, he was in touch with Paul Appleby (USDA under-secretary), Mordecai Johnson (president of Howard University), Army General Maurice Rose, and Frank Bane (head of NDAC’s division of state and local cooperation). From Capitol Hill, he got calls from Senator Joseph Guffey (D-PA) and Congressman Lyndon Johnson (D-TX). Coy also talked with many reporters, including columnists Drew Pearson and the Post’s Jerry Kluttz, and reporters from United Press and the Washington Times-Herald. It appears that these media contacts were exclusively reactive, such as returning calls or meeting with journalists at their request. Coy also was in contact with a larger network of civic and political leaders, such as Mrs. Eugene Meyer (spouse of the owner/publisher of the Post), Anna Rosenberg (a labor-oriented political activist in New York City), and the University of Chicago’s radio director, Sherman Dryer.99

Planning a Civil Defense Agency within OEM (Part 1) Coy’s major assignment in the winter of 1940–41 came directly from Roosevelt. The president appointed an ad hoc group consisting of Hopkins,

The Rise of Wayne Coy

63

former Ambassador William Bullitt,100 and Coy to develop plans for a home defense agency within OEM. They prepared a draft and, along with BOB director Smith, met with FDR on March 19, 1941.101 After getting feedback from the president, Coy’s assignment was “perfecting the home-defense plan” with Bullitt.102 This would be tough for Coy to do given that the president’s thinking was shifting day by day on what was needed, in particular being hazy about the scope of the new agency. Coy and Smith were focusing on the tangibles of a new organization called the Division of Home Defense. It would focus on “coordinating services of volunteer groups all over the U.S.”103 These ranged from recruiting a large corps of air-raid wardens on both coasts, training millions of volunteers for emergencies at local Red Cross chapters and social welfare agencies, and greatly strengthening the capabilities of fire departments in cases of bombing, sabotage, and arson.104 But FDR was thinking more along the lines of a morale agency, to mobilize public opinion about cooperating with and supporting the national defense effort. Therefore, he wanted it to be led by a major public figure, not a competent bureaucrat. There was a further complication. Mrs. Roosevelt indicated her personal interest in the nascent civil defense agency. She particularly wanted to be sure that the new agency would focus on recruiting volunteers to assist it. She envisioned a major role for women volunteers to be involved personally in this national defense effort, rather than the WWI stereotype of women rolling bandages and knitting socks. She invited Coy, Bullitt, Smith, and assistant BOB director John Blandford to lunch at the White House on Sunday, March 23. They talked it over for ninety minutes. Smith’s summary of the conversation hinted at his exasperation with the seemingly neverending gestation of the home defense agency. He wrote that at lunch “the discussion covered the ground that we had been over a good many times.” In trying to obtain Mrs. Roosevelt’s support without making significant changes to the draft executive order, Smith emphasized to her that there had to be pragmatic considerations of what would explicitly be in the executive order or, if not, why. “No group sitting in Washington could foresee all of the aspects of home defense,” he argued. That’s why the executive order needed to be relatively open-ended and somewhat vague to permit the agency to evolve in the direction it identified as most fruitful. That seemed to reassure her for the moment.105 A few weeks later, Mrs. Roosevelt gave a speech in Buffalo on the theme of the role of women volunteers in the upcoming federal civil defense agency. She assured her largely female audience that indeed there would be multiple and important roles for them in the national mobilization.106

64

Get Things Moving!

After FDR returned from a postelection Caribbean cruise, he still was not firmly settled on what the functions of a home defense agency should be. He had additional meetings with, and memos from, Smith and Coy, including on April 4, 9, and 11.107 By now, Coy and Smith were thoroughly exasperated and frustrated. They felt they had incorporated everything the president had asked them to in an executive order creating the agency, yet he still had not signed it. Even worse, during a meandering discussion at a Cabinet meeting on April 17, FDR had seemingly invited Vice President Wallace to look into the as-yet-unsettled subject (Ickes 1974, 483–84). Wallace promptly convened a meeting on April 18 with Coy, Smith, and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy to talk about it. The next week, Wallace twice talked to Smith on the phone to review some of the details of the latest draft of the Smith and Coy proposal.108 (For the denouement, see next chapter.) During his work in the administration, especially in 1940–41 when he increasingly had contact with FDR and received high-level assignments, Coy demonstrated “a free-wheeling” style: flexible, adaptable, and catholic in his policy interests, with an ability to master large amounts of information and to condense his recommendations into one-page memos. For example, Coy displayed “an unusual knack for breaking up bureaucratic logjams” (Parrish 2010, 58). This was a talent that appealed to Roosevelt, who relied on Coy to get things done despite the tangled lines of authority that the president himself had created in the sprawling war production effort. Right after he had been appointed LOEM, Time magazine explained what led to it. In the last year or so, Coy had “become increasingly important to the president as a drafter of domestic and defense programs.”109 It was time for more responsibility and more direct service to the reelected president.

3

Coy Begins as LOEM “Wayne Coy, the President and Three Motorcycles,” April–May 1941

World events in April 1941, the month Coy was appointed LOEM, capture the seriousness of the war situation and, as a result, the huge demands on OEM and on him right from the start. During April, Germany and Italy attacked and defeated Yugoslavia, then Greece. The British dug in on the island of Crete, hoping to stop Germany there. Canada and the US expanded their joint defense cooperation. The US declared that the protection of Greenland was in its defense interests and extended its military umbrella over it.1 Then came the UK’s defeat in Crete, the US occupation of Iceland for the duration, and FDR’s declaration of an unlimited national emergency. The pace of defense preparedness and armament production quickened significantly. Congress generally approved the president’s requests for billions of additional spending in those areas, whether for the military services, arms production, or aid to allies such as the UK and China. In part, they were afraid to refuse for fear of the political accusation that they were weakening the country’s national defenses. On other topics, however, Congress felt free to weigh in, including declining to enact some presidential requests. While public opinion was gradually coming around to understanding the threat that Nazism posed to American freedom, isolationists were still very active and vocal, uncowed by FDR’s vehement disagreements with them. In some respects, and to the maximum that the president could maneuver toward, the US was in an activist defense posture, such as the draft and aggressive naval patrols in the Atlantic, though not in any congressionally declared war.

65

66

Get Things Moving!

Finding the Right Place for Coy, March–April 1941 In the months after Roosevelt had been reelected to a third term and while Coy was increasingly involved in a wider array of matters relating to national defense (chap. 2), there was a round robin of conversations about finding a more significant role, or at least perch, for him within the administration. For example, FDR met with Smith on March 18. Just two and a half weeks earlier, the president had mandated McReynolds to reorganize and strengthen LOEM’s role. At their March 18 meeting, the president shared with Smith “his present conception of the organization” of OEM.2 Most likely, the conversation included his thoughts on McReynolds’s record as LOEM. The next day, Hopkins—just before heading to the meeting with FDR, Smith, and Coy on home defense—dashed off a dictated note to Coy that read, “I do want you to get into something so that you can work directly with the Presiding [sic].”3 Meanwhile, Administrative Assistant James Rowe was talking to Coy about serving on a congressionally mandated board to study the transportation system. As part of the Transportation Act of 1940, which FDR had signed in September, Congress required him to appoint a three-person “board of investigation and research” on the current transportation system. This was during an era of strict regulation of transportation by the then-powerful Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). There were ongoing struggles for advantage by the three major forms of transportation: rail, truck, and water. The congressional role in this policy area was ripe for rent seeking by these three industries. For example, the assignment to the board included such red-flag topics as “the relative economy and fitness” of the three modes of transportation, gauging the three by which each “is especially fitted or unfitted,” how each “should be developed” in the future (presumably with federal aid), if past federal aid had been “in excess of adequate compensation or services rendered in return,” and the extent of taxes each paid in relation to the other two.4 According to a political column, the underlying motivation for it was “to settle the old controversy over regional freight differentials. This has been a stormy issue in Congress for years, the South and West claiming discrimination against them in favor of the so-called ‘official territory’—namely that part of the country lying north of the Potomac and east of the Mississippi.”5 The board was created to exist for two years from the enactment of the law, also giving the president the option of extending it for two more. That this was a senior-level board was indicated by the high salaries for the three

Coy Begins as LOEM

67

members ($10,000 a year), its legal counsel ($9,000), and secretary ($7,500). Signaling the intense interest by senators (and the particular transportation industry with which each was allied), the three members would not be appointed by the president, but rather nominated by him and subject to confirmation by the Senate.6 The two-year clock for the board had started running when the law was signed in September 1940. But between reelection and the national defense mobilization, FDR and his aides had little time for the assignment. The trouble was that the statute required the board to release a preliminary report on May 1, 1941. By now it was already March. There were only two months to go, and the board had not even been appointed. Rowe was given the thankless hurry-up assignment to recruit quality board members so the president could at least nominate the board and have it under way before the deadline. Rowe talked to Coy about accepting an appointment to the Board and being designated its chair. This looked like a maneuver to get Coy freed from FSA drudge work, have a decent salary, and likely have lots of discretionary time to continue serving as a utility player for the administration. When Hopkins sent his letter to Coy about Coy’s future role in the administration, he made a point of opining about this: “Maybe you think you should do the job which Jim Rowe has talked to you about. I know you would do that extremely well and I feel a little hesitant about advising you on this because I know Jim has taken a lot of trouble to collect a competent board.”7 Hopkins was hinting he hoped this would not be where Coy would settle for the third term and at a time of a defense emergency. Lacking any other concrete options at the moment, Coy accepted and FDR agreed. Their thinking likely included that the job would not really require Coy’s full-time involvement. In that case, he would be a free addition to the president’s staff with a senior-level salary. The White House announced his nomination as chair on March 20 along with the two other board members.8 Making clear that Coy would not be wearing two hats (at least not formally), a few days later Roosevelt signed an executive order appointing Coy’s replacement at FSA.9 Coy quickly began gearing up for the new assignment, meeting a few days later with Rowe and Smith to map out the administration’s strategy for the policy direction the board should take.10 Press reactions to the appointment varied. Time magazine said, probably accurately, that “Washington wiseacres expect the rising young New Dealer to spend his time on much more pressing things.”11 The Wall Street Journal said that Coy was “an almost unknown person in transportation circles,” but that railroads would not openly protest.12 Reflecting that, the newsletter

68

Get Things Moving!

of the rail industry made the point not very subtly with the headline “Coy Heads New Transport Board, a Newspaper Man (Lately a W.P.A. Official).”13 A conservative columnist called Coy’s appointment (along with that of one of the other members) “admittedly political payoffs. Neither man ever has had any interest in or connection with the subject matter of the study.”14 It did not take long for senators who were close allies of the special interests involved in the subject to oppose Coy’s nomination (and that of one other nominee). The anti-FDR Chicago Tribune chortled that “opposition to the Roosevelt appointees is based on their reported inexperience and lack of fitness to serve as a board of experts. . . . Even some of the most ardent New Dealers on the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee have indicated privately they will oppose confirmation of the nominations.”15 A Washington column got to the heart of the congressional politics beneath the surface. Senators from “the South and West expected to have at least one member each on the board, which is empowered to recommend important rail rate changes. But to their outraged surprise the three men named by Roosevelt are from the ‘official territory,’ ” meaning the Northeast and Midwest.16 Given these political rumbles from Capitol Hill, it looked like the president’s ploy with Coy would not work. Roosevelt, with his usually exquisite political antenna, could tell. He was a pragmatist who spent political capital only if absolutely necessary, preferring to find workarounds if possible. In particular, one of the lessons FDR had taken from his experience in the Wilson administration was to try to keep the Senate happy and to bend over backward to avoid fighting with senators. They could break a president in a showdown, as they had with Wilson and his League of Nations treaty. So FDR pivoted to find a more viable place for Coy with fewer political complications.

FDR Decides, April 17 and 22, 1941 On April 11, 1941, FDR invited Coy to have dinner with him. It lasted for an hour and twenty minutes, and no one else was there other than household members.17 While Roosevelt enjoyed relaxing over dinner and mixing cocktails, he also loved to talk politics, gossip, and have meandering chats on multiple topics. The conversation must have included a noncommittal and free-ranging decision of Coy’s future in lieu of the transportation board.18 After the March 19 meeting with the president about home defense, Coy and Smith met repeatedly to hammer out a concept for the new agency that

Coy Begins as LOEM

69

they and, hopefully, FDR would like. The two met at least four times in April to finish the assignment.19 Their next appointment with the president was set for April 17 (six days after Coy’s dinner with Roosevelt). For their meeting with the president, they brought with them the latest final draft of an executive order creating the agency that incorporated the guidance FDR had given them in earlier exchanges. It was a long meeting, ninety minutes.20 First FDR went over the document in detail and suggested a few minor changes. He committed to them that he would definitely sign the revised draft on April 22. To demonstrate the firmness of his resolve to finally get this done (they probably had skeptical looks on their faces), he picked up the phone on the spot to tell his appointments secretary (Watson) to add the signing to his schedule that day and to have copies ready to hand out at his regular semiweekly press conference later in the day.21 Then the conversation shifted to personnel. Who would head the agency? At an earlier meeting, FDR had thrown out the name of New York Mayor La Guardia as a possibility. Neither Coy nor Smith liked it.22 Coy tried his best to discourage it, saying he “had felt out the situation and rather surmised that La Guardia would not accept.” Coy and Smith then mentioned some other possible candidates they had come up with. The only name to which Roosevelt seemed to have any positive reaction was that of William Donovan, at the time a prominent lawyer in New York City.23 Finally, after exhausting all the names, Roosevelt said that with the signing of the executive order, he “would put Coy to work,” impliedly as head of the civil defense agency. Coy quickly replied that he did not think he should get the appointment, if only because he would be “in a position of coordinating some of the work of his former boss [McNutt, and] this might be embarrassing” and awkward for both of them. FDR immediately took the point and agreed. Improvising, Roosevelt then suggested maybe swapping the appointments and transferring Coy to FSA and McNutt to civilian defense. Smith and Coy said they had already explored that scenario and felt “there were practical difficulties.” To their relief, “the President could see these difficulties, too, for he did not press the point.” Now Coy volunteered “that he felt he could be more useful in the Office for Emergency Management.” In reaction, “the President indicated that he wished to strengthen the Office for Emergency Management set-up, and he agreed that this spot was probably where Coy would be most helpful.”24 Done? Not quite. Smith was accustomed to FDR’s conversational style and understood that something he had seemingly decided was not the same as a definitive decision. So when Smith and Coy met with the president again

70

Get Things Moving!

on April 22 for yet another discussion of civil defense, FDR said to Smith, inter alia, to give him the paperwork replacing McReynolds with Coy as LOEM.25 This was the kind of unambiguous green light that Smith needed before he would act on behalf of the president.26 (See chap. 4 for further discussion of the civil defense executive order.)

Coy’s Philosophy of Government: National Defense and Social Welfare, April 1941 Between the April 17 meeting when FDR tentatively decided to appoint Coy as LOEM and the public announcement of it on April 24, Coy traveled to Mobile, Alabama, to give the opening address at the joint annual meeting of the Alabama Conference of Social Work and the Alabama Conference of Child-Caring Institutions. About five hundred people had registered for the conference. His speech was titled “The Responsibility of Government in a National Defense Program for the Welfare of its Citizens.” This platform gave him an opportunity for both a retrospective reflection on his WPA and FSA experiences and a prospective outline of his upcoming (but unannounced) leadership role in OEM. Coy’s central argument was that the US needed to face the future with both a strong national defense and a strong social welfare system. He pointedly disagreed with “those of the Right [who] claim that social gains must be sacrificed to a strong defense in the interests of national solvency.” In other words, the war abroad and mobilization at home should not be permitted to be used by opponents of the New Deal as a new excuse to roll it back. Coy just as strongly disagreed with “those of the Left [who] hold that social reform is itself an adequate defense and requires the entire national income to be effective.” This was his rebuttal to the peace and social justice movements on the political left who were against any strengthening of military preparedness. Both positions were equally wrong because “both sacrifice the very democratic values we seek to preserve, the one by starvation and the other by suicide.” In other words, defense and welfare “are not enemies in a death grip for control of the public purse, they are twin guardians of the public interest.” He made a point of reminding the audience that the Constitution assigned powers to the national government “to promote the general welfare” and to “provide for the common defense.” Both were important enough to be mentioned in the Constitution, and

Coy Begins as LOEM

71

neither was declared in it as more important than the other (Coy 1941a, 4). Coy suggested some lessons to be learned from the current status of the war in Europe. To their credit, countries such as Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark, and France had had social welfare programs that “surpassed us in the scope and advance of their social legislation.” But, now that they were conquered, those welfare programs were of no import. Instead, the totalitarianism of Germany could decide whatever it wanted for those countries. So their social welfare programs were of no use now, because the programs could only have been maintained if those countries had also had adequate military capabilities to defeat German invasions. Coy also saw the condition of the UK after Dunkirk27 as an example of how important it was for countries be ready for anything. The US needed to learn from the UK’s current weakened position, even the possibility of a German cross-channel invasion. “It’s a terrifying thought, but I know that you are as aware as anyone that the time to prepare for such a contingency is before it occurs rather than sit now in complacency in the hope that it can’t happen here” (5). In part, he attributed Great Britain’s strength to face the current war situation to “having as part of its social welfare program a general system of relief, a system which was adaptable to the needs of persons suffering on account of enemy action” (6). That model would serve the US well, too, even though pre-FDR relief traditionally had been a state and local duty, not one for the national government. In general, Coy said, “it seems to be that of all the fields of human endeavor none is more antipathetical to the totalitarian philosophy than that of social welfare. Totalitarians start with the assumption that the individual is important only as he contributes to the purposes of the State. A democracy starts with the assumption that government is a collective device for assuring to individuals the opportunity and security of living together peacefully in a complex social order” (5). Therefore, he called on social welfare agencies to integrate themselves deeply and completely into the national defense mobilization then under way. Such a role would be a true reflection of the power of democracy. Coy enumerated many of the social welfare problems he anticipated would arise as part of the emergency. They included the social impact of the draft on the men who were suddenly conscripted from civilian to military life as well as the impact on their families, large population movements of workers (and their families) to expanding defense industries, inflation, housing, hospitals, and transportation. The central focus for dealing with

72

Get Things Moving!

the repercussions of these developments, he argued, was to avoid “a policy which places a disproportionate share of the burdens of defense on those least able, by reason of economic circumstance, to bear them. A democratic government places equally on all its citizens the obligation to contribute to the common defense; conversely, it must afford equal protection to all of its citizens against the economic hazards and hardships created by defense” (5). Solutions included national planning, federal funding, and maximizing cooperation and coordination with the existing welfare apparatus. Given that he had spent the last few months in Washington developing a plan for a civil defense agency within OEM, Coy hinted at what he expected to occur: “I feel sure that ultimately there will be a single agency coordinating all these services in the Federal Government” (6). He urged the audience to be closely involved in civil defense in their localities. In particular, he focused on the importance of morale as an element of civil defense. He wanted social welfare organizations not only to address tangible problems (which indirectly improved morale), but also to be involved in promoting national morale per se. In his peroration, he summarized his theme: Experience abroad has proved that the survival of democracies in the modern world depends on two things and two things alone; an adequate military machine and national morale. The Army and Navy are building, with the support of the entire population, the adequate military machine. It is the job of those of us whose work is concerned with the problem of social security and expanding opportunity for the common man to assure the morale. This is our destiny—we shall not fail. (7)28 This address presented a coherent and cogent summary of what Coy thought a successful mobilization for the defense emergency would require. A democracy needed both social progress and defense preparedness; military and social needs were intertwined; the burdens of the national mobilization should be carried equally by all citizens; the social implications of the mobilization would affect all aspects of life; the federal government had to have a role in activities previously assumed to be solely within the province of localities to the point of a national relief program; civil defense should be the fulcrum for social welfare; and existing local institutions should be meshed into the needs of the national mobilization. While obvious only in retrospect, he had just outlined his values, goals, and the programmatic framework that would guide his work as the second liaison officer for emergency management.

Coy Begins as LOEM

73

Public Announcement and Initial Reactions The audience in Mobile on April 21 apparently had an inkling that Coy was about to become much more important. According to Mobile’s Sunday paper, Coy “recently was mentioned in authoritative circles as a prospect for a job on the White House secretariat.”29 After getting to town, the reporter for the morning paper asked him about the rumors that he had been “offered a place in the White House secretariat, but this he denied.”30 However, the afternoon paper noted that Coy had met with the president the day before the conference and was expected to meet with him again the next day. This was underscored when Coy flew back to Washington (he had come by train), indicating that his time was precious and that he was involved in urgent presidential matters.31 On April 23, 1941, the president signed a letter prepared by Smith appointing Coy as special assistant to the president and liaison officer for emergency management at an annual salary of $9,000. In that capacity, Coy would “assist me in carrying out my duties and responsibilities as head of the Office for Emergency Management.” To do so, Coy’s powers included the “exercise of the authorities and the performance of the duties” already specified in FDR’s administrative orders and letters regarding LOEM.32 When he accepted the appointment, Coy promptly asked that the president withdraw his nomination to the Senate to serve on the transportation board. He wrote, “I am sure that the work which you have assigned me . . . is all that I should attempt.”33 At the same time, Roosevelt signed another letter prepared by Smith to McReynolds to “relieve” him of his second hat, the LOEM role. He generously thanked McReynolds for his service, saying that when he had given McReynolds the NDAC and OEM duties, “I did not anticipate that you would have to carry the extra responsibilities for so long a period. I shall always be grateful for the unsparing manner in which you have responded to this double duty during these difficult days.”34 McReynolds was now to return full-time to his main duty as administrative assistant to the president heading the Liaison Office for Personnel Management. There was a minor legal hitch. When FDR had arranged for the WWI-era Council of National Defense to create NDAC, the Council had also, at his request, formally appointed McReynolds as its secretary. But it did so in McReynolds’s capacity as administrative assistant to the president. Coy, the new LOEM, was now a presidential special assistant, not one of the six statutory administrative assistants. Therefore, the president had to ask the six Cabinet secretaries who comprised the Council of National Defense

74

Get Things Moving!

to approve changing the Council’s rules and regulations and shifting the designation of NDAC secretary to whoever held the LOEM title, even if he was not an administrative assistant to the president. The six department secretaries duly signed the piece of paper doing so.35 White House Press Secretary Stephen Early released the news on the morning of April 24.36 Coy’s appointment was announced in tandem with the president’s naming Hopkins to head the new Lend-Lease office. The afternoon Washington Star interpreted the dual appointments as reflecting a decision by the president “to tighten up his emergency administrative machinery handling the defense and aid programs.”37 The Baltimore Sun gave it front-page treatment.38 Coverage in the morning papers the next day was much less prominent, buried in part because of the larger war news.39 Indicating their interests, at FDR’s regular semiweekly press conference the day after the appointment, none of the reporters asked about Coy and the role he would play. Understandably, they were much more interested in the latest military developments, such as naval protection of waters far beyond the traditional US definition of its territorial waters and the increasing US involvement in the defense of Greenland (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 132–38). Despite his innocuous title of liaison officer, some reporters knew better. Given the strictures of journalism at the time, reporters—even columnists and pundits—could only hint at it. They struggled to find ways to convey to the public that Coy was much more important than what his title implied. Some of their efforts included using unofficial titles, such as “head” of a “super agency” or “super administrative agency,”40 “Defense Boss,”41 “chief ” of OEM,42 “OEM director,”43 OEM “chairman,”44 “OEM administrator,”45 “executive officer,”46 “and “executive secretary.”47 One newspaper did not even try, but simply said that FDR had appointed Coy to an “important job.”48 Other reporters tried to communicate his importance in descriptive terms: “the president’s watch-dog over the crossroads of national defense,”49 “coordinator-in-chief,”50 “representing the White House at the Office for Emergency Management,”51 “chaperoning” defense spending,52 and “at the top of the defense organization pyramid (exclusive of the armed services).”53 As mentioned in the preface, one columnist even called him “assistant president,”54 the title later commonly applied to Byrnes. Another columnist tried to be more precise. Coy would “not be a policy-making official in an obvious sense,” but nonetheless would “coordinate policy,” clearly a fuzzy yet important role.55 Perhaps the closest was a profile the next year in the Chicago Sun. It described the LOEM position as having “supervisory

Coy Begins as LOEM

75

powers over” OEM agencies.56 Although Coy was not the hierarchical and traditional boss of a federal bureaucracy, he was much more than a glorified messenger merely doing liaison. But others did not think Coy would be important. For example, AP concluded that Coy’s oversight of OEM agencies was “only in a bookkeeping sense.”57 An editorial in an Iowa paper said that OEM agencies would only be “supposedly responsible” to Coy.58 Over the next few weeks, opinion and commentary were mostly critical. The Baltimore Sun saw the dual appointments of Coy and Hopkins as reflecting “the mounting influence of . . . ardent New Dealers” in FDR’s inner circle for national defense decision making.59 The Chicago Tribune similarly gave the appointment the same political interpretation: “Coy and other New Dealers brought into the [defense] setup will act as buffers between the President and the OPM, etc.”60 A few days later, an editorial in the Buffalo [NY] News described Hopkins and Coy as “amateurs in defense” who were “miscast” in their new roles. What was needed were qualified people, such as from the financial and industrial sectors.61 Similarly, the Greensboro [NC] News described Hopkins and Coy as bringing “the social reformer’s viewpoint” to national defense, particularly inappropriate qualifications for their new top roles.62 A conservative columnist said that the appointment of Coy and Hopkins “means that national defense has become an all-WPA affair.” Neither “has had business or financial or military experience. And both are very sick men.”63 Another conservative columnist said Coy was merely a social worker, and the OEM position was “a job miles too big” for him.64 In another column a few weeks later, he further called Coy “one of the more radical of the New Deal group.”65 In this Manichean and binary political struggle to control US defense policy and spending, score one for the New Dealers and a big loss for business. There were positive opinions, too.66 A profile distributed by the International News Service described Coy as “second only to Harry Hopkins in the White House confidence” because he was a “bearcat for work” and was modest and unpretentious. He “gets an overwhelming amount of back-breaking work accomplished without any fanfare.”67 Kudos also came from a Post columnist (and Newsweek reporter). Observing the rise of the profession of public administration, Lindley called Coy “one of the best of the lot: a level-headed liberal without an axe to grind or personal political ambition, and a top-notch administrator.” Furthermore, “like Budget Director Smith and a handful of other first rate public administrators, Coy is able also to understand public policies and to devise means of furthering them.”68 It was an apt summary of the skills that LOEM Coy would need

76

Get Things Moving!

in this unprecedented position: policy and administration—and a pinch of New Deal politics, too.

Creating a Role from Scratch Coy was essentially starting his LOEM assignment from the ground up, inheriting little from McReynolds. McReynolds had only held the LOEM title since January (chap. 1) and had done almost nothing to explore the new powers and leverage that FDR had delegated him. Instead, McReynolds had continued his largely ministerial approach to the job. He diligently implemented the directives contained in the president’s February 28 letter. He created a division of Central Administrative Services and named his assistant NDAC secretary, Sidney Sherwood, to head it. He reappointed Robert Horton as director of the Division of Information, now part of OEM rather than NDAC. That was about it. McReynolds’s relative passivity as LOEM also carried an advantage for Coy. It meant that the role was something of a blank sheet, with no precedents or templates already established and nothing hardened into the bureaucracy’s cement. His remit was as broad as he wanted. Coy could assert just about any expansive role vis-à-vis OEM agencies and, assuming FDR’s support, could prevail. He was on his own and could shape the job to fit what he thought was best in terms of public administration, policy, and politics. In his Alabama speech, Coy had already laid out a few principles to guide him as LOEM: social welfare should continue to be as important in a time of a defense emergency as it had been before; social programs should be an integral part of the civilian mobilization; civil defense should be concentrated in one central entity; the burden of the defense effort should fall on all citizens equally; and social welfare should expand its focus to include the cascading societal impacts of the draft and expansion of arms production. Coy also inherited almost nothing from McReynolds in terms of the tangible elements of public administration, such as budget, office space, and personnel. Roosevelt quickly demonstrated his desire to strengthen the LOEM position beyond McReynolds’s approach. A week after appointing Coy, he transferred $100,000 from his discretionary defense account for purposes of “administrative expenses” in OEM.69 This gave Coy a flying start. For office space, initially Coy’s entire LOEM operation was a two-room suite in the State Department building (just west of the White House). It was

Coy Begins as LOEM

77

occupied by Coy and two secretaries.70 Because of the shortage of office space in DC, OEM agencies were scattered in more than a dozen sites around town.71 Even CAS, a unit directly under Coy’s supervision, was not within arm’s length either. As discussed previously, CAS had been created the previous month to provide, on a centralized basis and under LOEM’s control, the management needs of OEM agencies, such as HR, budgeting, accounting, and auditing. (CAS was a re-creation of the service units that had been part of the NDAC secretary’s office.) If he was to be an activist LOEM, Coy needed to be able to be in close and frequent touch with the horizontal silo of CAS as well as with all the vertical silos of OEM agencies. A few months into the job, Washington Daily News columnist Richard Scholz wisecracked that the entire civilian mobilization and arms production buildup was being managed by “Wayne Coy, the President and three motorcycles.”72 The quip was only a slight exaggeration. Coy indeed relied heavily on motorcycle messengers to convey his directives as quickly as possible to the far-flung OEM agencies spread all over town.73 Scholz’s picturesque description also concisely conveyed how thin OEM’s outer skin was and how spare any oversight of OEM component agencies actually could be. Plus, FDR wanted to be involved in just about everything, making Coy truly the president’s liaison and voice throughout the extensive policy arenas in which OEM agencies were involved. Scholz’s phrase caught on and was repeated by other journalists for months afterward, not only because of its humor, but also as a way to convey to readers what the LOEM job did and what it comprised. However, with each repetition, the quip became increasingly mangled from the original: • “President Roosevelt, Wayne Coy and three motorcycles”74 • “President Roosevelt, Wayne Coy (former assistant to Federal Security Administrator Paul V. McNutt), and three motorcycles”75 • “Wayne Coy and three motorcycles”76 • “Roosevelt, Coy and a motorcycle”77 Inevitably (and somewhat amusingly), problems arose from Coy’s reliance on motorcycle messengers who were rushing to deliver his messages, instructions, and documents. In June 1941, Coy submitted a claim to Congress to pay $42.25 for private property damage when one of the LOEM motorcycles

78

Get Things Moving!

with a sidecar collided with a parked car. The motorcyclist was rushing to the point of failing “to have it sufficiently under control to avoid the accident.” Apparently somewhat lost, he “attempted to make a U turn which he was not able to complete in the very narrow space in which it was attempted” (US House 1941a, 3). A few months later, another of Coy’s motorcycle drivers (also with a sidecar) crashed into a parked car. Coy submitted a claim for $18 to cover the costs of repairs to the owner of the car.78 In 1942, one of his motorcycles crashed into a car stopped at a stop sign. Coy stated that the crash “was caused by a mechanical deficiency” of the motorcycle’s brakes and that the driver was not “in any manner contributorily negligent.” The owner of the car submitted a claim for $16.50 for repairs.79 The fluidity of Roosevelt’s approach to public administration in general and OEM in particular was captured by Scholz in his daily columns over the next few months. The day after Coy’s appointment, he lightheartedly noted that the just-released OEM guidebook, prepared by Horton’s Division of Information, was already out of date (US OEM 1941). To reflect FDR’s latest executive orders creating and reorganizing OEM agencies, the draft had to be revised several times from December through mid-April. It went off to the printer, finally, on April 11, rolled off the presses, and was quickly distributed. It reached the Scholz the day before Coy’s appointment.80 It was now no longer accurate. A few weeks later, Scholz found a different way to convey how much and how quickly OEM was expanding: the March version of OEM’s phone directory was seventy-one pages, while the new April edition was eighty-one.81 He continued conveying to readers the dynamic situation. A few days after Coy’s appointment, Scholz reported that OPM employed about 2,500 people and expected to increase that to 3,500 within a year. Similarly, the price control office expected to employ about 1,500 staffers in DC within a few months. Generally, OEM’s structure and budget were “a headache” because FDR kept adding agencies to it or reorganizing them.82 Coy was trying to ride a tiger.

Planning a Civil Defense Agency within OEM (Part 2) There was one major piece of unfinished business that carried over from Coy’s pre-LOEM role in the administration: civil defense. It will be recalled (chap. 2) that Coy and BOB director Smith had met repeatedly with the president to create a home defense agency that would draw together some

Coy Begins as LOEM

79

widely scattered federal activities, but had trouble pinning Roosevelt down. They were thinking about the tangibles of what home defense would encompass, while the president had in mind an agency that would focus on civic morale to whip up support for and cooperation with the national defense emergency. Furthermore, the president preferred to be able to announce a new agency and its head simultaneously.83 FDR had even promised them that he would sign it on April 22, but that date had come and gone without action. Instead, on that day, Mayor La Guardia came to the White House to meet with the president, Smith, and Coy to talk about the possibility of heading the new agency. He had some suggestions for revising the umpteenth draft of the executive order. In general, La Guardia was interested, but not convinced. He was due to run for reelection, which he very much wanted to do, so acceptance would mean the president’s agreeing to a two-hatted role. Roosevelt was convinced that La Guardia would be the right person to rally the citizenry to support the defense mobilization and to keep civil morale high. FDR was less interested in how good La Guardia was at the nonpublic duties of public administration, such as paperwork, organizational leadership, and so on. So the president persisted, asking for additional changes in the executive order draft that La Guardia wanted. Smith and Coy gamely kept at it, meeting again on May 8.84 Smith incorporated as many of La Guardia’s suggestions as possible, but limited them to what “could be made this side of legislation”—in other words, what could be done within the current scope of the president’s powers. Asking Congress to pass legislation about the civilian defense infrastructure was a major no-no for FDR because it could lead to statutory handcuffs. In tandem, Coy prepared a list of eighteen to twenty people to be the core of a volunteer participation committee.85 At last, on May 20, FDR signed the executive order creating the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) as a unit within OEM and appointed La Guardia to head it.86 Coy quickly followed up politically and managerially. He updated Mrs. Roosevelt on the most recent conversation he had had with the mayor about the membership of OCD’s Volunteer Committee87 and transferred the funding of NDAC’s Division of State and Local Cooperation to OCD.88 Coy received distinct public credit for the OCD executive order in the press, including United Press’s national wire, syndicated columnist Lindley, and Time magazine.89 A historical review of the antecedents of the Department of Homeland Security also credited Coy’s early role in organizing a federal structure for civil defense (Roberts 2014, 359).

80

Get Things Moving!

Plunging In: April–May 1941 When Coy began his assignment of overseeing the entire scope of the civilian economic mobilization, that effort was already well under way. Metaphorically, he was not just trying to jump aboard a moving train; he had to get to the front of it to replace the locomotive’s engineer. Some highlights of his activities in his first forty days on the job (the remainder of April and his first full month) convey the scope and range of Coy’s LOEM role. He was setting out to define it as a much more active office than McReynolds had: • Authorized release of discretionary OEM funds to the War Department for telegraph service at an Ohio air base90 and to USDA to study expanding production of castor beans91 • Met with FDR and Housing Coordinator Palmer to speed up housing construction for defense workers92 • Inquired about the status of the Pan American highway (he was in favor of doing it as quickly as possible) and the use of synthetics and plywood for plane construction (same)93 • Was updated on labor policy for defense contracts94 • Roosevelt asked for his recommendations regarding FCC’s plan to create a defense communications board and use of a civilian communication system by the Army and Navy95 • As NDAC secretary, attended its meetings on May 7, 14, and 28, 1941 (US CPA 1946a, 153–56) • Sent a letter to Congress endorsing legislation permitting shipping iron ore from one US port on the Great Lakes to another on Canadian-flagged ships for the current shipping season (US House 1941b, 12) • Urged FDR to meet with the acting director of the Selective Service to help boost the morale of the new agency96 • Urged Roosevelt to oppose pending legislation creating a director of priorities for defense-related spending97 • Submitted to BOB a comprehensive budget request for all OEM units for FY 1942, which was set to begin July 1,98 and

Coy Begins as LOEM

81

FDR then sent a message to Congress containing Coy’s OEM budget request for $39 million (US House, 1941c) • Advised the president on ways to increase production by the machine-tool industry99 • Served on the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation100 • Coordinated development of a policy on priority of, and production systems for, construction of railway cars101 • Attended a major confab of all senior managers involved in defense production in an effort to harmonize their work and increase the efficiency of decision making102 • To increase production of defense materials, encouraged major contractors to expand the amount of subcontracting with the underutilized capacities of small businesses103 • FDR asked Coy and Smith to create a unit in OEM for medical research, separate from the incipient Office of Scientific Research and Development104 • Asked the president for guidance on resolving the complicated tax status of export materials that had already been paid for by (the now-conquered) France, Holland, and Belgium, but still were in storage at ports in the US; FDR suggested conferring with the secretaries of state and treasury105 • In an effort to deal with trucking bottlenecks in Kentucky (due to its state laws and regulations), obtained FDR’s approval to state in a letter to the governor that the request for dealing with the problem came from the president personally106 • Met with BOB director Smith fourteen times along with four phone conversations107 As can be seen from the range of subjects covered in this list of highlights of his first forty days, the role of LOEM could be as broad as the president and office holder wanted it to be. As LOEM, Coy was instantly at the crossroads of just about every subject relating to the national defense

82

Get Things Moving!

mobilization. He quickly had to live up to his reputation for being able to handle a large amount of work, engage in dozens of issues at the same time, and keep a low profile in the press. His was a good formula for lasting relatively long at the highest levels of FDR’s presidency.

4

Coy as LOEM before the War Public Policy, April–December 1941

Liaison as Policy by another Name During Coy’s service at OEM, he always insisted publicly that he did not make policy and did not initiate policy. For example, at a congressional appropriations hearing seven weeks after starting his new job, he was asked about his policy powers. He replied that “policy rests with the President. He gives the directions as to the policies. I do have some responsibility in carrying them out, but I do not initiate policies.” A Republican member of the House Appropriations Committee asked him point blank, “You are not responsible for the policies of the O.P.M.?” “No, sir,” he replied (US House 1941d, 646). Strictly speaking, this was legally accurate. However, a feature article later in the summer perceptively captured the opacity of Coy’s de facto power. His purpose is to coordinate these [OEM] agencies, to exercise some of the President’s powers which he has delegated to it, and to help him watch and work out the problems of the various bodies. . . . What control Coy can or does exercise over them is a matter for conjecture. Under the law, heads of the other agencies can ignore Coy. They can carry their complaints, memoranda or reports direct to President Roosevelt if they wish. And they are not compelled to carry out any orders Coy gives them. The only clear power he has is to insist on being given any information he requests. But a position like this one can be as strong or as weak as the office holder is able to make it. Coy’s possibilities are almost unlimited. He has the right and duty to be in constant 83

84

Get Things Moving!

communication with the President, and it is his job to know what the President wants. When he disagrees with some policy, or makes a suggestion, it is improbable that any of the defense chiefs take his words lightly.1 Coy was inevitably involved in public policy, but most of those roles were behind closed doors. Multiple policy issues involving the national defense mobilization crossed his desk. Only a few of his activities were public, mostly relating to legislation being debated in Congress. In some cases, his policy role was major, with him serving as the lead person for the administration on that issue. These included expediting military aid to the USSR in the summer of 1941 and dealing with African American protests about segregation. Other policy involvements were more modest and routine, whether in terms of his role or the relative importance of the subject. Examples of these second-tier policy issues that cropped up on a day-to-day basis in 1941 (before Pearl Harbor) included further use of Canadian ships on the Great Lakes, a food stockpile in Hawaii, daylight savings, conscientious objectors, hiring aliens, emergency funding for the Philippine army, farm labor shortages, research on uranium and isotopes, and the St. Lawrence seaway.

Routine Public Policy Coy was at the crossroads of anything dealing with the nonmilitary side of the civilian defense mobilization in 1941. That included juggling multiple policy issues reaching his desk, whether from the president, to the president, or on behalf of the president. Some examples of his active roles in these day-to-day policy issues convey the broad scope of subjects in which he was involved, what he did about them, and how they turned out. These were his day-in-and-day-out policy roles—nothing special, just a routine day in the office. It will be recalled that during his first forty days on the job (chap. 3), one of Coy’s early tasks was to convey to a congressional committee endorsement of legislation permitting Canadian ships to move iron ore on the Great Lakes from one US port to another. It passed. Then the subject continued bobbing up through the rest of the year. On July 11, Coy sent FDR a detailed memo on the status of Great Lakes shipping. This was an important topic because the goal was to maximize transportation capacity of materiel needed for defense. In part, there was the touchy political issue

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

85

of increasing the use of non-US flagged boats. Coy updated the president on the increase in iron ore tonnage being shipped (11½ million tons more than the same date the year before), a cost-benefit analysis of extending the shipping season with icebreakers to open the lakes for shipping a few weeks earlier than normal and keeping them open a few more weeks at the end of the season, and whether to permit shipping grain by boat or by rail. The latter involved comparative costs, capacity of the transportation system, and impacted interest groups. Coy recommended not expanding current law on use of Canadian ships between American ports beyond iron ore to grain.2 FDR replied that he agreed about not expanding the law, but requested that Coy double-check with USDA Secretary Wickard.3 In addition to having a substantive position on this policy topic, Coy was also eager to establish his primacy over requests for legislation from agencies and departments to Congress. He felt that there should be no end-runs or surprises. In general, legislative requests needed to be cleared with BOB to categorize whether they were in harmony with the president’s positions. Coy wanted the same role for anything relating to the civilian side of the defense mobilization. He quickly wrote to Clifford Townsend, the head of USDA’s Office of Agricultural Defense Relations, saying that “I heard indirectly” that the department was asking for legislation to permit use of Canadian ships for grain, rather than the current limit to iron ore. Based on the facts he had, “it would be extremely unfortunate” if USDA got congressional assent for this.4 Townsend quickly replied that such an initiative would only be taken if supported by OPM and if justifiable in terms of costs and transportation capacity. He particularly emphasized that the grain elevators in Duluth were full and there was an urgent need to make room for incoming grain.5 (This policy issue continued after Pearl Harbor; see chap. 7.) In May, Leon Henderson, head of OEM’s Office of Price Administration (OPA), recommended spending about $3 million to create a food reserve in Hawaii.6 Coy was reluctant to bring it up at a meeting of NDAC until getting more input. Indicating the senior level at which he was operating, he called Interior Secretary Ickes for reaction and also talked to Secretary of State Hull. Both felt that any such program should treat the Philippines the same way it treated Hawaii. He then gave FDR his own assessment, stating that it would “be terribly bad from the standpoint both of morale and strategy in the Pacific to be saying to the Japanese that we will establish a food reserve in Hawaii and not in the Philippines.”7 The president replied that he wanted Coy to talk to the secretaries of War and Navy about it.

86

Get Things Moving!

“My own feeling is that a food reserve is not needed for the Philippines, and that it would be a mistake to build one up in Hawaii” because, in all likelihood, shipping food from the West Coast to Hawaii would not be impaired in foreseeable scenarios.8 Nonetheless, Coy permitted Henderson to make his case to NDAC and to BOB.9 Eventually, FDR disapproved the funding request (US CPA 1946a, 155, 157, 162). Coy was the lead person in the administration regarding using daylight saving as a way to reduce consumption of electricity by residents and thereby maximize it to defense production. The supply of electricity was especially tight in the south. He personally talked with the governor of Alabama—another indication of Coy’s senior status—who was concerned about the situation.10 Coy asked the Federal Power Commission (FPC), an agency outside OEM, to study the matter and make recommendations.11 The commission reported back that implementing daylight saving in all or parts of the country would assist in assuring adequate power supply to production of military materiel and suggested two methods to accomplish it, both needing congressional authorization. FDR asked Coy to follow up with OPM and Ickes for their preference, if any.12 Coy then drafted a message to Congress from the president requesting authority to establish daylight saving in all or parts of the country (US House 1941e).13 The Chicago Tribune editorialized against it, saying that FDR deliberately wanted “to discommode the people for no good reason” other than to convey the seriousness of the defense emergency and for them to experience the emergency tangibly. It was simply “more ballyhoo” for war.14 In the meantime, Coy drafted letters for the president’s signature to all southern governors asking them to use their full legal powers to proclaim daylight saving. Some agreed. But Georgia Governor Talmadge declined, as did Florida Governor Holland. Coy drafted FDR’s replies to them, observing a bit tartly to Talmadge that the national defense was more important than inconveniences to the comforts of some citizens and to Holland that the governor was exaggerating the supposed negative effect daylight saving would have on the state’s economy.15 In Georgia, some mayors went against the governor and unilaterally declared daylight saving time. For example, Coy wrote a warm letter of appreciation to the mayor of Augusta for doing so.16 Congress did not act on the president’s request for legislation. On the Friday before Pearl Harbor, the chairman of the House committee declared it dead “because of lack of interest” by legislators and the public.17 The Post and Los Angeles Times carried the news in their big Sunday paper on December 7, 1941.18

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

87

Coy also was involved in lesser public policy questions. For example, there was an opportunity to assign some conscientious objectors to alternate service in Mexico in the wake of an earthquake (Robinson 1996, 25). Coy recommended to the president to approve it, because it was “an unusual opportunity to build understanding in accordance with our good neighbor policy.”19 FDR asked the State Department to weigh in.20 The department did not object to the project, but to the use of conscientious objectors from the draft.21 It also felt the assignment could be used by German propaganda to criticize the incapacity of the Mexican government to take care of its citizens. Coy gave up, concluding that it was “impossible to overcome their point of view.”22 Coy had a role in maximizing the options for OEM agencies to hire noncitizens, some of whom had unique knowledge and expertise, such as scientists and other recent European émigrés. Generally, congressional appropriations for national defense funding allocated millions for discretionary spending by the president with a routine caveat that those funds could only be spent on the employment of US citizens. One of those bills, however, authorized the president to spend on a onetime basis $50,000 for OEM to hire aliens.23 CAS head Sherwood quickly prepared the paperwork for the president to delegate to Coy all decisions about the funds, rather than, for example, requiring FDR to permit each individual hire.24 Coy asked BOB, it agreed, and Coy then provided Roosevelt with a letter to sign, which he did.25 In turn, Coy quickly approved a formal procedure for OEM agencies to apply for the funding.26 He wanted the money used to the fullest extent and as easily as possible, just as long as an adequate paper trail existed to stay out of trouble with congressional auditors and critics of the administration. By April 1942, the account had nearly been used up, with only $5,000 left.27 Another issue in which Coy was involved was US military aid to the Philippines. Given Japanese offensives elsewhere in Asia, in mid-1941 FDR had nationalized the Philippine armed forces to be under federal command (comparable to a president mobilizing a state’s national guard). A few months later, Congress was wrangling over the source for the continued costs to the federal government for taking command of the Philippine army. The House Insular Affairs Committee (which had jurisdiction over the Philippines) invited Coy to speak to it about the current situation and what the administration recommended. Seeking someone to speak to the committee at a meeting that was not a public hearing was a very unusual situation, and Coy was the only non-member to speak at the meeting. Coy was a particularly

88

Get Things Moving!

appropriate choice to brief the committee, not just as LOEM overseeing large amounts of money delegated by Congress to OEM, but also because he had served earlier in the Philippines (chap. 2). Coy told them that the Philippine army would need new funding quickly, particularly because the money FDR had allocated it from OEM emergency and discretionary funds would be exhausted in only ten days. A journalist reported that in reaction to Coy’s comments, the committee had “a stormy session.” They debated if, based on his comments, it should continue its endorsement of a Senate bill it had already approved or if it should recommend new legislation.28 Considering the urgency of the situation and after hearing Coy’s comments, the committee decided that day that it was better to continue supporting legislation similar to one already passed by the Senate rather than start the legislative process from scratch (US House, 1941f ). Other seemingly routine issues in which Coy participated included policy responses to farm labor shortages,29 allocating funding to the Commerce Department for experiments with uranium30 and to USDA for isotope separation31 (both of which related to the very early stages of research culminating in the atomic bomb), and congressional funding to build the St. Lawrence seaway (which failed).32

FDR Turns to One of His “Best Administrators” to Expedite Military Aid to Russia Coy’s assignment from the president to expedite military aid to the USSR (mentioned briefly in the preface) was his most prominent and his highestprofile role in histories of the war effort (Burns 2006, 115; Bennett 1990, 32–33; Heinrichs 1988, 140; Herring 1973, 14; US CPA 1969 [1947], 131n33; Coy 1946a; Milton 1943). The issue began immediately after Hitler invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941.33 The president quickly made a decision that the US should give any aid it needed to help fight the German army. This was a controversial decision for several reasons. First, up to the day of the invasion, the USSR had been a German ally, including their joint invasion of Poland in September 1939. Second, as a Communist country seeking to export Communism to the rest of the world, many American politicians continued to view the USSR with hostility, as an enemy of the capitalist system. Third, a view quickly took hold that the German invasion would likely succeed and that the USSR would collapse, similar to what had

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

89

happened the year before in France. If so, then providing aid would either come too late or, worse, those armaments would fall into German hands to use. Fourth, with arms production still ramping up, sending equipment to the USSR was a zero-sum decision. Anything shipped to Russia meant less for Great Britain or for rearming of the US military. The UK and the American army would insist on having a higher priority than Russia to receive such new supplies. But Roosevelt was adamant. Anyone fighting against Germany, no matter how briefly or unsuccessfully, was in harmony with American security interests. American aid could also make the difference in preventing or at least delaying the success of the German invasion. He did not care about the odd ideological alliance or even the unhappy squawking by the War Department or Churchill about reductions in what they were expecting. From late June to early August, FDR pressed the bureaucracy to send aid urgently to Russia. He kept getting bland assurances that everything that could be done was being done—not a particularly reassuring message to a president familiar with the ways of the bureaucracy. Roosevelt became particularly insistent after Hopkins flew to Moscow for unprecedented and controversial direct talks with Stalin in late July and early August. Hopkins was not just FDR’s most trusted advisor (even living in the White House), but at the moment he was also the head of Lend-Lease. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had lunch with the president on Friday, August 1, just before the afternoon Cabinet meeting. Morgenthau later claimed that he had deliberately used the lunch to agitate FDR about the glacial pace of supplying arms to the USSR. Morgenthau told the president he was being misinformed and did not have an accurate picture of the current status of delivery efforts. “The President first questioned it and I said no, that it was a fact, and did he want me to bring it up at Cabinet, and he said no, that he would.”34 By the time the Cabinet meeting started, Roosevelt was visibly angry and let loose a forty-five-minute lecture on the importance of the subject. In a rare outburst of anger, he turned to Secretary of War Stimson and sharply complained about the Russians being given the runaround. Stimson was embarrassed by the unusual dressing-down, but with little news to report, he in effect confirmed what FDR was saying. Morgenthau recounted that “never I have heard the President more emphatic and insistent.” He recalled Roosevelt memorably saying that “he didn’t want to hear what was on order, he wanted to hear what was on the water.”35 When the president seemed

90

Get Things Moving!

to have run out of steam, Morgenthau jumped in and said that with Hopkins away,36 the Lend-Lease office in DC was not even sure it had enough authority to overrule supply obstacles. In reaction, FDR said, “Well, I am going to put one of the best administrators in charge, Wayne Coy, and his job will be to see that the Russians get what they need.”37 This was the background to Roosevelt’s dramatic charge to Coy to “get things moving!”38 He called Coy long distance in Indiana on Saturday, August 2, and told him to get back to DC as quickly as possible.39 “Your instructions and your authority will be outlined in a memorandum which I will leave for you,” he told him on the phone (Coy 1946a, 546). Then he secretly left town for two weeks for his first summit with Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland.40 Coy hurried back and got to his office on Monday morning on August 4. He immediately read the president’s memo. It was as blunt as the Saturday phone conversation. It was also quite detailed, demonstrating FDR’s typical minute knowledge of a subject and his ability to absorb and remember large amounts of information. Roosevelt was not the kind of leader who merely exhorted in generalities and left the details of implementation delegated to staff. He dictated the memo to Coy on Saturday evening just before leaving and had it marked “Personal and Confidential.” The memo read in full: I raised the point in Cabinet on Friday that nearly six weeks have elapsed since the Russian War began and that we have done practically nothing to get any of the materials they asked for on their actual way to delivery in Siberia. Frankly, if I were a Russian I would feel that I had been given the run-around in the United States. Please get out the list [of Russian requests] and please, with my full authority, use a heavy hand—act as a burr under the saddle and get things moving! The enclosed [memo from General Marshall41] comes in just before I leave. In regard to bombers, we should make and the British should make small token deliveries. In regard to P-forties, it is ridiculous to bring any back here from England by steamer through the submarine zone and we should expedite 200 of them via Fairbanks from the total number now in this country.

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

91

I have told the Russians that I am dividing things into two categories—first, material which can be delivered on the Russian western front in time to take part in battle between September first and October first—and secondly, those materials which physically could not get there before October first. I have chosen that date because after October first, we all doubt if there will be very active operations in view of rain, snow, frost, etc. and that if Germany can be held until then, Russia is safe until the Spring. Step on it! F.D.R.42 Coy quickly got up-to-date on the details of the subject. On Monday, August 4, he had lunch with Stimson, and the next morning he met with the Soviet ambassador. On midday Tuesday, he had a long meeting with Morgenthau, Lend-Lease legal counsel Oscar Cox, Treasury economist Andrew Kamarck, and Army Colonel Philip Faymonville, who was assisting in fulfilling Russian requests. Coy, ever the pragmatist, did not want to engage in refighting old battles, the Washington parlor game of who said what to whom and who was to blame. He wanted to get to the root of the matter (a Hopkins trait) by cutting through the bureaucratic politics and developing a cooperative and coordinated approach that everyone participated in and then committed to. In the short term, he said, “you have to take about what you can get and immediately you can get that and get it delivered,” with the caveat of “as much of it as we can get without too much fighting with the Army about it.” Then, everyone had to pivot to future armament production schedules and supply of raw materials. He said he told the Soviet ambassador earlier that morning that “Certainly we ought to be able to set up a distribution schedule here that recognizes where the fighting is being done” and therefore appropriate to what those specific needs were.43 But, as always in the federal government, it was complicated. Coy’s goal (after the immediate supply of what he could get his hands on) was to finalize an agreed-upon distribution schedule. Within the federal government, that would need to include the Army, the Lend-Lease office, OPM, and the State Department. Once that was set in place within the federal government, there would then need to be a three-way agreement of the US, UK, and USSR on the supply program.

92

Get Things Moving!

On Wednesday, August 6, Coy wired an update to the president. He reported “arrangements nearly complete” on transferring 200 P-40s to Russia, 140 from the UK and 59 from the US. Also, that he had obtained some supplies with the “Maritime Commission arranging necessary transportation” by cargo ship. He asked Roosevelt for some clarifications, such as if FDR approved using Lend-Lease funding to finance some of the equipment—an important detail that was not clear so far. He gave the president a headsup that the biggest longer-range problem he had uncovered was dividing future delivery of newly manufactured equipment between the Army, UK, and USSR. Only the president could resolve that one. “In the meantime we will prepare for your decision tentative recommendations on the division of production.”44 FDR cabled back on Friday, August 8, with his replies.45 By Wednesday, August 6, Coy felt he had collected all relevant information and was ready to act. He issued a flurry of hurry-up memos. He posed four highly specific questions to the War Department on the status of itemized requests from the USSR, asked the British purchasing office in DC for details on implementation of a commitment already made to supply 1,000 tons of tutuol (an ingredient for TNT) to Russia, and sent OPM chief Knudsen a detailed list of questions and demands for information.46 The letter to Knudsen was particularly pointed, ending with the not-veryveiled threat that “I should be greatly indebted to you if you would inform me of the status of each of these items by Friday [August 8], because the President has charged me with making a full report to him on his return.” Knudsen resisted and delayed, replying to Coy only on Saturday, August 9 (US CPA 1969, 131n33). It was a relatively uninformative and unresponsive posture. Dissatisfied, Coy called back that day and was told that the Russian request for tank armor plate would absorb the entire US production (at its current levels) for two years. Knudsen even opposed redirecting 1,200 tons of aluminum then on the docks of New York City’s port. A few days later, the OPM Council discussed Coy’s request, with Knudsen continuing to resist making any major commitments, let alone releasing or shipping anything. He said that “the orders for machine tools are very large and, if granted, would affect the American bomber program” (US CPA 1946b, 50).47 Knudsen and the OPM leadership kept playing for time, trying to sit out the peak of the storm as much as possible, waiting for FDR to return. Maybe by then more reasonable demands would be placed and competing zero-sum priorities could be balanced. Coy would not play that game. He went to see Knudsen, showed him the memo from Roosevelt granting Coy full authority to act in the president’s name, and then wrote

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

93

a memo directing Knudsen to release the machine tools the Russians had asked for. Knudsen yielded on that particular item (Milton 1943, 2–3). Similarly, the army resisted assigning pilots to fly bombers to Russian bases because it said its experienced pilots were more urgently needed as instructors at its pilot training base in Texas. Coy would not take no for an answer. At a showdown meeting in Simpson’s office with Army brass, Coy “acidly reminded them that the war was not being fought in Texas” (Herring 1973, 14). Stimson, by now convinced that FDR’s priorities must be honored, overrode the Army’s preferences and told them to release the pilots to fly the bombers immediately (Milton 1943, 3). Coy kept hammering away. But at the other end, it also was not easy dealing with the Russians. They were tight-lipped, difficult, and often unresponsive (perhaps in part because of a justifiable fear of Stalin). On Friday, August 15, Coy wrote the Soviet ambassador of the availability of ninetyone scout cars and forty tractors. Coy wrote that OPM had been trying, unsuccessfully, to arrange a meeting with the embassy official in charge of that subject to obtain final details to complete the handover. Separately that day, he wrote the ambassador to create a system of weekly written reports with authoritative confirmation of what had been received and a parallel report on pending unfulfilled requests.48 This would be a way to nail down facts and specifics, something that Coy (and others) found very difficult to do with the Soviets in general and, in particular, with this ambassador. In another example of unexpected obstacles with the USSR, Coy was unable to fulfill FDR’s specific request of flying bombers to the USSR via Siberia, “because of Russian refusal to give us information as to location of airfields” there (Coy 1946a, 547). Similarly, when Hopkins got back to DC, Coy strongly urged that the two of them meet before Hopkins’s first appointment with the Soviet ambassador so that Hopkins would have the US’s version of what was going on before hearing the unreliable Russian version. Coy also asked to attend that meeting so he could correct on the spot any false claims and accusations that the ambassador was wont to make—routinely.49 In particular, Coy felt that the bureaucratic resistance stemmed from the conventional wisdom in Washington that Russia was about to collapse (as France had), so the whole effort would be a waste, especially with the pressing needs of the US military and the UK. This was understandable. Given the enormous amount of territory Germany had already conquered by August and the astonishing figures of casualties and POWs the USSR had experienced, it was relatively reasonable to assume that Russia was on the verge of being defeated. Coy felt he had to do something to change the

94

Get Things Moving!

consensus view. He leaked to Time magazine some reliable but unknown figures he had obtained, such as the number of partially equipped tanks now in production in Russia, which was why they had asked for a huge amount of armored plates from the US. Their plan was to complete the construction of each tank by adding those plates to each chassis and gun they had produced on their own. Coy had obtained statistics from a reliable Soviet military liaison officer in DC (not the ambassador) that convinced him that the USSR indeed had the necessary production infrastructure and that these industries were located safely far east from the front. He was also convinced that the USSR was so large that the country had strategic depth to keep losing battles, but not be defeated. Coy knew that Time magazine was closely read in Washington. He felt that if he could get the magazine to write optimistically about the future of the Russian front, it would change the atmosphere in the bureaucracy. But, as in a transactional relationship, the Time reporter wanted something in return. Probably one of the few times in his LOEM career, Coy leaked to them the upcoming assignment from FDR to Rosenman to reorganize the supply and pricing organization of OEM. Time ran both stories on the first news page of its August 18 issue.50 A German victory against Russia “added up to a gigantic pincers movement directed at the U.S.” Showing its editorial preferences, it stated that “the U.S. must realize that aid to Russia is aid to the Russian people of all beliefs,” including the Orthodox church, which, even though persecuted by the Communists for twenty years, now openly supported defending the Motherland. This was no time for ideological niceties or for getting even. Furthermore, “the U.S. must refuse to be duped, as other democracies were duped, by German lies.” Those opposing military aid to Russia now were the same people who had opposed earlier military aid to the UK. That crowd included—Time pointedly and poisonously noted—Lindbergh. Coy felt the atmosphere changed almost instantly afterward and that some of the resistance and barriers he had faced began melting away. He recalled that “within a week, people inside the War Department were quoting the Time story as the reason we ought to help Russia get supplies, for our own better defense!” (Milton 1943, 7). (He also falsely denied that the leak about Rosenman had come from him when asked by those trying to identify the leaker, including the Secret Service.) In all, Coy spent about three weeks working on the assignment full time (Milton 1943, 5). By then the president was back. Coy was able to report that two ships had been filled and already embarked for Russia “plus commitments of additional material for later delivery” (Herring 1973, 14).

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

95

By then, Hopkins and General Burns (manager of the Lend-Lease office) were back in the capital after the Roosevelt-Churchill summit. Coy handed off to them what was left of his assignment along with his files (Milton 1943, 5). But he continued keeping an eye on Russian aid. For example, on a more prosaic level, Coy arranged for office space in the State Department building (next to the White House, where he was located) for the LendLease staff now working most directly on financing and fulfilling Russian equipment requests.51 As in the real estate business, in the bureaucratic world of Washington, the most important factors were location, location, location. That the Lend-Lease staff for Russia was in the same building as FDR’s administrative assistants, BOB, and Coy conveyed much about the importance of the task.52 Looking back, Coy felt his accomplishment “was very small,” but at least “our determination to aid Russia had been clearly demonstrated” (Coy 1946a, 547). Cox was more generous, concluding at the time that “Coy has done a good job in blasting out of OPM and the War Department action” on some of the items.53 Historians have been similarly charitable. Herring concluded that Coy had “produced notable results” (1973, 14). Another wrote that Coy “got some results, but weapons could not be made out of thin air” (Heinrichs 1988, 140). Burns probably summarized it best with a vivid metaphor. Coy had tried very hard, “but he had a poor engine and a meager gas supply” to do it (2006, 115). Coy also kept FDR apprised of other developments relating to the sudden warming of the wartime relationship with Russia. For example, when FDR got back from his meeting with Churchill, Coy filled him in on a new charity effort to finance and send medical supplies to the USSR.54 A few days later, he made arrangements for a delegation of Russian military officers to come to Indiana, mostly to see the Allison plant in Indianapolis where airplane engines were being manufactured. For conservative Hoosiers, being friendly to Communists did not come easily, let alone thinking of them as allies. Coy tried his best to create goodwill toward the Russian delegation while they were in Indiana.55 For the foreseeable future, giving aid and comfort to Communist Russia was the patriotic thing to do.56

African Americans Race was one of the big public policy issues in the prewar period (and later, of course, during the war). Coy was viewed as one of the administration’s

96

Get Things Moving!

few “experts” on African Americans. As a result, whenever problems relating to race came up, he was one of the senior people expected to handle those issues. Coy’s reputation as having experience dealing with racial matters was based on his pre-LOEM record. As WPA state director in Indiana, WPA regional director, and assistant FSA administrator, he had demonstrated support for fair treatment of African Americans. Politically, if based only on his membership on the platform committee of the Democratic National Convention in 1936 and his attendance at the 1940 convention, he knew the touchy politics of race given the disproportionate importance of the South in presidential elections (and, because of the seniority system, in Congress). In the fall of 1940, he had been active in FDR’s reelection campaign to disseminate information to African American voters on FDR’s putative positive record on race (chap. 2). After the election, when FSA was assigned roles in the national defense mobilization, Coy again was involved in the subject. A relatively explicit acknowledgement of Coy’s standout and progressive role on race, compared with much of the rest of the administration, came from Mordecai Johnson, president of Howard University, a unit within FSA. When Coy was appointed LOEM by FDR, Johnson sent him a warm letter of congratulations. First he thanked Coy for his brief record at FSA, including “the generous and thoughtful interest which you had begun to take in our work.” Second, he hoped Coy would remain interested in “Howard University and in the colored people. As yet they have only a few thoughtfully active friends in the public life. One like yourself is precious to them beyond measure.”57 Eight days after he was appointed LOEM, Coy sent a memo to Roosevelt regarding the need for inclusion of African Americans in hiring by corporations receiving large federal defense contracts. He submitted some data on the subject and provided a draft of a statement the president could sign on the subject. Press Secretary Early followed up, saying he “took up” the issue (presumably with FDR) and that “it is suggested” (again, presumably by FDR) that the matter be handled differently. It could be a letter from OPM’s associate director Hillman (who came from the labor movement) reporting to the president on its activities and then having the president reply. Both letters would be released to the press.58 It did not happen. Meanwhile, major defense contractors were responding to a letter Hillman had sent them about opening up their training programs to African Americans. On May 10, 1941, OEM’s central PR unit, the Division of Information, issued a press release with the news that Curtiss-Wright had agreed to train and employ some African Americans in its aircraft factory

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

97

in Buffalo, New York. The release also quoted the CEO of a shipbuilder in Pennsylvania who said that 10 percent of its employees “are colored men,” and not all of them were in unskilled or semiskilled positions.59 When he replied to a telegram from a far-left organization to the president on the matter, Coy wrote soothingly that “every possible effort will be made to correct the situation.”60 These relatively mild and low-profile actions were not enough for the subject to go away. African American groups viewed defense hiring as a major venue and unprecedented opportunity for opening up employment and training in skilled and semiskilled positions. Here seemingly was a non– zero sum situation: African Americans would not be replacing or succeeding whites in existing jobs. Rather, these were new jobs with no incumbents. But if African American organizations did not raise the subject now, the “whites only” practices, especially for skilled positions, would expand to the new jobs and become de facto and permanently limited to whites. NAACP Secretary Walter White invited the president to broadcast a message to the opening session of the organization’s next annual conference in June. Early replied that the president would be unable to do so. Instead, Coy drafted for FDR’s signature a relatively mild letter that there had “recently been some advances” in integrating African Americans in defense employment and that “if democracy is to survive, all individuals and all groups must be allowed to play their full parts.”61 It was not a ringing endorsement. Early thought the letter was “excellent,” though telling Coy that the final version Roosevelt signed “embodies most” of Coy’s draft, but that it was modified— presumably softened.62 Nonetheless, White called the letter “outspoken.”63 By late May, a new and signal development arose that the administration considered threatening. Major African American groups announced that there would be a March on Washington on July 1 for the purpose of obtaining equality in the military and in defense production employment.64 FDR was adamantly opposed to its taking place. He did not want civil rights on the top of the defense agenda because it would be politically divisive and a detraction from a focus on national unity (i.e., whites), and he especially did not want to further antagonize southerners, who controlled Congress. There was even an amorphous fear for public safety of the city, with so many African Americans descending on the capital. Who knew what that could trigger? The implication (as was repeated before the 1963 march) was that somehow a “race riot” would occur and the fault would be assigned to African Americans (no matter how false the insinuation would be).65 Getting the march called off was assigned to Coy, Press Secretary Early, and

98

Get Things Moving!

presidential aide Marvin McIntyre. Do whatever it takes—as long as it does not look to conservatives that FDR is more pro-black than white! The story of their frantic efforts has been well covered by historians (Lucander 2014, 33–36; Parrish 2010, 63–64; Kryder 2000, 59–63, 74). Focusing on Coy’s involvement, Early’s first idea was to have Coy talk to La Guardia, now that the mayor was heading the civil defense agency within OEM. After all, the march was being organized by several national African American organizations based in New York, and the march committee’s office was also there. Surely the mayor had “great influence with the New York negroes.” The line of argument Early suggested be used was that “there is a better means of presenting their case on its merits than the one proposed in this march on Washington.”66 Coy talked with La Guardia, who promised to try to help. Coy suggested that another way to get the March canceled would be FDR’s public support for the passage of a Senate resolution calling for an investigation of the subject and with the president committing to follow up on its passage by authorizing such an inquiry. One benefit of creating such an investigating committee was that it “would give Negroes a continuous forum” to raise their concerns.67 Here was the seminal idea for the creation of the president’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice. Another avenue Coy suggested could be pressure on African American organizations from Mrs. Roosevelt to cancel, because she had a record of strong support for equal rights. The First Lady was in touch with Coy frequently about issues of concern to African Americans (Kiplinger 1942, 149). Eventually, in a round robin of contacts, the consensus was for FDR to sign an executive order that in general terms prohibited employment discrimination by defense contractors by race, creed, color, or national origin.68 President Roosevelt signed it on June 25, 1941, and the March on Washington was called off.69 Further adding to his standing with African Americans (and justifying the cancellation of the March), right after Labor Day in 1941, the president sent a letter to the heads of all federal departments and agencies requesting that they take steps to assure that employment decisions be open to all loyal and qualified workers regardless of creed, race, or national origin (Lee 2016, 95).70 Coy followed up on it with written guidance to all OEM agency heads that he wanted them to issue memos to their supervisory personnel instructing them to follow the president’s letter.71 But the executive order had a kind of time bomb in it because it created—along the lines of Coy’s idea—a body within OPM (and therefore

Coy as LOEM before the War: Public Policy

99

within OEM) called the Committee on Fair Employment Practice (but eventually routinely referred to as the Fair Employment Practices Committee [FEPC]).72 The Southern mandarins of Congress hated the FEPC and tried every which way to ostracize it, abolish it, or defund it.73 Liberals and African Americans had to fight again and again to keep it alive and with some modicum of leverage to influence employment decisions by contractors. As an entity in OEM, the work of the committee fell within Coy’s domain, and he had ongoing duties relating to whom FDR appointed to it,74 if the membership by heads of the labor union movement could be delegated to a substitute,75 what its scope of powers really was, what legal enforcement sanctions it could impose, the size of its staff, and all other manner of politically touchy subjects.76 Other racial issues in which Coy was involved as LOEM before Pearl Harbor included adequate construction of new housing for defense workers allotted to African Americans,77 discrimination by USDA employees in Louisiana,78 and inclusion of an African American on the National Advisory Committee to the selective service agency (on which Coy served).79 The instances covered in this chapter demonstrate and document some of Coy’s roles in the policy process for the administration. In many of these cases, his role was an in-house one, largely out of the public eye. However, sometimes he was engaging in a public role associated with that policy subject. Also, policy sometimes bled into politics, and the two could not be separated easily. Examples of the intertwining of Coy’s policy and political work are discussed in the next chapter, along with his more purely political activities. That is followed by his distinctly managerial and administrative work before Pearl Harbor (chap. 6).

5

Coy as LOEM before the War Politics, April–December 1941

Politics and Policy In Washington, politics and policy are often two sides of the same coin and therefore nearly impossible to separate. As described in chapter 4, Coy’s policy work sometimes involved modest contacts with Congress, such as using Canadian ships on the Great Lakes, daylight saving, and funding for the Philippine Army. For those issues, Coy’s contacts with Congress were glancing-to-brief and usually by letter rather than in person. That work did not make him highly visible on Capitol Hill. Similarly, these issues were largely behind closed doors and therefore gave him little public visibility. This subchapter examines some of his policy work entailing significant inperson interactions with legislators, the public, and the news media. Property Seizure Legislation In some respects, the very messy and public fight over FDR’s property seizure bill in mid-1941 was Coy’s debut as a public figure. The resulting references to his presence at congressional hearings and in the press indicated quite how unknown he was up to that point. The legislation was relatively simple: in times of war, a president needed to have in his back pocket the power of requisitioning property, sometimes called eminent domain, for the national military effort. This power would be used only in a case of last resort, but it needed to exist. Indeed, in WWI, Congress had passed more than a dozen bills giving President Wilson the power to requisition property. Each bill was relatively narrowly focused on specific industries or economic sectors, often reactive to particular problems the president identi101

102

Get Things Moving!

fied as degrading the war effort. FDR, of course, remembered this from his service as assistant secretary of the Navy. This time, Roosevelt wanted to get ahead of the problem by obtaining on a proactive basis a broad authorization to seize property if necessary for the national defense. In mid-1941, he asked Coy to work on a bill draft based in part on some early versions prepared by the military (Parrish 2010, 63). Coy sought input from the OPM Council. Some of its members were taken aback by “the extraordinarily broad sweep of the proposed statute.” The secretaries of War and Navy attended the council meeting and generally voiced support for the bill, notwithstanding its scope. They volunteered informally that they would not object if the bill were to be revised to require them to make “a finding of actual or pending shortage” before invoking the powers delegated them by the bill. The Council approved Coy’s draft (US CPA 1946b, 27). But then the War Department, without final clearance from the White House, submitted its own draft legislation to the Senate. It was not what Coy thought they had agreed on. Trying to muffle the blunder, the president followed up with a letter to the Senate Committee chairman endorsing the need for legislation and softly arguing for a broader definition of what categories of property could be taken than what was presented in the War Department’s initial draft (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 230–32). Initial reception was rough. Perhaps, in part, because the US was not in a state of war, opposition was easy politically, especially for conservatives, Republicans, and the business sector. To the conservative coalition in Congress and right-leaning editorialists, this proposal encompassed their quintessential anti-Roosevelt metanarrative: he wanted the powers of a dictator, was expanding the federal government to interfere in the lives of citizens, was anti–free market capitalism, and was a warmonger seeking to push the US economy into a warlike posture so that it would be easier to enter the war. At a hearing in late June by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, the National Association of Manufacturers called it the “socialization of all property.” A utility executive from Indiana said the bureaucratic aim of the bill was “collectivization of all private property.”1 This was all a bit baffling to the executive branch representatives, who emphasized that the concept of eminent domain was rooted in the Constitution and that the precedent from WWI was strong and within the remembered experience of some legislators. In an effort to fight back in the media, the White House Press Office released a statement by Coy on July 15, 1941.2 As a native of Indiana, Coy focused on the sensational and shrill characterizations of the bill by the Indiana utility executive. Besides

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

103

providing seventeen examples of requisition laws passed during WWI, Coy especially chided the seeming obliviousness and double standard of the testifier. In most states, the legislature and utility regulatory commission routinely delegated to utilities the use of eminent domain for the purpose of construction of power lines and other facilities. If it was good for the goose, why was it not good for the gander? Coy’s rational arguments for the bill, by now two weeks after the hearing, got no coverage. On July 16, the Senate Military Affairs Committee met to act on the bill. Coy brought with him a new (third) version supported by the White House, which was broader in scope than the earlier War Department version. One reporter recounted the odd dynamic of the meeting: “Committee members were put somewhat in the position of spectators” while Coy and Under Secretary of War Patterson “attempted to smooth out differences between themselves on best details for such law.”3 One of Coy’s lawyers later confessed that, “all in all, it was a mess” because of the unilaterally submitted draft by the War Department.4 Coy patiently tried to justify to the senators the broad scope of the bill draft instead of a highly specific and narrow one. “The difficulty, in being specific about the items that you may want to requisition, is your lack of vision about what may be the needs, or where the shortages will be. . . . I can’t give you instances where shortages will occur in a year from now, for example” (US Senate 1941a, 215). After senators raised concerns about the third draft, Coy agreed to come back the next day with a fourth version of the bill containing some revisions they had suggested. It incorporated those concerns, and at the closed session, the Committee approved the substitute version. Coy, of course, kept the president apprised.5 A reporter noted the odd near-miracle legislatively: “Seldom in this session has a bill met so much opposition when first introduced and so little when it finally reached the Senate as this bill today.”6 Coy was not named, but surely the credit must go in large part to him. That was just the beginning. After passing the Senate, the House Military Affairs Committee held a hearing on the bill. As part of the hearing record, OPM submitted documentation of its reasons for “the usefulness of a properly safeguarded requisitions bill.” OPM’s position was presented to the Committee in the form of a letter it had sent Coy in response to his request for its position on the bill (US House 1941g, 18). After the House amended the Senate version, a conference committee worked out a compromise version on August 12. The House rejected it. Finally, a second conference committee report was passed on October 6. Roosevelt signed it a few days later without any public statement.7 Reflecting an understanding

104

Get Things Moving!

that legislative liaison included showing appreciation to allies with considerateness even in the smallest of details, Coy made a point of notifying the president’s secretary that one of the senators involved in passing the bill would appreciate receiving the pen FDR used to sign it.8 Confusion about who exactly Coy was reigned in Congress and the press during the fight over the bill. At two Senate hearings, he was identified without any title, very unusual for official hearing transcripts (US Senate 1941a, 209, 235). During the second hearing, a senator, grasping for a title, called him “the President’s secretary” (246). Covering the Senate hearings and the multiple versions of the bill in quick succession, the Washington Star referred to him simply as “of the White House staff.”9 The New York Herald Tribune identified him as “one of Mr. Roosevelt’s administrative assistants.”10 A variation on that called him “an assistant to President Roosevelt.”11 None used his LOEM title. (As late as mid-1943, people were still getting his title wrong. A staffer at the Foreign Economic Administration called him OEM’s “Principal Liaison Officer” [Milton 1943].) This spot news coverage of his congressional testimony led to some further commentary about him. A columnist depicted Coy’s sudden appearance at the Senate committee as mysterious and putatively odd: “someone sent in Wayne Coy.” He was identified vaguely as a “new member of the Presidential staff of executive assistants.”12 Editorializing against the bill, the Chicago Tribune depicted Coy as arbitrarily bossing around senators: “One of Mr. Roosevelt’s executive assistants, Mr. Wayne Coy, walked over to Capitol hill on Wednesday to deliver a copy of Mr. Roosevelt’s new property seizure bill. The draft was handed to Senator Chandler of Kentucky, who promptly introduced it.”13 Syndicated columnist Raymond Clapper complimented Coy’s role with faint praise. The way Coy handled congressional relations for the bill “has proven more diplomatic and therefore more effective than some other of his new deal colleagues.” Clapper perceived something about Coy that was prescient: Coy had “shown ability to work with Congress in shaping technical legislation in a way that sets a desirable pattern for the future and puts new life in the democratic method.”14 Coy was a patient cooperator and explainer, important traits for passing legislation. Price Control Legislation The problem of managing the national economy was a long-running issue throughout the run-up to the war and then the war itself. It affected everybody in one way or another. An example of the pervasiveness and

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

105

importance of economic policy was indicated when James Byrnes resigned from SCOTUS to be Roosevelt’s “assistant president” in October 1942 with the title of director of the Office of Economic Stabilization. Specific ongoing aspects of macroeconomics included inflation (too much money chasing too few goods), employment levels, manufacturing, wages (unions wanting to benefit from increased defense spending), ancillary but necessary services (such as transportation and housing), effect of population migration to job openings, and impact of the draft on manpower availability. These and many other events all affected the economy, and all interacted with each other in sometimes invisible and unpredictable ways. In this context, price control legislation was an archetypal example of American politics, the classic asymmetry of influence in the legislative process. As a result of the enormous amounts being spent on arms production, prices began rising (and unions sought to obtain their fair share of such federal contracts). The public at large would generally be in favor of price control. But such support was a mile wide and an inch deep, giving it little political muscle. As usual, the voters at large were inattentive to the eye-glazing details of this kind of legislation. Legislators knew that they would suffer little at the polls even if their record on this bill went against this generalized public interest. On the other hand, economic special interest groups had much at stake in this legislation. For example, anyone in the selling business wanted to be exempted from this bill. It would be acceptable to freeze someone else’s prices, but not theirs. Their political mobilization had one message: count me out! These dozens of economic interests may have been small in terms of voting population but had enormous clout on Capitol Hill because of their intense salience on how the bill would affect them. Everybody honed self-serving arguments about why it would be unfair if they were covered by price controls. Leon Henderson, director of OEM’s OPA, was preparing to recommend that FDR request Congress to pass legislation with price controls. Henderson kept Coy up-to-date on what everyone immediately understood would be controversial. In mid-May, Henderson told Coy that he (Henderson) was about to request a meeting with the president to get his guidance and potential approval for legislation. Coy asked Roosevelt’s scheduler to include him in the meeting and made a point of saying that Henderson supported the idea. In particular, Coy knew that price controls would have significant effects on other OEM agencies. He wanted to be sure that he would be in a position of “clearing” suggestions from other entities in his empire.15 The meeting took place on May 21, 1941, and was limited to

106

Get Things Moving!

Henderson, Coy, and David Ginsburg, OPA’s top lawyer.16 Given the topic, the meeting was news even though nothing was decided. All the coverage made a point of identifying Coy as attending the meeting. Amusingly, one reporter claimed that Henderson was not seeking any formal action or legislation, while another wrote the opposite.17 Legislators representing economic interest groups were on a hair trigger. For example, the chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee—an industry that did not want price controls—promptly denounced the idea and said he would haul Henderson before the committee to answer for this.18 Coy proceeded cautiously and privately. He filled FDR in on Henderson’s informal consultation earlier that day with Knudsen and Hillman, the heads of OPM. As a union man, Hillman was strongly against wage controls as part of a price control regime. This was a major political red flag that FDR should know about right away.19 The president replied by asking Coy to talk this over in depth with Hillman and Henderson and see if Coy could discern any political daylight on the subject. FDR also asked Coy to consider meeting with Bernard Baruch, whom FDR was already scheduled to meet with in a few days.20 Bernard Baruch was a major public and political presence who had to be handled with great care. After a successful Wall Street career making him a multimillionaire, he had headed Wilson’s War Industries Board during WWI. His job was to manage the wartime economy, and, in his telling, he was totally successful at it.21 The myth he peddled to gullible reporters was that he was not a bureaucrat generating paper, but rather that a park bench supposedly was his office, from where he dispensed wisdom. “Baruch was not modest about the wisdom he had to offer” and he was able to cultivate that public image because “no one was better connected in the upper reaches of the administration or the Washington press” (Lelyveld 2016, 109). He held himself out as the most credible expert to advise FDR on the defense mobilization and ultimately to be appointed as the federal economic czar. The president ostensibly consulted with Baruch for advice. But, while Roosevelt embraced Baruch in many public and private ways, he seemed wary of giving Baruch any official status. At least for the short term, the key was to pre-empt Baruch from ever criticizing the ongoing economic mobilization, if only because reporters were predisposed to assume (falsely) that Baruch was disinterested and whatever he said was right. Baruch needed to feel deference. Coy understood Baruch’s standing from both the policy and political perspectives. So, when FDR suggested on May 26 that Coy touch base with

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

107

Baruch, Coy knew the importance and delicacy of the suggestion. After the two talked (probably more accurately after Baruch lectured Coy on what he should do), Baruch sent Coy a copy of his 1921 report on American industry during WWI. “It would pay you to read as much of it as you can,” he modestly told Coy.22 Seemingly out of nowhere, perhaps even as the political equivalent of a warning shot across the bow by the navy, Baruch was in the news in the next few weeks without ever being quoted. It was news without a source, or at least no visible fingerprints. Columnist Richard Scholz praised Baruch’s WWI record as a model to be relied on for the current situation.23 The Times compared FDR’s price control proposal with how Baruch had handled it.24 The Star had two articles lauding Baruch’s precedent, with one saying that Baruch was being “mentioned” for appointment as “chairman or director of the Office for Emergency Management.”25 Behind the scenes, Coy worked on the gestation of the president’s proposed price control legislation and message to Congress. He reported back to FDR after his consultations with Baruch, Knudsen, and Hillman.26 Baruch continued being handled with kid gloves by the administration. For example, in July he had a thirty-five-minute meeting with BOB director Smith, joined by Coy and assistant director Blandford.27 Even after the price policy was finally released, Coy continued being responsive to Baruch to keep him happy and on the (political) reservation. For example, Coy took a call from Baruch in April 1942. Baruch said “he was very anxious to talk to Coy,” presumably to give his putatively sought advice on management of the economy in wartime based on his experience in WWI.28 Baruch then came down to DC, and Coy visited him at his hotel suite to hear him out.29 Henderson also further conferred with Coy and Hopkins.30 Over the next week, Coy and others reworked the proposal three times to deal with internal concerns and objections.31 Finally, on June 14, Coy submitted to Roosevelt a final draft of the bill that had been fully “revised in conjunction with OEM” agencies’ comments.32 After another round of consultations and revisions, Coy submitted a draft of the presidential message to accompany the requested legislation. He told FDR that the group had worked hard to fulfill the president’s standard rule that a message should be no longer than four pages, but failed. He lightheartedly said they had gone over that limit by nine lines.33 He then made yet additional changes and submitted a revised draft to the president on July 29.34 Now Coy’s assignment was to work with congressional leaders for early feedback and advice regarding the most propitious time to send the presidential message and introduce the bill (as two separate actions). Even

108

Get Things Moving!

this relatively simple stage of the legislative process was difficult to navigate. Reflecting his sense of the body, Speaker Rayburn told Coy that the message had to explain why the president was seeking only price controls and not also wage controls. He also suggested a proposed date for submission.35 Senator Byrnes wanted a different day. Byrnes told Coy that the message should not be sent before July 7 because the Senate had too many priority bills that it needed to complete first.36 FDR met again with Coy and Henderson on July 15 to plan the legislative strategy for the bill.37 Later that day, at his semiweekly press conference, he was asked about his meeting with them. He downplayed its importance, saying that they “made progress. That’s all. They are taking it up on the Hill. In other words, it might be called a three-cornered state of conversations” (Roosevelt 1972, 18: 31). On the eve of sending his message, Coy updated the president on the strategy of seeking to include in the bill a seemingly minor and unrelated provision as justification to refer it to House and Senate committees with chairs who were reliable. Indicating an instance of the tail wagging the dog, a relatively extraneous provision was added at the last minute to the legislation merely to have a more overt rationale for those committee referrals.38 Roosevelt finally sent his message on “stabilizing” prices on July 30, 1941 (US Congress 1941h). From this point on, Coy largely stepped back in his keen involvement. As expected, the fight over the bill was long and hard. Ten days before Pearl Harbor, the House passed a very weak version because “a militant coalition refused to grant powers over American business the Administration had deemed essential to check inflation.” It was “one of the bitterest controversies of the session” and a “crushing defeat” for the administration.39 (Congress did not finish working on the bill until after Pearl Harbor [Roosevelt 1969, 1942: 67–70].)

Liaison as Politics by Another Name The preceding subchapters describe several instances when Coy was involved in subjects that were both public policy and politics. He was also involved before Pearl Harbor in other activities that were much more explicitly political and almost entirely out of the public eye. For example, barely a month after becoming LOEM, Coy had a political assignment. On May 27, 1941, FDR was scheduled to give a radio fireside chat on the implications of the war for the US and the state of its national defenses. This was to be the president’s

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

109

speech proclaiming an unlimited state of emergency (superseding his September 1939 declaration of a limited state of emergency). Without knowing exactly what the president was going to say, Coy and several other White House aides were expected to gin up in advance of the speech statements of support by leading public officials to be released immediately afterward. The day before the speech, Coy called publisher John Cowles (including Des Moines [IA] Register, Minneapolis [MN] Star, and Look magazine) to see if he would ask Iowa’s governor to announce his support for the president after the speech. Cowles declined because the governor was preparing to run for Senate and Cowles did not want to be obligated to him by the ask.40 Richard Neustadt, regional coordinator of the Social Security Board in San Francisco, wired Coy before the speech that he expected California’s governor to be “OK” and that he had quietly obtained the cooperation of the California League of Cities to prompt mayors to release statements of support after the broadcast.41 After the speech, Coy tracked public statements of support, some of which he had generated. A letter of support by Mississippi’s governor to an OEM unit was quickly given to Coy, who forwarded it to the White House press office.42 The regional defense coordinator in Boston wired Coy the morning after the speech that Boston newspapers reported Massachusetts Governor Saltonstall issuing a statement to the press calling on every citizen to do his or her part.43 The next day, he followed up with more positive comments by Saltonstall in a speech as well as the approval of FDR’s speech by Sumner Sewall, Republican governor of Maine.44 The day after the fireside chat, the director of the Social Security Board office in Texas wrote Coy to update him on how Texas Governor W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel, a conservative Democratic and consistent opponent of the New Deal, had dealt with FDR’s speech. A primary for a vacant US Senate seat was scheduled for late June, and the two main contenders were O’Daniel and Congressman Lyndon Johnson, a strong supporter of the New Deal. O’Daniel, to everyone’s surprise, spoke on statewide radio the afternoon before the speech to encourage all Texans to listen to it. The next day, O’Daniel again spoke on a statewide radio hookup and endorsed the president’s leadership. During that broadcast, he also criticized isolationist Senator Burton Wheeler for Wheeler’s postspeech comments continuing his opposition to the president’s national defense policies.45 Coy shared with Rowe the surprising news that even O’Daniel was trying to soften his image as a consistent critic of FDR’s, evidently to deny Johnson a major campaign theme. Coy and Rowe chortled about it. Coy said it showed that O’Daniel

110

Get Things Moving!

“is not dumb politically,” and Rowe replied, “No dope, he!”46 They decided to share a copy with Johnson, whom they were, of course, hoping would win. Coy also played another role in trying to help Johnson beat O’Daniel in the primary. As part of his campaign platform, LBJ was trying to undermine O’Daniel’s strong support from senior citizens who liked his platform of old-age pensions (a la Huey Long). Several White House aides, including Coy, participated in drafting a presidential letter to Johnson stating Roosevelt’s general support for Johnson’s approach to achieving this and inviting Johnson to come to the White House to talk to him further about it.47 (Johnson lost the June 28 primary to O’Daniel by a very small margin, possibly because of ballot stuffing.) Politics of the Production Buildup: Who Should Be in Charge? What Were the Facts? One of the long-running anti-Roosevelt political narratives of the prewar and wartime era was that there was a “mess” in Washington and that FDR was mismanaging the organization of the armament production effort.48 This was a sly attack line, if only because whatever the factual situation, critics could always argue that it was not good enough and that it—whatever the “it” was that day (it kept changing)—was FDR’s fault. In particular, there was an elementary issue of power embedded in the attacks. Conservatives, being pro-business and anti–New Deal, said that the industrial mobilization should be run by industrialists and that those business CEOs were the only ones who knew how to do it. They claimed that FDR should appoint a czar to run the economy and such a person should come from big business. Also, that in a time of a defense mobilization, social gains and labor rights would have to be delayed to give industrial and business managers the unfettered power to get the job done. Woven into the critique was a pro-military stance. Give the military whatever it said it needed (which included an economic czar), with, again, FDR essentially stepping aside (Lee 2005, chap. 4). Roosevelt absolutely refused on all counts. He insisted he could not delegate his constitutional powers as chief executive, that there must be civilian oversight of the military, that the production effort should be under his direct supervision, that social gains should not be lost because of the mobilization, and that he had the power and right to keep adjusting the structure of the economic emergency agencies based on changing circumstances. One of the fronts of this ideological battle had to do with

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

111

the control of OEM and its key subunits, such as OPM. A conservative columnist condensed the issue with a vivid personalization of the larger political argument: The OEM Liaison Officer is an entirely new position and was created by Roosevelt to prevent the production management bureau [OPM] from exercising greater power. This late appointment really puts the inexperienced Coy in a more important position than William Knudsen occupies. Why? Well, Knudsen has vast experience, knows his business and attends to it without running to the white house to discuss every daily detail. That does not please Roosevelt; therefore he appoints this socialistic dreamer—a second and weaker Harry Hopkins—to shuttle back and forth and bring the news to papa and receive instruction, and then go back and interfere.49 From that side of the political mirror, FDR participating in OPM decision making was interference. One of the leaders of this bloc in the Senate was Harry Byrd Sr. (D-VA). A longtime small government conservative, in 1937–39 he had led the opposition to the implementation of the Brownlow Committee report (Lee 2016, 50). Then, in the fall of 1940, during the presidential campaign, Byrd attacked FDR’s armament buildup, stating that with all the spending on aircraft production, only 343 combat planes had been delivered. Maybe Congress should create a committee to oversee the defense effort, comparable to the one created in the Civil War? The attack got wide coverage. FDR defused the potency of the attack by noting that at this stage of the defense expansion, what was needed were training planes for pilot training, not combat planes. Byrd’s “actual figures were correct and the implication was dead wrong,” he said. This successfully deflated a potential campaign issue (Lee 2012, 37–39). Now, a year later, Byrd tried again. Beginning in June, he began releasing statistics questioning the happy news coming from the administration on the production effort.50 Citing statistics about the modest amount of armaments manufactured since then, he said the effort so far was falling far short of what was needed, including Lend-Lease supplies to the UK. Byrd called for reorganizing the defense production system to be under a single powerful director, that social gains must yield at least temporarily to national defense, and that labor rights, such as the forty-hour workweek,

112

Get Things Moving!

should be suspended.51 FDR again tried to bat down the accusations with facts of his own, trying to document that Byrd’s basic assertions about productions levels were wrong. While this was playing out publicly and politically, behind the scenes Coy had an unwelcome message for FDR and Hopkins (his mentor), head of Lend-Lease. Coy said that Byrd was generally right about his statistics and that the internal data provided to FDR were not. In terms of airplane production, there is “an alarming lag in production of bombers and fighters. . . . We are falling farther and farther behind our production schedules.” For antiaircraft guns, “the situation is almost as critical as Senator Byrd stated.” For tank production, “it is likely that both present and scheduled production will prove to be inadequate in view of the great quantity of tanks needed to equip our own forces and those of Britain and Russia.”52 Hopkins was furious and sent Coy a “blunt note” questioning Coy’s figures and saying that FDR “should not be annoyed with such flawed reports.” Coy would not back down. He sent his legal team back to double-check the figures with the chief statistician at OPM. The researcher said Coy got it wrong—that the figures in Coy’s memo were still too high, especially for four-engine bombers delivered to the UK. It was not merely a very small number, the source said, it was zero (Parrish 2010, 61). The president asked Rosenman to look into the in-house controversy. Rosenman told Coy that the burden was on Coy to prove to Hopkins and Knudsen that Coy’s figures were right. Unapologetically, Coy stood by his figures, with the exception of correcting (down) his airplane stats.53 Roosevelt passed it on to Hopkins with a dictated note: “Do you want to take this up?”54 Coy stood by his updated (and even lower) figures.55 Trying to move beyond the controversy, in the fall he sent FDR a bigger-picture memo emphasizing the importance of an all-out production effort as opposed to one still trying to minimize the impact on the civilian and consumer economy.56 A year later, a reporter wrote that as a result of this unwelcome role within the administration, Coy’s job was at risk and that “he went deep into the dog-house for a while.”57 When Coy was on a family trip to Indiana in August 1941, the White House operator tracked him down. Her message was that FDR wanted to talk to him as soon as possible. Coy guessed he was about to get fired or demoted because of the controversy (Milton 1943, 1–2). (He was not. The president wanted to give him the urgent assignment about expediting aid to the USSR [chap. 4].) Coy gradually restored his good standing, especially when his statistics and larger message that production needed to be ramped up further were confirmed over the subsequent months.

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

113

Politics and Management: Dollar-a-Year Men The phenomenon of businessmen joining the federal war effort for a salary of one dollar a year is sometimes associated with American participation in WWII. That is incorrect. By June 1941, there were several hundred dollar-a-year men at OPM.58 A listing of where they had worked before coming to OPM indicates how much corporate America by this time was in the thick of the production mobilization (US House 1941d, 865–76). These businessmen, the right argued, were experts in their particular silo of the private marketplace, whether it be transportation, energy generation, commodities, manufacturing, and so on. Therefore, they could greatly assist in the war effort by using their expertise, and, even better, they would be free to the taxpayer. New Dealers were much more skeptical about the finger of big business being put on one side of the scale during a wartime political economy. If someone could afford to work for free, that meant they were already wealthy. What inherent values would they bring with them into government service? Would these men be objective and balanced, even toward those they competed against during their corporate years? Would their decisions while in government be slanted to protect the corporations they would likely be returning to after the war? For example, Robert Horton, head of OEM’s Division of Information, was convinced from his experience that the dollar-a-year men were anti-FDR in their politics and engaged in self-serving activities for their companies while in government. Horton’s only exception to that generalization was Knudsen. Horton felt he was an authentic patriot and did not make decisions favoring GM over other car companies while heading OPM (Lee 2012, 186). The president did not want to fight that battle.59 If, as he argued, the US faced a national defense crisis (even though short of a declared war), then should the federal government not welcome the assistance of all patriots volunteering to serve? After starting with men from big business he had already appointed as NDAC commissioners, he was not in a position to draw the line there. And if politically the presence of dollar-a-year men helped generate support for the prewar mobilization effort, then all the better. Perhaps their work would help muffle a bit the seemingly permanent blare of criticism from the conservative coalition in Congress, business, and newspaper owners. So, shortly after NDAC became active, dollar-a-year men began appearing on the OEM staff. FDR’s major concern was political: he did not want any rabid Roosevelt haters to become dollar-a-year men. He understood that

114

Get Things Moving!

almost all businessmen were Republicans and had likely opposed him in 1932, 1936, and 1940. Fair enough. But he felt that a few had crossed a line beyond acceptable bounds of political disagreement and he wanted to veto them. Also, he did not want any appointments that would be politically embarrassing because of, say, previous tangles with the law. Therefore, initially he kept very close control over these appointments, requiring that he have the final say on who got approved and who did not. However, Roosevelt’s personal involvement was not motivated simply by political considerations; it also was required by law. The First Supplemental National Appropriation Act of 1940, which went into effect in June 1940, required him to do so for all “$1 per annum” appointments.60 Only ten days after Coy became LOEM, there were loud complaints from OPM about the long delays caused by the need to clear every name with the president. Coy promised to try to speed up the paperwork by suggesting that for every vacancy, OPM submit several names of acceptable men for each slot. Then, if Roosevelt vetoed one candidate in particular, it would not hold up the process or force it to start over again. The president likely would find at least one name among several who would be acceptable to him. Coy also conferred with Rowe, who generally handled such political matters, about speeding up the process.61 Rowe said he needed a week to ten days to “clear their men” by gathering information on the background and politics of the nominees. Rowe did not think he could speed that up. But he conceded that sometimes, after clearing the names and submitting them to FDR, the papers sat on the president’s desk for a long time: “I know of no cure for this, since I hate to ‘high-pressure’ him on such a minor matter. I have done so on the last two lists and it is quite a task.”62 The public’s impression that these men were indeed only being paid a dollar a year was inaccurate. They qualified for federal per diems for their daily living expenses, then set at ten dollars a day. After Coy was asked about this by the House Appropriations Committee, he was quite surprised when he eventually got the answers to his follow-up effort to collect accurate information about it. It turned out that 90 percent of OPM’s 200 dollara-year appointees were applying for per diem reimbursements. Somewhat oddly, only 30 percent of the dollar-a-year appointees in all the other OEM agencies requested per diems. Coy flagged this for Rowe in the White House in case it became a touchy subject politically.63 During the late summer and fall of 1941, there continued to be bumps and skirmishes in the politics and management of the dollar-a-year program. OEM personnel expert Lyle Belsley suggested that Coy centralize

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

115

all offers to serve as dollar-a-year men into the CAS personnel office.64 CAS head Sherwood complained that an OGR booklet for newcomers to federal service (including dollar-a-yearers) did not list CAS as the locale for management service functions in OEM agencies.65 Coy complained to La Guardia about a newspaper column mentioning someone as a dollar-a-year man at OCD whose name Coy had never submitted to FDR. La Guardia scribbled a note back on Coy’s memo that the person “has not been appointed to anything yet. We are only surveying a situation. More later.”66 Trying to get a more broad-based handle on the status of the program, Coy pointed out to Sherwood that a CAS list of dollar-a-year men did not fully correspond to the list of names approved by the president. Some of the supposedly approved appointments had never been submitted to FDR. What the heck was going on? The law required that the president approve every appointment. Coy guessed part of it might be errors in personnel files between dollar-a-yearers and WOCs.67 The politics of presidential oversight of dollar-a-year appointments came to a boiling point in late September. Rowe strongly protested to Coy that OPM had announced the appointment of Lessing Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck to head its conservation division before submitting the name to the White House.68 This was at least the second time it had happened. The same thing occurred when Arthur Bunker of Lehman Brothers was appointed head of OPM’s aluminum and magnesium section before FDR’s okay. In Bunker’s case, making appearances even worse, according to the Chicago Tribune, Bunker’s salary—continuing to be paid by Lehman while he would be at OPM—was a staggering sixty thousand dollars a year, and all the while Lehman continued as one of ALCOA’s major bankers.69 Rowe said that: I have explained to the President that embarrassment is a necessary contingent if such publication is made by OPM before Presidential approval. I also wish to point out that this sort of thing is extremely embarrassing to the White House. . . . Such publicity by OPM practically forces the President to approve its candidates.70 Several weeks later, FDR signed off on the appointment.71 But Roosevelt tired not only of the sheer paperwork, but also of the political risks in approving or disapproving nominees. On October 30, he delegated the authority to approve most dollar-a-year appointments to heads

116

Get Things Moving!

of major agencies, including Coy. The president’s eagerness to get out from under this political and legal role is apparent in his letter of delegation. He wrote that “in an informal opinion, the Attorney General has told me” that the law permitted a president to make such a delegation.72 For FDR to act on such a flimsy legal basis (not even in writing!) conveys how strongly he wanted to do this. Upon receiving FDR’s letter, Coy in turn asked CAS to develop a standard procedure for reviewing all nominations from smaller OEM agencies, including clearing the person’s standing with the IRS and a background investigation from the FBI or other qualified federal investigative units.73 Coy then informed heads of these smaller OEM agencies of the new procedure for nominating such appointments, that is, forwarding them after IRS and FBI clearances to the CAS personnel office, and that he would then have the final say on those nominations.74 (By then it was only three and a half weeks before Pearl Harbor.)

Coy’s Partisan Activities Coy held several unofficial political portfolios. In general, he was expected to promote the best political interests of the president, including cooperating with the national Democratic Party, patronage appointments, and keeping an eye on politics in his home state of Indiana. Democratic Party Generally, Coy closely monitored party politics. For example, in the spring of 1941, he updated FDR on the fratricide in Ohio’s Democratic Party, saying it was “a hell of a mess.” There were two party factions there, each with a headquarters office and grassroots supporters, each claiming to be the authentic Ohio Democratic Party, and each hating the other and refusing to cooperate or reconcile. Unless the factionalism could be overcome, the party would not be able to recruit an attractive candidate for governor in 1942, thus assuring the party’s defeat and reelection of Republican John Bricker. Given the importance that Ohio had in presidential elections, this would then affect the chances of Democrats winning in 1944. Coy suggested a relatively byzantine maneuver of offering a federal job to the current state party chair (who was in one of the two factions). Then a leading Democrat who was in neither faction could be named as the new state party chair,

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

117

thus beginning a gradual reuniting of the party. Coy asked FDR if he should pursue this scenario. “OK,” FDR wrote back on Coy’s memo.75 On another occasion, a Democratic congressman from Connecticut was upset about the impact of the defense emergency mobilization on his district. He felt that OPM’s priorities system of controlling and diverting key commodities for military use was detrimental to the small businesses in his district. How could they stay in business without raw materials? He had a fallback position: if they no longer could get the raw materials they routinely used, then how about making sure they received subcontracts from the large defense contractors? The main thing was to keep constituents happy, for local businesses to continue to make a profit, and for employees to keep good-paying jobs. To defend himself from any potential political precariousness associated with the situation, the congressman told a local newspaper that he had been “conferring” with Coy, who was the senior presidential aide responsible for dealing with these concerns. The congressman said he had “insisted” to Coy that this problem had to be addressed.76 In terms of politics, Coy understood the importance of making a Democratic politician look good back home so the congressman could stay in Washington and keep voting for administration policies. On another occasion, Coy and Rowe were in touch about a vacancy on the Maritime Commission. One person under consideration was Oscar Chapman, then the assistant secretary of the interior. Coy reminded Rowe that Chapman’s long-term goal was to run for governor of Colorado. Therefore, Chapman would welcome serving on the Maritime Commission because “he wants to get into the middle of the defense picture” to have that credential for his eventual political campaign.77 Coy was often the intermediary trying sincerely to find jobs in the executive branch for New Deal Democrats or others recommended by the Democratic National Committee (DNC). For example, in May he urged OPM Secretary Herbert Emmerich to consider hiring someone recommended by Oscar Ewing, then DNC vice chairman.78 A staffer at the DNC office in Washington wrote a strong letter of protest about how recommendations from the party for qualified people to be hired in OEM were being treated disrespectfully by CAS’s personnel office. They were supposedly told to leave their resume with a mere secretary and, if interested, would be contacted back. DNC suggestions should be given priority, he argued, for all of the non–civil service jobs throughout OEM.79 On another occasion, the Democratic committeewoman from Ohio wondered why the administration had given a job to someone she did not approve of. Coy checked. He reported

118

Get Things Moving!

back that the person was “a damn good lawyer, a real liberal and a supporter of the President’s policies.”80 Case closed. Sometimes he was obliged to respond with bad news about placing people in federal jobs. When Indiana Congressman Ludlow (a pro-FDR ally of Coy’s [chap. 2]) asked Coy to help someone get a job specifically at OCD, Coy had to reply that he could not. “I find it quite difficult to place any one with the Office of Civilian Defense,” in part because La Guardia (and, impliedly, Mrs. Roosevelt) was concentrating on staffing as much of the agency as possible with volunteers and probably also because of the general managerial chaos at OCD due to La Guardia’s scattershot and whirlwind style.81 Indiana Politics As a native of the state, Coy was expected to pay special attention to Indiana politics. For example, Coy and Rowe strategized about how to be sure that the vacancy for the Federal Housing Administration’s Indiana state director would be filled by a Democrat and pro-FDR person. Coy suggested that Rowe get Roosevelt to ask the agency to notify him when such a vacancy occurred. Then FDR could suggest whom the agency should appoint. Coy was particularly concerned about an apolitical appointment, a person who “will not be any help from an organizational point of view.” It was important to fill the vacancy with a party activist who was also “a loyal Roosevelt supporter.” Otherwise, politically, “there will be hell to pay in the good old Hoosier state.”82 Coy’s political antenna picked up some potential side benefits to the governor of Indiana’s trip to Newport News, Virginia, to dedicate the USS Indiana. How about inviting the governor to have a short visit with Roosevelt if the governor drops by the White House when he comes through town? After all, Governor Schricker “is giving real support to the President in a state that has long been regarded as a stronghold of isolationists.” A publicized meeting with FDR “would greatly strengthen the Governor’s hand in his support of the Administration in Indiana.” Even better, how about inviting the governor to stay overnight at the White House?83 FDR was not sure if he would be in town on the day of the dedication but “would like for Mr. Coy to bring this matter to his attention later.”84 Coy followed up a few weeks later when it looked like Roosevelt would be in DC that day, but apparently the meeting never took place.85 On another occasion, during a paralyzing coal strike by the United Mine Workers, Coy told FDR about the potential for a breakthrough that

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

119

could be had in Indiana. Indiana’s labor commissioner, an acquaintance from Coy’s years in Indiana state government, called Coy. He said he thought at least 75 percent of Indiana’s coal miners would go back to work if the president made a personal appeal to them based on the needs of the defense emergency and an assurance that their working conditions would remain the same as before.86 Roosevelt shared Coy’s memo with the secretary of war,87 but never acted on the suggestion because the strike was settled a few days later. As LOEM, Coy often had correspondence with people in Indiana seeking national defense spending in the state. A friend who was high up in the Indiana Democratic Party asked Coy to direct some defense housing construction to occur in Indiana. Coy checked the specifics of the request and replied that a Kentucky plant across the river from Indiana did not employ a large enough workforce to justify new housing construction. Furthermore, Congress limited funding to fulfill significant housing shortages strictly related to defense production, not housing shortages per se. But he promised to follow up personally about the friend’s other suggestions regarding need for defense housing construction in Terre Haute and Muncie to see if they were justifiable.88 James Adams, a banker, chair of Indiana’s Highway Commission, and businessman, asked Coy to help with his application for a production contract for a factory he owned. Coy replied with detailed instructions on what conditions needed to be met to qualify on the priorities system for a contract. He apologized, saying that “you may feel this answer is dictated by unnecessary Government red tape, but I can assure you that” this was not the case. The requirements were necessary because of “the tightness in machine tools.” Coy diligently continued trying to assist him, but it was a chicken and egg situation. Adams wanted business for an empty factory, but the federal government could not seriously consider giving him a production contract without the factory already having the machinery to produce a specific product that it wanted and that was high on the priorities list.89 A milling company executive urged that a new egg-drying plant be located in southern Indiana. Coy then “made a thorough investigation” of the suggestion. The results were not encouraging or helpful because of other nearby facilities and the requirement that any new large facility be strategically located. Conveying a sense of the impact of the large increase in national defense employment and its concomitant good-paying jobs, he wrote: “I know of literally hundreds of agricultural communities that are complaining now that the defense projects are robbing the farms of labor,

120

Get Things Moving!

creating false standards of living, and disrupting community life. If I learn of any projects of a defense agricultural nature which could be located in Greensburg, I will certainly keep you in mind and I have advised . . . the Office of Agricultural Defense Relations of my interest.”90 Another incident captured the mixed politics of defense spending. The federal government authorized Du Pont to build a $55 million ordnance plant in a rural area in Indiana. Coy thought it was a good idea, especially because that area “long has represented one of the worst spots in the United States so far as unemployment and relief is concerned.” The local Chamber of Commerce was delighted by all the new, good-paying jobs that would be coming. But farmers, who would be losing their lands to the plant site (see earlier subchapter on property seizure legislation), were protesting vehemently. While understanding and sympathizing with the farmers, Coy nonetheless emphasized that “I am sure that the assets far outweigh the liabilities” of the project.91 Coy’s relatively active involvement in Indiana Democratic politics led to his being promoted as a potential candidate for governor.92 He did not take it too seriously, and it never went further than newspaper mentions.

Promoting the Administration’s Defense Policy Coy understood that serving as a senior administration officer included being a public figure, in particular giving speeches to advocate for FDR’s policies. While the audiences for such speeches were relatively modest, the potential for press coverage of them could extend his and the administration’s voice significantly. In June 1941, Coy was the commencement speaker at his alma mater, Franklin College in Indiana. He compared the postwar mood of the country in the 1920s when he was an undergrad with current times. Coy recalled the shared attitude “that from then on we would mind our own business—and that we would never again get mixed up in other people’s wars. We now know that it was a mistake to expect that we could have a good peace just by winning the war. We expected too much and quit too soon. Instead of working for peace we contented ourselves with talking against war.”93 This attitude would no longer work, he said. The continuing assumption that the US could avoid war or aggression simply by maintaining the isolationist status quo was “the narcotic delusion of security” (3). At the very least, the US needed to greatly enhance its defenses and, if absolutely necessary, engage in war to protect its democracy. This justification for the produc-

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

121

tion mobilization was having an increasing impact on everyday life. There would be tax increases, there would be scarcity of consumer goods, and men would have to serve in the military. Fundamentally, Americans needed “the ability to sacrifice national complacency” (6). Some people were against tax increases that would affect them. Others thought that the government could afford the defense production effort only if it “sacrificed some of its recent progressive measures” (6). Coy bluntly said that “whether we can build a military machine adequate to win the war depends upon about ability to expand production” (9). But, at the same time, success could only be defined by “our ability to equalize the burden of the defense program and assure to all our people minimal economic security” (9). He was not arguing for guns and butter, but rather for guns while maintaining the New Deal’s social gains. After all, even in a defense production mobilization there will still be “aged and retired workers, too old to work and having no means of their own. Widowed mothers will still be confronted with the problem of rearing their children in decency and health” (9–10). He concluded with a pointedly striking statement that under current conditions “it seems necessary to carry a gun in one hand and our faith in democracy in the other” (10). His speech apparently received a tepid response from students and professors. Conversations he had with faculty during the visit were in the same unenthusiastic vein. A few weeks later, Coy wrote a friend who was involved in higher education that he was “considerably disturbed about the viewpoint of college professors. . . . It seemed to me that they all believed that the virtues of democracy are a sufficient protection, which seems to me to be terribly unrealistic. I can see their opposition to war, but when we come to a situation in which a madman is loose in the world [and] armed to the teeth,” then active defense and perhaps even war had to be acceptable options.94 Whether for self-interested reasons (such as not wanting to be drafted) or philosophical ones about war, before Pearl Harbor, campuses were not gung ho about the national defense mobilization, actively defending democracy, or engaging in concrete actions to stand up to antidemocratic dictators. Coy’s speech got no press coverage outside Indiana, even though OEM’s Division of Information (DOI) issued the full text of it to the Washington press corps in the form of a press release.95 However, his message did get through in a roundabout way. A few weeks later, a national news service quoted him as saying that “the kind and degree of sacrifice necessary for defense has not yet been fully realized . . . The population has been slow to appreciate the meaning of defense.”96

122

Get Things Moving!

In October, Coy continued his public speaking in an effort to explain the rationale of administration policies and encourage support for them from his direct audiences and by reaching indirect audiences in print. He spoke to the Washington [DC] Council of Social Agencies to emphasize that even with the expansion of federal social service programs, citizens still needed the assistance of local government agencies and nonprofits. In particular, the capital was being flooded by new federal employees and men in uniform. They, in turn, were causing shortages in housing, recreation, and medical care. Basing his comments on “the tradition of Jane Addams,” Coy urged his audience to up their game and encouraged an increase in volunteerism to deal with the rise in social service needs.97 The Post and Star both covered his speech with long excerpts and a photo.98 Later in October, Coy went on an out-of-town swing to speak at social welfare conferences in Kentucky and Indiana and at a student convocation at Indiana University.99 At the two conferences of social workers, he restated his earlier themes about the importance of social work during the defense emergency, the need for all to expect sacrifices, and the importance of volunteers. Building on that, Coy struck two new themes: First, the importance of civic morale. He criticized in particular that “the question of morale has tended to be obscured by the sort of recrimination and buck-passing that tries to fix the blame rather than analyze the cause.” Social workers understood the need of “analyzing what lies back of attitudes,” but other citizens often did not. He hoped the profession would lead the way in a positive and constructive response to problems related to morale (Coy 1941b, 3). His second point was that the US might be able to participate in defeating fascism without declaring war. Coy said, “I do not agree with those who feel that this nation will find its full moral stature only if we enter upon a shooting war” (15). This very much reflected Roosevelt’s thinking, such as his active support for the UK, USSR, and China while refusing any commitment to declare war. In other words, Coy was saying that the current national defense emergency needed to have the same kind of active public support and patriotism that would be generated by a declared war. The Associated Press moved on its national wire a short story about his speech, though it received little coverage.100

Promoting the Profession of Public Administration During the same trip, Coy spoke to students at Indiana University. His theme was the importance of the profession and practice of public admin-

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

123

istration during the defense emergency. Given that he was speaking to a lay audience,101 he provided a grand overview of what government management was like and what it needed to be, and he invited the men in the audience to join this patriotic effort. He said that “the influence and the prestige of public administration has enormously increased” (1941c, 114). For assisting the national defense mobilization, he downplayed ideological differences that mangers were now bringing into government: “If our public administrators are to help the United States through the tangles that lie ahead, it will not matter a whit whether they are ‘New Dealers’ or ‘business men’ ” (115). Nonetheless, a bit backhandedly, he did raise a concern about those business administrators who were now entering government: “Public administration in this time of great peril cannot be conducted by minds which are prisoners of the balance sheet” (115). In the same vein, he quietly complimented managers who had recent governmental experience: “I think that the work of public administration has been the best teacher and the best preparation for the enormously complex tasks involved in the defense program” (116). Coy did not spare current public administrators from criticism. Some viewed government service merely as “preparation for the easy and lucrative rewards of a professional career in the service of private interests.” Others suffered from “power complexes and jurisdictional avarice.” In particular, he criticized managers who “aspire to be the slot-machines of government, refusing to perform until someone higher up inserts a coin of specific direction and command” (115). While not using the terminology, he was attacking the public administration orthodoxy of a policy-administration dichotomy, of passive civil servants who merely executed what others told them to do. In general, he called for public administrators to focus on solving problems, no matter how unorthodox their solutions (such as the TVA), and making sure that their solutions were in the public interest. He invited the men in his audience to consider entering government service upon graduation: “More apparent every day is the importance of trained public men who understand” the complex functions of government (116). Coy also addressed the claims that the larger the federal bureaucracy, the greater the threat to freedom and democracy. No, a large centralized government would not inevitably lead to tyranny as in Germany, Italy, and Russia, he said. To keep raising this argument would only “carry us into the camp of those defeatists” (117). Rather, public administration and democracy could easily coexist in harmony. For example, public administrators had to be open-minded about public criticisms of their work, and government

124

Get Things Moving!

agencies needed to engage in more public relations activities to report on their records and accomplishments. Coy concluded by saying that the public generally deserved “intelligent leadership from all the forces in our national life,” but in particular that for government to succeed, it needed management that “recognizes the public character of its responsibility” (117). It was a clarion call of the importance of public administration in the national defense mobilization and the invitation to the men in universities to join the cause. Coy’s October campus speech was considered of such importance that it was published in the biweekly issue of Vital Speeches of the Day (1941c). His themes resonated. A few weeks after the speech, Coy made the same points in a lengthy interview with a Scripps-Howard reporter.102 After Pearl Harbor, the speech took on a greater relevance. The day after Congress declared war, a senator inserted the full text in the Congressional Record.103 Later that month, a nine-paragraph excerpt was reprinted in the Christian Science Monitor.104

News Media As a former newspaper reporter and editor, Coy understood better than some of his public administration peers the importance of being available when reporters called to talk to him, whether for spot news stories or features. He viewed the press as an indirect channel for promoting understanding of, and support for, FDR. Media relations was a useful, if hazardous, political and policy activity. Coy’s record appears to indicate that he was not as much of a publicity hound as some other senior administration officers, such as McNutt. Also, it did not seem that he routinely or frequently leaked information anonymously to promote or oppose a policy. Instead, for him media relations was simply part of the price of public service. As already recounted, he received press coverage for some of his specific activities in spot news articles and columns as a policy explainer or policy participant. Coy was also sometimes profiled in newspapers and magazines as a senior and influential administration figure who was not well known to news consumers. Some news outlets seemed to like him on a relatively consistent basis. Not willing to cater to its readership’s visceral opposition to FDR, the monthly Nation’s Business twice praised his competence. In June 1941, columnist Herbert Corey wrote that with Coy’s LOEM appointment, “he may bring some sort of order into a situation that has been unsatisfactory

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

125

to every one. He is reputed to be that kind of man.”105 The next month, Corey wrote that Coy seemed to confirm those expectations—that he was “knocking the team into form. He is tough, fast and imperative without being noisy.”106 The gossipy and largely pro–New Deal “Washington MerryGo-Round” column by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen also liked Coy. In July 1941 they awarded him their “brass ring” because of his “meteoric rise” to be “one of the ablest and most conscientious new deal executives.”107 In October, they described him as “the energetic chief ” of OEM.108 Time magazine also seemed to like him. It gave him positive credit for framing the OCD executive order (chap. 4) and for standing by his figures on armament production and being right (see earlier discussion of the politics of the production buildup). In July 1941, it described him as “now rapidly becoming President Roosevelt’s No. 1 trouble-shooter.”109 Jerry Kluttz, the Post’s daily columnist for news of interest to federal employees, generally liked Coy and usually referred to him positively. For example, in the fall of 1941, he described Coy as “the smoothly functioning White House attache.”110 Coy got his share of critical coverage. For example, his appointment as LOEM was greeted largely by negative commentary (chap. 3). A few weeks before Pearl Harbor, Newsweek said that as LOEM, Coy had failed at coordinating OEM agencies and therefore “now does miscellaneous tasks.”111 Fortune wrote that “the most glaring weakness in our chart” of the defense organization was the leadership of OEM, with Coy listed in that box.112 United States News said that Coy “is without power to decide basic issues of policy or to deal with personality conflicts.”113 These oneshot criticisms were somewhat counterbalanced by one-off compliments. New Republic described him as “becoming one of the most important men in the administration.”114 Paul Mallon, usually a conservative critic of the administration, wrote in one column that Coy “enjoys a reputation at the White House for aptitude in organization.”115 There were also some feature profiles of Coy, usually complimentary. He was the subject of one of a long-running series of profiles called “Did You Happen to See—” in the Washington Times-Herald by Inga Arvad. She said that his role as “being the eyes, ears and legs for the President is a 24-hour job.”116 A profile in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch described him as a prodigy and the “boy wonder from Indiana.”117 An editorial in another Missouri newspaper repeated those characterizations and said he was “capable and safe in his advice.”118 Another positive profile called him the “surprise package” of the emergency mobilization, seemingly emerging out of nowhere

126

Get Things Moving!

and even now “still a mystery.” He was a “human ferret” (this was meant as a compliment) rushing around the city for meetings and conferences. In particular, the reporter praised his low-key management style, the opposite of the stereotype of a dictatorial bureaucrat or self-important business pooh-bah.119 In November, a feature writer for AP called Coy one of the “capable performers on the administration’s big 1941 squad.”120 Perhaps as a humorous signal that he had become something of a prominent public figure, he was part of a newspaper’s weekly quiz on recent events. Who “is director of the Office for Emergency Management”? Options for readers were Wayne Coy, William Knudsen, or Leon Henderson.121 Coy tried to be philosophical about the ups and downs of press coverage. A friend in Indiana wrote to compliment him on a positive newspaper article he had seen in a local paper. Coy replied that, “being human, I always like to hear the good things. I might add that I hear plenty of the bad as well.” He self-deprecatingly joked that perhaps some of the positive coverage from the capital press corps was due to his also having been a reporter.122

Family Coy and his spouse, Grace, were a political team. She did not work outside the home, but when volunteering opted for projects that reinforced his role and standing in the administration. Before the emergency mobilization, Mrs. Coy had volunteered at the research committee of the DNC’s women’s division.123 It will be recalled that in December 1940, Mrs. Roosevelt had invited the two of them to dine with her at the White House before going to a concert (chap. 2). That represented a signal of Coy’s importance in the administration and Mrs. Coy’s concomitant rising status in society. In August 1941, the front page of the society section of Sunday’s Star had a photo spread of four important women in DC society, all wives of men active in the administration or military. Grace Coy was among them.124 The next month, the Washington Times-Herald featured her as the “Beauty of the Week.” She was “alert and vivacious, bubbling over with interests of her own,” including reading detective stories even though all the while she “runs a household beautifully.” Continuing to link her activities with her husband’s role, she now volunteered six days a week at OCD. There she was “in charge of the Keysort filing system. This is the miraculous card catalogue ‘put and take’ that enables her and her 30 some workers to find in a jiffy exactly the right person for a specific task.” However, she eschewed

Coy as LOEM before the War: Politics

127

publicity, just like her spouse, who was “one of those busy, bright, young men who are supersecretaries and assistants to the President.”125 They were a power couple. Perhaps it is surprising how much Coy was involved in politics. Would that disqualify him from the definition of being a public administrator? This chapter suggests that anyone involved at the senior levels of government management is always involved in politics to some extent. In Coy’s case, the context of making public policy, engaging with Congress to pass legislation, and explaining administration policies to the public through speeches and media coverage were all mere extensions of being a public administrator. That he violated the orthodoxy distinguishing between public administration and politics is probably something of a reality check on the very normative framework of what good public administration is. In sophisticated economic modeling, economics professors sometimes joke that while something may work in practice, it does not in theory. If that is the case regarding Coy, then what works in the real world of public administration practice needs to be harmonized with any academic model of what public administration comprises, not vice versa.

6

Coy as LOEM before the War Management, April–December 1941

Based on Coy’s title of liaison officer and the way he described his role as merely a conduit linking the president with OEM agencies, one would not expect a review of Coy’s managerial work as LOEM to be extensive. However, an examination of his work documents activities that would surely be defined as associated with management, even if not perfectly aligning with the scope of work of a senior public administrator sitting as boss atop a traditional hierarchical government bureau. Coy found other, lower-profile ways to do just about everything one would associate with direct public administration.

Coy Talks about Management to a Management Audience As discussed in the introduction, Coy viewed himself as a professional public administrator and identified with the emerging profession’s new association for practitioners and faculty. The American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) was founded in December 1940 while Coy was transitioning from FSA assistant administrator to a more senior role in FDR’s third term (chap. 3). An indication of this orientation was the speech he gave to a student convocation on the importance of public administration in a democracy, especially when mobilizing against enemies of democracy (chap. 5). That speech was to a lay audience, and therefore Coy focused on general themes of interest to the public at large. That was not the only time he addressed an audience about public administration. In the fall of 1941, he also gave a talk to an audience of professional managers at a meeting of the Washington chapter of the Society 129

130

Get Things Moving!

for Advancement of Management.1 This gave him an opportunity to explain in more detail his philosophy of government management. While the two speeches had some overlapping points (and a few identical paragraphs), this speech contained elements that were not in his talk to the students. He saw the role of public administrators as “turning the enormous facilities of our peacetime nation overnight to the tasks of war; and then the job of somehow somersaulting this great machinery” back to a peacetime economy, all the while maintaining basic democratic freedoms (1941d, 145). To deal realistically with those problems, Coy denounced the lazy clichés of politics and the commentariat. For example, he praised a Walter Lippmann column that questioned the media’s obsession with the number of businessmen versus New Dealers on a defense production board. Lippmann asked if it would make much of a difference if, say, a seven-member board was 4–3 or 3–4? Coy agreed, saying “that sort of meaningless nosecounting [sic] can only serve to becloud and befog.” These were “spongy labels.” What excellent managers of any background needed was “a freshness of view, a lift of imagination, and a comprehension of fundamentals.” In particular, the excellent public administrator for the times had to be “disinterested” (146). Coy emphasized that there was nothing wrong with representative administration when the formal makeup of a government body required individuals from specific backgrounds, such as business, labor, and agriculture. But, ultimately, final decisions had to be made by disinterested leaders. This characteristic, Coy argued, could only be found in professional public administrators whose job—in war as well as in peace— “requires primarily the ability to judge accurately and fairly” the array of interests being advocated. In that respect, “the tasks and technique of public administration . . . of national defense are for the most part just like those of peacetime government, only more so” (147). Coy also denounced the “nonsense” being advocated publicly that somehow the number of guns and planes and other needed products “would sprout like weeds if only a oneman director with powers of omniscience were put in charge.” Increasing production levels were “large problems [that] require the consultation and co-operation of many organizations and agencies.” The solution could only be “a complex system of organization to meet the complicated needs of our times.” It looked complicated because it was complicated. Furthermore, talking in a language that was largely absent from management theory and public administration, Coy said there was a need to understand that “it is human beings, limited, faulty men, we are working with” (147). Trying to be oblivious of this reality of the human condition would only make things

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

131

worse. It was a concise statement of the management theory he brought to the LOEM position: bossing people around or merely issuing memos and orders were routes to failure. Rather, trying to bring well-meaning, but flawed, people together to solve problems jointly was the philosophy that guided him as the head of the defense mobilization. Without insulting an audience that included managers from business, Coy frankly talked about the one-sidedness of some current tropes of the private sector (and its allies in politics and the news media). Why was it that “workers who strike are clearly subversive, disloyal, un-American—a tendency to forget that strikers can be patriots bearing just grievances, that they can be honest, sincere men” (148). This was not the way the corporate world viewed production problems. Management was always right, labor unions were always wrong. No, said Coy, the national defense mobilization could not be used as a cover to degrade the union movement. To what was probably an all-white (or nearly) audience, Coy also raised the touchy subject of race, a topic that was largely ignored at the time by management literature. “There have been contemptible efforts toward creating racial intolerance and murmurings about suppressing opinions,” he said, “as though we should throw away the freedom and tolerance which are the greatest of men’s creations” (148). Again, he was emphasizing that the war would not be an alibi or cover to repress human rights. He concluded with a final point about public administration. There was no doubt, he said, that contemporary managers “can perform the sheer physical work of analysis and organization and execution required to meet and conquer the present crisis.” Trying to do so without protecting “the great democratic traditions—the qualities of freedom and tolerance,” well, then it would no longer be public administration (148). In retrospect, he had enunciated an enlightened theory of management, especially in the public sector, and even more so in a defense emergency. Coy’s talk at the Society for Advancement of Management was considered a major event for people interested in the management of the defense mobilization. The next issue of the Society’s quarterly journal reprinted it in full (1941d). The daily columnist at the Post who covered the civil service advertised Coy’s appearance in advance and reported on it afterward.2 The Des Moines [IA] Register reprinted portions of it across four columns of its editorial page and then generally praised it in an accompanying editorial.3 The week before Pearl Harbor, the chair of the House Civil Service Committee, more attuned than most to government management, inserted it in the Congressional Record.4 An issue of the newsletter of USDA’s Agricultural

132

Get Things Moving!

Marketing Service presented verbatim the closing paragraphs of his speech. The introduction to the text stated that “Under Secretary [Paul] Appleby recommends the address for reading by all employees in administrative work. However, these paragraphs should be of interest to every employee.”5

OEM as a Growth Business The frequency with which Roosevelt tinkered with the organizational composition of OEM was always deliberate. He was not acting capriciously or indecisively, as some critics insinuated. Rather, the president was responding to the ever-changing environment of war events overseas, domestic economic trends, problems in the production mobilization, and political criticisms. The week after Coy was appointed LOEM, FDR expanded Coy’s empire by moving the operation of Lend-Lease into OEM. Until then, it had been an independent agency headed by Hopkins (with the press noting that Coy and Hopkins were now peers). But Lend-Lease suffered from Hopkins’s relatively casual attitude toward the vexing details of daily administration. Somewhat camouflaging the move was FDR’s misleading title of the new agency: Division of Defense Aid Reports.6 Indicating the potential power that the president was willing to extend to his new LOEM, the executive order contained what became a standard stipulation for new OEM agencies: “In so far as practicable, the Division of Defense Aid Reports shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management.”7 It was a reference to the two administrative silos under the direct supervision of LOEM: Central Administrative Services (CAS) and the Division of Information (DOI). This gave Coy a subtle but real chokehold over such OEM agencies. He controlled the administrative services they needed to function on a day-today basis, such as budgeting, HR, and auditing. He also had some control over an agency’s public relations and external communications. Perhaps more important than the indirect administrative power this presidential directive assigned him was that through CAS and DOI, Coy would know what they were doing and, if necessary, be able to intervene proactively on important issues. Later in May, FDR created the Office of Civilian Defense within OEM (chap. 3). This time, the standard clause on using CAS and DOI was strengthened with a more specific list of services OCD had to use, including “such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities” provided by the two service units under LOEM’s direct control.8

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

133

The number of OEM agencies kept increasing through 1941. In May, the president reorganized the administration of export controls by creating the Office of Export Control within OEM (US House 1941d, 643). Later that month, he designated Interior Secretary Harold Ickes as petroleum coordinator for national defense and authorized him to make use of any of OEM’s administrative services and facilities that Ickes may want (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 198). In June, he created the Office of Scientific Research and Development, mandating, as he had for OCD, that it use OEM’s administrative services.9 The next month, the president created the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, using the by-then common requirement of using CAS and DOI.10 Headed by Nelson Rockefeller, it was intended to keep an active focus on implementing FDR’s “good neighbor” policy (and the longstanding Monroe Doctrine) during the defense emergency.11 In September, Roosevelt created the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services as a unit within OEM. Recognizing how closely it would overlap with FSA, this executive order stated that the agency “may” use the administrative services of OEM, but was not required to.12 The next month, FDR established the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) within OEM, again mandating that it use LOEM’s administrative services, though limiting the list of services to “fiscal, personnel, and other general business services.”13 This deliberately omitted statistical and informational services from the now-standard language because the raison d’être of the new agency was to develop and release data on its own and not be forced to use DOI.14 A few days later, the president re-created the Division of Defense Aid Reports into the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, also an entity within OEM. He retained the wording of the division’s earlier executive order, namely that it “shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available” by OEM.15 Coy was involved in formulating an organizational and structural response to one of the big issues confronting the production mobilization. In mid-1941, when the fierce arguments between OPA’s Henderson and OPM’s Knudsen became dysfunctional for purposes of production priorities, FDR asked trusted outside advisor Samuel Rosenman to study the situation and recommend changes. Rosenman in turn conferred with the players and then with the “men who had broad perspective” on the problem, naming only two: BOB director Smith and Coy. He further described Coy as having “the confidence of the President” (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 357). The same month, International News Service distributed a profile of Rosenman. In an interview, Rosenman was asked to whom else FDR turned for such tasks. He answered, “Hopkins, Frankfurter, [and] Wayne Coy.”16 After these Rosenman-Coy consultations on improving the coordination of production

134

Get Things Moving!

and prices, Coy followed up with a comprehensive memo to Rosenman summarizing his views and recommendations.17 Coy also pulled together an “organization-planning team” to do the groundwork in preparation for implementing Rosenman’s proposal to FDR.18 The end result was an executive order creating within OEM a Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB) as a supreme policy-making and coordinating body that bridged OPM and OPA.19 Another organizational issue on which Coy worked behind the scenes was a body to create a labor policy for the defense emergency. Labor-management strife was a near-constant occurrence during this period. Coy proposed to FDR creating an interdepartmental committee with representation from all federal agencies with labor-related roles. The plan was to give the group “responsibility for controversial labor decisions” and—especially important given the centrifugal dynamic of the executive branch—for seeing that all the agency members followed the adopted policy, an assumption that could not be taken for granted.20 OEM was of course growing in more ways than the number units it comprised. For example, a week after Coy’s LOEM appointment, a columnist reported that OPM was expanding rapidly, expecting to employ 2,500 staffers within the next sixty days.21 To keep up with this, CAS loaned OPM some of its personnel and hiring specialists. CAS’s own sixty-person HR office was working overtime to fill new slots in all OEM agencies.22 Six months later, OPM employed 7,500 people and expected to double again within a few months.23 As an indication of how fast OEM agencies were growing, sometimes the CSC had trouble keeping up lists of eligibles for particular positions because the entire list was exhausted relatively quickly.24 On occasion, its regular recruiting efforts resulted in a list, but that number was below the pending requests from national defense agencies.25 In one case, the slowness of the process meant that no one had yet been declared eligible for a particular specialization. One OEM agency, desperate to fill some specific positions, was advised by the CSC’s executive director on how to evade the Commission’s own rules: hire as temps people who have applied to the CSC for that specialization and then, if they pass all CSC tests and standards, rehire them as permanent employees (Lee 2012, 137). Another bottleneck was personnel itself. The CSC registers of qualified candidates for personnel officers in CAS and other OEM agencies kept running short. Cutting corners, some HR offices were promoting their current junior personnel staff “too rapidly for insufficiently trained and experienced younger technicians.”26

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

135

Liaison as Management by Another Name A review of what Coy actually did as liaison officer can be helpful in reaching a conclusion about whether he managed OEM or not. This can be based on some of the standard functions associated with being a senior public administrator, such as setting organization-wide policy, mediating internal disputes, and budgeting. Coy routinely issued OEM-wide administrative policies. These included a procedure for hiring aliens (chap. 4), acceptance of gifts,27 reducing duplication of mailing lists,28 centralized printing services (Lee 2012, 104, 230n124), developing OEM-wide vacation policy,29 the Red Cross’s annual Roll Call campaign,30 sales of war bonds to OEM employees,31 inclusion of the Treasury Department’s “Minute-man” symbol on the letterheads of all OEM agencies (to promote sales of bonds to recipients of OEM correspondence),32 and OEM staff participation in the annual Community Chest campaign in the DC area.33 Coy also tried to resolve intra-agency disputes. When DOI chief Horton and the coordinator of housing argued over who was the ultimate boss of the PR man whom DOI detailed to the housing coordinator’s office, Coy’s office was drawn into the conflict and tried to mediate a solution. Sherwood, by then the assistant LOEM, met with both sides and tried to word a vaguely stated compromise solution. Predictably, his gauzy language satisfied neither side (Lee 2012, 108). On another occasion, when OPM was burgeoning in size, Coy asked Sherwood to reexamine which OPM units were really OEM-wide in scope and responsibility and therefore should be reassigned to be under LOEM. In a cooperative negotiation, OPM agreed to transfer to LOEM its library, conference-reporting personnel, property control unit, purchasing, and messengers.34 One of Coy’s thankless managerial duties was space allocation for OEM agencies. As will be recalled from the discussion of his heavy reliance on motorcycle messengers (chap. 4), Washington had a severe shortage of office space, and OEM agencies were scattered in more than a dozen locations all over town. Notwithstanding the opening of new federal buildings (such as the new Social Security building), buying office buildings, leasing space in private office buildings, and temporary buildings,35 the burgeoning size of OEM agencies led to major difficulties in providing adequate space for them. In May, CAS head Sherwood told Coy that the federal government was about to buy the Du Pont Circle Hotel and turn it into office space. That would meet Henderson’s urgent request for 100,000 square feet for OPA.

136

Get Things Moving!

Also, a nearly completed apartment building on Q Street could potentially be bought by the federal government, converted to office space, and used for OCD and CAS.36 In August, Knudsen complained to Coy that OPM urgently needed an additional 140,000 square feet of office space. The recent acquisition of the Raleigh Hotel provided him with 20,000 feet, but that barely scratched the surface of his needs.37 Sherwood tried to help and told Coy that 20,000 more square feet would become available when the federal government finalized buying the Scottish Rites Temple, but, again, that did not solve the problem. Conveying a sense of the intensity of the problem and the enormous pressure to find solutions, Sherwood reported to Coy that the head of the Public Buildings Administration (a unit of the Federal Works Agency) “felt quite helpless in the circumstances.”38 A few weeks later, the head of the Federal Works Agency had the minor good news to report to Coy of acquiring an apartment building on C Street with 13,000 square feet.39 In the grand scheme of what the needs were, it barely dented the demand. In October and November, the office crunch problems came to a head. BOB director Smith convened a meeting of the key players—twelve of them (including Coy). The number of attendees indicated how many agencies were involved in the subject and the inherent complexity of working jointly toward a solution.40 After the meeting, according to one reporter, “the space problem has become so complex that the President is reported to have assigned Wayne Coy . . . to work out a solution.”41 Another reporter credited Coy with finally solving OPM’s space problems the month before. In that heroic telling, “youthful Wayne Coy . . . personally cracked one of the biggest bottlenecks in defense. Mr. Coy modestly insists he had nothing to do with it” and gave credit to others. Not so, wrote the reporter. According to his sources in BOB and OPM, “Coy got action when others failed.”42 (Office space problems continued after the US declared war [chap. 8].) Having adequate space did not an office make. Another office-related problem was the increasingly limited availability of furniture, supplies, and equipment. These were all basic necessities for an office to operate. In August, Sherwood told Coy that OPM’s priorities system was gradually squeezing out raw materials necessary to create office supplies. Even when given a relatively high priority rating by OPM, an order often took at least several weeks or longer to be fulfilled. Coy was told that this was “an increasing problem which we may have to do something about before long.”43 In response, Coy wondered if part of a solution could be achieved by shifting the make of the equipment. For example, how about ordering wood-based

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

137

office furniture instead of metal desks and tables?44 Metal, of course, was very high priority for defense production, while wood was somewhat more abundant. The discussion of such a relatively mundane subject is a good reminder that the scarcity of common goods was already a major factor in daily life during 1941, before Pearl Harbor and the war-based mobilization of the economy and raw materials. As in all public administration, the power of the purse is a very influential lever of control. Coy seemed to downplay his role in budgeting, but he had it nonetheless. Because OEM’s funding came from discretionary presidential defense accounts, funding decisions for FY 1942 (beginning on July 1, 1941) did not have to be made as early as routine agency budgets that went to Congress. Budget requests from OEM agencies did not go directly to BOB. Instead, in late April 1941, OEM agencies were required to submit them to Coy. For OPM’s budget request, Coy asked Sherwood and CAS staff to review it rigorously. Sherwood reported back that “we have been unable to accurately support” some increased spending projections and that moving OPM’s administrative support services to CAS could save nearly half a million dollars.45 Two weeks later, Coy submitted an integrated budget estimate for all of OEM to BOB.46 Indicating how influential Coy’s recommendations were, Housing Coordinator Palmer (who was falling out of favor in the administration) quickly complained about the cut in the estimate he had submitted because “he will either have to curtail his present operations or deliberately create a deficit.”47 BOB, in turn, developed its recommendations but welcomed from Coy “any comment you may wish to make” before finalizing it.48 Another indication of Coy’s budget influence occurred in the fall. Given the fluidity of the defense situation, budget estimates for OEM agencies were subject to frequent review. In September, Smith invited Coy to come to his office to discuss OEM’s estimates with L. C. Martin, the senior BOB official in charge of budget estimates.49 But not all of Coy’s decisions and policies were on routine or common managerial matters. Two big issues he dealt with were field coordination of OEM agencies and loyalty investigations of employees and applicants.

Field Administration As will be recalled, as early as 1936, Coy was recognized as a leader in public administration on field structure and organization (chap. 2). Now, as LOEM, he was facing an extraordinary version of that subject, larger

138

Get Things Moving!

by several orders of magnitude than his Indiana WPA experience. How to mesh into a nationwide field structure the dozen quasiautonomous OEM agencies? Understandably, many agencies needed to have substantial staff in the field to implement their missions. These included OPM, OPA, OCD, and DOI. What was the relationship between these silos in the field? Were they coordinating with each other or referring all disagreements to the headquarters in the capital? Did they have the same regional districts or different alignments? Were uniform regions necessary? Should LOEM have regional directors to engage in the same coordinative activity as Coy did in DC? Only a few weeks after Coy became LOEM, Daily News columnist Scholz was already commenting on the field coordination problem that existed just for OPM and its internal divisions. OPM’s contract office had thirty-six field offices; the labor division had thirty-three; and the local cooperation division had thirty-six “state” offices (with the US having at that time forty-eight states). Sometimes these field offices were not in the same city even if assigned to cover a similar territory. For example, in some states, two cities traditionally jockeyed for primacy, such as Philadelphia versus Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania or Cleveland versus Cincinnati versus Columbus in Ohio. Where should a field office be located, and what were the political implications of favoring one over the other? Scholz reported that OPM was considering designating twelve uniform regions for the US and requiring that all of OPM’s subdivisions would have to be structured in conformity with that arrangement.50 A week later, he reported that OPM’s Priorities Division had decided to go ahead with fifteen regional offices.51 Coy convened a meeting in his office with CAS staffers in mid-May. They agreed that there should be uniform regions for all OEM agencies. But before promulgating a plan, BOB needed to be consulted. BOB decided to do its own study.52 For reasons that are unclear, by mid-September BOB had not issued any reports, approvals, or guidelines. In the meantime, “new field offices limped into being.” By that point, OEM agencies had 121 field offices.53 Barring an authoritative directive, CAS was not in a position to disapprove any requisitions from OEM agencies to rent new field offices and hire personnel to staff them.54 Sherwood suggested that while waiting for BOB, perhaps Coy should authorize a “model” regional field office in New York City as a template for a later nationwide and uniform OEM field service. Sherwood foresaw appointing a regional manager for OEM agencies at the New York office. This implied that the manager would be a kind of regional LOEM, with all the powers Coy possessed. This approach would have been a major leap, perhaps even an overreach, by placing mini-

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

139

LOEMs in every region to oversee all OEM agencies.55 Coy did not act on it, waiting for BOB. Apparently finally obtaining BOB approval, it was not until September 22 that Coy was able to issue a policy memo to all OEM agencies about field offices “in order to assure maximum coordination of effort.” He decided that there would be twelve regions to cover the country, and he designated the cities, which he called regional centers, where they would be located. This gave him the thankless task of picking one city over another. For example, the Ohio office would be located in Cleveland;56 the southwest region would be based in Dallas, Texas, not in Fort Worth or Houston. The California office would be in San Francisco, not Los Angeles. Coy requested that all OEM agencies “wherever possible” locate their regional offices in these cities, preferably in the same building. He said that CAS would appoint a field administrative service officer for each regional office. It would provide all the common administrative services needed for office operations, such as supplies, equipment, duplicating, travel authorizations, travel vouchers, time and leave records, and recruiting for lower-level positions.57 By the spring of 1942, ten field service officers were in place (US OEM 1942, 44). Coy’s policy memo indicated the limits of his direct managerial power over the federated system that OEM was. He could enunciate some authoritative policies, such as dividing the county into regions and identifying the city where regional offices would be. But he could not force OEM agencies to locate their regional offices in that city, let alone in the same building. The field administrative officer would oversee providing office services for all OEM agencies in the region, but this was a service function, not a supervisory one, certainly not a mini-LOEM. Regions would not be overseen by a delegate or appointee of the LOEM. Rather, the regional administrative officer was merely a representative of CAS and would only handle routine office services. Even if such a person had been appointed directly by Coy, he could not have more power than Coy had in DC. Neither Coy nor his representatives could have the traditional hierarchical managerial control over regional field operations of individual OEM agencies. His managerial powers were fuzzier than that. Generally, OEM agencies made some effort to conform to Coy’s policy guidance, but inevitably the particular needs and preferences of an agency could override Coy’s recommendation. For example, OPM generally tried to hew to Coy’s memo, but did not do so perfectly (US CPA 1947). As early as 1944, an article in PAR concluded that “CAS could not live up to coordinating aspirations” in the regions and that the “instinct for

140

Get Things Moving!

institutional survival” of each OEM agency tended to trump truly effective field coordination (Carey 1944, 33). Indicating the difficulties involved in overcoming the autonomizing tendencies of large federal agencies, a good example of regionalization into one building only occurred in New York City after the emergency caused by Pearl Harbor.58 After issuing his policy memo, Coy continued to be involved with field coordination to the extent that his powers permitted him. He arranged with the GAO an auditing format for the expenses of OEM field centers,59 handled the presidential response to a letter from California Governor Olson on the need for better coordination with the various federal civilian defense agencies in his state,60 and approved some new subregional offices for DOI, although not all that Horton requested (Lee 2012, 132–33).

Loyalty Investigations The civic obsession with flushing out subversive federal employees and other citizens disloyal to the United States was already intense long before the Cold War, McCarthyism, and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). In fact, these concerns predated Pearl Harbor. While Coy may not have had explicit direct management control of OEM, for all intents and purposes for this subject, the buck stopped at his desk. He was the one who, on behalf of all OEM agencies, routinely set policy and corresponded directly with other executive branch agencies on the subject. Sometimes he delegated the routine aspects of investigations to CAS officials who were under his direct supervision. As early as May 1941, CAS had an Investigations Section of six full-time employees, including (based on Civil Service classifications) an investigator, two assistant investigators, and a junior investigations reviewer. By September, reflecting the growth in the size of OEM, the Investigations Section had more than doubled, now with sixteen employees.61 In July, Coy passed on to Sherwood the names of three OEM employees he had been told may have been disloyal. Sherwood asked the Investigations Office to look into it. It turned out that at least one of them, now working in OPM, had a disqualifying record. The employee, after being shown the materials generated by the investigation into his past, was allowed to resign effective immediately.62 The quiet termination was not just a humane HR approach. It also had a political logic. The professional “Commie hunters” on Capitol Hill and elsewhere were quick to accuse the New Deal of being

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

141

soft on Communism to the point of endangering the republic. A noisy and public firing of the OPM employee would attract further attention from them. They could then claim that the firing proved the need to hunt for subversives, would prompt demands for even more intense investigations, and would be seen as confirming that FDR was indeed soft on lefties. Investigations were not limited to political affiliations. Sometimes they focused on truthfulness in CSC employment applications, which required that applicants sign under oath and with penalty for misrepresentation. For example, in October, CAS director Dallas Dort (who succeeded Sherwood when Sherwood became assistant LOEM in September) informed OPM that an investigation of one of its staff attorneys documented that in his application for hiring he had lied about his membership in the bar, his past employment record, his past salaries, and his education. When the CAS investigator interviewed the attorney, he admitted to those details being false. But he then claimed that no civil suits had ever been filed against him as explanation that the false information was not intended to avoid legal obligations. But the investigator identified at least one civil suit for unpaid merchandise. Finally, he confessed that he had filed false federal income tax returns and had a tax liability assessed on him to reflect the corrected returns. However, “no indication was found that he had any subversive tendencies or was engaged in any un-American activities.” As a result, there was no loyalty justification to prompt immediate firing, but given his false statements under oath, there was sufficient derogatory information to flag to OPM “for whatever action you consider advisable.”63 By fall, the volume of investigations prompted Coy to suggest to all OEM agencies a standard procedure for handling results that uncovered something. The president had proclaimed a policy that all applicants for OEM employment must be investigated “with respect to their loyalty to the United States and their possible affiliation with subversive organizations.” Coy informed OEM agency heads that such personnel investigations would “rightly” be limited to presenting relevant documented information uncovered in the investigation. These reports would be submitted to each OEM agency without a recommendation for action because “the ultimate responsibility for acting upon the basis of this information must devolve upon the heads of the various defense agencies.” At the same time, Coy noted that the heads of individual OEM agencies may not have felt completely confident about what specific actions to take—or not take, as the case may have been—in response to the investigative reports. He said he would be willing to create an OEM-wide review board to act on them in the name of the agency heads.64 A

142

Get Things Moving!

clear managerial benefit of such an entity was that it would shift the recommended personnel action from agency directors to LOEM. The review board would comprise HR experts comfortable with such decision making, and the board would develop consistent guidelines and precedents for such personnel actions. Hence, decisions would be less arbitrary and, importantly, would not vary in similar cases in different OEM agencies. Again, in addition to the HR-based justifications for handling cases in this more professional way, the review board approach would also provide political cover from accusations that one OEM agency was “softer” on subversives than another. This was a charge that conservatives were eager to hurl at New Dealer Leon Henderson at OPA compared with reliably conservative businessmen like Knudsen at OPM. (It appears that Coy’s suggestion of an OEM-wide review board was not adopted, and agency heads continued to deal with these cases.) FBI director J. Edgar Hoover considered himself an expert on subversives, dating back to the Palmer raids right after WWI. He was eager to establish his agency’s primacy in the area of loyalty investigations. In mid1941, he arranged for Congress to give the FBI authority to investigate all federal employees (not just applicants) to ascertain if they were “members of subversive organizations or advocate the overthrow of the Federal Government.” Furthermore, the new law directed the FBI to submit reports of its findings to Congress.65 Once an investigation was concluded, the FBI would send the agency head an informational summary of what it uncovered, but without a recommendation for action. This was a shrewd bureaucratic maneuver by Hoover, a master at it, in that this approach preemptively exculpated the FBI in case a relatively innocent person was fired. At the same time, it never exonerated anyone either. Also, this approach permitted Hoover to maintain that the FBI was merely an investigative agency, never making decisions or recommendations. The form letter he used further intimidated public administrators with this concluding statement: Inasmuch as this particular investigation was conducted under the provisions of the above-mentioned Public Law and as this Bureau must make a report to Congress, I shall appreciate your official comment as to what, if any action will be taken by you as a result of this investigation, either by way of exoneration, dismissal or any other administrative action.66 That meant the FBI imposed on the agency head the obligation to notify it once an action had been decided upon. This approach permitted Hoover

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

143

to complain to Congress if he thought an agency was too soft in response to a report. This was in the context of the FBI having had some reason in the first place to initiate an investigation. In all, it was an unstated pressure on federal managers to be conservative: fire the person. If later evidence turned up even more proof of the individual’s disloyalty, then how would the agency head look for not having fired him or her at the first hint of this? In October, Attorney General Biddle (Hoover’s nominal supervisor) formally notified agencies of the FBI’s new power, including that it could initiate on its own accord loyalty investigations of federal employees whenever it received information that someone was a member of a subversive organization. Furthermore, such investigations would be conducted without notifying the head of the agency. Coy was on a speaking tour out of town when a response to the attorney general’s letter was drafted based on Coy’s instructions and was now ready for signature.67 As acting LOEM that day, Sherwood signed it. In it, Coy established the principle that any replies by OEM agencies to FBI reports would come from the LOEM himself, not from OEM agency heads directly to the FBI. This put the LOEM in a position to shield OEM agencies from direct accountability to the FBI, to assure a relatively consistent approach by all OEM agencies in response to FBI reports, and generally to counteract Hoover’s bureaucratic power play. Perhaps the head of an OEM agency would be intimidated by Hoover, but as special assistant to the president, Coy was pulling rank on Hoover. LOEM was no mere bureaucrat; he was in the White House. If Hoover wanted to complain about how OEM agencies handled FBI reports, well, only the president outranked Coy. It was a smooth maneuver to check Hoover’s offensive. This LOEM response to the attorney general also oneupped Hoover. He said that in response to the president’s policy on OEM employees, all investigations under the supervision of LOEM were broader than just the question of membership in subversive organizations. Instead, such investigations covered all aspects of a person’s reliability and integrity, not just political affiliations, as was the case of the OPM lawyer (above). Finally, the letter updated the attorney general that most personnel investigations were now being done for OEM (on a fee basis) by the Intelligence Unit of the Treasury Department, although some were by CAS’s in-house investigative office.68 A few weeks later, Coy told White House Administrative Assistant Rowe that the FBI did not seem interested in the information about Nazi activities and supporters in the US that had been collected by the B’nai B’rith AntiDefamation League. Coy suggested that he and Rowe jointly meet with the

144

Get Things Moving!

Jewish official “especially before you get into the Department of Justice” with regard to the FBI seeking supremacy and perhaps even exclusivity in subversive investigations.69 Here was an early indication that Hoover’s obsession with Communism was much stronger than his interest in disloyalty on the right. Several internal CAS character investigations of current OEM employees before Pearl Harbor (as opposed to FBI loyalty investigations) give a sense of the range and scope of these reviews. In one case, a man hired by Rockefeller’s Latin America office was documented to have “very strong pro-German sentiments.” CAS stated that this derogatory information “is deemed to be of sufficient importance to warrant its being brought to your immediate attention.”70 This was as close as such reports came to recommending firing. Another investigation uncovered that the brother and sister of a probationary employee had signed nominating petitions for Communist Party candidates. The employee denied knowledge of that even though all three were living under the same roof at the time. Nonetheless, there was “no evidence that the employee has been active in any organization whose interests are inimical to those of this Government.”71 This careful wording implies that as long as the US was supporting the USSR in its war with Germany then the employee’s record was not as serious as it would have been in a different political situation (such as when Nazi Germany and the USSR were allies from 1939 to mid-1941). An investigation of a woman working for OPM documented that many details about her past that she had listed on her paperwork was false, including if her parents were alive and if she had ever used a different name. Her motive for doing so it was unclear, as nothing uncovered related to “subversive tendencies or activities.”72 In another case, a woman working in CAS’s personnel office was cleared as to her “character, reputation and loyalty” although the report noted that she “has been rather closely associated” with someone named as a Communist or sympathizer by the Dies Committee (the predecessor to HUAC), particularly because her close friend had attended a drama and acting school in Russia.73 Given the political sensitivity of the subject and the potential for any case to be quietly passed by the FBI to the Dies Committee for leaking and negative publicity, Coy kept a very close eye on these reports. In each of the cases described above, he initialed the office file carbon copy of the correspondence, thus indicating that he had personally seen the letters, including the results of the investigations. He wanted to be prepared to take any heat that might arise from them rather than leave the heads of OEM agencies out to dry.

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

145

Management as Coordination, Cooperation, and Communication Even if he wanted to boss people around, given his lack of official and formal hierarchical standing, Coy could only exercise a relatively light touch as LOEM in much of his day-to-day work. This light touch also seemed to reflect his personality. He exhibited a low-key approach to the constant conflict occurring within OEM or between an OEM agency and an outside one. The premise of his operating style seemed to be that each side in a disagreement or an argument had a valid concern. Rather than acting as a parent taking sides and giving orders when two kids argued, Coy generally sought ways to accommodate the parties to a dispute. Was there—to use twenty-first-century management jargon—a win-win approach that could satisfy both sides? No need to issue a verdict on who was right and who was wrong. Both parties were at least to some degree right. Therefore his and their energy needed to be channeled toward a workable solution that resolved the issue to their minimal satisfaction, at least for the time being. Several of the positive newspaper profiles of Coy (chap. 5) captured this tone when the journalists were observing him at work. One described him talking on the phone this way: “His job is to chat . . . Coy puts a telephone to his ear, tilts back in his chair . . . and talks briefly, cheerily, with a ‘let’s get together, boys’ attitude.” Coy also liked having business meetings over a meal, not only an efficient use of time, “but probably food makes officials feel like agreeing.”74 For example, on September 15, 1941, he had lunch with BOB director Smith. On November 26 (a weekday), Coy hosted a dinner at his home for Smith and Donald Nelson, the new honcho and rising star at OEM’s Supply Priorities and Allocations Board.75 A different reporter described his operating style: “on his own initiative and in his own name, Coy arranges conferences for the purpose of ironing out differences of opinion among defense agency heads.” Sometimes those conferences were in his office, neutral ground for the arguers. At other times he would go to their offices as an indication of not pulling rank and instead going to them to get their perspectives.76 Other profiles described him as “a quiet man” and as having “tact” when dealing with problems between competing managers.77 The reporter watching OEM most closely in 1941, Richard Scholz of the Washington Daily News, described Coy’s working style: “He confers with all agencies and departments which may be interested in the suggestion. As a result of his conferences, a common policy is agreed

146

Get Things Moving!

to. If no agreement is possible, the alternatives are put to the President, who then makes the decision.”78 Sherwood, briefly Coy’s assistant LOEM (see below), described more critically Coy’s indirect and low-key approach to resolving conflict. Sherwood wanted to send a strongly worded memo to the president about problems at OPM, especially by anti–New Dealers—or at least to Eleanor Roosevelt, his occasional conduit in the past (chap. 1). Coy instead told him a draft a letter to be signed by one senior OPM official to another. Coy thought that if the letter were to be read out loud at the daily OPM senior staff meeting, then “something would be done.” Sherwood sputtered to his diary that “I never heard of such a left-handed indirection” instead of “making them direct to the President.”79 As an example of his approach, Coy tried to negotiate the creation of a common telephone switchboard for all defense-related agencies, not just within OEM, but also with the military. Seeking a voluntary agreement, he engaged in detailed negotiations with the Army, but after many discussions, ultimately “reached an impasse.” Theoretically, such an impasse could now only be broken by the president, but it seemed to him absurd that FDR should have to referee that. So Coy made one last effort to break the impasse by sending a letter to John J. McCloy, the assistant secretary of war. Coy provided McCloy with detailed reasoning why other approaches preferred by the military just could not work. He concluded with a plea for McCloy “to consummate this most necessary arrangement.”80 An indication of Coy’s collegial and person-to-person approach to management was demonstrated in mid-1941. Because of the increasingly strained world situation, BOB, as the main occupant of the old State Department building, decided there was a need to increase security in the building, which was across the alley from the West Wing and White House. BOB asked other occupants of the building to submit a list of their routine visitors. Those on the list would be allowed entry without any further security procedures. Coy’s listed ninety-six people who came “at frequent intervals” to his office.81 These were officials he met with routinely. The list included twenty from the Lend-Lease program, sixteen from the export control office, and twenty from OPA. Civilians ranged from agency heads (such as OPA’s Henderson) to clerks. Military men on the list ranged from major generals to ensigns and lieutenants. Meeting with such a large contingent of people conveys that Coy was not the kind of bureaucrat who sat alone in his office signing outgoing orders to minions. In-person meetings and interactions would invariably include two-way conversations, exploring ideas, and

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

147

obtaining information. Suggestions and proposed solutions, worked out in person, were the likely results of these routine meetings of a senior manager with people scattered throughout his organization and other organizations he worked with. It also conveys that Coy did not limit himself to the heads of OEM agencies, but rather reached deep into their pyramids to deal with operating-level officials who would be well informed and knowledgeable about their specializations.

Clearing Legislation It will be recalled that Roosevelt’s first administrative order relating to OEM included the role of clearing proposed legislation (chap. 1). This was federal nomenclature for coordinating and categorizing proposals for legislation from executive branch agencies vis-à-vis the administration’s views. Also, Coy’s involvement in public policy and politics sometimes overlapped with preparing legislation, lobbying for it behind the scenes, and occasionally testifying before Congress (chaps. 4–5). As LOEM, Coy’s role in clearing emergency management legislation was a role that paralleled BOB’s traditional clearance role. Given the close working relationship Coy had with BOB, it was relatively easy to mesh LOEM’s legislative clearance role with it. In general, Coy coordinated the various legislative requests from OEM agencies or other agencies interacting with OEM. He wanted to make sure that the administration maintained control over what was requested of Congress, that all legislative requests would be in harmony with each other, and that disagreements within OEM or with outside agencies be worked out in advance of requests for new legislation. His goal was “uniformity in legislation” dealing with the defense mobilization (US House 1941d, 644). This was a major lever of power for Coy as a non-manager manager. Shortly after his LOEM appointment, Coy created a legal office under his direct supervision to review legislation (and handle other legal matters). He appointed Oscar Cox as his chief counsel. Coy then issued a policy to all OEM agencies on a uniform procedure for clearing legislation they wanted though his legal service.82 There was plenty of work. By August, the counsel’s office employed ten attorneys and five support staff.83 It was an impressive roster. Cox went on to be the assistant solicitor general, Joe Rauh became a prominent liberal activist (chap. 4), and Philip Graham, already son-in-law of the owner of the Post, eventually became the paper’s publisher.84 Much of the LOEM legislative clearance role was to coordinate

148

Get Things Moving!

with BOB’s clearance office on legislation sought by the old-line Cabinet departments and independent agencies. Coy’s collegial approach to management manifested itself in this context frequently. Whenever BOB informed him of a relevant legislative request it had received, he had his legal office review the proposal with all OEM agencies that would be affected by it or have any interest in the subject. As a result of these consultations, Coy would inform BOB of his recommendation. They varied from “no objection” on such subjects as public works,85 Navy,86 and a bridge over the Mississippi in Minnesota,87 to the very soft position of being “in accord with the objective of the proposed legislation” relating to price controls,88 and to “favor” for pipeline legislation.89 In one case, BOB had already notified the War Department that a proposed improvement in the harbor of Ashland, Wisconsin, was not in accord with the president’s program, thus for all intents and purposes killing it. Coy injected himself into the subject, telling BOB that his transportation office thought this was a good idea because it would result in more efficient transportation of defense-related raw materials. Coy submitted a report to BOB with details on why he thought the Bureau should reverse its earlier position.90 In another case, Coy reversed his own position. Originally, OEM did not object to legislation revising the Internal Revenue Code as requested by the War Department. A month later, he informed BOB that “I am in the difficult position of having changed my mind” and now objected to the legislation unless and until the War Department and OEM could reach a compromise.91 OEM agencies sometimes opposed each other. For a USDA bill on standard sizes of fruit and vegetable cans, OPA and OPM initially disagreed. Following Coy’s management style of negotiating mutually satisfactory resolutions, Cox proposed a compromise solution. He suggested that OPM could issue an administrative order on the subject that would obviate the need for the USDA legislation while keeping OPA’s future options open. Coy then recommended to BOB to accept that approach, making the proposed legislation “unnecessary.”92 However, Coy’s approach to legislative clearance was broader than BOB’s. Generally, BOB’s role ended when it assigned a clearance category to proposed legislation or bills recently introduced. Coy extended his purview of clearance by sending his legal staff to Capitol Hill to follow developments after bills were introduced. This was a significant improvement in maintaining control over legislation or, at least, awareness of what was happening to them as they were being considered by Congress.93 For example, Cox briefed Coy on a House hearing on a bill relating to lifting certain federal navigation

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

149

and inspection laws during the defense emergency. Given the concerns that Committee members expressed during the hearing, Cox suggested that there was a need for a revised bill draft dealing with those concerns and then for a memo to be prepared for committee members explaining and justifying the contents of the new draft.94 On another occasion, Cox summarized all relevant legislative developments that day on the floors of the Senate and House and in committees.95 After the House recessed for a month in mid-August 1941, Rauh gave Coy an overall update on the status of all important pending legislation in which OEM had an interest.96 In at least one case, BOB benefited from Coy’s monitoring of the legislative process after bills were introduced. BOB was in the midst of deciding about a request for legislation when Coy informed it that another bill with a provision relating to the same subject was about to be approved by a House committee. Therefore, Coy recommended to BOB that “the proposed amendment should not be introduced at this time.”97 In this kind of reciprocal relationship, Coy was cementing his close working relationship with BOB, thus enhancing the LOEM’s influence on clearance of all legislation. This extended his reach beyond parochial OEM-agency requested legislation. It was a shrewd mixing of management, policy, and politics.

Not Always Cooperative: Dealing with a Threat to His Power Notwithstanding this mild-mannered operating style and the limits of his formal management powers, Coy was not shy about protesting to FDR when he thought the president was undercutting him. Roosevelt famously operated informally, issued oral and ambiguous instructions, gave overlapping assignments to people, and did not care about messy organization charts. Coy generally understood this about Roosevelt and seemed comfortable managing in this environment. But at least once he complained directly to FDR about a particular situation that Coy thought undercut his standing as LOEM. At the time, Isadore Lubin was the director of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor. He was one of the mid-level civil servants with whom FDR had personal contact, whom FDR had developed confidence in, and who was routinely given assignments outside his strict departmental portfolio. (USDA’s Milton Eisenhower—brother of Dwight— was another.) As an economist, Lubin was sometimes even identified in the press as one of FDR’s brain trust. In mid-May 1941, just a few weeks

150

Get Things Moving!

after being appointed LOEM, Coy was working on establishing a more systematic and reliable system of weekly reporting to the president on the progress (or lack thereof ) in the defense mobilization. This would include all the OEM silos, such as updated reports from the unit for defense workers’ housing construction, the transportation coordination office, the production office, and so forth. While in the process of doing this, Coy got a phone call from the head of NDAC’s research office, Stacy May. May told Coy that Lubin had asked May for assistance in creating a periodic reporting system because FDR had asked Lubin to create it for him and then route the results directly to the White House. Uncharacteristically, Coy hit the roof. He immediately understood that his LOEM power came from being in-between OEM agencies and the president. They reported to FDR via Coy. He was their link to the president. If their reports went to Roosevelt via Lubin, then Coy’s monopoly on communications with the president would dissolve. That would wipe out the leverage he was supposed to have as the liaison between OEM units and FDR. Coy wrote a strong memo to FDR protesting the assignment to Lubin. If OEM agencies started getting calls for information to be submitted to the president through Lubin (and perhaps from other people saying they had received OEM-related assignments from FDR), then “quite naturally there will arise in their minds a question as to whom to look for clearance on a multitude of matters which they now believe should clear through the OEM Liaison Officer.” Perhaps a bit impolitely, he argued legalities. Coy reminded the president of the explicit assignment Roosevelt had delegated in a presidential order to the LOEM, which included serving as a channel of communication between the president and OEM agencies. This probably did not carry much weight with FDR, if only because a president could just as easily change his own order. But in politics, you play the hand you have been dealt. This was the strongest political card Coy was holding, which was probably why he used it. Coy concluded by telling Roosevelt that “my only desire is to be of service to you. My effectiveness will be fairly well destroyed if uncertainty as to the functions of OEM continues.”98 The next time Coy saw the president was two days after sending the memo. It was a meeting with Leon Henderson and David Ginsberg (the top lawyer at OPA) on developing price control legislation (chap. 5).99 It is likely that as an aside, perhaps before or after the meeting, FDR placated Coy by soothingly saying he had full confidence in him and that he wanted Coy to continue as LOEM exactly as before. FDR was very skillful at dealing with senior members of his administration who were unhappy

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

151

with him and even threatening to resign (Ickes in particular). He knew how to defuse problems without necessarily giving the complainer exactly what was requested and certainly not doing so in writing. Roosevelt sometimes said different things to different people about the same subject, or at least what they thought they heard him say (Lelyveld 2016). Whatever the president said to him that day, he succeeded in resolving the issue to Coy’s satisfaction. Coy stayed on as LOEM without any discernable change in his approach to his general assignment and, in particular, his informational liaison between OEM agencies and Roosevelt. For example, in September, he forwarded to the president a report from the Defense Housing Coordinator. Fully exploiting the potential of his liaison role, Coy was more than merely shuffling a piece of paper from his inbox to his outbox. In his cover letter, Coy said he had “carefully gone over the contents of this report” and that he hoped the president would similarly go over it because “we are not getting enough” new housing for defense workers. He encouraged the president to intervene to reinvigorate the program.100 Nor did this episode have any lasting impact on the frequent and informal interactions between Coy and Roosevelt. For example, in July, he sent a lighthearted memo to the president about the difficulties of finding qualified people to appoint to senior positions. He related a (probably apocryphal) story of Stanford University’s Board of Trustees seeking to recruit a successor to its long-time president. When seeing the list of qualifications the trustees wanted, someone wisecracked that only three people could fulfill that list: “the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost—and as far as he knew they all had better jobs!”101 FDR clearly continued to value not just Coy’s service, but personal interactions with him, too. For example, in November, Roosevelt invited Congressman Fritz Lanham (D-TX), chairman of the committee in charge of federal construction, to come to the White House for lunch with him and Coy. This was an opportunity for them to discuss in a leisurely and relaxed fashion the pressing need to expand significantly the funding for national defense construction, especially new housing for industrial defense workers and federal employees.102

Coy as Traditional Public Administrator Generally, Coy’s management role and power were hazy at best. He was not the director of OEM. Rather, he was merely its liaison officer, theoretically limited to communications connecting the president and OEM agencies. As

152

Get Things Moving!

already presented in this chapter, Coy made the most of this fuzzy power by encouraging cooperation and coordination by OEM agencies, sometimes relatively explicitly, sometimes lightly. In general, it appears that he maximized the leverage he had with a hand of weak cards. To give him something of a running start in constructing a managerial operation, a few weeks after taking office, FDR allocated $100,000 to OEM for “administrative expenses.”103 Coy was a traditional public administrator in one respect. This was the division of CAS, the horizontal silo that was under his direct supervision and operated at his pleasure. With the exception of the very large OEM agencies, such as OPM and OPA, CAS was the common provider of all major administrative services to OEM agencies, from paperclips to loyalty investigations. CAS was even the telephone “czar” of the mobilization by maintaining a central defense switchboard. (Coy’s effort to include the War Department in a shared phone exchange was discussed earlier in this chapter.) In another case, Sherwood had to promulgate a policy that all OEM agency phones must be covered during the lunch hour because the twenty operators staffing the central switchboard were too busy to take messages.104 OEM also published phone directories listing the employees in all its agencies.105 In general, CAS’s direct involvement in the administration of OEM agencies gave Coy some degree of internal leverage and a high degree of informational awareness regarding the ongoing operations and problems at OEM’s line agencies. The next year, while testifying before Congress, he said as much when using the example of centralized hiring: “so long as you centralize the procurement of your personnel, you were able to control to a very considerable extent the competition as between agencies for employees” (US Senate 1942a, 334). As the direct boss of CAS, Coy had the routine management obligations of running CAS in the way that other public administrators ran their agencies. In May 1941, Coy’s CAS shop had seven senior managers (as defined by the CSC): the two men at the head of the division and the heads of CAS’s major subunits: personnel, budget and finance, service operations, tax amortization, and investigations (US CSC 1941, 13). Coy quickly created a legal unit (discussed above) and a management analysis unit to promote administrative reforms and efficiencies.106 One news story said that Coy directly supervised only twenty-three staffers in his headquarters office.107 That was a gross undercounting, perhaps artificially limited to a few categories to prevent a public impression that the LOEM office had become a burgeoning bureaucracy of its own.

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

153

When CAS director Sherwood testified before the House Appropriations Committee in mid-1941, he said that CAS employed 565 people (US House 1941d, 848). Members of Congress were confused about CAS’s mission because, except the very biggest (OPM and OPA), it provided all the other OEM agencies the full panoply of management and administrative services from soup to nuts: personnel, supplies, equipment, budgeting, transportation, space, and financial auditing. Sherwood argued that centralized administrative services enhanced economies of scale, while some members of the committee insisted there must be duplication because OPM and OPA also had, for example, personnel staff (US House 1941d, 855). It was a difficult arrangement to present convincingly, if only because the orthodox template of federal agencies was that each had its own personnel office, budgeting office, and so on. The horizontal silo of CAS went against the traditional vertical silos of the federal executive branch. (The same was true of the Division of Information, the other horizontal silo in OEM [Lee 2012]). Coy had frequent contact with Sherwood and other CAS officials, indicating not just his direct managerial oversight but also, more importantly, showing a recognition of the value of the unusual horizontal structure of CAS vis-à-vis OEM. It could help counteract the inherent centrifugal tendency of federal bureaus. He did not seem to be a micromanager, but he did consume large amounts of information that routinely flowed from CAS to his desk. As LOEM, Coy automatically became NDAC’s secretary. While most of its units had gradually migrated to OEM as independent agencies or as components of OPM and OPA, NDAC continued to exist and meet. It used to meet weekly, and Coy attended his first meeting on May 7. At the next meeting, he suggested that NDAC convene only every other week (US CPA 1946a, 154). In early May, a reporter wrote that NDAC “would be abolished soon.”108 Cox asked Coy if he indeed wanted to do that, given that NDAC still had only “a few legislative stumps.”109 Coy, perhaps after consulting with FDR, decided not to. Better to let sleeping dogs lie. NDAC continued limping along with only one important remaining power, assigned it by statute, that of tax amortization. Moving the legal duty out of NDAC would require asking Congress to pass an amendment to the law. That could give conservatives a platform for their near-constant criticisms of the president’s approach to the defense mobilization. Tax amortization certificates were a very technical aspect of tax law that granted businesses authorization for amortization of newly constructed capital

154

Get Things Moving!

facilities the companies planned to build to fulfill armament contracts. But it was no small matter—not merely a clerk or two pushing paper. NDAC’s Tax Certification Section had twenty-four full-time employees.110 The military sought to assume full control of this function, but Coy resisted. He saw a benefit of having direct management power over the granting of authorizations because he could then leverage big business to agree to greater use of subcontracting for the major armament orders.111 Coy agreed that there was a need for “a more efficient coordination” between the civilians of NDAC and the military, but was insistent that any new policy must continue to include civilians in the process (US CPA 1946a, 159). Benjamin V. Cohen, a trusted New Deal government lawyer, negotiated an agreement with the military that would make it “possible to dispose of the controversy without further delay.”112 Coy agreed, with the civilian role to be transferred from NDAC to Knudsen at OPM. Coy recommended to FDR to approve Cohen’s framework. Roosevelt cautiously asked Coy to be sure that Treasury Secretary Morgenthau—who had not been part of the negotiations, but whose department handled tax matters—agreed. Morgenthau was okay with it. FDR signed a directive to Knudsen approving the agreement on October 28, 1941.113 A few days later, Congress approved removing this last of NDAC’s statutory duties.114 With that, Coy adjourned NDAC sine die (US CPA 1946a, 164).

Sidney Sherwood, Assistant Liaison Officer for Emergency Management, September 1941 to February 1942 After four months as LOEM, Coy decided that he was so busy that he needed a deputy, someone who could act on his behalf and take some of the load off his shoulders, particularly internal management duties. He was thinking about Sidney Sherwood, CAS’s director. This would be an approach reminiscent of his role at FSA, except that this time Coy would be the number one person and outside guy, while the assistant LOEM would be the inside person, handling the day-to-day administrative problems in large organizations. Coy first touched based with Roosevelt, who already knew Sherwood (chap. 1). Even though FDR was acquainted with Sherwood, there was a chance that he would disapprove of the idea. The question was whether, notwithstanding Coy’s fuzzy title, he was line or staff. For example, when Administrative Assistant Rowe asked the president for approval to hire an assistant, FDR said no. His reason was that if Rowe felt he needed assistance to do his job, then

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

155

Rowe was not doing what the president expected of him—to give advice, not to run mini-agencies. Having a deputy would suggest that the six presidential administrative assistants (approved by Congress based on the Brownlow report) had a governmental role beyond that of staff. Roosevelt did not want to create that precedent (Lee 2016, 85). So it was possible that FDR would feel the same way about a liaison officer having a deputy. But FDR wrote “OK” on Coy’s memo to him about it.115 Ever so lightly, Roosevelt had just signaled that Coy was line, not staff. LOEM was more akin to an agency head than to a president’s administrative assistant. Coy, despite his nebulous title and the soothing public rhetoric about his role, was running something; he was a direct manager of an organization. In particular, he was more than a staffer (like Rowe) who merely gave advice or, as was claimed publicly about Coy, who was tightly limited to facilitating communication between the president and OEM agencies. Coy was in charge of OEM. A few days later, Coy publicly announced Sherwood’s promotion to the new position of assistant liaison officer.116 To fill Sherwood’s spot as CAS director, Coy appointed Dallas Dort, who had been WPA’s assistant commissioner in charge of its Division of Administration.117 The creation of the new job and the potential power it conferred on a new player was barely noticed by anyone in the media.118 Sherwood tried to pitch in wherever he could. Sometimes he tried to mediate conflicts between OEM agencies, such as who was the boss of DOI’s PR man assigned to the Housing Coordinator’s office (discussed earlier in this chapter). At other times, when Coy was out of town, Sherwood signed relatively routine correspondence as the acting LOEM, such as to the attorney general about personnel investigations (also discussed earlier in this chapter). Examples of his assistant LOEM activities included drafting the relevant sections for an OEM-wide handbook for new employees,119 thanking the secretary of commerce for a periodic report,120 and working with BOB on some details of the financial accounts of the export control office.121 Some later examples of Sherwood’s work assignments included checking on military security at Texas refineries where a labor strike was occurring, checking contingency plans for possible arson attacks in national forests in the West, and being sure that all letters written by citizens to the president relating to OEM’s role were answered. (At one point, his backlog was 1,500 letters.)122 Sherwood served as assistant LOEM until early February 1942. (Even though this occurred after Pearl Harbor, it is presented here so that the complete story is in one place and because the majority of the time he had served as assistant LOEM occurred before the war.) The few months he served

156

Get Things Moving!

in that position were not happy ones. In his diary, Sherwood at one point wrote, “I can’t fathom Wayne Coy: ambitious, modest, bright, intelligent, understanding, energetic—inscrutable at least to me his assistant. I feel as though I am being held at arm’s length with so much big work to be done.”123 To Coy, Sherwood may have come across as punctilious, bureaucratic, and a bit dogmatic. One complication lurking in the background of the CoySherwood team was Sherwood’s feeling that he had his own relationship with FDR and could use it if and when he felt it necessary. On his own initiative, he was now spending a substantial amount of time and effort working on a proposal for a comprehensive reorganization of the production apparatus that he intended to give to FDR via Eleanor Roosevelt.124 It was not an assignment Coy had given him. From Sherwood’s diary, it is not clear if Coy even knew that Sherwood was doing this. Furthermore, Coy felt that he was the line of communication to the Oval Office and would not want his deputy to make end runs around him. It was one thing for the head of a major OEM agency like OPM or OPA to insist on having direct contact with the president, but not Coy’s own assistant. Nonetheless, whatever strains were between them, Coy made friendly overtures to Sherwood, such as inviting him to dinner at his home with a few other men they both worked with, including Dort and Cox.125 In Washington, being invited to a social event by one’s boss—at the boss’s home no less—was a significant signal of a relationship. However, within weeks of Pearl Harbor, Sherwood concluded that he would not be happy staying on as assistant LOEM. Regardless of any difficulties in his relationship with Coy, Sherwood wanted to be where the action was, to be doing something more concrete than mere liaising. For several weeks, he nosed around OEM’s line agencies looking for the right opportunity (and tried to enlist the political help of a US senator). On February 3, Sherwood announced that he would become the executive officer of the Division of Industry Operations at the War Production Board (WPB, the successor to OPM).126 After Sherwood left, and for the rest of Coy’s time as LOEM (through June 1943), he did not appoint anyone else as assistant LOEM, nor did Byrnes, his successor.

Two Days before Pearl Harbor, Coy Discusses Public Administration with a College Audience On Friday, December 5, 1941, Coy delivered the keynote address at Oberlin College in Ohio as part of its third biennial career conference for men.127 In the retrospect of history, it provides a vivid sense of how things looked

Coy as LOEM before the War: Management

157

to him two days before Pearl Harbor. Coy’s theme was the importance of public administration, and public service generally, in this time of a national defense emergency.128 Some of the passages of his speech were similar to what he had said to Indiana University students (chap. 5) and to the Society of Management in Washington (beginning of this chapter). Other sections of his talk conveyed the urgency of the topic. Certainly Coy was feeling it. Presciently, on Tuesday, December 2, Coy and Smith shared with each other the perspective that “it’s later than you think,” that is, that things were becoming much more urgent, yet some people were not recognizing this and were still acting like there was more time for gradually ramping up the national mobilization.129 In his speech, Coy denounced the lingering caricature of what government had been before FDR, the New Deal, and the defense mobilization. Such views reflected “a stubborn, unshakeable affection for a past that never existed, and a steadfast refusal to comprehend a present and future that demand adult judgment rather than persiflage” (3). He suggested that finally “we are leaving behind us the minimization of the importance of capable government administrators and the distaste for public service.” Government now needed the “quality of men in public service” like those in his audience (4). Coy tried to link his listeners to the immediacy of the present and the pressing needs for capable public servants: “In a time when the unknown and the unexpected of today are the headlines of next month, or next week, or tomorrow, the affairs of this nation cannot be entrusted to men whose vision is hobbled by the fragmentary experiences of the immediate past” (10). Getting closer to how things looked to him, Coy said that the armament production effort “is a government job.” This called for deciding on “the place which all the varied economic interests of the country—business, labor, agriculture, and all of the subdivisions—must play in the defense program” (13). Coy continued hammering away at the facile criticisms of FDR’s expansion of the scope of government: “By now only a few can afford the luxurious ignorance of thinking that somewhere in Washington a furtive little group of men are craftily erecting agency after agency in opposition to popular will. . . . The complexity of our industrialized civilization is the explanation of the expansion of government. That is the plain, unmistakable fact and that fact can not be ignored” (24–25). He also sought to convey that the defense mobilization was a fast-moving and adaptable organization. There was a need to be fleet-footed and to learn quickly from what already had been experienced. For example, already “we can see an avoidance of the danger of over-centralization” by shifting the focus of OEM’s agencies to regionalization and field administration (26). Coy concluded on a note

158

Get Things Moving!

similar to his previous speeches about public administration. All the current difficulties facing the country in the defense mobilization, including an increase in the role of the federal government, “have to be overcome.” But to do so, “the job of government calls for securing the 130 million free men and women” their current democratic freedoms. Therefore, “this is the true job that faces us today” (29–30). After the speech, Coy moved to a smaller room in a different building for an informal discussion with students.130 His speech got minimal press coverage, mostly in Saturday’s Cleveland Plain Dealer. The story accurately conveyed his theme of the importance of public administration in democratic government, especially during “the present crisis.”131 More striking is that, given the romanticized historical narrative of WWII, the true sentiments of higher education at the time were not supportive of the defense mobilization, let alone of a war to defeat Hitler. The Oberlin student newspaper pointedly noted in an editorial after the conference (and two days after Pearl Harbor) that some “faculty refused to boost the conference.” In particular, Coy’s call to arms was received flatly by some in the audience. There was even “a lack of manners of campus ‘dignitaries’ who walked out on Wayne Coy’s brilliant keynote.” This behavior reflected the pervasive student “apathy that remains the dominant Oberlin characteristic” concerning world affairs and dangers to the US that affected them.132 Coy was back at work on Saturday, December 6, the day after his speech. That afternoon he and Smith convened an informal summit meeting of five men involved in housing and related federal programs. The group met with Coy and Smith in Smith’s office for about an hour, adjourning at about 3:40 p.m.133 That meeting was Coy’s last recorded business before Pearl Harbor. In seeking to generalize about Coy’s approach to the LOEM role, it is clear that he understood he was not the conventional hierarchical boss of all the OEM agencies. He could not just order them around like a general to underlings. In part, this derived from not having a normal manager’s title such as director or executive director. Instead, he was exercising shadowy power in the name of the president, with the option for agencies to go over his head by appealing to the president, going public with leaks, or seeking protection from congressional allies. Coy acted on the insight that cooperation, coordination, and compromise were the best way to keep the civilian mobilization effort on track. It was not pretty and did not always work, but his leadership largely seemed to be, in Simon’s term, satisficing.

7

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War Policy and Politics, December 1941–May 1942

The preceding three chapters reviewed in detail Coy’s public administration record by dividing it into three spheres, with a chapter dedicated to each: chapters 4 (policy), 5 (politics), and 6 (management). The next two chapters cover the same three spheres, but to avoid redundancy and repetitiveness, in a slightly condensed presentation. In general, Coy’s wartime work was an extension of what he had done in 1941 before Pearl Harbor. Naturally, with the declaration of war, there was a major jump in the urgency of his work. But quantitatively and qualitatively, the differences, when contrasted with 1941, were more modest than perhaps would be expected. After Pearl Harbor, Coy shifted quickly to the increased pace of his work. The day after Congress passed the declaration of war against Japan, he and Smith attended a meeting that FDR convened with the members of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB).1 They discussed changes necessitated by the new wartime situation, including a Victory production program, projected scarcities of civilian goods (except food), and streamlining procurement procedures (US CPA 1946c, 40). Before the meeting with the president, Coy met with Smith and other BOB senior staffers to talk about what changes were now needed to the defense organization. After the SPAB meeting, Coy and Smith had lunch together to continue their conversation.2 Coy also quickly prepared a new wartime budget of $100 million for the operational expenses of OEM agencies for the remainder of FY 1942 (ending on June 30, 1942). BOB promptly submitted it to the Senate Appropriations Committee as an amendment to a defense funding bill that had been approved by the House a few days before Pearl Harbor. The

159

160

Get Things Moving!

planned allocations included about $12 million for CAS and $60,000 for the liaison officer (US Senate 1941b, 309). On Wednesday, December 10, a Senate subcommittee held a hearing on the bill, including the OEM amendment. Coy explained that because “war came on us, the Bureau of the Budget felt that the demands on the defense agencies were such that the expansion would come before we could get into the Congress in January” as part of the regular schedule of the president’s annual budget request submitted at that time for the next fiscal year (295). A senator asked if the new funding would indeed cover all OEM administrative expenses for the remainder of the current fiscal year. In his answer, Coy conveyed both a sense of urgency and unpredictability of how events might unfold. He said, “We are very hopeful but I do not know that anyone dare say that what we are now doing” would be enough. “We are working today under a very difficult situation” (306). It was an extensive appearance (along with several other OEM officials), covering twenty-three pages of the hearing transcript. During that time, Coy appeared to be unruffled by some relatively aggressive questioning from members, especially from subcommittee chair Kenneth McKellar (D-TN).3 Coy was prepared for the questions posed to him and either knew or had before him information on OEM’s financial, personnel, administrative, and programmatic matters. In a question about transportation bottlenecks, which did not have anything to do with the administrative costs of the transportation office, he was on top of the issue and carefully explained that a major cause was that railroads could not get adequate supplies of raw materials needed to repair engines and cars and get them quickly back into service (298). To a question about how many OCD staff were stationed in the field (versus in DC), Coy said he did not have that at his fingertips, but offered to guess—a very risky thing for a public administrator to do at any legislative hearing. McKellar invited him to do so. Coy guessed it was about seventy-five to one hundred. Again showing his mastery of administrative detail, he subsequently submitted the precise number for the hearing record: 87 (299). Moving uncharacteristically quickly because of the war, the subcommittee recommended that OEM receive the full request of $100 million, as did the full Senate (US Senate 1941c, 4). The House had approved this bill before Pearl Harbor, so the new OEM wartime funding amendment along with many other new war-related requests went to a conference committee on Friday, December 12. Regarding OEM, the House conferees were not willing to go along with the full requested funding approved by the Senate, and the conference committee agreed to reduce it to $75 million. As an

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 161

explanation, the conference report stated that it had “no desire to hamper any essential activities” of OEM. The recommended reduction “should be adequate for the immediate future. As the fiscal year progresses, and the specific needs become more definitively defined, such additional sums as may be justified can be provided” (US House 1941i, 7). Roosevelt signed the bill, including the $75 million for OEM administrative expenses, a few days later.4 But relatively routine business also needed Coy’s attention that week. For example, clearing reports to Congress was another way that he kept a close eye on OEM agency activities. It provided the LOEM with additional leverage over the agencies and the opportunity to preempt potential problems. On Thursday, December 11, Lend-Lease director Stettinius submitted to Coy a draft of his next quarterly report to Congress, as mandated by the Lend-Lease law. These reports had a high profile and were reviewed carefully by Congress and the press. Just a week earlier, in his speech at Oberlin on December 5 (chap. 6), Coy had highlighted these Lend-Lease reports as “an example of how the public can be kept freshly informed of the more important accomplishments of government.”5 Coy carefully reviewed the draft that day and replied, “I have gone through it and think that an excellent job has been done in the preparation. I have made no corrections.”6 That gave Stettinius permission to release it to Congress and the press. Other activities that first week of the war varied from major to minor. The former included making sure that the draft emergency executive order on the president’s wartime authority to take over radio facilities was acceptable to the War, Navy, State, and Treasury Departments.7 An example of the latter was Coy approving an allocation of $850 from discretionary OEM funds to the Census Bureau for tabulating results of a questionnaire on shoes (a product that consumed large amounts of leather).8

Public Policy Some of the policy issues Coy had been involved in before Pearl Harbor continued into the war, such as daylight saving and use of Canadian ships on the Great Lakes (chap. 4). After the declaration of war, FDR again asked for Congress for broad authority relating to daylight saving. Even then, Congress still refused to delegate extensive powers to the president on this issue. The law it eventually passed only gave FDR the power to move clocks by one hour.9 On Thursday, December 11, Coy updated the

162

Get Things Moving!

president on the results of the use of Canadian vessels to carry iron ore from one US port to another during the 1941 shipping season. He suggested asking Congress to renew the law for 1942, which FDR approved.10 Congress enacted the request. Labor-Management Relations One of the biggest domestic problems during WWII that is sometimes forgotten was labor-management strife. In some cases, New Deal pro-union legislation continued to be relied on by labor unions to organize, force (antiunion) management to bargain collectively, and win benefits it felt were long deserved. In other cases, wartime labor strife was due to the inflationary effects of increased federal spending on armaments and economic controls on consumer goods. Unions were intent on catching up to the cost of living or preemptively getting ahead of it. Finally, some labor issues were direct political power struggles between a major union figure and FDR. In general, Roosevelt tried to steer a middle course by encouraging management to settle voluntarily with labor, discouraging strikes from disrupting production, and generally urging restraint and cooperation for the sake of the war. Coy was sometimes involved in these issues. Within days of Pearl Harbor, the president convened a summit meeting of industrial labor and management. Coy urged him to be sure the agenda for the conference not focus exclusively on ending work stoppages because that would be perceived as anti-labor. Instead, he suggested a broader theme of urging initiatives to increase production. FDR liked that approach and asked Coy to work with the secretary of labor on this.11 At the conference, the AFL and CIO jointly agreed to a three-part proposal that would ban strikes, encourage peaceful settlements, and have the president create a labor board to settle remaining disputes.12 It was quickly dubbed the no-strike-no-lockout agreement. In mid-January, Roosevelt signed an executive order creating the National War Labor Board within OEM to promote labor-management harmony during the war.13 It largely reflected the results of the industry conference and replaced the prewar National Defense Mediation Board. The seeming peace treaty between unions and business was quickly put to a test at a long-standing labor-management dispute at a shipyard in Kearny, New Jersey. The issue centered on the union’s insistence on a “maintenance of membership” clause, which the management refused to agree to. Coy participated in a meeting of senior administration officials and then updated the president on the four options developed at the meeting

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 163

to break the impasse.14 Indicating FDR’s knowledge and skills, he replied to Coy with a suggestion of a fifth option for dealing with the subject.15 In general, Coy worked very closely with Philip Murray, president of the CIO. In advance of a major steel industry issue, Murray came to DC to confer with Coy about how to handle it. Coy, of course, kept FDR fully informed.16 In February, Murray wrote FDR a letter of appreciation of Coy’s work. Murray said that Coy is “rendering services of a nature calculated to maintain and improve the relationships between your administration and our organizations. It requires men possessed of certain qualities to render satisfactory services of this description in the labor field.” Murray concluded by urging that Roosevelt assign Coy more involvement in labor union matters.17 In another instance, Murray wrote to Coy asking him to pass a memo on to FDR.18 Many of the problems with labor emanated from John L. Lewis, president of the independent United Mine Workers (UMW). He was a union militant and was not willing to soften union demands because of the war. He became increasingly hostile to FDR to the point of working against him politically. In this fierce battle, Lewis was trying to maneuver out of office lower-level union officials who were sympathetic to the president’s wartime policy. Coy even talked with West Virginia’s governor to strategize on keeping in place the union officer in charge of the UMW’s West Virginia district who was an opponent of Lewis’s.19 The governor agreed. In March, Coy told the president that “John Lewis has declared war on you by declaring war on Phil Murray.”20 Murray was reluctant to engage in a fight with Lewis, thereby somewhat ceding power to Lewis. Coy tried to buck Murray up. For example, as a signal of support for Murray, Coy arranged for FDR to sign a letter to be read at a CIO conference (“My dear Mr. Murray”) praising the CIO’s moderate position on labor-management strife.21 Someone leaked to conservative columnist Paul Mallon that Coy was behind the administration’s public maneuvers against Lewis, calling it a “stop-Lewis publicity stunt.”22 Coy did a lot of hand-holding with Murray. In one case, he told FDR that Murray “was terribly disturbed” by some of FDR’s actions and some of the decisions of the new War Labor Board. But Coy thought that “by Sunday Murray will have improved his state of mind. You will recall a previous instance similar to this.”23 Roosevelt did not always follow Coy’s advice. For example, in April, Coy suggested FDR call Murray to buck him up. The president penciled “No” on Coy’s message.24 Major industrial sectors were often the focus of these labor problems. In addition to shipbuilding yards and mining, others included steel and

164

Get Things Moving!

railroads. In the “little steel” case pending at the War Labor Board, Coy arranged for the board to postpone for a few days its consideration of the case as a way to gain time for Murray to meet with FDR first.25 Regarding railroads, Coy gave FDR a lengthy report on the problems vis-à-vis the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen because the president of the union was seeking a meeting with the president to talk about these issues. In response, FDR dictated a short note to Coy, “Will you speak to me about this?”26 One of the bitterest and longest-lasting strikes in the spring of 1942 was at the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad. The president of the railroad refused a federal suggestion of using arbitration to settle the issues raised by the union. Finally, reluctantly, Roosevelt ordered the OEM transportation agency to take over the management of the railroad (as the federal government had done nationally in WWI). Coy kept FDR updated on the success of the takeover, with workers returning to work and the line resuming full operation.27 Coy also arranged for BOB to release additional funding to the OEM transportation agency to cover the costs of sending personnel to manage the company.28 African Americans The treatment of African Americans continued to be a public policy (and politically touchy) issue after war was declared as it had been before. NAACP Secretary Walter White complained to Coy about the appointment of T. Roy Reid as USDA personnel director because of an earlier role in which Reid had been involved that suggested a hostile viewpoint to equality of the races. Coy dictated a reply trying to prevent the issue from escalating. He suggested that White meet with Reid for an in-depth conversation before taking the issue to the USDA secretary or going public: “I know from my personal acquaintance with you that you are a great believer in tolerance. Even though you cite a case against Mr. Reid, I think in all fairness to Reid and in fact in fairness to you, Walter White, and to the colored people of this country whom you represent, that the procedure which I have suggested will appeal to you as eminently fair.”29 (According to the US Government Manual, Reid was still in place in mid-1944, suggesting that White’s concerns had been alleviated.) Coy had extensive correspondence with Lawrence Cramer, executive secretary of the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice, about federal employment of African Americans in OEM. Cramer pointedly cited the information he had received from the Navy Department (i.e., the civilian

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 165

agency, not the Navy itself ), noting that it now employed 1,051 “colored personnel” in relation to a total of 14,745. This was an improvement over the previous period.30 Coy replied that, at his direction, personnel offices of OEM agencies were informed “that there could be no racial discrimination” in hiring. As a result, “a substantial number of Negroes” were hired by OEM agencies. However, he was unable to reply with any statistics because, again at his direction, application forms for OEM agencies no longer requested that applicants list their race.31 Cramer responded with a request that supervisor-level employees of agencies be sent a questionnaire on the number of African Americans they had.32 Coy asked CAS head Dort to look into it and check: “Can we help him?” Dort, in turn, passed it on to CAS’s personnel director, Charles Mills.33 (See chap. 9 for the continuation of this subject.) Coy also recommended Mercer Mance, an African American lawyer in Indianapolis, for admission to the FBI as an agent. Mance had worked with him when Coy headed the WPA in Indiana. Using the language common for the times, he wrote Rowe about the query “from a young negro [sic] friend in Indianapolis. Entirely aside from the fact that he is a Hoosier he is a very intelligent negro [sic] and would reflect great credit” on the FBI if hired.34 Coy also demonstrated his personal commitment to racial equality in February. He heard that an African American messenger was denied a seat by the white driver of an OEM station wagon making its rounds. (This was a case of messengers who were not motorcyclists [chap. 3]. Instead, they used whatever transportation they could, including streetcars and buses.) Coy complained that, after he personally looked into the matter, it looked as though OEM’s central garage had an informal policy that it would “not carry Negro messengers at any time.” When there was a request for a car to pick up and drop off African American messengers, the routine response was that no car was available. “Either drivers of the cars are adverse to carrying Negros or there is an outstanding instruction that Negroes should not be carried.”35 Cox hurrahed Coy for using his position against racial discrimination: “Your memorandum to Dallas Dort upon the Negro messenger problem is swell. My hat is off to you.”36 Dort eventually replied that it was all a “misunderstanding.” This car was not on a point-to-point assignment; rather, it was doing a fixed circuit of stops at specific federal buildings with OEM offices, and the route happened not to include the messenger’s destination of Capitol Hill. He also reassured Coy that there was no racial discrimination for passengers who were messengers and that most drivers were African American. To check independently, Coy sent a

166

Get Things Moving!

staffer to ride as a passenger for two and a half hours on one of the station wagons. He reported back that many passengers were African American messengers. It was, Dort said, the high volume of requests for cars to drive officials that often led to refusals to send cars for messengers. However, some officials (Stettinius and Rauh) had made special arrangements to be sure that African American messengers detailed to their offices were provided with transportation when needed.37 Given the racial mores of the time in Washington, it is likely that Coy was more right than Dort. Regardless, Coy’s complaint had its intended effect, and the garage now had been put on notice by the boss not to engage in invisible discrimination. In April, Coy received a call complaining that the Broadway company of Porgy and Bess was coming to DC to perform at a gala banquet at the Mayflower hotel to celebrate Army Day, but could not stay there overnight because the hotel permitted only white guests. Coy called Assistant War Secretary John McCloy to ask about this. McCloy checked and called back. Indeed, the skeletal information Coy had was accurate, but McCloy found several legalistic reasons to claim that the War Department had no link to the event and could do nothing about it: The banquet had been organized by the independent nonprofit veterans group Military Order of the World War (I), the Army and War Department had no formal role in the event, it was taking place because FDR had declared Army Day in a proclamation, and the arrangements were too far along to cancel anyway.38 The event went on as planned.39 Shortages With the war, shortages of products and infrastructure came quickly. For example, Coy updated FDR on a rubber shortage and the resultant need for tires to be rationed, in part so there would be enough for commitments to ship to the USSR. He pointed out that this was oddly contradicted when OPM permitted car companies to continue producing new cars in January. In response, Roosevelt gave Coy’s memo to Hopkins to “take this up immediately.”40 A few months later, Coy updated FDR on the need to encourage truck drivers to maximize the life of their tires. Press Secretary Early liked it and suggested that the president could eventually release a public statement on it.41 Rubber continued to be a scarce commodity to the point of hampering transit services to defense workers.42 The rubber and tire shortage of course affected transportation, but there were other related problems with shipping and transportation. In

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 167

March 1942, Joseph Eastman, director of the Office of Defense Transportation (an agency within OEM), submitted his routine monthly report to Coy for the president.43 Coy read it carefully and was unhappy with several major points. He forwarded the report to FDR along with a draft letter he hoped FDR would send to Eastman in response to the report.44 Coy and FDR were concerned about continuing reliance on coastal shipping instead of shifting to rail; coordination of shipping from major ports by the Army, Navy and Lend-Lease; pooling of retail deliveries; and maximizing use of inland waterways in Florida. FDR signed and sent the letter.45 The next monthly report was more satisfactory to Coy. He forwarded it to FDR with a summary of key news and had no request for presidential follow-up.46 Coy continued being unhappy about the overall shipping situation and thought there was a need for an in-depth review of it. In a bureaucratic maneuver, he convinced Vice President Wallace (as chair of the Board of Economic Warfare) to write Coy requesting such a report.47 In turn, Coy shared the letter with FDR who endorsed the idea.48 Within weeks, Coy produced a report that identified the weak points and bottlenecks in the supply chain. His researchers identified shocking information about the condition of shipping. Rauh told him that “losses last week were the worst in history—one half.” Rauh suggested an emergency freeze on departing ships until the Navy had a full-fledged convoy protection system in place. Reflecting this situation, Rauh said that foreign merchant marine sailors were so scared that five hundred were deserting a month. Quite agitated, Rauh described Maritime Commission Chair Land as “the worst criminal we have today on the war effort.”49 The next day, Rauh reported that there was no coordination between American Atlantic ports, “that each port acts as a law unto itself and sometimes boats were sent out not fully loaded.”50 Coy finished his report by early May and told the president that his findings were “of such import that I want to discuss it with you personally.51 Two days later, FDR met with the vice president and Coy to be briefed on their report and consider their recommendations to improve the shipping system.52 In macabre confirmation of the relevance of Coy’s report, the next day Coy found out and told Roosevelt that four tankers had been sunk by German submarines off Florida in the last few days, even though the War Shipping Administration had claimed two weeks earlier that it had taken all tankers off coastal service.53 Shortages of scrap iron came up at the president’s press conference on April 24, 1942. In reply, he said there probably was more scrap iron around the country that could be salvaged, mentioning a dump on his own land

168

Get Things Moving!

in Hyde Park with old and broken farming equipment. He was making arrangements to have them hauled out for reuse, he said.54 As soon as the session was over, he dashed off a note to Coy: Wayne. Old mine machinery “ trolley rails “ dumps in the woods FDR55 Coy promptly asked Nelson, head of the War Production Board, to look into it.56 Coy got back a detailed reply from WPB’s Bureau of Industrial Conservation on its efforts at general salvage from homes, farms, small retail establishments, car graveyards, and industrial salvage yards.57 When Coy forwarded the memo to FDR, he dryly commented that “the Salvage Division really believes in conservation. They use both sides of the paper” in the report that they submitted.58 Other Policy Areas Coy’s wartime brief was so broad that it covered nearly the entire civilian side of the federal war effort. Some other policy areas he participated in included manpower, OPA, antitrust, production goals, workplace safety, poll taxes, public information, and the USO. For example, he participated in summit meetings that Smith called for overview discussions of manpower problems and about the operations of the OPA.59 Regarding antitrust enforcement, Coy conveyed to FDR that the conflict between the Justice and War Departments on the application of antitrust laws during the war had become “one of the most bitter scraps that I have seen in the Government for some time.” He urged FDR to designate someone not associated with either department to look into it, such as Rosenman.60 In the spring, the president received an alarmed letter marked “personal and confidential” from Gardner Jackson, a former union official (and ally of Phil Murray) now at USDA. Gardner was very concerned about the current rate of production and the likelihood of not meeting schedules and goals.61 FDR dictated a note to Coy, “Will you speak to me about this?”62 When Coy came in, Roosevelt asked him to show the letter to WPB Chair Nelson discretely, but not to leave a copy with Nelson. Coy did that and then returned Gardner’s letter to the president’s secretary.63

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 169

Coy’s portfolio included workplace safety. In addition to their impact on individuals (the social worker in Coy), injuries and accidents had the effect of reducing production (Coy as LOEM). He therefore asked FDR to highlight the issue, and the president obliged. At a March press conference, Roosevelt said, “Wayne Coy suggests that I say a word about a thing that last August I issued a Proclamation on, asking an intensified campaign against accidents, and especially the campaign that is being directed by the National Safety Council” (Roosevelt 1972, 19: 219). FDR proceeded to provide statistics Coy gave him on the losses of man-days due to accidents and urged employers and employees to focus on safety in the workplace. The president’s plug for Coy’s campaign got little notice from the media.64 Roosevelt mentioned Coy in another press conference the month before, this time regarding poll taxes. Southern racists in Congress had complained that when tenant farmers submitted their expenses to the Farm Security Agency (also, confusingly, FSA) in loan applications, they could include all taxes including the poll tax. This meant that more poor farmers (African American or white) would be able to vote, overcoming the very intent of poll taxes. There was the usual Washington kerfuffle, with southerners framing the issue for the media their way and the head of the FSA floundering to explain the other side. FDR assumed the question might come up at his next press conference on Friday, February 13, 1942. On Thursday he asked Press Secretary Early to ask Coy to prepare “a little statement for me to make to the Press?”65 On short notice, Coy did, but apparently was unable to determine authoritatively the answer to a very detailed aspect of the controversy, namely if the FSA also permitted farmers to list on their loan applications membership dues to the conservative Farm Bureau and then deduct it from the loans and pay it directly to the Bureau. (If so, why was it okay for FSA loans to cover Farm Bureau dues, but not poll taxes?) At the press conference, FDR said, “I asked Wayne about that just now, and I don’t know. We haven’t got the information on it—whether it is allowed in the budget or not.” (Roosevelt 1972, 19: 136). Mentioning Coy only by his first name conveyed that the reporters would of course know whom Roosevelt was talking about. (The White House stenographer later inserted Coy’s last name in parenthesis in the verbatim transcript of the press conference.) It will be recalled that in October 1941, FDR created by executive order the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) as a unit within OEM (chap. 6) and appointed Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish to head it (while retaining his Library of Congress hat). DOI director Horton viewed

170

Get Things Moving!

OFF’s creation as a slap to DOI’s place in the defense mobilization. At first, Horton maintained a frosty relationship with MacLeish, though it gradually improved (Lee 2012, 109–10, 175–76), in part because of Coy’s gentle coaxing of Horton. Coy was Horton’s administrative boss, at least theoretically, even though Horton sometimes claimed that he was accountable only to FDR. In January 1942, using his power as LOEM, Coy formally delegated to OFF the clearance power for all posters issued by OEM agencies, an action Horton was very unhappy about too.66 The executive order creating OFF also called for appointment of an advisory committee, and MacLeish invited Coy to serve on it.67 Coy accepted, although that put him in a slightly awkward position vis-à-vis DOI, because DOI was the only other horizontal silo (along with CAS) that was directly under his authority. From January to March, Coy actively participated as a member of the Committee on War Information, sometimes hosting its evening meetings at his centrally located office.68 For example, the committee worked on and then issued a uniform news policy, a very touchy subject to the media, as well as uniform policy guidance on the release of procurement information.69 Recreational services to the military had been hampered by disunity in the USO (United Service Organization) particularly due to competition at the local level by the six major religious organizations that were the USO’s primary sponsors. Coy was concerned that the next annual fundraising campaign for the USO would be hurt by these occurrences. To get out in front of the problem, he suggested that FDR appoint Raymond Fosdick, a civic leader in New York, to look into the problem and recommend solutions before the next fundraising effort. FDR responded that Coy’s proposal was “an excellent idea.”70 Coy contacted Fosdick, who agreed to do it as long as his inquiry would be known only to FDR and Coy.71 Fosdick’s report then became the basis for FDR’s public statement endorsing the fundraising campaign.72 In it, the president praised USO, but softly emphasized the need for “united action and joint service,” hinting that the sponsoring religious organizations needed to meld into one group with one purpose.73

Politics As he had before Pearl Harbor (chap. 5), Coy continued to be active behind the scenes in politics, sometimes issues that related to his LOEM work, sometimes not. For example, Coy:

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 171

• told FDR of a potential Democratic candidate to oppose to FDR’s own congressman, the very conservative Hamilton Fish (of “Martin, Barton, and Fish” fame).74 • drafted a get-well letter for Roosevelt to sign to the chairman of the Indiana Democratic Party after an operation.75 • updated the president on the maneuverings regarding who would be the Democratic nominee for governor in Ohio. Coy met for an hour with Congressman Robert Crosser (D-OH), hoping to persuade him to run. Coy then arranged for FDR to meet with Crosser to help get him to yes. He did not run.76 • briefed Roosevelt on the internal party politics in Pennsylvania to select a gubernatorial nominee.77 • sought FDR’s consent for an effort by the defense transportation director to recruit Joseph Kennedy to return to federal service to help in the war mobilization. Roosevelt agreed to let the transportation director try, but doubted Kennedy would accept. He was right.78 • updated Roosevelt on the best candidate for appointment as new chief judge of the District of Columbia’s Court of Appeals. FDR replied: “Will you speak to me about this?”79 The president eventually named the person Coy had recommended. • apologized to a congressman whose last name, Wasielewski, was misspelled on an OEM mailing list.80 • after attending the president’s press conference on April 3, 1942, when FDR publicly solicited a formal yet catchy name for the war, submitted a memo suggesting “the Peoples’ War.”81 • attended another press conference on April 21. As he was leaving, FDR dashed off a note to Postmaster General Frank Walker to hold off on filling the vacancy for postmaster in Boston (a decision that a local congressman was very interested in influencing), handed it to Coy, and asked him to deliver it.82 • nominated a Hoosier who was “a real liberal” for the public representative slot on the War Labor Board.83

172

Get Things Moving!

Politics and Management: Dollar-a-Year Men As will be recalled (chap. 5), Roosevelt wavered between wanting to control the appointment of dollar-a-year men (in particular to veto political opponents he felt had crossed a line) and wanting to rid himself of the paperwork and overt political responsibility. Finally, in October 1941, he had delegated the appointment power to the major OEM agencies and the rest to Coy. In January 1942, when FDR reconstituted OPM as the War Production Board (WPB), he had designated Nelson as its chair (and, using contemporary nomenclature, CEO). Coy promptly notified Nelson that he now had the power to appoint dollar-a-year men. To be sure that Nelson felt confident about the transfer, Coy made a point of telling him that “I have discussed this matter personally with the president and he asked that the authority be delegated to you.”84 Nonetheless, Coy continuing clearing some prospective appointments with the president. Generally, FDR wrote “OK” on Coy’s memos.85 One appointment stuck in Coy’s craw. In the summer of 1941, Roosevelt had vetoed the appointment of Gordon Reed to OPM, if only because Rowe and Coy were skeptical that Reed had the financial wherewithal to be a dollar-a-year man and, if so, that would mean he would be especially dependent on continued corporate funding of his salary. In that case, Reed would not be able “to serve in the interests of the Government alone.”86 Even though FDR had explicitly vetoed Reed’s appointment, Knudsen quietly kept him on in OPM. Reed’s presence came to light only after Nelson took over as WPB chair and asked for a comprehensive survey of all the personnel transferring to WPB. Coy and Rowe hit the roof.87 Coy wrote the president, “It is a hell of a note that your disapproval of him in the first instance was ignored.”88 In mitigation of that, Coy noted that there was now financial information confirming that Reed had holdings of about $800,000 along with a continuing corporate salary of $12,000 a year. Coy also told FDR that a lower-level OPM official not involved in the subterfuge spoke well of Reed’s service and “asks that the matter be presented to you to see if you are willing now to give approval to his being continued.” “OK,” Roosevelt wrote on it.89 When Coy conveyed the approval to WPB, he made a point of noting FDR’s unhappiness that “his previous action on this matter had meant nothing.”90 This was more than ideological warfare between New Dealers and business. In April, USDA Secretary Wickard told Coy about current infighting over controlling rationing of fats and oils. There was “an awful big fight

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 173

on between the Independents and the Big 4; that Procter and Gamble [dollar-a-year] men in WPB are fighting to keep control of fats and oils and will resist any attempt to take it away.”91 In other words, marketplace competition transferred from the business world to government regulation for the duration of the war. Big business was using its dollar-a-year men to strangle, or at least weaken, smaller competitors for market segment in the postwar economy. This was exactly why New Dealers were so suspicious about the power of dollar-a-year men during the war. Dealing with the Congressional Conservative Coalition The coalition on Capitol Hill of conservative Democrats and minority Republicans got renewed vigor as a result of the declaration of war. From 1933 to 1941, their complaints and criticisms had to be based on political ideology or on vague accusations of bureaucracy, political machines (like WPA), wasting money, and—especially during the fight to implement the Brownlow Committee report—their claim that Roosevelt was seeking to become a dictator. Now that the US was in a state of war, the conservative coalition was reenergized (Lee 2005, chap. 8; 2011, 157–65; 2012, 154–58). It smoothly pivoted and reframed its traditional criticism into three warrelated foci. First, conservatives claimed that the president was bungling the war effort and the economic mobilization. This permitted them to aver their patriotism and support for the war and to claim that they were merely focusing on the management of the war by FDR. Second, they accused the administration of misplaced priorities, that the war’s priority must mean downgrading or defunding various New Deal social reforms, programs, and agencies. Third, they accused the administration of engaging in propaganda that tried to equate patriotism with support for the president.92 Generally, the media preferred to refer to this group as the “economy bloc” because it kept emphasizing the need to cut spending, especially expenditures not directly related to the military’s prosecution of the war. Given that OEM encompassed nearly the entire civilian wartime mobilization, it was a big fat target for the conservative coalition. As LOEM, Coy often faced these attacks. Two of the leaders of the coalition were Senators Harry Byrd (D-VA) and Millard Tydings (D-MD).93 They chaired two congressional entities that became the institutional homes for the conservatives’ running criticism of the war effort. Byrd chaired the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, which had been created in 1941. Tydings chaired a special subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee created in

174

Get Things Moving!

February 1942 to investigate “expediting and intensifying the war effort, [and] reducing governmental expenses” (US Senate 1942b, 1). The cohesion and shared goals of the two chairs was reflected in back-to-back letters that Coy received from Tydings and Byrd, both signed (and delivered) on Tuesday, February 24, 1942. The letter from Tydings demanded that Coy submit a reply no later than that Friday. It must include “the names, business and home addresses, title, pay and grade of the head of each bureau, division, section and other administrative units in the Office for Emergency Management” as well as “the number of persons working under each person enumerated and that two lists be prepared, one for the District of Columbia and the metropolitan area and the other for personnel outside this area.”94 The letter from Byrd contained a questionnaire on multiple operational activities of OEM seeking information on the administrative activities funded from lump-sum emergency appropriations allocated at the president’s discretion, such as ownership of cars and trucks, employment of chauffeurs, and employee travel.95 Byrd then followed up with a demand to CAS for all travel vouchers and authorizations by OCD. Evidently, he had heard rumors or had suspicions about La Guardia and possibly others engaging in excessive and expensive travel. CAS director Dort asked Coy for guidance on how to handle it. Showing his political finesse, Coy advised Dort to reply that the senator’s staff was welcome to come down to the office to go over the files, “but that it would be too big an undertaking and cost too much” to make copies of all these records.96 The Tydings Committee released its report in July 1942. (Even though the report was released shortly after the period covered in this chapter, it is presented here so that a more complete story is in one place.) The report said that OEM “might be termed a second Federal Government structure.” These were merely “so-called war agencies.” From their operations, the amount of “duplication, overlapping, and paralleling of functions, already being prosecuted in the regular departments and agencies, exists to an unbelievable degree.” This duplication, including in fair employment practices (Tydings was Southern in his politics), “would astound the imagination of a well-reasoning person” (US Senate 1942b, 7). Coverage in the Baltimore Sun followed this framing, presenting Coy as the president’s man for “the giant catch-all organization” of OEM.97 An editorial in another Maryland newspaper said that Tydings had exposed one reason why federal taxes were so high—too high really. His report ostensibly documented and proved the duplication of federal functions between FDR’s OEM, “through Wayne Coy, liaison officer,” and the regular executive branch agencies.98

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 175

Other conservatives on Capitol Hill joined in the fray. For example, a pro-business Republican congressman from New Jersey called the LOEM legal office asking how OEM’s War Labor Board was funded. Cautiously Coy advised that the reply be a bland explanation that it came from discretionary funds Congress had appropriated to the president. If the congressman wanted more detailed information on specific amounts, he should put it in writing and send it to Coy.99 Publicly Promoting the Administration’s Management of the War Showbiz columnist Leonard Lyons reported in his column in April 1942 that Coy “has been touring the country for one month, making private surveys in behalf of the White House.”100 That Coy was even mentioned in an entertainment and celebrity column is odd but nonetheless is an indication of his importance at the time. This tidbit of gossip was apparently a very garbled and exaggerated version of Coy going on a short speaking tour on March 9–12, 1942.101 His first public appearance was before the Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Chamber of Commerce.102 He then traveled to West Lafayette, Indiana, to give a speech at a Purdue University special student convocation on “To Win the War and the Peace” (1942a). In it, he analyzed the lessons of the previous year and the prospects of what a postwar world should look like. Regarding the recent past, Coy openly criticized those who were now calling for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to retreat back to the US coasts for defensive purposes. Coy said this came from the same old isolationists and that their advice was “foolishness” and the voices of “defeatists.” These were the same people who had opposed the prewar preparedness buildup. They had said back then that “Europe’s troubles were none of our affair” and that “we had nothing to worry about—except politics and the New Deal, and the labor unions’ trying to take over industry and the management’s trying to kick labor in the teeth” (6–7). Coy then shifted to public administration. He said that just as industry needed conversion to war, so did government. “Faulty organization and inadequate administrative methods are the cause of some of the mistakes of your Government.”103 However, the key weakness of public administration was “the intangibility of the Government’s affairs” because “it is very difficult in Washington to take aside a bureau chief or a lawyer or a stenographer and say, ‘Look! A hundred men were wounded today because of your delay!’ ” Shifting to a more abstract and less inflammatory way to say it, he suggested that this difficulty “lies in

176

Get Things Moving!

our general inability to grasp the fact that the enemy is upon us though we cannot see his fire” (10–11). Commenting on the present, Coy suggested that the US did not seem to be, at the moment, as resilient as Russia and China in coming back from defeats. Those countries “spit out” their battlefield reverses and kept fighting (12). American public opinion, on the other hand, was dwelling on the defeats that began at Pearl Harbor (and then the Philippines) and seemingly was not able to shake them off. Instead, the American public seemed to prefer the usual political game of finding someone to blame. Turning to the future, Coy said that full national mobilization had not yet been achieved, in part because “great segments of our population are excluded from the war effort,” presumably referring to African Americans. The war must be fought with the premise to “extend and improve our democracy” (13). In particular, Americans who engage in the war effort “would like to know that what is won by their sacrifice will never be surrendered” in a postwar retrenchment back to the status quo ante (15). Coy outlined Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms as the war’s goals. As to criticisms of the vagueness of FDR’s pledge, he used this analogy: “We don’t buy the furniture for the living room until we have planned and built the house” (26). He concluded with a call for national unity and mobilization.104 Coy’s most important and most noticed public defense of the administration’s war effort came in an article he wrote in the April 1942 issue of Atlantic Monthly (Coy 1942b). In part an extension of his Purdue speech, Coy’s theme was the importance of good public administration and good public administrators. He feared that, so far, the conversion of the federal government to war might mean that “it will probably be the best government that ever lost a war” (399). In example after example, he described government officials (and legislators) as continuing to act with a business-asusual mentality. In one case, Lend-Lease steel was shipped to the UK, and then some of it was reshipped from there to British armed forces around the world. That meant “running steel twice through Hitler’s U-boats” (401). Why the insanity? Those were the usual rules, and suspending them was not viewed as a high priority effort by the government officials in question. In another case, the only manufacturer of large-caliber guns to be placed on merchant ships was about to go bankrupt because it underestimated its costs in the supply contract it originally signed with the federal government. In Washington, officials argued for a week about whether they should let the company go bankrupt and then take it over. To Coy, this looked “as though the officials were bargaining for soap in peacetime” (401). Another

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 177

absurdity was arguing over the precise wording of suspending US compliance with an international agreement about maximum loads for tankers (401). When a bureau was unintentionally left off the membership of a committee drafting an interagency policy, rather than quickly suggesting some modifications to the draft for unintended omissions, “instead they complained that their jurisdiction had been meanly and unpardonably invaded.” This obstructionism cost several days and, to people like Coy, brought “despair” (402). As to the controversial production decision about when to end the manufacturing of new cars, Coy conceded it was a difficult decision with some merit on both sides. What he criticized was that when one official argued for immediate suspension of new car production, he was dismissed as “hysterical” (402). Coy also took on the parochial pleadings of members of the House and Senate. He related one story of an important legislator insistent on not letting a quasi-monopolistic producer expand capacity unless all efforts to farm out production to smaller companies had been exhausted. Cowed, officials agreed to write a policy incorporating that principle “in order to avoid the further delay of an open fight. This unnecessary work, however, took up considerable time and the needed production will come weeks later than it should have.” The problem was that the legislator insisted on defeating the Axis “in the particular manner most palatable to his personal desires, a view which was widely held in lands now overrun” (402–3). The latter was a jab at French industrial mobilization during the Phony War (between Hitler’s invasions of Poland and France). Coy assured readers that problems of organization and public administration “are fast being set right.” But the problem was more than tables of organization. Even the commitment of the Cabinet secretaries to this mentality of urgency “cannot alone prevent the recurrence of such instances of mismanagement.” What was needed was an “esprit de corps of the operating personnel—from sub-Cabinet members to messenger boys.” The main obstacle to achieving this was, as he had said at Purdue, “maladministration” caused by the lack of seeing a direct link between the work of civil servants with harm, death, and defeats on the battlefield. What was needed was an authentic and urgent intensity in Washington. Coy concluded with his perspective about improving wartime public administration in Washington: “The officers of government must somehow learn that in a very real sense they are standing precariously on the cliffs while the enemy is pouring up the beaches” (403–4). Coy’s article attracted notable attention, probably because he was somewhat criticizing the administration of the war in which he was so

178

Get Things Moving!

highly involved.105 It also could have been interpreted as a jab at FDR and his entire administration.106 But generally the media coverage treated it as a sober and fair call to action without partisan or ideological overtones. Some newspapers ran news stories about it or reprinted excerpts of it.107 H. V. Kaltenborn, a leading nonpartisan radio commentator, praised it, saying that Coy “is one of the higher-ups in Washington who knows what’s wrong and has the courage to say so.”108 Writing from Chicago, Arthur Krock, influential Times columnist (and relatively consistent critic of FDR after the early years), lauded Coy’s article as “almost a composite of the complaints launched at Washington by observing and well-informed Middle Westerners.”109 Many newspapers ran editorials endorsing Coy’s points, though largely as confirmation of their already-set views.110 News Media Coy continued to maintain a relatively low profile as a news maker in the daily churn of public affairs in Washington, but he accepted that dealing with reporters was part of his duties. As before Pearl Harbor, he was sometimes profiled or mentioned in feature stories as an important, but largely unknown, official high in the administration. The month after Pearl Harbor, Life magazine ran a story on what the new wartime Washington was like. It mentioned Coy in a short list of “the ‘coming’ men” in Washington (including a photo), although mistakenly identifying him as one of FDR’s administrative assistants (instead of special assistant).111 A series distributed by the North American Newspaper Alliance on “key men in wartime” profiled Coy and described him as “a great man for detail; administrative work is his dish and he never loses his temper.” He “takes orders directly from the Chief Executive, but who plays his role off-stage.”112 As before Pearl Harbor, the monthly Nation’s Business continued going against the preconceived views of its readership by presenting Coy in a positive light (chap. 5). Its April 1942 issue identified him as in “the inner circle of White House intimates [who] makes most of the basic policies.” In particular, it said that Coy, Smith, and Rosenman “have much say-so on departmental organization.”113 The Washington Merry-Go-Round column, with a somewhat liberalleaning viewpoint, continued speaking well of him, describing him as having “brains, courage and real executive ability.”114 On the other hand, conservative columnist Peter Edson described OEM as the epitome of “Mr. Government Bureaucracy, run by a specialist in government paper work,

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Policy and Politics 179

Wayne Coy.”115 What was needed, he said, was less red tape and fewer officials whose only expertise was government. They should be replaced by men with real-world—that is, business—experience. It was a representative juxtaposition reflecting the political wars of the time.

8

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War Management and Workday Routine, December 1941–May 1942

The preceding chapter covered Coy’s LOEM work during the first half-year of the war in the spheres of policy and politics. This chapter completes that review by discussing his management activities in that period and also includes some generalizations about his daily work based on his appointment calendar and summaries of his phone conversations in April 1942.

Management The shift to war did not radically change Coy’s approach to managing OEM (chap. 6). To avoid redundancy and duplication in the text, this subchapter focuses on some highlights that demonstrate Coy’s continued managerial style or relatively new developments. OEM as a Growth Business As the organizational home for the nonmilitary aspects of the war effort, OEM continued growing and reorganizing to meet pressing policy and political circumstances. In response to the criticisms of OPM and the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB [chap. 6]), in mid-January, FDR superseded them with a War Production Board (WPB) as an agency within OEM.1 Even though this was a multimember board, Roosevelt made it clear that Nelson’s role as chairman was that of a full-fledged CEO and that

181

182

Get Things Moving!

Nelson would not be required to get approval of the Board for his decision making. Coy was extensively involved in planning the reorganization with BOB.2 Over the next few months, FDR created several other new entities within OEM, including the War Shipping Administration,3 the Office of Alien Property Custodian,4 the War Relocation Authority (to move Japanese Americans to concentration camps),5 and the War Manpower Commission (WMC).6 By the end of April, OEM comprised fifteen constituent agencies, not counting the two horizontal units—CAS and DOI—directly under LOEM (US OEM 1942). Although the president strongly preferred the flexibility of having all the civilian mobilization agencies exist based on executive orders, he lost one fight. As part of the long effort at price stabilization (chap. 5), in January, Congress passed a bill making OPA a statutory agency. Despite his misgivings, FDR signed it.7 However, there was less here than met the eye in terms of the structure and management of the nonmilitary war effort. OPA continued its ongoing interactions with OEM agencies, and OPA head Henderson continued working with Coy on relevant issues. A strong indication of the ongoing managerial relationship between OPA and LOEM was that when Congress explicitly gave CAS more exclusive power to be the provider of administrative services to OEM agencies, it included OPA as well (with the minor caveat that BOB needed to agree) (chap. 9). Coy was also deeply involved in a reorganization of all federal housing programs into a National Housing Authority. In mid-February, the president met with Coy, Smith, Rosenman, and assistant BOB director Blandford for more than an hour to review their reorganization recommendations.8 Rosenman recommended appointing Blandford as National Housing administrator. Smith protested at the prospect of losing Blandford but had to acknowledge it was a good idea.9 FDR signed the reorganization executive order in late February.10 Time magazine credited Rosenman and Coy for reorganizing the housing “mess.”11 With housing taken care of for the time being, the two problem children under LOEM were La Guardia’s OCD and the multiple information agencies, including OEM’s DOI and OFF. Coy and Smith had opposed La Guardia’s appointment from the start (chaps. 3 and 5). By late 1941, they were tearing their hair out about what they saw as La Guardia’s failings. In November 1941, a month before Pearl Harbor, La Guardia was reelected (by a surprisingly narrow margin). Coy then gently asked FDR if this was an opportune moment to edge the mayor out.12 The president did not take the hint. The first weekend after Pearl Harbor, Coy and Smith wrote FDR, this time more plaintively pleading for action: “Your Committee on Civilian

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

183

Defense is despondent and despairing of the activities of that organization. We think it is terribly important that we have a very frank discussion with you about this matter.”13 FDR met with them briefly on December 15.14 They also met for an hour and a half with Mrs. Roosevelt because of her position in the agency and interest in the subject. The president agreed to consider sending a memo to La Guardia urging the mayor to give up his management responsibilities at OCD and become, in effect, the titular public spokesman for the agency.15 They drafted it for him, but he never signed it.16 Always reluctant to fire people directly or publicly, in January Roosevelt named Harvard Law Dean James Landis as the executive of OCD without any change in La Guardia’s title and status. After an awkward two weeks, La Guardia said he would resign.17 Mrs. Roosevelt promptly said she would too. For Coy and Smith, one headache finally was solved. The other problem child was the multiplicity of PR agencies in the executive branch. The conservative coalition incessantly attacked these activities as duplication, a waste of money (why was any PR needed at all?), and implicit political propaganda to make FDR look good (Lee 2005, chap. 8). Roosevelt agreed to have the subject studied, which Coy participated in.18 Similar to his inaction on OCD, FDR kept delaying any decision on an information reorganization. For Coy (and Smith), this project seemed to turn into the never-ending management story of the first half-year of the war. (Roosevelt finally acted in June [chap. 9].) Loyalty Investigations The outbreak of war made issues of loyalty more serious, but also more complicated. Now that the USSR and the US were both actively in combat and allies against Germany, was it okay for American citizens to be sympathetic to the USSR? As far as Hoover was concerned, nothing had changed. A Communist was a subversive. Period. In the meantime, prosaic issues of costs hung over FBI investigations. The FBI charged OEM $60 for every “character and fitness” investigation it conducted (for applicants and new hires).19 The Treasury Department only charged about $40.20 Coy lightly complained to BOB about the disparity and tasked Sherwood with trying to negotiate the FBI to a lower figure.21 But the FBI would not budge.22 However, the new realities of wartime led to a huge volume of hiring and therefore a big load of cases for investigation. Even the FBI conceded that it could not do all of them on a timely basis. Coy asked if they could now adopt a streamlined (and cheaper) investigative procedure for clearing

184

Get Things Moving!

new OEM hires. No, said the FBI.23 Coy called Attorney General Biddle to complain. Biddle said he had already told Hoover to hurry and wrap up what it treated as its top priority, investigating currently employed subversives for the congressionally mandated report, so that it could get back to its regular duties (chap. 6). Biddle promised Coy he would talk to Hoover again.24 Eventually the FBI grudgingly, and temporarily, agreed to resume doing some of the newly hired investigations, but only forty cases a week. This limited its assignment to those who were at the highest levels of responsibility and management. Now with the FBI’s acquiescence, the overload of new-hire investigations was handled by the Civil Service Commission’s investigative unit and other agencies, such as Treasury. But they were very busy too. The FBI’s concession created an opening and was the kind of break that Coy could take advantage of. He imposed a new OEM-wide policy. Agencies were to designate each new hire according to three categories. Category A would be for “positions of particular confidence or responsibility, where it is absolutely essential that an investigation report be obtained as soon as possible.” Category B would cover new hires who would not need to have such a report done for a month or so. Category C involved “work not of a confidential nature” that could be delayed until the FBI or other agency would be able to do it. Then, showing his bureaucratic finesse in fighting Hoover as well as managerial pragmatism for dealing with a problem, Coy directed OEM agencies to limit designating new hires in the A and B categories “to the smallest limit believed to be consistent with the proper safeguarding of operations of the War Program.”25 Coy was not being coy. He could not have been more explicit. He wanted to minimize to the absolute any ideological leverage that the FBI could have over OEM’s new employees as well as minimize how much OEM would subsidize the FBI. It was a way to finesse a management bottleneck expediently as well as a neat political maneuver to counter Hoover’s empire building and ideological filters. As for FBI-initiated subversive investigations (of current employees), Coy settled into a routine standard operating procedure. First he continued to insist that he would be the sole contact person for the FBI, not individual OEM agency heads. Second, when he received so-called subversive reports from the FBI, he had CAS forward them to the appropriate agency and ask the agency to notify him after it had decided on its disposition of each case.26 He never dictated to an agency any particular outcome he wanted. Once the agency notified Coy what it had decided, he accepted it without further consideration. He never second-guessed the agency’s decision. He

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

185

would then write Hoover a very brief letter informing him of the result. For example, in one case he wrote Hoover that “it is believed that the evidence submitted exonerates” the individual.27 Another time, he wrote that OPA “decided that the evidence submitted exonerates the employee.”28 The FBI investigated Osgood Nichols, a DOI employee, because his name was on what it called its “active indices,” in this case the mailing list of the American Peace Mobilization (later renamed the American People’s Mobilization). The FBI considered this organization to be pro-Communist. The employee protested that he was not a member of the organization and had no idea how his name ended up on a mailing list. He objected again during his FBI interview, saying that when he had been hired by DOI, the Treasury agent doing the application investigation brought up the same charge, but came up with no proof. Why was that not enough? Quite vehemently, he said: “I am a public relations fellow, and I know something about how long it takes for the truth to catch up with the accusations, and it usually doesn’t.”29 The FBI, too, was unable to find another source to corroborate the accusation. Coy, as usual, forwarded the FBI report to DOI chief Horton. Horton replied with a heated letter protesting the whole business: “If I read the report correctly, anonymous witnesses, alphabetically identified, would seem to agree unanimously that Mr. Nichols is not now nor has he ever been a Communist. . . . If the statements contained in the report you transmitted are true, the people of the United States are indeed fortunate to have the advantage of Osgood Marsh Nichols’ services.”30 Without naming Horton (let alone attaching Horton’s letter), Coy dryly wrote Hoover in the passive voice that “a decision has been made to retain Mr. Nichols in the Service.”31 Some other cases were much more complicated and tortuous. Abraham Glasser, an attorney, worked in the antitrust division of the Justice Department. When the department received confidential information (apparently from the House Un-American Activities Committee) that Glasser had had Communist connections, it suspended him (without pay), pending a hearing. But the attorney-based due process culture of the department dictated that an employee could only be disciplined after a hearing before a board on the information against the employee and giving the accused the chance to defend himself. But this could not happen because the department was not allowed to share the negative information with him. His case could not be disposed of one way or the other until he could be informed exactly what the charges against him were and had an opportunity to reply to them. He was in limbo, unemployed but unable to apply for work elsewhere in the

186

Get Things Moving!

federal government. In late fall of 1941, the FBI submitted to the department additional and new information from a foreign agent (of the USSR’s OGPU [forerunner of the KGB]) who had been arrested in Canada. He told them that he occasionally came by train from New York to the capital on Saturdays to meet Glasser. Glasser, who supported the Loyalist side in the Spanish Civil War, believed the person was of similar political views and likely thought the man was connected to the Loyalist government (which was actively supported by the USSR, while the US was neutral). Glasser shared information he knew from work, but given his area of responsibilities, little of it was of value to the agent. When the spy gave Glasser some names to see if the department’s files had any information on them, Glasser was “not being very adept obtaining names requested.”32 Now, finally, the department was able to hold a hearing on Glasser’s loyalty and let him respond to the information supplied by the FBI. Glasser denied being a Communist and that he spied for the USSR. In the end, the department decided that the charge he was a Communist was “not sustained,” that his contacts with the spy “were not inspired by motives of disloyalty,” but that he was negligent by conveying information from departmental files to outsiders. He was asked to resign and did.33 By then it was after Pearl Harbor, and OPA had hired Glasser for its legal staff. Hoover sent a report addressed to LOEM McReynolds (this was eight months after Coy replaced him) with a summary of its information against Glasser.34 As usual, Coy forwarded it to OPA. In reply, OPA’s general counsel said that the record against Glasser did not present a case of disloyalty to the US (let alone belonging to a subversive organization). Therefore, “unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation develops further facts which were not previously considered, no further action be taken in Mr. Glasser’s case.”35 Coy therefore wrote Hoover that “the Office for Emergency Management is of the opinion that, in the absence of additional facts, no action with respect to Mr. Glasser should be taken.”36 Hoover probably fumed at the leftists in the administration who had outmaneuvered him through legalistic rationales while bending over backward to be soft on parlor pinkos and fellow travelers. Coy’s most heated protest came when Hoover investigated Joe Rauh of his legal staff. Congressman Martin Dies Jr. (D-TX), chair of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), had sent Hoover a list of sixty-six federal employees “alleged to be affiliated with subversive organizations” (Parrish 2010, 69–70). Rauh was on the list. Hoover promptly sent a report to Coy with information the Bureau had collected about Rauh

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

187

insinuating he might have subversive leanings. Coy hit the roof. As far as he was concerned, Rauh was a mainstream New Dealer. First, Coy wrote a very strong letter of protest to Hoover, saying that such an accusation against Rauh “is absurd and fantastic” and that Rauh had been “completely exonerated” of the charges originating with the Dies committee and further investigated by the FBI.37 Then Coy followed up with a vehement letter ripping the FBI to Hoover’s boss, the attorney general. He said the accusation against Rauh was “entirely without foundation” and that a kind of guilt-by-association back-up charge that his wife belonged to a subversive organization was “a joke.” The FBI report was fair enough, as much as “such ex parte procedures go.” However, the synopsis at the beginning of the report, supposedly summarizing the entire contents of the report, “is wholly misleading and paints a totally different picture of the situation than does the full report.” In particular, the exonerating information from multiple people the FBI interviewed (including Coy) “is submerged under other and less reliable information.”38 In response, Hoover defensively (but not particularly apologetically) said that the synopsis was “unfortunately phrased and not as complete as it should have been” and claimed it would not happen again. It did. Every “subsequent FBI probe into Rauh” in the 1950s and 1960s used the negative information in the report as an introduction to his questionable patriotism (Parrish 2010, 71). In another celebrated case that played out in public, Coy had an important behind-the-scenes role to maximize a blunder by HUAC chairman Dies. Dies had named David Vaughn, an official of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), as affiliated with a Communist front organization.39 It turned out that there were two David Vaughns, one a professor in Boston and the other a conservative businessman from Kentucky. The latter had worked on Wall Street and was now in Washington to help out in the economic war effort.40 Coy thought this was a blunder that could be exploited to discredit Dies and his methods of naming names, sloppy investigations, and casual accusations. He called Vaughn and urged him to sue Dies.41 Then Coy strategized on selecting the lawyer to represent Vaughn. He said it was important to pick a lawyer who was viewed as an establishment figure so that the lawsuit would keep “the matter free from political implications.” He suggested Charles Evan Hughes Jr.42 Coy also offered to raise money to help cover the costs of the suit.43 A few weeks later, he agreed to be one of twenty people to donate $50 each for initial legal costs. He said that “he did not know many people who could contribute this much apiece” but would ask friends to make smaller donations.44

188

Get Things Moving!

Vaughn filed a $75,000 defamation suit and successfully served Dies (no mean feat). Finally, Dies made a floor speech publicly acknowledging the error, apologizing, and agreeing to pay Vaughn’s legal fees.45 It was a sweet moment for Coy to deflate so effectively (while staying behind the scenes) the professional Commie hunters who did not let up during the wartime alliance with the USSR. Liaison as Management by Another Name The complicated power relationship that Coy had with OEM agencies continued to be confusing to those with more traditional views of hierarchical public administration. At a House hearing on moving nonwar agencies out of Washington to create office space for war agencies, a Democratic congressman sought to clarify the situation. He hyperbolically and ignorantly claimed that “we have never been able to get any facts or details as to the functions of the different agencies under the O.P.M. . . . I guess that O.E.M. is part of the O.P.M.” Coy quickly corrected him, “no; you turn it around. It is the other way” (US House 1942a, 658). Similarly, a CAS personnel officer tried to clarify OEM’s role in a newsletter article read by other federal HR professionals: “The Liaison Officer does not exercise direct control over the agencies, but as a representative of the President, attempts to keep the entire program moving in a unified direction without friction and with a minimum of duplication or overlapping of functions” (Cooper 1942, 2). That was not the full story. For example, when a new director of the transportation agency began, Coy sent him a letter saying that he wanted “to talk with you very shortly” because “there are several matters which I should like to discuss at some length.”46 A few weeks later, Coy sent him a memo that said, “I construe the President’s delegation of authority to me to approve action” the new director wanted to take. There was no need for FDR to be involved. If any fussy bureaucrat in another agency would decline to cooperate because Roosevelt had not formally signed a piece of paper approving Coy’s delegation of power to the transportation director, then he should not hesitate to “use this letter for authority, if any is needed.”47 Both instances sounded like a boss exercising direct and traditional authority over a new subordinate. Coy also closely supervised budgets for OEM agencies. For example, on April 30, 1942, he met with Smith and other BOB officials to review the budget estimates for OEM and make decisions about their allocation.48 These amounts were, as they quip in Washington, serious money. About a month after Pearl Harbor, BOB had estimated

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

189

OEM spending for FY 1942 would be $121 million. Of that, the LOEM office (including CAS but excluding DOI) was expected to spend about $4.3 million (US House 1942b, 48). Similarly, Coy continued his prewar practice of issuing OEM-wide policies (chap. 6). For example, Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve would not be holidays for OEM employees, but offices could close two hours earlier than usual if they wished.49 Washington’s birthday would not be a federal holiday in 1942, and Coy directed that offices be open for business that day.50 In April, he released an OEM-wide policy on CAS’s role, specifying what managerial functions it would perform for constituent agencies and which ones the agencies would do in-house.51 Coy also continued to have the thankless job of allocating office space to OEM agencies. The onset of the war somewhat improved the 1941 problems (chap. 6) in part because the new urgency sped up the process of finding new space. This included occupying the Italian Embassy now that it was a declared enemy. Fittingly, the Alien Property Custodian was designated to move into that newly available space.52 By 1943, OEM agencies were dispersed in seventy locations around the capital (US House 1943a, 544). (This was why Coy continued to want CAS to maintain a large and centralized messenger service.) The president also directed that nonwar agencies be relocated to other cities for the duration of the war. Coy and BOB worked on accomplishing this,53 but many agencies resisted decentralization. They felt it downgraded their importance, and their employees did not want to hassle of moving, even though residential rent in other cities was lower than in DC. For example, after announcing that the Census Bureau was being moved to Maryland, about five hundred employees applied for jobs at OEM agencies so they would not have to move.54 At a congressional hearing, a member said, “We have been informed that many of these agencies could not operate out of Washington.” Coy dryly replied, “I am sure that if a few bombs were dropped in Washington the decentralization would be much easier” (US House 1942a, 668). The biggest impact on space availability was the construction of what came to be called the Pentagon, with more than a million square feet. At one point, FDR asked Coy to look into the progress of the project and update him.55 Coy had no direct role in its construction, but the cautious FDR probably felt it was a good idea to have an independent and fresh set of eyes appraising the status of the project and giving him a disinterested report. In his managerial efforts external to OEM, Coy continued his inclination for cooperation and coordination (chap. 6). For example, in late

190

Get Things Moving!

December he worked with the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritime Commission to agree to a proposed executive order setting a uniform policy for contracting and modifying contracts.56 The next month, the Navy proposed that Coy coordinate development of a common federal policy for relief payments to people injured in construction activities.57 In March, he worked with the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and OEM’s WPB to develop a common policy on handling the financial details of war contracts. In an excess of caution, including Washington tales of unreliable pooh-bahs who sometimes reneged on an agreement and denied they ever had, he made sure that senior officials of the four agencies signed the same document urging FDR to approve a new executive order they had negotiated.58 FDR did.59 Later in the spring, Coy tried to work out a compromise between DOI’s Horton, who wanted to tailor federal news to localities, and OGR’s Mellett, who wanted everyone to get a national perspective on war news (Steele 1985, 188n12). Clearing Legislation Coy maintained his firm prewar policy that all legislative requests from OEM agencies or impacting OEM had to be cleared through him.60 He expressed his views directly to Congress in support of building a new lock on the Great Lakes to expand the shipping capacity to meet war needs (US Senate 1942c, 3). For a bill suspending taxes on importing coconut oil, Coy endorsed it. Without such action, the price of imports would rise, forcing OPA to issue regulations raising the price of coconut oil, which, in turn, would mean that “an entire series of other price ceilings would be affected.” The latter scenario would have the effect of “setting in motion inflationary forces.”61 Working in cooperation with BOB, he opposed a bill to construct a tunnel under the Delaware River as “not directly essential to the war effort,” particularly because of the zero-sum nature of materials the tunnel would require.62 In another case, two OEM agencies disagreed. For a USDA proposal to provide assistance for fire protection in rural areas, OCD endorsed the bill, but OPM noted that the bill contradicted a different bill giving the secretary of war virtually the same duty. These two pieces of legislation would need to be harmonized, Coy wrote.63 Regarding proposed legislation on overtime, he advised BOB that the purpose could be accomplished by administrative action of the president, a scenario always preferred by FDR.64

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

191

Workaday Routine: What Did Coy Do All Day? April 1942 FDR had a strong preference that members of his official family not write “memos for the file” or other documents that might hamper his ability to change his mind or deny something. Nonetheless, some senior officials thought that they had to keep written records of their activities. For example, BOB director Smith dictated detailed notes of his meetings with FDR immediately after getting back to his office so that he could then circulate the summaries to the BOB staffers who would need to know the president’s decisions on matters they were working on. (While it was not Smith’s purpose, for historians these accounts are invaluable.) Similarly, Smith’s secretary kept logs of his daily appointments and phone calls, though she rarely summarized the business he transacted. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had his secretary take verbatim transcripts of all meetings he hosted in his office as well as listen in on his phone conversations. Given that she sat in on meetings, the taking of a stenographic record would not have been kept secret from the participants, but callers may not have been aware of it. Somewhat differently, Interior Secretary Ickes dictated a very detailed diary of his work, presenting his version of meetings and his political opinions. Regarding Coy, only one month of his wartime LOEM work, April 1942, survived.65 His secretary included a list of his office appointments but without any detail of what transpired, suggesting she did not sit in on meetings. She also kept a record of his phone calls, evidently because she was listening in. It is unclear if callers knew. Unlike Morgenthau’s secretary, Coy’s secretary did not transcribe a verbatim stenographic record of phone conversations. Instead she provided brief summaries of the business discussed, including key points that were agreed to. As with Smith’s purpose of summarizing his meetings with FDR, one likely reason Coy had her do this was to keep track of what, for example, he was told in a phone call and what he or the person at the other end of the line committed to doing. (Again, an unintended benefit of this record of telephone transcripts and office appointments is that it supplements the usual sources of historical research.) Coy did much of his business through memos, letters, and other written formats. This single month of records provides a glimpse of Coy at work through nonwritten communications, such as meetings, working meals, and phone conversations. This contributes to constructing a more balanced and well-rounded sense of what he did and how he did it. It also is a way to slow down the historical clock and get a more vivid sense of

192

Get Things Moving!

how things looked from his desk and what he did on an average day. It intimately conveys Coy routinely at work and is a further opportunity to become acquainted with his activities in the areas of policy, politics, and management. His daily life constituted public administration at the most senior level of government. (Citations from these records have already been referenced earlier in this chapter on his management record and in chap. 7.) Sometimes portions of his secretary’s summaries of phone calls sound like direct or near-direct quotes because of their pointedness and color. For example, when Coy complained about an impending appointment of a union official he thought poorly of, he said the appointment would be “awful, stupid and would make a farce of the whole thing.”66 Deputy DOI director Straus called with the good news that he had finally brokered an agreement among all OEM agencies and outside stakeholders interested in conservation by getting them “locked up in one room and [he] refused to let them out until they got together with a unified program.”67 Rauh praised a researcher he was using for his report on shipping bottlenecks as “the best ferret man in town.”68 DOI director Horton complained about a recent dollar-a-year appointment, saying that this businessman was “one of the worst Tories, bitterly anti-Roosevelt.”69 Coy complained to an OFF official that whoever at the agency had drafted the section of the daily Intelligence Report on labor union unrest had depicted the role of unions as “negative and did not get at the real labor problem.”70 The informal and self-adopted name for a network of OEM officials who were pro-union mocked the anti-union lingo used by conservative businessmen. They called themselves “the goons.”71 Occasionally Coy’s secretary editorialized a bit by inserting into her summary of a call a characterization of what transpired. For example, she dryly commented that a caller spoke with Coy “at great length” about getting appointed federal judge and that another did the same when stating his opposition to the draft of an executive order awaiting the president’s signature.72 When Coy called someone in the administration to complain about an impending appointment he disagreed with, she wrote that Coy “jumped him” about that potential appointment.73 An unhappy congressman got Coy’s detailed explanation for a snafu about not getting to announce a federal contract in his district, but he remained “very irate and did not take the explanation too well.”74 She was also protective of Coy, sometimes hinting in her comments when she sensed insincerity of callers. When Coy was in a traffic accident (see below), DOI chief Horton called the next day. “After inquiring about his heath,” Horton quickly segued to talk business. She thought Horton’s claimed reason for calling was false and merely an

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

193

excuse to talk about something else.75 Similarly, when two callers told her they wanted to talk to Coy simply to say hello, she put quotation marks around the word because it was evident to her that they really wanted to talk about something they wanted from him.76 During a normal day Coy usually had five to seven meetings in his office, one or two meetings in other places, about ten to twelve phone calls, and at least one working meal. During this period, the most frequent topics were about policy in the making, presidential thinking, space allocation, administrative matters, federal contracting, people seeking jobs, and labor-management issues affecting the war effort. Some of Coy’s phone conversations were about public administration principles. For example, he talked with BOB’s Bernard Gladieux to be sure that the draft of an executive order would not make the mistake an earlier one had, namely “the difficult problem of policy without administration.”77 Executive orders from on high were no solution when they merely enunciated a policy. Somebody somewhere in OEM or the old-line bureaucracy had to be assigned explicit responsibility for implementing it or at least overseeing its correct execution. On another occasion, he recognized that as a top-level manager, he needed to show support for, and encouragement to, line managers. He should not second-guess them, and he should clear the path so that they could succeed. When he felt one of his better agency heads was being ganged up on by bureaucrats on the wrong side of a policy fight, Coy called him and “offered to help him in any way he could.”78 Coy dedicated a large amount of time to personnel recruitment, viewing the placing of a competent, qualified, and experienced person in the right place as going a long way to solving the daily issues of public administration that cropped up and otherwise would likely rise to his desk. For example, when asked by an OEM agency for a recommendation for someone to be its chief administrative officer, Coy suggested looking at USDA, because “they had the best bunch of trained men in Gov. on administration.”79 WPB’s Emmerich called to ask about the management skills of a person he was considering appointing. Coy said he thought the person “was a pretty good guy” and would work out well if Emmerich decided to select him.80 Milton Eisenhower, then with the War Relocation Authority, came to meet with Coy for advice on recruiting a top-flight personnel officer for the agency, especially someone who could handle wage policy for employees. During the meeting, Coy picked up the phone and tried to reach the person he had in mind.81 On another occasion, Coy proactively recommended someone for BOB’s legislative clearance office, given his view of the importance of that central managerial function.82

194

Get Things Moving!

Many of his meetings and phone conversations were about the more traditional topics of public administration, such as budgets, administrative services, office space, and communication. Some callers worried about BOB cutting their budgets and asked him to intervene on their behalf.83 Office space allocation was another never-ending problem.84 When the Maritime Commission wanted the offices of the new OEM War Shipping Administration to be located right next to the commission’s, Coy said he agreed. From his managerial perspective, this would help to achieve the need for close cooperation between the two agencies. Coy said he would try to get it accomplished. However, he warned his caller, if commission chair Land “screamed” about obtaining that outcome, Land would be shooting himself in the foot and less likely to get what he wanted.85 Frequently, callers were officials in OEM agencies or elsewhere in the executive branch acting like children running to a parent to complain about their sibling and seeking the parent to side with them. Indeed, a newspaper feature in 1942 on the wartime organization of the federal government likened Coy’s relationship with OEM agencies as that of a “parent.”86 Coy did not act like a parent and did not view himself as in that power relationship (chap. 6). His management style was such that he did not like exercising power, pulling rank, or being dictatorial. Invariably, his approach was one of compromise and cooperation. In 1942, a reporter described Coy’s approach to governance as having a “great ability to reconcile differences” instead of the power-focused approach of dictating commands from on high (Kiplinger 1942, 448). Coy’s daily work demonstrated this. He routinely recommended that two people or agencies who were fighting needed to talk to each other and work out their differences. For example, for a conflict between agencies on new contracting legislation that was already working its way through the legislative process, he suggested that they all meet on a Sunday afternoon or Monday morning before the congressional committee resumed marking up the bill. That would give all the stakeholders an opportunity to work out a common position rather than fight in front of the committee (or through the press).87 On another occasion, he told the complainer that the only solution was to meet with the complainee to redraft a version of an executive order “agreeable to both of them.”88 Sometimes he declined to intervene and served merely as a referral person, with variations on the basic approach that the caller should talk to someone else who was a more appropriate person to address whatever the problem was. At other times, when he did not have the knowledge at hand to give that advice, he would

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

195

promise to look into it and then get back to the caller, without necessarily involving himself in the substantive issue. One of the most striking impressions that his routine daily work conveys is how frequently he interacted with current elected officials, such as senators, congressmen, and governors. These contacts could theoretically be categorized as apolitical and nonpartisan legislative liaison that every senior public administrator would be expected to be involved in. But many of Coy’s interactions more subtly conveyed a concomitant, if unstated, political motivation to grease friendships, create favors, and develop goodwill: • House Majority Leader John McCormack called to promote Boston as a location for some of the federal offices moving out of Washington. He said that “the people in his district are looking to him for this action.” Coy replied that “we are trying to do what we can to get something up there.”89 • Another Massachusetts congressman who had publicly defended the administration from attacks by HUAC and other commie hunters (discussed earlier in this chapter) also had a salient interest in who would become the next postmaster in Boston. If the congressman could arrange for a certain person to get the appointment, then that man could not run against him in the next election. Coy made sure the congressman was kept apprised of developments.90 • The chair of the Senate small business committee called to ask Coy if he could detail a few OEM employees to the committee because he was short-staffed. After all, he argued, facilitating more subcontracts to small business would help the war effort. Coy said he would try.91 • A generally friendly congressman called to complain that he was not given an opportunity to be the one to announce a major federal contract to a business in his district. Coy promised to find out why. It turned out that the local Chamber of Commerce had announced it without any approval or authorization.92 • A senator who was a strong supporter of FDR came to Coy’s office to request something. (The subject was not provided in Coy’s calendar.)93

196

Get Things Moving!

• Senator Harry Truman, chair of the powerful committee investigating waste in the war effort, called Coy about finding a job for someone he recommended.94 • The governor of Florida came to Coy’s office to talk to him. (The topic he wanted to talk about was not listed in the daily summary of Coy’s appointments.)95 • The governor of Indiana called Coy to ask if he should accept an invitation to speak at a national labor convention to be held in Indiana. The governor feared that if he accepted, he would look too pro-union to conservative Indiana voters. Coy recommended that he do it and offered to arrange hotel reservations for the governor and his entourage.96 • Representative Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), then on a leave of absence from Congress to serve on active duty in the Navy, came to Coy’s office.97 The subject of the meeting was not specified in his calendar, but it probably was about the Navy sending LBJ to Australia. Right after their meeting, Coy signed several letters of introduction for Johnson to present to senior American officers in Australia, all of whom Coy had worked with when he was McNutt’s aide in the Philippines, including General Douglas MacArthur.98 Coy routinely attended FDR’s twice-weekly press conferences.99 Occasionally FDR would mention him, but mostly not. Coy was evidently there to be sure he knew what the president’s thinking was on whatever issues were in the news. He wanted his behind-the-scenes work to be consistent with FDR’s policy comments and up-to-date with the most recent presidential decisions. Coy also had frequent contacts with reporters, roughly several times a week. Almost exclusively, they were calling him or dropping by his office to check on a policy development. When this happened, he routinely agreed to tell them what he knew that was now public information. But he was discrete about policies not yet adopted or decided on by the president. It could be that Coy’s somewhat routine approach to media relations is one of the reasons that he seemed to get relatively good press, especially in features and profiles, and in particular from Pearson and Allen’s Washington Merry-Go-Round column and Time magazine.

Coy as LOEM in the First Half-Year of the War: Management

197

Family and Health As earlier in his federal career, Coy continued to have health issues. In March, he had a recurrence of kidney difficulties that kept him homebound for several days.100 The next month, his wife picked him up to go to lunch. On their way back, while stopped at a light, a cab bumped into their car from behind. Coy, in the passenger seat, was hurled headfirst through the windshield. With a severe headache, he went to a hospital emergency room.101 X-rays disclosed no serious injury, but because of his headaches he was unable to come in to work for a few days.102 As an indication of his wide network, one of the letters of sympathy he received was a handwritten note from Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy.103 Mrs. Coy also continued her civic involvements in roles that were permitted for wives of high officials. For example, in February, she served as the only woman on a ceremonial “jury” of assayers as part of the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the US Mint in Philadelphia.104 Chapters 7 and 8 presented details of Coy’s public administration record in the spheres of policy, politics, and management during the first half-year after the US joined the war. This can be contrasted with his work in 1941 before the war (chaps. 4–6). Naturally, with the declaration of war, there was a change in the urgency of the work. But quantitatively and qualitatively, the differences were modest. Contrary to what one might expect, while the intensity of his responsibilities increased substantially, he generally stayed on the same trajectory as before Pearl Harbor. Certainly, the pace of what he did increased. However, the scope of work, the issues in which he was involved, and his general record as a senior public administrator continued largely as they had before the war. Coy also continued viewing his professional dedication to public administration as encompassing policy, politics, and management. War or no war, that was his job.

9

Wearing Two Hats Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director, May–October 1942

In February 1942, FDR had brainstormed with Smith and Coy on whom he should appoint to head a newly reorganized federal housing agency. He eventually decided on BOB Assistant Director Blandford (chap. 8). That meant Smith needed to recruit a replacement. Coy and Smith had worked closely together ever since Coy had become LOEM. Given that both of them were in coordinating and central management positions, they usually talked on the phone at least once a day and often met to discuss mutual problems. Sometimes they had working meals. Their joint projects included drafting executive orders, planning reorganizations, budgeting, and troubleshooting. Both were no-nonsense and results-oriented managers. They had little patience for seemingly artificial problems that were hurdles and obstacles to commonsense solutions. Neither was a publicity hound, though each reactively returned calls from reporters and cooperated for features and profiles. Neither was a prima donna. A month after Blandford’s departure, Smith began talking to Coy about taking Blandford’s job.

Roosevelt Considers What’s Next for Coy Around the same time that Smith was considering Coy for BOB assistant director, WPB head Nelson was trying to recruit Coy to be his deputy director. There was a round robin of conversations between Coy, Nelson, and Roosevelt. Coy, of course, was willing to do whatever FDR preferred. The president was vague and opaque about expressing a strong preference to Smith or to Nelson.1 Nelson decided to try harder. He had lunch with 199

200

Get Things Moving!

the president specifically to talk this over and resolve it. He walked away from the luncheon with the impression that FDR had said it was okay if Coy wanted to work with him and that the president would also discuss it with Coy—an ambiguous comment that could have had several different interpretations. When FDR did talk with Coy, he (the president) said that Coy should go to WPB only on a loan basis for just a short time to clean up whatever issues Nelson was concerned about. This was very different from Nelson’s version of what the president had said at lunch.2 Coy was more inclined to go to BOB than to WPB, so Smith decided to talk it over with the president on March 14, 1942.3 He reminded Roosevelt that “he had stolen a man from me and that stealing one from him was only fair play, at which point he indicated that he enjoyed my point. The President immediately said that if I wanted Wayne I could have him.” But who should replace Coy as LOEM? Smith’s answer was that OEM did not necessarily have to have a liaison officer and the position could be left vacant. Smith said that a reason to leave it vacant was that “Coy pointed out to me that he was often embarrassed by the feeling that the heads of various emergency agencies thought of him as standing between them and the President.” Leaving that detail hanging for the moment, Smith then brought up what he viewed as a possible deal breaker: politics in public administration. Coy had told Smith he felt he had been involved in much of his government experience in a mixture of politics and administration, that he might be looked upon as neither fish nor foul [sic]. Therefore, I pointed out to the President that I considered that Wayne Coy was attempting to make something of a major decision with respect to his real interest, which he believes is in governmental administration and where I feel that he has very considerable capacity. Smith, a pillar of the emerging practitioner profession of public administration, was fanatically committed to the proposition that politics and administration should not mix. He always insisted that BOB was not a political arm of any president, but rather that it served the institution of the presidency. Smith’s views carried enormous weight in the emergence of ASPA, including his election as president of the association and development of the values and ethics of the profession. At this meeting with FDR, he was trying to sell a distinction between politics and administration, between elected officials and civil service.

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

201

I made the point of the fact that I knew the President had given him [Coy] several political assignments, and that naturally, when he was appointed Assistant Director of the Budget, such assignments would be incompatible with his position; and while we were not impervious to political considerations at the Bureau of the Budget, we had to be objective in our approach, and politics and budgeting, in one sense, do not mix. Here, starkly, was the difference between Smith’s view and Coy’s experience. Smith sought to mold a culture of pure apolitical public administration. Coy had a more pragmatic approach for senior levels of public administration, including some degree of politics, as well. Based on his experience ever since first becoming a federal administrator in 1935, the two were often indivisible. Roosevelt seemingly agreed with Smith’s condition for taking Coy, glibly and soothingly claiming that “he recognized this very well and that as a matter of fact he had not given Wayne Coy many political assignments of late.” Although politely not arguing with the president, in his internal narrative Smith disagreed. He appended this unvoiced reaction to his summary of the meeting: “This was somewhat contrary to the impression Wayne Coy himself had given me.” True. For the first six months of the war, Coy had engaged in politics (chap. 7) roughly at the same order of magnitude as his political activities in 1941 (chap. 5). There was no obvious or discernable cutback. But Coy, ever discrete, could go either way. That could mean quietly doing some political assignments that FDR requested of him, while at the same time trying his best not to ruffle Smith. By late March, the story started leaking out. On March 25, ScrippsHoward news service reported Coy was moving to BOB.4 As it turned out, that was not exactly the case. By then FDR had leaned toward Coy continuing as LOEM and simultaneously being BOB assistant director. Roosevelt, cautious as usual, did not see why he had to make a binary choice, at least from the get-go. Why did it have to be “either” instead of “and”? He wanted Coy to try the arrangement out for size and see if it worked or not. If it did not work out, then not much would have been lost. He could undo it quickly if that’s what he concluded, especially given Smith’s view that OEM’s continued existence did not require the position of a liaison officer. If it worked out with Coy wearing both hats, better yet. Coy was on his wavelength, so why toss him overboard? In the meantime, by keeping Coy as LOEM as well as at BOB, FDR’s options would still be open. He could wait and see how developments unfolded. This was his

202

Get Things Moving!

natural temperament for public administration and politics. He never made a decision before he had to. Even then, sometimes it was best to wait even longer. Coy and Smith, of course, accepted his preference. This important detail was accurately reported in a Pearson and Allen column on April 16 and by the Post’s Kluttz on April 22.5 The White House officially announced it on April 24, and it was to go into effect at the beginning of May.6 Time magazine greeted the appointment positively in an article titled “Smith & Coy”: The new team of trouble shooters already had the feel of working in harness. They were not high-strung race horses, as many another brain-truster has been. But in wartime Washington, with tough stumps to be yanked up and hard rows of work to be done, they were doing heavy duty. . . . Working together now, Smith & Coy have enough odd jobs to keep them busy from 9 a.m. to midnight, six or seven days a week. . . . No yes-men, Smith & Coy both like to call a spade a spade, and often do, in conferences with Franklin Roosevelt. They share none of his skittishness in weeding out bad helpers. The new brain trust is a far cry from the old.7 A profile of Coy in the Chicago Sun said that describing Coy as an assistant to Smith missed the mark. Rather, “it probably would be more proper to say that he and Mr. Smith are the managerial team.”8 Smith probably would have agreed with that characterization. Two months after the appointment, Smith was happy to tell FDR that “Wayne Coy is handling things nicely.”9

Organization of Chapters 9 and 10 With Coy wearing two hats, it is important to try to untangle what he did as LOEM and as BOB assistant director. This is sometimes difficult, if only because of the close working relationship that Coy had had with BOB before. As presented in preceding chapters, there was frequent overlap and collaboration between LOEM and BOB. From this point forward, to separate which hat he was wearing for a particular occasion, this review carefully tries to distinguish between his two roles. First, a clear-cut differentiation can be made between when Coy signed paperwork using his LOEM title or when he received documents addressed to him with that title. Second, the

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

203

location of archival materials is important. All documents at the National Archives in the boxes of “Office of the Liaison Officer” of the records of the Office for Emergency Management (Record Group 214) are assumed to relate to his LOEM jurisdiction.10 On the other hand, materials in Coy’s personal papers at the FDR Library could relate to his LOEM position or to his BOB work. They must be categorized carefully. If they do not clearly reflect one of his two hats, their classification and relevance are based on context, subject, and other relevant details. Third, sometimes a policy area Coy began working on as LOEM before his BOB appointment continued afterward. In most cases, the continuations of those subjects are assumed to reflect his LOEM hat unless the documentary record heavily reflects that his subsequent actions were BOB related. Chapters 9 and 10, both covering the time when Coy wore two hats, are divided into two chronological periods, based on the timing of James Byrnes’s role in the war effort. As mentioned briefly in the preface, Byrnes resigned from the Supreme Court in October 1942 to become director of the newly created Office of Economic Stabilization (OES). From Coy’s coterminus service as LOEM and BOB assistant director beginning in May 1942 until Byrnes’s arrival at the White House in October, the focus of this inquiry on Coy as LOEM is relatively straightforward and binary (chap. 9). From October 1942 on, Byrnes’s role in the war effort as the major economic policy maker adds some complexity to the focus on LOEM Coy (chap. 10). As discussed in the preceding chapters, Coy’s role as LOEM often included involvement in public policy issues that affected the economy, such as farm labor shortages, production levels to include the needs of the USSR, a transportation infrastructure to meet domestic and overseas needs, seizure of property, labor-management relations, price controls, salvage campaigns to reduce the need for raw materials, manpower, antitrust enforcement against corporations involved in the war effort, and improving workplace safety to increase production (chaps. 4 and 7). Therefore, chapter 10 seeks to further tease out what Coy did as LOEM in relation to the significant economic policy powers assigned to Byrnes. That chapter concludes in June 1943 when Coy resigned as LOEM after FDR expanded Byrnes’s power and role by appointing him director of war mobilization. Both chapters follow the same structure used in the earlier chronological chapters. Serially, they discuss Coy’s involvement as LOEM in public policy, politics, and management during that time period. To avoid repetition and redundancy of the material in the earlier chapters, the presentation in these two chapters is condensed and abbreviated relative to previous discussions.

204

Get Things Moving!

Public Policy Shortages It will be recalled that in the first half-year of the war, Coy had been involved in policy making in reaction to shortages of raw materials, such as rubber (chap. 7). These problems continued after he joined BOB. OPA head Leon Henderson was pushing for nationwide gasoline rationing, mostly to conserve a severe supply of rubber. FDR, ever alert to the politics of a policy, understood how unpopular this would be. For example, about a hundred congressmen (mostly from the conservative coalition) preemptively called on him not to do so even before anyone made the case justifying the need for it.11 FDR called a summit meeting of all the players for June 5 to discuss it and hammer out a consensus position.12 Coy was invited, most likely because both of his hats were relevant to the issue.13 Punting at the end of the meeting, FDR decided to start with an all-out rubber salvage drive and asked Baruch, always eager to become a player, to chair a rubber committee to make recommendations. In the meantime, the policy issue became intermingled with bureaucratic territoriality. OEM’s Office of Defense Transportation claimed jurisdiction, as did OPA. Roosevelt sent Coy a memo that it was “essential” to get both agencies working in harmony and that he opposed resolving it by “divided authority,” which would over time inevitably culminate in making matters worse.14 Baruch’s committee submitted its report in mid-September, including calling for national gasoline rationing based on mileage. The president approved it and signed an executive order creating a rubber czar within WPB (thus placing it within OEM).15 Coy also continued his earlier focus on shipping problems (chap. 7). A top official of OEM’s War Shipping Administration kept him updated with the latest reports on tonnage loss due to sunk ships and maps of the most dangerous locations in the shipping lanes. He reminded Coy that the information was “highly secret” and that he should not “let them get out of your hands.”16 Aid to Russia Although Coy’s major role in aid to the USSR had taken place in mid1941 (chap. 4), he continued to have some incidental involvement in the subject. In August, an official of the American Legion had addressed the

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

205

Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and asked local business not to support the War Chest Campaign (an umbrella fundraising effort that included Russian War Relief ) because some of the money raised would go to “communist inspired” groups and would directly aid Communist Russia. Coy was asked by the national president of Russian War Relief to weigh in. He quickly sent a telegram with a public statement condemning the idea: “I deplore the attempt to sabotage the United War Relief Drive . . . Such an unwarranted action is divisive of national unity. To my mind it is much more serious than a challenge to the success of the war relief drive and should be met for what it really is.”17 Coy’s role contributed to the failure of the proposed boycott.18 In 1942, Roosevelt sent Wendell Willkie, his 1940 Republican opponent (and internationalist), to Russia and China as his personal emissary (along with two senior officials from the Office of War Information [OWI]) to review the war effort of those allies and report back to him. Coy gave Willkie a letter of introduction to General Faymonville, head of the US Army delegation in the USSR overseeing the aid effort, whom he had worked with in 1941 (chap. 4). He asked the general to brief them on his view of the war situation because “I have spoken to them about your intimate knowledge of Russia.”19 African Americans In May, Coy sent a reminder to the heads of OEM agencies of FDR’s 1941 policy against racial discrimination (chap. 4). He asked that each of them issue a memo to the supervisory personnel in their agencies instructing them “to follow the policy of non-discrimination in making appointments and promotions.”20 During this period, Coy also had extensive correspondence with Lawrence Cramer, executive secretary of the president’s Fair Employment Practice Committee. As before (chap. 7), he provided quarterly figures on the number of African Americans employed by OEM agencies.21 In late July, FDR transferred the committee from WPB to the War Manpower Commission (also an OEM agency).22 He did so, he told Coy, because he felt “the objective of the Committee is complete utilization of the available manpower of the country.”23 Roosevelt also increased the funding of the committee, in part reacting to criticisms from African Americans that he was deliberately underfunding the committee so it would not be as effective as it could be. However, early planning for the increase assumed an expansion of the staff from 21 to 225. FDR told Coy that was too much

206

Get Things Moving!

and that the increase should be cut back to “perhaps 60 to 75 people.”24 Coy also told the president that the committee was hoping to expand its jurisdiction to discriminatory hiring practices by states and local governments and to any business involved in interstate commerce. This would give the committee power to investigate employment discrimination by all Southern governments. Roosevelt reacted sharply against the idea, saying “They can’t do that.”25 Coy was also in touch with Mrs. Roosevelt about race relations. He found out that she had been invited “by the leading Negros in Indianapolis” to address a Victory Bond Rally they were organizing. Coy advised her not to go. If she decided to accept the invitation nonetheless, “I should like to talk with you about the situation in Indiana before you go.”26 (It is unclear what particular problem he had in mind.) Economic Policy During the summer of 1942, there was increasing pressure on FDR to set a wage stability policy because wage increases could have the effect of sharpening inflation. OPA’s Leon Henderson urged him to send a message to Congress with proposed legislation to do so. Coy got involved because he wanted to be sure that other federal agencies involved in wage disputes would act coherently instead of autonomously. After having extensive conversations with two members of the War Labor Board (an OEM agency), he hurriedly summarized their concerns and handed it to Tully with a cover note that read “I hope the President can read this today. It supplements a memorandum which Leon Henderson sent him earlier today.”27 Coy urged Roosevelt to base his proposal on what was then called the “Little Steel” decision about wage increases for the steelworkers union. Even if FDR did not agree with him about using it as the core of a policy, Coy emphasized the importance of coordinating with all federal agencies dealing with labor disputes. He suggested quickly notifying them “that pending your decision on sending a message to Congress a status quo should be maintained, otherwise I feel one or more of these agencies may be taking an action which will seem to contradict your program if and when you send a message outlining such a program to Congress.”28 By September, such a wage and price bill was pending in Congress. One of the lawyers in the LOEM’s office urged Coy to get involved regarding the link between taxes and inflation. He suggested that Coy try to convince FDR that an upcoming tax bill was as essential to a successful

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

207

anti-inflation policy as a wage and price bill.29 Based on the archival record, it appears that Coy merely filed this memo and did not convey the idea to the president, at least not in writing. Other Policy Areas As LOEM, Coy was involved in how vigorously the Justice Department should enforce antitrust law in relation to important war industries (Heath 1972, 309n31), facilitating the cashing of salary checks by DC-based employees of war agencies,30 and checking with FDR regarding if he wanted to meet with several people recently returned from the war theaters.31 He also advised FDR about handling the upcoming resignation of Francis Sayre as high commissioner to the Philippines (the same position McNutt had held). The key, he said, was not to “play into the hands of Japanese Propagandists” who liked to highlight the colonialist role of the US vis-à-vis the Philippines.32

Politics Notwithstanding Smith’s strongly expressed condition that Coy sharply reduce his ongoing involvement in politics (and FDR’s seeming agreement to that), Coy went well beyond Smith’s remit and continued his political activities. For example, in July, he updated the president on the status of the military voting bill. Its pending version would permit absentee voting by soldiers and sailors but would not abolish the poll tax (at least for them) or allow them to vote in primaries, only in general elections. If the bill were to pass in this version, “a large number of men and women from the South in our armed forces will be, as a practical matter, disenfranchised.”33 He urged FDR to mention publicly his opposition to the poll tax (chap. 7). After a long fight, the bill eventually passed in September.34 It included a ban on the poll tax for military absentee ballots, but by the time it passed it was too late for voting in primaries. On another occasion, when DNC chair Ed Flynn sent Roosevelt a memo on his sense of public sentiment about the government and how it was running the war effort. FDR passed it on to Coy and asked him, after reading it, “Will you speak to me about this?”35 Coy and Interior Secretary Ickes developed a closer relationship during this period. Some of their contacts were about policy, such as hiring alien doctors to work on Indian reservations, support for public power (which was taking a beating with the fadeout of the New Deal), and Ickes’s desire

208

Get Things Moving!

for additional powers for his hat as petroleum coordinator. But mostly they talked politics confidentially. Earlier, Ickes had been suspicious of Coy’s political views (chap. 2). Now he was glad to confirm that Coy “is a true liberal,” although utterly lacking in a sense of humor.36 Ickes particularly liked Coy because “he is not afraid to tell the truth to the President even if it is not pleasant hearing for the President,”37 something Ickes occasionally did too. To develop a more personal relationship, Ickes invited Coy and spouse to his farm near Washington for a leisurely Sunday luncheon along with a few other power couples. In part because of Coy’s solemnity, Ickes later said “it was not a particularly sprightly party.”38 A few months later, Ickes invited Coy to come over to the new Interior building for lunch in his private dining room. Ickes, who loved to gossip and talk politics, decided that Coy was trustworthy, and therefore “I talked pretty frankly to him.”39 In particular, they shared views on the politics and personalities of the war effort. Ickes was glad to hear Coy badmouth Hopkins, even though Coy came up as a Hopkins protégé. Coy felt Hopkins had bollixed up Lend-Lease because of his lack of interest in organization and administration.40 Both were also down on Nelson’s record at WPB. Ickes quoted Coy as saying that he knew “Nelson is a failure and he knows why.” But both were even more worried about him being succeeded by his current deputy, William Batt. Ickes claimed that Coy thought Baruch should probably be the one to succeed Nelson. Ickes agreed. They felt that Baruch’s role should not be day-to-day administration. Rather, he should “resolve differences of opinion that could not be settled otherwise and determine finally on matters of high policy.”41 (This is just about exactly what Byrnes’s role was when FDR appointed him in October [chap. 10].) Other Political Activities Coy kept the president updated on union politics, especially the effort to strengthen Phil Murray against John L. Lewis (chap. 7). In May, Coy filled FDR in on Murray’s effort to create a Steel Workers Organizing Committee as a way “to cut the umbilical cord which has tied him to Lewis.”42 Roosevelt promptly sent Murray a congratulatory telegram of support to be read at the first meeting of the nascent organization.43 Coy also continued his role in overseeing appointments of businessmen to war agencies. In part he was doing this as a manager, to help OEM agencies seeking such appointments, but also in part he was there to protect FDR’s political interests. For example, WPB’s Nelson wanted to appoint the president of Union Oil Company of

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

209

California to run WPB’s Steel Branch. Coy flagged for Roosevelt that the man had actively supported Willkie in 1940.44 In reply, Roosevelt said he did not know the man and therefore asked Coy to “make a check” about his politics.45 Coy did, filled him in, and then FDR approved the appointment.46 On another potential WPB appointment, FDR asked Coy, “Will you speak to me about this?”47 News Media Coy continued receiving positive, but modest, feature coverage and little spot news attention. In July, he was profiled in the fourteenth installment of a series on the important men in the war effort.48 In September, a reporter for the New York Herald Tribune listed Coy as one of five members of FDR’s wartime “Little Cabinet.”49 Also that month, Forbes published the results of polling sixty Washington-based reporters. When they were asked to name the most important backstage presidential advisors, Coy came in fifth. The magazine said his LOEM role was “unique,” describing it as “a sort of executive secretary” of OEM. “There he remains today, an important ‘in between’ man with the very special qualification—access to Hopkins or Roosevelt.”50

Management A review of the archival record indicates that, in addition to being BOB assistant director, Coy continued to be very active managerially as LOEM. During the summer, Coy wrote an acquaintance that he was “busy as the very devil.”51 On another occasion, he said that overseeing OEM was more difficult than heading a more traditional agency “due to the relative complexity” of OEM’s structure and member agencies.52 Coy’s appointment to BOB did not discernably change his routine managerial oversight patterns for OEM that he had already established (chaps. 6 and 8). In terms of his organizational empire, the most significant change in OEM occurred when FDR finally decided in June to sign a plan to merge the multiplicity of PR agencies in OEM (OFF and DOI) as well as in EOP (OGR) into the Office of War Information (OWI) (chap. 8).53 Coy continued being involved in setting OEM-wide administrative policies, such as helping to set a standard policy on overtime pay (Lee 2016, 107), use of cars for official business,54 and nondiscrimination in hiring (discussed earlier in this chapter). Under Coy’s authority, in 1942, CAS issued about sixty

210

Get Things Moving!

standard policies to be used by OEM agencies for uniform processing of routine administrative services.55 Wearing his LOEM hat, Coy’s management role involved budgeting for OEM agencies,56 authorizations for spending from presidential discretionary funds,57 release of apportioned funds,58 and adjustments of allotments.59 To BOB’s legislative clearance office, he contributed an OEM perspective on a proposed executive order creating Legion of Merit awards.60 When OEM’s Office of Scientific Research and Development asked for a clarification of its procurement powers, he submitted a proposed executive order and FDR signed it.61 Coy also continued being the point of contact with GAO to ensure that all OEM procedures and spending were consonant with GAO guidelines for eligible federal expenditures.62 During this hectic and busy period, Coy’s personal LOEM office continued to be very small (in the context of the executive branch and OEM), with seven full-time employees, primarily secretarial and administrative support. Two were very junior, with annual salaries between $1,200 and $1,619 a year, and five with relatively good salaries for those categories of positions of $4,500 a year or more. On the other end of the spectrum, CAS had 5,375 staffers (US Congress 1943, 32). After joining BOB, Coy’s salary line shifted from the LOEM to the BOB payroll. As set by legislation that Smith personally lobbied for, Coy’s salary as assistant director was $10,000 a year.63 (That was the same salary FDR had set for Coy as LOEM a month after Pearl Harbor.64) Liaison as Management Coy continued his reliance on promoting voluntary agreements when agencies in or outside OEM disagreed. This approach led to agreements between the War Shipping Administration (WSA) and the Army and between WSA and the Coast Guard. The latter related to training of merchant seamen.65 Coy also continued being the middle man for progress reports from OEM agencies to Roosevelt. As before, he did not merely forward them. He reviewed them and sometimes flagged certain issues in the reports for the president’s attention. For example, the May report from the Office of Defense Transportation blamed WPB for inadequate allocation of material necessary for rail maintenance and equipment.66 Its June report highlighted the efforts by the agency to conserve rubber used by trucks and privately owned cars (discussed more generally in policy section on shortages above).67 He also monitored the status of presidential appointments related to OEM and reminded FDR when they were expiring and needed to be dealt with.68

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

211

An external confirmation of the benefits of Coy’s low-key but highly focused approach to management was perhaps best reflected when he testified before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in June. This occurred about six weeks after his BOB appointment. Wearing his BOB hat, he was questioned closely by subcommittee members about the budget request from the president for FY 1943 for national defense, including discretionary presidential accounts and budgets for all OEM agencies. The deeply embedded culture of the committee was to be skeptical of executive branch requests for money and to grill the testifiers extensively on minute details. They were professional skinflints, war or no war. During his testimony, Coy demonstrated a fluency of knowledge about the president’s request and was able to give informed answers to their questions. When there were no more questions, he got a rare compliment. Out of the blue, Congressman George Johnson (D-WV) offered, “I might add, Mr. Coy, that I think you are doing a very good job and you have the confidence of the committee and the Congress.” Congressman Ludlow, a fellow Indianan who knew Coy well (chaps. 2 and 5), chimed in: “And I would like to join in that endorsement” (US House 1942d, 553). Certainly, the unusual compliment came in the context of Coy testifying that day wearing his BOB hat. But, with only six weeks on the job at BOB, it seems reasonable to assume that his credibility with committee members predated his BOB appointment. The appropriators were very familiar with him from his previous congressional appearances as LOEM. Their positive view of him had gradually developed over time and likely was based on much more than this single appearance before them. Therefore, this highly unusual and uncustomary praise that they spontaneously offered should probably be viewed as covering his management activities as LOEM as well as at BOB. Congress Strengthens CAS Whenever CAS’s budget came up at congressional hearings in the past, there usually was confusion about what it did and whether it duplicated what OEM constituent agencies did themselves (chap. 8). In June 1942, FDR sent a message to Congress that included his recommendations for FY 1943 funding of LOEM and CAS: $113,000 and $12 million, respectively (US House 1942c). As part of the same series of hearings when the congressmen had complimented Coy (above), a House Appropriations Subcommittee held a very detailed and extensive hearing on CAS. It covered forty pages of the hearing transcript (US House 1942d, 699–738). The committee subsequently

212

Get Things Moving!

cut the CAS budget by $3 million and stated its concern about “a number of instances of apparent tendency toward duplication of administrative services” between CAS and individual OEM agencies. Therefore, OEM was directed “to eliminate any present duplication and to avoid any such in the future” (US House 1942e, 21). However, when the House-approved version of the bill came up at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the senators quickly zeroed in on the benefits of centralized administrative services due to the economies of scale and employing specialists who were not needed on a full-time basis by any of the individual agencies. They wondered if CAS’s power was inadequate to preventing OEM agencies from quietly building these activities in-house (US Senate 1942, 212–25). Therefore, in one of the very few changes the Senate Committee recommended to the House version, the Committee sought to empower CAS more explicitly vis-à-vis OEM agencies. The senators wanted “full advantage to be taken of economies which are possible in centralized purchasing, in the pooling of duplicating and communication facilities, and in the maximum utilization of space.” In particular, CAS should provide “central fiscal controls . . . for greater uniformity and standardization in the use of equipment” (US Senate 1942d, 4). They also cut CAS by less than the House did. In a conference committee, the House agreed to the Senate’s funding of CAS, and the Senate agreed to the House language on CAS (US House 1942f, 3). As signed into law, it clearly strengthened CAS’s leverage over OEM agencies as well as over the statute-based and legally independent OPA. Those agencies “shall not establish, in the District of Columbia or in the field, fiscal, personnel, procurement, space allocation or procurement, duplicating, distribution, communication, or other general services, wherever the Director of the Bureau of the Budget determines that the Division of Central Administrative Services can render any such service.”69 This expanded role for CAS in procurement prompted Coy to request that FDR sign an executive order giving CAS authority to buy property (rather than being limited to renting or leasing) and to sell such properties.70 Loyalty Investigations LOEM Coy continued handling reports from the FBI on its investigations of the loyalty of senior officials in the routine standard operating procedure he had developed previously (chap. 8).71 By then, nearly all investigations of new hires were done by CAS’s own investigative unit, Treasury Depart-

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

213

ment investigators at the IRS and Secret Service, and a similar CSC office. So, for example, regarding a new secretary in Coy’s own LOEM office, a report stated that “inquiries have shown this person to be a loyal American citizen and nothing of a derogatory nature has been revealed which would reflect on this employee’s character or reputation.”72 That the cover letter was mimeographed with only the person’s name typed in indicates how common both the investigations and positive conclusions were. Through July 1942, the FBI continued doing forty investigations a week of new hires at very senior levels or other highly specialized positions (such as scientists) vital to the war effort. Hoover notified Coy that effective August 1 the FBI would no longer do any. This was necessary, he said, because of the press of work. Coy struck back at Hoover’s vulnerability: How could the FBI justify no longer investigating “extremely vital positions in connection with War work,” such as dollar-a-year men? Continuing the FBI’s character inquiries for such new appointees was needed “due to the urgency of the situation and the instantly important requisite for character inquiries.”73 In other words, why was Hoover’s ideological interest in investigating low-level OEM employees accused of possible communist links more important than investigating conservative Republican businessmen who would be at the top level of policy making? It was an effective thrust. Coy knew he had the high ground. He promptly asked FDR to intervene, claiming that OEM agencies “are considerably concerned in this problem” of the FBI no longer investigating even the most important and delicate new hires.74 FDR agreed to sign a memo to the attorney general asking the him to direct Hoover to continue doing forty cases a week of new hires.75 The Hoover-Coy fight became muddled when former Congressman Maury Maverick (D-TX) complained to the first lady about when he was interviewed in November 1941 as part of the routine investigation after he was appointed to a position at OPM (later at WPB).76 She told Maverick’s story to the president, who, in turn, asked Hoover and Coy about it. Hoover accurately noted that the interview of Maverick was conducted by a Treasury investigator, not the FBI.77 And, besides, it was the head of CAS’s investigations unit—under Coy’s direct supervision—who had made the request for an investigation of Maverick. Coy parried that the reason the FBI did not do the interview was because it insisted on dropping its ongoing duty of new-hire investigations as of August.78 Maverick was quickly interviewed by an FBI agent asking why the FBI had been implicated and then by a CAS official asking what he was complaining about to Mrs. Roosevelt. Maverick, quite chagrined by these cascading developments, quickly backpedaled. He

214

Get Things Moving!

now said the Treasury agent who had interviewed him was polite, that he understood why new hires were asked the questions about their organizational affiliations (which had particularly piqued him), and that his negative comment to the first lady was casual and not meant to lead to anything.79 This round was something of a draw, Hoover bashing Coy and Coy bashing him back. Coy again showed that he was not cowed by Hoover’s bullying. He was willing to go toe-to-toe with Hoover in front of the president and tried to show FDR that Hoover was not always right. Few bureaucrats or at-pleasure officials were willing to risk that.

Coy’s Evolving Management Philosophy Coy’s philosophy of wartime public administration gradually evolved in mid1942. In August, he gave the after-dinner speech at a large national conference of educators in DC. Using the metaphor of public administration as a “tool,” he said that the shift from peace to war meant that “if you wanted a good saw you did not try to combine it with an augur.” Therefore, the needs of successful management of the war now called for “special tools” (1942c, 27).80 In particular, at this stage of the war, there was a specific adaption in public administration that the federal government needed to do comprehensively. The civilian and economic mobilization needed to be converted from the narrow perspective of national military needs to the combined needs of the international war alliance. “We have moved from a national administration of the war effort to meet the United Nations’ concept of this war. It may be that as the fight goes on still other needs for administrative tools may arise” (28). Coy’s speech and significant observation about the need to reorient war management got almost no media coverage.81 A few weeks later, in private correspondence, he elaborated on what he meant. Coy’s letter was a bit more blunt than the way he had made this point publicly in his speech. “It is almost as difficult to gear the administrative machinery to this concept of running the war as it was to shake the stranglehold of the isolationists. The newspapers have pointed to a conflict between Nelson and [Army General] Somervell for control of the war effort. My own opinion is that the difficulties which have been aired in the newspapers are those that are inherent in changing our administrative sights from the national level to the United Nations level.”82 Coy was referring to the then-unprecedented multination unified military command approach, which was emerging as the template for running each war the-

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director

215

ater. The unity of command principle was strongly pushed by Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and then FDR. A supreme commander for each region would be appointed. He would have full power over all forces of all the nations: land, sea, and air. His remit was to make military decisions solely focused on how, as an integrated and single military force, he could win the war in his theater of operations. The nationality of the supreme commander or the makeup of the military force under him would be irrelevant. That was how Coy viewed the conversion needed for the wartime civil administration. No longer should the production and mobilization goal be to serve American military needs. Rather, the managerial goal was to fulfill the comprehensive needs and priorities of the alliance as a whole. No more “me first.” Instead, “us first.”

Family As before Pearl Harbor and during the first six months of the war, Grace Coy continued being active in venues that were considered appropriate for women but that conveyed her full agreement with her spouse’s governmental work. In May she gave a talk on “Progress of the War in the Far East” at the women’s division of the DNC.83 She was a member of the Board of Directors of the Washington Chapter of Russian War Relief. In June, it sponsored a pro-Russia rally at the Watergate amphitheater bandshell on the bank of the Potomac in observance of the second anniversary of Germany’s attack. It was a fundraiser for medical supplies to be sent to the USSR.84 The next month, she agreed to co-chair its Group Solicitation Committee as part of a more extended fundraising effort for Russian relief. The first lady served as its honorary co-chair.85

10

Wearing Two Hats Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes in the East Wing, October 1942–June 1943

By the fall of 1942, the effect of the war on inflation was having serious economic impacts. After a battle over including or excluding farm prices, in early October Congress finally sent to the president a bill to “aid in preventing inflation” and gave him broad powers to accomplish economic stabilization.1 It did not impose on him a statutory structure for implementing his new powers. He promptly created a new agency within OEM called the Office of Economic Stabilization (OES).2 In something of a political coup, he convinced Associate Justice of the Supreme Court James Byrnes to resign from the court and become the director of OES.3 Organizationally, Byrnes was to LOEM Coy what all the other OEM agencies were to Coy. The letterhead on Byrnes’s stationery confirmed OES’s organizational home by presenting them in ascending font sizes: Executive Office of the President

Office for Emergency Management

Office of Economic Stabilization4 Even though it was an agency within OEM, OES politically was in a different world from the other routine OEM agencies. Byrnes was seen as the president’s senior advisor, as a policy maker with delegated line powers, and he had an office in the White House (in the East Wing). Upon his appointment, the media immediately began referring to him as a “czar” with power over all federal economic policies.5 217

218

Get Things Moving!

There were significant similarities in Coy’s and Byrnes’s modi operandi. Both traveled light, with very small immediate staffs. Neither was interested in traditional bureaucratic power or empire. Neither was much of a publicity hound. Both had the confidence of the president and had practically unlimited access to him when they judged it necessary. Both derived their power from the president, and their influence on events reflected that. Both sought to be involved in larger issues, especially public policy. Both were comfortable making decisions in person and verbally. Paperwork and legalisms were secondary. More often than not, their involvements were reactive because of conflicts between competing agencies that could only be resolved or conciliated by someone higher up the ladder.6 While not explicitly subtracting any role that Coy had as LOEM visà-vis OEM agencies, the practical effect of Byrnes’s role was that all activities of OEM agencies relating to economic policy were now viewed as under his direct control. Nonetheless, the impact of Byrnes’s presence did not seem to have a major impact on Coy’s ongoing LOEM duties. A review of his work record largely reflects an extension of the status quo ante in policy, politics, and management. On the other hand, Coy’s role at BOB during this period gradually and understandably increased. Only two weeks after appointing Byrnes, Coy participated in a presidential press conference with updated budget information on federal war and nonwar expenditures. Given how loquacious the president was and how well informed he was about the details of federal operations, Coy barely got a word in edgewise (Roosevelt 1972, 20: 147–52). Plus, the press had little interest in such boring information compared to politics and war.7 Three months later, in January 1943, Smith and Coy participated in the president’s annual press conference (sometimes called the annual budget seminar) on the president’s budget submission to Congress (for FY 1944). As usual, it was a very long (two hours) and detailed briefing (Roosevelt 1972, 21: 28–85A). At the end, FDR quipped to the press, “I’m glad I don’t have to write a piece on this!” A reporter replied, “You’re lucky,” and another said, “You’re fortunate” (21: 85). During this period, Smith often invited Coy to come with him for his frequent meetings with the president. For example, Coy accompanied Smith to meetings with Roosevelt on November 10, 16, 25, and 30, December 8 and 18, 1942; January 4, and February 3, 1943.8 When Smith was absent and Coy was the acting director, Coy filled in for him at such routine conferences with the president, such as on March 25 and April 9, 1943. Following Smith’s practice, as soon as he got back to his office, Coy would

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

219

dictate a summary of the meeting and then distribute copies to the relevant BOB staffers so they would be apprised of any presidential decisions or guidance on those subjects.9

Public Policy Coy continued participating in internal discussions of public policy, although sometimes the line differentiating what he did wearing his LOEM hat versus his BOB hat was opaque. Shortages and Production Opposition to gas rationing was very strong with some segments of the population (chap. 7). Coy was targeted by organized opponents in Indiana in November. A preprinted postcard was addressed to “Mr. Wayne Coy, Washington, D.C.”

+  +  +  +  +  +

A Pledge

From One American to Another American BELIEVING that gas rationing is unnecessary and that conservation of rubber can be best brought about by a strict observance of a 35 mile per hour regulation, the undersigned pledges himself and his family to simple, necessary use of his car for the duration. We make this pledge to you—a former Hoosier friend and neighbor. We feel that gasoline rationing is entirely unnecessary here in the middle west and ask your aid in a 90 day trial of voluntary rationing as outlined above. Signed ___________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ Street

City

State

My Occupation ____________________________________________

220

Get Things Moving!

The WPA Indiana state director (the position Coy used to hold) sent Coy a copy of the card. He said that it was being distributed to defense workers in Indianapolis. He obtained it when it was handed out at the Curtiss-Wright aircraft plant there. The card did not identify who was behind the effort, nor was the WPA state director able to do so.10 Coy said he had already begun getting inundated with such cards and, figuratively, sighed that this kind of self-serving lobbying came with the territory. More generally, Coy was involved in major policy issues regarding production and military needs. In a letter to an acquaintance in Indiana in mid-1942, Coy explained why the production arguments were so fierce. The question came down to whether they should dedicate the limited supply of raw materials to produce military equipment. That would be easy to answer: yes, if that would definitely be enough of a supply to win the war. Alternatively, they could dedicate some of those raw materials to instead create infrastructure to expand production capacity for the future to be sure they would have enough supply in the long run to win. “I don’t know of a single person who would want to take such a gamble” on the first option, he said.11 Coy attended several highly charged summit meetings of WPB and the military. Reflecting his desire to always get to the root of the matter and to clarify facts, his participation in those meetings generally focused on the reasonability of what the armed forces were requesting and identifying the underlying rationale they used for what they presented to WPB (US CPA 1946d, 138–42, 161–63; Koistinen 2004, 311–12).12 In general, along with FDR, Coy concluded that Nelson was not a strong enough personality to head WPB, especially when feuding with the military, and sometimes doing so publicly (Bernstein 1967, 163n7). That was a line that FDR felt particularly strongly about. African Americans Coy continued being involved in racial matters as they affected OEM in general and often the broader executive branch. It will be recalled (chap. 7) that FEPC had urged that even when federal hiring application forms omitted any reference to race, it nonetheless sought quarterly information on the number of African Americans employed by agencies. In October, Coy tried to square this contradictory guidance. In the absence of the information from the hiring form, “it will be necessary to make an appropriate notation on the employees’ record card.”13 A few months later, he was finally able to

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

221

submit the quarterly report for all OEM agencies.14 In May 1943, Roosevelt reestablished the Committee on Fair Employment Practice as an independent and freestanding agency in OEM, thereby somewhat strengthening its status and freedom of action.15 Coy was also involved in two other matters relating to African Americans. One was triggered when two OEM agencies (WPB and OCD) scheduled recreational socials for their employees at a segregated hotel in Washington. That meant African Americans employees were prohibited from attending. After much complaining (and attention in the African American press), Coy intervened and made a commitment that in the future all OEM agencies would be prohibited from holding employee events at segregated venues.16 Another issue related to African American farmers in the South. USDA was pursuing a campaign to maximize food production in the US. It noted that African American farmers in the South were often busy with traditional crops on a seasonal basis but were free at other times (and sometimes had unused land). Through the (segregated) extension system, agents assigned to the African American farmers were working to encourage planting victory gardens and generally to increase their production. However, there was a shortage of African American extension agents. This, in turn, degraded the department’s attempt to maximize food production. As usual, it was an issue of money. A delegation from African American land grant schools met with Coy on December 10, 1942, to request that he seek discretionary presidential war funding for the effort.17 Other Policy Areas Some examples of Coy’s policy roles in other areas included his continued promotion of workplace safety (chap. 7). He gave a dinner talk at a joint conference of the Society for [Public] Personnel and the federal interagency safety committee emphasizing the impact of accidents and injuries in the federal workforce and the importance of the need to reduce them.18 As LOEM, Coy also had modest roles regarding postwar planning. He corresponded with Gulick, then a consultant at EOP’s National Resources Planning Board, on the postwar agenda.19 More tangibly, he served on a somewhat secret task force on postwar commercial aviation. A reporter, listing Coy’s participation by his LOEM title, extrapolated that “Mr. Coy’s inclusion [on the committee] is evidence of President Roosevelt’s personal interest” in the subject.20

222

Get Things Moving!

Politics Coy continued being active politically after Byrnes came to the White House and notwithstanding that Smith would have disapproved of it if he had known. For example, in November 1942, Coy and (new) Administrative Assistant David Niles sent a memo to FDR with “some ideas on the political front which we believe are not unrelated to the task for winning the war and the peace.” They made three suggestions: appointing Oscar R. (Jack) Ewing as chairman of the DNC, increasing the president’s in-person contacts with a broader range of senators and congressmen, and FDR meeting with Lyndon Johnson, Jim Rowe, and the two of them to talk politics. They ended their memo with a PS: “Only 102 weeks until the 1944 election.”21 Coy also continued receiving suggestions from the DNC of Democrats it hoped would be appointed to unclassified positions in the war agencies.22 An indication of Coy’s close standing (political or otherwise) with the president occurred in early 1943, when he and his wife were invited to join FDR at an annual church “service of intercession.” The invitation was extended to the president’s “official family” and to “certain friends.” The former category was set by formal protocol, and they probably would not have been on that list. It is more likely that Coy received the invitation because he fit in the more discretionary second category. This was further suggested by the wording of the invitation, with Early writing that FDR “has asked me to invite you and Mrs. Coy to attend” as opposed to the more conventional “you are invited.”23 Another indication of Coy’s political standing came in a spread in Life magazine titled “The Roosevelt Party” published about a week before the November 1942 midterm elections.24 The text explained that its purpose was to present voters with information to use when they would soon be voting: “Are Franklin Roosevelt and the men in power with him doing a good enough job of running America and fighting the war? And, if they are not, would it be better to put more of their political opponents in power?” (103). The article divided the forty-two key members of the president’s team into several subcategories, the first of which was “The White House Gang: They Keep Things Humming for Mr. Big.” It consisted of seven men depicted in this order: Hopkins, Byrnes, Niles, Smith, Rosenman, Lubin, and Coy.25 The description of Coy noted his two roles, in BOB and as “special liaison” for the president. “He is a young Indiana New Dealer with a passion for speeding up the war effort,” it said (105). (Democrats took a beating in that election [Lee 2011, 160].)

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

223

Other Political Activities Coy continued being involved in labor politics, Indiana politics, and dollara-year appointments. An official of the mine workers union publicly accused Coy of having offered him a job in the federal government in return for dropping his support for John L. Lewis.26 Coy traveled to Indiana in mid1943, apparently for a meeting of the state’s Democratic Committee. There he met with Governor Schricker (the only Democratic governor in the Midwest) and other party leaders. Coy declined to comment to the press on what was discussed at the meetings.27 Coy’s trip came only a few weeks after a brief meeting that FDR had had with Schricker while on a base and plant tour on his way to meet with the Mexican president.28 Rumors were that FDR and Coy encouraged Schricker to think about the possibility of being nominated for vice president in 1944 because he was able to attract conservative Midwestern voters.29 Appointments for dollar-a-year men continued to be politically and managerially touchy. When the commerce secretary asked Roosevelt to approve a particular appointment, the president asked Coy for advice.30 Coy lamented fatalistically that “I do not believe he [the secretary] can make any more boners in choosing dollar-a-year men than have been made by other department heads.”31 While ambiguous in his specific meaning, presumably the “boner” reference covered candidates who were politically obnoxious or turned out to be managerially incompetent. As LOEM, Coy also continued handling delegation of presidential powers to make other dollar-a-year appointments, in this case to Maverick’s Smaller War Plants Corporation.32 News Media Regarding news coverage, Coy continued his low profile as a newsmaker for daily journalism and continued getting largely positive coverage in features and profiles. A wire service feature on the president’s aides said Coy “dislikes to talk about his job, refuses to take glory for anything— which may be one reason for his success in Washington.”33 A feature on Coy in an extended series of profiles on “Who’s News Today” noted that “his always casual but incisive word may carry more weight than a congressional debate.”34 A Canadian magazine described him this way: “You don’t hear much about Coy but at Presidential press conferences when Mr. Roosevelt wants figures he most often turns to him and says, ‘What about it, Wayne?’ The man seems to have an encyclopedic knowledge of

224

Get Things Moving!

the administrative maze that is Washington and while he works just outside the merciless publicity spotlight that plays upon the White House his influence is important.”35 Another profile described him as “one of the few ‘co-ordinators’ in Washington who can get things done” and that he was “a worker of governmental miracles.”36 Not all coverage was positive. The Chicago Tribune archly noted that Coy was one of the pre–Pearl Harbor pro-war hawks in the administration, but, like some others around FDR, he was too old to be drafted. At the time, he was thirty-nine, and the current draft cutoff was thirty-seven.37 A columnist called for creating a war Cabinet because Coy “is merely a ‘liaison officer.’ ” As a go-between without line power, he was not “capable of giving centralized direction of our war effort.”38 Coy sometimes played unorthodox roles with the press. After a presidential press conference, Coy introduced Edgar Snow, prominent foreign correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post, to FDR. They chatted for a few minutes. Months later, Snow was in Russia reporting on the war. He hoped to convey his frank opinions to FDR, but wanted to make sure they would reach the president and not be seen by any underlings who might be tempted to leak them. He sent his letter to Coy, asking to use his good offices to make sure Roosevelt saw it.39 On another occasion, Coy arranged for Herald Tribune reporter Joseph Alsop, who was in Asia, to be hired as the representative of Lend-Lease in China for about six months.40 Presumably such a favor would redound to the president’s short-term benefit with frank observations about the facts on the ground as well as longer term when Alsop returned to journalism.

Management Byrnes or not, BOB or not, Coy’s managerial responsibilities as LOEM continued apace during this period. Some of his activities (now and before) could probably be categorized as relatively ministerial, such as signing formal letters as required by law. However, as a direct or indirect manager, he continued to be fully involved in overseeing OEM’s vast empire. While somewhat awkward linguistically, in federal parlance Coy’s unit was formally called the Office of the Liaison Officer. It continued to be a modest operation (chap. 9). During FY 1943, he had about twentyeight employees on his payroll, eleven attorneys in his legal office, and seventeen clerical and secretarial. In the spring of 1943, when estimating

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

225

the LOEM budget for FY 1944, he expected the size of his staff to drop to fifteen, seven attorneys and nine clerical. His office budget for FY 1943 was $113,000, and predicted expenses for FY 1944 were $62,000 (US House 1943c). During this time, the number of people in his immediate office fluctuated between three and five (excluding lawyers and their support staff). His longtime personal secretary and office manager was Mrs. Thelma Abbott. In the spring of 1943, she transferred out of the LOEM office to Rockefeller’s Latin American OEM unit.41 Even though Coy’s staffing and budgeting were estimated to be going down at this point in the war, Coy’s travel expense allotment during FY 1943 nearly doubled, from $625 to $1,040.42 This indicated an increased effort on his part to get out from behind his desk and travel for official purposes, whether to give talks, attend business-related meetings, visit CAS regional offices, or (very quietly and on the side) engage in politics.43 Liaison as Public Administration by Another Name Coy continued receiving progress reports from OEM agencies and forwarding them to the president. He also continued reading them and flagging for Roosevelt important points of good news or bad. For example, the January 1943 monthly report from the Office of Defense Transportation said that the last iron-ore carrier cleared the Great Lakes in early December (before ice shut down the shipping season) and that the total shipped in 1942 was more that 10 percent greater than in 1941. Some bad news was the growing scarcity of mechanics to maintain truck and rail engines, which created a delay in delivery of war cargo.44 Coy sent a form letter to all OEM agencies on the need to maximize the usage of the skills of current personnel. That was because there was a diminishing pool of qualified civilians for hiring. He said that the CSC was “scouring” the country but still not able to fulfill all requests for new hires from agencies. For example, a severe shortage of stenographers and typists meant the CSC was able to fill only one in every ten vacancies.45 Coy’s responsibility for office space allocations and the concomitant decentralization of federal offices from Washington (chap. 8) led to an issue with the Maryland state income tax. As LOEM, Coy asked the governor to exempt from the state income tax any federal employees who were moved to offices in Maryland for the duration of the war, especially those who resided in DC and Virginia. Their employment in Maryland was wholly out of their control and was temporary, he emphasized.46

226

Get Things Moving!

Coy continued being the point of contact with the GAO about proper spending of OEM federal funds. The subjects he inquired about included requesting an authoritative interpretation of the law permitting delegation of authority for appointment of personnel,47 mishandling of the opening of sealed bids,48 and use of condemnation proceedings to acquire office space that was delayed because of an appeal.49 On another occasion, Coy asked GAO who was financially responsible if a federal employee canceled a trip but not his Pullman compartment reservation. GAO’s answer was that it all depended. If the government traveler was somehow prevented from canceling the reservation due to a meritorious reason, OEM should pay. Otherwise, the individual was required to pay.50 One of the touchiest managerial and political issues at the time was draft deferments. This related to the fairness of the selective service. Would politically connected people be able to manipulate the system to avoid doing their national duty compared to other men in the identical demographic status, such as age and marital status?51 OGR director Mellett was criticized by the conservative coalition and by the media several times for allegedly arranging draft deferments for Hollywood stars (Lee 2015; 2005, 111–12). To tamp down on rumors and allegations, FDR issued a uniform policy on deferments. One element of the policy was a severe restriction on granting deferments to civil servants and at-pleasure officials. His view was that federal employees should be subject to the same obligations for service imposed on their nongovernmental peers. Requests for deferments of federal employees therefore needed to be submitted to the president on a case-by-case basis and were closely reviewed by the White House’s personnel expert, William McReynolds (and Coy’s LOEM predecessor). Coy submitted only a handful of such requests during the war. He was torn between his managerial duties and his keen understanding of the political sensitivity of requesting these exemptions. Therefore he was reluctant to submit such requests and seemed very parsimonious in the few instances when he agreed the man would be very hard to replace. In one case, he asked for a six-month deferment for the fiscal officer of CAS’s San Francisco regional office. Coy said that “it appears to be almost impossible to find another person with experience and background comparable” to that person.52 In another instance, he said that the OEM regional director in Atlanta had just been reclassified as 1-A, but given “the extreme importance of his work to the total war effort,” Coy was hoping for a deferment.53 Another time, he said that when the procurement officer in the Cleveland regional office had been promoted from a junior to a senior position six months

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

227

earlier, CAS had tried to recruit a qualified successor to the position he vacated, but without success. In the meantime, he “has been doing double duty for us and the loss of his services would be a definite detriment to the organization.”54 Coy made an unusually strong plea to keep the supervisor of the CAS printing facility in DC from getting drafted. He said that the man “is responsible for the twenty-four hour a day operation of a battery of four high speed” presses, producing about three million impressions a week. Conveying the realities of the labor pool during the war, Coy said that “due to the manpower shortage it has been necessary for him to operate [the presses] with unskilled labor, fifty per cent of his force being girls, all of whom he has been training for a very short time,” and there was constant turnover with people leaving for less dirty and physical jobs. Coy pointed out that WMC categorized lithographic pressmen as an “essential occupation” and therefore felt his employee had “a valid criterion for seeking occupational deferment.”55 Loyalty Investigations It will be recalled (chap. 9) that the FBI refused to investigate new hires, even for the most senior and sensitive positions, because it was too busy investigating subversives. During the period from November 1942 to April 1943, the FBI sent Coy reports of its investigations of at least nine OEM employees about whom the FBI had received complaints. These were accusations—however baseless—from a citizen that the OEM employee was either a subversive, a Communist, or was disloyal to the US. Generally, they related to the largest OEM employers: OPA, WPB, and WMC. In each case, Coy forwarded the FBI report to the agency. In all of those cases, the agency decided that the FBI report did not justify firing the employee. The reasons for the decisions, as conveyed by Coy back to Hoover, included that the report “exonerates Mr. Hynming from any charges of subversive activity”; the agency did “not feel that the charges are substantiated”; or, without a reason, simply that the employee “will be retained in his present position.”56 Notwithstanding these particular cases, not everyone in OEM was exonerated and retained. There were some instances during the war when the results of an investigation (whether by the FBI or other units) were not clear-cut enough for full exoneration or firing. There were a handful of cases when “the evidence was not so clear,” but, in an excess of caution, even though the person was retained, he or she was shifted to a work

228

Get Things Moving!

assignment that was less confidential and sensitive (US House 1943a, 527). These examples also helped protect OEM from accusations that it was soft on loyalty issues, a haven for reds, or that it gave blank-check exonerations to everyone sight unseen. Giving a sense of the enormous volume of this work, from the beginning of personnel investigations to the spring of 1943, CAS’s investigations unit received and reviewed more than 50,000 investigative reports conducted at its request (US House 1943a, 527). Overseeing CAS CAS was Coy’s major direct management responsibility. By this point in the war, it was a huge operation, spending about $13 million a year and employing about 8,000 people (US House, 1943b). For example, one of CAS’s duties was to provide centralized telephone switchboards for all OEM agencies. These were people-intensive activities. For each of OEM’s regional offices, CAS employed about thirty-seven switchboard operators (US House 1943a, 547). Another of CAS’s major centralized services was printing and distribution. It was an important operation with large plants in Chicago and San Francisco. For example, in the first ten months of FY 1943, its regional warehouses distributed approximately one billion printed matters, including about half a billion ration books, 250 million posters, and 150 million booklets and pamphlets (541). When calculated on a per-employee basis, each worker at its printing plants produced 24,000 impressions a week (517). These printing plants were such large and hazardous operations that CAS employed eight nurses to treat employees for injuries and accidents (543). In November 1942, Coy wrote the postmaster general about a way to reduce the burden of packages in the mail stream. According to the Post Office Department’s regulations at the time, parcels sent by federal agencies from Washington could weigh up to seventy pounds. But parcels originating from other locations were limited to four pounds. Coy pointed out that CAS’s publishing arm maintained printing operations in many cities, not just DC. If the Post Office insisted on the four-pound limit, then CAS would be burdening the mail stream with many more packages of printed material than if it were permitted to mail up to seventy pounds per parcel from non-DC locations. Also, by mailing from regional offices, the packages would have to travel shorter distances than if mailed from Washington. Finally, it seemed illogical that private-contract printers doing work for CAS around the country would have to ship their products to

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

229

DC simply to permit redistribution of those materials within the eligibility limit of seventy pounds. Surely it would be in the Post Office’s best interest to do that? Coy asked the postmaster general to waive the DC-only rule for seventy-pound packages of printed matter.57 Based on Dort’s testimony before Congress in May 1943, it appears that a change along those lines was approved (US House 1943a, 528–29). Deriving from the law granting the president the power to seize property (chap. 5), Coy sometimes needed to sign legal documents permitting CAS to use this power to acquire office space for OEM agencies in the regional offices. In one case, probably guessing that Coy would ask, Dort handwrote a postscript on the form letter justifying the necessity for this requisition: “No other suitable space in downtown area” of Chicago was available, he explained to Coy.58 One of the advantages of Coy wearing both hats was the ease of handling management issues relating to CAS. For example, GAO raised questions about the strict legality of paying travel expenses for OEM consultants and other intermittent employees. As LOEM, Coy asked BOB for a presidential request to Congress to clarify the meaning of the statutes. Presto! After being reviewed and okayed by BOB staff, acting BOB director Coy (when Smith happened to be out of the office) asked the president to send a message to Congress requesting the change (US House, 1943d). Congress smoothly folded the presidential request into a wartime appropriation bill (US House 1943e, 717–19). It will be recalled that during the congressional appropriation process for FY 1943 in the spring of 1942, CAS’s operations were reviewed in depth and, in the end, strengthened (chap. 9). A year later, in the spring of 1943, BOB and Coy (wearing both hats) reexamined the scope of CAS’s services. They concluded that CAS should continue to provide all administrative services to the smaller OEM agencies (about a dozen), but that the two largest, WPB and OPA, should now have all their administrative activities in house. In the same vein, they shifted CAS’s personnel roles to CSC. They counterbalanced that shrinkage with an expansion of CAS’s client agencies. Smith and Coy decided that CAS would provide all field administrative services for the highly decentralized US Employment Service (a non-OEM agency), with about 23,000 employees in offices around the country (US House 1943a, 519). Smith submitted a draft executive order to FDR in April 1943 explaining their rationale.59 A few days later, FDR signed it.60 The net result was to shrink CAS’s budget by about $3 million a year and about 2,000 staffers.

230

Get Things Moving!

Coy’s Evolving Management Philosophy A few weeks after Byrnes came to the White House, Coy put his thoughts on paper on improving the management of the civilian mobilization.61 At an earlier meeting with FDR, the president had mentioned that he was thinking about reorganizing that aspect of the wartime administration. Coy took him up on that opening. In October 1942, Coy suggested that the president appoint an “administrative secretary” who would be responsible for this area of activity. He pointed out that the president now had a de facto chief of staff for economic policy (Byrnes), for the United Nations (Hopkins), and a formally titled chief of staff for the military (Admiral Leahy). How about a counterpart for the civilian mobilization and the rest of the executive branch? Appointing such a person would be an improvement over Coy’s LOEM role because such an official would have an explicit presidential delegation of authority to make authoritative decisions. As LOEM, Coy implicitly had that power, but he could not prevent an OEM agency (let alone a Cabinet department) from going to FDR when it did not like Coy’s efforts at compromise and cooperation or simply refused to accept the results. On some other occasions, oracular words from on high—even if attributed to the president—could still lead to a lack of precision and clarity in resolving disputes. When that happened, such problems were “left to breed uncertainty and confusion.” Problems needed to be settled. An administrative secretary would have much more obvious authority to resolve such disagreements, whether they were intra-OEM or also involved the legacy executive branch. Coy suggested that such an official “could be invaluable as arbiter in these disputes.” In other words, the buck would stop there; no crybabies thinking they could still appeal to the president. Naturally, to be accepted as representing the president, the administrative secretary would have full access to Roosevelt when needed. For example, “he could serve to bring pressing questions to your attention before they develop into outright controversy.” He would need to be routinely and fully aware of the president’s objectives. Finally, the administrative secretary would need to be plugged in to the daily issues of budgeting and management across the entire executive branch, not just OEM. That would mean having a very close tie to BOB. Coy suggested that FDR appoint Smith to such a position and proposed that Smith be given the title of “Chief of Staff of the Executive Office of the President.” Smith would continue to be associated with BOB, but would be relieved of “all operating details of the budget estimates and procedures,” which were exceptionally time-consuming.62

Coy as LOEM and BOB Assistant Director with Byrnes

231

Given that Byrnes was sometimes referred to as a czar and even assistant president, Coy was suggesting that Smith become the White House’s czar, even assistant president, for management. As the explicitly designated head of all of EOP, such a person would have full power to oversee activities and policies in which EOP agencies were involved. Evidently, Coy’s memo led to a follow-up conversation with FDR. The president asked him for information on how UK Prime Minister Lloyd George structured his oversight of the civilian war effort in WWI. Coy got the information and summarized it in two follow-up memos. He said that Lloyd George had, in addition to a War Cabinet, a “personal secretariat” of four men who were the prime minister’s eyes and ears, served as a buffer to keep people away from taking up his time, and worked behind the scenes. Coy then slightly modified the proposed title he had used in his earlier memo, now suggesting the appointee have the title of presidential “Special Assistant for civilian war agency affairs.”63 Coy’s idea was an interesting take on improving wartime public administration. The holder of such an office would be as empowered as Byrnes and Hopkins were to speak for the president regarding their portfolios. Based on subsequent events, Coy’s suggestion was never adopted by FDR as such. But it is possible that it may have played some role in the president’s eventual decision in May 1943 to promote Byrnes to be the White House’s director of war mobilization, a position quite close to what Coy had suggested half a year earlier (chap. 11).

Coy and Byrnes’s Working Relationship Coy’s LOEM work did not overlap much with Byrnes at OES. Before Byrnes had arrived in the White House, Coy’s involvement in public policy matters sometimes touched on the mega-issues of macroeconomic management, such as rationing, production, and shortages (chaps. 4, 7, and 9). But these were not the central focus of his participation in public policy, let alone of his overall LOEM duties. Generally his time and focus lay in overseeing and coordinating the baker’s dozen of OEM agencies plus OPA (now a legally freestanding agency, but serviced by CAS). Therefore, Byrnes’s presence in the White House seemed to have little substantive effect or impact on Coy’s day-to-day LOEM work. That OES was a unit within OEM and therefore slightly under Coy’s oversight never was a problem. Coy stayed clear of any LOEM managerial work that would impinge on OES. Also, OES was such

232

Get Things Moving!

a small OEM agency that it did not require the kind of attention that he (and CAS) gave to the other OEM agencies. Notwithstanding their evident efforts not to step on each other’s toes, Coy and Byrnes had assignments that could overlap. In such situations, Byrnes had the stronger hand. He was the director of an agency with an office in the White House compared with Coy being a liaison officer with an office in the State Department building (across the alley west of the White House). One of the few times that Byrnes’s and Coy’s work explicitly, but lightly, overlapped occurred was when Smith and Coy were finalizing their draft executive order for the reorganization of CAS (above). As a matter of routine, White House Secretary McIntyre sent a copy of the draft to Byrnes for review, reaction, and input. In a one-sentence response, Byrnes wrote, “I think the attached Executive Order should be signed by the President.”64 This reflected Byrnes’s lack of interest in public administration. He was the president’s economic policy guy.

Family Grace Coy continued being her husband’s political partner, sometimes doing publicly what he had to avoid because of his official capacity. For example, in the run-up to the November 1942 elections, she participated in a DNC effort to promote absentee voting generally and presumably by those in the military specifically.65 She continued her involvement in Russian relief by cosponsoring an exhibit in DC of photos depicting how children in the USSR were affected by the war.66 She also participated in the launch of a cargo ship named after Indiana native Thomas Marshall, Wilson’s vice president and, before that, Indiana governor.67 Signifying her rising status, Mrs. Coy was profiled in the Post in late 1942. She was described as “vital, gracious and intelligent—a rather rare combination.” The reporter discussed how busy she was, with her volunteer role at OCD (chap. 5), raising two boys, and having an active social life. “Her face bears none of the proverbial signs of the wornout [sic] Washington war worker; serene and intelligent, Mrs. Coy simply exudes good humor.”68

11

LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

Roosevelt Creates the Office of War Mobilization, May 1943 Even though FDR was comfortable with messy organization charts and confusing, even overlapping, duties, there were continuous criticisms—often from conservatives in Congress and the media—of the “mess” in Washington. What was needed, they argued, was an all-powerful czar in charge of the civilian war effort. Coy was involved in some of the internal White House conversations about this. At one point, he and Smith suggested the president appoint a small War Cabinet. When FDR met with Congressman Andrew May (D-KY), chair of the Military Affairs Committee, to talk about some options for action, Coy and Byrnes were invited to sit in (Somers 1946).1 It was good timing for Byrnes. After about half a year as head of OES, he felt he had righted the economy or at least gotten it on its way. He was already getting restless, even frustrated. In mid-May, at lunch with FDR, Byrnes offered his resignation from OES and his interest in another new challenge. When Roosevelt asked him point-blank what that might be, Byrnes mentioned the role of central war mobilizer (Relyea 2011, 12). FDR agreed with alacrity. Within a few weeks, Rosenman drafted an executive order, and FDR signed it on May 27, 1943. It created an Office of War Mobilization (OWM) with Byrnes as its director.2 In the accompanying press statement, the president explained: “[W]e are entering a phase of the war effort when we must streamline our activities, avoid duplication and overlapping, eliminate interdepartmental friction, make our decisions with dispatch, and keep both our military machine and our essential civilian economy running in team and at high speed.”3 Press and political reaction was positive, with a headline in the Times saying the action “wins Capital plaudits.”4 The Christian

233

234

Get Things Moving!

Science Monitor reported that FDR’s action was “hailed” and congressional reaction was “favorable.”5 Coy had a typically unsentimental reaction, making sure to communicate with Byrnes private feedback he was getting from OEM agencies. On May 31, he quickly sent a memo to Byrnes with the initial reactions he was hearing from two senior people he trusted (“my informants”) in WPB. The general reaction was confusion as to what their new role (if any) would be and if this meant that FDR was seeking the resignation of the entire top management of the agency.6 The letter led to a phone conversation between the two. A few days after that, Coy updated Byrnes on what he knew and quickly recommended some possible managerial counterstrategies that Byrnes could take vis-à-vis WPB. First, avoid having everything being bumped up to him, and, second, Byrnes should decline to sign any formal memorandum of understanding on WPB’s relationship with OWM. That could be too confining and not fit unforeseen situations. “It would seem to me much better to let developments work out the relationships, with the guiding principle being that you force the settlement of all possible issues within WPB before accepting jurisdiction in your office.”7

Coy Resigns as LOEM, June 1943 Coy quickly concluded that with Byrnes heading OWM, he should not continue as LOEM. He viewed the two offices as overlapping and that Byrnes’s appointment “provides a good opportunity to centering in one individual the two closely related jobs.” Therefore, on June 1, 1943, he submitted a letter of resignation to FDR with a recommendation that Byrnes also be appointed LOEM. Independent of Byrnes’s new role, Coy also explained that being LOEM and BOB assistant director was “somewhat incongruous” and that he had “been increasingly disturbed about my dual status.”8 Smith promptly chimed in, agreeing with Coy’s recommendation. Indeed, when Coy was wearing both hats, Smith said, he was in “the somewhat anomalous position . . . where in several instances he has in effect been passing judgment upon his own recommendations.”9 A few days later, Byrnes also agreed that FDR should accept Coy’s resignation and recommendation that Byrnes wear a second hat as LOEM. Byrnes told FDR that he understood why the LOEM office should be continued instead of being abolished.10 Roosevelt accepted Coy’s LOEM resignation on June 8 and appointed Byrnes as LOEM along with his OWM directorship.11

LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

235

Now what for Coy? During his two years as LOEM, Coy had been considered for, either in private meetings or in press speculation, many other roles, including deputy to Nelson at WPB (chap. 9), War Manpower Commission,12 assistant secretary of the interior,13 OPA director,14 and under secretary of state.15 However, he indicated no strong interest in them, preferring to stay, first, as a one-hatted LOEM and later as a two-hatted LOEM and BOB assistant director. With his resignation as LOEM, Coy was glad to simplify his life by going back to a one-hatted role. There was only one other possible job change he was interested in making. Following the pattern of many men whom he worked with (such as Rowe and Rauh), in 1942, he applied to the Army to be recommissioned as second lieutenant in the Indiana National Guard’s Quartermaster Corps and called up to active duty.16 Coy told Rosenman that if his application were accepted, he would be glad to serve wherever the Army assigned him, but realized that he might be detailed right back to OEM.17 The Army declined his offer, probably because of his fragile health.18 Apparently, it nearly happened. In spring 1944 (before D-Day), Coy wrote General Eisenhower (“Dear Ike”) that “I have sometimes regretted that I did not ask you to take me with you in June 1942 when you took the command in England.”19 (This suggests that after both returned from the Philippines, they occasionally crossed paths in Washington in 1941–42.) Punctilious as ever, in June 1943, after Roosevelt had accepted his LOEM resignation, Coy immediately notified CAS director Dort that “you have a new ‘boss.’ ” He explained to Dort that, with Byrnes heading the new OWM, “it seemed a logical thing for the functions to be transferred to Byrnes.” Coy did not expect that the change in LOEMs would cause any substantive change in CAS’s role. He made a point to tell Dort “how satisfactory your services have been and those of your staff.”20 Similarly, Coy wrote to the heads of all OEM agencies informing them of the change.21 In response, he received a gracious note from the acting coordinator of Rockefeller’s Latin American office saying “how much we appreciate your cooperation and the grand job you did while directing this difficult operation.”22 Coy also drafted a short press release that Press Secretary Early could use when he announced it.23 Early released the news on June 14 in time for the evening papers. But the press did not consider it major news, giving it modest to minor play.24 Coy’s last official act as LOEM was to sign an official authorization, as required by law, delegating the power to certify vouchers for certain payments to several staffers scattered throughout the many OEM agencies. He signed it on June 11, 1943.25 Amusingly, theoretically this

236

Get Things Moving!

was three days after his resignation supposedly took effect. Coy probably wanted to save Byrnes (or his staffer) the trouble of facing and mastering the details of this routine form on his first days as LOEM. Dort’s routines were apparently still ingrained. The next day he sent another document to Coy to sign. Now Coy had to put his foot down. He returned it unsigned to Dort for retyping with Byrnes’s name as signatory.26

Byrnes as the Third and Last LOEM, June–November 1943 Explaining his rationale for Byrnes’s second hat, the president said there was “the need for linking closely the central direction of the Office for Emergency Management and the administration of the Office for War Mobilization.”27 When Byrnes had accepted the idea of taking on the role of LOEM, he said he understood from Coy that the duties largely involved “daily signing papers” for various formal and legal obligations. Waving that off as a minor and ministerial duty, Byrnes said he would be glad to “have someone on my staff” look after the job of such required paperwork.28 On June 12, when Coy declined to sign any more LOEM documents, he told Dort to be sure to contact a Byrnes staffer to find out, more generally, “how he wants the mail prepared.”29 However, it appears that Byrnes did not quite understand that the LOEM position involved significant attention, more than pro forma signing of paperwork and a lot more than he expected. He liked policy, not administration.30 His attitude surfaced indirectly only a few weeks after becoming LOEM. CAS’s Dort was testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on his unit’s FY 1944 budget request. Oddly, the hearing record lists his appearance regarding the CAS budget with just his name, unlike the usual presentation of name and title (US Senate 1943, 295). Then, during the hearing, Senator Tydings seemed a bit confused and wanted to nail down who Dort was: Tydings: For the record, who is the chairman of this agency? Dort: I am, sir. (296) This was more than odd. Tydings’s request for the “chairman” of the agency could have been interpreted by Dort as asking who his boss was. Dort, cryptically, said that he was the chairman of the agency (and further implying

LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

237

that CAS was run by a board or commission, not by a division director). He avoided mentioning Byrnes at all. Similarly, in advance of the hearing, the committee received a letter appealing some of the House’s cuts to the CAS budget. (This was routine, with the Senate Committee at that time playing the relatively passive role of being an appeals court from House decisions.) The letter to the Senate Committee was signed by Dort, not Byrnes, and it letter made no reference to LOEM’s direct administrative responsibility for CAS. It was as though there was no link between CAS and LOEM Byrnes. Byrnes was quick to officially unload the main direct administrative duties he had inherited from Coy. The month after he became LOEM, the president signed an administrative order (in the form of a letter to Byrnes) that, “in accordance with your desire,” he relieved the LOEM of the functions and duties “which relate to the supervision and direction of the Division of Central Administrative Services.” From now on, CAS would not be under the LOEM’s direct management. Instead it would be a freestanding agency within OEM. The functions and duties that the LOEM exercised over CAS were transferred to CAS’s divisional director.31 Amusingly, it was Coy, wearing his BOB hat, who drafted the paperwork reflecting Byrnes’s request and then submitted it to FDR to sign.32 As a result, when Dort resigned in August, just like heads of other OEM agencies, this required FDR’s signature to accept the resignation and formally appoint his successor, Richard Brown.33 A few months later, a reporter for an African American newspaper submitted a question to the White House press secretary about enforcement of the nondiscrimination clause for federal contracts. When Press Secretary Early asked Byrnes about it, he brusquely replied that he knew nothing about it and that Brown did not work for him.34 That it related to race relations and that Byrnes had a standard racist legislative record on it contributed to his lack of interest in the subject and desire to avoid any official link to it (Robertson 1994, 335–41). However, this delinking of LOEM and CAS did not change some other duties that FDR had formally assigned to the LOEM in earlier executive orders during Coy’s service. For example, some executive orders stated that any major changes or personnel appointments in most OEM agencies required the president’s approval. In fall 1943, the Office of Scientific Research and Development wanted to formally create its own personnel office. Based on the extant executive orders, the LOEM would have the duty of asking the president to approve it. Again, when Byrnes realized what he had inherited, he wanted to shed that, too. At Byrnes’s request,

238

Get Things Moving!

Coy submitted a memo to Roosevelt explaining another request to sign an executive order undoing the earlier ones relating to LOEM.35 FDR signed it, though not very promptly (he waited ten days).36 In another instance, when a space allocation issue came up, Coy advised Byrnes’s aide that “this is one of the jobs that falls to the Justice [Byrnes] due to his taking over the job of Liaison Officer which I formerly held.”37 LOEM Byrnes had some other modest interactions with his predecessor, such as how to handle a congressional idea to create a central body to oversee wartime scientific and technological initiatives (Somers 1969, 69n38). When Coy read in the paper that Byrnes had addressed a confab of senior military officials on Byrnes’s view of the mobilization effort and war strategy, Coy sent him a friendly memo suggesting doing the same for two to three hundred senior civilian officials working on the federal war effort.38 Within only a few months, Byrnes quickly tired of his LOEM role. This broke with his general interest in expanding his power and influence, of truly being the assistant president. According to his biographer, “but for once, Jimmy Byrnes was not interested in bringing a part of the executive branch directly under his personal control.” In particular, he did not like being viewed as the overseer of all OEM agencies, including FEPC. He especially disliked getting complaints from “liberal congressmen or the CIO about instances of job discrimination—or complaints from private employers or southern congressmen about what they considered the overzealous activities of the FEPC” (Robertson 1994, 335). Byrnes wanted to resign his LOEM hat as quickly as possible. But could he resign without FDR naming a successor? Even since creating the LOEM position in January 1941 and appointing McReynolds to it (chap. 1), there had always been an official serving as LOEM. Would Byrnes have to wait until FDR agreed to name someone else? Was there anyone else who would agree to serve and be acceptable to the president? Byrnes urgently conferred with Smith. (Coy must have been involved in these conversations.) Finally, Smith saw his way to a solution, remembering that he had advised FDR that if Coy became the full-time assistant BOB director, OEM could continue to exist even without a liaison officer heading it (chap. 9). He submitted a memo to Roosevelt about Byrnes’s desire to resign and explaining that “as near as I can determine, the appointment of a successor can be dispensed with if you so desire.”39 Not sure what FDR’s reaction would be, Smith attached a kind of tentative resignation letter to FDR from Byrnes. It stated that Byrnes wanted to “devote full attention” to his duties at OWM and, holding his breath politically, that he hoped “you will see your way clear to accept it.”40 A few days later, FDR accepted

LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

239

Byrnes’s resignation because the “provision of liaison facilities in the Office for Emergency Management is optional” under the executive order creating it. Therefore, the president said, “I propose to appoint no successor unless future experience should indicate that it is necessary to do so.”41 With that, the position of LOEM was vacated and never reinstated.

OEM after LOEM, 1943–Present The abolishment of the LOEM position did not affect OEM itself. It continued to be one of the components of EOP and the home of multiple wartime agencies that FDR created and continued to tinker with. Succeeding FDR in 1945, Truman maintained OEM even after V-J Day. However, as he wound down the wartime and reconversion administrative infrastructure, OEM gradually emptied out, but still existed on the books. In 1952, Somers described it as “not presently in operation, but the President can bring it back to life any time he wishes” (1952, 108). It eventually disappeared from being listed in the main text and directory of the authoritative US Government Manual. But OEM was never abolished by a president repealing the executive order creating it. The 2017 Manual’s directory of past federal entities lists it, accurately, as “inactive.”42

Coy after LOEM, 1943–1957 Coy continued as the one-hatted BOB assistant director, working closely with FDR, Smith, BOB staff, and the entire executive branch. Giving a sense of his importance, he was occasionally mentioned in the press as quietly powerful. In a cover story about Smith in Time, Coy was mentioned as Smith’s “tough, able” assistant director.43 The next month, another newsmagazine described him as FDR’s powerful and behind-the-scenes “ax man,” apparently because of his unsentimental approach to governance.44 A feature on the wartime news management said he “has more power in such matters than most people realize.”45 An editorial cartoon in the conservative Chicago Tribune depicted him as one of the six most liberal and influential New Dealers left in the administration who were still trying to find new ways to expand the role of government.46 But Coy’s health was fragile. It is also possible that he was simply exhausted. In August 1943, the Post reported that Coy “is taking an extended vacation.”47 A month after that, Coy wrote a friend that “I am leaving at

240

Get Things Moving!

noon today for the hospital in Baltimore. I am going to try penicillin and probably will be there for about ten days.”48 It was not an opportune time to be gone, as this was the high season for BOB to prepare the president’s budget for FY 1945. Coy returned to work and soldiered on. But as soon as the budget was done and sent to Congress, he felt he had to get away from the pressure cooker of FDR’s White House. During the winter of 1943–44, he received an offer to be an aide to Post publisher Eugene Meyer (and father-in-law of former Coy legal aide Phil Graham). He mentioned it to the president, who, according to a sympathetic columnist, “at first tried to argue him out of it. The president pointed out that the government had to have live-wire young men and that they, in turn, owed it to their country to serve, even if salaries were low and abuse from the newspapers was hard to take.” Coy replied that it would be in the president’s political interests for him to be at the “leading fair-minded newspaper in the capital.” In response to that, “the president spread his hands on his desk, a customary gesture with him when a matter is settled.”49 Coy, of course, also talked it over several times with Smith, himself a workaholic. Smith eventually agreed. When Smith and FDR met on January 21, 1944, they first put the finishing touches on the FY 1945 budget proposal and the president’s annual budget message to Congress. With that months-long duty finally concluded, it was timely for Smith to broach the subject of Coy’s desire to leave and, being careful, to be sure that this had FDR’s final assent. Smith, in preparation for the conversation, had tentatively choreographed a simultaneous announcement that Coy would step down on January 31 and be replaced immediately by USDA Under Secretary Paul Appleby. FDR approved both changes.50 Coy submitted his formal resignation on January 25, 1944. He wrote that he had “many regrets at leaving” and especially was “most appreciative of the many opportunities I have had to work with you personally.”51 FDR responded warmly (“Dear Wayne”) and accepted his resignation “with sincere regret,” the code used in Washington for an authentically voluntary departure. The president wrote, “You have devoted some of your best years to the public service in varied offices of great responsibility. In all these posts and latterly as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget you have done splendid work. We shall all miss you.”52 In one of his last contacts with the president, an uncharacteristically sentimental Coy asked if FDR would autograph a photo for him.53 On January 29, Roosevelt inscribed it “For Wayne Coy from his old friend.”54 Professionally, the rest of Coy’s working career involved broadcasting. While at the Post, he became vice president and general manager of its two

LOEM after Coy and Coy after LOEM

241

radio stations, WINX-AM and WINX-FM. In late 1947, President Truman asked him to fill a vacancy as chair of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Coy accepted. Why? After Coy died, a Post columnist, then a White House reporter, recounted bumping into Coy at the White House after meeting with Truman. Typically, Coy was trying to avoid attention by leaving through a side door so as not to be seen and speculated about by the press corps. The journalist remembered the conversation between the two as going something like this: “I could hardly believe my ears. ‘I thought you left the Government to make enough money to provide for your family,’ I said. ‘Why would you take a pay cut to go back?’ ‘Because,’ Coy said simply, ‘I’m still enough of a country boy that when the President of the United States asks me to do something, I do it.’ ”55 The Senate approved the nomination, notwithstanding criticisms by conservatives that he was too ideological and political for what they claimed should be a neutral, expertisebased, and experienced-based (i.e., broadcasting management) regulatory role.56 In 1951, Truman renominated him for a full seven-year term and, again, he was confirmed by the Senate.57 When asked why he accepted reappointment, typically conscientious, he said, “I’ve gotten myself so involved in some of the issues that I didn’t want to pull out on unfinished business.”58 Coy resigned from the FCC in 1952 to work for Time-Life’s broadcasting subsidiary, first at KOB-TV in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and then WFBM-TV in Indianapolis, nicely closing the circle of his life and career. As a private citizen, Coy continued a modicum of civic service, including a presidential appointment to the Philippine Rehabilitation Commission in 1944.59 He reported back to FDR, meeting with him on March 14, 1945, only a few weeks before Roosevelt died.60 In 1946, Coy wrote a paper for the American Political Science Review on federal reorganization, especially of the EOP. He urged strengthening the role of EOP units in the discrete rubrics of policy development and management. However, he felt that a president ultimately needed an officer whose sole duty would be to coordinate the often separate flows of paper to the president from those with policy roles and those with management ones. He suggested that this new presidential official have a title along the lines of chief of staff or executive secretary (1946, 1134–35). Coy’s health remained fragile, and in 1944 he was said to have stomach ulcers.61 Later that year, he was hospitalized at the Mayo Clinic for kidney problems.62 He died of a sudden heart attack in September 1957 while working at the Time-Life TV station in Indianapolis. Fittingly, it occurred while he was attending an event for the Urban Land Institute, a nonprofit organization founded in the mid-1930s that was dedicated to

242

Get Things Moving!

improving the effectiveness of land use in metropolitan areas and increasing the professionalization of urban planning.63 It was the kind of eye-glazing good-government public policy he always supported. New Dealer to the end, he had been scheduled a few days later to address a meeting of the Indiana State Democratic Party. Released posthumously, his speech criticized President Eisenhower’s record in office, in particular, the administration’s “unwillingness to recognize the dangers inherent in the world situation, its inability to face up to the realities of inflation, its indifference to the needs of our school children, and the bankruptcies of our small businessmen and farmers.” It was “an administration which promises me ‘progress’ and then promotes reaction.”64 Grace Coy lived until 1981. She moved back to Washington and resumed her involvement in political and civic causes. She chaired the District’s Public Welfare Advisory Board (resigning noisily when she felt it was not being effective), endorsed candidates for school board, and volunteered with social work organizations. She worked part-time for the Eugene and Agnes Meyer Foundation (the family that owned the Post) and was a consultant to the Labor Department and Peace Corps. Demonstrating her independent commitment to the same principles that propelled her late husband, she received an award from the National Association of Social Workers, a profession he had been supportive of since the beginning of his federal career in 1935.65

Conclusion

The preceding chapters examined what Coy actually did while he was FDR’s liaison officer for emergency management. Three main generalizations emerge. First, for Coy, liaising was merely management by another name. He did not feel hampered by the lack of explicit control powers. He had all the authority he needed: Roosevelt’s support. In any event, his operating style was a good fit. He pursued administrative goals through cooperation, communication, and coordination. Second, there were some times when he controlled the unruly OEM agencies as though his title was director of OEM. Using the common hierarchical nomenclature of public administration, he acted this way both downward and upward. Regarding the former, for example, he insisted on the right to clear any legislation sought by OEM agencies or executive branch units involved in the civilian mobilization. In another instance, he was the exclusive contact person with the FBI regarding loyalty investigations. As the direct supervisor of the Division of Central Administrative Services (CAS), he had control over the kind of managerial activities of (most) OEM agencies that were essential for a government agency to function, such as HR, budgeting, communication, travel, procurement, office space, printing, and field services. This gave him a channel of information about what was going on and even a choke point, if necessary. Managing upward—to the president—when it looked like FDR’s casual approach to competitive management was impinging on Coy’s activities and diluting his role (chap. 6), he reacted strongly. If Lubin now had a presidential assignment to submit progress reports about OEM agencies directly to Roosevelt, Coy could not perform the role he thought FDR had given him. The president resolved it and Coy stayed. But his threat to resign was clear, and Roosevelt’s preference to prevent that was clear too.

243

244

Conclusion

Third, as the leader of one of the six units in the Executive Office of the President, Coy was a colleague and peer to other central and powerful agencies, especially the Bureau of the Budget. His close working relationship with BOB Director Smith gave Coy even deeper control over OEM units. BOB would not act without his approval, whether the issue was budgeting, legislation, drafting executive orders for the president, or reorganization. As far as BOB was concerned, Coy had the last word on anything touching his empire. This was also what made for such a smooth transition when Coy shifted from being a one-hatted LOEM to the two-hatted LOEM and BOB assistant director, and then to a one-hatted BOB role. Here was an indication of how closely budgeting and emergency management were in harmony.

Judging Coy’s Importance: Was He an Early Presidential Czar? Was Coy important when he was LOEM, at least at the time? Few historians have thought so up to now. Based on the recent academic literature on presidential czars, he certainly has not been viewed as one of the FDR-era and early presidential czars. The definition used by Sollenberger and Rozell was of an official who was not subject to Senate confirmation and exercised final decision-making authority over relevant federal entities (2012, 7).1 Vaughn and Villalobos defined a czar slightly differently, as an administration official with coordination responsibilities over a particular policy area (2015, 13). For his examination of czars in Roosevelt’s presidency, Relyea took a broad approach, describing them as presidential “agents, special assistants, and closest advisers, including coordinators” (2011, 1). None mentioned Coy. The literature generally views Byrnes’s role in the White House as a czar, even before Congress passed the law creating the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR). Byrnes started as director of the Office of Economic Stabilization (an executive order–based entity located within OEM), then the executive order–based Office of War Mobilization, and as Coy’s successor as liaison officer for emergency management. Finally, in 1944, Congress enacted a statute creating OWMR and FDR named him to head it (as a successor to OWM). While fuzzy, Byrnes generally has been considered a czar during his entire White House service, not only when OWMR came into existence as a statutory agency. Even absent naming Coy personally, none of the recent writings on czars identify the LOEM position itself as belonging in the czar category.

Conclusion

245

Nonetheless, based on the definitions of czars in the recent literature, it appears that the historical case for viewing Coy as a czar or, at least, a proto-czar seems relatively strong. He headed the policy area of emergency management, served at the pleasure of the president, did not have any statutory powers, and coordinated a wide panoply of federal entities, mostly in OEM, but sometimes beyond too. His power was hazy, but it was power nonetheless. He was the president’s representative and, while resisting authoritarian approaches to solving problems, was viewed as the president’s man. One aspect of czardom, not always identified in the literature as a distinct factor, is being important to the president and viewed as important by the players at the time (such as the media and Congress). Surely the preceding chapters, by honing in on the details of what Coy did as LOEM in the areas of public policy, politics, and management, present a case for his importance in the civilian mobilization before and during the war. He was in the thick of it. If only based on the volume of memos that he submitted to the president, one would have to conclude that Coy was important. Otherwise he would not have lasted as long as he did in the competitive atmosphere of FDR’s presidency. People rose and fell, even if not fired outright. Roosevelt was unsentimental in that regard, focusing on results. That Coy held the LOEM title for more than two years (April 1941 to June 1943) is a marker of his longevity and credibility. Another easy-to-miss signal of Coy’s importance to FDR and to the White House press corps occurred at two of Roosevelt’s routine twice-aweek press conferences early in WWII (chap. 7). In response to a question at a February 1942 press conference, the president said, “I asked Wayne about that just now, and I don’t know. We haven’t got the information on it” (Roosevelt 1972, 19: 136). He did not bother to identify Coy by his full name (the stenographer inserted his last name in parentheses), let alone his title and role. Then, in advance of a press conference the next month, Coy asked FDR to highlight industrial safety and workplace injuries. When Roosevelt began his discourse on this subject at the presser, he said, “Wayne Coy suggests that I say a word about” worker safety (19: 219). Again, FDR did not even feel a need to state Coy’s title or role. In both cases, just plain “Wayne” or “Wayne Coy.” This minor detail occurring at two press conferences while he was a one-hatted LOEM indicates both Coy’s good relationship with FDR (even his taking the initiative to urge Roosevelt to discuss something) and the fact that Coy was a familiar figure to journalists. He was important enough and high enough in the administration to be a public figure. The regulars of the White House press corps knew who he

246

Conclusion

was. They did not even need the president to refer to him more specifically. Surely these two incidents are a flash from the past conveying something that most of history has largely overlooked or forgotten: Coy was important and well known at that time. Probably the most common knock against crediting Coy with a significant role in the civilian mobilization derives from his title. He was merely a liaison officer. Chapter 3 discussed how contemporaneous observers treated his title and role. Some, indeed, assumed he was not very important, a paper shuffler at most. Others, from the start, disagreed and assumed the appointment meant he would be playing an important role as LOEM. A persuasive refutation of the stereotype of his minor status comes from Roosevelt himself, in a private meeting when Coy was not present. Several months after he had appointed Coy as LOEM, at a Cabinet meeting in mid-1941 on expediting aid to Russia, the president said he was assigning the role to Coy because Coy was “one of the best administrators” he had.2 This detailed historical examination suggests that Coy earns recognition as an early presidential czar or proto-czar. Perhaps a good summary of the value of his tenure can be discerned from a thank-you note he got from Archibald MacLeish, outgoing director of OEM’s Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) (and librarian of Congress). After FDR reorganized the information agencies in June (including abolishing OFF), MacLeish sent a warm letter of appreciation to Coy for having served on OFF’s advisory War Information Committee (chap. 7). He wrote, “I don’t suppose the Committee will get much credit on the books anywhere but I am sure its members ought to feel whatever satisfaction comes from the knowledge of a difficult job well done.”3 Given Coy’s near invisibility in history up to now, MacLeish’s observation was perhaps something of a fitting synecdoche for Coy’s entire LOEM service from 1941 to 1943. Not much public credit, but constructive service and accomplishment.

Judging Coy’s Importance: Somers’s Guiding Principles for Presidential Coordinators Somers, biographer of OWMR, dismissed almost sarcastically any importance of the LOEM role. It “was never accepted as a centralizing force and even its liaison functions—whatever they were intended to be—never materialized.” This was followed by an arch parenthetical comment when Somers emphasized that “the head of the Office was to serve as Liaison

Conclusion

247

Officer (that was his title).” This conveyed that a reader likely would not even believe that such a slight and weak term could be someone’s formal title. Most certainly it was not an important or powerful position. Shifting to a more substantive critique, Somers asserted that the LOEM could never be successful as a coordinator because “the Liaison Officer had no authority and could not act, either in his own name or in that of the President” (1969, 43). Case closed. Therefore, it would be particularly relevant to evaluate Coy’s LOEM record based on the standards that Somers used to judge and applaud Byrnes’s tenure. Somers thought very well of Byrnes’s record at the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR)4 and extrapolated from that one case seven guiding principles for evaluating successful presidential coordinators (and, nowadays, czars): 1. “institutional status in the president’s office” 2. “jurisdiction over all agencies” 3. “restriction of functions to top policy and program issues” 4. “non-involvement in normal functions of individual departments” 5. “maintenance of reasonable control” 6. “qualifications of the program coordinator” 7. “small high-level staff” (1969 [1950], 224–30) This checklist can be used as a generic test of an official’s importance and usefulness to the president. Relyea was the first to use it when evaluating Tom Ridge’s service as presidential czar for homeland security before Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (2002). Following Relyea, in two previous studies of other high-level White House staffers, I similarly applied these criteria as a neutral and disinterested scale to evaluate them. At the beginning of his second term, President Nixon gave three cabinet secretaries a second hat. He named them counsellors to the president, each with a separate office and staff in the White House compound. (This differentiated their presidential role from their departmental responsibilities.) Each was responsible for all executive branch activities relating to a broad policy area whether in their department or outside it: human resources, natural resources, and community development. The media dubbed them super-

248

Conclusion

secretaries. Somers’s seven criteria, as applied to the three super-secretaries, led to my conclusion that they largely met six of the seven measures and therefore could probably be judged as largely successful (2010, 202–6). A few years later, I applied Somers’s seven guiding principles to evaluate the record of William McReynolds, head of FDR’s Liaison Office for Personnel Management. Like Coy (and Byrnes, briefly), McReynolds’s title was liaison officer, in this case for personnel management (a reminder that McReynolds was also LOEM briefly before Coy [chap 1]). Applying Somers’s seven criteria, I concluded that McReynolds fully met five of them and partially the other two, so, he, too, would need to be considered relatively successful (2016, 144–46). The following applies Somers’s same seven criteria to Coy’s record as LOEM. Institutional Status in the President’s Office: Somers was ambivalent about whether an effective presidential coordinator should have statutory status, as OWMR had. He leaned more toward the OWM model, of a president having the freedom to define and refine the coordinator’s work without limitations of law. Somers seemed to prefer the OWM model of an executive order–based entity. OEM had the identical status as OWM. On the other hand, many of the details fleshing out the roles of LOEM (and CAS) came in the form of administrative orders signed by the president. These had a legal status lower than executive orders. Also, the formal creation of the LOEM position emanated from a presidential letter, of even lesser legal standing than an administrative order. Even though LOEM Coy did not have statutory status like Byrnes eventually gained through OWMR, Congress certainly took note of Coy in formal ways. He testified before Congress several times using his LOEM title (e.g., US House 1941d, 636; US Senate 1941b, 287). Congress also obliquely recognized his office when the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1941 included funding for “the head of one office, created within the Office for Emergency Management by the President” at an annual salary of $9–12,000.5 In mid-1942, Congress explicitly appropriated funds to “the Office of the Liaison Officer” of OEM.6 Grade compared to OWMR: low pass. Jurisdiction Over All Agencies: Coy’s formal liaison jurisdiction was limited to OEM agencies. However, the agencies spanned the breadth of the federal government’s civilian mobilization before and during the war, giving him wide scope. Coy also was a key liaison with non-OEM executive branch agencies, such as by deciding when to recommend allocation of the president’s discretionary defense fund to a non-OEM agency and his participation in BOB’s legislative clearance function. In particular, Coy

Conclusion

249

focused on reconciling divergent viewpoints emanating from different OEM and non-OEM agencies. His premise was that the disagreers needed to meet and find compromise resolutions. While such a role is not the same as an authoritative “here’s my decision,” it nonetheless was controlling—short of appealing to the president. Grade compared to OWMR: low pass. Restriction of Functions to Top Policy and Program Issues: Coy consistently restricted his LOEM work to top policy and program issues. When OEM agencies were able to work out their differences, he would almost automatically go along. It was only when policy, political, and management issues could not be resolved that he got involved. He was not a micromanager. Some of the policy areas he was involved in related to civilian defense, African Americans, delivering military aid to the USSR, shortages, transportation, labor-management relations, dollar-a-year appointments, and property seizure legislation. Grade compared to OWMR: pass. Noninvolvement in Normal Functions of Individual Departments: Coy was not interested in getting involved in the normal day-to-day activities of OEM agencies. Sometimes, because of his direct oversight of CAS, he resolved OEM-wide administrative matters, such as a uniform regional organization and field service. His involvement in relations with the FBI on loyalty investigations was an external-facing role (arguing with the FBI and defending the decisions of OEM agencies about individual cases) rather than internal management control. Similarly, he sometimes imposed a policy of not raiding other agencies for personnel recruitment, but this, too, was a general policy. Grade compared to OWMR: pass. Maintenance of Reasonable Control: Somers’s meaning for this evaluation criterion was that a decision made by the presidential coordinator would stick and not be flouted. The examination of Coy’s work in public policy, politics, and management did not indicate any pattern of OEM agencies routinely ignoring or disregarding his decisions. The hottest he got related to selection of dollar-a-year men, particularly when OPM kept someone on after the president had disapproved the appointment (chap. 7). However, Coy later became more fatalistic about whether these were good or bad personnel selections. He sent a memo to FDR that a particular nomination coming from the Commerce secretary could not be more of a boner than some earlier ones and therefore should be permitted (chap. 10). Grade compared to OWMR: pass. Qualifications of the Program Coordinator: Coy was qualified for the LOEM position. Before his appointment, he had been the secretary to a governor, head of a state welfare agency, WPA state director, WPA regional

250

Conclusion

director, assistant to the US commissioner in the Philippines, and assistant administrator of FSA. He was appointed to the LOEM position in April 1941. From that point forward, if FDR had concluded that Coy was not performing well and was not qualified, he could have removed him at the stroke of a pen or exiled him into an excommunicated status. He never did that. Coy remained a (one-hatted) LOEM through May 1942, after which he was a two-hatted LOEM and BOB assistant director until June 1943. When FDR appointed Byrnes as LOEM to replace Coy, Coy continued at BOB until January 1944. His longevity indicates that FDR continued to have confidence in him and felt Coy was qualified for the work he was doing. Grade compared to OWMR: pass. Small High-Level Staff: Coy had a very small staff. During his initial months as LOEM, a reporter lightheartedly described the oversight of OEM as “Wayne Coy, the President, and three motorcycles,” and another reporter said that the LOEM operation comprised Coy and two secretaries (chap. 3). Later, Coy’s personal office expanded a bit. During the winter of 1941–42, Sidney Sherwood served as the assistant LOEM, but left rather quickly. Coy never appointed a successor. LOEM’s legal office was formally part of Coy’s office structure and payroll but operated like all other general counsel’s offices in federal agencies, as a discrete unit. Similarly, Coy was the direct supervisor of CAS, a very large agency with thousands of employees and a budget of millions of dollars. But, again, it functioned autonomously for routine administrative services and activities. Coy was only involved when necessary. Grade compared to OWMR: pass. In summary, Coy’s LOEM work fully met five of Somers’s guiding principles for effective presidential coordination and partly met two others. These results are somewhat surprising, given how poorly Somers judged Coy and the LOEM position. Nonetheless, a point-by-point comparison of the seven criteria Somers used to declare Byrnes and OWM/OWMR a success with Coy’s record results in a necessary conclusion that LOEM Coy was for the most part also a successful presidential coordinator. He got things moving.

Public Administration as Troubleshooting Just before Pearl Harbor, Newsweek declared that Coy had been a failure as LOEM. He “found coordination of defense agencies as difficult as lassoing a herd of plunging tanks.” Giving up on trying to do that, it said, “he now does miscellaneous tasks.”7 This seems like a harsh verdict, even when applied

Conclusion

251

only to his prewar work (chaps. 3–6). Nonetheless, a few months later, Sherwood slightly echoed Newsweek in his private diary. As Coy’s assistant LOEM in the winter of 1941–42, Sherwood felt frustrated and unable to be of service to Coy. Why? Because “Coy is primarily a trouble-shooter for the President and is at his best in that capacity, which leaves me high and dry without authority and little chance of accomplishment.”8 These two characterizations present Coy as a kind of minister-without-portfolio, a political operative who put out governmental fires wherever they occurred and whatever they may have been. Outside observers often echoed exactly Sherwood’s terminology of Coy as a troubleshooter. However, in these cases, the characterization of troubleshooting when used by the media conveyed a much more positive meaning. For example, a few months before Pearl Harbor, Time magazine (which generally covered him positively) described him as “the President’s No. 1 trouble shooter.”9 After reading Coy’s article in Atlantic Monthly, radio commentator H. V. Kaltenborn described him as “one of the most effective trouble-shooters in the Federal Service.”10 A favorable profile in the Chicago Sun described him as carrying out “trouble-shooting assignments.”11 A book about wartime Washington said he was a “Presidential assistant, general choreman [sic], trouble-shooter, since April 1941” (Kiplinger 1942, 448). A society page profile of Grace Coy in late 1942 described her husband as “one of the President’s brilliant young trouble-shooters.”12 Whether these depictions of Coy are positive or negative, accurate or inaccurate, a reasonable issue is whether troubleshooting is a key element of public administration or not. The term could mean that a person had a full-time job limited solely to scurrying from one presidential assignment to another without rhyme or reason. If this were the case, the job probably was not public administration. Hopkins comes to mind, particularly because he disliked day-to-day management even when it was his direct responsibility. FDR eventually had to oust him as the titular manager of Lend-Lease to bring order to the administrative chaos surrounding the program. Hopkins was the president’s confidant (and lived in the White House) who was involved in anything on Roosevelt’s mind. On the other hand, the record presented and examined in chapters 3 to 10 surely documented that what Coy did all day was more than Newsweek’s “miscellaneous tasks” or scattershot troubleshooting. There was a coherence and general commonality to what he did, a sense of what his mission was. Whether predominantly policy, politics, or management, almost all his work involved OEM in some way or another. Also, senior public administrators do many things, including dealing with

252

Conclusion

problems that rise to them, that is, requiring ad hoc troubleshooting. These are issues that could not be solved at lower levels and need some kind of direction and resolution. The hierarchical structure of public administration suggests in these situations that there is a need for a command decision. Coy’s approach was more toward cooperation and coordination. Either way, if this is an accurate portrayal of one of the many things that senior government managers do, then troubleshooting is part of public administration, while public administration is not solely troubleshooting. Perhaps a sticking point is that Coy had such a seemingly soft and trifling title, liaison officer. Even if Roosevelt had given him the title of OEM director, it is likely that Coy would have faced the same issues of power and control. An analogy could be made to Cabinet secretaries. They are, undoubtedly, the authoritative head of a federal department. Yet secretaries can face problems with bureaus seeking to be as autonomous as possible, resisting centralization and control. This centrifugal imperative is located deep in the DNA of public administration. Carpenter’s seminal study of the history of American political development focuses on the built-in drive by bureaus for autonomy (2001), as did Roberts in his study of the George W. Bush presidency (2008, 72).13 If so, then the centripetal power to control is always a relative term in the real world of large federal organizations. When reviewing the paperwork that crossed Coy’s desk and the management and policy issues he was involved in, it is hard to see how having the title of OEM director would have made much of a difference. In the name of the president, Coy tried his best to ride herd over the factious and overlapping OEM agencies. He was not a hands-off manager in the sense that he would exclude himself from a problem simply because of what his title supposedly limited him to. He was a full-blown senior public administrator, so close to acting as the de facto director of OEM that the lack of such title was a minor irrelevancy. Recycling the negative metaphor Newsweek used in late 1941 of Coy failing at “lassoing a herd of plunging tanks,” it is an apt and positive analogy to Coy’s approach to management. He was somewhat akin to a cowboy with a herd of cattle. He could never expect to get all of them to march in lockstep or in perfect order. He could not boss them around. But he could keep them all moving, prevent strays from wandering too far away (troubleshooting), encourage them when they were doing what he hoped they would, and—most importantly—keep them all going roughly together in the same general direction as one herd. This suggests a perspective often lacking in WWII histories, including the deserved reverence for the Greatest Generation. In 2017, Nolan made the

Conclusion

253

case that historians generally overrate the importance of individual battles, tactics, heroism, and generalship. Rather, he suggested that winning a war usually goes to the side that can absorb more attrition and exhaustion than the other. This factor, he wrote, was more than merely superior production of materiel, although that was an important element of it. Other related strategic factors of attrition and exhaustion contributing to victory included “foresight, leadership, wartime planning and strategic management” (2017, 479). If so, then Coy almost certainly earns some credit for contributing to the US victory in WWII. This inquiry documented how deeply he was involved in leadership, planning, and management of the economic mobilization. For example, he not only tried to keep all OEM agencies pulling in the same direction and planning ahead, but he also had the strategic insight that the wartime production effort should be refocused on the needs of the United Nations coalition, rather than merely an American-centric one (chap. 9).

Whose Public Administration: Roosevelt’s or Brownlow’s? Coy considered himself a public administrator. He repeatedly identified himself with the profession in speeches, writings, and professional involvements. Yet does public administration consider Coy to have been a public administrator? After all, he did not have line powers. He was merely a liaison. And he was deeply involved in politics at the highest levels. Are those factors enough to expel him from membership in the profession? In retrospect and using broad generalizations, perhaps FDR, whose leadership style included indirection and misdirection, pulled a trick on the three public administration theoreticians of the Brownlow Committee.14 He let Brownlow pretend to the world that PCAM was just another independent blue ribbon and good government research inquiry, à la the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel (Lee 2016, 23–26). This was to be a research study on the nonpolitical and expertise-based new profession of public administration and improving the operations of the federal government. It had nothing to do with politics. However, that was not truly the case. PCAM was funded wholly by federal dollars (not foundation money), was located in a federal agency office (the National Emergency Council [later OGR]), and was controlled at every step by Roosevelt, from its initial agenda to its final report (Roberts 1996). After the release of the report, the nascent academic discipline of public administration seemed to swallow it in one gulp. It was viewed uncritically

254

Conclusion

as the encapsulation of the new field, propounding a nonpolitical theory of administrative management underlying it and expertise-based recommendations emanating from it. Until then, the mainstream view of a civil service system was that it applied to lower-level employees, practically the factory workers of government: every day they did the same thing. What the report inserted into the academic mainstream quickly and strongly was that higher-level government managers were more alike than different from those worker bees in at least one sense: management was a nonpartisan and nonpolitical activity, just like the work of rank-and-file civil servants. This was a major leap forward for expanding the scope of the empire of the new academic field studying the civil service side of government. The founding of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) in 1941 can be seen as an outgrowth of the PCAM report. In part, ASPA came about because of the efforts of Brownlow and Gulick to institutionalize the new consensus of the PCAM report into the conventional wisdom of the academy. In particular, they emphasized that public administration was wholly separate from politics, that it could be separated from politics, and that the kernel of the so-called politics-administration dichotomy was a value buried deep into the new academic discipline. Policy was okay, but not politics. The Brownlow report also enunciated the principle that all government employees be under the classified civil service with the exception of the senior positions, those who were at the policy-making level. Were policy makers public administrators? The early orthodoxy of public administration would have cautioned that public administration was about implementing policy. But the academic discipline wanted to encompass these high-level policy positions, too. After all, this was the senior managerial level. This is where the action was, where important decisions were made, and organizational leadership occurred. The work of what came to be called the Executive Office of the President was viewed as being part of public administration. Drawing the profession’s boundaries to include the presidential level would therefore make public administration the equal and counterpart to business administration. If a corporate CEO and the next level of C-suite officers were all business administrators, then senior EOP officials were their counterparts as public administrators. In both cases, they worked at the management level of a large organization. In fact, the discipline of public administration never showed much interest in lower-level and front-line civil service drones. Rather, it was interested in the managers who ran things. Just like business administration divided the for-profit world between labor and management, so too public administration differentiated civil servants from public administrators. As the

Conclusion

255

focal point of public administration, interest in those below the managerial levels receded. Facing the real world after the war, the orthodoxy in public administration changed by moving the marker to include explicitly senior managers who were in policy-level positions. Appleby (Coy’s successor at BOB) articulated the new conventional wisdom that policy and politics could be separated and that public administrators should be involved in policy while staying out of politics (1975 [1949]). FDR was content to let this academic propaganda seep in. He never contradicted it publicly. He fully knew (and practiced) the reality that senior public administration included politics. Hence, the secret that the true scope of senior public administration incorporated politics remained hidden and unstated. When BOB Director Smith told Roosevelt he wanted to appoint USDA Under Secretary Appleby to replace Coy as assistant director, FDR somewhat misleadingly waxed on and rhapsodized how much he liked this new profession of public administration: “The President commented that he thought Appleby was a good choice, and pointed out that Appleby had done a good job as a public administrator; that he knew the Federal Government; that he talked the language of those interested in public administration and in the programs of the Government.”15 In retrospect, who co-opted whom? Was it Brownlow and Smith who convinced FDR to accept the dogma that public administration did not overlap with politics? I suggest it was Roosevelt who co-opted Brownlow and his colleagues. He let them claim the nonpolitical nature of public administration because it helped advance his own goals, and he knew that behind the scenes he could continue assigning political duties to his senior administrators, such as Coy. The role that FDR assigned to Coy violated a precept of pre-WWII orthodox public administration that policy and administration were separate spheres and that the good public administrator merely implemented adopted policy. But Coy was not only jumping the supposed dichotomy of policy versus administration that prevailed at the time, but he also was spanning the much more forbidden principle of engaging in politics and administration. Additionally, leave it to the unorthodox Roosevelt to invent a new role in public administration. Coy was both line and staff.16 This violated another of the basic precepts of orthodox public administration. One either had power over others or one advised the person who had that power. In some respects, Coy was running OEM, overseeing the dozen odd (and constantly changing) agencies it encompassed. He coordinated them, a hierarchical role at the top of the pyramid. Yet at the same time, he was staff,

256

Conclusion

advising the president and meshing tightly with BOB (before he became its assistant director), the ultimate incarnation of a staff function in public administration. Similarly, he interacted with the other staff advisors to the president, such as Rowe and the White House press secretary. Was Coy even a public administrator at all? He felt he was, and exemplified it through his involvement in the American Society for Public Administration. Coy did not try to manage on a day-to-day and detail-todetail basis the many component agencies of OEM. While he sometimes focused on implementation, he mostly focused on personnel, organizational structure, strategy, and policy. Essentially his approach to his job was agnostic: What problems needed to be addressed? What policies already adopted did not seem to be working? What changing conditions necessitated policy reviews? That Coy was indeed a manager can be argued by viewing the Byrnes example backward. Byrnes only wanted to be a policy person. That’s why he so quickly decided to give up his second hat as Coy’s successor to the LOEM position. It was too much management. In that case, Coy truly was a manager, notwithstanding his soft and even misleading title. He was much more than a liaison officer, which is exactly why Byrnes wanted to give it up. Is it even possible to separate a coordinating or liaising activity from management, policy, and politics? Not really. That distinction was at times convenient for FDR to state, but the operational reality of the real world made it meaningless and indivisible. Perhaps the glib conclusion is that Coy was a politician, a White House adviser to the president. Yet this still does not capture his duties. He oversaw the entire civilian war effort. He certainly needs to be seen as a senior public administrator, while at the same time a political adviser-at-large who involved himself in any issue relevant to his catholic assignment. Perhaps it is time for academic public administration to reconsider its abhorrence of politics and, based on the example of Coy, to more openly endorse that politics is inherent to seniorlevel public administration. If so, then Coy was Franklin Roosevelt’s compleat public administrator. He got things done.

Notes

Preface 1. F. C. T. (Frank C. Travers), “Current Comment: An Assistant President” (column), Creston [IA] News Advertiser, April 29, 1941, 1. Travers was the editor of this newspaper and usually wrote a front-page column commenting on the news. 2. Gene Robb, “Men Behind the Scenes in Washington: An Inside Story on the Five Who Make up the President’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet,’ ” Forbes 50, no. 5 (September 1942): 8–10. 3. Thomas F. Reynolds, “Meet Wayne Coy, Spark Plug of America’s War Effort,” Chicago Sun, May 17, 1942. 4. Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig: News behind the News” (syndicated column), Muscatine [IA] Journal and News-Tribune, January 26, 1943, 4. 5. Alfred Toombs, “The President’s Man,” Liberty 20, no. 17 (April 24, 1943): 53.

Introduction 1. Letter from Coy to Flemming, January 5, 1940. File: F (1939–41), Box 5, WCP. He declined because he was hospitalized. 2. Letter from Don K. Price, managing editor, Public Administration Review (PAR), to Coy, October 29, 1941. File: P—General (1941–43), Box 12, WCP. 3. Letter from Harvard Professor Arthur Holcombe to Coy, January 2, 1942. File: Hi-Hy—General (1941–43), Box 8, WCP. In the conference program, Coy is listed as “Wayne McCoy” (Kenneth Colegrove, “Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,” APSR 36, no. 1 [February 1942]: 110). 4. “News of the Society,” PAR 5, no. 2 (Spring 1945): 180. 5. “News of the Society,” PAR 6, no. 2 (Spring 1946): 200. 6. “Report of Conference Sessions, Annual Meeting,” PAR 7, no. 2 (Spring 1947): 144.

257

258

Notes to Introduction

7. The 1943 panel was a roundtable on “Coöperative [sic] Government” (Kenneth Colegrove, “Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting,” APSR 37, no. 1 [February 1943]: 112). The topic of the 1944 panel was “Problems of Bureaucracy in Business, Labor, and Government” and was organized by Pendleton Herring. Another panelist was Herbert Emmerich, then at Federal Public Housing Authority (Colegrove, “Thirty-ninth Annual Meeting,” APSR 38, no. 1 [February 1944]: 127). 8. Summary of phone call from Donald Stone inviting Coy to come to a CPA/SSRC meeting, April 28, 1942. Coy accepted. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. Other examples of his interactions with CPA/ SSRC include letter from Professor William Anderson, University of Minnesota and CPA/SSRC chair, to Coy, October 20, 1942, file: A—General (1941–43), Box 1, WCP; letter from Joseph McLean, secretary of CPA/SSRC Washington Office, to Coy, October 27, 1942, and Coy reply, October 30, 1942, file: Mac-Mc—General (1939–43), Box 11, WCP. 9. Coy calendar entry for April 14, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 10. Letter from Coy to Joseph Harris (“Dear Joe”), University of CaliforniaBerkley, March 3, 1943. File: Ha-He—General (1941–43), Box 8, WCP. Letter from Friedrich to Coy, n.d. File: Armaments Program, Box 1, WCP. 11. Letter from J. M. Juran, assistant administrator, Lend-Lease Administration, to Coy, September 28, 1942. File: Lend-Lease, Box 10, WCP. I did not find the text of his talk in his papers, suggesting his comments were informal as a discussant and panelist rather than giving a major address. 12. Results of search on Hathi Trust database. Sources: Official Congressional Directory, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., 1st ed., updated to December 19, 1941; US Government Manual, Spring 1942, revised to January 31, 1942; US CSC, Official Register of the United States, 1942, as of May 1, 1942. I excluded from these counts Coy, McReynolds, and OGR’s Lowell Mellett, who, as the coordinator of Government Films, had a liaison staff to work with Hollywood (Lee 2005, 110). 13. AP, “FDR Prepares to Establish 3 New Posts,” Danville [VA] Bee, May 2, 1941, 5. 14. International News Service, “Wayne Coy, Bearcat for Work, Is F.D.R.’s New Liaison Officer,” WP, May 4, 1941, B3. 15. Charles Hurd, “New Faces in Washington,” Redbook 77, no. 4 (August 1941): 55. Hurd was a reporter for the NYT. 16. Merlo Pusey, “Wartime Washington” (column), WP, December 1, 1942, 11. 17. Kenneth G. Crawford, “FDR Plans Revamping Whole Defense Setup to Implement New Anglo-U.S. Peace Aims,” [New York] PM, August 15, 1941, 3. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 18. Ibid., 4. 19. George Riley, “Efforts Begun to Heal McNutt, Coy Breach,” Washington Times-Herald, June 17, 1942. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 1

259

20. Coy also was interviewed for Sherwood (1950), but his comments were mostly about pre-LOEM events. Folder 2419, Robert E. Sherwood Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. 21. Letter from Coy to Grace Tully, executive secretary, FDR Memorial Foundation, January 3, 1948. File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP.

Chapter 1 1. EO 7065, June 7, 1935. 2. 53 Stat. 1423–24. 3. “Franklin D. Roosevelt Day by Day,” online calendar, accessed March 1, 2018, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/ [hereafter FDR Day by Day]). Brownlow’s memoir mistakenly dates the lunch to August 29 (1958, 424). 4. These were the six who should have, as famously stated by the Brownlow Committee, “a passion for anonymity.” 5. While the reorganization plan FDR submitted to Congress explicitly included sections relating to creating the executive office of the president and to moving several entities into it, it made no reference to EOP also having a unit for emergency management. It was only the EO implementing the reorganization plan several months later that mentioned emergency management. This detail meant that Congress could not have prevented OEM’s creation by exercising a legislative veto over the reorganization plan establishing EOP. 6. September 10, 1939: Felix Blair Jr., “Roosevelt Unifies White House Tasks,” NYT, 1; AP, “Roosevelt Drops Brain Trust in Revising Staff for Emergency,” WP, 1; Willard Edwards, “President Sets Up Bureaus to Deal with War,” CT, 1. 7. “Discard of ‘Brain Trust’ Viewed as Stressing Moderation Trend,” Baltimore Sun, September 11, 1939, 11. 8. Chapter VII: Administrative Orders, Title 3: The President, Code of Federal Regulations: 1938–1943 Compilation (Washington, DC: GPO, 1968): 1320. Brownlow erred, calling it an executive order (1958, 429). Unlike executive orders, FDR’s administrative orders were “not part of a numbered series” or titled, being identified only by date of issuance (Morstein Marx 1947, 20). In federal jargon, clearance meant behind-the-scenes coordination and centralization leading up to approval or rejection of proposed actions. The Brownlow Committee had recommended strengthening a president’s central clearance role (US Senate 1937, 39–40). BOB’s legislative clearance power meant that no agency could submit a legislative proposal to Congress without first “clearing” it with BOB (Neustadt 1954; Gilmour 1971). After reviewing it, BOB would assign the proposal a kind of grade, such as “in accord with the program of the president,” “consistent with the objectives of the administration,” or “no objection from the standpoint of the administration’s program.” Sometimes it flatly objected, thus dooming the proposal. LOEM Coy was significantly involved in clearing legislative proposals (chap. 6).

260

Notes to Chapter 1

9. Letter from FDR to McReynolds, May 25, 1940. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. 10. US Government Manual, Fall 1940, 50. Brownlow similarly erred by saying the administrative order appointed McReynolds as the “head” of OEM with the duty of being its “liaison officer” (in lower case) (1958, 429). BOB’s official war history made a slightly different mistake. It stated that this administrative order gave McReynolds the formal title of liaison officer for emergency management (US BOB 1972, 22). 11. McReynolds, Memorandum, January 2, 1941. The memo was not to anyone and did not have a subject line. He was formally delegating to three men on his NDAC staff the authority to certify travel vouchers. GAO and internal auditors generally insisted on such tight controls and paper trails. File: Council of National Defense, Box 5, SSP. McReynolds’s use of the formulation of “in charge of ” for a proper title had been relatively common in government earlier in the twentieth century (Lee 2008b, 98). 12. Robert C. Albright, “New Board Will Gear U.S. Industry to Defense Needs,” WP, June 2, 1940, B3. 13. AP, “White House Defense Board,” HC, May 30, 1940, 1. A Pennsylvania newspaper gave this headline to the AP story: “Dressing for the Windows,” implying that as window dressing this public administration detail was not very important. Somerset [PA] Daily American, May 30, 1940, 2. 14. AP, “Hoover Attacks Program,” WP, May 30, 1940, 2. 15. Walter Lippmann, “For the Immediate Defense of American Interests” (Today & Tomorrow syndicated column), WP, May 30, 1940, 1, 9. 16. The invitation to a social event at the White House was not extraordinary for Sherwood. For example, he had been invited to lunch with the president on May 26, 1940 (FDR Day by Day). Only two other people from Roosevelt’s large network of long-time friends and acquaintances were invited. The lunch appears to have been mostly a social occasion. However, given the timing—the day after FDR activated OEM and created NDAC—it could be the president wanted to feel Sherwood out about becoming assistant secretary of NDAC under McReynolds. (McReynolds and Sherwood also knew each other from when both were in the Treasury Department earlier in FDR’s presidency.) Similarly, on April 13, 1941, Sherwood, his spouse, and mother were invited to a social luncheon at the White House along with several other guests. 17. Entry for New Year’s Eve, December 31, 1940, Sherwood Diary, SSP. 18. Even though it was signed in 1941, EO 8629 was included in the 1940 volume of FDR’s papers (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 689–92). This signals in part that the president’s action belonged to the tail end of his second term and that it wrapped up business he had been working on in late 1940. The 1941 volume begins with his inaugural address on January 20, 1941.

Notes to Chapter 1

261

19. This quote comes from the explanatory note in FDR’s Public Papers and Addresses regarding the executive and administrative orders he signed that day (1969, 1940: 698). While presented in FDR’s voice, they were written by aide Samuel Rosenman. 20. The Defense Communications Board had been created on September 24, 1940, by EO 8546. 21. The reference to OEM providing “routine office services” to its constituent agencies likely reflects the point that Sherwood had made to FDR on New Year’s Eve. 22. Letter from FDR to McReynolds, January 9, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240, FDRL. 23. The White House Office, the sixth component of EOP, was not included in the conference session and printed symposium. Brownlow justified its exclusion on the grounds that it did not relate to public administration, but rather to the more political side of a president’s work (1941, 105). McReynolds also wrote an article about his first hat, liaison officer for personnel management. Because of the press of business, McReynolds did not attend. His papers on OEM and LOPM were read by his assistant Lyle Belsley (Brownlow 1941, 101). Like McReynolds, OGR director Mellett did not attend, sending an assistant director to read his paper. 24. Nicely rounding out the panel, Charles E. Merriam, the third member of the Brownlow Committee, presented the paper on NRPB in his capacity as vice chairman of its board. 25. Summary of Sherwood note to FDR, February 17, 1941. Summary of Rowe memo to FDR, FDR reply to Sherwood, FDR note to Smith, all February 20, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 26. Letter from FDR to McReynolds, February 28, 1941. File: Council of National Defense, Box 5, SSP. 27. EO 8632, January 11, 1941 (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 703–06). Somewhat oddly, the executive order was accompanied by regulations governing the new office (706–8). Normally regulations were promulgated by the sponsoring agency through publication in the Federal Register. In this case, the president “prescribed” regulations directly. For a reporter’s attempt to make sense of the new entity, see Turner Rose, “Defense Housing: Small Office Performs Big Task,” WP, January 18, 1941, 7. 28. Letter from McReynolds to Sherwood, March 1, 1941, emphasis added. File: Council of National Defense, Box 5, SSP. 29. McReynolds, Administrative Memorandum (Document Control #4527), Organization Series No. 1, March 1, 1941. File: Reference File of Sidney Sherwood, Box 39, RG 214. Considered an important development likely to affect its readers, the steel industry’s weekly reprinted it in full. L. M. Lamm, ed., “Office for Emergency Management Organized” (Windows of Washington section), Steel 108, no. 12 (March 24, 1941): 32. 30. “OEM’s Mr. Mac,” Business Week, April 19, 1941, 25–28.

262

Notes to Chapter 2

31. Paul Mallon, “Defense Setup Being Revised by President,” HC, March 8, 1941, 3. 32. Peter Edson, “One of Capital’s Dandiest Mysteries Is O.E.M.—Created to Unstick Red Tape” (Behind the Scenes in Washington syndicated column), Murphysboro [IL] Daily Independent, March 31, 1941, 2. 33. Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig” (syndicated column), [Bradford, PA] Era, March 24, 1941, 10. 34. Frank R. Kent, “OPM and OEM” (Great Game of Politics syndicated column), Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1941, 4. 35. Jay Franklin, “$1-a-Year Men Placed in Twilight,” WS, March 19, 1941, A-11. 36. Memo from Sherwood to McReynolds, Subject: Progress Reporting Procedure,” March 22, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214, NA II. Based on the archival record, it appears that McReynolds did not take any major actions to implement Sherwood’s suggestions and instead left it to his successor. 37. AP, “Roosevelt Plans Central Defense,” NYT, March 28, 1941, 18. 38. Ernest K. Lindley, “Pyramid of Agencies: An Over-All Defense Set-Up” (column), WP, March 28, 1941, 13. 39. “Super-Defense Organization” (Periscope section), Newsweek, March 31, 1941, 11. Lindley, author of a syndicated column (see preceding note), also worked for Newsweek and was the likely source for the Periscope item. 40. United Press, “Drafting Program for Women,” NYHT, April 18, 1941, 5.

Chapter 2 1. For general discussion of FERA and WPA from the perspective of hunger, see Ziegelman and Coe (2016), chaps. 5–10. For an overview of WPA, see Opdycke (2016). 2. There were, of course, criticisms and accusations, but none seemed to stick or indicated maladroitness on Coy’s ability to deflect them: “2,000 WPA Men Refuse to Work 7 or 8 Hour Day,” CT, December 7, 1935, 15; AP, “Williams Orders Holt Reinstated,” Baltimore Sun, February 23, 1936, 18; AP, “Van Nuys Finds Political ‘Boondoggle’ in Indiana,” NYHT, April 24, 1936, 11 [Senator Van Nuys was a conservative Democrat from Indiana who routinely criticized FDR and the New Deal]; “Indiana Seethes over Political Use of the WPA,” CT, April 25, 1936, 2; “Opening Campaign Speeches by Landon Eagerly Awaited,” CSM, August 20, 1936, 10; “Indiana Man Recants Denial of His Charges of WPA Waste,” NYT, August 25, 1936, 1, 11. The longest-running criticism of Coy was from the conservative Chicago Tribune. It claimed he was responsible for the early release of gangster John Dillinger from the Indiana state prison in 1933 and therefore should be held accountable

Notes to Chapter 2

263

for Dillinger’s subsequent crime spree (until he was shot and killed by the FBI), including a later escape from an Indiana jail, supposedly with a gun he had carved out of soap and blackened with shoe polish. Coy’s reply was that, as the governor’s secretary, he was one of three members of the state parole board, that Dillinger had received an excessive ten-year sentence for robbery (compared to average sentences for the crime), and that he was at that point serving his ninth year. With that single crime on his official record, the parole board had felt that nine years imprisonment was adequate for the crime and that Dillinger would be out within a year anyway. The Tribune depicted Coy as a soft-on-crime, bleeding-heart social worker who did not believe in locking up criminals or giving them long sentences. “Dillinger Jury Hears Story of Sherif [sic] Holley: Indiana Politics in Turmoil over Parole Charge,” March 16, 1934, 2; “Indiana Blamed for Dillinger’s Career of Crime: Lutz and McNutt Aid [sic] Hit ‘Inhumanity,’ ” June 29, 1934, 19. In 1938, Tribune publisher Robert McCormick gave a speech charging that crime was rampant in Indiana because of Coy’s parole of Dillinger. Coy, by this point serving as McNutt’s aide in the Philippines, felt obligated to issue a two-page public rebuttal to correct the factual record (n.t., October 1938, file: Dillinger, Box 4, WCP). After Coy was appointed LOEM, the Tribune recapped his career by claiming that he “was head of the Indiana prison administration when the arch criminal John Dillinger escaped to conduct a reign of terror in the middle west.” “Hopkins Lands a $10,000 Berth on War Pay Roll,” April 25, 1941, 2. 3. Ernest K. Lindley, “McNutt Faces Many Storms,” WP, July 17, 1939, 7. 4. Blair Moody, “How Two States Went ‘Off Relief,’ ” Boston Globe, December 11, 1935, 16. 5. “Roosevelt Calls for Donations to Flood Fund,” NYHT, January 24, 1937, 16. 6. AP, “Looting in Indiana Brings Armed Law,” NYT, January 24, 1937, 33. 7. “Thousands in Indiana Given Work with WPA,” Chicago Defender (national weekly ed.), January 16, 1937, 2. 8. ANP [Associated Negro Press], “Thousands on WPA Payrolls in Indiana,” Pittsburgh Courier, January 23, 1937, 20. 9. “$5,000,000 for Jersey WPA,” NYT, July 20, 1935, 14; “Wayne Coy Relief Co-ordinator [sic],” NYHT, August 4, 1935, 17A; “West Virginia Woman in PWA [sic] Regional Job,” WP, August 8, 1935, 7. 10. Franklin College was a small liberal-arts college in Franklin, Indiana, near Indianapolis. Founded in the 1830s, it was affiliated with the American Baptist denomination. 11. Coy’s Indiana friends called him by his nickname, Skeet. Letter from attorney Dave Harrison, Indianapolis, to Coy, July 30, 1942. File: Ha-He—General (1941–43), Box 8, WCP. 12. For general discussion of McNutt’s professional and political careers before serving in the federal government, see Kotlowski (2015, chaps. 1–7).

264

Notes to Chapter 2

13. “Coy, (Albert) Wayne,” Current Biography 9, no. 3 (March 1948): 7–9. 14. “President Starts Far West Journey,” NYT, September 27, 1935, 1. 15. February 9, 1936, FDR Day by Day. 16. “Resolutions Committee,” NYT, June 24, 1936, 18. 17. “Platform Builders Wrangle over Spelling and Commas,” CSM, June 25, 1936, 4. 18. Albert L. Warner, “Drought Tour Builds Up Issue for Roosevelt,” NYHT, September 6, 1936, 1, 15. 19. “Works Administration Approves City Pool,” Seymour [IN] Daily Tribune, October 1, 1936, 1; Wayne Coy, “The Social Security Program” (mimeograph), Indiana University Extension Division, Indianapolis, October 7, 1936 (in the collection of the Indiana State Library). 20. Wayne Coy, “Organization of Field Services” (Supplement to Part IV), in Donald Stone, Report on Organization and Administration of the Social Security Board (Boston: Public Administration Service, 1936). WorldCat/OCLC listed the Social Security Administration’s library as the only one with a copy of the report. However, in 2017, the library reported it was unable to locate the copy. Stone was a major figure in the professionalization of public administration, including the founding of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) (Lee 2014). Later in his career, he headed the management analysis office of BOB, interacting often with Coy as LOEM. 21. At one point, the head of a county welfare board opposing the change (because he would lose power and autonomy, especially control over money) asked the legislative committee chair if he could “borrow” the official copy of the bill. He then disappeared with it, oddly hoping that would preclude the bill from being voted on. It did not. Later, a lawyer with the same county board had a heated argument with Coy about the bill in the corridor next to the legislative chambers. He suddenly slugged Coy in the face, knocking him unconscious and shattering Coy’s glasses. Some of the shards from the broken lenses hit Coy’s eyes, requiring an operation to remove them. Coy later underwent a second operation to reset the bones over his eye. “Indiana WPA Chief Beaten by Lawyer in Surprise Attack,” CT, March 2, 1937, 12; “Call Three Judges,” CT, March 7, 1937, 23; AP, “Arrested on Charges of Assault and Mayhem,” Baltimore Sun, March 13, 1937, 12. AP moved on its national wire a photo of McNutt visiting Coy at his hospital bed. “M’Nutt Visits Injured Aid [sic],” CT, March 7, 1937, 23; “Visits Injured Secretary,” Atlanta Constitution, March 8, 1937, 3. Oddly, this was the second time Coy got punched by a political adversary. In June 1936, at the state convention of the Indiana Democratic Party to select McNutt’s successor for the November election, McNutt and Coy wanted the convention to pick Lt. Governor Townsend as the nominee. In a chaotic floor fight and long roll call vote, one delegate opposing Townsend charged toward the podium. He wanted to announce through the public address microphone on the stage that

Notes to Chapter 2

265

his county was changing its vote from one of Townsend’s opponents to another, hoping that would start a trend and stop Townsend from winning. Blocked at the podium by a gaggle of McNutt and Townsend supporters because convention rules prohibited announcements of vote switches until after the end of a roll call, he then “delivered a terrific blow to the chin” of Coy. “Wayne Coy Smacked on Jaw at Dem Convention by Ellison,” Valparaiso [IN] Vidette-Messenger, June 16, 1936, 1. Even though it was described in some newspapers as “a fist fight,” Coy was not reported to have punched back. AP, “M’Nutt Man Picked for Governorship,” NYT, June 17, 1936, 2. Given that he weighed about 130 pounds and wore glasses, it seems unlikely Coy had been the one to start either of the two fistfights. 22. “Wayne Coy’s Child Badly Burned, Dies,” Hammond [IN] Times, February 15, 1937, 2; “Baby Died: Infant Son of Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Coy Died at Hospital,” Tipton [IN] Daily Tribune, February 15, 1937, 6; “Baby Son of Coys Is Fatally Burned,” Delphi [IN] Citizen, February 18, 1937, 8. 23. “Roosevelt Plans Trip to Philippines,” NYT, March 22, 1937, 1. 24. August 2, 1937 (10 minutes) and August 31, 1938 (30 minutes), FDR Day by Day. While in Manilla, Mrs. McNutt and Mrs. Coy had a falling out (Kotlowski 2015, 316, 407). This perhaps contributed slightly to Coy gradually shifting from his close affiliation with McNutt toward FDR and Hopkins. 25. Julius Edelstein, United Press, “Wayne Coy Winning Recognition as One of Chief ‘Idea Men’ of New Deal,” Manila [Philippines] Bulletin, January 17, 1941, 15 (File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP); “Raymond Clapper’s Comments on News,” Athens [OH] Messenger, July 10, 1939, 4. 26. 53 Stat. 1424–26. In Reorganization Plan No. II of 1939, FDR also transferred to FSA the American Printing House for the Blind and, from the soonto-be defunct National Emergency Council (to be reborn as OGR in EOP), the US Film Service and radio programming (53 Stat. 1434–35). Congress promptly defunded the Film Service (Lee 2005, 45–46; 2012, 51). FDR’s Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940 further expanded FSA’s size and scope by transferring to it the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Howard University (focused on higher education for African Americans), Columbia Institution for the Deaf, Freedman’s Hospital (focused on medical treatment for African Americans), and St. Elizabeth’s Hospital (for the mentally ill) (US FSA 1941, 3). FSA was the forerunner of Eisenhower’s Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Carter then subdivided the department into two: the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Education. 27. Joseph Driscoll, “McNutt Boom Draws a Gibe by Roosevelt,” NYHT, July 12, 1939, 1, 6. 28. The president’s gibe may well have been the reason Coy quickly announced that McNutt would not accept any speaking invitations to out-of-town Democratic events for at least three months, perhaps longer (AP, “Speaking Engagements Declined by McNutt,” Baltimore Sun, July 22, 1939, 1). That this was a front-

266

Notes to Chapter 2

page story is an indication of the significant political implications it conveyed at the time. But McNutt’s pledge did not include out-of-town speaking engagements to non-Democratic groups or to Democratic events in the capital (“Liberals Take McNutt under Wing,” CSM, November 16, 1939, 6). On the same page was an unrelated photo of McNutt with his direct reports (“A Winning Smile Is a Political Asset”). Coy was incorrectly identified in the caption as “Assistant to” McNutt. Generally, in federal nomenclature, that title indicated someone in a staff position to an important office holder, while Coy had a line role, that is, authority over lower-ranking officials in the hierarchy. 29. EO 8205, July 14, 1939. 30. Letter of appointment from McNutt to Coy, July 14, 1939. File: MacMc—General (1939–43), Box 11, WCP. 31. “Federal Diary” (daily column), WP, July 15, 1939, 20. 32. “Raymond Clapper’s Comments on News,” Athens [OH] Messenger, July 10, 1939, 4. 33. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (syndicated column), Coshocton [OH] Tribune, July 14, 1939, 6. This story contains such detailed information that it most likely came from Coy. It was the beginning of a long stretch of positive coverage and even praise from the muckraking and gossipy column during Coy’s federal career. If so, this is an indication that even though Coy was not a publicity hound compared to most in Washington, he understood the need for the caring and feeding of the press. Another possible explanation for the relatively consistent positive coverage is that a former fraternity brother of Coy’s was a legman and researcher for the columnists. Presumably the two had mutually beneficial interactions. Editor’s Note, Tris Coffin, “Coy, Trouble-Shooter Extraordinary,” The Scroll of Phi Delta Theta 66, no. 1 (September 1941): 15–16. Coffin later got a job in the federal government and occasionally interacted with Coy on LOEM matters. 34. Raymond Clapper, “National Affairs” (syndicated column), Syracuse [NY] Herald, July 10, 1939, 12. This column was published the same day as a different Clapper column in the Athens [OH] Messenger (cited in note 32). Each newspaper decided on its own which day to publish columns it subscribed to, often depending on the size of the news hole of that issue. Hence the apparent oddity of two different columns by the same reporter published on the same day. 35. Ickes later changed his mind about Coy, eventually developing a good relationship when Coy was LOEM and then BOB assistant director (chap. 9). 36. As part of its Sunday paper, the Post usually included a photo supplement called “Our Town in Pictures.” In mid-1940, it dedicated the eight-page section to McNutt and FSA. For a politician hoping to run for president or, at least, vice president, it was dream coverage. The captions were fawning. On the front page, “Handsome Paul V. McNutt . . . calls for a secretary.” One of the inside pages had five more photos of McNutt, including with his dog (“even the McNutt dog is glamorous!”), dining with his wife and daughter (the family’s “good looks obvi-

Notes to Chapter 2

267

ously are unanimous”), and selecting a tie with his African American “houseman.” Coy was in one photo seated next to McNutt in an office listening intently while McNutt held papers and talked to him. Christine Sadler, “The Post Visits Federal Security Agency,” WP, June 16, 1940. 37. “Thirty-Eight Annual Conference of State and Territorial Health Officers,” Public Health Reports 55, no. 20 (May 17, 1940): 900. 38. Harold Brayman, “The Mirror of Washington,” Philadelphia Ledger, August 19, 1939. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP. Brayman claimed that McNutt and Coy were closer than FDR and the late Louis Howe. That sounds like an exaggeration, but it captures the inseparability of McNutt and Coy as a working pair before the 1940 Democratic convention. 39. “Assistant to McNutt in Critical Condition,” Baltimore Sun, December 23, 1939, 7; Julius Edelstein, United Press, “Wayne Coy Winning Recognition as One of Chief ‘Idea Men’ of New Deal,” Manila [Philippines] Bulletin, January 17, 1941, 15. File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP. 40. “Coy Is Released from Hospital,” Indianapolis Star, February 4, 1940. File: Clippings/Articles 1937–56, Box 31, WCP. 41. Letter from Coy to Oscar R. “Jack” Ewing, Democratic National Committee (DNC), February 9, 1940. File: Ewing, Oscar R., Box 5, WCP. 42. Letter from Coy to Mrs. Richard Edwards, April 9, 1940. File: E (1939–41), Box 5, WCP. 43. Letter from Coy to Thomas Rush, November 7, 1940. File: R (1939–41), Box 12, WCP. 44. For an overview of the 1940 election, see John W. Jeffries, A Third Term for FDR: The Election of 1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017). 45. Letter from Coy to Ewing, DNC, February 9, 1940. File: Ewing, Oscar R., Box 5, WCP. 46. For example, one political benefit of FDR holding back on announcing his decision was that during this period, public opinion judged him more as president than as candidate. “Sentiment for a Third Term Up Sharply Since Nazi Invasion, Gallup Survey Finds,” NYT, June 5, 1940, 18. 47. AP, “McNutt Backs Third Term, May Seek Second Place,” CSM, May 31, 1940, 3. 48. Letter from FDR to Coy, August 15, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 49. “President Asks Social Security for Draftees,” NYT, September 15, 1940, 8. 50. Louis M. Lyons, “Row Over C.C.C. Camp,” Boston Globe, February 26, 1941, 1, 7. The article identified Coy as one of four people overseeing the program. 51. Alfred Friendly, “Engel Calls New CCC Project a ‘Camp for Overprivileged,’ ” WP, January 23, 1941, 1, 6. 52. Memo from Coy to McNutt, “Conference with the President, Thursday, September 5th,” September 6, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP.

268

Notes to Chapter 2

53. Memo from Coy to James Rowe, administrative assistant to the president, September 9, 1940 (regarding press release on racial policies). File: Navy Department, Box 11, WCP. 54. Memo from Coy to Rowe, September 9, 1940 (regarding African Americans to serve on draft advisory committee), ibid. Both memos (see note 53) were to Rowe, dated the same day, and filed in the same folder, but related to separate topics. 55. September 27, 1940, Roosevelt Day-by-Day. 56. 54 Stat. 887. FDR also signed an executive order creating the Selective Service System to administer the draft. EO 8545, September 23, 1940. 57. Letter from Coy to Ewing, DNC, October 17, 1940. File: E (1939–41), Box 5, WCP. 58. Letters from Coy to Ewing, October 11 and 26, 1940. File: Ewing, Oscar R., Box 4, WCP. 59. Letter from Coy to Ewing, September 28, 1940, ibid. 60. “Harry McAlpin Reinstated, Pending Study,” WP, October 25, 1940, 21. The issue dragged on for months: “McNutt May ‘Reconsider’ Harry McAlpin Dismissal,” Chicago Defender (national weekly ed.), April 5, 1941, 7. By then, Coy was no longer involved in the day-to-day management of the agency. 61. Letter from Coy to Ludlow, September 23, 1940, CR 86, no. 11 (September 23, 1940): 12487. 62. 54 Stat. 1035. 63. “New Ludlow Amendment Bans Discrimination,” Pittsburgh Courier, October 5, 1940, 23; “Nat’l Defense Training Hits Segregation,” Chicago Defender (national weekly ed.), October 19, 1940, 1. 64. “Salute to Schools,” September 3, 1940, no. 537, 6. Federal Radio Education Committee, Educational Radio Script Exchange, 4th ed. Catalog Supplement, November 1, 1940 (mimeograph). 65. “Vote Aid to Children Despite War Effects,” NYT, October 23, 1940, 13. 66. Letter from Coy to FDR, October 25, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 67. Letter from Smith to Coy, September 17, 1940, ibid. 68. AP, “Roosevelt Names Draft Committee,” Baltimore Sun, September 22, 1940, 8. 69. Catton recounts the story humorously. Knudsen said his mind suddenly went blank at the hearing. Improvising, he instead kept repeating that the Senate’s approach would not work. “Why?” asked a senator. “Gentlemen, where I come from [CEO of GM], when I say a thing won’t work—it don’t work.” A few days later, Coy asked Knudsen why he did not use the arguments they had developed before the hearing? Knudsen clapped Coy on the shoulder and laughingly said, “I forgot ’em! ” (70–71, emphasis in original). Catton was a colorful writer but unreliable in terms of dates (Lee 2015, xiii–xiv, 252n10). Impliedly, based on its location in the book, this incident occurred in the fall or early winter of 1940, when NDAC was the central venue of the defense mobilization.

Notes to Chapter 2

269

70. Letter from Coy to Marriner Eccles, chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, August 19, 1940. File: E (1939–41), Box 5, WCP. 71. Letter from Elliot Thurston, special assistant to Eccles, to Coy, August 22, 1940, ibid. I did not find Sherwood’s formal reply in any of the obvious places in Coy’s or Sherwood’s papers. Perhaps Sherwood handled it by phone or in person. He probably said yes. Coy would become Sherwood’s boss in April 1941 and appoint Sherwood his deputy in September. 72. Memo from Coy to Dr. Ross T. McIntire, surgeon general, US Army, and Dr. Thomas Parran, surgeon general, Public Health Service, October 31, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 73. “Health Center Is Dedicated by President,” WP, November 1, 1940, 3. Presumably McNutt was out of town, probably campaigning, thus making Coy the acting FSA head. 74. November 1, 1940: “President Assures Medical Freedom,” NYT, 1, 11; C. P. Trussell, “Calls for U.S. Mobilization of Medicine,” Baltimore Sun, 1, 7; AP, “Health Fight Wins Praise of President,” Los Angeles Times, 1, 6. The Chicago Tribune placed it on page 6: “Health Center Is Dedicated by Roosevelt.” 75. Obsequiously, after the election Coy asked FDR to autograph a photo of the two of them at the ceremony. Letter from Coy to Marguerite ‘Missy’ LeHand, private secretary to the president, November 26, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 76. Julius Edelstein, United Press, “Wayne Coy Winning Recognition as One of Chief ‘Idea Men’ of New Deal,” Manila [Philippines] Bulletin, January 17, 1941, 15. File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP. 77. Frank R. Kent, “The Great Game of Politics” (syndicated column), Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1940, 4. 78. EO 8612, December 15, 1940. 79. EO 8716, March 18, 1941. 80. EO 8734, April 11, 1941. 81. Letter from McNutt to Roosevelt, November 18, 1940. File: Roosevelt— Misc., Box 13, WCP. The lower-left corner of the file copy shows “WC: fm,” meaning that Coy had prepared it and McNutt merely signed it. 82. “M’Nutt Takes Up New Defense Task,” NYT, December 4, 1940, 1, 20. 83. Frank R. Kent, “The Great Game of Politics” (syndicated column), Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1940, 4. 84. “Defense Rush Creates Social Problems, Relief Parley Told,” WP, December 7, 1940, 4. 85. Louis M. Lyons, “Young Harvard Dean Helping Army to Run Own Morale Program,” Boston Globe, April 13, 1941, B1, B16. 86. Letter from C. H. Tobias to Charles Taft, February 27, 1941 (re: meeting with Coy); letter from Coy to Walter Hoving, President, USO, March 31, 1941. Both online: ProQuest History Vault, African Americans in the Military: Folder: 102613-025-0750: Entertainment on Military Bases, Special Services Organization,

270

Notes to Chapter 2

November 1940–December 1941. Originals from General Correspondence (Judge Hastie) 1940–1948, Entry 188: Civilian Aide to the Secretary, Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Records of the Secretary of War, RG 107, NA II. 87. FDR Day by Day. 88. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 26, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 89. AP, “CCC Training Men for Defense Jobs,” CSM, November 25, 1940, 2. 90. “218,000 Ask Skilled Jobs,” NYT, November 26, 1940, 12. 91. AP, “Defense Jobs Courses Offered,” CSM, December 14, 1940, 9. 92. Memo from Coy to the president, December 26, 1940; Memo from Coy to General Watson (in charge of FDR’s schedule), November 7, 1940. Both in file: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 93. Letter from Coy to Eleanor Roosevelt, November 28, 1940. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. 94. Letter from Coy to Eleanor Roosevelt, December 23, 1940, ibid. 95. Coy’s telephone call list for March 22, 1941. File: Coy Daily Schedule (Jan.–Apr. 1941), Box 3, WCP. 96. “Symphony Draws Notables to Hear Stokowski Play,” WP, December 11, 1940, 11. 97. “Music Hath Charms,” WP, December 15, 1940, S8. 98. “Mrs. Roosevelt Gives Dinner; Parley Follows,” WP, March 5, 1941, 14. 99. Coy’s call lists and schedules for March 20 and 22, April 5, 15, 18, and 22, 1941. File: Coy—Daily Schedule (Jan.–Apr. 1941), Box 3, WCP. Telegram from Dryer to Coy, April 17, 1941. File: Civilian Defense (1941–42), Box 2, WCP. 100. Bullitt had been US ambassador to France and awoke FDR to notify him of the Nazi invasion of Poland by long-distance phone call. Before that, he had been the first US ambassador to the USSR. He returned to the US after the German conquest of France in 1940. He was engaged to Missy LeHand, FDR’s private secretary, but she broke it off upon learning about his continued womanizing. 101. Smith’s summary of meeting, March 18, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. 102. Frank L. Kluckhohn, “President on Way to Florida Vacation,” NYT, March 20, 1941, 1, 8. 103. “Home Front,” Time magazine, April 7, 1941, 24. 104. The administration particularly feared deliberate setting of forest fires in the West (entry for January 9, 1942, Sherwood Diary, SSP). 105. Summary of meeting, March 23, 1941. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 106. AP, “Mrs. Roosevelt Says U.S. Must Aid in Peace,” NYHT, April 18, 1941, 5. As related in chap. 1, at a press conference that day, she specifically mentioned Coy in relation to civil defense. United Press, “Drafting Program for Women,” ibid.

Notes to Chapter 3

271

107. Summary of hour-long meeting, April 4 and 11, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Office of Civilian (Home) Defense, May 9, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 108. Conference with the vice president, April 18, 1941; phone conversations, April 21 and 22, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. 109. “New Managers?,” Time magazine, May 19, 1941, 16.

Chapter 3 1. Greenland had been governed by Denmark. But now that Germany had conquered Denmark, FDR wanted to preempt the possibility of the Nazis claiming it and getting a military toehold there. 2. Summary of meeting with FDR, March 18, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. 3. Letter from Hopkins to Coy, March 19, 1941. File: Hopkins, Harry L., Administrative Assistant, Box 8, WCP. Presumably “Presiding” was a typo and should have been “President.” 4. 54 Stat. 953. 5. Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (syndicated column), Lowell [MA] Sun, April 4, 1941, 6. 6. 54 Stat. 952–54. 7. Letter from Hopkins to Coy, March 19, 1941. File: Hopkins, Box 8, WCP. 8. AP, “Three-Man Board Appointed by President to Study Adequacy of Transport Systems,” NYT, March 21, 1941, 29. 9. EO 8720, March 22, 1941. It will be recalled that Coy had been appointed assistant administrator of FSA by an executive order. 10. Appointments for March 28, 1941. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 11. “Home Front,” Time magazine, April 7, 1941, 24. 12. “Wall Street Comment: Transport Board,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1941, 27. 13. Railway Age, 110, no. 13 (March 29, 1941): 565. 14. Ray Tucker, “Washington” (syndicated column), Reno [NV] Evening Gazette, April 7, 1941, 4. 15. “Research Board Appointees Face Congressional Battle,” CT, March 26, 1941, 25. 16. Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (syndicated column), Lowell [MA] Sun, April 4, 1941, 6, emphasis added.

272

Notes to Chapter 3

17. FDR Day by Day. In the daily log, “Household” was a catchall category comprising whoever from the family was in town and possibly the two permanent White House residents, Hopkins and Missy LeHand. 18. Earlier that day, FDR had separate meetings with Smith and Hopkins. It is possible the subject of Coy’s future came up in those conversations. 19. Appointments on April 3, 7, 9 and 15, 1941. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 20. The following text is based on Smith’s dictated memo summarizing it when he got back to his office. Meeting of April 17, 1941, file: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. While FDR disliked memos for the record, Smith did so because he would then distribute copies to the relevant BOB staff to implement the president’s decisions. 21. He did not. He eventually signed it on May 20. This is a good example of FDR’s fluid operating and decision-making style. He only acted when he was ready. Sometimes that meant revising a document, sometimes nailing down an appointee, sometimes his sense of the intangible political weather. The same happened with the executive order in mid-1942 creating the Office of War Information. He delayed signing it for several months. 22. In private, they were horrified by the idea. Later events proved them right. 23. A few months later, in July, FDR signed an executive order creating a new agency opaquely called the Coordinator of Information and appointed Donovan to head it. It later morphed into the Office of Strategic Services and eventually was the progenitor of the Central Intelligence Agency. 24. Emphasis added. 25. Summary of meeting, April 22, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. 26. The same pattern occurred when Smith was preparing the executive order creating OWI. In his conversations with Smith, FDR had initially wanted OGR to be from excluded from the proposed OWI. Later, Roosevelt seemed to concede that, after all, OGR would be folded into OWI. But he never explicitly said so. Smith eventually had to ask him point-blank (Lee 2005, 155–56). 27. Coy used the French spelling: Dunkerque. 28. The published version of the speech omitted Coy’s closing sentence as delivered. His final sentence (after the peroration quoted here) was in the form of a prayer. Echoing FDR, he said, “Dear Father, I pray that my country awakes. This is our rendezvous with destiny. We shall not fail.” “Coy Recommends a National Plan for U.S. Defense,” Mobile [AL] Press, April 21, 1941, 1. The next day, an editorial generally praised Coy’s message. “Social Workers Conscious of Their Part in National Defense Program,” Mobile [AL] Press, April 22, 1941, editorial page. Both in file: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 29. “U.S. Welfare Work Leaders to Gather in Mobile Today,” Mobile [AL] Press Register, April 20, 1941, 1. The morning and afternoon weekday newspapers published a joint Sunday issue.

Notes to Chapter 3

273

30. “Revision of Entire U.S. Transportation System Seen by Coy: Integrated Defense Program, Including Steps to Keep Up Public Morale, Is Urged by Federal Official in Mobile Address,” Mobile [AL] Register, April 22, 1942, 1, 7, emphasis added. His denial was technically true because FDR had not yet formally offered him the LOEM position. The main headline’s focus on transportation reflected his appointment the previous month to the transportation board. At the beginning of his speech, he quickly emphasized that the transportation board had “nothing to do with defense” and made only a few brief points about transportation. He said increased demands put on the transportation system due to national defense were causing the prices of some commodities to go up (because of uneven deliveries) and that FDR was not contemplating nationalizing the railroads as Wilson had done in WWI. Coy then pivoted to his prepared speech on national defense and its implications for social work. 31. “Coy Recommends a National Plan for U.S. Defense,” Mobile [AL] Press, April 21, 1941, 1. 32. Letter from FDR to Coy, April 23, 1941. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. A few months after being appointed LOEM, Congress obliquely went along with the salary FDR had granted Coy. The Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1941 included funding for “the head of one office, created within the Office for Emergency Management by the President” at an annual salary between $9,000 and $12,000. 55 Stat. 543. 33. Letter from Coy to FDR, April 25, 1941. File: Roosevelt—Misc., Box 13, WCP. Even though the closeness of the McNutt-Coy working partnership had significantly diminished after the 1940 Democratic Convention, on the same day that Coy accepted the LOEM appointment, he wrote a warm letter of appreciation to McNutt upon his official resignation from FSA. File: Mac-Mc—General (1939–43), Box 11, WCP. 34. Letter from FDR to McReynolds, April 23, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. The archival copy has Smith’s initials at the bottom left, meaning that the original draft of the letter was prepared by BOB. 35. Memo from McReynolds to Council of National Defense, April 30, 1941. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. See also Council of National Defense, Rules and Regulations, April 23, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 36. At that time, afternoon newspapers were a major element of daily journalism. Therefore, Early (and others, such as Horton at OEM’s Division of Information) alternated their releases between morning and afternoon news cycles. 37. John C. Henry, “Wayne Coy Is Named Liaison Assistant for Roosevelt,” WS, April 24, 1941, A-2. 38. “Wayne Coy to Head U.S. Super Agency,” Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1941, 1, 7. 39. April 25, 1941: “President Names Coy as Assistant on Defense,” NYT, 22; “Coy Named to Conduct Liaison between White House and OEM,” WP, 13; “Roosevelt Sees War Cabinet on Aid to Britain,” NYHT, 11.

274

Notes to Chapter 3

40. “Wayne Coy to Head U.S. Super Agency,” Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1941, 1. 41. “New Defense Boss,” Altoona [PA] Mirror, April 26, 1941, 1. 42. Jerry Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (daily column), WP, June 12, 1941, 17. 43. Alfred Friendly, “Henderson Asks No New Price Laws,” WP, May 22, 1941, 11. 44. Joseph G. Harrison, “Meet the Army’s New Morale Man,” CSM, October 4, 1941, WM12. The article incorrectly stated that the name of Coy’s agency was Office for Economic Management. 45. “The Growing Friction in Defense Agencies,” United States News, August 1, 1941, 13. 46. Peter Edson, “Pulse of the Nation” (syndicated column), Kingsport [TN] Times, May 5, 1941, 4. 47. “New Managers?,” Time magazine, May 19, 1941, 16. 48. “Important Job,” Lockhart [TX] Post-Register, May 8, 1941, 7. 49. Jack Stinnett, “Washington Daybook” (syndicated column), Portsmouth [NH] Herald, May 3, 1941, 4. 50. “OEM Means FDR in ABC of Defense,” CSM, May 3, 1941, 6. 51. “Administrator,” Business Week, May 3, 1941, 30. 52. Baukhage, “Washington Digest” (syndicated column), Akron [OH] RegisterTribune, May 15, 1941, 2. During the early decades of the twentieth century, when newspaper articles began being bylined, the convention was to present only the last name of the journalist. 53. C. P. Ives, “Our Defense Setup,” Baltimore Sun, May 20, 1941, 14. 54. F. C. T. (Frank C. Travers), “Current Comment: An Assistant President” (column), Creston [IA] News Advertiser, April 29, 1941, 1. 55. Ernest K. Lindley, “Wayne Coy, in the Slot: Expert on Defense,” WP, April 28, 1941, 9, emphasis added. The reference to being “in the slot” was how newspaper copy desks operated. The slot editor placed copy submitted by reporters in slots, thereby assigning each story to a specific copy editor. So, in Lindley’s metaphor, FDR was placing Coy in a particular slot with the assignment of anything relating to the defense mobilization. 56. Thomas F. Reynolds, “Meet Wayne Coy, Spark Plug of America’s War Effort,” Chicago Sun, May 17, 1942. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 57. AP, “FDR Prepares to Establish 3 News Posts,” Danville [VA] Bee, May 2, 1941, 5. 58. “Confusion in the United States Defense Set-Up” (editorial), Waterloo [IA] Daily Courier, May 23, 1941, 4. 59. “Wayne Coy to Head U.S. Super Agency,” Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1941, 7. 60. “Hopkins Lands a $10,000 Berth on War Pay Roll,” CT, April 25, 1941, 2. 61. “Amateurs in Defense” (editorial), Buffalo [NY] News, April 28, 1941. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 3

275

62. “Division at the Center,” Greensboro [NC] News, April 28, 1941. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 63. Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig” (syndicated column), Iowa City [IA] Press-Citizen, April 30, 1941, 4. 64. Frank R. Kent, “The Great Game of Politics” (syndicated column), Baltimore Sun, May 11, 1941, 1. 65. Kent, Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1941, 4. 66. A glowing editorial in an Indiana newspaper should probably be discounted as largely motivated by home-state boosterism and a local-boy-makes-good narrative story line. “Right Man for the Job,” Fort Wayne [IN] Journal-Gazette, April 29, 1941. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Clippings/Articles 1937–56, Box 31, WCP. Similarly, the Indiana newspaper he used to run would have been predisposed to positive coverage of him. It said that the simultaneous appointments of Coy and Hopkins meant that “it is doubtful if any two men in the government now rank higher than Hopkins and Coy.” “Wayne Coy Becomes Liaison Officer for National Emergency,” Delphi [IN] Journal, May 1, 1941, 8. 67. International News Service, “Wayne Coy, Bearcat for Work, Is F.D.R.’s New Liaison Officer,” WP, May 4, 1941, B3. 68. Lindley, “Wayne Coy, in the Slot,” WP, April 28, 1941, 9. 69. Summary of Defense Aid Allocation No. 24, FDR letter to Treasury Secretary, May 2, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 70. Richard L. Stokes, “President May Appoint Chief for ‘War Industries Board,’ ” WS, June 26, 1941, A-2. Now (2018), the building is called the Eisenhower Executive Office Building and is enclosed within the security fence around the White House. A reporter described it as “the granite, slate and cast iron edifice across West Executive Avenue from the White House.” Peter Baker, “A Whirlwind Envelops the White House,” NYT, February 13, 2018, A1. 71. Henry Gemmill, “The ‘Surprise Package’ of the Emergency,” WS, September 28, 1941, B5. A few months earlier, when testifying before Congress, Sherwood estimated there were sixteen locations (US House 1941d, 853). 72. Richard F. Scholz, “Aug. 25 Moving Day for Many Federal Agencies in District” (“9 to 4:30” daily column for civil servants), Washington Daily News, July 17, 1941, 16. 73. The federal government’s classified civil service included scores of messengers in DC (including many African Americans). The CSC’s qualifications for messengers did not require the ability to drive a motorcycle. But the questionnaire that applicants filled out as part of the hiring process inquired if they had this additional skill. A handful of senior managers, Coy particularly, specifically wanted to have their messages delivered by motorcycle because they thought it would be the fastest way to communicate in writing. Scholz, “House Committee to Act on Promotion Bills for Civil Service Soon” (daily column), Washington Daily News, May 10, 1941, 8. Later in 1941, a growing proportion of the messengers were women, especially after the beginning of the draft. Kluttz, “Federal Diary,” WP, September

276

Notes to Chapter 3

22, 1941, 13. However, based on stereotypes associated with driving motorcycles, it is likely that Coy’s motorcyclists were all men. In the spring of 1941, CAS employed about thirty-five messengers (and another fifteen were detailed to specific OEM agencies). They were assigned to three civil service categories: messengers, assistant messengers, and motorcycle messengers. File: Service Operations Office, CAS, OEM Personnel Charts, Box 7, RG 214. When OPM was quickly growing into a huge agency, it created its own messenger unit. In October 1941, based on Coy’s query, OPM’s messenger staff and equipment were transferred to CAS, giving Coy even faster and greater reach. Memo from Roland Severy, OPM, and Dallas Dort, CAS, to Coy and Emmerich, October 6, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 74. “Rosenman to the Rescue,” Time, August 18, 1941, 11. 75. Virginia Imlay, “From NDAC to SPAB—the Story of Our Defense Leaders,” [Madison] Wisconsin State Journal, September 21, 1941, 7. 76. Jack Vincent, International News Service, “Washington Now Boom Town with 31 New Bureaus,” Waterloo [IA] Daily Courier, October 23, 1941, 23. 77. Thomas F. Reynolds, “Meet Wayne Coy, Spark Plug of America’s War Effort,” Chicago Sun, May 17, 1942. 78. Letter from Coy to Smith, BOB, October 23, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 79. Ibid., April 1, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 80. Scholz, “That Emergency Book Finally Hits the Street, But It Is Outdated” (daily column), Washington Daily News, April 26, 1941, 8. An editorial in the Reno [NV] Evening Gazette recounted the story with a tut-tutting tone indicating how awful FDR, the civilian defense effort, and the federal bureaucracy were (“The Defense Organization,” May 12, 1941, 4). 81. Scholz, “No U.S. Appointments Outside Merit Will Be Allowed After June 30” (column), Washington Daily News, May 1, 1941, 5. 82. Scholz, “OPM Personnel Here Expected to Reach 2500 in Two Months” (column), Washington Daily News, April 29, 1941, 16. Scholz later worked for Time magazine and then enlisted in the Navy in spring 1942. Commissioned as an ensign, he was a torpedo bomber pilot based on an aircraft carrier. He died in 1943, when his plane apparently crashed at sea and was not recovered. “Ex-Oregonian Man Missing: Navy Department Notifies Mother,” [Portland] Oregonian, December 10, 1943. 83. This was one of the reasons for the long delay in the late spring of 1942 for signing the executive order creating the Office of War Information. In part, FDR wanted to name the new agency head (Elmer Davis) at the same time (Lee 2005, 149–57; 2012, 180–82). 84. Calendar for May 8, 1941. Assistant BOB director Blandford also attended the meeting. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 85. Memo from Smith to FDR, May 17, 1941. File: White House Memoranda 1941, Box 4, Smith Papers.

Notes to Chapter 3

277

86. EO 8757. 87. Memo from Coy to Eleanor Roosevelt, May 24, 1941. File: OCD 1941, Box 2, RG 214. Keeping the promise to his wife that volunteerism would be central to the new agency, in July FDR met with OCD’s Volunteer Participation Committee when it convened for its first meeting at the White House (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 277–81; “Get Results, President Tells Defense Aides,” WP, July 25, 1941, 6). Demonstrating her own commitment to the project, she formally became OCD’s assistant director in September. But some of her more far-out ideas and associates triggered political attacks that eventually led to her resignation in February 1942 (Lee 2012, 107; 2005, 226n22). 88. Letter from Coy to Smith, May 23, 1941. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. 89. Thomas F. Reynolds, United Press, “President to Create Civilian Defense Commission Today,” Lowell [MA] Sun, May 20, 1941, 13; Ernest K. Lindley, “LaGuardia and the Civil Defense Program,” WP, May 25, 1941, B5; “Home Front: La Guardia’s Job,” Time, May 26, 1941, 18. Time referred to him as “Braintruster Wayne Coy,” suggesting he was now at the same level as FDR’s original so-called brain trust at the beginning of his first term. 90. Letter from Coy to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, April 30, 1941. File: OPM Correspondence, Box 33, SSP. 91. Letter from Coy to USDA Secretary Claude Wickard, May 6, 1941. File: Agriculture Department 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 92. April 30, 1941, FDR Day by Day. 93. Letter from Mordecai Ezekiel, economic advisor to the secretary, USDA, to Coy, May 2, 1941. File: Agriculture Department, Box 1, RG 214. 94. Letter from Herbert Emmerich, OPM secretary, to Coy, May 2, 1941. File: Emmerich, Box 7, RG 214. 95. Memo from FDR to Coy, May 17, 1941. File: Defense Communications Board 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 96. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Selective Service, May 8, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. For reasons that are unclear, General Watson, the president’s appointments secretary, promised to try to arrange it, but it never happened. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. It will be recalled that Coy had served on a White House advisory committee to help set up the draft (chap. 2). 97. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: House Bill Creating Director of Priorities, May 9, 1941. File: OPM 1941, Box 146, Subject Files, PSF. 98. Letter from Coy to Smith, May 10, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 99. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Need for Increasing Total Number of Workers in Machine-Tool Industry, May 13, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 100. File: Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, Box 9, WCP.

278

Notes to Chapter 4

101. Memo from Coy to Smith, May 15, 1941. The memo was cc’d to Frederic A. Delano (the president’s uncle), chair of the National Resources Planning Board, one of EOP’s original five agencies. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 102. Memo from J. Weldon Jones to Gardiner C. Means, Subject: Persons Invited to Production Conference, May 19, 1941. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 103. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, May 19, 1941. File: Wayne Coy Correspondence of Sidney Sherwood, Box 32, RG 214. 104. Summary of memo from FDR to Smith and Coy, May 20, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. This was easier said than done. In June, Coy reported to FDR that he “had the devil’s own time” just getting all the affected officials to sign off on creating the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Memo from Coy to FDR, June 13, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. On June 28, 1941, FDR signed EO 8807. Then it took another month of wrangling to finalize the organization and membership of the new Committee on Medical Research. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 11, 1941, ibid. FDR accepted all of Coy’s recommendations, and on July 16, 1941, he signed the letters of appointment Coy had submitted. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 105. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 24, 1941. File: 1941, OEM, OF 4240. Follow-up letter from Coy to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, May 26, 1941. File: Treasury Department, Box 16, WCP. 106. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 28, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. The issue continued into the fall. In October, Coy updated FDR that the problem still had not been resolved. He drafted a letter for FDR to send to the governor urging the state to raise its limit on the maximum size and weight of trucks to conform to other states. Oddly, the governor then replied to the president that he had never received any such requests before, pretending he had never had any direct phone conversations with Coy about it and had never received any letters on the subject. Summaries of actions: Coy’s October 16 memo to the president, FDR signing Coy’s draft of letter on October 24, governor’s October 30 reply to FDR, FDR memo to Coy on November 6. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 107. Smith’s daily appointments and phone calls from April 24 to May 31, 1941. File: Daily Record January–June 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. Three of the meetings were for meals, suggesting extensive and relatively leisurely conversations, as well as conveying that they enjoyed each other’s company.

Chapter 4 1. Clarke Beach, Special News Service, “Conflict of Authority in Defense Job,” Somerset [PA] Daily American, August 22, 1941, 5. 2. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Movement of Ore on the Great Lakes, July 11, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240.

Notes to Chapter 4

279

3. Memo from FDR to Coy, July 14, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. Wickard was also from Indiana. He had started his political career as a state senator, so Coy knew him when both were involved in Indiana state government. 4. Letter from Coy to Clifford Townsend, July 11, 1941. File: Agriculture Department Office of Defense Relations 1941, Box 1, RG 214. Townsend had been Indiana lieutenant governor under McNutt and then was elected to succeed McNutt. Coy supported him. It will be recalled that Coy got slugged by a Townsend opponent during the state Democratic Party’s convention to determine the gubernatorial nominee to succeed McNutt (chap. 2, note 21). 5. Letter from Townsend to Coy, July 14, 1941, ibid. 6. I became acquainted with Henderson while serving as legislative assistant to Congressman Henry Reuss in 1975–76. Henderson was assisting him in drafting the Humphrey-Hawkins (and Reuss) Full Employment bill. Henderson advised Reuss on drafting the bill as an embodiment of liberal economics. He was sharp, articulate, and shared his views at length. Reuss welcomed his input (though he did not always take it) but seemed wary of permitting Henderson to be publicly associated with the bill because of his fearsome reputation, still vivid thirty years after his OPA directorship. During the war, the conservative coalition had made Henderson the poster boy for big government, regulatory overreach, and New Deal economics. The image was still so strong in political circles and on Capitol Hill when I was there that Reuss felt Henderson would be a liability and easy target if he were too identified with the bill. A very watered-down version of it, now called the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, was signed by President Carter in 1978 (92 Stat. 1887). 7. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 27, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 8. Memo from FDR to Coy, May 31, 1941, ibid. 9. Letter from Smith to Coy, August 1, 1941. File: Advisory Commission— Council for National Defense 1941, Box 1, RG 214. Memo from Coy to Smith, August 26, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 10. Letter from Coy to Frank Dixon, Alabama governor, June 2, 1941. File: Daylight Saving Time, Box 3, RG 214. Another indication of Coy’s senior status was the salutation of the letter: “Dear Frank.” The governor’s acknowledgement of the receipt of Coy’s letter reciprocated: “Dear Wayne,” June 6, 1941, ibid. 11. Letter from Leland Olds, chair, Federal Power Commission, to Coy, May 30, 1941, ibid. 12. Memo from FDR to Coy, June 21, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 13. Coy’s draft of the presidential message is in his office files along with a note, dated July 7 by his secretary, to notify BOB when FDR signed the document. File: Daylight Saving Time, Box 3, RG 214. 14. “More Ballyhoo” (editorial), CT, July 21, 1941, 8. 15. FDR letters to Governor Talmadge, July 26, 1941, and Governor Holland, July 19, 1941. Both were drafted by Coy. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240.

280

Notes to Chapter 4

16. Coy letter to Mayor J. R. Woodhall, August 5, 1941. File: Daylight Saving Time, Box 3, RG 214. 17. AP, “Daylight Saving Plan Is Shelved,” Reno [NV] Evening Gazette, December 6, 1941, 1. 18. December 7, 1941: “House Group Puts Daylight Saving Plan on Shelf,” WP, 13; AP, “Daylight Saving Measure Shelved,” Los Angeles Times, 27. 19. Memo from Coy to FDR, June 24, 1941. File: Objectors—Conscientious & Religious, Box 12, WCP. 20. Memo from FDR to Sumner Welles, under secretary of state, June 25, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 21. Memo from FDR to Coy, July 12, 1941, ibid. 22. Letter from Coy to Paul Comley French, National Service Board for Religious Objectors, August 26, 1941. File: Objectors—Conscientious & Religious, Box 12, WCP. After Pearl Harbor, Coy met again with French to discuss the role of conscientious objectors now that war had been declared. Daily schedule of meetings, April 14, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 23. 55 Stat. 543. 24. Handwritten note from Sherwood to Coy, July 22, 1941, including draft of Coy memo to BOB. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 25. Memo from Smith to FDR, Subject: Employment of Non-Citizens by the Office for Emergency Management, July 31, 1941. Based on the sequence of the paperwork, this date is apparently a typo. File: 1941, OF 4240. Letter from FDR to Coy, July 25, 1941. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. 26. Memo from Coy to Sherwood, Subject: Procedure for the Appointment of Non-Citizens in the Office for Emergency Management, August 13, 1941. File: Alien Employment Procedure 1942, Box 1, RG 214. 27. Summary of phone call from Coy to CAS director Dallas Dort, April 24, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 28. AP, “Insular Group to Stand by Its OK of Philippine Bill,” [Kalispell, MT] Daily Inter Lake, October 23, 1941. Congressional archives have no record of Coy’s comments to the Committee or even of any documents relating to that committee meeting (emails to the author from Adam Berenbak, Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives, January 23 and 24, 2017, author’s files). After the coordinated Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, FDR asked Congress for a direct appropriation to fund the Philippine military (CR 87, no. 9 [December 15, 1941]: 9797–98). It passed later that month as part of an omnibus war-funding bill (55 Stat. 857). 29. International News Service, “OPM Pledges Machinery for Farmers,” Salt Lake [UT] Tribune, July 31, 1941, 4. 30. Letter from BOB to Coy, August 5, 1941; letter from Coy to secretary of commerce, August 12, 1941; letter from Coy to BOB, September 24, 1941. File: Commerce Department 1941, Box 3, RG 214. The research grant was to the

Notes to Chapter 4

281

National Bureau of Standards, a unit within the Commerce Department. A letter from research director Vannevar Bush to Sherwood stated that the usual paperwork and specifics about the use of the money were being omitted “in view of the secrecy necessarily observed with regard to information concerning experiments with uranium.” Letter from Bush to Sherwood, September 17, 1941, ibid. 31. Letter from BOB to Coy, October 8, 1941. File: Agriculture Department 1941, Box 1, RG 214. The research grant was to the Bureau of Plant Industry, a unit within USDA. Again, detailed information for the files about this funding allocation was omitted because of the secrecy of the research. Letter from Irvin Stewart, executive secretary, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Dallas Dort, CAS director, December 4, 1941. File: Commerce Department 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 32. On June 2, 1941, FDR sent a message to Congress urging approval of the St. Lawrence Seaway in the interests of national defense (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 201–5). But it was not enough to change the power dynamics of the issue. Coy cited “extremely active opposition from railroad, coal, utility and existing port interests” as a main reason for the difficulty in getting funding. Memo from Coy to FDR, November 21, 1941. File: St. Lawrence Project, Box 14, WCP. Still pushing for it, FDR talked to the Speaker of the House about it and then asked Coy to follow up with the Speaker to “get this thing straightened out.” Memo from FDR to Coy, November 22, 1941. Coy talked to the Speaker, who continued to be pessimistic (and seemingly unhelpful). Memo from Coy to FDR, December 1, 1941. Both in file: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 33. The original jump-off date for Operation Barbarossa had been May 15. But it was delayed to June 22 in part because Hitler had to divert the German army to bail out Italy after its botched Balkan campaign. Some historians suggest that had it started on time, those extra five weeks before winter would have made a significant difference in how far the German army would have gotten that first year (perhaps even conquering Moscow) and may well have changed the tactical history of that front. 34. Entry for August 4, 1941, 951. File: Book 4, Presidential Diary, Morgenthau Diaries. Morgenthau’s recollection was dictated four days after the luncheon and Cabinet session. The account of the entire lunch conversation and Cabinet meeting is on 951–54. 35. Aid to Russia (transcript of meeting), August 5, 1941, 52. File: Book 428, Morgenthau Diaries. The transcript of the entire meeting with Coy is on 52–79. 36. After his meetings with Stalin, Hopkins flew back to London. He then accompanied Churchill on a Royal Navy ship to the secret summit meeting with FDR. Once there, Hopkins transferred to the US Navy ship that brought the president. He briefed FDR on the latest information and advice he had. 37. Entry for August 4, 1941, 953. File: Book 4, Presidential Diary, Morgenthau Diaries. The day after dictating for his diary his recollection of the August 1 lunch and Cabinet meeting, Morgenthau met with Coy. When he recounted what

282

Notes to Chapter 4

FDR had said, he used slightly different wording: “I am going to get a first-class administrator, Wayne Coy, and have him watch this thing for me.” Aid to Russia (transcript), August 5, 1941, 61. File: Book 428, Morgenthau Diaries. 38. Two years later, in an oral history interview, Coy speculated that the reason he got the assignment was that Hopkins was out of town and the head of the Lend-Lease office in the capital, Major General James Burns, was accompanying FDR to the Churchill summit (Milton 1943, 5). 39. Transcript of phone conversation between Morgenthau and Lend-Lease counsel Oscar Cox, August 4, 1941, 276. File: Book 427, Morgenthau Diaries. Coy was there visiting his son at summer camp. “Wayne Coy Visits Son at Culver,” Indianapolis Star (?), August 19, 1941. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. According to the caption, “Mr. Coy’s visit to Culver was interrupted when he was hurriedly called back to Washington, D.C.” 40. The conventional narrative of WWII views this summit as the beginning of the US-UK war alliance: of joint military planning, operational cooperation, and war strategy. A more recent revisionist recounting argues the opposite: that Roosevelt refused to commit to entering the war and made no binding promises about anything (Nigel Hamilton, The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942 [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014]). He told his military advisors to listen to presentations from their UK counterparts but to offer no substantive reply, let alone make any commitments. “Roosevelt had no intention whatsoever of entering hostilities in Europe to save the British Empire—especially its colonial empire. Instead, he wished merely to get the measure of the British arch-imperialist—and see if he might bend him to a different purpose” (7). Churchill thought the meeting would be about the war role for the US, but FDR declined to say or do anything along those lines. Rather, FDR’s goal was “not to declare war on Germany, as the Prime Minister evidently hoped, but to see how war could be avoided for the moment” (9, emphasis in original). Roosevelt’s focus was on the wording of a joint statement on postwar aims, the Atlantic Charter. It included the end of colonialism. At this point, FDR hoped the war could be won without the US necessarily ever entering a combat role. Perhaps the British, Russian, and Chinese military could accomplish that with the help of American equipment and money. Hamilton argued that Churchill considered the summit “a defeat” (38). 41. Late Saturday afternoon, Army Chief of Staff Marshall dispatched to FDR a detailed letter listing the current status of the Army’s participation in shipping military equipment to Russia. It had been triggered by FDR’s dressing down of Stimson (Marshall’s civilian boss) at the Cabinet meeting. Memo from Marshall to FDR, Subject: Transfer of Air Materiel to Russia, August 2, 1941. File: Lend-Lease to Russia (1), Box 10, WCP. 42. Memo from FDR to Coy, August 2, 1941. File: Diplomatic Correspondence: Russia 1941, Box 49, PSF. This relatively famous memo was reprinted in full in Roosevelt (1950, 382–83) and in the Post’s serialized excerpts from the book

Notes to Chapter 4

283

(“Roosevelt Tried to Bargain with Japanese in Mid-1941,” WP, November 28, 1950, 13). For a reproduction of the memo, see the page facing the title page. 43. Aid to Russia (transcript), August 5, 1941, 67–68. File: Book 428, Morgenthau Diaries. 44. Telegram from Coy to FDR, August 6, 1941, 227. File: Box 430, Morgenthau Diaries. In his cover letter, Cox told Morgenthau he was sharing Coy’s telegram with Morgenthau “for your confidential information,” suggesting that Coy did not give Cox permission to do that and probably would not have wanted him to do so. Letter from Cox to Morgenthau, August 9, 1941, 226, ibid. 45. Cox’s cover letter stated that “the President answered this cable late last night,” ibid. 46. August 6, 1941, from Coy: Memo to J. J. McCloy, assistant secretary of war, Subject: Supply Requests of the Soviet Government; letter to Knudsen, OPM; letter to G. H. S. Pinset, British Supply Council of North America, Washington, DC. File: Lend-Lease to Russia (2), Box 10, WCP. 47. Also, letter from John Biggers, OPM, on behalf of Knudsen, to Coy, August 12, 1941. File: Lend-Lease to Russia (1), Box 10, WCP. 48. Two letters from Coy to Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky, August 15, 1941. File: Lend-Lease to Russia (1), Box 10, WCP. 49. Memo from Coy to Hopkins, Subject: Aid to Russia, August 18, 1941. File: Hopkins, Harry L., Box 8, WCP. 50. “Aid to Russia” and “Rosenman to the Rescue,” Time magazine, August 18, 1941, 11. Issues were postdated, so the articles would have been read in DC beginning on Tuesday or Wednesday, August 12–13. Coy was not exaggerating about the influence of Time in the mid-twentieth century. When Senator John F. Kennedy was running for president in 1960, he was asked what the most influential news outlet was. “Time magazine,” he replied. Richard Reeves, “Saved by the Cold War” (op-ed), NYT, April 26, 2009, Week in Review section, 13. 51. Letter from E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease administrator, to Coy, October 14, 1941. Note from CAS director Sherwood to Coy updating him on implementation of the request, October 16, 1941. Both in file: Lend-Lease 1941, Box 11, RG 214. After getting back, in late August, FDR had appointed Stettinius as Lend-Lease administrator under Hopkins’s general supervision. 52. On October 13, 1941, FDR released a public statement on the hastening of military aid to Russia. After the war, for the publication of FDR’s 1941 papers, Rosenman wrote an explanatory note to that announcement comprehensively summarizing Roosevelt’s actions to assist the USSR that year (Roosevelt 1969, 1941: 418–22). He did not mention Coy’s role. Perhaps he suspected Coy of the leak to Time about Rosenman’s behind-the-scenes planning for reorganizing OEM’s supply and production efforts and got even by writing Coy out of this story. 53. Letter from Cox to Morgenthau, August 9, 1941. File: Box 430, 228, Morgenthau Diaries.

284

Notes to Chapter 4

54. Memo from Coy to FDR, August 19, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 55. August 21, 1941, Coy letters to: Col. Everett Gardner, director of Indiana Unemployment Compensation Commission; and Mr. Martin, manager, Indianapolis Athletic Club. Both in file: F—General (1941–43), Box 5, WCP. Unmarked article: “Coy Plays Role in Bringing Red Army Mission to State,” Indianapolis Star (?), probably published about August 25, 1941. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 56. After Pearl Harbor, Coy continued trying to promote support by citizens for the USSR. For example, on April 22, 1942, he met in his office with Edward Carter from the charity United Russian War Relief. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 57. Letter from Mordecai Johnson to Coy, April 25, 1941. File: Coy—Congratulations (1941), Box 3, WCP. 58. Summaries of memo from Coy to FDR, “Subject: Negro Participation in Defense Industries,” May 1, 1941; memo from Early to Coy, May 7, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 59. DOI press release PM (for Production Management) #385, n.t., May 10, 1941. File: Negroes and the Defense Program 1941, Box 11, RG 214. 60. Letter from Coy to Hugh Miller, chair, Washington Committee for Democratic Action, May 8, 1941, ibid. Communist hunters claimed that the committee was a Communist front. A later organization, Americans for Democratic Action, was a wholly different group. 61. Summary of FDR correspondence with Walter White, May 21, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. Coy cover memo to William D. Hassett, June 2, 1941, attaching draft of letter for FDR’s signature. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 62. Letter from Early to Coy, June 6, 1941. 63. Letter from White to Early, June 6, 1941. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. The formal title of this file folder is listed as “Coy—Personal (to interfile).” It is unclear to what “interfile” refers. 64. Letter from A. Philip Randolph, director, Negro March-on-Washington Committee, to FDR, May 29, 1941. File: Marches on Washington 1933–1945, OF 391. 65. The term “race riot” was commonly used by the press and government officials to describe major civil and military disturbances involving African Americans (or Latinos). The term implied that minorities were to blame for whatever had happened. Yet most of the so-called race riots of the first half of the twentieth century were instigated by whites, and the blame should have been applied to them, not to the minorities, who were the victims in each case. 66. Letter from Early to Coy, June 6, 1941. File: Marches on Washington, 1933–45, OF 391. 67. Letter from Coy to Early, June 12, 1941. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 5

285

68. The drafter of the order was Joe Rauh, a lawyer on Coy’s staff. He said that he included the fourth category, “national origin,” because Coy told him the president was also getting complaints from Polish residents of Buffalo that they, too, were being excluded from defense employment for nonmeritorious reasons (Parrish 2010, 63). After the war, Rauh became an icon of American liberalism, cofounding and active in Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). 69. EO 8802. 70. For the text of the president’s letter, see Kiplinger (1942, 150–51). 71. Letter from Coy to Leonard Burg, president, National Negro Congress, September 30, 1941. File: Negroes and the Defense Program 1941, Box 11, RG 214. 72. The commonly used, but inaccurate, misnomer included Coy’s own office files, which had a folder titled “Fair Employment Practices Committee, 1941–42” (Box 7, RG 214). 73. For example, in 1944, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) authored an amendment to an appropriations bill to prohibit funding any federal agency not created by statute, particularly all executive order–based bodies (Lee 2016, 99– 101). 74. Memo from Coy and Administrative Assistant James Rowe Jr. to FDR, July 7, 1941, and reply by FDR, July 9, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 75. Memo from Coy to General Watson, September 27, 1941. File: Watson, Edwin M., Box 17, WCP. Also summary of letter from Mark Ethridge, FEPC chair, to FDR, September 23, 1941, and subsequent actions. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 76. Letter from Ethridge to Coy, September 20, 1941 and Coy’s reply, October 3, 1941. File: Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941–42, Box 7, RG 214. 77. Letter from Coy to Mrs. Mary McLeod Bethune, National Council of Negro Women, November 11, 1941. File: Negroes and the Defense Program 1941, Box 11, RG 214. 78. Letter from Walter White, NAACP secretary, to Coy, December 5, 1941, ibid. 79. “Committee Completes Second Registration,” Chicago Defender (national weekly ed.), July 26, 1941, 2 (photo).

Chapter 5 1. “Seizure of Plants Fought at Hearing,” NYT, July 1, 1941, 38. 2. “Statement of Wayne Coy,” July 15, 1941. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 3. “New Property Seizure Bill Is Broader but with Time Limit,” CSM, July 17, 1941, 20. 4. Memo from Rauh to Coy, August 18, 1941. File: General Counsel, Box 8, RG 214.

286

Notes to Chapter 5

5. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 17, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 6. “Property Measure Passed by Senate,” NYT, July 22, 1941, 6. 7. 55 Stat. 742–43, October 16, 1941. 8. Memo from Coy to Miss Tully, October 11, 1941. File: Tully, Box 16, WCP. 9. AP, “White House Seeks Broader Bill on Property Seizure,” July 16, 1941, 20. 10. Bruce Pinter, “Third Version of Seizure Bill Goes to Senate,” July 17, 1941, 1. Incorrect; he was a special assistant to the president. 11. “President Demands ‘All-Out’ Power to Seize Property,” Washington TimesHerald, July 17, 1941. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 12. Joseph C. Harsch, “Intimate Message: Washington,” CSM, July 21, 1941, 11, emphasis added. 13. “A Siege Gun for Use Against Crows” (editorial), CT, July 21, 1941, 8. 14. Raymond Clapper, “Law-Drafting Methods Said to be Improved” (syndicated column), Moorhead [MN] Daily News, July 21, 1941, 2. 15. Memo from Coy to General Watson, May 20, 1941. File: Watson, Box 17, WCP. 16. FDR Day by Day. 17. May 22, 1941: Alfred Friendly, “Henderson Asks No New Price Laws,” WP, 11; AP, “Roosevelt Seen Ready to Curb Retail Prices,” NYHT, 16. 18. AP, “Questions Power to Dictate Prices,” [Hanover, PA] Evening Sun, May 22, 1941, 9. 19. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 23, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 20. Memo from FDR to Coy, May 26, 1941, ibid. 21. A revisionist history of the US in WWI tells a very different story about the record of the War Industries Board. G. J. Meyer, The World Remade: America in World War I (New York: Bantam, 2016) 348–52. 22. Letter from Baruch to Coy, May 28, 1941. File: B—General (1941–43), Box 2, WCP. 23. Richard Scholz, “OPM Re-Organization on Industry Basis Seen; Buying Agency Expected” (9 to 4:30 daily column), Washington Daily News, June 9, 1941, 16. 24. Turner Catledge, “Defense Price Bill Is Mapped; Will Go to Congress Next Week,” NYT, July 17, 1941, 1, 28. 25. WS: Richard L. Stokes, “President May Appoint Chief for ‘War Industries Board’: Baruch Mentioned as Possible Head of Office of [sic] Emergency Management,” June 26, 1941, A-2; James Free, “Baruch’s Old Setup Seen as Pattern for O.P.M. Shifts,” July 16, 1941, A-7. 26. Memo from Coy to General Watson, June 2, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 5

287

27. Smith appointments for July 22, 1941. File: Daily Record July–December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 28. Coy calendar entry for April 9, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 29. Coy calendar entry for April 23, 1942, ibid. It is unclear how long it lasted, but evidently Baruch held forth at length. Coy arrived 2:30 p.m., and his next office appointment was not until 5:00 p.m. Coy was holding his cards close to the vest. In an oral history interview, he said that by early 1943 he had given up on Donald Nelson’s leadership at WPB. He lobbied FDR to replace Nelson (who would go to Australia as ambassador) with a war cabinet. FDR did not like the latter advice. Instead, the president asked for an executive order replacing Nelson with Baruch. Coy, though not a fan of Nelson, was even more alarmed about the possibility of Baruch getting the post. In Coy’s view, that would mean the military would gain full control over the civilian production mobilization effort. Coy felt that there was a need to maintain independent civilian review of whatever the military claimed it needed. He persuaded Nelson to take a firmer stance as head of WPB, leading to Nelson firing his deputy as a sacrificial lamb. That alleviated the crisis, and Baruch never got the appointment he salivated after (Somers 1946). 30. Summary of memo from Henderson to FDR, June 2, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 31. Memo from Coy to Watson, June 12, 1941. File: Watson, Edwin M., Box 17, WCP. 32. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, June 14, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 33. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 16, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 34. Memo from Coy to Tully, July 29, 1941, ibid. 35. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Price Legislation, June 17, 1941, ibid. 36. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, June 27, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 37. FDR Day by Day. 38. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 29, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 39. Robert De Vore, “House Votes Price Control, but Greatly Modifies Bill,” WP, November 29, 1941, 1. 40. Memo from Coy to Rowe, May 26, 1941. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 41. Telegram from Richard M. Meustadt (typo, should be Neustadt), Social Security Board, San Francisco, to Coy, May 27, 1941. File: Roosevelt—Material re: Fireside Chat (5/27/41), Box 13, WCP. Neustadt later served in the Truman White House and then, as Harvard professor, in 1960 wrote the influential book

288

Notes to Chapter 5

Presidential Power. His theme was that the power of the president was mostly that of persuasion, and merely issuing orders to subordinates would not be effective. 42. Summary of letter from Governor Paul Johnson to Frank Bane, director of the Division of State and Local Cooperation, May 28, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 43. Summary of telegram from Hardy, regional defense coordinator, Boston, to Coy, May 28, 1941, ibid. 44. Telegram from Hardy to Coy, May 29, 1941. File: Roosevelt—Material re: Fireside Chat (5/27/41), Box 13, WCP. Once received by the federal telegram center in DC, it was delivered to Coy by messenger, probably by one of his three motorcyclists (chap. 3). 45. Letter from James B. Marley, Social Security Board, Austin, Texas, to Coy, May 29, 1941. File: Political File, Box 12, WCP. 46. Memo from Coy to Rowe, June 2, 1941, and Rowe’s handwritten response, ibid. 47. Summary of draft of letter from FDR to Johnson, June 5, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 48. Elsewhere I have argued that the so-called mess looked complicated simply because it was necessarily complicated (Lee 2012, 202–6). 49. F. C. T. (Frank C. Travers), “Current Comment: The Flow of Money” (column), Creston [IA] News Advertiser, July 1, 1941, 1, emphasis added. 50. AP, “Lend-Lease Help Scant, Says Byrd,” NYT, June 1, 1941, 26. 51. AP, “Byrd Asks Defense Shakeup,” CSM, August 20, 1941, 3. 52. Memo from Coy to FDR, August 25, 1941 (and two-page attachment on airplane production). File: Armaments Program, Box 1, WCP. Coy also pointed out that Byrd was correct in stating that the US Army did not have any heavy tanks and was not planning to order any. A major strategic decision by the Army had been to base its offensive capacities on fast light tanks. They would prove to be highly vulnerable to heavy German tanks and antitank guns. For a discussion of this blunder (including higher casualties), see David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 53. Memo from Coy to FDR, August 28, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 54. Memo from FDR to Hopkins, September 3, 1941. Subject File: Wayne Coy, Box 129, PSF. 55. “Critical Situation in Ammunition Production,” n.a., September 3, 1941. File: Armaments Program, Box 1, WCP. On September 11, Coy’s senior attorney Cox updated Coy that he was still at work on a more comprehensive status report (ibid). 56. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Present Defense Production and the All Out Objective, n.d., ibid. 57. “The Administration: Smith & Coy,” Time magazine, May 18, 1942, 12.

Notes to Chapter 5

289

58. Confusingly, there was a similar, but slightly different, employment category called WOC [without compensation]. They received no salary (compared to $1) and were eligible for expense reimbursements and per diems ($10) only when traveling. 59. These political battles from 1940 to 1945 over the management of the economic mobilization continue to reverberate, merely shifting from journalism and politics to history. A 2012 book by Arthur Herman claimed that it was business that deserved the credit for the accomplishments of the production effort: Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II (New York, Random House). For a more balanced view, see Mark R. Wilson, Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). 60. 54 Stat. 599. 61. Memo from Coy to Rowe, May 2, 1941. File: Dollar-A-Year Clearances 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. A handwritten note on the file copy says “Sent by Special Messenger,” presumably another reference to Coy’s three motorcyclists. 62. Memo from Rowe to Coy, Subject: Dollar-a-year Men, May 5, 1941, ibid. 63. Memo from Coy to Rowe, June 26, 1941. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 64. Memo from Belsley to Coy, Subject: Procedure for acknowledging offers of personal services on a dollar a year basis, August 12, 1941. File: Dollar-A-Year Procedure 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. For Belsley’s background and OEM service, see Lee (2016, 81–83). 65. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, July 3, 1941; and memo from Coy to Lowell Mellett, OGR, Subject: Guide for Federal Executives to Inter-Agency Service Functions, Contacts and Procedures, July 10, 1941. Both in file: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. The brochure apparently was not republished by OGR, at least not with that title. 66. Memo from Coy to La Guardia and handwritten reply from La Guardia to Coy, both dated August 12, 1941. File: OCD 1941, Box 2, RG 214. Coy was reacting to a Scholz column, “Russ Davenport New LaGuardia Morale Builder,” Washington Daily News, August 11, 1941. 67. Memo from Coy to Sherwood, August 14, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 68. Jerry Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (daily column), WP, September 17, 1941, 21. 69. “Patriotism Pays Ickes Chief Aid [sic] $67,000 a Year,” Chicago Tribune, October 27, 1941, 13. 70. Memo from Rowe to Coy, Subject: Lessing J. Rosenwald, September 20, 1941. File Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 71. Roosevelt, “Authority to Appoint Persons at a Compensation of $1.00 Per Annum,” October 7, 1941; and cover memo from Coy to Mrs. [Margaret] Holmead, October 9, 1941. Both in file: Dollar-A-Year Clearances 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. Holmead, head of the personnel office at NDAC and then OPM, was the daughter of William McReynolds, Coy’s LOEM predecessor (Lee 2016, 124;

290

Notes to Chapter 5

2012, 219n130). In the spring of 1942, Rosenwald complained to Coy that the field offices of WPB’s Bureau of Industrial Conservation were inadequately funded. Memo from Rosenwald to Coy, March 30, 1942, and memo from Coy to Dort, April 4, 1942. Both in file: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. A few weeks later, FDR approved a long list of such appointments, including Chester Barnard to be assistant to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. “Authority to Approve Persons at a Compensation of $1.00 Per Annum,” October 24, 1941. File: Dollar-A-Year Clearances 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. Barnard was the retired CEO of a large telephone company and author of the highly influential 1938 management theory book The Functions of the Executive. 72. Memo from FDR, October 30, 1941. File: Dollar-A-Year Procedure 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214, emphasis added. FDR delegated the appointment power directly to the larger OEM units, including OPM, OPA, coordinator of information (Donovan), and Rockefeller’s Latin America office. Coy got the rest. 73. Memo from Coy to CAS director Dallas Dort (Sherwood’s successor), November 5, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 74. Memo from Dort to Coy, November 12, 1941. File: Dollar-A-Year Procedure 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. For an example of the form letter Coy sent to OEM agency heads under his new delegated power: Letter from Coy to La Guardia, November 12, 1941. File: OCD 1941, Box 2, RG 214. La Guardia replied to Coy somewhat defensively and opaquely on November 21, saying he would generally continue his practice of giving background information to the president (directly?) and that he did not see any difference between dollar-a-year and WOC appointments. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214. La Guardia’s letter was misfiled by being placed in the 1942 file. 75. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 21, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 76. Arthur C. Wimmer, “Urge Saving of Consumer Goods Plants,” HC, August 14, 1941, 2. 77. Memo from Coy to Rowe, Subject: Vacancy on Maritime Commission, July 8, 1941. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 78. Memo from Coy to Emmerich, May 29, 1941. File: Emmerich, Herbert, Box 7, RG 214. Emmerich was the de facto executive director of OPM. Before his OPM position, he had been active in the professionalization of public administration, including as a staff member of the Brownlow Committee (Lee 2016, 71, 183n127). After WWII, he succeeded Brownlow as head of the Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago and concluded his career as a professor at the University of Virginia, including writing several books on reorganizing the federal government. 79. Letter from James T. Mathews, DNC, to Coy, November 27, 1941. File: Mathews, James T., Box 11, WCP. 80. Letter from Coy to Richard C. Durham, acting secretary, DNC, September 23, 1941. File: Ma-Me—General (1941–43), Box 11, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 5

291

81. Letter from Coy to Ludlow, July 7, 1941. File: OCD 1941, Box 2, RG 214. Members of Horton’s PR staff were exasperated by the disorganization at OCD even after OCD asked them to organize a public salvage collection campaign (Lee 2012, 99–100). 82. Memo from Coy to Rowe, June 12, 1941. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 83. Memo from Coy to Grace Tully, November 6, 1941. File: Tully, Box 16, WCP. The ship USS Indiana was different from the USS Indianapolis, whose fate was memorably recounted in the movie Jaws. 84. Summary of memo from Tully to Coy, November 7, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 85. Memo from Coy to Tully, November 18, 1941. File: Tully, Box 16, WCP. Also, no such meeting is listed in FDR Day by Day. 86. Memo from Coy to FDR, November 18, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 87. Summary of memo from FDR to secretary of war, November 21, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 88. Letter from Coy to Fred Bays, Indianapolis, July 7, 1941. File: Defense Housing Coordination 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 89. 1941 letters: Adams to Coy, June 17; Coy to Stettinius, June 19; Stettinius to Coy, June 21; Coy to Adams, June 21; Adams to Coy, July 11; Coy to Adams, July 21; Adams to Coy, August 22; E. S. Chapman, chief, Light Ordnance Section, OPM, to Coy, August 28; Coy to Adams, August 30. File: A—General (1941–43), Box 1, WCP. Adams eventually created a production company that obtained contracts to manufacture airplane parts. Letter from Adams to Coy, August 5, 1942; Coy to Adams, August 12, 1941, ibid. 90. Letter from Coy to John F. Russell, Garland Milling Company, Greensburg, Indiana, October 17, 1941. File: Agriculture Department 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 91. Daniel M. Kidney, “Protests Can’t Stop Plans for Powder Plant,” Evansville [IN] Press, November 26, 1941. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 92. “May Be Candidate,” Tipton [IN] Tribune, December 5, 1941, 8; Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), Camden [AR] News, June 8, 1942, 2. 93. “Address by Wayne Coy, Liaison Officer for Emergency Management at Franklin College, Indiana, Monday noon, June 9, 1941.” Press release #3804, OEM Division of Information, 1. File: Government Files, Box 7, WCP. To avoid excessive notes, page numbers of subsequent quotes from the press release of the speech are presented in parentheses in the text. 94. Coy letter to Charles E. Goodell, American College Bureau, Chicago, June 23, 1941. File: G—General (1941–43), Box 7, WCP. 95. “Wayne Coy Speaker to Franklin Alumni,” Greensboro [IN] Daily News, June 11, 1941, 2; “Wayne Coy Warns of Sacrifices in Store for Nation,” Delphi [IN]

292

Notes to Chapter 5

Citizen, June 26, 1941, 7. DOI gave some circulation to the speech by including an article about it in OEM’s official weekly bulletin, which had wide distribution nationally: “Kind and degree of necessary sacrifice not yet realized in U.S., Wayne Coy warns,” Defense 2, no. 24 (June 17, 1941): 24. That the press release of Coy’s speech was not picked up by the capital’s press corps is not surprising given the torrent of releases issued by DOI’s twenty-four-hour, seven-days-a-week newsroom about the activities of all OEM agencies (Lee 2012, 89). 96. Jack Vincent, International News Service, “Shortages May Force Americans to Accept ‘Ersatz’ Life,” San Antonio [TX] Light, June 25, 1941, 5-A. 97. Remarks by Wayne Coy (text of speech), October 13, 1941. File: Washington Council of Social Agencies (10/13/41), Box 26, WCP. 98. October 14, 1941: “Social Upheaval Here, Welfare Council Told,” WP, 8; “ ‘Upheaval’ Requires Volunteer Welfare Workers, Council Told,” WS, B-16. 99. Memo from Coy to Tully, October 23, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. Apparently, during that trip he also attended a meeting of the leadership of Indiana’s Democratic Party. United Press, “Flynn to Talk Before Demos,” Valparaiso [IN] Vidette-Messenger, October 17, 1941, 2. Coy’s files also include the draft of a speech to the Political Union at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill scheduled for October 20. It is unclear from his records (where the notes for the speech are marked “draft”) and from the absence of local news coverage afterward if he delivered it or canceled. File: Speeches—Misc. (1941–43), Box 26, WCP. 100. November 1, 1941: AP, “Morale Sound and Improving,” Hattiesburg [MS] American, 4; “U.S. Morale Good,” Danville [VA] Bee, 9. Five days after Pearl Harbor, Congressman Clyde T. Ellis (D-AR) inserted Coy’s speech in the Congressional Record, saying that in the retrospect of what had happened since then, it was a “masterful presentation [that] is of new and renewed significance in light of the tragic developments of the last few days” (CR 87, no. 14 [December 12, 1941]: A5638–40). 101. Also in 1941, he made a presentation to an audience of management professionals at a meeting of the Society of Management (chap. 6). 102. Daniel M. Kidney, “Managed U.S. ‘Bunk’: New Deal Keyman’s View,” New York World-Telegram, October 2, 1941. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Clippings/Articles 1937–1956, Box 31, WCP. 103. Senator Lister Hill (D-AL), CR 87, no. 14 (December 9, 1941): A5483–85. 104. Wayne Coy, “The Wide Horizon: Keeping Government Democratic,” CSM, December 27, 1941, 20. 105. Herbert Corey, “Washington and Your Business” (monthly department), Nation’s Business 29, no. 6 (June 1941): 65. 106. Ibid., 29, no. 7 (July 1941): 79. 107. Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Racine [WI] Journal Times, July 5, 1941, 5.

Notes to Chapter 5

293

108. Ibid., October 5, 1941, 2. 109. “Hunger” (profile of USDA Secretary Claude Wickard), Time magazine, July 21, 1941, 14ff. 110. Jerry Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (daily column), WP, October 20, 1941, 13. 111. “The White House,” Newsweek, December 1, 1941, 23. 112. “U.S. Organization for War,” Fortune, September 1941, 171–73. 113. “The Growing Friction in Defense Agencies,” United States News, August 1, 1941, 13. 114. T.R.B., “Washington Notes: Reshuffle,” New Republic, July 7, 1941, 20. 115. Paul Mallon, “Defense Job Coordinated, Officials Say” (syndicated column), HC, July 17, 1941, 3. 116. Inga Arvad, “Did You Happen to See—Wayne Coy?” Washington TimesHerald, August 4, 1941, 2. FBI director Hoover believed she was a Nazi spy and had her followed. That led to the discovery that she was dating and sleeping with young Navy officer John F. Kennedy, then briefly stationed in Washington. 117. Richard L. Stokes, “ ‘Boy Wonder’ from Indiana Is Key Man in Nominal Control of the Defense Set-Up,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 20, 1941, 1, 3 (editorial section). File: Clippings/Articles 1937–1956, Box 31, WCP. 118. n.t. (editorial), [Jefferson City, MO] Daily Capital News, July 22, 1941, 4. 119. Henry Gemmill, “The ‘Surprise Package’ of the Emergency,” WS, September 28, 1941, B5. 120. Alexander R. George, AP, “New ‘Brain Trust’ Is Versatile,” Charleston [WV] Gazette, November 2, 1941, 6. 121. “Test Your Knowledge,” Oil City [PA] Derrick, September 8, 1941, 6. A few months after stepping down as LOEM to become BOB assistant director full-time, a similar feature again named him, this time as the wrong answer: “Who is the director of the United States bureau of the budget? [a] Harold D. Smith. [b] James M. Landis. [c] Wayne Coy.” “Test Your Facts,” CT, June 21, 1943, 6. 122. Letter from Coy to Joseph T. Ives, Delphi, Indiana, September 16, 1941. File: I (1940–42), Box 8, WCP. 123. Jane McBaine, “Post Profile: Mrs. Wayne Coy” (In the Capital Spotlight feature of the society page), WP, December 22, 1942, B7. 124. Untitled photo spread, WS, August 10, 1941, D-1. 125. The Times-Herald advertised itself as an “around the clock” newspaper, meaning that it had morning and afternoon editions. Coy’s papers include two versions of this profile, presumably from those two editions. Each had different photos of her and different captions. Humorously, one version described her as having “deep-blue eyes,” while the other said she had “big, gray eyes.” Washington Times-Herald, September 29, 1941: “Beauty of the Week: Mrs. Wayne Coy,” File: Coy, Grace, Box 4; and “Beauty of the Week—No. 91: Mrs. Wayne Coy,” File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35.

294

Notes to Chapter 6

Chapter 6 1. The Society apparently had relatively high standing in Washington at the time, perhaps even as an alternative to ASPA. One of McReynolds’s successors as liaison officer for personnel management during the Truman administration was Raymond Zimmerman, who was the national president of the society (Lee 2016, 129). 2. Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (daily column), WP: September 22, 1941, 13; September 29, 1941, 15. 3. “Towards Better Conception of Public Administration” (speech excerpts) and “The Task of Public Administration” (editorial), Des Moines [IA] Register, November 22, 1941. File: Clippings/Articles 1937–1956, Box 31, WCP. 4. Congressman Robert Ramspeck (D-GA), CR 87, no. 14 (December 4, 1941): A5461–62. 5. “OEM Officer Outlines Principles of Administration for Good Government,” A.M.S. [Agricultural Marketing Service] News 5, no. 11 (December 1, 1941): 9. 6. EO 8751, May 2, 1941. 7. Clause 3, emphasis added, ibid. The use of the imperative “shall” is a powerful key word in legal terminology, the opposite of the optional “may.” Coy saw an early version of the executive order before it was issued. Memo from Coy to Smith, May 2, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. While most reporters missed this detail or were not interested in the minutia of public administration, Scholz caught it (9 to 4:30 daily column, Washington Daily News, May 7, 1941, 20). 8. EO 8757, May 20, 1941, clause 7. 9. EO 8807, June 28, 1941, clause 10. 10. EO 8840, July 30, 1941, clause 8. 11. In July, FDR also signed an executive order creating the Coordinator of Information office headed by William Donovan. It was not within OEM. Coy immediately vacated his corner office suite in the State Department building (rooms 246 and 248) to give Donovan an initial office to locate the new agency. Wilfred Fleisher, “Donovan Takes Up Defense Post, Is Silent on Information Duties,” NYHT, July 22, 1941, 8. Coy moved down the hall to room 224. Memo from Coy to FDR, September 12, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 12. EO 8890, September 3, 1941, clause 8. 13. EO 8922, October 24, 1941, clause 5. 14. DOI director Horton took it personally (Lee 2012, 109–10). But, politically, FDR’s decision to create OFF was much more an indication of his declining confidence in La Guardia’s handling of OCD’s external communication role. 15. EO 8926, October 28, 1941, clause 4. 16. Lee Carson, International News Service, “ ‘The Rose,’ Man Friday to FDR, Shuns Glory,” Charleston [WV] Gazette, August 31, 1941, 24. 17. Memos from Coy to Rosenman, August 8, 1941. A few hours after sending a six-page memo summarizing his ideas, Coy realized he had forgotten to make

Notes to Chapter 6

295

one point. Later that day, he sent a follow-up two-page memo with the additional suggestion. Both in file: Alphabetical R-S, Box 21, RG 214. 18. Kenneth G. Crawford, “FDR Plans Revamping Whole Defense Setup to Implement New Anglo-U.S. Peace Aims,” PM, August 15, 1941, 3–4. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 19. EO 8875, August 28, 1941. SPAB, chaired by Vice President Wallace, was short-lived and superseded the month after the US entered the war (Morstein Marx 1947, 7). 20. Kluttz, “Federal Diary,” WP, October 20, 1941, 13. 21. Scholz, “OPM Personnel Here Expected to Reach 2500 in Two Months” (column), Washington Daily News, April 29, 1941, 16. 22. Scholz, “OEM Goes Overtime Supplying Personnel to Defense Units” (column), Washington Daily News, May 9, 1941, 24. 23. Kluttz, “Federal Diary,” WP, October 20, 1941, 13. 24. Kluttz, “Federal Diary,” WP, September 22, 1941, 13. 25. “U.S. Hunting for Specialists in Many Fields,” WP, September 22, 1941, 22. 26. Scholz, “4 Defense Agencies May Soon be Joined as War Economy Unit” (column), Washington Daily News, April 28, 1941, 17. 27. Form letter from Coy to Clifford Townsend, director, Office of Agricultural Defense Relations, December 4, 1941. File: Agriculture Department Office of Defense Relations 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 28. Memo from Coy to Heads of all OEM agencies, December 8, 1941. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. This memo went out the day after Pearl Harbor, but was clearly in the works beforehand, so I have included it here. 29. Letter from Emmerich to Coy, May 2, 1941. File: Emmerich, Box 7, RG 214. Cross-Reference (summary sheet on actions relating to vacation policy). File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 30. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, May 13, 1941. File: American Red Cross, Box 1, WCP. Summary of memo from Marvin McIntyre to heads of EOP units, October 17, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 31. Memo from Coy to Shane MacCarthy (executive assistant to the CAS director), December 6, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 32. Letter from Sherwood, acting LOEM, to D. W. Bell, acting treasury secretary, October 25, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. Form memo from Coy to Fiorello La Guardia, OCD, November 6, 1941. File: OCD 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 33. “Businessmen Push Recruiting of Aides for Chest Drive,” WS, October 10, 1941, A-3. Letter from Coy to Wayne Taylor, under secretary of commerce, October 9, 1941. File: Commerce Department 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 34. Memo from Roy Jackson, OPM, to Sherwood, Subject: Transfer and Consolidation of Certain Phases of Administrative Services, May 27, 1941. File: OPM, Correspondence with Sherwood, Box 33, RG 214. Memo from Roland Severy, OPM, and Dallas Dort, CAS, to Coy and Emmerich, October 6, 1941. File:

296

Notes to Chapter 6

CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. To avoid perceptions of a power grab and of winners and losers, the two men who negotiated the agreement decided to implement the transfers “quietly and gradually.” Memo from Sherwood to Coy, May 16, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. What initially was the NDAC Library in 1940 had become the OPM Library and now became the OEM Library. Perhaps partly to obscure its nomadic history, the head librarian sometimes referred to it simply as the National Defense Library (Wanner 1941). 35. Temporary buildings (called “tempos”) were designated by letters of the alphabet in the order that they were built. Some were left over from WWI and referred to as old tempos. In 1941, the federal government started building new tempos, including on the National Mall. OGR’s US Information Center was a tempo and eventually torn down after the war (Lee 2005, chap. 8). 36. Letter from Sherwood to Coy, May 10, 1941. File: Wayne Coy, Correspondence of Sidney Sherwood, Box 32, RG 214. 37. Letter from Knudsen to Coy, August 4, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 38. Note from Sherwood to Coy, August 8, 1941, ibid. 39. Letter from John N. Edy, acting administrator, Federal Works Agency, to Coy, August 15, 1941, ibid. 40. Appointments for November 24, 1941. File: Daily Record July–December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 41. Kluttz, “Federal Diary,” WP, November 26, 1941, 21. 42. John F. Cramer, “Mr. Coy Breaks Bottleneck and OPM Gets Space,” Washington Daily News, October 9, 1941. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 43. Handwritten note from Sherwood to Coy on memo from W. D. Wright (head of CAS’s Service Operations Office) to Sherwood, August 27, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 44. Memo from Coy to Sherwood, September 16, 1941, ibid. 45. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, April 30, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 46. Letter from Coy to Smith, May 10, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 47. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, June 4, 1941. File: Defense Housing Coordination 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 48. Letter from Blandford, assistant BOB director, July 1, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 49. Smith appointments for September 3, 1941. File: Daily Record July– December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. 50. Scholz, “12 Regional Officers Being Considered for OPM in Near Future” (column), Washington Daily News, May 14, 1941, 21. 51. Scholz, “Priorities Division of OPM Setting Up Offices in 15 Cities” (column), Washington Daily News, May 27, 1941, 16.

Notes to Chapter 6

297

52. Memo from Lyle Belsley to Coy, August 6, 1941. File: Belsley 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 53. Memo from Shane MacCarthy to Sherwood, September 13, 1941. File: Field Offices OEM 1941, Box 8, RG 214. 54. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, June 10, 1941. File: Personnel—Miscellaneous 1941–43, Box 6, RG 214. 55. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, July 11, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 56. Predictably, in the spring of 1942, the Columbus, Ohio, Chamber of Commerce complained to Coy about this. Reply by Coy to telegram from Columbus Chamber of Commerce, March 23, 1942. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214. 57. Memo from Coy to the heads of all agencies in OEM, Subject: Plan for Coordination of Defense Field Activities, September 22, 1941. File: Field Offices OEM 1941, Box 8, RG 214. 58. “Defense Offices Centralize Here: Victory Production Quarters at Chanin Building House Major OEM Agencies,” NYT, December 28, 1941, F1, F6. 59. Letter from comptroller general, GAO, to Coy, October 15, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. 60. Memo from FDR to Coy, November 27, 1941, requesting Coy to draft a reply to the letter from California Governor Olson, November 21, 1941; memo from Coy to FDR with draft reply, January 2, 1942. Both in file: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 61. CAS organization charts, May 13 and September 29, 1941. File: OEM Personnel Charts, Box 7, RG 214. 62. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, July 17, 1941. File: OEM Personnel Investigations 1941, Box 7, RG 214. Sherwood’s memo did not identify who gave Coy the tip about the three suspect employees. 63. Memo from Dort to Roland Severy, assistant administrative officer, OPM, October 14, 1941, ibid. 64. Special memo from Coy to heads of agencies in OEM, Subject: Alleged Subversive Affiliations of Employees, October 27, 1941. File: OEM Personnel— Miscellaneous 1941–43, Box 6, RG 214. 65. 55 Stat. 292. 66. Form letter from Hoover to Coy, February 6, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 67. This was for his speeches to the Kentucky and Indiana social welfare conferences and to Indiana University students on public administration (chap. 5). 68. Letter from Sherwood, acting LOEM, to Attorney General Biddle, October 31, 1941. The attorney general’s letter about the new FBI policy was sent on October 23 and mistakenly addressed to former LOEM McReynolds. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214.

298

Notes to Chapter 6

69. Memo from Coy to Rowe, November 11, 1941. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. 70. Letter from Dort, CAS director, to Rockefeller, October 29, 1941, emphasis added. File: OEM—Personnel Investigations 1941, Box 7, RG 214. 71. Letter from Gould, chief of CAS Investigations Office, to Dort, November 27, 1941, ibid. 72. Letter from Dort to Henderson, November 18, 1941, ibid. 73. Letter from Gould to Dort, November 28, 1941, ibid. 74. Henry Gemmill, “The ‘Surprise Package’ of the Emergency,” WS, September 28, 1941, B5. 75. Smith appointments for September 15 and November 26, 1941. File: Daily Record July–December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. Indicating how closely they worked, Smith’s appointments for September 15 also include three phone conversations they had that day. Based on the number of times Coy appears in Smith’s daily records, they apparently accomplished a large amount of work through these quick phone calls, if only to coordinate who would do what or what each man’s initial inclination was on a particular issue. Coy also seemed to have a habit of calling Smith to touch base before they cohosted larger meetings on complicated issues. Presumably one reason was so that Coy could give a head’s up to Smith on some of the potential problems or arguments that would probably come up or indicate in what direction Coy was hoping the discussion at the meeting would eventually go. 76. Richard L. Stokes, “Great Expansion of OEM Activities,” side box to “ ‘Boy Wonder’ from Indiana Is Key Man in Nominal Control of the Defense SetUp,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 20, 1941, 1 (editorial section). File: Clippings/ Articles 1937–1956, Box 31, WCP. 77. “Defense Leaders,” American Observer (weekly newspaper), November 3, 1941, 8. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. Thomas L. Stokes, “OEM Chief Is Big Factor in Defense,” Washington Daily News, November 11, 1941. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 78. Scholz, “New Deal Chiefs See OEM as Ideal Unit to Head Defense Effort” (column), Washington Daily News, July 1, 1941, 14. 79. Entry for January 12, 1941, Diary, SSP. Even though this occurred a month after Pearl Harbor (and therefore chronologically belongs in the next chapter), I am presenting it here as a counterpoint to journalists’ praise of Coy’s low-key and conciliatory approach to conflict. Sherwood speculated that the reason Coy declined to take Sherwood’s direct approach was that he was afraid the president would not accept Coy’s recommendation. In the context of the many memos from Coy to FDR and back (some, of course, replying in the negative), Sherwood’s speculation seems to be an unlikely explanation for Coy’s advice. For example, in May, Watson sent a note to FDR that Coy requested a meeting to fill him in on a major businessman threatening to leave OEM. FDR penciled “No” on the note. Retyped copy of memo from Watson to FDR, May 15, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240.

Notes to Chapter 6

299

80. Letter from Coy to McCloy, October 15, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. It is unclear if McCloy overruled the Army. Two days after Pearl Harbor, Coy ordered the acceleration of its installation of the central phone exchange and switchboard. Memo from Coy to Dort, December 9, 1941. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. The National Defense switchboard became operational in early February 1942. Memo from Coy to all employees, January 27, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 81. Letter from Coy to John Blandford, acting BOB director, August 19, 1941. File: Budget Bureau 1941, Box 1, RG 214. The list excluded Rockefeller office staffers who were making their access arrangements through the State Department. Coy’s list included two women, a professional (chief of audits and records in the Lend-Lease office), and a secretary. Perhaps the latter sometimes acted as a messenger or accompanied a senior manager to meetings with Coy and took notes of the discussion. Some of the men on the list were probably de facto couriers, too, picking up or dropping off documents of such importance, urgency, or sensitivity that they could not be handled by OEM’s own messengers. However, based on the titles of the officials, the number of men in that ministerial role looks like a small proportion of the list. 82. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, May 13, 1941; and Organization Series No. 2 (internal OEM announcement), Administrative Memoranda, n.d. File: Wayne Coy, Correspondence of Sidney Sherwood, Box 32, RG 214. The news was announced in early June: “New Defense Agencies Set Up,” PAR 1, no. 4 (Summer 1941): 410. 83. Letter from Coy to John Blandford, acting BOB director, August 19, 1941. File: Budget Bureau 1941, Box 1, RG 214. Office of the Liaison Officer (organization chart), September 29, 1941. File: OEM Personnel Charts, Box 7, RG 214. 84. From that experience, Graham came to know public administration. In 1953, he gave the closing address at the annual ASPA conference. Philip L. Graham, “Public Administration and the Press,” PAR 13, no. 2 (Spring 1953): 87–88. 85. Letter from Coy to F. J. Bailey, BOB assistant director for legislative clearance, June 27, 1941. File: General Counsel, Box 8, RG 214. 86. Letter from Coy to V. L. Almond, BOB, October 10, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 87. Memo from Cox to Coy, Subject: S. 1983, November 21, 1941. File: Commerce Department 1941, Box 3, RG 214. OPM did not object to the legislation per se, just as long as it was clear that its non-objection was not misinterpreted as meaning it was committing to providing the steel needed for the bridge. Such a decision would depend on exactly what would be requested, when it would be requested, and what priority level was sought for the steel. 88. Letter from Coy to Bailey, September 17, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 89. Letter from Coy to Bailey, July 23, 1941, ibid.

300

Notes to Chapter 6

90. Letter from Coy to Smith, August 12, 1941, ibid. 91. Letter from Coy to Bailey, August 11, 1941, ibid. 92. Memo from Cox to Coy, Subject: H.R. 5029—A Bill Establishing Thirteen Standard Size Cans for the Canning of All Fruits and Vegetables, November 6, 1941; and letter from Coy to Bailey, November 6, 1941. Both in file: Agriculture Department 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 93. Memo from Rauh to Coy, August 18, 1941; Memo from Cox to Coy, Subject: S. 1810, September 17, 1941. Both in file: General Counsel, Box 8, RG 214. 94. Memo from Cox to Coy, July 1, 1941. File: Legislative Reports 1941, Box 10, RG 214. 95. Memo from Cox to Coy, Subject: Legislative Report, July 11, 1941, ibid. 96. Memo from Rauh to Coy, Subject: Congressional Program during House recess period, and status of unfinished business, August 18, 1941, ibid. 97. Letter from Coy to Bailey, October 2, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 98. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 19, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. In his memo, Coy misstated the source of the official LOEM role as the channel of communication between the president and OEM agencies. He claimed his power derived from an executive order. It did not. It came from an administrative order FDR issued on January 7, 1941, detailing the duties he was assigning to the first LOEM, McReynolds (chap. 1). 99. May 21, 1941, FDR Day by Day. It is, of course, possible that their interaction on this subject occurred through a quick phone call from Roosevelt to Coy or a quick visit that was off the books (something FDR occasionally did [Lee 2016, 179n46]). Given his operating style, it is highly unlikely that FDR replied in writing with a dictated note. 100. Memo from Coy to FDR, September 5, 1941. File: Defense Housing Coordination 1941. Box 3, RG 214. Indeed, in February 1942, FDR reorganized the entire federal housing program, including easing the current OEM housing coordinator out of office (chap. 8). 101. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 30, 1941. File: Wayne Coy, Box 129, Subject File, PSF. 102. November 27, 1941, Roosevelt Day by Day. Significantly, the incumbent OEM housing coordinator was not invited. Where the money would be spent was, of course, of strong political interest and significance. For example, Mrs. Roosevelt had her own list that likely emphasized prioritizing new construction of housing for single women and African Americans. Summary of letter from C. F. Palmer, OEM housing coordinator, to Eleanor Roosevelt, November 27, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. That Palmer wrote the first lady on the same day that he was excluded from the FDR’s luncheon with Coy and Lanham is probably not a coincidence. He likely was trying to get back into the game through a side door, that is, direct contact with Eleanor Roosevelt. Indicating her influence, a few weeks after the

Notes to Chapter 6

301

luncheon (by then after Pearl Harbor), Coy reported back to FDR on one of the assignments he had gotten from the president at lunch, namely increasing housing in the DC area for single women who were hired by the federal government. File: Memo from Coy to FDR, December 17, 1941. File: Defense Housing Coordination 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 103. Summary of FDR letter to the secretary of the treasury, Defense Aid Allocation No. 24, May 2, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 104. “O.E.M. Orders Closer Attention to Telephones,” WS, September 4, 1941, B-1. 105. Scholz, “No U.S. Appointments Outside Merit Will Be Allowed After June 30” (column), Washington Daily News, May 1, 1941, 5. 106. Scholz, “Placement Service Preparing to Meet Special Defense Jobs” (column), Washington Daily News, June 7, 1941, 8. 107. W. H. Lawrence, “Key to the Federal Defense Organization,” NYT, October 26, 1941, E8. 108. George Bookman, “President Sees Aides to Speed Bomber Output,” WP, May 7, 1941, 1. 109. Memo from Cox to Coy, May 7, 1941. File: General Counsel, Box 8, RG 214. 110. Tax Certification Section (organization chart), April 15, 1941. File: OEM Personnel Charts, Box 7, RG 214. 111. “Smaller Firms to Get Easier Plant Amortization Terms in New Plan,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1941, 2. 112. Letter from Benjamin V. Cohen to Colonel Edward Greenbaum, War Department, October 14, 1941; Rauh forwarded a copy of the letter to Coy. File: Advisory Commission—Council of National Defense 1941, Box 1, RG 214. Thirty years later, I became casually acquainted with the legendary Cohen while a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in 1972–74. A bachelor, he was quite elderly, retired, and lived in the neighborhood. He was a diminutive person who was easily noticed, and I frequently saw him taking his equally diminutive dog for walks. Sometimes senior Brookings officials invited him to come to the cafeteria for lunch to talk politics. Seating at a large round table was open to all comers, and I joined as many times as I could. He was sharp, funny, incisive, and original. For example, when Nixon’s presidency began unraveling in mid-1973, there was no precedent for how to handle it. After all, no president had ever been removed from office by Congress, and none had ever resigned before completing his term. Assuming that there was no choice but to let Nixon finish his second term, Cohen suggested appointing a Cabinet of national unity, composed of an equal number of Republicans and Democrats, who would govern through bipartisan consensus. The president would be a figurehead with no control over policy. It was an arresting and original suggestion (later mooted, of course, when Nixon resigned). Cohen died in 1983.

302

Notes to Chapter 6

113. Letter from Sherwood to Coy, October 22, 1941. File: Advisory Commission—Council of National Defense 1941, Box 1, RG 214. Summary of actions, including Coy memo to FDR, October 23, 1941; FDR memo to Coy to clear the plan with Morgenthau, October 25, 1941; Morgenthau memo agreeing to plan, October 27, 1941; and FDR signing a draft directive prepared by Coy to Knudsen, October 28, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 114. 55 Stat. 757, October 30, 1941. For a review of the rationale, see letter from Coy to Hugh Fulton, chief counsel, Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (aka the Truman Committee), October 18, 1941. File: Advisory Commission—Council of National Defense 1941, Box 1, RG 214. The file copy notes that Coy’s letter was “rewritten by Mr. Sherwood.” 115. Memo from Coy to FDR, September 12, 1941. File: 1941, OF 4240. 116. DOI Press release PM 1195, September 19, 1941. File: CAS Reference File of Sherwood, Box 35, RG 214. The release was reprinted as an article in DOI’s widely distributed official OEM weekly: “Sherwood named Assistant OEM Liaison Officer; Dort heads Administrative Service,” Defense 2, no. 38 (September 23, 1941): 24. 117. Administrative Memo from Coy, Organization Series No. 3, September 15, 1941. File: OEM—General organization. Box 5, RG 214. 118. Jay Franklin, “We the People” (column), [Harlingen, TX] Valley Morning Star, October 7, 1941, 4. When McReynolds appointed Sherwood CAS director in March 1941, the media was abuzz about the significance of it (chap. 1). Some thought he, a New Dealer, was being anointed as a czar of the defense mobilization. However, his appointment in September 1941 as assistant LOEM attracted almost no press attention other than Franklin’s column. 119. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, November 4, 1941. File: CAS Reference File of Sherwood, Box 35, RG 214. 120. Letter from Sherwood to South Trimble Jr., acting secretary of commerce, October 20, 1941. File: Commerce Department 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 121. Letter from Sherwood to Smith, October 24, 1941. File: Export Control, Box 7, RG 214. 122. Entries for January 8, 9, and 10, 1942. File: Diaries, Box 5, SSP. 123. Entry for January 6, 1942, ibid. 124. Entries for January 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12, 1942, ibid. 125. Entry for January 24, 1942, ibid. 126. “WPB Official,” CSM, February 6, 1942, 18; “Sidney Sherwood Named Executive Officer,” Victory [formerly Defense] 3, no. 6 (February 10, 1942): 11. 127. “Wayne Coy Will Keynote Oberlin Men’s Meeting,” WS, December 2, 1941, B-16. 128. “Remarks of Wayne Coy; Opening Session—Men’s Career Conference,” text of speech. File: Oberlin College, Ohio (12/5/41), Box 26, WCP. To avoid exces-

Notes to Chapter 7

303

sive notes, the page numbers of subsequent quotes from the unpublished speech are presented in parentheses in the text. 129. Memo from Coy to Smith, December 2, 1941. File: BOB 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 130. “Coy Keynotes Career Conference in Chapel Speech: Calls for Unity in Defense as Career Parley Begins,” Oberlin [OH] Review (student newspaper), December 5, 1941, 1. 131. “Oberlin Career Parley Hears Coy: OEM Aid [sic] Cites Government’s Duty to People,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 6, 1941. Copy forwarded to Coy by OGR’s clipping service. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 132. V. J. S. [Victor J. Stone, associate editor], “Conference Serves Purpose” (editorial), Oberlin [OH] Review, December 9, 1941, 2. 133. Smith appointments for December 6, 1941. File: Daily Record July– December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers.

Chapter 7 1. December 9, 1941, Roosevelt Day by Day. 2. Appointments for December 9, 1941. File: Daily Record July–December 1941, Box 2, Smith Papers. Coy and Smith routinely talked almost every day. During this week, also Thursday, December 11, and Friday, December 12 (ibid.). 3. This skeptical and questioning attitude by Congress, even during the first week of the war, was not an exception. On Friday, December 12, Coy’s general counsel, Oscar Cox, testified before the House Judiciary Committee on granting FDR the same powers as those granted to President Wilson in WWI. He faced intense questioning about highly detailed matters concerning reauthorizing a president’s powers from that WWI legislation. For example, why not just pass new legislation? Because, he explained repeatedly, some highly technical court decisions and executive actions made based on the WWI law would be nullified by a de novo law (US House 1941j). A week later, Congress passed the First War Powers Act, though not exactly what Cox had requested (55 Stat. 838). 4. 55 Stat. 818–19. 5. “Remarks of Wayne Coy; Opening Session—Men’s Career Conference,” 26. File: Oberlin College, Ohio (12/5/41), Box 26, WCP. 6. Memo from Coy to Stettinius, December 11, 1941. File: Lend-Lease 1941. Box 11, RG 214. 7. Letter from James Fry, chairman, Defense Communications Board, to Coy, December 9, 1941. File: Defense Communications Board 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 8. Letter from Coy to secretary of commerce, December 10, 1941. File: Census Bureau, Box 2, RG 214.

304

Notes to Chapter 7

9. 56 Stat. 9. After it passed, conservative columnist Paul Mallon blamed Coy for the defeat of the president’s request for broader authority. What Coy was trying to get enacted would have caused “hopeless confusion,” and thankfully “Congress decided otherwise.” “Knox Speech Considered Boomerang” (column), HC, January 23, 1942, 3. 10. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 11, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. Letter from Coy to Congressman Otis Bland, chair, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, January 16, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 11. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Industrial Conference of Labor and Management, December 11, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. In response to Coy’s memo, FDR asked Tully to phone Coy with his suggestion about Coy working with the labor secretary. Summary for the files by Tully, file: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 12. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 22, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 13. EO 9017, January 12, 1942. 14. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 28, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 15. Memo from FDR to Coy, December 30, 1941, ibid. 16. Memos from Coy to FDR, January 22 and 29, 1942. Both in file: Murray, Philip, Box 11, WCP. 17. Letter from Murray to FDR, February 4, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 18. Letter from Murray to Coy (with enclosure for FDR), March 6, 1942. File: Mi-My—General (1941–43), Box 11, WCP. 19. Memo from Coy to FDR, February 2, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 20. Memo from Coy to FDR, March 20, 1942, ibid. 21. March 23, 1942: Memo from Coy to Watson and letter from FDR to Murray (drafted by Coy), ibid. 22. Paul Mallon, “Final Nazi Drive Held Impossible” (column), HC, February 7, 1942, 3. 23. Memo from Coy to FDR, April 28, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 24. Summary of Coy phone message for FDR, April 27, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 25. Memo from Coy to Tully, February 22, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 26. Memo from Coy to FDR, February 27, 1942, and dictated reply from FDR to Coy, March 2, 1942. Both in file: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 27. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, April 18, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240.

Notes to Chapter 7

305

28. Memo from Coy to Smith, April 21, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 29. Letter from Coy to White, December 17, 1941. File: Negroes and the Defense Program 1941, Box 11, RG 214. 30. Letter from Cramer to Coy, April 3, 1942. File: Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941–42, Box 7, RG 214. 31. Letter from Coy to Cramer, April 13, 1942, ibid. 32. Letter from Cramer to Coy, April 27, 1942, ibid. 33. Coy note to Dort and Dort note to Mills, May 1, 1942, ibid. 34. Letter from Coy to Mance, January 2, 1942; memo from Coy to Rowe, January 5, 1942. Both in file: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. It is unclear if Mance applied. If he did, he was not hired. The FBI had a handful of African American agents during Hoover’s reign, mostly in minor positions or doing undercover work spying on African American organizations. It did not substantially open up recruiting African Americans until years later. In 1958, Mance was the first African American elected judge in Indiana. 35. Memo from Coy to Dort, February 25, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 36. Memo from Cox to Coy, February 26, 1941. File: C—General (1941–43), Box 2, WCP. 37. Memo from Dort to Coy, March 4, 1941. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 38. Summary of phone conversations, April 3, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 39. Charley Cherokee, “National Grapevine” (column), Chicago Defender (weekly national ed.), April 11, 1942, 15. 40. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 28, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. Text of note from FDR to Hopkins, December 29, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 41. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, April 13, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 42. Letter from Ralph J. Watkins, assistant director, National Resources Planning Board, to Coy, April 24, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. One idea to emerge was to discourage the traditional Sunday leisure drives by families. DOI put out a list of fun things people could do on weekends without driving. It blew up in their face when conservative Democratic Senator Tydings ridiculed it and depicted it as an example of (using modern nomenclature) the nanny state. Conservative editorial writers milked it for all it was worth (Lee 2012, 155–57). 43. Memo from Eastman to Coy, March 18, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 44. Memo from Coy to FDR, March 23, 1942, ibid.

306

Notes to Chapter 7

45. Summary of letter from FDR to Eastman, March 24, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 46. Memo from Coy to FDR, April 18, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 47. Memo from Coy to Vice President Wallace, April 13, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 48. Letter from Wallace to Coy, May 16, 1942, ibid. Coy shared it with FDR, who wrote “OK” on it. 49. Summary of phone call from Rauh to Coy, April 21, 1942. File: Coy— Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 50. Summary of phone call from Rauh to Coy, April 22, 1942, ibid. 51. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 4, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 52. May 6, 1942, FDR Day by Day. 53. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 7, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. Summary of subsequent actions, May 16, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. The deputy administrator of the War Shipping Administration (an agency within OEM) was Lewis Douglas. He had been a conservative Democratic congressman from Arizona whom FDR appointed BOB director in 1933. A few years later, Lewis resigned in disagreement with FDR’s deficit spending. Lewis then endorsed FDR’s Republican opponents in 1936 and 1940. After Pearl Harbor, he requested an opportunity to serve and FDR accepted. 54. April 25, 1942: AP, “President Calls War Output So Big Goal Can Be Raised,” NYT, April 25, 1942, 1; “Arms Goals Exceeded,” WP, 4. 55. Note from FDR to Coy, April 24, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. The document in the archive is a typed copy, not the original handwritten note or a photocopy of it. 56. Memo from Coy to Nelson, Subject: Salvage, April 24, 1942, ibid. 57. Summary of report, April 29, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 58. Memo from Coy to FDR, April 29, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. That month, BOB launched a paper-conservation effort within the federal government: “U.S. Agencies Push Salvage of Paper,” WP, April 7, 1942, 16. 59. Appointments for February 5 and March 20, 1942. File: Daily Record January–May 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. 60. Memo from Coy to Tully, March 5, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. Indeed, Rosenman examined the legal disagreements and recommended a compromise version to FDR that would be acceptable to the War and Justice Departments. Given how divisive the argument was, Rosenman also suggested FDR share his plans in advance with the congressional leadership to be sure that they would support FDR’s actions to resolve it. Summary of memo from Rosenman to FDR, March 14, 1942, and subsequent developments. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240.

Notes to Chapter 7

307

61. Summary of letter from Murray to FDR, March 7, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 62. Memo from FDR to Coy, March 11, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 63. Memo from Coy to Tully, March 18, 1942. File: Jackson, Gardner, Box 8, WCP. 64. AP, “Industrial Mishaps Kill 101,500, President Says,” HC, March 21, 1942, 14. Passing references in Roscoe Drummond, “Roosevelt’s Quiet Composure Shown at Press Conference, CSM, March 20, 1942, 8; “President’s Press Conference: Sees No Labor Mobilization Before Fall,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1942, 3. 65. Memo from FDR to Early, February 12, 1942. Handwritten note below the text by Early: “Wayne: Can I have this late today or very early Friday (tomorrow) morning?” File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 66. Letter from MacLeish to Coy, May 28, 1942. File: OFF 1942, Box 7, RG 214. MacLeish was flagging for Coy a poster issued by DOI that had not been cleared with OFF. For the poster he was complaining about, see “Price Control for Retail Stores,” NYT, May 18, 1942, 27. 67. Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (column), WP, December 12, 1941, 25. MacLeish was sometimes called to the White House to be part of FDR’s speechwriting team. The day after Roosevelt was reelected to a fourth term, MacLeish submitted to him his resignation as librarian of Congress. But a few weeks later, in December 1944, the president nominated MacLeish to a new subcabinet position in the State Department, with the title of assistant secretary for public affairs. Out of loyalty to FDR, MacLeish agreed to accept the nomination. However, a few months after Roosevelt’s death, he resigned and returned to academic and private life (Lee 2008c). 68. Letter from MacLeish to Coy, March 2, 1942. File: OFF, Box 12, WCP. 69. “Official Policy Issued by OFF as Guide to Handling of News,” Broadcasting 22, no. 12 (March 23, 1942): 22. Letter from MacLeish to Coy, January 13, 1942. File: Committee on War Information (Jan.–Mar. 1942), Box 2, WCP. 70. Memo from Coy to FDR, March 20, 1942; reply by FDR to Coy, March 21, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. At the time, Fosdick was president of the Rockefeller Foundation in Manhattan. In the 1910s, he was active in the efforts by good government reformers to fight the corruption of the Tammany Hall Democratic machine and replace it with civil service and professional public administration (Lee 2008b, 161–62, 181n23). The character Fearless Fosdick in the long-running cartoon strip Li’l Abner was inspired by Fosdick’s corruptionfighting image. 71. Letter from Fosdick to Coy, March 24, 1942. File: F—General (1942–43), Box 5, WCP. 72. Memo from Coy to FDR (with Fosdick’s confidential report attached), April 9, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP.

308

Notes to Chapter 7

73. “Roosevelt Urges More USO Support,” NYT, April 13, 1942, 18. 74. Memo from Coy to FDR, February 3, 1942. File: Hi-Hy—General (1941–43), Box 8, WCP. 75. Summary of memo from Coy to Tully, February 3, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. Coy also corresponded with the secretary of Indiana’s Democratic State Committee about potential plans by the Interstate Commerce Commission to open a branch office in Indianapolis. Letter from Coy to Charles Skillen, March 23, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 76. Memos from Coy to FDR, February 12 and March 2, 1942. Both in file: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. As a cover for the congressman to meet with FDR, Coy suggested the public topic be that they discussed building another lock on the Great Lakes to expand shipping capacity. They met on March 20, FDR Day by Day. A few weeks after Crosser met with FDR, he made a panicky call to Coy and asked him to come urgently to the Hill to meet with the Ohio Democratic delegation later that day. Crosser said “the Ohio delegation was very much disturbed about recent developments in Ohio.” It is unclear from the records what the specific subject was. Coy attended the meeting. Coy calendar entry for April 30, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. In November, incumbent Republican Governor John Bricker won reelection. 77. Memo from Coy to FDR, March 6, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 78. Memo from Coy to Joseph Eastman, March 26, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. The subject also came up in phone conversations Coy had on April 13 and 22, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 79. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, March 26, 1942; reply by FDR, March 28, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 80. Letter from Coy to Congressman Thad Wasielewski (D-WI), March 21, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. Coy blamed it on “the girl” in the newly created OEM Distribution Unit who got a phone call from the congressman’s office requesting he be added to the mailing list, but wrote it down wrong. She did not have access to a Congressional Directory to double-check. Coy said the unit office was now in possession of the latest edition of the Directory so such a mistake would not happen again. 81. Memo from Coy to FDR, April 6, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. FDR toyed with “the Survival War” (Roosevelt 1969, 1942: 193–94, 196–97). He eventually settled on World War II, including insisting that the number be in Roman numerals. 82. Retyped memo from FDR to Walker, April 21, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. It read: “Don’t hold an examination for P.M. [Postmaster] in Boston until I give the high sign.” When he got back to his office, Coy called the congressman to update him. Reciprocating, the congressman said he was doing

Notes to Chapter 7

309

everything he could to cut the budget of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Coy calendar entry for April 21, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 83. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, December 30, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. It was Fowler Harper, former FSA general counsel and then on the faculty of the University of Indiana Law School. Harper instead became the deputy commissioner of the War Manpower Commission (WMC). 84. Letter from Coy to Nelson, January 30, 1942. File: Dollar-A-Year Procedure 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. 85. Memo from Coy to Tully, March 18, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. Summary of memo from Tully to FDR (about phone call from Coy), March 4, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 86. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Gordon W. Reed, April 23, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 87. Summary of phone conversations with Sidney Weinberg, WPB, April 21 and 23, 1942; phone conversation with Rowe, April 22, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 88. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Gordon W. Reed, April 23, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 89. Ibid. 90. Memo from Coy to Weinberg, April 24, 1942. File: Dollar-A-Year Clearances 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. 91. Summary of phone conversation, April 8, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 92. Wartime criticisms by politicians of the military were practically taboo at the time, in particular strategy, tactics, and operations. When the Truman Committee investigated the armed forces, it generally focused on waste in contracts, construction, and supplies. 93. Tydings also had a personal motive: revenge. In FDR’s largely unsuccessful effort in 1938 to purge the party of conservative politicians, Tydings was one of his targets. Fighting back, Tydings was renominated by the Democratic Party and reelected. He came back to the Senate on the political warpath and loaded for bear. See chap. 9, Susan Dunn, Roosevelt’s Purge (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2010). 94. Letters from Coy to Tydings, February 24 and March 4, 1942. Both in file: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. Coy’s submission was on the Wednesday after the Friday deadline set by Tydings. Notwithstanding his political war on the administration, Tydings sent someone to see Coy about getting a job in OEM. Coy calendar entry for April 6, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 95. Letter from Coy to Byrd, February 25, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. The economy bloc often focused on the staff and service elements of public administration, rather than the programmatic ones, so that their criticisms

310

Notes to Chapter 7

would not appear to be ideologically motivated. For example, a few months later, Byrd attacked travel expenses: “Byrd Assails U.S. Agencies’ Use of Autos,” WP, May 17, 1942, 11. 96. Summary of phone conversation, April 13, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 97. “OEM Attacked for Activities That Overlap,” Baltimore Sun, July 22, 1942, 1, 8. 98. “Why Federal Taxes Must Be So Heavy” (editorial), Cumberland [MD] News, July 24, 1942, 4. 99. Summary of phone conversation, April 15, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 100. Leonard Lyons, “Broadway Bulletins” (syndicated column), WP, April 6, 1942, 8. 101. Being careful to assure administrative continuity while he was away, Coy formally designated CAS director Dallas Dort to be the acting LOEM for the duration. Memo from Coy to Dort, March 7, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 102. Coy accepted the invitation to this relatively off-the-beaten-track venue because the Chamber’s secretary was “an old friend of mine.” Letter from Coy to Dr. E. C. Elliot, Purdue University, February 17, 1942. File: C—General (1941–43), Box 2, WCP. A feature about him said that he had accepted the Iowa speaking engagement because that was Harry Hopkins’s birth state, implying that Hopkins had asked Coy to accept the invitation as a favor. The reporter also misstated the location, calling it “Rapids City, Ia.” Everett C. Watkins, “Wayne Coy, Hoosier in President’s Confidence, Is ‘Light’ Heavyweight,” Indianapolis Star, March 8, 1942. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. Coy’s papers did not include the text of his speech or any postspeech press coverage. It contained only the flyer mailed to Chamber members announcing the event and a preview article: “OEM Official to Address Chamber Annual Meeting,” Cedar Rapids [IA] Gazette, February 27, 1942. Both in file: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. It is probable that he gave a speech similar to the one he had already prepared for his appearance at Purdue a few days later. 103. Coy also criticized the efforts by conservatives to hamstring governmental action and regulation of business by imposing an administrative procedures law on federal administrators (p. 8). The Walter-Logan administrative procedures bill had passed both the House and Senate but was vetoed by FDR in December 1940. One of his arguments was that the bill would harm the flexibility of national defense efforts because it explicitly only excluded some agencies engaged in defense from the new required procedures of the law, but not others, such as the Maritime Commission and the Treasury Department (Roosevelt 1969, 1940: 616–22). Even though the veto was upheld, a majority of House members voted to override his veto (153–127), indicating how close the issue was. 104. Coy’s speech did not attract any national press coverage. His papers include the campus poster advertising the event. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. Two pictures of Coy meeting with student leaders while at Purdue are

Notes to Chapter 7

311

online, accessed March 1, 2018, http://earchives.lib.purdue.edu/cdm/singleitem/ collection/puhistphot/id/1077/rec/1 and http://earchives.lib.purdue.edu/cdm/ singleitem/collection/puhistphot/id/1076/rec/2. 105. Coy was careful to clear a draft with FDR. The president approved it and, to further strengthen the draft, also suggested some other illustrations Coy could use, such as the mess in housing. Memo for the file by Coy, March 6, 1942. File: Atlantic Monthly, Box 1, WCP. MacLeish also reviewed the draft. Memo from Coy to Early, March 8, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 106. The columnist who covered the civil service for the Times-Herald softly jabbed at Coy based on the Atlantic Monthly article. Summarizing Coy’s piece, he wrote that, with Coy’s new second hat as assistant BOB director, he “now has his opportunity to practice what he is hired to preach—efficiency,” implying that Coy did not do that or did not care about it as LOEM. George D. Riley, “U.S. and Us” (column), Washington Times-Herald, April 30, 1942. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Newspaper Clippings, Box 27, WCP. 107. March 27, 1942, Wide World (news service): “Ship to Indies Carried Empty Bottles, Charge,” Boston Globe, 10; “Bottles, Not Arms, Went to Indies, OEM Man Says,” WP, 3. Excerpts: “Our War Effort,” CSM, April 11, 1942, 19; “Teamwork in Washington: Conversion to War,” San Francisco Examiner, March 29, 1942, 15. File: Personal, Box 4, WCP. 108. H. V. Kaltenborn, transcript of broadcast, March 22, 1942. File: Personal, Box 4, WCP. Kaltenborn made a cameo appearance as himself in the movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. During the filibuster by Senator Smith (Jimmy Stewart), Kaltenborn is seen speaking dramatically into a radio microphone: “Senator Smith, has now talked for 23 hours and 16 minutes. It is the most unusual and spectacular thing in the Senate annals. One lone and simple American, holding the greatest floor in the land. What he lacked in experience, he’s made up in fight. But those tired Boy Ranger legs are buckling, bleary eyed, voice gone, he cannot go on much longer. And all official Washington is here to be in on the kill.” 109. Arthur Krock, “The Middle West Worries about Washington” (In the Nation column), NYT, March 31, 1942, 20 (editorial page). 110. “Peacetime Bureaucracy Perils U.S. in War,” San Francisco Examiner, March 29, 1942, 15. File: Personal, Box 4, WCP. “Listen, Mr. President,” [Madison] Wisconsin State Journal, March 23, 1942, 4; “Inefficient Bureaucrats,” WS, March 28, 1942, A-8; “Bureaucratic Red Tape: Wayne Coy’s Analysis,” San Antonio [TX] Express, March 30, 1942, 4; “While Men are Being Killed or Wounded,” Camden [AR] News, March 30, 1942, 2; “Questionnaire Deluge,” Miami [OK] Daily NewsRecord, April 24, 1942, 8. 111. Milton Mayer, “Washington Goes to War,” Life magazine, January 5, 1942, 60. 112. Merwin H. Browne (NANA), “Coy’s Duties Are to Cut War Knots,” Buffalo [NY] Evening News, February 25, 1942. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP.

312

Notes to Chapter 8

113. Frederick Shelton, “Management’s Washington Letter” (monthly department), Nation’s Business 30, no. 4 (April 1942): 34. 114. Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), Racine [WI] Journal Times, January 11, 1942, 2. 115. Peter Edson, “Red Tape Bobs Up in OCD” (column), Wichita [Falls, TX] Daily Times, March 9, 1942, 4.

Chapter 8 1. EO 9024, January 16, 1942. 2. Appointments for January 14 and 15, 1942. File: Daily Record January–May 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. 3. EO 9054, February 7, 1942. 4. EO 9095, March 11, 1942. 5. EO 9102, March 18, 1942. 6. EO 9139, April 18, 1942. 7. 56 Stat. 29. FDR won one important detail in how legislation would implement price controls. Early versions of the bill called for the agency to be headed by a board. Roosevelt wanted it to be run by a single manager. As signed into law, the bill placed an administrator at the head of the statutory OPA (Roosevelt 1969, 1942: 75). 8. February 14, 1942, FDR Day by Day. 9. Conference with the president, February 14, 1942. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1942, Box 3, Smith Papers. 10. EO 9070, February 24, 1942. Given the negative consensus about the work of Charles Palmer, the defense housing coordinator (a small agency in OEM), the order effectively eliminated Palmer’s job. FDR, who disliked overtly firing anyone, gave Palmer a face-saving assignment of studying how the UK was handling its wartime housing needs (Roosevelt 1972, 19: 167). But even after he was back, Palmer did not take the hint and did not resign. FDR again relented and directed Coy to keep Palmer on the LOEM payroll. It was for another make-work assignment, this time to report on postwar housing. File: Summary of letter from FDR to Palmer, January 1, 1943. File: 1943–45, Box 1, OF 4240. In April 1943, Coy again asked FDR if he could end Palmer’s employment with the submission of his report. No, said FDR, keep him on indefinitely. Conference of the assistant director with the president, April 9, 1943. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1943–45, Box 3, Smith Papers. Finally, Coy notified Palmer that, because of a new congressional appropriation limitation, his position could no longer be funded after the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1943). Memo from Coy to Palmer, June 14, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 8

313

11. “Housing: Sammy the Sweeper,” Time magazine, March 9, 1942, 14. Following the metaphor in the title of the article, the text described Coy as “holding the dustpan.” 12. Memo from Coy to FDR, November 7, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 13. Memo from Coy and Smith to FDR, December 13, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 14. Roosevelt Day by Day. 15. Conference with the president, December 15, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1941, Box 3, Smith Papers. 16. Draft memo from FDR to La Guardia, December 18, 1941. File: Roosevelt (1941), Box 13, WCP. 17. Memo from Coy to FDR, February 2, 1942. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214. 18. Appointments for February 25, 1942. File: Daily Record January–May 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. 19. Letter from Attorney General Biddle to Coy, January 29, 1942. File: OEM—Personnel Investigations 1942, Box 7, RG 214. 20. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, January 9, 1942, ibid. 21. Handwritten note from Coy to Sherwood, January 9, 1942, on Sherwood’s January 9, 1942, memo to him, ibid. 22. Memo from Sherwood to Coy, January 30, 1941, ibid. 23. Summary of phone conversation, April 24, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 24. Summary of phone conversation, April 30, 1942, ibid. 25. Form letter from Coy to Landis, May 8, 1942. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214. 26. For example, letters from Coy to Dort, January 26 and March 24, 1942. Both in file: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 27. Letter from Coy to Hoover, April 15, 1942. File: Alphabetical F–I, Box 18, RG 214. 28. Letter from Coy to Hoover, April 24, 1942, ibid. In October 2016, I submitted a Freedom of Information request to the FBI for all records mentioning Coy. In March 2017, the agency replied that after searching its records, it could not find any because “records which may have been responsive to your request were destroyed.” Letter to the author, FOIA Request No. 1360131-000, March 23, 2017, author’s files. Presumably the kinds of letters to and from Coy discussed in this chapter were considered routine office correspondence that was not required by law to be retained (in contradistinction to files on alleged subversives or illegal political surveillance). However, the FBI carefully stated that “this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject’s name on any watch list.” While Coy was

314

Notes to Chapter 8

too liberal for Hoover’s taste and was probably subject to a de novo security clearance when Truman nominated him to the Federal Communications Commission, it is highly unlikely that anything would have turned up to justify being on a watch list. 29. FBI Report on Osgood Marsh Nichols, March 19, 1942, 12. File: OEM Personnel—Miscellaneous (1941–43), Box 6, RG 214. 30. Letter from Horton to Dort, April 1, 1942, ibid. 31. Letter from Coy to Hoover, April 3, 1942, ibid. 32. “Re: Abraham Glasser,” December 22, 1941, 2, attachment to letter from Hoover to LOEM McReynolds [sic], December 31, 1941. File: OEM Personnel Investigations 1942, Box 7, RG 214. Typical of the FBI’s style, this report was a fugitive document. It was on blank white paper, with no letterhead, no authorship, or any other identification of its derivation. This permitted the FBI to circulate information by anonymously mailing it to, for example, friendly reporters or antiCommunist groups. Another scenario was to provide it unofficially to HUAC or other allies in Congress. If the document ever surfaced and was criticized, the FBI could facilely deny it was an official FBI report, implying it was a forgery, facsimile, or pastiche from different sources. That deniability gave it sufficient credibility to avoid accountability. 33. Memo for the records by Ugo Carusi, executive assistant to the attorney general, “In re: Abraham Glasser,” October 24, 1941, ibid. 34. Letter from Hoover to LOEM McReynolds, December 31, 1941, and attached memo, ibid. 35. Memo from David Ginsburg, OPA general counsel, to Coy, Subject: Investigation of Abraham Glasser by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 4, 1942, ibid. 36. Letter from Coy to Hoover, March 2, 1942, ibid. 37. Letter from Coy to Hoover, April 6, 1942. Cited in Parrish 2010, 71, 286n18. 38. Letter from Coy to Attorney General Biddle, April 6, 1942. File: OEM Personnel Investigations 1942, Box 7, RG 214. 39. “Wallace Hits Dies for Aiding the Axis,” NYT, March 30, 1942, 1, 9. 40. Congressman Thomas H. Elliot (D-MA), “Mr. Dies at Work” (transcript of radio address), HC, April 7, 1942, 10. 41. Summary of phone conversation, Coy calendar for April 1, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 42. Summary of phone conversation with Monroe Oppenhiemer, Coy calendar for April 2, 1942, ibid. 43. Summary of phone conversation with Oppenhiemer, Coy calendar for April 3, 1942, ibid. 44. Summary of phone conversation with Oppenhiemer, Coy calendar for April 29, 1942, ibid.

Notes to Chapter 8

315

45. July 10, 1942: AP, “Dies Retracts Charges Against BEW Official, Explains Error,” WP, 1; “Dies Apologizes to Wallace Aide,” NYT, 8. The payment for legal fees was $500 and it came from HUAC funds, not Dies personally. “House Votes Dies $75,000 Over Protest,” WP, February 19, 1943, B4. 46. Letter from Coy to Joseph Eastman, December 27, 1941. File: Defense Transportation Office 1941, Box 4, RG 214. 47. Memo from Coy to Eastman, January 14, 1942. File: Defense Transportation Office 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 48. Appointments for April 30, 1942. File: Daily Record January–June 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. 49. December 11, 1941: Memo from Coy to Dort. File: CAS 1941, Box 2, RG 214. Form letter from Coy to C. H. Palmer. File: Defense Housing Coordination 1941, Box 3, RG 214. 50. Form letter from Coy to Clifford Townsend, February 11, 1942. File: Agriculture Department Office of Defense Relations 1942, Box 1, RG 214. 51. Memo from Coy to heads of agencies in the Office for Emergency Management, April 2, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 52. Memo from Coy to Leo Crowley, March 18, 1942. File: Alien Property Custodian 1942–43, Box 1, RG 214. 53. Appointments for April 24, 1942. File: Daily Record January–May 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. 54. Coy intervened to stop any such hiring. Summary of phone conversation with J. C. Capt, census director, April 20, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. In November, the Census director complained that this was happening again. Coy reaffirmed his policy that “we should leave their employees alone.” File: Memo from Coy to Dort, November 25, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 55. Memo from Coy to FDR, February 20, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. For a history of the construction of the building (and reconstruction after 9/11), see Steve Vogel, The Pentagon: A History (New York: Random House, 2007). 56. EO 9001, December 27, 1941. Summary of Coy’s role, December 29, 1941. File: 1941, Box 1, OF 4240. 57. Summary of FDR memo to Smith, January 12, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 58. Memo from Coy to Smith, March 20, 1942; attached signed memo to FDR by Nelson, Patterson, Land, and Forrestal, n.d. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. The probable reason the joint memo is not dated is that it took a few days to get the document to each of the four officials to sign it. Being cautious, Coy would not have wanted an incorrect date on the document erroneously depicting when any of the four signed it. The document was probably shepherded around town by one of Coy’s messengers, who likely was directed to sit and wait in the

316

Notes to Chapter 8

person’s anteroom until the official signed it and only then move on to the office of the next man on the list. 59. EO 9112, March 26, 1942. 60. Form letter from Coy to Clifford Townsend, December 23, 1941. File: Agriculture Department Office of Defense Relations 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 61. Letter from Coy to Congressman Robert Doughton, Chair, Ways and Means Committee, February 27, 1942. File: Legislation 1941–42, Box 10, RG 214. 62. Letter from Coy to BOB, December 26, 1941. File: Federal Works Agency 1941, Box 8, RG 214. 63. Letter from Coy to BOB, December 19, 1941. File: Agriculture Department 1941, Box 1, RG 214. 64. Letter from Coy to Smith, March 24, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 65. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. All subsequent references in this subchapter are from this file, unless otherwise noted. 66. Summary of phone conversation with Lee Pressman, April 24, 1942. 67. Summary of phone conversation, April 28, 1942. 68. Summary of phone conversation, April 30, 1942. 69. Summary of phone conversation, April 20, 1942. 70. Summary of phone conversation with Abe Feller, April 27, 1942. 71. Summary of phone conversations with Edward Pritchard, April 24, 1942. Appointments calendar, April 29, 1942: dinner with Pritchard “and then ‘goon meeting.’ ” A year later, they were outed by a conservative columnist as “one of Washington’s most secretive, but supposedly most influential inner councils and supper clubs” of administration liberals. Peter Edson, “Bob Nathan and the Goons” (syndicated column), Piqua [OH] Daily Call, May 5, 1943, 4. Their other nickname was the “Long-Haired Boys.” Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), WP, April 30, 1943, 13. For a discussion of Pritchard’s rise and fall, see Campbell (2004). 72. Summary of phone conversations, April 10 and 24, 1942. 73. Summary of phone conversation, April 24, 1942. 74. Summary of phone conversation, April 14, 1942. 75. Summary of phone conversation, April 18, 1942. 76. Summary of two phone conversations, April 8, 1942. 77. Summary of phone conversation, April 24, 1942. 78. Summary of phone conversation with Charles P. Taft, assistant director of OEM’s Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, April 20, 1942. 79. Summary of phone conversation, April 6, 1942. 80. Summary of phone conversation, April 1, 1942. 81. Appointments calendar and summary of phone conversation, April 15, 1942. This was a particularly difficult subject because the agency had widely dispersed

Notes to Chapter 8

317

concentration camps in many Western states and needed a wage policy structure that would be fair horizontally and vertically. 82. Summary of phone conversation, April 20, 1942. 83. DOI budget: appointments calendar, April 9; summary of phone conversations, April 7, 10, 18. WSA budget: summary of phone conversation with Dort, April 30, 1942. 84. Summary of phone conversations, April 7, 8, 15, 22 (three calls), 23 (six calls), 24 (three calls), 27, and 30, 1942. 85. Summary of phone conversation, April 23, 1942. 86. “PURP Is Not Slang for Dog: Glossary of Terms for Varied U.S. Agencies, Bureaus,” Burlington [IA] Hawk-Eye Gazette, August 20, 1942, 2. It was the pronunciation for PRP, the Production Requirements Plan at WPB. 87. Summary of phone conversation with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, April 4, 1942. 88. Summary of phone conversation, April 20, 1942. 89. Summary of phone conversation, April 27, 1942. A few days earlier, the mayor of Boston had called BOB’s Smith with the same request. Appointments for April 24, 1942. File: Daily Record January–May 1942, Box 2, Smith Papers. Amusingly, later that year Coy received the opposite complaint. A Boston insurance company was being hampered from expanding its offices or leasing space it controlled to commercial tenants because the federal government had first call on all downtown office space. Coy replied that all federal needs would soon be finalized in a comprehensive plan by CAS’s regional manager in Boston. Then the insurance company would know definitively what was available and what was not. Letter from Coy to Wallace Falvey, VP, Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., November 24, 1942. File: 1942, OF 4240. 90. Summary of phone conversations, April 8 and 21, 1942. Similarly, he asked CSC member Flemming to reopen the examination for postmaster of Muncie, Indiana, because a politically preferred candidate was not on the eligibles list. Summary of phone conversation, April 13, 1942. 91. Summary of phone conversation, April 10, 1942. Appointments calendar, follow-up meeting with committee staff, April 14, 1942. 92. Summary of phone conversations, April 13 and 14, 1942. 93. Appointments calendar, April 22, 1942. 94. Summary of phone conversation, April 3, 1942. 95. Appointments calendar, April 2, 1942. 96. Summary of phone conversations, April 24 and 29, 1942. 97. Appointments calendar, April 24, 1942. 98. Letters of introduction from Coy to Generals Douglas MacArthur, Hugh Casey, and Richard Sutherland, May 1, 1942. File: Johnson, Lyndon, Box 9, WCP. No doubt Johnson and Coy also talked politics. Johnson was thinking of running again against O’Daniel, who was now running for a full term, even though Johnson would be overseas during the campaign.

318

Notes to Chapter 9

99. Appointments for April 3, 7, 14, 21, 24, and 28, 1942. 100. Letter from Coy to Howard Hunter, WPA commissioner, March 8, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 101. “Coy Hurled from Auto in Collision,” n.d., probably Indianapolis Times. File: N—General (1941–43), Box 11, WCP. 102. Dictated memo from Coy to Bernard Gladieux, BOB, April 16, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. His calendar showed that he stayed home for two days, April 16 and 17, and only worked for a few hours on Saturday, April 18. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. 103. Note from Associate Justice Murphy to Coy, April 16, 1942. File: Mi-My—General (1941–43), Box 11, WCP. 104. “U.S. Giving Us Our ‘Money’s Worth,’ Jury of Assayers Report,” Billboard 54, no. 9 (February 28, 1942): 77.

Chapter 9 1. Memos from Coy to FDR, January 26 and 29, 1942. Both in file: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. Also: Alfred Friendly, “Army, Navy May Receive OPM Units,” WP, January 20, 1942, 6. 2. Summary of phone conversations, April 4 and 9, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. Robert S. Allen, “Nelson to Name 2 Young Liberals His Chief Aides,” Philadelphia Record, April 7, 1942. File: Clippings/ Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 3. All subsequent quotes are from Smith’s summary of his meeting with FDR, March 14, 1942. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1942, Box 3, Smith Papers. 4. “OEM Liaison Officer Eyes Budget Post,” El Paso [TX] Herald-Post, March 25, 1942, 5. 5. Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), Fayette County [IA] Leader, April 16, 1942, 6; Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (column), WP, April 22, 1942, 17. 6. “Wayne Coy Appointed Budget Director’s Aide,” WS, April 24, 1942, 1. 7. “Smith & Coy,” Time magazine, May 18, 1942, 12–13. 8. Thomas F. Reynolds, “Meet Wayne Coy, Spark Plug of America’s War Effort,” Chicago Sun, May 17, 1942. OGR’s press-clipping service sent a copy to Coy. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 9. Memo from Smith to FDR, July 16, 1941. File: White House Memoranda 1942, Box 4, Smith Papers. 10. “Records of the Office for Emergency Management Office of the Liaison Officer, 1941–1943.” File: Series Inventory, Box 1, RG 214. 11. International News Service, “100 Solons Go on Record Against Gas Ration Plan,” San Antonio [TX] Light, June 5, 1942, 5.

Notes to Chapter 9

319

12. June 5, 1942, FDR Day by Day. 13. Two news services identified him with his OEM position: International News Service, “FDR Meets Officials to Reach Verdict,” San Antonio [TX] Light, June 5, 1942, 5; AP, “Begins Study of Gas Rationing, June 5, 1942, [Massillon OH] Evening Independent, June 5, 1942, 1. But both stories listed him as its “executive director.” Two major newspapers identified him by his BOB title: “President Acts to Learn Facts in Gas Rationing, WS, June 5, 1942, 1; Samuel W. Bell, “Roosevelt Moves to Head Off Revolt on Gasoline Rationing,” NYHT, June 6, 1942, 1. The NYT used a third title: “administrative assistant to the President”: Frank L. Kluckhohn, “All-Out ‘Gas’ Edict Waits Tire Count,” June 6, 1942, 7. That title was also incorrect, as Coy was a special assistant to the president. The 1939 reorganization law had limited a president to employing a maximum of six administrative assistants. FDR’s official calendar listed most attendees by their titles, but none for Coy (June 5, 1942, FDR Day by Day). 14. Memo from FDR to Coy, August 3, 1942. File: Roosevelt, Conferences with Director and Asst. Director (1942), Box 13, WCP. Based on where this memo was in Coy’s files, it related to Coy’s BOB hat. On the other hand, regardless of where it was filed, arguments between OEM agencies were definitely related to Coy’s LOEM responsibilities. 15. EO 9246, September 17, 1942. 16. Memo from David E. Scoll, Administrator’s Office, War Shipping Administration, to Coy, May 8, 1942. File: Shipping, Box 14, WCP. 17. Telegram from Coy to Edward Carter, president, Russian War Relief, August 14, 1942. File: C—General (1941–43), Box 2, WCP. 18. Thank you note from Fred Myers, Public Relations Department, Russian War Relief, to Coy, August 21, 1942. File: R—General (1941–43), Box 12, WCP. United Press, “Legion Splits Over Fund to Aid Russia,” [Madison] Wisconsin State Journal, August 16, 1942, 10. 19. Letter from Coy to Brigadier General Philip Faymonville, August 20, 1942. File: F—General (1941–43), Box 5, WCP. 20. Form letter from Coy to Leo Crowley, Alien Property custodian, May 27, 1942. File: Alien Property Custodian 1942–43, Box 1, RG 214. Ostensibly, the distribution of the form letter was limited to OEM agencies that did not exist in their current form when the president had originally announced the policy in 1941. In reality, that covered almost all OEM units. 21. Letters from Coy to Cramer, May 6 and 19, 1942; letter from Cramer to Coy, August 21, 1942; letter from Coy to Cramer, September 23, 1942. All in file: Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941–42, Box 7, RG 214. 22. Summary of FDR letters to Nelson (WPB), McNutt (War Manpower Commission), and MacLean (chair, FEPC), July 30, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 23. Coy summary of meeting with the president, July 21, 1941. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1942, Box 3, Smith Papers. Even though Coy had routinely handled racial matters as LOEM, he was wearing his BOB hat at this

320

Notes to Chapter 9

meeting with FDR. Smith was not there. A heart disability prompted his doctor to order him to take it easy for a few weeks and not go to work. Memo from Smith to FDR, July 16, 1941. File: White House Memoranda 1942, Box 4, Smith Papers. When Smith was absent from the office (for whatever reason), Coy automatically became the acting director. 24. Coy summary of meeting with the president, July 21, 1941, ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Memo from Coy to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 17, 1942. File: R—General (1941–43), Box 12, WCP. 27. Memo from Coy to Grace Tully, July 23, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1943), Box 13, WCP. Note: This memo was misfiled; it should have been placed in the 1942 folder. 28. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 23, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 29. Memo from Alfred E. Davidson to Coy, Subject: Anti-Inflation Program, September 21, 1942. File: Anti-Inflation Program 1942, Box 1, RG 214. 30. Letter from Coy to Morgenthau, July 11, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 31. Memo from Coy to General Watson, May 14, 1942. File: Watson, Edwin M., Box 17, WCP. Memo from Coy to FDR, June 15, 1942. File: Coy, Wayne, EOP, Box 132, PSF. 32. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 13, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. After getting advice from the State Department, FDR asked Sayre to maintain the status quo. Summary of FDR letter to Sayre, May 21, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 33. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 20, 1942. Subject file: Wayne Coy, Box 129, PSF. 34. 56 Stat. 753. 35. Dictated memo from FDR to Coy, July 30, 1942. Subject file: Wayne Coy, Box 129, PSF. It is unclear what, if anything, transpired after that. 36. Entry for June 7, 1942, 6672, Ickes Diaries (longer unpublished version). 37. Entry for September 12, 1942, 6968, ibid. 38. Entry for June 14, 1942, 6699, ibid. 39. Entry for August 16, 1942, 6925, ibid. 40. Entry for August 16, 1942, 6926, ibid. 41. Entry for September 12, 1942, 6968–69, ibid. 42. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 13, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 43. Summary of wire from FDR to Murray, May 18, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 44. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 8, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 9

321

45. Dictated memo from FDR to Coy, May 20, 1942, ibid. 46. Handwritten note by Coy: “Cleared by Pres. Phoned Nelson 5/22/42,” ibid. 47. Dictated memo from FDR to Coy, June 29, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 48. Jean Appleton, “Men at Work! . . . in Washington: Wayne Coy,” Boston Globe, May 24, 1942, B27. She mistakenly identified him as previously the “liaison officer with the Office of Production Management, a ‘coordinator’ job.” 49. Bert Andrews, “New Advisers Taking Power from Cabinet,” NYHT, September 27, 1942, A1. 50. Gene Robb, “Men behind the Scenes in Washington: An Inside Story on the Five Who Make Up the President’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet,’ ” Forbes 50, no. 5 (September 1, 1942): 10. Reacting to the Forbes story, an Iowa newspaper criticized the five profiled advisers because they “have had only a smattering of well-rounded experience,” meaning that they were not successful businessmen. “Influential Personalities” (editorial), Ames [IA] Daily Tribune, August 18, 1942, 4. 51. Letter from Coy to Brigadier General Philip Faymonville, August 20, 1942. File: F—General (1941–43), Box 5, WCP. 52. Letter from Coy to Cramer, FEPC, May 6, 1942. File: Fair Employment Practices Committee 1941–42, Box 7, RG 214. 53. EO 9182, June 13, 1942. For a detailed discussion of the reorganization, see Lee 2005, chap. 9. 54. Note from OEM Personnel Office to Coy, May 8, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 55. CAS Budget Office, “Index of Division of Central Administrative Services Releases Issued to OEM Constituent Agencies,” July 23, 1942. File: CAS Reference File of Sidney Sherwood, Box 35, RG 214. Based on their dates of issuance, about half were promulgated after his BOB appointment. 56. Form letter from Coy to Townsend, Office of Agricultural Defense Relations, May 5, 1942. File: Agriculture Department Office of Defense Relations 1942, Box 1, RG 214. 57. Letter from Coy to commerce secretary, June 23, 1942. File: Commerce Department 1942, Box 3, RG 214. Letter from Coy to agriculture secretary, July 22, 1942. File: Agriculture Department 1942, Box 1, RG 214. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, August 26, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 58. Letter from Coy to OCD director Landis, July 20, 1942. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214. 59. Letter from Coy to Smith, June 4, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. Amusingly, Coy was wearing his LOEM hat and writing to his boss when wearing his BOB hat. 60. Letter from Coy to BOB legislative reference office, August 12, 1942. File: BOB 1942, Box 2, RG 214. Again amusingly, wearing his LOEM hat, Coy was writing to his subordinate under his BOB hat. He wanted to be sure that if

322

Notes to Chapter 9

civilians were also eligible for the award (as opposed to the award being limited to the military), there should be civilians on the boards making the decisions. The version FDR signed limited it to US military personnel and the military of allies. EO 9260, October 29, 1942. 61. Summary of Coy memo to BOB, May 1, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. Coy said that the science office wanted to be able to state unambiguously to contractors that it was explicitly prohibited from signing cost-plus contracts, a form of contracting relatively common during the war. EO 9218, August 11, 1942. 62. Letter from Coy to comptroller general, August 20, 1942. Coy sought to confirm with GAO that volunteer pilots for the Civil Air Patrol (part of OCD) would be eligible for travel reimbursement if they flew their own airplanes from their inland residences to their assigned duty stations on one of America’s coastlines. File: Comptroller General 1942–43, Box 3, RG 214. Regarding administrative controls over use of government-owned cars by OEM employees: letter from Coy to comptroller general, August 29, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 63. 56 Stat. 234. 64. Letter from FDR to Coy, January 16, 1942. File: OEM—General organization, Box 5, RG 214. 65. Memo from Lew Douglas, WSA, to Coy, June 19, 1942. File: Shipping, Box 14, WCP. Memo from Coy to FDR, May 19, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. These issues were relevant to both of Coy’s hats and not exclusively to LOEM. 66. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, May 28, 1942. File: 1942, Box 1, OF 4240. 67. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 31, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 68. Memo from Coy to FDR, September 2, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. Memo from Coy to FDR, August 3, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1943), Box 13, WCP. Note: This memo was misfiled and placed in the 1943 folder instead of the 1942 folder. 69. 56 Stat. 707. 70. EO 9211, August 1, 1942. Letter from McIntyre to Coy, August 4, 1942. File: 1942, Box 2, OF 4240c. 71. Form letter from Coy to Dort, CAS, forwarding FBI reports on results of investigations of individual employees, May 4, 5, and 18; June 9, 13, and 28. All in file: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 72. Letter from Dort to Thelma Abbott, office manager, Liaison Office, OEM, July 6, 1942. File: OEM Personnel—Miscellaneous 1941–43, Box 6, RG 214. 73. Letter from Coy to Hoover, July 10, 1942. File: Dollar-A-Year Procedure 1941–42, Box 4, RG 214. 74. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 30, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 10

323

75. Memo from FDR to the attorney general, August 4, 1942, ibid. 76. “Maverick Made Henderson Aide,” NYT, September 12, 1941, 12. After two terms in Congress, Maverick was defeated while running for reelection. He was then elected mayor of San Antonio, but did not win reelection in May 1941. Later in the war, Maverick headed the Smaller War Plants Corporation. 77. The records varyingly identify the investigator as an employee of the IRS or the Secret Service. 78. Memo from Dort to Coy, Subject: Attached file concerning the investigation of Maury Maverick, June 20, 1942; Memo from Coy to FDR, June 24, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 79. Memo from Coy to FDR, July 18, 1942. File: Ma-Me—General (1941–43), Box 11, WCP. 80. Coy’s use of the tool metaphor for public administration echoed Woodrow Wilson’s seminal 1887 article about the need for American governments to professionalize the management of executive branch agencies. In the article, Wilson had argued that improving public administration in the American public sector was not a threat to democracy, even though bureaucracy was then associated with nondemocratic regimes like Germany. He wrote, “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it” (“The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 56, no. 4 [December 1941]: 504). Originally published by Political Science Quarterly in 1887, the journal’s editors decided to republish it when the US entered WWII. Perhaps Coy’s similar use of the tool metaphor for public administration was coincidental, but it is possible that at one of the meetings of the public administration groups he attended, someone flagged the recently republished article for him as something he might find interesting. 81. “Landis Tells Educators New Course Needed in War Effort,” WS, August 29, 1942, A-2. 82. V-Mail from Coy to former legal aide Rauh, September 15, 1942. File: Rauh, Box 12, WCP. 83. “Clubs: Panel Discussions on National Problems Find Increasing Favor in Women’s Club Programs,” WP, May 13, 1942, 15. 84. “Today Begins the Second Year of the Glorious Fighting of the Russian People, in Defense of Democracy [sic], Against the Nazi Onslaught” (ad), WP, June 22, 1942, 12. 85. “Russian Relief Drive Workers Plan Meeting,” WS, August 9, 1942, C-5.

Chapter 10 1. 56 Stat. 765. 2. EO 9250, October 3, 1942.

324

Notes to Chapter 10

3. Byrnes, a former Democratic senator from South Carolina, had been the majority leader in the Senate and ally of FDR. FDR nominated him to the Court in mid-1941. After a career in politics, he was quickly dissatisfied by the slow pace of work by the Court and missed the faster-paced action of federal policy. He even moonlighted as a behind-the-scenes activist brokering compromises between Congress and the president (Lee 2005, 132). 4. Letterhead of letter from Byrnes to McIntyre, April 14, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 5. October 3, 1942: “Byrnes Is Named Stabilization ‘Czar,’ ” CSM, 1; “Price Control Bill Signed; Roosevelt Will Name ‘Czar’ to Direct Stabilization Today,” WP, 1. 6. These generalizations about Byrnes are largely based on my earlier summaries of his work (2016, 144–45; 2010, 202–5). 7. As the press conference was on a Friday, spot news coverage would put it in the least important and smallest issue of the week, Saturday. October 17, 1942: Bert Andrews, “74 Billions Set for War Outlay in Fiscal Year,” NYHT, 1, 5; “War Cost to Reach 74 Billions in 1943,” NYT, 7. Both articles mentioned Coy’s attendance at the press conference. 8. FDR Day by Day. 9. Coy, Summary of meeting, March 25 and April 9, 1943. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1943–45, Box 3, Smith Papers. Sometimes, even when Smith attended, Coy dictated the meeting summary, such as for November 10, 1942. File: Roosevelt—Conferences with Director and Asst. Director (1942), Box 13, WCP. 10. Letter from John K. Jennings, state administrator, WPA, Federal Works Agency, Indianapolis, to Coy, November 30, 1942 (card enclosed). File: J—General (1941–43), Box 8, WCP. Purely as speculation, the card probably was not generated by labor unions. They had open lines of communication with the administration in general and Coy in particular. Also, they would have had no reason to hide their sponsorship. If that is a correct assumption, this suggests a business organization, such as a chamber of commerce, was behind it and wanted to mask its self-serving motivations by manipulating workers to its own ends. 11. Letter from Coy to James Adams, August 12, 1942. File: A—General (1941–43), Box 1, WCP. 12. WPB Executive Secretary Lyle Belsley kept the minutes. He had worked with Coy at LOEM in 1941. Belsley identified Coy by his BOB title in the minutes, although Coy’s participation in the discussion was equally relevant to his LOEM role. 13. Letter from Coy to Cramer, October 15, 1942. File: FEPC 1941–42, Box 7, RG 214. 14. Letter from Coy to Cramer, December 18, 1942, ibid. 15. EO 9346, May 27, 1943. 16. Harry McAlpin, “WPB Recreation Chief Bars ‘Mixed Dance,’ ” Chicago Defender (national weekly ed.), December 5, 1942, 7.

Notes to Chapter 10

325

17. Folder: 001587-002-0708, “Wartime food production and efforts to expand agricultural extension services for black farmers,” 1942, Claude A. Barnett Papers: Part 3: Subject Files on Black Americans, 1918–1967, Series A, Agriculture, 1923–1966, ProQuest History Vault. 18. “Personnel News: Federal Safety Record Criticized,” Personnel Administration 5, no. 7 (March 1943): 20. For the text of speech, file: Speeches—Misc. (1941–43), Box 26, WCP. For this speech, he was identified with his BOB title, but his earlier involvement in the topic derived exclusively from his LOEM work and came before his BOB appointment. 19. Letter from Gulick to Coy, November 20, 1942. File: Post War Economic Planning, Box 12, WCP. 20. Bert Andrews, “U.S. Surveys Its Post-War Aviation Role,” NYHT, January 16, 1943, 1. 21. Memo from Coy and Niles to FDR, November 17, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 22. Letter from James Mathews, DNC, to Coy, November 28, 1942. File: Emmerich, Box 7, RG 214. 23. Letter from Early to Coy, February 25, 1943, emphasis added. File: Coy—Invitations, Box 4, WCP. 24. “The Roosevelt Party,” Life, October 26, 1942, 103–13. Of the forty-two, all were white and only one was a woman: Representative Mary Teresa Norton (D-NJ), chair of the Labor Committee. The magazine said she was the first Democratic woman elected to the House (111). 25. Smith was probably chagrined by the article’s insinuation that he was in FDR’s party. His reaction may have been slightly alleviated by the article’s description of him as “a college-trained expert on public administration who stays out of the political limelight. He gives the President more specific advice than anyone and is an expert on planning big Government reorganizations” (105). Regarding Lubin, it will be recalled that Coy had complained to FDR when Lubin said the president had asked him to collect and submit OEM progress reports directly to Roosevelt (chap. 6). 26. William Stringer, United Press, “Mine Workers Sever All Relations with CIO to Back Lewis,” DuBois [PA] Morning Courier, October 8, 1942, 8. 27. Lois Owens, United Press, “Groom Schricker for Vice President,” Hammond [IN] Times, May 23, 1943, 1. 28. AP, “President Stirred by Trip to Camps and War Plants,” NYT, April 30, 1943. FDR visited the Republic fighter plane plant at Evansville, Indiana, on April 27, 1942. 29. That FDR dumped Wallace in 1944 and picked Truman for the VP nomination is consistent with these rumors about Schricker. Like Schricker, Truman was a moderate Democrat from the heartland who successfully attracted votes from relatively conservative middle-America voters.

326

Notes to Chapter 10

30. Dictated memo from FDR to Coy, December 19, 1942. File: Roosevelt (1942), Box 13, WCP. 31. Memo from Coy to FDR, December 22, 1942. File: Commerce Department 1942, Box 3, RG 214. 32. Summary of memo from Dort to FDR, May 8, 1943. File: Folder: 1943–45, Box 1, OF 4240. Coy was away, so Dort signed it as acting LOEM. 33. Herman Allen, AP, “President’s Administrative Assistants Vary in Success as Capital’s ‘Mystery Men,’ ” WS, January 4, 1943. The article misidentified him as a presidential administrative assistant. He was a special assistant to the president. 34. Lemuel F. Parton, “Wayne Coy Another Man from Indiana on Uptake at Capital” (Who’s News Today series), The [New York] Sun, December 10, 1942, 23. 35. R. T. Elson, “Roosevelt Close-Up,” Maclean’s Magazine 56, no. 8 (April 15, 1943): 34. 36. Alfred Toombs, “The President’s Man,” Liberty 20, no. 17 (April 24, 1943): 15. 37. “Many Shouters Kept from War by Draft Shift,” CT, February 9, 1943, 4. It was a particularly cheap shot because the Washington Post had reported a year earlier that Coy applied to the Army, but was rejected. Kluttz, “Army Turns Down President’s Aid [sic]” (Federal Diary column), WP, February 17, 1942, 19. 38. Merlo Pusey, “Why Don’t We Have a War Cabinet?” (Wartime Washington column), WP, December 1, 1942, 11. 39. Memo from Coy to FDR, January 26, 1943. File: Roosevelt (1943), Box 13, WCP. 40. Memo from Coy to the secretary of state, December 5, 1942. File: Lend-Lease 1942, Box 11, RG 214. Earlier in the war, Alsop was captured by the Japanese when they occupied Hong Kong, but managed to escape back to Nationalist China. “J. W. Alsop Reported Safe in Hong Kong,” Washington Times-Herald, April 20, 1942. The article was stapled to Coy’s daily schedule for April 13, 1942. File: Coy—Telephone Transcripts (Apr. 1942), Box 3, WCP. Alsop was a distant cousin of FDR. 41. Letter from Coy to H. P. Martin, February 26, 1943. File: OEM Personnel—Misc. 1941–43, Box 6, RG 214. It is possible she had an inkling that Coy was not long for LOEM. 42. Allotment Advice (OEM standard form), October 6, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 43. For example, during FY 1942, Coy planned a trip to Indiana and Chicago. Letter from Thelma Abbott to G. A. Johnson, August 20, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 44. Summary of memo from Coy to FDR, January 7, 1943. File: 1943–45, Box 1, OF 4240. 45. Form letter from Coy to Landis, October 29, 1942. File: OCD 1942, Box 3, RG 214.

Notes to Chapter 10

327

46. November 14, 1942: AP, “Income Tax Exemption Plan Studied,” WP, B9; “State Studies Tax Exemption for U.S. Workers,” Baltimore Sun, 4. 47. Letter from Coy to comptroller general, May 7, 1943. File: Comptroller General 1942–43, Box 3, RG 214. 48. Letter from Coy to Lindsey Warren, May 18, 1943, ibid. 49. Letter from Coy to comptroller general, May 29, 1943, ibid. 50. “Cancel Pullman Space or Pay, U.S. Aides Told,” WS, March 12, 1943, A-14. 51. For example, during the war there was a persistent rumor in the Boston area that Jewish men were successfully evading the draft. Carl J. Friedrich, “Issues of Informational Strategy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7, no. 1 (Spring 1943): 84. 52. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Deferment of the Fiscal Officer, San Francisco Regional Office, December 26, 1942. File: Deferment Policy 1942–43, Box 4, RG 214. 53. Memo from Coy to FDR, Subject: Deferment of Mr. Glenn Edwin Garrett, Office for Emergency Management, January 26, 1943, ibid. 54. Coy memo to FDR, Subject: Deferment of Mr. Normer Lilburn Royse, Office for Emergency Management, February 2, 1943, ibid. 55. Coy letter to FDR, February 26, 1943, ibid. An impression is the number of times a page or publication passes through the printing process to receive the complete image. In monochrome (single-color) printing, only one impression is necessary, whereas in multicolor printing, two or more impressions are needed. Most federal publications at the time were one color (usually black on white), but some posters needed to be printed in color. 56. Letters from Coy to Hoover, November 25 and December 15, 1942. File: OEM—Personnel Investigations 1942, Box 7, RG 214. Letter from Coy to Hoover, April 17, 1943. File: OEM—Personnel Investigations 1943, ibid. 57. Letter from Coy to Postmaster General Frank Walker, November 17, 1942. File: CAS 1942, Box 2, RG 214. 58. Letter from Dort to Coy, January 11, 1943. File: CAS 1943, Box 2, RG 214. 59. Letter from Smith to FDR, April 13, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 60. EO 9330, April 16, 1943. It is reprinted in US Congress 1943a, 513. 61. All subsequent quotes are from Coy memo to FDR, October 13, 1942. Subject file: Wayne Coy, Box 129, PSF. 62. Given their close working relationship, Coy must have cleared the memo with Smith and not done anything behind his back. If so, that means Smith would have been willing to accept such a role if the president approved Coy’s memo. It could be argued that Coy had an allegedly self-serving motive for sending the memo: that he wanted to kick Smith upstairs and then become the de facto BOB director. While this is possible, it is not probable because it is not consistent with Coy’s role in White House politics until then. He did not seem driven to aggregate

328

Notes to Chapter 11

power for its own sake, such as leaking stories to make his competitors look bad, promoting his own importance with reporters, or engaging in obscure political maneuvering and palace politics to gain more power. Another detail indirectly adds credibility that Smith had signed off on Coy’s memo. In his postwar interview with Somers about OWMR, Coy said that Smith largely refused even to acknowledge Byrnes’s role and power because Smith thought that was what BOB was supposed to do (Somers 1946). In that case, Coy’s idea would have given Smith the explicit power he felt he should have. 63. Coy’s papers include two memos to FDR on Lloyd George in WWI. Both memos were undated and appear to be sequential. One starts “Since our conversation of several days ago” and the other “In view of your continued interest” in the subject. File: Bureau of the Budget: Reports re: Administration of Misc. Agencies, Box 2, WCP. Based on context and content, I have assumed that both memos came after Coy’s October 13, 1942, memo to FDR (above). However, it is possible that they were submitted before it and that the October 13 memo was a more detailed effort to translate the UK model into what it would look like in FDR’s White House. 64. Letter from Byrnes to McIntyre, April 14, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 65. Photo and caption (no headline), WS, October 26, 1942, B-4. It will be recalled that a few months earlier Coy had sent FDR a memo on the status of the military voting bill in Congress (chap. 9). 66. “War Pictures of Russia on View at Headquarters,” WP, November 11, 1942, B7. 67. “Liberty Ship Marshall Launched,” NYT, January 16, 1943, 28. 68. Jane McBaine, “Post Profile: Mrs. Wayne Coy” (In the Capital Spotlight feature on the society page), WP, December 22, 1942, B7. Evidently she was livelier and more gregarious than her spouse, whom Interior Secretary Ickes described as having no sense of humor or lightness (chap. 9).

Chapter 11 1. This might have taken place on March 15, 1943, FDR Day by Day. His calendar shows a meeting with May but does not list Coy and Byrnes as attending. 2. EO 9347. Two months later, FDR signed an executive order further expanding Byrnes’s empire to include foreign economic matters. EO 9361, July 15, 1943. 3. AP, “President’s Texts on the OWM: President’s Statement,” NYT, May 29, 1943, 3. 4. Turner Catledge, “New Board Wins Capital Plaudits,” NYT, May 29, 1943, 1. 5. “Byrnes Heads U.S. Super Cabinet,” CSM, May 28, 1943, 1, 8. 6. Memo from Coy to Byrnes, May 31, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP.

Notes to Chapter 11

329

7. Memo from Coy to Byrnes, Subject: WPB Developments, June 4, 1943, ibid. 8. Letter from Coy to FDR, June 1, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 9. Memo from Smith to FDR, June 1, 1943, ibid. 10. Memo from Byrnes to FDR, June 7, 1943, ibid. 11. Letter from FDR to Coy (“Dear Wayne”), June 8, 1943. File: Roosevelt (1943), Box 13, WCP. 12. Leonard Lyons, “Gossip from Gotham” (syndicated column), WP, November 2, 1942, B6. 13. Ickes Diary (unpublished version), February 7, 1943, 7420; February 13, 1943, 7436–37. 14. Kluttz, “Most OPA Jobs Subject to Civil Service Rules” (column), WP, June 12, 1943, B1. 15. “Help Wanted (Male),” Time, September 27, 1943. 16. This was the rank he held in the Indiana National Guard from 1934 to 1940. Letter from Elmer Straub, Indiana adjutant general, to Coy, September 1, 1940. File: Coy—FSA, Box 3, WCP. Letter from E. S. Adams, adjutant general, US War Department, July 2, 1941. File: Coy—Personal, Box 4, WCP. 17. Letter from Coy to Rosenman, February 11, 1942. File: Rosenman, Box 13, WCP. 18. Kluttz, “Army Turns Down President’s Aid [sic]” (column), WP, February 17, 1942, 19. 19. Letter from Coy to Eisenhower, March 25, 1944. File: E—Miscellaneous (1943–48), Box 5, WCP. 20. Memo from Coy to Dort, June 10, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 21. Memo from Coy to Cox, June 12, 1943, ibid. 22. Letter from Percy L. Douglas to Coy, June 17, 1943. File: WPB, Box 17, WCP. 23. Memo from Coy to Early, June 10, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 24. “Byrnes Gets Another Job; OEM Liaison Officer,” WS, June 14, 1943, 1; “Another Post for J. F. Byrnes,” NYT, June 15, 1943, 23. All the major wire services moved brief stories on the change. June 15, 1943: AP, “Byrnes Given Another Government Position,” Baltimore Sun, 8; United Press, “Byrnes Gets New Position in OEM,” Troy [NY] Record, 11; International News Service, “Byrnes Gets New Liaison Duties,” El Paso [TX] Herald-Post, 11. 25. Memo from Shane MacCarthy to Coy, Subject: Certifying Officers, May 7, 1943. Handwritten note on it: “Signed by Mr. Coy 6/11/43.” Just a few days earlier, Coy had signed similar authorizations (June 4 and 7). Before Coy totally cleared his desk of LOEM business, CAS was probably eager to catch up on these legal authorizations rather than leave them hanging during the transition to LOEM Byrnes. File: CAS 1943, Box 2, RG 214.

330

Notes to Chapter 11

26. Memo from Coy to Dort, June 12, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 27. Letter from FDR to Byrnes, June 8, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 28. Memo from Byrnes to FDR, June 7, 1943, ibid. 29. Memo from Coy to Dort, June 12, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 30. For example, the twenty-two boxes of documents of the Office of the Liaison Officer (in RG 214) contain only a handful of Byrnes-era LOEM records. 31. Letter from FDR to Byrnes, July 29, 1943. File: 1943, Box 2, OF 4240c. For the official Administrative Order, see Chapter VII: Administrative Orders, Title 3: The President, Code of Federal Regulations: 1943–1948 Compilation (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957), 1078. 32. Summary of actions, July 29, 1943. File: 1943–45, Box 1, OF 4240. 33. Memo from Smith to FDR (with attached paperwork to sign), August 10, 1943. File: Roosevelt (1943), Box 13, WCP. Smith, who was largely antagonistic to Byrnes’s OWM role (Somers 1946), made a point of reminding FDR in his memo that his signature was necessary “inasmuch as Jimmie Byrnes has been relieved by you” of that role. He reminded the president that “Mr. Coy formerly had this responsibility as Liaison Officer.” CAS lasted only one more year. Because of appropriations pressures from Congress against maintaining CAS (58 Stat. 536), on August 25, 1944, FDR signed EO 9471 disbanding CAS and shifting its duties to OEM agencies. It went into effect on November 1, 1944. “Head of OEM Division Resigns,” NYT, September 15, 1944, 16. 34. Query by John P. Davis, Pittsburgh Courier, to Early, October 28, 1943, summary of actions. File: 1943, Box 2, OF 4240c. 35. Memo from Coy to FDR, October 8, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 36. EO 9389, October 18, 1943. 37. Memo from Coy to Donald Russell, OWM, September 16, 1943. File: OWM 1943, Box 15, RG 214. 38. Memo from Coy to Byrnes, September 30, 1943. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 39. Memo from Smith to FDR, November 1, 1943. File: 1943–45, OF 4240. 40. Letter from Byrnes to FDR, November 1, 1943, ibid. 41. Letter from FDR to Byrnes, November 3, 1943, ibid. 42. US Government Manual, December 2016, 38, accessed March 2, 2018, GOVMAN-2016-12-16-History-of-Agency-Organizational-Changes-104.pdf. 43. “The General Manager,” Time magazine, June 14, 1943. 44. “A New Brain Trust: Nation’s Policy Makers; Little-Known Group That Wields Vast Powers Behind the Scenes,” United States News, July 9, 1943, 15. A columnist commented on the magazine story, interpreting the meaning of the term “ax man” differently. Coy was the administration’s axman because “he drafts executive orders delegating F.D.R. executive power to others somewhat willy-nilly.” Frank I. Weller, AP, “Behind the Doors of the White House,” WS, August 26, 1943, B-1.

Notes to Chapter 11

331

45. Raymond P. Brandt, “ ‘Scoops’ in Churchill Talks May Liberalize Censorship Here,” WS, October 10, 1943, C-3. 46. [J. L.] Parrish, “What Experiment Shall We Try on Him Today!,” CT, August 5, 1943, 12. The others were Frankfurter, Cohen (identified as “Benny the Brain”), Rosenman, Hopkins, and Smith. Oddly, Smith was identified in the cartoon as “Dewey Smith.” Dewey was indeed his middle name, but he did not use it regularly. On documents, he always listed himself as Harold D. Smith. A month after Coy left the administration, a conservative columnist similarly characterized Coy as having been “one of the few surviving liberals in the capital” at that stage of the war and FDR’s presidency. Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig” (column), Muscatine [IA] Journal and News-Tribune, February 7, 1944, 4. 47. Kluttz, “Federal Diary” (column), WP, August 11, 1943, B1. 48. Letter from Coy to Rowe, September 30, 1943. File: Rowe, Box 13, WCP. By pure chance, I became slightly acquainted with Rowe in the early 1970s. While a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution (1972–74), I joined some of the staffers on Sunday afternoons for a pickup volley ball game in a park in northwest Washington. Rowe lived in the neighborhood and often walked his dog (an Irish Setter, if I recall correctly) at about the same time. After a while, he started timing his walks to be there when we were. After each game, he would join us as we stood around socializing and having a beer or two. I recognized who he was, but some of my Brookings teammates did not. (Economists!) I sensed he preferred it that way, and I did not say anything to my colleagues. But I tried my best to lean in to be sure I could hear everything he said. In those conversations, he always made incisive and insightful observations about current-day politics, but never said, “When I was in the White House . . .” or “And then I told the President . . .” Rowe died in 1984. 49. Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), Waterloo [IA] Courier, February 6, 1944, 4. Coy must have been the source for the column. A month later, another senior White House aide resigned to go to the media. Mellett left to become a columnist at the Star with the goal of giving some balance to the overwhelmingly conservative punditocracy (Lee 2015). 50. Summary of meeting with FDR, January 21, 1944. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1943–45, Box 3, Smith Papers. That Smith was truly pleased with Coy’s work as his deputy was demonstrated later that year. In October, Smith told FDR that Appleby was thinking of leaving and that Smith felt “it will be practically impossible to match the Blandford-Coy-Appleby performance.” Summary of meeting with FDR, October 30, 1944, ibid. Appleby eventually changed his mind and stayed. After the war, Appleby was a major figure in academic public administration, serving as dean of Syracuse University’s Maxwell School from 1947 to 1956. 51. Coy letter to FDR, January 25, 1944. File: Coy—Personal (to interfile), Box 4, WCP. 52. “Wayne Coy Resigns from Budget Post,” NYT, January 31, 1944, 15. 53. Memo from Coy to Tully, January 20, 1944. File: Coy, PPF 8641.

332

Notes to Conclusion

54. Memo for the files, January 29, 1944, ibid. 55. Bill Gold, “The District Line” (column), WP, September 26, 1957, D12. 56. Walter Trohan, “Reece Attacks Choice of Coy as Head of FCC,” CT, October 31, 1947, 37; George E. Sokolsky, “Wayne Coy” (These Days column), The [New York] Sun, December 23, 1947, 13. 57. Once when Coy went to meet with Truman, he brought his two sons along. Ten-year-old (Albert) Wayne Coy Jr. was planning to ask the president for his autograph, but became so nervous in the presence of the president that he was tongue-tied. Understanding what was happening, his father asked Truman on behalf of his son. Truman cheerfully agreed and tried to reassure the boy and reduce his embarrassment. He told Coy’s son he had had the same problem the first time he met a president (in 1935, as a new senator). At that meeting, Truman, too, was unable to speak. But that was because FDR was so loquacious, he never gave Truman a chance to get a word in edgewise. Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), WP, December 13, 1948, B17. Again, Coy must have been the source for the column. 58. “Contented Bureaucrat” (Radio-Television section), Newsweek, July 2, 1951, 50. 59. AP, “Roosevelt Names 3 for Philippine Rehabilitation,” WP, July 12, 1944, 5. 60. FDR Day by Day. 61. Pearson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round” (column), Coshocton [OH] Tribune, April 21, 1944, 4. 62. Letter from Coy to FDR, November 19, 1944. File: Coy, PPF 8641. It was written on the stationery of the Hotel Kahler in Rochester, Minnesota, and congratulated the president on his reelection. Notwithstanding his own fading health and energy levels, FDR’s reply shows a personal touch, closing the letter with “Always sincerely.” Letter from FDR to Coy (c/o Mayo Clinic), November 29, 1944, ibid. 63. AP, “Wayne Coy, Ex-Chairman of the F.C.C. Dies; Headed Indianapolis Radio-TV Stations” (obit.), NYT, September 25, 1957, 29. 64. United Press, “Message Left by Coy Criticizes Ike,” WP, September 28, 1957, A13. 65. “Grace Coy, 75, Was Volunteer, Assistant at Meyer Foundation” (obit.), WP, April 22, 1981, C4.

Conclusion 1. They accurately quote from FDR’s executive order creating EOP as including an “office for emergency management” (59) and use its correct title once in the text (81). But they also mistakenly refer to it as the Office of Emergency Management in the text (61) and the index (295).

Notes to Conclusion

333

2. This FDR quote comes from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau’s recollection of what FDR had said at the Cabinet meeting on Friday, August 1, 1941. Morgenthau dictated his diary entry four days later. File: August 4, 1941, Book 4, Presidential Diary, Morgenthau Diaries, 953, emphasis added. 3. Letter from MacLeish to Coy, June 16, 1942. File: OFF, Box 12, WCP. 4. Somers’s book is routinely cited and assumed to be reliable. However, these researchers rarely note that Somers had worked at OWMR before writing the book (and dissertation). Relyea (2002, 403) is in the minority who flag that important detail. While Somers’s real-world experience could be interpreted positively as giving him the benefit of participant observation, this probably should be counterbalanced by the reasonable consideration that his positive conclusions about OWMR were tainted by subjectivity and absence of disinterestedness. Who would want to confess in writing that something he had spent his time on actually was unimportant and wasted? 5. 55 Stat. 543. 6. 56 Stat. 707. 7. “The White House,” Newsweek, December 1, 1941, 23. Given that news magazines postdate their issues, this was probably written about two weeks before the attack. As Time magazine’s competitor, it is possible that Newsweek was deliberately tough on Coy as a counterpoint to the generally positive coverage he got in Time. 8. Entry for January 23, 1942. File: Diaries, Box 5, SSP. 9. “High Strategist,” Time magazine, August 4, 1941. 10. H. V. Kaltenborn, transcript of broadcast, March 22, 1942. File: Personal, Box 4, WCP. 11. Thomas F. Reynolds, “Meet Wayne Coy, Spark Plug of America’s War Effort,” Chicago Sun, May 17, 1942. File: Clippings/Scrapbooks, Box 35, WCP. 12. Jane McBaine, “Post Profile: Mrs. Wayne Coy” (In the Capital Spotlight feature of the society page), WP, December 22, 1942, B7. 13. A recounting of this kind of classic bureaucratic conflict occurred in FSA right after WWII (a reminder that Coy had been FSA’s first assistant administrator in 1939–41). The issue was whether the individual bureaus within FSA would continue to maintain their own libraries or if all the bureau-level libraries should be consolidated into a centralized FSA-wide one. “The Office of Education Library,” in Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book, ed. Harold Stein, 31–52 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952). 14. While they were all public administration theorists, they were not all academicians. Strictly speaking, only Merriam was a full-time and tenured professor. Gulick had a PhD and taught courses at Columbia, but his major perch was heading the Institute of Public Administration in New York City. Brownlow had the least education but was closely linked to the academy, including the (vague) affiliation of the Public Administration Clearing House with the University of Chi-

334

Notes to Conclusion

cago and his leadership of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. 15. Summary of meeting, January 21, 1944. File: Conferences with President Roosevelt 1943–45, Box 3, Smith Papers. 16. Nowadays, business administration tends to refer to them as functional and operational roles, but public administration generally continues to use the traditional terms line and staff (Raadschelders and Stillman 2017, Parts III and IV).

Bibliography

Archival and Primary Sources Coy, Wayne, Executive Office of the President, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), FDRL, Hyde Park, NY. ——, Papers of (WCP), FDRL. ——, President’s Personal File (PPF) 8641, FDRL. ——, Subject File, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), FDRL. Diplomatic Correspondence: Russia 1941, Box 49, PSF, FDRL. Division of Central Administrative Services, Office for Emergency Management, Record Group (RG) 214, National Archives II, College Park, MD. Fesler, James W. “Some Problems of Wartime Administration,” paper presented at annual conference of the Southern Political Science Association, Knoxville, TN, November 6, 1946. Folder 6, Box 1, James Fesler Papers (MS 207), Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT. Ickes, Harold L., Papers of. Diaries (1933–1951), longer unpublished version. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Liaison Officer for Emergency Management—General Records, Office for Emergency Management, Record Group (RG) 214, National Archives II. Marches on Washington, 1933–45, Official Files (OF) 391, FDRL. Milton, George Ford. 1943. “Interview with Mr. Wayne Coy, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Saturday, May 29, 1943, Concerning a Memorandum Addressed to Him at the time that he was Principal Liaison Officer of the OEM, August 2, 1941.” File: USSR No. 1 Directive of President, USSR Section, Foreign Economic Administration, RG 169, National Archives. Microfilm: Entry UD-11D-1, Roll 1, M-57 Film. Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., Diaries and Presidential Diaries, FDRL. Also online, accessed March 2, 2018. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/franklin/ index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=535. Office for Emergency Management, Official Files (OF) 4240, FDRL. Office of Production Management, Subject Files, PSF, FDRL.

335

336

Bibliography

Policy Documentation File, Box 2408, War Production Board, Record Group (RG) 179, National Archives II. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1950. F.D.R., His Personal Letters: 1928–1945. Vol. 3. Edited by Elliot Roosevelt. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. ——. (1938–1950) 1969. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. New York: Russell and Russell. ——. 1972. Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt (transcripts). New York: Da Capo Press. Sherwood, Sidney, Papers of, Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. Smith, Harold, Papers of, FDRL. Somers, Herman Miles. “Interview with Wayne Coy, Former Director of the Office of [sic] Emergency Management, Assistant Director of the Budget, and currently Assistant Publisher of the Washington Post, August 12, 1946.” Folder 4, Box 31-a, Series IV, Papers of H. M. Somers, Collection ID MS 1238, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT.

Federal Publications Relyea, Harold C. 2008. “Presidential Directives: Background and Overview.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed March 1, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf. US Bureau of the Budget, War Records Section. (1946) 1972. The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government. Historical Reports on War Administration No. 1. New York: Da Capo Press. US Civil Service Commission. 1941. Official Register of the United States. Washington, DC: GPO. US Civilian Production Administration (CPA), Bureau of Demobilization. 1946a. Minutes of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense: June 12, 1940 to October 22, 1941. Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board, Documentary Publication No. 1. Washington, DC: GPO. (Note: Confusingly, because of a printing error, the title on the spine of the book is incorrect: Minutes of the Council of the Office of Production Management.) ——. 1946b. Minutes of the Council of the Office of Production Management: December 21, 1940 to January 14, 1942. Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board, Documentary Publication No. 2. Washington, DC: GPO. ——. 1946c. Minutes of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board: September 2, 1941 to January 15, 1942. Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board, Documentary Publication No. 3. Washington, DC: GPO.

Bibliography

337

——. 1946d. Minutes of the War Production Board: January 20, 1942 to October 9, 1945. Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board, Documentary Publication No. 4. Washington, DC: GPO. ——. 1947. Field Organization and Administration of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, May 1940 to November 1945. Prepared by Carroll K. Shaw under the Supervision of George W. Auxier, WPB Historian. Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board, Special Study No. 25 (mimeograph). Washington, DC: CPA. ——. (1947) 1969. Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945; Volume I: Program and Administration. New York: Greenwood Press. (James W. Fesler led the team who authored the book, but GPO felt there were too many to list all of them as coauthors. So it stripped all proper names from the official authorship of the book, not even something along the lines of “Fesler et al.” [Email from Fesler to the author, March 4, 2002, author’s files.]) US Congress. 1942a. Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Part 3, hearings. 77th Cong., 2nd sess. ——. 1942b. Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Part 4, hearing. 77th Cong., 2nd sess. ——. 1943. Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures: Federal Personnel. 78th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 66. US Federal Security Agency. 1941. First Annual Report, 1940. Washington, DC: GPO. ——. 1942. Second Annual Report, 1941. Washington, DC: GPO. US House. 1939. First Plan on Government Reorganization, Presidential message. 76th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 262. ——. 1940. Recommendations Incident to Preserving Insurance Protection, Presidential message. 76th Cong., 3rd sess., H. Doc. 951. ——. 1941a. Claims for Damages to Privately Owned Property, Presidential message. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 274. ——. 1941b. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Transportation of Iron Ore on the Great Lakes by Canadian Vessels, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1941c. Estimate of Appropriation, Office of [sic] Emergency Management, Fiscal Year 1942, Presidential message. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc 239. ——. 1941d. Committee on Appropriations. Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1941, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1941e. Daylight Saving Time for National Defense, Presidential message. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc 312.

338

Bibliography

——. 1941f. Committee on Insular Affairs. Amending Section 19 (A) of the Philippine Independence Act. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rep. 1309. ——. 1941g. Committee on Military Affairs. Authorizing the Requisition of Personal Property, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1941h. Stabilizing Price of Various Commodities and Rentals, Presidential message. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 332. ——. 1941i. Committee of Conference. Supplemental Appropriations for National Defense, 1942 and 1943. 77th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rep. 1501. ——. 1941j. Committee on the Judiciary. To Expedite the Prosecution of the War, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. Unpublished, ProQuest Congressional database: HRG-1941-HJH-0023. ——. 1942a. Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds. To Transfer from the District of Columbia Departments, or Bureaus Thereof, and Independent Agencies to Other Localities, Part 2, hearings. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1942b. Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1943. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc. 528. ——. 1942c. Estimates of Appropriation for Certain Services, Office for Emergency Management, Presidential message. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc. 792. ——. 1942d. Committee on Appropriations. First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1943, Part 1, hearings. 77th Cong., 2nd sess. ——. 1942e. Committee on Appropriations. First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill, 1943. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Rep. 2295. ——. 1942f. Committee of Conference. First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill, 1943. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Rep. 2354. ——. 1943a. Committee on Appropriations. National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1944, Part 2, hearings. 78th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1943b. Appropriation Estimates for Division of Central Administrative Services of Office for Emergency Management, Presidential message. 78th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 199. ——. 1943c. Estimate of Appropriations for the Office of the Liaison Officer of the Office for Emergency Management, Presidential message. 78th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 196. ——. 1943d. Drafts of Proposed General Provisions for the Office for Emergency Management, Presidential message. 78th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 104. ——. 1943e. Committee on Appropriations. First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1943, hearings. 78th Cong., 1st sess. US Office for Emergency Management. 1941 (April). Office for Emergency Management: Functions and Administration. Washington, DC: GPO. ——. 1942 (May). OEM Handbook: Functions and Administration. Washington, DC: GPO. US Senate. 1937. Reorganization of the Executive Departments, Presidential message. 75th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 8.

Bibliography

339

——. 1940. Committee on Education and Labor. Prevention of Industrial Conditions Hazardous to the Health of Employees, hearing. 76th Cong., 3rd sess. ——. 1941a. Committee on Military Affairs. Requisition of Property by the United States, Part 2, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1941b. Committee on Appropriations. Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1942, hearing. 77th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1941c. Committee on Appropriations. Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill, 1942. 77th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. 894. ——. 1942a. Committee on Appropriations. First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation for 1943, hearings. 77th Cong., 2nd sess. ——. 1942b. Subcommittee on S. Res. 223, Committee on Appropriations. Transfer of Employees, Conserving Office Space, Relief in Housing Conditions, and Promotion of Economy and Efficiency. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 1554. ——. 1942c. Committee on Commerce. St. Marys [sic] River, Mich., Additional New Lock in St. Mary’s Falls Canal. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 956. ——. 1942d. Committee on Appropriations. First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill, 1943. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 1542. ——. 1943. Committee on Appropriations. National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1944, hearings. 78th Cong., 1st sess. ——. 1951. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Nomination of Wayne Coy, of Indiana, To Be a Member of the Federal Communications Commission for a Term of Seven Years from July 1, 1951—Reappointment, hearing. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Unpublished, ProQuest Congressional database: HRG-1951-ISF-0029.

Coy’s Writings Relating to National Defense, 1940–1946 Coy, Wayne. 1940. “Schools to Aid Defense Needs.” Washington Post, September 8, L1. ——. 1941a. “The Responsibility of Government in a National Defense Program for the Welfare of its Citizens.” Alabama Social Welfare 6, no. 5 (May): 4–7. (Text of speech to Alabama Conference on Social Work, April 21, Mobile, AL.) ——. 1941b. “Social Work and National Defense.” Public Welfare in Indiana 51, no. 12 (December): 3–4, 14–15. (Text of speech to Indiana State Conference on Social Work, October 31, 1941, Indianapolis, IN.) ——. 1941c. “The Men of Government: Keeping the American Government Democratic.” Vital Speeches of the Day 8, no. 4 (December 1): 114–17. (Text of speech to students, Indiana University, October 30, 1941, Bloomington, IN.) ——. 1941d. “Organization for National Defense.” Advanced Management 6, no. 4 (October–December): 145–48. (Text of speech to the Washington chapter of the Society for Advancement of Management, September 25, 1941, Washington, DC.)

340

Bibliography

——. 1942a. To Win the War and the Peace: A Defense Convocation Address. Fort Wayne, IN: Purdue University. (Text of speech to Student War Council, Purdue University, March 12, 1942, Fort Wayne, IN.) ——. 1942b. “Teamwork in Washington: Conversion to War.” Atlantic Monthly 169, no. 4 (April): 399–404. ——. 1942c. “Federal Organization of the War Effort and its Relation to Education.” In Handbook on Education and the War. Washington, DC: GPO. (Text of speech to conference of National Institute on Education and the War, sponsored by US Office of Education, FSA, August 28, 1942, Washington, DC.) ——. 1946a. “ ‘Get Things Moving’—FDR.” New Republic 114, no. 15 (April 15): 546–47. ——. 1946b. “Basic Problems.” Symposium on Federal Executive Reorganization ReExamined, American Political Science Review 40, no. 6 (December): 1124–37.

Memoirs and Related Writings by Participants Appleby, Paul H. (1949) 1975. Policy and Administration. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Biddle, Francis. 1962. In Brief Authority. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Brownlow, Louis. 1941. “A General View.” Public Administration Review 1, no. 2 (Winter): 101–5. ——. 1958. A Passion for Anonymity: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow; Second Half. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Byrnes, James F. 1947. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper. ——. 1958. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper & Brothers. Catton, Bruce. (1948) 1969. War Lords of Washington. New York: Greenwood Press. Corson, John J. 1967. “Historical Interview by Abe Bortz.” March 3, 1967. Accessed March 1, 2018. https://www.ssa.gov/history/corsonoral.html. Emmerich, Herbert. 1971. Federal Organization and Administrative Management. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Gulick, Luther. (1948) 1971. Administrative Reflections from World War II. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Harris, Joseph P. 1983. Joseph P. Harris: Professor and Practitioner: Government, Election Reform, and the Votomatic. Oral History interview conducted in 1980 by Harriet Nathan, University History Series, Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley. Ickes, Harold L. (1953) 1974. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes; Volume II: The Inside Struggle, 1936–1939. New York: Da Capo Press. Land, Emory Scott. 1958. Winning the War with Ships: Land, Sea and Air—Mostly Land. New York: R. M. McBride.

Bibliography

341

McReynolds, William H. 1941. “The Office for Emergency Management.” Public Administration Review 1, no. 2 (Winter): 131–38. Nelson, Donald M. (1946) 1973. Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production. New York: Da Capo Press. Rosenman, Samuel I. (1952) 1972. Working with Roosevelt. New York: Da Capo Press. Tully, Grace G. 1949. F.D.R., My Boss. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons.

Secondary Sources—Books and Articles Bartels, Andrew H. 1983. “The Office of Price Administration and the Legacy of the New Deal, 1939–1946.” Public Historian 5, no. 3 (Summer): 5–29. Beasley, Norman. 1947. Knudsen: A Biography. New York: McGraw-Hill. Bennett, Edward M. 1990. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: AmericanSoviet Relations, 1939–1945. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Bernstein, Barton J. 1967. “The Debate on Industrial Reconversion: The Protection of Oligopoly and Military Control of the Economy.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 26, no. 2 (April): 159–72. ——. 1988. “America’s Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 11 (3): 292–317. Brands, H. W. 1992. Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines. New York: Oxford University Press. ——. 2008. Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New York: Doubleday. Burns, James MacGregor. (1956) 1996. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York: Smithmark. ——. (1970) 2006. Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom: 1940–1945. Edited by Francis Parkman. New York: History Book Club. Campbell, Tracy. (1998) 2004. Short of the Glory: The Fall and Redemption of Edward F. Prichard, Jr. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Carey, William D. 1944. “Central-Field Relationships in the War Production Board.” Public Administration Review 4, no. 1 (Winter): 31–42. Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cesarani, David. 2016. Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews, 1933–1949. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Cooper, Richard W. 1942. “Position Classification in the War Program.” Personnel Administration 4, no. 8 (April): 1–10. Cuff, Robert D. 1978. “An Organizational Perspective on the Military-Industrial Complex.” Business History Review 52, no. 2 (Summer): 250–67.

342

Bibliography

Davies, Norman. 2007. No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939–1945. New York: Viking. Donald, David Herbert. 1995. Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster. Douglas, Lawrence. 2016. The Right Wrong Man: John Demjanjuk and the Last Great Nazi War Crimes Trial. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Downs, Anthony. (1967) 1994. Inside Bureaucracy. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland. Gilmour, Robert S. 1971. “Central Legislative Clearance: A Revised Perspective.” Public Administration Review 31, no. 2 (March–April): 150–58. Grundstein, Nathan D. 1961. Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Harris, Joseph P. 1946. “Wartime Currents and Peacetime Trends.” American Political Science Review 40, no. 6 (December): 1137–54. Heath, Jim F. 1972. “American War Mobilization and the Use of Small Manufacturers, 1939–1943.” Business History Review 46, no. 3 (Autumn): 295–319. Heinrichs, Waldo H. 1988. Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II. New York: Oxford University Press. Herring, George C., Jr. 1973. Aid to Russia, 1941–46: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press. Hobbs, Edward H. 1954. Behind the President: A Study of Executive Office Agencies. Washington, DC: Public Affairs. Jennings, Audra. 2016. Out of the Horrors of War: Disability Politics in World War II America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kimble, James J. 2006. Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Kiplinger, W. M. 1942. Washington Is Like That. New York: Harper & Brothers. Koistinen, Paul A. C. 2004. Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Kotlowski, Dean J. 2015. Paul V. McNutt and the Age of FDR. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kryder, Daniel. 2000. Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lee, Mordecai. 2002. “The Federal Public Relations Administration: History’s Near Miss.” Public Relations Review 28, no. 1 (February): 87–98. ——. 2005. The First Presidential Communications Agency: FDR’s Office of Government Reports. Albany: State University of New York Press. ——. 2007a. “When Politics Overwhelms Administration: Historical Proofs for Fesler’s Maxim Against State-based Federal Regions, 1934–1943.” Public Voices 9 (2): 25–45. ——. 2007b. “Clara M. Edmunds and the Library of the United States Information Service, 1934–1948.” Libraries & the Cultural Record 42 (3): 213–30. ——. 2008a. “Media Relations and External Communications during a Disaster.” In Disaster Management Handbook, edited by Jack Pinkowski, chap. 19. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Bibliography

343

——. 2008b. Bureaus of Efficiency: Reforming Local Government in the Progressive Era. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. ——. 2008c. “Public Affairs Enters the US President’s Subcabinet: Creating the First Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (1944–1953) and Subsequent Developments.” Journal of Public Affairs 8, no. 3 (August): 185–94. ——. 2010. Nixon’s Super-Secretaries: The Last Grand Presidential Reorganization Effort. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. ——. 2011. Congress vs. the Bureaucracy: Muzzling Agency Public Relations. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. ——. 2012. Promoting the War Effort: Robert Horton and Federal Propaganda, 1938–1946. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. ——. 2014. “Colluding to Create the American Society for Public Administration and the Consequent Collateral Damage.” Public Voices 14 (1): 2–27. ——. 2015. “Working for Goodwill: Journalist Lowell Mellett.” Traces of Indiana and Midwestern History 27, no. 4 (Fall): 46–55. ——. 2016. A Presidential Civil Service: FDR’s Liaison Office for Personnel Management. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. ——. 2017. “Trying to Professionalize Expert Knowledge (Part II): A Short History of Public Administration Service, 1933–2003.” Public Voices 15 (1): 28– 45. Lelyveld, Joseph. 2016. His Final Battle: The Last Months of Franklin Roosevelt. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Lichtenstein, Nelson. (1982) 2003. Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lucander, David. 2014. Winning the War for Democracy: The March on Washington Movement, 1941–1946. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Morstein Marx, Fritz. 1947. The President and His Staff Services. Publication No. 98. Chicago: Public Administration Service. Neustadt, Richard E. 1954. “Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance.” American Political Science Review 48, no. 3 (September): 641–71. Nolan, Cathal J. 2017. The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost. New York: Oxford University Press. Opdycke, Sandra. 2016. The WPA: Creating Jobs and Hope in the Great Depression. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis. Owens, Larry. 1994. “The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development.” Business History Review 68, no. 4 (Winter): 515–76. Parrish, Michael E. 2010. Citizen Rauh: An American Liberal’s Life in Law and Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Raadschelders, Jos C. N., and Richard J. Stillman II, eds. 2017. Foundations of Public Administration. Irvine, CA: Melvin & Leigh. Reeves, William D. 1973. “PWA and Competition Administration in the New Deal.” Journal of American History 60, no. 2 (September): 357–72.

344

Bibliography

Relyea, Harold C. 1997. “Exigency and Emergency.” In The Executive Office of the President: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Guide, edited by Harold C. Relyea, chap. 7. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. ——. 2002. “Homeland Security: The Concept and the Presidential Coordination Office—First Assessment.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June): 397–411. ——. 2011. “The Coming of Presidential Czars and Their Accountability to Congress: The Initial Years: 1937–1945.” White House Studies 11 (1): 1–20. “Reorganization of Public Welfare Departments.” 1937. Social Service Review 11, no. 2 (June): 289–90. Riccucci, Norma M. 1995. Unsung Heroes: Federal Execucrats Making a Difference. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Roberts, Alasdair. 1996. “Why the Brownlow Committee Failed: Neutrality and Partisanship in the Early Years of Public Administration.” Administration & Society 28, no. 1 (May): 3–38. ——. 2008. The Collapse of Fortress Bush: The Crisis of Authority in American Government. New York: New York University Press. Roberts, Patrick S. 2014. “The Lessons of Civil Defense Federalism for the Homeland Security Era.” Journal of Policy History 26 (3): 354–83. Robertson, David. 1994. Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes. New York: W. W. Norton. Robinson, Mitchell L. 1996. “ ‘Healing the Bitterness of War and Destruction’: CPS [Civilian Public Service] and Foreign Service.” Quaker History 85, no. 2 (Fall): 24–48. Rossiter, Clinton L. 1949. “The Constitutional Significance of the Executive Office of the President.” American Political Science Review 43, no. 6 (December): 1206–17. Sander, Alfred Dick. 1989. A Staff for the President: The Executive Office, 1921–1952. New York: Greenwood Press. Sherwood, Robert E. 1950. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. New York: Harper. Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 4th ed. New York: Free Press. Sollenberger, Mitchel A., and Mark J. Rozell. 2012. The President’s Czars: Undermining Congress and the Constitution. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Somers, Herman Miles. 1952. “The President as Administrator.” Annals of the American Academic of Political and Social Science 283 (September): 104–14. ——. (1950) 1969. Presidential Agency: OWMR, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. New York: Greenwood Press. Sparrow, Bartholomew H. 2014. From the Outside In: World War II and the American State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bibliography

345

Steele, Richard W. 1985. Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933–1941. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Vaughn, Justin S., and José D. Villalobos. 2015. Czars in the White House: The Rise of Policy Czars as Presidential Management Tools. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wanner, Carol. 1941. “National Defense Libraries.” Special Libraries 32, no. 9 (November): 344–45. Ziegelman, Jane, and Andrew Coe. 2016. A Square Meal: A Culinary History of the Great Depression. New York: HarperCollins.

Index

Abbott, Thelma, 225 absentee voting, 207, 232 ADA (Americans for Democratic Action), 285n68 Adams, James, 119 Addams, Jane, 122 administrative orders, 28, 259n8, 300n98 administrative procedures bill, 310n103 Advanced Management, 3 Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. See National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) African Americans. See also racial discrimination in the Army, 54, 55–56 Byrnes’s disinterest in, 237 Coy’s support for racial equality of, 56–57, 131, 164–66, 205–6 defense contract employment and, 96–99 employment discrimination and, 205–6, 220–21 equitable treatment of, 1, 56–57, 95–99, 164–66 as FBI agents, 305n34 food production assistance to, 221 housing for defense workers, 99, 300n102

March on Washington, 97–98 OEM employment of, 164–65 as OEM messengers, 165–66, 275n73 poll taxes and, 169 “race riots,” 97, 284n65 Roosevelt, Eleanor, and, 61 segregated hotels and, 221 USO and, 61 WPA funding designated for, 44–45 Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA), 131–32 agriculture defense employment and, 119–20 price controls and, 106 Agriculture Division, NDAC, 37 Alabama Conference of Child-Caring Institutions, 70 Alabama Conference of Social Work, 70 ALCOA, 115 alien employment, 84, 87 Allen, Robert S., 21, 125, 196, 202 Alsop, Joseph, 224 American Legion, 204–5 American Peace Mobilization, 185 American Political Science Association (APSA), 35 Coy’s role in, 2–3 American Political Science Review (APSR), 3, 11, 241

347

348

Index

American Printing House for the Blind, 265n26 Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 285n68 American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), 35, 129, 200, 253, 256, 264n20, 294n1 Coy’s role in, 2–3 Coy’s speech on management at, 129–32 Section on Emergency and Crisis Management, 19 annual press conference (annual budget seminar), 218 antiaircraft guns, 112 antitrust law, 1, 168, 207 Appleby, Paul, 62, 132, 240, 255, 331n50 APSA. See American Political Science Association (APSA) armament production buildup. See defense production Army, US African Americans in, 54, 55–56 CCC and, 54–55 Selective Service System and, 54 Army Day, 166 Arvad, Inga, 125, 293n116 ASPA. See American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) Associated Press (AP), 75, 122, 126 Athens [OH] Messenger, 266n34 Atlantic Charter, 282n40 Atlantic Monthly, 3, 176 Austria, 24 automobile production, 177 aviation postwar planning, 221 volunteer Civil Air Patrol pilots, 322n62 back-shadowing, 14 Baltimore Sun, 27, 58, 74, 75, 174

Bane, Frank, 62 Barnard, Chester, 290n71 Bartels, Andrew H., 1 Baruch, Bernard, 26, 287n29 as czar, 106 gasoline rationing and, 204 price controls and, 106–7 Batt, William, 208 Battle of Britain, 32 Beasley, Norman, 2, 29 Belgium, 81 Belsley, Lyle, 114–15, 261n23 Bennett, Edward M., 1, 88 Bernstein, Barton J., 1, 220 Bethune, Mary McLeod, 56 BEW. See Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) Biddle, Francis, 2, 143, 184 biological warfare, 1 Blandford, John, 63, 107, 182, 199, 276n84 B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League, 143–44 Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), 167, 187 BOB. See Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Boston postmaster, 171 Brands, H. W., 1, 12 Bricker, John, 116, 308n76 Brookings Institution, 331n48 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 164 Brown, Richard, 237 Brownlow, Louis, 2, 3, 25, 35, 46, 48, 155, 253–56, 261n23, 333n14 on Coy, 11 creation of OEM and, 26–27 criticism of OEM by, 9 executive office reorganization and, 26–27 NDAC and, 30 Brownlow Committee, 3, 10, 111, 253–56, 259n8, 261n24. See

Index also President’s Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM) Buffalo [NY] News, 75 Bullitt, William, 63, 270n100 Bunker, Arthur, 115 Bureau of Industrial Conservation, 168, 290n71 Bureau of Plant Industry, 281n31 Bureau of the Budget (BOB), 11, 18, 25, 62, 63, 85, 86, 107, 133, 145–47, 193 Coy’s budget hearing testimony, 211 Coy’s resignation from, 240 Coy’s role at, 48, 199–202, 244 emergency management reorganization and, 32, 33 field management and, 138–39 legislative clearance and, 147–49 noncitizen employment and, 87 OEM and, 6, 7, 32, 33, 37–38, 80–81 OEM funding and, 188–89 OEM space needs and, 136 OEM wartime budget and, 159–60 public administration and, 6–7 reorganization role, 182 Burns, James MacGregor, 1, 43, 88, 95 Bush, Vannevar, 281n30 business administration, public administration and, 254–55 business interests. See also industry defense mobilization and, 110–16, 289n59 dollar-a-year men and, 113–16, 173, 192, 223 labor-management relations, 163–64 New Dealers vs., 60, 113, 123, 130, 172–73 political issues and, 208–9 public administration and, 131 Business Week, 39

349

Byrd, Harry, Sr., 111–12, 173–74, 222, 230, 288n52 Byrnes, James F., 1, 4, 7, 11, 22, 74, 105, 108, 208, 231, 328n62, 330n33 Coy and, 218, 231–32 as a czar, 4, 244, 250 as director of Office of Economic Stabilization, 203, 217–18 as LOEM, 12, 234, 236–39 Office of War Mobilization and, 233–34 as policy maker, 203, 256 resignation from Supreme Court, 22, 203, 217, 324n3 as senior advisor, 217–18 as wearing two hats, 18 California League of Cities, 109 Campbell, Tracy, 1 Canada flagged ships on Great Lakes, 80, 84–85, 161, 162 joint defense cooperation with US, 65 Carey, William D., 1, 140 Carpenter, Daniel P., 252 Carter, Edward, 284n56 Carter, Jimmy, 279n6 CAS. See Central Administrative Services (CAS) Catton, Bruce, 58, 268n69 CCC. See Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) Cedar Rapids, IA, Chamber of Commerce, 175 Census Bureau, 161, 189 Central Administrative Services (CAS), 15, 16, 17, 40, 76, 87, 132, 133, 134, 136, 174, 182, 188, 189, 330n33 administration of, 153 budget, 229

350

Index

Central Administrative Services (CAS) (continued) Coy’s supervision of, 243, 250 dollar-a-year men and, 115, 116 establishment of, 38 field management and, 138 funding increases, 211–12 loyalty investigations, 140, 141, 144 management issues and, 229 OEM administration and, 152–53 office size, 210 oversight of, 228–29 package mailings, 228–29 printed material, 228 reorganization of, 232 role of, 21–22, 77 standard policies, 209 wartime budget, 160 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 8, 272n23 Cesarini, David, 14 Chandler, Albert Benjamin, 104 Chapman, Oscar, 117 “character and fitness” investigations, 183 Chicago, University of, 25 Chicago Defender, 57 Chicago Sun, 74–75 Chicago Tribune, 27, 68, 75, 86, 104, 202, 224, 239, 262–63n2 China Japan’s invasion of, 24, 28 resiliency of, 176 review of war efforts in, 205 US aid to, 65, 122, 224 Christian Science Monitor, 124, 233–34 Churchill, Winston, 28, 90, 95, 281n36, 282n40 CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), 163 civic morale, 122 Civil Air Patrol, 322n62

civil defense policies, 1 civil defense agency, 62–64 civilian mobilization effort, 4 health and social services, 60–61 morale and, 63 New Dealers and, 59–60 social welfare policy and, 71–72, 76 training programs, 61 volunteer group coordination, 63 women and, 63 Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 49, 54–55 camps, 54–55 national defense training programs, 61 Civilian Production Administration (CPA), 40, 86, 88, 92, 102, 159 Civil Service Commission (CSC), 2, 8, 20, 25, 36, 134, 152, 229, 275n73 loyalty investigations, 141 McReynolds and, 36 new-hire investigations, 184 civil service employees, 253 Civil Works Administration (CWA), 43, 45 Clapper, Raymond, 104 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 158 coal miners Indiana, 118–19 United Mine Workers (UMW), 118–19, 163, 223 coconut oil imports, 190 Coffin, Tris, 266n33 Cohen, Benjamin V., 154, 301n112, 331n46 Columbia Institution for the Deaf, 265n26 Columbus, OH, Chamber of Commerce, 297n56 Commerce Department, 88 Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, 253

Index Committee on Medical Research, 278n104 Committee on Public Administration, Social Science Research Council (CPA/SSRC), 3, 6 Committee on War Information, 170 communication issues. See also information agencies at OEM, 145–47 at Office of Production Management (OPM), 138 Communism, 88, 94, 95, 284n60 “Commie hunters,” 140–41 loyalty investigations and, 140–41. 144, 183–88, 227 military aid to USSR and, 205 competitive administration, 23 conflict resolution, 194–95 Congress, US conservative coalition, 173–75 Coy’s contact with, 101–8 Coy’s testimony before, 102–4, 248 military spending approvals, 65 Roosevelt’s preference for executive actions over, 24 transportation board of investigation and research, 66–68, 73 Congressional Directory, 8, 308n80 Congressional Record, 124, 131, 292n100 Connecticut, 117 conscientious objectors, 1, 84, 87, 280n22 Constitution, US, 70–71 Consumer Protection Division, NDAC, 37 contracts. See defense contracts Cooper, Richard W., 188 Coordinator of Information, 8, 20, 272n23, 294n11 Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 133. See also Rockefeller, Nelson Corey, Herbert, 124–25

351

Council of National Defense, 26, 29, 60, 73–74 Council of Social Agencies, 122 Coventry Cathedral, 59 Cowles, John, 109 Cox, Oscar, 91, 147, 148–49, 303n3 Coy, Albert Wayne, Jr., 47, 332n57 Coy, Grace Elizabeth Cady, 46–47, 62, 126–27, 222 civic involvement of, 197, 215, 232, 242 death of, 242 description of Coy in newspaper profile of, 251 McNutt’s wife and, 265n24 profiles of, 126–27, 293n125, 328n68 Coy, Philip Wayne, 47 Coy, Stephen, 47 Coy, Wayne. See also emergency management; Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM); management; politics; public administration; public policy; speeches (Coy) as BOB assistant director, 18, 48, 199–202, 199–215, 239 budget hearings, 211 management role, 209–12 resignation of, 240 responsibilities, 218–19 Byrnes and, 218, 231–32 career accomplishments, 14–16, 256 Army application, 235 chronology as a public administrator, 19–22 early career, 45 evaluation of, 246–50 as FCC chair, 241 at Federal Security Agency (FSA), 41, 48–51, 53

352 Coy, Wayne, career (continued) finding the right role for, 66–68 importance of, 246–50 in the Philippines, 47–48 as a public figure, 245–46 radio and TV management, 241 rise of, 43–64 salary, 210 as social reformer, 75 transportation board and, 67–68, 73, 274n30 as WPA state and regional director, 44–45, 46 Congressional testimony, 102–4, 211, 248 death of, 241 Democratic Party and, 45–46, 51–53, 116–18, 242 evaluation of criticism of, 9, 74–75, 95, 111, 112, 125, 224, 250–51, 262–63n2 praise for, 44–45, 59, 104, 136, 178–79, 202, 209, 211, 222, 246, 251, 266n33, 266n34, 275n66, 277n89 profiles of, 202, 209 reputation of, 44–45, 46, 49, 50–51, 59, 64, 74–76, 104, 124–26, 222, 223–24 soft on crime accusation, 263n2 visibility of, 10–11 family and, 46–47, 126–27, 197, 215, 232 health of, 51, 75, 192, 197, 235, 239–42, 264n21 Hopkins and, 44–45, 49, 53, 59 Ickes and, 49, 207–8 as LOEM, 18, 20, 65–82, 159–79 activities of, 80–82 appointment of, 20, 41, 65, 73–76

Index civil defense agency planning and, 62–64, 78–79 as de facto director of OEM, 243 jurisdiction of, 248–49 liaison role, 83–84, 108–16, 135–37, 188–90 liaison title, 244 maintenance of reasonable control by, 249 Office of Facts and Figures and, 169–70 personnel recruitment by, 193 prewar service, 20 qualifications of, 249–50 regular contacts, 146 resignation, 234–35 role of, 76–78, 83–84, 145–47, 244–46, 249 staff and budget, 160, 225, 250 threats to power of, 149–51 travel expenses, 225, 229 as a troubleshooter, 251–53 workday routine, 191–96 as LOEM and BOB assistant director, 199–215 management, 224–32 as wearing two hats, 18, 20, 22, 201, 203, 229, 234 Lubin and, 149–50, 243 management role, 7, 21, 129–58, 135–37, 181–97, 209–14, 224–32, 243 as “ax man,” 239, 330n33 coordination with other agencies, 189–90 coordination with White House, 54–58 as czar, 244–46 daily meetings and phone calls, 193–94 line and staff roles, 7, 255–56 management style, 64, 194

Index philosophy of government, 70–72 philosophy of management, 214–15, 230–31 as presidential special assistant, 73–74 upward management by, 243 McNutt and, 45, 47–50, 53, 273n33 media relations, 62, 245–46 news media and, 124–26, 178–79, 209, 223–24 nickname, 263n11 Office of War Mobilization and, 233–34 politics and, 7, 20–21, 45–46, 53–58, 101–20, 170–79, 207–9, 222–24 Congressional contacts, 101–8 Democratic Party and, 116–20 elected officials and, 195–96 leaks to the media, 94 political adroitness of, 45 punched by political adversaries, 264–65n21, 279n4 profiles of, 328n68 research sources contemporary, 15 historical interviews, 11, 259n20 literature review, 1–2 personal papers of, 15–16, 202–3 postwar memoirs and biographies mentioning, 1–2 research approach by author, 13–17 Roosevelt, Eleanor, and, 61–62, 223–24 Roosevelt and church service, 222 decision to appoint as LOEM, 68–70 relationship with, 9, 45, 47–48, 54–58, 222, 240, 241, 243, 245–46, 250, 269n75, 282n37

353

“Step on it!” memo to, 1, 90–91 support of, 53, 67–70, 243 White House visits, 45, 61–62, 63, 68–69, 126 scope of book, 17–18 Sherwood, Sidney, and, 15–16, 154–56 Smith and, 199–202, 218–19, 234, 240, 244, 298n75, 327–28n62 World War II victory and, 253 writings Advanced Management article about public administration, 3 American Political Science Review article about the presidency, 11 APSR article on federal reorganization, 241 Atlantic Monthly article promoting public administration, 176 memos and records, 191–96 memos to Roosevelt by, 15, 51, 245, 249, 298n79 public administration speech published in Vital Speeches of the Day, 3 CPA. See Civilian Production Administration (CPA) Cramer, Lawrence, 164–65, 205 Crete, 65 Crosser, Robert, 171 CSC. See Civil Service Commission (CSC) Cuff, Robert D., 10 Curtiss-Wright aircraft plant, 96–97, 220 czars. See also presidential coordinators Baruch as, 26, 106, 110–11 Byrnes as, 4, 217, 231, 233 CAS as telephone czar, 152 Coy as, 244–47 industrial mobilization and, 25–26, 32, 110

354

Index

czars (continued) McReynolds as, 302n118 OEM and, 35, 59–60 principles for evaluating, 247–50 Roosevelt’s rejection of, 32, 35, 59–60 rubber czar, 204 Czechoslovakia, 71 Davies, Norman, 12 Davis, Elmer, 276n83 daylight savings, 84, 86, 161 decision making by disinterested leaders, 130 Lincoln’s views on, 14 Roosevelt’s style of, 272n21 Defense Communications Board, 34, 261n20 defense contracts African Americans and, 96–99 announcing, 195 Democratic Party and, 117 politics and, 117–20 racial discrimination and, 98–99, 237 small business subcontracts, 195 uniform policy for, 190 defense employment housing for workers, 80, 99 WOC (without compensation), 289n58 defense policy. See national defense policy defense production. See also national defense mobilization armament buildup, 110–16, 157–58 arms production policies, 1 business interests and, 110–16, 289n59 Coy’s explanation of, 157–58 criticism of, 110–12 democracy and, 120–21

military equipment production, 220 as public policy, 220 tank production, 112, 288n52 workplace safety and, 169 Delaware River tunnel, 190 Delphi [IN] Citizen, 45 democracy defense production and, 120–21 public administration and, 123–24 social welfare and defense policy and, 71–72 in wartime, 131 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 56, 117, 222, 232 Coy, Grace, and, 126 Negro Division, 56 Women’s division, 215 Democratic National Conventions 1936, 45–46, 96 1940, 51–53, 52–53, 96 Democratic Party Coy and, 51–53, 116–18 defense contracts and, 117 employment and, 117–18 Indiana, 118–19, 171, 242, 264–65n21, 308n75 Ohio, 116, 308n76 Roosevelt’s decision to run for a third term and, 28 Denmark, 28, 71, 271n1 Department of Agriculture (USDA), 85, 88, 148, 172–73, 190, 193, 281n31 Agricultural Marketing Service, 131–32 Bureau of Plant Industry, 281n31 racial discrimination and, 99 Department of Education, 265n26 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 265n26 Department of Health and Human Services, 265n26

Index Department of Homeland Security, 79, 247 Depression, 43 Des Moines [IA] Register, 109, 131 diaries, as research sources, 16–17 Dies, Martin, Jr., 186–88 Dies Committee, 144, 186–88. See also House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) Dillinger, John, 262–63n2 disabled persons policies, 1 Disaster Management Handbook (Lee), 19 disinterested leaders, 130 District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 171 Division of Central Administrative Services. See Central Administrative Services (CAS) Division of Defense Aid Reports, 132, 133 Division of Defense Health and Welfare Services, 133 Division of Defense Housing Coordination, 37 Division of Home Defense, 63 Division of Information (DOI), 17, 38, 76, 78, 96, 113–16, 121, 132, 133, 135, 169–70, 182–83, 190, 209, 292n95, 305n42 Division of Operations, War Production Board, 156 Division of State and Local Cooperation, 37, 79 DNC. See Democratic National Committee (DNC) DOI. See Division of Information (DOI) dollar-a-year men business interests and, 113–16, 173, 192, 223 at CAS, 115, 116

355

FBI and, 213 at OEM, 113–16, 192, 249 at OPM, 113, 115, 172, 249 per diems of, 114 Roosevelt’s concerns about, 113–16, 172–73, 223, 249 WOC appointments and, 290n74 Donald, David Herbert, 14 Donovan, William, 69, 272n23, 294n11 Dort, Dallas, 141, 155, 165, 166, 174, 229, 236–37, 310n101 Douglas, Lawrence, 13 Douglas, Lewis, 306n53 Downs, Anthony, 7 draft deferments, 226–27. See also Selective Service draft evasion, 327n51. See also Selective Service Dryer, Sherman, 62 Dunkirk, 31, 71 Du Pont, 120 Early, Stephen, 27, 74, 96, 97, 166, 169, 222, 237, 273n36 Eastman, Joseph, 167 Eccles, Marriner, 58 economic policy economic stabilization, 217 price controls, 1, 104–8, 206–7, 312n7 wage stability policy, 206–7 during World War I, 106–7 economic special interest groups, 105–8. See also business interests Edson, Peter, 178 Egypt, 28 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 13, 47, 235, 242 Coy’s speech criticizing, 242 Eisenhower, Milton, 149 Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 275n70

356

Index

elected officials Coy’s interactions with, 195–96 emergency management. See also management clearing legislation, 147–49, 190 Coy’s adeptness in, 44 historical literature about, 19 need for, 26–27 as a profession, 18–19 eminent domain, 101, 102 Emmerich, Herbert, 117, 193, 290n78 criticism of OEM by, 9 employment of African Americans, 96–99, 205–6, 220–21 defense contracts, 96–99, 117–20 Democratic party and, 117–18 discrimination in, 98–99, 205–6, 220–21 of New Deal Democrats, 117–18 of noncitizens, 84, 87 at OEM, 134 price controls and, 105 shortages of qualified personnel, 225, 227 of women, 227 Employment Service. See US Employment Service EO 8248, 26 EO 8629, 33–34, 260n18 EO 8632, 261n27 EOP. See Executive Office of the President (EOP) esprit de corps, 177 Ewing, Oscar R. (Jack), 51, 117, 222 “execurats,” 7 executive branch Roosevelt’s reorganization of, 25–27, 259n5 Executive Office of the President (EOP) agencies included in, 25, 26 chief of staff for, 4

Coy and, 3, 4 creation of, 25–26 public administration and, 6–7, 254 public relations agencies in, 209 Roosevelt’s explanation of, 40 executive orders administrative orders vs., 259n8 civilian mobilization agencies created by, 182 OEM changes and, 39 OEM created by, 12 prohibiting employment discrimination in defense contracts, 98–99 Roosevelt’s preference for, 24 export controls, 133 export taxes, 81 Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), 98–99, 164, 205, 221, 285n72 Farm Bureau, 169 farm labor shortages, 84, 88 Farm Security Agency (FSA), 169 fascism. See also Nazis defeating without declaring war, 122 Faymonville, Philip, 91, 205 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FCC. See Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Fearless Fosdick, 307n70 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 293n116, 313–14n28, 314n32 African American agents, 305n34 “character and fitness” investigations, 183 loyalty investigations, 142–44, 183–87, 212–14, 227–28, 243 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 4, 80, 314n28 Coy as chair of, 241

Index federal documents, as research sources, 16 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 18–19 Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), 43–44, 45 Federal Housing Administration, 118 Federal Power Commission (FPC), 86 Federal Register, 261n27 Federal Security Agency (FSA), 21, 41, 69, 133 agencies within it, 48–49 Coy’s administration of, 49–51 creation of, 48–49 libraries, 333n13 national defense role of, 60, 61 racial equality and, 56–57 Federal Theatre Project, 44–45 Federal Works Agency, 136 FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) FEPC. See Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) FERA. See Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) Fesler, James W., 2, 9, 337 field management, of OEM, 137–40 Film Service, 265n26 Finland, 28 fire protection, in rural areas, 190 First Supplemental Civil Functions Appropriations Bill, 56 First Supplemental National Appropriation Act of 1940, 114 First War Powers Act, 303n3 Fish, Hamilton, 171 Flemming, Arthur, 2–3 Flynn, Ed, 207 Food and Drug Administration, 265n26 food production assistance, for African Americans, 221

357

food reserves in Hawaii, 84 in the Philippines, 85–86 Forbes, 209, 321n50 Foreign Economic Administration, 11, 104 Fortune, 125 Fort Wayne [IN] Journal-Carrier, 275n66 Fosdick, Raymond, 170, 307n70 Four Freedoms, 176 France declaration of war against Germany, 26 exports to, 81 German conquest of, 24 Maginot Line, 28 social welfare programs, 71 surrender to Germany by, 31–32 Frankfurter, Felix, 133, 331n46 Franklin College, 45, 46, 263n10 Coy’s speech on national defense policy at, 120–21, 291–92n95 Freedman’s Hospital, 265n26 freight transportation, 67–68, 80 French Indo-China, 32 Friedrich, Carl, 3 FSA. See Farm Security Agency (FSA); Federal Security Agency (FSA) Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, 279n6 Garner, John Nance, 51–52 gasoline rationing, 204, 219–20 General Accounting Office (GAO), 140, 226, 229 Germany aggression by, 24, 28, 31–32, 65, 71, 271n1 European social welfare programs and, 71

358

Index

Germany (continued) French and British declaration of war against, 26 invasion of USSR by, 24, 88–89, 93–94 Italy and, 281n33 submarine attacks, 32, 59, 176 tripartite agreement, 32 US loyalty investigations and, 144 Ginsburg, David, 106, 150 Gladieux, Bernard, 62, 193 Glasser, Abraham, 185–86 “good neighbor” policy, 133 “goons,” 192 Governor’s Commission on Unemployment Relief (Indiana), 45 Graham, Philip, 147, 240–41 Great Lakes Canadian-flagged ships in, 80, 84–85, 161, 162 shipping capacity expansion, 190, 308n76 shipping reports, 225 Greece defeat of, 65 US aid to, 59 Greenland, 65, 74, 271n1 Greensboro [NC] News, 75 Grundstein, Nathan D., 10 Guffey, Joseph, 62 Gulick, Luther, 1, 25, 35, 253, 333n14 criticism of OEM by, 10 Hamilton, Nigel, 282n40 Harper, Fowler, 309n83 Harris, Joseph, 3, 9, 41 Hawaii food reserve, 84, 85–86 headquarters-field relations, 1 health and social services. See also social welfare armament production and, 111–12

Coy’s social welfare policy, 70–72, 76 defense mobilization and, 60–61 human rights, 131 need for, 122 Heath, Jim F., 1, 207 Heinrichs, Waldo H., 1, 88, 95 Henderson, Leon, 85–86, 105–8, 133, 135, 142, 146, 150, 182, 204, 206, 279n6 Herman, Arthur, 289n59 Herring, George C., Jr., 1, 88, 93, 94, 95 Hillman, Sidney, 34, 55, 96, 106, 107 historical research, 13–17 back-shadowing, 14 historiographic approach, 14 retrospective views, 13–14 Hitler, Adolf, 24, 26, 27–28, 88, 158, 176, 281n33 Hobbs, Edward H., 9, 12 holding companies, 9, 10 holidays, 189 Holland, 81 Holland, Spessard, 86 Holocaust, 14 Hoover, Herbert, 31, 43 Hoover, J. Edgar, 227, 293n116, 305n34, 314n28 loyalty investigations, 142–44, 183–87, 213–14 Hopkins, Harry, 2, 4, 41, 48, 62, 112, 132, 133, 166, 208, 222, 230, 231, 272n17, 281n36, 310n102, 331n46 Civil Works Administration (CWA) and, 43 criticism of, 75 FERA and, 43–44 Lend-Lease office, 74, 75 military aid to USSR and, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95 Roosevelt and, 251

Index support of Coy by, 44–45, 59, 66 as a troubleshooter, 251 WPA and, 43–45 Horton, Robert, 76, 78, 113, 135, 140, 169–70, 185, 190, 192–93, 294n14 as head of DOI, 38 House Appropriations Committee, 6, 83, 114, 153, 211–12 House Civil Service Committee, 131 House Judiciary Committee, 303n3 House Military Affairs Committee, 233 House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 185, 186, 195. See also Dies Committee housing for African Americans, 300n102 for defense workers, 80 Roosevelt, Eleanor, and, 300–301n102 for single women, 300–301n102 Howard University, 61, 62, 96, 265n26 HUAC. See House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) Hughes, Charles Evan, Jr., 187 Hull, Cordell, 52–53, 85 human rights, 131 Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill, 279n6 Hungary, 59 ICC. See Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Ickes, Harold, 18, 64, 85, 86, 133, 151, 328n68 Coy and, 49, 207–8, 266n35 diaries, 16, 191 import taxes, 190 Indiana African Americans in, 206 Governor’s Commission on Unemployment Relief, 45

359

mineworkers, 118–19 Ohio River flooding, 44 politics, 118–20 racism in, 44 rubber conservation pledge, 219–20 Works Progress Administration (WPA), 43, 44 Indiana, University of, 3 Indiana Democratic Party, 118–19, 171, 223, 242, 264–65n21, 308n75 Coy’s undelivered speech on Eisenhower administration, 242 Indiana Department of Public Welfare, 45 Indiana Highway Commission, 119 Indiana National Guard, 329n16 Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 205 Indiana State Legislature, 46 Indiana University, Coy’s public administration speech at, 122–24 Industrial Mobilization Plan, 25–26 industry. See also business interests coal mining, 118–19 labor-management relations, 163–64 steel industry labor issues, 163–64 inflation Coy’s undelivered speech on, 242 economic stabilization and, 217 import taxes and, 190 labor-management relations and, 162 price and wage controls and, 105, 108, 206–7 information agencies. See also public relations agencies multiple, 133 public policy and, 169–70 reorganization of, 246 Institute of Public Administration, 25 Intelligence Unit, Treasury Department, 143

360

Index

Internal Revenue Code, 148 International Journal of Emergency Management, 19 International News Service, 75, 133 Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 66, 308n75 Investigations Section (CAS), 140–41 isolationists, 65, 109, 120–21, 175 isotopes, 84, 88 Italy aggression by, 28, 65, 123 Balkan campaign, 281n33 Tripartite Pact, 32, 59 Jackson, Gardner, 168 Japan aggression by, 24, 28 military aid to the Philippines and, 87 Tripartite Pact, 32 Japanese Americans, 182 Jennings, Audra, 1, 51 Johnson, George, 211 Johnson, Lyndon B., 62, 109–10, 196, 222 Johnson, Mordecai, 62, 96 Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, 81 Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, 173 journalism, as research source, 16 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19 Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 19 Justice Department, 144, 185 Kaltenborn, H. V., 179, 311n108 Kamarck, Andrew, 91 Kennedy, John F., 283n50, 293n116 Kennedy, Joseph, 171

Kent, Frank, 60 Kerr, Robert, 53 Kimble, James J., 1 Kiplinger, W. M., 11, 45, 98, 194 Kluttz, Jerry, 62, 125, 202 Knudsen, William, 2, 58, 92–93, 106, 107, 111, 113, 133, 136, 142, 154, 172 NDAC and, 30 Senate hearing, 268n69 Koistinen, Paul A., 40–41, 44, 220 on OEM, 9 Kotlowski, Dean J., 53 Krock, Arthur, 178 Kryder, Daniel, 1, 98 Labor Department, 50 Labor Division, NDAC, 37 labor-management relations dispute resolution, 162–64 interdepartmental committee for, 134 labor strikes, 131 labor unions, 99, 324n10 issues of, 162–64 national defense mobilization and, 1, 131, 134 political issues, 208, 223 price controls and, 105 report on, 192 wages and, 206 La Guardia, Fiorello, 18, 69, 79, 98, 115, 118, 174, 182–83, 290n74, 294n14 Land, Emory, 2, 167, 194 Landis, James, 183 Lanham, Fritz, 151 Leahy, William, 4, 230 Legion of Merit awards, 210 legislative clearance, 147–49, 190 LeHand, Missy, 62, 270n100, 272n17 Lehman Brothers, 115 Lelyveld, Joseph, 13, 106, 151

Index Lend-Lease program, 59, 74, 90, 92, 95, 111, 112, 146, 176, 208, 224, 251 moved to OEM, 132 quarterly reports, 161 Lewis, John L., 163, 208–9, 223 Liaison Office for Personnel Management (LOPM), 8, 26, 36, 41, 73, 261n23 McReynold’s role at, 248 Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM). See also Coy, Wayne; Office for Emergency Management (OEM) Byrnes as, 12, 236–39 Coy’s appointment as, 73–76 creation of, 20, 31–34 criticism of, 246–47 czar role and, 244–46 empowerment of, 36–38 evaluation of, 248–50 funding, 37, 38, 211 historical papers, 15 jurisdiction of, 248–49 leaving vacant, 200, 239 management and, 21–22, 135–37, 188–90, 210–11, 243 McReynolds as, 12, 35–36, 39–41 meaning of title, 35–36, 246, 251 national defense mobilization and, 111 office space for, 76–77 OWMR and, 246–47 role of, 8–9, 12–13, 17–18, 35–36, 76–78, 246–47, 250–53 staff and budget, 210, 224–25 liaison officers, 8 Library of Congress, 169–70 Manuscript Division, 15 Libya, 28 Lichtenstein, Nelson, 1 Life magazine, 222

361

Li’l Abner cartoon strip, 307n70 Lincoln, Abraham, 14 Lindbergh, Charles, 94 Lindley, Ernest K., 75, 79, 262n39, 274n55 Lippman, Walter, 31, 130 “Little Cabinet,” 209 “Little Steel” decision, 164, 206 Lloyd George, David, 231 LOEM. See Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM) London Blitz, 59 Look magazine, 109 LOPM. See Liaison Office for Personnel Management (LOPM) Los Angeles Times, 58, 86 loyalty investigations, 140–44, 183–88, 212–14, 227–28, 243 Lubin, Isadore, 149–50, 222, 243, 325n25 Lucander, David, 1, 98 Ludlow, Louis, 56–57, 118, 211 Lyons, Leonard, 175 MacArthur, Douglas, 47, 196 MacLeish, Archibald, 169–70, 246, 307n67 magazines, as research sources, 16 “maintenance of membership” labor union clause, 162 Mallon, Paul, 163, 304n9 management. See also emergency management CAS oversight, 228–29 competitive administration, 23 Coy’s philosophy of, 214–15, 230–31 Coy’s role in, 21, 129–58, 135–37, 209–14, 224–32, 243 federal reorganization, 241 liaison function as, 135–37, 210–11, 225–27, 243

362

Index

management (continued) loyalty investigations, 140–44, 183–88, 212–14, 227–28, 243 personnel issues, 225–26 Roosevelt’s philosophy of, 23–24 Roosevelt’s style of, 8, 22 unified military command, 214–15 upward, 243 wartime, 230–31 Mance, Mercer, 165, 305n34 March on Washington, 97–98 Maritime Commission, 92, 117, 167, 194 Marshall, George, 61, 90, 215, 282n41 Marshall, Thomas, 232 Martin, L. C., 137 Maryland, OEM personnel tax issues, 225 Maverick, Maury, 213–14, 223 May, Andrew, 233 May, Stacy, 150 Mayflower Hotel, 166 McCloy, John J., 64, 146, 166 McCormack, John, 195, 263n2 McIntyre, Marvin, 98, 232 McKellar, Kenneth, 160 McNutt, Paul, 45, 56, 59, 69, 124, 196, 264–65n21 Coy and, 273n33 criticism of, 50 featured in Washington Post photo supplement, 266–67n36 as FSA administrator, 49–50 as health and social services coordinator, 60 in the Philippines, 47–48 presidential aspirations, 47, 48, 52–53 speaking engagements, 265–66n28 McReynolds, William H., 7, 12, 32, 60, 73, 226, 238, 261n23, 302n118 appointed LOEM, 29, 35–36

criticism of, 39–41 evaluation of, 248 as Liaison Officer for Personnel Management, 8, 36 as LOEM, 9, 36–38, 39–41, 66, 76, 80 obscurity of, 40 OEM agency support and, 38 OEM responsibilities of, 39–41 as overseer of PR director for NDAC, 38 Public Administration Review article on OEM, 35–36 replaced by Coy as LOEM, 70 Roosevelt’s dissatisfaction with, 42 as secretary to NDAC, 29–30 Sherwood, Sidney, and, 32–33, 39–41, 260n16 US Civil Service Commission (CSC) and, 36 as wearing two hats, 18, 29–30, 35, 73 media coverage, historical research and, 16 media relations, 62. See also news media Coy and, 124–26, 178–79, 209, 223–24, 245–46 Roosevelt and, 124–26 medical care, 58 Mellett, Lowell, 62, 190, 226, 331n49 memoirs, as research sources, 16–17 memos from Coy to Roosevelt, 15, 51, 245, 249, 298n79 “Step on it!” memo, 1, 90–91 workday details revealed in, 191–96 merchant ships, 176 Merriam, Charles E., 25, 261n24, 333n14 metal shortages, 137, 167–68 Mexico, conscientious objectors in, 87 Meyer, Agnes, 62 Meyer, Eugene, 240

Index Meyer, Eugene and Agnes, Foundation, 242 military aid to the Philippines, 87–88 to USSR, 1, 11, 84, 88–95 military equipment production, 220 Military Order of the World War (I), 166 military recreation services, 170 military voting bill, 207 Mills, Charles, 165 Milton, George Ford, 11, 93, 94, 112 Minneapolis Star, 109 Monroe Doctrine, 133 morale, 122 Morgenthau, Henry, 89, 90, 91, 154, 333n2 diaries, 15 meeting transcripts, 191 Morstein Marx, Fritz, 9, 12, 27 motorcycle messengers, 77–78, 135, 250, 275–76n73 Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, 311n108 Murphy, Frank, 197 Murray, Philip, 163, 168, 208 NAACP, 97, 164 National Advisory Committee, Selective Service, 99 National Archives, 203 Site II (College Park, MD), 15–16 National Association of Manufacturers, 102 National Association of Social Workers, 242 National Bureau of Standards, 281n30 National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), 9, 37, 42, 57, 58, 59, 73, 74, 77, 113, 150 Coy as secretary of, 153 Hawaii food reserve and, 85–86

363

OEM and, 30–31, 32–34, 38 role of, 29–31 Tax Certification Section, 154 National Defense Mediation Board, 60, 162 national defense mobilization. See also defense production academic opposition to, 158 Coy and, 60–62, 84–88 Coy’s Oberlin College speech about, 156–58 criticism of, 11–12 infrastructure creation, 220 labor unions and, 1, 131, 134 management and, 130–31 public administration and, 123–24 national defense policy airplane production, 112 armament production, 110–12, 157–58 business interests and, 110–12 Coy’s philosophy of, 70–72 Coy’s promotion of, 120–22 Coy’s speeches on, 120–21, 291–92n95 Coy’s tracking of support for, 109–10 democracy and, 120–21 dollar-a-year men and, 113–16 post-World War I mood and, 120 National Emergency Council, 26, 265n26 National Housing Authority, 182 National Institute of Health, 58 National Negro Congress, 285n68 national origin, defense employment discrimination and, 285n68 National Planning Board, 25 National Resources Committee, 25 National Resources Planning Board, 26, 221 National Safety Council, 169

364

Index

National War Labor Board, 162–64 National Youth Administration (NYA), 49, 54, 55, 56, 61 Nation’s Business, 124 Navy Department, African American employment in, 164–65 Nazis. See also fascism FBI investigations and, 143–44, 293n116 threat of, 65 NDAC. See National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) Nelson, Donald, 2, 145, 168, 172, 181–82, 208–9, 214, 220, 287n29 effort to hire Coy as deputy director of WPB, 199–200 Neustadt, Richard, 109, 287–88n41 New Deal civilian defense effort and, 59–60 Depression relief under, 43–44 holding companies and, 10 OEM upgrading and, 40 as soft on Communism, 140–41 “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column and, 21 New Dealers business interests vs., 60, 113, 123, 130, 172–73 jobs for, 117–18 national defense policy and, 75 opposition for Coy for transportation board, 68 technocrats vs., 32 New Republic, 11, 125 news media. See also media relations Coy’s relationship with, 124–26, 178–79, 209, 223–24 leaks to, 94 politics, 209, 223–24 public policy and, 124–26

newspapers bylines, 274n52 news release timing, 273n36 as research sources, 16 slot editors, 274n55 support for Coy by, 275n66 news policy, 170 Newsweek, 41, 125, 250–51, 252, 262n39, 333n7 New York Herald Tribune, 104, 209, 224 New York Times, 27, 58, 107, 178, 233 Nichols, Osgood, 185 Niles, David, 222 Nimitz, Chester, 61 Nixon, Richard, 18, 301n112 presidential coordinators (super secretaries), 247–48 Nolan, Cathal, 252–53 noncitizen employment, 84, 87 North American Newspaper Alliance, 178 Norton, Mary Teresa, 325n24 Norway, 28, 71 NYA. See National Youth Administration (NYA) Oberlin College, Coy’s public administration national mobilization speech at, 156– 58 OCD. See Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) O’Daniel, W. Lee “Pappy,” 109–10 OEM. See Office for Emergency Management (OEM) OES. See Office of Economic Stabilization (OES) OFF. See Office of Facts and Figures (OFF)

Index Office for Emergency Management (OEM). See also Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM) activation of, 27–31 administration expenses, 151 African American employment in, 164–65 armament production and, 111 Brownlow and, 26–27 budget hearing, 160 character investigations, 144 civil defense agency in, 62–64, 72 communication issues, 145–47 Congressional conservative coalition and, 173–75 as consisting of Coy, Roosevelt and three motorcycles, 77 Coy’s appointment to, 69–70 Coy’s management approach, 181–91, 243 creation of, 4, 12, 20, 25–27, 40 criticism of, 8–13, 173–75 Division of Home Defense, 63 dollar-a-year men and, 113–16 field management of, 137–40 fluid nature of, 78 funding of, 137, 188–89 furniture, supplies, and equipment for, 136–37 growth of, 34, 39, 132–34, 181–83 guidebook, 78 historical research on, 13–17 as a “holding company,” 9, 10 holidays, 189 “inactive” status of, 239 legal status of, 12 Lend-Lease program moved to, 132 liaison functions of, 8, 34, 135–37 loyalty investigations, 140–44, 183–88, 227

365

management of, 21–22 McReynolds appointed to, 29 motorcycle messengers, 77–78, 135, 250, 275n73 national defense concerns and, 41–42 NDAC and, 30–31 new hire categories, 184 obscurity of, 40 office space for, 76–77, 189, 229 planning a civil defense agency within, 78–79 proper spending of federal funds, 226 property seizure and, 229 public relations agencies in, 209 racial discrimination in, 165–66 regions, 139–40 role of, 17, 28–29, 34, 36–38, 188–90 Roosevelt’s intentions for, 42 space allocation, 238 speculations on, 41 staff size, 134 travel expenses, 225, 229 wartime budget, 159–61 Office for Emergency Management (OEM) agencies, 4. See also specific agencies additional, 60 Coy’s coordination of, 145–47, 194 field management of, 138–40 growth of, 132–34, 181–83 individual needs of, 139–40 loyalty investigations, 140–44 office space for, 77, 135–36, 189, 225 public relations for, 38 shortages of qualified personnel, 225 support structure for, 38

366

Index

Office of Agricultural Defense Relations, 85, 120 Office of Alien Property Custodian, 182, 189 Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), 8, 18, 118, 136, 160, 182–83, 291n81 Coy, Grace, volunteer work at, 126–27, 232 creation of, 79, 132 dollar-a-year men at, 115 Office of Defense Transportation, 4, 167, 204, 210, 225 Office of Economic Stabilization (OES), 105, 203, 217, 233, 244 Office of Education, 49, 56 national defense training programs, 61 Office of Export Control, 133 Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), 133, 169–70, 182–83, 209, 246, 294n14 Office of Government Reports (OGR), 6, 26, 29, 62, 190, 253, 272n26 dollar-a-year men, 115 liaison officers, 8 Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 133. See also Lend-Lease program Office of the Liaison Officer (OEM), 224–25. See also Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM) Office of Price Administration (OPA), 85–86, 105, 134, 186, 204, 229, 231 loyalty investigations, 227 as statutory agency, 182 Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, 60 Office of Production Management (OPM), 32, 33–34, 37, 42, 55, 59, 83, 92, 95, 98–99, 102, 111, 112, 133, 134, 188 armament production and, 111

dollar-a-year men at, 113, 114, 115 field communication issues, 138 loyalty investigations, 144 OEM furniture, supplies, and equipment and, 136–37 OEM office space and, 135–36 reconstituted as War Production Board (WPB), 172, 181 Sherwood’s concerns about, 146 Office of Scientific Research and Development, 81, 133, 210, 237, 281n31 Office of Strategic Services, 272n23 Office of War Information (OWI), 205, 272n26, 276n83 public relations agencies in, 209 Office of War Mobilization (OWM), 18, 248 creation of, 233–34 Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR), 11, 12, 244, 328n62, 333n4 evaluation of, 247 LOEM and, 246–47 office space for Liaison Officer for Emergency Management (LOEM), 76–77 for Office for Emergency Management (OEM), 76–77, 189, 229 for Office for Emergency Management (OEM) agencies, 189, 225 Office of Production Management (OPM) and, 135–36 temporary buildings (tempos), 295n35 OGR. See Office of Government Reports (OGR) Ohio Democratic Party, 116–17, 308n76 Ohio River flooding, 44

Index Olson, Culbert, 140 OPA. See Office of Price Administration (OPA) Operation Barbarossa, 281n33 OPM. See Office of Production Management (OPM) OPM Council, 102 overtime polices, 1, 190, 209 Owens, Larry, 1 OWI. See Office of War Information (OWI) OWM. See Office of War Mobilization (OWM) OWMR. See Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) Palmer, Charles F., 80, 137, 312n10 Pan American Highway, 80 Parrish, L. E., Chicago Tribune cartoonist, 331n46 Parrish, Michael E., 10, 64, 98, 102, 112, 186, 187 Patterson, Robert P., 102 PCAM. See President’s Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM) PCAM report, 253–54 Pearson, Drew, 21, 62, 125, 196, 202 “People’s War,” 171 petroleum coordination, 133 Philadelphia Ledger, 51 Philippine Rehabilitation Commission, 241 Philippines Coy’s service in, 47–48 emergency funding for, 84 food reserve in, 85–86 high commissioner to, 207 military aid to, 87–88 policies affecting, 1 Phony War, 177

367

Poland, 26, 27, 88, 270n100 policy. See public policy politics Congressional conservative coalition, 173–75 Coy and, 7, 20–21, 45–46, 53–58, 101–20, 170–79, 207–9, 222–24 Coy’s and Ickes’s agreement on, 207–8 defending war efforts, 175–78 defense production, 110–12 Democratic Party, 51–53, 116–20 dollar-a-year men, 113–16, 172–73, 223, 249 election campaigns, 109–10 Indiana, 118–20 labor-management relations, 134, 162–64 labor unions, 208–9, 223 military voting bill, 207 national defense policy, 120–22 news media, 209, 223–24 partisan activities, 116–20 politics-public administration dichotomy and, 5, 7, 123, 254–55 poll tax, 207 in pre-war period, 101–27 price controls, 104–8 property seizure legislation, 101–4 public administration and, 5–7, 53–58, 123, 127, 200–201, 253–56, 254–55 public policy and, 127 unlimited state of emergency declared, 109 poll taxes, 169, 207 Porgy and Bess, 166 posters, 170 Post Office Department, 228–29 postwar planning business interests and, 173 Coy and, 175–76, 221

368

Index

postwar reconversion policies, 1 presidential coordinators. See also czars guiding principles for, 246–50 under Nixon, 247–48 Presidential Power (Neustadt), 287–88n41 President’s Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM), 25, 35, 253–54. See also Brownlow Committee President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 164–65 President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), 15 press conferences, 196, 245 annual, 218 Price, Don K., 2 price controls, 1, 104–8, 206–7, 312n7 Price Stabilization Division, NDAC, 37 Prichard, Edward, 1 principal liaison officers, 8 Priorities Board, 60 Procter and Gamble, 173 procurement procedures, 159 property seizure legislation, 101–4 Coy’s congressional testimony on, 102–4 Coy’s use of, 229 criticism of, 102–3 PSF. See President’s Secretary’s File (PSF) public administration ASPA and APSA and, 2–3 Atlantic Monthly article promoting, 176 Brownlow Committee and, 253–56 business administration and, 254–55 CCC camps and, 54–55 civil service employees and, 254 Coy’s discussions of, 123, 129–32, 194

Coy’s promotion of, 3, 122–24 Coy’s role in, 2–7, 17–18, 46, 53–58, 75, 129–58, 151–54, 197, 253, 256 Coy’s speeches on, 122–24, 129–32, 130–32, 156–58, 157, 175–76 disinterested leaders and, 130 history of, 5, 8–13 Indiana University speech on, 156–58 national defense mobilization and, 123–24 Oberlin College speech on, 156–58 policy making and, 5–7, 127, 254–56 politics and, 5–7, 53–58, 123, 127, 200–201, 253–56 politics-public administration dichotomy and, 5, 7, 123, 254–55 principles of, 193 professionalization of, 264n20 public interest and, 123–24 public policy and, 5–7, 53–58, 127, 254–56 Purdue University speech promoting, 175–76 Society for Advancement of Management speech on, 130–32, 157 as a tool, 214, 323n80 as troubleshooting, 250–53 upward and downward management in, 243 in wartime, 3–4 Public Administration Clearing House, 25, 46, 290n78 Public Administration Review (PAR), 2, 35 Public Administration Service, 46 Public Buildings Administration, 136 Public Health Service, 49, 50, 58

Index public interest defense and welfare and, 70 price controls and, 105 public administration and, 123–24 public policy, 219–21. See also economic policy; national defense policy antitrust law, 1, 168, 207 Canadian-flagged ships in the Great Lakes, 80, 84–85, 161, 162 conscientious objectors, 1, 84, 87, 280n22 Coy’s role in, 1, 5–7, 20, 83–99, 101–27, 161–70, 203, 204–7 daylight savings, 84, 86, 161 defense production, 110–16, 120–21, 220 draft deferments, 226–27 economic policy, 206–7 emergency management legislation, 147–49, 190 food reserve in Hawaii, 84, 85–86 health and social services, 60–61 information agencies, 133, 169–70, 246 military aid to USSR, 1, 11, 84, 88–95, 112, 204–5, 282n41, 283n52 national defense policy, 70–72, 84–88, 108–16, 120–22 news media and, 124–26 noncitizen hires, 84, 87 Philippines, 87–88, 207 politics and, 127 poll taxes, 169, 207 postwar planning, 221 presidential coordinator role and, 249 price control legislation, 104–8, 206–7, 312n7 prior to war, 83–99 property seizure legislation, 101–4, 229

369

public administration and, 5–7, 53–58, 127, 254–56 racial discrimination, 44, 56–57, 95–99, 131, 164–66, 205–6, 220–21, 237 recreational services for the military, 170 routine, 84–88 shortages, 84, 88, 137, 166–68, 204, 219–20 social welfare policy, 70–72, 76 top policy and program issues, 249 workplace safety, 169, 221, 245 public relations agencies. See also information agencies multiplicity of, 183 reorganization of, 209 Smith and, 6 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 10 Public Welfare Advisory Board, Washington DC, 242 Public Works Administration (PWA), 18, 49–50 Purdue University, 3 Coy’s speech promoting war efforts and public administration, 175–76 PWA. See Public Works Administration (PWA) “race riots,” 97, 284n65 racial discrimination, 95–99. See also African Americans banned in FSA, 56–57 barred in Selective Service Act, 56 Coy’s support for racial equality, 56–57, 131, 164–66, 205–6 in defense contract employment, 96–99 in federal contracts, 237 in housing, 99 in Indiana, 44

370

Index

racial discrimination (continued) nondiscrimination policies, 205–6 in USDA employment, 99 in wartime, 131 rail transportation, 66–68, 164, 167, 273n30 Rauh, Joe, 147, 149, 166, 167, 192, 285n68 loyalty investigation of, 186–87 Rayburn, Sam, 108 Record Group 214, 203 recreational services for the military, 170 Red Cross, 63, 135 Reed, Gordon, 172 Reeves, William D., 23 Reid, T. Roy, 164 relief payments, 190 Relyea, Harold C., 9, 28, 233, 244, 247, 333n4 Reorganization Acts, 26, 40 plans, 48, 265n26 Resolutions Committee, Democratic National Convention, 45–46 Reuss, Henry, 279n6 Riccucci, Norma M., 7 Ridge, Tom, 247 Roberts, Patrick S., 1, 79, 253 Robertson, David, 237, 238 Robinson, Mitchell L., 1, 87 Rockefeller, Nelson, 133, 144, 235. See also Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs Rockefeller Foundation, 307n70 Romania, 59 Roosevelt, Eleanor African American employment and, 98 civil defense and, 63 Coy, Grace, and, 126 Coy and, 61–62, 223–24 executive branch reorganization and, 32–33

home defense agency and, 41 housing construction priorities, 300–301n102 loyalty investigations and, 213 Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) and, 79, 118, 183 race relations and, 206 Russian War Relief and, 215 Sherwood, Sidney, and, 146 volunteerism and, 277n87 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 1936 reelection campaign, 45–46 African Americans and, 96–99 annual press conference, 218 appointment of businessmen to war agencies and, 208–9 appoints Coy LOEM, 68–70, 73, 74 appoints McNutt as high commissioner of the Philippines, 47 appoints McReynolds LOEM, 35–36 Army mobilization and, 54–56 Brownlow Report and, 253, 255–56 Byrnes’s resignation as LOEM and, 238–39 Coy’s appointment to BOB assistant director and, 199–202 Coy’s LOEM role and, 83–84 Coy’s meetings with, 45, 47–48, 54–58, 55–56 Coy’s memos to, 15, 245, 249, 298n79 Coy’s relationship with, 9, 45, 47–48, 54–58, 59, 64, 222, 240, 241, 243, 245–46, 250, 269n75, 282n37 criticism of, 110 daylight savings and, 86 decision-making style, 272n21 declaration of limited national emergency, 65

Index declaration of unlimited state of emergency, 109 declaration of war, 24 defense mobilization and, 110–12 Depression relief and, 43 dollar-a-year men and, 113–16, 172, 223 efforts to avoid European war, 282n40 executive branch reorganization, 25–27, 32–34, 259n5 fireside chat on national defense policy, 108–9 Four Freedoms, 176 Hopkins and, 251 Indiana politics and, 118–19 leadership style, 253, 272n21 Lend-Lease program and, 59, 132 LOEM empowered by, 37–38 management philosophy, 23–24, 30–31, 35–36 management style, 8, 22, 149–51, 312n10 media relations, 124–25 on medical care, 58 military aid to USSR and, 1, 11, 88–95 morale and civil defense, 63 names suggested for war, 171, 308n81 National Institute of Health dedication by, 58 notes on meetings with, 191 OEM and, 9, 10, 25–27, 38, 77, 78–79, 80–82 Office of War Mobilization (OWM) and, 233–34 Official Files (OF), 15 on poll taxes, 169 preference for executive orders over Congressional action, 24 President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), 15

371

press conferences, 196, 245 pre-war national defense concerns, 41–42 price controls and, 105–8 property seizure legislation and, 101–4 public administration and, 6–7 public relations programs and, 183 racial issues and, 54, 57 relationship with McReynolds, 9 reorganization of OEM agencies and, 182–83 Sherwood, Sidney, and, 154–56 shortages and, 204 “Step on it” memo, 1, 90–91 third term, 28, 51–53, 66, 267n46 transportation board and, 66–68, 73 Truman’s first meeting with, 332n57 as wanting dictator powers, 102, 173 War Production Board and, 181–82 on workplace safety, 169, 245 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, Library, 11, 15–16, 203 Rose, Maurice, 62 Rosenberg, Anna, 62 Rosenman, Samuel, 2, 94, 133–34, 168, 178, 182, 222, 233, 235, 283n52, 306n60, 331n46 Rosenwald, Lessing, 115 Rossiter, Clinton L., 9 Rowe, James, 37, 62, 66, 67, 109–10, 114, 115, 117, 118, 143–44, 154–55, 165, 172, 222, 256, 331n48 Rozell, Mark J., 244 rubber and tire shortages, 166, 204 DOI suggestions to reduce driving, 305n42 rubber conservation, 210, 219–20 Russell, Richard, 285n73 Russia. See USSR

372

Index

Russian War Relief, 205, 215 Saltonstall, Leverett, 109 Salvage Division, 168 Sander, Alfred Dick, 9 satisficing, 14, 16, 158 Saturday Evening Post, 224 Sayre, Francis, 207 Scholz, Richard, 77, 78, 107, 138, 145, 276n82 Schricker, Harry F., 118, 223, 325n29 science R&D, 1 scrap iron shortages, 167–68 Scripps-Howard news service, 201 Sears, Roebuck, 115 Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1941, 248, 273n32 Secret Service, 94 Selective Service African Americans and, 54, 55–56, 99 draft deferments, 226–27 draft evasion, 327n51 morale of, 80 Selective Service Act racial discrimination barred in, 56 Social Security and, 54, 57–58 Senate Agriculture Committee, 106 Senate Appropriations Committee, 159–60, 173–74, 212, 236 Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 68 Senate Military Affairs Committee, 102–3 Sewell, Sumner, 109 Sherwood, Sidney, 2, 58, 76, 87, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 183, 250, 298n79, 302n118 as assistant LOEM, 154–56 CAS and, 39, 153 criticism of Coy by, 251 emergency management reorganization and, 32

McReynolds and, 39–41, 260n16 OEM and, 37, 38 papers, 15 responsibilities of, 39–40 Roosevelt and, 32–33, 154–56, 260n16 shipping Canadian-flagged ships in Great Lakes, 80, 84–85, 161, 162 coastal vs. rail, 167 convoy protection system, 167 rail transportation, 66–68, 164, 167, 273n30 truck transportation, 66–68, 81, 278n106 wartime losses, 167, 204 shortages DOI suggestions to reduce driving, 305n42 farm labor, 84, 88 gas rationing, 204, 219–20 metal, 137, 167–68 products and infrastructure, 166–68 rubber and tires, 166–67, 204, 219–20 scrap iron, 167–68 Simon, Herbert A., 14 Sloan, Donald, 264n20 Slovakia, 59 small business, 195 Smaller War Plants Corporation, 223 Smith, Harold, Papers, 15 Smith, Harold D., 35, 37, 57, 62, 66, 69, 73, 75, 81, 107, 133, 137, 145, 158, 159, 168, 178, 182, 188, 222, 229, 238, 330n33, 331n46, 331n50 CAS and, 229 civil defense agency planning and, 63, 64, 78–79 considered for chief of staff of the EOP, 230–31

Index Coy and, 202, 218–19, 234, 240, 244, 298n75, 327–28n62 Coy’s appointment as BOB assistant director and, 199–202 Coy’s political involvement and, 200–201, 209 health of, 320n23 meeting notes, 191 OEM and, 38, 136–37 public administration and, 6–7, 200–201 role in administration, Life magazine, 325n25 Snow, Edgar, 224 socialism Coy and, 111 property seizure legislation as, 102–3 socialized medicine, 58 Social Science Research Council Committee on Public Administration (CPA/SSRC), 3, 6 Social Security, 48, 54, 57–58 Social Security Act, 50 Social Security Board, 48, 109 social welfare. See also health and social services armament production and, 111–12 Coy’s philosophy of, 70–72, 76, 120–22 Coy’s speeches on, 70–72, 122, 272n28 in Europe, 71 need for, 122 totalitarianism and, 71 social work, 122 Society for Advancement of Management, 3 Coy’s speech on public administration at, 130–32, 157 Society for Public Administration, 2. See also American Society for Public Administration Society for [Public] Personnel, 221

373

Sollenberger, Mitchell A., 244 Somers, Herman Miles, 4, 9, 11, 233, 238, 246–50, 287n29, 328n62, 333n4 Somervell, Brehon B., 214 Soviet Union. See USSR Sparrow, Bartholomew H., 1 speeches (Coy) Alabama joint conference speech on national defense and social welfare, 70–72, 272n28 American Society for Public Administration speech on management, 129–32 Franklin College speech on national defense policy, 120–21, 291–92n95 Indiana Democratic Party undelivered speech on Eisenhower administration, 242 Indiana University speech on public administration, 122–24 Kentucky and Indiana social welfare conferences speech on social work and national defense, 122 Oberlin College speech on public administration, public service, and national mobilization, 156–58 Purdue University speech on war efforts and public administration, 175–76 Society for Advancement of Management speech on public administration, 130–32, 157 Washington [DC] Council of Social Agencies speech on social services, 122 Stalin, Joseph, 27, 28, 89, 93 Stanford University Board of Trustees, 151 State Department conscientious objectors and, 87

374

Index

Steele, Richard W., 1, 190 steel industry, 163–64, 206 Steel Workers Organizing Committee, 208 St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 265n26 “Step on it!” memo, 1, 90–91 Stettinius, E. R., 161, 166 Stimson, Henry, 89, 91, 93, 282n41 St. Lawrence Seaway, 84, 88, 281n32 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 125 Stone, Donald, 46, 62 Straus, Robert W., 192 subversive investigations, 184–88, 227 subversive organizations, 142 Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB), 134, 145, 159, 181 Supreme Court, 25, 51 Talmadge, Eugene, 86 Tammany Hall Democratic machine, 307n70 tanker regulations, 177 tank production, 112, 288n52 Tarkington, Booth, 53 Tax Certification Section, NDAC, 154 taxes export taxes, 81 import taxes, 190 income tax issues in Maryland, 225 poll taxes, 169, 207 tax amortization certificates, 153–54 technocrats, 32 telephone switchboards, 146, 152, 228, 299n80 temporary buildings (tempos), 295n35 tenant farmers, 169 Time magazine, 64, 67, 79, 94, 125, 182, 202, 251, 276n82, 277n89, 283n50, 333n7 tire shortages, 166, 204 Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad, 164

totalitarianism, 71 Townsend, Clifford, 85, 264–65n21 Transportation Act of 1940, 66 transportation board of investigation and research, 66–68, 73, 273n30 Transportation Division, NDAC, 37 transportation system board of investigation and research, 66–68, 73 rubber shortages and, 166–67 voluntary agreements, 210 travel expenses, 225, 229 Treasury Department, 25, 37 Intelligence Unit, 143 loyalty investigations and, 212–14 “Minute-man” symbol on stationery, 135 Tripartite Pact, 32, 59 troubleshooting, public administration as, 250–53 truck transportation, 66–68, 81 size and weight limits in Kentucky, 278n106 Truman, Harry S., 13, 196, 241, 325n29, 332n57 Truman Committee (Senate), 309n92 Truman Presidential Library, 15 Tully, Grace, 2, 62 tutuol, 92 Tydings, Millard, 173–74, 236, 305n42, 309n93 Tydings Committee (Senate), 173–74 UMW. See United Mine Workers (UMW) unified military command, 214–15 Union Oil Company of California, 208–9 United Kingdom Battle of Britain, 32 Crete and, 65 declaration of war against Germany, 26

Index German aggression and, 71 German submarine attacks against, 32, 59, 176 Lend-Lease supplies to, 111, 112, 176 London Blitz, 59 military aid to USSR and, 89, 91–92 US aid to, 59, 65, 122 US alliance with, 282n40 United Mine Workers (UMW), 118–19, 163, 223 United Nations, 4, 214, 230, 253 United Press (UP), 62, 79 United Russian War Relief, 284n56 United Service Organization (USO), 61, 170 United States News, 125 United War Relief Drive, 205 upward management, 243 uranium, 84, 88 Urban Land Institute, 241–42 USDA. See Department of Agriculture (USDA) US Employment Service, 49, 54, 56, 61, 229 US Government Manual, 8, 29, 164, 239 US House (source), 25, 48, 78, 83, 86, 88, 102, 113, 133, 147, 153, 161, 188, 189, 211–12, 228, 229, 248 US Information Service (OGR), 29 USO. See United Service Organization (USO) US Senate (source), 4, 50, 104, 152, 160, 174, 190, 212, 236, 248 USS Indiana, 118, 291n83 USSR criticism of military aid to, 88–89 German invasion of, 24, 88–89, 93–94 loyalty investigations and, 144, 183, 186

375 military aid to, 1, 11, 84, 88–95, 112, 122, 204–5, 282n41, 283n52 relief work, 205, 207, 232 warming of relations with, 95

Van Nuys, Frederick, 262n2 Vaughn, David, 187–88 Vaughn, Justin S., 244 Victory Bond Rally, 206 Victory production program, 159 Villalobos, José D., 244 Vital Speeches of the Day, 3, 124 vocational training, 54 volunteerism, 118, 122, 126–27, 277n87 Civil Air Patrol pilots, 322n62 civil defense groups, 63 Volunteer Participation Committee, 277n87 voting absentee, 207, 232 military voting bill, 207 poll taxes and, 169, 207 wage controls, 106, 108 wage stability policy, 206–7 Wagner, Robert, 46 Walker, Frank, 171 Wallace, Henry A., 52–53, 64, 167, 325n29 Wall Street Journal, 67 Walter-Logan administrative procedures bill, 310n103 war bond sales, 1 War Chest Campaign, 205 War Department, 48, 152 antitrust law and, 148 contracting policy and, 190 military aid to USSR and, 89, 92, 94, 95 property seizure legislation and, 102–3 racial discrimination and, 166

376

Index

War Industries Board, 106, 286n21 War Labor Board, 171, 175, 206 War Manpower Commission (WMC), 4, 182, 205, 227, 309n83 loyalty investigations, 227 War Production Board (WPB), 4, 156, 168, 181–82, 193, 204, 208–9, 220, 229, 287n29 Coy considered for deputy director of, 199–200 dollar-a-year men and, 172–73 loyalty investigations, 227 War Relocation Authority, 182, 193 War Shipping Administration (WSA), 167, 182, 194, 204, 210, 306n53 wartime economy human rights and, 131 price controls and, 104–8 public administration and, 3–4 shortages, 84, 88, 136–37, 166–68, 204, 219–20, 305n42 Washington, George, 28 Washington Committee for Democratic Action, 284n60 Washington Daily News, 138, 145 Washington [DC] Council of Social Agencies Coy’s speech on social services at, 122 “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column, 21, 49, 125, 178, 196, 266n33 Washington Post, 27, 49, 57, 62, 86, 122, 147, 202, 232, 239–40 Coy’s career at, 240–41 criticism of OEM by columnist in, 8–9 photo supplement, 266–67n36 Washington Star, 74, 104, 107, 122, 126 Washington Times-Herald, 125, 126, 293n125 Wasielewski, Thad, 171

water transportation, 66–68, 80, 84–85 Watson, Edwin M., 62, 69, 277n96, 298n79 Wheeler, Burton, 109 White, Walter, 97, 164 White House Office, 261n23 White House Press Office, 102 Wickard, Claude, 85, 172–73. See also Department of Agriculture (USDA) Wilkie, Wendell, 205, 209 Wilson, Woodrow, 24, 68, 232, 273n30, 303n3, 323n80 power to requisition property, 101–2 wartime economy and, 106 WMC. See War Manpower Commission (WMC) WOC (without compensation) appointments, 289n58, 290n74 women civil defense and, 63 as motorcycle messengers, 275n73 regularly meeting with Coy, 299n81 single, housing for, 300–301n102 in US House of Representatives, 325n24 wartime employment of, 227 workplace safety, 169, 221, 245 Works Progress Administration (WPA) Coy’s roles in, 43–45, 46 function of, 49–50 Indiana, 43, 44 World War I power to requisition property during, 101–2 wartime economy during, 106–7 World War II Coy’s defense of war efforts, 175–78 esprit de corps and, 177 events leading up to US entry into, 26, 27–28, 31–32, 59, 65

Index property requisition laws during, 101–2, 103 regulations hampering conduct of, 176–77 Roosevelt’s efforts to avoid European war, 282n40 Roosevelt’s name suggestions for, 171, 308n81 US declaration of war, 24

377

WPB. See War Production Board (WPB) WSA. See War Shipping Administration (WSA) Yugoslavia, 65 Zimmerman, Raymond, 294n1