Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674368712, 9780674368705

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GERMANY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

W R I T T E N U N D E R T H E AUSPICES O F C E N T E R FOR I N T E R N A T I O N A L HARVARD

UNIVERSITY

THE

AFFAIRS

GERMANY AND

THE

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE The Interaction of Strategy and Politics

JAMES L. RICHARDSON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE,

MASSACHUSETTS I966

©

COPYRIGHT 1 9 6 6 B Y THE

PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE A L L RIGHTS RESERVED PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN B Y OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, LONDON L I B R A R Y OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD N U M B E R 6 6 - 1 3 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

was made possible by the Harvard Center for International Affairs, where I spent the two academic years 19611963 and where most of the chapters were drafted. Through its scholarly program and its wealth of contacts with Washington policymaking, the Center offers unique advantages for the study of contemporary foreign policy and strategy. I am especially grateful to its Director, Robert R. Bowie, and Faculty Members Henry A. Kissinger and Thomas C. Schelling; association with them has immeasurably enriched my understanding of the problems treated in the book. T o Thomas Schelling I am particularly indebted, not only for constant stimulus and support, but also for the care with which he read the drafts of the book and his fruitful suggestions for its improvement. In the formative stage of the work I benefited greatly from discussion with my fellow Research Associates at the Center — Morton H. Halperin, Robert A. Levine, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Fred C. Iklé, and Johan J. Hoist, all of whom commented on considerable sections of the manuscript. Morton Halperin, in addition to valuable comments on the whole of the manuscript, made freely available his unrivaled collection of materials on strategy and arms control. Less directly but no less certainly, my book profited from my participation in the Joint Harvard-M.I.T. Arms Control Seminar and from discussion with the Fellows of the Harvard Center, in particular Jörg Kastl and Gunther van Well. At a later stage, very valuable comment and criticism on the whole manuscript was made by Kenneth N . Waltz, and extensive comments were made by Glenn H. Snyder and Agnes Headlam-Morley. Karl Kaiser commented in detail on the chapters on Germany, and suggestions on specific points were offered by Hedley Bull, Nathan Leites, and Neville Brown. Anthony King made a very valuable contribution at the proof stage. Thanks to all of these, many faults have been removed; for those which remain, the author's own obstinacy is fully responsible.

Τ

, HIS BOOK

ν

A

cknowledgments

Research on German military policy, on which Part I is based, was carried out in 1959-61, while I was a student of Nuffield College, Oxford; it is a pleasure to thank the Warden and Fellows of the College for their support for my early research and again to thank Professor Headlam-Morley of St. Hugh's College, Oxford, who has guided my research on Germany over a long period. The chapters on Germany owe much to interviews and discussions with members of the Bundestag from all three leading parties and with officials of the German Foreign Office and Defense Ministry, who gave liberally of their valuable time. I must also thank the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, and in particular Uwe Neriich, for assisting me in arranging a brief but fruitful visit to Bonn in late 1963. Of the many libraries and librarians who assisted the work, I must mention especially the library of the Bundestag, in particular its Press Library, whose materials are invaluable for the study of contemporary German politics. I wish to thank the R A N D Corporation for permission to quote from the R A N D Corporation translation of V . D. Sokolovskii's Soviet Military Strategy, the Council on Foreign Relations for permission to reproduce a text from Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952·, and the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies for permission to quote from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Finally, I should like to thank Robert Erwin, Editor of Publications at the Harvard Center, for his friendly help with the final revision; Mrs. Ann Jacobs, whose further editing removed many flaws of style and expression; and Mrs. Connie Janssen, who bore the greatest burden of the typing of successive drafts of the book with remarkable good humor and efficiency. James L. Richardson London, England August 2, 1965

vi

CONTENTS

Introduction PART

3 I. WEST

GERMAN

POLICY

IN

NATO

ι Germany's Alignment with the West, 1949-1951 2 Western Alliance versus Neutralization, 1952-1955 3 Germany Adapts to NATO's Nuclear Strategy, 1956-1960 4 German-Allied Discord, 1961-1963 PART 5 6

II. THE

SOVIET

THREAT

The Soviet Political Challenge Soviet Military Policy PART

91 116

III. NATO

STRATEGY

7 Deterrence and War: A General Analysis 8 Defense in Europe 9 Deterrence in Europe 10 Nuclear Control h Arms Control PART 12 13 14 15 16

IV. THE

BERLIN

135 159 183 199 224 CRISIS

Pressure and Resistance The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960 The Crisis Continues, ¡961-1962 Soviet Objectives and Interests Issues in Western Policy

245 264 279 301 314

PART V. GERMAN-ALLIED PROBLEMS OF REUNIFICATION 17 18 19

11 24 39 63

RELATIONS: AND DETENTE

German Reunification: The Interests of the Powers Toward a Policy for German Reunification Germany and Its Allies

339 361 378

Index

395 vii

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This study will examine some of the interrelations between two central problems of contemporary international politics: the orientation of Germany and the political and strategic implications of nuclear weapons. There is no dearth of writings on each of these questions in isolation. Since the early postwar period, journalists and academic analysts have contributed to a steady stream of works on Germany, and in recent years a large number of American scholars and theorists have turned their attention to the problems of nuclear strategy. However, with some few notable exceptions, the strategic literature has paid remarkably little attention to the political problems which not only complicate strategic choices but may even, to use a current idiom, determine the rules according to which the game of strategy is to be played. It is one thing to deplore the separation between the two universes of discourse, the political and the strategic, quite another to relate them in practice. There are no simple relationships between strategy and politics, indeed, no simple boundaries between the two: military strategy is an integral part of foreign policy, as is economic planning, for example, in the case of domestic policy. However, just as many politicians have no knowledge of economics and some economists lack political judgment, most strategists and politicians inhabit different worlds. This mutual incomprehension is reflected in the two opposing complaints, the strategists' lament that governments do not take military considerations seriously, and the political charge that Western diplomacy has been hamstrung by the dominance of the same military considerations. Such formulations illustrate the indeterminate nature of our concepts of the political and the military. T h e study will examine some of the issues underlying both charges. These include, on the one hand, the constraints that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has imposed on Germany and the question whethe:

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance N A T O policies have prevented desirable political settlements with the Soviets, as many critics of Western policy have argued. The strategists' complaint, on the other hand, is not directed against the priority of political objectives as such, but against the politicians' frequent lack of concern with the implications of decisions in military policy, in a period when the options available and the level of risks in future crises or wars depend very greatly on the choices made today. The strategist is not seeking greater influence by the military (service interests and pressures may impede over-all design of policy) but is advocating a firm coordination of military policy, based on a systematic examination of contingencies and evaluation of military options. One purpose of the present study is to suggest in some detail what might be implied in such an approach to contemporary European military problems. A n y contemporary study will be deeply influenced by the circumstances of the time of its writing. This is usually described, rather misleadingly, as the problem of keeping up with events; what is more important than the stream of events as such is the way in which international situations undergo a process of gradual change, the perception of which alternately lags behind or advances beyond the "objective" changes in the situation. Thus the period starting in the later 1950's was one in which the balance of power within the Western alliance was changing. Europe's economic strength, America's corresponding balance-of-payments problem and Charles de Gaulle's successful termination of the Algerian war created a new freedom of maneuver for France and brought about a new climate of opinion in which Europe no longer felt constrained to follow the American lead in alliance policy: de Gaulle's intransigence in the early 1960's may be contrasted with France's reluctant acceptance of German rearmament a decade earlier. De Gaulle's rejection of the Nassau Agreement and the British bid to enter Europe (in January 1963) ushered in a brief period in which it appeared possible that Europe as a whole might support his challenge to American leadership. B y the end of 1963, however, it was clear not only that most Europeans wished to preserve existing links with the United States, but also that Europe would have to assume a greater share in the responsibility for its own defense (as well as its burden), though it remained quite unclear how this might be realized in practice. German attitudes in this period have been influenced first and 4

Introduction foremost b y the Berlin crisis, which reinforced an already strong sense of dependence on the Western alliance, and more especially on the United States. This effect of the crisis may have been even more significant than the strain in American-German relations over policy differences: whereas a new tension was caused at the head-of-government level, German public opinion as a whole became more strongly committed to the Atlantic alliance, the only means of securing W e s t Berlin against Soviet and East German pressure. One of the most important of today's uncertainties is the effect of a prolonged relaxation of Soviet pressure on Berlin — if indeed the relaxation since the end of 1962 should prove to be more than temporary. T h e book is divided into five parts. Part I gives an account of West German foreign and military policy from the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949 to the end of 1963. Basically, German policy was exceptionally stable, and not only because of Adenauer's leadership. German policy was determined b y an acute sense of vulnerability, exposure to a hostile power. Western opinion generally, mindful of W o r l d W a r II and impressed b y German economic recovery, has greatly exaggerated the importance of adventurism and irredentism in contemporary Germany and equally underestimated the German concern for external security, which has proved a far more important determinant of policy than Germany's economic strength. Somewhat paradoxically, the constant priority accorded to security has led to rapid changes in concrete German objectives and preoccupations, as Germany has had to respond to changes in American and Soviet policy. Throughout, however, G e r many's interest in the alliance proved stronger than the strains and tensions of alliance membership. Nonetheless, like any alliance, N A T O will survive only so long as most of its members feel that they are subject to external threat and that the alliance offers adequate security. In 1964, fifteen years after the signing of the N A T O treaty and five years before the time when its members may opt to withdraw, both propositions were coming to be questioned, though less so in Germany than elsewhere. T h e Soviet policy of détente, like each previous relaxation in the Soviet line, had sparked questioning whether the Soviets still represented a military threat to Western Europe; and many in Europe had come to feel uneasily that, to the extent that there was such a 5

Germany and the Atlantic

Alliance

threat, the traditional N A T O strategy, relying ultimately on America's willingness to employ nuclear weapons to protect Europe, could no longer be relied on when America itself had become vulnerable to Soviet missiles. Parts II and III take up these issues in turn. Part II inquires whether the alliance is still necessary in today's changing circumstances: is the Soviet-Western conflict still sufficiently acute to determine the alignments of the European states, or is N A T O essentially a survival from an earlier period? Even granting some degree of conflict, what purposes can be served by military policy in the radically changed conditions of the nuclear age? Soviet military policy can be appraised only from the outside; in the case of Western policy (treated in Part III) it is possible to trace in some detail the thinking of the decisionmakers. Part III turns to N A T O strategy, examining the conflicting views (often but not always American-European differences) on deterrence, ground defense, the control of nuclear weapons, and arms restraints in Europe. The analysis necessarily draws heavily on the American strategic literature, the only body of writing which has examined the problems of nuclear strategy systematically in the light of the insights of a wide range of scholarly disciplines. If the conclusions in the main lend support to American strategic doctrine, the emphasis is less on policy conclusions than on the attempt to explore and evaluate a wide set of considerations bearing on strategic choices. Part I V turns from strategic analysis (necessarily speculative) to an examination of the actual political struggle between the Soviets and the Western powers initiated by Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum of November 1958, conducted in the shadow of thermonuclear war. For four years the two sides engaged in a protracted contest of will, evenly matched with respect both to caution and obstinacy, each apparently determined to avoid a showdown, Khrushchev as reluctant to abandon his challenge as the West to make any substantial concession to purchase a relaxation of Soviet pressure, until the Cuban crisis of 1962, which appeared to convince Khrushchev that gains could be won only at excessive risk. The Berlin crisis offers a rich source of material on Soviet objectives in Europe in the recent past and on the difficulties of concerting policy among the Western powers, whose interests and priorities inevitably diverge. Western diplomacy, in particular that of the United States and Britain, 6

Introduction escaped major political losses more by good fortune than good judgment, and largely through the Soviet failure to make the most of the opportunities offered them. Though prepared to risk all for Berlin, America and Britain were strangely blind to the importance, in German eyes, of the principle of the nonrecognition of East Germany. Part V explores further the problems of Germany's relations with its allies, focusing on the issue of German reunification. Notwithstanding Germany's exceptional degree of commitment to the alliance, it is possible that geography and the German partition may offer both the opportunity and the incentive for a shift of alignment. Along with Berlin and the security of West Germany itself, reunification may be crucial for the future of German-allied relations. There is no natural convergence of interests on reunification: Germany's allies cannot avoid ambivalent attitudes. It is necessary to ask whether, given a strong but not overriding interest in common action, a basis can be found for a common policy, and also whether and in what circumstances reunification might become feasible. T h e issue is unlikely to lead to German pressure for war, but rather to pressure on Western diplomacy. In times of tension, Bonn is apt to interpret any weakening on "the German question" as a sign of allied betrayal, but in periods of détente German pressure may become even more insistent, especially if détente consists in tensionreducing moves in Central Europe which leave the German partition unchanged. Very broadly, the Soviets are interested in arms control in Europe in order to cement the political status quo, the United States and Britain in order to contribute to global relaxation, and the Germans in order to open the way to a "political settlement," that is, reunification. Allied diplomacy of a conventional kind may well be insufficient to bridge these divergences: we shall see that their resolution may require the emergence of what could properly be called an Atlantic community. Inevitably, a contemporary political study is deeply influenced by the author's value judgments. One such judgment, affecting even the language used to describe N A T O , should be made clear at the outset. T h e author supports the idea of Atlantic community as a longterm aim and employs the terms "Atlantic" and "Western" as something more than geographical expressions. These terms are used in this study to indicate, not indeed an identity of interests or an ab7

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance sence of conflicting interests, but the presence of important common interests, especially but not exclusively as regards external security. 1 Only the incorrigibly sanguine could suppose that an Atlantic community is close to achievement. But at the present time it may be more appropriate to point to the traces of "community" which already exist in Western relationships: however short of the ideal, they already go far beyond what has been customary in peacetime alliances. Some prerequisites for an Atlantic community have been realized by the statesmen of the postwar period; whether the vision can be given form and reality will depend on the coming political generation. ' F o r a discussion of the concepts of Atlantic community and partnership, see James L . Richardson, " T h e Concept of Atlantic Community," Journal of Common Market Studies (October 1964), pp. 1-22.

S

PART I

WEST GERMAN POLICY IN NATO

CHAPTER 1

GERMANY'S ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST, 1949-1951

Adenauer's Foreign

K

Policy1

was elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic on September 17, 1949. From the outset he dominated the conduct of foreign policy, negotiating with the Allied High Commissioners and frequently taking the most vital decisions without consulting his cabinet. He had attained a position of uncontested leadership of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) even before the foundation of the Federal Republic; his continued electoral success and his control over the party enabled him to retain the decisive voice in foreign policy. 2 T o an exceptional extent then, the study of West German foreign policy must be based on an appraisal of Adenauer. It is true that his policies can be viewed as a reflection of the basic values of the West Germans: a sense of community with the Western powers, extreme aversion to the prospect of Communist rule and commitment to the "European idea" in place of a discredited nationalism. But German values were in fact more complex and contradictory: public opinion as a whole remained more nationalist than European (in contrast to "elite" opinion), and reunification was as prominent as the other values mentioned. Furthermore, public opinion was reluctant to adONRAD A D E N A U E R

1 There is as yet no scholarly study of Adenauer's foreign policy. T h e authorized biography b y Paul W e y m a r , Konrad Adenauer (London: André Deutsch, 1957), contains useful material for the period to 1955. Wilhelm G . G r e w e , Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, i960) contains a comprehensive collection of articles and papers which offer valuable insight into the thinking of the German Government. T h e first volume of Adenauer's memoirs (the translation to be published b y Regnery) throws additional light on the period to 1953. 2 Adenauer's rise to party leadership is examined in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU ( T h e Hague: Nijhoff, i960). T h e development of the C D U ' s Western orientation and the subsequent role of foreign policy as a factor in party unity are discussed b y Heidenheimer, on pp. 9 2 - 1 1 4 and 205-229, respectively. (For convenience, this study uses the short form " C D U , " not the complete " C D U / C S U " [Christian Social Union] except where the C S U acted independently of the remainder of the Party.)

West German Policy in TS!ATO mit the fleéd to choose between different values or objectives; Adenauer showed a marked capacity for decisive choice. It can be argued that in reality West Germany had no choice in the major decisions fixing its alignment with the West, that any government would have had to follow the same course as Adenauer. But while a strong case can be made for this view, it does presuppose the existence of an effective and responsible government, a condition that can hardly be taken for granted. Weak governments can all too easily rationalize the evasion of hard choices. Moreover, Adenauer's consistent priority for the Western alliance over the search for reunification — his most disputed political choice — was so controversial among responsible Germans that it cannot be rightly described as the only possible course open to Germany. Adenauer's claim to greatness in foreign policy, however, rests not only on his firmness in committing Germany to a Western orientation, but even more on his persistence in working toward an ideal that may come to transform the European state system — political integration. N o other European leader was for so long in a position to influence the fortunes of European integration; Adenauer, though seldom the initiator of new ideas, consistently provided the indispensable support of a leading power for each European initiative. Adenauer took little interest in the details of military policy. He saw the German military contribution as a prerequisite for the achievement of his objectives: only by participation in the alliance could Germany claim allied protection, without which its political freedom would be constantly threatened. If the vision of a united Europe served as a long-term objective, Adenauer's more immediate goals were to regain German sovereignty and achieve acceptance into the international community, to promote the solidarity of the alliance and in particular to promote Franco-German cooperation. Only after i960, partly through disagreement with the new military strategy of the Kennedy Administration, partly as an inevitable consequence of the growth of the Bundeswehr, did certain distinctive German views on military policy become apparent. Although Germany remained more single-mindedly committed to N A T O than any other European member state, its special geographical situation made it fearful of the new tendencies in American strategic thinking. Inevitably, Adenauer also sought to increase Germany's strength and influence: the achievement of his broader aims strengthened ι 2

Germany's

Alignment

with the West,

194.9-1

Germany's position, which in turn lent weight to his European and alliance policies. What is remarkable is the restraint with which Adenauer sought to enhance German influence. In the military field, for example, while resisting any discrimination imposed on Germany from outside, he adhered unconditionally to the unilateral renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons offered to N A T O in 1954 as part of the political framework for Germany's entry into the alliance. Moreover, Germany has been the only member state willing to place the whole of its armed forces under N A T O command; in marked contrast to Gaullist France, Germany has not sought greater national military independence, has not sought to use the commitment of troops to N A T O as a source of bargaining leverage, but has held out the ideal of military integration as the goal appropriate to all N A T O members. Further, by renouncing a national command structure or a General Staff 3 and by encouraging logistic interdependence, especially with the United States forces, German policy has deliberately renounced options for independent military action and in particular the use of force for irredentist aims. Thus the notion that beneath the surface of the European statesman lurked a traditional German nationalist — that German strength was in reality Adenauer's overriding objective — need not be taken seriously. His record speaks convincingly for the genuineness of his commitment to the uniting of Europe. While documentation of Adenauer's private thinking on foreign policy is still lacking, chance provided Der Spiegel with a unique opportunity to record a private discussion between Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Joseph Bech (Foreign Minister of Luxemburg) — Der Spiegel's reporter having overheard a midnight conversation during the London Conference (late September 1954) which worked out the basis for Germany's entry into N A T O after the collapse of the European Defense Community (EDC); the general accuracy of the report was not challenged. "That I should be compelled to remake the German national army is nonsense, Herr Bech. It is grotesque . . . ! "I am one hundred percent convinced that the German national army, to which Mendès-France is driving us, will be a great danger for both " T h e Planning Staff in the German Defense Ministry is very small, its members are of relatively junior rank, and it regards itself as subordinate to S H A P E , w o r k ing within its guidelines.

ι3

West German Policy in

NATO

Germany and Europe. When I am no longer there, I do not know what will happen to Germany if we have not yet succeeded in creating a united Europe . . . "The French nationalists are just as ready as the German to repeat the old policies, in spite of past experience. They would rather a Germany with a national army than a united Europe — so long as they can pursue their own policy with the Russians. And the German nationalists think exactly the same way; they are ready to go with the Russians." Adenauer seemed completely possessed by the fear of a revival of a cynical, narrow German nationalism, which deeply disturbs him. Again and again, raising his voice, he charged his two listeners to believe him: "Believe me, the danger of German nationalism is much greater than is realized. The crisis of European policy emboldens the nationalists, they are becoming self-confident, and winning supporters. . . ." Again and again, he used the words "when I am no longer there." "Make use of the time while I am still alive, because when I am no more it will be too late — my God, I do not know what my successors will do if they are left to themselves: if they are not obliged to follow along firmly preordained lines, if they are not bound to a united Europe." 4 If this represented Adenauer's basic thinking, his final period of rule is puzzling. In this phase he increasingly aligned himself with de Gaulle, who as a French nationalist was hostile to the idea of a supranational Europe and indifferent to N A T O , seeing military policy in wholly national terms. It will be necessary to make a special inquiry into the reasons f o r this modification of Adenauer's policies, and it will be seen that a variety of factors were relevant, including the Berlin crisis and the change of administration in Washington. In the new circumstances of 1 9 6 1 - 6 3 , Adenauer's objectives for the first time conflicted with one another. Previously, Germany's revival, European integration, Franco-German cooperation and the strengthening of N A T O had all pointed in the same direction; when this was no longer the case, Adenauer was confronted with unfamiliar and highly unwelcome choices. In the earlier years there had been tactical problems, but Adenauer seems to have had little anguish in choosing his course.

Adenauer's Early Leadership: Steps Toward European Unity Adenauer's first Government was formed in September 1949. In a fast-changing situation he was to take a succession of decisions in 4 Oer Spiegel, no. 41 (October 9, 1963), pp. 36-39. Author's translation, utilizing a partial English translation in Alastair H o m e , Back into Power (London: Max Parrish, 1955), p. 302.

!4

Germany''s Alignment with the West,

1949-1951

which he demonstrated a remarkable ability to strike a balance between German interests and those of the Western powers and at the same time to shape events in a desired direction. A deceptive impression of inevitability came to characterize Germany's advance toward equal status and its participation in the defense of Western Europe. In fact, four years after the war, the obstacles in the w a y of a successful resolution of Franco-German differences, especially, were very great; granted that events played into Adenauer's hands, he showed a remarkable command of the situation before this had become clear. A t the outset, the Germans were largely preoccupied with the occupation restrictions: dismantling, occupation costs, and the existence of the International Ruhr Authority. 5 France, while moving away from its earlier policy of dismemberment, had not yet arrived at the policy of close union with Germany. T h e establishment of a Saar Republic with separate membership in the Council of Europe on March 3, 1950, amounted to a continuation of the former policy. Adenauer, perceiving Western European integration as the framework within which these conflicts might be resolved, was not yet in a position, less than five years after the war, to take the initiative in pressing f o r it. However, he made the most of the limited means of action open to the German Government. Having obtained an assurance from the Western powers that the Saar's independent status and membership in the Council of Europe were provisional, he was able to obtain sufficient support from public opinion to apply for associate membership in the Council of Europe, the indispensable first step symbolizing West Germany's desire to work its w a y back to acceptability within Europe. Realizing that this step was of slight practical importance,® Ade6 T h e Petersberg Agreement (November 24, 1949) negotiated between Adenauer and the Allied High Commission, was bitterly attacked for its "acceptance" of the International Ruhr Authority; in return, Adenauer obtained concessions on dismantling. T h e German commitment not to rearm, on the other hand, was not controversial in the existing climate of German opinion. W e y m a r , Adenauer, pp. 328-329, emphasizes this contrast. β "It may be objected that the Council of Europe is an inadequate institution, and it is doubtful if it is open to constructive reform in the present circumstances. But in any case it is a fact that the European States have taken the w a y to Strasbourg and now invite the Federal Republic to follow them. In practice there is no other w a y to membership of the W e s t European Community of states. T h e Federal G o v ernment is in absolutely no position to indicate another w a y to the absolutely essential goal of European unity . . . If w e wish to approach the goal, w e must take the w a y that has been prepared by others. There can be no German claim to

1

5

West German Policy in NATO nauer resorted to the method of interviews with foreign journalists, which he was frequently to use as a way of throwing out informal initiatives in foreign policy. On March 21, 1950, in an interview with Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service, he suggested the desirability of a customs union between France and Germany as a way of approach toward full political union. His special interest in the Franco-German relationship was already clear.7 If the immediate French response was cool — that FrancoGerman relations could be conducted only within a wider framework of European unity — the real response to Adenauer's overtures came with the Schuman Plan, put forward on May 9, 1950. Schuman proposed the pooling of French and German coal and steel production in an organization open to other European countries as a first step toward European federation. Adenauer, who was not informed in advance, immediately announced his acceptance of the "basic idea and general tendency of the plan." 8 But his major contribution to the creation of the Coal and Steel Community was to maintain Germany's support for it, against considerable industrial and political opposition, in the period after the outbreak of the Korean War, when Germany's bargaining position had become very much stronger. Before the North Korean attack, the Schuman Plan had opened the way to equality for Germany; after the attack, with the United States pressing for German rearmament, equality could be expected as a natural concomitant of the new American policy. 9 T o Adenauer, the long-term political objective of European federation was more important than the economic interests at stake. Adenauer's policy on rearmament closely paralleled his approach to European integration. In this case the situation was even more delicate: in the existing climate of opinion in Europe it was unthinkable that the Germans should propose rearmament. As early as 1948 there had been discussion in political circles in Germany as leadership" (Adenauer, statement of May 7, 1950, quoted in Europa-Archiv, vol. V , no. 12, June 20, 1950, author's translation). In the early years Adenauer was at pains to persuade his audience; later he resorted increasingly to simplifications and slogans. 7 Interestingly, de Gaulle at once commented favorably on Adenauer's initiative. See Karl Kaiser, EWG und Freihandelszone: England und der Kontinent in der europäischen Integration (Leiden: Sythoff, 1963), p. 211. 8 Weymar, Adenauer, p. 349. For an account of the circumstances of Schuman's proposal, see William Diebold, The Schuman Plan (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 1-4, 8-46. ° Diebold, Schuman Flan, pp. 67-75.

16

Germany's

Alignment

with the West,

1949-1951

elsewhere, and Adenauer was reported to have accepted the view current among the German military that thirty German divisions would be necessary.10 In December 1949, following a visit to Europe by Acheson which had sparked rumors of plans for German rearmament, Adenauer publicly raised the issue, first through an interview with the Cleveland Plain Dealer, then by a clarification given to The Times (London). Adenauer spoke against rearmament, stating that the allies were responsible for German defense, but adding that if they should demand German participation in defense he would oppose a national German force and would propose instead a German contingent in a European force. This position was reiterated before CDU meetings and finally before the Bundestag on December 16. 11 Thus, without provoking serious foreign concern, Adenauer was able to signal his readiness to sponsor a German contribution and his support for the form of rearmament which would minimize foreign opposition as well as promote the cause of European integration. The Decision to Rearm Germany The question of German participation in Western defense was raised by military planners shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (April 4, 1949). 12 A long-term plan was drawn up for the requirements for defending Europe against all-out conventional attack; at this point tactical nuclear weapons had not yet been 10 Der Spiegel, special issue on Adenauer (October 9, 1963), p. 66. The first press discussions of the possibility (usually negative) were in 1948; the first public statements favoring German rearmament by senior military leaders (Montgomery and Clay) were not made until late 1949. " W e y m a r , Adenauer, pp. 330-334. H e also foreshadowed his later position in hinting that the Germans could not be "mercenaries" but must have equal rights with other members of the European force. " T h e extensive discussions of N A T O ' s early military planning and the decision to rearm Germany include the following: Roger Hilsman, " N A T O : The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr, ed., NATO and American Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 11-22; Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 312-326, and Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 28-51, 64-74. Huntington (pp. 47-64) provides a concise account of NSC68, which is examined in detail by Paul Hammond, "NSC68, Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R . Schilling, Paul Y . Hammond and Glenn H . Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 267-378. Lawrence W . Martin, " T h e American Decision to Rearm Germany," in Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 643-665, is a definitive case study of the American decision.

!7

West German Policy in NATO developed, and there was no concept of a strategy depending on them. It soon became clear that forces of the required magnitude would not be supplied by Britain, France, and the smaller countries; hence the planners were led very early to propose the arming of Germany. In the autumn of 1949 the United States Army General Staff drafted a plan for the creation of German divisions that was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1950. The Administration did not yet adopt this as official policy; for the time being the State Department prevailed, holding that European political objections were too strong. Indeed, before the Korean War it was unclear whether N A T O would become a full-fledged military alliance or would remain merely a political guarantee by the United States to intervene if any of the members were attacked. The conflict between these two conceptions has been analyzed by Robert Osgood. On the one hand, European leaders were reluctant to increase their arms effort at the price of delaying economic recovery and were even more reluctant to contemplate German rearmament; the American Government, seeking to economize, was reluctant to increase the defense budget substantially beyond the existing level ($13 billion). On the other hand, Europe shrank from the prospect of further war fought on European territory (in the phrase of Henri Queuille, this would amount to "liberating a corpse"). N A T O was compelled to adopt a declaratory policy of "forward strategy," though totally lacking the forces to implement it, and indeed European leaders were willing to commit themselves to a future military build-up provided American assistance was supplied. Within the United States Administration the balance was shifting in favor of a military build-up; one indication was the appointment of Paul Nitze as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department in place of George Kennan, the leading advocate within the Administration for restricting N A T O to a political guarantee. In response to the first Soviet atomic explosion (August 1949) Truman had set up a high-level interdepartmental committee to undertake a broad reassessment of American military policy. The initiative for the reappraisal came largely from the State Department, which had become increasingly critical of the effects of budgetary limitations. The ensuing document, NSC68, recommended a major expansion of both general-war and limited-war capabilities and the strengthenI8

Germany''s Alignment

with the West,

1949-1951

ing of America's allies; a special point was made of allied weakness in Europe. The report estimated that the danger of a major Soviet attack could become acute by 1954, when it was expected that the Soviets would have built up a sizable strategic nuclear force. The report thus supported the prevailing view that there was no immediate military danger. Despite the increasing pressure for a build-up, it appeared unlikely in the early summer of 1950, before the North Korean attack, that the United States would make more than a marginal increase in the defense budget for the following year. 13 It seemed equally unlikely that N A T O would have decided on a rapid build-up or on German rearmament. Nonetheless, the pressures for a build-up were likely to increase. American military aid to Europe had been initiated with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (October 1949), and Congressional thinking from the outset made American assistance conditional on greater efforts by the Europeans. The three major policy innovations of September 1950 — the establishment of a N A T O Supreme Commander, the reinforcement of the American troops in Europe and the decision to rearm Germany — had already been widely discussed, and it had become clear that they represented a potential "package." The first two were sought by the Europeans and obtained State Department backing, the latter was the quid pro quo likely to be insisted upon by the Pentagon and Congress. If the United States were to make unprecedented military commitments in Europe, then the Europeans would have to create an effective military defense. The Korean War precipitated a rapid American decision in the form of a Pentagon-State Department agreement on the policy innovations as an inseparable package. European opinion was, momentarily, as shocked by the North Korean attack as American: on August h , 1950, the Council of Europe passed a resolution sponsored by Churchill calling for the creation of an integrated European army, which was understood to presuppose German participation, by an overwhelming majority (89:5 with 27 abstentions). But the European governments were extremely reluctant to accept German rearmament. As a counter to the American proposal for German " H u n t i n g t o n ( C o m m o n Defense, p. 5 3 ) suggests that the most likely outcome would have been a compromise, a marginal upward adjustment to $ 1 7 - $ 18 billion for the fiscal year 1951.

19

West German Policy in

NATO

divisions, France proposed that the German force should be integrated into a supranational European force "at the level of the smallest possible unit" (the Pleven Plan, October 1950). Protracted negotiations followed, but by the end of the year a modified version of the Pleven Plan had been accepted as the basis for negotiation. The United States began to transfer reinforcements to Europe (four divisions being sent between May and December 1951), and all N A T O members undertook vastly expanded arms programs, which were to impose serious strains on the British and French economies.14

Britain (Million £ Sterling) France (Milliard Fr. Frs.) United States (Million U.S. f )

1949

1950

1951

19j 2

•953

779 479 13,300

849 559 14,300

1,149 881 33,216

1,561 i,297 47,671

1,689 ',45 1 49,734

N A T O ' s final force targets were not laid down until the N A T O Council meeting at Lisbon in February 1952, which adopted the military recommendations for a total force in Europe of 96 divisions, including reserves. Germany was to contribute the equivalent of 12 divisions for the standing force, the level of intended German reserves not being made public. The treaties establishing E D C were not signed until May 26, 1952.

The West German Political Reaction In August-September 1950, the West German Government had very little choice. With 22 Soviet divisions and an armed "People's Police" of 70,000, which was expected to double in each of the following years, in East Germany, it was wholly dependent on protection by the N A T O powers. Adenauer in fact anticipated by a few days the final crystallizing of the American position. In a memorandum to the Allied High Commission on August 29, 1950, he requested additional American protection and stated that West Germany would be willing to make a military contribution within the framework of a European force. 15 As in the case of the signing " T h e defense expenditures of Britain, France and the United States were as follows (taken from Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, Utrecht: Bosch, 1955, p. h i ) . " T h e text was not published until February 1952. See Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 191 Sitzung, February 8, 1952, pp. 8159-60. (German parliamentary debates are cited hereafter as Verhandlungen.) For Adenauer's statement on the

2O

Germany's

Alignment with the West,

1949-1951

of the Petersberg Agreement and the initial acceptance of the Schuman Plan, Adenauer acted before informing his cabinet — which in this case precipitated the resignation of Minister of the Interior Heinemann, whose opposition to rearmament proved to be fundamental. Adenauer's tactical sense was very sound: to have delayed the German offer in an attempt to bargain for good terms at the outset might well have led to Europe's rejection of German rearming. His decision paralleled Truman's announcement of American reinforcements for Europe (September 9) before pressing N A T O to accept German forces. An attempt at hard bargaining, in the delicate state of Western relationships, was likely to prove self-defeating — confidence-building gestures were more likely to bring about a consensus. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), the main opposition party, whose basic orientation was as Western-democratic as that of the C D U (it had been the first party to break with the Communists in the Soviet zone and had taken the lead in the political struggle for Berlin's independence) did not raise fundamental objections to rearmament in the initial phase, but advanced three reasons for opposing the Government's stand. First, it argued that the specific proposal in question, the Pleven Plan, implied unequal treatment for the Germans, a point taken up in the subsequent negotiations. Second, it criticized Adenauer's tactic of offering the German contribution in advance, thus destroying Germany's bargaining leverage in pressing for equality and the removal of the occupation restrictions. The third point was one of principle, touching on the fundamentals of alliance, and was indeed a continuing theme in Germanallied relations but of slight relevance to the actual circumstances. "Only if the Anglo-Saxons and the other democratic powers of the world unite their own national and military fate with the German fate, can a major German contribution be expected." 1 6 It was pertinent to point out, as Schumacher did, that the Germans were concerned with the first battle, not merely the last, but in the light of the American reinforcement and British and French arms increases, it was difficult to see what Schumacher's demand could expected increases in the East German forces, see Verhandlungen,

8, 1950, p. 3564.

98 S., November

" Dr. Kurt Schumacher, leader of the SPD, in Verhandlungen, 98 S., November 8, 1950, p. 3571. This and all subsequent translations from Verhandlungen are by the author.

2ι

West German Policy in

NATO

mean as a condition for Germany's making a contribution. The allies had gone far toward satisfying his condition; Germany could not expect assured protection before it rearmed. Schumacher's alternative to Adenauer's policy amounted to unlimited national self-assertion. The SPD position was influenced by Schumacher's tactic of taking a nationalist line in order to avoid the Left's being stigmatized as antinationalist, as under the Weimar Republic, and was affected by the strength of public opposition to rearmament, wholly unexpected by the Western powers. The prevailing "ohne mich" sentiment reflected a rejection of involvement, of personal sacrifice for political ends, but also a revulsion against war. The responsible opponents of rearmament, including many of Germany's staunchest liberals and democrats, were concerned for its effects on the infant German democracy and the deepening of the German division.17 Most Germans, influenced by allied attacks on German militarism and dreading another war, desired not to reestablish a German army. Nonetheless, in the case of public opinion as a whole, opposition to rearmament was never overwhelming; the passion and articulateness of its opponents gave an exaggerated impression of their numbers. Opposition was greatest in 1950 (in one poll, 48:33), after which the numbers fluctuated unevenly, support on balance being equal to opposition. The general public, unlike the political elites, preferred an independent national army to participation in an integrated European force. 18 In 1951-52, the situation in Korea being stabilized, the negotiations on the terms of German membership in E D C proved arduous. Over and above the complex technical problems of sharing costs and designing a supranational armed force, the main political problem was to reconcile the French demand for controls over Germany with the German demand for equality. Adenauer demonstrated his 17 T h e opposition to rearmament and the Government's policy on military reforms and civilian control for the new armed forces are discussed b y Gordon A . Craig, " N A T O and the N e w German A r m y , " in William W . Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, N . J . : Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 194-232. " S e e Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung 1941-1955 (Allensbach: Verlag f ü r Demoskopie, 1956), esp. pp. 360-361, 3 7 2 - 3 7 3 ; ibid., 1957, p. 296. F o r a later poll b y the institute Divo, somewhat more favorable to rearmament (support, 1954-1957, ranging from 54:34 to 68:24), see Divo, Umfrage?! 1951 (Frankfurt: Europäischer Verlagsanstalt, 1958), p. 72.

22

Germany's

Alignment

with

the West,

1949-1951

pragmatism and restraint by the degree to which, though insisting on the principle of equality, he tacitly accepted a number of inequalities.19 " F o r example, Germany did not insist on a General Staff, accepted France's right to maintain national forces outside EDC, renounced the production of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and did not insist on immediate membership in N A T O . For a detailed account of the negotiations, see Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), pp. 60-70, i o j - u i , and ibid., 1952 (1955), p p . í5-'3