Germany & American Neutrality, 1939-1941 0374979804, 9780374979805

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Germany and American Neutrality 1939-1941

Copyright, 1951, by H. L. Trefousse

R ep rin ted 1969 by special arrangement with Twayne Publishers, Inc.

OCTAGON BOOKS A D ivision o f F a r r a r , S tr a u s & G iro u x , In c . 19 Union Square West New York, N. Y. 10003

L ib r a r y o f C o n g re s s C a ta lo g C a rd N u m b e r: 71-76012

Printed in U.5.A. by n o b l e o f f s e t p r in t e r s ,

NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

INC.

T O R . F. T.

Contents PAGE

P reface

9

C hapter O n e : T he P roblem

of

H itler’s U ltimateAims

13

C hapter T w o : H itler’s N eutrality Policy T oward the U nited States . September, 1939—April ,1940 1. General Background

25 25

2. Lull in Anti-American Propaganda

28

3. Diplomatic Courtesies

33

4. Conciliatory Naval Policies

35

5. Attempts to Put Pressure on America

43

C hapter T h r ee : E xtension of the N eutrality Policy. M ay, 1940— D ecember, 1940

53

1. Complication of the Neutrality Policy by Hit­ ler’s Victories

53

2. Efforts to Enlist Japan

65

3. Additional Aid to the Isolationists and the Election of 1940

74

4. Plans for the Future

77

Germany and American Neutrality page

C hapter F our : I ncreasing Complications of the N eutrality Policy. J anuary, 1941—J une, 1941

79

1. All-out American Aid to Britain

79

2. Continued Efforts for a Negotiated Peace

81 83

3. Hitler Restrains His Admirals 4. Nazi Warnings Against American Convoys and the Bismarck Episode 5. Pressure on Japan to Attack Singapore and Bypass the United States 6. Complications of the Hull-Nomura Conver­ sations 7. Reversal of Press Policies 8. Attempts to Weaken American Defense Efforts

89 91

101 103

111

C hapter F ive : Between P eace 1941

and

War. J une , 1941—N ovember, 113

1. Delicacy of German-American Relations

113

2. Naval Clashes

115

3. Russia’s Place in the Scheme

123

4. Continued Trust in Isolationists and the Climax of the Press Campaign

129

C hapter Six : F ailure of the N eutrality P olicy. N ovember, 1941—D ecember, 1941 1. Negotiations Leading to Pearl

Harbor

137 137

2. Germany and Pearl Harbor

148

3. Reasons for the Failure of the Neutrality Policy

153

Contents PAGE C hapter Seven : Conclusion N otes Preface and Acknowledgments Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Seven

157 165 165 165 169 180 190 200 207 213

Bibliography: A Note on Source Material Bibliography I llustrations I ndex

215 219 92 237

ILLUSTRATIONS Hitler addressing the Reichstag on December 11, 1941, on the occasion of Germany’s declaration of war against the United States. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop receiving Ambassador Oshima at Fuschl, February, 1941. Hitler receiving Ambassador Oshima. Signing of No Separate Peace Agreement and Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, December 11, 1941. Sitting, left to right: Japanese Ambassador Oshima, Ger­ man Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Italian Ambassador Dino Alfieri. Signing of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan at the new Chancellery in Berlin, September 27, 1940. Sit­ ting, left to right: Japanese Ambassador Kurusu, Italian Foreign Minister Giano, Hitler. Standing, second from right, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. Hitler and Matsuoka on the balcony of the Chancellery dur­ ing the latter’s visit to Berlin in 1941. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop seeing Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka off during the latter’s visit to Berlin in 1941.

Germany and American Neutrality 1939-1941

Preface and Acknowledgments It will be the purpose of this study to trace the development of Germany’s policies toward the United States during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the two countries. An attempt will be made to outline briefly Hider’s ultimate aims as far as possible and then deal in detail with the evolution of his policy of neutrality toward the United States from the time of the outbreak of war in 1939 to its complete failure after the Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941. The two years under discussion may well be subdivided into four distinct periods. The first comprised the period of the “phony war” from September, 1939, to April, 1940; the second, Hitler’s lightning campaigns and their aftermath of American aid to England; the third, the period of all-out American sup­ port to the Allies in the spring and summer of 1941 ; and the fourth, the period of undeclared war between Germany and the United States in the months immediately preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. In each of these periods, Germany’s neutrality policy will be examined with reference to propagandists atti­ tude, relations with the American opposition, naval affairs, and diplomatic efforts. Since Japan played such a great role in Hider’s geopolitical thought, his relations with that country are also of importance. Germany’s attitude toward the United States during the years under consideration raises a number of problems. What were the purposes of the policy she adopted? Why did the policy fail? If Hitler desired America to remain on the sidelines for

9

Germany and American Neutrality

over two years, why did he consent to a complete reversal of that policy in December, 1941? This raises the whole question of Ger­ many’s role in the Pearl Harbor attack. Did Hitler incite Japan to take this step? If the answer is no, why did he fail to prevent it? How great was his influence in Tokyo? Did he know of the attack beforehand, and why did he declare war so promptly thereafter? An attempt will be made to answer these questions. It is not the intention of the author to deal at great length with the details of the development of American foreign policy during the years in question. Robert E. Sherwood,1 Basil Rauch, and Herbert Feis2 have done so from the pro-Roosevelt point of view; Charles A. Beard,3 John T. Flynn,4 and George Mor­ genstern5 have taken the opposite approach. Nor is it the author’s plan to write a general history of Germany’s foreign policies during these years. It is hoped that some day, when the material is available, a comprehensive study will be made of the whole field of German-American relations during the pre-war years, but at the present time, practical reasons have dictated limitation to the more manageable subject here outlined. My thanks are due first of all to Dean John Allan Krout and Professor John H. Wuorinen of Columbia University. With­ out their patient help, encouragement, and advice this study could not have been completed. I also owe a great debt to Professors Dwight E. Miner, Richard B. Morris, Henry L. Roberts, Franz Neumann, and Theodor Abel, all of Columbia University, who read the manuscript and made valuable sug­ gestions. The Historical Department of the United States Navy, especially Mr. Daniel B. Kimball, and Commanders Dorothy E. Richard and S. R. Baraw were kind enough to make available innumerable documents dealing with the German Navy. Mrs. Martha Dodd Stem gave permission for the use of her father’s papers. I should also like to express my gratitude to the libra­ rians of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress at Washington, D. C., the International Law Library at Columbia and at the 10

Preface and Acknowledgments

Library of Congress, as well as the American Jewish Committee in New York. I also a owe a great debt to my father, Dr. George L. Trefousse, whose suggestions were very valuable, and last, but not least, to my wife, without whose patience the manuscript could not have been completed.

11

CHAPTER ONE

The Problem o f Hitler’s Ultimate Aims The main part of this study deals with Germany’s policies toward the United States in the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. Since these Nazi diplomatic maneuvers will appear in their proper perspective only if Hitler’s final aims are kept in mind, it is helpful to attempt to discover his ultimate objectives. The definition of these with any degree of accuracy, how­ ever, presents great difficulties because of the essentially irra­ tional nature of the Third Reich’s leaders. As it was one of Hitler’s characteristics to deal with first things first,1 the United States played a comparatively minor role in his early plans. The most pressing issues confronting him in the years preceding the outbreak of war did not directly involve the United States, and he told Louis Lochner in 1934 that he simply had not yet had time to think about that country.2 Nevertheless, a number of factors seem to indicate that in the long run, Nazi expansion hardly spelled neutrality for the American people. In the first place, the militarist nature of the Nazi move­ ment was bound to create difficulties for a nation such as America. Hitler had described his war years as the “greatest and most unforgettable period of my life,”3 and had ridiculed peaceful methods in diplomacy and economics as “the greatest piece of folly ever set up as a leading principle in state policy.”4 On November 5, 1937, he told his chief advisers, “The German question can be solved only by way of force.”5 At the time, he was thinking primarily of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 13

Germany and American Neutrality

case of these two countries, such action proved unnecessary, but when his legions crossed the Polish frontier on September 1, 1939, he was translating his militarist theories into action. Secondly, there existed the unbridgeable ideological gulf between the world’s strongest democracy and the avowed ene­ mies of that form of government. In the words of G. Grove Haines, “Hitler stamped himself as the champion of everything popularly regarded as un-American.”6 Had the Nazis been sin­ cere in their assertions that National Socialism was not an article for export, the ideological clash might not have created such difficulties, but the facts belied their pronouncements. The very first point of their party program stated, “We demand that all Germans be gathered together in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of all peoples to self-determination.”7 For America, this meant the establishment of a race-conscious German-American Bund which endeavored to teach racism to the American people. It declared open war on the principle of the melting pot, so essential to a nation of immigrants. Its news organ, the Deutsche Weckruf und Beobachter, announced, “To create . . . a bloc of German men is the fundamental task of the Bund. . . . This means in short the conscious rejection of the national idea of the ‘melting-pot.’ ”8 The Deutsche Auslands­ institut in Stuttgart could be utilized in this endeavor as it main­ tained files of potential members of a German racial bloc in America.9 Further aid came from sundry native Fascist groups which copied Hitler in every particular.10 That such policies were bound to strike at the very heart of a nation composed of many ethnic strains was realized by the German Ambassador himself. In 1938, he reported to the Wilhelmstrasse, “ . . . Every­ thing which smacks of consideration for the rights of a racial group is unwelcome here, as the United States has no very clear conscience as regards its own racial groups. On no point are the Americans more sensitive than on this. . . .”ai Third, disagreement over fundamental economic policies had bedevilled business relations between the two countries for 14

The Problem of Hitler’s Ultimate Aims

years. Already in peacetime, German methods of attaining autarchy had caused severe dislocations of normal trade chan­ nels.12 Had Hitler obtained control of the entire European continent, is it not certain that these problems would have in­ creased a thousandfold? Last, but not least, a Nazi victory would have altered pro­ foundly the balance of power not only in Europe, but also throughout the world. For over one hundred years, the United States had prospered in a world dominated by British sea power; the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine itself had, in the opinion of some eminent scholars, been based upon this fact.13 Had British naval supremacy been successfully challenged by rising German sea power, the United States would have found itself in a world full of unknown dangers. That the Doctrine was imperilled was hardly a secret. For years, ominous German activities had plagued the republics south of the Rio Grande.14 After war broke out in Europe, it seemed expedient to the Nazis to adopt a policy of keeping the United States out of the war. Nevertheless, they had no desire to leave that country entirely unmolested in the long run. Goering expressed his conviction that America would come to terms soon enough once victory crowned Hitler’s efforts.15 The German Consul General in New Orleans, Baron Edgar von Spiegel, unburdened himself to the press in June, 1940. Germany, he complained, would not forget that the United States gave every material aid to her enemies while she was bitterly fighting for her very life.16 The Waffen S. S. in the Reich drew up plans for the recruitment in the United States of new divisions of German stock after 1953. The Chief of this recruiting service sent the following survey of allegedly available reserves to Heinrich Himmler on August 7, 1940: “Throughout the world we have these additional racial Germans at our disposal: In North America and Canada ap­ proximately 5j/a Million. . . .” Rounding out his estimates with similar calculations for other countries, the officer con-

75

Germany and American Neutrality

eluded, “The recovery of these people who would be excep­ tionally suited as settlers later on should be started.”17 In discussing their economic aims, the Germans also became quite precise after their stupendous victory in the West. On September 23, 1940, the Ministry of Economics informed the Ministry of Justice that “The exchange of goods between Ger­ many and the European countries has to be further intensified; American, British, and French goods have to be crowded off the European market.”18 Two months earlier, the Reichswirtschafts­ minister had shared a secret with the press: After the war, the Reich would either do business directly with South America or not at all—any American intermediate agency was out of the question.19 He also announced that postwar trade with the United States would be possible only on Germany’s own terms: Either Washington would give up all its “dogmatism” or there would be no trade at all.20 Its plentiful gold supply would not help the Republic in the least; the Nazis would see to it that the metal lost its value anyway.21 In Funk’s vocabulary, “dogma­ tism” referred to reciprocal trade agreements. His threats im­ plied that the United States would either have to accept the German barter measures against which it had so long struggled or else cease trade with Germany and German-dominated regions altogether. If any doubts still remained on this subject, the Führer him­ self dispelled them. Addressing the National Socialist Party on February 24, 1941, he shouted, “We are going to do business solely on the basis of German advantage. If it’s good for Ger­ many, we shall trade. And no American or British interests are going to put a stop to our way of doing business.”22 Trade wars and agitation among ethnic groups were not the only calamities which might have befallen the United States had Hitler been successful. Unknown to the world at large, on July 11, 1940, weeks before the Roosevelt administration had taken any real steps against the Reich, such as the later exchange of overaged destroyers, the German Naval Staff submitted an 16

The Problem of Hitler’s Ultimate Aims

important memorandum to the Führer. Entitled “Views of the Naval Staff on Expansion of the Navy after the War,” it did not mince words about expected future conflicts with the democracy beyond the seas. After a brief résumé dealing with the splendid strategic position in which the Fatherland would presumably find itself after its triumph in Europe, the admirals stated, Great Britain in her weak situation will look to the U. S. A. for support, and because of her great interest in a strong Britain in Europe, America will be forced to be hostile to Germany. The two Anglo-American powers will maintain or reconstruct their great sea power for the protection of their empire, thereby be­ coming the next natural enemies with which Germany will have to deal. They concluded with a strong plea for a powerful postwar Nazi navy.28 Herr von Ribbentrop was equally explicit. In September, 1940, he visited Benito Mussolini in Rome. There he unburdened himself concerning the irritating Yankees who refused to admit that the war had already been won by the Axis. He described the terrestrial Fascist paradise after the final de­ struction of England, a turn of events he considered a certainty, and made plans for the division of the world among Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan. The first three countries would redraw the map of Europe and Africa, while the latter would follow suit in Asia. “Should the United States continue to oppose this new order even after England’s destruction,” he asserted, “it would have to march practically against the whole world, as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan would be opposed to her, while Russia would stand aside.” The Duce readily agreed.24 The German Navy, in the meantime, had been giving serious thought to the occupation of Iceland, West Africa, the Azores, and other Adantic islands.25 Hitler himself became interested in the acquisition of the Canaries.26 A sense of urgency de­ veloped with the consummation of the destroyer deal. Not only did the Dictator give orders to complete preparations against 17

Germany and American Neutrality

Gibraltar as soon as possible before the United States would make its weight felt, but he also seriously considered occupation of the Azores and Canary Islands as a counter-measure against American interference.27 Admiral Raeder re-emphasized the importance of Dakar in this connection.28 The Reichsmarschall concurred; he, too, strongly advocated the occupation of Dakar and the Atlantic islands to forestall the United States.29 By October, Hitler was consulting with his military advisers about ways and means of teaching that country a lesson. In the now famous Falkenstein Memorandum, a major bearing that name wrote as follows: The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the oc­ cupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of the war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present: a. No other operational commitment, b. Portuguese neutrality, c. Support of France and Spain.30

The Dictator continued his considerations of the problem for the rest of the year, but was forced to give up immediate action for a number of reasons.31 As time went on and the United States became more and more conscious of the Nazi danger, Hitler’s interest in the occupation of the Azores steadily increased. Though his admi­ rals had serious misgivings regarding the success of any such venture, he refused to abandon his scheme. The officer pre­ paring the transcript of the Naval Conference of May 22, 1941, wrote, The Fuehrer is still in favor of occupying the Azores, in order to be able to operate long-range bombers from there against the U. S. A. The occasion for this may arise by autumn.82 18

The Problem of Hitler9s Ultimate Aims

It was again the same old story; Hider believed in moving step by step against one adversary at a time. By fall, he expected the completion of the conquest of the Soviet Union, and then he reserved “the right to take severe action against the U. S. A. as well.”33 After the outbreak of the Russian campaign, new vistas opened up before the eyes of Germany’s leaders. Joachim von Ribbentrop wired to the German Ambassador in Tokyo that the United States would be “totally isolated from the rest of the world” after Russia’s defeat and that it “would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining portions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact Countries.”34 The only difficulty was Russia’s refusal to suc­ cumb to Hitler’s intuitive strategy; hence he had to keep post­ poning his “severe measures” against America throughout the fall of 1941.35 When Japan finally delivered her blow against Pearl Harbor, hastening the day of reckoning with the United States, Friedrich Gauss, Chief of the Wilhelmstrasse’s Legal Division, felt that an old dream had been realized. In his affi­ davit to the Nuremberg Tribunal, he asserted, The German political leadership saw in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the first step toward the realization of the idea of founding a Great Germanic Empire. For this Empire was intended not only to rule Europe, but to be the decisive factor in the steering of world events in their en­ tirety. . . . The triangular coalition of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, Rib­ bentrop had tried to establish firmly as an idea for world policy as early as 1936 through his Anti-Comintern Pact and then above all through the Tripartite Pact of autumn 1940. . . . It was in­ tended that the United States should thereby receive a position of second rank, excluded from the heritage of the British world empire and her sphere of power and influence limited to the northern part of the American Continent. The program of the German foreign policy provided further a division of the spheres of influence in the Eastern Hemisphere between Germany and Japan.8® 19

Germany and American Neutrality

The Nazis would have preferred waiting until after Russia’s defeat, but the precipitate action of their Eastern ally did not at all conflict with their ultimate goals. American diplomats abroad were not oblivious to the impli­ cations of a Nazi victory for the United States. After Germany’s occupation of the Memel territory, Ambassador William G. Bullitt wrote from Paris, The moral for us is that unless some nation in Europe stands up to Germany quickly, France and England may face defeat and such defeat would mean the French and British fleets in the hands of the Germans and Italians. We should then have the Japs in the Pacific and an overwhelming fleet against us in the Atlantic.87

Two days later, he painted this same contingency in even darker colors in a note to the State Department. He had just met Otto von Habsburg, who had previously proved himself well-informed by accurately predicting Hitler’s march on Prague. According to the Pretender’s private sources in Austria, Hitler had boasted to three important Nazis on March 9 or 10, That he would seize Czechoslovakia on the fourteenth of March; that he would take control of all the rest of Central and Eastern Europe this summer; that in 1940 he would wipe out France and the French race from the map and would reduce Great Britain to serfdom. In the year 1941, using all the resources of Europe, he would conquer the United States by a joint attack with Japan on North and South America.38

Bullitt added that he believed Hitler had actually made these remarks. While no corroborative evidence has ever been found, there was, nevertheless, some element of truth in his alleged prognostication. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy in London confirmed the danger. This American diplomat, whom no one could accuse of favoring the British, wrote on March 3, 1939, 20

The Problem of Hitler9s Ultimate Aims

During the nineteenth century it was Britain’s control of the sea which enabled the peoples of the Low Countries, the Baltic littoral, and of North and South America to develop unhindered their own institutions. . . . It is this system which is now under attack. Should the British Empire disintegrate . . . the consequence to the United States must be most serious.39 The Ambassador then turned to a frightening description of these consequences. Defeat of the British and French, he wrote, would mean “the disintegration of the last bulwarks of democ­ racy in Europe, and the rise of Germany as the sole great power in Europe. It would mean the Mediterranean as a GermanItalian lake; Russia at the mercy of Germany and Japan; the division of the British, French, Dutch, and the Belgian colonial empires between Germany, Italy, and Japan—with the latter holding an unassailable position in East Asia and the Western Pacific.” In six concise points, he summarized the effects of such a victory upon the United States. In the first place, 50 percent of America’s export trade and 75 percent of her foreign investments would be lost or in the hands of potential enemies “who would seek to use this power to extract concessions from us.” Second, reduction of foreign trade and increased arma­ ments would depress our standard of living. Third, this would result in the spread of Communism and Fascism in the United States, a development constituting a serious danger to our democratic institutions. Fourth, our Navy would be unable to protect Atlantic and Pacific trade routes, yet the sources of rubber and tin would be in hostile hands. Fifth, “while the United States, with the aid of a gigantic expansion in arma­ ments and a drastic alteration in its way of life, should be able to defend North America from invasion, a simultaneous attack on both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts, with Latin America under totalitarian influence, might well be more than the Amer­ ican navy could handle alone.” Finally, a Nazi victory would 21

Germany and American Neutrality

mean the end of liberalism in economics and politics in Europe, with far-reaching repercussions here.40 As time went on, the American Ambassador at the Court of St. James’s became more and more despondent. By September, he bewailed the unkindness of fate which had tied the very survival of democracy to the maintenance of the status quo, but he was only too well aware of the impossible situation in which his country would find itself should Britain go under. Though he wanted the United States to stay out of the war, “The prospect of our best customer beaten and finished as a Power and the attendant difficulty of arranging our place in the world with powers who know we hate them. . .” convinced him that “we must be considerate of our friends who are in it.”41 These warnings were heard in Washington. President Roose­ velt had stated his convictions concerning totalitarian perils, at least by unmistakable inference, as long ago as his Chicago speech in 1937, in which he advocated the quarantining of aggressors, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had loyally supported him.42 Privately, both had voiced their misgivings much earlier.43 If the leaders of the European democra­ cies had not already been aware of this source of good will, they soon received personal confirmation. On September 11, 1939, the President wrote to Neville Chamberlain, “I need not tell you that you have been much in my thoughts during these difficult days and further that I hope you will at all times feel free to write me personally and outside of diplomatic procedure about any problems as they arise.” To offer more concrete evidence of his good will, he held out hope for a speedy repeal of the arms embargo.44 At the same time, the famous correspondence between Mr. Roosevelt and the “Former Naval Person,” Winston Churchill, began.45 M. Daladier had constantly been reminded of the President’s good will by the fact that the American Embassy was in charge of Mr. Bullitt, with whom he was friendly enough 22

The Problem of Hitler9s Ultimate Aims

to share the last prewar bottle of a rare French wine. After drinking to their mutual friend’s health, the two companions doubtless discussed the situation, and the Prime Minister sent the label, which he had signed personally, to the White House. The Chief Executive, acknowledging its receipt, asked Bullitt to express his hopes to the donor that he personally might be able to partake of similar beverages “as soon as the survival of the democracies is again assured.”46 Perhaps it is indicative of the President’s mood in those dark September days that he sent for the old Navy files con­ cerning Admiral Dewey’s encounter and conversation with Admiral von Goetzen soon after the Battle of Manila. The German had prophesied even then that America would be the Reich’s first objective following the defeat of England.47 At the time of the outbreak of war in 1939, then, Hitler faced vigorous opposition on the part of the Roosevelt adminis­ tration—an opposition which greatly complicated his immediate war plans. His attempts to cope with this problem by adopting a policy calculated to keep the United States out of war as long as possible constituted the essence of his attitude towards the American government during the next few years.

23

CHAPTER TWO

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States September, 1939 - April, 1940

7. General Background On May 23, 1939, Adolf Hitler called together the heads of his armed forces for a most important conference. His plans concerning a new war had assumed definite shape. The cryptic notes of the meeting do not tell us much about the reaction of the assembled Nazi leaders, but it is safe to assume that some of them experienced at least slight feelings of anxiety when they heard their Führer pronounce the fateful words, “. . . We are left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.”1 The success or failure of this project depended a great deal upon the attitude of the Great Powers. Hitler had hopes that he could keep England and France temporarily neutral, but there remained the possibility of their coming to Poland’s assistance.2 Because of his well-known principle of finishing off his enemies one by one, he was quite capable of concealing his hatreds temporarily if policies of state dictated such an approach.3 In the summer of 1939, it became imperative for him to isolate his Western opponents as much as possible. Nazi ideology must not stand in the way of strategic necessities. Therefore he con­ cluded the Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin in August,4 to deprive the democracies of an important potential ally, although 25

Germany and American Neutrality

his hatred for Bolshevism had dominated his political thinking for years. Having temporarily neutralized Russia, Hitler now hoped to prevent Great Britain and France from securing any possible support from the United States. Should that country be in­ volved in war, its enormous industrial potential would surely accrue to those in control of the high seas, then still firmly in Britain’s grasp. Furthermore, American participation in the conflict might well tip the balance of power in favor of the Allies, just as in 1917. American neutrality might benefit Germany in other respects also. Hitler never abandoned hope that he might succeed in bluffing the Allies into acceptance of his conquests, at least for the time being; therefore he stood in need of some intermediary power whose good offices might be utilized at the proper time. The United States might serve this purpose. To cite a single example, after the victorious conclusion of the Polish campaign, the Führer was anxious for an armistice; evidently it was not merely a coincidence that on October 7, 1939, Chargé d’Affaires Alexander Kirk cabled that someone close to Hitler wanted Roosevelt to make use of the Dictator’s speech to send him a confidential message endorsing his peace efforts and seeking a clarification of the terms.5 Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht served as the chief go-between in these dealings. Not only did he approach the American Government directly for an invitation to come to the United States for a lecture and then to discuss peace possibilities,6 but he also attempted to establish contacts through the German underground.7 That group, however, never quite trusted him.8 Hitler himself was well informed,9 but the State Department refused to be taken in by this rather obvious game.10 Nevertheless, neither the banker nor his Nazi masters ever quite abandoned their hope of using the United States for purposes of mediation.11 For all these reasons, if Hitler and his advisers wanted to win their war, it was essential for them to keep the trans26

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

Atlantic democracy temporarily on the sidelines. This purpose assumed such fundamental proportions that even the United States Associate Trial Counsel at Nuremberg, prosecuting the Nazis for war crimes, conceded it. As Mr. Alderman told the Tribunal, “For a time, they [the Nazis] maintained their pref­ erence that the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the United States into the war.”12 ‘The defendants themselves made the most of this seemingly peaceful aim, which, if taken out of its larger context, appeared to lessen their war guilt. Joachim von Ribbentrop essayed to recount the story of German-American relations in a most con­ fused and inexact manner, but he kept fairly close to the truth when he emphasized his and his Führer’s resolve to avoid war with the United States.13 His Secretary of State, Emst von Weizsaecker, otherwise not well-disposed toward him, corrobo­ rated his testimony and stated, “. . . No one—no G erm andesired to be at war with the United States or looked for trouble in that direction . . . we were not to let ourselves be provoked to be the ones who bring the conflict to the open daylight. Wherever there would be unfriendly acts . . . we would not want to be the ones who start.”14 The Second Secre­ tary of the Washington German Embassy offered additional proof of this policy; he recalled that the Foreign Office had intended “to avoid anything that might harm the political rela­ tions between Berlin and Washington.”15 The Führer himself supplied contemporary support to these later recollections; im­ mediately after the sinking of the Athenia on September 3, 1939, he gave orders not to torpedo passenger steamers “in order not to provoke neutral countries, the United States in particular.”18 The Nazis tried to achieve their aim in two ways. Onjhfc. one hand, they adopted a policy __of extreme care and reserve in dealing with Washington. They hoped that such measures would avoid giving the interventionists any cause for agitation 27

Germany and American Neutrality

and that they would lull other Americans into a sense of security. On the other hand, they thought they could also rely upon policies calculated to frighten the United States into enforced neutrality. They expected to accomplish this either by diverting American attention from European affairs by applying pressure in Asia, or by proceeding with firmness in certain matters to play into the hands of existing isolationist sentiment. It never seems to have occurred to them that these twin policies drafted for the same end might in the long run prove incompatible; their diversionary efforts might involve them in adventures over which they had no control. The result brought them disaster. Japan refused to coordinate her policy with theirs and attacked the United States, thus unifying the American people and bring­ ing about the full participation of the United States in the crusade against the Axis. 2. Lull in Anti-American Propaganda At the time of the outbreak of the war, these developments still lay in the future. Hider was determined not to provoke Washington. The first indication of the implementation of this resolution virtually coincided with his preparations for the im­ pending conflict. At that moment, a propaganda campaign of unprecedented proportions had been in progress against the United States in general and President Roosevelt in particular. For more than two years, the German press had been working overtime in castigating America for all sorts of crimes and shortcomings from the Nazi point of view.17 It had called the President an “honorary Hebrew” ;18 the head of the Amerika In ­ stitut in Berlin had described the allegedly bellicose nature of American democracy;19 and the Führer himself, furious at Mr. Roosevelt’s peace appeal, had answered with bitter sarcasm.20 In any case, the Völkischer Beobachter had set the pace by referring to the Chief Executive’s efforts as “a ruffianly prank which only a Jewish schmock could consider clever.”21 The offi­ cial Party Press Service, Zeitschriften-Dienst, which set forth the 28

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

party line for editors throughout the Reich, suggested that strikes in America be played up and compared with the indus­ trial peace prevailing in the paradise which was Germany.22 Lest their attitude be misunderstood, the molders of Berlin public opinion urged Nazi publications to emphasize all and sundry difficulties in America, a country which, they felt, had formerly been heavily overrated.23 According to the propaganda then current in the Reich, the entire American people were being helplessly exploited by unscrupulous Jews who had suc­ ceeded in dominating the President and his immediate advisers.24 An unfortunate astrologer was even taken to task for having cast a horoscope not entirely unfavorable to the detested occu­ pant of the White House!25 Then, all of a sudden, in the months preceding the Polish campaign, a change came over the German press. It ceased its abuse of America and instead turned against Great Britain. While it had formerly acquainted its readers with the diabolical Jewish machinations emanating from Washington and New York, it now conveyed to them the impression that the chief synagogue of the alleged warmongers had been moved to Lon­ don, whence arose causes of all European woes. It still referred to American affairs, but the trend was unmistakable.26 Through­ out the summer and fall of 1939, the Völkischer Beobachter, Germany’s leading newspaper, treated them with disdainful neglect.27 Toward the end of August, European developments, as well as the incessant propaganda barrage against the Poles, hardly left the papers with enough space to pay attention to faraway continents.28 Hence Hans Fritzsche, Dr. Goebbels’ chief assistant, probably spoke the truth when he later told his accusers that he had had strict directives to spare the United States as much as possible prior to the outbreak of war.29 After the first shot had been fired, these instructions were repeated. “Let us preserve the greatest reserve in the treatment of all U. S. problems,” admonished the Zeitschriften-Dienst, not only 29

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once, but several times.30 These orders, with brief intermissions, remained operative for over a year. When one considers the superlatives of fury, hate, and venom of which the Nazi press was capable, its reticence toward the United States deserves notice. In resisting aggres­ sion, that country certainly gave Dr. Goebbels and Herr Dietrich enough material to work on, but during the first months of the war, the Nazis were willing to overlook most of it. When the luxury liner Bremen arrived at her home port in December, 1939, after having dodged the British Navy by sailing to friendly Soviet Murmansk,81 the Frankfurter Zeitung cele­ brated the deed as a great naval exploit, but did not even allude to the fact that American authorities had done their utmost to delay the ship’s sailing in order to facilitate her capture by the British.82 Similar examples of German forbearance occurred in con­ nection with two other incidents on the high seas. One involved the American freighter City of Flint, which had been captured by the Nazis as a prize and was then towed into Murmansk. On the trip to Germany, Norwegian authorities returned it to the American crew. So anxious were the Berlin authorities to tone down press attacks upon the United States that they gave strict orders not to mention the affair.33 The other incident arose with the scuttling of the passenger liner Columbus, brought to such extremes by the activities of the Neutrality Patrol; the Nazis reported the event; yet, for the time being, blamed neither the patrol nor the Roosevelt administration.34 The lull in the propaganda campaign against the transAtlantic democracy also manifested itself in other ways. As late as 1940, German authors still had permission to write books and articles about the origin of the war without even mentioning the Washington Government, much less accusing the President of starting the conflict.35 Such periodicals as the violently anti-Semitic Judenfrage managed to confine their Jew-baiting almost exclusively to countries other than America, 30

Hitler's Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

although the great influence of the Jews in the United States had been a favorite theme with Nazi writers before the brakes were put on.36 Nazi movie critics did not even encounter serious obstacles in reviewing an occasional American film until the summer of 1940, when Hollywood productions were barred from the Reich.87 As time went on and the United States became more and more outspoken in its criticism of Nazidom in both word and deed, the Germans found it increasingly difficult to refrain altogether from attacking the hated democracy. Still, the Nazi press paid surprisingly little attention to Roosevelt’s attempts to aid the Allies. When the proposed change in the neutrality law irritated the Völkischer Beobachter enough to induce it to print a few derogatory remarks about the Administration,38 the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reassured Berliners, “America is not Roosevelt, and Roosevelt is not America.”39 Though the repeal of the Embargo was obviously designed to aid Great Britain and France, the Zeitschriften-Dienst remained firm, bluntly stating, “Let us not take up Roosevelt’s and Woodring’s comments; let us practice reserve in the absence of other instructions, and let us not create prejudice.”40 The limited publicity given to the affair at that time constituted so notice­ able a departure from previous policy that William L. Shirer confided to his diary, “Last summer I tried to find out whether America came into the calculations of the Nazis at all. I couldn’t find any evidence that they gave a damn about us. 1914-1917 all over again. But now they’re beginning to think about us.”41 Faithful to instructions, some papers played up the nefarious role of British propaganda in attaining the repeal of the Embargo rather than Roosevelt’s efforts. The Frankfurter Zeitung explained to its readers that Great Britain was again engaged in attempts to undermine American neutrality, just as during the First World War.42 This type of approach 31

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fitted in perfectly with the standing order to the Fourth Estate that “the fury of our attack must be directed exclusively against England.”43 The controversy between the two Anglo-Saxon powers dur­ ing the winter of 1939-1940 concerning the enforcement of the blockade simplified the German propagandists’ task. They utilized for their own purposes the spectacle of British inter­ ference with American ships and airplanes. Here was certain proof of Albion’s perfidy toward neutrals!44 Nazi radio an­ nouncers hammered away at this topic in their short wave broad­ casts across the Atlantic Ocean and maintained that the English treated America worse than Italy or Japan.43 Toward the end of January, however, they were beginning to feel uneasy. “The more notice we take of any controversies,” wrote the Zeitschriften-Dienst, “the sooner they will be settled.” Hence it warned the Reich’s editors not to emphasize the incidents too much.46 The Nazis were right; the whole affair was soon for­ gotten. Roosevelt and Churchill were able to contribute greatly to the solution of the problem through their personal corre­ spondence, while the outbreak of the Scandinavian campaign in the spring focussed the world’s attention on weightier matters.47 Nevertheless, Germany’s propagandiste treatment of the controversy is enlightening; she made good use of it in her attempt to show that America had always been Britain’s dupe and that the London government, worried about continued American neutrality, lurked behind most “warmongering” activ­ ities in the United States.48 The Nazis disliked direct attacks on Washington and wrote, “U. S. A. and Russia are to be spared in all cases in treating with this question. No criticism of U. S. A. policies wanted.”49 This injunction may not always have been followed implicitly, but as far as the German press was concerned, Whitehall remained the principal foe, while America received only very restrained attention. 32

Hitler9s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

3, Diplomatic Courtesies The Reich’s reticence in its press relations was matched by the indulgence with which Nazi leaders treated the United States in their public speeches and diplomacy. For years they had protested against all kinds of imagined insults to German honor in America;50 Hitler had personally attacked cabinet members51 and had finally launched an all-out offensive against the President himself in his sarcastic reply to the latter’s peace proposals in April, 1939.52 Yet when war actually broke out, Germany’s leaders lodged few protests of any kind with the State Department, though they certainly could have readily found sufficient reasons had they so desired.53 In their speeches, they no longer dealt with the Republic as a wicked enemy to be ruthlessly exposed. The Führer him­ self, in his speech of September 1, 1939, announcing the out­ break of war, refrained from mentioning the United States altogether, a practice he was to follow for over a year there­ after.54 His Foreign Minister went further. In a speech at Danzig in which he breathed defiance of the Western Democ­ racies, he declared specifically, “As far as Germany’s relations with America are concerned, there is no possibility of any differences ever arising between the two countries.” He prom­ ised that Germany would continue to observe faithfully the injunctions of the Monroe Doctrine, as the Reich had no inter­ ests in the Americas except legitimate trade. He concluded that it required “an almost morbid imagination to conceive of any difference or dispute between the two countries.”55 His representative in Washington, Chargé d’Affaires Dr. Hans Thomsen, fell in line by publishing an official release concerning German war aims. He expressed deep satisfaction'* about the official announcement that “the great American people” was determined to remain neutral and maintained the Reich was fighting only for the adjustment of the insufferable wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles. The statement concluded 33

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with the compliment, . . I accept as my own the high-minded words of your President who in his memorable address last Sunday cautioned the American people not to give credence to all rumors nor readily to believe all insinuations emanating from one side in this war.”56 So anxious were the Nazis to lull the people of the United States into believing the war did not concern them that even the “honorary Hebrew” was now highminded ! As late as April, 1940, General Walter von Brauchitsch was still able to tell representatives of the press that he had always admired the youthful strength of the United States and its people, to which he attributed the “gigantic success of the new continent.”57 Hitler’s determination not to provoke the great democracy must have caused him many a private fit of anger. He con­ sidered the United States completely in agreement with his enemies’ cause, but for strategical reasons he had to control his fury.58 His war plans, for example, were not at all appreciated by Mr. Roosevelt. On August 22, 1939, at the Obersalzberg, the Dictator told his military and naval chieftains that the time for action had finally come, provided no "Schweinehund” attempted to mediate.59 The detested President proved to be just such a Schweinehund two days later. He sent the Führer a public appeal to enter into direct negotiations with Poland, to accept international arbitration, or else to submit the whole issue to conciliation.60 He dispatched a similar communication to the President of Poland, who answered immediately.61 Not so Hitler, to whom Mr. Roosevelt consequently wired a second appeal on the next day to the effect that Poland had accepted and that therefore the consequences of rejection lay squarely on his shoulders.62 This time the Leader replied. Desiring toN treat his powerful adversary courteously, he expressed his deep appreciation of the Chief Executive’s efforts. Nevertheless, he merely put the blame for the crisis at Warsaw’s door and pro­ ceeded with his invasion during the same night.68

34

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Thereafter, the Wilhelmstrasse mended its behavior in its diplomatic dealings with the United States. Unlike the Presi­ dent’s mediation offers, his appeals not to bomb civilians64 were quickly answered—always, of course, with the saving clause that Germany would not consider the use of such frightful methods unless her enemies did so first.65 When Mr. Roosevelt closed the American three-mile zone to submarines, the Nazis ignored his obvious partisanship.66 They reacted in the same negative manner to Secretary Hull’s application of the Stimson Doctrine to Poland, a country he continued to recognize after the con­ quest on the grounds that its demise had been due to force as an instrument of national policy.67 Even when the Embargo was finally repealed in November, 1939, the German Foreign Office refrained from protesting against the patently pro-Allied move. America must not be given any cause for intervention. 4. Conciliatory Naval Policies From the very beginning of the conflict, Hitler considered the implications of submarine warfare as the most likely cause of incidents between himself and the Americans. Although he denied it, he was still thinking in terms of 1917. Conse­ quently he was determined to avoid any maritime venture which might give the interventionists opportunities for agitation. At any rate, he had been preparing primarily for a continental war rather than for a naval conflict; hence his fleet frequently was of secondary importance when it came to overall planning.68 On September 3, 1939, a Navy project to wage a campaign of unrestricted submarine attacks had been carefully weighed against its effects on neutrals.60 On the same day, a U-boat sank the British passenger liner Athenia. There had been a num­ ber of United States citizens aboard whose names were prominendy displayed in the American papers.70 Hitler was alarmed; he certainly did not want a second Lusitania Case on his hands. Hence he directed that earlier orders to German submarined not to attack passenger liners be repeated specifically by radio.71 35

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The Nazi Foreign Office did not deem this action sufficient. As soon as he learned of the British charge that a German vessel had committed the atrocious deed, Baron von Weizsaecker put through a hurried telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff. What he heard there doubdess relieved him. The Navy did not really know whether a German submarine had been in the vicinity; the officer to whom he spoke told him that the British account did not conform to the facts.72 With this information at his disposal, the Nazi Secretary of State sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires and insisted that no German craft could possibly have been responsible.73 As Admiral Raeder later told the Nuremberg Court, “From his experiences in the First World War, it was clear to him [Weizsaecker] that there should be no incident involving Amer­ ica.”74 The Admiral himself took the additional precaution of conveying a similar disclaimer of responsibility to the American Naval Attaché. He even went so far as to repeat his denials to Karl von Wiegand to make sure of his version reaching the American press.75 The German Library of Information in New York printed a long account of Weizsaecker’s disclaimers and hinted that the British themselves were responsible.76 The Berlin propagandists did not stop at intimating; they boldly issued instructions to the press throughout the land to blame the British Admiralty.77 Dr. Goebbels’ propagandists accused Winston Churchill of having torpedoed the Athenia as part of a plot to drag the United States into the war.78 When the German Government finally learned the true story of the sinking after the return of U-30 in mid-September, it decided to swear the real culprits to secrecy and maintained its accu­ sations against Churchill.70 One of the chief reasons for this deliberate falsification was the desire not to harm GermanAmerican relations.80 After this incident, the German Navy exercised great care in its dealings with the United States. The Führer absolutely prohibited the torpedoing of passenger ships, even when they 36

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

were sailing in convoy, “in order not to provoke neutral coun­ tries, the United States in particular.”81 Furthermore he agreed with his admirals never to use the notorious expression, “unre­ stricted submarine warfare,” but to substitute the term, “trade warfare” instead, an obvious attempt not to hurt American sensibilities.82 Needless to say, humanitarian considerations had no part in these decisions; the admirals encountered few diffi­ culties in obtaining Hitler’s consent to sink without warning enemy merchant ships definitely identified as such. For appear­ ances’ sake they decided occasionally to treat a neutral ship with special consideration,83 and Admiral Raeder categorically de­ clared to a representative of the Amsterdam Algemeen Handelsblad, “Germany does not wage unlimited submarine warfare.”84 Whatever their plans, American public opinion plagued the German admirals. Admiral Schniewind agreed with Under Secretary of State Ernst Woermann that neutral vessels guilty of certain offenses should be sunk without warning, but the two Nazis were also convinced that some territorial restrictions would have to be observed in this matter “so that the Americans could not say that we were doing such things in front of their coastlines.” As the latter were even then considering the pas­ sage of a new Neutrality Act designed to keep their vessels out of a specified closed war zone, the two officials decided to wait with their proposed measures until the American position had been clarified by the passage of the bill,85 although they dispatched a note to the United States Maritime Commission warning against unneutral behavior in the war zones.80 In the meantime, Admiral Raeder discovered more and more cause for worry. Hitler’s peace offensives made little head­ way; the small German navy, in many respects unprepared, was faced with a fight to the finish with the powerful British fleet. The Grand Admiral saw only one possibility of success­ fully meeting his problems: An air-tight blockade of the British Isles. On October 10, he discussed his plans with the Führer. Nothing must stand in the way of a “siege” of England, 37

Germany and American Neutrality

he said, not even the danger of America’s entry into the war, a contingency he considered certain in the long run anyway.87 Though Hitler agreed in principle, he never permitted his impetuous admirals to inveigle him into premature adventures with the United States.88 On November 1, he agreed with Raeder to defer the declaration of a state of siege in order to await “political developments in the near future.”89 Fore­ most among these ranked the revision of the Neutrality Law in Washington, to which Woermann had already referred. The main feature of the act was the repeal of the arms embargo of 1937, a change intended to help Great Britain and France. Ambassador Bullitt had characterized the law as essential for allied victory;90 American Nazis had fought it most bitterly,91 and the interventionists had been its chief advocates.92 When the bill became law on November 4, 1939, the Germans were well aware of its hostile intent,93 but they were able to find at least one redeeming feature in it: American ships were no longer allowed to sail through the war zones surrounding the British Isles.94 The United States by its own action had obviated the necessity for a specific declaration of siege in the war area; hence the Kriegsmarine dispensed with it temporar­ ily. The admirals merely decided to step up their offensive measures in the region involved, where they no longer had to guard against embarrassing clashes with the world’s strongest remaining neutral.95 The Foreign Office even went so far as to instruct German diplomats in neutral countries to urge the governments to which they were accredited to follow the Ameri­ can example.96 The otherwise obnoxious law offered some advantages to the Nazi navy after all. As one officer expressed it, The American Neutrality Law is a shackle for the most warloving of American Presidents, one which presumably cannot be shaken off as long as we do not provide him with the excuse to break this shackle and thus fulfill the dearest wish of the Britishl The terms of the Neutrality Law . . . are such that under them we could conduct a very intense economic war against Britain 38

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

without the fear of a conflict with the U. S. A. . . . Even if we are convinced that, should the war be of long duration, the U. S. A. will enter it in any case . . . it must be our object to delay this event so long that American help would come too late.97 The Führer himself assured his top-ranking officers that the measure rendered America harmless.98 Congress had clarified the situation for the Germans. There existed an operational area, defined by Washington itself, in which American ships could not saü. Within this zone Admiral Raeder could let loose his full fury against the Allies as well as the lesser non­ friendly neutrals. Outside of this region, he still had to proceed with circumspection if he did not wish to offend American sensibilities. Instructions given to U-21 and U-56 on November 24, 1939, constitute a good example of Nazi submarine policies at that time. Within the operational zone as defined by the United States, they were to torpedo all ships worth sinking; elsewhere, however, they were to leave strictly alone all vessels belonging either to friendly nations or to the United States.99 In the course of a naval conference held on December 30, 1939, Hitler agreed to this arrangement as an overall policy. Not only did he grant American ships the same protection from attack as those belonging to the pro-German Spaniards, Italians, Japanese, and Russians, but he also insisted that American crews be treated with the greatest consideration.100 On January 18, 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations re­ iterated these directives. He issued orders to sink without warning all ships in those waters near enemy coasts in which the use of mines could conceivably be made responsible, but expressly exempted vessels belonging to the United States, Italy, Russia, or Japan.101 Finally, on March 5, 1940, Admiral Raeder became even more specific. He instructed his forces neither to stop, pursue, nor sink American ships, so that “all difficulties which might result from trade war between the United States and Germany might be avoided at the very 39

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beginning.”102 These orders were to stand for almost two years, often making life miserable for Nazi submarine commanders. Hitler was clearly determined not to provoke the Roosevelty administration; yet the neutrality zone established by the Pan­ ama Conference on October 3, 1939, severely tested his resolve. At that time, the American nations set up a closed area stretch­ ing at times more than three hundred miles eastward into the Adantic Ocean within which they requested the belligerents to refrain from warlike acts. Raeder immediately discussed with his Führer the importance of this declaration. Should the latter abide by the proclamation, the Admiral urged his recognition be made contingent on America’s keeping her ships out of European war zones. Should he intend to step up his attacks on England, however, Raeder suggested that “a more favorable psychological basis” for German attacks be created by making recognition of the area contingent on the admission of the exemption of food from contraband, a demand certain to be rejected by Great Britain.108 Apparendy the Dictator made no immediate decisions; America herself kept her ships * out of the seas adjacent to Allied coasts without having to be prodded to do so by the Germans. Nevertheless, the question of recognition of the Pan-American •' Security Zone soon became exceedingly acute. From one end of the world to the other, headlines told of the encounter between the Nazi pocket batdeship Admiral Graf Spee with a British task force off the delta of the River Plate. After the German raider had sought temporary refuge in Montevideo Harbor only to be scutded shortly afterwards, the twenty-one American republics, acting through the President of Panama, sent notes of protest to the belligerents involved.104 The answers proved discouraging. The Allies, replying after a comparatively short interval, affirmed their desire to abide by the Declaration, provided their enemies consented to do likewise.105 The latter waited until February 14, 1940, to acknowledge not only the protest in the matter of the Admiral Graf Spee, but also the 40

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original note setting forth the policies of the American repub­ lics of October, 1939. The Wilhelmstrasse expressed its gratifica­ tion at the republics’ desire to remain neutral, but pointed out that the Allies not only had failed to recognize the zone but even owned colonies within it. For this reason, it refused to comply with the request until Britain and France changed their policies.106 From the point of view of prestige and internal propaganda, the Reich could hardly have given a different answer. Yet so determined was the Führer to keep America neutral that private orders were issued to seek no engagement in the Pan-American Security Zone after all!107 The Navy attempted to have these* instructions modified from time to time thereafter, but Hider generally remained adamant.108 He consciously avoided inci­ dents in the safety zone in order not to give the United States cause for intervention, although he was by no means constrained to do so under international law ! That it was the Dictator him­ self who was chiefly responsible for this policy is shown by the record of the Naval Conference of February 23, 1940. Admiral Raeder suggested that two submarines with mines and torpedoes be stationed off Halifax, Nova Scotia, to operate in the terri­ torial waters of Canada outside the safety zone, but Hider refused to sanction these operations “in view of the psycho­ logical effect on the U. S. A.” He took this stand although the Foreign Office had no objections.100 All considerations of naval strategy notwithstanding, America must not be provoked. The most irksome aspect of the security zone, as far as the Germans were concerned, was the so-called neutrality patrol. Ships of the twenty-one republics, which meant in effect the* American navy, patrolled the entire area and had orders to broadcast the position of any belligerent vessels they might en­ counter. As Britain was still Mistress of the Seas, this practice served to play Nazi ships directly into her hands;110 yet Ger­ man commanders, bound by strict instructions not to offend the 41

Germany and American Neutrality

United States, were unable to take effective counter-measures. The first serious test of Hitler’s determination to keep America neutral arose with the scuttling of the Columbus in December, 1939. This German liner had been trailed by the U. S. S. Tusca­ loosa from the moment she left the Mexican port of Vera Cruz. Since the American ship continually broadcast her position, she prevented the Columbus from attempting a hurried return to the Reich, and the Nazi captain scuttled her 450 miles east of Cape May.111 At the time, the Germans kept their chagrin to themselves; the Frankfurter Zeitung, reporting the incident, barely mentioned the patrol.112 It was not until after German press policies in connection with America were reversed that the incident was fully exploited. On March 30, 1941, the Völkischer Beobachter insisted that the United States had never been neutral and that the Captain of the Tuscaloosa had in­ formed the British of the whereabouts of the Columbus already in 1939.118 In spite of Hitler’s indignation, the patrol continued its activities right up to the declaration of war. How it operated and how desperately the Germans attempted to evade it may be gathered from the description of the Captain of the U. S. S. Broome, who trailed the Rhein late in 1940: From the very beginning, the Rhein made every effort to shake us off her tail and I believe we went through every gyration of which a destroyer is capable. . . . When we finally got into the open sea . . . we felt qualified as trailers first class. In the meantime the radio carried on with a considerable volume of traffic.114 The Rhein, needless to say, joined the Columbus at the bottom of the sea. It is obvious that such activities tested the endurance of a dictator as aggressive as the German Führer. His deter­ mination not to join issue with the United States until he was ready, however, compelled him to submit to these repeated injuries. 42

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

5. Attempts to Put Pressure on America Bellicose as the Nazis were, it was inevitable that they would not rely merely on passive methods. After all, there were a great number of isolationists in America with exactly the same ideas about the desirability of that country’s neutrality as their own, albeit for different reasons. These might be used to con­ firm arguments that Hitler had no designs on the Republic; moreover, should honeyed words fail to decoy Americans into acquiescence in German aggression, they might well serve to apply pressure to the hated Roosevelt administration to hinder it in its foreign policies. Hider righdy considered the President his principal enemy in America;115 what was more natural, therefore, than to base his hopes on and make common cause with the Chief Executive’s domestic enemies?115 This calcula­ tion dominated Nazi reflections on the subject of the United States. With the argument that the United States would become more and more isolationist should the likelihood of war in Europe increase, Ribbentrop had attempted to dispel Count Ciano’s fears of an eventual Anglo-American counter-alliance to that of the projected Axis, as early as October, 1938.11T Ten months later, he placed his trust in the isolationists again. In the course of his interview with Ciano at Salzburg he boasted that his propaganda campaign during the spring had produced a profound change toward isolationism in America, and therefore there need be no cause for anxiety in that direc­ tion.118 Hitler, too, felt sure that for the time being those groups attempting to turn the United States against Germany would be unable to achieve their aim.119 When Ribbentrop met the Duce in March, 1940, the conversation turned to the isola­ tionists again; Mussolini even quoted the New York Daily News to the effect that 90 percent of the American people wanted to stay out of war. The Nazi agreed that for this reason even the President himself might have changed his mind.120 By May, he ventured to predict that the American people would refuse 43

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to follow should Roosevelt decide to enter the war.121 Hence the records partially substantiate Goering’s statement at Nurem­ berg that Hitler had always relied on the isolationist press to keep America quiet.122 The Nazis’ confidence in the opponents of intervention may have been exaggerated, but it certainly was not entirely ground­ less. American public opinion, though not friendly to Hitler,' was still very amenable to isolationist propaganda. Of those polled by Mr. Gallup in September, 1939, 84 percent registered their opposition to American participation in the European war; their number climbed to 95 percent during October.123 Leading isolationist newspapers insisted repeatedly that the war did not concern America.124 Isolationist orators in and out of* Congress, supported by the popular Colonel Lindbergh, echoed this sentiment.125 Their arguments were most helpful to Berlin in keeping America quiet. Given such conditions, support of the isolationists became, Germany’s obvious strategy. In certain cases, the Wilhelm­ strasse was able to establish personal contacts with leaders of the American opposition. During the eventful days prior to the outbreak of war, Representative Hamilton Fish of New York stopped off in Germany on his way to attend the Oslo meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Herr von Ribbentrop received him most courteously. For an hour and a half he listened to the Congressman’s pleas to settle the Danzig question by conference. The interview must have confirmed the Nazis’ implicit trust in the isolationists, for the New York Congressman even agreed that it would be a good thing for the world if Germany were permitted to establish her hegemony over Eastern Europe. If we are to believe his own account, he assured Ribbentrop that American public opinion would not be adverse to such an undertaking.126 It paid to be polite to such a man; Herr von Ribbentrop showed his appreciation by putting his own private plane at Fish’s disposal for the flight to Oslo.127 44

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The Nazis did their best to bolster the isolationists’ position. As it was obviously impossible to make Americans like Hitler, German propaganda had to be carefully attuned to isolationist and pacifist thought.128 The German radio arranged its broad­ casts accordingly. Crowding trans-Atlantic air waves with posi­ tive assertions of British war guilt, it contrasted these with the Reich’s desire to localize the conflict.129 Nazi propaganda agen­ cies within the United States, such as Dr. Friedrich Auhagen’s American Fellowship Forum, took a similar point of view. Lawrence Dennis, one of this organization’s chief contributors, had long stressed the argument that the interests of the two countries did not clash.130 After the war had actually started in Europe, Dr. Auhagen himself, keeping in mind the pacifist mentality of many isolationists, emphasized Germany’s designs for peace. The Fatherland wanted nothing more than to es­ tablish a United States of Europe!131 As indeed many of President Roosevelt’s opponents in America had pacifist lean­ ings, Hitler’s periodic peace offensives constituted an excellent way of playing into their hands. After many a successful mili­ tary campaign, the Führer would offer peace to everyone—always, of course, on his own terms. His speech of October 6, 1939, serves as a good illustration of this practice. The world had no further cause to fight, said he; the Polish campaign was over and he had no further demands to make of the Western Powers.132 The isolationists in America promptly took up his cry for peace.133 To the Nazis, Great Britain appeared the guilty prolonger of the war. Consequently, when the isolationists were making the most of the Anglo-American controversy concerning the blockade in the winter of 1939-1940, the Forum Observer was only too ready to make use of the issue. With the theme, “Britannia Waives the Rules,” the periodical charged that per­ fidious Albion was ruining American exporters as much as she was interfering with the time-honored concept of freedom of the seas.134 45

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The German press, too, commented favorably upon the isolationists’ struggle to keep America neutral. The Völkischer Beobachter prominently displayed various findings of the Gallup poll to prove its contention that the majority of the American people wanted no part of Europe’s wars.135 The utterances of opposition leaders, however, constituted its best source. On September 21, 1939, it reported General Hugh Johnson’s warn­ ing to his countrymen to beware of British plots; on September 26, commenting on the debates over the repeal of the arms embargo, it felt justified in announcing, “Isolationists gaining in the United States,” and on October 8, it asserted categorically, “Influence of warmongers sinking in the United States.”13® The Zeitschriften-Dienst habitually presented material culled from the speeches of leading non-interventionists or from articles in anti-Allied papers so that German editors might put it to good use; the organ recommended especially the use of anti-British material in the Gaelic-American, Lindbergh’s radio addresses, and John O ’Donnell’s columns.137 The Nazis prominently fea­ tured Senator Reynolds’ attack on British interference with the mails,138 not to speak of Senator Lundeen’s contributions. The Gentleman from Minnesota could often be relied upon to do the talking for Germany in America.189 Another indication of Nazi appreciation of the isolationists was the unanimous support this group received from the Berlininspired “lunatic fringe.” Though native and naturalized ad­ mirers of Hitlerism had no sympathy at all with pacifism and presumably would have loved to see the United States ranged side by side with the Reich in a struggle against the European democracies, they did their best to conform to Hitler’s efforts to lull the American people into a calm acceptance of German aggression through the maintenance of neutrality. The GermanAmerican Bund became such a staunch supporter of all and sundry isolationist, and, ironically enough, pacifist groups and causes. Its official organ, The Free American and Deutscher Weckruf and Beobachter, appeared once every week on York-

46

Hitler*s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

ville’s newsstands. Originally, it had been published entirely in German under the title of Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter, but ever since 1938, an English section, entided Free American, had attested to the “American” character of both paper and Bund. By 1939, the organization had become so “patriotic” that the English section comprised the first few pages; the Weckruf had been relegated to the rear portion of the publica­ tion. On the day before Hitler’s march into Poland, this Free American ran a headline, “PLANNING TO PUSH U. S. INTO WAR.” Below this alarming caption, Bundists could read that Great Britain was deliberately trying to force the United States into another European conflict. “Do you intend to allow YOUR life, or that of YOUR sons to be jeopardized in this way? Write your Congressmen and Senators NOW . . . to prevent such embroilment,”140 urged the paper. In subsequent issues, it informed its readers that the Poles had committed the first act of war. As Nazi principles could not be allowed to stand in the way of the all-important aim of keeping America neutral, it managed to forget the cherished Führerprinzip and began to speak of the danger to the “priceless . . . boon of democracy should the country be involved in foreign war.”141 Proposals for repeal of the arms embargo horrified the Yorkville editors who declared, “Bund Demands Real Neutrality.”142 Colonel Lind­ bergh became the idol of the Bundists, who could read his speeches verbatim in their weekly.143 Fritz Kuhn’s organization had fallen into line with the general isolationist movement. Fascists more indigenous than the followers of the Bundes­ führer also rallied to the isolationist banners. The Reverend Gerald B. Winrod pleaded, “Keep America Out of War,”144 and prayed that the Republic might be rescued from conspira­ tors. Father Charles E. Coughlin at the Shrine of the Little Flower waged a vigorous campaign against the repeal of the Embargo and actively propagandized for Hitler’s peace proposals in October, 1939.145 Some of his followers even went so far that they were arrested in January, 1940, on charges of plotting 47

Germany and American Neutrality

the overthrow of the government.146 William Dudley Pelley contributed his share to the cause he had advocated for so long. He pointed out the responsibility of the Jews for the war and stressed the noble fight Hider was waging against them,147 while Laura Ingalls, from a plane, dropped pamphlets on Washing­ ton.148 The Fascists exerted every type of pressure conceivable to defeat pro-Allied legislation. A group of women, calling themselves the “Mothers of America,” invaded the Capitol at the time of the Congressional struggle for neutrality revision in November, 1939, denounced supporters of the measure as “Jewlovers,” and in general made a nuisance of themselves.149 Hitler even managed to get the services of his newly-found allies, the Communists, during the brief period of Russo-German collabora­ tion. The Daily Worker exhorted the faithful to “Keep the United States Out of the Imperialist War,”150 while party members held vociferous anti-war rallies.151 The Nazis were thus well supplied with supporters of their dilatory policies toward the United States. It is true that the overwhelming majority of isolationists abhorred them as much as their interventionist opponents, but for the time being Colonel Lindbergh’s followers, whether aware of it or not, fitted very well into Hitler’s calculations. The Nazi press even went so far as to praise highly Senator William E. Borah, although the lat­ ter’s political convictions had been diametrically opposed to its own. When he died, he received a laudatory obituary in the Frankfurter Zeitung,™2 which charged that the British and French had carried partisanship so far as to print uncompli­ mentary remarks about the dead isolationist.153 Apparently the Nazis did not distinguish clearly between their attempts to keep the United States neutral by avoiding provocation and their policy of attaining the same end by firmer means. Their support of American isolationism at times caused them to modify their propagandists reticence. Early in 1940, they decided on an all-out military offensive against the West. They still considered it important to keep the United States 48

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

from supporting the intended victims; the German Navy re­ mained utterly passive. In other ways, however, the Wilhelm­ strasse attempted to strengthen the isolationists and thereby pos­ sibly to frighten the Administration. Late in March, it published what it hoped would have the effect of a bombshell in America and constitute a great help to the opposition in its fight against President and State Department: The Third White Book of Polish Documents Relative to the Outbreak of War.154 This document collection, allegedly captured in the files of the defunct Warsaw Government, was designed to pillory Mr. Roosevelt’s representatives abroad. It purported to show that as early as November, 1938, Ambassador William G. Bullitt had assured Polish diplomatic officers that the United States, bitterly resentful of Germany, would assuredly take part in any future European conflict, provided Britain and France made the first move.165 In January, 1939, he had allegedly left for France with instructions to give the Quay d’Orsay a “moral assurance” that the United States was abandoning its policy of isolation and would be prepared to grant active support to the Western democracies in case of war.156 Further documents seemed to indicate that throughout the spring and early summer of 1939 the American Ambassadors in Paris and London had used their influence to stiffen British and French statesmen in their deter­ mination to protect Poland against further expansion from Berlin.157 The Nazis also included a report from the Polish Ambassador to Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, about the tremendous influence of the Jews in America.158 Although this publication involved a temporary departure from the lull in the press campaign, German newspapers were given free reign with these revelations, at least in attacking the incriminated American diplomats.159 This might result in con­ fused instructions, but for Ribbentrop, at any rate, the docu­ ments had proved America’s inveterate hatred of Nazism. He told Mussolini that they showed America’s great guilt in starting the war and her deep-seated dislike for the dictators. To empha49

Germany and American Neutrality

size his remarks, he presented a copy to the Duce with his own hand, and agreed with the Italian that the isolationists would keep the United States out of war.160 If he had expected that his publications would cause the American opposition to stir, he was right. The documents caused a veritable uproar. Although they really contained no startling revelations, the isolationist writer, G. Hartley Grattan, appropri­ ately wrote the foreword to the American edition to show how neady they fitted into Roosevelt’s foreign policy of “action short of war” in support of the Allies.161 Nazi-subsidized publications naturally gave them publicity,162 while leading isolationist organs published full facsimiles of the diplomatic notes.163 Representa­ tive Hamilton Fish introduced a resolution into the House call­ ing for an investigation of the White Book’s authenticity; his colleague, Senator Reynolds, delivered dramatic speeches on the other side of the Capitol, claiming that American boys were being sent to batde for Great Britain’s benefit,164 and the State Department considered the affair serious enough to warrant an official denial.165 Premier Daladier sent a handwritten letter to the President, assuring the Chief Executive that Ambassador Bullitt had never made any promises of any kind.166 Germany had won a point; she had played a powerful argument into the hands of the Administration’s enemies. Another indication of Ribbentrop’s contradictory behavior at this time was his remarkable reception of Sumner Welles. Determined as his Führer was to keep the United States neutral, it would certainly have been wise from the Nazi point of view to treat the American diplomat with some courtesy. After all, Germany was, at the time, tolerating the annoying Atlantic patrol in order not to provoke the United States. Yet the Reich Foreign Minister behaved in an exceptionally rude manner.167 In his opinion, the Envoy had either come for internal reasons, and any successes he might achieve would thus bolster the hated Roosevelt administration, or he had come to save the Allies from that imminent disaster which Ribbentrop desired.168 Further50

Hitler’s Neutrality Policy Toward the United States

more, the Nazis were unwilling to raise any hopes of peace among the German people and decided to put up a stiff front lest they be suspected of weakness.169 A display of strength and intransigence might play havoc with the President’s plans and conceivably frighten him into acquiescence with German schemes. Hence Ribbentrop refused to speak a word of English when he received his visitor, though he was certainly familiar with that language. He sought to impress Welles with a long monologue concerning the Reich’s invincibility. Nevertheless, totally oblivious of the incongruity of the situation, he reverted temporarily to his other theme. Germany, he emphasized, had absolutely no interests in the Western Hemisphere and constituted no threat of any kind to the United States. All she wanted was the establishment of a Monroe Doctrine of her own in Central Europe, while the English aimed at the complete destruction of the Fatherland. Hence, he foresaw no chance of peace except through a com­ plete German victory.170 Other Germans behaved with much greater courtesy. Ernst von Weizsaecker, hoping for a negotiated settlement, saw no rea­ son why he should abandon his efforts to placate America. When Mr. Welles met him later during the day, he drew his chair toward the center of the room lest he be overheard, and sug­ gested the Under Secretary tell Hitler personally to negotiate while there was still time, implying that Ribbentrop stood in the way of discussions.171 The Führer himself also proved far more affable than his Foreign Secretary. Although he too was con­ vinced that Welles had merely come to prevent the spring offensive, he was careful not to refer to the ticklish question of German-American relations at all.172 Hermann Goering seemed cordial and emphasized once again the Nazi contention that America had nothing to fear from Germany.173 The peculiar reception accorded to Mr. Welles may be ex­ plained partially as the result of the Wilhelmstrasse’s belief that he had come to save the Allies from imminent disaster. If the Nazis at the same time had managed to frighten the United 51

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States by impressing Roosevelt’s emissary with stubborn deter­ mination, so much the better. The Germans expected to accom­ plish the same purpose through other channels as well. Hoping that realization of their steadfastness and strength might keep the United States from interfering, they counted upon American businessmen with interests in the Reich to impress influential circles.174 James D. Mooney of General Motors served as an intermediary of this sort. His representative in Germany, Mr. C. R. Osborn, held a conversation with Dr. H. Wohlthat, Hjalmar Schacht’s erstwhile deputy, in April, 1940. In no uncer­ tain terms, the Nazi boasted that his country would offer no more peace proposals; had not Germany’s superiority in the air been proven beyond doubt in Norway? Furthermore, he ex­ pressed his satisfaction with the forthcoming Presidential cam­ paign, which, he expected, would give the Fatherland a period of grace in America.175 The United States must stay neutral, but let it be aware of German might. When the great offensives of spring, 1940 started, the Nazis’ policies of keeping the United States temporarily neutral had been evolved in their main outlines. The methods used had at times been contradictory, but they had been crowned with initial success. By pursuing them further, Hider might be able to achieve speedy victories over the deserted Allies, a consideration he kept in mind for many months longer. One difficulty re­ mained. The United States might refuse to be lulled or cajoled into inactivity, and the future would have to tell how far the neutrality policy might be extended.

52

CHAPTER THREE

Extension of the Neutrality Policy M ay, 1940 - December, 1940

1. Complication of the Neutrality Policy by Hitler9s Victories However much the Nazis desired to keep America neu­ tral, whether by lulling her into passivity or by high-pressuring her into inactivity, their designs could succeed only if Washington were gullible and stupid enough to play their game. Much to the detriment of the Fiihrer’s plans, the American Government was neither. President Roosevelt had perceived for years the* danger threatening his country in case of German victory; he was a shrewd enough leader of public opinion to guide his people’s thoughts in the same direction.1 In the last analysis, Hitler himself simplified this task. The spring offensive against Norway and Denmark and later against Belgium, Holland, and France, caused a tremendous stir in the United States, as the German press itself had to admit.2 These campaigns involved such unequivocal violations of neutrality that not even the isola­ tionist newspapers could find anything good to write about them.3 The President and his Secretary of State condemned these breaches of international law in the strongest terms; they even froze in American banks the assets of the countries in­ volved.4 The Wilhelmstrasse, unwilling to reply and loath to provoke the United States any more than absolutely necessary, took no official notice of these steps. Even when the President attempted to use his influence to induce Italy to stay out of the war, Hitler refused to comment, although Mussolini kept him 53

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well up-to-date on details.6 On May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht began its onslaught against the West. Roosevelt again castigated Germany in the most unequivocal terms.6 When the Duce finally declared war on an already prostrate France, the President delivered his famous address at Charlottesville, Virginia, in which he bluntly stated, “The hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.”7 The rapid fall of France brought the long-foreseen peril of total Nazi victory into the range of immediate possibilities. Even the isolationist New York Daily News editorialized, Our job is strictly one of building up our own defenses on the chance that Hitler may take it into his head to show our own “Pluto-democracy” where it heads in. We hope he won’t; but he may. Our job is to make insurance against such a thing.8 Two days later, the same tabloid admitted, Hitler may win. After that, he may feel that the United States should be given the blessings of Nazism, too. We’d better hurry the raising of that army of 1,000,000 mechanic sergeants. . . .9 If isolationist editors could use such language, supporters of the Administration could certainly read the handwriting on the wall. America’s historic position in a world dominated by a friendly England seemed to be coming to an end.10 The eastern approaches of the Atlantic Ocean might soon be in the hands of Nazi Germany, a power hardly friendly. The British navy, which had long constituted a sort of first line of defense for the Monroe Doctrine,11 might momentarily either disappear com­ pletely or swell the resources of hostile sea powers. American diplomats throughout the world had left nothing untried to warn of these dangers. On May 23, 1940, Joseph E. Davies wrote to the President that he was afraid Britain and France would be defeated. Should the British fleet fall into German hands, he was convinced that disaster threatened the United States. In spite of Hitler’s frequent denials of interest in trans-Atlantic affairs, the diplomat concluded, 54

Extension of the Neutrality Policy

From such experience as I have had, I am firmly convinced that the community of interest of Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan is cohesive and implemented with the very definite under­ standing as to how each will participate in the spoils through spheres of influence over and occupation of different parts of the world. It is only our strength which has probably eliminated us from their calculations so far. With the British and French fleets in their possession the United States would undoubtedly be in­ cluded in their plans.12 On June 7, 1940, the General Navy Board came to a similar conclusion. It maintained that American prosperity and reliance on the Royal Navy had rendered the nation soft and vulnerable and suggested the country strain every nerve to arm for any eventuality.13 As R. W. Shugg and H. A. De Weerd have put it so well, “For the first time since Napoleon the continent of Europe was dominated by one military power, and consequently the United States was in danger.”14 Professor Langer has summed up the situation in even more dramatic terms, Viewed from Washington, it was clear that American interests of the most vital character were directly involved in the crisis. Prior to May, 1940, the United States still had the armies and navies of France between it and the Nazi menace. Now suddenly the European front was caving in. France was probably doomed and Britain as well as France might be forced to make peace with Hitler. Not only would the Nazis then command the coasts of Europe; they might even secure control of two of the world’s largest navies. In that case . . . they could rule the Adantic and choose their own time for operations against the Western hemi­ sphere.15 The President himself was well aware of this situation.16 But if he had any doubts left, he received a communication from the American Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin to dispel them. On June 17, 1940, Alexander Kirk wrote, The United States is the only power in the world which can effectively oppose Hitler now and in the future and he knows it. 55

Germany and American Neutrality

It is easy to say that it is safe in so far as Nazi aspirations are concerned or even that in the post-war plan of the regime a world is envisaged in which the United States will maintain its estab­ lished position in cooperation with the German hegemony in its extended spheres of influence, and the utterances of Hitler him­ self would tend to quiet any fears to the contrary. The develop­ ment of Nazi aims in the past, however, and the contradictions in fact which have characterized his other assurances would not justify any belief in those assumptions. It is also easy to assume that even if Hider intends to launch an offensive against the Western Hemisphere the United States, with the assistance of the British and French fleets, can oppose and destroy Hitler after he has established his domination of Europe; and finally the assump­ tion may be offered that as there is a limit to what the power galvanized by one human being can achieve, time and the exten­ sion of that power will eventually negative its effectiveness. . . . The position of America, therefore, is clear. There will be no place in the world envisaged by Hitler, and he will exercise his power with a view to eliminating it as a great power as soon as possible. He will not attack the Americans by force, as he can attain his aims by other methods, once he has established his domination over the countries of Europe. He will strangle the United States economically and financially and even if he does not succeed in breaking down the solidarity of the countries of the Western Hemisphere which may be precarious at present, he will confront the United States within a brief measure of time with the impossible tasks of adjusting its system to an economy in which it will be excluded from access to all foreign markets. The fight, therefore, which is now being waged in Europe, is a fight for the preservation of the American order, and complete defeat of the Allies in the present battles is the defeat of the United States. The diplomat then urged that the United States line up un­ equivocally on the side of the Allies.17 vThe President was told substantially the same thing in M. Reynaud’s two desperate appeals for immediate American inter­ vention, but since only Congress possessed the power to declare .war, he had to decline.18 Nevertheless, he did what he could 56

Extension of the Neutrality Policy

and made the survival of Great Britain the cornerstone of his foreign policy.19 Whitehall urgently asked for aid; its pleas did not remain unanswered, and more and more assistance was lent to the beleaguered island. The fall of France so shocked public/ opinion that it was possible for the President to introduce into Congress a bill for selective service.20 Isolationist law-makers no longer blindly blocked vigorous defense measures.21 AngloAmerican relations became ever closer.22 The Nazis realized all this very well. Still, continuation of the policy of keeping the United States out of war for some time longer remained a matter of cardinal importance for them. American counter-moves designed to aid the Allies complicated greatly their program of passive reticence; consequently, they tended more and more toward the high-pressure approach, al­ though they refused to give up its softer counterpart entirely. In several ways, the Germans even abandoned the intransigent atti­ tude they had assumed toward Sumner Welles. As soon as they had finished their propagandists exploitation of the captured Polish documents, they returned to the never abandoned policy of attempting to lull the Republic into neutrality. The Press Ser­ vice took an unequivocal stand: Nazi papers must not arouse the Americans. While German armies were still driving forward, it enjoined, “The U. S. must not be offended.”23 After they had won the battle of France, it voiced a similar command: “Let us avoid everything which might strengthen the United States in its fears that its importance might be weakened through German victories.”24 No matter how difficult ever-increasing American help to the Allies might render this task for Nazi newspapers, the Zeitschriften-Dienst remained adamant. “We shall neither point out England’s politico-diplomatic attempts [to obtain aid from the United States] . . . nor mention the very aggressive Bullitt address, nor the U. S.-Canadian agreements concerning the institution of a common defense committee,” it wrote.25 Even after President Roosevelt stretched traditional concepts of neutrality to the utmost by transferring fifty over-

57

Germany and American Neutrality

age destroyers to the hard-pressed British navy, it refused to be swayed on the grounds that “the time of a verbal break with the United States” had “not yet arrived.”26 From the long range point of view, the propaganda organ’s efforts fitted in very well with overall Nazi aims. It is indicative of the peculiar inconsistency of German policy toward the United States throughout this period of American neutrality that its directions were not followed implicitly. The temptation of playing into the isolationists’ hands through a policy of pressure remained an ever-present possibility; constant transAtlantic challenges could not be permanently ignored for domes­ tic reasons; consequently the Nazi radio went to war with the Roosevelt administration after the fall of France.27 The news­ papers and periodicals did not begin in earnest their campaign of abuse until the Press Service so enjoined in March, 1941,28 but they had kept up quite a vigorous rearguard skirmish with the hated President throughout the latter half of the preceding year. The Völkischer Beobachter, for example, referred to the transfer of the over-age destroyers as an Anglo-American “cheap bargain sale” {Ramschgeschäft),20 while other publications de­ plored the unneutral nature of the President’s action.30 On the other hand, the truce in polemics still applied to book pub­ lishers; it was still possible to write fairly objective works about the American scene.81 The Führer himself set the pace in this matter of restraint toward the United States. On June 14, 1940, he granted an interview to the American press and stated, Germany is one of the few countries which hitherto has re­ frained from interfering in America in any way. Germany has never had any territorial or political interests on the American continent, nor has Germany any such interests now. Whoever as­ serts the contrary is lying for some purpose. Peace, not war, was the aim of his Government, insisted the Dictator.32 Two months later, his Minister of Propaganda and 58

Extension of the Neutrality Policy

Public Enlightenment repeated similar sentiments to Karl Wie­ gand. Categorically denying that North America could be in­ vaded by air or sea, Dr. Goebbels worked hard to convey the impression that the country had nothing to fear from people like the Nazis, who only wanted to preserve and uphold Germany’s political and economic ties with the United States as they con­ sidered its aid essential for the reconstruction of Europe.83 These soothing words coincided with one of Hitler’s periodic peace offensives. On July 10, he delivered a long speech offer­ ing Britain eternal peace if only he might keep his European gains.84 Perhaps he also had the isolationists in mind; had they not long been staunch advocates of a negotiated peace? At any rate, American neutrality might well be utilized for such pur­ poses. Dr. Schacht was still available; according to an agree­ ment reached with Sumner Welles during the latter’s stop in Berlin, the First Secretary of the American Embassy, Donald R. Heath, served as the banker’s contact with Washington. The two officials met on May 8. The former President of the Reichsbank reiterated his suggestion that he be invited to speak at a non-political forum in America and to meet leading circles in that country. Hitler would then be drawn into peace nego­ tiations which he would “neither dominate nor escape from.” For the success of these plans, Schacht insisted, continued Amer­ ican neutrality was absolutely essential.35 Whether he was really interested in forcing Hitler’s hand remains highly doubtful; any negotiated settlement at that time would have been most advan­ tageous for the Nazis. On June 6, he met Heath again. He repeated his previous proposals, although he admitted prospects for peace to be rather slim.36 Whatever his intentions, he was still doing Hitler a favor. The Nazis themselves approached the First Secretary through Dino Alfieri later in the same month with very similar requests for American services as an inter­ mediary in the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain. Mr. Hull, however, convinced that he could not comply with­ out harming Whitehall, refused to act.37 59

Germany and American Neutrality

4 i Hitler attempted to preserve American neutrality by re­ straining his press and periodic talks of peace, he outdid himself in his continued reluctance to clash with American ships on the high seas. The orders of March 5 not to sink, stop, or pursue them continued to stand, as did the secret recognition of the Pan-American security zone.88 On June 11, 1940, a German submarine did stop the Hner Washington, but as soon as the Nazi commander had ascertained that she was not Greek as originally surmised, he released her in compliance with his orders.89 At the Naval Conference of July 11, the question of a declaration of a state of “siege” of the British Isles was again discussed; it was decided to proclaim it as soon as total war against Britain began. The admirals felt that such a declaration should affect the same region as the American war zone defined by the President. Such a concession would avoid incidents with the United States and, as they put it, hinder American “ten­ dencies toward altering the neutrality laws.”40 With the begin­ ning of the Battle of Britain, Hitler acted upon the suggestion. He publicly proclaimed a complete state of siege of Great Britain, but the area to which this applied corresponded almost exactly to the zone delineated by Washington.41 The Germans’ fear of incidents with the powerful Republic was illustrated by the case of the American Legion. This army transport had been scheduled to sail from Petsamo, Finland, in mid-August, to evacuate stranded American citizens from the continent. The Crown Princess of Norway was also included among the passengers. Informed of the projected voyage, the German Government had given official assurances that no harm would come to the vessel. On August 14, however, it changed its mind and suggested a more northerly route on the grounds that it could not guarantee the American Legion’s safety if she proceeded as originally intended. Since the American Govern­ ment knew that the alternate route was mined by the British,42 it refused to heed the belated Nazi request.43 The Germans interpreted this intractability as a desire to create new incidents 60

E x te n s io n o f th e N e u tr a lity P o lic y

on the high seas. In order to forestall any possible consequences, the German Embassy held a press conference and disclaimed, in advance, responsibility for any mishaps which might befall the ship.44 The Nazi press hinted suspiciously at obscure intentions on Washington’s part and expressed great satisfaction when the transport arrived safely.45 Increasing American aid to Great Britain, especially the famous destroyer deal, caused quite a stir among Hider’s ad­ mirals. The Pan-American security zone and the neutrality patrol seriously interfered with their operations; their orders not to molest or provoke American units became more and more of a burden to them. On November 14, they broached the sub­ ject to their Führer. They succincdy stated, Since the U. S. A. and other American republics have relin­ quished strict neutrality . . . the safety zone, recognized neither by Great Britain nor by Germany, has been divested of its neutral character. It is very obvious that this safety zone benefits British interests alone. . . . It is therefore proposed to permit German naval forces to make attacks in the safety zone. They suggested an alternate zone of about 200 or 300 miles in width, but Adolf Hitler refused to budge. Determined as before not to pick a quarrel with the powerful American navy, he turned down the request, at least for the time being.46 Hence Grand Admiral Raeder and his colleagues had to continue to put up with the irksome restraints and the troublesome zone and lost a number of merchant ships because of the patrol. During November and December, 1940, the freighters I darwild and Rhein, attempting to reach the Reich from their ports of refuge in Mexico, found themselves trailed by American naval forces. As a result, the former vessel’s crew scutded her within the the Security Zone, while H . M . S. Diomede torpedoed the latter, U. S. S. Broome standing by.47 Yet Germany Hid not protest in Washington. 61

G e r m a n y a n d A m e r ic a n N e u t r a l i ty

Despite Germany’s official reticence toward the United States in the critical summer days of 1940, there was one field in which her victories were bound to affect her relations with the Republic immediately. Nazi machinations in Latin America had irritated Washington in the past, but with the fall of France, the position of the French and Dutch colonies in the Western Hemisphere became at once a matter of great anxiety. Further­ more, the expected overall victory of the totalitarian powers led many Latin governments to adopt at least an attitude of studied care toward the Reich. The Republic of Uruguay early in June frustated a Nazi coup d’état/ 8 but her great neighbor, Brazil, seemed to veer sharply toward the New Order when President Getulio Vargas paid some lip-service to institutions very reminis­ cent of the corporate state. Although the American Ambassador immediately informed Washington that the speech was meant to apply to domestic matters only and in no way changed Brazil’s traditionally friendly attitude toward the United States, the impression created was one of disquiet, to say the least.49 Under the circumstances, it was imperative for the Roosevelt administration to fortify its position on the continent. First of all, it organized a purchasing agency to take care of South American export surpluses;50 second, it sent notes to the Wilhelm­ strasse informing German authorities that any transfer of Amer­ ican territory from one non-American power to another would constitute an open violation of the Monroe Doctrine.51 Third, the American foreign ministers gathered for a meeting at Havana to deal in concert with the threatened change of ownership of European colonies within the Western Hemisphere.52 Although German official sources exerted considerable pressure on the smaller powers not to agree to anything the Yankees might propose, the Conference succeeded in agreeing on the Act of Havana, providing for joint inter-American administration of any islands or other territories in danger of being shifted from one non-American sovereignty to another.53 Von Ribbentrop, 62

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in view of his desire to avoid trouble with the State Department, had already disclaimed any intention of seizing French West Indian possessions and recognized the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine at the time the original Washington note reached him.54 Hence the Nazis made no overt attempts to seize the orphaned colonies and did not confront the republics with the immediate necessity of taking counter-measures. Ribbentrop’s careful approach, however, did not reassure the American Government in the least. After the collapse of France, Great Britain stood alone; her “finest hour” had arrived. Far from accepting Hitler’s peace proposals, she defied the seemingly invincible Dictator. America’s friendship and an everincreasing flow of material aid doubtless encouraged the British. Although the United States did not go quite as far as Mr. Churchill wanted,55 nevertheless, it accomplished something. The President consolidated his position by inviting two promi­ nent Republican internationalists, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, to join his cabinet,56 while various officials became more and more outspoken in their criticism of Nazism.57 Congress passed the country’s first peacetime draft,58 and a joint-defense agreement was concluded with belligerent Canada.59 A sub­ stantial portion of the American people had come to realize the danger presented by Hitler’s victories. These developments probably indicated to the Germans that something radical had to be done about America, but this indi­ cation became a virtual command with the consummation of the exchange of the fifty over-age destroyers in return for a number of British naval bases on September 2, 1940. All-out aid to Britain had most clearly overstepped the bounds of tradi­ tional neutrality with this momentous transaction.60 Germany’s well-known desire to keep the United States temporarily neutral had enabled Mr. Roosevelt to deliver a blow to her without running the risk of war for which his country was not yet pre­ pared. To cite Winston Churchill, 63

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The transfer to Great Britain of fifty American warships was a decidedly unneutral act by the United States. It would, accord­ ing to all the standards of history, have justified the German Government in declaring war upon them. The President judged there was no danger, and I felt there was no hope, of this simple solution of many difficulties. It was Hitler’s interest and method to strike his opponents down one by one. The last thing he wished was to be drawn into war with the United States before he had finished with Britain.61 The Prime Minister was right. Conflict with the United States prior to complete victory in Europe was indeed the last thing Hitler wanted and he did not declare war, but he did decide that he had better do something positive to counteract the effect of the President’s move. The policy of lulling the United States into neutrality had not succeeded entirely; yet the Führer clung to the belief that the Americans would not dare to intervene actively for some time.62 The corollary ap­ proach of high pressure methods might still be stepped up to achieve the desired aim. Consequently, just as in the preceding February, not only did the press receive at least tacit permission to comment in detail upon the hated transaction,63 but the Nazis also decided that other ways of checking the Roosevelt administration would have to be found to keep America from going to war. Support of domestic enemies of the President did not seem to suffice; collaboration with diversionary enemies abroad might. Keeping these considerations in mind, Hitler made up his mind that the time had come for the conclusion of a definite military alliance with Japan. By attempting to coordinate his American policy with that of Japan, he com­ promised severely his resolve not to provoke the United States until after victory. He could exercise no control whatsoever over Japanese diplomacy; consequently the Island Empire could be expected to frighten Washington into inactivity and to divert its attention from the European war only so long as it suited 64

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Tokyo to do so. Once Japan’s plans changed, Hitler’s whole scheme of American neutrality would collapse. 2. Efforts to Enlist Japan The idea of German collaboration with Japan, an approach culminating in the Tripartite Pact, had long held a peculiar fascination for the Nazi Foreign Minister. Although he knew so little about the Far East that he was under the impression that the term “Shimonoseki” referred to a person,64 he loved to play with the idea of rearranging not merely the map of Europe but that of distant countries as well. Since Hitler considered the Japanese a “kindred heroic people” (artverwandtes Helden­ volk), Herr von Ribbentrop was able to indulge freely in his oriental fancies.65 In order to understand the final conclusion of the Three Power Pact in 1940, it is necessary to digress for a moment and to go back to the beginnings of Nazi-Japanese collaboration. It was in 1936, after three years of ever-closer collabora­ tion,66 that Bureau von Ribbentrop, the later Foreign Minister’s special organization, negotiated the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, in effect serving notice upon the world of the community of interests between the two countries.67 A few difficulties still remained to be solved during the next few years. In 1937, Japan attacked China, a country in which the Germans were com­ mercially interested and where they maintained a military mis­ sion of advisers to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For these reasons, the Nazis adopted an official policy of strict neutrality at first.68 Ambassador Dieckhoff even took the trouble of speci­ fically informing Secretary Hull of the Reich’s perfect impar­ tiality in the Far East.69 Germany then attempted to bring the two belligerents together around a conference table,70 but when their efforts to mediate failed, the Nazis were forced to choose one or the other. The Führer, convinced of Nippon’s strength, reluctantly cast his lot with her rather than with her adversary. He ordered the withdrawal of the German military mission to 65

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China, stopped deliveries of war material to the Kuomintang,71 and announced that he would recognize the puppet Empire of Manchukuo.72 He fulfilled this promise shortly afterward73 and authorized the signature of a pact of cultural amity with the Japanese in November, 1938.74 In the meantime, Germany too had started to expand. Hitler had annexed his native Austria in March, 1938, only to increase his appetite for the adjacent Sudetenland. Since both Nazis and Nipponese were now openly changing the territorial status quo, they began to draw closer together.75 The chief Asiatic exponent of this policy was General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese Military Attaché and later Ambassador in Berlin. This officer worked for years to bring Tokyo and Berlin together, and enjoyed Ribbentrop’s utmost confidence.76 In the summer of 1938, the Foreign Minister, confronted with the Sudeten Crisis, interrupted his vacation to pay a visit to this spokesman of the Mikado. Would it not be possible, inquired the German, to conclude a new treaty between the Fatherland and Japan, directed against all potential enemies of the rapidly emerging Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle?77 This was a bit too much for Japan. Upon Oshima’s inquiries, Tokyo wired back that specific clauses exempting Britain, France, and the United States must be included in any projected treaty. The Land of the Rising Sun was not yet pre­ pared to deal with the Western Democracies.78 As Ribbentrop had wanted his treaty precisely for the purpose of frightening America into neutrality, he was unable to agree to the proposed limitations. In his opinion, Roosevelt would not mix in Euro­ pean affairs as long as Japan’s position remained uncertain.79 As Germany remained adamant, the Japanese sent a mission headed by Prince Ito to Berlin in February, 1939, again to explain that they could only sign an alliance directed against Russia, but against no one else.80 General Eugen Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, wrote home that fear of the United States made Japan reluctant81 66

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He may have been right. The State Department, aware of the negotiations between the two powers, exerted its influence to keep the Japanese from signing an alliance with Germany.82 This state of affairs, however, only confirmed von Ribbentrop’s conviction that in a treaty with Tokyo he had found a weapon to be used against Washington. He instructed the Ambassador to accelerate the negotiations. Would not an alliance be the best way of keeping America out of any conflict?83 By the middle of April, after Roosevelt had made his mediation appeal to Hitler and the Führer was preparing his sarcastic reply,84 his Foreign Minister’s impatience mounted. He implored the Am­ bassador to induce the Japanese to commit themselves prior to Hitler’s speech of April 28, as the latter had to be certain of their attitude before then.85 Tokyo did not comply, however; in spite of a public communication of admiration from Prime Minister Kiichiro Hiranuma to Adolf Hitler,86 the negotiations reached an impasse.87 The Japanese Ambassador to Italy, Toshio Shiratori, came to Berlin in the summer of 1939 to make one last attempt to reach an understanding, but his efforts also faded because of Ribbentrop’s demands for an unlimited alliance against all and sundry.88 With the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August, all further discussions came to an end. Tokyo even recalled pro-Nazi General Oshima, much to the regret of his good friend, the Foreign Minister.89 Never since 1933 had relations between the two countries been cooler.90 In spite of this evident failure of his plans, Ribbentrop did not consider everything lost. The German press continued to treat the Asiatic nation as a good friend.91 In his instructions to Ambassador Ott, the Foreign Minister defined the task of Nazi diplomacy: Russia and Japan must be brought together.92 The German Navy considered Nippon a friendly nation and with Hider’s permission issued orders to treat her as such.98 Through the agency of the I. G. Farben Trust, the Reich spent considerable sums for propaganda purposes in the Island 67

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Empire.04 Ribbentrop was still convinced that Japan might prove the main weapon at his disposal in keeping America in check. When he met the Duce on March 11, 1940, he focused attention on the great Republic because of Mr. Welles’ trip, but discounted the possibility of American intervention. Japan, he stressed, constituted a strong counterweight to any such tendencies. Had not the Yankees remained neutral during World War I until they were very sure of their Pacific neigh­ bor’s attitude? There was no doubt in his mind: just as in 1914, so in 1940, the United States would have to take Japan into consideration.95 Then came Germany’s great victories in Western and Northern Europe; America became less and less neutral, and the chief of the Wilhelmstrasse turned again to his Far Eastern partner. According to his own testimony, he entered into closer relations with Tokyo in the summer of 1940 to keep the United States out of war and perhaps to obtain a compromise peace.90 His credibility as a witness may justly be doubted, but the facts in the case apparently bear him out in this in­ stance. On June 12, 1940, Ambassador Ott informed him, “The Embassy is still endeavoring to stir up Japanese ill-feeling against America by influencing the press and leading political personalities in a way deemed proper.”97 The seeds planted by the diplomat soon bore fruit. The Japanese asked for his good offices with Vichy in Indo-China. Let the Nazis apply the necessary pressure on Marshal Pétain; after all, was not the Imperial navy tying down the American fleet in the Pacific?98 Hitler’s phenomenal successes had impressed the Japanese;99 they were ready to make the most of the opportunity. General Ott proved receptive to these overtures, not only in refer­ ence to Indo-China, but also in connection with overall prob­ lems affecting both countries. On June 25, he was able to write to the Wilhelmstrasse, “My impression up to now that the possibility of the formation of a Pacific bloc of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek China [sic], and Russia in association with Germany, 68

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which ties down America in the Pacific sphere and could cripple her freedom of action vis-à-vis Europe is becoming prominent.”100 If more proof was wanted, it was supplied by the visit of Mr. Naotake Sato to Herr von Ribbentrop in July, 1940. After the customary compliments, the Nipponese informed the Nazi that his country had “drawn the attention of the United States to herself and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean.” Upon Ribbentrop’s question concerning the funda­ mental differences between the United States and Japan, the visitor pointed to the Nine Power Pact, thus undoubtedly implanting even more firmly in his host’s mind the idea of using Japan against America.101 After this interchange of attitudes, events moved quickly. The Japanese, if we are to believe General Hideki To jo, had made up their minds that they needed strong allies against the Anglo-Saxon powers in connection with the interminable China Incident.102 On July 12, the Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs held a Joint Conference and discussed the possibility of an alliance with the Third Reich. What impressed them most was the fact that Ribbentrop had told Sato that Germany wanted to use any possible pact to keep the United States out of war.103 In July, 1940, Japan’s intentions still coincided with this desire.104 Ambassador Kurusu then indi­ cated that his Government was anxious to establish closer relations with the Reich, whereupon a special envoy, Heinrich Stahmer, travelled post-haste to Tokyo to find out what the Japanese had in mind.105 There was still one obstacle in the way of Ribbentrop’s cherished alliance: The Führer was not yet prepared for the step; he felt that Great Britain would shortly capitulate and dubbed the Japanese mere “harvest helpers.” It was only when England refused to surrender and received the fifty destroyers from America instead, that he changed his mind.106 Stahmer received a green light and drove the negotiations to a speedy conclusion,107 though Herr von 69

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Weizsaecker still considered the proposed pact an alliance of the “weak and the lame.”108 Throughout these discussions, both sides apparently kept in mind the idea of utilizing the alliance to keep America neu­ tral by frightening her.109 Special Emissary Stahmer never tired of stressing this fact to his hosts.110 Mr. Matsuoka assured his colleagues in a similar vein that the sizable bloc of GermanAmericans would constitute a deterrent for the interventionists, much to the advantage of the Empire,111 although Stahmer had little faith in this group. Ribbentrop could hardly contain himself when he met the Duce in September. His project was nearly finished. The war had already been won, he boasted to the Italian dictator. England still hoped to be saved by America, but he had taken the necessary steps to meet this contingency. His own man (Stahmer) was at that very time in Japan to negotiate a pact, and if Italy was willing, an alli­ ance could be concluded within a few days. The Führer him­ self, he said, was very favorably inclined toward the venture, which he believed would have a great political impact on America. He counted on three factors to keep that country out : the general disinclination of the people to engage in military adventures, the conviction of business circles that active par­ ticipation in the conflict would not net them any economic advantages, and, last but not least, the fear of Japan. Hence propaganda, properly handled, might be developed to act as a firm brake on the President. If a world coalition “as it would exist through the pact, were to threaten turning against Amer­ ica, the United States would reflect a hundred times before participating in the war. . . .”112 He concluded with the hope that the treaty would give the isolationists a forceful weapon against the Adminstration. Convinced that the alliance would create a powerful diversion for the Republic, he tried to assure Count Ciano that America would not dare move under the threat of the Japanese fleet. Although the Italian Foreign 70

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Minister still had some doubts,113 his father-in-law was appar­ ently impressed. A few days later, the Tripartite Pact was signed with great pomp in Berlin. The lavish ceremonies accompanying this achievement, especially the godlike entry of the Führer in person to climax the festivities, have frequently been described.114 The entire propaganda apparatus extolled the global successes of the Foreign Minister,115 while in Tokyo the Mikado himself was prevailed upon to issue a special Imperial Rescript in honor of the occasion.110 In view of its implications, the text of the agreement proved quite enlightening. After a preliminary article in which they asserted that each nation of the world be given its proper place, the three signatories agreed to recognize one another’s suprem­ acy in their respective regions of the world. Article III con­ tained the gist of the pact’s provisions: Germany, Italy, and Japan . . . undertake other with all political, economic, and military the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a not involved in the European War or in the conflict.117

to assist one an­ means, if one of Power at present Chinese-Japanese

At the time, it was widely believed that this obligation was supplemented by some secret proviso committing Japan to war against the United States when circumstances seemed appropriate.118 These suspicions were not entirely unfounded. According to Erich Kordt, Stahmer did agree to a secret oral understanding: Japan retained for herself the right to decide whether the casus foederis existed in any given situation or not.119 Although the witness maintained that this restriction was inserted on Stahmer’s own responsibility and not even divulged to his superiors in Berlin, Otto Tolischus reported its existence as early as November 2, 1941.120 As the Soviet Union was specifically exempted under Article V, the treaty was obviously directed against the United States. 71

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Herr von Weizsaecker took great pains to convince the Russians of this state of affairs in person. On the day following the signing of the protocol, he received the Soviet Ambassador and told him specifically that the treaty was aimed at America.121 Hitler himself re-emphasized this point when he practically invited Mr. Molotov to join in the redistribution of spheres of influence envisioned by the new pact. In the United States, no one seemed particularly surprised.122 Though The New York Times ran a tremendous headline, “JAPAN JOIN S AXIS: ALLIANCE SEEN AIMED AT U. S.,”123 and Ambassador Joseph C. Grew wired that the alliance was designed to increase the fears of the United States about developments in the Pacif­ ic,124 the State Department refused to be ruffled. It merely issued a press release to the effect that the treaty did not “substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years.”125 Winston Churchill stressed the obvious point against the United States in his letters to the President,126 while Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi in Tokyo practically told Ambassador Grew the same thing.127 If additional proof of the implications of the treaty were needed, the Nazi press supplied it. Das Archiv called the new arrangement an answer to America’s hostility,128 while the Frankfurter Zeitung exulted that it ended all British hopes of intervention of third parties.129 After a short time, however, the Nazis’ contradictory methods of dealing with America proved embarrassing once more. The press received orders not to emphasize the anti-American aspects of the pact, but rather to stress the constructive effects on the restoration of peace expected from it.130 The shortwave radio took the same approach.131 Berlin was still careful not to antagonize Washing­ ton, the implicit threat of the completed Axis triangle notwithstanding. One question still remains to be answered. Was the alli­ ance really intended to keep the United States out of war as had been contended by the Germans during the negotiations? 72

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Berlin officialdom certainly behaved as if this had indeed been the aim. Hitler informed Franco at Hendaye that America could not only be expected to remain unprepared for a year and a half longer, but that the Three Power Pact was expressly designed to frighten her and to simplify the isolationists’ work.132 By the end of October, he believed that he had accom­ plished this job of intimidation very satisfactorily.133 His Foreign Minister spoke in the same vein to Giano on November 4; he envisaged a large-scale extension of the alliance. Let Russia be included to confront the United States with a European continental bloc on the one side and an Asiatic one under Japan on the other. Such a combination would make the meddlesome democracy cautious and keep her at peace.134 Later writers, both Allied and Nazi, agreed that the tie with Nippon had indeed been designed to divert attention from European affairs and in this manner induce the United States to move with caution.135 Upon interrogation, all participants in the affair stressed this point. Ribbentrop declared repeatedly that the alliance had been concluded to keep Roosevelt out by strengthening the isolationists;136 Weizsaecker maintained that he had hoped for a similar outcome on the grounds that the two-ocean navy had not yet been ready,137 and General O tt laid claim to similar views.138 Apparendy the Japanese felt the same way about it. The Foreign Minister wrote to Kichisaburo Nomura one year later that the original purpose of the pact had been to maintain “amicable relations” with America.139 Yosuke Matsuoka made similar remarks to Masuo Kato early in 1941.140 Such a wellplaced hostile observer as Ambassador Ulrich von Hassel con­ fided to his diary that he considered it “. . . a move to frighten the United States out of taking an active part” in the war.141 Even the International Tribunal passing judgment on the war criminals at Tokyo came to the same conclusion.142 The real proof of the matter lies in the history of subsequent GermanJapanese relations. Had the Nazis wanted war with America, 73

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they could conceivably have asked for Nipponese assistance at various times under the terms of the treaty. They might simply have found an incident of “American aggression” to make it operative, especially after the first naval encounters in 1941 and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot on sight. But the fact remains that they did not do so.148 Hence the Tripartite Agreement fitted neatly into their scheme of keeping the United States out of war temporarily by all possible means. 3. Additional Aid to the Isolationists and the Election of 1940 With the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, Hitler had extended considerably his policy of frightening America into neutrality. He had created a diversionary force in the Pacific which he hoped might deter that nation from taking more active measures in the Atlantic. For the same reason, he was still eager to facilitate the isolationists’ struggle against the White House. If leading Axis personages could find assurances of continued American non-participation in certain articles in the New York Daily News in the spring of 1940,144 subse­ quent isolationist activities must have impressed them even more. Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, rapidly becoming a lead­ ing spokesman for the anti-war groups, practically took his cue from Berlin when he decried all fears of invasion as ludi­ crous because of the impossibility of an adversary’s crossing the Atlantic.145 In August, serving again as Goebbels’ involun­ tary mouthpiece, he told a wildly cheering audience that the British Empire had become too rich and the Central Europeans too poor, a state of affairs responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. In his opinion, nothing would be simpler than to continue trading with a Europe dominated by Germany after the war.146 The exchange of over-age destroyers for British bases spurred the isolationists to greater efforts. Full-page advertisements appeared in the newspapers, stating, “Dictator Roosevelt Comits an Act of War.”147 Innumerable anti-interventionist organ-

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izations kept springing up throughout the late summer and fall of 1940, a trend culminating in the formation of the powerful America First Committee in September.148 No wonder Ribbentrop relied on such forces to put the Tripartite Pact to good use!149 Just to make sure that his unknown friends across the water would not run short of material, he decided to present them with another gift. As he had told his Italian colleague in June, he was fully aware of the great industrial power of the United States and the certainty of its being used against the Axis should the war last for any length of time, but he felt certain that American entry could be avoided. For this purpose, he proposed to release some more documents compromising the Roosevelt administration.150 This was done on October 28, 1940. The Völkischer Beobachter published an additional communication allegedly found in the Polish archives, a note which again severely indicted the men around Roosevelt. According to this latest revelation, the Polish Am­ bassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, in a report to Warsaw on March 7, 1939, had described the extremely proAllied atmosphere prevailing in the city at that time.151 Here was additional material for the isolationist propagandists! A certain indecision in the Nazis’ policy toward America may well be illustrated by their attitude toward the crucial Presidential election of 1940. In spite of official announcements of indifference, they followed the contest with great interest. Since they considered Mr. Roosevelt their most dangerous enemy in the country, they naturally wanted to see him defeated. At first, they had hopes of an isolationist third party; when these proved illusory, they hoped for Willkie’s success,152 al­ though the Republican nominee harbored no friendly feelings for them whatsoever. Even members of the Underground believed that the President’s victory would mean America’s gradual entry into the war, while his opponent’s triumph would foreshadow a gradual return to neutrality.153 Count Ciano had been so convinced of the importance for the Axis of a 75

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change of personnel in the White House that he had asked Hider in 1939 to postpone his aggressive designs, partly for that reason. He had emphasized the fact that Mr. Roosevelt’s re-election would be assured in case of war, but that his defeat would be equally certain in case of peace.154 While the Repub­ lican Convention was in session, the Frankfurter Zeitung pointed out that Mr. Willkie had praised German Tüchtigkeit;155 when he received the nomination, it characterized him as the ideal of “numerous American businessmen who are opposed equally to Roosevelt’s foreign and domestic policies.”150 As the cam­ paign progressed, the German press refrained from boosting the G. O. P.’s nominee too much. His anti-Nazi utterances were too unmistakable, and the Zeitschriften-Dienst had advised care with everything concerning America lest Germany’s enemies in that country be furnished with propaganda material. “In no case will we exhibit any sympathies for Willkie,” became the watchword for the press.157 Nevertheless, anyone could sense which way the wind was blowing. As the Frankfurter Zeitung hopefully pointed out, “a change of Presidents would be regarded as a complete change of the system by millions of Americans.”158 Other publications disregarded the injunc­ tions of the Press Service entirely and openly hoped for a Re­ publican victory.159 Hitler personally appears to have been unwilling to furnish the Democratic incumbent with ammuni­ tion for his campaign in the form of further Axis expansion, but much to his regret, Mussolini did not have the patience to wait until after the election before embarking on his disas­ trous Greek venture.160 American admirers of the Third Reich had fewer com­ punctions. The Bund’s weekly urged the faithful to defeat the President,161 while Father Coughlin, though publicly repudiated by the Republican standard-bearer,162 enjoined his followers to “vote for Willkie to avert war and dictatorship.”163 The exigen­ cies of politics created strange champions for constitutional government ! 76

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Even though the contest ended on a note of isolationism with both candidates pledging to keep American boys at home,164 the British hailed the President’s re-election with great relief.165 The Nazi press declared that the result had no foreign political implications, but it was unable to deny that the aid-to-Britain program would continue.166 If the Nazis had had any hopes of reversal of American policies, they were now compelled to abandon such expectations. Neither feigned indifference nor support of the opposition, not to speak of their attempts to combine these two approaches, had had the desired effects. The United States was no longer neutral except in name; it had become merely a non-belligerent. 4. Plans for the Future It was during the late summer and fall of 1940 that Hider began to consider seriously the possibility that America might not wait in utter passivity until he was ready to deal with her as he had done with other countries. Though still a firm advo­ cate of keeping her temporarily out of war, he gave some thought to the consequences of the breakdown of American neutrality. After his victories in Europe, he was engaged in planning his campaigns through the Iberian peninsula and points beyond, as well as the seizure of Atlantic islands and possible hosrilities with the United States. These operations hinged on the co­ operation of General Franco.167 Since the Caudillo refused to play his game,168 Hitler was unable to execute his scheme.169 Hence no change in his American policy was necessary. Plans for action against the hated Democracy continued to crowd the agenda of various naval conferences, but for the time being, the attempt to keep that country on the sidelines remained the order of the day.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Increasing Complications o f the Neutrality Policy January, 1941- J u n e , 1941

1. All-Out American Aid to Britain As the year 1940 drew to a close, the Führer was able to look back on momentous achievements. He had conquered Norway and Denmark, Belgium and Holland. He had crushed the allegedly mighty French army in a few weeks and forced Germany’s ancient foe to surrender. Mussolini had joined forces with him; even distant Japan had signed an alliance with him. Only Great Britain had successfully defied all his attempts at negotiation or conquest. This indomitable opponent even had enough stamina left to frustrate his plans in the Mediterranean by aiding the Greeks and inveigling the Span­ iards into staying neutral. This totally unexpected resistance would have been wholly impossible without the aid of the United States. The Germans were perfectly aware of this fact. They had tried their best to keep America as passive as possible, partially by exercising extreme care in their relations with her; partially by attempting to browbeat her into a frightened state of inactivity. In spite of all these efforts, the Americans had rendered more and more aid to the British. As the Neutrality Act was still on the statute books, the latter had to pay cash for everything they received. By December, 1940, they had exhausted their dollar reserves. The Prime Minister thereupon wrote a long letter to the Presi-

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dent, and set forth clearly his country’s great needs for the coming year.1 Mr. Roosevelt, convinced that an Allied victory was still possible, was determined to help bring it about.2 The method he chose was the ingenious Lend-Lease Bill, significantly called H. R. 1776. This measure was designed, among other things, to enable him to lease or lend war mate­ rials to the government of any country whose defense he deemed vital to the defense of the United States, “notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.”3 In effect, this meant that America would become an arsenal for Great Britain and her allies; the measure committed the Republic most definitely to Germany’s defeat. Roosevelt had gauged Hitler’s aims correctly and refused to stand idly by while the Führer con­ solidated his power. “Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack while a free Britain remains our most powerful neighbor in the Atlantic?” he asked in his “fireside chat” of December 29, 1940. “Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?”4 With these remarks, he had come right to the point. To make sure that his friends’ needs were correcdy understood, he sent his most intimate adviser, Harry Hopkins, to London in January, 1941. The latter reported that England did indeed still have a chance.5 Through adroit handling, the Lend-Lease Bill was guided safely through both Houses and became law in March, 1941.6 Through this open declaration of aid to one of the bellig­ erents, the Roosevelt administration gave up every pretense of traditional neutrality. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson called the Act a “declaration of economic war.”7 Robert E. Sherwood aptly characterized it as ushering in a period of “common-law marriage” to Great Britain.8 Raymond Clapper, listening to the President’s White House Correspondents Asso­ ciation address four days later, felt that twenty years of isola­ tionism had gone forever.9 Lend-Lease marked only the be­ ginning. Constant rumors reached the Reichskanzlei that the 80

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United States would actively intervene in the crucial Batde of the Atlantic by convoying ships to Great Britain.10 American diplomats exerted pressure on Vichy French officials to resist Axis demands;11 they fanned the spirit of opposition in the Balkans.12 As a matter of fact, throughout the year 1941, Washington took one energetic step after another to interfere with Hitler’s plans. 2. Continued Efforts for a Negotiated Peace The Fiihrer’s policy of keeping the United States neutral had not worked as well as had been expected. From his point of view, however, all was not yet lost: America had not yet declared war. As long as she remained non-belligerent, she was unable to employ in full her tremendous resources against the Reich; her armed forces were kept inactive. Furthermore, Hitler had never entirely despaired of the possibility of a negotiated peace on his own terms. The new year had hardly begun when Hjalmar Schacht resumed his conversations with Mr. Heath of the American Embassy. He still had not aban­ doned his plan of being invited to address some group in the United States and hoped his good friend Leon Fraser, formerly of the Bank for International Settlements, might be able to make the necessary arrangements. As Mr. Heath wrote to Sumner Welles, “He believes that his visit would mark a turn­ ing point in the war and he felt certain of having Hitler’s consent if the invitation were issued.” He attempted to impress the First Secretary with the Fiihrer’s own willingness for peace and even raised some hopes of the disappearance of Fascism. As for specific terms, he stressed that his “group” only desired Germany to take her place as a junior partner of the AngloSaxon team, not as a subject. In his opinion, this aim might be accomplished by the establishment of a sort of condominium over Austria, the Sudetenland, and Alsace-Lorraine.13 Since such an arrangement would have amounted to an unquestioned Nazi victory, Hitler could have offered but few objections 81

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to it. It must be remembered that the self-styled spokesman for the opposition still held the post of Minister without Port­ folio at this time and could still ask the Dictator for special favors. It so happened that he desired to enter into marriage for the second time early in 1941; too impatient to wait until the regular formalities were over, he went to see his Leader in person to get his exceptional permission to wed at once. The Führer willingly obliged. During the course of the inter­ view, Hitler asked, “What about your thought about going or sending someone to America?” Schacht later maintained he had answered that it was too late for that,14 but in reality, he continued his efforts to arrange for a negotiated peace. It is apparent that the banker did not act merely for the Underground. At the time, Schacht made no secret about his position. On February 28, Donald Heath wrote again to the Under Secretary of State describing his latest interview with the finan­ cier. The latter was still seeking an invitation to come to America, and emphasized that Hider knew and approved of his plans. Heath refused to be duped. “It does not seem un­ reasonable,” he wrote, “that Hider would welcome peace on terms which while involving the withdrawal of troops would allow him to conserve essential control of areas now occupied, maintain his prestige, and provide a breathing spell in which to prepare for the next aggression.”15 Upon his return from his Swiss honeymoon, made possible again by Hitler’s express permission, the banker continued his talks with the American diplomat.16 Soon thereafter, he tried to establish further con­ tacts through the Chinese.17 Additional efforts toward peace were made during this period by a Mr. Stallforth. This mysterious American businessman whose real name and iden­ tity have never been revealed, seemed to enjoy the complete confidence of various Nazi leaders.18 In short, as far as the Germans were concerned, American non-belligerency not only served the purpose of keeping the forty-eight states in bounds 82

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somewhat longer, but also as the channel through which peace negotiations, at that time necessarily favorable to Berlin, might eventually be carried on. Hence Hitler clung tenaciously to his original resolve to avoid active American participation in the conflict. 3. Hitler Restrains His Admirals In no field did he make this determination more clear than in his dealings with his fleet. Any incident on the high seas might present an opportunity to the President to overcome isolationist opposition. Consequently Hitler remained stead­ fast against his Navy: The United States must not be provoked. This resolve created great difficulties for the Dictator. His enemies had taken cognizance of it and turned it to good use. When Winston Churchill pleaded with President Roosevelt to establish some form of a convoy system, he felt justified in bolstering his arguments by the following statements: I think it improbable that such protection would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States. . . . Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the Kaiser’s mistake. He does not wish to be drawn into war with the Unted States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain. His maxim is “One at a time.”1® The Chief Executive himself became more and more con­ vinced of the need of some form of convoying,20 though he denied it.21 Constant rumors about impending moves in that direction appeared in the world’s press.22 Hitler felt constrained to issue a public warning against such practices in his speech of January 30, 1941.23 As the Frankfurter Zeitung was happy to report, isolationist Senators agreed with him that in the event of the institution of convoys, American ships would be sunk.24 Roosevelt finally solved the issue by the occupation of Iceland:25 Hider received a brief respite from the dilemma presented by American convoys. 83

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Not only his enemies, but also his own forces made the implementation of his policies difficult for the Führer. If the German Navy had been desirous of more vigorous measures against the United States as long as that country still preserved the forms of neutrality, it was even more anxious to take some action after all-out aid to Great Britain had become an estab­ lished fact. Hitler’s admirals came to the conclusion that American neutrality cost more than it was worth. On February 4, Grand Admiral Raeder arrived for a conference with his Leader. In Annex 1 to the written record of the conversa­ tions, the Navy presented its point of view. Its first concern was with an increase in concrete assistance from its Far-Eastern ally. The admirals envisioned Japan’s position vis-à-vis Germany as an exact replica of America’s relationship to Britain: con­ sequently Tokyo must be induced to help Berlin by measures short of war. In particular, they desired full utilization of Imperial naval bases, the establishment of a neutral zone around the Japanese islands comparable to the Pan-American security zone, including an information service operated by the Imperial Navy along the lines of the Atlantic Neutrality Patrol, and continual application of strategic pressure on vari­ ous British and American possessions. Furthermore, they en­ visaged Japan’s taking over the difficult task of supplying Italian colonies in East Africa. Fully aware that such measures would tend to draw the United States closer and closer to war, the Naval Command calmly weighed the advantages and disadvantages of continued American neutrality. The admirals reached the conclusion that United States entry might actu­ ally prove “advantageous for the German war effort” if Japan were to come in, too. They even expressed their doubts con­ cerning their previous advice to induce the Island Empire to attack Singapore on the grounds that such an operation might tie down too many units of the Imperial forces urgently needed elsewhere.26 84

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In the long run, Hitler failed to be impressed; the measures advocated fell on deaf ears. The next time he interviewed his Grand Admiral, the latter, probably despairing of some­ thing better, endorsed the Singapore scheme again.27 Certain elements in the Navy, however, did not change their minds about the United States. According to Captain Hansjiirgen Reinicke,28 “. . . At least from late spring or early summer of 1941 it didn’t make any difference whether America would be brought into the war or not.” When, after the war, he was confronted with the specific question of whether or not he had been aware of efforts to get Japan to participate in the conflict but to leave America out, this witness answered, “That was at the beginning of 1941. I think . . . it was in the early spring of that year that the attitude changed and Japan’s entry . . . would be welcomed if the U. S. A. was brought into the war as a result.” As the chief advocate of this school of thought, he named Admiral Kurt Fricke, Chief of the Oper­ ations Division of the Naval War Staff.29 The notes of the Führer Conferences corroborate this witness’ testimony. Ad­ miral Raeder, however, was apparently unable to convince Hider. After the end of the war, he either conveniently forgot the existence of the “Get-Tough School” of thought, or else he himself had never been too sure of the advice of this group. His statements to the International Military Tribunal, if taken at their face value, would lead to the conclusion that he had always cautioned the Führer against involvement with America;30 he was even able to produce witnesses to testify to the truth of these contentions.31 The transcript of the Naval Conferences unfortunately belies the testimony of both the Admiral and his faithful sup­ porters. In the late winter and early spring of 1941, the Battle of the Adantic reached its crucial phase. In Washington, plans were being prepared for the implementation of LendLease by convoying;32 on the high seas, the Pan-American Neutrality Patrol irked the Germans more and more. The 85

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next Naval Conference took place on March 18. The Grand Admiral implored Hitler to give the Navy greater freedom to deal with the United States. Specifically, he asked that Ger­ many’s tacit recognition of the Pan-American neutrality zone be either totally or partially abandoned, that restrictions gov­ erning the treatment of American ships elsewhere be ended, and that final permission be granted to carry out the longhoped-for scheme of mining the approaches to Halifax Harbor. Furthermore, he foresaw the danger of an invasion of North Africa and stressed the importance of moving first in that direction. Reports had come to him that Iceland was fast becoming a vital base for Allied convoy operations; hence he was most anxious to have the German war zone extended to include that island. The Führer was willing to grant the last request;33 he even promised to seek facilities for the German navy in Japanese ports should British vessels be allowed to undergo repairs in the United States, but he could not make up his mind concerning the other demands. In the African venture, his hands were tied because neither France nor Spain was ready to collaborate; otherwise he procrastinated, remark­ ing that the issues involved were being discussed with the Foreign Office.34 The very fact that Raeder had to ask for the same favors again and again at innumerable subsequent conferences shows Hitler’s attitude at this time: The United States must not be provoked. Instruction to the German press never to use the expressions, “unrestricted” and “unlimited submarine warfare” (uneingeschränkt and unbeschränkt), offer the clue to Nazi thinking:35 The mistakes of the First World War must be avoided at all costs. As time went on, the admirals’ difficulties increased. On March 30, the Coast Guard seized all Axis vessels in American waters. The crews were interned, allegedly to prevent them from committing sabotage.36 The Nazis considered this affair serious enough to warrant one of their rare diplomatic pro­ tests.37 Worse was to follow. On April 9, the State Department 86

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announced the conclusion of an agreement with the Danish Minister for the occupation of Greenland for the duration.38 This step infuriated the Germans; they had lost a potential base in the North Atlantic. Nevertheless, presumably because of their desire to avoid incidents with the United States, they restricted themselves to filing an angry note with the captive Copenhagen Government. The Danes were to disallow, recall, and try Mr. DeKruif Kauffmann, their offending diplomat.30 King Christian’s Foreign Office had no choice but to comply, but Washington refused to send the Minister home on the grounds that his Government was “patently acting under duress” and could not be considered a “free agent.”40 If these measures annoyed the German Navy, the President’s exemption of the Red Sea from the prohibited war zones defined by the Neutrality Act must have given it even more serious cause for resentment.41 On the following day, April 12, Admiral Raeder got in touch with the Foreign Office and pleaded again for permission not only to disregard the PanAmerican neutrality zone, but also to abolish all special privi­ leges still granted to American ships by the Nazi fleet.42 His entreaties fell on deaf ears; he had to bring up his requests anew about a week later. To impress Hitler, he appeared armed with a summary of British violations of the neutrality zone. He presented the Dictator with memoranda showing the great disadvantages of the zone and urgently suggested that offensive operations be permitted within it. The Führer agreed to a slight concession: South of the twentieth meridian, he prom­ ised henceforth to recognize only an area 300 miles in width. Concerning the region off the continental United States, how­ ever, he refused to budge; nor would he sanction stern treat­ ment of American ships in accordance with prize regulations. He did hold out some hope that he might change hismind after a few more weeks to permit greater freedom of action to the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen,43 but after the big warship 87

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fell victim to the Royal Navy, this consideration fell away and nothing further was done. Unkown to the Nazis, Mr. Roosevelt at this very time was completing preparations for convoy operations. He had long been urged to act by such veteran interventionists as his own Secretary of War.44 In March, high-ranking naval officers visited Britain to select bases for American convoys.45 On April 2, the President ordered the Navy to draw up a so-called Hemisphere Defense Plan # 1 which provided for aggressive action against units of the German fleet in the Western Atlantic.40 The signing of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact induced him to abandon these vigorous measures in favor of the some­ what toned-down Hemisphere Defense Plan # 2 , providing only for the reporting of the presence of German ships.47 Nevertheless, he kept the Nazis guessing by gradually shifting the limits of the neutrality zone eastward toward the end of April.48 As a matter of fact, it was at this period that the first recorded engagement between the armed forces of the two nations took place. On April 10, the American destroyer Niblack, fearing a submarine attack in the vicinity of Iceland, countered with depth charges and forced an unidentified U-boat to retire.49 Things were rapidly coming to a head. The admirals apparently managed to induce Hitler to relent somewhat when he agreed to extend the German zone of operations to the waters of the Red Sea in answer to the President’s proclamation concerning that body of water,50 but otherwise he refused to listen to them. When a German submarine torpedoed the Egyptian steamer Zamzam, the survivors, including a number of Americans, were rescued by the Nazi supply ship Dresden. In accordance with orders, her captain made sure to treat his unwilling trans-Atlantic guests with special consideration. Raeder considered the latter’s presence on a belligerent51 vessel “inex­ cusable.” He submitted a long memorandum to his Führer suggesting a number of forceful steps against the Roosevelt 88

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regime, but Hitler refused to budge. As the reporter of the conference put it, The Fuehrer considers the attitude of the President of the United States still undecided. Under no circumstances does he wish to cause incidents which would result in U. S. entry into the war, especially since Japan will probably come in only if the U. S. is the aggressor.52 If these were Hitler’s ideas late in May, Roosevelt’s state­ ments early in June must have reinforced them. Careful as the President was, he re-emphasized to the representatives of the press his desire to stay out of war.53 This announcement was grist for Hider’s mill. When the Grand Admiral returned with his ceaseless demands for action against the United States, he told him bluntly “that for the time being no change should be made in the present situation.”54 In a resumé of this inter­ view for the Foreign Office, General Jodi explained, “The Fuehrer wanted to avoid everything which might lead to incidents with the United States.”55 4. Nazi Warnings Against “Bismarck?* Episode

American

Convoys

and

the

In view of the foregoing, there can be little doubt that Hitier wanted the United States kept “neutral” during the first half of 1941. But as usual, he combined his policy of reticence with one of blustering. Consequently, when Admiral Raeder suggested an interview with some newspapermen prior to May 24 to warn the President of the consequences of further interference in naval matters, the Führer approved. He ar­ ranged the date so as to make an impression on his adversary, expected to be about to deliver an important radio address.56 The plan was carried out. On May 26 (somewhat late but still in time for the President’s speech) Susumu Ejiri, Domei’s Berlin correspondent, interviewed Raeder. Well coached, 89

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he asked the proper questions. His informant made it clear to him that convoys meant shooting, and that Germany, though patient in spite of the intolerable Security Patrol, must not be misunderstood: Convoying clearly constituted an act of war. For the benefit of the isolationists, the Admiral explained that the President was an inveterate warmonger intent on causing “incidents” to drag his country into the conflict.57 To make sure that the warning be effective, Hitler issued it in person. On May 23, he received Mr. John Cudahy, former American Ambassador to Belgium and inveterate iso­ lationist. He emphasized that convoys meant war and that all talk of Nazi intentions to invade the Western Hemisphere was sheer nonsense.58 Mr. Cudahy had heard similar sentiments from Goebbels and Ribbentrop, both of whom, characteristi­ cally enough, had attempted to reassure and frighten him at the same time.59 At Washington, Hitler’s attempts to intimidate the Admin­ istration were watched with great interest. The meteoric career of the Bismarck off American waters kept the Government ill at ease.60 Robert E. Sherwood is convinced that the battle­ ship was dispatched at that time to sink an entire convoy, frighten the United States, and discredit the widely advertised Presidential talk on May 27.61 In view of Hitler’s policies, this explanation appears well founded; the Bismarck episode constituted another way of cautioning the President into neutral­ ity. The contemporaneous sinking of the Robin Moor may be considered in a similar light, although the disaster did not become known until after the speech.02 The Raeder interview and the Bismarck episode made superlative headlines in American newspapers,63 but Mr. Roose­ velt’s answer remained inconclusive. He merely proclaimed a state of “unlimited emergency,” a situation which might mean anything or nothing at all.64 90

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5. Pressure on Japan to Attack Singapore and Bypass the United States Interviews with the press and bellicose statements were not the only means of supplementing German reticence with bluster. Determined as he was to maintain American non­ belligerency, Hitler saw no contradiction in his use of Japan as a bludgeon to keep Washington in check. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September, 1940, had focused at­ tention on this possibility. The Germans made much of their new friends. Articles dealing with all phases of Japanese life followed one another in rapid succession in the brown press.65 Nazi authors praised the doctrine of the co-prosperity sphere, safeguarded by the new pact which, they assured the public, was certain to keep disturbing third powers out.66 They were doubtless pleased when Mr. Matsuoka told Tokyo’s foreign correspondents that he hoped to avoid war with America but was honor-bound to come to Germany’s assistance should the Reich be attacked.67 Under these circumstances, the Nazis could have essayed to goad on their allies against the United States, but they did not choose to take this course of action. Far from inveigling the Japanese against Washington, they attempted to induce them to make common cause with them against the British and Dutch Empires. By attacking Singa­ pore and the Dutch East Indies, Nippon would bypass the United States, but at the same time shift American attention from European to Asiatic waters. This characteristic scheme dominated Nazi thoughts about the Far East. In December, 1940, Admiral Raeder, pointing out the evident weakness of Britain’s position in Asia, sug­ gested that Hitler incite Japan to an attack on Singapore. He hoped that such an offensive would result in the ardently desired withdrawal, of some British naval units from the Atlantic. Well aware of the Fiihrer’s aversion to provoking the United 91

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States too early, he emphasized that it was unlikely that Washington would take belligerent action in such a case. Hit­ ler was not yet enthusiastic about the venture; he feared that Japan would “do nothing decisive” to cause any shifts in the Royal Navy.68 Less than two weeks later, however, he had changed his mind. The Japanese had evinced some interest in the British naval base themselves, whereupon he decided that they “should be given a free hand even if this may entail the risk that the United States is thus forced to take drastic steps.”69 His Japanese policy was beginning to blur his original clear-cut resolves, but this unconcern with eventual American steps, though repeated shortly afterward to the Duce,70 appears to have been braggadocio for the most part. In his subsequent dealings with Japan, he continued to stress his interest in American “neutrality” and consistently advocated that the Rising Sun attack powers already at war. The Nazis’ first opportunity in this connection arose when their firm supporter, General Hiroshi Oshima, returned to Berlin. Since Japan at that time still wished to remain at peace with the great nation across the Pacific, the old samurai’s instructions71 fitted in very well with the German’s purposes. After a welcome marked by innumerable laudatory articles in Nazi papers,72 he went to see his old friend, the Foreign Min­ ister, at Fuschl, in what had once been Austria. In this Alpine setting, the latter conveyed Germany’s latest conclusions con­ cerning mutual cooperation to the attentive representative of the Son of Heaven, reported as follows in the official memorandum : Concerning America . . . it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. . . . We believe . that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skill­ fully coordinated politics of the Allied powers. 92

Hitler addressing the Reichstag on December 11, 1941, on the occasion of Germany’s declaration of war against the United States

Foreign Ministei von Ribbentrop re ceiving Ambassadoi Oshima at Fuschl February, 1941

Hitler receiving Ambassador Oshima

Increasing Complications of the Neutrality Policy

• . . Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as pos­ sible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East. . . . There were three reasons for quick action: 1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire. . . . 2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of Hawaii, could do this even less in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect American interests there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it would then have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America be­ ing able to do anything about it. The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would . . . be by no means decisive and would not endanger final victory. . . . The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain lan­ guage must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but of course, not aggressive. . . . The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U. S. A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were funda­ mentally determined upon this. . . . Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation and under 93

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certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion.78 In short, Ribbentrop outlined the chief German contention: The United States must be kept non-belligerent if possible. Japan’s entry into the war against the British Empire would help materially to accomplish this desire by frightening the Americans into inactivity. A few days later, a telegram arrived from Chargé d’Affaires Thomson. This wire strengthened the Foreign Minister’s faith in his ability to browbeat the United States into non-participa­ tion. The communication spoke of the great uncertainty and fear of Hitler’s next moves then prevailing in the capital and dismissed American plane production figures as mere wishful thinking on the part of the Administration.74 Herr von Rib­ bentrop thereupon did not rely on General Oshima alone. He dispatched a cable to the German Ambassador in Tokyo direct­ ing him to “use all available means to induce Japan to take possession of Singapore by a surprise blow as soon as possible.”75 He followed it up with a longer wire on the next day and described the entire Fuschl interview with great satisfaction. As for America, he telegraphed that he had told his visitor it would be better to postpone any plans concerning an attack on the Philippines and to take Singapore alone, as America would stay out if adequate explanations and reasons were given for the occupation.70 He dispatched similar explanations to his representatives in Washington, Rio de Janeiro, and Peiping, leaving appropriate memoranda for the Foreign Office in Berlin.77 As it might conceivably be argued that Germany was not really interested in keeping America out but stressed this point only to please her cautious partner, these telegrams are of interest. Ribbentrop himself cautioned against inclusion of the Philippines in the aggressive plans of his Far Eastern allies. The question was raised again during the next interview be­ tween the representatives of the two powers on March 3. This 94

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time Ribbentrop received his friend, the Ambassador, in more conventional surroundings in Berlin. He repeated his plea that the Japanese seize Singapore as soon as possible as such an action would force England to sue for an early peace. Oshima replied that he was doing his best in this connection; even an occupation of the Philippines had been provided for, if necessary. The Nazi reemphasized his point not to take any action against the United States. That country was so weak that it would not risk its fleet west of Hawaii; consequently it would stay out of the war in spite of the Singapore venture.78 Germany’s policies in regard to Japanese moves during the first half of 1941 stand out in bold relief. The Nipponese must attack British possessions in Asia to hasten the end of the conflict and keep the United States from active participation. The Führer himself issued a secret order to the armed forces on March 5, 1941, entitled “Basic Order # 2 4 Regarding Collaboration with Japan.” This document, summarizing Ribbentrop’s argu­ ments, stated in part: 1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interest of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. . . . 3a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of war.70 Two weeks later, Grand Admiral Raeder went to see the Dictator. He, too, emphasized again that Japan must be urged to attack Singapore immediately. Such a move, said Raeder, would solve the American question, the United States being unprepared to act. Japan would be able to avoid an armed clash with the latter if she only took Berlin’s advice and hurled her armed might against the tottering British Empire. Before being dismissed, the Admiral also advised that the Japanese be 95

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informed of the impending Russian campaign. This last sug­ gestion was disregarded, but the former, as we have seen, cor­ responded to Hitler’s own ideas.80 The German leader was soon to be presented with a unique opportunity to press his point. At just about this time, he was awaiting the long-heralded visit from Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka of Japan. This enterprising official had informed Ambassador Ott of his intention to visit Europe in person81 after announcing again to the Diet that the Tripartite Pact was de­ signed to “prevent further extension of present disturbances.”82 The German representative cabled his chief that the projected trip was most important in the determination of the Axis pow­ ers’ attitude toward the United States. The notion of preventing that country’s entry by means of the Singapore campaign figured prominently in this communication also.83 Churchill interpreted the visit as an attempt to cover up for Japan’s failure to act;84 in the long run, its main result turned out to consist of a Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. However that may be, it offered an excellent opportunity for Hitler and Ribbentrop to continue their pressure on Nippon to attack, not the United States, but the British Empire. “The most important subject, naturally, is the time of Japan’s entry into war against England,” wrote Ernst von Weizsaecker in a confidential memorandum in preparation for the visit.85 As the distinguished visitor ap­ proached the Fatherland, the German press, under strict orders to emphasize the importance of the impending conversations in spite of the ominous Balkan situation,86 gave great publicity to the subject. The Frankfurter Zeitung explained to its doubt­ less astonished readers the great similarity between the concepts of Hakko Ichiu—thz whole world under one roof—and the New Order,87 while the Völkischer Beobachter ran a headline, “BAN­ ZAI, GREAT POWER JAPAN,” to welcome the great ally88 who arrived on March 26. On the very next day, von Ribben­ trop started the conversations. After some preliminary remarks about the great successes achieved by the Wehrmacht and some 96

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veiled hints that relations with the Soviet Union were none too friendly, he came to the point. “The Fuehrer believed,” he said, “that it would actually be very advantageous if Japan would decide as soon as possible to take an active part in the war upon England. Germany believed . . . that a quick attack upon Singapore would be a very decisive factor in the speedy overthrow of England.” Such policies, he assured his guest, “would perhaps be most likely to keep America out of the war, because the United States could scarcely risk sending its fleet into Japanese waters.” As the Foreign Minister stated so bluntly, “America had to be prevented by all possible means from tak­ ing an active part in the war and from making its aid to England too effective,” a policy which had found expression already in the Tripartite Pact. This agreement had “above all had the goal of frightening America into abandoning the course it had chosen and of keeping it out of the war.” The conversations had to be interrupted as Ribbentrop was called to the Reichs­ kanzlei, whereupon Matsuoka ate lunch in “a very intimate circle.”89 In the afternoon, the traveller from Tokyo was ushered into the august presence of the Führer himself. Hitler, too, opened the interview by recalling the triumphant forward march of German arms in Europe. Then he took up where his Foreign Minister had left off in the morning; Japan must attack Singa­ pore at this favorable moment while Russia was still neutralized by 150 German divisions poised at her western frontiers and while American aid to the British was still in its initial stages. He, too, emphasized the beneficial result of an immediate attack on the British outpost in East Asia; it would tend to keep the United States out of war. Matsuoka agreed with the Dictator’s arguments, but he refused to commit himself, merely promising in a rather vague manner to urge on his government the policies advocated by his hosts. Since he was not in control of Japanese affairs, he pointed out, he could “make no pledge on behalf of the Japanese Empire that it would take action.”90 97

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On the following day, the two Foreign Ministers met again. Ribbentrop emphasized once more the German thesis: “A great Japanese victory at Singapore would . . . strengthen American neutrality.” Matsuoka retained some doubts, but he expressed the hope that he would be able to keep his trans-Pacific oppo­ nent “quiet” for another six months. Ribbentrop assured him of the infallibility of the Nazi contention. A Japanese capture of Malaya would' put “the greater part of the world” under Tri­ partite control; hence America would find herself in an isolated position. Such a state of affairs would render her much too weak to fight. Thereupon the Mikado’s emissary evinced some curi­ osity about Germany’s intentions toward America after Great Britain’s final defeat. His host answered that “Germany did not have the slightest interest in a war against the United States.” The two diplomats agreed that the world would be divided up among the victors, while the United States would have to be satisfied with the Western Hemisphere. Needless to relate, Mr. Matsuoka hoped that America might be converted to what he called “our way of thinking” in such a case.91 The conversations continued on April 29. Matsuoka ex­ pressed concern that the measures advocated by his allies might lead to war with the United States, but Ribbentrop assured him that such fears were groundless. The Americans would be pow­ erless to act as Roosevelt would be unable to suffer the loss of prestige implicit in the fall of the Philippines. Switching to an­ other point, Matsuoka asked what specific aid the Reich could render to his country in case of the contemplated attack on Singapore. The German hastened to explain that he had already requested Ambassador Oshima to let him have some maps of the area involved in order “that the Führer, who certainly must be considered the greatest expert of modem times on military matters, could advise Japan as to the best method for the attack on Singapore.” The transcript is silent about Mr. Matsuoka’s reaction to this most interesting piece of information, but he must have found it difficult to suppress a smile in view of such 98

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invaluable aid. Before the end of the interview, he received more tangible support: a promise of expert advice of German submarine personnel to train the Japanese.92 A few days later, he repeated his request for technical as­ sistance to Hider in person. He assured Hitler that Tokyo would do its utmost to avoid war with the United States, an attitude which pleased the Führer. He promised the desired information, pointing out that “Germany also considered a war with the United States to be undesirable.”03 Herr Schmidt, the omnipresent interpreter, recalls that this thought was apparendy especially close to his master’s heart, as he repeated it several times.04 The Japanese, too shrewd to be trapped into agreeing to anything definite, finally made some extremely hazy refer­ ences to eventual Imperial action against the British. Hitler, anxious to please his visitor, assured him that should Japan become involved in a conflict with the United States, he would come to her assistance immediately no matter who started the shooting.95 Such assertions constituted forebodings of things to come. Japan, unwilling merely to serve as a diverting force in the Nazis’ plans, might easily wreck their careful schemes for American neutrality. Hitler was attempting to play both ends against the middle; the day of reckoning would come. For the time being, however, the conference ended on a happy note of concord. Before leaving Berlin for Moscow, Matsuoka paid a parting visit to Ribbentrop. The latter repeated everything said before and predicted the Nazis would reestablish something like the Holy Roman Empire in Europe.90 The proponent of Hakko Ichiu may or may not have been impressed with such medieval ideas; in any case, he had more pressing matters in mind. Upon his arrival at Moscow, he signed a neutrality pact with the Soviets. This diplomatic move caused quite a stir in German circles about to launch their giant offensive against Russia. Although Miss Wiskemann believes that the agreement fitted in very well with Germany’s intention of lulling the Bolsheviks into 99

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a feeling of false security,97 and although Hitler told Raeder that he welcomed the treaty as it restrained Japan from taking action against Vladivostok, turning her against Singapore in­ stead,98 there was considerable dissatisfaction in Berlin.99 Am­ bassador Ott anxiously inquired of the Foreign Minister what would happen in case Germany and her Eastern neighbor were to become involved in war. He was happy to report home that in such a case the pact would become untenable. In the mean­ time, he continued pressing for the attack on Singapore with all the powers at his disposal.100 This series of conversations underlines the essentially dilatory policy toward the United States which obviously faced grave dangers if Axis plans were to succeed. It is true that on this occasion, as before, the possibility of America’s going to war was taken into consideration with promises of immediate assis­ tance on the part of the Führer, but such a move was left up to Roosevelt, not to the Japanese. The aim was to frighten America, not to provoke her. Lest this be misunderstood, the Japanese Foreign Minister explained to United States Ambassa­ dor Lawrence Steinhardt in Moscow that he had entered into no specific commitments in Berlin, that Hitler was desirous of keeping America at peace; but that the Island Empire would adhere to the Tripartite Pact, should Roosevelt enter the con­ flict, all attempts to the contrary notwithstanding.101 In one instance, the Axis even succeeded with its policy of blustering. At Washington, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact caused such alarms concerning the situation in the Pacific that the President shelved an order for aggressive convoy operations in the Atlan­ tic.102 In the long run, such measures would not work, but for a time the Nazis used them for all they were worth. Various records of conversations between the Italians and their trans-Alpine partners offer additional evidence. Shortly after Matsuoka’s departure, Hitler spoke to Ciano and main­ tained that the recent victories of the Axis in the Balkans as well as the Russo-Japanese agreement had reinforced Ameri100

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can isolationists. As he considered it of prime importance that America be kept in check, he sincerely welcomed this alleged trend.103 Apparendy Mussolini shared this opinion. On May 13, 1941, he welcomed von Ribbentrop with great pomp at the Palazzo Venezia. During the course of the ensuing talks, the Duce touched on Far Eastern affairs, especially the Hull-Nomura negotiations which had just begun. His guest expressed the hope that the Japanese would keep the Americans occupied,1(M whereupon he rejoined “that it would without doubt be favourable to Germany and Italy if Matsuoka were in this manner to prevent the United States entering the war.”105 After Roosevelt’s proclamation two weeks later of an un­ limited emergency, Giano’s and Ribbentrop’s paths crossed again, this time at the Brenner Pass. The German tried to reassure his colleague that the speech merely disclosed the unpreparedness of the United States. Provided Japan main­ tained what he called a “loyal” anti-American attitude, the latter would not enter.106 Throughout the late winter and spring of 1941, the Germans continued to hope and press for the never forthcoming attack on Malaya. General Alfred F. Kretschmer, their Military Attaché in Tokyo, drew up plans for the operation should the Japanese be interested.107 The newspapers openly stressed the weakness and exposed position of Singapore.108 The British Government confided its anxiety concerning the city to Mr. Hop­ kins.109 Ambassador Grew, too, reported constant rumors con­ cerning the much-talked-about operation,110 but Japan, ap­ parently uneasy about the presence of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor,111 refused to follow Germany’s advice. 6. Complications of the Hull-Nomura Conversations A certain lack of harmony between the two ends of the Axis was discernible in other ways, too. Not only did the Tokyo Government disregard Berlin’s strategic suggestions, but it 101

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also initiated the conversations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. This development did not please the Nazis at all. Should the two powers reach an agreement at Washington, the pur­ pose of the Tripartite Pact—to frighten America into acqui­ escence—would be defeated; increased United States attention to Atlantic affairs might well be expected. The Nazis had run up against the dilemma that they themselves had created while trying their best to keep the United States neutral by alternate pressure and reticence. Unless they were prepared to give up their plans to utilize Japan as a diversionary force, they would have to attempt to wreck the Washington conversations with all their might, but in doing so, they might well be drawn into the very war they desired to avoid. In spite of this serious complication, they strained every effort to prevent any sort of rapprochement between Tokyo and Washington. It is true that at the farewell luncheon given for the departing Nomura, Matsuoka stressed Japan’s desire to keep America neutral through the Tripartite Pact,112 but the Germans were not satisfied. As Ribbentrop told his captors after the war, . . . the Fuehrer . . . saw the attitude of the United States “short of war” and he was worried . . . about groups in Japan who wanted to come to an arrangement with America. He was afraid that if an arrangement would be made between the United States and Japan, that this would mean, so to speak, the back free for America and the expected attack or entry into the war by the United States would come quicker. Consequently, Ribbentrop agreed that Hitler had been opposed to Japan’s arriving at any arrangements with the United States.118 Contemporary documents confirm his recollections. Weizsaecker wrote to him on May 15, 1941, “Any political treaty between Japan and the United States is undesirable at present.” He strongly suggested its prevention lest it pull Japan out of the Axis.114 Matsuoka tried to dispel German apprehensions 102

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by keeping the Nazis partially informed of the progress of the discussions;115 he assured them that he would object to any provision not in accord with the Alliance.116 Indeed, he said, he would attempt to conduct himself in such a way as to force the United States not to participate in the European war. He even promised to handle negotiations in a manner calculated to prevent President Roosevelt from using convoys.117 These may have been soothing words, but the Germans remained apprehensive. General O tt warned Tokyo that the talks would only delay the desired southward expansion of Japan.118 Ribbentrop advised him explicitly that it was “desirable to hinder the entry of America into the war.” To accomplish this end, Germany and Italy had remained wonderfully patient with that country, though the Jewish capitalist wirepullers there had been trying their best to involve her in the conflict. If they succeeded in neutralizing Japan, their task would be greatly simplified. If negotiations were to proceed at all, let Japan make the abandonment of unneutral policies on the part of the United States a sine qua non.119 The Ambassador acted as instructed; again and again he sought to impress upon his Japanese allies the Nazi contention that only firmness with the United States, coupled with an attack on Singapore, would keep that country neutral.120 7. Reversal of Press Policies Nazi policies toward the Roosevelt administration had run into serious contradictions concerning Japan. In other ways, too, complications mounted. With the passing of neutrality in favor of non-belligerency in Washington, it occurred to the directors of Hitler’s propaganda that the restraint which had so long held the German press somewhat in check had out­ lived its usefulness. In spite of the fact that the ZeitschriftenDienst had not yet given the signal for an all-out attack, various publications vented their indignation with increasing frequency as time went on. In December, 1940, the Archiv 103

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was allowed to conclude that as Britain was growing weaker, the United States was becoming Germany’s real opponent.121 The Judenfrage, a periodical devoted to incessant anti-Semitic propaganda, began to attack American Jewry after November, 1940.122 The Zeitschriften-Dienst itself relented somewhat. On December 6, 1940, it wrote, “Although it is still not advis­ able for German periodicals to deal minutely with the internal and foreign policies of the United States, or even to treat any single aspects polemically, nevertheless, there is no objection to . . . information . . . about American conditions.”123 Interest in the American scene mounted greatly after the President’s fireside chat of December 29 and his subsequent announcement of the Four Freedoms. Faithful Nazis now read that the cripple running the United States was suffering from a Wilsonian complex, a disease completely at variance with his country’s own best interests.124 The Völkischer Beobachter maintained that there were thousands of British agents in American cities, an army relentlessly driving the unsuspecting inhabitants to war. It characterized the Presidential address on the state of the Union as “confused” and angrily complained about its contents. According to this Nazi mouthpiece, not Germany but England maintained a fifth column in South America and was seeking to dominate the world.125 The Frankfurter Zeitung joined the news campaign. The fireside chat gave rise to a headline, “ROOSEVELT W ITH O U T MASK,” and the accompanying articles castigated the President as one of the chief instigators of the war.126 Later on, this charge was to be repeated over and over again, but the directors of German public “enlightenment” were apparently still not quite ready to abandon their reserve altogether. The Press Service privately informed Nazi editors that the fireside chat contained the two most outrageous lies of Roosevelt’s career, the charges that Hitler wanted to rule the world and that he had designs on America. In spite of these challenges, it directed continued reserve in connection with American affairs. Nothing published 104

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about the United States must be made to appear important as all such speeches were merely signs of England’s weakness.127 It issued similar orders following the 1941 message to Congress, but cautioned against mentioning a Japanese statement char­ acterizing the document as a. de facto declaration of war.128 In their illogical way, the Nazis allowed considerable lee­ way to the papers in dealing with the Lend-Lease Act, all exhortations of the Press Service to the contrary notwithstanding. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung pointed out that the pro­ posed bill constituted a direct violation of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907.129 The Völkischer Beobachter regretted the passing of what it considered the healthy principles con­ tained in George Washington’s Farewell Address and commis­ erated with the poor American people, who, it asserted, must foot the bill in the long run.130 It also exhibited indignation about frequent American charges of Nazi attempts to rule the world and wrote, “Englishmen and Americans, as is known, want to know so little about world domination that they tyrannize over half the world and would like to enslave the rest.”131 The Zeitschriften-Dienst, however, still refused to sanction these attacks. It preached continued restraint even in connection with the “aid-to-England law,” lest its proponents obtain too much publicity and its opponents be compromised by Nazi support.182 As the debates went on, and as passage of the bill became more and more certain, the Nazis’ doubts concerning the efficacy of care in propaganda increased. The Führer included a brief warning to the United States in his speech commemo­ rating the seventh anniversary of the Brown Revolution. After again proclaiming that the Reich had absolutely no quarrel with the American people, he shouted, “Let there be no mistake —whoever believes that he can help Britain must realize one thing above all: Every ship, with or without convoy, that comes within range of our torpedo tubes, will be torpedoed.”133 Minor irritations, such as the tearing down of a swastika flag 105

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from the German Consulate at San Francisco, were taken up by the press with appropriate comments,134 although the United States publicly apologized for the incident.135 The Germans felt that the Lend-Lease Law rendered obsolete the primary pur­ pose of the publicity lull; they had been unable to dupe America altogether. The passage of the act seemed to make it more expedient to revert to a policy of propagandiste opposition to the Administration; such an approach might help the isola­ tionists in their struggle and end the peculiar position of Eng­ land’s best friend in Germany’s overall publicity picture. Still, the Nazis were quite satisfied with themselves. Hans Dieckhoff, the German Ambassador to the United States, on leave since November, 1938, wrote to his chief, von Ribbentrop, . . . Our quiet and reserved diplomatic and publicistic attitude toward the United States, during the first fifteen months of the war, was the deciding factor that the American aid to England was only started so late. If right from the beginning we had squabbled with the U. S. diplomatically and journalistically it would have been much easier for the President to arouse public opinion against Germany and thus get quicker and stronger help for England. Mr. Ahrenkiel136 quite understands that now, after Roosevelt’s reelection and the passing of the lend-lease bill in Congress we use stronger words in our press against the United States . . . this could not produce any more damage on the other side, but . . . on the contrary, this tactic was now justified.137 The Ambassador’s summary is significant: in the Nazis’ opinion, at least, their care and prudence had postponed the evil day of all-out American aid to England as long as possible. Still not willing to have the United States go any further, they hoped to accomplish this aim in part by an all-out propaganda campaign against the so-called warmongers in Washington. The isolationists might adopt some of these ideas. The change which came over German publications during that time was so noticeable as to be reported by Percival Knauth in The New York Times who wrote that it was apparent that 106

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now the United States loomed as a potential foe in the Reich.188 The actual passage of the Lend-Lease Act gave rise to violent outbursts in Berlin. Even American legal publications were cited to prove that the measure utterly contravened longestablished international law.139 At long last, even the Zeitschriften-Dienst changed its instructions. On March 7, it informed Nazi editors that in discussing the trans-Atlantic Democracy, they would have to join the ideological battle.140 As Dr. Goebbels did not believe in half-hearted measures, the President’s next speech was officially selected as the immediate cause for launching of a renewed newspaper campaign in earnest. The Press Service, promising polemical material deal­ ing with the Republic in its next issue, wrote, In our bouts with the plutocratic opponents of the young peoples during the last few months we have all considered it a hindrance that in our intellectual warfare we could only draw the sword against Great Britain, although the attitude of most in­ fluential circles in the United States of North America offered enough material for a similar polemic. Now, however, we may utilize Roosevelt’s speech to inaugurate sharpest attacks against the dictatorship of capitalism and of plutocracy’s reign of force in the U. S. A. In this connection no periodical may shirk the task of drawing for us a positive picture, severely attacking the enemy. . . . 141 The next issue contained the promised material for use against the new enemy. His crimes became the “main theme” of Nazi publications. Exhortations went out throughout the Fatherland to emphasize Roosevelt’s warmongering, the baneful influence of the Jews, the difficulties between the two countries since 1933, the imperialist aspirations of the White House, the horrors of American capitalism, and a host of other propagandistic matters which were to be harped on as time went on.142 According to Hans Fritzsche, Hitler and Ribbentrop personally ordered this press campaign against the President;148 while there may be some doubt about the former, chief advocate 107

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of care in dealing with America, there is none whatever in connection with the latter. The polemics which followed surpassed anything that had occurred prior to the enforced brief lull. In keeping with their policy of strengthening the hands of the anti-interventionist opposition, the Nazis concentrated their fire upon Mr. Roose­ velt and his supporters. The endlessly repeated charge that Roosevelt, the criminal warmonger, wanted to drag his country into a conflict contrary to the wishes of the American people became the dominant note of the campaign. In order to accom­ plish this purpose, ran the Nazi argument, he was trying to provoke the Reich to give him an excuse to declare war, but good National Socialists were too intelligent to fall for such a trick.144 Hitler apparently believed this until his involvement in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.145 If occasional out­ bursts against forces other than the Administration crept into the Nazi line, they merely illustrate the amazing lack of coordi­ nation in the Third Reich. In any case, one never could tell; the Americans might come into the war after all, and the German people would have to be prepared for this latest enemy. This possibility constituted a great danger for the propagandists. Fear of American industrial power might get the better of Nazi morale; hence they were eager to emphasize the industrial troubles of the United States and similar weak­ nesses. Intervention was portrayed as certain to come too late; it would never save perfidious Albion.146 To emphasize this point, Nazi publications had long been directed to play up the unlimited reserves available to the Reich;147 after the resumption of the press campaign, the Zeitschriften-Dienst temporarily made the topic, “Can the U. S. A. Help?” its “main theme.” The aim of this emphasis was to reassure German readers with a categorical answer in the negative.148 None other than Hitler in person set the tone in this train of thought. Addressing the Reichstag on May 4, 1941, he boasted, 108

Signing of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan at the new Chancellery in Berlin, September 27, 1940. Sitting, left to right: Japanese Ambassador Kurusu, Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, Hitler. Standing, second from right, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop Signing of No-Separate Peace Agreement and Treaty of Mutual Assis­ tance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, December 11, 1941. Sitting, left to right: Japanese Ambassador Oshima, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Italian Ambassador Dino Alfieri

Hitler and Matsuoka on the balcony of the Chan­ cellery during the latter’s visit to Berlin in 1941

German Foreign Minis­ ter von Ribbentrop seeing Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka off during the latter’s visit to Berlin in 1941

Increasing Complications of the Neutrality Policy

When today the democratic agitators of a country to which the German people have never done any harm, and whose state­ ment that the German people intended so to do is nothing but an absurd lie, threaten to choke the National Socialist people’s state . . . with the force of their capitalistic system and of their material production, then there can be only one answer: the Ger­ man people will never again experience such a year as 1918. . . ,149 In the meantime, the press printed almost any calumny that it could think of about the President and his alleged mentors, while books and periodicals added their revelations to those of the Fourth Estate. The supposed power of the Jews constituted a favorite topic; they were portrayed as the real wire-pullers behind the Administration.150 As various Gallup polls had shown overwhelming sentiment against entry into war, the Völkischer Beobachter found it easy to explain how the despised race was pulling and pushing unsuspecting Gentiles into slaughter.151 Other publications asserted that all talk of American democracy served merely as a cloak to hide greedy imperialist territorial ambitions.152 Nazi editors discovered the headquarters of the warmongers at Hollywood in the West and on Wall Street in the East.153 The press had become an instrument designed to expose the Roosevelt administration. What was true of the printed word also applied to the radio. The Princeton listening post reported a constant increase in the virulence of attacks on Washington by the Reich’s broad­ casting stations.154 At home, Nazi announcers also became active; they gradually began to modify their disregard of the United States after the fall of France, and attacked that country most emphatically during 1941.155 The reopening of the propaganda campaign against the President as distinct from the American people at last brought the German Nazis into harmony with their American supporters. The Bund had long idolized all isolationist heroes.156 Early in 1941, it was engaged in a crusade against the proposed Lend-Lease Act, and after March, United States affairs were 109

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treated in almost identical fashion both at Yorkville and Berlin. When the Lend-Lease Act was passed, the Free American ran a bold, black headline, “THE GREAT AMERICAN TRAGEDY.” It adopted the slogan, “Keep the USA Out of Britain’s War,”157 an aim Berlin could well publicly call its own. The Nazis were still relying on the isolationists to do their bit in the strange involuntary alliance of common hatreds existing between them. In time, the similarities between the statements of representatives of both groups became increasingly obvious. If the American opposition deplored the encroachments of the executive on constitutional privileges of Congress, the Führerprinzip constituted no obstacle to Nazi sympathy. Adolf Halfeld stressed this identical issue in his booklet, USA Greift in die Welt.15* The trend toward Presidential “autocracy” appalled the followers of the Great Dictator.159 Similar una­ nimity existed on the subject of the bankers’ bellicose influence in Washington.160 In order to coordinate isolationist and Nazi propaganda, the German Embassy employed George Sylvester Viereck of World War I fame to do his bit to keep America out of war. He thought to accomplish this partially by taking a hand in the affairs of the publishing concern, Flanders Hall, at Scotch Plains, New Jersey. Herr Thomsen’s staff also con­ tacted such domestic Fascists as Deatherage and Pelley and started anti-Semitic whispering campaigns designed to assure the nation that the Fatherland would win the war.161 The Trans-Ocean News Agency assisted by distributing isolationist speeches to South American audiences.162 The German Library of Information, the Westermann Book Store, and similar organizations also attested to German attempts to influence public opinion along isolationist lines.163 Such an approach seemed appropriate, since the Nazis well realized that it would be virtually impossible to make Americans like Hitler.164 The only change after 1941 was that domestic German publications 110

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fell in line with the trans-Atlantic apparatus, a line of attack they had avoided previously for reasons of high diplomacy. 8. Attempts to Weaken American Defense Efforts While the resumption of the propaganda barrage may be regarded as an attempt to frighten or force the United States into neutrality, it also served a subsidiary purpose. The Ameri­ cans might not be gullible enough to wait until Hitler was ready to tackle them alone. There can be no doubt that the Nazis considered this possibility and essayed to take all neces­ sary precautions. Hitler’s preoccupation with the seizure of the Azores is one example of this line of thought;105 there are many others. The emanations from Dr. Goebbels’ printing presses may be considered an attempt to prepare the German people for the worst by creating a preliminary war fever. Furthermore, while continually declaring their utter scorn for the Americans’ efforts at rearmament, the Nazis tried to hamper them with all the means at their disposal. Their support of the isolationists who could be trusted to vote against most defense measures served them well in this connection, but there were even more effective means at their disposal. They may have been in a position to slow down American industrial development through the implementation of international car­ tels. Such arrangements existed between I. G. Farben and Standard Oil of New Jersey. For example, under the terms of the so-called “Division of Fields” agreement of November 9, 1929, Standard gave I. G. control of the world’s “chemical” business, while I. G. reciprocated by handing over the world’s oil and “natural gas” trade outside of the Reich.100 This arrangement was supplemented by an agreement whereby the respective patents were signed over to a common pool, Standard I. G., owned and controlled by both partners. New develop­ ments were assigned to similarly constituted dummy corpo­ rations.1*7 After the Nazis came to power, they prevailed upon III

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I. G. to keep all developments of a military nature from the American firm,168 all engagements to the contrary notwith­ standing. The chemical concern acted upon these suggestions and achieved great successes. Stringing its American partners along by giving them merely the patents of new processes but not the know-how with which to apply them,169 it was able to receive valuable information for the Reich, but may possibly have hampered the production of such crucial materials as buna, atabrine, aluminum, machine tools, and periscopes.170 In sabotage activities as well as in their efforts at espionage, the Nazis were handicapped because of the internal dissensions within their intelligence service. Admiral Canaris, its chief, opposed most Hitlerian policies and therefore tried to sabotage many of them, a stand he was to pay for with his life.171 In spite of this drawback, the Germans engaged in widespread, if largely unsuccessful attempts in this direction, so that they possessed an organization already functioning at the time of Pearl Harbor.172 In spite of these precautions, Hitler’s main objective toward America remained unchanged. The United States must be kept out of the war as long as humanly possible. Whether it was really within the range of possibility to accomplish this by methods as diverse as those he tried to use was the problem which the coming months would decide.

112

CHAPTER FIVE

Between Peace and War June, 1941-N o v em b er, 1941

7. Delicacy of G erman-American Relations By the summer of 1941, relations between Germany and the United States had reached a stage of extreme delicacy. The President was determined to see to it that the Nazi cause failed; yet he was still hampered in carrying out a really vig­ orous policy by the prevalence of isolationist sentiment both in and out of Congress. Evidently a declaration of war against Germany, necessary as it might appear, could never be ob­ tained from the legislature. Consequently Mr. Roosevelt was compelled to move slowly within the bounds of his own defini­ tion of a program of aid “short of war,” although he did man­ age to keep public opinion alive to the dangers of Nazism. His German opponents, on the other hand, were handi­ capped in another way. They hated the President and everything he stood for, but, engaged in combat with the British Empire and about to launch a mammoth offensive against their Soviet confederates, they could not risk an open break with the mightiest remaining neutral. Hence the two countries veered ever closer to open war, but neither actually brought about the anticipated bellicose solution until Japan forced the issue. During the month of June, a number of events took place which threatened to bring the two countries closer to active warfare. On the tenth, the American people were informed of the first sinking of an American ship in World War II: 113

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the freighter Robin Moor, torpedoed while on a trip to Africa by German undersea craft.1 On the fourteenth, Treasury officials froze all Axis funds in the country,2 and a few days later, the State Department ordered the closing of all German and Italian consulates, as well as the German Library of Information and Trans-Ocean News Service, on the grounds that they served as headquarters for espionage activities.3 The latter measure merely climaxed a long series of continual difficulties between the two countries; the President had been incensed about successive German demands to close various American con­ sulates in occupied countries as early as January, 1940.4 All this occurred a few days before the invasion of Russia. Hitler’s resolve to keep America at peace was especially timely at this crucial moment in his career. Consequently, the Ger­ mans merely retaliated by freezing American funds and closing American consulates on their part.5 The Wehrmacht3s attack on Russia so changed the international situation that they had to direct their attention to issues larger than the squabbles with Washington. Somehow or other, however, America could not be dis­ regarded. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt’s policy of supporting Hitler’s foes assumed gigantic proportions. He occupied Iceland in the middle of the Nazis’ extended blockade zone; he issued shoot-on-sight orders for German ships encountered in the American defense area. He met Winston Churchill off Newfoundland and, while still technically neutral, endorsed the Allied war aims listed in the Atlantic Charter; he sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to aid the Fiihrer’s enemies in the Kremlin. Finally, he was instrumental in bringing about the repeal of the most important sections of the Neutrality Act of 1939, not to speak of the occupation of the cryolite mines in Dutch Guiana. His public references to Nazi leaders became more and more challenging, but the latter, generally prepared to resent the slightest insult, failed 114

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to lodge any formal protests with the State Department. They still had not quite abandoned their passive policies. 2. Naval Clashes The first serious incident on the high seas reminiscent of Wilsonian days developed between the two countries on the eve of the invasion of Russia. On May 21, a German sub­ marine commander torpedoed and sank the freighter Robin Moor en route to South Africa with some machinery. As the sinking occurred outside the blockade zone, the submarine commander must have disregarded orders not to apply prize law to American ships. The President demanded, in a message to Congress on June 20, that Germany pay damages.6 Here was a situation fraught with danger to Hitler’s plans.7 Similar sink­ ings during World War I had led to American participation in that conflict with dire results for the Fatherland. Hoping to benefit from history, the Führer was determined to avoid parallel entanglements twenty-five years later. Grand Admiral Raeder knew this well. Although he sought to justify the action, as well as an encounter with an American battleship and accompanying destroyer, by maintaining that the engage­ ments proved to the United States that Germany’s warnings were meant seriously, he nevertheless hastened to inform the Dictator that he had already given orders to prevent further incidents. The instructions had made reference to Hitler’s desire to “avoid incidents with U. S. warships and merchant ships outside the closed area under all circumstances.” Since his troops were to attack Russia within the next twenty-four hours, the Führer confirmed his Admiral’s directions. In the words of the transcript, The Fuehrer declares in detail that until operation “Barbar­ ossa” is well under way he wishes to avoid any incident with the U. S. A. After a few weeks the situation will become clearer, and can be expected to have a favorable effect on the U. S. A. and 115

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Japan; America will have less inclination to enter the war, due to the threat from Japan which will then increase. If possible, therefore, in the next weeks all attacks on naval vessels in the closed area should cease, especially since in the past few months such attacks have been exceptions in any case.8 With this statement, the Führer leaned over backwards more than ever before. He had always proclaimed that all ships in the blockade area were to be sunk; now, busy in Russia, he was willing to forego temporarily even this vital part of the blockade of Great Britain. Appropriate orders, dated June 21, were issued immediately to both Navy and Luftwaffe. All attacks on naval vessels either inside or outside the closed area were to cease for the time being, only craft definitely recognized as hostile constituting an exception. The Navy justified this order with the clear-cut injunction: “The Fuehrer desires absolutely to avoid any possibility of incidents with the U. S. A. until the development of operation Barbarossa becomes clearer. . . .”9 The President in the meantime could not be lulled into inactivity as easily as Hitler desired. On June 20, he sent his message concerning the Robin Moor to Congress and casti­ gated Germany as an international outlaw bent on terrorizing the United States into acquiescence. He announced that he would never yield the high seas to piracy.10 From the Nazi point of view, worse was to follow. Carefully keeping just one step ahead of public opinion, the Chief Executive ordered the occupation of Iceland on July 7. He announced laconically that the Navy had instructions to keep the approaches to the island clear.11 Two days later, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox explained these directives to the press; he implied strongly that the Fleet had the right to use its guns as well as its eyes when on patrol.12 Germany and America were rapidly drifting into a state of undeclared war at sea.18 The occupation of Iceland and attendant possibilities of clashes with United States naval units raised a furore in Berlin. 116

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Ribbentrop wired to Tokyo that “the sending of American military forces to the support of England into a territory which has been officially announced by us as combat area, shows not only Roosevelt’s aggressive intentions, but the fact of the intrusion of American military forces into the combat area to the support of England is in itself an aggression against Germany and Europe.”14 The press echoed his sentiments. The occupation of the Northern isle appeared to the Nazi edi­ tors as an undoubted attempt on the part of the President to create an incident.15 The Völkischer Beobachter published a cartoon in which Mr. Roosevelt, dressed like a gangster, says to a gagged and bound figure labelled “Iceland,” “Of course you’ll say you invited me for a cup of coffee, understand?”16 The rumor that orders to shoot on sight had been given to the American navy proved to the Nazi mouthpiece that the Presi­ dent, too cowardly to ask Congress for war, was trying to accomplish the same end in an underhanded manner. “His provocations against the Reich,” it wrote, “are becoming more and more outrageous from week to week; under all circum­ stances he wants to conjure up incidents which may permit him to present Congress with a fait accompli and to proclaim a state of war on his part.”17 The American step affected seriously neither the Wilhelm­ strasse nor the press. It was the often neglected German navy which would have to bear the brunt of the consequences of this latest move. The Fleet’s judgment was clear: the action was wholly disadvantageous from the Nazi point of view. Amer­ ican reconnaissance planes would now be able to cover the entire convoy route to Canada; the presence of American naval units in the blockade area would not only increase the likelihood of incidents, but also facilitate greatly the task of convoying units across the North Atlantic. The admirals sub­ mitted all these considerations to Hitler. They appended two pages of what they called American “provocation” of Germany, a summary of various mishaps which had arisen in connection 117

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with Roosevelt’s increasingly active aid-to-England program. They concluded that something had to be done. As a minimum concession, they demanded permission to sink American mer­ chant ships in the convoy area and to attack American naval forces in that zone if the exigencies of the time so required; as a maximum possibility, they suggested the occupation be considered an act of war.18 Such a development might at least solve their own immediate problems, as they had long complained about the anomalous situation created by their enforced passivity in the face of the American patrol system.19 The last decision, however, was up to the Führer, who refused to give his petition­ ers the freedom they desired. He explained “in detail” that he was “most anxious to postpone the United States’ entry into the war for another one or two months” as the Russian campaign would have to receive first priority; he needed all available forces in the East in order to achieve a decisive vic­ tory there as quickly as possible. For the time being, therefore, he did not “wish the existing instructions changed,” and explic­ itly wanted “to be sure that incidents will be avoided.”20 One week later, he did agree to a slight concession by per­ mitting attacks on American merchant ships in the original blockade zone, but as this area was the same as that forbidden to vessels flying the Stars and Stripes by the Neutrality Act, it amounted merely to a paper sop to the impatient Navy. The all-important Iceland run was still excluded. Just to make sure that his basic policies continued in force, Hitler appended to the new regulation a specific command, In the extended zone of operations U. S. merchant ships, whether single or sailing in English or American convoys, if recog­ nized as such prior to the use of arms, may not be attacked.81 Such orders resulted in a highly confusing state of affairs in the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Raeder’s entire blockade system was in danger of collapse if further American aid to England could not be prevented. The Führer assured him that he had not 118

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changed his mind on the importance of the so-called “siege” ; it was only that he wanted time to defeat Russia before America definitely joined the Allies. After the Eastern campaign, he reserved the right to take serious measures against the Western Democracy as well. He furthermore assured the Admiral that he would never court-martial a submarine commander who torpedoed an American ship by mistake.” The Dictator’s care actually succeeded in complicating somewhat Mr. Roosevelt’s task of awakening the American people to the Nazi peril. Although he was able to blacklist certain South American firms doing business with the Germans,23 isolationist sentiment almost defeated the extension of the draft law, which expired in the fall.24 In view of such isolationist strength, he was in no position to promise anything tangible to Mr. Churchill at the Atlantic Charter Conference.25 The German navy was still biding its time; it received on August 9 renewed specific orders not to attack American ships anywhere outside the original blockade zone even when in convoy.26 In spite of all precautions, incidents were bound to occur. It was not always easy to recognize American ships as such. At any rate, the aggressive convoy tactics of United States naval units on the Iceland run must have made Nazi sub­ marine commanders jittery. Furthermore, American-owned ships of Panamanian registry could be sunk by the Germans, thus constituting another source of possible friction. Two mer­ chant vessels were torpedoed and sent to the bottom of the sea in August and early September,27 but these incidents tended to be forgotten in view of the more spectacular German en­ counter with the U. S. S. Greer on September 4. This destroyer had been engaged in convoy duty to Iceland when a British plane informed her of the presence of U-652. She made con­ tact with the submarine and broadcast its position to the air­ craft. The latter then dropped depth bombs on the German vessel, which countered with fire on the Greer; the American ship accepted the challenge; hostilities on the high seas had 119

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commenced.28 The Nazis later claimed that the Greer fired first, since U-65229 reported that she had been attacked with three depth charges and further harassed by an unidentified destroyer.80 It appears fairly certain, however, that the missiles were dropped first by the British plane rather than the American naval vessel. Mr. Roosevelt refused to be intimidated by the affair. On September 11, he delivered a radio address which may well be regarded as one of his most significant. Calling the Greer incident an act of piracy, he served notice upon the Nazis that for the future American ships had orders not to wait to be attacked but to strike first. He drew parallels between the situation in the North Atlantic and the undeclared wars against the French and the Barbary pirates a century and a half earlier; nor did he leave any doubts in the minds of his listeners that his country’s safety depended on the survival of the British fleet.81 This address made a profound impression upon Berlin. The masters of propaganda wrote: . . . War monger No. 1 Roosevelt has decided to increase his provocations. He attempts to create incidents at any price in order to find at last the longed-for excuse to drop even the last mask . . . and to follow nakedly and brutally his lust for war which is to make him dictator of the world.82 According to his Foreign Minister, Hitler was very much upset about the latest developments on the Washington front,88 but Admiral Raeder almost felt a sense of relief at the clarification of what to him had seemed an intolerable dilemma.84 His staff pre­ sented a long memorandum concerning the unfavorable conse­ quences expected from the shoot-on-sight order, and, as usual, urged vigorous counter-measures. The Führer agreed with the arguments presented; he even allowed attacks on unlighted ves­ sels outside the blockade area, but requested again “that care be taken to avoid any incidents in the war on merchant shipping 120

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before about the middle of October.” In view of this anxiety, the Grand Admiral did not even avail himself of the new per­ mission and kept the old restrictive orders in force.35 The German reaction to the President’s aggressive speech constitutes perhaps the clearest example on record of Hitler’s Fabian policies toward the great Republic beyond the sea. Had he so desired, he could easily have regarded this challenge as a casus belli, either at the time it was announced, or else with each successive incident caused by it. He actually took this point of view in his declaration of war three months later,36 but he did not choose to take such a course of action at the time. He merely parried this latest Rooseveltian thrust, be­ lieving that the period of reckoning with the President had not yet come. The shoot-on-sight orders occasioned a number of clashes during the next few months; various merchant ships fell victim to over-anxious Nazi subs.37 Not only merchant vessels were involved. When the United States destroyer Kearny came to the aid of a convoy under attack on October 17, she dropped depth charges on a German submarine which replied by tor­ pedoing the Kearny. A considerable number of American sailors lost their lives, the first casualties in the still undeclared conflict.38 President Roosevelt took note of this encounter in his Navy Day speech of October 27, 1941. Boldly proclaiming, “History has recorded who fired the first shot,” he revealed that he held in his possession a Nazi plan to subvert the Reich’s Christian churches, as well as a map indicating various pro­ jected German puppet states in South America.39 These accu­ sations greatly incensed the organs of German propaganda,40 but otherwise Hitler refused to accept the challenge. The Chief Executive challenged Hitler in other ways as well. He ordered a Nazi radio station in Greenland seized by the Coast Guard41 and initiated the parliamentary process lead­ ing to the final repeal of the most restrictive sections of the 121

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Neutrality Act in November.42 A few additional serious naval engagements took place late in October, the most widely pub­ licized of which was the torpedoing of the Reuben James on October 31, 1941, costing one hundred American lives. This action, too, appears to have been occasioned by the destroyer’s convoy duties rather than by any change in Nazi policy.43 The truth of the matter was that no such reversals had taken place. In order to dispel all doubts concerning this subject, Hitler shouted to his faithful listeners on November 9, “President Roosevelt has ordered his ships to shoot the moment they sight German ships. I have ordered German ships not to shoot when they sight American vessels but to defend themselves when attacked. I will have any German officer court-martialled who fails to defend himself.”44 The Dictator had not lied. Although he was still thinking of capturing the Azores to attack the United States as soon as that country’s hour had struck, he refused to alter his policies, even while Congress was modifying the Neutrality Law, when he issued the following directive: Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought deliberately; they are to be avoided as far as possible. Ef­ forts to avoid incidents are to be abandoned, however, as soon as the American forces endanger our naval forces. . . . 45 The Wilhelmstrasse, too, in certain ways was still unwilling to provoke the United States any further. It advised that no American Jews be arrested in France although it evinced no objections whatsoever to the apprehension and eventual execu­ tion of their unfortunate European coreligionists.46 These are not the acts of a government seeking an excuse for war, or even one attempting to show to its Far Eastern partner the existence of a casus foederis within the meaning of a defensive alliance! It is therefore safe to assume that Hitler desired to keep the United States out a little longer until shortly before Pearl Harbor. 122

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3. Russia's Place in the Scheme To reach this end, Hitler still felt that he might safely use pressure as well as circumspection. The opening of the cam­ paign against the Soviets gave him a new propaganda weapon for use against the hated Washington Government. Americans generally abhorred Communism; their detestation might con­ ceivably be used for Axis purposes. The Russian invasion pre­ sented welcome opportunities to isolationists as well as outspoken Fascists, as the entrance of the despised Reds on Great Britain’s side seemed to simplify greatly their struggle to keep America out of war.47 Diplomatically, too, the new offensive might be used for Germany’s advantage. America and the Soviet Union had been on extremely bad terms for years, especially since the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Russian attack on Finland in 1939.48 But if Hitler calculated on this rift to force the President’s hand, he was mistaken. His attack on Stalin in no way came as a surprise to the State Department. It had had an inkling of the impending rift within the totalitarian camp for months in advance40 and had not hesitated to pass this intelligence on to the Russian Ambassador, although M. Oumansky had ex­ pressed nothing but utter incredulity.50 At any rate, Berlin, not Moscow, imperilled the immediate safety of the Republic. Con­ sequently, the American answer to the loudly advertised crusade against world Bolshevism must have disappointed the Führer. “If any further proof could conceivably be required of the real purposes and projects of the present leaders of Germany for world domination,” announced the State Department, “it is now furnished by Hitler’s treacherous attack upon Soviet Russia.” Although Sumner Welles, the Department’s spokesman, con­ tinued to condemn Communism in all its forms, he remained firm. “In the opinion of this Government . . . any defense against Hiderism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism —will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German lead­ ers, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense 123

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and security. Hitler’s armies today are the chief dangers of the Americas.”51 The Administration soon implemented this state­ ment by rendering all possible aid to the embattled Soviets. In spite of these developments, Hitler refused to abandon his chosen path. He was engaged in a tremendous undertaking in the East; continued American neutrality seemed even more essential than before. In order to divert that country’s attention from European affairs, he turned again to his Asiatic allies.52 Up to the moment of his attack upon Russia, he had generally advocated Japanese entry into the war only against the British and Dutch Empires. After his break with Stalin, such objectives became obsolete. National Socialist interests now required Japan not only to attack Singapore, but also Siberia. America’s posi­ tion in this new scheme of things remained unchanged : absolute neutrality, if at all possible. Von Ribbentrop inaugurated the new policy immediately after the first battles. On June 28, he dispatched one of many subsequent telegrams to Ambassador Ott in Tokyo. “I have come to an agreement with Ambassador Oshima to bear on his government in order to bring about prompt military action on Soviet Russia,” he wired. “I ask you to influence in the same sense the government there as well as other influential circles.” He advised that the Japanese be in­ fluenced by an appeal to their desire for spoils, but emphasized again his determination to keep America “neutral.” To continue in his own words: It may be expected that the rapid defeat of Soviet Russia— especially should Japan take action in the East—will prove the best argument to convince the United States of the utter futility of entering the war on the side of a Great Britain entirely isolated and confronted by the most powerful alliance in the world.58 The old policy of frightening the democracy was to be devel­ oped to a greater extent than ever before. The Japanese refused to comply. Although the pro-Axis Matsuoka was in favor of war with Russia, his views did not 124

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prevail.54 On the same day on which Ribbentrop sent his tele­ gram to Ott, the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled to the Mikado’s representatives abroad that Japan intended to deal with the Russian situation in her own way, meaning not at all.55 As a matter of fact, the Germanophile Matsuoka was dismissed soon thereafter and there were some indications that the Tripar­ tite Alliance had been subjected to considerable strain.56 The Nazis, however, refused to be discouraged. Waging a vigorous campaign in Tokyo to convince the Imperial Government of the advisability of northward expansion, they even enlisted resi­ dent German businessmen in their endeavors.57 General Ott carried out his master’s instructions with great dispatch, but he was unable to report any positive achievements. He ascertained that Matsuoka personally favored the Nazi suggestions and con­ sidered all Siberia as far west as Irkutsk a Japanese sphere of interest; but he was made to realize in no uncertain terms that “at present Japan is not in a position to enter the war against the Soviet Union. . . .”58 Ribbentrop refused to be discouraged. While following his Führer on a special train near the Eastern front, he cabled again to Tokyo, “Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse . . . it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military opera­ tions are completed.” He continued by emphasizing that the Reich was still interested in Nippon’s southward expansion as well, but still refused to consider any strong measures against America, which, much to his dismay, had just occupied Iceland. As he put it, he did “not doubt for a moment that in case of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and America . . . Japan will fulfill her obligations, as agreed upon in the Three Power Pact,” but he asked the Ambassador “to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date. . . . ” He con­ cluded by painting a most favorable picture of Axis strength 125

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after the attainment of total victory and of the embarrassing position in which the United States would then find itself, “if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weap­ ons.”59 Thus he incited his ally to attack Russia, not America. Since President Roosevelt possessed no constitutional powers to declare war, the telegram’s last sentence clearly implied a con­ tinuance of .defensive measures. The reply from Tokyo arrived on July 14. Ambassador Ott assured the Foreign Minister that he was doing everything possible to induce the Japanese to attack Russia,00 but his exer­ tions proved no more fruitful than his first attempts. He tried his best to carry out his mission, only to find that the Japanese were evasive. They assured him on August 15 that their lack of action in a northerly direction constituted merely a temporary maneuver to gain time,61 but simultaneously promised the Rus­ sian Ambassador that there would be no change in their adher­ ence to the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact.62 Four days later, Ott called on Vice-Minister Amau at the Foreign Office to impress again upon that official the advisability of an attack on the Soviets. Furthermore, he expressed concern about re­ ports of American oil supplies reaching them through Vladi­ vostok and inquired what his allies intended to do about this leak. The Vice-Minister refused to be pinned down. He merely remarked, “For Japan to do a thing like attacking Russia would be a very serious question,” and minimized the importance of the oil situation.63 In spite of all negative answers, Hitler was convinced that the Japanese would embark upon the desired adventure in the near future. He explained the delay as merely a tactical move to enable the Imperial army to assemble its forces and then strike all of a sudden in a surprise offensive.64 His friend, the Duce, agreed, though he attributed the endless procrastinations to continued internal difficulties in Japan.65 The Foreign Minis­ ter persisted in his efforts to realize the Fiihrer’s desires. On 126

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August 25, he sent another long wire to the German Ambassa­ dor in Tokyo. The gist of this dispatch was again the idea of inducing the Konoye Government to move northward, es­ pecially in view of Russia’s weakness in Siberia and America’s alleged unpreparedness, revealed by her supine acceptance of the Japanese occupation of Indo-China. Japan simply must move quickly to dispose of Russia before the United States gained enough strength to become active. In his opinion, the same arguments applied to the question of intercepting Ameri­ can ships bound for Vladivostok. Japan could easily tow them into her ports, take off war materials, and then let them pro­ ceed, as the Yankees were much too cowardly to do anything about it.66 Somehow or other, Ribbentrop’s logic failed to impress Hirohito’s advisers. After all, why was there such need to hurry when, as their allies asserted, Russia was about to collapse? Von Ribbentrop’s telegrams, like his policies, bore the stamp of contradictory thinking; on the one hand, he maintained the Soviet Union was finished, but on the other, he pleaded for aid to finish her off. It was apparent that all was not well on the Eastern front. Consequently, instead of following the Nazis’ advice, the Tokyo Government, in the course of its conversations in Washington, suggested a personal meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Prince Konoye. News of this unexpected development brought Ambassador O tt in great haste to the Tokyo Foreign Office. He professed concern lest the negotiations alter fundamental Axis policies allegedly agreed upon in Matsuoka’s time, but the Vice-Foreign Minister reas­ sured his visitor that nothing had changed. “Our aim at the time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister,” he said, “was to keep America from participating in the war.” Since it had proved impossible to frighten her into strict neutrality, other means to achieve that end were called for. He recalled that the Reich itself had taken “a very mild attitude” toward Washing­ ton. Despite repeated provocations, Germany had taken no 127

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action; hence German and Japanese policies still coincided. The end result desired, he pointed out to the Ambassador, was still strict American neutrality.87 The Nazi evidendy was not satisfied with these explanations. Since his superior in Berlin kept pressing him to induce Japan to go to war with Russia,68 he returned on the following day, August 30, to see Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda in person. Coming direcdy to the point, he inquired whether Japan’s intentions were still the same as on July 2. Was there any chance of her participation in the Russo-German war? As for the negotiations with America, he viewed them with “grave apprehensions.” Toyoda refused to be ruffled. Reiterating his assistant’s explanations, he dismissed the anxious caller with the unmistakable statement, “In a word, I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future.”69 The Ambassador was severely disappointed; in spite of his emphasis upon the Soviets’ weakness and the Americans’ unpre­ paredness, Toyoda had not only remained unconvinced, but had even exhibited an attitude of unmistakable reserve.70 He must have been even more annoyed when the first American freighter carrying oil to the Red Army arrived unharmed in Vladivos­ tok,71 all his pleadings notwithstanding. From the German point of view, Japan was failing to fulfill her obligations. Berlin had always regarded her as an effective means of frightening the United States into neutrality; now she was negotiating. During the next two months, the Germans tried to make the best of their allies’ uncooperative disposition. From time to time, they heard that Tokyo would tie down Moscow without war,72 but there were also some rumors of preparations against the Western powers.73 They had not yet abandoned their policy of cowing America; after the shoot-on-sight order, they even en­ deavored to utilize the Hull-Nomura conversations for this pur­ pose. Though still opposed to the talks on the grounds that they 128

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endangered Axis solidarity and undermined the expected diver­ sionary effects of the Tripartite Alliance on the United States,74 they hoped to obtain at least some benefits from an otherwise deplorable situation. Consequently they demanded that the Japanese caution Mr. Hull in the course of the negotiations that any further actions in the Atlantic would be considered a casus foederis by Japan. It is significant that they themselves never issued such a warning direcdy; only by playing upon American fears of her Pacific opponent did they hope to restrain the Washington Government from committing itself too far in the Adantic. Admiral Toyoda complied only in part. He sent a very innocuous version of the request to Ambassador Kichesaburo Nomura for transmittal to Secretary of State Cordell Hull,75 thus probably confirming the Nazis’ objections to himself, his Vice-Minister, and Prime Minister Konoye.76 His assistant did go so far as to warn the American Ambassador. Germany, he said, was putting pressure upon his country to declare she would assist Berlin in case of war with Washington,77 but Mr. Grew was well aware of the fact that the Nazis were still working pri­ marily for a Japanese attack on Russia rather than for one on America.78 4. Continued Trust in Isolationists and Climax of the Press Campaign Hider’s efforts to influence Tokyo to reach out for Vladi­ vostok constitute additional examples of his continued desire to keep America neutral. To reach this end in another way, he also continued to put his trust in the isolationists. Goering re­ called this fundamental error during his trial.79 The Nazis repeatedly told the Italians the same thing;80 the Duce believed them and refused to believe in the imminence of American entry even after President Roosevelt’s Navy Day speech following the Kearny incident.81 In a way, Hitler’s trust was justified. The opposition in the United States, did in many respects serve as his involuntary mouthpiece. Material for polemics was available 129

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in great quantities; both Germans and isolationists used it con­ stantly and the parallels in propaganda were unmistakable. Hit­ ler did his best to help his fellow opponents of the President along. The propaganda apparatus, in need of new targets after the development of trouble in Russia, was increasingly directed against the United States. In most cases, the victim of this tirade was Mr. Roosevelt as distinct from the American people; for the latter, Nazi publications often professed sympathy. President Roosevelt had loomed large in German attacks on America from the very beginning of the press campaign, but during the summer and fall of 1941, he assumed the distinction of becoming the chief Nazi bogeyman. One author, Theodor Seibert, characterized the Chief Executive as a “domineering, but adroit autocrat,” senselessly bewitching the American peo­ ple into ever-increasing fear of the new Europe. Such sinister demagoguery, as seen from the Fatherland, resulted in con­ stant prolongation and extension of the war.82 Naturally, the President was pictured as completely dominated by the Jews;83 some overanxious Nazis, letting their imaginations run away with themselves, asserted that their hated opponent himself was of Semitic origin.84 Once this connection was established, German propaganda followed its familiar pattern. The Jews, completely in control of banking, the press, the motion picture industry, and American life in general, utilized the White House for their own sinister purposes, a veritable example of the authenticity of The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion.85 In the course of that eventful summer and fall, there was certainly no dearth of material for polemics. The Nazis pro­ fessed great indignation at the freezing of Axis funds, the closing of German consulates, and the proclamation of the black list. They condemned these measures as deliberate provocations de­ signed by Roosevelt to drag his country into the world conflict.86 The opening of the Eastern front coincided with a new out­ burst. “Sumner Welles Welcomes Ally,” complained the head­ lines in the Reich. The Völkischer Beobachter editorialized, 130

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“This is the way we imagined the plutocrat’s attitude toward the European conflict. The close correlation between the aims of Soviet Russia and those of American plutocracy in enmity against National Socialist Germany cannot be demonstrated more ex­ plicitly. . . .”87 The propagandists creation of a mysterious con­ nection between the Bolsheviks and democratic Jewish capitalists was beginning to take shape. As the Russian campaign con­ fronted the German population with much greater sacrifices than anticipated, the propaganda apparatus attempted to divert attention from the cosdy Eastern venture by stepping up its attack on Roosevelt and the Jews.88 Portentous Masonic docu­ ments, allegedly shedding new light on the President’s connection with the much-maligned lodges, were conveniently found in Norway. The Press Service hastened to admonish, “This is the greatest opportunity to show up the underground wire-puller of North American policy and to call the Jewish Free-Mason secret circle by its right name. . . . The warmonger Roosevelt is to be exposed in a documentary fashion on this occasion.”89 The Fourth Estate complied. The reputed shooting orders inten­ sified the anti-Roosevelt campaign. The Völkischer Beobachter treated the affair as further evidence of the President’s desire for incidents and war. Its confidence in the isolationists, however, remained unshaken; it found solace in the fact that “patrioti­ cally oriented” (vaterländisch gesinnte) circles continued their “defensive struggle against Roosevelt’s policy of catastro­ phes. . . .”90 The distinction between President and people was empha­ sized constantly. It was the former who sought war, not the latter. The Zeitschriften-Dienst explained this approach to the molders of public opinion. It wrote: The shoot-on-sight order . . . the presence of American mili­ tary forces in Gibraltar, the cry for bases, for Northern IrelandScotland, and the slogan of the second front in Portugal and Spain prove conclusively that the half-Jew Roosevelt seeks inci131

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dents come what may, and, with the criminal fanaticism of a pathological arsonist, runs after war as war has not come to him.91 By August 3, the Chief Executive had become a “major aggres­ sor,” a term formerly reserved for Churchill and Stalin.92 Dr. Goebbels sought to prove his point by giving full publicity to a new publication entitled Germany Must Perish. This obscure American pamphlet advocated the sterilization of every Ger­ man;93 no one in authority in the United States ever supported such a ludicrous idea, but the magazine was represented as offi­ cially inspired and it was effectively utilized for propaganda in the Fatherland.94 As time went on, Dr. Goebbels heaped more and more abuse on the President. Always with one eye in the direction of the isolationist opposition, the Minister of Public Enlight­ enment pilloried the Argentia Conference and the Atlantic Charter as a mere repetition of Wilson’s meddling in inter­ national affairs.95 When Mr. Roosevelt officially announced the existence of the long-discussed shoot-on-sight orders, it was again against him rather than the American people that Nazi resentment was directed. His outspoken stand assured him of a permanent place in the Nazi rogues’ gallery. He became “War Monger Number One,” an epithet previously applied to the British Prime Minister.96 The exigencies of war and propaganda make for strange companions; so anxious were the Nazis to keep in tune with isolationist thought that they contin­ ued to deplore the White House’s alleged disregard of the Constitution. “Never in history,” wrote Das Reich, “has a people, proud of its self-government, been so irresponsibly cheated and lied to and abused for the lust of war of a small group of rulers as the American people by the Roosevelt administra­ tion.”97 A few weeks later, the introduction of the bill for modifi­ cation of the Neutrality Act enabled the Germans to pursue the same line even further. Hitler’s own paper, again concern732

Between Peace and War

ing itself with the detested President, wrote, “He desires armed conflict in order to be able to break the resistance of by far the greatest part of the U. S. A.’s people, resistance which neither propaganda nor every conceivable twisting of facts nor pro­ vocative maneuvers have been able to overcome.”08 The Navy Day address in October, 1941, marked the climax of the press campaign against the new “War Monger Number One.” The Reich Press Chief counselled that it be branded as “the speech of a liar and falsifier and as the product of Jewish demagoguery and hysterical war mongering.” He wanted it “tom to pieces with all the means at our disposal.”99 This was done,100 even by the Foreign Office, which officially charged that the Presi­ dent’s statements were untrue and that the United States had attacked Germany.101 A few weeks later, Ribbentrop chimed in. Addressing the representatives of friendly nations and sat­ ellites who had come to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact, he blamed Roosevelt for the war and bemoaned the fate of the “truthful, religious . . . American people,” led down the road to disaster by their irresponsible leader.102 Much has been said about the direct relations between the Nazi Government and the isolationists, especially the America First Committee. In reality, the evidence available so far appears to show only a very limited type of cooperation. George Sylvester Viereck, who received financial support from the German Embassy in Washington, kept on friendly terms with such isolationists as Congressmen Hamilton Fish and Stephen Day, as well as with Senators Holt and Lundeen,103 but aside from the activities of Flanders Hall, the German Library of Information, and similar organizations,104 the Germans were rather careful to avoid direct contacts with the more important leaders of the opposition. Even in the Reich itself they sought to avoid excessive publicity for the latter lest they embarrass them and hinder them in their work.105 Such a position was quite feasible. The isolationists carried on anyway, without any special encouragement from Berlin. Official German agen133

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cies in the United States might be closed down, but domestic anti-interventionist propaganda was unaffected by the termi­ nation of consular relations in the summer of 1941. On the contrary, it grew constantly in vehemence. Nor did the opposi­ tion confine itself merely to words; the extension of the draft passed the House of Representatives by the incredibly close margin of one vote,106 while an organization calling itself “The Mothers of America” picketed Representative Sol Bloom’s house, with the Nazi slogan of “Jewish War Monger.”107 The Ger­ mans had long decried the interventionism of the film capital;108 the isolationists, without the need of additional stimuli from Berlin, started an investigation of the maligned movie world on their own.108 Finally, Colonel Lindbergh obliged his distant well-wishers even more. In a speech at Des Moines, Iowa, he injected what might easily have been interpreted as antiSemitism into his constantly reiterated arguments of despair.110 Intelligence of Senator Gerald P. Nye’s inquiry into the Greer affair must also have afforded considerable relief to the Germans.111 In spite of their fear of compromising their American friends, they liked to reinforce their arguments with quotations from trans-Atlantic newspapers and orators. Herbert Hoover could be cited to prove that all talk of Nazi invasion of the Western Hemisphere constituted a mere figment of Roosevelt’s imagination,112 while the editorial page of the New York Daily News presented inexhaustible material for Dr. Goebbels.113 As was to be expected, the Fascist papers did their bit. Father Coughlin believed the President had lied to the American people concerning the undeclared war at sea,114 while the Bund still appeared as the champion of a violated Constitution with the headline, “Shall the Constitution Become a Scrap of Paper?”115 It would have been difficult to predict years earlier that Amer­ ica’s self-styled advocates of the “leadership principle” would become stalwart defenders of the Supreme Law of the Land against executive encroachment! The Free American’s new 134

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slogan supplied the answer. In common with its isolationist heroes, it exhorted daily, “Save America Now,” and reprinted the bulk of the literature of the Keep America Out of War Committee.116 It may be interesting to note that even in the midst of all this steady flow of propaganda in Germany and the United States, the Nazis had not entirely forsaken their policy of passive acquiescence in American moves. The Zeitschriften-Dienst minced no words concerning the closing of the German con­ sulates in America. Its editors considered the move a calculated challenge on the part of the Administration, but contradictory as it may appear, instructed the press, “. . . We shall be careful not to be provoked. For there is no reason for us to give our aid to the plots of the war clique in the United States, plots which are being more and more revealed to the world.”117 Secretary of the Navy Knox’s outspoken speeches in the summer of 1941 satisfied the directors of Nazi propaganda that their truculent attitude had not entirely failed of success; they felt that Washington was distinctly worried, but they continued to hope for isolationist relief. “Even though Mr. Knox . . . has pointed out that the present moment is especially favor­ able for intervention,” they wrote, “we do not wish to exceed the present bounds of our polemic aims in view of the ever more clearly developing opposition in the U. S. A.”118 Appar­ ently they were still trying to keep America neutral by diverse means. In the general atmosphere of an undeclared war during the summer and fall of 1941, the Nazis seem to have abandoned all hope of using the United States for the purpose of obtaining a favorable peace settlement. No longer did Hjalmar Schacht serve as a go-between. Secretary of State Weizsaecker even advised his chief that all rumors of peace should be counter­ acted by a vigorous press campaign.119 Under such conditions, even Mr. Stallforth, the self-styled but as yet unidentified rep­ resentative of American business, only met with rebuffs. His 135

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plans fell on deaf ears;120 he had to report to the President that the Reich would counter any warlike acts on the part of the United States by seizing the Atlantic islands and cutting the New World off from world trade.121 The time for parley­ ing had passed; but the resolution to keep the United States on the sidelines for a little while longer remained.

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CHAPTER SIX

Failure o f the Neutrality Policy November, 1941 - December, 1941

7. Negotiations Leading to Pearl Harbor As Hitler’s legions penetrated deeper and deeper into Russia during the fall of 1941, even the most optimistic Nazis must have realized that their crusade against Bolshevism would not prove as simple as the defeat of demoralized France in 1940. The Germans had become involved in a most difficult adven­ ture. In order to attain victory, it was imperative for them to continue their policy of keeping America at least partially out of the war. They were beginning to worry about increased United States participation as it was,1 a state of mind which explains Hitler’s great forbearance during September, October, and early November. His speech of November 9 was the very model of restraint;2 yet when America was attacked by his Asiatic ally one short month later, he declared war on the last non-belligerent great power shortly thereafter. This fate­ ful development of Axis policy, in all probability the death warrant of the Fascist cause, took shape sometime during the intervening weeks; its consummation marks the subject matter of this chapter. As the Japanese made the final and most drastic move in this drama, the answer to the question of Germany’s part in the Pearl Harbor attack must once again be sought in the relations between the two allies. These had become somewhat strained during that eventful fall. In the first place, Japan 137

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steadfastly refused to expand toward the North, though the Wehrmacht desperately needed a diversion in Russia’s rear. Secondly, and this was even worse, Japan was still carrying on conversations with the State Department without fully divulging their contents to the Axis ambassadors in Tokyo. As has been seen,3 the latter tried to make the best of this situation by strongly urging Foreign Minister Toyoda to stick to the original purpose of the Tripartite Pact and to frighten America into neutrality. General O tt demanded that the Jap­ anese Government submit a strong note to Cordell Hull to the effect that a belligerent situation within the meaning of the Tripartite Pact would assuredly arise should the Roosevelt administration continue to attack the Axis powers increasingly. Since Toyoda was primarily interested in getting concessions from the United States, he did not act upon the proposal immediately, but he did inform Ambassador Nomura. “Under the circumstances,” he wired, “we can do no more than warn the United States at the appropriate moment in such words . . . as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another.”4 The negotiators in Washington were to execute this commission in their own way, simply advising Mr. Hull that the purpose of the Three Power Pact had always been to restrict the area of warfare, and to request him to cease provoking Germany.5 On October 16, the Konoye Cabinet fell. The proud scion of the Fujiwaras had to give way to the arch-militarist, General Hideki To jo. General Oshima, completely in agreement with the Axis cause, explained to the Wilhelmstrasse that these devel­ opments constituted a great gain for Axis solidarity; he had hopes for the termination of the Washington conversations, but was unable to offer any assurance of a war against Russia.6 Either by accident or by design, the Ambassador had failed to emphasize the real significance of the cabinet change. The appointment of an extremist as prime minister was the logical consequence of Japan’s determination to attack the United 138

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States should negotiations fail, a possibility the Germans had scarcely ever discussed with their allies.7 If Hitler wanted to continue to collaborate closely with Japan, and possibly induce her to help him against Russia, he might have to follow Tokyo’s lead in moves quite different from those for which he had long been working. The policies of reticence in naval matters and diversion by Tokyo no longer led in the same direction; the Japanese had ceased to be content with a mere distractive role in the Western Pacific. Hitler, still conceiving of Japan as a club to be held over the Roosevelt administration to frighten it into passivity, did not want the Hull-Nomura discussions to succeed lest they weaken that club. He was probably unaware of the fact that the desired failure of the negotiations would also spell the final failure of his policy of keeping the United States neutral.8 At first the Nazis tried to solve the problem by virtually ignoring it and merely continued their original maneuvers. Ribbentrop, having fallen prey either to wishful thinking or to his own propaganda that America was too weak to resist any Axis moves, still urged his ally to act in bypassing American territories. He had received dispatches from the German Em­ bassy in Washington “indicating that the present situation was particularly propitious for Japan to implement her political ambitions in the Far East, since the United States was not in a position to interfere,” and forwarded this intelligence to Ambassador Ott so that the latter might “utilize those argu­ ments over there.”9 No doubt reports from the Japanese Embassy to the effect that Nomura too considered the Ameri­ cans unprepared to enter into the conflict, enthralled him greatly.10 As for the Washington conversations, he continued his attempts to induce the Japanese to be firm in resisting American demands, presumably to counteract incessant United States pressure upon Nomura to scrap the Tripartite Pact.11 Herr von Erdmannsdorff, his special representative at the Japa­ nese Embassy, followed instructions by bombarding Ambassador 139

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Oshima with endless talk advising offensives against Singapore and Vladivostok. ErdmannsdorfiF reported to his chief that the long-expected offensive might be directed against the Dutch East Indies alone, accompanied by a definite guaranty to the United States concerning the status quo in the Philippines, although that archipelago would of course be taken also should America enter the war.12 The possibility of an attack on Amer­ ican possessions in the first place apparently did not even occur to the diplomat. Nevertheless, indications of increased strain between the two Pacific powers mounted steadily. To jo’s notes to Nomura assumed a tone of ever greater urgency. Cordell Hull, excellently informed by his cryptologists, correctly interpreted these as assuming the form of ultimata.13 Military observers in London wired that Japan might be expected to expand southward in the near future, not only at the expense of the British Empire, but also at the expense of the United States.14 Prime Minister Churchill promised to assist his friends across the ocean in case of a Japanese attack.15 Finally, closely following the arrival of Special Ambassador Saburo Kurusu in Washington, the American intelligence service decoded the fateful “winds” mes­ sage. Should the Japanese newscaster insert the words, “east wind rain,” in his daily broadcasts, war would break out with the United States.16 Events were moving so rapidly that in spite of all wishful thinking, von Ribbentrop would have to face the realities of the situation. On November 18, the Japanese Government requested his assent to a treaty affirming Germany’s intention never to conclude a separate peace treaty with common enemies. Who these were was not quite clear, but he agreed in prin­ ciple to the proposal.17 Two days later, he received ominous news from Ambassador Ott. General Okamoto had asked if the Reich would join her partner even if Japan were to start a war. The Nazi Ambassador had referred the General to Ribbentrop’s promise to sign the no-separate-pcace agreement, 140

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whereupon Okamoto indicated that a decision on an advance toward the south was imminent. Ott, adhering to the original German policy of keeping America on the sidelines, explained to his host, “that in view of American weakness, a hesitant attitude would be initially possible and suitable, in order to drive the U. S. to a decision, difficult from the domestic political stand­ point, on entry into the war.” He believed the attack would be directed against the Isthmus of Kra, Thailand, and the Borneo oil fields.18 The Germans evidently still hoped that actual American entry might be postponed a little longer. Their Charge d’Affaires in Washington even went so far as to state at a din­ ner party that he would not mind a minor reverse in Africa to remove the absurd American fear of a contemplated Nazi attack on the United States.18 While such self-effacement was exaggerated, it was indicative of German thinking at the time. The Nazis refused to be provoked either by the modification of the Neutrality Act or by the occupation of Surinam in Novem­ ber, 1941. Although the Völkischer Beobachter in high indig­ nation spoke of “The Grime Against Dutch Guiana” and plans of Rooseveltian world rule,20 the Wilhelmstrasse failed to lodge an official protest with the State Department, much less to make the occupation a casus beUi. The last two weeks of November were perhaps the most crucial in the history of Axis-American relations. On the twentieth, the Japanese submitted their final proposals to Sec­ retary Hull; on the twenty-second, word came from Tokyo that a settlement must be reached by the twenty-ninth at the very latest—Mr. Hull knew this because of the “magic” code— and on the twenty-sixth he delivered what proved to be his final counter-offer to the Mikado’s ambassadors. On the twentyfifth, the Japanese task force set sail for Pearl Harbor—for all practical purposes negotiations had come to an end.21 Herr von Ribbentrop, too, was treating with the Japanese; amid great pomp and ceremony, the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 was renewed on November 25. The Axis world had assembled 141

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in full force, and Ribbentrop utilized the opportunity to casti­ gate Mr. Roosevelt as “the chief culprit of this war” before the expectant guests and retainers.22 It was during these festivities that Ribbentrop appears to have felt called upon to make a decision concerning his Ameri­ can policy. Anxious to cooperate with Japan as fully as pos­ sible, he was unwilling to let that country reach any sort of understanding with the United States. It had dawned upon him at last that the alternative might well involve a development diametrically opposed to his two-year-old efforts of neutraliz­ ing the Republic; hence he would either have to abandon his neutrality policy or refuse to support Japan in her global strategy. Since the latter alternative did not fit in with his concept of Tokyo’s role as an allied power, he had to take the consequences and abandon the idea of American non-belliger­ ency. It was characteristic of the erratic nature of the Nazi regime that this weighty decision, like so many others, was taken in a most haphazard manner. Although Ribbentrop did not know that virtually the last word had been spoken at Wash­ ington on November 26, he had a hunch and summoned Ambassador Oshima to the Wilhelmstrasse. According to the latter’s report of the ensuing conversation to his superiors, the Foreign Minister made a startling revelation. After again inquiring about the progress of the Nomura conversations, he said, We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded suc­ cessfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front. If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interests of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.38 This constituted a complete reversal; for years, the Nazis had urged that Japan attack various nations but keep America 142

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neutral; again and again the Führer had indicated that he wanted to finish other business, especially Russia, before deal­ ing with the United States. The Soviets were far from defeated— still the Foreign Minister was ready to take on a new adversary! Oshima was taken aback by the sudden reversal. Just to make sure, he asked whether an actual state of war was to be estab­ lished between Germany and the United States. At that moment, the Nazi apparently realized that he had permitted his enthu­ siasm to carry him further than his Führer desired; all he said in reply was, “Roosevelt is a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do.” These developments called for a thorough report to Tokyo. Oshima stressed the change that had come over Ribbentrop’s thinking and wrote, Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid war, and from the tone of Hitler’s recent speech and that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if neces­ sary.24 In view of the Reich’s past insistence on American neu­ trality and the unreliability of its Foreign Minister, Tokyo wanted more than a casual utterance to tie its European partner closely to itself in its forthcoming war. On November 30, General Oshima received instructions from home informing him that the Washington conversations “now stand rupturedbroken.” The directive continued, Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. . . . Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon nations through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of that war may come quicker than anyone dreams.25 143

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In Tokyo, the Foreign Minister went even further. After explaining in great detail to German Ambassador Ott that Japan’s unwillingness to give up the Tripartite Alliance had constituted the chief reason for the failure of the Nomura talks, he indicated that America was definitely preparing for a conflict. He emphasized again that his country had been firm with her trans-Pacific rival in order to keep it out of the European war as Germany desired, but should worse come to worst, he wanted to be sure of Nazi help under the pro­ visions of the Three Power Alliance. General Ott now promised all possible aid and cooperation without hesitation.26 At first sight, these German assurances to the Japanese would indicate that the Nazis had made the choice with which they had been confronted and decided in favor of warlike support of the Island Empire rather than continued attempts to keep America out. In dealing with such irrational person­ ages as the Führer and his Foreign Minister, however, it may be wise to cast aside any conclusions resting on assumptions of their logical behavior. Ribbentrop himself evidently never realized his düemma at all; after the end of the war, neither he nor the Japanese Ambassador was able to remember the interview of November 28. The Japanese managed to recall only that “Germany tried to appease America in spite of the dangerous situation in the Atlantic.” When confronted with the recorded transcript of the interview, he stoutly maintained that if Ribbentrop had really voiced such sentiments, it was only to get information from the Japanese or to keep them on his side.27 The Nazi’s memory also failed when, in 1946, he was questioned about his remarks to Oshima on November 28, 1941. He charged that the document contained an incorrect interpretation of a conference and insisted that he could not believe it to be true.28 Although his statements at Nuremberg must not be taken at face value, it is possible that the interview did not seem as important to him at the time as it actually turned out to be. He was not at all prepared to accept the 144

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consequences of his decision. Fortunately, we are not com­ pelled to rely on his memory alone. By December, the Japa­ nese had all the oral promises they wanted. As by that time they had decided definitely to start a war with the United States, they desired more binding pledges from their European partners. The diplomatic representatives of the Rising Sun consequently spent the next few days in attempts to have the Germans sign a definite treaty of assistance. This was not easy, for in spite of Ribbentrop’s boasts a few days earlier, considerable sentiment in favor of the old policy of keeping America neutral appears to have persisted in Berlin. On December 1, the Japanese Ambassador was in Austria enjoying the Mozart Festival. His stay was cut short by a call to return to the German capital, where he found instruc­ tions to initiate negotiations.29 He hastened to see his friends at the Wilhelmstrasse to secure a pact with the Reich to ensure its participation in war and to outlaw separate peace agree­ ments with common enemies. This time the Foreign Minister was no longer so free with his promises as three days before. Receiving evasive replies to his inquiry whether war would break out, Ribbentrop refused to entertain any definite commit­ ments.30 He simply excused himself with the statement that Hitler, temporarily absent from Berlin, would first have to be consulted. The next interview took place on December 3. The Japanese averred that the situation was more critical than expected, but the Nazi was unable to oblige. Though he assured Oshima of his personal agreement with the proposed arrangements, he was again compelled to delay the official reply until the Fiihrer’s return to headquarters later in the week.31 Having realized the dangers facing them, the Nazis were stalling.32 Mussolini was less squeamish about making impossible promises than his comrades to the north of the Alps. Inter­ preting the Tokyo message concerning the rupture of the Nomura conversation as a direct warrant to seek Italian aid, the Japa­ nese Ambassador in Rome paid a visit to the Duce on December 145

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3. More successful than his colleague in Berlin, he was able to inform his superiors that Mussolini had given his unqualified assent to anything Japan might choose to undertake, including war against America.33 The Ambassador had painted a highly appealing picture of a Nippon loyal to its Axis obligations; he had pointed out to Mussolini that this attitude had pre­ vented her from reaching an accord with the Americans, who had demanded that she sever the link with Rome and Berlin. For this reason, he invoked the provisions of the Alliance and demanded that Italy join and sign a no-separate-peace pledge concerning Great Britain and the United States. He assured the Dictator that an identical request was being submitted at that very time by his colleague in Germany. Mussolini, berating the hated President in the most violent manner, promised everything demanded from him,34 although the original alli­ ance had merely been defensive in character. Count Ciano confided to his diary that the interpreter translating the request for Italy’s declaration of war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities was trembling like a leaf ;35 well might he tremble! Apparently he had more political sense than the Duce. The latter, anxious to act in concert with Hitler, immedi­ ately sent word of these proceedings to Herr von Mackensen, the German Ambassador. The Nazi then cabled a summary to Ribbentrop, emphasizing the fact that “the outbreak of a conflict between Japan and the U. S. A. . . .” was only a matter of days, and that Japan demanded that her allies declare war instantly thereafter.86 Nevertheless, the Wilhelmstrasse still hesitated. In Ciano’s words, Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move was extremely cautious. “Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it,” he wrote, “but the idea of provoking America’s in­ tervention pleases the Germans less and less.”37 As late as the fourth, three days prior to the contemplated attack, they had not yet given a definite reply.38 146

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All their stalling and hesitation could not obscure the fact that the Nazis were now forced to come to a decision concerning their American policies. Japan was no longer willing to wait; they were unwilling to endanger their alliance with the Island Empire. It was during the late hours of December 4 or the early hours of the fifth that Ribbentrop finally appears to have received Hitler’s permission to comply with Tokyo’s wishes. At three o’clock in the morning, he gave Oshima a draft treaty agreeing to support Japanese demands for assistance against the United States and pledging not to conclude a separate peace.39 His attempts to keep the United States out of war by combining safer methods with reliance on Japanese policies had at last made the accomplishment of this endeavor an impossibility. These developments so excited the Foreign Minis­ ter that he sent Ambassador von Mackensen to Count Ciano at the same untimely hour to submit the proposed pacts. The skeptical Italian observed with amazement in his diary, “After delaying two days, now he [Ribbentrop] cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese. . . .”40 Of course there still remained the vexatious Russian situation to be disposed of; the Japanese had made up their minds to keep the Soviets neutral, an arrange­ ment which their Ambassadors were to attempt to explain to the Nazis as best they were able,41 but when they dropped their bombs on the great Hawaiian base, they could be fairly cer­ tain of German intervention, having a draft of an agreement to that effect virtually in their pocket. Just how soon and under what circumstances they would be called upon to honor their new pledges was not apparent to the Nazis until after the Pearl Harbor raid. While the Ger­ man Naval Attaché in Tokyo heard on December 3 that action toward the south might be expected in the very near future, he was ignorant of both the date and place of such an offen­ sive. His Japanese friends were slightly more specific on Decem­ ber 6, but their information still remained vague. Consequently all that he could learn was that within three weeks simul147

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taneous attacks upon Thailand, Borneo, and the Philippines might surprise the world.42 The German Ambassador, too, had word that Tokyo expected America to enter the war mo­ mentarily, as Roosevelt felt only temporarily sure of the coopera­ tion of Britain, Russia, and China; he noted that the Japanese were wondering how to begin “an unavoidable conflict.” An official of the Foreign Office told him quite bluntly, “Japan has always taken the view that Article Three of the Three Power Pact is applicable in any conflict between one of the three powers and the United States, with the exception that one of these States would attack, without cause, say the Ameri­ can Continent.” He merely took “dutiful notice” of this remark, but maintained his view “that in absence of a direct attack the [missing] for this grave decision about entering the war might be shifted to the United States.”43 The Nazis had not entirely abandoned their earlier desire to place the onus for the first move upon the United States. They knew something was going to happen; Ribbentrop declined a hunting invitation from the Hungarian Regent on December 6 because of the Far Eastern Crisis,44 but what that something involved they never knew until after the surprise raid.43 2. Germany and Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor day must have been an unforgetable experi­ ence in Berlin as well as in Washington. According to almost all the available evidence, the news of the attack took the Wilhelmstrasse completely by surprise. When a member of the press department tried to tell the astonishing news to the Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop refused to believe it and said it was a mere canard, “a propaganda trick of the opposing side which has fooled my press department.”46 Weizsaecker also remembered this story and maintained that Hitler himself refused to lend credence to the first sensational reports.47 Simoni found the Germans vexed and very busy; he commented sadly that World War One was repeating itself step by step—the 148

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entry of the United States marking the beginning of the end for the Axis.48 After he had overcome his initial doubts, Ribbentrop composed himself. Totally oblivious of his former attempts to neutralize America and of the implications of the failure of this endeavor, he was now so happy about his new ally that he called the Palazzo Chigi to communicate his delight to Ciano. The Italian was not so sure of the final advantages of the most recent developments; he dreaded the almost certain prolongation of the war and the possibility that America might at last be able to throw all her potential force into the balance.4® When the nature of the raid on Pearl Harbor is kept in mind, it is not surprising that the attack caught the Nazis, as so many others, completely unaware. Even in Japan, very few people knew about the preparations for the attack. Neither Ambassador Nomura nor his companion Kurusu knew pre­ cisely what was in store for their hosts.60 Nor did the Ameri­ can Government, well informed as it was through the “magic” code, have any real knowledge of what was coming. President Roosevelt and his advisers were constantly thinking of Japa­ nese attacks on the Isthmus of Kra and other far-away places, but never of Pearl Harbor.61 Therefore it is not surprising that the Germans knew even less, and we may give credence to the later testimony of almost all the public figures involved in the relations between the two countries that the raid had taken the Nazis completely by surprise. Weizsaecker recalled that it had generally been believed that Japan would attack Singa­ pore, but no one had thought of Hawaii, nor considered an outright attack on the United States possible.62 Ribbentrop also repeatedly declared that he had had no foreknowledge of the action whatsoever and had heard about it first over the radio.68 Kordt was more circumspect; he admitted that the Germans had known “tensions were growing,” but he too stated unequivocally that the actual plans had never been communicated to Berlin.84 The admirals expressed similar sentiments. Neither Raeder, nor Schulte-Mönting, nor Wagner 149

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could recall any message from Tokyo that would have informed them of the impending operation; they all agreed that December 7, 1941, had been a day of great astonishment to them.55 Hans Fritzsche, Goebbels’ assistant, was convinced that Hitler had been completely taken by surprise.56 In Tokyo, too, the Ger­ man colony had not enjoyed To jo’s confidence. General O tt recalled, “It [Pearl Harbor] came as a complete surprise to me as well as to the other members of my staff. I was offi­ cially informed hours after the occurrence.”57 Stahmer58 and Kretschmer corroborated his testimony; according to the latter the impression had prevailed that Japan still wished to avoid war with the United States just prior to the attack. “I, as an officer,” he said, “could have no understanding at this time for creating a new enemy.”59 Hideki Tojo himself also stated, “No close cooperation existed between Japan and Germany and Italy prior to the outbreak of war, and Japan’s decision to go to war was made without regard to the attitude of Ger­ many and Italy, and was dictated purely by the needs for selfdefense.”60 In Rome, too, members of the German and Italian press seemed to be utterly amazed on Pearl Harbor day.61 No matter how astonished the Nazis may have been, the opening of hostilities in the Pacific confronted them with the necessity for action. Oshima formally called on the Foreign Minister and demanded that Germany declare war on the United States without fail. Ribbentrop assured the Japanese that he would do everything in his power to comply with Tokyo’s wishes; Hitler was at that very moment in conference at headquarters, where he was discussing the formalities of Germany’s entry.62 Foreign Minister Togo also asked Ambas­ sador Ott to inform Berlin that “The Japanese Government expects that now Germany too would speedily declare war on the United States.”68 The Reich did what it had promised. On December 8, Hitler authorized the Navy to attack all Amer­ ican ships at sight,64 although he waited three days longer to address his Reichstag with proper pomp and ceremony to mark 150

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his formal declaration of war on the American Government.05 On December 11, 1941, Ribbentrop called in the Chargé d’Affaires, Leland Morris, and handed him the declaration without asking him to be seated.66 The note accused the United States of a long train of abuses suffered by the Nazis, who, however, at long last, after having been warred upon by the United States Navy, considered themselves as also in a state of war with Washington.67 The Führer informed the Reichs­ tag of the momentous decision amid the usual fanfare. Casti­ gating the President as the chief instigator of the war in gen­ eral, he announced that he was calling that warmonger’s bluff.68 Congress replied with a declaration of war in turn,69 and for the second time in less than twenty-five years, Germans and Americans confronted one another on the field of batde. Officially, the Nazis greeted the acquisition of still another enemy with unbounded confidence. To emphasize the brother­ hood of arms between Berlin and Tokyo, Hitler received Gen­ eral Oshima in audience on December 14. He bestowed the Order of Merit of the German Eagle upon the Ambassador, and cordially acknowledged services rendered “in the achieve­ ment of German-Japanese cooperation.” “You gave the right declaration of war,” he said, reminding the diplomat that he himself had at times struck suddenly and without formalities.70 The German Navy was apparently gready relieved. Admiral Raeder assured Hider that “the situadon in the Atlantic will be eased by Japan’s successful intervention.” He buoyed up his Führer’s spirits with hopes of large-scale withdrawals of American naval forces from the Adantic to the Pacific, and even counted upon similar transfers of merchant vessels to facilitate American supply operations in the Far East. The Dictator asked whether the Americans might not occupy the Adantic islands, but the Admiral dispelled his worries: they were much too busy in the Pacific to engage in any such opera­ tions. He also assuaged the Führer’s fear that the Anglo-Saxon powers might concentrate on Germany first instead of Japan, 151

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although these were their exact plans.71 The Navy had been urging strong measures all along; its immediate dilemma, mag­ nified beyond all expectations by the modification of the Neu­ trality Act in November, 1941, had been how to reconcile the Flihrer’s demands that America be kept neutral with the strict maintenance of the blockade of the British Isles. This was now a thing of the past; the admirals faced fewer complications for a brief moment.72 Hider explained all this to Oshima in great detail. He conveyed the general impression that he was very happy that the naval situation had been clarified and that all “Jew concepts, such as ‘Western Hemisphere,’ ‘300-mile zone,’ etc., had become obsolete.”73 The task of the propaganda machine was also simplified; instead of having to explain away the embarrassing and cosdy stalemate at the Eastern front, it could concentrate on a series of unending successes in the Pacific. Its instructions were clear: The war in East Asia is the work of the warmonger and world criminal Roosevelt, who as the stooge of the Jews besides Churchill has for years ceaselessly striven for war, until he has now at last reached his aim even in the Far East. The outbreak of hostilities in the Far East is to be represented under this viewpoint and with the help of the Roosevelt record of sin, is to be commented most severely. The papers can, in so doing, give vent to their human indignation against this bloodstained moral hypocrite of all times.74 No editor dared to see things as they really were. Germany had acquired an ally with limited industrial and military poten­ tial, but she had also taken on a new enemy with unlimited resources whose might was to spell defeat for the Axis in the long run. These facts had done their part to restrain the Nazis for two years; they had done their best to keep the United States temporarily out of the war until their Far Eastern partner took the fateful decision of reversing this policy and attacked the Americans instead. The older generals felt uncomfortable about these developments, but they were not allowed to take 152

Failure of the Neutrality Policy

the public into their confidence.75 AU Nazi rationalizations after the event cannot hide these facts. Though it has time and again been asserted that Germany pushed Japan into war,76 aU the available evidence shows that the exact opposite was true. Japan did the pushing, and although Ribbentrop late in November no longer opposed American entry into the conflict, he was certainly not instrumental in shaping the Tojo Cabinet’s decision to attack, much less in working out its plan of action, of which he knew absolutely nothing until he heard the news­ caster announce its results on December 7, 1941. 3. Reasons for the Failure of the Neutrality Policy Two questions remain to be answered. Why did Japan decide to strike against Pearl Harbor rather than against West­ ern European colonial possessions in East Asia or Soviet Siberia as desired by the Germans? And why did not the latter, in conformity with their overaU policy of long standing, try to pre­ vent the attack? After aU, at that very same period of time, they stül continued to maintain their composure despite Roose­ velt’s shoot-on-sight orders. The first question does not properly belong within the confines of this study; yet it is not difficult to surmise that the Nipponese did not feel safe in moving toward any Pacific goal so long as the powerful United States fleet remained undisturbed at its base in Pearl Harbor, ready to strike at any time to disrupt Japan’s vital sea lanes.77 As Winston Churchill wrote as early as August, 1940, to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Should Japan . . . declare war on us . . . the United States would not like this. What they would do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support, but their main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty.78 For this reason, American authorities had refused to move sub­ stantial portions of the Navy to the Mediterranean as requested by the Allies during the summer of 1940;79 the significance of 153

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its presence was not lost on Tokyo. The postwar recollections of a number of high Japanese naval officers were quite specific on this point. When asked for the reason for the attack, they replied, The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation cluding the PHILIPPINE Islands) and (2) the defense of mandated islands.80

the and (in­ our

General Tojo later justified the raid by citing his fear of an American attack, as he had interpreted Hull’s note of November 26 as an ultimatum to which he had been unwilling to accede.81 Since they had determined on conquest, his countrymen had had to eliminate the American fleet first,82 all Nazi advice to the contrary notwithstanding.83 The answer to the second question is not quite as simple. For two years, Hitler had refused to be provoked by the United States; he would deal with the hated democracy in his own good time. Many a nation had fallen victim to his designs for far less; his own forbearance must have irked the Führer con­ siderably. Yet he did absolutely nothing to keep his ally in check; on the contrary, his Foreign Minister at last even con­ sented to the Pacific venture. As Count Ciano’s diary and General Oshima’s affidavit show, the conversion was by no means a wholehearted one, except perhaps on the part of von Ribbentrop, but in the long run Hitler did assent to unqualified assist­ ance to the Japanese by handing them what amounted to a blank check. The Three Power Pact by no means obligated him to join in any offensive operations; yet in the last analysis, he chose to interpret it in this light. As a matter of fact, he took this decision at a moment when his attempts to pressure the Roosevelt administration into neutrality had met with partial success; the President and his advisers, expecting a Japanese attack on British outposts in the Far East, were actually faced 154

Failure of the Neutrality Policy

with a serious dilemma; they knew how perilous such a move would be to their country, but had no sure way of counter­ acting it because of the strength of isolationist sentiment.84 To understand Hitler’s action under these circumstances, it must be remembered that he had long looked upon the Japanese alliance as one of the cornerstones of his global plans. As American aid to his enemies steadily increased, he had become seriously frightened lest the two Pacific powers compose their differences in the course of the Hull-Nomura conversations.85 Under no circumstances was he willing to lose Japan as an ally. He would have preferred her to have attacked British, Russian, or Dutch territories, but since she would not do his bidding and was even negotiating with the Americans, he apparendy felt that he had to make concessions to her to keep her good will. Hence he was unable to press too much his determination to keep the United States out in the later stages of the discussions; if the Americans were to come into the conflict as a result, it would be the lesser of two evils,86 especially as, by this time, the Foreign Office expected them to come in eventually at any rate.87 It may be argued that Hitler could still have refused to declare war on the Republic after Pearl Harbor; but he could ill afford to break his promises to Tokyo two days after he had made them and fail to cooperate if he still hoped Japan might re­ ciprocate by attacking Russia from the rear. That he never aban­ doned this hope is shown by subsequent attempts to realize it.88 His policy of simultaneous diversion and reticence was no longer feasible. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was right when it convicted the Nazi defendants of having urged a policy upon Japan almost certain to bring America into war; the judges did not find that Germany pushed her partner into the conflict.80 Hitler’s decision violated his own principles of never striking until ready, but he had long fallen victim to his own propaganda concerning the weakness of the United States. He had refused to be impressed by Colin Ross’ warnings against underestimat155

Germany and American Neutrality

ing American war potential as early as October, 1939,90 had maintained an equally supercilious attitude in his correspon­ dence with Mussolini,91 and had boasted of the superiority of the German soldier over the American doughboy to Matsuoka in 1941.92 The Foreign Office in general and Ribbentrop in particular had also become affected by this self-delusion.93 Last but not least, the admirals had made the Dictator’s decision easier for him. Had they not implored him for months to ease the restrictions imposed upon them to keep America neutral? Consequently, he let himself be carried along by the acts of his ally, instantaneously solving Roosevelt’s dilemma. The isola­ tionists, angered by the treacherous attack on the vital naval base, ceased their opposition to his foreign policies and rallied to their country’s defense. Hitler had not only blundered, but had committed a folly which proved well-nigh irrevocable. He had ruined his own cause.

156

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion Nazi policies toward most countries followed a definite pattern. At first, Hitler would assure foreign nations of his peaceful intentions; then he would isolate them from potential friends and allies; finally, when he was fully prepared and his victims reduced to impotence, he would strike and conquer.1 He pursued this fine of action with great success toward Austria ; he obliterated Czechoslovakia with the same cunning. Poland, after having participated in the dismemberment of her neighbor, was next; she, too, was first wooed and then, when her allies were powerless to lend assistance, ruthlessly conquered. Not profiting by this example, other nations of Europe followed suit. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, all accepted pledges from the Dictator and refused to seek allies, only to be overrun when it was too late. Even France had appeased the Führer too long to withstand his armored divisions with any degree of success. The disaster of her complete collapse left Britain alone to defend herself; she might never have found herself in such an unen­ viable situation had she not previously appeased Hitler. Yugo­ slavia and Greece became the subsequent victims of German aggression. The United States, potentially Hitler’s most dangerous adver­ sary, constituted no exception to the Nazi rule of making idle promises to powers marked for eventual humiliation. At first, when the Führer was busy elsewhere, he wanted to leave Amer­ ica strictly alone, and repeatedly ridiculed the very idea of his ever wanting to wage war against her. At any rate, he was 157

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continentally oriented and considered the United States too dis­ tant to matter.2 During this period, he strained every resource at his disposal to neutralize America. His plans for the “decrepit Democracy” in case of Axis victory, of course, were quite dif­ ferent. An isolated America would have to face an overbearing Germany single-handed. Peace under such conditions would have been difficult to maintain. In the case of most European countries, the German pattern worked. The victims, hoping against hope that they might be spared, refused to abandon their neutrality until it was too late, thus playing directly into their adversaries’ hands. In re­ spect to the United States, however, Hitler’s policies failed. Under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, America refused to be caught unaware and took the liberty of defending herself, building up her own armed establishment and rendering all pos­ sible aid to the Allies. This line of action was Mr. Roosevelt’s great contribution to American foreign policy. As Robert E. Sherwood put it, it was his way of keeping his oath, not merely to uphold, but also to defend the Constitution,3 and with it the way of life it had made feasible.4 The State Department later maintained that “. . . the President and the Secretary of State . . . early became convinced that the aggressive policies of the Axis powers were directed toward an ultimate attack on the United States and that therefore our foreign relations should be so conducted as to give all possible support to the nations en­ deavoring to check the march of Axis aggression.”5 However that may be, the Administration was well informed of the dan­ gerous trends in the Reich as early as 1933; Ambassador Dodd had analyzed the warlike and criminal character of the three top Nazis, Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels, soon after his arrival in Berlin.6 Similar opinions reached Washington from Consul General George S. Messersmith and his successor at the Nazi capital, Raymond Geist.7 By 1935, the President’s earlier optimis­ tic appraisal of European affairs had given way to pessimism.8 158

Conclusion

As time went on, he became more and more convinced of the dangerous implications of German resurgence, but he felt checkmated by the drift toward isolationism in and out of Congress.9 When he came out publicly with his warning to quarantine the aggressors in 1937, he was not merely looking for foreign adventures to take the nation’s mind off the depres­ sion, as has been contended by domestic foes10 as well as by Nazi observers.11 He was performing his duty in cautioning the American people against perils which were to prove only too real a few years later. With the outbreak of actual war in 1939, the President’s course was clear. America’s safety depended on Germany’s defeat. During the phony war he could do little except press for neutrality revision,12 but with the fall of France, he decided to throw his whole weight and prestige behind the seemingly hopeless British cause,13 clearly showing the Nazis with the destroyer exchange that he would not remain inactive until they were ready to deal with him. By October, in spite of the forthcoming election, nothing seemed more important to him than to beat Hitler; he continued to act accordingly.14 Hitier’s policies toward the United States had therefore to take into account the fact that he had found a formidable opponent in Washington, a foe prepared to meet dangers as they arose, an adversary determined not to be lulled into acqui­ escence in Nazi expansion. During the first phase of the conflict, the Germans generally attempted to soothe the United States into a false sense of security. They minimized their press attacks; Hider gave strict orders to avoid naval incidents, and the Wil­ helmstrasse lodged as few diplomatic protests with the State Department as possible. The Nazis also conceived of and acted upon an alternate line of action, an endeavor to checkmate the American Government. They sought to apply pressure against the pro-Allied Administration, especially by relying upon its domestic foes, to prevent it from frustrating their designs.15 After the fall of France, it became obvious that the President refused to be frightened into neutrality by German White Books 159

Germany and American Neutrality

designed to play into his isolationist opponents’ hands, or to be lulled into a state of passive inertia by temporary Nazi reticence toward America. He helped Britain and led public opinion toward a better understanding of the dangers of Nazism. Hence Hitler was faced with the problem of continuing his original policy of keeping America neutral while at the same time devis­ ing some means by which he might divert her attention from Europe and thus disrupt the flow of supplies to Britain. When Mussolini wrote that the possibility of American intervention must be regarded as a fact with which one had to reckon in the future,10 he was only echoing Ribbentrop’s statements to Ciano at Munich in June, 1940.17 The Nazis had to do something; hence Hider finally assented to the Tripartite Pact of September, 1940. With this agreement he thought he had found the answer to his problem. On the one hand, he was sure that the pact would play into the hands of the isolationists and thus help cajole the United States into neutrality, while on the other, he hoped that it would direct American attention to the Pacific Ocean to the detriment of Great Britain.18 In the long run, these considerations involved difficulties; it proved impossible to divert the Americans to the Far East with­ out involving them in war. Throughout the remaining fourteen and a half months of United States non-belligerency, the Nazis tried their best to keep America neutral while threatening her at the same time; they continued to exercise the utmost caution in their diplomatic intercourse with Washington and refused to be provoked into a declaration of war despite the ever-increasing boldness of the United States Navy. At the same time, they relied on frightening the American people with a violent press campaign and increased pressure on Japan; so much so that Ambassador Grew was under the impression that they were enticing the Japanese into an eventual war with the United States.10 That this was not the case is shown most clearly by their attempts to inveigle Tokyo into offensives against the Brit­ ish Empire, and later, Russia. 160

Conclusion

In spite of his desire to keep the United States out, the possi­ bility of its refusing to play his game worried the Führer as time went on. His navy was menaced more and more by American interference at sea. Certain admirals began to believe that Japan’s entry into the war might be desirable even if the United States should be brought into the conflict as a result.20 Since the wish is father to the thought, the Nazis conveniently began to deprecate American strength. Ribbentrop told Oshima at Fuschl that it would not matter too much if the United States were to come in as a consequence of Japanese actions, though he averred that it would be preferable to keep it out.21 Hitler himself voiced similar sentiments to Matsuoka a few weeks later. He, too, hoped that America would remain on the sidelines, and urged Japan to attack Singapore with this consideration in mind, but he made it quite clear that he would immediately support his Far Eastern ally should Washington take a vigorous stand against Japanese expansion. Such developments, stressed the Führer, would not endanger final victory; he had a mean opinion of American power.22 The double purposes of frighten­ ing America while simultaneously diverting her attention were beginning to cause complications. If he at least contemplated the possibility of war with the United States with Japanese help, Hider still was determined to keep the country “neutral,” at any rate until after the success­ ful termination of his Russian campaign. He refused to give the Navy any leeway whatsoever in dealing with the ever-morebelligerent United States patrol activities. The Wilhelmstrasse failed to protest against the Lend-Lease Law, though Nazi writers never tired of stressing its unneutral nature and its open violation of the Hague rules of land warfare.23 Even such radical steps as the occupation of Greenland, Iceland, and Surinam brought forth nothing worse than press attacks, though the incensed Ribbentrop was led by them to consider breaking off relations with the United States.24 The seizure of Axis ships early in 1941 did elicit a protest, but this was the exception, 161

Germany and American Neutrality

not the rule. If the German propaganda machine finally received permission for a campaign against the “warmongers” in the United States early in 1941, the resulting polemics must be considered more a part of the Nazis’ efforts to indoctrinate the German people and perhaps to aid the isolationists, than any­ thing else; certainly its purpose was not to start a conflict with the Americans. Hider’s one-by-one policy encountered once again the clear and forceful opposition of the Washington Government. Presi­ dent Roosevelt refused to be dismayed by isolationist criticism. Keeping one step ahead of public opinion,25 sometimes moving at a pace much too slow for his impatient supporters, he ren­ dered increasing aid to Germany’s foes.26 The Chiefs of Staff entered into conversations with allied military forces,27 extended the Atlantic patrol system more and more, and finally authorized the Navy to shoot on sight at German submarines within certain specified areas. If this did not constitute sufficient provocation to test German aggressiveness, nothing would; but the Führer refused to budge; under no circumstances would he be drawn into war with the United States as long as he was not absolutely sure of Japanese cooperation. Even should Tokyo decide to come in, he still favored bypassing America. Ambassador Ott exerted all his diplomatic skill to have Japan join in the Russian venture,28 but the Japanese were noncommital. In reality, the Germans had much less influence in Tokyo than is generally supposed. This lack of rapport caused their calcula­ tions to go awry; they had no means of forcing the Japanese to move against the British or the Russians; consequently they had no control whatsoever over Tokyo’s American policies. To take one example, there was the matter of the Japanese-American conversations, carried on contrary to Germany’s desire. Were these to succeed Japan’s value as a diverting influence on Wash­ ington would sink to nil. For this reason, Berlin opposed the talks with all the means at its command;29 yet this very course of action could hardly be expected to cause the Japanese to take 162

Conclusion

very seriously Nazi pleas to keep the United States neutral. By the time of the final exchange of notes between Cordell Hull and the Japanese negotiators, it was no longer possible for Hitler to attempt to keep the United States neutral by restraining his Navy and letting Tokyo divert Washington’s attention from Europe. Japan had decided against the earlier plan of bypassing the United States in case of failure of the negotiations. Hitler, therefore, had no choice. If he wanted to keep the Island Empire as an ally, he had to agree to war on America. Rather than lose Japan altogether, Ribbentrop even endorsed her deci­ sions beforehand during the interview with Oshima on Novem­ ber 28, 1941.30 Though Germany was still uneasy about this departure from the Nazi practice of taking on one enemy at a time, she cooperated. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor; if she still hoped for their assistance against Russia, Germany had to honor her promises, and so, contrary to expectations, she found herself at war with the United States long before her adventure with the Soviets had been liquidated. The difficulties inherent in Hitler’s twofold approach to the problem of the United States involving as it did, his reliance upon Japan, caused him to forget his fundamental principle never to strike until his victim was ripe. He attempted to reas­ sure himself with his own propaganda concerning American weakness, but his hesitation during the period of undeclared warfare at sea indicates that, in the last analysis, he did not fully believe his own arguments. As a matter of fact, his original policy had been the only feasible one. As long as the United States remained neutral in theory and hamstrung by isolationist opposition, there was some chance of final Axis success. Once this situation was reversed by a direct attack on American territory, Roosevelt could devote the entire resources of the country to the Allied cause; he no longer had to worry about internal dissension. When he de­ clared war on America, Hitler had practically signed his own death warrant.81 163

Germany and American Neutrality

This folly was so stupendous that anti-Roosevelt writers have generally believed that the President maneuvered the Axis into attacking him to solve his problems at one stroke.82 Their explanations, however, seem too facile and top perfect. Mr. Sherwood describes in great detail the dilemma in which the President found himself in the weeks immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. He knew the Axis could not be beaten except by American intervention; he was also aware of the fact that the Japanese were going to attack, but he always believed they would move against the Kra Peninsula or some Dutch possession in the Far East, thus bypassing the United States and making it almost impossible for him to get the isolationists to consent to a declaration of war.33 In the words of Secretary Stimson and his collaborator, “The Administration paid the Japanese the compliment of assuming they would take the course best calculated to embarrass their potential enemies. It seemed obvious that by limiting their overt attack to such areas as Thailand or the Dutch East Indies or even Singapore they could insure a serious division of opinion among Americans.”34 The Japanese, however, afraid to move further in any direction as long as a strong United States fleet remained at Pearl H ar­ bor, committed the blunder of attacking Hawaii instead. Con­ sequently, they solved the President’s dilemma and contributed greatly to final Axis disaster.35 As the Nazis had done nothing at all to stop them, they too had seriously compromised the totalitarian cause.38 By not permitting Hitler to complete his preparations undisturbed, America was saved from great perils. Through forceful measures of his own, President Roosevelt had compelled the Führer to involve himself in adventures which wrecked Nazi plans designed to keep America neutral until Germany was ready for her, thus making certain of Axis defeat to the benefit and salvation of the world.

164

Notes

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948). 2 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt, from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950) ; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). 3 Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946); President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). 4 John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York: DevinAdair Co., 1948). 5 George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: DevinAdairCo., 1947). Chapter O ne: TH E PROBLEM OF MATE AIMS

HITLER’S U LTI­

1 Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1948), p. 319, stresses this aspect of Hitler’s diplomacy. 2 Louis P. Lochner, What About Germany? (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1943), p. 47. 3 Adolf Hitler, My Struggle (London: Hurst & Blacket, 1933), p. 76. 4 Ibid., p. 65. 5 United States, Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggres­ sion (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946-1948), III, 295-305. (Hereafter referred to as Nazi Conspiracy and Ag­ gression.) 165

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6 C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman, Origins and Back­ ground of the Second World War (London, Toronto, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 477. Gf. E. L. Hasluck, The Second World War (London and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, 1948), p. 171. 7 English version in Hitler, op. cit., p. 277. 8 Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter, May 6, 1938. 9 Memorandum, February 9, 1939, and card files, Deutsches Auslandsinstitut Papers, Library of Congress, Washington. 10 A good example of this aid may be found in certain hand­ bills distributed in Charleston, W. Va., after 1936, entitled Ameri­ can Guard. They stated, “Racial equality was IMPOSED upon America by Lincoln.” 11 The German Ambassador to the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry, May 31, 1938, in United States, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Series D, II, 369-372. 12 United States, Tariff Commission, Compilation of Data on U. S. Trade with Germany (Washington: Government Print­ ing Office, 1939), pp. i-ii. Cf. Douglas Miller, Via Diplomatic Pouch (New York: Didier, 1944), pp. 17, 18, 69; and William O. Scroggs, “Foreign Treatment of American Creditors,” Foreign Aßairs Quarterly, XIV (January, 1936), 345. Goering con­ sidered the United States a “country of scoundrels.” Expressing his opinion that it was impossible to do business with a country “that cares for legality as little as the U. S.,” he advised German com­ panies to liquidate their investments there as early as November, 1938. His anger had been especially aroused by Secretary Harold Ickes* refusal to accommodate him with the helium gas necessary to construct new dirigibles after the disastrous explosion of the Hindenburg. He boasted that he had told the American Ambas­ sador, “We don’t need any helium. I fly without helium, but the prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where justice prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such gangster states.” Stenographic Record of a Con­ ference with Goering, 12 November 1938, Document 1816-PS, in International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947-1949), XXVIII, 499-540, especially 523; translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, IV, 443. (Trial hereafter referred to as lnter166

Notes

national Nuremberg Trial.) For Ambassador Wilson’s version of this interview, cf. Memorandum from Hugh R. Wilson to the Secretary of State, April 29, 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 13 Edward M. Earle, “A Half-Century of American Foreign Policy: Our Stake in Europe, 1898-1948,” Political Science Quar­ terly, LXIV (June, 1949), 166-188; Lewis Lorwin, Economic Consequences of the Second World War (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 281; Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943), pp. 22 et seq. and passim. 14 The best book on this subject is Hugo Fernandez Artucio, The Nazi Underground in South America (New York: Farrar & Rhinehart, 1942). 15 Leonardo Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata d’Italia, 1939-1943 (Rome: Migliaresi, 1946), p. 58. 16 The New York Times, June 15, 1940, p. 9. 17 Letter from G. Berger, Chief of Recruitment Office of the Waffen S. S., to Himmler, August 7, 1940, Document NO-1825, United States Military Tribunals, “The United States of America Against Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al.,” Case #11 (hereafter re­ ferred to as “Weizsaecker Case.” ) Document Book #65. (Mimeo­ graphed.) 18 Memorandum from the Ministry of Economics to the Min­ istry of Justice, September 23, 1940, Document PS-1093, “Weiz­ saecker Case,” Document Book #144A. 19 Zeitschriften-Dienst, #2898, August 2, 1940. 20 Frankfurter Zeitung, July 27, 1940. 21 Ibid. 22 English version in S. Shepherd Jones and Denys P. Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1939-1950), III, 409. Original in Völkischer Beo­ bachter, February 25, 1941. Cf. R. H. M. Worsley, Europe versus America (London: Jonathan Cape, 1942), passim. 23 View of the Naval Staff on Expansion of the Navy after the War, Annex #3 to Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Führer on 11 July 1940 on the Obersalzberg, in U. S. Navy Department, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy 1940. (Hereafter referred to as Fuehrer Conferences 1940. Washington: Navy Department, 1947), I, 73-79. 24 Notes by Minister Schmidt, 20 September 1940, on a Dis­ cussion of the Previous Day Between von Ribbentrop and Mus167

Germany and American Neutrality

solini, Document 1842-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXVIII, 570-582, especially 580. Translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, IV, 477-478. 25 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer on 20 June 1940 at Wolfsschlucht and Annexes, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, I, 54-66. 26 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 11 July 1940 on Obersalzberg, ibid., pp. 67-69. 27 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on the afternoon of 6 September 1940, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 17-21. 28 Ibid.; Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 26 September 1940 at 1700 in ibid., pp. 24-26. 29 International Nuremberg Trial, XI, 346. He so testified. 30 Letter from Major D. G. (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein to an Unnamed General, 29 October 1940, in Inter­ national Nuremberg Trial, XXV, 391-394; translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 288-290. 31 Infra, p. 77. 32 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 22 May 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 62-67. 33 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer in Wolfsschanze in the afternoon of 25 July 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, II, 13-18; cf. Fuehrer Conferences of July 20 and June 21, 1941. 34 Code Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambas­ sador in Tokyo, 10 July 1941, Document 2896-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXI, 258-262, translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, V, 564-565. Cf. infra, pp. 125-126. 35 Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer at Wolfsschanze in the afternoon of 17 September 1941 and Novem­ ber 13, 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, II, 33-54 and 54-78. 36 Affidavit of Dr. Friedrich Gauss, Document NG-4556, in “Weizsaecker Case,” Document Book #9. 37 Bullitt to Roosevelt, March 23, 1939, Franklin D. Roose­ velt Papers. 38 William C. Bullitt to the Secretary of State, March 25 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 39 “Summary of the Situation from Kennedy’s Office,” March 3, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 168

Notes

40 “Summary of the Situation from Kennedy’s Office,” March 3, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 41 Communication from Joseph P. Kennedy to the President, September 30, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 42 Cf. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948) p. 684: “The President and I, long be­ fore the outbreak of war, saw clearly that it would be to our national interest to assist Britain and France. . . . We knew that a German victory over Britain and France would place us in direct contact with the ruthless leaders of Germany riding a powerful military machine. With Japan on the rampage in the Orient, our position in that event would be of the utmost danger.” 43 Infra, p. 158. 44 Communication from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Neville Chamberlain, September 11, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 45 Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering of the Storm (Bos­ ton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pp. 440-441. 46 William C. Bullitt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 13, 1939; Franklin D. Roosevelt to William C. Bullitt, September 28, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 47 Excerpt of Report of Commodore Dewey in Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. Chapter Two:

H ITLER ’S NEUTRALITY POLICY T O ­ WARD TH E UNITED STATES September, 1939 - A pril, 1940

1 Undated Account of a Discussion Between Hitler and the Commanders and Senior Officers of the Three Services in the Reich Chancellery, 23 May 1939 (Called “Little Schmundt Report” ) Document 079-L, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXVII, 546-556, translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, I, 151. Cf. L. B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 175, 213-217. 2 Ibid. 3 Hermann Rauschning, Gespräche mit Hitler (Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1940), pp. 113-114. 4 Alexander Dallin, “The Month of Decision: German-Soviet Diplomacy, July 22—August 22, 1939,” in Journal of Central European Affairs, IX (April, 1949), 1-31. George Denicke, 169

Germany and American Neutrality

“Origins of the Nazi-Soviet Pact,” in Modern Review, II (MarchApril, 1948), 204-209. 5 Hull, op. eit., p. 710. 6 Ibid.y p. 712. 7 He wrote a letter to his good friend Leon Fraser, the former President of the Bank for International Settlements, in which he indicated that “certain conditions” in Germany warranted Mr. Roosevelt’s speedy interference in the cause of peace. He sug­ gested an American lecture tour for himself in order to be able to do his part. Berndt Gisevius took this epistle to neutral Switzer­ land. Cf. Gisevius* testimony, International Nuremberg Trial, XIII, 553, also Letter, 16 October 1939, from Schacht to Mr. Fraser, Document Schacht-31, ibid., XII, 256-259, and Hans Berndt Gisevius, Bis zum bitteren Ende (Zürich: Fretz und Wasmuth, 1946), II, 150. 8 Ulrich von Hassel, The Von Hassel Diaries (Garden City: Doubleday and Go., 1947), p. 77. 9 Schacht emphasized this himself: having come to see Hitler in February, 1940, he told him he had received an invitation to write for an American magazine but that he thought someone should go to that country in person to explain Germany’s posi­ tion there. Extracts from Interrogation of Hjalmar Schacht, 17 October 1945, by Lieutenant Colonel Murray I. Gurfein, Docu­ ment 3729-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIII, 1-32, especially pp. 9-10. 10 Hull, op. eit., p. 712. The Secretary of State wrote, “Schacht’s move appeared to us to be part of a general effort by the German Government to establish contact with other gov­ ernments through unofficial agents who appeared to be acting entirely independently of the German Government and, in fact, in some ways in opposition to it.” 11 Infra, pp. 59, 81-83. 12 International Nuremberg Trial, II, 296. 13 Excerpts from testimony of Joachim von Ribbentrop, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, 31 August 1945, 1150-1200, by Col. Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement B, pp. 1194 et seq. He also stressed this point in open court; cf. International Nuremberg Trial, X, 379. 14 “Weizsaecker Case,” English Transcript, p. 7904. 15 Testimony of Dr. Heribert [sic] von Strempel, at Oberursel, Germany, 14, 15, and 16 February 1946, by Captain Sam Harris, 170

Notes

OUSCC, Document 3800-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggres­ sion, Supplement A, pp. 550-585, especially p. 561. 16 Infra, 36-37. 17 William E. Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd (eds.), Ambas­ sador Dodd’s Diary (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 293-294, 390, 392, 394, 400, 409, 434. 18 Völkischer Beobachter, December 24-25, 1938. 19 Friedrich Schönemann, Demokratie und Aussenpolitik der USA, Pamphlet 47-48, Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1939), p. 59. 20 German Library of Information, Exchange of Communi­ cations Between the President of the United States and the Chan­ cellor of the German Reich (New York: German Library of In­ formation, 1939). 21 Völkischer Beobachter, April 17, 1939. 22 Zeitschriften-Dienst, #181, June 6, 1939. 23 Ibid., #98, May 23, 1939. 24 Schönemann, op. cit., p. 59. 25 Zeitschriften-Dienst, #154, May 30, 1939. 26 Cf. Frankfurter Zeitung, July-August, 1939. The paper devoted many articles to the trade differences between the two countries. 27 Völkischer Beobachter, July-November, 1939, serves as an example. 28 Ibid., August 23-30, 1939; Frankfurter Zeitung, same period. 29 United States Military Tribunals, Commission in the Mat­ ter of Ernst Weizsaecker et al., Defendants, “Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal,” p. 9127. (Mimeographed.) 30 Zeitschriften-Dienst, #806, September 23, 1939, and #849, September 30, 1939. 31 Adolf Ahrens, Die Siegesfahrt der “Bremen” (Berlin: Steiniger Verlag, 1940), pp. 58 et seq. and passim. 32 Frankfurter Zeitung, December 15, 1939; Commodore Ahrens also exercised great care in dealing with the delay in his book. Ahrens, op. cit., pp. 58 et seq. 33 Zeitschriften-Dienst, #1191, November 13, 1939. Before this date, Nazi papers had mentioned it and stressed the legality of the action; cf. Frankfurter Zeitung, October 28, 1939. 34 Ibid., December 23, 1939. After the Nazis threw all care to the winds in their propaganda campaign, they never failed to 171

Germany and American Neutrality

mention this incident as an example of United States perfidy. Cf. Völkischer Beobachter, March 30, 1941. 35 Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Die Entstehung des Krieges, 1939. Pamphlet 49/50, Schriften für Politik und Aus­ landskunde, ed. F. A. Six (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940) ; Wilhelm Ziegler, Wie kam es zum Kriege 1939? (Leipzig: Reclam, 1940). Cf. Rheinbaben’s emphasis on the United States two years later, Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Kurzgefasste politische Geschichte des Krieges 1939-1942 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1942). 36 Mitteilungen über die Judenfrage, 1940 issues. Cf. supra, p. 26. 37 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 1332, January 12, 1940. 38 Völkischer Beobachter, October 11, 1939. 39 Quoted in William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 219-220. 40 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 1110, November 3, 1939. 41 Shirer, op. cit., p. 219. 42 Frankfurter Zeitung, November 6, 1939. 43 Oberheitmannmaterial, Document NG-3800, II, September 4, 1939, in “Weizsaecker Case,” Document NG-4493, Document Book #12 D. 44 Das Archiv, LXVII-LXXII (January, 1940), 1351; Frank­ furter Zeitung, November 24 and December 10, 1939, January 4, 25, 26, February 25, 1940. 45 Princeton Listening Center, School of Public and Inter­ national Affairs, Princeton University, Report, IV (January 1731, 1940), 5. 46 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 1746, February 2, 1940. 47 Letter of Franklin Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, Febru­ ary 1, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 48 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 2329, May 10, 1940. 49 Ibid., 2048, March 21, 1940. 50 For typical examples, cf. United States, Department of State, Press Releases (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929-1939), XIII, 100-109 for the Bremen Flag Case; Völkischer Beobachter, March 5, 1947, for protests against speeches by Mayor La Guardia; Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939), p. 247, for the Mundelein Case; Völkischer Beobachter, November 19, 1938, for the recall of the Ambassador; John W. Wheeler Bennett and Stephen A. Heald 172

Notes

(eds.), Documents on International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1929-1943), 1938, II, 35, for the protest against Secretary of the Interior Ickes; Dodd and Dodd, op. cit., p. 86, for the Mock Trial Case. 51 Völkischer Beobachter, January 31, 1939, cf. Gordon W. Prange, Hitler’s Speeches and the United States, Voi. 16, America in a World at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 13. 52 Supra, p. 28. 53 For exception, infra, p. 86. 54 Völkischer Beobachter, September 2, 1939. 55 Facts in Review, November 6, 1939, contains the English translation of the Danzig speech of October 24, 1939. 56 Ibid., September 14, 1939. 57 Das Archiv, LXXIII (April, 1940), 35. 58 "Colloquio col Führer,” Berlin, October 1, 1939, in Galeazzo Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1948), pp. 474-475. (Hereafter referred to as Ciano, L’Europa.) Cf. also Dirksen’s letter to the Wilhelmstrasse, “Memorandum on the Development of Political Relations Between Germany and Britain During My Mission in London, May, 1938-August, 1939,” in Documents Relating to the Eve of the Second World War (New York: International Publishers, 1948), II, 148-192, especially p. 179. He considers Roosevelt the chief crisis-monger. 59 Address by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939, Document 798-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXVI, 338-344. 60 Samuel I. Rosenman (compiler), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938-1940), VIII, 444-445. (Vols. VI-IX Macmillan.) 61 United States, Department of State, Bulletin, I, 158. 62 Ibid., p. 157. 63 Ibid., pp. 183-184. Hull, op. cit., pp. 654-655, contains an interesting account from the American point of view. The origi­ nal note or a copy thereof for the President is in the Roosevelt Papers dated August 31, 1939. 64 United States, Department of State, Bulletin, I, 181. 65 Das Archiv, LXVI (October, 1939), 693. 66 Ibid., p. 456. 67 For the official State Department release, cf. United States, Department of State, Bulletin, I, 342. 173

Germany and American Neutrality

68 Kurt Assmann, “Relations Between the Supreme Com­ mand of the German Armed Forces and the Naval War Staff, World War II,” (Washington: United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1947), p. 5. (Mimeographed.) 69 German Foreign Office Memorandum, 3 September 1939, Document 851-D, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXV, 547-548. 70 For example, The New York Times, September 4, 1939, P- !•

.

71 Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (New York: Dutton, 1949), p. 23. 72 Raeder* s testimony in International Nuremberg Trial, XIV, 79. 73 Frankfurter Zeitung, September 4, 1939. 74 Raeder’s testimony in International Nuremberg Trial, XIV, 79. Weizsaecker’s testimony conforms in all essentials, ibid., p. 277. 75 Telegram from Karl von Wiegand in Amsterdam to Gen­ eral Admiral Raeder, Berlin, September 7, 1939, and Telegram from Grossadmiral Raeder to Karl von Wiegand, September 8, 1939, Document 804-D, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXV, 525-526. 76 Facts in Review, September 9, 1939. 77 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 742, September 9, 1939. 78 The first intimation of this line of approach appeared in Völkischer Beobachter, September 7, 1939; the best example may be found in ibid., October 25, 1939. 79 Sworn statement of Karl Dönitz, 17 November 1945, Docu­ ment 638-D in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXV, 235-236. 80 Testimony of Admiral Schulte-Mönting, ibid., XIV, 325. The United States State Department, in spite of an investigation, was unable to find out the truth until after the War. Hull, op. cit., p. 677. 81 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 7 September 1939, in Fuehrer Conferences 1939, pp. 3-4; Reflections of the Chief, Naval Staff on Atlantic Warfare, 20 September 1939, ibid., pp. 5-6. 82 Conference between the Chief, Naval Staff, and the Führer on 23 September 1939 in Zoppot, ibid., pp. 8-11. 83 Ibid. 84 Das Archiv, LXVI (September 27, 1939), 764-765. 174

Notes

85 Memorandum from Woermann, September 27, 1939, Docu­ ment NG-3049, in “Weizsaecker Case.” Ships deemed liable to sinking were all those continuing to send radio messages, steering zig-zag courses, or sailing in complete blackout, whether enemy or neutral. 86 The New York Times, October 3, 1939, pp. 1, 9. 87 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrei on 10 October 1939 at 1700, in Fuehrer Conferences 1939, pp. 12-14. 88 Karl Doenitz, “Essay on the War at Sea,” Mimeographed by United States Department of the Navy, p. 21, refers to this desire in connection with later operations. 89 Conference Notes, November 1, 1939, in Fuehrer Confer­ ences 1939, pp. 33-34. 90 Communication from Bullitt to Roosevelt, September 8, 1939, Roosevelt Papers. 91 Cf. The Free American, September-November, 1939. 92 Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, pp. 50 et seq. 93 Cf. Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, X, 1036. In retro­ spect, Friedrich Berber, special adviser to von Ribbentrop and editor of the Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, called it a breach of neutrality in time of war. Friedrich Berber, Die Amerikanische Neutralität im Kriege 1939-1941 (Leipzig: Deutsches Institut für Aussenpolitische Forschung, 1943), p. 13. 94 Assmann, op. cit., p. 20. 95 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 10 November 1939, in Fuehrer Conferences 1939, pp. 37-38. 96 Telegraphic Order by German Foreign Office to German Missions in Neutral Countries, November 24, 1939, Document Dönitz-73, in International Nuremberg Trial, XL, 92-93. 97 From notes, undated and unsigned, on a memorandum on the intensification of the war at sea against Britain, in Document C-100, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A, p. 845. 98 Address by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief, 23 Novem­ ber 1939, Document 789-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXVI, 327-336, especially pp. 331-332. 99 Orders for U-21, U-56, in Document C-100, in Nazi Con­ spiracy and Aggression, Supplement A, p. 849. 175

Germany and American Neutrality

100 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 30 December 1939 and Annex 1 thereto, in Fuehrer Confer­ ences 1939, pp. 62-69. 101 Extracts from the War Diary of the Naval Warfare Ad­ ministration ( “Seekriegsleitung” ), 1 January 1940 to 31 January 1940, Document 021-C, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIV, 177-187, especially pp. 179-180. 102 Extract from German Naval Staff War Diary, 5 March 1940, Document Dönitz-86, in International Nuremberg Trial, XL, 99. Raeder had assured the American Naval Attaché that the German Navy had orders not to stop United States vessels, on February 20, 1940. 103 Report by Raeder to Hitler, 16 October 1939; Memo­ randa by Naval Warfare Administration on Measures for In­ tensification of the War at Sea Against England, Document 157-C, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIV, 608-641. 104 United States Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, I, 723. 105 Ibid., II, 125-127, 199. 106 Paul Meier Benneckenstein (ed.), Dokumente der deut­ schen Politik (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934-1944), V III, 432-437. (Hereafter referred to as Dokumente der deutschen Politik.) 107 The original order is not yet available to civilians, but the repeated attempt to amend it makes its existence certain. In the war diary of October 20, 1940, the author states, “Atlantic ships have instructions to seek no engagements in the Pan-American safety zone (see map),” Annex 2 to Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer on 14 November 1940 at 1300, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 37-55, especially p. 46. Annex 1 to Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 20 April 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 50 et seq., reads, “After . . . rejection [of the zone] on the part of Great Britain, Germany sent notification that ‘the German Government could not see any prospect for success in continuation of the Safety Zone plan, unless the Anglo-French standpoint were basically revised.* The private order to naval forces to respect the zone just the same incurred all the strategic disadvantages which an official rejection of the zone was supposed to have prevented.” It goes without say­ ing that there were certain exceptions to the rules. Further refer­ ences to the order may be found in Conference of the Commander176

Notes

in-Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 22 May 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 62 et seq. 108 Infra, p. 86. 109 Report of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 23 February 1940 at 1030, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, I, 12-19. Cf. “Doenitz Essay,” p. 21. 110 George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: The Devin Adair Go., 1947), pp. 14-15, makes the most of this in his attack on the President. 111 New York Herald Tribune, December 21, 1939, p. 1. 112 Frankfurter Zeitung, December 23, 1939. 113 Völkischer Beobachter, March 30, 1941. 114 Memorandum to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 115 Cf. Jefferson Gafferey to Sumner Welles, July 17, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 116 In the words of Waverley Root, “A few earnest but mis­ guided Americans could do more harm to America’s defense ef­ forts than all the organized Nazis in the country.” Waverley Root, The Secret History of the War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1945), II, 162. 117 teColloquio fra il Duce e il Ministro degli Esteri del Reich von Ribbentrop presente il Conte Ciano,” Rome, October 28, 1938, in Ciano, L'Europa, pp. 373-378. 118 "Colloquio col Ministro degli Esteri del Reich von Rib­ bentrop,” Salzburg, August 11, 1939, ibid., pp. 449-453. 119 Unsigned Memorandum from Hitler to Brauchitsch, Raeder, Goering, Keitel, 9 October 1939, Document 052-L, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXVII, 466-486, especially p. 472. He believed, however, that they might succeed in the long run. 120 etColloquio fra il Duce e il Ministro degli Affari Esteri del Reich, in presenza del Conte Ciano e dell9 Ambasciatore von Mackensen,” in Ciano, L'Europa, pp. 527-541. 121 Simoni, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 122 International Nuremberg Trial, IX, 444. 123 The New York Times, October 6, 1939; cf. Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 128-129. 124 Denys Smith, America and the Axis War (New York and London: Macmillan, 1942), p. 191, remarks that the isolationists 177

Germany and American Neutrality

“could scarcely be excused for forcing their country to abdicate from her position as a great power.” 125 For Lindbergh’s speeches, cf. Charles A. Lindbergh, The Radio Addresses of Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, 1939-1940 (New York: Scribner’s Commentator, 1940). 126 Alexander Kirk to State Department, September 26, 1939, Roosevelt Papers. 127 Ibid. 128 Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 42. 129 Princeton Listening Center, School of Public and Inter­ national Affairs, Princeton University, Report, III (January 2-16, 1940), 7-11. 130 Today's Challenge, I (June-July, 1939), 6. 131 Ibid., I, 3 (November-December, 1939), 26-31. 132 Völkischer Beobachter, October 7, 1939. 133 Cf. New York Daily News, October 7, 1939, p. 15. 134 Forum Observer, I (February 29, 1940), 1. 135 Völkischer Beobachter, October 8, 1939. 136 Ibid., October 8, September 21, and September 26, 1939. 137 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 842, September 23, 1939. 138 Völkischer Beobachter, January 25 and February 17, 1940. 139 Frankfurter Zeitung, February 5, 1940. 140 The Free American and Deutsche Weckruf and Beobach­ ter, August 31, 1939. 141 The Free American, September 4, 1939. 142 Ibid., September 14, 1939. 143 Ibid., September 21, 1939. 144 The Defender, September, 1939. 145 Social Justice, October 2 and 16, 1939. 146 John Roy Carlson, Under Cover (New York: Dutton, 1943), pp. 105-106. 147 Liberation, August 28, 1939; September 7, 1939. 148 The New York Times, September 27, 1939, p. 27. 149 Olive E. Clapper, Washington Tapestry (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1946), pp. 250253. 150 The Daily Worker, September 20 and 22, 1939. 151 Cf. Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 178

Notes

152 Frankfurter Zeitung, January 21, 1940. 153 Ibid., January 25, 1940. 154 Shirer, op. cit., p. 308; Lavine and Wechsler, op. cit., p. 258. 155 Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Polish Documents Relative to the Origin of the War (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 1940), pp. 9 et seq. The German edition was called Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges (Berlin: Eher, 1940). 156 lbid., pp. 18 et seq. 157 Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Polish Documents Relative to the Outbreak of War, pp. 25 et seq. 158 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 159 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 2117, April 5, 1940. 160 Discussion between Ribbentrop, Mussolini, and Count Giano, 10 March 1940, Document 2835-PS, in International Nur­ emberg Trial, XXXI, 209-221, especially pp. 219 et seq. 161 The German White Paper (New York: Howell, Soskin and Go., 1940), pp. 7-11. 162 The Forum Observer, I (April 15, 1940), 3. 163 New York Journal American, April 1, 1940, p. 1. 164 United States Congress, Congressional Record (Washing­ ton: Government Printing Office, 1941), 76th Congress, 3rd Ses­ sion, pp. 4, 3745. 165 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, II, 335. 166 Edouard Daladier to Frankin D. Roosevelt, April 4, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. The Premier wrote: “Personne ne peut prévoir jusqu'à quelles limites la propagande allemande portera ses mensonges. Aussi je tiens à vous dire que pendant les deux dernières années où j'ai été Président du Conseil des Ministres de France, VAmbassadeur Bullitt m'a toujours dit que, dans le cas d'un conflit européen la France devait prendre ses décisions en sachant que d'après l'opinion de l'Ambassadeur Bullitt, les EtatsUnis d'Amérique n'entreraient pas dans la guerre." 167 The Zeitschriften-Dienst gave orders not to mention the visit. Zeitschriften-Dienst, 1817, February 16, 1940. The Adlon Hotel did not even have the courtesy to display the American flag in honor of its guest. Cf. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 90 et seq. 168 He expressed himself to that effect to Mussolini on March 10. Discussion between Ribbentrop, Mussolini, and Count Ciano, 179

Germany and American Neutrality

10 March 1940, Document 2835-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXI, 209-221, especially p. 216. 169 Dr. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf der diplomatischen Bühne, 1923-1945 (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949), p. 475. Weizsaecker testified that he was under strict orders not to discuss peace with the American. “Weizsaecker Case,” p. 7934. 170 Welles, op. cit., pp. 121-135. The papers at Hyde Park bearing on Mr. Welles* mission were still closed at the time of this writing. 171 Ibid., p. 99; “Weizsaecker Case,” pp. 7932-7935 (Weizsaecker*s testimony). 172 Von Hassel, op. cit., p. 120; Welles, op. cit., pp. 100-109. 173 Ibid., pp. 112-119. 174 Waverley Root stresses this channel of communication and gives an undocumented account of it. Root, op. cit., pp. 622 et seq. 175 Basil O’Connor to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 30, 1940, with a verbatim account of the conversation enclosed, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers.

Chapter Three: EXTENSION OF THE NEUTRALITY POLICY May, 1940-D ecember, 1940 1 Cf. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Har­ per and Bros., 1949), p. 8. 2 Das Archiv, 73-78 (May, 1940), 193-194. 3 Cf. Daily News, April 9, 1940, p. 25; May 11, 1940, p. 17. 4 Rosenman, op. cit., IX, 157. 5 Les Lettres secrètes échangées par Hitler et Mussolini (Paris: Editions du Pavois, 1946), p. 63, Mussolini to Hitler, May 2, 1940. (Hereafter referred to as Les Lettres secrètes.) 6 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, II, 493. 7 Ibid., p. 635. 8 Daily News, June 18, 1940, p. 25. 9 Ibid., June 20, 1940, p. 33. 10 Cf. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 107. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 593; Walter Lippman, U. S. War Aims (Boston: 180

Notes

Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 42; Haines and Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 611-612. 11 Smith, op. cit., pp. 19 and 184. 12 Joseph E. Davies to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 23, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 13 The Chairman of the General Navy Board to the Secre­ tary of the Navy, June 7, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 14 Roger W. Shugg and H. A. De Weerd, World War 11 (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1946), p. 60. 15 William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 6. 16 James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story (New York: Whit­ tlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 234. Mr. Farley describes the Cabinet Meeting of May 17, 1940, in which Mr. Roosevelt speculated on the possibilities of a German victory. Cf. Hull, op. cit., p. 766. 17 Memorandum for the State Department from Alexander Kirk, June 17, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 18 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, II, 638 et seq.; Hull, op. cit., pp. 767-769; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 184-187. 19 Hull, op. cit., p. 766. 20 Cf. Sol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 1948), p. 240. 21 H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), p. 202; Bruce Catton, The War Lords of Washington (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 17-18. 22 Forest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, How War Came to America (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1943), p. 180. 23 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 2372, May 17, 1940. 24 Ibid., 2574, June 14, 1940. 25 Ibid., 3042, August 23, 1940. 26 Ibid., 3267, October 4, 1940. 27 Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 224. 28 Infra, pp. 107 et seq. 29 Völkischer Beobachter, September 5, 1940. 30 Das Archiv, LXXIII-LXXVIII (September, 1940), 596. 31 Cf. Max Clauss et al., Die U. S. A. und die Welt von heute (Munich: Bruchmann Verlag, 1940). 32 Facts in Review, II (July 1, 1940), 282. 181

Germany and American Neutrality

33 Facts in Review, II (August 12, 1940), 378. 34 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 21, 1940, translated in Gordon W. Prange, Hitler’s Words (Washington: American Coun­ cil on Public Affairs, 1944), pp. 175-176. 35 Memorandum of conversation of May 8, 1940, Sumner Welles to Franklin Roosevelt, July 5, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. Mr. Heath did not mention Schacht’s name in this report, but Welles identified him in a letter to the President on November 13, 1940, also in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 36 Heath to Welles, June 6, 1940; Welles to Roosevelt, June 19, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 37 Hull, op. cit., pp. 844-845. 38 Supra, pp. 40-41. 39 Jones and Myers, op. cit., II, 571. 40 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 11 July 1940 on the Obersalzberg, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 67-79. 41 Deutschland im Kampf, XXIII/XXIV (August 17, 1940), 73. 42 State Department Memorandum, August 23, 1940, Frank­ lin D. Roosevelt Papers. 43 The New York Times, August 18, 1940, pp. 1, 30; August 19, 1940, pp. 1 and 6; Frankfurter Zeitung, August 19, 1940. For the original arrangements, cf. Memorandum from Captain D. J. Callaghan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 14, 1940, and Welles to Roosevelt, July 10, 1940, Roosevelt Papers. 44 The New York Times, August 20, 1940, pp. 1 and 4. 45 Frankfurter Zeitung, August 22, 1940. 46 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer on 14 November 1940 at 1300, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 37-49, especially p. 46. 47 The New York Times, November 30, 1940, p. 1, December 9, 1940, p. 1; Frankfurter Zeitung, December 18, 1940; supra, p. 48. 48 Fernandez, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.; cf. Allan Chase, Falange (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943), passim for Axis activi­ ties in Latin America. 49 Jefferson Caffery to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 12, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 50 Davis and Lindley, op. cit., pp. 127 et seq.; Hull, op. cit., pp. 827-828. 51 Jones and Myers, op. cit., II, 90. 182

Notes

52 Hull, op. cit., pp. 813-827. 53 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, III, 138. 54 Facts in Review, II (July 29, 1940), 345. 55 On July 5, 1940, the British Ambassador asked Cordell Hull not only to send destroyers, material aid, and supplies to England, but also to stop all exports to Germany and to freeze Axis funds. He also suggested that pressure be brought to bear on Latin American countries to do likewise. Memorandum of Con­ versation between Lord Lothian and Cordell Hull, July 5, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 56 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Serv­ ice in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), p. 328. 57 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, III, 121 et seq., is an example. William C. Bullitt and General Pershing were in the forefront of this cam­ paign. 58 The New York Times, September 17, 1940, p. 1. 59 Davis, op. cit., p. 100. 60 In the words of the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, the “whole theory of neutrality vis-à-vis an aggressor had disap­ peared with the Kellogg-Briand peace pact.” Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 328. Good accounts of the transactions may be found in the works of Churchill, Sherwood, Hull, Davis, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 61 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 404. 62 Kordt, op. cit., p. 261. 63 Supra, p. 58. 64 Kordt’s testimony in “Weizsaecker Case,” p. 7418. Kordt said that Ribbentrop was peculiarly responsible for the Japanese policy. Cf. Hitler’s own favorable though confused opinions on Japan in Hitler, op. cit., pp. 251 et seq. 65 Kordt’s testimony in “Weizsaecker Case,” p. 7418. 66 United States, Department of State, Peace and War (Wash­ ington: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 255 and 322; Interrogation of Oshima, Document 2156-B and Foreign Office Memorandum, Document 4034-B, in International Military Tri­ bunal for the Far East “Record of Proceedings . . . ” (hereafter re­ ferred to as “Far Eastern Trial” ), pp. 5907 and 6133; William C. Bullitt to Cordell Hull, December 24, 1933, and William E. Dodd to Judge Moore, February 23, 1935, in Franklin D. Roosevelt 183

Germany and American Neutrality

Papers; personal statement of Hermann von Raumer at Freising, Germany, August, 1945. Von Raumer was responsible for the phraseology of the pact. 67 Personal statement of Hermann von Raumer, August, 1945. Although von Raumer denied that the pact was directed against anyone except the Communists, his veracity may be questioned. He even denied the existence of the secret protocol. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew sized up the treaty very adequately when he called it “merely the banner under which the have-nots are rallying.” The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), II, 160-161. Cf. Paul Schwarz, This Man Ribbentrop (New York: Julian Mesner, 1943), pp. 172-177. For the text, providing for collaboration against the Comintern, cf. Germany, Reichsministerium des Inneren, Reichsgesetzblatt 1937 (Berlin: Reichsverlagsamt, 1937), II 28-29; for the secret protocol, pro­ viding for mutual neutrality in case of war with Russia, cf. Docu­ ment 1561-E, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 5936-5937. 68 United States, Department of State, Documents on Ger­ man Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, I, 733-756. 69 The New York Times, July 2, 1937, p. 10. 70 James T. Liu, “German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1938,” in Far Eastern Quarterly, V III (February, 1949), 157-171; United States, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, I, 787-825. 71 Ibid., pp. 826-864. The difficulties confronting the Nazis in China because of their pro-Japanese decision are best outlined in a letter from the chief of the Auslandsorganisation, Wilhelm Bohle, to his representative in Shanghai, dated June 18, 1938. After informing his correspondent of the necessity of supporting the Fiihrer’s policies even if it meant economic losses, he continued, “You as a Landsgruppenleiter are responsible for the Fiihrer’s Japan policy being ruthlessly defended by all compatriots in your area . . . the men of the AO have to show that unconditionally and without hesitation they follow the Reich even when the ways of the Reich are sometimes not understandable for them.” Docu­ ment NG-2793, Document Book 27 in “Weizsaecker Case.” 72 Völkischer Beobachter, February 21, 1938. 73 Frankfurter Zeitung, May 13, 1938. 74 Ibid., November 26, 1938. 184

N o te s

75 H. G. Stahmer’s Affidavit, Document 17-H, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 24396 et seq. 76 He received the Grand Cross of the German Eagle from Hitler in December, 1938, as a token of appreciation. Frankfurter Zeitung, December 27, 1938. 77 Interrogation of General Oshima, February 4, 1946, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6050 et seq. Stahmer’s affidavit, p. 24398, corroborates him. 78 Interrogation of General Oshima, February 4, 1946, in loc. cit. Gf. note 81. 78 "Colloquio fra il Duce e il Ministro Degli Esteri del Reich von Ribbentrop,” Rome, October 28, 1938, in Giano, UEuropa, pp. 374-378. 80 Interrogation of General Oshima, February 4, 1946, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6061 et seq., cf. note 81. 81 Telegram, General Ott to Secretary of State Weizsaecker, 18 February 1939, in “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 6093. 82 Hull, op. cit., pp. 627-628. 83 Telegram, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to General Eugen Ott, March 15, 1939, in “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 6115. 84 Supra, p. 28. 85 Ribbentrop to Ott, April 26, 1939, Document 4035, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6098 et seq. Also contains Ribbentrop’s substantiation of Oshima’s testimony. 86 Ott to Ribbentrop, 4 May 1939, Document 4043-B and D, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6103 et seq. 87 Ibid. 88 Letter from Weizsaecker to von Mackensen and reply, June 20, 1939, including telegram from Ribbentrop to Mackensen, 17 June, 1939, Document PS-1827, in Document Book IV-A, “Weiz­ saecker Case.” 89 Ribbentrop to Ott, September 9, 1939, Document 4034, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6127 et seq. 90 H. G. Stahmer’s Affidavit, Document 1714; Oshima Affi­ davit, Document 2862, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 2404 and 34016; Kordt Testimony, “Weizsaecker Case,” p. 7419. 91 Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, XI (April, 1940), 201203. 92 Ribbentrop to Ott, September 9, 1939, Document 4034, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6127 et seq. 185

G e r m a n y a n d A m e r ic a n N e u tr a lity

93 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 16 October 1939, in Fuehrer Conferences 1939, p. 21; cf. supra, p. 44. 94 Ott to the Foreign Ministry, September 19, 1939, in Uni­ ted States, Military Tribunals, Case VI, “The United States of America Against Krauch, et al.” p. 1823. (Hereafter referred to as “I. G. Farben Case.” ) (Mimeographed.) 95 “Colloquio fra il Duce e il Ministro degli Affari Esteri del Reich, in presenza del Conte Ciano e dell3Ambasciatore von Mackensen” Rome, March 11, 1940, in Ciano, UEuropa, p. 537. 96 Ribbentrop’s testimony in International Nuremberg Trial, X, 294. 97 Ott to the Foreign Office, Document 4027A, June 12, 1940, in “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 6152. Violet Sweet Haven, Gentlemen of Japan (Chicago and New York: Ziff-Davis Pub­ lishing Co., 1944), p. 131, considers the General the head of the “fifth column” in Japan. 98 Ott to Chancellery, June 10, 1940, Document 4025A, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6162-6165. 99 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1944), p. 320. 100 Ott to the Foreign Office, June 24, 1940, Document 4025-C, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6175-6177. 101 Memorandum on Interview, Document 1379, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6179-6184. 102 Hideki Tojo Affidavit, Document 3000, in “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 36185. 103 Minutes of Joint Conference of War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers . . . July 12, 1940, Document 1308, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 6191-6212. 104 Tojo Affidavit, Document 3000, in “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 36185. 105 Stahmer’s Affidavit, Document 2862, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 24441 et seq. 106 Kordt, Testimony in “Weizsaecker Case,” pp. 7417 et seq. 107 Wilfred Fleischer, Our Enemy Japan (New York: Double­ day, Doran and Co., 1942), p. 56. 108 Kordt Testimony in loc. cit. 109 Douglas Glen, Ribbentrop is Still Dangerous (London: Rich and Cowan, 1941), pp. 276-277. 186

N o te s

110 Masuo Kato, The Lost War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 44. The author recalls that throughout these negotiations the Germans did not even ask Japan to attack the Allies, their efforts being devoted entirely to the task of neutraliz­ ing the United States. 111 Stahmer Affidavit, Document 1714, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 24438 et seq.; Tojo Affidavit, Document 3000, ibid., p. 36191. 112 Notes by Minister Schmidt, 20 September 1940, on a Discussion of the Previous Day Between Von Ribbentrop and Mussolini, Document 1842-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXVIII, 570-583; especially pp. 573-574. (Translation by the author.) 113 Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1946), p. 291. (Hereafter referred to as The Ciano Diaries.) 114 Cf. Shirer, op. cit., pp. 532-537; Simoni, op. cit., p. 130. 115 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 3267, October 4, 1940; Das Archiv, LXXIII-LXXVIII (September, 1940), 597; Karl Rosenfelder, “Der Krieg um ein neues Asien,” Nationalsozialistische Monat­ shefte, XI (November, 1940), 644-657. 116 Kinoaki Matsuo, How Japan Plans to Win the War, trans. Kilsoo K. Haan (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942), p. 307. 117 Reichsministerium des Inneren, Reichsgesetzblatt 1940, II, 280-281. A translation may be found in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, V, 355-356. 118 Davis and Lindley, op. cit., p. 14. 119 Kordt Testimony, “Weizsaecker Case,” pp. 7426-7427. 120 The New York Times, November 10, 1941, p. 3. 121 Weizsaecker Memorandum, September 28, 1940, Docu­ ment NG-3074, Document Book VIII-A, “Weizsaecker Case.” 122 United States, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, (eds.) Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 226-234. Professor Feis feels that the sudden realization of the treaty did come as a surprise, though its general tenor did not. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 110. 123 The New York Times, September 29, 1940, p. 1. 187

G e r m a n y a n d A m e r ic a n N e u tr a lity

124 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, September 29, 1940, in United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, II, 169. 125 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, III, 251. 126 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 497-498. 127 Grew, op. cit., p. 140. 128 Das Archiv, LXXIII-LXXVIII (September, 1940), 597. 129 Frankfurter Zeitung, September 28, 1940. 130 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 3271, October 4, 1940, and 3317, October 14, 1940. 131 Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Listening Center, Report, 16 (April 16, 1941), p. 14. 132 Memorandum of a Conversation between Adolf Hitler . . . and . . . General Franco at Hendaye, October 23, 1940, in James W. Gantenbein, Documentary Background of World War 11, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 727-729. 133 Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 233. 134 "Colloquio col Ministro Degli Esteri del Reich Von Ribbentrop,” Schönhof, November 4, 1940, in Ciano, L’Europa, pp. 608-612. 135 Cf. William C. Johnstone, The United States and Japan’s New Order (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 315; Edgar Mclnnis, The War 11 (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 48; Wer­ ner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Kurzgefasste Politische Geschichte des Krieges, 1939-1942 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1942), p. 57. 136 Ribbentrop’s testimony in International Nuremberg Trial, X, 188, 294. Excerpts from Testimony of Joachim von Ribbentrop, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, 30 August 1945, 14301640, by Col. Howard A. Brundage, JADG, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement B, pp. 1182-1194. 137 Kordt’s testimony in “Weizsaecker Case,” p. 7428; Weizsaecker’s testimony, ibid., p. 7898. 138 Eugen Ott’s Affidavit, August 30, 1947, Document 2477, in “Far Eastern Trial,” pp. 28019-28022. The ex-Ambassador 188

N o te s

wrote, “The main purpose of the agreement was to prevent the entry of the United States into the war.” 139 Telegram, Foreign Minister to Nomura, October 8, 1941, in U. S. Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 56-57. (Hereafter referred to as Pearl Harbor Attack.) 140 Kato, op. cit., p. 20. 141 Von Hassel, op. cit., p. 152. 142 “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 48994. 143 It may be argued that the secret clause of the treaty left the decision of entry up to Japan and prevented the Nazis from invoking the alliance, but they never even approached the Japanese to inquire about the implementation of the agreement during the undeclared naval war, as far as the writer has been able to dis­ cover. 144 Supra, p. 43, and (eColloquio fra il Duce e il Ministro degli Affari Esteri del Reich, in Presenza del Conte Ciano e dell3 Ambasciatore von Mackensen,3i May 11, 1940, in Ciano, UEuropa, pp. 527-541, especially p. 540. 145 The New York Times, May 20, 1940, pp. 1 and 8. 146 Ibid., August 5, 1940, p. 1. 147 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 3, 1940, in New York Times, September 3, 1940, p. 19. 148 Johnson, op. cit., pp. 161 et seq.; Walter Phelps Hall, Iron Out of Calvary (New York and London: D. Appleton Cen­ tury Co., 1946), pp. 196 et seq. 149 Supra, p. 70. 150 “Colloquio con il Ministro degli Esteri del Reich,33 June 19, 1940, in Ciano, L’Europa, pp. 562-565. 151 Völkischer Beobachter, October 28, 1940. 152 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 2945, August 8, 1940. 153 Von Hassel, op. cit., p. 153. 154 Schmidt’s Notes on Hitler’s Conference with Ciano and von Ribbentrop, 12 August 1939, Document 1871-PS, in Inter­ national Nuremberg Trial, XXIX, 41-53. 155 Frankfurter Zeitung, July 26, 1940. 156 Ibid., July 29, 1940. 157 Zeitschriften-Dienst, p. 3123, September 6, 1940. 158 Frankfurter Zeitung, October 15, 1940. 189

G e r m a n y a n d A m e r ic a n N e u t r a l i ty

159 Cf. Max Clauss et al., Die U. S. A. und die Welt von heute (Munich: F. Bruckmann Verlag, 1940), p. 28. 160 Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, November 20, 1940, in Les Lettres secrètes, pp. 81-91. 161 The Free American and Deutsche Weckruf and Beobach­ ter, November 4, 1940. 162 The New York Times, August 28, 1940, p. 1. 163 Social Justice, November 4, 1940. 164 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 186 et seq. 165 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 553. 166 Frankfurter Zeitung, November 10, 1940. 167 Supra, pp. 18 et seq. 168 Sir Samuel Hoare, Complacent Dictator (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 89-174; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 518-530. The British exerted every known device of cajolery to keep the Spaniard neutral. 169 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 27 December 1940 at 1600, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 68-80, especially pp. 68-69; Hitler to Mussolini, December 31, 1941, in Les Lettres secrètes, pp. 103-113. Hitler did not give up his plans until later in 1941.

Chapter Four : INCREASING COMPLICATIONS OF TH E NEUTRALITY POLICY 1 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 558-567. 2 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 227; Hull, op. cit., p. 915. 3 Public Law 11, 77th Congress, Chapter 11, 1st Session, H. R. 1776, in Gantenbein, op. cit., pp. 206-210; cf. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory (New York: Mac­ millan, 1944), pp. 57 et seq. and passim. 4 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, IV, 3 et seq. It was in this speech that Roose­ velt himself stated that America “must be the great arsenal of democracy.” 5 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 256-260. 6 Bloom, op. cit., pp. 241-242, contains an interesting account. 7 Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 360. 8 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 270. 190

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9 Raymond Clapper, Watching the World (London and New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., Whittlesey House, 1944), p. 269. 10 Frankfurter Zeitung, December 29, 1940, February 2, March 23, May 9, 1941; Zeitschriften-Dienst, 4494, May 2, 1941; infra, pp. 83, 85, 88. 11 Langer, op. cit., pp. 133 et seq. and passim. 12 Constantin Fotic, The War We Lost (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), pp. 41 et seq. 13 Donald R. Heath to Sumner Welles, January 7, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 14 Extracts from Interrogation of Hjalmar Schacht, 17 Octo­ ber 1945, by Lieutenant Colonel Murray I. Gurfein, AUS, OUSGC, Document 3729-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIII, 1-32, especially pp. 11-12. 15 Donald R. Heath to Sumner Welles, February 28, 1941, including Memorandum of Conversation of that date, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 16 Donald R. Heath to Sumner Welles, May 27, 1941, Frank­ lin D. Roosevelt Papers. 17 Donald R. Heath to Sumner Welles, July 7, 1941. Henry Morgenthau to Franklin Roosevelt, June 23, 1941, including Soong to Henry Morgenthau, June 3, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 18 Von Hassel, op. cit., p. 190. The author also recalls Schacht’s plans to go to America. These were supposedly approved by Stallforth, but von Hassel always felt the banker would put himself at Hitler’s disposal if the latter handled him correctly. 19 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 563. 20 Hull, op. cit., p. 992. 21 The New York Times, January 22, 1941, p. 1. 22 Supra, pp. 80-81. 23 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, February 1, 1941, quoted in Prange, op. cit., pp. 365-366. 24 Frankfurter Zeitung, February 2, 1941. 25 Infra, p. 116. 26 Annex 1 to Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer in the afternoon of 4 February 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 12-19. For momentary Hitlerian weakening to his admirals’ arguments, cf. infra pp. 115, 117, 124. 27 Infra, p. 95. 191

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28 Captain Hansjiirgen Reinicke was an operations specialist in the Navy Department when not in command of the Prinz Eugen. 29 Reinicke’s testimony, “Weizsaecker Case,” pp. 1904-1920. In explaining this attitude, the witness said, “It was regarded as the lesser evil to have Japan as an ally even with the U. S. A. as enemies than having no ally at all.” 30 Raeder’s testimony, in International Nuremberg Trial, XIV, 116-117. 31 Admiral Schulte-Mönting’s testimony, ibid., p. 322. 32 Morgenthau to Roosevelt, February 28, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, contains a list of vessels ready for convoy service. 33 Iceland was included in the zone on March 25, 1941. 34 Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 18 March 1941 at 1600, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 27-49. 35 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 3989, February 7, 1941. 36 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, IV, 419. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., p. 443. 39 International Nuremberg T rial, VI, 503-504. 40 United States, Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, IV, 469. 41 The New York Times, April 12, 1941, p. 1. 42 Report by Weizsaecker to Ribbentrop, 12 April 1941, Document 849-D, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXV, 545546. 43 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 20 April 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 50-61. 44 Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 367. 45 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 138; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval Opera­ tions in World War II, Vol. I, The Battle of the Atlantic, Septem­ ber, 1939-May, 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1948), pp. 49-55. 46 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 291-292. 47 Ibid., infra, p. 100. 48 The New York Times, April 26, 1941, p. 1; April 30, p. 1. 49 Morison, op. cit., p. 57. 50 Das Archiv, LXXXVI (May, 1941), 175. 192

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51 The Admiral so referred to Egypt, although that country was technically non-belligerent. 52 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 22 May 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941,1, 62-76, especially pp. 63 and 73. 53 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 298. 54 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 6 June 1941 at the Berghof, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 77-78. 55 Internal German Foreign Office Memorandum, 9 June 1941, Document 850-D, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXV, 546. 56 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 22 May 1941, loc. cit. A draft of the interview was specifically approved by the Foreign Office. 57 Dokumente der deutschen Politik, IX, 46. 58 The New York Times, June 6, 1941, pp. 1-2. 59 Ibid., May 2, 1941, p. 9; Cudahy to Hull, June 14, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 60 Russell Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode (New York: Mac­ millan, 1949), passim. 61 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 294-296. 62 Infra, pp. 115-116. 63 “RAEDER SAYS CONVOYS MEAN SHOOTING,” wrote The New York Times, May 26, 1941, p. 1. 64 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 19331941 (New York: Wilfred Funk, 1942), pp. 394 et seq. \ Sherwood, op. cit., p. 298. 65 For example, Das Reich, January 26, 1941; Frankfurter Zeitung, October 7, 1940, January 19 and February 9, 1941; Völkischer Beobachter, December 21, 1940. 66 Rosenfelder, op. cit., loc. cit. 67 The New York Times, December 10, 1940, pp. 1 and 16. 68 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 27 December 1940 at 1600, in Fuehrer Conferences 1940, II, 68-72. Cf. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Voi. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1948), p. 48, for earlier references to the scheme. 193

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69 Report on Conference with the Fuehrer and Supreme Com­ mander at the Berghof (Obersalzberg) on 8 and 9 January, 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 1-4. 70 Notes on . . . Hitler’s Statements at His Conference With Mussolini, 20 January 1941, Document 134-C, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIV, 462-471, especially p. 469. He said he did not consider America a great danger, even if she should decide to enter the war. 71 Oshima’s Affidavit, Document 2862, “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 34021. 72 Das Reich, February 2, 1941, and Frankfurter Zeitung, December 25, 1940, are examples. Even the envoy’s dolichoce­ phalic head was mentioned with great approval as proof of his racial superiority. 73 Extract from the report of the Conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 Febru­ ary 1941, Document 1834-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggres­ sion, IV, 469-475. 74 Telegram from General Boetticher and Hans Thomsen to Hans Dieckhoff, Document NG-4369, Document Book IX, “Weizsaecker Case,” February 26, 1941. 75 Telegram from Ribbentrop to the Tokyo Embassy, Febru­ ary 27, 1941, Document NG-4448, Document Book IX, “Weizsaecker Case.” 76 Telegram from the Foreign Minister to the Tokyo Embassy, February 28, 1941, Document NG-4449, Document Book IX, “Weizsaecker Case.” 77 Telegram from Ribbentrop to Washington, Rio, and Peip­ ing Embassies, Document NG-3826, Document Book VIII-A, “Weizsaecker Case.” 78 Records of Conversation between Ribbentrop and Oshima, March 3, 1941, Document NG-4425, Document Book IX, “Weiz­ saecker Case.” 79 Hitler’s Order, 5 March 1941 . . . (Directive No. 24) to Induce Japan to Take an Active Part in the Far East, Docu­ ment 075-C, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXXIV, 302305, translation in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI 906908. 80 Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on 18 March 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 27-49; Ad­ miral Assmann clearly recalled this, too. Assmann, op. cit., p. 35. 194

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81 Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, February 10, 1941, Document 4037-B, “Far Eastern Trial,” p. 6454. 82 The New York Times, January 21, 1941, pp. 1, 14. 83 Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, February 10, 1941, loc. cit. 84 Memorandum for Franklin D. Roosevelt from Secretary Hull’s Office, February 22, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 85 Confidential Memorandum, March 24, 1941, Document NG-3825, Document Book VIIIB, “Weizsaecker Case.” 86 Zeitschriften-Dienst, 4216, March 21, 1941; 4300, April 4, 1941. 87 Frankfurter Zeitung, March 12, 25, 27, 28, 1941. 88 Völkischer Beobachter, March 26, 1941. 89 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the Presence of Ambassadors Ott and Oshima at Berlin on March 27, 1941, in United States, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Rela­ tions, 1939-1941, pp. 281-288. The quotes refer to the wording of the memorandum. 90 Memorandum of the Interview Between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassadors Ott and Oshima, March 27, 1941, in United States, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Rela­ tions, 1939-1941, pp. 289-298. 91 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on March 28, 1941, in United States, Department of State, NaziSoviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp. 298-303. 92 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on March 29, 1941, ibid., pp. 303-311. 93 Memorandum of the Interview Between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and Minister of State Meissner at Berlin, April 4, 1941, in United States, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp. 311-316. 94 Schmidt, op. cit., p. 531. 95 Cf. note 93. 96 Schmidt’s Notes on Conference Between von Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, 5 April 1941, Document 1882-PS, in International Nuremberg Trial, XXIX, 78-84. 195

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97 Wiskemann, op. cit., p. 259. 98 Louis P. Lochner, What About Germany (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1943), p. 314. 99 Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Fuehrer on April 20, 1941, in Fuehrer Conferences 1941, I, 50-54. 100 Ott to Ribbentrop, May 6, 1941, Document NG-4422C, Document Book IX, “Weizsaecker Case.” 101 Hull, op. cit., pp. 991 et seq. 102 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 291. 103 frColloquio con il Fuehrer," April 20, 1941, in Ciano, L'Europa, pp. 649-652. 104 He said, “The whole affair shows that Roosevelt is be­ ginning to get alarmed, probably because he is gradually realizing that, in case of war-like complications, he can accomplish nothing . . . and therefore wishes to keep his back free.” 105 Notes by Schmidt on von Ribbentrop’s Conference with Mussolini and Ciano, 13 May 1941, Document 1866-PS, Interna­ tional Nuremberg Trial, XXIV, 29-40, translation in Nazi Con­ spiracy and Aggression, IV, 499-508. 106