The Neutrality Imperative 9780761843078, 9780761843061

Citation preview

The Neutrality Imperative Richard H. Owens

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA,® INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Copyright © 2009 by University Press of America,® Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard Suite 200 Lanham, Maryland 20706 UPA Acquisitions Department (301) 459-3366 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America British Library Cataloging in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2008936784 ISBN-13: 978-0-7618-4306-1 (paperback : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7618-4306-X (paperback : alk. paper) eISBN-13: 978-0-7618-4307-8 eISBN-10: 0-7618-4307-8

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum

requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1984.

To Professor Wayne S. Cole of the University of Maryland, my advisor, mentor, and friend, for all that he has done for me and for all his students over the years, and for his profound insights into United States foreign policy and international relations.

And to my wife, son and daughter, the lights of my life.

“Prudence and moderation on every side can now end all international discord which has heretofore menaced our tranquility.”

President George Washington, State of the Union Address to the United States Congress, Dec. 8, 1795.

Contents

Preface

ix

Chapter 1

1

Chapter 2

4

Chapter 3

7

Chapter 4

10

Chapter 5

13

Chapter 6

17

Chapter 7

19

Chapter 8

26

Chapter 9

30

Chapter 10

35

Chapter 11

38

Chapter 12

41

Chapter 13

45

Chapter 14

49

Chapter 15

51

Chapter 16

53

vii

viii

Contents

Chapter 17

55

Appendix A

59

Appendix B

61

Notes

63

Bibliography

66

About the Author

68

Preface

The purpose of this study is to outline the tradition of The Neutrality Imperative in the history of United States foreign relations, draw some observations and conclusions about it, and cite possible implications for the future conduct of United States foreign policy. Examination of The Neutrality Imperative in the conduct of American foreign policy can assist in understanding the ‘what and why’ of U.S. foreign affairs. Additionally, The Neutrality Imperative offers a blueprint for better understanding, anticipating, and guiding future U.S. foreign policy decisions. Richard H. Owens, Ph.D. Powell, Ohio May 24, 2008

ix

Chapter One

In the future, historians will attest that in the first decade of the twenty first century, the United States became entangled in an ill-considered and unwinnable sectarian civil war in Iraq. Prior to and throughout 2007, President George W. Bush continued to equate the war in Iraq with the war against terror, and-until late in 2007-added more U.S. troops to the maelstrom. Yet more American troops died in 2007 than in any prior year since the beginning in 2003 of that Iraq War. Following the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy has been anecdotal, not archetypal. There has been no guiding principle, no consistency, and no paradigm. During the Cold War, United States foreign policy was usually formulated on the standard, often misapplied, and usually misunderstood policy of containment. But Cold War containment was too absolute, militaristic, and inappropriate to situations outside Europe, and not even always apropos there. Preceding the Cold War, in the brief foreign policy interlude of WWII from 1941 to 1945, the United States did have a single focus-defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It had a guiding set of principles in the Atlantic Charter, United Nations Declaration, etc. Clearly, those goals and principles served the best interests of the United States, its ideals, and its security. However, in order to find a guiding principle in American foreign policy that actually worked effectively over a long period of time, one has to look to the era before WWII. That policy was neutrality. In fact, because it was such a strong and valid guiding principle in United States foreign policy until WWII, it can be called The Neutrality Imperative. Although it was never a solitary guidepost, and while its impact diminished significantly during and after the McKinley-Wilson era, The Neutrality Imperative was and remained a major factor in United States foreign policy from 1

2

Chapter One

the 1790’s until WWII. Unfortunately, threats to the United States from Germany and Japan in the 1930’s led to a discrediting of the historic policy of neutrality. It was inaccurately and derogatorily dubbed “isolationism” by internationalists and proponents of a proactive policy against the Axis powers in that decade. Prior to the imminent rise of the Axis threat, however, neutrality had been a prevalent, tested, and effective basis for United States foreign policy. The Neutrality Imperative provided goals, guidelines, principles, parameters, and a paradigm for American foreign policy from the founding of the United States. It was based on the Model Treaties of 1776 and President George Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793. It remained a cornerstone of United States foreign relations until the Axis powers posed a mortal threat to the United States. In addition to the tested validity and practicality of The Neutrality Imperative from 1776 until WWII, the United States could and should have reverted to The Neutrality Imperative as the guiding principle and primary focus of its foreign policy following WWII. President Franklin Roosevelt hinted at that as early as January 1941.1 The Neutrality Imperative is still valid today. However, domination of post-WWII American government, media, economy, and social mores by what President Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” has prevented a return to the guiding principles of The Neutrality Imperative. Instead of using American power to influence development of a more just and peaceful world-a global Marshall Plan without the political agenda of the Truman Doctrine and the anti-communist crusade-United States military, industrial, armaments, energy, and financial interests seized the opportunity following WWII to achieve a global American economic and political hegemony. The only serious obstacles were the Soviet Union and its philosophy of state socialism, or, as it was called, and inaccurately and intentionally denigrated-“communism.” Using and manipulating American fears of communism, the doctrine of containment, and the overwhelming military and economic power wielded by the United States following WWII, the military-industrial complex and its allies created a highly un-neutral context and unilateral content for American foreign policy. Instead of seeking amity and commerce with all according to the Model Treaties of 1776 and the principle of neutrality, the United States instead sought confrontation with some and dominion over others. Exploiting fears of communism and-or Soviet domination of Europe [and later Asia through the U.S.S.R.’s alleged surrogates China and Vietnam], the military-industrial complex and opportunistic American politicians used fear

Chapter One

3

to extend their influence over the politics, economy, culture, and psyche of the American people. Their financial, political, and social interests flourished. They extended their power and influence over nations and peoples which had no ability to resist the overwhelming economic, diplomatic, and military power of the United States. Those opportunists created a world which provided great wealth and power for them and their personal and corporate partners at home and abroad. Unilateral American intervention on behalf of their economic, social, and political interests became the norm in United States foreign relations after WWII. Following the end of the Cold War, much of that unilateral intervention shifted to Southwestern Asia, a.k.a. the Middle East. There, in the twenty first century, the Iraq war continued, despite National Intelligence Estimates that stipulated the most serious threat to America was Al-Qaeda action within and directly against the United States. Nor did unilateral militarism stop with Iraq. The Bush administration also directed various economic, diplomatic, and military gestures against Iran and other states similar to 2003 actions that preceded the Iraq War. The purpose of this study is to outline the tradition of The Neutrality Imperative in the history of United States foreign relations, draw some observations and conclusions about it, and cite possible implications for the future conduct of United States foreign policy. Examination of The Neutrality Imperative in the conduct of American foreign policy can assist in understanding the ‘what and why’ of United States foreign affairs. Additionally, The Neutrality Imperative offers a blueprint for better understanding, anticipating, and guiding future American foreign policy decisions. First, working definitions of Neutrality and The Neutrality Imperative. Next, a look at United States international interests and policies in the twenty first century. Then the history of the Neutrality Imperative. Finally, a paradigm for renewed attention to the wisest of the Founders and his views toward American security, vital interests, ideals, and foreign policy.

Chapter Two

Neutrality or neutralism is a principle of foreign policy that requires unbiased assessment of the best interests of the United States vis a vis a particular state or situation. A position of neutrality toward an issue or state is fair and objective. It is non-ideological, reasonable, rational, and based on the best interests of the U.S. in regard to a particular issue, power, etc. Neutrality is not isolation or isolationism. It is not avoidance or rejection of the world, its peoples, or its challenges. It is not national or diplomatic temerity. Likewise, neutrality is not unilateralism. Neutrality applies to any country or issue outside the defined area of vital United States overseas interests. For this analysis, it generally means areas outside the northern half of the globe’s American Quartersphere. Defining clear and specific vital national interests is not easy. But we can differentiate among vital national interests, other national interests, and special interests. Vital interests are particular geo-political areas, values, and key economic or political issues that are critical to the security and well-being of the United States. They include defense of the national homeland and its shores; prevention of wars that directly impact the United States, such as a nuclear war or a major biological or chemical exchange; protection of essential food and energy resources in the northern half of the American Quartersphere1 on which the U.S. depends, and defense of democracy and freedom within the United States. The most critical and vital American national interests encompass the United States itself and its territorial possessions. Outside the U.S., they include Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America; the North Atlantic Ocean to the shores of the British Isles; and the Eastern Pacific Ocean to and around Hawaii. Other vital American interests overseas include United 4

Chapter Two

5

States possessions [some of which, like Guam, are marginal to American interests and security]; Britain and the North Atlantic rim of Western Europe; and areas of the Northern and Central Pacific westward to include the Aleutians, Midway, and Guam. Finally, based on historic and specific circumstances, it is proper to add American support for the defense, independence, and integrity of Western Europe and Israel [not the rest of the Middle East]. Outside those areas, the United States may and does have interests. But they are not vital interests. That is a narrow definition of vital American interests for good reason. The basic geo-political sphere of interest of the United States cannot contain most of or the entire planet. The United States does not have resources to protect or guarantee such a vast area. Therefore, the essential resource base must be defined within the northern half of the American Quartersphere and contiguous oceans. To define it more broadly is unrealistic. Yet for the last sixty years the United States has defined its vital interests globally or sought to dominate specific states [Korea, Vietnam], regions [Central and Eastern Europe], or resources [i.e. Middle Eastern oil] outside the realm of vital U.S. interests in the name of unilateral global interests or crusades [anti-communism or antiterrorism]. Special interests are those political, economic, or other interests whose advocacy or defense is the primary work of particular corporations and financial interests [no matter how large], specific industries [oil, sugar, steel, computers, aircraft, etc.], or individual ethnic, religious, or political organizations [lobbies] whose interests in a particular region, issue, resource, or market supersede consideration of the overall or best national interests of the United States. The United States has gone to war or has been entangled in difficult and dangerous situations throughout its history in pursuit or defense of special interests. Those include numerous territorial expansions – or attempts at expansion – in the interest of expanding slavery in the nineteenth century; late nineteenth century imperialism along with annexations of Puerto Rico and Hawaii; the ‘open door’ in China; ‘merchants of death’ using the arms trade to create momentum for the United States to enter WWI; numerous forays into the Middle East since WWII; continued American presence in Korea; the Vietnam quagmire; twenty first century Iraq; etc. Examples of American policy being driven by special interests, most of them economic, can and do fill entire textbooks on United States foreign affairs. These have been periodic but increasingly frequent violations of The Neutrality Imperative. Unilateralism is an international action or overseas entanglement without formal foreign alliance, treaty, or justifiable Constitutional commitment to other states based on truly vital American interests. Unilateral actions often

6

Chapter Two

are undertaken in defense of specific private or special interests, poorly defined priorities, or less than vital national interests. Looking back, most unilateral and unneutral actions and policies undertaken by the United States have been government assisted or sponsored efforts to open, penetrate, expand, and secure markets or resources for special interests which were unable or unwilling to compete without United States strength behind them. Typically, unlike WWII (the last war actually declared by the United States Congress, as stipulated in the Constitution), they were unilateral. Yet once the door was opened, the United States set itself up to support and defend those special interests. An example of this kind of diplomatic trap was offered in 1910, when France sought a British military presence on France’s frontiers in the event of an attack by Germany. When asked how many British soldiers would be sufficient to defend France, French General Ferdinand Foch responded: “A single British soldier; and we will see to it that he is killed.”2 In the name of corporate profits, anti-communism, and now a misguided anti-terrorist war, the United States has been set up, or has set itself up, for just that kind of exploitation, with tens of thousands of Americans and millions of other human beings paying the supreme price for it.

Chapter Three

Today the United States still has brave members of its armed forces serving as tripwires around the globe in places which are not, and probably never were, vital areas of American national interest. In addition to Iraq, those areas include Afghanistan; Okinawa; South Korea; and many other locales. Despite arguments of certain special interests and their supporters, most regions under past or current United States protection [i.e. South Korea, Okinawa, Guam, and Iraq] are not critical to vital United States interests and arguably never were. If and when needed, the United States possesses the ability to project its air, naval, and ground forces and other resources anywhere in the world. The real issue, however, is whether the United States chooses to or should act wisely and rationally in defense of its true national interests, not special interests, in exercising its military or diplomatic options. The Neutrality Imperative calls for application of the paradigms of Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and the Model Treaties of 1776. It mandates a judicious approach to foreign policy issues based on firm and wise assessment, calculation, prioritization, and comprehension of the range and parameters of crucial security and other vital global interests of the United States of America. That can include serving as an honest diplomatic broker for peace or as an advocate of shared American values such as individual rights and democracy through diplomatic and intellectual-not military-channels. Not every interest is vital. Some are specific or special interests, not vital national interests, despite political or xenophobic fears or rhetoric. Priorities, principles, and consistency must be established. Policies and tactics must be just, reasonable, and worthwhile. There is a stark and obvious contrast between The Neutrality Imperative and most decisions and actions in American 7

8

Chapter Three

foreign relations during all post-WWII United States administrations, but particularly the egregious and unilateral actions and positions taken during the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush. In the last two decades, none of the three presidents who served following the end of the Cold War (George Herbert Walker Bush, 1989-1993; William Jefferson Clinton, 1993-2001; and George W. Bush, 2001 – 2009) created a new paradigm for the conduct of American foreign policy to replace the anachronistic and inappropriate strategies of Cold War containment. None worked consciously or successfully to supplant the selfish goals of the military-industrial-financial-media complex and its political and social supporters, or the militaristic, interventionist, and unilateral shibboleths that began with “containment” at the start of the Cold War era. A coherent foreign policy, an assessment of critical needs and clearly defined vital interests, reasonable national priorities [besides tax cuts for the affluent], and a vision for the twenty first century world did not emerge from either Bush [I or II] administration or the Clinton administration. President George Herbert Walker Bush talked about a “new world order” following the end of the Cold War. However, he did nothing to define it or reestablish parameters in United States foreign policy, replace containment, or guide the United States in leading that new world order. Neither did his successors. In March 1990, Bush’s National Security Council produced a blueprint for American diplomatic and national security policies. It focused benevolently and traditionally on Europe and paid homage to the emergence of democratic governments in Eastern Europe, as did President George H.W. Bush in several speeches in 1990. The N.S.C. assessed United States security, economic opportunity, communism, and international relations in conventional terms. But neither President Bush nor the National Security Council offered a new postCold War course, a vision of the future, or a sound, flexible global policy. In that 1990 N.S.C. analysis, the “East’ to which it referred was not the “Middle East.” It was the [soon to be former] Soviet Union. The N.S.C. document made just one reference to the Persian Gulf, and that was still tied to the frayed ideological strings of the Cold War. It made no mention of Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia. In 1990, just one year before Desert Storm, neither the Bush administration nor its N.S.C. took account of Middle East issues. The U.S. had no plans, no policies, and no priorities. In a parallel May 1990 development, the American Security Council Foundation surveyed National Strategy for the Nineties and Beyond. Unable to perpetuate Cold War fears against a disappearing Soviet nemesis, it was unable to see beyond the events and rhetoric of the past. It needed a new global

Chapter Three

9

phobia to sustain itself and its priorities. But it had none. It identified no issues, directions, or policies for the United States in the new decade or century to follow. President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy was post-containment in its orientation. But Clinton’s desire for the United States to serve as an honest broker for peace along with an ineffective Jeffersonian style of using economic leverage as a primary tool of diplomacy were plagued by distractions in domestic affairs [national health care, partisan budgetary battles, government shutdowns, his ultimately successful efforts to eliminate the Reagan- Bush deficits, Supreme Court and other top nominations, the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, and personal scandals]. Moreover, like much of Mr. Clinton’s presidency, foreign policy seemed marred by expediency impacted more by opinion polls or political distractions rather than by a coherent and principled framework or plan. An example early in Clinton’s presidency serves to illustrate. Dan Rather of CBS News, interviewing President Clinton in the White House, ironically asked: “Mr. President, what is our policy in Bosnia today?” Policy should be long-term, not just a day-to-day matter. Policy should be based on guiding principles and models that may be adjusted over time but do not sway with daily changes in public opinion. Despite good intentions, especially in the Middle East, Clinton’s foreign policy was essentially ineffective. Neither he, nor Presidents Bush I or II, set new standards for or created a post-Cold War paradigm for United States foreign policy. Despite the rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration, there has been no mortal threat to the existence of the United States, its essential security, or its vital interests comparable to threats posed in the 1940’s by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Granted, nations termed “the axis of evil” by George W. Bush do manifest policies and actions that most Americans deem evil, unjust, cruel, and contrary to American ideals. But so too have other states throughout history, including Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, plus many lesser powers [some considered to be American “allies”] which are equally evil, unjust, cruel, but not of major consequence to critical United States interests.

Chapter Four

United States foreign policy following WWII was an oxymoron. It remained so after the Cold War. American planning to meet regional or global issues had been and remained shortsighted and its diplomacy reactive. The world was still seen in terms of nation states and absolutes. There was no United States foreign “policy.” The United States simply cannot replace an ideological Cold War between capitalism and communism with a conflict between western and Islamic values as the foundation for United States policy. The United States must develop other perspectives on the global community that offer a model and method for dealing effectively with the international challenges of a new century.1 With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, the military-industrial complex needed to sustain or expand acquisition of foreign markets, increase corporate and personal wealth and resources, and defend the status quo and its entrenched interests at home and around the world. Yet it found no immediate threat to justify the militaristic American national budgetary expenditures, unilateralism, and interventionist policies that characterized United States foreign policy in preceding decades. That is, until September 11, 2001. While one could have made a cogent case prior to September 11, 2001 for the urgent need to enhance American intelligence activity and protocols related to domestic security against a possible terrorist strike, the mindset of American policy makers from the end of the Cold War until 9-11 [and after for many of them] was continued emphasis on their standard twentieth century unilateralism, self-aggrandizing economic agenda, and traditional “nation-state” perspective on security issues. No one can deny the horrible and tragic consequences of the 9-11 attacks. Terrorist acts of murder and destruction wherever or however perpetrated are 10

Chapter Four

11

deplorable, inhuman, criminal acts. But rather than define terrorists and terrorism in appropriate non-traditional terms and devise specific new strategies to combat them, the United States almost immediately retooled the traditional strategy of containment through fear. Certain elements in the United States created a new phobia to drive American public support for continuation of Cold War type policies and militarism now directed at a new fear-terrorism. Politicians used the politics of fear to sustain the agenda of the military-industrial complex. Following 9-11, policy makers seized upon terrorism as the new universal enemy and focus of foreign and military policy decisions that communism previously had been. Terrorism provided a popular, albeit superficial, excuse for renewed unilateral American military and political interventionism in various parts of the world, especially in oil rich Southwestern Asia. In those regions, sources of wealth, resources, and interests of great importance to the military-industrial complex-but not necessarily or often relevant to the vital interests or ideals of the United States-needed to be maintained or advanced. Once again, as prevalent political and economic interests exploited fear during the Cold War, a new phobia emerged in the threat of global terrorism. Global terrorism is indeed a threat. It is a horrible and unpredictable threat to persons and infrastructure at those times and places terrorists choose to strike. But the specter of terrorism conjured by certain Americans and the militaryindustrial complex is not nearly the organized or institutionalized enemy that fascist Germany or even the “communist” Soviet Union represented. One could argue that rather than fight terrorists in Iraq, the United States could leave them overseas and concentrate the efforts of 130,000 brave Americans on actual defense of the United States where twenty first century U.S. government Intelligence Estimates suggest they should be. Terrorism is a threat to human morality and safety, to some material interests, and to the tranquility of travel and commerce. Terrorism is not a mortal threat to the existence or vitality of America’s worldwide interests or essential domestic security in the twenty first century. Despite inflammatory and sadly attractive political rhetoric, terrorism does not constitute a state-led or hegemonistic threat to the vital interests, democratic institutions, and security of the United States. Neither on 9-11 nor now do terrorists seriously threaten to take over or destroy the United States in ways that Germany overran and dominated Europe [with aspirations to include the United States too] or Japan established hegemony over East Asia in the 1940’s, or that many Americans perceived the Soviet threat to the existence of the United States during the Cold War. A ‘cold’ war thermo-nuclear exchange was a real but not constant threat, especially after 1962 when both sides realized the mutually destructive outcomes of nuclear confrontation.

12

Chapter Four

Nor is it likely that present terrorist forces ever could threaten the United States to that extreme degree. The greater threat to American security, vital interests, and liberties is perpetuation of irrational fears and overreaction to the possibility of terrorist threats with misguided or misdirected incursions into foreign lands and-or abrogation of constitutional and traditional liberties at home. Ineffective security measures cannot stop a well planned and fearlessly executed terrorist strike in the future. The tragedies of September 11, 2001 proved that. But stationing and funding [$2.5 trillion and counting] between 130,000 and 200,000 American troops and civilians in Iraq likewise cannot foster better security precautions or expanded prosperity at home. Indeed, there is a real and tragic connection between the Bush (and Reagan) military spending and the historic deficits and recessions spawned by those programs.

Chapter Five

Foreign policy actions of the George W. Bush administration have had no model or principles. They have been unilateral, misdirected, and unprincipled. Bush’s foreign policy has consisted of short term and ill-considered efforts to use fear plus traditional military and other costly means to thwart the highly non-traditional and ever-changing objectives and tactics of a multitude of terrorist groups worldwide. For the first nine months of his administration in 2001, Mr. Bush had no foreign policy focus. He was consumed with a domestic agenda to serve the interests of the wealthy and advocates of the status quo [SQ’s]. The attacks of September 11, 2001 created for the Bush administration not an opportunity to create and articulate a new foreign policy paradigm or principles. Instead, they perpetuated an alternative to coherent foreign policy in the form of disconnected and ill-considered unilateral military actions against certain states and organizations that were termed terrorist or evil by President Bush and his supporters. That served the interests of the military-industrial complex. Terrorism provided an easily perceived and despicable enemy for the American people to hate–and fear. It became the global phobia for the twenty first century. It was a new, heinous, communist-like menace even more frightening in the suddenness and cruelty of its actions against innocent Americans and innocent people worldwide. It also generated hundreds of billions of dollars for the weapons and service of war and unilateral American military actions overseas. Fear is not a viable basis for the conduct of foreign policy. However, wars generate profits. And fear is a powerful domestic political weapon. No one can gainsay the serious nature of terrorism and the threat of terrorists to peace and innocent life throughout the world. The United States can 13

14

Chapter Five

and must do more to protect its citizens and interests within the United States. But the Bush administration has had no coherent plan or policy to deal with those considerations, or with terrorism or states that abet terrorists and their activities. Iraq has been nearly obliterated. Afghanistan was partially secured from then reverted again to Taliban influence. Iran has been threatened time and again. Syria has been nearly ignored. Pakistan-the most likely nuclear power to be threatened by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other terrorist elements-merely has been coddled. Regardless of who was responsible for the December 2007 assassination of Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, her murder further undermined Pakistani instability and underscored the dangers and volatility of Pakistan having nuclear weapons (itself another fruit of misguided United States Cold War policies). The Bush administration has employed unilateral actions, military interventions, confrontational tactics, and insensitive decisions that have cost hundreds of billions in American resources, thousands of American deaths, and hundreds of thousands of casualties among other peoples. In the process, the Bush administration has alienated tens of millions of people worldwide to the United States, its people, and its ideals. In a series of potential opportunities to flex American military muscle-potential quagmires to the more discerning eye-the United States has sought to battle terrorism by traditional diplomatic and military means. Thus the conventional military invasion of Iraq, a nation state, not a terrorist camp, was based on the alleged presence there of weapons of mass destruction and an alleged strong connection and web of support by and from Iraq and its dictator Saddam Hussein for Al-Qaeda, the despicable Osama Bin Laden, and terrorism in general. The United States thus made war against a nearly invisible and constantly shifting enemy in lands about which American policy makers knew very little. The United States made war on people whose goals and ideals often contrasted with American principles of freedom, democracy, and individual worth. These lands manifested social, economic, political, and religious traditions and conditions about which Americans knew little and about which Americans could do little, especially from the barrel of a gun. A century ago, American troops in the Philippines sang “we’ll civilize ‘em with a crag” (a rifle). In the twenty first century, it was Iraq. The Bush administration employed skillful and exploitative use of patriotic rhetoric and manipulated the understandable fears of the American people for their lives and safety. It was not unlike that which led to creation of the Truman Doctrine and the corollary axiomatic admonition to President Truman by Senator Arthur Vandenberg [Republican of Michigan] in 1947 to “scare hell

Chapter Five

15

out of the American people.” The attacks of 9-11-2001 did more than enough to scare the American people. The Bush administration did not need to do more. But it did-to advance and mobilize support for the latest round of selfserving actions by the twenty first century generation of self-interested individuals and politicians acting as part of and on behalf of the military-industrial-financial complex. The Bush administration successfully, at least for a time, created in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, including at home, a new fear-based crusade against terrorism as the long-sought substitute for the former twentieth century crusade against the immoral and demonic nemesis of worldwide communism. Terrorism and the acts of terrorists have no significant bearing on United States relations with most nation states, nor its priorities regarding the world economy, environment, or human rights. Terrorism does not alter the balance of international power or potential hegemonistic threats to the United States from other powers [of which Russia is currently the only one on the horizon]. But there is no clear and coherent definition of American priorities, goals, and vital interests for the twenty first century world. That definition must be established before the United States can articulate and implement a sound, effective, honest foreign policy, and create a fair, realistic paradigm for conducting future relations with the other states and peoples of this planet. Twenty first century circumstances present daunting challenges to any American foreign policy paradigm or objectives, even without complications resulting from unilateral military intrusions and threats of further military intervention in Southwestern Asia. As the chimera of American success and long-term U.S. involvement in Iraq potentially wane in 2008-2009, the Bush administration already has helped to destabilize it and Pakistan. Plus, it has initiated another demon-construction project aimed at Iraq’s neighbor, Iran. While Iran certainly is no paragon of political virtue or humanitarianism, like Iraq it is not a vital threat to United States interests, unless one defines as vital the unequivocal American commitment to oil with no consideration of environmental and other energy options. Yet despite investing hundreds of billions of dollars [by deficit spending] and thousands of American lives [impossible to repay] there is no oil flowing to the United States from Iraq. In fact, Iraq has nothing to offer the United States except its oil, and that hasn’t been flowing to the United States or anywhere else for years since the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. However, that commodity still can be found elsewhere. Moreover, the benefits of Iraqi oil can be offset by conservation and development of alternative energy sources. International terrorism was and is not based solely or permanently in Iraq or Afghanistan. Removing the Taliban in Afghanistan resulted in transfer, not

16

Chapter Five

abolition, of worldwide terrorism, its bases, and redoubts. Al-Qaeda and Taliban relocation was a factor in the erosion of stability in Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan experienced a resurgence of Taliban and other destabilizing terrorist elements once American military attention and resources shifted to Iraq. The Bush administration inaccurately equated Al-Qaeda terrorism with nation states. President Bush specifically compared Al-Qaeda with the former U.S.S.R.1 To justify United States incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush declared “anyone who harbors a terrorist (is) equally guilty of being a terrorist.”2 He did not elaborate on possible terrorists in the U.K., Canada, or the United States. Bush blamed terrorists for sectarian [religious] violence in Iraq, less as an excuse to send troops in 2003, but rather to remain there in 2006 and thereafter.3 Unless one presumes the United States after 2004 sought a staging area in Iraq for military action against Iran, continued American troop presence in Iraq has only served to limit strategic and tactical diplomatic and military options elsewhere. It has placed additional pressures on Israel, too. Moreover, it has alienated countless millions of Muslims and others in Asia and elsewhere. There is and has been no long term American plan for peace and stability in Iraq or the Middle East. There is no definition of which vital American interests are at stake in Iraq. There has been no long term or viable foreign policy paradigm articulated by the Bush administration throughout the United States adventure in Iraq. The Iraq war has been the culmination of the worst trends in American unilateralism and a blatant violation of The Neutrality Imperative.

Chapter Six

Unfortunately, the situation could have been altered or avoided. A clear focus on vital American interests and a global perspective on Iraq, both pre- and post-Saddam, could have offered other policy alternatives for the United States. Contrary to an entangling alliance with a new Iraqi regime that has nothing to offer the United States, an alliance which has stimulated greater jihadist and terrorist impulses against America, and contrary to the unilateralist approach favored by George W. Bush and his associates, the United States could have determined that involvement in Iraq, or at least continued involvement after toppling Saddam Hussein, was not in America’s best interests. The unilateralist approach to foreign policy prevalent since 2001 also characterized eight years of the Reagan presidency and many actions of the George Herbert Walker Bush administration, as well as the George W. Bush administration. Not uncoincidentally, those administrations have featured many of the same persons in policymaking and advisory capacities. There is no surprise in regard to what the United States did and continues to do. The surprise is that after several decades the United States continues to make the same foolish and myopic mistakes. The United States could have refrained from unilateral action or consequential involvement outside its true areas of vital interest. The long list includes Korea and Vietnam. In Iraq, the United States could have sought amity, and if not reciprocated, walked away from perilous situations and a quest for still undiscovered weapons of mass destruction [W.M.D.’s] that were a causus belli of the undeclared war and unilateral U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. Instead of a unilateralist adventure in Iraq’s civil war that did not serve its best and vital strategic interests, the United States could have followed The Neutrality Imperative. 17

18

Chapter Six

Contrary to President George Washington’s wise admonition to avoid entangling alliances, the United States in 2003 - without benefit of a formal treaty approved by the U.S. Senate - unilaterally allied and tied itself to an unstable, unpopular regime in Iraq. That regime often has been impervious to and unable to overcome deep and historic religious, sectarian, and ethnic divisions. Moreover, in entangling itself in Iraq, the United States helped destabilize relations with other Islamic states and peoples worldwide. It pushed some Middle Eastern states to seek to develop the capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons, and helped destabilize control of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. Those developments put more pressure on Israel, the historic American relationship with Israel, and the United States itself. Furthermore, United States actions in Iraq destabilized the American economy, producing ever higher gas prices, record budget deficits and national debt [along with record tax cuts], and major reallocations of funds from domestic programs to pay for the war in Iraq. Who profits? Due to the war in Iraq, the United States has neglected, to the tune of $10 billion a month, vital health, education, and social programs; infrastructure; and additional security against tangible terrorist threats in the aftermath of attacks launched against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Those actions and the collateral and resultant situations brought on by the unilateralist American incursion into Iraq clearly were not and are not in the best interests of the United States. There was either no serious consideration or a very poor assessment of American priorities prior to the decision to go to war and remain in Iraq. Likewise, there was little or no effective recalculation of the cost and impact of continuing into the Iraqi abyss in 2004-2007. A sound, effective, fair, unbiased, “neutral” assessment of American priorities would have likely resulted in a more circumspect and deliberate approach to post-Saddam Iraq. It would have involved thoughtful assessment of likely political, humanitarian, military, fiscal, and civil scenarios to result from American actions taken from 2004-2007. No such practical and fair [neutral] assessment would have resulted in plans that jeopardized so greatly the long term Iraqi, Middle Eastern, or global strategic interests of the United States.

Chapter Seven

What then were and are the historic alternatives? President George Washington’s policy of neutrality was designed to provide security through peace. Washington’s admonition against entangling alliances did not preclude necessary and vital alliances. But when the stakes or interests were not truly vital, Washington’s admonition was to avoid alliances, entanglements, interventions, or other actions that would threaten American security or were not in the best interests of the United States. Looking back to the Model Treaties of 1776, Washington advised a moderate, circumspect approach to foreign policy that placed American security and vital interests at the top of the list. Maintaining amity and commerce with all peoples who sought such relations with the United States was the policy standard that Washington set and maintained. Throughout much of American history, and with no disparaging implications intended until the 1940’s, that course of action and perspective on foreign policy advocated by Washington was known as neutrality. In fact, for the first century of American history, neutrality was more than a preference; it was a foreign policy imperative. President George Washington’s admonition, stated in his 1793 Proclamation of Neutrality regarding the war then raging between Britain and France, was much more than a warning against entangling alliances. An alliance that enhances or preserves American security and vital interests is beneficial and wise. An example is the 1940’s wartime alliance with Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other powers against the menacing threat to global peace and the United States posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. However, most twentieth century American alliances or unilateral actions and interventions in support of special interests were not well suited to the 19

20

Chapter Seven

best and long term strategic interests of the United States. Examples include the “open door” in China; pre-WWI dispositions to support British and French market imperialism against Germany; Caribbean “dollar diplomacy;” Vietnam; and twenty first century Iraq, to name a few. Even some alliances that have worked generally in favor of American security interests often were conceived for less than noble or altruistic purposes. N.A.T.O. is an example of the latter, despite the fact that N.A.T.O. has evolved substantially in the wake of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, twentieth century alliances and unilateral interventions-especially since WWII-often entangled the United States with countries and situations whose outcomes were not crucial to vital American interests. Another option has existed since the establishment of the United States. It still remains valid. Entangling alliances and unilateral interventions [except in case of threat to United States security or its truly vital interests] are inimical to peace and United States security. Unilateralism is an entanglement without formal foreign alliance or Constitutional commitment to other states. The United States has been guilty of that since its interventions in Cuba, Hawaii, China, and other areas beginning in 1898. Similarly, twenty first century American actions in Iraq have been unneutral, unilateral (despite some cooperative fig leafs), and not in America’s best interests. They have not been based upon Senate ratified treaties of alliance that sought to provide diplomatic and military support to the United States or provide a paradigm for long-term peace and stability in Europe, East Asia, Iraq, or the Middle East. They have been interventionist and unilateral. They have been designed to serve certain special interests, not the cause of peace or vital United States interests and security considerations. Foundations for The Neutrality Imperative were established between 1776 and 1796. Regarding neutrality, George Washington got and had it right. Thomas Jefferson eroded it; James Madison’s and James K. Polk’s unilateral expansionism temporarily destroyed it. The rest of the 19th century presidents perpetuated it (at least nominally) until the dramatic shift in perceptions and reality regarding national security issues that arose in 1898. That shift was engendered by changes such as industrialization; steam powered navies; massive multi-million man armies; submarine and air warfare; bombing of civilians; biological and chemical weapons; nuclear weapons; and total economic, political, and ideological warfare. The American people were confused and besieged by Bolsheviks, a crusade to make the world safe for democracy, the dangers of collective security and the League of Nations to American independence, etc. In 1776, two model treaties established a vision of the United States as an independent continental power trading with all nations, protected [and lim-

Chapter Seven

21

ited] by two oceans and other natural boundaries [geographic and demographic] to the south. The Model Treaties were the first face of the two-sided image of the Roman god Janus that symbolizes the historic dichotomy in United States international relations. On the one side were peace and amity based on the Model Treaties and The Neutrality Imperative. On the other side were self-interest and unilateralism. Two Model Treaties were approved by Congress in 1776: one of Amity and one of Commerce. They were blueprints for the future. They were influenced, among other things, by the colonial experience of being drawn into Britain’s European and North American wars, Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, and the Declaration of Independence. Seeking their independence, the American colonies wanted no long-term or binding political or military connection or involvement with other powers. The American Congress and its people saw the United States as unique. They sought to maintain a purity and independence in foreign affairs to further differentiate the new, emerging nation from the states of Europe. It was a way to safeguard the United States from Europe’s wars, monarchical power avarice, and to prevent corruption of the new nation’s emerging social and political principles as embodied in the Declaration of Independence. The Model Treaties reflected America’s image of itself. They discerned the value to France of American amity and commerce, and as such were initially a potential instrument for achieving American independence and prosperity. Congress also hoped that opening American ports to the trade of the world would help spread prosperity and the ideals of the American Revolution. Congress sought to invite all the powers of Europe [later in the 1820’s, Latin America as well] as partners in American trade and commerce. All countries would be treated as equals. Trade would both contribute to American economic stability and remove a reason to seek confrontation with the new nation. The path to peace was through friendship and prosperity. Liberty and democracy would spread through the same channels. In short, it was a union of economics and ideology, of economics and foreign policy. It was a formula and blueprint for liberty, peace, and prosperity through neutrality. In one sense, the Model Treaties were idealistic and unrealistic. But so were the very ideas of American independence and democracy. So was the idea of essential economic self-sufficiency. Yet that too was achievable, then and now, by the United States. Alexander Hamilton’s Report of Manufactures in 1791 set forth not just a domestic economic program. Its goal was economic independence. Despite Hamilton’s Anglophilism and his support for protective tariffs and a formal credit system supporting and legitimizing strong central government, his advocacy of economic self-sufficiency underpinned the neutralist character of the report. Coupled with a firm neutrality,

22

Chapter Seven

the Model Treaties made sense. And while France in 1778 rejected the Model Treaties and compelled Congress to negotiate concessions to achieve alliance and aid in the war against Britain, the paradigm remained as a model for the new nation and its first administration. In 1778, the United States made an exception in its alliance with France. But that agreement was concluded for the limited goal of achieving American independence. There was no intention to tie the United States to France in regard to the affairs of Europe or future disputes between France and Britain or among other European states. Nor did the United States ever reciprocate on the 1778 Franco-American alliance, to the consternation of some otherwise strict constructionist pro-French [and anti-British] Jeffersonians. The FrancoAmerican alliance indirectly and substantively fostered the ideals and goals of the Model Treaties. Only with independence could the United States hope to implement the new ideological framework for domestic tranquility and international security set forth in the Model Treaties. In fact, the course of American diplomacy during the Revolution was charted to allow America to remain aloof, and even detach itself, from entanglements and alliances with Europe, except specifically as related to their critical value in achieving American independence itself. The colonies sought independence. Alliances with France, Spain, and the Netherlands were vehicles to abet that single goal. But they never contemplated permanent attachment to those alliances and foreswore entanglement in the political intrigues of Europe long before independence itself was achieved. So strong, even then, was The Neutrality Imperative. In 1783, Congress rejected American membership in the European Armed “Neutrality,” aimed at America’s recent wartime opponent, Great Britain. The resolution in Congress was adopted unanimously. The resolution stated “the true interest of these states requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations.” The resolution was consistent with actions and positions taken by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay, representing The United States in Europe, as well as later by President George Washington. Although nationalistic, the resolution of 1783 also was neutralist. It specified American avoidance of the “politics” of Europe. It advocated a normal process of commercial exchange, diplomacy, and amity. It foreswore partnership in Europe’s Armed “Neutrality” and the collateral but important de facto recognition such membership would likely have conferred on the new United States. It was neutralist in its position and vision for the foreign affairs and policies of the nascent United States of America. In the early years and first century of the Republic, America’s Neutrality Imperative was the dominant policy.

Chapter Seven

23

In a parallel development that foreshadowed his own adherence to the principle of neutrality as president, in that same month, June 1783, George Washington wrote in his final circular letter to the states, that America “seemed to be peculiarly designated by Providence for the display of human greatness and felicity.” He stated that “the result must be a nation which would have a meliorating influence on all mankind.” Even before he was elected to the presidency, and likely before he contemplated such a role, Washington already saw the need for America to remain neutral regarding insidious external influences. Those were the same lessons John Adams, John Jay, and even Franklin had garnered in Paris. Soon after implementation of the new United States Constitution, Europe was ablaze with revolution and war. Both sides sought to drag the United States into the cauldron. Britain played upon the strong trade and commerce with America that re-emerged after the 1783 Treaty of Paris. France tried to get the United States to reciprocate French military and diplomatic support rendered during the American Revolution in the wars of the French Revolution. The Neutrality Imperative opposed such actions, rendering the United States free from the wars of the French Revolution until, later in 1812 with greater stability, it entered the tail end of that late eighteenth-early nineteenth century series of global conflicts. As president, George Washington faced serious international issues, crises, and decisions. In 1792-1793, Citizen Edmond Genet and the dispute over recognition of France tested American independence, integrity, and adherence to neutrality. Recognition of France, not alliance (except for some Jeffersonians) emerged from a national consensus to avoid becoming embroiled in European wars. Neutrality trumped favors bestowed by monarchical France during the American Revolution. Washington and other Federalists saw France exporting more than republican virtues and popular revolution. They saw France exporting radicalism, mobocracy, and chaos. That was the antithesis of the American republic and its virtues for which they had fought since the 1770’s. Moreover, Washington, the Federalists, and most Americans also refrained from overt support of France’s enemy, Great Britain. That, too, was part of a Neutrality Imperative. In 1793, Washington issued The Neutrality Proclamation in the wake of French declarations of war against most of the major powers of Europe: Britain, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, and the Netherlands, with others including Spain and vast Russia following in subsequent years. Washington further defined and refined his proclamation with Congress, Cabinet, and the body politic. He continued to advocate vigilance and preparedness in his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1793. But, as he acknowledged, he saw more than a need to establish a level of international respect for the United

24

Chapter Seven

States. The stakes were far greater. In his opinion (and borne out by the history of those times), neutrality was the best means to ensure continued American peace, security, and independence. Washington advocated and proclaimed “strict neutrality.” He did so not to advance or abet the interests of Britain or another power. Washington held a profound sense and belief that neutrality was the best and only safe recourse for the United States. Even at that early date, despite protection from mighty oceans, Washington and others realized foreign military and economic forces could still touch, affect, and undermine American stability and security. When The Neutrality Proclamation was proclaimed publicly on April 22, 1793, the word “neutrality” was not employed in the text. But everyone ascertained what the text meant. The words “conduct impartial towards the belligerent powers” more than implied neutrality. They defined it. Moreover, the idea and the words were consistent with the Model Treaties of 1776, and extension of the concepts of openness and friendship not only to “belligerent powers” but to all nations. The Neutrality Proclamation invited the world to engage in peaceful and fair amity and commerce with the United States, but warned that the United States would not take sides or become involved in affairs not vital to American interests. Clearly the titanic struggle waged between 1792 and 1815 among European powers, including Britain and revolutionary France, substantively impacted certain American interests. The Neutrality Proclamation and Neutrality Imperative were not intended to produce isolation from the rest of the world. But despite the importance of the struggle in Europe and its potential to overspread the globe-as had the world conflicts of the Seven Years War and the American Revolutionary War-Washington and others understood the critical need for the United States to stay out of the conflict in order to protect and preserve its institutions, prosperity, and security. Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation did not define United States foreign policy as isolation from the affairs of the world. Nor does The Neutrality Imperative. Like the Model Treaties, Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality proffered American willingness to cooperate in world affairs, trade, and cultural exchange. However, it did suggest that the United States should not become involved in disputes not vital to its interests, even if the outcome of such struggles could and would affect the United States in some other way. Such was the case as early as the French Revolution. No one could ascertain with certainty how the wars spawned in the 1790’s by the French Revolution might end or the attitude of any power toward the United States after that conflict. Yet most Americans were reluctant to take up arms in support of revolutionary France despite the critical contribution France had made to American independence. Washington understood that, and more.

Chapter Seven

25

The seminal pronouncement and foundation regarding The Neutrality Imperative came in President Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793. Rooted in part in the ideals of the Model Treaties of 1776 and the American Revolution, and part in wise response to the realities of international power politics in the 1790’s, Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation formed the essential basis and precedent for advocacy and implementation of The Neutrality Imperative in American foreign relations.

Chapter Eight

On December 8, 1795, in his State of the Union Address to Congress, President Washington stated: “Prudence and moderation on every side can now end all international discord which has heretofore menaced our tranquility.” Washington admonished that the new United States be “faithful to ourselves” and engage in “temperate discussion and mutual forbearance.” Later, in his September 19, 1796 Farewell Address, Washington continued to advocate the same paradigm of neutrality he had outlined in 1793 and earlier in 1795. From the time George Washington proffered that advice to his countrymen to the present, there has been constant opportunity for implementing a Neutrality Imperative in United States foreign policy. That imperative provides a strong and viable foundation for the conduct of United States foreign relations. In the post-WWII years, however, neutrality evaporated in the name of anti-communism as a cloak for expanding the special interests of the militaryindustrial complex. Proponents of neutrality were discredited as “isolationists.” Progressives traded goals of peace and progress for the temptations of popular post-war anti-Bolshevik crusades. The earlier liberal-internationalist consensus was co-opted by the unilateralist, anti-communist, later anti-terrorist panaceas. The global unilateralism of the military-industrial complex asserted its preeminence over The Neutrality Imperative. Yet there has always been in United States foreign policy and American public opinion a recognition of the option for a Neutrality Imperative despite predominance of postWWII unilateralism. The crucial issue in 1792-1796 was not whether the United States should recognize governments [the Hamiltonian preference] or nations [the Jeffersonian inclination]. Rather it was whether the United States would endanger its future and security in defense of the interests of another power. A broad consensus of the American people understood the vital interests of the United 26

Chapter Eight

27

States to be interests vital to the peace, prosperity, and security of the United States. They followed the guiding principle of The Neutrality Imperative. Over the Jay Treaty in 1795, Washington and Jay were pilloried in the court of public opinion for what proved to be a workable and wise treaty that safeguarded the vital interests of the United States – its security and independence. Washington best defined neutrality and the Neutrality Imperative during the acrimonious debate over The Jay Treaty in 1795 with a restatement of the basis for his 1793 Neutrality Proclamation. “Every true friend to this country [the United States] must see and feel that the policy of it is not to embroil ourselves with any nation whatever, but to avoid their disputes and their politics.” True to the Model Treaties, the principle of neutrality, and Washington’s plan, the Jay Treaty abetted amity and commerce with Britain far more than belligerent ramblings or retaliatory reactions. In 1796, Pinckney’s Treaty with Spain preempted the possibility of war from that quarter. It secured a critical link in America’s commercial chain, free and open access and deposit at the port of New Orleans. That link later was correctly and admirably secured by Jefferson in one of his moments of nationalist rather than strict constructionist perspective. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was consistent with parameters of true and just neutrality in the conduct of American foreign relations. In 1796, Washington’s Farewell Address provided another reiteration and extrapolation of the concept of neutrality initiated in The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793. Washington’s Farewell Address was no more an advocacy of isolation [or unilateralism] than were the Neutrality Proclamation, Jay Treaty, the Model Treaties, or the Constitution itself. He did not seek to ignore the natural individual and public tendency to take sides, even in international affairs. [Washington was far less naïve and fatalistic than Wilson, and more straightforward then F.D.R. and others in stating it thus]. Preparing to leave office, President Washington advocated statesmanship over politics, common good over self-interest, and national policy over particular or local interests. Prefiguring Eisenhower’s farewell address more than any of his other successors, Washington admonished those in his own time and presumably in the distant future who would place self interest, local interests, special interests, or self aggrandizement over the good of the nation or the body politic. He advocated avoidance of antipathy toward any nation, people, or government, lest it become permanent and erroneous. He advocated impartiality in deliberation and adherence to the spirit and principles of the Model Treaties of 1776 that advocated American amity and commerce with all. [Today, one would suppose that Washington would include socialist, Islamic, and other such governments despite their differences with American preferences].

28

Chapter Eight

Commerce was fine. In fact, it would mitigate other frictions. Formal political alliance or war with or on behalf of foreign powers, however, was to be avoided, unless the direct and specific vital national interests and security of the United States were at stake. Washington disdained the troublesome effects of faction, party, and partisanship in domestic affairs. He could discern such delineation in differences arising from disparate special or local interests. In foreign affairs, President Washington believed that only a strong, unified, national consensus would allow the United States to withstand the many pressures and threats that became evident in his years in office and would undoubtedly appear in the future. Washington’s Farewell Address was the coda for his philosophy and precedent of The Neutrality Imperative. In summary, he concluded: “The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred…from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations.” (See Appendix A). Unfortunately, the unilateralist impulse also was present from the beginning. Along with The Neutrality Imperative, unilateralism emerged in the 1790’s, too. Neutrality, amity, and open commerce could be corrupted to and by unilateral actions, especially in defense or advocacy of special interests. One potential direction for such development was advocacy by some Americans of joining France in its wars against Britain and other continental powers in the 1790’s. Such action would have been contrary to the principles of the Model Treaties, unneutral, and because of the self-centered war aims of France, conspicuously unilateral on the part of the United States. Not to mention dangerous. It was precisely that kind of entanglement against which Washington warned and proclaimed American neutrality. Likewise, in domestic affairs beginning in the 1790’s, special interest groups emerged among those who advocated the status quo and a limited domestic role for government. Historically, unilateralists have been advocates of the status quo and strict construction of the Constitution in almost every area of government and policy, especially in domestic affairs, except in regard to unilateral United States action on behalf of preferred special interests in the international arena. At home, in addition to endangering American peace and security by advocating alliance with France and war against Britain, unilateralists sought government support of special economic and financial interests overseas. However, unilateralists historically tended to avoid alliances or collaboration characteristic of an internationalist or collective security approach to security and foreign affairs. In 1792-1796, there was precious little that was more important to the United States than ensuring its security and independence. Those goals were best achieved by staying out of the European conflict rather than taking sides in any way. That was The Neutrality Imperative.

Chapter Eight

29

In some ways, Washington’s case was among the easiest in American foreign policy history to understand. His course of action was the most safe and conscientious. The mighty British fleet could at will and with impunity imperil the coastline and cities of the United States, where most Americans lived and most of its commerce flowed. British troops in Canada were a formidable military threat to the United States from their Great Lakes forts [some still on United States soil]. So were Britain’s Native American allies who, despite Washington’s efforts, had good reason to fear American hostility to their vital interests and existence. Spain’s entry into the European war threatened to place another potential foe on the insecure south and southwest flanks of American territory. President Washington was sensibly unwilling to walk into a dark alley unarmed. With foreknowledge that formidable hostile and heavily armed foes lurked about, he was simply and wisely unwilling to risk American involvement in that global conflict, despite perceived or tangible political, economic, or ideological interests on the opposing sides in the domestic debate. The results of Washington’s forbearance included his Proclamation of Neutrality, the Jay and Pinckney Treaties, and later, the Farewell Address. Washington’s policies were based on a commitment to American neutrality, a Neutrality Imperative.

Chapter Nine

By the close of 1793, Washington had further explained and justified to the nation his Neutrality Proclamation. Thomas Jefferson [one of the two men on whom he initially leaned most in the early days of the country’s new government and Constitution], James Madison [a heretofore close friend and confidant], James Monroe [another protégé], and others [many of them old friends among the Virginia gentry], were by then in open political defiance of the president. The country was well on the way to developing the bifurcated body politic with which all Americans are familiar in the guise of the two-party system. Washington’s concerns about parties [factions] as well as his admonitions regarding foreign entanglements were sometimes acknowledged, but often unheeded. However, it was never about Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in regard to foreign affairs. It wasn’t even as much about strict versus flexible construction of the Constitution, although that is a better barometer of philosophical and political posturing than most other measures. Rather, it was about interests: local and self interests maintaining the status quo versus community and national interests in response to social, political, and economic change. In the nineteenth century, Democrats were advocates of the status quo, aggressive territorial expansion, and other special interests. That shifted by the latter part of the century and into the twentieth century as the Republican Party became the primary [although not always the exclusive] advocate of overseas economic, political, and ideological expansion, defense of special interests, and advocates of the status quo. Foreign policy positions in American history were never bi-partisan. They were trans-partisan. Such a perspective is the only way to explain the apparently “bi-partisan” approaches to foreign policy throughout American history. 30

Chapter Nine

31

The real nature of the Federalist-Jeffersonian fissure was domestic and constitutional. Would the government of the United States be a government of the people [of the nation] which Hamilton reluctantly espoused or a weak confederation of states and an economic elite supporting the status quo dominated by powerful, special, entrenched, established, affluent, dominant, local interests. Ironically, the Jeffersonians, erstwhile advocates of the people, lent support to the rule and domination of local elites [and not coincidentally to continuance of the institution of slavery]. Hamiltonians, elitists who cherished the United States but not its people, created the archetype for Lincoln’s national government “of the people, by the people, for the people.” As all that translated to foreign policy, Washington’s policy of neutrality eschewed special interests as it protected the institutions, vital interests, security, and independence of the American people and nation. Unintended though it might have been in light of their personal views of their fellow countrymen, Hamilton’s, really Washington’s, was the right direction, instinct, and policy. Jefferson became more defensive of the status quo and slavery in his later years while Washington struggled with the issue throughout his life, finally freeing his slaves upon his death, evolving in a different direction than the Sage of Monticello. In the realm of foreign policy, the Washington-Hamilton advocacy of broader powers for the federal government, practical pre-eminence of the Constitution’s preamble rather than its tenth amendment, and in particular for this analysis, advocacy of neutrality as the touchstone of a successful and productive foreign policy, provided and continued to provide the best hope for the United States and the American people in the complex and dangerous maelstrom of international affairs. President John Adams undertook unilateral [and non-neutral] action by engaging in an undeclared naval war with France. The Quasi-War was America’s first non-declared war and was conducted only at sea. However, it set a dangerous and important precedent followed by many presidents regarding the use and disposition of American military forces for diplomatic, political, or economic goals without Congressional approval. Indeed, Jefferson and many of his successors took strict construction and unilateralism much farther. John Adams’ actions and the Quasi-War had limited repercussions for United States diplomacy and the Constitution. But the precedent was set, and later repeated. Examples since John Adams included Jefferson and the Barbary pirates; the 1823 Monroe Doctrine; James Polk sending United States troops to a disputed area on foreign soil in 1846; William McKinley [and T.R.] anticipating war with Spain and dispatching Admiral Dewey to the Philippines in 1898; pro-Allied economic and financial policies prior to 1917;

32

Chapter Nine

F.D.R.’s necessary but undeclared 1941 Atlantic naval war against Nazi Germany; countless Cold War confrontations under many presidents; wars in Korea and Vietnam; and George W. Bush’s war in Iraq - despite disclaimers of using the umbrella of the War Powers Act and a Congressional “resolution,” not a constitutional declaration of war. These were unilateral and un-neutral international military actions. Lack of public challenge to unilateral presidential actions stemmed sometimes from congressional acquiescence in the action [Adams, McKinley], lack of information or interest in Congressional involvement at the time [Polk], Congressional and popular deference to the power of the president [the naval war with Germany in 1940-41], or the political popularity [at least at the time] of the action undertaken [in Operation Desert Storm and initially perhaps in Iraq]. In 1798-1800, John Adams wrecked whatever chance he had for reelection while he destroyed for years his reputation among political friends and foes alike. Yet Adams redeemed himself morally and diplomatically as he navigated an end to the Quasi [naval] War with France that could have weakened American security irreparably as well as destroying American overseas commerce and credit. Moreover, in 1800-1801, he negotiated an end to the troublesome Treaty of Alliance of 1778 and other turmoil with revolutionary France. Although he made many crucial errors in his four year term, including allowing the Alien and Sedition Acts to become law and be enforced, John Adams took the second great threat to American security and independence, France, off the board for the foreseeable future [forever as it turned out], just as Washington and Jay had negated the potential threat emanating from London for nearly two decades, until finally Jefferson’s blunders and Madison’s follies placed the United States in jeopardy again in 1812. As president, Thomas Jefferson set the risky process of unilateralism in motion with efforts to achieve through economic means [The Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts] the special expansionist territorial and economic interests of his faction and section. He also added to the propensity for unilateralism by his decisions to fight the Barbary pirates and then wage economic war with Britain and France in 1807. His unilateral actions against the two major powers of his era, as well as the idea of using economic tools to coerce a powerful or determined rival, endangered American security and independence. And it did not work.1 Economic coercion failed in the early nineteenth century, as it has for most of United States history. The Neutrality Imperative was still valid. But the folly of the opposite course of action became evident in Madison’s precipitous fall into asking Congress to declare war against Britain in 1812. That

Chapter Nine

33

consummated a long trend by Madison to twist the tail of the British lion, not just during the struggle for American independence, but thereafter. As early as 1791, and again in 1794, Madison sought approval for reprisals against Britain for incursions against and affronts to American commerce, a position adopted in Jefferson’s term when Madison was Secretary of State, and, later in Madison’s presidency, to the final step of war. Madison’s unilateral move against Britain on behalf of special territorial expansionist interests among his Democratic constituents in the South and West undermined the premise of The Neutrality Imperative. Declaring war in 1812 substituted a less perspicacious unilateralism for neutralism. It was consistent, and not unexpected, that Madison and his political and ideological colleague Thomas Jefferson in 1793 had opposed Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation. In 1793, the issue hadn’t been Citizen Genet, his antics, or which French faction he represented. Any representative and any government, any nation at war with Britain and the rest of the continent, which sought to involve the United States in a conflict that would at best cripple its economy and which might threaten its very existence, was simply a conflict to be avoided despite other issues. Washington understood that. In 1812, Madison was pressured by special interests in the South and West that sought United States territorial expansion into Canada, Florida, and Indian lands in the southeast. A similar situation occurred over a century later in regard to World War One. Then, President Woodrow Wilson initially sought neutrality before he succumbed to the unilateralist impulses of special interests and tacked slowly but surely into a position incompatible with neutrality and continued peaceful relations with Germany. After the War of 1812, the Monroe Doctrine was the work of British creativity and the diplomatic skill of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. While it could have been bi-lateral or multi-lateral, the Monroe Doctrine was another early example of United States unilateralism. Supported by the president’s supporters who were advocates of the domestic status quo, Monroe and Adams co-opted and proclaimed the British proposal for joint AngloAmerican opposition to European incursions into the internal and political affairs of the new states of the American Quartersphere. The Monroe Doctrine created a dangerous pretext for further unilateral United States actions in Latin America initiated by numerous presidents from William McKinley to Ronald Reagan. However, Monroe’s and Adam’s unilateral action in the Monroe Doctrine should not diminish the essentially neutral perspective the United States took on Latin America in their era. The United States did not seek to colonize or take over the newly independent states of Latin America. Some Southern

34

Chapter Nine

expansionists did aspire to such conquests in the 1840’s – 1860’s, but theirs was not mainstream American thought or policy. The Monroe Doctrine also extended the principles of the Model Treaties of 1776 and the basic premises of Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and Farewell Address. The Monroe Doctrine offered trade and amity with all states of the American Quartersphere and those of Europe in a context of peaceful and respectful commerce. Abraham Lincoln, who ranks with Washington as one of the two greatest presidents in American history, also shared Washington’s view of the need for American neutrality and the benefit of maintaining a policy of amiable and proper relations with other powers. Lincoln did not perceive, nor did he imagine, a hegemonic or cataclysmic foreign attack against the United States. He did see, however, the possibility of the destruction of American democracy and freedom from within. Regarding slavery, a domestic and internal threat, but thinking broadly and globally - just twenty three years after Britain displayed the power and will to burn the American capital - Lincoln wrote in 1837: “All the armies of Europe and Asia could not by force take a drink from the Ohio River or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men, we will live forever, or die by suicide.” The same equation is true and valid today. A significant but overlooked assertion of The Neutrality Imperative in the nineteenth century was President Lincoln’s handling of Southern secession. Turning the mandate from Washington not to interfere overseas to domestic affairs, Lincoln demanded that foreign powers not interfere in America’s internal affairs, i.e. not recognize the Confederate States of America. Lincoln wanted the United States, and its civil war, to be fully neutral, an altogether exclusive American affair. Thanks to Union diplomacy and the critical factor of Northern exports of wheat to Britain and the rest of Europe, Lincoln’s diplomacy was an example of subtle, unstated, and successful neutralism. .

Chapter Ten

Economic and political development of the United States from 1865-1897 established the foundations for America’s status as a great power. Expansion and conquest of the continent, possession of most of the necessary raw materials for industrial and commercial domination of the world by the early part of the twentieth century, plus agrarian self-sufficiency and even a surplus of food (along with water, the sine qua non of national and human survival), made America a world power. The United States interfered unilaterally to maintain the status quo and protect special interests at home against AfricanAmericans, Native Americans, labor, etc. Then, it turned overseas. Projection of American power overseas increased constantly after 1898, without full or public regard for the overarching interests of United States independence and security. The resulting impulse of American economic interests following the Panic of 1893 was an outburst of unilateral American imperial and expansionist activity abroad led and abetted by special commercial, industrial, and financial interests. By 1898, special interests countermanded the wise admonitions of the Founders to remain neutral. The years of continentalism and commercial maturation of the United States between 1800 and 1898 changed priorities and leadership at the national level. Between 1800 and 1865, the national conflict over slavery dominated expansion [territorial expansion for the slavocracy and commercial-financial aggrandizement for the Midwest and Northeast]. After the Civil War, United States industrial development and its search for overseas markets to sustain a consumption, industrial, commercial, and capitalist society came to dominate United States foreign policy considerations. Domestic concerns and foreign policy became inexorably intertwined.

35

36

Chapter Ten

The tendency toward and precedents for unilateralism pervaded twentieth century American foreign relations. They undermined The Neutrality Imperative. The Spanish-American War; annexations of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico; the Open Door Notes; and dollar diplomacy followed as and from unilateralist actions, imperialist ideas, private sector market expansion, military incursions, and assertion of special interests by the United States overseas. After 1898, unilateralism became the rule rather than exception in United States foreign policy and international relations. While clearly the times and issues have changed, the principles remain valid. Neutrality is practical, fair, and temperate. Isolation is absurd. Unilateralism is arrogant and dangerous. But after 1898, United States policy usually followed the latter course. The American paradigm for empire and war in the Imperial Decades1 from 1897-1917 started with the Spanish-American War and culminated with intervention in 1917 by the United States in favor of conservative and reactionary interests (the status quo) both overseas and in the United States. The year 1898 marked a great departure and a major confluence of events leading to a fundamental shift in foreign policy paradigms for the United States. It was more than the traditionally recognized shift to an imperial world view and quest for formal and informal empire. It also was the harbinger of disengagement from the virtues of The Neutrality Imperative. One element of the confluence was transition in leadership from the more idealistic generation that had fought the Civil War to the new generation of leaders who were allies of the economic and political elite. The best example of this generational transition was the shift of power and influence to the new market oriented business-industrial leadership. The idealism of anti-slavery and other reforms had burned out. Progressive reform was in the air. But some Progressives ignored global issues while others dangerously grafted overseas imperialism onto domestic reform, eventually resulting in the phenomenon of nation building. During the Imperial Decades, that cohort of American leaders represented not just the national economic elite. It also included many political, religious, social, and intellectual leaders of the United States. Advocates of the domestic status quo [the SQ’s] controlled both political parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They defeated the Populist insurgency of 1896. They solidified racial stratification into the national fabric that same year with the United States Supreme Court decision in Plessey vs. Ferguson. No benevolently pacific Progressive counterweight was influential enough to offset this socio-politico-economic coalition in either party, not even the so-called liberal-international consensus of the mid-twentieth century. There

Chapter Ten

37

was no critical mass of support for the moderating effects of neutrality in The Imperial Decades. Americans at most levels of society and most walks of life accepted Social Darwinism and its political and economic corollaries: survival of the fittest, the perceived need to expand markets overseas, ennui over demise of the frontier, racial and ethnic hierarchies, and the special interests of the emerging military-industrial complex.

Chapter Eleven

Between the Spanish-American War and U.S. entry into World War I, almost every major world event or international crisis of the Imperial Decades marked another step on divergent curves of diplomatic cordiality or hostility between the United States and other major powers. Significant improvement in Anglo-American and Anglo-French relations characterized the years 1897 to 1917. German-American relations experienced steady decline from 1897 to American entry into World War I. Issues included the Philippines, Samoa, the Algeciras Conference, China, Boxer Rebellion, Agadir, economic rivalry in Latin America, German hostility to American trade in Europe, and frequent German conflicts with Britain and France in the two decades after 1897. The Imperial Decades marked a steady and steep decline in German-American relations. The U.S. decision in 1917 to fight alongside Britain and France against Germany reflected two decades of diplomatic and economic trends. Improvements in Anglo-American and Franco-American relations from 1897 to 1917 were important factors for the United States and developments in world affairs. In the years 1898 to 1905, the pattern for cordial Anglo-American and Franco-American relations in the twentieth century was well established. Those trends were strongly parallel to patterns of Anglo-American and Franco-American trade, commerce, and investments. Reasons for the American decision for war in 1917 developed over a period much longer than the war years of 1914 to 1917. They spanned the Imperial Decades from 1897 to 1917. France and Britain were the greatest beneficiaries of the decline in German-American relations from 1897 to 1917 and eventual recourse to war 38

Chapter Eleven

39

between Germany and the United States. Their security and survival were assured by American entry into war against Germany in 1917 (and 1941). Ultimate declaration of war on Germany by the United States in 1917 followed logically, therefore, not just from war in Europe and events between 1914 and 1917, but from a much longer period of deteriorating relations between Germany and the United States. (See Appendix B). The United States decision to declare war on Germany in 1917 also was influenced heavily by American special interests. Prior to the twentieth century, wars trended to disrupt and be bad for business. But late nineteenth and twentieth century armaments races proved to be major boons to the new heavy industries of the era, and related financial and commercial interests. Making armaments and war became profitable overseas and in the United States to certain special interests-later known in America as the military-industrial complex. Thus, the United States opted for war in 1917. In 1914, as war erupted in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson initially had urged Americans to remain neutral. At first, he followed a largely neutral course of action. But beginning in 1915 he was compelled by German actions and increased American business and financial commitments to the Allied cause to opt for war by April 1917. Wilson, his Republican predecessor, and three Republican successors allowed continued domination of foreign affairs by the growing coterie that came to be known in the 1950’s as the militaryindustrial complex. Yet despite the great departure of 1898, the Imperial Decades, and WWI, the importance, relevance, viability, and popularity of The Neutrality Imperative among the American people were clearly evident both before and following the Great War. Many of the proposed reservations to the controversial Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations Covenant in 1919-1920 were not so much an effort to push the United States into isolationism, as Wilsonian and Rooseveltian critics inaccurately charged then and subsequently. Rather they were an effort to reassert America’s role as an honest broker, to maintain flexibility and an open eye to opportunities and threats to the United States throughout the world, and to utilize American influence and power as positive leverage in international affairs. Reservationists sought to preserve freedom of action in foreign affairs for the United States, clearly a hallmark of The Neutrality Imperative paradigm [not “isolationism”] as it had operated before the United States embarked on its great departure in 1898 and its grand European adventure in 1917. Following defeat of the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations by the United States Senate, internationalists performed poor service to American foreign policy by unwavering and often biased criticism of the Reservationists

40

Chapter Eleven

and what by Franklin Roosevelt’s second term was derogatorily called isolationism. Those critics incorrectly helped to discredit the historic foundation for American foreign policy, The Neutrality Imperative. In fact, the United States was not isolated in the years between WWI and WWII any more than it had been in the nineteenth century, although it was not allied with another power or coalition of powers. Even in WWI, the United States remained an associated power, not an outright ally of Germany’s adversaries. The Neutrality Imperative, even in World War One, was that strong.

Chapter Twelve

Post-WWI American leaders who sought a return to neutrality did not seek American isolation from the rest of the world. The alleged “isolation” of the United States in the 1920’s and 1930’s has long since been disproved. Internationally, the United States was quite active economically and diplomatically in the inter-war period. Because of its overwhelming economic and military power in the 1920’s and 1930’s, especially in the American Quartersphere, some United States actions were militaristic and aggressive. But certainly no major respected leader of either Democratic or Republican party in that era advocated literal American isolation from the rest of the world. However, many Americans, including many Progressives, continued to value neutrality. Thus, in its diplomacy and domestic affairs, the United States did seek, and until threatened by the Axis preferred, neutrality. Examples abound: the multi-power Washington Treaties of 1922; the various Neutrality Laws of the 1930’s; public response to the reports of the Nye Commission in the mid1930’s; and all efforts short of war in 1939-1941. Each reflected not avoidance of and withdrawal from the world, but rather interest in and commitment to American neutrality, peace, and security. Highly critical assessments in the 1930’s attacked the basis and decision for war by the United States in 1917. The impetus for and findings of the Nye Commission (1934-1936) and its critique of the ‘merchants of death’ reflected widespread public opinion and concern. The Nye Commission reports contained a certain basis in fact that the United States did intervene in WWI partly because of vested economic interests in Britain, its allies, and the war itself. For instance, an analysis of pre-WWI bond prices in The Economist indicated that American investment money had been moving toward Britain 41

42

Chapter Twelve

prior to the war, and strongly toward Britain [as well as France] and away from Germany after the start of WWI. It should come as no surprise that certain American financial interests - the proto-military-industrial complex - had a much greater stake in an Anglo-French victory that was made possible by American support and intervention in 1917 rather than in German hegemony in Europe. By the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, global Great Depression, developing legitimate overseas threats to United States security, and F.D.R.’s perceived political fragility until his reelection in 1936 [a position of strength scuttled quickly in 1937 with the ill-considered Supreme Court packing scheme], the proto-military-industrial complex already was increasing its influence. F.D.R. had neutralist tendencies and instincts. For example, he insisted on the importance of Western Europe over Asia before and after the outbreak of WWII, despite the clamor of expansionists, anti-communists, and the military-industrialists. He supported or acquiesced in the Neutrality Laws. He restrained his Anglophile tendencies until late 1940. But for F.D.R. and all Americans, World War II overwhelmed neutrality and The Neutrality Imperative. Yet it did not necessarily have to remain that way. Although an internationalist, Franklin Roosevelt was committed to United States neutrality prior to WWII, unless or until America’s vital interests made it necessary to act otherwise. Many of F.D.R.’s speeches and policy decisions reflected his penchant for neutrality as the best course in American foreign policy. Neutrality was and is not taking sides. United States policy under F.D.R. prior to 1940 typically did not choose sides, reflect inherent bias, or seek to retain the strident militancy and hostility to lesser powers that had been exhibited by presidents from McKinley through Hoover. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, recognition of the Soviet Union, refusal to involve the United States in the Spanish Civil War, and signature of the Neutrality Acts affirmed Roosevelt’s basic belief in the benefits of neutrality and danger of overseas entanglements. Following such a course of action was indicative of a belief in the value of The Neutrality Imperative. Likewise, and more certainly, a majority of Congress and the American people in the years between WWI and WWII felt that way. The Neutrality Acts of the 1930’s reflected the majority opinion in the United States that the country should stay out of war, i.e. remain neutral. The war that engulfed the world by the late 1930’s eventually affected vital American international interests and its security. But the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1936 did not alter traditional American policies in regard to neutralism. In fact, they affirmed, while making more specific, the guidelines under which American foreign relations traditionally had been conducted.

Chapter Twelve

43

Extension of ‘cash and carry’ to belligerents in the 1937 version of the Neutrality Laws provided a variation of the offer of amity and commerce. In 1937, the United States was far from loaning or giving war material to enemies of the Axis powers. The Neutrality Laws were closer in principle to the Model Treaties of 1776 than to later unilateralist foreign policy and military decisions abroad during and after the Cold War. Even so dramatic a reversal of apparent past policy and tradition as occurred in the revision of the Neutrality Act in 1939 was a departure in degree; it was not absolute. The mortal danger presented by the Axis powers to the security of the United States was just becoming apparent in 1939. And because lifting the arms embargo in 1939 showed the American intention to act in concert with other powers rather than unilaterally, the revised statue, as well as its predecessors, was consistent with the tradition and parameters of The Neutrality Imperative. Likewise, the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 was collective in approach and appeal, not unilateralist, and consistent with American traditions of nonintervention and neutrality. It, like the Model Treaties, also was highly idealistic. And there is nothing inconsistent or inappropriate with including reasonable agreements in defense of such humanitarian goals and high ideals among a nation’s vital interests. While Roosevelt may have anticipated eventual American belligerency, the Atlantic Charter stated universal freedoms with which the Founders would have been both familiar and supportive. Later concepts of the four policemen and the United Nations were less designed to project the United States into every trouble spot in the world than to ensure that others shared responsibilities for collective world security with the United States. That was far from unilateralism. It was consistent with the foundational Model Treaties of 1776 seeking amity with all nations as opposed to later unilateral twentieth and twenty first century efforts to dictate conduct and mores to the world, whether through diplomacy or the barrel of a gun. Pre-WWII Americans could not see things with the perspective of twenty first century hindsight. They assumed the United States was safe behind two vast oceans. Reaction to the 1917-1918 conflict led to a desire to avoid similar or greater sacrifices. People suffered from post-war ennui. Depression and malaise marred the lost generation. The American people heeded the influence of the Nye Commission and its specters of “merchants of death.” The Neutrality Laws themselves (supplemented by a close vote in 1940 on Selective Service and the slimmest of margins - one vote in the House - for renewal of Selective Service in September 1941) and even the 1940 destroyers for bases deal reflected public opinion polls showing Americans were

44

Chapter Twelve

committed to neutrality and avoidance of war. Perhaps most of all, day to day and critical concern with the Great Depression, whose effects still held sway over much of the American population, distracted or dissuaded a majority of Americans even in 1940 that the ongoing world war was truly their fight. That view persisted until December 7, 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Then, a few days later, on December 10, 1940, the gratuitous German declaration of war on the United States changed everything. Sadly for history and The Neutrality Imperative, Roosevelt labeled neutralists who opposed his foreign policy actions as “isolationists.” That pejorative misnomer continued to taint advocates of neutrality in the post-WWII era. In reality, the issues were really, first, which specific interests were truly vital and worth defending, and second, a means of defining the priority of foreign affairs concerns, among themselves or in juxtaposition with pressing domestic matters. Roosevelt concluded in 1941 that the United States had to act before its security was dangerously in jeopardy. In that he was ahead of, not in opposition to, the thinking of most Americans.

Chapter Thirteen

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s growing realization of the Axis threat to American vital interests and security did not mean that his earlier adherence to neutrality was wrong. By 1940, circumstances had changed. Germany and Japan threatened American security and the continuation of its freedom and independence. There was nothing in the historical precedent of The Neutrality Imperative to negate American defense of its legitimate vital interests or its security. In 1940-1941, Germany and Japan jeopardized both. Roosevelt would have been grossly derelict in his duties as president and commander in chief if he had refused to adjust to the international circumstances of the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. Had he been alive, George Washington almost certainly would have concurred. But that does not mean Roosevelt did not see value in neutrality. He sought to keep the United States out of war as long as he could. So too did those who adhered to a policy of neutrality. In Charlottesville, Virginia, on June 10, 1940, Roosevelt articulated a proper and viable position of neutrality for the United States, despite the Italian dagger that, in Roosevelt’s metaphor, had just been struck into the back of its neighbor, France. Roosevelt said: “This Government directed its efforts to doing what it could to work for the preservation of peace in the Mediterranean area, and it likewise expressed its willingness to endeavor to cooperate with the Government of Italy when the appropriate occasion arose for the creation of a more stable world order, through the reduction of armaments and through the construction of a more liberal international economic system which would assure to all powers equality of opportunity in the world’s markets and in the securing of raw materials on equal terms.”1 That was neutrality. 45

46

Chapter Thirteen

For the first four decades of the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, The Neutrality Imperative was a viable, accepted, and workable model for conducting American foreign policy. However, by criticism of so-called isolationists in the mid and late 1930’s, President Franklin Roosevelt and his allies unwittingly undermined a return to the rubrics of The Neutrality Imperative after F.D.R.’s death and the end of WWII. Whether a Neutrality Imperative would have served American interests in the post WWII era better than containment can never be proven. But it is certainly subject to debate, and one can make a good hypothetical case for it. The key demarcation in abandonment of The Neutrality Imperative in American foreign policy came at the end of WWII. Clearly, there was a mortal threat in the 1940’s to the United States and its vital interests from the Axis powers Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The American effort to defend itself and the world from that threat was noble, justified, and righteous. Alliances were appropriate then, even with a policy paradigm that stressed neutrality in normal international affairs. However, post-war plans to demilitarize and return to a pre-war peacetime economy were sidetracked for the rest of the twentieth century by the morbid fears, which were often unsubstantiated and contrived, of renewed depression and communism. And those fears sustained vast expenditures on the materials of war and routine unilateral military intervention overseas. The last American effort to maintain a traditional position of neutrality occurred prior to WWII. Writing in Foreign Affairs in April 1941, Eugene Staley addressed “The Myth of the Continents.”2 As Staley explained, on the eve of American involvement in WWII, the oceans by that time no longer offered the sanctuary and solace that they had provided since the founding of the Republic. Staley correctly claimed that the United States and Europe no longer occupied two separate continents but rather one Atlantic region. Staley could not presage the development of atomic weapons and focused on pressing military and security concerns for the U.S. on the eve of WWII. Nevertheless, Staley proposed a new way for Americans and Europeans to view themselves and their world in a global but not unilateral context. In his January 1941 State of the Union Address, Franklin Roosevelt offered one of last specific articulations of U.S. foreign policy and national purpose. He stated: “Our national policy is this. . . . We are committed to all-inclusive national defense . . . full support of all those resolute peoples, everywhere, who are resisting aggression . . . Morality and considerations for our own security…[Providing] an arsenal for them as well as for ourselves.” Roosevelt specifically and in a neutral manner declared that “Such aid is not an act of war.”3

Chapter Thirteen

47

Roosevelt offered clear priorities based on vital American interests. In his analysis, it was the thoughtful and essential action of a neutral nation defending its independence, integrity, and ideals, not special or inconsequential interests. It was neutrality. Near the close of WWII in 1945, however, technology offered a substitute for the outmoded oceanic basis for neutrality the United States had enjoyed since 1776. That technological advancement was United States development of the atomic bomb. In 1945, when the United States first tested then used against Japan the mightiest weapon in history, everyone in the United States, and most people around the world, assumed the American monopoly on atomic weaponry would last well into the future. Josef Stalin’s spies were hard at work in Britain and America trying to learn about the secret weapon, and the science to make such a bomb. But in 1945 not even Stalin could believe that his scientists and industrial plant were capable of duplicating the feat so soon. While the Soviet Union did copy, develop, and test an atomic bomb by 1949, that was a very rapid timetable not envisioned by anyone, especially American policy makers, in 1945-1949. President Harry S Truman’s words to and attitude toward Stalin regarding United States possession of the atomic bomb were highly indicative of the exclusivity, arrogance, and unilateral nature of the emerging American position regarding atomic weapons. United States leaders assumed the bomb would provide an unparalleled hedge against aggression towards itself, its territories, its interests, and its allies. The bomb was seen as greater protection for America than the oceans had been. In 1945, the atomic bomb must have appeared to some as a new oceanic moat behind which the United States could live and prosper, maintaining amity and commerce with friends, and a splendid indifference towards those whose systems or ideology were different [i.e. communists and communist states]. But for others, it was a boon to the militaryindustrial complex, defense of the status quo at home, and a new means of compelling the influence and expansion of United States special interests overseas. Although wrong in those security assumptions, in 1945 the atomic bomb must have appeared to many in Washington as the ultimate guarantor that the United States could remain apart from the ills and cares of the rest of the world except where it chose to intervene, if indeed it chose that course. Truman, as Midwestern a president as the United States has ever had, shared the preferences and predilection of his region to forego foreign entanglements and the troubles of Europe and the rest of the world. Truman was not prone toward an anti-communist crusade in 1945. Pressure from Winston Churchill, Great Britain, anti-communists in both American political parties, Soviet truculence in Europe, plus developments in Greece, Turkey, and the rest of

48

Chapter Thirteen

Europe after 1946, and the influence of the military-industrial-financialmedia complex, pushed him in that direction. On the edge of transition to “the American Century,” the last throes of neutrality came in 1945-1949. The duel among neutrality, isolation, collective security, and unilateralism as the dominant American approach to foreign relations from the end of WWI and defeat of the Treaty of Versailles to the end of WWII in 1945 was a duel fought at ten close paces. Neutrality was lost along the way. True neutrality, as defined by the Founders, was not part of the definition of any of the three latter dueling concepts. The first real break with the tradition of neutrality came in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine. The break was complete by 1949 when the United States joined N.A.T.O. Although that was done in the context of collective security and collaboration, United States leadership and pressure regarding N.A.T.O. made it, too, essentially unilateral in nature. N.A.T.O. marked the end of American neutrality.

Chapter Fourteen

The triumph of unilateralism and dismissal of The Neutrality Imperative began with the advent of the Cold War. By 1947, the new direction was set. By 1949, it was solidly in place. From 1947 to the present, from the Truman Doctrine and N.A.T.O., through the Reagan Doctrine and the invasion of Grenada, to the current war in Iraq, the United States has employed unilateralism, belligerency, arms sales and manufacture, and imposition of capitalist interests and values throughout the world. Those capitalist values are not inherently bad. However, imposition of those values on others is inappropriate. Moreover, markets opened and profits enhanced by war and fear are at best morally questionable. The Model Treaties and The Neutrality Imperative abetted by programs such as the Marshall Plan could and would have achieved the same positive expansion of democracy and productive capitalism worldwide, but without the terrible losses of life, destruction of nations, and decline in America’s moral standing that unilateralism, confrontation, and military containment created. The Cold War deepened. So did unilateralism and the influence of the military-industrial complex on United States foreign and domestic policies. After WWII, many of the pre-war “isolationists” became ardent interventionists and unilateralists overseas in their consistent quest to preserve the international and domestic status quo. Neutrality disappeared. Stalin based much of his aggressive and nationalist agenda on defense of “mother Russia” from the American anti-communist crusade. American fears of the U.S.S.R. and communism ironically were among the motivations Stalin used to compel state planning, development of heavy industry, and totalitarianism on the Soviet Union, plus a massive arms race, frequent international tensions, the threat of atomic war, and the potential for universal destruction. 49

50

Chapter Fourteen

One must ask if Stalin’s [and his successors’] tyranny would have survived for so long had the United States not presented such a convenient perceived threat to the Soviet Union. Stalin used the same irrational fear of an external enemy as the military-industrial complex conjured in the United States, with similar effect. It is possible that potential Soviet aspirations to world hegemony could have been thwarted had the United States remained the world’s great neutral and maintained policies of amity and commerce with all nations, as set forth in the Model Treaties of 1776 and Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation. In 1947, the goals and parameters of the Marshall Plan (contemporary with the non-altruistic militaristic and hegemonistic assertions of containment in the more dominant and aggressive Truman Doctrine), sought just such a paradigm for United States policy toward nations recovering from the ravages of WWII. The Marshall Plan was open to all nations. It owed much to the ideas and ideals of past American initiatives and practice consistent with The Neutrality Imperative. Conditions attached to the Marshal Plan were minor and consistent with guidelines attached to most twentieth century foreign aid programs. Soviet refusal to participate or allow its client states to participate [the United States also had client states in Latin America and Western Europe!] caused the Marshall Plan to veer in the direction of containment and exclusion rather than toward an inclusive policy directed toward amity and commerce with all. Within two years, the United States departed formally with the tradition of The Neutrality Imperative when it grafted the Marshall Plan onto the Truman Doctrine, and initiated and ultimately joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. America lost a unique opportunity to combine the Marshall Plan and The Neutrality Imperative.

Chapter Fifteen

Since the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, N.A.T.O.’s continued existence and American membership in it did not preclude a return to the paradigm of The Neutrality Imperative in the conduct of United States foreign policy. If N.A.T.O.’s purposes could evolve from military containment and intervention to those of a positive agent for European development and security, and if the United States allowed N.A.T.O. to become a truly open association of free states rather than an institution dominated by the United States and its military-industrial complex (preferably a military dimension of the EU and not an alliance dominated by the U.S.), the United States could be perceived as something less than a self-aggrandizing, imperialistic, and aggressive nation by the developing countries of the world. Post-WWII fear that communism or the Soviet Union somehow actually could and did threaten vital American interests and institutions does not withstand close rational scrutiny. Soviet domination for several decades of Eastern Europe and even Cuba did not harm the vital interests of the United States. Nor did its occasional presence or influence in various states in the Middle East [Egypt; Syria; Iraq; Afghanistan]. To avowed anti-communists, the mere mention, let alone presence, of the Soviet Union was sufficient to start a stampede of military, political, economic, and diplomatic actions and reactions. Those led, among other things, to brinksmanship, the fiasco in Vietnam, the unproductive continuation since 1959 of an economic embargo against Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis, and surrogate interventions by the United States in the Middle East and Asia for more than half a century on behalf of former colonial masters such as Great Britain and France. That practice has continued in the twenty first century. 51

52

Chapter Fifteen

Past practice does not make unilateral interventionism right or justify the loss of American lives for the economic benefit of certain special interests. Nor does past practice dictate that it must continue. Even in the years of the so-called liberal-international consensus, from 1945 until1968, there were many examples of special interests dictating United States foreign policy decisions. Under presidents Truman through Reagan, the unilateralist impulse was a prominent, often preeminent strategy and stratagem in American international activity. After WWII, President Truman was too inexperienced in international affairs and too politically deferential. He adopted the advice of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan to, and did, “scare hell out of the American people” in regard to perceived threats from communism. A basic error in the assumptions and paranoia that fed American foreign policy actions and unilateralism beginning in the Truman years was the confusion of communist ideology with the historic expansionist aspirations of the Russian state. The purists and some Trotskyites sought the socialist millennium. But Lenin, Stalin, and their successors, including Mikhail Gorbachev and the post-communist Russian leader Vladamir Putin [who in turn controls the policies of his successor Dimitri Medvedev], maintained oligarchic despotism or dictatorship seeking internal hegemonistic control within Russia, and expansion of the territory, power, and influence of the historic Russian state in Eastern Europe, the Pacific Northeast, and Southern Asia. Today, Putin (who still controls policy; and Medvedev) sounds like Stalin in his anti-Americanism and belligerent Russian xenophobia. The strategy has been the same under Czarist Russia, the U.S.S.R., and now the twenty first century Russian state. What has changed is the official ideology of the Russian state, not the basic foundations of historic Russian foreign policy, xenophobia, and expansionism of which American policy makers have seemed to be blissfully unaware for a century or more.

Chapter Sixteen

Republican President Dwight Eisenhower saw the danger of the military-industrial complex. However, he articulated it only at the twilight of his career as he was leaving the White House. Eisenhower might have been the only post-WWII president to have been able to slow or weaken the power of the military-industrial complex over American foreign policy decisions. But he did not. In a farewell address second in importance only to Washington’s and stressing essentially the same need for the United States to maintain a neutral stance in world affairs, Eisenhower admonished Americans to avoid entanglements in foreign affairs that might be prompted by the special interests of the military-industrial complex. But by then the message was muted by years of Cold War fear, fervor, and rhetoric. In 1960, neither John Kennedy nor Richard Nixon could or wished to thwart the ambitions of those who had created the American century. Some believe that Kennedy, like Eisenhower, became wiser and more wary as he gained experience. They grew in office. Kennedy’s speech at American University in June 1963 suggested a turning point. But by November 1963, that was a moot point; John Kennedy was dead. After 1963, no president was able or wanted to withstand the military-industrial complex. Not Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter [a small town politician who, like Truman, was unprepared for international challenges], or the quintessential cold warrior Ronald Reagan. Neither did Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War coincidental with his term in office. Bill Clinton might have been in position to initiate a reversal of unilateralism and the domination of the military-industrial complex. But he too, like 53

54

Chapter Sixteen

Truman and Carter, was inexperienced in foreign affairs. And like John Kennedy, Clinton was in a weak position politically with a list of domestic priorities on which he expended much of his political capital in his first two years in office, Republicans in control of Congress after the 1994 elections, and the sundry scandals of his administration. Thus, in the twentieth century, there was no political impetus for a reintroduction of The Neutrality Imperative. Continuity in unilateralist approaches to foreign policy issues since Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 has been further delineated by significant similarity in rhetoric, attitude, and policy repercussions. That continuity has been confirmed in the same administrative personnel from the Reagan years through the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush, and even in some Clinton administration foreign policy actions, to the current administration of George W. Bush. Among the recurring personalities in the formulation of American foreign policy from 1981 to the present are pater familias George Herbert Walker Bush himself, as well as Richard Wolfowitz, Richard [Dick] Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and others below that top layer of decision making. As partial argument for the strength and continuity of unilateralist impulses over the last three decades, witness the frustration and eventual demise of the consensus-internationalist perspective brought to the George W. Bush administration by former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Even after the fall of the U.S.S.R., the triumph of unilateralism during the period 1981 to the present surpassed the need for seeking a new world order based upon the foundations of peace, neutrality, and the ideals and principles of the United States. In August 2006, President Hassad of Syria stated categorically [even after his political bias and internal and Islamic audiences were discounted] that the United States under George W. Bush had pursued an aggressive policy in the Middle East. Hassad foresaw no hope for peace in that region as long as the Bush administration remained in power. He understood clearly that a significant change in U.S. foreign policy and its unilateralist behavior in the world arena could come no sooner than January 20091. That awaits the judgment of history.

Chapter Seventeen

There is an alternative to war, unilateralism, domination of foreign policy by the military-industrial complex, and American alienation of peoples throughout the world. The United States needs to return to its historic, proven, workable, practical, and valid policy of true neutrality, with amity and commerce with all. As the most powerful nation on earth, such a strategy for the United States in the twenty first century is even more practical and attainable than it was at any time in American history, save for the immediate post-WWII era. History has shown where the United States deviated from justice and neutrality, the consequences were special interests overriding vital national interests as the basis for unilateral United States actions and foreign policy decisions. The Neutrality Imperative is a valid and necessary option in the face of twenty first century challenges to peace, stability, and American security. The Neutrality Imperative offers many significant advantages to the United States in the twenty first century. The American people must demand a determined and frequent assessment of priorities and truly vital interests for the United States. Those interests must be established in a reasonable order of priority, debated, fairly justified, and explained fully to the American people. Unilateral action on behalf of special interests must cease. The United States should only align itself with or act when its vital interests are in jeopardy. The United States must avoid being drawn into apparently multilateral actions that in reality are part of another nation’s agenda but not crucial to vital American interests. The United States must cease acting unilaterally outside its defined area of truly vital interests. The United States government must stop serving as the overseas agent for and defender of arms merchants, special economic interests, and other private ventures. 55

56

Chapter Seventeen

Unlike traditional twentieth century unilateralism, there is an important role for Congress and the American public, as well as the executive branch, in the formulation of neutral foreign policy parameters and priorities. Unilateralism is impulsive, selfish, and less thoughtful. Short of legitimate ‘great crusades’ in support of the security and vital interests of the United States such as WWII, multi-lateralism is often slow moving, diluted, deceptive, or inconsequential. Unilateral actions are self-serving for the special interests which promote them. However, neutrality in any diplomatic situation requires clearly understood priorities and interests, plus consensus around those priorities and interests, a process not necessarily needed or obvious in unilateral actions. Once re-established as a paradigm for American international policy and foreign relations, The Neutrality Imperative affords priorities, principles, and perspective for decision makers and the public. It provides a sound, fair, flexible, principled, clear, just, and justifiable order of interests and priorities, as well as a model for American conduct in the community of nations. The United States needs to act in its own best interests based on a legitimate hierarchy of priorities, and not on behalf of special interests, no matter how powerful their political influence, economic power, or fear mongering. The United States needs to re-establish a foreign policy paradigm based on The Neutrality Imperative. As envisioned, established, and implemented by the Founders, neutrality was a strategy of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations or continents outside the American Quartersphere. President George Washington clearly saw that the best way to guarantee American security was to remain at peace. The best way to achieve peace was to avoid entangling alliances and unilateralism. That is The Neutrality Imperative in action. The Neutrality Imperative is consistent with the aspirations and goals of the Founders in United States relations with foreign powers and peoples. It is based on a plan to foster and follow America’s best interests overseas in areas of international amity and commerce despite possible emotional, popular, financial, ideological, or other dispositions to intervention not based on valid and long term assessment and application of America’s most vital national and security issues. Like President Washington, The Neutrality Imperative rejects entangling alliances, although not alliances that support United States security and vital American interests. It also rejects unilateral actions not designed to protect or advance the truly vital interests of the United States. Neutrality proffers amity and commerce with all. It is friendly and fair. It is consistent with the Model Treaties of 1776, the ideals of the American Revolution, Declaration of Independence, and the United States Constitution.

Chapter Seventeen

57

Neutrality best serves the vital interests of the people of the United States. Isolationism was and is an unrealistic approach to international relations. No nation can remain alone and aloof from the world. Unilateralism represents the selfish and arrogant side of foreign policy. It is the tool of the military-industrial-financial-media complex. In the long term and as a model for foreign policy and international conduct, unilateralism is inconsistent with the founding principles, ideals, and best interests of the United States. Thus the lines of demarcation are clear among the concepts of isolation, unilateralism, and neutrality. According to its first president, logic, and the best interests of the United States, America should pursue the latter. Twenty first century issues are global. They are substantial enough to compel at least an examination of a new model by which the United States views the world. They are important enough to require, in a democracy, a fair and open assessment of fundamental goals, values, and priorities. Use and potential misuse of land, air, oceans, space, and modern technology affect all peoples. Access to and depletion of soil, fuel, wood, water, and food resources impacts the very survival of the human race. The growing and endemic nature of the scourges of war, poverty, disease, malnutrition, hunger, illiteracy, drugs, waste disposal, and global climate change challenge every unit of government and society in ways unprecedented in human history. Intolerance, racism, despotism, conflict, and denial of human rights persist. Some solutions require more than just time and money. They require good example, openness, sharing, compassion, and a vision of a better future. International cooperation is necessary to allow the solutions of humanists, scientists, and statesmen to be implemented beyond traditional national boundaries. If the countries of each quartersphere can act in the way citizens of several nations cooperate for the sake of exploration and survival on Antarctica, perhaps the people of the world will meet the challenges of their new century. In the final analysis, all depends on the willingness of governments and their peoples to advocate and build a world in which understanding replaces hatred, trade supplants tariffs, communication supersedes confrontation, and peace stills the engines of war. Robert F. Kennedy said: “Each time a person stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, they send forth a tiny ripple of hope...These ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.” On November 9, 1989, the people of Europe tore down the Berlin Wall. Such was the essence of the proposed Continental Paradigm. And such is the underlying principle and premise of The Neutrality Imperative. It is not too late to change the scope and direction of American foreign policy. It is not too late to see the world, its critical issues, and America’s global

58

Chapter Seventeen

role not through the dark prism of unilateral and elitist interventionism, but rather through the perspective of a Continental Paradigm and with a foreign policy guided by the principles of The Neutrality Imperative. The path between those two developments in the history of United States foreign relations is clear and direct. Near the end of his life, John F. Kennedy said: “Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they can be solved by men. . . . For in the final analysis, the most basic common link is the fact that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s’ future. And we are all mortal.” (President John F. Kennedy, Address, The American University, June 10, 1963). The Founder said it best. “Prudence and moderation on every side can now end all international discord which has heretofore menaced our tranquility.” (President George Washington, State of the Union Address to the United States Congress, December 8, 1795). And: “Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . I was well satisfied that our country . . . had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend on me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. . . . The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred . . . from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations.” (President George Washington, Farewell Address, September 19, 1796).

Appendix A

Among President George Washington’s specific admonitions in his 1796 Farewell Address were: “The unity of government . . . is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence.” . . . “But . . . much pains [sic] will be taken, many artifices employed to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively directed.” . . . “Every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union . . . which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of . . . overgrown military establishments” “Two treaties, that with Britain, and that with Spain, . . . secure to them everything they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their prosperity.” . . . “Will [Americans] not henceforth be deaf to those advisors . . . who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens?” . . . They are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government” . . . “Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all.” . . . “Give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.” . . . “In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachment for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated.” . . . “The nation, prompted 59

60

Appendix A

by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity and adopts through passion what reason would reject.” . . . “The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations, has been the victim.” . . . “An imaginary common interest in cases where no common interest exists . . . betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.” . . . “And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens . . . facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country . . . gilding . . . a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for the public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.” “Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence . . . the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake.” . . . “Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign affairs is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.” . . . “The period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected . . . when we may choose peace.” “Why entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of (international) ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?” . . . “I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy.” . . . “Trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies…But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand…diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing.” “My proclamation of the twenty-second of April, 1793, is the index of my plan . . . the spirit of that measure has continually governed me.” . . . “I was well satisfied that our country…had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend on me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness.” “The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred . . . from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations.” President George Washington, Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796.

Appendix B

Trends in U. S. foreign relations in the Imperial Decades from 1897 until 1917 when the United States entered WWI can be depicted on a graph. By placing each country’s name on the ‘y’ axis of a graph and each major international crisis or event on the ‘x’ axis in chronological order [left to right], it is possible to graph the trend in relationships between the United States and other major powers during the Imperial Decades. In the order with which they enjoyed the most positive relationships with the United States in 1897, countries can be listed in order along the ‘y’ axis, from top to bottom: Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Each world crisis or significant event involving one or more of the major powers and the United States from 1897-1917 is marked on the graph along the ‘x’ axis in chronological order. If the relationship or outcome with the United States was positive, a mark would be placed higher on line parallel to the ‘y’ axis for that event. If friction resulted or the result was not favorable for the relationship between the United States and a country, a mark was placed lower on the line parallel to the ‘y’ axis for that event or issue. When connected, marks on the graph for each country form lines that slope up [improvement], flat [steady], or down [declining relations]. By connecting marks from left to right, event to event by country during 1897-1917, a pattern emerges. Some of the lines slope upward [indicating improving relations with the United States] such as lines for Britain and France. There was substantial improvement in Franco-American and Anglo-American relations from 1897-1917. Until 1914 there were relatively few incidents that involved Italy or Austria-Hungary. Therefore there are few marks for them. For Italy and Austria-Hungary, events leading to World War One showed that relations 61

62

Appendix B

between the United States and Italy did not deteriorate, while those with Austria-Hungary declined from 1914 to 1917. Lines on the graph move up and down, finally down, in regard to Russia and Japan, thus indicating unstable but generally deteriorating relations, despite the U.S. and Russia fighting as “Associated Powers” for a time in WWI and some common Japanese-American interests early in the century. Friction in Russian-American and Japanese-American relations began when the U.S. became a Pacific and East Asian power in 1898. Between the U.S. and Russia, and increasingly with Japan when it emerged as a great power after the Russo-Japanese War, events moved in a downward curve of growing friction and conflict of interest. After 1897, the Russian-American curve declined, except for brief upturns when World War I began, when America entered World War I, and when the Revolution of 1917 appeared initially to presage democracy in Russia. The Bolshevik victory was the last negative straw, however. Russian-American relations declined thereafter throughout the twentieth century except for slight improvement in 1933 and again during WWII. Japanese-American friction increased after 1905. The final break with Japan occurred in the late 1930’s and ultimately at Pearl Harbor. Finally, the German-American relations line from 1897 to 1917 slopes sharply down. For France and Britain, the diplomatic curve was up with positive relationships, cooperation, and eventual ‘alliance.’ Each event or crisis from 1897 to 1917 demonstrated common Franco-American, Anglo-American, and Anglo-French interests, and resulted in stronger ties between them. This was abetted by trade growth as well as common democratic institutions and other traditions. For Germany, the line moves in the opposite direction of Anglo-American and Franco-American curves. German-American relations were tense in the 1890’s, got worse as the decade progressed, became even more strained early in the century, and hit bottom after 1914, resulting in war in 1917. (See Richard H. Owens, Vigilance and Virtue: A Biography of General and Ambassador Horace Porter, 1837-1921. Lewiston, New York: Mellen Press, 2002, 182-185).

Notes

CHAPTER 1 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt. State of the Union Address. January, 1941.

CHAPTER 2 1. The Earth may be divided into four major quarterspheres. Each quartersphere is a super-continent sharing particular characteristics, and distinct in many ways from the others. The quarterspheres are Eurasia, Africasia, the East Asian Pacific Rim, and the Americas. The first three are contiguous. Only the Americas are separated from the others by oceans. Each quartersphere is a super-continental land mass within which various peoples share much in common, and sometimes deep and complex hostilities as well. One of those four landmasses is the area of the globe containing North and South America. It is the “American Quartersphere.” This is not the archaic and inaccurate slicing of the globe into traditional eastern and western halves (the “Western Hemisphere”) or more recently, northern and southern hemispheres. The Americas cover far less than half the globe [a “hemisphere”]. With their adjoining oceans, the Americas occupy about a quarter of the earth’s surface. Thus, the term American Quartersphere is more accurate and less culturally pretentious than older terms. 2. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, 49.

CHAPTER 4 1. Such was the purpose of “The Continental Paradigm,” published in the European Studies Conference Proceedings, 1990. “The Continental Paradigm” offers an 63

64

Notes

historical perspective on international events and a model for American and world relations in the 21st century that is global and issue-oriented. “The Continental Paradigm” also contains the rationale for the global concept of quarterspheres.

CHAPTER 5 1. Bush, George W. Address. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 28, 2006; and, Address. United States Military Academy at West Point, May 28, 2006. 2. Bush, George W. Address. United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, May 28, 2006. 3. Bush, George W. Address. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 28, 2006.

CHAPTER 9 1. Imposition of similar economic sanctions in the twentieth and twenty first centuries has been a foreign policy tactic as well. Typically, they work only against a state that needs or values such material things as highly as the imposer of said sanctions [a nation or the U.N.]. As a counterweight to materialism or xenophobia, or in cases of fighting terrorism or national support for terrorist organizations, there is little evidence that threat or imposition of economic sanctions has any serious impact. Witness ineffective economic efforts to force Japan to abandon China prior to Pearl Harbor, coerce Iran regarding nuclear weapons development, or modify pre-2003 Iraqi behavior. One virtue of some twentieth and twenty first century American efforts at economic diplomacy is the multi-national or multi-lateral tendency of such efforts. Yet the United States has created a blatant exception in the unilateral and ineffective economic embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba since 1959, an absurd and anachronistic policy that should be terminated by the United States, along with recent economic sanctions against Iraq and Iran.

CHAPTER 10 1. Richard H. Owens, Vigilance and Virtue: A Biography of General and Ambassador Horace Porter, 1837-1921. Lewiston, New York: Mellen Press, 2002, 182-185.

CHAPTER 13 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charlottesville, University of Virginia. Address, June 10, 1940. United States Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United

Notes

65

States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 544-548. 2. Staley, Eugene. “The Myth of the Continents.” Foreign Affairs, XIX, April, 1941. 3. Franklin D. Roosevelt. State of the Union Address, January 20, 1941.

CHAPTER 16 1. In the twenty first century world, unilateralism has failed and will likely fail again to protect the security or prosperity of the United States. Multilateral action in foreign affairs consistent with America’s best and vital interests offers a better alternative. Yet multilateralism also can lead to unwanted complications for the United States [Bosnia, Ethiopia], or a vehicle for ‘least common denominator’ policies or actions. Although preferable to unilateralism, it also remains an unsatisfactory manner of protecting or ensuring the vital interests of the United States.

Bibliography

American Security Council Foundation. National Strategy for the Nineties and Beyond. Washington, D.C.: American Security Council Foundation, May 1990. Atlantic Council of the United States. Post World War II International Relations as a omponent of General Education in American Colleges and Universities. Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1989. Bartlett, C.J. The Global Conflict. London: Longman, 1994. Beach, Edward. The United States Navy: A 200 Year History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986. Behrman, Greg. The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Saved Europe. New York: Free Press, 2007. Brands, H. William. The United States in the World, two volumes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Bush, George H.W. Address. Oklahoma State University, May 4, 1990. Bush, George H.W. Address. University of South Carolina, May 12, 1990. Bush, George W. Address. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 28, 2006. Bush, George W. Address. United States Military Academy at West Point, May 28, 2006. Chicago Tribune. “Perspective,” August 26, 1990. Cole, Wayne. Roosevelt and the Isolationists. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983. Dalleck, Robert. F.D.R. and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford, 1979. Dudden, A.P. The American Pacific. New York: Oxford, 1992. Ferrell, Robert. American Diplomacy, 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975. Germany, Federal Republic of, and German Democratic Republic. “Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic, and Social Union,” Bonn, 1989. Greenspan, Alan. The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World. New York: Penguin, 2007. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987. 66

Bibliography

67

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Viking, 1989. Keylor, William. The Twentieth Century World and Beyond. New York: Oxford, 2006. Kiernan, V.G. America: The New Imperialism. London: Verso, 2005. Kissinger, Henry. “Trends in the Communist World.” World Events, LXVI, Winter, 1990. McNeill, William H. “Colleges Must Revitalize the Teaching and Study of History,” Chronicle of Higher Education, August 8, 1990. Newsweek, September 4, 1989 - September 17, 1990. Roosevelt, Franklin. State of the Union Address, January 1941. Ryan, David. The United States and Europe in the 20th Century. London: Pearson, 2003. Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1985. Staley, Eugene. “The Myth of the Continents.” Foreign Affairs, XIX, April, 1941. Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: Balentine Books, 1994, c. 1962. United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935-1941. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. United States Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943. United States National Security Council. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, March, 1990. Washington, George. Papers. Washington, D.C., Library of Congress. Washington, George. Papers; Presidential Series, 1789-1797. Washington, D.C., Library of Congress. Washington, George. Proclamation of Neutrality, April 22, 1793. Washington, George. Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1793. Washington, George. State of the Union Address to the United States Congress, December 8, 1795. Washington, George. Farewell Address, September 19, 1796. Winkler, Allan. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Making of Modern America. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006. Zuk, Gary, et al. “Preserving the Global Commons.” National Forum, Winter, 1990.

WORKS BY THE AUTHOR OF THE NEUTRALITY IMPERATIVE Vigilance and Virtue: A Biography of General and Ambassador Horace Porter, 18371921. Lewiston, New York: Mellen Press, 2002. “Marianne and Uncle Sam: Growth and Confirmation of Franco-American Cordiality, 1897-1905.” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), 1993. Peaceful Warrior: Horace Porter and United States Foreign Relations, New York: Garland, 1990. “The Continental Paradigm.” European Studies Conference Proceedings 1990.

About the Author

Dr. Richard H. Owens is Professor of History at West Liberty State College, where he also served as President from 2001-2005. After serving as a U.S. Navy officer, he began his teaching career at the University of Maryland. He moved to administrative roles at Maryland, Catholic University, and University of New Hampshire. From 1986-1988, he was Vice President for Development at the University of Rio Grande; from 1988-1996, Vice President for Advancement at Lewis University; and from 1996-2001, President of Heidelberg College in Ohio. Dr. Owens is the author of several books and articles, including historical novels: Knightime (2006) and Conspiracy of Terror (2001), and historical monographs: The Neutrality Imperative (2008), Vigilance and Virtue: A Biography of General and Ambassador Horace Porter (2002) and Peaceful Warrior: Horace Porter and United States Foreign Relations (1990). Dr. Owens also served as historian and commentator for a 1993 BBC production, “A Nation Divided: The U.S. Civil War.” Dr. Owens earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Maryland, Masters degree at Old Dominion University, and B.A. from Manhattan College. He has held many civic and political offices, including the Board of Trustees at Columbus State College in Ohio. He and his wife Phyllis reside in Powell, Ohio.

68