»Freedom within the press« and »Tendency protection« under Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: (This publication is an English summary of »'Innere Pressefreiheit' und Tendenzschutz im Lichte des Art. 10 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten« published in 1996 in »Schriften zum Europäischen Recht«, vol. 27) [1 ed.] 9783428491964, 9783428091966

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MICHAEL KLOEPFER

"Freedom within the press" and "Tendency protection" under Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights

"Freedom within the press" and "Tendency protection" under Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights

By

Dr. Michael Kloepfer Professor of Law at the Humboldt University, Herlin

DUßcker & Humblot · Berliß

This publication is an English summary of ",Innere Pressefreiheit' und Tendenzschutz im Lichte des Art. 10 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten" published in 1996 in "Schriften zum europäischen Recht", vol. 27.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Kloepfer, Michael: "Freedom within the press" and "Tendency proteetion" under Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights / by Michael Kloepfer. Berlin : Duncker und Humblot, 1997 Einheitssacht.: "Innere Pressefreiheit" und Tendenzschutz im Lichte des Art. 10 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (engl.) ISBN 3-428-09196-5

Alle Rechte vorbehalten 1997 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Fremddatenübemahme und Druck: Berliner Buchdruckerei Union GmbH, Berlin Printed in Germany

©

ISBN 3-428-09196-5

Preface Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the freedom of expression and information and, therewith, also the freedom of the press on an European level. The presented study examines especially the question, whether the demands - raised again on the European level - for the "freedom within the press" ("Innere Pressefreiheit") or for the liquidation of the "tendency protection" ("Tendenzschutz") would correspond to Art. 10 ECHR. The study contains essential parts of a legal expertise elaborated for the Stiftervereinigung der Presse e.Y. in November 1995. The complete legal expertise was published in German in 1996 (Kloepfer, Michael, "Innere Pressefreiheit" und Tendenzschutz im Lichte des Art. 10 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996, Schriften zum europäischen Recht, vol. 27, ISBN 3-428-08792-5). The translation into English presented here is to contribute to open these ideas to an extended public in Europe. Berlin, May 1997

M. Kloepfer

Content I. Introduction . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. .

13

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR ................................

16

I. An overview of the material area of protection granted by Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: freedom of the press as a part of the freedom of expression and information ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

a) Introduction.................................................................

16

b) Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. ..

17

c) Content of the freedom of expression .......................................

19

d) Freedom of information and freedom to proeure information ................

21

e) Freedom of the press. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

2. An overview of the personal area of protection granted by Art. 10 ECHR . . . . . . .

25

a) Bearers of human rights .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

b) Obligors of the human right: "Effeet on third parties" ("Drittwirkung") and institutional guarantee? .....................................................

27

aa) Introduction ............................................................

27

bb) Practice of the Convention organs ......................................

29

ce) Effect on third parties ("Drittwirkung") and protective duties ........... (I) (2) (3) (4)

Preliminary considerations ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A general protective duty of the state resulting from Art. I ECHR? . . Protective duties as a matter of attribution .......................... Protective duties of the state on the level of the European Community?............................................................... (5) Interim result .......................................................

30 30 31 32 34 35

dd) Institutionalisation of the freedom of the press according to Art. 10 ECHR? ............. ................................. ...................

35

3. Formal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR .......................

39

a) General remarks on the dogmatics of limitations ............................

39

b) The examination of proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung) within the framework of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR in comparison to German law: suitability and adequacy as weil as "margin of appreciation" as a system of differentiated protective levels .................................................

42

8

Content aa) Introduction

42

bb) Legal bases of interference .............................................

44

cc) Aim of interference ....................................... : .............

45

dd) The necessity of interference in a democratic society ...................

46

(1) Pressing social need ................................................

46

(2) On the extent of the examination of proportionality ("Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) On the concept of the "margin of appreciation" ....... . ............. (4) Concretisation of the "margin of appreciation" ...................... (5) On the significance of the margin of appreciation for independent acts of the organs of the European Council and the European Community......................... .....................................

48 50 54

57

4. Art. 10 ECHR as a yardstick for the "freedom within the press" ................

58

a) Personal area of protection: Art. 10 ECHR as a defensive right of the publisher .......................................................................

58

b) Material area of protection: protection (also) of the functionality of the publishing unit .................................................................

59

c) Interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher by laying down "freedom within the press" ..................................................

60

aa) Introduction, questions of competence ..................................

60

bb) Interference by Decisions of the European Parliament and by the Directive on European Works Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

cc) Interference by the acts of the European Council ........................

64

d) lustification of interference according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR .............

65

aa) Introduction ....... :....................................................

65

bb) Catalogue of aims ......................................................

65

cc) Prevention of disorder ..................................................

66

(1) General character of the aim of protection ..........................

The case Engel et al. ................................................ Protection of democratic institutions and structures? ................ The Case Autronic ............................................... . .. Intermediate result ......... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66 67 67 68 69

dd) Reservation of the rights of others ........................ . .......... . ..

69

(1) The general significance of this aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exc1usion of objectively rendered value concepts ................... The case Groppera et al. ............................................ Protection of economic and publishing competition? ................ Rights of the editors as "rights of others" legitimating interference?

69 70 71 71 73

ee) Legitimacy of the "freedom within the press" in a democratic society? ..

76

(2) (3) (4) (5)

(2) (3) (4) (5)

Content

9

e) Summary and prospects .....................................................

79

aa) Summary ...............................................................

79

bb) Prospects ...... .. .. .. ...... . ...................... .... ...... . .. .........

80

III. Tendency protection ("Tendenzschutz") and Art. 10 ECHR ....................

82

1. Interference with Art. 10 ECHR due to insufficient tendency protection? .......

82

2. Art. 10 ECHR and the granting of tendency protection ................. . .......

83

IV. The prohibition of discrimination according to Art. 14 ECHR and property guarantee by Art. 1 of the Ist Protocol ..........................................

86

I. "Freedom within the press" and the prohibition of discrimination according to Art. 14 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

a) The general content of the prohibition of discrimination .....................

86

b) Application of the measure to the "freedom within the press" ................

89

2. "Freedom within the press" and guarantee of property granted by human rights according to Art. 1 Protocol 1 ..................................................

90

V. Summary in theses ........... .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .

93

Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

Abbreviations Abs.

paragraph

Absatz

acc.

according to

entsprechend

AfP

Archiv für Presserecht

AöR

Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts

Art.

article

AuslG

Foreigners Act

Ausländergesetz

BGBI

Federal Law Gazette

Bundesgesetzblatt

BverfGE

Decision of the Federal Constitution Court

Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen

CCPR

U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über zivile und politische Rechte

Artikel

Doc.

Document

Dokument

EC

European Community

Europäische Gemeinschaft

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights

Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention

ECT

European Community Treaty

Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft

Edit.

editors

Herausgeber

EMRK

European Convention on Human Rights

Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention

esp.

especially

insbesondere

etc.

et cetera

et cetera

EuGRZ

Europäische GrundrechteZeitschrift

EuZW

Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht

e.V.

registered society

eingetragener Verein

expl.

explained

erläutert

fin.

finally

abschließend

FN

footnote

Fußnote

GG

Basic Law

Grundgesetz

GRUR

Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht

11

Abbreviations IPCPR

International Pact on Civil and Political Rights

Internationales Abkommen über zi vile und politische Rechte Juristische Schulung

JuS

Juristenzeitung

JZ

lit.

literal

Buchstabe

MS.

manuscript

Manuskript

N.

number

Randnummer Neue Juristische Wochenschrift

NJW Ns.

numbers

Randnummern Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht

ÖZöRV p.

page

Seite

Para.

paragraph

Absatz

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Universelle Menschenrechtskonventionen

UWG

Unfair Competition Act

Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb

viz.

namely

nämlich

vol.

volume

Band

WRP

Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis

ZaöRV

Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht

ZUM

Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht

I. Introduction 1. Europe is infeasible without European basic rights. This is especially true of the European freedom of communication, without which a European public cannot emerge in a secure form. However, the European public is indispensable for the further realisation and democratisation of European integration. This illustrates the fundamental significance of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, with which the European freedom of communication and media was basically created. The following observations deal with the protective area and the possibilities to restrict Art. 10 ECHR, taking into account European political demands to introduce "freedom within the press" and to reduce "tendency protection" in press enterprises. 2. The so-called "freedom within the press" - especially the freedom of the editor with regard to the publisher, but also the prohibition of the so-called "tendency protection" by unrestricted rights of co-determination for employees in tendency enterprises - are demands which are elevated to the level of the European Union or the European Council. a) In this respect, the demand for the so-called ''freedom within the press" is a politically highly explosive subject if it aims, among other things, at ensuring the freedom of orders of the editorial offices or of the individual editor with regard to publishers and press entrepreneurs - especiaBy by means of editorial councils and editorial statutes. At a European level, these demands received a partly positive echo, but probably as areaction to the press concentration in particular. By its Decision on the Concentration of Media of 15. 2. 1990 (Edit. EC N° C 68, p. 137) and by its Decision on the Concentration of Media and the Diversity of Opinions of 16. 9. 1992 (Edit. EC N° 284, p. 44) the European Parliament demanded "that the freedom of aB employees in the information sector is granted". In the Resolution of 1992 the Commission is called upon to "submit a proposal for a European framework directive to ensure the journalist and publicist independence in all media". The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council goes even further. In its Resolution 1003 (1993) on the Ethics of Journalism of 1. 7. 1993 it demands the following: " ... to safeguard the freedom of the media, freedom within the media must also be protected and internal pressures guarded against". In its Recommendation 1215 (1993) on the Ethics of Journalism of 1. 7. 1993 the Ministers' Committee of the European Council is recommended "to adopt a declaration on the ethics of journalism along the lines of Assembly Resolution 1003 (1993) ... ". However, the essence

I.

14

Introduction

of this Recommendation was contradicted by the Ministers' Committee on 24. 3. 1993 and the Committee rejected in particular the adoption of the desired declaration. Commissioned by the Ministers' Committee, a "group of specialists" worked out "eight principles" regarding the rights of journalists which were adopted as apart of a document by the 4th European Media Policy in Prague on 7. / 8. December 1994. These underlined the significance of the "journalistic freedom of expression", and the dialogue between journalists, editors, publishers and owners of media and state institutions as weIl as self-regulation on the basis of "codes of conduct" was supported. b) Some attempts on the part of European politicians aim at a relativisation or abolition of so-called "tendency protection" against participation and co-determination in enterprises. In tendency enterprises (e.g. ecclesiastical, charitable, partypolitical organisations and in particular press publishing houses) which pursue inteIlectual and non-material goals, rights of co-determination of the employees are restricted or excluded in particular according to German law, in order to ensure the tendency character of the enterprise in this way. In the course of various discussions concerning the Directive on the "European Works Councils" this tendency protection appeared to be jeopardised for some considerable time; thus, the draft of the Vredeling Directive (KOM [83] 292 fin. of 8. 7. 1983) as weIl as the relevant draft of a directive of 1991 (Edit. EC 1991 W 39, p. 10) did not contain any regulation on tendency protection.' The Directive finally adopted in 1994 on the Establishment of a European Works Councils (Edit. 94/45/ EC) contains an opening clause in Art. 8 Para. 3 wh ich allows tendency protection in those member states which already had corresponding provisions when the Directive was adopted. Conversely, however, this means that tendency protection is inadmissible in those member states which were unfamiliar with it to date. 3. Taking the Federal Constitution and the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) as a yardstick, the "freedom within the press" as weIl as the abolition or relativisation of "tendency protection" were discussed intensively in the Federal Republic of Germany in the past. Today, such demands are seen chiefly as a violation of the guarantee of the freedom of the press (Art. 5 Para. 1 (2) Grundgesetz) as granted by the Basic Law. However, as this provision operates only on anational but not on a supranational level, the question arises as to whether and, if it then be the case, to what extent appropriate human rights guarantees on a supranational level can constitute a corresponding obstacle to appropriate attempts at a European level. In this respect, the guarantee of Art. 10 ECHR (freedom of communication) is of outstanding significance. lt will be analysed in the foIlowing, paying particular regard to the question as to whether it obstructs the "freedom within the press" or diminishes "tendency protection". 4. The thoughts published here are parts (translated into English) of a more comprehensive legal expertise which I drew up by order of the Stiftervereinigung der I

Barton, AtP 1994, 261 (262); Kuli, AtP 1993,430 (432).

I. Introduction

15

Presse in November 1995,2 and which was published in 1996? In the translated parts the specific questions regarding the application of Art. 10 ECHR with respect to the "freedom within the press" and the reduction of "tendency protection" have been placed in the foreground. The aim was to familiarise interested circles with the content and system of the human rights guarantee of the freedom of communication. Those parts of the legal expertise which were not translated are primarily linked with thoughts regarding German Constitutional law, a detailed description of the various European political advances in Germany as weIl as a general explanation of the legal nature and rank of the ECHR. They can be read in the original German publication. However, an overall summary of the legal expertise is included in the translation (see under Y.), enabling the reader to familiarise hirn or herself with the results of the non-translated parts.

2 Innere Pressefreiheit und Tendenzschutz im Lichte des Artikels 10 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten. Schriften zum Europäischen Recht, vol. 27, Berlin 1996. 3 I want to express my thanks to my former assistant, Mr. Dirk Uwer; Trier, for his support in the preparation of this legal expertise. To Mrs. Annelin Starke, Berlin, and Mr. Ian McCaughtrie, Ahrensburg, I owe a debt of gratitude for their translation work.

11. "Freedom witbin tbe media" and Art. 10 ECHR 1. An overview of the material area of protection granted by Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: freedom of the press as apart of the freedom of expression and information a) Introduction

Unlike the Basic Law ("Grundgesetz"), the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, in its Art. 5, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not inc1ude such a differentiated system of constitutional guarantees in the field of communication. In particular, the press is not provided with any special guarantee. However, one should not therefore conc1ude that the basic rights of communication are only of a subordinated significance. On the contrary: a look at the historical genesis of the ECHR demonstrates c1early that freedom of expression should rank highly in a general sense: "We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing freedom of thought, assembly and expression as well as the right to form a political opposition;",l was the c10sing "Message to the Europeans" at the Congress of the European Movement held from May 7 to May 11, 1948 in The Hague (Netherlands).2 From the German point of view, Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, which formally confers a more general guarantee of all freedoms of communication, seems nonetheless to fall short of the more differentiated guarantee of basic rights offered by Art. 5 of the Grundgesetz. Admittedly, three points should be mentioned in this respect: - Firstly, it is well known that the German solution is not as perfect as it seems; in particular, the systematic relation between the freedom to express an opinion and the freedom of the press does not appear to be c1arified. As regards content, repeated and extensive discussion of the Constitution was needed in order to grant the freedom of communication comprehensively (e.g. regarding the information about mere facts); - Secondly, an undifferentiated guarantee of freedom given by the ECHR does not hinder the European "legislator" from differentiating in keeping with the subject matter; Quoted ace. to: Karl lose! Partsch, ZaöRV 15 (1954), 631 (635). See also: Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 48 f. 1

2

I. An overview of the material area of protection

17

- Thirdly, a uniform guarantee of freedom of communication does not create guarantee limitations in the increasing fusion of general and individual communication in the field of electronic media and data transmission. The old form of guarantee is possibly a more modem freedom with regard to content in the sense that it is more open to development.

b) Freedom %pinion and /reedom 0/ expression Art. 10 Para. 1 (l) ECHR grants everyone the right of freedom of expression, and according to (2) - which with the help of examples renders more exacdy 3 the general c1ause given by sentence 1 - the freedom of opinion (" ... inc1ude to hold opinions") is inc1uded. This raises the question of the relation between freedom of opinion and freedom of expression. This relation is determined decisively by the exact interpretation of the freedom of opinion in the sense of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR. To begin with, it may be interpreted - as in COmmon German usage - as the freedom to express an opinion. Interpreted in this way, the freedom to express an opinion is nothing other than a part of the general freedom of expression according to Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR. 4 Theoretically, the freedom of opinion may, however, also be understood as the freedom to have an opinion - the right to hold an opinion - an interpretation which is supported in particular by the English text of the Convention. This freedom to hold an opinion can be distinguished intellectually from the freedom to express an opinion. To a certain extent, it may be understood as aprerequisite for the basic right of the freedom to express an opinion5 , though the freedom (intransitively) to form an opinion comes first. 6 The question does arise, however, regarding the practical significance of this inner freedom of opinion (freedom of thought), as it can hardly be influenced by the state ("thoughts are free"). But apart from the threat posed by psycho-pharmaceutical products and subliminal forms of influence 7, the practically most important effect is certainly the freedom of the so-called forum internum in the sense of the protection of a secret, ultimately a negative freedom to express an opinion, Le. the freedom of not being forced to reveal one's opinion or will. 8 Interpreted in this manner, the freedom to hold an opinion forms the basis of the freedom of expression (of an opinion), thereby rendering the freedom of Opi7 Christoph Engel, Atp 1994, 1(2). Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschemechte, p. 289; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der EMRK, p. 163. 5 See Michael Kloepfer, Grundrechte als Entstehenssicherung und Bestandsschutz, p. 57, 3

4

W( 6 7

8

.

Michael Kloepfer, Grundrechte als Entstehenssicherung und Bestandsschutz, p. 57. See Michael Kloepfer, Grundrechte als Entstehenssicherung und Bestandsschutz, p. 67 f. Michael Kloepfer, Grundrechte als Entstehenssicherung und Bestandsschutz, p. 61.

2 Kloepfer

18

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

nion the generic term. 9 From the phrasing of Art. 10 Para. 1 (2) ECHR one may conc1ude that the freedom to have an opinion is only the basis of the freedom of expression; this basis is to be determined. 1O To be correct, one need not, however, consider the (inner) freedom of (holding an) opinion as itself being covered by the area of protection of Art. 10 ECHR; on the contrary, it is covered by Art. 9 Para. 1 1st alt. ECHR, the freedom of thought. 11 This is not only demonstrated by the genesis,12 but it is also and above all an elementary systematic fact: the freedom of thought of Art. 9 ECHR is granted unrestrictedly, because the possibilities of restriction of Art. 9 Para. 2 ECHR apply only to the freedom of religion and confession, which is also mentioned in Art. 9 Para. 1 ECHR. If one understood the freedom of (holding an) opinion as being under the area of protection of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, it would be covered equally by the possibilities of restriction of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. This result, however, would be unacceptable, as the freedom of (holding an) opinion with reservations is simply inconceivable in democratic states under the rule of law. 13 However, as on the other hand the borderline between freedom of opinion and freedom of thought cannot be drawn in practical terms, the inclusion of the freedom of (holding an) opinion in the freedom of expression (of

9 Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 expl. 3, p. 142; Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 53. IO Karl lose! Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann I Franz L. Neumann I Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, I. Part, p. 435; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 163. 11 Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 53. - In particular the French version does not see a semantic difference between "liberte d'opinion" and "liberte de pensee" in Art. 9 ECHR; compare Karl lose! Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann I Franz L. Neumann/Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, I. Part., p. 435; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 163; compare also Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 expl. 3, p. 142; different Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 280; [vo E. Schwartz, in: Peter Schiwy I Walter 1. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 93; (at least terminologically) different also Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (6); lörg P. Müller, ZUM 1987, I (8); mrk Michael Barton, AfP 1994, 261 (264); lochen A. Frowein, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (edit.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 7, § 180, N. 59ff.; Meinhard Hilf, in: Ernst G. Mahrenholz/Meinhard Hilf I Eckart Klein, Entwicklung der Menschenrechte innerhalb der Staaten des Europarates, p.28f. 12 See Gilbert-Hanno Gornig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 289. 13 Incidentally, in the case of accepting the freedom of opinion granted independently by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, the possibilities of restriction mentioned in Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR could not be applied, because a restriction of the freedom of opinion could by no means be called "necessary in a democratic society" (regarding this necessity see the following text, p. 76 ff.) (correctly Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 54).

I. An overview of the material area of protection

19

an opinion) would mean the liquidation by Art. 10 ECHR of the otherwise unconditional proteetion offered by Art. 9 ECHR. 14 In this respect, the following interim result emerges: the freedom to express an opinion is covered by Art. 10 Para. 1 (2) ECHR, whereas the freedom to hold an opinion is covered by Art. 9 ECHR. c) Content 0/ the /reedom

0/ expression

The general c1ause of Art. 10 Para. 1 (1) ECHR grants the freedom of expression in a broad sense. However, one must reject the widespread mi stake in the German translation that the freedom of expression (Äußerungsfreiheit) is - without restrictions - equivalent to the concept of the freedom to express an opinion (Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit) as used justifiably in Art. 5 Grundgesetz. 15 The English version (Ufreedom of expression") and the French version (Uliberte d'expression") are definitive; 16 the freedom of expression is therefore unspecifically protected,I7 i.e. quite simply the freedom to express contents 18 using all conceivable forms of communication (for the technical media only the possibility of restriction given by Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR need to be taken into account).19 BasicaIly, the expression of opinions is also covered as weIl as all kinds of artistic expression 20 and the pure imparting of facts;21 the question as to whether commercial or advertising state14 Karl Josej Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann / Franz L. Neumann / Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, Ist Part, p. 435. 15 [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 14, (but compare also p. 15 with FN 8). Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 290, also calls the term of the freedom to express an opinion a "misleading" one. [vo E. Schwartz, in: Peter Schiwy /Walter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 92, speaks quite correctly of a "series of misleading deviations" in the official German translation; compare also Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. VII. 16 See Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, p. 16. 17 Also Michael KloepjerlGerhard Michael, GRUR 1991, 170 (178); Walter Berka, EUGRZ 1982,413 (416). 18 Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p.290. 19 Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (349f.); Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 N. 5; Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 439; Walter Berka, EUGRZ 1982, 413 (417). 20 Mentioned in the original version, compare Travaux Preparatoires, vol. IV, p. 280. Compare also the recommendation 719 (1973) of the Advisory Assembly of the European Council "On the Exercise of Freedom of Artistic Expression", published in European Yearbook, vol. 21, p. 385 f. as weil as the judgement by the European Court for Human Rights of May 24 1988 (Series A no. 133,4 = EuGRZ 1988, 543 - Case Müller et al.). 21 To exclude the "pure material information about facts" from the area of protection of Art. 10 Para. I ECHR, as it is postulated by Hubert Schom, Die EMRK in Einwirkung auf

2*

20

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

ments 22 are also covered cannot be answered unambiguously based on the practice of the Convention organs, but must ultimately be answered in the affirmative. 23 This does not, however, require further discussion here. The freedom of expression also refers fundamentaBy to "information" and "ideas" (compare Art. 10 Para. 1 (2) ECHR) which offend, shock or disturb the state or any part of the population, because in a democratic society characterised by pluralism, tolerance and openmindedness this is indispensable. 24 It may suffice for the time being to mention that the Strasbourg organs in their judication, which attempts to create the best possible balance between Paras. 1 and 2 of Art. 10 ECHR, introduced differentiation regarding the press on the one hand and audio-visual media on the other, as weB as commercial information and political statements. 25 In general, one may state that the broad, general guarantee of a das deutsche Recht, p. 254, seems objectively unjustified; his reference to corresponding views regarding Art. 5 Grundgesetz is wrong in its direct transition to Art. 10 ECHR; as here Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982, 413 (416); Michael Kloepfer, Produkthinweispflichten bei Tabakwaren als Verfassungsfrage, p. 44; Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 281. 22 Compare no. 4 of Recommendation 952 (1982) of the Parlamentary Assembly "On international means to protect freedom of expression by regulating commercial advertising", Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 25 (1982), Part I. Chapter IV, p. 19; see [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 1923. On the broader possibilities of restrictions in this respect compare Karl Preslmayr, EuGRZ 1985,221- 224. In the case of Barthold (Judgement of March 25 1985, Series A no. 90,6 EuGRZ 1985, 171) the Court did not take a clear position; see Jochen A. Frowein, in: Josef Isensee I Paul Kirchhof (edit.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 7, § 180, N. 59; Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 268. On the problem complex Wolfgang Müller, WRP 1991,20 (22f.); Michael Kloepfer/Gerhard Michael, GRUR 1991, 170 (178 f.); Jochen A. Frowein, AfP 1986, 197 (198 f.). The most recent decision by the Court on this question (Judgement of February 24 1994, Human Rights Law Journal 15 (1994), 184-188 (Case Pablo Casada Coca) seems to tend towards understanding commercial advertising as being covered by the area of protection, even though this is not clearly stated. (compare the same, §§ 35 f.). In concreto the Spanish prohibition of advertisments of lawyers was considered as being in line with Art. 10 EHRe. 23 Michael Kloepfer, Produkthinweispflichten bei Tabakwaren als Verfassungsfrage, p. 44; extensive remarks Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 115 f. (FN 413); compare also Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (349); Edgar Kull, AfP 1993,430 (431). 24 Judgement of April 29 1976, Series A no. 24, 3, 23, § 49 =EuGRZ 1977,38 (42) (Case Handyside); continuous judicature, compare recently the judgement by the Court of October 29 1992, Series A no. 246-A, 4, 30, § 71 = EuGRZ 1992,484 (488) (Case Open Door and Dublin Weil Woman); compare also Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (347); on the term "democratic society" see sub 3. b) dd) (4) (a) p. 54. 25 See [vo E. Schwanz. in: Peter Schiwy IWalter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 94. The correct point of view here is that it is not a question of facts, but a differentiation to be made within the framework of the criterion "necessary in a democratic society", see below sub 5. b) dd); see also Eckart Klein. AfP 1994, 9 (15); Christian Jacq / Francis Teitgen. The

=

1. An overview of the material area of proteetion

21

comprehensive understanding of the freedom of expression covered by Art. 10 Para. 1 (1) ECHR does not binder differentiation between the media as regards content.

d) Freedom ofinformation andfreedom to proeure information Apart from the freedom of expression, Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR also grants the active and passive freedom of information. Regarding the active freedom of information, the text of the Convention speaks of " ... impart information and ideas" in the English version and of " ... communiquer des informations ou idees" in the French version; the German translation, which circumscribes this right as the freedom "zur Mitteilung von Nachrichten und Ideen", here again remains imprecise. Apart from the freedom of expression in (1), the active freedom of information mentioned in Art. 10 Para. 1 (2) ECHR has no constitutive significance, the one is covered by the other, because the area of protection of the freedom of expression is broader. 26 The passive freedom of information, 27 which is described as the right " ... to receive ... information and ideas" in the English version and " ... recevoir ... des informations ou idees" in the French version of the Convention, is the necessary correlative to the active freedom of information, but beyond that it is also an indispensable aspect of a modern bipolar basic right of communication, because only the informedcitizen is able to exert his or her political rights effectively and responsibly.28 Between the freedom of expression and the passive freedom of information there exists the relation of basic rights equivalents. 29 The passive freedom of information must not, however, be understood as if the freedom of expression were also to include conceptually the freedom to receive information. The passive freedom of information not only covers facts perceived when exercising the freedom of expression, but principally all perceptible events. 30 According to the wording, only the freedom "to receive" information is protected. In contrast to Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)31 and Art. 19 Para. 2 of Press, in: Mireille De1mas-Marty (edit.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, p. 69 f. 26 [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 29. 27 Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 remark 5, p. 143, speaks of "freedom of information in a reflexive sense". 28 [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 31; Michael Kloepfer/Gerhard Michael, GRUR 1991, 170 (179); Michael Kloepfer, Produkthinweispflichten bei Tabakwaren als Verfassungsfrage, p. 44. 29 See Kloepfer, Grundrechte als Entstehenssicherung und Bestandsschutz, 1970, p. 58 ff. 30 Gilbert-Hanno Gornig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p.291. 31 Resolution 217 (III): Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records third Session (part I) Resolutions (Doc. A /810), p. 71 (translation in: Sartorius 11 under no. 19).

22

H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights (lPCPR),32 which grant the freedom to obtain information actively ("to seek ... information"),33 the jreedom to proeure injormation 34 is not - as is the common view - generally granted by Art. 10 ECHR. 35 This is not unintentional on the part of the drafters,36 as is demonstrated by an early draft by the group of experts in which this right was initially planned and subsequently deleted. 37 The freedom of information of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR also provides no right to information. Even though modern state legislation stipulates that government organs are obliged to supply information and the individual has an enforceable claim to obtain information,38 it must be stressed that the individual does not have an enforceable claim to obtain information on the basis of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR; Art. 10 ECHR does not demand further supranational or national provisions, but of 32 Of December 19 1966 (BGBI. 197311 p. 1532, for the Federal Republic in force acc. to declaration of lune 14 1976, BGBI. 11 p. 1068, on March 23 1976). - Detailed in this respect Manfred Nowak, CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 19 N. 10 ff. 33 Also the Declaration of the Committee of Ministers "On the freedom of expression and infonnation" of April 29 1982 (published in Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 25 (1982), Part I, Chapter IV, p. 25 - 27), which must be striven for in the field of mass media first of all "the protection of the right of everyone, regardless of frontiers, to express himself, to seek and receive infonnation and ideas, whatever their source, as weil as to impart them under the conditions set out in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (p. 26, sub Il.a., accentuated by the author) - Still unclear regarding the freedom to procure infonnation is its significance within the interpretation of the area of protection of the basic right of communication by Willibald Pahr, To What Extent has Freedom of Expression Evolved?, p. 123. 34 Karl losef Partseh, in: Karl August Bettennann I Franz L. Neumann I Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, 1. Part, p. 435 speaks of the "active freedom of infonnation"; also Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 164. 35 A different point of view Volker Diesbach, V6lkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Infonnationsfreiheit, p. 75 - 78; the same position, but without explanation, Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 expl. 5, p. 143 (compare also there p. 144 above); also not correct Manfred Nowak, CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 19 N. 15. 36 In so far doubting Sabine Astheimer, Rundfunkfreiheit - ein europäisches Grundrecht, p. 51 with FN 10; Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Infonnationsfreiheit, p. 76; as here Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (16). 37 Karl loser Partsch, in: Karl August Bettennann I Franz L. Neumann/Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, 1st Part, p. 436 points out that also Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR does not grant this freedom, because the rights of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR can be restricted "to prevent the disclosure of infonnation received in confidence ... ". If Para. 1 contained a guarantee of the "active freedom of information", this infonnation would also have had to be protected against investigation (p. 436 remark 674). Also Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Infonnationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 292; Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 56; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 164. 38 Compare only § 4 Umweltinfonnationsgesetz of 8.7.1994 (BGBI. I p. 1490).

1. An overview of the material area of protection

23

course does not prohibit them either. 39 Nor does this norm grant the public the right to be informed generally about the activities of administration and govemment. 40 Nevertheless, interference by govemmental organs rendering difficult or hindering the reception of information from generally available sources 41 is inadmissible in any case. 42 It still remains to be pointed out that Art. 10 Para. 1 (2) ECHR grants the passive freedom of information "regardless of frontiers". The right to receive information is therefore also extended to indude foreign printed products as well as (within the restrictions made by Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR) foreign radio and television. 43 e) Freedom ofthe press

The necessity of the following survey of the freedom of expression and information granted by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR results, finally, from the lack of an explicit guarantee of the freedom of the press. The fundamental significance attributed to the free press in a democratic community found no dear, specific expression in the 39 The European Court of Human Rights in the case Leander in its judgement of 26. 3. 1987 (Series A no. 116,6,29, § 74): "Article 10 does not, in circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on the individual a right of access to a register containing information on his personal position nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the individual." So the Court did not actually determine whether the freedom to obtain information should not, in fact, be accepted in certain circumstances (but Michael O. Müller goes too fm; ZUM 1994,289 (290); restrictive also Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 N. 13). As far as it is known, the commission has made only negative decisions up to now (compare decision no. 8383/78 of 3. 10. 1979, Decision and Reports 17, 227). lrene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 38, in this respect points out correctly that in a democratic society it could be necessary to grant the citizen the right to obtain information from an official, if he is only in this way able to exert a democratic right. Compare also Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (16). 40 lrene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 34; Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 280; critical Jörg P. Müller, ZUM 1987, 1 (5). 41 Detailed Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 69 -71. 42 Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (352f.); Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 292; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 164; Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 280 (with express and correct reference to the decision by the Court in the case of Sunday Times, the grounds of which do not indicate anything to the contrary, despite the emphasis of the right of the public to receive information through the media; ebenso Martin Bullinger, same place, p. 353 f.). 43 See lvo E. Schwanz, in: Peter Schiwy /Walter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 95 f.

24

II. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

ECHR. This may be surprising,44 but in this respect the ECHR is congruent with the other human rights catalogues and must be understood in their historical context. The historical perspective 45 shows clearly that the freedom to receive information contains important links not only with the "classical" human right of the freedom of the press, but also with the freedom regarding other information media, as weH as with aH the means of mass communication emerging as technology continues to develop. With the wording "freedom to seek ... information ... through any ... media", Art. 19 UDHR and Art. 19 Para. 2 IPCPR express this aspect more clearly than the ECHR, despite the fact that Art. 10 ECHR does not set out to determine anything to the contrary.46 The lack of an explicit guarantee of freedom for individual media - as already intimated, Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR merely lays down the adrnissibility of a licensing requirement regarding radio, television and cinema - is therefore also not damaging, as the guarantee contained in Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR is unanimously seen to include 47 the mass media48 and in particular the freedom of the press, which is even considered by some to be the nucleus of the human right of freedom of information. 49 Therefore, in recent literature the rights gran ted by Art. 10 ECHR are appropriately summarised by the term freedom of communication. 50 Interference with the freedom of information does not necessarily begin with the severance of the link between the bearers of the basic rights and the source of in44 Compare instead of many Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 57; Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garan-· tien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 70; Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (13). 45 Explicitly Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 FN 8, p. 146. 46 More detailed Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 24 - 26. 47 Compare instead of all Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (417); Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 165; Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRKKommentar, Art. 10 N. 16ff.; Walfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 282; Christian JacqlFrancis Teitgen, The Press, in: Mireille Delmas-Marty (edit.), The European Convention for the Proteetion of Human Rights, p. 62 f.; Edgar Kuli, AfP 1993, 430; Klaus Stern, Staatsrecht, vol. 3/2, p. 1569; [vo E. Schwartz, in: Peter Schiwy/Walter J. SchUtz(edit.), Medienrecht, p. 93; Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 9. 48 Mass media are those technical and organisational carriers of content which can be spread by communicators to an unlimited, dispersed public, Winand Gellner; Massenmedien, in: Oscar W. Gabriel (edit.), Die EG-Staaten im Vergleich, p. 277. 49 Yutaka Tajima, Revue des droits de l'homme 2 (1969), 658 (664). 50 Compare as an example Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechfsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 282; Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS.,p.4.

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

25

fonnation, but can already take place when the emergence and development of a source of infonnation is hindered. In spite of the above-mentioned restriction in Art. 10 ECHR regarding the guarantee offree infonnation obtained from generaHy available sources, the state must not hinder the emergence of such generally available sources of infonnation, given the aim and purpose of the provision. For this reason, the requirement of official approval for press enterprises would be also (going beyond the argurnenturn e contrario Art. 10 Para. 1(3) ECHR) an inadrnissible interference according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. 51 2. An overview of the personal area of protection granted by Art. 10 ECHR a) Bearers 0/ human rights aa) The basic right of communication according to Art. 10 ECHR is an universal right and is therefore applicable to foreigners - in the territory of the member states of the European Council - and native Europeans to the same extent and with the same restrictions. 52 Art. 16 ECHR, which constitutes a material restriepon of the exercise of, amongst other things, the human right according to Art. 10 ECHR and is not only a rule of interpretation,53 does, however, pennit the member states to apply special restrictions to the political activities of foreigners. The freedom of expression according to Art. 10 ECHR can therefore be restricted further, namely by disregarding the fonnal and material requirements of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR as weH as the prohibition of discrirnination according to Art. 14 ECHR. 54 According to Art. 16 ECHR, the restriction of political activities does not require a legal basis, but in Gennany such a legal basis exists in § 37 AuslG (Foreigners Act).55 bb) The Strasbourg organs treat the personal area of protection in a very broad sense of the tenn. In the relevant judicature regarding press publications, apart 51 As here Heinz Guradze. EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 remark 10, p. 147; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy. Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 165; Peter Curdin Ragaz. Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 63; not dear Huben Schom. Die EMRK in Einwirkung auf das deutsche Recht, p. 256. 52 See above sub 1. b), p. 17. 53 Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy. Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 48. 54 Volker Diesbach. Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 165; Ulrich Hoffinann-Remy. Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 48; the regulation can be interpreted restrictively. compare Wolfgang Peuken. Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p.279. 55 See also § 14 Vereinsgesetz (Law Relating to Associations).

26

H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

from publishers, editors, chief editors and employed editors 56 (for whom it is taken for granted), press informers57 and third parties who occasionally publish news paper articles were also included;58 and not long after this the authors of readers' letters. 59 The fact that the freedom of expression and information of Art. 10 ECHR is in essence an individual basic right does not rule out the possibility of juristic persons - including those motivated purely by profit60 - also being holders of rightS. 61 Not only individuals, but also juristic persons and even associations not possessing legal capacity can therefore lay claim to the rights of the ECHR. 62 This can be derived from Art. 25 ECHR: under the preconditions mentioned there, any natural person, non-govemmental organisation or association of persons is actively legitimated in proceedings of individual complaint63 in case of the breach of the rights granted by the Convention. This necessarily supposes that these associations of persons and organisations are entitled to use the material rights and freedoms of the ECHR, otherwise the acceptance of the capacity to complain in Art. 25 ECHR would be useless. 64 Therefore the right of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR is not only granted to persons working in press enterprises, but also to the press enterprises themselves, irrespective of their legal form. 65 The organs of the Convention quite evidently accept this without reservation. 66 This would appear quite understandable 56 Judgement by the Court of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4, 6, § land 29, §§ 44 f. = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (Case Sunday Times). 57 Judgement by the Court of 22. 5. 1990, Series A no. 177, 6, 20, § 42 (Case Weber). 5B Judgement by the Court of 23. 4. 1992, Series A no. 236, 7, 20 f., §§ 34 f. (Case Casteils). 59 Judgement by the Court of 25.6. 1992, Series A no. 239,6, 24f., § 56 (Case Thorgeir Thorgeirson). 60 Continuous judicature, recently in the judgement by the Court of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,7,23, § 47, further reference = EuGRZ 1990,261 (262) (Case Autronic). 61 On the complex Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (420). 62 Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, Einleitung § 3 IV, p. 9; Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 279; Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 9. 63 Detailed on the proceedings Klaus Stern, Staatsrecht, vol. 3/2, p. 1606ff.; Karl-Peter Sommermann, Der Schutz der Menschenrechte im Rahmen des Europarates, p. 16 ff. 64 Also Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 165 f. 65 Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 165; Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 97. 66 In the case of the Sunday Times the editor in chief of this newspaper complained on his own behalf and on behalf of the publishing house, the Commission considered this as being admissible without restrictions (Complaint no. 6538/74, Report of 18.5. 1977, published in EuGRZ 1977,439 (440)), also the Court in the respective judgement. Confirmed in the case Autronic (Judgement of 22. 5. 1990, Series A no. 178,7,23, § 47 = EuGRZ 1990, 261 [262]

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

27

from the point of view of an effective protection of human rights, because in a time of the predominance of the printed or technical transmission of opinions and news the media enterprise in its financial and organisational complexity has become an endangered object of interference and needs human rights protection. 67

b) Obligors ofthe human right: "Effeet on third parties" ("Drittwirkung") and institutional guarantee ? aa) Introduction The human rights and basic freedoms of the ECHR are fundamentally formulated as individual rights and grant fundamental freedom against state interference. 68 The ECHR and its protocols do not fundamentally constitute positive rights against the state. The only exception to the role is the right to education granted by Art. 21st Protocol. Incidentally, according to the continuous judicature of the European Court of Human Rights only the right to the equal access to existing educational institutions can be derived from this positive right; the establishment of particular, as yet unavailable forms of education or, in general, the extension of the number of educational institutions cannot be demanded. 69 Neither the ECHR nor the Human Rights Codifications of the United Nations contain any express reference to the effect that the rights and freedoms that they grant also apply directly amongst citizens in their mutual legal relations, i.e. having "effect on third parties". However, it must be assumed that the problem of the effect on third parties played no part - if it was known at all - during discussions of the (various) drafts ofthe ECHR. In fact, numerous phrases suggest that the ECHR was drafted entirely without consideration for the relations existing between private individuals. 7o However, this cannot be the decisive factor. 71 The c1assical with special reference to the decisions in the case Sunday Times and the case Markt intern, Judgement of 30.3.1989, Series A no. 165,4,20, § 34). Further examples Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 97 f. (with FN 265), and Panagiotis Tsakiridis, Das Recht der Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit nach Art. 10 EMRK und die Frage seiner Drittwirkung, p. 121 (with FN 379). 67 Similar Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (420 f.). 68 Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 3, speaks of an "abstention right" and by this means "a prohibition for the state to interfere, i.e. a duty of abstention in the field of the freedom of communication." Compare also Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (351 f.). 69 Compare Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 2 of the 1st Protocol, N. 2 ff.; Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (424 f.). 70 P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 15; Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 49.

28

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

principle of international law "pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt", which means that neither bilateral nor multilateral contracts have entitling or obliging effects for non-contracting parties, has almost certainly been derogated by the practice of internationallaw for some considerable time, if we consider, for example, collective security pacts, supranational comrnunity treaties or agreements to prevent double taxation. 72 Volker Diesbach 's view 73 that, unlike nationallaws, which may "develop a life of their own, independent of the will of the historicallegislator, and pos sibly even change in significance", contracts in international law are "ultimately invariably subject to the will of the contracting parties" must be qualified within the framework of the ECHR. By no means is the - historical - will of the contracting parties alone decisive in the interpretation of the ECHR. The purpose of the ECHR, namely the protection of humans at that time, marks the interpretation of the Convention, which is independent of the understanding of the time of its emergence. 74 More recently in particular, the Strasbourg organs emphasise consistently that the ECHR should be interpreted "in the light of present day conditions". 75 Admittedly, it must be stressed that the ECHR may well grant the individual natural person the right under international law to subjectivity in international law (right of individuals to complain), but this legal subjectivity - very rare in international law - says nothing about legal relations between natural persons. 76 The question as to whether the ECHR gives rise to protective duties of the state or even produces an effect on third parties will be answered below. Another question, which will not be treated in greater depth here, is whether the states in their national legal systems expressly include effect on third parties in the human rights and basic freedoms of the Convention. One thing is certain: the Convention does not fundamentally prevent them from doing SO.77 71 Also P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 16, further reference. 72 Compare instead of many Meo-Micaela Hahne, Das Drittwirkungsproblem in der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, p. 28 ff. 73 Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 113; similar Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 216 with FN 8. 74 Compare Eckart Klein, AfP 1994, 9 (10). 75 Guiding decisions: Judgements by the Court of 25. 4. 1978, Series A no. 26, 4, 15 f., § 31 =EuGRZ 1979, 162 (164) (Case Tyrer); of 13. 6. 1979, Series A no. 31,4, 19f., § 41 = EuGRZ 1979,454 (457) (Case March); of 18.12.1986, Series A no. 112,5, 24ff., §§ 53, 57 =EuGRZ 1987,313 (316f.) (Case Johnston et al.); of 28. 10. 1987, Series A no. 126,6, 18, § 41 (Case Inze). On the evolutionary interpretation of the ECHR Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 49; in general on the evolutionary interpretation of international contracts Georg Ress, Verfassungsrechtliche Auswirkungen der Fortentwicklung völkerrechtlicher Verträge, in: Festschrift Wolfgang Zeidler, p. 1778 ff.; Karl-Peter Sommermann, Der Schutz der Menschenrechte im Rahmen des Europarates, p. 23. Compare also P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 16. 76 Compare only Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, Völkerrecht, N. 937 ff.

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

29

bb) Practice of the Convention organs The practice of the European Comrnission of Human Rights is, generally speak:ing, not very enlightening regarding the question of the effects on third parties. As regards Art. 25 ECHR, the Comrnission regularly declares itself not to be responsible for complaints directed against natural or juristic persons in private law and rejects these ratione personae as being inadmissible. 78 It is not quite clear in this respect whether the Commission negates only the (procedural) capacity to be a party in a law-suit or whether it also answers negatively the (material-legal) question of the effect on third parties regarding granted human rights and basic freedoms. 79 A quite different situation emerges if the individual complaint is directed against sovereign activities, for example against a court judgement of the last instance. The European Commission on Human Rights had to examine the effects of the freedom of expression on a private-law employment relationship (the Rommelfanger case).80 The complaint was directed against adecision made by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) in a constitutional complaint proceeding 81 initiated by a church foundation as the carrier of a catholic hospital against the successful action of an assistant medical practitioner against unfair dismissal. Because of his publicly stated point of view in favour of the right to abortion, the employer disrnissed the medical practitioner first by notice and subsequently without notice. The Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled that the medical practitioner's view was contrary to the fundamental stance of the catholic church in the question of the sanctity of human life and that he had, according to the norms of canon law, advocated a serious crime. This understanding was seen to be decisive 11 Detailed on this Andrew Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law, p. 199 ff; the question remained open in the judgement by the Court of 6.2. 1976, Series A no. 20, 4, 14, § 37 = EuGRZ 1976, 62, 64 (Case Svenska Lokmannafärbundet) (compare Vincent Berger; Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 68 f.). 18 Compare P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 14, 67; Dirk Voorhoof Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 4. 19 Compare instead of many decision no. 11 002 /84 by the Commission of 8. 3. 1985 in the case Henrikus van der Heijden, Decisions and Reports 41, 264. Compare also Sabine Astheimer; Rundfunkfreiheit - ein europäisches Grundrecht, p. 13; Panagiotis Tsakiridis, Das Recht der Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit nach Art. 10 EMRK und die Frage seiner Drittwirkung, p. 238; Peter Curdin Ragaz, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 50; P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 15; Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presseund Informationsfreiheit, p. 120. On the relation between right to apply and holding of a right already Karl lose! Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann / Franz L. Neumann / Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, 1st Part, p. 295. 80 Decision no. 12242/86 of6. 9.1989, Decisions and Reports 62,151. 81 Of 4.6. 1985, BVerfGE 70, 138.

30

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

for the breach of loyalty on the part of the medical practitioner,82 who could not call upon the protection of basic rights granted by Art. 5 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), "especially because his position as such was not subject to evaluation within an 'altemating c1ash of opinions",.83 The individual complaint of the medical practitioner was rejected by the European Commission of Human Rights as being c1early unfounded. Among other things, the Commission emphasised that the employer of the practitioner is an organisation which is founded on particular, upright convictions and values. The decision made by the Bundesverfassungsgericht is adequate as regards the right to the freedom of expression of the employer and is in accordance with the Convention. The employer could not exercise his right effectively without imposing certain loyalty obligations on his employee in this respect. 84

cc) Effect on third parties ("Drittwirkung") and protective duties (J) Preliminary considerations

Nothing can be derived from the practice of the Convention organs as regards the immediate effect on third parties ("unmittelbare Drittwirkung,,).85 In fact, the only thing c1ear at first is that effects on third parties (private persons) must be mediated by state legal acts if Art. 10 ECHR is to apply. However, recent decisions by the Strasbourg organs does partly (though so far seI dom within the framework of Art. 10 ECHR) indicate a tendency that individual rights of the Convention can lead to legislative and executive duties regarding the human right of conformity of legal relations between private persons. 86 It is uncertain whether it may therefore be conc1uded that Art. 10 ECHR - even if its direction at the state is fundamentally maintained - also contains private-law guarantees. 87 Cautious interpretation is required here. But even if one correctly assumes that the rights and freedoms of the ECHR are not directed at third parties, there remains the question as to what extent the member states of the ECHR can be responsible for the interference by private persons with human rights and basic freedoms. An express protective duty results only from Art. 2 Para. 1 (1) ECHR. The duty of the state to protect human life by

82

83

BVerfGE 70,138 (170f.). BVerfGE 70,138 (172).

84 On the complex also Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 285; Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 12. 85 Compare also Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 65 with FN 171. 86 Compare in general instead of many the judgement by the Court of 21. 6. 1988, Series A no. 139,5,12, § 32 = EuGRZ 1989,522 (524) (Case platform "Physicians for Life"). 87 Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (421).

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

31

law also applies to interference by third parties. This does not prejudice anything, however, for the other subject matter under the protection of the ECHR. 88

(2) A general pratective duty of the state resulting fram Art. 1 ECHR? The situation would be quite different, however, if a general performance guarantee of the state were to result from Art. 1 ECHR;89 according to this standard, the signatory states are obliged to ass ure the rights and freedoms of the Convention to all the persons under their government. In part, far-reaching conclusions are drawn from this standard: the rights and freedoms of the ECHR are not only granted with respect to the state, but also with respect to third parties. 90 The states are said therefore to be obliged to protect the objects of individual legal protection with the help of legislation, also against violations on the part of third parties; if the states violate this duty they are seen to be responsible for interference based on this by third parties. 91 This cannot apply even initially: Art. 1 ECHR does not materially add anything to the duties - which result from the various human right guarantees - of the Convention states. 92 The scope of the state's duties in fact results exclusively from the various rights and duties granted by the Convention. Art. 1 ECHR does indeed contain a guarantee duty - made necessary by the fact that the ECHR has the character of a contract of international law - for those states in which the ECHR is not treated as an internal state law (Le. without an order to apply the law or a law of transformation). However, the provision says nothing about the scope of application of this duty and whether it should embrace the behaviour of third par88 On the secondary protecti ve duties deri ving from the guarantee of the legal protection by the court in Art. 6 Para. I ECHR detailed Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 236 ff.; basically against a differentiation ace. to primary and secondary protective duties Johannes Dietlein, Die Lehre von den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten, p. 130 ff. 89 In general on the meaning of this standard Wolfgang Kleeberger, Die Stellung der Rechte der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention in der Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 36 ff. 90 Amongst others, Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, p.226. 91 The Court in its judgement of 13. 8. 1981, Series A no. 44, 4, 20, §§ 48 f. (Case Young, James und Webster) (the translation in EuGRZ 1981, 559 - 563 is in so far incomplete); similar Panagiotis Tsakiridis, Das Recht der Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit nach Art. 10 EMRK und die Frage seiner Drittwirkung, p. 228. On the case Young, James und Webster Dietrich Murswiek, JuS 1983, 58 f.; Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 151 ff. 92 Also Meo-Micaela Hahne, Das Drittwirkungsproblem in der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, p. 55.

32

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

ties. 93 The interpretation mentioned above adds something to Art. 1 ECHR that it . seeks to extract from the same. 94 For this reason Art. 1 ECHR cannot be taken as the basis for the thesis of the protective duties of the Convention states with respect to third parties. The correct understanding of Art. 1 ECHR is to be found in the following, diametrically opposite approach: if the member state has such a protective duty according to other provisions of the Convention, this state is then also, according to Art. 1 ECHR, obliged to fulfil this protective duty through its internal state legislation. 95

(3) Protective duties as a matter 0/ attribution Further considerations are necessary in order to find out whether the state has a protective duty - according to the ECHR - with respect to interference by third parties. In the case of Young, James and Webster,96 the European Court of Human Rights implicitly considered the state to be responsible for a violation of the Convention because - in the Court's view - through its nationallegislation, the state accepts a violation on the part of third parties of objects protected by the Convention (i.e. the state does not impose the prohibition of illegality on such violations). This therefore touches on the question of the attribution of the behaviour of third parties, because if one correctly assumes that the human rights and basic freedoms of the ECHR are fundamentally directed at the state, the question of the protective duty of the state is necessarily a question of attribution. A decisive factor for this problem of attribution is the fact that the legal systems of the states of the European Council regularly provide legal assurance for everything which is allowed in the form of prohibitions of violation and thereby oblige the subjects under their government to tolerate the non-prohibited behaviour of others. By imposing this obligation to tolerate, the state restricts the rights and freedoms of the Convention if the behaviour to be tolerated of third parties violates legal objects protected by the ECHR. 97 The following fact is decisive: the express or tacit admission by the state of interference on the part of third parties is linked to state interference with legal positions gran ted by the Convention and therefore demands a justification of the interference; this is assessed according to the c1early expressed reservations under the proviso of the various human right guarantees. 98 It must be mentioned in 93 Also P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 15. 94 Correctly Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 222. 95 Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 223. 96 Judgement of 13. 8. 1981, Series A no. 44, 4 (case Young, James und Webster). 97 More detailed Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 226ff.; respectively for nationallaw Udo Di Fabio, Risikoentscheidungen im Rechtsstaat, p. 46 ff.

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33

this context that, when the European Court of Human Rights imposes on the member states the duty to protect against violations by third parties, it concedes greater latitude to the states regarding the choice of means. 99 Up to now, however, the case practice of the Strasbourg organs has provided little concrete occasion for the development of c1early positive protective duties of the state from Art. 10 ECHR. 1OO In its report on the case of De Geillustreerde Pers of Jul y 16th 1976,10 1 however, the Commission indicated that, although the protection of commercial interests as such is not contained in the scope of guarantee of Art. 10 ECHR, something else may be valid for the case where member states violate their duty to protect against excessive press concentration. 102 It could be conc1uded that the Commission abstractly recognises the obligation of govemment organs to take measures against media monopolies which lead to violations of the freedom of communication. 103 However, the Commission did not draw concrete conc1usions from this indication; it mentions neither a limit from which the state should (allegedly) be obliged to interfere, nor other more detailed criteria. 104 Therefore, consequences which would force a qualification of the point of view stated here, i.e. that any measure relevant to the freedom of communication must be judged according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR,105 cannot be drawn from this decision either. 98 Also Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 226, 242; Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (15); the result as before, but without foundation Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 4. Also Gerhard Robbers, Sicherheit als Menschenrecht, p. 24 f., correcdy does not attach to the understanding of protective duties of the state in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Young, James and Webster a significance that goes essentially beyond the defensive function of human rights. 99 In this respect in detail below sub 3. b). From the jurisdiction compare only the judgement by the Court of 21. 6. 1988, Series A no. 139,5, 12, § 32 = EuGRZ 1989,522 (524) (Case platforrn "Physicians for Life"). 100 Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 284. 101 No. 5178171, Decisions and Reports 8, 5 (14), § 88. 102 In its decisions no. 10871/84 of 10. 6. 1986, Decisions and Reports 48, 154 and no. 11366/85 of 16. 10. 1986, Decisions and Reports 50, 173 (175) the Commission underlined furtherrnore that the states are responsible for a minimum of protection of honour. One has to differentiate between the question of the protection of commercial interests by Art. 10 EHRC (as a problem of the area of protection) and the question of the bearers of human rights. As mentioned above, according to the (correct) point of view of the Court, also purely profit-oriented persons can call upon Art. 10 ECHR. 103 Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 12. 104 Critical also Christian Jacq / Francis Teitgen, The Press, in: Mireille Delmas-Marty (edit.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, p. 63. 105 The same result also Martin Bullinger; Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (358).

3 Kloepfer

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

34

(4) Protective duties ofthe state on the level of the European Community? In the judicature of the European Court the term protective duties - as far as can be seen - has so far not emerged at European Community level, not even in the typical cases of protective duties as regards life and health protection. Until now the Court has understood the basic rights, which are binding - as mentioned - for the Court, fundamentally in their defensive function against imperative interference (status negativus) alone. 106 This also applies to the freedom of expression and information. It is questionable whether anything else can be concluded from the judgement of the European Court in the case of Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda a.o .. /. Commissariaat voor de Media of July 25th 1971. In this preliminary ruling on the question as to whether restrictions of free service transactions in the Netherlands can be justified by cultural-political considerations (protection of the freedom of opinion of the various social, cultural, religious and intellectual movements as they should develop in press and broadcasting media), the Court explained the following regarding Art. 10 ECHR: 107 "A cultural policy understood in that sense may indeed constitute an overriding requirement relating to the general interest which justifies a restriction on the freedom to provide services. The maintenance of the pluralism which that dutch policy seeks to safeguard is connected with freedom of expression, as protected by Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, which is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the community legal order ( ... ).,,108

The explanations of the Court, however, lack any dogmatically sufficiently tenable foundation. 109 In particular for this reason it would appear unjustifiable to interpret these thin statements as meaning that Art. 10 ECHR contains "a legal obligation of the Community to create a balanced variety in the European fields of communication" and "an obligation for all the organs bound to the basic rights of the community to protect and support media diversity".11O However the concept of pluralism is evaluated,l11 a protective duty derived from Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR must definitely be rejected when activities based on Art. 10 Para. I ECHR ensuring or mediating pluralism with the effect of restricting human rights at the same time are not to be assessed in terms of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR.

Detailed Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994, 400ff. Lawsuit C-288/89, col. 1991,1-4007 (1-4043, N. 23). 108 The same wording in the judgement of 25. 7. 1991, Lawsuit C-353/89, col. 1991, 1-4069 (1-4097, N. 30); approved by judgement of 3.2. 1993, Lawsuit C-148/91 (Association Veronica Omroep Organisitie / Commissariaat voor de Media) EuZW 1993, 251 (252). 109 Conceded also by Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (412). 110 But Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (414). 111 See below sub 3. b) dd) (3), p. 50. 106

107

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

35

(5) Interim result

The acceptance of protective duties of the state by no means renders the discussion of the effect on third parties obsolete. lJ2 However, caution is called for when attempting to apply further considerations on the national constitutional law unquestioningly to the level of the ECHR. The differentiated dogmatics of the defensive rights granted by the Convention, which are not in contradiction of the protective duties discussed l13 (due to their links to state activities), must under no circumstances be displaced, as it were,114 by claiming an "all-around right" ("Rundumrecht") or a direct effect on third parties. 115

dd) Institutionalisation of the freedom of the press according to Art. 10 ECHR? (1) In recent times, the original singular significance of the freedom of the press as a defensive right has frequently - without having an echo up to now in the practice of the Convention organs - taken second place behind the demand for an extensively interpreted basic right of communication, which is to be ensured by the positive action of the state: " ... , it is now a right of the individual to free communication which public authority is bound to ensure also by taking positive action.''\16 As mentioned before, the human rights guarantees ofthe ECHR can under certain circumstances impose protective duties of the state. However, should such statements approve an exclusive or primarily institutionalised understanding of the freedom of expression and information and thereby of the freedom of the press, a cautious approach is called for.

(2) If - on this line - the resolution 1003 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council postulates that "news organisations" are "special socio112 Instructive on the link between effect on third parties and protective duties Gerhard Robbers, Sicherheit als Menschenrecht, p. 201 ff. 113 Dietrich Murswiek, in: Hans-Joachim Konrad (edit.), Referate der 23. Tagung der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung Öffentliches Recht, p. 242; too restrictive Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 122 ff. 114 Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (6); Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (15); often too far Panagiotis Tsakiridis, Das Recht der Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit nach Art. 10 EMRK und die Frage seiner Drittwirkung, passim. 115 Therefore erroneous the judgement by the Landgericht Mannheim of 12. 8. 1955 (NJW 1956, 384), which concludes without a clear explanation from Art. 10 ECHR a claim to reply to a private press enterprise; but correct Ulrich HojJmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - II Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 165; wrong also Meo-Micaela Hahne, Das Drittwirkungsproblem in der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, p. 70. 116 Willibald Pahr; To What Extent has Freedom of Expression Evolved?, p. 129; tendencially also Dirk Voorhoof Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 3.

3*

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

36

economic agencies" whose economic aims must be restricted 1l7 and calls for "citizens' participation in public affairs", 118 the question arises as to whether these postulates from the point of view of Art. 10 ECHR do not imply an institutionalisation of the press, i.e. whether, ultimately, objective press rules linked with the basic rights should take the place of the freedom of the press (as the classical defensive right).1l9 (3) "Institutional guarantees" ("Institutsgarantien") are alien to the nature of the ECHR;120 at best, the protection offamily life by Art. 8 in conjunction with Art. 12 ECHR could be considered an institutional guarantee. 12l Heinz Guradze's claim that, while the freedom of the press is implied in Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, the authors of the Convention did not recognise "die Fortentwicklung vom Individualrecht als Unterfall der Meinungsfreiheit zur selbständigen Einrichtungsgarantie ... : ( ... ) Soweit daher Art. 10 Abs. I [EMR]K hinter Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG zurückbleibt, gelten dessen günstigere Normen. ( ... the further development from the right of the individual as a sub-case of the freedom of opinion to an independent institutional guarantee ... : ( ... ) As far as in this respect Art. 10 of the Convention (ECHR) contains less than Art. 5 Para. I Grundgesetz, the more favourable standards of the latter are applied),,122 is certainly not tenable in this form. 123 Tbe judicature of the Convention organs hardly permits a pure or primarily institutionalised final interpretation of the guarantee of the press law: in its judicature the Court does repeatedly emphasise in particular that - apart from the fundamental significance of the freedom of expression in a democratic society 124 - a major task of the press is to be a "purveyor of information and public watchdog,,125 and points out that the mass media are responsible for the dissemination of information which

No. 11 of the Resolution. No. 17 of the Resolution. 119 Compare Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (6). 120 Firrnly Ulrich Scheune" Die Fortbildung der Grundrechte in internationalen Konventionen durch die Rechtsprechung, in: Festschrift Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, p. 919; tendencially different Albert Bleckmann, Die Bindung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft an die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 151 f. 121 Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 165. 122 EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10 FN 8, p. 146. 123 Also Hubert Schom, Die EMRK in Einwirkung auf das deutsche Recht, p. 255, who also transmits the principles valid to Art. 5 Grundgesetz to Art. 10 ECHR and draws partly wrong conclusions (see e.g. the same, p. 256: "Nach dem Gesetz über die Presse ( ... ) ist diese im Gegensatz zu Artikel 10 EMRK [sie!] keinem Genehmigungs- oder Zulassungsverfahren unterworfen". (According to the law on the press ( ... ) this is not - in comparison to Art. 10 ECHR [sic!]- bound to any procedure of approval or admission.) 124 "Freedom of expression ( ... ) constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratie society and one of the basie conditions for its progress and for each individual's selffulfilment.", Judgement by the Court of 8.7. 1986, Series A no. 103, 14,26, § 41 = EuGRZ 1986,424 (428) (Case Lingens). 117 118

2. An overview of the personal area of protection

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is of public interest. Furthermore, the public has a right to receive the information spread by the media, as we11 as the right to be informed in an adequate manner. 126 It is, however, highly questionable whether such a right can rea11y be derived from Art. 10 ECHR I27 This "right" is not discussed further by the Court. Any interpretation of Art. 10 ECHR which preferred the objective-Iegal interpretation of the freedom of the press at the expense of the individual-legal freedom of the press or replaced it would not be tenable anyway: the particular emphasis of the outstanding significance of the press in a democratic constitutional state must always be seen in the context of the decision concemed. By no means was it the intention of the Court to take an objective-Iegal view of the freedom of the press, i.e. objective press rules instead of subjective freedom of the press. In a11 its rulings on press law the Court has underlined the special status of the free press in imposing on the state more restraint as regards the protection of honour of politicians,128 the protection of state secrets, 129 the impartiality of the administration of justice,130 as well as of the criminal prosecution authorities and courts. I3I The functions of the press in a democratic society are therefore used here as an argumentative support of the "c1assical" defensive right of the free press and strengthen the human rights guarantee of freedom. 132 Areduction of freedom possibly linked with an institutionalised understanding of the freedom of the press was never intended by the Court. 133 The main emphasis of the Strasbourg judicature c1early lies in that interpretation of Art. 10 ECHR which grants the bearers of human rights a subjective entitlement. 134 (4) In two recent decisions, the European Court of Human Rights had to deal with the broadcasting law for the first time, and the decisions made cannot be used 125 E.g. the Court in the case Barthold, Judgement of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6, 26, § 58 = EuGRZ 1985, 171 (175); confirmed by the judgement of 26. 11. 1991, Series A no. 217,4,28 f., § 50 (Case Sunday Times II). 126 Judgement by the Court of 26.4. 1979, Series A no. 30,4,40, § 65 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (390) (Case Sunday Times); similar also in the judgement of 23. 5. 1991, Series A no. 204, 4, 25 f., § 58 = EuGRZ 1991, 216 (222) (Case Oberschlick). 127 Martin Bullinger; Human Rights Law Journal 6 (1985), 339 (353 f.); Jochen A. Frowein, AfP 1986, 197 (198); however agreeing Dirk Voorhooj, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 14. 128 E.g. in the case Lingens (Judgement by the Court of 8.7. 1986, Series A no. 103, 14 = EuGRZ 1986,424). 129 Case Sunday Times II (Judgement by the Court of 26. 11. 1991, Series A no. 217,4). 130 Case Sunday Times (Judgement by the Court of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4 = EuGRZ 1979, 386). 13l Cases Castells (Judgement by the Court of 23.4. 1992, Series A no. 236,7) and Thorgeir Thorgeirson (Judgement by the Court of 25.6. 1992, Series A no. 239, 6). 132 Also Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (13). 133 Correct Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (6); also Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (15). 134 Also evaluated by Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (13).

38

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

in favour of a (purely or primarily) institutionalised understanding of the press. In the cases of Groppera et al. 135 and Autronic 136 the Court decided that all measures taken by the states on the basis of Art. 10 Para. I (3) ECHR (possibility of a licensing procedure for radio, television and cinema) must also fulfil the criteria of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. 137 The aim of Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR is said to lie in c1arifying that the states on their territory are allowed to regulate by a licence procedure the mode and manner (in particular) of broadcasting with particular regard to the technical aspects. It is not planned, however, for the other aspects of the licence procedures not to be subject to the conditions of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR; this would contradict the aim and purpose of Art. 10 ECHR. Up to these decisions made in 1990, Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR was seen as a kind of gateway to an institutional understanding of broadcasting. 138 On the basis of the judicature mentioned above, this understanding is no longer tenable. 139 But if in the field of broadcasting all state interference has to pass through the "eye of a needle" of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR, this must be most certainly apply to the press, which is not in the least inc1uded in Art. 10 Para. 1 (3) ECHR. Accordingly, state measures which are "formative" in the sense that, from the very outset, they are not subject to the disciplinary restrictive regulations laid out in Para. 2, cannot exist. However, for certain legal measures of the organisation of basic rights the aspect of the normative facilitation of basic rights is put in the foreground to such an extent that it would be difficult to qualify these legal measures immediately as a restriction of basic rights - at least in their major aspects. All in all, it is evident that all restrictions of the freedom of the press must be seen in terms of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR; the organs of the European Council cannot evade this. 140 Even though their consideration that journalists are a typical (and sometimes endangered) "circ1e of beneficiaries" ("Nutznießerkreis") 141 of the guarantee of the freedom of the press may be correct to some extent, the mere possibility that 135 Judgement of 28. 3. 1990, Series A no. 173, 4, 22ff., §§ 53 ff. = EuGRZ 1990, 255 (256 ff.). 136 Judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4, 24ff., §§ 52ff. = EuGRZ 1990,261 (262 ff.). I37 Compare instead of many Jochen A. Frowein, in: Josef Isensee I Paul Kirchhof (edit.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 7, § 180, N. 62; Michael O. Müller, ZUM 1994,289 (290); Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (415 f.). 138 Detailed proof by Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 43 - 61. 139 Whether or not the broadcasting c1ause has lost any practical significance, as Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (6) thinks, is not relevant in this respect. 140 Also Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 13 f., drawing the attention quite correctIy also to Art. 17 ECHR; accordingly, any interpretation reducing freedom is impossible. Compare in this respect Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 49 ff. 141 Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (17).

3. Fonnal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

39

such a (supposed) special right of journalists to shape human rights has restricting effects on the other bearers of human rights (in particular editors and publishers) demands a differentiated examination of these proposals in terms of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. This will be explained below. 3. Formal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR a) General remarks on the dogmatics

0/ limitations

aa) The practical value of international human rights is assessed not least by their limitations, i.e. above all by the possibility to predict and check their limitS. 142 If the guarantee of European human rights and basic freedoms becomes effective, the ECHR would need not only institutional preparation for an effective control, but also justiciable principles to evaluate the demarcation between freedom and obligation, should these be in the hands of the national legislators. 143 Even though the most exact circumscription of the possibilities of the state to restrict basic rights would have been desirable on the one hand, the referral to undetermined restrictive reservations was indispensable in many cases, simply because the respective national peculiarities must be taken into account in a way that respects the states' sovereignty. Therefore, the ECHR tries to attain a high degree of predictability of the restrictions of freedom 144 by using a differentiated and balanced system of restrictive reservations. 145 Nevertheless, for some human rights 142 Kay Hailbronner. Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 359. 143 Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (79). 144 Kay Hailbronner. Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 359; Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (79). 145 Basically, the rights and freedoms granted by the Convention can be divided into three groups as regards their restrictability. On the one hand, there is the first group of rights without reservation, which are "absolute" in so far as a restriction of the legal situation once granted is impossible; besides the "absolute" prohibition of torture, slavery and bondage (Art. 3 and 4 Para. 1 ECHR, also no restriction in war and emergency periods: Art. 15 ECHR!) among these one finds, for example, the right of an accused acc. to Art. 6 Para. 3 ECHR or the presumption of innocence acc. to Art. 6 Para. 2 ECHR. (Also the English instruction uses the tenn "notstandsfest" in this respect, compare P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoo!, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 421.) Regarding a second group of rights, the ECHR is entitled to interfere in a very particular and strictly Iimited way. Among these rights there are the right to live and the right to the protection of personal freedom (Art. 2, 5 ECHR); as an exception the democratic and liberal state may be forced to interfere with these rights. This category is characterised by the fact that special restrictions are imposed on the interfering state as regards content and procedural law. Apart from the freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 9 ECHR), the freedom of assembly and association acc. to Art. 11 ECHR and others, one finds in the third group of the guarantees of freedom and human rights the freedom of expression and infonnation acc. to Art. 10

40

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

granted in the Convention it was necessary to have recourse to highly undetermined reservations such as public security, the maintenance of law and order, national security or the protection of rights of other persons. The concept of the limits of the Convention cannot be ascertained using the usual juridical techniques of interpretation,146 because the organs of the Convention cannot refer back to a uniform and stringent constitutional system, but have to take into account the most varied legal systems with different guarantees of basic rights and constitutional concepts. This fact becomes even more important because "die Konvention mit der Demokratieklausel Zuflucht zu einem Begriff genommen hat, der wie kaum ein anderer durch eine Erosion präziser Begriffssubstanz gekennzeichnet ist." (" ... with the democracy clause the Convention resorts to a term which is marked - as are only very few - by an erosion of the exact content of the term.'')147 The law-creating activity of the Commission and of the Court resulting necessarily from these facts is limited by the necessity of a fundamental consensus among the member states,148 i.e. the Convention organs cannot create a uniform European system of human rights where a political agreement cannot (yet) be achieved: "Es sind die Mitgliedstaaten und nicht die europäischen Menschenrechtsorgane, die über das Ausmaß einer integrierten europäischen Menschenrechtsordnung entscheiden." ("It is the member states and not the European Organs of human rights which decide on the scope of an integrated European system of human rights.") 149 The ECHR cannot and does not want to replace the national systems of basic rights; unlike the European Union, it does not fundamentally want to achieve a uniformity of law,150 but aims at the continuous further development of the standard of the European protection of human rightS. 151 At most, one could, therefore, speak of a growing material similarity of the national legal systems on the level of the minimum standard of human rights granted by the Convention. 152 ECHR, which is of special interest here. These freedoms have in common that their use demands the respect of many public and private concerns. The state legislators are, therefore, entitled by the Convention to define the necessary legal limits of these freedoms (more detailed later on in the text). Detailed on the complex Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (80 ff.); compare also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Reflections on the European Convention on Human Rights - and on Human Rights, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 211 ff. 146 In this respect see sub 3. b), p. 42. 147 Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (91). 148 Compare instead of many Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 370 f., further reference. 149 Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 361. 150 Compare instead of many Albert Bleckmann, EuGRZ 1979,485 (487); Ulrich Scheuner, Die Fortbildung der Grundrechte in internationalen Konventionen durch die Rechtsprechung, in: Festschrift Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, p. 916, 921 f. 151 See in this respect below sub 3. b) dd) (3), p. 50. 152 Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (10).

3. Formal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

41

An extreme interpretation of the Convention, not adequately taking into account the national peculiarities and constitutional traditions of the states, could lead at worst to the situation that the member states withdraw their submission - declared always for a certain period of time only - under the control of the Strasbourg organs. 153 bb) The dogmatics of the limits of the ECHR is marked by two principles, one of which, namely the prohibition 01 misuse, is expressly laid down in the Convention: Art. 18. The restrietions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms 154 shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.

This regulation, which is actually self-evident and is essentially of a declamatory155 nature only, prohibits (referring to the French constitutionallaw) a "detournement de pouvoir" in the application of the provisions on the limits of the Convention. 156 On the one hand, this means that the restrictions allowed in the respective guarantees of human rights and freedoms must not be extended to other guarantees (prohibition of the exchange of interference targets), and on the other hand, the possibilities of restrietion mentioned in the respective articles shall be applied only to the purposes mentioned there (motive barrier),157 a use of a "fraudulent kind" is prohibited. 158 The introduction of new interference motives which are not mentioned in any provision of the ECHR is also inadmissible. 159 Linked with this, there is a second principle, namely "that only the restrictions expressly authorised by the Convention are allowed.,,160 This principle, that restrictions must be covered by an express possibility 01 restrietion, is of great signi153 The Federal Republic of Germany declared most recently on July I 1994 for the subsequent 5 years its submission under the individual complaint article 125 and declared the final judgements by the Court ace. to Art. 46 as binding. Compare the status quo published in EuGRZ 1994, 350, of the signatures and ratifications of the ECHR and its additional notes of 28.7. 1994. Compare also Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (3). 154 Seil. the human rights and basic freedoms laid down in Art. 2 - 17 ECHR. 155 Roman Herzog, AöR 86 (1961), 194 (209 with FN 62); Karl lose! Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann/Franz L. Neumann/Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, 1st Part, p. 305 and Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Informationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 305, speak, however, of a "Iegally binding indication". 156 lochen A. FroweinlWoljgang Peuken, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 18 N. 1; Klaus Stern, Staatsrecht, vol. 3/2, p. 1574; P. van DijkIG.J.H. van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 284, 415 - 420. 157 Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 52, further reference. 158 Huben Schom, Die EMRK in Einwirkung auf das deutsche Recht, p. 297. 159 Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 53. 160 Francis G. lacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, p. 196.

42

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

ficance. This enables the controlling organs of the Convention to check any interference with the granted human rights and basic freedoms in terms of written limits; the recourse to immanent limits is (in contradiction to the point of view represented by the Commission in the 60S 161 ) ruled out. 162 A "weakening" ofthe human right on the path of the "practical concordance" is blocked on the level of the ECHR. 163 This will be referred to later on. In particular the Arts. 8 - 11 ECHR, which in their respective parts 2 provide for detailed and exceptional possibilities of restrictions of the granted human rights, allow in their essence an adequate balance between the protection of human rights and the restrictions - necessary in a democratic society - in the exertion of the granted freedoms. The catalogue of these restrictions is, therefore, a final one. 164 b) The examination of proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung) within the framework of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR in comparison to German law: suitability and adequacy as well as "margin of appreciation" as a system of differentiated protective levels

aa) Introduction The Convention guarantees of privacy (Art. 8 ECHR), of the freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 9 ECHR), of the freedom of expression and information (Art. 10 ECHR) and of the national freedom of movement (Art. 2 Protocol4) con161 Explanations in this respect by P. van DijkIG.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 422. 162 Explicitly Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, p. 199 f.: "In fact the doctrine of inherent limitations seems to be based on a Gerrnan theory (of immanente Schranken) developed in the context of a system which appeared to guarantee fundamental rights without any restrietion; the system of the Convention is quite different and leaves no place for inherent limitations." (underlined in the original). The decision by the Court of 21. 2. 1975 in the case Golder (Serie A no. 18, 4, 18 f., 21, §§ 38,44 = EuGRZ 1975,91 (98, 100)) is not c1ear regarding this question (in contradiction to Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (2) and Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 58). While in § 38 "Raum für stillschweigend geltende Beschränkungen" (room for implicitly valid restrietions) is considered, this is contradicted in § 44 for Art. 8 ECHR, compare in this respect also P. van DijkIG.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, p. 423. Not correct Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (417), who understands the rule of pluralism constructed by himself as an "immanente Schranke der Meinungsfreiheit" (immanent limits of the freedom of expression). 163 Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (2); [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 97. 164 Compare instead of many Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, preliminary remark to Art. 8 - 11, N. 11; P. van DijkIG.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 422 f.; Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 288.

3. Fonnal and materialIimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

43

tain more or less the same restrictions according to their structure in the practice of the Convention organs. 165 In the last few years - since the decision in the case of Handyside, in which for the first time the Court had to apply Art. 10 ECHR 166 - the European Court of Human Rights has developed fixed dogmatics for these restrictions, which are applied "nach der Art eines dreifach gestuften Kontrollschemas" (in the form of a control scheme in three steps).167 An interference (ingerence) with one of these freedoms corresponds to the Convention only if it - firstly, is "preseribed by law" ("prevu par la loi"), - secondly, serves a purpose mentioned in the respective reservation (compare in particular Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR) and thirdly, is "neeessary in a demoeratie society,,168 ("mesures necessaires dans une societe democratique"). 169 In the following paragraphs (bb, ce, dd) this threefold threshold of requirements will be examined.

165 Detailed in this respect Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 ff.; compare also Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), 41 (43 f.); P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 427 ff. 166 Judgement of 29.4. 1976, Series A no. 24, 4, 22 f., §§ 48 f. = EuGRZ 1977,38 (42). 167 Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (83); compare also Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 52 f. 168 In the subsequent parts, the tenns "necessity" and "necessary" are used, because they come closer to the authentie versions than the official translation "indispensible". 169 The guiding decisions of the Court on this dogmatics of restrietions are - apart from the Handyside judgement - the decisions of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4, 29 - 42, §§ 45 - 68 = EuGRZ 1979, 386-391 (case Sunday Times); of 13.8.1981, Series A no. 44, 4, 24-26, §§ 59-65 = EuGRZ 1981, 559 (561 f.) (Case Young, James und Webster); of 22.10.1981, Series A no. 45, 4,19-25, §§ 42-62 = EuGRZ 1983,488 (490-493) (Case Dudgeon); of 25.3. 1983, Series A no. 61, 7,32-40, §§ 84-104 = EuGRZ 1984, 147 (149-153) (Case Silver et al.); of 2. 8. 1984, Series A no. 82, 4, 31 - 33, §§ 65 - 68 und 36 f., § 81 = EuGRZ 1985, 17 (20 f., 22) (Case Malone); of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6, 21 - 26, §§ 43 - 59 = EuGRZ 1985,171 (173-175) (Case Barthold); of 8.7.1986, Series A no. 103, 14,24-28, §§ 35 - 47 =EuGRZ 1986,424 (427 - 429) (Case Lingens); of 24. 11. 1986, Series A no. 109, 6, 20 - 24, §§ 48 - 58 (Case Gillow); of 26. 3. 1987, Series A no. 116, 6, 23 - 27, §§ 49 - 67 (Case Leander); of 23. 10. 1987, Series A no. 121,4,27 - 29, §§ 59 - 65 (Case W. v. UK); of 24.3.1988, Series A no. 130,3,31 f., §§ 67 f. (Case O1sson). On the precursors of these guiding decisions of the Court during the earliest practice of decision of the Commission compare P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 429 ff. Compare also "Principle 4" of the resolution loumalistic Freedoms and Human Rights by the Ministers Committee of the European Council.

44

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

bb) Legal bases of interference The necessity of a legal basis does not only exist for written law. 17o In the case of the Sunday Times 171 the Court decided for the first time that unwritten law also meets the requirements of the term "law" or "loi" respectively within the restrictive c1auses "prescribed law" and "pn!vue par la loi". This is of great significance because of the "common law" legal systems of Great Britain and Ireland. 172 The Court underlines that the intentions of the authors of the Convention would be contradicted if one were to assurne that a restriction based on "common law" rnight be not "prescribed by law" only because it did not find expression in an act of legislation. If one were to demand a formal law as the basis for the restriction of the freedom of expression and information, this would imply that the Convention organs would have to deal with the question as to whether the legislative procedure ordered by the state was adhered to; this cannot be the task of the Court and the Comrnission. 173 For this reason, from the words "prescribed by law" the Court derived at first two - subsequently four - individual aspects which render this requirement more concrete: 174 The following mIes, to a great extent marked by the constitution, are important: (1) On the one hand, the law must be accessible for the citizens (" accessibility "),

i.e. the citizens should be able to recognise adequately ("to have an indication that is adequate" / "disposer de renseignements suffisants") which legal regulations can be applied to any given case. (2) On the other hand, a standard cannot be considered a "law" if it is not worded precisely enough for the citizens to be able to behave accordingly. Basically, the citizen must be enabled to foresee the effects of certain behaviour with a degree of security corresponding to the circumstances ("foreseeability,,).175 General c1auses are not exc1uded by this requirement. 176

170 Not correct Heinz Guradze, EMRK-Kommentar, introduction to § 8 IV, S. 26, and Art. 10 FN 12, p. 148. 171 Judgement of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4, 30 - 33, §§ 46 - 53 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (387 f.) with comment by Rolf Stümer, JZ 1980, 1-7. l72 Jochen A. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, preliminary remark to Art. 8 - 11, N. 4; Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 5. On critics compare P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 427, further reference. 173 [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK,

p.104.

174 Judgement of 26.4. 1979, Series A no. 30,4,31, § 49 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (387) (Case Sunday Times). 175 Like Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (2), one could call this a "menschenrechtlicher Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz" (definitory c1ause at the level of human rights); on the complex also Irene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 100ff.

3. Formal and materialIimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

45

(3) Thirdly, in the case of Silver et al., the Court made it dear that the interference

in question must have a basis in national law, that, therefore, only those legal standards correspond to the term "law" or "loi", which are also considered to be legal standards in nationallaw. Furthermore, a law which allows discretion must indicate the extent of this discretion; 177 there must not be any room for arbitrary interference. 178 (4) Fourthly, the legal basis must correspond to the general principles of the constitutional state ("rule of law,,179) to which the preamble of the ECHR makes

express reference. 180 Finally, the interfering govemment body must not have violated nationallaw in an obvious and serious way.181

ce) Aim of interference Another essential requirement, namely that the measure restricting human rights must serve one of the aims l82 mentioned in condusion in the restrictive dause, means that the legislator loses the lawful entitlement to pursue any legal political intentions whatsoever (even if they are directed at public welfare) in the protective area of a right of freedom; a restrietion is rendered adrnissible not by the mere pursuance of an undifferentiated general interest, but only by the pursuance of the aims mentioned. 183 The authentie English and French versions of the Convention assume a special significance l84 in the - narrow l85 - interpretation of the catalo176 Judgements by the Court 25.3. 1985, Series AN. 90, 6, 22, § 47 = EuGRZ 1985,170 (173) (Case Barthold); of 24.3. 1988, Series A N. 130,3,30 § 61 = EuGRZ 1988, 591 (598) (Case Olsson) and of 24. 5. 1988, Series A N. 133, 4, 20, § 29 = EuGRZ 1988, 543 (544) (Case Müller et al.). I77 Judgement by the Court of 25.3. 1983, Series A N. 61, 7, 33f., §§ 88f. = EuGRZ 1984, 147 (150) (Case Silver et al.); see also Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 208. 178 See also Vincent Berger, Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, p. 249. 179 Compare also Ulrich Scheuner, Die Fortbildung der Grundrechte in internationalen Konventionen durch die Rechtsprechung, in: Festschrift Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, p. 920. 180 Judgements of the Court of 2. 8. 1984, Series A N. 82, 4, 32, § 67 =EuGRZ 1985, 17 (20) (Case Malone); of 23. 4. 1992, Series A N. 236, 7, 23, § 43 (Case Castells); of 25. 6. 1992, Series A N. 239, 6, 27, § 63 (Case Thorgeir Thorgeirson); see also Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p. 287 with FN 54. 181 Taken from the latest judicature of the Court on this complex the judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4,25, § 57 =EuGRZ 1990,261 (263) (Case Autronic). 182 In this respect already above sub 3. b) aa), details below sub 4. d) bb )-dd). 183 Walter Berka. ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (84); Walter Berka. EuGRZ 1982,413 (425). 184 Detailed on the problem of the divergence between the authentie versions and the officia! translation Gerhard Ulsamer, in: Jochen A. Frowein I Gerhard Ulsamer, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und nationaler Rechtsschutz, p. 43 f.

46

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

gue, whieh is marked by "the use of terms that ean hardly be differentiated" 186: the term used in the offieial German translation of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR, "Aufreehterhaltung der Ordnung" ("maintenanee of order") says eertainly more than the authentie terms of the "prevention of disorder / defense de I' ordre". For this reason it would be wrong to suppose a general reservation of "publie order". 187 All in all, this is therefore a rule bound relatively strietly to an aim. In praetieal applieation, however, this should not be overestimated: regarding the high degree of the need for eoneretisation of the undeterrnined terms of purpose the Strasbourg organs eoneede to the signatory states a eertain latitude referred to as the "margin of appreciation" and diseussed below. The individual aims will not be diseussed in detail here, but later on within the framework of the examination of the justifieation of interferenee with regard to the "freedom within the press" .188 dd) The neeessity of interferenee in a demoeratie soeiety ( 1) Pressing social need

In the praetical applieation of Art. 10 ECHR, the neeessities of the legal basis and the pursuanee of a purpose mentioned in Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR do not regularly eause diffieulties for the Strasbourg organs; in reality, the requirements set are not particularly high. 189 For this reason, in the deeisions by the Court up to now the major aspect lies mostly in the decisive third l90 threshold of requirements. 185 Continuous judicature, compare only judgement by the Court of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4, 40 f., § 65 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (390) (Case Sunday Times); further proof by Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 49 (with FN 80); compare also Michael Kloepfer. Produkthinweispflichten bei Tabakwaren als Verfassungsfrage, p. 44; [vo E. Schwartz, in: Peter Schiwy /Walter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p.94. 186 Karl losef Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann / Franz L. Neumann / Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, Ist Part, p. 438. 187 Detailed on this Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (85 f.). 188 Below sub 4. d), p. 65. 189 Compare instead of many Wolfgang Müller; WRP 1992, 20 (21); Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (l3f.). 190 In the past, the introductory sentence of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR ("The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, ... ") was sometimes understood as an independent further restriction (compare the decision no. 6084173 of the Commission of 1. 10. 1975, Decisions and Reports 3, 62 (64 f.), further reference by Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 62 with FN 156). Today, the judicature of the Strasbourg organs is fixed (detailed reference by Christoph Engel, same place, p. 62 with FN 157, p. 450) but this phrase gains significance, however, only within the framework of the criterion "necessary in a democratic society". One can agree with this point of view, because this sentence serves as a basis for of the complex catalogue of aims (the most comprehensive one in the whole Convention), which allows the restriction of the free-

3. Fonnal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

47

After having previously established that both the (abstract) legal measure and the (concrete) measure taken on the basis of a law in a single case serve one of the aims mentioned in the respective reservation of restrictions, the Convention organs check whether a European (Convention) standard already exists as regards the requirement "neeessary in a democratie society" and whether the state is still acting 191 within the framework of the "margin of appreciation,,192 conceded to it regarding the legal standard and its application. In the terrninology of German constitutionallaw, the reference to the "necessity in a democratic society" can be understood as a "limitation limit" ("Schranken-Schranke,,).193 In the framework of the examination of the constitutionality of an interference according to Art. 5 Para. 2 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) questions the suitability and necessity oe' a measure as weIl as its reasonableness in a more narrow sense (adequacy). In VIe judicature of the Convention organs as regards the examination of reasonableness according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR, this threefold examination of German constitutional law is not clearly evident. 194 The point of time at which interference is "necessary" in the sense of the decisive requirement "necessary in a democratic society,,195 mentioned above was defined in a different manner by the Court in some of its decisions: the established facts 196 must lead to the conclusion that a "pressing social need" ("dringendes soziales Bedürfnis" /"un besoin social imperieux") 197 existed for the state to become dom of expression and infonnation (similar Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Infonnationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 295). 191 Compare Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (43 f.); P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoo/. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 429; Eckart Klein, AfP 1994, 9 (14). 192 On this immediately under (3), p. 50. 193 Also Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 360; Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (91); Gilbert-Hanno Gomig, Äußerungsfreiheit und Infonnationsfreiheit als Menschenrechte, p. 192. 194 On this immediately sub (2), p. 48. 195 At first, the older practice of the Convention organs neglected the significance of the c\ause of democracy and was satisfied with fonnal references to democratic society without understanding the independent significance of this element; compare in this respect Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 362; Phedon Th. Vegleris, Revue des droits de J'homme 1 (1968),219 - 241. As far as one can see, in the decision of admissibility published on June 9 1958 in the Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 2 (1958 - 1959), p. 215 ff. the Commission used the c\ause of democracy for the first time in order to justify that a restriction of the freedom of expression was inadmissible. 196 And this does not only mean the facts presupposed bona fide by the acting state organs, on this below sub (3) (b), p. 42. 197 Fundamental judgements of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (Case Sunday Times); of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6 = EuGRZ 1985, 171 (Case Barthold); of

48

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

active in the pursuance of one of the aims mentioned in the catalogue of restrietions of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR: "55. It has been pointed out in the Court's case-law, whilst the adjective "necessary", whithin the meaning of Art. 10 § 2 of the Convention, is not synonymous with "indispensable",198 neither does it have the flexibility of such expressions as "admissible,,199, "ordinary,,200, "useful", "reasonable" or "desirable"; rather it implies a "pressing social need". The Contracting States enjoy apower of appreciation in this respect, but that power of appreciation goes hand in hand with a European supervision which is more or less extensive depending upon the circumstances; it is for the Court to make the final determination as to whether the interference in issue corresponds to such a need, whether it is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient" ( ... ).,,201

On the whole, this judicature of the Court is convincing. Particularly worthy of approval is its approach of allowing the contract states the evaluative prerogatives regarding the question of whether a pressing social need exists for the restrietion of a right gran ted by the Convention, while at the same time reserving the right to monitor this state evaluation. In this way, the Court can work towards a continuous raising of the European human rights standard without disregarding the legal and political peculiarities of the signatory states. (2) On the extent ofthe examination ofproportionality (" Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung ")

To begin with, this now consolidated dogmatic approach 202 necessarily leads to the conclusion that an (abstract) law and (concrete) measures must be fitting in order to achieve the (legitimate) aim pursued at al1. 203 8.7. 1986, Series A no. 103, 14 = EuGRZ 1986, 424 (Case Lingens); of 24.5. 1988, Series A no. 133, 6 = EuGRZ 1988, 543 (Case Müller et al.); but compare also the judgement of 26.11. 1991, Series A no. 216-A, 3, 29f., § 59 = EuGRZ 1995, 16 (20) (Case Observer and Guardian). 198 As in Art. 2 Para. 2 ECHR, compare also Art. 15 Para. 1 ECHR. 199 As in Art. 4 Para. 3 lit. b ECHR. 200 As in Art. 4 Para. 3 lit. d ECHR. 201 Judgement of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6, 24 f., § 55 = EuGRZ 1985, 171 (175 f.) (Case Barthold). 202 On cases of application outside the press complex, which cannot be dealt with here, especially in the field of competition 1aw and in the law of self-employment see Christoph E. Hauschka, ZUM 1987,559 (563 ff.). 203 However, one has to agree with the special opinion of judge Hermann Mosler in the case Handyside (§ 2 = EuGRZ 1977,50 (51», which says that the mere fact that a measure proves to be inefficient because it does not achieve its aim does not allow this measure to be considered not suitable and therefore not "necessary". "Der mangelnde Erfolg kann einer Maßnahme, die unter günstigeren Umständen Erfolg haben könnte, nicht nachträglich die Rechtsgrundlage entziehen, wenn sie unter normalen Bedingungen Aussicht auf Erfolg ge-

3. Formal and materialIimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

49

So far, however, it has not been finally clarified whether state measures must be "necessary" in terms of the German dogmatics, Le. whether the state must necessarily pursue its legitimate aim using the most lenient means (the least necessary). Nevertheless, there is justifiable doubt regarding the view held by Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy and others 204 that law and measure must be also necessary and proportionate (in a narrower sense), that there must not be a more lenient but an equally fitting means, and that the disadvantages linked with the measure must not as a whole outweigh the advantages,205 with the result that the requirement of necessity corresponds ultimately to the (German) basic principle of proportionality ("Verhältnismäßigkeit,,).206 But this cannot be derived from the judicature of the Convention organs. 207 The Court mIed in the case of Young, James and Webster as follows: 208 "Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the detriment suffered by Mr. Young, Mr. James and Mr. Webster went further than was required to achieve a proper balance between the conflicting interests of those involved and cannot be regarded as proportionate to the aims being pursued."

It can be derived from this that "necessity" is determined according to proportionality; the requirement of the most lenient interference does not therefore follow. 209 It is certain that the Court considers Art. 10 ECHR to have been violated if the "restraint proves not to be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued; ... ,,210 habt hätte." ("If a measure which could be successful under more favourable conditions is unsuccessful, one must not subsequently withdraw the legal basis if it had had a chance of success under normal conditions.") (Hermann Mosler; same place) - This corresponds in fact to the requirements made by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) agreeing to the theory of the suitability of an interfering law (compare instead of many Christoph Degenhart, Staatsrecht I, N. 328). 204 Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 35 f. 20S The same view, but not convincing Albert Bleckmann, EuGRZ 1979, 485 (486); Michael O. Müller; ZUM 1994,289 (291). 206 Also Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (89); Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (426); Klaus Stern, Staatsrecht, vol. 3/2, p. 1572; probably also Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (416). 207 In contradiction Walter Berka, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 71 (89); rejecting also Wolfgang Müller; WRP 1992,20 (22). 208 Series A no. 44, 4, 26, § 65 =EuGRZ 1981,559 (562). 209 Correct Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (263 with FN 12); Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9(14). 210 Compare instead of many the judgement of 26. 4. 1979, Series A no. 30, 4, 42, § 67 = EuGRZ 1979,386 (391) (Case Sunday Times). According to the English wording there is a regular demand to take into account "the nature of the right involved, the degree of interference, i.e. whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the nature of the public interest and the degree to which it requires 4 Kloepfer

50

H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

The Verhältnismäßigkeitsprülung (examination of proportionality) of the Conventi on organs is, therefore, a direct appraisal 211 between the interference with the human right concemed and the aim pursued by the interference. The appraisal must also take into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the precise individual case. 212 To sum up, this examination by the Court can be said not to correspond fully to the threefold control in German law. 213 (3) On the concept 01 the "margin 01 appreciation"

(a) The Strasbourg organs are cautious with the comprehensive examination of proportionality (according to the German example). This caution is part of the system of the ECHR and can be explained by another keystone of the Strasbourg judicature which is not based directly on the reservation of restrictions, but exists in the form of an unwritten characteristic: The Convention organs allow the member states a "margin 01 appreciation (marge d' appreciation) " in order to render precise the reservations of restrictions and, in particular, to correspond to the measure "necessary in a democratic society".214 This "margin of appreciation" - which is translated into German as "Beurteilungsspielraum", 215 although this translation is insufficient because of the totally different meaning of this term in the German law of administrative procedure - is not unlimited; in fact, the Strasbourg organs monitor its observance. At a very early stage, the European Commission on Human protection in the circumstances of the case". Compare e.g. the decision no. 7805/77 by the Commission of 5.5. 1979, Decisions and Reports 16, 68, § 5; compare in recent times the judgement by the Court of 29. 10. 1992, Series A no. 246-A, 4, 30, § 70 = EuGRZ 1992,484 (488) (Case Open Door and Dublin Well Woman) as well as judgement of 23. 6. 1994, Series A no. 291, 5, 14, § 26 (Case lacubowski); compare in this also Dirk Voorhoof Freedorn of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 6. 211 In the case Lingens (judgement of 8.7. 1986, Series A no. 103, 14,26, § 42 = EuGRZ 1986, 424 (428)) the Court expressly speaks of weighing up; also in the judgement of 30.3. 1989 (Series A no. 165,4,20, § 34 (Case Markt intern) (on this Colin Warbrick. Yearbook of European Law 9 (1989), p. 385 (445 ff.); Jochen A. Frowein, in: losef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (edit.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 7, § 180, N. 60). 212 Christoph Engel. ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (264). 213 ChristophEngel. ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (263). 214 Since the decision no. 753/60 by the Commission of 5. 8. 1960, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 3 (1960), p. 311. The first guiding decision on this by the Court was made in the case Handyside (decision of 29. 4. 1976, Series A no. 24, 4, 2224, §§ 48-50 = EuGRZ 1977, 38 (41 ff.). Detailed on this Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (esp. 273 ff.); Rosario Sapienza. Rivista di diritto internazionale 64 (1981), 43 (54 - 59); Rosario Sapienza. Rivista di diritto internazionale 74 (1991), 571 - 614; on the older judicature Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy. Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 69 -77. 215 But ace. to Kay Hailbronner; Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 381; [rene Laeuchli Bosshard. Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 100.

3. Fonnal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

51

Rights declared its competence and obligation to examine the necessity of any restriction as weIl as the question as to whether the margin of appreciation given to the states had been adhered tO. 216 The European Court of Human Rights again summarised its competence to make the final decision regarding this question in the Handyside ruling as follows: 217 " ... The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of those States' engagements (Art. 19), is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a "restriction" ( ... ) is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Anicle 10. The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its "necessity"; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it ( ... )."

Accordingly, the margin of appreciation concems both the question as to whether interference with the rights protected by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR is necessary at all and the extent of this interference. In this respect, the scope of the margin is not always the same for all the subject matters mentioned in Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR, but varies depending on the significance of the subject matter in question. 218 (b) The precise content of the "rnargin" concept has so far not been finally clarified in juristic discussion. On the basis of the present judicature of the Strasbourg organs an exact and final determination - notwithstanding the fundamentals mentioned above - of the relation between the concept of the margin of appreciation on the one hand, and the criterion of the necessity of interference in a democratic society on the other, is not possible,z19 However, it will not be possible to persist in seeing this instrument only as an expression of "judicial self-restraint", even if the Court (in as much as it is related to the German Bundesverfassungsgericht) does not consider itself a "Superrevisionsinstanz" (highest reviewing body).220 Whether the "margin of appreciation" is a mere instrument of procedural law offering the only possibility to restrict the examinationatory measures of the Strasbourg organs, or whether it has a material-legal content going beyond this, is a disputed point. 216 Fundamental the decision by the Commission on the complaint no. 214/56 of 9.6. 1958 (Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 (1958-1959), p. 214ff.) (Case Oe Becker); compare also the decisions of the Commission in Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 3 (1960), p. 311 ff. (319) and in vol. 4 (1961), p. 204ff. (218). 217 Of 29. 4. 1976, Series A no. 24, 4, 22 f., § 49 = EuGRZ 1977, 38 (42); further details by [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Oie Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 100 (with FN 28). 218 Compare instead of many the judgements of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6, 24 f., § 55 = EuGRZ 1985,171 (175f.) (Case Barthold) and of 30.3. 1989 (Serie A no. 165,4, 19f., § 33 (Case Markt intern); compare also Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 6 f. 219 Also Wolfgang Müller, WRP 1992,20 (22). 220 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (273, further reference).

4*

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

52

(c) A starting point to solve this emerging question is to be found in the fact that the Convention organs do not consider the granting of a margin of appreciation to be in their discretion, but instead ass urne that their decision is bound in this respect. Many of their decisions indicate that the margin of appreciation is seen as a restriction of competence. 221 This restrictive function is demonstrated above all by the repeated emphasis of the subsidiary character of the legal protection gran ted by the ECHR. Whether, for example, the question as to whether a "pressing social need" necessary in order to justify interference according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR exists should be judged in particular by the national organs, which are more competent as regards their more precise knowledge of the relevant living and legal conditions. 222 The Convention organs, which should not replace the discretion of the member states with their own discretion, are entitled only to ascertain whether a common European standard exists. 223 It would be premature to conclude that this instrument was of procedural significance only. Christoph EngeZ 224 points out quite correctly the "other side" of this self-restriction: in contradiction of the original understanding of the Commission the Court does not restrict its examination to the question of whether the interfering state organ has acted in good faith, but investigates and evaluates the subject matter regardless of the fact that the subject matter itself was presupposed by the organ and, on this basis, the Court makes its decision, even though in other cases it accepts a margin of appreciation. 225 Apart from this and first and foremost, one must take into account the material-legal dimension of the margin of appreciation in its close connection with the characteristic "necessity in a democratic society". In the practice of the Convention organs, the determination of the limits of this "latitude" takes place regularly in connection with the discussion as to whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society.226 The "wahre Bedeutung des Konzepts der margin of appreciation" ("real Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (274, further reference). Decision of the Court of 29. 4. 1976, Series A no. 24, 4, 20, § 48 = EuGRZ 1977, 38 (41) (Case Handyside); on this also Wolfgang Peukert, Die Kommunikationsrechte im Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Organe der EMRK, in: Festschrift Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, p.288f. 223 Judgement by the Court of 26.4. 1979, Series A no. 30,4, 37 f., § 61 =EuGRZ 1979, 386 (389) (Case Sunday Times) (detailed on this P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoo!, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 440ff.); compare also the judgement by the Court of 30.3. 1989 (Series A no. 165,4,21, § 37 (Case Markt intern). On the complex Albert Bleckmann, EuGRZ 1979,485 (487); Dirk Voorhoo!, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 7; Ulrich Scheuner, Die Fortbildung der Grundrechte in internationalen Konventionen durch die Rechtsprechung, in: Festschrift Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, p. 922 ff. 224 ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (275). 225 Expressly underlined in the decisions on the cases Handyside (Series A no. 24, 4, 2224, §§ 48 ff. = EuGRZ 1977, 38 (41 ff.», Sunday Times (Series A no. 30,4, 35 - 37, § 59 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (389» and Dudgeon (Series A no. 45, 4, 21, § 52 = EuGRZ 1983, 488 (491». 226 Compare Wolfgang Müller, WRP 1992,20 (22). 221

222

3. Fonnal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

53

significance of the margin of appreciation,,)227 lies in the attempt to find an explanatory model showing that the ECHR does not contain guarantees independent of place and time, but always the same,228 and that on the level of material law the Convention organs practise a human rights standard which has a broad approach but is gradually consolidated?29 The peculiarities of the living and legal conditions in the member states must be taken into account provided that the already existing minimum standard is upheld?30 Furthermore, this concept renders it possible at the same time to take the sovereignty of the member states into consideration and to ensure the continuous further development ofthe European standard?3! Regarding the choice of means that they use to pursue a legitimate intention, the member states are to be given a certain latitude which can, however, be controlled by the Strasbourg organs?32 As far as the member states are entitled to material-legal latitude in this respect, the Strasbourg organs cannot administer justice and, as Christoph Engel puts it, thus avoid a "gouvernement des juges".233 This also explains why the criterion of necessity in terms of the German dogmatics cannot have any significance on the level of the ECHR: the latitude granted to the member states would be restricted too much if one always demanded the measure which interferes Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (276). Critical on the unforeseeability of the Strasbourg Decisions, which often goes hand in hand with the flexibility of the measure, Wolfgang Müller, WRP 1992,20 (22), further reference. 229 Compare Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (3); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 459. 230 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (276, further reference). 231 Also Sir Humphrey Waldock, EuGRZ 1979, 599 (602); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 458. 232 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.69. The claim by Cora S. Feingold, Notre Dame Lawyer 53 (1977), 90- 106, is untenable, that with the help of the margin of appreciation doctrine the Convention organs granted "unlimited discretion" regarding the restriction of the Convention rights to the member states and thus evaded the demands of the ECHR. On this also Rudolf Bemhardt, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und nationaler Gestaltungsspielraum, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 81 with FN 9. Quite correct lohn Kelly, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Vertragsstaaten: Die internationale Kontrolle der Beschränkungen und Grenzen der Garantien, in: Irene Maier (edit.), Europäischer Menschenrechtsschutz, p. I 82f.: Die "margin of appreciation" stelle eine gewisse Freiheit dar, "sowohl das Falsche als auch das Richtige zu tun, vorausgesetzt, daß die Umstände des Falles erkennen lassen, was in der Sprache der CommonLaw-Länder 'vernünftige Gründe' ('reasonable grounds') für die Bildung des Urteils, sei es auch eines falschen, genannt würde." ("The margin of appreciation grants a certain freedom to act in the wrong as weil as in the right way given that the circumstances of the case offer something which in the language of the commom-law-countries could be called "reasonable grounds" for the making of adecision, even a wrong one.") However, he also considers the control of the observance of the Convention by the organs (correctly) as a strict control (ibid., p. 185). 233 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (276). 227 228

54

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

to the least extent with the human right concerned. 234 The instrument of the margin of appreciation, which is sometimes veiled, as it were, by the Convention organs calling it "judicial policy" and a procedural question, is of a material-legal significance which necessarily has a reflexive effect on decision competences. (4) Concretisation

0/ the

"margin 0/ appreciation"

(a) The points mentioned above already illustrate why the activities of the Strasbourg organs reveal at best indications of the concept of democracy, which is decisive for the restrictive clause "necessary in a democratic society". Regarding the freedom of expression and information, which is of primary interest here, the judicature of the Convention organs leads to the clear conclusion that this is considered to be one of the keystones of a democratic society?35 One should exercise restraint when dealing with the further definitory concretisation of "democratic society" offered at times in the literature. 236 On the one hand, Christoph Engel points out quite correctly that such a democratic principle of "good selectivity" would lead (as mentioned above) to a "gouvernement des juges", which would contradict the restricted competence of the Strasbourg organs. 237 On the other hand, a differentiated understanding of democracy presupposes a not inconsiderable degree of European unity as regards legal and actual conditions which is no more in evidence in the signatory states than the will required to have precisely this concept of democracy determined by the Strasbourg organs in order to restrict national sovereignty.238 (b) In order to examine the "necessity in a democratic society", in practice the Strasbourg organs fix the limits of the margin of appreciation with the help of evidentiary facts. By doing so, they at the same time to a certain extent put the concept of democracy into concrete terms without exposing themse1ves to the dangers just described. 239 The two most important evidentiary facts are the comparison of the contracting states and the impoitance of the concrete use of human rights for a democratic society. The aspect of the comparison 0/ the contracting states is of special evidential significance: 240 if the restriction of a basic right by 234 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 69; similar Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (14). 235 Compare instead of all else the judgement by the Court of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6, 26, § 58 = EuGRZ 1985, 171 (175) (Case Barthold). 236 As for example Walter Berka, EuGRZ 1982,413 (426 f.); compare also Martin Bullinger, Human Rights Law Joumal6 (1985), 339 (342 ff.). 237 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (267). 238 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (268). 239 P. van Dijk/G.J.H. van Hoo/. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 449. 240 Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 374; Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahr-

3. Fonnal and materiallimitations of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

55

the state has no equivalent in other contracting states, this is evidence of the inadmissibility of the interference, i.e. the interference is not "necessary".241 Whether a numerical majority of the other member states is to be taken into account or to what extent, if at all, quantitative aspects are to be evaluated, has not been fully clarified to date. If one considers that the Convention strives to raise the level of human rights in the territory of the Convention, but does not aim at the harmonisation of law as such,242 then such a majorisation cannot be decisive in the end. Therefore, the European minimum standard must be ascertained by "evaluating" means in order not to pave the way for a possibly less democratic majority; this demonstrates the limits of the indication derived from the comparison. 243 This indication can be refuted by the fact that the definitive living standards or legal traditions in the member state concemed differ in a decisive way from those in the other states. 244 (c) A further, no less important indication is the political relevance 0/ the use 0/ human rights. The differentiated system of protective levels becomes obvious when one considers this criterion: the standard for the restriction of a basic right is all the more stringent, the more directly the concrete use is linked to the functioning of a democratic society. According to the continuous judicature of the Court, in the media and especially the press sector the special significance of the media for the forming of public opinion must be taken into consideration. 245 Irrespective of a thorough reflection still to take place, the consequences can already be formulated here in the form of theses: the more immediate the effects of a restriction on the publishing work are, the more it will be seen as inadmissible, but the more it concentrates on the econornic aspect, the more adrnissible it is likely to be. 246 With regard to the press, one can conclude that control here is most stringent in those cases of interference which are directed at clearly expressed views or the slant of a press organ. The joumalistic competition of the press enterbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (82); compare also Ulrich Scheuner, Die Fortbildung der Grundrechte in internationalen Konventionen durch die Rechtsprechung, in: Festschrift Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, p. 916 f. 241 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 77; Kay Hai/bronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 374. 242 Compare above sub 11. 3. a) aa), p. 39. 243 Going further Kay Hai/bronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hennann Mosler, p. 376 ff. 244 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (269). 245 Compare the judgement by the Court of 26.4. 1979, Series A no. 30,4,41 f., § 66 = EuGRZ 1979, 386 (390) (Case Sunday Times); more recently the judgement of 23.4. 1992, Series A no. 236,7 (Case Castells). 246 Compare mutatis mutandis the judgement by the Court of 23.6. 1994, Series A no. 291, 5, 14, § 26 (Case Jacubowski); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 180.

56

II. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

prises is protected at a higher level than their economic competition. 247 The press is, for example, less intensively protected against state regulations regarding the structure of financing than against state influence regarding political positions. 248 The fact that interference linked with competition is - in principle - neutral as regards opinion facilitates greater interference possibilities. (d) The Convention organs take the consistency of state behaviour as a further indication. A restriction is considered to be not necessary if the interfering official organs appear to have no reasons for effecting a restriction in one case and not in another. 249 If circumstances are ascertained which justify non-consistency the indication is refuted. In the case of Handyside the Court examined the consistency of state action 250 thoroughly,251 but accepted the refutation of the indication without excessive demands. 252 (e) However, the evaluations which form the basis of the Recommendations of the Ministers' Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly have no indication effect whatsoever. If the invocation of the international legal obligations of astate seems - even in general - to be questionable as an indication, because international legal contracts (apart from the Human Rights Treaties themselves) can hardly be "raised" by interpretation to the sphere of human rights,253 even more restraint should be exercised as regards the recommendations of the organs of the European Council: not only do these recommendations lack any legally (or internationally legally) binding character, but it is also hard to see how they contribute to the "continuous further development of an European standard,,254. The fact that these Acts of the organs of the European Council can and should be judged in terms of the 247 Christoph Engel. Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.244ff. 248 Christoph Engel. AfP 1991, 1 (3); Eckart Klein. AfP 1994,9 (15). 249 If existing subject matters are compared one should consider at the same time an offence against the prohibition of discrimination acc. to Art. 14 ECHR. In the practice of the Convention organs, an additional examination of the violation of Art. 14 ECHR is often refrained from in these cases, compare in this respect below sub III. 1. as well as Franz MatscheT; Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art. 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 638 f.; compare also thejudgement of26. 11. 1991, Series A no. 216-A, 3, 35, § 72 = EuGRZ 1995, 16 (22) (Case Observer and Guardian). 250 The controversial publication was confiscated only in England, but not in Northern Ireland, Scotiand, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. 251 Judgement of 29.4. 1976, Series A no. 24,4,26 f., §§ 54 - 56 =EuGRZ 1977, 38 (4547). 252 Critical also the special votum by judge Hermann Mosler in the judgement of 7. 12. 1976 (same place, § 2 = EuGRZ 1977,38 (52». 253 In contradiction to Franz MatscheT; Vertragsauslegung durch Vertragsrechtsvergleichung in der Judikatur internationaler Gerichte, vornehmlich vor den Organen der EMRK, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 564. 254 But, although with some restraint, Christoph Engel. ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (271).

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57

ECHR has already been expounded. If one were to endow them, however, with an indicial effect within the framework of the fixing of the limits of the margin of appreciation, this would be to a large extent equivalent to an argumentative petitio principii or the Convention organs providing themselves with possibilities of restriction. 255 If the Court occasionally invokes the secondary law of the European Council in order to interpret the Convention, as it did in the case of Autronic 256 with the European TV Convention within the framework of Art. 10 ECHR, this is done only in order to safeguard and strengthen the right of freedom, but never to reduce it. From the dogmatic point of view this might be wrong, but was in concreto harrnless, because of its freedom-strengthening effect. 257

(5) On the significance ofthe margin of appreciation for independent acts of the organs of the European Council and the European Community If one takes into account that the study presented here does not judge state acts of a member of the European Council in terms of the ECHR - as it is normally done by the Convention organs in their examinations -, but evaluates acts of the organs of the European Council, i.e. the Parliamentary Assembly and the Ministers' Committee, as weIl as the organs of the European Union itself, the explanations on the margin of appreciation require further qualification: as explained, to a considerable extent this instrument serves the consideration given to the living conditions and legal traditions of the signatory states of the Convention. It therefore follows that the organs of the Convention and of the European Community must also have a margin at their disposal, because they are (presumably to a particular degree) obliged to exercise such consideration. The extent of the margin can often vary between the various member states. 258 A choice between the possibly different margins of the member states must be made, because the European Council (from this point of view also the European Community) does not have its own living conditions and legal traditions worthy of protection. The link with the lowest common denominator (i.e. the greatest latitude) must be rejected right from the beginning: if one assurnes that the states of the European Council (and therefore all the member states of the European Community) - and this is proved by the preamble of the ECHR - intend "the achievement of greater unity" between the members and want to use methods in favour of "the maintenance and further realisation of 255 This is not considered by Kay Hailbronner, Die Einschränkung von Grundrechten in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 378 f. 256 Judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4,27, § 62 =EuGRZ 1990,261 (264). 257 Detailed on this Franz Matscher, Vertragsauslegung durch Vertragsrechtsvergleichung in der Judikatut internationaler Gerichte, vornehmlich vor den Organen der EMRK, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 556 ff. 258 On this and the following Christoph Engel. AfP 1994, I (5).

58

11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

human rights and fundamental freedoms", one must conc1ude that the European Council wants to influence politics and law with a view to raising the standard of human rights in all its member states, therefore also in the state which is entitled to the narrowest margin of appreciation. For this reason, its acts must meet the highest requirements that can be demanded by the ECHR from a member state. As regards the protection of human rights, nothing else can be valid at the level of the European Community.

4. Art. 10 ECHR as a yardstick for the "freedom within the press" a) Personal area ofprotection: Art. 10 ECHR as a defensive right of the publisher

Like other freedom guarantees of the ECHR, Art. 10 ECHR grants first and foremost the freedom of expression and information as a c1assical defensive right against the state, which has to abstain from interference not expressly permitted in the fie1d of the freedom of communication. 259 The great significance, which Art. 10 ECHR as an essential principle of a democratic society has within the framework of the Convention, often results in this basic right being seen as going beyond the mere guarantee of the freedom of expression, information and press per se, namely also as a framework to regulate the mass media and journa1ism in the broadest sense. 260 The state is said to take precautionary measures against processes of concentration in the sphere of the media which are frequently seen diffusely as being fundamentally bad and worth fighting 261 and against which the state should take action using all the means at its disposal. In his address at the IVth International Colloquy on the European Convention of Human Rights in 1975, Willibald Pahr maintained: "The significance which attaches to the media as sources of information just in our modem pluralistic and advanced society seduces those operating the media to take unfair advantage of their position by concerting the economic power vested in them into joumalistic power and thus, in the last analysis into political power. ( ... ) It is, indeed, not onl y for political considerations but also in the light of the change in the conception of fundamental rights in general and liberty of information in particular that such a society cannot content itself any longer with refraining from itself interfering with the individual's liberty to impart, receive and obtain information, but it is bound to take effective action in order to bring about and maintain a situation where everybody is Compare above sub 11. 3. b), p. 42. Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Communication and the Protection of Privacy. Legal expertise. MS., p. 3, 14. 261 Differently, however, the European Parliament in its reason of consideration L of its Decision of the European Parliament on the concentration of media and on the diversity of opinions of 16. 9. 1992. 259

260

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59

able to exereise that right. This duty neeessitates in particular measures designed to prevent impairment of the diversity of sourees of information and abuse of the media.,,262

Such far-reaching demands should be treated with extreme caution. The reasons why an institutionalised view of the guarantee of the freedom of the press according to Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR cannot be considered as the basis for restrictions of freedom have already been explained above,263 as has the fact that even if we accept the state protective duties arising from Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, all the measures based on it must be seen in terms of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. May it therefore suffice to reiterate that Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR grants the publisher a defensive right against any kind of state interference. Any measure restricting this right of freedom, even if it serves to safeguard pluralism, requires justification in the face of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. Further considerations must therefore begin with the proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council and the European Parliament, which could, if put into practice, possibly constitute interference with the publishing side of the freedom of the press, whose general human right guarantee has already been explained and is here only to be looked at from another point of view. In this respect, one point must be mentioned beforehand: there can be no doubt that joumalists are also bearers of the same state-directed human right of freedom of the press?64 But as has been shown, at the level of the personal area of protection (by the compensation of conflicting legal positions) this parallel bearing of human rights must not be used as an instrument to legitimate the restriction of the freedom of the press of the publisher, but can only become significant at the level of justification of interference. This aspect will be examined in the following paragraphs.

b) Material area of protection: proteetion (also) of the functionality of the publishing unit In its nuc1eus, the guarantee of the publishing freedom of the press according to Art. 10 Para. I ECHR means that a press entrepreneur need not in his publications accept opinions which oppose his own or that news are selected and disseminated against his will. At all times, the publisher - and this is also part of the nuc1eus of his human right - must be able to take his publishing decisions autonomously; he is entitled to a basically unlimited authority to give directions?65 Beyond this nuc1eus, however, the publicist human right of the freedom of the press gives further protection. The functionality of the press enterprise in general 262 Willibald Pahr; To What Extent has Freedom of Expression Evolved?, p. 125. 263 Sub 11.2. b) dd) (3), p. 36. 264 Compare above sub 11. 2. a), p. 25. 265 It reaehes its limits regarding the individual journalist in his proteetion of eonseienee, on this below sub 11. 4. d) dd) (5) (e)., p. 75.

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11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

and of the individual publishing unit (this means of the newspapers and journals with editorial offices for aIl areas of interest - "VoIlredaktionen" ["complete editorial offices,,]266) in particular must, to be consistent, be considered guaranteed. Although no Strasbourg judicature exists yet as such, a reason is, however, to be found in the fact mentioned above 267 that the Convention Organs interpret the area of protection of the freedom of comrnunication in a very broad sense. In the cases Groppera et a1. 268 and Autronic 269 the Court expressly included the means of transmission and reception (and thereby, beyond the informational content, also the distribution) of a broadcaster in the area of protection of Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR. The same applies to the financing of media enterprises. 270 But compared with the functionality of a press enterprise, these pre- and post-effects of the activities of the media271 are rather far removed. The fact that they are included here leads to the conclusion that the specific investments of the press publisher as regards personnel and material, which are intended to serve his autonomously chosen task as an entrepreneur, also come under the guarantee of human rights 272 . If astate measure were to hinder the press entrepreneur from perforrning his independently chosen task as an entrepreneur in the way he wishes to, the protective area of the freedom of the press would be activated. State measures that hinder the function of press enterprises in a sustained way are an offence against the freedom of the press, if as a consequence this freedom can consequently no longer be exercised efficiently.

c) Interference with thefreedom ofthe press ofthe publisher by laying down "freedom within the press" aa) Introduction, questions of competence From various points of view, the organs of the European Community as weIl as those at the level of the European Council have devoted themselves to the promotion of pluralism in the media. From Art. 10 ECHR derives not only a defensive right of the individual against state interference, but also the state's duty to ensure pluralism. 273 1t has already been explained above 274 that any state protective duties 266 On these terms Walter J. Schütz, in: Peter Schiwy/Walter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 203. 267 Sub 11. 2. a), p. 25. 268 Judgement of 28.3.1990, Series A no. 173,4,22, § 55 = EuGRZ 1990,255 (256). 269 Judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4,23, § 47 =EuGRZ 1990,261 (262). 270 On this detailed Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 387 ff. 271 Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7). 272 Compare mutatis mutandis Christoph Engel, AöR 118 (1993),169 (2IOf.). 273 Eckart Klein, AfP 1994, 9 (15). 274 Sub 11. 2. b) ce), p. 30.

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resulting from Art. 10 Para. I ECHR cannot be considered a mere part of the human rights guarantee of the freedom of the press by circumventing the disciplining restrictive regulation. Measures to ensure pluralism are "ambivalent regarding basic rights,,275 inasmuch as they themselves can have restrictive effects on basic rights (for example of publishers) when they have strengthening effects on the basic rights of others (for example of editors, joumalists). This must be analysed in detaillater on. Interference by acts of the European Community could be said to take place if one denied in general its competence to deal with aspects of the freedom of expression, of information and of the press and assumed an action ultra vires on the part of the organs of the Community. In favour of this thought one could mention the principle of subsidiarity of Art. 3 b ECT. The question becomes even more significant if one takes into account that from the point of view of the member states the question of competence more urgently demands an answer at the level of the European Community than at the level of the European Council. While the organs of the latter deal in principle only with guidelines of policy which are not immediately binding for its member states, the legal acts of the European Community (in its limited areas of responsibility) have a greater degree of binding character, as is weIl known. The question of the principle of subsidiarity (which is rather doubtful regarding its competence-restricting effect 276 ) and its implications for European cultural policy cannot be dealt with in detail here. However, it should be pointed out that the principle of subsidiarity could certainly oppose other ideas of the organs of the European Community regarding media law. In no. 24 of its Decision of 16. 9. 1992 the European Parliament postulates, for example, a European "media code to safeguard professional ethics". Bearing in mind that in all the member states of the Union the press is subject to the control of press councils 277 or similar forms of self-control (for example, codes of ethics) and that the press markets - in contradiction of the claim in the reason of consideration 0 of the Decision - are limited to national and often even smaller areas, there is not the slightest need for harmonisation here. 278 The same applies at least as far as the press is concemed - to the establishment of a European Media Council demanded in no. 29,279 whose potential tasks are already fulfilled sufficiently at the national level by scientific institutions established to observe the media landscape. 280 The fact that "the Member States and the European CommuEckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (16). Compare instead of many Carl-Eugen Eberle, AfP 1993,422 (426, further reference). 277 On the "Deutscher Presserat" compare Franz Ronneberger; in: Peter Schiwy I Walter J. Schütz (edit.), Medienrecht, p. 383 f. 278 The same position Edgar KulI, AfP 1993,430 (434). 279 Critical from the point of view of broadcasting law Carl-Eugen Eberle, Das Fernsehen im Zugriff des europäischen Rechts, in: Festschrift Werner Thieme, p. 947 f. 280 Correcdy Edgar KulI, AfP 1993,430 (435). 275

276

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11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

nity bear responsibility for safeguarding and developing pluralism,,281 is an apodictic claim by the European Parliament, which while taking into account the principle of subsidiarity still awaits proof which cannot, however, be furnished within the framework of this analysis. Besides, it must be taken into consideration that the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union extended the sphere of competence of the Community as regards culture (Art. 128 ECT). While the economic aspects of the press (in particular the laws governing competition, mergers, business establishment and service) were the responsibility of the Communit/82 from the very beginning anyway, this is now also true of the cultural aspect of the press. 283 The new sphere of judicature of Art. 128 ECT must, however, if seen correctly, be interpreted as a generally restrictive 284 , competence-limiting, but by no means competence-extending regulation, with the consequence that the prohibition of harmonisation of Art. 128 part 5 ECT (based on Art. 100a ECT or Art. 235 ECT) protecting the relevant national legal and administrative regulations must not be evaded?85 In the following, the questions regarding competence law will not be dealt with, but the starting point will be the premise that the European Community is not - in principle - deprived of legal acts and decisions on the diversity of opinions and on the safeguarding of pluralism. bb) Interference by Decisions of the European Parliament and by the Directive on European Works Councils To summarise, the state organs are certainly entitled and in certain circumstances even obliged to provide special protection for the sensitive basic right of the freedom of the press. It must be underlined once more that in cases where measures ensuring pluralism are not excluded from the very beginning they cannot be seen as apart of the human right guarantee itself (but as its restriction only), as is expressed,286 among other things, by the Decision by the European Parliament of 15. 2. 1990 on the concentration in the media. In the reason of consideration D and no. 2 of this Decision it is claimed that pluralism of information and freedom of opinion are granted by Art. 10 Para. 1 281 No. 1 of the Decision of the European Parliament of 16. 9. 1992 on Media Concentration and Diversity of Opinions. 282 Compare instead of all Edgar Kuli, AfP 1993,430 (434). 283 Compare for broadcasting Carl-Eugen Eberle, AfP 1993,422 (425). 284 Carl-Eugen Eberle, Das Fernsehen im Zugriff des europäischen Rechts, in: Festschrift Werner Thieme, p. 951; Carl-Eugen Eberle, AfP 1993,422 (426). 285 BVerfGE 89, 155 (194, 2IOf.); Dieter Dörr; ZUM 1995, 14 (20); Eckart Klein, AfP 1994,9 (14f.). 286 But this way also Christian Jacq I Francis Teitgen, The Press, in: Mireille DelmasMarty (edit.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, p. 64.

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63

ECHR. It has already been mentioned that, according to common opinion, the freedom of opinion, however, forms only the basis of the freedom of expression and is under the proteetion of Art. 9 ECHR. 287 In no. 1 of the Decision the rights of information, of the independence of the editorial offices and of the freedom of the journalist are placed alongside each other in a way that allows no other interpretation than that all three aspects are aspects of the guarantee of expression and of the freedom of information granted by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR. However, such an understanding of the guarantee of freedom of information and expression is not laid down in this provision. Pluralism of information must not be taken unquestioningly as a guarantee of the same rank, because this (wrongly) implies the priority of the freedom of information (from the point of view of the public) over the freedom of expression in general and the freedom of the press of the publisher in particular. The "independence of the editorial offices,,288 asserted in the Decision could be understood to mean that the journalistic employees should be entitled to make publishing decisions independent of the publisher. One must assurne that the editors' freedom to act independently of instructions is fully intended. Such an intention interferes with the publisher's freedom of the press, because in this way he is deprived of the autonomy of his publishing decisions and the functionality of the publishing unit is restricted. Both require justification in terms of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. The "freedom of journalists" mentioned at the same juncture - though the freedom of the press is probably meant first and foremost - can be applied only in order to check the lawfulness of the interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher. The guarantee of the "freedom of opinion of aB employees in the field of information" demanded in no. 3, 4th sub-clause, is probably directed equally at the editors' publishing independence of instructions, because the European Parliament cannot seriously intend to establish a legal standard for the obvious fact that also in press enterprises anyone (within the general limits) is allowed (and must be able) to say what he or she thinks. An aspect which must be clearly separated from this is the question whether he or she must also be allowed to publish what he or she has said in a press organ of his or her employer. The framework directive to ensure the journalistic and publishing independence in all media proposed in the reason of consideration C and no. 24 of the Decision by the European Parliament of 16. 9. 1992 would also constitute interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher: without any doubt, it would be interference if this independence of the journalist forces the publisher to publish opinions he does not share. But even if this directive did not give cause for such a far-reaching regulation, interference with the protective area of Art. 10 ECHR could exist in cases where (in turn) the functionality of the publishing unit was affected. There Cornpare above sub H. 2. b), p. 27. Onee more underlined in the reason of eonsideration D for the Decision by the European Parliarnent of 16. 9. 1992 on the Coneentration of the Media and the Diversity of Opinions. 287

288

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H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

are no objections to this; the state itself would not be forced to influence the publishing unit on the basis of the directive. The fact that, on the basis of astate measure (in this case instigated by a supranational organ), third parties are given possibilities to interfere 289 is sufficient far it to constitute interference. The "freedom within the press" - the paraphrase used here for journalistic and publishing independence - constitutes such interference with human rights. This interference is only indirect, but nevertheless requires unrestricted justification. 290

cc) Interference by the acts of the European Council The freedom within the media ("freedom within the media must also be protected and internal pressures guarded against") postulated in nos. 10 and 13 of Resolution J003 (1993) passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council "on the ethics of journalism" also constitutes interference with the autonomy of the publisher. If it were put into practice, the extension of the freedom of the journalists (beyond the undisputed state-directed guarantee) would have the effect of restricting the freedom of the press entrepreneur. By no means can the necessary level ofinterference be neglected here, because the "coexistence" of publisher and journalist expressly demanded by no. 13 probably goes (in spite of the rather obscure wording) far beyond the mere restricted duties of hearing and consideration on the part of the publisher, which are - as will be shown in the following 291 reconcilable with Art. 10 ECHR. The special right of co-determination of the editors demanded in no. 32 of the Resolution must also be understood as interference, because the mentioned "rules ( ... ) for editorial staff'," which are intended to regulate the relations between publisher and editor "separately from the normal requirements of labour relations", must probably be understood in this way. Concerning these special provisions away from the "normal" co-determination of the employee, the Parliamentary Assembly, however, does not aim at a restriction of codetermination under the aspect of tendency protection, but on the contrary, aims at a clear extension. However, this constitutes massive interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher. The Resolution of the 4th Ministers' Conference on media policy of December 1994 "Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights", however, hardly attains the necessary level of interference. The emphasis on "free, independent, pluralistic and responsible journalism" in "Principle I" is too general in its wording to allow the derivation of a restriction of the decision-making autonomy of the publisher. Furthermore, the principles of the resolution must be interpreted in the light of the reasons of consideration: the second paragraph, however, stresses the role of press 289 Compare above sub H. 2. b) cc) (3), p. 32; summarising Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 445. 290 Also Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7). 291 Compare below sub III. 2. b). p. 83.

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65

entrepreneurs and press employees to equal degrees. The fact that in the early drafts of this resolution the publishers and owners were not mentioned supports this consideration inasmuch as there is now no cause for a "misunderstandable" interpretation which goes beyond the threshold of interference.

d) lustification of interference according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR

aa) Introduction As previously mentioned, the significance of the press to inform the public as a "public watchdog" has been underlined repeatedly by the Strasbourg Organs. This does not result in the prevention of interference, but, in fact, in no more and no less than the fact that the necessity for measures that limit the freedom of the press needs intensive and restrictive examination. 292 bb) Catalogue of aims Interference with the freedom of the press must serve one of the aims mentioned at the end of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. 293 Not a11 the aims mentioned require explanation here,294 because up to now they have not been applied by the Strasbourg Organs to the sphere of the media and, furthermore, cannot be considered regarding the subject matter of this study. As far as can be seen, there has not yet been a Strasbourg decision regarding the aim of interference of "territorial integrity". According to the author's information, the restrictive aim of the prevention of the "spreading of confidential news" has been considered for only one decision by the Commission. 295 Regarding the catalogue, the prevention of disorder ("Ordnungsvorbehalt" I "defense de l' ordre,,296) and the c1ause pertaining to the protection of the rights of others ("Schutz der Rechte anderer" I "la protection ( ... ) des droits d'autrui") must be considered in the final result. It also appears as if Resolution 1003 (1993) passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council is 292 Judgernent by the Court of 26. 11. 1991, Series A no. 217, 4, 28 f., § 50 (Case Sunday Tirnes H). 293 Cornpare above sub H. 3. b) cc), p. 45. 294 Cornpare instead the surnrnarising survey by [rene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gernäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 113 ff. 295 Decision by the Commission of 6. 10. 1983 (no. 10343/83), Decisions and Reports 35, 224. 296 On the different wording of the authentie texts cornpare Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 179f.; Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (50): harrnonising interpretation of both versions, priority should be given to the (positively worded) French version, which also allows preventive interference (subject to its necessity in a dernocratic society which rnust then be checked).

5 K10epfer

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II. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

based on this, when it speaks of "the citizen's fundamental right to infonnation" in no. 13 and of "the joumalist's freedom of expression" in no. 14. ce) Prevention of disorder (1) General character of the aim of protection

The legal content of the restrictive purpose of the "prevention of disorder" has not yet been conc1usively c1arified. All that can be taken for granted is that it is neither a general c1ause of the national "ordre public,,297 nor a c1ause for the "raison d'Etat".298 This is suggested not only by the wording (the term "ordre public" is used in neither Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR nor Art. 8 Para. 2 and Art. 11 Para. 2 ECHR which are of a similar structure), but also by the inner systematics of the restrictive c1auses, because an extended ordre-public c1ause could inc1ude the enumerative catalogue of the restrictive c1auses and would ultimately render it obsolete. The individual aims would then be concrete tenns only; but this is not catered for in the Artic1e. 299 From the systematic position, one may furthermore conc1ude that the prevention of disorder - placed in the catalogue of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR between the first group of the aims serving only the proteetion of the state and its order and the third group containing aims exc1usively directed at the proteetion of private individuals - allows restrietions which are necessary for the good of the state or society as a whole; the proteetion of individual interests can only be subsumed here if it embraces at the same time the proteetion of the interests of society as a whole. 3oo 297 But Roman Herzog, Grundrechtsbeschränkungen nach dem Grundgesetz und der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 241 f.; also Phedon Vegleris, Diskussionsbeitrag, in: Irene Maier (edit.), Europäischer Menschenrechtsschutz, p. 188 f.; compare Phedon Vegleris, Revue des droits de l'homme 1 (1968),219 (227). 298 Previously Karl lose! Partsch, in: Karl August Bettermann I Franz L. Neumann I Hans Carl Nipperdey (edit.), Die Grundrechte, vol. I, p. 437; Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 32; including a detailed grounds against a "unkontrollierbaren Totalvorbehalt" ("uncontrollable total reservation of the legislation") Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (91, passim); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 79ff.; similar lochen A. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, preliminary remark to Art. 811, N. 12; Christoph E. Hauschka, ZUM 1987,559 (565). Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 150, and Sabine Astheimer. Rundfunkfreiheit - ein europäisches Grundrecht, p. 145, understand the prevention of disorder in the sense of the public order of the (German) police law, but this is open to doubt. 299 A closer understanding of the prevention of disorder can be proved with the evolution, on this, for example, Volker Diesbach, Völkerrechtliche Garantien der Presse- und Informationsfreiheit, p. 149; Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (47 ff.). 300 Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41

(SI f.).

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67

(2) The case Engel et al. The Decision by the Court in the case Engel et al. apparently contradicts the above. 301 According to this decision, the term "order" in Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR goes beyond the "public order" in the sense of Art. 9 Para. 2 ECHR as weIl as Art. 2 Para. 34th Protocol (freedom of movement and freedom to leave the country) and "it also covers the order that must prevail within the confines of a specific social group". Therefore, the Court understands the prevention of disorder - in an unjustifiable manner ~ not only as a general c1ause of ordre public, but understands it - without any sufficient grounds, however - in a broader sense. Because of the reasons just mentioned the author does not agree with this understanding. 302

(3) Proteetion 0/ democratic institutions and structures? It remains to be considered whether the protection of institutions and structures is also part of the prevention of disorder. Analysis of the judicature of the Strasbourg Organs 303 does not reveal a unified picture. While in the case Engel et al. quoted the functionality of the army is subordinated to the prevention of disorder,304 in the case Barthold305 the European Court of Human Rights did not mention the prevention of disorder at all and, therefore, the question remained unsolved as to whether the institution of freelance professions could be protected by using the prevention of disorder. In the case CasteIls,306 the Court subsumed under the prevention of dis order the protection through crirninal law against the disparagement of democratic institutions. For this reason, one must ultimately differentiate: the prevention of disorder seems to be suitable, in principle, to protect democratic institutions, but mere structures are not protected, because then the states would be offered a carte blanche for a politically motivated shaping of a material sphere. 307 Therefore, in this respect, too, the dogmatic concept of the margin of appreciation must be applied, which - as previously explained - is filled by the Court with indications, also inc1uding the comparison within the signatory states. 308 The protecJudgement of 8.6.1976, Series A no. 22, 3, 41, § 98 = EuGRZ 1976,221 (237). Rejection also by Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (49); more in agreement Irene Laeuchli Bosshard, Die Meinungsäusserungsfreiheit gemäss Art. 10 EMRK, p. 163. 303 Detailed Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (71 ff.). 304 On the decision practice in cases of the maintenance of order in prisons Ulrich Hoffmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - II Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 186 ff. 305 Judgement of 25. 3. 1985, Series A no. 90, 6 = EuGRZ 1985, 171. 306 Judgement of 23.4. 1992, Serie A no. 236, 7, 21 f., § 39. 307 Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (81); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.81. 308 See above sub 11. 3. b) dd) (4), p. 54. 301

302

5*

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11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

tion of institutions which exist only in some states therefore needs special justification. Following the proposal made by Christoph EngeP09, one must also differentiate as to whether institutions have evolved historically or are newly established. While the former can only be reduced to the extent that the European human rights standard is increased, the (human rights-restricting) creation of the latter is admissible in a few exceptional cases only. In doing so, the Convention shows greater respect for historically evolved institutions. Nevertheless, nothing shows clearly that the motives of the European Council and the European Parliament to fight media concentration and demand "freedom within the press" - namely pluralism of information and diversity of opinions could justify interference with the human right of the freedom of the press under the aspect of the prevention of disorder. Pluralism of information31O and diversity of opinions are by no means democratic institutions, but models and in a more favourable light existing structures of a democratic society. If such structures and models were seen as legitimating interference, restrictive discretion would be unlimited. (4) The Case Autronic If the prevention of disorder is therefore not a general reservation for the functioning of a democratic society, there are no reasons to elevate it to the status of a general media policy reservation. In any case, the media policy decision alone cannot justify interference with human rights.

In contradiction to the point of view presented here, in the case Autronic 311 the European Court of Human rights accepted in its broadcasting law decision that the authority to "safeguard cultural and political pluralism" falls without restrietion under the limited reservation of the "prevention of disorder" . However, interference with the freedom of the press cannot be justified by this (not clearly founded) claim alone. The decision, therefore, quite correctly met with criticism. 312 309 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (82f.); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 82. 310 No. 2 of the Decision by the European Parliament on Concentration in the field of the media of 15. 2. 1990 speaks of a "basic right" of pluralism of information; in any case, such a basic right cannot be derived from Art. 10 ECHR. The contrary (and correct) position is represented by the European Commission in the Green Book "Pluralismus und Medienkonzentration im Binnenmarkt", KOM (92) 480 fin., 15: "Aus der Verbindung zwischen dem Prinzip der Aufrechterhaltung des Pluralismus und dem Prinzip der freien Meinungsäußerung ergibt sich nicht die Möglichkeit, das erstgenannte Prinzip als Grundrecht anzusehen." (UFrom the link between the principle of preservation of pluralism and the principle of the free expression of an opinion there does not result the possibility to consider the first principle a basic right.") Agreeing Edgar Kuli, AfP 1995, 551 (556). 3ll Judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4,26, §§ 58 f. =EuGRZ 1990, 261 (263). 312 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention,

p.81.

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(5) Intermediate result If, after all this, only the protection of evolved democratic institutions is taken into account as a case group of the prevention of disorder, it results inevitably that from this point of view the "freedom within the press" cannot be justified as interference with the human right of the freedom of the press. These evolved democratic institutions in the field of the media basically comprise the public broadcasting institutions only.313 According to the point of view represented here, the opinion-forming process or the democratic model of pluralism of information are not taken into account.

dd) Reservation of the rights of others

(1) The general significance 01 this aim According to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR, interference with the freedom of the press is allowed in order to protect the rights of others. The Convention makes no express mention as to which rights of others are meant here in general, whose protection the state may take as reason to restrict a human right; up to now, the question is not c1arified sufficiently either in the practice of the Convention Organs or in the literature. But without any doubt, those rights which are themselves protected by the ECHR are definitely inc1uded. 314 In this case, the human rights of others cannot be applied in their state-directed defence function, because state interference with this protective area is not to be fought from this perspective; on the contrary, the rights are used in order to legitimate interference with the human rights of third parties. The aim is, therefore, to protect legal matters which are protected (from the state) by Convention rights. In any individual case, the rights of others which legitimate interference need not become a positive right of interference (in the sense of a protective duty)?15 The state may regularly interfere with a human right restricted by "rights of others" in cases where the state wants to protect the interests of another person (or of several others, but not mere collective rightS)316 protected by human rights, provided that, in doing so, the state fulfils the other preconditions of the restriction of human rights?I7 3I3 Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7); Christoph Engel, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 46 (1989), p. 41 (83 ff.). 314 Miclwel O. Müller, ZUM 1994,289 (290); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 65. 315 Compare already above sub II. 2. b) cc) (3), p. 32. 316 Ulrich Hojfmann-Remy, Die Möglichkeiten der Grundrechtseinschränkung nach den Art. 8 - 11 Abs. 2 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 148. 317 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.66.

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H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

Whether the "rights of others" can also result from nationallaw requires further consideration. As the signatory states of the ECHR decided in favour of a complete catalogue of aims which can be pursued in the case of interference, the reservation of the rights of others must not become a general omnibus clause for interference purposes which do not fall under any other aspect in the catalogue of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. 318 In order to set limits in this respect, the above-mentioned concept of the margin of appreciation should be applied with the result that regularly only those purposes are legitimate which are predominantly legally protected in the member states on the basis of evaluating investigation. 319 Therefore, as regards the extension and the direction of the protection of the rights of others, a member state may go further, but it is - as has been shown - subject to the control of the Convention organs. In this way, it is possible to prevent the reservation of the rights of others from being reinterpreted as a general reservation of policy, as was already negated regarding the prevention of disorder. The protection of individuals must remain the starting point; the reservation must not be a gateway for almost any political ideas. 320 (2) Exclusion of objectively rendered value concepts

The facts mentioned above already clarify that objectively rendered value concepts alone cannot fall under the reservation of the rights of others. Otherwise, the state would be free to justify any interference with the freedom of the press by saying that this also serves the protection of others on some other level. Such a reservation would be limitless and must therefore be rejected. 321 In principle, this consideration already mIes out the possibility that "freedom within the press" can be justified merely by applying the ideas of the pluralism of opinions, especially with the claim of the public to pluralist press offerings, because the guiding idea of the pluralism of the media 322 and of opinions is an objective value only, but by no means an individual right: the right of individual (or of a group of) recipients to "balanced" information in a certain publishing unit is utterly inconceivable, because any reader would have an individual idea of what is "balanced". Interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher could by no means be justified by laying down the "freedom within the press". The majority of the thoughts presented by the European Parliament323 and by the Parliamentary Assembly of the

318

p.77. 319

320 321

p.78.

Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, See above sub H. 3. b) dd) (4) (b), p. 54. Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7). Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention,

322 So clear1y no. 1 of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration of the Media and on the Diversity ofOpinions of 16. 9.1992.

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European Council 324 would have to be rejected as being irrelevant with regard to the necessary justification of interference. (3) The case Groppera et al. However, adecision by the Strasbourg Court seems to contradict clearly the point of view presented here. In its broadcasting law decision in the case Groppera et a1. 325 the Court decided without giving further grounds that the purpose to "support pluralism, especially the diversity of opinions" serves the aim of protecting the rights of others. 326 This approach must be reproached, as above, for its lack of contour and for its arbitrariness. As, however, it cannot be ruled out that if the Court had to decide whether an introduction of the "freedom within the press" based on considerations to ensure pluralism corresponds to the Convention, the Court could base this decision in a similarly unrefIected way on the rights of others. Therefore, it remains in the following 327 to examine whether the "freedom within the press" would also correspond to the further criteria of the examination of proportionality328 specific to human rights. This means that even if one assumed together with the European Court of Human Rights that the aim to ensure pluralism was a legitimate aim, even then the "freedom within the press" would be necessary in a democratic society, in order to justify corresponding interference. This will be dealt with later on?29 (4) Protection 0/ economic and publishing competition? However, it should be considered whether the protection of econornic and publishing competition among the press enterprises can be used in order to justify the "freedom within the press,,?30 Basically, it would appear possible for the member states to oppose distortions of the economic competition among press enterprises 323 Compare for example the reasons of consideration Band C of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration of the Media of 15. 2. 1990; reason of consideration J and no. 1 of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration of the Media and on the Diversity of Opinions of 16. 9. 1992. 324 Compare no. 17 of the Resolution 1003 (1993) of I. 7. 1993 "On the ethics of joumalism". 325 Judgement of 28. 3. 1990, Series A no. 173,4, 27, §§ 69 f. = EuGRZ 1990,255 (258). 326 Compare the Decision already mentioned in the case Autronic (Judgement of 22.5. 1990, Series A no. 178,4 =EuGRZ 1990,261), in which the Court subsurnes the aim to ensure pluralism also and without any doubt under the reservation of the prevention of disorder. Compare also Hubertus Gersdorf, AöR 1994,400 (416f.). 327 Immediately sub 11. 4. d) ee), p. 76. 328 Detailed on this above sub 11. 3. b), p. 42. 329 Below sub 11. 4. d) ee), p. 76. 330 Thus the reason of consideration A of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration ofthe Media of 15. 2. 1990.

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in order to "protect the rights of others", because such distortions can result in the hindrance of competitors and prejudice readers. 331 In this respect, the state must on the one hand protect the econornic competition among press enterprises only because of its existing or potential publishing repercussions,332 because Art. 10 ECHR is not essentially a standard serving the protection of econornic interests. 333 Vice versa, active and selective state promotion of publishing competition must on the other hand be ruled out, because this would bring about the danger of a state-directed press system. The Convention therefore permits only state opposition as regards distortions of competition. Such distortions of competition can take place, on the one hand, because of a ("dishonest") kind of competition (for example, the spreading of misinformation or predatory competition),334 but above all because of concentrations of the press and the exertion of power on the market, on the other hand. If such distortions of competition seriously hinder or even rule out publishing competition, legal restrictions of the freedom of the press are justified according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. 335 This corresponds to the Decision mentioned above made by the European Commission of Human Rights in the case De Geillustreerde Pers of 16. 7. 1976,336 which underlined the duty of the state to protect against excessive concentrations of the press, Le. ultimately, state supervision of the market structure. 337 Therefore, a (preventive) control of mergers will have to be regarded as being justified according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR; apart from this supervision of the market structure, however, the ECHR also allows the state to monitor market behaviour. However, one must take into account at all times that publishing competition among the press enterprises, as mentioned above,338 is protected by the ECHR at a higher level than pure economic competition. If the introduction of the "freedom within the press" has the effect of being astate influence on the political or other intellectual-spiritual position of a press enterprise there is great doubt as to whether this severe interference can still serve the protection of the "rights of others". But doubts emerge especially in so far as the "freedom within the press" Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (7). Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.245. 333 Compare only Jochen A. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 10, N.18. 334 On a different problem regarding the competition relevance of press expression compare only Adolf Baumbach/Wolfgang Hefermehl, Wettbewerbsrecht, Einleitung UWG, N.239ff. 335 Compare detailed (for German law) Emst-Joachim Mestmäcker; Medienkonzentration und Meinungsvielfalt, esp. p. 30 ff. 336 No. 5178/71, Decisions and Reports 8, 5 (14), § 88, above sub 11. 2. b) cc) (3), p. 32. 337 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p.372. 338 Sub 11.3. b) dd) (4) (c), p. 55. 331

332

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must be adequate in order to act against distortions of the competition; this will be dealt with later on. 339 In any case, the "necessity" must, however, be examined very critically.340 The argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights would probably be quite different: if it continued its judicature founded in the cases Groppera et al. and Autronic mentioned above, any public support of publishing competition (for example, by the introduction of the "freedom within the press") would have to be attributed to the protective aims of the rights of others and of the maintenance of order. There are fundamental doubts in this respect as mentioned above, but even if the Court (superficially) affirmed the legitimate aim of interference, the important guiding decisions would probably be made within the framework of its examination of proportionality.

(5) Rights ofthe editors as "rights of others" legitimating inteiference? (a) Finally, it remains to be considered whether the rights of the journalists as "rights of others" can be used in order to justify the "freedom within the press". For example, the European Parliament in its Decision of 15. 2. 1990 in No. I (in addition to the above-mentioned reference to the defence against the dangers of the pluralism of information) returns to the freedom of the journalists. 341 In order to answer the resulting question as to which rights of the journalists should be considered, the explanations on the personal protective area of Art. 10 ECHR can be applied. The freedom of the press of the journalists should be considered first of all, because the rights of others legitimating interference are primarily laid down, as explained, in the ECHR. But if the effect of this human right on third parties has already been negated,342 all that need be pointed out once again at this juncture is that the publisher and the editor are entitled to the same extent to the state-directed freedom right of the freedom of the press. All the decisions mentioned above, 343 which defined the personal protective area of the freedom of the press in a broad sense, dealt with state influence on the bearers of human rights; therefore, as has also already been explained, nothing is to be gained from these decisions for the publisher-directed right of the freedom of the press of an editor. Fundamentally, however, in the previous paragraph the author accepted the possibility that under certain circumstances state protective duties do result from Art. 10 ECHR. 344 However, as far as can be seen, the Strasbourg organs did notOn this immediately sub 11. 4. d) ee). p. 76. On this immediately. 341 Also in the reasons of consideration C and S of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration of the Media and on the Diversity of Opinions of 16. 9. 1992. 342 Above sub H. 2. b) ce), p. 30. 343 Sub H. 2. a), p. 25. 344 Above sub 11. 2. b) ce), p. 30. 339

340

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11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

even to the slightest degree - postulate the protection of the freedom of the press of an editor against his publisher. The Convention organs have also not yet concemed themselves with the alleged danger of the "freedom of joumalism" caused by the concentration of the media. 345 The Decision by the Commission in the case De Geillustreerde Pers346 mentioned above accepted in principle the possibility of astate protective duty against excessive press concentrations, but it supported neither the interdependence of press concentrations and the danger to joumalistic rights of freedom insinuated by the European Parliament nor anything else which could justify the understanding of the "freedom within the press" as a concretisation of astate protective duty?47 (b) As has already been explained, the state is nevertheless allowed to interfere regularly in cases where its interference is intended to protect the interest of another person protected by human rights. But after all, in the ECHR itself there appears to be no legally protected interest of the editor against the publishers and for this reason the only option is to resort to national law. Regarding the choice of the rights to be considered, the signatory states are entitled only to a margin of appreciation which is subject to examination by the Strasbourg Convention organs?48 This margin must be fumished - according to the dogmatics explained above with indications,349 of which the comparison of the legal systems of the individual signatory states must be looked at first of all. An exemplary examination of the influence with which the member states of the European Council equip the editors against their publishers reveals that in the member states the editors are not entitled to a publisher-directed right of the freedom of the press, i.e. there is no "freedom within the press" whatsoever. Basically, interference is, however, inadmissible where an equivalent of the restriction is

345 No. I of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Concentration of the Media and on the Di versity of Opinions of 16. 9. 1992. 346 No. 5178/71, Decisions and Reports 8, 5 (14), § 88 (on this already above sub 11. 2. b) ce) (3), p. 32. 347 According to the correct point of view of Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (8) (also Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 318) the contrary seems to be true, because in a case within the application area of Art. 9 ECHR (freedom of religion) similar to the basic problem of the "freedom within the press" the Commission decided as follows (Decision no. 7374/76 of 8. 3. 1976, Decisions and Reports 5, 157 (158»: A clergyman who exerts his human right according to Art. 9 ECHR by entering the service of a church is in his freedom of religion sufficiently protected by the state, if the state grants hirn the possibility to leave the church. It goes without saying that considerations regarding imminent unemployment must be excluded. The case of the journalist can be compared with this. Consistently, the Commission should decide here that an editor is always giyen the possibility to leave the press enterprise. This is sufficient as astate protective duty; on the further necessities as regards protection of conscience see below in the text. 348 See above sub 11. 4. d) dd) (I), p. 69. 349 Compare above sub 11.3. b) dd) (4), p. 54.

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not to be found in the signatory states. 350 It therefore follows that, regarding the precise case of the "freedom within the press", the comparison between the member states of the Convention indicates the inadmissibility of the interference with the publisher's freedom of the press thus effected. If one also takes into account that, for the reasons mentioned above,351 the organs of the European Council (as weil as the organs of the European Community) are entitled to the smallest margin of appreciation, at the European level the assertion of the "freedom within the press" cannot, however, be justified by referring to the "rights of others". (c) One exception to this is the freedom of conscience of the journalists, which must be accepted by the publisher. In individual cases, this freedom of conscience can be endangered during the writing of artic1es, but under certain circumstances also during supporting activities in the editorial offices. The protection of conscience and conviction of the editors and journalists, which corresponds to the general European legal tradition, will have to be considered as being granted by human rights. To this extent, (as regards the freedom of the press of the editor) a "right of others" legitimating interference can be assumed. Where this protection of conscience is laid down in the ECHR is not yet c1ear. One possibility would be the freedom of conscience (granted without limits) of the editor according to Art. 9 Para. 1 ECHR, and another would be a negative freedom of expression resulting from Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, i.e. here the freedom against any compulsion to express an opinion which one does not share. Regarding both approaches one has to consider once more that the ECHR does not display any effect on third parties,352 i.e. it cannot be applied to the relationship between editor and publisher (who may be exerting pressure). Nevertheless, a protective duty of the state must be considered. Although the margin of appreciation for the protective duties is particularly broad, any pressure to work against one's conscience in an editorial office would encroach on the nuc1eus of the personality of an editor to such an extent that the margin (also in respect of the comparison among the member states regarding the freedom of conscience, which is guaranteed almost everywhere in Europe) is significantly reduced. Like the Grundgesetz (Art. 5, Para. 1 (1», the ECHR also prohibits a journalist from being forced to write under his name, publish or support by auxiliary editorial activities something that contradicts his conscience or personal convictions. 353 The fact that the conscience c1ause (Gewissensklausel) is underlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council 354 therefore seems justified: its self-appointed task to "legally expand" this c1ause does, however, demand a certain degree of restraint.

350 351 352 353 354

ism".

Compare above sub 11. 3. b) dd) (4) (b), p. 54. Above sub II. 3. b) dd) (5), p. 57. Above sub II. 2. b) ce), p. 30. Also Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (8). No. 14 (sent. 2) of the Resolution 1003 (1993) of 1. 7. 1993 "On the ethics of joumal-

76

H. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

Any extension of the protection of conscience which goes beyond the minimum standard described, for example by especia11y favourable regulations on giving notice and compensation for an editor giving notice for "reasons of conscience" (as proposed for German press law de lege ferenda), 355 can neither be demanded nor justified at a European level. The reservation of the rights of others a110ws - this point should be underlined once more - only measures protecting the freedom of expression of the editor which do not have any decisive restricting effect on the functionality of the press. ee) Legitimacy of the "freedom within the press" in a democratic society? (1) Having exc1uded a11 further possibilities of justification (as further admissible restrictive aims, as described, are not to be considered), it fo11ows from the approach developed in the last paragraph that the granting of the "freedom within the press" - beyond the respect of the freedom of conscience - does not contravene Art. 10 ECHR only if and in so far as it is suitable to oppose distortions 0/ competition. However, from the probable point of view of the European Court of Human Rights, which can be assumed because of its judicature regarding broadcasting law, the "freedom within the press" would still be a legitimate purpose of the restriction of the press freedom of the publisher if it aimed in general at strengthening pluralism. According to the dogmatic construction of the examination of proportionality specific to human rights described above, it should therefore be asked whether the assertion of the "freedom within the press" would be necessary in a democratie society in order to protect the rights of others and (if one fo11owed the point of view of the European Court of Human Rights which must be rejected) in order to prevent disordet: (2) Nevertheless, whether the "freedom within the press" is in any way suitable in order to oppose distortions of competition in the press system seems more than doubtful. In order to prevent or remedy impairments of economic competition, national (perhaps also supranational) provisions on cartel and mergers law (anti trust law) are needed. It is not c1ear how the editors' independence of instructions should have anything like the same effect. As regards possible distortions of publishing competition it has already been pointed out that this publishing competition is protected by Art. 10 ECHR at a higher level than economic competition. Interference affecting the tendency of a press organ are therefore always subjected to a particularly stringent examination of necessity. However, national pluralism can only coincidenta11y affect external competition, but on the other hand it brings about serious interference with the autonomy of the publisher as granted by human rightS. 356 355 Compare Rupert Schah, Pressefreiheit und Arbeitsverfassung, p. 193 f.; Peter Lerche, Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der "inneren Pressefreiheit", p. 107 ff.

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Consideration of all the facts and circumstances would regularly and quite c1early come out in favour of the freedom of the press entrepreneur: for the editors or their substitutes the "freedom within the press" renders possible a kind of publishing power that cannot be controlled neither by the state no by the market (they would not carry the risk of an entrepreneur). As mentioned above,357 the Strasbourg organs understand and underline the functions of the press in a democratic society as strengthening freedom. This understanding is therefore not in keeping with the "freedom within the press". The forced "freedom within the press" would greatly hinder the effects of competition, the effects of which "tendency" press organs in particular are subjected. The existence of "tendency newspapers" is largely responsible for the fact that publishing units are "scrutinised" by competition in order to win readers. The existence of "tendency" press products is, therefore, a precondition for the existence of the freedom of the press as granted by human rights. (3) If one concurs with the view of the European Court of Human Rights, the aim to ensure pluralism is sufficient in order to restrict the freedom of the press of the publisher: the interference brought about by the "freedom within the press" must be necessary in order to ensure or even merely to support the pluralism of information and opinions spread by the press. But the suitability of the "freedom within the press" to achieve this aim is itself extremely doubtful. The Ministers' Committee of the European Council also seems to be of the same opinion when it underlines expressly that the impartial transmission of information encounters particular difficulties. The Committee points out at the same time that newspapers follow a special publishing guideline which affects the way information is presented. 358 Even the advocates of "freedom within the press" have to concede that editorial co-determination only seldom leads to a perceptible extension of the spectrum of the views existing within a press organ at all; empirically even this cannot be proved. 359 Even if publishing co-determination is granted, the fact cannot be denied that neither the individual editor nor the editorial board (or its elected representatives) reflect the opinions prevailing in society or could even represent a balance of opinions. 360 Therefore, the general effect of "freedom within the press" in supporting pluralism cannot be logically deduced even in theory. Reinhold Zippelius stated quite correctly as folIows: "Aber auch unter diesen Bedingungen (scil. der "Inneren Pressefreiheit") können sich Meinungsc1iquen bilden." ("But also under these conditions (viz. of the "freedom within the press") groups of opinions can emerge,,).361 The transmission of the publishing autonomy of decision to indiChristoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7). Sub 11.2. b) dd) (3), p. 36. 358 No. 5 of the Dec1aration of the Ministers' Committee of 24. 3. 1994 (Doc. 7053) on eight principles of "Ioumalistic Freedoms and Human Rights". 359 Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Innere Pressefreiheit als politische Aufgabe, p. 55. 360 Also Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (7). 361 Allgemeine Staatslehre, § 28 IV, p. 267 f. 356

357

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11. "Freedom within the media" and Art. 10 ECHR

viduals or to a group of privileged employees cannot, therefore, in any way compensate for existing deficits as regards the diversity of the press and is accordingly unsuitable as a measure to ensure and promote pluralism in the press market. 362 Any concept of media-intemal pluralism, which ultimately forms the basis of the "freedom within the press", finds itself caught between, on the one hand, economic competition (which cannot be relativised) with the resulting sales-oriented demands made of the publishing profile and, on the other hand, the "democratic" ideal of the pluralism of opinions. Such a concept is exposed to the deficits inherent in the system: the transfer of publishing competences from the press entrepreneur to the press employee would inevitably result in the latter (even though he does not carry the actual risk of an entrepreneur) being forced to submit to the economic pressure of the market, which is often said to reduce quality and to be detrimental to the diversity of opinions, if he wants his press product to retain customers. The consideration by the publisher of the potential buyers' interests and opinions is the "link" via which, in a market economy, the population itself can attain influence on the information offered to it; too much "autonomy" for the editorial offices vis-a-vis the publisher would adversely affect the "democratic" sensibility to the expectations and wishes of the population. 363 Admittedly, the interest of the editors to keep their jobs will not blind them entirely to the economic effects of their activities. However, this sensibility will be weaker than that of the publisher, particularly since the editors still have the option of changing their jobs. (4) Accordingly, there is considerable doubt regarding the suitability of the "freedom within the media" to ensure and promote pluralism. But on the next level of the examination of proportionality specific to human rights this model does not pass muster by any means. The necessary determination of a pressing social need for the restriction of the (publishing) freedom of the press 364 demands an appraisal of the interference and the aim of the interference. 365 The fact that the "freedom within the press" constitutes a serious restriction of the publisher's autonomy to make decisions has already been explained at length. However, a publisher is protected at a very high level by Art. 10 ECHR against interference with the tendency of his press organ. 366 For this reason, high demands must be made of the admissibility of such interference. Without any doubt, the idea of pluralism within the framework of the freedom of the media is also of great significance. However, the "freedom within the press" can serve this aim to an insufficient extent only. Furthermore, the reservation of the rights of others must be defined all the more 362 Christoph Degenhart, in: Bonner Kommentar, Art. 5 Abs. land 2 Grundgesetz N. 384; similar Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, I (7): "( ... ) zur Remedur ( ... ) zur Stärkung des Pluralismus taugt die innere Pressefreiheit höchstens zufällig." (" ... only by chance, the freedom of the press can be used ( ... ) as a remedy ( ... ) to strengthen pluralism. "). 363 Reinhold Zippelius, Allgemeine Staatslehre, § 28 IV, p. 267 f. 364 Above sub 11.3. b) dd) (I), p. 46. 365 Above sub 11. 3. b) dd) (2), p. 48. 366 Compare above sub 11.3. b) dd )(4) (c), p. 55.

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precisely, the greater the political relevance of the use of human rights is: the restriction of a human right is all the less admissible, the less its use is immediately linked with the functioning of a democratic society.367 The significance of the press for the functioning of a democratic society has always been underlined by the Strasbourg organs; this has been already mentioned here several times. Therefore, the reservation of the rights of others entitles the member states of the Convention as well as the organs of the European Council and of the European Union to carry out only such measures as do not serious impair the functioning of the press enterprises?68 But it is quite obvious that the "freedom within the press" would cause such a serious impairment. From this point of view, far-reaching restrictions of the autonomy of the publisher are inadmissible. No other conlusion is possible if one also takes into account the aspect of increasing media concentration,369 because the European Parliament agrees that the concentration of the media can also exert positive influence on the diversity of the media?70 As a result, if one fundamentally accepts the restrictive aim of pluralism (taken under the reservation of the rights of others), the "freedom within the press" cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve this aim, as no pressing social need exists. 371 e) Summary and prospects

aa) Summary An examination of the human rights conformity of the embodiment of the "freedom within the press", in particular of its proportionality, has shown - in the light of Art. 10 ECHR - that proposals aiming at internal pluralism in press enterprises constitute unjustified interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher and are, therefore, contrary to human rights. The warning by the Ministers' Committee of the European Council against real interference with the freedom of the media under the guise of promoting responsible journalism 372 therefore seems to be totally correct. Its view, expressed at the same juncture, that legislative intervention cannot be considered the adequate means to establish harmony between the freedom of the media and other rights and values seems to be at best an understateCompare above sub 11.3. b) dd) (4) (e), p. 55. Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (8). 369 So for example the reason of eonsideration B of the Deeision by the European Parliament on the Coneentration of the Media of 15. 2. 1990. 370 Reason of Consideration L of the Decision by the European Parliament on the Coneentration ofthe Media and on the Diversity ofOpinions of 16. 9.1992. 371 Going too far: Martin Bullinger. Human Rights Law Jouma16 (1985), 339 (360): "The legal requirements of a eertain independenee for newspaper editorial staff seems to be eompatible with, but not required by Artic1e 10 of the Convention." 372 No. 2 of the Dec1aration by the Ministers' Committee of 24. 3. 1994 (Doe. 7053) on eight prineiples of "Joumalistie Freedoms and Human Rights". 367

368

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ment, taking into account the points mentioned above. Legislative attempts to achieve pluralism by "freedom within the press" are not just inappropriate, they are quite simply contrary to human rights. To summarise, it can therefore be said that the freedom of the press is a freedom to be treated with caution, which must not be suffocated by excessive state or supranational care. 373 The attempts - although well-meant - on the part of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council and of the European Parliament to extend the basic rights of journalists ultimately aim at an (unjustified) restriction of the basic rights of press entrepreneurs. Areturn to the original view of basic rights and freedoms as state and community-directed defensive rights of the individual could serve to ward off similar attempts in the future from the very outset.

bb) Prospects From the German point of view, the "Europeanisation" of the freedom of the media - as the "Europeanisation" of basic rights in general - cannot be welcomed unilaterally in terms of the Grundgesetz, but must also be viewed with some degree of concern. Because of well-considered and understandable reasons for a c1ear renunciation of the so-called Third Reich, in a European comparison the regime of the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany has become especially significant within the constitutional system. Following decades of industrious extension by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and the science of constitutional law, the basic rights of the Grundgesetz are almost unparalleled in Europe as regards their efficiency, normative power and their considerable - now perhaps too considerable - attention to detail. It is therefore to be expected that in the case of the development of common European constitutional traditions, of constitutional harmonisation in Europe, of European conventions on human rights and finally during the creation of a European constitutional law, in the future the level of basic rights achieved will be lower than that of the Grundgesetz. Certainly, it would be tantamount to German basic-rights chauvinism if one were only to object to or reject this development without having given careful and fair consideration to the respective reasons and driving forces behind it. Because of their historical development, at least in recent times, most of the other European nations have not had any reason to react to arecent dictatorial past by raising the protective level of basic rights. In a European comparison, the more moderate basic rights positions may therefore be attributable to the normal historical, internal political situation in many of the European states; besides, some German critics of the perfectionism of the basic rights will support a normal level - according to their understanding - of basic rights under the Grundgesetz which is lower than the present one. Certainly, different constitutional and legal cultures, different historical experiences and dif373

So also the point of view of Eckart Klein, AfP 1994, 9 (18).

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81

ferent geographie, demographie, political, economic, social as well as cultural situations may result in different structures of the basic rights in the various European states, which at a European level may ultimately lead to solutions deviating from the Grundgesetz; on the other hand, the German point of view in individual cases may well cause an increase (e.g. fundamental procedural rights) in the standard of the basic rights induced by European integration. The losses - which are admittedly more probable on the whole - to the German level of basic rights caused by a European influence are part of the political cost of European integration. One cannot deny or negate this cost, but perhaps one can justify it. There is, for example, the possibility of political and economic justification. Political justification comes mainly in the form of European integration and the reasons on which this integration is based, especially the assurance of peace. In comparison to this very principle-oriented political approach, concrete economic justification can be more tangible, e.g. in the sense of rendering a market possible by standardising basic rights. Admittedly, only very general models of argument and legitimisation have been described. The question always remains as to whether - measured in terms of the German level - concrete losses regarding basiC rights are suitable, necessary and proportional in order to achieve progress in a particular case or the facilitation of a market. This can be doubted as regards the introduction of the "freedom within the press" for the mere reason that up to now this "freedom within the press" or similar concepts are unknown as legal standards in almost all European states.

6 K10epfer

III. Tendency protection ("Tendenzschutz") and Art. 10 ECHR 1. Interference with Art. 10 ECHR due to insufficient tendency protection? It is not easy to answer the question whether - in spite of its Art. 8 Para. 3 - the Directive 94/45/ EC of the Council of the European Union on the Introduction of European Works Councils I contains interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher as also protected by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR. This provision must be understood as a "reservation" or "opening clause" which intends to take into consideration the above-mentioned tendency proteetion demanded by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.z It may be taken for granted that without this provision the interference threshold would be clearly crossed: by giving third parties the possibility to interfere, a member state putting this Directive into practice would reduce the functionality of the publishing units and thereby restrict the freedom of the press of the publisher. It is therefore questionable whether the "opening clause" of Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Directive leaves untouched the functionality of the publishing units also protected by Art. lO Para. 1 ECHR and prevents the autonomy of the publisher from being restricted. It is conspicuous that the clause allows "special provisions" only for the "central management" of those enterprises which are located in its sovereign territory. According to Art. 2 Para. 1 (e), however, "central management" is only the central management of an enterprise (or the central management of the leading firm within a group of enterprises). From this one might conclude that German tendency protection applies only to the actual enterprise level, but not also to the operational level. One would, however, then have to ass urne interference, because the functionality of the publishing unit would also be impaired if the enterprise level, but not the operational level, were released from employee co-determination. In this case, too, the press entrepreneur could not exert his (in principle unlimited) right to issue instructions. This interference therefore also requires special justification according to Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. Furthermore, Art. 3 Para. 3 of the Directive stands out in another respect: it expressly allows special provisions only for domestic firms, but not for firms abroad.

OJ 1994 EC Nr. L 254, p. 64. On the difficult history of the imp1ementation of the opening clause in the draft of the Directive Dirk Michael Barton, AlP 1994, 261 (261 f.). 1

2

2. Art. 10 ECHR and the granting of tendency protection

83

If one concluded from this that a press entrepreneur with enterprises (or perhaps only firms) in several member states of the Union is protected against co-determination in his firms only in those countries which already have "solche besonderen Bestimmungen zum Zeitpunkt der Annahme dieser Richtlinie" ("such special provisions at the time when this directive is adopted"), then interference requiring justification must also be affirmed in this respect, because regarding his autonomy of decision it is immaterial to the publisher on which territory he is obliged to accept interference. Moreover, the clause prevents tendency enterprises from being exempt in future from employee co-determination in member states which have not yet adopted express special provisions. In any case, this could not be justified vis-a-vis the ECHR if Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR consistently demanded tendency protection or comparable protective provisions. Only if this were not the case would the restriction to a national "property clause" of Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Directive viv-a-vis Art. 10 ECHR be justified.

2. Art. 10 ECHR and the granting of tendency protection a) The question as to whether Art 10 ECHR, like the Grundgesetz, not only - as discussed - opposes the introduction of the "freedom within the press" in general, but also - at a higher level - guarantees tendency protection, can be answered on the basis of the results found regarding the "freedom within the press". If the ECHR presupposes - as does the Grundgesetz - the existence of "tendentious" press products as a precondition for the efficient functioning of economic and publishing competition, it follows that the ECHR, too, demands tendency protection for press enterprises. 3 Tendency protection is the necessary precondition for this competition, because without publishing units protected in their tendencies to a far-reaching extent, press products could not be considered as being suitable participants in such competition, i.e. as being sufficiently competitive. At the level of the Grundgesetz, too, it is not ultimately decisive that tendency protection is fixed by law, but only that the state respects the tendency proteetion resulting from material constitutional law. The organs of the European Council are also obliged to respect in their activities the tendency proteetion granted (to an equal degree) by human rights. b) This applies to an even greater extent to legal acts of the European Community: these should not be measured only in terms of the ECHR; on the contrary, also the Community Charta of the Basic Social Rights of Employees demands in No. 17 (to which the Directive of the Council of the European Community on the European Works Councils makes express reference) that, moreover, national customs are to be taken into account. If, however, Art. 10 ECHR and the imperative 3

6'

Also Christoph Engel, AlP 1994, 1 (8).

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III. Tendency protection ("Tendenzschutz") and Art. 10 ECHR

consideration of customs in the member states - tendency protection in Germany, as mentioned, is demanded by the constitution, therefore it is more than a mere "custom" - demand tendency protection, it folIo ws just as imperatively that tendency protection must be considered in every legal act of the Community. This has far-reaching effects on the Directive of the European Community on European Works Councils mentioned above. Although this Directive is not motivated by competition-related considerations, but by co-determination policy, it must nevertheless fulfil the requirement just described. The opening c1ause of Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Directive probably does not take the human rights consideration of tendency protection sufficiently into account. If Art. 10 ECHR contains tendency protection as a human right postulate, a provision that permits this institution only where it already exists at the moment of its coming into force cannot be lawful. On the contrary, the freedom of the press protected by human rights demands the establishment of tendency protection in all the member states - not only, as the wording of the opening c1ause suggests, at the enterprise level, but also at the operational level. This applies equally to the Community itse1f, because in its legal acts - as mentioned before - the basic rights of the Community must be taken into account. Even if the individual publisher is not influenced by the Directive itself but by its practice in national law, these two levels of the legislative act do not release the organs of the European Community from their duty to take into sufficient account the requirements of human rights (in concreto tendency protection) already at the first level. If one is therefore compelled to suppose a general obligation of the Community organs to inc1ude a provision regarding tendency protection (at least for the press enterprises discussed here) in all legal acts on co-determination law, an opening c1ause such as Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Directive cannot be sufficient. This c1ause does not sufficiently protect the press entrepreneurs concemed against co-determination of the publishers in their foreign enterprises and prevents (because of its restriction to already existing provisions on tendency protection) the requirements of the human rights from being put into practice in those European states which do not yet have provisions on tendency protection. The fact that, because of the opening c1ause, German legislators can and must bring about compatibility between the Directive and the Employees' Representation Act does not therefore remedy the infringement of human rights in general. Particularly in states without existing provisions on tendency protection, Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR is violated due to the absence of tendency protection. Art. 10 ECHR therefore prohibits only areduction of the freedom of the press of the publisher to the authority (incidentally, not protected at all by Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR) to eam money by publishing a press product. 4 On the contrary, the freedom of the press protected by human rights for the publisher guarantees hirn tendency protection in the sense of a necessary limitation of the co-determination powers of 4 Correct Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 319 for the parallel case of the "freedom within broadcasting".

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85

works councils. Protection against interference with the publishing autonomy of a publisher results inevitably in the editors not necessarily being deprived of any kind of influence, but more probably of any authority to make decisions. This applies not only to the publishing guidelines in the sense of a "fundamental competence", but also to a "detail competence". The points explained within the framework of the freedom of the press granted by the Grundgesetz can be applied here accordingly: in any case, the competence authority must fundamentally be the entitlement of the publisher. The human right guarantee of the freedom of the press therefore corresponds in general to the guarantee given by the Grundgesetz as regards the guarantee of material private autonomy and tendency protection as a reduction of co-determination. The homogeneity of the guarantee of freedom by human rights and basic rights also applies from the point of view of the editors. Fundamentally, certain restricted rights of hearing and participation also conform to the Grundgesetz in tendency enterprises. The ECHR also does not prohibit certain strictly lirnited duties regarding proceedings and consideration from being imposed on the publisher,5 provided that he only "has the last word", so to speak, in publishing questions, i.e. that the functionality of the publishing unit is not impaired. These entrepreneurial duties must be defined carefully - and restrictively - so that they do not in effect become rights of co-determination, which in turn would be exposed to the verdict of being contrary to human rights.

5 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 319; Christoph Engel, Atp 1994, 1(8).

IV. The prohibition of discrimination according to Art. 14 ECHR and property guarantee by Art. 1 of the 1st ProtocoI Apart from the central provision of Art. 10 ECHR, there are two further human rights guarantees in the press sector guarantees which can also attain particular significant, namely Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 Protocol 1. First of all, the prohibition of discrimination as laid down in Art. 14 ECHR will be discussed.

1. "Freedom within the press" and the prohibition of discrimination according to Art. 14 ECHR a) The general content of the prohibition of discrimination aa) According to its wording, Art. 14 ECHR, which is based on Art. 2 Para. I GDHR, does not contain a general principle of equality; 1 its genesis confirms this thesis. 2 According to the judicature of the Strasbourg organs, which has now established itself, 3 the provision develops, however, an autonomous significance within the field of the Convention rights. Although Art. 14 ECHR cannot have an independent significance removed from the other material provisions of the Convention (Art. 14 constitutes an "accessorial prohibition of discrimination,,4), its applicability, however, does not depend on the violation of a corresponding human right. On the contrary, the provision also applies when a measure only touches a human right, but does not violate it. A measure which in itself meets the requirements of a certain standard of the Convention can violate this standard in conjunction with Art. 14 ECHR, because the measure is discriminating. 5 As an integral part of the I Compare instead of many Franz Matscher; Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art. 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 629. 2 On this Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 14, N. 1. 3 Fundamentally the Judgement by the Court of 23.7. 1968 in the so-called "Belgischer Sprachenfall" EuGRZ 1975,298 (301, part I, § 9). 4 Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (278); Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 461. 5 In such a case, one speaks of the (of course misconstructable) "autonomous application" of Art. 14 ECHR, on this in particular Franz Matscher; Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 633 ff.

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Convention rights the prohibition of discrimination becomes effective only if "der Genuß der in der vorliegenden Konvention festgelegten Rechte und Freiheiten" ("the exercising of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention we are concemed with") is questionable. 6 Therefore, Art. 14 ECHR does not contain an absolute prohibition of discrimination, but only a guarantee against interference with the protective area of the material human rights of the Convention caused by discriminating treatment. 7 bb) In spite of the very broad wording of its authentie French version ("sans distinction aucune"), Art. 14 ECHR does not prohibit all different treatment in the exertion of the respected human rights and basic freedoms. The English version ("without discrimination") would also contradict such an interpretation, which so far has never been represented. According to the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, the principle of equality must, on the contrary, be understood as it can be deduced from "the legal practice of a large number of democratic states".8 According to this understanding, the Court considers a measure as inadmissible, due to its discriminating character, firstly, if it treats comparable matters unequally, or to be more precise: if it regarding the guarantee of a Convention right - differentiates between persons or groups of persons who are in a comparable situation; this unequal treatment then constitutes "interference"; - secondly, if this differentiation does not have an "objective and reasonable justification,,9 or "if it does not pursue a 'legitimate aim"'\o and - thirdly, if there is no adequate relation between the means applied and the aim pursued (criterion of proportionality).l1 All in all, the Convention organs have brought the preconditions, according to which they consider unequal treatment to be justified, nearer to their dogmatic understanding of the limits of Art. 8 - 11 ECHR. While the Convention organs make 6 Compare in detail Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 14, N.3ff. 7 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Ref1ections on the European Convention on Human Rights and on Human Rights, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, S. 217f.; Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (278 f.). 8 Judgement of 23.7. 1968, EuGRZ 1975,298 (301, part I, § 10) ("Belgischer Sprachenfall"). 9 Judgement by the Court of 23. 7. 1968, EuGRZ 1975, 298 (301, part I. § 10) ("Belgischer Sprachenfall"); also Jochen A. FroweinlWolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 14, N. 17. 10 Judgement by the Court of 13. 6. 1979, Serie A no. 31,4, 16, § 33 =EuGRZ 1979,454 (456) (Case March); also Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 91. II More detailed on this Franz Matscher; Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art. 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 631 ff.

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no great demands on the comparability of the situations 12 and accept that an objectively evident lawful public interest 13 is a sufficient basis for justification (Art. 14 does not contain a catalogue of the adrnissible restrictive aims), here the final decision also takes place with the examination of proportionality. In doing so, the Court takes into account the legal and actual circumstances that characterise life in a society in astate; because of the subsidiary character of the ECHR and especially its system of legal protection, also in this respect, the Court does not put itself in the place of the national govemmental bodies. The latter remain independent in their choice of the measures that they consider suitable to be taken in the areas ruled by the Convention. 14 In other words: also regarding the question of the observance of the prohibition of arbitrary distinction, the signatory states are entitled to a margin of appreciation;15 the Court restriets itself to monitoring the observance of their limits. In addition, the Court underlined that even a "severe" measure, provided that it does not amount to arbitrary unequal treatment, must be accepted. 16 From this one may conclude that a measure need not be "necessary", i.e. need not be the most moderate means imaginable. 17 The discrirninatory features, which are expressly mentioned but not finally clarified in Art. 14 ECHR (in comparison to Art. 3 Para. 3 Grundgesetz) do not contain absolute prohibitions of discrirnination, but are indications to fill the margin of appreciation. 18

12 A survey on the practice of the Convention organs in this respect is given by Jochen A. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 14, Ns. 19-21. 13 Compare again the Judgement by the Court of 23. 7. 1968, EuGRZ 1975, 298 (303, part 11, § 7) ("Belgischer Sprachenfall"); further proof Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 91 (with FN 295 f.); Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (279 f.). 14 Judgement by the Court of 23. 7. 1968, EuGRZ 1975, 298 (301, part I, § 10) ("Belgischer Sprachenfall"); also Jochen A. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 14, N. 22. 15 Compare only the Judgement by the Court of 21. 2. 1986, Series A no. 98, 10, 44f., §§ 75 - 77 (Case James et al.); on the complex with numerous details Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (283 ff.). 16 Judgement by the Court of 23.7. 1968, EuGRZ 1975,298 (303 f., part 11, § 13) ("BeIgiseher Sprachenfall"). 17 Franz Matscher, Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art. 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 638 demands, however, a certain "severity" of unequal treatment; as here Christoph Engel, ÖZöRV 37 (1986), 261 (281). 18 Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 238, further reference.

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b) Application ofthe measure to the "freedom within the press"

aa) One could imagine collisions between a possible "freedom within the press" and the prohibition of discrimination from two points of view: on the one hand, unequal treatment could be supposed, because the publishing influence on the content and direction of a press organ, which employed editors may exert by way of a corresponding special co-determination, equips these editors with a more extended publishing power than that of a self-employed journalist. Unlike employed journalists, self-employed journalists would always remain dependent on their products having to correspond to criteria laid down by other parties regarding content and tendency. On the other hand, the "freedom within the press" would privilege the editors vis-a-vis the publishers, because only the latter's publishing autonomy to make decisions is inseparably linked with the risk of an entrepreneur; for employed editors, however, this publisher's co-determination would not lead to any kind of personal economic coresponsibility.19 bb) There certainly seem to be no sufficiently objective and reasonable grounds for self-employed journalists to be in a worse position than employed journalists due to the "freedom within the press", because both occupational groups are initially in the same situation with regard to the publisher: both are dependent on the fundamental tendency decision, but also on the individual decision by the publisher regarding the publication of a journalistic work. All the proposals made so far on the "freedom within the press" were able and prepared to alter this fact only with regard to the employed editor (any granting of publisher's co-determination to a person alien to the enterprise would be contrary to basic and human rights anyway); this also applies to the rights of co-determination in the Directive on the "European Works Councils", which has already been described as being irreconcilable with the granting of the freedom of the press of the publisher. Although it must be conceded that an employed editor will regularly find hirnself in a position of far greater dependence on the individual publishing house than a self-employed journalist, this is not sufficient reason to treat them unequally as regards the "freedom within the press". Different degrees of guarantee would, admittedly, be pos sible. cc) If one also assurnes that, in a press system with a private enterprise structure, the material decision-making autonomy of the publisher is always linked inseparably with his risk as an entrepreneur, the granting of publishing competences without participation in the economic risk would constitute unequal treatment of the editor and the publisher. Although economically motivated interference with the scope of Art. 14 ECHR is not fundamentally mIed out, publisher's co-determination which is not originally economically motivated is quite a different matter. The protective level of Art. 14 ECHR, which is (also) an integral part of the guarantee 19 Christoph Engel, AfP 1994, 1 (5); the job risk of an editor due to the jeopardisation of the economic existence of a news paper is not comparable to the risk of the entrepreneur.

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of freedom according to Art. 10 ECHR, is based, among other things, on the protective level of interference with the human right, the scope of which is discriminated by the state. 20 Therefore, it could be seen as inappropriate that an economic activity (namely of the press entrepreneur) is particularly burdened, despite the fact that its autonomy, as described in detail, benefits from the special and extensive protection of Art. 10 ECHR. dd) If one can in summary claim that the "freedom within the press" has a discriminating effect on publishers and non-privileged freelance joumalists, Art. 14 ECHR to some degree assurnes the role of a "reason to render more serious" an already established offence against Art. 10 ECHR. 21

2. "Freedom within the press" and guarantee of property gran ted by human rights according to Art. 1 Protocol 1 The right of the respect of property laid down in Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of 20. 3. 195222 is one of the classic human rights. One may gather from the judicature of the Convention organs that the concept of property must be understood in a broad sense. Like the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) within the framework of Art. 14 Grundgesetz, the Strasbourg organs do not restrict the protection of property to the property strictly defined by civillaw, but extend it to all "correctly acquired, vested rights" ("wohlerworbene, vermögenswerte Rechte / droits acquis,,).23 The European Commission of Human Rights considers the right to an established and practised business enterprise, or any vested position brought about by the legal use of personal means and capabilities while taking on personal risks in economic life, as property capable of being protected in the sense of the Article. 24 The Court has decided in the meantime that the enterprise as a living unit is to be treated as property capable of being protected in the sense of Art. 1 Protocol 1. 25 20 Summarising Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 462. 21 See in this respect in general Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Reflections on the European Convention on Human Rights - and on Human Rights, in: Festschrift Hermann Mosler, p. 218; Franz Matscher, Betrachtungen über das Diskriminierungsverbot (Art. 14 EMRK) nach der neueren Praxis der Straßburger Instanzen, in: Festschrift Hans R. Klecatsky, p. 632. 22 BGBI. 1956 11 p. 1880, in the Federal Republic of Germany in force ace. to the Publication of 13. 4. 1957 (BGBI. 11 p. 226) on 13. 2. 1957; on the genesis Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. I of the Ist Protocol, Ns. 1- 3. 23 Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar. Art. I of the Ist Protocol.

N.4.

24 Detailed evidence by Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. I of the Ist Protocol, N. 5.

2. Guarantee of property granted by human rights according to Art. 1 Protocol 1

91

Art. 1 Protocol 1 protects property against deprivation and restrictions of use to different degrees. While Para. 1 (1) establishes the principle of the "respect of property", Para. 1 (2) draws up preconditions under which adeprivation of property is admissible. In Para. 2 of the Article, the right of the states is finally accepted to regulate - by laws that are considered necessary for this purpose - the possibilities of the use of the property in accordance with public interest. While the "freedom within the press" can hardly go as far to present itself as being adeprivation of property (in any case, no entrepreneur would be expropriated formally by the "freedom of the press", but material impairments - at least in the models discussed - also do not have the same status as a formal expropriation), a restriction of property must nevertheless be taken into consideration. In order to be admissible, this must have a legal basis. The criteria found above 26 within the framework of Art. 10 ECHR regarding the feature "prescribed by law" can be applied 27 to this requirement. Due to the fact that Art. 1 Protocol 1 does not contain a catalogue of aims for interference with property, all those aims must in any case be considered legitimate which are mentioned in the respective Paras. 2 of the Art. 8 - 11 ECHR. The Convention organs are satisfied if the restrictions of property prescribed by law are considered necessary in order to safeguard public interests, or to put into practice political aims, either in an economic, social or any other field. 28 For Art. 1 Protocol I, too, the final decision is made within the framework of the examination of proportionality. The signatory states of the Report are also granted a margin of appreciation in this respect. One will therefore have to assurne that, in general, the guarantee of enterprise co-determination for the employees - at least to prevent the predominance of the employers - does not constitute inadmissible interference with the right of property of an entrepreneur. The protection of a press entrepreneur according to Art. 1 Protocol 1 does not, therefore, go as far as the protection according to Art. 10 ECHR, which guarantees, as shown above, tendency protection and thereby protects it against extensive staff co-determination, in particular with regard to publishing questions. All in all, it can be said that the protection of property at a European level is, in general, less well-equipped than the guarantee of the freedom of the press. In this respect, the press entrepreneur who finds hirnself exposed to interference by the establishment of "freedom within the press" can repulse this interference on the basis of Art. 10 ECHR; Art. 1 Protocol 1 certainly does not grant hirn any protection going beyond 25 Judgement of7. 7.1989, Series A no. 159,7,21, § 53 (Case Tre Traktörer AB); further evidence by Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 212 (with FN 968); compare also Christoph Engel, AöR 118 (1993),169 (203). 26 Sub 11. 3. b) bb). p. 44. 27 For this also Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 1 of the 1st Protocol, Ns. 45 f.; Christoph Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 464. 28 Compare only Jochen A. Frowein/Woljgang Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Art. 1 of the 1st Protocol, N. 39.

92

IV. The prohibition of discrimination

this. The guarantee of the freedom of the press granted to the publisher by human rights therefore appears comparable to the German legal situation as a whole: Art. 14 Grundgesetz does not prohibit basically any enterprise co-determination on the part of the employees,29 but - deviating from this - press entrepreneurs do enjoy tendency protection granted by Art. 5 Para. 1 (2) Grundgesetz.

29

BVerfGE 50, 290 (339 ff.).

v. Summary in theses 1. If, under the aspect of the "freedom within the press" ("innere Pressefreiheit"), the freedom from instructions or pertinent special rights of co-determination are demanded for editors, this contradicts the private-enterprise structure of the press as granted by the Grundgesetz. The state-enforced internal pluralism of the press system would be irreconcilable with the constitutional guarantee of the press as a private freedom. This fact, which is c1ear for German law, cannot be applied automatically to the guarantee of the freedom of the press in Art. 10 ECHR. 2. Attempts by organs of the European Community and at the level of the European Council in order to introduce "freedom within the press" must be measured against Art. 10 ECHR, because the ECHR is the material Constitution of the European Council and Acts passed by the European Council are ineffective in cases of a violation of the ECHR. The prohibition of discrirnination in Art. 14 ECHR and the guarantee of property in Art. 1 Protocol 1 serve as additional yardsticks. 3. a) Art. 10 ECHR is a c1assic defensive right (also) of the publisher. The fact that the editor, who is to benefit from the "freedom within the press", is also entitled to the basic right becomes significant only on the plane of the justification of interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher. b) The "freedom within the press", as a freedom of the editor from instructions given by the publisher or as a concession of special rights of staff co-determination for journalists, interferes with the freedom of the press of the publisher. The distinction between "shaping" and restricting laws - as is known in German constitutional law regarding the freedom of broadcasting - cannot be transferred to the human right of the freedom of the press according to Art. 10 ECHR. c) The "freedom within the media" postulated by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council in its Resolution 1003 (1993) is not lacking in the necessary level of interference, because the demanded "coexistence" of the publisher and the journalist (compare Nos. 10 and 13 of the Resolution) goes beyond the mere rights of hearing, which in themselves do not necessarily cross the threshold of interference. d) The Framework Directive to Safeguard the Independence of lournalists and Publishers in all Media (compare Reason of Consideration C and No. 24 of the Decision by the European Parliament of 16. 9. 1992) proposed at the level of the European Community would constitute interference with the freedom of the press

94

V. Summary in theses

of the publisher: without any doubt, it would constitute interference especially if because of this journalistic independence - the publisher were forced to publish opinions which correspond neither to his general publishing aims nor to individual cases. But even if the Directive did not pave the way for such a far-reaching provision, interference with the protective area of Art. 10 ECHR could still be assumed, namely if the "functionality of the publishing unit" were affected. This fact cannot be contradicted by c1aiming that, due to the Directive, the state itself was not forced to influence the publishing unit. Interference is sufficiently justified if a state measure causes known possibilities of interference to be placed at the disposal of third parties. e) Measures ensuring pluralism cannot be seen as part of the guarantee of the freedom of the press according to Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR, as is suggested by the Decision by the European Parliament of 15. 2. 1990 (Reason of Consideration D). On the contrary, they must be measured against Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. Any objectivised view of the freedom of the press is alien to the ECHR; the differentiated dogmatics of defence law of the Artic1e must not be evaded. Only a superficial perusal of the judicature of the Convention organs could lead to the understanding (key word: "vital role of public watchdog") that the guarantee of the freedom of the press could be considered to be objective law. By insisting on the eminent and necessary role of the free press in a democratic state, the Convention organs intended to raise the standard offreedom in the sense of freedom (of the press) from the state. The intended protection of the press against state interference certainly cannot, however, be used in order to justify a restriction of the freedom of the press of the publisher based on internal pluralistic considerations. 4. a) Interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher is only lawful if it is made in order to render precise the restrictions of the basic rights laid down in Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. In this respect, the interference requires a legal basis which is only permitted to pursue certain restrictive aims, and the interference must be "necessary in a democratic society" ("notwendig in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft") . b) In Art. 10 Para. 1 ECHR there are no further unwritten restrictions of the freedom of the press, especially not under the aspect of the practical concordance. c) "Freedom within the press" could only be justified if it were necessary in order to protect public order or the rights of others. Other aims of restriction than those of the prevention of disorder and the protection of the rights of third parties are out of question. Resolution 1003 (1993) of the European Council seems to refer to these two aims when it quotes in No. 13 "the citizen's fundamental right to information" and in No. 14 "the journalist's freedom of expression". d) The prevention of disorder is - as is shown more c1early by the binding English and French versions of the Convention ("the prevention of dis order" , "defense de l' ordre") - neither a general reservation of the ordre public nor a reservation for the raison d'Etat nor must it degenerate into a general political reservation. Funda-

V. Summary in theses

95

mentally, the prevention of disorder can, however, be seen to inc1ude the protection of grown democratic institutions (but not of mere structures or policies). This is not the case, however, with the process of the formation of opinions. As Engel proved convincingly, only the public broadcasting stations come into this case group in the media sector; for the press, the prevention of disorder has no significance. e) The reservation of the rights of others must be interpreted to mean that its character as a protective reservation in favour of individuals is not reinterpreted as an arbitrary political reservation. Interference with the freedom of the press of the publisher while c1aiming the reservation of the rights of others, however, certainly cannot be justified by the right of the public to balanced information in a certain publishing unit. f) Only with regard to the fight against economic and publishing distortions of competition in the field of the press organs could measures be based on the reservation of the rights of others. There is already considerable doubt regarding the suitability of the "freedom within the press" to oppose distortions of competition in the press system. National (at times also supranational) provisions on cartel and mergers law (anti-trust law) can serve as remedies against impairments of economic competition. The editors' independence of instructions is incapable of achieving an even remotely similar effect in this respect. Interference which is aimed at the tendency of a press organ is, incidentally, subject to particularly stringent controls regarding necessity. The forced internal pluralism of a newspaper can have only marginal effects on external competition, but causes, on the other hand, severe interference with the autonomy of the publisher as gran ted by human rights. An appraisal of this comes out, however, quite c1early in favour of the freedom of the press of the press entrepreneur: the "freedom within the press" enables the editors or their representatives to exert publishing power which is controlled neither by the state nor by the market.

g) The journalist, too, is entitled to the freedom of the press; for this reason, the journalist concerned must, of course, also be taken into consideration as being entitled to the "rights of others". However, all the decisions made so far by the Convention organs on the freedom of the press of journalists have dealt with the influence exerted by the state on journalists, i.e. the congruent interests of the editor and the publisher. Whether the editor has protection of the freedom of the press with regard to the publisher has not yet had to be decided legally by the Strasbourg organs. 5. The fact that the state has certain protective duties to the press does not contradict the shaping of the freedom of the press as a c1assic defensive right. But the dogmatic instrument of the margin 0/ appreciation attains particular significance in this respect: it allows the Convention organs to take the different living conditions and legal traditions of the member states into account. The negative freedom of expression of journalists prohibits in particular that pressure is exerted on a jour-

96

V. Summary in theses

nalist to publish a point of view under his name which contradicts his opinion and should therefore suffice as grounds for a protective duty of the state. It does not, however, legitimise the "freedom within the press". A comparison of the signatory states reveals that the editors are not granted a defensive right directed against the publisher anywhere. The margin is, therefore, smaIler. 6. a) If one were to understand the reservation of the rights of others as weIl as the prevention of disorder in a broader sense and were satisfied with a general protection of pluralism, the "freedom within the press" to be introduced into the freedom of the press of the publisher would ultimately have to be examined in terms of the prohibition of excessiveness. The interest pursued to rectify competition and to deconcentrate the press system would have to be weighed up against the restrictions of the freedom of the press. b) It is decisive in this respect that the granting of the "freedom within the press" would enable journalists to exert publishing power without control by the state or the market. It can be proved neither empiricaIly nor theoreticaIly that the "freedom within the press" has the effect of supporting pluralism in general. On the contrary, the existence of tendency newspapers resulting from the freedom of the publisher to determine tendency has the effect that publishing units are at least controIled by competition. The introduction of the "freedom within the press" would to a great extent eliminate this corrective, which is, however, necessary due to the significance of the press in a democratic society. The "pressing social need" to be "explained convincingly" by the member states according to the judicature of the Strasbourg organs is therefore not given as regards the restriction of basic rights. 7. The freedom of the press as granted by human rights inevitably demands "tendency protection" ("Tendenzschutz"). The freedom of the publisher to determine a tendency must not be restricted by rights of co-determination - which cannot be justified in view of Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR - of the Works Council in particular. The opening clause of Art. 8 Para. 3 of the Directive by the Council of the European Union on a "European Works Council" does not meet these requirements. 8. More extensive protection of the journalists against their publishers than the protection granted by the conscience clause cannot be justified vis-a-vis Art. 10 Para. 2 ECHR. The reservation of the rights of others aIlows only those measures for the protection of the freedom of expression and information of the journalists which do not decisively impair the functionality of the press. The functionality of the press also includes the existence of tendency press products which are subject to control by competition. 9. a) If a "coIlective" model is pursued, such as by the introduction of "European Works Councils" in the Directive of the European Community, the introduction of the "freedom within the press" must ultimately be measured against the prohibition of discrimination of Art. 14 ECHR. The editors would be equipped with a special form of co-determination which would privilege them in comparison to self-employed journalists who publish in the press organ concerned and are excluded from

V. Summary in theses

97

this special fonn of co-detennination. Discrimination against the publisher would also have to be considered if he has the same status as the editors regarding publishing decision-making authority, but has to bear the full economic risk alone. b) On the other hand, however, the protective area of the guarantee of property as laid down in Art. I Protocol 1 is also affected. The enterprise as a living unit must be also regarded as property in the sense of this provision. However, this provision does not give the publisher greater proteetion against interference caused by the publishing co-detennination of the press employees.

7 Kloepfer

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