Focus and Secondary Predication 9783110815214, 9783110150575

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Focus and Secondary Predication

W DE G

Studies in Generative Grammar 43

Editors

Jan Köster Henk van Riemsdijk

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Focus and Secondary Predication

by

Susanne Winkler

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1997

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.

The series Studies in Generative Grammar was formerly published by Foris Publications Holland.

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Winkler, Susanne, 1960Focus and secondary predication / by Susanne Winkler. p. cm. - (Studies in generative grammar ; 43) Based on thesis (doctoral) - University of Tübingen, 1994. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 3-11-015057-3 1. Grammar, Comparative and general - Syntax. 2. Focus (Linguistics) 3. Grammar, Comparative and general — Verb phrase. 4. Generative Grammar. I. Title. II. Series. P295.W55 1996 415—dc21 96-46629 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Winkler, Susanne : Focus and secondary predication / by Susanne Winkler. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1997 (Studies in generative grammar ; 43) ISBN 3-11-015057-3 NE: GT

© Copyright 1996 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printing: Werner Hildebrand, Berlin. Binding: Dieter Mikolai, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Preface This monograph presents the results of a syntactic and focus-theoretical investigation of secondary predication constructions. The syntactic analysis is couched in the Principles and Parameters Theory. The focus analysis addresses the question of the prosodic realization of secondary predication constructions as well as their focus projection capacities and compares them not only to each other, but also to focus projection regularities in primary predications. This multilayered account shows that although the various types of secondary predication constructions have many aspects in common, they differ with respect to their distributional, selectional, sequential, binding-theoretic, semantic, and focus structure properties. In addition, only resultative secondary predications and eventive primary predications share the possibility of focus projection from subject position. The task then is to propose an explanation that accounts for the similarities and dissimilarities of the different predication types. With respect to focus marking and focus projection, it would be theoretically desirable that the same conditions which hold for primary subject-predicate relations also hold for secondary subject-predicate relations. This, however, would account for only part of the data and leave the fact that focus projection from subject position is only possible in some but not all secondary predication types unexplained. This book proposes that the focus projection differences between the different predication types directly result from the mapping relation between their syntactic structure and their focus structure, which is mediated by licensing principles of thetasaturation theory that take into account the specific event structure of the predicates. This book is based on my 1994 University of Tübingen dissertation. Its topic arose as a consequence of my work in the A4 project of the Sonderforschungsbereich 340 Syntaktische Fokussierung im Englischen at the University of Tübingen. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Bemie Drubig, the supervisor of the project and head of the Department of English Linguistics, for encouraging me and guiding large parts of the present work. I benefitted greatly from his knowledge of syntax and focus and I thank him for pointing out the relevant questions. I would further like to gratefully acknowledge the many fruitful discussions on syntax and focus, help, and advice of the following people: Agnes Bryan, Daniel Büring, Peter Culicover, Caroline Fery, Jochen Geilfuß-Wolfgang, Carlos Gussenhoven, Hubert Haider, Satomi Honda, Gert Jäger, Ingrid Kaufmann, Ursula Kleinhenz, Inga Kohlhof, Angelika Kratzer, Jürgen Lenerz, Uli Lutz, Juliane Möck, Valeria Molnär, Uwe Mönnich, Jürgen Pafel, Janet Randall, Tova Rapoport, Marga Reis, Michael Rochemont, Inger Rosengren, Susan Rothstein,

vi

Lisa Selkirk, Jane Simpson, Arnim von Stechow, Rosemarie Tracy, and Susanne Trissler. Α special thank you goes to Marga Reis for serving on my committee and for her helpful guidance through academia. Special gratitude goes to Kirsten Brock, who not only participated in the experiments and· corrected the English in this book, but also served as an every day of the week informant during the last years. I also thank the editing team, Juliane Möck, Steffi Manz, Heike Bötz, and particularly Ladi Bursik for preparing the final manuscript and Uwe Ruckgaber for his computer software and hardware first aid services during the writing of this book. I also thank the DFG, the Land Baden Württemberg and the University of Tübingen for supporting the research presented in this book from 1989 until 1994. This book is dedicated to Benjamin.

Contents

1.

2.

3.

Introduction 1. Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication 2. Roadmap Syntactic representation of secondary predications 1. The small clause analysis 1.1. The theoretical program 1.2. Stowell's dilemma: problems with the ungoverned status of PRO 1.3. Alternative small clause proposals 1.3.1. Chomsky's (1981) proposal 1.3.2. Chomsky's (1986a) proposal 1.3.3. Hornstein & Lightfoot's (1987) proposal 1.4. Hoekstra's (1988) generalization of the small clause analysis to resultatives 1.5. Conclusion 2. The predication theory analysis 2.1. Williams (1980): the theory of predication 2.2. Williams' (1983) arguments against small clauses 2.3. Conclusion 3. Distributional syntax of secondary predications 3.1. Rothstein's (1985) elaboration of the predication theory 3.2. Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986): VP-intemal representation of depictives 3.3. McNulty (1988): modifications of Rothstein's analysis 3.4. Roberts (1988): the subject in VP hypothesis 4. Defending a complex predicate analysis 4.1. Larson's (1988) complex predicate analysis 4.2. Modification of Larson's proposal 4.3. Theta-theoretical considerations 5. Conclusion Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar 1. Introduction 2. Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

1 1 15 17 18 18 22 27 27 31 34 40 49 50 50 52 56 58 58 65 68 70 74 74 78 85 90 93 93 94

viii

Contents 2.1.

3.

4. 4.

The syntactic approach 2.1.1. Chomsky & Halle (1968) 2.1.2. Bresnan's (1971, 1972) revision of the nuclear stress rule 2.1.3. Liberman (1975) and Liberman & Prince (1977): a phonological account of the nuclear stress rule 2.2. The semantic-pragmatic approach 2.2.1. Bolinger (1972) 2.2.2. Schmerling (1976) 2.3. Focus as new information 2.3.1. Halliday (1967b) 2.3.2. Chomsky (1972) 2.4. The focus structure approach 2.4.1. Jackendoff (1972) 2.4.2. Ladd (1980) 2.5. Conclusion The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus 3.1. Culicover & Rochemont (1983): a modular NSR-based account 3.2. Gussenhoven (1983): focus domain formation replacing the NSR 3.3. Selkirk (1984): a pitch-accent-first model 3.4. Rochemont (1986): an elaborated pitch-accentfirst model 3.5. The concept of argument structure in Selkirk's and Rochemont's focus theories 3.6. Excursion: Cinque's (1993) revival of the syntactic approach Conclusion

Focus theory and theta-saturation theory as methods of licensing 1. Introduction 2. The intonational model 3. The motivation of the intonational model 3.1. WH-questions are not an exception to the DF A 3.2. Focus assignment at D-structure 3.2.1. Focus assignment and WH-movement 3.2.2. Focus assignment and NP movement 3.3. Focus assignment and adjuncts

96 96 98

103 107 107 109 113 113 115 118 118 121 123 125 125 140 146 163 173 179 191

193 193 195 202 202 212 212 213 220

Contents

Licensing, focus, and the argument-adjunct asymmetry in a derivational approach A generalization of the focus licensing principles 4.1. Introduction 4.2. The licensing theory of theta-saturation and argument structure 4.3. Focus licensing principles revisited 4.3.1. Introduction 4.3.2. Thetic and categorical utterances 4.3.3. Diesing's (1992) proposal 4.3.4. Drubig's (1992a) proposal 4.3.5. An alternative account of focus projection facts Conclusion

i

3.4.

5.

Pitch extraction analysis of secondary predications: experimental data 1. Introduction and experimental design Pitch extraction analysis of resultatives and depictives 2. 2.1. Transitive AP resultatives 2.2. Intransitive resultatives 2.3. German Vend resultatives 2.4. Object-oriented depictives 2.5. German Vend depictives 2.6. Focus on the secondary predicate 2.7. Conclusions on the production experiment 3. Prosodic disambiguation of secondary predications 3.1. Prosodic disambiguation of resultatives vs. depictives 3.2. Prosodic disambiguation of directional and locative PPs 3.3. Perception test 4. Evaluation of experiments and summary Pitch extraction contours of related finite and 5. noninflectional constructions 5.1. Thetic finite constructions 5.2. Thetic noninflectional constructions 5.3. Categorical finite constructions 5.4. Categorical noninflectional constructions 5.5. Summary Conclusion 6.

223 237 237 238 251 251 253 258 262 266 274

277 277 282 282 288 290 291 292 293 294 299 299 304 306 309 311 311 315 323 325 331 332

χ

6.

7.

Contents

Syntactic licensing and focus projection in secondary predications 1. Introduction 2. Syntactic licensing of resultatives 2.1. Event structure of resultatives 2.2. Incorporation of resultative event composition into Higginbotham's phrase structure theory 2.3. Particle and three-place predicate constructions 2.4. Conclusion 3. Syntactic licensing of depictives 3.1. Arguments against the licensing of depictives at D-structure 3.2. Subject-predicate and predicate-predicate-linking 3.3. Explanation of the differences between RSPs and DSPs 3.4. Conclusion 4. Focus projection in secondary predications 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Focus projection in RSPs 4.3. Focus projection in DSPs 4.4. Licensing and the focus-projective behavior of related constructions

405

5.

411

Conclusion

Conclusion

333 333 334 334 344 352 354 355 356 366 372 380 380 380 382 388

413

Notes

419

References

435

Records

465

Index

471

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1.

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

The primary goal of this monograph is to examine the interaction of two different areas of linguistic study. First, I investigate the syntactic structure of secondary predications within the Principles and Parameters Theory. Second, I provide a focus-theoretical account of primary and secondary predications which is based on argument structural considerations. In particular, this study addresses the problem of determining licensing conditions which appropriately account for the structural and prosodic characteristics of the different types of secondary predication constructions, such as those given in (1). (1)

a. b. c.

She snapped her bag shut... (Ree 1:307) If you ate an animal raw, you could never wash the blood off. (Rec2: 111) Several times during the past summer Marya had wakened frightened from sleep. (Ree 1:512)

The italicized APs in (la) and (lb) are predicated of the object NPs, while the AP in (lc) is predicated of the subject NP. Although the italicized predication relations in all three sentences occur in addition to the clausal predication, (la) differs from (lb) and (lc) with respect to its interpretation. The italicized predication in (la) has a resultative reading, whereas those in (lb) and (lc) have a depictive reading. As formulated by Halliday (1967a, p. 63), a resultative predicate describes a resultant state which is caused by the action denoted in the primary predication, whereas a depictive predicate describes the state of its subject at the time when the action denoted by the clausal predicate occurs. In the literature on secondary predications, the idea that the different types of secondary predication constructions should be treated as a unified phenomenon has been one of the fundamental premises (see, for example, Williams (1980, 1983), Stowell (1981, 1983), Rothstein (1985), Chomsky (1986a, b), and Guömann (1990), among others). The classification of the set of examples in (1) as secondary predication constructions is based on such factors as the thematic independence of the secondary predicate, the fact that its distribution is governed by the rule of predication, and its occurrence as a noninflectional predication which observes the predicate restriction.

2

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary

predication

Thematic independence refers to the fact that secondary predicates are systematically excluded from being licensed by theta theory. Theta theory, as proposed, for example, by Chomsky (1986b), governs the distribution of arguments in syntax, but does not account for secondary predicates, which are typically analyzed as nonargument maximal phrases. Thematic independence, then, has been equated with the claim that resultatives and depictives are secondary predications that can be deleted from the sentence without causing a syntactic or semantic violation. This claim holds for the object-oriented depictive (OOD) in (lb), and the subject-oriented depictive (SOD) in (lc), as well as for the detached OOD in (2a), and the detached SOD in (2b). (2)

a. b.

"I shall burn the snake, alive or dead, and your mask and feather cloak," said Jewel. (Reel: 054) All there was, was the two birds across the street, chirping. (Rec2: 131)

The question, however, arises of whether resultative secondary predications (RSPs) are also thematically independent. Although some speakers may accept a version of sentence (la) in which the transitive resultative predicate is omitted, such optionality is usually contingent upon there being another meaning available for the primary predicate. The primary predicates of examples (3a-c) select the resultative predicate and are semantically odd if left out. (3)

a. b. c.

A brisk-looking young man pushed the door open and came in smiling. (Reel: 743) I knew Eddie Mars would bleed me white, but I didn't care. (Reel: 511) How close can we come (...) to causing Alex to laugh himself to death? (Rec3: 048)

Neither the transitive sentence in (3 a), nor the intransitive constructions in (3b) and (3c) can occur without the resultative predicate. The only class of resultatives that may omit the resultative predicate is the group of so-called ergative resultatives, which occur with change-of-state verbs, as originally observed by Simpson (1983a, p. 143). (4)

a. b.

As early as October it will begin to snow (...) and the lake will freeze solid. (Reel: 079) The force of the whale's impact cracked the earth open, and that's where we have to go. (Ree 1:217)

Introduction

3

There is some disagreement in the literature on whether (4a) constitutes an RSP (e.g., Pustejovsky (1991)), since the ergative verb freeze already provides the typical telic reading of an endpoint denoting activity which defines RSPs, in this case, that the medium water changed into ice by freezing. The causative versions of ergative resultatives, such as in (4b), are unequivocally resultatives. Judging from the examples (l)-(4), the generalization that all secondary predications are thematically independent cannot be maintained. Rather, there seems to be strong evidence that only SODs and OODs are truly thematically independent. Transitive resultative examples bear a close relation to the primary predicate, and intransitive resultatives introduce a new internal argument into the argument structure of the verb. The resultative predicate in ergative resultatives, however, appears to be optional. Thus, we arrive at a double-edged situation: if we concentrate on their status of forming syntactic predicates, we have to recognize that the different predication types are systematically excluded from the standard theta theory, as outlined, for example, in Chomsky (1986b); however, if we focus our attention on their thematic status, we are forced to recognize their different behaviors in relation to the primary predicate. The goal of this investigation, then, is to provide licensing principles that account for the different thematic statuses of resultative and depictive secondary predications (DSPs). Since theta theory only accounts for arguments and not for predicates, the proposal is based on a more elaborate theory of thematic relations, such as that proposed by Higginbotham (1985, 1989). Higginbotham's chief aim is to develop a semantic framework in which the interpretation of sentences is directly derived from the meaning of the individual words contained within them. He proposes that the restrictions that hold between lexical elements at D-structure result from the argument structure of each item. Each lexical element, which is equipped with a theta-grid, is licensed with respect to another element by virtue of specific licensing relations that hold between and within maximal projections at Dstructure. The step by step application of the licensing relations constructs syntactic phrase structures without recourse to stipulated phrase structure rules. They can ultimately be derived from argument structure in conjunction with different modes of licensing relations: theta-marking, theta-binding, thetaidentification and autonomous theta-marking. To account for the different secondary predication structures in theta-theoretic terms, two refinements of Higginbotham's theory are proposed. First, licensing of RSPs occurs at the level of D-structure in consideration of their thematic relation to the primary predication and their specific event structure. Second, licensing of DSPs occurs at the level of S-structure in consideration of specific linking operations. The conflict created by pursuing a maximally restrictive licensing theory to arrive at an explanatorily adequate grammar, on the one hand, and trying to provide a descriptively adequate account of the phenomena of secondary predications, on the other hand, occurs not only with respect to theta theory, but

4

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary

predication

also with respect to predication theory. Predication theory governs the distribution of nonargument maximal phrases. Therefore, it is commonly assumed that the different types of RSPs and DSPs form a unified phenomenon because they are nonargument maximal phrases that take a subject that is theta-marked by another lexical head. This notion is syntactically defined and can be stated informally by the rules of predication in (5): (5)

Rules of Predication: i. the subject must be an NP; ii. the predicate must be a maximal projection; iii. the subject, which appears as an external argument, must ccommand the predicate, and must be c-subjacent to the predicate, (see Williams (1980, p. 205ff.))

If the rules of predication are fulfilled, the licensed subject-predicate relation is signaled via coindexing. The rules of predication are proposed to not only apply to clausal predications, but also to the different types of secondary predication constructions. The c-command condition of the rules of predication (5iii) marks examples (6c) and (6d) as ungrammatical, because the respective subject cannot ccommand the predicate as it is in both cases contained in a PP which does not contain the AP. (6)

a. b. c. d.

John loaded the wagon; full; with hay. John loaded the hay; into the wagon green;. *John loaded the wagon with hay; green;. *John loaded the hay into the wagon; full;.

Note, however, that the difference in grammaticality between (7a) and (7b) cannot be attributed to a violation of the c-command restriction: (7)

a. b. c.

It was a challenge to John Bidlake, who had painted real Jenny and kissed her; into silence;. (Rec3: 043) *... and seen her; into silence;. ... and seen her; dead;.

To explain the ungrammaticality of resultative examples like in (7b), Simpson (1983a) suggests that "the verb must necessarily affect the OBJECT" (p. 146). The primary predicate kiss affects the object her, whereas the perception verb see does not. This restriction also explains the ungrammaticality of example (6d), in which the antecedent of the resultative is embedded in a prepositional phrase, and is thus not directly affected by the action expressed by the primary predicate.

Introduction

5

The concept of affectedness is made more explicit by Tenny (1987, 1992), who recognizes in the aspectual interface hypothesis that it is not the verb class that is responsible for the aspectual meaning of a sentence, but the internal argument, which plays a special aspectual role. With respect to the internal argument, this hypothesis states that "the direct internal argument of a simple verb is constrained so that it either undergoes no change or motion, or it undergoes change or motion which 'measures out the event' over time" (1992, p. 3). The relevant observation for resultative constructions is that they occur only with verbs of change taking an internal argument that is an affected argument in the sense that it not only measures out the event, but also delimits the event, where "a delimited event is one that the language encodes as having an endpoint in time" (Tenny (1989, p. 7)).1 Thus, the notion of affectedness is defined and eventually replaced by the notion of delimitedness. Modification by temporal adverbials is one useful diagnostic for determining if an event is delimited or nondelimited. If the adverbial expression in an hour can occur, the event expressed in the sentence is delimited; if the sentence takes for an hour, the event is nondelimited (see Dowty (1979)): (8)

a. b. c. d.

John kissed his wife into silence in an hour / ?for an hour. Jake knocked the door open in a minute / *for a minute. Bertha ate the plate empty in an hour / "for an hour. Alex laughed himself to death in an hour / *for an hour.

(9)

a. b. c. d.

John kissed his wife * in an hour / for an hour. Jake knocked at the door *in a minute / for a minute. Bertha ate from the plate *in an hour / for an hour. Alex laughed *in an hour / for an hour.

The events described in the resultative sentences in (8) are typical delimited events, whereas the nonresultative equivalents in (9) are nondelimited events. It follows from this regularity that the resultative predicates are the delimiting expressions in (8). According to Tenny's hypothesis, the resultative secondary predicate does not mark an endpoint of the action expressed by the primary predicate, but it identifies a central property of the internal argument, which undergoes change, and terminates the event by describing the state in which the changing process ends. In (8a), for example, the resultative predicate realized as the goal PP into silence picks out the abstract location as a central feature of the internal argument. In (8b), the resultative predicate specifies the property of doors as being typically in either a closed or open state. Tenny's proposal is particularly interesting if applied to intransitive or reflexive resultatives as in (8c) and (8d). The quandary these sentences present is that the primary predicate does not subcategorize for the postverbal NP, and it is not immediately clear how the internal argument should measure out the event; however, if the resultative

6

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

predicate and the primary predicate are understood as a complex verb of change, as is claimed here, the internal argument is necessary to measure out the event specified by eat empty or laugh to death. Returning to the examples in (7), the unavailability of the resultative reading in (7b) is explained in aspectual terms by a combination of factors. Although the perception verb see denotes an event, the internal argument of this verb does not measure out the event since it does not undergo change; therefore, the internal argument is not an affected argument, and the resultative expression cannot delimit the event. This explanation of the ungrammaticality of (7b) as an aspectual violation, however, does not yet explain why the depictive reading is possible with a perception verb as in (7c). A first answer is that depletives occurs more freely since they neither contribute to the thematic structure of the verb nor interfere with the aspectual interpretation of the sentence. More precisely, while resultative predicates are delimiting expressions that can only occur with events that can be terminated, the depictive predicates do not constitute delimiting expressions and therefore may occur with both undelimited events or activities, as in (10a), and delimited events, accomplishments or achievements, as in (10b, c): (10)

a. b. c.

Jake drinks beer; stale;. Howard; drove home drunk;. Al found the child; alive;.

However, OODs are ungrammatical with stative verbs, such as own in (11a), while their counterparts with process verbs as in (1 lb) are grammatical. (11)

a. b.

*Jake owns chickens; young;, Jake sells chickens; young;.

Since RSPs are only allowed to occur with verbs of change in which the internal argument can measure out the event, while OODs are allowed to occur with delimited and nondelimited events, one would expect there to be instances in which the secondary predicates have both a resultative and a depictive reading. Halliday notes that "ambiguities arise between depictive and resultative attributes, thus providing a hint of the need to recognize this distinction in the grammar" (1967a, p. 65). Consider the examples in (12): (12)

a. b. c.

Bill bought the shop empty. Mary cooked the lamb dry. John walked his dog across the street.

Example (12a) can either mean that Bill bought so many things that the shop became empty, or that when Bill bought the shop, the shop was empty. A similar

Introduction

7

interpretation is available for example (12b). Example (12c) has either the reading that John walked his dog from this side to the other side of the street, or that John walked his dog on the other side of the street. The question arises of why only a depictive reading is possible in (7c), while both depictive and resultative interpretations are possible in examples such as (12a-c). It can be predicted from the verb class restriction on resultatives that the examples in (12) without the secondary predicate must constitute either nondelimited events, or must be ambiguous between a nondelimited event and a delimited event. There is a further distributional difference between resultative and depictive secondary predication constructions, which also cannot be explained by the structural conditions of predication given in (5). This distributional difference is known as the cooccurrence restriction (see Simpson (1983a) and Rothstein (1985)), and applies to resultatives but not to depictives: Resultatives are not allowed to cooccur, whereas depictives can cooccur: (13)

a. b. c. d. e.

* John kicked the door; open; to pieceSj. They eat the meat; rawi5 tender;. John hammered the metalj flat; hotj. Johnj kicked the door; open; tiredj. Theyj ate the meat; raw; tired,.

Example (13a) with two resultatives cannot mean that John kicked the door open and to pieces. But according to both Simpson (1983a) and Rothstein (1985), example (13b) with two depictives means that "they eat the meat when the meat is raw, when the meat is tender" (Rothstein (1985, p. 19)). The ungrammaticality of (13a) results from the fact that the second resultative predicate violates the restriction that a sentence can only be delimited once. Since depictives are not delimiting expressions, this restriction does not apply.2 The restriction that an event can only be delimited once also explains why in sentences that involve two secondary predicates, as in (13c), the second is automatically interpreted as depictive. The occurrence of an SOD is less restricted. An SOD can occur both after an RSP, as in (13d), and after an OOD, as in (13e). Note, however, that the order of the secondary predicates cannot be reversed. The resultative secondary predicate and the object-oriented depictive secondary predicate must appear adjacent to their antecedents, and the subject-oriented depictive must occur last. The syntactic reasons for these word order restrictions are discussed in chapter 2. Thus, although secondary predications and their subjects have commonly been defined in terms of the structural c-command restriction of the standard predication rule given in (5), there seem to be further restrictions governing the distribution of the different predication types that need to be accounted for with more specific rules. The restrictions operating on the resultative predications have been shown to be aspectual and require a more elaborate theory of aspectual relations, such as the

8

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

theory of events developed in, for example, Pustejovsky (1991). Depictive predications, on the other hand, seem to be less restricted with respect to aspectual properties; however, the fact that they cannot intervene between the verb and a resultative predicate must also be accounted for by specific licensing conditions. Thus, we are again confronted with a situation where a rule, such as the predication rule in (5), applies to all secondary predication types and emphasizes a specific structural feature which they have in common; however, this rule is not specific enough to provide an explanation of the differences that can be observed if the distribution of secondary predication constructions is considered. Therefore, it is proposed that in addition to the predication rule in (5), secondary predication constructions are defined by the fact that they form a noninflectional predication which observes the predicate restriction. Whereas the c-command restriction defines the structural relation of the secondary predicate to its subject, the characteristic feature discussed here is that the second subject-predicate relation is always noninflectional in the sense that it does not contain an INFL element and is therefore unmarked for tense.3 It follows that resultative and depictive secondary predication constructions are temporally dependent upon the primary predication: (14)

a. b.

Sandy found Jake asleep. Sandy will find Jake asleep.

(15)

a. b.

Jake watered the lilies flat, Jake will water the lilies flat.

Both the depictive and the resultative predicates in (14) and (15) are temporally dependent on the governing INFL (see Dowty (1972), Marantz (1984, p. 45), and Rothstein (1985, p. 90)). For example, (14a) expresses that the state of Jake being asleep is in the past relative to the moment of speech and contemporaneous with Sandy's finding Jake. Example (14b), on the other hand, expresses that the state of Jake being asleep is in the future relative to the moment of speech, and is again contemporaneous with Sandy's achievement. The resultative examples in (15a, b) are also temporally dependent upon the primary predication. Although resultatives and depictives are temporally dependent upon the primary predicate, the temporal interpretations of the events denoted in depictives and resultatives differ. Rothstein (1985) observes that "a depictive describes the state of its subject at the time defined by the tense of the main predicate" (p. 83); thus, in (16a) raw describes the state of the vegetables at the time denoted by the tense of the verb eat. Rothstein proposes paraphrasing (16a) with the formula "when X were Y," as in (16b).4 A more precise semantic denotation, which avoids both a temporally sequential reading and a conditional reading, is given in (16c):

Introduction (16)

a. b. c.

9

Sandy ate the vegetables raw. Sandy ate the vegetables when they were raw. [3f: t a past time] Sandy ate the vegetables at t and the vegetables were raw at t.

A similar semantic interpretation can be assumed for SODs, but not for RSPs. RSPs like (15a) are paraphrased by until they become XP, as in (17a) (see Simpson (1983a) and Rothstein (1985)). A more precise semantic representation, which reflects the fact that resultatives express a cause-become relationship, is given in (17b):5 (17)

a. b.

Jake watered the lilies until they became flat. [3/: t a past time] Jake watered the lilies at t, the lilies not flat at t, causing the lilies to become flat at t'.

What is important is that the event of watering the lilies is temporally prior to the state of the lilies being flat. The event described by an RSP consists of a complex event that is composed of a nondelimited causal event and a final state (see Pustejovsky (1991)). In cases where the internal event structure is not observed, the example becomes ungrammatical, as in (18): (18)

a. b.

Miriam walked the dog hungry/?exhausted/?sweating. Jake danced his feet sore/?blistered/?stinging/?hurting.

The aspectual clash that causes the unacceptability of the sentences in (18) under a resultative reading (see Simpson (1983a), Smith (1983), and Carrier & Randall (1992)) can be explained by the fact that the past and present participles cannot function as delimiting expressions because they typically express cotemporality. Since cotemporality is felicitous in depictives, example (18a) is wellformed under both an object-oriented and a subject-oriented depictive reading. (18b) is ungrammatical under a depictive reading for reasons of subcategorization. This discussion raises the question of what types of predicates are allowed to occur in resultative and depictive secondary predication constructions. The question can be more precisely formulated as what types of predicates can function as delimiting expressions in resultatives, and what types of predicates can signal cotemporality in depictives. Simpson (1983b) observes that resultative predicates can be either APs or PPs, but not NPs or VPs: (19) I cooked the fish

10

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

Rothstein (1985) observes that DSPs occur with APs, PPs, and participles, but not with NPs: (20) Heateafrog

falive / in the garden / deep F - fried / smiling B \ [*a delicacy

As Simpson (1983b) notes, certain adjectival NPs can function as resultative secondary predicates, whereas no such exceptions are observed with depictive secondary predicates. (21)

a. b.

They painted the car green/a pale shade of green, They cut the stick short/the right length.

Generally, nominal phrases are referring expressions and cannot define a resulting state; however, the examples in (21) are wellformed because these specific NPs can function as delimiting predicates. These exceptions show that the predicate restriction that operates on resultatives must be stated in category-neutral terms. Note, however, that not all types of adjectival phrases are wellformed in resultatives: (22)

a. b.

*She walked the dog brown. *She taught the students intelligent.

Despite the fact that depictive predicates are much freer in their distribution than resultatives, they are subject to a similar restriction. DSPs are ungrammatical, as in (23), if they do not denote a transitory property or phase of their subject: (23)

a. b.

* She ate the snail brown. *She met her husband intelligent.

Rothstein (1985) proposes that there are two conditions operating on depictive secondary predicates. "The attribute described by the predicate must be at the same time an intrinsic property of the subject, and a transitory one" (p. 84). The first condition explains why (24a) is grammatical whereas (24b) is not: (24)

a. b.

John ate the peanuts salted, *John ate the peanuts salty.

In contrast to the predicate salted in (24a), which constitutes a temporary property of peanuts, salty in (24b) violates the first condition, since salty is not an inherent

Introduction

11

property of peanuts but an estimation of the peanuts John tasted. This restriction also holds for resultatives. The resultative predicate must identify a central property of the internal argument, which undergoes change, and terminates the event by describing the state in which the changing process ends. The second condition mentioned by Rothstein, namely that the adjectives occurring in resultatives and depictives must denote a temporary property, explains the ungrammatically of the examples in (22) and (23). The fact that both resultative and depictive secondary predications are noninflectional predications that are restricted to occurring with stage-level predicates (SLPs) contributes to the assumption that they form a unified phenomenon. The distinction between stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates (ILPs) is introduced by Carlson (1978), who draws upon a distinction made by Milsark (1976) between states and properties'. Properties are those facts about entities which are assumed to be, even if they are not in fact permanent, unalterable, and in some sense possessed by the entity, while states are conditions which are, at least in principle, transitory, not possessed by the entity of which they are predicated, and the removal of which causes no change in the essential qualities of the entity. (Milsark (1976, p. 129)) Milsark (1976, 1977) observes that a predicate restriction exists that can be tested in existential /Aere-sentences. This restriction only allows predicates to occur in there-sentences that denote states; adjectives that denote properties are ungrammatical. (25)

a. b.

There are some men dead/awake/drunk/naked/tired/sick. *There are some men intelligent/big/boring/black/fat/smart.

In Carlson's theory, intelligent, big, boring, black, fat, and smart are predicates of individuals (objects and kinds) denoting inherent properties, whereas dead, awake, drunk, naked, tired and sick are predicates of stages of individuals, where a stage is defined as "a spatially and temporally bounded manifestation of something" (Carlson (1978, p. 68)). The much discussed question of what distinguishes depictive secondary predicates from adverbs can be readily answered if the /Aere-sentence test is applied.6 Assuming Drubig's (1992a, p. 178) generalization to be correct that depictive secondary predicates denote stage-level predicates, whereas subjectoriented manner adverbs like cleverly, stupidly, and cheerfully are predicates of properties of individuals, as seen in (26), then adverbs of this class should not be allowed to occur in ί/zere-sentences, as in (27):

12

(26)

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

a. b.

(27)

John dropped his spoon drunk/* clever, John dropped his spoon cleverly. *There are some men cleverly.

The adverb cleverly in (26b) denotes a property of John that is either expressed in the action or causes the action, whereas the depictive drunk in (26a) denotes only a phase or stage of the individual in this specific event. As predicted by the predication restriction, (27) is completely unacceptable. Although it seems that the secondary predication constructions can be defined as noninflectional predications which observe the predicate restriction, there exist a variety of noninflectional predications that form exceptions to this definition: (28)

a. b.

We can love Eisenhower the man, even if we consider the politician a mediocre president. (Ree 1: 1191) "I'm a female Jewish shrink," Susan said. "You expect long silences?" "I thought shrinks cryptic," Hawk said. (Ree 1:915)

The predicate restriction seems to be such a powerful restriction that it should be made part of the licensing conditions operating on secondary predications. Thus, a central proposal of this study is that the rule of predication given in (5) must be supplemented by an additional licensing rule which requires that the secondary predicate must be a stage-level predicate. However, the implementation of this requirement with respect to resultative and depictive predication constructions differs. The discussion of the characteristics of secondary predication constructions, which emphasizes the properties that classify secondary predications as a unified phenomenon, shows that at first sight resultative and depictive predications do seem to observe thematic independence and the c-command restriction, as well as form noninflectional predications which obey the predicate restriction. On closer investigation, however, it becomes obvious that resultative and depictive secondary predication constructions exhibit grammatically and semantically distinct behaviors and thus call for more descriptively adequate licensing conditions that explain not only their similar but also their dissimilar behavior. Furthermore, prosodic properties of the construction types given in (1) and repeated in (29) annotated with primary and secondary pitch accents signal that one has to carefully distinguish between them.7 Whereas (29a) exhibits a typical thetic intonational pattern, in which a pitch accent is realized on the secondary subject, both the secondary subject and the secondary predicate must be assigned pitch accents in (29b) and (29c) in order to signal a wide focus reading.

Introduction

(29)

a. b. c.

13

[She snapped her bag shut], (Reel: 307) [If you ate an animal raw], you could never wash the blood off. (Rec2: 111) Several times during the past summer [Märya had wakened frightened from sleep]. (Ree 1:512)

The theory of focus developed here belongs in the realm of information structure theory and is often referred to as information focus. That is, it is conceptualized as a syntactic licensing theory operating at the level of D-structure for which specific principles are designed which derive the focus structure of the sentence from directly focus-assigned argument structures. This focus analysis addresses the question of the prosodic realization of secondary predication constructions as well as their focus projection capacities and compares them not only to each other, but also to the focus projection regularities in primary predications. An extensive empirical study of primary predications, secondary predications, and related constructions allows the isolation of two basically different intonational contours, which not only cut across the classification of primary and secondary predications, but also distinguish between resultative and depictive constructions since they pattern with the syntactic restrictions discussed above. Thus, for example, the set of ambiguous examples given in (12) can be disambiguated prosodically. Furthermore, related noninflectional constructions can also be classified on the basis of their intonational contours. Particle constructions, theresentences, perception verb complements, causative verb complements and copula verb complements, as in (30), pattern with resultatives, while cognitive verb complements, and perception verb depictives, such as those in (31), pattern with depictives. (30)

a. b. c. d. e.

I'm sorry I talked your arm off. There are mice on the table. I heard a match strike and then whistling started. Arthur was about to have his head cut open. Toni has got her dates wrong.

(Reel: 496) (Reel: 249) (Reel: 350) (Ree 1: 253) (Rec2: 055)

(31)

a. b.

"I thought shrinks cryptic," Hawk said. He saw Harriet alive.

(Reel: 915)

The focus theory that forms the foundation of this discussion must be explicitly distinguished from the semantic association-with-focw theories, such as the structured meaning theory of focus (see Jacobs (1983, 1991b), and von Stechow (1991)) or the theory of alternative semantics (Rooth (1985)). Within these theories it is assumed that every focus-sensitive particle is associated with a focus

14

Syntactic focus theory and the phenomenon of secondary predication

and, conversely, that every focus is associated with a focus-sensitive operator. Although the latter assumption seems to be violated by virtually all cases of information focus, it has been proposed by Jacobs (1984) in the relational focus theory that in those cases in which no visible focus-sensitive operator is present, focus is interpreted by the illocutionary operator of the sentence. Various other proposals have been made as to how the different types of focus can be assimilated (see, for example, Drubig (1990)). Although an integrated theory of focus is certainly a desirable research goal, it seems that the questions which each theory addresses are better studied in isolation at the present time. Thus, in accordance with Kiss' proposal (1995, 1996) that the operator focus and the information focus must be distinguished cross-linguistically, this study addresses questions of information focus in relation to primary and secondary predication constructions. The study of focus and secondary predication presented here is an interdisciplinary one in which the interTelatedness of modular systems of grammar like the theory of syntax and the theory of focus is investigated. I concentrate on the question of what licensing principles account for the syntactic and thematic restrictions operating on the different types of secondary predication constructions and how they relate to focus theory. Thus, the connectedness of three licensing theories is investigated and they are eventually refined to account for the different types of secondary predications: (32)

a. b. c.

the theory of thematic relations the theory of predication the theory of focus

The task of this study, then, is to show how the licensing theories in (32) interact to account for both the similar and the dissimilar behavior of secondary predication constructions with respect to their thematic status, their syntactic distribution and their prosodic realization. The central hypothesis of this investigation is that there is a direct relation between syntactic representation and focus structure assignment, and that this correlation is mediated by an elaborate version of the theta theory. More precisely, I propose a syntactic analysis of subject-predicate relations that renders the correlation between syntax and focus structure maximally transparent. In addition, I investigate the syntax-prosody interface from a focus-theoretical perspective, and examine the possibility of extending Selkirk's (1984) proposal that focus structure is derived from syntactic argument structure in order to be able to make correct predictions in terms of focus projection for primary and secondary predications. I further propose that the mechanism of focus projection can be derived from Higginbotham's (1985, 1989) theory of theta-saturation with some minor modifications. Specifically, this proposal accounts not only for focus projection from object position, but also for focus projection from subject position in both finite and noninflectional subject-predicate relations.

Introduction

1.2.

15

Roadmap

In the chapters that follow I first examine the different types of secondary predication constructions from different theoretical perspectives, and then develop the syntactic and the focus-theoretical accounts. Chapter 2 discusses competing syntactic analyses of secondary predications with the goal of arriving at an adequate syntactic representation and correct predictions for the syntactic distribution of each predication type. I contrast the basic theoretical program of the Principles and Parameters Theory (PPT) with that of the Predication Theory (PT) analysis and show that neither analysis can adequately capture the empirical evidence on the syntactic distribution of secondary predications provided by Andrews' (1982) constituent tests. In a further step, I discuss more recent developments within the framework of the PT analysis (e.g., the extended X-bar schema, the subject within VP hypothesis, etc.) and state the case for a slightly modified Larsonian sentence structure (Larson (1988a, b)) that reflects the differences between resultative and depictive secondary predications syntactically. Chapter 3 reviews different focus-theoretical approaches from a historical perspective and examines how they apply to the problem of how to represent and anchor focus theory in generative grammar. I show that the central goal of recent research has been directed towards the development of an adequate modular intonational model incorporating the theory of focus. Two different focus models are isolated: the so-called top-down focus model and the bottom-up focus model. Although the rules of these two approaches should eventually be reversible, I argue for the second approach since it is the methodologically more feasible account. I follow Selkirk (1984) and Rochemont (1986) in the claim that focus structure is derived from syntactic argument structure, but propose that the concept of argument structure as the relevant factor for focus projection must be further refined. In chapter 4, I argue that the theory of focus can be sharpened and to a certain extent motivated by relating it to considerations of theta theory. Specifically, I propose a focus model that capitalizes on the importance of argument structure and suggest that focus assignment actually occurs at the level of D-structure. Assuming the hypothesis that D-structure is a pure representation of theta structure (see Chomsky (1981, p. 335, 1986b, p. 98)), the focus projection algorithm is shown to be a natural consequence of Higginbotham's (1985, 1989) theory of thetasaturation with some modifications. Since focus projection rules operate in the reverse direction of theta-assignment, they coincide with the principle of thetadischarge, provided that a clear distinction is made between the licensing of arguments and adjuncts at the level of D-structure. This focus model is shown to compare favorably with alternative proposals if applied to finite subject-accented sentences.

16 Roadmap The assumption that focus theory can be reduced to theta theory sets the stage for the empirical work presented in chapter 5. I propose that a systematic analysis of sentence accent and intonation plays a crucial role in determining the syntactic structure - via argument structure - of the different types of secondary predications and related constructions. Fundamental frequency analyses that stem from two different experiments confirm the focus model proposed in chapter 4 and the independently motivated syntactic analysis in chapter 2. Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the licensing principles of resultatives and depictives within Higginbotham's (1985, 1989) semantic framework. I argue that two basically different licensing mechanisms are needed for RSPs and DSPs. Resultative predicates are licensed at the level of D-structure by theta-saturation and event composition, while depictive predicates are proposed to be basegenerated independently and adjoined to the kernel sentence later in the derivation if they fulfill the predicate-predicate-linking condition and the subject-predicatelinking condition. I discuss the implications of the proposed analyses for the special status of subjects in the theory of focus and examine the possibility of extending Diesing's (1992) proposal to include not only focus projection from finite subject-predicate relations, but also from those noninflectional subjectpredicate relations that are present at D-structure. The conclusion in chapter 7 takes a final look at the question of whether or not intonation is relevant for the analysis of the syntactic structure of sentences, and ends with a discussion of results and areas where further research is required.

Chapter 2 Syntactic representation of secondary predications In recent work on the syntactic representation of secondary predications, various controversial theories have emerged. Although all theories agree that resultatives and depictives contain a second subject-predicate relation, they vary considerably with respect to how it should be structurally represented. The first theory, which is proposed by Stowell (1981, 1983), Chomsky (1981), Kayne (1985), Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987), and Hoekstra (1988), among others, claims that the second predication relation is represented by a sentential constituent on the syntactic level that is smaller than a clause. Since the exact categorial status of this sentential constituent is much debated, the term small clause analysis (SC analysis) has been used to include all of those approaches which agree that there is a phrasal node immediately dominating the secondary predication relation. The SC analysis has been opposed by Williams (1980, 1983), Rothstein (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986), McNulty (1988), Roberts (1988), and Carrier & Randall (1992), among others. Williams (1983) holds that there is no reason to assume a syntactic constituent for the secondary predication relation; rather, it is best represented in a flat syntactic structure, and is signalled by coindexing the secondary subject with the secondary predicate. This theory is referred to as the predication theory analysis (PT analysis), and the theoretical controversy between the SC and PT analyses is central to the discussion in sections one and two. A closer examination of the major SC proposals in section 2.1 shows that they fail because of the strong theory-internal requirements, which have contradictory effects when the different types of secondary predication relations are considered. Williams' counterproposal is discussed in section 2.2. Although his specific proposal for the structural representation cannot be maintained considering the evidence provided by a variety of empirical data, the PT analysis relies upon a theoretical framework that has the potential of accounting more appropriately for the different types of secondary predications shown in subsequent work; therefore, I will adopt the PT analysis in essence and consider it a mandatory component of the PPT framework, arguing that it will bring the correct results for the syntactic analysis of secondary predications provided that some necessary adjustments are made. In section 2.3, the distributional syntax of each specific secondary predication type is explored in its own right and compared to the others. Specifically, I discuss various recent proposals (Rothstein (1985), Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986), McNulty (1988), Roberts (1988), and Carrier & Randall (1992)) and show that

18

The small clause analysis

they are based upon conflicting assumptions about the syntactic status of the primary and secondary subjects, the respective predicative XP, and the structural relation among these and the verb, although they are rooted in spirit in the theory of predication. Drawing on the implications of this discussion, I will argue in section 2.4 for a complex predicate analysis (CP analysis) of the type proposed by Larson (1988a, b) and Ike-Uchi (1990), with small refinements. Specifically, I propose a structural representation that accounts for the empirical evidence not only from subjectoriented and object-oriented depictives, but also from resultatives utilizing restrictive structural constraints of predication.

2.1.

The small clause analysis

2.1.1.

The theoretical program

The SC analysis was developed within the PPT as part of a more general program to capture the observation that the traditional definition of the subject as [NP, S], provided by the Aspects Model (Chomsky (1965)), cannot account for the contrast between (la) and (lb): (1)

a. b.

Louise considers the president proud of himself, ""Louise considers the president proud of herself.

Contrary to the prediction made by Chomsky's (1965) definition of subject, not Louise but the president is the antecedent of the reflexive pronoun, and thus constitutes a subject in the relevant sense of binding theory.1 To account for the binding facts, the proponents of the SC analysis introduce a clausal node that dominates the president and proud of himself in (1). A clausal node dominating the embedded subject-predicate structures would also explain the contrast in (2). The SC subject the women in (2a) is the only possible antecedent for the reciprocal each other, however, it is not accessible in (2b) since it does not appear within the SC domain. (2)

a. b.

Max considers [ s c the women angry at each other], *The women consider [ s c Max angry at each other].

The central question that arises from the theoretical assumption that secondary subject-predicate relations constitute clausal constituents in syntax, as in (2), is whether there are further empirical arguments in addition to the binding facts that support the existence of SC constituents. There are two tests which are frequently

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

19

quoted: namely, Safir's (1983) observation that certain SCs can appear in subject position, and Stowell's (1983) phrasal integrity condition. Safir (1983, p. 732) observes that despite the fact that SC subjects need to occur adjacent to the matrix verb to meet the requirements of case theory, there is one instance in which SC constituents can appear in [Spec, IP]: (3)

a. b·

[ s c Workers angry about the pay] is just the situation that the ad campaign was designed to avoid. *[sc Workers angry about the pay] pleases Maybell, immensely.

Safir argues that an SC constituent can occur as a subject of a sentence only if it appears as the subject of be. It is assumed that be used in an identificational sense can assign case to the subject of the SC (via L-marking) in contrast to the regular verb please. A reduced relative clause (RRC) reading, which I propose is more readily available in (3) than an SC reading, is claimed to be blocked by the use of a singular verb form despite the fact that the SC subject appears in the plural.2 The relevant observation of Safir with respect to (3) is that under the widely accepted assumption that only true constituents can occur in subject position, the sequence workers angry about the pay in (3) must form a constituent of some kind. The second argument repeatedly quoted in the literature stems from Stowell (1983) and is based upon the assumption that adverbial constituents, PPs, and emphatic reflexives are allowed to float freely within VP as long as they do not separate the complement and the verb, as in (4a), or appear in the substructure of the complement, as in (4b) through (4d): (4)

a. b. c. d.

* Julia considers seriously [Bertha foolish]. *Anna saw [Bertha on purpose cheat], * Sandra wants [Bertha very much off the ship], *Toby considers [Bertha himself crazy].

The examples in (4) constitute violations of the phrasal integrity condition and provide empirical support for Stowell's assumption that the bracketed elements form a complement constituent. Assuming the arguments for a clausal SC constituent to be correct, the identity of the SC node must be further specified. The debate on the exact status of the SC node is essential to this discussion both because it has propelled the development of a restrictive generalization in the PPT framework known as subjects across categories, and because it shows where the SC analysis fails.3 Chomsky (1981, p. 106) proposes that the categorial status of the SC is S,4 but Stowell (1981, 1983) recognizes selectional restrictions between the verb and the secondary predicate, which become obvious in the following sentence pairs:

20

The small clause analysis

(5)

a. b.

John considers [AP Bill [A. very stupid]]. * John considers [ s Bill off my ship].

(6)

a. b.

I expect [PP that sailor [P. off my ship]]. *I expect [ s that sailor very stupid].

(7)

a. b.

We feared [yp John [ v killed by the enemy]]. *We feared [ s John unfriendly],

(8)

a. b.

Alexandra proved [AP the theory [A. false]]. *I proved [ s the weapon in his possession].

Stowell argues that if the matrix verb in (5b)-(8b) assigns a theta-role to the embedded sentences with the categorial status S, as proposed by Chomsky (1981) and others, the categorial status of the secondary predicate should play no role; however, the grammatical difference in the sentence pairs in (5) through (8) appears to suggest that the matrix verb selects the categorial status of the predicate. Therefore, Stowell claims that the SC node must be conceived of as a projection of the secondary predicate, as in (9). (9)

a. b.

Mary finds [AP Melissa [A. unbearable]]. Rick expects [PP Louise [P. to dinner this evening]].

Both Chomsky (1981) and Stowell must ensure that the SC node is not considered a barrier to government in order to explain case assignment to the SC subject; however, they provide different explanations for the government relation. Chomsky (1981, p. 164, (6)) follows Aoun & Sportiche's (1983, p. 214) definition of government, which states that intervening maximal projections block government. This definition applied to Stowell's proposal would render case assignment to the SC subjects impossible. To avoid this consequence, Chomsky chooses the S node as the categorial instantiation of the SC since it is the only category that does not impede government by virtue of the fact that it is not considered a maximal projection in his framework. Chomsky proposes that α governs γ in (10): (10)

Chomsky's (1981) Definition of Government [n ... γ ... α ... γ ...], where (!) α = Χ° (ii) where φ is a maximal projection, φ dominates α if and only if φ dominates γ. (Chomsky (1981, p. 164))

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

21

Stowell, on the other hand, incorporates Reuland's (1983) directional definition of government, which is stated from left to right in English, as shown in (11), and proposes that maximal projections of subcategorized SC complements are transparent to government by the verb. (11)

Stowell's (1983) Definition of Government: In the configuration (a) or (b) - choice of (a) or (b) parametric a category Ρ governs a category Q in R, where: (i) R is an X-bar projection of P, and (ii) there is no category D, D = X°, such that Q is contained within a projection of D and D governs Q (a) [R... Ρ ... Q ...] (b) [R... Q ... Ρ...] (Stowell (1983, p. 295))

It follows directly from the definition in (11) that PRO, characterized as a pronominal anaphor, is not allowed in the subject position of subcategorized SCs since the distribution of PRO is restricted to ungoverned positions, as shown by the ungrammatically of the following examples: (12)

a. b. c.

*Mary considers [ s c PRO crazy]. * Louise expects [ s c PRO out of town]. * Rick doesn't hear [ s c PRO shout].

Both Chomsky's and Stowell's definitions of government exclude examples (12a) through (12c) since the condition that allows the matrix verb to assign case to a lexical subject in this position is violated if a PRO element appears instead. What makes Stowell's approach more appealing, however, is the theoretical program that lies behind his proposal. He generalizes Chomsky's (1982) Extended Projection Principle, which states that clauses have subjects, and claims that since SCs are lexical projections which receive a clausal interpretation at LF, the syntactic position subject appears not only in NPs and in regular sentences but generally in all lexical categories: (13)

The SUBJECT of a phrase XP is the argument of X or X' which is directly dominated by X". (Stowell (1983, p. 295))

Principle (13) constitutes a structural definition of subject in the sense that it identifies any NP appearing in an [NP, XP] configuration as a subject. This proposal incorporates the original Aspects definition of subject in category-neutral form. If applied to example (1), the generalization (13) identifies the president as the subject of the adjectival complement SC [ s c NP, XP], which thus constitutes the minimal complete functional complex in which the reflexive must be bound.

22 2.1.2.

The small clause analysis Stowell's dilemma: problems with the ungoverned status of PRO

As noted above, Stowell (1981, 1983) develops the SC analysis for subjectpredicate relations, such as in (14), and argues that the categorial status of the SC is the maximal projection of the secondary predicate, an AP in (14a), a VP in (14b) and (14c), and a PP in (14d). (14)

a. b. c. d.

John John John John

considers / finds [AP Bill intelligent]. made / had [yp his brother open the door]. heard / saw [ w it rain last night]. expects / believes [PP Bill in the computer room].

The common property of the examples in (14a) through (14d) is that they are all subcategorized SC complements: (14a) contains an epistemic verb complement; (14b) contains a causative verb complement; (14c) contains a perception verb complement; and (14d) contains a complement of exceptional case-marking verbs. Stowell proposes that a subcategorized complement appears as a sister of V under V', and the subject of an SC appears in the specifier position. The examples in (14) are then structurally represented as in (15): (15) IP

NP

I'

VP

V'

V NP

X'

Χ John

considers

Bill

intelligent

Syntactic representation ofsecondary predications

23

If Stowell's definition of government is applied to structure (15), the maximal projection of the subcategorized SC is transparent to government, and the restrictions of case theory are met. The verbal head V assigns case to the subject of the subcategorized SC under c-command since government is defmed from left to right, prohibiting overlapping government domains. According to this analysis, PRO cannot appear in the subject position of a subcategorized SC because the distribution of PRO is restricted to ungoverned positions, as seen in (12) above and repeated in (16): (16)

a. b. c.

*Mary considers [ s c PRO crazy]. *Louise expects [ s c PRO out of town]. *Rick doesn't hear [ s c PRO shout].

It is exactly this restriction on the occurrence of PRO that Stowell's analysis of subject-oriented and object-oriented depictives is based upon. He proposes that DSPs are adjunct SCs that function as control complements; therefore, they cannot appear within VP. The subject position of the adjunct SC is ungoverned, and a PRO subject is allowed. The controllers in (17) and (18) are written in italics.

(17)

a. b. c.

Bill [ w wandered home] [AP PRO drunk], John [yp arrived] [AP PRO completely exhausted]. Charley [yp left home] [PP PRO in a red shirt].

In Stowell's proposal, the examples in (17) involve subject control, whereas the examples in (18) are instances of object control. (18)

a. b.

John [ w loaded the hay into the wagon ] [AP PRO green], Bill [ w drove the wagon] [AP PRO full of hay],

Stowell considers two possibilities. Adjunct SCs, as in (17) and (18), could be assigned either the representation in (19) or that in (20). Note that since Stowell analyzes adjunct SCs as control structures, the adjunct orientation is not represented structurally.

24

The small clause analysis

(19)

Spec IP

drove arrived

OOD: SOD:

the wagon

PRO PRO

full of hay exhausted

(20)

Spec IP

OOD: SOD:

Bill Kevin

drove arrived

full of hay exhausted

Stowell assumes that adjunct SCs are either dominated by IP, as in (19), or adjoined to VP, as in (20). In a structure like (19), the verb cannot govern the PRO subject because government is restricted to the VP domain. In (20), the government domain has to be restricted to the minimal verb phrase (VP!) to prohibit government of PRO.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

25

Stowell (1983) proposes generalizing this observation, which captures the difference between subcategorized and adjunct SCs with respect to government theory, as in (21): (21)

If a lexical category appears as a subcategorized small clause complement, then it may not contain a PRO subject. (Stowell (1983, p. 305, (46)))

Although this generalization explains why adjunct SCs can occur with PRO subjects, it causes a considerable problem if applied to RSPs, as in (22): (22)

a. b. c. d.

Tom [ w painted the barn [AP PRO [A. black]]]. Sandy [yp shot the skunk [ AP PRO [A. dead]]]. Bertha [yp rolled the dough [PP PRO [ P into a doughnut]]]. Phil [yp loaded candy bars [PP PRO [p. into the shopping cart]]].

Stowell (1983, p. 306) terms the examples in (22) quasi causative and assigns them a structure as in (23):

constructions,

(23) IP

I'

NP

VP

V

NP

SC

NP

X'

X Tom Sand y

painted shot

the barn the skunk

PRO PRO

black dead

26

The small clause analysis

Stowell proposes that since the resultative XP functions like the indirect object of the matrix verb and also assigns a second theta-role to the postverbal NP, it must appear within VP. Nevertheless, Stowell has to assume a PRO subject for RSPs, as shown in (23), to avoid a violation of the projection principle, given in (24a), and of the standard theta criterion, given in (24b): (24)

a.

b.

Representations at each syntactic level (i.e. LF, and D- and Sstructure) are projected from the lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorization properties of lexical terms. (Chomsky (1981, p. 29)) Each argument bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument. (Chomsky (1981, p. 36))

The PRO element is introduced into the resultative constructions in (23) to ensure that the postverbal NP (the subject of the RSP) is not assigned two distinct thetaroles. Rather, the postverbal NP receives a theta-role from the primary predicate, and PRO receives one from the secondary predicate. Note, however, that this treatment of resultatives violates Stowell's generalization in (21), since the PRO subject occurs in a governed position. Thus, Stowell's (1983) analysis of RSPs creates a dilemma that is caused by theory-internal requirements. An SC with a PRO subject is required by the projection principle and by the theta criterion. However, the introduction of an SC with a PRO subject constitutes a violation of the generalization in (21). Stowell attempts to solve this quandary by introducing an additional condition designed to block government of referential phrases. The condition is given in (25). (25)

A referring phrase is opaque (to government). (Stowell (1983, p. 307))

He argues that under the assumption that resultative XPs are referential expressions, they could be subsumed under condition (25), obstructing government by the verb and allowing a PRO subject. This proposal, however, is not easily sustained, because it implies that expressions such as resultative XPs, which can enter into subject-predicate relations, can be either referential or predicative, a prediction that is theoretically untenable; therefore, the dilemma of the proposed SC analysis of depictive and resultative expressions remains.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

2.1.3.

27

A Iternative small clause proposals

Since Stowell's (1981, 1983) proposal, various analyses have emerged within the SC framework that attempt to avoid what I term Stowell's dilemma. The discussion of these alternative proposals is the topic of this section.

2.1.3.1. Chomsky's (1981) proposal Chomsky (1981, p. 169) revises his assumption that SCs are of the categorial status S and follows Stowell's (1981, 1983) proposal to analyze subcategorized SC complements as X-bar projections of their respective predicates; however, he continues to treat depictive sentences, as in (26), as SCs of the categorial status S, "since there is no selection of AP by the main verb in this case, presumably" (Chomsky (1981, p. 111-112)): (26)

a. b.

John [yp left the room] [ s PRO [AP angry]], John [VP left the room] [ s PRO [AP empty]].

He argues that in the case of SODs, as in (26a), and of OODs, as in (26b), the matrix verb neither subcategorizes the SC nor selects the adjunct predicate. Rather, he assumes that since the SC appears outside the projection of VP, the empty category PRO is not governed under the definition of government given in (10) above. Constituent tests, however, show that both SOD and OOD predicates are part of VP. Using tests assumed to apply to the VP constituent, namely VP-preposing, fAowgA-movement, and WH-clefiting, Andrews (1982) provides evidence that subject-oriented, nonsubcategorized predicative adjectives are included in VP operations and thus belong in VP.5 Relevant applications of the tests are given in (27) through (29): (27)

VP-Preposing: a. Anne said that Chris would go to bed tired and go to bed tired he did. b. •Anne said that Chris would go to bed tired and go to bed he did tired. c. Mary said that they would burn a woman alive and bum a woman alive they did. *Mary said that they would burn a woman alive and burn a d. woman they did alive. e. Sandra said that Ray would push the door open and push the door open he did.

28

The small clause

f.

analysis

* Sandra said that Ray would push the door open and push the door he did open.

These examples show that the SOD predicate in (27a), the OOD predicate in (27c), and the resultative predicate in (27e) are realized in VP since the secondary predicates are preposed together with the subcategorized VP and cannot be left behind, as is signalled by the ungrammaticality in (27b), (27d) and (27f). (28)

Though-Movement: a. Go to bed tired though Chris did, he could not sleep. b. *Go to bed though Chris did tired, he could not sleep. c. Burn a woman alive though they did, nobody would put them on trial. d. *Burn a woman though they did alive, nobody would put them on trial. e. Push the door open though Ray did, he could not see the killer. f. *Push the door though Ray did open, he could not see the killer.

The though-movement test in (28) shows that the secondary predicates in (28a, c, e) are preposed together with the remainder of the VP regardless of their orientation. The ungrammaticality of examples (28b, d, f) indicates that none of the secondary predicates can be left behind. Although some authors omit the WH-clefting test, claiming that it does not yield clear results for SODs (see Ike-Uchi (1990)), I include the test here since it is obvious that (29a), in which the SOD predicate is clefted along with the VP, is more appropriate than (29b). This distinction can be sharpened if (29b) is read without a pause before the secondary predicate tired, since an isolating intonation of the predicate may cause a detached SOD reading. (29)

WH-Clefting of VP: a. What Chris did was go to bed tired. b. ?* What Chris did tired was go to bed. c. What extremists did was burn a woman alive. d. * What extremists did alive was burn a woman. e. What Ray did was push the door open. f. *What Ray did open was push the door.

McNulty (1988, p. 8) proposes an additional VP constituency test, the VP-deletion test, to show that SODs and OODs belong in VP:

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

(30)

29

VP-Deletion: Torry left the party angry and Rick did too. a. •Torry left the party angry and Rick did happy. b. Julie drank tequila cold and Jem did too. c. '"Julie drank tequila cold and Jem did warm. d. Ray pushed the door open and Sandra did too. e. '"Ray pushed the door open and Sandra did shut. f.

The examples in (30a), (30c), and (30e) suggest that SODs, OODs, and resultative predicates are included in the VP-deletion operation. The ungrammaticality of examples (30b), (30d), and (30f) shows that they cannot be left behind.6 The above constituency tests provide evidence for the fact that attached depictive and resultative secondary predicates appear in VP, but they are indifferent to the level of VP or to the segment of VP where the respective adjuncts occur. The differences with respect to the hierarchical distribution of these predicates can be seen if the do-so test is applied. Zagona (1988, p. 33) applies the do-so reduction test to adverbials to argue that adjunct adverbials and complement adverbials might be attached to different levels of VP. If the do-so test is applied to the secondary predication constructions under discussion, sentences as in (31) are derived: (31)

a. b. c.

Torry left the party angry, but Rick did so happy. ?Julie drank tequila cold, but Jem did so warm. *Ray pushed the door open, but Sandra did so shut.

Under the assumption that the do-so proform replaces the V'-level, the data in (31) provide some evidence that the resultative predicate in (31c) is generated under the V'-level, since the do-so proform must include it to be grammatical. Although judgments are not entirely clear, the example (31b) is better than (31c), which suggests that OODs are not generated in the same position as resultative predicates. In (31a), the do-so proform can leave the SOD predicate behind, indicating that they are generated higher up in the VP projection than both resultative predicates and OOD predicates. The interpretation of the data in (31) crucially depends upon the assumptions made with respect to the structure of VPs. If we assume that a VP can possibly consist of more than one V-bar level, the data provided in (31) imply that only resultative predicates are generated under the lowest V-bar level, leaving the distribution of OOD and SOD predicates in VP open for further discussion. The constituent tests in (27) through (30) suggest the conclusion that Chomsky's (1981) analysis of depictives, which he claims appear outside the projection of VP, cannot be maintained. Rather these tests recommend an analysis in which both the SOD and the OOD predicates are base-generated in VP. The do-so test in (31) further suggests that SOD predicates do not appear just anywhere in VP, but higher

30

The small clause analysis

up than OOD or resultative predicates. Taking the evidence provided by these tests into consideration, there are three possibilities for the representation of subjectoriented depictive SCs. One is that they are adjoined to V'; the second is that they occur as daughters of VP; and the third possibility is that they are adjoined to VP. According to Chomsky's definition of government in (10), the domain of government in the first two cases is the maximal projection of VP. The SC of the category S that dominates the PRO subject is not a maximal projection and does not block government; therefore, PRO is governed by V if it appears adjoined to V' or as a daughter of VP. Thus, these two representations are excluded under the PRO theorem. The third case, in which the SC is adjoined to VP, will be investigated more thoroughly next. Chomsky's definition of government, provided in (10), does not incorporate the concept of c-command, which is necessary for the explanation of adjunction structures. In the framework under discussion, Chomsky revises the definition of (10) and includes the concept of c-command as a third condition; then, a governs γ in (32): (32)

Chomsky's (1981) Revised Definition of Government: [η ... γ ... α ... γ...], where /•κ ΛΛΟ (ι) α =Χ (ii) where φ is a maximal projection, if φ dominates γ then φ dominates a . (iii) a c-commands γ. (Chomsky (1981, p. 165,(11)))

The notion of c-command is provided under (33): (33)

Chomsky's (1981) Concept of C-Command: a c-commands β if and only if (i) α does not contain β (ii) Suppose that γ ]5 ..., γη is the maximal sequence such that (a) γη = α (b) γ-α* (c) γ; immediately dominates yi+1 Then if δ dominates a, then either (I) δ dominates β, or (II) δ = γ; and γ! dominates β. (Chomsky (1981, p. 166))

The definition of c-command is crucial to the question of whether or not the PRO subject can be governed by the verbal head if it is adjoined to VP. The indices in (33) refer to the following projections: γ„ denotes the head of a phrase; y{ refers to an intermediate projection; and γ, refers to a maximal projection. The relevant

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

31

definitional component is that a lexical category α c-commands β as long as they are both dominated by a maximal category δ. This implies that in a VP-adjoined SC structure, the PRO subject is c-commanded by the verb since both are dominated by the maximal projection VP, and the SC node of the category S does not block government by virtue of not being a maximal projection. It can be concluded from this discussion that Chomsky's (1981) proposal for the analysis of depictive secondary predication structures cannot avoid the predicament termed Stowell's dilemma since the PRO subject of the SC is governed no matter whether it appears adjoined to V', as a daughter of VP, or adjoined to VP. 7 In addition, Chomsky's treatment of depictive predications fails to distinguish between the different forms of adjunct orientation. There are two obvious arguments against a uniform treatment of OODs and SODs. First, Zagona's (1988) do-so test shows that the SOD and OOD predicates appear on different levels of projection. Second, a uniform treatment is also inadequate because, as pointed out by Rothstein (1985, p. 94), the structural ambiguity between an SOD and an OOD reading, as in (34), cannot be accounted for: (34)

[John [vp left Mary] [ s PRO angry]].

The predicate angry in (34) refers either to Mary or to John', however, this ambiguity cannot be represented structurally as long as depictive predications are analyzed as control structures.

2.1.3.2. Chomsky's (1986a) proposal In Chomsky's (1986a) framework, the structures of complement SCs are stated as in (35): (35)

Sandra considers [AP. Ray [ AP intelligent]].

The SC node AP' in (35) is treated as a maximal projection by Chomsky. Some verbs, however, such as consider, can L-mark AP' and make it transparent to government. This is how the subject of the SC is assigned case by V. If the basic assumptions of this analysis are applied to DSPs that are treated as control structures with PRO as the subject of the SC, the following structures are assigned: (36)

a. b.

Mary left the office [AP. PRO [ AP angry]], Ray ate meat [AP. PRO [AP raw]].

32

The small clause analysis

The question arises of at which level the secondary predication constructions are attached. Assuming Andrews' (1982) observations to be correct and assuming further that adjunct SCs are not subcategorized and therefore are not L-marked by the verb, the three possibilities already discussed above must be investigated more thoroughly. The following three structures are possible for the examples in (36): (37)

a.

AP' Small Clause: Adjoint to V IP

(37)

b.

AP' Small Clause: Daughter of VP IP

NP

VP

AP'

V'

NP Mary Ray

left ate

the office meat

Spec AP PRO PRO

AP angry raw

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

(37)

c.

33

AP' Small Clause: Adjoined to VP IP

The crucial question to be answered is whether or not the PRO subject in the AP' SC is governed in Chomsky's (1986a) Barriers approach. Since the adjunct SCs are not L-marked and since the AP' is clearly understood as a maximal projection, government seems not to be possible in any of the structures in (37); however, since government is restricted neither to directional requirements nor to lexical governors, the elements INFL, V, and A must also be checked in order to discover if they appear in a configuration in which they govern PRO. PRO appears within the SC in a configuration that is reminiscent of an adjunction structure. Following May's (1985) segmental theory of adjunction, in which each segment of an adjunction structure is considered a category in its own right, an element that appears as an XP adjunct is said not to be dominated by XP because it is only dominated by one segment of this maximal projection; however, it is not excluded by Xmax either because it is still dominated by one maximal projection. PRO in the above structures can be governed by A0; first, because government is not directional, as in Stowell's (1983) definition, and second because the PRO subject is not excluded since it is still dominated by one segment of Amax, namely AP'. Thus the domain of government is AP', the PRO subject is governed by A0, and all three structures are excluded. A possible solution to the problem of government in SCs comes from the proposals to analyze SCs as agreement phrases (AGRP). Such an analysis is

34

The small clause analysis

pursued by Uriagereka (1988), Bennis & Hoekstra (1989), Raposo & Uriagereka (1990), and Suzuki (1991), among others. They follow Pollock's (1989) proposal of a more elaborate sentence structure in which the INFL-node is split into two projections, the Tense Phrase (TP) and the Agreement Phrase (AGRP), as in (38). (38) TP

subject

T'

Τ

AGRP

SC-subject

AGR'

AGR

XP

Under such an analysis, an SC would be analyzed as an AGRP, which contains a subject but no temporal features. If we assume an AGRP SC instead of an AP' SC in all three instances in (37a-c), the problem that PRO could be governed from inside the SC is excluded. PRO occurs in the specifier position of AGRP and cannot be governed from A0. To summarize, Chomsky's (1981, 1986a) frameworks show that the analyses in which secondary predications are treated as adjunct SCs with a PRO subject fail since there appears to be no feasible way to solve the dilemma that SCs display a dual status in terms of structure; that is, the subject in subcategorized SCs must be governed, while the PRO subject in adjunct SCs is not allowed to be governed. Moreover, both SCs still need to be represented as some part of VP.

2.1.3.3. Hornstein & Lightfoot's (1987) proposal Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) propose an interesting solution to Stowell's dilemma, which specifically concerns the analysis of depictive predicates. The authors base their proposal on both Stowell's SC analysis and Williams' predication theory analysis and claim that it is possible to avoid Stowell's dilemma by rejecting the PRO theorem, and assuming that PRO can be governed. They incorporate ideas of

Syntactic representation ofsecondary predications

35

Bouchard (1982) and Sportiche (1983), and essentially follow Köster (1984) by agreeing that PRO can appear either governed or ungoverned: Like Köster, we shall make the further claim that, when PRO is governed, it behaves like an anaphor, bound within its governing category; and that an ungoverned PRO receives the arbitrary interpretation. (Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987, p. 26)) They basically assume the definition of government proposed by Aoun & Sportiche (1983) (see footnote (9)), but incorporate the additional idea that if α governs a phrasal category, it also governs its head, as in (39): (39)

Hornstein & Lightfoot's Definition of Government: a. α (X°) governs β iff α and β share all maximal projections. If α governs XP, then α governs the corresponding X . b. A governing category for α is the first clause or NP which contains a governor for α and a subject accessible to a . (Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987, p. 26))

Concurring with Andrews' (1982) arguments for the VP-internal representation of SODs (see constituent tests (27)-(30)), Hornstein & Lightfoot propose the structure in (40a) for SODs and the structure in (40b) for OODs: (40)

a. b.

John INFL [VP [ VP ate the meat] [ s PRO INFL0 [AP naked]]], John INFL [ w tv ate the meat] [ s PRO INFL0 [AP raw]]].

The phrasemarkers are given under (41) and (42), respectively:8

36

The small clause analysis

(42) IPCS)

NP VP

John

ate

NP

NP

the meat

PRO

INFL0

AP

raw

Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) follow Stowell's (1981, 1983) and Chomsky's (1981, 1986b) proposal that depictives are best represented as SCs. Like Chomsky (1981),

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

37

they assume that the categorial status of depictive SCs is S, which is also considered to be a nonmaximal projection.9 It is further proposed that S and S' are projections of INFL, INFL containing [+TENSE], [-TENSE], or no feature, in which case it is written INFL0. The distribution of INFL0 is restricted to sentences in which there is no S' node. INFL can only function as a governor if it is marked [+TENSE]. The PRO subjects in the SCs in (40a) and (40b) are governed by the verb eat in both cases, since the S node does not function as a barrier to government. Since the governed PRO behaves like an anaphor in this proposal, it must be coindexed with a c-commanding NP in its governing category, in (40a) with John and in (40b) with meat. Following Rizzi (1982), Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) assume that the verb can assign case only once. They propose that in (40a, b) only the NP meat, but not PRO is case-marked. The structures (41) and (41) are both adjunction structures, but they differ with respect to the level at which they are attached. The SOD in (41) is analyzed analogously to sentential adjuncts that are Chomsky-adjoined to VP, and the OOD in (42) is adjoined to V' (see Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987, p. 26, footnote 3)). Hornstein & Lightfoot's central claim is that PRO has two different instantiations: either governed or ungoverned. If it is governed, it behaves like an anaphor. If it is ungoverned, it is arbitrary in reference. The cancellation of the PRO theorem is the proposed solution to the problem of how to keep PRO ungoverned in adjunct SCs, thus avoiding Stowell's dilemma. Note that the departure from a condition like the PRO theorem has far-reaching consequences since it renders the PPT less restrictive. In addition, certain questions occur with respect to binding facts that Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) do not investigate. Consider the following paradigm: (43)

a. b. c. d.

Maryj left John; [ PRO; angry at himselfj. Maryj left Johnj [ PROj angry at herself·]. * Maryj left John; [ PROj angry at himselfi], *Maryj left Johnj [ PROi angry at herselfj].

The authors claim that PRO must be coindexed with a c-commanding NP in its governing category. If more than one NP is a possible c-commanding antecedent for PRO, as in (43), then the antecedent is determined by the same procedure by which reference is established in regular infinitival structures (see Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987, p. 27)). Examples (43a) and (43b), however, suggest that PRO is not necessarily restricted to one of two possible c-commanding NPs. Rather, the decisive factor for the sentence to be grammatical is that the reflexive pronoun, PRO, and the antecedent of PRO carry the same index. In (43a), John is the antecedent of PRO, and PRO is coindexed with himself. Example (43b) is also grammatical because Mary, PRO, and herself appear with the same index. But (43c) and (43d) result in ungrammaticality because in (43c) Mary controls PRO,

38

The small clause analysis

but himself and PRO carry different indices. In (43d), John controls PRO, but PRO and herself do not carry the same index. The problem with example (43) is not so much the fact that the theory of control must account for ambiguous controllers, since this issue must be addressed notwithstanding (cf. Manzini (1983, p. 428) and von Stechow & Sternefeld (1988, p. 309)); the problem rather is that it must account for control ambiguities with respect to primary predications, such as leave, eat, etc., which are not associated with the property of control in the first case. The step of assigning this task to the control theory is a consequence that an explanatory theory of secondary predication seeks to avoid. I briefly turn to another issue that is raised with respect to the generalization of Hornstein & Lightfoot's proposal. Assuming the analysis of subcategorized SCs proposed by Hornstein & Lightfoot and following Stowell's (1986) assumption that floating anaphors have to adhere to binding principle A, the sentences under (44) receive a straightforward explanation: (44)

a. b.

Anne considers [ s Jack; entirely responsible himselfj]. *Annej considers [ s Jack; entirely responsible herself^.

The floating emphatic reflexives must be bound within their governing category, here the SC; however, Jack is a possible subject only in (44a) and not in (44b). In the appendix, Hornstein & Lightfoot generalize the analysis proposed for adjunct SCs to encompass all SC structures, including subcategorized SCs, providing the structure in (45) for the sentences in (44). (45)

a. b.

Anne considers Jack; [PRO; entirely responsible himself^. "Annej considers Jack; [PRO; entirely responsible herselfp.

The binding facts in (45) are explained in the same way as in control structures. Since emphatic reflexives have to be bound within their governing category, PRO can only be an appropriate antecedent if it is controlled by Jack to satisfy agreement requirements. This renders (45a) grammatical and excludes (45b). Under this proposal, transitive RSPs would receive the following structural representation: (46)

a. b. c. d.

John shot the skunk; [ s c PRO; dead]. John pushed the door; [ s c PRO; open]. John kicked his shoes; [ s c PRO; down the steps]. John kissed Mary; [ s c PRO; to sleep].

The examples in (46) clearly show that RSPs are always object-oriented. Argued within Hornstein & Lightfoot's framework, this entails that the object in RSPs must always control the PRO subject, where PRO constitutes the argument that absorbs

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

39

the theta-role of the predicate, providing an interpretation for (46a) in which the skunk is dead, for (46b) in which the door is open, and so on. Subject control is not possible in resultatives. However, binding facts show that Hornstein and Lightfoot's generalization of their SC analysis to include all secondary predication constructions fails. In analogy to (45), RSPs that occur with floating anaphors, would be assigned structures as in (47): (47)

a. b. c. d.

* Johnj kicked his sister; [PRO; out of the house himself}]. *Joluij kicked his sister; [PRO; out of the house herself;]. *Johnj kicked his sister; [PROj out of the house himself}]. *Johnj kicked his sister; [PROj out of the house herself;].

As argued in the examples (43)-(45) and as assumed in control theory, a reflexive element in a control structure must be bound within its governing category, namely by PRO in (47). The reflexive element must bear the same index as PRO, which itself must be coindexed with a controller, which in turn provides reference for the reflexive. Since resultatives are always object-oriented, the PRO subjects in (47) have to be coindexed with the object his sister, which excludes (47c) and (47d). For the sentence in (47a) to be grammatical, the indices of John, PRO, and himself would have to be the same. PRO, however, is controlled by his sister, and cannot bind the reflexive. In (47b), the controller, the PRO element, and the reflexive carry the same index, but the sentence is semantically ill-formed. It has to be concluded that RSPs and subcategorized consider-SCs cannot both be explained under one SC analysis as Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) suggest. Bouldin (1990, p. 112) raises a further issue with respect to the status of the SC as a projection of an empty INFL node (INFL0). He argues that the authors would be forced to introduce specific features to prevent such an SC from appearing with an INFL-node filled with to together with a VP predicate instead of an AP predicate. In Hornstein & Lightfoot's proposal, there is no apparent reason why (48) should be ungrammatical, while (49) and (50) are grammatical: (48)

*John [ v ate the meat; ] [sPRO; [,to] [ w b e raw]]

(49)

[ s PRO [|to] [ypbe raw]] is to be uncooked.

(50)

They tried [ s PRO [,to] [ypbe nice]].

Bouldin assumes that the authors would be forced to introduce ad hoc features to distinguish between a depictive SC of category S and a complete control structure of category S. From this problem and those discussed above, it can be concluded that although the analysis by Hornstein & Lightfoot can avoid Stowell's dilemma by simply

40

The small clause analysis

allowing PRO to be governed, it falls short of an answer to the questions of how to limit overgeneration, as in (48), and of how to explain the difference between subcategorized SCs and resultatives with respect to certain binding facts, as in (47). So far, I have made only passing reference to the issue of how the different types of resultatives are analyzed within the SC analysis. The most elaborate analysis of RSPs represented as SCs is suggested by Hoekstra (1988), whose proposal incorporates ideas from Kayne (1985) and van Voorst (1986).

2.1.4.

Hoekstra's (1988) generalization of the SC analysis to resultatives

Hoekstra (1988) distinguishes complement structures from predicative structures appearing in VP, and claims that secondary subject-predicate relations have to be analyzed as SCs. After motivating the existence of subcategorized SC complements independently, he proposes analyzing intransitive RSPs analogously to SCs, as in (51): In the resultative construction we find a complement structure which also is best analysed as a SC, but the verb that combines with the SC does not license it by virtue of some lexical selection. (Hoekstra (1988, p. 115)) The following examples in Hoekstra are taken from Riviere (1982) and Randall (1982). a. b. c. d. e. f. g·

He laughed himself sick. She laughed him out of his patience. We talked her out of her crazy schemes. They danced their days away. The joggers ran the pavement thin. The clock ticked the baby awake. I shall walk you to the station.

Since the examples in (51) contain intransitive verbs that do not bear a subcategorized relationship to the postverbal NP or to the following predicative XP, Hoekstra assumes from a semantic standpoint that the postverbal NP and the predicative XP form a subject-predicate relation, which is syntactically signalled by an SC. The syntactic structure of the intransitive RSPs in (51) is represented as in (52):

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

41

(52) VP

V

sc

NP

XP

Hoekstra also assigns structure (52) to pseudotransitive RSPs, as in (53): a. b. c. d. e. f.

He washed the soap out of his eyes. They ate us out of house and home. The sopranos sang us sleepy. He shaved his hair off. They wrung a confession out of him. He rubbed the tiredness out of his eyes.

Although the verbs in (53) can also appear in transitive constructions, selectional restrictions prohibit sequences like wash the soap, eat someone, sing someone, and so on. Hoekstra (1988) claims that the sentences in (53) also contain resultative SCs. "The postverbal NP in these examples only has a sensible semantic relationship with the following predicate, which again motivates the SC analysis" (p. 117). Hoekstra observes that as a consequence of the SC analysis, the construction as a whole acquires a specific resultative meaning because "the SC denotes a state of affairs which is presented as a consequence of the activity or process denoted by the verb" (p. 121). He argues that the resultative meaning is also found in the transitive resultatives given in (54): (54)

a. b. c. d.

They painted the door green. They cooked the chicken dry. They pushed him into the well. They wiped the table clean.

The analysis of the resultatives in (54) as SC constructions is suggested on the basis of the semantic similarities among intransitive, pseudotransitive, and transitive RSPs. Hoekstra proposes that the SCs of all three types of RSPs in (51), (53), and (54) convey a resultative meaning, appear with an affected postverbal NP

42

The small clause

analysis

that is understood as the subject of the secondary predication relation, and require a nonstative matrix verb. Hoekstra discards Jayaseelan's (1984) stripping hypothesis, which claims that a resultative construction is formed by stripping the transitive verb of its arguments and adding a small clause complement that receives a transitive reading. He also criticizes Simpson's (1983a, b) proposal, which adds the resultative XP to the structure of the verb, and introduces a rule that makes the object of the verb the subject of the secondary predication. Instead, Hoekstra assumes that the resultative formation can be explained by the so-called null hypothesis: The null hypothesis is, of course, that nothing needs to be said about the internal structure of verbs that enter into the resultative construction; i.e. that its distribution is derivable from general principles. (Hoekstra (1988, p. 127)) This hypothesis characterizes the theoretical program behind Hoekstra's proposal. It implies that nothing more needs to be said about resultative formation except that a nonstative verb that takes an NP complement can alternatively subcategorize for an SC complement, everything else is derived by general principles. Consider the examples in (55):10 (55)

a. b.

Jan bouwt [ s c de stad vol], Jan builds the city full Jan bouwt [NP een huis]. Jan builds a house

Hoekstra assumes that the argument structure of bouwen in (55) is in both sentences. In (55a), the argument structure is realized by the SC de stad vol, and in (55b) by the NP een huis. He further observes that not only nonstative verbs that denote an activity, as in (55), but also nonstative verbs that denote a process, as in (56), take a resultative SC. (56)

My skin turns [t red].

It is assumed that the verb turn in (56) can take an SC complement; however, in its ergative use the verb turn cannot assign case to the SC argument. To acquire case, the SC subject my skin moves to the external subject position and leaves behind a trace, as suggested by Burzio's generalization (Burzio (1981, p. 178-179, 184)). Although the subject appears in the external subject position at S-structure [Spec, IP], thus blocking the causative interpretation of the SC, object orientation of the secondary predicate is maintained via the trace.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

43

Before I examine each of the above assumptions, the general program contained in Hoekstra's (1988) proposal needs to be examined more thoroughly. I turn to Hoekstra & Mulder (1990), where the theoretical claim that the resultative meaning is not limited to specific verbs and complement types is discussed further. They maintain that resultative predication has to be understood as a general concept that can be employed productively, at least in languages like English and Dutch and also in German and in Icelandic, although not in French or Spanish. The definition of what can constitute an SC complement with a resultative reading is broadened to include all different types of RSPs. Specifically, the fact that an intransitive verb can appear with a resultative SC is derived from the so-called unergative-ergative shift hypothesis, given in (57). (57)

Unergative-Ergative Shift Hypothesis'. [,PNP[V]] ^ [, P V[ SC NPXP]]

The hypothesis in (57) accounts for the fact that a basically intransitive verb can be transformed into an SC-taking ergative verb if the intransitive verb is a verb of motion that takes an endpoint denoting expression. An example for the unergativeergative shift hypothesis is given in (58a) and (58b): (58)

a. b.

John flew for the first time. John flew into a rage.

[IPNP [V]] [IPNPj [V [ s c tj PP]]]

The verb fly in example (58a) is an unergative verb that selects an external argument and assigns it an agent theta-role; however, fly in (58b) appears with an endpoint denoting PP, into a rage, and thus acquires an ergative meaning, which is supported by the observation that the selectional restrictions for the unergative fly do not hold. It is further claimed that a shift from unergative to ergative syntax is not dependent upon the category of the endpoint denoting expression, since the PP in (58b) can easily be replaced with an AP, such as in John flew mad, and still cause an ergative reading. A slight modification of the unergative-ergative shift hypothesis in (57) can also provide an explanation for the intransitive and pseudotransitive resultative constructions discussed in Hoekstra (1988). The relevant concept is that the addition of an SC to an intransitive verb has a causativizing effect, as in (59) and (60): (59)

The joggers ran. The joggers ran the pavement thin.

[ IP NP [V]] [ipNP [V [ SC NP AP]]]

(60)

He ate. [IPNP [V]] He ate his stepmother out of house and home. [ιΡΝΡ [V [ SC NP PP]]]

44

The small clause analysis

Although the general concept proposed by Hoekstra (1988) and by Hoekstra & Mulder (1990) seems to be intuitively plausible, it is not immediately evident why the semantic concepts of resultativity and ergatmty should be structurally represented as involving an SC. The following critical discussion of Hoekstra's (1988) SC proposal should be understood as an examination of the syntactic implications of the SC analysis only. There is wide agreement that it is possible to analyze intransitive resultatives using an SC structure, as in (52) (see Yamada (1987) and Wilder (1991), among others), but Hoekstra's attempt to generalize the analysis of intransitive resultatives to include all resultative constructions has been questioned, by both opponents and proponents of the SC analysis. The main argument against an SC analysis of transitive RSPs as in (54) is that it violates the projection principle because the postverbal NP is at the same time a complement of the matrix verb and a subject of the resultative SC. The subject of the RSP is thus assigned two theta-roles, which violates Chomsky's (1981, p. 36) narrow version of the theta criterion given in (24b) above.11 Rividre (1982) observes that the uniform treatment of all types of resultatives, whether under a flat structure or under an SC analysis, creates a dilemma because the same analysis cannot be applied to both intransitive and transitive RSPs alike. Either the NP that follows the verb is its object, or it is part of an S which is the complement of the verb. In either case the contextual constraints will be violated. (Riviere (1982, p. 687)) The SC analysis of transitive RSPs violates subcategorization restrictions as well as selectional restrictions:12 (61)

Violations of Subcategorization Restrictions: a. The audience laughed [ s c the actor off the stage]. b. They drank [ s c my husband under the table], c. They cooked [ s c the chicken dry].

Even if it is assumed that a resultative template can be added to intransitive verbs of motion, Rivtere (1982), Yamada (1987), Bouldin (1990), Wilder (1991), and Carrier & Randall (1992) find restrictions violated by the subcategorization violation of the transitive RSP in (61c). The argument structure of the transitive verb cook requires a direct object NP; however, if it is assumed that in resultatives with cook the postverbal NP appears as a subcategorized argument to V, then sentences like (62) again pose a problem:

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

(62)

45

Violation of Selectional Restrictions: Chris [yp cooked his hands [ s c ? dry].

The selectional restrictions of the verb cook require that it take an NP that denotes a certain type of food. In (62), however, the verb cook selects a human body part, his hands, as object NP, violating selectional restrictions. The SC analysis of transitive RSPs, as in (62), also cannot be maintained. Bouldin (1990) and Wilder (1991) discuss semantic relations in RSPs and find that in examples (63) through (66), the a-sentences entail the b-sentences, contrary to Hoekstra's claim. (63) (64) (65) (66)

a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.

They They They They They They They They

painted the door green. painted the door. cooked the chicken dry. cooked the chicken. pushed him into the well. pushed him. wiped the table clean. wiped the table.

Hoekstra (1988, p. 117) suggests that the semantic implications of sentences (63)(66), i.e. that the door is painted, the chicken is cooked, etc., are attributed to a socalled shadow interpretation, which can be cancelled in a sentence such as 1 painted my fingers black and blue when I painted the walls in this room, which does not imply I painted my fingers. Bouldin takes issue with Hoekstra's claim that these sentences contain a shadow interpretation and argues that since the truthvalue of each a-sentence is identical to the truth-value of each b-sentence in (63) through (66), an entailment relation exists. However, Bouldin agrees that there is a figurative reading of those transitive RSPs that typically appear with body parts, such as example (62). Therefore, he proposes classifying resultatives in three groups according to their entailment relations: in entailment resultatives, formerly transitive resultatives; in inalienable possession resultatives, formerly pseudotransitive resultatives; and in intransitive resultatives. Bouldin concludes that Hoekstra's proposal to assign a uniform SC structure to all types of resultatives cannot be upheld because it fails to distinguish between nonentailment resultatives and entailment resultatives, the latter of which cannot be assigned an SC analysis. Wilder (1991) concurs with Bouldin and concludes from sentences like (63) to (66) that transitive RSPs cannot be analyzed as SC structures. Rather, since the postverbal NP semantically constitutes a possible direct object, it should be analyzed as a sister to V. Further, he proposes that the resultative predicate should then appear in a VP-adjoined structure. Wilder refers to the middle construction, which shows a clear difference between transitive and intransitive resultatives. The

46

The small clause analysis

central claim is that although verbs that take a second subject-predicate structure can passivize, as in (67), only those verbs that have a direct internal argument can form grammatical middles (see also Rapoport (1990) and Carrier & Randall (1992)). Consider the examples in (67) and (68) below: (67)

a. b. c. d. e.

Chris was considered t handsome. The children were made t happy. The pavement was run t flat. My husband was drunk t under the table. The chicken was cooked t dry.

(68)

a. b. c. d. e.

*That boy considers handsome easily. *Young children make happy easily. *This pavement runs flat easily. *My husband drinks under the table easily. Small chickens cook dry easily.

The examples in (67) show that consider SCs, causative SCs, and intransitive, pseudotransitive and transitive RSPs can be passivized; however, as seen in (68e), only transitive resultatives can form a grammatical middle construction.13 Wilder (1991) and Carrier & Randall (1992) note a further test that supports the assumption that in transitive RSPs, unlike in intransitive RSPs, the postverbal NP has to be understood as an argument of the verb, namely process -ingnominalizations. The central claim is that only a direct internal argument can appear as an o/nominal in a process -/'«g-nominal. (69)

a. b.

The hammering of this metal straight took us a long time, The wiping of the table any cleaner would be no easy job.

(70)

a. b.

*The eating of the refrigerator empty is not good for your health, *The jogging of the pavement flat makes your muscles sore.

The contrast between (69) and (70) is due to the difference in argument status of the (^nominal. The o/-nominals are only licensed in (69) since here the nominalization is interpreted as the direct internal argument of its head nominal. Under the assumption that the argument structure of these nominale is inherited from the resultative verbs, it can be argued that only the postverbal NP of transitive RSPs, as in (69), and not that of intransitive RSPs, as in (70), can be considered an internal argument of the base verb. Carrier & Randall (1992) claim that a similar contrast can be observed with adjectival passive formation. Under the assumption that adjectival passive formation applies to a verb only if it has a direct internal argument, the contrast

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

47

between (71) and (72) provides evidence for the assertion that the postverbal NP in transitive RSPs, but that not in intransitive RSPs, is an internal argument of the verb. (71)

a. b. c.

the wiped-clean table the pushed-open door the hammered-flat nail

(72)

a. b. c.

*the eaten-empty refrigerator *the drunk-under the table husband *the barked-awake children

Yamada (1987), who advocates two different types of resultatives, presents an argument in the same vein. He claims that only transitive, and not intransitive RSPs, can form verbal compounds. (73)

a. b. c.

clean-wiped table clean-shaven face thin-sliced cheese

(74)

a. b. c.

*blind-cried eyes *the thin-run pavement *a sick-laughed lady

Under the assumption that only direct internal arguments can form verbal compounds, the above data suggest that only transitive and not intransitive resultatives contain an internal argument.14 The empirical evidence provided above suggests that in RSPs only the postverbal NP that appears with a transitive verb has the status of an internal argument, to which the verb assigns a theta-role. Since Hoekstra's proposal assigns a uniform SC analysis to all types of RSPs, it cannot account for the different status of the postverbal NP in transitive and intransitive RSPs and must therefore be rejected. Two additional issues must be considered with respect to this analysis. The first is noted in Carrier & Randall (1992). In an analysis of the type proposed by Hoekstra (1988), the ungrammatical sentences in (75) would be assigned a structure as in (76):15 (75)

a. b.

*John hammered on the metal flat. *John shot at Mary dead. (* shot at Mary, causing her death)

48

The small clause analysis

(76)

Assuming Williams' (1980) condition on predication, sentences like (75) are excluded since they violate the c-command condition that holds between the subject and the predicate. Carrier & Randall claim that the SC analysis of RSPs in (76) is inadequate since it cannot explain the ungrammaticality of (75a, b), at least not with reference to the c-command condition. Thus, further assumptions have to be made to explain the ungrammaticality of these sentences. A second issue arises with respect to the distribution of the postverbal NP and PRO. Hoekstra (1988) suggests that the analysis of secondary predications follows the pattern in (77): (77)

a. b. c. d.

Mary wipes [ s c the table clean], Bill danced [ s c his girlfriend tired]. Diane found [ s c Chris tired]. Ray left [ s c PRO tired].

Hoekstra follows Stowell (1981, 1983) and claims that SCs are maximal projections. He proposes that the subjects of the SCs in (77a)-(77c) are assigned case by the matrix verb under government and assumes that the SC-node does not constitute a barrier to government since it is L-marked by the matrix verb. The licensing of RSPs and OODs is then claimed to function in analogy to subcategorized SC complements. The SC does not form a barrier by virtue of being L-marked by the matrix verb.16 The subject-oriented depictive in (77d), however, is claimed to lack L-marking because it is not a complement of the verb; therefore, the SC-node forms a barrier to government, and guarantees that the PRO subject of the SC appears in an ungoverned position. Although the analyses of the secondary predications in (77) do not violate the PRO theorem, (77c) causes a problem of interpretation. It is not apparent from the OOD in (77c) whether the secondary predicate tired could also have a subjectoriented reading. If it can, it would have to be represented with a PRO SC, like the

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

49

SOD in (77d), thus forcing all transitive matrix verbs that can occur with both object-oriented and subject-oriented predicates to have two lexical entries. In an SOD construction, the verb must not L-mark the SC in order for it to constitute a barrier for the government of PRO, but in the OOD construction, it must L-mark the SC in order to be able to assign case to the lexical element.17 Theoretically, such a distinction in the lexicon would be highly unwarranted, especially since both the subject and the object-oriented depictive XPs are syntactic adjuncts. Moreover, further complications arise in Hoekstra's framework if a resultative and a depictive predicate cooccur, as in (78a) and (78b): (78)

a. b.

Rayj pulled the doorj shut; tiredj. Ray pulled the windowj shutj broken;.

In (78a), the sequence the door shut would be analyzed as a resultative SC, followed by a PRO SC. PRO would have to be controlled by the sentential subject; the analysis of (78b), however, is problematic. As in (78a), the sequence the window shut would be represented as a resultative SC, leaving no SC subject for the OOD predicate broken. The discussion of Hoekstra's proposal shows that although the concept of representing all types of secondary predications in a uniform complement SC is conceptually appealing, it poses serious empirical problems when an attempt is made to account for the representation of transitive RSPs and for combinations of RSPs and DSPs. The central problem with a unified SC analysis of secondary predications within the PPT framework is that the theory-internal requirements automatically create a conflict that can only be avoided by assuming idiosyncratic forms of representation or by relaxing theoretical restrictions, such as the PRO theorem.

2.1.5.

Conclusion

In this section, the SC analysis of depictive and resultative secondary predications has been discussed in detail. I have argued that the introduction of a sentential SCnode renders further theory-internal requirements necessary. As a consequence of the PPT prohibition on the assignment of two theta-roles to one argument, Stowell (1981, 1983) and Chomsky (1981, 1986b) introduce a PRO element that functions as a placeholder for the theta-role that the secondary predicate assigns to its subject. Since it is generally agreed in the PPT framework that PRO has to appear in an ungoverned position, an SC with a PRO subject has to be moved out of the VP, which conflicts with the empirical data found by Andrews (1982). Both Stowell's and Chomsky's analyses are caught up in the dilemma of trying to satisfy theory-internal requirements and empirical facts at the same time. Although

50

The small clause

analysis

Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) propose that PRO can also occur in a governed position, this analysis proves inadequate if binding facts have to be explained. Hoekstra's (1988) proposal is also unconventional in that he assumes that all types of resultative sentences are realized as complement SCs. I have shown that Hoekstra's analysis of transitive RSPs as SCs violates basic assumptions of the argument structure of transitive verbs. Furthermore, Hoekstra's analysis cannot accommodate more complicated SP constructions in which different types of secondary predicates cooccur. It can be concluded from the above discussion that the analysis of both DSPs and RSPs within the SC framework must be discarded, because it cannot meet both the empirical and the theory-internal requirements.

2.2.

The predication theory analysis

2.2.1.

Williams (1980): the theory of predication

Williams (1980) proposes a radically different analysis of secondary subjectpredicate relations within a theoretical framework that he labels the theory of predication. Although the concept of predication is also needed as a licensing condition in the SC theory (cf. Chomsky (1986b, p. 93)), I will refer to Williams' analysis as the predication theory analysis (PT analysis) for expository purposes. Williams (1980) conjectures that there is a separate level of representation, called predication structure (PS), at which subject-predicate relations are signaled by coindexing. PS is derived from S-structure by a set of rules, called rules of predication, as shown in (79): (79)

Williams' (1980, p. 237)) Grammatical Model·. filters DS

J

>

SS

Transformations

c-command restriction 1 rules of predications

>PS

ι

Opacity >

i LF

RI

The rules of predication apply at S-structure by performing a coindexing operation between the subject NP and the predicate under c-command, as shown in (80). (80)

... NP;... XP...

... NP;... XP; ...

The coindexing requirement is given in (81) and the c-command condition on predication is given in (82):

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

51

(81)

Comdex NP and X. (Williams (1980, p. 206))

(82)

If NP and X are coindexed, NP must c-command X or a variable bound to X. (Williams (1980, p. 206))

Williams follows Reinhart (1976) and defines the structural relation of c-command as in (83): (83)

α c-commands β iff every branching node which dominates α dominates P(Williams (1980, p. 204, footnote 1))

Williams suggests that the c-command condition on predication proposed in (82) can be strengthened if one assumes that the subject NP must c-command and be csubjacent to its predicate. C-subjacency is defined as in (84): (84)

α is c-subjacent to β iff β is dominated by at most one branching node which does not dominate a . (Williams (1980, p. 204, footnote 1))

Williams proposes an additional refinement by suggesting that the tightest structural condition on predication is a mutual c-command condition. Although he does not further pursue the idea of a symmetric condition on predication, employing instead the asymmetric condition defined in (82) in the main body of the text, subsequent work adopts the symmetric condition on predication (see Rothstein (1985), Demonte (1987), and McNulty (1988) for the mutual mcommand condition; and Roberts' (1988) as well as Larson's (1988) analyses for the mutual c-command condition). Specifically, he states that SPs as in (85) are not represented in an SC structure, but appear instead as naked predicates coindexed with their subject NP. (85)

a. b. c.

Sandy; ate the meat nude ; . Ray ate the meatj rawj. Bertha drove Jackj crazy;.

He distinguishes grammatically governed cases, which are predications of the subject of the sentence as in (85a), from thematically governed cases, in which a VP internal XP is predicated of the theme as in (85b) and (85c). The structural representations of the examples in (85) are given in (86):

52

(86)

The predication theory analysis

a. b. c.

Sandy; [yp ate the meat] [ApnudeJ. Ray [yp ate the meatj raw;]. Bertha [yp drove Jackj crazyJ.

In (86a) through (86c), the rules of predication are met. In (86a), the NP Sandy ccommands the predicate nude, and is c-subjacent to the predicate. In (86b) and (86c), even the tighter structural restriction of mutual c-command applies.

2.2.2.

Williams' (1983) arguments against small clauses

Williams' (1983) arguments against SCs are based on the assumption that subjectpredicate sequences need not be represented as sentential constituents on the syntactic level. Instead, he asserts that the subject and the predicate that enter into a predication relation function as independent maximal projections, which are represented either in a flat structure under VP in the case of OODs and RSPs or as adjoined to IP in the case of SODs. Neither in the grammatically nor in the thematically governed cases does Williams assume that the subject of the predication relation is a structurally defined subject in the sense of Stowell (1983) or Chomsky (1981), (1986a); therefore, it need not appear in a structurally defined subject position. Williams contrasts the structural concept of subject as [NP, XP] with the concept of subject as external argument given in (87): (87)

The subject of a predicative phrase XP is the single argument of X that is located outside of the maximal projection of X. (Williams (1983, p. 287))

The definition in (87) replaces the structural definition of subject with a relational definition. If (87) is applied to example (88), the postverbal NP Al is defined as subject with respect to the naked predicate angry since it constitutes an external argument to the predicative AP. (88)

Mary made Alj angryj.

Since the definition in (87) does not appeal to structural concepts of subject, it is not immediately clear how the above definition could be employed to rule out sentences like (89b):

Syntactic representation ofsecondary predications (89)

a. b.

53

Mary made Alj angry; at himself, ""Mary made Al; angry; at herself.

Under the SC analysis, the ungrammaticality of (89b) is explained in terms of a violation of binding principle A, which says that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category, here by the subject of the SC. Since the definition in (87) defines subject in terms of predicate, the relevant binding principle has to be restated in terms of the concept predicate. This is proposed by Williams (1980, p. 234) and explicitly stated by van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986), as in (90): (90)

Predicate Binding Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in the smallest predicate in which it occurs, or it must be bound to the subject of that predicate, (van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986, p. 326))

The definition in (90) excludes (89b), which is provided in (91) with the relevant coindexing conventions: (91)

*Maryj made Al; [angry at herself}];.

Example (91) does not satisfy the definition of (90) since the reflexive pronoun herself is neither bound within the minimal predicate angry at herself, nor is it bound by the subject of the predicate, Al. An immediate consequence of this relational definition of subject is that it can explain the grammatical status of sentences such as (92): (92)

a. b. c. d.

Amanda; met Jakej [proud of himself^. * Amanda met Jakej [proud of himself·];. Amanda; met Jakej [proud of herself;];. * Amanda; met Jakej [proud of herself;^.

For each of the sentences in (92) to be grammatical, the reflexive pronoun must fulfill two conditions. First, it must appear within a predicate that is licensed by a subject under the mutual c-command condition of predication. Second, it must find a possible antecedent in the predicate proud of himself/herself or in the subject of the predicate. Only in examples (92a) and (92c) is the reflexive pronoun bound by an acceptable antecedent, namely by the subject of the predicate. These data show that the binding facts, which PPT proponents advance as an argument for the introduction of an SC-node, are equally well explained by Williams' definition of subject as the external argument. The main issue under debate between the proponents of the SC analysis and the proponents of the PT analysis, then, is stated by Williams (1983) in simple terms.

54

The predication theory analysis

"Both parties to the debate agree that there is an XP in the SC-constructions. They simply disagree on whether there is a phrase that includes that XP and its subject, and nothing else" (p. 293). He offers three arguments against an SC analysis of secondary subject-predicate relations. The first is based on the observation that raising constructions that embed a sentential structure exhibit scope ambiguities. The quantifier in example (93) can have either a wide scope reading, as in (94a), or a narrow scope reading, as in (94b): (93) (94)

Someone seems to be sick. a.

b.

There is someone who seems to be sick. 3x [ χ seems sick] (someone; [ s t; seems [ s tj sick] s ] s ) There seems to be someone sick, seems [3x [x sick]] (seems [ s someone; [tj sick] s ] s )

The wide scope reading in (94a) follows from the rule of quantifier raising, which adjoins the existential quantifier to the highest embedded S, as suggested by May (1977), (1985). The narrow scope reading in (94b) results from the operation of quantifier lowering, which causes the quantifier in raising constructions to adjoin to the embedded S where it can bind the trace of the raised subject. The relevant observation is that noninflectional predicate structures that occur with a raising verb, as in (95), do not allow the narrow scope reading. (95)

Someone seems sick. = There is someone who seems to be sick. Φ There seems to be someone sick.

Under the assumption that an SC analysis of example (95) would assign to the predicate seem a clausal complement with a subject trace, an in (96), the absence of the narrow scope reading cannot be explained because the conditions for quantifier lowering are met, as the nonoccurring structure (97) shows. The existential quantifier binds the subject trace of the SC and still the narrow scope reading is not possible. (96)

someone; seems [ s c t ; sick]

(97)

*x seems [ someone; [ s c t; sick]]

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

55

Note, however, that the absence of the narrow scope reading follows immediately from the PT analysis since it does not assume an SC-node that could serve as an adjunction site for the existential quantifier.18 Williams' scope argument is further supported by evidence from perception verb complements (see Higginbotham (1983) and Williams (1983, p. 302)), consider complements (see Guömann (1990, p. 155)), and also from RSPs. (98)

a. b. c.

Jake saw someone leave. Mary considers someone sick. Sandy shot someone dead.

In each example in (98), only the wide scope reading is available, which can only be explained by assuming that the secondary subject-predicate relations in the examples are not SCs.19 The second argument against the SC analysis is based on the distribution of thematically independent predicates, where the term thematic independence is coined for situations "in which two predicates each assign a theta-role to the same NP" (Williams (1983, p. 290)), and for which the SC analysis suggests PRO structures, such as in (99) and (100), to avoid a violation of the theta criterion. (99)

Mary [ w came home] [ s PRO sad].

(100)

The students [ w eat vegetables] [ s PRO raw].

Williams discounts the generalization made by the SC analysis that thematically independent [PRO XP] structures do not occur in governed positions, but only in ungoverned positions. He argues that this prediction is not tied to the concept of government but rather to the fact that these structures are restricted to nonargument positions and cannot occur in argument positions. To show that the SC analysis does not make the correct predictions, Williams examines ungoverned argument positions, such as the subject position of infinitival sentences, as in (101a). He predicts that SCs cannot occur there since the SC-node does not protect PRO from being governed by AGR, as shown in (101b). (101)

a. b.

[ s [ s PRO to leave]] AGR would be fun. * [ s PRO bashful] would be a shame.

It is further argued that an SC with a PRO subject that occurs in the subject position of an infinitival sentence should be protected from outside government by the maximal projection S'. This is not the case, however, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (102):

56

The predication theory analysis

(102)

*[s'tsc PRO sad] to surprise Mary] would be unfortunate.

Williams concludes from these examples that the PRO theorem is insufficiently motivated and does not account for the distribution of thematically independent cases. The last argument against the SC analysis is directed towards the internal structure of SC in sentences as in (103): (103)

John considers [ N . Bill [ NP Bob's friend]].

Williams argues that the structure in (103) is deviant since the nonmaximal projection N* contains a maximal projection NP of the same category. He posits that the acceptance of structures like (103) would allow single projections with infinitely numerous subject positions.

2.2.3.

Conclusion

The evidence adduced by Williams (1983) adds additional weight to the line of argumentation in chapter 2.1, where it has been shown that the SC analysis has serious defects and cannot account for all the different types of secondary predication relations. While Williams' proposal to explain predication relations by means of coindexing the subject and its respective predicate seems to be superior to the promotion of SC structures, a problem occurs with respect to the precise structural representation of the different predication relations, which were discussed under (85) and are repeated here for convenience in the form of phrasemarkers. The SODs have the structure represented in (104a) and the OODs and RSPs have the structure in (104b): (104)

a. IP

NP

I'

XP

VP

Sandy

V

NP

ate

the meat

nude

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

Ray Bertha

ate drove

the meatj Jack;

57

raw; crazy;

The different structural representations of SODs and OODs/RSPs result from Williams' rules of predication. The predicate nude in (104a) must appear under the IP node to meet the requirement that the subject NP c-commands and is csubjacent to its predicate. The predicates raw and crazy in (104b) are represented in VP, where they are coindexed with their thematic subject under c-command. Andrews' (1982) constituent tests, however, show that movement operations that affect the VP constituent include SODs, OODs, and RSPs, suggesting that all three predicate types must be represented as parts of VP. The problematic case is the representation of SODs in (104a). The structural requirement that the subject has to be c-subjacent to the predicate forces the SP to appear outside of VP. Any VPinternal representation of the predicative XP would qualify as a violation in the PT framework proposed above. I conclude that although the specific structural representations of SPs proposed by Williams must be rejected for this reason, the PT analysis appears to be the more promising approach for the analysis of SP constructions. Specifically, Williams has established the concept of predication as a syntactic relation that has influenced much of the subsequent work on SP structures. It has led, for example, to Rothstein's (1985) more radically syntactic approach, which has caused the concept of predication to be adopted as a licensing condition within the PPT framework. For these reasons, I discard the SC analysis of secondary subjectpredication relations and turn to the investigation of the distributional syntax of SPs, concentrating on proposals that follow Williams' theory of predication in spirit.

58

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

2.3.

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

2.3.1.

Rothstein's (1985) elaboration of the predication theory

Rothstein's (1985) proposal constitutes an empirical elaboration of Williams' PT analysis for SPs while still being conceptually quite distinct. The central thrust of her proposal is not directed toward the establishment of an independent theory of predication, but rather toward the recognition that the concepts predicate and predication must be conceived of as syntactic primitives that must be integrated into the PPT framework. Specifically, she proposes that a theory of grammar must account for the distribution of both theta-marked or argument XPs and non-thetamarked or predicative XPs. Chomsky's (1981) PPT framework, however, can only account for the distribution of theta-marked XPs, namely by means of the theta criterion. Rothstein claims that non-theta-marked constituents must be licensed by the concept of predication, which is structurally defined by the rule of predicate linking given in (105): (105)

Rule of Predicate Linking (for English): a. Every non-theta-marked XP must be linked at S-structure to an argument which it immediately c-commands and which immediately c-commands it. b. Linking is from right to left (i.e., a subject precedes its predicate). (Rothstein (1985, p. 11))

Rothstein claims that the theta criterion and the rule of predicate linking are two complementary syntactic principles that should both be incorporated into the PPT framework. The proposal that predication is essentially a syntactic licensing condition from which the obligatoriness of clausal subjects can be derived has been acknowledged by Chomsky (1986b, p. 116) as a motivating argument for the EPP. Thus, Rothstein's proposal is not only conceptually distinct from Williams' original analysis in that it is radically syntactic (see also Rothstein (1990)), but it also contains various refinements with respect to the details of the concept of predication under discussion. First, Rothstein's rule of predicate linking introduced in (105) differs from Williams' (1980) rule of predication in that the predication relation is no longer expressed by coindexing the subject and the predicate, but by rather linking them, where the linking operation is structurally defined by c-command. Rothstein proposes that the relation between the predicate and the subject is exhaustively defined by (106) and (107), respectively:

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

59

(106)

X is predicated of Y (is a predicate of Y) if and only if X is linked to Y under (SW: 105).

(107)

X is the subject of Y if and only if Y is linked to X under (SW: 105). (Rothstein (1985, p. 11))

With this definition, it can be predicted that certain syntactic constituents appearing in an otherwise unlicensed position can be licensed as a predicate by the subject on the basis of definition (105). Second, Rothstein's rule of predicate linking is not based on the asymmetric definition of c-command and c-subjacency offered by Williams (1980), but on the symmetric definition of mutual c-command, which is proposed to hold between the subject and the predicate. C-command is defined by Rothstein as in (108): (108)

α c-commands β if and only if every maximal projection dominating α also dominates β. (Rothstein (1985, p. 15))

Rothstein follows Aoun & Sportiche's (1983) proposal that c-command is defined not in terms of branching nodes (see Reinhart (1976)), but in terms of maximal projections. Mutual c-command is then understood to hold between the subject and the predicate if they share all maximal projections. Since this definition makes reference to maximal projections only, it is similar to the restriction that Chomsky (1986a, p. 8) calls m-command. The notion of m-command rather than c-command is needed in Rothstein's framework to accommodate SODs, OODs, and RSPs, as in (109a)-(109c): (109)

a. b. c.

David left the office angry. Bertha ate the fish raw. Anna pushed the door shut.

Examples (109a) through (109c) are assigned the structural representations in (110a) through (110c), respectively:

60

(110)

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

a. IP

AP

NP

VP

NP

David (110)

angry

the office

left

b. IP

NP

VP'

AP

VP

NP

Bertha

ate

the fish

raw

Syntactic representation ofsecondary predications

(110)

61

c. IP

NP

Γ

I

Anna

VP

V

NP

AP

pushed

the door

shut

Representation (110a) contains an SOD that is represented as a daughter to IP. Examples (110b) and (110c) both contain object-oriented predicates that are licensed by their subject in VP. Rothstein observes that RSPs bear a close semantic connection to the verb, which allows them to be realized as sisters to V as in (110c). Since OODs do not enter into a close relation with the verb, they are not allowed to appear as sisters to V, but are attached to the VP node as represented in (110b). Rothstein supports this analysis by pointing to distributional facts, as in (11 la, b), where it is evident that RSPs must occur before OODs: (111)

a. b.

Jake hammered the metal flat hot. *Jake hammered the metal hot flat.

Examples (111a) and (111b) show that RSPs and OODs must occur in hierarchically different syntactic positions, with the RSP being closer to the verb than the OOD. To account for the hierarchical representation of RSPs and OODs, Rothstein assumes a concept of c-command that is defined over maximal projections. The linking operation between the predicate raw and the subject the fish in (110b) is allowed only if the VP', to which the OOD is attached, is conceived of as the maximal domain for c-command. Note, however, that under these premises the problematic case for Rothstein's proposal is neither RSPs nor OODs, but the analysis of SODs, which is given in (110a). As noted in section 2.1.3.1, Andrews (1982) provides evidence that SODs are sensitive to VP operations, and must therefore be understood to be part of VP. If, however, the secondary predicate angry in (110a) were attached to VP, the subject-predicate relation between angry and David could not be licensed by

62

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

Rothstein's definition of c-command, since VP adjunctions count as maximal projections in her framework. The critical discussion of Rothstein's (1985) (and also of Williams' (1980, 1983)) structural representations of SPs is essentially based on the conclusions drawn from Andrews' constituency tests. Therefore, it should be mentioned that Andrews' claim that subject-oriented XPs appear as a part of VP has not remained unchallenged. In particular, arguments by Demonte (1988) and Nakajima (1990) appear to contradict Andrews' findings. Demonte (1988) argues that for Spanish, OODs and SODs have to appear in different projections because an OOD predicate is not allowed to be separated from its subject antecedent; however, this restriction of contiguity does not hold between SOD predicates and their antecedents. This contrast is clear in (112a) and (112b): (112)

a.

Juanledio Juan gave him

elcafö the coffee

(*en bandeja de plate) caliente. (on a silver tray) hot

b.

Luisa preparaba los apuntes en su despacho Luisa prepared the notes in her office

contrariada. disturbed

Demonte (1988) further observes that SODs and OODs are sharply distinguished from one another with respect to productivity. Whereas SOD predicates occur freely with verbs that assign an external theta-role to their subject, OOD predicates seem to behave like subcategorized subject-predicate relations (SCs), in that they are subject to certain subcategorization restrictions. The difference is shown by the contrasts in (113a) and (113b): 20 (113)

a.

Mi hija sölo come las verduras guisadas / *caras. 'My daughter only eats vegetables cooked / expensive.'

b.

Tu propuesta hizo viable / *elaborada la soluciön. 'Your proposal made the solution viable / elaborated.'

The third difference between SODs and OODs that Demonte adduces is cooccurrence restrictions. While SOD predicates can cooccur with OOD predicates in a single sentence, this is not possible for predicates of the same type: (114)

a.

Juan; sirviö la carnej padadaj disustado;. 'Juan served the meat overcooked angry.'

b.

*Juan bostezö cansado malhumorado. 'Juan yawned tired ill-humored.'

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

c.

63

*Juan cortö la hierba corta preciosa. 'Juan cut the grass short beautiful.'

Demonte explains these data by assuming that SODs and OODs appear in different syntactic projections; namely, IP for SOD predicates and VP for OOD predicates. However, one could also argue that Demonte's evidence merely supports the hypothesis that SODs and OODs cannot appear in the same syntactic position, allowing for the possibility that they are generated in different projections within VP. Before this possibility is discussed further, consider Nakajima's (1990) arguments. Nakajima (1990) claims, as does Williams (1980), Rothstein (1985), and Demonte (1988), that SODs are daughters of IP, whereas OODs appear within VP. He adduces facts from syntactic constituency tests, the most interesting of which stem from extraposition from NP and heavy NP shift. With respect to the first test, he observes that SOD predicates occur to the left of extrapositions from the subject (SX) but not to the left of extrapositions from the object (OX), as in (115a) and (115b); OOD predicates, in contrast, can appear either to the left of SX or to the left of OX, as in (116a) and (116b): (115)

a. b.

(116)

a. b.

[A man t] left happy [who had a plan to build a new house in the suburbs]. *Bill left [the party t] angry [which my wife had prepared since last weekend], [Many Americans t] eat fish raw [who are interested in something Japanese], John ate [the fish t] raw [which he bought at Legal Seafoods].

Nakajima follows the widely adopted assumption that SX is adjoined to IP and that OX is adjoined to VP (see Baltin (1978, 1981, 1987), Asakawa (1979), Terazu (1979), Taraldsen (1981), van Gelderen (1985), and Barss (1986), among others). He deduces from the evidence in (115a) that SODs must be associated with the IP node. Following this train of thought, the ungrammatically of example (115b) results from a violation of the no crossing branches condition, since OX appears adjoined to VP and SOD appears adjoined to IP. The grammaticality of both examples in (116) is claimed to confirm the assumption that OODs are associated with the same syntactic node as OXs. Nakajima's interpretation of the data is crucially based on the assumption that SX is adjoined to IP and OX to VP. But evidence from VP ellipsis and from linear sequences of VP constituents proposed by Culicover & Rochemont (1990) and Rochemont & Culicover (1990) shows that SX is not always adjoined to IP but must be allowed to attach to VP (see Möck (1994 , p. 5If.)). If these authors are correct, then Nakajima's argument is considerably weakened, since the relevant

64

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

question now concerns the problem of exactly where SX and OX occur in relation to SOD and OOD predicates in VP. The data in (115) and (116) then merely suggest that OX and OOD occur lower in VP than SX and SOD. Nakajima's second argument is based on the position of depictive predicates in relation to the occurrence of heavy NPs, which are commonly assumed to have been moved to the right and adjoined to VP by heavy NP shift (HNPS) (see Stowell (1981), Rochemont (1986), Nakajima (1989)). The central observation here is that heavy NPs can be moved to the right of OODs, as in (117a), but not to the right of SODs, as in (117b): (117)

a. b.

John ate t raw [the fish which he bought at Legal Seafoods last week], *John left t angry [the awful party where everyone was drunk and rowdy].

Under the assumption that the HNPS landing site is VP, the difference in grammaticality between (117a) and (117b) is interpreted as additional evidence for assuming that SOD predicates appear as daughters to IP, while OOD predicates appear in VP. Nakajima's argument is again crucially dependent upon the assumption that HNPS operations involve movement and adjunction to VP. Larson (1988b), however, argues that natural language does not involve movement operations toward the right, and that the HNPS phenomenon must be explained as an instance of light verb raising, thus rendering the discussion of the landing site irrelevant. Even if Nakajima's proposal turns out to be correct, the evidence in (117a, b) only shows that heavy NPs are adjoined to a hierarchically lower position than SODs. Nakajima provides additional facts from the relative order of sentential adverbs, manner adverbs, temporal and locative adverbs, and emphatic reflexives with respect to SOD and OOD predicates, which support the hypothesis that SODs and OODs are generated at different levels in the syntactic structure. However, what they do not do and what Nakajima claims that they do is prove that they appear in different maximal projections. Since these tests depend upon the findings of other word order tests, they are subject to interpretation. Similar heuristics can be used by both proponents and opponents of a symmetric representation of OOD and SOD predicates, as can be seen by the test involving emphatic reflexives noted by Nakajima in (118) and (119): (118)

a. b.

John ate the meat himself nude, John ate the meat nude himself.

(119)

a. b.

* John ate the meat himself raw. John ate the meat raw himself.

Syntactic representation ofsecondary predications

65

Nakajima claims that since (118) and (119) show that emphatic reflexives can occur before SODs but not before OODs, and since emphatic reflexives are further assumed to occur only before or after IP constituents, it can be concluded that SOD predicates are daughters of IP and OOD predicates are daughters of VP. However, this test was originally proposed by Culicover & Wilkins (1984) to provide evidence for the assumption that VP is structured and that there is at least one phrasal node (V 1 ) between the V and the maximal VP (V 2 ) because emphatic reflexives may be attached to V 1 or V 2 final positions but not to a V internal position. This means that the relational word order tests, which are based on additional assumptions, can only provide relative evidence and not solid proof. The assignment of the exact position is left to interpretation. This test differs from those provided by Andrews (1982), which involve VP operations only: Andrews' tests provide reliable results because they clearly show that if a VP operation is carried out and the SOD predicate is not included but is stranded, the sentence is ungrammatical. As long as the arguments that support the asymmetric representation of SODs and OODs do not include evidence of this kind, Andrews' arguments for the assumption that SODs appear within VP must be favored. To return to the main argument, it must be concluded from the discussion above that the issue raised with Rothstein's analysis remains: her rule of predicate linking in (105) cannot accommodate the fact that SOD predicates appear within VP.

2.3.2.

Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986): VP-internal representation of depletives

Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986) develop the theory of predication proposed by Williams (1980) independently of Rothstein (1985) and offer a different proposal. As noted above, Culicover & Wilkins assume that the VP is made up of two segments, V 1 , which contains subcategorized material including the OOD predicate, as in (120), and V2, which dominates the SOD predicate, as in (121):

66

Distributional syntax ofsecondary predications

(120) S

John

V

NP

AP

ate

the meat

raw

(121) S

V John ate

NP the meat

nude

Thus, on the basis of constituent tests, such as V-bar deletion, emphatic reflexives, and gapping, Culicover & Wilkins (1984) arrive at essentially the same conclusion as Andrews (1982): namely, that OOD and SOD predicates are located in VP, although they are represented at different levels. The predication relation is formally defined by a predicate coindexing rule, as in (122a), and a locality condition, as in (122b): (122)

a. Predicate) Comdex: Coindex NP and X where X is a predicate, b. Locality Condition: All rules are local. #1. Ρ Coindex affects NP and X where X is bijacent to NP. Definition: X is bijacent to NP iff: (a) X is a sister to NP, or (b) X is immediately dominated by a sister of NP. (Culicover & Wilkins (1984, p. 25))21

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

67

The relevant concept that accounts for the distribution of SODs and OODs in this framework is the definition of bijacent, where the concept of bijacency is clearly based upon Williams' (1980) notion of c-subjacency. In (120), the AP raw is predicated of the meat since both stand in a sister relation as defined by the bijacency condition in (122b(a)). Under this definition, John in (120) would not be an adequate antecedent for the predicate raw since John and raw are not sisters and raw is not dominated by a sister of John. In (121), the predication relation between nude and John is licensed by condition (122b(b)), since nude is dominated by V2, which is a sister of NP. In contrast to Rothstein's proposal, Culicover & Wilkins' (1984) proposal can account for the empirical fact that SOD predicates appear in VP; however, they do not consider resultative predicates, and therefore are not aware of the possibility that OOD predicates might not be realized as sisters to NP under V1 because this is the designated position of result predicates. Another issue is raised by Napoli (1989). She comments upon the predication rule in (122) and notes that it fails to incorporate the observation that subjects c-command their predicates, as already proposed by Williams (1980). It follows that the bijacency condition, which is introduced to provide a structural definition of subject and object orientation, causes a weakening of the structural constraints on predication. Compared to Rothstein's mutual m-command condition, Culicover & Wilkins' proposal is less restrictive and therefore less favorable, and must be rejected on theoretical grounds. Contrasting Rothstein's with Culicover & Wilkins' approach, it becomes obvious that the challenge posed by an adequate theory of predication is to account for the empirical data with the most restrictive conditions. Although Rothstein's formal statement of predication in terms of mutual m-command is more restrictive than Williams' or Culicover & Wilkins', it can only account for the fact that resultative predicates and OOD predicates are represented at different levels of VP, but not for the possibility that SOD predicates occur in VP. If SOD predicates were to appear in VP, they could not m-command their subject antecedent, because there is always a maximal projection dominating the depictive which would not dominate the subject, namely VP. It follows from this discussion then that Rothstein's proposal of the structural representation of SODs, OODs, and RSPs must be rejected on empirical grounds. There are two possible solutions to the conflict between descriptive adequacy and theoretical restrictiveness in the predication analysis of secondary subjectpredicate relations. One concerns an improved definition of m-command in terms of the theory of adjunction structures, and the other concerns the adoption of the subject within VP hypothesis, which would guarantee that both OODs and SODs are predicated of their subjects under the more restrictive mutual c-command condition. The first solution has been proposed by McNulty (1988) and is

68

Distributional syntax ofsecondary predications

discussed in the next section. The second solution is attributed to Roberts (1988) and is discussed in section 2.3.4.

2.3.3.

McNulty (1988): modifications of Rothstein's analysis

McNulty's (1988) proposal basically constitutes a modification of Rothstein's (1985) analysis in that she accounts for the fact that SOD predicates are generated under VP 2 by incorporating the essential aspects of the theory of adjunction structure proposed by May (1985) into the rule of predication. The complete structure accounting for the three types of secondary predications is proposed in (123): (123) IP

VP 1

XP. J

McNulty argues that in (123) RSPs, OODs and SOD sappear on different levels in VP. She follows Rothstein (1985) in the assumption that resultative predicates are sisters to V, assuming an extension of the projection principle to allow non-thetamarked resultative XPs to appear in complement positions in VP. OOD predicates appear as sisters to V ' to account for the relative order of RSPs and OODs, as discussed in examples (111a, b). SOD predicates are proposed to be adjoined to VP in accordance with Andrews' (1982) findings.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

69

Like Chomsky (1986b, p. 96), Culicover (1988), and Roberts (1988), McNulty assumes that the distribution of secondary predicates is subject to the same principles that govern the structural conditions under which theta-role assignment occurs.22 In short, she understands predication not as a coindexing relation, but in terms of theta-role assignment. She follows Rothstein and claims that the relevant condition is mutual m-command as defined in Chomsky (1986a, p. 8); however, in order to maintain Rothstein's mutual m-command condition and still account for SODs in VP, McNulty adopts May's (1985) definition of maximal projection. Contrary to Rothstein, who assums that a VP projection containing an adjunction is a maximal projection, May's theory of adjunction structure considers each segment of a maximal projection in its own right. This proposal also applies to SODs such as in (124): (124) IP

Ray

V

NP

left

the room

angry

In this structure, the AP angry is adjoined to VP2. In May's terms, VP2 is not considered a maximal projection because a maximal projection is composed of both VP1 and VP2. VP2 is only understood as one segment of a maximal projection. It then follows that the mutual m-command requirement between angry and its antecedent Ray is met, since the first maximal projection that dominates angry, namely IP, also dominates Ray. McNulty accounts for the empirical fact that SOD predicates appear in VP while maintaining a restrictive locality condition, namely the mutual m-command

70

Distributional syntax ofsecondary predications

condition, by turning to May's theory of adjunction. Another solution to the same issue of reconciling empirical fact with the theoretical goal of restrictiveness has been proposed by Roberts (1988).

2.3.4.

Roberts (1988): the subject in VP hypothesis

Roberts (1988) follows Williams' (1980) proposal, and assumes that the most restrictive structural condition on predication is the mutual c-command condition, where c-command is defined in the sense of Reinhart (1976, p. 148). Roberts rejects the hypothesis that SOD predicates are adjoined to S on the basis of three types of evidence: VP constituency tests, binding facts, and scope facts. Since VP constituency tests have already been shown to provide results incompatible with the assumption that SODs are outside of VP (see Andrews' (1982) data in section (2.1.3.1)), only Roberts' additional evidence will be considered here. Binding facts, as in (125), constitute further evidence for assuming that SODs must occur inside VP. (125)

a. b.

*Mary met him; [ AP angry about Billjj. *Ray met her; [AP proud of Suejj.

In (125a) and (125b) it is not possible for the embedded coindexed referential expressions Bill/Sue to c-command the pronouns him/her. Therefore, the ungrammaticality cannot result from a violation of binding principle B. On the other hand, the ungrammaticality could result from the fact that the pronouns ccommand the referring expressions, which is prohibited by principle C. However, this explanation is valid only if it is assumed that the SOD predicates appear in VP, where they can be c-commanded by the pronouns. Moreover, evidence from parasitic gap constructions supports the assumption that SOD predicates occur in VP. Under the assumption that the restriction proposed by Chomsky (1982, p. 40) and Engdahl (1983) that "a parasitic gap may not be c-commanded by a real gap" (p. 22) is correct, the ungrammaticality of the sentence in (126) can be attributed to a violation of this condition: (126)

*Who did you meet tj [angry at e^.

However, if the ungrammaticality of (126) were caused by the fact that the trace t c-commanded the gap e, then it would follow that the AP angry at e would have to appear in VP. An additional reason for assuming that SOD predicates do not appear outside of VP but within it is provided by scope facts. Following Lasnik (1975), Roberts

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

71

observes that a sentence like (127) containing a VP-external because-adjunct has three different readings depending on the scope of negation. (127)

John didn't [ w kiss his wife] [ s because he loves her].

The negation in (127) can either have scope over both the primary and the secondary predication, or it can have scope over the primary predication or VP, or, moreover, it can have scope over only the adjunct predicate. The first reading is equivalent to a negation of the entire sentence in the sense that it is not the case that John kissed his wife because he loves her, the second equals the paraphrase that John loves his wife so much that he did not kiss her, and the third reading is that John kissed his wife not because he loves her but for another reason. Roberts contrasts example (127) with example (128), which contains the VPinternal adjunct deliberately. (128)

John didn't [yp kiss his wife [deliberately]].

Example (128) provides only two of the three possible readings above. The negation can have scope over the whole sentence and mean either that John didn't kiss his wife at all, or that John kissed his wife by accident. But it cannot mean that John deliberately abstainedfrom kissing his wife. Roberts argues that the negation in a sentence with an SOD predicate, as in (129), can only have scope over the entire clause or over the main predicate. (129)

Bill didn't [yp leave [angry at John]].

The fact that (129) can never mean that Bill did not leave because he is angry at John can only be explained by assuming that angry at John appears in VP, and is thus being included if negation ranges over the VP. Roberts concludes from these empirical tests that SODs, like OODs and RSPs, must appear within VP. A crucial problem arises from the question of how to account for these empirical facts if the theoretically most restrictive version of the concept command should be maintained. Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986) have to depart from a restrictive structural condition on predication to account for the empirical facts at hand, and McNulty (1988) has to assume a refinement of the mutual m-command condition in terms of May's (1985) theory of adjunction. Roberts' solution takes a different direction. He argues that under the hypothesis that predication is understood as theta-marking, and theta-marking occurs under mutual c-command at D-structure, there can be only one reason for the occurrence of SODs in VP: namely, that the subject which licenses the SOD predicates is also in VP. It follows that evidence from SODs provides an argument for the VPinternal subject hypothesis that has been independently proposed by Fukui &

72

Distributional syntax of secondary predications

Speas (1986), Koopman & Sportiche (1985, 1991), Kuroda (1988), Speas (1990), and Diesing (1992), among others. Consequently, the correct D-structure representation for predication relations is as in (130): (130)

a. b.

[ypNP, [ v V N P 2 ] AP] (SOD) [VP NP, [y V NP2 AP ]] (OOD / RSP)

The assumption that SODs occur as daughters of VP and OODs and RSPs as daughters of V', as proposed in (130), is supported by the syntactic behavior of reflexives, pronouns, and the each...the other construction in relation to secondary predication. The interplay between binding facts and predication relations in (131) suggests that SODs and OODs occur in different projections of VP. (131)

a. b. c. d.

*Maryj met Johnj [Ap angry at himself]];. Mary; met John, [AP angry at himself^. Mary; met Johnj [AP angry at herself^. ""Mary; met Johnj [AP angry at herselfjj.

An explanation of the ungrammaticality in (131a) is easily provided under the assumption that the predicate containing the PP angry at himself occurs as a daughter of VP, and is therefore excluded from the c-command domain of the antecedent of the reflexive predicate, the object John. In cases where the predication and the reflexive contained within it take the same subject antecedent, the grammaticality is preserved. Note, however, that the ungrammaticality of (13Id) cannot be explained in terms of a violation of the c-command restriction since the reflexive pronoun herself is still c-commanded by the sentential subject; rather, the ungrammaticality of (13Id) is due to a violation of predicate binding principle A, which states that an anaphor must be bound in the minimal predicate in which it occurs or by the subject of that predicate (see section 2.2.1., (90)). Another set of evidence for the structural representation in (130) is given in (132): (132)

a. b.

""Mary; met everyonej [angry at hisj mother];, Mary; met everyonej [angry at hisj mother]j.

The ungrammaticality in (132a) is readily accounted for if it is assumed that the secondary predicate occurs as a daughter to VP and that the pronoun his, which is contained in it and which acts as a bound variable, cannot be c-commanded by everyone. The c-command condition is fulfilled in (132b), where the secondary predicate occurs as a sister to the NP antecedent of the pronoun.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

73

The last piece of evidence for the structure in (130) is provided by the each ... the other construction in (133). (133)

a. b.

*Maryj met each manj [angry at the other^. Mary, met each manj [angry at the other^j.

Roberts follows Barss & Lasnik (1986) in the assumption that each must ccommand the other in configurations like (133). As in the above cases, the ungrammatically of (133a) suggests that the other, which is contained in an SOD, cannot be c-commanded by each man because it appears as a daughter of VP, outside of the c-command domain of the object. It can be concluded that the evidence provided by Roberts supports the proposal that SOD predicates are represented inside VP, and that OOD predicates occur in a lower projection of VP. Based on the two premises that SODs occur in VP and that subject-predicate relations are subject to a mutual c-command condition, Roberts draws the conclusion that the sentential subject must be base-generated in VP. The claim that OODs appear on a lower projection than SODs has been supported by constituency tests; however, it is not totally evident whether the facts provided by Roberts can be taken as proof that OODs are daughters of V'. The assumption that OODs appear as sisters to V and NP is crucial to the explanation of the binding facts in (131) through (133). The problem here, however, is that in spite of evidence to the contrary from Rothstein (1985) and McNulty (1988), Roberts' analysis commits him to the assumption that OODs and RSPs occur in the same syntactic position (see (130)). To summarize, the empirical evidence shows that SODs, OODs and RSPs are represented within VP. While McNulty proposes a mutual m-command condition as a licensing condition on secondary predications, Roberts embrases the VPinternal subject hypothesis to maintain the stricter c-command condition. These two separate attempts to solve the conflict between empirical adequacy and theoretical restrictiveness will be further discussed in the next section, where it will be shown that McNulty's proposal cannot account for a variety of empirical facts, whereas Roberts' can account for them, but only under the problematic empirical assumption that RSPs and OODs occur in the same structural position. The counterproposal that will be defended in the following section is based upon a modified Larsonian sentence structure (Larson (1988a, b)).

74

2.4.

Defending a complex predicate analysis

Defending a complex predicate analysis

In this section, I propose an analysis that is empirically and theoretically superior to the proposals discussed above. Like McNulty's and Roberts' proposals, it is rooted in the tradition of the theory of predication, where predication is understood as theta-role assignment of the non-theta-marked secondary predicate to its subject antecedent. The formal condition on the subject-predicate relation is the mutual ccommand condition that applies at LF; however, the analysis differs from both McNulty's and Roberts' analyses in that it claims that the primary predicate and the secondary predicate form a complex predicate under V'. More precisely, the analysis of SPs is based on the type of sentence structure proposed by Larson (1988a, b) as an alternative to the traditional analyses of dative constructions, with the proviso that some emendations will be introduced to accommodate the entire body of empirical SP data.

2.4.1.

Larson's (1988) complex predicate analysis

Pursuing a concept first developed by Chomsky (1955/1975, p. 492), Larson (1988a) claims that the double object construction in (134) is derived from an underlying dative construction (135) via a dative shift operation, which bears some similarity to passive formation. (134)

John sent Mary a letter.

(135)

John sent a letter to Mary.

Dative complements, Larson claims, are derived from structures such as (136), which are based on the subject in VP hypothesis and the single complement hypothesis,23

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

75

(136) VP

V

John

e

PP

send

a letter s

inner subject

to Mary 7

x/ small

predicate

/ clauselike

structure

Larson's proposal is based on the concept that in (136) the indirect object to Mary forms a constituent with the verb send. The object NP, a letter, which appears as a direct object at the surface structure, is an inner subject that is not part of this complex predicate. The complex predicate and the inner subject are understood as a clauselike structure predicated of the sentential subject John. For the purpose of this discussion, I turn to Larson (1988b), where he conjectures that both RSPs and OODs could be analyzed under an analogous proposal. More precisely, Larson proposes that the RSP in (137a) and the OOD in (137b) are assigned a structure as in (138): (137)

a. b.

Jude hammered a coin flat. Jude ate fish raw.

76

Defending a complex predicate analysis

(138) VP

Spec VP

V'

VP

NP

AP a. Jude b. Jude

a coin fish

hammer eat

flat raw

In this structure, the predicative APs flat and raw combine with their respective matrix verbs to form the complex predicates hammer flat and eat raw. To arrive at the appropriate surface structure, Larson proposes that V raising takes place due to case and agreement requirements between INFL, NP, and V. The process of V raising causes the lower V° to move to the empty V via head-to-head movement. It is further suggested that an optional rule of V to V reanalysis may apply to the complex predicate under V', assigning it a status of V and moving it to the empty V-head. This movement operation is also referred to as light predicate raising (LPR). The rule of V' reanalysis, which is a prerequisite for LPR, is given in (139). (139)

Let α be a phrase [ v ...] whose θ-grid contains one discharged internal Θrole. Then α may be reanalyzed as [v.··]· (Larson (1988a, p. 348))

Larson assumes that rule (139) is responsible for the generation of structures like (140b) from (140a), which are traditionally analyzed as HNPS constructions, but are treated as instances of LPR in Larson's framework: (140)

a. b.

Jude [yp hammered [NP a coin which she found on the street] flat], Jude [yp hammered flat [NP a coin which she found on the street]].

Larson proposes that the complex V' predicate hammer flat in example (140a) is reanalyzed as V and is moved leftward, leaving behind a heavy NP on its right side

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

77

as seen in (140b). Not only does this analysis permit a more restrictive explanation of the HNPS cases if applied to resultative secondary predicates, but it also accounts for the facts of sentence accentuation, which will be discussed in chapter 5. Larson further suggests that OODs have the same structural representation as RSPs; thus, examples (141a) and (141b) receive the same derivational analysis as (140a) and (140b). (141)

a. b.

Jude [ w ate [NP fish over two days old] raw], Jude [yp ate raw [NP fish over two days old]].

Larson claims that the verb ate and the OOD predicate raw are reanalyzed as V by the rule in (139). The light predicate ate raw is then moved to the empty V-node by V-to-V movement; thus, under this analysis, sentence (141b) is not an example of HNPS, but a case of LPR in analogy to the resultative example (140b). Larson (1988b) further observes that SOD predicates cannot undergo V' reanalysis with the verb. More precisely, left angry is not a possible light predicate and is therefore excluded from the LPR operation, as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (142b): (142)

a. b.

John [yp left [NP the reception for the ambassador from Ulan Bator] angry]. *John [yp left angry [NP the reception for the ambassador from Ulan Bator]].

To account for the ungrammaticality in (142b), Larson (1988b, p. 19) follows Dowty (1979), Schein (1982), and Roberts (1988), and proposes that the structural representation of SODs differs from that of RSPs and OODs in that they are not sisters to V under V' but rather sisters to V'. Compare the structural representation of RSPs/OODs in (138) to that of SODs in (143):

78

Defending a complex predicate analysis

(143) VP

NP

V'

V'

John

AP

V

NP

left

the reception

angry

It is evident from structure (143) that rule (139) cannot reanalyze the verb left and the SOD angry since they do not occur as sisters under V'. Larson's proposal for the analysis of SPs raises two issues. The first issue concerns the fact that Larson assumes identical syntactic structures for the analysis of RSPs and OODs alike, representing only SODs as adjunct structures. The second issue concerns the question of whether Larson's proposal of theta-role assignment in dative constructions can be applied to predicate structures. The empirical problem is discussed in section 2.4.2, leaving the issue of theta-role assignment in a complex predicate structure for section 2.4.3.

2.4.2.

Modification of Larson's proposal

In contrast to resultative XPs, which are considered sisters to V under V', as in (138), object-oriented depictive XPs are adjunct structures, and thus cannot be represented in the same way. There are four sources of evidence for the claim that RSPs and OODs must be distinguished structurally.24 The first argument refers to the fact that sentences like (141b), which Larson (1988b) offers as evidence for V' reanalysis and LPR of OOD predicates in what appears to be an HNPS construction, are significantly less grammatical than LPR operations that involve resultative predicates (see (140b)). Further, it is questionable whether the intended reading of sentence (141b) with a pause after raw is the preferred reading, or whether the reduced relative clause (RRC) reading with a pause after fish is not the more natural one. The claim that V' reanalysis and LPR with an OOD predicate is less appropriate than with a resultative XP is supported by the examples in (144) and (145) (see Larson's examples ( l l b i , iii)), which range from questionable to unacceptable.

25

Syntactic representation of secondary predications (144)

a. b.

(145)

a. b.

79

Felix found the door that he had not dared to unlock for years open. ?Felix found open the door that he had not dared to unlock for years. Edith drinks tea that comes all the way from China cooled with ice. *Edith drinks cooled with ice tea that comes all the way from China.

The second piece of evidence stems from LPR operations involving all three types of secondary predications: RSPs, OODs, and SODs. None of the sentences in (146) could be represented with the structural proposals given in (138) and (143): (146)

a. b. c. d.

Murphy hammered a coin from his grandfather's collection flat hot, drunk as a skunk. Murphy hammered flat a coin from his grandfather's collection hot, drunk as a skunk. ?Murphy hammered flat hot a coin from his grandfather's collection, drunk as a skunk. "Murphy hammered flat hot, drunk as a skunk, a coin from his grandfather's collection.

Larson proposes an identical structural representation for RSPs and OODs. They are both assigned the structure given in (138), which respects the single complement hypothesis. Note, however, that structure (138) cannot accommodate cooccurring RSP and OOD predicates, as in (146), since there is only one complement position available for two predicates. It follows that an additional V' adjoined node is indispensable to an account of both the fact that RSPs, OODs, and SODs cooccur and the fact that only the V' dominating the RSP and the main predicate is reanalyzed as V, leaving the OOD behind as in (146b). Rothstein observes that RSPs and OODs cannot be reversed in order. The fact that the resultative predicate must always occur before the depictive is also supported by the ungrammaticality of example (147d), where LPR involves the reanalyzed V' dominating the V and the OOD, leaving the RSP behind. (147)

a. b. c. d.

The loggers cut a tree in the front yard into pieces green. The loggers cut into pieces a tree in the front yard green. ?The loggers cut into pieces green a tree in the front yard. *The loggers cut green a tree in the front yard into pieces.

80

Defending a complex predicate analysis

The third source of evidence is derived from extraposition from NP facts. Various observations have been made with respect to extrapositions; for example, Nakajima (1990) proposes that extraposition from the object (OX) cannot be moved over SODs. This observation is supported by Ike-Uchi (1990), although the data is murky and definite conclusions are not possible.26 Furthermore, Rochemont and Culicover (1990) independently claim that the order of extraposition and predication is only constrained by an interpretive nesting requirement. I employ the OX test here to argue that RSP predicates and OOD predicates appear at different levels of the VP projection. (148)

a. b.

John wiped an antique trophy that came all the way from Crete clean broken. John wiped an antique trophy clean that came all the way from Crete broken.

It is not possible to reverse the order of RSP and OOD as in (149c): (149)

a. b. c.

John cut a tree that lay in the front yard to pieces broken. John cut a tree to pieces that lay in the front yard broken. *John cut a tree broken that lay in the front yard to pieces.

The fact that the OX can be moved over the RSP and land between the RSP and OOD, as in (149b), but cannot be moved over the OOD and be adjoined before the RSP, as in (149c), provides evidence for the assumption that RSPs and OODs are generated in different positions in VP, and that RSPs always precede OODs. This claim is also backed up by cross-linguistic evidence. Rothstein (1985, p. 17) provides proof for the close semantic relationship between the RSP predicate and the verb in Icelandic, where the RSP forms a compound with the verb, as in (150): (150)

Eg hvit-prooi fötin. I white-washed the clothes Ί washed the clothes until they were white'.

A close connection between the verb and the RSP can also be observed in German V^-sentences. (151)

a. b. c.

daß sie das Blech flachgehämmert hat. that she the metal flathammered has daß sie das Blech heiß gehämmert hat. that she the metal hot hammered has daß sie das Blech heiß flachgehämmert hat. that she the metal hot flathammered has

Syntactic representation of secondary predications d.

81

?daß sie das Blech flach heiß gehämmert hat. that she the metal flat hot hammered has

The resultative predicate flach in (151a) is incorporated in the verb flachhämmern. The predicate heiß in (151b) can receive either a depictive or a resultative reading depending upon the phrasing of the predicate-verb combination. If RSP and OOD cooccur, as in (151c), the predicate closer to the verb receives a resultative reading, if possible. Example (151c) can only mean that when the metal was hot, she hammered it flat, whereas (15 Id) is ungrammatical if both predicates are interpreted as depictives, or if the predicate heiß is forced to receive a resultative reading, such as when the metal was flat, she hammered it until it became hot,27 It can be concluded from the evidence provided above that each of the different types of secondary predications must be represented in a separate verbal projection as proposed in (152): (152) IP

I'

(NP)

VP

VP

SOD

NP

V'

V

VP

2

NP

V'

2

V'

V

1

OOD

RSP

trans/intrans

82

Defending a complex predicate analysis

The assumption that RSPs and OODs appear in the same position as a daughter of V' characterizes not only Larson's (1988) proposal, but is also found, as previously noted, in the analyses of Roberts (1988), Rapoport (1990), and Guömann (1990), among others. Although this assumption is clearly inadequate, as shown by the evidence provided in (141) through (151), the grammaticality judgments in constituent tests such as the do-so test vary greatly.28 This uncertainty in judgments is due to the fact that certain verb-predicate combinations involving OODs appear to be nearly as close semantically as combinations with RSP predicates. This is also seen in judgments of WH-moved predicates. While WH-extraction of a secondary predicate for Chomsky (1986a, p. 84), Demonte (1987), McNulty (1988), and Roberts (1988) is only possible in the case of resultatives, Ike-Uchi claims that not only RSP predicates, but also OOD predicates, and in some dialects even SOD predicates can be WH-extracted. Judgments of the first group of authors are marked off from Ike-Uchi's by a slash. (153)

a. b. c.

V/V V/V V/V

How clean did John pick the bone t? How red did John paint the house t? How angry did John make his friends t?

(154)

a. b. c.

*/?

How raw did John eat the meat t? How drunk did you meet John t? How young did Diane marry Chris?

(155)

a. b. c.

How angry did John serve the meat t? How drunk did John discuss the topic t? How angry did John leave the room t?

Various proposals account for WH-extractions of secondary predicates. The most rigid is offered by Chomsky (1986a, p. 83 f.), who defines government in terms of inclusion. This marks WH-extraction of adjuncts such as the SODs and OODs in (154) and (155) as ungrammatical because under this definition, the VP functions as a barrier to government, yielding a violation of the empty category principle (ECP). To account for the grammaticality of WH-extraction of resultative predicates in (153), Chomsky suggests that either government has to be defined in terms of exclusion, or it has to be assumed that the verb and the resultative predicate form a complex predicate and thus allow movement of the L-marked predicate. The most liberal proposal is offered by Ike-Uchi (1990), who assumes that traces of SPs have to meet the conjunctive ECP in that they must be both antecedentgoverned and L-governed. Government in this proposal is defined in terms of mcommand and exclusion as discussed in Chomsky (1986a), where the government relation must hold at LF. Since each trace in (153) through (155) is antecedent-

Syntactic representation

of secondary predications

83

governed, the difference in grammaticality is determined with respect to Lgovernment. If we assume structure (152), the verb L-governs the traces of RSP and OOD predicates, rendering (153) and (154) acceptable. Ike-Uchi further assumes that although SODs are L-governed by the raised verb, the SP relation is not fulfilled at LF, since the sentential subject has been raised into [Spec, IP] without leaving a trace in [Spec, VP]; therefore, he introduces two dialects, where dialect 1 speakers judge WH-extracted SODs as ungrammatical. This is not the case with respect to dialect 2 speakers, who allow a so-called string-vacuous movement operation adjoining the SOD to VP, from where it can m-command its subject. With respect to the proposed structure in (152), I further argue that the position for RSP predicates can be filled either by transitive or intransitive resultatives for two reasons: first, resultatives cannot cooccur, as briefly mentioned in chapter 1 and as seen by the ungrammaticality of the examples in (156): (156)

a.

b.

*He washed the clothes clean white. *He washed the clothes clean until they where white. (Rothstein (1985, p. 18)) *He drank the bar empty out of business. *He drank the bar empty with the result of being out of business.

Second, intransitive resultatives also form complex transitive predicates that are allowed to undergo LPR, as proposed in Larson (1988b, p. 61): (157)

a. b.

Alice drank a barkeeper and his entire staff under the table, Alice drank under the table the barkeeper and his entire staff.

(158)

a.

The wolves howl anyone who has to listen to them for more than an hour into a frenzy, The wolves howl into a frenzy anyone who has to listen to them for more than an hour.

b.

Under this analysis, it is assumed that intransitive resultative predicates change the intransitive verb like drink or howl into a transitive verb, or in Larson's words: The adjuncts make an absolute contribution to the verbal complex in such cases, increasing the valence of a basically intransitive predicate. (Larson (1988b, p. 61)) Carrier & Randall (1992) support the view that there is a close connection between the matrix verb and the resultative predicate in both transitive and intransitive cases; however, they do not assume, like Larson (1988b), that the verb and the

84

Defending a complex predicate analysis

secondary resultative predicate form a complex predicate. Instead, they propose that the verb, the postverbal NP, and the resultative XP are daughters of VP, and form a tripartite structure as in (159): (159) VP

V

water run

NP

the tulips the pavement

AP

flat thin

Carrier & Randall (1992) note that the close connection between the verb and the transitive and intransitive RSPs is evident from long-distance WH-movement operations. The authors agree with McNulty (1988), who observes that WHextraction of a resultative predicate out of WH-islands does not result in an ECP violation, but only causes a subjacency violation. See examples (160) and (161): (160)

Long-distance extraction of transitive result XPs: a. ?How flat do you wonder whether they hammered the metal? b. ?How shiny do you wonder which gems to polish?

(161)

Long-distance extraction of intransitive result XPs : a. ?How threadbare do you wonder whether they should run their sneakers? b. ?How dry do you wonder whether the sun baked the field?

Carrier & Randall (1992) argue that both transitive and intransitive RSPs behave like internal arguments of the verb and not like adjuncts, subjects, or subjectoriented depictives, which cause an ECP violation because they are not Lgoverned by the verb, as shown in (162): (162)

Long-distance extraction of adjuncts, subjects and depictives'. a. * [How]j do you wonder whether to punish these boys t;? b. *[Who]j do you wonder [which boys]j tj should punish 1j? c. *[How angry]; does Mary wonder whether John left tj?

It is argued that the grammaticality of long WH-extraction of either transitive or intransitive resultatives is based on the fact that they are L-governed by the verb, 29 which depictives are not.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

85

With respect to structure (159), it is further suggested that although the postverbal NP appears as a daughter of VP in both the transitive and the intransitive RSPs, only in the transitive case is it understood as an argument of the verb. Carrier & Randall support their view with evidence from middle formation, adjectival passive formation, and nominal formation, which suggests that the postverbal NP does not behave like a subcategorized NP in certain transformational operations. Based on these arguments, the authors assume that an asymmetry exists between argument structure and syntactic structure, and they claim that even if elements such as the postverbal NPs of intransitive RSPs appear as sisters to V, they do not necessarily constitute arguments of the verb. On the other hand, Carrier & Randall propose that secondary predicates of both the transitive and the intransitive RSPs are conceived as arguments of the verb. It is even argued that they receive a theta-role from the verb, an assumption not necessarily standard under the theory of predication, since Rothstein (1985) defines predication as a licensing mechanism of non-theta-marked XPs. Furthermore, the predicate XP is unsaturated in the sense that it is incomplete if it is not licensed by an argument that c-commands it and saturates its undischarged theta-role. Viewed from this perspective, the question of whether the postverbal NP in intransitive resultatives constitutes an argument of the primary predicate could be moot. Tests that apply to the argument structure of the intransitive predicate will not necessarily provide clues to the argument structure of RSPs. On the other hand, a resultative predicate could not be licensed if not provided with a subject of which it is predicated and to which it can assign its theta-role.

2.4.3.

Theta-theoretical considerations

Two questions are relevant in the discussion of the interaction between theta theory and predication theory: 1. 2.

How does the predication theory account for the violation of the theta criterion in secondary predication constructions? How does the process of theta-marking work in a complex predicate analysis as proposed in (152) above?

With respect to the first question, it has been repeatedly observed that a secondary predicate assigns a second theta-role to its licensing subject. Rothstein (1985) even uses this feature to define secondary predications: Our analysis of secondary predication has made it a condition on secondary predicates that the subject of such a predicate is the argument

86

Defending a complex predicate analysis of, i.e., is assigned a theta-role by another lexical head. It is therefore a condition on secondary predication that the theta-criterion be violated. (Rothstein (1985, p. 93))

There are essentially two means of avoiding a violation of the standard definition of the theta criterion (repeated in (163)): (163)

Each argument bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument. (Chomsky (1981, p. 36))

The first way is to introduce a PRO subject, as suggested by the SC analysis of secondary predications. Under an SC analysis, the secondary predicate angry in (164) assigns its theta-role to PRO, where PRO is controlled by Jake. (164)

Jake left the room [PRO angry] contro The shortcomings of the SC approach were discussed in chapter 2.1. The second way is to revise the theta criterion so that it allows for the assignment of two different theta-roles to one argument, as in (165). (165)

a.

Jake left the room angry.

b.

Bertha ate the meat raw.

c.

Ray shot the skunk dead.

d.

Jana drank the bar empty.

It has repeatedly been overlooked that Chomsky (1981) has already provided a definition of the theta criterion that would account for the assignment of two thetaroles to one argument, namely, the chain formulation of the criterion in (166):

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

(166)

87

Given the structure S, there is a set Κ of chains, Κ = { Q }, where Q = ( a \ , . . . , a' n ), such that: (i) if α is an argument of S, then there is a C; e Κ such that α = and a θ-role is assigned to Q by exactly one position P. (ii) if Ρ is a position of S marked with the θ-role R, then there is a C; ε Κ to which Ρ assigns R, and exactly one a'| in Q is an argument. (Chomsky (1981, p. 335))

Definition (166) is not applied to arguments but to chains, meaning that a chain is allowed one and only one theta-role, which is to be assigned by one theta-marker, thus allowing for the possibility that an argument is assigned two theta-roles if it heads two different chains. Various other definitions have been proposed independently to account for the specific case of SPs. Most of these definitions are based on Schein's (1982) original proposal, which allows theta-assignment of two theta-roles to one argument as long as they come from two different sources, as in (167): (167)

Any two theta-roles Θ, and θ2 cannot be assigned to the same NP if and only if the α that selects θ[ also selects θ2. (Schein (1982, p. 27, footnote 16))

While Rothstein (1985) agrees with Schein, Williams (1983) proposes defining the theta criterion in terms of argument complexes, as in (168): (168)

The Restricted Theta Criterion: In an argument complex, each phrase is assigned only one theta-role. (Williams (1983, p. 300))

An argument complex is defined as in (169): (169)

Argument Complex: An argument complex consists of a verb (or any other predicate), its arguments, its arguments' arguments, and so forth. (Williams (1983, p. 300))

Basically, the proposed revisions of the theta criterion relax the biuniqueness condition of the standard theta criterion (166) and permit an argument to be assigned more than one theta-role if the source is different (see also Culicover & Wilkins (1986), Rapoport (1986), Carrier & Randall (1992)). This discussion brings us directly to the second question mentioned above, which concerns the process of theta-marking in a complex predicate analysis such

88

Defending a complex predicate analysis

as proposed in (152). Larson (1988a) suggests that in the case of datives, as in (136), the indirect object receives its theta-role directly from V°, whereas the surface object receives a theta-role compositionally from the verb plus the indirect object.30 Obviously, this operation of theta-role assignment cannot be applied to the case of transitive or intransitive RSPs without modification: (170)

a. b.

Max shot the skunk dead. Alice drank Max under the table.

If Larson's analysis were transferred to (170a), the matrix verb shoot would assign a theta-role to the result phrase dead, and the complex predicate shoot dead would assign a theta-role to the skunk. In (170b), drink would assign a theta-role to under the table, and drink under the table would compositionally assign a theta-role to Max; however, there are two problems with this analysis.31 First, it has been argued that secondary predicates are non-theta-marked XPs which are licensed by a subject that can saturate the open argument position in the predicate and not by arguments, as suggested by Larson's (1988a) analysis. Second, Schein (1982) has already observed that in (170a) the postverbal NP is assigned two theta-roles, an object theta-role by the matrix verb shoot the skunk, and a subject theta-role the skunk is dead. In (170b), however, where the matrix verb is intransitive, the issue is still undecided of whether the postverbal NP is assigned a subject theta-role by the secondary predicate under the table only, or whether the subject of a resultative predicate also receives a theta-role from the verb. In either case, the proposal of the theta-role assignment offered in Larson (1988a) must be carefully refined. Carrier & Randall (1992) further note that the combo-role, which is compositionally assigned by the verb and the secondary predicate in Larson's (1988a) framework, cannot account for the selectional restrictions that they argue are separately induced by the verb and by the resultative predicate. It seems that if we differentiate between transitive and intransitive resultatives, the process of function composition proposed by DiSciullo & Williams (1987) does not capture the process of theta-assignment (see also Jackendoff (1990) and Larson (1990)). These problems can be solved if we amend Larson's system with two requirements. First, the RSP does not receive a theta-role by virtue of being a predicate; the close semantic relationship between the verb and the RSP is expressed by the fact that they are part of the same complex predicate. Second, in cases of resultative phrases, the theta-role of the object of the verb and of the subject of the secondary predicate is not compositionally assigned, but is individually assigned via different theta-marking operations (see chapter 6). Following a proposal by Higginbotham (1985, 1989) and Speas (1990), I assume that there are different modes of licensing theta-relations: theta-marking, thetaidentification, and theta-binding. In the transitive resultative case, two distinct

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

89

operations take place. The theta-role of the postverbal NP is saturated via thetamarking, the usual operation for argument saturation, also called theta-discharge. The theta-role of the resultative XP is then not discharged, but is identified with the position , the postverbal NP in the verbal grid, and percolates to the maximal projection of V. This process, in which the theta-roles of two predicates are combined, is called theta-identification. Theta-marking must occur between syntactic sisters. For the examples in (171) I propose the simplified theta-discharge procedures represented in (172): (171)

a. b.

Max hammered a banana flat, Jana drank the bar empty.

(172) IP

(...)

r

I

VP

NP

V'

V

VP

NP < ! • >

V'

V

a.

Max

a banana

hammered

b.

Jana

the bar

drank

AP

flat empty

With these two changes to Larson's proposal in mind (first, the differentiation between RSPs and OODs, and second, the individual assignment of theta-roles through theta-identification), I claim that the complex predicate analysis given in (152) is superior to the proposals provided by Carrier & Randall (1992), McNulty

90

Defending a complex predicate analysis

(1988), and Roberts (1988), because it accounts not only for constituent tests, but also for binding facts and phonological facts, as will be seen in chapter 5.

2.5.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the syntactic representation of resultative, objectoriented depictive and subject-oriented depictive secondary predications in English. The evidence suggests that strict ordering conditions exist between RSPs, OODs, and SODs, which are mapped into a hierarchical representation in syntax. I follow Andrews (1982) and others who argue that all three predicate types occur VP-intemally. I further propose that the close semantic connection between the resultative predicate and the verb should be signaled syntactically by a complex predicate analysis of the Larsonian sentence structure type (Larson (1988a, b)). This analysis is based on the assumptions that structures are binary branching, that the sentential subject is generated in the specifier position of the highest VP projection, and that the subject of the resultative and object-oriented predicates, which is an argument of the verb, appears in the specifier position of the lowest VP in accordance with the single complement hypothesis. In the case of resultatives, it is further proposed that the small predicate, which includes the verb and the secondary predicate, makes up a clauselike structure with the subject of the secondary predicate. Once the verb is raised via head-to-head movement, the remaining structure bears only the secondary subject and the resultative predicate, and is thus reminiscent of an SC structure; however, the suggested proposal is grounded in the tradition of the theory of predication, in which the secondary predicate is licensed by its subject in that it saturates an open position in the theta-grid of the predicate under the mutual c-command condition. The subject-predicate relation is thus defined in terms of theta-assignment of the secondary predicate to its subject. Although Chomsky (1986b, p. 97) incorporates the process of predication as a licensing condition in the PPT, strong disagreement exists with respect to the syntactic representation of secondary predications. Proponents of the SC analysis assume that secondary subject-predicate relations must be represented as sentential constituents in syntax, thus supporting the structural definition of subject, whereas this step is considered unnecessary by proponents of the predication theory analysis. With respect to this controversy, I have argued that the SC analysis suggested by Stowell (1981, 1983) and Chomsky (1981) is inadequate and must be rejected both on empirical and theory-internal grounds. The strong theory-internal requirements based on the PRO theorem, the projection principle, and the theta criterion create a situation in which empirical data from secondary predicates, especially the fact that they appear VP-internally, cannot receive a descriptively adequate analysis.

Syntactic representation of secondary predications

91

Although Hornstein & Lightfoot (1987) relax the theoretical restriction of the PRO theorem so that PRO can be governed, their analysis is still inadequate if interactions between resultative secondary predications and binding facts are at issue. Hoekstra (1988) applies the SC analysis to all three types of resultatives, arguing that a verb taking a theme object can alternatively take a resultative SC, just as an intransitive verb can take a resultative SC. I have argued that exactly the same theory-internal restrictions that void the SC analysis of depictives void the SC analysis of transitive resultatives: namely, that the proposal violates the theta criterion and the projection principle. I have contrasted the SC analysis with the predication theory, which shows a higher degree of descriptive adequacy while relaxing theoretical premises, such as the theta criterion and the projection principle, and introducing a relational concept of subject. Williams (1980) proposes a general theoretical framework for a theory of predication, which is refined and elaborated by Rothstein (1985); however, both proposals have to be rejected because they do not account for the observation that RSPs, OODs, and SODs are part of VP. The proposals that have followed in the same framework suggest various ways to account for these empirical facts. Culicover & Wilkins (1984, 1986) suggest that VP is composed of different projections, accounting for the subject-predicate relation by a weak version of the concept of command. McNulty (1988) proposes that the mutual m-command condition is sufficient if amended by May's (1985) theory of adjunction. Roberts (1988) adheres to the stricter version of mutual c-command, and argues that the sentential subject is generated in VP. Carrier & Randall (1992) offer a flat structure for resultatives, and claim that the matrix verb assigns a theta-role to the resultative predicate. I have discussed each proposal individually and suggest instead a CP analysis that is based upon a modified Larsonian sentence structure. This analysis mirrors the close connection between the verb and the resultative secondary predicate syntactically in that they are allowed to form a complex predicate structure under appropriate conditions. I have also shown that the proposal by Carrier & Randall (1992) to signal the close connection between the verb and the secondary predicate by theta-assignment is theoretically deviant, since thetamarked argument XPs and non-theta-marked predicate XPs occur in complementary distribution. It will be seen in the following chapters that the distinction between arguments that are theta-marked by the verb, resultative predicates that can form a complex predicate with the matrix verb, and adjunct predicates is relevant, since only thetamarked arguments and resultative predicates that form a complex predicate and assign a theta-role to their licensing subject are present at argument structure. The adjunct predicates, however, are not present at argument structure, since they are essentially adjunct structures licensed by their subject at a later stage of derivation (cf. Lebeaux (1988)). I turn to the discussion of theta-theoretic considerations in chapter 4 and chapter 6.

Chapter 3 Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar 3.1.

Introduction

The goal of this book, as noted in chapter 1, is to examine secondary predications from two perspectives, their structure, and their prosodic behavior. With respect to the former, a complex predicate analysis is offered to explain the distribution of secondary predications. The theoretical premises of the latter are discussed here. The chapters that follow will show that these seemingly unconnected areas of investigation provide specific insights into the set-up of the syntax-prosody interface. This chapter discusses the theoretical foundation of the focus structure theory by concentrating on the following questions: 1.

What reasons have led to the commonly held assumption that the hypothetical construct focus must be represented as a syntactic feature producing an intermediate level of representation known as focus structure?

2.

What are the reasons for assuming a modular intonational model of grammar? What kind of proposals exist, and what are their limitations?

3.

What are the ramifications of the hypothesis that syntactic focus structure operates upon argument structure?

Chapter 3.2 investigates the development of the focus concept as a syntactic feature and its relation to accent assignment. Specifically, four disparate approaches will be discussed in chronological order: the syntactic approach, the semantic-pragmatic approach, the focus as new information approach, and the focus structure approach. Major emphasis will be placed upon the question of how sentence accent and focus are related, on the shortcomings of the nuclear stress rule (NSR) and on the changes that the focus concept has undergone since its emergence as the focus structure approach. Chapter 3.3 provides a detailed discussion of recent publications on focus theory with emphasis on those theories that are situated within the focus structure approach. Their central research goal has been the development of a modular intonational model of grammar that provides a principled account of the theory of focus. However, the proposals differ not only with respect to the degree of

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Introduction

modularity achieved, but also with respect to the question of whether they are based upon a so-called top-down focus model (focus-to-accent approach) or a bottom-up focus model. In chapter 3.3.1, I concentrate on the characteristic features of Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) intonational model, which is based upon the autonomous system hypothesis as outlined by Hale et al. (1977) and incorporated into the Tmodel by Chomsky & Lasnik (1977). Gussenhoven's theory of focus, which is related to Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) model in that it also constitutes a focus-to-accent approach, is discussed in chapter 3.3.2. Like Gussenhoven's focus theory, Selkirk's (1984) approach outlined in 3.3.3 is built on concepts of argument structure; however, its formulation as a bottom-up focus model, which she calls a pitch-accent-first account, differs radically from his approach. Rochemont's (1986) elaboration of Selkirk's focus model is discussed in chapter 3.3.4. In chapter 3.3.5, I discuss Selkirk's and Rochemont's concept of argument structure and show that a more precise definition of exactly how it feeds into focus structure is needed. This discussion sets the stage for the chapter 4, where it is proposed that the theory of focus and more specifically the concept of focus projection can be motivated by relating them to a more elaborate theory of thematic relations. Chapter 3.3.6 concentrates on Cinque's (1993) approach, which must be distinguished from the previous theories, since its central goal is not directed towards the construction of a modular intonational model, but towards the revival of the syntactic approach, as it was first introduced by Chomsky & Halle (1968). It is included into the discussion here to show that although stress patterns from different languages can be nicely predicted, many empirical problems remain.1

3.2.

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

The development of the concept of focus as a syntactic feature (see Jackendoff (1972)) has been the result of research conducted since Halliday (1967b) introduced the concept of focus of information as a proposal for the description of the information structure of English. The focus concept is understood as a hypothetical construct that has a phonological correlate (the sentence accent), a semantic-pragmatic correlate (the new information), and a syntactic correlate (a syntactic feature [+F]). In the short history of the development of a comprehensive theory of focus, each correlate has been chosen by different schools of thought as a conceptual starting point. The following section outlines each approach, commencing with the syntactic approach, which is rooted in the transformational-generative tradition and is represented by Chomsky & Halle (1968), Bresnan (1971), Lakoff (1972), Stockwell (1972), and Berman & Szamosi (1972). The proponents of this approach assume that there is a direct relation between the well-formed sentence and the

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

95

position of the sentence accent, also referred to as the nuclear accent. More precisely, these authors claim that the relationship between the syntactic structure and the occurrence of the nuclear accent can be predicted by a specific set of rules, the most notable of which is the nuclear stress rule (NSR), originally proposed by Chomsky & Halle (1968) in The Sound Pattern of English (SPE). Approximately the same approach is taken by Liberman & Prince (1977), who investigate the mapping process of syntax onto phonology, not from the syntactic point of view as the aforementioned authors, but from the phonological point of view. Viewed from the modular perspective, which I employ as an empirical hypothesis, Liberman & Prince's approach claims that the syntactic component as represented by labeled bracketed surface structures can be directly translated into intonational phonology. This syntactic approach is severely criticized by Bolinger (1972), who functions as the chief proponent of the semantic-pragmatic approach. Bolinger's central thesis is that "the distribution of sentence accent is not determined by syntactic structure but by semantic and emotional highlighting" (1972, p. 644). While Schmerling (1976) is associated with the same approach, her criticism is directed against both the syntactic approach and Bolinger's programmatic counterproposal. Schmerling denounces the NSR and the notion of normal intonation, which was taken for granted in linguistic research at that time. She shows that syntax-based stress rules like the NSR are subject to circularity since they function according to the aphorism "my rules account for normal stress, and 'normal stress' means the stress my rules predict" (p. 48); she proposes instead that accent placement results from the interaction of semantic, contextual, and rhythmic factors. The focus as new information approach was first introduced by Halliday (1967b). Although his work is still based on the terminology coined by the Prague School linguists such as Mathesius (1929) and Firbas (1966), he transcends terms like theme vs. rheme, and introduces instead the terms given vs. new information, which are still influential in the discussion of the interpretation of focus structures today. I group Chomsky (1972), and also Akmajian (1973), Williams (1980), and Höhle (1982) into this tradition since they conceive the concept of focus as a pragmatic concept in that they employ the term focus as a synonym for new information, and use the term presupposition for given information. Chomsky (1972), however, is also strongly influenced by the conceptual scheme of the SPE, since he does not perceive focus as an independent concept, but argues that focus is directly derived from the pitch accent distribution of the sentence. Although Jackendoff (1972) elaborates on Chomsky's focus-presupposition account, he departs from Chomsky's view that focus is a reflex of phonology and introduces the concept of focus as a syntactic feature. Various additional concepts of the function of the syntactic focus feature have since been offered (see Ladd (1980) and Rochemont (1978)), but it is agreed that the assignment of the focus feature in syntax forms a focus annotated structure, which is often referred to as focus structure (see Selkirk (1984)). With this view of focus structure as an

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

intermediate structure, it has become possible for the first time to conceive of focus as being essentially independent of both accent assignment and semantic interpretation. Moreover, focus structure can serve as input to the accent placement rules on the derivation of PF and to the semantic rules on the derivation of LF.

3.2.1.

The syntactic approach

3.2.1.1. Chomsky & Halle (1968) Within the transformational-generative tradition, Chomsky & Halle (1968) formulate the strong hypothesis in the Sound Pattern of English (SPE) that the intonational contour can be determined by the surface structure of an utterance. They state: It is well known that English has complex prosodic contours involving many levels of stress and pitch and intricate processes of vowel reduction. It is clear even from a superficial examination that these contours are determined in some manner by the surface structure of the utterance. (Chomsky & Halle (1968, p. 15)) It is assumed that the phonological component operates autonomously on the surface structure output of the syntactic component without taking the context of specific decisions of the speaker into consideration: Once the speaker has selected a sentence with a particular syntactic structure and certain lexical items (largely or completely unmarked for stress ...), the choice of stress contour is not a matter subject to further independent decision. That is, he need not make a choice among various "stress phonemes" or select one or another "superfix." With marginal exceptions, the choice of these is as completely determined as, for example, the degree of aspiration. Similarly, a hearer who has grasped the structure and morphemic constitution of an utterance from a rough sampling of the physical input need not attend to stress variation, to whatever extent that may actually be a physical property of the utterance. (Chomsky & Halle (1968, p. 25-26)) Chomsky & Halle propose two basic rules, the compound stress rule (CSR) and the NSR, which interpret the input to the phonological component. These two rules, which operate on transformational cycles, are formalized in (1):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory ofgrammar

97

(1) I

1 stress V

[l stress]

_...V... ]NAV I V..._... ]

(a) CSR (b) NSR

The result of the CSR is the placement of primary stress on the first stressed vowel of a compound (as in (2a)), and the result of the NSR is the placement of primary stress on the last stressed vowel of a phrase (as in (2b)). (2) a. b.

1 2 [NP blackboard] 2 1 [NP UP black] board]

In the derivation of normal accentuation of sentential constituents, a primary stress is assigned to each syllable of a lexical item within a sentence by a rule of lexical phonology called the main stress rule (MSR) in combination with other rules that provide the location of the most accentable syllable. These rules apply only to the lexical categories noun, adjective, and verb, and do not apply to certain grammatical categories, such as auxiliaries, prepositions, articles, etc. Moreover, in each transformational cycle a general convention applies that reduces all stresses within the domain of application by one, except the primary stress: "When primary stress is placed in a certain position, then all other stresses in the string under consideration at that point are automatically weakened by one" (Chomsky & Halle (1968, p. 16-17)). It follows that after all rules have applied, only one primary stress remains, the nuclear stress. As an example of the application of the MSR and the interaction between the CSR and the NSR, the stress contour of the sentence John's blackboard eraser was stolen is derived in (3): (3)

[[[John's] [[[black] [board]] [eraser]]] [was stolen]] 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 4 3 3 2 5 4 1

MSR CSR CSR NSR NSR

On the first level of derivation, the MSR assigns primary stress to the accentable syllable of each lexical element in (3) except was. Then the CSR is applied twice to the compound blackboard eraser, retaining the primary stress on black and reducing the other stresses within the compound in each application by one. The

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

NSR operates on this output, retaining the primary stress in its first application, and selecting stolen as the most prominent element in the final application. Although Chomsky & Halle (1968) assure the reader that "the principle of the transformational cycle is a very natural one" (p. 20), they are aware of the fact that the repeated application of the NSR to its own output causes considerable problems in more complex sentences. For example, the phrase sad plight may appear either with a [2 1] stress contour in isolation, with a [3 2] contour in the sentence his sad plight shocked us, or with a [3 1] contour in the sentence consider his sad plight. However, it appears with a [8 1] stress contour in a complex sentence such as my friend can Ί help being shocked at anyone who -would fail to consider his sad plight, although the actual stress relations between the adjective and the noun are the same as in a simple phrase. Noting these shortcomings, Chomsky & Halle warn the reader that "the rules discussed above give accurate results only for very simple constructions" (p. 23), adding that "the problem of extending this description to a wider class of cases may be nontrivial" (p. 24). Despite this obvious limitation, the approach offered by Chomsky & Halle presents strong assertions with respect to the relationship between syntax and phonology and in regard to the nature of the rules that apply. First, the model suggests that stress assignment can be predicted by syntactic surface structures. Second, the model restricts stress assignment to the lexical categories NP, VP, and AP for theory internal reasons. Third, the proposal is directed toward the explication of normal stress; contrastive stress and emphatic stress are largely neglected (SPE, p. 25). Fourth, the CSR and the NSR apply only to the linear order of the bracketed surface structures, disregarding their derivation. Each of the above assertions has either been adopted by proponents of the syntactic analysis and then been refined, or has been called into question because the proposed system is obviously faulty. Since the discussion here is concerned with the question of modularity and the violation thereof, I concentrate on those authors who explicitly mention the issue of the interaction of components.

3.2.1.2. Bresnan's (1971, 1972) revision of the nuclear stress rule Although Bresnan (1971, 1972) concurs with the fundamental theoretical premises of the generative transformation approach taken by Chomsky & Halle (1968), her analysis of exceptions to the NSR shows that its original formulation and its domain of application require revision. Bresnan notes a number of examples in which the primary stress does not fall on the rightmost lexical element in the sentence as predicted by the NSR. The first and less problematic group of examples given by Bresnan (1971, p. 258) involves anaphoric pronouns, as in (4), indefinite pronouns, as in (5), and resumed referential NPs, as in (6).

Focus structure in a principle-based

theory of grammar

99

(4)

a. b.

Helen teaches it. *Helen teaches it.

(5)

a. b.

The boys böught some, *The boys bought söme.

(6)

a.

John knows a woman who excels at karate, and he avöids the woman. *John knows a woman who excels at karate, and he avoids the wöman.

b.

Bresnan (1971) suggests that "by some means or other, anaphoric and indefinite elements are not assigned primary stress" (p. 258). The second and more problematic group of exceptional cases concerns syntactically ambiguous sentence pairs that exhibit different stress patterns. These were first observed by Newman (1946). (7)

a. b.

George has pläns to leave, George has plans to teave.

(8)

a. b.

Helen left dirictions for George to follow, Helen left directions for George to föllow.

Examples (7a) and (8a) represent infinitival relative clauses, whereas (7b) and (8b) represent examples of infinitival complements. Example (7a), with primary stress on plans, means that George has plans which he intends to leave, whereas (7b), with primary stress on leave, means that George is planning to leave. Similarly, (8a) has the meaning that Helen left directions which George is supposed to follow, whereas (8b) means that Helen left word that George shouldfollow her.2 Bresnan claims that examples (7) and (8), which are exceptions to the NSR, are nevertheless "predictable without any special modifications in that rule, given one assumption: THE NUCLEAR STRESS RULE IS ORDERED AFTER THE SYNTACTIC TRANSFORMATIONS ON EACH TRANSFORMATIONAL CYCLE" (Bresnan (1971, p. 259)). She proposes in this ordering hypothesis to maintain the NSR in its original form but to apply it after each syntactic transformation, and to further restrict the domain of application from all major syntactic categories to only NP and S. The accent patterns of (8a, b) are derived by different transformational cycles, as demonstrated in (9a, b) respectively:

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(9)

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

a.

[sHelen left [NPdirections [ s for George to follow directions]]] 1 1 1 1 1 1 MSR 2 2 1 NSR 0 syntax 2 2 1 3 3 NSR

b.

[sHelen left [^directions [ s for George to follow]]] 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 4 1

MSR NSR NSR NSR

Bresnan argues that the difference in stress assignment in sentences (9a, b) results from the fact that the examples differ with respect to their deep structures. The embedded sentence in (9a) has a direct object directions, to which the NSR assigns primary stress on the first transformational cycle and which is deleted (under identity) together with the stress assignment in the second cycle. In the third cycle, primary stress is then assigned to the rightmost lexical element in the matrix sentence, which constitutes the next domain of rule application. Example (9b), which represents the infinitival complement reading, has an identical deep and surface structure. Due to the lack of transformational operations, the NSR applies only to one cycle and assigns primary stress to the last element in S. Although not explicitly stated in her text, Bresnan's analysis of these examples challenges Chomsky and Halle's (1968) central assumption that the rules of the phonological component (CSR and NSR) operate on the surface structure output of the syntactic component. Her proposal that the NSR is sensitive to the deep structure of each element as well as to transformational operations, such as deletion and movement, thus weakens the original claim that surface structures are sufficient to predict stress assignment. Once Bresnan's (1971) proposal to revise the NSR was published, a variety of articles followed suit. Lakoff (1972), Berman & Szamosi (1972), Stockwell (1972), and Bresnan (1972) all attempt to preserve the essence of the NSR, while the list of exceptions to it grows. Lakoff (1972) notes that although Bresnan's revision of the NSR accounts for cases, in which a direct object occurs at the end of the clause, it cannot accommodate sentences with moved direct objects, such as those in (10a, b) (see Lakoff s examples (40) and (41)): (10)

a. b.

To what city was John träveling? From which airport did John depärt?

In these cases, Lakoff observes that the correct stress contour would be provided by the original NSR, which does not apply to different stages of the trans-

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

101

formation, but to surface structures; thus, he proposes the revision to the NSR given in (11), which includes both Bresnan's exceptions to it and those examples unexplained by her proposal: (11)

In constituent A, put 1-stress on constituent Β if a. Β is stressable; and either b. in logical structure Β is a direct object, and in shallow structure Β has no clausemates following it, and in surface structure Β is a clausemate of its logical predicate P; or c. there is no constituent to the right of Β bearing 1 -stress. (Lakoff (1972, p. 298))

LakofFs NSR combines the previous approaches in that his NSR both has access to the transformational cycles (defined in ( l i b ) ) and the surface structure (as in the original NSR, given in (11c)). In addition, he assumes that the rules ( l i b ) and (11c) may be disjunctively applied and thus will bring correct result. However, Stockwell (1972) offers counterexamples to Lakoffs NSR, as in (12): (12)

a. b.

I have instructions to leave with Mary, I have instrüctions to leave on the plane.

In these examples, the primary stress occurs on the direct objects despite the fact that they are not the rightmost elements at deep structure. Moreover, critical exceptions to both Bresnan's and LakofFs revisions of the NSR are provided by Berman & Szamosi (1972), who note that the stress patterns of examples in which the subject of the relative clause is deleted cannot be adequately predicted. (13)

a. b.

Let me tell you something that häppened. Let me tell you about something stränge that happened.

Aware of the diversity of the stress phenomena that speak against a rule such as the NSR, the authors refrain from proposing additional revisions. Nevertheless, with respect to surface structures, they generalize that "regardless of the 'derivational history' of a sentence, if it ends in an NP, this NP receives primary stress" (Berman & Szamosi (1972, p. 309)). That this generalization is easily violated is immediately clear from the examples provided by Stockwell (1972) in (12), and also from their own examples, such as those given in (14). (14) a. b.

The children didn't want to go to bed, so John scölded the göverness. John scolded the bästards.

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

Berman & Szamosi (1972) argue that different types of NPs must be distinguished. Anaphoric NPs in sentence-final positions, such as bastards in (14b), occur with reduced stress, whereas ordinary NPs, such as governess in (14a), are marked with primary stress. The authors observe that this does not generally hold, since both types of NPs occur with reduced stress if they appear in a sentence-initial position: (15) a. b.

The children didn't want to go to bed, so the göverness was scolded. the bästards were scölded.

Berman & Szamosi conclude their discussion of the previous accounts with the observation that "neither the surface level application nor the cyclical application of the NSR work" (1972, p. 311). It becomes obvious that they doubt that stress assignment can be treated by the NSR: "Can the NSR be made to work at all?" (p. 311); they also wonder whether the structural approach to stress assignment is correct: "Primary stress assignment (let alone entire stress contours) often depends on factors that only marginally, if at all, involve structure" (p. 312). The discussion of the counterexamples to the NSR so far invalidates Chomsky & Halle's claim to the generality of the NSR. Bresnan (1972) also does not sustain her claim that the NSR generally holds. She admits to Berman & Szamosi that "there may be semantic and surface structure generalizations about primary-stress placement" (p. 333). Nevertheless, she attempts to maintain the ordering hypothesis, and introduces an optional rule of topical stress assignment (p. 328), which applies before the NSR and assigns primary stress to the subject in subjectpredicate sentences, such as in (16):3 (16)

a. b. c. d. e.

The siin is shining. A proposal was made. A new böok has appeared. An umbrella was lost. Wörk must be done.

Bresnan assumes that since the rule of topical stress assignment is optional, the stress pattern can be reversed, as in (17a, b), and as in examples (18a, b), which were observed by Berman & Szamosi: (17)

a. b.

A proposal was made. A proposal was defeated.

(18)

a. b.

In 1556, what kings reigned? In 1556, what kings äbdicated?

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

103

Adding the rule of topical stress assignment to the repertoire of phonological rules seems to severely undermine the idea of the predictability of stress patterns, since this rule must have access to additional thematic or semantic information and cannot automatically apply to the syntactic surface structure. It must be concluded from the discussion thus far that the revisions proposed by Bresnan (1972) and Lakoff (1972) cannot be maintained, nor can Chomsky & Halle's original proposal that the pitch accent location can be predicted solely by syntactic surface structure be saved. Therefore, a further revision is discussed that follows the generative tradition in essence but distinguishes itself from Chomsky & Halle's approach in that it concentrates on the revision of the formalism that generates phonological structures; namely, the metrical theory by Liberman (1975) and Liberman & Prince (1977).

3.2.1.3. Liberman (1975) and Liberman & Prince (1977): a phonological account of the nuclear stress rule The metrical theory proposed by Liberman (1975) and Liberman & Prince (1977) is based upon a then new concept of the description of the generative processes in phonology, namely, nonlinear phonology. The basic difference between linear and nonlinear phonology is that while linear phonological description, as in SPE, is based upon a linear sequence of segments consisting of unordered bundles of binary features including suprasegmental information, nonlinear phonology proposes that certain phonological features, such as tonal and prominence features, must be represented on separate tiers to allow an independent analysis of these features on the basis of a larger unit, namely, the syllable as the relevant unit of pitch accent assignment. In Liberman & Prince (1977), two formalisms are introduced: the metrical tree and the metrical grid. The metrical tree is represented as a hierarchically organized binary branching syntactic tree in which each sister relation is labeled s for strong and w for weak. The features s/w do not encode the prominence relation in an absolute sense, but rather in a relative sense. Relative prominence is a purely local concept that expresses the fact that in each sister relation, one branch is stronger than its sister. Three simple examples are given in (19a-c). Examples (19a, b) are from Liberman & Prince (1977), and (19c) is from Hayes (1984, p. 35):

104

(19)

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

a. W I red

b S 1

cows

W S I I John left

W s w I I Belgian

S / \ s w I I fanners

In (19a), red is weak in relation to cows; in (19b), John is weak in relation to left·, and in (19c), Belgian is weak in relation to farmers. On the syllable level, both the first syllable of Belgian and the first syllable of farmers are strong in contrast to the second syllables. The system of s/w assignment is based upon the idea that constituent structure, and more precisely each syllable and not some intrinsic feature of phonological segments as in SPE, is relevant for prominence assignment. Above the syllable level, Liberman & Prince (1977) propose that the NSR and the CSR apply as defined in (20): (20)

In a configuration [ c AB c ] a. NSR: If C is a phrasal category, Β is strong. b. CSR: If C is a lexical category, Β is strong iff it branches. (Liberman & Prince (1977, p. 257))

The CSR is generalized and assumed to apply to words as well as to compounds, and is therefore called the lexical category prominence rule (LCPR), as given in (21). Win (21) stands for node: (21)

LCPR In the configuration [N, N2], N2 is strong iff it branches. (Liberman & Prince (1977, p. 270))

The LCPR predicts that every metrical unit in a relational tree has either the assignment in (22a) or the one in (22b): (22)

a.

N2 node does not branch Λ s w I I freedom

Focus structure in a principle-based theory ofgrammar b.

105

N, node branches

w s Λ Λ s w s w I I I I realization The same rule applies to compounds, as in (23): (23) s w l l lifeguard

s

w I I blackboard

The LCPR expresses the generalization that relative prominence is assigned to the penultimate syllable on the word level in English. In larger constituents, however, the strong assignment is to the last syllable in the phrase, as formalized by the NSR in (20a) above. The application of the NSR is given in (24): (24) R

s w

s w

Belgian farmers

w

s w

grow turnips

In each relational tree, there is an element that is exclusively dominated by snodes. This element is called the designated terminal element (DTE). This means that in example (24), the DTE is the first syllable in turnips, since it is stronger than any other syllable in the phrase. The second formalism that was also originally proposed by Liberman & Prince (1977) is the metrical grid. In their proposal, the metrical grid uses the metrical tree as input.4 The grid construction rules are given in (25): (25)

Grid Construction Rules'. a. As a place marker, assign every syllable a mark on the lowest level of the grid.

106

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development b.

Assign a mark at level two to the strongest syllable of every phonological word. c. Assign sufficient additional marks so that the strongest syllable of every constituent labeled S has a higher grid column than the strongest syllable of its weak sister. (Hayes (1984, p. 35), based on Liberman & Prince (1977, p. 315-316, 322)) If the grid construction rules are applied to example (24), as in (26), rule (25a) assigns an asterisk to each syllable. Rule (25b) assigns a second mark to each strong syllable. On the third level, the first syllable o f f a r m e r s and the first syllable of turnips are both assigned a third asterisk by rule (25c), which is also called the relative prominence projection rule. The first syllable of turnips receives a fourth mark by virtue of its being the DTE of the sentence. (26) * * *

*

* *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Belgian farmers grow turnips. The metrical grid allows a more adequate definition of the function of the English rhythm rule than the metrical tree. The rhythm rule is introduced to avoid the stress clash that occurs between two adjacent asterisks on the same level: Elements are metrically adjacent if they are on the same level and no other elements of that level intervene between them; adjacent elements are metrically alternating if, in the next lower level, the elements corresponding to them (if any) are not adjacent; adjacent elements are metrically clashing if their counterparts one level down are adjacent. (Liberman & Prince (1977, p. 317)) The rhythm rule alleviates the clash by shifting the highest asterisk of the first tower to the left, as shown in examples (27a, b): (27)

a.

* *

*

*

•

*

*

*

*

thirteen men

-»

* *

*

thirteen men

Focus structure in a principle-based theory ofgrammar *

b. * *

*

* • *

*

* • * *

107

* * * *

Mississippi legislature

* *

->

* *

* * * * * * * *

Mississippi legislature

The formalisms introduced by Liberman & Prince (1977) have a variety of advantages over the SPE framework. In a relational theory, the problem of embedded structures involving multiple degrees of stress which are not psychologically real is avoided since the concept of stress is based upon a binary distinction between s/w. In addition, since the stress feature in the metrical theory is not reliant upon segments but on syntactic constituent structure, the CSR and the NSR can apply to the output of the metrical representation, and can thus avoid the cyclic reapplication that was necessary in the linear model of the SPE. However, the problem of determining pitch accent locations in sentences remains, since Liberman & Prince's (1977) proposal, like the rules in SPE, operates on syntactic surface structures only, and employs a version of the NSR that is subject to the same criticism as the cyclically defined NSR in SPE.

3.2.2.

The semantic-pragmatic

approach

3.2.2.1. Bolinger (1972) Bolinger (1972) finds serious fault with the underlying assumption of the syntactic approach that the sentence accent is predictable from syntactic surface structure, and argues that the attempt to establish syntactic rules for prosody fails because "two domains are confused which should be kept apart" (p. 644). He proposes that there is no systematic relationship between syntactic structure and sentence accent. "Instead, accent should be viewed as independent, directly reflecting the speaker's intent and only indirectly the syntax" (p. 633). Syntactic structure is assumed to play only a mediating role. "Syntax is relevant indirectly in that some structures are more likely to be highlighted than others. But a description along these lines can only be in statistical terms" (p. 644). Bolinger provides a variety of counterexamples to the operation of the NSR as proposed by Bresnan (1971, 1972). He claims that the following examples show that the pitch accent distribution in infinitival relative clauses cannot be explained by Bresnan's rules, but instead varies dependent on the predictability of the verb. (28)

a.

I can't finish in an hour - there are simply too many töpics to eliicidate.

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

b.

I can't finish in an hour - there are simply too many töpics to cover.

The contrast in (28a) and (28b) is explained in the following terms: "When he (the speaker) says elucidate rather than cover, he has already made up his mind that the operation rather than the thing is the point of information focus; the choice of the semantically richer verb is part of the decision" (Bolinger 1972, p. 634). In this quote, the term point of information focus is used to combine the idea that it is the function of accented words to signal the point of information focus, where information focus is equated with a high degree of informativeness, and the speaker's interest in providing relevant information. Bolinger's concept of semantic weight is further clarified by his criticism of the syntactic investigation: The error of attributing to syntax what belongs to semantics comes from concentrating on the commonplace. In phrases like books to write, work to do, clothes to wear ... - as they occur in most contexts - the verb is highly predictable.... Less predictable verbs are less likely to be deaccented - where one has lessons to learn, one will probably have passages to memorize. It is only incidental that the syntax favors one or the other accent pattern. (Bolinger 1972, p. 634) Other examples that are problematic to the NSR are also explained by the semantic concept of information focus. It is generally assumed that in an adjective-noun combination, the noun receives the pitch accent. However, the opposite is the case in the examples in (29): (29)

a. b.

I don't see how you could make it to 0ur place in 45 minutes unless you went through every rid light, I like it because it has a silky sheen.

These examples show that in addition to informativeness, the speech situation also influences the pitch accent location. Bolinger stresses that accent patterns are dependent upon the utterance context, and argues that the sentence in (30), which is marked with the reverse accent pattern by Berman & Szamosi (1972), is normal if the sentence is uttered in a situation, in which the development of democracy is the issue. (30)

What kings abdicated?

In addition to semantic and discourse notions, Bolinger provides an explanation for the operation of the NSR in English that is neither syntactic nor semantic, but rather assertive, in that he assumes that the most relevant information comes last:

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

109

The NSR is an attempt to overlay word stresses, and describe in stress terms, what is really a performative realized in the intonation. The English intonation that means Ί declare' is the one that has its main accent or accents followed by a terminal fall, and it is gradiently assertive: the deeper the fall, the more accents there are; the closer to the end the last one comes and the sharper the contrasts are, the more assertive the intonation becomes. (Bolinger (1972, p. 643)) Bolinger argues that the operation of the NSR, which he interprets as the pressure to put the sentence accent as far to the right as possible for assertive reasons, sometimes interferes with the lexical stress pattern of the respective item, as seen in the following examples: (31)

a. b. c.

Students may resist their apparent arbiträriness. They will follow up their enthusiäsms. They center around the sacrament of baptism.

The examples in (31) demonstrate that "the speaker will put the main accent as far to the right as he dares when assertive pressure is high; and he frequently dares to put it on a syllable ... farther to the right than the recognized lexical stress" (Bolinger (1972, p. 644)). Bolinger's proposal is in clear opposition to the idea that pitch accent assignment is determined by syntactic structure, and he provides a variety of examples that show that the deterministic view employed by the syntactic approach fails. As the title of the article states, Accent

Is Predictable

(If You're

a

Mind-Reader).

However, Bolinger's proposal that the location of the sentence accent is governed by the relatively vague concept of semantic relevance ("what counts is RELATIVE semantic weight" (p. 635)) seems to carry the issue to the other extreme. It is on this point that Schmerling (1976) finds fault with Bolinger's account, as discussed in the following section.

3.2.2.2. Schmerling (1976) Schmerling concurs with Bolinger that pitch assignment is not grammatically predictable. She supports her position by pointing out several major shortcomings of the NSR as proposed by Chomsky & Halle (1968), three of which are reviewed here (see Schmerling (1976, p. 16fF.)). First, she observes that the NSR fails to account for the stress shift phenomenon, discussed here as the rhythm rule (see section 3.2.1.3). The NSR cannot explain why the stress pattern on adjectival phrases, which is typically [2 1] in isolation, as

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

in (32a) and (33a), differs if they appear as prenominal adjectives, as in (32b) and (33b): (32)

a.

2 1 context-sensitive

b.

2 3 1 context-sensitive rule

(33)

a.

2 1 brand new

b.

2 3 1 brand new car

A second problem for the NSR is subject-predicate constructions, since the NSR assigns the sentence accent to the last constituent in the sentence (the verb) and does not account for the sentences in (34), which typically exhibit primary stress on the subject. (34)

a. b. c.

I have to go home - my cöusin is coming. Watch out - there is a cär coming. Waiter, there is a fly in my soup.

In her discussion of the sentences in (34), Schmerling raises the question as to which contour is considered "normal," the [1 2] contour predicted by the NSR, or the [2 1] contour given in (34). As a preliminary solution, she suggests regarding the contour in (34) as normal "since it is the one involving a minimum of specific assumption" (p. 21). She later rejects the notion of normal stress, because every sentence is context dependent, and because "it is not obvious that adopting a notion like 'normal stress' is going to prove useful" (p. 56). Nevertheless, the concept of normal stress was prevalent in linguistic literature at the time, and is still influential today. A third problem with the NSR concerns adjective-noun sequences. Schmerling observes that the mechanical application of the NSR can only generate the [2 1] contour, as in sentences like (35a, b), but not the [3 1] contour, as in (36a, b):

(35)

(36)

a.

2 1 When I went to Europe I saw some unusual sights.

b.

2 1 The text is very good, but page 27 contains a lousy footnote.

a.

3 1 When I went to Europe I saw all the usual sights.

b.

3 1 The only mention he makes of my work is a lousy footnote.

Focus structure in a principle-based

theory of grammar

111

Schmerling argues that the difference in the stress patterns is due to a difference in the logical structures. Whereas (35a) describes sights that were unusual, (36a) does not make reference to sights that are usual. The same is true for (35b) and (36b): the adjective in (35b) can be paraphrased by a restrictive relative clause, which is not the case for (36b). An explanation along the same lines is offered for example (37), originally from Trager & Smith (1951).

(37)

3 1 2 1 Long Island is a long island.

Schmerling suggests that long island involves the interpretation of a reduced relative clause, which is always restrictive, whereas Long Island does not. The different intonational contours observed by Schmerling result from the fact that prenominal modification is ambiguous, as later observed by Sells (1985), Sproat & Shih (1987, 1991), and Hornstein (1988), among others. Prenominal adjectives with the contour given in (35a, b) can be paraphrased by a restrictive relative clause, while those with a contour as in (36a, b) are paraphrasable by a nonrestrictive relative clause. Thus, Schmerling's data show that rules of accent placement must have access to more information than is visible at surface structure. Therefore, Schmerling agrees with Bolinger that pitch assignment is not predictable from surface structure; however, she disagrees with his alternative proposal that the accent placement is sensitive to semantic predictability, since it does not account for straightforward subject-predicate structures, as in (38): (38)

a. b. c.

Hey - your cöat's on fire. I'm not going to be able to make it in today - the cär blew up. Your wife called. Your uncle Harry died, and the täx people want to see you.

Schmerling observes that the sentences in (38) carry the pitch accent on the subject despite the fact that the verb is not semantically predictable. In contrast, the sentences in (39) contain predictable predicates that are assigned the sentence stress nevertheless: (39)

a. b.

Come on in - the door is 0pen. Well, just make sure you don't get caught. Driving without a license is illögal.

A further argument for Schmerling's assumption that accent placement is contextually defined is provided by the sentence pair in (40):

112

(40)

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

a. b.

Truman died, Jöhnson died.

The sentence pair in (40), also known as Schmerling's puzzle, has received various interpretations. Schmerling quotes these examples as authentic, and explains their intonational contours in terms of their respective historic contexts. Since it was generally known at the time that President Truman was seriously ill, the contour of (40a) signals that Truman was treated as topic and the predicate died as comment, "that is, in uttering such a sentence, the speaker brings up some topic and says something about it - makes a comment" (p. 93). In contrast, Schmerling argues that "Johnson's health was not on people's minds as Truman's has been, and when his death came it was a surprise" (p. 42). Therefore, example (40b) exhibits a contour that is typical for news sentences. Schmerling explains the different intonational contours with two principles that are specifically designed to account for different sentence types. Principle II accounts for the stress assignment in news sentences, and principle IV accounts for topic-comment structures. (41)

Principle II: The verb receives lower stress than the subject and the direct object, if there is one; in other words, predicates receive lower stress than their arguments, irrespective of their linear position in surface structure. (Schmerling (1976, p. 82))

(42)

Principle IV: In a topic-comment utterance, stress both the topic and the comment. (Schmerling (1976, p. 93))

In order to achieve the correct accent pattern for (40a), in which the comment is assigned the nuclear accent, Schmerling employs principle III: (43)

Principle III: Given a sequence of stresses which are equal and greater than other stresses within the intonational unit, the last such stress will be more prominent than the others. (Schmerling (1976, p. 86))

Gussenhoven (1983) agrees with Schmerling's explanation of the different contours in (40a, b), but he criticizes her proposal to explain different sentence types by different principles. Instead of using various principles, he proposes that since Schmerling's principle II is of far greater generality than she realizes, it can be applied to utterances in general.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory ofgrammar

113

It can be concluded from the discussion in this section that neither the radically syntactic approach forwarded in the SPE nor the programmatically semanticpragmatic approach by Bolinger constitutes a reliable approach to determining the sentence accent. Schmerling, who challenges both extreme positions on notions such as normal vs. contrastive stress, contributes to the development of a more refined concept of accent placement; however, she does not recognize focus as an independent concept that mediates between syntax, semantics, and phonology. Ladd (1980) argues that the insights of the syntactic and the semantic-pragmatic approach can be integrated by "treating accent as a signal of focus, treating focus as a semantic notion involving no inherent normal-contrastive dichotomy, and assuming that focus can apply to any constituent and that accent falls on the rightmost accentable item of that constituent" (p. 80). To substantiate Ladd's claim, the discussion turns to the earlier approaches that correlate the concept of focus with new information.

3.2.3.

Focus as new information

3.2.3.1. Halliday (1967b) Halliday (1967b) develops the concept of information focus within a theoretical model that analyzes discourse in terms of information structure, which exists as a separate level of grammatical organization. "This 'informational structure' is then mapped onto the constituent structure as specified in terms of sentences, clauses and so forth, neither determining the other" (1967b, p. 200); thus, the information and constituent structures are understood as independent levels of discourse representation. The information structure of a text consists of a sequence of information units that do not coincide with syntactic constituent structure; the speaker is free to determine its boundaries and its internal organization. However, in the unmarked case, one intonation unit corresponds to a clause, which is phonologically realized as a tone group (called intonational group by Cruttenden (1986, p. 35), or intonational phrase by Pierrehumbert (1980), etc.). A given sentence such as John saw the play yesterday may be realized as one or more tone groups, as in (44a-c), or as part of an informational unit, as in (44d). The tone group boundaries are represented by //: (44)

a. b. c. d.

//John saw the play yesterday// //John//saw the play yesterday// //John//saw the play//yesterday// //John saw the play yesterday but said nothing about it//

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

Only example (44a) is considered unmarked, since the tone group boundaries coincide with the sentence. In Halliday's system, each information unit realized as a tone group bears at least one point of information focus. In the phonological structure, the information focus is realized by the assignment of the tonic (pitch accent) in the tone group. In the information structure, the information focus specifies the new information that is contributed to the discourse. What is focal is 'new' information; not in the sense that it cannot have been previously mentioned, although it is often the case that it has not been, but in the sense that the speaker presents it as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse. (Halliday (1967b, p. 204)) In terms of information structure, the concept of focus is defined as new information. Given information is then defined as "recoverable either anaphorically or situationally" (p. 211). Although Halliday is aware of the terminological problems involved in the contrastive pair given vs. new information, he conceives given and new information as functions of the information structure that vary according to the context. The relation between information focus and accent placement is given in the following focus rule: The tonic falls ... on the last accented syllable of the item under focus. (Halliday (1967b, p. 207)) The fact that information focus is not always strictly identified with the single element upon which the pitch accent is realized is expressed by the concept of focus domain. The domain of focus is thus not the tonic component as such but, in general, the highest rank constituent within which the syllable that is tonic is the last accented syllable. (Halliday (1967b, p. 207)) The information focus marks the elements within its focus domain with the discourse status new. The elements outside the focus domain are considered given. Halliday speaks of marked focus if the focus domain is confined to a single element, and of unmarked focus if the tonic falls on the last element in the focus domain, which may include the entire informational unit. The examples (45) through (48) illustrate the distinction between marked and unmarked focus: (45)

A: B:

Who painted the shed?/Did Mary paint the shed? iΊJohn painted the shed yesterday//

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

(46)

A: B:

(47)

A: B:

(48)

Al: A2: Β:

115

What did John do to the shed yesterday?/Did John mend the shed yesterday? //John painted the shed yesterday// When did John paint the shed?/Did John paint the shed this morning? //John painted the shed yesterday!1 What did John paint yesterday?/Did John paint the wall yesterday? What happened? //John painted the shed yesterday//

In examples (45) through (47), the pitch accent identifies the focus domain, and marks the italicized lexical item as the point of information, assigning it the function new and the rest of the information unit the function given. Halliday notes that in these examples "what is structurally new is informationally contrastive" (p. 208). John in (45), painted in (46), and yesterday in (47) constitute new information, whereas the remaining elements are assigned the status of given information. Only in example (48) may the pitch accent on shed signal either marked focus as an answer to questions Al or unmarked focus as an answer to question A2. A variety of issues come to mind when considering a system in which pitch accent assignment is located on the rightmost focus constituent and focus is understood in terms of new information (such as how to account for news sentences, how to formalize the given vs. new distinction, or how to explain instances of focused elements which cannot be interpreted as new information). However, Halliday's account of accent placement transcends both the syntactic and the semantic-pragmatic accounts because of the introduction of an independent level of information structure upon which the tonic identifies the focus domain.

3.2.3.2. Chomsky (1972) Chomsky's (1972) focus proposal is clearly influenced by Halliday's concept of information structure. Like Halliday, he assumes that focus is essentially a phonological phenomenon, and defines focus as "the phrase containing the intonation center" (p. 91). He claims that the accent signaling the focus constituent can be predicted by syntactic surface structure, similar to Chomsky & Halle (1968). Thus, as a corollary, focus is assumed to be a reflex of phonological

116

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical

development

processes that are themselves determined by syntactic surface structure phenomena. Chomsky concurs with Halliday in the assumption that the focus constituent represents new information; therefore, in (49b) the accent on garden signals a focus constituent that is interpreted as new information accordingly: (49)

a. b.

Does John write poetry in his study? No, John writes poetry in the gärden.

It is further argued that the part of the sentence that is not focused is presupposed. Chomsky defines the presupposition as that part of the sentence "determined by replacement of the focus by a variable" (p. 91). Thus, Chomsky's focuspresupposition account can be formalized as in (50): (50)

a. b.

Focus: The foci Fi„.F n in S are identified by accent location. Presupposition: Given a sentence S and its foci F,...Fn) replace each F, in S with a variable X,.

Although the definition in (50) gives the impression of complete specification of the concepts of focus and presupposition, the truth is that in Chomsky's proposal both concepts are not only dependent upon each other, but are also reliant upon other grammatical levels. Focus is dependent upon the level of phonology since it is signaled by accent placement, and what is presupposed has to be determined from the discourse. That is, the concept of presupposition must be defined pragmatically as has been convincingly argued by Schmerling (1976) and Rochemont (1986). Chomsky's focus-presupposition account raises major issues. His concept of focus relies upon the concept of normal intonation, which Halliday calls unmarked intonation. Although "the concept normal intonation is far from clear" (p. 89, footnote 21), Chomsky assumes that normal stress can signal multiple focus constituents, whereas contrastive stress, which involves "grammatical processes of a poorly understood sort" (p. 100), can only mark a single phrase as focus. Judging from Chomsky's outline, normal stress occurs in configurations as in (51): (51)

[,...a]p

If the rightmost element a receives the accent in the constituent β, the entire constituent may be focus. Contrastive stress, on the other hand, occurs in configurations as in (52): (52)

[,..δ....α]β

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

117

If δ receives the main accent in the configuration in (52), then only δ is identified as focus. Like Halliday before him, Chomsky provides examples showing that a sentence with normal intonation can serve as the answer to a variety of questionanswer sequences, as in (53), whereas sentences with contrastive stress can only constitute a well-formed answer to a single question, as in (54). a. b. c.

Al: A2: Β:

Does John write poetry in his study? Does John play with the VCR? No, John writes poetry in the gärden.

a. b. c.

Al: A2: Β:

Does John write poetry in his study? Does John play with the VCR? No, Räy writes poetry in his study.

The example in (53c) serves to answer the questions in (53a) and (53b), but the answer in (54c) serves only to answer the question in (54a). In any other context, for example in (54b), the answer in (54c) is inadequate. If we consider example (53c), the sentence accent is realized on the last syllable, which is marked as focus and interpreted as new information. According to the formalization in (50), the presupposition of this sentence is represented as in (55): (55)

a. b.

John writes poetry in the [gärden]. 3x (John writes poetry in the x)

However, this brings the incorrect results if sentence (53 c) is uttered in the context of (53b). In the context of (53b), not only garden but the entire VP constitutes the focus constituent and has to be replaced by the variable X, as in (56b). (56)

a. b.

John [writes poetry in the gärden], 3x (John does x)

Additional concerns arise with the focus-presupposition approach in cases where a constituent is not stressed but is still focused, as in (57), and conversely in cases where part of the presupposition is stressed but is not new information, as in (58): (57)

a. b. c.

I think John loves Mary after all. How do you know? I saw him kiss her.

In (57c), an accent is assigned to the verb kiss. According to principle (52), the pitch accent should be interpreted as contrastive stress; however, kiss does not express a contrast of any other action denoted in the context. Rather, it must be

118

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

argued that what is focus is the entire VP kiss her, where the pronoun her cannot be stressed by virtue of being present in the discourse. The problem for the focuspresupposition proposal in (57) is that since the accent is realized only on kiss, only the verb is represented as variable X, marking the rest as presupposition. This clearly provides incorrect results, since the entire VP is understood as a focused constituent. The second consideration that registers concern is given in (58): (58)

a. b.

What books by Grisham did Ray and Sandra decide on? Räy bought The Pelican Brief and Sändra The Firm.

Pitch accents are assigned to both Ray and Sandra, although they constitute presupposed material by virtue of having been mentioned in the previous sentence. Furthermore, both NPs The Pelican Brief and The Firm are assigned a pitch accent although they are indirectly presupposed by mentioning the author's name. The only constituent that is new is the verb buy, which, however, is not assigned an accent. In sum, focus is understood as a byproduct of accent placement by the NSR, and is interpretively identified with new information. The presupposition is not adequately defined as a pragmatic concept, and the impression is given that it can be computed by a simple arithmetical operation: the sentence minus the focus is the presupposition. It must be concluded from this discussion that the focuspresupposition approach advanced by Chomsky is seriously flawed since the respective concepts focus and presupposition are intertwined and are not considered as independently defined and independently operating notions.

3.2.4.

The focus structure approach

3.2.4.1. Jackendoff(1972) Jackendoff (1972) bases his analysis of focus on Chomsky's (1972) focuspresupposition account and elaborates upon it. Jackendoff characterizes focus and presupposition as working definitions in relationship to a discourse model involving speaker and hearer, much in the sense of Chafe (1970): We will use "focus of a sentence" to denote the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and the hearer, and "presupposition of a sentence" to denote the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer. (Jackendoff (1972, p. 230))

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

119

This definition of the notion of presupposition explains why sentence (60a) in the context of (59) is wellformed in contrast to (60b): (59) (60)

a. b.

Is it Jöhn who writes poetry? No, it is Bill who writes poetry. No, it is Jöhn who writes short stories.

While (59) and (60a) share the presupposition that someone writes poetry, the response of (60b) to (59) is felt to be inadequate due to the disparity in presuppositions. Jackendoff (1972, p. 245) proposes a formalism for the derivation of the semantic representation that consists of three steps: First, a one-place predicate Presupps (x) is formed by replacing the focus with an appropriate semantic variable x. In a sentence like (61), the functional structure would be (62) and the function Presupps (x) would beas given in (63): (61)

John LIKES Bill.

(62)

LIKE (John, Bill)

(63) [relation between John and Bill the \ [attitude of John and Bill The second step requires that the focus be a member of the presuppositional set. That means that if the focus variable is substituted for χ in Presupps (x), it must yield a true proposition. The presuppositional set is symbolized by λ χ Presupps (x).

The third step involves constructing the presupposition and assertion from the presuppositional set given in (64) (see Jackendoff (1972, p. 246)): (64) is a coherent s e t l . . . . is well defined the present discourse λχ Presupps (x) is amendable to discussion is under discussion The claim that the focus satisfies the presuppositional function is symbolized in (65):

120

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

(65)

Focus e λχ Presupps (x) (Jackendoff (1972, p. 246))

The presupposition of example (61) is given in (66), and the assertion is given in (67) (see Jackendoff (1972, p. 247)): (66) λ χ the

attitude of John toward Bill

(67)

In the proposed speaker-hearer model, (66) would be interpreted as we are talking about possible relations between John and Bill or attitudes of John toward Bill, and (67) would specify that like is one of the relevant relations. Although Jackendoffs proposal is more fully developed than Chomsky's and serves as a useful framework in his treatment of focus-sensitive particles like even, the presupposition proposal is subject to the same shortcomings noted in the last section; however, what distinguishes Jackendoffs work from Chomsky's and marks it as exceptional is the fact that Jackendoff does not assume that focus is directly correlated with accent, but rather treats focus as an independent syntactic feature. If a phrase Ρ is chosen as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in S will be on the syllable of Ρ that is assigned highest stress by the regular stress rules. (Jackendoff (1972, p. 237)) Jackendoff specifies the hypothetical construct focus as "a syntactic marker F which can be associated with any node in the surface structure" (p. 240). Focus is not understood as a reflex of phonology as in Chomsky's approach, but rather constitutes a concept that is relevant for phonology and for semantics. "Two systems of rules will make use of the marker F, one in the semantics and one in the phonology" (p. 240); thus, Jackendoff clearly separates the concept of focus from its phonological representation and its semantic interpretation. Since his interest lies in the explication of the semantics of focus, he proposes a rule of focus assignment that annotates the syntactic structure, and can therefore serve as input to semantic interpretation.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar (68)

121

Focus Assignment: In a sentence S, with otherwise determined semantic representation SR, the semantic material associated with surface structure nodes dominated by F is the Focus of S. Substitute an appropriate semantic variable χ for Focus in SR to form the function Presupp s (x). (Jackendoff (1972, p. 247»

It can be concluded that Jackendoffs proposal reverses the view that focus depends upon accent assignment postulated in Chomsky (1972). In his approach, the focus feature F is independently assigned and receives both a phonological and a semantic interpretation. Phonological rules assign the pitch accent to the constituent that carries the focus feature according to the NSR. Interpretive rules of the semantic component assign an interpretation to the focus marked constituent that yields the presuppositional set. Thus, by proposing a focus annotated surface structure, later referred to as focus structure, Jackendoffs proposal stands as the first approach that satisfies the requirements of a modular grammatical model, as discussed in more detail in chapter 3.3. The fact that Jackendoff assumes that focus structure is located in the realm of syntax is a necessary prerequisite for a modular description: only syntactic structures can be used as input to both the phonological and the logical structures.

3.2.4.2. Ladd (1980) Ladd (1980) agrees with Jackendoff in the assumption that the concept of focus is realized independently of accent placement, but disagrees with him with respect to the dominant role of the NSR that is preserved in Jackendoffs proposal. Ladd specifically argues against the commonly assumed dichotomy of normal and contrastive stress, and introduces the idea that they occur at different ends of a continuum. The notion of normal stress is used to specify the maximum number of possible focus constituents, including the entire sentence, while all other accent patterns convey narrow focus. Normal stress is simply the accent placement that permits the broadest possible focus interpretation - focus on the whole sentence. Other accent placements signal foci which are narrower than the whole sentence, but which ... may also have internal structure of their own and thus permit multiple focus interpretations as does normal stress. (Ladd (1980, p. 78))

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Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

Although Ladd wants to preserve the idea of normal stress to signal broad focus and nonnormal stress to signal narrow focus, he proposes a more liberal concept of focus by not attributing any significance to the different focus readings. There is no essential difference between normal stress and any accent placement that signals narrow focus; broad and narrow are simply points on a spectrum. (Ladd (1980, p. 77)) Ladd's view that the focus constituent in a sentence is independently marked and subsequently identified by the pitch accent is expressed in a preliminary focus rule that states "that accent -in general- goes on the rightmost accentable item of the focus constituent" (p. 77). With the introduction of the notions broad and narrow foci as points on a continuum and the idea that the pitch accent is realized on the respective focus constituent, Ladd can explain how the focus-sensitive particle even can mark different constituents as focus. (69)

Even a nineteenth-century professor of classics wouldn't have allowed himself to be so pedantic.

If the example (69) is uttered in a context in which a person shows pedantic behavior but is neither a professor nor has anything to do with classics, the focus of the sentence is the entire NP a nineteenth-century professor of classics. If, however, the sentence is about nineteenth-century pedantry, the focus of the sentence is only professor of classics. In a context, then, in which it is assumed that pedantry is found with nineteenth-century professors, the focus of the sentence above would signal narrow focus on classics only. It is evident from this example that the particle even, which operates on a scale, can seek out different foci within a focus constituent. The central issue of Ladd's proposal, which is directed toward the elimination of the direct relationship between the nuclear accent and the focus constituent, is captured by the notion of the so-called default accent (see also Fuchs (1984)). Ladd observes that there are sentences in which the pitch accent does not go to the rightmost accentable item in the focus constituent and still does not signal narrow focus. See (70) and (71): (70)

(71)

A: B:

Has John read Slaughterhouse-Five? John doesn't read books. A bill was sent to Congress today by President Carter which would require peanut butter sandwiches to be served at all government functions. At a press conference today, a group of

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

123

Senators led by Republican Barry Goldwater of Arizona denöunced the measure. Goldwater said.... Ladd claims that the accents on read in (70) and on denounce in (71) are not contrastive, but are assigned by default. In both cases, the focus is broad, but in (70) the concept of book and in (71) the concept of measure are given in the context and are therefore deaccented.5 The fact that the concept of default accent is not an exception but is a consequence of deaccenting those items that are known to the speaker and the hearer leads Ladd to revise the focus rule as in (72): (72)

Focus Rule: Accent goes to the most accentable syllable of the focus constituent. (Ladd (1980, p. 85))

Rule (72) shows that Ladd has eliminated the requirement of the NSR that the rightmost lexical item should be stressed. In Ladd's revised focus rule, the location of the pitch accent is not required to fall on the right periphery. It must be concluded that although Ladd shows that there is no direct relationship between focus and nuclear accent, he fails to develop a grammatical model in which focus assignment and the exact principles of accentuation in relation to the range of focus would find a natural explanation. Proposals to that end will be discussed in the next section.

3.2.5.

Conclusion

This section has presented a detailed discussion of the early approaches to accent assignment and the development of the concept of focus as a syntactic feature. If the four approaches discussed in this section are judged against a modular grammatical model, such as the T-model introduced by Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) in (73), it becomes obvious that none of them except for the focus structure approach is consistent with it. (73) D-Structure

S-Structure Phonological Form (PF)

Logical Form (LF)

124

Focus as a syntactic feature: a historical development

The main goals of this model, which has been seen refined by Chomsky (1981, 1986b), are the reduction of the transformational component to an absolute minimum and the achievement of the autonomy of syntax. In this model, each level of representation adheres to the principles of modularity and autonomy; furthermore, S-structures are mapped onto PF and LF, which appear on branches that are orthogonal to one another. It follows that the level of PF is not directly accessible to rules of the LF component and vice versa. The syntactic approach based in the transformational-generative tradition, which assumes that syntactic structures can be directly translated into intonational phonology, violates the thesis of autonomy. Gussenhoven calls attention to this point by providing an analogy to this syntax-based approach: "It is rather as if phonologists were to try and predict the lexico-syntactic content of a sentence on the basis of a given intonation contour" (1983, p. 378). The semantic-pragmatic approach, which claims that semantic highlighting, significance, and informativeness are relevant for the phonological realization of the sentence, falls into the same trap since it assumes that semantic and contextual factors are directly reflected in phonology; however, the model of grammar outlined in (73) shows that semantic-pragmatic concepts are not even provided for. The third approach (represented by Halliday (1967b) and Chomsky (1972)) is based upon the idea that the focus of the sentence is identified as the constituent that is assigned the pitch accent, and is interpretively equated with new information. Again, this approach is inconsistent with the model of grammar presented in (73) since the identification and interpretation of focus follow directly from accent assignment. According to the model in (73), the interpretive rules of the LF component do not have direct access to the PF component. The only approach compatible with (73) is the focus structure approach first proposed by Jackendoff (1972), in which focus is understood as a syntactic feature that is assigned at S-structure. The focus-annotated S-structure can then be mapped both onto the level of PF and onto the level of LF. Since only the focus structure approach coincides with the modular concept of grammar, the present study will use the insights of this approach and concentrate on the methods of how exactly a modular intonational model has to be constructed.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

3.3.

125

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

The discussion of the early approaches to accent placement and focus in the last section has shown that only the focus structure approach introduced by Jackendoff (1972) is consistent with a modular theory of grammar. In this section, more recent proposals of the theory of focus are discussed and related to each other. Although all of these proposals analyze focus as a syntactic feature, they differ in at least two respects: first, with respect to the specific grammatical model upon which they base the intonational model; and second, in regard to the mechanisms that they hold responsible for the determination of the range of focus in a hierarchically represented sentence structure. In discussing the former point, I will concentrate on the issues that arise with respect to intonation and meaning if the levels of PF and LF that take focusannotated structures as input are conceived of as encapsulated modules under the autonomy hypothesis. In discussing the latter point, I identify two different focus models. In the so-called top-down focus model (focus-to-accent approach), the syntactic focus feature is assigned to the highest possible node and is then assumed to trickle down and find an adequate focus exponent upon which the pitch accent is realized (see Culicover & Rochemont (1983), Gussenhoven (1983), von Stechow & Uhmann (1984), Jacobs (1991b), Rosengren (1993)). In the bottom-up focus model (focus projection approach), the focus feature is assigned to the element that carries a pitch accent and is then projected in the syntactic tree to mark the range of focus (see Selkirk (1984), Rochemont (1986), Drubig (1990), and Hetland (1992). 6 Although the rules applied by either model should eventually render the same results, the reversability of the two frameworks has not yet been reached. This is essentially due to two factors: most top-down focus models are based upon the NSR and are subject to the limitations of that rule. The bottom-up focus models, on the other hand, crucially rely on the concepts of argument structure, which need to be further refined. I will argue for the focus projection approach since it is the methodologically and theoretically more promising approach, provided that the rather vague concepts of argument structure are made more precise by reference to an independently motivated theory.

3.3.1.

Culicover & Rochemont (1983): a modular NSR-based account

Culicover & Rochemont (1983) propose a theory of stress and focus that explicitly adheres to the principles of the autonomous systems view proposed in Hale et al. (1977). "According to this view, language consists of a number of distinct systems, each possessing inherent principles of organization that are essentially independent of factors relating to any other linguistic system or to extralinguistic considerations" (Hale et al. (1977, p. 379)). The principle of autonomy has been

126

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

one of the strongest research paradigms in the development of a principle and parameter-driven grammatical system, such as that suggested by Chomsky (1981, 1986a, b, 1992). Also known as the principle of modularity in the cognitive sciences, Fodor (1983) defines it in terms of four major criteria: (1) modular input systems, including the language input system and its submodules, are domain specific, that is, they operate only on certain types of signals; (2) modular systems apply mandatorily to the signals to which they are sensitive; (3) modular systems are informationally encapsulated if their access is limited to the information represented within them; and (4) modular systems operate with high speed. If grammar is conceived of as being constructed from modular systems, then what is meant most often is that each of the grammatical components, i.e., Dstructure, S-structure, the level of PF, and the level of LF, are independent domains constrained by specific sets of principles, such as X-bar theory, theta theory, case theory, binding theory, government theory, etc. Each of these subsystems operates on domain-specific representations of grammatical information. The transfer of information from one component to another is restricted by specific mapping relations. Applied to the system of grammar, Fodor's first criterion of domain specificity suggests, for example, that pitch accents are assigned at the level of PF and not at any other level, whereas the scope of operators is computed at LF and not elsewhere. The criterion of mandatoriness describes, for example, the condition that the principles operating on PF do not have the freedom to assign or not to assign a pitch accent to a sentence, just as the interpretative principles on LF must assign scope to operators. The criterion of informational encapsulation is, according to Garfield (1988), "one of the most intriguing properties ascribed to modules by the modularity hypothesis," but he adds that "it is one of the most difficult of the central properties to detect experimentally" (p. 4). With respect to the model of grammar, this criterion refers, for example, to the empirical hypothesis that the interpretative principles operating at LF have access only to input from the S-structure and not to the input from PF. Although the hypothesis that LF and PF are orthogonal to each other is widely assumed, the discussion of its implications for the analysis of intonation and meaning is very often neglected (see, however, van Riemsdjik & Williams (1986), Hornstein (1988) and Drubig (1991)). The last criterion of modules is speed, which is a relative criterion. Due to the application of the other three criteria, it is assumed that the operations within grammar must be quick and effortless. For example, the perceptual language module that translates sound into strings of words is faster than nonmodular central cognitive processes (such as reasoning, computing, etc.); however, the question of what exactly happens in individual modules of grammar to make them operate so fast is largely unexplained. An explicit proposal is provided by Culicover & Rochemont (1983), who spell out the consequences of the internal autonomy hypothesis for a modular intonational model.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

127

Culicover & Rochemont (1983) propose that their theory of the relationship between stress7 and intonation can be accommodated in the T-model proposed by Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) with some refinements. Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) theory of stress and focus is incorporated in the following model: (74) Base Movement Transformations

S-Structure

Phonetic Representation (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 124)) Culicover & Rochemont follow Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and assume that the rules of the base generate base-structures, which are converted to S-structures by

128

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

movement transformations generally identified as move a. These S-structures provide the input for the interpretative rules on the right branch, which eventually yield semantic interpretations of the sentences at LF. Independently, S-structures are mapped onto phonetic representations on the left branch; thus, the level of Sstructure constitutes an interface between two independently operating rule systems, both of which take S-structures as input. In accordance with the autonomy hypothesis, the distribution of strong and weak stress is specified in the phonological domain, whereas the identification of focus occurs in the interpretative domain. Concomitantly, only the level of S-structure can relate accent location and focus interpretation to each other. The central concept is that a rule called strong assignment (SA), which applies as the last rule in the derivation of S-structures, assigns primary stress freely and optionally. (75)

Strong Assignment: Any node X -> X:s. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 134))

Rule (75) specifies that any node that is assigned an s defines a focus constituent. To differentiate among the modules, the s-annotated S-structures form the input for the phonological component, whereas focus assignment and the explicit identification of focus occur on the level of F-structure, which is located on the derivation of LF. The interpretation of focus is argued to be a pragmatic phenomenon and belongs in the realm of discourse grammar. In the derivation of the prosodic structures (P-structures), Culicover & Rochemont (1983) distinguish S-structures from surface structures, which result from the application of deletion transformations, filters, and stylistic rules on Sstructure; nevertheless, the ^-feature is preserved in the derivation and surface structures are transformed by accent placement rules into P-structures, which take the form of metrical trees as proposed in the relational theory by Liberman & Prince (1977). Since surface structures and P-structures are not isomorphic, Culicover & Rochemont introduce the following rules for the mapping relation between surface structures and metrical trees: (76)

The Head Rule·. a. The head of a phrase combines \yith the highest right adjacent ccommanded non-recursive node. b. A specifier combines with its head.

(77)

The Sister Rule: If α and β are sisters and neither is the output of the Head Rule, combine α with β.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

129

Rule (76) specifies that the head of a phrase α combines with the highest adjacent c-commanded node β which is not recursive, where the notion of combine is understood as Chomsky-adjoining α to β to form a nonlabeled binary branching node. The application of the head rule to the surface structure in (78a) is given in (78b): (78)

a.

[S[NP Hanna] [vp[v saw] [NP a [N:s hedgehog]] [PP in the garden]]]

The head rule first combines the specifier a to the head noun hedgehog. Then the verb saw combines with a hedgehog, which is the highest right adjacent ccommanded constituent in the ternary branching VP structure. The sister rule applies to multibranching nodes that are not subject to the head rule. It transforms, for example, the ternary branching coordinate structure in (79a) into a binary branching structure, as in (79b): (79)

a. b.

U U a c a t ] [conj and] [NP a dog]] MNP a cat] [x[Conj and] [NP a dog]]]

In a structure such as (78a), the rule of SA has already assigned primary stress to the noun hedgehog (N:s), which must be translated as s in the corresponding prosodic tree as seen in (78b). Furthermore, to assure that an element carrying s

130

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

will receive primary stress, a rule is introduced called strong propagation, which is given in (80): (80)

Strong Propagation·. If a node N( dominates a node Nj:s, then Nj is N^s.

The rule in (80) specifies that any node dominating a strong node is itself strong. This rule applies after the head rule and the sister rule and derives the structure in (81) from the tree in (78b): (81)

[S:s [NP Hanna] [γρ., [X:s [ v saw] [X:s a [N.„ hedgehog]]] [PP in the garden]]]

Note that SA is free to assign s to any node. If s is assigned to a lexical element as in (81), the strong propagation rule applies from bottom to top and marks all nodes dominating the Ν with s. The values of the other nodes are then determined by the following set of rules: (82)

Weak Default An unspecified sister of s is w.

(83)

Neutral Accent Placement: [ α (ß) Υ] [ a (ß) s]> where β, γ are unspecified.

(84)

If α is the root of the tree, α is R.

The rule (82) states that by default, the sister of a strong node is weak. This rule labels each sister of the s projection line with w. The labeling of the nodes in the PP follows the rule of neutral accent placement (NAP), which equals the NSR as stated in rule (20a) by Liberman & Prince. NAP incorporates the idea that accent in English goes to the right if not otherwise specified, and assigns s to garden in (81), w to the determiner the, and w to the preposition in. It follows that in cases in which SA does not assign s to a lexical category but to a phrasal category or in cases where SA does not apply at all (see discussion of WH-sentences), the labeling of the unspecified nodes is determined by the NAP as specified in (83). The rules (82) through (84) apply to the output of strong propagation and yield a metrical P-structure, as in (85), after the application of the pruning convention, which deletes any remaining nonbranching and nonterminal nodes:

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

131

(85) P-structure: R

w

Hanna

saw

hedgehog

in

the

garden

Culicover & Rochemont propose that the stress levels can be computed from metrical trees according to the following rule: (86)

If a terminal node t is labeled w, its stress number is equal to the number of nodes dominating t to the nearest P-cyclic node, plus one. If a terminal node t is labeled s, its stress number is equal to the number of nodes that dominate the lowest w dominating t to the nearest P-cyclic node, plus one. In the domain defined by R, if a 1-stress is dominated by w, add one. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 137))

A P-cyclic node is defined as follows: (87)

A P-cyclic node is a. Any node in a P-structure that translates a syntactic S; or b. Any node in a P-structure that (i) is not dominated (i.e., it is R); or (ii) immediately dominates two branching nodes. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 138))

In the structure (85), the root R and the former VP node are cyclic nodes. If the stress level rule (86) is applied to this structure, it provides the following stress levels:

132

(88)

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

2 3 4 1 3 4 2 Hanna saw a hedgehog in the garden.

According to the grammatical model in (74), the identification of focus occurs on the derivation of LF, or more precisely at the level of F-structure. The mapping relation between S-structure and F-structure is formalized by the rule of focus assignment (FA) given in (89): (89)

Focus Assignment: Let X be an arbitrary node, and let α be the highest node in the tree. If X is s, then FA (a) is the result of appending X to α and replacing X with a dummy whose index is i(X) and whose syntactic type is type (X), i.e. [ α X; [a-ti·..]]· (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 150))

The rule of FA, which functions like a regular raising mechanism, operates on an S-structure to which SA has already been applied. The derived F-structure for a simple sentence in which s is assigned to the last noun, as in (90a), is given in (90b): (90)

a. b.

Louise bought a used [ s car], car; [Louise bought a used NJ

However, s could possibly be assigned to each constituent in (90), yielding a set of different F-structures, as in (91): (91)

a. b. c.

[a used car]; [Louise bought NPJ [bought a used car]; [Louise VPJ [Louise bought a used car]; [IP;]

In all of these examples, the element carrying the primary stress (the DTE) is determined by the rule of NAP as given in (83); therefore, potential focus ambiguities (i.e., that a focus exponent signals either narrow or broad focus) can only arise in cases in which the SA assigns s to a nonterminal right-branching node, as in (92a), and not if s is assigned to a left-branching node, as in (93a). The sentence in (92a) yields at least two F-structures, as in (92b, c), whereas (93 a) gives rise to only one F-structure, as in (93b). (92)

a. b. c.

Ray drank a glass of b6er. beer; [Ray drank a glass of NJ [a glass of beer]; [Ray drank NP;]

Focus structure in a principle-based

(93)

a. b.

theory of grammar

133

Ray drank a gläss of beer. glass; [Ray drank a N; of beer]

As an immediate empirical consequence of the claim that accent placement and the identification of focus are conceptually distinct, Culicover & Rochemont point to WH-sentences, such as in (94), in which the constituent in focus, according to their view the WH-phrase, does not carry primary stress. (94)

Whät did you buy?

Culicover & Rochemont (1983) observe that this sentence can occur in either context given in (95): (95)

a. b.

I finally went out and bought something today. Bill took me downtown to all the big department stores.

The authors note that regardless of whether the verb buy can function as focus, as in the context of (95b), or cannot function as focus, as in the context of (95a), it is assigned primary stress. The WH-phrase what only receives secondary stress. It is claimed, that, however, the WH-phrase always functions as focus, regardless of the level of stress assignment. Culicover & Rochemont suggest that the accent pattern of (94) is a natural consequence of their analysis, since (94) is easily accommodated under the assumption that the optional rule SA did not apply, and the accent assignment is then subject to the NAP, which assigns primary stress to the rightmost category in (94). It is further assumed that the WH-phrase leaves a trace in the D-structure position of the moved WH-phrase, which is assigned the feature s, thus yielding the P-structure for (94) given in (96):8 (96) R

what

did

you

buy

t

134

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

To avoid the undesirable consequence that a phonologically empty element is assigned primary stress, the authors introduce a rule that switches the labels of two sister nodes if the element that is assigned primary stress is empty, so that buy in (96) is strong and t is weak. The switch rule is given in (97): (97)

Switch Rule: (Alternative) [si w ts e]J [si s tw eJ]> where [s e] is a designated terminal element. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 143))

The focus specific treatment of WH-sentences such as those in (98) and (99) raises many questions. In each of the sentences in (98), the accent falls on the penultimate word, whereas the accent in (99) falls on the final word. If we follow the authors' claim that in WH-sentences the WH-word always functions as focus while the pitch accent is independently assigned by the NAP, then only the sentences in (99), in which the pitch accent falls on the final element, should be appropriate. a. b. c. d. e.

Whö is Bill steeping with? What kind of creature do you think we're up against? Which seat was she sitting in? Whät will you tälk about? Whät are you löoking at?

a. b. c. d. e.

Whö is Bill sleeping with? What kind of creature do you think we're up agäinst? Which s£at was she sitting in? Whät will you talk aböut? Whät are you looking ät?

Although it is claimed at the outset that no SA assignment is necessary in WHsentences, the authors amend their hypothesis since they recognize that the sentences in (98) are used in different contexts than those in (99). The sentences in (99) can only be used if the verb is provided by the context. As a consequence, Culicover & Rochemont propose that in (98), the feature s falls on the verb marking the verb as focus, while the contour in the examples in (99) follows from the assumption that s is assigned to the WH-trace and is then moved to the preposition by the switch rule in (97). Note that the derivation of WH-questions which extract the subject of the sentence constitutes an additional problem for Culicover & Rochemont's analysis. Examples like those in (100) are used by the authors to claim that the accent assignment in WH-questions follows from the NAP:

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

(100)

a. b.

135

Whö was talking to Bill? Whö decided to leave darly?

This analysis is not compatible with the proposal that the ί-feature is assigned to the WH-trace and subsequently triggers the switch rule, because the trace of the subject WH-element occurs as its sister in a sentence-initial position in P-structure, as in (101): (101) R

It is obvious that the assignment of s to the WH-trace cannot account for the accent placement on the NP Bill in the sentence-final position. I will propose in chapter (4.3) that there is no evidence that WH-phrases are inherently focus assigned. Rather, WH-questions are sensitive to contextual factors in exactly the same way as their declarative counterparts. Although Culicover & Rochemont observe that the interpretation of focus in WH-questions is contextdependent, they do not apply this concept because it stands in direct opposition to the assumption that WH-words function as focus in WH-questions. The autonomous system approach taken by Culicover & Rochemont is characterized by the strict separation of stress assignment and focus assignment, on the one hand, and focus assignment and focus interpretation, on the other: In our approach, then, focus is a formal property of sentences: its characterization is independent of either its particular interpretation in some context, or the conditions under which it may have a specific interpretation. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 151))

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The modularity of intonational models and the theory offocus

As a consequence, the interpretation of focus is subject to rules of discourse grammar that operate on F-structures. Culicover & Rochemont distinguish three types of focus: contrastive, informational, and presentational. These are formally defined in (102), (103), and (104), where Foc(F(t)) describes an F-structure in which Foe is the focus constituent, t and Foe are coindexed, and F(t) is an Sstructure with t replacing the focus constituent. (102)

Generalized Contrastive Focus·. In FoC[(F(t)), the element Foe, is a generalized contrastive focus iff F(t/Foc2)(Foc2 Foe,) is c-construable. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 153))

(103)

Informational Focus: In Foc!(F(t)), the element Foe! is an informational focus iff S believes that Η wants S to specify Foc2 such that F(t/Foc2). (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 155))

(104)

Generalized Presentational Focus'. In Foe (F,(t)), the element Foe is a generalized presentational focus iff it is not the case that F2(t/Foc) is c-construable for all F2. (Culicover & Rochemont (1983, p. 157))

The definition provided for contrastive stress states that at F-structure, Foe, specifies a contrastive focus if the S-structure in which Foc2 replaces t is cconstruable, where c-construability is defined as being inferable from the discourse. In the context of example (105), any constituent in italics in (106a) through (106g) can be contrastively focused: Louise bought a used car. a. b. c. d. e. f. g·

Louise bought a used bicycle. Louise bought a new car. Louise sold a used car. Mary bought a used car. Louise bought a house. Louise went on vacdtion. Mary leftfor Europe.

(N) (AP) (V) (NP) (NP) (VP) (S)

The notion of informational focus is used to define the foci in question-answer contexts. Culicover & Rochemont observe that the concept of informational focus can be subsumed under the definition of generalized contrastive focus, since in

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

137

both cases the utterance provides a focus Foe, (F(t)), where the S-structure F (t/FocJ is c-construable for the specifiable Foc2. The concept of presentational focus applies to sentences as in (107), where a new element is introduced in the discourse. Note that the new element is not restricted to NPs. (107)

a. b. c.

Α stränger appeared. I met your ex-husband today. (Bertha met Murphy in the hallway.) He insulted her.

(NP) (NP) (VP)

The sentences in (107a) through (107c) each contain a presentational focus since in each case the focus constituent is not c-construable at S-structure. Culicover & Rochemont's proposal spells out the autonomy hypothesis as it may apply to stress and focus in English. Although they confine their discussion explicitly to stress-related focus (free focus) and are not concerned with issues of constructional focus (see Rochemont (1978), Rochemont & Culicover (1992)) or bound focus (cf. Jacobs (1984), Rooth (1985)), they argue on the basis of WHsentences that the concepts of stress and focus must be separated since sentence stress is not a sufficient condition for the identification or the interpretation of focus in all cases. According to the autonomous system hypothesis, they propose that stress is the relevant signal for the derivation of PF, whereas focus is the relevant signal for LF. The discussion of the mapping procedure from surface structures to P-structures shows how a simple set of rules can account for the distribution of stress in a variety of sentences. Following the principle of strict autonomy of the different components, the authors argue that P-structures are only sensitive to the phonological equivalent of focus assignment, namely the i-feature assigned by SA, and not to a pragmatically defined notion of focus; however, despite the incorporation of SA into the rule system, their proposal of accent placement is crucially based upon the operation of the NSR, since the basic labeling process follows from it. In this sense, the SA is actually only superimposed on the NSR, which is obvious in light of the fact that it is considered an optional rule that may or may not apply, as in WH-sentences. Moreover, in cases in which SA assigns s to a phrasal constituent (nonterminal branching node) or possibly to the R node, the s/w assignment is completely determined by the NAP. As the discussion above has shown, the NAP has a variety of serious shortcomings that reassert themselves in the system proposed here. Let us assume, for example, that in example (108a) SA assigns an s-feature to the entire sentence, yielding the metrical representation in (108b). Note that the same P-structure is derived if the optional SA rule does not apply.

138

(108)

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

a. b.

The roof fell in. R

w

s

w

s

the 3

roof 2

fell 3

in 1

If the entire sentential constituent (R) is assigned s by SA, the NAP assigns j to each rightmost branch yielding a P-structure in which the designated terminal element is identified as the preposition irr, thus, if the sentence is uttered out of context, the stress assignment mechanism, which operates from top to bottom, does not provide intuitively adequate results. I assume that Culicover & Rochemont's system would attempt to remedy this unwanted result by proposing that SA assign s to the noun roof, yielding a P-structure as in (109), with the prominence relations assigned below: (109) R

w

s

the 2

roof 1

w

s

fell

in 2

3

There is no doubt that the joint operation of SA together with the rule of NAP can achieve adequate metrical trees, and this is true for English and for German; however, the system fails since the process of mapping SA assigned S-structures to F-structure will identify the wrong constituents as the focus, as in (109); the corresponding F-structure to (109) is given in (110). (110)

[roof]; [The Nj fell in]

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

139

It follows that a metrical structure, as in (109), where an element on a left branch is assigned the s-feature, derives a focus structure that marks only one element unambiguously as focus. The NAP raises a further concern in sentences that are treated as default foci by Ladd (1980), as shown in (111): (111)

A: B:

What did Hanna do to the hedgehog? She bit it.

Ladd argues that the accent in such cases is realized on the verb by default. Nevertheless, the entire VP is considered focus since what is presentationally focused in this sentence is the biting event, where the dog acts as agent and the hedgehog as patient. This fact could not be expressed by the mapping processes provided by Culicover & Rochemont. To state it more clearly, if SA is assigned to a lexical constituent, such as the verb bite, only this constituent is identified as focus on F-structure. Focus in this case is local. If SA is assigned to a phrasal constituent, e.g., the VP, then the realization of the primary stress is determined by the NAP and primary stress is assigned to the rightmost constituent it in (111), which does not yield appropriate results. Although the intonational model proposed by Culicover & Rochemont appears to be rather sophisticated, a basic dilemma is found in their account that is still present in some focus theories today. This dilemma can be described as a typical interface problem in a modular system. The phonological rules and the focus identification rules in the derivation of LF are designed to operate on exactly one feature specified on S-structure, namely the feature s, which is optionally assigned to the constituent that functions as focus. Wherever this feature is assigned, it triggers exactly one P-structure with one designated terminal element, but it may permit more than one F-structure in the derivation of LF. This basic ambiguity cannot be accounted for in Culicover & Rochemont's framework, since it is designed as a top-down focus model, in which the F-structure of a sentence is given before the pitch accent is assigned. Two possible solutions to this problem have been proposed. The first, provided by Gussenhoven (1983), is based on the concept offocus domain formation within a focus-to-accent system; the second, proposed by Selkirk (1984), utilizes the idea of a bottom-up focus model, which computes the actual focus structure by a socalled focus projection convention. What both of these alternative proposals have in common is that they assume that the focus structure of a sentence is crucially influenced by its predicate-argument structure.

140

3.3.2.

The modularity of international models and the theory

offocus

Gussenhoven (1983): focus domain formation replacing the NSR

Although Gussenhoven (1983) does not explicitly propose an intonational model of grammar, he makes three observations that have had a considerable influence on all of the subsequent linguistic analyses of the relationship between focus and accent. First, the NSR with its exclusive emphasis on final sentence accents cannot explain the distribution of focus. Second, the notion of normal stress must be rejected because it does not account for the empirical data. Third, arguments and predicates play a crucial role in the focus-accent relationship. The first observation is a consequence of the strict separation of the concepts of focus and pitch accent (nucleus). Focus is understood as a linguistic prime that is distinct from both the pragmatic factors and the phonetic realization. Focus is defined as a binary feature [± focus] that is assigned to linguistic S-structures, establishing the focus structure of the sentence. The accent assignment rules take the focus structure of a sentence as input and then assign the pitch accents in an automatic fashion. The realization that "there is an upper limit to the amount of material to be put in a focus" (p. 382) prompts Gussenhoven to suggest a rule that forms focus domains upon which the accent placement rules can operate relative to the focus structure. Since a focus domain is defined as a semantic entity that can be put into focus by a single pitch accent and since more than one focus domain can occur within a sentence, this approach departs radically from the traditional view that the sentence accent location is determined by the NSR. With respect to the second observation, Gussenhoven argues that a linguistic concept such as normal stress which does not help to explain the data at hand must be discarded: The important point is, however, that the notion 'normal stress' has no role to play in our theory, simply because we cannot make it DO anything to account for the data. The only thing a characterization of the concept can do for us is to account for people's intuitions about what is the most likely ('normal') place in which they will put the nucleus in isolated 'sentences' that are presented to them. (Gussenhoven (1983, p. 388)) Gussenhoven instead introduces concepts like eventive sentences and definitional sentences, which are defined in relation to the utterance situation and which have a direct influence on domain formation. These concepts, then, explain the occurrence and the distribution of exactly those stress patterns that have been called normal and nonnormal, and indicate that there is nothing like normalcy of stress pattern, but only appropriateness in a specific discourse context. The third and most important observation concerns the fact that focus is not related to the accentuation of the rightmost element, as proposed by the NSR, but

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

141

that the relationship between sentence accents and focus is instead crucially dependent upon the argument structure of the verb. Gussenhoven generalizes Schmerling's (1976) principle II (see example (41)) and proposes that in any focus domain that consists of at least a predicate and an argument, the argument receives primary stress. Gussenhoven formalized these findings in the sentence accent assignment rule (SAAR), which consists of two parts: the domain assignment rule, forming focus domains from tone groups, and the accent assignment rule, operating over the semantic elements in the focus domain. A focus domain comprises either the accented element alone or a predicate and its argument. The accent assignment rule specifies that the accent is realized on the argument: (112)

Sentence Accent Assignment Rule (SAAR) a. Domain assignment: Ρ (Χ) Δ Δ (Χ) Ε

[Ρ (Χ) A] [A (Χ) Ρ]

Υ

b. Accent assignment: [ ] (Gussenhoven (1983, p. 391))

[Υ]

->

[*]. In AP/PA, accent Α.

In (112), the abbreviations A and Ρ represent argument and predicate. The variables Xand Kare meant to range over A, P, or C, which stands for condition or modifier. The underlined abbreviations symbolize focused constituents, and the absence of underlining represents nonfocused elements; square brackets are used to mark focus domains; and the asterisk indicates a sentence accent, which is signaled with the acute accent in print. The prose version of the SAAR is given in (113): (113)

If focused, every predicate, argument, and modifier must be accented, with the exception of a predicate that, discounting unfocused constituents, is adjacent to an argument. (Gussenhoven (1992, p. 84))

The SAAR accounts for those examples that have traditionally been analyzed by the NSR, such as (114). (114)

A: B:

What's new with Julia? She published a böok.

In example (114B), the complete sentence, except for the subject, is focused. Gussenhoven's SAAR applies to this example in the following steps:

142

(115)

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

Focus distribution: Domain assignment: Accent assignment:

APA A [PA] A [PA*]

The focus domain formation can also occur between the subject and the predicate, as in (116B), in cases where the final argument is a pronoun, which is always phonologically weak by virtue of being a nonfocused constituent: (116)

A: B:

What's new with Julia? Her böyfriend left her.

The SAAR applies to (116B) to form a focus domain of the sentence-initial subject-predicate structure, as shown in (117): (117)

Focus distribution: Domain assignment: Accent assignment:

APA [A P] A [A*P] A

Example (116) shows that the domain assignment rule is sensitive only to semantic and not to syntactic concepts, since the subject-predicate structure in a transitive sentence does not form a syntactic constituent. Furthermore, in examples (114) and (116), the SAAR predicts that the predicate can remain unaccented, although it is marked as focus. Note, however, that a PA/AP structure with an accent assigned to A is potentially ambiguous. The PA structure in (118) can have either of the two structures given in (119a, b): (118)

He bought a höuse.

(119)

PA*

a. b.

[P A*1 Ρ [A*]

The structure in (119a) would be appropriate if sentence (118) were uttered as an answer to the question any news about Ray? The structure in (119b) would be the correct structure if (118) were an answer to the question what did Ray buy? The SAAR also provides the correct results for a phenomenon that is not easily accommodated by NSR-based approaches and is still controversial. Consider the examples given in (120): (120)

a. b. c.

Our dög's disappeared. The bäby is screaming. Your cöat's on fire.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

143

If the sentences in (120) are uttered out-of-the-blue or in a what-happened context, the SAAR applies to the sentences in (120) as shown in (121). Note that the sequences has disappeared, is screaming, and is on fire are analyzed as single predicates P: (121)

Focus distribution: Domain assignment: Accent assignment:

AP [A P] [A* P]

Furthermore, if the AP-structures in (120) are analyzed in isolation, the ambiguity discussed for the PA structures in (119) is also present. Ladd (1983) also discusses the ambiguity of stressed subjects and argues that it can be expressed by tests containing the focus-sensitive operator even, as in (122): (122)

His refrigerator even stopped.

Even can be associated either with the subject refrigerator alone in the [A*] Ρ structure, signaling a narrow focus reading, as in (123), or it can be associated with the complete [A*P] structure, as in (124): (123)

He blew so many fuses in the house that not only the clock and the tape-recorder stopped but even the refrigerator, which was on a separate circuit, stopped as well. (Ladd (1983, p. 167))

(124)

His plants had died, his basement had flooded and his refrigerator had stopped as well. (Ladd (1983, p. 167))

According to the SAAR, focus domain formation between A and Ρ (AP/PA) can only take place if the predicate is adjacent to the argument, as in (125a). If, however, a focused constituent intervenes in the AP structure as, for example, mysteriously in (125b), the domain formation is blocked and each of the elements must form its own focus domain, as in (125c). (125)

a. b. c.

My k£y's disappeared. My key's mysteriously disappeared. [Δ*] [£*] [P*]

The concept of merging introduced by Gussenhoven describes the situation in which "if an Argument and a Predicate are to merge into a structure that can be marked [+focus] by just the accent on the argument, no other [+focus] constituents must be inserted between them" (p. 391). Note, however, that the merging

144

The modularity ofintonational

models and the theory of focus

operation, including the reasons for its nonapplication as described here, does not follow from any principle but merely captures a descriptive generalization. The matter is further complicated by the contrast between all-focused APsentences that form one focus domain (eventive or thetic sentences), as in (126a, b), which are assigned the structure in (126c), and all-focused AP-sentences that form more than one focus domain (categorical sentences), as in (127a, b), with the structure in (127c). (126)

a. b. c.

The röof fell in. The computer exploded. [A* P]

(127)

a. b. c.

Dögs bärk. Trdspassers will be prösecuted. [Δ*] [P*]

To account for the contrast in (126) and (127), Gussenhoven introduces a binary semantic feature [±eventive] that is assigned to entire sentences. Only sentences that express an event, such as those in (126), allow domain formation between A and P, whereas in noneventive sentences, as in (127), the SAAR's domain formation rule is blocked, preventing the argument and the predicate from merging in a single focus domain. In these examples, cutting across generic, definitional or contingency sentence types, the predicate and the argument form separate domains that are allocated two separate accents. Although this issue will be discussed in more detail below (chapter 4), it is not desirable in any linguistic theory for a rule, such as the domain formation rule, to be constrained by sentence types. The principle of generality with respect to the SAAR poses additional concerns. Baart (1987) notes that the interference of a focused condition between a focused predicate and argument does not force the domain formation rule to apply to A, P, and C individually, as shown in (128a) and (128b). (128)

a.

b.

[We bestellen vandäag de ringen] dann kunnen we ons morgen [We order today the rings] then can we us tomorrow verloven). engage) Hij kocht rond't middaguur'n kränt. He bought around midday a newspaper

In German, it is even possible to have a single accent in a sentence such as (129B) and still receive a wide focus reading.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

(129)

A: B:

145

Warum strahlt Ihr so? 'Why are you so radiant?' Wir haben heute unsere Eheringe bestellt. We have today our wedding-rings ordered

These counterexamples to the SAAR appear to suggest that a more precise definition of the concept of condition is in order. In the same vein, there are a variety of cases in which not only a predicate and an argument form a focus domain but also a predicate, a prenominal modifier (condition), and an argument, such as in a simple sentence like (130a): However, if the modifier occurs postnominally, the application of the SAAR appears to be blocked, and each semantic entity is assigned an accent individually, as in (130b): (130)

a. b.

weil er sich ein neues Büch gekauft hat because he himself a new book bought has weil er sich ein Buch n6u gekäuft hat. because he himself a book new bought has

Although these sentence types will be discussed in detail later, these examples raise the question of whether or not the semantic concepts of argument, predicate, and condition sufficiently define the relevant relationships of linguistic constituents that are needed as input to the accent assignment rule. To summarize, by assuming a close relationship between focus domain formation over the focus-annotated S-structure and accent assignment to each domain, Gussenhoven shows that the NSR is not only empirically incorrect, but also simply superfluous. It will become evident in the discussion of adjunct structures (chapter 4) that Gussenhoven's analysis of the relationship between focus domain formation and accent assignment is empirically correct. Thus, it can be argued that Gussenhoven's focus model is designed to predict the occurrence of pitch accents in relation to focus structure. Since the focus structure, which is the result of assigning the feature [+F] to S-structure, constitutes the conceptual starting point for the SAAR, Gussenhoven's model is categorized as a top-down focus model employing a focus-to-accent approach. The central question it answers is how can the location of the pitch accent be derivedfrom a sentence in which the focus structure is given. On the focus-annotated S-structure, a domain is formed, and a pitch accent, which is preferably realized on the argument of the head, is assigned to it. Gussenhoven does not address the question of whether this model can be used in reverse fashion so that the focus structure is derived from the occurrence of the pitch accents. Gussenhoven's approach to the focus-accent relationship has had considerable influence on subsequent studies of focus structure. Although his detailed analysis of a wide range of data is outstanding, it has been shown that the SAAR cannot

146

The modularity of international models and the theory offocus

adequately explain all the data at hand. The rule of domain formation, which operates on semantic concepts and on the linear order of surface structure, suffers from two shortcomings. First, the semantic concepts argument, predicate, and condition lack a precise definition in theoretical terms; and second, a rule that cannot take the hierarchical structure of sentential syntax into account is flawed. Additional rule specifications, such as the sentence type and construction specific information, as well as their effect on the application of the SAAR (e.g., to accented subject sentences, extraposition from NP, passives, cleft-constructions, and topicalization) would have to be introduced. Furthermore, by restricting the operation of the SAAR to surface structure, crucial information such as the connection between focus and D-structure, S-structure, and LF is lost. Consequently, much of the information modular models of grammar can provide is forfeited. There is an alternative proposal which concurs with Gussenhoven's approach in that it takes into account the predicate-argument structure of sentences, but differs from it in that it employs these concepts in hierarchically organized syntactic structures as proposed by X-bar syntax. Such an intonational model is proposed by Selkirk (1984). However, the approach by Selkirk also differs conceptually from the top-down focus models by Culicover & Rochemont (1983) and Gussenhoven (1983), since in her model the placement of the prosodic prominence comes first. The assignment of focus occurs in relation to the pitch accent. The transfer of the focus feature in phrasestructure trees from a lower to a higher constituent, called focus projection, is argued to follow from the syntactic argument structure of the sentence.

3.3.3.

Selkirk (1984): a pitch-accent-first model

Selkirk (1984) proposes a modular intonational model acknowledging that PF and LF are separate components, and that the focus structure of a sentence is independently represented on either level. Selkirk's (1984, p. 34) general grammar model is given in a slightly modified version in (131):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

147

(131) DS (Sentence Syntax)

SSiS^ (word-level phonol. representation)

Assignment of Intonational Structure

ISS (S' n ) (intonated surface structure)

S'nOrP,

LF

Phonological Rules

Pn (Phonetic Representation) Placing special emphasis on the derivation of PF, Selkirk claims that there are three main stages in the mapping process from syntax to phonology. The first stage is the syntactic surface structure, Sn, which contains the phonological representation of words in addition to surface syntactic information. The second stage is intonated surface structure, S n '. The mapping from S„ to S„' involves the formation of intonational phrases (ip), the autosegmental representation of tonal contours and the alignment of the abstract tonal elements Η and L to particular syllables of the sentence on surface structure. This structure, which forms the input to metrical grid construction rules (NSR, CSR, PAR), is mapped onto the third stage, the intonatedand-rhythmated surface structure, also referred to as the underlying phonological

148

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

representation, P,. Specific phonological rules, which are claimed to be blind to syntactic structures, derive the surface phonological representation. The mapping procedure from S-structure to intonated surface structure S n ' is demonstrated using example (132): (132)

Mary bought an American novel.

As noted, the derivation of S n ' from the S-structure proceeds in three steps. First, one structure is freely selected on the basis of functional considerations from the possible intonational phrase structures assigned to (132), as seen in (133a)-(133e). (133)

a. b. c. d. e.

(ip Mary bought an American novel) (ip Mary) (ipbought an American novel) (ip Mary bought) (ip an American novel) (ip Mary) (ip bought) (ip an American novel) *(ip Mary) (ip bought an American) (ip novel)

The mapping from S-structure to intonational phrases is not isomorphic, as can be seen from (132), where a subject and a transitive predicate form an ip. However, the ungrammaticality of (133e) demonstrates that this ip violates the sense unit condition, since bought an American where American is an AP does not appear in any meaningful predicate-argument or specifier-head relationship. Second, an intonational contour is assigned via the allocation of abstract tonal features. Assume that the largest intonational phrase is chosen from (133) and is realized with a fall on the prominent syllable of novel·, then, the representation of the tonal features is as given in (134a): (134) a. b.

Mary bought an American novel. H+L H*+L

Third, pitch accents are freely assigned. In (134a) the tonic falls on the Η tone as it does in (134b). The mapping from the S n ' to P, involves the formation of a metrical grid according to specific construction rules, of which one major principle is, the pitch accent prominence rule (PAR), which incorporates the observation that the presence of a pitch accent on a syllable of a word entails that this word has greater prominence than any word not containing a pitch accent. Selkirk claims that the PAR overrides the effects of the NSR; however, if no pitch accents are present, the NSR applies to the metrical grid. In the metrical grid, given for (134b) in (135), the PAR and the NSR coincidentally coincide.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

149

(135) *

•

* *

* *

*

*

*

»

*

*

* * *

*

*

Mary bought an American novel. Selkirk's approach differs from traditional NSR-based accounts (Jackendoff (1972), Liberman (1975), and Culicover & Rochemont (1983)) in that she claims that the pitch accent assignment is completely free and occurs prior to focus assignment. Selkirk's refined intonational model specifies the relationship between intonational structure and focus structure, on the one hand, and focus structure and intonational meaning, on the other. This model (Selkirk (1984, p. 205)), including focus rules, is given in (136): (136) SURFACE STRUCTURE

PHONETICAL REPRESENTATION

LOGICAL FORM

(underlying) Focus interpretation

"MEANING"

150

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

As the model shows, focus rules operate at S-structure to build the level of focus structure on the basis of argument structure. Selkirk (1984) defines her concept of focus structure as "the set of assignments of the property of focus to the constituents of a sentence" (p. 200). Focus structure functions as a mediating level between the phonological representation of focus and the level of focus-related meaning. Although Selkirk does not elaborate on the derivation of LF, she assumes that the mapping relationship between the intonational structure and LF is restricted to the conditions of wellformedness, which include focus rules and rules such as the sense unit condition, which operates over intonational phrases. The relationship between focus structure and intonational structure is based on two rules. The first rule, called the basic focus rule, states that pitch accents, which are assigned to words and are realized upon the rhythmically most prominent syllable, are directly related to focus. (137)

Basic Focus Rule: A constituent to which a pitch accent is assigned is a focus. (Selkirk (1984, p. 207))

The basic focus rule establishes a direct relationship between a pitch accent and focus, and simply states that a word carrying a pitch accent is assigned a focus feature. This rule also incorporates the assertion that the intonational structure of a sentence and not its phrase stress designates its focus properties. The second rule, the phrasal focus rule, establishes a recursive definition of focus, as given in (138): (138)

Phrasal Focus Rule·. A constituent may be a focus if (i) or (ii) (or both) is true: (i) The constituent that is its head is a focus. (ii) A constituent contained within it that is an argument of the head is a focus. (Selkirk (1984, p. 207))

This rule states that a constituent may be focused if either the head of the constituent or an argument of the head contained within the constituent is focused. It incorporates the observation that the relationship between focus structure and intonational structure does not depend upon the word-order relationship at surface structure, but rather depends upon the predicate-argument structure of the lexical elements in the sentence. The predicate-argument structure is not defined in purely semantic terms, as in Gussenhoven (1983), but rather provides functional information in reference to syntactic constituents. Von Stechow & Uhmann (1984) propose that Selkirk conceives of predicate-argument structure as a syntactic tree plus additional labels, as in (139):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

151

(139) S

NP: Arg

VP: Pred

V

NP: Arg

Det

She

sent

a

PP: Arg

Ν

book

Ρ

NP

to

Mary

Essentially, Selkirk's approach is based on the assumption that argument structure relates to the characterization of semantic role-taking properties of predicates (lexical items). In (139), both a book and to Mary are assumed to be arguments of the predicate send. The semantic roles are then mapped onto the phrase structure tree with the appropriate syntactic realizations. Note that to conceive of argument structure in terms of valency of predicates leaves certain issues open, such as the treatment of adjuncts and modifiers and also the exact syntactic representation of the argument structure of a verb. Chapter 2, for example, discusses the fact that the grammatical realization of the argument structure of ditransitive predicates like send is not agreed upon. Assuming Larson's (1988a) proposal for the syntactic representation of dative constructions as complex predicates is correct, then the representation of the argument structure of a verb like send would differ from that in (139) and a different focus structure would be the result. Thus, a focus theory based upon argument structure depends crucially on the theory of argument structure involved. Disregarding this issue for the moment, I continue to discuss Selkirk's focus rules as they apply to sentences in which the predicate-argument structure is straightforward. Consider the following intransitive sentence in (140):

152

(140)

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

a. b.

She sn6ezed. IP

NP

Γ I

she

VP [+F]

sniezed

In an intonational realization of the sentence in (140a) with a pitch accent on the verb sneeze, the basic focus rule determines that this pitch accent is correlated with the assignment of the focus feature [+F] to the lexical element V. The resulting focus structure would be appropriate in contexts in which only the verb is focused, such as no, she didn't sniffle, she sneezed. The same intonational pattern could occur as an answer to the question what did she do? In that case, the entire VP would be marked as [+F] on focus structure due to the application of the first condition of the phrasal focus rule (138i). Since V is focused and V is the head of VP, VP can optionally be assigned focus under appropriate conditions. The operation of the second condition of the phrasal focus rule (138ii), which specifies that a constituent may be focused if an argument of the head is focus, becomes clear in transitive sentences as in (141):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

She

watched

153

Magnum

The phrasal focus rule applies after the basic focus rule, which correlates the pitch accent assignment with the focus assignment to the noun Magnum. Since Magnum is an argument of the verb watch, rule (138ii) allows the feature to percolate optionally to the NP and even to the VP. VP focus is possible in the context of the question what did Louise do last night? while NP focus is possible as an answer to the question what did Louise watch last night? There are three controversial issues in Selkirk's theory of focus, all of which relate to the formulation of the phrasal focus rule. The first concerns the fact that the rule (138i) appears to overgenerate; for example, only under very specific discourse conditions is it possible for a prominent verbal head to mark the complete VP as focus. The second issue concerns Selkirk's concept of embedded focus, specified in (138ii). The concept of embedded focus is based on the observation that in sentences that occur with two arguments (e.g., NP PP), the VP may be focus, despite the fact that only one of the arguments is focused: "without the notion of embedded focus, VP focus and the focus of NPs within a VP cannot be independently manipulated" (Selkirk (1984, p. 210)). However, since Selkirk generalizes this observation, the informational status of the verb (and of adjuncts)

154

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

in a focused VP is left unspecified by the rule (138ii). The third issue concerns prominence assigned subjects that allow IP focus, a phenomenon which is not accounted for by condition two of the phrasal focus rule. I turn to each concern below. Let us apply Selkirk's rules (138i) and (138ii) to an example with a complex NP complement, such as (142): (142)

a. b.

She watched a rerun of the presidential debäte.

watched

a

rerun

of

the

presidential

If the pitch accent is assigned to the noun debate in (142), it is marked as focus by the basic focus rule. In the derivation of the focus structure, the phrasal focus rule can optionally mark the NP as focus including the prenominal adjunct presidential, the PP, which is a complement of the noun rerun, the complex NP a rerun of the presidential debate, and even the entire VP watched a rerun of the presidential

debate. According to rule (138i), a pitch accent on the head noun rerun should optionally mark the NP constituent as focus, as in (143), an accent on the verb watch should optionally mark the VP as focus, as in (144) and an accent on the prepositional head of should mark the whole PP as focus, as in (145).

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

155

(143)

A: B:

Did Louise see the debate between Bush, Clinton, and Perot? She watched [ (+F] a τέηιη of the presidential debate].

(144)

A:

What did Louise do when John took her to the presidential debate yesterday? She [ [+F] wätched the debate].

B: (145)

A: B:

I heard Louise didn't make it home in time to watch the presidential debate. Don't worry, she watched pieces [ [+F] 0f it] (on the news).

While the pitch accent on rerun in (143B) permits an NP (or even VP) focus reading, and the pitch accent on watched in (144B) allows a VP focus reading, the application of rule (138i) does not render entirely natural results if a pitch accent is assigned to the preposition of in (145B). Note, however, that the attested example in (146) provides evidence that rule (138i) does apply in naturally occurring utterances in English: (146)

I just talked to my mother. She asked, "You aren't interested in the family history, are you?" Actually, I was, but the way she put it t6 me, I wasn't going to answer the question. (Ree 3: 072)

Example (146) confirms that rule (138i) also applies to heads of prepositional phrases since the accent on to marks the PP and in this case even the entire VP as focus. Von Stechow & Uhmann (1984) argue that the first condition of the phrasal focus rule (138i) is incorrect when applied to German. 9 "Focus projection from the head constituent to the entire constituent is correct for some NPs but doesn't give the correct prediction for VPs and PPs" (p. 246). They provide the following examples: (147)

a. b. c.

ein alter Mann an old man *Xenia schenkt ihrer Mutter einen Fernseher. Xenia gives to-her mother a television *Franz bringt Odo im Staatsdienst unter. Franz gets Odo in-the civil-service in (von Stechow & Uhmann (1984, p. 246))

They claim that except for (147a), the sentences in (147) are ungrammatical under a wide focus reading and they conjecture that even (147a) is only grammatical because the head of the phrase occurs at the right constituent boundary. They

156

The modularity of intonational models and the theory offocus

provide example (148) to show that if the nominal head is not on the right, a wide focus reading is not possible. (148)

a. b.

[+F ein Männ] mit Vermögen. A man with fortune [+F ein Mann mit Vermö'gen]

The example given by von Stechow & Uhmann is intended to show that in German the rightmost constituent is the decisive factor for the transfer of the focus feature to a higher projection - not the head line. This argument is weakened by the fact that all of their examples are provided without a context, which Selkirk claims is essential for determining the possible focus structures of a sentence with a given intonation. VP focus in (147b) would be possible in a context in which it is evident that Xenia's mother Gerda would like to have a TV, such as in (149): (149)

A: B:

Hast du mitbekommen, daß sich Gerda einen Fernseher wünscht? 'Did you hear that Gerda wants a TV?' Ja, Xenia schänkt ihrer Mutter einen. Yes, Xenia gives her mother one

What is certainly true is that the accented predicate schenkt in (147b) cannot include arguments that represent information not established in the discourse, such as einen Fernseher. With the head condition, Selkirk attempts to capture only those examples in which the arguments of the phrase are c-construable as defined by Culicover & Rochemont (1983). It follows then that under specific discourse conditions example (147b) is an appropriate utterance, as shown in (149).10 It should be mentioned that Selkirk restricts her exposition of focus structure to sentences consisting of only one intonational phrase, such as all the sentences discussed above. Even though she is aware of the fact that intonational phrasing of sentences is relevant to focus structure, she does not define the relationship in any detail. It is clear from Gussenhoven's (1983) proposal that the relationship between ips and focus is a very direct one, and should not be ignored. Gussenhoven explicitly puts the rule of domain formation before the rule of accent assignment. In Selkirk's discussion, this point is somewhat obfuscated, since the formation of intonational phrases applies at the derivation of intonational structure. However, she disregards possible interactions between the formation of intonational phrases and pitch assignment (or focus assignment). If, for example, a sentence like (148) is employed in the context of (150A), where Märchenprinz is not implied, the intonation would be as given in (150B):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory ofgrammar (150)

A: B:

157

Wen möchtest du einmal heiraten, wenn du groß bist? 'Whom do you want to marry when you grow up?' Einen Mä'rchenprinz mit Vermö'gen. A fairytale-prince with fortune

The intonation in (150B) shows that the sentence is divided into two intonational phrases. I propose that Mann in (148b) or Märchenprinz in (150B) does not have the structure given by von Stechow & Uhmann in (151), but rather the structure in (152): (151) NP:F

N':F

Det

Ν

PP:F

NP:F

Mann

Ein

mit

Vermö'gen

(152) NP:F

Det

N':F

N':F

PP:F

N:F

Ein

Mä'rchenprinz

NP:F

mit

Vermö'gen

More precisely, the PP in the constituent ein Märchenprinz mit Vermögen does not constitute an argument of the head but an adjunct, and adjunct structures in general

158

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

confirm independent intonational phrases that must each be assigned a pitch accent. I claim that adjuncts do not participate in the focus projection process; however, there are exceptions that include single prenominal adjectives, deictic temporal or locative adverbs, such as yesterday or here, and other adjuncts that do not contribute to the information structure of the sentence. The assumption that the head can project focus to the entire phrase must be carefully considered. The observation that focused nominal heads can include the prenominal adjective remains unchallenged. Furthermore, there are examples (see Ladd (1980) and Selkirk (1984)) that show that the focus accent of a VP is realized on the verb, but only under very specific discourse conditions. In English, an accent on the preposition in some contexts can transfer the focus feature to include the entire PP constituent as focus. However, this possibility should only be included in a system of rules as a default possibility, implying that only if the pitch accent cannot be realized on any other element of this constituent, it must then be realized on the head. Furthermore, counterexamples such as (147) cannot be accepted as they stand. Throughout the discussion, the influence of the formation of intonational phrases on pitch accent assignment must be considered. With respect to the second issue, the discussion of the concept of embedded foci, Selkirk claims "that focus may be embedded within another focus. This assumption is necessary to the very formulation of the Phrasal Focus Rule, which gives a recursive definition of focus. We will show that any theory must allow for embedded foci" (p. 208). This assumption is exemplified by her examples in (153a)-(153c). (153)

a. b. c.

She sent a böok to Märy. She sent a/the book to Märy. She sent a böok to Mary.

She claims that (153a-c) each contain an intonational meaning where the VP is focus. However, the focus structure of each sentence is different. In (153a), both NPs constitute new information, whereas in (153b) the NP a/the book and in (153c) the NP Mary are old information; nevertheless, the VP constituent in each example can be considered as new. Furthermore, Selkirk assumes that only arguments are relevant to intonational meaning, and this is the reason why unaccented NP arguments need to denote old information. Unaccented predicates, however, can still convey new information, and this asymmetry can best be explained by assuming that only argument structure exerts a controlling influence on focus structure, as expressed in the focus interpretation principle.11 (154)

F(argument)

new information

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

159

Selkirk argues that the focus interpretation principle makes the correct prediction for sentences as in (155), in which the direct object carries a focus feature and the indirect object is unaccented, in opposition to the predictions of the NSR. Consider Selkirk's examples in (155): (155)

a. b. c. d.

She sent her skötches to the publisher. She offered all her röcipes to Pete. They told us not to put our 6Ibows on the table. La Guardia used to read the funnies to the kids (on the radio).

According to Selkirk, all of these sentences may have VP focus provided that the NP the publisher in (155a), Pete in (155b), the table in (155c), and the kids in (155d) are present in the discourse. Although this analysis captures one reading of these sentences, the underlying argument structure must be evaluated, and a new understanding of the focus structure of these sentences must be reached. In other words, although I agree with Selkirk that sentences like those in (155) can signal VP focus, I will argue in the next chapter that directional PPs do not need to denote given information, since sentences like those in (155) are perfect out-of-the-blue utterances. This hypothesis is based upon the specific argument structure of these sentences. Rochemont (1986), who agrees in general with Selkirk's view that a focused phrase need not contain only focused material, takes issue with the formulation of the phrasal focus rule (138ii); specifically, in cases in which an argument of the verb is focus, the VP may be focused while the head of VP does not participate in the assignment of the focus structure.12 Verbs do contribute to the focus structure of a sentence, as shown by the ungrammaticality of the answer (156B) to (156A): (156)

A: B:

Who is John dating? *John is däting Jill.

Since the predicate dating is already introduced in the discourse by the question, the pitch accent on dating in the answer violates discourse well-formedness conditions. Rochemont agrees with Selkirk that pitch accents and focus are freely assigned, but he claims that each focused lexical element, be it the verb, argument, or adjunct, contributes to the information structure of the discourse. Selkirk is certainly aware of this fact: "Of course prominence (and hence focus) are possible on 'new' verbs as well" (p. 213). However, her proposal is constructed first to explain why the verb can remain unaccented if its argument is focused, and second why the verb can carry prominence although it is contextually given, as is the case in Ladd's default focus examples. Specifically, Rochemont's counterproposal states that the focus feature assigned to an argument is not transferred to the VP-node, but is inherited by the verbal head.13

160

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

The third issue concerns the concept of argument referred to in the phrasal focus rule (138ii). It is obvious that this rule is geared toward explaining regular transitive sentences with a pitch accent on the object-argument at the right periphery of the sentence; however, there are examples in which the entire sentence is focused with only the subject carrying a pitch accent, as in the examples in (157): (157)

a. b. c.

The sun is shining. My umbrella's been found. My möther's coming.

Although the stressed subjects in (157a) and (157b) are arguments of the verb, they do not fulfill the requirements of rule (138ii); i.e., the subject NPs sun and umbrella are not contained within the VP in Selkirk's framework, and thus cannot transfer the focus feature to the sentential node. These sentence types, which Gussenhoven calls [+eventive], are often contrasted with intransitive sentences as in (158). (158)

a. b. c.

Peter snöres. Sandra is typing. Dogs bärk.

Note that in these agentive intransitive sentences the pitch accent is assigned to the predicate. According to the first condition of the phrasal focus rule, only the VP and not the entire sentence can be optionally focused. Only under a syntactic analysis that would categorize the VP as a complement of INFL would it be possible for the pitch accent on the predicate to contribute to the focusing of the entire sentence. Selkirk herself frequently marks the option of sentential focus with a question mark. I assume that sentences such as those in (158), require a second pitch accent on the external subject to signal a wide focus reading, or the referents of the subjects must be either present in the discourse or easily inferable. Nevertheless, the difference between examples (157) and (158) is not adequately explained in Selkirk's proposal. The examples given in (159) and (160) also remain unexplained: (159)

a. b.

He pushed a door open. He banged his bräin into shape.

(160)

a. b.

He ate the meat räw. He likes whiskey cöld.

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

161

While it seems possible in (159) to get a wide focus reading with the pitch accent assigned to the postverbal NP, which functions as a secondary subject, it does not seem possible in (160). Whether there is a correspondence between this contrast and that observed between whole focused sentences with the pitch accent on the subject, as in (157), and those with the pitch accent on the subject and object, as in (158), depends upon the analysis chosen, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. To summarize, Selkirk (1984) concentrates on the syntax-phonology interface * and delineates the relationship between intonational structure and the focus structure in a modular intonational model of grammar. Her approach differs crucially from all earlier approaches in two respects. First, she proposes a pitchaccent-first account, which distinguishes her theory from those that are based on the assumptions of the NSR (Chomsky & Halle (1968), Bresnan (1971, 1972), Liberman & Prince (1977), Bing (1979), Ladd (1980), and Pierrehumbert (1980), among others). The correlation of pitch accent assignment with the assignment of the property [+F] at the word level (or syllable structure) and the construction of focus structures that feed into PF and LF also distinguishes her theory from the modular focus structure theory proposed by Culicover & Rochemont (1983). These authors assume that the largest possible focus structure is given, and the task consists of implementing rules specifying the focus exponent upon which the pitch accent is realized. Selkirk's approach, then, departs from the assumptions contained in the NSR, since the assignment of the pitch accent occurs prior to focus assignment and is completely free. Second, like Gussenhoven (1983), she observes that argument structure is relevant, but she applies it in a different manner. While Gussenhoven argues that focus domain formation is sensitive to the predicateargument structure, Selkirk (1984) shows that argument structure is relevant to focus projection and the determination of the widest possible focus reading. The literature on focus theory in generative grammar today is still divided on the issue of whether Selkirk's focus projection approach (bottom-up focus model) or Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) or Gussenhoven's (1983) top-down focus model is correct. Although Selkirk's pitch-accent-first approach has been very influential and is supported by Rochemont (1986), Drubig (1989, 1990), Hetland (1992), Möck (1994) and Winkler (1991a, 1993), recent proposals (Baart (1987), Meredith (1990), Jacobs (1991b, 1992a), Uhmann (1991), Rosengren (1993), and Cinque (1993)) lean toward the traditional top-down focus model. In contrast to Jacobs (1991b, p. 24, 1992) and Rosengren (1989, p. 284), I claim that ultimately it is irrelevant which model is employed because the same set of rules, if generalized, determine the widest possible focus-reading on the prior assignment of pitch accents or the focus exponent from a given focus structure. Nevertheless, the two models have different goals. In a top-down focus model, the largest constituent that is assigned a focus feature is given. The decisive question, then, is, How is the

162

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

focus exponent determined? Note, however, that more than one focus exponent can occur in a sentence, thereby complicating the rule system. In the bottom-up focus model, the relevant question is: Given the pitch accent assignment in a sentence, how is the largest possible focus structure computed? These questions are integral to the problem of how to characterize the relationship between the focus structure of a sentence and the distribution of pitch accents within it. Neither the top-down nor the bottom-up focus model is the correct model or the theoretically superior model. As long as syntactic focus theory is a conceptual enterprise, both the top-down and the bottom-up models must be utilized in order to test their viability. Rules that relate pitch accents to focus structure should yield the exact same results when applied to focus structure in order to determine the pitch accent locations. Clearly, the rules should be reversible. This should especially be the case if the claim of almost all recent research is put to task, namely, that both pitch accents and focus structures are freely and independently assigned. Selkirk (1984) claims in her approach that "the focus rules define which of these freely generated combinations are well formed" (p. 285). I have shown that Selkirk's focus rules are not entirely sufficient for this task; however, the manner in which they are enhanced should yield the same results for a top-down model. Although theoretically equivalent, the top-down and the bottom-up focus models imply different empirical and methodological procedures. The bottom-up focus model is the result of putting into practice the theoretical tenant that pitch accents are freely assigned and that [+F] is associated with them. That means it incorporates an extremely liberal perspective of pitch accent assignment, also called Focus Glasnost by Lenerz & Klein (1988). The methodological consequence is that the linguist takes the intonational realization (f0-contours) of sentences in discourse as the starting point. Then, in a second step, the following questions have to be asked: (161)

i. ii. iii.

What kind of intonational phrase structure is associated with the pitch accent(s)? What kind of focus structures are associated with the specific intonational structure in a given discourse? What does the focus structure tell us about the operation of the focus rules?

In contrast, the top-down focus approach is characterized by the free assignment of the focus feature. The empirical consequence is that the linguist must somehow control the freely assigned focus structure, which presupposes a discourse model that is elaborate enough to correlate discourse structures and focus structures (i.e. to provide a certain focus structure in a specific discourse). Only under the

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

163

assumption that the specific focus structure of a sentence in discourse is controlled can the following questions be asked: (162)

i.

What kind of intonational pattern is associated with the given focus structure? What kind of intonational phrases are formed? What are the rules for the computation of the focus exponent(s)?

ii. iii.

It follows that the bottom-up focus model is an inductive model since the f 0 contour of a given sentence can be observed, whereas the top-down focus model is a deductive approach since the location of the pitch accent is deduced from the empirically nonobservable focus structure. The result must always be checked against naturally occurring utterances. 14 1 turn to an elaborated pitch-accent-first model below.

3.3.4.

Rochemont (1986): an elaborated pitch-accent-first model

Rochemont (1986) proposes a modular intonational model which integrates a theory of focus that is conceptually related close to both Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) and to Selkirk's (1984) frameworks, although it differs from them in various important points. His intonational model of grammar is given in (163): (163) D-structure

PF

LF (Focus Condition)

164

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

Rochemont's (1986) intonational model is based on Chomsky & Lasnik's (1977) Tmodel and like Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) emphasizes the autonomy of the different grammatical levels. D-structure is mapped onto S-structure, which functions as an interface to PF and LF. In Rochemont's model, the prominence assignment (PA) and focus assignment (FA) apply "late" in the derivation of Sstructure from D-structure, implying that they apply after the application of move a . Since PA and FA operate freely, each D-structure representation is associated with a set of S-structures, in which the focused constituents are identified. These focus-identified S-structures form the input to the accent placement rules, which derive PF,15 and the input to the focus raising rules, which form quantified representations in the derivation of LF. It is conceptualized that the focus interpretation rules operate as well-formedness conditions (focus condition) at LF. Rochemont's proposal differs from Selkirk's (1984) intonational model in at least three respects: first, Rochemont's focus assignment rules, which are modeled after Selkirk's, still deviate from hers in a few rather important respects. Second, Rochemont dismisses Selkirk's concept of embedded focus and instead assumes a rather complicated mechanism for the derivation of LF representations from focused constituents which contain unfocused material. Third, Rochemont's model strictly adheres to the modular set-up of grammar in that syntactic S-structure is separately mapped onto PF and LF, as is generally assumed in the GB literature. This makes his model superior to Selkirk's system, where the levels are not conceived as irrevocably autonomous, which, although empirically motivated, is conceptually a disadvantage. I turn to each issue in the above order. Rochemont, like Selkirk, basically proposes a pitch-accent-first focus model, which is reflected in the exposition of the focus rules, represented in the mechanism of FA. The obligatory FA rule, which coincides with Selkirk's basic focus rule, is given in (164): (164)

If α is prominent, then α is [+focus] (obligatory). (Rochemont (1986: 84))

Rule (164) states that the lexical element, which is assigned a prominence feature in the derivation of S-structure, is interpreted as [+focus], Rochemont uses the term prominence in (164) as an unspecified term which is meant to refer to the pitch accent in Selkirk's sense or to the phonological feature s (strong) assigned by the rule of strong assignment in Culicover & Rochemont's (1983) model. Note that Rochemont's proposal is less liberal than Selkirk's since it departs from Selkirk's basic focus rule in that rule (164) is claimed to apply only to a subset of all sentences. Rochemont claims that for the remaining sentences a revised version of the NSR has to be employed, the so-called NSR", given in (165):

Focus structure in a principle-based theory of grammar

(165)

165

Assign an accent to the rightmost lexical category (in a [+focus] constituent) in S. (Rochemont (1986, p. 25))

Rule (165) appears to be a remnant of the analysis of WH-sentences forwarded in Culicover & Rochemont (1983). Rochemont claims that it is necessary to account for those sentences, in which the pitch accent assignment and the focus assignment do not coincide. I will argue below that the NSR" is superfluous since the alleged exceptions can be explained by a rule which incorporates the effects of rule (165) alone. Once the focus feature is assigned, Rochemont provides a set of focus projection rules that may apply optionally after the basic focus assignment of rule (164) at word level (or lower). Superficially, these rules roughly correspond to Selkirk's phrasal focus rule (138); however, they provide a more concise picture of the complexity of the focus projection mechanism. Rule (166) defines focuspercolation in a vertical direction, namely from the phrasal head to its projection. (166)

If α is [+focus] and α is X°, then X" is [+focus]. (Rochemont (1986, p. 84))

Rule (166) is graphically represented in (167): (167) XP

[+F]

I ^ I I X

'[+F]

f I X

[+F]

Although rule (166) resembles Selkirk's phrasal focus rule (138i), in which it is specified that a constituent may be focus if the head is focused, it is, if I interpret Rochemont correctly, introduced to replace together with rule (168) the operation originally attributed to the more specific rule incorporated in the NSR" in (165) (the rule without the parentheses). (168)

If α is [+focus] and α is an argument of X° contained in Xn, then X° is [+focus]. (Rochemont (1986, p. 85))

In addition to the vertical transferral of the focus feature as specified in (166), rule (168) defines focus-inheritance in a horizontal direction, as outlined in (169):

166

The modularity of intonational models and the theory of focus

(169) XP

X'

X

[+F]
chl I

Tim

( m )

1.372

: IPA TRANSCRIPT

d e a t h

e.eaa

t h r e a t s

8.00008 w e r e

b e i n g

1

s

s u e

•B>PITCH

d 1.373

T i n · 8.00008
ohl : lPfi TRANSCRIPT er b e s ο r g t •B>PITCH 1

Tlw

riM· The example in (60b) shows that both the argument of the sentence and the postverbal adjective receive a pitch accent. The stressed syllables of Fairy and Ultra receive a high pitch accent. The fall after the high accent on the second unaccented syllable of Fairy is clearly visible, before the second high accent occurs on Ultra. As is widely acknowledged, the lower peak on Ultra at the end of the sentence is perceived as being equally as strong as the accent on Fairy by the ear. This phenomenon has been called downstep (cf. Pierrehumbert (1980), Fery (1993)).The pitch extraction contour shows that the prediction that both the argument and the postnominal adjunct must be assigned a focus feature is correct.

4.3.4.

Licensing, focus, and the argument-adjunct asymmetry in a derivational approach

The central claim formulated in the introduction to this chapter is that the asymmetry between arguments and adjuncts in relation to focus projection can be reduced to theta-theoretic considerations. If it is the case that only arguments are licensed by theta-marking, and if it is further assumed with Chomsky (1981) that D-structure is a "pure representation of GF-theta" (p. 335), then the nonparticipation of adjuncts in the focus projection mechanism of the kernel sentence may be explained by the fact that adjuncts are not licensed by theta theory at D-structure. I conjecture that the argument-adjunct asymmetry observed in the behavior of focus projection may find interesting independent support in a theory explicitly proposed by Lebeaux (1988, 1991) and controversially debated in Epstein (1987,

223

224

The motivation of the intonational model

1991), Uriagereka (1988), Speas (1989, 1990, 1991), and Lutz (1993) (cf. also Chomsky (1992), although his aim is the elimination of both D-structure and Sstructure). The basic tenet of this theory is that adjuncts actually are not present at D-structure, but are attached to the main sentence later in the derivation by a generalized transformation (GT). The conceptual layout of this theory was established previous to Lebeaux (1988) by linguists who speculate that a theory that accounts for the argument-adjunct asymmetry by assuming that only heads and arguments are present at the level of D-structure is theoretically superior to one which must account for the difference with a battery of stipulated principles. The former theory is referred to as the derivational approach and the latter as the representational approach (see Speas (1989, 1991)).15 Speas (1989) points out that there are three conceptual arguments which support the derivational theory. The first goes back to Epstein (1987, 1991) and Uriagereka (1988). Epstein, who discusses the argument-adjunct asymmetries in long-distance relations and more specifically the different behavior of the traces of who and why, proposes the following generalization: (61)

a. b. c.

Α-positions, and only Α-positions, are indexed at D-structure. Movement only copies indices already assigned (i.e., movement does not create indices). There is no indexing at S-structure. (Epstein (1987, p. 117; 1991, p. 53))

Epstein applies the assumptions of (61) to the examples in (62) and speculates that the difference between (62a) and (62b) suggests that the trace of why is not present at S-structure, in contrast to the trace of who. This is signaled by the fact that the trace in (62b) does not carry an index. (62)

a. b.

Who; do you know t,. Why do you know Bill t.

According to (61a), only an element in an Α-position, like who in (62a), can carry an index. Since movement only copies indices as specified in (61b), why remains without an index. This proposal, which basically describes adjuncts as neglectable in the mapping process between D-structure and S-structure, comes close to the generalization forwarded in Uriagereka (1988, p. 131) given in (63): (63)

Adjuncts are not licensed until S-structure.

Uriagereka claims that assuming (63) is true, the reason why extraction from adjuncts is excluded is straightforwardly accounted for: "extraction is a relation

Focus theory and theta-saturation

theory as methods of licensing

225

defined in the mapping from DS to SS. If adjuncts are not there, though, a relation extracting from them is just ill-defined" (p. 132). The second conceptual reason is based on the first in that many linguists have concluded that if Chomsky's (1981) definition of D-structure as a "pure representation of GF-theta" is correct, it is implied that the D-structure does not contain any material not included in the theta-grid of a head. Adjuncts are not provided for in the theta-grid of the verb and therefore may not be licensed at Dstructure. The third conceptual reason for the assumption that adjuncts are not present at D-structure stems from Chomsky's (1981, p. 133) discussion of the toughconstruction. Epstein (1987, 1991), Uriagereka (1988, p. 291), and Lebeaux (1988) note that Chomsky's analysis is only valid if based on generalized transformations; therefore, the process of GTs should be allowed for other substitution operations, such as adding adjuncts in the derivation of S-structure. The fact that Chomsky (1992) returns to his original proposal from the LSLT (1955/1975), where he introduces the concept of GT, lends the theory of GT additional support. He conceives of GT as a substitution operation which inserts a phrasemarker in an empty position of the kernel phrasemarker, thus forming a new phrasemarker. However, Chomsky (1992) is mute on the issue of how adjuncts are appropriately analyzed in a minimalist theory of grammar.16 I will concentrate on Lebeaux's (1988, 1991) proposal in more detail since he supports the claim that adjuncts are added to the phrasemarker by GTs after Dstructure with interesting empirical evidence.17 He presents two sets of data which show that the binding principle C applies to WH-phrases which include a referential expression in argument position differently than to those which contain a referential expression in adjunct position. In the first set of data, the referential expressions are embedded in a CP, and in the second set, the referential expressions are embedded in a PP (see Lebeaux's (1988) examples (36) and (37) on p. 146): (64)

a. b. c. d.

*Hej believed the claim that John; is nice. *Hej liked the story that John; wrote. ""Whose claim that John; is nice did he; believe? Which story that John; wrote did he; like?

Examples (64a) and (64b) are both ungrammatical due to a violation of binding principle C. However, there is a clear contrast in the grammaticality of the WHextracted structures in (64c) and (64d). This contrast was first observed by van Riemsdijk & Williams (1981), who claim that antireconstruction effects apply in the case of (64d), an occurrence which might be attributable to the depth of embedding. Lebeaux (1988) argues against their assumption and proposes that the

226

The motivation of the intonational model

difference in grammaticality has to do with an argument-adjunct distinction instead. (65)

a. b. c. d.

destroyed those pictures of John;. *Hej destroyed those pictures near Johnj. ?*Which pictures of John; did he; destroy? Which pictures near John; did he; destroy?

Like the examples in (64), the picture-noun examples in (65a) and (65b) both constitute violations of binding principle C since the referential expressions are illegitimately bound by a coindexed pronoun. In the corresponding WH-extracted cases, only (65c), and not (65d), is excluded. Lebeaux argues that the contrast in grammaticality between (64c) and (64d), on the one hand, and (65c) and (65d), on the other, results from the fact that in the c-examples the referential expression is embedded in an argument, whereas in the d-examples it is embedded in an adjunct. In contrast to van Riemsdijk and Williams' hypothesis of depth of embedding, he proposes that the relevant generalization must make reference to the argumentadjunct distinction, as in (66): (66)

If α, α a name, is contained within a fronted adjunct, then Condition C effects are abrogated; otherwise not. (Lebeaux (1988, p. 148))

The contrast is thus attributed to the fact that the condition C effects are canceled if the referring expression occurs in a fronted or WH-extracted adjunct, but not if it occurs in a fronted argument. Lebeaux offers an explanation of the generalization in (66) within the derivational approach to the argument-adjunct distinction. Assuming that condition C holds at each level of representation, and assuming further that adjuncts are added after condition C applies at D-structure, then the puzzle is solved. (64c) and (65c) are excluded because arguments must be present at D-structure, and in each case the subject John c-commands the referring expression. If, however, adjuncts are adjoined to the kernel sentence later in the derivation at a point where the subject cannot c-command the referring expression as in (64d) and (65d), then the sentences are grammatical. This argument seems compelling on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Like Epstein (1987) and Uriagereka (1988), Lebeaux proposes a mechanism, adjoin α , which is reminiscent of a GT that adjoins the adjunct later in the derivation. The definition of this operation is given in (67): (67)

Adjoin-α takes two tree structures and adjoins the second into the first. Let us assume that this always involves Chomsky-adjunction, copying the node in the adjoined-to structure. Like Move-α, Adjoin-α applies

Focus theory and theta-saturation theory as methods of licensing

227

perfectly freely, ungrammatical results ruled out by general principles, interpretive or otherwise. (Lebeaux (1988, p. 148)) The derivational procedure is modeled after Lebeaux (1991, p. 216ff.), as in (68): (68) DS

(substructures respecting the 'argument-of relation)

Move α , Adjoina

SS The derivations for sentences (64a) and (64b) are represented as in (69a) and (69b). Note that Lebeaux assumes a single tree structure (si) for argument structures, as in (69a), but two phrasemarkers for adjunct structures, the kernel sentence (si) and the adjunct substructure (s2), as in (69b): (69)

Base Structures: a. He believed the claim that John is nice. Sj: He believed the claim that John is nice b. s,: s2:

He liked the story that John wrote, He liked the story That John wrote

Lebeaux (1991) further proposes that whereas (64c) has one possible derivation as shown in (70a), "two potential derivations underlie the DS which contain an adjunct" (p. 217), such as (64d) represented in (70b). In one derivation, (70b(i)), the adjunct is adjoined after WH-movement, and in the other derivation, (70b(ii)), it is adjoined before WH-movement. The derivation of argument structures has only one derivation, namely that in which WH-movement has applied:

228

(70)

The motivation of the intonational model

Derivations: a.

DS: SS:

*He believed whose claim that John is nice. —Move **—> *Whose claim that Johnj is nice did he; believe?

b.

(i)

DS:

s,: s2: s,:

Ηε; liked which story That John wrote Which story did he; like t

M(

?V