Fathers of the Lega: Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism in Historical Perspective [1 ed.] 9781003297420, 9781032285658, 9781032285665

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Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Italy

FATHERS OF THE LEGA POPULIST REGIONALISM AND POPULIST NATIONALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE George Newth

Fathers of the Lega

This book investigates the historical roots of the Italian Republic’s oldest surviving political party, the populist far-right Lega (Nord), tracing its origins to post-war Italy. The author examines two main case studies: the Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) the Piedmontese Movement for Regional Autonomy (the MARP) and the Bergamascan Movement for Autonomy (the MAB), both of which formed a first wave of post-war populist regionalism from 1955 to 1960. The regionalist leagues which later emerged in both Piedmont and Lombardy in the 1980s – and which would later form part of the Lega Nord – represented in many ways a revival of the MRAs’ populist regionalist discourse and ideology and, therefore, a second wave of post-war populist regionalism. Despite this, neither the MRAs nor the 20-year gap between these waves of activism have received the attention they deserve. Drawing on a series of archival and secondary sources, this book takes an innovative approach which blends concepts and theories from historical sociology and political science. It also provides a nuanced examination of the continuities and discontinuities between the MRAs and the Lega from the 1950s until the time of publication. This contributes to debates not only in contemporary Italian history, but also on populism and the far right. While rooted in historical approaches, the book’s interdisciplinarity makes it suitable for students and researchers across a variety of subject areas including European history, modern history, and political history. George Newth is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Bath. Researching links between regionalism, nationalism, the far right, and populism, his publications examine the Lega (Nord)’s ideology in relation to Movements for Regional Autonomy (2018), populist regionalism (2019), (anti)-fascism (2022), Euroscepticism (2022), and contentious politics (2022).

Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Italy Edited by Carlotta Ferrara degli Uberti University College London

Mondini Marco University of Padua and Italian German Historical Institute-FBK Trent

Patriarca Silvana Fordham University

Schwarz Guri University of Genoa The history of modern Italy from the late 18th to the 21st centuries offers a wealth of dramatic changes amidst important continuities. From occupying a semi-peripheral location in the European Mediterranean to becoming one of the major economies of the continent, the Peninsula has experienced major transformations while also facing continuing structural challenges. Social and regional conflicts, revolts and revolutions, regime changes, world wars and military defeats have defined its turbulent political history, while changing identities and social movements have intersected with the weight of family and other structures in new international environments. The series focuses on the publication of original research monographs, from both established academics and junior researchers. It is intended as an instrument to promote fresh perspectives and as bridge, connecting scholarly traditions within and outside Italy. Occasionally, it may also publish edited volumes. The sole criteria for selection will be intellectual rigour and the innovative character of the books. It will cover a broad range of themes and methods - ranging from political to cultural to socio-economic history – with the aim of becoming a reference point for groundbreaking scholarship covering Italian history from the Napoleonic era to the present. Drafting Italy Conscription and the Military from 1814 to 1914 Marco Rovinello Jewish Displaced Persons in Italy 1943–1951 Politics, Rehabilitation, Identity Chiara Renzo Fathers of the Lega Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism In Historical Perspective George Newth

Fathers of the Lega Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism in Historical Perspective

George Newth

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 George Newth The right of George Newth to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-28565-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-28566-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-29742-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420 Typeset in Sabon by MPS Limited, Dehradun

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements Introduction 1

vi vii viii 1

Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo

14

Crisis, Transition, and Demands for Regional Autonomy in the History of the Italian Nation-State

54

3

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance

92

4

Making or Unmaking Italians? Regionalism, the Region, and the Nation-State between Two Waves of Activism

119

5

Populist Regionalism

158

6

Populist Nationalism

201

Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism in Historical Perspective: Conclusions

249

Bibliography Index

264 303

2

Figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1

Abeyance: The Genealogy of Piedmontese and Lombard Regionalism. 1946–1991 The Hen with the Golden Egg The Roman Wolf Slave Breaking Free of Chains United Federal States of Italy

98 101 102 103 141

Tables

1.1

1.2 4.1 5.1 6.1

Summarises the key ideational and discursive features examined in the paragraphs above, with a particular emphasis on how each of these features relies on an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy An interpretive framework for three waves of activism: Populist regionalism and populist nationalism Patriotic regionalism vs neo-federalism/secessionism Two waves of populist regionalism Matteo Salvini’s populist nationalism – A third wave of activism

29 30 122 168 219

Acknowledgements

Writing a book is never a solo pursuit. It requires the support of a network of friends, family, and comrades. The fact that there are too many to mention here is incredibly humbling. I hope those whose names do not appear below nevertheless recognise my gratitude and do not interpret their omission here as anything other than my desire to be succinct. Nevertheless, I would be remiss not to mention some names who have been fundamental to this project. This book is dedicated to the memory of Christopher Duggan. Quite simply, the book would not exist without the faith and enthusiasm Christopher showed in the PhD proposal from which it has developed. I continue to be infinitely grateful for Christopher’s careful, discreet, and skilful supervision which was invaluable in the progress that I made in the first two years of my research on this project. A huge debt of gratitude also goes to my former PhD supervisors at University of Bath, Anna Cento Bull and Aurelien Mondon, whose research and guidance have been an inspiration. Thank you to all who have read through various drafts of book proposals and chapters and provided critical, constructive feedback. You know who you are, and this book is stronger for your input. Thanks also to the fantastic team at Routledge for their support throughout the process. Having said that, the usual caveat applies that I take full ownership of any errors or oversights in the text. Grazie mille to my friends and comrades in Bergamo, Milan, and Turin. A huge thanks in particular to Maria Chiara Gonella and Giuseppe Sala for allowing me access to invaluable materials. I would like to thank my parents, Gay and Jonathan Newth, for their emotional and psychological support both throughout my doctoral research and the writing of this book. Last, but by absolutely no means least, a huge thank you to the wonderful Lucy-Anne Katgely for her unconditional love, affection, understanding, and support while I was writing this book.

Introduction

1 Crisis and Leghismo ‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’ is an oft-cited mantra in politics, but what does it mean in practice? One political party which has amplified, navigated, and invariably benefited from a series of crises since its official formation in 1991 is the populist regionalist/nationalist and far-right Lega Nord (hereby referred to as the Lega).1 In 2012, the Lega found itself in a crisis of its own making. Punished by its electorate after a corruption scandal which directly implicated its founder and leader, Umberto Bossi, it languished between 4% and 5% in the polls. Following Bossi’s resignation and the brief interim leadership of party co-founder Roberto Maroni, the task of navigating this internal crisis was handed to Matteo Salvini, elected new Federal Secretary by a landslide in 2013. Salvini’s answer was a gradual but steady abandonment of the party’s historic cause of regionalism for nationalism between 2013 and 2017. In anticipation of general elections in March 2018, Salvini set up a nation-wide sister party, the Lega per Salvini Premier, stripped of the iconic words ‘Padania’ and ‘Nord’ which had long formed part of the Lega’s battle-cry of regional autonomy. Now a vague reference to ‘autonomy and responsibility’ in Salvini’s 2018 electoral programme was all that remained in terms of regional autonomy and federalism. This represented a seismic shift for a party which had since the early 1990s gained significant political capital via the construction of a ‘Northern Question’ that emphasised ‘a growing economic and social gap between a wealthy North and a much less developed South.’2 The Lega, under Bossi, had 18 years previously seized on the crisis of the post-war Italian Republic in the early 1990s, campaigning for a ‘Republic of the North’ to ‘amplify’ this crisis and ‘penetrate into the cracks of a system which was by then in decline’.3 Salvini now promised to put ‘Italians First,’ abandoning the historic battle cry of ‘Rome the Thief’ in favour of focusing on Brussels elites. He received 17% of the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-1

2 Introduction vote in March 2018 and went on to form a coalition government with the populist and anti-establishment Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S). Just like Bossi’s exploitation of the political crisis of the early 1990s, Salvini had, therefore, not allowed the Lega’s internal crisis of 2012 to go to waste. Salvini’s ‘revolution’ marked a watershed moment for the Lega’s identity. However, its significance runs deeper than just a break with the Bossi era. It also signalled a turning point for a tradition of populist regionalism which was born alongside the formation of the Italian Republic in 1948. This book provides a reconceptualisation of the roots of the political phenomenon of the Lega, the programme of which has often been referred to as leghismo (‘league-ism’). Over the following pages, I argue that leghismo not only has roots in the political crisis which led to the transition of the First to Second Italian Republic in the 1980s and 1990s but also in another period of crisis and transition in the 1940s and 1950s. These earlier decades saw the emergence of ‘Movements for Regional Autonomy’ (MRAs), the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco - hereby referred to as the MAB), and the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese - hereby referred to as the MARP), which were in many ways significant antecedents of the leghismo that emerged in the 1980s. Further to this, however, it also considers a third period of crisis and transition: the combined Euro-zone crisis and so-called refugee crisis combined with the internal corruption scandal and crisis of leadership of the Lega which had culminated in the resignation of the party’s charismatic founder and leader, Umberto Bossi, in 2012. In doing so, the book challenges a dominant trend in the literature on the Lega which insists on viewing this party as a uniquely ‘new’ political actor rather than the second wave of populist regionalism in the history of the Italian Republic. The presence of two waves of populist regionalist activism prior to Salvini’s latest wave of populist nationalism raises important questions that this book aims to address; namely, how did three separate periods of crisis and transition affect North Italian populist regionalism, transforming it from a force of unity to one of fragmentation and later into populist nationalism? How did populist regionalism survive, following the decline of the MRAs in the 1960s, only to re-emerge in the form of leghismo in the early 1980s? Finally, to what extent and how do populism and nativism account for continuities and discontinuities between the far-right political message of the MRAs and the Lega? In addressing these questions, Fathers of the Lega reconceptualises the political and ideological roots of Lega, filling a significant gap in the literature by examining the continuities and discontinuities between two waves of North Italian populist regionalism and their eventual evolution into populist nationalism. The following paragraphs will outline the dual approach taken in this book to address these questions.

Introduction

3

2 A Dual Approach to Leghismo As I will illustrate over the following pages, the post-war movements of both the MARP and the MAB were responsible for developing populist regionalist repertoires which attacked the centralist Italian state and argued that regionalism was the best way to cure the country’s ills. This book proposes a dual approach of historical sociology grounded in political science to argue that the regionalist leagues which emerged in northern Italy in the 1980s and from 1992 to 2017, acting under the umbrella term Lega Nord, have clear precedents in the MARP and the MAB. This allows for populism to be viewed as a socio-political phenomenon which has been recurrent but also somewhat intermittent throughout political history both within and outside of Italy.4 Prior to outlining the key concepts and principles behind this approach, it is worth establishing a rationale for why this approach matters. A good point of departure for this is a speech made by the founder of the Lega, Umberto Bossi, in 1994 at the party’s annual rally at Pontida, in which he claimed the 1950s autonomist movement, the MARP, was the ‘Father of the Lega.’5 This claim of direct heritage from the MARP came barely a month after the 1994 elections which inaugurated what became known as the Second Italian Republic. Amidst the birth of this ‘Second Republic,’ in which the Lega formed part of the new governing coalition, it was politically expedient of Bossi to claim historical legitimacy while trying to detach himself from the corruption which had contributed to the fall of the First Republic. While simplistic and lacking in nuance, Bossi’s claim raises an under-researched question for scholars of regionalism, nationalism, populism, and, more broadly speaking, Italian history: to what extent has the Lega been subject to historical analyses in order to understand its emergence? Until now, any comprehensive attempt to look at the phenomenon of leghismo from a historical perspective has found little favour in literature on the Lega. As will be established in a review of a cross-section of literature in the following chapter, most studies have tended to overlook the more historic movements such as the MARP and the MAB.6 Bearing in mind the immediacy of the political challenges to the Italian state to which the Lega contributed in the 1980s and 1990s, it has been natural to treat leghismo as a political rather than a historical subject and, therefore, to look to the immediate decade prior to the first successes of the regionalist leagues in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Veneto. Indeed, histories of the movement have tended to start no earlier than 1979.7 More frequently, the existence of historic movements has in the past been seized upon by Lega Nord ideologues such as Gilberto Oneto and Beppe Burzio who, in writing for Quaderni Padani (Padanian notebooks – a Legaaffiliated journal), have referred to such movements to endow the Lega with historical legitimacy.8 This represents one of the key pitfalls for the historian

4 Introduction who, in trying to provide a critical analysis, is sometimes dealing with the same materials used by those who have clearly partisan political motives. This book presents a challenge to existing approaches to leghismo and argues that the regionalist leagues which emerged in northern Italy in the 1980s and from 1992 to 2017, acting under the umbrella term, Lega Nord, have clear precedents in the MARP and the MAB. It should, however, be stated unequivocally from the outset that the MRAs were not ‘Fathers of the Lega’ in the direct sense which Bossi was suggesting; it is historically inaccurate to claim a direct line of continuity between the MRAs and leghismo due to the differing contexts in which each movement operated. Nevertheless, the post-war populist regionalists did in many ways set the foundations for the second wave of populist regionalism (and later, Salvini’s populist nationalism). Writing of the latent nature of populist politics, Paris Aslanidis stated that it can often ‘remain “in abeyance,”9 awaiting political reactivation, bound to inspire and inspire again’. It is here that a historical sociological approach grounded in political science can shed light on the change and continuity between different waves of political activism. Historical sociology has taken many different forms in its evolution as a discipline;10 here the term refers to an examination of how contemporary events are shaped by the past.11 It is, thus, an approach which is not dominated by either by history or sociology but is influenced by elements of both, and is situated in the context of a wider and more multi-disciplinary field in which sociology is only one player.12 The two key components in this ‘multi-disciplinary field’ are social movement analysis and political science. Long seen as divergent in nature, these areas are increasingly becoming a focus of cross-disciplinary research,13 to the extent that some have viewed ‘social sciences and politics’ as ‘two different discourses on the same subject’.14 While social movements have been studied under the lens of political concepts such as populism, the same is also true vice-versa, i.e. political movements have been subject to social movement study approaches.15 This has encouraged a ‘cross-fertilisation’ between scholars from political science and social movement analysis as movements are studied as socio-political phenomena by combining political science concepts with social movement theory.16 While concepts from political science (and sociology), such as populism, regionalism, racism, and nativism, will be used to help define the Lega in terms of its political ideology and discourse, the field of social movement analysis – in particular, the social movement theory of abeyance – will enable an examination of links, change, and continuity between leghismo and the MRAs. This dual approach will also allow for an examination of how north Italian regionalism has more recently (to the time of writing) morphed into a broader nationalist narrative under Matteo Salvini.

Introduction

5

However, examining the historic connection between the MRAs and the Lega is of interest not just to Italianists, but to anybody studying the contemporary phenomenon of populism and the far right. It builds on the various scholarly contributions over the past decade which have helped us situate the current wave of populist politics in historical perspective.17 This interest has been sparked by a recent resurgence of populist regionalism, populist nationalism, and populist far right in Europe and beyond. From independence referenda in Catalonia (2017) and Scotland (2014) to the victories of Brexit and Trump (2016), these populist forms of politics have mobilised voters by constructing ‘the people’ in alignment with regional and national identities both against an elite and (in the case of far-right articulations) against ‘others,’ such as foreign migrants and/or Muslims.18 Capitalising on rising distrust in mainstream politics, these parties and campaigns have redrawn the political map and sent shockwaves through decisive electoral victories. Beyond the case of Italy, this book contributes to a greater understanding of the broader political transformations we are currently witnessing vis-à-vis the resurgence of populist politics in Europe by examining connections between populism, regionalism, nationalism, and the far right. While rooted in a contemporary context, such phenomena are often not without historical precedent or a specific genealogy. Political actors, therefore, draw on repertoires, tactics, and discourse from previous waves of activism which can potentially be better understood through the inter-disciplinary approach developed in this book. 3 Where Does the ‘Mother of All Leagues’ Fit into All of This? With this historical approach in mind, there will inevitably be some raised eyebrows from colleagues at the absence of the ‘Liga Veneta’ (the Venetian League) from my analysis over the following pages. This is understandable, considering this party’s status as ‘the mother of all leagues’ (having emerged prior to the Lega Lombarda) and being the first regionalist league to send representatives to the Italian Senate. However, the decision not to include this movement and to instead focus on Lombardy and Piedmont is not the result of mere oversight, but rather due to three interlinked key factors. First, given that one of the aims of this book is to trace the genealogy of leghismo, it should be noted that such a ‘genealogy of the Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto’ and their preceding ‘Venetian Autonomy Movement’ (the MARV) has already been articulated elsewhere.19 Furthermore, while the MAB has been subject to historical analysis by Lynda DeMatteo and Christophe Bouillaud, who have attempted to trace the roots of leghismo this movement, my approach is fundamentally different. First, by highlighting both continuities and discontinuities, it will counter the claim that leghismo was ‘an old political programme, new only in appearance’.20

6 Introduction Second, by focusing on both the MAB and the MARP, I provide a comparative analysis which illustrates how the two movements influenced one another and worked together in the 1950s. This links to a second point which is that Lombardy and Piedmont (more specifically, Bergamo and Turin) were the two principal birthplaces of autonomist movements in the immediate post-war period. The Associazione Regionale Italiana of Turin and the Movimento per le Autonomie Locali in Bergamo would later evolve into the MARP and the MAB to protest against the fact that the ‘ordinary regions were simply not set up’ following the constitution of the post-war Italian Republic in 1948.21 They would both stand in the 1956 administrative elections and later form an alliance in 1958 before gradually disbanding in the 1960s.22 As examined in greater detail in chapter 4, the 1958 alliance included Venetian movements affiliated with the MRAs . Following this, a shortlived Movement for Venetian Autonomy (the MARV) emerged in the early 1960s just as the Piedmontese and Lombard movements were in decline; thus, a diachronic comparison between the MARV and its Piedmontese and Lombard counterparts is beyond the scope of this book. Finally, while the Venetian leagues have been the subject of numerous studies, the role of Piedmontese regionalism in Italian history has been comparatively neglected and deserves to be re-evaluated. The Piedmontese origins of many materials examined in this book from the 1950s onwards will contribute to this re-evaluation of Piedmont’s role in developing regionalist ideology not only in the 1950s but also in the 1980s. Piedmont’s influence on leghismo should not be solely measured on the electoral success of the Piedmontese leagues during these early years. The pioneering role played by a number of Piedmontese autonomists in the mid to late 1950s acted both as an inspiration to its smaller sister movement, the MAB, as well as forming a key part of the framework for leghismo. A nuanced analysis of both continuities and discontinuities between the MRAs and the Lega allows for a reappraisal of the roots of leghismo while raising awareness, in general, of the relationship between political movements and the context in which they are active. For such nuance to come forth from the following pages, the sources used have been viewed through the lens of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and, in particular, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). 4 The DHA: The Importance of Context and Triangulation in Understanding Two Waves of North Italian Populist Regionalism This book draws on an analysis of hundreds of available archival documents on the MARP, the MAB, and the regionalist leagues from Piedmont

Introduction

7

and Lombardy located in both National and Communal archives in Turin, Rome, Bergamo, and Milan, and several other archival repositories in North Italy. From these archives, a rich tapestry of 1950s and 1960s Lombard and Piedmontese regionalist activism emerged, illustrated through visual and textual propaganda as well as other repertoires of contention.23 Given the scope of this book, the methodological approach chosen is one that brings to light and explains the continuities and discontinuities between the political discourse of two waves of populist regionalism. The research method employed here is, therefore, that of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) in the broader field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). Prior to examining the relevance of this approach, I will outline the relevance of the ontological and epistemological foundations of CDS for this study and provide a brief definition of discourse. ‘Discourse’ is understood here as ‘a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.’24 CDS’ key objective of ‘[shedding] light on the ways through which discourse helps to sustain social and political inequalities, abuses of power, and domination patterns’ makes it a suitable methodology for two reasons.25 First, one of the key purposes of the production of texts and images by the two waves of populist regionalist activism was to portray themselves as victims of unequal power relations at the hands of the centralist Italian state. Second, both waves of activism also contributed to unequal power relations by discursively constructing racialised ‘outgroups’ through their textual and visual propaganda. The fact that CDS has proved influential in the study of both populism and far-right politics therefore makes it suitable for examining how populist regionalism evolved into far-right ideology.26 Due to its emphasis on both context and the principle of triangulation, the branch of CDS used in this book is Reisigl and Wodak’s DHA.27 Regarding the first element, while context is important in all approaches to CDS, within the DHA it holds particular significance. This is because it is especially interested in integrating ‘a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive “events” are embedded.’28 Further to this, however, scholars engaging in the DHA also analyse ‘the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change.’29 The DHA, therefore, enables the application of ‘theory to real-world situations while formulating a wider critique situated in various levels of context’.30 The fact that the DHA pays particular attention to the broader socio-political and historical context makes it particularly relevant to the analysis in this book which situates the two waves of populist regionalism firmly in their contexts of crisis and transition of the Italian Republic.31

8 Introduction Historical context will be emphasised and reiterated in all chapters of this book yet plays a particularly significant role in chapter 2 which will outline a history of regionalism and regionalist movements in Italy. The long-term and comparative nature of this study invites a combination of the three ‘practical applications’ of the DHA with regards to context identified by Reisigl.32 This consists of the reconstruction of not only the prehistory of contemporary discourse by relating the present to the past but also the historical interrelationships between discourse within a specific period. This is key to understanding how the Lega Nord’s discourse in the 1980s and 1990s evolved from post-war MRA discourse. The comparative approach also consists of a critical analysis of how different social actors talk, write, sing, etc., about the past with respect to claims of truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness. The content of this book is the product of such analysis of articles, speeches, and textual and visual propaganda from both waves of activism. Meanwhile, the principle of triangulation, i.e. working with different approaches, multi-methodically, and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information, lies at the heart of the analysis in Fathers of the Lega.33 This book’s approach to data collection is rooted in the discipline of history, yet analysis moves beyond historiographical lenses towards theoretical paradigms relating to regionalism, nationalism, populism, and the far right. Further to this, as will become evident in chapter 3, political theory is blended with more sociological approaches and social movement theory in order to understand the ‘gap’ between two waves of populist regionalism and, later on in chapter 6, to examine the transition from populist regionalism to populist nationalism under Matteo Salvini. 5 Chapter Outline Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the key concepts relevant to defining the Lega and its precursor movements in the 1950s. In particular, the chapter addresses the tension between approaches to the Lega which have focused on either its regionalist or populist element. In doing so, the pages lead to a nuanced redefinition of the Lega which takes account of its regionalist ideology, articulated through a populist discourse. The key paradigm to emerge from this chapter is that of populist regionalism/ nationalism, which, with its components of regionalism/nationalism, nativism (as a racist discourse), and populism, will form the basis for the comparison between the different waves of populist regionalist (and later nationalist) activism examined in this book. Further to this, the chapter makes a significant contribution to debates on terminology surrounding the far right by situating both the MRAs and the Lega amongst respective first/second and third waves of post-war right-wing extremism.

Introduction

9

Chapter 2 provides the necessary historical context for navigating the subsequent archive-based and case study-driven chapters. First, it establishes not only the crucial role of crisis and transition in the emergence of regionalist and federalist narratives in the history of Italy; second, it places both the MRAs and the Lega in a wider historical context, whilst also recognising them as movements intrinsically linked to their separate socioeconomic contexts; and finally, the chapter expands on the history of the Lega which in this opening chapter traces a brief history of the Lega, laying the foundations for the analysis of how the Lega’s far-right ideology is connected to the 1950s’ MRAs. Chapter 3 is the book’s first archive-based chapter and completes the genealogy of North Italian populist regionalism started in chapter 2. It develops the social movement theory of abeyance and interprets populist discourse as a form of ‘contentious politics’ to construct a theoretical lens which will allow for the examination of continuities and discontinuities between two waves of populist regionalist activism. By recognising populist regionalism’s potentially latent nature, this framework contributes to the field of populism studies by analysing it as a socio-political phenomenon under the social movement theory of abeyance. The chapter focuses on a case study of three overarching populist regionalist discursive repertoires which were reproduced by the Lega. These repertoires, therefore, act as a useful point of departure for the more in-depth study of the creation and reproduction of repertoires relating to regionalism in chapter 4, populism and nativism in chapter 5, and finally, Salvini’s latest iteration of populist nationalism in chapter 6. Chapter 4 is this book’s second archive-based chapter and turns its attention to defining the central regionalist and federalist ideology of the MRAs and the Lega; it returns to the working definition of ‘crisis’ established in chapter 2 to examine two significant moments of crisis and transition in more depth. This chapter highlights that whereas the MRAs were born alongside and defended the First Italian Republic, the Lega contributed to its fall and the subsequent transition to the Second Italian Republic. Two case studies on the Risorgimento and Europe help illustrate the change and continuity in the discourse of the MRAs and the Lega relating to representations in the political discourse of each wave of activism and how these relate to an emerging notion of a separate northern state of ‘Padania,’ introduced in chapter 3. These case studies bring the chapter to the conclusion that while the MRAs’ aim was to promote regional autonomy and, to a certain extent, federalism as a way of strengthening the Italian nation-state, the Lega promoted a different type of neo-federalism and separatism which aimed to divide the nation-state. Chapter 5, the book’s third archive-based chapter, focuses specifically on populist regionalism in order to analyse how the regionalist, populist, nativist, and racist elements of the Lega hold roots in 1950s autonomist

10

Introduction

politics. This chapter makes use of two case studies of MRA and Lega discourse to illustrate how the populism and nativism at the heart of each wave of activism were articulated through its regionalist ideology. The first case study concerns the ‘regime of the parties’ vs ‘the Northern regions,’ while the second case study focuses on how nativism formed part of a wider racist ideology of both the first and second waves of populist regionalism, situating them as elements of post-war right-wing extremism. Chapter 6 returns to the concept of crisis and transition to examine the end of the second wave of North Italian regionalist activism and the transition to a third wave of activism based on nationalism. Examining both endogenous and exogenous crises with regards the Lega, the chapter examines how the ideological core of the Lega has now shifted from regionalism to nationalism while the populist and nativist elements represent continuity with the two previous waves of populist regionalism. This third wave of activism has also seen Salvini’s Lega play a key role in the absorption of the traditional regionalist elements of the party, which are, for now, being held in abeyance. The concluding chapter of the book re-iterates its key arguments, reinforcing the argument that a more nuanced analysis of both continuities and discontinuities between the MRAs and the Lega allows for a reappraisal of the roots of leghismo while raising awareness, in general, of the relationship between political movements and the context in which they are active. This chapter will also outline some tentative and nonprescriptive ‘rules of engagement’ in terms of studying the latent nature of populist regionalist, nationalist, and far-right ideology. Notes 1 As an amalgamation of autonomist regionalist ‘leagues’ in 1991, the original party name was Lega Nord (Northern League), and from 1996 onwards, ‘Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania (Northern League for the Independence of Padania)’. In 2018, the party rebranded as the Lega, which includes sister organisations Lega per Salvini Premier and Noi con Salvini. As of 3 August 2020, Lega per Salvini Premier has superseded all other denominations. For convenience, this book refers to the party of both the Bossi and Salvini eras as ‘the Lega’. 2 Franco Zappetini and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 17, no.2 (2021): 239–257. 3 Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto, Lega & Padania. Storie e luoghi delle camicie verdi (Bologna: il Mulino, 2015) 33. 4 Margaret Canovan, ‘Two Strategies for the Study of Populism’, Political Studies 30, no.4 (1982): 544–552. Idem, ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, Political Studies 2, no.16 (1999): 2–16. Idem, ‘Populism for Political Theorists’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no.3 (2004): 241–252.

Introduction

11

5 Giuseppe Sangiorgio, ‘Il MARP degli anni 50 Padre della Lega’, La Stampa (12 April 1994). 6 Roberto Biorcio and Tomasso Vitale, ‘Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Centrifugal Regionalism: A Contextual Political Analysis of the Lega Nord’ in Contemporary Centrifugal Regionalism: Comparing Flanders ad Northern Italy, Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for the Science and the Arts Press, 2011, pp. 171–199, (172). 7 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 59. Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, Storia e Sociologia Di Un Nuovo Soggetto Politico, Saggi (Roma: Donzelli, 1993). Idem, Il Male Del Nord: Lega, Localismo, Secessione, Interventi 33 (Roma: Donzelli, 1996). Renato Mannheimer, La Lega Lombarda, 1. ed. in “Idee”, Idee/Feltrinelli (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1991). Luciano Constantini, Dentro La Lega. Come nasce, come cresce, come comunica (Roma: Koine Edizioni, 1994). 8 For analyses of precursors to the Lega, by two Lega ideologues, please see: Beppe Burzio, ‘Da “La Permanente al M.A.R.P”: Breve viaggio nell’autonomismo piemontese’, Quaderni Padani 6, no.32 (November–December 2000): 5–12. and Gilberto Oneto, Polentoni o Padani? Apologia Di Un Popolo Di Egoisti, Xenofobi, Ignoranti Ed Evasori: In Difesa Della Comunità Più Diffamata Della Storia, Quaderni Padani 101–102 (maggio-agosto 2012) (Rimini: Il cerchio, 2012) 22. 9 Abeyance as a sociological theory will be examined in greater detail in chapters 1 and 3 of this book; however, for now, it is worth noting that it broadly refers to a pattern of temporary activity or suspension. Common synonyms include cold storage, deep freeze, doldrums, dormancy, cessation, holding pattern, moratorium, and suspended animation. For more detail, see: David. A Snow and Colin Bernatsky, ‘The Conterminous Rise of RightWing Populism and Superfluous Populations’ in Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Volume 1, Concepts and Theory., eds. Gregor Fitzi, Juergen Mackert, and Bryan Turner (London and New York: Routledge, 2019) 130–146. 10 Gerard Delanty and Engin. F. Isin, ‘Introduction: Reorienting Historical Sociology’ Handbook of Historical Sociology ed.s Idem (London: Sage) 1–9 (2). Richard Lachmann, What Is Historical Sociology? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Comparative Historical Sociology and the State: Problems of Method’, Cultural Sociology 10, no.3 (September 2016): 335–351, https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975516639085. Richard Saull, Alexander Anievas, Neil Davidson, Adam Fabry (eds). The Longue Durèe of the Far-Right: An International Historical Sociology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 11 Delanty and Isin, ‘Introduction: Reorienting Historical Sociology’, 2. 12 Ibid.

12

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13 For more detail on cross-disciplinary developments regarding political science and social movement studies, see: George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. Paris Aslanidis, ‘Populism and Social Movements’. In The Oxford Handbook of Populism, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 305–325. Kenneth M. Roberts, ‘Populism, Social Movements and Popular Subjectivity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 681–695. 14 Michel Huysseune, Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy, Studies in Ethnopolitics, v. 5 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006). Anna Cento Bull, ‘Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 171–189. 15 Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance’. 16 Aslanidis, ‘Populism and social movements’, 313. Roberts, ‘Populism, social movements and popular subjectivity’, 692. 17 Federico Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017). Enzo Traverso and Régis Meyran, The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right (London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2019,) 21. Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Populism and Italy: A Theoretical and Epistemological Conundrum’, Modern Italy 27, no.1 (2022): 5–17). https:// doi.org/10.1017/mit.2021.66 18 Katy Brown, ‘When Eurosceptics Become Europhiles: Far-Right Opposition to Turkish Involvement in the European Union’, Identities 27, no.6 (1 November 2020): 633–654, https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2019.1617530. Bhambra, ‘Comparative Historical Sociology and the State: Problems of Method’. Kurt Adam Sengul, ‘Performing Islamophobia in the Australian Parliament: The Role of Populism and Performance in Pauline Hanson’s “Burqa Stunt.”’ Media International Australia 184, no.1 (2022): 49–62. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1329878X221087733 19 Percy Allum and Ilvo Diamanti, ‘The Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 151–171 (159). 20 Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda DeMatteo, “Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi” in Culture politiche e territorioli in Italia 1945–2000, ed. Adriana Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52 (33). 21 David Hine, ‘Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 109–130 (111). 22 George Newth, ‘The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no.4 (8 August 2019): 384–406, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0031322X.2019.1615784.

Introduction

13

23 Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances, 1st ed (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 24 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity, 1996) 64. 25 Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, ‘Critical Discourse Studies in/of Applied Contexts’ in The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, eds. John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018) 120 –132 (121). 26 Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon, ‘The Role of the Media in the Mainstreaming of the Far Right’, IPPR Progressive Review 29, no.2 (September 2022): 147–153, https://doi.org/10.1111/newe.12306. John E. Richardson and Monica Colombo, ‘Race and Immigration in Farand Extreme-Right European Political Leaflets’, in Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies. eds. Christopher Hart and Piotr Cap (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) 521–542. Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (London: SAGE Publishing, 2015). Ruth Wodak and John E Richardson (eds.) Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text (New York: Routledge, 2013). 27 Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Studies, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE Publishing, 2009) 87–121. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Martin Reisigl, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach’, in The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, eds. John Flowerdew and John. E. Richardson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018) 44–59. (53–54). Brown and Mondon ‘Populism, the media, and the mainstreaming of the far right’. 31 Reisigl, ‘The discourse-historical approach’, 53. 32 Ibid., 53–54. 33 Ibid.

1

Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo

1.1 Introduction Writing about any political party is fraught with difficulties. One of the most significant of these is navigating conflicting interpretations of what the party in question stands for, who it represents, and why it emerged in the first place. When studying the history of the Lega (Nord), the situation is, arguably, made more difficult due to the fact that the party has been typical of the ‘chameleonic’ nature of populist parties,1 fluctuating between federalism, secessionism, devolution, and nationalism. Furthermore, the chaotic context in which the Lega emerged – amidst corruption scandals and the disappearance of the Christian Democrat-Communist polarisation in Italian politics – and the Lega’s ability to exploit this crisis of the late 1980s/early 1990s led to an equally chaotic way of defining what the movement was and who/what it represented. The initial interpretation of the Lega as a protest movement was discredited as its durability saw it ride the crest of an anti-system wave and increased vote share in the Second Italian Republic.2 Many scholars came to see the Lega as a regionalist populist movement or a subcultural party.3 As the party’s policies shifted to the right, it became the focus of studies which defined it as a far-right party.4 Diamanti’s analysis of the Lega as a political entrepreneur allowed for an analysis of the movement’s development into four different stages in which it changed its political appeal in line with the changing socio-economic realities of the regions in which it was operating.5 Meanwhile, Cento Bull and Gilbert noted the importance of distinguishing ‘between two levels of analysis: structure and agency’ and argued that ‘structural factors, the party’s programme and its evolving world view, and the nature of its electorate’ all needed to be taken into consideration when analysing the Lega.6 As observed by Cento Bull and Gilbert in their book, after studying the various categorisations of the movement, readers would be ‘fighting a sense of confusion’ and asking, ‘what is the Lega?’7

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-2

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 15 In terms of how this book adds to these debates there are three points which are examined in this chapter. First, as a useful point of departure, is whether the Lega’s programme should be viewed as wholly unprecedented in Italian history.8 Bearing in mind the immediacy of the political challenges to the Italian state to which the Lega contributed in the 1980s and 1990s, it has been natural to treat leghismo as a political rather than a historical subject and, therefore, to look to the immediate decade prior to the first successes of the regionalist leagues in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Veneto. A second point relates to the extent to which 1950s’ Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) should be viewed as Fathers of the Lega. Existing studies which examine connections between post-war regionalism and leghismo have tended to lack nuance and eschew approaches which encourage an examination of both change and continuity between cycles of contention/waves of activism.9 A third and final point relates to whether the Lega’s regionalist, populist, and far-right identities should be analysed separately or as overlapping ideologies and discourses.10 Over the course of the following pages, I will address these three points and, in doing so, establish the necessary conceptual and theoretical framework to examine leghismo from a dual perspective of political science and historical sociology. While the intention of this chapter is not to replicate debates and discussions which have been well-established elsewhere,11 the first section of this chapter will examine a cross-section of literature which dovetails with the overarching issues raised above; namely, the historical precedents to leghismo and the centre of gravity between regionalism, populism, and far-right ideology. Having established the literary context for this study, the second section will proceed to outline the conceptual frameworks necessary to navigate the following chapters. On the one hand, this book relies on concepts from both political science andsociology/social movement analysis. This will enable the examination of the MRAs and the Lega as ‘populist regionalist’ and, latterly, ‘populist nationalist’. This populist regionalist/nationalist framework emphasises how ethnic/exclusionary forms of regionalism and nationalism overlap with racist ideology; meanwhile populism and nativism are interpreted as discourses via which these ideologies are articulated. On the other hand, a historical-sociological framework enables examinations of the change and continuity between different waves of activism.12 Indeed, ‘concepts from this discipline strive to identify and explain not just passing phenomena but also longer term patterns of social interactions’, and will therefore play a key role in this book’s historical approach to populist regionalism and populist nationalism.13 The concluding section summarises the key contributions of this chapter in terms of conceptual and theoretical debates, providing signposts for where each framework will be used and/or developed throughout the book.

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1.1.1 Debates and Definitions

The taxonomy of the Lega since the 1980s has helped our understanding of a constantly changing and evolving political organisation.14 The following section examines a cross-section of this literature to identify the dominant themes to which this book offers a contribution. It then concludes by reflecting on the limitations of existing historical analyses of the Lega in particular, the lack of attention paid to how 1950s North Italian regionalism evolved into far-right ideology. 1.1.1.1 Historical Approaches to the Lega

Central to this book is the contention that there have been two separate waves of populist regionalist activism in North Italy in two distinct periods of Italian history. The following paragraphs therefore highlight accounts of the Lega which have taken a historical approach to this party to tease out the gap in the literature which this book seeks to address.15 While early scholarly work presented the regionalism proposed by the Lega as a new political offer, it was often contextualised in long-standing issues affecting Italy. In particular, the historic North-South divide in Italy has been seen as a key contributing factor to the rise of leghismo.16 Others, providing a brief history of the socio-economic conditions in Italy from the 1960s to the 1980s, have rooted the rise of leghismo in the history and subculture of north-eastern industrial districts.17 Meanwhile, diachronic perspectives on the crisis enveloping the Italian Republic in the late 1980s and early 1990s viewed the emergence of leghismo as part of a series of turning points (svolte) in Italian history and the latest of a series of failed attempts to ‘make Italians’.18 In addition to studying the Lega as a party of Italian history, there have also been histories of the Lega itself which examine the development of the party and its political message. Several accounts have examined leghismo in four different stages, analysing how the party evolved and adapted in line with the changing socioeconomic realities of the regions in which it was operating.19 Indeed, more recent histories have adopted this approach, taking advantage of the fact that (at the time of writing) more than four decades have passed since the emergence of the first regionalist leagues. For instance, Barcella’s history of the party is part of a burgeoning literature examining change and continuity between the Bossi and Salvini era, albeit one which does not look comprehensively beyond the 1980s in terms of historical context.20 The fact that much of the emerging literature on Salvini’s Lega has made use of the term populism and/or populist radical right to define the difference between the Bossi era, widely understood as ‘regionalist populist,’ raises an important point with regards to the Lega as part of the wider history of Italian populism.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 17 While terminological debates surrounding the Lega’s populist and/or far-right identity are covered in greater detail in the following text, it is worth examining here how the Lega has often been interpreted as part of Italy’s history as a ‘promised land of populism’.21 Bossi’s protest against the partitocrazia (partyocracy) which sought to sow division between Italy’s parties and the ‘common people’, invited scholarly comparisons with the 1950s populist movement, Uomo Qualunque (UQ), led by Guglielmo Giannini.22 However, the same could also be said of Bossi’s Lega and Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, with the latter drawing on similar populist articulation of the people vs the elites. It is certainly useful to note that ‘in the history of the Italian Republic, the populist mentality has, with different levels of intensity and greater or lesser persistence, left deep and visible traces’;23 however, historical analyses which focus solely on populism are insufficient as they overlook the main ideological differences between these populist movements. Indeed, the UQ had lacked a vital element of regionalism and federalism, and not only were the Lega’s and the UQ’s electoral strongholds completely different but also, in contrast to the Lega’s federalist programme, UQ ‘was against the introduction of the regions: worried that they would damage the unity of the country’.24 Unlike UQ, the presence of both populist discourse and regionalist ideology in the transition between the First and Second Italian Republic saw the re-emergence of debates as old as the unified Italian state itself, centring most prominently around an age-old fracture between the North and South. In 1995, the history of this fracture reached a new stage as Bossi changed the focus of the Lega from federalism to secessionism and now campaigned for the independence of ‘Padania,’ an ‘imagined nation’ with vaguely defined borders above the river Po. This secessionist turn opened up avenues for historical approaches, which were examinations of how the Lega itself framed historical events to suit its political project, how the geography of Padania was delineated,25 and the Lega’s nation-building methods.26 The Lega treated history as a ‘wardrobe to be plundered for whatever symbols split Italy in a convenient way and achieved the appropriate resonance with the public’.27 This involved ‘reframing’ and ‘articulating long-standing arguments surrounding regional autonomy in terms of a new and politically more contentious Northern question’.28 The idea of ‘reframing’ raises a further important point regarding historical approaches to the Lega.29 As noted by Biorcio and Vitale ‘The Northern Question was “invented” by the Lega and embedded in a well-defined frame: that of the dispute of the labouring North against an inefficient, inefficacious, and ineffective (good-for-nothing) political centre’.30 Diani, for instance, has previously explained the success of the Lega Nord’s populist discourse in the early 1990s by linking ‘the congruence

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between the leagues’ message and the master frame that characterised the political opportunity structure of the early 1990s in Italy’.31 Building on Giordano’s observation that ‘political regionalism is not a new phenomenon in Italy,’ Basile highlighted how Bossi’s Lega ‘reframed’ longstanding themes and arguments surrounding regional autonomy such as ‘hostility’ against the ‘wasteful’ Southern Italy and a harsh critique of the inefficiency of the central State,32 and ‘articulate them in terms of a new and politically more contentious Northern question’.33 This is particularly important when considering the connections between the ideas of the MRAs and the Lega as such themes were not only previously present in the 1970s, but had roots in the 1950s and 1960s.34 This relates to a further historical perspective on leghismo, the Northern Question, and Padania, which interpret the Lega ‘in many ways a long tradition of movements that have attempted to devolve power from the central state in Italy’.35 On the one hand, studies on the growth of ‘ethnonationalist’ mobilisation during the 1960s36 claim that there are ‘two distinct groups of autonomist movements’ in Italy – Historic groups and the Lega.37 The ‘historic groups’ highlighted in these studies, however, are not the 1950s movements such as the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (MARP) and the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (MAB), but instead ethno-regionalist groups such as the Sardinian Action Party, the Union Valdotaine (UV), and the South Tyrol People’s Party (SVP).38 On the other hand, studies have argued how Padania holds roots in the European ‘ethnic’ wave of the 1970s which resulted both in the diffusion of new ideas about the recognition of national minorities and the multiplication of efforts to mobilise and organise regionally based ‘political parties’.39 A sharp distinction between ‘historic groups’ and the Lega accounts neither for the links that early forms of leghismo held with Bruno Salvadori’s UV nor the connections between the SVP and former members of the MAB . Neither the MRAs nor the Lega can, therefore, be considered a completely distinct entity from historic ethno-regionalist movements. This raises the question of how and to what extent the 1950s’ movements examined in this book have been considered precursors to leghismo. Some scholarly work has paid lip service to the 1950s movements without examining any extensive connections with leghismo. These have included 1950s’ autonomists in Piedmont,40 the Veneto,41 Bergamo,42 and even in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.43 While some of these studies also contain significant imprecisions in terms of the MRAs’ ideology, discourse, and chronology,44 others have focused solely on the anti-southernism of both the MARP and the MAB.45 While anti-southernism certainly formed a key element of the MRAs, focusing solely on this aspect overlooks the wider raison d’être, which was to activate the regional statutes of Italy’s Constitution.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 19 Meanwhile, other scholars have drawn direct continuities between the MRAs and leghismo at the expense of analysing the significant discontinuities. This includes claims by DeMatteo and Boulliaud that Umberto Bossi’s Lega Lombarda was ‘nothing more than the latest manifestation of an autonomist current rooted in the Catholic subculture in Bergamo’.46 This claim that leghismo was ‘an old political programme, new only in appearance,’47 neglects the broader ideas of the post-war autonomists pertaining to national unity which over the pages of this book, will emerge as a key element of discontinuity between the two waves of activism. Indeed, such an approach, which insists too strongly on continuities, risks overlapping – albeit unintentionally – with a discursive strategy adopted by Lega activists and ideologues, including Bossi himself, who seized on the existence of the MARP and the MAB as historical legitimisation for the Lega.48 The Lega leader’s simplistic representation of both the MRAs in his semiautobiographical history of the Lega in 1999 as movements which fought for ‘freedom for the North against Roman oppression’, indeed, builds on his previous statement that the MARP was the ‘Father of the Lega’.49 While existing studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of why the Lega enjoyed the success it did in the 1980s and 1990s, none of these interpretations take a nuanced consideration of the change and continuity from a history which included the MRAs in Piedmont and Lombardy in the 1950s. The above-mentioned literature has dealt predominantly with the first issue raised in the introduction to this chapter vis-à-vis the extent to which the Lega should be considered as a second wave of post-war regionalism. What has not been examined to any significant measure are the ways in which the Lega’s ideology and discourse have been interpreted and how this relates to an intersection between its far right and regionalist identities. It is to this issue that the chapter now turns. 1.1.1.2 ‘Regionalist Populist,’ ‘Radical Right Populist,’ ‘Populist Radical Right,’ ‘New Right,’ or ‘Extreme Right’?

A further key theme of this book relates to a search for a centre of gravity between the Lega’s two dominant ideologies: regionalism and the far right. The Lega has been subject to definitional debates which have focused largely on the party’s use of populist discourse as well as its regionalist demands. This has seen a proliferation of conceptual paradigms applied to the Lega, ranging from regionalist populist to radical right populist, as well as populist radical right, new right, and extreme right. Space does not permit a full examination of these terms and how/the extent to which they have been applied; nevertheless, the following paragraphs will highlight some of the dominant paradigms which have been used and the debates which have accompanied them.

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Debates surrounding far-right terminology have been well documented elsewhere, with Mudde referring to a ‘terminological chaos’ which ‘is not the result of fundamental differences of opinion over the correct definition.’ Rather, it is ‘largely the consequence of a lack of clear definitions’.50 Mudde notes that ‘it is not exceptional to see one author use three or more different terms to describe the same party or group of parties in one article, if not on a single page’.51 Passarelli and Tuorto’s examination of Matteo Salvini’s Lega provides an illuminating example of this and a useful point of departure for examining the application of terminology to this party. Although the authors build on their previous own work to define the Lega predominantly as ‘extreme right,’52 they go on to use no less than six other terms throughout their book to describe the party family to which the Lega belongs. Amongst these terms are, ‘New Extreme Right,’ ‘National Neo-Fascists,’ ‘New Right,’ ‘New European Right,’ ‘Radical Right,’ and ‘Populist’.53 This is by no means a new issue, with numerous studies having previously attributed various ‘far-right’ labels to Bossi’s Lega Nord. On the one hand, some scholars viewed Bossi’s Lega as an embodying the ideals of the intellectual new right, radical right populism, or the populist radical right. Regarding the ‘new right’ (Nouvelle Droite), this term refers to the ideas of philosophers such as Alain De Benoist which influenced (and to an extent continue to influence) Lega policy. In particular, the idea of ‘cultural differentialism,’ i.e. that ‘certain cultural differences simply cannot be overcome,’ became a key justification used by Lega politicians and ideologues for the party’s racist politics.54 Moreover, the Lega’s early belief that ‘a new Europe should be divided into macro-regions, which could establish the basis for a new type of federal Europe,’ overlapped with the new right’s focus on ethno-regionalism.55 This led some scholars to argue that leghismo and the new right were ‘different, but complementary faces of [...] sophisticated rightwing ethno-regionalist ideology’.56 Meanwhile, Zaslove drew on Betz’ paradigm of radical right populist parties to group the Lega Nord as part of the ‘third wave’ of right-wing extremism that had begun to emerge in the early 1970s.57 Zaslove defined the Lega as ‘radical right populist’ due to Bossi’s stance against a ‘multi-racial and multi-ethnic’ society, his ‘opposition to the social integration of marginalised groups, and […] appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism’.58 At the same time, Mudde included the Lega in his analysis of populist radical right parties (PRRPs), despite the party’s regionalism, which he viewed as anathema to far right politics. This separation of regionalism and far/radical right politics was predicated on viewing nativism as deriving solely from nationalism. Indeed, Mudde ‘exclude[d] regionalism from the core feature of’ the radical right ‘party family’.59 This perceived incompatibility between regionalist and far right ideology has been at the root of many of the debates surrounding the Lega’s far-right identity, at least when considering its early stages (1979–1996).60

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 21 In response to those who argued that the Lega formed part of the new right, Cento Bull pointed towards some significant differences between leghismo and the new right’s intellectuals. First, in its early stages, ‘the European Union (EU) and globalisation were allies’ of the Lega and Bossi believed ‘that the Northeast as a region was already competing successfully in the global economy’.61 Second was the fact that the party represented a ‘complex interrelation of neo-liberalism, federalism, and ethnicity’.62 Although the Lega could certainly be defined as a racist party, this was viewed as subordinate to the wider aim of delegitimising and dismantling the Italian state.63 These aims involved ‘breaking down the prevailing political and social consensus and attacking partyocracy, consociationalism, and state welfarism’.64 Prior to secessionism, the Lega did, indeed, hold more ‘idiosyncratic positions’ on ‘European co-operation and federal ideals of selfdetermination’ than other parties in the third wave of post-war right-wing extremism.65 The party’s ‘performative anti-fascism’ also depicted its regionalist project as ‘anti-fascist’ and ‘beyond left and right’; such discourse was performative in that it enabled the Lega to mask its exclusionary and racist policies as part of a wider struggle for freedom against what it depicted as the ‘fascist centralist state.’ Such discourse sets it aside from far-right parties with a fascist heritage, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National.66 A point of agreement between Zaslove, Cento Bull and Gilbert, and several other scholars, however, was that the Lega became a far-right party, but only after its ‘nationalist project’ of campaigning for an independent ‘Padania’ (an imaginary nation-state north of the River Po) from 1996 onwards. The argument here was that ‘since the foundation of Padania […] the Lega should be counted as an authentic member of the far-right “family” of political parties’.67 This association of secessionism/ nationalism with far-right ideology worked from the same logic which Mudde employed to exclude regionalism from his PRRP definition, i.e. ‘regionalism should not be used for parties that strive for separatism to fulfil their nationalist aspirations of a mono-cultural nation-state’.68 However, what such analyses tended to overlook was the central role of racism in far right ideology. By this logic, the Lega should be considered a far right party since its inception, not despite but because of its regionalist ideology, which was articulated in an ethnic and exclusionary way and encouraged hard borders against migration while racialising both southern Italians and foreign migrants. Other scholars, however, objected to labels such as far right and radical right even after the Lega’s shift towards Padanian nationalism/secessionism and argued that it wasn’t until Salvini’s complete abandonment of the Lega’s historic cause of regionalism in 2017 that the Lega should be considered far right. Indeed, Duncan McDonnell eschewed any definition of the Lega Nord rooted in terminology related to the far right, insisting instead on the

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term ‘regionalist populist.’ This term emphasised that ‘the Lega’s regionalist and populist claims were profoundly intertwined, fed on each other, and could hardly be dissociated’.69 Regionalist populism had first been coined by Biorcio who argued that ‘the political model’ offered by the Lega Lombarda ‘appeared as an original combination of regionalism and populism,’70 i.e. ‘the exaltation of values such as “industriousness” and “entrepreneurship” contrasting them with the “lack of state apparatus” which “attributed to the Lega a general sense of revolt of civil society against the political class.”’71 In his work with Daniele Albertazzi, McDonnell has made extensive use of the term ‘regionalist populism’ to describe the Lega, arguing that the party framed the problems of the north as a centre-periphery question within a ‘people’ vs ‘the elite’ populist discourse.72 These authors argue that the party has historically depicted the North as ‘advanced and hard-working regions’ oppressed by a corrupt political class and inefficient bureaucracy, both of which are in the hands of ‘southerners’.73 Woods, following a similar approach, highlighted how ‘northern regional identity is defined in oppositional terms […] the real interest of the people is undermined and corrupted by outside political elites and parties who do not share their values’ and that the Lega engages in a ‘negative production of others,’ i.e. ‘corrupt politicians in Rome, the mafia globalisation, and immigrants’.74 A debate which emerged in 2006–2007 between Andrej Zaslove and Duncan McDonnell centred around whether the Lega should be viewed as radical right populist or regionalist populist.75 McDonnell argued that radical right labels acted as a definitional ‘straitjacket’ and diminished the crucial territorial aspect of the Lega and its history as a movement constantly committed to some form of northern autonomy […] seen as an essential part of the solution to the problems of northern Italy.76 This debate is worth mentioning for two reasons. The first is that, despite McDonnell’s claims that the term ‘radical right populism’ distracted from the Lega’s regionalist project, Zaslove highlighted how one term, in fact, did not exclude the other. Instead, Zaslove outlined that ‘claiming that the Lega is a regionally based party does not preclude that the Lega is also a radical right party’.77 Second, and perhaps more importantly, this debate obscured the fact that the terms radical right populist and regionalist populist have more in common than what separates them. This is the assumption that populism is a ‘core ideology’ with either radical right or regionalism ‘serving to determine the ideological emphasis of this specific form of populism’.78 This is part of a wider issue in studies of the far right, that warnings regarding semantic precision have often been neglected.79 The logical conclusion of debates such as those between McDonnell and Zaslove is that populism became the key analytical lens through which the

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 23 Lega is examined.80 While populism has, indeed, played a key role in the Lega’s communication and discursive strategy,81 years of considering populism as a core feature of its ideology have served to obscure and euphemise the party’s racist politics.82 Further to this, however, a specific interpretation of populism has often been applied to the Lega, i.e. one which interprets it as inherently exclusionary and anti-pluralist in nature. Albertazzi and McDonnell, for instance, in their book Populists in Power, in which the Lega forms a key case study, define populism as a thin-centred ideology which pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.83 This emphasis on ‘dangerous others’ naturally lends itself more to farright movements and their tendency to interpret immigration as an invasive strategem rather than a consequence of myriad geo-political and socioeconomic factors. Such a trend has continued in contemporary research on Salvini’s Lega. Salvini’s leadership, - in particular his frequent proximity to neo-fascist groups in Italy - has encouraged scholarship which has defined the party as far right, radical right, or extreme right. Nevertheless, there has continued to be a proliferation of terms such as ‘right-wing populism’ or, at times, just ‘populism’ which continues to decentre exclusionary ideologies and discourses which might be more precise, such as racism and nativism.84 Such a focus also risks a conflation between populism and nativism. Indeed, the fact that the Lega’s ideology has been at times defined as ‘nativist populist’85 and ‘nativist nationalist’86 reflects a muddying of the waters of different discourses and ideologies.87 As a result, like populism, nativism has itself at times become a ‘fuzzy’ term for Lega’s racism and Islamophobia.88 Both populism and nativism, therefore, have arguably acted as terms which euphemise and mainstream the Lega’s far-right ideology and discourse. Indeed, in the interest of bringing this section full circle, it is significant that ‘populism’ is one of the series of terms used by Passarelli and Tuorto in their above-mentioned book which putatively examines Salvini’s Lega as an extreme right party. This is indicative of a conflation of populism with far and extreme right politics and reinforces the importance of both semantic and definitional precision. This review of a cross-section of literature on the Lega (Nord) has raised several issues which outline the need for a new approach to leghismo that draws on both political science and historical sociology (in particular social movement studies). The first issue is that existing historical approaches to the MRAs and the Lega have not been successful in capturing the importance of precursors to leghismo or the connections between two waves of

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populist regionalism. While the MRAs have not been completely absent in the canon of literature on North Italian regionalism in general and the Lega in particular, there has been a tendency to either pay lip service to this postwar phenomenon and/or dismiss it as a flash in the pan. The idea, for instance, that ‘the political model’ offered by leghismo was ‘an original combination of regionalism and populism’89 can be called into question by looking at the MRAs’ populist regionalism. Overlooking the connections between two waves of regionalism is detrimental not only to our understanding of Italian political history, but also to the connections between regionalism and far-right ideology. As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this introduction, the nativist and populist discourse of Salvini’s Lega, as well as his party’s far-right ideology, owes much not only to the Bossi period, but also to the more historic 1950s MRAs. This links to a second issue that relates to an exaggerated distinction between the Lega’s regionalist and nationalist identities in terms of the Lega’s far-right ideology. The notion that ‘the Lega started out as a fairly liberal party, both in terms of economics and rights,’90 overlooks the fact that since its formation, the Lega has consistently espoused a far-right ideology, either in its regionalist or nationalist form.91 Prior to Salvini, Bossi had also begun forming connections with other European far right parties.92 Equating far-right politics with nationalism and populism with regionalism is too simplistic, particularly when considering the MRAs as historical precursors to the Lega, insofar as their exclusionary form of regionalism contributed to the development of the Lega’s far-right ideology. As will become apparent throughout this book, but particularly in chapters 5 and 6, racism and its accompanying nativist discourse have been articulated alongside the Lega’s shifting ideologies of regionalism, secessionism, devolution, and, most recently, nationalism, leading to the (cultural and physical) racialisation of a series of ‘out-groups’.93 A final point relates to the use of populism and nativism and how these terms have both been used as proxy terms for racism when defining the Lega.94 The Lega can be seen as a paradigmatic example of a wider issue in studies of the far right vis-à-vis the (mis)use of populism as a proxy term for more stigmatising terminology.95 A key emphasis of this book is on the importance of establishing precise definitions of terms (rather than just choosing a term in itself) when studying both populism and the far right. The following pages turn their attention to outlining these concepts and definitions. 1.1.2 (Re)defining the Lega: Concepts from Political Science and Historical Sociology

The following paragraphs will establish core concepts which allow a comparative analysis of the MRAs and the Lega. Chapters 5 and 6 are

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 25 dedicated to examining the populist regionalism, populist nationalism and far right identity of the MRAs and the Lega in greater detail, . Nevertheless, at this point, it is important to note that this book analyses the first wave of populist regionalism (1947–1963) represented by the MRAs at the intersection between the first and second waves of post-war right-wing extremism (1946–1960; and 1960–1980). Meanwhile, the second wave of populist regionalism (1979–2017) and Salvini’s subsequent wave of populist nationalism (2017 to present day) are examined at an intersection of the third and fourth waves of right-wing extremism (1980–2001; and 2001 to present day).96 While the MRAs are certainly outliers in this categorisation, their populist and nativist discourse arguably contributed to to the development of the Lega’s far right politics.97 The paragraphs below address, the what, how and why regarding the waves of activism examined in this book. The populist regionalist/populist nationalist framework outlined below will enable an examination of the what, regarding change and continuity in discourse and ideology; the various components of this framework will be unpacked in 1.1.2.1, prior to examining how they fit together in 1.1.2.2. This framework, however, will not enable an examination of how and why certain ideational and discursive elements of populist regionalism survived a period of inactivity. For this, it is necessary to view the MRAs and leghismo through the lens of social movement theory and contentious politics, which will be unpacked in subsection 1.1.2.3. 1.1.2.1 Key Ideational (Regionalism, Nationalism, and Far Right) and Discursive (Nativism and Populism) Features

The dual approach taken in this book allows for a greater understanding of the connection between regionalism and far-right ideology by examining the roots of the Lega’s regionalist ideology and its populist and nativist discourse with a new framework of populist regionalism and, latterly, populist nationalism. The key concepts within this framework consist of an understanding of regionalism, nationalism, and far right as ideologies, and nativism and populism as discourses (or logics of articulation). Prior to establishing how a variety of different ideational and discursive features can be brought together into a conceptual framework, it is necessary to first unpack them and examine their meanings. Regionalism, in this book, refers to an ideology which ‘politicises the specificities of the population living in a certain sub-state region vis-à-vis the population of the state as a whole’.98 Following Mazzoleni and Mueller’s definition, regionalist parties are political parties that (a) demand more regional power who [sic] are neither (b) organised on a nation-wide scale nor do

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Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo they (c) possess the ambition to represent the interests and people over, of and in the whole territory of a country. Instead, regionalist parties are organised exclusively on a regional basis and aim to cater for a regional electorate only. (…) [They also] have fully subscribed to the territorial ideology of regionalism: they aspire to government of, by and for the region.99

Regionalism and nationalism can often be viewed as two sides of the same ‘sovereignist’ coin, in that they are advocating for the sovereignty of their nation and region.100 Existing literature on ‘ethno-regionalism’101 and ‘stateless minority nationalism’102 has highlighted how there are often blurred lines between regionalism and nationalism. To take account of this caveat, I borrow from Heinisch, Masetti, and Mazzoleni’s work on the people, the region, and the nation to interpret ‘stateless’ or ‘minority nationalism’ as an ‘internal subcategory of regionalism’.103 While regionalism (and stateless or minority nationalism) can be applied to both the MRAs and the Lega until 2017, since Salvini’s abandonment of this defining feature of the party, the Lega’s central ideology can be broadly defined as ‘state nationalism’.104 This is defined here as ‘a thin ideology which prioritises national divisions over other political issues and promotes the own nation vis-à-vis other nations’.105 Nationalism is, therefore, ‘at the basis of the (putative) nation-state: the nation is presented as the prerequisite social entity and used to justify the state’s raison d’être’.106 As a result, nationalist parties tend to ‘advocate the prevalence of national culture over the many regional/local cultures and identities of pre-modern societies,’ for ‘the centralisation of power in a sovereign state (i.e. the unification of territory, language, culture, and tradition)’.107 As noted above, this book challenges the notion that a strong distinction can be drawn between regionalism and nationalism in terms of respective progressive and regressive politics. The idea that ‘regionalism mostly embraces diversity’108 will be challenged by examining the politics of the MRAs and the Lega. Meanwhile, the notion of nationalism necessarily representing ‘regressive and anti-democratic’ politics has been called into question by several studies which have examined iterations of nationalism from the left wing to the right wing of the political spectrum.109 Nationalism’s and regionalism’s inclusionary or exclusionary nature can be examined, respectively, using a civic vs ethnic dichotomy.110 Civic regionalism and nationalism, for instance, are based on the idea of a more inclusionary idea of belonging in that it entails newcomers ‘living within […] territorial borders and respecting civic values’. Such articulations are ‘premised on an ideological commitment to a common destiny and government through shared civic institutions’.111 On the contrary, ethnic regionalism and nationalism have been argued to use more

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 27 exclusionary criteria for membership of the region and nation, involving a ‘shared language, culture, ethnicity, traditions, and history.’ This is based on the ideas of shared ancestry and a protection of those shared values.112 While this dualism has come under intense scrutiny, with scholars noting the blurred lines between what is thought of as civic and ethnic, it can nevertheless act as a useful heuristic tool to analyse connections between regionalism/nationalism and far-right ideology.113 Indeed, when the region and the nation are viewed in ethnic and exclusionary terms, it is not always possible, nor necessary, to distinguish between regionalist (or nationalist) and far-right ideologies; these may at times overlap and influence one another. As ethnic articulations of regionalism and nationalism tend to determine more objective and exclusionary criteria for membership of the region/nation, this will encourage a racialisation of ingroups and out-groups which is central to far-right ideology and the nativist discourse via which this is articulated.114Indeed, an ‘exclusionary attitude towards immigration and racial/cultural others’ is more likely to be linked to ethnic [rather than civic] regionalism or nationalism.115 When using the term far right in this book, I draw on Mondon and Winter’s definition of parties and movements which espouse ‘a racist ideology,’ albeit ‘often in an indirect, coded [and] covert manner, notably by focusing on culture and/or occupying the space between […] the extreme and the mainstream’.116 Far right ideology is, therefore, a position characterised by a generalised commitment to inequality, with racism at its core. This may be accompanied by a broader ‘politics of fear’ which encompasses various forms of exclusion targeting different marginalised groups.117 This ideology118 is often ’articulated via a nativist discourse which posits a “we” whose identity is simply incommensurable with everything external and “alien” to it’.119 Existing approaches to nativism have defined it as a ‘combination of nationalism and xenophobia’120 while denoting it as potentially ‘nonracist’ or ‘race neutral’. This book builds on my existing research on nativism which argues that such ideational approaches to nativism risk euphemising racist ideology.121 In line with the methodological approach focused on critical discourse analysis, views it instead as a racist and xenophobic discourse structured around an exclusionary vision of ‘the nation’ in which the ‘native’ is discursively constructed as a disadvantaged and threatened ‘in-group’ through its juxtaposition along antagonistic and horizonal lines to a racialised ‘non-native’, ‘foreigner’, ‘non-integrated co-citizen’.122

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One clear benchmark for measuring the nativist discourse within a nationalist or regionalist party is their stance on immigration, and in particular, whether the region and nation are either promoted through a civic criterion of belonging as a ‘land of welcome’ or, conversely, whether they are protected through more ethnic criteria and portrayed as a ‘land of fear’.123 While ‘the former implies that immigration is viewed as a positive phenomenon, contributing both economically and culturally to society while the challenges it entails are manageable […] negative or exclusive stances include reluctance to accept the arrival and settlement of newcomers, who are perceived as problematic and threatening for society’.124 Regionalist and minority nationalist parties ‘with a positive stance towards immigration tend to portray a civic […] discourse’.125 On the contrary, therefore, a more exclusionary attitude towards immigration and racial/cultural others is more likely to be linked to an ethnic discourse.126 While some scholars believe nativism and populism to be linked,127 the discourse analytical approach taken in this book insists on a clear distinction between these two concepts. Populism plays a central, but different, role to nativism in the waves of activism examined in this book. While nativism is interested in a horizontal juxtaposition between the native and the non-native, populism, on the other hand, is a ‘discourse in which “the people” are juxtaposed to ”the elite” along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which “the people” is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to “the elite” conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group’.128 With its key features being those of ‘people-centrism’ and ‘anti-elitism,’ populist discourse often makes reference to popular sovereignty and the will of the people.129 This discursive approach to populism avoids attributing populism itself with an ‘anti-pluralist’ nature, emphasising that ‘populist politics’ do not have to eradicate the differences between the different groups and demands that are grouped under ‘the people’.130 It is true that populist far-right parties not only construct ‘the people’ against an elite but also ‘as a homogeneous group based on ethno-cultural or racial traits.’ However, rather than being an ‘extension of populism,’ this particular ‘contestation of a liberal-democratic vision of society flows from the particular articulation of nativism with the logic of populism, not from populism itself’.131 Populists also often attempt to present themselves as ‘arbiters of common sense’ and thus speaking for the common man against perceived intellectual elites.132 One final feature of populist discourse, which will become particularly relevant in terms of chapters 5 and 6 of this book, is that of exploitation.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 29 Ruth Breeze has highlighted that ‘in discursive terms, populist discourses usually represent specific social groups (e.g. elites) as having betrayed or exploited the people’.133 Indeed, populists tend to ‘condemn political, economic, and/or cultural elites who neglect, devalue, or exploit the “common people”’.134 This emphasis on exploitation within the antielitist element of populist discourse plays a key role in chapters 5 and 6 of this book in understanding how three waves of populist activism articulated their arguments against different iterations of the elite.135 Table 1.1 summarises the key ideational and discursive features examined in the paragraphs above, with a particular emphasis on how each of these features relies on an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy. The following subsection proposes a revised conceptual framework which combines these ideational and discursive features as a way of examining the different waves of activism in this book. Table 1.1 Summarises the key ideational and discursive features examined in the paragraphs above, with a particular emphasis on how each of these features relies on an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy Ideology/Discourse

Key Features

Us vs Them Dichotomy

(State/majority) nationalism

Centralisation of power in a sovereign state. Prioritisation of national divisions over other political issues Demand for more regional/ sub-state territorial power. Not organised on a nationwide scale

National culture and interests (us) vs Regional culture and interests (them) Regional culture and interests (us) vs National culture and interests (them) ‘The native (us)’ vs ‘The non-native’ ‘foreigner,’ ‘nonintegrated co-citizen’ (them) The People (us) vs The Elite (them)

Regionalism (stateless or minority nationalism) (Far Right) Nativism

A racist and xenophobic discourse structured around an exclusionary vision of ‘the nation’ (or region)

Populism

A discourse which constructs ‘the people’ as ‘a large powerless group’ in juxtaposition to an ‘elite’ conceived as a ‘small and illegitimately powerful group that exploits the people’

Credit: George Newth

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1.1.2.2 Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism

The following paragraphs are dedicated to establishing how the abovementioned concepts converge in an interpretive framework (see Table 1.2). The terms ‘populist regionalism’ and ‘populist nationalism’ are preferred in this volume to the above-mentioned ‘regionalist populism’ (and, by extension, ‘nationalist populism’). This choice follows Cas Mudde’s rationale for using the term ‘populist radical right’ (rather than radical right populism), insofar as it highlights how regionalism and later nationalism were the core ideologies of the different waves of activism examined in this book (from the MRAs to Lega Nord and, finally, to Lega Salvini Premier). These ideologies were articulated via discourses of nativism and populism. Such articulations can be broken into three key conceptual points; namely, a people vs elites dichotomy and expression of the general will; a discourse of exploitation; and, finally, nativism which derives from the ethnic/exclusionary form of nationalism and regionalism. The given framework will act as a key reference point for chapters 5 and 6 which examine the evolution of populist regionalism from the MRAs to the Lega and, latterly, of populist regionalism to populist Table 1.2 An interpretive framework for three waves of activism: Populist regionalism and populist nationalism Conceptual Point

Populist Regionalism

Populist Nationalism

A) People vs elites dichotomy and expression of the general will

Region or minority nation (the people vs state (the elites) Regionalism as guarantor of popular sovereignty

B) Discourse of exploitation

The region exploited by national political and economic elites 1 Immigration as an invasive strategem and threat to the region 2 A racist and racialised process of othering 3 An emphasis on ‘assimilation,’ ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference,’ or ‘stopping the invasion’

Nation (the people) vs supra-state (the elites)/ Internal elites Nationalism as a guarantor of popular sovereignty The nation exploited by supranational, political, and economic elites 1 Immigration as an invasive strategem and threat to the nation 2 A racist and racialised process of othering 3 An emphasis on ‘assimilation,’ ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference,’ or ‘stopping the invasion’

C) Nativism (a racist and xenophobic discourse linked to ethnic and exclusionary articulation of regionalism or nationalism)

Credit: George Newth

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 31 nationalism from the Lega Nord to Lega per Salvini Premier. For the purposes of examining three very different periods of contemporary postwar Italian history, this framework will help examine both the continuities and discontinuities between the three respective waves of activism. A people vs elites dichotomy and expression of the general will equates ‘the people’ with the ‘sovereign’ nation or region. By doing so, populist nationalist and populist regionalist parties claim to represent the expression of the general will of the people in reclaiming sovereignty from elites. While in terms of populist regionalism, this dichotomy ‘can be equated with region (or minority nation) state (or minority nation) and vice versa,’ for populist nationalists, it may be equated to ‘nation’ vs. supra-state (e.g. EU) or nation vs internal elites (e.g. liberal media, parliament), while it may also target ‘national parties and cultural elites’.136 Both populist nationalist and populist regionalist parties aim to return popular sovereignty to a ‘lost heartland,’137 often proposed through plebiscitary or direct democracy such as referenda, which portrays the people ‘as the ultimate source of legitimacy’.138 Such ways of claiming ‘direct links between the people and its leaders’ allow for populist regionalist and populist nationalist demands to be articulated in a way which appears to be responding to the general will.139 This idea of the monolithic view of the general will can be articulated in phrases such as ‘the right to decide’ or ‘the will of the people’. A discourse of exploitation accounts for how such movements justify their calls for a return of national or regional sovereignty. Populist nationalists and regionalists ‘often argue that the elite is not just ignoring the interests of the people; rather, they are even working against the interests of the country’ or the region.140 Since populists often ‘define the elite in economic terms,’ they may often relate ‘the ultimate struggle between the people and the elite to economic power’; in other words, financial arguments may often play a key role in populist discourse.141 Inherent in this is the idea that the elite ‘have willingly chosen to betray’ the people ‘by putting the special interests […] of the elite over those of the people’.142 Populist nationalists may ‘accuse the political elite of putting the interests of the EU over those of the country’143 thus moving centre-periphery arguments to a supranational level and arguing that such elites are impinging not only on national sovereignty but also national economic growth and enterprise.144 Populist regionalism, on the other hand, may manifest itself in the betrayal and exploitation of richer regions to subsidise poorer areas or what has been labelled elsewhere as ‘bourgeois regionalism,’ i.e. ‘grievance of exploitation by state policies that directly (territorial transfers) or indirectly (welfare) drag resources from the wealthy (and supposedly hard-working) region to send them to other poorer (and supposedly self-indulgent) region’.145

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The presence of nativist discourse articulated by an ethnic (rather than civic) form of regionalist and nationalist ideology is a key factor in the use of the term far right to define these two waves of activism. Nativist logic is, therefore, racist, not populist, and can be broken into three components in three steps. The first component is the depiction of immigration as a threat to the nation (or region). Nativist discourse, therefore, associates immigration with an ‘invasive stratagem aimed at the displacement and/or replacement of the autochthonous population in the nation or region’.146 The second component is a racist and racialised process of othering. This contributes to exclusion of perceived ‘non-natives’ from belonging to the nation-state and can manifest itself in discrimination from employment, housing, and welfare opportunities. This is not only relevant for migrant ‘foreigners’ but also towards racialised fellow citizens who may be recast as virtual or de facto ‘foreigners’ – indeed ‘enemies’ within the space of the nation-state.147 An emphasis on ‘assimilation,’ ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference,’ or ‘stopping the invasion’ comprises the third component. Assimilation is presented as a pathway to becoming ‘native’ and belonging to the nation-state, thus ‘potentially bringing an end to discrimination and intolerance’.148 However, since nativism is a racist and racialised process often linked to religion and culture, if not exclusively to skin colour, such ‘assimilation’ may be an unattainable goal and part of a strategy to create a barrier between an in-group and out-group and pave the way for policies which aim to ‘stop the invasion.’ With regards to populist nationalism, it is in its more exclusionary and ethnic articulations that ‘nativism equips the nation-state with a “national identity” by which to fashion its people by positing a “we” whose identity is simply incommensurable with everything external and “alien” to it’.149 To emphasise the centrality of the ‘nation’ in nativist discourse, it is useful to note how regionalism and nationalism can potentially be seen as two sides of the same coin operating from a similar logic of ‘us’ vs ‘them,’ particularly when the region is viewed as a ‘lost nation’.150 On the one hand, populist regionalists and populist nationalists promoting an ethnic discourse may accuse elites ‘of systematically giving preference to non-natives […] when in reality, preference should be accorded to the native population’.151 On the other hand, these parties may present immigration as an invasion due to fears of ‘replacement’ and also through demands to put the interests of the ‘native population’ first, and this invasion should be stopped.152 This framework will enable the analysis of three waves of populist regionalism/ nationalism from the post-war period until the Salvini era. The following section moves on from the what of the MRAs and the Lega’s ideology and discourse and introduces concepts which allow the reader to understand the

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 33 how and why behind change and continuity in the different waves of populist regionalism and populist nationalism. 1.1.2.3 Crisis and Transition; Change and Continuity: Contentious Politics, Discursive Fields, and Abeyance Theory

Populist forms of politics, while sometimes fleeting in nature, derive from ‘endemic tensions at the heart of representative democracy’.153 Herein lies the key importance of understanding leghismo as a second, albeit much changed, wave of activism with roots in the MRAs’ political discourse. The Lega reframed the discourses and narratives inherited by these post-war movements to suit the political context of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Concepts from historical sociology are, therefore, essential in understanding the change and continuity between these different periods of history. The following paragraphs outline some key concepts which will provide a reference point for the following chapters; namely, crisis, discursive fields, and abeyance theory, the latter of which will be viewed as part of the wider approach to studying political struggles and social movements as ‘contentious politics’. This will enable a view of populist regionalism and populist nationalism as a socio-political phenomenon which has been a recurrent but intermittent phenomenon in post-war Italy. As noted in the introduction of this book and the start of this chapter, crisis has been a key feature in the history of leghismo. However, crisis also plays a larger role in accounting for the emergence of populist regionalist and later populist nationalist narratives at different intervals in Italian history. For this reason, crisis will be a recurring concept throughout this book. Crisis is an ambiguous term which has been subject to extensive academic debate. For the purposes of this book, a centre of gravity can be found in Colin Hay’s recognition of a cohabitation of two distinct dimensions: that of objective contradiction leading a given system into a phase of instability with unpredictable consequences, on the one hand, and that of subjective intervention which signifies and represents this instability in particular ways.154 Chapter 2 will return to and unpack this definition in more detail in relation to the history of regionalism and federalism in the Italian state. However, Hay’s paradigm will also form a central component from chapters 3 to 6 in terms of accounting for the different periods of crisis and transition in which the MRAs and the Lega emerged and/or evolved and how this impacted on the respective movements’ discourse and ideology. The respective ability/inability of three waves of populist regionalism (and

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nationalism) to amplify these moments of crisis and promote/disseminate ‘certain modes of thought’ is a vital component in understanding the rise of leghismo towards the end of the 1980s. It is, however, equally useful in explaining why the MARP and the MAB, as a previous wave of activism, were unable to make a breakthrough in a previous moment of crisis and transition. As noted by Aslanidis, ‘failed attempts at reaping immediate political benefits do not necessarily signal the political irrelevance of grassroots populist episodes. Once it establishes itself, the sheen of “the people” will rarely dull’.155 In terms of where such (re)activation may come from, ‘fertile political opportunities such as an economic crisis, a sudden disaster, or a high-profile case of corruption’.156 This brings us to the issue of contentious politics and the social movement theory of abeyance. Considering populist regionalism as a form of contentious politics allows us to also see it as a socio-political phenomenon which has re-emerged at various points throughout history.157 Contentious politics, as conceptualised by Charles Tilly, is a form of politics which brings together ‘three familiar features of social life: contention (making claims on someone else’s interests), collective action (coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests and programmes), and politics (interacting with agents of governments, either directly engaging in activities bearing on governmental rights, regulations, and interests).’ In short, therefore, contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other actors’ interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.158 In order to make such claims, actors must operate within a specific ‘discursive field,’ which constitutes a ‘set of discourses – such as discourses of “nationalism,” “citizenship,” or “gender” – that changes slowly over time’.159 Actors are almost obliged to participate in the discourses that dominate the field; for example, labour movements must engage with a hegemonic political-economy discourse that privileges capitalist agenda.160 Alternatively, in the case of this book, regionalist movements must engage within a specific discursive field of centralism in order to shape their regionalist project as beneficial for the whole nation. The populist regionalism embodied by both the MRAs and leghismo involved the elites (identified with the centralist state) as the targets of actors claiming to represent the region on behalf of ‘the people’ (associated with the region). Viewing the waves of activism examined in this book through the lens of ‘contentious politics’ means viewing them not only as political but also as social actors/movements, i.e. ones which hold

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 35 (a) networks of informal interaction; (b) shared beliefs and solidarity; (c) collective action on conflictual issues; (d) action which is displayed largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life.161 The resulting research on social movements has seen a proliferation of theories ranging from ‘cycles of contention,’ ‘collective action frames,’ and ‘path dependence’ to examine the decline and re-emergence of social movements.162 In terms of social movement theory, one of the most widely used theories with regard to the Lega has been that of ‘collective action frames’ which transform the understanding of social reality by combining events and social facts, and by focusing attention on specific issues and conflict dimensions. […] In this sense, frame analysis is the most appropriate approach by which to compare the interpretation of a social reality across different actors.163 Such an approach has proved fruitful in analysing how the Lega has managed to draw on past frames and latent ideologies and discourses. However, it does not fully account for ‘the issue of how and by what form of agency populist discourses are preserved and transmitted during times when populism has apparently disappeared from the public sphere’.164 Collective action frames may well account for how long-standing ideas have been reframed by the Lega. However, what is of particular interest to this book is not simply concentrating on the moments when movements and ideas are at their most visible but recognising ‘the continuity between visible challenges’.165 It is here that abeyance theory is useful in understanding the links between the MRAs and the Lega. Abeyance engages with cycles of mobilisation or waves of activism of social movements and so ‘fits with a historical sociology that strives to identify and explain not just passing phenomena but also longer term patterns of social interactions’.166 This theory has been applied to explain the abeyance and revitalisation of various iterations of the feminist movement,167 grassroots organisations,168 Islamist networks,169 and cycles of resistance to oppressive regimes.170 In this book, which builds on my existing work, it will be used as a central component of an interpretive framework which is outlined in greater detail in chapter 3. This framework will help analyse not only the decline and absorption of previous waves of activism and how preceding ideas were reframed by a second wave of activism, but also how certain narratives, symbols, and repertoires survived two decades of relative political hostility towards regionalist ideology. Etymologically, the term abeyance refers to a ‘pattern

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of temporary activity or suspension.’ Common synonyms for abeyance, therefore, may include ‘holding pattern,’ ‘suspended animation,’ ‘dormancy,’ ‘deep freeze,’ or ‘latency’.171 ‘From a sociological point of view, Ephraim Mizruchi coined a theoretical interpretation of abeyance to describe a ‘form of social control’172 and explain how organisations temporarily retain potential challengers to the status quo, thereby reducing threats to the larger social systems.173 In a significant development of Mizruchi’s work, Verta Taylor conceptualised abeyance as a process by which movements sustain themselves when confronted with a nonreceptive political and social environment. In an abeyance phase, movements are less visible but not inactive. Central to abeyance are structures that retain and sustain activists. Abeyance structures provide a holding ground for a small number of committed activists to maintain cause until there is a favorable political climate for mass mobilization. In a way, these structures provide organizational and ideological bridges from one mass mobilization to another.174 Abeyance theory is, therefore, vital in moving away from a ‘narrow emphasis on emergence and success’ in studying political movements. Instead, it encourages a focus on ‘how movement potentials survive between peaks of mobilisation’.175 Instead of focusing on the moments when protest movements are at their most visible, it is equally important to ‘recognise the continuity between visible challenges’.176 Indeed, this theory sustains the idea that ‘social movements persist over long periods in various stages of mobilisation, decline, or abeyance.’ During a period of abeyance, social movements ‘often retreat from public visibility’ and move into ‘stand-by mode,’ […] ‘temporary suspension’ or ‘hibernation’.177 As noted by Taylor if movements are comprised exclusively of sporadic moments of dramatic challenge, challengers themselves are invested with little agency, and left with little to do in the long periods between episodes of widespread collective action.178 As will be examined in greater detail throughout this book, following the decline of the MARP and the MAB in the 1960s, various ‘challengers’ found ways to sustain North Italian regionalism in the two decades between its first and second waves. Abeyance theory will, therefore, illustrate, on the one hand how a gap of two decades led to a second wave of activism and ensured a level of continuity. On the other hand, it will enable an examination of discontinuities in discourse and ideologies, and their implications. Drawing on abeyance theory will enable an examination of the survival of populist politics during a period of ‘hiatus’ or

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 37 inactivity. The fundamental role of abeyance in the decline of movements and the maintenance and subsequent transmission of populist discourse from one period of activism to another is, therefore, central to understanding the links between the MRAs and the Lega. 1.2 Conclusion The Lega, in its various iterations, is one of the most studied Italian political movements and has been the subject of a variety of definitions and theoretical approaches which have sought to interpret its political programme. This chapter has contributed to this discussion by providing not only a review of the cross-section of the literature which has viewed the Lega from a historical perspective, but also in finding a centre of gravity between interpretations of the Lega as populist, regionalist, and far right. Furthermore, the chapter has outlined the key elements not only of political science but also of historical sociology – in particular social movement theory – of relevance for the following chapters. These core ideological and discursive features will provide the lens through which not only the Lega but also the MRAs will be examined. Providing conceptual clarity is important in the historical approach of this book, allowing a more nuanced examination of the continuities and discontinuities between the populist regionalism of the MRAs and the Lega Nord and the populist nationalism of the Lega per Salvini Premier. With regards to the application of these frameworks, while the various components of populist regionalism and populist nationalism will be useful to consider for all chapters in this book, the framework in itself will become particularly relevant in chapters 5 and 6 which focus on illustrative case studies. While acknowledging the need to distinguish between populism and nativism, this framework encourages a more nuanced view of the blurred lines between regionalism and nationalism and notes how nativism is not exclusive to nationalist ideologies. It also emphasises the overlap between nationalist, regionalist, and far-right ideologies. More immediately, chapter 2 turns to the issue of regionalism by providing a history of both waves of North Italian regionalist activism in the context of a broader history of the Italian state. By concentrating specifically on how various instances of regionalism and federalism have coincided with periods of crisis, change, and transition, the twin phenomena of the MRAs and leghismo are viewed as products of two key moments of crisis and transition of the post-war Italian state. Notes 1 Paul A. Taggart, Populism, Concepts in the Social Sciences (Buckingham [England]; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000).

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2 Donald Sassoon, ‘Tangentopoli or the Democratization of Corruption: Considerations on the End of Italy’s First Republic’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 1, no.1 (1995): 124–143. 3 Roberto Biorcio, ‘La Lega Come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al populismo regionalista’, in La Lega Lombarda, ed. Renato Mannheimer (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991). Idem, La Padania Promessa: La storia, le idee e la logica d’azione della Lega Nord (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1997). 4 Andrej Zaslove, The Reinvention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the Lega Nord (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens Press, 2011). Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Reinventing the Radical Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post-Fascism’ (London: Routledge, 2005). 5 Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo sogetto politico (Rome: Donzelli, 1993). Idem, Il male del Nord: Lega, localismo, secessione (Rome: Donzelli, 1996). 6 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 65. 7 Ibid., 59. 8 Roberto Biorcio and Tomasso Vitale argue that ‘The issues of regional autonomy and federalism have never had great political relevance in Italy, at least until the eighties’ in ‘Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Centrifugal Regionalism: A Contextual Political Analysis of the Lega Nord’ in Contemporary Centrifugal Regionalism: Comparing Flanders ad Northern Italy, Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for the Science and the Arts Press, 2011, 171–199, (172). 9 See for instance: Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda De Matteo, ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in ed., Adriana Castagnoli Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945-2000 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52. Christophe Boulliaud, ‘Les antécédents idéologiques de la Ligue nord’, Revue française de science politique 48, no.3 (1998): 458–479. These works argue that Umberto Bossi’s Lega Lombarda, which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, was nothing more than the latest manifestation of an autonomist current rooted in the Catholic subculture in Bergamo … [leghismo] … was an old programme, new only in appearance. For a critique of such approaches and a suggestion for a more nuanced approach, see: George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’, Modern Italy 23, no.3 (2018): 235–252, (236). 10 Duncan McDonnell, in a ‘A Weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, Politics 126–127, states: The Lega […] frames the problems of the north as a centre-periphery question within a ‘people’ vs. ‘the elite’ populist discourse. The ‘radical right’ label […] diminish[es] this crucial territorial aspect of the Lega and its history as a movement constantly committed to some form of northern autonomy.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 39 11 For comprehensive reviews of the different analytical lenses applied to Umberto Bossi’s Lega, see: Tambini, Nationalism in Italian Politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000, 1–26. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics. 12 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 13 John W. P. Veugelers, ‘Dissenting Families and Social Movement Abeyance: The Transmission of Neo-Fascist Frames in Post-War Italy’ The British Journal of Sociology 62, no.2 (2011): 241–261, (244). https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1468-4446.2011.01363.x 14 Tambini, Nationalism in Italian Politics. 15 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 59. Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo sogetto politico, Idem, Il male del Nord: Lega, localismo, secessione, Renato Mannheimer, (ed.), La Lega Lombarda (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991). Luciano Costantini, Dentro La Lega. Come nasce, come cresce, come comunica (Rome: Koine Edizioni, 1994). 16 Thomas W. Gold, The Lega and Contemporary Politics in Italy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) 7. Carl Levy (ed.), Italian Regionalism: History, Identity & Politics (Oxford: Berg, 1996). Gold, The Lega and Contemporary Politics in Italy. 17 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 4. 18 Giovanni De Luna, ‘La Lega e il progetto di fare gli Italiani’, in Idem (ed.), Figli di un benessere minore. La Lega 1979–1993 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1994) 8. 19 Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo sogetto politico. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa: La storia, le idee e la logica d’azione della Lega, 35–82. Mannheimer, La Lega Lombarda. 20 Paolo Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2022). Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating Fortunes of the Lega Nord’, in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy, History, Politics and Society, eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A. Veltri (New York: Routledge, 2015) 204–214. Marco Brunazzo and Mark Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels: Euoscepticism and the Right-Wing Populist Turn of the Lega Since 2013’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no.5 (2017): 624–641. Davide Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016: Between Stasis and New Opportunities’ in Italian Politics, eds. Maurizio Carbone and Simona Piattoni 32, no. 1 (Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo, 2015) 32–50.

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Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo Daniele Albertazzi, Adriana Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone, ‘No Regionalism, Please, We Are leghisti! The Transformation of the Italian Lega under Matteo Salvini’, Regional and Federal Studies 28, no.5 (2018): 645–671.

21 Marco Tarchi, ‘Italy: The Promised Land of Populism’, Contemporary Italian Politics 7, no.3 (2015): 273–285, (276). 22 Biorcio, ‘La Lega come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al Populismo Regionalista’, 79. Andrea Sarubbi, La Lega Qualunque: Dal populismo di Giannini a quello di Bossi (Rome: Armando Editore, 1995) 19. 23 Tarchi, ‘Italy: The Promised Land of Populism’, 276. 24 Sarubbi, La Lega Qualunque: Dal populismo di Giannini a quello di Bossi, 19. For further comparisons between the Lega and Uomo Qualunuque, see: Antonio Costabile, Il Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque e La Lega Lombarda: Movimenti Antipartito e Crisi di Legittimazione nel Sistema Politico Italiano (Messina: Armando Siciliano Editore, 1991). 25 Jonathan Agnew, ‘The Rhetoric of Regionalism: The Northern League in Italian Politics, 1983-94’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 20, no.2 (1994): 156–172. Benito Giordano, ‘A Place Called Padania?: The Lega and the Political Representation of Northern Italy’, European Urban and Regional Studies 6, no.3 (1999). 26 The Lega’s nation-building project has been analysed in great detail in the following publications: Isabelle Fremeaux and Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Discursive Strategies around “Community” in Political Propaganda: The Case of Lega Nord’, National Identities 4, no.2 (2002): 145–160, doi: 10.1080/14608940220143835 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 105–135. Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Back to Our Roots or Self-Confessed Manipulation? The Uses of the Past in the Lega’s Positing of Padania’, National Identities 8, no.1 (2006): 21–39. Tambini, Nationalism in Italian politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000. 27 Tambini, Nationalism in Italian Politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980-2000, 117. Linda Basile, ‘A Dwarf among Giants? Party Competition between EthnoRegionalist and State-Wide Parties on the Territorial Dimension: The Case of Italy (1963-2013)’, Party Politics 21, no.6 (2015): 887–899, (894). 28 Biorcio and Vitale, ‘Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Centrifugal Regionalism’ 29 Maragarita Gomez Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega and the Northern Question (Farnham: Ashgate, 2002).

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 41 30 Biorcio and Vitale, ‘Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Centrifugal Regionalism’. 31 Mario Diani, ‘Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: Insights form Regional Populism’, American Sociological Review 61, no.6 (1996): 1053–1069, (1054). 32 Benito Giordano, ‘Italian Regionalism or “Padanian Nationalism”: The Political Project of the Lega Nord in Italian Politics’, Political Geography 19, no.4 (2000): 445–471, (446). Basile, ‘A Dwarf among Giants? Party Competition between EthnoRegionalist and State-Wide Parties on the Territorial Dimension: The Case of Italy’, 894. 33 Basile, ‘A Dwarf among Giants? Party Competition between EthnoRegionalist and State-Wide Parties on the Territorial Dimension: The Case of Italy’, 894. 34 Giordano, ‘Italian Regionalism or “Padanian Nationalism”: The Political Project of the Lega in Italian Politics’, 446. Basile, ‘A Dwarf among Giants? Party Competition between EthnoRegionalist and State-Wide Parties on the Territorial Dimension: The Case of Italy’, 894. 35 Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, 7. 36 Alberto Melucci and Mario Diani, Nazioni senza Stato: I movimenti etniconazionali in Occidente (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1992) 45. 37 Willam Brierly and Luca Giacometti, ‘Italian National Identity and the Failure of Regionalism’ in Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, eds. Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos (London: Routledge, 1996) 180. 38 Ibid. Nicola Di Sotto, Tra Protesta e governo: Successi, trasformazioni e crisi della Lega (Naples: Editoriale scientifica, 2014) 27. 39 Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics? Understanding the Rise of the Northern Question in the 1990s’, South European Society and Politics 5, no.3 (2000): 80–107, doi: 10.1080/13 608740508539615 40 One of the earliest literary references to the MARP by Francesco Compagna in 1959 was as the political manifestation of the ‘great polemic between regions of the North against those of the South because the Northern regions saw people arriving from the South every day’. Francesco Compagna, I terroni in citta’ (Bari: Laterza, 1959) 7. Further references to the MARP can be found in the following publications on the Lega, which do not examine the full significance of the movements in the wider history of leghismo. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. Erica Capusotti, ‘Nordisti Contro Sudisti Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Europe: 1950s and 1960s’, Italian Culture 28, no.2 (2010): 121–138. Fiorenzo Toso, Frammenti d’Europa: Guida alle minoanze etnicolinguistiche e ai fermenti autonomisti (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1996) 107–116. Guido Passalacqua, Il Vento della Padania (Milan: Mondadori, 2009) 11.

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41 As mentioned in the introduction to this book, the Movement for Venetian Autonomy has been mentioned briefly in the following publications: Percy Allum and Ilvo Diamanti, ‘The Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. C. Levy, 151–171, (159). Francesco Jori, Dalla Liga alla Lega, storia, movimenti, protaganisti (Venice: Marsilio, 2009), 35. 42 In his recent history of the Lega, Barcella dedicates brief space to the MAB in order to establish historical context La Lega: Una storia (26–27). 43 For an analysis of the continuities and discontinuities of the Movimento Friuli (the Friulian Autonomy Movement), see the following: Massimo Greco and Alberto Bollis, Carroccio a Nord-Est: Storia, programma e uomini della Lega Nord del Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Trieste: MGS Press Editrice) 86. 44 Gomez Reino Cachafeiro in Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics (52) states, for example, that MARP ‘was born in 1952’ […] elected some local councillors in the city of Torino in the 1953 elections … and died in 1956. Gold in The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy (41), meanwhile has argued that ‘the MARP ran a campaign to limit the number of southern immigrants into the city in the 1958 local elections’. On the first point, 1956, far from marking the movements’ death, actually marked local elections which saw the MRAs make a small yet significant breakthrough. Regarding the second point, the 1958 elections were not local but national. This confusion over dates does little to help us understand a movement which, in fact, had its greatest success in 1956 after having been officially formed in 1955. 45 Toso, Frammenti d’Europa, 107–116. Capusotti ‘Nordisti Contro Sudisti Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Europe’ Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. 46 Christophe Boulliaud, ‘Les antécédents idéologiques de la Ligue nord’, Revue française de science politique 48, no.3 (1998): 458–479. Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda De Matteo, ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945-2000. ed., Adriana Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52. Lynda De Matteo, L’idiota in politica, Antropologia della Lega Nord (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2011). 47 Ibid. 48 For analyses of precursors to the Lega, by two Lega ideologues, please see: Beppe Burzio, ‘Da “La Permanente al MARP”: Breve viaggio nell’autonomismo piemontese’, Quaderni Padani (L’autonomismo Piemontese 6, no.32 (November–December 2000): 5–12. and Gilberto Oneto, Polentoni o Padani: Apologia di un popolo di egoisti xenofobi ignoranti ed evasori (San Marino: Il Cerchio, 2012) 22.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 43 49 50 51 52

Umberto Bossi, La Lega 1979-1989 (Milan: Editoriale Nord, 1999) 61–62. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 12. Ibid. Valerio Renzi, La Politica della Ruspa: La Lega di Salvini e le nuove destre europee (Rome: Alegre, 2015). Antonio Rapisarda, All’armi siam leghisti: Come e perchè Matteo Salvini ha conquistato la Destra (Reggio Emilia: Alberti Wingsbert House, 2015). Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto, La Lega di Salvini: Estrema Destra di Governo (Bologna: il Mulino 2018).

53 All of these terms are mentioned at various intervals in Passarelli and Tuorto, La Lega di Salvini: Estrema Destra di Governo. 54 Dwayne Woods, ‘Pockets of Resistance to Globalization: The Case of the Lega Nord’, Patterns of Prejudice 43, no.2 (May 2009): 161–177, https:// doi.org/10.1080/00313220902793906. 55 Alberto Spektorowski, ‘Ethnoregionalism: The Intellectual New Right and the Lega Nord’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no.3 (2003): 55–70, (68). 56 Ibid. 57 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the Italian Lega Nord (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2011) 5. 58 Zaslove, The Reinvention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the Lega Nord, 152. Hans-Georg, Betz, ‘The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe’, Comparative Politics 25, no.4 (1993): 413–427 (413–417). 59 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 28–29. 60 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone in ‘No regionalism please, we are Leghisti!’ (662) have recently built on this idea, arguing that it is only since ‘the regionalist cause was dropped and replaced by an “empty nationalist” and nativist one that Salvini’s Lega can now be included in the Populist Radical Right (PRR) party family’. 61 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Collective Identities: From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Ethnicity and Difference’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no.3–4 (2003): 41–54 (47). 62 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Breaking Up the Post-War Consensus: The Ideology of the Lega Nord in the Early 1990s’, The Italianist 31, no.1 (2011): 112–122 (112). 63 Ibid., 114. 64 Ibid., 113. 65 Ibid., 113–114. 66 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism: The Lega (Nord’s) Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies (2022). Online First. See also Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia. 67 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 106 68 Ibid., 28–29. 69 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti! The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini’, 648.

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70 Biorcio, ‘La Lega Come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al populismo regionalista’, 72. 71 Ibid. 72 McDonnell, ‘A Weekend in Padania’, Politics, 126. 73 Daniele Albertazzi, ‘“Addressing the People”: A Comparative Study of the Lega Nord’s and Lega dei Ticinesi’s Political Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda’, Modern Italy 12, no.3: 327–347 (327–328). 74 Dwayne Woods, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Northern League’s Ideological Profiling’, Journal of Political ideologies 15, no.2 (June 2010): 189–219 (193–194). 75 For more details of this debate/disagreement, see the following two articles: McDonnell, ‘A Weekend in Padania’, 126–132. Andrej Zaslove, ‘Alpine Populism, Padania and Beyond: A Response to Duncan McDonnell’, Politics 27, no.1 (2007): 64–68 (65). 76 McDonnell, ‘A Weekend in Padania’, 126–127. 77 Zaslove, ‘Alpine Populism, Padania and Beyond: A Response to Duncan McDonnell’, 65. See also: Zaslove, The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the Italian Lega Nord, 74: it is argued that the Lega combines regionalism with Radical Right Populism. Zaslove highlighted that ‘it is not possible, and not necessary, to distinguish between the Lega as a regionalist and a radical right populist party; in other words, it [was] a regionalist party with a radical right ideology. Regional sovereignty, federalism, and devolution have been a constant theme throughout the party’s evolution’. 78 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 30. 79 For more on the importance of semantic precision when using the term populism, see: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Populism’s “Meteoric Rise” and Its Relation to the Status Quo. Populismus working paper series, no. 4 (2016). Andrea Pirro, ‘Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept’, Nations and Nationalism (2022). Online First https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860 The following works also highlight the dangers of euphemising far-right ideology through the misuse of the term populism, which has also been raised in the following papers: Jason Glynos and Aurelien Mondon, ‘The Political Logic of Populist Hype: The Case of Right Wing’. Andrea Mammone, ‘The Eternal Return? Faux Populism and Contemporarization of Neo-Fascism across Britain, France and Italy’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17, no.2 (2009): 171–192, DOI: 10.1 080/14782800903108635 Annie Collovald, Le Populisme Du FN, Un Dangereux Contresens, Savoir/Agir, Collection de l’association Raisons d’agir (Bellecombe-enBauges: Croquant, 2004). Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon, ‘Populism, the Media and the Mainstreaming of the Far Right: The Guardian’s Coverage of Populism as a Case Study’, Politics 41, no.3 (2020): 279–295.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 45 80 Daniele Albertazzi and Davide Vampa, Populism in Europe: Lessons from Umberto Bossi’s Northern League (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021). Daniele Albertazzi and Mattia Zulianello, ‘Populist Electoral Competition in Italy: The Impact of Sub-National Contextual Factors’, Contemporary Italian Politics 13, no.1 (2 January 2021): 4–30, https://doi.org/10. 1080/23248823.2020.1871186. Daniele Albertazzi, Donatella Bonansinga, and Mattia Zulianello, ‘The Right-Wing Alliance at the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic: All Change?’, Contemporary Italian Politics 13, no.2 (3 April 2021): 181–195, https:// doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857. 81 Biorcio, ‘La Lega Come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al populismo regionalista’. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord Back in Government’, West European Politics 33, no.6 (November 2010): 1318–1340, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508911. Idem, ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of Its Own’, West European Politics 28, no.5 (November 2005): 952–972, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500310600. 82 Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Reinventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post-Fascism’, 1, issued in paperback, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy 10 (London: Routledge, 2010). Andrej Zaslove, ‘Alpine Populism, Padania and Beyond: A Response to Duncan McDonnell’, Politics 27, no.1 (February 2007): 64–68, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2007.00280.x. McDonnell, ‘A Weekend in Padania’. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Populists in Power (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015). 83 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Populists in Power (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015) 5. 84 Carlo Berti, ‘Right-Wing Populism and the Criminalization of Sea-Rescue NGOs: The “Sea-Watch 3” Case in Italy, and Matteo Salvini’s Communication on Facebook’, Media, Culture & Society 43, no.3 (April 2021): 532–550, https:// doi.org/10.1177/0163443720957564. Giuliano Bobba, ‘Social Media Populism: Features and “Likeability” of Lega Nord Communication on Facebook’, European Political Science 18, no.1 (March 2019): 11–23, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0141-8. 85 Dwayne Woods, ‘A Boat Load Too Many: How the League Uses Global Migration: Crisis to Undermine Liberal Democracy in Italy’, Chinese Political Science Review 7, no.2 (June 2022): 305–320, https://doi.org/10.1007/ s41111-020-00175-w. 86 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, No regionalism please, we are Leghisti! The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini’. 87 Ibid. See also: Passarelli and Tuorto, La Lega di Salvini, Estrema Destra al Governo.

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88 George Newth, ‘The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no.4 (8 August 2019): 384–406, https://doi.org/10.1 080/0031322X.2019.1615784. Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Facets of Nativism: A Heuristic Exploration’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no.2 (15 March 2019): 111–135, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0031322X.2019.1572276. 89 Biorcio, ‘La Lega Come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al populismo regionalista’, 72. 90 Mudde Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 30. 91 Barcella. La Lega: Una Storia. 92 Piero Ignazi, ‘Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord’, South European Society and Politics 10, no.2 (July 2005): 333–349, https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608740500135058. La Repubblica (1993) Quei Tre Leghisti con l’anima nera Available from: https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1993/11/19/ quei-tre-leghisti-con-anima.html. Last accessed: 1 July 2020. 93 Marzia Maccaferri and George Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country: “Sovereignism” and Populism in the Political Discourse of Matteo Salvini’s Lega’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no.2 (8 March 2022): 277–299, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21066.mac. 94 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 12. 95 Sophia Hunger and Fred Paxton, ‘What’s in a buzzword?: a systematic review of the state of populism research in political science’, Political science research and methods, 2022, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 617–633 96 For further details of the four waves of right-wing extremism, please see the following two publication: Klaus von Beyme, ‘Right‐Wing Extremism in Post‐War Europe’, West European Politics 11, no. 2 (April 1988): 1–18 (11), https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01402388808424678. Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Cambridge: Polity, 2019) 97 The MRAs should not be conflated with extreme right/neo-fascist movements which emerged in the post-war period; indeed, as will be highlighted in chapter 4, they contained distinctly anti-fascist elements. Nevertheless, the MRAs’ politics were also influenced by the populist far right movements of Guglielmo Giannini’s Uomo Qualunque and Pierre Poujade’s UCDA (later Poujadist Party). This, as well as their use of both populist and exclusionary nativist discourse, justifies its inclusion - albeit as outliers - as part of the wider history of far right politics in North Italy. Similarly, while the Lega in its early stages contained elements which set it apart from other parties in the third wave of right-wing extremism, its use of racism, nativism, and populism justifies its inclusion in this classification. 98 Reinhardt Heinisch, Emanuele Masetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni, ‘Introduction’ in The People and the Nation: Populism and EthnoTerritorial Politics in Europe, eds. Idem, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020) 7.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 47 99 Oscar Mazzoleni and Sean Mueller. ‘Introduction: Explaining the Policy Success of Regionalist Parties in Western Europe’ in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. Dimensions of Success, eds. Idem (London: Routledge, 2017) 1–21 100 George Newth, ‘Rethinking “Nativism”: Beyond the Ideational Approach’, Identities, 18 August 2021, 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2021. 1969161. 101 Lieven De Winter and Huri Tursan (eds). Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1998). 102 Eve Hepburn, ‘Introduction: Re-Conceptualizing Sub-State Mobilization’, Regional & Federal Studies 19, no.4–5 (December 2009): 477–499, https:// doi.org/10.1080/13597560903310204. 103 Reinhardt Heinisch, Emanuele Masetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni, ‘Introduction’, 7. 104 Alberto Martinelli ‘Populism and Nationalism: The (peculiar) Case of Italy’ in When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power, ed., Idem (Milan: ISPI, 2018) 13–47. (14) 105 Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political Studies 46, no.4 (September 1998): 748–765, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165. 106 Reinhardt Heinisch, Emanuele Masetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni, ‘Introduction’, 7. 107 Martinelli ‘Populism and Nationalism: The (peculiar) Case of Italy’, 14. 108 Such an argument was put forward in the following chapter which examined the link between populism and regionalism in Catalonia. Astrid Barrio, Oscar Barberà, and Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, The Populist Dimensions of Catalan Secessionism. Rhetoric, Mobilization and Institutional Practices in The People and the Nation: Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe, eds. Reinhard Heinisch, Emanuele Massetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni., Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020) 212–234. 109 The following studies examine nationalism as an ideology or discourse which can be used by both left-wing and right-wing political parties. Giorgos Katsambekis and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Revisiting the Nationalism/ Populism Nexus: Lessons from the Greek Case’, Javnost - The Public 24, no.4 (2 October 2017): 391–408, https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330087. Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou, and Sofia Vasilopoulou, ‘The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism: The Paradox of Nationalism’, European Journal of Political Research 51, no.4 (June 2012): 504–539, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x. Emanuele Massetti and Arjan H Schakel, ‘From Class to Region: How Regionalist Parties Link (and Subsume) Left-Right into Centre-Periphery Politics’, Party Politics 21, no.6 (November 2015): 866–886, https:// doi.org/10.1177/1354068815597577. 110 Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism’, Javnost - The Public 24, no.4 (2 October 2017): 301–319, https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083.

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Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo Arno van der Zwet, ‘To See Ourselves as Others See Us: Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration amongst Civic Nationalists’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no.8 (20 June 2016): 1242–1256, https:// doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1082284.

111 Nuria Franco-Guillén, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, and R. Catalunya, ‘Terra d’acollida: Stateless Nationalist Party Discourses on Immigration in Catalonia’, in The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel States Governance and Political Parties. Eds. Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 261–284. 112 André Lecours, ‘Ethnic and Civic Nationalism: Towards a New Dimension’, Space and Polity 4, no.2 (November 2000): 153–166, https://doi.org/10.1080/135625 70020013672. 113 For critiques of the civic-ethnic dualism, see the following works Meghan Tinsley, ‘Decolonizing the Civic/Ethnic Binary’, Current Sociology 67, no.3 (May 2019): 347–364, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392117750212. Thomas Jeffrey Miley, ‘Against the Thesis of the “Civic Nation”: The Case of Catalonia in Contemporary Spain’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13, no.1 (April 2007): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110601155734. Rogers Brubaker ‘The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between “Civic” and “Ethnic” Nationalism’ in Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. eds. Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, Hannes Siegrist, and Andreas Wimmer (Zurich: Verlag Ruegger, 1999) 55–71. 114 Newth, ‘Rethinking ‘Nativism’: Beyond the Ideational Approach’, 17. 115 Ibid. 116 Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream (Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2020) 19. The term far right is relatively new in academia and debates surrounding its accuracy in comparison to other options such as ‘extreme right’ and ‘radical right’ continue with some scholars using the term as an umbrella term for extreme and radical right and others seeing it as a separate concept in itself. As it does not pertain to any direct translation in many other languages (including Italian), authors may translate it directly as ‘radical right.’ For more information, see: Pirro, ‘Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept’. 117 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right‐Wing Populist Discourses Mean (London: Sage, 2015). 118 Katy Brown. ’Talking ‘with’ and ‘about’ the far right: putting the mainstream in mainstreaming. PhD Thesis. (Bath: University of Bath. 2023) 28‐29 119 Nicholas De Genova, ‘The “Native’s Point of View” in the Anthropology of Migration’, Anthropological Theory 16, no.2–3 (September 2016): 227–240, https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499616652513. 120 This widely accepted definition of nativism is used by Cas Mudde in his following two books: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The Far Right Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019).

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 49 121 For interpretations of nativism as ‘non-racist’ or ‘race neutral’, see Mudde Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 19. Linda Bosniak, ‘“Nativism” the Concept: Some Reflections’, in Immigrants Out! the New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States, ed. J. F. Perea (New York and London: University of New York Press, 1997) 279–299. 122 Newth, ‘Nativism: Beyond the Ideational Approach’. 123 Andrea Carlà, ‘Land of Welcome, Land of Fear: Explaining Approaches to “New” Diversity in Catalonia and South Tyrol’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no.7 (19 May 2018): 1098–1116, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017. 1352465.

124 125 126 127

Núria Franco-Guillén, ‘Selfishness of the Affluent? Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties and Immigration’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no.8 (20 June 2016): 1304–1316, https://doi.org/10.1080/13 69183X.2015.1082287. Franco-Guillèn, ‘Selfishness of the Affluent? Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties and Immigration’, 1306. Franco-Guillénand Zapata-Barrero, ‘Catalunya, terra d’acollida: Stateless Nationlist Party Discourses on Immigration in Catalonia’, 279. Ibid. The idea that nativism (and nationalism) and populism are two sides of the same coin stems from the notion that ‘the people’ can be related to both ‘demos’ and ‘nation’ while being articulated against the elites and ‘others’. What such arguments, however, tend to eschew is the fact that nativism (and nationalism) relies on a horizontal juxtaposition of the native (in-group) and non-native (out-group), while populism depends on a vertical logic of an underdog against an elite. For examples of work which argue for an affinity between populism and nativism (and/or nationalism), see: Jasmine Noelle Yarish, ‘From “Empty Lands” to “Empty Signifiers”: Nativism, Race, Gender, and Populist Nationalism’. In Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas, eds., Fernando López-Alves and Diane. E. Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2019) 153–170. Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Nativism and the Success of Populist Mobilisation’, International Journal for Political Thought 12 (2017): 169–188. Idem, “Facets of Nativism: A Heuristic Exploration”, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no.2 (2019): 111–135, doi: 10.1080/0031322X.2019.15 72276. Rogers Brubaker, ‘Populism and Nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism 26, no.1 (January 2020): 44–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/ nana.12522. For a refutation of the links between populism and nativism/ nationalism, see the following: Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘How Should We Analyze the Connections between Populism and Nationalism: A Response to Rogers Brubaker’, Nations and Nationalism 26, no.2 (April 2020): 314–322, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12575. Benjamin De Cleen, Jason Glynos, and Aurelien Mondon, ‘Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules of Engagement’, Organization 25, no.5 (September 2018): 649–661, https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508418768053. Newth, ‘Nativism: Beyond the Ideational Approach’.

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128 De Cleen and Stavrakakis, ‘Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism’, 310. 129 Arthur Borriello and Nathalie Brack, ‘“I Want My Sovereignty Back!” A Comparative Analysis of the Populist Discourses of Podemos, the 5 Star Movement, the FN and UKIP during the Economic and Migration Crises’, Journal of European Integration 41, no.7 (3 October 2019): 833–853, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1665658. 130 De Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon, ‘Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules of Engagement’, 654. 131 Ibid. 132 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017) 18 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). Rogers Brubaker, ‘Paradoxes of Populism during the Pandemic’, Thesis Eleven 164, no.1 (June 2021): 73–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/072551362 0970804. 133 Ruth Breeze, ‘Positioning “the People” and Its Enemies: Populism and Nationalism in AfD and UKIP’, Javnost - The Public 26, no.1 (2 January 2019): 89–104, https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2018.1531339. 134 Kenneth M. Roberts, ‘Populism, Political Mobilization, and Crises of Political Representation’ in The Promise and Perils of Populism, ed. Carlos de la Torre (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015) 140–158 (142). 135 While this study eschews the perceived ‘anti-pluralist’ and ‘homogenous’ qualities attributed to ‘the people’ by the ideational approach to populism, the feature of exploitation, to an extent, represents an intersection between discursive and ideational approaches. This is because it pertains to a ‘moralistic’ element of populist discourse in its underlining of the elites’ exploitative practices. Ideational scholars such as Matthijs Roodujin have noted that ‘Populists argue that the people are exploited by the elite; they believe that all ‘ordinary’ persons have a shared interest in their opposition to the elite’. See: Matthijs Rooduijn, ‘The Nucleus of Populism: In Search of the Lowest Common Denominator’, Government and Opposition 49, no.4 (October 2014): 573–599, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.30. See also: Cas Mudde, C., and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 13. Cas Mudde, Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/97801 98803560.013.1. 136 Heinisch, Mazzoleni, and Masseti, ‘Introduction: European Party-Based Populism and Territory’, 6–7. 137 Taggart, Populism. 138 Barrio et al., ‘The Populist Dimensions of Catalan Secessionism’, 88. 139 Ibid.

Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo 51 140 Cas Mudde, C., and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 13 141 Ibid. 142 Cas Mudde, ‘Populism: An Ideational Approach’, in The Oxford Handbook of populism’, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 30. 143 Heinisch et al., ‘Introduction: European Party-Based Populism and Territory’, 13. 144 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘No regionalism please. We are Leghisti!, 662. 145 Masetti and Schakel, ‘From Class to Region: How Regionalist Parties Link (and subsume) Left-Right into Centre-Periphery Politics’, 867. 146 Aurelien Mondon, ‘Populism, the “People” and the Illusion of Democracy – The Front National and UKIP in a Comparative Context’, French Politics 13, no.2 (June 2015): 141–156, https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2015.6. Yannis Stavrakakis et al., ‘Extreme Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Revisiting a Reified Association’, Critical Discourse Studies 14, no.4 (8 August 2017): 420–439, https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2017.1309325. 147 De Genova, ‘The “native’s point of view” in the anthropology of migration’, 228. 148 Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neo-liberal Age (London: GBR Zed Books, 2009) 43. 149 De Genova, ‘The “native’s point of view” in the anthropology of migration’, 234. 150 Hepburn, ‘Introduction: Re-Conceptualizing Sub-State Mobilization’. 151 Hans Georg Betz and Fabian Habersack, ‘Regional Nativism in East Germany’ in The People and the Nation eds. Reinhard Heinisch, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Emanuele Masetti (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020) 112. 152 Ibid. 153 Steven Fielding, ‘A Mirror for England? Cinematic Representations of Politicians and Party Politics, circa 1944-1964’, Journal of British Studies 47, no.1 (2008): 107–128 (128), doi: 10.1086/522346 154 Yannis Stavrakakis et al., ‘Populism, Anti-Populism and Crisis’, Contemporary Political Theory 17, no.1 (February 2018): 4–27, https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0142-y. Colin Hay, ‘Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, no.3 (October 1999): 317–344, https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467- 856X.00018. 155 Paris Aslanidis, Populism and Social Movements, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017) 305–325.(313), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.23. 156 Ibid. 157 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (2022): 511–529, DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483 158 Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 8. 159 Leslie King, ‘Charting a Discursive Field: Environmentalists for U.S. Population Stabilization’, Sociological Inquiry 77, no.3 (August 2007): 301–325, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.2007.00195.x.

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Considerations of a Dual Approach to Leghismo See also: Marc. W. Steinberg, ‘The Roar of the Crowds: Repertoires of Discourse and Collective Action among the Spitalfields Silk Weavers in 19th-century London’ in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, ed., Mark Traugott (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). David A. Snow, ‘Discursive Fields’, in The Wiley‐Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, ed. David A. Snow et al., 1st ed (Wiley, 2022) 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm072.pub2.

160 Leslie King, ‘Charting a Discursive Field: Environmentalists for U.S. Population Stabilization’, Sociological Inquiry 77, no.3 (2007): 301–325 (303), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.2007.00195.x 161 Carlo E. Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke, ‘Roots of Success of the Lega Lombarda: Mobilisation Dynamics and the Media’, West European Politics 16, no.2 (April 1993): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389308424958. Dwayne Woods, ‘Pockets of Resistance to Globalization: The Case of the Lega Nord’, Patterns of Prejudice 43, no.2 (May 2009): 161–177, https:// doi.org/10.1080/00313220902793906. Mario Diani, ‘The Concept of Social Movement’, The Sociological Review 40, no.1 (February 1992): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467954X.1992.tb02943.x. Newth ‘Populism in abeyance’. 162 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, ‘Contentious Politics and Social Movements’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 1st ed (Oxford University Press, 2009) 435–460, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0019. James Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29, no.4 (2000): 507–548. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1 007113830879 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–639. 163 Pietro Castelli Gattinara, ‘Framing Exclusion in the Public Sphere: Far-Right Mobilisation and the Debate on Charlie Hebdo in Italy’, South European Society and Politics 22, no.3 (3 July 2017): 345–364, https://doi.org/10.1 080/13608746.2017.1374323. 164 Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance’. 165 Traci M. Sawyers and David S. Meyer, ‘Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy’, Social Problems 46, no.2 (May 1999): 187–206, https://doi.org/10.2307/3097252. 166 John W. P. Veugelers, ‘Dissenting Families and Social Movement Abeyance: The Transmission of Neo-Fascist Frames in Postwar Italy1: Dissenting Families and Social Movement Abeyance’, The British Journal of Sociology 62, no.2 (June 2011): 241–261 (244), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2 011.01363.x. 167 For work on the feminist movement in abeyance, see: Paul Bagguley, ‘Contemporary British Feminism: A Social Movement in Abeyance?’, Social Movement Studies 1, no.2 (October 2002): 169–185, https://doi.org/10.1 080/1474283022000010664.

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169 170 171

172 173 174

Alison Dahl Crossley, Finding Feminism: Millennial Activists and the Unfinished Gender Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 2017). Sandra Grey and Marian Sawyer, eds. Women’s Movements: Flourishing or in Abeyance? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). Laurel. L Holland and Sherry Cable, ‘Reconceptualizing Social Movement Abeyance: The Role of Internal Processes and Culture in Cycles of Movement Abeyance and Resurgence’, Sociological Focus 35, no.3 (2002): 297–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2002.10570705 Tine Gade, ‘Together All the Way? Abeyance and Co-Optation of Sunni Networks in Lebanon’, Social Movement Studies 18, no.1 (2 January 2019): 56–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1545638. Robert M. Press, Ripples of Hope, How Ordinary People Resist Repression Without Violence (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015). David. A Snow and Colin Bernatsky, ‘The Conterminous Rise of Right-Wing Populism and Superfluous Populations’ in Populism and the Crisis of Democracy Volume 1, Concepts and Theory., eds. Gregor Fitzi et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019) 130–146. (140) Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, Regulating Society: Marginality and Social Control in Historical Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1983). Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, Regulating Society: Marginality and Social Control in Historical Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1983). Özge Zihnioğlu, ‘Strategizing Post-Protest Activism in Abeyance: Retaining Activist Capital under Political Constraint’, Social Movement Studies 22, no.1 (2 January 2023): 122–137, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.2003193. Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, American Sociological Review 54, no.5 (October 1989): 761, https://doi.org/10.2307/2117752.

175 Veugelers, ‘Dissenting families and social movement abeyance: The transmission of neo-fascist frames in post-war Italy’, 243. 176 Sawyers and Meyer, ‘Missed opportunities: Social movement abeyance and public policy’, 188. 177 Gade, ‘Together all the way?’ 73. 178 Sawyers and Meyer, ‘Missed opportunities: Social movement abeyance and public policy’, 188.

2

Crisis, Transition, and Demands for Regional Autonomy in the History of the Italian Nation-State

2.1 Introduction The Lega was one of a long line of regionalist parties in a country where regional and municipal identities have always held great significance. This can largely be attributed to the fact that prior to just 1861, the peninsula was fragmented into a series of kingdoms, duchies, and papal states1 representing a ‘complex of diverse societies’ and ‘differences in state traditions.’2 Indeed, as noted by Garau, during this period the village, the province or the region were still the point of reference for a population who did not share the same language and did not feel any sense of loyalty towards a nation that many felt had been imposed upon them.3 This very fact posed a pressing question for Italian patriots in the 19th century: how could ‘a series of states with administrative subdivisions that suited the needs of each pre-unification state’ be united into a single Italy?4 The chosen solution – a ‘unitary system’ in which ‘all major decisions are made by the central government’ – would have a long-term impact on Italy’s institutions, politics, and society and would come to represent a slow-burning crisis for the Italian nation-state. This chapter analyses how regionalist demands – in the form of campaigns for the institution and/or reform of the region as ‘a unit of government of administration,’ either via decentralisation, federalism, or both – have emerged at ‘times of crisis in the relationship between political forces and reorganisation of institutions.’5 In doing so, it contextualises the rise of the Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) and, later, leghismo in the longer history of demands for regional autonomy in Italy. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, to establish context for the book’s subsequent archive-based and case study-driven chapters and introduce recurring themes with regards to Risorgimento federalist narratives, the anti-fascist resistance, the north-south divide, anti-southern racism, and far

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-3

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right articulations of regionalism; second, to account for the breakthrough of leghismo in comparison to previous demands for regional autonomy which had remained at the margins of Italian politics. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section establishes an interpretive framework to analyse the connections between crisis, transition, and demands for regional autonomy, thus outlining some key concepts to navigate the historical context. The following two sections are separated in line with Italy’s two institutional frameworks since 1861: first as the Kingdom of Italy under the Piedmontese Albertine Statute, and second as the Italian Republic under the Constitution of 1948. What ties these otherwise very different institutional arrangements together is the maintenance of a centralist administrative framework. Section 2.1 begins by examining the reasons behind the implementation of a centralist administration following the unification of these states in 1861 as the Kingdom of Italy and concludes by establishing why, despite the granting of regional statutes in the constitution, regional government was not fully implemented in the Italian Republic. The following section then focuses on the two waves of post-war North Italian regionalist activism, dealing first with the emergence of the MRAs in the 1950s and second with leghismo from the 1980s onwards. This chapter is interested primarily with setting context, and leaves in-depth examination of ideology to subsequent chapters. The MRAs’ and Lega’s regionalist, nationalist and far right identities will instead be addressed in chapters, 4, 5 and 6. The final section of this chapter returns to the concepts of crisis and transition and reflects on the findings from the historical analysis and how this links to the following chapters of this book. 2.1.1 Crisis, Transition, and Demands for Regional Autonomy in Italy: An Interpretive Framework

Crisis and transition – two concepts at the heart of this book – enable both a clearer understanding of how demands for regional autonomy resulted from moments of heightened political fluidity and how such demands contributed to discursive renegotiation of the unity of the Italian state. What follows is a concise interpretive framework which will allow for clearer navigation of this chapter’s historical context. The following section will outline the elements of crisis of relevance to this chapter prior to establishing how crisis will be interpreted with regard to instances of regionalism throughout the history of the Italian nation-state. The first of these elements is that of an ‘objective contradiction leading a given system into a phase of instability with unpredictable consequences.’ In this sense, crisis means ‘a moment of heightened political fluidity and uncertainty’ which can destabilise the entire ‘political system.’6 This can be nuanced through the concepts of ‘fast-burning’ or ‘slow-burning’/‘creeping’ crises. While a ‘fast-burning crisis explodes on the scene and quickly

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disappears into the history books after it is brought under control,’ a ‘slowburning or creeping crisis has a long incubation time.’ As such ‘It does not have a clear beginning or ending [and] can remain undefined for a long time [changing] meaning during its lifespan.’7 This is because ‘crisis may represent a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought,’ posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of ‘national life.’8 This links closely to the notion of transition and ‘thorough-going transformation.’9 The second dimension is ‘that of subjective intervention which signifies and represents this instability in particular ways.’10 While often associated with ‘negative connotations of “downfall” and “decline,”’ ‘crisis can also evoke the optimistic scenario of a chance for renewal.’11 In this sense, a key part of a crisis is a historically immanent ‘transitional phase’ and leads to a situation ‘a chance for renewal.’12 The second dimension offers opportunities to ‘crisis entrepreneurs,’ i.e. social and political actors who may attempt to interpret, shape, exploit, and/or amplify the crisis for their own ends in a ‘claim to represent civil society’s general interests.’13 Crises, whether resolved via mediations such as ‘the recourse to polls, a change of government or majority, or the redefinition of common values,’14 can mark a point at which the unity of the state is discursively renegotiated and, potentially, reachieved.15 This may lead to a new strategic trajectory being imposed upon the institutions that now (re-)comprise it16 thus leading to a redefinition of the responsibilities and boundaries of the state […] translated over time into the contours, forms, norms, procedures and practices that characterise an emergent state regime constituted in and through crisis.17 Drawing on the concepts above, the process of crisis and transition can be summarised as follows: • First, a moment of objective heightened political fluidity, leading to a (slow burning/creeping or fast burning) phase of instability and uncertainty with unpredictable consequences. • Second, a subjective intervention via crisis entrepreneurs and/or state actors which signifies and represents this instability in particular ways. • Finally, a transitional phase which comprises a discursive renegotiation and redefinition of the boundaries of the state. In line with this interpretive framework, the following sections illustrate how, in Italy, the regional question represented a slow-burning crisis for the Italian state. Meanwhile, a series of fast-burning crises – often linked to regime change and the more open-ended set of political events which resulted from these – created opportunities for a series of political entrepreneurs to amplify

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crises via demands for regional autonomy. With regards to the transition following a crisis, the following sections illustrate that the success or failure of such efforts to exploit the crisis of regime change in the Italian state has depended largely on the capacity of the state to shut down these demands and maintain unity via a tradition of centralism. 2.1.2 From the Risorgimento to the Republic (1848–1948)

This first section examines the emergence of demands for regional autonomy at times of institutional crises during the Kingdom of Italy. The imposition of a rigidly centralised administrative system, which would remain in place until the fall of fascism, created the conditions for the emergence of ongoing debates surrounding regional autonomy in Italy. The key themes which emerge here are those of federalism in the Risorgimento era, the north-south divide, precedents for regionalist demands in Piedmont and Lombardy, as well as regionalism during fascism and, later, during the anti-fascist resistance. 2.1.2.1 Federalism in the Risorgimento Era

The first and second wars of Italian independence constituted moments of crisis which offered opportunities for regionalist and federalist politics yet ended up paving the way for a system of administrative centralism. The year 1848, however, saw a moment of crisis for the regimes ruling the Italian peninsula and an opportunity for patriots involved in the movement for Italian unification known as the Risorgimento (Resurgence). As popular insurrections ‘rippled up the island from Sicily’ amidst the ‘wave of revolutions sweeping Europe,’18 an opportunity arose for Risorgimento patriots to ‘organise a federal army composed of soldiers from all the Italian states.’19 Particular inspiration came from Milan, where Lombardy’s Habsburg rulers had been driven out of the city in just five days and Piedmont’s King Carlo Alberto subsequently marched on the city. It should be noted, however, that federalism meant different things to different patriots. While Democrats (Republicans) such as Cattaneo and Ferrari envisioned a ‘Swiss-like confederation’20 of Italian states, some Moderate ‘neo-guelph federalists,’ such as Vicenzo Gioberti, advocated for an Italian federation overseen by the Pope. The federalist cause, however, was dealt a series of fatal blows; these came in the form of distrust between federalists and unitarians, the dynastic, rather than patriotic, ambitions of Piedmont,21 the Pope’s allocution repudiating the war between Piedmont and Austria,22 and the superior military strength of the Austrians in a counter-attack against Piedmont and the insurrectionists.23 This discredited federalism as a means of achieving Italian independence while strengthening the cause of Moderates such as Count Camilo Cavour – Prime Minister of Piedmont and

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later of unified Italy – who viewed the creation of a (northern) monarchical State led by the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia as the best way forward.24 In the aftermath of 1848, Piedmont, ‘the only state in Italy to preserve any form of constitutional government,’25 was ‘able to present itself, both at home and abroad, as the logical standard bearer for the national question.’26 In 1859, Cavour, backed by France, engineered a conflict with Austria to begin the Second War of Independence. Piedmont’s subsequent annexation of Lombardy sparked a ‘series of patriotic uprisings in central Italy’27 and the establishment of ‘provisional governments’ in Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, which in 1860 would achieve annexation to ‘Piedmont.’28 However, Italian unification would not have been achieved without Garibaldi’s famous ‘Expedition of the Thousand’ to Sicily, from where he promoted a bottom-up insurrection against Bourbon rule, which led him to enter Naples as victor only to then hand over control to the Piedmontese King.29 By 1861, through a series of fortuitous events, a fragile unity had been achieved and a new Kingdom of Italy was established (Venice was annexed in 1866, and Rome in 1871).30 Following this, ‘in an attempt to hold this fledgling state together, Cavour extended Piedmont’s centralist administrative and bureaucratic structures across newly annexed territories’.31 This process of ‘Piedmontisation’ had been instituted in Lombardy via a royal decree, the Rattazzi law of 23 October 1859. A series of plebiscites between 11 and 12 March 1860 then confirmed the annexation of central Italian states to the new Kingdom of Italy.32 Cavour had ‘initially promised a large degree of regional autonomy,’33 via ‘a scheme of regional devolution-the Farini-Minghetti bill,’ which was ‘prepared in 1861’34 and ‘would have diffused the powers of the state in an additional layer of government’.35 Parliament, however, rejected even these moderate proposals of decentralisation in part due to Cavour’s lukewarm support for the bill.36 In reality, Cavour had become tormented by ‘the danger that Italy might fall apart if a uniform administrative system was not imposed on the whole kingdom’37 and had ‘changed his mind on decentralisation shortly before his death in June 1861’.38 This paved the way for the eventual introduction in 1865 by one of Cavour’s successors, Alfonso La Marmora, of a series of laws which further tightened Italy’s centralist structures.39 Italy was divided into provinces, and prefects – who would become a key symbol of administrative centralism in years to come – were given discretionary powers ‘to oversee, and if need be, veto, municipal decisions’.40 The most decisive factor in Cavour’s volte-face regarding regional autonomy prior to his death was the deteriorating situation in the south of the peninsula.

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2.1.2.2 The North/South Divide and the ‘Southern Question’

Two respective moments of social unrest in southern Italy in the 1860s and 1890s constituted moments of crisis from which centrifugal forces put the newly unified Italian Kingdom in jeopardy. While these moments of insurrection arose from different social and political contexts, they are nevertheless tied together by two key aspects. First, they were shut down by the Liberal regime via campaigns of repression. Second, these rebellions in the South acted as a ‘central moment’ for reinforcing and disseminating the ‘stereotypes and prejudices’ of the Mezzogiorno.41 Any initial enthusiasm for unification in the South quickly gave way to distrust and suspicion of new northern officials in the ex-Bourbon Kingdom. There were good reasons for this; as Duggan notes, in southern Italy, the imposition of military service was causing huge problems, especially in Sicily, which had no previous experience of the draft, while Piedmontese tariffs were resulting in thousands of people losing their jobs as workshops and factories that had depended under the Bourbons on high protective tariffs for their survival were forced to close down.42 These tensions were exacerbated by the ‘revulsion, prejudice, intolerance,’ and heavy-handed rule shown by northern administrators in these newly annexed southern territories.43 It is no surprise, therefore, that ‘many southerners were demanding some degree of regional autonomy’.44 The early 1860s, therefore, saw increasing acts of rebellion against the Kingdom of Italy in the south, including the ransacking of National Guard headquarters, pledges of loyalty to the deposed Bourbon King, and acts of banditry.45 While Cavour had sought to not govern via martial law, his successors were not so diplomatic and successive Italian administrations responded with violence: by the mid-1860s, almost ‘100,000 troops were engaged in a campaign of repression against rebellions in the South’.46 The bloody civil war between Italian troops and pro-Bourbon groups – bands of peasants and ex-soldiers – was ‘speciously referred to as a war against Brigands’.47 This was, however, a way of ‘degrading in status’ what ‘was an expression of widespread social unrest which had its roots in desperate social and economic conditions, particularly those experienced by the peasantry’.48 In 1892, demands for regional autonomy re-emerged in Sicily with a movement known as ‘the Fasci (from the word fascio, meaning “bundle,” indicating strength through solidarity). Mobilising the peasantry and staging increasingly unruly strikes and demonstrations,’49 the Fasci should be considered in the wider context of a ‘new nationally based socialist party in 1892 and militant labour organisations springing up across Italy’.50 As

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this crisis deepened, demands emerged for ‘the right of regional autonomy for Sicily’.51 ‘Indeed, there were talks of separatism, of land being divided up, of the invasion of Piedmont, and of Sicilian autonomy becoming the protector of the island’.52 Eventually, Prime Minister Francesco Crispi declared a state of siege in which civil liberties were suspended and ‘forty thousand soldiers were eventually dispatched to Sicily’.53 Both the civil war of 1861–1865 and the ‘Fasci siciliani’ in the 1890s strengthened old prejudices regarding the South’s innate backwardness.54 Underpinned by positivist anthropological studies claiming to demonstrate ‘scientifically’ that the ‘South was culturally and genetically less evolved than the North,’ a moral climate was created in which ‘centralisation and martial law appeared wholly justified’.55 This discourse was exploited by a ‘narrow elite of northerners’ that ‘dominated government in the first decades of unity’ in an orientalist attempt to ‘make Italians’ in the image of the North, depicted as progressive, European, hardworking, and civilised.56 These ideas were also heavily influenced during the mid-1870s by a series of writings announcing the existence of a ‘Southern Question’57 which depicted the South as a threat to the political and moral integrity of the nation.58 One of the key ideas of these writings was that the emerging criminal phenomenon of the mafia was part of the Southern character. The term ‘mafia’ was used as a blanket term to blame southern rebellions on criminality and gave pretext for further waves of repression.59 The discourse of a criminal and ‘deadweight south’ would re-emerge as part of regionalist demands in north Italy, by groups in the north of Italy who felt they had borne an unfair share of the costs of unification. 2.1.2.3 Regionalist Demands in Piedmont and Lombardy

Demands for regional autonomy in post-unification Italy were not limited to the South. Regionalist politics in Piedmont and Lombardy exploited moments of crisis to articulate their demands around the idea of Rome as the capital of Italy. Between 21 and 22 September 1864, bloody riots broke out in Turin.60 At the centre of this unrest was the loss of the national capital to Florence via the September Convention, -an agreement between Marco Minghetti’s administration and Napoleon III’s France that the latter ‘would withdraw their troops from Rome, […] in return for the transfer of the capital from Turin to Florence’.61 This decision, however, seemed to confirm the fears of many in Piedmont that after a glorious decade in which they had occupied the centre of the Italian stage, the future seemed to promise only an insignificant minor role far from the centre of national life and political power.62

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Some Piedmontese deputies broke from the governing Right coalition to form a federation of groups known as the permanente ‘to act in “permanent” opposition to any government which attempted to transfer the capital to anywhere but Rome’.63 Proposals of federalism and regionalism became a useful stick with which the permanente could beat the Florence-based government64 by arguing for the ‘highest possible level of administrative decentralisation’.65 The shift of the capital from Florence to Rome in 187166 removed the permanente’s very rasion d’être; however, it was not long before Rome again became the target of demands for regional autonomy, this time from the Kingdom of Italy’s ‘moral capital’ i.e. Milan. Milan in the late 1800s saw a ‘growing autonomist current’ and ‘resurgence of the old civic patriotism that had inspired Cattaneo’s federalist vision of Italy,’67 inspired in part by ‘achievements of engineers and industrialists such as Giovan Battista Pirelli, Giulio Prinetti, and Giuseppe Colombo’.68 A reassertion of Milan’s status as ‘moral capital,’ i.e. the ‘most honest, hardworking, and civil regions of Italy,’69 was occurring right at the moment when ‘the South, in the form of Francesco Crispi, for the first time became dominant in national politics’.70 An administration led by Crispi, a Sicilian and Italy’s first Southern Prime Minister,71 sparked a fear that ‘a change in the direction of the country’s politics would no longer respond to Lombard interests or aspirations’.72 This was further reinforced by a73 series of banking scandals in Turin, Florence, and Rome (the three successive Italian capitals) which implicated Crispi, his family, and friends, and a pursuit of an expansionist war in Libya, through which Crispi became the symbol of ‘fiscalism and bureaucratic centralism, militarism, and colonialism’.74 As Duggan observes Lombardy’s continued progress now seemed threatened by the deadweight of the ‘medieval south’ and by a bureaucratic and (after the banking scandals) corrupt central government intent on high military spending and unrealistic dreams of national glory.75 In 1888, to head off autonomist demands, Crispi introduced a law which ‘established elected mayors with more powers over local government’.76 However, boroughs continued to have very limited financial control, and the state-appointed prefect was given the role of chair in a reformed provincial council.77 Between 1894 and 1896, therefore, ‘Left, Right, industrialists, and workers’ came together in Lombardy to demand federalism as a reaction against Rome and a perceived ‘southernisation’ of politics.78 In 1895, the launch of the slogan of ‘the State of Milan’ (Lo Stato di Milano) by the republican left indicated a shift towards outright secession, a threat which Crispi took seriously and regarded as a ‘fundamental ambivalence towards Italian unity’.79 However, this left-wing

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seizure of the anti-Crispi movement would prove to be its downfall. Moderates, previously sympathetic to the federalist cause, feared any threat to the system of constitutional monarchy posed by republicanism.80 The Italian state, therefore, continued to be underpinned by administrative centralism as it entered the 20th century, making it easier for fascism to consolidate its power from 1922 onwards. 2.1.2.4 From Liberalism to Fascism: Cultural and Political Regionalism

In the first decades of Italian unity, majority forces not only consistently rejected regionalist and federalist ideas but construed them negatively.81 Accusations of campanilismo (literally, attachment to one’s local bell tower – campanile – which denotes ‘love of one’s native place,’ but with overtones of narrow mindedness) were often levelled against regionalist demands as a ‘danger to Italian unity’.82 The ‘Giolitti era’ of the early 1900s (named after the long Premiership of Giovanni Giolitti), however, represented the first laboratory for the formation of ‘political and cultural regionalism’ which had an agenda of achieving decentralisation.83 This was partly due to the increasing visibility of debates surrounding the ‘Southern Question’ and the gap between North and South in national and local journals devoted to ‘cultural and political affairs.’84 Interest in regionalism and decentralisation came from ‘a myriad of disparate groups which included southern intellectuals, exponents of the extreme left, and Catholic conservatives.’85 The introduction in 1915 of a law which reinforced the centralism established in 1865 and 188886 did little to deal with the social crisis precipitated by Italy’s involvement in World War One. Instead, regionalism was posed as a potential solution to national problems by newly emergent political parties.87 The post-war era saw the emergence of political actors such as The Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party, PPI) which channelled a Catholic demand for regional autonomy and ‘inserted administrative decentralisation amongst its first policies’88 and the Partito dei Contadini (the Italian Peasants’ Party) which proposed local autonomy as a way of ‘protecting peasant small-holdings’.89 In 1924, these parties gained 39 and 4 seats, respectively, in the chamber of deputies. However, these were the first and last elections to be held under the controversial Acerbo Law introduced by Benito Mussolini’s fascist government and which, by design, rewarded the fascists with two-thirds of the seats in parliament. On Mussolini’s appointment as prime minister after the March on Rome in 1922, many fascists had requested ‘both legislative and administrative decentralisation’ to symbolise a transition from the ‘liberaldemocratic regime to Fascism’.90 However, greater centralisation was a logical necessity of the fascist corporatist and totalitarian state, and

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Mussolini had no intention of relinquishing control to local administrations.91 A political crisis sparked by the subsequent murder of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti by fascist thugs in June of that year saw a wave of political opposition to Mussolini, who was widely viewed as complicit in the planning of the murder.92 The Matteotti crisis, rather than spelling the end of Mussolini’s premiership, would culminate in Fascism tightening its grip on the state machinery, leading to a dictatorship; this entailed the banning of all political opposition and reinforcement of a centralist administration.93 Fascism attempted to distinguish between political regionalism and cultural regionalism.94 The logic behind this was that‘ the former had to disappear to eliminate the threat to unity of the nation’, while ’the latter would be cultivated to demonstrate its contributions to the greatness and unity of the country’.95 Fascism, therefore, cohabited with local traditions to convey its message, and local culture was exploited in an attempt to bolster national and patriotic sentiment.96 In some cases, this involved tailoring the cult of Mussolini to local needs and circumstances, such as delivering acclamations for the Duce in local dialect.97 In other instances, it meant directly appropriating local symbols and traditions.98 As noted by Ferris in her study of fascist Venice, the symbols, memories and myths of Venice were deployed by the regime to foster a national sense of identity and allegiance of Rome [which] had the potential to act both as complement and as rival to the fascist project.99 The Venetian experience of Fascism was indicative of how the regime was often ‘unable to control how their messages would be received by the population’.100 Essentially, regional identity during the Fascist period had an adverse effect on the regime’s attempt to impose its totalitarian project101 as there was a failure ‘to penetrate many local situations in an efficient, attractive, and above all “nationalising” way’.102 Following Italy’s disastrous entry into World War Two, many anti-fascist groups became the standard bearers of a vision of post-war Italy which would hold regional autonomy amongst its founding principles. 2.1.2.5 Towards the Republic: Regional Autonomy as a Value of the Resistance

The fall of Fascism precipitated the most significant moment of crisis for the Italian state since unification; following a disastrous intervention into World War Two, Italy once again found itself a divided peninsula under foreign rule. Mussolini’s dismissal as Prime Minister by King Vittorio Emanuele III in 1943 meant that

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Crisis, Transition, and Demands for Regional Autonomy from 1943 until 1945 there were three Italies: one in the South, occupied by the Allies, a Central Italy, under control of the Germans until summer of 1944 and North Italy, which, until April 1945, was the theatre of conflict between Resistance fighters on one side and Germany and fascists of the Republic of Salò/Italian Social Republic.103

From this crisis emerged a renewed opportunity for regionalist politics which were now framed as the anti-thesis of fascist centralism. It is a damning indictment of the Liberal era that its centralist administrative framework assisted Mussolini’s consolidation of power following 1924; regional autonomy, therefore, appeared now to be a unifying element of the partisan resistance. Various documents, including Altiero Spinelli’s communist Ventotene Manifesto, the Carta di Chivasso, written by a group of partisans from Valle D’Aosta, and the 12 points of Milan, written by Christian Democrats (DC), argued for varying degrees of federalism and/or regional autonomy in a post-war republic.104 Meanwhile, Committees for National Liberation (CLNs) and/or Partisan Republics signified an association between democracy and regional autonomy and saw power and authority operating in many areas of the north on a very localised and provincial basis.105 This encouraged the concept that ‘regional CLNs constituted the new government of the country’ and the prospect that there could be ‘a direct relationship between the regional CLN of the resistance and the future Constitutional Region’.106 Further to this, some regionalist parties were ‘rooted in resistance anti-fascist autonomist movements’.107 These included the Union Valdotaine – with which Umberto Bossi would gain his first political experience – and the South Tyrol People’s Party. The Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali was a further legacy of the anti-fascist resistance’s emphasis on regional autonomy.108 Post-war demands for autonomy should, therefore, be considered as closely linked to drawing a line under the ‘tragic experience of Fascism and the annexation to Germany and the Third Reich.’109 While the US State Department initially pushed for decentralisation, arguing that ‘excessive centralisation […] had helped spawn fascism in the first place,’110 the majority of anti-fascist parties also initially accepted the need, albeit to varying degrees, of a form of regional government.111 Prominent Liberal politician and future president of the Republic, Luigi Einaudi’s equivocation of centralism with fascism is highly significant in this respect. In particular, ‘with his article via il prefetto, Einaudi advocated the abolishment of the prefect and the self-administration of regions and communes.’112 Indeed, as argued by Rotelli, the coincidence between the end of the dictatorship and the advent of autonomy was so intimate [that] nobody doubted that the future Democratic Italian state would be founded on regional autonomy.113

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This was not, however, to be the case. While Title V (articles 114–133) of the 1948 Constitution divided the Italian State into 20 regions that were subdivided into provinces and municipalities, 15 so-called ‘ordinary regions’ had to wait until 1970 to see any provisions implemented.114 Only five (Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Val d’Aosta) were accorded ‘special statutes’ as autonomous regions,115 either because they were home to significant linguistic minorities or, in the case of the islands, because of their geographic isolation.116 What explains this half-measured approach? It was largely down to the fact that the two largest parties in the new republic - The Italian Communist Party (the PCI) and the Christian Democrats (the DC) opposed decentralisation. While ‘the Communists feared that strong regions would weaken state unity, the DC were afraid the Communists would win elections in some regions.’117 As Hine has noted ‘regionalism existed on paper but remained unimplemented because enabling legislation was blocked in parliament’.118 Therefore, Italy’s republic maintained a centralist tradition that had lasted for almost a century. It was these institutional conditions which would lead to the emergence of the first wave of post-war regional autonomy in Piedmont and Lombardy, to which this chapter now turns.119 2.1.3 Two Waves of North Italian Regionalist Activism in Republican Italy

The following section examines two waves of regionalist activism in Lombardy and Piedmont. The ideological and discursive features of these two waves of activism form the focus of the following chapters of this book; what follows is a brief historical overview of the birth, growth, and subsequent decline of these movements. 2.1.3.1 The MARP and the MAB – 1948–1964

The MRAs emerged during the first period of crisis and transition in the post-war period, i.e. the fall of Fascism and the transition to a democratic and – ostensibly – regionally based Republic founded on anti-fascist values. Despite their different origins, the key objective of both MRAs was the activation of the articles in the constitution which would introduce regional administrations in Italy. The history of the MRAs’ should be analysed in three stages. The first stage, 1946–1955, saw the emergence of two organisations which would provide many of the ideas, resources and personnel for both the MRAs and contribute to their official constitution in 1955. The second stage, 1955–1958, were years of fleeting success with the MRAs making inroads at a local level. The third stage, 1958–1964, represented a period of decline which is dealt with more comprehensively in chapter 3 as it relates directly to abeyance theory.

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2.1.3.1.1 1946–1955: FROM THEORY TO ACTIVISM

In 1946 and 1947, two organisations were formed to campaign for the inclusion of the regional statute in the Italian Republican Constitution.120 Between 1946 and 1948, in Turin, Piedmont, the Associazione Regionale Italiana (Italian Regional Association - ARI) provided financial and organisational support to candidates from various political parties, emerging following the fall of Fascism, who declared themselves in favour of regional autonomy. Amongst the objectives of the ARI were the ‘constitution of a Union of Piedmontese provinces’ and the establishment of ‘an elected regional council’ in Piedmont.121 At first sight, Turin may appear a peculiar site for the birth of an autonomist movement considering its history as the first capital city of unified Italy; however, as previously illustrated with the case of the permanente, the other side of Piedmontese pride in ‘having made Italy’ was a feeling of having sacrificed much of the region’s identity for the cause of Italian unity. This has at times resulted in a desire to protect customs and tradition, and the post-war republic offered a fresh opportunity for this via the putative regional statutes. While the ARI disbanded in 1948 following the inclusion of regional statutes in the Constitution in January 1948, many of its activists would later enter the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (the MARP).122 The MARP, constituted in 1955, was a separate organisation from the ARI and was one of several unions of small to medium business owners and tradesmen founded in the first decade of the Italian Republic dedicated to protecting Piedmontese business interests and obtaining tax cuts.123 However, it would later become essentially a proxy movement for former members of the ARI who saw in the MARP the potential for a new political movement to further their interests.124 To gain control, however, they first had to oust ‘an unsettled and rowdy element of the movement who failed to win any public trust,’ by the name of Enrico Villarboito.125 As the sole author of the MARP’s first statute, Villarboito had attempted to mould the movement in his image, including articles which ensured he would remain in position until the attainment of regional autonomy and reserved him the sole right to nominate and revoke membership.126 Central to the expulsion of Villarboito were ARI members such as Michele Rosboch and Timoteo Nobile who formulated a new statute with the help of existing MARP member, Franco Bruno.127 It is no coincidence that three of the four councillors elected from the MARP list were former members of the ARI. Indeed, the MARP would without doubt have remained one of the many fleeting movements of this period if it had not been for the entry of the most noted and respected members of Turinese society, some of whom came from the ARI.128

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Members of the ARI also financed the fortnightly publication of a newspaper, Piemonte Nuovo, which published propaganda related to the campaign for regional autonomy. Although the MARP could count only around 2,000 registered members by the end of 1956, this official figure does not account for sympathisers amongst business owners who provided financial support.129 Villarboito would continue to be a thorn in the side of the MARP throughout the 1950s, forming new movements to rival his former organisation. The first of these, the Movimento Autonomie Regionali (Movement for Regional Autonomies - the MAR), mirrored both the MARP’s anti-party and regionalist ideology and propaganda. So similar were its methods and name that the MARP released a notice in Piemonte Nuovo to distance itself from the movement.130 The MAR, unlike the MARP, proposed a national alliance for regionalist movements and was made up of two distinct organisms … one in North Italy and the other in South Italy with the respective denominations of ANRI (Autonomie Regionali Nord Italia) and ARSI (Autonomie Regionali Sud Italia).131 In 1958, Villarboito teamed up with TV personality Gianluigi Marianini, who formed an organisation called the SCOPA (Servire Coscientemente Ogni Pubblica Amministrazione – To serve consciously every public administration). While acting as an acronym for a very cumbersome title, the SCOPA, meaning ‘broom’ in Italian, gave the impression that this party would ‘clean up’ politics in Piedmont.132 Meanwhile, in Bergamo, in 1947,133 a group called the Movimento per le Autonomie Locali (the Movement for Local Autonomies - the MAL) was formed and ‘dedicated itself to the democratic principles of Local Autonomy […] independent of any political party’. Unlike the ARI, the MAL did not disband following the signing of the constitution.134 Indeed, one of its founding members, Anselmo Freddi, wrote that, following 1948, ‘it became the duty of the MAL to ensure that the regional statutes written into the Constitution were activated.’ As well as the influence of a particular Bergamascan Catholic subculture, Bergamo is also situated in one of the richest, most productive, and dynamic areas of Italy, Lombardy. Bergamascans, therefore, tend to define themselves – often in oppositional terms with the rest of Italy – as people who work and produce. This, in combination with Bergamo’s geographic location as a mountain city have helped create a sub-culture of ‘localism’ through which Bergamascans ‘feel that their town is selfsufficient’.135 The MAL had no ‘Villarboito moment’ in its formative years.136 Guido Calderoli and other leaders of the MAL, such as teachers Anselmo Freddi

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and Aldo Rizzi and civil servant Gianfranco Gonella, wrote and designed a significant range of pamphlets, essays, speeches, and posters which promoted regional autonomy, Europeanism, and federalism.137 The ideas in these documents provided the basis for future waves of activism. Such ideas re-emerged, being reframed in the 1960s and 1970s during the period of abeyance and later recycled by leghismo. During the early 1950s, members of the MAL spoke in piazzas in Trieste and then Friuli and this activism sparked a desire to stand in the upcoming administrative elections of 1956 in Bergamo.138 The MAL’s leading members, in 1955, therefore ‘renamed themselves as the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (the MAB), with headquarters in Via Verdi 17, Bergamo, and presented a list of candidates, amongst whom was Guido Calderoli, in the administrative elections to the communal and provincial councils’.139 The first edition of the MARP’s Piemonte Nuovo, released one month prior to these elections, contained a guest column written by Calderoli, thus indicating early collaboration between the two MRAs.140 This collaboration would continue over the decade, with Franco Bruno of the MARP also campaigning in Bergamo.141 In 1955, seven years following the signing of the Republican Constitution, the regional statutes still lay dormant,142 and it was in this year that the MARP and the MAB signed their own respective statutes and began to field candidates for administrative elections.143 2.1.3.1.2 1955–1958: SUCCESS AND SIGNS OF DECLINE

In 1956, the MARP’s members complained that the ‘question (of regional autonomy) had been [sic] deliberately kicked into the long grass’.144 The MAB similarly protested that ‘the Lombard region which was approved eight years ago […] until now has not been implemented.’145 On 28 June 1956, the MARP received 31,370 votes (5.79%) in Turin, which translated in the election of 4 councillors out of a total of 80, of whom 2 were to become regional assessors.146 The MARP, representing the entirety of Piedmont, not just Turin, also won seats in Pinerolo, with 3,400 votes in the communal council (10%) and 3,471 in the provincial council (9.38%). Three MARP councillors were elected to Pinerolo’s commune.147 In 1957, in Vercelli, the MARP’s Dr Andrea Busto gained a provincial council seat with 10,569 votes out of 240,406 votes cast (4.3%). Dr Paolo Barelli, Carlo Piazzano, and Dr Hertz de Benedetti with 2,283 votes out of 29,718 (7.6%) also became communal councillors.148 In 1957, a MARP mayor, Ferrero Emilio, took charge of the commune of Prali, a small mountain town which borders France. Piemonte Nuovo reported:

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we have our first MARPista mayor! In a small mountain commune the voice of the people will be heard and will speak for the Region, justice for all and for a forgotten Piedmont.149 Piemonte Nuovo also reported that the MAB received 1,248 votes out of the 63,173 votes (1.98%) in the commune and 1,381 votes (2.23%) of the 61,926 votes cast in the province, with Guido Calderoli and Ugo Gavazzeni becoming communal and provincial councillors, respectively.150 While, on the surface, the MAB’s result appears relatively minor, it was a significant breakthrough considering Bergamo was a province with a particularly strong Catholic subculture and subsequent Christian Democrat hegemony. Piemonte Nuovo subsequently cited the Lombard autonomists as an example of regionalist fervour across the north of the peninsula.151 Although he stepped down from his post to be substituted by fellow MAB member Gianfranco Gonella, Calderoli continued to play an active role in the movement, attempting to form the Lombard Autonomy Movement and extend the autonomist movement to Milan.152 He also tried to join the Federazione Autonomie Regionali Italiane with Silvio Milazzo, President of the Region in Sicily who had gained support through his intransigent opposition to Roman centralism and the use of slogans such as ‘Sicily for the Sicilians,’ thus mirroring Calderoli’s use of ‘Lombardy for the Lombards!’153 A 1958 alliance between the MARP and the MAB entitled the MARPadania saw not only a precedent for the Alleanza Nord formed by the regionalist leagues in 1989 but also the use of the term Padania, which would later be developed and recycled.154 However, the MARPadania alliance in 1958 represented the first significant sign of decline for the first wave of regionalism in North Italy. The MARP list, now represented an alliance of autonomists in provinces across Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Veneto, yet failed to return a single parliamentary candidate. In Turin, the vote was more than halved to 13,721 (2.23%) and the combined Piedmontese vote from Turin-Novara-Vercelli of 36,169 (2.15%) barely matched the Turin-based MARP vote in the administrative elections of 1956.155 The Bergamascan delegation received a reduced vote share in the Bergamo-Brescia electoral college with 772 votes (1.11%) of the 69,303 cast for the Chamber of Deputies and 764 votes (1.23%) out of 62,145 for the Senate.156 This should be interpreted as a result of several difficulties caused by the 1958 elections. First was the presence of Villarboito’s SCOPA movement which caused a split in the autonomist vote. Although the SCOPA managed to take nearly 7,000 votes, across the Turin-NovaraVercelli section, this still would not have brought the MARPadania list a threshold high enough to send deputies to Rome.157 Nevertheless, Villarboito’s insistence that he alone was the founder and leader of the

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MARP and his imaginative propaganda campaign of distributing fake cheques throughout Turin to indicate that the city’s citizens were paying too much tax damaged the momentum of the MARP’s campaign.158 Fractures also emerged due to disagreements over whether to pursue a more local or more national agenda.159 The elections of 1958 highlighted a factionalism which would come to the fore in the 1960s, thus accelerating the process of decline and absorption of the MRAs. Indeed, the MARPadania alliance led to the split in both the MARP and the MAB between those who chose to join mainstream political parties and those who were determined to continue the campaign for regional autonomy. These factional divisions are explored in greater detail in chapter 3.160 For now, this chapter turns to the second wave of post-war regionalist activism of leghismo and the implications this held for the centralist state in Italy. 2.1.3.1.2.1 Leghismo The second moment of the post-war crisis of transition was that of the Italian political institutions between 1989 and 1994, caused by the combined factors of fall of the Berlin Wall, the Tangentopoli Scandals, and electoral reform, leading to a transition between the First and Second Italian Republic.161 Leghismo should be understood, in part, as a product of a crisis of political and cultural representation in the so-called ‘industrial triangle’ of north Italy in the 1980s. From this crisis, the Lega articulated a new and politically more contentious ‘Northern Question’ which was ‘superimposed on the longstanding Southern question’.162 This emphasised ‘a growing economic and social gap between a wealthy North and a much less developed South’.163 For purposes of clarity and in line with the definitions adopted in this book, it should be reiterated here that the Lega was not just a regionalist party. Indeed, its exclusionary form of regionalism made up an important element of the Lega’s identity as part of a third wave of right-wing extremism during the 1980s. While a closer examination of this will be left to chapter 5, it should be highlighted that the second wave of post-war regionalist activism outlined below emerged as a far-right articulation during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 2.1.3.1.3 FROM THE 1970S REGIONAL REFORMS TO THE CRISIS OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

In 1970, the MRAs’ primary objective was realised when, for the first time in the history of Italy as a unified state, a form of administrative decentralisation was implemented by the central government. This was the result of significant electoral gains by ‘the pro-regionalist Left’ which put ‘pressure on the DC to decentralise power to the regions.’164 This was far from the federalist ideals of Cattaneo, Ferrari, and Gioberti or the

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freedoms that the MRAs had envisaged; there were ‘virtually no areas of “exclusive” legislative power and financial autonomy [was] extremely modest’.165 Italian regional devolution was ‘for many a disappointment, both for the unconscionably long time it took to establish and for the limits on regional autonomy when it was established’.166 One of the results of this incomplete decentralisation is a seemingly contradictory ‘administrative record of the regions (since 1970)’. Therefore, while on the one hand, regions were able to develop their own cultural policies and bring the populace in on them; on the other hand […] regional government failed to erase the north-south gap, with northern regions continuing to be more efficient.167 The persistent lack of autonomy after the 1970 regional reforms played a key role in the emergence of a second wave of regionalist activism represented by leghismo. The first regionalist leagues emerged as part of an electoral list formed by Bruno Salvadori’s Union Valdotaine for the first European elections in 1979. The early years of leghismo were marked by an equal measure of co-operation and competition between several regionalist ‘leagues’ in the north of Italy.168 These organisations emerged in what has been labelled variously as the ‘deep north,’ the ‘zona pedemontana,’ or ‘Third Italy,’ i.e. the ‘North East in Pordenone, Belluno, Treviso, and Vicenza; the northern areas of Lombardy (Brianza, Bergamo, and Sondrio)’; and in the North West, ‘some Piedmontese provinces (Cuneo and Asti)’.169 ‘Third Italy’ emphasises how this North Eastern economy was based predominantly on small, family-owned businesses and was thus different to ‘the industrial triangle in the North West’ and ‘the marginal and dependent South’.170 During the 1980s, a ‘burgeoning state deficit’ resulted in ‘fiscal pressure’ being exerted on this ‘Third Italy’. The DC, which had played a role in every government since the foundation of the Republic, proved itself unable to respond to resulting demands for ‘neo-liberal and autonomist’ policies.171 This party, therefore, became the principal target of ‘anti-state and anti-centralist sentiments of early Lega voters’.172 The regionalist leagues reframed demands for autonomy in line with the establishment of regional administrations throughout Italy from 1970. They, therefore, denounced the Italian regional governments as ‘a by-product of the centralised Italian state’ and claimed that ‘existing regional autonomy in Italy [was] a mockery’.173 While initially subordinate to the Venetian and Piedmontese leagues,174 Umberto Bossi’s Lega Lombarda would become the leading voice of leghismo in the latter half of the 1980s.175 Bossi was an effective political strategist and campaigner; however, his profile was further boosted through collaborations with university professor Gianfranco Miglio and journalist

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Daniele Vimercate. While the former provided an intellectual grounding for Bossi’s autonomist proposals, the latter facilitated a series of publications through which such ideas could reach a wider audience.176 In the 1987 national elections, the Lega Lombarda ‘obtained 186,000 votes in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies and nearly 140,000 votes in elections to the Senate’ which was ‘enough to send Giuseppe Leoni to the Chamber of Deputies and Bossi to the Senate’.177 The subsequent formation of Alleanza Nord for the 1989 European elections between Lega Lombarda and other five allies, including Franco Rochetta’s Liga Veneta and Gipo Farassino’s Piemont Autonomista, saw the election of two deputies to the European Parliament.178 A congress of these leagues in February 1991 saw ‘the integration […] into a unitary federation and single League: the Lega Nord,’ and Bossi was confirmed as its Federal Secretary.179 In the 1992 elections, the Lega increased its vote share from 1.3% to 8.6%, gaining 55 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 25 seats in the Senate.180 Two years later, the 1994 elections marked a transition to the so-called Second Italian Republic following the Tangentopoli crisis and subsequent electoral reform. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 opened ‘the electoral market,’ until then blocked ‘by a tacit agreement between the DC and their allies to permanently exclude the second largest party, the Italian Communist Party, from government,’ thus leaving many DC voters ‘free to vote for other parties’.181 The Lega’s long-standing accusations of corruption levelled against the parties of the First Italian Republic were vindicated by the Tangentopoli scandals of 1992.182 With electoral reform in 1993 shifting the system from a proportional to a largely majoritarian system, ‘a real electoral earthquake’ ensued in which ‘all the old parties’ which had emerged in 1948 ‘were either wiped out or emerged as much weakened’.183 The parties which had dominated the Italian Republic from 1948 onwards, in particular the DC, were, therefore, consigned to history. The Lega exploited the vacuum left by the DC in former ‘white zones’ (the colour of Christian Democracy) and turned them into ‘green zones’ (the colour adopted by leghismo).184 However, the fall of the First Italian Republic was a double-edged sword for the Lega; it enabled an electoral breakthrough, but also saw the emergence of a competitor in Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), which would siphon off a significant section of the Lega’s electorate. Berlusconi’s ‘entry into the field’ (in his own words), therefore, posed a dilemma for Bossi as the 1994 elections drew nearer. 2.1.3.1.4 THE FEDERALISATION OF THE ITALIAN STATE

The Lega’s different ideological programmes in relation to the region can be summarised as follows: the party campaigned for ‘federalism in the first half of the 1990s, secessionism in the second half, devolution in the first

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half of the 2000s, fiscal federalism in 2008,’ and gradually abandoned regionalism for nationalism from 2013 onwards.185 Chapter 4 will return to these stages of the Lega’s programme to examine them in more detail; the purpose of the following paragraphs is to establish the ‘process of federalisation’ which took place in Italy in response to the Lega’s political programme. In an attempt to achieve its proposed programme of macro-regions, Bossi entered an alliance with Berlusconi’s FI and Gianfranco Fini’s ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale.186 This turbulent administration, characterised by almost constant clashes between the Lega and its coalition partners, was brought to a swift conclusion at the end of December, following a vote of no confidence in Berlusconi.187 From 1995, the Lega shifted from federalism to secessionism, in part to rediscover its voice in the face of mainstream parties adopting federalist and/or free-market policies. This move was also ‘predicated on the hope/expectation that Italy would fail to meet the entry criteria for the European Monetary Union’.188 While secessionism initially gained the Lega 10.1% of the votes at the 1996 general election, Bossi had no influence in determining the composition of the new government. Subsequent heavy losses ‘in the European elections of June 1999’189 and a government crisis in December 1999 which revealed ‘the fragility of the centre-left coalition government’ led Bossi to conclude that a new coalition with FI and AN was the best way to revive his party’s fortunes.190 This re-entry into a coalition with FI and AN was based partly on an agreement to reject the Centre-Left’s regionalist reforms. The Ulivo coalition which governed Italy between 1996 and 2001 was led by Romano Prodi, Massimo D’Alema, and finally Franco Rutelli and embarked on a series of constitutional reforms (the so-called Bassanini reforms) including a reform of Title V of the Constitution (encompassing ‘the regions, the communes and the provinces’) which amounted to ‘an overhaul of local government’.191 The Ulivo’s reform consisted of reorganizing the state and administrative machine to give new authority to the central government and efficacy to local administration, by pursuing greater integration between the different levels of government192 This reform, therefore, transferred substantial competencies to the regions, notably in areas such as public health, and gave the regions the power to legislate in all subject matters not expressly covered by state legislation.193

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While this reform was far away from the federalist model proposed by the Lega, it nevertheless ‘stole the Lega’s clothes. Its principal policy – the one that differentiated it from the “Roman” parties – had been appropriated by its rivals’.194 This reform was approved by referendum with ‘64.2% in favour to 35.8% against’ on 7 October 2001, shortly after the fall of the Ulivo administration and the subsequent election and formation of the second Berlusconi cabinet.195 Prior to the 2001 elections, the Lega had campaigned on the platform of ‘devolution,’ thus abandoning the separatist image which had played such a key role in its identity since 1995. This followed years of intransigent calls for an independent Padania and harsh attacks on Berlusconi, depicted by Bossi as the ‘mafioso of Arcore.’ The volte-face represented by an adoption of devolution and an alliance with Berlusconi disappointed a large part of the Lega’s electorate as the party failed to achieve more than 3.94% of the national vote. However, the Lega nevertheless played a pivotal role in the centre-right coalition, with Berlusconi relying on Lega votes in the Senate.196 The Lega, therefore, gained key ministries in spite of its low polling, including Bossi’s occupation of the Ministry for Reforms.197 Bossi flexed his ministerial muscle and proposed a more radical ‘devolution’ bill which promised to transfer healthcare, education and training, and even some aspects of policing to sub-national tiers of government.198 Although Bossi’s reform did not pass the test of a referendum required by the Constitution,199 2 years later, in the 2008 elections, the Lega became Italy’s third largest party, obtaining 8.3% of the national vote and with it 60 deputies and 26 senators.200 This was no small feat; Bossi had suffered a cardiac arrest and subsequent stroke in 2004 and, following this, there had been doubts over the survival of the party.201 The Lega reignited demands for ‘fiscal federalism’ and introduced a framework law in May 2009 to this effect.202 However, ‘long delays’ in introducing this measure ‘did not sit well with the Lega’s northern constituency’ and the party was punished in 2011 with the fall of the fourth Berlusconi government.203 The traditional message of the Lega also ‘became less effective and appealing because, after eight years of government (2001–2006, 2008–2011), it was perceived as too embedded (or “institutionalised”) within the traditional political system’.204 While the NorthSouth/Centre-Periphery dichotomy which had historically formed a central part at the centre of the Lega’s raison d’être had already become rather marginal in Lega discourse prior to 2013.205 2.1.3.1.5 FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD ITALIAN REPUBLIC: THE DECLINING SALIENCE OF REGIONALISM, A NEW ERA OF CRISIS AND TRANSITION, AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POPULIST ACTOR

While the Lega had experienced significant gains in the 2010 regional elections, these successes were marred by increasingly visible signs of

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nepotism and corruption in the party’s hierarchy.206 On returning to the opposition benches, Bossi reverted to campaigning for an independent Padania.207 However, he had little opportunity to re-establish secessionism as, in January 2012, the party was rocked by a financial scandal involving payments from party funds to Bossi’s children and even corrupt deals with the Calabrian Mafia. In 2012, the Lega’s treasurer, Francesco Belsito, was placed under investigation by the public prosecutor’s offices in Naples, Rome, and Milan, as well as by the anti-Mafia unit in Reggio Calabria, facing charges of money laundering and fraudulent abuse of public funds. Investigations into Belsito’s dealings revealed that public funds made available to the party for electoral and other expenses, had been appropriated to maintain the luxuries and private expenses of the Bossi family, in particular of Renzo (Umberto Bossi’s youngest son), including houses, cars, holidays and other luxury items.208 Rather than an isolated incident, these investigations revealed a damning pattern of behaviour ‘among Umberto Bossi’s closest collaborators, the so-called cerchio magico (‘magic circle’). This group had gained much influence ‘as Bossi, whose health problems had caused his powers to wane, exercised a looser grip on the party’.209 For a party which had built its image largely on a platform of anti-corruption, these revelations were devastating. This meant that ‘the Lega and Bossi himself dramatically lost the aura of relative honesty that they had won over two decades of hard campaigning’.210 Bossi resigned on 6 April 2012 with the vacant post of federal secretary being filled by the party’s co-founder, Roberto Maroni. Maroni ‘publicly declared that he would clean up the Lega’ and upon being elected party secretary conducted a balancing act between strengthening the Lega’s northern identity and federalist mission whilst stopping short of ‘secessionism’.211 With a policy of ‘North First’ or a ‘macro-federation of the North,’ the Lega won ‘the three main northern regions’ (Lombardy, Piedmont, and Veneto) in the regional elections of 2013.212 In the midst of the Lega’s identity crisis, a transition from the Second to Third Italian Republic had been triggered by the fall of the Berlusconi government, in which Bossi’s party had been a coalition partner.213 Following ‘a collapse in domestic and international confidence’ in the capacity of the Berlusconi government ‘to stave off the pressure’214 exerted by the Eurozone crisis and Italy’s unsustainable cost of borrowing, Mario Monti, a European Union Commissioner, was chosen by President Giorgio Napolitano to take ‘the reins of the Italian government in 2011’.215 The unelected, technocratic Monti government ‘attempted

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to impose an austerity plan without relying on any relays to Italian society to mobilise consent for its difficult reform programme’.216 In this ‘experiment in “unmediated democracy,”’ Monti enjoyed the support of all parties represented in parliament except Lega, which became the de facto opposition in parliament’.217 While Monti helped steady the ship in terms of Italy’s finance and international reputation, his cabinet ‘lost the support of its largest parliamentary party (Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom Party) which abandoned the governing majority on 6 December 2012’.218 The subsequent elections held on February 2013 split Italy three ways with 30 per cent of voters choosing the coalition of the centre-left, 30 per cent choosing the coalition of the centre-right, and 25 per cent voting for the party of Beppe Grillo, a comedian-turned-blogger whose Five Star Movement ran against Monti’s technocratic record and the parties of the mainstream right and left.219 The Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S) ‘challenged the Lega on its own terrain, namely that of the need to sweep away the Italian political system and the political class’.220 The emergence of this new populist actor, therefore, radically challenged the political establishment (which now included the Lega) without placing a particular emphasis on territorial issues.221 Meanwhile, the 10% received by Monti’s newly formed political was not enough to be a viable coalition partner.222 These elections, therefore, marked the transition from the Second to the Third Italian Republic insofar as they heralded an unprecedented tripolar era,223 i.e. the two traditional forces of the Second Italian Republic (Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right and variously assorted centre-left alliances) were matched, in terms of size, by the M5S.224 With the M5S refusing to govern with any party and leader of the centre-left Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD), Pier Luigi Bersani, failing to command any majority or consensus on the Left President Giorgio Napolitano turned to the PD’s deputy secretary, Enrico Letta, to head a ‘grand coalition’ government which included both right and left-wing parties.225 However, on his election as PD secretary in 2013, Matteo Renzi exerted a huge amount of internal pressure on Letta’s government, forcing his resignation and subsequently being appointed prime minister in February 2014.226 With regards to the Lega, the elections saw support for the party drop to 4.1% of the national vote, amounting to a loss of 1.5 million votes from the 8.3% achieved in 2008.227 These elections should, therefore, be viewed as the death knell for the Lega’s message of regionalism, as Maroni’s ‘North First’ policy failed to arrest the decline at a national

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level. After Maroni stepped down to concentrate on the presidency of the regional government of Lombardy the party held its first ever primaries in which Matteo Salvini defeated Bossi by 82% to 18%.228 This marked the beginning of a transition away from populist regionalism to populist nationalism, which will be examined in greater detail in chapter 6. 2.2 Conclusion Until the emergence of the Lega in its key role as a crisis entrepreneur, Italy’s ruling classes throughout its Kingdom and Republic had managed to successfully suppress calls for regional reform during moments of crisis. In light of the historical context above and returning to the theoretical framework established at the start of this chapter, it is possible to summarise key moments of crisis and transition from the Risorgimento until the present day and their impact on the regional question in Italy. The 1848 uprisings in Italy ended in the rejection of many of the federalist ideals which had acted as inspiration for a possible confederation of Italian states. Instead, what followed unification in 1861, was an adoption of a centralist administrative framework and the subsequent refusal to concede any measure of decentralisation in the latter half of the 19th century.229 Following unification, however, demands for an Italian State more sensitive to regional differences came from those taking part in uprisings in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and, later on, riots and protests in both Piedmont and Lombardy. Such movements failed to force any form of regime change and were suppressed (often violently) by the Liberal regime and/or fizzled out due to internal divisions between those advocating for federalist reform. As Italy entered the 20th century, political and cultural regionalism began to find a voice and political representation in new parties such as the Popular Party and the Party of Italian Peasants. However, with the advent of the corporatist state, the outlawing of political opposition, and the consolidation of a centralist framework inherited from the Liberal period, avenues for political regionalism were closed off. As protagonists in perhaps one of the most significant moments of crisis and transition in the recent history of the Italian state – the antifascist resistance – the CLNs and partisan republics relied heavily on regionalist identity. Resistance actors positioned themselves as direct opponents to fascist centralism and proponents of an Italian rebirth. The inclusion of regionalism - a key value of the resistance - in the republican Constitution heralded an opportunity to break Italy’s tradition of administrative centralism. In the end, however, the years of transition to

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democracy following the crisis caused by years of Fascism saw these statutes remain inactive in the majority of Italy’s regions. This example of subjective intervention by state actors to maintain Italian unity and navigate a period of unstable transition saw the emergence of the first wave of post-war populist regionalism. The inability of post-war autonomists in Piedmont and Lombardy – which evolved from the ARI and MAL – to make a significant breakthrough was due largely to the fact that the 1948 elections saw the establishment of DC hegemony throughout the republic until the 1990s. The DC was able to shut down regionalist demands and thus maintain a system of centralism. The MRAs also remained at the margins of Italian politics due to factional splits which would play a role in their downfall. In any case, the prediction of these movements that regional autonomy would bring about sweeping changes in Italy’s institutional framework was at best overly optimistic and at worst naive; barely a decade following the decline of the MRAs, the institution of the regions in 1970 was widely regarded as inadequate in devolving powers to newly formed local governments, especially in the failure to allow for fiscal autonomy. The centralist state, therefore, represented something of a paradox for modern Italy’s ruling classes. On the one hand, it threatened a slowburning crisis in that it failed to deal adequately with the different administrative and cultural aspects of Italy’s heterogeneous regions; on the other hand, for over 100 years of Italian unification, it proved an effective instrument to shut down regionalist demands which emerged as a result of a variety of fast-burning crises. In all of the above instances, rather than any necessary redefinition of the contours or boundaries of the state, Italian governments made recourse to the centralist framework to maintain the fragile and somewhat fortuitous unity that had been established in 1861. The emergence of the regionalist leagues changed this. The ability of these organisations to campaign successfully on a regionalist and federalist platform where the MRAs had remained at the margins can be explained through both structural and agency factors. In terms of structural factors, the crisis of the Italian party system caused by the twin factors of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tangentopoli scandals marked the end of a party or coalition being able to achieve overall control and shut out regionalist demands. Regarding agency, Umberto Bossi’s leadership of the Lega Lombarda and, later, his ability to unite the various regionalist leagues into a federation represented the real turning point for this wave of activism. Under the leadership of Bossi in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the leagues became increasingly organised into a single federation of the Lega Nord which led a ‘headlong

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attack’ against the centralist state.230 Unable to intervene to navigate this crisis which had been amplified by the Lega, the parties which had dominated the Italian Republic from 1948 onwards, in particular the DC, were consigned to history. The 1994 elections marked the transition to the socalled Second Italian Republic following the Tangentopoli crisis and subsequent electoral reform. This would lead to discursive renegotiation of the contours of the Italian state, as the Lega questioned the very narratives on which Italian unity was predicated. While the Lega played a key role in enacting discursive shifts around the issues of centralism, regionalism, and federalism, it did not directly participate in any significant constitutional reform on this key issue. To the time of writing, the Bassanini reforms of Romano Prodi’s centre-left Ulivo administration remain the most significant change to Italy’s regional framework. These reforms, nevertheless, owed a lot to the pressure exerted by leghismo throughout the 1990s. By the end of the 2010s, with the Italian Republic facing a national debt crisis, the Lega was no longer able to use regionalism to attack the Italian government as it had done in the early 1990s. This was a clear illustration of how ‘federalism’ had ‘lost its gloss’ and was, therefore, no longer the ‘sure vote winner’ that it had been in the 1990s.231 To both amplify and become a protagonist in Italy’s transition beyond this new period of crisis, the Lega, under Matteo Salvini, would abandon its long-standing regionalist cause . As stated in the Introduction, the significance of this ideological shift lies in the fact that it ended a second wave of populist regionalism, whose roots lay in the transition from fascism to democracy. Indeed, if Umberto Bossi’s Lega was the political earthquake which shook the post-war republic to its very core, then the tremors which foretold this event were already present in the 1950s and early 1960s. In other words, the post-war autonomists should be considered as precursors to what would become leghismo, and it is to the connections between these two waves of activism that the next chapter now turns. Notes 1 Stefano Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’ in Region and State in 19th-Century Europe Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism, eds. Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 69–89 (83). This consisted of Piedmont-Sardinia (under the Savoys), LombardyVenetia (under the Habsburgs), and the Two-Sicilies (under the Bourbons), duchies of Parma, Modena and Tuscany and Papal States of Rome, Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches.

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2 Adrian Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’ in Italian Regionalism, History, Identity, Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 33. 3 Eva Garau, Politics of National Identity in Italy: Immigration and’Italianità (Oxon: Routledge, 2015) 1. 4 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 83. 5 Ettore Rottelli, L’avvento della Regione in Italia dalla caduta del regime fascista alla costituzione repubblicana (1943–1947) (Milan: Giuffre, 1967) 18. 6 Frédéric Volpi and Johannes Gerschewski, ‘Crises and Critical Junctures in Authoritarian Regimes: Addressing Uprisings’ Temporalities and Discontinuities’, Third World Quarterly 41, no.6 (2 June 2020): 1030–1045, https://doi.org/10.1 080/01436597.2020.1729728. 7 Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul’t Hart, eds., Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism (Springfield, Ill., U.S.A: C.C. Thomas, 1989). Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, and Mark Rhinard, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight: Conceptualizing the Creeping Crisis’, Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 11, no.2 (June 2020): 116–138, https://doi.org/10.1002/ rhc3.12193. 8 Antonio Gramsci and Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Repr. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2012) 184. 9 Colin Hay, ‘Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, no.3 (October 1999): 317–344, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467856X.00018. 10 Yannis Stavrakakis et al., ‘Populism, Anti-Populism and Crisis’, Contemporary Political Theory 17, no.1 (February 2018): 4–27, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296017-0142-y. 11 Rüdiger Graf and Moritz Föllmer, ‘The Culture of “Crisis” in the Weimar Republic’, Thesis Eleven 111, no.1 (August 2012): 36–47 (39), https:// doi.org/10.1177/0725513612445364. 12 Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela W. Richter, “Crisis.” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no.2 (2006): 357–400 (371). http://www.jstor.org/stable/30141882.– my Italics 13 Marc Lazar, ‘Testing Italian Democracy’, Comparative European Politics 11, no.3 (May 2013): 317–336 (320), https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.40. 14 Ibid. 15 Colin Hay, ‘Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, no.3 (1999): 317–344. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 83. 20 Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 25. Denis Mack Smith, The Making of Italy 1796–1866 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1988) 344.

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21 Lucy Riall, Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero, 1. print. in paperback (New Haven, Conn. London: Yale University Press, 2008) 70. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 71. 24 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 83. 25 Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796 (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2007) 183. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 204. 28 Ibid., 206. 29 Anna Cento Bull, Modern Italy: A Very Short Introduction, 1st edition, Very Short Introductions 494 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) 14. 30 Ibid. 31 Duggan, The Force of Destiny. A history of Italy since 1876, p. 231. 32 Raphael Zariski, ‘The Establishment of the Kingdom of Italy as a Unitary State: A Case Study in Regime Formation’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 13, no.4 (Fall 1983): 1–19. 33 Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary politics in Italy, 26. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid 36 Ibid. 37 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985) 263. 38 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Regionalism in Italy’ in Regionalism in Europe, ed., Peter Wagstaff, Intellect European Studies Series, vol. 1, nos. 2–3 (Oxford: Intellect, 1994) 68–83. 39 Ibid. 40 Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 141 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 232. 43 Ibid., 232. 44 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) 248. 45 Ibid., 221. 46 Ibid., 139. 47 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 72–73. 48 Cento Bull, Modern Italy: A very short introduction, 15. 49 Duggan, The Force of Destiny, p. 340. 50 Ibid. 51 Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary politics in Italy, 39. 52 Christopher Duggan, Francesco Crispi, 1818–1901: From Nation to Nationalism (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 632; 645. Mack Smith, Cavour, 371. 53 Ibid., 643. 54 Duggan, The Force of Destiny, 225–226. Idem, Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism, 652. 55 Duggan, The Force of Destiny, 226 Idem, Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism, 652. 56 Nelson Moe, The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2006) 50.

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57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia, 1. paperback ed (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 60 Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870–1925, Repr (London: Methuen, 1981) 14. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’, 46. Valerio Castronovo, Il Piemonte, 2. rist, Storia d’Italia (Torino: Einaudi, 1988) 44. 64 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 75. ‘La Permanente ed il Corriere Mercantile’ in (Gazzetta Piemontese, Saturday 21 March 1868). 65 ‘Il Decentramento’. In (Gazzetta del Popolo, 4 July 1868). 66 Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. C. Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 33–53, (35). 67 Duggan, Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism, 649. 68 Ibid., 649. 69 Ibid. 70 Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’, 48–49. 71 Ibid. 72 Fausto Fonzi, Crispi e lo stato di Milano (Milan: Giuffre, 1965) XVII. 73 Ibid., XVI. 74 Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’, 48. F. Fonzi, Crispi e lo stato di Milano, (Milan: Giuffre, 1965) XXII. 75 Duggan, Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism, 649. 76 Ettore Rotelli, La non riforma. Le autonomie nell’età dei partiti (Lavoro, 1981). 77 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 75–76. 78 Lyttelton, ‘Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City’, 48. Fonzi, Crispi e lo stato di Milano, p. XXII. Ibid., p. XIX Duggan, The Force of Destiny. A history of Italy since 1796, 345. Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 78–79. 79 C. Duggan, Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 649–650. 80 Ibid.

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81 André Lecours and Erika Arban, ‘Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: The Cases of Italy and Nepal’, Regional & Federal Studies 25, no.2 (15 March 2015): 183–201, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1011138. 82 Raffaele Ruffilli, La Questione Regionale dall’unificazione alla dittatura 1862–1942 (Milan: Giuffre, 1971) 348. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Rotelli, La non riforma. Le autonomie nell’età’ dei partiti, 8. 87 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 84. 88 Ruffilli, La Questione Regionale dall’unificazione alla dittatura 1862–1942, 275. Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 78. 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107

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Castronovo Storia delle Regioni italiane dall’Unità a oggi: Il Piemonte, 340. Ibid., p. 353. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary politics in Italy, 32. Duggan, The Force of Destiny, 444–445. Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, p. 85.; Rotelli, La non riforma. Le autonomie nell’eta’ dei partiti, 8. Kate Ferris, Everyday Life In Fascist Venice 1929–40 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 85–120.; Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 85.; Ibid., 29. William E. Simeone, ‘Fascists and Folklorists in Italy’, The Journal of American Folklore 91, no.359 (January 1978): 543–557 (547), https:// doi.org/10.2307/539573. Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 85. Paul Baxa, ‘“Il Nostro Duce”: Mussolini’s Visit to Trieste in 1938 and the Workings of the Cult of the Duce1’, Modern Italy 18, no.2 (May 2013): 117–128, (125) https://doi.org/10.1080/13532944.2013.781836. Simeone, ‘Fascists and Folklorists in Italy’, 547. Ferris, Everyday Life In Fascist Venice 1929–40, 90. Ibid., 120. Paul Corner, Mussolini’s Italy: The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion under Fascist Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 4. Ibid., 12. Rotelli, L’avvento della Regione in Italia dalla caduta del regime fascista alla costituzione repubblicana (1943–1947), 11. Girolamo Rossi, Lo Scudo Crociato. Un simbolo medieval nella communicazione politica del Novecento (Rome: Armando Editore, 2014) 148. Rotelli, L’avvento della Regione in Italia dalla caduta del regime fascista alla costituzione repubblicana (1943–1947). Ibid., 19–20. Giulia Sandri, ‘The Union Valdotaine’ in From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of Representation, eds., Anwen Elias and Filippo Tronconi, Studien Zur Politischen Wirklichkeit, Band 26 (Wien: Braumüller, 2011) 195–217, (195). Günther Pallaver ‘The Sudtiroler Volkspartei’ in From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of Representation, eds., Anwen Elias and Filippo Tronconi, Studien Zur Politischen Wirklichkeit, Band 26 (Wien: Braumüller, 2011) 171–195, (172).

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109 Lorenzo Barratter, Storia dell’ASAR. Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali 1945–1948 (Rovereto: Egon, 2009) 17–19. 110 Robert Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948, Toronto Italian Studies (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 45. 111 Rotelli, L’avvento della Regione in Italia dalla caduta del regime fascista alla costituzione repubblicana (1943–1947), 217–284. 112 Ibid., 125. 113 Ibid., 15. 114 Amnon Lev, ‘A House Divided: Federalism and Social Conflict in Italy’, Federal Law Review 46, no.4 (2018): 615–630.; Anna Cento Bull, ‘Regionalism in Italy’ in Regionalism in the European Union, ed. Peter Wagstaff (Exeter: Intellect, 1999) 143. 115 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Regionalism in Italy’ in Regionalism in the European Union, ed. Peter Wagstaff (Exeter: Intellect, 1999) 143. 116 Amnon Lev, ‘A House Divided: Federalism and Social Conflict in Italy’, Federal Law Review 46, no.4 (December 2018): 615–630, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0067205X1804600408. 117 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 85. 118 David Hine, ‘Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State’, in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity, Politics, ed. C. Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 109–131, (111). 119 Sergio Fabbrini and Marco Brunazzo, ‘Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization’, Regional & Federal Studies 13, no.1 (March 2003): 100–120, (104) https://doi.org/10.1080/714 004782. 120 Alberto Paini, (ed.), L’istituto Regionale e la nostra riforma (Bergamo: Tipografia Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1949). 121 MARP, L’autonomia regionale, perchè la si volle perchè la si vuole (Turin: Ruata Editore, 1956) 24–25. 122 ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’, Archivio di Stato, Torino. Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 123 Michele Rosboch, interviewed by author, 13 February 2016.; ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’, Archivio di Stato, Torino. 124 ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’, Archivio di Stato, Torino. 125 ‘L’autonomia regionale nella provincia di Bergamo, i soprendenti risultati delle elezioni’, Piemonte Nuovo. 126 Enrico Villarboito. Statuto del MARP. Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. (Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy). 25 July 1955. 127 Picco Giovanni Battista, Costituzione del “Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale del Piemonte – M.A.R.P”, Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. (Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy) 23 December 1955.

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Turin Police Commissioner. Notes entitled MARP, Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 30 October 1956. 128 ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’ and ‘Profili di alcuni Rappresentanti del MARP’ 24 January 1958, Archivio di Stato, Torino. 129 MARP, Archivio di Stato, Torino. 130 ‘Il MARP non ha rapporti con altri gruppi autonomisti’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 30 September 1956). 131 Leaflet entitled ‘Movimento Autonomie Regionali’ Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy). 132 Turin Police Commissioner. Notes: ‘Movimento Autonomia Piemontese – Movimento Autonomia Piemontese Villarboito’, in Fasc. Movimento Autonomia, Cat. A3A. Vol. 1. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy) 18 April, 1958. Roberto Gremmo, interviewed by Author, via email, 9 February 2016. This idea of sweeping or cleaning up politics would also become a key part of the Lega Nord’s message in the 1980s. 133 Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, ‘Breve storia del nostro movimento’ in Così parlano gli autonomisti, ed. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 59–61, (59). 134 Ibid. A. Freddi, Breve storia del MAB (Bergamo: Stampa Fratelli Carrarra, 1963) 5. George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’, Modern Italy 23, no.3 (August 2018): 235–252, (237). 135 Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda De Matteo, ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945‐2000. ed., Adriana Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52. Lynda De Matteo, L’idiota in politica, Antropologia della Lega Nord (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2011). 136 Freddi, Breve storia del MAB, 9. 137 Three of these publications, consultable at ISREC, Bergamo: Giovanni Rinaldi, L’autonomia locale e l’ordinamento regionale (Bergamo: Tipografia Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1948). Alberto Paini (ed.), L’istituto Regionale e la nostra riforma (Bergamo: Tipografia Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1949). Ubaldo Riva (ed.), Parole Autonomiste (Bergamo: Scuola Professionali Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1950). 138 Freddi, Breve storia del MAB, 9. Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’, pp. 237–238. 139 Ibid., 238. 140 Guido Calderoli, ‘Padroni a Casa Nostra!’, in Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956. 141 Poster entitled ‘Cittadini! Domenica 6 maggio alle ore 12 in Piazza V.Veneto. Parlerà il Dott. Comm. Franco Bruno’, Fasc. MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio ‘Aldo Rizzi’, Biblioteca Angelo Mai, Bergamo.

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142 David Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State” in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity, Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 109–131 (111). 143 ‘Statuto del MARP’ in Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, vol.2, Archivio di Stato Torino, Cat.A3A, 25 July 1955. Anselmo Freddi, ‘Il nostro programma’, in Così Parlano gli autonomisti (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955) 9–11, (9). 144 Michele Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo 23 March 1956. 145 Guido Calderoli, ‘Che Cosa Vuole il MARL’ in Zibaldone Autonomista di un Montanaro Bergamasco, ed. Idem. (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 56. 146 Il Consiglio comunale di Torino Nell’Italia Repubblicana 1947–2006, Archivio Storico della città di Torino Atti consiliari – Serie Storica, 2006. 147 Carlo Palenzona, ‘MARP – La Prima affermazione’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 September 1956. 148 ‘Magnifica affermazione del MARP nelle recenti elezioni amministrative Vercellesi’, Piemonte Nuovo 17 November 1957. 149 ‘Ferrero Emilio, Capo del Comune di Praly - Il Primo Sindaco Marpista – La nomina ha suscitato in tutta la zona di Pinerolo il più vivo gradimento’, Piemonte Nuovo, 1 September 1957. 150 D.C apobianchi, ‘L’autonomia regionale nella provincia di Bergamo, I soprendenti risultati delle elezioni’ Piemonte Nuovo, 15 September 1956. Bergamo 1956 Communal Election Results: Dati statistici ufficiali relativi alle votazioni nel comune di Bergamo. Elezioni Comunali, Elezioni Provinciali 1956’in Cat. 6 (Governo). Classe a. Fasc. 1 e 2. Anni 1954–1964, (Archivio Storico Comune di Bergamo, Via Torquato Tasso, 8, 24121 Bergamo BG, Italy) 1956. 151 Capobianchi ‘L’autonomia regionale nella provincia di Bergamo’. 152 Villarboito. Statuto del MARP. Archivio di Stato Torino. Statute entitled ‘Statuto del MARL’, in Fasc.MAB – Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi. Biblioteca Angelo Mai. Piazza Vecchia, 15, 24129 Bergamo BG, Italy. ‘Dati statistici ufficiali relativi alle votazioni nel comune di Bergamo. Elezioni Comunali, Elezioni Provinciali 1956’ Archivio Storico Comune di Bergamo, Cat. 6(Governo). Classe a. Fasc. 1 e 2. Anni 1954–1964. 153 Roberto Chiarini, ‘Il disagio del Nord, l’anti-politica e la questione settentrionale’ in Gli Anni Ottanta come storia, eds. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons, and Gaetano Quagliarello (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2004) 215–231, (247). 154 ‘Il MARP diventa Padano per presentarsi alle elezioni’, La Stampa, 24 February 1958. ‘Coalizione di Movimenti regionali progettata dal Marp per le elezioni’ La Stampa, 7 February 1958.

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155 ‘Voti e seggi alla Camera per Torino-Novara-Vercelli’ La Stampa 28 May 1958. 156 ‘Camera dei deputati, Brescia- Bergamo, 1958’, Archivio Storico Comune di Bergamo, Cat. 6 (Governo). Classe a. Fasc. 1 e 2. 1954–1964. ‘Dati statistici ufficiali relativi alle votazioni nel comune di Bergamo. Elezioni Politiche, 1958’ Archivio Storico Comune di Bergamo, Cat. 6(Governo). Classe a. Fasc. 1 e 2. 1954–1964. 157 Roberto Gremmo, interviewed by George Newth via email, February 2016. ‘Il MARP degli anni’ 50 il padre della Lega’ La Stampa, 12 April 1994. 158 Enrico Villarboito, ‘Se questi cambiali non vorrai ripetutamente pagare, così DOVRAI VOTARE!!!’ in Fasc.Autonomia Piemontese Movimento Villarboito, Cat A3A. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 27 March 1958.; ‘Le rivelazioni di Villarboito sul MARP e la risposta dei dirigenti autonomisti’ La Stampa, 16 February 1958. 159 ‘Pensionati e divorzisti presentano liste proprie’, La Stampa, 29 March 1958. 160 ‘Il MARP degli anni 50 Padre della Lega’, La Stampa. 161 Margarita Gomez Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and nationalism in Italian politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) 103. 162 Anna Cento Bulland Mark Gilbert, The Lega and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001). Franco Zappetini and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 7, no. 2 (May 2021). Benito Giordano, A Place Called Padania?: The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy, European Urban and Regional Studies 6, no.3 (July 1999): 215–230. 163 Zappetini and Maccaferri ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle’. 164 Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary politics in Italy, 49. 165 David Hine, ‘Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 109–131, (113). 166 Hine, Governing Italy: The Politics of Bargained Pluralism, 154. 167 Cavazza, ‘Regionalism in Italy: A critique’, 85. 168 Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question. 169 Ilvo Diamanti, Il Male del Nord: Lega, localismo, secession (Rome: Donzelli, 1996) 18. 170 Michel Huysseune, Modernity and Secessione. The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega in Italy (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006) 99. Arnaldo Bagnasco, Tre italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano, Studi e ricerche 74 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992). 171 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating fortunes of the Lega’ in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy, eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A. Veltri (London and New York: Routledge, 2015) 205.

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172 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 38. Idem, La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico (Rome: Donzelli, 1993) 49. 173 Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and nationalism in Italian politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the northern question, 103. 174 Guido Passalacqua, Il Vento della Padania:storia della Lega Nord 1984–2004 (Milan: Mondadori, 2009). 175 Ilvo Diamanti and Ilvo Diamanti, Mappe Dell’Italia Politica: Bianco, Rosso, Verde, Azzurro-- e Tricolore, Nuova ed, Contemporanea 191 (Bologna: Il mulino, 2009) 70. 176 Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia. 177 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 13. 178 Passalacqua, Il Vento della Padania: Storia della Lega Nord 1984–2009, 23. 179 Diamanti, La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico, 73. 180 Luciano Constantini, Dentro La Lega, Come nasce, come cresce, come comunica (Rome: Koine Edizioni, 1994) 82–83. 181 Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto, Lega & Padania (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012) 31. 182 Tangentopoli or ‘Bribesville’ refers to the name given to the widespread system of bribes given for public works contracts which was uncovered in the ‘Mani Pulite’ (Clean Hands) investigations. The results of these investigations saw the elimination of the majority of the parties of the post-war Republic and opened the door for newer parties such as the Lega. 183 Donald Sassoon, ‘Tangentopoli or the democratization of corruption: considerations on the end of Italy’s First Republic’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 1, no.1 (1995): 124–143, (128). 184 Anna Cento Bull, Social Identities and Political Cultures in Italy: Catholic, Communist and Leghist Communities between Civicness and Localism (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000). 185 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Lega Nord: A Case of Simulative Politics’, South European Society and Politics 14, no.2 (2009): 129–146 (141). 186 Ilvo Diamanti, Mappe dell’Italia politica, Bianco, rosso, verde, azzurro … e tricolore (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003) 73. Passarelli and Tuorto, Lega & Padania, 41. 187 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord Back in Government’, West European Politics 33 no.6 (2010): 1318–1340, (1319). Carl Levy and Joseph Farrell, ‘The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 131–150, (146–147). 188 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own’, West European Politics 28, no.5 (2005): 952–972, (955). See Also: Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, pp. 107–108. Diamanti, Mappe dell’Italia politica. Bianco, rosso, verde, azzurro … e tricolore (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003) 7.

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189 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’, 207. Albertazzi and McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own’, 955. 190 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 132. 191 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Towards a Federal State? Competing Proposals for Constitutional Revision’, Italian Politics 17, no.1 (1 January 2002): 190, https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2001.170110. Mark Gilbert, ‘The Bassanini Laws: A Halfway House in Local Government Reform’ in Italian Politics Vol.14: The Return of Politics, eds. in David Hine and Salvatore Vassallo, 139–155. 192 Ibid. 193 Marco Brunazzo and Mark Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the Right-Wing Populist Turn of the Lega Nord since 2013’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no.5 (20 October 2017): 624–641 (630), https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1389524. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid., 185. 196 Paolo Barcella La Lega. Una Storia (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2022) 82–83. 197 Ibid., 198. 198 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Lega Nord: A Case of Simulative Politics?’, South European Society and Politics 14, no.2 (June 2009): 129–146, https:// doi.org/10.1080/13608740903037786. 199 Passarelli and Tuorto, Lega & Padania, 48–49. 200 Ibid., 50. 201 Paolo Barcella La Lega. Una Storia (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2022). 202 Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’, 209. 203 Ibid. 204 Vampa ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, 34. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, ‘Italy: A Case of Mutating Populism?’, Democratization 23, no.2 (23 February 2016): 304–323, (316–317) https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213. 205 Paolo Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia, 1a edizione, Quality Paperbacks 642 (Roma: Carocci editore, 2022). 206 Following a stroke in 2004, Umberto Bossi had held an ever looser grip over the party and the Lega had consequently seen increasing tensions between two main factions. On the one hand, were Umberto Bossi’s closest collaborators, the so-called cerchio magico (magic circle), who were committed to Bossi’s continued leadership of and predominance over decision making in the party; on the other hand, was a faction dissatisfied with Bossi’s leadership and this ‘magic circle’. The latter group backed Roberto Maroni (the Lega’s co-founder) to succeed him and represent a return to the Lega’s roots. 207 ‘Padania Indipendente. Bossi suona la carica’, La Padania, 11 January 2012. Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’, 210. 208 Barcella, La Lega, 141.

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209 Brunazzo and Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels’, 631 It brought to a head tensions between two main factions in the party which had been growing for some time. On the one hand, were Umberto Bossi’s cerchio magico (magic circle), who were committed to Bossi’s continued leadership of and predominance over decision making in the party; on the other hand, a group who backed Roberto Maroni (the Lega’s co-founder) to succeed Bossi and represent a return to the Lega’s roots. 210 211 212 213

214 215 216 217

218 219 220 221 222 223 224

Brunazzo and Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels’, 630. Ibid. Ibid. Fabio Bordignon and Luigi Ceccarini, ‘Five Stars and a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics’, South European Society and Politics 18, no.4 (December 2013): 427–449, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013. 775720. Pepper D. Culpepper, ‘The Political Economy of Unmediated Democracy: Italian Austerity under Mario Monti’, West European Politics 37, no.6 (2 November 2014): 1264–1281, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.929334. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Diego Garzia, ‘The 2013 Italian Parliamentary Election: Changing Things So Everything Stays the Same’, West European Politics 36, no.5 (September 2013): 1095–1105, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.815483. Ibid. Culpepper, ‘The Political Economy of Unmediated Democracy’. Brunazzo and Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels’, 630 Davide Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, Italian Politics 32, no.1 (1 January 2017): 33–34, https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2017.320104. Daniela Giannetti, ‘Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government’, Italian Politics 28, no.1 (1 January 2013), https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2013.280108. Roberto D’Alimonte, ‘The Italian Elections of February 2013: The End of the Second Republic?’, Contemporary Italian Politics 5, no.2 (August 2013): 113–129, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2013.807599. Diego Garzia, ‘The Italian Election of 2018 and the First Populist Government of Western Europe’, West European Politics 42, no.3 (16 April 2019): 670–680, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1535381. Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘The 2013 Elections and the Italian Political System’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 19, no.4 (8 August 2014): 424–437, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2014.929826.

225 Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino, ‘The Partito Democratico after the 2013 Elections: All Change?’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 20, no.4 (8 August 2015): 474–490, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2015. 1066129. 226 Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘Renzi: The Government, the Party, the Future of Italian Politics’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 21, no.3 (26 May 2016): 389–398, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2016.1169883. Mattia Guidi, ‘The Democratic Party of Matteo Renzi’, Italian Politics 30, no.1 (1 January 2015), https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2015.300104.

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227 Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Going, Going, … Not Quite Gone yet? “Bossi’s Lega” and the Survival of the Mass Party’, Contemporary Italian Politics 8, no.2 (3 May 2016): 115–130, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2016.1193349. 228 Brunazzo and Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels’, 631. 229 Raphael Zariski, The Establishment of the Kingdom of Italy as a Unitary State: A Case Study in Regime Formation, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 1–19, https://doi-org.ezproxy1.bath.ac.uk/10. 1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037456 230 Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’, p. 205. 231 Brunazzo and Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels’, 630.

3

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance

3.1 Introduction The breakthrough of leghismo in the 1990s was a phenomenon rooted in a specific context of crisis and transition following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, the populist regionalism at the heart of the Lega’s message held significant ideological and discursive roots in the 1950s’ autonomist move­ ments introduced in chapter 2.1 Therefore, while the emergence of the Lega represented a ‘real electoral earthquake’2 in the 1990s, the phenomenon of the Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) in the post-war era con­ stituted the tremors leading up to this seismic political event. Between 1947 and 1963, the MRAs in Lombardy and Piedmont developed a ‘cultural toolkit’ of discursive repertoires relating to regionalism, populism, and nativism. This chapter, by focusing on three specific repertoires, acts as a point of departure for the more in-depth study of the creation and repro­ duction of repertoires relating to regionalism in chapter 4, populism and nativism in chapter 5, and finally, Salvini’s latest iteration of populist nationalism in chapter 6. By accounting for the genealogy of North Italian populist regionalism, the purpose of this chapter is, therefore, three-fold. First, in terms of historical context, it fills the gap left by chapter 2 which focused principally on a chronological history of the two waves of post-war populist regionalism without addressing the twenty year gap between them. It examines how periods of inactivity and hiatus between the two waves of activism did not mean the end of populist regionalism in north Italy. Second, it establishes how and by what means certain populist regionalist repertoires of contention survived a period of inactivity through their main­ tenance via abeyance structures and subsequent transmission via intergenerational links. Third – and linked to the previous two points – the chapter sets out the theoretical grounding for the remaining chapters of this book. In other words, it establishes the importance of considering both similarities and differences between the ideology and discourse of the MRAs and leghismo when examining both their respective creation and reproduction.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-4

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 93 The chapter proceeds as follows: The first section of the chapter, drawing on the theoretical concepts introduced in chapter 1, establishes an interpretive framework to trace the creation of populist regionalist repertoires of conten­ tion, their maintenance in abeyance and subsequent transmission to a new wave of activism, and their eventual reproduction. The second section consists of a case study to illustrate how populist regionalist discursive repertoires developed in the 1950s by North Italian MRAs were subsequently maintained by ‘abeyance structures’ consisting of rump movements of committed activists during a period of abeyance between 1960 and 1980. Abeyance theory allows for a clearer understanding of not only the decline of certain populist move­ ments, but also how populist discourse is transmitted between cycles of mo­ bilisation or waves of activism. This is because the movements under analysis conform to the minimal definition of populist regionalism, i.e. a form of regionalism which pits ‘the people of the region against national political elites’.3 At the same time, the repertoires also contain elements relating to the three core components of populist regionalism vis-à-vis, regionalism, popu­ lism, and nativism. It then demonstrates how these repertoires were trans­ mitted to a new wave of activists through inter-generational links of friendship, rivalry, and family. The second section focuses on a case study of three specific repertoires of contention. While these repertoires will be examined in greater detail in the following chapters as part of a wider ex­ amination of the Lega’s regionalist/nationalist, populist and nativist politics, they are used here to illustrate the relevance of abeyance theory and, therefore, set the interpretive framework for the remaining chapters of the book. 3.1.1 Discursive Repertoires of Contention. Creation, Maintenance in Abeyance, Transmission, and Reproduction: An Interpretive Framework

Populism is a latent political phenomenon which has tended to emerge intermittently throughout history.4 This has been noted in several studies which emphasise the potential for populism to be instigated by lesser-known political entrepreneurs and substantiated through protests and social movements as a form of contentious politics.5 While it has been argued that populism’s latency ‘spares activists the need to reinvent the wheel,’6 this underestimates the very impact that a process of abeyance can have on how repertoires of contention are transmitted and recycled. A social movement process of repertoire creation, maintenance in abeyance, transmission, and, finally, reproduction means that certain narratives and discourses are re­ cycled to suit new claims in a new context. The following framework – adapted from my earlier work – unpacks this process and sets out the principles for understanding the change and continuity examined in the following chapters with regards to regionalism, populism, and nativism.7 Drawing on concepts introduced in chapter 1, and emphasising abeyance

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theory in particular, the framework is divided into three parts: the first deals with the creation of repertoires of contention in specific discursive fields, accounting for how a toolkit of strategies, tactics, and ways of doing politics is established and later made available for a second wave of activism. Second, the framework focuses on the maintenance of these repertoires during a period of abeyance via ‘rump movements’ and how these reper­ toires of contention are transmitted to a new wave of activism prior to their reproduction. The third and final component accounts for the various ways in which these repertoires survive during periods of inactivity to then later be recycled by a second wave of activism. 3.1.1.1 First Wave of Activism: The Creation of Discursive Repertoires of Contention

The first component of this interpretive framework focuses on the creation of repertoires of contention. Be it writing speeches, designing posters, leafletting, writing essays, holding public meetings, or conducting demonstrations, political and social movements often rely on repertoires of contention to further their cause.8 The choice of the word repertoire as a ‘theatrical meta­ phor […] calls attention to the clustered, learned, yet improvisational char­ acter of people’s interactions as they make and receive each other’s claims’.9 Repertoires, therefore, are ‘arrays of performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors’.10 Together, these constitute a ‘cultural toolkit’ of ‘habits, skills, and styles’ from which a social movement is able to formulate a ‘strategy of action’, i.e. select differing pieces from this toolkit to construct lines of action and make claims on behalf of their shared interests and programmes.11 One of the ‘styles’ of particular interest to this study within this cultural toolkit is that of discursive repertoires. This refers to the ‘recognisable routines of arguments, descriptions, and evaluations found in people’s talk often distinguished by familiar clichés, anecdotes, and tropes’.12 As noted in chapter 1, however, such discourses ’operate within broader “discursive fields,” i.e. sets of discourses – such as discourses of “nationalism,” “citizenship,” or “gender” – that change slowly over time’.13 The discourse of ‘regionalism,’ for example, was not the same in the 1950s and 1960s as it would become in the 1980s and 1990s. This means that challengers such as the MRAs and the Lega had to frame their arguments within the ‘existing ideology of domination’ to ‘subvert some of the powerholder’s justifica­ tions’.14 As a result, the use of discursive repertoires as part of a strategy of action does not always guarantee success in the aims of a social movement and may even contribute to social movement decline, as the discursive field in which a group is active may be hostile to its claims. Discursive repertoires, however, do not simply disappear, but can remain latent, ready to be re­ activated by a future wave of activism following a period of abeyance.

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 95 3.1.1.2 Maintenance in Abeyance

For repertoires of contention to be (re-)evoked by future waves of activism, they must often survive periods of hiatus and/or inactivity; to account for this, it is worth reiterating two of the key principles of abeyance theory introduced in chapter 1. The first regards the decline and absorption/co-optation of a social/political movement. From this perspective, abeyance constitutes ‘a theory of social control in which marginal groups are integrated or put under the surveillance and control of functionaries in institutionalised organisations’.15 The reasons why certain members of social movements may choose to be co-opted and others not are varied and often context dependent. Financial, ideological, or moral reasons may act as key motivating factors.16 The process of abeyance can therefore accelerate the decline of a movement by frag­ menting movements between members who are co-opted into conven­ tional political processes and others ‘who remain marginalised in their commitment to a particular cause’.17 This links to the second guiding principle of abeyance theory, which relates to how repertoires of con­ tention survive periods of inactivity.18 During a period of abeyance, social movements ‘often retreat from public visibility’ and move into ‘stand-by mode,’ […] ‘temporary suspension,’ or ‘hibernation’; they do not disap­ pear entirely.19 While co-opted members no longer take part in any activism, a committed core of activists may well sustain ‘values, identity, and political vision’ during this period of abeyance.20 Such maintenance of repertoires takes place within ‘abeyance structures’, otherwise called ‘rump movements’ or ‘submerged networks’ which retain and sustain activists between ‘waves of mobilisation’. 21 During periods of abeyance, therefore, ‘rump movements’ may continue to ‘interact, exchange ex­ periences, and generate ideas’22 and provide ‘the organisational basis, collective action repertoires, and collective identity for a new generation of activists’.23 Rump movements provide a holding ground for a small number of committed activists to maintain their cause until there is a fa­ vourable political climate for mass mobilisation. They will link one upsurge of activism and another, according to Taylor, through promoting the survival of activist networks, sustaining a repertoire of goals and tactics, and promoting a collective identity that offer participants a sense of mission and moral purpose.24 The maintenance in abeyance of repertoires of contention means that such repertoires may be available for a future wave of activism. For these to be reproduced, however, they first need to be transmitted from one generation to the next. This can take place ‘through imitation of other

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observed performances’ and ‘handed down templates and, perhaps most centrally, through interactions with other actors and parties involved’.25 It is to this final aspect of the framework that this section now turns. 3.1.1.3 New Wave of Activism: Transmission and Reproduction of Discursive Repertoires in a New Discursive Field

The final component of this interpretive framework relates to the trans­ mission and reproduction of the discursive repertoires developed by a previous wave of activism. Inter-generational links between waves of activism ranging from family, friendship, to rivalry may provide ‘organi­ sational and ideological bridges’ from one mass mobilisation to another.26 With regards to family, this is not always as straightforward as a parent passing on ideas to a child;27 indeed, transmission may skip a generation and/or take place via uncle/aunt to nephew/niece or grandparent to grandchild.28 A transmission of ideas may represent a form of dissent from the officially sanctioned national discourse, thus allowing for the teaching of oppositional points of view with regards to framings of history, society, and politics. Besides family, ideas may also be transmitted via ‘profes­ sional ties, friendships, or both.’29 The fact that such relationships may lead to a sharing of a variety of tactics between individuals, small groups, and on occasion via mass participation should be viewed as a key form of transmission between one wave of activism and another.30 There is often, however, a fine line between friendship and rivalry in some cases; com­ petition which can result from this latter form of inter-generational links may lead to a battle over how to interpret a particular discourse or a contested ownership of a particular symbol or message. These rivalries in and of themselves can therefore encourage a transmission of repertoires as different individuals try to claim heritage from past movements.31 Political and social movements are often able to ‘construct chains of action beginning with at least some pre-fabricated links.’32 Indeed, for innovative tactics to diffuse and ignite further activism, they need to be recognisable, or, in other words, ‘borrow from previous routines of claim making.’33 However, while different waves of activism may use the same symbols, discourse, and styles, ‘individuals and groups know how to do different kinds of things in different circumstances’.34 This means that while the toolkit of repertoires left behind by the previous wave of activism provides a vast array of resources, a second wave of activism will not be able to use them in exactly the same way. This is because cultures are not only ‘loosely integrated,’ ‘contested,’ and ‘subject to constant change,’ but they can also be ‘contradictory’ insofar as certain symbols, for example, may have simultaneously two opposing meanings.35 When a new wave of contention emerges via a more fertile political context,36 the way(s) in

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 97 which this future wave of mobilisation accesses a previous toolkit of repertoires varies greatly depending on the discursive field.37 It is here that context becomes particularly important. Indeed, the ‘loosely integrated’ and ‘contested’ nature of cultures means that repertoires may be ‘subject to constant change’.38 Such contextual differences mean that certain dis­ cursive repertoires ‘may need to be (re)-elaborated and adjusted to suit new and different contexts.’39 Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere ‘con­ textual differences […] entail, if not a total reinvention of the wheel, then at least a modification of its parts by a second wave of activism to suit the new socio-political reality’.40 Such contextual differences notwithstanding, the collectively shared social consensus behind certain repertoires of contention ‘is often so established and familiar that only a fragment of the argumentative chain needs to be formulated’.41 Having established the three-step process of how repertoires of contention are created, main­ tained in abeyance, transmitted, and subsequently reproduced, the fol­ lowing section illustrates this framework in order to account for the 20-year gap between the MRAs and leghismo. 3.1.2 Tracing the Genealogy of Leghismo via Three Populist Discursive Repertoires of Contention

Figure 3.1 illustrates the genealogy of post-war populist regionalism from the post-war precursors to the MRAs to the official formation of the Lega Nord in 1991. In line with the interpretive framework established above, the details of this figure will be unpacked in three stages over the following section. The first period 1946–1960 represents that of repertoire creation during which the post-war autonomists devised some of the key populist regionalist discursive repertoires. The first wave of post-war populist regionalist activism concluded two years following the failure of the MARPadania alliance in 1960. Regarding the first aspect of abeyance, this period saw the absorption/cooptation of several members of the MRAs in the Christian Democrat Party (DC) and Social Democratic Party (PSDI). The subsequent period of abeyance (1960–1980), however, also witnessed the emergence of a series of ‘rump movements’ (abeyance structures) in both Lombardy and Piedmont which allowed for the continuation of activism at a more submerged level. Repertoires of contention may well have disappeared had it not been for their maintenance via a committed core of activists in these rump movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The years 1980–1991 mark the third and final period accounted for by this chart, marking the emergence of the second period of populist regionalist activism. This marks the beginning of a process of transmission and reproduction of discursive repertoires of contention in a changed discursive field by the regionalist leagues, later to be brought together in 1991 under the umbrella organisation of the Lega Nord. This meant that a

MARP BIS Franco Bruno

FEDERASSION PIEMONTEIS Luigi Cerchio Anotonio Brodrero Roberto Gremmo

Links between First and Second waves of activism family, Friendships & Rivalry

THE LEGA ALPINA/UNION PIEMONTEISA Roberto Gremmo (Leader) Enrico Villarboito

SECPMD WAVE PF ACTIVISM - LEGHISMO

Splits between movements

KEY Absorption

THE LEGA LOMBARDA - ALLEANZA NORD Roberto Calderoli Umberto Bossi

THE LEGA LOMBARDA Roberto Calderoli Umberto Bossi

L’UNIONE OSSOLANA Umberto Bossi

Guido Calderoli Ugo Gavazzeni Aldo Rizzi THE UAI-SVP Aldo Rizzi Ugo Gavazzeni Antonio Brodrero

THE DC Anselmo Freddi Gianfranco Gonella

AUTONOMISTI CAMPANILI

Rump Movements

THE LEGA NORD FEDERAL CONGRESS

Gipo Farassino (Leader/Founder) Antonio Brodrero Pietro Molino

THE LEGA NORD PIEMONT - ALLEANZA NORD

PIEMONT AUTONOMISTA Gipo Farassino (Leader/Founder) Antonio Brodrero Pietro Molino

M.A.R.P (Movimento Autonomista Rinascita Piemonteis [Union Piemonteis] Roberto Gremmo (Leader) Antonio Brodrero

L’UNIONE OSSOLANA Roberto Gremmo

THE PSDI Michele Rosboch Timoteo Nobile Carlo Palenzona

THE MARPADANIA (MARP and MAB alliance)

Guido Calderoli (Councillor 1956) Ugo Gavazzeni (Councillor 1956) Anselmo Freddi Aldo Rizzi Gianfranco Gonella (Councillor 1956)

THE MAB - MARL

THE MAR (Movimento Autonomie Regional /Moviemento d’Azione e Rinnovamento Enrico Villarboito (Expelled from MARP in 1956) SCOPA (Servire Coscienzamente Ogni Pubblica Amministrazione) Enrico Villarboito Gianluigi Marianini

THE MARP Enrico Villarboito (President 1955) Franco Laini (Vice-President 1955-1956) Achille Barrico (President) Pietro Molino (Leafletter/Member) Mario Vezzani (Councillor 1956) Franco Bruno (Councillor 1956) Michele Rosboch (Councillor 1956) Timoteo Nobile (Councillor 1956 & 1958) Germano Benzi (Councillor 1960) Carlo Palenzona Antonio Brodrero (Member)

LOMBARDY THE MAL (Movimento Autonomie Locali) Guido Calderoli Aldo Rizzi Anselmo Freddi Ugo Gavazzeni Gianfranco Gonella

FIRST WAVE OF ACTIVISM - MRAS

PIEDMONT

THE ARI - (Associazione Regionale Italiana) Michele Rosboch Timoteo Nobile Carlo Palenzona

Source: (Created by George Newth. Image available in colour in the eBook version).

Figure 3.1 Abeyance: The Genealogy of Piedmontese and Lombard Regionalism. 1946–1991.

1991

1989

1987

1980

1978

1975

1960-63

1955-56

1946

98 Populist Regionalism in Abeyance

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 99 series of repertoires could subsequently be transmitted in the 1980s via intergenerational links which consisted of friendship and rivalry on the Piedmontese side and family on the Lombard side. The repertoires examined in this book are varied and numerous and will be examined in more detail over the following chapters. However, for the purpose of this chapter, three repertoires which would later become central to the message of Umberto Bossi’s Lega form the central focus here. These are ‘The North exploited by Southern elites,’ ‘A Free Padanian Heartland,’ and ‘The Battle of Legnano’. While these repertoires represent the tip of the iceberg of populist regionalist discourse developed by the MRAs, for illustrative purposes, they nevertheless constitute three central features linking MARPismo/MABismo with leghismo. 3.1.2.1 1946–1960: The MRAs as the First Wave of Activism (Repertoire Creation)

The period between 1946 and 1960 saw the creation of a series of rep­ ertoires of contention by post-war autonomists who promoted the cause of regionalism in the name of ‘the people’ against ‘centralist political elites’. As established in chapter 2, the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (MARP) had been founded in 1955 by Enrico Villarboito but was taken over by members of the Italian Regional Association (ARI) in 1956. Both the MARP and the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (MAB) experienced limited success between 1956 and 1960 with the election of both communal and provincial councillors. However, argu­ ably, the MARP experienced a more tumultuous period in the 1950s, with an initial split in the organisation leading to Villarboito’s expulsion. This is worth reiterating on two accounts: first, it meant that Villarboito formed two further movements, namely the Movimento Autonomie Regionali (the MAR), and the Servire Coscientemente Ogni Pubblica Amministrazione (SCOPA – to serve consciously every public administration). Both organi­ sations, in competing with the MARP in the 1950s, encouraged the pro­ liferation of populist regionalist repertoires. Villarboito would also later form a direct link between the first and second waves of activism through his friendship with Roberto Gremmo42. One of the early Piedmontese autonomists of the second wave of activism, Gremmo had originally cut his political teeth during the 1960s in several Marxist-Leninist organisations. He became involved in the cause of Piedmontese autonomy in the 1970s.43Gremmo would collaborate with Villarboito in regionalist organisations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Also present in the MARP, however, were Pietro Molino and Antonio Brodrero, who would later become representatives for Lega Nord Piemont.44 The experience of the Lombard section of post-war populist regionalism was comparatively much less fractious. The Lombard-based

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MAB was a direct descendent of the Movement for Local Autonomies (MAL) and saw the smooth transition of members from one organisation to the next. Of these members, however, Guido Calderoli, Ugo Gavazzeni, and Aldo Rizzi would all play a significant role both in the creation of repertoires and their later transmission via rump movements. In terms of the means via which discursive repertoires were disseminated, from as early as 1946–1947, post-war autonomists in Piedmont and Lombardy began delivering speeches and writing essays in support of regional autonomy. Subsequently, in 1955, with the evolution of the ARI and the MAL into the respective MARP and the MAB, words began to be accompanied by imagery in the form of leaflets, flyers, posters, and newspapers. In particular, the MARP’s fortnightly Piemonte Nuovo was an extremely important means of circulating these repertoires. The MRAs’ strategy of action was couched in a context of regionalism, which em­ phasised the imperative of Italian unity following the transition from Fascism to democracy. The MRAs pointed to the inactive regional statutes in the Constitution to justify their political programme, claiming regional autonomy would strengthen Italian unity to legitimise their claims within the hegemony of centralism. Repertoires of contention were therefore used to make claims on the regional statutes in the constitution. This was couched in the discursive field which emphasised the imperative of Italian unity following the transition from Fascism to Democracy. Any suggestion of regional autonomy and/or discourse against the elites was accompanied by a profession of loyalty towards Italy.45 In the lead-up to the 1956 administrative elections in Turin, the MARP published the following message to its voters via Piemonte Nuovo stating, People of Turin! This may be your only chance to vote exclusively for our poor, mistreated, exploited Piedmont. We’ve had enough of politicians and bureaucrats! It’s time to leave the door open for a breath of fresh air […] the MARP is not a political movement, but a movement tired of the partitocrazia with one aim: regional autonomy.46 This highlights the first discursive repertoire of ‘a Northern underdog exploited by Southern and centralist elites.’ At the centre of this repertoire was an anti-political and anti-southern discourse which protested against a ‘partitocrazia’ (regime of parties), demanding fewer contributions to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (The fund for the South) and demanded a stop to post-war migration from the South to the North.47 This was repre­ sented by various items of propaganda released by the MRAs throughout the 1950s, all of which depicted the resources of a hard-working North being exhausted and exploited by a parasitic South and centralist state.48 It is, however, perhaps best encapsulated in an image which would

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 101 subsequently become one of the most reproduced pieces of propaganda by the Lega throughout the early 1990s, i.e. that of the ‘Hen with the Golden Egg’.49 This depicted a hard-working North represented by a hen, producing an egg which is duly stolen by a southern matriarchal figure,50 and represented the dispute of the labouring North against an inefficient, inefficacious, and ineffective (good-for-nothing) ‘political centre’.51 This image also overlaps, however, with the further discursive repertoire of a ‘free Northern/Padanian’ heartland (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The MRAs defined the North as liberal and free, while Rome was depicted as responsible for imposing a suffocating ‘bureaucratic centralism’

Figure 3.2 The Hen with the Golden Egg. Credit: Giuseppe Sala and Maria Chiara Gonella.

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Figure 3.3 The Roman Wolf. Credit: Giuseppe Sala and Maria Chiara Gonella.

on the region (see Figure 3.4). Propaganda released by the MRAs depicted a previously enslaved North breaking free from the bondage of Roman power and bureaucracy.52 Such ideas also drew on long-standing racist tropes examined in chapter 2 regarding a progressive North and a backward South. As will be explored in greater depth in chapter 5, ‘bureaucratic centralism’ represented a dog-whistle anti-southern trope. This was linked to the fact that both the MARP’s and the MAB’s pro­ paganda depicted government functionaries of southern origin as a ‘colonising’ presence in Piedmont and Lombardy. The results of the

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 103

Figure 3.4 Slave Breaking Free of Chains. Credit: Giuseppe Sala and Maria Chiara Gonella.

1956 elections, which saw the election of MARP and MAB councillors, gave the idea of a ‘Free Northern/Padania heartland’ extra impetus, with the MARP and the MAB forming an electoral pact with other North Italian autonomist movements from Liguria, the Veneto, and TrentoAlto Adige in early 1958.53 The MARPadania alliance thus saw North Italian autonomy associated with the name ‘Padania,’ which in this case represented northern Italy across which these groups wished to cam­ paign for greater regional autonomy in the 1958 general election.

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The juxtaposition of ‘the people’ against the ‘Roman elites’ is present in a further cultural repertoire of ‘the Battle of Legnano’.54 In 1959, Bergamascan autonomists launched a newspaper entitled La Regione Lombarda, using a symbol of Alberto Da Giussano and the Oath of Pontida, to hark back to the 1179 Lega Lombarda’s victory at ‘battle of Legnano’ and reappropriate this medieval event as a symbol of ‘inde­ pendence from Roman centralism’.55 Accompanying the symbol was a message that read: ‘in the memory of the battle of Legnano – a symbol of victory against Barbarossa – the Lombard cities, with the spirit of the “oath of Pontida,” gather for administrative independence from Roman centralism’.56 On the one hand, the image and the caption reinforce the message of opposition to Rome during this period, but also showed the first signs of appropriating symbols and myths which had been previously used to promote national unity during the Risorgimento to promote instead a regionalist cause. This is, therefore, an example of a symbol holding simultaneously two opposing meanings and being exploited as such by the MRAs.57 On the other hand, the image was used to symbolise a stereotypical polarity between Milan and Rome to draw out the differ­ ence between the ‘moral’ capital of the North and the ‘immoral’ capital of the South.58 The three discursive repertoires examined above reflect how populist regionalist demands in the post-war period emphasised an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomy between the North and the centralist state. In the early 1960s, however, divisions emerged between those who wished to keep the MRAs alive and those who wished to see them merge with larger political organisations. This contributed to the process of abeyance, to which this chapter now turns. 3.1.2.2 1960–1980: Holding Process and Rump Movements (Maintenance in Abeyance)

The years between 1960 and 1963 sparked a period of abeyance by causing splits in the MRAs in Lombardy and Piedmont. These fractures marked the decline and absorption of these movements. Even though the MARP, as highlighted in chapter 2, enjoyed a brief run of success in 1957, the MRAs had never managed to sustain any long-term political challenge following their victory in the 1956 communal elections. Additionally, a split in the votes caused by Villarboito at the time of the 1958 elections also damaged the prospects of the North Italian regionalist movement. It should be noted, however, that just as the histories of the MARP and the MAB were different, so were the processes of abeyance, including the fact that they did not undergo this process at the same time nor were they absorbed by the same political organisation. While in 1960, members of the MAB joined a DC list,59 in 1962, similar plans were put into motion to merge

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 105 the MARP with the PSDI.60 Although it was clearly not the key objective of the two respective parties, the DC and the PSDI undertook a ‘process of holding and absorbing personnel’.61 Ugo Gavazzeni played an important role in the Unione Autonomisti d’Italia (UAI) which emerged following the absorption of the MAB, in terms of inter-generational links between the movements; meanwhile, fellow MAB activist and founder, Guido Calderoli, would later become a key actor in transmitting repertoires of contention to a second wave of activism. The DC and PSDI, therefore, through making electoral agreements and pacts with the MRAs, allowed the passage of members into their organisations and contributed to social control by coopting former dissidents to embracing norms and behaviours regulated by their parties. These parties in turn acted as ‘holding’ organisations and contributed to the process of abeyance by temporarily retaining potential challengers to the status quo.62 The abeyance process, however, also inev­ itably led to fragmentation sowing the seeds for abeyance structures and, subsequently, the transmission of repertoires to a second wave of activism. As noted previously, with regards to the MAB, in 1960, a group of Bergamascan activists decided that the DC was the party which could act as the best vehicle for regional interests in Bergamo and Lombardy in general. The following message, composed on 13 October 1960 by several members of the MAB, marked the beginning of a period of decline of populist regionalism in Bergamo: We, the undersigned, are convinced today that even the parties which are ideologically opposed to regional government recognise the neces­ sity of regional autonomy and that in the natural environment of the Christian Democrats, it is possible to finally pursue and activate institutional autonomy, putting an end to the dualism of belonging to two political organisations.63 The reason for adhering to the DC was that the party had, in some activists’ eyes, become more open to the idea of regional autonomy. In 1960, the DC ‘printed a brochure entitled “We want the Region,”’ which Guido Calderoli attributed to pressure from the MAB’s propaganda in the region.64 The preceding 1956 election victory of the Bergamascan au­ tonomists had depended on the fact that Guido Calderoli ‘was closely linked to the clergy in Bergamo.’65 His son, Innocente Calderoli, stated that in the elections of 1956, rather than voting for the DC, ‘many priests of Val Brembana asked people to vote for my father’.66 Indeed, both Guido Calderoli and Aldo Rizzi had distributed materials and propaganda to priests in the hope that they would spread the message of regional autonomy.67 In truth, therefore, a section of the MAB had always attempted to walk a tightrope between loyalty to the political subculture

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of Christian Democracy in the region whilst at the same time offering a political alternative to the status quo. This was evident through messages on their posters, which read, ‘if you vote for our list, you will not be betraying the party you belong to’.68 The strong implication was that the DC subculture would not be threatened by the MAB but rather the MAB would accommodate the DC’s demands. Several autonomists did not opt to join the DC’s electoral list but, led by former respective communal and provincial councillors Guido Calderoli and Ugo Gavazzeni, chose instead to ‘assume the new name of Autonomisti.’ This rump movement would later evolve into the UAI.69 The UAI allied itself to the South Tyrol People’s Party (SVP) in a move­ ment entitled La Stella Alpina, (The Alpine Star) which also involved the former MARP activist Toni Brodrero.70 This provides evidence of how Lombard and Piedmontese regionalist movements continued to collabo­ rate in the 1960s. The UAI survived into the 1970s and provided conti­ nuity of populist regionalist discourse in a seeming period of hiatus.71 On 17th December 1968, Gavazzeni’s UAI met at Pontida to celebrate the 18th centenary celebration of the ‘Oath of Pontida’ by proposing a ‘new Lega Lombarda’.72 Following the 1970s’ regional reforms, the UAI pro­ moted the terms ‘Padania’ and ‘Padanians’ to denote a North Italian identity, with pledges made to ‘defend Padanian work and Padanian traditions’.73 Regarding the MARP,74 in 1962 plans were put into motion to merge the MARP with the PSDI via a series of talks between the two elected MARP councillors and former ARI members Dr Germano Benzi and Dr Timoteo Nobile, and an exponent of the PSDI by the name of Guido Secreto.75 The MARP had attracted votes from Piedmontese en­ trepreneurs, small business holders, and shopkeepers who had previously been loyal to the Social Democrats.76 With this in mind, the PSDI showed itself willing to incorporate all 2,000 of the MARP’s members or sym­ pathisers whilst also assuming all of the movement’s debts.77 Benzi and Nobile appear to have been instrumental in framing this decision as ‘the right thing to do’ and cited the fact that the PSDI had recently added the implementation of regional autonomy to its political manifesto.78 Meanwhile, however, more intransigent members of the MARP went on to form rump movements in the 1960s and 1970s with varying degrees of success. An initial rump movement was led by former MARP exponent Franco Bruno, who in the 1964 local elections attempted to present a separate MARP list entitled MARP bis.79 By doing so, he continued to campaign for regional autonomy into the 1960s, ensuring a survival of populist regionalist discourse.80 With the the 1970 regional reforms leading to establishment of the region as an administrative body , how­ ever, demands shifted towards a ‘Special Statute’. This would see the

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 107 emergence of a new rump movement named Federassion Piemonteisa (Piedmontese Federation), which involved another of the MARP’s former members, Toni Brodrero. This organisation represented a radicalisation of previous demands for activation of the region and instead now aimed at the implementation of a special statute, maximum local autonomy for the alpine communities […] the provision of subsidies to all cultural organisations which deal with traditions and folklore of the Piedmontese people and encourage the teaching of Piedmontese language, literature and history.81 Part of this proposal also marked the beginning of a new element in Piedmontese regionalism which was the appropriation of two important moments in the Resistance in Piedmont: the Carta di Chivasso (Chivasso Declaration), - which had been signed by the partisans of the Valle Valdesi in 1943 - and also of the Repubblica Partigiana (Partisan Republic) of Ossola. Both of these historic events were exploited to claim historical legitimacy for regional autonomy.82 This was an indication that the Constitutional statutes were no longer considered sufficient and that the myths of the Resistance were called upon to play a key role in Piedmontese regionalism. These rump movements acted as key abeyance structures to ensure the survival of populist regionalist discourse and repertoires in the 1960s and 1970s. The second wave of populist regionalist activism began in 1980 and, over the subsequent decades, a series of discursive repertoires pre­ viously used by the MRAs would re-emerge in Lega discourse and ide­ ology. Prior to examining this, however, it is necessary to establish how such repertoires were transmitted from one wave of activism to another. 3.1.2.3 1980–1991: Second Wave of Activism (Transmission and Reproduction of Discursive Repertoires)

The emergence of the regionalist leagues in the 1980s marked the beginning of a second wave of post-war populist regionalism which would ‘borrow from previous routines of claim making’ used by the MRAs.83 Examining the reproduction of the three repertoires introduced in section 3.1.2.1 will illustrate both change and continuity in the messages of the two waves of activism. It is, however, first necessary to establish the way in which these templates were handed down through friendship, rivalry, and family.84 One key inter-generational link between the first and second waves of North Italian regionalist activism was a friendship between Roberto Gremmo and former MARP member Antonio Brodrero. In 1980, Gremmo formed one of the first regionalist leagues, the MARP for Movimento Autonomista Rinascita Piemonteisa (Movement for a Piedmontese

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Rebirth). The use of this specific acronym ensured the revival of a term which had promoted populist regionalism in the 1950s and owed a lot to his friendship with Brodrero.85 The two had also collaborated in the writing of l’Oppressione Culturale Italiana in Piemonte (Italian cultural oppression in Piedmont) which depicted the ‘Piedmontese people’ as historically oppressed by ‘Roman bureaucrats’.86 Populist regionalist narratives were also transmitted to the Lombard section of leghismo via Gremmo’s friendship with Umberto Bossi, whose Lega Lombarda was initially the ‘little brother’ of Gremmo’s movement.87 Indeed, ‘Gremmo and Bossi had originally collaborated in the establishment of two organisations in Piedmont and Lombardy, respectively, called L’Unione Ossolana (L’UOPA) and L’Unione Nord-Occidentale per i Laghi pre-Alpini’.88 Bossi was, therefore, indirectly influenced by Brodero’s ideas via Gremmo89 and, in 1982, began publishing a mouthpiece promoting Lombard autonomy entitled Lombardia Autonomista (Autonomist Lombardy) as a supplement of Gremmo’s party newspaper Rinascita Piemontese (Piedmontese Rebirth), prior to founding the Lega Lombarda in 1984. 90 In 1987, Brodrero defected from Gremmo’s movement to join a rival faction formed by Piedmontese folk singer Gipo Farassino, Piemont Autonomista (Autonomist Piedmont).91 Brodrero was not the only former MARP member to join this group; he was joined by Pietro Molino, who had also been a MARP leafletter in the 1950s.92 Both Brodrero and Molino would become re­ presentatives for Lega Nord Piemont and form a direct link of personnel between the MARP and the Lega as individuals who had participated in the MARP in the 1950s.93 This established a rivalry between Piemont Autonomista and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Lombarda on one side and Gremmo’s renamed movement Union Piemonteisa (Piedmontese Union) on the other. A battle between these rival factions ensued to control the narrative over the history of North Italian regionalism. Activists in Piemont Autonomista published an article paying tribute to the ‘important cultural figure of Toni Brodrero,’ stating that ‘the seed planted 35 years ago by MARP was not in vain but instead has developed like never before’.94 The article paid homage to the MARP, arguing that in the 1950s it had ‘conquered a worthy space in the region’ and given ‘shape and form to Piedmontese pride’.95 The same article also praised former MARP leader Enrico Villarboito in an attempt to attract him to Piemont Autonomista. However, the MARP founder instead came out in support of Gremmo’s radical plan for the creation of a separate ‘North-West alpine state’ and in his renaming Union Piemonteisa as the Lega Alpina (Alpine League).96 Further to friendship and rivalry, however, transmission of repertoires also depended on familial relationships. Guido Calderoli had been a key figure in both the MAB and subsequent rump movements. It was subse­ quently his son, Innocente, and grandson, Roberto (of whom Innocente was the uncle, not father), who helped form the Bergamascan section of

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 109 the Lega Lombarda in 1985.97 Bossi claims that Innocente Calderoli ‘gathered four people at his house, including his nephew Roberto Calderoli,’ to form this regionalist league and that in the coming years, ‘the Lega Lombarda became well-rooted in Bergamo’.98 Calderoli was elected to the Bergamo communal council,99 thus representing a family tradition which helped push the movement forward between the two periods.100 Calderoli, in his early electoral campaigns for the Lega, even made references to his grandfather’s role in regional autonomy in the 1950s.101 While Giuseppe Calderoli, Roberto’s father, was not involved in such activism, repertoires which encouraged dissent from the officially sanctioned centralist form of governance in Italy were nevertheless transmitted to Roberto via his uncle and grandfather. This demonstrates how family can harbour ‘a latent mo­ bilisation potential even when parents are not activists’.102 As noted in chapter 2, under the leadership of Bossi in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the regionalist leagues’ strategy of action became increasingly organised, culminating in the federation of these organisa­ tions into the Lega Nord in 1991.103 Leghismo was a phenomenon rooted in a specific context of crisis and transition for the Italian Republic. For the populist regionalism of the Lega to make a breakthrough and amplify the crisis of the First Republic, it required the right combination of structural and agency factors. In terms of ‘a Northern underdog exploited by Southern and Centralist elites,’ a series of Lega posters which ‘showed a pained-looking Lombard hen laying golden eggs into a basket held by a distastefully caricatured Roman matron’ were reproduced throughout the 1990s and 2000s.104 The template for these images was the previously mentioned MRA discursive repertoires of the ‘Hen with the Golden Egg’ developed in the 1950s, thus showing the enduring relevance of this image in highlighting the Northern Question. Further to this, the Lega, following its declaration of Padania, drew heavily on the cultural repertoire of a ‘Free Padania.’ This demon­ strated a logical progression from the MAB to the UAI to the Lega Nord. Finally, in a reproduction of a key discursive repertoire developed by the MAB in 1959, Bossi used the image of Alberto da Giussano to act as the key symbol of the Lega Lombarda, and later, Lega Nord. The ‘Battle of Legnano’ had, therefore, survived the period of abeyance as a symbol of North Italian regionalism. 105 There were, however, some significant differences. The second wave of activism had to evolve and abandon elements which had previously been present in the MRAs and had been, instead, a product of the transition between Fascism and the First Italian Republic. These contextual differ­ ences (which will be further examined in chapters 5 and 6) necessitated a modification of pre-existing populist regionalist cultural repertoires. With regards to the first two discursive repertoires, the Lega associated Roman

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power with the Mafia. This took advantage of the increased publicity sur­ rounding organised crime and its association with the south of the penin­ sula, which Bossi argued had infiltrated the state. While the MRAs had, for instance, often chosen the figure of a wolf to represent Rome, this imagery was often substituted with a stereotypical image of the Mafia and what was labelled as mafiosità (mafianess).106 Lega imagery now also made use of Roman dialect to emphasise the juxtaposition between North and South.107 The Lega’s notion of Padania was also more radical than either the MRAs’ ‘MARPadania’ or the UAI’s ‘Free Padania’ message, with Bossi proposing a separate North Italian state.108 In terms of the Battle of Legnano, the use of this symbol is much more central to the Lega’s identity, providing party activists with an image to rally around. The Battle of Legnano’s historic link to Pontida, previously highlighted by the MAB in the aforementioned newspaper, La Regione Lombarda, and then developed further by the UAI’s gatherings and oaths in the 1960s and 1970s, was also re-emphasised by the Lega through its annual party rally of the ‘Festa di Pontida’.109 This gath­ ering has acted as a key platform for the reproduction and reinforcement of discursive repertoires with roots in 1950s populist regionalism. 3.2 Conclusion The emergence of the regionalist leagues across north Italy, the constitu­ tion of the Lega Nord, and the declaration of the Independence of Padania represented the revival of a previous upsurge of activism during the 1950s – reframed to suit the political context of the 1980s and 1990s. The 20-year gap between these two upsurges in activism had vitally acted as a period of ‘abeyance,’ allowing for continuity of discourse, imagery, and a reframing of regionalist arguments. This chapter has highlighted how ‘being mindful of the period of abeyance between waves [of activism] offers […] a safeguard against the failure to appreciate that instances of political contention are not independent events’.110 Following repertoire creation in the 1950s by the MRAs, the abeyance structures in the 1960s and 1970s allowed for the maintenance of populist regionalist repertoires. Following the transmission of these repertoires in the 1980s, in terms of structure, the crisis of the Italian party system caused by the twin factors of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tangentopoli scandals saw a breakthrough of the Lega’s demands as it marked the end of a party or coalition being able to achieve overall control and shut out regionalist demands. Regarding agency, Umberto Bossi’s leadership and his ability to unite the various regionalist leagues into the Lega Nord represented the real point of departure for this wave of populist regionalism. In short, it is not possible to fully understand the rise of leghismo by focusing solely on the 1980s and 1990s alone. The 1956 administrative

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 111 elections, which provided a platform for regionalist activism in Lombardy and Piedmont, and the 1958 MARPadania alliance formed for the general elections of that year should be considered political tremors in the buildup to the political earthquake of leghismo in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, ‘focusing on what is salient in social life may lead to a neglect of “unmarked” features’.111 Instead, it is essential to identify how these events form part of ‘longer term patterns of social interaction’.112 This chapter has, to this end, employed a historical sociological perspective on the phenomenon of North Italian populist regionalism to illustrate how certain narratives, ideas, and rituals have remained latent – or in abeyance – awaiting reactivation.113 Whilst examining how abeyance ac­ counts for the decline of the MARP and the MAB in the 1960s with the movements’ absorption into larger political organisations, it has also been shown how the diverse formation of each of the MRAs contributed to dif­ ferent ‘abeyance structures’ following the decline of the first wave of activism. However, just as it is too simplistic to consider MARPismo/MABismo and leghismo as two individual and unconnected waves of activism, it is equally precarious, from a historical and sociological perspective, to consider them as identical. While the 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of some of the discourse, images, and slogans which would later be used by the Lega, focusing only on the similarities in the populist regionalist discourse between the post-war autonomists and the Lega can prove more of a hindrance than a help when trying to understand the success of leghismo. Significantly, many members of the MARP and the MAB would not have endorsed the message of the Lega. Indeed, the fact that a key member of the MAB, Gianfranco Gonella, who had contributed to the break-up of the movement, voted for the DC in Bergamo in the 1980s and continued to do so up until his death in the 1990s (when the Lega had become a powerful political force in Lombardy), is a testament to this.114 Also, Guido Calderoli’s desire for unity and a profession of love for the nation would have found no home in the Lega Lombarda, in which his grandson, Roberto, would campaign against not for the idea of the nation-state. Similarly, much of the work produced by Brodrero and Gremmo represented a complete departure from the unitary message promoted by the MARP. The MRAs had used populist regionalist repertoires to make claims for regionalism in a discursive field in which national unity was considered paramount following the second world war. Such repertoires of contention had, therefore, to be framed in a way which did not threaten such unity and, as such, failed to make any significant impact in the post-war discursive field. The shift from demands for ‘ordinary’ regions in the 1950s to demands for Special Statutes115 ‘marked a turning point in the development of movements and parties in the North Italian regions’.116 According to

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Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, it also involved a ‘new political mobilisation [which] introduced new categories of nationhood’.117 Whereas the MARP and the MAB had been able to point to the lack of ‘ordinary’ region status to justify their existence and put forward their political programme, with the 1970s regional reforms, any future claims for autonomy in Piedmont and Lombardy had to be reframed. The enactment of these reforms were not followed by a dissolution of regionalist movements, but instead saw autonomist ideas continue to circulate in Lombardy and Piedmont. Furthermore, the changing context of the 1980s and 1990s, and in partic­ ular the fall of the First Italian Republic and the transition to the Second Republic following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revelation of the Tangentopoli scandals, influenced the discourse put forward by leghismo. The second wave of activism would have to evolve and abandon elements which had previously been present in the MRAs and had been, instead, a product of the transition between Fascism and the First Italian Republic. The following two chapters will focus in greater detail on how the different discursive fields in which the two waves of activism were active impacted their political message with regards to the strengthening and maintenance or the weakening and dismantling of the nation-state. Notes 1 Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, American Sociological Review 54, no.5 (October 1989): 761 (763), https://doi.org/10.2307/2117752. 2 Donald Sassoon, “Tangentopoli or the Democratization of Corruption: Considerations on the End of Italy’s First Republic”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 1, no.1 (1995): (128). 3 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. 4 Margaret Canovan, ‘Two Strategies for the Study of Populism’, Political Studies 30, no.4 (1982): 544–552. Idem, ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, Political Studies 2, no.16 (1999): 2–16. Idem, ‘Populism for Political Theorists’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no.3 (2004): 241–252. 5 Paris Aslanidis, ‘Populism and Social Movements’ in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017) 305–325 (305). Kenneth. M. Roberts, K. M. ‘Populism, social movements and popular subjectivity’, in The Oxford handbook of social movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 681–695.

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 113 6 Paris Aslanidis, ‘Populism and Social Movements’. In The Oxford Handbook of Populism, eds. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 305–325. 7 For details of these frameworks, please see the following works: George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. George Newth, ‘Fathers of the Lega Nord?’ Phd Thesis (Bath: University of Bath, 2018). 8 Ibid. 9 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, ‘Contentious Politics and Social Movements’ in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan. C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 435–460 (441). 10 Tilly, Contentious Performances, 15, (My emphasis). 11 Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review 51, no.2 (April 1986): 273, https://doi.org/10.2307/2 095521. 12 Jill Reynolds and Margaret Wetherell, ‘The Discursive Climate of Singleness: The Consequences for Women’s Negotiation of a Single Identity’, Feminism & Psychology 13, no.4 (December 2003): 489–510, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 09593535030134014. 13 Leslie King, ‘Charting a Discursive Field: Environmentalists for U.S. Population Stabilization’, Sociological Inquiry 77, no.3 (2007): 301–325 (303), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.2007.00195.x 14 Marc W. Steinberg ‘The Roar of the Crowds: Repertoires of Discourse and Collective Action among the Spitalfields Silk Weavers in 19th-century London’ in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, ed. Mark Traugott (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995) 57–87 (60). 15 Ephraim Mizruchi, Regulating Society: Marginality and Social Control in Historical Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1983) 163. 16 For the process of abeyance to work effectively, Mizruchi identified a number of variables which ‘describe the relative capacity of an organisation, at a point in time and under specified conditions, to absorb or expel people as external societal conditions change’. Mizruchi, Regulating Society: Marginality and social control in historical perspective, 26–27. 17 Paul Bagguley, ‘Contemporary British Feminism: A Social Movement in Abeyance?’, Social Movement Studies 1, no.2 (2002): 169–185 (173), https:// doi.org/10.1080/1474283022000010664 18 Tilly, Contentious Performances, 15. 19 73. 20 Traci M. Sawyers and David. S. Meyer, ‘Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy’, Social Problems 46, no.2 (1999): 187–206 (188), https://doi.org/10.2307/3097252 21 Tine Gade, ‘Together all the way? Abeyance and cooptation of Sunni net­ works in Lebanon’, Social Movement Studies 18, no.1 (2019): 56–77 (59) https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1545638 Bagguley, ‘Contemporary British feminism: A social movement in abey­ ance?’, 171.

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Populist Regionalism in Abeyance Taylor, ‘Social movement continuity: The women’s movement in abey ance’, 761.

22 Alberto Melucci, John Keane, and Paul Mier, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). See also: Caitríona Beaumont, Mary Clancy, and Louise Ryan, ‘Networks as “Laboratories of Experience”: Exploring the Life Cycle of the Suffrage Movement and Its Aftermath in Ireland 1870–1937’, Women’s History Review 29, no.6 (18 September 2020): 1054–1074, https://doi.org/10.1 080/09612025.2020.1745414. 23 Taylor, ‘Social movement continuity: The women’s movement in abeyance’. Gade, ‘Together all the way? Abeyance and cooptation of Sunni networks in Lebanon’. 24 Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, American Sociological Review 54, no.5 (1989): 761–775 (762), https://doi.org/10.2307/2117752. 25 Eitan Y. Alimi, ‘Repertoires of Contention’ in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 410–422 (410). 26 Özge Zihnioğlu, ‘Strategizing Post-Protest Activism in Abeyance: Retaining Activist Capital under Political Constraint’, Social Movement Studies, Online First (2021), doi: 10.1080/14742837.2021.2003193 See also: Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, American Sociological Review 54, no.5 (1989): 761–775 (762), https:// doi.org/10.2307/2117752. 27 John W. P. Veugelers, ‘Dissenting Families and Social Movement Abeyance: The Transmission of Neo-Fascist Frames in Post-War Italy’, The British Journal of Sociology 62, no.2 (2011): 241–261 (21). 28 John W. P. Veugelers, ‘Dissenting Families and Social Movement Abeyance: The Transmission of Neo-Fascist Frames in Post-War Italy’, The British Journal of Sociology 62, no.2 (2011): 241–261 (21). 29 Robert M. Press, Ripples of Hope, How Ordinary People Resist Repression Without Violence (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015) (173). 30 Ibid., p.152. 31 George Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance’, 511–529. 32 Swidler, ‘Culture in action: Symbols and strategies’, 277. 33 Jannis Grimm and Cilja Harders, ‘Unpacking the Effects of Repression: The Evolution of Islamist Repertoires of Contention in Egypt after the Fall of President Morsi’, Social Movement Studies 17, no.1 (2 January 2018): 1–18 (4), https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1344547. 34 Swidler, ‘Culture in action: Symbols and strategies’, 277. 35 Gade, ‘Together all the way? Abeyance and cooptation of Sunni networks in Lebanon’, 89–91. 36 Ibid., 59. 37 Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’ in Social Movements:Readings on their Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics, eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles:

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 115 Roxbury, 1997) 409–420 (409), cited in Bagguley, ‘Contemporary British feminism: A social movement in abeyance?’, 171. 38 William H. Sewell, The Concepts of Culture in Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn, ed., Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Rewriting Histories (New York: Routledge, 2005) 76–95 (89–91). See also: Tomasso Vitale, Territorial Conflicts and New Forms of Left-Wing Political Organization: From Political Opportunity Structure to Structural Contexts of Opportunities. Sociologica 9, no.3 (2015): 1–13. Loris Caruso, ‘Theories of the Political Process, Political Opportunities Structure and Local Mobilizations. The Case of Italy’, Sociologica no. 3 (2015): 0–0, https://doi.org/10.2383/82471. Newth, 2022. ‘Populism in abeyance’. 39 Newth, 2022, ‘Populism in abeyance’, 515. 40 Ibid. 41 Reynolds and Wetherell, ‘The discursive climate of singleness: The conse­ quences for women’s negotiation of a single identity’, 496. 42 Newth, ’Populism in abeyance: The survival of populist repertoires of con­ tention in North Italy’, 518‐519. 43 Maragarita Gomez Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega and the Northern Question (Farnham: Ashgate, 2002). 44 ‘Elezioni politiche ’87 – I nostri candidati’. Piemont Autonomista. (18 May 1987). Sangiorgo, ‘il MARP degli anni 50 Padre della Lega’. 45 George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’, Modern Italy 23, no.3 (2018): 235–252. 46 Michele Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’ (Piemonte Nuovo 23 March 1956). 47 George Newth, ‘The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no.4 (2019): 384–406, DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2019.1615784 48 Further posters released by the MRAs which depict the North being either drained or devoured by the centralist state can be accessed via the following article: George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. 49 In a correspondence between Aldo Rizzi and Guido Calderoli in 1959, Rizzi praises his colleague for the work, stating that ‘it could not be more perfect’ and urges him ‘not to add any more regions, for now’. This plea to keep the poster solely about Lombardy is significant, as it indicates that Rizzi and Calderoli wished to maintain a Lombard identity in spite of being part of the MARPadania alliance examined in chapter 2. It was, indeed, not until the recycling of this image that regions other than Lombardy were printed on the poster, as is seen in the use of the poster by Lega Nord Piemont in 1991. Aldo Rizzi, Notes entitled “De relazione Tempestiva” in Fasc. MABAutonomisti (Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai). 24 July 1959.

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50 An earlier example of this image emerged in 1956 local elections, when the Piedmontese autonomists released an image of a Roman matron, this time taking the form of a ‘sorceress siren’ (maliarda sirena). Rome is depicted as compelling a hard-working Piedmontese worker to participate in the age-old ritual of throwing coins into the Trevi Fountain; however, rather than the traditional purpose of bringing good luck, it is to support various state entities. 51 Biorcio, and Vitale, ‘Culture, values and social basis of Northern Italian cen­ trifugal regionalism: A contextual political analysis of the Lega Nord’, 175. 52 Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance: The survival of populist repertoires of con­ tention in North Italy’, 519. 53 ‘Ultime Notizie’ (Piemonte Nuovo 12 April 1958). Vei Piemunt! Gli Autonomisti Italiani vedono nel MARP l’algiere del­ l’autonomia regionale – il congresso di Verona ha messo in luce che l’idea autonomista ѐ oggi diventata la forza motrice del popolo italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo, 1 February 1958. ‘Il MARP diventa Padano per presentarsi alle elezioni’, (La Stampa, 24 February 1958). Smaller, fledgling movements from the Veneto and Liguria were absent from the official signing of the electoral agreement of MARPadania, but would adhere to this alliance prior to the 1958 elections. 54 Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance: The survival of populist repertoires of con­ tention in North Italy’, 520–523. 55 Roberto Gremmo, Contro Roma: Storia idee e programmi delle Leghe au­ tonomiste del Nord (Brescia: Stem Editoriale Spa, 1992) 75. 56 Ibid. 57 Gade, ‘Together all the way? Abeyance and cooptation of Sunni networks in Lebanon’, 89–91. 58 Ibid. 59 Anselmo Freddi, Breve Storia del MAB (Bergamo: Stampa Fratelli Carrarra, 1963) 20. 60 Turin Police Commissioner Notes: ‘MARP- Confluenza nel PSDI’, Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol.1. Archivio di Stato Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 18 December, 1962. 61 Mizruchi, Regulating society: Marginality and social control in historical perspective, 20. 62 Ibid., 17. 63 Freddi, Breve storia del MAB, 20. 64 Ibid., 19. 65 Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda DeMatteo, ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945–2000, ed. Adriana Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52,(38). 66 Ibid. 67 ‘Notes by Aldo Rizzi entitled “De relazione Tempestiva”’ in Fasc. MABAutonomisti, (Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai, 24 July 1959). 68 “Electoral poster entitled Vota La Lista Autonomista” in Fasc. MAB Autonomisti. (Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai). 69 Freddi, Breve Storia del MAB, 20–21. Dati statistici ufficiali relativi alle votazioni nel comune di Bergamo. Elezioni Proviniciali 1960. Archivio Storico Comune di Bergamo, Cat. 6(Governo). Classe a. Fasc. 1 e 2. Anni 1954–1964. ‘Così schierati i partiti per le elezioni’ L’Eco di Bergamo. 13 October 1960.

Populist Regionalism in Abeyance 117 70 Gremmo, Contro Roma, 235–236. Boulliaud and DeMatteo ’Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ p.44 71 Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance: The survival of populist repertoires of con­ tention in North Italy’, 521. 72 Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda De Matteo ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945–2000, ed. Adriana Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52. 43. Newspaper article clipping entitled “La Nuova Lega Lombarda”. L’Eco di Bergamo, in Fasc. MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai, 15 January 1968. 73 UAI. 1970. Electoral Poster, in Fasc. MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai. 74 Il Consiglio comunale di Torino Nell’Italia Repubblicana 1947–2006, Archivio Storico della città di Torino Atti consiliari – Serie Storica, 2006. 75 ‘MARP- Confluenza nel PSDI’, Archivio di Stato Torino. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Turin Police Commissioner Notes entitled ‘P.S.D.I – Congresso Provinciale’, in Fasc.Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol.1. Archivio di Stato Torino. Cat Archivio di Stato Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 13 November 1962. 79 ‘Il MARP bis non intende modificare il simbolo’, La Stampa, 29th October 1964 80 ‘MARP- Confluenza nel PSDI’, Archivio di Stato Torino. 81 Brodrero and Gremmo, L’oppressione Culturale Italiana in Piemonte, p.11. 82 Roberto Gremmo, ‘La Carta di Chivasso compie cinquant’anni’, La Lega Alpina, 15 January 1994. Idem, Contro Roma, 235–236. 83 Jannis Grimm and Cilja Harders, ‘Unpacking the Effects of Reperession: The Evolution of Islamist Repertoires of Contention in Egypt after the Fall of President Morsi’, Social Movement Studies 17, no.1 (2018): 1–18, (4), https:// doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1344547 84 Eitan Y. Alimi, ‘Repertoires of Contention’ in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 410–422 (410). 85 Newth, ‘Populism in abeyance’, 521. Umberto Bossi, Lombardia Autonomista, (October–November, 1982). Gremmo, Contro Roma, 5. 86 Antonio Brodrero, A., and Roberto Gremmo, L’Oppressione culturale Italiana in Piemonte (Editrice BS, 1978) 14. 87 Guido Passalacqua, Il Vento della Padania: Storia della Lega Nord 1984–2009 (Milan: Mondadori, 2009) 17. 88 Maragarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question (Farnham: Ashgate, 2001) 76. 89 Roberto Gremmo, Interview with author, 8 February 2016 90 Umberto Bossi, Lombardia Autonomista (October–November 1982), wrote in a 1983 edition of its mouthpiece Lombardia Autonomista, ‘our thanks go to Roberto Gremmo of MARP, who […] allows us to publish Lombardia Autonomista as the supplement of Rinascista Piemontese’.

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91 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘Ethnicity and nationalism in Italian politics’. 92 Giuseppe Sangiorgo, ‘Il MARP degli anni 50 Padre della Lega’, La Stampa, 12 April 1994. 93 ‘Dai le preferenze a Piemont’, Piemont Autonomista, 24 May 1989. ‘Elezioni politiche ’87 – i nostri candidati’, Piemont Autonomista, 18 May 1987. 94 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘35 anni di Lotta’. Piemont Autonomista (April 1987). 95 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘35 anni di Lotta’. Piemont Autonomista (April 1987). 96 Maurizio Lupo, ‘Gipo Farassino fonda la Lega Nord. Va con Gremmo il fondatore del MARP’ La Stampa (27 November, 1989). 97 Bossi, La Lega: 1979–1989, 61–62. 98 Ibid. 99 (Bergamo Election Results, 1990). 100 Giuseppe Sala, Interview with author (20 March 2016). 101 Ibid. 102 Veugelers, ‘Dissenting families and social movement abeyance: The trans­ mission of neo-fascist frames in post-war Italy’, 244. 103 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’ in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy, History, Politics and Society, eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A.Veltri (New York: Routledge, 2015) 204–214. (205). 104 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2001) 14. 105 Umberto Bossi, Vento dal Nord: La mia Lega, la mia vita (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1992) 75. Claims in his autobiography that the symbol of Alberto da Giussano ‘was my invention’. 106 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Ethnicity, Racism, and the Northern League’ in Italian Regionalism, ed. C.Levy. 171–187 (175). 107 Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance’ 523. 108 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 111. 109 Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance’ 523. 110 Ruud Koopmans, ‘Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention’ in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007) 19–46, https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470999103.ch2. 111 Veugelers, ‘Dissenting families and social movement abeyance: The trans­ mission of neo-fascist frames in post-war Italy’, 243. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Giuseppe Sala, interviewed by George Newth, June 2016, Bergamo, Italy. 115 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and nationalism in Italian politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the northern question, 63. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., 47

4

Making or Unmaking Italians? Regionalism, the Region, and the Nation-State between Two Waves of Activism

4.1 Introduction Speaking in 1948 to fellow members of what would later become the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (the MAB), Ubaldo Riva argued that the region and the nation arguably have more in common than what divides them. He reassured his audience that to those who fear the region will damage the unity of the nation, we would remind them that […] the nation is by nature a unitary creature, even if free and unshackled […] greater freedom does not dissolve unity.1 In many ways, he was correct: both entities rely on borders and define their ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ via civic and/or ethnic criteria. Both also draw on various rites, symbols, paraphernalia, repertoires, and in­ vented traditions to foster regionalist/nationalist sentiment and soli­ darity between communities. These similarities, however, belie a complex and often antagonistic relationship between the region and the nation-state, particularly when the latter is administered by a centralist government which affords limited autonomy to the former. It is this antagonism which contributes to the raison d’être of regionalist move­ ments such as the Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) and the Lega. This chapter addresses, in part, the question of how separate periods of crisis and transition transformed regionalism from a force of unity into one of fragmentation. It illustrates the differences in the ide­ ologies of the MRAs and the Lega and their respective relationship with the Italian nation-state. While it has become cliché in any study of Italian history to cite Massimo D’Azeglio’s post-unification (1861–1870) statement of ‘we have made Italy now we need to make Italians’, it, nevertheless, provides an important reference point for the two types of regionalism examined in this chapter. This is because while the MRAs

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-5

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were concerned with ‘making Italians’ through the activation of the regional statutes, leghismo can be viewed as a way of ‘unmaking Italians’. Both forms of regionalism, therefore, reflect the complex pro­ cess of constructing a unitary national identity encapsulated by D’Azeglio’s statement. This chapter unpacks the respective ideologies of the MRAs and the Lega over three sections. Section 4.1.1 outlines in greater detail the ideological content of the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective regionalist and federalist programmes. Via a patriotic form of regionalism, both the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (the MARP) and the Bergamascan Autonomy Movement (the MAB) framed regional autonomy as a way of strengthening the Italian nation-state. Literature on patriotism suggests that love for one’s ‘locality, state, region, or country’ may be articulated and/or expressed in myriad ways, including ‘environmental patriotism,’2 ‘social patriotism,’3 ‘democratic patriotism,’ ‘authoritarian patriotism,’4 and ‘civic patriotism’.5 The term ‘patriotic regionalism’ describes how the MRAs used narratives of love, devotion, and a strong differential concern for one’s own locality, state, region, or country in order to promote the government of, by, and for the region.6 It is this very love for the patria, alongside the lack of any proposals for a federalist transformation of the Italian nation-state which sets this first wave of activism apart from the second. Instead, the Lega’s calls for a constitutional reform, which involved the discursive reinvention of northern regions as lost nations, derived from a critique of the fundamental basis for the Italian nation-state. Leghismo presented a challenge to Italian national identity through the use of neo-federalism, the promotion of secession of the North Italian state of Padania, and, subsequently, the adoption of devolution. The common denominator between these variations of claims for autonomy, however, was that they ‘always considered the possibility of the centrifugal pressures leading to a separation of the North from the South’.7 After establishing the divergent nature of the regionalist programmes of the MRAs and the Lega, section 4.1.2 of this chapter then examines how these ideologies were articulated via three discourses: the Risorgimento, anti-fascism, and A Europe of the Regions. Examining how each wave of regionalist activism articulated their ideologies through these various logics will illuminate both elements of change and continuity in how the MRAs and the Lega presented their message. Section 4.2 will reflect on how this chapter’s findings build on the overview of regionalist and federalist debates in the history of unified Italy in chapter 2 and the theory of abeyance in chapter 3. Not only this, but the conclusion will articulate how the debates explored over the following pages set the context for a deeper examination of populist and nativist discourses in chapter 5.

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4.1.1 Establishing the Discursive Field of Regionalism and Federalism: Ideologies of Unity or Fragmentation?

Both the MRAs and the Lega held regional reform at the centre of their programme; however, the type of regionalism each wave of activism produced was very different. The following paragraphs provide a com­ parative analysis of the MRAs’ patriotic regionalism and the Lega’s neofederalism/secessionism (see Table 4.1). What emerges from this analysis are some common themes in each ideology relating to reforming the constitution, fiscal federalism, and Padania, which had all emerged in the 1950s. However, whereas the MRAs were born alongside and defended the First Italian Republic, the Lega contributed to its fall and to a subse­ quent transition to the Second Italian Republic. This meant that while the MRAs’ regionalism was limited to calling for the activation of the regional statutes written into the Constitution, by the time leghismo emerged, these statutes had already been active for nearly a decade. The Lega’s region­ alism and federalism, therefore, attacked the regional governments as inadequate institutions for satisfying the demands posed by an increas­ ingly prevalent Northern Question. The patriotic elements of the MRAs regionalist programme would therefore be abandoned by the Lega which argued instead for a deconstruction of the Republic and the replacement with a Federal Republic (and later a state of Padania). In short, the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective forms of regionalism can be broadly distin­ guished between one which defended and another which attacked the post-war republic and which in turn either sought to make or unmake Italians. 4.1.1.1 The MRAs: Making Italians

For the post-war autonomists, regionalism was an ideology which would address almost any and all of Italy’s problems and was conducive to patriotism. This was encapsulated in a message to the electorate in the months leading up to the 1958 election in which the MARP stated: Voters! The moral, spiritual, political and economic situation of Italy is chaotic […] our movement is completely convinced that the majority of these problems can be resolved through ADMINISTRATIVE REGIO­ NAL AUTONOMY … Long live Italy!8 In stating that it was their duty to ensure the activation of the regional statutes, the MRAs were presenting themselves as defenders of the 1948 Republican Constitution. Regionalism was depicted as fundamental to the survival of a fledgling democratic and regionalist republic during an unstable period of transition for the nation-state. Working from the logic

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Table 4.1 Patriotic regionalism vs neo-federalism/secessionism Theme

The MRAs (Patriotic Regionalism)

The Lega (NeoFederalism/Secessionism)

Title V of the Constitution Fiscal Federalism

Guaranteeing freedom

Impeding freedom

Taxes kept in the northern regions but as part of series of national communities An electoral pact

Taxes kept in the ‘North’ as part of a separate community A nation-building project

Padania Credit: George Newth.

that ‘Italy’s unity does not run any risk once the region is established,’9 the MRAs’ form of patriotic regionalism viewed the regional statutes as guaranteeing freedom. In doing so, they also advocated for an early iter­ ation of what would later become known as ‘fiscal federalism’ as part of a wider notion of civic duty within a framework of national unity and, latterly, a notion of Padania as an electoral alliance for regionalist movements in the north. The MRAs’ patriotic regionalism adhered to the dominant imperative of the post-war unitary state and advocated for the activation of the regional statutes so regional autonomy would strengthen the Constitution. The post-war autonomists had to navigate ‘an unresolved conflict between two outlooks of regional administration in Italy’.10 On the one hand, the MRAs viewed their regions as ‘discrete communities’ with ‘different needs’ to the rest of the country. At the same time, they respected the Constitutional limitation that ‘the region is free to legislate provided that such legislation is not in contrast with the interests of the Nation or of other regions’.11 Indeed, the MRAs argued that ‘if regionalism was made to divide Italy, then the Constitution itself was written to divide Italians’.12 They claimed that ‘Rome’ had ‘forgotten the Constitution which allows for regional decentralisation’ and depicted regional autonomy as synon­ ymous with the new republic.13 The centrality of the Constitution to the MARP’s and the MAB’s raison d’être can be seen in the movements’ writings. One of the MAB’s founding members stated By 1948, our movement entered into a new stage of its development. The regional statutes we had desired had now been written into the Constitution. It now became our duty to ensure they were activated.14 The activation of the regions would represent, according to the MARP, ‘a demonstration of love for our land and for our Italy’15 while ‘refreshing

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the memory’ of politicians who ‘seemed to have forgotten’ the regional statutes.16 Further to this, it was believed that the region would cut through administrative red tape and allow for more efficient governance,17 arguing that ‘if you want the region as a way of de-bureaucratising the country, you should vote for the MARP’.18 ‘De-bureaucratisation’ should, however, also be viewed as a euphemism for an early form of fiscal federalism, i.e. a demand that locally raised taxes should not be appropriated by ‘national government.’19 One key element of the MRAs regionalism, examined in greater detail in chapter 5, was that of a tax revolt against Rome. This was centred around opposition towards the Cassa per il Mezzorgiorno (Special Fund for the South), ‘set up in 1950 to assist the economic regeneration of the poorest regions of the country [spending] over 8,000 billion lire between 1957 and 1975 on (for the most part failed) schemes to promote industrialisation’.20While the MARP’s Piemonte Nuovo asserted that ‘we pay every year 280 million to the state and receive less than 90 million,’21 in a separate essay, the Bergamascan autonomists stated that Lombardy sends 440 million per year to the state and receives no more than 140 million in return. We must reflect on this. We cannot industrialise the South at the cost of draining completely the resources of the North.22 However, this form of fiscal federalism was viewed by the MRAs as part of civic duty in that regionalism was a more responsible form of administration which could help ‘make Italians’ and ‘teach Italians how to govern themselves’.23 The post-war autonomists, therefore, promoted the idea of regional government representing the ‘true Italy of the Italians’ and as the ‘point of departure for true patriotism’.24 The argument that ‘in recognising every Region’s rights and duties, united with a key sense of responsibility, the unity of the Nation is reinforced’.25 Arguing that ‘patria and nation are and remain therefore the symbolic elements of our qualities as citizens and of subjects,’ the MARP claimed that ‘only regional autonomy, in the framework of superior unity of the State, will guarantee the respect of traditions and local needs’.26 This was reinforced by the MAB’s anthem of the autonomists, a verse of which is worth citing in full here as it summarises how regionalism was presented as conducive to national unity and fraternity: The country is united, but with different ancestry, Even sisters have different traditions, They each follow their own aspirations, And bring greater unity to the family.

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Regionalism, Region, and Nation-State between Waves of Activism In memory of the free communes, a new movement emerges in Italy, With the Region and decentralisation we will have more complete liberty, The state will acquire new prestige and the citizens new dignity.27

While the MRAs were keen to depict themselves as patriots, they dis­ tinguished their programme of regionalism from the nationalism of the preceding fascist era. Indeed, the idea of nationalism as a destructive force was presented in the MRAs’ message that ‘nationalism is finished. Nationalism is nothing but an aberration, a scandal, and it is no longer possible to sustain that ours or another nation is worth more than another’.28 The MRAs’ message involved a clear distinction between love for the patria and nationalism, with claims that love for the nation is one thing and nationalism is a completely different thing. […] Everybody should love their own country. But nobody should demand the humiliation and the enslavement of other nations.29 This disavowal of nationalism can be seen as one reason why a united Padanian identity never took hold in the late 1950s, despite a MARPadania alliance breaking new ground in bringing together region­ alist movements in the north. The MARPadania list contained the Veneto (Verona-Padova-Vicenza-Roviga), Lombardy (Brescia-Bergamo; MilanoPavia; Como-Sondrio-Varese), Piedmont (Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti; Torino-Novara-Vercelli), Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (Udine-Gorizia-Belluno), and Trentino-Alto Adige (Trento-Bolzano).30 This list received 70,589 votes for the Chamber of Deputies and 61,088 votes for the senate amounting to respective 0.24% and 0.23% of the popular vote. However, when we consider that 65,412 of votes for the Chamber of Deputies came from the combined colleges of Lombardy and Piedmont, we see that MARPadania was, in reality, a coalition between the two principal pro­ tagonists of regional autonomy in the post-war era, the MAB and the MARP. The fact that MARPadania fielded senatorial candidates only in Lombard and Piedmontese provinces is further evidence of the dominance of these two regions.31 This imbalance can be attributed to the fact that the Venetian and Friulian regions were late additions to the alliance, having been absent from the original MARPadania congress.32 However, it is also an effect of the relative absence of regionalist activism and, thus, MRAs in these regions.33 The fact that the MARPadania alliance did not lead to a unified Northern identity was largely due to the MRAs being active during a period in which the primacy of the nation-state was not called into question. The MARP’s symbol of the Piedmontese flag was

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used on MARPadania documents, rather than the invention of any new Padanian symbol.34 In Bergamo, the MARPadania35 label was quickly abandoned after 1958 in favour of the creation of the Movement for Lombard Autonomy.36 This is in stark contrast with the Padania of the second wave of activism which emerged from neo-federalism and seces­ sionism and to which this chapter now turns. 4.1.1.2 The Lega: Unmaking Italians

While the MRAs were born alongside the First Italian Republic, the Lega contributed to a transition to the Second Italian Republic. With the estab­ lishment of regional administrations throughout Italy in 1970, the region­ alist leagues reframed demands for autonomy. Indeed, leghismo denounced the Italian regional governments as ‘a by-product of the centralised Italian state’ and claimed that ‘existing regional autonomy in Italy [was] a mockery’.37 The second wave of regionalist activism represented by le­ ghismo was, therefore, devoid of the patriotism of the MRAs and pursued a reform of the regional statutes, a fiscal federalism which challenged national solidarity, and a notion of Padania as a separate nation-state. In stark contrast to the MRAs’ faith in the post-war constitutional statutes, the Lega argued that ‘the roots of all the evils of [Italy] could be found in the centralist nature of the Italian Constitution.’38 Unlike the Piedmontese leagues (Union Piemonteisa and Piemont Autonomista) which both advocated for a special statute for their region, Bossi’s Lega Lombarda had been the first to argue for the ‘transformation of the Italian state in a confederation of autonomous regions’.39 Bossi called for an urgent rewrite of the Republic’s founding document,40 and at the first congress of the Lega Nord, he put forward the plan of ‘three macroregions’ of North, Centre, and South.41 In doing so, he argued that solutions to the ‘pension, health and labour systems […] tax evasion and organised crime […] would only be possible through a federalist reform of the state’.42 Following this came proposals for a ‘Constitution of a Federal Italy’.43 Based on the model of Catalonia, the Lega proposed the intro­ duction of ‘a new tier of local administration, so-called “states” as an intermediary between national government and regional governments’.44 However, while on the surface, the Lega’s neo-federalist programme presented itself as a ‘means to modernise and reform the state,’45 it held at its basis a racialised notion of ‘two very different political cultures between the “European North” and the “Mediterranean South”’. The potential to ‘weaken and even dismantle the central state’ and lead logically to seces­ sionism was always present.46 Between 1991 and 2013, various iterations of a policy of fiscal federalism undermined the principle of national

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solidarity and were part of an ‘ethnicised view of Italy as divided into distinct and discrete peoples’.47 A constant obsession of the Lega was to ‘reform the state so as to reverse the abuse and exploitation of northern wealth and generosity by the “parasitic South” and “thieving Rome”’. Later proposals in 2008 promoted a fiscal mechanism and an equalising fund which ‘appeared to reduce to a bare minimum the transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer regions.’48 This was subject to ‘the southern regions attaining a series of established targets.’ An iteration of fiscal federalism in 2008 even included an ‘explicit quantification of the amount of fiscal revenue that the regions would be allowed to keep for themselves’.49 This aimed to ‘ensure that one part of the country pays fewer taxes and receives the same level of services,’ therefore expecting ‘any savings to be internally redistributed so as to benefit the northern regions as opposed to the nation-state’.50 While Bossi’s argument that a ‘generous distribution of wealth has not brought any real advantage to the South,’51 illustrates a level of continuity with the MRAs, unlike the post-war autonomists, the Lega’s fiscal federalism was rooted in the notion of northern regions as ‘lost nations’.52 This was en­ capsulated by an early slogan from Bossi that ‘Lombardy is a nation and Italy is only a state,’ which reflected how ‘national identity and cultural distinctiveness formed the basis of the leagues’ political identification’.53 Such claims for nationhood would later develop into the nation-building project of Padania. The adoption of secessionism in 1995 had not come without warning, nor did its official abandonment in 1999 mean that ‘Padania’ would dis­ appear from party rhetoric. Separatist discourse was present as early as 1983 in editions of Lombardia Autonomista, which had included articles calling for the creation of a Padanian-Alpinian federation to defend the rights of Padanians.54 Writing in his autobiography in 1992, Bossi had stated that if anyone tries to halt our march towards true autonomy, let them be warned: Padania, the Cisalpine Republic if not allowed to govern itself via federalism, will go it alone.55 Two years later, at the party’s ‘Festa di Pontida,’ Bossi announced the formation of two factions in the party which could provide an outlet for these conflicting voices of federalism and separatism.56 Indeed, immedi­ ately after the presentation to parliament of a bill which proposed the aforementioned federal reorganisation of Italy, Bossi began to talk of outright secession for the North.57 Whereas the MRA’s Padania had been conceived strictly as an electoral alliance, the Lega employed a series of

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sophisticated nation-building strategies to question Italy’s legitimacy as a nation. 58 As secessionism gained pace in 1995, the Lega shifted its emphasis from a critique of the state – its centralistic nature, the southernization of state personnel, its mechanisms for redistributing resources, the inefficiencies of public administration – to a nationalist project - constructing a collective identity, re-writing history, creating a whole new repertoire of myths and symbols, establishing quasi-religious rituals.59 These included ‘the declaration of the independence of the Padanian Republic, the referendum for self-determination, the Padanian elections for the Padanian parliament, and the referendum on the Padanian constitu­ tion’.60 In stark contrast with the MRAs’ profession of loyalty to the Italian state, ‘the overwhelming impression of the “Declaration of the Independence and Sovereignty for Padania” was one of authentic rage to­ wards Italy and the Italian state’.61 The Lega, therefore, used Padania to call into question the unity of the peninsula, which the MRAs had promoted as an essential component of the Republic,62 claiming that ‘the history of the Italian state is a history of colonialist oppression, economic exploitation, and moral violence’.63 The Lega was, therefore, ‘trying to establish the institutions of a parallel state that might become accepted as the voice of the North’.64 Further to institutions, however, were a series of cultural asso­ ciations and events which demonstrated the Lega’s attempt to win hearts and minds. A series of publications from Lega ideologues such as Gilberto Oneto which ‘included descriptions of Padanian territory and culture and attempts to define a Padanian language and/or to encourage studies of Northern dialects’.65 Meanwhile, other activities/associations included – but were by no means limited to – a beauty pageant called ‘Miss Padania,’ a ‘Padanian Scout Troop,’ the ‘Padanian national football team’ which took part in the ‘international federation of nations without states world cup,’ ‘Padanian musicians,’ and ‘Padanian collectors,’ not to mention associa­ tions such as ‘Padanian assistance and Together for the Future’ which provided assistance to the elderly and disabled.66 This comprehensive attempt at nation-building and invention of tradition meant that Padania remained a key part of the Lega’s identity even after secessionism was substituted for devolution in 1999.67 The name of the party remained ‘Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania’ and the first article of the party’s statute still aimed for the establishment and ‘international recognition’ of an ‘independent and sovereign Federal Republic of Padania.’68 While espousing very different types of regionalism and federalism, there were nevertheless nuanced elements of continuity in the discursive repertoires of each wave of activism. To further illustrate these aspects of

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change and continuity, the chapter now turns to three case studies which centre on the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective objectives of either making or unmaking Italians. 4.1.2 (Un)making Italians via Discourses of Italian National (and Regional) Identity

Since the end of the Second World War and the fall of Fascism, the Italian Republic has attempted to construct its identity through a variety of dif­ ferent but often complementary discourses. Arguably three of the most significant narratives around which Italian identity has been reconstructed following the fall of Fascism have been those relating to the Risorgimento, anti-fascism (and the values of the Resistance), and the post-war European project. As established in chapter 2, however, each of these discourses, while providing a source of identity for the Italian Republic, has also been related to regionalism and federalism. It is no surprise, therefore, that both the MRAs and the Lega engaged with these narratives to articulate dif­ ferent aspects of their regionalist ideologies and relate these to their respective ideas regarding the Italian nation-state. The following para­ graphs provide a comparative analysis of how the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective programmes of patriotic regionalism and neo-federalism/ secessionism interacted with these three important components of postwar Italian identity. In line with the process of abeyance introduced in chapter 3, the MRAs’ creation of discursive repertoires around these three interlinked themes will be established before examining the continuities and discontinuities in the message of the Lega. Each subsection will, therefore, provide some brief historical outline of each theme in order to understand the different contexts in which each wave of activism was operating and how it relates to each respective period of crisis and tran­ sition. What emerges is a nuanced illustration of how these three dis­ courses of national identity were exploited by the MRAs and the Lega to serve either the purpose of making or unmaking Italians. 4.1.2.1 A ‘Second Risorgimento’

The Risorgimento marked the foundation of the Italian nation. As such, it represents not only a crucial period in Italian history,69 but has since been a symbol of political discourse appropriated by a series of political move­ ments.70 Indeed, ‘the sheer frequency, and intensity, of references to the Risorgimento and its mise-en-scène in public space betokens something far more profound, involving the intertwining of political strategy and symbolic practice’.71 In this sense, it is important to view ‘the Risorgimento as a complex of historical symbols that constitute the semi-permanent tropes

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which provide a sense of historical continuity between lived memory and national history’.72 As examined in chapter 2, the Risorgimento also pro­ vided fertile ground for federalist ideas such as those of Carlo Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari, albeit for a limited period. For both the MRAs and the Lega, therefore, the significance of this lies primarily in the interpretation of the Risorgimento as an example of regionalist and federalist (rather than nationalist) politics, which involved an exaggeration of the federalist thought present during the process of unification. However, each wave of activism presented constrasting narratives of the Risorgimento as either a moment of glory or tragedy for the Italian peninsula. 4.1.2.1.1 THE MRAS

The Piedmontese and Bergamascan autonomists emerged just as ‘the Risorgimento was somewhat losing its significance in terms of public discourse’. Indeed, due to fascism’s association with nationalism, ’from the 1950s onwards, Italy was entering an epoch requiring symbols […] ever further removed from the traditional framework of the patriotic and national myths’.73 While the MRAs did engage with anti-fascism (see as follows), its notion of a ‘Second Risorgimento’ was not that of ‘the idea of the Resistance as a national and patriotic war of liberation’ 74 or of ‘reappropriating the symbolism of the Risorgimento’ from fascism.75 Instead, for the MRAs, a ‘second Risorgimento’ consisted of (re)making Italians around the idea of regional government. Indeed, it was argued that ‘the tradition of the Risorgimento lies in the liberty found in the regions’.76 Regional reform, according to the MARP and MAB, represented the final piece of the puzzle of Italian unity. While the post-war autonomists, therefore, celebrated Italian unification, this was tempered by claims that the perceived regionalist roots of the Risorgimento had been betrayed by decades of centralist administration. What emerged was a discourse which, first, argued that the Risorgimento had been betrayed and cen­ tralism had been imposed on Italy by foreign powers; second, linked regionalism with Italian patriots of the Risorgimento; and finally, associ­ ated regionalism with the 100th anniversary of unification in 1961. Regarding a betrayal of the Risorgimento, the MRAs did not attribute the administrative centralism adopted by the Italian state to Savoy ex­ pansionism or to the Piedmontese ruling class. Instead, MRA literature referred vaguely to ‘oligarchies’ and ‘privileged classes’ who had ‘stolen’ the Risorgimento ‘changing it to suit their interests.’77 It was these oli­ garchies that, according to the MARP in 1861, had ‘made a France of this rough-edged Italy.’78 Indeed, France, in particular, was blamed by both the MARP and MAB for its influence on Piedmontese prefectorial system.79

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History was in danger of repeating itself, according to the post-war autonomists who warned that the same oligarchies that stole the results of our revolution are not resigned to their destiny, and with various tricks are trying to keep the country trapped inside the hard circle of centralization.80 The MARP argued that it was ‘no surprise that the first post-war regionalist movement was born in Piedmont’ as its programme was part of ‘making Italians’.81 This reference to D’Azeglio’s appeal to patriotism was part of a wider trend present in the MRAs’ second Risorgimento discourse of linking regional autonomy to the ideas of Italian Risorgimento patriots. According to the MRAs, all the ‘great men of the Risorgimento’ had desired a form of regional administration. This involved a conflation of patriots who had, indeed, advocated for federalism or regionalism such as Carlo Cattaneo and Marco Minghetti, with those who were highly sus­ picious of such forms of government such as Giuseppe Mazzini, under the umbrella term of ‘committed regionalists’.82 A particularly prevalent myth was that of ‘Cavour the betrayed regionalist’ which stated that it was only the Piedmontese statesman’s premature death which had prevented a regionalist administration in Italy and that his plans to administer autonomy had not been respected by his successors.83 Meanwhile, acti­ vists in the MAB depicted themselves as the ‘grandchildren of Garibaldi’s red-shirts,’ thus linking their fight for regional autonomy with Garibaldi’s contribution to Italian unification.84 In doing so, the MAB extolled Bergamo’s city’s status as città dei mille (city of the thousand) – a reference to the fact that around a third of Garibaldi’s volunteers were Bergamascan.85 The MRAs were, therefore, arguing for the justness of regionalism by associating it with key signifiers of Italian patriotism. To honour the memory of these patriots, the post-war autonomists suggested a ‘completion of the Risorgimento’ via an activation of the regional statutes in line with the 100th anniversary of Italian unification in 1961. For the MAB, the ‘best way to commemorate the centenary cele­ brations of Italy would be to activate the regional statutes, as was desired by the Patriots of the Risorgimento’.86 Meanwhile, the MARP, referring to the fact that the centenary jubilee would be held in Turin, stated that ‘in 1961, Piedmont will fly the flag of the Risorgimento’ to ‘ensure that Italy, one and undivided, will return to the path laid out by its fathers’.87 The post-war autonomists focused principally on the year 1959 which marked 100 years since the start of the second war of independence. This enabled the MRAs to use militaristic imagery and language to depict regional autonomy as a battle against Rome, perceived as a colonising centralist power. The MAB compared Rome to one of the principal antagonists of

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Italian unification, the Habsburg Empire, and - by conflating AustroHungarian and German identities - stated that ‘in 1859, the German rod did not break Italy’s back; now, in 1959, let us break free of the oppressive Roman chains’.88 The MARP also argued that Rome had ‘forgotten that all of our history of the Risorgimento holds its roots in Piedmont’.89 Depicting Rome as ‘ungrateful’ for Piedmontese sacrifice, the MARP lamented the lack of funds provided to enable celebrations in 1959 to commemorate the start of the second war of independence.90 A poster bordered with the tricolour of the Italian flag but containing MARP’s symbol stated 100 years ago, the glorious Piedmontese army, with its valour, its heroism and its fallen, gave life to Great Italy. The same Great Italy today cannot find the means to celebrate in Turin the memory of the Piedmontese who, for our Fatherland, fought, suffered and won. Does it perhaps forget or regret that moment of greatness?91 In short, therefore, the MRAs articulated their patriotic regionalism through a ‘Second Risorgimento’ discourse which depicted an idealised, romantic, image of an incomplete Italian unification. Some 20 years fol­ lowing on from these centenary celebrations, leghismo emerged and also claimed to represent a second Risorgimento while paradoxically pro­ posing a fragmented Italy. 4.1.2.1.2 THE LEGA – CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

The two decades following the decline of the MRAs and prior to the emergence of leghismo had seen a waning of Risorgimento discourse in the circuits of public memory.92 The subsequent rediscovery ‘of the value of patriotism and the symbol of Risorgimento’ in the 1980s and 1990s was, in part, inspired by a reaction against leghismo and its narratives of frag­ mentation which constituted ‘the total rejection of the Italian Fathers’ as­ pirations to achieve complete unity through the creation of a ‘common people’.93 This re-emergence of Risorgimento narratives should be under­ stood, however, more broadly in the context of the grave crisis of the Italian political system in the early 1990s which the Lega had amplified. This prompted a renewed interest in themes linked to the nation or the fatherland and to processes of cultural and political nationalisation. In short, the col­ lapse of the so-called First Republic and the post-1989 political context led to an ongoing debate about Italian national identity.94 It was against this backdrop that Risorgimento discourse experienced a revival and was thus once again at the heart of a wide-ranging debate.95 One of the key pro­ tagonists in this debate was the Lega, with Bossi arguing that ‘the time has

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come to perfect the Risorgimento with Federalism’.96 The Risorgimento played a role in the discourse of both Lombard and Piedmontese sections of leghismo from the early 1980s.97 There were continuities in the Lega’s Risorgimento discourse with regards to the use of historical figures, myths of Cavour as a betrayed federalist, and the use of jubilee celebrations to promote regionalist and federalist ideals; however, the Lega was principally interested in using Risorgimento discourse to weaken the nation-state. As the regionalist leagues converged into the Lega Nord, the party began to argue that it was ‘the most precise point of reference for the Second Italian Risorgimento’98 and articulated its neo-federalist programme via a dis­ course which mirrored, albeit superficially, that of the first wave of activism. This involved an invocation of Italian patriots such as ‘Carlo Cattaneo, Giuseppe Ferrari, and Giuseppe Montanelli’99 as precursors to leghismo, the neglect of whose ideas had meant that ‘the unitary process in Italy began in the wrong way.’100 The Lega echoed not only MRA claims that it was only Cavour’s ‘premature death [which] led to a disastrous centralism,’101 but also, as the 150th anniversary of Italian unification approached in 2011, that ‘the best way to celebrate the unity of Italy is the activation of feder­ alism.’102 This jubilee event also saw a recycling of the MRAs’ message that ‘a New Risorgimento’ would ‘cancel the original sin of centralism’.103 A closer look at the Lega’s second Risorgimento discourse, however, illumi­ nates significant discontinuities between the MRAs’ patriotic regionalism and the Lega’s neo-federalism.104 The Piedmontese leagues, similar to the MRAs, asserted Piedmont’s regionalist history and made references to military events in an attempt to provide historical legitimacy to autonomist claims. However, the fact that this engagement with history was an attempt to distance Piedmont from Italy rather than to ‘make Italians’ was just one way in which the second wave of activism differed in its use of a ’Second Risorgimento’ discourse. While Italian patriots were later associated with federalism in Lega dis­ course, the Piedmontese leagues also published material which promoted the ideas of antagonists of Italian unification, citing Prince von Metternich of the Habsburg Empire’s by now infamous claim that Italy was a merely a ‘geographical expression’.105 In terms of militarism, the House of Savoy, according to Roberto Gremmo, had been ‘dragged’ into a war in 1859 as part of an ‘unnatural institutional arrangement with foreign cultures and peoples’ which ended up ‘costing the Savoy dynasty dearly’.106 In contrast to the MRAs’ depiction of Piedmont fighting to unify the Italian nation, the Piedmontese leagues preferred to focus on a pre-Risorgimento Piedmont fighting as a nation-state.107 This involved exalting events such as the 1792 Battle of Assietta during which the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia had fought as an independent state alongside the Austrians rather than against them.108

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The process of Italian unification was depicted, from the beginning of the second wave of activism, as an event which had threatened to wipe out northern identity. The process of Italianisation was viewed in apocalyptic terms for Piedmontese identity, culture, and customs, as well as its political influence.109 Gremmo argued that it was ‘unfortunate’ that in Piedmont, the myth of having made ‘Italy had always been strong’.110 Leghismo was more explicitly forthright in denouncing the Savoy Monarchy for having con­ ducted an expansionist project which had prevented federalism and led to ‘authoritarian centralism’.111 The Savoys were, therefore, depicted as the ‘sworn enemy of regional autonomy.’112 Piedmont was, therefore, held accountable for the failure to implement regionalism, with Oneto stating ‘no-one will blame the Piedmontese any more for having made Italy, but they must avoid the even greater fault of not having made Padania’.113 In 1991, Gipo Farassino cited Piedmont’s ‘500 years of independence as a nation-state as hugely more significant than Italian unity of merely 130 years’.114 Then 20 years later, as the country approached the 150th jubilee celebrations, the separatist overtones articulated by this statement would form a key part of the Lega’s second Risorgimento discourse. A series of polemics printed in La Padania in 2011 reinforced the idea of Padania as a distinct cultural and political unit being forced against its will to com­ memorate a process which had ‘colonised’ the North.115 Roberto Calderoli noted that there was ‘very little sense’ in celebrating this occasion and that the anniversary should not be seen as a chance ‘to just wave the trico­ lour.’116 A sombre and aloof approach to the celebrations was designed to distance the North from any notion of Italian unity and was further reinforced by a number of essays and articles released in La Padania throughout 2011. As a partner in the governing coalition led by Berlusconi, the Lega’s reticence contributed to a failure to organise ‘the regional ex­ hibition, initially planned to continue the tradition started in 1911’.117 This involved attacks on the memory of Garibaldi as ‘a fraud’ and a whose ‘actions […] had caused damage to both Padania and the Mezzogiorno’.118 These attacks on Garibaldi were part of a wider project of depicting him as a ‘hyper-Italian’ and a ‘fascist’ and exploiting, for example, how his image had been appropriated by Mussolini’s regime. This is linked to how le­ ghismo under Bossi depicted its programme as an anti-fascist counterhegemonic project against ‘fascist centralism.’ This manipulation of the fascist-anti-fascist binary is the focus of the following subsection. 4.1.2.2 (Performative) Anti-Fascism

After 1945, the political myth of the anti-fascist Resistance was in­ stitutionalised as the constitutional basis of democratic legitimacy of the new Republic, thus providing ‘a potent source of political legitimation and

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power’.119 Indeed, the demands for and eventual inclusion of regional statutes in the Constitution stemmed from the Resistance and its identi­ fication of regionalism as a bulwark against a return of Fascism. Therefore, the democratic, liberal, and (ostensibly) decentralised nature of the Republic was due to its desire to be ‘the antithesis of fascism’.120 However, the post-war Italian state never carried out a full purge (epur­ azione) of fascist state functionaries despite rapid democratic renewal following the end of the Second World War. This, alongside the fact that the Republic maintained a system of centralist administration active under Mussolini’s regime, left the Italian state open to accusations of fascism from both the MRAs and the Lega. The use of the Resistance by these waves of activism illustrates how narratives of anti-fascism are ‘highly malleable to manipulation and falsification’.121 The following paragraphs examine how both the MRAs and the Lega articulated their regionalist ideology through a discourse of ‘performative anti-fascism,’ i.e. an asso­ ciation of its regionalist project with anti-fascism and equation of what it portrayed as the nationalist and centralist Italian state with a continuation of the fascist regime. It was ‘performative’ in the sense that, as will become clearer in chapter 5, both the MRAs and the Lega contained ideas and/or personnel which would be anathema to the principles of anti-fascism. 4.1.2.2.1 THE MRAS

The MRAs, whilst justifying their regionalist programme by highlighting the presence of the regional statutes in the Constitution, also subscribed to the dominant ideology and myth of the new Republic, anti-fascism.122 Activation of the regional statutes was depicted as a way of preventing Italy from falling back into a fascist dictatorship: The centralised system gave fascism an effective base for the affirmation of the doctrine of a strong state, necessarily anchored in a system of control. Bureaucratic centralism is the root of totalitarian states.123 Two factors are relevant here in terms of the MRA’s strategic use of anti-fascism: first, the MRAs’ association with the partisan resistance and its ideals of regional autonomy; second, an association of bureaucratic centralism with fascism and regional autonomy with anti-fascism. Regarding the first issue, this should be considered in the context of the immediate post-war period in which a ‘new political class […] from the struggle against fascism’ had emerged and represented the dominant force in Italian politics.124 While the MARP claimed on more than one occasion to have partisans in its ranks, the MAB associated itself with the ideals and politics of partisans such as Piero Malvestiti, founder and proponent of

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Movimento Guelfo D’Azione.125 Anselmo Freddi, a leading member of the MAB, was keen to present Bergamascan autonomists as torch-bearers of the 12 points in the ‘Programme of Milan’ drawn up by Movimento Guelfo D’Azione partisans. Freddi highlighted that in this programme, what was laid out was decentralisation, autonomy and the strengthening of the communes and of the regions: the attribution to the Regions of normative functions, especially in administrative and financial areas.126 Regional autonomy was viewed as part of drawing a line under the ‘tragic experience of fascism and the annexation to Germany and the Third Reich.’127 The post-war autonomists therefore presented regional autonomy as a system of government which could help Italy distance itself from the fascist Ventennio. To reinforce their promotion of regionalism as a guarantee against a return to fascist centralism, both the MARP and the MAB cited the second President of the Italian Republic and anti-fascist Liberal, Luigi Einaudi, who stated that ‘the Regional Body was the only bulwark possible against the return of any form of dictatorship’.128 In doing so, both the MRAs were associating themselves with the birth of the First Italian Republic and its anti-fascist roots. This leads on to how the MRAs linked a centralised bureaucracy to the descent into a fascist, totalitarian dictatorship.129 A mere eight years fol­ lowing the establishment of the Republic, the MAB stated that ‘all cen­ tralized states are by their very nature totalitarian […] just like all autonomist states, of a pluralist nature, are by their very nature demo­ cratic’.130 This was echoed by an assertion that ‘the original sin of bureaucratic centralism was brought to a grotesque conclusion with the Fascist ventennio’.131 The MRAs argued that centralist institutional sys­ tems, even if democratic on the surface, always had the potential to deteriorate into totalitarian dictatorships and that Mussolini demonstrated that, having taken control of Rome, he had all of Italy under his command. It is for this reason that all of the centralised states are by their very nature totalitarian […] just like all autonomist states, of a pluralist nature, are by their very nature democratic.132 Arguing for the justness of local government in the face of what it viewed as increasing centralisation,133 the MARP stated that ‘fascism fell exactly because this absurd despotism of the state could not but fall’; however, the movement also warned against any potential continuity of the fascist state which it linked to bureaucratic centralism, stating

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What remains of fascism is the chaotic bureaucratic machinery in which our aspirations will only meet a tragic end, not least the freedom of autonomist movements which act in the interest of the unity of the patria.134 This idea of fascist centralism being facilitated by the previous Liberal period meant that the MRAs were able to present regional autonomy as a completely clean break with the past which would guarantee freedom. This dichotomous equation of Fascism with centralism and of regionalism with democracy would also form a key part of the Lega’s political discourse. 4.1.2.2.2 THE LEGA – CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

Starting in the 1980s, anti-fascist public discourse was increasingly criti­ cised and contested by new political and intellectual forces. This culmi­ nated in Silvio Berlusconi’s entry into politics, amidst his ‘revisionist campaigns concerning Italian contemporary history,’135 anachronistic anti-communism, and a critique of the anti-fascist paradigm.136 The tan­ gible epitome of Berlusconi’s political experiment were the political alli­ ances he presented for the 1994 general elections: with the Italian Social Movement - National Alliance (MSI/AN) in the South and with the Lega in the North. As part of this coalition, the Lega took a far more supportive line than Berlusconi throughout the commemorations of the Liberation of the country from Nazi-Fascism on 25 April 1994.137 Bossi stated that his support for these celebrations had demonstrated that for the Lega, ‘the choice between fascism and anti-fascism is an instinctive one’.138 While the Lega did not openly attack the Italian anti-fascist Republican para­ digm, the party was active in a context in which the Republic’s anti-fascist values were being challenged and a mainstreaming of the far right was gaining pace. The Lega, therefore, recontextualised the fascist/anti-fascist paradigm in order to justify its calls for neo-federalism, claiming to be ‘anti-fascists’ that would ‘not tolerate any manifestation of fascist ideology’.139 There were some key elements of continuity with the MRAs. The first of these was the connection between the partisan resistance and its ideals of regional autonomy. Claims of heritage from partisans and anti-fascists ranged from Bossi urging voters to choose ‘giustizia e libertà’ (justice and freedom) – thus implicitly linking leghismo to a partisan movement of the same name140 – to stories of the Lega having to ‘beat down fascists […] during rallies’.141 Lega posters promised voters that ‘Milan will never be fascist’ invoking the memory of Mussolini’s execution by anti-fascist partisans in Milan.142 Indeed, this links back to the 1988 poster which stated that the Lega was acting in the name of a ‘partisan conscience’

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(coscienza partigiana) and that the movement was made up of ‘militant anti-fascists’ who ‘want regional autonomy’.143 This involved a dichoto­ mous equation of centralism with fascism and of regionalism with antifascism.144Indeed, a perceived continuity between fascism and the Republic was a key discursive feature of the Bossi era in the so-called ‘myth of the Italian nation’ which was depicted as a key tool of ‘liberal, fascist, and Christian democratic regimes’ alike.145 Associating ‘centralist Roman parties’ with Jean-Marie’s neo-fascist National Front, Bossi ar­ gued that ‘the Le Pen phenomenon demonstrates that wherever regional autonomy is gagged, fascism triumphs!’146 Similar to the citation of Piero Malvestiti, the Carta di Chivasso, a document drafted by anti-fascist partisans in 1943 which proposed a federal system of government, acted as a reference point for the Lega’s claims for federalism.147 The Lega’s anti-fascism, however, differed from the MRAs’ in two key interlinked ways.148 First, the Lega depicted all opposition parties as fascists and drew a false equivalence between Fascism and Communism. Second, Fascism was depicted as an inherent part of unified Italy, and anti-fascism was used to justify claims for separatism. The MRAs had never claimed, as Bossi did that Italy had a ‘fascist’ government and a parliament that were ‘only formally legal’ but substantially devoid of […] legitimacy.149 Nor had they depicted all political opponents as fascist (southern) centralist parties. Bossi claimed that ‘the centralist fascist state survived the civil war’150 and the Italian Republic was ‘not born from the Resistance.’151 This became more important for the party in 1994, when, as part of the Polo Coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi, the Lega helped form the ‘most Right-wing government in Italian post-war history.’152 Bossi instead focused attention on the ‘regime of the parties’: warning that the regime, […] is not yet defeated […] we must therefore be vigilant to not make the same mistake that Matteotti made when he thought that the fascist regime would collapse […] and then, instead lasted for years.153 Benito Mussolini and the ‘Repubblica di Salò’ (the Italian Social Republic - a puppet state set up in North Italy by the Nazis with Mussolini at its head following the allied invasion of the peninsula) were also evoked to describe the technocratic governments of Giuliano Amato154 and Silvio Berlusconi, respectively,155 in the 1990s. The Lega’s conflation of all Roman parties as fascist meant that Bossi viewed ‘Communists, Christian Democrats, and Fascists’ as ‘three centralist statist political forces […] always ready to unite against federalism’.156 The argument that both

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fascists and communists represented a ‘statist manganello’ (fascist trun­ cheon) which threatened the North depicted a false equivalence between Fascism on the one hand and partisan forces of Christian Democracy and Communism on the other157. The Lega’s campaign for secessionism involved arguing that fascism had emerged prior to 1922, that its ‘true meaning’ was ‘centralised bureaucracy,’ and that the Italian state had been fascist since unification in 1861 due to the centralised form of government imposed on the newly unified nation.158 Meanwhile ‘Italian nationalism, Fascism, and statism’ were depicted as impinging on ‘Padanian national identity’.159 Amongst the ‘50 good reasons for independence’ outlined in a special issue of Quaderni Padani was the notion that the Italian state’s ‘distinctly illiberal and authoritarian nature’ had enabled Fascism to seize power.160 Meanwhile, Bossi drew parallels between Committees for National Liberation set up by the partisan anti-fascist Resistance and the Lega’s claims for secessionism, stating that ‘Resistance and secession are two rights which are at the root of the Constitution’.161 Indeed, Bossi’s per­ formative anti-fascism was used to depict leghismo as a call for liberty from the perceived racism and Fascism of the centralist Italian state. Bossi argued that the Lega was ‘fighting for freedom against […] southern hegemony’, ‘state-centralism’ and ‘Roman parties’.162 A poster advertising the ‘historic oath of the first government of Padania’ was stated as being for the purpose of the ‘rights of resistance and secession of the Padanian Nation’.163 While claiming to be anti-fascist, a key argument for Padanian independence was the defence of a ‘Christian Europe’ and the ‘Padanian race’164 against a perceived ‘Islamic invasion’.165 While racism will be examined in greater detail in chapter 5, it is to the role which Europe played in the discourse of both the MRAs and the Lega that this chapter now turns. 4.1.2.3 A Europe of the Regions

The European project and the European Union (EU) have always played a pivotal role in Italy’s political discourse following the end of the Second World War. Indeed, the European Economic Community (EEC) and, subsequently, the EU have symbolised the institutional and political space for the legitimation of the Republic introduced after Fascism.166 In both the first and second periods of crisis and transition for the Italian state, Europe was viewed as a vehicle through which to promote North Italian regionalism. The following paragraphs examine the way in which both waves of activism’s regionalism were articulated through a discourse of ‘a Europe of the Regions’. In the immediate post-war era, Italy ‘developed into a core country in the process that led to European integration’ as ‘one

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of six countries to set up the nascent European Economic Community in the 1950s’.167 The fact that the Treaty of the EEC was signed in Rome was indicative of the central role which Europe was to play in Italian post-war identity. It is important to consider this in the context of broader European federalist thought of the time, one of the principal aims of which was to maintain peace and unity following the Second World War.168 The ideas of Altiero Spinelli – ‘a partisan who had been interned on the island of Ventotene’ and later founder the ‘European Federalist Movement’ – for example, played an important role in post-war European federalist thought.169 Spinelli, cited by both the MRAs and the Lega in their respective discourses is but one such example of a cross-over in how these movements conveyed their regionalist message. 4.1.2.3.1 THE MRAS

Both the MARP and the MAB presented European federalism as a logical part of the campaign for regional autonomy and therefore promoted it as part of their priority to achieve the activation of the regional statutes. The MARP argued that ‘the concept of regional autonomy places itself neatly in the context of European federalism’ going on to argue that ‘it will be local regional autonomies which will […] through resolving local prob­ lems be able to execute the tasks of the heavy and grand administrative machine of Grand Europe’.170 The very existence of a European project and of European unity was portrayed as legitimising demands for regional autonomy, as it was depicted as part of the same project of ‘freedom and democracy’.171 Drawing parallels between regionalism and European federalism, the MARP stated that if the aim is to constitute a European Union, or rather, European Federation - for which it will be necessary to reduce the barriers between states to allow free circulation of people - it is absurd to not allow a regional territory to govern its own streets, its own schools, the nominations of its communal secretaries.172 This view of European federalism as regionalism on a macro level led the Piedmontese autonomists to argue that ‘it is contradictory that, at a time when Europe is unifying in the name of freedom and democracy, MRAs are being denounced as anti-democratic and anti-libertarian’.173 Arguing that ‘if Europe is to be united, it is necessary first to unbind that which is bound by force and liberate those who wish to govern them­ selves’.174 The MARP argued that ‘without local autonomy, freedom in Europe cannot exist. It is foolish to think that a United Europe can be achieved through centralist tyrannical states’.175 Meanwhile, the

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Bergamascan autonomists argued that ‘regional autonomy and freedom from […] administrative centralism’ was ‘in no way antithetical to the European Federalist Movement’ of Altiero Spinelli.176 Indeed, both the MRAs were loosely affiliated with Spinelli’s movement and promoted a message inspired by his vision for a peaceful Europe via a federation between nations and regions.177 Through the ideal of a European federation, both the MARP and the MAB expressed a desire for regionalism and federalism to surpass nationalism without threatening the unity of the nation-state.178 Indeed, regionalism and European federalism were seen as the ‘point of departure for true patriotism’.179 The MAB was committed to the ‘development of initiatives of an international character, in particular regarding the cre­ ation of a United States of Europe’.180 The movement’s writings in the post-war period represented a desire to find peace and unity within a European federalist framework stating, for example, that ‘a European federation is the point of departure, not of arrival’.181 A commitment to ‘the politics of peace and friendship between the peoples and the free exchange of goods and men between nations of the European Common Market’ therefore formed a key part of post-war regionalism.182 One particular image circulated by the MAB provides a clear example of how the post-war autonomists attempted to navigate the blurred lines between nationalism and patriotism. Aping the flag design of the United States of America, the MAB used the stars to represent the inactive regional statutes whilst advocating for European federalism. The maintenance of the tri­ colour reflects how the MRAs believed federalism was ‘not in contrast to the ideal of patriotism’.183 European federalism, therefore, was seen as both the best way to overcome the destructive force of nationalism while expressing love for one’s country.184 The European and federalist identity of the MRAs’ was therefore a key part of their patriotism and would later feed into a vision of Padania promoted by the Union of Italian Autonomists (UAI), the rump movement which emerged from the MAB in the late 1960s (see Figure 4.1). Prior to the first ever regional Italian elections in 1970, posters were distributed throughout Milan and Bergamo by the UAI, brandishing the slogan of ‘Libera Padania’ (Free Padania) while promoting a ‘Europe of the Regions’.185 Calls to protect ‘European Padanian’ sovereignty jux­ taposed the North against what the UAI portrayed as the southern and ‘centralist bureaucratic’ state. The UAI were talking of a Europe of the Regions even before the concept had officially emerged after the evolu­ tion of the European Economic Community into the EU. A European identity therefore continued to play a significant role in the identity of the UAI following the split in MAB in 1961, as Gavazzeni’s UAI also called for a federation of the peoples of a united Europe.186 The

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Figure 4.1 United Federal States of Italy. Credit: Giuseppe Sala and Maria Chiara Gonella.

movement was using the terms Padania and Padanians to denote a Northern identity, claiming to wish to ‘defend Padanian work and Padanian traditions’ and to want ‘greater participation of Padanians in regional concorsi.’ The idea of a European Padania, therefore, held roots in MRA discourse and would be developed by the second wave of activism. 4.1.2.3.2 THE LEGA – CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

Under Umberto Bossi, the Lega shifted from ‘Europragmatism’ and ‘Euroscepticism,’ with respective aims of legitimising and delegitimising the EU. Between 1979 and 1998, ‘on the basis of pragmatism, the Lega decided to assess the European institutions positively because they deemed it profitable for their own constituency’.187 From 1998, however, ‘the party supported the general ideas of European integration but expressed pessimism about the EU’s current ideas and/or future reflection of these ideas’.188 These positions should be understood in the context of a push for greater integration from the 1980s onwards. The period from the mid1960s to the mid-1980s in the context of European integration is often

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referred to as an era of stagnation or ‘Eurosclerosis’. While integration did not stand entirely still throughout this decade – the EEC expanded from six to nine members in 1973, and 1970 saw the introduction of European parliamentary elections in a push towards greater democratisation – this expansion took place in the context of a wave of recessions in European countries. What resulted was the rise of apathetic attitudes towards the EEC. From the 1980s, the EEC began to make moves towards greater integration.189 This would begin with the Single European Act of 1986, which proposed a common market of goods and services, and would culminate in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 which would establish the EU.190 It is in the context of this transition from Eurosclerosis to a renewed push for European integration that the first regionalist leagues emerged. European parliamentary elections would act as a springboard for alliances of these leagues in the late 1970s and early 1980s.191 While the MRAs neither participated in European elections nor depicted their regions as lost nations which could use greater European integration to bypass the nation-state,192 aspects of their European dis­ course were nevertheless recycled by leghismo. First, was the argument that regionalism was a logical extension of European integration. Claiming that ‘European unification is not in contradiction with the Lega’s federalist proposal,’193 Bossi argued that only through a federalist reform of the Italian state would it be possible to achieve a ‘Federal European Union’.194 Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty was viewed as a potential boon for federal reform in Italy with Bossi claiming that Maastricht underlines how federalism does not threaten the nationstate’s unitary structure, but instead unity is strengthened … beginning from the communes and finishing at the nation - which ensures the development of democracy.195 Such ideas were shared by both Gremmo’s and Farassino’s PIedmontese leagues which included the notion of a federal Europe as key to achieving regional autonomy.196 Second, was the notion of European federalism ensuring peace on the continent. Bossi cited both Carlo Cattaneo’s ‘United States of Europe’ while making reference to Altiero Spinelli’s vision of a federalist Europe197 to argue that ‘the biggest threat to peace in the world is a Europe which does not complete its political union.’198 Finally, both the Lombard and Piedmontese leagues built on the MAB’s message of European federalism and the UAI’s Libera Padania from 1970, associating an Alpine-Padanian region with Europe.199 Leghismo’s stated aim to create ‘a confederation of European peoples’200 and argument that a European North was being held back by a backward ‘African’ South ‘both drew on the MRAs’ and UAI’s respective discourses.’201

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The Lega’s support for the EU, however, was not unconditional. Prior to 1998, ‘party literature already criticised a centralist Europe subordinated to the interests of its bureaucracy, high finance, and the multinational corpo­ rations’.202 Bossi’s arguments that ‘The Republic of the North,’ like that of the Centre and the South, must enter Europe autonomously203 set the stage for the Lega’s unilateral ‘Declaration of Independence of Padania’ in 1996. With this project, Bossi proposed ‘the secession of northern Italy (“Padania”) and its separate integration in the Economic Monetary Union (EMU)’. Bossi gambled that in the event of failing to meet the criteria for the EMU, Italy would leave northern industry in crisis, thus rendering it more disposed towards the North (Padania) seceding from the South, and the central government.204 A number of articles printed in the Lega’s mouth­ piece, La Padania, under a section entitled l’Europa impossibile portrayed a nightmare scenario of Italy’s rejection from the EMU. These articles argued that the burden of a distinctly ‘non-European’ South and centralist state were weighing heavily upon a European Padania. The North could gain accession by itself if it broke free of these shackles.205 Italy’s eventual incorporation into the EMU represented a turning point in the Lega’s discourse on Europe and the EU, as it contradicted ‘Bossi’s claim of the inevitability of the sep­ aration of the North and South’.206 From the Lega’s point of view, the EU’s decision in 1998 represented Padania’s rejection of the EU as much as Italy’s acceptance. Thus, in accepting the ‘centralist’ ‘dependent’ southern/south­ ernized Italy in contrast to the Northern, hard-working Padania, the Lega extended its critique to the EU which was viewed ‘like the Italian state as a centralist institution and an antagonist of the aspiration for self-government of the Padanian and other European peoples’.207 What followed was an acceptance of European identity and rejection of EU institutions. On the one hand, the Lega ‘emphasised Europe’s Christian identity […] sociocultural modernity and entrepreneurial spirit [and] the opposition between Europe and its others’.208 On the other hand, the EU was criticised both for its ‘regulatory tendency and technocratic nature’ and as the ‘vehicle’ of ‘immigration and multi-culturalism.’209 Indeed, in contrast to previous statements in support of the EU, Bossi now put forward the view that the idea born in the post-war years to abjure new wars between European states is now giving birth to a monster that will breed neither democracy, nor stability, nor economic benefits for all. It can’t bring about democracy since its parliament won’t legislate: it will be a Europe of big capital.210 The Lega maintained a Eurosceptic discourse throughout the 2000s, arguing that Italy’s involvement in the EU and, in particular, the Eurozone had impinged on the sovereignty of the common people of the North. Such

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a position hardened in the wake of the Eurozone crisis of 2008, with the Lega claiming ‘that they were good Europeans, but not in favour of the “Europe of austerity” ushered in by the measures taken to save the Euro.’211 While the advent of Matteo Salvini’s leadership from 2013 saw an intensification of the Lega’s Eurosceptic position, this would fluctuate in line with changing opportunity structures, the details of which are ex­ amined in greater detail in chapter 6. For now, this chapter turns to a summary of the key arguments above and an analysis of what it tells us about the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective ideologies. 4.2 Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the complex interplay between regionalism, federalism, and nation-state in two waves of North Italian regionalist activism. While for the MRAs, the region represented a vital component of the Italian nation-state, for the Lega, the region took on a national identity of its own. In stating that it was their duty to ensure the activation of the regional statutes in the constitution, the MRAs were presenting themselves as defenders of the 1948 Republican Constitution. Regionalism was fun­ damental to the survival of a democratic, anti-fascist, and regionalist Republic during an unstable period of transition for the nation-state. During this period, the notion of Padania emerged in north Italian regionalist politics, acting as an alliance for movements across Piedmont, Lombardy, and Veneto at the time of the MARP’s and the MAB’s electoral alliance. The Lega, however, played a very different role to the MRAs before, during, and following another period of transition, which this time saw the end of the First Republic. By challenging the institutional and centralist framework and proposing a neo-federalist reform of the con­ stitution, the Lega challenged the Italian state and would later challenge the very idea of the Italian nation with its proposals of a Padanian nation. Instead of campaigning for the regionalism sanctioned by the constitution, the Lega, be it through proposals of a neo-federalist reform or threats to secede from the Italian state, was challenging the very foundations of the Italian Republic which its precursors had defended. A series of discursive repertoires of contention created by the MRAs in the 1950s would later form the basis of much of the Lega’s propaganda and writings regarding the region and the nation-state, albeit modified to suit the second wave of regionalist activism. While the MRAs used dis­ courses relating to the Risorgimento, the Resistance, and Europe of the Regions to ‘make Italians,’ the Lega’s engagement with these narratives was with the scope of ‘unmaking’ Italians and the Italian nation-state. Both the MRAs and the Lega associated their forms of regionalism/fed­ eralism with a ‘Second Risorgimento.’ As the MARP and the MAB were

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operating in the longer term transition from Fascism to the First Italian Republic, the aim of the MRAs was to use these historical figures as proof that regional autonomy and national unity were synonymous. By contrast, the Lega criticised the very foundations of the Risorgimento, depicting it as a case of historical fraud and, in some cases, genocide of North Italian identity. Both the MRAs and the Lega depicted bureaucratic centralism as the last surviving remnant of the Fascist regime and by promoting ideals of autonomy and decentralisation that would have been anathema to fascist ideology. However, while the post-war autonomists used this discourse to depict themselves as defenders of the new Republic and, therefore, the Italian nation-state, the Lega’s performative ‘anti-fascism’ depicted le­ ghismo as a new type of ‘partisan brigade’ and a southernized central(ist) state as a continuation of Fascism. Finally, in both the first and second periods of crisis and transition for the Italian state, Europe was viewed as a vehicle through which to promote North Italian regionalism. Both the MRAs and the Lega saw a Europe of federated regions not only as a potential way of bypassing the centralist nation-state, but also as a way of ensuring a lasting peace. The respective positions towards the European institutions of the Lega and the MRAs should, however, be understood in terms of the changing context of the increasing relevance of globalisation and the impact of global markets. Using the European Parliament as a forum to promote anti-system and anti-centralist politics, the Lega, unlike the MRAs, used Europe as a tool of division rather than unity. By inter­ twining the fate of Europe with that of Italy and eventually using the notion of Padania it had inherited from the previous waves of activism, the Lega first promoted a separate North European identity juxtaposed against a Mediterranean South and, second, embarked on an anti-EU position which would have been anathema to the European federalist spirit of the MRAs. While providing an analysis of how two periods of activism engaged with regionalism, federalism, and the nation-state, this chapter has not tackled several key variables which link the MRAs and the Lega. Drawing on the divergent aims of national unity and national fragmentation promoted by the MRAs and the Lega, respectively, chapter 5 will look at how both waves of activism engaged with populist and nativist discourse to promote their political programmes. Notes 1 Ubaldo Riva, ‘Discorso a San Pellegrino’ in Parole Autonomiste, ed. Ubaldo Riva (Bergamo: Scuola Professionali Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1950) 33. 2 Philip Cafaro, ‘Patriotism as an Environmental Virtue’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23, no. 1–2 (March 2010): 185–206, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9189-y.

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3 Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez, Daniel Romero Portillo, and Luis Navarro Ardoy, ‘Social Patriotism: Populist Glue for a Multinational Democracy’, National Identities 23, no. 2 (2021): 127–148, doi: 10.1080/14608944.2020.1735326 4 Sara Zamir and Gila Cohen Zilka, ‘The Countenance of the Value of Patriotism among Young and Mature Pre-Service Teachers during Their Apprenticeship at School’, Israel Affairs 28, no. 1 (2022): 75–95, DOI: 10.1 080/13537121.2022.2017143 (77) 5 Jeremy Brooke Straughn and Angie L. Andriot, ‘Education, Civic Patriotism, and Democratic Citizenship: Unpacking the Education effect on Political Involvement’, Sociological Forum 26, no. 3 (2009): 586–580, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2011.01262.x 6 Cafaro, Patriotism as an Environmental Virtue?, 186. 7 Gianfranco Pasquino, Lo Stato Federale (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1996) 80. 8 Carlo Palenzona, ‘Appello agli elettori’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 24 May 1957). 9 MARP, L’autonomia regionale, perchè la si volle perchè la si vuole, 41. 10 David Hine, Governing Italy: The Politics of Bargained Pluralism (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1993) 263. 11 Ibid, 267. 12 Mario Vezzani, ‘Lettera aperta al Sindaco’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956). 13 ‘MARP electoral pamphlet: “MARP. Perché vogliamo l’autonomia re­ gionale”’, (Fasc Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, vol.1, Archivio di Stato Torino, Cat.A3A) 8 June 1956. 14 Anselmo Freddi, Breve storia del MAB (Bergamo: Stampa Fratelli Carrarra, 1963) 9. 15 “MARP. Perché vogliamo l’autonomia regionale”. Movimento per l’Auotonomia Regionale Piemontese (MARP), L’autonomia regionale, perchè’ la si volle perchè la si vuole (Turin: Ruata Editore,1956). 16 Michele Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativo non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956). Vezzani, ‘Lettera aperta al Sindaco’. ‘Articolo 117’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 17 May 1958). ‘Titolo V della Costituzione’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 February 1958). 17 ‘Italia. Regno della burocrazia’ (Piemonte Nuovo). P. Pelizzaro Borgna, ‘L’autonomia amministrative non porterà nuove spese ed una nuova burocrazia’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956). Guido Calderoli ‘Il centralismo di Stato, e il Riscaldamento centrale’ in Così Parlano gli autonomisti, ed. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955) 23–25. 18 Carlo Palenzona, ‘Il regionalismo: Un soffio di autentica libertà e di vera democrazia’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 24 May 1958). 19 Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Reinventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post-Fascism’, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy 10 (London: Routledge, 2010) 86. 20 Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796 (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2007) 564. Enrica Capussotti, ‘Nordisti Contro Sudisti: Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Italy: 1950s and 1960s’, Italian Culture 28, no. 2 (September 2010): 121–38 (126) https://doi.org/10.1179/016146210X12790095563101.

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21 Electoral poster entitled ‘Piemontesi – paghiamo ogni anno … ’, Piemonte Nuovo, 6 December 1958. 22 Guido Calderoli, ‘Il centralismo di Stato e il riscaldamento centrale’ in (Così parlano gli autonomisti), 21 23 ‘L’autonomia regionale completerà il Risorgimento’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 February 1957. ‘Piemonte-Lombardia-Veneto. Combttono per l’autonomia amminis­ trative’ Piemonte Nuovo, 24 May 1958. Sergio Favero Longo, ‘L’insegnamento della Storia Memorie e glorie del vecchio Piemonte’ Piemonte Nuovo, 17 May 1958. Carlo Palenzona, ‘ll Secondo Risorgimento Italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo. 24 Guido Calderoli, Campanalismo e Centralismo in Zibaldone Autonomista, ed. Guido Calderoli (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 79–83 (79). Riva, Discorso a San Pellegrino. 25 ‘MARP electoral pamphlet entitled “MARP. Perché vogliamo l’autonomia regionale”’ (Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese). 26 ‘Regione, Patria e Nazione’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 30 September 1956). 27 Gianfranco Gonella, ‘L’inno degli autonomisti’, (Fasc.MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi. Bergamo: Biblioteca Angelo Mai). 28 ‘Le autonomie locali risolveranno i problemi economici della Grande Europa’ in Piemonte Nuovo, 15 June 1957. 29 Ubaldo Riva, ‘A proposito di Federalismo e autonomismo’ in Parole Autonomiste ed. Ubaldo Riva (Bergamo: Scuola Professionali Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1950) 41. 30 ‘Risultati del MARP’ Piemonte Nuovo (31 May 1958). 31 Ibid. 32 ‘Vei Piemunt! Gli Autonomisti Italiani vedono nel MARP l’algiere dell’au­ tonomia regionale – il congresso di Verona ha messo in luce che l’idea au­ tonomista ѐ oggi diventata la forza motrice del popolo italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo, (1 February 1958). 33 Ibid. 34 MARP. Perché vogliamo l’autonomia regionale. 35 ‘Il MARP diventa Padano per presentarsi alle elezioni’, (La Stampa, 24 February 1958). 36 George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord: Continuities and discontinuities’, Modern Italy 23, no. 3 (2018): 235–252, doi: 10.1017/mit.2018.4 37 Margarita Gomez Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) 103. 38 Ibid., 145. 39 Umberto Bossi, ‘Programma Politico’, Lombardia Autonomista, September 1983. Gipo Farassino. ‘Il nostro statuto’, Piemont Autonomista April 1987. Roberto Gremmo. ‘Programma dell’Union Piemonteisa’ Union Piemonteisa, 15 December 1986.

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40 Ibid., 117. Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercate, La rivoluzione. La Lega, storia e idee (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer 1993) 151. U. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia lega, La mia vita (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1992) 201. 41 Guido Passalacqua, Il Vento Della Padania: Storia Della Lega Nord, 1984–2009, 1. ed, Ingrandimenti (Milano: Mondadori, 2009) 23. 42 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Fluctuating Fortunes of the Lega Nord’ in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy: History, Politics, Society eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A. Veltri (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014) (206). Stefano Allievi, Le Parole Della Lega: Il Movimento Politico Che Vuole Un’altra Italia, 1. ed, I Coriandoli (Milano: Garzanti, 1992). 43 Umberto Bossi, Tutta la verità: Perché ho partecipato al governo Berlusconi. Perché l’ho fatto cadere. Dove voglio arrivare (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1994) 211. 44 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2001) (106). 45 Ibid., 146. 46 Gianfranco Pasquino, Lo Stato Federale (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1996) 78. For more information on Gianfranco Miglio’s neo-federalist proposals, see: Gianfranco Miglio, Come cambiare. Le mie riforme (Milan: Mondadori, 1994). Idem, Io, Bossi e La Lega: Diario Segreto dei miei Quattro anni sul carroccio (Milan: Mondadori, 1994). Gianfranco Miglio and Marcello Veneziani, Padania, Italia: Lo Stato Nazionale è Soltanto in Crisi o Non è Mai Esistito?, Contrappunto 4 (Firenze: Le lettere, 1997). Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 146. 47 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Collective Identities: From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Exclusion and Difference’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 3–4 (March 2003): 41–54, (49). 48 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Lega Nord: A Case of Simulative Politics’, South European Society and Politics 14, no. 2 (2009): 129–146. 49 Ibid. 50 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Lega Nord and Fiscal Federalism: Functional or Postfunctional?’, Modern Italy 16, no. 4 (November 2011): 437–447 (442), https://doi.org/10.1080/13532944.2011.611221. 51 Umberto Bossi, Il mio progetto. Discorsi sul federalismo e Padania (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1996), 150. 52 Lieven De Winter and Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties’, Party Politics 8, no. 4 (July 2002): 483–503, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068802008004007. 53 Roberto Gremmo, Contro Roma: Storia idee e programmi delle Leghe au­ tonomiste del Nord (Brescia: Stem Editoriale Spa, 1992) 6–7.

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Antonio Brodrero and Roberto Gremmo, L’Oppressione Culturale Italiana in Piemonte (Ivrea: Editrice BS, 1978). Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 65–66. 54 Umberto Bossi, ‘Federazione Autonomista Padano-Alpino’, Lombardia Autonomista, September 1983. Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A terri­ torial Cleavage in Italian Politics? Understanding the Rise of the Northern Question in the 1990s’, South European Society and Politics 5, no. 3: 80–107. 55 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia lega, La mia vita, p.166. 56 Bossi, Tutta la verità. Perchè ho participato al governo Berlusconi, perchè l’ho fatto cadere, dove voglio arrivare, 116. Damian Tambini, Nationalism in Italian Politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000, Routledge Advances in European Politics 3 (London; New York: Routledge, 2001). 57 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 106. 58 Roberto Biorcio and Tomasso Vitale, ‘Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Cetrifugal Regionalism. A Contextual Political Analysis of the Lega Nord’, Contemporary Centrifugal Regionalism: Comparing Flanders and Northern Italy, Royal Flemish Academy for Science and the Arts Press, 2011, pp.171–199, (176). Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Back to Our Roots or Self-Confessed Manipulation? The Uses of the Past in the Lega Nord’s Positing of Padania’, National Identities 8, no. 1: 21–39, (24). Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 113. Benito Giordano, ‘A Place Called Padania?: The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy’, European Urban and Regional Studies 6, no. 3 (1999): 215–230, (217). 59 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 147. 60 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics?’, 80–107. 61 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 111. 62 Bossi and Vimercate, La Rivoluzione. 63 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 111. 64 Ibid., 112. 65 Michel Huysseune, Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy, Studies in Ethnopolitics, v. 5 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006) 167. 66 Paolo Barcella, La Lega. Una Storia (Rome: Carrocci Editore, 2022) 105 67 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Collective Identities: From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Ethnicity and Difference*’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 3–4 (March 2003): 41–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/14718800308405143. Passarelli and Tuorto, Lega & Padania: Storie e luoghi delle camicie Verdi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012) 193.

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68 Statuto della Lega Nord Available at: http://www.leganord.org/phocadownload/ ilmovimento/statuto/Statuto.pdf 69 Annarita Gori, ‘The Risorgimento in Contemporary Italy: History, Politics and Memory during the National Jubilees (1911-1961-2011)’ The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy: History, Politics, Society eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A. Veltri (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014). 70 Rosario Forlenza and Bjørn Thomassen, ‘Resurrections and Rebirths: How the Risorgimento Shaped Modern Italian Politics’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no. 3 (2017): 291–313, DOI: 10.1080/1354571X.2017.1321931 71 Baioni, ‘Anniversaries and the Public Uses of the Risorgimento in TwentiethCentury Italy’. 398. 72 Rosario Forlenza and Bjørn Thomassen, ‘Resurrections and rebirths: how the Risorgimento shaped modern Italian politics’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no. 3 (2017): 291–313, DOI: 10.1080/1354571X.2017. 1321931 73 Massimo Baioni, ‘Anniversaries and the Public Uses of the Risorgimento in Twentieth-Century Italy’, Journal of Modern European History 9, no. 3 (2011): 397–415 (398). Forlenza and Thomassen, ‘Resurrections and Rebirths’. 74 75 76 77 78 79

Ibid. Ibid. MARP, ‘L’autonomia regionale, perchè la si volle perchè la si vuole’, p.75. Ibid. Ibid. Guido Piovone, ‘La burocrazia dei partiti è fornita dal Piemonte’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 31 May 1958). Carlo Palenzona, ‘La scene politica Italiana dominate dagli avvenimenti Francesi’ (Piemonte Nuovo, 31 May 1958). Postcard of Cavour entitled “Personaggi Autonomisti”, in Fasc.MABAutonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai.

80 Ibid. 81 Giuseppe Minolfi, ‘L’autonomia regionale completerà il Risorgimento’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 February 1957. ‘Piemonte-Lombardia-Veneto. Combttono per l’autonomia amminis­ trative’ Piemonte Nuovo, 24 May 1958. ‘L’insegnamento della Storia Memorie e glorie del vecchio Piemonte’Piemonte Nuovo, 17 May 1958. Carlo Palenzona, ‘ll Secondo Risorgimento Italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo. 82 Freddi, Breve storia del MAB, p.6. Gavazzeni, Ugo, ‘I grandi uomini del Risorgimento quasi tutti favorevoli al Regionalismo’, Piemonte Nuovo, 5 April, 1958. 83 ‘Postcard of Cavour entitled “Personaggi Autonomisti”’, in Fasc.MABAutonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai.

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84 85 86

87

151

Ugo Gavazzeni, ‘Regionalismo e decentramento amministrativo nella storia nello spirito e nelle tradizioni italiche. Da un millennio gli Italiani sono autonomisti’, Piemonte Nuovo, 28 June 1958. ‘I grandi uomini del Risorgimento quasi tutti favorevoli al Regionalismo’, Piemonte Nuovo, 5 April 1958. ‘Newspaper entitled “La Regione Lombarda March 1959”. Ann. 1 No. 1’ in C. Boulliaud and L. DeMatteo, ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ 47. G. Calderoli, ‘Dieci Anni di Servitù Burocratica in Bergamasca’ in Zibaldone Autonomista di un montanaro Bergmasco, 48. ‘Postcard entitled “La Migliore commemorazione centenaria dell’Unità d’Italia si farebbe attuando le Autonomie Regionali come volevano i Patrioti del Risorgimento”’, in Fasc.MAB-Autonomisti, Archvio Aldo Rizzi. Biblioteca Angelo Mai. Michele Rosboch, ‘Torino, Piemonte e Piemontesi nel quadro dell’in­ gratitudine romana’ Piemonte Nuovo, 18 October 1958. Carlo Palenzona, ‘La trasformazione di “To.61” in “Italia ‘61”’, Piemonte Nuovom, 31 July, 1958.

88 ‘Postcard entitled “Il Peggior nemico dell’unità d’Italia è il centralismo bur­ ocratico”’, in Fasc. MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai. 89 Michele Rosboch, Per Torino e la sua regione (Turin: Ruata editore, 1956) 67–68. Michele Rosboch, ‘La città di Torino sarà la sede di una grande esposizione universale’ Piemonte Nuovo, 1 December 1956. 90 ‘L’autonomia regionale completerà il Risorgimento’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 February 1957. 91 ‘MARP electoral poster entitled “Piemontesi-Torinesi! – Forse dimentica o rimprovera quell’ora di grandezza”’, Piemonte Nuovo, 14 July 1959. 92 Baioni, ‘Anniversaries and the Public Uses of the Risorgimento in TwentiethCentury Italy’. 398. 93 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Regionalism in Italy’, in Regionalism in the European Union, ed. Paul Wagstaff (Exeter: Intellect, 1999) 140–158 (147). Forlenza and Thomassen, ‘Resurrections and Rebirths’. 94 Silvana Patriarca, ‘Italian Neopatriotism: Debating National Identity in the 1990s’, Modern Italy 6, no. 1 (May 2001): 21–34, https://doi.org/10.1 080/13532940120045542 95 Baioni, ‘Anniversaries and the Public Uses of the Risorgimento in TwentiethCentury Italy’. 398. 96 U,Bossi, ‘La Prealpina’, Lombardia autonomista, May 1985, cited in S.Allievi, Le parole della lega: Il movimento politico che vuole un’altra Italia, p.37. 97 Roberto Gremmo, Arnassità Piemonteisa, 15 September 1981. Umberto Bossi ‘Uno scritto profetico di D’Azeglio’ Lombardia Autonomista 1984. 98 Umberto Bossi, ‘Lega Nord: Il nostro Risorgimento, Il nuovo Risorgimento’, Lombardia Autonomista, 7 August 1992.

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99 Bossi and Vimercati, La Rivoluzione, 31. Gilberto Oneto, La strana unità: Risorgimento: Buono, inutile o dannoso? (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 2011) 275–276 100 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega La mia vita, pp.176–177. See also, Bossi and Vimercati La Rivoluzione, 30–31., See also ‘Un patto con il popolo non col palazzo’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 13 April 1994, Ibid., 29. 101 Bossi, Tutta la verità 195–196. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, ‘Persuasion, Myth and Propaganda’, Journal of Political Marketing 3, no. 3 (6 October 2004): 87–103 (93), https://doi.org/10.1300/J199v03n03_05. Bossi, Tutta la verita’, 195.A.D’Argenio, ‘Bossi: “Unità d’Italia? Una ricorrenza inutile. Ci vado se me lo chiede Napolitano”’, La Repubblica.it, 4 May 2010.‘Bossi – Intervista. Il Federalismo sarà il Risorgimento degli enti locali’, Telepadania. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=hL47QvdjKUA. Last accessed 10 June 2018. ‘Via libera al “Polo della Libertà” La prossima legislature dovrà essere costituente. Il trasformismo dei vecchi partiti centralisti non ci inganna’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 9 February 1994. 102 ‘Calderoli: 150 anni dell’unità d’Italia Non so se saremo alle celebrazioni’ La Repubblica.it, 5 February 2010. 103 Diego Scalvini, ‘Un nuovo Risorgimento sconfigga il centralismo’, La Padania, 17 March 2011. Ibid. 104 Cento Bull, ‘Regionalism in Italy’, 147. 105 ‘L’antica vocazione europea del Piemonte’ Piemont Autonomista. Gremmo, Arnassità Piemonteisa, 15 September 1981. Roberto Gremmo, Interviewed by George Newth via email, February 2016. Roberto Gremmo, Contro Roma. Storia, idee, e programmi delle Leghe autonomiste del Nord (Milan: Stem Editoriale Spa, 1992) 253–54. 106 Ibid., 254. 107 ‘Alla “Festa del Piemont” di Domenica 17 luglio In 3500 all’Assietta’ Piemont Autonomista, 27 July 1988. ‘Gruppo storico Pietro Micca’ Piemont Autonomista, April 1987. 108 ‘Alla “Festa del Piemont” di Domenica 17 luglio In 3500 all’Assietta’ Piemont Autonomista, 27 July 1988. ‘Gruppo storico Pietro Micca’ Piemont Autonomista, April 1987. 109 R. Gremmo, Contro Roma. Storia, idee, e programmi delle Leghe autono­ miste del Nord (Milan: Stem Editoriale Spa, 1992) 253–254. ‘L’antica vo­ cazione europea del Piemonte’, Piemont Autonomista, 13 October 1987. 110 Gremmo, Interviewed by George Newth via email, February 2016. 111 ‘Un patto con il popolo non col palazzo’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale. Bossi, Tutta la verità 189. Bossi and Vimercate, La rivoluzione, 27. 112 Bossi, Tutta la verità. Perchè ho participato al governo Berlusconi, perchè l’ho fatto cadere, dove voglio arrivare, 189. ‘Un patto con il popolo non col palazzo’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale. 113 G. Oneto, ‘L’autonomismo Piemontese oggi’, Quaderni Padani. L’autonomismo Piemontese Anno. 6, no. 32 (November-December 2000): 5–12. My italics. http://www.laliberacompagnia.org/_files/qp/pdf/qp_32.pdf 114 Giovanni De Luna, ‘La Lega e il progetto di fare gli Italiani’ in Figli di un benessere minore. La Lega 1979–1993, ed. Giovanni De Luna (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1994) 1–20.

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115 Marco Reguzzoni, ‘150 Aperte per ferie. Stiamo diventando il Paese delle “ricorrenza civili”’, La Padania. 14 Februrary 2011. Paolo Bassi ‘Padani convincetevi. Dovete essere Italiani!’, La Padania, 10 January 2011. P.Pellini, ‘Festeggiamo l’Addio ai parassiti! Uniti nel Federalismo’, La Padania, 17 March 2011. Andrea. Montanari. ‘Gran Gala per l’unità. La Lega non applaude’, La Padania, 17 March 2011. ‘Cavour considerava l’unita’ d’Italia una corbelleria’, La Padania, 6 January 2011. Scalvini, ‘Un nuovo Risorgimento sconfigga il centralismo’. 116 ‘Calderoli: 150 anni dell’unità d’Italia Non so se saremo alle celebrazioni’, La Repubblica.it. D’Argenio, ‘Bossi: ‘Unità d’Italia? Una ricorrenza inutile. Ci vado se me lo chiede Napolitano. La Repubblica.it. 117 Gori, ‘The Risorgimento in Contemporary Italy’, 310–311. 118 Sergio Rizzo and Gianantonio Stella, ‘Garibaldi, da santo a quasi terrorista La parabola di un’icona, l’800 adorava il condottiero, ora il dileggio leghista’, Corriere della Sera, 23 April 2010. Silvana Patriarca, ‘Unmaking the Nation? Uses and Abuses of Garibaldi in Contemporary Italy’, Modern Italy 15, no. 5: 467–483, (477). 119 120 121 122

John Foot, The Archipelago: Italy since 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2018) 28. Duggan, The Force of Destiny. Foot. The Archipelago, 28 Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy – Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948, 41. 123 ‘Comuni, provincie e regioni i veri pilastri del autogoverno locale’ Piemonte Nuovo, 1 June 1957. 124 Robert A. Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy – Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 41. 125 ‘Le critiche al MARP e il suo fondamento storico’ Piemonte Nuovo, 1956. ‘Il fondamnto storico del MARP’ Piemonte Nuovo, 17 May 1958. 126 Anselmo Freddi, Breve storia del MAB (Bergamo: Stampa Fratelli Carrarra, 1963) 17. 127 Lorenzo Baratter, Storia Dell’ASAR: Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali, 1945–1948 (Rovereto (Trento): Egon, 2009) 18. 128 Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativo non potrà dividere il po­ polo Italiano’ Giovanni Rinaldi, L’autonomia locale e l’ordinamento (Bergamo: Tipografia Orfanotrofio Maschile, 1948) 21.

regionale

129 Antonio Meli, ‘Il Vizio dello Stato genera vizio negli stessi partiti’ in Così Parlano gli autonomisti, ed. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955) 44–46, (p.45). 130 Ibid., 45. 131 Freddi, Breve storia del MAB, 10. 132 Meli, ‘Il Vizio dello Stato genera vizio negli stessi partiti’, 45.

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133 ‘Comuni, provincie e regioni i veri pilastri del autogoverno locale’ Piemonte Nuovo, 1 June 1957. 134 Guido Calderoli, ‘Padroni in casa nostra’, Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956. My italics. 135 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Role of Memory in Populist Discourse: The Case of the Italian Second Republic’, Patterns of Prejudice 50, no. 3 (2016): 213–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2016.1208863. 136 Gian Enrico Rusconi, Resistenza e post-fascismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995). 137 Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, ‘The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?’, Italian Regionalism: History, Identity, and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 145. Bossi, Tutta la verità. Perchè ho participato al governo Berlusconi, perchè l’ho fatto cadere, dove voglio arrivare, 85. 138 Ibid. 139 Umberto Bossi, ‘Patto di Pontida Federalismo entro 6 mesi’, Lega Nord-Italia Federale (13 April 1994). 140 Umberto Bossi, ‘Fino alla libertà della Lombardia’, Lombardia Autonomista, (1984) October. 141 Bossi and Vimercate, La rivoluzione, 214. 142 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti‐Fascism to Post‐Fascism: The Lega (Nord)’s Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11 November 2022, 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1 080/13569317.2022.2138296. 143 Umberto Bossi, ‘Le Pen è fascista come i partiti di Roma’, Lombardia Autonomista (1988). 144 Umberto Bossi, ‘Modello Politico’ Lombardia Autonomista, (September 1983). Umberto Bossi, ‘Fino alla libertà della Lombardia’, Lombardia Autonomista, (October 1984) 145 Michele Corti, ‘l’identita nazionale italiana: un mito evanescente’, Quaderni Padani 2, no. 3 (January-February 1996): 20–28. 146 ‘Le Pen è fascista come i partiti di Roma’, Lombardia Autonomista (1988). 147 ‘Il MARP degli anni ’50 il padre della Lega’, La Stampa (12/4/1994); Gilberto Oneto ‘La Carta di Chivasso Sessant’anni di Lotta’, Quaderni Padani 9, no. 50 (November-December 2003): 3–4. 148 Newth. Modern Italy. 149 Emma Bassani, ‘Il federalismo è a portata di mano’, Lega Nord-Italia Federale, (9 March 1994). 150 Bossi, Tutta la verità. Perchè ho participato al governo Berlusconi, perchè l’ho fatto cadere, dove voglio arrivare, 35. 151 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 127. 152 C. Levy ‘Introduction’ in Italian Regionalism: History, Identity, and Politics, ed. Idem (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 2. 153 Umberto Bossi, 1994: Cade la dittatura’, Lega Nord - Italia Federale (28 February 1994). 154 Umberto Bossi, ‘Amato Come Mussolini – La nostra forza populare contro i fantasmi del fascismo’, Lombardia Autonomista, (1992) September. 155 Bossi, Tutta la verità. Perchè ho participato al governo Berlusconi, perchè l’ho fatto cadere, dove voglio arrivare, 80. 156 Umberto Bossi, ‘Colpo di Coda della dittatura’, Lega Nord - Italia Federale, (28 February 1994).

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157 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti‐Fascism to Post‐Fascism. 158 Eugenio Fracassetti, ‘Il vero significato di “fascismo”’ Quaderni Padani 6, no. 27 (January–February 2000): 46–49. 159 Andrea Rognoni, ‘Precari nell’educare. Manca il Federalismo’, La Padania (1 November 2012). 160 Oneto, Gilberto, and Giancarlo Pagliarani, ‘50 buone ragioni per l’indi­ pendenza’, Quaderni Padani 11, no. 61–62 (September-December 2005): 3–44 (30). Fracassetti, ‘Il vero significato di “fascismo”’. 161 Umberto Bossi, Il mio progetto. Discorsi su federalismo e Padania (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1996) 139. 162 G. Cerruti, ‘La Lega esulta: “ma non siamo razzisti”’, La Stampa (6 January 1988). Umberto Bossi, ‘Le Pen è fascista come i partiti di Roma’, Lombardia Autonomista, May 1988. 163 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti‐Fascism to Post‐Fascism 164 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 134. 165 G. Colombo, ‘In difesa dell’Europa’, La Padania (31 January 1999). 166 Antonio Varsori, 2010. La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 ad oggi, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino. 167 Foot, The Archipelago. 168 Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe 1950–2000 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) 31. 169 Martin J. Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945–95 (London: Routledge, 1996) 17. 170 ‘Le autonomie locali risolveranno i problemi economici della Grande Europa’ in Piemonte Nuovo, 15 June 1957. 171 MARP, L’autonomia regionale, perchè’ la si volle perchè la si vuole, 41. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 ‘Il manifesto del Consiglio dei Comuni d’Europa’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 June, 1957. 176 Riva, U., ‘Autonomie locali e Federalismo Europeo’ in Parole Autonomiste, pp.19–25 (p.21). 177 ‘Le autonomie locali risolveranno i problemi economici della Grande Europa’ in Piemonte Nuovo, 15 June 1957. Riva, ‘Autonomie locali e Federalismo Europeo’, 22. 178 ‘Torino Capitale della Communità Europea’, Piemonte Nuovo, 1 June 1957. Riva, ‘Autonomie locali e Federalismo Europeo’, 21. 179 Calderoli, ‘Campanalismo e Centralismo’, in Zibaldone Autonomista 79. 180 Ibid. 181 Riva, ‘A proposito di Federalismo e autonomismo’, 40. Ibid.

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182 ‘Newspaper entitled “La Regione Lombarda March 1959. Ann. 1 No. 1”’ in Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda De Matteo ‘Autonomismo e leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’ in ed., Adriana Castagnoli Culture politiche e territorio in Italia 1945–2000 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004) 32–52. (47). 183 Riva, ‘Autonomie locali e Federalismo Europeo’, 21. 184 Riva, ‘A proposito di Federalismo e autonomismo’, 41. 185 George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’. 186 Ugo Gavazzeni, ‘Speech entitled “Unione Autonomisti d’Italia” at Via Romagnosi, Rovereto, Trentino-Alto-Adige’, in Fasc. MAB-Autonomisti, Archivio Aldo Rizzi, Biblioteca Angelo Mai, 1968. 187 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2002): 297–326, https://doi.org/10.1177/146511 6502003003002. 188 Ibid. 189 Anil Awesti, ‘The Myth of Eurosclerosis: European Integration in the 1970s’, L’Europe En Formation 353–354, no. 3 (1 November 2009): 39–53, https:// doi.org/10.3917/eufor.353.0039. 190 Ibid. 191 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics? Understanding the Rise of the Northern Question in the 1990s’, 81. De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘European Integration and Ethnoregionlaist parties’, 493. Gremmo. Contro Roma. Storia, idee e programma delle Leghe autonomiste del Nord, 5. 192 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and nationalism in Italian politics, 92–97. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 202. 193 Bossi, ‘Statuto della Lega Autonomista Lombarda’, Lombardia Autonomista. Farassino, ‘Il nostro Statuto’, Piemont Autonomista. Gremmo, ‘Programma Politico’ Union Piemonteisa. 194 ‘Lega Nord: Il nostro Risorgimento, Il nuovo Risorgimento’, Lombardia Autonomista August, 1992. Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 9 March 1994. 195 ‘Via libera al ‘polo della libertà’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 9 February 1994. 196 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics?’, 92. Paolo Molino, ‘Ma è proprio razzismo?’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 September 1987. 197 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 196. Bossi and Vimercate, La Rivoluzione, 212. 198 Umberto Bossi, ‘Senza il federalismo l’Europa si scioglie’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 18 May 1994. 199 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics?’.

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200 Umberto Bossi, ‘Internazionalismo Autonomista’ Lombardia Autonomista, September 1983. 201 N. Moe, The view from Vesuvius Italian Culture and the Southern Question (California: University of California Press, 2006). John Dickie, Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno (New York: St.Martins Press, 1999). Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848–1918, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1989), https://doi.org/ 10.1017/CBO9780511558573. 202 M. Huysseune, Modernity and Secession, Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006) 69. 203 Umberto Bossi, ‘Via libera al “Polo della Libertà”’, Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 9 February 1994 204 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of Its Own’, West European Politics 28, no. 5 (November 2005): 952–972, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500310600. 205 Antonio Spampinato, ‘L’Europa non ci vuole. Per il Tesoro valgono solo I fatti. Quindi è ufficiale: Siamo fuori’, La Padania, 24 April 1997. Stefano Piazzo, ‘La Padania ha già la forza per conquistare l’Europa’, La Padania, 15 January 1997. Giancarlo.Pagliarini, ‘Perchè la secessione fa bene anche al Sud’, La Padania, 14 January 1997. 206 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, ‘A Territorial Cleavage in Italian Politics?’ 207 Michel Huysseune, ‘A Eurosceptic Vision in a Europhile Country: The Case of the Lega Nord’, Modern Italy 15, no. 1 (February 2010): 63–75 (69), https://doi.org/10.1080/13532940903477880. 208 Ibid. Gilberto, Oneto ‘Europa oggi e domani – Quale Europa?’ Quaderni Padani 8, no. 43–44 (September-December 2002): 48–56. Pagliarini, G, L’Europa dei popoli e i suoi nemici. Quaderni padani, 2002: 27–30. Oneto, G., L’invenzione della Padania. La rinascità della comunità pi [ugrave] antica d’Europa (Bergamo: Foedus Editore, 1997). 209 Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Reinventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post-Fascism’, 1. issued in paperback, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy 10 (London: Routledge, 2010). Huysseune, ‘A Eurosceptic vision in a Europhile country: The case of the Lega Nord’, p.69. 210 Bossi, U., 1998. Discorso tenuto in occasione del Congresso straordinario federale, 27-28-29 marzo. 211 Marco Brunazzo and Mark Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the Right-Wing Populist Turn of the Lega Nord since 2013’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no. 5 (20 October 2017): 624–641, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1389524.

5

Populist Regionalism

5.1 Introduction Some 40 years prior to Umberto Bossi’s electoral breakthroughs of the early to mid-1990s, administrative and national election campaigns were in progress in the fledgling post-war Italian Republic. As we have seen in chapter 3, these campaigns would see the emergence of discourse which would later be employed by the Lega. On the one hand, these narratives depicted regionalism as an expression of the popular will against an outof-touch political class, with claims that ‘the voice of the people will be heard! Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (MARP) will speak for the Region, justice for all, and for a forgotten Piedmont’.1 On the other hand, they also took aim at southern Italians who had begun to migrate to north Italy during the 1950s and were portrayed as a threat to Lombard culture, language, and jobs, with slogans promising, for instance, to keep ‘Lombardy for the Lombards’.2 Regionalism was, therefore, articulated by the MRAs through both a populist and nativist logic. This chapter highlights the significance of a populist and nativist articulation of regionalism in providing an important framework for leghismo’s political message. Analysis will focus on continuities but also discontinuities – at times nuanced, at times more explicit – represented in the populism and nativism of the two waves of activism. Following this brief introduction, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first establishes the contextual framework necessary to understand the change and continuity between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s populist regionalism. The terms ‘post-1945’ and ‘post-1989’ populist and nativist discourse will be introduced to encapsulate the key contextual particularities for both Italian and European politics represented by the respective end of the Second World War and the fall of Fascism, and the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the post-war socio-economic consensus. Section 5.1.2 of this chapter focuses on the creation and reproduction of populist and nativist discursive repertoires, examining party documents,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-6

Populist Regionalism 159 newspapers, and literature produced by and about the MRAs and the Lega. Indeed, the discursive fields in which these waves of activism were operating were impacted by key contextual differences. While the MRAs were a product of the First Italian Republic and operated within its parameters, the Lega contributed to its downfall and was a benefactor from the transition to the Second Italian Republic. The first case study focuses specifically on populism and how the MRAs’ and the Lega’s respective stances against the partitocrazia (regime of the parties)3 were dictated by post-1945 and post1989 populist discourse. The second case study focuses on nativism. This builds on scholarly work which has analysed ‘south-to-north migrations from a specific angle, namely the hostility and rejection of southern workers that developed in the receiving areas’.4 Analysis of MRA nativist discourse will illuminate how ‘old images and prejudices were used, confirmed, and transformed within the historical conjunctures of the 1950s’.5 The chapter will also examine how the Lega’s view of a separate Padanian heartland, which excluded southerners and began to shift the focus further to migration from abroad, represented both change and continuity with the MRAs’ nativism. This was not only in the construction and racialisation of the non-native out-group but also regarding its depiction as ‘a nation under threat from internal and external Others.’6 Section 5.2 synthesises the key elements of continuity and discontinuity between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s populist and nativist discourse, paving the way for chapter 6 which focuses on the shift to populist and far-right nationalism under Salvini. 5.1.1 The Discursive Field of Populism and Nativism: Post-1945 and Post-1989 Populist and Nativist Discourse

As demonstrated in chapter 4, the fact that the MRAs and the Lega emerged in two very different contexts necessitates a nuanced analysis of any continuities and discontinuities in the political message of these waves of activism. The following section introduces the respective concepts of ‘post-1945’ and ‘post1989’ populist and nativist discourse. This contextual framework complements the conceptual framework of populist regionalism outlined in chapter 1 of this book while situating the MRAs and the Lega as part of the respective first/second and third waves of right-wing extremism. The development of far-right politics in Europe following the collapse of Nazism and Fascism has been examined extensively elsewhere with numerous typologies of parties having been proposed in line with these different periods.7 The following section, rather than engaging directly with these debates, examines how populist and nativist discourse was shaped by the post-1945 and post-1989 contexts. This framework is essential in understanding the continuities and discontinuities illustrated by the empirical data in section 5.2 of this chapter.

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5.1.1.1 Post-1945 and Post-1989 Populist Discourse

The following subsection outlines the key elements of post-1945 and post1989 populist discourse. This is in line with the aforementioned discursive approach to populism which interprets it as a dichotomic discourse in which ‘the people’ are juxtaposed to ‘the elite’ along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which ‘the people’ is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to ‘the elite’ conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group.8 Regarding post-1945 populist discourse, this should be viewed in the context of the first and second waves of post-war right-wing extremism. Far from marking the unequivocal defeat of Fascism in Europe, the defeat of the Axis powers in WW2 saw an almost immediate re-emergence of far-right politics in Europe. The end of the war, ‘having condemned a number of the former followers of fascism to an underprivileged situation,’ led such individuals to seek refuge in parties which emerged in the first wave of postwar right-wing extremist parties, such as the Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque (UQ – ‘Everyman Movement’), ‘created shortly after the end of the war by a flamboyant Neapolitan playwright, Guglielmo Giannini.’9 The UQ was ‘a direct precursor of the French Poujadist movement,’10 formed in 1953 by Pierre Poujade. Poujadism emerged in what is known as the second wave of post-war right-wing extremism which ‘seems to have been conditioned by new waves of social deprivation’ and was ‘a reaction against the endangered status of mostly petit-bourgeois groups’.11 A brief examination of UQ and Poujadism allows us to establish that post-1945 populist discourse emerged within the context of the first and second waves of post-war right-wing extremism and saw a people vs elites discourse centred around: • a revolt of the small against the big • a protest against the party and parliamentary system • heritage from the far-right and fascist systems which had preceded postwar representative democracy. Giannini’s construction of the people against the elites was articulated around his claim to speak for the folla (crowd). He championed ‘the cause of those who simply wanted to be left in peace to enjoy their lives without meddling politicians’ and without the imposition of taxes.12 The UQ ‘was in favour of a liberal economic policy with little state interference … and the privatisation of state-owned companies’.13 The UQ promoted an ‘efficient … government of technicians’ which ‘surpassed ideologies’.14 While the UQ was ‘against the entire block of parties as it held them all responsible for the

Populist Regionalism 161 ruin of the country,’15 Giannini did in fact engage with liberalism ‘and even advocated an alliance of his movement with the Italian Liberal Party,’ demonstrating how post-1945 populist discourse was not 100% in opposition to the political sub-cultures of the time.16 The UQ also distanced itself from certain aspects of fascism; Giannini ‘did not embrace nationalism’ and stated that ‘there is no idea more flawed than the patria.’17 Nevertheless, the movement reserved ‘high esteem’ for those who had held fascist membership and were ‘not ashamed to admit it’.18 An anti-parliamentarian position was strongly linked to the ‘disdain’ shown by the movement for the ‘values of the resistance’ and the anti-fascist parties which went on to form the partitocrazia.19 Thus, the UQ in part represented those who had not experienced the resistance against Fascism and Nazism in the north of the country and for those for whom the establishment of anti-fascist values often generated preoccupations and fear.20 In terms of the second wave of right-wing extremism, Pierre Poujade’s Union de Défense des Commercants et Artisans (UDCA) formed part of a broader group of movements in Europe which ‘revolted against post-war conditions, most notably the marginalisation of the rural peripheries’.21 The UCDA represented ‘a localised protest by small shopkeepers against the punitive effects of an anachronistic tax system and the highhandedness of government inspectors in clamping down on tax fraud’.22 Poujade, like Giannini, was not a professional politician and used this background to bolster his claim to be a ‘man of the people’.23 In 1956, the ‘hastily constituted Poujadist Party’ enjoyed short-term electoral success, some 10 years after the UQ’s emergence, and gained ‘52 seats in the National Assembly’.24 Poujadism claimed ‘to incarnate the revolt of the small against the big,’25espousing ‘the cause of the small man and attacking big capital and the self-serving politicians who promoted it’.26 This message was reflected by the fact that most Poujadist deputies were ‘shopkeepers, artisans, and small entrepreneurs’.27 Anti-political and anti-parliamentary in nature, Poujadism ‘railed against the “fraud” of parliamentary democracy’ and the ‘exploitative gangs growing fat on the toil and suffering of the people’.28 Poujade’s reactionary stance against the modernisation of the French economy and the threat this posed to the lower-middle classes was ‘typical of the extreme right’.29 It is, therefore, no surprise that Poujadism, in a similar way to the UQ, served ‘as a magnet for ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists wishing to destabilise the regime and keen to exploit what they saw as its fascist potentialities’.30 Indeed, Poujade himself was linked to the Vichy regime, having been a section leader in the Nazi puppet regime’s

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‘Compagnon de France’ and having also previously been linked to Jaques Doriot’s fascist party.31 One figure who had cut his political teeth in the Poujadist Party and bridged the gap between the second and third waves of post-war rightwing extremism is Jean-Marie Le Pen. After founding the Front National, Le Pen in 1984 drew ‘an unexpected 10.9% of the votes’ in the subsequent European elections of the same year.32 Despite these being ‘second-order’ elections, this result is widely viewed as having marked the beginning of the third wave of right-wing extremism.33 This has not only been the longest-lasting wave since World War Two,34 seeing the emergence of a number of far-right parties, but has also significantly seen a proliferation of terms containing the term ‘populist’ to describe these parties. A case in point is that of ‘New Populism,’ a term coined by Paul Taggart in the 1990s, but since used by other scholars to depict a collection of movements, broadly on the right of the political spectrum, [which] claim to represent the rightful source of legitimate power—the people, whose interests and wishes have been ignored by self-interested politicians and politically correct intellectuals.35 Rather than ‘New Populism,’ the people vs elites discourse articulated by some far right parties within this third wave of right-wing extremism will be referred to in this chapter as post-1989 populist discourse. This is in line with an approach which states that populism is ‘akin to a form rather than content’ and recognises it as a sometimes occurring discursive feature of a wider far-right regionalist and nationalist ideology.36 The term post-1989 populist discourse more than anything signifies a shift in emphasis, dependent on context, rather than any ‘newness’ in the logic of populism itself. As noted by Taggart, the type of populism which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s was contingent upon a particular historical and political context … [tying] … itself to the collapse of many of the prevailing ‘meta-narratives’: the ‘end’ of the Cold War, the ‘collapse’ of communism, the ‘crisis’ of welfarism and the ‘passing’ of fordism.37 The people vs elites dichotomy remains the same and, to an extent, holds some important continuities with post-1945 populist discourse. This is most evident in terms of a ‘bid to mobilise “the people” against the political class and elites,’ an ‘exaltation’ of ‘manual workers and small producers in opposition to non-productive workers described as being parasites and lazy’.38 Post-1989 populist discourse also continued to represent ‘hostility […] against the political class and the administrative

Populist Regionalism 163 bureaucracy and their control over fiscal policy’.39 However, in line with a new political and historical context, what changed in terms of post-1989 populist discourse was a reconstruction of people vs elites dichotomy around • a rejection of the post-war consensus • opposition to the development of a heavily bureaucratised welfare state40 • the adoption of terms such as mafia or caste to refer to political elites in protest against corruption and collusion.41 The relevance is, therefore, that the juxtaposition of ‘the people’ vs ‘the elites’ was no longer solely contingent on opposition to post-war political parties and parliamentary systems, as with post-1945 populist discourse, but rather, on the collapse of the ‘postwar settlement’. This settlement can be portrayed as the consensus that grew around ideas such as social democracy, the welfare state, corporatism and Keynesianism in most West European countries following the end of the Second World War.42 Terms such as ‘New Populism,’ while correctly identifying this new context of the 1980s/1990s, nevertheless appear to attribute a level of ideational content to this phenomenon, underplaying connections with previous populist discourse. Furthermore, ‘New Populist’ has been applied to parties widely recognised as belonging to the third wave of right-wing extremism, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National, Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party, Umberto Bossi’s Lega, and the Pim Fortuyn List.43 This runs the risk euphemising the more racist and exclusionary aspect of such parties’ ideologies. With this in mind, post-1989 populist discourse, as a term, seems more appropriate in highlighting a new context for far right constructions of ‘the people’. While distinguishing between post-1945 and post-1989 populist discourse can help examine one side of the MRAs’ and Lega’s political message, it does not account for the hostility towards racialised ‘non-native’ Others. To address this missing component, we now turn to two different contexts of nativist discourse. 5.1.1.2 Post-1945 and Post-1989 Nativist Discourse

While the above paragraphs focused on a broader European phenomenon of post-war populist discourse, the following subsection is specific to two waves of mass immigration in Italy. It is around these two phenomena that the terms of ‘post-1945’ and ‘post-1989’ nativist discourse will be developed. Several studies have demonstrated how far right parties construct

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‘the people’ not only against an elite ‘but also (and more importantly in terms of their racist ideology) as a homogeneous group based on ethnocultural or racial traits’.44 While it has been argued elsewhere that such antagonism indicates that nativism is an ‘extension of populism’,45 a discursive approach to nativism instead supports De Cleen et al.’s assertion that this juxtaposition of an in-group vs an out-group ‘flows from the particular articulation of nativism with the logic of populism, not from populism itself’.46 This, as outlined in chapter 1, is in line with the discursive approach to nativism which interprets its key features as immigration as a threat to the nation, a racist and racialised process of othering, and an emphasis on assimilation/acceptable transformation of the problem of difference or stopping the invasion. Nativist discourse, therefore, derives from the ethnic and exclusionary articulations of the core ideology of far-right parties (in the case of this chapter, regionalism). The first of the waves of migration of interest to this chapter related to an ‘unparalleled movement’ of Italy’s population which helped drive and sustain Italy’s post-war ‘economic miracle’.47 Indeed, in terms of the first wave of post-1945 nativist discourse, it is important to note that Piedmont was the ‘prime receiving region’ of the ‘more than 2 million people [who] left Italy’s south […] in the two decades following WW2’.48 However, southern Italians also migrated towards Lombardy and its provinces, such as Bergamo.49 During this period, as noted by Foot, ‘[…] the racialisation of the southern immigrants in particular – their Otherness, their Outsiderness – went very deep. This was also at the level of their accent, of appearance of their marginal location in the urban fabric’.50 Much of the nativist discourse, which will be examined as follows, depended on a racialisation of Southern Italians which can be traced back to the pre-unification period. Highly influential in this process of racialisation were Italian intellectuals such as Alberto Niceforo, who, in his 1906 work Forza e Ricchezza (Strength and Wealth), stated that two classes, actually two castes, live beside each other in our society. Such differences […] divide neatly the same society in two groups of populations as physically and psychologically different from each other as two different peoples or two entirely dissimilar tribes.51 This idea of two ‘tribes’ became particularly significant in the post-war period of the ‘economic miracle’ which saw mass migrations of southern Italians to the industrial areas of the North in search of employment. Indeed, as noted by Cagliotti

Populist Regionalism 165 the post-war economic development, the industrialisation of the North of the country, and the migratory wave of Southern Italians to the factories of Turin and Milan revived Italy’s internal orientalism by emphasizing the differences between the ‘civilised North’ and the ‘barbaric South’.52 These south to north migrations saw great ‘hostility and rejection of southern workers […] in the receiving areas’.53 Indeed, southern Italians, often labelled pejoratively by northern Italians in this period as Marocchini (Moroccans) or Terroni (‘dirty Southerners’), were ‘presented as either savages or potential criminals who disrupted the respectable lives of Milanese or Torinese citizens’.54 This criminalisation was also due to the fact that many of those who arrived in the North were technically ‘illegal’ under a fascist law of 1939. This legislation had been introduced to ‘favour a rural economy and prevent a mass exodus from the countryside, thus depriving Italian citizens of the right to choose freely where to reside’.55 Paradoxically, this law remained enforceable despite the fact that it contradicted the rights guaranteed by the 1948 Italian Constitution.56 This had serious consequences on employment rights as it allowed ‘some employers to take advantage of the undocumented employees because these “foreigners” in their own land accepted exploitative employment contracts’.57 Post-1945 nativist discourse in North Italy was therefore focused around: • An articulation of nativism with the logic of populism to emphasise a colonisation of the ‘North’ by a foreign ethnic group (the Southerner). • The Southern Italian as terrone • An orientalist discourse of nation-building. As will be illustrated in the case studies as follows, many of these features of nativist discourse would survive into the 1980s. However, what is referred to as ‘post-1989’ nativist discourse in was also influenced by the aforementioned second wave of migration. As noted by Ginsborg, at the beginning of the 1980s modern Italy reached another watershed; it ceased to be a net exporter of labour and began to welcome […] a significant number of non-European and east European immigrants.58 The significance of this period is that ‘the opening of borders, the incoming flows of immigrants, and economic competition from the lowwage countries of the global south were perceived as threatening the jobs of the unskilled workers’.59 As with the case of ‘post-1989 populism,’ the contextual shift here does not entail a change in the actual discourse and discursive juxtaposition of the native against the non-native, per se, but rather a shift in its emphasis. Indeed, Parati has noted that ‘there are many parallels that can be drawn between past internal migrations and recent

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immigrations to Italy’ and has called the previous migrations from the South to the North in the 1950s and 1960s a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the debates surrounding more recent migrations.60 The second wave ‘concerns non-Italians from a myriad of countries but above all from North Africa, Egypt, and Albania’.61 While these two waves took place against the backdrop of vastly differing economies, existing comparisons between these waves of migration have nevertheless noted continuities between the racialisation of migrants of the first and second waves of migration. Indeed, Foot notes how ‘there are far more similarities than differences between the immigrations’ paths and experiences of the two ‘mass movements’.62 It was during this period that categories employed in describing migration have recycled labels […] the questione del mezzogiorno has now become la questione immigrati that identifies people as problems and, very often, migrating people as potential criminals.63 Indeed, newspaper headlines from the 1960s which read ‘Calabrian kills his wife’ or ‘Sicilian involved in a brawl’ began to be substituted in the 1980s by others such as ‘Albanian involved in the business of prostitution’ or ‘Moroccans arrested for selling drugs’.64 This is indicative of the fact that ‘Italian immigrants […] have seen their status change over the years. They have […] become white’. This process has in part ‘been a component of the reinvention of identity in the face of foreign immigration’.65 The fact that the term ‘Marocchino’ (Moroccan) had previously been used to signify southern Italian ‘non-natives’ signifies certain similarities in the process of racialisation, a key part of nativist discourse outlined in chapter 1. This is particularly true in the focus on how a ‘way of life’ or values impede a non-native’s capacity to become a full member of a national community and ‘essentialisation’ which attribute certain (illiberal) traits to certain groups.66 Due to the North African and Middle Eastern provenance of much of this new wave of migration towards Italy, however, a particular focus was placed on the ‘otherness’ of the figure of the Muslim. Particular attention was paid to ‘the Muslim headscarf or to physical characteristics’ which ‘become an indicator of cultural racism’.67 ‘Post-1989 nativist discourse,’ therefore, saw Islam depicted as incompatible ‘with western values such as liberty and democracy’.68 A reconstruction of nativist discourse took place around • An articulation of nativism with the logic of populism to emphasise a ‘colonisation of the Italian State’ by an internal, yet foreign ethnic group (the Southerner). • A focus on foreign migration. • A juxtaposition between Islam and perceived European Christian values.

Populist Regionalism 167 Having established the contextual particularities of both populist and nativist discourse in the post-1945 and post-1989 eras, the following paragraphs now turn to an examination of the political message of the MRAs and the Lega. The regionalist ideologies of these two waves of activism, outlined in the previous chapters, found expression through a juxtaposition not only of the people vs the elites, but also the ‘native’ vs the ‘non-native’; however, as will become apparent over the following pages, the emphasis of this discourse was impacted greatly on the two divergent contexts outlined above (see Table 5.1). 5.1.2 Repertoire Creation and Reproduction. Post-1945 and Post-1989 Populist Regionalism

5.1.2.1 The Construction of ‘a Northern People’ against the ‘Thieving Regime of the Parties’

The following case study illustrates points A) and B) of the conceptual framework established in chapter 1 and reiterated above with summaries of the empirical data. With regards to the ‘people vs elites’ dichotomy and expression of the general will, it focuses on how both the MRAs’ and the Lega’s regionalism was articulated through a juxtaposition of all parties of the partitocrazia (partyocracy) regime against the North, claiming that political elites were denying the people their regional and popular sovereignty. In terms of a discourse of exploitation, the paragraphs as follows focus on how the message of ‘Roma Ladrona’ (Rome the Thief) held roots in 1950s populist regionalist discourse. After establishing some continuities, the empirical analysis underlines important discontinuities rooted in the aforementioned contextual frameworks of post-1945 and post-1989 populist discourse. 5.1.2.1.1 THE MRAS

On the eve of the 1956 administrative elections in Turin, the MARP issued a call to arms to its electorate. A brief analysis of this message reveals much about how the MRAs articulated their regionalism through a ‘people vs elites’ dichotomy: People of Turin! This may be your only chance to vote exclusively for our poor, mistreated, exploited Piedmont. We’ve had enough of politicians and bureaucrats! It’s time to leave the door open for a breath of fresh air […] the MARP is not a political movement, but a movement tired of the partitocrazia with one aim: regional autonomy.71

Credit: George Newth

An emphasis on ‘assimilation,’ ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference,’ or ‘stopping the invasion’

A racist and racialised process of othering

Immigration as an invasive stratagem and threat to the region

‘Let us help them, but not through handouts!’ Regional statutes viewed as a way of controlling migration

Rome the Thief exploiting Piedmont and Lombardy Campaign to reform the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno Southerners viewed as a threat to jobs, housing, culture, and identity and as colonising the North. Immigration depicted as ‘genocide’ of Alpine peoples and ‘depiedmontisation’ Racialisation of southern Italians via language, physical characteristics, & ‘criminality’

The region exploited by national, political, and economic elites

C. Nativism (racist and xenophobic discourse)

1 North Italians vs Regime of the Parties 2 Popular sovereignty via regional statutes of the Italian constitution

1 Region (the people) vs supra-state (the elites)/ Internal elites 2 Regionalism as a guarantor of popular sovereignty

A. People vs elites dichotomy and expression of the general will B. Discourse of exploitation

MRAs (Post-1945 Context)

Populist Regionalism

Conceptual Point

Table 5.1 Two waves of populist regionalism

Rome the Thief exploiting ‘the North’ as community of interests Campaign to abolish the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno Southerners viewed as a threat to jobs, housing, culture, and identity and as colonising the Italian state. Foreign migration & Islam depicted as replacement of ‘autochthonous Catholic population’ (Eurabia) Racialisation of Southern Italians as ‘mafiosi’ and ‘fascists,’ as well as nonpadani. Racialisation of foreign migrants via language and physical characteristics ‘Let us help them in our own homes!’ Bossi-Fini legislation of 2002 and the Security Package of 2009

1 North Italians vs Regime of the Parties/Mafia State 2 Popular sovereignty via federalism/ secessionism

Lega (Post-1989 Context)

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Populist Regionalism 169 ‘Poor,’ ‘mistreated,’ and ‘exploited’: all words which help establish the underdog status of the Piedmontese citizen. The communiqué released by the MARP identifies politicians and bureaucrats, and most significantly the partitocrazia as the ‘up-group’ or ‘elite’ and thus the principal enemies of regional autonomy, and the northern people. Piedmontese autonomists would later also depict victories in the communal council of Vercelli as evidence that a ‘large part of the Italian electorate has lost all trust in political parties’ programmes,’69 while their Lombard counterparts in the build-up to the 1958 national elections would claim that ‘for years, Bergamo has been taken advantage of by ministers, parliament, and government.’70 Regionalism was depicted by the MRAs as the only guarantee of returning popular sovereignty from this elite with both the MARP and the MAB arguing that ‘the cure’ to the partitocrazia was ‘an effective regional and communal decentralisation’.72 The MRAs stated that centralisation empowered the partitocrazia, thus meaning that any proposals of regional reform were against the parties’ interests.73 While the MAB spoke of the similarity between the Italian parties and that they had ‘become instruments of propaganda,’74 the MARP also drew an equivalence between ‘Red and White Bolshevism,’ thus conflating (Red) Communism and (White) Christian Democracy. Key to the MRAs articulation of regionalism through populist discourse was, therefore, a focus on presenting itself not as political parties but as movements which were ‘conducted by free men […] tired of the partitocrazia and the bureaucratic centralism of Rome’.75 In terms of pre-existing political sub-cultures, two of the MARP’s key members, Enrico Villarboito and Michele Rosboch, had briefly been members of the Liberal Party prior to joining the MARP, thus reflecting a dissident Liberal current running through the movement.76 Meanwhile, the MAB also appealed to a strongly rooted Catholic political sub-culture in Bergamo.77 The movement claimed that the party had betrayed Bergamo in not activating the regional statutes due to it being the ‘province most loyal to Christian Democracy’.78 The MARP’s plea to voters to ‘choose Piedmont before the parties’ in 1956 was typical of the MRAs’ juxtaposition of the region against the centralist state.79 The movement stated, ‘we are delighted to confirm that in our list we have no “great names“ because we have purposefully excluded them’.80 The MRAs argued that ‘the region will not destroy the parties, it will allow for the regional version of the parties which is what already exists in countries with a regional or federal structure’.81 This regional version of the parties was seen as holding the potential for a more direct connection between parties and ‘the people’ with the suggestion that ‘nobody should be able to have a seat in parliament or a ministerial portfolio if they have not first passed the exam of sitting in regional government’.82

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The MRAs’ populist regionalism was articulated around hostility towards post-war parliamentary politics, a connection to pre-1945 fascist politics, and a revolt of the small against the big. This brand of politics, therefore, held points in common with Giannini’s UQ and the first wave of post-war right-wing extremism, but also the Poujadism of the second wave. Similarities to both UQ and Poujadism are notable in how the MRAs depicted all parties of the ‘partitocrazia’ as the same and the leftright axis as irrelevant,83 arguing that there was ‘a tacit agreement between the parties to simply ignore the Constitution and happily continue along the old path of centralism’.84 Similar to the UQ’s and Poujadism’s opposition to bureaucracy, the MAB aimed to ‘free Bergamascans from bureaucratic slavery,’ arguing that the partitocrazia was responsible for the ‘lack of unity throughout Italy and lack of faith in the political system’.85 Guido Calderoli stated that ‘we have fallen, in the last ten years following the liberation, into a bureaucratic servitude’.86 Breaking free from this servitude was emphasised in several posters which would later provide inspiration for the Lega.87 The MRAs’ populist discourse directed against an Italian government made up of former anti-fascist parties was connected, in part, to the movements being a safe haven for those who sympathisesd with the previous Fascist regime. The MARP in particular attracted former members of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF – National Fascist Party) party. Among the leading members of the Piedmontese autonomists were individuals such as Michele Rosboch and Franco Bruno who had been particularly active members of the PNF; Bruno had been a ‘tenacious supporter of the regime and was a member of the directorate of the “fascio” of Turin’ and for this reason, at the moment of Turin’s liberation, Bruno ‘was forced to flee his birth town, Altare, to avoid recriminations’.88 Meanwhile, Rosboch’s activism was marked by his request to take part in the Ethiopian campaign as a volunteer for the MSVN (fascist blackshirts).89 The MARP’s founder, Enrico Villarboito, also joined the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) prior to joining the Liberal Party and then the MARP.90 The MARP held the UQ in high esteem, praising its founder, Giannini, for ‘having fought against the tyranny of the Committees for National Liberation (CLN)’ and ‘ensuring Italy’s freedom’.91 However, the autonomists emphasised that ‘regionalism was not Qualunquismo’ because the Piedmontese were, unlike Giannini, now fighting against a ‘new tyranny’ of the ‘partitocrazia married with centralist bureaucracy’.92 With regards to a ‘revolt of the small against the big,’ this is related to the MRAs’ discourse of exploitation and is linked in particular to Poujadism. In the case of the MRAs, this was articulated in the ‘little man’ against big government and big business. The MARP, in particular, had originally been a union of small businesses and traders against taxes.93

Populist Regionalism 171 These particular origins of the MARP led to a direct appeal to this group of voters in the lead up to the 1958 elections: Business owners! … the MARP is your movement – it was born for you and principally for you! … Vote for the MARP, and you will vote to protect yourselves, your businesses, your jobs and your livelihood!94 Indeed, the main source of funding for the MARP came ‘from small to medium businessmen’.95 The MARP wrote numerous articles in support of small businessmen, including a piece by the future MARP councillor, Mario Vezzani, who was described in police reports as ‘the most Poujadist member of the MARP’.96 Vezzani wrote, ‘Business Owners: the voice of Piedmont is reawakening […] only the Region will be able to end the economic, financial and moral ills which afflict us’.97 While the MAB did not share the same origins as the MARP as a ‘union of businessmen’, the Bergamascan movement certainly held strong affinities with Poujadist politics claiming to represent the squeezed ‘piccoli popoli’ against sending taxes to Rome.98 Wasteful centralism was seen as a malaise caused by the partitocrazia and connected to state intervention. The MRAs argued strongly for economic liberalism promoted private enterprise as opposed to state ownership of industries.99 With regards to a discourse of exploitation, this relates strongly to the issue of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno introduced in chapter 4. The MRAs’ opposition to this measure depicted admininstrative centralism as an exploitative system which targeted the hard-working North and favoured the South. This issue of exploitation is highlighted clearly in an image designed by the MARP which depicts Rome as a greedy and insatiable siren sitting in the Trevi Fountain. Surrounding this siren are Piedmontese citizens pouring bags of money in the form of taxes in a vain attempt to satisfy the greed of the Roman elites. Such crude imagery, which sought to symbolise Roman wastefulness and corruption, as, established in chapter 3 of this book would provide the framework for the image of the ‘Hen with the Golden Egg,’ designed by the MAB in 1958. One of the key motivations for regional autonomy was, therefore, that the ‘Piedmontese are tired of paying taxes and duties in a larger quantity than any other region and receiving in return little or nothing’.100 Nevertheless, the MRAs recognised the need for financial help for the South. The MARP stated that we are aware of the necessity of collaborating for the improvement in the quality of life for depressed areas with careful and gradual investment […] we say yes to helping but no to handouts.101

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Therefore, while very much rooted in the context of ‘post-1945 populist discourse,’ the MRA’s construction of a Northern ‘people’ against the partitocrazia and its depiction of an exploited North at the hand of centralist bureaucracy created a framework on which the Lega would build in the 1980s and 1990s. The following subsection, through analysis of articles from Lega Nord mouthpieces Lombardia Autonomista, Piemont Autonomista, and writings by Umberto Bossi, as well as academic literature, highlights how this was adapted in line with ‘post-1989 populist discourse,’ thus contributing to the evolution of populist regionalism. 5.1.2.1.2 POST-1989 POPULIST DISCOURSE. THE LEGA – CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

A dichotomy between ‘the people and the elites’ was a common theme of the Lega in the late 1980s and early 1990s and reveals definite continuities with the MRAs, in particular in its focus on the partitocrazia. In 1991, the Lega gained a narrow majority on the communal council of Brescia, a Lombard town east of Milan. When other parties, in particular the Christian Democrats (DC) which had arrived a close second in number of votes, refused to govern with the Lega, the party’s mouthpiece Lombardia Autonomista argued that this was ‘the clearest demonstration of how little respect the partitocrazia holds towards the will of the communities and the popular will expressed by the vote’.102 The results of the Brescia elections were used by the Lega to argue that ‘the ideologies of the centre, the left, and the right’ were ‘unable to represent the people’s demands’.103 This was backed by Piemont Autonomista which claimed that regionalism was a political alternative, ‘separate from the ideologies of the parties’ and put forward a call to ‘substitute the party ideologies […] with the values and common sense of Piedmont’.104 Also similar to the MRAs, which had claimed that regional autonomy would bring democracy closer to the people, Bossi argued that ‘only our reforms … can safeguard democracy which is threatened by the partitocrazia, and give the country back to the people’.105 Meanwhile Piemont Autonomista also mirrored MRA discourse with its claim that the partitocrazia could be ‘combatted effectively with regional autonomy […] bringing honest and competent men chosen directly by the Piedmontese’.106 Turning now to adiscourse of exploitation, further to the image of the ‘Hen with the Golden Egg,’ examined in chapter 3, which would later be reproduced by the Lega, there were elements of continuity regarding the depiction of regional autonomy as a form of breaking free from the centralist partitocrazia. Indeed, the language used by the Lega reflected this with articles in Piemont Autonomista stressing the need to ‘break away from the chains of […] centralist Roman power’ and ‘excessive power of

Populist Regionalism 173 the parties of Rome’.107 Piemont Autonomista argued that ‘with autonomy, the resources of Piedmont will go to the productive categories: small to medium businesses, entrepreneurs, small business holders, artisans, and farmers’.108 Bossi also claimed that ‘the Lega represents the squeezed North which is completely fed up (arcistufo) with this way of doing things’.109 Further to this, the Lega called for a series of tax revolts in the early 1990s with slogans such as ‘Stop taxes to Rome,’ ‘Refusal to pay property tax is a moral duty,’ and ‘The Thieving Regime vs The Free North’.110 It was partly for these reasons that in 1993 Pierre Poujade himself labelled leghismo as an ‘updated version of Poujadism’.111 However, such an assertion overlooks how the Lega represented a break with ‘post-1945 populist discourse,’ contributing instead to the construction of ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ in the previously established ‘post-1989’ context. A closer analysis of the Lega’s political message reveals some important discontinuities with the MRAs as its populist regionalism formed part of a post-1989 rejection of the post-war consensus. The party’s main goal was ‘that of breaking down the prevailing political and social consensus and attacking partyocracy, consociationalism, and state welfarism’.112 In terms of political sub-cultures, this represented a radical departure from the MRAs as the Lega exploited the vacuum left by the DC in former ‘white zones’ and turning them into ‘green zones’.113 Indeed, the conscious appeal of the Lega to former DC voters can be seen in a feature of the newspaper in both Lombardia Autonomista and Lega Italia Federale entitled ‘i Cattolici votano Lega’ (Catholics vote for the League) which portrayed the Lega as the natural home for Catholic voters.114 This formed part of a wider Lega message that ‘Catholic centralism [was] incompatible with federalism’ and that ‘many Catholics [had] decided to rid themselves of the fraudsters of the partitocrazia and to choose the Lega for a true renewal of political life’.115 As highlighted in chapter 4, in terms of a break with the post-war consensus and returning sovereignty to the people, the Lega did not advocate the regional statutes sanctioned by the constitution, but rather neo-federalism and fiscal federalism. Neo-federalism referred to a plan to reform the institutional framework of the Italian state so that the country would be divided into a confederation of three macro-regions: Padania in the North, Etruria in the Centre, and ‘the South.’116 Fiscal federalism, on the other hand, referred to the ability of local governments to have greater control over raising taxes.117 The Lega’s version of federalism lay at the heart of any solution to ‘Roma Ladrona,’ as is shown once again in Bossi’s writings, which state that ‘our fiscal policy is intrinsically linked to our federalist thesis and the proposal of the subdivision of the State into three republics: North, Centre, and South’.118 The notion of a separate state of Padania as an oppressed nation was present in editions of Lombardia

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Autonomista during the early 1990s as a possible way of reclaiming sovereignty from the ‘partitocrazia’.119 In contrast to the MRAs, therefore, which had argued that the bureaucratic centralism of the political class could be reformed at a regional level, the Lega put forward the claim that the partitocrazia was beyond redemption and unable to reform. Indeed, even before the declaration of the independence of Padania, Bossi expressed his conviction that the partitocrazia will not be able to change course, because no longer exploiting the North to exploit the south would mean undermining the roots of their power. This political class will sink with this rotten and corrupt state.120 This also raises the issue of how the language adopted by the Lega formed part of post-1989 populist discourse. This is reflected by terms such as ‘mafia’ were to protest against corruption and collusion in established political parties. In particular, following the Tangentopoli scandals, the Lega’s populist regionalism focused instead on how the partitocrazia was criminal and had outlived its purpose. The party complained of ‘the increasingly Mafioso and clientelistic’ nature of the parties and accused the political class of being ‘puppets of the mafia of parties and/or parties of the mafia’.121 The Lega used this discourse in order to shift the focus away from Milan, the epicentre of the ‘Tangentopoli’ scandals, stating Poor Milan! A city famous in the world for its efficiency, for its hardworking nature, has ended up on the front pages of all the newspapers with the nickname ‘Tangentopoli’. It certainly is not the fault of the Milanese citizens … but of a corrupt, and political class which has … succeeded in abusing public money with the typical modes of Roman centralism.122 The image of Roma Ladrona had therefore evolved since the 1950s. It was now used in order to divert the focus of attack from Milan and the North towards Rome and the South.123 The Lega presented Rome as the South writ large which enabled the party to focus not only on the wasteful centralism of Rome, but also liken it to a ‘Mafia state’, thus illustrating the post-1989 emphasis on corruption and criminality and the notion of political parties as a ‘caste’ or ‘mafia’. This protest against corruption and criminality was linked to the Lega’s opposition to the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, which relates to a further key aspect of post-1989 populist discourse, which was a reaction against the heavily bureaucratised welfare state. The context of ‘the fiscal crisis’ of the state and the corruption crisis enveloping the political class in the early 1990s ‘provided the favourable

Populist Regionalism 175 terrain for the emergence of counter-hegemonic populist movements and parties’.124 The Lega argued that criminality and mafiosità had become the principle raison d’être of the Italian state and the Cassa formed a part of this. Bossi stated that ‘the generosity of the North has […] done nothing apart from enrich the network of corruption and criminal dealings’.125 The Lega’s main critique of the use of the Cassa was that the South had ‘been allowed to stagnate by decades of state handouts’.126 Finally, while the MRAs had not advocated for an abandonment of this state body, the Lega claimed it was no longer sustainable. Bossi stated that ‘the current Italian public finance system, based on transfers from region to region to local bodies, based on a logic of random distribution which has denied any criteria of economic efficiency, has to stop’.127 While this section has, therefore, dealt principally with a ‘people vs elites’ discourse, in the case of the Lega’s arguments surrounding ‘Roma Ladrona’ and a ‘mafioso political class,’ there are fuzzy borders between this party’s populist and nativist discourse. These arguments, based as they are on an ethnic and exclusionary vision of the North, link to a broader xenophobic and racist discourse directed against southern Italians. Such ideas held significant roots in MRA discourse and form the focus of the following case study. 5.1.2.2 The Discursive Construction of the ‘Non-Native’ against the ‘Native’ in North Italy

While the previous case study focused on how the MRAs and the Lega employed a populist argument of pitting the centralist regime of the parties against the productive North, it also touched on anti-southern discourse which formed an important part of nativism. With this in mind, the following case study illustrates point C) of the populist regionalist framework. As outlined in chapter 1 of this book, this nativist discursive feature is an add-on component relevant to ethnic, and exclusionary iterations of regionalism. An examination of archival documents and secondary literature as follows will illustrate how each wave of activism constructed a Northern identity in oppositional terms with the South. The MRAs, in representing the first political manifestation of anti-immigrant and antisouthern discourse in post-war Italy, helped formulate a nativism which would later be developed by leghismo to oppose not only a ‘southern hegemony’ but also migration from abroad and, in particular, the figure of ‘the Muslim’. Building on Cento Bull’s assertion that the Lega is ‘a political party which has exploited racist sentiments already present among the Lombard population,’128 this case study will also address a question posed by the same author of

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why the diffused quasi-racist attitudes of so many Northern Italians only found political expression and representation in the later 1980s and early 1990s and not in the 1950s and 1960s, when immigration from the South to the North undoubtedly created tension and illfeelings among the ‘indigenous’ population.129 By contending that the MRAs did indeed provide the political expression and representation for such tension and ill feelings, this section of the chapter expands on existing work which has noted the relevance of postwar autonomists in providing an outlet for anti-southern racism.130 5.1.2.2.1 POST-1945 NATIVIST DISCOURSE – THE MRAS

The MARP, in 1956, wrote of the need for ‘a new administration capable of making Turin great again and giving Piedmont back to the Piedmontese!’.131 Two years later, the MAB’s exponents promoted a ‘Lombardy for the Lombards!’ and ‘Bergamo for the Bergamascans!’132 Such slogans invite the question of who was and, perhaps more importantly, who was not Piedmontese, Lombard, and/or Bergamascan in the eyes of the MRAs. The regional identity proposed by the post-war regionalists was based around an ethnic and exclusionary vision of the region which was constructed, in part, against a ‘non-native’ component of the migrant from the South. This was in response to post-war migration patterns from the South to the North, which would be a key component of the post-war ‘economic miracle.’ As Foot has highlighted, one of the main ‘clichès’ of migration during this period is that it was ‘overwhelmingly from the “deep south”’.133 In fact, migration to the two regions at the heart of ‘the miracle,’ Piedmont and Lombardy, also took place from within their borders (both urban to urban and rural to urban) as well as from neighbouring northern regions, such as the Veneto. While both MRAs, to a certain extent, acknowledged this fact, the political expediency of focusing principally on the Southern Italian (pejoratively termed as ‘Terrone’ ), whose otherness was deeply rooted in the history of the Italian state and the long-standing ‘Southern Question,’ was part of a discursive strategy to construct in-groups and out-groups. The MRAs, therefore, presented immigration from the South as a threat to the region. One of the MARP’s electoral slogans from the late-1950s promised to ‘Kick Naples out of Turin’ (‘Fuori Napoli da Torino’), with Naples acting as a metonymical device for the entire South. This was cited as ‘one of the main reasons for the MARP’s electoral success among the local middle classes’ in Piedmont.134 Immigration was, therefore, depicted as an ‘invasion’ of Turin and therefore a threat, with the MARP making spurious statistical claims regarding the arrival of southerners Turin:

Populist Regionalism 177 unfortunately, in seven years, the face of our city has changed profoundly. Over 200,000 individuals have come from the South and have invaded every corner of the city.135 The MAB’s electoral campaign in 1956 also presented migration as an invasion by ‘Sicilians, Calabrians, Puglians, and Neapolitans’.136 While the MARP argued that ‘it is the duty of citizens to ask first for our children to be housed and then say yes to immigration but a firm no to invasion,’137, the MAB claimed that ‘the best jobs’ were being systematically taken away from ‘Bergmascans’ by southerners.138 The MRAs’ also claimed that taxation imposed on the squeezed middle classes was made ‘much worse by the continuous influx of migrants’.139 The MRAs posed the question of ‘what is the purpose of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno if it doesn’t manage to employ southerners in their regions and they continue to come to the North?’140 The aforementioned images of the ‘Greedy Siren’ in the Trevi Fountain and the subsequent iteration of the ‘Hen with the Golden Egg’, therefore, not only represented a populist discourse of the people vs the elites. They also depicted a stereotypical dichotomy between the ‘hardworking North’ and the ‘lazy Mediterranean South,’ which, represented a key part of a nativist discourse.141 The MRAs at times articulated a ‘non-natives’ versus ‘natives’ discourse via a populist logic. In other words, Roman elites were not only depicted in MRA discourse as responsible for imposing migration on the north, but state institutions were often viewed as ‘southernised’ i.e. as predominantly occupied by southern functionaries. In terms of post-1945 nativist discourse, this threat to the region was linked to a perceived ‘colonisation’ of bureaucratic posts in the North and the idea that ‘local administrative offices should be run by natives’.142 Leading MAB exponent Anselmo Freddi noted that in the 1956 elections, ‘the MAB became more identified with the expression of the discontent for the continued arrival of southern bureaucrats’ and argued that ‘local administrative offices should be run by a Lombard or Bergamascan’.143 Another mabista, Guido Calderoli claimed that ‘in Bergamo, in these past ten years there has been no Bergamascan judge, not even a Lombard one: all of them have been foreigners […] the same can be said for numerous other key jobs’.144 Calderoli complained that Bergamo was ‘treated worse than a colony’ also stated that 86 of our 92 prefects are southerners. ‘The 90 out of our 92 police chiefs are southerners […] soon foreigners will be in charge of everything’.145 The following statement from a contributor to Piemonte Nuovo also spoke of a similar problem arguing that ‘in Piedmont, one can hear Southern-speak in government offices […] Who is in charge of Piedmont, the Piedmontese or the Southerners?’146 In preparation for the 1958 national elections, the MAB claimed that Bergamo had been

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‘invaded by too many southern bureaucrats’.147 The MRAs, therefore, provided ‘concrete evidence of both the spread of anti-southerner attitudes and of one of the first attempts at organising those sentiments in the political domain of Republican Italy’.148 The Piedmontese autonomists, for instance, presented southern Italians as a foreign component in Piedmont, complaining that ‘every hour, three meridionali arrive in Turin […] taking jobs away from Piedmontese citizens’.149 A racist and racialised process of ‘othering’ of southern Italians was therefore also present in this discourse. This was a dual process in the sense that in racialising southern Italians, the MRAs were, in turn, racializing northerners. A case in point is how Calderoli had argued that an influx of ‘foreigners’ (referring to southerners) into Bergamo was tantamount to a ‘genocide’ of the native Alpine people.150 This conspiracist discourse preceded what would later become known as ‘Great Replacement theory’151 and would be echoed by the MARP’s argument that Rome was pursuing a policy of ‘depiedmontisation’and that Piedmont was being overrun by ‘meridionali’.152 To this end, co-operatives to reserve work for ‘real Piedmontese’ were promoted to counter those of ‘southern workers’.153 Such discourse hints at notions of ‘whiteness’ fostered by the MRAs. Indeed, referring to northerners and southerners living in the same region, the 1950s autonomists forwarded the notion that ‘however hard they try, the government will never be able to amalgamate men of such different races,’ claiming that ‘whoever is from the North is always able to recognise a southerner at first glance, and vice versa’.154 Notions of ‘southern criminality’ played a role in racialisation. The MRAs often conflated migration with crime stating that immigrants are ‘always implicated in muggings and beatings […] putting at risk the safety of Turin’s citizens’.155 Southern Italians were portrayed as ‘inevitably end up shoring up the ranks of delinquents, thieves, prostitutes, and individuals dedicated to the criminal world.’156 Northern dialect was also portrayed as under threat by the use of ‘foreign’ southern dialects: ‘every day we see songs, speeches, comedies in Neapolitan from RAI […] while Torinesi is forced to feel ashamed by their dialect’.157 Calderoli also claimed it was a southern bureaucrat’s duty to learn to understand Bergamascan or at least employ an interpreter, writing that many mountain folk can’t speak Italian, or speak it badly […] Mr Bureaucrat, do you not feel any moral obligation to learn a little Bergamascan, or at least employ an interpreter? Is speaking Bergamascan something to be ashamed of?158 The MAB also argued that it was unjust for ‘teachers from Palermo who have won concorsi to take the place of teachers of Bergamo,’159 arguing that ‘sending elementary teachers from the South to our mountain valleys is

Populist Regionalism 179 counter-productive […] differences in needs, in customs, and habits and way of life constitute an insurmountable barrier to academic life’.160 This racialisation of southern Italians was rooted in post-1945 nativist discourse which saw the use of the aforementioned terms meridionale and terrone to essentialise a group of people and give political expression to anti-southern sentiment. Claims were made that ‘many fathers have protested against the difficulty that their children have met in elementary classrooms. They say that they do not understand anything that the terrone teacher tells them’.161 The MAB also argued that it was unjust for ‘teachers from Palermo who have won concorsi to take the place of teachers of Bergamo.’162 Alongside this, the term ‘terrone’ itself was used with regular frequency in writings from MRA activists, with Calderoli, for example, complaining that a ‘good part of’ those working in local administration in Bergamo were terroni.163 Some exponents of the MAB attenpted to qualify such exclusionary language, arguing it was due to ‘the necessity of the electoral battle’ which ‘forced our speakers to go beyond the simple and orthodox arguments of the autonomist;’ nevertheless this nativist discourse was reflective of longstanding racialisation of southern Italians which was given fresh impetus by the MRAs.164 In terms of an emphasis on assimilation/acceptable transformation of the problem of difference or stopping the invasion, the MRAs unshakable faith in the Republican Constitution’s ability to solve regional problems also related to proposals to stop migration to the North. The MARP and the MAB both claimed – falsely – that Title V of the Constitution, which contained the articles pertaining to regional autonomy, would provide a solution to ‘uncontrolled migration’ to their regions. The MAB stated that ‘defending the natural right of residence, for which nobody should have to be forced, if not for extreme and just motives, to abandon their place of birth,’ was strongly linked to ‘the realisation of regional autonomy […] as is allowed by article 117 of the Constitution’.165 Further to this, the Bergamascan autonomists argued that ‘when regional autonomy is activated […] it will no longer be seen necessary to emigrate to other regions’.166 The MARP echoed this idea stating that ‘only regional government will allow us to examine the problem of immigration from a morally and economically advantageous perspective’.167 Additionally, however, the MARP had suggested implementing the aforementioned fascist law of 1939 which had prohibited Italians from ‘transferring their residency to a major centre unless they already had a job there’.168 Claiming that this law had not yet been abrogated, the movement argued the application of the 1939 law is not in contradiction with article 16 of the new constitution [… it … ] could be applied effectively to prevent the movement of those who not having secured themselves a stable job.169

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The MRAs did, however, recognise the economic necessity of migration stating, ‘let it be clear that we do not propose a complete block of migration […] it would not be wise to impose unnecessary limits on the workforce’.170 The MRAs’ policy of exclusion of southerners from Lombardy and Piedmont did not mean to exclude them completely from a more national heartland which could be found through regional government. This was linked strongly to an element of post-1945 nativism, i.e. an orientalist discourse of nationbuilding. The movements argued that the North and the South ‘could not be governed with the same laws’171 and that Italy would ‘be united only when more ample and wide-ranging autonomies were granted to each region’.172 One MARP exponent, Roberto Codazza, in a letter addressed to all southern migrants in Turin published in the MARP’s mouthpiece Piemonte Nuovo drew on Piedmont’s role in the Risorgimento to remind southerners that ‘we fought in order to unite your lands to ours in one Italy.’ Codazza, in an attempt to distance himself from accusations of anti-southernism, in his address to southern migrants, stated, ‘don’t think that we don’t want you as part of Italy!’173 Similarly, the MAB emphasised the need for Northerners and Southerners to ‘become more Italian’ and encouraged greater ‘fraternity between North and South’ by arguing that ‘reflecting […] upon the divisions between North and South … encouraged greater solidarity and balance in the nation.’174 The MRA slogan of ‘aiutare sì, mantenere no!’ (Let us help them, but not through handouts!) related to the idea that175 southern Italians, therefore, should be taught to help themselves in their own regions. The MARP stated that We are often accused of being anti-southern … simply because we want the full activation of the regions … we hope that in every other part of Italy, everybody else is working for their own region.176 Southern Italians were, therefore, encouraged to work to strengthen their own region: you can only solve your own problems by staying in your own homes and fighting to obtain the right to administer yourselves, we will gladly help you as equals, without making you rely on handouts.177 These nativist discursive repertoires of contention set significant template for the second wave of activism which would be impacted by the post-1989 discursive field. 5.1.2.2.1.1 Post-1989 Nativist Discourse. The Lega: Continuities and Discontinuities The Lega’s anti-southern discourse owed much to the MRAs. Lega slogans such as ‘I am Lombard, I vote Lombard’ and

Populist Regionalism 181 ‘Piedmont for the Piedmontese’178 used in the 1980s and 1990s were complemented by details in party programmes demanding that housing and jobs be reserved for Lombards and the Piedmontese who had been resident the region for at least five years.179 The Lega also claimed ‘the South is stealing our jobs,’ arguing that the closure of the Marelli factory in Turin had been orchestrated by the ‘southern political class’ to benefit the South.180 Echoing the MRAs’ campaigns against Southern migration, the Piedmontese section of the Lega in the late 1980s complained that Turin had become ‘the third southern city in Italy’181 and posed the question of how ‘will we manage to form the Piedmontese of tomorrow?’, thus suggesting an exclusionary vision of the region which did not consider ‘southerners’ as part of Piedmont.182 Moioli’s observation that ‘hostility towards the “terrone” as a public functionary’ formed a key part of the Lega’s anti-southern attitude is further reinforced by Cento Bull who has stated that ‘one of the main components of the Northern League’s anti-southern attitude is the transfer of southern employees to publicservice jobs in the North’.183 Mirroring to an extent Guido Calderoli’s campaign against Southern Bureaucrats in the North, Umberto Bossi claimed that ‘Rome has transformed the North into a colony with excessive southern population’.184 He accused Southern Italians of ‘degrading’ Lombardy into a ‘land of conquest’ exposing northerners to ‘the choices of a political class […] of a largely southern origin’ which shared ‘no sense of belonging’ with Lombards.185 Further to a discourse of southern migration as a threat, the process of racialisation of southern Italians, therefore, continued under the Lega.186 Perhaps the clearest example of this is through a series of posters released in the 1980s and early 1990s by the Lega with titles such as ‘Basta Mafia,’ ‘Alt all-invio dei Mafiosi in Lombarda!’, and ‘Scuola Coloniale Basta!’.187 The first two slogans focused on the ‘soggiorno obbligato’ (forced resettlement) of mafiosi to northern regions. A campaign against this state policy by the Lega served to conflate the entire southern population in the North with mafiosi, thus exploiting old stereotypes of ‘southern criminality’ which had also been present in the 1950s. The Lega stated its desire to ‘prevent the use of Lombardy’ as a destination of ‘immigrants who had committed crimes’.188 ‘Scuola Coloniale Basta!’ on the other hand valorised of ‘regional dialect’ and argued that ‘in our schools, we must speak our own language’ and ‘our teachers must not remain unemployed to allow the employment of “others”’.189 The use of dialect to ‘other’ the Southerner, who did not speak it, and also an insistence that concorsi (competitive exams) to become a teacher should be held at regional level to preference North Italians, also represented a level of continuity.190 Following this campaign, posters emerged in Trentino in 1992 with the Lega Nord emblem which invited Southern Italians to leave region and

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‘return home.’ While the Trentino posters were quickly disowned by Bossi and attributed to an overly zealous youth wing of the party, they were nevertheless merely the cruder and more illiberal articulation of the dog whistle racism of the series of ‘Basta!’ posters in the preceding years.191 Racist attitudes towards southern Italians also emerged in a discourse which depicted a modern ‘European’ North being held back by a backward ‘African’ South unable to contribute towards pushing Italy towards ‘Europe’.192 MAB exponent Anselmo Freddi’s aforementioned pragmatic view of anti-southern discourse as ‘the necessity of the electoral battle’ can be seen as a precursor to comments from Umberto Bossi, who claimed that leghismo’s hostile position towards the South had merely been a ‘Trojan horse’ to attract the attention of the media and the electorate.193 In terms of assimilation or stopping the invasion, Bossi’s call for southerners to ‘find answers for themselves via self-government’ echoed the MRAs’ exclusionary vision of a northern heartland, but within the framework of the Italian state.194 This discourse of ‘let us help them in their own homes’ demonstrates a significant continuity between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s nativism. The later creation of Padania emphasised this exclusionary heartland, with new borders of a northern ‘nation’ as it emphasised the impossibility of keeping together, without coercion, a multi-ethnic state […] in which Southerners represent the ‘foreign’ component: a state whose multi-ethnic character is determined by the presence of fellow Italians classified as non-Padani.195 Indeed, the Lega during its secessionist phase argued that a separate state of Padania would be of great benefit not just to the North but also to the South as it would teach it fiscal responsibility.196 After the abandonment of secessionism in 1999, the Lega continued to adapt the MRAs’ ‘aiutare sì mantenere no’ to become one of their ‘immutable principles’ of ‘aiutiamoli ad aiutarsi’ (let us help them help themselves) or ‘aiutiamoli a casa loro’ (let us help them in their own homes) to apply to both southern Italians and later to foreign migrants.197 Indeed, Bossi’s claims that ‘a Senegalese is better off tending to his affairs in Senegal than in Brescia’ provides a significant parallel with the MRAs’ insistence that each Italian should work to improve their own region.198 In terms of ‘stopping the invasion,’ the Lega was involved in drafting the Bossi-Fini immigration legislation of 2002 and the ‘Security Package of 2009,’199 which saw the linking of ‘employment with the ability to obtain a work permit or a visa’.200 This can be seen as a continuity in the policy recommended by the MARP relating to the former Fascist law which would, in essence, also criminalised migration and linked it directly to employment.

Populist Regionalism 183 Furthermore, just as the MRAs had recognised that migration was necessary, ‘while the Lega has opposed immigration […] at the same time the industrialists of the party’s north-eastern heartland have campaigned for larger visa quotas and more immigrant labour’.201 However, this focus on foreign migration also indicated one of the many differences between the MRAs’ post-1945 and the Lega’s post-1989 nativist discourse. Despite some significant continuities, the Lega’s political message should be viewed through the lens of post-1989 nativist discourse. An important question arises here as to how the Lega was able to make a breakthrough in national elections using this anti-southern discourse, while the MRAs remained on the periphery of administrative politics. This can be explained through the Lega’s articulation of nativism with the logic of populism.202 A vital point here relates to how the Lega depicted the entirety of Italy’s political class as ‘southernised’. Indeed, the Lega ‘had attempted to forge a connection between the importation of the mafia to the North and the predominance of the southerners in public administration’.203 The enemy here is not simply the partitocrazia but an invading ‘migrant’ in the form of the southerner. The Lega, therefore, claimed that the state had been entirely colonised by one ethnic group, i.e. Southern Italians, and that by 2001, the North would have absolutely no representation in central government due to this ‘mafioso hegemony’.204 The Lega’s anti-southern nativist discourse was articulated as part of a broader ‘popular struggle by excluded and subordinated groups against the dominant bloc’ of the ‘southernised state’.205 While the MRAs had complained of southern occupation of bureaucratic posts, they had never suggested, as Bossi did, that ‘the entire state apparatus had been southernised’.206 The Lega, therefore, portrayed the entire Italian State, rather than just the North, as having been colonised by the South.207 A further point linked to post-1989 nativist discourse is a focus on foreign migration. The focus shifted to non-European immigrants (extracommunitari) during the late 1980s and early 1990s.208 The cultural differences between Northerners and Southerners highlighted by the MRAs were now articulated alongside racism directed towards external migration. The Lega in the 1980s and early 1990s promoted hard regional borders209 and fomented racist moral panics which depicted the north as being overrun by North African migrants. Arguments that ‘immigration from the Third World means fascism’210 involved depicting a multicultural society as being imposed on North Italians by an ‘authoritarian centralist state’.211 The Piedmontese section of the Lega stated, ‘we live in fear of this army of illegal immigrants of colour, with their colonising, rampant invasion, irreconcilable with our customs and life’.212 Just as the MRAs had argued that southerners had represented this threat in the 1950s, Piemont Autonomista also stated that

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The few jobs that remain must go exclusively to Piedmontese residents and not the new arrivals […] if the ‘guests’ do not adapt to our civilisation […] send them back to where they came from.213 The invasion discourse shifted towards the ‘non-native’ from abroad with the idea of a ‘great replacement’ present in questions of ‘where will we put the millions of immigrants arriving in Italy’214 and arguments that ‘jobs and houses should be reserved for those who belong here’.215 While promoting a federalist Europe, the Lega also claimed that ‘Italy was being transformed into a multi-cultural society against the will of its citizens by mass immigration from the Maghreb countries and (after 1989) Albania’.216 Bossi presented regionalism, at least in part, as a way of guaranteeing Northern sovereignty in terms of controlling its borders against migration. The Lega connected foreign migration to the aforementioned racialisation of southern Italians, highlighting how the mafia and/or organised crime groups affiliated to the mafia sometimes exploited new arrivals to Italy, employing them to sell counterfeit products on the streets of North Italian cities. The term vu cumprà (a racist reference to how street vendors of these products sometimes pronounced ‘vuoi comprare’? – do you want to buy?) became a common way of labelling and racializing foreign migrants in Lega discourse.217 Both Cento Bull and Gilbert, and Garau have referred to the writings of Gilberto Oneto and the release of documents such as Padania, identità e società multi-razziale which marked a significant shift in the Lega’s nativist discourse.218 The Lega’s primary objective became ‘the preservation of Padanian culture and identity from the powerful global forces arrayed against it – Fortress Padania.’219 Elaborating on this theory, Garau has argued that with the invention of Padania […] the presence of immigrants was perceived […] as carrying an inner cultural and ethnic difference absolutely incompatible with Northerners values.220 The Lega used Padania to offer a narrow definition of citizenship and campaign against ‘racial and ethnic minorities who will not “assimilate” into the desired culture’.221 In contrast to the MRAs encouraging southerners to ‘become more Italian,’ no such nation-building project was afforded to foreign migration by the Lega. Indeed, as has been argued by Garau, the Lega as a member of governing coalitions ‘has actively participated in the creation of an exclusionary Italian identity’ against migration from abroad.222 Significant discontinuity can also be seen in the Lega’s ‘fortress Europe’ mentality i.e. stopping a perceived invasion of Europe’s borders from both documented and undocumented migrants’.223

Populist Regionalism 185 While the MRAs claimed that regional autonomy would tackle the causes of migration because migration would no longer be necessary, on the contrary, the Bossi-Fini law ‘refused to confront the global phenomenon of migration and the causes which motivate it’.224 This is due to the fact that while the Lega claimed ‘migration ought to be temporary as it concerns the Italian economic present and not the Italian cultural future,’ the MRAs did indeed concern themselves with both Italy’s economic and cultural future, arguing that Italy would be further benefitted by southerners working to improve their own region.225 The language adopted by the Bossi-Fini bill also represented a significant change, maintaining ‘the public focus on the repressive an authoritarian aura of the legislation’ such as proposals ‘for the use of naval force against boats carrying immigrants’ and for ‘the collection of biometric data when immigrants applied for or renewed resident permits’.226 In terms of the post-1989 nativist discourse emphasis on juxtaposing Islam against perceived European Christian values, a focus on an ‘Islamic invasion’ was present as early as 1992, with the Lega exploiting the Algerian civil war to conflate Islamic Front extremists in Algeria in the 1990s with Islam in general.227 Great replacement and clash of civilisation narratives played a role in Bossi’s early writings with warnings that “mondialism imposes a multi-racial society with its ethnic, social, and cultural tension”228 and that Italy faced an “Islamic invasion”’. Ideas of a ‘Christian Europe’ also emerged in this period in Lega propaganda, with statements such as A Catholic citizen cannot but vote for the Lega, the political force whose federalist vision guarantees the defence of those Christian principles which lie at the root of our civilisation.229 This preceded the discourse of ‘Eurabia’ supported by the Lega which was to form part of a post-1989 nativist discourse, drawing on Islamophobia and cultural racism, with references to a perceived proliferation of mosques in Italy, and the perceived threat this posed to ‘Italian culture and traditions’.230 Such discourse was particularly prevalent following the attacks of 9/11, which represented a ‘godsend for the Lega,’ helping as it did, the framing of immigration as an ‘existential threat to the very survival of the identities and cultures of northern Italians’.231 This was key to the Lega’s construction of Islam in the portrayal of Islam ‘not only as a monolith but as a belief system synonymous with acts of terrorism (mainly against Christians)’.232 A shift to Padanian nationalism arguably brought the Lega more in step with other far right parties in Europe, with greater emphasis on defending ‘national’ borders,233 a pivot towards Euroscepticism (following Italy’s acceptance into the EMU in 1998), and a

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growing ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse which pitted (white) Christian Italians against a Muslim ‘other,’ particularly following 9/11. In line with the discourse of the European far right, the Lega in the 2000s therefore ‘stressed the need for a common Christian identity’ and, ‘extending this identity to all Italians,’ portrayed itself as protector of what it argued were ‘traditional Catholic Italian values’ in the face of foreign migration, arguing in various articles and propaganda against ‘hijabs and jihad’.234 Indeed, as noted by Barcella, towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the ‘North-South/centre-periphery’ fracture in Lega discourse was already becoming marginalised. If, at the beginning of the 1990s, the objective had been to ‘free the North of the various tentacles of the South,’ this had been gradually replaced with an increased focus on ‘eliminating all agents of social disorder’.235 This ‘increased focus on immigration, identity issues, and law and order’ set the scene for a new era under Salvini examined in chapter 6.236 5.2 Conclusion In this chapter, a cross-analysis of MRA and Lega discourse has sustained a discursive interpretation of populism and nativism by revealing how populist regionalism emerged in two separate contexts in Lombardy and Piedmont. Through an antagonistic discourse against the partitocrazia, the MRAs and the Lega depicted themselves as above the rightleft axis and denounced the political system as irrelevant while also depicting regionalism as the cure to a wasteful centralist elite and a guarantee of popular sovereignty. The MRAs should be considered in the context of post-1945 populist discourse and connected to both UQ and Poujadism, representing as they did small businesses, artisans, and, in general, the ‘piccoli popoli’ of the North against big government and interventionist states. Post-1945 populist discourse also relates to the fact that the MARP’s anti-party message was firmly rooted in a distrust of the CLN which was in turn connected to the fascist heritage of some of its members. This places it firmly in the Qualunquist line of thought regarding the partitocrazia, which was based on a conflation of all of the anti-fascist coalition as part of a new form of dictatorship being imposed on the country. Despite important cross-overs in the Poujadist fiscal revolt of the MRAs and the Lega, the Lega’s populist regionalism should be viewed through the lens of post-1989 populist discourse in which it sought to construct ‘the people’ in a post-Cold War era. The Lega’s campaign against the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was part of a reaction against a heavily bureaucratized welfare state.Meanwhile, its protest against the partitocrazia, in particular in the wake of the Tangentopoli scandals, also

Populist Regionalism 187 allowed the Lega to focus on another post-1989 populist narrative relating to organised crime and corruption, something which had been absent from the MRAs 1950s’ iteration of populist regionalism. The MRAs saw their campaign to implement regional autonomy as a way to reform the party system, ensure the survival of the First Italian Republic, and return sovereignty to the people via the regional statutes. The Lega, like the MRAs, had argued that the South would be better off managing its own resources; however, the actual form of ‘self-government’ is where this difference ultimately lies as the Lega, through its imagined nation-state of Padania, began speaking about both economic and cultural separation of the North and South. This chapter has also acknowledged how the fiscal protest used in the populist narratives used by the MRAs and the Lega was also aimed against the South and, more precisely, the institutions designed to help its development such as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. The preceding pages illustrated how the idea of non-native elements threatening the homogeneity of a community has strong roots in 1950s nativist discourse. This allowed the MRAs to define northerners in oppositional terms against southerners; presenting southern migration as a threat to northern jobs, housing, culture, and identity, the MRAs provided a nativist discourse which would later be exploited by the Lega. However, by claiming that the entire state apparatus had been southernised, the Lega, with references to mafiosità, could use nativist discourse as part of a radical counter-hegemonic project. Prior to the creation of Padania, there was a level of continuity in the way the MRAs and the Lega aimed to exclude southerners from their Northern heartland and create a homogeneous Northern region within the Italian nation. There were also significant continuities in how preventing an invasion was portrayed as beneficial for both natives and non-natives alike, with nativism being portrayed in philanthropic terms. Padania meant that the Lega’s rhetoric against the south and later against migration from abroad was accompanied by calling into question the Italian unity which had been central to the message of the MRAs. Padania also marked a key element in the Lega’s further shift to the far right, contributing as it did to a fundamental role in its exclusionary identity. Populist regionalism in the 1950s helped raise ‘impenetrable cultural barriers’ by ‘linking the concept of participatory citizenship to cultural roots’.237 However, Padania, with its new exclusive borders separating it from the Italian nation-state, focused on new threats posed by a multicultural and multi-racial society. The Lega’s contribution to legislation in the 2000s to – in their terms – ‘stop the invasion’ of a northern heartland reflected a different view of national and popular sovereignty from that of the MRAs. While the MRAs, to an extent, acted as precursors in their calls to limit the migration of ‘foreign’ southerners, their faith in the Constitution

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to limit migration reflects a clear discontinuity with the Lega. For the MRAs, the Constitutional statutes would help restore sovereignty to both the North and South. If each region agreed to work towards the greater unity of Italy, there would be a permanent place for northerners and southerners in the Italian state. By contrast, there was no permanent place for foreign migrants, particularly the essentialised figure of the ‘Muslim other,’ within either a Padanian or Italian heartland, with the Lega’s emphasis on ‘European Christian values.’ This ethnic and exclusionary ideology would be inherited and further pursued by Matteo Salvini in 2013, on his appointment as federal secretary. Under Salvini, populist and far right nationalism, while representing a departure from the Lega’s traditional cause, nevertheless owes much to both the ideology and discourse of not only Bossi’s party but also the MRAs of the 1950s. It is to this latest development in the Lega’s history that the book now turns. Notes 1 ‘Emilio Ferrero, ‘Capo del Comune di Praly - Il Primo Sindaco Marpista – La nomina ha suscitato in tutta la zona di Pinerolo il più vivo gradimento’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 1 September 1957). 2 Guido Calderoli, ‘La Bergamasca Invasa’, in Idem(ed.), Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958), 15–16. 3 Both the MRAs and the Lega used the term partitocrazia (regime of the parties) to signify a key antagonist against which to construct a Northern people. This term was first used by Italian Liberal Party (PLI) politicians Roberto Lucifero and Giuseppe Maranani to convey the idea that, ‘the coalition governments of the parties which had made up the CLN […] in some way configured a sort of new ‘single party’ dominating Italian society’and to indicate ‘a distortion of democratic regimes caused by the ‘occupation’ of public institutions by party ‘oligarchies’ averse to accountability and the sovereignty of the people’. For more details see: Alberto Giordano, Contro Il Regime: Panfilo Gentile e l’opposizione Liberale Alla Partitocrazia (1945–1970), Novecento Liberale / Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Roma (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010). Eugenio Capozzi, Partitocrazia: Il ‘Regime’ Italiano e i Suoi Critici, Prima Pagina 17 (Napoli: Guida, 2009). 4 Erica Capusotti, ‘Nordisti Contro Sudisti Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Europe: 1950s and 1960s’, Italian Culture 28, no.2: 121–122. 5 Ibid. 6 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’, in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy, History, Politics and Society, eds., A. Mammone, E. Giap Parini, and G. A. Veltri ( New York: Routledge, 2015) 211.

Populist Regionalism 189 7 Klaus von Beyme, ‘Right‐Wing Extremism in Post‐War Europe’, West European Politics 11, no. 2 (April 1988): 1–18 (11), https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402388808424678. 8 De Cleen and Stavrakakis, ‘Distinctions and articulations: A discourse theoretical framework for the study of populism and nationalism, 310. 9 Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 540. 10 Marco Tarchi, ‘Italy: A country of many populisms’ in Twenty First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, eds., Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007) 84–99, (89). See also, Marco Tarchi, Italia Populista: Dal Qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo, Contemporanea (Bologna: Il mulino, 2014). 11 Klaus Von Beyme, ‘Right Wing Extremism in Post-war Europe’, West European Politics 11, no. 2 (1988): 11. 12 Duggan, The Force of Destiny, 540. 13 Corduwener, ‘Challenging Parties and Anti-fascism in the name of democracy’, 74–75. 14 Sandro Setta, L’Uomo Qualunque 1944–1948 (Rome: Laterza, 2005) 4. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Pepijn Corduwener, ‘Challenging Parties and Anti-Fascism in the Name of Democracy: The Fronte Dell’Uomo Qualunque and Its Impact on Italy’s Republic’, Contemporary European History 26, no. 1 (February 2017): 69–84 (81), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777316000163. 18 Sandro Setta, L’Uomo Qualunque 1944–1948 (Rome: Laterza, 2005) 33. 19 Duggan, The Force of Destiny 540. 20 Corduwener, ‘Challenging Parties and Anti-fascism in the name of democracy’, 71. 21 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Cambridge: Polity, 2019) 14. 22 Ibid. 23 James.G.Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Petain to Le Pen, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) 68. 24 Ibid., 72. 25 Aurélien Mondon, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony? (London: Routledge, 2016). 26 Shields The Extreme Right in France, 70. 27 Ibid., 72–73. 28 Ibid., 70. 29 Aurélien Mondon, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony? (London: Routledge, 2016). 30 Shields, The Extreme Right in France, 83. 31 Ibid., 68. 32 Nonna Mayer, ‘Political Science Approaches to the Far Right’ in Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method and Practice, Stephen Ashe et al., eds., Fascism and the Far Right (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020) 21. 33 Ibid. Mudde, The Far Right Today. 34 Von Beyme, ‘Right Wing Extremism in Post-war Europe’, 11.

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35 Margaret Canovan, ‘Populism for Political Theorists?’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no. 3 (2004): 242. See also: Paul Taggart, ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, West European Politics 18, no. 1 (January 1995): 34–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/014023895 08425056. 36 Emmy Eklundh and Andy Knott ‘Introduction’ in Idem. (eds.) The Populist Manifesto (London: Rowland and Littlefield, 2020) 2–3. 37 Taggart ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, 38. 38 Mayer, ‘Political Science Approaches to the Far Right’, 21. 39 Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Introduction’ in The New Politics of the Right: NeoPopulist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, eds., HansGeorg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martinʾs Press, 1998) 1–11 (5). 40 Taggart, Populism,75. 41 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism, ed. Michael Freeden and Marc Stears, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2013) 497, https://doi.org/. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199585977.013.0026 See also: Giles Ivaldi,Maria Elisabetta Lanzone and Dwayne Woods, ‘Varieties of Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement’ Swiss Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (2017): 358. Taggart ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, 38. 42 Taggart ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, 38. 43 Canovan, ‘Populism for Political Theorists?’, 242. 44 Benjamin De Cleen, Jason Glynos, and Aurelien Mondon, ‘Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules of Engagement’, Organization 25, no. 5 (September 2018): 649–661 (654), https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508418768053., Hans Georg Betz, ‘Facets of Nativism: A heuristic exploration’ (Patterns of Prejudice, 53:2, 2019). Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. 45 Hans-Georg Betz, ‘A Distant Mirror: Nineteenth-Century Populism, Nativism, and Contemporary Right-Wing Radical Politics’, Democracy and Security 9, no. 3 (July 2013): 200–220, https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166. 2013.792250. 46 De Cleen et al., Critical research on populism: Nine rules of engagement, 654. (My emphasis). 47 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943–1988 (London: Penguin, 1990) 218 48 Enrica Capusotti, ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti’. 49 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943–1988 (London: Penguin, 1990) 223–226. 50 John Foot, ‘Milan Since the Miracle. City, Culture and Identity (Oxford: Berg, 2001) 37. 51 Alfredo Niceforo, Forza e ricchezza: studî sulla vita fisica ed economica delle classi sociali (Torino 1906), vii–xix. cited in Angelo Matteo Caglioti, ‘Race, Statistics and Italian Eugenics: Alfredo Niceforo’s Trajectory from Lombroso

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52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

to Fascism (1876–1960)’, European History Quarterly 47, no. 3 (July 2017): 461–489, https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691417707164. Ibid. Capusotti, ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti’, 121–122. Graziella, Parati, Migration Italy, The Art of Talking Back in a Destination Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 145. Ibid. Ibid., 144. Ibid., 144–145. Paul Ginsborg, Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State, 1980–2001 (London; New York, NY: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2001) 62. Mayer, ‘Political Science Approaches to the Far Right’, 21. Parati, Migration Italy, The art of talking back in a destination culture, 145. Foot, Milan since the miracle, 39. Ibid. Parati, Migration Italy, The art of talking back in a destination culture, 36. Ibid. Ibid. Betz, ‘Facets of Nativism: A heuristic exploration’, 127. Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Nativism and the success of populist mobilisation’, International Journal for Political Thought, 12 (2017). Peter Hervik, ‘Xenophobia and Racism’ in Elsevier International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences ed., James D. Wright (Oxford: Elsevier 2015) 799–800; Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, ‘Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 13 (21 October 2017): 2151–2179, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2 017.1312008. Steve Garner and Saher Selod, ‘The Racialization of Muslims: Empirical Studies of Islamophobia’, Critical Sociology 41, no. 1 (January 2015): 9–19, https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920514531606.

68 Betz, ‘Facets of Nativism: A heuristic exploration’, 127. 69 ‘Magnifica affermazione del MARP nelle recenti elezioni amministrative Vercellesi’, (Piemonte Nuovo 17 November 1957). 70 Guido Calderoli, ‘Così a Bergamo. E nei Friuli!’ in Idem (ed.), Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 62–63. 71 Michele Rosboch. ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’ (Piemonte Nuovo 23 March 1956). 72 Palenzona, ‘Non vediamo differenze fra Bolscevismo rosso e bianco’, (Piemonte Nuovo) Busto ‘Il Partito Liberale Italiano ha pienamente esaurito il suo compito’, Piemonte Nuovo. 73 R. Codazza, ‘Perche’ l’autonomia regionale è avversata dai partiti di massa’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 January 1957. Q. Massara, ‘L’autonomia regionale reduce lo strapotere di tutte le segreterie di tutti i partiti’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 November 1957.

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Populist Regionalism ‘La strada percorsa dal MARP in un raffronto con altri partiti’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 January 1957.

74 Antonio Meli, ‘Il Vizio dello Stato genera vizio negli stessi partiti’, in Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi (eds.), (Così Parlano gli autonomisti, Bergamo, Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955) 44. 75 Michele Rosboch, ‘Perchѐ ho scelto la lista del MARP’ Piemonte Nuovo, (23 March 1956). 76 Turin Police Commissioner Notes: ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’. Fasc. Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat. A3A. Vol.1. Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino, Italy. 24 January 1958. 77 Christophe Boulliaud and Lynda DeMatteo, ‘Autonomismo e Leghismo dal 1945 ad oggi’, in Culture politiche e territoriali in Italia 1945–2000, ed. A. Castagnoli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004). 78 Guido Calderoli, ‘Dieci anni di servitù bergamasca’, in Idem (ed.), Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958), 49. 79 Mario Vezzani, ‘Gli utili idioti e la libertà del voto’, Piemonte Nuovo, 23 March 1956. 80 Michele Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo 23 March 1956. 81 Mario Vezzani, ‘Solo la Regione potra’ opporsi alla imperante partitocrazia, Piemonte Nuovo, 23 May 1956. 82 Ibid. 83 Carlo Palenzona, ‘Non vediamo differenze fra Bolscevismo rosso e bianco’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 March 1958). 84 ‘Tacita intesa fra tutti i partiti nell’ignorare la Costituzione’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 26 April 1958). 85 Guido Calderoli, ‘Il MAB ha tre punti importanti nel suo programma’, in Zibaldone Autonomista di un montanaro Bergamasco, 72. Idem, ‘Il Paternalismo di Roma’, in Ibid., pp.114–116 (pp.114–115). 86 Idem, ‘Dieci anni di servitù burocratica in Bergamasca’ in Ibid., pp.48–54 (p.48). 87 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no.4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483 88 ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’. Archivio di Stato, Torino. 89 Ibid. 90 ‘Notes by Turin Police Commissioner entitled “Movimento Autonomie Regionali, M.A.R.”’ in Fasc.Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, vol.2, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Cat. A3A. Notes by Turin Police Commissioner entitled, ‘Movimento Autonomie Regionali/Movimento Azione e Rinnovamento’ in Fasc.Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, vol.2, (Archivio di Stato di Torino, Cat. A3A. 30 December 1957). 91 ‘Notes by Turin Police Commissioner entitled “Le origini del the MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano”’, in Fasc.Movimento per l’Autonomia

Populist Regionalism 193 Regionale Piemontese, vol.2, (Archivio di Stato. Cat.A3A. Torino, 24 January 1958). 92 Carlo Palenzona, ‘Regionalismo non è qualunquismo’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 1 December 1956). 93 ‘Notes by Turin Police Commissioner entitled “Le origini del the MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano”. ‘Notes by the Turin Police commissioner (untitled)’ in Fasc.Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese. vol.2. (Archivio di Stato Torino, Cat.A3A, 20 January 1957). 94 ‘Non abbiamo nè avremo i miliardi dei comunisti, i democristiani o i liberali’ (Piemonte Nuovo 26 April 1958). 95 ‘Le origini del MARP e gli uomini che lo rappresentano’. Archivio di Stato, Torino. 96 Ibid. 97 Vezzani, ‘Gli utili idioti e la libertà del voto’ 98 George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord: Continuities and discontinuities’, Modern Italy 23, no. 3 (2018): 235–252, doi: 10.1017/mit.2018.4 99 ‘Non abbiamo nè avremo i miliardi dei comunisti, i democristiani o i liberali’, Piemonte Nuovo. Calderoli, ‘Il centralismo di Stato e il riscaldamento centrale’, p.28. 100 Mario Vezzani, 23 “Cosa chiedono i professionisti e gli intellettuali del Piemonte” (Piemonte Nuovo, 23 March 1956). 101 ‘MARP electoral pamphlet: “MARP. Perché vogliamo l’autonomia regionale”’, (Fasc Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese, Cat.A3A vol.1, Archivio di Stato Torino, Archivio di Stato, Torino, Via Piave, 21, 10122 Torino TO, Italy. 8 June 1956. 102 Roberto Ronchi, ‘Brescia: Le proposte della Lega’, Lombardia Autonomista, (11 January 1991). 103 Ibid. 104 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘Che Costi!’, Piemont Autonomista, (10 December 1988). 105 Umberto Bossi, ‘Suffragio universale: dalla partitocrazia al federalismo’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 10 June 1991). 106 Borsotti, ‘Che Costi!’, Piemont Autonomista. 107 Farassino, ‘Una firma verso l’autonomia; i perchè dell’Autonomia’, Piemont Autonomista. McDonnell, ‘A weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, 127. 108 Farassino, ‘Una firma verso l’autonomia. I perchè dell’Autonomia’, Piemont Autonomista. 109 Bossi, Il Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 136. 110 Umberto Bossi ‘Nord Libero’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 31 May, 1991). Umberto Bossi, ‘Basta Tasse a Roma’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 21 May, 1992). Umberto Bossi, ‘Non Pagare l’ISI è un dovere morale, Regime Ladro’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 18 September 1992). 111 Pierre Poujade, ‘Un leader simile a me’, (La Stampa, 25 August 1993).

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112 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Breaking up the Post-War Consensus: The Ideology of the Lega Nord in the Early 1990s’, The Italianist 31, no. 1 (February 2011): 112–122 (113), https://doi.org/10.1179/026143411X12966456896862. 113 Idem, Social Identities and Political Cultures in Italy: Catholic, Communist and Leghist Communities between Civicness and Localism, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000). See also: John Agnew, ‘The Rhetoric of Regionalism: The Northern League in Italian Politics, 1983–94’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 20, no. 2 (1995): 156, https://doi.org/10.2307/622429. Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico (Rome: Donzelli, 1993) 19–42. 114 Anna Grassi, ‘i Cattolici votano Lega – La corruzione del regime disgusta i Cristiani’, Lombardia Autonomista, (31 January 1992). 115 Irene Pivetti, ‘I Cattolici votano Lega – La corruzione del regime disgusta i Cristiani’ Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 28 February 1994). Umberto Bossi, ‘Colpo di coda della dittatura’, (Lega Nord, Italia Federale, 28 February 1994). 116 David Hine, ‘Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State’ in Carl Levy (ed.) Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 112). 117 Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Re-Inventing the Italian Right. Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post-Fascism’ (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) 85–86. 118 Umberto Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1992), 133. 119 A.Croci, “Le Bandiere della Padania”, (Lombardia Autonomista, 28 April 1992). 120 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 136. 121 Gipo Farassino, ‘Una firma verso l’autonomia. I perchè dell’Autonomia’, (Piemont Autonomista, 10 December 1988). Borsotti. ‘Che Costi!’ Piemont Autonomista. 122 Umberto Bossi, ‘La Lega vuole elezioni subito: La Partitocrazia corrotta e mafiosa ha i giorni contati’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 8th May 1992). 123 Foot, Milan since the Miracle, 171. Cento Bull, ‘Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League’, 185. 124 Ibid. 125 Bossi and Vimercate, La Rivoluzione, 155. 126 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian politics, 14. 127 Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, La Rivoluzione La Lega: storia e idee (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1993) 155. 128 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Ethnicity,Racism and the Northern League’, in Italian Regionalism, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 172. 129 Ibid. 130 Capusotti, ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti’121–122.

Populist Regionalism 195 131 Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’, Piemonte Nuovo. 132 Guido Calderoli, ‘Lombardia ai Lombardi’, in Zibaldone autonomista d’un montanaro Bergamasco ed. Guido Calderoli 78–80. (78). Aldo Rizzi, ‘Bergamo ai Bergamaschi’ (poem), Il Gazzetino, 15 March 1955. 133 Foot, Milan since the miracle 43–44. 134 Capusotti, ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti. Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Europe: 1950s and 1960s’, 126–127. 135 ‘Torino non può più assorbire altre forti masse di immigrati’, Piemonte Nuovo, (28 June 1958). 136 ‘La Battaglia dei terroni si farà’, La Notte, (13 April 1956). 137 Rosboch, ‘L’autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano (My italics). 138 Guido Trapletti, ‘L’autonomia locale nei dirirtti delle persone’, in Così parlano gli Autonomisti, eds. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi 1955) 12–15, (14). 139 Calderoli, ‘Campanalismo e anti-terronismo’, 161–166. Idem, ‘Contro l’invasione Burocratica’ in Ibid., 161–171. Idem, ‘Dieci Anni di servitù in Bergamasca’, in Così Parlano gli autonomisti’, 39–43. ‘Notes by the Turin Police commissioner (untitled)’, 20 January 1957. 140 Rizzi, ‘Fra settentrione e meridione, qualcosa bisogna fare’,18. 141 Calderoli, ‘Campanalismo e anti-terronismo’, 161–166. Idem, ‘Contro l’invasione Burocratica’ in Ibid., 161–171. Idem, ‘Dieci Anni di servitù in Bergamasca’, in Così Parlano gli autonomisti’, 39–43. 142 Rizzi, Aldo, ‘Fra settentrione e meridione qualcosa bisogna fare’, in Così Parlano gli autonomisti, eds., Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955. 16–18. Anselmo Freddi, ‘Sperano nei voti’, (La Notte, 13 April 1956). 143 A. Rizzi, ‘Fra settentrione e meridione qualcosa bisogna fare’, in Così Parlano gli autonomisti, ed. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergmaschi (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi) 16–18, (16). A. Freddi, ‘Sperano nei voti’, La Notte, 13 April 1956. 144 Guido Calderoli, ‘Dieci anni di servitù bergamasca’, in Zibaldone Autonomista di un montanaro Bergamasco, 48. 145 Idem, ‘Che cosa vuole il MARL?’ in Ibid, 59. Idem, ‘l’emigrazione e l’invasione burocratica’ in Ibid, 85. 146 ‘Siamo in periodo di piena immigrazione’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 December 1957). 147 Guido Calderoli, ‘La Bergamasca Invasa’ in Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco, ed., Guido Calderoli (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 15–16. 148 Capusotti, ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti’, 121–122.

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149 Meridionali a Torino metà della popolazione. 150 Gudio Calderoli, ‘Da Bergamo. Genocidio o distruzione della gente dei monti’ in Idem (ed.) Zibaldone Autonomista di un montanaro Bergamasco (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 106–110. Idem, ‘Il Bergamasco è maltrattato come Cittadino e più ancora come Contadino perfino nel dialetto’ in Ibid., (191). 151 Mattias Ekman, ‘The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of FarRight Conspiracy Claims’, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 28, no. 4 (August 2022): 1127–1143, https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565221091983. 152 ‘Meridionale: A Torino meta’ della popolazione!’, (Piemonte Nuovo 1 August 1957). 153 ‘Meridionale: A Torino metà della popolazione!’ Piemonte Nuovo 1 August 1957. 154 ‘Lettere al Direttore – La polemica fra Nord e Sud’, in Piemonte Nuovo, (my italics). 155 ‘Torino non può più assorbire altre forti masse di immigrati’, Piemonte Nuovo. 156 ‘Torino non può più assorbire altre forti masse di immigrati’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 28 June 1958). Carlo Palenzona ‘La Terza Italia’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 1 December 1957). 157 ‘L’Italia è una sola’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 November 1956). 158 Guido Calderoli, ‘Il Bergamasco è maltrattato come Cittadino e più ancora come Contadino perfino nel dialetto’, (Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco, 1958), 191. 159 G. Trapletti, ‘Sperano nei voti’, Ibid. 160 Tarcisio Pacati, ‘Conosicamoci anzitutto’, in Così parlano gli Autonomisti, eds, Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi 1955 161 ‘Troppi maestri meridionali’, La Notte, (13 April 1956) 162 G. Trapletti, ‘Sperano nei voti’, La Notte, (13 April 1956). 163 Guido Calderoli, ‘Dieci anni di servitù bergamasca’, in Zibaldone Autonomista di un montanaro Bergamasco, 48. 164 Freddi, Breve Storia del the MAB, p.16. 165 Anselmo Freddi “Commento al Programma” in Così Parlano gli autonomisti, eds. Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, (Bergamo, Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955). 166 Ibid., p.11. 167 Rosboch, ‘L”autonomia regionale amministrativa non potrà dividere il popolo Italiano’ in Piemonte Nuovo 23 March, 1956. 168 Duggan, The Force of Destiny: A history of Italy since 1796, 471. 169 ‘Torino non può più assorbire altre forti masse di immigrati’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 28 June 1958). 170 ‘Notes by the Turin Police commissioner (untitled)’, (20 January 1957). 171 Ibid. 172 ‘Lettere al Direttore - La polemica fra Nord e Sud’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 September 1956).

Populist Regionalism 197 173 Roberto Codazza, ‘Lettera diretta a chi viene dal Sud’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 15 October, 1956). 174 Pacati, ‘Conosicamoci anzitutto’, 22. 175 Calderoli, ‘Campanalismo e anti-terronismo’, 161–166. Idem, ‘Contro l’invasione Burocratica’ in Ibid., 161–171. Idem, ‘Dieci Anni di servitù in Bergamasca’, in Così Parlano gli auton omisti’, 39–43. 176 Q.Massara, ‘Chi ha mobilitato il Sud contro il Nord?’ in Piemonte Nuovo, 15 February 1958. 177 Codazza, ‘Lettera diretta a chi viene dal Sud’. 178 ‘Sono Lombardo, Voto Lombardo’, Lombardia Autonomista, (21 May 1992). ‘Piemont ai Piemonteis’, Piemont Autonomista – Alleanza Nord,( 24 May 1989). 179 Gipo Farassino, ‘Il nostro statuto’, Piemont Autonomista, (April 1987). Roberto Gremmo, ‘Programma dell’Union Piemonteisa’ Union Piemonteisa, 15 December 1986. Umberto Bossi, ‘Programma Politico’, Lombardia Autonomista, September 1983. 180 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘Il Sud ci ruba il lavoro’, (Piemont Autonomista, October 1988). 181 M. Grosso, ‘Riusceremo a formare i Piemontesi di domani?’, Piemont Autonomista, 24 July 1987. 182 Ibid. 183 Vittorio Moioli, Il tarlo delle leghe, Milan, Associazione culturale Antonio Gramsci, Edizioni Comedit2000, 1991, 228. Cento Bull, ‘Ethnicity Racism and the Northern League’, p.180. 184 Umberto Bossi, ‘Federazione Autonomista Padano-Alpina’, (Lombardia Autononmista, 1983). 185 Ibid. 186 Margarita Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) 122. 187 Posters available at: http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20 lega.htm Last accessed 1 November 2022. See also: Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 43. George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti‐Fascism to Post‐Fascism: The Lega (Nord)’s Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11 November 2022, 1–25. 188 Umberto Bossi, ‘Statuto della lega autonomista lombarda’, Lombardia Autonomista, September, 1983. 189 Ibid. Mario Cavallin, ‘Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania. Sezione Magenta’ (16 November 2010). Available at: http://sezionemagenta.leganord.org/?p=714 Last accessed: 28 June 2021.

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190 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 43. ‘Programma Politico’, Lombardia Autonomista, September 1983. 191 Sebastiano Messina, ‘Terroni, a Casa. La Lega fa campagna’ (La Stampa, 28 October, 1982). Available at: https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1992/10/28/ terroni-casa-la-lega-fa-campagna.html Last accessed: 28 June 2021. Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, ‘The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?’ inItalian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 141. 192 Marzia Maccaferri and George Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country: “Sovereignism” and Populism in the Political Discourse of Matteo Salvini’s Lega’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no. 2 (8 March 2022): 277–299, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21066.mac. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 175. 193 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 174. 194 Bossi and Vimercate, La Rivoluzione, 155. ‘Lettere al Direttore - La polemica fra Nord e Sud’, Piemonte Nuovo. 195 Eva Garau, The Politics of national identity in Italy: Immigration and Italianità (London: Routledge, 2015) 111. 196 Giancarlo Pagliarini ‘La Padania o il solito ombrello (rotto)’, La Padania, 29 March 1997. Giancarlo Pagliarini, ‘Perchè la secessione fa bene anche al sud’, (La Padania, 14 January 1997). 197 Garau, National Identity and Immigration: The Case of Italy. 179. 198 Dwayne Woods, ‘Pockets of Resistance to Globalisation: The Case of the Lega Nord’, Patterns of Prejudice 43, no.2 (2009): 173–174. 199 Andrej Zaslove, ‘Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no. 1 (February 2004): 99–118, https://doi.org/10. 1080/1356931032000167490. Parati, Migration Italy: The art of talking back in a destination culture, 151. 200 Zaslove, ‘Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy’, 111. 201 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi government. In a League of Its Own’, West European Politics 28, no.5 (2005): 962. 202 De Cleen et al., Critical research on populism: Nine rules of engagement, 654. 203 Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa: La storia, le idee e la logica d’azione della Lega Nord (Rome, Il Saggiatore, 1997) 45. Umberto Bossi, ‘Statuto della Lega Autonomista Lombarda’, Lombardia Autonomista, September, 1983. Maurizio Borsotti, ‘Gli autonomisti contro la criminalità, Piemont Autonomista, 27 July 1988

Populist Regionalism 199 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘Mai più Mafiosi in confine’ Piemont Autonomista, 10 December 1988. 204 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘Le poltrone del Sud’, Piemont Autonomista, 29 December 1989. Maurizio Borsotti, ‘2001: Montecitorio nelle mani del Sud’, Piemont Autonomista, October 1988. 205 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The Role of Memory in Populist Discourse: The Case of the Italian Second Republic’, Patterns of Prejudice 50, no.3 (2016): 215. Allum and Diamanti, The Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto, 153. Cento Bull, ‘The role of memory in populist discourse’, 220. 206 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 175. 207 Cento Bull, ‘The role of memory in populist discourse’, 220. 208 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord (Montréal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2011) 91. 209 George Newth, The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism, Patterns of Prejudice 53 no. 4 (2019): 384–406. 210 Umberto Bossi, ‘Islam in casa. E Roma costruisce moschee’, Lombardia Autonomista, January 18 1992. 211 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism: The Lega (Nord)’s Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies (11 November 2022): 1–25, https://doi.org/10. 1080/13569317.2022.2138296. 212 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘L’opportunismo dei partiti, vu cumpra?!’ (Piemont Autonomista, 27 July 1988). 213 Idem, ‘Ma è razzismo o autodifesa?’ (Piemont Autonomista, 30 September 1988). 214 Stefania Piazzo, ‘Quattro milioni di clandestine in casa’ La Padania (17 February 1997). 215 U. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, La mia Lega, La mia vita, 144. 216 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian politics, 14. 217 Mario Cavallin, ‘Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania. Sezione Magenta’ (16 November 2010). Available at: http://sezionemagenta. leganord.org/?p=714 218 Ibid., 106. 219 Ibid., 133. 220 Eva Garau, Politics of National Identity in Italy: Immigration and’Italianità (Oxon: Routledge, 2015). 221 Hans‐Georg Betz and Carol Johnson, ‘Against the Current—Stemming the Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology of the Contemporary Radical Populist Right’, Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no.3 (October 2004): 311–327 (316), https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546. 222 Eva Garau, Politics of National Identity in Italy: Immigration and’Italianità (Oxon: Routledge, 2015). 223 Parati, Migration Italy: The art of talking back in a destination culture, 151. 224 Ibid., 155.

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225 Ibid. 226 Andrew Geddes, ‘Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the Centre-Right in Italy’, Journal of European Public Policy 15 no.3: 361. 227 Umberto Bossi, ‘L’islam in casa e Roma costruisce moschee’, Lombardia Autonomista 18 January 1992. 228 Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercate, La rivoluzione. La Lega, storia e idee (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer 1993) 206. 229 Giuseppe Leoni, ‘iCattolici votano Lega – La corruzione del regime disgusta i Cristiani’ (Lombardia Autonomista 2 November 1993). 230 Francesca Morandi, ‘Le moschee proliferanno contro la volonta’ dei cittadini’ (La Padania 11 January 2011). Simone Giardin, ‘Il No della Lega a Nuove Moschee’ La Padania, 10 January 2011. 231 Daniele Albertazzi, Arianna Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone, ‘No Regionalism, Please. We Are Leghisti!’ The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini’, Regional and Federal Studies 28 no.5 (2019): 648. 232 Alberto Testa and Gary Armstrong, ‘“We Are Against Islam!”: The Lega Nord and the Islamic Folk Devil’, SAGE Open 2, no.4 (1 October 2012): 215824401246702, https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244012467023. 233 Passarelli and Tuorto, Lega & Padania. Daniele Albertazzi, Arianna Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone, ‘No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti! The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini’, Regional and Federal Studies 28, no.5 (2018): 645–671. 234 Garau, ‘National Identity and Immigration: The Case of Italy’, 180–181. Roberto Visentin, ‘Nessuna aperture – non vogliamo veli e jihad’ La Padania, 10 January, 2001. 235 Paolo Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia, 1a edizione, Quality Paperbacks 642 (Roma: Carocci editore, 2022). 236 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!” The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini’. 237 Alberto Spektorowski, ‘Ethnoregionalism: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no.3–4 (2003): 58.

6

Populist Nationalism

6.1 Introduction Shades of Umberto Bossi’s 1996 ‘declaration of independence’ of Padania were present in Matteo Salvini’s inaugural speech as the new federal secretary of the Lega Nord in 2013. Salvini pledged to party members that he would ‘not stop until independence’ and that ‘Padania [was] ready to disobey Italy’.1 This speech followed what had been a difficult two years for the Lega; as noted in chapter 2, a declining salience of regionalism, the collapse of the centre-right administration, and the Lega’s internal corruption crisis were compounded by bruising results at the 2013 general election.2 Furthermore, the emergence of a new populist actor in the form of the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement - M5S) challenged the entire political establishment.3 Having ‘turned to Matteo Salvini as the only candidate who could regain the trust of voters,’4 the Lega membership now listened to what appeared to promise a return to the hard-line secessionist stance of the mid – to – late1990s. This was not, however, to be the case; rather than continuing with Bossi’s calls for ‘Padanian Independence’ or even the more moderate ‘North First’ policy adopted by interim leader Roberto Maroni, Salvini soon made it clear that his leadership of the Lega would be defined by the principle of ‘Italy and Italians First’.5 This chapter, organised in three sections, examines both change and continuity in Salvini’s Lega both with regards to the previous two waves of populist regionalism. The first section establishes the concept of ‘post2010 crisis and transition’. The initial part of this section will focus on the ‘converging crises’ of the Eurozone crisis (and the subsequent politics of austerity), the so-called refugee crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic.6 After establishing the key components of these crises, I will examine how they impacted the discursive field of populism and nativism prior to situating Italy as a ‘laboratory’ of ‘post-2010 crisis’. The concluding part of the first section focuses on transition. Matteo Salvini’s first mandate, although still part of the second wave of populist regionalism, marked a period of

DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-7

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transition to nationalism. Having established the necessary historical context, the second section then analyses the period from November 2017 – when regionalism, as a key defining feature of the Lega, was abandoned – as a ‘third wave of activism’. An analysis of data gathered from Salvini’s and the Lega’s Twitter feed between November 2017 and September 2022 will reveal how this third wave of activism was defined by the discursive field of post-2010 crisis.7 This analysis will focus, however, not just on change but also on continuities with both previous waves of activism, focusing on how populist nationalism has entailed a discursive recontextualisation of previous debates and polemics used by both Bossi’s Lega and the MRAs. The third section will discuss the significance of the shift from populist regionalism to populist nationalism and recent developments in Italian politics, thus paving the way for a wider discussion in the book’s concluding chapter. 6.1.1 Establishing the Post-2010 Discursive Field and the Transition from Populist Regionalism to Populist Nationalism

The purpose of the following section is two-fold: first, it will conceptualise a new period of ‘post-2010’ crisis and establish its central relevance to Italy, prior to outlining how this new discursive field impacted populist and nativist discourses. Second, the section will examine the transition of the Lega under Matteo Salvini’s first mandate in the first years of the socalled Third Italian Republic; this was marked by the elections of 2013 which saw an end to the bipolar party system established by the 1994 elections. In short, this will establish the necessary context for examining the third wave of activism marked by populist nationalism in section 6.1.2 of this chapter. 6.1.1.1 Post-2010 Crisis and Italy’s Protagonist Role

The term ‘post-2010 crisis’ is coined here to encapsulate what has elsewhere been dubbed as the ‘converging crises’ of the Eurozone crisis (and the subsequent politics of austerity), the so-called refugee crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic.8 These crises, despite holding different roots and having posed different challenges, have nevertheless combined over the past decade, causing major economic and social destabilisation with unforeseen political results.9 The following paragraphs outline these different components of the post-2010 crisis, prior to establishing how they relate specifically to Italy. Regarding the Eurozone crisis, this has come to signify the grave economic and social implications caused by the Eurozone countries entering a recession in the first quarter of 2008 as a result of the financial meltdown

Populist Nationalism 203 in the USA.10 However, this term represents more broadly how, between ‘2009 and 2019, the term austerity dominated every discussion about the economy’ and therefore affected the discursive field of the European Union (EU), Europe and its governance.11 Indeed, ‘the dominance of austerity in the Eurozone crisis years created the impression that there was something fundamentally different compared to previous episodes of politics in hard times’.12 The second component of the post-2010 crisis consists of the ‘humanitarian crisis of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing or migrating from war, oppression, or disastrous economic circumstances to EU member states’.13 The use of the qualified term so-called refugee crisis hereby acknowledges two things. First, that the dominant categories of ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space.14 Second, ‘this was largely a crisis of European governance which was exacerbated by dealing with the humanitarian crisis’.15 While the perceived wisdom surrounding this crisis is that it lasted between 2015 and 2017, people fleeing war and destitution and/or searching for a better life have continued and continue to arrive in Italy and other European countries at the time of writing. As with the Eurozone crisis, the important element is not if or when the crisis stopped but instead that this crisis had a significant impact on the discursive field regarding migration. The third component of the post-2010 crisis is the Covid-19 pandemic.16 This saw the imposition of lockdown orders and strict restrictions on physical contact. In some cases, this resulted in the loss of work, working or learning from home, and reduced contact with family and friends. At the time of writing, there have been over 765 million confirmed cases of Covid and over 6.9 million resultant deaths. At the same time, as of April 2023, close to 14 billion vaccine doses have been administered.17 However, ‘vaccine nationalism’ meant nations jockeying for advantage in obtaining vaccine supplies, individual countries claiming credit for developing particular vaccines, and government’s with greater resources and power stockpiling surplus vaccines rather than sharing them with other parts of the world.18 One key aspect of this was a tendency among governments and some politicians to seek to secure vaccine doses to the detriment of other nations.19 An interpretation of Italy as a key protagonist in these three components of the post-2010 crisis is rooted in scholarly work that documents the peninsula’s recent history as one characterised by a series of crises and critical junctures.20 First, for the Italian economy, the 2008–2017 decade

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was almost entirely contextualised by the Eurozone crisis. Prior to the crisis, the country had experienced a 20-year-long decline in gross domestic product,21 which arguably exacerbated the severe social crisis triggered by the Great Recession. At the peak of this crisis (2011–2012), the Italian economy was ‘in the eye of the storm’,22 seeing an increased role of external actors, including the EU and global financial markets,23 and resulting in an entrenchment of the ‘politics of austerity’.24 Indeed, as previously highlighted in chapter 2, in this period, Italy’s economy was undergoing severe ‘structural reforms’(a common euphemism for austerity measures) under the technocratic government of Mario Monti. The long-term impact of the Eurozone crisis on Italy has been considerable, with what has been labelled as ‘perpetual austerity’ and ‘permanent real wage restraint’ compounded by rising youth unemployment and declining social mobility.25 Meanwhile, Italy’s geographical position in the Mediterranean (and, in particular, Sicily’s proximity to the coast of north Africa) meant that it was among the countries most directly affected by migration to Europe.26 Specifically, the island of Lampedusa became a key focal point of the socalled refugee crisis. As ‘a major gateway for migrants and refugees trying to reach Europe from Africa,’27 Lampedusa had long acted as a border zone for the EU. This meant that, further to hosting a key ‘reception’ (detention) centre for migrants, it had since 1998 acted as an operational base for deportations to North Africa as well as a regional hub for supranational organizations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Frontex, the EU agency responsible for external border security.28 As noted by Dines et al., Lampedusa came to symbolise ‘the dehumanised conditions that face undocumented migrants attempting to enter Italy and Europe by sea and their subsequent detention on land’.29 The 2015 Mare Nostrum operation2 of Matteo Renzi’s government had the twin objectives of performing search-and-rescue activities to save lives at sea and bring migrants ashore, while at the same time gaining leverage in the call for greater European solidarity.30 The threat of a ‘migrant wave’ has been frequently sounded in Italy, despite the fact that refugees arriving in Italy since 2015 have constituted only approximately 1% of Italy’s population of around 59 million.31 These debates over migration have had profound effects on Italian politics, as they have focused on border control, heightened conflict over cultural and religious diversity, and the notion that receiving refugees and migrants generates new costs in an already tightly constrained fiscal setting.32 Nevertheless, it should also be noted that

Populist Nationalism 205 Italian attitudes to both EU and non-EU immigrants have consistently become more positive since the ‘migration crisis’. By June 2019 more Italians held a positive view of EU immigrants than a negative one, while the net negativity towards non-EU immigrants was significantly diminished.33 With regards to Covid-19, Italy was the European ‘guinea pig’ for the pandemic.34 In March 2020, it became the first Western country to be dramatically overwhelmed by the virus, ‘the first country outside of China to implement lockdown measures, and the most affected country in the world in terms of contagions and victims’.35 While initially adopting a ‘step-by-step strategy’, which led to the spread of the virus the Italian government was ‘eventually forced to adopt draconian measures to contain the outbreak’.36 Having established a new context of the post-2010 crisis and outlined Italy’s role in this, the following paragraphs take a wider view of how these crises held a significant impact on the discursive field of populism and nativism. 6.1.1.2 Post-2010 Populist and Nativist Discourses

In terms of the individual components of post-2010 crisis, this took place against the backdrop of a fourth wave of post-war right-wing extremism (from the 21st century onwards). The characterising feature of this fourth wave has been an increased mainstreaming and normalisation of far right ideas.37 In other words, far right politics have become increasingly detached from far right parties, with many mainstream parties advancing ‘a nativist, authoritarian, and populist discourse, including Euroscepticism, Islamophobia, and opposition to so-called “do-goodism” and “political correctness”’.38 The following paragraphs examine how the post-2010 era affected populist and nativist discourses. While the Eurozone crisis affected the discursive field related to populism, the so-called refugee crisis impacted that of nativism. Covid-19, meanwhile, had an impact on both populist and nativist discourses. Regarding populist discourse, the Eurozone crisis and Covid-19 had a major impact on how a people vs elites dichotomy was articulated. This saw populist discourse centre around the following key elements: • A conflation of popular sovereignty with national sovereignty. • Antagonism towards EU-rope (The EU and the European institutions). • Distrust of experts and proliferation of conspiracy theories. The Eurozone crisis meant that populist actors tended to equate ‘popular sovereignty’ with the nation in view of the limits of ‘pan-European solidarity’, revealed by the reluctance of citizens in ‘creditor’ countries to bail out

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Eurozone ‘debtors’.39 This fuelled what has been labelled as ‘populist Eurosceptic’ logic. 40 In other words, the EU was depicted as ‘an obstacle, not only for its policies but for its representing the juxtaposition between the people defrauded of its power and the elite (bureaucratic, technocratic, and political) that does not operate with citizens’ interests in mind’.41 This was exacerbated by the increased role of external actors, such as the so-called troika in national economies.42 Populists from the left to the right, therefore, targeted not only EU actors as supranational elites, but also internal national elites who were seen as complicit with the EU in imposing austerity measures.43 Furthermore, the questioning of ‘the politics of expertise’ which formed a part of populist discourse played a role in critiquing ‘the depoliticising deployment of technocratic governance and economic expertise’.44 In terms of Covid-19, populist politicians, whether in power or opposition, have used the pandemic to ‘attack other parties and supranational institutions’ while invoking ‘the will of the people’.45 However, those in opposition, in particular, used populist discourse to ‘benefit from the erosion of trust to governments [...] seen as handling the pandemic in inadequate or problematic ways’.46 Populist discourse could also manifest itself as ‘distrust in expert advice, scepticism towards elite overprotectiveness, and antipathy against government regulation’.47 At times, conspiracy theories related to the virus also seemed ‘to function as a form of populist discourse’ in its targeting of elites and experts.48 Indeed, anti-elitism played on the idea that ‘sudden and oftentimes strict government responses to Covid-19 were a result of backroom deals between powerful elites’.49 It also led to accusations against perceived European elites that they were conspiring against ‘the people’ by not moving fast enough on vaccines, thus feeding into vaccine nationalism articulated around the notion of popular sovereignty.50 Pushed to the extreme, this at times equated to vaccine hesitancy or even Covid-19 denialism.51 However, as pointed out by Fenster, while ‘all conspiracy theories are by definition populist, not all populist movements rely upon or even use conspiracy theories to build support’.52 Meanwhile, the post-2010 discursive field saw a native vs non-native discourse increasingly framed around the following aspects: • Migrants as a security threat, a disease, or both. • An increased emphasis on ‘Fortress Europe’. • An articulation of nativism with the logic of populism which depicted anti-immigration measures as responding to ‘legitimate grievances’ of ‘the people’ The so-called refugee crisis threw Europe’s border regime into sharp focus. The framing of this crisis by the government and establishment media involved the use of different categories, such as ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ to

Populist Nationalism 207 differentiate between the legitimacy or otherwise of their claims to international protection.53 At a supranational level, a reluctance among EU member states ‘to share the costs of receiving the migrants […] resulting in an emphasis on border security at the periphery’.54 At a national level, this led to ‘specific policies of reception and integration, which concentrate migrants in particular reception centres and areas of countries’.55 Increased securitisation has seen the routinisation of ‘pervasive and entrenched “Islamophobia” (or more precisely, anti-Muslim racism)’56 as well as an intensification of anti-Roma racism.57 Meanwhile, governments have claimed that pledges ‘to tighten borders’ are in response to ‘the people’s legitimate grievances’. This often involves the specious use of ‘public opinion surveys that claim that immigration is among the top concerns of many, if not most, people’.58 A key example of this was the so-called ‘Brexit referendum’ of 2016 which many depicted in a simplistic manner as the expression of ‘ordinary people’ to ‘take back control’ of their borders.59 In terms of Covid-19, the very nature of the virus, vis-à-vis how it easily spread across borders, meant that it was considered by many as an exogenous threat to the nation,60 leading to many narratives related to the virus oftentimes being shaped by a nativist logic.61 Furthermore, however, the crisis represented the latest example in ‘a long-established pattern of linking minorities, racial groups, and specific communities to disease.’62 Indeed, political leaders have misappropriated the crisis to reinforce racial discrimination via the construction of the ‘Other’.63 On the one hand, a racialisation of Covid-19 as the ‘Chinese Virus’ in light of the news that the virus supposedly originated from Wuhan province has also been a key aspect of farright and nativist discourse.64 On the other hand, political actors have further scapegoated migrants and refugees from African countries as potential carriers and transmitters of the disease.65 This convergence with the discourse of the so-called refugee crisis ‘has been a doubling down on border policies’ and a conflation of ‘public health restrictions with anti-migrant rhetoric’.66 In short, the post-2010 crisis, therefore, meant that populist and nativist discourses were both articulated in varying ways. It was amidst this changing discursive field that Salvini steadily changed the identity of the Lega during his first mandate as federal secretary. 6.1.1.3 The Gradual Transition from Populist Regionalism to Populist Nationalism: Matteo Salvini’s First Mandate as Federal Secretary of the Lega Nord (2013–2017)

During his first mandate as federal secretary of the Lega, Matteo Salvini oversaw a transformation of the party in four interlinked ways: first, in terms of its central ideological focus; second, in how the party communicated to the electorate; third, in terms of a shift even further to the right;

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and, finally, in terms of how the party was organised. With regards to ideology, soon after his maiden speech in which he had hinted at a return to hard-line secessionism, Salvini argued that ‘either Italy saved itself as a nation or else all of its regions, without exception, would face ruin’.67 Between 2013 and 2017, the ideological orientation of Salvini’s Lega, therefore, shifted significantly. His first mandate as federal secretary marked an increased focus on immigration, identity issues, and law and order and a declining emphasis on ‘northern issues’ in favour of national ones.68 Salvini’s new set of ‘enemies’ were encapsulated by EU-rope, namely the banking system and the Euro currency, clandestini (illegal immigrants), and general liberal/progressive values such as LGBT rights often perceived as associated with/ pushed by the EU.69 Indeed, figures such as the head of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, were depicted as enemies of the people70 and the Euro as a ‘crime against humanity’.71 Meanwhile, Salvini’s Lega organised ‘one of the largest anti-immigration marches in Italy in recent years, the Stop Invasione rally in Milan on 18 October 2014’.72 This event was widely publicised via social media, through which Salvini increasingly focused his communicative strategy. While the Lega’s ideology and discourse had previously been disseminated, at least in part, via its newspaper, La Padania, towards the end of 2014, Salvini closed the offices of this loss-making publication.73 Salvini’s communications instead relied on ‘synergy between traditional in-person and face-to-face activism […] and modern online activism, carried out through social media and instant messaging systems’.74 Indeed, an increased personalisation of the Lega under Salvini and ‘his rise as a “digital leader”’ took place ‘through an active digital mediatisation of his own political persona on social media including Twitter where he has over one million followers’.75 Using an algorithm known as ‘The Beast,’ Salvini identified ‘best-performing posts’ in order to ‘polarise political debate’ and ‘trigger negative emotions which are most likely to get public attention.’76 Salvini has harnessed the power of social media to ‘shape (and, indeed, dominate) national debates on issues concerning identity, immigration, and law and order’ as ‘common sense’ in public debates.77 Furthermore, however, with regards to the far right, social media acts as a ‘powerful tool for reaching followers, connecting with like-minded groups, and spreading ideology’.78 Indeed, a further significant development under Salvini was a shift of the Lega even further to the right. In line with recent trends of the nationalist European far right, Salvini played on the idea that ‘neither Left or Right nor fascists or communists exist anymore’.79 This

Populist Nationalism 209 formed part of a wider ‘post-fascist’ discursive strategy which aimed to consign fascism to history in three ways: first, via a delegitimisation of the Republic’s anti-fascist foundations and a trivialisation of the importance of fascism; second, by claiming that both fascism and communism were ‘dead ideologies’; and finally, by a depicting far right policies as ‘not fascist, but common sense’ (buon senso).80 There was also collaboration (and jointly organised rallies) with the extreme right and neo-fascist right.81 The aforementioned Stop Invasione rally was attended by CasaPound Italia – a self-defined fascist social movement from whom Salvini had adopted the slogan ‘Italians First’. Salvini later shared a stage with this movement’s leader, Simone Di Stefano, at a joint event on 28 February 2015 in Rome’s central Piazza del Popolo.82 Meanwhile a ‘cooperation – at least, at the local level’ existed between the Lega and neo-fascist group Forza Nuova (New Force, FN).83 In 2016, Salvini used a rally against Democratic Party (PD) prime minister Matteo Renzi’s proposed constitutional reform to strengthen links with other parties on the far right, particularly with the far-right Fratelli d’Italia (heir to the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement) and its leader, Giorgia Meloni.84 This rally focused on issues largely unrelated to constitutional reform, in particular immigration (in the context of the so-called refugee crisis) and EU policies.85 This year also saw the election of Donald Trump in the USA, whose far right ‘America First’ campaign Salvini had been the only Italian politician to publicly endorse. With regards to the party structure, a process of ‘nationalisation’ of the party structure and political strategy began in earnest in 2014.86 Salvini launched ‘a sister party called Noi con Salvini (Us with Salvini) to contest sub‐national elections in Southern Italy’.87 Shortly following Salvini’s reelection as federal secretary in 2017, in November of that year, he announced the launch of Lega per Salvini Premier and shelved his party’s historic cause of regionalism/secessionism. This came shortly after regional autonomy referenda in Lombardy and Veneto, for which Salvini’s support had been lukewarm at best.88Under Salvini, the Lega Nord was turned into a disempowered and politically inactive ‘bad company,’ charged with the task of paying the debts of the old party, while its structure, resources, and personnel were poured into the new state‐wide organisation represented by the Lega per Salvini Premier.89 With a ‘shelving of calls for regional autonomy/reform for northern Italy,’ a ‘distinct focus on the national dimension,’ and a decision by the Lega to file candidates for the 2018 general election not just in the North, but across Italy,90 this move represented the end of the second wave of postwar populist regionalism in north Italy.

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6.1.2 Populist Nationalism: A Third Wave of Activism Framed as ‘Common Sense’

Between 2017 and 2022, Matteo Salvini articulated his far right ideology around the core components of the post-2010 crisis. In line with the populist nationalist framework established in chapter 2, the following paragraphs examine the Lega from the official abandonment of regionalism towards the end of November 2017 until the collapse of the Draghi administration in June 2022 which saw a call for snap elections on September 25th of that year.91 This period, which saw the Lega switch between government and opposition, was in many ways paradigmatic of the ‘fluctuating fortunes’ which have characterised the party since its formation.92 This populist nationalist activism is considered a ‘third’ wave, insofar as it follows on from the previous two waves of populist regionalism. Salvini’s formation of the Lega per Salvini Premier was accompanied by the announcement of a ‘common sense revolution’ (rivoluzione del buonsenso) towards the end of 2017.93 Between 2017 and 2022, through a series of videos and posts via social media, Salvini claimed to embody common sense in offering his direct point of view to the audience while also in effect shaping common sense by ‘trying to persuade addressees of the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness’.94 Through this common sense trope, Salvini ‘aimed at a dual construction of himself as a strong leader […] but also an approachable people’s man or one of us’.95 The following section, therefore, deconstructs how Salvini frequently shaped populist nationalism via a discourse of common sense. In keeping with the historical approach taken so far in this book, the section will conclude with an overview of continuity and discontinuity with regards to the previous two waves of populist regionalism. It is worth briefly outlining some key moments in the five-year time scale analysed as follows. Between 2018 and 2019, Salvini was Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the first Giuseppe Conte administration (a coalition government between the Lega and the M5S). Lega per Salvini Premier had received 17.4% of the vote in March 2018, and becoming Italy’s third largest party behind the M5S and the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD).96 The main symbolic victory for Salvini during this short spell in government was the ‘Decree-Law on Immigration and Security’ – also known as the ‘Salvini decree,’ passed in November 2018. This decree in reality consisted of 42 articles which among other things […] abolished humanitarian protection status for migrants, reduced barriers to stripping migrants of Italian citizenship, lengthened the naturalisation process, stopped asylum seekers from accessing reception centres and introduced a fast-track expulsion system for ‘dangerous’ asylum seekers.97

Populist Nationalism 211 Following this, in June 2019, ‘new so-called security decrees targeted NGOs by threatening fines of up to €1 million for ships “ignoring bans and limitations” on accessing Italian waters’. Indeed, Salvini blocked an NGO ship from landing in Lampedusa in August 2019, for which he is at the time of writing facing a trial on charges of kidnapping, having detained 147 people on board in dire conditions.98 At the 2019 European Parliamentary (EP) Elections, the Lega emerged as the largest Italian party, with a stunning 34.3%.99 This success was followed by polling figures which put the Lega at a record 36% at a national level in the summer of 2019. Fuelled by hubris, Salvini withdrew his support for the Conte administration in the hope of triggering elections. However, with the M5S managing to reach an agreement with the PD, Salvini’s gamble did not pay off and he found himself on the opposition benches to the Conte II administration.100 Amongst the first acts of this new coalition was to reverse Salvini’s Security Decree. Between January 2021 and July 2022, Salvini lent his parliamentary support to Mario Draghi’s technocratic government. While Salvini was part of Draghi’s governing coalition, his far-right coalition partner/rival Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy (FdI), has been able to position herself as having been alone in opposition. The results of the 2022 elections, in which the Lega’s vote fell by 9 points to a mere 8% from 17.4% in 2018, while that of FdI rose from 4.4% to 26%, illustrate how Meloni has capitalised on Salvini’s miscalculations since 2019.101 The conclusion of this chapter will return to this point; however, for now, the following section turns to an examination of how Salvini shaped his populist nationalist discourse as ‘common sense’. 6.1.2.1 A People vs Elites Dichotomy and Discourse of Exploitation

Between the end of 2017 and 2022, Salvini’s populist discourse involved a juxtaposition of common sense Italy and Italians against a perceived ‘antiItalian elite,’ while depicting politics as beyond ‘left and right.’102 The following paragraphs examine the people vs elites dichotomy and discourse of exploitation,103focusing on how these narratives were connected to the Eurozone crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. 6.1.2.1.1 THE EUROZONE CRISIS – COMMON SENSE VS EU-ROPE

A key part of the people vs elites dichotomy and a discourse of exploitation in Salvini’s populist nationalist discourse was formed around narratives relating to the Eurozone crisis. The following paragraphs examine these aspects via three key developments with regards to the Lega’s position on Europe between 2017 and 2022: the 2018 general election

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campaign, the 2019 EP campaign, and, finally, the decision to support Mario Draghi’s administration between 2021 and 2022.104 Following his re-election as federal secretary towards the end of 2017, Salvini launched his ‘common sense revolution’ campaign in view of the March 2018 general election. A key feature of this campaign was a promise to the Italian electorate that voting for the Lega would ‘put Italy First’ in Europe. Simultaneously articulating a people vs elites dichotomy and a discourse of exploitation, Salvini juxtaposed Brussels as a dictatorship consisting of bankers and bureaucrats against an Italian people that wished to break free from Europe’s suffocating rules and regulations.105 Indeed, Brussels was blamed for Italy’s economic woes and high unemployment rates106 and Italians were depicted as ‘slaves to Europe’.107 Promoting nationalism as the guarantor of popular sovereignty via various promises to protect the ‘little man’ against big interests in Europe, Salvini argued that a vote for the Lega was a way to guarantee Italy could hold its head high in Europe.108 This involved pledges to protect ‘Made in Italy’ products ostensibly under threat from EU elites,109 while claiming that he would force the EU to rewrite its treaties if they no longer aligned with Italy’s national interests.110 During the 2019 EP elections, Salvini consolidated these narratives under a campaign slogan of Europa del Buonsenso (Common Sense Europe) which aimed at reforming Europe’s institution along the lines of a ‘Europe of the nation-states’ and ‘Europe of the Peoples.’111 This common sense Europe was depicted as the end of an era of precarity for young people, a way of protecting ‘made in Italy’ products, boosting employment rates, lowering taxes, and returning ‘the people’ to the heart of decision making in Europe.112 The 2019 EP elections were therefore framed as a referendum in which Italians could choose to reclaim Europe from a series of political, economic, and cultural elites.113 In terms of Salvini’s discursive construction of these elites, the EU was depicted as an undemocratic EU superstate whose rules were killing Italian farmers and fishermen while putting Italian workers out of a job.114 In the final weeks leading up to the 2019 EP elections, Salvini urged Italian voters to plump for this common sense Europe to stop the Europe of ‘the four Bs’: Burocrati, Banchieri, Buonisti, and Barconi (bureaucrats, bankers, do-gooders, and big NGO and refugee boats).115 This slogan encapsulated Salvini’s us vs them populist logic and his depiction of Italy as a victim of Brussels and the EU institutions. Salvini later reshaped populist narratives articulated during the 2018 and 2019 election campaigns to justify support for a government headed by the former President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi. Recycling discourses of exploitation related to the EU’s elites, Salvini stated that the EU was responsible for rising inflation and electricity and gas prices in Italy and that the country was under attack from ‘speculators

Populist Nationalism 213 and bureaucrats’. Depicting the Draghi government as post-ideological,116 Salvini argued that this administration was the best way of defending Italy’s popular sovereignty in Europe.117 Previously a fierce critic of Draghi, Salvini now praised the ‘common sense agenda’ of the new Prime Minister118 and depicted him as different from other Brussels elites.119 Indeed, Salvini argued that his party’s confidence vote for the Draghi administration was a way of bypassing an unresponsive elite in Brussels and ensuring that Europe was more responsive to Italy’s needs.120 According to Salvini, a Draghi administration was a way of making Italy stronger in Europe and increasing popular sovereignty. Indeed, support for Draghi was depicted as fighting back against this exploitation from Europe due to the fact that Draghi, was familiar with the EU’s institutions and would be able to tackle Germany’s perceived ‘excessive power’ headon and reduce levels of European bureaucracy.121 Draghi was, therefore, reconstructed in Salvini’s discourse from a member of the elite, to an ally of the people who could reduce the level of ‘European bureaucracy,’ increase ‘Italian pride’ in Europe,122 and help Italy become a leading protagonist in Europe again.123 6.1.2.1.2 COVID-19: A CONSPIRATORIAL AND ANTI-ELITIST VIEW OF THE PANDEMIC

A further way in which Salvini shaped a people vs elites dichotomy and discourse of exploitation was around the Covid-19 pandemic. Finding himself on the opposition benches when the first cases of Coronavirus arrived in Italy, Salvini’s position was, at best, incoherent as he first criticised the Conte II administration for the ‘excessive permissiveness of the lockdown’ to only then demand a ‘return to normality and reopening of economic activities’.124 Later, as part of the grand coalition of parties backing the Draghi administration between 2021 and 2022, Salvini framed his support for the prime minister as defending the health, rights, and freedoms of the Italian people against the selfish interests of the elites. The analysis as follows focuses on two, sometimes overlapping, articulations of populist discourse: the first relates to a conspiratorial view of Chinese and EU elites and vaccine nationalism; the second relates to a conspiratorial view of state response to the pandemic which ‘reified individualism and social Darwinism’.125 Regarding a conspiratorial view of Chinese and EU elites, Salvini argued that the Chinese government should take ownership of the damage caused by Covid-19 and that there had been a cover-up regarding the virus’ origin.126 Accusing Beijing of deliberately spreading the virus in order to damage European economies, Salvini’s populist discourse also linked the virus to the Chinese phone company Huawei and 5G

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technology.127 According to Salvini, Brussels was directly funding projects at the Wuhan Institute, the putative ‘ground zero’ of the virus. The Lega leader also argued that both the EU and China were responsible for trade in counterfeit medicines which was damaging the Italian economy and Italians’ health.128 Using the hashtag #Italianvoices and thus claiming to speak on behalf of the people, Salvini urged the EU to demand a solidarity fund from Beijing which could compensate Italian families and small businesses affected by Covid, thus claiming to stand up for the little man against big interests.129 Anti-elite discourse also extended to claims that Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s policies were designed to benefit China at the expense of Italian economic growth.130 Both a people vs elites dichotomy and discourse of exploitation involved linking popular sovereignty to vaccine nationalism. Depicting vaccine production as a zero-sum game between nation-states, Salvini argued that Italy was losing due to the failure of elites in the Conte II administration and the European institutions to secure enough vaccines for Italy.131 Attacking both national and supranational institutions in the name of ‘the people,’ Salvini therefore emphasised the need for Italy to act unilaterally in producing vaccines.132 On the one hand, this consisted of depicting the Conte II administration as an inept and out-of-touch elite which was failing Italy due to its poor handling of the pandemic and vaccine production.133 In particular, Domenico Arcuri, Conte’s appointment as Extraordinary Commissioner for the Covid-19 Emergency, was the target of what amounted to a character assassination campaign from the Lega. Arcuri’s appointment to this office was depicted as an act of elitist nepotism which endangered the Italian people.134 On the other hand, Salvini attacked Brussels elites claiming that the EU had overseen nothing short of a dramatic failure in the production of vaccines.135 Citing Brexit as the key reason why Great Britain had released vaccines sooner than Italy was a way of attacking Brussels elites and indirectly claiming that being outside of the EU had empowered the British people.136 Salvini’s support for the Draghi administration was, therefore, framed as a way of ensuring vaccine production in Italy and for Italians.137 While part of the Draghi coalition, vaccine production was linked to popular sovereignty in Salvini’s discourse, with the Lega leader arguing that by blocking vaccine exports, Draghi was defending the interests of the Italian people and allowing them to reclaim sovereignty.138 With regards to a conspiratorial view of pandemic response, while supportive of initial lockdown measures, Salvini then argued that further lockdowns were against common sense. While accusing the Conte government of taking advantage of Italians’ tolerance of lockdown measures,139 Salvini cherry-picked expert opinion to add a veneer of respectability to his anti-lockdown discourse. To an extent, this tactic

Populist Nationalism 215 employed by Salvini turned populist logic on its head in his endorsement of expert opinion; however, these views – taken from senior medical practitioners and academics who delegitimised lockdown measures140 – were framed by Salvini as common sense and, therefore, close to what the people think.141 Salvini cited such opinion to criticise the mandatory wearing of face coverings, restriction of travel between regions, curfews, the closure of restaurants and cafes, and the introduction of vaccine passports (the Green Pass). These were all depicted as a way for elites to impinge on Italians’ freedoms.142 Later, Salvini framed his support of the Draghi administration as a way of lending support to common sense Italians and guaranteeing their return of freedom and health.143 Salvini depicted the Draghi government’s proposed removal of mandatory use of masks on 11 February 2022 as a ‘common sense’ measure144 while offering lukewarm support to the idea of a Green pass stating that using it to encourage re-openings was common sense as long as it did not cause unnecessary bureaucracy for Italians.145 6.1.3 Nativism: The So-Called Refugee Crisis and Covid-19. Common Sense as Closing Borders and Clearing Camps

The remaining paragraphs of this section examine Salvini’s nativist discourse, examining the overlap between how these exclusionary narratives centred around both the so-called refugee crisis and, between 2020 and 2022, also around Covid-19.146 The idea of immigration as an invasion and a threat to the nation was articulated via Great Replacement conspiracy theories that promoted the idea that Italians were ‘being demographically “replaced” by people of non-European origin.’147 This framing of immigration as an invasion involved holding a series of ‘enemies’ responsible for plotting and conspiring to turn Italy into ‘Europe’s refugee camp’.148 These actors ranged from philanthropist George Soros149 to the PD,150 the M5S (after the fall of the first Conte administration), and the EU.151 Meanwhile Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which embarked on rescue missions to ensure refugees and migrants did not drown at sea were not only depicted as a key component in this conspiracy, but also as helping human traffickers in their operations, and thus linked to organised crime.152 A discourse of threat was amplified during the Covid-19 pandemic, during which Salvini depicted the Conte II administration as a danger to Italians.153 Citing his upcoming trial for charges of kidnapping, Salvini claimed that the real criminals who should go on trial were the Conte II administration for having thrown open the borders and allowed an invasion of Covid-19-positive immigrants.154Again here, NGOs were targeted as key antagonists, with Salvini arguing that ‘while Conte dismantles the security decrees and opens up the ports, the NGOs are bringing Covid-positive immigrants to Italy […] public health is in danger’.155

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With the language of invasion and war playing a key role in Salvini’s discourse on immigration, Lampedusa was the focal point.156 The island was depicted as under relentless pressure from boat landings and brimming with disease and criminality.157 With regards to a racist and racialised process of othering, this took different yet often overlapping forms. The first was the figure of the ‘muslim invader’ and/or ‘terrorist,’ which focused on a clash of civilisations discourse and constructed a moral panic over a supposed threat of ‘Eurabia’.158 Salvini argued that it went against common sense for what he depicted as ‘non-Italian’ cultures to threaten ‘Italian culture’. This involved stoking a recurrent moral panic in Italy surrounding the (non) presence of the crucifix in Italian schools and claiming that children risked no longer being able to celebrate the nativity due to the ‘invasion’ of other cultures.159 An association of Christianity and above all Catholicism with Italian culture and identity was part of Salvini’s pledge to defend Italian identity, history, traditions, and rights from what he depicted as the key risk in Europe vis-à-vis Islamic fanaticism and extremism.160 Salvini paid particular attention to those arriving in Italy from North Africa and specifically Libya, whose majority Muslim population was conflated with a terrorist threat.161 This links to the second form of othering related to the so-called ‘fake refugee’.162 As Interior Minister, Salvini stated that one of his principle goals was ensuring repatriation of ‘fake refugees’163 and that he was tired of Italy being treated as Europe’s refugee camp.164 These ‘fake refugees’ were, according to Salvini, in reality clandestini (undocumented migrants) who came to Italy to commit crimes and claim benefits. This narrative aimed to foment a moral panic which depicted Italians as under attack from perceived ‘non-native’ criminals.165 This included framing a vote for the Lega as a vote for common sense which would make neighbourhoods safer and allow Italians to reclaim houses from these clandestini.166 This criminalisation of migrants overlapped with the racialised tropes used against Italy’s Roma population, the very presence/existence of which had long been depicted as a detriment to ‘native Italians’.167 Building on this pre-existing anti-Roma racism, Salvini constructed the figure of the Roma as ‘illegal’ and/or living on the border of legality, occupying areas of the country and/or houses which, in the Lega’s view, rightfully belonged to ‘native’ and ‘law-abiding’ Italians.168 Finally, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the process of othering took place through a racialisation of the virus itself. This happened in two key ways: the first was the figure of the ‘infected’ or ‘disased migrant’ and an argument that many cases of Covid-19 were ‘imported’ by ‘fake refugees’ and clandestini.169 This involved linking immigration to Italy with spikes in cases of Coronavirus170 and claiming that ‘common sense Italians’ who had followed rules were being punished by open border policies.171

Populist Nationalism 217 Anti-Chinese racism also played a key role in this othering, with Salvini labelling Covid-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’172 and depicting Chinese people as irresponsible and cruel for attending the controversial Yulin Dog Meat Festival during the pandemic173 while also claiming that China was an enemy of the ‘Made in Italy’ brand for banning Italian meat exports.174 The racialised process of othering outlined above often entailed elements of interdiscursivity in that it conflated the perceived threats posed by fake refugees, terrorism, Covid-19, and Italy’s Roma population. Salvini attributed a series of terrorist incidents in France to ‘fake refugees’ who had been allowed to land in Italy,175 thus linking the idea of Italy as Europe’s refugee camp to Islamic terrorism.176 Meanwhile, the figure of the ‘fake refugee’ infected with Covid-19 arriving in Italy played a key role in depicting immigration as a threat to Italy,177 and Roma camps were also discursively linked to the virus in Salvini’s narrative, accused of being sites of outbreaks and hotspots.178 Turning to an emphasis on assimilation, acceptable transformation of the problem of difference, or stopping the invasion, on the one hand, Salvini often set criteria for integration and assimilation into Italian culture and society. This involved telling ‘new arrivals’ to Italy that they would be welcome as long as they respected ‘Italian traditions’.179 Such demands, depicted as simple common sense, were directed more often than not at Italy’s Muslim population, with Salvini often relying on ‘liberal Islamophobic’ tropes which ‘allowed for limited distinctions between “good” (redeemable) and “bad” Muslims subject to a loyalty test.’180 Meanwhile, anti-Roma racism was also justified along the lines of encouraging assimilation and/or integration. Salvini demanded the government to protect children living in Roma camps ‘who are not allowed to attend school regularly’ but instead ‘introduced to delinquency?’181 He also claimed that in ‘Ferrara, With the new Lega mayor, in two months the Roma camp was cleared and guests transferred to real houses with rent, water, electricity, and gas at their expense’.182 However, Salvini was careful to add the caveat of his conviction that integration was only possible if immigration was kept under strict control.183 On the other hand, therefore, Salvini pledged to ‘stop the invasion’. Framing exclusionary immigration measures as common sense involved articulating nativist discourse via a populist logic insofar as it was depicted as what ‘common sense Italians’ wanted. To add a veneer of rationality/ respectability to his argument, Salvini claimed that he supported immigration with rules and integration, but wanted to put a stop to uncontrolled migration which he claimed had been enabled by previous centreleft administrations.184 His ‘security decree’ was depicted as responding to Italian people’s legitimate grievances, claiming that this measure was supported by more than two-thirds of the population.185 Indeed, Salvini

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argued that all Italians wanted order, security, and respect186 and that his measures, by ensuring closed borders and encouraging ‘repatriation,’ were in line with the opinions of common sense Italians.187 Anti-immigration measures were, however, also depicted in supposedly humanitarian terms via the argument that closed borders meant fewer boats would attempt to arrive in Italy and therefore result in fewer deaths.188 Having served as a symbolic victory for Salvini while interior minister, the reversal of the ‘security decree’ by the second Conte administration (consisting of the PD and the M5S) following the Lega’s exit from government was depicted as an attack on common sense and Italians’ security.189 A ‘stop the invasion’ discourse was also accompanied by pledges - framed as common sense - to ‘clear out Roma camps’.190 While this formed a central part of the Lega’s campaign in the administrative elections in October 2021, Salvini also claimed that a Lega administration in Pisa had cleared the largest Roma camp in Tuscany.191 Demands to ‘close the borders’ and ‘clear the camps’ intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic. Using the hashtags #stopinvasione (stop the invasion) and #portichuisi (closed ports) alongside #Covid19 was a clear indication of how Salvini used nativist logic to depict ‘solutions’ to both Covid-19 and immigration as intrinsically linked.192 The logical conclusion of this discourse was a depiction of tighter border controls during the pandemic as common sense.193 While participating in the Draghi administration, Salvini claimed that he had urged the government to prioritise immigration and reinstate the hard-line measures imposed by the security decree.194 The Lega’s support for the Draghi administration was framed in language which both praised the prime minister for having shown the courage to tackle illegal immigration,195 but with the caveat that migrant landings remained too high and needed the Lega’s presence in government to hold Draghi’s feet to the fire on reducing migration figures.196 This use of nativist discourse to both praise and criticise the Draghi government was the latest in a long line of examples of the Lega walking a tightrope between being in government and opposition.197 Such a position, however, became increasingly untenable as the grand coalition of parties supporting Draghi collapsed towards the end of June 2022 and the Lega’s far-right rival, Brothers of Italy – which had remained outside of the government – intensified its demands for elections.198 Table 6.1 summarises how the three conceptual points of populist nationalism discussed above were articulated in Salvini’s discourse. This, however, also marked a discursive recontextualisation of previous populist regionalist discourses, not only of the Lega, but also of the post-war MRAs. The following section is, therefore, dedicated to analysing how Salvini’s populist nationalism represents both elements of change and continuity with these two previous waves of activism.

Immigration as ‘great replacement’ facilitated by a series of enemies of Italy Migrants and Roma as terrorists/ criminals/ delinquents/Covid-19 as a ‘Chinese Virus’/ ‘Fake and “infected” refugees Close the Borders and Clear the Camps’

The nation exploited by supranational, political, and economic elites

• Exclusionary, ethnic and far-right (racist) articulation of nationalism • Immigration as a threat to the nation/region • A racist and racialised process of othering • An emphasis on ‘assimilation,’ ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference,’ or ‘stopping the invasion’

B) Discourse of exploitation

C) Far-Right nativism as a racist and xenophobic discourse

Credit: George Newth.

Europe of the Peoples/Europe of Common Sense Europe of the Nation States vs Europe of the Bureaucrats ‘Italians First’ Italy exploited by the EU and ‘globalist elites’ during Eurozone Crisis Italy exploited by EU and Chinese elites during Covid-19

Nation (the people) vs Supra-state (the elites)/Internal elites Nationalism as a guarantor of popular sovereignty

A) People vs Elites Dichotomy and expression of the general will

Lega per Salvini Premier

Populist Nationalism

Conceptual Point

Table 6.1 Matteo Salvini’s populist nationalism – A third wave of activism

Thieving Rome [Roma ladrona] recontextualised in EU of the banker’s Victimisation of the North recontextualised in Victimisation of Italy Northerners vs Southerners recontextualised in Italians vs migrants/refugees/ travellers

Padania vs Italy (as a nation) and Southern Italy recontextualised in Italy vs EU and ‘buonisti’

Recontextualisation of a Third Wave of Activism

Populist Nationalism 219

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6.1.3.1 Recontextualisation of Populist Regionalist Discourse: Continuities and Discontinuities

Matteo Salvini’s third wave of activism represented both change and continuity regarding the previous two waves of post-war populist regionalism. The following paragraphs will examine both of these elements in line with the populist nationalist framework. Regarding populism, there are three points to consider: the association of popular sovereignty with the region/nation, a people vs elites dichotomy, and a discourse of exploitation. In terms of nationalism being presented as a guarantor of popular sovereignty, there are important elements of continuity with the previous iterations of populist regionalism vis-à-vis the fact that nationalism and regionalism can be viewed as ‘two sides of the same coin’.199 While the switch from North First to Italians First was predicated on a recontextualisation of the party’s regionalism to a national level, ‘Padania’ itself had already been framed as a ‘lost-nation,’ therefore blurring the lines between regionalism and nationalism.200 ‘Italians First,’ therefore, represented a logical step in the wake of previous attempts to transform the Lega into a national party. These include an attempted establishment of the Lega Centro and the Lega Sud to complement the Lega Nord in the early 1990s and the brief renaming of the party as the Lega Nord–Italia Federale in the mid-1990s. The Lega in the 2000s also ‘stressed the need for a common Christian identity’ and, ‘extending this identity to all Italians,’ portrayed itself as protector of what it argued were ‘traditional Catholic Italian values’.201 Looking back to the first wave of activism, the MARPadania electoral alliance had previously attempted to forge links with autonomist movements in the south of Italy.202 Meanwhile, the founder of the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movements (MARP), Enrico Villarboito, had attempted to create a national movement based on the notion of confederal (and national) sovereignty and autonomy. Guido Calderoli, following suit, had developed the idea of an organisation called Federazione Autonomie Regionali Italiane with Silvio Milazzo, President of the Region in Sicily, who had gained support through his intransigent opposition to Roman centralism and the use of slogans such as ‘Sicily for the Sicilians,’ thus mirroring Calderoli’s use of ‘Lombardy for the Lombards!’203 In terms of a people vs elites dichotomy, Salvini’s populist discourse while articulated in different contexts holds similarities with that employed by both the MRAs and Bossi’s Lega. The construction of a ‘bureaucratic elite’ and ‘bureaucratic centralism’ represents a line of continuity from the MRAs campaign for the activation of the region, the Lega’s campaign for a federalist reform of the Italian state, up until Salvini’s campaign against the undemocratic ‘superstate’ represented by the EU. Salvini’s claim to stand up for the ‘little man’ against big interests also had clear links with the

Populist Nationalism 221 Poujadist elements present in both the MRAs and (Bossi’s) Lega. Indeed, while the MRAs had argued that there was ‘a tacit agreement between the parties to simply ignore the Constitution,’204 Bossi had played on similar conspiratorial tropes claiming that (North) Italy was ruled by a ‘Mafioso political class which has […] succeeded in abusing public money with the typical modes of Roman centralism’.205 Salvini’s attacks on EU elites relied on pre-existing populist frames used to attack Roma Ladrona and a discursive relocation of the Northern Question in Italy to the ‘Italian Question’ in Europe.206 In other words, the Lega’s populist discourse, which had derived from MRA narratives and focused on the supposedly unequal state subventions and taxation for the Southern regions, at the expense of the industrious Northern economy, now became a discourse of Italy/Italian people vs the EU of the greedy bankers and bureaucrats.207 Salvini’s populist nationalism represents continuity in the use of such discourse with the preference of a ‘Europe of the many’ against ‘a Europe where few people decide’.208 The regionalist leagues in the 1980s had also emphasised a particular kind of Europe: a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ juxtaposed against a ‘Europe of big business and big interests’.209 Such ideas had also been promoted by the MRAs, in particular the MAB, which advocated for a Europe which responded to the needs of the regions rather than a ‘Soviet Style’ European bloc.210 As far as a discourse of exploitation is concerned, the enduring image of (North) Italy as a ‘slave’ to the interests of national and supranational elites is particularly significant here. Salvini’s framing of Italy’s membership of the EU as that of ‘slavery’ to European interests and a vote for the Lega as a way of breaking free of this ‘servitude’ relied on a discursive recontextualisation of discourse previously used by both the MRAs and Bossi’s Lega. While in the 1950s, a vote for the MAB was depicted as helping Bergamo and Lombardy break free from Roman chains, this image also featured later in Bossi’s promise of a ‘Free Padania,’ i.e. one which would break free of a ‘mafia state’.211 (North) Italy has always been depicted as exploited in Lega discourse. Salvini’s claim that ‘Italy pays in more than what it receives from Europe’ involves a discursive repositioning of the previous juxtaposition of the hardworking European North being impinged upon by a southern-dominated centralist ‘Roma Ladrona.’ Just as Salvini claimed that Europe ‘is squeezing Italy,’ Bossi had in the 1990s also claimed that ‘the Lega represents the squeezed North which is completely fed up with this way of doing things’.212 Salvini’s promise to not raise VAT at the behest of the Brussels elites is therefore reminiscent not only of Bossi’s Lega called for a series of tax revolts in the early 1990s, but also of the MRA’s demands to keep money from taxes in the North.213

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Regarding discontinuities, Salvini’s populist discourse marked a break with the previous period in three interlinked and overlapping ways. First, before 2017, the Lega had been able to ‘turn on and off its claims for an independent Padania in line with political context.’214 While reverting back to regionalism and/or secessionism is by no means beyond the realms of possibility for the Lega over the next decade, the rebranding of the party as Lega Salvini Premier has, for now, represented a much more radical and decisive move in the history of postwar populist regionalism/nationalism. This leads to the second point of discontinuity in that the party has developed a ‘janus faced’ nature in which it ‘maintains its traditional structure as a party rooted in the North, […] mirrored by a much lighter organisation, which fields candidates across Italy, including the South’.215 This strategy of reconciliation/apology to the central/southern regions of Italy is examined in greater detail as follows in the context of change and continuity regarding nativist discourse; however, it set a key marker for how Salvini viewed the nation-state and how he constructed ‘the people’ in line with Italy rather than just Padania. The disappearance of the ‘partitocrazia’ (regime of the parties/partyocracy) as a key enemy represented another step change in the content of the Lega’s populist message. As noted in chapter 2, this reflected not only the changing composition of the Italian parliament and the evolution from a bi-polar to tri-polar system (the shift from the Second to a so-called Third Italian Republic) but also the emergence of a new populist actor in the form of the M5S and the Lega’s increased embeddedness in the mainstream of Italian politics. With the party’s increased presence in the halls of power in Rome and particularly following the Belsito scandal, the label Roma Ladrona became far less salient as a populist slogan. Salvini shifted attention to a combination of elites ranging from ‘dogooders’ to ‘bureaucrats’ and ’bankers’ which coalesced around a floating/ empty signifier of ‘common sense’. This links to a further element of change: the use of ‘common sense’ not only allowed Salvini to construct the people and elites along the lines of the common man against a series of different enemies, but also enabled him to shape a far right form of common sense in line with his vision of Italy; while, as has been examined above, this was linked not only to populism, but also nativism, it played a particularly salient in a populist depiction of political and cultural elites as out of touch with the common man. This brings us to the third and final point of rupture insofar as how Salvini’s populist discourse was conveyed to his audience.216 While the previous two waves of activism had relied largely on rallies, essays, print media, and – in the case of Bossi’s Lega – TV interviews/appearances, Salvini’s engagement with social media was part of a process of an increased

Populist Nationalism 223 personalisation of the party, i.e. the connection of the party with the leader. Indeed, Salvini’s attempt to embody common sense was tantamount to an embodiment of the party in and of itself, particularly with the creation of Lega per Salvini Premier.217 While Bossi had been a central figure and, for many years, unquestioned as leader, he had never extended this to renaming the party and/or fully shaping it in his image. In terms of nativism, the ‘increased focus on immigration, identity issues, and law and order’ was not only ‘perfectly consistent with the changes that had already been noted during the last years of the “Bossi era,” but had also been a key element of the MRAs’ discourse.’218 Variations on Great Replacement theory provide an interesting perspective here. Conspiratorial ideas relating to the (North) Italian ‘race’ being replaced by a non-native invader had been present in the Lega under Bossi who, like Salvini, had cited a clash of civilisations narratives and invoked Islamophobic hate speech.219 Furthermore, as noted in chapter 5, while the MARP spoke of Piedmont being ‘over-run’ by southern migration, the MAB had also fostered similar theories of there being a risk of a ‘genocide of Alpine people’.220 Salvini’s depiction of immigration as a planned invasion, therefore, holds roots not only in Bossi’s Lega and the wider ideology of the far right but has synergies with the exclusionary form of regionalism articulated by the MRAs in the 1950s. Meanwhile, Salvini’s racialisation of so-called clandestini, particularly people of African origin, had already played a central role in both the Lombard and Piedmontese leagues in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, some language of the Piedmontese leagues had verged on that used by the extreme right in its illiberal articulations of racism.221 This is in addition to a juxtaposition of Europe against Africa previously used by the Lega to distance the ‘lazy’ and ‘African’ South of Italy from the ‘progressive European’ North. Further elements of continuity are evident through the association of immigration with organised crime. Salvini’s linking of immigration to human trafficking was a recontextualisation of how Bossi depicted soggiorno obbligato (forced resettlement of mafiosi to the north of Italy) with southern immigration. This association of immigration with (organised) crime was also a key aspect of the MRA’s nativist discourse, which accused those who arrived in Lombardy and Piedmont of vagrancy. Meanwhile, Salvini’s framing of immigration as a way of stopping the invasion followed the example of Bossi who had often used similar narratives to frame antiimmigration measures.222 Such narratives can also, to an extent, be linked back to the MRAs urging southern Italians to ‘stay in their own regions’ and the MARP’s pledge to ‘kick Naples out of Turin.’ There are, however, some important points of discontinuity. As noted above in relation to the association of popular sovereignty with nationalism, a key issue relates to the Lega’s relationship with southern Italians under Salvini’s leadership. While southerners being ‘replaced by non-Italian

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immigrants in [the Lega’s] rhetoric against a pluralistic state’ began long prior to Salvini, the 2018 elections were the first to be campaigned under the banner of ‘Lega’ rather than ‘Lega Nord’.223 With this, one clear discontinuity is an abandonment of anti-southern racism under Salvini’s tenure. Both previous waves of populist regionalism had denied that their attacks on southern Italians were racist, instead framing them as a way of highlighting the ‘northern question’ and defending themselves against what they depicted as ‘racism against the north’ from a southern political class.224 Salvini, however, now apologised for having used ‘exaggerated tones’ and having made a mistake with his past racist slurs against Sicilians, Neapolitans, and the South of Italy in general.225 While these apologies took place in 2015 prior to the official abandonment of regionalism, they should nevertheless be considered as part of the Lega’s wider recontextualisation of populist regionalism to populist nationalism. This discursive reconstruction of southerners as Italian rather than non-Padanians significantly impacted on who the Lega discursively constructed as a ‘non-native’. A further element of discontinuity regarding nativist discourse relates to Salvini’s engagement with the extreme right. Under Salvini’s tenure, the party has abandoned the performative anti-fascism of the Bossi era. Such discourse would have clashed with Salvini’s attempts to build links with neo-fascist organisations, his sharpening of anti-immigration rhetoric and increased focus on issues relating to ‘national sovereignty’.226 A shift from regional to national sovereignty facilitated the rehabilitation of fascist discourses in the guise of ‘post-fascism,’ interpreted here as ‘a political logic through which far-right actors rearticulate and recontextualise fascist ideas’.227 This saw the use of a post-fascist schema that situates fascism in a ‘remote past,’ portraying it as a ‘distant and closed historical event’.228 The fact that ‘Bossi took aim at Salvini for his defence of neo-fascists, insisting that the Lega should not try to attract votes from the extreme right’ and calling Salvini a ‘nationalist fascist,’ is in many ways indicative of a significant shift in the Lega’s position regarding the fascist/anti-fascist dyad. The main point here in terms of nativist discourse is that denying the existence of new forms of fascism (and racism) and framing anti-immigration language as ‘common sense’ was a way of normalising racism in public debate. Such mainstreaming of far-right discourse, while certainly not new in Italian politics,229 reached an apex in the 2022 elections. The concluding paragraphs of this chapter will reflect on this new turning point in Italian politics and what it means for Salvini’s populist nationalism. 6.2 Conclusion On 21 July 2022, President of the Italian Republic Sergio Mattarella formally dissolved Italian parliament, after the Lega (alongside M5S and Forza

Populist Nationalism 225 Italia) withdrew its support for Mario Draghi’s government. The snap elections called for 25 September of that year saw Salvini’s ‘common sense revolution’ slogan come full circle, having initially been used towards the previous general elections in March 2018. A new phase in Salvini’s use of a common sense trope combined it with a new slogan of ‘credo’ (believe/faith) in which politics was defined as an ‘act of secular faith’. This dog-whistle reference to a ‘sacralization politics which had formed a part of Mussolini’s fascist era230 foretold what would amount to a victory for the far-right coalition; this coalition contained the Lega but was spearheaded by Giorgia Meloni’s far-right Brothers of Italy party. Meloni’s victory points to the fact that despite a fall in votes for the Lega in these elections, Salvini’s depiction of populist nationalism as common sense has contributed to a normalisation of far-right discourse and ideology. Meloni has capitalised on Salvini’s success in bringing reactionary ideas into the mainstream. Indeed, a key element of Salvini’s ‘common sense’ strategy was downplaying the threat of fascism and arguing that calls for law and order or stronger borders were not fascistic. While Salvini had therefore created the perfect conditions for far-right politics to thrive, Meloni was able to position herself as having been alone in opposition and therefore as being more in touch with ‘real Italians’. Salvini’s losses have been Meloni’s gains and the balance of power on Italy’s political right has once again shifted away from the Lega. Indeed, Salvini’s party in 2022 found itself ‘perilously close to the disastrous performance of 2013, when it was on the brink of extinction’.231 Salvini had some ten years previously inherited this party in crisis, no longer responsive to a changing political context. In a discursive field of post-2010 crisis, the party’s exclusionary and far-right brand of regionalism provided diminishing returns in a political contect in which there was increasing focus on national issues. While recognising the importance of paying lip service to the party’s traditional ideology of (far right) regionalism, over the course of his first mandate, Salvini gradually but steadily substituted North First with Italians First. This would entail significant changes in the Lega, both in terms of its ideological focus, its communicative style, its organisational structure, and its electoral ambition, as Salvini sought to move beyond its traditional northern heartlands and conquer an increasingly uncontested ideological terrain via populist (and far-right) nationalism. On the one hand, this was quite the volte-face for a politician previously filmed at the Lega’s annual rally of Pontida wearing a t-shirt stating ‘Padania is not Italy’ and joining in with racist anti-Neapolitan chants.232 Italians First is, from this perspective, undoubtedly representative of a significant ideological shift for a party which had built its success on various iterations of regionalism.233 Meanwhile, the open embracement of neo-fascist and extreme right groups illustrates a significant abandonment of the Lega’s pretence to be ‘anti-fascist’ in any shape or form. The

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changing discursive field has played a key role here. The components of post-2010 crisis changed the focus of populist and nativist discourses. Regarding the former, there was a discursive recontextualisation from elites embedded in and exploiting the bureaucratic centralism of the nation-state at the expense of the regions. Instead, Italy as a whole was seen as part of a ‘peripheral’ region in a European ‘superstate’ dominated by the ‘core’ countries of central-northern Europe.234 In terms of the latter, pre-existing nativist discourses stemming from the exclusionary regionalism of the previous two waves of activism were relocated to emphasise the ‘defence of national borders’ in the context of ‘fortress Europe’ and, following the Covid-19 pandemic, an association of migration with disease. At the same time, however, the idea that ‘the party led by Salvini is radically different from the one created by Bossi in the 1990s’ can be considered an overstatement as it risks overlooking the influence of a previous wave of activism with longstanding roots in post-war populist politics.235 The new wave of populist nationalism under Matteo Salvini depended not only on narratives rooted in the post-2010 context, but also on a recontextualisation of pre-existing discursive repertoires previously used not only by Bossi’s Lega, but also the 1950s MRAs. Salvini, therefore, should be viewed not only as part of a new period of crisis and transition, but also as a reformulation and recontextualisation of previously used discursive repertoires of contention. Coming from a tradition of political activism in North Italy rich in discursive repertoires related to populism, nativism, and exclusionary articulations of regionalist ideology, Salvini has been able to draw on a wide tapestry of pre-existing narratives. As examined in previous chapters, while some aspects of this tradition of populist regionalism can be linked back to the post-war period and the failure to activate the regionalist statutes in the Italian Constitution, others owe more to a post-1989 context and the transition from the First to Second Italian Republic. Salvini therefore inherited a series of discursive frames not only from predecessors in the previous iteration of the Lega, but also the MRAs of the post-war era. The following concluding chapter of this book, by returning to the three key questions posed in the introduction of the book, will underline the nuanced elements of both change and continuity between populist regionalism and populist nationalism and establish the extent to which the MRAs can truly be considered ‘Fathers of the Lega’. Notes 1 Adriana Destro, ‘A New Era and New Themes in Italian Politics: The Case of Padania’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 2, no. 3 (September 1997): 358–377, https://doi.org/10.1080/13545719708454958.

Populist Nationalism 227 ‘Lega: Salvini, non ci fermiamo fino all’indipendenza’ LiberoQuotidiano.it. Available at: https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/1371959/legasalvini-non-ci-fermiano-fino-allindipendenza.html Accessed 29 January 2023. 2 The elections saw support for the party drop to 4.1% of the national vote, amounting to a loss of 1.5 million votes, from the 8.3% achieved in 2008. Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Going, Going, Not Quite Gone yet? “Bossi’s Lega” and the Survival of the Mass Party’, Contemporary Italian Politics 8, no. 2 (3 May 2016): 115–130, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2016.1193349. 3 Davide Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, Italian Politics 32, no. 1 (1 January 2017): 33–34, https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2017.320104. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. Roberto D’Alimonte, ‘How the Populists Won in Italy’, Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 114–127, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0009. 6 Costis Hadjimichalis, ‘An Uncertain Future for the Post-Brexit, Post-COVID-19 European Union’, European Urban and Regional Studies 28, no. 1 (January 2021): 8–13, https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776420968961. Kayvan Bozorgmehr et al., ‘COVID and the Convergence of Three Crises in Europe’, The Lancet Public Health 5, no. 5 (May 2020): e247–e248, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30078-5. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard et al., ‘Towards a More Resilient European Union after the COVID-19 Crisis’, Eurasian Economic Review 11, no. 2 (June 2021): 321–348, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-021-00167-4. 7 Twitter was given preference due to its role in ‘shaping public opinion’ and its ‘ability to drive traffic across all platforms’ meaning that issues that are emphasised in tweets are often subsequently discussed in blogs, talk radio, and news stories. See, for instance: John H. Parmelee, ‘The Agenda-Building Function of Political Tweets’, New Media & Society 16, no. 3 (May 2014): 434–450, https://doi.org/10. 1177/1461444813487955. Carlo Berti and Enzo Loner, ‘Character Assassination as a Right-Wing Populist Communication Tactic on Social Media: The Case of Matteo Salvini in Italy’, New Media & Society (16 August 2021): 146144482110392, https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211039222. 8 Hadjimichalis, ‘An Uncertain Future for the Post-Brexit, Post-COVID-19 European Union’. Kayvan Bozorgmehr et al., ‘COVID and the Convergence of Three Crises in Europe’, The Lancet Public Health 5, no. 5 (May 2020): e247–e248, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30078-5. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard et al., ‘Towards a More Resilient European Union after the COVID-19 Crisis’, Eurasian Economic Review 11, no. 2 (June 2021): 321–348, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-021-00167-4. 9 Hadjimichalis, ‘An Uncertain Future for the Post-Brexit, Post-COVID-19 European Union’.

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10 Servaas Storm and C. W. M. Naastepad, ‘Myths, Mix-Ups, and Mishandlings: Understanding the Eurozone Crisis’, International Journal of Political Economy 45, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 46–71, https://doi.org/10.1 080/08911916.2016.1159084. 11 Johannes Karremans, ‘The European Decade of Crises – Responsiveness and Responsibility’ Ideas on Europe – The JCMS Blog. Available at: https://jcms. ideasoneurope.eu/2022/01/21/the-european-decade-of-crises-responsiveness-andresponsibility/#:~:text=Between%202009%20and%202019%2C%20the,of %20politics%20in%20hard%20times. Accessed 2 January 2023. 12 Ibid. 13 Daniel Stockemer et al., ‘The “Refugee Crisis,” Immigration Attitudes, and Euroscepticism’, International Migration Review 54, no. 3 (September 2020): 883–912, https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918319879926. 14 Crawley and Skleparis, ‘Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both’. 15 Stockemer et al., ‘The “Refugee Crisis,” Immigration Attitudes, and Euroscepticism’. 16 Nicholas Hind, ‘The Covid‐19 Pandemic: A Potted History for (Future) Readers’, Curtis’s Botanical Magazine 39, no. 1 (March 2022): 191–192, https://doi.org/10.1111/curt.12429. Deborah Lupton and Karen Willis, eds., The COVID-19 Crisis: Social Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021). 17 World Health Organisation. Available at: https://covid19.who.int/Last Accessed 5 May 2023. 18 Alexander B. Murphy, ‘Taking Territory Seriously in a Fluid, Topologically Varied World: Reflections in the Wake of the Populist Turn and the COVID19 Pandemic’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 104, no. 1 (2 January 2022): 27–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/04353684.2021.2022987. 19 Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah and Robert E. Hinson, ‘COVID ‐19 Pandemic, Vaccine Nationalism and Counterfeit Products: Discourse and Emerging Research Themes’, Thunderbird International Business Review 64, no. 6 (November 2022): 595–604, https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.22302. Godwell Nhamo et al., ‘COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments Nationalism: Challenges for Low-Income Countries and the Attainment of the SDGs’, Global Public Health 16, no. 3 (4 March 2021): 319–339, https:// doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1860249. The way in which vaccine nationalism manifested depended on the nation in question, ranging from tensions between the USA and partners on one hand, and China and partners on the other and an increase in Euroscepticism in the UK, whose government heavily criticised the EU and claimed the EU’s Member States suffered as a result of EU incompetence. See, for instance, Paul Copeland and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘The UK, the EU, and COVID19: Media Reporting, the Recontextualisation of Eurosceptic Discourse, and the Fait Accompli of Brexit’, Politics (6 October 2022): 026339572211223, https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221122322. 20 Matthew Evangelista, ed., Italy from Crisis to Crisis: Political Economy, Security, and Society in the 21st Century, Routledge Advances in European Politics (London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018). 21 Silvia Bolgherini, ‘Can Austerity Lead to Recentralisation? Italian Local Government during the Economic Crisis’, South European Society and Politics

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19, no. 2 (3 April 2014): 193–214, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746. 2014.895086. Martin J. Bull, ‘In the Eye of the Storm: The Italian Economy and the Eurozone Crisis’, South European Society and Politics 23, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 13–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1433477. Andrea L. P. Pirro, Paul Taggart, and Stijn van Kessel, ‘The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis: Comparative Conclusions’, Politics 38, no. 3 (August 2018): 378–390, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704. Zelia A. Gallo, ‘The Penal Implications of Austerity: Italian Punishment in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis’, European Journal of Criminology 16, no. 2 (March 2019): 147–169, https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818769589. Servaas Storm, ‘Lost in Deflation: Why Italy’s Woes Are a Warning to the Whole Eurozone’, International Journal of Political Economy 48, no. 3 (3 July 2019): 195–237, https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2019.1655943. Pietro Castelli Gattinara, ‘The “Refugee Crisis” in Italy as a Crisis of Legitimacy’, Contemporary Italian Politics 9, no. 3 (2 September 2017): 318–331, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1388639. Marxiano Melotti, Elisabetta Ruspini, and Ezio Marra, ‘Migration, Tourism and Peace: Lampedusa as a Social Laboratory’, Anatolia 29, no. 2 (3 April 2018): 215–224, https://doi.org/10.1080/13032917.2017.1414441. Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna, and Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘Thinking Lampedusa: Border Construction, the Spectacle of Bare Life and the Productivity of Migrants’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 3 (19 February 2015): 430–445, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.936892. Rutvica Andrijasevic, ‘Lampedusa in Focus: Migrants Caught between the Libyan Desert and the Deep Sea’, Feminist Review 82, no. 1 (February 2006): 120–125, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400274. Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna, and Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘Thinking Lampedusa: Border Construction, the Spectacle of Bare Life and the Productivity of Migrants’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 3 (19 February 2015): 430–445, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.936892. Pietro Castelli Gattinara, ‘The “Refugee Crisis” in Italy as a Crisis of Legitimacy’, Contemporary Italian Politics 9, no. 3 (2 September 2017): 318–331, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1388639. Teresa Fiore and Ernest Ialongo, ‘Introduction: Italy and the Euro–Mediterranean “Migrant Crisis”: National Reception, Lived Experiences, E.U. Pressures’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 23, no. 4 (8 August 2018): 481–489, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2018.1500787. Alessio Patalano, ‘Night Mare Nostrum? Not Quite: Lessons from the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean Migrant Crisis’, The RUSI Journal 160, no. 3 (4 May 2015): 14–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015. 1061253.

31 Fiore and Ialongo, ‘Introduction’. 32 Pietro Castelli Gattinara, ‘The “Refugee Crisis” in Italy as a Crisis of Legitimacy’, Contemporary Italian Politics 9, no. 3 (2 September 2017): 318–331, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1388639. 33 James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, ‘The Centre No Longer Holds: The Lega, Matteo Salvini and the Remaking of Italian Immigration Politics’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 48, no. 2 (25 January 2022): 441–460, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1853907.

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34 Martin Bull, ‘The Italian Government Response to Covid-19 and the Making of a Prime Minister’, Contemporary Italian Politics 13, no. 2 (3 April 2021): 149–165, https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.1914453. 35 Giulia Vicentini and Maria Tullia Galanti, ‘Italy, the Sick Man of Europe: Policy Response, Experts and Public Opinion in the First Phase of Covid-19’, South European Society and Politics (31 July 2021): 1–27, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13608746.2021.1940582. 36 Maria Laura Ruiu, ‘Mismanagement of Covid-19: Lessons Learned from Italy’, Journal of Risk Research 23, no. 7–8 (2 August 2020): 1007–1020, https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1758755. 37 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019) 21 See also: Katy Brown, Aurelien Mondon, and Aaron Winter, ‘The Far Right, the Mainstream and Mainstreaming: Towards a Heuristic Framework’, Journal of Political Ideologies (5 July 2021): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1 080/13569317.2021.1949829. Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon, ‘The Role of the Media in the Mainstreaming of the Far Right’, IPPR Progressive Review 29, no. 2 (September 2022): 147–153, https://doi.org/10.1111/newe.12306. Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange, and Matthijs Rooduijn, eds., Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 38 Mudde, The Far Right Today, 22. Mainstreaming is the process by which parties/actors, discourses and/or attitudes move from a position of unacceptability (outside the norm) to one of legitimacy (within the norm). Brown, Mondon, and Winter, ‘The Far Right, the Mainstream and Mainstreaming’, 9. 39 Andrea L. P. Pirro, Paul Taggart, and Stijn van Kessel, ‘The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis: Comparative Conclusions’, Politics 38, no. 3 (August 2018): 378–390, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704. 40 While space does not permit a full examination of the definition of Euroscepticism, this book follows Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde in acknowledging that ‘Euroscepticism can take different forms and shapes, following from different visions of European integration and different interpretations of the EU’. Eurosceptics in this case combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions. They support the general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas’. See: Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2002): 297–326 (302), https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1465116502003003002. 41 Marco Damiani and Lorenzo Viviani, ‘Populism and Euroscepticism in Podemos and in the Five Star Movement. Faraway, so Close?’ (University of Salento, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1285/I20356609V12I1P197.

Populist Nationalism 231 42 Andrea L. P. Pirro, Paul Taggart, and Stijn van Kessel, ‘The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis: Comparative Conclusions’, Politics 38, no. 3 (August 2018): 378–390, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704. 43 Andrea L. P. Pirro and Stijn van Kessel, ‘Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands during the European Crises’, Politics 38, no. 3 (August 2018): 327–343, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718769511. Damiani and Viviani, ‘Populism and Euroscepticism in Podemos and in the Five Star Movement‘. Gilles Ivaldi, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, and Dwayne Woods, ‘Varieties of Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement’, Swiss Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (December 2017): 354–376, https://doi.org/ 10.1111/spsr.12278. 44 John Clarke and Janet Newman, ‘“People in This Country Have Had Enough of Experts”: Brexit and the Paradoxes of Populism’, Critical Policy Studies 11, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 101–116, https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.201 7.1282376. 45 Luca Manucci, (2020) ‘Italy’ in Populism in the Pandemic: A collaborative report. POPULISMUS Interventions No. 7 (special edition) eds. Giorgos Katsambekis and Yannis Stavrakakis, 31–33. Lucio Rennó and Nils Ringe, Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to Covid-19, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2022) 12. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614. (p.274 Conclusion) 46 Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé, ‘COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis’, in Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe, ed. Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021) 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6_1. http://populismus.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/interventions-7-popul ism-pandemic-UPLOAD.pdf 47 Daniele Caramani, ‘Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government’, American Political Science Review 111, no. 1 (February 2017): 54–67, https://doi.org/1 0.1017/S0003055416000538. Dominik A. Stecula and Mark Pickup, ‘How Populism and Conservative Media Fuel Conspiracy Beliefs about COVID-19 and What It Means for COVID-19 Behaviors’, Research & Politics 8, no. 1 (January 2021): 205316802199397, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168021993979. José Javier Olivas Osuna and José Rama, ‘COVID-19: A Political Virus? VOX’s Populist Discourse in Times of Crisis’, Frontiers in Political Science 3 (18 June 2021): 678526, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.678526. 48 J. Eric Oliver and Wendy M. Rahn, ‘Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667, no. 1 (September 2016): 189–206, https://doi.org/10.11 77/0002716216662639. 49 Jakob-Moritz Eberl, Robert A. Huber, and Esther Greussing, ‘From Populism to the “Plandemic”: Why Populists Believe in COVID-19 Conspiracies’,

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Populist Nationalism 233 Securitization of the Roma in Europe. Human Rights Interventions (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77035-2_3 58 Aurelien Mondon, ‘Populism, Public Opinion, and the Mainstreaming of the Far Right: The “Immigration Issue” and the Construction of a Reactionary “People”’, Politics (23 June 2022): 026339572211047, https://doi.org/10.11 77/02633957221104726. See also: Dennison and Geddes, ‘The Centre No Longer Holds‘. 59 John Clarke and Janet Newman, ‘“People in This Country Have Had Enough of Experts”: Brexit and the Paradoxes of Populism’, Critical Policy Studies 11, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 101–116, https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.201 7.1282376. Ben Pitcher, ‘Racism and Brexit: Notes towards an Antiracist Populism’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 42, no. 14 (26 October 2019): 2490–2509, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1623410. 60 Murphy, ‘Taking Territory Seriously in a Fluid, Topologically Varied World’. 61 Yanqiu Rachel Zhou, ‘Vaccine Nationalism: Contested Relationships between COVID-19 and Globalization’, Globalizations 19, no. 3 (3 April 2022): 450–465, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1963202. 62 Florian Bieber, ‘Global Nationalism in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Nationalities Papers 50, no. 1 (January 2022): 13–25, https://doi.org/10.101 7/nps.2020.35. Murphy, ‘Taking Territory Seriously in a Fluid, Topologically Varied World’. 63 Yanqiu Rachel Zhou, ‘Vaccine Nationalism: Contested Relationships between COVID-19 and Globalization’, Globalizations 19, no. 3 (3 April 2022): 450–465, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1963202. 64 Delan Devakumar et al., ‘Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses’, The Lancet 395, no. 10231 (April 2020): 1194, https:// doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3. 65 http://populismus.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/interventions-7-populismpandemic-UPLOAD.pdf 66 Delan Devakumar et al., ‘Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses’, The Lancet 395, no. 10231 (April 2020): 1194, https:// doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30792-3. 67 Daniele Albertazzi, Arianna Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!” The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini’, Regional & Federal Studies 28, no. 5 (20 October 2018): 645–671, https://doi.org/10.1080/135 97566.2018.1512977. 68 Ibid. 69 Franco Zappettini and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 17, no. 2 (11 May 2021), https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1184.

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70 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post. 8 August 2014. 11.09am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/497686104020365313 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post. 23 September2014. 8.01am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/514308447366828032 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post. 6 February 2017. 5.16pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/828653579229659136 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post. 12 February 2017. 10.47am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/830729973610725378 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post. 21 January 2017 8.47pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/826532355523432449 Lega Salvini Premier, Twitter Post. 7 February 2017. 9.24am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/828897134372147201 Lega Salvini Premier, Twitter Post. 6 February 2017. 9.09pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/828712184620347392 Lega Salvini Premier, Twitter Post. 7June 2017. 11.46am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/872404383614500864 71 While consolidating his position as leader, Salvini continued to pay lip service to the party’s traditional regionalist message During Salvini’s campaign to ‘abolish the Euro’, Padania remained a key reference point Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, and Caterina Froio. 2014. “Opposition in the EU and opposition to the EU: Soft and hard Euroscepticism in Italy in the time of austerity.” Rising Populism and European Elections Collection of selected contributions. Spring (14).(196). Salvini also lent his support to Scottish, Catalan and Venetian cam paigns/referenda for independence and travelling to Edinburgh to campaign with Scottish nationalists on the eve of the Scottish referendum in 2014 Giovanni Polli, ‘La Lega: Niente sarà più come prima. Renzi lasci votare il Veneto’ La Padania, 18 September, 2014. Paola Brera, ‘E con la maxi-Devo’ niente potrà più essere come prima’, La Padania, 18 September, 2014 72 Padovani, Cinzia (2018) “Lega Nord and Anti-Immigrationism: The Importance of Hegemony Critique for Social Media Analysis and Protest.” International Journal of Communication (Online): 3553. 73 Albertazzi, ‘Going, Going, … Not Quite Gone Yet?’. 74 Zulianello, ‘The League of Matteo Salvini’. Nina Hall, ‘Paolo Gerbaudo, The Digital Party: Political Organisation and Online Democracy’, International Sociology 34, no. 5 (September 2019): 624–628, https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580919870741. (628) 75 Zappettini and Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy 76 Zulianello, ‘The League of Matteo Salvini’. Nina Hall, ‘Paolo Gerbaudo, The Digital Party: Political Organisation and Online Democracy’, International Sociology 34, no. 5 (September 2019): 624–628, https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580919870741. (628) Nicole Ernst et al., ‘Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter across Six Countries’, Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (2 September 2017): 1347–1364, https://doi.org/10.1 080/1369118X.2017.1329333.

Populist Nationalism 235 Paolo Gerbaudo, ‘Social Media and Populism: An Elective Affinity?’, Media, Culture & Society 40, no. 5 (July 2018): 745–753, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0163443718772192. 77 George Newth, ‘A common sense revolution? Matteo Salvini’s Lega and the mainstreaming of far right ideology 2017-2022’ Political Studies Review. (2023) Forthcoming. Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Caterina Froio, ‘The Italian Right ahead of the 2022 General Elections: Old Wine in Old Bottles’, Centre for Research on Extremism Blog Post (19 September 2022) https://www.sv.uio.no/crex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2022/the-italian-right-ahead-ofthe-2022-general-electi.html 78 Ofra Klein and Jasper Muis, ‘Online Discontent: Comparing Western European Far-Right Groups on Facebook’, European Societies 21, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 540–562, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494293. See also: Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh, ‘The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter: Issues and Actors That Cross Borders in Western European Democracies’, European Societies 21, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 513–539, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295. Jordan McSwiney, ‘Social Networks and Digital Organisation: Far Right Parties at the 2019 Australian Federal Election’, Information, Communication & Society 24, no. 10 (27 July 2021): 1401–1418, https:// doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1757132. 79 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism: The Lega (Nord)’s Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies (11 November 2022): 1–25, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13569317.2022.2138296. 80 Ibid. 81 Antonio Rapisarda, All’armi Siam Leghisti: Come e Perché Matteo Salvini Ha Conquistato La Destra (Correggio (RE): Aliberti Wingsbert House, 2015). Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto, La Lega Di Salvini: Estrema Destra Di Governo, Contemporanea 276 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2018). 82 Andrea L. P. Pirro, ‘Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept’, Nations and Nationalism, 27 June 2022, nana.12860, https://doi.org/ 10.1111/nana.12860. Brusini, M. (2015). Sovranità: l’associazione politico culturale di Casa Pound che appoggia Matteo Salvini. Huffington Post. https://www.huffingtonpost.it/ 2015/01/13/sovranita-casa-pound-matteo-salvini_n_6462966.html 83 Andrea L. P. Pirro, ‘Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept’, Nations and Nationalism, 27 June 2022, nana.12860, https://doi.org/ 10.1111/nana.12860. Pietro Castelli Gattinara, ‘Europeans, Shut the Borders! Anti-Refugee Mobilisation in Italy and France’, in Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’, ed. Donatella della Porta (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018) 271–97, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71752-4_10.

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84 Davide Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, Italian Politics 32, no. 1 (1 January 2017), https://doi.org/10.3167/ip.2017.320104. 85 Ibid. 86 Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, 36 87 Mattia Zulianello, ‘The League of Matteo Salvini: Fostering and Exporting a Modern Mass-Party Grounded on “Phygital” Activism’, Politics and Governance 9, no. 4 (24 November 2021): 228–239, https://doi.org/10.1 7645/pag.v9i4.4567. 88 Arianna Giovannini and Davide Vampa, ‘Towards a New Era of Regionalism in Italy? A Comparative Perspective on Autonomy Referendums’, Territory, Politics, Governance 8, no. 4 (7 August 2020): 579–597, https://doi.org/10.1 080/21622671.2019.1582902. 89 Zulianello, ‘The League of Matteo Salvini’. 90 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!”, 649. 91 For this analysis of social media, I initially compiled a corpus of data by scraping tweets between the period of November 2017 and August 2022 from both Salvini’s personal handle (@MatteoSalvinimi) and the official Lega handle (@LegaSalvini) using the advanced search function and the following key words: Buonsenso; PrimagliItaliani; Europa; Europee; UE; Immigrazione; Clandestino; Covid. This search yielded a total of 500 tweets (@ Matteosalvinimi N=307; @Legasalvini N=293). Since some tweets are catchphrases of Salvini’s Facebook and/or YouTube, I have extended my corpus to analysis of some of Salvini’s major speeches and video-messages given during the electoral campaign rallies ‘hyperlinked’ to his Facebook page or YouTube Channel (N=100) which include embedded videos, images and hyperlinked texts. This took the total corpus to N=600. 92 Anna Cento Bull, ‘The fluctuating fortunes of the Lega Nord’ in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy, History, Politics and Society, eds. Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, and Giuseppe A. Veltri (New York: Routledge, 2015) 204-214. 93 Salvini’s attempt to shape ‘buonsenso’ (common sense) is the latest example of ‘Gramscian of the right’ strategies employed by the far right to mainstream and normalise reactionary ideology. this trope is an attempt to shape common sense in a reactionary way so that far right discourses become dominant and unquestioned and therefore as part of the norm or mainstream See, for example: Tamir Bar-On, ‘Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Dream of PanEuropean Empire’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 16, no. 3 (December 2008): 327–345, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782800802500981. Alberto Spektorowski, ‘Ethnoregionalism: The Intellectual New Right and the Lega Nord’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 3–4 (March 2003): 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/14718800308405144. Aurelien Mondon, ‘The French Secular Hypocrisy: The Extreme Right, the Republic and the Battle for Hegemony’, Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 4 (8 August 2015): 392–413, https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1069063. 94 Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA’), in Methods of Critical Discourse Studies, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE Publishing, 2009) 87–121 (93).

Populist Nationalism 237 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 15 February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRr5z4RBA0A 95 Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Populism and Italy: A Theoretical and Epistemological Conundrum’, Modern Italy 27, no. 1 (February 2022): 5–17, https:// doi.org/10.1017/mit.2021.66. 96 Jon Henley, ‘Italian Elections 2018. Full Results’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng‐interactive/2018/mar/05/italian‐ elections‐2018‐full‐results‐renzi‐berlusconi Last accessed 4 May 2023 97 Dennison and Geddes, ‘The Centre No Longer Holds’. ‘Salvini Decree Approved by Italian Senate, Amid Citizen’s Protests and Institutional Criticism’, European Council of Refugees and Exiles. Available at https://ecre.org/salvini-decree-approved-by-italian-senate-amid-citizensprotests-and-institutional-criticism/ 98 Lorenzo Tondo, ‘Matteo Salvini goes on trial over migrant kidnapping charges’ The Guardian, 2 October 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/oct/02/matteo-salvini-set-to-be-tried-over-migrant-kidnappingcharges-italy 99 Arianna Giovannini and Davide Vampa, ‘Boom to Bust: Where Next for Matteo Salvini’s League’ The Loop: ECPRs Political Science Blog (2022). Available at https://theloop.ecpr.eu/what-happened-to-matteo-salvinis-league/ 100 Dennison and Geddes, ‘The Centre No Longer Holds. 101 Mattia Zulianello, ‘Italian General Election 2022: The Populist Radical Right Goes Mainstream’, Political Insight 13, no. 4 (December 2022): 20–23, https://doi.org/10.1177/20419058221147590 102 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 November 2019, 4.02pm. https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1198995353414119424 103 Maccaferri and Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country’. 104 With respect to Salvini’s previous flirtation with Euro-rejectionism at the 2015 European Parliamentary (EP), his represented a ‘softer’ Eurosceptic approach and Salvini now advocated for Italy remaining in the EU and the Eurozone. 105 https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/939825122059407361 Lega Salvini Premier, Twitter Post, 1 February 2018 7.50pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/959151943842136064 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 16 November 2017, 4.12pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/931193258499117056 106 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 March 2019, 6.56am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1103912287973171200 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 14 January 2018, 1.55pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/952539702963384321 107 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 10 January 2018, 7.47pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/951178783020781569 108 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 31 March 2018, 7.17pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/980147203607007233 109 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 15 February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRr5z4RBA0A Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 10.12pm

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Populist Nationalism https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1132031741739315200 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 May 2019, 3.43pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1132296141419307009 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 20 May 2019, 8.47pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1130560767630094336 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 20 May 2019, 9.07pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1130565815101792258 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 8.41am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1131827513477484544 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 28 January 2018, 1.41pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/957609607597260800 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 10 December 2017, 11.33am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/939820368923123712 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 1 March 2018 11.12pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/969349732685541376 Maccaferri and Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country’ 277–99. Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 18 May 2019, 4.15.pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1129767529415626756 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 18 May 2019, 4.26pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1129770198565834754 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 26 April 2019 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsuBkp6lz6g Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 19 May 2019, 8.04pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1130187566320369666 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 12.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1131883856796311552 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 21 May 2019, 8.37am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1130739396842545154 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 18 May 2019, 4.26pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1129770198565834754 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 18 May 2019 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5ybvqQEHLw Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 April 2019, 9.38am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1115171936450023424 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 29 April 2019, 8.45pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1122949941842862082 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 23 May 2019, 6.26pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1131612498984087553 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 9.51pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1132026420652367872 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 4.37pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1131947277558439936 Lega Salvini Premier, Twitter Post, 3 February 2022, 6.19am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1489121228006776833 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 17 February 2021, 9.46pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1362156587771715590 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 23 February 2022, 5.11pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1496533294183292931

Populist Nationalism 239 119 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 10 February 2021, 1.29pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1359494591938969602 This represented a significant volte-face from the position taken during his previous mandate in which Draghi was targeted as representative of an unresponsive and distant elite. Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 August 2014, 11.09am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/497686104020365313 Indeed, in just 2017 Salvini had stated his fierce opposition to Draghi ever becoming prime minister. See for instance: Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 7 June 2017, 11.46am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/872404383614500864 120 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 27 April 2021, 11.49am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1386995996740227072 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 19 March 2021, 8.07pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1373003273184161794 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 3 March 2022, 11.01am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1521429767836377088 121 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 28 March 2019, 4.22pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1243936439433408512 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 9 February 2021, 8.56pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1359244722905239566 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 7 February 2021, 10.38am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1361988290908475393 122 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 7 February 2021, 10.38am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1361988290908475393 123 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 9 February 2021. 7.59pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1359230352699641860 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 10 February 2021. 7.49am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1359409027327946752 124 Manucci ‘Italy’. 125 Paolo Gerbaudo, ‘The Pandemic Crowd: Protest in the Time Of COVID-19’, Journal of International Affairs, 73 no. 2 (2020): 61–75 (63). 126 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 21 November 2020, 10.14am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1330092165360463876 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 3 November 2020, 5.45am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1323501409757761542 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 6 January 2021, 4.41pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1354172012055429120 127 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 6 July 2020, 5.21pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1280174937022566401 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 12 June 2020, 8.01am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1271336687176646656 128 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 21 October 2020, 4.03pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1318930959790649344 129 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 14 November 2020, 10.14am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1327487676308602881 130 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 28 December 2022, 9.05pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1608207540298592256 131 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 31 December 2020, 5.45am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1344519906126020609

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132 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 2 March 2021, 1.42pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1366745797065388033 133 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 29 December 2020, 12.16pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1343893545674043395 134 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 22 November 2020, 6.56 pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1330585987181907976 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 17 November 2020, 1.06 pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1328685839933710336 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 11 November 2020, 5.16 pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1326574414989828102 135 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 March 2021, 8.41pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1374823825607688192 136 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 3 December 2020, 7.01am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1334392177355608067Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 2 December 2020, 12.38pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1334114677501140992 137 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 March 2021, 10.41pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1372679620974284800 138 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 10 March 2021, 12.49pm https://twitter.com/legasalvini/status/1369631380884361216 139 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 11 March 2020, 9.17pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1237850048865566727 140 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 1 November 2020, 5.45am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1330024391334273024 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 5 November 2020, 11.49am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1324317992570757121 141 Eric Merkley, ‘Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and Motivated Resistance to Expert Consensus’, Public Opinion Quarterly 84, no. 1 (9 July 2020): 24–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfz053. Rogers Brubaker, ‘Paradoxes of Populism during the Pandemic’, Thesis Eleven 164, no. 1 (June 2021): 73–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513620970804. Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). 142 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 31 August 2020, 4.41pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1300458578575273984 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 21 June 2021, 6.39pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1407030318805176330 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 27 April 2020, 8.01am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1254666858797707265 143 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 April 2021, 7.27pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1386386393715417088 144 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 9 February 2022, 9.39am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1491345887964143623 145 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 7 September 2021, 4.49pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1435268890267996162 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 15 October 2021, 12.06pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1448968398893948935

Populist Nationalism 241 146 Jennifer Cole and Klaus Dodds, ‘Unhealthy Geopolitics? Bordering Disease in the Time of Coronavirus’, Geographical Research 59, no. 2 (May 2021): 169–181, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-5871.12457. 147 Mattias Ekman, ‘The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of FarRight Conspiracy Claims’, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 28, no. 4 (August 2022): 1127–1143, https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565221091983. 148 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 14 August 2019, 5.05pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1161670149986029568 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 15 October 2019, 10.55pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1184226268721627138 Dennison and Geddes, ‘The Centre No Longer Holds’. 149 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 16 February 2018, 8.32pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1280554023331004417 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 3 July 2018, 8.07pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1014224157284986881 150 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 12 March 2018, 6.13pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/973260644697899008 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 October 4 2018, 8.22am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1047748689081589760 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 February 2019, 1.00pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1092407575491035136 The hashtag #governoclandestino (illegal immigrant government) was often deployed to depict the Conte II government and the EU as complicit with the invasion of so-called ‘illegal immigrants.’ 151 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 6 February 2020, 4.34pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1225457797518761984 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 28 June 2020, 4.06pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1313403388613324800 152 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 April 2019, 5.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1113840121466499073 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 7 July 2020, 6.27pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1280554023331004417 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 17 July 2020, 5.27pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1284162889738268674 153 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 11.27am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275737304741576704 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 3 December 2020, 6.10pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1334560625276628992 154 Lega Salvini, Premier Twitter Post, 17 September 2020, 12.11pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1306551232681652224 155 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 10.57pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275729822686359553 156 https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1178318381059063808 157 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 27 June 2019, 8.07pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1144321298111311873 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 29 September 2019, 9.03am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1178218651620708352 158 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 25 May 2019, 9.05am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1132196056261890049 For more on the Eurabia conspiracy theory, see

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Eirikur Bergmann ‘The Eurabia Conspiracy Theory’ in Europe, Continent of Conspiracies: Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe, Conspiracy Theories. eds, Andreas Önnerfors and André Krouwel. (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021). 159 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 15 February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRr5z4RBA0A 160 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 April 2019, 10.25am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1115183869790228480 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 8 April 2019, 8.58am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1130382333079691264 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 18 May 2019, 3.57pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1129762907472969728 Continuing in a long-standing Lega tradition of citing Salvini, stated that ‘anyone who denies their roots is a traitor and runs the risk of opening the doors to Eurabia, as the great Oriana Fallaci wrote’ Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 18 May 2019, 4.02pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1129764276766412801 Following the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021, Salvini reiterated such claims stating that ‘terrorism, violence, fear and illegal immigration’ were now ‘on the horizon, how right Oriana Fallaci was! Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 15 August 2021, 10.27pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1427019131711279112 Francesca Orsini has noted that in its Islamophobic discourse, in which the Lega spoke of ‘defending Italy’s Chrsitian roots’, it used ‘a language very close to Fallaci’s also in its use of the colloquial register and slang’. See below: Francesca Orsini, ‘CANNONS AND RUBBER BOATS: Oriana Fallaci and the “Clash of Civilizations”’, Interventions 8, no. 3 (November 2006): 444–460, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698010600956071. See also: Liriam Sponholz, ‘Islamophobic Hate Speech: What Is the Point of Counter-Speech? The Case of Oriana Fallaci and The Rage and the Pride’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 36, no. 4 (October 2016): 502–522, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2016.1259054. Alberto Testa and Gary Armstrong, ‘“We Are Against Islam!”: The Lega Nord and the Islamic Folk Devil’, SAGE Open 2, no. 4 (1 October 2012): 215824401246702, https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244012467023. Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 4 April 2019, 5.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1113840121466499073 161 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 16 April 2019, 11.33am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1118100015350730753 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 31 January 2018, 3.10pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/958719229737492484 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 4 April 2019, 5.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/978922109727576065 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 28 March 2018, 10.09am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1118428757981827072 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 29 January 2018, 6.45pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/958048417237872640; Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post 11 February 2018, 1.54pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/962686195758174208

Populist Nationalism 243 162 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 12 November 2018, 8.51am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1061904270591774720 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 September 2018, 8.57am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1044495990378688512? lang=en Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 12 January 2019, 11.04am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1084043377501442048 163 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 2 August 2018, 5.06pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1025050308664340482 164 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 10 November 2018, 4.03pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1061288280724041728 165 Matteo Salvini, Facebook Update, 6 October 2018 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=494094054445708 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 13 April 2022, 3.44pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1514253257153171466 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 7 May 2022, 6.21pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1522989950689583106 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 3 September 2020, 4.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1311326282064580609 This involved circulating decontextualised videos of immigrants in Italy supposedly committing crimes and ‘terrorising’ native Italians. In one of these videos, for example, Salvini states ‘Nigerian illegal immigrant terrorizes passers-by in Fermo, in the Marche region, armed with a billhook’ Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 3 October 2019, 8.10pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1179836239081623552 ‘in Milan on Saturday night […] a man originally from New Guinea, an IRREGULAR Egyptian with some previous immigration records […] dragged a woman behind a hedge and raped her. What a horror’ Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 3 October 2019, 8.10pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1544278834639687680 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 March 2019, 5.25pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1110231313037094914 166 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 26 September 2021, 8.39am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1442030947596079104 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 20 September 2021, 2.59pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1439952256418394113 167 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 5 July 2022, 12.15pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1157020510070480897 168 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 2 June 2019, 7.53pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1135258234539913218 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 22 June 2020, 7.28pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275133538283720712 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 27 July 2018, 8.26am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1022745061392564224 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 17 November 2021, 4.49pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1461013518459809797 169 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 17 July 2020, 5.27pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1284162889738268674 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 27 December 2020, 11.06am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1343151157062103048

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170 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 24 August 2020, 2.46pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1297892987175931904 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 August 2020, 11.37am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1290597847067500544 171 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 21 June 2020, 6.34pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1285629116595789825 172 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 3 December 2020, 9.36am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1334431194956619778 Lega Salvini Premier witter Post, 8 February 2020, 4.46pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1226185437691219972 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 19 November 2020, 8.41pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1329525115776888832 173 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 23 June 2020, 1.51pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1275411049051807745 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 22 June 2021, 3.09pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1407339843617689605 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 6 July 2020, 12.31pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1280101946980995073 174 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 7 January 2021, 1.11pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1347168877592137729 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 7 January 2021, 6.21pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1347246880770699265 175 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 22 December 2020, 11.15pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1341522875551985664 176 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 3 November 2020, 7.11am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1323523059748347904 177 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 15 August 2020, 4.37pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1294659404080480256 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 22 December 2020, 11.15pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275883531294687233 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 9.08pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1287461824481370113 178 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 25 June 2020, 5.57pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1276197881565896706 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post,25 June 2020, 4.25pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1276173566598426631 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 25 June 2020, 3.29pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1276160654760697862 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 25 November 2020, 7.01pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1331674277616230401 179 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 27 December 2019. 12.08pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1210532943703269378 180 Mondon and Winter, in describe this as: ‘the creation of a loosely defined Muslim culture and community inherently and homogenously opposed to some of the core values espoused in a mythical essentialized culturally homogenous, superior and enlightened West. In this vision, the progress achieved by the West is taken uncritically and portrayed as a natural state of things ignoring that democracy, human rights, free speech, gender and sexual equality and rights remain precarious, unequally distributed and unfulfilled’

Populist Nationalism 245 Matteo Salvini, YouTube Post, 15 February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRr5z4RBA0A 181 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 25 July 2019, 1.52pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1154373755516456960 182 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 31 October 2019, 4.53pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1189948628347105281 183 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 5 March 2019, 5.04pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1102978099334074369 184 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 17 September 2018, 3.15pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1041692031855341568 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 11 May 2021, 12.55pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1392085972586729478 185 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 12 January 2019, 11.04am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1084043377501442048 186 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 January 2019, 10.04am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1081129248604213249 187 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 10 August 2020, 4.02pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1292838631573532675 Matteo Salvini Twitter Post, 4 August 2020, 11.37am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1290597847067500544 188 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 30 April 2019, 7.45pm https://twitter.com/ matteosalvinimi/status/1123297337244303361 189 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 10 December 2020, 12.01pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1337004397382033409 190 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 30 September 2021, 8.39am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1443480491093602312 191 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 4 September 2019, 2.37pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1169243068408766471 192 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 10.57am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275729822686359553 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 10.58am https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1275730090337480705 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 8.02pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1275867008924598274 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 24 June 2020, 7.31pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1275858990841430017 193 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 21 February 2020, 9.36am https://twitter.com/ matteosalvinimi/status/1230788369485094912 194 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 1 May 2021, 3.46pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1388505181281832962 Lega Salvini, Premier Twitter Post, 9 May 2021, 8.09pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1391470281076744193 195 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 25 May 2021, 4.23pm https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1397211792158437385 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 10 April 2021, 10.07am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1380809543723126784 196 Lega Salvini, Premier Twitter Post, 10 August 2021, 10.07am https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1425023871191863310 Lega Salvini Premier Twitter Post, 2 May 2021, 6.29pm https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1388908394501787655

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197 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, ‘The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of Its Own’, West European Politics 28, no. 5 (November 2005): 952–972, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500310600. 198 Davide Vampa, Brothers of Italy: A New Populist Wave in an Unstable Party System (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023). Gianfranco Baldini, Filippo Tronconi, and Davide Angelucci, ‘Yet Another Populist Party? Understanding the Rise of Brothers of Italy’, South European Society and Politics, 10 January 2023, 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1 080/13608746.2022.2159625. 199 Marzia Maccaferri and George Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country: “Sovereignism” and Populism in the Political Discourse of Matteo Salvini’s Lega’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no. 2 (8 March 2022): 277–299, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21066.mac. 200 Marzia Maccaferri and George Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country: “Sovereignism” and Populism in the Political Discourse of Matteo Salvini’s Lega’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no. 2 (8 March 2022): 277–299, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21066.mac Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!” 649. 201 George Newth, ‘The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 384–406, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/0031322X.2019.1615784. 202 ‘In Margine al Congresso dei M.A.R.Padani. Invio alle regioni centromeridionali’ Piemonte Nuovo (1 March 1958). 203 Roberto Chiarini ‘Il disagio del Nord, l’anti-politica e la questione settentrionale’,in Gli Anni Ottanta Come Storia, ed. Simona Colarizi (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004) 215–231, (247). 204 ‘Tacita intesa fra tutti i partiti nell’ignorare la Costituzione’, (Piemonte Nuovo, 26 April 1958). 205 ‘La Lega vuole elezioni subito: La Partitocrazia corrotta e mafiosa ha i giorni contati’, (Lombardia Autonomista, 8 May 1992). 206 Franco Zappettini and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 17, no. 2 (11 May 2021), https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1184. 207 Marzia Maccaferri and George Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country: “Sovereignism” and Populism in the Political Discourse of Matteo Salvini’s Lega’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no. 2 (8 March 2022): 277–299, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21066.mac 208 Matteo Salvini, Twitter Post, 24 May 2019, 10.37pm. https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1132037906980327424 209 Maccaferri and Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country’. 210 ‘Il manifesto del Consiglio dei Comuni d’Europa’, Piemonte Nuovo, 15 June, 1957. 211 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no. 4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483.

Populist Nationalism 247 212 Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, Vento Dal Nord, Politica 7 (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 1992) 136. 213 Maccaferri and Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro-European Country’. 214 John Foot, The Archipelago: Italy since 1945 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018) 390. 215 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!” The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini’, 649. 216 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). 217 Zappettini and Maccaferri, ‘Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy‘. Mattia Zulianello, ‘The League of Matteo Salvini: Fostering and Exporting a Modern Mass-Party Grounded on “Phygital” Activism’, Politics and Governance 9, no. 4 (24 November 2021): 228–239, https://doi.org/10.1 7645/pag.v9i4.4567. 218 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!”’, 649. 219 Giuseppe Leoni, ‘iCattolici votano Lega – La corruzione del regime disgusta i Cristiani’,(Lombardia Autonomista 2 November 1993). Umberto Bossi, ‘L’islam in casa e Roma costruisce moschee’, Lombardia Autonomista 18 January 1992. Francesca Morandi, ‘Le moschee proliferanno contro la volonta’ dei cittadini’ (La Padania 11 January 2011) Simone Giardin, ‘Il No della Lega a Nuove Moschee’ La Padania, 10 January 2011. 220 ‘Torino non può più assorbire altre forti masse di immigrati’, Piemonte Nuovo, (28 June 1958). Guido Calderoli, ‘La Bergamasca Invasa’, in Zibaldone Autonomista d’un Montanaro Bergamasco, ed., Guido Calderoli, (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1958) 15–16. 221 Maurizio Borsotti, ‘L’opportunismo dei partiti, vu cumpra?!’ (Piemont Autonomista, 27 July 1988) Idem, ‘Ma è razzismo o autodifesa?’ (Piemont Autonomista, 30 September 1988). In differentiating the extreme right from the far right I draw on Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream (Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2020) (19) who state that the former rely on ’illiberal articulations of racism, and engage in violence, whether verbal or physical’. 222 Andrew Geddes, ‘Il Rombo Dei Cannoni? Immigration and the Centre-Right in Italy1’, Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 3 (April 2008): 349–366, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760701847416. 223 Maccaferri and Newth, ‘The Delegitimisation of Europe in a Pro‐European Country.

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224 Newth and Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism’. 225 Si24.it ‘Salvini chiede scusa ai napoletani | “Se Renzi affonda i barconi lo voteremo”’ si24.it Available at: https://www.si24.it/2015/05/24/salvini-chiede-scusa-ainapoletani-se-renzi-vuole-affondare-i-barconi-lo-voteremo/ Last accessed 7 February 2023. Vista. Agenzia Televisiva Nazionale. Roma/Bruxelles. ‘Salvini: Chiedo Scusa al Sud e ai Meridionali’. YouTube Post. 8 February 2015. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKCV9IUeHKg Last accessed: 7 February 2023. 226 Antonio Rapisarda, All’armi Siam Leghisti: Come e Perché Matteo Salvini Ha Conquistato La Destra (Correggio (RE): Aliberti Wingsbert House, 2015). Valerio Renzi, La Politica Della Ruspa: La Lega Di Salvini e Le Nuove Destre Europee, Tempi Moderni (Roma: Alegre, 2015). 227 Newth and Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism’. Chamsy el-Ojeili, ‘Reflecting on Post-Fascism: Utopia and Fear’, Critical Sociology 45, no. 7–8 (November 2019): 1149–1166, https://doi.org/1 0.1177/0896920518768867. 228 Newth and Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti‐Fascism to Post‐Fascism 229 See, for instance: Giorel Curran, ‘Mainstreaming Populist Discourse: The Race-Conscious Legacy of Neo-Populist Parties in Australia and Italy’, Patterns of Prejudice 38, no. 1 (March 2004): 37–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322032000185578. Joao Miguel Duarte de Carvalho, Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing Britain, France and Italy (London: Routledge, 2016). 230 Emilio Gentile. The sacralization of politics in fascist Italy. Harvard University Press, 1996. 231 Giovannini and Vampa, ‘Boom to Bust’. 232 Matherthebec, ‘Salvini Coro Contro i Napoletano’, YouTube Post, 5 July 2009. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2wdCs2BOdo Last accessed: 5 January 2023. Alexander Stille, ‘How Matteo Salvini pulled Italy to the right’ The Guardian, (9 August 2018). https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvinipulled-italy-to-the-far-right Last accessed: 7 February 2023. George Newth ‘Italy: How Matteo Salvini sacrificed bid for northern autonomy to save the League’ The Conversation, (30 May 2018). Available at: https://theconversation.com/italy-how-matteo-salvini-sacrificed-bid-for-north ern-autonomy-to-save-the-league-97392 Last accessed: 7 February 2023. 233 Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, ‘“No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!”’. 234 Vampa, ‘Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in 2016’, 34. 235 Ibid. 33.

Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism in Historical Perspective Conclusions

1 Introduction This book began with the assertion that the historical and ideological roots of the Lega should be re-examined in the light of previously under-researched 1950s’ Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) in Lombardy and Piedmont. Via this approach, the book has interpreted the Lega as a product not only of its contemporary socio-economic environment of the 1980s, but also of ideas rooted in the post-war period. In other words, this book has argued that leghismo is not an isolated phenomenon, but instead a second wave of populist regionalist activism. Three questions were posed in light of this research problem: How did three separate periods of crisis and transition affect North Italian populist regionalism, transforming it from a force of unity to one of fragmentation and later into nationalism? How did populist regionalism survive, following the decline of the MRAs in the 1960s, only to re-emerge in the form of leghismo in the early 1980s? Finally, to what extent and how do populism and nativism account for continuities and discontinuities between the political message of the MRAs and the Lega? In line with these three questions, this conclusion will first examine the synchronous nature of three separate crises of the Italian Republic and three moments of transition for (North) Italian populist regionalism and activism, before going on to illustrate how changing discursive fields have shaped populist and nativist discourse. The conclusion then re-iterates the central role of abeyance theory in accounting for the maintenance and reproduction of repertoires of contention; finally, there is a summary of the contributions made in this book to the scholarship not only on the Lega, but also on historical approaches to political science in general. 1.1 Crisis, Transition, and the Evolution of Regionalist and Nationalist Claims

Crisis and transition have been key features throughout all chapters of this book. Having established a definition of crisis in chapter 1, chapter 2 then DOI: 10.4324/9781003297420-8

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underlined the central role played by the connection between crisis and transition and the (re)emergence of regionalist and federalist narratives throughout contemporary Italian history. This highlighted how, while the regional question was a slow-burning crisis for the Italian state, a series of fast-burning crises created opportunities for demands of regional autonomy from a series of social and political actors. With regards to transition, the success or failure of regionalist demands depended largely on the capacity of the state to shut down these demands and maintain unity via a tradition of centralism. The first crisis relevant to the first wave of populist regionalism was the fall of Fascism and the period of transition to democracy. The Bergamascan Autonomist Movement (the MAB) and the Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement (the MARP) emerged seven years after the establishment of the Italian Republic following the fall of fascism to campaign for the activation of regional statutes which had remained inactive since 1948. The MRAs were, therefore, a product of the Republic, which had been constructed on the principles of anti-fascism, engaging with a discursive field of regionalism related to transition from Fascism to democracy. While the MRAs questioned the legitimacy of the parties of the First Italian Republic, this was never extended to criticise the foundations of the Republic or of the Italian nation-state itself. Indeed, these movements wished to use regional autonomy to strengthen the Italian nation-state, not question its legitimacy. Depicting bureaucratic centralism as the last surviving remnant of the fascist regime, the MRAs presented themselves as defenders of the 1948 Republican Constitution, arguing that regional government was fundamental to the survival of a democratic, anti-fascist Republic. While the MRAs’ notion of a ‘second Risorgimento’ consisted of activating the regional statutes, its ideal of a Europe of the regions was part of a post-war ideal of European federalism. The post1945 discursive field of regionalism meant that while Italy was in the process of rebuilding in the post-war period, it would have been difficult for the MARP and the MAB to argue for a deconstruction of the Republic and the replacement with a Federal Republic, which is exactly what leghismo demanded in the 1980s and 1990s. The period between 1989 and 1994 consisted of a crisis of the Italian political institutions caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Tangentopoli Scandals, and subsequent electoral reform. This second period of crisis and transition comprised the decline and fall of the First Italian Republic and the transition to the Second Italian Republic. Whereas the MRAs’ regionalism was limited to calling for the activation of the regional statutes, the Lega’s regionalism and federalism attacked the regional administrations the MRAs had campaigned for, labelling them as an extension of centralism. The phenomenon of leghismo, therefore, contributed to a shift

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in the discursive field of regionalism away from unity to one of fragmentation as Bossi called for a transition between the First and the Second Republic to be marked by a federal restructuring of the Italian nation-state. Leghismo reframed anti-fascist discourse to depict the First Italian Republic as a continuation of Fascism and a betrayal of the regionalist principles that underpinned many aspects the anti-fascist resistance. Furthermore, Fascism was depicted – falsely – as a predominantly Southern phenomenon, and freedom, liberty, and anti-fascism as Northern qualities. The shift of emphasis from unity towards fragmentation had begun before the second period of crisis and transition; this is perhaps most pertinently demonstrated in the role of the early Piedmontese leagues in their attempt to of disown Risorgimento narratives and dissociate Piedmont with the process of national unification. In the case of the Lega, a ‘Second Risorgimento’ consisted of the transition between the First Italian Republic towards a Second ‘Federal’ Republic; the MRAs, however, had never argued for such a radical measure. Furthermore, while initially adopting a Europragmatist position in which the party extolled the benefits of European Union (EU) membership for the North of Italy, the Lega later shifted towards Euroscepticism to delegitimise the EU which it increasingly depicted as a centralist institution frustrating the Lega’s aims of self-government for Padania. In terms of the third period of crisis and transition, ‘at the beginning of the 1990s, the relationship between the central government and the periphery was a hot button issue in many European states’. However, attention had by the end of the first decade of the 2000s ‘shifted to the struggle against the austerity being imposed by the EU and, more in general, to the perceived “risks posed by immigration” to national economies and sovereignties’.1 Such perceived risks were later exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic which offered opportunities for far-right and nationalist parties to promote hard borders and vaccine nationalism. These convergent crises of the Eurozone, the so-called refugee crisis and Covid-19, were combined with an identity crisis for the Lega which stemmed from the declining salience of regionalism, the ‘Belsito Affair,’ and the emergence of a new populist actor in the form of the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S). Matteo Salvini responded to this period of post-2010 crisis by changing the Lega’s identity in line with a transition between the Second and Third Italian Republics. At the time of Salvini’s election as federal secretary, the Lega was ‘the oldest party of the so-called Italian Second Republic’2; meanwhile, its federalist programme had been stymied by the centre-left’s own regionalist reforms to the Constitution and the emergence of the M5S had ‘challenged the Lega on its own terrain, namely, that of the need to sweep away the Italian political system and the political class.’ While under Bossi, ‘the Lega was a party of the north, of Padania,’ under Salvini, ‘the enemy was Rome no longer’ but Brussels, European institutions, and ‘buonisti’ (do-gooders).3

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The first years under Salvini, therefore, marked a significant shift in the party’s identity, culminating in the end of post-war regionalist activism and a shift towards populist nationalism. Salvini’s Lega entailed a discursive relocation of the Northern Question to an ‘Italian Question’ in which Italy was viewed as a ‘region’ subordinate to a broader centralist bureaucratic and exploitative framework of the EU. Salvini, abandoned the association between regionalism and anti-fascism which had been a key component of the party under its previous leader. Conversely, Salvini now delegitimised the Republic’s anti-fascist foundations and claimed that ‘neither Left or Right nor fascists or communists exist anymore’.4 The two waves of post-war populist regionalism held very different objectives regarding the Italian nation-state; in essence, the first wave represented by the MAB used a patriotic form of regionalism and federalism to argue for national unity. This was due to the MRAs selfappointed role as defenders of the First Italian Republic, with their arguments formulated both during and after a period of crisis and transition between Fascism and democracy. Conversely, the Lega pursued a programme of national fragmentation and, later, secessionism. These were ideas which began to emerge some years before change and crisis between 1989 and 1994 and contributed to the fall of the First Italian Republic and a subsequent transition to the Second Italian Republic. Subsequently, Matteo Salvini oversaw a transition of the Lega from populist regionalism to populist nationalism in line with the transition from the Second to Third Italian Republic. Salvini’s wave of populist nationalism consisted of a discursive recontextualisation of the party’s ‘old’ idea of regionalism to a national level and returned to the idea of national unity, albeit via a nationalist narrative which would have been anathema to MRA discourse. It should nevertheless be considered a third wave of activism despite this change in ideology, comprising as it did of discursive repertoires which had been passed down via previous generations of activists due to the process of abeyance. 1.2 Abeyance Theory and the Survival and Reformulation of Populist Regionalist Discourse(s)

Chapters 1 and 3, respectively, introduced and applied social movement theory to the case of North Italian populist regionalism to examine the survival and subsequent recontextualisation of populist regionalist repertoires of contention. Using a conceptual framework rooted in abeyance theory, this book has accounted for how populist regionalist discourse survived a period of inactivity through its maintenance via abeyance structures and subsequent transmission via inter-generational links.5 Two key elements of abeyance, conceptualised, respectively, by Ephraim

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Mizruchi and Verta Taylor, have played a key role in this analysis. The first regards abeyance as a form of ‘social control’6 and explains how organisations temporarily retain potential challengers to the status quo, thereby reducing threats to the larger social systems.7 The second interprets abeyance as ‘a process by which movements sustain themselves when confronted with a non-receptive political and social environment. In an abeyance phase, movements are less visible but not inactive’.8 This second feature also accounts for the survival and transmission of past repertoires via ‘abeyance structures’ or ‘rump movements/submerged networks’ which provided ‘organisational and ideological bridges’ from one mass mobilisation to another.9 Building on my existing research which has traced the genealogy of North Italian regionalism, this chapter revealed key links between leghismo and the MRAs.10 The MARP’s and the MAB’s decline had begun shortly following their first successes in 1956, the results of which they would never match again. Indeed, the 1958 elections, while presenting an opportunity for the MRAs to capitalise on previous successes in the 1956 administrative elections, proved instead to be their swansong. The 1958 national elections should be viewed as a key turning point in the history of North Italian populist regionalism. By making agreements with the MRAs and by accepting MRA members into their local party structures, mainstream political parties such as the Christian Democrats (DC) and Social Democrats (PSDI) contributed to a more rapid decline of the post-war autonomist movements. Some postwar autonomists may well have believed that these parties were suitable environments in which to continue the campaign for regional autonomy, while others may have simply been looking for a way to prolong their political careers. Importantly, there were others who remained opposed to these larger political institutions and were committed to the pursuit of the regionalist ideal in smaller movements. By the time significant sections of both MRAs were absorbed by the DC and the PSDI, a quantity of materials in the form of newspapers, posters, essays, poems, slogans, and postcards demonstrating regionalist repertoires had already been produced by the MARP and the MAB. The Piedmontese origin of many of these materials from the 1950s onwards illustrate this region’s key role in developing regionalist ideology not only in the 1950s but also in the 1980s. The pioneering role played by several Piedmontese autonomists in the mid- to-late 1950s acted as an inspiration to both its smaller sister movement, the MAB, and also formed a key part of the framework for leghismo. As illustrated by the comparative analyses in chapters 4, 5, and 6, the MRAs had created a rich tapestry of populist regionalist repertoires which would later be reformulated by the Lega. This book has, accordingly, also explored how the populist regionalism of the 1950s survived North Italian regional autonomy. Populist

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regionalism survived since the process of decline had encouraged the formation of cadres of activists or ‘rump movements’ which continued to campaign for regional autonomy. The transmission of populist regionalism in the form of essays, posters, and leaflets through rump movements friendship, family, and rivalry accounts for the survival of these narratives over these two decades, thus bridging the gap between the two waves of activism. Abeyance structures meant that instead of many of the populist regionalist repertoires of the MRAs fading into obscurity, they were passed on to a new generation of activists, recontextualised and recycled for a second wave of activism. In short, a wide variety of populist regionalist discursive repertoires survived and were intermittently developed and promoted by individuals committed to the regionalist ideal in the decades leading up to the emergence of the first regionalist leagues. Between the 1960s and the late 1970s, these repertoires were passed on through inter-generational links between family, friends, and rivalry. What had previously been thought of as a period of inactivity prior to the emergence of leghismo can now be viewed as a period that, although more hostile to regionalist movements, experienced a persistence of smaller scale activism. Figures such as Ugo Gavazzeni and Guido Calderoli played a central role in this continuation of activism in Lombardy, setting up movements such as the Unione Autonomisti d’Italia (UAI) which acted as precursors to Umberto Bossi’s Lega Lombarda. Meanwhile, Toni Brodrero and Enrico Villarboito helped populist regionalist discursive repertoires survive in Piedmont, working in collaboration with Roberto Gremmo to pass them down to new generations. What this book has illustrated is how a period of abeyance entails contextual differences which command, if not a total reinvention of the wheel, then at least a modification of its parts to suit the new sociopolitical reality.11 As illustrated in chapters 3–6, several repertoires of contention which had been developed in the 1950s were recycled not only by the leagues of the 1980s and the Lega under Bossi, but also in a populist nationalist iteration under Matteo Salvini. However, in line with how the region vs nation, people vs elites, or natives vs non-natives dichotomy was articulated in a specific discursive field, some arguments were either no longer relevant or needed to be updated/modified. A case in point here is the MARPadania alliance of 1958. Although it was short-lived, its significance should not be underestimated for a number of reasons. First, it provided an important precedent for the future Alleanza Nord in 1989 between various regionalist leagues. Second, the use of the term Padania was also highly significant and would re-emerge in 1970 as part of the UAI, linking a European, federalist identity with anti-southern discourse which had been present in the MRAs’ political identity in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the call to arms by MARPadania of ‘long live Italy!’ was not

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only absent from leghismo but would have been anathema to this second wave of populist regionalism. While the MRAs used their ideology of regionalism in conjunction with narratives of national unity to defend the Italian Republic, their successors, conversely attacked the Italian nationstate by reframinng repertoires inherited from the MRAs to suit the political context of the 1980s and 1990s.12 1.3 Populism, Nativism, and the Evolution of FarRight Ideology in (North) Italy

The framework of populist regionalism and populist nationalism has taken into consideration how the populist and nativist articulations of regionalism used in the 1950s by the MRAs were later adopted and adapted by the Lega under both Bossi and Salvini, thus enabling a more nuanced analysis of the connections between three waves of activism. In terms of populism, presenting themselves not only as the vox populi but also as antagonists of an out-of-touch ‘elite,’ the MRAs between 1955 and 1960 contributed at a local level to Italy’s image as ‘the promised land of populism’ in the post-war era, setting an important precedent for populist discourse in the 1980s and 1990s.13 The fact that the MARP and the MAB share similarities to both Qualunquismo and Poujadisme is significant as it illustrates how the MRAs’ anti-fascist identity conflicted with their distrust of the anti-fascist parties which formed the new political order of the First Italian Republic. Indeed, the MARP’s ambivalence towards what they labelled as the partitocrazia was rooted in a longstanding distrust of these parties; meanwhile, both MRAs, in their fiscal protest against measures such as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, had much in common with Poujadisme. Although a large number of these post-war populist narratives would be recycled by the Lega, to see leghismo as a direct reincarnation of Qualunquismo or Poujadisme is to ignore the fact that the Lega was operating as part of a post-1989 populist and nativist discourse which was linked strongly to the collapse of political narratives related to the Cold War era. A comparison between the MRAs and the Lega makes for a much more apt analysis of two waves of populism. Viewing regionalism as the core ideology articulated via populist discourse is fundamental to this analysis. Indeed, the interplay between each wave of activism’s regionalist-federalist proposals and their populism is vital in understanding the differences between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s message. Central to both waves of populist regionalism was the notion that regionalism was the only way to redress the balance of power between the elites and the people. However, the differences in the regionalism and federalism established in chapter 4, in turn, played a key role in the divergent ways in which the populist regionalism of the MRAs and the

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Lega proposed returning regional sovereignty to the people of the North. The MRAs’ opposition to the Italian political class was partly due to their view that the central government in Rome was inherently biased towards the South, looted the North’s resources to find the money for the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, and encouraged a system of patronage and clientelism. This book has shown, therefore, how prior to the emergence of the regionalist leagues, a ‘Northern Question’ had been raised by the MRAs. Cento Bull and Gilbert wrote in 2001 that the presence of the Lega has been a goad jabbing at Italy’s political class into remembering that the North – Italy’s productive heartland – has become alarmed and angry about the inadequacy of the Italian state.14 Such warnings had been present in MRA discourse; indeed, the focus on the inadequacy of the parties and the centralist system to respond to the divide between the North and the South formed a central plank of MARP’s and the MAB’s political message. Therefore, the MRAs preceded the Lega in the sense that they existed ‘because there is a Northern Question’ and had ‘contributed to creating such a question’.15 Fundamentally, however, the Lega, unlike the MRAs, succeeded in making the ‘Northern Question […] at least as important as the more familiar Southern Question in the political debate’.16 This had not been the case in the 1950s and was linked to the second wave of populist regionalism which allowed the Lega’s narratives challenging the post-war consensus in Italy of a heavily bureaucratised welfare state to flourish. While for the MRAs, the regional statutes were depicted as a way of ensuring Northern taxes stayed in the North, the Lega proposed a federalist overhaul of the state as a solution to the Northern Question. The Lega’s version of federalism did not initially pose an explicit threat to Italian unity; nevertheless, the move towards secessionism in 1995 reflected a radicalisation of returning the ‘heartland’ to the people with respect to the MRA’s previous message. This idea of the heartland was also intrinsically linked to the nativist element within populist regionalism. While the MRAs and the Lega both saw the partitocrazia as denying regional sovereignty for the Northern people, the MRAs’ idea that state-sanctioned regional government would have returned this sovereignty to the people would have been anathema to the Lega. The populist regionalist framework established in this book has also challenged Mudde’s analysis of the Lega as a ‘borderline’ example of a far right party borne from his assertion that ‘while populism has always been a core feature of the Lega […] authoritarianism and nativism have not’.17 The populist regionalist framework instead shows how the Lega has, since its inception, always espoused a nativist discourse, which forms a part of a wider racist

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ideology; the party should, therefore, be considered a far right party from its origins. This book has contributed to a clearer understanding of the roots of the politicisation of anti-southern sentiment in post-war Italy. The MRAs provided a framework of nativist repertoires against the South in their essays, articles, and images, which would be recycled by the Lega in the 1980s. The Lega’s nativist discourse of anti-southernism built upon many of the stereotypes, discourse, and imagery which the MRAs had used during the migratory flows of the 1950s. Many of the anti-immigration arguments which had been used by the MRAs remained the same and were discursively reconstructed and recontextualised from the Southerner to the clandestini and, later, the Muslim ‘Other’. The notion of an ‘invasion,’ be it from the South or from abroad, was used to justify arguments for the secession of the North or Padania as the Lega attempted to construct new borders for its imaginary state. In terms of the longer term analysis employed throughout this book, while the MARP and the MAB should certainly not be considered alongside neo-fascist or extreme parties, which pursure illiberal forms of racism, the fact that they espoused racism in often coded terms, relating to southern culture and customs, for instance, while pursuing a policy of exclusionism against southern Italians, means they have been analysed at the intersection of the first and second waves of post-war right-wing extremism. Indeed, it would also be an error to see the Lega’s far right ideology as unrelated to both its and the MRAs’ previous nativist stances against southerners and against migration. The populist and nativist form of regionalist ideology which the Lega incarnated was inherited from the MRAs. In short, populism and nativism are essential in understanding the continuities and discontinuities in the political message of the MRAs and the Lega. By adopting a discursive approach to populism, this book has allowed for the examination of two examples of ‘when populism has come to the fore not only in different historical moments and parts of the world, but also in very different shapes or “sub-types”’.18 This has illuminated how regionalism and populism have intertwined while also demonstrating how an exclusionary form of regionalism can lead to nativism. The Lega’s sharper turn to the far right post-1996 was inextricably linked to the decision to pursue secessionism. Therefore, the Lega’s intensification of their opposition to migration from abroad, the movement’s increasing hostility to the EU, its anti-globalisation position, its authoritarian stance on law and order, and its emphasis of a Christian identity in opposition to Islam represented a radicalisation not only of its previous discourse, but also a significant departure from its 1950s’ predecessors.19 As illustrated in chapter 6, this shift even further to the right paved the way for Salvini’s adoption of populist nationalism from 2017 onwards in which any pretence of anti-

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fascism was abandoned and reconciliation with the south of the peninsula was made a key priority. Populism and nativism have once again proved key elements of continuity in Salvini’s third wave of activism; however, the fact that these discourses have been articulated alongside a nationalist ideology as well as in a discursive field of post-2010 crisis means that key aspects of the previous two waves of activism have been abandoned by Salvini and/or held in abeyance. It is to this issue, and other potential implications of this book, that the final section of this conclusion now turns. 1.3.1 A Historical Approach to Political Science and Future Directions for Studies on the Lega, Populism, and the Far Right

This book has provided the first in-depth study of the historical roots of the populist regionalist and populist far right Lega (Nord). The dual historical sociological and political science approach towards leghismo in this book has illustrated how the context in which a political movement operates is that which makes it unique to its time in terms of purpose, objectives, and individual endeavour. Indeed, the study of populist regionalism in this book is but one of the many forms of recurring contentious politics which deserves greater scrutiny. Neither the MARP nor the MAB were ‘Fathers of the Lega Nord’ in the direct sense that Bossi had claimed in his speech at Pontida in 1994; however, they were responsible for developing narratives that attacked the perceived centralist state, argued that regionalism was the best way to cure the country’s ills, and targeted southern Italians via nativist discourse. A vast number of populist regionalist repertoires had been developed by the MARP before being adapted and developed by the MAB and later, in turn, being adopted by the Lega. The fundamental difference between the MRAs and the Lega regarding the region and the nation-state, however, shows how important it is to avoid focusing solely on the continuities in discourse at the expense of the clear discontinuities between political and social movements. The final paragraphs of this conclusion outline some possible future directions for studies on the Lega and then suggest some ways in which this book’s dual disciplinary approach might be adapted and applied in future research. Regarding further research most closely related to historical research on leghismo and MRAs, this book offers two potential avenues. Although Piedmont has been a key focus of this book, an exclusive study of the development of Piedmontese leghismo has been beyond its parameters. Bearing in mind the findings of this research inand the fact that literature on the history of the Lega has tended to focus on Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, and more recently on Emilia Romagna, future research may be able to address the comparative lack of literature on Piedmontese

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leghismo20. The fact that an autonomist movement emerged in Piedmont, a region which had played such a central role in unification and the adoption of administrative centralism in the years following the Risorgimento raises important questions with regards to the overlap between regionalism and nationalism which deserve much greater examination. However, further to a re-evaluation of the role of Piedmontese regionalism in the development of post-war and 1980s North Italian regionalism, this study also has wider implications for the Veneto, a region that has not formed a key focus of this study. Research on the Venetian Regional Autonomy Movement (the MARV) would also further our understanding of whether this organisation, for instance, professed the same level of loyalty towards the nation-state as the Bergamascan and Piedmontese MRAs. Furthermore, as the first documented record of the MARV is in 1960, at a time when the MARP and the MAB began their decline, additional research would enhance our understanding of this period of abeyance. A further avenue of research which has been beyond the scope of this book is how the traditional regionalist elements of the party are being held in abeyance under Matteo Salvini’s leadership. Party factions which may well develop into rump movements or cadres of activists, can promote and develop north Italian regionalist narratives.21 Since the establishment of the Lega Salvini Premier, the Lega Nord’s website acts as an important abeyance structure as it acts as a digital archive for many of the Lega’s old posters and manifestos.22 In the meantime, other high-profile leghisti have publicly available personal archives of the Lega’s early posters dating back to the 1980s.23 A further abeyance structure is that of La Nuova Padania, an online newspaper set up in 2020 by some of the main contributors to the Lega’s old daily newspaper, La Padania. This website continues in the federalist tradition of the Lega Nord, publishing blogs and articles in support of federalist movements across Europe while putting forward the case for a ‘true party of the North’.24 Counter-narratives to Salvini’s nationalist turn found a voice in 2017 not only via the debates on regional autonomy referenda in Lombardy and Veneto25 but also through Gianni Fava’s campaign in the leadership primaries for the federal secretaryship in that same year.26 While existing scholarly work hints at the role of these abeyance structures, further research is needed to understand the survival of regionalism within the party under Salvini’s leadership.27 This is increasingly relevant following the Lega’s disastrous showing at the 2022 elections. Amidst claims from long-standing activists in the North that ‘Salvini’s nationalist turn has abjured the League’s core values and should be reversed,’ the founder of the Lega, Umberto Bossi, ‘has even called for the creation of a “regionalist faction” within the party to bring it back to its roots and regain support in the North’.28 While the question of how the

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Lega develops next in its next phase remains open to debate, one thing is highly likely: given the durability of the populism and nativism which have survived since the 1950s through the 1980s and 1990s until today, these two discourses will remain a key part of the party’s identity for years to come. While this book has reconceptualised the roots of populist regionalism and populist nationalism in (North) Italy, the implications of the research stretch beyond Italian history and politics . This study paves the way for future research on the origins and survival of social and political movements in general. Political scientists, sociologists, and historians working on a wide range of ideologies, parties, and social movements may further refine and develop the frameworks applied in this book to pursue a cross-disciplinary approach between historical sociology and political science. The two main theoretical frameworks in question are those of populist regionalism and populist nationalism, and the framework inspired by abeyance theory introduced in chapter 1 and applied in chapter 3. The populist regionalist and populist nationalist framework used in this book has,been adapted from a prior study in which, in contrast to the approach taken to this book, I had interpreted populism as a thin-centred ideology.29 The fact that a discursive approach was adopted in this book to adapt and update this populist regionalist/nationalist paradigm illustrates the adaptability of the framework and its possible application to different ontological approaches to populism. This book has also contributed to definitional debates on populism, regionalism, nationalism, and the far right. In particular, it has clarified the connection between exclusionary regionalism and far right politics, focusing on how the former can contribute to an articulation of nativist discourse, which is a key feature of the latter.30 With this in mind, while this book has focused on a particular form of regionalism which emerged in a particular contextas stated in chapter 1, not all forms of regionalism – or indeed nationalism – are nativist or exclusionary. Existing research has illustrated how populist regionalism and populist nationalism can be applied to left wing and/or civic regionalist and nationalist movements which do not hold overtly nativist programmes.31 However, more research is needed to examine the various ways that inclusionary and exclusionary forms of regionalism, nationalism, and populism intersect and contribute to different constructions of ‘the people’. The populist regionalist and populist nationalist framework used in this book hold the potential to navigate this centre of epistemological gravity. In terms of abeyance theory, this book has contributed a further example of how instances of contention are not independent events but instead form part of longer term pattern of social and political interaction. This can pave the way for greater collaboration between historical sociology and political studies. Despite the different intellectual traditions behind abeyance and populism, historical sociological theory can provide an explanation of the

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latent nature of the populist movements, ideas, and repertoires. For instance, with the recent debates which are developing at the time of writing regarding popular and national sovereignty in Scotland and support for independence growing, more research is required to examine how current repertoires of contention have developed from past instances of contention in Scottish populist nationalism.32 Beyond populism, however, abeyance theory may also be used to examine a wide range of ideologies, parties, and social movements. The re-emergence of political narratives of both the far left and far right, continuing debates over EU membership and integration, and militant climate crisis activism are all phenomena that have both deep roots in a variety of social and historical repertoires and are likely to act as reference points for future waves of activism. Underpinnning these phenomena are the seeming collapse of a social-democratic consensus in Europe since the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing economic, social, and political deficit in many societies which, since the outbreak of Coronavirus, have been exacerbated, threatening new waves of contention. If adapted and applied to different case studies cited above, the frameworks used in this book can help account for the role of structure and agency in the survival, continuity, and discontinuity of a variety of movements, their ideas, and inter-generational links. Fathers of the Lega, therefore, while breaking new ground in tracing the roots of leghismo to the post-war transition from Fascism to democracy, can also help understand how various crises are amplified by populist actors drawing on past repertoires of contention. This book promises, therefore, to contribute to a wider discussion on the intersection between populism, nativism, regionalism, and nationalism over the coming decades. Notes 1 Marco Brunazzo and Mark Gilbert, ‘Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the Right-Wing Populist Turn of the Lega Nord since 2013’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no. 5 (20 October 2017): 624–641, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1389524. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 George Newth and Marzia Maccaferri, ‘From Performative Anti-Fascism to Post-Fascism: The Lega (Nord)’s Political Discourse in Historical Context’, Journal of Political Ideologies (11 November 2022): 1–25, https://doi.org/10. 1080/13569317.2022.2138296. 5 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no. 4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. 6 Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, Regulating Society: Marginality and Social Control in Historical Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1983) 163. 7 Ibid., 17.

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8 Özge Zihnioğlu, ‘Strategizing Post-Protest Activism in Abeyance: Retaining Activist Capital under Political Constraint’, Social Movement Studies, Online First (2021), doi: 10.1080/14742837.2021.2003193 See also: Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, American Sociological Review 54, no. 5 (1989): 761–775 (762), https:// doi.org/10.2307/2117752 9 Ibid. 10 Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance’. 11 Paris Aslanidis, Populism and Social Movements, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10. 1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.23. 12 George Newth, ‘The Roots of the Lega Nord’s Populist Regionalism’, Patterns of Prejudice 53, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 384–406, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0031322X.2019.1615784. 13 Marco Tarchi, ‘Italy: The Promised Land of Populism?’, Contemporary Italian Politics 7, no. 3 (2 September 2015): 273–285, https://doi.org/10.1080/2324 8823.2015.1094224. Marzia Maccaferri, ‘Populism and Italy: A Theoretical and Epistemological Conundrum’, Modern Italy 27, no. 1 (February 2022): 5–17, https://doi.org/ 10.1017/mit.2021.66. 14 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 7. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 57. 18 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017) 19. 19 Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, 106 20 Paolo Stefanini, Avanti Po: La Lega Nord Alla Riscossa Nelle Regioni Rosse, Infrarossi (Milano: Il saggiatore, 2010). Massimo Greco and Alberto Bollis, Carroccio a Nord‐Est: Storia, programma e uomini della Lega Nord del Friuli‐Venezia Giulia (Trieste: MGS Press Editrice, 1993). Francesco Jori, Dalla Liga alla Lega, storia, movimenti, protaganisti, (Venice: Marsilio, 2009). Paolo Barcella, La Lega: Una Storia, (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2022). 21 George Newth, ‘Populism in Abeyance: The Survival of Populist Repertoires of Contention in North Italy’, Social Movement Studies 21, no. 4 (4 July 2022): 511–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1928483. 22 Source: https://www.leganord.org/Last accessed: 5 May 2023 23 One such Lega MP with a publicly available archive is Davide Caparini whose collection of old Lega materials is available at: http://www.caparini.com/ propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm Last accessed: 5 May 2023

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Index

Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes; and page numbers in Bold refer to tables; and page numbers in italics refer to figures 1848-1948: the Risorgimento to the Republic 57–65 1946–1955: from theory to activism 66–68 1946-1960: the MRAs as the first wave of activism 99–104 1955–1958: success and signs of decline 68–70 1960–1980: holding process and rump movements 104–107 1970S regional reforms 70–72 1980–1991: second wave of activism 107–110 Abeyance, populist regionalism: creation of repertoires of contention 94; genealogy of Leghismo via three populist discursive repertoires of contention 97–110; genealogy of Piedmontese 98; interpretive framework 93–97; Lombard regionalism 98; maintenance in Abeyance 95–96; 1946-1960: the MRAs as the first wave of activism 99–104; 1960–1980: holding process and rump movements 104–107; 1980–1991: second wave of activism 107–110; overview 92–93; transmission and reproduction of discursive repertoires 96–97

abeyance theory 35–37, 93, 95, 249, 252–255 Agnew, Jonathan 40n25 Albertazzi, Daniele 22, 23, 43n68, 45n79, 90n226, 246n197, 263n27 Alberto, Carlo 57 Alleanza, Nord 69 Allum, Percy 12n19 Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph 232n50 Amato, Giuliano 137 Andriot, Angie L. 146n5 anti-fascism (performative): the Lega – continuities and discontinuities 136–138; the MRAS 133–136 anti-fascist resistance 54, 57, 64, 78, 133, 138, 251 Arban, Erika 83n81 Arcuri, Domenico 214 Aslanidis, Paris 12n16, 112n5, 113n6, 262n11 Baioni, Massimo 150n71 Barcella, Paolo 39n20, 89n195 Barelli, Paolo 68 Basile, Linda 18 Belsito Affair 251 Belsito, Francesco 75 Bergamascan Autonomy Movement 2, 18, 99, 119–120, 169, 221, 250 Bergamaschi, Gruppo A. 85n133 Bergamo communal council 109 Berlusconi, Silvio 72, 73, 76, 136–137

304

Index

Bernatsky, Colin 11n9 Bersani, Pier L. 76 Betz, Hans-Georg 190n39, 190n45, 199n221 Biorcio, Roberto 11n6, 17, 149n58 Borsotti, Maurizio 198n203 Bossi, Umberto 1–4, 16–21, 24, 42n48, 64, 71–79, 99, 108–110, 118n97, 125, 126, 131, 133, 136–138, 141–143, 147n39, 148n40, 154n154, 155n162, 158, 163, 172–175, 181–183, 185, 193n109, 194n120, 197n184, 201, 202, 220–224, 226, 251, 254, 255, 258 Boulliaud, Christophe 5, 12n20, 19, 42n46, 117n70, 192n77 Breeze, Ruth 50n132 Brodrero, Antonio 107, 108 Brodrero, Toni 106, 107 Brown, Katy 12n18, 13n26 Brunazzo, Marco 91n227, 261n1 Bruno, Franco 106 Bull, Martin J. 229n22 Burzio, Beppe 3, 11n8 Busto, Andrea 68 Cable, Sherry 53n167 Cachafeiro, Gomez R. 42n44 Cafaro, Philip 145n2 Calderoli, Giuseppe 109 Calderoli, Guido 67, 69, 100, 105, 106, 108, 109, 147n22, 170, 177, 188n2, 191n70, 195n141, 220, 254 Canovan, Margaret 10n4 Capusotti, Erica 188n4 Caramani, Daniele 231n47 Carlo Cattaneo 130, 142 Cavazza, Stefano 45n81, 79n1 Cavour, Count Camilo 57 Cento Bull, Anna 11n7, 14, 21, 38n6, 39n15, 43n60, 43n61, 88n190, 89n189, 89n197, 148n50, 152n104, 175, 181, 184, 188n6, 236n92, 256 cerchio magico 75 Charles, Michael T. 80n7 Chiarini, Roberto 86n153 Christian Democrat-Communist polarisation 14

Christian Democrat Party (DC) 64, 65, 70–72, 78, 79, 97, 104–106, 111, 172, 173, 253 clandestini 8, 216, 223, 257 Clarke, John 231n44 Codazza, Roberto 180, 191n73, 197n173 Colombo, Giuseppe 61 Compagna, Francesco 41n40 Conte, Giuseppe 214 Corduwener, Pepijn 189n17 Corti, Michele 154n145 Covid-19 pandemic 201, 213–218, 226, 251 Crisis and Leghismo 1–2 crisis and transition 2, 7, 9, 10, 33, 37, 55, 56, 65, 74, 77, 92, 109, 119, 128, 138, 145, 201, 226, 249–252 Crispi, Francesco 60, 61 Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) 6, 7 Da Giussano, Alberto 104 D’Alema, Massimo 73 D’Alimonte, Roberto 90n222 Damiani, Marco 230n41 D’Azeglio, Massimo 119, 120, 130 de Benedetti, Hertz 68 De Cleen, Benjamin 49n126, 164 De Genova, Nicholas 232n54 Delanty, Gerard 11n10, 11n11 De Luna, Giovanni 39n18 DeMatteo, Lynda 5, 12n20, 19, 117n70, 192n77 Dennison, James 237n100 Destro, Adriana 226n1 De Winter, Lieven 47n100 Diamanti, Ilvo 12n19, 14 Diani, Mario 17, 41n36 Dines, Nick 204, 229n29 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) 6–8 discursive field 33, 34, 94, 97, 100, 111, 112, 121, 159, 180, 202, 203, 205–207, 225, 249, 250, 254, 258; regionalism and federalism 121–128 Draghi administration 210, 213–215, 218 Draghi, Mario 208 dual approach to Leghismo 3–5;

Index Diamanti’s analysis 14; historical approaches to the lega 16–19; party’s ‘performative anti-fascism’ 21; political science and historical sociology 24–37; populist radical right 19, 20; radical right populist 20; regionalist populist 19, 22 Duggan, Christopher 61, 81n40, 82n79 Einaudi, Luigi 64, 135, 137 Eklundh, Emmy 190n36 Emilio, Ferrero 68 Europe of the Regions: the Lega – continuities and discontinuities 141–144; the MRAS 139–141 Europe’s refugee camp 215 Evangelista, Matthew 228n20 evolution of farright Ideology in (North) Italy 255–261 Fairclough, Norman 13n24 Farassino, Gipo 72, 108, 133, 194n121 Fathers of the Lega 8, 261 Fava, Gianni 259 Fella, Stefano 45n81, 157n209 Ferrari, Giuseppe 57, 132 Ferris, Kate 83n94 fertile political opportunities 34 Fielding, Steven 51n152 fighting a sense of confusion 15 Finchelstein, Federico 12n17 Fini, Gianfranco 73 Fiore, Teresa 232n54 Five Star Movement (M5S) 2, 17, 76, 201, 251 Fonzi, Fausto 82n72 Franco-Guillén, Nuria 48n110, 49n123 Freddi, Anselmo 135 Garau, Eva 54, 184, 198n195, 198n197 Garzia, Diego 90n216 Gattinara, Pietro Castelli 229n26, 229n32 Gavazzeni, Ugo 69, 100, 105, 106, 140, 150n82, 254 Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia 13n25 Geddes, Geddes 237n97 genealogy of Leghismo via three populist discursive repertoires of contention 97–110

305

genealogy of Piedmontese 98 Giannini, Guglielmo 17, 160, 161, 170 Gilbert, Mark 11n7, 14, 21, 38n6, 39n15, 91n227, 184, 261n1 Ginsborg, Paul 165, 190n47 Gioberti, Vicenzo 57 Giovannini, Arianna 43n66, 263n25, 263n27 Giulia, Friuli-Venezia 18 Gold, Thomas W. 39n16 Gonella, Gianfranco 68, 69 Grassi, Anna 194n114 Gremmo, Roberto 87n157, 107, 108, 117n85, 132 Grillo, Beppe 17 Grimm, Jannis 114n33 Hadjimichalis, Costis 227n6 Haider, Jörg 163 Harders, Cilja 114n33 Hart, Paul’t 80n7 Hay, Colin 33 headlong attack 79 Heinisch, Reinhardt 26, 47n102, 47n105 Hervik, Peter 191n67 Hind, Nicholas 228n16 Hine, David 12n21, 65, 87n165 Hinson, Robert E. 232n50 Holland, Laurel. L 53n167 Huysseune, Michel 12n14, 149n65, 157n202 Ialongo, Ernest 232n54 ideational and discursive features: Italian nation-state 65–77; political science and historical sociology 25–29, 29 Isin, Engin. F. 11n10, 11n11 Islamophobic hate speech 223 Italian culture 216, 217 Italian nation-state: crisis and transition 55–57; federalist transformation 120; Modern Italy’s ruling class 78; North Italian Regionalist Activism 65–77; the Risorgimento to the Republic (1848-1948) 57–65; United Federal States of Italy 141

306

Index

Johnson, Carol 199n221 Kennedy, Jonathan 232n51 King, Leslie 51n158, 113n13 Klein, Ofra 235n78 Knott, Andy 190n36 Koopmans, Ruud 118n110 La Marmora, Alfonso 58 Lecours, André 83n81 the Lega - continuities and discontinuities: anti-fascism (performative) 136–138; construction of ‘a Northern People’ against the ‘Thieving Regime of the Parties’ 172–175; discursive construction of the ‘non-native’ against the ‘native’ in north italy 180–186; a Europe of the Regions 141–144; Risorgimento 131–133 Lega Lombarda 79, 104, 108, 109, 111, 125, 254 Lega Nord’s discourse 8 Lega’s far-right ideology 24 Lega’s regionalism and federalism 250 Leghismo 1–6, 10, 14–16, 18–21, 23–25, 33, 34, 36, 37, 54, 55, 68, 70, 71, 79, 92, 97, 99, 108–112, 120, 125, 131–133, 136, 138, 142, 145, 158, 173, 175, 182, 249–251, 253–255, 258, 259, 261 Leoni, Giuseppe 72 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 21, 137, 162, 163 Letta, Enrico 76 Lev, Amnon 84n114 Lombard regionalism 98 Lyttelton, Adrian 80n2 Maccaferri, Marzia 46n92, 233n69, 248n224, 261n4 Maroni, Roberto 1, 75, 77 MARP and MAB (1948-1964): federalisation of the Italian state 72–74; 1946–1955: from theory to activism 66–68; 1955–1958: success and signs of decline 68–70; 1970S regional reforms 70–72; from second to the third Italian republic 74–77

Masetti, Emanuele 26, 47n102, 47n105 Massimo D’Azeglio’s post-unification (1861-1870) 119 Matteotti, Giacomo 63 Mazzini, Giuseppe 130 Mazzoleni, Oscar 25, 26, 46n97, 47n98, 47n102, 263n31 McDonnell, Duncan 21–23, 38n10, 246n197 Melucci, Alberto 41n36 Meyer, David. S. 113n20 Miglio, Gianfranco 71 Minghetti, Marco 60, 130 Mizruchi, Ephraim H. 36, 53n171, 53n172, 113n15, 253, 261n6 Moe, Nelson 81n56 Moioli, Vittorio 197n183 Molino, Pietro 108 Mondon, Aurelien 13n26, 27, 233n58 Montagna, Nicola 229n29 Montanelli, Giuseppe 132 Monti, Mario 76 Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) 2, 15, 92; anti-fascism (performative) 133–136; a Europe of the Regions 139–141; fascism and democracy 252; Lombardy and Piedmont 249; Risorgimento 129–131 the MRAS: construction of ‘a Northern People’ against the ‘Thieving Regime of the Parties’ 167–172; discursive construction of the ‘non-native’ against the ‘native’ in north italy 176–180 Mudde, Cas 30, 50n131, 230n37 Mueller, Sean 25, 47n98 Muis, Jasper 235n78 Murphy, Alexander B. 228n18 Mussolini, Benito 62–64, 136, 137 Naastepad, C. W. M. 228n10, 228n11 Napolitano, Giorgio 76 ‘nation’ in nativist discourse 32 nativism: common sense 217, 218; Covid-19 pandemic 215; criminalisation of migrants 216; Draghi administration 218; immigration, identity issues, and law and order 223; racialised process 217;

Index recontextualisation of populist regionalist discourse 220–224; refugee crisis 215; Salvini’s populist discourse 222 nativist nationalist 23 nativist populist 23 neo-federalism/secessionism vs. patriotic regionalism 122 Newman, Janet 231n44 Newth, George 12n13, 12n15, 12n22, 46n92, 112n3, 113n7, 115n47, 116n52, 116n54, 155n157, 199n209, 246n199, 246n200, 248n232, 261n4, 262n5, 262n10, 262n20 Niceforo, Alberto 164 Nobile, Timoteo 66 non-Italian cultures 216 North Italian populist regionalism 2, 6, 9, 92, 111, 249, 252, 253 North Italian Regionalist Activism 10, 37, 55, 65–77, 107, 144 Oliver, J. Eric 231n48 Oneto, Gilberto 3, 11n8 Pacati, Tarcisio 196n160 Padovani, Cinzia 234n72 Paini, Alberto 84n120 Palenzona, Carlo 146n18 partitocrazia (regime of the parties) 17, 100, 159, 256 Pasquino, Gianfranco 148n46 Passalacqua, Guido 88n178, 148n41 Passarelli, Gianluca 10n3, 20 Patriarca, Silvana 151n94 patriotic regionalism 120–122, 122, 128, 131, 132 people vs. elites dichotomy and discourse of exploitation: Covid-19 pandemic 213–215; the Eurozone crisis 211–213 Piazzano, Carlo 68 Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement 2, 18, 99, 120, 158, 220, 250 Piedmontese Regional Autonomy ovement (the MARP) 250 Piemont Autonomista 108, 125, 172, 173, 183 Pirelli, Giovan Battista 61

307

Pirro, Andrea L. P. 230n39, 231n42, 231n43, 235n83 political discourse 7, 9, 33, 128, 136, 138 political science and historical sociology: abeyance theory 35–37; contentious politics 34; discursive field 34; ideational and discursive features 25–29, 29; populist regionalism and nationalism 30, 30–33; temporary suspension/ hibernation 36 populist discourse 8, 9, 17, 19, 22, 24, 28, 29, 31, 35, 37, 93, 159–163, 169, 170, 172–174, 177, 186, 205, 206, 211, 213, 220–222, 256 populist far-right Lega (Nord) 258 populist nationalism 255–261; federal secretary of the Lega Nord (2013-2017) 207–209; historical perspectives 249–263; nativism 215–224; overview 201–202; people vs. elites dichotomy and discourse of exploitation 211–215; post2010 crisis and italy’s protagonist role 202–205; post2010 populist and nativist discourses 205–207; third wave of activism 219; third wave of activism framed as ‘common sense’ 210–215 Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) 20 populist regionalism: construction of ‘a Northern People’ against the ‘Thieving Regime of the Parties’ 167–175; discursive construction of the ‘non-native’ against the ‘native’ in north italy 175–186; historical perspectives 249–263; post-1945 and post1989 nativist discourse 163–167; post-1945 and post1989 populist discourse 160–163; two waves of 168 post-1945 and post-1989: nativist discourse 163–167; populist discourse 160–163

308

Index

post-war autonomists 19, 78, 79, 97, 99, 100, 121–123, 126, 129, 130, 135, 140, 145, 253 Poujade, Pierre 161 Poujadisme 255 Prinetti, Giulio 61 Prodi, Romano 73, 79 Qualunquismo 170, 255 radical right populism 20, 22 Rahn, Wendy M. 231n48 refugee crisis 2, 201–205, 207, 209, 215, 251 Reinhard Heinisch 263n31 Reisigl, Martin 7, 8, 13n27, 13n30, 13n31 Renzi, Matteo 77, 204, 209 Reynolds, Jill 113n12, 115n41 Risorgimento 9, 54, 57, 77, 104, 120, 128–133, 144, 180, 250–251, 259; the Lega – continuities and discontinuities 131–133; the MRAS 129–131 Riva, Ubaldo 119, 145n1 Rizzi, Aldo 68, 100, 106 Rizzo, Sergio 153n118 Roberts, Kenneth M. 12n13 Rochetta, Franco 72 Roma Ladrona 167, 173–175, 221–222 Rosboch, Michele 66, 86n144, 151n87, 169, 192n80 Rosenthal, Uriel 80n7 Rotelli, Ettore 64 Ruffilli, Raffaele 83n82 Ruggiero, Vincenzo 229n29 Ruiu, Maria Laura 230n36 rump movements 93–95, 97, 100, 104–108, 140, 253–254, 259 Rutelli, Franco 73 Salvadori, Bruno 18 Salvini, Matteo 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 16, 20, 21, 23–26, 30, 31, 37, 77, 79, 92, 144, 159, 186, 188, 201–202, 207–218, 220–226, 234n70, 237n102–n109, 238n110–n118, 239n119–n131, 240n132–n140,

240n142–n145, 241n148–n158, 242n159–n161, 243n162–n169, 244n170–n179, 245n181–n196, 251, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259 Sandri, Giulia 83n107, 263n26 Sangiorgo, Giuseppe 11n5, 118n92 Sassoon, Donald 38n2, 112n2 Sawyers, Traci M. 113n20 Seddone, Antonella 43n68, 90n224, 263n26, 263n27 Simeone, William E. 83n95 Snow, David. A 11n9 social and political interaction 261 Social Democratic Party (PSDI) 97, 105, 106, 253 Soros, George 215 Spektorowski, Alberto 200n237 Spinelli, Altiero 64, 139, 140, 142 Stavrakakis, Yannis 49n126, 80n10 Stefanini, Paolo 262n19 Stella, Gianantonio 153n118 Storm, Servaas 228n10, 228n11 Straughn, Jeremy B. 146n5 Swidler, Ann 113n11 Taggart, Paul A. 37n1, 162, 230n39, 231n42 Tangentopoli Scandals 70, 72, 78, 110, 112, 174, 186, 250 Tarchi, Marco 40n21, 262n13 Tarrow, Sidney 52n161, 113n9 Taylor, Verta 36, 112n1, 114n24, 114n37, 253 Tilly, Charles 13n23, 34, 52n161, 113n9 Tondo, Lorenzo 237n98 transmission and reproduction of discursive repertoires 96–97 Trapletti, Guido 195n138 Trump, Donald 5 Tuorto, Dario 10n3, 20 Tursan, Huri 47n100 Ulivo administration 74, 79 (un)making Italians via discourses of italian national identity: antifascism (performative) 133–138; a Europe of the

Index Regions 138–144; Risorgimento 128–133 Vampa, Davide 44n79, 227n3, 236n86, 263n24 van Kessel, Stijn 230n39, 231n42, 231n43 Venetian Autonomy Movement 5 Venetian Regional Autonomy Movement 259 Ventresca, Robert A. 153n122 Venturino, Fulvio 90n224 Veugelers, John W. P. 52n165, 114n27 Vezzani, Mario 193n97 Villarboito, Enrico 66, 67, 69, 99, 104, 169 Vimercate, Daniele 72

309

Vitale, Tomasso 11n6, 17, 149n58 Viviani, Lorenzo 230n41 Von Beyme, Klaus 189n11 Wetherell, Margaret 113n12, 115n41 Winter, Aaron 27 Wodak, Ruth 7, 13n27, 48n116 Woods, Dwayne 22, 44n73, 45n84 Zapata-Barrero, Ricard 48n110 Zappettini, Franco 10n2, 233n69 Zariski, Raphael 91n228 Zaslove, Andrej 20–22, 38n4, 43n56 Zhou, Yanqiu Rachel 233n61 Zulianello, Mattia 234n76, 236n89