Europe and the Left: Resisting the Populist Tide 9783030545406

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CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY SERIES EDITOR: HANSPETER KRIESI

Europe and the Left Resisting the Populist Tide Edited by James L. Newell

Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century

Series Editor Hanspeter Kriesi Department of Political and Social Science European University Institute San Domenico Di Fiesole, Firenze, Italy

Democracy faces substantial challenges as we move into the 21st Century. The West faces malaise; multi-level governance structures pose democratic challenges; and the path of democratization rarely runs smoothly. This series examines democracy across the full range of these contemporary conditions. It publishes innovative research on established democracies, democratizing polities and democracy in multi-level governance structures. The series seeks to break down artificial divisions between different disciplines, by simultaneously drawing on political communication, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, and political economy.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14889

James L. Newell Editor

Europe and the Left Resisting the Populist Tide

Editor James L. Newell Manchester, UK

Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century ISBN 978-3-030-54540-6 ISBN 978-3-030-54541-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Zoonar GmbH/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The idea for this book came to me while I was employed as a ‘visiting scientist’ at the University of Turin between February and May 2019. As a UK and EU citizen whose political sympathies are firmly on the left and who is also strongly opposed to Brexit, I wanted to explore the links between progressive politics and European integration. The European Parliament elections were due to be held in May, and colleagues in the University’s Department of Culture, Politics and Society were gearing up to study the campaigns of the parties and the behaviour of voters. Media commentary was dominated by the suggestion that the nationalist, populist right would make significant advances at the elections and that Europe itself would figure more highly than in the past in the various national contests. I therefore decided to produce this volume whose purpose is to explore what the European elections have to tell us about what the mainstream left in Europe is doing to pursue a leftwing integration agenda as a means of countering the growth of rightwing populism. It has been made possible thanks to the timely submissions of the volume’s contributors and to the staff at Palgrave, especially Ambra Finotello, Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun and Arun Kumar. Thanks are also due to Giuliano Bobba and Antonella Seddone for making available most of the data on which the country chapters are based and to Franca Roncarolo and Luigi Ceccarini. They persuaded the University of Turin and the University of Urbino to have me as a visitor in 2019 and therefore helped to mobilise the resources in terms of time v

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PREFACE

and money without which this volume would not have been possible. Finally, participants in the June 2019 conference, ‘The Crisis of European Social Democracy: Causes and Consequences in an Age of Political Uncertainty’ held at the University of Genoa, gave me important insights. They would not have been able to do this had it not been for the hard work of Mara Morini, Antonella Seddone and Davide Vampa in organising the conference, which was sponsored by the UK Political Studies Association’s Italian Politics Specialist Group and the Aston Centre for Europe. Manchester, UK

James L. Newell

Contents

1

Introduction James L. Newell

1

Part I The Challenges 2

3

4

5

Social Democracy and Euroscepticism: The Integration Trap Michael Holmes and Knut Roder

19

The Left’s Divided Constituency and the Construction of a Unifying Narrative Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi

43

The European Institutions and Their Communication Deficits Marinella Belluati

73

The Party of European Socialists and Its Problems Luke March

93

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CONTENTS

Part II The Campaigns 6

7

Germany and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Matthias Scantamburlo and Ed Turner

123

The French Socialist Party in the 2019 European Elections Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi

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8

The Firm Europhilia of the Italian Democratic Party Giuliano Bobba and Antonella Seddone

167

9

The UK and the Labour Party Eric Shaw

189

10

Spain and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Luis Ramiro

211

11

Greece and the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima Dimitris Tsarouhas

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12

Conclusion James L. Newell

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Marinella Belluati is Associate Professor at the University of Turin where she teaches Sociology of Media and Media Analysis. Since 2017, she has been coordinator of the Master’s Degree course ‘Public and Political Communication’. She is deputy director of De Europa. European and Global Studies Journal (http://www.deeuropa.unito.it/). She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet module, ‘Communicating Europe: Institutions, Representations and Public Opinion (CoEur) 2019–2021’ (http://www. coeur.unito.it/it). Giuliano Bobba is Assistant Professor at the University of Turin and Affiliate at the Collegio Carlo Alberto. His research interests focus in particular on populism and political communication. Recently, he has published articles in the International Journal of Press/Politics, PLOS ONE, European Political Science and Journalism. Jocelyn Evans is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds. His main research interests include electoral behaviour in France and Europe, and the radical right. He is author of The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation? (2018), with Gilles Ivaldi, and editor of the French Politics, Society and Culture series with Palgrave Macmillan. Michael Holmes is Senior Lecturer in European Politics at Liverpool Hope University and Visiting Professor at ESPOL in Lille. He is also Director of the Lille-Liverpool European Institute. He has published

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

extensively on left-wing parties and European integration and on Ireland and the EU. Gilles Ivaldi is CNRS researcher in politics at CEVIPOF (Sciences-Po) in Paris. His main research interests include French politics, elections and the comparative study of populism. He has recently published De Le Pen à Trump : le défi populiste (2019) and The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation? (2018), with Jocelyn Evans. Luke March is Professor of Post-Soviet and Comparative Politics at the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests include Russian politics, Russian nationalism and foreign policy, the radical and centre-left in Europe, and populism. His most recent book (with Richard Dunphy) is The European Left Party (Manchester University Press, 2019). James L. Newell is former Professor of Politics at the University of Salford. His recent books include Silvio Berlusconi: A Study in Failure (2019) and Corruption in Contemporary Politics: A New Travel Guide (2019) (both with Manchester University Press). He is founder and co-editor of the quarterly journal, Contemporary Italian Politics. Gianfranco Pasquino is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Fellow of the Accademia dei Lincei. Coeditor of The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics (2015), his most recent books are Minima Politica. Sei lezioni di Democrazia (2020) and Italian Democracy. How It Works (2020). Carolina Plaza-Colodro has a Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from the University of Salamanca, Spain. Her research is focused on the transformations triggered by the Great Recession in Southern European party systems. Her most recent works, which explore the influence of populism on both the demand and the supply side of electoral competition in Spain, have been published in West European Politics and Electoral Studies. Luis Ramiro is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at UNED, Spain. His research centres on parties and political behaviour. His most recent works, focused on the vote for radical-left parties, political attitudes and parties’ organisational innovations, have been published in West European Politics, Party Politics, Political Studies and European Political Science Review.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Knut Roder is Principal Lecturer and Head of Politics at Sheffield Hallam University. His research interests include politics and the political economy of the European Union, political parties and policy-making processes. His books include The European Left and the Financial Crisis (2019) and The Left and the European Constitution (2012) (both coedited with Michael Holmes); Social Democracy and Labour Market Policy (2003); The Missing Linke? Restraint and Realignment in the German Left, 2005–2017 (2017). Matthias Scantamburlo is Postdoctoral Researcher at Aston University and team member of the Regional Manifestos Project. His research interests include territorial politics and electoral competition in multi-level settings. He is currently working with a project on the challenges of German social democracy, funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Antonella Seddone is Assistant Professor at the University of Turin. Her main research interests focus on political parties and their organisation; primary elections, and political communication. Her recent publications include articles appearing in Regional & Federal Studies, the International Journal of Press/Politics, Parliamentary Affairs and Acta Politica. Eric Shaw is Honourary Research Fellow in the Division of History and Politics, University of Stirling. He has written very extensively on the Labour Party. His most recent works include The Strange Death of Labour Scotland (Edinburgh University Press, 2012) and The People’s Flag and the Union Jack (Biteback, 2019), both with Gerry Hassan. Dimitris Tsarouhas is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Turkey. He has published extensively on social democracy in Greece and Europe. He has been a Jean Monnet Chair and Visiting Fellow at Bilgi University, Turkey, Georgetown University, USA, and Queen Mary College, University of London, UK. Ed Turner is Reader in Politics at Aston University and Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe. He has published widely on issues in German politics, especially political parties and federalism. He is currently conducting a project on the challenges of contemporary German social democracy, funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

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Marco Valbruzzi is Assistant Professor at the University of Naples Federico II and Adjunct Instructor at the Gonzaga University in Florence. Since 2017, he has also been the coordinator of the Electoral research unit of the Carlo Cattaneo Institute Research Foundation. He has co-edited (with R. Vignati) Il vicolo cieco. Le elezioni del 4 marzo 2018 (Il Mulino, 2018). His most recent book, with G. Pasquino, is A Changing Republic. Politics and Democracy in Italy (Epoké, 2015).

Abbreviations

AES AfD ALDE AWOL BNG BSP CDU CETA CiU CSPEC CSU CSV DC DG DiEM25 DIMAR DK DS DUP EA EACEA EAJ/PNV EC ECB

Alternative Economic Strategy Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Absent Without Leave Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) Belgian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste belge / Belgische Socialistische Partij ) Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió) Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union) Christian Social People’s Party (Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei) Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana) Directorate-General Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 Democratic Left (Δημoκρατ ικ η´ Aρισ τ ερ α) ´ Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció) Left Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra) Democratic Unionist Party Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna) Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco) European Community European Central Bank xiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

ECJ ECR ECSC ECT EDC EEC EELV EFA EFD EGP EHBildu EL EMS EMU EP EPP ERC ETUC EU FdI FDP FI FN GDP GDR GUE/NGL IMF ISF IU KDNP KIDISO KINAL LeU LFI LGBT+ LR LREM

European Court of Justice European Conservatives and Reformists European Coal and Steel Community European Constitutional Treaty European Defence Community European Economic Community Europe Ecology—the Greens (Europe Ecologie Les Verts ) European Free Alliance Europe of Freedom and Democracy European Green Party Basque Country Unite (Euskal Herria Bildu) Party of the European Left European Monetary System Economic and Monetary Union European Parliament European People’s Party Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) European Trade Union Confederation European Union Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) Forza Italia National Front (Front national ) Gross Domestic Product German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left International Monetary Fund Solidarity tax on wealth (Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune) United Left (Izquierda Unida) Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt ) Democrats and Socialists’ Movement (K´ινημα ημoκρατων ´ και oσιαλιστων) ´ Movement for Change (K´ινημα Aλλαγ ης ´ ) Free and Equal (Liberi e Uguali) La France Insoumise Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender plus The Republicans (Les Républicains ) La République en Marche!

ABBREVIATIONS

LSAP M5s MDC MEP MoDEM NATO NGO NI NPS ÖDP PASOK PCF PCI PCP PD PDeCAT PDS PES PP PPI PS (France) PS (Portugal) PSD PSDI PSI PSOE PvdA RE RN SAP S&D SDP SEA SFIO

xv

Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei) Five-star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) Movement of Citizens (Mouvement des Citoyens ) Member of the European Parliament Democratic Movement (Mouvement Démocrate) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation Non-Inscrits New Socialist Party (Nouveau Parti Socialiste) Ecological Democratic Party (Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei) Panhellenic Socialist Movement (ανελληνιo ´ oσιαλιστικ´o K´ινημα) French Communist Party (Parti communiste français ) Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano) Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português ) Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) Catalan European Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català) Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra) Party of European Socialists People’s Party (Partido Popular) Italian People’s Party (Partito Popolare Italiano) Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) Social Democratic Party (Romania) (Partidul Social Democrat ) Italian Democratic Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano) Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano) Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español ) Labour Party (Netherlands) (Partij van de Arbeid) Renew Europe National Rally (Rassemblement National ) Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Social Democratic Party of Finland (Suomen sosialidemokraattinen puolue) Single European Act French Section of the Workers’ International (Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière)

xvi

ABBREVIATIONS

Smer-SD SOC SPD SPÖ TNP TUC UK UKIP UMP US WiO

Direction—Social Democracy (Smer—sociálna demokracia) Socialist Group Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands ) Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs ) Transnational party Trade Union Congress United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire) United States Spring (Wiosna)

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

European social-democratic parties in 2018–2019 (left-right and international dimensions) (Note Question for the Left-Right scale = ‘Parties can be classified by their current stance on economic issues such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic right favour a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party on the following scale?’; Question for the Nationalism-Multilateralism scale = ‘Where do parties currently stand on nationalism versus multilateralism? Those favouring multilateralism seek to respect international treaties, engage with United Nations agencies, and collaborate with regional organizations like the EU, OAS, AU, ASEAN, and OSCE. Those favouring nationalism reject these ideas. Where would you place each party on the following scale?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Norris [2020])

46

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

European social-democratic parties in 2018–2019 (left-right and EU integration dimension) (Note Question for the parties on the Anti/Pro-EU scale = ‘Some parties are strongly in favour of the EU and European integration, while others are strongly opposed to the EU and European integration. Please tick the box that best describes each party’s position on the EU and European integration [0 = Strongly opposed to the EU - 10 = Strongly in favour of the EU]’. Question for the voters on the Anti-Pro-EU scale = ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position?’ For the Left-Right scale, see note to Fig. 3.1. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Norris [2020], Schmitt et al. [2019], and Meijers and Zaslove [2020]) Position of European social-democratic parties, social-democratic voters and the median voter in the EU-28 countries (left-right and progressive-conservative dimensions) (Note Question for the parties on the Progressive-Conservative scale = ‘Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with liberal values favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with conservative values reject these ideas in favour of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following scale?’ Question for the voters on the Progressive-Conservative scale = ‘Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues [same-sex marriage and civil liberties]. For each issue, we will present you with two opposite statements and we will ask your opinion about these two statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you “fully agree with the statement at the top” and 10 means that you “fully agree with the statement at the bottom”’. For the Left-Right scale, see note to Fig. 3.1. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Norris [2020] and Schmitt et al. [2019])

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.4

Fig. 3.5

Fig. 3.6

Fig. 3.7

Positions of European social-democratic parties and voters on the process of EU integration in 2019, by country (Note Question 1 [social-democratic party position] = ‘Where would you place the following parties on this scale, where 0 means “already gone too far” and 10 means “should be pushed further”?’, Question 2 [social-democratic party voters’ positions] = ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019]) Positions of European social-democratic parties between 1999 and 2019, by country (Note We rescaled the original CHES [1–7] measure of European integration on a new scale from 0 to 10. For the wording of the questions, see note to Fig. 3.2. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019] and Meijers and Zaslove [2020]) Positions of European social-democratic parties and voters on the process of EU integration in 2019 (mean values) (Note Question for voters and parties: ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position? And about where would you place the following parties on the same scale?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019]) Salience of European integration in the manifestoes of the EU social-democratic parties, by decade (Note Salience is calculated as the sum of both positive [‘per108’] and negative [‘per110’] statements towards European integration [as a percentage of the total number of quasi-sentences]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project Volkens et al. [2019])

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53

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.8

Fig. 3.9

Fig. 3.10

Fig. 3.11

Fig. 3.12

Fig. 3.13

Fig. 3.14

Positions of the social-democratic parties in the EU towards European integration, by decade (Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project Volkens et al. [2019]) The electoral trajectory of social-democratic parties in Europe from 1900 to 2019, by decade (total share of valid votes) (Note Only democratic periods (and elections) are included in the analysis. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019]) Vote-share of European social-democratic parties in national elections since 1900, by decade and region (Note Northern Europe = Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, UK; Continental Europe = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland; Southern Europe = Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain; Central and Eastern Europe = Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019]) Vote-share of social-democratic parties in European Parliament elections 1979–2019 (Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019]) Electorate of the social-democratic parties in the 2019 European elections, by social class (Note Question = ‘If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to - the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class or the upper class?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019]) Citizens’ views on EU integration (2019), by social class (Note For the wording of the questions, see Note to Figs. 3.2 and 3.12. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019]) Electorate of the social-democratic parties in the 2019 European elections, by level of education (Note Question = ‘How old were you when you stopped full-time education?’ [Low = 15 years old and less; Medium = 16–19 years old; High = 20 years old or more]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.15

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 8.1

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3

Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2

Fig. 10.3

Composition of the main Italian left-wing parties 1968–2018, by level of education (Note For a more detailed scrutiny of the relationship between education and voting behaviour in Italy, see Corbetta and Ceccarini [2010]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Itanes [1968–2018]) Share of the vote won by the SPD 1979–2017 (European and Federal elections) (Source Bundeswahlleiter) Salience of federalism to mainstream and challenger parties in France (2008–2019) (Source Rohrschneider and Whitefield Expert Survey Trend File [2019]) Party positions on European market integration among governing and challenger parties in France (2008–2019) (Source Rohrschneider and Whitefield Expert Survey Trend File [2019]) European and legislative results for the PS (1979–2019) Maps of 2019 Euro election results for leftist lists and the governing Renaissance list by department Mean positions of party electorates on Europe (Source EES 2019) Mean positions on the effects of European integration (Source SCoRE survey, wave 2) In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? (Source Eurobarometer) Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Italy has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU? (Source Eurobarometer) Trend data of the PD’s Facebook activity during the election campaign (27 April–26 May 2019) (Source ITEM 2019) Parties’ general orientations towards the EU (1999–2017) (Source Authors’ elaboration of data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey [CHES]) Changes in vote between the April and May 2019 general and EP elections, and between the 2014 and 2019 EP elections (Source Authors’ elaboration) Word cloud of PSOE’s Facebook posts about Europe (Source Author’s elaboration)

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65 126

152

153 157 158 161 162

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175

181

214

221 225

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10.4

Fig. 10.5

Spanish citizens’ general attitudes towards the EU (2006–2017) (Note The vertical axis of the graph on the left-hand side represents degree of trust in the EP and support for, or opposition to, European unification, both on a 10-point scale. In the graph on the right-hand side, the vertical axis shows the percentages of those who say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU and who consider the situation of the European economy to be good. Source Authors’ elaboration of data from Eurobarometer and European Social Survey [ESS]) Spanish citizens’ attitudes towards the main EU policies (2006–2017) (Note Percentages of respondents in favour of: the single currency; a common EU foreign policy; a common security and defence policy; further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years. Source Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer data)

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1

Table Table Table Table

6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5

Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5

Table 8.6

Centre-left European parliamentary results 1979–2019 PES policy priorities, 2009–2019 EP elections The PES’ emergent anti-neoliberalism Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections in Germany Germany could better face the future outside the EU Trust in the EU QA11 What does the EU personally represent for you? QA5 In your opinion, what are the two most important problems facing the EU now? 2019 European Parliament election in Italy I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union (%) How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU? (%) Please tell me how attached you feel to the European Union (%) For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion: You feel you are a citizen of the EU (%) What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment? (%)

102 104 110 129 137 137 138 139 170

176 176 177

177 178

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 8.7 Table 8.8 Table 8.9 Table 8.10 Table 8.11 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3

Distribution of topics in the PD manifesto Facebook posts with EU focus and average engagement level Facebook posts with EU focus and their content and average engagement level Facebook posts with EU focus and reference to EU values and average engagement level Facebook posts with EU focus and topics and average engagement level Electoral results, November 2019 general elections Election results: May 2019 EP elections, and April 2019 and November 2019 general elections Opinions on EU among PSOE voters and among Spanish citizens generally

180 182 182 183 184 217 219 231

CHAPTER 1

Introduction James L. Newell

Mainstream parties of the left have been in a state of continuing if uneven decline throughout Europe for the past four decades (Ignazi 2017) and most of the explanations that have been advanced to account for the malaise are widely understood and accepted. On the ‘demand’ side of politics, they have to do with the declining political significance of traditional social cleavages such as class (Mair 1984, 1998), this in turn due to a wide range of economic, social and political changes having to do with rising living-standards, lifestyle changes and the way in which people relate to political parties. On the supply side of politics they have to do with the mediatisation and personalisation of campaigning; the rise of cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995) and the decline of parties of mass integration; the decline of ideology, and change in the ways parties relate to voters (Manin 1997). More recently, the way in which globalisation has deprived national governments of many of their powers to shape public policy and under-pinned the emergence of the neoliberal consensus has rendered parties of the left vulnerable, in the face of the Great Recession, to the loss of large numbers of their former natural supporters to populist parties of the right. Unable to offer to the so-called losers of globalisation (Kriesi

J. L. Newell (B) Manchester, UK © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_1

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et al. 2006)—economically insecure and uncomfortable with the cultural effects of globalisation especially mass migration—proposals significantly different to those of their conservative rivals, parties of the left have lost out to new outsider parties and political entrepreneurs claiming a unique affinity with ordinary people and their concerns. Less well understood is how the parties of the left have been reacting to these difficulties in terms of organisation, policy reappraisals and communication strategies. In the initial months of 2019, the European elections of May of that year appeared to offer a unique opportunity to explore these matters, as they looked set to become the most significant in the EU’s history both for the future of the EU itself and for the internal politics of the EU member states. On the one hand, thanks to the EU’s legitimacy crisis, arising from the politics of austerity and migration and the consequent growth of populist parties, these parties looked set to achieve significant advances in the elections and so raise significantly the profile of Eurosceptical actors within the parliament and the institutions of the EU itself. On the other hand, the elections seemed set to break new ground. In the past, they had been considered second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980)—with domestic policy issues occupying the highest profile in campaigns and voters using the elections as an opportunity to cast protest votes against national incumbents. It seemed likely that for the first time, Europe itself would feature highly in the campaign in many member states—revealing that if in the past European integration had not gone far enough to figure highly in member states’ election campaigns, now it had not gone far enough to prevent it doing so: a point to which we shall return. In many respects, therefore, it seemed that the 2019 elections offered European parties of the left significant opportunities to attempt to mount a comeback. For with the EU itself occupying a high profile, and with campaigns progressively polarised around the new cleavage dividing antisystem, anti-Euro ‘sovereigntist’ forces from traditional, pro-European, pro-Euro parties, there was an opportunity for the mainstream left to recapture some of the themes of its heyday in the early post-war years. Then, its raison d’être was a fight for the rights of working people built around a commitment to the mixed economy, strong trade unions, market regulation, the welfare state and Keynesian economic management. Of course, all or most of this has disappeared thanks to the economic, social and political processes described above. Moreover, the left finds itself confronted with a divided constituency consisting of the winners

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and losers of globalisation. However, an increasingly influential strand of thinking on the left argues that the solution to these problems lies in the direction of seeking to recreate the old Keynesian agenda (or something similar) at European level through demands for further integration and the democratisation of EU institutions themselves. For example, in The Globalization Backlash, published not long before the elections, Colin Crouch makes the point that ‘globalization has come for many to mean the loss, not just of individual jobs, but of entire long established industries and the communities and ways of life associated with them’ (2018: 1). That is, for many, an increasingly interdependent world represents a loss of control over the circumstances of their own lives. However, as Crouch goes on to note, ‘[w]e can only gain a measure of control over a world of increasing interdependence by growing identities, as well as institutions of democracy and governance that can themselves reach beyond the nation state’ (2018: 3). In other words, if globalisation has drained power away from national governments, and if its economic and cultural consequences have led traditional supporters of the left into the arms of the nationalist right, then the response of the left must be to seek international collaboration and the pooling of national sovereignty that can allow us to establish democratic governance structures beyond the nation state. The European elections saw the appearance of a new transnational party whose raison d’être was to offer just such an agenda: European Spring, led by the former Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis and his Democracy in Europe 2025 (DiEM25) movement. Its message was that while the EU had been an exceptional achievement, ‘bringing together in peace European peoples … across a continent that was, not long ago, home to murderous chauvinism, racism and barbarity’,1 it had also made it possible for international capital to impose austerity, this thanks to the undemocratic way in which it was constituted. Consequently, the nationalist right had gained traction thanks to a lack of accountability in Europe, seeming to present citizens with two equally unpalatable options: either a retreat behind national borders, or surrender to an unaccountable Brussels. Therefore, according to European Spring, the EU would, in the long run, either democratise or disintegrate. I have elsewhere (Newell 2019) referred to the perspective exemplified by Crouch and European Spring as ‘critical Europeanism’. It is one 1 Manifesto of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). Available at https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/.

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that is shared by other writers (among which one may include Hilary Wainwright (2018), Ania Skrzypek (2013), and Cäcilie Schildberg et al. (2014)) and organisations (including the think tanks, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Social Europe and others). In the UK, it is a perspective exemplified by the grassroots organisation, ‘Another Europe is Possible’. Formed in February 2016 ‘to campaign for a Remain position in the EU referendum from a specifically left, progressive perspective’, it now campaigns for the UK’s re-entry into the EU, which it sees as requiring ‘radical and far-reaching reform, breaking with austerity economics and pioneering a radically new development strategy’.2 The suggestion that, for the left, the way back to electoral health lies in a project for European integration and democratisation strikes me as a persuasive one for several reasons. First, it provides an answer to the fundamental question, ‘If (thanks to the collapse of the Berlin Wall) communism appears to be fatally wounded, and if (thanks to globalisation) social democracy is in crisis, then what does it mean to be on the left in the early twenty-first century?’ The question is a fundamental one because you cannot achieve anything unless you first have a clear idea of what it is you want to achieve. There are several aspects to the answer. First, recognition that national communities can only assert regulation of the processes of globalisation by pooling national sovereignty speaks to the traditional internationalist, cosmopolitan agendas of the European socialist parties since their founding in the nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. Ever since Marx and Engels elaborated their theories, internationalism, or international solidarity, has been a defining feature of what it means to be on the left. In an early statement of the thesis of economic globalisation, the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist Party argued that ‘[m]odern industry [had] established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way’; for ‘[t]he need of a constantly expanding market for its products [had chased] the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe’, so that ‘[i]n place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we [had] intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations’. Consequently, the revolutionary abolition of private property would not be possible in

2 https://www.anothereurope.org/about/.

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one country alone. For, as Engels put it—in ‘The Principles of Communism’ written a few months prior to publication of the Manifesto—‘big industry [had] already brought all the peoples of the Earth … into such close relation with one another that none [was] independent of what happen[ed] to the others’.3 It seemed to follow from this that efforts to bring about the workers’ emancipation would have to be organised internationally and that workers’ parties would have to oppose wars between capitalist states. Such wars, in the words of the resolution adopted at the seventh International Socialist Congress in 1907, were ‘favoured by the national prejudices … systematically cultivated … in the interest of the ruling classes for the purpose of distracting the proletarian masses from their own class tasks as well as from their duties of international solidarity’.4 Famously, the Second International disintegrated as its constituent parties found it impossible to maintain a united front against the outbreak of World War I. However, the tradition of international solidarity lingers on in the opposition of parties of the left—as a general rule—to racism and xenophobia, and—again, as a general rule—in their positive attitudes to cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. Second, if to be on the left means to embrace the principle of equality (Bobbio 1994), then the left-wing project is a project of empowerment and therefore democratisation. Working-class movements of the early nineteenth century, such as the Chartists, were movements that sought to extend to workers the franchise that had been won by manufacturers, as well as guarantees on equality before the law, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, the absence of which had until then hampered the development of their organisations. In this sense, a project for a fully integrated, democratic Europe is merely a twenty-first-century example— an extension to the international plane—of demands parties of the left have always made. As is frequently argued on the left, the shortcomings in terms of accountability in EU policy-making provide inroads for the undue influence of multinational corporations and the powerful such that it is inevitably driven by big business and its interests against those of ordinary people. Indeed, it was precisely this argument that lay at the heart of

3 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf. 4 https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism. htm.

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the support a minority on the left lent to the Leave side in the UK Brexit referendum, their suggestion being that While there have been idealists involved and progressive laws made along the way, at its core [the EU] is undemocratic and distant, a threat to all those living in its shadow. However sweet the propaganda, it is a tool for multinationals, another part of the globalisation process. (King 2015)

While (for a whole host of reasons there is not the space to go into here) left-wing Eurosceptics tend to see a democratic EU as unrealisable, we should perhaps avoid confusing ‘difficult’ with ‘impossible’. No doubt many sympathisers of the Chartists saw their suffrage demands as unrealisable. In 1839, their petition, though three miles long and with 1,280,000 signatures, was rejected out of hand by parliament by 235 votes to 46. However, by the middle of the next century their demands were normal and accepted parts of the political architecture of democratic countries everywhere. Third, ‘critical Europeanism’ represents a natural extension of the traditional social-democratic project. That is, if social democracy is the promise to extend principles of equality from the political to the economic and social spheres, then it is a project for the extension of rights. This is, ultimately, what political conflict is all about, its outcomes being to shift the patterns of rights and obligations recognised in societies.5 And since patterns of rights and obligations, once shifted, tend to be long lasting (as they become part of a new normal, taken-for-granted, state of affairs), so political struggle, including struggle over (in)equality is, ultimately, a struggle for hegemony. As countries have competed for inward investment, what might be called the ‘social-democratic hegemony’ of the initial post-war years has been rolled back. Spearheaded initially by the advent of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the West, neoliberal globalisation has since eroded or threatened large numbers of the rights previously fought for and won by social democrats, especially in the field 5 Conflicts over rights, in turn, are conducted by reference to the principle of justice: to treat the same things in the same way and different things differently. For example, the arguments leading up to passage of the Cirinnà law in Italy in 2016, giving LGBT+ people some of the partnership rights already enjoyed by heterosexual couples (Ozzano 2020), revolved around the question of whether sexuality was a relevant criterion of difference in the conferral of partnership rights. For the Catholic Church it was; for the LGBT+ community it was not.

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of welfare, seen as too expensive for states looking to court multinationals. This again suggests that the social-democratic project to have a chance of revival needs to become a fully international one, based on the collaboration of national parties in pursuit of rights to be established across, and above the level of the nation state. In other words, it suggests the need to acknowledge that the nation state, having once been a vehicle for the pursuit of progressive agendas, has now become a fetter upon it. Nowhere is this clearer than in the field of immigration where largescale population movements, refugee crises and so on have given rise to welfare chauvinism6 in which social-democratic politicians have on occasion been complicit. Their argument has been that migration has been inimical to the social-democratic project because the welfare state has been a national construction, ‘drawing on the solidarity with one another that members of a nation feel’ (Crouch 2018: 5), and therefore one dependent on societies remaining ethnically and culturally homogeneous. An alternative way of looking at the problem, one more consistent with the internationalism at the heart of what it means to be on the left, is to suggest that welfare states have been built on a series of citizenship rights which, in the face of globalisation-induced flows of mass migration, now need to become universal rights. There is nothing altruistic about this. It rests on the recognition that population movements are likely to increase, not decrease in the coming years, and on the simple point that security (used here in its broad meaning) is a public good. It can only be provided to some if it is provided to all. Again, this points in the direction of seeking to gain control of the processes of globalisation by going beyond the nation state and seeking to develop forms of collaboration and supranational integration above it. Such a project seems timely. The coronavirus outbreak which threatens to bring in its wake a recession even deeper than that of the 1930s has thrown a spotlight on the limitations of purely national responses and the dangers of a lack of international coordination. As borders one after the other were closed down, it became apparent not only that the closures were futile once transmission of the virus had begun but that they could

6 Actually, racism and xenophobia have not emerged in recent years thanks to migrant crises and the rise of right-wing populism but predated them, being bound up with nation states and the controls on population movements they exert by means of the passport system. As Lavenex (2018: 1) points out, ‘[I]t is only because the world is organized into sovereign states that international migration becomes an issue that needs to be governed’.

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make a bad situation worse by interrupting aid and disrupting business (Calder 2020). It became apparent that, given hyper-interconnectivity, for there to be an effective response to the virus, there needed to be far greater cross-national equality in terms of access to basic health care.7 It became apparent, in Europe, that social distancing and closing down economic activities would add massively to the public debt. With some countries worse affected than others, this led to calls for the mutualisation of debt at EU level through the issuing of European recovery bonds. The situation was not unlike the one that had come about with the sovereign debt crisis eight years previously. Then, the idea of mutualisation had been strongly resisted by some member states. Then, resistance to austerity in the debtor countries and popular resentment against financial aid packages in the creditor countries had appeared to put the European project itself at risk. With deepening divisions between countries like the Netherlands and Italy over the recovery bonds, Europe seemed to be facing the same paradox it had earlier faced. This was that the absence of Europeanwide fiscal solidarity provided the basis in countries such as Italy for the sovereigntist and chauvinist forces which in other countries, such as the Netherlands, made it difficult if not impossible for the member-state governments to embrace the principle of European-wide fiscal solidarity in the first place. The governments of countries such as Germany and the Netherlands were terrified of what agreeing to the bonds would do for support for the populist sovereigntists, which, in other countries, such as Italy, were likely to gain a fillip from a failure to agree to the bonds. It was hard, then, to avoid the impression that Europe stood at a crossroads and would in the long run either democratise and further integrate, or else fall victim to the nationalist right and, after Brexit, further dis integrate. The coronavirus outbreak appeared, then, to be reiterating the point made by the Eurozone crisis. This is that monetary integration needs to embrace fiscal policy as well if economic downturns are not to lead to austerity and to put the governance structures of the Union itself under strain. In 2008, because of monetary union, the governments of the Eurozone countries had been unable to respond to the fallout from the financial crash by using interest- or exchange-rate adjustments, and neither did they have much room for deficit spending. This was especially problematic for those Eurozone countries with high levels of public 7 Ben Chu, Newsnight, BB2, 24 January 2020. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/epi sode/m000dlbv/newsnight-24012020.

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indebtedness, such as Greece. Lower tax receipts and increased calls on public spending created increasing pressure on the public debt, along with increased interest rates in order to finance it, as it grew increasingly risky— with the prospect that rising interest rates might bring about that very un-sustainability that was driving rates up in the first place. Since it was not possible for Greece to respond by devaluing the currency, the only measures available for addressing what had become a sovereign debt crisis were the acceptance of international bailouts along with public spending cuts. Had integration—in accordance with the tenets of ‘functional spillover’ (Haas 1958)—gone beyond monetary policy to embrace fiscal policy as well, it would have been possible to avoid austerity. An EU-wide system of taxation, with the EU as a whole taking over responsibility for the indebted countries’ liabilities, would have made possible, between the economically prosperous and less prosperous regions of the Union, the resource transfers that happen as a matter of course between more and less prosperous regions within individual nation states. The reason such arrangements had not been put in place was essentially political: the need to get them approved through the Union’s weakly supranational governance structures and the difficulties of doing this given that the structures are dominated by governments each of which is sensitive to the pressures exerted on it by its own national electorate. As a result, the sovereign debt crisis was a crisis for Europe as a whole. Inter-governmentalism is advantageous to international capital because it obstructs the adoption of measures (e.g. a European-wide tax regime ending the freedom of multinationals to channel profits through states where taxes are lowest) that would restrict its freedom in the interests of addressing power disparities. It also enables political choices (e.g. austerity) to be presented as technical necessities (required to ensure the stability of public finances and the Eurozone). Thus it is that organisations like DiEM25 and others argue that to be on the left in the early twentyfirst century is to be committed to a project of transnational democracy. They see this as a means of controlling internationally mobile capital; of making possible alternatives to austerity in the face of economic downturns, and of avoiding, in such cases, the centrifugal pulls of national chauvinism (which has also been fuelled by—and, so far rendered vain efforts to find an EU-wide solution for—the international migrant crisis). The purpose of this volume, then, is to explore what the 2019 European elections have to tell us about the extent to which the European

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socialist and social-democratic parties are giving voice to this left-wing integrationist agenda. The questions it seeks to throw light on are twofold: Is the agenda being given a higher profile than in the past and with what consequences in terms of electoral performances? On the other hand, how are the parties coping with the various obstacles in the way of effective pursuit of this agenda, and what is their relative significance? The parties would appear to face at least four such obstacles. Internally, they face the obstacle of growing Euroscepticism within their own ranks (Hickson et al. 2019; De Luca 2019). While media attention has largely focussed on the growth of Euroscepticism in political parties of the radical right, there is also growing scepticism on the left. This is not just confined to the radical left but is also, increasingly, to be found in social-democratic circles. As the chapter by Holmes and Roder makes clear, the history of social democracy’s relationship with European integration is by no means straightforward. At least since the 1970s, however, social democracy has generally been pro-European, especially in the context of more free-market domestic policy agendas and the challenges of globalisation; but with the perception of increased economic liberalism within the EU, even some on the centre left have became more receptive to Euroscepticism, and this has been especially pronounced since the Great Recession. Externally, there is the obstacle from the social democrats’ former supporters among the socially conservative ‘precariat’ (Rovny 2018) whose outlooks are national and protectionist rather than international and cosmopolitan. The challenge for the parties of the left is to construct a narrative that enables them to bridge the divide between the two groups of their potential and actual supporters. A narrative is a story which, by telling people who they are and how they came to be where they are, creates common values; reinforces identity (against the ‘other’); lays out objectives, and identifies end states (Laity 2018). Umberto Bossi had a narrative revolving around hard-working northern Italians, Padania, and secession from Roma ladrona. Berlusconi in 1994 had a narrative based on the virtues of a civil society under attack from the left, and the realisation of a second Italian miracle. The Five-star Movement has a narrative based on the themes of direct democracy and the mainstream party elites’ dishonesty and unresponsiveness to ordinary citizens. Matteo Salvini has a narrative based on the cultural and economic threats, from migration and the EU, to ordinary Italians’ ways of life. Narratives are important because they move people in a way that purely rational, scientific discourse—based

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on appeals to sound empirical evidence combined with logical argument—does not and cannot. People believe them to be true because they want them to be true. Without narratives—involving emotional resonance and moral authority as well as rational persuasion—we find it difficult to make sense of the world and our place in it. Arguably, therefore, much of the explanation for the mainstream left’s electoral difficulties of recent years has to do with the way in which the end of the Keynesian consensus, the collapse of the Berlin wall, the rise of neo-liberalism and the ‘end of ideology’ deprived it of its traditional narratives. Consequently, it has to recreate them, with European integration offering a potentially fruitful base on which to do so. So the question is, How well are the mainstream parties of the left, and their transnational representatives, especially the Party of European Socialists (PES), actually managing to construct and communicate a genuine and effective narrative around their political project? Institutionally, there is the obstacle posed by the EU itself and its preferred styles of communication. Communication constructs identity and so a style of communication that is purely technical and that fails to capture popular imaginations is unlikely to be helpful. So the questions that need addressing are: To what extent has Europe’s own communication in recent years, in the period leading up to, and during, the 2019 election campaign, assisted or obstructed a left-wing pro-integration agenda? What have the parties themselves been seeking to do to shape this communication to their needs? The limits on the role of the European Parliament and the lack of a genuine European political space or demos have hitherto conspired to lend a predominantly ‘technical’ and intergovernmental hue to the messages coming out of the EU institutions, at the expense of those reflecting an awareness of the sense of a common European identity. However, recent years have seen four important developments. They are, the decline in the drive towards institutional reform spearheaded by the Commission; the shift in power between EU institutions in favour of the parliament; the growing awareness of European citizens (with the single currency, freedom of movement and so on) of the significance of the EU in their everyday lives; the decline of the so-called permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Hooge and Marks 2009). All these have led to a growing awareness on the part of representatives of EU institutions of the significance of political communication for the success of policy-making (Belluati and Caraffini 2015).

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Finally, there are organisational obstacles created by the parties themselves and the difficulties they face in cooperating and pooling sovereignty within the framework of the PES and the other transnational organisations of the left. Given that the transnational European parties, unlike their national counterparts, have no responsibility for sustaining in office a parliamentary executive, they have throughout their history tended to be weak and undisciplined entities—some would say more or less empty vessels in which cooperation has been difficult, a consistent disappointment, with few developmental prospects (Dunphy and March 2019). On the other hand, given that they do seek to coordinate the activity of their members, they may be considered nascent parties intimately bound up with the emergence of the European Parliament as a significant EU actor. Moreover, two developments made it seem reasonable to think that the PES would be more effective in 2019 as compared to past elections in ensuring a profile for a unified, distinctly European, agenda in the national-level campaigns of its component parties. The first was the fact that media attention in the period leading up to the 2019 elections focussed on the possibility that the social democrats and the European People’s Party would lose their combined majority in the European Parliament for the first time in its history. The second was the fact that European Parliament elections have since the Lisbon Treaty acquired an influencing if not determining role in the choice of president of the European Commission. The challenge for the research, then, was to assess the extent to which the expectation was borne out empirically. In short, the volume revolves around two sets of questions. First, what do the European elections suggest about the extent to which the mainstream parties of the left are attempting to deal with their decline through an increased, common, emphasis on the project for a more integrated, ‘social Europe’ as opposed to an emphasis on the more ‘traditional’, domestically focussed, issues? The period since the Great Recession has seen a heightened profile of Europe in domestic politics. It has seen heightened polarisation around the issue of Europe. Especially in the countries of the Eurozone, media discussion of the domestic implications of EU decision-making can influence the climate of opinion regardless of the actions of domestic party actors themselves. Given all of this, we would expect the social democrats among such actors to seek to reassert control over the conditions of opinion formation through a renewed emphasis on integration (as well as its benefits and its potential as a source of identities to rival national, exclusionary identities) in opposition to their

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populist and Eurosceptical adversaries. Hence the two questions driving the volume: To what extent do the campaigns waged by these parties bear out this expectation? Second, how well are the parties coping with the internal and external, institutional and political obstacles in the way of pursuit of this agenda? Given these concerns, the remainder of the volume is divided into two sections where the first consists of four chapters each devoted to an historical account, and an evaluation of the significance for the European socialist project, of the problems/issues/concerns outlined above. They are: (1) growing Euroscepticism in the ranks of the socialists/social democrats themselves; (2) the construction of a narrative capable of bringing unity to a divided target constituency vulnerable to the appeals of populist and nationalist adversaries; (3) EU institutions’ own communications; (4) the organisational strengths and weaknesses of the PES itself. In the light of these four sets of issues, the six chapters of part II of the volume describe, explain and evaluate the 2019 European election campaigns conducted by PES member parties in France, Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain and Greece. They seek, by comparison with the parties’ campaigns at past European elections, to throw light on the extent to which in 2019 they heightened their emphasis on social Europe and renewed European integration. The countries were chosen to reflect the need to include the most significant member states in terms of size and to include a sufficiently wide range of countries to make possible the investigation of relevant comparisons and contrasts. It turned out in the end that the social democrats were unable to reverse their long-term decline at the 2019 European Parliament elections. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats ended up with 38 seats fewer than the number they had had at the end of the outgoing parliament: 147 as opposed to 185. On the other hand, rightwing populist parties did less well than many had feared, and with climate change having everywhere acquired increased salience, Green parties, as well as other parties with EU integration agendas to tackle the issue, saw significant advances. For example, the Greens-European Free Alliance saw its seat share increase from 52 to 70. Once again, the election campaign featured a televised debate between the Spitzenkandidaten. The Europeanisation of domestic public spheres if not yet the Europeanisation of national media (involving a focus on the same issues at the same time with the same frames of interpretation) was reflected in an increase in turnout,

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which at 51% was the highest for twenty years. As signs of encouragement for a left-wing integration project, these were all small—but they were signs nonetheless. The combined health and economic crisis created by the coronavirus outbreak eight months later suggested that without such a project, or something similar, the EU might lose its already fragile legitimacy, thus putting its very survival at risk.

References Belluati, M., & Caraffini, P. (2015). Introduzione. In M. Belluati & P. Caraffini (Eds.), L’Unione Europea tra istituzioni e opinione pubblica (pp. 17–29). Roma: Carocci editore. Bobbio, N. (1994). Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica. Roma: Donzelli editore. Calder, S. (2020, March 25). Coronavirus: Flight Bans Don’t Work Say Health Professionals. The Independent. https://www.msn.com/en-gb/lifestyle/ travel/coronavirus-flight-bans-dont-work-say-health-professionals/ar-BB1 1G5k6?ocid=spartanntp. Crouch, C. (2018). The Globalization Backlash. Cambridge: Polity Press. De Luca, M. D. (2019, March 2). La sinistra che non vuole l’Europa. il Post. https://www.ilpost.it/2019/03/02/sinistra-euroscettica/?fbclid=IwAR10 cFa2OH1XgshZ45raIok6XnoozGrzAf8moCSTsFurWw6Wzj-1ZC1A7vU. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Haas, E. B. (1958 [2004]). Introduction: Institutionalism or Constructivism? In E. B. Haas (Ed.), The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (3rd ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Hickson, K., et al. (2019). Social Democratic Euroscepticism in Comparative Perspective: Losing Faith in European Integration? (Unpublished Paper). Hooge, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Ignazi, P. (2017). Party and Democracy: The Uneven Road to Party Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28. King, J. (2015, June 11). The Left Wing Case for Leaving the EU. New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/06/johnking-left-wing-case-leaving-eu. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Timotheos, F. (2006). Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space:

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Six European Countries Compared. European Journal of Political Research, 45, 921–956. Laity, M. (2018). Storytelling and Politics: How History, Myths and Narratives Drive Our Decisions. https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/storytelling-and-pol itics-how-history-myths-and-narratives-drive-our-decisions. Lavenex, S. (2018). Migration. In T. Risse, T. A. Börzel, & A. Draude (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood (pp. 520–540). Oxford: Oxford University Press, Handbook Online. Lindberg, L., & Scheingold, S. (1970). Europe’s Would-be Polity. Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall. Mair, P. (1984). Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A Challenge to Parties. West European Politics, 7, 170–183. Mair, P. (1998). Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Newell, J. L. (2019). Meanings and Messages: Social Democrats and the EU’s Legitimation Crisis in the 2019 Election Campaign. Comunicazione Politica, 20(3), 301–320. Ozzano, L. (2020). Last But Not Least: How Italy Finally Legalised Same-Sex Unions. Contemporary Italian Politics, 12(1), 43–61. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Rovny, J. (2018, February 22). What Happened to Europe’s Left? Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/happened-europes-left. Schildberg, C., Dahm, J., Gombert, T., Krell, C., Timpe, M., & Wagenführ, A. (2014). Europe and Social Democracy. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10723.pdf. Skrzypek, A. (2013). Winning for Real: The Next Left Taking the Chance to Shape Europe for the 21st Century 10 Fundamental Challenges. Foundation for European Progressive Studies. https://www.feps-europe.eu/Assets/Pub lications/PostFiles/352.pdf. Wainwright, H. (2018, November 6). Socialism Beyond Borders. Red Pepper. https://www.redpepper.org.uk/socialism-beyond-borders/.

PART I

The Challenges

CHAPTER 2

Social Democracy and Euroscepticism: The Integration Trap Michael Holmes and Knut Roder

Social Democracy and European Integration Social democrats were the original Eurosceptics. When the integration project first emerged in the 1950s, social democratic parties in several countries—both in the original six member states and in others that initially chose to remain outside the new organisation—were at the forefront of opposition. Other parties were perhaps more outspoken in their criticism, but the scepticism evident in social democracy was arguably more significant because social democracy emerged in the post-war era as a powerful parliamentary and governmental force in almost all Western European democracies. This chapter analyses the development of European social democracy’s relationship with integration. The relationship between these two

M. Holmes (B) European School of Politics (ESPOL), Lille, France e-mail: [email protected] K. Roder Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_2

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transformative projects has gone through several phases. Of course, while European integration is a relatively uniform construction, social democracy in Europe is far more variegated, with different stories in different countries. Nonetheless, we argue that there are identifiable phases in the relationship between social democracy and European integration, and we use these to analyse the trajectory of Euroscepticism in social democracy. These phases reflect the interplay of three features. First, there is the ideological and political evolution of social democracy in the post-war era. It evolved from a relatively marginal force, ‘seldom in control of the government machine’ before 1945 (Sassoon 2014: xi), to enjoy a ‘golden age’ (Sejersted 2011: 184) of political and policy influence in the 1950s and 1960s. This was followed by a decline in influence and support and a consequent attempt at redefinition and renewal by social democrats (Gillespie and Paterson 1993). However, the centre-left continued to struggle. Occasional sightings of a ‘magical return’ of social democracy (Cuperus and Kandel 1998) proved illusory. Instead, the language ranges from ‘retreat’ (Callaghan 2000) to ‘crisis’ (Scharpf 1991) to ‘death’ (Lavelle 2008) of social democracy. Second, there is the evolution of the European integration project. It has enlarged from the initial six member states to the 27 remaining in the EU after Brexit in 2020 (see, for instance, Ikonomou, Andry and Bieberg 2017). This expansion contributed to adjustments of the institutional structure, with a deepening of the powers allocated to EU-level institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament (see, for instance, Hodson and Petersen 2017). In addition, integration has also been extended to new policy domains, such as regional and social programmes, environmental activities and foreign and security policy (see, for instance, Wallace et al. 2014). We argue that underpinning both is the pattern of development of the post-war political economy in Europe. There have been two distinct models. Through the 1950s and 1960s, there was a consensus based on a significant degree of government intervention in socio-economic affairs, particularly through the construction of welfare states. This was closely aligned to social democratic ideals, and social democratic parties were able to pursue their programmes without significant challenge from the European level. It could be argued that social democracy was trying to transform capitalism, and that the European integration project was not seen as an obstacle to that.

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However, in the 1970s that model began to stall, and a new neoliberal consensus emerged as the dominant paradigm. In this period, capitalism transformed social democracy, and the EU played a role in that. The Union was strongly influenced by neoliberal ideas in key policy areas. This had a profound effect on social democracy, with Lavelle arguing, ‘social democrats have embraced neo-liberal policies since at least the 1980s’ (2008: 9). Finally, we argue that the dominance of this neoliberal consensus was fractured by the financial crisis of 2008. But instead of revitalising social democracy, the crisis seems to have accelerated its decline. These developments have shaped the Eurosceptic dimension of social democracy. On the one hand, social democrats have always espoused an internationalist vision and have for the most part accepted working within a capitalist framework. Crouch described social democracy as a way of ‘making capitalism fit for society’ (2013), which sought ‘to reconcile socialist ideas with democratic politics in a capitalist world’ (Keman 2017: 3) and which ‘traditionally insisted on the need to use democracy to address capitalism’s negative consequences’ (Berman 2020). On the other hand, some social democrats have regarded European integration as a limiting factor—be that real or potential—in achieving their preferred policy goals. This chapter discusses four periods in the relationship between social democracy and European integration. There was a hesitant period in the 1950s and 1960s, where some major social democratic parties were uncertain about the benefits of integration and where Eurosceptic opinions were quite prevalent. This gave way to a period of social democratic support for integration in the 1970s and 1980s, with Euroscepticism becoming marginalised. As neoliberalism took hold in the 1990s and 2000s, Eurosceptic opinions began to re-emerge, though the dominant social democratic stance remained pro-European. Finally, the period from the financial crisis in 2008 has seen further strengthening of social democratic Euroscepticism, though still within a context of pro-Europeanism. We identify two main sources of social democratic Euroscepticism. First, there is an ideological dimension. While social democracy has always accommodated itself to capitalism, the degree of that accommodation varies. Some have accepted a tight embrace; others have sought a more arms-length relationship. This is reflected in perspectives on European integration. Second, there is a national dimension. This produces different social democracies that are specific to their national political and economic

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setting. Again, this impacts on perspectives on European integration. Social democrats in some countries see an EU which could enhance their social provisions, others see the Union as weakening or undermining their achievements. In overall terms, integration has proven to be something of a trap for social democracy. The integrationist principles of international cooperation, of promotion of peace, of democratic politics, of mutual development, of shared values are ones that are intrinsic to social democracy. However, the EU is also a fundamentally economic project, which has advanced a very specific model of capitalist development. For a time, social democracy could accommodate itself to that, particularly when integration did not impinge too much on social policies or when it helped to advance them. But the EU is increasingly seen as a constraint on social programmes rather than a facilitator of them. This has brought the Eurosceptic elements in social democracy back to the fore.

Approaching an Integrated Europe Post-war Western Europe gave rise to two major political developments. First, social democracy became a mainstream political and economic movement. Second, European integration was established, starting from the Coal and Steel Community of the 1950s and evolving into the EEC and beyond. Both developments reflected a desire for new forms of cooperative politics, and they shared an internationalist outlook. Social democrats were certainly not against the principle of European integration, and some played leading roles in the establishment of the ECSC and the EEC. Notably, Paul-Henri Spaak of the Belgian Socialists, Guy Mollet of the SFIO in France and Sicco Mansholt of the Dutch PvdA were very influential figures in these founding years. However, there were two limiting factors. First, many social democrats were more interested in having power and pursuing policies in the national sphere than at the European level. This is evident from the choice of ministries in coalition governments in the six founder member states in the 1950s. Social democrats frequently took on roles such as Finance, Economic Affairs, Social Security, Public Works and Labour,1 but were 1 In the Willem Drees governments in the Netherlands from 1948 to 1958, the PvdA held areas such as Finance, Social Affairs, Reconstruction and Housing, and Agriculture (which included food supplies). In Italy, the PSDI featured in a number of coalitions in

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only rarely found in ministries that were directly involved with the ECSC, the failed EDC or the EEC.2 Second, the centre-left was not consistently in favour of European integration. This was particularly evident in the West German SPD, whose leader Kurt Schumacher argued against Western integration because it was ‘un-European’ and would hinder German reunification (Risse 2001: 208). In 1951, the German SPD and Italian PSI voted against the ECSC in their national parliaments, while the Belgian BSP abstained (CVCE 2016). Similarly, the SPD voted against the EDC Treaty, as did over half of the French SFIO and a third of BSP deputies (Conord 2016). This resistance was even more evident outside the six founder members, with social democratic parties in Britain and the Scandinavian countries refusing to countenance participation in the ECSC. One motivation for this was a straightforward one of narrow nationalism. Members of the French SFIO voiced some ‘hysterical anti-German attacks’ (Bell and Criddle 1988: 24), while some in the SPD viewed the Schuman Plan as a ‘continuation of the old politics of French claims to rule with European words’ (Weber 2010: 253). Similarly, the British Labour Party ‘oscillated between little Englandism and imperialism’ with the ‘two pillars of Labour foreign policy being anti-Europeanism and proAmericanism’ (Sassoon 2014: 175–176). It was still too soon after the war. But the desire to protect national sovereignty was also linked to an ideological perspective. Notably, the British Labour Party had just nationalised their coal and steel industries and were reluctant to cede control of these ‘commanding heights’ to the ECSC. Their attitude was ‘we have got the coal and we are keeping it’ (Zagari 1993: 102). Similarly, in Scandinavian countries ‘just as in Britain opposition to European unity was in important ways

the 1950s, holding posts such as Finance, Labour and Social Security, and Public Works. In Luxembourg, the LSAP were in coalitions with the CSV for most of the 1950s, holding ministries in Transport, Public Works and Economic Affairs. In Belgium, social democrats provided the ministers for Transport, Labour and Social Security, Education, and Health in Achille van Acker’s government from 1954 to 1958. Finally, in France various centreleft parties were participants in governments of the Fourth Republic, holding ministries such as Education, Reconstruction, Justice, Budget and Social Security. 2 The exceptions would include Paul-Henri Spaak and Christian Pineau (Foreign Ministers in Belgium and France, respectively), René Pleven (Defence Minister in France), and Edgar Faure and Robert Lacoste (both Trade Ministers in France).

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driven by considerations about the feasibility of realising social democratic political projects’ (Wolkenstein 2020). This was not dissimilar to the response of the German SPD to the ECSC, which they dismissed as ‘too capitalist, too corporate and western European orientated’ (Featherstone 1988). Thus, for social democratic parties, protection of national sovereignty had a distinct left-wing ideological dimension. Another reason for the opposition to the early stages of European integration was a concern about reinforcing Cold War divisions. Such an attitude was particularly strong in Germany, where the SPD feared that closer Western European economic integration would make the prospect of German reunification more distant. Many of the social democratic opponents of these early steps advocated instead a conception of European integration that would be less ‘western’, in either a capitalist or just a pro-American sense. For example, the SPD’s Schumacher ‘strongly promoted the “Europe as a third force” concept’ (Risse 2001: 208), which was a vision of European integration as ‘a democratic socialist alternative between capitalism and communism’ (Risse 2001: 204). Again, the ideological dimension in this is clear. There was also a feeling that the nascent ECSC and EEC projects would limit or prevent the extent to which social democratic parties could pursue their preferred programmatic agendas. For example, Article 4c of the Treaty of Paris prohibited ‘subsidies or state assistance, or special charges imposed by the state, in any form whatsoever’ (CVCE 1997). Similarly, Article 3f of the Treaty of Rome declared, ‘competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market’, while Article 68 stated that free movement of capital would be pursued in the ‘most liberal manner possible’ (CVCE 2015). However, the treaties could also be read in a way much closer to the interests of social democrats. For example, Article 3e of the Treaty of Paris recognised the need to ‘promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the labour force in each of the industries under its jurisdiction so as to make possible the equalization of such conditions in an upward direction’ (CVCE 1997). Similarly, a phrase in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome refers to ‘progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States’ in a context of ‘raising of the standard of living’ of citizens (CVCE 2015). Furthermore, in the 1950s and even into the 1960s, the ECSC and EEC focused on establishing their basic structures and systems. They did not greatly impinge on each state’s capacity to

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develop its own policies in some areas that were particularly important to social democrats, such as national welfare systems. Indeed, during this period ‘this social democratic order worked remarkably well’ (Berman 2020). This contributed to two important shifts in social democratic policy towards integration, both of which began to weaken the Eurosceptic tendencies. First, social democratic parties became more accustomed to being in power. Second, they grasped the importance of high growth rates to sustain their model of redistribution and thus became increasingly dependent on capitalism to generate that growth. Sassoon refers to this period as a ‘golden age of capitalism’ (2014: 189), though Shonfield (1969: 3) argues that the extent of change made it ‘misleading … to use the word “capitalism”’ to describe the new economic and social order. This shows how social democracy could accommodate supporters both of a limited project of reforming capitalism and of a transformative programme that would gradually transcend capitalism. Both the reformist and more radical sides could see social democratic parties securing successes. There were concerns that European integration might curtail the more ambitious ideas, and some scepticism remained evident. For instance, Hickson and Miles refer to Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell’s 1962 party conference speech as the ‘high watermark of social democratic Euroscepticism’ in Britain (2018: 871). Social democratic Euroscepticism reflected national concerns to some degree, but more strongly related to an ideological stance. Nonetheless, social democrats in many states were able to advance their goals without any hindrance from the European level, as the main levers of social intervention remained in national hands. It was an age ‘when its more hubristic advocates believed that it could achieve anything’ (Callaghan 2000: 1). This helped social democrats of all shades to approach integration.

Accepting a Social Europe In the 1970s, the relationship between social democracy and European integration became increasingly positive. Most social democratic parties abandoned their remaining hesitancy and instead began to embrace European integration with enthusiasm. This development is due to changes in the nature both of social democracy and of European integration. However, it also reflects the developing political economy context in Europe at this time.

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First, the European Community began to change significantly. Three programmes, either expanded or established in the 1970s, showed a strong redistributive and interventionist approach. The European Social Fund, which had been set up in the Treaty of Rome to promote employment through training and skills development, saw a significant increase in its budget in 1972; an Environmental Action Programme was initiated in 1973 to promote higher environmental standards; and the European Regional Development Fund was created in 1975 to offset social and economic imbalances between regions. These developments were at least partly due to the enlargement of the European Community, with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973 and Greece, Portugal and Spain during the 1980s. The Community also changed in terms of institutional structures, with the European Parliament gaining power from the introduction of direct elections in 1979. However, the economic context in Europe also began to change. A succession of economic crises, especially the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, triggered ‘stagflation’ in Western economies. The extraordinary levels of growth that had characterised the previous two decades—such as the West German Wirtschaftswunder, les trente glorieuses in France, Italy’s miracolo economico, le miracle/het wonder in Belgium—ended. This led to the first signs of a fundamental shift away from the high levels of redistribution that had underpinned the European social market model. At a European level, there was a renewed emphasis on economic competitiveness and market liberalisation. One example of this was the launch of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, which nibbled away at the fiscal autonomy of states. It was also evident in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), which signalled a commitment to complete the single market with the ‘four freedoms’—freedom of movement of goods, of capital, of labour and of services. At one level, this was a straightforward liberalisation of the economy of the European Community. However, the SEA included initiatives to strengthen social provisions. This reflected the conviction of its principal architect, Jacques Delors,3 that ‘societies were more than markets, citizenship more than consumption, and government more than an economic traffic squad’ (Ross 1995: 46). Thus, the SEA tried to maintain a balance between economic freedom and social cohesion. 3 Finance Minister from 1981 to 1984 in Mitterrand’s Parti Socialiste government, and then President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995.

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Social democracy was changing too. Social democratic parties had become ensconced in government in most countries across Western Europe. They were no longer a new and innovative force promoting a new programme; they had become part of the establishment. This of course brought benefits, with for example the Dutch PvdA-led government of Joop den Uyl in 1973–1977 being described as ‘the most ambitious post-war coalition ever in ideas on modernising society by means of policy change’ (Keman 2017: xiii). However, it also meant that the focus of social democratic parties was less about transcending capitalism and more about maintaining it. Social democracy’s more radical ideas were in abeyance. The problem for social democracy became especially evident in the early 1980s. François Mitterrand and the Parti Socialiste came to power in France in 1981, and initially adopted strongly interventionist economic policies involving nationalisation of industries, wage increases, improved social protections and raising the wealth tax. However, after several devaluations of the French franc, Mitterrand announced a volte-face in March 1983, abandoning Keynesian strategies and instead adopting a much more conservative economic approach to keep France within the EMS (see Cole 1994). This highlighted in particular how the constraints of an increasingly integrated Western European economy could curtail the freedom of action of a more radical government. This meant that alongside growing social democratic acceptance of European integration, there was also a persistence of Euroscepticism. This tension was particularly noticeable in some of the enlargement countries. In Ireland, the Labour Party led the campaign against membership in the 1972 referendum, although the sweeping majority in favour of joining the EC meant the party changed policy immediately (Holmes 2006). In Denmark’s 1972 accession referendum, the social democrats faced ‘a deep split on the European integration issue between the party leadership and the parliamentary party on the one hand and the party’s voters on the other hand’ (Haahr 2000: 208). This remained evident in the 1986 referendum on the SEA. In Norway, the Labour Party had supported accession, so the rejection of membership in the 1972 referendum led to the resignation of their Prime Minister, Trygve Bratteli. These pressures are also evident in the British Labour Party. Britain’s second application for EC membership had been undertaken by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1967, but internal differences persisted. When Labour returned to power a year after accession in 1973, it

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asserted that ‘the Labour Party opposes British membership of the European Communities on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government’ and called for a renegotiation (Political.Stuff.co.uk 1999a– 2001a). A significant minority of the Labour Party, including government members,4 campaigned against continued membership in the subsequent referendum in 1975. This Euroscepticism became even more pronounced in the party’s 1983 election manifesto, which called for ‘Britain’s withdrawal from the EEC, to be completed well within the lifetime of the Labour government’ (Political.Stuff.co.uk 1999b–2001b). It was not until the late 1980s that Labour began to see Europe in a more positive light, as a bulwark against Thatcherism rather than a barrier to Keynesianism. Here, the union movement played a significant role, particularly after Jacques Delors’ speech to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1988 (Motard 2009).5 The 1980s enlargements posed far fewer challenges. In Greece, PASOK went from being ‘an enemy of the Common Market’ and a vigorous opponent of Greek membership in the 1970s ‘to eventually “slide” to a “yes” to Europe’ (Nafpliotis 2018: 512, 518), though again leaving a minority of party members and voters open to a more critical stance on integration. But both the Spanish PSOE and the Portuguese PS were enthusiastic supporters of membership, seeing membership as a safeguard for democracy and a possible route to economic development. For PSOE, ‘modernisation [was] achieved through the instrument of European integration’, and their ‘support for the European project never wavered’ (Kennedy 2013: 2), while in Portugal ‘the Socialist Party gave absolute priority to the construction process of European integration’ (Magone 2005: 509). In this period, we can see that there was growing social democratic support for integration, though with some significant residual Euroscepticism. This was because of a changing context. The unparalleled growth of the early integration period, which had permitted a model of capitalism hand-in-hand with ambitious social redistribution, was stuttering. Indeed, it was increasingly being seen as unsustainable. This elicited three types of response from social democrats. Some accepted this change as inevitable,

4 Michael Foot, Tony Benn, Peter Shore, Eric Varley and Barbara Castle. 5 The speech ‘promised a social dimension to the EU based on workers’ rights enshrined

in law, quality public services and collective bargaining’ (Tudor 2018).

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accepting globalisation, Europeanisation and neoliberalism and trying to adapt to them as best as possible. Others saw the EC as a potential bastion that could protect them from the worst of the new era. But there was still a minority of social democrats who felt that the EC was not just a neutral arena in which this struggle was being played out, but was instead an active participant, gradually stifling the scope to rebuild the more progressive social projects. This Eurosceptic strand remained in the background. Instead of shaping a new model, social democrats were becoming more dependent on the European Community and more influenced by its policies. But we can also see the centripetal force of integration, drawing social democratic parties into its orbit more and more intensively.

Adjusting to a Neoliberal Europe From the early 1990s, the neoliberal dimension of both European politics and European integration became ever more pronounced. At the national level, more and more governments adopted neoliberal economic programmes. In many cases, these policies were pursued by right-wing parties. But increasingly, social democratic parties were also acquiescing to these policies when in power. To varying degrees, parties such as PSOE in Spain, SAP in Sweden, the PvdA in the Netherlands, the SPD in Germany and the Labour Party in the UK adopted policies which sought to maximise growth in the hope of maintaining basic features of a welfare state (see Glyn 2001). This was the ‘Third Way’ approach (Giddens 1998, 2000), which argued that social democracy could find ‘new acceptance because it stands not only for social justice but also for economic dynamism and the unleashing of creativity and innovation’ (Blair and Schröder 1998: 2). There was a ‘fleeting high watermark’ (Callaghan et al. 2009: 1) in 2000 when there were 11 social democratic prime ministers among the then 15 EU states, with social democrats also in coalition in a twelfth country.6 But by this time, it could be argued that ‘social democracy 6 In January 2000, there were social democrat prime ministers in 11 member-states: Austria (Viktor Klima), Denmark (Poul Nyrup Rasmussen), Finland (Paavo Lipponen), France (Lionel Jospin), Germany (Gerhard Schröder), Greece (Konstantinos Simitis), Italy (Massimo D’Alema), the Netherlands (Wim Kok), Portugal (Antonio Guterres), Sweden (Göran Persson) and the UK (Tony Blair). In Belgium, social democrats were members of Guy Verhofstadt’s government. Only in Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain were they not in government.

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has become a conservative force, both politically and culturally’, where ‘uncritical support of globalisation had become the new mantra’ (Marlière 2010). Rather than setting an agenda, social democrats were following one, and were at times cutting back the social democratic welfare regimes they themselves had established, such as the Hartz IV cuts in Germany (Lavelle 2008). This was apparent at the European level. The European Community evolved into a significantly more neoliberal European Union. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty7 which established the Union was central to this. It formalised the rules and conditions for membership of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the project for a single currency. The convergence criteria for meeting EMU membership conditions created narrow fiscal rules that restricted national policy options (Stiglitz 2016: 96–97). This was tightened further by the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, which aimed ‘to align national fiscal policies along one common doctrine’ (Heipertz and Verdun 2010: xii). The EMU process is overseen by the European Central Bank, which ‘perhaps best defines the relinquishing of state sovereignty to an institution with powerful supranational mechanisms of decision-making and enforcement’ (Howarth and Loedel 2005: xi). The Maastricht Treaty marks a turning point from a ‘permissive consensus’ about integration (the idea that the public were broadly content with closer integration and would permit their governments to continue down that path) to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (where there was far more open disagreement about integration) (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Two referendum results in 1992 provide immediate indicators of this shift in public mood. First, Denmark voted to reject the Treaty.8 While the social democrats called for a Yes vote, they failed to convince many supporters (Siune 1993: 95), with about 40% of them voting against the Treaty. Second, France voted to accept the Treaty, but by an unexpectedly tight margin.9 About one-third of Parti Socialiste members were against the Treaty, and about a quarter of PS voters voted No (Lewis-Beck and Morey 2007: 67–69). 7 Formally, the Treaty on European Union. 8 The vote was 49.3% for, 50.7% against. The following year, the vote was overturned in

a second referendum (56.7% for, 43.3% against) after Denmark gained exemptions from four clauses of the Treaty. 9 51% for, 49% against.

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Euroscepticism now became a more overt force in European politics. While it found strong support in many radical right and radical left parties, it also attracted Eurosceptic elements from within social democracy. They were concerned that the European Union was becoming more and more of a barrier, not just to achieving new social goals but even in terms of maintaining welfare programmes. Others on the centre-left continued to accept the EU as being better than nothing. But there were increasing tensions as the Maastricht EMU programme began to be put into effect. The 2006 Bolkestein Directive on Services in the Internal Market gives one example. The European Trade Union Confederation declared itself ‘implacably opposed’ to the directive (Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009: 154), which they saw as threatening to undermine employment conditions.10 They subsequently criticised several Court of Justice rulings for being ‘a licence for social dumping’ (ETUC 2008) and ‘an open invitation for social dumping’ (ETUC 2020). Similarly, ETUC argued that the Lisbon Agenda11 favoured business interests at the expense of social goals (Van Apeldoorn 2009: 36). But Van Apeldoorn also concludes that ‘ETUC seems still too much wedded to the current European project to take this radical step of disowning the Lisbon Agenda’ (2009: 36). They preferred to attempt to adjust some details of these policies rather than pose any fundamental challenge. Significant swathes of the economic agenda were already set in stone through EU treaties. For social democrat Eurosceptics, there was a growing sense that their mainstream colleagues either would not or could not challenge the neoliberal consensus, and that the EU was an increasingly obdurate obstacle. The Union became associated with neoliberalism and the dilution and disappearance of a distinct social democratic agenda. This was not a clear-cut situation. There were still redistributive aspects of the EU: social and regional programmes, commitments to harmonising upwards, to environmental protection. But it is indicative of a model of integration

10 Frits Bolkestein was the Dutch Commissioner for the Internal Market, under whose leadership the Directive was drafted. The Directive sought to expand freedom of provision of services in the EU, with critics arguing that this would lead to undercutting of wages and welfare conditions (Jensen and Nedergaard 2012: 849–850). 11 The Lisbon Agenda, or Lisbon Strategy, was an action plan which set a goal of making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ by 2010 (European Council 2000).

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which was increasingly a means of controlling the state, or in Dyson’s phrase, of ‘binding leviathan’ (1999). This sense of an EU moving sharply to the right was exacerbated by another feature of this period, as the EU went through three further enlargements. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 1995. These three countries had very strong social democratic traditions, but they were followed by twelve more countries—most of them former components of the Soviet bloc—in 2004 and 2007.12 The Eastern enlargements brought in countries with weak social democratic parties and which had mostly embraced a very rapid ‘shock’ transition to market economies. While some social democratic parties had success after the collapse of communism, this rapidly waned to the point where ‘even compared with Western Europe, the state of the left in Central Europe looks dire … The left has been marginalised and the whole political spectrum has been jerked to the right’ (Anderson 2020). The growing tensions became evident in the campaigns to endorse the 2005 European Constitutional Treaty (ECT). In France, the Parti Socialiste held a vote among party members to decide on its stance, and over 40% voted to oppose the ECT, citing concerns about democratic accountability and the perceived threat to the social dimension of the EU (Marthaler 2012). The referendum resulted in the rejection of the Treaty and was followed almost immediately by another No vote, this time in the Netherlands.13 Here, the PvdA supported a Yes vote, but found themselves campaigning alongside centre-right parties, while the radical left Socialist Party was one of the leaders of the No campaign (Harmsen 2012). These two referendums resulted in the ECT being abandoned, though aspects of it were resurrected in the Treaty of Lisbon a few years later. They also highlighted the dilemma for social democrats. On the one hand, they wanted to emphasise their sense of responsibility and their pro-integration commitment. On the other, they were coming up against increased concern about significant aspects of the EU project—from other parties on the left, from within their own parties, and from their voters (Holmes and Roder 2012).

12 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004, with Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007. 13 In the French vote on 29 May, 54.7% voted against, 45.3% for; in the Dutch vote three days later, on 1 June, 61.5% voted against, 38.5% for.

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In this period, the EU could be described as developing a form of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Van Apeldoorn 2009: 21). A new form of political economy took hold, and with it came cutbacks to welfare states, growing casualisation of labour, and an acceleration of economic inequality. For many social democrats, there was a growing realisation that key aspects of the EU integration process, particularly those associated with EMU, were detrimental to the wider realisation of traditional social democratic policies and to the ability of states to intervene in their national economies. Any return to traditional Keynesian policy approaches was being ruled out. Thus, an ideological position also touched on debates about sovereignty. Of course, the majority in social democratic parties was still prepared to accept these neoliberal conditions and adjust to them. Their broad argument was that without economic growth, it would be impossible to maintain any sort of welfare state, even a reduced one, and the EU offered the best chance of achieving growth and defending a social market economy in a globalised world. The problem, as we have seen, was that this did not bring social democrats much political success, in terms of election results or impact on policies. Thus, the Third Way model was increasingly contested, within social democracy and on the wider left. These debates were suddenly to become much more intense when the economic growth that underpinned the Third Way outlook collapsed when the financial crisis hit.

Alienation from a Contested Europe In 2008, the European political economy was jolted into change. The bursting of the subprime bubble led to a domino effect. Many financial institutions in the United States and in Europe collapsed. Governments then stepped into try to bolster their banking sector, but quickly found themselves in a severe sovereign debt crisis. For countries that were members of the Eurozone, and which therefore could no longer deploy adjustment devices such as devaluation of their currency, this meant in turn a specific stability crisis for the euro. The EU and the ECB became involved,14 and five countries received bailouts: Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 14 The ECB, the Finance Directorate of the European Commission and the IMF were the ‘troika’ of institutions that collaborated to provide the bailouts and to supervise the austerity measures.

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Spain and Cyprus. The condition for this economic assistance was the imposition of very strict austerity measures in all five countries. Italy was also put under austerity restrictions in order to obviate the need for a bailout. The financial crisis posed particular challenges for European integration. There were sharp policy disagreements between EU member states and between different institutions. The main criticisms were those already well known in Eurosceptic discourses. The EU was not seen as a bulwark against the negative aspects of globalisation, but rather a vanguard for them. The policy impositions of the ECB and the Commission were an example of the undermining of national sovereignty. The troika was a technocratic structure that reinforced the democratic deficit—something felt very keenly in Greece, where the result of a public referendum was ignored,15 and in Italy, where an entire government of technocrats was manoeuvred into office.16 Above all, austerity was another means of enforcing neoliberal orthodoxy. Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker later acknowledged that the EU was guilty of what he termed ‘thoughtless austerity’ (Juncker 2019).17 This could have been a time of opportunity for social democrats. In the wake of the crisis, there were many suggestions of a revived role for the state, including calls for a greater regulatory role and the increased use of demand management tools to stabilise the economy (Walter 2010: 59). However, social democratic parties were ill-prepared to exploit this. As Jones notes, ‘when Lehman Brothers imploded, the left’s intellectual cupboard was bare’ (Jones 2020). Many parties had only relatively recently gone through a neoliberal ideological reform, becoming converts to the causes of deregulation and a reduced welfare state. Indeed, social democratic parties were frequently the ones implementing austerity

15 The referendum, on 5 July 2015, was on whether to accept the conditions of the bailout. It was rejected by 61.3% to 38.7%. No concessions were made; if anything, even more punitive measures were imposed. 16 In 2011, Mario Monti (an economist who had served as European Commissioner from 1994 to 2004, and who had never held elected political office) was appointed a lifetime senator, and a week later was installed as prime minister. His cabinet was made up entirely of technocratic appointees. The government introduced a series of austerity measures and labour market reforms. 17 The original French is ‘l’austérité irréfléchie’, which could equally be translated as foolish or irresponsible or reckless austerity.

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regimes during the financial crisis, often propping up centre-right parties in a grand coalition. The result was a calamity for social democracy. There was a collapse in support for some parties. Perhaps the most dramatic example was in Greece, where PASOK plummeted from 43.9% of the vote in 2009 to 4.7% in 2015—indeed, this gave rise to the phrase ‘Pasokification’ to describe a precipitous fall in the vote for social democratic parties in the post-crisis era. In Ireland, Labour did well in the 2011 election, winning 19.4% of the vote, but then fell to 6.6% in 2016 and then 5.7% in 2019. In the Netherlands, the PvdA won 24.8% of the vote in 2012, but only 5.7% in 2017. And in France, the Parti Socialiste went from 29.4% in the 2012 parliamentary elections to 9.5% in 2017. Other social democratic parties saw continuing deterioration rather than a dramatic decline. Support for the German SPD went from 40.9% in 1998 to 20.5% in 2017. The Swedish SAP fell from 45.2% in 1994 to 28.3% in 2018. Their Finnish neighbours, the SDP, went from 28.5% in 1995 to 17.7% in 2019. And the Austrian SPÖ fell from 38.1% of the vote in 1995 to 21.2% in 2019. The situation was even more parlous in Central and Eastern Europe, where ‘popular support for the social democratic parties declined significantly’ (Biró-Nagy et al. 2016: 7) and ‘there are several eastern European countries where the social democrats can no longer be described as a major party’ (Hasselbach 2019). While social democrats were losing votes, support for Eurosceptic parties was growing. Notably, the radical left gained support in some of the bailout countries, such as Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Sinn Féin in Ireland and, to some extent, Bloco and the PCP in Portugal (Holmes and Roder 2019). Another political result of the financial crisis was the rise of right-wing populism, boosted further by the 2015 EU migration crisis. Both the radical left and the populist right have been Eurosceptic, and in reaction, a more critical and nuanced approach to the EU has developed within social democracy (Streeck 2013; Stiglitz 2016; Busch et al. 2016). There have been suggestions of a fundamental rethink of certain pillars of integration such as the EMU, with for example calls for ‘a rewriting of the rules of Europe’s economy’ (Stiglitz 2019: 10). In this chapter, we have argued that social democrats face an ‘integration trap’: by accepting and, indeed, becoming committed advocates of integration, they have made some marginal gains but have ceded control over major economic levers of power. By the time this became evident, social democratic parties had become deeply Europeanised (Lightfoot

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2005; Sloam and Hertner 2012) and enmeshed into EU structures, making it very difficult to find a way back out. And as the EU has moved in a more neoliberal direction, this has become more and more of an albatross around the neck of social democracy. Integration has always represented a constraint on left-wing policies, but in the early years the reach of integration did not extend very far. As integration began to develop, social democrats were becoming less radical in their outlook, and their support for European integration became much more overt. But when the EU became more neoliberal, that changed. Social democratic parties were no longer trying to transform capitalism, even mildly; they were being transformed by it. Their programmes became more defensive. The financial crisis challenged the neoliberal orthodoxy, but social democrats were by now committed to a strongly pro-EU stance and failed to put forward a coherent vision for integration. Social democratic Euroscepticism has always advocated a different Europe rather than abandoning integration. The problem is that there is no coherent social democratic vision of what this ‘other Europe’ might look like. Already in 1999, Ladrech was lamenting ‘the absence of a truly European social democratic project’ (1999: 219), while more recently Piketty has concluded that ‘the left has not tried hard enough to propose alternatives’ (Piketty 2020). There is scope to build what might be termed an ‘alter-European’ stance (Holmes and Roder 2019). But to do this, it requires a clear left vision of how and why the EU needs to change. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Simon Lightfoot‚ Andy Storey and Martin Upchurch for their assistance.

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Bíró-Nagy, A., Kadlót, T., Lafferton, S., & Lakne, M. (2016). The State of Social Democratic Parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Brussels: FEPS and Budapest: Policy Solutions. Blair, T., & Schröder, G. (1998). Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte (Working Documents no. 2.). Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/02828.pdf [accessed 1 April 2020]. Busch, K., Troost, A., Schwan, G., Bsirske, F., Bischoff, J., Schrooten, M., & Wolf, H. (2016). Europa geht auch solidarisch! Hamburg: VSA Verlag. Callaghan, J. (2000). The Retreat of Social Democracy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Callaghan, J., Fishman, N., Jackson, B., & McIvor, M. (2009). In Search of Social Democracy: Responses to Crisis and Modernisation. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Cole, Alistair. (1994). François Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership. Abingdon: Routledge. Conord, F. (2016). Les socialistes et l’Europe. Encyclopédie pour une histoire nouvelle de l’Europe, online at https://ehne.fr/article/epistemologie-du-pol itique/les-modeles-politiques-pour-faire-leurope-depuis-lepoque-moderne/ les-socialistes-et-leurope [accessed 14 February 2020]. Crouch, C. (2013). Making Capitalism fit for Society. Cambridge: Polity. Cuperus, R., & Kandel, J. (Eds.). (1998). European Social Democracy: Transformation in Progress. Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckmann Stichting and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. CVCE. (1997). Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951). Luxembourg: Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe. https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02b b76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/59a178d2-782d-4736-b64b-7e5df1 df82b0/Resources#11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58_enandoverlay [accessed 14 February 2020]. CVCE. (2015). Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957). Luxembourg: Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/cca6ba280bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e/publishable_en.pdf [accessed 14 February 2020]. CVCE. (2016). Ratification of the ECSC Treaty. Luxembourg: Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe. https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unitcontent/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023/3f50ad11-f34048a4-8435-fbe54e28ed9a/Resources#f0f68935-5ee7-49a2-8dac-418932a47 545_enandoverlay [accessed 14 February 2020].

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Holmes, M., & Roder, K. (Eds.). (2019). The European Left and the Financial Crisis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Howarth, D., & Loedel, P. (2005). The European Central Bank: The New European Leviathan? (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikonomou, H. A., Andry, A., & Bieberg, R. (Eds.). (2017). European Enlargement Across Rounds and Beyond Borders. Abingdon: Routledge. Jensen, M. D., & Nedergaard, P. (2012). From ‘Frankenstein’ to ‘Toothless Vampire’? Explaining the Watering Down of the Services Directive. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(6), 844–862. Jones, O. (2020, April 2). The UK Will Change After Coronavirus. But We Have to Fight to Make It a Change for the Better. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/ 02/after-coronavirus-left-cure-social-ills [accessed 8 April 2020]. Juncker, J.-C. (2019, January 15). Discours par le Président Juncker en plénière du Parlement européen à l’occasion de la séance solennelle pour célébrer le 20e anniversaire de l’euro. Brussels: European Commission press release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/SPEECH_ 19_425 [accessed 14 February 2019]. Keman, H. (2017). Social Democracy: A Comparative Account of the Left-Wing Party Family. London and New York: Routledge. Kennedy, P. (2013). The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ladrech, R. (1999). Postscript: Social Democratic Parties and the European Union. In R. Ladrech & P. Marlière (Eds.), Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organisation, Policies (pp. 218–222). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lavelle, A. (2008). The Death of Social Democracy. Farnham: Ashgate. Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Morey, Daniel S. (2007). The French ‘Petit Oui’: The Maastricht Treaty and the French Voting Agenda. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 38(1), 65–87. Lightfoot, Simon. (2005). Europeanizing Social Democracy? The Rise of the Party of European Socialists. London: Routledge. Magone, J. M. (2005). The Internationalization of the Portuguese Socialist Party, 1973–2003. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 6(3), 491–516. Marlière, P. (2010). The Decline of Europe’s Social Democratic Parties. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/decline-of-europessocial-democratic-parties/ [accessed 1 April 2020].

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Stiglitz, J. (2019). Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy. Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS). Streeck, W. (2013). Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Tudor, O. (2018). The TUC Has Backed the Single Market for Thirty Years— Here’s Why. London: TUC Blog Post. https://www.tuc.org.uk/blogs/tuchas-backed-single-market-30-years-heres-why [accessed 1 April 2020]. Upchurch, M., Taylor, G., & Mathers, A. (2009). Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe: The Search for Alternatives. Abingdon: Routledge. Van Apeldoorn, B. (2009). The Contradictions of ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’ and Europe’s Multi-Level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and Its Limits. In B. Van Apeldoorn, J. Drahokoupil, & L. Horn (Eds.), Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon (pp. 21–43). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wallace, H., Pollack, A. M., & Young, A. (Eds.). (2014). Policy-Making in the European Union (7th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walter, Franz. (2010). Vorwärts oder abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Weber, P. (2010). Guter Patriot und guter Europäer – das Europa Carlo Schmids. In V. Depkat & Piero S. Graglia (Eds.), Entscheidung für Europa – Decidere l’Europe (pp. 243–262). Berlin: De Gruyter. Wolkenstein, F. (2020). The Social Democratic Case Against the EU. Journal of European Public Policy‚ 27 (9)‚ 1349–1367. Zagari, M. (1993). The Testimony of an Eye-Witness: Mario Zagari Interviewed by Lorenza Sebestà. In R. T. Griffiths (Ed.), Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s (pp. 99–105). EJ Brill: Leiden, New York, and Cologne.

CHAPTER 3

The Left’s Divided Constituency and the Construction of a Unifying Narrative Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi

A Short Preface to a Long Story The beginning of the long and, from most points of view, successful story of the European institutions was made possible by the strong commitment of three Christian Democratic statesmen: in alphabetical order, the Chancellor of Germany Konrad Adenauer, the Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman. They shared a common language (German) but, above all, they were desperately concerned to prevent any future war on the European continent and extremely anxious to launch the reconstruction of the economies of their own countries and those of the other countries of

G. Pasquino Emeritus of Political Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy M. Valbruzzi (B) Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, University of Naples - Federico II, Naples, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_3

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Western Europe. The ‘iron curtain’ had already fallen on Eastern European countries in 1946, but NATO (1949) was already equipped to provide for the defence and security of the West. There were different interpretations of the way the European future ought to be constructed: through inter-governmentalism (the European Coal and Steel Community being the harbinger of this view) and neo-functionalism—but federalism loomed large in the background. Gradually, new democratic institutions—special mention goes to the European Parliament—were added and many other countries became member states of what has become the European Union. European institutions proved to be sufficiently strong and resilient to accommodate without any strain or tension the unexpected and epoch-making event of German reunification (1990). Once more a German statesman, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, played a highly significant role—as he did in shaping European (socio-)economic policies. Ordoliberalismus has been the name of the European game for at least a couple of decades (Schäfer and Streeck 2013; Streeck and Elsässer 2014; Scharpf 2014). All this is intended to emphasise that the contributions of European social-democratic parties to the shaping of the European Union and its governing have been (far) less important than those of the Christian Democrats and the moderates. Moreover, in some countries—for instance in Italy, but also in France—many on the left for long had an ambiguous posture towards Europe (Ladrech and Marlière 1999; Ladrech 2000). Out of their allegiance to Stalinism and the Soviet Union, the French Communists rejected from the start any and all European attempts at convergence and unity of action, while the Italian Communists, tenaciously prodded by Altiero Spinelli, had by 1976 reversed their negative stance partly in order to be accepted as partners in Italian governing coalitions (an ambition never achieved). Northern European Socialists, with the exception of the SPD, always had mixed feelings, fearing for their cherished welfare states and Keynesian economic policies (that subsequently became well-nigh impossible). To make a very long and complex story short, no matter which European Union narrative is chosen and told, it cannot and will not be a socialist narrative. Which is not to say that the European socialists, their leaders, their MEPs, their voters have not contributed to the development, growth, transformation, deepening and widening of the European institutions. However, to different degrees all of them have had relatively ambiguous positions.

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On the one hand, there is the Italian Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD), which, in all likelihood, can be considered the most consistently European of all Italy’s ‘system-relevant’ parties. Indeed, in 2014 the PD polled a spectacular percentage of votes, more than 40%, not only because of the qualities of its then leader, Matteo Renzi, but especially because it was rightly perceived as by far the most pro-European party (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2014). The inability to steer a consistent European policy is responsible for the less satisfactory results of the 2019 European elections. On the other hand, there is the French Parti Socialiste whose internal divisions doomed the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Bluntly, we feel justified in stating that there is no (convincing, shared, forward-looking) socialist narrative of the European Union. The same held true for the UK Labour Party as long as the UK was an EU member state—a party deeply divided on the supranational dimension and the Remain/Leave issue. Ambiguity and expediency have done Labour no good.

Social-Democratic Parties in the (Changing) Political Space Analysis of the social-democratic narrative may appropriately start with the position of the parties on two important dimensions of inter-party competition: the left-right and the nationalism-multilateralism dimensions. The former classifies parties (based on the opinions of experts) by their stances on economic issues such as privatisation, taxes, regulation, government spending and the welfare state. The latter takes into consideration the positions of the parties on international issues, in particular their acceptance of, respect for or collaboration with, international treaties, supranational agencies and regional organisations (such as the European Union). Figure 3.1 provides the necessary information for such an analysis by combining both dimensions (domestic and international) of political competition. Of course, social-democratic parties exhibit some idiosyncratic differences which we cannot analyse here, not only for reasons of space, but because it is more significant to focus on their similarities. In fact, they all seem to have been capable of avoiding any national-sovereigntist temptations, scoring relatively highly on multilateralism. Indeed, most of the European social-democratic parties here analysed can be located in

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the upper-left quadrant, which describes a situation in which a general programme of economic interventionism goes hand in hand with a more or less spontaneous adherence to the principle of multilateralism at the international level. The only exceptions to this pattern emerge in some Central and Eastern European countries (such as Romania and Slovakia), in which social-democratic parties (respectively, the PSD and

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Smer-SD) exhibit a nationalist (and populist) stance on international issues, particularly in the field of immigration policy. If we investigate the positions of the social-democratic parties further, paying special attention to the process of European integration—only one of many facets of multilateralism and regional cooperation—it is possible to obtain an even clearer picture of the policy embraced by socialist actors. Figure 3.2 locates these parties in a two-dimensional political

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Fig. 3.2 European social-democratic parties in 2018–2019 (left-right and EU integration dimension) (Note Question for the parties on the Anti/Pro-EU scale = ‘Some parties are strongly in favour of the EU and European integration, while others are strongly opposed to the EU and European integration. Please tick the box that best describes each party’s position on the EU and European integration [0 = Strongly opposed to the EU - 10 = Strongly in favour of the EU]’. Question for the voters on the Anti-Pro-EU scale = ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position?’ For the LeftRight scale, see note to Fig. 3.1. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Norris [2020], Schmitt et al. [2019], and Meijers and Zaslove [2020])

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space combining both the left-right dimension with the EU integration dimension. As expected, social-democratic parties turn out to be strongly Euro-enthusiastic and in favour of a process of further integration among its member states. In this sense, the ambiguity of some left-wing parties at the inception of the European project has been gradually reduced or fully resolved through a decisive choice in favour of membership of the proEuropean camp. Moreover, it is worth noting that the Euro-enthusiasm shown by the social-democratic parties at the elite-level is also present at the voter level. In fact, Fig. 3.2 shows a significant degree of overlap between the positions of the parties and those of the voters, on both the economic and the European dimensions. From this point of view, socialdemocratic leaders seem to offer an effective vehicle for the representation of their sympathisers and voters. What we can call ‘internal representation’—the cycle of representation that takes place within ‘the socialist world’—appears to be effective and functioning well for the European social-democratic parties (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020). By contrast, ‘external representation’ seems to be more problematic. In fact, if one takes into consideration the position of the median voter in each European country described by the two dimensions of competition, it is clear that there is a gap between the location of the social-democratic actors (parties and voters) and the median voter. More precisely, in most cases European national electorates appear to be moderately more pro-market on the economic issues and generally more Eurosceptic (or less pro-European) than both social-democratic parties and social-democratic voters. This is what we may call the gap in external representation for the socialist party family. It has probably increased in the last two decades, especially after the end of the so-called permissive consensus at the EU level (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and even more so since the Great Recession (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The basic agreement with the process of European integration on the part of both social-democratic parties and social-democratic voters implies that when that process slows down or reaches a stalemate, it is likely that the social-democratic project as a whole will suffer a setback. This is even more likely if, as we have seen above, there is a gap between the positions espoused by the leadership of the parties in their platforms and the preferences expressed by voters. Left-wing parties have often been accused of having lost touch with their voters, especially on cultural issues. Many of their voters may have been left behind by the socially ‘progressive’ path trodden by leaders engaged in ideological leaps

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forward or, simply, unable to understand that some sectors of their electorates may harbour ‘authoritarian inclinations’ as discovered by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) decades ago. Figure 3.3 suggests that some small distances do exist because social-democratic parties place themselves in

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Fig. 3.3 Position of European social-democratic parties, social-democratic voters and the median voter in the EU-28 countries (left-right and progressiveconservative dimensions) (Note Question for the parties on the ProgressiveConservative scale = ‘Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with liberal values favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with conservative values reject these ideas in favour of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following scale?’ Question for the voters on the Progressive-Conservative scale = ‘Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues [same-sex marriage and civil liberties]. For each issue, we will present you with two opposite statements and we will ask your opinion about these two statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you “fully agree with the statement at the top” and 10 means that you “fully agree with the statement at the bottom”’. For the Left-Right scale, see note to Fig. 3.1. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Norris [2020] and Schmitt et al. [2019])

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the left-libertarian quadrant (Norris and Inglehart 2019); but on the whole, their voters show attitudes that are congruent with the positions of their respective parties. What is true, however, is that median voters—as to some extent expected—are politically somewhat more to the right and, culturally, rather less progressive. These elements constitute the background against which social-democratic parties have to make their choices and to pursue their (European and national) policies. Moreover, they confirm the existence of what we have called the gap in external representation. This gap affects European socialist parties because there exists a general electorate that is more socially conservative, less economically interventionist and more softly Eurosceptic than the average supporter of the social-democratic party family.

From a Little Story to a Love Story: How Social Democracy Met the EU As we have seen, social-democratic parties have accepted the idea of a politically unified Europe. However, they have been either unwilling or unable to produce a narrative based on the need for the construction of a unified, supranational, democratic Europe. They have never tried to acquire ‘ownership’ of a particular European issue or achievement. Their most visible and successful European personality has been the French official, Jacques Delors, twice President of the European Commission (1985–1995), not really a Socialist and most certainly not a political leader. Delors was a technocrat with a democratic vision for the future of the European Union. It would be an exaggeration to say that all European social-democratic parties embraced Delors’ vision. Nor did they focus on those features that might have convinced their voters that a better future was one that would no longer be in the hands of national politics and policies, but was for the European institutions to build and provide. Perhaps, only three social-democratic parties could be defined as totally pro-European Union: the German SPD, the Italian PD and the Spanish PSOE (we would add Tony Blair, personally, but not his New Labour), but even their narratives lagged behind. Taking all these elements into consideration, it is not surprising that there exists a gap between party leaders’ attitudes and those of their voters. In fact, rarely and only occasionally have those voting for social-democratic parties been ‘taught’

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about the positions of their parties including those concerning the overall process of European integration. To investigate further the relationship between socialist parties and the European Union, Fig. 3.4 compares the positions of the social-democratic parties on the EU dimension as perceived by their voters. In other words, the placement of each party is derived from the answers of their voters (respondents) in response to a question asking them to locate the parties

Luxembourg Bulgaria Ireland Cyprus Denmark Belgium Slovakia France Romania Sweden UK Finland Netherlands Czech Republic Estonia Lithuania Austria Greece Latvia Portugal Spain Slovenia Italy Germany Croatia Malta Poland Hungary

0

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Fig. 3.4 Positions of European social-democratic parties and voters on the process of EU integration in 2019, by country (Note Question 1 [socialdemocratic party position] = ‘Where would you place the following parties on this scale, where 0 means “already gone too far” and 10 means “should be pushed further”?’, Question 2 [social-democratic party voters’ positions] = ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

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along a 0–10 scale where 0 indicates that the process of European integration has ‘already gone too far’ and 10 that it ‘should be pushed further’. The same scale has been used to identify the positions of the social-democratic party voters according to their self-placements. When combining these two figures, two elements stand out. First, both social-democratic parties and their voters share a remarkably positive evaluation of the process of European integration and, second, as probably to be expected, the voters tend to see their parties as being more pro-European than they are. Put differently, social-democratic parties and voters share a strongly positive feeling towards the European Union, but the parties are perceived as even more Euro-enthusiastic than their electorates. If this is the general picture, then there are some exceptions. In fact, in Fig. 3.4 social-democratic voters in Bulgaria, Romania and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, are located to the right of their respective parties, meaning that they are even more pro-European than they perceive the socialist candidates and leaders as being. All in all, social-democratic parties in Europe have progressively embraced the project of an ‘ever closer union’ and this relatively new strategy has been accepted and, in some circumstances, even promoted by their voters and sympathisers. As reported in Fig. 3.5, between 1999 and 2019 the social-democratic parties’ placements, especially in relation to the process of further EU integration, remained remarkably stable for most European countries. The most striking exception is the UK Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. In fact, his party shifted from a position of clear Europeanism (with a score of 7.3 on a 0–10 scale) in 1999 to a position on the edge of soft Euroscepticism (5.4) in 2019. Certainly, the 2016 Brexit referendum split Labour’s electoral base between ‘blue-collar Brexiteers’ and ‘cosmopolitan, whitecollar professional remainers’, especially along the rural–urban societal divide (Colantone and Stanig 2018). But the middle-of-the-road position adopted by Corbyn—and even more his strategy of de-emphasising European issues in the 2019 general election—proved disastrous for his leadership and his party. Besides the UK Labour exception, all other social-democratic parties maintained their (positive) positions regarding the process of EU integration, in particular after the ‘turbulent times’ experienced by the European countries during the Great Recession and the implementation of austerity measures oftentimes proposed (not to mention imposed) by the EU institutions on the member states (Bremer 2018). This alone is evidence that

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Fig. 3.5 Positions of European social-democratic parties between 1999 and 2019, by country (Note We rescaled the original CHES [1–7] measure of European integration on a new scale from 0 to 10. For the wording of the questions, see note to Fig. 3.2. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019] and Meijers and Zaslove [2020])

the choice made by the European social-democratic parties concerning the EU project was structural, not episodic or erratic, and it held firm even when the policies adopted at the supranational level contradicted or nullified long-standing social-democratic traditions of economic and state interventionism. At the crossroads between socialism and Europeanism, and while waiting for a possible way effectively to combine them in a coherent policy package, social-democratic parties seem to have embraced the latter and downplayed the former. If we now move to Fig. 3.6, it is important to stress that the most pro-European social-democratic parties are those of Hungary (DK) and Poland (WiO) and that their voters do follow them, do support them. In Italy, one can find almost perfect overlap between the Democratic Party and its voters, as one can in Portugal and Spain, between the PS and

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Fig. 3.6 Positions of European social-democratic parties and voters on the process of EU integration in 2019 (mean values) (Note Question for voters and parties: ‘Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed further”. What number on this scale best describes your position? And about where would you place the following parties on the same scale?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

PSOE and their voters, respectively. The same is true, at a slightly lower level of pro-European sentiment, of the PS and its voters in France. In the light of these findings, one may hypothesise that where rightwing/conservative parties take a national-populist route—as in Hungary and Poland, but also to some extent in Italy and in Germany—there mainstream left-wing parties feel encouraged to stress their pro-European positions. This shift seems finally to vindicate Altiero Spinelli’s 1941 prophesy, formulated in the Ventotene Manifesto, that the ‘pro-Europe versus pro-nation state’ cleavage would replace the traditional left/right

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divide, opening the way to an altogether new type of political competition and a complete reconfiguration of party systems. Right-wing, conservative, populist parties do their best to attempt to win the support of all those voters—and there are many—who are dissatisfied with the functioning of the European institutions and their constraints on domestic politics (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). They have scored some successes; however, as the results of the 2019 European elections clearly indicate (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2019), such successes have remained well below expectations and the parties’ power and influence in the European Parliament are quite limited, because their coordination strategies, in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas, are problematic and poorly executed. Understandably, the likelihood of realignment will depend significantly on the willingness of the European socialist parties to play the European card. The indications—from the space that European social-democratic parties give to European issues in their manifestoes—are only partially encouraging. In Fig. 3.7, we report the percentages of sentences devoted 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

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Fig. 3.7 Salience of European integration in the manifestoes of the EU socialdemocratic parties, by decade (Note Salience is calculated as the sum of both positive [‘per108’] and negative [‘per110’] statements towards European integration [as a percentage of the total number of quasi-sentences]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project Volkens et al. [2019])

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to European integration in the election manifestoes of social-democratic parties. As Almeida (2012: 25) has noted, ‘the simple addition of positive and negative statements on the EC/EU provides an indicator for the relative importance of the issue for each party’. In brief, this variable tells us the extent to which a given issue is salient or otherwise for a party. For the social-democratic parties (but the argument applies also to the other ideological party families), European issues still appear somewhat marginal vis-à-vis purely national issues, even though it is possible to detect an upward trend from the 1950s to the present. What is more, as is well-known (Reif and Schmitt 1980), even the campaigns for European Parliament elections appear to be largely fought on national issues, playing, thus, into the national-populists’ hands (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). In terms of the salience of the EU in the electoral manifestoes of the social-democratic parties, the peak was reached in the period from the approval of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) to the late 1990s. The last two decades have registered a slight decrease in the salience of EU issues in the socialist programmes, probably because the parties and their leaders have tried to de-emphasise the role and function of supranational institutions in a period in which the European Union has been increasingly associated with tough fiscal and austerity measures. The same trend can be observed in Fig. 3.8, in which we report the ratio of positive quasi-sentences to total statements on the EC/EU using a scale from 0 to 1. After the initial phase of permissive, idyllic consensus on the functioning of the EU, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the ratio reached its record-low level in the 1970s (0.37). In the subsequent phase, the number of positive quasi-sentences in the social-democratic parties’ manifestoes again outnumbered the negative statements concerning the EU and, in the 2000s, nearly 90% of the sentences conveyed a positive attitude towards the supranational institutions. Thus, these figures confirm the transformation of the socialdemocratic parties that we have pointed to above, in particular the gradual acceptance and the later completely uncritical adherence of these parties to the EU project. So much so, that now it would be difficult to identify the boundaries between socialist ideals and Europeanist principles.

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1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 1950

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Fig. 3.8 Positions of the social-democratic parties in the EU towards European integration, by decade (Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project Volkens et al. [2019])

The Electoral Decline of Social-Democratic Parties: Conjunctural or Structural? As we have just seen, European integration has become an integral component of the social-democratic identity. To a certain extent, it is no exaggeration to say that Europeanism has replaced social democracy as the main source of intellectual inspiration for the socialist parties throughout Europe. Put bluntly, the Communist Manifesto has been replaced by the Ventotene Manifesto. But what have been the consequences of this genetic mutation, or adaptation, for the electoral support of social-democratic parties? To begin with, Fig. 3.9 reveals that explicit support for the process of European integration has not been translated into an increased voteshare for this party family. Of course, many other factors (Kitschelt 1994; Benedetto et al. 2020) are responsible for the stagnation, if not—for some parties, like the once powerful SPD—the decline. However, the point is that, though important for other reasons, support for European integration has not so far reversed the long-term electoral decline of social-democratic parties. Indeed, especially in the last two decades, the crisis of the European Union has been strictly intertwined with the slowly growing crisis of social democracy (Best 2011). More precisely,

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35.0 33.0 31.0 29.0 27.0 25.0 23.0 21.0 19.0 17.0 15.0 1900

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Fig. 3.9 The electoral trajectory of social-democratic parties in Europe from 1900 to 2019, by decade (total share of valid votes) (Note Only democratic periods (and elections) are included in the analysis. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019])

after a decline in the late 1980s, electoral support for the social democrats declined precipitously between 2010 and 2019, when the total share of the vote obtained by the European socialist parties fell to 27%. To find an electoral result for the social democrats worse than the one observed in the 2010s, we have to go back to the period before the First World War, when socialist parties obtained nearly 28% of the vote. There are, of course, regional trends that can be identified in the evolution of the electoral support for the socialist parties. Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 3.10, the decline in support for the social democrats is evident and fairly homogenous in all Western European countries, in particular in Continental Europe where the vote-share has plummeted to 15.2%. Instead, the electoral trend is moderately positive in Central and Eastern Europe, where support for the social democrats exceeds 40%. In any case, a similar downward trend in the support for socialdemocratic parties emerges also by looking at the results of the elections for the European Parliament (see Fig. 3.11). In this particular electoral arena, support for these parties peaked in the 1989 European elections (29.5% of the total vote) but then decreased steadily until 2019, when the social democrats registered their worst electoral performance ever since the inauguration of the European Parliament. Scholars and political leaders alike have questioned themselves about the factors responsible for this seemingly irreversible decline without

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70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 1900

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Fig. 3.10 Vote-share of European social-democratic parties in national elections since 1900, by decade and region (Note Northern Europe = Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, UK; Continental Europe = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland; Southern Europe = Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain; Central and Eastern Europe = Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019])

reaching agreement (Kitschelt 1994; Giddens 1998; Benedetto et al. 2020). Obviously, the numerical decline of the working class has negatively affected left-wing parties (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015), as has the reduction in public spending. The growing divergence in outlooks between materialist and post-materialist voters has made it increasingly difficult for left-wing parties to appeal to them both. Finally, the victory of neo-conservative economic ideas and recipes has severely dented the core values and cherished goals of a social-democratic society. Reactions and responses have been very slow in making themselves felt. Only very recently have there been any signs that the tide might be turning (will it be accelerated by the coronavirus?). A longitudinal perspective on electoral support for the socialdemocratic parties also allows us to identify the different waves that have characterised the parties’ gradual consolidation as components of the European party systems (Berman 2006; De Waele et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2014). As Benedetto et al. (2020: 5) have recently pointed out, there have been three waves in the electoral breakthrough of social democracy in Europe. The first wave, based on the notion of a parliamentary road

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Fig. 3.11 Vote-share of social-democratic parties in European Parliament elections 1979–2019 (Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from ParlGov database Döring and Manow [2019])

to socialism, ‘started after the end of the First World War, when most social-democratic parties broke from revolutionary politics, embraced democratic elections, and aimed to achieve socialism via a parliamentary and reformist route’. This wave, which lasted until the advent of the Great Depression, came with the rise of industrial society and the assertion of the organised working class at the start of the twentieth century. Although there were differences in the composition of the electoral bases of social-democratic parties (Bartolini 2000; Sassoon 1996; Przeworski and Sprague 1986), most of their support derived from blue-collar and, to a lesser extent, agricultural workers. The second social-democratic wave, which started with the advent of, or the return to, democracy in the mid-1940s, brought about an enlargement of the electoral base of the socialist parties, and this trend was accompanied by the gradual adoption of a catch-all strategy by their leaders. Consequently, the social-democratic electorate came progressively to include middle-class components (e.g. public sector employees, those in administrative occupations, urban professionals) at the expense of a

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more traditional class-based, Marxist politics. This was the age of the socalled social-democratic consensus, as Dahrendorf (1990: 116) put it, one which, in policy terms, was focused on ‘building the new welfare state, nationalizing natural monopolies, establishing a social market economy, macroeconomic demand management, and social liberalism, especially regarding gender equality’ (Benedetto et al. 2020: 8). This second social-democratic wave ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent success, in both ideological and political terms, of neoliberal policies at the national as well as at the supranational level (Mudge 2018). More important for our argument here, it is exactly at this stage that social democracy fully embraced the EU project, accepting more or less enthusiastically and consistently the ‘market liberalizing effects of European integration and globalization, the success of free market and deregulatory strategies’ promoted by centre-right governments (ibidem). Accordingly, the ‘Third Way’—the name given to the new, third wave of social democracy—implied a further watering down of the original class-based politics, progressively replaced by a focus on libertarian issues and market efficiency. Kirchheimer’s (1966) catch-all strategy proved outdated in the new socio-economic context represented by strongly integrated advanced economies, and it gave way to parties with more precisely defined electoral targets. As Herbert Kitschelt (1994) noted some time ago, ‘social democratic parties can no longer hope to be traditional catch-all parties, but will appeal to more sophisticated, but limited groups of voters’. In other words, we have observed the transformation from a catch-all party to a party model based on a net of niche audiences bound together by a loose organisational infrastructure and a ‘light’ ideological baggage. In the light of this, social democracy changed, for the third time in its history, the composition of its electoral constituency, which is now built around ‘sophisticated industrial technicians and engineers, white collar employees and middle managers, and the large sector of professionals in personal services’ (Kitschelt 1994: 301). This structural transformation of the social-democratic electorate can be analysed by looking at its composition in terms of both social class and level of education. With regard to the former, Fig. 3.12 shows the composition of the European social-democratic parties’ voters by their self-perceived social class. As can be seen, the working class represents, on average, less than one-fifth of the total social-democratic electorate, and in some cases (e.g. Austria, Romania, Italy, Greece and Cyprus), the proportion amounts to less than 10%. Instead, about three-fifths of the socialist

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Fig. 3.12 Electorate of the social-democratic parties in the 2019 European elections, by social class (Note Question = ‘If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to - the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class or the upper class?’ Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

electoral base in 2019 is composed of people of the middle, upper-middle or upper class, whereas the remaining one-fifth consists of the lowermiddle class. Thus, in the span of a century, social-democratic parties have undergone a complete reshuffle, if not a reversal, of their electoral base, shifting from being working-class parties to being representatives of the upper-middle class. Not just in passing, it is important to note that social class in Europe is associated with attitudes towards the European Union. As Fig. 3.13 makes clear, pro-Europeanism reaches its peak among upper-middle and upper class voters, while the working class is the most Eurosceptic group. Obviously, this is perfectly in line with what we have observed above, especially in the third section: if social-democratic parties have fully embraced the principles of Europeanism, this embrace has been

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Fig. 3.13 Citizens’ views on EU integration (2019), by social class (Note For the wording of the questions, see Note to Figs. 3.2 and 3.12. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

made possible by the structural transformation of their electorates, which now ‘sing’ with especially pronounced upper class, cosmopolitan and pro-European accents. Even more dramatic, but absolutely telling, are the percentages concerning the levels of education of those who voted for the socialdemocratic parties in the 2019 European elections (Fig. 3.14). It is crystal clear that the vote for the social-democratic parties comes predominantly from those who have medium and high levels of education. On average, more than half of the socialist electorate completed tertiary education, which includes both theoretical programmes leading to advanced research or highly skilled professions, and more vocational programmes leading to the labour market. Instead, less than 15% of the European socialist electoral base—with the exception of Malta’s Labour Party—has attained only primary or lower-secondary levels of education, typically associated

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Aus-SPO Bel-PS/SPA Bul-KB Cro-SDP Cyp-EDEK Cze-CSSD Den-SPD Est-SDE Fin-SDP Fra-PS Ger-SPD Gre-PASOK Hun-DK Irl-LAB Ita-PD Lat-SDPS Lit-LSDP Lux-LSAP Mal-LAB Net-PVDA Pol-WIO Por-PS Rom-PSD Slo-SD Slo-SMER Spa-PSOE Swe-S Uk-LAB

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Fig. 3.14 Electorate of the social-democratic parties in the 2019 European elections, by level of education (Note Question = ‘How old were you when you stopped full-time education?’ [Low = 15 years old and less; Medium = 16– 19 years old; High = 20 years old or more]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Schmitt et al. [2019])

with those low-skilled manual occupations that, incidentally, are most threatened by the opening up of markets at the international level. Thus far, we have observed the composition of the social-democratic electorate in a given period of time (2019), proceeding with a series of synchronic comparisons between European countries. However, in order to have a better grasp of the transformation of the socialist electorate, we have analysed the changing social profile of voters for Italy’s main left-wing party over the last fifty years, with special attention to levels of education. More precisely, Fig. 3.15 reports the vote-share of the Italian Communist Party (1968–1987), the Democratic Party of the Left (1992–1996), the Left Democrats (1998–2006) and the Democratic Party (2008–2018) by level of education (primary, secondary and tertiary).

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1972

1983

1987

1992

1994

1996

2001

2006

2008

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20 60 50 40 30 20 60 20

30

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Vote-share of left-wing parties (%)

30

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1968

65

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary Primary

Secondary

Tertiary Primary

Secondary

Tertiary Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

Fig. 3.15 Composition of the main Italian left-wing parties 1968–2018, by level of education (Note For a more detailed scrutiny of the relationship between education and voting behaviour in Italy, see Corbetta and Ceccarini [2010]. Source Authors’ own compilation based on data from Itanes [1968–2018])

At least three aspects deserve special emphasis. First, there have been several ideological and organisational transformations during the fifty-year period covered by the graph. The mass-based Communist Party lost along the way its anti-system posture and a great deal of its membership. Its main direct heirs (firstly, the PDS/DS and then the PD) fiercely rejected any suggestion that they were social-democratic parties, preferring other definitions in the (ultimately vain) attempt to go ‘beyond left and right’, in the direction of a democratic compromise without any clear ideological orientation. Second, the turning point is located between 1994 and 1996 when, in fact, the left suffered a serious defeat and resurfaced in a new centreleft guise. President Clinton’s policies, the Italian Ulivo, Tony Blair’s New Labour, Gerhard Schröder’s Neue Mitte were successful in the short term. With hindsight, however, one can say that these strategies had limited

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value and have made the subsequent life and work of centre-left and social-democratic parties much more difficult. Finally, in 2007 the birth of the PD put an end to any likelihood of the resurgence of a social-democratic party (Vampa 2009). What Italy has today is a party that has rejected any reference to a left wing past and has deliberately characterised itself not as social-democratic but as exclusively ‘democratic’. The level of education of its 2018 voters is almost exactly the reverse of what it was in 1968. And, in fact, the PD in 2018 performed pretty well among those who have a degree or higher, with about 32% of their votes; but its support was 13 percentage points lower among those with a primary education. The opposite pattern was evident for the Communist Party in the late 1960s, when the PCI won 40% of the vote among those who had completed primary education only, but just 26% among those with the highest levels of education. Lastly, it is important to stress that the transformation of the electorate of the main Italian left-wing party is not limited to Italy, but is common to other European countries. As Piketty (2018: 3) has recently pointed out, in France, the USA and Britain ‘the “left” has become the party of the intellectual elite (Brahmin left), while the “right” can be viewed as the party of the business elite (Marchant right)’. If in the 1950s and 1960s voting for the social-democratic parties was associated, as in the Italian case, with lower levels of education and income, then in the twentyfirst century that tendency has been reversed, with the high-education elite much more in tune with the new libertarian, pro-European socialist recipe.

By Way of Conclusion For most of the twentieth century, the narrative of social-democratic parties was effectively shaped and convincingly argued. It has also been translated into successful (and long-lasting) policies, so much so that the famous German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf stated that the twentieth century had been the social-democratic century. However, by 1983 it had come to an end. Representing the industrial working class and, indeed, all workers, the social-democratic parties constructed a welfare state providing for their needs from the cradle to the grave. It proved capable of financing the welfare state and, at the same time, producing economic growth and development by Keynesian techniques of market intervention and budget deficits whenever necessary (Notermans 2000).

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On top of both, and thanks to those policies, the social-democratic promise was able to reduce inequalities and to reach a stage at which all could enjoy equality of opportunity. Moreover, the Socialist International provided a framework in which solidarity among workers could be practised. On the whole, it was, indeed, a powerful narrative. Somewhat paradoxically, however, both the welfare state and even more so Keynesian policies could be more successful when implemented within a national framework and tailored to the social and economic specificities of each country. The very success of the welfare state and the many social and cultural changes (Inglehart 1977) that affected especially the working class, its size and attitudes, had a negative impact on social-democratic parties. The ascendance of neoliberal economic policies challenging the role of the State, and the difficulties of resorting to Keynesian economic policies in the context of the process of European integration, have dealt a significant blow to European social-democratic parties. At the same time, and relatedly, it has become much more difficult to enact the policies and to sustain the costs of the equality of opportunities. Striking inequalities have made their appearance in all European states (Piketty 2013; Milanovi´c 2016). Moreover, the process of European integration, ‘narrated’ and justified in order to guarantee peace and create prosperity was, at the same time, taken for granted; but, recently, it has been criticised and challenged because perceived as cancelling cherished national traditions, customs and peculiarities. In fact, many nationalpopulist parties have seen their electoral and political support grow out of the shift of some sectors of the working class that feel that socialdemocratic parties do not respect their feelings, do not care for their expectations, fears and emotions, open their arms to migrants, embrace so-called multiculturalist approaches and perspectives. What is at issue in the twenty-first century is not whether and how to go beyond left and right (Giddens 1994), (the Third Way, with the exception of Tony Blair’s performance, not having been a spectacular success), but what kind of progressive narrative social-democratic parties and leaders will be capable of elaborating. For the time being, all over Europe, they seem to be groping in the dark.

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Country

Name

Abbreviation

Austria Belgium

Austrian Social Democratic Party Socialist Party Different Francophone Socialist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party Coalition for Bulgaria United Democratic Union of Centre Social Democratic Party of Croatia Czech Social Democratic Party Social Democratic Party Social Democratic Party Finnish Social Democrats Socialist Party Social Democratic Party of Germany Panhellenic Socialist Movement Democratic Coalition Hungarian Socialist Party Social Democratic Party Labour Party Democratic Party Social Democratic Party “Harmony” Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Socialist Workers’ Party Labour Party Labour Party Norwegian Labour Party Spring Social Democracy of Poland Socialist Party Social Democratic Party Direction–Social Democracy Social Democratic Party Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Social Democratic Labour Party Social Democratic Party of Switzerland Labour Party

SPÖ SP.A PS BSP KB EDEK SDP CSSD SPD SDE SDP PS SPD PASOK DK MSZP A Labour PD SDPS LSDP LSAP PL PvdA DNA WiO SDPL PS PSD Smer-SD SD PSOE S SP-PS Labour

Bulgaria Cyprus Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

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Almeida, D. (2012). The Impact of European Integration on Political Parties: Beyond the Permissive Consensus. London and New York: Routledge. Bailey, D. J., de Waele, J.-M., Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (2014). European Social Democracy During the Global Economic Crisis: Renovation or Resignation? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Bartolini, S. (2000). Political Mobilization of the European Left 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Benedetto, G., Hix, S., & Mastrorocco, N. (2020). The Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, 1918–2017. American Political Science Review‚ 114(3)‚ 928–939. Berman, S. (2006). The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Best, R. E. (2011). The Declining Electoral Relevance of Traditional Cleavage Groups. European Political Science Review, 3(2), 279–300. Bremer, B. (2018). The Missing Left? Economic Crisis and the Programmatic Response of Social Democratic Parties in Europe. Party Politics, 24(1), 23–38. Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). Global Competition and Brexit. American Political Science Review, 112(2), 201–218. Corbetta, P., & Ceccarini, L. (2010). Le variabili socio-demografiche: generazione, genere, istruzione e famiglia. In P. Bellucci & P. Segatti (Eds.), Votare in Italia: 1968–2008: Dall’appartenenza alla scelta (pp. 83–148). Bologna: Il Mulino. Dahrendorf, R. G. (1990). The Modern Social Conflict: An Essay on The Politics of Liberty. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. De Waele, J.-M., Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (2013). The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Döring, H., & Manow, P. (2019). Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies (Development version). Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. London: Pelican Books. Giddens, A. (1994). Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gingrich, J., & Häusermann, S. (2015). The Decline of the Working-class Vote, the Reconfiguration of the Welfare Support Coalition and Consequences for the Welfare State. Journal of European Social Policy, 25(1), 50–75. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Itanes. (1968–2018). Italian National Election Studies. Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo. http://www.itanes.org/. Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In M. Weiner & J. LaPalombara (Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (pp. 177–200). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, H. (1994). The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (Eds.). (2015). European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR. Ladrech, R. (2000). Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ladrech, R., & Marlière, P. (Eds.). (1999). Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organization, Policies. London: Palgrave. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Democracy and Working-class Authoritarianism. American Sociological Review, 24(4), 482–501. Meijers, M., & Zaslove, A. (2020). Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey 2018 (POPPA). https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8NEL7B. Harvard Dataverse, V2. Milanovi´c, B. (2016). Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mudge, S. L. (2018). Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Norris, P. (2020). Global Party Survey, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ WMGTNS. Harvard Dataverse, V3. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Notermans, T. (2000). Money, Markets, and the State: Social Democratic Economic Policies Since 1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pasquino, G., & Valbruzzi, M. (2014). Il Partito democratico: #Renzistasereno. In M. Valbruzzi & R. Vignati (Eds.), L’Italia e l’Europa al bivio delle riforme. Le elezioni europee e amministrative del 25 maggio 2014 (pp. 115–126). Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo. Pasquino, G., & Valbruzzi, M. (2019). Sovereignty in the Italian Polling Booths. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 24(5), 641–647. Piketty, T. (2013). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Piketty, T. (2018). Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality & the Changing Structure of Political Conflict. Available online here http://piketty. pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf. Przeworski, A., & Sprague, J. (1986). Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Sassoon, D. (1996). One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York Press. Schäfer, A., & Streeck, W. (Eds.). (2013). Politics in the Age of Austerity. London: Polity Press. Scharpf, F. W. (2014). After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy. European Law Journal, 21(3), 384–405. Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S. B., van der Brug, W., & Popa, S. A. (2019). European Parliament Election Study 2019. Voter Study. Streeck, W., & Elsässer, L. (2014). Monetary Disunion: The Domestic Politics of Euroland. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1), 1–24. Vampa, D. (2009). The Death of Social Democracy: The Case of the Italian Democratic Party. Bullettin of Italian Politics, 1(2), 347–370. Volkens, A., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., & Weßels, B. (2019). The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2019b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

CHAPTER 4

The European Institutions and Their Communication Deficits Marinella Belluati

The European Union is experiencing a moment of profound crisis, one of the many since it was founded. Internally, the rise of populism is calling the pillars of the common project into question; externally, the new fronts that have opened up with the geopolitical and socio-economic crisis of 2008 and the migrant crisis of 2015 are putting the European institutions’ ability to cope with the major issues of globalization to the test. After a period flush with such major achievements as the creation of the Eurozone (with its 19 countries and approximately 350 million inhabitants), the Schengen Area and the enlargement to 28 member states, the approval of the Lisbon Treaty (the EU’s first Constitution) and the creation of the European Central Bank, the process of integration has begun to show unmistakable signs of strain. Though there can be no doubt that these achievements have made the European project more concrete—fuelling the expectations as well as the criticisms surrounding

M. Belluati (B) Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Turin, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_4

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it—repeated onslaughts such as the 2008 financial meltdown, international terrorism and the recent migrant emergencies have probed the limits of what Europe’s institutions can take. Most recently, the threats besetting the Union have come to a head with Brexit, throwing the ongoing crisis into even sharper relief.

Democratic Deficit and Political Deficit: A Gap to Be Bridged Now that internal and external crises are accentuating the differences between Member States rather than reducing them, the differentiation within the EU that has been taken as the narrative of European integration is becoming a limitation. The backdrop here is the democratic deficit1 from which the European project suffers, and the long-standing difficulty in reducing it (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal and Hix 2005). As long as membership of the Union was more symbolic than tangible, the problems did not surface. But when Europe’s role in the public and political spheres became more concrete and impacted the Member States’ domestic politics and the lives of their citizens in more obvious ways, criticisms and unfavourable views also began to carry greater weight. The years of permissive consensus (Brechon et al. 1995) gave way to those of constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009), which is now hardening into open conflict. The lack of solid institutional narratives addressed to public opinion at such critical moments as the entry into force of the Schengen (1990) and Maastricht (1992) treaties, the introduction of the euro and the enlargement to EU-28 gave free rein to adverse rhetoric in the political discourse (Belluati and Serricchio 2014; Belluati and Caraffini 2015; Belluati 2018). From a certain point onwards, Euroscepticism—or antiEuropean populism—became powerful political rhetorics but also an element of contentious politics as defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2006).

1 ‘The “democratic deficit” is a term used by people who argue that the EU institutions and their decision-making processes suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen due to their complexity. The real EU democratic deficit seems to be the absence of European politics. EU voters do not feel that they have an effective way to reject a “government” they do not like, and to change, in some ways, the course of politics and policy’. Source: Euro-Lex (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html; last accessed 12 February 2020).

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After the Lisbon Treaty became law, the burden of supporting the European Union’s new arrangements fell largely to the European institutions, which were unable or unwilling to advance a true political discourse. What emerged was not just a democratic deficit, which would in any case be typical of any constituent phase, but a full-scale political deficit (Schmidt 2006) in negotiating and addressing the integration process in the European public sphere. The result was an erosion of trust in the European Union, at least until 2014. In that year, the trend was reversed, and trust in the EU outstripped trust in national parliaments and governments.2 Thus began the debate on what the European public space should in fact be, and what concrete shape a political discourse capable of going beyond the Member States’ borders should take. It is a widespread opinion that the creation of a transnational democracy without a European demos (Schlesinger 1995, 1999; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Habermas 2004, 2011; Sassatelli 2008; Risse 2014) is the main reason that the integration project has stalled (Habermas 2011, 2019). Many intellectuals have viewed the European project as a challenge to modernity and the construction of complex identities (Elster 1991; Melucci 1991), while others have warned of the dangers of forced uniformity and the loss of values. There is broad agreement that the reason for the integration project’s lack of success lies in its democratic deficit, a term first used in 1977, when it appeared in the ‘Manifesto of Young European Federalists’ by Richard Corbett (2016). According to Gianfranco Pasquino (2018), applying this expression to the European Union is as convincing as it is unclear. In general, it denotes the legitimacy shortfall and inefficiency of the main European institutions, which are accused of not reflecting the wishes of the Member States’ voters and being unable to ensure that Europe’s citizens can fully hold them to account. Thus, all institutional decisions remain in the hands of the national governments on the one hand and EU technocrats on the other, cutting the voters out of the picture. Consequently, the decision-making procedures are wide open to the concerns of Member State governments and the Eurocrats, but not those of the public. Pasquino (2012) argues that we must determine where exactly this deficit lies. If the European institutions do not respond adequately to the voters because the latter do not have the opportunity to express

2 Standard Eurobarometer 91, Spring 2019.

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their wishes, then the deficit is a question of what has been called inputlegitimation. Conversely, if the problem is that the institutions act in their own interests and not those of the ‘people’, then the deficit is one of output –legitimation. When we speak of the democratic deficit, however, what do we mean by the term ‘democratic’? The term refers both ‘to the electoral procedures whereby political office and power are granted to those who are legitimized to make binding decisions for a community’ and to the decision-making processes for the elected office-holders. In addition, it ‘should also include the existence of procedures, methods and relationships of accountability—or in other words, the decision-makers’ acceptance of their responsibility to the voters who elected them and who are affected by the decisions’ consequences—and whether or not voters are in fact able to replace the decision-makers’ (Pasquino 2012: 417–419). Europe’s democratic deficit has been expressed in many ways. The intransigent positions that a number of Member States took via the European Council at several crucial moments resulted in certain political strategies that were poorly explained and poorly understood by the public, who thus had an unfiltered view only of the negative consequences. These States’ economic policies, for example, aggravated the divisions within the Union, fuelling ‘sovereigntist’ movements and empowering hostile alliances such as the so-called Visegrád Pact between Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which is also being eyed by several Italian and Austrian party groups. The EU’s cohesion and redistribution policies have had little impact, while the power disparity between the Union’s ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries has become glaringly apparent, as has the resurgence of ‘sovereigntist’ pressures. And with Brexit, the culminating moment of the current crisis, the idea of a two-speed Europe has returned with a vengeance to the institutional and intellectual debate3 on the Union’s future (Cavalli and Martinelli 2015). From the institutional standpoint, one of the features of the democratic deficit is the weakness of the European Parliament, the Union’s political arm and its only institution elected by direct universal suffrage. As the EU arose primarily as a problem-solving entity, it has long embraced an intergovernmental working method that thought of the integration process in 3 Cfr. online article ‘Europa a due velocità’, https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/new sitem/index/Item/News:NEWS _ITEM:4268; last accessed 10 February 2020.

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terms of achieving a strategic compromise between the Member States, each of which pursued its own interests (Moravcsik 2002). For many years, this meant that the community institutions—regarded as being at the service of the national governments—had little autonomy. Since the late 1980s, the effects of globalization have forced the European institutions to find a new approach to making decisions, based to a large extent on neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen 1992) and cooperation between the Member States. The aim was to promote a principle of social equity that would make it possible to go beyond national interests, but these hopes were soon dashed by the difficulty of curbing the many forms of competition between the Member States and of managing conflict in the EU’s institutional space. Though the Lisbon Treaty increased the power of the European Parliament, which in theory dictates Union policy, its role is still subordinate to that of the European Commission and Council. Decisions regarding a variety of questions are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, based on what is intended to be an equitable ‘institutional triangulation’. Under the ordinary legislative procedure (also called the co-decision procedure), proposals by the Commission must be approved by the European Parliament and ratified by the Council, where voting is almost always unanimous and any Member State can veto the decision. In some matters such as foreign policy and defence, the European institutions are not directly involved because the Member States have not ceded sovereignty. In these cases, decisions on proposals by the Commission are made through an intergovernmental method where the Council plays a fundamental part and the European Parliament acts in an advisory capacity. The workings of the European parties also contribute to creating a democratic short circuit (Cavalli and Martinelli 2015). The Europarties’ power to influence policy-making is very different from that traditionally wielded by their national counterparts (Hix 2002; Caraffini 2015). Taking the operation of Italy’s parties as a comparator, it is clear that the Europarties’ function is chiefly one of providing links rather than political guidance. The European party families subscribe to several overarching political visions—socialist, popular, liberal, leftist, Christian and green—but internally, each accommodates national political cultures that can differ widely (Ciancio 2007; Levi and Sozzi 2015). Starting from the left-leaning European parties, we have the Greens/European Free Alliance, where hard-core eco-warriors like the

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Portuguese party share political space with other more institutional and government-aligned groups such as those from Northern Europe. The European left has joined forces in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), where Spain’s opposition Podemos and Izquierda Unida (IU) have thrown in their lot with Ireland’s Sinn Féin and the Greek left-wing coalition SYRIZA. Italy’s left-wing Liberi e Uguali (LeU) party would also have been part of the bloc, had it been able to send at least one MEP to the European parliament. Likewise, the European socialists in the European Parliament—the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—are also an assemblage of parties with highly dissimilar political orientations. To cite a single example, it is only since 2014 that all of the MEPs from Italy’s Partito Democratico (PD)—which was established in 2007—have belonged to the group. Before 2014, only those PD MEPs who had formerly been with the Democratici di Sinistra (DS) were part of the group, while those who had been members of the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) caucused with the European People’s Party (EPP). The EPP in turn brought together members of very different national parties, such as Angela Merkel’s Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and Victor Orban’s Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, or Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). The rise of nationalist parties is another example of the atypical operation of Europe’s supranational political institutions. The liberal Renew Europe group (RE) is perhaps the most transnational of all, as it is made up of a series of minor national parties that were able to make their political strength felt only on the larger European stage. Had Emma Bonino’s +Europa reached the threshold required for representation in the European Parliament, it would also have become part of the RE Spitzenteam. Over time, RE’s charismatic leader, Guy Verhofstadt, has been able to consolidate a political force which is less constrained by national considerations, though his leadership has recently been challenged by the entry of the French Liste Renaissance movement headed by Emmanuel Macron. As for the anti-European parties (something of a contradiction in terms in the European Parliament), it cannot be said that there is a united Eurosceptic front. France’s Rassemblement National (RN) headed by Marin Le Pen and Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern League) under Matteo Salvini are both in the Identity and Democracy group. Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5s), along with the Basque separatists, are not currently part of a political grouping, whereas in the previous legislature they were

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together with the UK’s UKIP, which after Brexit is no longer in the European Parliament. Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group which also includes many MEPs from Visegrád Pact countries, though they tend to take their cue from Victor Orban (EPP). This tangle of political affiliations produces variable results at the codecision stage. It is by no means to be taken for granted that MEPs will toe their European group’s line. Analyses of parliamentary voting yield results that are not always unequivocal. The ‘matching rates’ in votes cast for or against individual measures published by Vote Watch for Europe4 up to the latest legislature show that how MEPs vote does not always reflect their national party’s group membership. For example, the M5s voted together with ALDE, the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL much more frequently than with its own group.5 Seen through the lens of national political cultures, the European political space thus takes on the blurred outlines of a Politics without Polity (Dosenrode 2016), validating the charge that the European public space is too normative. At the same time, beneath the complexity of Europe’s political architecture, we can discern a new and more transnational potential, doubtless still highly technocratic, but ready and waiting to express itself. If we look, for example, at the formation of the parliamentary majority in Brussels, we see a distinct shift from the political centre that will have repercussions for future decisions. The grand coalition between the EPP and S&D that kept a tight grip on the majority in the European Parliament until 2014 has been forced to bring other groups on board. The liberal bloc (ALDE, now renamed Renew Europe) has often been the third force in Parliament. However, the recent success of Green parties in many European countries except Italy has opened up new possibilities for forming a majority. Nor should we forget that it is precisely through alliances that do not hinge on ideology that the European Union has been able to take major decisions that have often put it in the forefront in many areas: the environment, health and food safety, human rights, international cooperation and cybersecurity. Viewed from a pro-Union perspective, these are all signs of political and institutional action that

4 See https://www.votewatch.eu/; last accessed 10 February 2020. 5 See https://blog.openpolis.it/2017/01/10/con-chi-vota-piu-spesso-il-movimento-cin

que-stelle-in-europa/13098; last accessed 10 February 2020.

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is anything but static and depoliticized, and whose narrative potential is high. Nevertheless, this potential has not been put to full, effective use by the institutions, and information flows have centred mostly on the issues at stake for the Member States. The lacklustre outcome of the Union’s new constituent phase and the distortions generated by the economic crisis seem to have dragged the European project back to the starting line. If we take a dispassionate view of how institutional resources are managed, it is clear that there is an increasing need for a co-decision method where political mediation is central to dealing with the conflicts between Member States. The crux here is that conflict must be accepted as a ‘natural fact’ that can never be entirely suppressed in the system of institutional relationships (Adler 1992; Tilly 1984), which also involves NGOs, multinationals, public opinion and collective movements. Not all of the Member States, however, have taken the change in the decision-making model to heart. Those that have—Germany, for instance—have seized the helm of the EU. Others, like the United Kingdom, have refused to stay the course, exiting from the European regulation space. Others again have taken various tacks, often oscillating between these two opposing poles. At the heart of the democratic deficit that afflicts Europe, then, is the difficulty of elucidating an institutional and political architecture that is anything but clear, and is saddled with a set of far-from-straightforward rules of operation that make it seem remote and difficult to understand. The lack of politicization of the European public sphere weighs heavily on the situation, as does the inability to bring effective messages about ethics and values into the public discourse (Belluati 2012, 2015). Many factors can be blamed. On the one hand, the Member States balk at pushing their own interests into the background and making real efforts to pursue a policy of solidarity; on the other, the European institutional ethos prides itself on striving to be super partes, which an increasingly polarized and partisan public arena tends to find alienating. Though all of these elements can be interpreted in many ways, our intention here is to discuss them from the perspective of communication, which encompasses and regulates them all. In any case, the oft-cited Habermasian notion of the public sphere (Habermas 1990) centres on the effectiveness of communication processes in activating the institutional demos. Communication, however, is not only technique and strategy, but is also identity and active engagement (Koopmans and Erbe 2004;

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Della Porta and Caiani 2006) in an increasingly interconnected and crossfertilized communication environment (Bondebjerg and Golding 2004; Bondebjerg and Madsen 2008; Hutter et al. 2016).

The Information Deficit: Perennially Playing Catch-Up Apart from the problem of the decision-making method, the current phase must get to grips with the fact that, as Vivien Schmidt (2006) argues, the national polities are political orphans, and most Member States end up submitting to decisions without championing the need for them. This inevitably makes it harder to arrive at legitimized decisions. Whereas the de-politicization of Europe’s institutional space in the first constituent phase was dictated by caution and by the fear that an overly political approach would lead to political paralysis or even undermine the fragile process of integration, the much-touted impartiality and even handedness is now revealing itself to be a limitation that explains the reasons for the internal crisis. Some scholars have maintained that the fragility of the Union’s institutions and the growing dissatisfaction with the European project (and even open hostility towards it) are not so much the result of the absence of a European demos or of institutional rationality, as of the lack of political mobilization and discursive access in the public sphere (Koopmans and Erbe 2004). This lack is the main cause of the widening gap and growing estrangement between the place where decisions are made in Europe and the place where these decisions take effect. The much-discussed democratic deficit that separates the discourses produced by the European institutions, and the public, is thus the outcome of the lack of political mobilization at the European level, which has created the paradox of a supranational dimension that acts and interacts concretely with no ‘political’ vision to support it. Weighing on this is also the lack of mediation by the information system, which in the absence of spectacle surrounding the decision-making process shows little interest in what goes on in Brussels. With no real engagement on the part of the parties or interest groups, European decisions have no capacity to set the agenda unless they become political battlegrounds. The issue of migration is a clear example. Even though the European institutions have been working long and hard on a co-decided policy, the urgency of certain events and the anti-immigration rhetoric make these efforts look entirely unavailing

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and irrelevant, while allowing populist and hostile political forces to dominate the scene.6 The feebleness of European decisions stems precisely from the fact that the impact of institutional interaction has not yet made itself felt at the level of public debate. Against this backdrop, the structure of Europe’s communication in terms of both organization and the production of social meaning is a central strategic resource for building a sense of belonging and identity, and a bureaucratic culture. Despite delays and resistance, the salience of European issues in the public sphere is increasing (de Vreese 2007). The Brussels institutions grasped this fact before grasping the political dimension and have long invested in communication policies to support their actions (D’Ambrosi 2019). This process is the exact opposite of the traditional consensus-building practices deployed in mature democracies, where the communication resource is usually managed by political groups, parties or other stakeholders who, more or less in line with the media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004), construct the narrative space for issues at the national and European levels. The institutions are involved in these flows only afterwards, when decisions are translated into policies (Bobbio and Roncarolo 2016), following a familiar issue-attention cycle (Downs 1972). In Europe, the communication pipeline is turned around, as the institutions themselves handle the public narrative about EU decisions and channel it to the citizenry using their own methods and forms. At best, the political and media spheres tend to receive this narrative with a yawn; at worst, they will subscribe to (or at least not refute) negative counter-narratives. This short circuit acts on the cognitive plane at all levels, dragging Europe, public life and political routines even farther apart. Speaking of the European communication deficit thus requires us to take a closer look at the three streams that flow together to form Europe’s public discourse. The first is the process of constructing

6 The third Dublin Resolution for asylum seekers came into force in 2013 after lengthy negotiations among the Member States. The text approved was of more limited scope than the one proposed by the European Commission. Although it was signed by all member states, in 2015, during the migrant crisis, some signatory countries—Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic—refused to apply it. Although it was in Italy’s interest to push the European Council to have the resolution enforced, the former deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, of the Lega (League), aligned himself with these countries. Political populist positions in many states have dominated the institutional agenda.

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European identity, the second concerns the workings of the Union’s institutions, and the third relates to the information dimension that regulates the European space (Belluati and Marini 2019). We can start with the question of identity, as it is a delicate and controversial issue but one that is crucial if the difficulties of designing a European demos are to be overcome. There can be little doubt that the process of recognizing a European identity entails a series of interdependent steps, each of which contributes in its own way to outlining a space for communicating identity. The early dream of a common European culture soon proved all too illusory, as the European space is made up of an array of cultural, religious, geographical and political diversities that it would be difficult, and undesirable, to reduce to uniformity (Norris 1997). So far, the political identity associated with European citizenship has chiefly been based on technocratic rules (free circulation and free trade) and on the sum of loosely integrated national identities (Thiesse 1999). One factor concerns the definition and development of a European historical memory, in which the Member States’ investment has always been minimal (Lee and Thomas 2012). Apart from the rhetoric of Europe as the guarantor of the longest period of peace, few other narratives have arisen over time. The first moments of a European collective memory were the fall of the Berlin Wall, the introduction of the euro and, paradoxically, the financial crisis and the subsequent austerity policies. What Europe’s cultural identity lacks is a European cultural heritage, or in other words, that symbolic fabric whose warp and weft are woven together into a common space. There are those who maintain that this is an overly essentialist view which fails to give European countries’ cultural heterogeneity its due (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006; Sassatelli 2008). Others acknowledge that the policy of promoting European culture is working, celebrating Europe’s multiculturalism and the post-modern idea that different identities can coexist (Verderame 2018). Europe’s cultural policies7 have long subsidized the construction of symbolic transnational and identity resources through cooperation and exchange programmes, as well exemplified by Erasmus Plus. More recently, investments in infrastructures and in efforts 7 The largest investment is in the EACEA (Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency), which manages funding for education, culture, audiovisuals, sport, citizenship and volunteering. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/education-aud iovisual-and-culture_en.

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to overcome the digital divide have been trying to create transnational architectures, though they have met with resistance in individual Member States (Cronin 2002; Dunkerley et al. 2002). Language is another factor in cultural integration. Dieter Grimm (1995) and Philip Schlesinger (1995) have drawn attention to the pragmatic obstacles thrown up by the lack of a common language and shared communication systems. One side of the debate holds that without these prerequisites, creating a communicative rationality that can work towards building European citizenship is inconceivable. It is widely believed, however, that this is a non-problem: European identity should spring from the interaction of different messages, rather than standardizing forms and codes of communication. The culturalist vision maintains that language is not just a system of grammatical rules, but is a social practice that produces identity. At present, 24 languages are spoken in Europe, and official documents are translated into all of them—but the cost of this to the Union is not even particularly daunting. As several scholars have emphasized, multilingualism is a cultural asset (Gazzola 2006) because it encourages differentiation and the creation of multiple identities (Melucci 1991), but also calls for investing in mediation practices. An identity policy must also be based on an architecture and a governance that are equally solid. Mention has already been made of the fact that there is no integrated European media system, and the attempts that have been made so far at the institutional level, like Euronews —the European news network—or EuTube—the European Commission’s YouTube channel—and the official accounts on social media are fairly marginal and have little impact on the public debate (Cornia 2010). For many years, the Commission’s DG Comm in particular has fielded a permanent communication organization and policies.8 The DG has its own budget and has had a number of directives approved over the years that effectively express the

8 In 1995, the Santer Commission’s PRINCE programme laid down the first guidelines for orienting and organizing the Union’s communication flows. These were the first steps along a route that over the years would create information centres throughout the EU. The programme was followed in 2001 by the Prodi Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, which significantly reinforced the communication strategy pursued by Brussels. Since the early 2000s, there has been a succession of other European policy measures regarding the forms and instruments of communication, including the 2006 Green Paper on Transparency that sought to intervene in the process of digitization and move towards open government strategies in public administrations. Most recently, directives for fighting fake news and misinformation have been approved.

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goals and functions of Europe’s institutional and public communication. In the last decade, the European Parliament—whose public functions are more recent—has filled a communication gap by establishing its own DG Comm, whose structure and investments have continued to grow. The great anomaly of European communication is that institutional efforts are making up for the de-politicization of Europe’s public sphere. This is especially apparent during elections, when the national and European parties have done almost nothing to win public support for their candidates’ European platforms. This attitude towards Europe on the part of national politics has spurred the Union’s institutions to assume control of the electoral narrative, with all the limitations that this entails, and to take charge of most of the political communication circulating during campaigns. The 10% increase in voter turnout during the 2019 European elections was interpreted as being chiefly the result of the European Parliament’s all-out efforts at mobilization through the ‘This Time I’m Voting’ campaign.9 This was very much a departure for the European communication system, but a necessary one, as it vested the institution with a role which, on a democratic stage, would have been filled by other political actors. Some contributions to Europe’s institutional communication are also made by the European Council, the highest level of intergovernmental cooperation between the Member States, and an effectively political body as it is the forum where the national sovereignties deal with complex or delicate issues that cannot be resolved elsewhere. This institution’s communicative function is inversely proportionate to its role, which has become increasingly central over the years, often acting to block decisions made by the other European institutions. Another aspect that is crucial in outlining the European public sphere is the capacity to frame discourse. The European institutions are accused of being over-complicated and far removed from everyday life. Politically, they seem to have gone AWOL. But there is another rightful participant in the production of Europe’s social content: the media (Belluati and Marini 2019). For years, studies have blamed the information deficit on the traditional media outlets, as being ineffective at orienting public discourse towards European concerns (Grossi 1996; Marletti and Mouchon 2005). Institutional journalism has shown little desire or ability

9 https://www.thistimeimvoting.eu/.

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to shift away from its self-referential focus on national parties and political figures. There is a unanimous conviction that mainstream journalism neither frames European issues appropriately nor covers them in sufficient depth. There is an ambivalence in this debate that is not easy to resolve (Koopmans and Statham 2010). On the one hand, it is clear that quality journalism finds it increasing difficult to cover the European Union’s institutional activities. On the other, the growing internationalization of information and the new identity bestowed on it by the new channels of communication have called journalism in general—and European journalism in particular—more openly into question (Kriesi et al. 2008; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Risse 2010; Marini 2014). New technologies and sources of information are bringing about profound changes in how information produces social meaning. There is a tension between being deeply embedded in constant, global information flows and the need to re-localize experience (Meyrowitz 1985). This tension is clear in the European information flow, which is changing significantly as a result of new communicative opportunities that are more independent and disintermediated than the traditional journalistic approach. This explains why the once-familiar Brussels correspondents are disappearing and the bubble they worked in has burst, but it also explains the presence of new sources and players in the European information space. Never before have the flows of European news been so intense and salient. New organizations and professional skills are taking shape that, niche though they may be, are redefining what makes European information newsworthy. At the same time, they are changing the frameworks of meaning that a given news flow produces. Though the effect is still limited, and complements rather than replaces existing communication systems, some reverberations at the level of public narrative are beginning to make themselves felt.

Conclusions While the question of Europe’s democratic deficit is deeply entwined with the theme of communication, it cannot be considered apart from the political deficit. This chapter has attempted to draw attention to the fact that the gulf between Europe’s institutions and its citizens will not be bridged on its own, but calls for an effort to reinstate Europe’s symbolic and cognitive dimension. Unaware as many public players may seem to be, the impact and interdependence of European decisions are

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processes that cannot be reversed except with much pain and turmoil, as the British experience will show. Though Community choices have a significant influence on public decisions and everyday life, this is something that national political circles and the more traditional channels of communication fail to realize, and thus do not problematize with sufficient attention. But the European public sphere is more crowded than is generally thought, and new home-grown intermediate bodies are appearing. In the third sector, there are increasing numbers of transnational actors such as consumer movements, environmental movements and NGOs. Moreover, new information sources have arisen in the European space (Politico.eu, for example) and are becoming influential in steering the public debate and raising it to another level. Nor should we underestimate the role of the European institutions, the only actors on this scene who are stretching the limits of their functions to help a Europeanized vision of public discourse gain ground. If a true European public sphere is to come about, every mechanism must mesh together to ensure that this is not the ‘last chance’ (Habermas 2019) for Europe’s ‘unfinished adventure’ (Bauman 2006).

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CHAPTER 5

The Party of European Socialists and Its Problems Luke March

This chapter engages with the main theme of the volume (the possible emergence of a left-wing integrationist agenda at EU level), with a focus on the Party of European Socialists (PES), the social democratic transnational party federation (TNP). TNPs have a contested role—for some they are the nuclei of a nascent EU-level party system; for many others they are ‘timidly rising actors’ (Bardi 2004). At the very least they play a role as party networks, pooling party resources, particularly in programmatic terms via a common manifesto at European parliamentary (EP) elections, and occasionally they act as genuine force multipliers, projecting a more common party family agenda at EU level. In short, if there is any more pronounced left-wing integrationist agenda to be found, it should be visible in the policies and practices of the PES as a TNP. Indeed, this chapter does show such an agenda emerging in the PES’ manifestos. This agenda remains profoundly in favour of the principles and main policies of European integration. However, criticism of the EU

L. March (B) University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_5

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and the austerity policies of its key actors has certainly increased, and, alongside this critique, there is more emphasis on an alternative ‘growth’ agenda, focussed on social rights, environmentalism and feminism. To a large degree, this agenda is congruent with the PES’ long-term emphasis on ‘Social Europe’. However, since the Great Recession, there has been the notable development of a more partisan flavour (focussed on criticism of conservatives and ‘neoliberalism’) and more emphasis on developing the PES as a transnational political party. Such developments remain relatively modest, but, given that the PES was traditionally one of the most intergovernmentalist TNPs, are worthy of analysis. However, this agenda is shot through with contradictions. Continuing to reflect some of the typical weaknesses of TNPs, it at best lacks much substance or detail. At worst, it is a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, distilling general points of agreement from the PES’ member parties, but lacking mechanisms to synthesise them into a detailed policy prospectus. More strikingly still, the PES’ policies lack a coherent critique of the EU able to explain how a social democratic growth agenda can be furthered by a ‘neoliberal’ institution with an emphasis on open markets and competition. Such programmatic and organisational weaknesses are exacerbated by the PES’ increasing marginalisation as an actor at EU level, multiplying the marginality of its policy prescriptions. As such, the ‘crisis of social democracy’ is fully evident at EU level. The chapter proceeds as follows. It first briefly summarises the nature of the TNPs (often called ‘Europarties’) and their strengths and weaknesses. It then discusses the origins and emergence of the PES and its role within the EU ‘party system’. It proceeds to focus on the new ‘antiausterity’ agenda the PES has furthered since 2009, and the penultimate section focusses on the problems of furthering such an agenda in any real sense. The conclusion recaps on the multiple problems the PES indeed faces.

‘Europarties’: From High Hopes to Low Expectations TNPs are commonly called ‘Europarties’ (problematically, given that this term imputes a level of cohesion and pan-EU integration) and are officially ‘European Political Parties’. They comprise two core functions. Narrowly, they are the ‘party federations’ that co-exist alongside European parliamentary (EP) groups and national parties, co-ordinating party

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activity in the EU institutions, most obviously via manifestos in EP elections. More broadly, and particularly for the more developed TNPs such as the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the European Green Party (EGP), they have an integrative, transnational focus that aims to transcend the sum of the various parts and make the respective party a genuine force in European politics. Today’s TNPs (the main ones being the PES, EPP, EGP, ALDE [the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe] and the radical left Party of the European Left [EL]) have origins in the EP groups that existed from the 1950s, but were stimulated as manifesto and policy coordination networks by the first direct EP elections in 1979 (van Hecke 2006). Their role developed substantially from the late 1980s to the mid2000s in lock-step with the progression of EU integration, what Bartolini (2005: 336) calls ‘top-down institutionalization’. That is, TNP development reflects deliberate constitutional engineering to improve the EU’s functioning and legitimacy. Evident was ‘political spill-over’ from EU integration to TNP development—‘each step in the strengthening of the EU institutions eventually results in a strengthening of the transnational parties’ (Andeweg 1995: 67). In particular, institutional-legal changes following the Maastricht Treaty (1992) gave a significant boost to the development of TNPs; such changes included the augmentation of the EP’s powers from an advisory role to ‘co-decision’: a legislative role shared with the Commission and Council. More specifically, the so-called Party Article, Article 138a (later Art. 191) of the Treaty of European Union gave the existence of the TNPs a constitutional basis, stating that ‘Political parties at European level are important as a factor of integration within the Union’. In the 2000s, the new ‘party regulation’ (Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003) buttressed the role of the TNPs by legally and financially separating them from the EP party groups. A 2007 revision (Regulation (EC) No. 1524/2007) allowed the TNPs to establish pan-European party foundations that could potentially act as the instigators for pan-European consciousness, and furthermore permitted the TNPs to campaign directly in EP elections (Johansson 2009).1 This right was first used in the 2009 EP election campaign.

1 The latest legislation is at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri = LEGISSUM:0102_12 (accessed 27 February 2020).

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The role of the TNPs has been controversial in the literature, so scepticism about their prospects is appropriate (Dunphy and March 2019). Nevertheless, they play several important roles in co-ordination and information-exchange between national parties and socialisation, by inculcating a common culture and party family identity at European level. Particularly relevant for the PES is legitimacy (compensating for domestic marginality or defeats): the crisis of social democracy has driven greater aspirations for mutual learning and convergence via the PES (Newman 1996; Daniels 1998). Important too is policy-making, via promulgation of common EP manifestos, the TNP foundations acting as think-tanks, the party guidelines given to EP groups and pre-Council party summits, albeit only the biggest TNPs hold these. Above all, the TNPs are networks of Europeanisation—they expose national parties to European integrative processes, which thereby influence and can be influenced by them (von dem Berg and Poguntke 2011). Nevertheless, the limits on TNP activity are real and have undoubtedly increased since the Great Recession. In particular, they have not emerged as a bottom-up response to any visible social/electoral demand: a basic weakness of TNPs has been the ‘lack of “demand for Europe” from the base’ (Bardi 2004: 20). This is particularly the case in EP elections, which are not genuinely European, but ‘national elections with a European result’ (Gagatek 2009: 360). More starkly, TNPs are often largely invisible to the electorate outside the Brussels ‘Eurobubble’ (van Hecke 2017: 29). Notwithstanding the above-mentioned impetus towards more powers and financial autonomy, TNPs still remain agents of national principals (Hanley 2008), and as such have insufficient levers to drive greater consolidation and transnationalism against the wishes of national parties, and little with which to effect national party polices. Given that TNPs are primarily the products of political spill-over, it is evident that, as EU integration has run into greater public opposition (evidenced, inter alia, by the Brexit vote, the rise of national-populist parties across the EU and enlargement fatigue), both the top-down and bottom-up incentives for TNP development have diminished since 2009. This is reflected, for example, in the failure to advance on repeated proposals for transnational party lists in EP elections. TNPs remain factors of EU integration in the minds of EU federalists (for instance, European Commission President

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Jean-Claude Juncker explicitly mentioned the role of TNPs and transnational lists in his September 2017 State of the Union address [van Hecke 2017: 5]) but the evidence is less persuasive.

The PES: The Emergence of Pragmatic Intergovernmentalism Whereas the Christian Democratic EPP (founded in 1976 and the only TNP to bear the name ‘Party’ until 1992) was long regarded as the most developed TNP and has since 1999 been the most electorally successful, the PES was traditionally seen as a ‘model’ TNP (Hix and Lord 1998: 86). This was based on its stability and cohesiveness, linear development, and that it was the only TNP represented in all EU member states (Hix and Lord 1997: 96). Whereas like the EPP, it originated as a centralised, top-down organisation (Attinà 1998: 25), its main distinction has been its (general) preference for intergovernmentalism over transnationalism/federalism. This paradox—the theoretically more internationalist centre-left being more hesitant about transnational cooperation than the right—is explained by history: the Christian democrats believed that a common European civilisation reinforced by transnational ideological affinity could heal the divisions caused by interwar nationalism (Hix and Lord 1997: 11). Specifically, they saw transnational parties as ‘carriers of European integration’, and the EPP in particular as an embryonic European party (Haas 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold 1971; Johansson and Zervakis 2002: 14). In contrast, the PES emerged much more incrementally. It originated in the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (established in 1957 to coordinate Socialist International member parties operating within the EEC member states), and later the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC (CSPEC), formed in 1974 to foster greater cooperation in advance of the first direct EP elections in 1979. Both of these organisations enabled relatively high programmatic unity among the half-dozen core member parties, but had little ability to influence the broader programmes of non-aligned parties, including the UK Labour Party, which initially did not join the CSPEC as a full member (Hanley 2008: 66; Hix and Lesse 2002). Indeed, despite a very general manifesto being produced for the 1979 EP elections, the CSPEC had a largely ephemeral existence: the great ideological variance of European

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social democratic parties prevented aspirations towards a common European project in the 1980s, and many parties opted out or simply ignored its activity (Ladrech 2000: 93). Europe was one of the key divisions among social democratic parties, but, unlike the radical left, the social democrats did not articulate consistent ideological critiques of the EEC such that Euroscepticism became a prominent identity marker. First, despite occasional criticism of neoliberalism, no social democratic party has been substantively anticapitalist since the 1950s (Sassoon 2010: 243). Second, the logic of post-war democratic socialism argued for a progressive internationalism that was implicitly compatible with greater European transnational cooperation (Featherstone 1988: 1). Most social democrats’ ambivalence about Europe stemmed from their traditional national focus—an emphasis on Keynesian economic dirigisme via the institutions of the nation state. Ignazio Silone argued that ‘there is nothing the Socialists nationalize as quickly as socialism’ (quoted in Ladrech 2003: 114). Certainly, this ethos deeply imbued the PES’ development. Even in the late 1990s, the social democratic left failed to articulate a distinct vision about the EU, and according to Donald Sassoon ‘it did not even try. It was clueless’ (Sassoon 2011: 138). Different national approaches to Europe were at root: UK Labour, the Danish Social Democrats and Greek PASOK were the most sceptical (Labour’s (in)famous 1983 manifesto even advocated withdrawal from the EEC), and the Dutch, Belgian, French and German parties were most favourable towards common policies. Moreover, there has been a consistent north-south pro-/anti-EU cleavage, with the northern social democrats (especially the Nordic countries) markedly less keen (Almeida 2012: 58). When the PES emerged in 1992, this was (typically) not a proactive embrace of transnationalism but a pragmatic response to the EU’s political spill-over (Lightfoot 2005: 35). The social democrats perceived that the EPP allowed Christian democrats far greater policy co-ordination and effectiveness, especially via their leaders’ summits in advance of European Council meetings (Ladrech 2000: 95; 2003). At the same time, policy differences over Europe had narrowed and a consensus over integration emerged. The ideological onslaught of Thatcherite neoliberalism fundamentally dented social democrats’ confidence that Keynesian policies at national level were compatible with globalisation. On the one hand, this coalescence was accelerated by the inability to articulate any coherent alternative to the really existing Europe—so the EU was now

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accepted as a fact, somewhat unhappily and grudgingly (Hanley 2008: 70). On the other hand, many social democrats hoped that economic dirigisme at European level could compensate for the lacunae in their vision. Therefore, many began to embrace a ‘Eurokeynesianism’, which would ‘temper free market policies ex ante via regulation rather than ex post via [national-level] regulation’ (Almeida 2012: 54). Overall, it proved relatively easy to ‘transfer the notion of an interventionist state from the national to the supranational level’ (Ladrech 2003: 125). EUlevel socioeconomic interventionism would nevertheless emphatically not be accompanied by political federalism (Ladrech 2000: 145). The absence of any coherent PES view on political integration has proved consistently problematic, as will be seen. However, this core consensus allowed the rapid consolidation of the PES as a far more relevant actor than the CSPEC. Although there remain significant differences over its scope, there was agreement that it would reduce transaction costs in order to foster more effective and cohesive policy interventions at EU level, i.e. would operate as a ‘value-added meta network’ (Day 2005: 67). Reflecting the social democrats’ statecentrism, there was agreement that the primary purpose of the PES was to translate and aggregate national party priorities. As the PES institutionalised, it developed a limited but fairly effective ‘think-tank’ function, allowed freedom in policy development and a limited amount of ideological co-ordination, so long as it did not infringe national party prerogatives (Hanley 2008: 70). Overall, it was a ‘party of parties’ rather than an integrated, transnational ‘Europarty’ (Moschonas 2004: 130). This remains the case, albeit there has been greater movement towards more transnationalism in the last 15 years because poor electoral results have engendered ‘a time of soul-searching’ (Hertner 2019: 498). In particular, in 2005 the PES introduced the 30,000 strong ‘PES activists’ as an indirect form of individual membership (Hertner 2019). Members of PES member parties are automatically ‘activists’ if they register online and can organise horizontally, e.g. via ‘city groups’. This process has allowed greater member input into PES manifestos and policy discussion, and from 2010 the activists could make proposals direct to the PES Presidency. This resulted in the ‘European Charter for a Committed Social Democracy’, some of which was included in the PES’s 2013 fundamental programme (Hertner 2011‚ 2019). The activists’ network is active and

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has demanded more prerogatives, but its formal powers are weak (activities being coordinated from Brussels by the PES secretariat) and are resisted by some member parties (Gagatek 2009: 40; Hertner 2011). Moreover, the 2015 PES statutes, relative to those of 2009, give more scope to the TNP ‘to contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’ and ‘to lead the European election campaign for our movement with a common strategy and visibility, a common Manifesto and a common candidate to the European Commission Presidency’ (PES 2015: art. 3.4). In 2018, the party belatedly came out in favour of transnational party lists as part of ‘a fully-fledged transnational parliamentary democracy’ (PES 2019b: 5) Nevertheless, in essence the PES remains a predominantly intergovernmentalist organisation, largely limited to a think-tank and network-party function—the ‘spider in the web’ of broader EU relationships as Lightfoot describes it (Lightfoot 2005: 43). For instance, the 2015 statutes stress that the PES’ main roles include ‘support[ing] each other to win national, regional and local elections’, ‘provid[ing] a platform for member parties and organisations’ and ‘develop[ing] close working relationships between its member parties and organisations’. Whereas previous explicit restrictions on the role of the PES vis-à-vis member parties have now disappeared, these statutes still describe a TNP not conceived in any way as separate from those member parties. The PES’ ‘think-tank’ function is evident in the number of policy initiatives developed by its secretariat (such as an ‘Initiative on energy and climate change’ and a ‘European Employment and Social Progress Pact for fair growth’) and this function is one that constituent parties consider extremely useful. Moreover, the PES can be regarded as ‘Europeanising’ the social democrats, by helping coordinate their activity at European level and by further mellowing opposition towards Europe (Ladrech 2000). However, there have still been significant differences of view over its role. Parties like UK Labour have invested little in the PES, seeing it mainly as a ‘networking arrangement’ (Hanley 2008: 74). Since the 2000s, Labour has gradually withdrawn from the PES. Conversely, the Belgian and Dutch Socialists have supported a more federal structure, while the French PS and German SPD wish to consolidate and develop the organisation, without it becoming a super-party. In terms of producing a coherent integrative agenda prior to the Great Recession, the PES is seen as playing a critical role in getting the Employment Chapter inserted into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and developing

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the 1999 European Employment Pact, although it had less visible influence thereafter, particularly over the Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Convention for the Future of Europe (2001–2003), which drew up the first EU draft Constitution (Lightfoot 2005). Nevertheless, there have been clear limits. The first EP manifesto to which all PES members signed up was achieved only in 1999, although far from all parties actually used it in their campaigns (Almeida 2012: 49). Even in the 2009 EP elections, while parties such as the French PS adopted the PES manifesto entirely, others like the German SPD barely referenced it and UK Labour ignored it altogether (Hertner 2011). Moreover, the wider European context has vitiated many achievements of the EU ‘party system’, and demonstrated the predominance of the national over the supranational. In particular, the so-called social democratic moment in 1997–2002 (Ladrech 2013: 88) was the zenith of post-Cold War European social democratic influence when PES parties held office in thirteen of the then-fifteen EU member states. Europarties ‘matter (more) when they are in numerical ascendance’ (Johansson 2015: 8), and this should have been the period of the PES mattering most. But, aside from the above-noted Employment achievements, a unity of purpose was conspicuously absent. Social democrats were split between traditional Eurokeynesianism (as espoused by the French PS) and the new ‘Third Way’ politics that was much more supportive of neoliberalism, globalisation and EU integration (Therborn 2000). So ascendance was squandered, and the social democratic agenda fractured further over key events like the Iraq War, with PES member parties in both the proand anti-camps. In parallel, the PES began to lose the numbers game; in 1999, it lost first party status in the EP to the EPP, followed by a secular electoral decline (Table 5.1). In sum, the context for the PES prior to the Great Recession was inauspicious. The TNP operated largely according to a minimalist, intergovernmentalist logic. The PES neither aspired to, nor, given its internal divisions, could realistically achieve, any greater integrative impulse that might address or offset the decline of many of its national-level components. Indeed, its declining numerical strength indicates that the PES was (and is) a symptom of the crisis of social democracy rather than a remedy for it.

27.6 113/410 1st

1979 SOC

30.0 130/434 1st

1984 SOC 34.7 180/536 1st

1989 SOC 34.3 215/626 1st

1994 PES 28.8 180/626 2nd

1999 PES

Centre-left European parliamentary results 1979–2019

27.6 217/785 2nd

2004 PES

25.3 189/766 2nd

2009 PES

25.3 190/751 2nd

2014 S&D

20.4 154/751 2nd

2019 S&D

Source www.parties-and-elections.eu Key SOC: Socialist Group; PES: Group of Party of European Socialists (1994–2004), Socialist Group in the European Parliament (2004–2009); S&D: Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

Seats (%) Seats (n) Position

Table 5.1

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Policy: The Emergence of a New Anti-austerity Agenda? However, the Great Recession promised that out of the jaws of heavy defeats there might come an unlikely victory. On the one hand, historically heavy defeats for the former behemoths of the European centre-left such as the SPD and UK Labour reinforced views that social democracy was in near-terminal decline (Lavelle 2008). On the other, such defeats definitively ended the ‘Third Way’ period in social democracy and offered the prospect of new policy renewal by re-engaging with social democrats’ traditional electorate and values and by (re)discovering critiques of capitalism. Table 5.2 shows how the PES’ main policy priorities evolved in the 2009, 2014 and 2019 EP elections. It is not easy to compare these three manifestos like-for-like, in particular because of a difference in length and detail—the 2009 manifesto being much more developed in both respects than the latter two. This is a clear symbol of a return to a ‘lowest common-denominator’ policymaking that has typically plagued the PES (Lightfoot 2003). Given that the more developed 2009 manifesto was barely adopted by many member parties, the PES has apparently preferred to make fewer and less detailed commitments. Table 5.2 makes this clear: generally, the 2009 manifesto articulates the most detailed policies, only some of which reappear in the latter two manifestos, and usually in briefer or vaguer formulation. That said, the policy drift of the manifestos is consistent enough, reflecting a Eurokeynesianism positing stronger progressive regulation to effect a ‘Social Europe’ via increased market intervention, investment in skills and training for the vulnerable (especially the young) and protection of the welfare state and social rights. Reflecting the PES’ reluctant transnationalism, it professes commitment to a (broad-brush) progressive Europeanism (e.g. ‘Europe a beacon of democracy, peace and stability’), but its policies are largely focussed on economic and social rights and offer little in the way of political vision, let alone specific policies addressed at reform of the EU institutions. Also consistent in all three manifestos is an emphasis on environmental policies and sustainable development, gender equality and measures against trafficking and (particularly gendered) domestic violence, the need for managed but fair migration, a common EU defence policy and a global EU focus on development goals.

2014

PES policy priorities, 2009–2019 EP elections 2019

Economics Social (market) economy focused on growth and jobs Fundamental reform/regulation of markets/banking system Banking Union to protect citizens and give equal access to credit Measures against tax avoidance/tax havens (Youth) employment/education emphasis. Youth Guarantee to reduce youth unemployment (2014/9) European Central Bank to focus on Eurozone reform; European fiscal rules growth and employment to foster sustainable growth and employment Financial transaction tax Common European approach to fair taxation Sustainable budgets and managing public debt Limits on executive/bankers’ pay/bonuses European Independent Credit Rating Agency Skills and training focus via EU budget; European Investment bank (2009) Completion of EU internal market Social policy

2009

Table 5.2

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Social Union; affordable education, housing, healthcare, childcare and elderly care

‘New Social Europe’/European Social Progress Pact: improved social, health and education policies

Social Contract/Europe of Equality and Fairness: inequality addressed via European complementary unemployment insurance mechanism, European Labour Authority empowered to combat social dumping and ensure fair labour mobility

2019

(continued)

Decent minimum wages Strengthening citizens’ rights, especially those of workers, consumers, children and the elderly Anti-discrimination legislation Supporting gender equality; European Women’s Rights Charter (2009) EU Gender Equality Strategy Increased parental rights and leave Measures against trafficking and domestic violence Strengthening welfare systems via fair tax Social Action Plan; EU Pillar of Social policies Rights turned into binding rules that strengthen welfare systems, respect labour market models and improve living standards Universal access to public services Universal rights to education, healthcare, and decent pensions Fair work-life balance Gender-equal work-life balance

2014

2009

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(continued) 2014

Support for developing countries to fight climate change CAP reform European Common Energy Policy based on sustainability, energy security and independence EU internal policy

Investment in ‘smart green growth’, environmental transport and clean energy

Project Bonds to finance investments in the green economy, renewable energy and technology

Measures to regulate legal and combat illegal immigration Freedom of movement Environmental policy Sustainable development; EU to achieve global 30% cut in emissions by 2020

2009

Table 5.2

CAP reform Sustainable Development Pact with social and ecological targets

Implementing UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda by 2030; European emissions tax Investment Plan to prepare industries and workers for green transition, the digital revolution and the growth of AI; supporting R&D in environment via industrial strategy Leading on climate change

Fair management of migration and asylum

2019

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Gender-equal EP and EU Council; Commissioner for Gender Equality International policy Attaining Millennium development goals Fair trade and poverty reduction Reforming decision-making in IMF, World Bank, UN International disarmament EU enlargement to Western Balkans, support for Eastern Partnership Supporting developing countries within WTO (increasing overseas development aid) Strengthening EU foreign policy, Global player in promoting peace, particularly in conflict democracy and shared prosperity resolution/prevention

Greater role for EP’s legislative, budgetary and control powers Supporting election of head of European Commission

Democratic control of EU economic and fiscal policies via national parliaments

Progressive Europe; more active co-operation in financial crisis and managing globalisation Regions and local authorities to have greater role in EU affairs

Strengthening transparency of EU institutions; regulating lobbying

2014

2009

(continued)

Europe a beacon of democracy, peace and stability

Reform of UN

Strengthen Europe’s Unity while respecting its diversity; European Union must better serve its people Defending and improving EU democracy; empowering citizen participation from local to the European level

2019

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(continued) 2014

Sources PES (2009, 2014, 2019a)

European common defence (in partnership with NATO 2009/19) Cooperation against organised and cross-border crime/Terrorism

2009

Table 5.2

Defence of democracy, civil-society groups, free media; against ‘Fake News’ Binding social and environmental standards, human rights, consumer protection and workers’ rights in all future trade agreements

2019

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The manifestos do have different emphases. The 2009 one has a markedly confrontational tone with increased criticism of the ‘conservative’ EPP for its inability to address the economic crisis (Gagatek 2009: 49–50). The 2014 manifesto downplays this tone (no doubt because it was singularly ineffective and social democrats’ crisis records proved little better); it focusses on managing the public debt crisis, with specific methods to avoid its repetition and provide effective regulation of the market (the Financial Transaction Tax being most notable here). It is the only manifesto to propose specific democratic reforms to the EU (e.g. increasing both EP prerogatives and, perhaps paradoxically, those of national parliaments over the EU, especially its budgetary and economic policies). The 2019 manifesto loses a lot of the previous manifestos’ focus on the post-crisis aftermath (e.g. on limiting bonuses and executive pay), but articulates a more apparently radical left-populist agenda, in terms of more trenchant but vague criticism of the EU (the European Union must better serve its people via a Social Contract, EU democracy must be improved with citizen participation) and more explicit economic interventionism focussed on reducing wealth concentration and inequalities through concerted programmes. To what degree is there a coherent left-wing integrationist agenda at the core? That the PES has over time developed a stronger antineoliberalism, critique of austerity and economic focus on growth and investment rather than cuts is already evident from the above. It might be distilled further by focussing on the specific references to the EU’s economic model in the manifestos (Table 5.3). Indeed, Table 5.3 does show increased criticism of the EU’s economic model for its alleged neoliberalism and the austerity policies promoted by the conservative Right. Whereas no critique at all appeared in 2004, by 2019, the PES was calling for ‘radical change’, an end to austerity and a new economic model altogether. According to Bailey, this amounts to ‘a substantive process of supranational re-social democratisation’ (Bailey 2013: 52), that arguably goes beyond the PES’ previous Eurokeynesianism in tone and substance. Indeed, some argue that this approach could ‘strengthen … the social democratic approach to Europe’; in particular, by allowing the PES to look left to the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups in the EP rather than to rely on a ‘grand coalition’ with the EPP (Holmes and Lightfoot 2013: 96). Indeed, such a grand coalition was decreasingly possible. In 2019, the EPP and S&D groups lost their combined parliamentary majority for the first time ever.

Source PES (2004, 2014, 2019a)

• European elections are … the choice between our vision of a progressive Europe … Or a conservative, regressive Europe in which the future of our countries and people is left in the hands of the market and of forces beyond democratic control • We must promote better cooperation in Europe to manage globalization for the benefit of everyone

• Our vision of the European Union is a community based on the principles of the social market economy and mutual cooperation for the benefit of all

• This crisis marks the end of a conservative era of badly-regulated markets. Conservatives believe in a market society and letting the rich get richer, to the detriment of everyone else. We believe in a social market economy that enables everyone in society to make the most of the opportunities globalization offers

• The global financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the unregulated Market

2009 EP election

The PES’ emergent anti-neoliberalism

2004 EP election

Table 5.3

• The right wing has used neoliberal policies to cut provisions that have helped people bounce back after tough times. We will fight for a Europe that leaves no one behind

• After the end of the Troika missions, another model within the framework of the EU Treaties should be established, which has to be democratic, socially responsible and credible

• Austerity-only policy has harmed our economies and punished those least responsible for causing the crisis

• The right wing has created a Europe of fear and austerity … we have fought for a strong, socially just and democratic Europe

2014 EP election

• Europe needs a change of leadership and policy direction, leaving behind the neoliberal and conservative models of the past, and focusing on quality jobs for its people, a healthy environment, social security and an economic model which addresses inequality and the cost of living • The status quo is not an option. Radical change is required to build a project for the future which all Europeans can believe in • Inequality must be dramatically reduced and the concentration of wealth and property in the hands of a privileged few must stop • A EUROPE OF SOLIDARITY FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW. We will not bow to uncontrolled market forces and we will finally put an end to austerity policies

2019 EP election

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Certainly, the PES’ move leftwards allows further rapprochement with the other left-of-centre groups. As Dunphy and March (2019) show, the PES, EGP and EL manifestos show consensus over basic principles: a socially just, environmentally sustainable economy that invests in public services, with regulation and reform of the financial markets, a focus on poverty reduction, protection for minorities and the disadvantaged and foreign policies that focus on environmental regulation, support for developing countries and conflict resolution. There is basic agreement on the need to reform EU institutions in the interests of greater transparency and popular input (although wide variance on proposed mechanisms), and even a consensus that international economic organisations need reform (again, with significant differences over specific policies). However, there are some equally basic problems on the ideological and policy level, before we even focus on practical issues of cooperation with other party families. As noted above, the PES’ own commitments are nebulous and broad-brush. This may be a reflection that the PES’ increasing internal heterogeneity, particularly East-West divisions post the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, have prevented it having a coherent, coordinated or even adequate policy response to the Great Recession, with the 2014 programme being even a step backwards (Brustier et al. 2014). If that is true of the 2014 manifesto, it is still more true in 2019. More problematically, many have pointed to core problems in the social democrats’ approach to the EU. The PES’ Eurokeynesianism, absent a detailed radical critique of the EU itself, or the proposition of particular political mechanisms that might further its economic aims, fails to outline coherent proposals for how a market interventionist position might be implemented at EU level beyond an exhortation to increase PES representation therein (even as the reality is electoral decline). On the one hand, regulated capitalism requires further economic and political integration that potentially puts social democratic parties at odds with elements of their electorates, and makes it easier for parties simply to mute European issues (Külahci and Lightfoot 2014). On the other hand, the very structure of the EU provides an acute challenge to social democratic parties. As Gerassimos Moschonas shows (2009: 183), the EU’s conservative and neoliberal dynamics undermine three core elements of social democratic identity: ‘(a) the state-oriented culture of social democratic appeal; (b) welfare politics and, therefore, the link with the working class; (c) the broad primacy of politics orientation’. This places a premium

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on transnational cooperation at the very moment the forces required are diminishing. Moreover, although there is much overlap in general ideological proclivities between the PES and the left-of-centre parties there are some very divergent policy emphases. To name just a few, neither the Greens nor the radical left want augmentation of European defence and antiterror capabilities; for the EL (and the associated EP GUE/NGL group), anti-neoliberalism is usually a proxy for anti-capitalism and is manifested in far more trenchant criticism of both the EU’s politico-economic model and the global financial and military architecture (including demands for abolition of NATO). The PES, relative to both the Greens and (especially) the radical left, remains largely Atlanticist and Europhile. In particular, despite the developing misgivings about the economic dimension of EU integration, this hardly translates into demands for fundamental changes to the EU as such.

Practice Makes Imperfect: Anti-austerity Inaction Of course, notwithstanding the evidence of a more coherent left-wing agenda emerging from the PES and the other left-of-centre TNPs, there have been persistent barriers to implementing any such agenda. The most obvious is the electoral decline of the left at European level since 2009, both in aggregate and components (Table 5.1). The PES’ decline in the EP has been continuous, driven by the post-crisis electoral travails of some of its historically largest members (the German SPD, UK Labour, the French Socialist Party and the Italian Democratic Party, to name but a few). But 2019 was a nadir: despite some success stories such as the Portuguese and Spanish Socialists, the Danish Social Democrats and the Labour Party (Netherlands), the S&D group lost a significant share of votes in 17 of 28 EU member states. However, the S&D’s decline has not been offset by consistent increases in votes for either the Greens-EFA or the GUE/NGL. As a result, the left overall now comprises a minority within the EP (37% of seats in 2009–2014 and 36% in 2019–2024). The effect of this weakness is most evident in the PES’ inability to secure the Commission Presidency, which has since 2004 repeatedly gone to the EPP. In 2009, divisions between the PES member parties were primarily to blame for the PES not even offering an alternative to José Manuel Barroso. In 2014 and 2019, the PES supported the Spitzenkandidat process whereby the President was

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chosen by the leading party in the EP, but its electoral weakness meant that its candidates did not have a strong chance of succeeding (although it did secure support for Martin Schulz as EP President in 2012 and David Sassoli in 2019). Whereas its Spitzenkandidat Frans Timmermans was regarded as running a strong campaign in 2019, this primarily benefited the PvdA in his native Netherlands, rather than the PES as a whole, a stark reminder of the national content of EP elections. Moreover, such weakness in the EP is not compensated by strength in national government. At the time of writing (2020), the centre-left is in national office in a minority of EU states (Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden), and then usually as a minority coalition member. Realistically, only significantly greater representation in the EP, combined with a greater share of positions in the European Council via national government representation, might really give the potential for fuller left-wing legislative and executive authority at the EU level. However, the aforementioned failures of the ‘social democratic moment’ in 1997–2002 certainly cast doubt on any such potential, even with better results in future years. Furthermore, within the diminished left forces, the reality is further division rather than consolidation. Within the EP, the left does co-operate in a number of areas, in particular gender, environmental, development, and civil liberties issues (Dunphy and March 2019). However, their cooperation over economic and monetary affairs and employment and social affairs is much less marked, in particular fracturing because the S&D and Greens support ameliorative reforms and labour market flexibility but the GUE/NGL’s anti-capitalist position manifests itself in refusing to support proposals that don’t undertake structural change to the Eurozone and ECB. There have certainly been some attempts to pool resources across the left groups in the wake of the crisis. These include a number of conferences and gatherings focussed on cooperation. The latest is the Progressive Caucus, created in 2016 as ‘a space of dialogue based on confidence-building and open debate [for] analysing differences and building bridges between progressive allies in the European Parliament and across Europe’ (Progressive Caucus 2016). The Caucus has contributed to a number of solidarity events with parties and civil society such as the November 2017 Progressive European Forum in Marseille

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and the March 2018 Progressive Forum in Athens, but its activity has diminished since the 2019 EP elections. More high-level cooperation between left parties was evident in the PES invitation to Demetris Christofias, the Communist President of Cyprus‚ to its pre-Council leaders’ meetings in January and May 2012 in order to discuss common approaches during the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the European Union from June-December 2012 (Cyprus News Agency 2012). Nevertheless, with Christofias losing the Cypriot Presidency in February 2013, the chance of cementing cooperation dissipated. More significant was when the radical left Syriza came to government in Greece in January 2015 on an anti-austerity platform. Whereas PES member parties had led the most stringent austerity programmes in Spain, Portugal and Greece in 2009–2012 (in particular the Greek PASOK, whose vote Syriza largely inherited), by 2015 the antiausterity turn noted above in the PES’ manifestos was also reflected in the rhetoric of leading social democrats nationally. However, the challenge for contemporary social democrats remains to avoid a record of concrete policy outcomes that ‘have tended to be either minimal or … antithetical to the redistributive goals pursued’ (Bailey 2013: 56). The Syriza government was a paradigmatic case. According to the ex-Syriza Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, various prominent social democrats such as the German SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel combined private expressions of solidarity with Syriza with a resolute public loyalty to the austerity agenda of the Troika (Commission, ECB, IMF) (Varoufakis 2017: 217–220). To highlight the paradox, the public face of the Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers was then Jeroen Dijsselbloem from the Labour Party (Netherlands). The momentum of private support and public reprobation ratcheted up the pressure under which Syriza eventually buckled in July 2015, signing up wholesale to the Third Memorandum of even more stringent austerity measures. Syriza’s leader Alexis Tsipras remained a regular invitee to PES pre-Council meetings even after his government lost office in 2019. Yet in the context this was a sign of Syriza adopting the PES agenda rather than vice versa, i.e. a declarative anti-neoliberalism rather than a substantive one.

Conclusion This chapter has focussed on the PES to examine the emergence of a coherent left-wing integrationist agenda at the EU level. It finds the

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evidence wanting. The PES has certainly developed as an increasingly structured TNP and after the Great Recession has both made some small moves towards transnationalism and promulgated a more distinct (if not entirely coherent) vision—a Eurokeynesianism with a more developed anti-austerity and anti-neoliberal tone. This agenda supports the principle of EU integration, but is increasingly critical of the EU’s market-oriented policies, arguing for a pivot towards growth, investment and market interventionism, alongside commitments to social rights, environmentalism and feminism. However, the PES continues to reflect some of the typical weaknesses of a TNP, especially manifestos which tend towards the declarative and sloganistic. They veer towards lowest common denominator positions, and in many cases member parties do not closely adhere to them in national politics. Despite the PES’ supposed think-tank function, it has little aspiration or ability to transcend and mend some of the pivotal problems confronting today’s centre-left. Indeed, these problems are translated from the national to the EU level via the critical weakness of some of the principal member parties which manifests itself in declining numerical representation in the EU institutions and thus declining policy influence overall. The reverse feedback loop, from the EU level to the national, is far weaker; although it allows for some pooling of policies and information sharing, it cannot, by itself, address the crisis of social democracy rooted in national electorates. Indeed this is the crux of the PES’ problem—despite greater policy substance, this remains weak, and it is emerging at the same time as the instruments to translate such policy into action are decreasing. Even if those instruments (primarily through rebound in the performance of key national parties) were available, the PES would still need to confront the issue of whether a left-wing integrationist agenda is possible at all through the institutions of today’s EU.

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Attinà, F. (1998). Party Fragmentation and Discontinuity in the European Union. In D. S. Bell & C. Lord (Eds.), Transnational Parties in the European Union (pp. 10–27). Aldershot: Ashgate. Bailey, D. J. (2013). European Democracy after Social Democracy. In E. Stetter, K. Duffek, & A. Skrzypek (Eds.), In the Name of Political Union—Europarties on the Rise (pp. 44–61). Warsaw: FEPS. Bardi, L. (2004, April). European Political Parties: A (Timidly) Rising Actor in the EU Political System. The International Spectator, 39, 17–30. https://doi. org/10.1080/03932720408457069. Bartolini, S. (2005). Restructuring Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/view/10. 1093/0199286434.001.0001/acprof-9780199286430. Brustier, G., Deloy, C., & Escalona, F. (2014). Political Families in the European Elections May 2014: An Assessment (Policy Paper). Brussels: Fondation Robert Schuman. Cyprus News Agency. (2012, January 30). Cyprus News Agency: News in English. HR-Net (Hellenic Resources Network). http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/ cna/2012/12-01-30_3.cna.html. Daniels, P. (1998). From Hostility to “Constructive Engagement”: The Europeanisation of the Labour Party. West European Politics, 21(1), 72–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389808425233. Day, S. (2005). Developing a Conceptual Understanding of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties (with a Specific Focus on the Party of European Socialists). Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 13(1), 59–77. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14782800500061112. Dunphy, R., & March, L. (2019). The European Left Party. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Featherstone, K. (1988). Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gagatek, W. (2009). European Political Parties as Campaign Toward a Greater Politicization of the European Parliament Elections. Brussels: Centre for European Studies. Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hanley, D. (2008). Beyond the Nation State: Parties in the Era of European Integration (Illustrated edition). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hertner, I. (2011). Are European Election Campaigns Europeanized? The Case of the Party of European Socialists in 2009. Government and Opposition, 46(3), 321–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01341.x. Hertner, I. (2019). United in Diversity? Europarties and Their Individual Members’ Rights. Journal of European Integration, 41(4), 487–505. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1513500.

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Lindberg, L. N., & Scheingold, S. A. (Eds.). (1971). Regional Integration: Theory and Research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moschonas, G. (2004). The Party of European Socialists: The Difficult “construction” of a European Player. In P. Delwit, E. Kulahci, & C. Van Walle (Eds.), The Europarties: Organisation and Influence (pp. 113–134). Brussels: ULB. Moschonas, G. (2009). Reformism in a “Conservative” System: The European Union and Social Democratic Identity. In J. Callaghan, N. Fishman, B. Jackson, & Martin Mcivor (Eds.), In Search of Social Democracy: Responses to Crisis and Modernisation (pp. 168–192) Manchester: Manchester University Press. https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/978152 6125095/9781526125095.00016.xml. Newman, M. (1996). Party of European Socialists. London Metropolitan University. PES. (2004). Growing Stronger Together: Five Commitments for the next Five Years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament Elections. Party of European Socialists. http://www.pes.eu/en/ about-pes/pes-documents. PES. (2009). People First: A New Direction for Europe. PES Manifesto European Elections 2009. Party of European Socialists. http://www.pes.eu/en/aboutpes/pes-documents. PES. (2010). PES Activists Initiative: Adopted by the PES Presidency 4th February 2010. Party of European Socialists. http://www.pes.eu/en/about-pes/pesdocuments. PES. (2014). Towards a New Europe: PES Manifesto European Parliament Elections 22–25 May 2014. Party of European Socialists. https://www.pes. eu/export/sites/default/Downloads/PES-Documents/110001306_PES_ Manifesto_UK.pdf_2063069299.pdf. PES. (2015). PES Statutes Adopted by the 10th PES Congress on 12th June 2015. Party of European Socialists. https://www.pes.eu/en/about-us/documents/. PES. (2019a). A New Social Contract for Europe: PES Manifesto 2019. Party of European Socialists. https://www.pes.eu/en/manifesto2019/index.html. PES. (2019b). For a Stronger Democracy in Europe, Congress Resolution. Party of European Socialists. https://www.pes.eu/en/pes-documents/index.html. Progressive Caucus. (2016). About. Progressive CAUCUS. http://www.progre ssivecaucus.eu/. Sassoon, D. (2010). One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century. London: I.B. Tauris. Sassoon, D. (2011). A Response to David Miliband’s Lecture by Donald Sassoon. The Political Quarterly, 82(2), 138–139. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467923X.2011.02204.x.

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Therborn, G. (2000). Social Democracy in One Country? Dissent Magazine. http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1438. van Hecke, S. (2006). On the Road Towards Transnational Parties in Europe: Why and How the European People’s Party Was Founded. European View, 2(1), 153–160. van Hecke, S. (2017). Reconnecting European Political Parties with EU Citizens. Brussels: Office of International IDEA to the European Union. Varoufakis, Y. (2017). Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment. London: Bodley Head. von dem Berg, B., & Poguntke, T. (2011). The Influence of Europarties on Their Central and Eastern European Partner Parties: A Theoretical and Analytical Model. Maastricht: Maastricht University.

PART II

The Campaigns

CHAPTER 6

Germany and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Matthias Scantamburlo and Ed Turner

Introduction A founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and its forerunners, Germany has traditionally been a strong supporter of closer European integration. Since the Second World War, the (West) German political class has regarded European integration as a means of securing peace and prosperity in Western Europe (a commitment which continued beyond reunification in 1990). Yet much of this has been an elite-driven endeavour, and the so called ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Reif 1993) on European integration in Germany has been as prevalent as elsewhere in the societies of the EEC’s founding members. For a long time, public support for European integration was higher than in most other Western European countries, but it has declined significantly since the mid-1980s. While erosion of popular support for the advancement of European integration has created the potential for

M. Scantamburlo (B) · E. Turner Aston University, Birmingham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_6

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Eurosceptic mobilization, the elite consensus has lasted longer than in other countries (Busch and Knelangen 2004; Poguntke 2007). On the supply side, attempts to question European integration in national political debate have been rare, and they have usually been met by widespread rejection by the vast majority of established German politicians. Commitment to closer integration, as part of the mission to secure peace and prosperity, has been shared by Germany’s Social Democrats (SPD) with its Christian Democratic counterparts. Indeed, for a long time the German party system largely lacked European-policy concepts that could be assigned to political parties or which differed in content. As Müller (2011: 89) put it some years ago, in Germany ‘Euroscepticism as a principled suspicion of integration (and as a set of nationalist feelings) remains almost a political taboo’. While the German Greens were sceptical about the democratic credentials of the EU in their early years, they have never questioned the desirability of European integration as such— while the Left Party is largely united in its principled support for the idea of European integration even though the party remains sceptical about the way the EU is currently run (Pehle 2018). Similarly, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, although the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) has sometimes struck a slightly more Eurosceptic note, this has related to a desire for greater subsidiarity and power for sub-national entities, rather than challenging the integration project itself (Schöfbeck 2010; Vampa and Scantamburlo 2020). Notwithstanding the cross-party consensus on the broad thrust of European integration, the SPD has often emphasised particular affinity with the notion of a ‘Social Europe’. In 1979, Helmut Schmidt, the then Chancellor, gave a speech (cf. Werner 2019) which might be seen as a forerunner of that motif, later picked up by European Commission President, Jacques Delors. He called for “all of Europe to go down the path of social justice”. He said, “We don’t want a dictatorship of the rich, of money, of the ruthless, nor do we want a dictatorship of a communist party”, adding: “we want a Europe of solidarity, where we help each other, and where countries help each other”. In recent years, and especially since the economic crisis of 2008, the European integration process has emerged more clearly as a line of conflict in the national party system. This is partly linked to the rise of the right-wing populist, Alternative for Germany (AfD). At the time of its foundation in 2013, the party’s main focus was on rejecting the European Monetary System and calling for its dissolution (especially in

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the light of German participation in bailouts of Greece, which were highly contentious politically). The AfD has subsequently pivoted in its emphasis: with the refugee crisis of 2015, it has shifted to the right, and placed greater emphasis on such issues as reducing the number of refugees in Germany and rejecting its ‘Islamification’. It has retained its criticism of the Euro, but this has receded into the background. Yet, according to Alonso (2014) the favourable European positions of all the major German parties had already started to turn less pro-European shortly after 1998, becoming increasingly less pro-European with each election. The SPD was no exception in this regard. While the pro-European stance grew between 1990 and 2002, from 2005 onwards the SPD positioned itself at, by its own standards, historically lower levels of support for European integration (Alonso 2014). These positional changes reflect the SPD’s European dilemma since the 2008 economic crisis. While it has remained nominally supportive of a Social Europe, in practice it has lost its distinctive orientation, and instead adopted a position of broad consensus with the CDU. As Hacker (2015: 49), put it: ‘With the 2010 crisis of the Euro, and in spite of the party being in opposition to the CDU-CSU/FDP federal government [from 2009 to 2013], the SPD’s trust in a progressive European policy declined. […] The SPD strongly criticised Merkel’s course of muddling through. But it did not put forward its own programmatic aims, instead supporting most government initiatives on the Eurozone crisis in the national interest’. He concludes that the SPD was ‘caught out’ by the Eurozone crisis; and while there remained rhetorical support for its distinctive positions (i.e. commitment to a Social Europe) in practice these played no role. In 2018, one of the authors attended a private seminar with a leading SPD politician: he was at pains to stress that southern European countries needed to ‘do their homework’, and practice fiscal consolidation and engage in structural reform: an agenda that would be largely indistinguishable from that of the CDU/CSU. Similarly, the SPD, since taking over the Federal Finance Ministry under Olaf Scholz in 2018, has not fundamentally changed course on Eurozone integration, emphasising risk reduction over risk sharing. The decisions of the SPD in this area are not simply the result of indecisiveness on the part of its leadership; they reflect the party’s wider dilemmas. Until the early 2000s, the SPD was also one of the most electorally successful social democratic parties in Europe. Indeed, it used consistently to win more than one third of the vote in national elections.

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Socialist parties in two other major Western European countries, Italy and France, never managed to achieve similar results. Yet the electoral fortunes of the party after the end of the government led by Gerhard Schröder, the last social democratic chancellor of Germany, changed dramatically. As shown in Fig. 6.1, since 2005 the SPD has not managed to win more than 30% of the vote and collapsed to a disastrous 20.5% (an alltime low) in the last federal election of 2017. The Schröder governments sought to establish economic credibility (notably with a package of welfare retrenchment, known as the Hartz reforms), but in so doing alienated some previous supporters: we might argue that this reflects the ‘Political Economic Dilemma’ set out by Herbert Kitschelt a decade earlier (cf. Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Turner 2018). In European policy, it detected that public opinion was hostile towards a pivot towards a ‘transfer union’, and that real support for a ‘Social Europe’ would rub up against German taxpayers’ unwillingness to offer extra support to what they considered an unreformed and uncompetitive Greek economy. In doing so, however, it ended up with an agenda that looked rather indistinguishable, at least at the level of vision and ambition, from that of the CDU/CSU, especially on questions of fiscal policy. This chapter explores the extent to which the SPD dealt with its electoral decline in the run-up to the 2019 elections through an increased 50 45 40 35 30

40.8

42.9

40.9 38.2 37.4

37

37.3

38.5

36.4 33.5

34.2

32.2

25.7

30.7

25 20

27.3

23 20.5 21.5

20.8

15 10 5 0

Fig. 6.1 Share of the vote won by the SPD 1979–2017 (European and Federal elections) (Source Bundeswahlleiter)

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emphasis upon calls for a more integrated, ‘Social Europe’ as opposed to an emphasis on the more ‘traditional’, domestically-focused, issues. Has the SPD sought to reassert control over the conditions of opinion formation through a renewed emphasis on integration in opposition to their populist and Eurosceptical adversaries? How well has the SPD coped with the internal and external, institutional and political obstacles standing in the way of such an agenda? We conclude that while the SPD attempted to distance itself from populist and Eurosceptic adversaries, its wider strategic problems and the strength of competition, specifically from the Green Party, on the centre left, meant that its messages failed to cut through, with, for the party, truly disastrous results.

2019 European Election Results The European elections of 2019 took place at a time of crisis for the SPD. After its record low in the 2017 federal election (and following a modest recovery a few weeks later in Lower Saxony), it then appeared to be on a downward spiral. The state election in Bavaria in October 2018 saw its already modest vote share fall by over 10%; in Hesse, where it had governed for much of the post-war period, the same thing happened two weeks later. Throughout the early months of 2019, the SPD hovered around the 15% mark in national opinion polls. The CDU/CSU was also under pressure: Angela Merkel had stepped down as party leader (announcing that she would not seek another term as Chancellor) following the Hesse election, and new party leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, was under pressure to turn the CDU’s fortunes around. The upshot was that there was quite a lot of public interest in the election result and what it would mean for the governing parties, but not necessarily great interest in what it would mean for the European Parliament per se (though the rise of the AfD was the subject of some discussion in the context of increasing levels of right-wing populism throughout Europe). One other important point of context for the SPD was that, back in 2014, it had a ‘bonus’ from the position of Martin Schulz as the Spitzenkandidat (lead candidate) for social democrats throughout Europe. This gave Schulz extra prominence during the campaign; helped provide some focus on European issues, and perhaps gave a sense that voting for the SPD would raise Germany’s profile in European decisionmaking. In 2019, that was no longer the case; instead, the CDU and especially the CSU might have been expected to derive some advantage

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from Manfred Weber (of the CSU) being the European People’s Party (EPP) Spitzenkandidat, although his profile was rather lower than that of Schulz five years previously. The results of the 2019 European election in Germany are presented in Table 6.1. Compared to 2014, electoral turnout increased substantially and reached 61.4%, which is an increase of 13.3 percentage points and represents the highest electoral turnout since the 1990s. It seems indeed to be the case that the increased public interest and the politicisation around increasing levels of right-wing populism helped mobilise citizens to cast a ballot. Still, significantly fewer people participated than in the last federal election of 2017 (76.2%), a typical pattern observed in the case of second-order elections (Giebler 2019; Reif and Schmitt 1980). The Greens, who almost doubled their vote and seat shares, were the only clear winners of the election. In large part this was clearly driven by the increased salience of the party’s core issues: the exit poll conducted by Infratest Dimap found that for 48% of voters climate and environmental policy was important in deciding who to vote for (up 28% on the 2014 election), while 56% of voters thought the Greens had the best policies in this area (14% CDU/CSU, 5% SPD) (Tagesschau 2019). However, the party has also managed to become generally more attractive for (socioeconomically) centrist voters and, in comparison to other German parties it has in recent years been able to convey an impression of relative internal unity (Giebler 2019). The AfD, the CSU and the FDP are also among the parties that increased their vote share compared to 2014; however, they have lost support since the previous federal election. The AfD in particular, which in 2014 highly mobilised the Eurosceptic vote, did not reap the rewards from the growth in importance of migration issues and its pivot towards a focus on them (Giebler 2019). This, of course, matched the fact that right-wing populist parties did not surge at the elections across the EU in the way that had been expected. The parties that suffered the largest electoral losses were the traditional governing parties, the CDU and the SPD. While it is quite common that government parties lose support in second-order electoral contests, and that such losses are especially high at the mid-term (Reif and Schmitt 1980), the two parties’ results go beyond just short-term punishment and confirm a progressive decline in their support. Their combined vote share at the 2017 Federal Election was, at 53.4%, by far the lowest since the Second World War, and opinion polls at the time of the European election pointed to further slippage.

EPP G-EFA S&D EFD EPP GUE-NGL ALDE G-EFA/NI ALDE Other G-EFA ECR Other G-EFA

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Alliance 90/The Greens (Greens) Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) Alternative for Germany (AfD) Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) The Left (Die Linke) Free Democratic Party (FDP) The Party Free Voters (FW) Human Environment Animal Protection Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP) Family Party of Germany Volt Pirate Party Germany Other Total Voter turnout

Source Bundeswahlleiter

EP Group 8,438,975 7,677,071 5,916,882 4,104,453 2,355,067 2,056,049 2,028,594 899,079 806,703 542,226 369,869 273,828 249,098 243,302 1,435,693 37,396,889 37,807,746

Votes 22.6 20.5 15.8 11.0 6.3 5.5 5.4 2.4 2.2 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 3.8 100 61.4

Votes %

Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections in Germany

Party

Table 6.1

96

23 21 16 11 6 5 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

Seats

−6 +10 −11 +4 +1 −2 +2 +1 +1

−7.5 +9.8 −11.4 +3.9 +1.0 −1.9 +2.1 +1.8 +0.7 +0.2 +0.4 +0.0 −0.8

Seats +/−

Votes +/−

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A major exit poll (Tagesschau 2019) gives some indication of the reasons for the SPD’s failure. Its scores amongst younger voters were especially poor: 8% amongst those aged 18–24; 10% amongst those aged 25–34; 11% amongst those aged 35–44. It was held to be competent in the area of social justice policy by 29% of voters (a decline on 2014, when 41% of voters found it so). But in every other area of polling it had miserable figures: for instance, just 7% of voters found that the SPD had ‘the best answers to questions of the future’ (18% CDU, 17% Greens), and on the important issue of climate policy, just 5% of voters found the SPD to be the best party. On the question of which party would best represent German interests in the EU, it came way behind the CDU (47% CDU, 17% SPD); the same is true of economic competence (47% CDU, 12% SPD). The same pollster asked voters in the European elections about certain statements concerning the SPD. Perhaps this is a rather leading way of asking survey questions, but nonetheless it is noteworthy that 62% said they did not know what the SPD stood for; 56% thought it should leave the grand coalition with the CDU/CSU; 55% thought it had given up its social democratic principles, while just 15% thought its modernisation was coming on well under the leadership of Andrea Nahles. In the end, the result cost Nahles her job: just a few days after the election, she attempted to go on the front foot and bring forward her re-election as leader of the SPD’s group in the German parliament, the Bundestag. She realised she lacked sufficient support and resigned both as party leader and SPD leader in the Bundestag on 2 June. It would be wrong to characterise the SPD’s failings at this election as being exclusively related to European political issues; indeed, by resigning in the aftermath, this was something recognised by the party’s leader, in effect acknowledging the party’s wider political failings. Nonetheless, miserable poll ratings across a wide range of issues, from climate policy to immigration, from economic policy to representing Germany’s interests in the EU, showed that the party’s political agenda in the elections had dramatically failed to capture the public’s imagination.

Europe and the EU in the Election Manifesto To evaluate the SPD’s 2019 European election campaign and consider the emphasis on European issues, it is worth considering the political changes brought about by the emergence of challenger parties and the politicization of Europe following the Great Recession. The political space that

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followed the 2007 outbreak of the economic crisis was constituted by two ‘overlapping conflicts’: the conflict with the domestic – national – elites and the conflict with the European—EU—elites, each one having in turn a political and an economic component (Hutter et al. 2018; Scantamburlo et al. 2018). The conflict with European elites is based on the EU’s management of the financial crisis and the EU’s democratic deficit. The concrete manifestation of these issues, however, may differ across countries. In Southern Europe, it is mainly about ending the Troika-imposed austerity and its conditions; in Germany, for some voters the failure of the EU was about a failure to control the refugee crisis, and to impose necessary fiscal discipline upon countries in Southern Europe, both of which they viewed as being to the disadvantage of the German taxpayer. In order to capture this conflict empirically we use a methodology similar to the one adopted by Tarditi and Vittori (2020) analysing the SPD’s manifesto along four broad headings: (A) Political Integration, (B) European Democracy, (C) Social Europe, and (D) Economic Integration. The unit of analysis is the paragraph, which is firstly coded as 1 if it tackles one of these issues or as 0 if it refers to other ones, and secondly split into positive, negative, or neutral directions. Positive paragraphs refer to the promotion of further integration at the EU level for a given policy; in this sense, all the proposed reforms aimed at modifying the status quo at the EU level are coded as positive, even when a party criticizes the status quo. On the other hand, a paragraph is coded as negative when the party criticizes the status quo without promoting a supranational solution or when the criticism is coupled with a call for retrenchment of EU competencies in each policy. In neutral paragraphs, there are no positive or negative comments. The overwhelming majority of the references in both the 2014 and 2019 SPD manifestos frame both political and economic integration positively (cf. SPD 2014, 2019a). While in 2014 there are a few critical references to the status quo and the desire for more subsidiarity, the 2019 manifesto contains no negative references. It mostly refers to supranational solutions in the identified categories. What can be observed between the two elections is the increasing weight of references concerning the political realm, i.e. Political Integration or European Democracy, compared to the social and economic categories, which increased from 35% in 2014 to 47% in 2019 within all positively coded paragraphs. On the individual categories, the greatest increase is in European Democracy (from 25 to 30%) whereas the largest decrease is in Social

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Europe (from 38 to 29%). So there was a modest increase in emphasis on European democracy (perhaps to defend the project from populist, Eurosceptic attack), and a slight decline in emphasis on Social Europe, but both elements remained prominent. In its substance, the SPD’s 2019 manifesto (cf. SPD 2019a) gave a relatively orthodox account of what a deeper, more social Europe should look like. In terms of deepening, it called for qualified majority voting on foreign policy, and a European seat on the UN Security Council. On democracy, it wanted more powers for the European Parliament, and transnational party lists at European elections. On Social Europe, it wanted a binding European social agenda; a European youth plan including a minimum training allowance, and a European fund to help finance social benefits. On the economy, it demanded a Eurozone budget, a European minimum tax rate, and minimum global taxation of digital companies. It might be said that, while worthy, these recommendations were not especially persuasive against the backdrop of the grand coalition’s record (where the Finance Ministry, under Olaf Scholz, had not really shifted the previous German position, for instance in being highly sceptical of Eurozone budgets), and, as the exit poll cited above showed, it simply failed to persuade the voters. Social justice concerns were not at the top of their minds and, even where it was a concern, the SPD was not perceived as being very strong. On some of the (in the eyes of the electorate) bigger issues (such as climate change), the SPD’s manifesto did not persuade concerned voters at all.

Europe and the EU in the Party’s Communication As in the analysis of the party’s European election manifesto, we have identified these dimensions in the party’s and the party leader’s online communication. We have done so by coding the SPD’s Facebook postings (cf. SPD 2019b) during the last month before the 2019 European election. With the hashtag #EuropaistdieAntwort (#EuropeistheAnswer), which was also the party’s main electoral slogan, the SPD makes reference to Europe in 52 of its 72 postings, i.e. 72%. The others concern mainly the regional elections in Bremen (which took place on the same day) or other political events. In its more concise social network campaign, again there are no negative references to the EU as all posts refer to further integration or political solutions at the supranational level. Contrary to

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the European election manifesto, however, in its social network communication the SPD gives more salience to the economic dimension of Europe. 18 postings (25%) refer to Social Europe and 10 (14%) to greater European economic integration. The political dimension of Europe is addressed in 8 postings (11%). With only 3 references, the space given to climate change is relatively small. The social network campaign of the SPD begins with the identification of its main electoral competitor. In the initial posts, Katarina Barley (the SPD’s lead candidate, who stepped down from her role as Federal Justice Minister to take on the candidacy) makes clear that the SPD’s main political competitors in the 2019 European elections were the European conservatives: ‘I don’t want another coalition with the EPP. We as social democrats will do everything for a majority against the EPP, so that we can forge an alliance for social rights’ (SPD 2019b). Underpinning this focus is the claim that conservatives and their austerity policies are the main driver of the rise of right-wing populism. According to SPD General Secretary, Lars Klingbeil, after 15 years of conservative hegemony the EU has suffered increasing divisions, which has led to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Therefore, only a change of course can bring a Europe of increasing social cohesion: ‘Our main competitor in this campaign is the Union [CDU]. The conservatives only want to administer Europe. We want to create a Europe of social cohesion’ (SPD 2019b). This shows a juxtaposition of different visions of (European) democracy between the Right and the Left—a liberal Europe, where politics is subordinated to the market, versus a social-democratic Europe, where politics is supposed to regulate it. Indeed, the main framing of Europe in the SPD’s social network campaign is a unified economic and political space, which on the one hand ensures peace and freedom of movement, but where, on the other hand, social rights should have prominence over economic freedom: For us, Europe means: peace and freedom. A united Europe ensures peace. We can move freely without barriers at the borders. We can work and learn wherever we want. No generation before us has ever had this opportunity. But we also know that markets need clear rules and social balance. That is why we call for a European progress clause and say: The basic economic freedoms of the internal market must not take precedence over social rights. We want a Europe of social balance and good working conditions. (SPD 2019b)

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Within this framing, concrete policies concerning Social Europe are the demands for a European minimum wage; European regulations for increasing co-determination for employees; equal wages for women and men, and real prospects for Europe’s youth with more education and work. In short, the SPD called for a European Union against ‘social dumping’ and for good working conditions. The main pillar of economic integration, which should help to finance all this, is a European minimum tax: ‘Every café, every bookstore, every retailer pays taxes—Starbucks, Amazon and Co do not, despite billions in profits. That must be the end’. The political dimension of Europe on the contrary refers entirely to freedom and democracy against tendencies of re-nationalisation forwarded by right-wing populist parties. The SPD uses Germany’s past experience of Nazi dictatorship and the GDR to reiterate the importance of peace and free elections, which are consolidated through the European project and should not be taken for granted. Party leader Andrea Nahles spoke about Europe in 6 of her 11 Facebook posts during this period. She also focused entirely on freedom and democracy and the populist threat to the EU. While she clearly positions the SPD against an unravelling of European integration, she used the corruption scandal in Austria1 to emphasise that right-wing populist parties are part and parcel of the corrupt elite against which they are mobilising the electorate. For her, only a social Europe was the answer to the increasing threat of the radical right: #EuropeForAll is not a Europe of the nation-states in which everyone fights against everyone. We already had that; the result is known. A Europe for all is a social Europe that holds together. Especially against the right. That’s what we stand for in the election. (SPD 2019b)

Concerning Social Europe, Nahles refers to workers who have been left behind in 15 years of conservative leadership at the head of the European Commission and the Council. Citizens should once again perceive Europe as a place to strive for a better future for themselves and their children. This should be tackled by more economic planning, e.g. a longterm investment plan for work and innovation. Investment in research,

1 The ‘Ibiza scandal’, in which leading figures in the right-wing populist Freedom Party were exposed talking about corrupt practices in which they might engage.

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training and secure jobs must be reflected in the coming multi-year financial framework. She argued for minimum wages across Europe. ‘We are fighting for a social Europe in which the countries do not undercut each other in terms of wages but pull together. It is a Europe for the people’. We conducted some interviews with SPD officials, and included questions on the European election campaign. Overall, they were extremely critical: for one (a leading figure in the SPD’s business wing at Land level), “the European election campaign was the absolute low point”, and the party was doomed to failure in only making an “idealistic” appeal for European integration, rather than pointing to practical benefits. A senior state parliamentarian noted the contrast with Martin Schulz as Spitzenkandidat in 2014: Schulz was able to project the EU in a more credible way, whereas under Katarina Barley the campaign was “too moderate and too quiet”. He also noted that its credibility was damaged by an argument over the SPD’s position on copyright reform. A regional official (and former parliamentary candidate) criticised the campaign: the placards came from Berlin and the visual campaign was centralised: … if you have placards and the Eifel Tower is on them and ‘peace’ is written below, then highly-educated citizens will think of reconciliation with France, the Elysee Treaties … that’s the position of intellectuals. But the normal citizen just thinks: ‘What’s this? What have we got to do with the Eifel Tower?’ And everyone wants peace: there was no differentiation from other parties. We had to be far clearer what the SPD stood for in Europe. For instance, saving people on the high seas: you won’t be popular with everyone but you cut through.

A leading state party official said the campaign was “not loud enough”, there was “no real content, it just aimed to be likeable”—while a state parliamentarian from Rhineland Palatinate said that there was “not enough differentiation from other parties, no emotionalisation or focus on austerity or on future perspectives. That we allow there to be 40% youth unemployment in southern Europe or that people can’t get a doctor … that was only mentioned too vaguely, too tentatively”. Another North Rhine Westphalian parliamentarian agreed, also pointing to deficits amongst voters concerned about the consequences of migration: there was “too much good mood music but it was not concrete enough, and completely passed people by. […] We should also take criticisms of the EU seriously; for instance, immigration from Romania and Bulgaria and

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refugees in our city was an important question in my electoral district, and I had no answers how to handle this topic”. Perhaps most pointedly, commenting on the slogan and on the campaign, an SPD state parliamentarian in North Rhine Westphalia summarised the views of many interviewees: “‘Europe is the answer’. What was this slogan meant to mean? We lost, it was right that we lost, it was the worst campaign ever”. In summary, in its manifesto and its social network campaign, the SPD supported a deepening of European integration, and in particular a strengthening of Europe’s social dimensions. To some degree, these represented a desire to ‘upload’ some of the SPD’s achievements in government (most obviously, the introduction of a minimum wage, upon which the party had insisted in the 2013–2017 grand coalition). However, as the results demonstrated, this approach did not bear fruit. Indeed, after the election there was much internal criticism of the party’s key slogan (‘Europe is the answer’ was felt to be overly general). Perhaps most importantly, and to the consternation of SPD politicians, voters were simply not willing to give the party any credit for its political achievements in the grand coalition on a federal level, nor did its European policy ambitions cut through.

Voters’ Opinions on Europe and the EU As discussed in the introduction, notwithstanding the SPD’s miserable results in these elections, the German population remains quite clearly pro-European in outlook, and so in principle there should be demand for pro-European positions from political parties. Table 6.2 clearly shows that most of the German population is proEU. When faced with the question of whether Germany could better face the future outside the EU, 78% of respondents disagree, while only 16% would prefer to drop out. In more detail, 52% totally disagree and 26% tend to disagree, while the percentage who totally agrees is only 6%. The picture however is more balanced when we look at Germans’ trust in the EU (Table 6.3). Although the majority tends to trust (48%), at 42%, those who do not trust are a larger proportion than those who see a German future outside the EU. Looking at both tables we can also identify important differences between East and West. While the percentage of those who see a better future outside the EU almost doubles in the East, trust in the EU is reversed.

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Table 6.2 Germany could better face the future outside the EU 2018 Autumn

Totally agree Tend to agree Tend to disagree Totally disagree Total ‘Agree’ Total ‘Disagree’

2019 Spring

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

6

5

10

6

5

10

11

9

17

10

9

15

22

21

29

26

25

28

55

60

35

52

55

39

17

14

27

16

14

25

77

81

64

78

80

67

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

51

55

36

48

51

36

38

36

47

42

38

56

Source Eurobarometer

Table 6.3 Trust in the EU 2018 Autumn

Tend to trust Tend not to trust

2019 Spring

Source Eurobarometer

In general, the data show that Germans are broadly pro-European, although on a popular level maybe not quite as convinced as the political class (excluding the AfD). So there is no particular reason to see the SPD as being particularly at odds with German public opinion concerning its pro-European course and the focus on the deepening of European integration. Indeed, if we look at Table 6.4, we can see that freedom to travel, study and work in the EU, peace, the Euro and democracy are the most important sources of identification with the EU. Concerning the first three there are even no differences between East and West, although they appear when it comes to cultural diversity, external border control

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Table 6.4 QA11 What does the EU personally represent for you? 2018 Autumn

Freedom to travel, study and work Peace The Euro Democracy Cultural diversity Stronger say in the world Bureaucracy Economic prosperity Waste of money Not enough control at external borders More crime Social protection Unemployment Loss of our cultural identity

2019 Spring

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

60

62

52

66

67

58

50 50 42 37

52 50 47 39

43 50 21 26

60 56 46 43

62 56 50 47

52 58 29 28

32

33

26

37

40

25

32 21

30 23

42 11

34 28

33 31

38 15

26 24

23 21

38 37

27 26

25 23

36 37

23 11 8 10

19 11 6 9

40 11 14 13

20 16 11 10

17 16 10 9

31 14 18 13

Source Eurobarometer

and more crime, confirming the higher level of scepticism about the EU in the East observed above. The reason for the SPD’s poor performance might be found in the importance given to single issues. As shown in Table 6.5 (confirming the data presented in the exit poll cited above) most Germans saw in immigration and climate change the most important problems facing the EU shortly before the European elections. Classic issues for social democracy such as the economic situation, unemployment or pensions figure less prominently. An interesting and intuitive finding (given the AfD’s stronger support in the region) is that immigration is seen as a bigger problem in the East whereas climate change is perceived as being a bigger problem in the West.

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Table 6.5 QA5 In your opinion, what are the two most important problems facing the EU now? 2018 Autumn

Immigration Climate change State of Member States’ public finances EU’s influence in the world The environment Economic situation Terrorism Unemployment Crime Rising prices\inflation\cost of living Energy supply Pensions Taxation

2019 Spring

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

Germany

Germany West

Germany East

45 21 30

45 22 29

47 17 34

37 31 27

36 32 27

40 27 31

14

16

10

15

16

12

9 13 13 8 11 6

9 13 13 9 10 6

9 14 17 7 14 8

15 12 11 10 8 6

16 11 10 10 8 5

12 14 13 11 11 10

6 4 1

6 5 1

6 3 2

6 3 2

5 3 2

8 4 1

Source Eurobarometer

These data help us to make sense of the SPD’s election result. There is a narrative that parties of the centre left are losing ground to the far right. However, in looking at flows of voters between 2017 and 2019, there is no evidence of this: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen found that the SPD lost very few of its 2017 voters to the AfD (Tagesschau 2019). It lost a lot to the Greens (over 1 million), supporting our claim that unlike the SPD, the Greens cut through and also did well out of the prominence of the climate change issue. They also lost a disproportionate number of voters to non-voting (we would expect them to lose some because of lower turnout, but while turnout was 14% lower, they lost over 25% of their 2017 votes to non-voting). Again, this seems to say something about the inability of the SPD to motivate its supporters.

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Conclusion The 2019 European election in Germany took place in the context of a grand coalition government which the SPD had only reluctantly joined, and where both governing parties had experienced a slide in opinion polls, and miserable state-election results. It was therefore to be expected that the SPD would find these European elections a difficult experience. And so it came to pass: the final result set a new record for the worst performance in any German-wide election, and led, just days later, to the resignation of the party’s leader, Andrea Nahles. We should therefore be cautious about reading too much into the precise policy content of the SPD’s European election manifesto, and its links to the party’s support. No matter what the content of the party’s programme, it faced a distinctly difficult battleground. There are some important conclusions we can draw from these European elections. First, programmatically, the SPD adopted a broadly left-wing, pro-European election programme, with a strong emphasis on Social Europe. It appeared, however, to struggle to gain traction with this for several reasons. First, on particular issues, most notably climate change, the salience of which had grown sharply, the SPD was not perceived as being competent, whereas the Green Party was wellplaced to capitalise on this issue (and capitalise it did). For some voters, immigration remained a key concern, and for those, the AfD offered an alternative; on economic questions, the CDU/CSU led the SPD. Secondly, the SPD seemed to have a problem with credibility. Its achievements in the area of social policy at a national level had not cut through: in common with other countries (Austria and the Netherlands, for instance), governing as part of a grand coalition between centre-left and centre-right is damaging to social democrats’ credentials on social justice. Indeed, this applies especially to the SPD in 2019: not only did it suffer because of poor perceptions of its performance in the federal government, but also especially engaged voters would note that the SPD (as part of the S&D group) had been part of the informal grand coalition with Christian Democrats (in the EPP) in the European Parliament. Moreover, the party, as discussed above, had not challenged the imposition of ‘austerity’ by the European Union on struggling Southern European economies in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. The party had backtracked on its initial ambitions (in the paper recommending the commencement of coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU in January 2018) concerning

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a Social Europe. As part of Germany’s rejection of President Macron’s big European vision, Federal Finance Minister Scholz pursued an extremely cautious agenda at odds with the party’s stated commitment to deepening Social Europe. So for voters, the SPD lacked the credibility it needed on Social Europe issues: it could ‘talk the talk’ but the evidence of its time in government suggested that, in the eyes of voters, it did not ‘walk the walk’. Put into the mix a bland European election campaign and strong competition on the centre left, and the SPD ended up with a record low result. As a postscript, it is worth observing that the SPD has, since these elections, doubled down on support for a left-wing agenda. SPD MEPs surprised many observers by voting against Ursula von der Leyen of the German CDU as candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission, and after a drawn-out process, two left-wing politicians, Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken, became joint leaders of the party in succession to Andrea Nahles (dealing a major blow to centrist SPD Finance Minister, Olaf Scholz). At the time of writing, it is uncertain whether the SPD will follow through on this shift by leaving the grand coalition if it fails to secure further policy concessions from the CDU/CSU. This would be a painful move in the short-term at least, given that all opinion polling suggests that the party would lose perhaps a quarter of the seats in the Bundestag that it currently holds. It seems to be ensnared in a trap whereby the needs of governing the country, in a coalition with the centre right, prevent it having credibility on key issues of concern to centre-left voters: time will tell whether it can negotiate a way out. Acknowlegments We are grateful for the generous financial support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) ‘Promoting German Studies in the UK’ programme and logistical backing from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s London office, for our wider project on German social democracy. We are also grateful for the input of Davide Vampa. Responsibility for all content and errors remains our own. All translations are by the authors. Interviews referred to in the text took place in October and November 2019.

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CHAPTER 7

The French Socialist Party in the 2019 European Elections Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi

Introduction France has paradoxically been heralded variously as one of the motors of Europe, alongside parties of left and right inexorably opposed to the European project (Evans 2000); and a system where Europe has traditionally ceded place to domestic issues in its first-order elections (Kriesi 2007). With few, but prominent, exceptions, governing parties of the left and the right have promoted strongly pro-European programmes while simultaneously underlining the benefits to France from so doing. Since the mid-1990s, mainstream parties on both sides of the spectrum have undergone a process of Europeanisation, often at the cost of internal dissent and splits from radical Eurosceptic factions (Bergounioux and Grunberg

J. Evans (B) University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] G. Ivaldi CEVIPOF, Paris, France © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_7

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2005), however until recently maintaining their dominant position in both the domestic and European electoral arenas. Yet, in 2020, the French Parti Socialiste (PS) finds itself virtually erased from the European Parliament, after its poorest performance ever in the May 2019 election, having been similarly crushed in the presidential and legislative elections two years earlier. The party which had led the government and executive under François Hollande a decade earlier is now increasingly at risk of becoming irrelevant to French politics. During the five years of Hollande’s presidency, the PS lost over three-quarters of its electoral support to the radical left and right, and ultimately to Emmanuel Macron’s newly founded centrist La République en Marche! (LREM). In the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election, French Socialists were forced to ally with a tiny party, Place Publique, formed one year earlier, to which they awarded the list leadership. Meanwhile, the PS’s former minority Green allies, Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV), won back many of the leftist and former PS voters who had turned to LREM in 2017 and were increasingly disenchanted by the rightist turn under Emmanuel Macron’s presidency. This collapse of François Mitterrand’s former party of government cannot be directly ascribed to, or exclusively interpreted through the Euro-ballot. The political crisis of Socialism in France is largely accounted for by Hollande’s failure to deliver his 2012 election promises. It is also deeply rooted in the social-liberal pro-market orientation taken by the PS since the mid-1980s, and the tension this has produced with the party’s ideological tradition of political radicalism (Cole 2011). However, the inability of the party to make any headway against the forces responsible for 2017’s rout provides evidence of the PS’s incapacity to sell its European credentials any more than it could its domestic agenda. This chapter will argue that, similarly to the failure of right-wing conservative Les Républicains (LR) in the same cycle of elections, the PS as a party of government from the 1980s to 2017 has precisely been unable to gain electoral purchase from Europe because of its established position as a supporter of one version of the European project—‘social Europe’—which has historically failed to offer a credible alternative vision to compete with the unburdened, radical Eurosceptic proposals of La France Insoumise (LFI) and the Rassemblement National (RN), and even with LREM’s assumed centrist federalism. Inheriting the executive position of Mitterrand, Jospin and Hollande with regard to Europe, the PS found that the EP elections—which offer challenger

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parties a competition where the affective positioning of voters can align without first-order constraints—offer nothing to parties struggling with exactly those constraints: domestic irrelevance, organisational decline, and leadership failure, in particular. Before addressing this fundamental, and pessimistic, message of the 2019 European elections to the French PS, the chapter provides the background to the Socialists’ relationship with and internal divisions over Europe, and to its domestic electoral woes. It then turns to the European election itself, looking at how the party set out its stall for the election, in terms of vision and policy, and how an attempt to claim a stronger reformist line from previous Socialist policy in Europe failed to convince left-wing voters, which was reflected in the party’s performance in comparison to other parties of the left, and to its presidential/legislative nemesis of 2017, LREM. The chapter concludes by looking at the positions of these voters on European issues, finding little specificity, and certainly no issue set to which at least one of the Socialists’ competitors, on both the left (Mélenchon’s populist left) and right (Macron’s Renaissance list), didn’t align. The French Socialist Party and Europe Europe is at the heart of the PS’ political identity, and it is deeply rooted in the party’s ideological tradition of internationalism. In the 1980s, the Mitterrand presidency showed renewed support for the process of European integration, as revealed for instance in the decision to keep France in the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1983, at a time when the Socialists in government were decisively reorienting their economic policies towards austerity (Clift 2013). In 1992, François Mitterrand’s ruling Socialists were the main architects behind France’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Under the auspices of Jospin’s ‘plural left’ government with the Communists and the Greens, the PS parliamentary party voted massively in favour of both the Amsterdam (85.2%) and Nice Treaties (91.3%) in 1999 and 2001. But by December 2004, as we will examine below, only 58.8% of the party’s grassroots voted in favour of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) in the membership vote. Two months later, in February 2005, PS parliamentary support for the constitutional revision prior to the ratification of the European charter fell to 60.4%, reflecting increasing dissent over the EU within the party.

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During the Mitterrand years, the French socialists would also build the basis for their vision of a ‘social Europe’. The latter was seen as a vehicle to promote economic growth and employment, which could ultimately protect the French from the threats of globalisation and neoliberalism. During the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Socialist Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy would for instance describe European integration as a driving force behind ‘social progress’, ‘an advanced social model’ and ‘a space for the protection of workers’ social rights and the insertion of those excluded from economic growth’ (Speech in the National Assembly, 5 May 1992). Such Socialist discursive repertoire of a ‘social Europe’ formed part of an alternative utopian project which primarily rested on two main types of argument. First, there was a positive prospective anticipation of the benefits of European integration and the idea that further integration into the EU would foster job creation in France, therefore helping solve the country’s intractable problem of mass unemployment (Ivaldi 2006). Second was the claim that such a ‘social Europe’ would be achieved through the projection of France’s national values and interests, and transposition of its social welfare model to the European level (Manigand and Dulphy 2006). The promotion of France’s cultural exceptionalism and universal values was clearly one of the key elements driving the Socialist government’s action aimed at securing the inclusion of a social chapter in the Maastricht Treaty. Such commitment to European integration and to promoting the French model of social welfare has been central to the prescriptive policy agenda of French Socialists ever since, making paramount the fight against globalisation and against rampant neoliberalism within EU institutions. Basic principles such as economic intervention in industrial policies and infrastructure, the fight against further liberalisation, the prevention of social dumping and relocations, social policy harmonisation and the protection of public services have pervaded all PS electoral manifestos since the Mitterrand years, as revealed for instance in Jospin’s Plural Left’s commitment to defending a social treaty in the 1990s. In the 2012 presidential election, similar principles were key to the European platform advanced by the Socialist candidate, François Hollande. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, amidst a context of rising unemployment and continuing turmoil in the Eurozone, Hollande clearly shifted his campaign to the left, promising in particular that he would wage a war on international finance. His agenda included a number

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of measures such as the pledge to ban stock options, a possible tax on financial transactions, and the somewhat unrealistic promise to renegotiate the Fiscal Compact, whereby the Socialist candidate stressed the need for growth policies to be included in the battle to save the European currency and in the commitment to fiscal rectitude (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). Hollande’s policy shift away from austerity was mostly tactical, however, and reflected the need for the PS to secure support from Eurosceptic voters of the Left, and to avoid intra-party division such as had occurred in the 2005 ECT referendum campaign. Internal Divisions Over Europe Since the mid-1990s, the French Socialists have failed to present a completely united front, and the party has been deeply divided over European integration. To a large extent, party elite views of the EU overlap with the tension that has historically existed between radical maximalist party positions espoused by leftist elements of the PS, on the one hand, and the pragmatic and realistic approach endorsed by the more centrist sector of the party, on the other (Bergounioux and Grunberg 2005). Such opposition between ‘two lefts’ had been a constant feature of the PS since its foundation in the early 1970s and an important factor in party factionalism and internal dissent throughout the history of the party. In 1992, the campaign over the Maastricht Treaty led to the dissidence of Jacobin Eurosceptic Jean-Pierre Chevènement who left the PS to form his Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC). In 2005, the PS entered a phase of increased intra-party discord during the campaign over the ECT referendum. The campaign saw leading figures of the PS such as Laurent Fabius, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Henri Emmanuelli fiercely oppose the Treaty against the official position taken by the party’s leadership, its grassroots and leaders such as Robert Badinter, Jacques Delors, François Hollande, Martine Aubry and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, thus eventually contributing to the victory of the ‘No’ camp in the May referendum. The fracture within the PS attested to the persistence of diverging views about the liberal orientation of the EU as much as about the social-liberal approach inspired by Michel Rocard’s reformist ‘second left’ and espoused by the PS during most of the post-Mitterrand era. Such tensions had re-emerged in the 2003 Dijon congress where the party mainstream that had tactically rallied behind Hollande had been challenged by the more leftist radical factions within the PS, such as

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Emmanuelli and Mélenchon’s Nouveau Monde, and Vincent Peillon, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît Hamon and Julien Dray’s Nouveau Parti Socialiste (NPS). The PS in the 2017 Presidential and Legislative Elections The French Socialists went into a long period of opposition during Chirac and Sarkozy’s right-wing presidencies between 2002 and 2012. In 2012, Hollande’s victory in the presidential election took place in a context of growing unpopularity with the austerity policies pushed forward by Sarkozy. Soon after Hollande’s election, however, internal dissent and party factionalism resurfaced in the PS, reflecting the persistent tension between radical maximalist leftist factions and pragmatic social-liberal elites within the party. Ideologically, Hollande retreated from his left-wing presidential campaign and pledge to fight financial powers, radically shifting towards business-friendly economic measures. Formerly core tenets of the PS programme and of Hollande’s commitments in his speech at Le Bourget launching his presidential programme in January 2012—public investment; corporatist work-time directives involving union approval; support of workers in a market favouring employment change—were abandoned in the face of public deficits, poor growth, and required spending cuts to prioritise business growth above employee conditions. The social-liberal turn of the Hollande presidency was accentuated by the appointment of Manuel Valls as Prime Minister and the arrival of Emmanuel Macron as Minister of the Economy, and would be symbolised further by the El Khomri employment law. The latter was considered by many on the left to be a frontal attack on the Socialist tradition of defending workers’ rights.1 Additionally, the strong law-and-order agenda adopted by the Socialist government in the wake of the Islamic terrorist attacks of 2015 would alienate the cultural left and the Greens, thus increasing polarisation further. The dogged pursuit of the El Khomri law, beginning with the rebellion of some 40 Socialist deputies against the budget voted in 2014, led to a shifting division between supporters 1 The 2016 El Khomri law revised French labour law by strengthening companies’ ability to lay off employees, and weakening employee rights and benefits. The Hollande government presented the law as a necessary adjustment to increase competitiveness and indirectly reduce unemployment.

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and opponents of government policy. What was ideologically a division between frondeurs (rebels) and the rest of the Parliamentary group saw a shift towards the centre with even Socialist stalwarts such as JeanChristophe Cambadélis, First Secretary of the party, opposing the El Khomri law by 2016—this on the basis of the deep unpopularity of the law, not just within the party, but also among trade unionists and public opinion more broadly. In the 2017 elections, much of the PS’ difficulty in staking out a clear competitive space was due to Hollande’s policy reversals in the area of social welfare, business support and law-and-order during his presidency, which had alienated a large proportion of Socialist voters as well as party activists among the leftist groups of the PS. In the end, Hollande’s decision to stand aside from the 2017 presidential election attested to his failure to maintain party unity and assemble rival factions within the Socialist left. In January 2017, the unanticipated election of Benoît Hamon in the Socialist primary against former Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, confirmed that the PS was shifting further to the left, thus opening the field to Emmanuel Macron at the centre-left of the political spectrum. In 2017, all presidential candidates identified distinct European positions, based upon the dynamics of integration, areas of competence, and economic harmonisation. EU positions were primarily structured around the two polar opposites of Macron’s quasi-federalist position and Marine Le Pen’s Frexit strategy. The rise in salience of European issues had a significant impact on mainstream parties, increasing factionalism, most notably in the PS where European issues intersected with internal conflicts over both economic and cultural policies. Among the governing sections of both the Socialists and the Republicans, de facto alignment with the European agenda during periods in office had reduced their capacity to challenge Europe in the way that newer parties—or, more accurately, parties with no governing baggage—were able to do. Figure 7.1, using the Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2019) expert survey of party policy positions, shows the relatively lower salience of federalism and inter-governmentalism as a political issue over time for the parties of government relative to the radical-left LFI, Macron’s LREM and the populist radical right RN. In 2017, Hamon took the PS further to the left by adopting a domestic agenda of redistribution—including for instance a basic income—and ambitious environmental policies, while espousing soft criticism of EU austerity policies. As Fig. 7.2 shows, the relative shift towards

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a market orientation between 2008 and Hollande’s presidency in 2013 has reversed, and is still visible in 2019, two years after Hamon’s departure. During the presidential campaign, Hamon urged a moratorium on the stability pact and advocated mutualising national debts, while suggesting a new treaty on the ‘democratization’ of Eurozone governance and calling for a pan-European minimum wage. Meanwhile, faced with the intensification of Euroscepticism in Mélenchon’s LFI, Hamon took an economic protectionist turn and pledged to pull out of international trade agreements such as the Canada-European Union (EU) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The 2017 presidential election delivered a severe blow to the PS, nevertheless, giving Hamon a disastrous 6.4% of the vote, compared with 28.6% for Hollande in 2012, at its lowest since the late 1960s. Meanwhile, the election showed a rise in support for Mélenchon’s populist left at 19.6% of the vote share, marking substantial gains on his performance of five years earlier at 11.1%. The electoral debacle of the PS continued in the legislative elections where Socialist candidates polled just about 7% of the vote and secured a mere 30 seats as opposed to 280 in 2012.

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Immediately after the elections, the PS was confronted by another wave of secessions, as leading figures such as Valls and Hamon left the party. By 2018, the departure of radical elements of the party—including Marie-Noëlle Lienemann, leader of the l’Union et l’Espoir faction; Charles Fiterman, former Parti Communiste Français (PCF) Minister, and Emmanuel Maurel, a high-profile member of Lienemann’s faction, and supporter of cooperation with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s LFI—left only a pragmatic left-centrist core along with an increasingly anachronistic old guard—including Jean-Yves Le Drian, Macron’s Minister of Defence, who would himself leave as a result of acting First Secretary Rachid Temal’s statement that ‘there are no Socialists in the [Philippe] government’.2 In March 2018, Olivier Faure was elected as party leader with 2 https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2018/03/08/jean-yves-le-drian-quitte-leparti-socialiste_5267463_823448.html.

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48.4% of the membership vote. Meanwhile, fragmentation continued to the left of the political spectrum with the emergence of new parties and movements, such as Hamon’s Génération.s and essayist Raphaël Glucksmann’s Place Publique, the future list partner for the 2019 European election.

The French PS in the 2019 EP Elections The 2017 presidential election proved a turning-point for the French party system, first in the variegation of political positions on Europe among the candidates; and second, on the salience the issue had in the run-off, between the most Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen, and Europhile Emmanuel Macron (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). Thus, as the next main national poll, the 2019 Euro-elections were largely an extension of the outcome of the 2017 elections, confirming the pro- and anti-European stances of the presidential run-off contenders’ parties, and leaving little political space for other party lists to manoeuvre. To the left, an enfeebled PS entered a tactical agreement with Place Publique, a deal which also included other small parties of the French left such as the Mouvement des Citoyens and Nouvelle Donne, a social-liberal splinter group from the PS since 2013 and led by Pierre Larrouturou. Five years earlier, in the 2014 EP elections, Nouvelle Donne had run independently, polling a mere 2.9% of the vote. The 2019 coalition did not include however Hamon’s Génération.s nor EELV’s Greens, with both turning down the PS’s offer to join forces in the EP election. Together with the presence of the PCF, LFI’s insoumis and far left Trotskyists, this further increased party fragmentation, with a total of six lists competing against one another to the left of the party system. Europe and the EU in the PS Election Manifesto Ideologically, the PS entering the European elections in 2019 was difficult to identify as the heir of the Hollande executive, let alone the Mitterrand era. The PS 2019 European programme was on the other hand very much in line with the social and environmentalist ‘new left’ reorientation of the party since 2017. Such continuity and alignment with Place Publique’s ambitious environmentalist policies were evident in the selection of Europe’s role on the environment as its first of

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seven tenets in Changeons d’Europe (‘A new kind of Europe’).3 Half a trillion euros over 5 years was hypothecated for renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and a transition to a carbon-free society. To give greater flexibility to national governments in implementing an emergency plan, the programme proposed excluding environmental spending from the 3% budget deficit cap. In combining economic-growth targets with environmental protection, a commitment to trade protection including climate-protection enforcement was made. Similarly, to capitalise on technical know-how across member states, the programme recommended the formation of an ‘Airbus’ of energy companies to work on renewable energy projects. In keeping with retaining sovereignty over fiscal and economic policy, the second tenet of the programme saw Europe’s role as an enforcer for tax collection across its member states. As cross-national organisations such as Amazon and Google exploit their status to lower corporate tax and national insurance contributions in host countries, a concerted effort to address this liberal market capitalist loophole across Europe’s territories alongside ending tax havens and requiring country-level tax reporting, found the PS in line with many equivalent opposition parties. Similarly, tenet 3 placed the role of guaranteeing human rights firmly in Europe’s purview. Universal rights to abortion, to paid paternity leave, to freedom from violence against women, and to gender equality through a dedicated Commissioner, would enshrine many of the national programme policies traditionally associated with the PS. More broadly, the party’s concerns over human rights abuses in member states, and in potential accession states, were invoked through an explicit call for the protection and free movement of LGBT+ families, and a strengthening of the European Court of Justice’s mandate in ruling against states. Tenet 4 focused on migration policy, lobbying for an enhanced role for Europe in asylum applications and humanitarian support. The language mirrored the standard tension mainstream left parties have faced in addressing the migration issue—to defend a humanitarian, egalitarian approach to refugees, economic migration and reuniting families, while at the same time endorsing an informed, realistic and selective process based upon informed rational principles of national benefit, rather than the kneejerk, ‘Build-a-Wall’ mentality of the populist right. Consequently, ‘scientific’

3 https://www.parti-socialiste.paris/telechargement/changeons-deurope/.

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analyses of migration and policy development accompanied redrafts of the Dublin Accords and a proposed development aid threshold (0.7% of GDP). A similar approach to transnational issues characterised the two other tenets of the programme, covering: (1) a European social fund, particularly for young citizens struggling in the knowledge-economy jobs market; employee-oriented company governance structures, and a European minimum wage at 70% of the median; and (2) further sustainability commitments, this time in health, to eliminate harmful pesticides, such as the bee-killing neonicotinoids, and other contaminant agricultural chemicals. As regards foreign policy, the PS called for a reinforcement of European defence and security. Finally, the programme set out a vision of Europe as the principal defender of identity and sovereignty, through closer integration on budgets and stability, and a ‘Made in Europe’ preference to bolster European economies, as well as greater accountability and a voice for Europe’s representative institutions, such as the European Parliament, above the in camera status quo of the European Council and Commission. Thus, the 2019 electoral manifesto reactivated the old Socialist myth of a ‘social Europe’ pledging a wide range of social and fiscal policies to fight inequalities. Also central to the manifesto was the continuation of the idea that the EU should ultimately align with France’s national model—as revealed for instance by the proposal to create a wealth tax at the European level, similar to France’s ISF (Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune). The programme showed a dramatic move however from the softer reformist tone of the PS during the Jospin and Hollande years as it endorsed a radical critique of the EU and called for a ‘radical change’ that would more clearly ‘assume a break with liberal and austerity policies’. Overall, the 2019 EP election manifesto confirmed the PS’s shift to a ‘new left’ agenda combining radical redistributive and economic protectionist policies with libertarian-cosmopolitan values and a strong environmentalist approach. This policy package clearly resembled that of Hamon’s presidential bid of 2017 and would endorse more maximalist policies than those laid out in the Euro manifesto of the Party of European Socialists (PES). During the 2019 campaign, while still firmly anchored with the European Socialists within the S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) group, the PS/Place Publique coalition would not entirely rule out cooperation with Mélenchon’s populist left, attesting to the ideological and strategic repositioning of the PS

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further away from the centre of the political spectrum. Moreover, the party would condemn the traditional grand coalition with the European conservatives of the European People’s Party (EPP) and pledge for a broad alliance of all left-wing—including radical and populist—and ecologist forces in the EP, calling upon them to ‘lead common struggles together’. Electoral Results For the PS, which had lost large numbers of senior figures, including its former presidential candidate, as well as thousands of grassroots activists and, symbolically, its rue Solférino headquarters, which had been the party’s home since the launch of François Mitterrand’s 1981 presidential campaign, the European elections offered nothing beyond the opportunity to confirm its rapid descent from the presidential and governing party it had been in 2012, to an also-ran five years later (Fig. 7.3). The EP elections of 2019 confirmed the continued decline of the PS some two years after its debacle in the presidential election. The 6.2% of the vote share represented a loss of over 10% on the 2014 election, which was 40 35 30

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Fig. 7.4 Maps of 2019 Euro election results for leftist lists and the governing Renaissance list by department

a second-order mid-cycle election for the incumbent party—normally, a relative nadir for any governing party in a system predicated upon alternation (Marsh 1998). The score was almost identical to that of Benoît Hamon in April 2017, yet represented sixth place, with at least two other clearly leftist lists performing as well or better: EELV with 13.5%, and LFI’s new list at 6.3%. This does not take into account the incumbent Renaissance list, comprising LREM, Mouvement Démocrate (MoDEM) and other government-aligned parties, whose electorate still included a substantial number of former left-wing PS voters.4 Figure 7.4 breaks down the vote share of the leftist lists, and that of Renaissance, the governing party list formed by LREM and MoDEM, by department. The PS list did relatively well in certain old strongholds such as the South West, Brittany and the Massif Central. However, in these areas, the party barely reached double figures. Partly this was due to the 4 We should acknowledge here that a number of left-wing supporters of Macron and LREM moved to EELV, disenchanted with the rightist turn of the governing party (https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/apres-les-europeennes-l-aile-gauche-de-lrem-enquete-d-une-renaissance-28-05-2019-2315654_20.php).

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minority challenge of the Génération.s, splitting an already diminished moderate left vote; but predominantly it was due to the domination of Renaissance and of EELV, with stronger scores even in those areas of their own relative weakness—leaving only a tiny core of PS support anywhere in the country. The 2019 result represents a confirmation of the structural collapse of the Socialist vote. Over time, the decline is clear across the last 15 years, from the party’s strongest performance in 2004, when the opposition PS managed to consolidate gains from minor left-wing and radical-left parties under the logic of bipartisme pursued by the two main governing parties (Grunberg and Haegel 2007). The massive drop observed in 2009 reflected the revival of the right-wing presidential majority under Nicolas Sarkozy as well as the internal fractures of the PS party Congress in Reims a year earlier. Moreover, in 2009, the PS competed against an independent ecologist list led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, which by itself won over 16% of the vote. In the 2014 elections, the expected drop midterm through Hollande’s presidency was much steeper than expected, well below the upper ‘teens indicated by opinion polls. While the drop was somewhat relativised by the similarly poor results for the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP), and the shock victory of the FN in a poll combining anti-government protest with a continued high level of abstention—almost as high as 2009 (2009: 59.36%; 2014: 57.5%)—the 2014 result heralded however the electoral debacle of 2017. Voters’ Opinions on Europe and the EU Since the mid-1990s, European issues have deeply fractured the Socialist electorate along socio-economic lines, notably opposing its pro-European middle-class support to its more Eurosceptic working-class constituency. In 2005, a significant proportion of PS voters in the couches populaires had expressed discontent with the liberal orientation of the EU which was seen as a threat to France’s social welfare model, and had turned to the ‘No’ vote in the referendum on the ECT. Europe has remained a divisive and polarising issue in French politics ever since (Belot et al. 2013). Despite a clear shift to the left in 2017, the PS has yet failed to reconnect with its former traditional working-class voters who in great proportion have turned to the radical right FN since the late-1980s, or flirted with the UMP under Sarkozy in 2007. Our previous analysis of the 2017 Socialist vote showed that Hamon attracted younger, urban

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and secular voters, however showing no clear class or education profile. Compared with Macron’s support, this suggested that the Socialist candidate may have been fishing from the same pool of voters within similar social strata. This was corroborated by Hamon’s voters’ attitudinal proximity to Macron’s supporters as regards their views of the EU, which confirmed the lack of independent political space that Hamon was able to occupy in the first round of the presidential election. Overall, our analysis found that the electorate with the least differentiation from Macron’s in 2017 was that of Hamon (Evans and Ivaldi 2018: 171). Under the structural pressures highlighted above, the remaining core of Socialist voters in the 2019 EP elections makes possible an interesting study of the ideological profile of what remains of the party’s mass support. Because of its size, it constitutes a difficult group to capture using survey data; however, the European Election Study and the second wave of the SCoRE survey in France do provide sufficient cases for a simple descriptive analysis of the ideological positioning of the party’s supporters compared with those of LREM, LR, LFI and RN. Looking at the mean position of PS voters in comparison with the four other main political groupings—from left to right, LFI, LREM, LR and RN—some interesting differences are apparent across the different electorates (Fig. 7.5). First, quite clearly the main division in French political space on Europe in its current configuration is between proand anti-system forces, broadly separating the radical-left LFI and right RN from the erstwhile and current parties of government. The RN is clearly the most antipathetic towards the European project, but LFI’s opposition to the neoliberal elite cartel of the European institutions gives rise to almost as vigorous opposition among the radical-left voters. For the PS, its position generally aligns with that of its LR counterpart on the right, more moderate in its pro-European position than Macron’s LREM. The one issue where there is greater differentiation is on whether European integration should be rolled back or progressed further. Again, LREM scores highest on the further integration side, but the PS overlaps considerably in its 95% confidence interval, significantly closer to the integration ideal. This aligns closely with the party’s Euro-programme, analysed above, in identifying a number of areas for European competence in addressing policy areas through further harmonisation and, potentially, integration. The PS voter is Euro-positive, somewhat ambivalent about the current institutional context of the EU, and supportive of pushing

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Fig. 7.5 Mean positions of party electorates on Europe (Source EES 2019)

integration further to rectify these problems by realigning Europe from a liberal-market structure to a social Europe. The questions asked in the SCoRE survey portray a similar set of attitudes among voters (Fig. 7.6). Quizzing respondents on their fears concerning European integration reveals that Socialist voters showed the greatest concern over social protection—again mirroring their party’s position on shifting Europe from a liberal-market to a socially proactive vision—and the least on immigration. However, these graphs demonstrate a worrying reality for the PS in 2019, namely that the party is fishing in a crowded pond. On the European project as a good, the party’s moderate position promotes an ambiguity which makes mobilisation of support difficult, where more radical parties such as LFI are able to make easier capital from greater clarity in their opposition. On more specific issue content, the PS is largely indistinguishable from the same radical neighbours—and, on issues outside social protection, from the dominant governing LREM. On a policy area which increasingly crystallises broader ideological positions

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Fig. 7.6 Mean positions on the effects of European integration (Source SCoRE survey, wave 2)

within the French party landscape, the PS is poorly positioned to identify its own electoral pool, and through the atrophy of the five years of the Hollande presidency, no longer owns any dimension, having slipped behind LFI, EELV and LREM on each of these. Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this for the PS is the loss of identity among the electorate. In the SCoRE survey, when asked to place each of the party leaders on standard policy scales, almost half (43%) of the respondents felt unable to give a position for the PS and its First Secretary, Olivier Faure, on European integration. For an issue which dominated so heavily in the Presidential election of 2017, and which—as Fig. 7.1 reminds us—remains highly salient among the challenger parties which have overtaken the PS electorally, this bodes ill for the future of the former governing party at the ballot box.

Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the insuperable political and social challenges which have seen the PS fall from a dominant party of government

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to an electoral also-ran in the space of five years. A lack of presidential leadership, continued and deepened factional conflict, and ideological separation from much of its electoral base have led to a party able to mobilise only a core electorate reminiscent more of an intellectual club than a mass base. Under the presidential leadership of Hollande, the PS has been haemorrhaging voters. Reflecting the split of the party between its radical and moderate sectors, the PS has lost most of its lower-middle and working-class support to Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s populist left and Marine Le Pen’s radical right. Meanwhile, a significant contingent of moderate middle-class voters has also abandoned a sinking Socialist ship and eventually turned to Macron’s LREM in 2017. Coming into the 2019 EP elections, with a programme based upon sustainability and European integration to confront the major global challenges increasingly characterising the policy agenda, the PS found itself insufficiently differentiated from EELV’s Greens, on the former issue, and from the governing LREM, on the latter, to enable it to mobilise a substantial pool of support. That Martine Aubry, Mayor of Lille and former First Secretary of the party, felt obliged to back a relatively obscure, electorally naïve writer as the head of a party list indicates not just a more general shift in focus towards civil-society candidates and politicians so apparent in Emmanuel Macron’s cabinet, as well as in his party, but also the lack of options available within the PS itself. The PS’ political crisis is deeply rooted in its ideological incoherence and internal contradictions. Over time, the so-called Epinay party has not been able fully to resolve the tension between the social-liberal pro-market policy positions espoused while in office—originating in Mitterrand’s economic U-turn of the 1980s—on the one hand, and the strong Socialist ideological tradition of political radicalism in France, on the other, which has often been expressed while in opposition (Grunberg 2011). Such tension was revealed and amplified during Hollande’s presidency: significant policy shifts both on the economy and law-and-order took the party further to the right, which alienated vast sectors of the PS’ electoral support, paving the way for Hamon’s radical, new left bid in the Socialist primary. Ironically, by delivering a more ideologically extreme PS candidate, the primary ultimately opened wide a political field for Macron at the centre-left of the political spectrum. The current crisis of the French PS is also organisational. The dismantling of a politbureau once characterised by its wealth of high-profile national politicians, either through these individuals’ departure to their

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regional fiefdoms, or through their replacement by lower-tier, unknown party foot-soldiers, added the issues of recognition and competence. Having returned to the opposition in 2017, the PS has since failed to establish itself as the main opponent to Emmanuel Macron and many voters are uncertain on the party’s policy positions: as the December 2019 SCoRE survey showed, between a quarter and a half of the French were simply unable to place the party and its leader, Olivier Faure, in the political space on important issues such as redistribution, immigration and European integration. Partly the departure of much of the radical left, either towards Mélenchon’s LFI or to more direct action social movements, has undoubtedly seen the loss of mobilisation potential for the PS. Equally, institutionalised political parties in France as elsewhere are increasingly challenged organisationally by new social movements and novel forms of political mobilisation (della Porta et al. 2017; Evans 2018; Minkenberg 2019) In the case of the French PS, the decentralisation of the locus of power among party-affiliated unions to virtual networks of activists in the gilets jaunes , has left an anachronistic party organisation unable to exploit either the protests themselves, or apparently the underlying causes of these. Perversely, a party whose most influential government opposition came from within its own ranks, during the frondeurs ’ attacks on the pension and employment reforms of the Hollande presidency between 2012 and 2017, now finds itself unable to exploit the continuation of this protest during a year-long period of street demonstrations, and more recently strikes against Macron’s new pension reform. Some held out hope that Macron and LREM’s turn to the right in the first two years in power would see a return of prodigal Socialists to the fold in the European elections. Instead, the main destination for disenchanted leftists turned out to be EELV’s Greens, with its greater track-record of uncompromising positions on social, environmental and cultural issues resonating with leftist voters. In that regard, the 2019 Euro elections’ main function for the PS was to confirm its apparently inexorable decline as a force within French politics, and the ever-decreasing likelihood of its identifying a viable, let alone successful, candidate for the 2022 presidential election.

References Belot, C., Cautrès, B., & Strudel, S. (2013). L’Europe comme enjeu clivant: Ses effets perturbateurs sur l’offre électorale et les orientations de vote lors de

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l’élection présidentielle de 2012. Revue Française de Science Politique, 63(6), 1081–1112. Bergounioux, A., & Grunberg, G. (2005). L’ambition et le remords: les socialistes français et le pouvoir: 1905–2005. Paris: Fayard. Clift, B. (2013). Le Changement? French Socialism, the 2012 Presidential Election and the Politics of Economic Credibility Amidst the Eurozone Crisis. Parliamentary Affairs, 66(1), 106–123. Cole, A. (2011). The French Socialist Party and Its Radical Ambiguity. French Politics, Culture & Society, 29(3), 29–48. Della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H., & Mosca, L. (2017). Movement Parties Against Austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press. EES [Schmitt, Hermann, Hobolt, Sara B, van der Brug, Wouter and Popa, Sebastian A]. (2019). European Parliament Election Study 2019. Voter Study. Evans, J. (2000). Contrasting Attitudinal Bases to Euroscepticism Amongst the French Electorate. Electoral Studies, 19(4), 539–561. Evans, J. (2018). La candidature de Macron et le mouvement En Marche! In R. Brizzi & M. Lazar (Eds.), La France d’Emmanuel Macron (pp. 83–102). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Evans, J., & Ivaldi, G. (2013). The 2012 French Presidential Elections. The Inevitable Alternation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Evans, J., & Ivaldi G. (2018). The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A Political Reformation? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Grunberg, G. (2011). Le radicalisme dans le parti socialiste aujourd’hui. French Politics, Culture & Society, 29(3), 49–61. Grunberg, G., & Haegel, F. (2007). La France vers le bipartisme?: La présidentialisation du PS et de l’UMP. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Ivaldi, G. (2006). Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia. West European Politics, 29(1), 47–69. Kriesi, H. (2007). The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns. European Union Politics, 8(1), 83–108. Krotz, U., & Schild, J. (2013). Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manigand, C., & Dulphy, A. (2006). La France au risque de l’Europe. Paris: Armand Colin. Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the Second-Order Election Model After Four European Elections. British Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 591–607. Minkenberg, M. (2019). Between Party and Movement: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations of the Radical Right’s Organizational Boundaries and Mobilization Processes. European Societies, 21(4), 463–486. Rohrschneider and Whitefield Expert Survey Trend File. (2019).

CHAPTER 8

The Firm Europhilia of the Italian Democratic Party Giuliano Bobba and Antonella Seddone

Introduction For a long time, Italy has been considered a Europhile country. The relationship between Italy and Europe could be summarised by distinguishing three phases (Cotta et al. 2005). The first phase corresponds to the founding period of the European Community when participation in the European project was the subject of considerable political disagreement. In the 1950s and 1960s, the governing majority led by the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats, DC) was in favour of the nascent European Economic Community (EEC), while the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) and the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party, PSI) were both opposed to it. There were two main

G. Bobba (B) Department of Culture, Politics and Society and the Collegio Carlo Alberto, University of Turin, Turin, Italy e-mail: [email protected] A. Seddone Department of Culture, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Turin, Italy © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_8

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points of friction: on the one hand, the ideological opposition between capitalism and communism, on the other, Italy’s political position on the international stage. The DC’s adherence to the European project was mainly dictated by the search for international approval (Conti and Verzichelli 2005: 66) and by the desire to consolidate Italy’s position within the Atlantic bloc (Versori 1995). For these reasons, the DC supported the European project from the beginning, leading Italy to sign the Treaty of Rome (Bull 1996; Walker 1976), while it was only in the 1970s that the PCI also converted to Europeanism (Sbragia 2001; Verzichelli and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Verzichelli 1996). The second phase instead begins in the 1970s and ends with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. During this period, support for the integration process was growing strongly among both political elites and the public. Italy’s membership of the EEC was perceived as official recognition of the country’s democratic legitimacy. Not surprisingly, therefore, of the many tests applied to the PCI to ascertain its democratic reliability, the one concerning its European credentials was among the most significant: becoming pro-European was, in effect, an indispensable requirement for being considered democratic (Conti and Verzichelli 2005). In this phase, which Maurizio Cotta (2005) refers to as one of ‘consensus on Europe’, public opinion was positively oriented to the integration process. This, in turn, favoured convergence among the political elites: ‘principled support and more utilitarian support tend[ed] to merge’ (Cotta 2005: 385), depoliticising the theme and leaving room for those forms of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1971) destined to weaken and crack two decades later. Since the 1990s, the situation has changed again due to important institutional changes and to external events that have affected all member states. This third phase—initially defined as one of ‘disenchanted Europeanism’ (Cotta 2005: ibid.)—brought Europe to the centre of public and political debate by redefining, at least in part, the relationship between Italy and the European Union. The effects of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and of the financial recovery necessary for participation in the process of economic and monetary union (EMU) (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999), combined with the further transfers of national sovereignty contained in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, led to an increase in Euroscepticism and salience of the EU (Roncarolo 2011; Belluati 2015). This was ‘stronger among citizens than in the party system, among socioeconomic elites or in the media’, already during the 2009 European

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elections (Bellucci and Conti 2012). While, until then, the main parties had used the EU in an instrumental way to legitimise unpopular choices (Bellucci 2005: 212), at the same time an increasingly large share of citizens had switched ‘from enthusiasm to scepticism’ vis-à-vis the EU (Bellucci and Serricchio 2012). In this context, the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD)—heir to the PCI, and the main centre-left party in Italy—is the only major Italian party to have had a consistently pro-European profile since its foundation in 2007. It is also the only party so far to have regularly presented election manifestos focused on European issues at European elections. All these traits make the PD the effective heir to the Italian centre-left’s tradition—consolidated with the formation of the Ulivo (Olive-tree coalition) in 1996 and the first Prodi government from 1996 to 1998—of a high level of support for the process of European integration (Conti 2009; Conti and Verzichelli 2005). Although the three main secretaries (Walter Veltroni, Pierluigi Bersani and Matteo Renzi) who have succeeded each other as party leader have often pursued divergent political strategies, the party has never questioned its Europeanism and has indeed affirmed it at every European election since its foundation. The most critical secretary has been Renzi who as the Prime Minister in 2014 led a politically heterogeneous government coalition. After years of economic austerity imposed by Mario Monti’s technocratic government at the instigation of the European Commission, he operated in a public and political environment increasingly critical of the EU’s handling of the economic crisis and in a climate of opinion marked by growing public mistrust of the European institutions. In this new context, his party sought renewed popular legitimacy after its failure to win a secure majority at the 2013 general election (Fava and Girometti 2013) and the failure of the government led by Enrico Letta to bring about any recovery (Ceron and Curini 2014). The new secretary, Renzi, succeeded in this operation to the point of leading the party to over 40% of the vote in the 2014 European elections (starting from 25% in 2013, see Guidi 2015). Although Renzi has been called a ‘populist’ (Tarchi 2015; Newell and Carbone 2015) or a ‘leftist Berlusconi’ (Bordignon 2014), these traits do not seem to have substantially changed the pro-European orientation of the party.

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Table 8.1 2019 European Parliament election in Italy

Votes The League PD—Democratic Party M5s—Five-star Movement FI—Go Italy FdI—Brothers of Italy

9,175,208 6,089,853 4,569,089 2,351,673 1,726,189

% 34.26 22.74 17.06 8.78 6.44

Seats 29 19 14 7 6

Source Ministry of the Interior

2019 European Election Results Against the background of a significant decline in turnout (54.5%)— compared to both the general election of 2018 (72.9%) and the two previous European elections (65.1% in 2009 and 57.2% in 2014)—the most significant results of the 2019 European elections in Italy were three in number. These were: (a) the success of the Lega (League), (b) the failure of the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5s) and (c) the lacklustre performance and isolation of the PD. In just over a year, the League increased its support from almost 6 million votes at the 2018 general election to over 9 million at the most recent European elections (Table 8.1). A comparison of the two outcomes suggests that the expansion of the League’s support was for the most part due to switches on the part of voters who had supported Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and the M5s in 2018. While the first flow had already been clearly apparent in other elections, the flow from the M5s is more surprising, given the ideological diversity and the tensions between the two parties (Mosca and Tronconi 2019). Actually, a certain degree of overlap between the constituencies of the League and of the M5s was already apparent in 2018. This is evident from the fact that 29% of respondents who had voted for the M5s on that occasion said that their probability of voting for the League was more than 50%. On the other hand, the same was true of only 14% of those who had voted for the PD.1 Analyses of the daily press and news broadcasts testify to League leader, 1 The figures derive from the survey data gathered by SWG from March to May 2019 for a total of 10,800 interviews. See the report, European elections 2019: Media, Voters, Results published by the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena, available at https://interdispoc.unisi.it/en/journal/media-party-leaders-and-the2019-eu-elections.

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Matteo Salvini’s, ability to place himself at the centre of public attention and to set the political agenda. During the two months leading up to the vote, the visibility achieved by Salvini, who at the time was Minister of the Interior, far surpassed that achieved by the other party leaders. 46% of news items concerning the main Italian party leaders contain references to him (followed by 28% for M5s leader, Luigi di Maio, 10% each for Berlusconi and PD leader, Nicola Zingaretti, and 8% for Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) leader, Georgia Meloni).2 Salvini, however, was not only the most visible leader, he was also the most criticised: on average about 30% of the coverage contains unfavourable judgements of him. This is a tendency that can be found indiscriminately across all the mainstream newspapers, with higher levels in la Repubblica (50%) and Il Fatto Quotidiano (44%).3 As regards Europe, although the League leader did not focus his campaign on criticisms of the EU, his deep-rooted Euroscepticism was clearly understood long before the election campaign. Indeed, he attempted to create a common front with all those parties and leaders (including Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Nigel Farage) whose goal was to re-acquire what they claimed was a loss of national sovereignty. The League’s governing ally, the M5s, achieved electoral results which allowed for no other interpretation than that the 2019 European elections represented a resounding defeat for the party. Its support fell from over 10 million votes at the 2018 general election to around 4.5 million on 26 May 2019. Against this background, the Movement held up better in southern Italy, while collapsing in the North. This result is even more negative when one considers that, as deputy Prime Minister, M5s leader, Di Maio, achieved a high level of visibility. One political news item out of three contained a reference to his activity—although the coverage was characterised by an intermediate level of negativity (25%)4 mainly fuelled by conflict with the media system (a feature that has characterised the M5s since the time of Beppe Grillo’s V-Day against journalists in

2 Figures derived from the 4698 references to the five leaders drawn from the television news broadcasts Tg1, Tg2, Tg3, Tg5, TgLa7, and the newspapers, Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, La Stampa, Il Fatto Quotidiano, Il Giornale between 7 April and 24 May 2019. See: European elections 2019: Media, Voters, Results published by the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena, available at https://interd ispoc.unisi.it/en/journal/media-party-leaders-and-the-2019-eu-elections. 3 See footnote 2. 4 Figures derived from European elections 2019: see footnote 2.

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20085 ). Concerning the EU, after a period of harsh scepticism (e.g. in its 2018 campaign it had held out the possibility of a referendum on Italy’s membership of the Euro), the M5s had adopted more moderate positions. Although populist-style criticism of the Commission is still a relevant feature of the Movement’s campaigning, it should be noted that, together with the principal mainstream and pro-European groups in the European Parliament—the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats and Renew Europe—it supported Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment as President of the European Commission. For the PD and its newly elected secretary, Zingaretti, the European elections were a crucial moment. After the serious defeat at the general election of 4 March 2018, the 2019 European elections represented an opportunity to relaunch the party. Although reaching the level of support achieved in 2014 (when, as mentioned, Renzi led the party to around 40% of the vote) was never in prospect, the PD achieved a respectable result, managing at least to retain the absolute number of votes received in 2018 (about 6 million). In the light of the lower turnout, the result suggested that the PD had at least been successful in mobilising support in its heartlands. Analysis of individual-level vote switching suggested that the party had very limited ability to extend its support beyond its core constituency, and very limited appeal among other parties’ voters. Although it no longer risks losing voters—unlike FI which is still losing them to the League’s advantage—at the same time, it is in an isolated position since potential allies on the left or centre-left are virtually non-existent and potential new voters seem hard to attract.6

Voters’ Opinions Concerning Europe and the EU Euroscepticism is becoming mainstream across Europe (De Vries 2018). There are several indicators of this. In particular, the success of populist parties—which indulge in anti-elite rhetoric when depicting the EU

5 V-day, in Grillo’s words, is short for Vaffanculo Day (Fuck-off Day). In 2008 the V-Day took place on 25 April. The date was symbolic since it coincided with the Italian Liberation day, commemorating the end of Nazi occupation during World War II. In 2008, the thematic focus of the V-day was protest against the Italian media and information system, including promotion of a referendum calling for an end to public subsidies of newspapers. 6 European elections 2019.

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institutions—and the revival of nationalist claims blaming the EU for depriving member states of their authority, both suggest that the European integration project is currently being widely questioned (Pirro et al. 2018; Pirro and Taggart 2018; Rooduijn 2018). In addition, the growing prominence of Eurosceptical feelings also concern—and sometimes especially so—those countries usually labelled as Europhile and openly supportive of the European Union (Conti 2015; Conti and Memoli 2010; Huysseune 2010). Scholars tend to attribute this Eurosceptic turn to the Great Recession. More precisely, the failure of national governments to mitigate the effects of the recession, and their endorsement of the austerity policies demanded by the EU Commission during the most difficult years of the crisis, has helped to facilitate the rise of parties and movements critical of the European integration project as a whole. Italy has not been immune to this shift in public attitudes towards the EU. In this respect, the data collected for the Eurobarometer survey are particularly valuable. Indeed, they offer a better understanding of ongoing dynamics than most other data sources, as they also make it possible to observe from a longitudinal perspective the transformation of Italian sentiment towards the European Union. In particular, Fig. 8.1 illustrates the changes in perceptions of the EU from 2000 to 2018. Throughout the 18-year period covered by this trend, we observe the prominence of 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000

2002

2004

Very negative

2006

2008

Fairly negative

2010

2012 Fairly positive

2014

2016

2018

Very positive

Fig. 8.1 In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? (Source Eurobarometer)

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a consistently positive image of the EU. However, there are some quite notable shifts. While in 2000 we can see a quite marked positive image of the EU, with ‘fairly’ and ‘very positive’ images accounting for over the 50% of the Italian sample, in 2018 Italian public opinion appears far less supportive (with slightly more than 30% having a positive image of the EU). There is a turning point in 2008 when the proportion of respondents saying they have a ‘fairly negative’ image of the EU starts to increase, reaching its highest level in 2012. Since then, this mildly negative sentiment has stabilised at about one-fourth of the Italian sample. If we look at those Eurobarometer respondents reporting more extreme opinions (‘very positive’ versus ‘very negative’ images) the pattern is similar. However, in recent years those with a very negative image of the EU are a larger proportion than those having a very positive image. What happened during these 18 years? Two different elements should be considered, and the trend data make it possible clearly to identify two different moments of crisis in the relationship between Italian public opinion and the EU. The first one takes place in 2004 with the EU’s enlargement. Between 2004 and 2007, indeed, several countries from Eastern Europe became members of the European Union implying a quite significant redefinition of the EU budget as well as domestic economic consequences relating to the free movement of people and goods from the new member states. The second takes place in 2012, which is a very particular year for Italian politics. Mario Monti and his ‘technocratic’ government had just taken office supported by both leftand right-wing parties. In December 2011, a few weeks after it was installed, the Government enacted the Finance Act, which introduced a set of austerity policies. The slogan ‘Ce lo chiede l’Europa’ (Europe asks this of us) became a mantra for the Government, with the unfortunate consequence of feeding further criticism of the EU. Populist parties, such as the M5s and the League, found very fertile ground for their Eurosceptical rhetoric. Figure 8.2 presents the trend in Italian citizens’ opinions about the benefit to the country of being a member of the EU. The data range from 1983 to 2010, making it possible to verify whether criticism of the EU is only a recent phenomenon or whether it is actually the reflection of a longer-term process of change made explicit by the Great Recession. The trend data seem to suggest that detachment from the EU had actually already begun during the 1980s. If, in 1983, 70% of the sample considered that Italy benefitted from EU membership, then in

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80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1983

1986

1989

1992

1995 Benefited

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

Not benefited

Fig. 8.2 Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Italy has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU? (Source Eurobarometer)

2010 this proportion accounted for slightly less than 50% of the respondents. This pattern is combined with a steady increase in the proportion of those judging that Italy had not benefitted from having joined the EU. While in 1983 they were one-fifth of the Eurobarometer’s respondents, in 2010 they were about 40%. Again, the dates are not irrelevant. This wider perspective on Italian public opinion makes it possible to see that dissatisfaction with the EU is not only related to the Great Recession of 2008. Signs of criticism could be found even before, and precisely when the European project started to affect the domestic budget issue. It is no accident that the rising criticism coincides with the gathering momentum of debate about the Maastricht Treaty and the financial requirements for participating in the process of EMU. This brief longitudinal analysis has provided us with some clues for better interpreting the changes occurring in public attitudes towards the EU. In order to provide a more precise picture of current Italian sentiments towards the European Union, we also considered data collected for the Standard Eurobarometer 90 in November 2018, the last survey administrated before the EP elections. Table 8.2 provides information about Italian citizens’ trust in European institutions. The data are quite clear. There is a prevailing sentiment of distrust towards the EU, with 55% of the respondents tending not to trust, against a minority (accounting for slightly more than one-third of

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Table 8.2 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union (%)

Tend to trust Tend not to trust Don’t know N

36 55 9 1021

Source Standard Eurobarometer 90–November 2018

the sample) tending to trust the EU. These data are self-explanatory and would be enough to certify that the relationship between Italian public opinion and the EU has entered upon a new path. Further data provide confirmation of the sense of dissatisfaction. Table 8.3 addresses a burning issue, namely, the functioning of democracy within the European institutions. The literature on this topic is extensive (see Crombez 2003; Decker 2002; Katz 2001). The EU is often blamed for a lack of legitimacy, as well as for excessively bureaucratic procedures, which result in ineffectiveness in EU decision-making. The Italian data are interesting from this point of view. First of all, the respondents saying they are extremely satisfied with the way democracy works within EU institutions are a tiny proportion of the sample (1%), while those declaring themselves to be fairly satisfied amount to 41%. Altogether, therefore, those satisfied account for 42% of the Italian sample. More common, according to these data, is a sense of dissatisfaction with the democratic functioning of the EU. 38% report being not very satisfied, 14% not at all satisfied. Overall, negative sentiment accounts for the majority of the Table 8.3 How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU? (%)

Very satisfied Fairly satisfied Not very satisfied Not at all satisfied Don’t know N Source Standard Eurobarometer 90–November 2018

1 41 38 14 6 1021

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Table 8.4 Please tell me how attached you feel to the European Union (%)

Very attached Fairly attached Not very attached Not at all attached Don’t know N

177

8 41 32 17 2 1021

Source Standard Eurobarometer 90–November 2018

sample (52%). Similar patterns emerge with regard to Italian citizens’ attachments to the European Union (see Table 8.4). In this case too, it is worth noting the polarisation of respondents. Those claiming some sense of attachment to the EU amount to 49% overall (with 8% declaring themselves to be very attached, 41% fairly attached). Those reporting feelings of detachment from the European Union also amount to 49%, but with 32% describing themselves as not very attached, 17% describing themselves as not at all attached. Nonetheless, it is very interesting to observe that this distribution of attitudes does not correspond actually and precisely with feelings of European identity (Table 8.5). Respondents for the most part feel themselves to be citizens of the EU (59%), while those questioning their European identities constitute a smaller proportion of respondents (40%). Our investigation of Italian citizens’ opinions about the EU ends with a focus on the main problems, which, according to respondents, should be at the top of the European agenda. The data in this respect are not surprising and they reflect quite closely respondents’ domestic concerns. Table 8.6 shows that immigration is viewed as the most important challenge currently facing the EU (41%) followed by unemployment (34%). Economic issues emerge as extremely significant, even if they are wide Table 8.5 For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion: You feel you are a citizen of the EU (%)

Yes, definitely Yes, to some extent No, not really No, definitely not Don’t know N Source Standard Eurobarometer 90–November 2018

16 43 30 10 1 1021

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Table 8.6 What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment? (%)

Immigration Unemployment Economic situation Terrorism The state of Member States’ public finances Climate change Taxation Pensions EU’s influence in the world The environment Energy supply Don’t know N

41 34 27 15 14 11 10 6 5 5 3 1 1021

Note Up to two answers were possible Source Standard Eurobarometer 90–November 2018

ranging. Indeed, more than one interviewee in four signals that the economic situation is the most important problem that the EU should address (27%). This evidence should be read in conjunction with the data referring to the state of member states’ public finances (14%) and the same applies to answers relating to taxation (10%) and pensions (6%). Apparently, despite the fact that immigration emerges as the most important issue facing the EU, the consequences of the economic crisis are still high on the list of Italian citizens’ concerns. Finally, it is worth noting that issues related to climate change, more in general to the environment and the energy supply are among the most important for respectively 11%, 5% and 3% of the sample. Incidentally, these issues lay at the core of the agenda of the new EU Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen.

Europe and the EU in the PD Election Manifesto This section will look at the positioning of the PD towards the EU by analysing the election manifesto. Although election manifestos are no longer central to parties’ communication or in the public debate, analysis of the proposals they contain makes it possible to identify the parties’ orientations to the main issues of society in terms of the parties’ perceived relevance of problems, and their proposed solutions. As regards its length and its layout, the PD manifesto is a text consisting of 118 sentences, 20 pages long, which, after a general

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preamble, focuses on four different sets of proposals. These have quite vague titles. They refer to (i) sustainable development and social cohesion (A new Europe with people at the centre); (ii) protection and enhancement of local production and the cultures of the different European territories (A new Europe close to the territories); (iii) international relations and foreign affairs (A new Europe, protagonist in the world); (iv) institutional reform (A new, more democratic, Europe). The first and third sections are the more relevant in terms of the space accorded to them: respectively 33 and 25 of the 118 sentences. The remaining two are shorter, about half the length: 13 and 14 sentences respectively. Moving to the content of proposals, our analysis relied on a simplified version of the guidelines of the Comparative Manifesto Project.7 First of all, this allowed us to distinguish the sentences containing references to policies from those containing abstract and generic statements. The data show that references to policies are found in 36% of the total but that their distribution among the four main sections in skewed. The first—sustainable development and social cohesion—is one of the more concrete (78% of the statements refers to a policy) together with the last—institutional reforms (50%). The two remaining sections—protection and enhancement of local production and cultures (15%) and international relations and foreign affairs (28%)—are instead more blurred and mainly based on statements of principle. Table 8.7 shows the distribution of relevant topics in the manifesto. Two of them clearly stand out. They are EU values, and the economy. The first category covers a wide range of proposals which can however be summarised as democracy, peace and citizens’ rights (30 sentences) along with a ‘social Europe’ and inclusiveness (22 sentences). The second category includes both general references to economic growth and development, as well as precise proposals concerning the labour market and enterprises. In general, the PD manifesto is close to that of the Party of European Socialists.8 The EU itself is never criticised. Critical points are made only in the spirit of finding viable means to strengthen the European project and institutions. The EU continues to be the natural forum in which Italy can overcome its economic and social difficulties. This means investing money in the labour market, leaving behind austerity policies,

7 Available at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/. 8 Available at https://www.pes.eu/en/manifesto2019/.

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Table 8.7 Distribution of topics in the PD manifesto

References to a topic ( N) EU values Economy Environment International relations Education and culture Domestic issues Immigration Agriculture EU institutional reform EP elections Taxation EU security Total

% of total sentences ( N = 118)

52 31 14 14

44.1 26.3 11.9 11.9

9

7.6

6 5 5 5

5.1 4.2 4.2 4.2

4 4 3 152

3.4 3.4 2.5 128.8%a

Note a The percentage is over 100% because for each sentence up to three different topics were coded

putting finance at the service of citizens, bringing people back to the centre of the European project and claiming a leading role for Europe not only in economic but also in political and cultural terms.

Europe and the EU in the Party’s Communication This section will offer an analysis of the election communication carried out by the PD before the European elections. The aim was to provide empirical evidence about the substance of the controlled communication of the PD. More precisely, we intended to clarify whether and to what extent the party’s election campaign focused on European issues rather than revolving around domestic conflict. We focused on Facebook since social media nowadays represent the most important communication platform for political parties. The absence of journalistic mediation, along with the interaction allowed to followers in terms of reactions, shares and comments, make Facebook particularly interesting for our purposes because it allows us to collect information about both contents and their

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18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4

Total FB messages (n)

26-mag

24-mag

25-mag

23-mag

22-mag

20-mag

21-mag

19-mag

18-mag

16-mag

17-mag

15-mag

14-mag

13-mag

12-mag

10-mag

11-mag

09-mag

08-mag

07-mag

06-mag

05-mag

03-mag

04-mag

02-mag

30-apr

01-mag

28-apr

29-apr

27-apr

2 0

FB messages focusing on EU (n)

Fig. 8.3 Trend data of the PD’s Facebook activity during the election campaign (27 April–26 May 2019) (Source ITEM 2019)

engagement. Therefore, we relied on the ITEM 2019 dataset9 including all the Facebook messages published on the PD’s publicly-facing page during the last four weeks before the vote (27 April–26 May 2020). As illustrated by Fig. 8.3, the PD’s activity on Facebook increased during the election campaign, and this is especially true for Facebook messages relating to EU issues. These posts were analysed using human content analysis along different dimensions, identifying references to: (a) the EU or domestic issues; (b) EU values; (c) EU candidates; (d) specific policy issues. For each post, we also collected information about its impact and virality. Thus, the dataset also includes the total number of: (a) reactions; (b) shares; (c) comments. The sum of these three values provides us with the overall level of (d) engagement obtained by the single post. In total, as detailed in Table 8.8, the PD published 272 posts during the four weeks before 26 May, that is, about nine posts per day. More precisely, 39.3% of the published Facebook messages dealt with issues related to the EU or EU institutions, such as the election campaign, EU policy issues or domestic policies related to the EU. Data on engagement provide interesting information about the circulation of the Facebook messages published by the PD. Indeed, we observe that posts focusing on EU issues have systematically lower levels of engagement, with 541 reactions versus the 609 for Facebook messages related to other contents. We

9 ‘ITEM—ITalian Election in the Media, 2018’, is a research project sponsored by the Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Pubblica of the University of Turin.

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Table 8.8 Facebook posts with EU focus and average engagement level Reactions

Comments

Shares

Engagement

%

Avg

Avg

Avg

Avg

60.7 39.3 100.0

609 541 582

163 127 149

154 133 146

927 801 877

EU N Other content EU-related content Total

165 107 272

Source ITEM 2019

found similar patterns for comments (127 versus 163) and shares (154 versus 133). Table 8.9 instead shows that among the 107 posts devoted to European topics, the PD gave special emphasis to the election. 67.3% of these messages referred to the election campaign, focusing especially on appeals to vote, slogans and the candidates running in the elections. It should be noted that the messages explicitly referring to the European elections are often combined with references to more specific topics (see below). Once more, as concerns the kind of social media circulation obtained by EU-related contents, we again notice that these messages stimulated a lower level of engagement when compared with the other Facebook posts focusing on contents related to the EU. Table 8.10 illustrates the extent to which the PD’s communication on Facebook engaged with EU values. The proportion of Facebook messages referring to EU values amounts to 30.8% of the posts focusing on European issues. The references to EU values could be placed into two main categories, on the one hand the role of the EU in safeguarding democracy Table 8.9 Facebook posts with EU focus and their content and average engagement level Reactions

Comments

Shares

Engagement

%

Avg

Avg

Avg

Avg

35

32.7

570

108

143

821.29

72

67.3

527

137

128

791.13

107

100.0

541

127

133

801

EU N Other EU-related content Campaign and candidate focus Total Source ITEM 2019

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Table 8.10 Facebook posts with EU focus and reference to EU values and average engagement level Reactions

Comments

Shares

Engagement

%

Avg

Avg

Avg

Avg

74

69.2

626

161

159

946

33

30.8

266

64

49

379

13

12.1

294

43

43

380

20 107

18.7 100.0

248 541

78 127

53 133

379 801

EU N Other EU-related content Reference to EU values Democracy, peace and rights Social EU Total Source ITEM 2019

and peace (12.1%), on the other hand, the effort of the EU in supporting social inclusiveness (18.7%). These data are interesting since they allow us to understand better the kind of EU for which the PD campaigned. More specifically, the PD emphasises in particular the necessity to redefine the European integration project in terms of aims and principles in defence of social demands. It is argued that there is a need to set aside the economic and financial dimension in order to engage in a programme of European policies promoting employment and fighting economic and social inequality. It is worth noting that these two arguments are often juxtaposed to populist and nationalist claims made by the (Northern) League. Table 8.11 presents detailed data about the topics addressed by the PD’s Facebook communication during the European election campaign. Apart from the focus on EU values discussed above, it is interesting to observe the heterogeneity of the topics addressed by the PD’s communication. For each Facebook message, we coded up to three different possible topics. The results are interesting and to some extent reflect the issues at the top of Italian citizens’ agendas identified by the Standard Eurobarometer 90. Indeed, more than one post in four make reference to economic development. Notably, the PD highlights the importance of the EU for the development of the Italian economy, especially as it relates to the labour market, employment and economic growth in general (36.3%). As underlined above, the Facebook communication of the PD also focuses considerably on EU values. Almost one post in three provides arguments

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Table 8.11 Facebook posts with EU focus and topics and average engagement level EU N

Reactions Comments Shares Engagement %

% of cases

Mean

Labour market—Enterprise— 37 27.4% 36.3% 283 Economic growth—Development EU values 33 24.4% 32.4% 300 Domestic conflict 24 17.8% 23.5% 769 Environment 17 12.6% 16.7% 179 European electiona 11 8.1% 10.8% 1485 Immigration 8 5.9% 7.8% 749 Agriculture 3 2.2% 2.9% 84 Education 2 1.5% 2% 440 Total 135 100.0%132.4% b 541

Mean

Mean

Mean

57

59

399

69 147 41 458 178 15 59 127

62 177 40 481 131 19 83 133

431 1093 261 2423 1058 118 582 801

Note a This category includes those posts providing just appeals to vote, without any further related topics b The percentage is over 100% because for each Facebook post it was possible to code up to three different topics Source ITEM 2019

about the role of Europe in promoting values such as democracy, peace, civil rights and social inclusion. It is worth noting too that the PD also underlined its commitment to environmental protection, and fighting climate change (16.7%). Interestingly, the proportion of Facebook posts focusing on environmental issues is even higher than the proportion of messages referring to immigration (7.8%) which, as also emerged from the Eurobarometer data, was at the core of the public agenda. It is worth noting that the immigration crisis was a topic very often associated with domestic conflict and in particular with criticism of the (Northern) League’s anti-immigrant rhetoric. In this respect, it should be underlined that the domestic conflict between government and opposition was also quite a relevant topic addressed by the PD’s campaign communication on Facebook. Indeed, more than one-fifth of the messages focusing on the EU involved some kind of link with domestic political debate (23.5%).

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Conclusion The European Union is not in good shape, at least if seen from Italy. Italy has for long been considered a Europhile country, supportive of the European integration project where the public tended to show higher levels of trust in European than in domestic institutions. Something has changed recently. The rise of populist parties and the growing appeal of their rhetoric in public debate are just the most visible signals. Of course, the Great Recession helped to politicise the EU and its policies, and this new centrality in political debate very quickly turned into criticism on the part of political actors and then on the part of ordinary citizens. However, closer inspection of the data reveals that detachment from the European idea has been developing (and growing) since the 1980s. It exploded recently, but actually, it is rooted in the past. Eurobarometer data show rather clearly that the proportion of those thinking of EU membership as a benefit started to decline during the 1980s and latent dissatisfaction began to grow. This could be interpreted as a consequence of the growing significance of the EU for the domestic policy agenda. In other words, as the European integration project developed, so did the kind of commitment it required and consequently, besides the benefits there was growing awareness of the constraints it involved. The Great Recession not only made these constraints visible, but also made them binding—especially because of the unfortunate economic situation of the country and the need to comply with EU financial requirements. This combination of factors made it very easy for Eurosceptic (and what came to be called populist) parties to campaign against Brussels and so gain popular support. However, in this critical and negative climate of opinion surrounding the EU integration project one particular figure emerging from the Eurobarometer is especially interesting. While the figures concerning trust in and satisfaction with the EU institutions signal a decreasingly supportive mood, when asked about their identities as European citizens, Italians still appear close to a European ideal. More than rejection of the European project in principle, Italian respondents seem to express discontent with the current political situation, whereas EU ideals and values continue to be accepted. These background data help us better to understand the role played by the PD during the most recent European elections. The main result emerging from the analysis relates to the absence of criticism of the EU. Neither in the manifesto nor in the controlled Facebook communication

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was it possible to find negative references to the European integration project. The PD, indeed, interpreted its role as a Europhile party by underlining in particular the importance of the EU in defending values such as democracy and peace, and by emphasising the idea of a ‘social Europe’ engaged in promoting social inclusiveness. It is interesting to observe that, with regard to the policy dimension, the PD focused its attention on the economy and the labour market in particular. As emerged both from the manifesto and the communication materials, the EU was recognised as the political actor with the greatest significance for the economic development of the country. In this sense, tension between domestic and EU agendas was not at all present. On the contrary, the PD’s manifesto aimed to promote domestic reform within a European framework, emphasising the need to set aside austerity policies in favour of supporting ordinary citizens and their needs. Finally, analysis of the manifesto revealed a new (and more specific) interest in environmental issues, reflecting the agenda of the PES’ Spitzenkandidat, Frans Timmermans. In sum, the data on both the party manifesto and the controlled communication on Facebook, present the picture of a party strongly and firmly supporting the EU integration project. The PD acted as a champion of EU values. Even if this pro-European rhetoric was often deployed as part of a strategy to counter the League and its Eurosceptic claims, in essence the party promoted a truly European vision and showed staunch support for the EU going beyond its instrumental value in the pursuit of domestic political ambitions.

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CHAPTER 9

The UK and the Labour Party Eric Shaw

Introduction Ever since the beginnings of European integration, Labour’s European policy has been characterised by ambiguities and contradictions, oscillations and omissions. This has been for two main reasons. Firstly, the party has always been divided over Europe between the enthusiasts, the sceptics and the disengaged. Secondly, European Union has never been a popular cause in Britain: there has never been political mileage in flaunting European credentials. Indeed since the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the unremitting hostility of the right-wing tabloid press, with their familiar trope of the UK being outmanoeuvred by less scrupulous foreign (especially German and French) powers powerfully influenced the parameters of public debate. Further, after 2000 the question of relations with the EU became increasingly entwined with the volatile issue of immigration. The anti-European party UKIP, exploiting these issues, rose swiftly in the polls; the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party became ever more restive and influential and the Tory government responded by promising a referendum. The 2016 referendum, with its unexpected

E. Shaw (B) University of Stirling, Stirling, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_9

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decision to quit the EU, has had the most profound repercussions, with Brexit becoming the most explosive issue in British politics. Ever since Jeremy Corbyn’s astonishing election as Labour leader, the party has wrestled with the issue. For the 2017 general election, it evolved the stance of ‘constructive ambiguity’, effectively offering a ‘soft Brexit’ sufficiently ambiguous (it seemed) to placate Remainers whilst reassuring Leavers. The election, in which Europe did not figure as a major issue, saw Labour polling far better than expected, though still losing. It won 40% of the vote, a jump of 10% since the last election in 2015, compared to the Tories’ 42.3%, the Scottish National Party’s 3% and the Liberal Democrats’ paltry 7.4%. Without a majority and relying on the DUP for its survival, the Prime Minister, Theresa May, committed herself to a ‘hard Brexit’. From that point on, British politics was dominated by Brexit as the May government struggled, without success, to secure a deal which could command a majority in the House of Commons. But an issue which so damagingly divided the Tory party also fractured Labour. Its attempts to hammer out a policy which was both clear, unambiguous and feasible, and could accommodate differences of opinion both within its own ranks and the wider Labour electorate, signally failed. The 2019 European Parliament elections were in a sense a verdict on this, with Labour scoring a smaller percentage of the poll than at any time since 1910. In retrospect, this outcome presaged the far more debilitating defeat in the December 2019 general election, when Brexit dominated all other policy issues. Labour’s share of the poll, at 32%, shrank by 8% points and the party slumped to its smallest number of MPs since the election of 1935. There was much criticism over Labour’s temporising and inept leadership—as there had been since the 2016 referendum. But the roots both of Labour’s poor performance in the two elections lay much deeper; for its inability to devise a coherent policy reflected deep fissures in the party and in its voting base. These were essentially twofold. Firstly, there was a longstanding conflict, primarily economic in nature, over whether membership of the EU provided a forum for the pursuit of social-democratic values and goals. On the one hand, there were those who contended that in a setting where globalisation had imposed tight constraints on the freedom of the nation state to pursue the social-democratic project, European integration offered the opportunity to breathe new life into it. On the other, there were those who claimed that the EU was so permeated by

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free-market rules and principles that membership would bind a Labour government to neoliberal policies. The second conflict was cultural and whilst evident for some time, had been much deepened by the referendum. This conflict was between social liberal Remainers for whom membership of the EU symbolised a commitment to the values of tolerance, open-mindedness and internationalism, and Leavers who believed that only by respecting the results of the referendum could Labour retain the allegiance of its more socially conservative, mainly working-class voters. The Corbyn leadership’s attempt to balance and reconcile these two cleavages in the formulation of its European policy will be a prime theme of this chapter.

Labour and the EU: Historical Setting The Labour party is unique within European social democracy in its perennial ambivalence towards ‘Europe’. Its precise stance has oscillated over the years, as the balance of power and opinion in the party has fluctuated. But it has rarely exhibited much enthusiasm about engaging constructively with Europe, nor has membership been a significant reference-point for its policy deliberations. Even when in government and broadly sympathetic to the EU (as with the Blair/Brown governments) it has, at best, been halting, tepid and wary about schemes for further European integration. To understand why we need a brief excursion into the party’s history. The party had been divided over the Common Market (or EEC) at least as far back as 1962 when its then leader, Hugh Gaitskell, declared that participation in a federal Europe would mean ‘the end of Britain as an independent European state, the end of a thousand years of history’. But the issue only really emerged as a major item on Labour’s agenda with the abortive bid by Harold Wilson’s Labour government to join the Common Market in 1967. This was vetoed by Charles De Gaulle. Six years later the Heath Conservative government was successful, but the debate over joining the EEC caused a deep and acrimonious split with the opposition Labour party, broadly on left-right divisions. As his prime object was to maintain party unity, Wilson proposed that a future Labour government would renegotiate the terms of entry and then hold a referendum to allow the final judgement to be left to the electorate. With Labour’s return to power in 1974, a renegotiation (largely presentational) took place and a referendum was announced. Labour was evenly divided

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(with the left almost unanimously calling for the UK’s withdrawal from the EEC) but with the backing of the Conservatives and Liberals the referendum endorsed membership by a two-thirds majority. Wilson had skilfully navigated his party into accepting a European destiny. However, the party’s swing to the left revived the issue. With the left, led by Tony Benn controlling (briefly) the party’s influential National Executive Committee, the manifesto for the 1983 election contained a pledge that a future Labour government would quit the European Community (as it was now called), though without a referendum. The main grounds were economic and ideological. The EC was seen as an organisation wedded to free-market principles and governed by rules that would prevent the implementation of the party’s Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), which consisted of a highly interventionist industrial policy, nationalisations, import controls and a major Keynesian spending programme. After Labour’s electoral collapse in 1983, the pledge to quit the EC was hurriedly buried and, under Neil Kinnock’s leadership (1983–1992) a process of re-engaging with Europe began. This was gradual and cautious but was accelerated by the speech delivered to the TUC in 1988 by the president of the European Commission and former French socialist minister, Jacques Delors, in which he called for a much firmer ‘social dimension’. The unions were impressed and became much more sympathetic to the EC than hitherto. Mrs. Thatcher’s increasingly strident criticism of what was soon (and symbolically) retitled the European Union helped, at least psychologically, as many within Labour’s ranks concluded that an institution so reviled by her must have some merit. By the end of the 1980s, Labour had replaced the Tories as the more pro-European of the two major parties. For example, it endorsed UK membership of the European Single Market, though urging a stronger social aspect, and drew somewhat closer to its European sister parties. By the 1990s, the consensus within the Labour party was that Britain’s economic future was inextricably bound up with EU membership. Most on the centre-right and the ‘soft left’ of the party came to believe that ‘socialism in one country’ was a blind alley and that social-democratic aims could most effectively be pursued through the framework of the EU and in collaboration with like-minded forces. The domestic economy could not be insulated against pressures emanating from an increasingly economically interdependent world, and an economic policy based on national economic sovereignty was futile (Daniels 1998: 83). Pooling

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sovereignty within the EU and co-ordinated policy-making was the best way of advancing Labour’s traditional goals (Hickson and Miles 2018: 875). The so-called hard left of the party remained irreconciled but its influence, by this time, was negligible. The advent of the New Labour government in 1997 saw relations with the EU placed on a more friendly and constructive footing after long years of Conservative obstruction. One of its first steps was to abandon the UK’s opt-out over the European Social Chapter. It also agreed to the extension of qualified majority voting in the EU’s Council of Ministers, advocated greater defence and security co-operation and was an eager advocate of admitting East European countries to the Union. The UK was now ‘a willing partner’ in the EU (Bulmer 2008: 601). On one critical issue there was a serious division in the government. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was eager to secure British membership of the newly established single currency area (the Eurozone) but his powerful Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was not. The latter prevailed. He insisted that UK membership must be conditional on the meeting of five economic tests, knowing they could not be all met. As a result, on 9 June 2003, he announced that the UK would not become part of the Eurozone (Bulmer 2008: 603). On wider issues there was a consensus within the New Labour government. But those who hoped and anticipated that the government would work energetically to construct a more vibrant ‘social Europe’, in which a Labour Britain would work closely with its sister parties to promote a social-democratic Europe, were disappointed. As Tony Blair’s former advisor, Patrick Diamond, recalled, ministers ‘wanted the EU to be a dynamic market competing with the rest of the world in an era of globalisation, but were resistant to Europe as a guiding light for solidarity and equality’ (Diamond 2017). The enlarged EU, Brown declared in 2004, ‘must think globally, reform, be flexible and rise to meet the competitive challenge of globalisation’ (quoted in Schnapper 2015: 168). The challenge of globalisation could best be met, not by ‘excessive’ regulation, but by liberalisation of the financial sector and more flexible labour markets (Fella 2006: 399). After Labour’s defeat in the 2010 election, Ed Miliband replaced Brown as party leader. He exhibited little sustained interest in relations with the EU. To the extent that it impinged on his agenda, it was over the ramifications of membership for British domestic politics, especially concerning immigration—and the concomitant rise of UKIP. In a rare

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speech on Europe in November 2012, he urged a ‘more flexible European Union, where some countries pursue deeper integration and others don’t’ (Hertner and Keith 2017: 13). Indeed, he proposed a ‘new lock’ that would guarantee that no transfer of powers would be accepted without an in/out referendum. Under Miliband, the party took little interest in the activities and future direction of the Union and, indeed, during the 2014 European Parliament elections its campaign focused almost exclusively on domestic issues (Hertner and Keith 2017: 21). Though by inclination sympathetic to developing a European social-democratic order, he saw no point in expending scarce political capital in promoting it and the UK’s membership of the EU was defended solely in terms of palpable gains to the national interest.

Corbyn, the EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election After Labour’s unexpected defeat in 2015, Miliband abruptly resigned and, in a political earthquake, was replaced in September 2015, by Jeremy Corbyn from the hard left of the party. A long-standing Eurosceptic he was a disciple of Tony Benn, the party’s principle exponent of withdrawal from the Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Corbyn had voted against membership in the 1975 referendum and he opposed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In a speech to the House of Commons in January 1993, he warned that the treaty, with its establishment of an independent European central bank, amounted to ‘the imposition of a bankers’ Europe on the people of this continent [which] will endanger the cause of socialism in the United Kingdom and in any other country’ (Stone 2015). In May the same year he claimed that Maastricht would deprive national parliaments of ‘the power to set economic policy and hand it over to an unelected set of bankers who will impose the economic policies of price stability, deflation and high unemployment throughout the European Community’ (Corbyn 1993). Fifteen years later, he denounced the Lisbon Treaty asserting that ‘under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, Europe will become subservient to the wishes of NATO and the aims of NATO….What it does is create this military machine, this military Frankenstein, which will be so damaging to all of us’ (Kentish 2019). None of this suggested much goodwill towards the EU. However, in the run-up to the 2016 referendum, Corbyn sounded a quite different note. He argued that there was ‘a strong socialist case for staying in the

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European Union’, noting that EU membership had ‘guaranteed working people vital employment rights’ and raised Britain’s environmental standards. He now declared that the world’s most crucial challenges—global warming, ‘the overweening power of global corporations’ and rampant corporate tax avoidance—could only be resolved by collective international action through the European Union (Corbyn 2016). He continued to criticise the Union’s shortcomings, such as restrictions on state aid, the ‘institutional pressure to deregulate or privatise public services’ and the lack of democratic accountability, but nevertheless favoured redressing these through reforms in co-operation with political allies within the EU. How much this reflected genuine conviction rather than the need to placate very strong pro-Remain sentiment is a moot point. Pro-Europeans were not reassured by Corbyn’s lukewarm, lacklustre, even lethargic participation in the campaign, or by his refusal to work closely with the official Remain organisation, ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’. Not surprisingly, according to one campaign poll, almost half of all Labour voters did not think that Labour wanted to retain membership in the EU (Goodwin and Ford 2017: 8–9). Such was the anger with Corbyn’s half-hearted campaigning that, in the wake of the shock result, an attempt was made to oust him. Long-simmering hostility on a range of issues erupted with a mass resignation from the shadow cabinet and the overwhelming passage by Labour MPs of a motion of no confidence in the leader who was forced into a second leadership contest. But his opponents had seriously miscalculated. Corbyn crushed his challenger for the leadership (Owen Smith) and his authority in the party was bolstered. The impact of Brexit was profound. The parameters of Labour thinking shifted with many believing that the party now had no option but to respect the outcome of the referendum and to push for a ‘soft Brexit’. This was the stance taken by the party in its manifesto for the 2017 snap election called by Mrs. May as opinion polls indicated a major Tory victory. Confirming that Labour would accept the referendum result, the manifesto advocated a Brexit that would protect jobs, workers’ rights, living standards and environmental standards. It added that any agreement negotiated by Labour would entail membership of ‘a’ Customs Union and ‘close alignment’ with the single market though precisely what these commitments meant was not spelt out—nor was it to be in subsequent years (Labour Party 2017). It was a posture that came to be dubbed ‘constructive ambiguity’ which may well have benefited the party in the 2017 election since though

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two-thirds of Labour voters had backed Remain, one-third had opted for Leave. However, its major gains were amongst the young, well-educated professionals and voters living in the South: all categories which registered high rates of support for staying in the EU. Conversely, there was a belowaverage swing (or none at all) to Labour amongst the older, the less well educated, the working class and voters living in the North and Midlands, many of whom favoured Brexit. To further complicate Labour’s problems, although most Labour voters were Remainers, two-thirds of Labour MPs were elected for Leave constituencies. The problem for Labour, as negotiations between the UK and the EU over Brexit got under way, was that ‘constructive ambiguity’ was less a policy than a slogan and there was no consensus over precisely what it meant. Both the leadership and the wider party were badly divided, as we see below, and in multiple ways. The net result was endless, protracted and often opaque discussions as the party inched, slowly, towards endorsing a second referendum. Seeking to appeal to both sides of the debate, the danger, it soon became evident, was that it was appealing to neither. In April 2019, as the European elections drew nearer, the influential columnist Polly Toynbee noted that ‘Corbyn has been badly damaged by emerging, for the first time in his life, as an evasive fudger, opaque on a crystal-clear question’ (Toynbee 2019).

Labour and the 2019 European Elections The Tory government’s goal was to secure the UK’s exit from the EU by 29 March, obviating the need to participate in the 2019 European elections. However, the date passed with no withdrawal arrangement in sight, and in April, the European summit agreed a delay until 31 October. This meant that the UK would have to take part in the elections for the European Parliament held on Thursday, 23 May 2019. Neither of the major parties were keen participants, nor inclined to commit much in the way of time, energy and resources. The contest for seats in the European parliament has, in the UK, always been a ‘secondorder election’ (Hobolt 2016). Voters customarily use the election to deliver a verdict—usually a negative one—on the national government’s domestic record. As a result, the government concentrates on its claimed accomplishments at home, the opposition parties on its failures. Specifically, European issues hardly figure, and parties do not campaign as members of Europe-wide alliances.

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The 2019 European election differed in that Brexit eclipsed all other issues. Labour vacillated on whether to commit to a second referendum as favoured by the Remainers in the party, such as Tom Watson, the deputy leader not least to mobilise the pro-European section of the electorate. The leadership was not persuaded and eventually, after prolonged and often fractious debate, it was agreed that the party would contest the European parliament elections without a firm pledge to hold a second referendum, though this would be an ‘option’. Labour’s European manifesto reiterated a number of familiar pledges. It would, for example, promote EU-wide efforts to close tax loopholes and tax havens exploited by large corporations and the super-rich. It would work with others to establish a Robin Hood Tax on financial transactions to raise further revenue to fund public services. But there was no evidence of any effort to construct a common policy platform with other social-democratic parties (there was only a single casual reference to the Party of European Socialists) or to develop schemes of practical collaboration (Labour Party 2019). In large part, consistently with the election’s ‘second-order’ status, much of the manifesto was focused on domestic policy issues and did not remotely read as a programme for the EU. No attempt was made to extol shared European values and culture or urge a European social-democratic project. The results for Labour were very dispiriting. Nigel Farage’s six-weekold Brexit party topped the poll with 30.5% of the vote. The strongly pro-Remain Liberal Democrats were runners-up with 19.6% of the vote, their best result since 2010. Labour trailed in a dismal third place with 13.6% of the vote, its poorest showing in a nationwide election since 1910. The Greens performed impressively with 11.8%, their best result since 1989, whilst the Conservatives came fifth garnering only a meagre 8.8% of the vote (Cutts et al. 2019: 497). The turnout was higher than average for a European election in the UK at around 51% though still well below that normally achieved for UK parliamentary elections. It is worth noting that the combined share of the two major parties, which reached an unexpected high of 81% in 2017, plummeted to a mere 23%, the lowest ever. In effect the EP elections witnessed an upsurge in both strongly pro-Leave and pro-Remain parties. The evidence suggested that Labour was the victim of a ‘pincer movement’ as support from working-class Leavers diverted to the Brexit party, and from the young and well educated to the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. As Cutts et al. comment: ‘Simply put, Labour’s Brexit stance

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did not pay off among the electorate it had won over in 2017 and in those Remain areas where it had made so much ground just two years previously’ (Cutts et al. 2019: 510). Equally, it performed very poorly in Leave-supporting areas in the North and Midlands. The policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ appeared no longer to be working. But neither of the major parties were disposed to read too much into the results as, historically, European election performances had not figured as reliable indicators of general election behaviour: they were about venting feelings rather than choosing a government. This turned out to be correct, though overwhelmingly the beneficiaries were to be the Conservatives.

Labour’s Multiple Cleavages Over Europe Labour’s stance on Europe was widely seen, both by political commentators and by the voters, as confused, equivocal and muddled—and Corbyn perceived as weak, inept and indecisive (Menon and Wager 2019: 31). In fact, the party was caught in a genuine dilemma and its predicament was twofold. The first was electoral. How was it to accommodate both Labour Leavers, especially working-class voters in the North and Midlands and the younger, better-educated more middle-class Remainers, mainly in the South? The second was intra-party. How was it to bridge the differences between the large pro-EU majority in the PLP and the membership on the one hand, and pragmatic Leaver MPs and Lexiteers within Corbyn’s inner circle on the other? The problem was that, as we have seen, differences over the EU sprang from two distinct dimensions, one economic and the other cultural. The economic dimension referred less to the economic effects of leaving or staying within the EU (although this was a factor) than to whether or not the EU represented a vehicle for progressive economic and social change. The cultural dimensions referred to the conflict between two value constellations, broadly speaking the social liberal and the social conservative. Both had a direct bearing on definitions of the electoral space in which Labour operates, hence the electoral calculations of protagonists. Issues of principle and of electoral expedience were inextricably combined and the net result was to fracture the party in complex ways. Each of these two dimensions, the economic and the cultural, will be discussed in turn.

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The Economic Left-Right Dimension: The EU as a ‘Capitalist Club’ Historically, the social-democratic project had taken the form of operating the levers of the nation state to promote equality and social justice. In the 1980s and 1990s, the view gained currency that such a strategy was no longer feasible. The growing integration of national economic systems, the deregulation and liberalisation of trade, credit and currency movements, the massive expansion of financial markets and the domination of the multinational companies had fundamentally and irreversibly altered the context in which national policy-making occurred. The danger of rampant currency speculation, government bond sales and stock market volatility gave to those who controlled internationally mobile assets the means to bring into line governments deemed to be pursuing ‘unsound’ and ‘profligate’ policies (such as high public spending and nationalisation). Those seeking to implement socialist policies, in one country, would soon forfeit market confidence and the economic consequences would be dire. Social democracy in one country had ceased to be a viable political project (Cerny and Evans 2004; Mishra 1999; Swank 2001). For social-democratic Europhiles this meant that the only way to redress the balance between the state and capital was to pool national sovereignty and seek a more integrated, ‘social Europe’. Only through utilising the collective power and resources of the EU could progressive governments combat the inhibiting effects of globalisation. The institutions of the EU, and the co-ordination mechanisms it has created could afford protection against globalising forces seeking to erode pay, job security, social welfare, workplace protection and environmental standards. In the UK, this argument was particularly attractive to those on the left worried by the destabilising effects of globalisation and the impediments that constellations of global financial power placed in the way of pursuit of their radical agenda. For those on the ‘New Labour’ wing of the party, in contrast, globalisation was, in large part, a positive, beneficent force. But all Remainers, irrespective of where they stood on the party’s left-right spectrum, were united in the conviction that the UK’s departure from the EU’s single market and customs union would have very damaging economic consequences. But this view was not universally held. Eurosceptics by conviction, predominantly on the left of the party, regarded the EU as a body

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designed to bolster the power and interests of capital at the expense of labour. As The Guardian’s ‘Lexiteer’ (left-wing advocate of Brexit) economics editor, Larry Elliott, put it, the fundamental principle behind the European project had been ‘to make life easier for capital, which is why multinational corporations like it so much’ (Elliott 2019a). This capitalist orientation, it was argued, was manifested in two major ways. The first was the embedding of orthodox fiscal policy ‘at the heart of EU economic policy’, as demonstrated by the rules governing the Eurozone (Baimbridge et al. 2007: 84). The Euro had imposed a deflationary regime, delayed recovery from the crash, curbed welfare spending and entrenched high levels of unemployment, hence fuelling radical-right populism (Elliott 2019b). Although the UK was not directly affected, not being part of the Euro-regime, the priorities and rules of the Eurozone highlighted the principles undergirding the EU’s economic model. Secondly, heavily influenced by judgements of the European Court of Justice (Lexiteers contended), free-market ideology was becoming increasingly hardwired into the EU, with ever greater emphasis on removing restraints to competition and the rule of unfettered markets. Key elements of Labour’s radical programme such as public ownership and state aid would, as a result, ‘be deemed illegal under European law’ (Elliott 2017). Decisions over whether state aids and related measures conform to EU law were left to the discretion of the European Commission and ultimately the ECJ, and priority was always given to the protection and enhancement of the internal market. As Corbyn declared: ‘quite clearly, if you want to regenerate an economy, as we would want to do in government, then I don’t want to be told by somebody else that we can’t use state aid in order to be able to develop industry in this country’ (The Guardian, 21 December 2018). Furthermore, EU thinking and policy-making was increasingly governed by the presumption that goods and services were more efficiently delivered by profit-seeking firms operating in a competitive market including, not only in sectors such as energy and telecommunications, but also in education and health (Guinan and Hanna 2017: 20). Far from helping to loosen the constraining effects of globalisation, membership of the EU tightened them (Baimbridge et al. 2007: 71–72). This view, it should be added, was not confined to Labour’s Lexiteers. As the eminent German political scientist and former advisor to the SPD, Fritz Scharpf, argued, the completion of the single market and

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the creation of the Euro have shifted the EU’s axis in a neoliberal direction, spearheaded by an increasingly assertive market-oriented European Court of Justice. Far from operating as a buffer against the destabilising effects of globalisation, the EU has weakened ‘the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism’ (Scharpf 2015: 385). Equally, another distinguished German social scientist, Wolfgang Streeck, has argued that ‘European social policy as a political project has disappeared from sight’. Even more disturbing, welfare states in member states that refused ‘to submit their public services to private markets’ were ‘operating under a sword of Damocles’ (Streeck 2018: 16). In short, the EU lacked both the capacity or disposition to use public power to curtail market operations and act as a decisive force for social progress. Remainers challenged the whole thrust of this analysis. To the Lexiteers’ argument that EU rules would block the renationalisation of rail, a major Labour policy objective, Remainers responded that EU rules do not prohibit public ownership—indeed there were many publicly owned firms in the EU. It was true that where there was a ‘functioning market’, state monopolies were prohibited, but where it was absent a member state was free to determine what needs should be met by public enterprises and what needs subsidised for social purposes (Tarrant and Biondi 2017: 71). Thus whilst it was true that EU legislation prevented a single entity from owning and operating the rail system it also allowed for state-owned train operating companies with contracts awarded without competitive tendering (Morris and Kibasi 2019: 11). Remainers also contended that the legal status of state-aid rules was more complex and nuanced than critics claimed. Remainers accept that such rules are designed to protect the integrity of the single market, furthering competition and barring member states from subsidising ‘lameduck’ firms to the detriment of other enterprises (Tarrant and Biondi 2017: 80). But there are a series of block exemptions to these rules covering for instance, state aid to promote research and development; the provision of risk capital; assistance in regional-regeneration and in fostering environmental objectives (Tarrant and Biondi 2017: 69). Other exemptions include state assistance deemed to be appropriate (to the end envisaged), proportional and in the common interests of the EU (Morris and Kibasi 2019: 8). Tarrant and Biondi conclude from their survey of EU state-aid rules that ‘of the twenty six specific economic measures set out in Labour’s manifesto at the 2017 election, most (17) do not even potentially fall

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within the scope of European State Aid rules. Of those that could, seven are likely to fall within block exemptions’, leaving only two measures which may or may not be judged acceptable (Tarrant and Biondi 2017: 75). More broadly, Labour’s Remainers dispute that the EU is by its very nature free-market in orientation. For example, it has been prepared to curb destabilising financial speculation (through its proposals for a financial transaction tax), to combat tax avoidance (through regulating the use of tax havens), to tackle corporate power (e.g. by using existing EU antitrust rules to end Google’s unfair competitive practices) and to address global warming (e.g. by reducing carbon emissions) (Cooper et al. 2018: 8). As the National Co-Ordinator of the pro-Corbyn movement, Laura Parker, contended, whatever the EU’s shortcomings, Labour’s fundamental goals are more easily accomplished via membership of the EU than by acting unilaterally (Parker 2019). One final argument is deployed by Remainers. Lexiteers argue that outside the EU the UK will have more flexibility to pursue a strategic and interventionist industrial policy. But Brexit negotiations have shown that any future agreements, certainly one involving (as Labour wishes) a customs union and ‘close alignment’ with the single market, will contain curbs on the use of state aids to preserve a ‘level playing field’ (Morris and Kibasi 2019: 16). Lexiteers, in short, lack a convincing post-Brexit strategy in a globalised post-Brexit world.

Leavers Versus Remainers and the Cultural Cleavage However, for many within the party, economic issues have not been the prime consideration. Indeed, for most their stance over Brexit does not correlate with left-right divisions. The large majority of right-of-centre Labour MPs (the dominant force in the Parliamentary Labour Party) are Remainers. But so too are over 80% of the solidly pro-Corbyn party membership (Bale et al. 2019: 27). One explanation of this is that attitudes to Brexit are driven by material considerations. Labour’s predominantly well educated, professionally employed membership equipped with marketable skills consists of ‘globalisation winners’ with a major stake in the EU’s open market. Leavers, including 2017 Labour voters, in contrast, tended to be ‘globalisation losers’ (or the ‘left behinds’): working class, less well educated, with fewer

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marketable skills and in insecure employment (Bailey 2018: 58; Hobolt 2016: 1265). In other words, a new economic cleavage has emerged and divisions over Brexit are its clearest manifestation. There are problems with this analysis. Firstly, by no means all Brexit voters were ‘left behinds’, indeed the majority were reasonably comfortable Conservative supporters (Kelly and Pearce 2019: 3). Secondly, there is certainly evidence that many Leave voters felt marginalised, disadvantaged and ignored and that this was articulated in a determination to quit the EU. But, equally, there is little evidence of much economically related reasoning amongst Leavers which linked EU membership with, for example, wage stagnation and more precarious employment. Thirdly, research suggests that economic discontents were largely filtered through ethnic and cultural frames, with especial anger directed at a system which allegedly allowed the uncontrolled entry of ‘floods of immigrants’ (Goodwin and Ford 2017: 7; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017: 462; Hobolt 2016: 1270, 1273). Thus, Hobolt et al. conclude that the referendum registered less a collision between globalisation winners and losers than ‘an underlying fault line between social liberals …. and social conservatives’ (Hobolt et al. 2018: 14). The emergence of such a fault-line is not confined to the UK. Indeed, comparative analysis of European politics has discerned the increasing salience of a cultural cleavage between social liberals and social conservatives over such matters as immigration, gender equality, gay rights and criminal justice (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 15). This new cleavage is manifested most starkly in the rapid rise in the radical right, powered above all by resentment towards immigration and the perceived threat it posed to traditional values, communities and ways of life. The outcome is that long-standing structures of party competition are being disrupted, with the result that the cultural cleavage now seriously rivals the classbased economic one as a basis of electoral choice (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 8; Kriesi 2010: 678–679). Evidence is accumulating that the Brexit controversy has both activated and intensified the political relevance of this cleavage. Data indicates that attitudes to Brexit corresponded far more to voters’ place on the social liberal-social conservative divide than on the left-right spectrum (Surridge 2019: 6). Thus there is a marked correlation between Remainer affiliations and social liberal positions with regard to multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, gender equality and sexuality; between leaver affiliations and socially conservative postures (Goodwin and Ford 2017: 3–4; Jennings

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and Stoker 2016). Most Labour Party members and voters were emphatically Remainers not for economic reasons but because they were social liberals. Research indicates that whereas Labour Remainer voters do not differ from Labour Leavers on the ‘left-right’ scale, they are far more socially liberal (Surridge 2019: 7). Indeed, attachment to the EU seems to have become a touchstone of a wider social ethos, defined by equality, tolerance, internationalism and openness (Goodwin and Ford 2017: 19). As a result, an ever-widening gulf has emerged between, on the one hand, Labour Remain voters and the overwhelming bulk of party members and, on the other, many traditional Labour voters in what were once strongholds in the North and West Midlands. The European issue has, in short, driven a wedge through Labour’s support base. James Morris, Ed Miliband’s former pollster observed ‘a growing cultural gap between the way [traditional Labour] voters see the world and the cosmopolitanism and utopian egalitarianism of much of the Labour Party … These voters believe that a government’s first priority should be its citizens. They see no reason why citizens of other countries should have entitlements in the UK simply because they move here … They think Labour cannot comprehend these positions, let alone agree with them’ (Morris 2016). This confronted Labour’s leadership with the intertwined problems of party management and electoral strategy. A sizeable minority of MPs with seats in Leave-voting constituencies (most on the right of the party) clamoured for Labour to respect ‘the will of the people’ as decisively promulgated by the referendum. Failure to do so would alienate many voters, convince them that the party, run by a ‘metropolitan elite’, was totally out-of-touch with working-class opinion and jeopardise their ability to retain their seats. From a radically different vantage point, key advisors in Corbyn’s office, such as Seamus Milne, Andrew Murray and Karie Murphy, shared this analysis. They objected to a ‘People’s Vote’ for three reasons. The first was their own objections to the EU, as described above, and their belief that departure from the Union, whilst having some drawbacks, would also furnish opportunities. Secondly, they distrusted the motives of the Remainers, who, they were convinced, were using the issue of a ‘People’s Vote’ to destabilise the Corbyn leadership. They could point to the fact that many of the keenest and most prominent Remainers were Blairites and unsparing critics of Corbyn. Thirdly, they agreed with the analysis that vacillations over Brexit would corrode Labour’s working-class vote. As the pro-Corbyn Shadow Business Secretary Rebecca Long-Bailey

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argued, calls for a second referendum would undermine trust in the party. ‘Some people will think: “How many times do you ask before you get the answer you want?”’ Len McCluskey, the staunchly pro-Corbyn general secretary of the Unite union, added: ‘The people have already decided’ (Stewart et al. 2018). Backsliding over Brexit would unleash a mass of desertions from the party and scupper its prospects of returning to power. The pro-Corbyn frontbencher Ian Lavery put it bluntly: ‘I promise you that if we back a second referendum, we will lose the next general election’ (Helm 2018). (He and other Lexiteers certainly felt vindicated after the election.) However, pressure from Remainers for a second referendum intensified, backed by a large majority of Labour MPs, frontbenchers and party members. The Corbyn left was itself divided not only from its base in the party membership, but also from some of its senior figures— who were Remainers and supporters of another referendum. Calls for a ‘people’s vote’ were submitted in resolutions to the party’s 2018 annual conference by many constituency Labour parties (Stewart et al. 2018). Torn between competing pressures, Corbyn had to perform a difficult balancing act. Labour’s position gradually evolved, through fraught and tortuous internal negotiations—and occasional public spats. The bargain eventually struck was that the party would, first, pressurise the government for a Brexit which met its (Labour’s) preconditions; if it did not, the party would demand a general election and, failing that, it would consider ‘all options ….including campaigning for a public vote’ (Stewart et al. 2018). It was a concession extracted with difficulty and the leadership’s enthusiasm for a second referendum remained muted. But opinion slowly shifted more in its favour, partly because of pressure from senior frontbenchers, such as the highly capable Shadow Brexit Secretary, Keir Starmer, as well as from close Corbyn allies, the Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, and Shadow Home Secretary, Dianne Abbott. By 2019 a general stance favouring a soft Brexit, but coupled with a second referendum had been more or less agreed. A future Labour government would enter into negotiations with the EU in which it would seek safeguards for social, employment and consumer rights, and environmental standards; it would maintain membership of ‘a’ customs union and would preserve ‘a close alignment’ with the internal market. Any agreement reached would be put to a second referendum—as would the option of remaining. The formal stance Labour would take—whether to back its own negotiated agreement or Remain—would be decided by a party conference.

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However, as he reiterated time and again, Corbyn would take a neutral position: a stance that baffled and confused voters in the December 2019 election and reinforced the image of Corbyn as a vacillating and indecisive leader. Labour’s dilemma was not only how best to patch up differences within the party but how to prevent Leave voters defecting to the Tories or the Brexit party, and the Remainers to the Liberal Democrats, by tilting unduly to one side or the other. But the party managed, it seemed, to alienate both. Even the most deft and nimble of political jugglers would have struggled, but Corbyn notably lacked the guile, the ingenuity and dexterity of a Harold Wilson. He and his closest advisers seemed to persuade themselves that by a combination of cautious manoeuvrings and nuanced shifts in Labour’s stance they could square the circle. But in truth most voters, largely oblivious to the complexities of the issues, apparently indifferent to the practical policy consequences of Brexit and increasingly obsessed with getting the matter resolved, were thoroughly unimpressed by what they saw as an opaque and confusing position. To its credit, Labour did not promise simple solutions to complicated questions, but this is precisely what most voters wanted. When Theresa May was replaced by the much cannier, smarter and more ruthless Boris Johnson with his simplistic and disingenuous slogan of ‘Get Brexit Done’, the political weather turned decisively against Labour. Johnson fought an energetic, ruthless and highly disciplined campaign, which revolved almost exclusively around ‘Getting Brexit Done’. Labour’s campaign, in contrast, was poorly thought-through, lacked clear themes and was haphazardly conducted. The Tory target was Labour’s bastions in the Northern and West Midlands, areas which had voted heavily for Brexit in 2016. The result was a catastrophe for Labour which won only 32.2% of the vote and 203 MPs—the smallest total since 1935. Eurosceptics both on the right and (especially) on the Lexiteer left blamed Remainers’ advocacy of a second referendum and the party’s failure unequivocally to accept the electorate’s desire to quit the EU. The general consensus, both within the party and amongst commentators, was that this was indeed a crucial issue though not as important as the voters’ massive lack of faith in Corbyn’s qualities of leadership.

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Conclusion Corbyn’s task after the referendum was to craft a policy on the EU that was cogent, feasible and acceptable to the party, and underpinned by a coherent and persuasive narrative. It proved one impossible to discharge. Securing a consensus within a party so deeply riven and which could accommodate both socially liberal Remainers and socially conservative Leavers proved impossible. The constant shifts and incremental changes in policy just left most people—inattentive to the subtleties of politics— bewildered. For many voters, Labour’s stance on the EU was one of equivocation, muddle and procrastination. All this needs to be seen in a historical context. Labour had never been a party fired by a European mission. It had always been reticent on the European question, never—except for a minority—really animated by the spirit of European idealism, endlessly circumspect and fearful of provoking a fiercely Eurosceptic press. Even during the Blair years in office, it made no sustained effort to foster pro-European sentiment, to work closely with like-minded parties or defend the EU other than as an arena where British national interests could be advanced. The shortcomings of the Corbyn leadership have not helped but, as Diamond observes, ‘Europe has been a collective failure of leadership in the Labour Party over several decades’ (Diamond 2017). But one has doubt whether even a more impressive and astute leadership could have coped with a problem which, in effect, was insoluble: reconciling the broadly pro-EU sympathies of the party with the ever more vociferous clamour of much of the country to ‘set Britain free’.

References Bailey, D. J. (2018). Misperceiving Matters, Again: Stagnating Neoliberalism, Brexit and the Pathological Responses of Britain’s Political Elite. British Politics, 13(1), 48–64. Baimbridge, M., Whyman, P., & Burkitt, B. (2007). Beyond EU Neoliberalisation: A Progressive Strategy for the British Left. Capital and Class, 31(3), 67–93. Bale, T., Webb, P., & Poletti, M. (2019). Party Members. In A. Menon (Ed.), Brexit and Public Opinion 2019 (pp. 27–28). The UK in Changing Europe. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opi nion-2019-report.pdf.

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Bulmer, S. (2008). New Labour, New European policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian Supranationalism. Parliamentary Affairs, 61(4), 597–620. Cerny, P. G., & Evans, M. (2004). Globalisation and Public Policy Under New Labour. Policy Studies, 25(1), 51–65. Cooper, L., Kaldor, M., Milanese, N., & Palmer, J. (2018). The “Corbyn Moment” and European Socialism. https://www.anothereurope.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2018/03/aeip-reform-final-web.pdf. Corbyn, J. (1993, May 20). Speech to the House of Commons. https://publicati ons.parliament.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1993-05-20/Debate-3.html. Corbyn, J. (2016). Europe Needs to Change… But I am Voting to Stay. LabourList. https://labourlist.org/2016/04/europe-needs-to-change-but-iam-voting-to-stay-corbyns-full-speech-on-the-eu/. Cutts, D., Goodwin, M., Heath, O., & Milazzo, C. (2019). Resurgent Remain and a Rebooted Revolt on the Right: Exploring the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the UK. Political Quarterly, 90(3), 496–514. Daniels, P. (1998). From Hostility to ‘Constructive Engagement’: The Europeanisation of the Labour party. West European Politics, 21(1), 72–96. Diamond, P. (2017). Don’t Blame Jeremy Corbyn over Labour’s Lack of Vision on Europe, Tony Blair Is Just as Much to Blame. Independent, February 26. Elliott, L. (2017). Why the Moaning? If Anything Can Halt Capitalism’s Fat Cats, Its Brexit. The Guardian, July 21. Elliott, L. (2019a). Don’t Be Fooled—The EU Is No Defender of Workers’ Rights. The Guardian, October 24. Elliott, L. (2019b). Only a Rupture with the EU Will Alter the Failed status quo. The Guardian, January 17. Fella, S. (2006). New Labour, Same old Britain? The Blair government and European treaty reform. Parliamentary Affairs, 59(4), 621–637. Goodwin, M., & Ford, R. (2017). Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided. Journal of Democracy, 28(1), 17–30. Goodwin, M., & Milazzo, C. (2017). Taking Back Control? Investigating the Role of Immigration in the 2016 Vote for Brexit. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3), 450–464. Guinan, J., & Hanna, T. M. (2017). Forbidden Fruit: The Neglected Political Economy of Lexit. Progressive Review, 24(1), 15–24. Helm, T. (2018). Party Activists Pile Pressure on Corbyn to Back Second Vote. The Observer, December 16. Hertner, I., & Keith, D. (2017). Europhiles or Eurosceptics? Comparing the European Policies of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. British Politics, 12(1), 63–68. Hickson, K., & Miles, J. (2018). Social Democratic Euroscepticism: Labour’s Neglected Tradition. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(4), 864–87.

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Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1259–1277. Hobolt, S. B., Leeper, T., & Tilley, J. (2018). Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of Brexit. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston. https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/tjl-sha ring/assets/DividedByTheVote.pdf. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2017). Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Jennings, W., & Stoker, G. (2016). The Bifurcation of Politics: Two Englands. Political Quarterly, 87 (3), 372–382. Kelly, G., & Pearce, N. (2019). Introduction: Brexit and the Future of the British Model of Democratic Capitalism. Political Quarterly, 90(S2), 1–11. Kentish, B. (2019). Jeremy Corbyn Warned of “European Empire” and Said EU Treaty Would Create “a Military Frankenstein”. The Independent, February 6. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-brexiteu-lisbon-treaty-europe-empire-military-video-a8766421.html Kriesi, H. (2010). Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values. West European Politics, 33(3), 673–685. Labour Party. (2015). Manifesto, ‘Britain Can Be Better’. http://www.labour. org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetterTheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf. Labour Party. (2017). Manifesto, ‘For the Many, Not the Few’. https://labour. org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf. Labour Party. (2019). Manifesto for the European Elections, ‘Transforming Britain and Europe: For the Many, Not the Few’. https://labour.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/Transforming-Britain-and-Europe-for-the-manynot-the-few.pdf. Menon, A., & Wager, A. (2019). Labour’s Brexit Dilemma. In A. Menon (Ed.), Brexit and Public Opinion 2019 (pp. 31–33). https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-con tent/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opinion-2019-report.pdf. Mishra, R. (1999). Globalisation and the Welfare State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Morris, J. (2016). Labour has Taken Working Class Voters for Granted. Labourlist. https://labourlist.org/2016/10/james-morris-labour-has-takenworking-class-voters-for-granted-ukip-offers-them-a-political-choice/. Morris, M., & Kibasi, T. (2019). State Aid Rules and Brexit. Institute for Public Policy Research. https://www.ippr.org/files/2019-01/1548088552_brexitstate-aid-jan19.pdf. Parker, L. (2019). Our Future Lies Through Europe. Chartist, November 14. https://www.chartist.org.uk/our-future-lies-through-europe/. Schnapper, P. (2015). The Labour Party and Europe from Brown to Miliband: Back to the Future? Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1), 157–173.

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Scharpf, F. W. (2015). After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy. European Law Journal, 21(3), 384–405. Stone, J. (2015). Corbyn Predicted that the Euro Would Lead to “the Imposition of a Bankers’ Europe”. The Independent, September 18. https://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-eu-europe-bankers-eur ope-eurosceptic-ukip-10507381.html. Streeck, W. (2018). European Social Policy: Progressive Regression (MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 18/11). Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. https://wolfgangstreeck.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/dp18-11.pdf Swank, D. (2001). Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on Social Policy Change in Developed Democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (pp. 197–237). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stewart, H., Elgot, J., & Walker, P. (2018). Labour Agrees to Keep Options Open on “People’s Vote”. The Guardian, September 24. Surridge, P. (2019). The Left-Right Divide. In A. Menon (Ed.), Brexit and Public Opinion. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Pub lic-Opinion-2019-report.pdf Tarrant, A., & Biondi, A. (2017). Brexit and Labour’s Political Economy. Renewal, 25(3–4), 66–89. Toynbee, P. (2019). No ifs, No Buts: Jeremy Corbyn must Insist a Brexit Deal is Put to Voters. The Guardian‚ April 4.

CHAPTER 10

Spain and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Luis Ramiro

Before the Great Recession of 2008 and its simultaneous economic and political crises, Spanish society was characterised by widespread proEuropean and pro-EU attitudes, reflecting Euro-enthusiastic orientations at both the individual and party levels. In the Spanish debate, European integration, or the so-called European project, was associated with modernisation, democracy and economic development. Spanish incorporation into the EU (or the EEC as it was back then) meant incorporation into the ‘club’ of advanced nations, from which Spain had been excluded by previous decades of authoritarianism and political and economic backwardness (Ramiro and Morales 2007: 125; Díez-Medrano 2010). Given the widespread and almost unanimous support for the EU, there was no proper politicisation, debate or serious conflict on the ‘European’ issue.

C. Plaza-Colodro University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain L. Ramiro (B) Department of Political Science, UNED, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_10

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Even if some EU policy issues were potentially very sensitive (such as agriculture and fisheries, for example), EU-related issues have been almost completely uncontroversial in Spanish politics for much of the period since the accession negotiations (Ramiro and Morales 2007: 125). As a result, and as a demonstration of this consensus, Eurosceptical actors in Spain have traditionally struggled to gain a hearing. Euroscepticism in Spain has traditionally been limited to radical left and some ethno-regionalist parties (Llamazares and Gramacho 2007; Gómez-Reino, Llamazares and Ramiro 2008; Verney 2011). Elsewhere in Europe, Euroscepticism has been an integral part of the populist radical-right discourse, but precisely because until very recently Spain lacked relevant representatives of this party family (due to a combination of supply- and demand-side factors: Llamazares and Ramiro 2006; Llamazares 2012), anti-EU positions were almost absent from the party system. When compared to other countries and parties, even the Euroscepticism of the Spanish radical left was not very salient and was of a soft-Eurosceptic type (Gómez-Reino et al. 2008). There have then been clear limits to the (potential) mobilisation of Spanish citizens around Eurosceptical platforms, at least until the Great Recession. The positive connotations of the EU, and the comparatively weak presence of Eurosceptical attitudes among Spanish (as among Portuguese and Greek) citizens, were certainly of paramount relevance in this regard. Llamazares and Gramacho’s (2007) analysis showed that individual perceptions of the benefits the country derived from EU membership were the most important factor in explaining positive attitudes towards the EU in Spain. However, factors such as negative evaluations of the country’s economic performance or perceptions of the risk posed by the lack of regional integration for the country’s national culture played a role in explaining Eurosceptical orientations (Llamazares and Gramacho 2007). Negative views of European integration in Spain were more likely to be found among both cultural exclusivists and radicalleft sympathisers (Llamazares and Gramacho 2007). Relatedly, Brigevich (2012, 2018) has shown that peripheral and regional self-identifications hinder attachments to Europe and support for European integration in Spain as in other European countries. In this context of widespread pro-EU sympathies among the public and very weak Euroscepticism in the party system, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE) might

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be considered as one of the most pro-EU Spanish parties and a traditional bulwark of Spanish Europhilia. Spain joined the European Union under the Socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez in 1986, and the party has always presented an undoubtedly pro-EU platform, consistently proposing a deepening of the integration process. The position of PSOE as the Spanish champion of the pro-EU cause is apparent when we observe the party’s relative placement on this issue using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.1 If we examine the Spanish parties’ positions towards the EU between 1999 and 2017, PSOE emerges as the most pro-EU party throughout the entire period except in 2014, when the first post-2008 Great Recession European Parliament (EP) elections were held (Fig. 10.1). In 2014, when PSOE fell behind the Partido Popular (People’s Party, PP) as far as Euro-enthusiasm is concerned, a very slight shift towards less Euro-enthusiastic positions is perceptible. It seems that around 2014 European integration became a more relevant issue for most mainstream as well as minor Spanish parties. Then, the pro-EU orientation of the PP—clearly in favour of European integration although traditionally less Euro-enthusiastic than PSOE—reached a peak of 6.8, its positive orientation increasing by 0.8 points with respect to 2010. In contrast, the pro-EU orientation of PSOE—always in the proEuropean integration camp—was, at 6.7, perceived as being at its weakest since 2002. This is a very small change, but one that was related to the political and electoral earthquakes triggered by the 2008 Great Recession, which especially affected PSOE. The Great Recession created, for the social democratic parties, a kind of standoff, especially so in the countries most affected by the economic crisis. The mainstream parties of the left—liberal in social and cultural terms, moderate in economic policy terms and generally identified as the main supporters of integration (Marks and Wilson 2000)—were acutely challenged by the 2008 Great Recession and its aftermath. The Great Recession forced social democratic parties to come to terms with several dilemmas and trade-offs, especially concerning the economic dimension of European integration and its correlates. For PSOE, which has traditionally tried to combine clearly pro-market policies with a strong concern for social justice (a position not far from the classic Third Way orientation

1 Polk et al. (2017).

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Fig. 10.1 Parties’ general orientations towards the EU (1999–2017) (Source Authors’ elaboration of data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey [CHES])

formulated by Giddens in 1998), the Great Recession and EU policies aimed at overcoming it entailed an almost existential challenge. The 2008 crisis and the 2011 turn towards austerity policies took place when PSOE was in office. The crisis and the policies implemented to overcome it not only undermined the Keynesian-type responses traditionally preferred by social democrats, but also represented a threat to their achievements as founders and guardians of the modern Spanish welfare state. The huge challenge that the then incumbent PSOE faced was reflected in its electoral results. Never really coming close to suffering the fate of its Greek counterpart, the risk of suffering a PASOK-type defeat was, however, a very real danger between 2010 and 2015. The electoral effects of the Great Recession were not visible in Spain until 2011. In 2010, the PSOE government led by Rodríguez Zapatero

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implemented the first austerity package, which triggered a wave of social mobilisation and protest. In 2011, when the protest was at its height, new elections were held—elections, which, as predicted by economic voting models, were won by the PP, the main opposition party, with an absolute majority. The PP continued the implementation of austerity measures, which, together with the many corruption scandals that marked the initial months of its term of office, considerably eroded public support for the conservative party. However, it was not until the EP elections of 2014 that a change in voting patterns began to be observed. Then, the electoral successes of two new nationwide parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, in a context of considerable economic malaise and acute political crisis, crucially transformed the Spanish two-party system, which in a very short space of time acquired a strengthened multiparty configuration (Orriols and Cordero 2016). In the December 2015 national legislative elections, Podemos, a radical-left populist party founded in 2014, which emphasised issues related to redistribution and political renewal, and which strongly opposed austerity, won 21% of the votes, making it the third largest party, just 400,000 votes behind PSOE. Ciudadanos on the other hand, a party born in 2006 in Catalonia, with a liberal centrist political orientation and a narrative based on democratic regeneration and anti-Catalan nationalist themes, was the fourth largest party. PSOE obtained 23% of the vote in the 2014 EP elections, suffering a loss of 15.8 percentage points as compared with its performance at the previous, 2009, EP elections. At the 2015 parliamentary elections, PSOE won 22% of the vote, 6.8 percentage points less than at the previous, 2011, elections. The situation for PSOE could hardly have been more challenging. It had fallen to its lowest level of electoral support since the first democratic elections in 1977 and was challenged by new parties appealing both to its left wing and to its more moderate or centrist voters. The new competitor flanking it from the left was just below the level of support won by PSOE itself and it had risen to that position extremely rapidly in the context of a desertion of mainstream parties generally. The fear of a repetition in Spain of the fate suffered by the Greek PASOK was fully justified. However, the Spanish social democrats avoided the fate of their Greek counterparts. The relatively fragmented party system resulting from the 2015 elections, together with the inability of the political parties to form a coalition government, led to a repetition of the legislative elections in June 2016. PSOE slightly improved its result and increased its relative standing in the party system by benefitting from the disappointing

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result achieved by the radical-left coalition headed by Podemos. On this occasion, despite the fact that the two major parties, the PP and PSOE, suffered a significant decline, winning a combined share of only 50.7% of the vote (compared to 73.4% in 2011 and 83.8% in 2008), the results did allow the formation of a minority PP government with the support of Ciudadanos and the abstention of PSOE. In 2018, the PP minority government lost a no-confidence vote immediately after a negative judicial ruling arising out of a corruption scandal affecting the incumbent party. PSOE was able to form a new government immediately thereafter (the first time in Spain’s democratic history that a no-confidence vote had resulted in the successful formation of a new government). However, the PSOE minority government was unable to pass a new budget law and called for fresh elections in April 2019. PSOE obtained 28.7% of the vote, improving on its previous results by almost 6 percentage points. Although the centre-right Ciudadanos party increased its support, its showing was far behind that of PSOE, and Podemos worsened its performance again. In this way, the threats earlier posed by the electoral challengers of PSOE’s status in the Spanish party system seemed to diminish. The elections took place in a political context in which the centre-periphery conflict—which, together with the classic redistributive economic dimension, drives party and electoral competition in Spain— was very prominent. The polarising effect of this conflict in recent years has been considerable. Vox, a radical-right party, founded in 2013, which has mobilised Spanish nationalism, took full advantage of the tensions around Catalan nationalists’ demands for independence and the behaviour of the Catalan regional government in this regard, to emerge as a significant and electorally relevant party. More than around the defence of national sovereignty against the intervention of supranational powers, Vox has mobilised Spanish nationalism against the peripheral nationalists, which, from its point of view, threaten the sovereignty of the country from within and endanger its very existence. Between 2014 and 2016, Vox contested several elections without any success. However, in the 2018 Andalusian regional elections, Vox won 11% of the vote and in the April 2019 general elections attracted 10.3% (around 2,000,000 votes in absolute terms), finally winning national parliamentary representation. The April 2019 elections confirmed the leading role of PSOE and helped, to a degree at least, to restore its predominance on the left. Nevertheless, PSOE was unable to mobilise enough parliamentary support to

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Table 10.1 Electoral results, November 2019 general elections

Partido Socialista Obrero Español Partido Popular Vox Unidas Podemosa Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Ciudadanos Junts per Catalunya En Comú Podema Partido Nacionalista Vasco EHBildu Más País Candidatura d’Unitat Popular En Comúna

Votes

Share (%)

% change from April 2019 GE

MPs

6,792,199

28.0

−0.7

120

5,047,040 3,656,979 3,119,364 899,029

20.8 15.1 9.8 3.7

+4.1 +4.1 −1.2 −0.2

89 52 26 13

1,650,318 530,225 549,173 391,711

6.8 2.2 2.3 1.6

−9.1 +0.3 -0.1 +0.1

10 8 7 6

277,621 605,502 246,971

1.2 2.5 1.0

+0.2 (new) (new)

5 3 2

188,231

0.8

−0.1

2

Note a Unidas Podemos grouping (Podemos, Izquierda Unida and their Catalan and Galician allies)

form a government, and new elections (the fourth general election in less than four years) were called for November 2019. The results of these elections (Table 10.1) were paradoxical. PSOE, with 28%, fell back slightly. The other left-wing grouping, the radical-left coalition, Unidas Podemos (formed by Podemos, Izquierda Unida (IU) and their regional associates in Galicia and Catalonia) also declined once again, but on this occasion a PSOE-Unidas Podemos government was formed with the parliamentary backing of several peripheral nationalist parties (the first coalition government since the restoration of democracy in the 1970s). In spite of all these electoral changes—and in spite of the changes in the relative status of the party within the Spanish party system, of the changes in the party leadership and strategy, of the rise and fall of new parties and competitors—one of the most enduring features of PSOE has been its unrepentant pro-EU position. The party could certainly claim that this position was backed once again by the electorate in the 2019 EP elections.

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2019 EP Election Results In many countries, national and European politics merge in such a way that EP elections are eclipsed by the national political competition. This is not new and it is certainly the case more often than the opposite (that of EU policy issues dominating the political debate during national elections). This frequent pattern was remarkably true in the Spanish case of the 26 May EP elections, held one month after the 2019 Spanish general election and on the same day as regional elections in twelve autonomous communities, and local elections in all Spanish municipalities. The 2019 EP elections were a kind of rerun of the general election and saw the parties continuing to adapt their strategies to a recently reconfigured and increasingly fragmented party system, in a highly volatile, competitive and fluid electoral market, competing for a large number of offices at European, regional and local levels. In 2019, the incumbent PSOE Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, with his Foreign Affairs Minister, Josep Borrell, as the lead candidate, scored the first win for the party in an EP election since 2004. PSOE won 32.9% of the vote and 20 MEPs, six more than in 2014, substantially increasing its vote share from the comparatively meagre 23% it won then (see Table 10.2). PSOE became the largest national delegation within the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. These results consolidated PSOE’s position as the largest Spanish party, a status it had achieved by taking advantage—as in the general elections of April 2019—of the division between the centre and right-wing parties. In some countries, the high degree of polarisation of the campaign and/or the politicisation of the EU issue fostered increased turnouts and even a partisan differential in turnout. Non-mainstream parties, fringe parties and certainly anti-EU parties, which usually benefit from the second-order nature of EP elections, can animate such campaigns, mobilise their supporters (especially the more Eurosceptical ones) and leave their mark on the party system (Hix and Lord 1997; Taggart 1998; Marks et al. 2002: 588). A polarised campaign or politicisation of the EU issue might even make it possible for pro-European forces to mobilise those of their supporters who might otherwise have abstained. At 60.7%, up from 43.8% in 2014, turnout in Spain reached a figure that had not been seen since the 1999 EP elections. However, this seems to have had less to do with a growth in salience of the EU issue than with the coincidence with the other, subnational, elections, the effect of

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Table 10.2 Election results: May 2019 EP elections, and April 2019 and November 2019 general elections

Partido Socialista Obrero Español Partido Popular Vox Unidas Podemosa Ahora Repúblicasb Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Ciudadanos Junts per Catalunya En Comú Podema Partido Nacionalista Vasco Coalición por una Europa Solidariac EHBildu Más País Candidatura d’Unitat Popular En Comúna

April 2019 GE Share (%)

May 2019 EP elections Share (%)

MEPs

Nov 2019 GE Share (%)

28.7

32.9

20

28.0

16.7 10.3 11.0

20.2 6.2 10.1 5.6

12 3 6 3

20.8 15.1 9.8

3.9

15.9 1.9 2.4 1.5

3.7

12.2 4.5

7 2

2.8

1

6.8 2.2 2.3 1.6

1.0 – –

1.2 2.5 1.0

0.9

0.8

Notes a Unidas Podemos grouping (Podemos, Izquierda Unida and their Catalan and Galician allies) b Ahora Repúblicas is formed by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Bildu, among others c Coalición por una Europa Solidaria is formed by the Partido Nacionalista Vasco among others

a very competitive national election held less than a month before, and the increased competitiveness of Spanish elections generally in the newly fragmented party system. There was, however, a new element characterising the 2019 EP elections, that is, the electorally significant presence, for the first time since the democratic transition of the 1970s, of a radical-right party with relevant support (Vox). The 2019 general election demonstrated that the Spanish mainstream parties of the right and left had finally to confront a new radical-right party as many of their sister parties elsewhere in Europe had already had to do. This party directly challenged, in very assertive and antagonistic terms, most of the principles and policy positions of the

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centre left on every dimension of the political conflict (economic, cultural, centre-periphery). Despite this, PSOE won and, notably, increased its share of the vote not only as compared to the previous 2014 EP elections but also with respect to the general election held one month before. In addition, the results of the subnational elections held simultaneously also benefitted PSOE, helping it to consolidate its status as the largest Spanish party. To its left, the radical-left coalition, Unidas Podemos, notably declined—both as compared to its performance one month previously and as compared to the combined performance of IU and Podemos in the 2014 EP elections. The fear of being surpassed by the radical left, as happened to PASOK in Greece, was constant, but now seemed to be a fading threat for the Spanish social democrats. On its centre-right flank, the 2019 EP elections also brought good news for PSOE, as the liberal centrist Ciudadanos too lost support. After the EP elections, PSOE was a party clearly standing head and shoulders above its most direct competitors. Furthermore, the improved but modest performance of the conservative PP together with the disappointing results achieved by the radical-right Vox told the story of a modest revival of the two traditional, mainstream, nationwide parties following the uncertainties caused by the electoral earthquakes that had taken place in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession. It is interesting that the two most ideologically extreme political parties did not perform at all well in the 2019 EP elections. The radical-left Podemos had entered the EP in 2014 with an outstanding result only months after its formation in January 2014, but even after its coalition with IU since 2015 it has been forced to count each and every election as a new defeat. The radical-right Vox had surprised everybody with its powerful showing in the Andalusian regional election of 2018 and in the general election of April 2019, but it achieved a modest result in the May 2019 EP elections. EP elections are often considered as a perfect opportunity for the populist radical right to shine. However, Vox is not a hard Eurosceptic party; the EU is not one of its concerns. Its intense, highly salient and very vocal Spanish nationalism is aimed at peripheral nationalism, at Basque and Catalan nationalists, not (or at least not yet) at the EU political system. Vox was unable to retain or to increase the electoral support it won at the general election held just a month before. With the poor results of the more-or-less extremist parties, all the main challenges

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April 2019 - May 2019

2014-2019 European elections

500000

4000000

0

3000000

-500000 -1000000 -1500000

221

2000000 1000000 0 -1000000

-2000000

Fig. 10.2 Changes in vote between the April and May 2019 general and EP elections, and between the 2014 and 2019 EP elections (Source Authors’ elaboration)

the mainstream, incumbent and centre-left PSOE was confronting at the time appeared decisively attenuated after the May 2019 EP elections. A cursory analysis of the results of the 2019 EP election compared to those of the 2014 EP election illustrates these trends (Fig. 10.2). PSOE achieved a spectacular increase in its vote. Vox obviously grew from its previously insignificant status, although it remained the fifth largest party. The only party that suffered a clear electoral defeat was the radical-left coalition, Unidas Podemos. At the same time, these data do not seem to suggest that a change in the status of the EP elections, becoming first-order elections or gaining relevance, is behind the voting behaviour shown in the May 2019 EP elections in Spain. The results seem, rather, to be the consequence of a transformation in the patterns of party competition, of a changing Spanish party system.

Europe and the EU in PSOE’s Election Manifesto The recent sociopolitical processes affecting the EU and its member states—the Great Recession of 2008, the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis and Brexit—have helped in different ways to fuel reactions against the integration process. This has led to the (re)emergence of the transnational cleavage, as ‘a political reaction to European integration and immigration’ in the words of Hooghe and Marks (2018: 109). Thus, throughout Europe, parties challenging the broad EU consensus have been able to capitalise, on the national level, on the discontent arising from the problems facing the EU, those derived from the broader loss

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of legitimacy of national governments, and the general crisis of political representation that parties and political institutions are suffering. The three major European party families—social democrats, Christian democrats and liberals—had converged on a moderate pro-integration position (Kriesi et al. 2008: 16), leading to the de-politicisation of Europe in domestic politics. Since the established mainstream parties have no incentives to place on the political agenda issues that are beyond their control (such as many EU policy issues), electoral competition around EU policies appeared somewhat restricted (Mair 2000: 35; Bartolini 2005: 320). Small, non-mainstream, challenger parties are the ones that usually take critical stances towards European integration, hoping thereby to shake up voting patterns and party systems (Hix and Lord 1997; Taggart 1998; Marks et al. 2002: 588). For small or new parties, which are usually marginal players in electoral competition, introducing new themes and taking extreme positions on them can be advantageous since in that way they position themselves as key actors on the new dimensions and destabilise those who benefit from the status quo (Taggart 1998: 384; Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 881). However, criticism of the EU is no longer the exclusive territory of small and marginal parties. The increasing relevance of populist, mainly radical-right, parties has initiated a new phase of competition around the European integration project. Despite attempts to depoliticise the European issue and avoid political reactions against the EU, public debate around this issue has not only increased in national arenas (De Wilde and Zürn 2012: 138; Hooghe and Marks 2018: 123), but has also escaped the control of established parties (Grande and Hutter 2016: 40; Treib 2014). In the last decade, the political controversies related to Europe have generated debates on such basic principles of the integration process as solidarity, community, political identity and other issues related to membership (De Wilde and Zürn 2012: 138; Harteveld et al. 2018). This has led parties to politicise EU issues by adopting a range of different approaches. Besides this, the perception that the proposals of the mainstream political parties are basically equivalent was reinforced during the Great Recession, especially in relation to the approval of economic adjustment plans and the application of austerity measures. When these adjustment packages were approved and implemented by parties from the left and the right—separately or together in Grand Coalition cabinets—the crisis of established party systems accelerated. While

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the new transnational cleavage was mobilised by the populist right in northern countries, in the EU’s southern countries—where governments faced severe sovereign debt crises—the cleavage was mobilised by the left (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 117). The context in which the European elections of May 2019 were held was not then very promising for the mainstream left-wing parties. Both the management of the 2008 economic crisis and the salience of the refugee crisis posed challenges for the mainstream parties and promising terrain for the radical right. In Spain, in particular, as in Italy and Greece, the social democratic party had actively participated in the implementation of austerity during some of the worst years of the Great Recession. However, in basic terms and in spite of this challenging context, PSOE did not significantly change its approach to the EU issue. EU politics pivots around the classic, right/left, horizontal axis, focused on economic and social issues, and the vertical axis defining positions on whether intergovernmentalism or supra-nationalism should prevail. A neoliberal Europe versus a social one and a Europe of sovereign states versus one in which the process of progressive federalisation prevails appear in parties’ platforms to differing degrees and in differing combinations. However, if we read the parties’ manifestoes for the 2019 EP elections, it is not always evident where each party stands on these two dimensions. This is not exactly the case of PSOE. PSOE is much more ambitious and specific in showing its regulatory and redistributive vocation, aimed at re-establishing the ‘European social model’ after the battering it took with the fallout from 2008, than it is in clearly defining what its goal of ‘more Europe’ exactly means and how exactly it is achieved. However, the Spanish social democrats appear nonetheless as an unhesitatingly pro-EU party. In its manifesto for the 2019 EP elections, PSOE proposed to strengthen the social pillar of the integration process, equating it in importance to the economic dimension of the EU. It wanted to prioritise the implementation of redistributive mechanisms, to establish new social rights aimed at reducing inequality and to achieve equal opportunities in access to the job market. The Spanish social democrats emphasised the defence of fairer working conditions and the need for greater social protection and more ambitious policies of social inclusion. PSOE stressed its position in favour of working people with proposals such as a European-wide unemployment insurance scheme and a common European minimum wage. Additionally, in relation to the cultural dimension of

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contemporary political conflict in Europe, it connected these social policies with the need to guarantee gender equality. It also proposed a version of the Green New Deal for Europe and suggested the need to promote a common immigration policy. In sum, the Spanish social democrats presented a classically social democratic platform on the economic dimension of political conflict and associated these themes with a moderately cosmopolitan agenda (environmentalism, gender equality and moderate pro-immigration policies). Even if the degree of detail PSOE provided left much to be desired, its pro-EU position shone through clearly. PSOE outlined a number of proposals to deepen the integration process making explicit its favourable view of European federalism. Proposals such as strengthening the role of the European Central Bank, fostering a European constitution, proposing differentiated integration and expanding the range of European citizenship rights were presented by PSOE as steps in that direction. It also demanded, as part of the integration process, the democratisation of EU institutions, calling especially for a greater role for the European Parliament in the decision-making process as a means of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the European Union.

Europe and the EU in PSOE’s Communication During the 2019 EP Election Campaign Data on PSOE’s Facebook messages provide uncontroversial evidence of the secondary role of EU politics, and specifically of the EP elections, in Spanish party politics. During the campaign for the Spanish general elections held on 28 April, not one of the party’s messages referred to Europe or to any particular European issue. During the EP election campaign, which coincided with the campaign for the regional and local elections, only 8.7% of the messages (or 25 of 288) referred to EU political issues. The EP elections were relevant for PSOE but they were so because they were an intrinsic part of the national electoral cycle of which they were a component. Accordingly, the political communication of the party repeated the core ideas expressed at the general election one month before. In this way, PSOE presented itself as the only viable alternative to the right-wing parties, both in Spain and at the European level. This is a relevant aspect because the traditional left-right divide underwent a notable revival, with the neat division of parties into two separate blocks (PSOE and Unidas Podemos versus the PP, Ciudadanos and Vox).

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Besides this, PSOE presented itself as the key party to stop the increasing influence of populism. In programmatic terms, PSOE’s communications emphasised the main proposals of its manifesto and, very specially, those related to the expansion of social Europe: a European Green New Deal, European unemployment protection and a European strategy for gender equality. PSOE’s policy mix and the main axis of its communication are well reflected in the word cloud based on its Facebook posts (Fig. 10.3). There are three main aspects that deserve to be highlighted. First, the party presents a clearly

Fig. 10.3 Word cloud of PSOE’s Facebook posts about Europe (Source Author’s elaboration)

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social democratic, centre-left emphasis on progressive and redistributive social and economic themes (such as social justice and equal opportunities). Second, PSOE proposes a deepening (and democratising) of the process of European integration (i.e. a democratic Europe). Third, the party places itself on the cosmopolitan side of the new cultural dimension of political conflict in Europe (stressing freedom, citizenship rights, environmentalism and feminism). PSOE’s lead candidate for the EP elections, Josep Borrell, expressed himself along the same lines. In an interview with Spain’s leading daily newspaper, El País, Borrell2 emphasised PSOE’s commitment to winning the fight against inequality and poverty and to strengthening the social dimension of the integration process through proposals such as the European-wide scheme of unemployment protection and the European minimum wage. In relation to the proposal to deepen the process of European integration, he detailed a number of institutional reforms that would provide greater democratic legitimacy to the EU and weaken intergovernmentalism through the strengthening of the European Parliament. In his view, the EP had a key role to play in areas such as taxes, the budget and EU financial resources. In his words, ‘To achieve a European Union able to protect its citizens we need to go beyond macroeconomic regulation and intervene in the area of fiscal redistribution, currently in the hands of the member states’.

Spanish Voters’ Opinions on Europe and the EU The decisions taken at EU level to manage, first, the economic crisis and then the refugee crisis helped to erode the positive image of the EU and negatively affected evaluations of the EU institutions among European citizens. The idea of deepening economic integration lost support in all member states (Hobolt 2014) in the aftermath of the Great Recession. However, dissatisfaction with the EU was greater in the countries subject to bailouts (Cordero and Simón 2016; Dotti Sani and Magistro 2016; Ehrmann et al. 2013; Roth et al. 2014; Torcal 2019; Serricchio et al. 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2013; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). Once the economic crisis and the austerity policies’ effects were felt in the southern EU countries, the EU institutions, far from being perceived

2 https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/05/08/opinion/1557324263_937289.html.

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as guarantors of democratic stability and economic development as they had been before the Great Recession, were judged as imposing unacceptable constraints on national sovereignty. This in turn fostered the transformation of party systems (Magalhães 2013). However, in Spain, a country with high levels of support for the EU at the party-system level and among the public, attitudes to European integration barely changed, despite the warnings of some authors of subtle signals of change emerging at the beginning of the decade (Verney 2011). First, the Great Recession went hand in hand with a loss of trust in European institutions (Torcal 2019). Spaniards’ trust in the EU and support for further integration declined between 2010 and 2014, the toughest period of the economic recession and austerity. In parallel fashion, levels of satisfaction with democracy and of economic satisfaction also declined. However, the available indicators suggest that satisfaction levels are now reviving (Fig. 10.4). Several indicators have shown that indifference to or rejection of European integration grew just after the Great Recession (Verney 2011), and that some degree of polarisation has appeared around EU issues since the 8.00

80

6.00

60

4.00

40

2.00 20

0.00

0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017 Trust in the European Parliament European Union: European unification go further or gone too far

DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION - EU SaƟsfied SITUATION: ECONOMY EUROPEAN Good

Fig. 10.4 Spanish citizens’ general attitudes towards the EU (2006–2017) (Note The vertical axis of the graph on the left-hand side represents degree of trust in the EP and support for, or opposition to, European unification, both on a 10-point scale. In the graph on the right-hand side, the vertical axis shows the percentages of those who say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU and who consider the situation of the European economy to be good. Source Authors’ elaboration of data from Eurobarometer and European Social Survey [ESS])

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implementation of austerity policies (Ares 2016). However, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Spaniards are among the most Euroenthusiastic citizens in Europe and were so even during the worst years of the Great Recession. Until 2011, Spanish citizens exhibited clear pro-EU attitudes and had levels of trust in the EU that were above the European average. Moreover, Eurobarometer data show that the vast majority of Spanish citizens, even in the worst period of the Great Recession, still supported core European policies, and only enlargement suffered a temporary decline in support (Fig. 10.5). Analysis of recent public opinion data (Eurobarometer 90 and Eurobarometer 91) illustrates in more detail the pro-EU orientations of Spaniards. Most Spaniards (87%) consider themselves to be citizens of the EU. 80% want to know more about their rights as EU citizens, while the corresponding proportions for the EU as a whole are 73% and 68%, respectively (Eurobarometer 91). For both Spaniards and other Europeans, the EU means first and foremost free movement of people, goods 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

SINGLE CURRENCY

FOREIGN POLICY

DEFENCE POLICY

FUTURE ENLARGEMENT

2017

Fig. 10.5 Spanish citizens’ attitudes towards the main EU policies (2006– 2017) (Note Percentages of respondents in favour of: the single currency; a common EU foreign policy; a common security and defence policy; further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years. Source Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer data)

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and services (Eurobarometer 90). Thus, when presented with a list of 14 items and asked what the EU means to them personally, free movement is the item most frequently mentioned by both Spaniards (46%) and the citizens of the EU28 generally (53%). The second most frequently chosen item is the Euro: 37% of both Spaniards and Europeans generally chose the common currency. The third most frequently chosen item identifying the EU for Spaniards is cultural diversity (26%), while for Europeans it is peace (33%). It is important to highlight that, both for Spaniards and for Europeans generally, the most positive results of the EU are derived from the aforementioned elements. When asked to choose the most positive results of the EU, 60% of both Spaniards and EU citizens generally include free movement in their top three; 45% of Spaniards and 54% of Europeans generally include peace; 24% of both groups include the Euro. In addition, 24% of Spaniards include ‘the economic power of the EU’, and the same percentage includes ‘the level of social welfare (healthcare, education, pensions)’ (Eurobarometer 91). 78% of Spaniards are in favour of Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro as compared to 62% of Europeans generally (Eurobarometer 90). 9 out of 10 Spaniards agree with the free movement of people as compared to 8 out of 10 Europeans generally, while 80% of Spanish respondents support the common trade policy compared with 71% of Europeans generally (Eurobarometer 91). 86% of Spaniards are in favour of a common EU migration policy, compared to the 69% of Europeans generally (Eurobarometer 90). It is equally remarkable that 79% of Spaniards agree either totally or somewhat that their country ‘should help refugees’ as compared with 69% of citizens of the EU28 (Eurobarometer 90). 72% of Spaniards favour the creation of a single digital market within the European Union, while among citizens of the EU28 support is somewhat lower, but in any case, significant: 63% (Eurobarometer 90). In line with this growing political commitment, most Spaniards (85%) and EU citizens generally (74%) are in favour of a common European energy policy (Eurobarometer 90) and a common defence and security policy: 83 and 74%, respectively (Eurobarometer 91). In short, these data suggest that Spaniards tend to be more proEU than the European average. However, the reality is somewhat more complex. Paradoxically, fewer Spaniards than European citizens generally consider that they have benefitted from a range of EU achievements. Thus, 38% of Spanish citizens report that they have benefitted from ‘no/less border controls when travelling abroad’ in comparison with 56%

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of Europeans generally. Similar figures are obtained when respondents are asked about their having benefitted from ‘cheaper calls when using a mobile phone in another EU country’ (26% as compared to 51%); improved consumers rights when buying products or services in another EU country (26% as compared to 40%); strengthened rights for air transport passengers in the EU (21% as compared to 35%); medical assistance in another EU country (14% as compared to 26%); and the possibility of living, working or studying in another EU country. In the latter three cases, the percentages are, respectively, 15, 13 and 11 as compared to 22, 21 and 19 (Eurobarometer 91). Finally, and given the strongly Europhile nature of PSOE, it is relevant to ask whether PSOE voters are more Euro-enthusiastic than the general Spanish population. Survey data seem to provide an affirmative answer. Considering data from the 2019 European Election Study (Table 10.3), PSOE’s voters are more satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU than the Spanish average. They followed the campaign for the EP elections more closely in the media and on social media; they have greater trust in the European Parliament, are more likely to believe that Spain’s membership of the EU is predominantly positive and are more convinced supporters of further European integration.

Conclusions The Great Recession of 2008 had dire effects on PSOE. The crisis contributed to it losing office, but after that its electoral decline continued as it suffered from the challenge of new parties to its left and to its right. In the 2008 general election, PSOE won 43.6% of the vote; following the elections of 2011, 2015 and 2016, and the two elections of 2019, the party currently stands at 28% of the vote. Only in 2016 did the party manage to halt its electoral decline, and in 2019 it increased its vote. In the context of this electoral earthquake, the party can at least claim that it seems to have overcome the worst of its electoral crisis. It can also point to the fact that it has regained office in a coalition in which the radical left is the junior partner (a partner which, in 2015, certainly threatened PSOE’s traditional status as the largest party on the Spanish left). Many things have changed in Spain since the Great Recession and its austerity policies, but two elements remain. One is the position of PSOE as one of Spain’s two largest parties, and the dominant party of the Spanish left, stressing now its social democratic profile on the economic dimension and

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Table 10.3 Opinions on EU among PSOE voters and among Spanish citizens generally

Q4. All in all again, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? ‘Very satisfied’ + ‘Fairly satisfied’ Q8. How closely did you follow the campaign ahead of the European Parliament elections in the media or on social media? Mean (st. dev.) Q18. For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: ‘You trust the European Parliament’. ‘Yes, totally’ + ‘Yes, somewhat’ Q22. Generally speaking, do you think that… membership of the European Union is…? ‘A good thing’ Q23. Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Mean (st. dev.) N

PSOE voters

Spanish citizens

58.2

43.8

6.5 (2.5)

6.0 (2.8)

59.8

44.5

81.3

81.6

7.2 (2.2)

6.9 (2.5)

246

1000

Note The figures are percentages except for Q8 and Q23 which show means (with standard deviations in brackets). For Q4, the response categories are ‘Very satisfied’, ‘Fairly satisfied’, ‘Not very satisfied’ and ‘Not at all satisfied’. Q8 is a 0–10 scale, where 0 stands for ‘Not at all’ and 10 stands for ‘Very closely’. For Q18, the response categories are ‘Yes, totally’, ‘Yes, somewhat’, ‘Neither trust nor distrust’, ‘No, not really’ and ‘No, not at all’. For Q22, the response categories are ‘A good thing’, ‘A bad thing’ and ‘Neither’. Q23 is a 0–10 scale where 0 stands for ‘Unification has already gone too far’ and 10 stands for ‘Unification should be pushed further’ Source Authors’ elaboration of data from the European Election Study (2019)

its cosmopolitan orientation on the cultural dimension of political competition. Associated with the latter feature, PSOE stands—as much today as in the past—as the champion of the pro-EU cause, as an indubitable defender of integration, moderate institutional reform, democratisation and the progressive economic agenda of the European centre left. The second element that remains a feature of the changing landscape of Spanish politics is the generally pro-EU orientation of Spaniards. The weight of pro-EU attitudes in the population and the pro-EU stance of PSOE are surely related. Pro-EU attitudes are the norm among the Spanish population, even though a significant contingent of voters now supports a radical-right party. And PSOE, which won the 2019 EP elections with an increased share of the vote, well represents, as we have

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described in this chapter, that general orientation. There is no incentive for PSOE to modify its broad pro-EU position. An aspect that will deserve some attention in the future is how PSOE will react if the Spanish radical right moves towards more clearly Eurosceptical positions, a card, which, for the time being, Vox has declined to play. Will the society as a whole modify its current pro-EU orientation? Will the strongly pro-EU PSOE electorate weaken its current stand on this issue? And how will PSOE (and the mainstream conservative party) react to that? Only time will tell.

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Grande, E., & Hutter, S. (2016). Beyond Authority Transfer: Explaining the Politicization of Europe. West European Politics, 39(1), 23–43. Harteveld, E., Schaper, J., De Lange, S. L., & Van Der Brug, W. (2018). Blaming Brussels? The Impact of (News About) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes Towards the EU and National Politics. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 157–177. Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). Political Parties in the European Union. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hobolt, S. B. (2014). A Vote for the President? The Role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 1528–1540. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018). Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Llamazares, I. (2012). La communauté nationale menacée. Inertie et transformations de l’idéologie ultranationaliste de l’extrême droite espagnole. In A. Fernández García & M. Petithomme (Eds.), Les nationalismes dans l’Espagne contemporaine (1975–2011) (pp. 77–102). Paris: Armand Colin. Llamazares, I., & Gramacho, W. (2007). Eurosceptics Among Euroenthusiasts: An Analysis of Southern European Public Opinions. Acta Politica, 42(2–3), 211–232. Llamazares, I., & Ramiro, L. (2006). Les espaces politiques restreints de la droite radicale espagnole. Pôle Sud, 2, 137–152. Magalhães, P. C. (2013). Crisis and Party System Change: Greece, Portugal and Others. Retrieved from http://www.pedro-magalhaes.org/crisis-and-party-sys tem-change-greece-portugal-and-others/. Mair, P. (2000). The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems. West European Politics, 23(4), 27–51. Marks, G., & Steenbergen, M. (2002). Understanding Political Contestation in the European Union. Comparative European Studies, 35(8), 879–892. Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2000). The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration. British Journal of Political Science, 30(3), 433–459. Marks, G., Wilson, C. J., & Ray, L. (2002). National Political Parties and European Integration. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 585–594. Orriols, L., & Cordero, G. (2016). The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-Party System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election. South European Society and Politics, 21(4), 469–492.

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Polk, J., Rovny, J., Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., et al. (2017). Explaining the Salience of Anti-elitism and Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data. Research & Politics, 4(January–March), 1–9. Ramiro, L., & Morales, L. (2007). European Integration and Spanish Parties. Elite Empowerment and Spanish Adaptation. In T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, R. Ladrech, E. Carter, & K. R. Luther (Eds.), The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation. Abingdon: Routledge. Roth, F., Gros, D., & Nowak-Lehmann, F. D. (2014). Crisis and Citizens’ Trust in the European Central Bank—Panel Data Evidence for the Euro Area, 1999–2012. Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 303–320. Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M., & Quaglia, L. (2013). Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 51–64. Taggart, P. (1998). A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363–388. Torcal, M. (2019). Opinión pública y cambio electoral en España. Madrid: CIS. Treib, O. (2014). The Voter Says No, But Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 1541–1554. Usherwood, S., & Startin, N. (2013). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 1–16. Vázquez García, R., Delgado Fernández, S., & Jerez Mir, M. (2010). Spanish Political Parties and the European Union: Analysis of Euromanifestos (1987– 2004). Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11(2), 201–221. Verney, S. (2011). Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective. South European Society and Politics, 16(1), 1–29.

CHAPTER 11

Greece and the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima Dimitris Tsarouhas

Introduction The long-lasting economic crisis has left a large imprint on Greek party politics. From 2010 to 2019, the country saw eight different prime ministers alternating in office with a speed indicative of the country’s political woes. Further, the country found itself in the midst of an existential crisis regarding the future of the Eurozone and, by extension, of its European Union membership. Previously regarded as an external anchor of stability and welfare (Ioakimidis 2000), ‘Europe’ acquired a much more negative political connotation during the crisis (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2014). As the country became more polarized and political parties sought to manage the crisis, ‘Europe’ became increasingly associated with austerity, budget cuts and reduced levels of spending for the public and private purse alike (Karyotis and Gerodimos 2015). This was a form and type of Europeanism unlike anything seen since the country joined the then European Community in 1981: European integration and its contested nature became a major partisan divide (see Katsanidou and Otjes 2016).

D. Tsarouhas (B) Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3_11

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One of the crisis’ many consequences has been the redrawing of the party political map. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, PASOK) has undoubtedly paid the highest price, seeing its popularity shrink in dramatic, unprecedented fashion. Founded in 1974 by the popular (and, on more than one occasion, populist) Andreas Papandreou, the party won a single-party mandate to govern Greece from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 2004. In the 1970s, the party’s radical rhetoric fit the widespread anti-Americanism of a large part of the electorate and corresponded to its leader’s instinctive ability to charm the masses. However, after assuming office in the 1980s, the party toned down its rhetoric, accepted EEC and NATO membership, and concentrated on the build-up of the welfare state by way of a Keynesian-like economic policy based on redistribution (Moschonas 2013). Papandreou had created a popular party, which redrew the political map, and its mass party characteristics became a model for other parties to imitate (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006). However, PASOK remained a personalist party, lacked the organizational structure and institutional logic of European social democratic parties (Pappas 2009) and replaced traditional, direct patron-client relations with ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ on a mass scale (Lyrintzis 1984). The party’s adjustment to external conditions continued in the 1990s, especially following the death of its founder and the election of Kostas Simitis as Prime Minister and, following the 1996 Party Congress, party leader too. Simitis aimed at Greek Eurozone membership at any price and anchored PASOK to the then fashionable Third Way discourse of the centre left, which endorsed fiscal austerity, privatization and a supply-side management of the economy. He won both the 1996 and 2000 elections as the political symbol of Greek modernization, appealing to centre-right and conservative voters in a way his predecessor could not (Moschonas 2001). George Papandreou, who led PASOK from 2004 to 2012, changed PASOK radically: the party’s leader would henceforth be elected by party members and ‘friends’ instead of the party’s congress, while workplace branches were abolished and Internet-based ‘participatory democracy’ replaced intra-party dialogue. A ‘presidentialist party’ (Tsarouhas 2010) was thus created and remained in place after Papandreou’s resignation in 2012 and his replacement by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Evangelos Venizelos. The dramatic decline of PASOK’s electoral fortunes is remarkable given its deep roots in Greek society and the public policy achievements it can claim ownership of. These are primarily the setting up of the

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National Health Service, decentralized governance and major investment in public infrastructure (Sotiropoulos 2013: 202). The term ‘Pasokification’, coined by the Labour activist James Doran, captures the extent to which the erstwhile dominant PASOK has now been reduced to a smallsized political party, and it is also indicative of the larger crisis of social democratic parties in Europe, an issue addressed elsewhere in this volume. The full list of reasons for the party’s decline need not preoccupy us here, but three issues stand out and are worth mentioning. First, the party was in office when the crisis broke out, and a large part of the electorate never forgave the party for its handling of the crisis, not least the then Prime Minister’s decision to seek a bailout that included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), known for its pro-austerity policy recipes. Second, the party’s positive rhetoric on the European Union (EU) and European integration, which had begun in the 1980s and continues to this day, contrasted sharply with the more critical stance adopted by the left-wing SYRIZA, a party whose voters’ socio-economic profile is hardly distinguishable from that of PASOK voters. SYRIZA’s meteoric rise from 2012 and the concomitant decline of PASOK are indicative of the rise of Euroscepticism among the Greek public (Verney 2015) and the successful attempt by SYRIZA to portray itself as a left-wing party pushing for a genuinely ‘Social Europe’, in contrast to PASOK’s longevity in power and the (real and alleged) corruption that accompanied its terms in office. Third, PASOK formed a coalition government with the centre-right New Democracy party from 2012 to 2015, an unholy alliance given traditional Greek politics. Implementing austerity was difficult enough and the coalition fell apart in early 2015; yet for PASOK the experience was even more bitter. The party that had historically associated itself with social justice and the build-up of Greece’s welfare state now appeared in tune with a set of economic policy priorities that resulted in record-high levels of poverty, social exclusion and unemployment (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014). Under such circumstances, electoral decline was inevitable. Pasokification is indicative of the magnitude of PASOK’s electoral decline. A party that won almost 44% of the votes cast in 2009 fell to 13.2% just three years later, in May 2012. Falling further, to 12%, in June 2012, PASOK declined to 4.7% in January 2015 and faced the spectre of electoral irrelevance, not least due to the 3% national threshold that Greek electoral law prescribes for parties to gain representation in parliament. A series of initiatives and attempts to revive the flailing party, discussed in the

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next section, managed to avert this disastrous scenario. The decline has ceased, and the party has recently recorded small gains. In the September 2015 election, the party gained 6.3% of the vote, while in the most recent national election of July 2019 it climbed further to 8.1%. In this way, it managed to secure one of its two principal objectives prior to the polls: it ended up third, assisted by the waning of the far-right Golden Dawn, but remained far below double-digit figures, an objective the party had set itself prior to the poll.

The 2019 EU Election Results in Greece The 2012 results discussed above, and the signing of a second bailout programme with the Troika, triggered a crisis of representation for the Greek centre left. PASOK’s political brand became toxic among vast swathes of the population and the party soon found itself debating its political future. A series of high-profile members of the party resigned the whip, in both the national and European parliaments (Newsnow.gr 2012) and turmoil followed. The party’s very existence was at stake and a series of initiatives was launched to salvage its electoral fortunes. Prior to the September 2015 election, PASOK announced that it would contest the election in alliance with the Democratic Left ´ DIMAR), with both retaining their Party (ημoκρατικη´ Aριστερα, autonomous status post-election. The agreement paid off, as the coalition climbed back to 6.3%, and 16 out of 17 seats were won by PASOK MPs (Greek Interior Ministry 2015). Yet the improvement was only marginal, and PASOK soon concluded that a wider alliance of progressives and social democrats had become necessary, given SYRIZA’s ascent to power and its ability to attract both left-wing and centre-left voters. In 2017, PASOK, DIMAR and the liberal River Party (which had acquired a nationwide reputation and was headed by a popular journalist) announced the formation of a new centre-left party, the Movement for Change ´ KINAL). At the same time, the party sought to (K´ινημα Aλλαγης, heal its internal wounds, following the split caused by its former leader Papandreou’s decision to launch his own party, the Democrats and Socialists’ Movement (K´ινημα ημoκρατων ´ και oσιαλιστων, ´ KIDISO), only a few weeks prior to the January 2015 electoral contest (Naftemporiki.gr 2015). The split in the social democratic vote had harmed both PASOK, with its meagre 4.7%, and Papandreou’s party, which ended up with 2.5% and failed to elect any MPs. After prolonged internal debates,

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PASOK today maintains its autonomous party political status but does so as part of this wider umbrella party, which originally included both River and KIDISO. The River Party soon departed, however, and PASOK constitutes the backbone of KINAL to this day. The 2019 European Parliament (EP) election results were a disappointment for KINAL, despite attempts by its leader (and PASOK leader) Fofi Gennimata to beautify the outcome. KINAL won 7.72% of the vote and elected two MEPs. Despite the fact that the party ended up third, this was by no means a good result. To start with, EP contests are traditionally considered second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980), offering voters the chance to cast a ‘loose vote’. Greek voters indeed opted for a number of smaller parties, but mostly entrusted their votes to right-wing or far-right parties. Golden Dawn gathered almost 5% of the vote, while a newly founded party on the populist right, the Greek Solution, also gained representation in Brussels with its 4.2%. Second, voters punished the incumbent left-wing government by granting a mere 23.8% of the vote to SYRIZA; instead of capitalizing on the disappointment of progressive voters, KINAL failed to make the anticipated gains among this part of the electorate. New Democracy, the historic centreright rival of PASOK, emerged triumphant by winning a third of the votes cast, while the River Party ended up with a disappointing 1.5%. The outcome of the EU elections soon had domestic political repercussions: Prime Minister Tsipras called for a snap election, duly held in July 2019 (Efimerida Ton Syntakton, 27 May 2019). In these elections, KINAL fared marginally better, winning 8.1% and electing 22 MPs. In the meantime, yet another crisis had erupted as Gennimata and former leader Venizelos clashed openly about the latter’s role in the party. A brilliant orator representing the right wing of the party, Venizelos had made the political fight against SYRIZA a personal mission.

Europe and the EU in KINAL’s July Election Manifesto KINAL has long accused both SYRIZA and New Democracy of lacking clear, coherent plans to restore Greece’s economic stability and social cohesion. It describes itself as a convincing alternative to the alleged neoliberal tendencies of New Democracy and the unwillingness of SYRIZA to design and execute a long-term economic recovery plan marrying a dynamic market economy with the imperatives of social justice.

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In that context, the party contested the July 2019 elections on the basis of a detailed election manifesto, which included the party’s programmatic position. Extending to 185 pages, KINAL’s programme covers a wide array of topics and reads both as a pre-election manifesto and as a more general attempt to explain the new formation’s policy profile. The main subject areas are revealing of both the main points of public debate in the country and KINAL’s own objectives. There is no separate section devoted to Europe either with regard to European integration or with reference to the party’s positioning towards that process. Furthermore, and quite astonishingly, KINAL’s manifesto devotes no stand-alone section to foreign policy, defence or security. The bulk of the manifesto is instead oriented towards the party’s domestic political priorities: economic reconstruction, health, education and a rights-based agenda for minorities and excluded social groups. In a document that numbers 185 pages, references to either Europe or the European Union are very few. A word search on ‘Europe’ leads to only 18 hits. The EU is only mentioned three times, and the Eurozone receives only one mention. Clearly, this is a document drafted for domestic political consumption, attempting to appeal to erstwhile PASOK voters who have moved en masse to SYRIZA in recent years. Although it is true that KINAL had already committed to the PES manifesto and used that umbrella document to contest the May 2019 EP election, the absence of more European references in a general election that followed only a couple of months later is astounding. For the party was firmly convinced of the need to Europeanize the country’s institutional and economic structures. In the manifesto’s preface, the party alludes to further European integration, calling on Greece to ‘contribute to the integration of a European Union [that will] develop on a sustainable, social and participatory basis’ (KINAL 2019: 6). On page 7, KINAL praises its own contribution to the country’s modernization and sees in EU membership in 1981, as well as Greece’s EMU participation since 2001, the ‘peak’ of this positive process. In the same section of the preface, the party stresses that the environment shaped by EU and EMU membership brought new challenges that were not ‘dealt with correctly or on time’, illustrating the argument by mentioning the failed pension reform attempt of the Simitis government in the early 2000s (ibid.: 7). Proud of its contribution to Greece’s Europeanization, KINAL thus associates modernity with the country’s European character and underlines its own major contribution to it. This

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was a successful political recipe in the late 1990s and early 2000s: given today’s circumstances, it is doubtful that it can work again. The concluding paragraph of this page is indicative of the party’s view of the economic crisis: the latter has been the product of mismanagement by governments that followed PASOK’s removal from office in 2004. When the global financial crisis hit, the argument goes, Greece had become a country facing record-breaking debt, deficit and trade imbalances, which in turn made it the ‘Eurozone’s weakest link’ (KINAL 2019: 8). Equally significantly, the country was also suffering from a ‘trustworthiness deficit vis-à-vis its European partners’ (KINAL 2019: 7–8). There is little here to suggest self-criticism or indeed that the Eurozone (and Greek) crises may have been caused by any other factor(s) aside from domestic failures by political opponents. When referring to the external environment, PASOK stresses how ‘deregulated globalization undermined the “social contract” within Europe’ (KINAL 2019: 8), without reference to what that contract consists of or the precise mechanisms through which this undermining took place and by whom. The remainder of the preface, referring to the challenges that the fourth industrial revolution and artificial intelligence have brought about, adopts a more political tone: it contextualizes the need for Greek reforms by stressing that both national and European public policies ought to reject pure market mechanisms. They ought instead to invest in education to achieve equitable growth and decent living conditions for those who will be unsuccessful in ‘keeping up with [the pace of] change and unable easily to adjust to the new work and social environment’ (KINAL 2019: 9). Mainstream social democratic messages are thereby reproduced. The market alone will prove socially destructive in conditions of globalization; the new era brings challenges that will (continue to) leave many behind; adjusting to the challenge (instead of confronting its foundations) is necessary; national and EU-wide initiatives ought to be taken (but mostly on the supply side of markets through education and retraining). Finally, the remainder of the preface calls for a ‘leap forward’ by Greece so as to, inter alia, restore Greece’s equal participation in the EU by fighting for a Union that will be ‘politically united, economically powerful, progressive and socially sensitive, [a Union] which will pay equal attention to its social and economic pillars’ (KINAL 2019: 10). The last phrase constitutes a mild, indirect critique of the EU’s prioritization of economic and financial integration over ‘Social Europe’, an argument often used by social democratic parties across the Union. The fact that the same social democratic

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parties, including PASOK, have often agreed to this particular prioritization in years past is politely omitted. The preface’s list of policy priorities concludes by calling for a cross-party consensus on reforms to allow the country to exit the crisis quickly and ‘in a way similar to that achieved by other EU member states’ (KINAL 2019: 18).

Europe and the EU in KINAL’s Communication In the run-up to the European election and in line what is by now common throughout the world, PASOK utilized Facebook to get its message across. To what extent did the party stress pan-European issues, and what role did its party leader, Fofi Gennimata, play in the process? How did the party attempt to balance the need for opposition to a left-wing government with a critique of the ascendant New Democracy party? To start with, it is worth highlighting that out of a total of 145 Facebook postings between 25 April and 15 May 2019, the posts stemming from the party are only 16: the vast majority were posts emanating from the personal account of the party leader. Of a total of 16 postings, only two are directly related either to developments in European politics or to the EU election itself. On 28 April, PASOK congratulated the PSOE leader, Pedro Sanchez, for his victory in the Spanish election, arguing that it was now time to ‘change Europe’. It is worth highlighting that the then Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras did the same, reaching for Twitter to hail the victory of ‘progressive forces’ in Spain on behalf of his SYRIZA party (Petrou 2019). On 15 May, PASOK provided a web link to the pan-European debate among the Spitzenkandidaten for the Commission Presidency (none of which was eventually selected by the Council), underlining that the PES was represented by Frans Timmermans. Timmermans had attended the party conference on 1 April, and relations with the party leader Gennimata were cordial throughout. Yet for the PES and its candidate, the Greek socialists were not the only source of support in the country. After some initial hesitation, Prime Minister Tsipras declared that SYRIZA would support Timmermans’ candidacy, stressing the need to unite progressive forces behind a policy programme that would confront neoliberalism head on and allow for a common front against the far right (Kampouris 2019). A month prior to the elections, Tsipras invited Timmermans to Athens. Importantly, the PES candidate stressed that internal differences among progressives should not stand in the way of

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a common front against right-wing forces. The visit and the rapport between the two leaders, as well as the close relations that Tsipras has cultivated with socialist leaders across Europe, confirm that for the PES, SYRIZA as well as KINAL represents its values in Greece. As noted earlier, most Facebook posts prior to the EU elections stem from the party leader’s account. If this small sample of social media postings is anything to go by, it is clear that for KINAL (and possibly other parties in Greece and beyond), EU elections remain ‘second-order’ contests (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Gennimata used Facebook to campaign in the ways typical of parties in opposition: most posts accuse the then SYRIZA government of incompetence and malign intent in domestic and foreign policy. Concretely, Gennimata accuses the government of bankrupting the state electricity company, curtailing state pensions, reducing welfare benefits and delaying the processing of new pension applications on the part of hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries. Other posts seek to stress the party’s determination to revive its electoral fortunes, stressing the extent to which the then government’s progressive policy rhetoric contrasted sharply with its conservative practices. In that context, going beyond the two versions of the right, as Mrs Gennimata called the two largest political parties, was crucial: only KINAL represented ‘true progressive forces’ in Greece, ready to rebuild the country. The party’s tactic of accusing both SYRIZA and New Democracy was an attempt to maintain an autonomous political status and recapture disappointed voters who had earlier moved to SYRIZA: judging by the result of the EU election, and especially the general election that followed soon afterwards, the attempt was not successful. In line with the party’s manifesto discussed earlier, there is hardly a mention of foreign policy in Gennimata’s posts. However, in one of her posts, the party leader expresses her hope that the government will not ‘handle Greek-Turkish relations the way it dealt with the [Macedonian] question’, indicating the party’s disapproval of the 2018 Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia. It is worth highlighting that the agreement, which resolved the name dispute between the two countries and paved the way for a full normalization of bilateral relations and enhanced cooperation (Armakolas and Petkovski 2019), was hailed as historic by Western leaders, including social democrats from across the Union. Once again, the PES and SYRIZA leader Tsipras were in full agreement concerning what was a major policy initiative in the Balkans, while the PES’ formal institutional partner in Greece was the only PES

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member to vote down the agreement. The observer status of SYRIZA within the PES and the personal relations between party leader Tsipras and the PES attest to both the popularity of Tsipras in Europe and the uncomfortable position in which KINAL finds itself within the PES. KINAL emphasizes that SYRIZA does not belong to the PES, not least because of its repeated criticism of social democracy, but its objections carry little weight among most progressives.

Greek Voters’ Opinions on Europe and the EU: Persistent Euroscepticism The fall 2018 Standard Eurobarometer survey on public opinion in the EU constitutes an important source of data measuring popular attitudes towards the Union. By the time the survey was conducted (November 2018), Greece had just exited the bailout programme of the Troika, and its economy had just started to recover. Yet the overall economic and especially social picture remained bleak, with widespread poverty and social exclusion remaining extremely high. As argued above, the positive connotations that Europe and European integration used to awaken in Greeks had been substantially reduced during the crisis, partly explaining the (near total) absence of EU-wide slogans and campaigning by the Greek socialists in the run-up to the 2019 EU election. Below, I argue that KINAL’s attitude in this regard is very much in line with mainstream Greek opinion on the EU, its policies and its institutions. In fact, one could argue that KINAL has become a mainstream pro-European social democratic party at precisely the moment that such sentiments are becoming increasingly less popular among most Greeks. The overall impression that Greeks have of the EU is ‘neutral’ (neither positive nor negative), shifting from a negative view recorded a year earlier. In fact, Greek attitudes towards the EU had started to improve in 2016 (European Commission 2018: 4). Yet even the most recent findings demonstrate the continuation of a major sense of grievance towards the EU, regarding both its image and its policies. To illustrate, when asked whether the EU conjured up for them a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image, a plurality of respondents (39%) had a neutral view in November 2018. Only 25% viewed the EU positively and 35% had a negative image (European Commission 2018: 3). Greece is thereby the country with the most negative view of the Union across the EU28, followed by the Czech Republic (32%), and

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France, Italy and the UK (all with 27%). How can such an attitude be explained? Further questions concerning the attitudes of Greek and other EU citizens towards the EU offer important clues. When asked what the EU means to them, 57% of Greek respondents mention the freedom to work, travel and study anywhere within its borders; 48% (compared to 37% across the EU28) mention the single currency; 34% the maintenance of peace; 33% the strong voice of the Union in the world (33%). Further, when asked to choose the three most positive results the EU has delivered, 65% of Greeks include the free movement of people, goods and services; 55% preserving peace between member states; 27% the political and diplomatic influence of the Union in the world. The 2018 findings regarding the single currency are particularly important, confirming earlier results: Greeks may have been less friendly towards the Union in recent years but they continue to regard the Eurozone (and Greece’s membership of it) as a worthy prize and major achievement. Concretely, 67% support an economic and monetary union with one single currency, the Euro, a proportion five percentage points higher than the EU28 average (62%) (European Commission 2018: 11). In that sense, then, the last-minute compromise between the SYRIZA government and the country’s creditors in the summer of 2015 reflected popular attitudes. The events of that summer should therefore be interpreted as the final card the Greek government played in its attempt to keep the country in the Eurozone (and the EU), having earlier flirted with the possibility of expulsion. This is corroborated by Greek answers to the question as to whether the country could better face the future outside the EU: 59% disagree with the statement (European Commission 2018: 4) clearly sceptical of what isolationism would bring in a country already under severe financial strain. Regarding negative attributes and characterizations, Greeks record among the highest percentages across the Union. Asked what the EU means to them personally, 32% of Greek respondents (compared to an EU average of 20%) choose not enough control of the Union’s external borders; 31%, unemployment (compared to a mere 10% of EU citizens generally); 25%, the loss of cultural identity; 23%, criminality. When it comes to negative perceptions of the Union, two out of three Greek respondents describe it as ineffective, while 69% see it as ‘not protective’. Greek respondents’ answers regarding external borders are a function of two phenomena: first, the fact that Greek borders are also largely EU borders, exposing Greece to potentially large flows of third-country

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nationals. Second, the emergence and continuation of a large migration and refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 have hardened public attitudes visà-vis both immigrants in general and the way the EU has sought to handle the problem in particular. To be precise, a record 97% of Greeks consider it necessary that the Union takes additional measures to stop the illegal arrival of third-country nationals to the EU (EU28 average: 86%). More importantly, 77% of Greeks say that for them, immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ negative feeling, the fourth highest percentage in the EU28 and much above the EU average (53%) (European Commission 2018: 12). Given such views, it is hardly surprising that a large majority of Greek respondents, namely 71%, disagree with the statement that ‘immigrants contribute a lot’ to their country, compared to the much lower percentage of EU28 nationals generally who think the same way (43%). Further analysis of the data suggests that negative attitudes towards the EU on the part of Greeks are ‘structural’ in nature. That is, at least some of them relate to deep-seated problems and attitudinal positions the resolution and alteration of which by the EU or the domestic political elite is far from clear. To start with, 76% of Greeks disagree with the statement that the interests of their country ‘are well taken into account in the EU’, giving Greece the top spot in this category, followed by Cyprus (74%) and Slovenia (71%). It is noteworthy that Greek sentiments are not shared elsewhere in the EU: the average percentage of respondents across the Union who agree that their country’s interests ‘are well taken into account in the EU’ is 49%, the highest percentage recorded since 2004 (European Commission 2018: 5). The fact that Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia are all relatively small member states may not be a coincidence: the literature suggests the emergence of ‘new intergovernmentalism’ in EU decision-making since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. During this period, integration has proceeded apace yet this has mostly occurred through the strengthening of national representatives and a proliferation of informal policy-making modes (Bickerton et al. 2015). When it comes to their personal views and the extent to which these are taken into account, Greeks’ negative responses are even higher: 79% disagree that ‘[their] voice counts in the EU’. This finding is linked to their attitudes regarding democracy in the EU. Although in the 2018 survey the EU is characterized as ‘democratic’ by 50% of Greek respondents, this proportion is 17 percentage points lower than the EU average (67%). Further, those for whom the word ‘democratic’ describes ‘fairly badly’ or ‘very

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badly’, the idea they have of the EU is 48%, compared to a mere 27% across the member states generally. 66% of Greek respondents are ‘not very satisfied’ or ‘not at all satisfied’ with ‘the way democracy works in the EU’ and an even larger proportion (74%) are not very or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works at national level (74%). This high degree of disappointment with both the national and European levels of policy-making is reflected in levels of trust in key institutions. In fact, and although negative attitudes towards key institutions prevail in many other member states as well, the findings for Greece are nothing short of alarming. Greek respondents declare that they ‘tend not to trust’ national institutions in record-high proportions: political parties (95%), the Greek government (84%), the national parliament (84%), public administration (81%) and regional/local administration (77%). These percentages are by far the highest in the EU: the proportions of respondents who ‘tend not to trust’ political parties, the government and the national parliament across the EU28 as a whole are 77%, 59% and 58%, respectively (European Commission 2018: 6). In line with such attitudes are Greek views of the other major institution of liberal democracy, namely the mass media. A record 82% of respondents ‘tend not to trust’ television, while the written press (70%) and radio (64%) fare a bit better. Once more, the proportions exceed the EU average by far. Given this picture, it is hardly surprising that EU institutions meet with remarkable scepticism in Greece, albeit at slightly lower levels than national institutions. Distrust is highest towards the European Central Bank (72% ‘tend not to trust’ against a 42% EU28 average), followed by the European Commission (66% versus 39% of EU28 respondents generally), the European Parliament (59% versus 39%), the Council of the European Union (57% versus 36%) and the European Council (56% versus 36%) (European Commission 2018: 7). All in all, Greeks report record levels of distrust towards the EU as a whole: 70% ‘tend not to trust’ the European Union with only 26% tending to trust the Union. These proportions are the highest and lowest respectively among the EU28, suggesting that Euroscepticism in Greece is more than a fashionable trend associated with the politics of austerity: 59% are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ pessimistic ‘about the future of the EU’, again the highest percentage among the EU28 followed by France at 51%. Perhaps more important, but linked to the previous finding, are Greek respondents’ answers to the question whether ‘in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction’ in their country and the EU: Greeks consider that

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both nationally (77%) and at EU level (66%) things are headed the wrong way (European Commission 2018: 7).

Conclusion: European Integration and Greek Social Democracy This chapter has discussed the ways in which the Greek social democrats have sought to come to terms with a profound crisis of identity and representation, which has led to electoral decline and an uncertain future. The fact that the economic crisis was followed by PASOK’s decline in successive electoral contests after 2010 is, of course, far from coincidental, given that the crisis hit at a time when PASOK was at the helm. However, it would be misleading to argue that the crisis alone accounts for the party’s decline. After all, social democrats are in search of a new political mission and, with few exceptions, are suffering electoral setbacks to an unprecedented degree (at least if the post-1945 era is considered) across the Western world. The European Union, with its particular institutional set-up and policy-making mechanisms, is a contributor to social democratic decline. To start with, the multiple centres of decision-making and the need to maintain geographic, gender and political balances when agreeing portfolio allocations weaken the ideological component of the Union, along with the centrality of parties as the ultimate loci of policy-making and public authority (Moschonas 2009: 169–171). This cannot be good for the European left, priding itself on its ability to make a difference to peoples’ lives by isolating conservative social and economic forces and engineering progressive politics. Second, the policy direction of the Union over the last few decades is universally acknowledged to have favoured the economic over the social, above and beyond the institutional and policy measures that were taken during the Eurozone crisis in favour of austerity, balanced budgets and ‘fiscal consolidation’ (Parker and Tsarouhas 2018). This fact generally enhances the credibility and legitimacy of party political platforms more in tune with the need for fiscal conservatism and ‘sound economic management’, usually associated with centre-right parties. For the left, however, its association with social policy and defence of the welfare state places it in a position of weakness and vulnerability, precisely because national welfare state arrangements predate, and may even preclude, the formation of a pan-European welfare state (Majone 1996). The 1990s attempt by forces associated with the

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Third Way (Giddens 1998) to overcome this structural weakness within the EU system (and a globalized economic environment) by seeking to manage globalization in a more business-friendly fashion led, once financial liquidity was reduced and tough choices were called for, to increasing alienation by the left’s traditional working-class constituents. If there is one aspect of social democracy that the EU strengthens and underlines, then this is its liberal political character, associated with the respect for, and promotion of, fundamental social rights and liberties at the civic and political level (Moschonas 2009: 185). It is in this context, shaped by the institutional and policy practices of the European Union as well as the immediate consequences of choices made by leaders and party functionaries, that the political behaviour and electoral performance of KINAL ought to be judged. Given the longevity of PASOK in office and the decisive role it has played in shaping the modern Greek polity, it is ironic that the party has been reduced to a lesser, if still influential, role in Greek politics. The party’s liberal political character, its moderate positions on most issues and its embrace of globalization and European integration, make it a prototypical European social democratic party. Its failure, however, in common with most of its sister parties across Europe, to develop a convincing and plausible economic policy agenda contrary to the mainstream approach adopted by parties in office, has cost it dearly. In practical terms, the impoverishment, anger and frustration of the population have made more left-wing alternatives, SYRIZA being the most obvious example, genuine contenders for dominance in the large part of the political spectrum that progressive political forces traditionally occupy in Greece. The successful pursuit of social democratic politics in Greece necessitates the overcoming of petty differences between SYRIZA and KINAL and the concomitant cooperation, at national, regional and local level, of progressive forces.

References Armakolas, I., & Petkovski, L. (2019). Blueprint Prespa? Lessons Learned from the Greece-North Macedonia Agreement. Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(3), 703–722.

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European Commission. (2018). Tακτ ικ o´ Eυρωβαρ o´ μετ ρ o 90 – Eθνικ η´ ´ Eκθεσ η [Standard Eurobarometer 90—National Report]. Brussels: European Commission. Efimerida Ton Syntakton. (2019, May 29). Π ρ o´ ωρες εκλoγ šς μετ α´ τ ην ηχ ηρ η´ ητ ´ τ α [Early Elections Following the Resounding Defeat]. efsyn.gr. Available at https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/197108_proores-ekloges-meta-tin-ihiri-itta. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Polity. Greek Interior Ministry. (2015, December 17). Eθνικ šς Eκλoγ šς Σεπ τ šμβριoς 2015 [September 2015 General Election]. Available at http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2015b/v/public/index.html#{% 22cls%22:%22main%22,%22params%22:{}}. Ioakimidis, P. C. (2000). The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment. South European Society and Politics, 5(2), 73–94. Kampouris, N. (2019, April 1). Candidate for European Commission Presidency Timmermans Visits Greece. greekreporter.com. Available at https://greece. greekreporter.com/2019/04/01/candidate-for-european-commission-presid ency-timmermans-visits-greece/. Karyotis, G., & Gerodimos, R. (Eds.). (2015). The Politics of Extreme Austerity: Greece in the Eurozone Crisis. London: Palgrave. Katsanidou, Alexia, & Otjes, Simon. (2016). How the European Debt Crisis Reshaped National Political Space: The Case of Greece. European Union Politics, 17 (2), 262–284. KINAL. (2019). Π ρ o´ γ ραμμα—Π oλιτ ικ šς Θ šσ εις , Π ρ ooδευτ ικ šς Aλλαγ šς και Mετ αρρυθ μ´ισ εις. [Program—Political Principles, Progressive Changes and Reforms]. Athens. Available at https://kinimaallagis.gr/gggg/uploads/ 2018/11/unnamed-file.pdf. Ladi, S., & Tsarouhas, D. (2014). The Politics of Austerity and Public Policy Reform in the EU. Political Studies Review, 12(2), 171–180. Lyrintzis, C. (1984). Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of Bureaucratic Clientelism. West European Politics, 7 (6), 99–118. Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge. Matsaganis, M., & Leventi, C. (2014). Poverty and Inequality During the Great Recession in Greece. Political Studies Review, 12(2), 209–223. Moschonas, G. (2001). The Path of Modernization: PASOK and European Integration. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 3(1), 11–24. Moschonas, G. (2009). Reformism in a Conservative System: The European Union and Social Democratic Identity. In J. Callaghan, N. Fishman, & M. McIvor (Eds.), In Search of Social Democracy: Responses to Crisis and Modernization (pp. 168–192). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Moschonas, G. (2013). A New Left in Greece: PASOK’s Fall and SYRIZA’s Rise. Dissent, 60(Fall), 33–37.

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Nasftemporiki.gr. (2015, January 2). Γ . Π απ ανδρ šoυ: ηρθε ´ η ωρα ´ γ ια τ o επ o´ μεν o μεγ αλ ´ o β ημα ´ [G. Papandreou: The Time for the Next Big Step Has Arrived]. Available at https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/897924/gpapandreou-irthe-i-ora-gia-to-epomeno-megalo-bima. Newsnow.gr. (2012, March 15). Π αραιτ ησ ´ εις σ τ o Π AΣOK [Resignations at PASOK]. Available at http://www.newsnowgr.com/article/15422/parait iseis-sto-pasok.html. Pappas, T. S. (2009). To χ αρισ ματ ικ o´ κ o´ μμα: Π AΣOK, Π απ ανδρ šoυ, Eξ oυσ ι´α [The Charismatic Party: PASOK, Papandreou, Power]. Athens: Patakis. Parker, O., & Tsarouhas, D. (2018). Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery: The Political Economies of Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. London: Palgrave. Petrou, Z. (2019, April 30). Tsipras, Gennimata Both Hail Spanish Election Result. balkaneu.com. Available at https://balkaneu.com/tsipras-gennimataboth-hail-spanish-election-result/. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Spourdalakis, M., & Tassis, C. (2006). Party Change in Greece and the Vanguard Role of PASOK. South European Society and Politics, 11(3–4), 497–512. Sotiropoulos, D. (2013). Greece. In J.-M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union (pp. 185–205). London: Palgrave. Tsarouhas, D. (2010, April 1). PASOK’s Modernization Paradigm and New Social Democracy. Paper Presented at the Political Studies Association (PSA) Annual Conference. Edinburgh, Scotland. Verney, S. (2015). Waking the “Sleeping Giant” or Expressing Domestic Dissent? Mainstreaming Euroscepticism in Crisis-Ridden Greece. International Political Science Review, 36(3), 279–295.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion James L. Newell

European social democrats’ campaigns in 2019 showed few signs of novelty as compared with those they had run for earlier European Parliament elections. Their campaigns were very much national campaigns in the sense that while in their communications a focus on EU-related issues was present, the parties’ goals in the elections had mainly to do with their national-level standing. There were no obvious signs of cross-national coordination of the campaigns by the Party of European Socialists (PES), and the varying performances of each party confirmed that, as ever, voters were treating the elections as second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). As the data discussed by Pasquino and Valbruzzi show and as the country chapters confirm, the social democrats presented themselves, as in the past, as parties in basic agreement with the process of European integration. This was only to be expected. Historically, despite a persistence of Eurosceptical voices among its ranks, European social democracy from the 1970s had put aside initial hesitancy to embrace integration with increasing enthusiasm. As Holmes and Roder point out, this was due to

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the development of European programmes reflecting strong redistributionist and interventionist assumptions combined with a view of Europe, after the end of the post-War boom, ‘as a potential bastion that could protect [social democrats and their goals] from the worst of the new era’ (p. 29). So social democrats, in 2019, were broadly pro-European. However, there was little, if any, evidence in the 2019 election of a shared narrative ‘based on the need for the construction of a unified, supranational, democratic Europe’ (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, p. 50) as the pre-requisite for the pursuit of a distinctly progressive agenda. That is to say, there clearly was support in the parties’ manifestos for integration policies, for democratising measures and for measures of welfare and market regulation the parties wished to see adopted at a European level. The German SDP, for example, called for an extension of qualified majority voting to foreign policy, more powers for the European Parliament and transnational constituencies, a European minimum wage and minimum tax. The French PS manifesto pledged ‘a wide range of social and fiscal policies to fight inequalities’ (Evans and Ivaldi, p. 156). The UK Labour Party wanted EU-wide efforts to close tax loopholes exploited by multinational corporations. However, one has the impression that much of this was more about seeking to enshrine national programme policies at European level—‘a desire to “upload” some of the [parties’] achievements’ in Scantamburlo and Turner’s words (p. 136)—than it was about any kind of vision for a comprehensive overhaul of European institutions and processes themselves. Put another way, it seemed for the most part to be about transferring to the European level a series of ex ante regulations to compensate for the obstacles in the way of economic dirigisme at the national level, but without any sense that it would be accompanied by, or require, changes to the EU’s political structures and processes. Again, this can be explained, historically, by reference to the changing socio-economic context. On the one hand, the maintenance of prointegration positions despite the Great Recession (and the imposition of EU-inspired austerity measures in opposition to traditional social democratic principles) spoke to the ‘structural’, quasi-permanent, nature of the shift the social democrats had made in the 1970s. On the other hand, the Recession had strengthened the hands of those, among social democrats, for whom the EU was not a neutral arena for the deliberation of policy but a participant acting to obstruct progressive social projects, and who thus viewed its potential negatively, if anything wishing

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to see some reversal to integration. Moreover, by then, many social democratic parties had undergone the ideological transformation associated with ‘Third Way’ politics, adopting, when in government, neoliberal economic programmes difficult to distinguish from those of their opponents on the right. Consequently, by the time the recession hit, notions of an integrated, democratic Europe pursuing a social democratic agenda were beyond their intellectual horizons, or at least at odds with what they did at home. They had already bought into the idea that deregulation and neoliberalism were inescapable. This in turn may help to explain, first, why left wing demands in their 2019 manifestos failed (with the possible exception of Spain) to bring any really striking breakthroughs for them. Voters would take the demands as evidence of the parties’ tendencies to ‘talk the talk’ without being able to ‘walk the walk’ (Scantamburlo and Turner, p. 141). Second, it may help to explain the shift in the distribution of social democratic electorates away from manual working-class voters with limited education in the direction of highly educated middle-class voters, noted by Pasquino and Valbruzzi. For if the argument of ‘Third Way’ politicians was that adaptation to neoliberal conditions offered the best chance of both defending the welfare state and achieving shared prosperity in a globalised world, then the reality turned out to be different. The promise came true for those with high levels of human and financial capital but not for the relatively less well educated in the declining Fordist industries who instead faced growing inequality and hardship. Since social democrats had no alternative narratives to offer, they were unable to prevent large numbers of these voters defecting to radical right parties that did offer alternatives, i.e. the offer of the protection that would come through erecting borders, ‘standing up to Brussels’ and other policies of a nationalist and xenophobic kind. In this vein, the UK case confirmed, not once but twice in 2019, that ‘constructive ambiguity’ on the EU was completely useless as a strategy for keeping these voters, attracted by right-wing nationalist appeals, on board. Indeed, it seemed to confirm Marx’s dictum that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce. For the 2016 Brexit referendum had already revealed the drawbacks associated with attempting to accommodate xenophobic sentiments rather than challenging them. Then the Remain campaign sought to counter the anti-immigrant rhetoric of leavers merely by arguing that leavers were wrong to suggest that ending

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the free-movement arrangements of the single-market would reduce immigration since most immigration was from outside the EU. The fatal flaw in the argument was of course that when placed alongside the leavers’ argument, it presented the voter with this choice: stay in the EU and nothing will change (both sides agreed on that); vote to leave and immigration will not go down if the remainers are right, but will go down if the leavers are right. The choice for the ‘rational’, anti-immigrant, voter to make was obvious. (Newell 2019: 356)

Perhaps it was naïve to expect the social democratic parties in 2019 to offer a radical vision for turning the EU into a fully integrated, democratic vehicle for the pursuit of social democracy. After all, they lacked even the pre-requisites for such an ambition, namely a degree of unity on what vision they did have; a willingness to campaign as members of a European-wide alliance; and a willingness to campaign in ways that went beyond bland endorsements of the EU. In the first place, they clearly lacked a shared vision. Yes, the German, French, Italian, Spanish and Greek parties all signed up to the notion of a ‘social Europe’ but in the UK case, much of the 2019 manifesto was, as Eric Shaw (p. 197) points out, ‘focused on domestic policy issues and did not remotely read as a programme for the EU. No attempt was made to extol shared European values and culture or urge a European social democratic project’. Again, this was only to be expected given the party’s recent history. Its right wing had for the most part come to see the EU as a vehicle for meeting the challenges of globalisation through flexible labour markets and liberalisation rather than as ‘a guiding light for solidarity and equality’ (Diamond 2017; quoted by Shaw, p. 193). Its left wing, for the self-same reason, was for the most part Eurosceptical. Since the right of the party was solidly pro-EU, Euroscepticism became part of what was meant by being opposed to the right. In the second place, the social democrats had no overarching organisation that would enable them to campaign as members of a transnational team. Although in recent years the PES has taken some steps towards becoming genuinely transnational, it remains essentially an intergovernmental organisation. It takes decisions on the basis of consensus ‘whenever possible’ (Article 20.3 PES statute)1 and by qualified majority

1 Available at https://www.pes.eu/export/sites/default/.galleries/Documents-gallery/ PES-Statutes_EN.pdf_2063069299.pdf.

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if necessary, but allows member parties not to be bound by decisions they feel unable to adhere to provided they declare the fact before votes are taken. Hence, as Luke March shows, the PES remains ‘[an agent] of national principals’ (p. 96), ‘a “party of parties” rather than an integrated, transnational “Europarty”’ (p. 99). The ideological heterogeneity of its member parties has increased since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Consequently, the PES manifesto remained little more than a synthesis of member party positions. A distillation of general points of agreement, rather than a document offering a convincing critique of how the EU needed to change to make possible the pursuit of a left-wing agenda, it appears to have been referred to little in the national party campaigns. This relates directly to the third aspect, the blandness of the social democrats’ campaigns, because what stood out about the PES manifesto2 was its vagueness—its tendency, that is, to express a series of general aspirations difficult to disagree with, while remaining silent about the treaty changes that might be required to realise them. For example, few could argue with ‘European fiscal rules to foster sustainable growth and employment’ or with ‘fair management of migration and asylum’, but nothing was said about what these might imply for the Fiscal Compact or the Dublin principles which have caused such strong centrifugal pressures in the EU in recent years. The nebulous quality of the manifesto was reflected in the individual parties’ communications. The Italian PD, for instance, ‘never criticised’ (p. 179) the EU and sought to redefine integration as a project for the realisation of social demands rather than the achievement of economic goals without saying what this meant. The German SPD’s communications were likewise devoid of negative references to the EU and ‘aimed just to be likeable’ (p. 135). It could be argued that avoiding negative references to the EU will have enabled the parties to avoid unwittingly reinforcing the claims of right-wing nationalist competitors which, the PES manifesto claimed, were ‘selling nothing but dangerous illusions, putting past progress and European values at risk’. It may be, too, that aiming ‘just to be likeable’ allowed the parties to avoid dilemmas which were unavoidable with more specific and concrete approaches. For example, since the emergence and growth of the AfD, with its opposition to European solidarity economically and in terms of responses to the migrant crisis, the SPD faced the 2 Called, tellingly, ‘A New Social Contract for Europe’, the manifesto is available at https://www.pes.eu/en/manifesto2019/.

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following dilemma. If they adopted more ‘national’, less ‘European’ positions in an attempt to avoid being attacked from the right, then they risked losing votes because they were seen as little different from conservative rivals. However, if they attempted to distinguish themselves by pivoting in the direction of intra-European solidarity, then they risked losing support because of public hostility to notions of the EU as a ‘transfer union’. Whatever the explanation for it, the absence of a critique of the EU as presently constituted, of its democratic shortcomings and of an agenda for political reform means that the social democrats fail to explain how the EU can become a vehicle for the pursuit of equality and a progressive agenda more generally. If we then ask what such an explanation might look like, we can do worse than turn to the suggestions of the writers and organisations belonging to the category of ‘critical Europeanists’ set out in Chapter 1. These point in the direction of fiscal as well as monetary integration and the creation of a genuine European demos with supranational institutions fully accountable to it. Without these, it is difficult to see how—in a globalised world in which the levers of power have largely been removed from national legislatures–either the goal of ‘making capitalism fit for society’ (Crouch 2013) or the goal of superseding capitalism is realisable. A single integrated European polity is of course inconceivable without European politics, that is, public engagement with European-wide issues at the same time and with the same frames across the member states. Yet European policy-making is distinctive for its failure, by and large, to mobilise citizens thanks to ‘the lack of mediation by the information system’ and the absence of any ‘real engagement on the part of the parties or interest groups’ (Belluati, p. 81). As a consequence, the European institutions act and interact without a political vision to support their work, and therefore, their public narratives about EU decisions tend to be received by the political and media spheres ‘[a]t best… with a yawn’. At worst, the lack of purchase of such narratives leaves the field free for populist and hostile forces to dominate, so that political and media spheres end up subscribing to (or at least not refuting) negative counternarratives (Belluati, p. 82). A very good example of this phenomenon is given by the work of Boris Johnson as a journalist—which in turn lies

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at the heart of the cultural meaning of Brexit, as Irish Times journalist, Fintan O’Toole explains.3 The conclusion to which we are drawn, then, is apparently a disappointing one. It appears that the four obstacles in the way of the pursuit of a left-wing integrationist agenda identified in the introduction remain as seemingly insurmountable as ever. Social democratic parties did not seem significantly more inclined to address the obstacles or to pursue the left-wing agenda than they had in the past. It was not all doom and gloom. There were some positives. As Plaza-Colodro and Ramiro show, 3 See his (2018) book, and his ‘Politics and Prose’ talk available at https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=hA08SXJ8mAY where he observes:

You can’t really understand Brexit without understanding that it is a kind of camp parodic version of [the] nineteenth-century, early twentieth-century [British cult] of heroic failure. And the camping is done to a very large extent by Boris Johnson… Johnson’s mode, the mode he discovers in Brussels is a mode of camped-up outrage. Find something absolutely trivial … [and] find a way of making it seem like …. a matter of national pride … So some of you may remember that … in his campaign to become prime minister he said he would “die in a ditch” rather than seek another extension to the period allowed for the withdrawal agreement beyond October 31st … As it happens, in the book I had used a passage from him where he uses exactly the same phrase about dying in a ditch. And it was in 2002 and it was about dying in a ditch to save the prawn cocktail-flavoured crisp …. from the interference of Brussels bureaucrats as a matter of national salvation. And he was brilliant at doing this. So, just to give you this example, there’s a rule which I think most of us would probably approve of which says that if you are making potato products they must be mostly made of potato: you can’t add lots of other stuff. And Johnson kind of hits on it and its incredibly boring stuff so if you’re a journalist and you’re in Brussels, you get on page 15 if you’re lucky. How do you get on page one? Well you get on page one by saying, “Some Nazi in Brussels is trying to stop us feeding our children whatever kind of exotic potato chips we want. And” – he uses this word ‘heritage’ – “we have an English heritage of exotic-flavoured potato chips. And I will die in a ditch to fight this oppression”. Now, is this serious? Is it a joke? Well it’s a brilliant construct because its in the middle entirely where everybody loves the game because it feeds into all sorts of pre-existing prejudices: Brussels is this sort of horrible, oppressive machine. And what he does, its like a kind of Monty Python sketch where you invent a sort of surreal world where you have people sitting around all day thinking, “What could we do to really annoy the Brits? What could we do to really humiliate them? Oh let’s stop them eating whatever kind of crisps they want!” And then this becomes a whole genre of journalism, so the entire British press corps – not the entire corps but most of them – spend their time in Brussels trying to outdo each other: you find a regulation and make it completely absurd. You know: push it into some realm of Python-esque humour, which also sounds like its intolerable oppression.

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in Spain, PSOE secured a clear victory in an electoral context in which there is near consensus in favour of European integration. However, there was no great novelty in the social democratic camp in 2019. As PlazaColodro and Ramiro note, ‘parties have no incentives to place on the political agenda issues that are beyond their control’ (p. 222). Therefore, as long as social democratic parties remain weakly coordinated transnationally, their attention to European issues, even at EP elections, will continue to compete with the attention they give to purely national issues. Not surprisingly then, ‘electoral competition around EU policies appeared somewhat restricted’ (p. 222), and with due acknowledgement of the exceptions, the social democrats did not reverse their decline. All that said, we are reluctant to accept that the left-wing integration agenda is a lost cause and we end by explaining why we think that the terrain for it may be less infertile than may seem at first to be the case. In the first place, the fundamental issue underlying and driving it will not go away. The most intractable problems facing humanity require international collaboration. National sovereignty is an obstacle to problem solving. ‘Functional efficiency in the provision of public goods calls for multilevel governance, both below and above the central state’ (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 114). Second, it is of course true that transnationalism has brought a new division between the winners of globalisation and globalisation’s losers mobilised by the nationalist right. It is also true that ‘[t]he decisions taken at EU level to manage, first, the economic crisis and then the refugee crisis helped to erode the positive image of the EU and negatively affected evaluations of the EU institutions among European citizens’ (Plaza-Colodro and Ramiro, p. 226). However, it is not true that conflict over Europe is simply a reflection of the transnational cleavage. Rather, EU integration is a separate dimension of conflict and as such it may often place on opposite sides parties, which, in terms of the transnational, winners/losers, cleavage are on the same side. The reason is that economic crises (whether initiated by Lehman Brothers or the coronavirus) always seem to create European crises by heightening the significance of the dilemma created by integration thus far. This is the ‘unrelenting functional logic toward fiscal union’ (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 116) on the one hand, and resistance to it on the other, reflected in the north-south rift between debtor and creditor nations. Refugee crises have a similar effect, pitting the interests of the Mediterranean countries of first arrival against those of countries, like Hungary, implacably opposed to any relaxation of the Dublin principles. Consequently, being

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an EU ‘rejectionist’ party means different things depending on where in the EU the party is located. Parties like AfD are Eurosceptical in the sense that they are opposed to the potential resource transfers and burden sharing implied by Europe. Parties like the League and FdI in Italy are Eurosceptical in precisely the opposite sense. Their Euroscepticism arises from their awareness of the absence of resource transfers and burden sharing (as a result of which being in Europe implies having to submit to austerity and immigration). So these parties ought to be open to further integration since its logic impels the member states precisely in the direct of the intra-European solidarity which they complain is missing. Voters, meanwhile, have clearly lost faith in the European Union. In November 2018, six months prior to the 2019 EP elections, the proportion ‘tending to trust the EU’ had declined to 42% from a high of 57% in the spring of 2007 just before the financial crisis. Unsurprisingly, Greece and Italy were among the states with the lowest proportions (36% and 26%, respectively) tending to trust.4 However, when we explore what lies behind these figures, we find that active hostility to the EU is actually very much a minority sport, even in Italy and Greece. If citizens do not feel positive about the EU, then indifference appears to be the most common attitude. When asked whether the EU conjured up for them ‘a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image’, only 20% had (fairly or very) negative images, with Greece having the largest proportion at 35%. From the point of view of the prospects for a leftwing integration agenda, the crucial question is what drives hostility to the EU. Therefore, it is of some significance that in countries like Italy, ‘decreasing support for the EU coexists with requests for greater authority at EU level in specific policy domains’ (Conti et al. 2020: 78). Exploring the impact of multiple crises on attitudes, Conti, Di Mauro and Memoli go on to suggest that ‘even in countries where support for the EU is at a minimum, a sense of insecurity and grievance among citizens may turn into demands for EU initiatives’ (2020: 78). This is not a paradox. Rather, support for the EU is at a minimum precisely because citizens demand EU initiatives. Demands for EU initiatives reflect perceptions that solidarity arrangements in areas such as the economy and migration are undeveloped and un-institutionalised, and negative attitudes to the EU are the result. The perception is that the EU is failing to deliver on

4 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 90 First Results, Autumn 2018.

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its basic promise. Not surprisingly, ‘ever closer union’ implies increasing solidarity almost by definition. The real paradox is that the problem here lies not with Europe and supranationalism, but rather with the nationstate and intergovernmentalism; for this rather than the former is the real source of the disappointment. The terrain, then, is not unfertile. It requires some people to cultivate it. At the 2019 EP elections, these seemed to be most closely represented by the transnational Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) with its manifesto for a democratic Europe based on principles of social and economic egalitarianism. Formed in 2016, it starts from the recognition that the requirements for such a Europe are unlikely to be met without popular pressure since in the absence of some problem, none of the EU’s veto players have any incentive to shift from the intergovernmental status quo. With 1.4 million votes in the EP elections, nine members of the Greek parliament and around 120,000 members, it may never take off. However, given the difficulties of putting globalisation and European integration into reverse, as the UK is now finding out, then unless through nuclear war, pandemic or climate change humanity kills itself first, it seems more likely to become a significant movement than it is to die out. What this volume shows is that the crisis of social democracy and of the European Union have gone hand in hand—that the haemorrhaging of support of the social democratic parties and the crisis of legitimacy of the EU have been part and parcel of the same phenomenon, namely popular disenchantment arising from the politics of austerity. If many of the parties’ traditional supporters have abandoned them for Eurosceptical parties of the right and of the left, then this has to a significant degree been due to the failure of the social democrats and the EU together to live up to their promises. On the one hand, as the French, German and Greek cases all suggest, social democratic parties have come close to being crushed because they have not done what they said they would do (France), because voters do not believe them any more (Germany) and because they have been forced to bow to the pressure of international markets (Greece). On the other hand, the EU is unpopular, less because voters are against European integration in essence, than because many of them see the existing European institutions as remote and unresponsive and associate them with actions that belie in practice the solidarity that ‘ever closer union’ promises in principle. However, while it may be true

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that as presently constituted the EU has weakened ‘the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism’ (Scharpf 2015: 385), there is nothing inevitable about this. Left-wing Eurosceptics may be correct to suggest that integration has represented a constraint on left-wing policies, but they have to say what they would put in its place given that social democracy in one country has ‘ceased to be a viable project’ (Shaw, p. 199). If the challenge, then, is to develop an integration project that can speak not only to the economically advantaged, socially liberal ‘winners’, but also to the economically disadvantaged, socially conservative ‘losers’ of globalisation, then the project has to take account of the fact that the fault line between the two groups is defined by the issue of (dis)empowerment. Disempowered by their lack of human and financial capital and by the high unemployment entrenched by monetary integration, those in the second of the above two categories would surely benefit from the fiscal integration that would give the EU the capacity ‘to use public power to curtail market operations’ (Shaw, p. 201). Those in the second of the two categories are said to feel disempowered in the sense that they feel marginalised, disadvantaged and ignored—which points in the direction of a project for the democratisation of Europe. The task is then to sell the project by using media to enable people to feel that ‘Europe’ is something with which they can identify and in which they themselves have a stake.5 The task may not be an easy one, but since progressive projects confined to one country are no longer viable, for those on the left there really is no alternative. The task will certainly be costly in terms of the effort it requires, but the cost of not attempting it will surely be greater still.

5 The European Broadcasting Union’s Jeux sans frontières, which the writer has happy memories of watching as a child, is a far-from-trivial example of what can be done here. The idea for the show came from President Charles De Gaulle who thought that having French and German teams compete in a series of funny games would reinforce friendship between the two countries. Broadcast from 1962 and extended to include other European teams, at the height of its popularity, the show had over 110 million viewers across the continent. The writer certainly felt European watching the show. No doubt there are numerous other initiatives that could be taken to bring Europe alive in the popular imagination.

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References Conti, N., Mauro, D. D., & Memoli, V. (2020). Immigration, Security and the Economy: Who Should Bear the Burden of Global Crises? Burden-Sharing and Citizens’ Support for EU Integration in Italy. Contemporary Italian Politics, 12(1), 77–97. Crouch, C. (2013). Making Capitalism Fit for Society. Cambridge: Polity. Hooghe, Liesbet, & Marks, Gary. (2018). Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan and the Transnational Cleavage. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Newell, J. L. (2019). Italy’s New Government and the Migrant Crisis. Contemporary Italian Politics, 11(4), 355–357. O’Toole, F. (2018). Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain. London: Apollo. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Scharpf, F. W. (2015). After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy. European Law Journal, 21(3), 384–405.

Index

Note:Page numbers followed by f and t represent figures and tables A Abbott, Diane, 205 accountability, 5, 76 Adenauer, Konrad, 43 agricultural chemicals, 156 alienation, 248–249 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, 95 Almeida, D., 56 ’alter-European’ stance, 36 Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), UK, 192 Alternative for Germany (AfD), 124–130, 138–140, 257, 261 Amazon (company), 155 Amsterdam Treaty (1997), 100 Amsterdam Treaty (1999), 147 Andeweg, Rudy, 95 ‘Another Europe is Possible’ organization, 4 Aubry, Martine, 149, 163

austerity measures, 2, 3, 8, 33–35, 52, 83, 93–94, 109, 131, 133, 135, 140, 147, 152, 172–175, 186, 215, 222–223, 227, 237, 254, 262 opposition to, 114 Austria, 32, 134 authoritarianism, 48–50

B Badinter, Robert, 149 Bailey, David, 109, 114 bailouts, 9, 33, 125, 226, 238 Bardi, Luciano, 93 Barley, Katarina, 133, 135 Barroso, José Manuel, 112 Bartolini, Stefano, 95 basic income, 151 Belluati, Marinella, 258 Benedetto, G., 59 Benn, Tony, 192, 194

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. L. Newell (ed.), Europe and the Left, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54541-3

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Bérégovoy, Pierre, 148 Berlusconi, Silvio, 10, 78, 171 Bersani, Pierluigi, 169 Biondi, Andrea, 201 Blair, Tony, 29, 50, 65, 67, 193, 207 Bolkestein Directive (2006), 31 Bonino, Emma, 78 Borrell, Josep, 218, 226 Bossi, Umberto, 10 Bratteli, Trygve, 27 Brechon, Pierre, 74 Brexit, 6, 8, 52, 74, 76, 96, 190, 197–198, 202, 203, 206, 255, 259 Brigevich, A., 212 Brown, Gordon, 193

C Callaghan, John, 25 Cambadélis, Jean-Christophe, 151 capitalism, 20–22, 25–29, 36, 200 Changeons d’Europe, 155 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 213 Chartism, 5–6 Chevènement, Jean-Pierre, 149 Chirac, Jacques, 150 Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), 78 Christian Democrats, 44, 97. See also Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP); Christliche Demokratische Union Christian Democrats (German), 124 Christian Social Union (CSU), 124 Christlich Demokratische Union, 78 Christofias, Demetris, 114 Ciudadanos, 215 climate change, 13, 132, 133, 138–140, 178, 184 Clinton, Bill, 65 coalition governments, 22

co-decision procedure, 79–80 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 159 Cold War, 24 Commission Presidency, 242 communication style, 11 communication systems, 82–86, 180–186 communism, 4 Communist Manifesto (1848), 4 Comparative Manifesto Project, 179 competitiveness, 26 Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC (CSPEC), 97, 99 constructive ambiguity, 190, 195, 198, 255 Conti, Nicolò, 261 Corbett, Richard, 75 Corbyn, Jeremy, 52, 190–191, 194–198, 200, 204–206 coronavirus, 260 coronavirus outbreak, 7–8, 14 cosmopolitanism, 5 Cotta, Maurizio, 167, 168 Council of the European Union, 247 critical Europeanism, 3, 6, 258 Crouch, Colin, 3, 7, 21, 258 Cutts, David, 197

D Dahrendorf, R.G., 61, 66 debt crisis, 9, 33, 109 decision-making procedures, 75–77, 80–81, 176 decision-making processes, 224, 248 De Gasperi, Alcide, 43 Delors, Jacques, 26, 28, 50, 124, 149, 192 Democracy in Europe (DiEM25) movement, 3, 9, 262 democratic deficit, 34, 74–76, 80–81, 84–85, 131, 176

INDEX

Democratic Left (party), 238 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Northern Ireland, 190 democratisation, 2–5, 8, 109, 152, 176, 224, 246, 263 Democrats and Socialists’ Movement (KIDISO), 238–239 Democrazia Cristiana (DC), 167 Denmark, 26, 27, 30 deregulation, 195, 255 Diamond, Patrick, 193, 207 Dijsselbloem, Jeroen, 114 di Maio, Luigi, 171 DIMAR (party), 238 Di Mauro, Danilo, 261 direction of change in Europe, 248 disenchanted Europeanism, 168 disenchantment, 262 Doran, James, 237 Dray, Julien, 150 Dublin principles, 257, 260 Dunphy, Richard, 111 Dyson, Kenneth, 32 E Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 30–33, 35, 168, 175, 229, 240 egalitarianism, social and economic, 262 election results. See 158f , 170–172 elections to the European Parliament, 2–3, 9, 12, 45, 58, 83–85, 94–97, 101, 113, 127–130. See 129f , 140, 146–147, 150–154, 160–164, 168–172, 215–221, 223, 224, 238–239, 243, 254, 262 educational level of voters, 64 manifestos for, 93, 100 electoral results, 217–219 Elliott, Larry, 200

267

Emmanuelli, Henri, 149 empowerment and disempowerment, 263 Engels, Friedrich, 4 Environmental Action Programme, 26 environmental policies, 128, 151–152, 184, 186 Erasmus Plus programme, 83 Esken, Saskia, 141 Eurobarometer survey, 173, 184, 227–228, 244 euro currency, 193, 199–201, 245, 248 euro currency and the Eurozone, 73–74, 125, 140, 149, 221 Europarties, 77, 94–95 European as distinct from ‘national’ issues, 253–254, 258–260 European Central Bank (ECB), 30, 73, 194, 247 European Charter for a Committed Social Democracy, 99 European Commission Presidency, 100, 112 European Community enlargement of, 26, 32 European Constitutional Treaty (ECT), 32, 45, 147, 149, 159 European Council, 247 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 31, 155, 200–201 European Election Study, 160, 230 European identity, 83–84, 177 European integration, 2, 9–12, 19–30, 33–36, 44–52, 66–67, 75, 81, 94–97, 111–112, 115, 123– 125, 131, 134–136, 147–149, 160–164. See 162f , 169, 173, 182–186, 190, 221–228, 237, 240–242, 244, 246, 249, 253, 255, 259–260

268

INDEX

as an alternative to capitalism and communism, 24 effects of, 61 lack of success in, 75 opposition to, 19, 24 prioritization of, 241 relationship with social democracy, 19–22, 25–29 Europeanisation, 27–35, 87, 100, 145, 240 networks of, 96 Europeanism, 52–53, 57, 103, 168, 169 European Monetary System (EMS), 26, 124, 147 European Parliament, 11, 55, 79, 85, 132, 172, 224, 226, 239 augmentation of powers, 95 party composition of, 93 weaknesses of, 112–113. See also elections to the European Parliament European People’s Party (EPP), 78, 97–99, 128, 157, 172 European project, 167, 168, 175, 179, 180, 185, 211, 256, 263 European Regional Development Fund, 26 European Single Market, 192, 201–202 European Social Fund, 26, 156 European social model, 223 European Spring, 3 European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), 31 European Union achievements of, 3, 73 benefits from membership of, 175, 229–230 crisis for, 73–74

criticism of, 81, 100, 131, 151, 171, 172, 174, 185, 195, 222, 226, 257, 261 demands for initiatives from, 261 enlargement of, 83–84, 174 feelings of attachment to, 177 general attitudes to, 245–247 general orientations towards, 214, 227 law of, 200 legitimacy crisis, 2 problems faced by, 139, 246 problems for, 177 seen as a constraint on social programmes, 22 trust in, 136, 137 unpopularity of, 262 Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV), 146, 154, 158, 159, 162–164 Europhilia and Euro-enthusiasm, 167, 173, 185, 213, 227–232 Euroscepticism, 2, 10, 13, 20, 21, 25, 74, 78, 98, 124, 127, 146, 149, 152, 159, 168–175, 185, 189, 194, 199, 206–207, 212, 232, 247, 253, 256, 261, 262 two senses of, 261 Eurozone crisis, 8, 33 Evans, Jocelyn, 254 ‘ever closer union’ project, 52, 261–262

F Fabius, Laurent, 149 Facebook, 180–186. See 181f , 225, 242–243 factionalism, 151 families of political parties, 222 Farage, Nigel, 171, 197 Faure, Olivier, 153, 162, 164 federalism. See 152f

INDEX

financial crisis (2008), 21, 33–35, 83, 131, 169, 173, 174, 178, 184, 211–214, 230, 236, 241, 255 Finland, 32 First World War, 5 Fiscal Compact, 257 fiscal policy, 8, 156, 200, 248, 257 fiscal union, 260–261 Fiterman, Charles, 153 Five-star Movement, 10 force multipliers, 93 foreign policy, 156 Forza Italia (FI), 78, 170 France, 22, 44, 54, 145–164, 262 free movement, 256 free movement of people, goods and services, 228–229

G Gabriel, Sigmar, 114 Gaitskell, Hugh, 25, 191 Gaulle, Charles De, 191 Gennimata, Fofi, 239, 242–244 Germany, 8, 54, 80, 123–141, 262 perceived benefits of EU membership, 137, 138 reunification of, 44, 123 Giddens, A., 214 gilets jaunes , 164 globalisation, 1–7, 29, 30, 34, 61, 73, 77, 98, 101, 148, 190, 193, 199–201, 249, 256 winners and losers from, 202–203, 260, 262–263 global warming, 195 Glucksmann, Raphaël, 154 Golden Dawn (party), 238, 239 Gonzalez, Felipe, 213 Google (company), 155 government intervention in socio-economic affairs, 20

269

Gramacho, W., 212 Great Recession, 1 Greece, 9, 26, 28, 33–35, 114, 125, 212, 215, 235–249, 262 Green parties, 13, 127, 140, 197 Greens-European Free Alliance, 13 Grillo, Beppe, 171 Grimm, Dieter, 84 growth agenda, 94 H Hamon, Benoît, 149–154, 156–160, 163 harmonisation, 151, 160 Hartz reforms, 126 Heath, Edward, 191 hegemony, 6 Hertner, Isabelle, 99 Hickson, Kevin, 25 Hix, S., 59 Hobolt, Sara B., 196, 203 Hollande, F., 146–156, 159–164 Holmes, Michael, 10, 253 Hooghe, L., 74, 221, 260 Howarth, David, 30 human capital, 255 human rights, 155 Hungary, 53, 260

I image of the EU. See 173f , 174, 260–261 immigration. See migration and immigration immigration policy, 7, 81–82 imperialism, 23 institutional reform, 73–75, 81, 111, 179 intergovernmentalism, 9, 44, 76–77, 85, 97, 223, 262

270

INDEX

international collaboration, need for, 260 internationalism, 4, 21, 22, 98 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 237 Italy, 8, 26, 34, 44, 53, 61, 66, 77, 167–186 voters’ opinions on the EU, 172–178 ITEM 2019 dataset, 181 Ivaldi, Gilles, 254

J Johnson, Boris, 206, 258 Jones, Owen, 34 Jospin, Lionel, 146–148, 156 journalism, 85–86 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 34, 97

K Keman, Hans, 21, 27 Keynesianism, 2, 11, 27, 28, 33 Keynesian policies, 67, 98–99, 101–109, 115, 214, 236 KINAL (party), 238–242, 244, 249 Kinnock, Neil, 192 Kirchheimer, O., 61 Kitschelt, Herbert, 61, 126 Klingbeil, Lars, 133 Kohl, Helmut, 44 Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, 127

L labour market flexibility, 256 Labour Party, British, 23, 27–29, 45, 52, 97, 100–103, 189–193, 202, 204–206, 254. See also New Labour ambivalence towards Europe, 191, 195, 198

problems of party management and electoral strategy, 204 Labour Party, Irish, 27 Labour Party, Maltese, 63 Labour Party, Norwegian, 27 Ladrech, Robert, 36, 98 La France Insoumise (LFI), 146, 158 lame-ducks, 201 language barriers, 84 La République en Marche! (LREM), 146, 157–164 Larrouturou, Pierre, 154 Lavelle, Ashley, 20, 21, 30 Lavery, Ian, 205 Le Drian, Jean-Yves, 153 Left Party, 124 left-wing parties, 9–10, 36. See 65f , 259–260 authority of, 113 decline of, 1, 111–113 Italian, 64 Lega Nord, 170 legitimacy, 168, 169, 176, 224, 226, 262 legitimation, input and output types of, 76 Lehman Brothers, 34, 260 Le Pen, Marine, 151, 154, 163, 171 Letta, Enrico, 169 level playing field requirement, 202 Leyen, Ursula von der, 141, 172, 178 Liberal Democrats, 197 liberalisation, economic, 26, 256 Lienemann, Marie-Noëlle, 153 Lightfoot, Simon, 100 Lisbon Treaty (2007), 12, 73, 77, 168, 194 Lisbon Treaty and Lisbon Agenda, 31, 32 Llamazares, I., 212 Loedel, Peter, 30 Long-Bailey, Rebecca, 204

INDEX

lowest common denominator, 94, 103, 115

M M5s, 170, 171, 174 Maastricht Treaty (1992), 30, 74, 147–148, 168, 175, 189, 194 Macron, Emmanuel, 78, 141, 146, 154, 159–164 manifestos focused on European issues, 169 Mansholt, Sicco, 22 March, Luke, 111, 257 Marks, G., 74, 221, 260 Marx, Karl, 4, 255 Mastrorocco, N., 59 Maurel, Emmanuel, 153 May, Theresa, 190, 195, 206 McCluskey, Len, 205 McDonnell, John, 205 media outlets, 85 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc, 147, 149, 153, 156, 163, 164 Meloni, Georgia, 171 Meloni, Giorgia, 79 Memoli, Vincenzo, 261 Merkel, Angela, 78, 125, 127 migration, 128, 135, 155–156, 189 migration and immigration, 178, 184, 246, 256, 257 Miles, Jasper, 25 Miliband, Ed, 193–194 Milne, Seamus, 204 minimum wage levels, 135, 152, 156 Mitterrand, F., 27, 146–148, 154, 157, 163 Mollet, Guy, 22 Montebourg, Arnaud, 150 Monti, Mario, 169, 174 Morris, James, 204 Moschonas, Gerassimos, 111

271

Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), 149, 154 Müller, J., 124 multiculturalism, 5, 83 multilateralism, 45 multilingualism, 84 multinational corporations, 200, 254 Murphy, Karie, 204 Murray, Andrew, 204 mutualisation, 8 N Nahles, Andrea, 130, 134, 140, 141 narrative, 10–13 nationalisation, 27 nationalism, 3, 8, 13, 23, 47, 78, 173, 183, 215–217, 255, 257, 260 nation state, 3, 7 nation-states, autonomy of, 190 neo-federalism, 44 neo-functionalism, 44 neo-institutionalism, 77 neoliberalism, 1, 6, 11, 21, 28–35, 61, 67, 94, 98–99, 109–112, 148, 191, 223, 239, 255 embedded, 33 in Europe, 28–33 opposition to, 98, 114 Netherlands, the, 8, 29, 32, 35 New Democracy (party), 239, 242 New Labour, 199 new social movements, 164 Nice Treaty (2001), 101, 147 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 44, 112, 194 North Macedonia, 243 O Orban, Victor, 78 Ordoliberalismus , 44 O’Toole, Fintan, 259

272

INDEX

P Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima. See PASOK Papandreou, Andreas, 236 Papandreou, George, 236 Paris, Treaty of, 24 Parker, Laura, 202 Partido Popular (PP), 213–214, 220 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 28, 29, 50, 212–226, 230–232, 260 election manifestos of, 221–224 Parti Socialiste (PS), 27, 30, 32, 35, 45, 101, 146–164, 254 problems for, 146, 156, 159 Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), 167 Partito Democratico (PD), 45, 50, 66, 78, 169–171, 180–184 election manifestos of, 169, 178, 186 Party of European Socialists (PES), 11–13, 93–98, 115, 156, 179, 197, 242–244, 253, 256 manifestos of, 103–109, 256–257 policy priorities of. See 104–108t problems for, 111 purpose of, 115 party of parties, 99, 257 PASOK, 28, 35, 114, 236–239, 241, 242, 249 decline of, 236–238, 249 Pasokification, 35, 236–238 Pasquino, Gianfranco, 75, 253, 255 Peillon, Vincent, 150 Piketty, Thomas, 36, 66 Place Publique, 146, 154, 156 Plaza-Colodro, Carolina, 259–260 Podemos, 35, 78, 215–217, 220–221 Poland, 53 political entrepreneurs, 2 political structures and processes, 254

populism, 1–2, 11, 13, 35, 47, 54, 73–74, 81–82, 96, 109, 126–134, 151, 152, 155, 156, 163, 169–174, 183, 185, 222, 225 Portugal, 26, 28, 33, 35, 53, 77–78, 212 presidential parties, 236 Prespa Agreement (2018), 243 privatisation, 195 Prodi, Romano, 169 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), 78 Progressive Caucuses (Marseilles 2017 and Athens 2018), 113–114 progressive projects and agendas, 254–255, 258, 263 protectionist policies, 156, 255 public opinion, 226, 228, 244 in Italy, 168, 172–178 public spending cuts, 9, 59 public sphere, 80–87 Q qualified majority voting, 132, 193, 254 R racism, 5 radical vision for the European Union, 256 Ramiro, Luis, 259–260 Rassemblement National (RN), 146, 160 Reagan, Ronald, 6 reconstruction, post-war, 43 recovery bonds, 8 redistribution, 25 redistributive policies, 156, 236, 254 referendum results, 29–32. See also Brexit

INDEX

refugees, 125, 136, 155, 223, 229 refugees and the refugee crisis, 260 Renaissance (party), 159 Renew Europe (RE) group, 78–79, 172 Renzi, Matteo, 45, 169, 172 representation, internal and external, 48 rights, 6–7, 249 River Party, 238–239 Rocard, Michel, 149 Roder, Knut, 10, 253 Rome, Treaty of, 24, 26, 168

S Salvini, Matteo, 10, 78, 171 Sanchez, Pedro, 218, 242 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 150, 159 Sassoli, David, 113 Sassoon, Donald, 20, 23, 25, 98 Scantamburlo, Matthias, 254 Scharpf, Fritz, 200 Schildberg, Cäcilie, 4 Schlesinger, Philip, 84 Schmidt, Helmut, 124 Schmidt, Vivien, 81 Scholz, Olaf, 125, 132, 141 Schröder, Gerhard, 29, 65, 126 Schulz, Martin, 113, 127, 135 Schumacher, Kurt, 22–24 Schuman Plan, 23 Schuman, Robert, 43 SCoRE survey, 160–161 Sejersted, Francis, 20 Shaw, Eric, 256, 263 Shonfield, Andrew, 25 Silone, Ignazio, 98 Simitis, Kostas, 236 Single European Act (SEA) (1987), 26 Sinn Féin, 35, 78

273

Skrzypek, Ania, 4 Smith, Owen, 195 ‘social democratic moment’, 101, 113 social chapter and the social dimension of Europe, 192 social cleavages, 1 social contract, 241 social democracy, 4, 6, 10, 19–36, 44–67, 99–101, 109–112, 138, 192, 197, 213–215, 223–224, 237, 241, 244, 249, 253–260, 262 crisis of, 94, 115, 262 decline in, 248 electoral decline of, 57–66 in one country, 263 parties, 259 parties standing for, 56–61, 98 relationship with European integration, 19–22, 25–27 social class and attitudes to EU of those voting for, 61 waves of, 59–61 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 23, 24, 29, 35, 50, 57, 100–103, 124–141 dilemma faced by, 257–258 electoral failures of, 125–130, 137–141 manifestos, 132 share of the vote. See 126f social distancing, 8 social dumping, 31, 134, 148 Social Europe, 25–28, 94, 103, 124–126, 131–134, 139–141, 146–148, 156, 161, 179, 186, 193, 199, 241, 256 social inclusion, 243 socialism, 4, 10, 21, 44–52, 56–60, 66, 77, 126, 146–154, 156–159, 163, 194

274

INDEX

educational level of those voting for, 64 in one country, 192 Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Progressive Alliance of, 156 social liberals and social conservatives cultural cleavage between, 203 social media, 180, 182 social policy, 248 socio-economic context, 254 solidarity, 261–262 international, 4 solidarity policy, 80 sovereign debt, 8, 33 sovereignty as an obstacle to problem-solving, 260 constraints imposed by, 227 disputes about, 76 loss of, 171 pooling of, 3, 4, 12, 199 protection of, 24, 77 retention of, 155–156 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 22 Spain, 53, 211–232. See 231t spill-over, political, 95–99 Spinelli, Altiero, 44, 54 Stability and Growth Pact (1997), 30 stagflation, 26 Starmer, Keir, 205 state-aid rules, 201 Stiglitz, Joseph, 30, 35 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique, 149 Streeck, Wolfgang, 201 subsidiarity, 124, 131 supply side, 124, 241 supply side of politics, 1 sustainable development, 179 Sweden, 29, 32 Syriza, 35, 78, 114, 237–240, 242–245, 249

T Tarditi, V., 131 Tarrant, Andy, 201 Tarrow, Sidney G., 74 tax regimes, 155 Temal, Rachid, 153 terrorism, 150 Thatcherism, 28, 98 Thatcher, Margaret, 6, 192 Third Way, 29, 33 Third Way policies, 61, 67, 101, 213, 248–249, 255 Tilly, Charles, 74 Timmermans, Frans, 112–113, 186, 242–243 Toynbee, Polly, 196 transaction costs, 99 transnational parties, 10–11 transnational party federations (TNPs), 93–97, 100, 115 Treaty of European Union, 95 troika structure, 34 trust in institutions, 205, 227, 230, 247, 261 trust in the EU. See 176t , 185 in Germany. See 137f trustworthiness deficit, 241 Tsipras, Alexis, 114, 239, 242, 243 Turner, Ed, 254 turnout, 218 turnout at elections, 128, 139 Twitter, 242 U Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP), 159 United Kingdom, 255–256, 262 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 78–79, 189, 193 United Nations Security Council, 132 United States, 33

INDEX

V Valbruzzi, Marco, 253, 255 Valls, Manuel, 150–154 value-added meta networks , 99 values, European, 256–257 Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, 31, 33 Varoufakis, Yanis, 3, 114 Veltroni, Walter, 169 Venizelos, Evangelos, 236, 239 Verhofstadt, Guy, 78 veto powers, 77, 262 Visegrád Pact, 76, 79 vision for the European Union, 256 Vittori, D., 131 voters’ opinions on Europe and the EU, 159–162 in Spain, 226–230 Vox (party), 216–221, 232

275

W Wainwright, Hilary, 4 Walter-Borjans, Norbert, 141 Watson, Tom, 197 Weber, Manfred, 128 welfare policy and welfare state provision, 7, 20, 29, 33, 34, 66, 148, 159, 201, 214, 236, 248 Wilders, Geert, 171 Wilson, Harold, 27, 191, 206 X xenophobia, 5, 255 Z Zapatero, Rodríguez, 214 Zingaretti, Nicola, 171, 172