F. D. E. Schleiermacher's Outlines of the Art of Education: A Translation and Discussion 1433193884, 9781433193880

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F.D.E. Schleiermacher’s Outlines of the Art of Education

PAEDAGOGICA Norm Friesen and Karsten Kenklies General Editors Vol. 2

The Paedagogica series is part of the Peter Lang Education list. Every volume is peer reviewed and meets the highest quality standards for content and production.

PETER LANG New York • Berlin • Brussels • Lausanne • Oxford

F.D.E. Schleiermacher’s Outlines of the Art of Education A Translation & Discussion

Norm Friesen & Karsten Kenklies, Editors

PETER LANG New York • Berlin • Brussels • Lausanne • Oxford

Library of Congress CatalogingCataloging-​inin-​Publication Publication Data Names: Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1768–​ 1768–1834, 1834, author. | Friesen, Norm, editor, translator. | Kenklies, Karsten, editor, translator. Title: F.D.E. Schleiermacher’s outlines of the art of education: a translation & discussion / /​Norm Friesen and Karsten Kenklies, editors. Other titles: Lectures. Selections. English Description: New York: Peter Lang, 2023. Series: Paedagogica; Vol. 2 | ISSN 27712771-​6481 6 481 (print) | ISSN 27712771-​649X 6 49X (online) Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022001975 (print) | LCCN 2022001976 (ebook) ISBN 978978-​11-​43314331-​93889388-​0 (hardback) | ISBN 978978-​11-​43314331-​93879387-​3 (paperback) ISBN 978978-​11-​43314331-​93849384-​2 (ebook pdf) | ISBN 978978-​11-​43314331-​93859385-​9 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1768– 1768–​1834— 1834—​Translations Translations into English. | Education— Education—​Philosophy. Philosophy. | Philosophy, German— German—​19th 19th century. Classification: LCC LB675.S35 S325 2023 (print) | LCC LB675.S35 (ebook) | DDC 370.1— 370.1—​dc23/ dc23/​eng/ eng/​20220511 20220511 LC record available at https:// https://​lccn.loc.gov/ lccn.loc.gov/​202 202​2001 2001​975 975 LC ebook record available at https:// https://​lccn.loc.gov/ lccn.loc.gov/​202 202​2001 2001​976 976 DOI 10.3726/ 10.3726/​b19546 b19546

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Table of Contents

List of Illustrations  xi Acknowledgments  xiii Translators’ Introduction  1 Nor m Friesen and K arsten K enklies 1. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, 1768–​1834  2 2. Provenance and Publication of the Lecture  3 3. Schleiermacher’s Introductory Lecture: Overview  4 4. Schleiermacher’s Terminology  8 5. Schleiermacher’s Dialectical Style  14 6. Individual Chapters  16 7. Conclusion  18 References  19 Outlines of the Art of Education: Introduction  21 F.D.E. Schleier macher 1. Common View: Technique of Domestic Tutor and School Teacher  21 2. Foundation of a Scientific Inquiry  24 3. The Dignity of Pedagogy Presented in Formal Terms; Seen in Itself as a Theory of an Art  24 4. Considered in Relation to Politics  27 5. Defining Our Task Further  29 6. Inner and Outer Questions  30 7. The Extreme of the Omnipotence of Education  35 8. [The Impotence or Limitations of Education]  36 9. [Omnipotence versus Self-​Activity]  36 10. Universally Valid Pedagogy  37

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11. What Form Should Our Theory Have?  37 12. Factual Foundations  38 13. Sphere of the Applicability of Pedagogy  40 14. Defining the End Point of Education for the Present Time  47 15. How to Consider Contradictions between the Different Realms of Life?  47 16. The Significance of Our Theory  50 17. Universal and Individual Education  52 18. Are People Equal or Unequal in Relation to the Universal and Individual Direction of Education?  54 19. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Universal Direction [of Education]?  55 20. What Would Be Implied for Our Task By  56 20.1. Presupposing the Equality [of All People with Regard to Both Directions of Education]?  56 20.2. Presupposing the Inequality [of All People with Regard to Both Directions of Education]?  57 21. The Task of Education Insofar as It Must Proceed from Existing Inequality  61 22. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Individual Direction [of Education]  65 23. Is One Allowed to Sacrifice One Moment for Another?  66 24. To What Extent Do All the Different Pedagogical Influences Form a Unity?  72 25. How Do Supporting and Counteracting Relate to One Another?  75 26. How Do the Two Forms of Education [Support and Counteraction] Relate to the Other Factors That [Externally] Influence the Child?  78 27. Who Should Educate?  80 28. If and to What Extent Is Education the Same for Both Sexes?  83

Interpretations and Discussion  87 1. Schleiermacher’s Pedagogy: A Thematic Commentary  89 M ichael Winkler 1. Education as Wissenschaft  91 2. The “Rationality” of Pedagogy  92 3. The Development of Schleiermacher’s Ideas in the 1813–​1814 Lecture  94 4. 1826: Educational Theory Comes of Age  97 5. Positioning Pedagogy as a Discipline  100

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5.1 First Perspective: The Historical  101 5.2 Second Perspective: Pedagogy’s Relation to Other Disciplines  101 5.3 Third Perspective: Theory in Itself  102 6. From Theory to Practice  103 7. Schleiermacher and Our “Non-​G enetic Heritage”  106 8. Receptivity, Spontaneity and Self-​Activity  109 9. Education as Support  111 10. Sociality and Subjectivity  113 11. Conclusion: Dreams and Limitations  115 References  116 2. The Educational Awareness of the Future  119 David L ewin 1. What Does It Mean to Be Oriented to the Future?  119 2. Are We All Interested in the Future?  124 3. Becoming Concerned  127 4. Be in the Now  131 5. Conclusion  134 References  135 3. Entering the Circle. Schleiermacher and the Rise of Modern Education Studies  139 K arsten K enklies 1. Introduction: First Sentences 139 2. Theoretical Considerations: The Hermeneutic Foundation of the Circle 140 2.1. The Possibility of Publicly Talking and Theorizing about Education  143 2.2. The Assumption of Successful Communication about Education  145 2.3. The Limitations of Publicly Talking and Theorizing about Education  145 2.4. The Beginning and Goal of Reflecting on Education  148 2.5. The Purpose of Reflecting  149 3. Practical Considerations: The Enacting of the Circle  151 4. Epilogue: Education Studies as Hermeneutic Academic Discipline   154 References  155 4. Schleiermacher’s Educational Theory in the Context of the Debate on Vocational versus Liberal Education  157 R ebekk a Horlacher

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1. School Reforms in Prussia  159 2. Schleiermacher and National Education  163 3. Vocational or Liberal Education?  167 4. Conclusion  171 References  173 5. Accentuate the Negative: Schleiermacher’s Dialectic  177 Nor m Friesen 1. The Basic Characteristics of Schleiermacher’s Dialectic  179 2. Dialectic as Style  182 3. Dialectic as Process  186 3.1. Schleiermacher’s Method: A Close Reading  187 3.2. Schleiermacher’s Methodology  193 4. Dialectic as Structure  203 5. Conclusion: The Dialectical Character of Educational Reflection  209 References  211 Contributors  213 Index  217

Illustrations

Figure 5.1. Hegelian dialectic  180 Figure 5.2. Dialogical dialectic  180 Figure 5.3. Opposition of present and future  193 Figure 5.4. Example of dialectic from “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?”  195 Figure 5.5. Schleiermacher’s configuration of equality and inequality  196 Figure 5.6. The quadrilateral seen from the perspective of “inequality”  198 Figure 5.7. “Overview of the construction of Schleiermacher’s Theory of Education”  205

Acknowledgments

In working on a project of translation and interpretation that has taken well over five years, we (as the editors and translators) have incurred a debt of gratitude to many colleagues and friends. First, we would like to thank those who have contributed chapters to this book, Rebekka Horlacher, David Lewin, and Michael Winkler, for their patience and generosity. We would also like to thank those who participated in various readings and reviews of this translation, including David Lewin (again), as well as Fernando Murillo and Hanno Su—​in addition to Sabine Reh and her colleagues at the Deutsches Institut für pädagogische Forschung (DIPF) in Berlin, who provided valuable feedback relatively early in the translation process. Special thanks are also due to Jens Beljan, Mari Mielityinen-​Pachmann, Henning Schluß, Joris Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, all for varied but indispensably supportive contributions in moving this project forward. Finally, we would like to thank diverse cafés in Jena, Glasgow, and Vancouver for hosting us during our translation and review activities.

Translators’ Introduction Nor m F r iesen & K arsten K enk lies

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–​1834) is widely regarded not only as the founder of modern hermeneutics and of liberal Protestant theology, but also as the cofounder of the first modern German university in Berlin (with Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose name the university subsequently adopted). However, he is also known—​at least among students and scholars in Northern Europe—​a s the founder of pedagogy as a modern academic discipline. But while Schleiermacher’s achievements in hermeneutics (e.g., Schleiermacher 1826/​1998), theology (e.g., Schleiermacher 1799/​ 1988), and the formation of the research university (e.g., Schleiermacher 1808/​2017) are increasingly well documented in English, his contributions to education and pedagogy remain all but unknown. This book, which contains both a translation of the introduction to his 1826 lectures on education and five chapters by contemporary scholars on Schleiermacher and his introduction, represents an initial contribution in correcting this oversight. This editors’ and translators’ introduction begins with a brief overview of Schleiermacher as a pedagogue and public intellectual; it discusses the provenance of the text translated and commented upon in this volume. It also explains how we as translators approached the sometimes difficult and often elliptical nature of Schleiermacher’s original German. Following a brief summary of the main sections and divisions of Schleiermacher’s introduction, this introduction provides context for some of the key terms appearing in this text and offers guidance for approaching the sometimes challenging style and exposition of Schleiermacher’s text.

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1. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, 1768–​1834 Born into a long line of Protestant clergymen, Schleiermacher began work as a private tutor and as a student of theology (Schmidt 1972, p. 451). He was later engaged as an activist, a preacher, as well as a professor. As a young man, Schleiermacher worked as a tutor in the home of a wealthy count and soon afterwards completed his studies in theology and worked as a Reformed minister at a hospital in Berlin from 1796 to 1802. While in Berlin, he came to be involved with literary and cultural groups or salons, specifically with the German Romantics, a group of young writers and poets who were not particularly religious, but who greatly valued the young pastor for the depth of his knowledge and his profound humanity. One member of this group, for example, described him as not “the greatest man of his time, but as the greatest Mensch” (as cited in Vial 2013, p. 12). They challenged Schleiermacher to write something of his own, and his response was a collection of “speeches:” On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799/​1988)—​addressed, tongue in cheek, to his Romantic friends. Here Schleiermacher emphasized that religion is not about priests and rituals, prayers and commandments. It is instead about seeing the infinite, the source of creative insight so valued by the Romantics, in our everyday lives. Schleiermacher emphasized that one should do things with religion and belief, rather than out of religious belief or obligation (Blankertz 1982, p. 112). Schleiermacher then took up a professorial position in nearby Halle (about 100 miles southwest of Berlin), where he lectured widely on subjects ranging from theology, history, and ethics to hermeneutics. And he did so, perhaps unfortunately, often without taking the time “to give written form to most of his ideas” (Schmidt 1972, p. 451). As a result, many of his texts, including the one translated here, are reconstructed from notes made by his students, published only posthumously. In 1810 Schleiermacher became Chair of Theology at the University of Berlin—​a university which since has served as a model for research universities around the world. Schleiermacher lectured on education in 1813–​14, 1820–​21, and again in 1826. It is the rendition of the introduction to his lectures from 1826, the version that is most widely read and cited in subsequent (German) educational literature that is translated here. Schleiermacher died of pneumonia at the age of 65 on February 12, 1830. An enormous public funeral followed, with the King of Prussia, Fredrick William II, riding “in the first 100 carriages of the procession” (Vial 2013, p. 23)—​being followed by an estimated 20,000 members of the public. Schleiermacher was clearly beloved, as a preacher, a public intellectual, and also as a Mensch.

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2. Provenance and Publication of the Lectures Our translation follows the German text of Schleiermacher’s lectures published in 1849 as the third part and the ninth volume of Schleiermacher’s Collected Works. This ninth volume was titled “Teachings on Education” (Erziehungslehre) edited by Carl Platz from Schleiermacher’s posthumous writing and notes from his lectures. As editor, Platz treated the material from Schleiermacher’s 1826 lectures as the main text corpus for this volume. However, as title of the volume perhaps suggests, the history underlying it is rather complicated: The volume was never prepared for publication by Schleiermacher himself, but instead stands an amalgam from different sources compiled by Platz. In this compilation work, Platz relied on only six handwritten slips of paper from Schleiermacher that referred explicitly to the lectures of 1826. Platz had selected these from a set of unpublished lecture notes that had been made available to him after Schleiermacher’s passing. Refusing to identify those parts of the text that can justifiably be assumed to come from Schleiermacher himself, Platz reconstructed the contents of Schleiermacher’s lectures of 1826 with the help of student lecture notes. This includes its division into sections (and subsections) which are preserved here—​a lthough we have added sequential and hierarchical numbering. In total, four different sets of student lecture notes were brought together in this process of reconstruction—​ or perhaps more accurately, synthesis—​ which likely also included Platz’s own notes from the lectures. Unfortunately, none of this original material seems to have survived. As a result, the particular sources used to reconstruct specific parts of the lectures remains a mystery to this day. Using this reconstruction, different parts of the lectures have been reprinted numerous times in different editions of Schleiermacher’s works, and in this form it has become the main version upon which Schleiermacher’s renown in education is founded: Even through the philological merits of Platz’s work are somewhat unclear—​especially given editorial standards of the time—​t he achievement of Platz in developing a readable version of Schleiermacher’s lectures deserves admiration. Editorially speaking, the disposition of Schleiermacher’s lectures of 1826 has changed since a new set of student lecture notes was found in the library of the Institut für Hermeneutik (Institute for Hermeneutics) of the University of Zurich. It is clear that Platz did not have this particular set of notes available when he reconstructed his version of the lectures. This newly found set of lecture notes has served as the foundation for the new critical edition of Schleiermacher’s works (Schleiermacher 1808/​2017, pp. 543–​858) that is

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being published in piecemeal form. It will certainly be of interest for those wishing to understand the finer points of Schleiermacher’s theory of education, and others attempting to understand Platz’s editorial work. However, any analysis of Platz’s version of Schleiermacher’s lectures that would be based on these recently discovered student notes is a task for future scholars. In the case of the translation provided in this volume, we have deliberately chosen to use the “classic” version by Platz, given that it remains both the most readable and the most cited version in German educational discourse since the 19th century—​a discourse on which it has left its own indelible mark. Finally, because the part of the lectures translated in this volume indeed represents a “reconstruction,” it contains many apparently incomplete or elliptical remarks. Schleiermacher’s use of relatively complex structures of antecedent reference can be said to add further complexity. To address this, and to facilitate reading overall, as translators, we have introduced many words and phrases in square brackets (e.g., “both [tutor and teacher]”). These additions are used not only as reminders of what Schleiermacher is referring to at a given point, but also to complete some of Schleiermacher’s sentences and section titles. In one case, we have taken the liberty to add a full section title otherwise absent, but where a clear shift in topic is evident in Schleiermacher’s text.

3. Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the 1826 Lectures Outlines of the Art of Education: Overview Providing an overview of even only the introductory part of Schleiermacher’s lectures is not a simple task. The elliptical style of this part of the lectures as recorded, as well as the multiple dialectical pathways that Schleiermacher outlines, explores, and (in some cases) consolidates or abandons, means that many, equally plausible interpretations of his lectures—​either in part or as a whole—​are possible. Besides the overview provided immediately below, this volume offers what could be considered to be two other overviews: One is provided in the “thematic commentary” written by Schleiermacher expert Michael Winkler in Chapter 1 (pp. 89-​119), and the other, an outline offered in both diagrammatic and textual forms in the final sections of Chapter 5 (p. 205). All of these overviews should be taken into account in an attempt to understand Schleiermacher’s lectures, either in part or in whole. The particular overview below generally groups sections together thematically, anywhere from two to seven at a time, highlighting on a macro level points of decision, equivocation, and reconsideration on Schleiermacher’s part.

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Sections 1–​3 (pp. 21–​27): Schleiermacher’s introduction explores a wide range of possibilities and options for the configuration of education, both as it existed historically and in the then-​emergent national state. However, he begins by defining education in a rather counterintuitive way—​but one still germane to all the possibilities he subsequently considers: Education is not what happens in school or formal instruction. Seeing education as just a professional and institutional matter is to deny it both its history and universality as a practice. Education is instead a question of the relation of the older, educating generation to the younger. More specifically, education for Schleiermacher is the intentional influence of the older on the younger. This becomes the foundation of Schleiermacher’s rigorous inquiry into education specifically as a fully-​fledged discipline or “science.” A second counterintuitive starting point is that education begins not with theories of learning or instruction, or even a theory of the Good it is to attain. Instead, education for Schleiermacher begins above all with practice: “Originally, it was parents who educated,” Schleiermacher reasons, and “they did not do so following a ‘theory’ ” (p. 21). Practice for Schleiermacher consequently has a “dignity” all its own—​one that “exists independently from theory” (p. 26). Section 4 (pp. 27-​29): Because education involves two coexisting generations, it is not simply a private matter, but a public one; it is in this sense political. “Politics,” Schleiermacher reasons, “will not reach its goal unless pedagogy is an integral part of it or [unless pedagogy] stands next to it as an equally developed field” (p. 28). Education is similar to politics (thus defined) in that it is a domain in which we sort out options that are bad, good, and better for us collectively. Both efforts, in other words, are ethical, dealing with questions of right and wrong. This then makes “pedagogy … a science [Wissenschaft] that is at once closely connected to ethics, and also derived from it as an applied field, and [one] that is coordinated with politics” (p. 28). Sections 5– ​6 (pp. 29-​34): Schleiermacher continues his highly original line of questioning, asking both “what should be accomplished through education” and what “can be accomplished through it?” (p. 29). He is asking, in other words, about education’s aims, possibilities, and limits. Unlike today’s advocates of continuing education and lifelong learning, Schleiermacher identifies an endpoint for education (see Chapter 1 in this volume); the older generation does not forever hold the younger in its sway: “The educational influence ends when one becomes mature; i.e. when the younger generation is equal to the older in independently cooperating” in collective endeavors (p. 31). But asking about what education both can and should accomplish leads to the still further question regarding its power: Is education omnipotent,

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capable of redeeming society and the world, or is it relatively weak, capable only of more modest results? Sections 7–​9 (pp. 34-​37): Although Schleiermacher does not explicitly answer these two questions, he outlines two mechanisms through which education takes place—​and in this way gestures to an implicit answer: The older generation influences the younger either through a supporting influence (to strengthen what is good) or a counteracting influence (to discourage what is bad). In their modest banality, neither of these types of influence would lead one to believe that education is omnipotent, that it can “make of people into anything one might want” (p. 32); at the same time, the effect of a supportive or counteracting influence makes it clear that education is not entirely impotent, either. Nonetheless, Schleiermacher’s text reminds us that the younger generation brings its own energy, spontaneity, and will to the matter of education. This, too, must be supported and encouraged but also fruitfully directed: “Education is connected to an activity that is initially stimulating and later guiding [for the child and is] an activity that is connected to the Good” (p. 37). Sections 10–​13 (pp. 37-​46): Schleiermacher briefly pauses his discussion of the nature of education to focus specifically on his inquiry itself. As is clear above, Schleiermacher is careful to define education in intergenerational terms that are as inclusive as possible. Schleiermacher now takes this one step further by rejecting the now dominant empirical emphasis on what is happening (only) here and now in education (p. 37). He does this on principle: “pedagogy must be founded on a [philosophical or] speculative basis, because the question of how people should be educated cannot be answered but through reference to the idea of the Good” (p. 38). Regardless, he admits that “the theory” he is developing still “cannot be a universally valid one” (p. 39)—​namely “because … no specific relation between the individual and the community regarding education has been acknowledged as universally valid” (p. 39). In asking after further determinants and constraints on his theory, Schleiermacher recognizes that it unavoidably focuses on the individual person being educated (p. 44), and that its efforts (thus far defined in terms of support and counteraction) are themselves unavoidably ethical in character (pp. 44-​46). Sections 14–​16 (pp. 46-​52): Schleiermacher now turns to the question of education’s social obligations: Education must not only draw out the young person’s individual character, but as he says, it “should deliver the individual as its ‘work’ to the communal life of the state and the church, to free, convivial social intercourse, and to the [community of] reflection and knowledge” (p. 46). Here, Schleiermacher is listing four spheres of life

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constitutive of society that reappear elsewhere in his lecture: the state, religion or belief, social activity, and scholarship (perhaps today, “knowledge work”). Acknowledging that all of these aspects of life are valuable while at the same time imperfect and inharmonious, Schleiermacher sees the task of education not simply as a matter of changing the world, but more cautiously (and perhaps realistically) as one of simultaneously conserving and improving it: “Education should be established in such a way that both [conservation and improvement] are in the greatest possible harmony—​so that youth can enter into what already exists, and also energetically engage with those improvements that present themselves” (pp. 49-​50). Sections 17–​22 (pp. 52-​65): Given that education wishes to support the spontaneity and personality of the individual (as long as it is in accordance with the Good), but that it ultimately produces citizens ready for society as a whole, it must deal with the tension between individuality and universality. Schleiermacher considers this opposition from myriad perspectives, while emphasizing the need for equality in the treatment of the younger generation. His considerations occupy about 13 pages, five sections, two subsections and two subsubsections in his lecture. Although these sections are considered in greater detail in Chapter Five in this volume, Schleiermacher significantly sketches out a tentative solution to the question of individuality and universality in a form that will likely sound familiar today. Namely through two phases of public education: a general elementary education that gives everyone a chance to do as well as possible, followed by a more specialized secondary phase reflecting individual interests and abilities. Schleiermacher warns: “The judgment of the educating generation therefore must be as cautious and certain as possible, and it has to proceed from the clearest premises, so that … errors” in the selection of those on the basis of special interests and abilities “cannot occur” (p. 64). Section 23 (pp. 65-​71): In this famous section, Schleiermacher considers another question calling for caution among the educating generation: Namely, whether we can justifiably sacrifice the present moment (of enjoyment) in the life of the child for the sake of their future. “Every pedagogical influence” Schleiermacher observes, “presents itself as the sacrifice of a present moment for a future one” (p. 66). And young children only very gradually become aware of the future and of the value of preparing for it. To avoid the unnecessary sacrifice of a child’s present enjoyment, Schleiermacher looks to phenomena of play and games on the one hand, and of exercise and practicing on the other. His solution, ultimately, is to combine these elements—​games, play, exercises, and practice—​together in conjunction with the child’s developmental trajectory as follows: “In the beginning, exercise [has to be present]

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exclusively in play. However, gradually both [play and exercise] become separate to the degree to which the child develops an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is” (p. 70). Sections 24–​25 (pp. 71-​ 79): Schleiermacher’s reconciliation of the child’s present with their future leads him back to questions of the nature of the influence that constitutes education and its division into support and counteraction. How are these two forms interrelated and when should we switch from one to the other? Schleiermacher’s response to this question can be seen as drawing together a range of themes and concerns in his lecture—​ from ethics to influence, theory to practice—​into a kind of conclusion which also returns to the theme of the “dignity of practice” (p. 26): we then have to leave it to life itself to decide what should be done from moment to moment. Theory works only in the same way as a reflective awareness does for practice. Since when something is done with a truly reflective awareness in life, the full complexity of the task at hand is taken into consideration—​a nd not just the necessity of the moment (p. 76)

Schleiermacher’s answer to these combined concerns, in other words, is to encourage a kind of theoretical reflection and awareness that allows them to be reconciled and addressed both in and through practice. Sections 27–​28 (pp. 79-​86): Schleiermacher ends the introductory part of his 1826 lectures as one might expect of a live discourse: by tying up a few loose ends, specifically by addressing the question of who should educate and whether education should be the same for both males and females. Although his treatment of both questions is brief, it is insightful—​especially for his time: Educators, he says, are defined by the tension between their close identification with the social whole (which they represent to the young) and by that which distinguishes them from the whole—​namely, their ability to “envision something that is better but not yet achieved” (p. 80). The education of male and female, Schleiermacher acknowledges, is certainly not equal in 1826. However, through his division of education into a more general (elementary) phase and one more “academic,” Schleiermacher outlines how it is possible to see any differences between male and female be “gradually minimized” (p. 85).

4.  Schleiermacher’s Terminology The precise scope and meaning of terms that are used to discuss questions of method, disciplinarity, and above all, education as a field and a practice, are often quite different in German when compared to those used in English. As

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a result, we provide explanatory footnotes in the translated text where there are differences in these meanings. However, this introduction provides an opportunity not only to discuss the differences at greater length, but also to show how Schleiermacher himself, as “one of the founders of pedagogy as a discipline” (Böhme & Seichter 2018, p. 413) can be said to have influenced their meaning as well. In discussing these terms below, we rely on separately authored contributions from Benner and Oelkers’ 2004 dictionary, Historisches Wörterbuch der Pädagogik (Historical Dictionary of Pedagogy), and Böhm and Seichter’s 2018 edition of the Wörterbuch der Pädagogik (Dictionary of Pedagogy). Erziehung, certainly the key term in Schleiermacher’s lectures and one of the central terms in German pedagogical discourse (along with Pädagogik and Bildung) is translated here simply as “education.” In the German language in general, and in Schleiermacher’s lectures in particular, Erziehung is not limited to phenomena associated with institutions of education, with the school and institutions of postsecondary learning—​as it so often is in English. Instead, Erziehung refers broadly to “the process of bringing up a child, with reference to forming character, shaping manners, and behavior” (OED). This is a process that certainly includes schooling, but that extends far beyond it, and finds expression when we speak, for example, of someone’s biographical “miseducation.” In its broad scope, Erziehung also is relevant to the untranslatable German term Bildung, which refers to the broader biographical “formation” of an individual in the world. Further, whereas education, in its contemporary sense in English, generally refers to “systematic instruction […] in various academic and non-​academic subjects given to or received by a child, typically at a school” (OED), Erziehung is often defined in terms of “influence:” “Under Erziehung,” according to the 1968 Brockhaus (the German equivalent to the Encyclopedia Britannica) “one understands the pedagogical exertion of influence on the development and behavior of those growing up. This concept consequently involves both the process as well as the result of this exercise of influence” (p. 707). This emphasis on “influence,” which is significant in German definitions to this day, can be said to reflect Schleiermacher’s founding imprint on pedagogy (or, on contemporary Erziehungswissenschaft, i.e., Education Studies) as a discipline. This impression is perhaps clearest in his casting of the question for education as one of the “pedagogical influence” of the older generation on the younger (see: pp. 5–​9)—​a question repeated to this day in German educational discourse. Pädagogik is transliterated in this text as “pedagogy.” Whereas the connotations of the English term appear split between practically and politically

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informed “models of teaching” (e.g., in speaking, say, of “constructivist” or “queer” pedagogies, Friesen, 2021), the German word refers to ways in which education (i.e., Erziehung) and formation (i.e., Bildung) can be understood, both theoretically and pragmatically, in terms of what it means to educate and to be(come) educated, and what it means for an individual to form and be formed. In their Dictionary of Pedagogy, Böhm and Seichter (2018) explain that this Ambiguous concept includes …to this day both educational engagement (including goals, techniques, conceptions of values, acting persons, their historical foundations, and their institutional/​organizational frame) as well as the theory of education. (p. 358)

Echoing Schleiermacher’s own notion of the “dignity of practice,” (p. 26) Pädagogik brings with it an emphasis on practice and engagement—​and it situates these, as Schleiermacher also does, in cultural and historical terms, as well as in concrete individual situations that arise every day. Bildung has no obvious English language substitute. Consequently, it can be translated variously as formation, education, edification, learning, culture, cultivation, and literacy (Friesen, 2021). Bildung, however, was given canonical definition by Wilhelm von Humboldt as “the linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most unrestrained interplay” (1999, p. 58). Bildung thus can be said to identify a kind of formative “becoming human” that spans the biographical, collective, institutional, and historical dimensions of life—​w ith what is “human” being understood above all in terms of both individual and collective maturity, responsibility, and freedom. Regardless, Bildung does not play the same central role in Schleiermacher’s lecture as do the terms Erziehung and Pädagogik. He neither discusses its meaning nor problematizes its broader significance. Thus (and perhaps fortunately), this notoriously difficult term itself does not urgently require further discussion here. Bildsamkeit, declared to be one of the fundamental notions of pedagogy by J.F. Herbart, is a term closely related to Bildung that only occurs twice in the part of Schleiermacher’s lectures translated here, but that requires at least brief definition. If we accept that Bildung generally refers to a “formative” process, then Bildsamkeit can be broadly understood as referring to a kind of potentiality or “form-​ability.” It identifies that which is ready to be formed in the child or young person by the self and by others. It refers to qualities that are available to be actualized through education, and even through the child’s engagement with their environment and with themselves.

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Selbstätigkeit is a comparatively important concept for Schleiermacher. The standard English translation is nearly a transliteration: “self-​activity.” This is a term which has its own history of use in English, appearing in conjunction with the establishment of kindergartens in the US, in the work of early Dewey, and in more recent publications as well (e.g., Courthope Bowen 1903; Dewey 1913; Duminy 1990). To again quote from Böhm and Seichter, the term refers to “activity arising from one’s [the child’s] own initiative, according to the child’s own goals. It can arise spontaneously or can be prompted” (2018, p. 430) by a teacher or an adult—​a lthough Schleiermacher speaks specifically of it being “evoked” or “elicited” (p. 37). In referring to self-​activity in the text provided here, Schleiermacher very consciously brings attention to an important pedagogical issue of his own time: Following Kant’s discussion of the problematic relation of educational coercion and freedom, the idealist philosopher and public intellectual J.G. Fichte famously defined education as a “calling to free self-​activity” (Fichte, 1796, p. 32). By this he meant to emphasize that education, as an exercise toward human freedom, cannot force a response from the child, but rather calls or prompts them to act on their own volition. Geist, like Bildung, is notoriously difficult to translate, and can be rendered variously—​w ith the possibilities ranging anywhere from intellect, mind, and wit through animus, spirit, and esprit. It can also designate that which is intellectual or cultural, as the term Zeitgeist illustrates. Traditionally, the humanities in German have been referred to as the Geisteswissenschaften, i.e., the academic disciplines that concern themselves with the productivity and the manifestations of Geist. This would include everything that is regarded as a product of human creativity (in contrast to everything that is regarded as either simply given or produced through impersonal processes, which would be the realm of other Wissenschaften, e.g., the Naturwissenschaften, i.e., the natural sciences). Schleiermacher’s contemporary, G.W.F. Hegel, illustrates in his masterwork, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, the importance of the term Geist in intellectual and cultural (i.e., geistige) circles of the time. Also, given that Hegel’s canonical text has been translated both as Phenomenology of Mind (translated by Baillie 1910) and Phenemenology of Spirit (translated by Pinkard, 2019), it also suggests the many challenges presented by Geist both for translation and interpretation. Translating the term as mind and the mental, on the one hand, gives it clearly individual valences; translating it as spirit, on the other hand, makes it rather more diffuse. We have approached these and other difficulties in various ways, each in an attempt to be responsive to the various semantic contexts in which the term is used. And we differentiate above all between its individual and more diffuse or

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collective valences or connotations. For example, when Schleiermacher refers to our “common social and cultural [geistige] existence” (p. 27), he is using the adjectival form of Geist in direct relation to collective life—​gesturing toward culture, communication, and sociality. Accordingly, we have rendered the term geistig in these cases simply as “social and cultural.” On other occasions, the same adjective can be said to designate that which simply human, as opposed to that which is animal or material. However, where Schleiermacher speaks of “supporting the inner [geistige] activity” in a child (p. 80), he is of course referring not so much to something immediately common, but rather that which is intellectual, spiritual, and also emotional in the child. Geistig is thus rendered in these cases as the child’s “inner activity.” In these and many other cases, we have also included the word Geist or geistig in square brackets in our translation, both to indicate its diverse uses and to show how these are unified under what was certainly the theoretical cynosure of Schleiermacher’s time. Wissenschaft and wissenschaftlich, like the remainder of the words considered here, have to do with disciplinarity and theories of knowledge and science. These two words are often translated as “science” and “scientific”—​ but not in the sense that likely immediately comes to mind. In German, as in many other European languages (e.g., Italian, Spanish), “science” is not simply shorthand for “natural science,” but designates any rigorous academic pursuit, be it in the form of Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) or as Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) or in any of the other forms in which academic endeavors can take place. As a result, when Schleiermacher is asking whether pedagogy can be a universal science, or when he notes that “pedagogy is a science that is at once closely connected to ethics, and also derived from it as an applied field” (p. 28), he is speaking of pedagogy as a rigorous (but not a positivist or experimental) academic discipline, one that is related to the science of ethics (i.e., as a philosophical, academic discipline), and that is also derived from the latter to form an applied science. Anthropologie or anthropologisch are usually translated literally as “anthropology” and “anthropological.” But these terms work fundamentally differently in German than in English. Whereas in English, the word anthropology is usually taken to refer to the comparative study of cultures (also called ethnography), in German, it is still often seen to refer to its traditional meaning derived from the ancient Greek: Anthropo-​, ἄνθρωπος (anthropos), refers to “human;”—​logie (just like the English—​logy) refers to the ancient Greek λόγος (logos), i.e., “language,” “speech,” “discourse,” “science,” “account,” “theory,” etc. As it does in words like biology, geology, and physiology, -​ logie (-​logy) refers here to a specific realm of investigation, description, and

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explanation of the world. Anthropology in this context therefore means nothing less than the theory of the human or the theory of humanity. Formally speaking, this theory includes different fields like philosophical anthropology, biological anthropology, social anthropology, and many others. Understood in this way, Anthropologie designates the broadest possible theory of human that comprises and explicates any relevant aspect fundamental to human being. The adjective anthropologisch (anthropological) can therefore refer to either an activity within the practice of acquiring fundamental knowledge about the human or to a statement of a fact which is perceived to be a fundamental aspect of being human (and therefore valid for all human beings). In Schleiermacher, the discussion of anthropology is usually related to the question whether or not there are some fundamental truths about the human which can serve as a foundation for the development of educational theory: certainty about either the goal of human development (be it the development of individuals, of a society or of all humankind) or about the natural preconditions that provide the basis for any theory and practice of education. And it is one of the most striking characteristics of Schleiermacher’s theory of education that it does not assume such foundations to be known: The nature of the human sufficiently known to be able to decide about what is innate and what is not, nor is any ultimate fulfillment of human nature—​i.e., any ultimate goal of human development—​sufficiently clear to arrange all educational goals beneath it. For Schleiermacher, these matters must remain in suspension until we are able to come to a true understanding of the ultimate goal of human development, i.e., the unity of reason and nature. Schleiermacher recognizes, as we perhaps should today, that the interpretation of both the basis and goal of education are highly variable, and consequently so, too, must be any general theory of education. Kunst is translated as “art” throughout the text. However, it is important to remember that as Schleiermacher uses it, art refers specifically to the ancient Greek τέχνη (technē) and the Latin ars (as in Ars Vivendi—​t he Art of Living). It therefore relates to a specific sort of activity, exercised in a way that is deemed to be correct or appropriate. Instead of designating works or objects, art in Schleiermacher’s time was more about an artful way of doing something. Nevertheless, even art as τέχνη and ars retains certain aspects of art as fine art. This has to do particularly with connotations of talent, genius, and inspiration which can still be found in the associative horizon of the term to this day. These are aspects which further gesture toward a certain external influence, i.e., toward a power that is beyond the human capacity to control and create. Art in this sense therefore always includes an idea of human dependency.

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Kunstlehre is generally translated as “theory of an art.” In reference to what has just been said about art as technē or ars, the notion of Kunstlehre signifies the principles according to which a certain activity is to be exercised in order to be or become an art. Schleiermacher himself defines Kunstlehre in his Dialektik (Dialectics) as “every sort of instruction that explains how to proceed in an orderly manner with certain activities in order to arrive at a given goal” (Schleiermacher 1826/​1998, p. 13). As a result, the notion comprises a paradox in itself, one that has long been discussed in the disciplines of Pädagogik and Erziehungswissenschaft: Whereas the notion of Lehre in Kunstlehre seems to refer to a set of more or less rational and comprehensible rules which one only has to follow in order to arrive at a desired goal, the idea of Kunst connotes an element of unlearnable talent, inspiration, serendipity or even genius. In an educational context, the notion of Kunstlehre is thus positioned between two extremes: The first extreme is represented by the belief that educating (and more specifically teaching) can be learned by anyone, given that it can be mastered by simply memorizing and following rules laid out, for example, in a Lehre. The other extreme holds that educating is an art to the extent that it ultimately cannot be learned, that it requires some sort of personal talent—​a feature that cannot be substituted with study and memorization. As a result, the notion of Kunstlehre can be said to touch upon the matter of the education of teachers and educators more generally, positioning itself between an explicit method and more intangible talent or inspiration.

5. Schleiermacher’s Dialectical Style As quoted above, the 17th edition of the German language Dictionary of Pedagogy (Böhm & Seichter 2018) describes Schleiermacher as “belong[ing] to the founders of pedagogy as a discipline” (p. 413). The brief entry on Schleiermacher in this work also explains that Schleiermacher founded this discipline “on the basis of the dialectics and ethics that underlie his thought.” In other words, pedagogy as a “science” (Wissenschaft, above), is based on both dialectics and ethics—​a nd they have long remained important, although disputed, as key components of educational thought. The Dictionary of Pedagogy continues: By “working through oscillation,” the science of pedagogy in the work of Schleiermacher takes the form of “a structural analysis, a philosophy of culture and history, and a consideration and comprehension of the concrete individual situation” (Böhm & Seichter 2017, p. 413). This all constitutes a single sentence in the original German,

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and it illustrates just one take on the perhaps unusual presuppositions with which Schleiermacher—​a nd many in his wake—​have approached education and pedagogy. As a notion that has a rather long and complex history—​embracing a wide range of meanings—​dialectics as a method in Schleiermacher is able to encompass elements as varied as structural analyses, philosophies of culture and history, as well as concrete individual situations all precisely by “working through oscillation.” Such oscillation—​which itself takes on various forms—​is likely the most conspicuous, and perhaps also the most difficult, aspect of Schleiermacher’s lectures: In one paragraph, Schleiermacher will typically consider one hypothesis or possibility for education (e.g., education as it might occur in one particular political context), and in the next, he will imagine a diametrically opposed scenario. Then, often taking into account further contingencies and possibilities, he typically undertakes one of a number of possible moves: He will seek to either consider these oppositions and contingencies in terms of another opposition that he has outlined from another perspective, to reformulate the given opposition to become something different—​or he will seek to “bind” the opposed terms to overcome the opposition altogether. Often the alternative perspectives and formulations that Schleiermacher considers involve references to ethics, culture, and history, to “anthropology” (as discussed above), or to the specifics of concrete individual situations. Schleiermacher also tends to bring together two or more sets of such oppositions into play at the same time, adding further complexity to the “oscillating” movement of his dialectic. At the same time, he will often increase the complexity of his structural analysis of the factors involved (see Chapter 5 by Friesen in this volume). There is also a somewhat more slowly paced and less variable rhythm that marks Schleiermacher’s prose: This also takes the form of an “oscillation,” but in this case, it is between questions that Schleiermacher periodically raises on the one hand and what he refers to as “maxims” on the other. Schleiermacher will generally begin a new section or discussion with a question like “What is the starting point for this lecture?” (p. 24) or “To what extent do all the different pedagogical influences form a unity?” (p. 71) or “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?” (p. 65; some of these questions are captured in the section titles in Schleiermacher’s introduction). Often, a few paragraphs later, after thus formulating a question, he will follow with what generally sounds like an “authoritative” statement, sometimes explicitly labeled as a “maxim.” For example, in response to his first question about the lecture’s own starting point, Schleiermacher’s

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“answer” is not in the paragraph that immediately follows—​where he discusses the intergenerational rise and fall of different cultures—​but in the one that follows that, where he famously states: “This relationship between the older and the younger, and the obligations of the one to the other, form the basis on which we will build everything that lies in the scope of our theory” (p. 24) And although this statement is accompanied by a number of other questions, its finality is underscored by the fact that it is the last sentence in section labeled “Foundation of a Scientific Inquiry” (p. 24). Much later in his introduction, Schleiermacher’s question regarding the extent to which support and counteraction “form a unity” (p. 71) can be seen to be answered only three sentences before the end of the section in which it is raised—​namely with the simple imperative: “Supporting and counteracting must be merged” (p. 75). Such firm conclusions or maxims, as well as the key questions that they address be seen as figurative landmarks that highlight a path through Schleiermacher’s frequent, more particularized textual oscillations.

6. Individual Chapters The five chapters following Schleiermacher’s text represent the “discussion” promised in the title of this volume. The first of these, by Michael Winkler (University of Jena), the leading specialist in Schleiermacher’s educational theory, presents a commentary on the principal themes of Schleiermacher’s lectures. Winkler describes Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy—​particularly from 1826—​as nothing less than “epochal:” “of fundamental importance for pedagogy, both from a disciplinary and professional point of view” (p. 89). Among the themes considered by Winkler are Schleiermacher’s positioning of education (pedagogy) as an independent discipline, shoulder to shoulder with psychology, politics, and sociology. Winkler also explores the key Schleiermachian themes of the intergenerational relationship and the question of the individual versus the universal, linking these to relevant, contemporary scholarship. Finally, Winkler’s chapter compares a number of passages from the version of the introductory text translated here (i.e., the Platz version) with those of a newly published transcription of the same event made by one of Schleiermacher’s students, Sprüngli. In the chapter that follows, David Lewin (University of Strathclyde) focuses on a particularly important section of Schleiermacher’s lectures which asks: “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?” Should moments enjoyed by the child in the present, in other words, be sacrificed

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for sake of ones anticipated in their future? Pedagogy, Lewin observes, is by its very nature oriented to this future and requires of children a developing awareness of its importance in their lives. However, is this orientation always justified? After considering its ethical ramifications, Lewin concludes by highlighting that ethical questions of present enjoyment versus future preparation are of importance not only in children’s lives, but that—​g iven today’s emphasis on mindful “being in the moment”—​they are also relevant in our own (adult) ones as well. The third chapter, “Entering the Circle. Schleiermacher and the Rise of Modern Education Studies,” Karsten Kenklies (University of Strathclyde) focuses on the interpretive significance of the very first sentence in Schleiermacher’s lectures: “One must assume we are all familiar with what is commonly called ‘education.’ ” Kenklies focus, in short, is on the way that Schleiermacher artfully enters the interpretative or “hermeneutic circle” represented by his lectures. If Heidegger is correct in saying “what is decisive” in such interpretation “is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way” (1927/​1962, p. 195), then such an opening sentence is of the greatest importance, particularly for a hermeneutician like Schleiermacher. It carefully sets the stage for everything that is to follow, Kenklies argues. As adults, we are always already educated, and what this “education” might have amounted to can differ quite radically. But it is nonetheless “commonly called ‘education,’ ” as Schleiermacher observes. By highlighting these and other implications of this first sentence of Schleiermacher’s lectures—​a nd also comparing them to opening sentences from Locke and Rousseau—​K enklies shows how Schleiermacher indeed enters his hermeneutic inquiry in a way that is remarkably, perhaps uniquely, artful, and self-​aware. Rebekka Horlacher (University of Zurich), an educational historian who has also published on the German concept of Bildung situates Schleiermacher’s lectures and his related educational work in its historical, political and cultural context in the fourth chapter. In particular, she focuses on Schleiermacher’s involvement in reforms of educational institutions and their curricula. In the early years of the 19th century, the Prussian state developed a system of public education and founded universities, both of which were later admired and imitated both in America and around the world. Although the story of these reforms is a complex one, it involves a gradual move from a more “liberal” approach—​in which education is seen as an end in itself—​to a more “vocational” one—​i n which education is seen more as training or workforce preparation. Schleiermacher’s emphasis on the more liberal approach, one evident also in the lectures

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provided here, marks his influence as particularly “progressive” during a period of increasing conservatism in the rapidly developing Prussian state. Finally, Norm Friesen (Boise State University) looks at elements that characterize Schleiermacher’s introduction as a whole: its ultimately inextricable dialectical method, style, and structure. Schleiermacher’s dialectical method, Friesen points out, is characterized by both by its flexibility and its proximity to its subject matter. This differentiates it from both its Hegelian and Marxist cousins. Educational thought and practice both confront us with paradoxes, dilemmas, and “catch-​22s” having to do with the individual and the group, the present and the future (e.g., Lewin), as well as training and holistic growth (or Bildung; e.g., Horlacher). The point of Schleiermacher’s dialectic is above all to bring all of these into relation—​ often without attempts at synthesis that would reduce their contradictory character or negativity. This gives Schleiermacher’s lectures their special (and sometimes difficult) expository style and structure: It juxtaposes, modifies, heightens, and extends opposed possibilities, at some points accepting their ultimate incompatibility while at others finding ways to reconcile them. Understanding how he does this provides a way of navigating not only the general structure and organization of his lectures, but also of appreciating how Schleiermacher wends his way through myriad possibilities for education, both conservative and radical.

7. Conclusion While they are today deeply appreciated in contemporary Germany, Schleiermacher’s lectures on education suffered from significant initial neglect in the German speaking world. Although their initial publication by Platz was in 1849, it was not until about a full century later that the canonical character of Schleiermacher’s lectures, above all his lectures from 1826, came to be fully appreciated. This appreciation has only grown, despite the radical changes in the study of education in Germany—​above all in empirical and critical research—​since the 1960s. Simply put, since the rediscovery of Schleiermacher, German scholarship in education has not been the same. And as one recent author explains, we are waiting for a similar discovery in education in the English speaking world, where “work on Schleiermacher” has for too long been “confined… to a kind of theological ghetto of seminaries and divinity schools” (Vial 2013, p. 1). We hope that this volume contributes in some small way to such a discovery and that Schleiermacher’s contributions beyond the realm of theology and hermeneutics are given the attention they so richly deserve.

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References Benner, D., & Oelkers, J. (2004). Historisches Wörterbuch der Pädagogik. Beltz. Blankertz, H. (1982). Die Geschichte der Pädagogik: Von der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart. Büchse der Pandora. Böhm, W. (2004). Pädagogik. In D. Benner & J. Oelkers (Eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Pädagogik (pp. 750–​782). Beltz. Böhm, W., & Seichter, S. (2017). Wörterbuch der Pädagogik 17., aktualisierte und vollständig überarbeitete Auflage. Schöningh. Bollnow, O.F. (1986). Einige Bemerkungen zu Schleiermachers Pädagogik. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 32(5), 719–​741. Courthope Bowen, H. (1903). Froebel and education through self-​activity. Scribner’s. Dewey, J. (1913). Interest and effort in education. Houghton Mifflin. Duminy, P.A. (2013). Education for the student teacher. Pearson South Africa. Fichte, J.G. (1796). Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. C.E. Gabler. Friesen, N. (2017). (Micro)Didactics: A tale of two traditions. In T. Hug (Ed.), Didactics of microlearning (pp. 83–​97). Waxmann. Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/​1910). Phenomenology of mind. Allen & Unwin. Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/​2019). Phenomenology of spirit. Cambridge University Press. Heidegger, M. (1927/​1962). Being and time. Harper. Kenklies, K. (2012). Educational theory as topological rhetoric: The concepts of pedagogy of Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31(3), 265–​273. Oelkers, J. (2004). Erziehung. In D. Benner & J. Oelkers (Eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Pädagogik (pp. 303–​340). Beltz. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1799/​ 1988). On religion: Speeches to its cultured despisers. Cambridge University Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1826/​ 1998). Lectures on philosophical ethics. Cambridge University Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1826/​2000). Grundzüge der Erziehungskunst –​Einleitung. In M. Winkler & J. Brachmann (Eds.), Friedrich Schleiermacher: Texte zur Pädagogik Vol 2. Suhrkamp. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1849). Einleitung. Die Vorlesungen aus dem Jahre 1826. In. C. Platz (Ed.), Erziehungslehre. Aus Schleiermacher’s handschriftlichem Nachlasse und nach geschriebenen Vorlesungen (pp. 3–​102). G. Reimer. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1808/​2017). Occasional thoughts on German universities in the German sense. In L. Menand, P. Reitter, & C. Wellmon (Eds.), The rise of the research university: A sourcebook (pp. 29–​4 4). Chicago University Press. Schmidt, D.R. (1972). Friedrich Schleiermacher, a classical thinker on education. Educational Theory, 22(4), 450–​459. Vial, T. (2013). Schleiermacher: A guide for the perplexed. Bloomsbury.

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von Humboldt, W. (1792/​1999). Theory of Bildung. In S. Hopmann, I. Westbury, & K. Riquarts (Eds.), Teaching as a reflective practice: The German didaktik tradition. Lawrence Erlbaum. Winkler, M. (2000). Einleitung. In M. Winkler & J. Brachmann (Eds.), Friedrich Schleiermacher: Texte zur Pädagogik Vol 1. Suhrkamp.

Outlines of the Art of Education: Introduction F.D.E. S chleier macher

1. Common View: Technique of Domestic Tutor and School Teacher One must assume we are all familiar with what is commonly called “education.” But if we ask for whom this familiar knowledge is turned into a theory and what this theory should be about [we would say] it is as follows: Originally, it was parents who educated, and as is commonly acknowledged, they did not do so following a “theory.”1 However, parents do not only educate [their children]; and their “educational” activities are neither separated nor stand out from the other aspects of their lives. But now, one associates “general educational guidance”2 with those who help parents with education, with persons whose calling it is to work together with parents on matters of domestic education for a limited period of time. [One also associates this guidance] with those who dedicate their entire professional life to taking on a specific part [of children’s] education in a public institution. In both of these cases, a theory of education and upbringing appears to be fruitful, even necessary. The practices of both [tutor and teacher] are opposed to one another. What is important for the private tutor, undertaking education in the narrow meaning of cultivating moral sense, of children’s minds and

Theory is meant here in the sense of the Greek word θεωρία (theoria)—​meaning “viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life,” but simultaneously also as an activity understood in its relationship to action and praxis. (Peters, F. [1967]. Greek philosophical terms: A historical lexicon. New York University Press.) 2 Erziehungslehre. This compound word could be translated as principles regarding education. As just one example, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (literally, teachings of science) from 1804 has recently been translated as his “Science of Knowing.”

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souls in general,3 seems overshadowed in the context of the teacher. What is important for the teacher is instruction, or the transmission of skills and information—​something that is only of secondary importance for the tutor. However, it is for both that a set of instructions, a technique, is sought in general guidance for education. But whatever can be achieved in this regard does not seem aligned with what is usually presented in academic lectures. For in general guidance [for education], one can proceed only from relationships that are entirely by chance. At least as far as the tutor’s vocation goes, it has long been said that the education he provides is a necessary evil, and not anything particularly purposeful or good. When the tutor and the parents meet initially, numerous conflicts and collisions are sure to arise. As a result, much of the guidance for the tutor’s work consists of something one might—​t hrough reference to “pastoral prudence”—​call “tutorial prudence.” This guidance either seeks to align the tutor with the parents, or to give him a kind of independence from them. But these are things for which it is very difficult to provide advice. One can only formulate entirely general statements that do not help. This is in part because there are just too many exceptions and because they have nothing to say about the most difficult [question]—​namely [the] application [of such general statements]. Therefore, one can ask if it would not be much better if such [artificial, tutored] relationships did not actually come into being. Do not relations arise naturally in every family that could, just on their own, provide the necessary [educational] foundations for children? Through such foundations the child can be prepared in the family—​in both a moral and intellectual sense—​for instruction in public institutions. The fact that this does not happen is due to both domestic and public limitations. There is no way to develop a theory particularly for such situations because of these deficiencies. However, as long as the necessary evil of the household tutor remains, learning to teach will naturally be based on the general guidance that arises from experience.4 And this necessary evil is all the worse the more the young tutor has no way to

Here, Schleiermacher is using the term “Geist” (spirit) as an adjective (geistig), speaking of the entire “geist-​ly” being or essence of the child in general. We have translated Geist and geistig variously, depending on their association with individual or with a collective human way of being. In referring to individual manifestations, we use the terms spirit(ual), intellect(ual), mind/​mental, inner or inward. When speaking of its collective manifestation, we generally translate it as culture(al), society/​social and/​or intellect(ual). 4 The term being used here is Erfahrungslehren (literally the teachings of experience). See Footnote 2. 3

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make up for his lack of experience. The means of assistance, however, that are in this case readily available—​in the form of collections of experiences and rules derived from them—​do not appear from a distance at all rigorous or scientific.5 But when it comes to advice and guidance for work in public educational settings—​where instruction is the principal activity—​we cannot necessarily say that one is dealing with something that is based only on chance. It is difficult to think of a highly developed commonwealth, such as our states, without public institutions for the instruction of the youth. Rather, both [state and education] seem to belong together. But we consider on the one hand what is expected of school [by the state] because the school mirrors the type of commonwealth [that the state is]. And given [that] this commonwealth is a nation governed by laws, this means that education, too, is so governed. This further means that any theory of education would appear to belong to the political realm [rather than being an autonomous field of inquiry]. After all, Plato introduces laws for education in the context of his book about the state[, The Republic]. But on the other hand, the principal activity [in public educational institutions] is instruction, which is much less dependent on the laws of the state. And the theory of instruction is so closely wedded to the arts and sciences [or the school subjects that it addresses] that it cannot be separated from them. Every science and art has its own method that arises much more directly from the content itself than from the relation of teacher and learner. [Therefore] didactics[, or] the method of instruction, is hardly autonomous as it is a supplement to the sciences and arts which are being taught. Life itself confirms this, where it is regulated reasonably. Because for those whose instruction in the sciences and arts has been taken to the point where they can consider teaching it to others, there are institutes (seminaries) that teach [instructional] methods in a way that practice can follow directly from technique. And this [close connection of practice and technique] is the only way, since learning to teach ψίλω λόγω (just by words) is worthless.



Wissenschaftlich: Wissenschaft identifies a sematic field much broader than informal contemporary understandings of “science” or “scientific” suggest. It includes all scholarly study and work—​such as reflection and philosophical speculation. It reappears throughout Schleiermacher’s text, and is translated in a number of ways, but most often simply as “science.”

5

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2. Foundation of a Scientific Inquiry If we are concerned here neither with the technique of the tutor nor of the teacher, the question arises: What is the starting point for this lecture? Humankind is made up of individual beings who live through a certain cycle of existence on this earth before leaving it. And this happens in a way that those who are in this cycle at the same time can be divided into an older and younger generation, with the older being the first to leave this earth. However, when we look at humankind in terms of the large masses that we call peoples [or nations], it is clear that over generations, things do not remain the same. Instead, there is a rise and fall in every aspect [of the welfare of nations] that is important to us. However, in looking at the life of a people, we cannot tell exactly whether the first half leads to a high point and the second half to a low point, or whether we are confusing the two altogether. Regardless, it is clear that any such increase and decrease are based on human activity. This activity is more complete and perfect the more it is governed by an idea of what should happen—​t he more it has an exemplar to guide its action—​t he more it is an art.6 A significant part of the activity of the older generation extends toward the younger, and it is less complete or perfect, the less aware the older generation is about what it is doing and why it is doing it. Therefore, there has to be a theory that is based on the relation of the older generation and the younger, one that proceeds from the question: What does the older generation actually want with the younger? To what extent does the action [of the older] correspond to the [given] goal, the result to the [original] action? This relationship between the older and the younger, and the obligations of the one to the other, form the basis on which we will build everything that lies in the scope of our theory.

3. The Dignity of Pedagogy Presented in Formal Terms; Seen in Itself as a Theory of an Art7 So that this [theory] does not seem unjustified, we have to go back to the beginning. We started by saying that the activity of the older generation

Here, Schleiermacher is using the word “art” to designate not a purely aesthetic pursuit, but τέχνη or techne, a practical knowing and doing that involves craft and technique and that is variable and context dependent. 7 Schleiermacher is using the term “Kunstlehre” for “theory of an art.” He also uses this term in reference to his hermeneutics (where it is also translated as a “theory of an art;” see: Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2008). Hermeneutic criticism. Cambridge University Press.). Kunstlehre suggests a practical type of knowledge or teaching, 6

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toward the young [i.e., education] would have to possess the characteristics of an art. If this presupposition is correct, then there obviously has to be a theory of education as art—​since every art demands its own [theory]. At the same time, there are human activities which have little to do with art. So the question is: Is education really an art? Humans are beings that carry in themselves the sufficient ground for their development from their start to their completion. This is already in the idea of life, especially of life of the spirit [Geist] and intellect. Where there is no such internal ground, there is no change in the subject, or only change of a mechanistic nature. However, this does not mean that the changes of a living being must not be shaped or modified through external influence.8 Indeed, this is the essence of the idea of community—​or to take it to a higher level, the idea of the world. The idea of community here is nothing other than the idea of the species. If the sum of all individual beings constitutes the species, then the development of the individual being will be determined through their common nature which make them a species, as well as through the mutual influence [of individual beings]. Without this there is no humankind, no human species. One can think of the relationship between the principle of internal development and external influence in many different ways. Either [internal development or external influence can be seen] as minimal or maximal. The more one minimizes the importance of external influences, the less reason there is to view it [i.e., external influencing] as an art, and to develop a theory about it. But where does this leave us? Is the influence of the older generation on the younger so minimal that it is simply not worthwhile to regard it as an art? This is the first and preliminary question. Apparently, there are two ways to answer it: The first is historical and the second a priori, purely conceptual. However, if we want to begin with the correct starting points, the second option would lead us too far back. So we will opt for the historical path, and will find the answer in experience. In historical experience, we find societies at very early stages of development in which the older generation exerts an one that is realized in practice rather than something that can be articulated explicitly. It is also in this sense that Schleiermacher describes the practice of education as preceding its theory. 8 Einwirkung is often translated in English as “influence,” but it has stronger connotations than the English term suggests. It could be also translated as “effect,” “control” or “intervention,” but the very decisive, even deterministic denotations of these terms would be unsatisfactory for Schleiermacher’s text. Schleiermacher generally associates the term Einwirkung with the action of the older generation that is directed to the younger, and his text emphasizes that adult action in the life of a young person is ongoing, of many kinds, and does not reliably result in a predetermined outcome.

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influence upon the younger without producing any theory [to account for it]. Let us look at two peoples who are very close to us [Europeans]; the first in religious or spiritual matters and the other in philosophical and scientific terms: The first, the Jewish nation, out of which Christianity evolved, and the [second, the] Greek, upon whose culture ours has been built. At its height, the Jewish nation was an [entity] grounded within itself and had reached an appreciable level of development.9 This society had only very limited public institutions for education; most education apparently took place in the realm of the family. There is no doubt that this education followed a specific paradigm, but we cannot speak of a theory of education in this case. But with the Greeks, we can be very precise about the origin of such a theory. Education was primarily a task that was undertaken within a community; it was much more public, and more closely connected to laws of the state. However, there is no trace of a theory predating Plato. The elements of such a theory, however, were of course available much earlier in the form of very general maxims and proverbs. But these only prepare the ground for theory. These peoples [the Jews and the Greeks] placed great emphasis on external influences; and even though their theory developed later, their education did not lack the characteristics of an art. And it is true for every domain that can be called an art in the narrow sense of the word that practice always precedes theory. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that practice gains its character and specificity only through theory. The dignity of practice exists independently from theory. Theory only makes practice more conscious. We now try to find something more general and formalized in these specific historical observations. It is impossible to think of the individual, especially from the beginning of [his] life, in complete isolation from others. This is a general fact of experience. At the beginning of life, external influences greatly exceed any internal developmental force. However, if an individual were [already] developed to a certain extent through external influences, we could well imagine him being able to forge his own existence independently from society. However, we cannot suppose that he would flourish intellectually as he would in society. We have to infer from this that those who live within human society will develop much more fully than those who are isolated, even if the isolated individual had more original developmental force within him. Drawing on our conception of the human race, it seems clear that the difference between individuals is never so great that someone

Bildung is used by Schleiermacher here for development. Among other things, Bildung refers both to collective and individual growth and development; in both senses, it gives special emphasis to active self-​aware engagement in this development.

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deprived of external influence would develop to the same level as one who lives in society. Those scenarios that offer examples of very young children who have been removed from society show that intellectual development is strongly and unfavorably affected. Even though we should not generalize from these isolated instances, and more study is needed, we can still assume the following [in the case of the isolation of the young]: Not only would every younger generation lag behind the older, if not for the significant influence of the older, but also every generation would have to start from scratch, and achieve that which was already accomplished before. [In addition,] we could not talk about any kind of development in humankind. In a sense every individual starts life “afresh;” but what matters is how soon he can take part in the advancement of human activity on earth. The more quickly this can occur, the more the forces for the development of the human spirit are aroused. This is already part and parcel of the general moral undertaking. The influence exercised on the younger generation is a part of this moral undertaking[. It is] thus a purely ethical matter. The more importance we ascribe to this accelerating influence (although it is admittedly not always accelerating in effect), the more important it is in reality, and the more the older generation has already been developed, the less we can leave question of this influence to mere chance. Consequently, we can now see the relation of the theory of education to ethics more clearly, and that it is a theory of an art that is derived from ethics.

4.  Considered in Relation to Politics One point offers itself here as a parallel. If we ask how long the older generation continues to exercise influence on the younger, we realize that in general, there is no clear limit. But there will always be a coexistence of the two temporally separated generations, [a coexistence] in which the older does not simply influence the younger, but in which both work together toward one goal. To the same degree that this shared activity increases, the influencing of the older generation on the younger decreases. And in the end [this one-​way influence] ceases to exist. That is when education itself stops. In any case, every large mass of people forms a common social and cultural [geistige] existence. When this develops to a certain point, a living whole comes into being—​t he state. This continues to exist simply through human activity, since it is only a complex of such activity. As long as the state remains the same [as a political entity] and does not exclude [the possibility of] its eventual perfection, its social and cultural [geistige] activity will intensify. Then, the [complex of human] action must also remain the same in its kind, itself

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rising toward perfection. Communal life in the state is so significant that from a certain perspective it includes all moral activity. And even if we cannot share this particular perspective, we must admit that it is necessary to have a theory that reveals how the goal [toward which communal life strives] is to be reached—​so that the state might continue through generational changes, and its enterprise flourish. This theory will explain how the desired continuation and rise of the state in its entirety can be reached—​notwithstanding intervening generational changes. This [theory] is [called] politics. Both the theory of politics and the theory of pedagogy are inextricably intertwined; both constitute fields of ethical inquiry and need to be treated in the same way. Politics will not reach its goal unless pedagogy is an integral part of it or [unless pedagogy] stands next to it as an equally developed field. To the degree that communal life in the state is disrupted in practice and misconstrued in theory, the less the influence of the older generation on the younger can be accounted for. Here we have the starting point for our inquiry into our object. Pedagogy is a science [Wissenschaft] that is at once closely connected to ethics, and also derived from it as an applied field, and [it is one] that is coordinated with politics. The fact that there are two views on the relationship between the fields of pedagogy and politics arises from the difference between our Christian era and the earlier heathen [i.e., Greek and Roman] one. Our Christian era knows a collective life [not only] in the state but also in the church. One cannot be subordinated to the other; both [church and state] must coexist. There are many Christian states in which the church is not the one or only [church, and in these cases,] the church is not the state; at the same time, there are other states in which the church is the one church, but in which the state is not the same as the church.10 Notwithstanding its separation into different churches, the church remains an undivided whole, and it is therefore in some respects the same in all Christian states. The divisions within the church do not mirror the separation of the states just as the different states cannot be traced back to the[ir] conception of the church. Since we cannot deny either one—​church or state—​we must acknowledge both. It is part of our moral duty to sustain the life of the church from one generation to the next just as we do so for [the life of] the state. Our theory has to relate to both to the same degree.



10

Schleiermacher is referring to the relations of church and state that reflect the European situation at his time, and that still apply to some degree to this day: Some countries (e.g., Italy, Norway) have traditionally had an official church and a “state religion” (whether Catholic or Protestant).

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If we have now established [the grounds for] the dignity of pedagogy, we [can] say: On account of the great importance of the influence of the older generation on the younger, we are in need of a theory in order to gauge rules for practice. [Such a] theory is connected to ethical considerations as much as the activity exercised by the older generation [on the younger] is itself connected with general ethical activity. If this is the case, then we have defined the task for our inquiry—​but only in very general, formal terms. So far, we only know that there is an influence of the earlier generation on the later, and that for this [influence] we need a theory of an art.

5. Defining Our Task Further In order to define our task—​and the principle for the development of our theory—​further, we have to consider education as a process that progresses from a starting point to an endpoint—​one in which the composition of the influence [exercised within it] is independent of both starting and end points. In other words, the question—​how should the influence of the older generation on the younger be composed—​exists in close connection to the following question: What should be accomplished through education? And: What can be accomplished through it? Our observations here are not speculative but are in the strict sense of the word theoretical—​in other words, they relate to a specific practice. As a result of this [practical emphasis], we first have to ask: What can be accomplished through education? Of course, there are those who maintain that anything that should be done is also something that can be done [i.e., that we should have no obligations as humans that we also cannot fulfill]. If we refer back to ethics and develop ethical principles, we would address and solve both questions [raised about what education can and should do] from the same starting point. However, it is not possible to elaborate ethical principles at this moment [i.e., to answer our question of what education should do]; and there is also no universally valid ethical system that we can appeal to [in order to arrive at such an answer]. If such a system were available, then we could simply derive λῆμματα11 [theorems] from it and proceed logically from there. Since we are not in this position, we need to distinguish between both questions, and to accept a less than satisfactory answer. Another source for arriving at understandings for the two questions would be expressions that are in common use. Accordingly, we could answer the question of what the [older generation’s] influence should be simply by referring to the morality of the later [older] generation. And the question

11

λῆμματα, lemmata, is ancient Greek term for “theorems.”

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of what can be done can be answered by again referring to this morality, but only inasmuch as it exists in the laws set out for the progressive development of human nature. However, in this case, we would not be able to produce a unity [of the questions of “can” and “should,”] and we would first have to establish what morality is and what the laws of [human] progressive development are. This would only lead us farther away and raise still further questions. As a result, we have to answer both questions in another way. We will only find approximate answers, given that we engage in one domain in a number of different inquiries. But first, we should emphasize that the task that we have thus far only outlined in general terms has an inner and an outer aspect. It is divided into the inner and outer questions about the starting point and endpoint of education.

6. Inner and Outer Questions If we were to specify the inner question about the starting and endpoint of education in terms of the two questions—​what can and what should education accomplish—​we could then formulate the outer question as follows: What are the outer [temporal] limitations of the pedagogical influence? In other words, the outer question [is about] when the influencing [of the older generation] begins and when it ends[. These] would refer to the starting and endpoint [respectively as seen] from the “outside.” It would be easy to answer this [last question]. However, the answers that are available are not convincing and suffer from widely varying interpretations. If we ask when the pedagogical influence begins, everyone would be inclined to answer: when life itself starts. This answer, however, is an ambivalent one. It is based on contradictory presuppositions. One can say that life starts at birth, but this is not human life in the fullest sense the word. The influence on the child at this point is not connected with spiritual, intellectual [geistig] influence in a such a way that the former can be considered a part of the latter. We must therefore conclude: It is when human life begins—​i.e., when it is no longer merely animalistic but announces its humanity through the expression of intelligence—​t hat education also starts; our influence should be entirely one of mind and spirit. But then we actually separate mind and spirit from animalistic life. If one admits that all expressions of human life are not merely determined by animal life, but that rather, the two[, animal and spirit together] form a whole, then the [temporal] limits [of education] will have to be extended. Influence could [then be said to] begin in the womb, if only one knew what to do and to avoid [at this stage]. Given this, the starting

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point could be defined in a threefold manner [as indicated above, namely: (1) Conception, (2) birth, (3) the beginnings of intelligence]. The same is true regarding the endpoint: When does the pedagogical influence of the older generation on the younger actually stop? On the one hand, we are inclined to say that it actually never stops. Human life is consistently composed of two elements: Life activity that originates from within the individual, and the influence of others upon him. We have good reason to believe that neither of these elements will be nullified. Thus understood, influence stops only when life itself does—​just as it starts at life[’s beginning]. But there is another possibility: even though influence might persist, there comes a point in time when we are able to say that the influence on another is no longer formative [bildend]. It is at this point where influence is indifferent to the individual, where his inner powers of mind inform him of what is right, and when he is armed with his own counterinfluence to meet any [influence] that is coming from without. This, then, is always part of everyone’s moral life and there are rules for this. But since these rules do not relate to the development, the formation, of one’s inner power, which is the specific character of the pedagogical influence, these rules do not belong in our theory. If we want to properly limit ourselves—​otherwise things would be too indeterminate—​we need to remain consistent with what was just said and acknowledge that the real educational influence ends sooner than the broader moral influence. But when exactly does the educational influence come to an end? We can immediately respond with the answer: The educational influence ends when one becomes mature [mündig];12 i.e., when the younger generation is equal to the older in independently cooperating to fulfill common moral obligations. Then there is only cooperative work between the two to this end. Politically, this word [mature; adult; of the age of majority] is used in the same way. In all states, there is a point in time at which a person is legally allowed to take part in collective [political] activity—​[whether] sooner or later. However, we cannot simply subsume pedagogy under politics. And so these political restrictions shall not bind us; we cannot simply adopt a politically determined age-​limit. It is not the task of the state to determine the end of the pedagogical influence. And the solution to our task [to find the end of education] is least of all to be found at the point of any “age of majority”

12

Kant defined the enlightened individual precisely as one who is “mature” (mündig) in his famous 1784 text “What is Enlightenment.” Schleiermacher likely had this in mind in this context.

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If we consider the individual in relation to the religious [denominational] community, there is a similar point [in time] that is not identical with the political one [above]. So if we go back to the roots, the social or shared element of the community of church and state, which is the household, we do not find a fixed point [in time], but a gradual change: Parental authority decreases slowly, but still remains important after the [political] declaration of maturity. A child’s allegiance to [their] parents does not suddenly end at this point. We are thus presented with two points of view when it comes to this external limit [of education]: According to one, the end, like the beginning of education, is a fixed point in time; according to the other, the endpoint and the beginning are both of gradual transition. It is now apparent that answering the question regarding the outer beginning and endpoint [for education] is dependent on the answer to the inner question;[it is] also [apparent] that the way in which education should be carried out is clarified neither by the outer starting nor ending points. This [clarification] only happens through the determination of what should and what can be accomplished through education. Consequently, we [now] turn to the inner question which [, in turn,] leads us to two further questions: Is one allowed to make anything one might want of a person through education? And given the nature of education, can it accomplish such things? The first question—​is pedagogy [as a theory of an art] allowed to teach how to make of people into anything one might want?—​is founded on the distinction between Good and Evil. It can be answered only through reference to ethics, to the idea of the Good. If we assume that the idea of the Good and the difference between Good and Evil are things that are known, we would find a clarifying answer. Incidentally, something else becomes clear through this: We find Evil in humankind, and we also have to regard it as something that comes from within, even though we cannot deny that external influences contribute to this. We will therefore define the task [of education] in a way that if Evil appears, it is not to be supported [through external influence], but our influencing [action] would be a kind of counterinfluence.13 To the second question, whether or not pedagogy can make of humans whatever it wants: This is addressed by answering the first question [about what it is allowed to do]. In addition to the differences between Good and

13

See below, “Sphere of the Applicability of Pedagogy,” (pp. 40-​ 46) where Schleiermacher discusses educational influence in terms of the opposites of support and counteraction.

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Evil, we recognize a broad range of different aims that pedagogical activity must [also] be directed toward. Within human nature, we find a wide range of different mental [geistige] activities. Some of these more of the spirit, others which are mediated more through the senses, [but] all of which subsist within human nature—​and which also appear in some people very forcefully, and in others less so, and in still others not at all. If we assume that the basis for these differences is internal to the person, then we would describe them as natural human attributes. This means that if there were a natural barrier that prevents some capacities from developing, we would say that this inborn attribute is absent. There are different opinions regarding variations in an individual’s nature, and about the relation of this to the pedagogical influence; and these opinions range from ones of the omnipotence of education on the one hand to its impotence on the other. It is commonly asserted that what belongs to human nature belongs to everyone; otherwise the individual would be unnaturally limited. If one attribute [of human nature] or another were to be absent, this would show itself as something organic [i.e., having to do with the organism]. If nothing organic could be perceived, then it could be inferred that all attributes [of human nature] are present. And it can only be as a result of an influencing that started at the beginning of an individual’s life that particular qualities [of the individual’s nature] would be repressed or would remain undeveloped. And assuming that at the beginning [of life], external influences on the individual dominate, and that internal activity is limited, education would have to be blamed when the internal activity of the child does not express itself externally. So one is inclined to say that it would also be the fault of education if the individual does not aspire to develop these expressions. At its most extreme, this would presuppose the omnipotence of education. It would follow that one could form a person into anything one desired. In a certain sense, this can be found in practices carried out on a mass scale, in cases where large numbers of people are subjected to the same influence, and identical results are achieved. This lies however entirely in the realm of the mechanistic, for example, in the treatment of recruits in the Russian army.14 In particular [cases], one might find parents who want their children to acquire artistic virtuosity. The assertion here is that the organic [i.e., having to do with the organism] is given, and that with the right practical treatment, a child cannot fail to become a musician or a painter. If one were to ask about

Known then for its brutality.

14

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becoming a poet, matters would be much more mysterious and debatable. And people believe that this would be still beyond the capacity of the child. If we were to imagine the other extreme [of the impotence of education], we would then either presuppose that this [the complete formation of the younger through external influence] should not be the case or that there even is something deeply foolish in subjecting people to such despotism. We would then come face to face with the limitations of education. From this arises the following formula: One cannot form the person into anything else but that which corresponds to the interrelation of their natural inborn attributes. This interrelationship, some believe, cannot be changed. However, what we see as an activity [or possibility] to some extent in one person should also be one for development in every other as well. Human nature is the same for all people, and this is not contested by the fact that the individuality of every person is different. If we here were to decide in view of the underlying reasons, we would enter the [physical, biological] realm of psychology and physiology. Just as much as we earlier presupposed a [system of] ethics, we must now [presuppose] an anthropology, since it is anthropology that has as its task the determination of human physical preconditions. But in this case, we are in a worse position [i.e., dealing with a less developed field] than we were with ethics. The anthropological question whether at the beginning of life, all humans are identical with regard to their future development, or whether the individual brings a certain determinacy with him, cannot be answered as of yet. And we should not expect such an answer. There is nothing to deduce a priori if one does not want to enter into the [abstract or] transcendental. There are no [known] experiences of life’s first moments. [Nonetheless,] there is a perspective from which it appears this question can be answered: One could say that the beginning of an individual’s life is not a pure beginning but is related in its origin to the union of two other people who already have a specific way of being. Therefore[, one could conclude that] the life of this new person is a product of this union, and therefore dependent on the character of those two people. In opposition to this, one could say that moment of procreation is only an occasion, and that every life is a new creation. But here we enter the realm of the transcendental. We need to arrive at a determination, however, if we are not to leave this whole matter undecided. Let’s see, then, what follows from the one or the other [i.e., now from the opposite extreme of the omnipotence of education].

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7. The Extreme of the Omnipotence of Education [Let us] assume the one extreme, the omnipotence of education, and presuppose that it is only education upon which the emergence of every desired activity depends: What would follow for pedagogy [as a theory of an art]? But something is still unclear: To think of developing just any one attribute in all people to a desired level while ignoring all others is very different than to suppose that one could develop all human attributes together, as desired. If we were to assume the first possibility, it would be a question of the factors leading the one undertaking education to choose to develop some attributes while sacrificing others. We will not find justification for such a choice. If the general situation of the community to which the individual belongs furnishes the factors for this choice, then the appropriate combinations for this community would require the educator to also be the leader, to lead people to those areas [corresponding to certain attributes] which need to be filled. If there is a need to lead people in this way, however, then there will also be a lack of educators who will teach the young to this end. The only thing that remains is the determination that is grounded in the personal desires of the educator toward one or another subject [of instruction]. Accordingly, the decision of the educator would be grounded purely arbitrarily and subjectively. And the student would be formed by the educator as a mere extension [Anhang; epigone] of the educator. This is completely immoral. As there is no way of making such decisions, there would consequently be no education. It seems to be different with regard to the second assumption—​ the assumption that we can develop all aptitudes in all people to desired levels. But if we take a closer look, we see that it is actually the same. If one assumes that all aptitudes open to development are in every person and that we would only need to direct pedagogical activity toward some of them, we could leave other aptitudes to develop on their own. But this would be a contradiction: If there is a certain set of aptitudes that develop by themselves (without an educator) without disadvantage, then there would be no advantage for the educator to carefully direct his pedagogical activity to the development of any other aptitudes. [The contradiction is that all aptitudes need the same amount of formative attention.] This would deny the [validity of the] overall issue I am addressing. Should however all pedagogical activity lead to the development of all aptitudes to their maximum extent, and the virtuosity of pedagogy be applicable to all aptitudes, this would presuppose the absolute equality of all [aptitudes]. And we would be led to make assumptions about the certain physical grounding [of all aptitudes], an assumption we have no right

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to make. [i.e., the assumption that they’re all the same in some fundamental way]. Of course, [in speaking about physical grounding], we could differentiate between what is external and what is internal, as well as the difference between the two. And [based on our previous assumptions] there would be no equality. And no one could possibly assume that there is [external] physical equality, with there being no reason to further assume that there are only physical differences.15

8. [The Impotence or Limitations of Education] When we look at the other extreme, education in its limitations, we presuppose that every person is to be thoroughly differentiated, that every person is characterized by a different interrelationship of their attributes. Pedagogy is consequently restricted by this interrelationship [of attributes]. Even though there is now a foundation for decision making which the first extreme [of the omnipotence of education] lacked, education is still endangered in another way. It would first be necessary to get to know the different attributes before pedagogical activity could be directed toward them and [before this activity] could be regulated according to the given relation [of these attributes]. From this, a particular passivity would result, because, when knowledge of these relations is established with absolute certainty, the time of a dominating, formative influence and of pedagogical form-​ability or perfectibility [Bildsamkeit] of the person would be over.16

9. [Omnipotence versus Self-​Activity] The result of all of this is [the conclusion] that if there is to be a pedagogy, there also has to be a way of combining both extremes [of the omnipotence and impotence of education]. This way of combining can only be achieved theoretically. We can only rely on that which is given to us, on nothing else [other] than the uncertainty of our anthropological fundamentals. Accordingly, pedagogy would therefore have to be constructed in a way that it does not fail if one or the other [of the two extremes of omnipotence or impotence] were the case. But we can only develop this later. For now, we can simply gesture

In other words: Physically, different aptitudes require different educational activity, but at the same time, we cannot assume that aptitudes are simply different. They should be seen as having some commonality in their physical grounding, and thus also some in the required educational activity. 16 Since every individual is different, by the time we get to know an individual and the nature of their attributes, they would be too old for these to be directly formed. 15

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toward it. Even if we presuppose the omnipotence of education, there is one certainty: humans are living beings, which means that from the beginning, there inheres within them an innate self-​activity17 in relation to everything that is part of their nature.18 As a result, pedagogical influence would always take two forms: First, self-​activity would have to be evoked or elicited, and second, it would have to be guided. Education would first have to work to stimulate every aptitude, and then to exercise guidance [in order] to support those which emerge. The first [step, stimulation] would take into account the [aforementioned] uncertainty regarding our anthropological foundations. We are thus now able to define our task more precisely: Education is connected to an activity that is initially stimulating and later guiding [for the child], an activity that is connected to the Good, and that needs to take into account the uncertainty of its anthropological foundations. However, neither the method nor the starting or endpoint [of education] are clarified in this way. But before we can specify the method [of education] through a more thorough articulation of its original foundations and moral goals, we need to stay at the point we have now reached. Several questions come to the fore. If the anthropological foundations are [as uncertain] as we have described them and if—​as a result of the variety of ethical systems—​t he ethical goal is also unclear, to what extent can our theory be considered universal?

10. Universally Valid Pedagogy Would it be possible to advance a universal pedagogy [that is valid] for all times and places? The answer to these [two] questions can only be “no.” But they are connected with another question:

11. W hat Form Should Our Theory Have? Should it be purely empirical, so that all of its maxims are only the result of experience? Or should it be [philosophically] speculative, so that all rules are derived from the idea of human nature? If we answer yes to the second, we’ve also answered the first. Human nature is, in and of itself, always the same.

Self-​activity remains a key term in German discussions of education. As the word itself suggests, it emphasizes what the child does of their own “initiative.” It refers to the child’s self-​generated activity. And although this self-​activity may be initially prompted by adults, it has to do with the child’s own desire, projects, goals, and self-​ understandings, rather than with those of others. 18 The idea of education is limited by what we know about life itself. And we know that human life is something that is active in relation with itself and its nature. 17

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And if all rules of education are derived from it, then they must be valid and identical for all human beings across space and time. But if the first [question; that all maxims are only based on experience] is true, then pedagogy would be something very particular, changing continuously according to what is given [in experience]. But even if we were to deny this first question, we could not immediately affirm the second in terms of its first part [i.e., its speculative nature rather than its basis in human nature]. Because if pedagogy were to be entirely particular, then nothing in this theory could have any scientific validity. The merely empirical cannot have this validity, even though many ingenious and perceptive [empirical] observations can be made. On the contrary, pedagogy must be founded on a [philosophical or] speculative basis, because the question of how people should be educated cannot be answered but through reference to the idea of the Good. However, we can readily agree that what directly follows from this idea of the Good can only be the very general formula that is specified through the interconnection of theories of education and ethics. Inasmuch as particularity is to be introduced into our theory, we need to take into account actual, factual foundations—​w ithout which our theory cannot exist.

12. Factual Foundations The theory of education is nothing other than the application of the speculative principle of education upon certain specific factual circumstances. These factual foundations are related on the one hand to the condition in which pedagogy finds those to be educated, and on the other relates to the state into which they are to be educated. We could take the general formula for the education of humans as [something] derived from ethics and say as follows: Apart from any questions of original equality and inequality, education should accomplish through its influence the formation of the human being from his initial state in a way that corresponds as closely as possible to the idea of the Good. And the application of any such formula would depend on what is factually given. Initially, one [of the things factually given] is the precondition that there is someone who needs to be educated, and the question of how to educate and who should educate cannot be separated. We set as our task [to regard] education as the influence of the older generation upon the younger. Here we are dealing with collectivity. However, this [collectivity] consists of individuals. We want to assume that the [older] generation that educates is a collectivity and can be regarded as unity. However, the [younger] generation that is to be educated is not at all a unity. Instead, the earlier we view it, [the

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more] it breaks down into individuality; education therefore has to start with the individual. The individual being educated would confront an individual educator. In this regard, there are two very different ways to define the task of education: First, the entire older generation should educate the younger as a unity, but with these [the younger] constituted as an aggregation of individuals. The educating subject [is] the whole generation, but those being educated [are] individuals. Second, there are always [only] individuals—​under the aegis of the individual—​when the [older] educating generation engages [educatively]. To put this differently, in the case of the first [with the older generation acting as a unity], we would hold the view that education is an act of the public and the community. On the other hand [when the older generation acts as individuals, education] is the work of the family and the household. This is the initial political singularity, with the mother, of course, being the very first singularity. The first case [i.e., the older generation acting as a unity in education] is never realized in the full sense. In reality, we find a range of ways [in which] the tasks of education are divided between the family and the larger collective. In theory, however, education as state education, as the task of the community, is presented in its pure form in Plato’s Republic. Even in this case, there will be individuals who will undertake the task in the name of the community, and the method used will be very different from how the family educates. I don’t want to elaborate on the fact that within the family, natural love is a factor—​one which is not apparent in the other [case of public education]. But it must be said that in the case where education is undertaken by the family, it acts upon the individual [child] and it preserves the possibility of acting differently in each individual case. Whereas when education is undertaken by the community, it can only proceed only in accordance with general rules. Even if we are not able to separate these two extremes—​education provided by the state and by the family—​it is the case that [specific instances of] education leans more toward the one or the other. And the greater the prevalence of the one over the other, the more their methods differ. Nothing of general validity can be asserted [at this point]. This is because thus far no specific relation between the individual and the community regarding education has been acknowledged as universally valid. Either all of education must come to a rest until a specific relation is identified (so that a more general theory can be established), or one has to educate by connecting to what is factually given. But in these cases, the theory [also] cannot be a universally valid one. But [we arrive at this conclusion] not only when starting from the[se] presupposition[s]‌, but also in considering the end point of education. Even if

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we agree with the ethical maxim that education should accomplish the formation of the human according to the idea of the Good—​and assuming also that the Good is completely known—​t hen this maxim would [still] need clarification[. It requires this specifically] in the event of its application to each state that the person to be educated should attain at each point. But here also we require a factual basis. The relation of the individual to the community or collectivity needs to be clarified: A person can correspond to the idea of the Good only as someone [who is] active. One must [also] ask if people can pursue the idea of the Good in the context of different individual relations [to the community]. In a community that directs all common activity so that there is little room is given for individual freedom, a person would only be required to do what is [explicitly] asked in his relation to the community. What he will do beyond this will only be minimal, and not worth the effort. The individual effectively dissolves into the community. If the community is organized in this way, and if it is also organized according to the idea of the Good, then there is little reason to be concerned about the individual. If, on the contrary, the community is loosely organized, playing only a small role in determining the life of the individual, then the individual becomes completely visible as one who is active, and one must ensure that he is readied for this. A[ny] theory that would concern itself with this situation would have to be completely different from one dealing with a more bound [or socially predefined] situation. We therefore cannot say that anything is universally valid if nothing has been defined that itself possesses this validity regarding what corresponds most to the idea of the Good—​or what the relation between the life of the individual and the community [is like]. If this relation [between individual and community] is not really available [for consideration], then we either have to abandon our theory or understand it differently in relationship to what is [factually] given. We thus again return to the assertion that a universally valid theory is impossible. If we take this as our premise, then we also have to ask: If our theory [of pedagogy as the art of education] is to be applicable, to what domain should it apply?

13. Sphere of the Applicability of Pedagogy We can follow different paths in locating this [domain]. Because we are now working to develop a method, we need to adhere only to one point: Our theory is in any case one that can be expressed only through [natural] language—​ not through mathematical notation. It is therefore limited to the domain of one [specific] language, and not similarly applicable to other language

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domains. Everything we teach would not have the same value in another linguistic domain, as no one language perfectly corresponds to another, and every translation from one language into another is only an approximation.19 The domain of language and local culture [Volkstümlichkeit], are [in this sense] identical. And we can therefore say every general guidance for education becomes usable only when it can be located in a national sphere. By doing so, we have at the same time defined something—​but we do not yet know if we are justified in asserting it. Because if we were to say that our theory is limited to a specific nationality, then that would also imply that the sphere of nationality is coterminous with that of our theory—​at least as we have been discussing it so far. If we consider human life in general in relation to the different national domains, then we find continuous change. In a less advanced stage [of social development], peoples are more self-​contained, at first in smaller numbers, then in larger ones; but also in a way that they avoid and exclude everything that does not fit with their “nationhood.” We could hardly affirm the inclusion of such situations in our theory. It would have to be part of our art of education to form the future generation in a way that adherence to a nationality is not at the same time enmity toward everything outside of it. This would also mean that the theory has to go beyond self-​enclosed nationality. Let us say that at more advanced stages, a nation forms a sphere that also awakens a feeling of shared humanity, that discourages hard hearted adherence, and a place where that which is alien no longer immediately evokes feelings of antagonism. And of course, it is within larger nations that the greatest differences are to be found. One group or class will carry within it the greatest nationalistic hatred, will view the alien with hostility, while other classes within the same nation will view their nationality as unimportant, even using a foreign language to more comfortably engage with outsiders. A feeling of shared humanity dominates over the local culture. Our earlier observation that a theory of education should be founded on nationality is thus insufficient. For if the boundaries of education are to be limited to a specific nationality, we would first have to decide whether [its] theory would be appropriate to every group within that society. Or [we would have to decide] whether it should work to extinguish cultural differences, and to counterbalance the extremes of a collective return to nationalistic hatred [on the one hand] and common feelings of shared humanity [on the other].

Schleiermacher also lectured insightfully on translation. See: Schleiermacher, F. (2012). On the different methods of translating. In L. Ventui (Ed.), The translation studies reader. (pp. 43–​63). Routledge. See also: Saruya, T. & Justo, J.M. (2016). Rereading Schleiermacher: Translation, cognition, and culture. Springer.

19

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But our task again leads to a division: It seems that the theory is not self-​ contained, and always presupposes something that it can’t decide on its own. And even if we wanted to refer to a specific ethics, we might be left in uncertainty in relation to it. A universally acknowledged ethics would of course be able to tell us that a nation that hates everything alien to it is flawed, and that it must change. At the same time, it would tell us that a national community whose cohesion is undermined is also in a defective condition. It is not to be expected, however, that ethics will set something between these two extremes that serves as a universally valid mean or mediator. The result is that we have a new problem, one that is difficult, but one whose solution often becomes clear even despite our own efforts. Pedagogy would have to define maxims which can be correctly applied if education is to perpetuate the present state of affairs—​and also if the opposite is the case [i.e., if education is to change things as they currently stand]. Many things would have to remain indistinct, and it would not be clear in many instances which method should be chosen. Even if we were to remain with the premise that pedagogy is valid only in a specific national sphere, different opinions about whether or not a specific nationality should be supported or superseded are significant already at the earliest stages of education. Leaving aside the question of whether cultural particularities are inborn or not, it is obvious that such particularities can be established or undermined already at an early age by the environment, by language, and by the way they appear over time, etc. If we surround the child with that which is alien, and which allows him to move between different languages, then the child’s sense of nationality will be much less developed. General interchange will predominate. In this case, the difference [produced in the early stages of education] will soon be clear. If one were indeed to determine in theory that nationality should be preserved, then one would have to censure the early development of any alien characteristics at an early age. In the opposite case, one would have to praise exactly this [development of alien characteristics] and attempt to make it as general as possible. All these questions [exercise a direct] influence [on] practice, and an answer to them has to be developed and determined in the theory before one can develop an actual art of education. If we want to determine the sphere of application for our theory, then we not only have to consider national variance, but also take into account further possible differences. We need to consider whether or not given differences, inasmuch as they are original and innate, might demand another pedagogical approach. [This would be an approach] other than ones used in education for differences that arise later. One usually regards the collective qualities of humans in one and the same people, in what is called national character, as

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essentially belonging to inborn inequalities—​and not as something developing over time, [and thus] not as arising through education. There is a more significant source of inequity and difference than nationality, and this is race. This differentiation without doubt appears to be more innate, and physically grounded in that which is not open to influence of the kind that pedagogy teaches [us] to exercise. This difference is perceivable even in the more fixed parts of the body, in skeletal anatomy. Nationality is subordinated to racial differences, and within the national, we find personal differences, which then can be described through categories that are valid for all nationalities and races. If we consider, for example, what we call human temperament, 20 this is obviously something innate, something corporal as [well as] physical. However, this difference is in itself not one of pathological aberration. If we assume that an investigation had been completed and a number of temperaments physiologically developed and defined, then everyone would conclude that these temperaments would be evenly distributed across large groups. This would be true even though very often, the climate contributes to the fact that one or another large group would be characterized by one primary [temperamental] type. For example, if one were able to say that there are nations which are primarily choleric, then it would still be possible to presume that within those nations there are single individuals with melancholic or phlegmatic temperaments.21 In some nations, these are larger groups while in others, [it is] only individuals who are similar in this way. This is grounded in the fact that in some people, individual differences are more distinctively developed than in others in whom individual particularity is not so apparent, and where the general national type dominates. And the definition of the character of a people is based on whether the individual or the national [character or] difference dominates. The accommodation of the simultaneous appearance



“Temperament” refers here to a theory of personality that began with Galen of Pergamum’s ancient distinction between four temperamental types or humors: melancholic, choleric, sanguine, and phlegmatic. “The legacy of Galen’s theory of humors… is a descriptive typology of character that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that bears a remarkable resemblance to the extraversion and neuroticism dimensions” (Stelmack, R.M. & Stalikas, A. [1981]. Galen and the humor theory of temperament. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(3), 255). 21 Choleric: “a person having a predominance of choler …among the bodily humors (now hist.). Later also: an irascible person” (OED). Phlegmatic: “Having, showing, or characteristic of the temperament formerly believed to result from a predominance of phlegm among the bodily humors; not easily excited to feeling or action; stolidly calm, self-​possessed, imperturbable” (OED). 20

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of differences in temperament is part [or a measure] of the development of a nation. Beyond these differences in temperament, many variations develop in people—​ones which we cannot regard as original or innate. [The question then arises] whether or not the educating influence has a relationship that is different to variability that we call “inborn” than [it is] to [variations] not inborn? We cannot respond [to this question] affirmatively. We will not allow ourselves to be drawn into this contested terrain but refer to something much more commonly accepted: Among all human differences there are also moral ones which are based on the extent to which someone corresponds to the idea of the Good and morality, or not. Education must counteract the latter. So can we now say that all innate differences are not moral differences—​and all moral differences are not innate? This we cannot affirm. Just as there are congenital illnesses and dispositions toward illness to be countered through physical education, there are also congenital mental illnesses that can be similarly counteracted by education on the mental [geistig] level. With this, we are considering differences that are more interesting than those between [what is] innate and acquired. In the same way that education has to relate to specific differences at its starting point, it also has to do so at its end point. Pedagogy, however, will be determined by the differences at its starting and end points only inasmuch as those differences do not contradict the idea of the Good. In this way, both our main questions, the question of the starting point and of the endpoint or goal of education, to a degree become one. We can then say that as soon as there is a [geistige] departure internal to a person [from the idea of the Good] this must be met by counterinfluence. In whatever way education encounters the person, and whatever the person brings to education, education will still have to exercise an influence that counters whatever contradicts it given goal. In the course of education, if we find something that contracts the idea of the Good, we will always take education as being responsible for this, and we will say that education should have counteracted it from the very moment of its first appearance. But of course, we cannot ignore another distinction, that of fate. That [type of] education is more complete which perceives the first sign of something contradicting the Good and oppresses it, than one which perceives and begins to counteract Evil only when it is already significantly developed. We can now say: Whether that which is perceived and to be counteracted is original and innate, or if it only develops later—​a ll of this is completely irrelevant to any rules we might propose for education. Education has to concern itself with all potentialities in order to discover which contradicts the goal as early

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as possible. Since not everything develops in a human at the same time, there will be earlier and later perceptions with regard to that which is innate. And only as soon as—​but not before—​it is perceived, counteracting measures can start any earlier. Based upon what we have already established, there is no fixed point for our theory if we do not go back to Good and Evil, and if it is the case that there can only be a theory [of education] if we regard education as an ethical process, then we could define a maxim: All that can be ethically regarded as an imperfection, as something negative, has to be counteracted as soon as it appears. But does it also follow that anything in development that is to be regarded ethically as positive has to be supported through education? But [the] more challenging [question] is: Whether education must simply leave unchanged everything that is anomalous—​t hat is one-​ way in one person and different in another—​but that does not fall into the category of the ethically negative? Insofar as this question is raised in an ethical context, we will answer it ethically, and we can propose no other principle than this: everything in human nature that is not evil should remain. If it is not [expressly] evil, there is no characteristic, no variation which is found in individuals or in a group or community that education must counteract, if it is not evil. These human variations and characteristics, beyond that which is evil, are to remain. Human nature is complete only inasmuch as this diversity comes into evidence. All diversity and variety in the domain of human nature should [be allowed to] unfold before us. If humans can be the subject of education only as autonomous, self-​ active beings, then everything that develops must be regarded as part of human self-​activity, and therefore as part of the aim of education—​at least inasmuch as it doesn’t contradict the idea of the Good. And therefore, there is no rule for education other than that of moral life in general. That which we, regarding ethics, neither have the power nor the interest to interrupt in life’s later stages is similarly not to be constrained during [one’s] education. One could object that in those cases where a particular characteristic or quality has been developed through moral self-​activity into a specific way of life, it [this quality] could justifiably be supported, rather than suppressed. Regardless, evidence of some characteristics would still be clear at an early age, without appearing to be the result of self-​activity. It might therefore appear that the pedagogical influence on those characteristics is not governed by the same moral rules. Nevertheless, we have to say that passivity [on the part of education or the educator] is never pure, and that there is always a co-​or counterinfluence, and self-​activity is never excluded from this. Human

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beings are thoroughly self-​active, even when a development is primarily the result of another’s influence. And whether one is conscious of it or not, one must admit that self-​activity differs in degrees. If the person has arrived at full [self-​]awareness, then we must presuppose that what[ever particular characteristic] appears reflects his consent. Not yet being fully conscious about the direction of one’s life does not mean that this direction does not [also] belong to self-​activity. It depends only on where we delimit the opposition of Good and Evil—​upon which we base the entire enterprise [of education]. Since we here are not proposing a general ethical theory in relation to this opposition, we will have to leave this opposition in its relative uncertainty. Pedagogy is based on the idea of morality as it is established within and developed for a given human order, as seen in its generality and specificity. If, in one society, something is perceived as good that is not seen to be so in another, and if the younger generation is educated in accordance with this perception, and it is thus widely promoted so that it persists, then we cannot regard this as an error of education and blame education for insisting on it. Instead, it is an error in the way morality is understood. Education is correct and moral if it corresponds to the moral view of society. Here again, we are faced with a limitation of the universal validity of our theory. Our theory can only be established for one specific domain of moral comprehension. It will change according to changes in this domain. The more perfect moral comprehension is, the more education corresponds to the idea of the Good, the more perfect the theory of education will become. Because pedagogy is dependent on moral theory, it might appear doubtful that pedagogy as a coherent whole could be formulated as a unity that has a rigorous or universal [wissenschaftliche] character. Even though specific moral perceptions are changeable, from a broader view, this changeableness becomes less important. The greatest difference will always exist between the education of those who live in the state and are educated for the state, and those people who have not yet developed into a national community. For theory, there is no doubt that education is education for the state. If we nevertheless have to specify the boundaries for the universality of pedagogy, then we have already found the general points from which we [can] start. In relation to the starting point, these boundaries are not so well defined. In relation to the end point, they are clearer. We see them with precision in the communities into which the individual must autonomously enter. We now ask in connection with education’s endpoint in our time: What does education need to achieve to be seen as valid?

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14. Defining the End Point of Education for the Present Time Education—​which in a narrow sense ends when self-​activity becomes dominant over the influence of others—​should deliver the individual as its “work” to the communal life of the state and the church, to free, convivial social intercourse, and to [the community of] reflection and knowledge. Regarding the latter, one can ask whether it [this community] is something that as a whole refers solely to the state and the church and remains in these domains, or whether it is also part of convivial life which does not exist for itself as something autonomous? The answers to this question will vary, based on how life itself is ordered in the foundational domain of ethics. If we however consider knowledge in its entirety, it is something collective and shared, and there is a tradition of transmitting it from one generation to the next, with everyone taking his or her place within this realm.22 If one proceeds differently from the given circumstances, everything else that can be named beyond these communities, , would still be a part of these same realms [of church, state, communal life, or the common life of knowledge and ability].23 Even if we are supposing that general education always has to accomplish something that lies in one or more of these four realms [church, state, communal life, and the community of knowledge], then there are still some important things to take into account—​before we [can] decide to build upon and construct rules [on the basis of what we have so far undertaken].

15. How to Consider Contradictions between the Different Realms of Life? [The answer to this question] depends on whether education’s obligations to educate for the state, the church, broader communal life and for [the community of] knowledge are not in contradiction. But how often do we not see either apparent or real disharmony between these communities in appearance or reality? Inasmuch as communities of church and state mistrust each other—​so that the state believes that what happens in church damages it, or vice versa—​t here is presupposed a common feeling of disjunction,

Schleiermacher here is describing what he refers to later as the “community of knowledge” (Wissensgemeinschaft), which can also be understood in more narrow terms as the realm of science and scholarship. In the section that follows, we translate Wissenschaft [literally “knowledge-​ship” like friendship or scholarship] simply as “knowledge” in order to reflect this. 23 Schleiermacher is here referencing what he below refers to as the four different “realms of life.” 22

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rightly or wrongly. It is also not uncommon to find that the state also regards free convivial social life with a certain mistrust. Underlying this is also a contradiction—​just as when the people complain about the state. Again, the same thing appears when we look at the relation between church and [the community of] knowledge on the one hand, as well as state and [the community of] knowledge on the other. What should we say about this? It is also here where ethics that has to address these contradictions. It is in ethics that everything that people engage in for themselves and with others must be derived from one and the same principle. It is also to be established whether different conditions [in the relations between church, state, knowledge, and social life] are grounded in this same principle—​or not [at all]. If they are [thus grounded], then there cannot be any contradictions; they must belong together. Contradictions between these parts of society arise from their own imperfections—​and this happens to the same degree for all parts. So what are we to do now, given that we do not have an ethics that is universally valid? The greatest differences arise. Sometimes it is said that that the state is truly organic, the epitome of all moral institutions; other times, it is described as a necessary evil. However, even if perceptions vary so widely, and ethical systems so diverge so much, we remain with our deepest awareness of the truth of human nature. Even if we presupposed that ethics were not developed to the level that it could clearly and distinctly answer questions regarding different moral realms of life and their interrelationship, there will still be the aspiration to form moral interrelationships in a systematic way—​ ensuring both the truth and necessity of our task. Whatever is missing on this systematic side must be supplied by belief. This belief, however, is also nothing more than the living inward awareness of the truth of the aspiration to form moral communities according to the Good. This pursuit is a truly moral activity; the fact that it has resulted in the most varied and divergent moral views and systems to this point is proof that this pursuit or aspiration has not yet been fulfilled, that it has not reached its goal. The task of providing an integrated account of all moral relations and all moral views within which all differences are eliminated has to be completed.24 The different realms of human community would be in accord if they were all to correspond to their idea [of the Good]. When such discord [between the four realms] occurs, what then is the task of pedagogy? If we were to say that education should educate the young who are also maturing so that they are suitable and capable for the state as it

See: Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1812–​ 1817/​ 2002). Lectures on philosophical ethics. Cambridge University Press.

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is, then its imperfections would be perpetuated, and no improvement whatsoever would be achieved. The whole younger generation would enter into this imperfection with its whole being and in complete affirmation, and we would again face a new contradiction. Our theory would then appear to be derived from one in which free human activity is impeded. Our theory could then be expressed in the following: Because the younger generation are led to be satisfied with what already exists, they never aspire to leave a state of imperfection. If we were to suppose the opposite, and presuppose an awareness of discordance, [we could] say that it is the goal of pedagogy that every generation, after the completion of their education, aspires to and is capable of the improvement of any and all imperfections in communal life[. But] then we would again enter into uncertainty. It is precisely our task to avoid this [uncertainty].—​If we could direct education toward that which already exists and bring it into relationship with it, then we would have a certain foundation and points for further development. But this formula contains much within it that is dangerous. Because if one were to educate youth to all be reformers, this would stand in the most glaring contradiction with [the idea] that they be self-​actively involved in the world. Through their self-​activity, they would be drawn into the world, intervening [in it] in the most dangerous way. We therefore have to combine both sides, and only in this way can we find the right solution. Conservation and improvement certainly seem to be in mutual conflict. But this is only the case if we were to remain with the dead letter [in our interpretations]. As soon as we look at life itself, and develop our formula in this light, we see that both sides always coexist, even if in mutual opposition. It is sometimes the case that improvement dominates—​inasmuch as it is also destructive [i.e., productive of change]—​and that conservation retreats. This is what we call the revolutionary [approach].25 The opposite is the case when conservation is dominant, and improvement as a kind of destruction appears only sporadically. If we continue observing life as it presents itself to us, we

Here and below, Schleiermacher has the French Revolution (1789) in mind, likely especially the years of terror that followed. According to Sünkel, Winkler and others, the French Revolution plays a role in Schleiermacher’s lecture similar to that of Plato’s Republic: While the French revolution and the terror are seen by Schleiermacher as Evil, Plato’s Republic is seen as woefully insufficient. Both serve as foils, as negative possibilities to for the configuration of education and society that are to be emphatically avoided. See: Sünkel, W. (1964). Friedrich Schleiermachers Begründung der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft. Henn; Winkler (2000) as referenced in Translators’ Introduction.

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have to admit that within nature, there is continuous destruction. The closer improvement connects with this [continuous change], the closer it is to conservation [i.e., as the “conservation” of change.] As a result, in the opposing situation, where destruction [i.e., change] is at the fore, revolution is no longer necessary. The closer that improvement is connected with conservation, the less it is different from it. Therefore, we can say that the actual task would be to improve all that is imperfect in such a way that the opposing force of the revolutionary does not come into appearance. Where it [this revolutionary force] nonetheless appears, it is the result of immortality that came before it. If things had been moral from the start, the revolutionary would not have appeared. So we come to the formula: Education should be established in such a way that both [conservation and improvement] are in the greatest possible harmony—​so that youth can enter into what already exists, and also energetically engage with those improvements that present themselves. The more both can be achieved, the more the contradiction disappears.

16.  The Significance of Our Theory I cannot depart from these matters without saying something about the significance of our theory. Let us first consider something from the ancients, and then return to our argument above. Plato builds his entire state of the Republic on education, so that everything else, administration and legislation, is overshadowed by it. He establishes the rule that in the state, if education is correctly organized, nothing else needs to be of explicit concern. In doing this, he presupposes that it is precisely through education that any changes in his state should be prevented, so that the state should simply remain as it was in its original, correct organization. If a later generation were to be educated in the same way as the one before it, everything would remain the same. However, all of this presupposes that Plato had developed a perfected [system of] ethics—​or that he had at least imagined it to be so. If the idea of the state is presented as being in perfect correspondence with the idea of the Good, then Plato’s way of theorizing is completely justified and suited to its purpose. Similarly, Plato also had to assume that there is always the same relation between those who rule and those, according to their status, who are ruled—​and that the inner abilities of people remains the same. Again, if one assumes that ethics [as a system] is perfected, that the aptitudes of human beings remain constant, and that the state integrates all human activity within it, it would follow that Plato’s view is correct. We cannot, however, agree with much of this. The essential difference is that for us the state is

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not simply the embodiment of all human activity, and also that no state is as isolated as Plato envisioned. Still, if considered in the right way, Plato might show us the path to seeing the actual significance of our theory. [This is the case if we consider the following four presuppositions.] We assume that[: 1.] ethics [as a system] is perfected, [2]‌that the ideas of the church, state, social life, and of knowledge itself are also perfect; [3] that [the state] is modifiable (in response to differences between individuals that affect the form in which it can be founded), and [4] that the proportion of the forces holding every community together and keeping the four [aforementioned] communities in interrelation is regulated according to the different peoples and races in a way that all human activity is in correspondence to the idea of the Good. Would we not then have to say [with Plato] that education is the main thing and that in it, everything is integrated? But on the other hand, [one can] presuppose the imperfection and incompleteness of all of these domains and presuppose that through education, both conservation and improvement are brought into the greatest harmony, then nothing beyond education [itself] would be necessary. Through it [education], all human relations would be continuously developing [toward perfection] from one generation to the next. Everything that that appears to be in contradiction to the whole would become superfluous. There would be no disorganized conditions; no paternalism would be necessary, because education would ensure that everyone would be in accordance with the whole. Everyone would take a position that corresponds at once to his own inclinations and to the wishes of the larger whole. With one word, when seen in this way, the theory of education is the principle upon which the realization of all moral perfection would have to be based. For all of human life, for all of human formation [Bildung], there is nothing of greater importance than the perfection of education. The flaws of education [on the other hand] strengthen human imperfection or incompleteness. If one were not to stray any further from the right path in education, then all of the difficulties that occur so easily in all realms of human community would simply disappear. This image of such an ordered existence appears most clearly if one is looking to isolated fictions such as that of Plato, but it can also be applied to any human situation. Looking at all of this from a rather different perspective, we come to the same conclusion: Within those groups where there is a minimal level of development, we will not find education [in the sense discussed above;] we only find a mechanical influence without awareness, without particular direction, without a principle of the ideal. Under uncultivated conditions, it is the imitation of the leader which directs later generations to a perpetuation of existing

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conditions. We can also imagine other circumstances: If we view matters from the perspective of the general disorientation and dissolution of all social bonds and think about the causes of the development of such an anarchic situation, then we will find innumerable minutiae which are not related to each other, and which—​viewed independently from one another—​don’t seem to have had any effect. But we have to say: If there hadn’t been this kind of perverse influence from one generation to another for a long time, then such confusions and sudden changes would not have occurred. Those perversions are based in perverted influence. Considering the goal of education, the greater significance of our task becomes apparent from all those different ways [of seeing education]. All essential improvement of all aspects of human life rests on education. However, together with the great significance of our task, its great difficulty also becomes apparent. It follows that the usual treatment of our topic, which is focused (in most cases) only upon the smallest particularities, is not in accordance with the dignity and significance of the actual task. If our theory is to accomplish what is expected of it, our task has to be understood in a very different way.

17. Universal and Individual Education As an idea, the state has as its basis its nationality in that which is material. But this rule, like any, has its exceptions[, for example,] when a “nation” is separated into different states, and when various peoples are bound in a whole. We already asked the question about the degree to which people are determined by their birth, something which sets limits for education. We referred to this as national character or constitution. But now we need to leave aside the question of that which comes—​or does not come—​from birth. At the place from which education can begin, there is always a national determination of the state. We now need to consider this. We have so far assumed that individual is to be educated for the state. We have to admit that education always faces a national character, a sense of membership in a particular state that is developed to a certain extent, or [a set of] aptitudes [germane to] a particular local character.26 If the state and national character always belong together—​and the former represents the idea of the state and the latter, its material condition—​t hen education always has to presuppose a certain determination of the individual in terms of the ethical and the material, and also

Schleiermacher can be seen to be asserting that—​from the perspective of education—​ the individual cannot be regarded simply as a tabula rasa, a blank slate.

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a predisposition for the life of the state. What we so far regarded as the endpoint [of education] now appears as the starting point.27 So from this same perspective, what can we now see as the endpoint of education? If we now see the individual as personally developed fully as the end of his education, then every individual must distinguish themselves through a particular characteristic from the whole, from all others—​even if only very slightly or by degrees. [This is to be done] so that the degree to which the individual is developed personally and individually is at the same time the measure for the perfection of his development in general. In the same way, the greater or lesser extent to which the character of an individual is expressed within a whole people is also the degree to which the whole people are developed. When personal characteristics are reduced within a larger people, the development of the whole stands at a less advanced level. This is also the case for smaller groups within the whole. From this perspective, we will have to say that the endpoint of education is the expression of the individual’s personal character. We now have to combine this with what was said above about the endpoint of education. Here we said: education should develop the individual in correspondence with the moral whole to which he belongs. The state receives individuals from the hands of education as formed in analogy to itself, so that they can be integrated into the life of the whole as something already proper to it. Regarding the second [endpoint for education which takes the development to the individual as primary], education already receives the individual as formed homogeneously with the state—​and should deliver this individual over in his uniquely formed character. Viewed in this way, no one will be able to find a contradiction between these [two definitions of the endpoint of education]. Even though a national character is innate as an attribute that develops of its own accord, the influence of education is not superfluous [in this connection]. Personal characteristics, however, cannot be arbitrarily grafted [onto the individual;] one can only follow the indications that gradually become manifest. In this way, the task of education is divided into a moral universal and a moral individual side. We don’t [yet] know how these two tasks of education stand in relation to one another—​whether they are equal, or if one is to be subordinated to the other. We lack the information to choose and can only leave [these matters] undecided. We can only minimally assume that [what we called a people’s]

In other words: Whereas nationhood and national character was earlier viewed as the endpoint, the goal of education, it must now be viewed as the place from which education starts.

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national and material constitution—​which also contains something psychical [psychisch; namely a connection to the ideal of the state]—​is already given within the individual who at the same time is completely surrounded by it and moves within it[. If this is the case,] then one can say that there are already so many unintentional influences supporting what is already given [i.e., this national ideal and character] that education does not have to focus specifically on this and can regard it as secondary. If we consider, however, how many persons within a people appear only as a mass without individuality, one sees that education has to counteract human inertia, and has to encourage the development of individual characteristics to counterbalance the predominance of homogeneity. On the hand, one can say: Because individual characteristics cannot be arbitrarily “grafted” [onto the individual], and because these [characteristics] can only be recognized relatively late and with some difficulty, it would be futile for education to focus on this. [Instead,] one should influence “negatively” by removing barriers standing in the way of nature, by allowing nature to take its course freely. On the other hand, education for the community requires a great deal of activity to produce its considerable results, meaning that support through education is necessary so that such results can be accomplished. There is something true provided by all of these perspectives. And as matters currently stand, we cannot reject either [i.e., neither the moral universality nor the individuality of education]. Either we have to combine both or we have to distinguish between the two and say that one will be good for some objects of education, and the other for others. This, however, leads us to a new question, which also must be decided if the theory is to be developed further in its application to the two domains or directions for education—​t he universal and the individual. Namely:

18.  Are People Equal or Unequal in Relation to the Universal and Individual Direction of Education? In other words: Within a state [Volk], do all people relate to the communal spirit [geistigen Zusammenhang] or the idea of the state either the same or differently? And, viewed from the other side: Do all people relate to the idea of the individual personality the same or differently? If we were to affirm the identity [of all these relations] with regard to both [questions], then a system based upon a fundamental equality of all humans would be the result. By taking the side of inequality, we would introduce an aristocracy of inner [geistige] potentialities and form-​ability [Bildsamkeit]. We would then assert

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that it is not possible that one [person] could reach the same level of development in all respects as another. First, with regard to the universal side of education, this then entails two classes among the people, with one being relatively incapable of relating to the idea of the state, and the other being much more strongly drawn to it. Second, presupposing this inequality in connection with the individual side of education, there would be among the people a multitude of individuals naturally determined to always remain a mass and to distinguish and separate themselves only in terms of the place where they live. And there would be another class [of people], within which real individual personal characteristics would evolve. Now we also have to consider the other possibility more closely[, taking the side of individuality rather than equality]. The system based upon equality does not need to be understood as assuming that all humans are completely identical, not only in the degree but also in measure, in their relation to the universal or the individual. On the contrary: One might still be allowed to assume original differences between individuals which would, however, not form [stable] increments but could be regarded as transitory states. As there are no [stable] gradations, there is neither the possibility nor obligation to separate the individual subjects at the start of education. But if one were to assume such [a set of] differences, one would have to introduce a specific differentiation.

19. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Universal Direction [of Education]? It might be promising to consider matters from a historical perspective. In the communal life of different people at different times, we find institutions which clearly presuppose one of the options mentioned above. For example, wherever there is real subjugation or servitude, 28 the gradations mentioned above are most certainly presupposed. And these differentiations are surely not perceived as being merely arbitrary but as having a natural basis. According to the ancients, a slave is a living tool with a human soul which must always receive a [directing] impulse from someone else, as he was either deliberately deprived of his autonomy or always lacked it. However, in a state everything has to be arranged so that any impulse toward free action and all free movements emanate from the idea of the state. If there are humans who, according to law, are to be stripped of their

28

The German Knechtschaft can mean subjugation, servitude, or slavery. We make use of all these possibilities in translating the term.

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autonomy, this can be justified solely on the basis of their incapacity for autonomy. In other words: There are human subjects who are not responsive to the idea of the state. In many states, slavery derives from being of alien origin. In this case such treatment [i.e., deprivation of autonomy] could be forgiven as some lack the national character upon which the state is founded. And one could therefore say that those people would not need to be there at all or would at least not be granted autonomy as they are not responsive to the idea of the state. Even so, as such foreignness would gradually diminish over generations, slavery would cease to exist. However, where such servitude or slavery is not founded upon nationality, upon foreign origin, the prevailing view seems to be that within the people of a state there is gradation [within these people with regard to their capacity for a relation to the idea of the state]. In this case inequality is related to the idea of the state. But we don’t need to confine ourselves to servitude or slavery alone. Even a certain inequality with regard to civil rights suggests conditions of dependency, and this conception of dependency is based on the assumption that some people have a greater political capacity than others. Equality therefore works as an underlying principle only where there is no servitude or slavery of local people and no inequality with regard to political rights among natively born citizens. So it seems that inequality is more widely accepted as an assumption than is equality. However, we still have to keep in mind that we are rarely able to trace history back far enough to eliminate the possibility that political inequality might have been founded upon national differences. In most cases it began with two tribes, one of which won dominance over the other. This resulted in inequality within the state even if there was no difference in dignity before. After these general preliminary remarks, we now are able to formulate the question in the right way [as to whether or not people are equal or unequal in relation to the direction of education (toward the state and toward individuality). We are also able] to differentiate correctly between different cases. However, at the same time this brings us again very close to physiological considerations.

20. W hat Would Be Implied for Our Task By 20.1.  Presupposing the Equality [of All People with Regard to Both Directions of Education]? We have seen that equality can be understood in different ways. For now, however, we presuppose the definitive equality [of all people]. Under these

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circumstances, all differences in the capacities of the people to [relate to the idea of] the state are merely the result of external circumstances, of the ways they have been raised and educated. What would then fall to [i.e., be the task of] education? It can obviously follow [one of] two paths. Education always begins by engaging with conditions in which differences have already evolved, and it would have to treat those differences as the result of external influences which have favored one [person, group] over another. Education [as yet another form of external influence] is now added as a new factor. Should it then follow the path presented by [these] existing conditions [of difference], or should it not? In keeping with the maxim that no pedagogical effort should be wasted upon those who have not been favored by external circumstances, should education favor those who have already been so favored in order to achieve something truly remarkable? Or should it counteract those conditions [for the sake of equality]? The former would be the aristocratic principle, the latter the democratic. In the first case, according to the aristocratic principle, it wouldn’t matter whether the differences are innate or the result of external conditions. The pre-​existing inequalities, regardless of their origin, would again develop within the younger generation or even increase. But in this case, inequality must be presupposed. On the other hand: Were one to act in accordance with the democratic principle in a way that at the end of all education everybody has developed equal capacities for the state and the church, then those ready for a higher level [of development] would unfortunately have to be pushed back [by education] to a lower one. Therefore, as a result of presupposing the equality of all people, one has also to accept that education needs to tolerate external conditions to the extent that individuals must not be forced by such conditions into what is against their nature. Education must never counteract the innate aptitudes of a person but only constrain that which contradicts the idea of the Good.

20.2.  Presupposing the Inequality [of All People with Regard to Both Directions of Education]? Two cases can be distinguished if we presuppose an inequality that precedes all external circumstances and any education[al influence]. Inequality can be innate, based on one’s individuality, but it can also be innate and at the same time a matter of inheritance.29 The substantial difference between these two cases is readily apparent if one considers the following: that the presupposition

“Inherited” here refers not to inherited physiological conditions that might serve as the basis for discrimination and inequality. It instead refers to membership in a distinct social class which would have its own education system and/​or practice.

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of innate but mere individual inequality means that these differences need to be recognized as early as possible. The second presupposition is more pleasing: because if differences are a matter of inheritance, one knows in advance that those from one class or another are predestined by birth to a lower or higher rank. The difficulties in relation to the theory are then eliminated, and a differentiation of those to be educated [as well as] a differentiated education consequently emerge. But a question arises: Can we extract something universally valid from both presuppositions to render them irrelevant within the pedagogical realm? Pedagogy cannot decide based on physiology on either one or the other. If each takes pedagogy on a different path, then this would result in an even greater limitation on the universality of our theory. [This is] because a theory that is based on the presupposition of an innate [individual] inequality that is not inherited could not be valid in a community which accepts the other presupposition. Because we want to develop something general from these particular presuppositions, we now take each on its own terms: 20.2.1. A ssuming That Inequality Is Inherited Looking at history in general, we often find—​in smaller or larger states—​a transition from the assumption of inequality toward the opposite assumption of equality. However, it is always in this direction, not the other. Even though the opposite actually did take place, and inequality arose out of equality, this lies beyond history.30 And it is not a transition from the presupposition of equality to inequality if a small brave tribe that originally lived independently now is searching for another place to live and conquers another tribe because its original lands became too small, or because it was forced to leave these lands.31 This is instead the amalgamation of two [different] inherited inequalities. The presupposition of an inherited inequality is almost always the result of this kind of development—​where two peoples with different rights coalesce. As long as the inherited inequality remains, the organization of the state and education as a whole will also be directed toward this inequality. But sooner or later, a time always comes where this presupposition disappears, and this opposition gradually dissolves. This change will always take place against the

“Individual” and “innate” inequalities, on the other hand, refers to those which arise in ways other than class membership. 30 Schleiermacher is likely referring to the emergence of diversity from unity in the Biblical creation story. 31 Schleiermacher almost certainly has the people or tribes of Israel in mind in this instance.

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will of the ruling tribe. However, if it happens nonetheless, then is it because there is a very strong natural basis [for it]. This also suggests that here, too, a significant power of the mental and spiritual [geistige] principle over nature is to be observed. Through this principle, those in the state who are unequal through inheritance become one. The fundamental unity of this principle triumphs over natural difference. If we consider the difficulties that arise from this process in the state before it becomes whole, and how much destruction of life would occur before such a transformation really takes place, then everyone would agree: It is of the utmost importance to choose a method that would avoid perturbations, and through which the transformation can be gradually achieved without opposition. It can’t be denied that in many states which incorporate clear and substantial differences, there is a great tendency to not only perceive such inequalities as inherited, but also to ensure that established borders are not crossed. This has in many individual cases been so extreme as to result in emphatic prohibitions in teaching: If certain knowledge belongs to one class, it is not taught to the young of another, since it would be of no use. That however means sacrificing the individual to his relation with the state. For the individual person can make many uses of what he has gained through education, even if this knowledge is irrelevant for [his relation to] the state. Wherever this view is prevalent [that the individual must be thus sacrificed,] there is also a strong opposition to the tendency to [encourage the] development of the masses. [The more strongly it is opposed,] the more forcefully the lower classes strive toward this forbidden training of the mind and spirit. But in addition to this, something else appears: If the state presupposes inherited inequality, then this appeals to those who are favored, and they very easily succumb to the delusion that education has little to offer them, and that everything [that is good] results from their inherited excellence. Of course, for the state this means that it has to gather the greatest capacities wherever they can be found. The state thus ends up in a contradiction [in that it still must select those of greatest capacity who might not come from the upper classes]. And this contradiction gives the state and civil life a more or less revolutionary or anarchic character. If this is to be avoided, it all depends on how much space is freed for public education, and how the inequality [described above] is dealt with from the start. If one were to imagine a state that grows together from diverse elements and proceeds according to the idea that inequality should be treated so that it gradually vanishes, then such difficulties would not appear. The solution for [this] great political undertaking lies in nothing more than the proper organization of education, whereas all [that is] revolutionary [lies] in the incorrect organization of

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education. Not only are we again reminded of the enormous political importance of pedagogy, but we also have convinced ourselves that [even] if one is presupposing inherent inequality, it still emerges as a generally valid rule that inequality can be eliminated through the mental and spiritual [geistige] principle, and that it should be eliminated so that revolutionary conditions cannot develop. We will add another consideration: If we were to again adopt the assumption of political inequality, this time from the perspective of the higher classes[, we can also posit] that the desire that brought this state [i.e., the nation] in to existence—​t he desire to subjugate the others—​is a permanent one. In this case, we could still find another way to avoid the [kind of] difficulties [mentioned above], and to prevent the [revolutionary] transformation [also mentioned above]. In this case, the state could endure through the same principle that originally formed it. It would persist by virtue of the same power that enabled it and [that enables] the higher classes to subjugate the lower classes. But in this case, progress would of course be inhibited, because the one part is oppressed, and the oppressed part remains conscious of the fact that it cannot escape this oppression. We want to remain true to the presupposition of inherited inequality and say that there would be actually weaker political power among the lower classes. The greater this difference, the more easily the state of oppression is maintained. The smaller [this difference,] the shorter [it is maintained]. Taking this to an extreme, one part would be completely enslaved, not only without civil, but also individual rights. But then based on all these circumstances—​which result from the assumption of the existence of inherited inequalities in the state—​a contradiction becomes clear. This contradiction is that that if the state, viewed as a whole, is good and capable, then it would be realized [as such] precisely as a whole. This means that something of the essence of the state or its life as a whole will defuse to the lower and lesser elements [within it]. But if this inequality persists, then this [realization of wholeness] would have to be avoided at all costs, and the lower ranks could only be granted personal and at most domestic rights, and they cannot at all enter into political life. This would certainly provide the greatest security [in the maintenance of class inequality]. However, without taking inequalities to this extreme, one cannot hope to maintain such inequality. One would otherwise have to see the state as powerless. We thus see that the idea of treating inherited inequality as receding is one and the same as faith in political power [for all]. Inequality would be sustained only if the lower ranks were not to be influenced at all by the whole.

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20.2.2. A ssuming That Inequality Is Individual and Innate If we proceed from the other [opposite] case, that inequality is merely individually innate, and if we keep in mind that education must counteract neither the natural influence of external circumstances nor the inner power of the individual, but instead bring both into harmony so that the individual becomes what he or she can become: In this case, it would be easy to see that all inequality that prevails in our shared existence cannot be eliminated by education[. This is the case] inasmuch as inequality is the result of individual and innate variation, and inasmuch as it presupposes differences in spiritual and mental [geistige] powers [to begin with]. However, what prevails in the state as a result of enduring inherited inequalities is for education only a kind of external circumstance that should disappear. This [disappearance], however, can only happen through the inner power that also develops in individuals who belong to the lower ranks. In this way, we have moved beyond physiological investigations [of innate differences] into the truth of one presupposition or another. We have truly found something generally valid for all the cases and presuppositions [discussed above], a theorem that takes into account both presuppositions of equality and—​ collectively and individually inherited—​ inequality: Namely that education should support the inner powers that develop within those who are to be educated. Education should grant the external conditions for what results from this development. But it should do this only in acknowledgment of the fact that if these conditions can be regarded as an effect of inherited inequality, they need to be treated as something that should be gradually receding. If we proceed from the fact that the inequality of people with regard to intellectual capacity recedes as soon as the different parts of society come into contact with one another, then the theorem we just proposed is morally necessary, because it would be outrageous to organize education in a way that inequality would be deliberately and forcibly kept at the level at which it now exists. This would represent a constraint on human nature. But whatever stands in the way of the progression of human nature also stands in conflict with the idea of the Good.

21. The Task of Education Insofar as It Must Proceed from Existing Inequality Even if education should strive toward a decrease in inequality—​from which the possibility arises for its complete elimination—​even then education must presuppose existing inequality and must bring its particular methods to bear

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on this inequality. But if there are differences within human nature which cannot immediately be perceived after birth, but become apparent only later, then it follows that these are to be taken into account only when they are manifest. Two alternatives are possible here: On the one hand, one can say that even if inequality cannot be perceived right from the start, it is possible to introduce some principles of probability to be able to immediately take it into account. Then education could be differentiated [among those to be educated] right from the start. On the other hand, one could say that as long as inequality is not perceptible, everyone must be treated the same in education, with differentiations being introduced only when inequality becomes apparent. But which of these two maxims is the right one? It seems that the second has more advantages than the first. This is because the first one is based on the presupposition of an inherited inequality—​or at least of an extended enforcement of persistent inequality whatever its origin. If children from the lower ranks cannot rise to a higher level, then one of two things is obviously presupposed: [That there are] original differentiations, or that the children have to remain on the lower level because the parents have been at a lower level of development for a long time. The second of the two maxims comes closer to the presupposition of a general equality and has a more democratic character in the same way that the first has a more aristocratic one. By comparing these two maxims in this way, however, we still do not view one as clearly superior to the other. If we are in the position where a theory needs to be developed, then the practice of education must already be there. This practice, however, will—​if even unconsciously—​have been based on one or the other presuppositions [i.e., one the two maxims just mentioned]. If now one or the other of these two maxims is discovered [in practice] then one has to proceed from this as much as possible in order to secure the theory through its applicability. But how do things stand with us [as a society]? We are at a middle point between these two maxims. In general, those methods prevail that we have characterized as moving toward greater equality. Almost all of those who are being educated have initially had a more general elementary education, and only later entered into a more specialized one [in keeping with the second maxim, which is to introduce differentiations later in a child’s development]. Even in our own society, however, there is still something perceivable which is based on the opposite maxim [requiring immediate differentiation on the basis of assumed ability]: If we look at the parenting methods of the higher ranks of society, specifically those exercised before the completion of elementary education, we note that they do not typically send their children to

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public elementary schools. These children usually receive their elementary education at home [with a tutor, which might appear as an early or initial differentiation] even though they generally receive the same education in the paternal home as the children of the lower classes in public elementary schools [meaning that the early differentiation implied in the first alternative does not hold]. Is it not the case, however, that an alteration or change can be perceived in comparison with earlier times? It is worth the effort to look back half a century? In those days, it was very unusual that children of the so-​called aristocrats also entered institutions of higher general education. They instead received a higher education separately. These differences are decreasing in our time. Given that education should not constrain anything except that which conflicts with the idea of the Good, we would have to say that it would be in contradiction to what was said above to turn back time and return to the conditions of the past. But this leads to question: Why has progress on this one [of the two alternatives] been limited, and in a sense stood still? This has been caused by the imperfections of our elementary educational institutions, and by the incongruity between these institutions and private education at home. The parents from the higher ranks agree with the principles of elementary education as well as those of instruction at higher levels. But the usual complaint is as follows: that with the large numbers of children in public institutions, immorality dominates, and that the immorality of the domestic life of the lower ranks is brought to the school. Parents of the educated classes do not want their children to pick up these bad manners or the bad habits they presume to be prevalent in those places where large numbers of the youth of all classes are instructed. It is first in this respect that change must take place. To the degree that domestic life will become more moral, and domestic education more careful, public education in general will also improve. To the same degree, immorality will also decrease among the great proportion of children, and there is less to fear regarding the negative influence of immoral [children] on the moral, which means that common elementary education expands. We have thus found more on which we can further build. The dominant situation which we have before us then involves two different levels of education. Having to continue from there, we must see that in the first level of education, unity becomes ever more common and eventually dominates the whole. It is worth asking which of the two maxims [discussed above] would be best to realize. The maxim that [inherent] inequality [that cannot be directly perceived] is to be judged purely on the basis of probability is a predominantly

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empirical one. Even if we would find a formula to determine the method [to judge on the basis of probability], there would be a large number of exceptions, as is the case whenever empirical considerations are involved. The other maxim presupposes equality and attempts to introduce differentiation only when inequality becomes manifest. But is this also not something empirical? The act of differentiation presupposes a judgment over every individual person. But this [judgment] can only be an uncertain one. If we assume two different levels [in the educational process], then there must be a definite transition from the one to the other. If we assume that one level is dominated by an undifferentiated education, then the transition to more specialized education must not occur in an irregular way. Instead, it has to be related to a specific point in time. The uncertainty of the decision would hereby increase. If we were to assume a general period of time, say between the ages of 12 and 14, we would realize that there would be those who are outstanding and others who are delayed. But one can never say with certainty that the former could never be held back or the latter could never experience a spurt of inner [geistige] growth. Moreover, it is difficult to come to a completely certain judgment about those who occupy the middle ground between these [two extremes]. If nevertheless a formula could be found for the second maxim [i.e., for differentiating later in a child’s development]—​to formalize the method—​ this too would suffer from a large number of exceptions, so that even in this regard, both maxims are similar [in that both involve many exceptions]. [We begin by] assuming that education has been organized at two different levels, with elementary education being a more general education, and there being a division at its conclusion. In this case, it is a rather challenging, but also rewarding task to determine the right way to arrive at a most certain judgment by which everyone’s future way of life and sphere of activity is allocated. Once judgment is rendered that someone is suited only for lower life activity, they are usually excluded from all other intellectual activity, and in the case where they are then moved to pursue something higher they will have to overcome endless difficulty in order to succeed. There are sure to be many in the masses who live on a lower level of life because they received this judgment from education, even though they would have been quite capable to take a place in the higher activities of life. They lacked the strength to overcome the barriers and to strive upwards. They have suffered an injustice nonetheless. But the opposite case presents dangers that are no less grave. If the [original] judgment of the educating generation is wrong, one can be guaranteed the privilege of access to higher circles through this judgment and be

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awarded a place through favorable circumstances to which one is not equal. Great damage can arise for the community if someone is does not rise to the position which has been ascribed to him. If the mind and spirit of those placed at higher levels is not educated, those at the lower levels cannot be guided by them. The judgment of the educating generation therefore must be as cautious and certain as possible, and it has to proceed from the clearest premises, so that such errors cannot occur. Now we want to return to a point considered earlier. Just as we obviously are allowed to assume equality or inequality for the universal direction of education, we also can do the same for the individual direction.

22. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Individual Direction [of Education] One can proceed [firstly] from the assumption that individuality can be found to the same degree in all people, which means that there subsists in every person an individual way of being. Then it would only be as a result of unfavorable circumstances if this individuality is not developed. Or [secondly], conversely, it could be said that here also is an inherited inequality, through which some are destined to remain without individuality, merely part of the masses, and that others are destined to the highest development of their individuality, being realized as different characters. Or we could assume [thirdly] a middle point between these two assumptions, that is: there is an originally innate, but not inherited, unevenly distributed individuality. Since we also cannot venture into the realm of the physiological in considering the individual direction [for education], we will take into account only that which has been said in presenting the universal direction with regard to equality and inequality. And we will therefore come to the same results. We will only be able to name the individual direction as a new reason to separate the two levels of education. And since the inequality of people viewed as individuals only develops over time, at the beginning, education would not account for individual aptitudes, but education as a whole would remain general as long as individuality has not been recognized. And only later, another type [of education] would arise, which would preferentially favor the emergence of personal individuality. If education aspires both to the development of individuality—​inasmuch as it is given—​and to the capacity for the greater good of the community, then it is of the utmost importance for the organization of education to determine how both [of these aspirations—​to individuality and community—​] relate to one another: Whether they coincide and are achieved in the same

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way. However, we won’t be able to reach a fruitful decision about this until we have answered a different question.

23.  Is One Allowed to Sacrifice One Moment for Another? Both goals of education [to develop individuality and community] may coincide or [they] may not. [Nevertheless,] every pedagogical influence is a materialization [Ausfüllung] of a moment in the life of the subject to be educated[. At the same time,] this [pedagogical] influence calculates its direction regarding the future, and its value consists in what emerges out of it in the future. On the one hand, this is easily comprehended, since there is no awareness of the state and church in the child at the point where those influences begin. The child therefore cannot desire such a practice that relates only to state, church, and so on. However, the child surely desires in every moment some kind of specific activity in life. In all purely pedagogical moments, though, something is generated that the child does not desire, meaning that every predominantly pedagogical moment would be an inhibiting one. The unmediated consciousness [of the child] is entirely abrogated. The same is the case in relation to the development of the individual nature. Even though individuality isn’t completely absent in any given moment, we still need to differentiate between behavior that is an expression of the personal individuality of the child, and a practice that encourages something to appear that has not yet come into appearance. Also in this relation, the [young] child lives entirely in the present, not for the future, and they therefore cannot participate in this purpose, and cannot have an interest in it for the development of their own individual character. We therefore must deal with a contradiction regarding these two directions. In both cases, the activity of education appears at every single moment in opposition to what the person to be educated can desire. Every pedagogical influence presents itself as the sacrifice of a present moment for a future one; and it raises the question whether we are justified in making this sacrifice. From the start, common sense [das allgemeine Gefühl] refutes this. The clearer it is perceived that the children despise and oppose the education they receive, the more everyone holds this education to be harsh, and disapproves of it. It does not matter whether this opposition becomes more or less apparent. The problem remains. If we consider the matter more theoretically, then it is transformed into an ethical question: Is one permitted to sacrifice one moment of life as a mere means to the end of another moment of life?

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All of our life activity manifests consistent opposition to such a practice [of sacrifice]. For example, the act of nourishment, thought of as an act [of sheer animal ingestion] that fills one moment in time—​and nothing else—​ appears incongruous with human dignity. If one actually sensually enjoys the taste of food and drink, then it is better than being defined by mere ingestion—​a lthough only in comparison to that which is animalistic. Such an act must not exclusively occupy one moment in time; we associate it with conversation and make those moments of ingestion into something that is at the same time social, and this humanizes the process. This example can stand in the place of all others; we only need to consider its diametric opposite. We can, however, emphasize a more immediate aspect. Seen in terms of his or her appearance, the human being is governed by constant change, as is everything that is becoming in time [alles Zeitliche und Werdende]. Strictly speaking, the human is not at any given moment the same as he was in a previous one. Also, the internal activity which becomes apparent is governed by constant change. If we now consider two moments quite separate in time, namely one from childhood, and another from later in life in which self-​ conscious activity is most distinctively manifest, then everyone would admit that the two moments are indeed quite different. If we isolate one of these two moments, then we are confronted with a specific [kind of] human existence. However, this is as such still part of the whole, and is therefore to be supported in our common life through cooperation. In the relationship of the whole to the individual, there is a specific ethical obligation to support every moment in life as such. The more completely the essence of a person is manifest in every moment of life because of this affiliation with a greater, common realm of human life, the more complete life itself becomes. However, [if] one moment is now completely sacrificed for another one in the future, the ethical obligation remains completely unfulfilled. How can we escape from this disharmony? This becomes even more difficult and important if we consider not only one moment, but a great sequence of moments—​t he whole period of education. Among a great number of those to be educated, the intended moments [for the fulfillment of the education] are never realized. This is because the time of education is characterized by the highest level of mortality, making the sacrifice of an early moment for a later one lose any relevance for those who die early.32 One might think it helpful to suggest: Even

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The child mortality rate in the part of Europe that is now Germany was 34% in the early 1800s. This means that in Schleiermacher’s time, more than one in every three children born would die before they reached the age of five. (see: https://​our ​worl​ dind​ata.org/​child-​mortal​ity)

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though children may express opposition—​to whatever degree—​against a pedagogical influence aimed at the future, the time would certainly come when they would consent to it. The assumption is that this later time is privileged and complete, and the positions taken in the incomplete state of childhood are to be ignored. And if one were to suspend the pedagogical influence because of [the child’s] opposition, then the subject [i.e., the child or person themselves] would disapprove in the future, and the educator would be held responsible. This reasoning that is used to justify the sacrifice of the moment would be correct only if the child were also satisfied with substance of the pedagogical influence. However, one can never know this. And for those who do not reach a time when their consent can be given, the whole justification of the practice [of education] disappears. We therefore must consider another way. Proceeding from the justification attempted above, we assume that there will be a point and time in the future when the child will consent to pedagogical practice. However, does this time come only when one uses that which has been stimulated through pedagogical influence in one’s job or profession? We must not limit ourselves to this. To live in the present moment is only the province of the tenderest childhood. Remembrance of the past and anticipation of the future develop gradually in the same way. The time for [the child’s] endorsement [of the pedagogical influence] is therefore given to arrive. By the time the future reveals itself to the child in a particular way, and the child is able to realize what he or she has to achieve in the future and starts to aspire to it, the child will also desire that education will take the future into account. Presuming that education takes the right path, we would therefore have to say that it will struggle with this opposition primarily at the beginning. The closer it comes to its endpoint, the more education withdraws from any opposition, and at the end, there will be no opposition for it to overcome. If education follows the right path, opposition appears to dissolve and disappear. But our earlier observation [about the ethical obligation of education] is not eliminated. Because even this initial opposition [of the child] is not a state that can be sanctioned from an ethical point of view. From what has already been said, we only must gather that the corrective which we require and search out will be something that itself also dissolves and disappears. However, we cannot state at this point that in education as such, the relation to the future can be neglected in any way, since it is truly the nature of the pedagogical influence to be oriented toward the future. Inasmuch as we may want to weaken this orientation, we would eliminate the pedagogical influence as such.

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The only way we can eliminate the contradiction is to decide the matter from an ethical perspective: That life activity, which has its relation to the future, must at the same time find satisfaction in the present; in the same way, every pedagogical moment that, as such, is related to the future has to provide satisfaction for the individual as he or she is [in the moment]. The more these two interpenetrate, the more ethically perfect the pedagogical activity becomes. And the less one is sacrificed for the other, the more both moments are able to merge together. If we were to say that pedagogical activity has to be strictly enforced with the most recalcitrant child—​so that the child would have to abandon his or her satisfaction in the present moment for the sake of the future—​t hen education as an ethical activity would be imperfect and morally damaging. If on the other hand, we were to say that in order for the pedagogical influence to be exercised morally without being damaging, pedagogical activity would have to be diminished to the point where satisfaction is granted in the moment. But in this case, we just would have displaced the difficulty and contradiction elsewhere. Or in other words: we would have asserted that for pedagogical activity to be morally perfect, it must be technically imperfect [i.e., without influence]. It is therefore [our] task [to achieve] such a unification in which no sacrifice occurs. But this only seems possible when on the one hand, we establish a relation to the future in a way that the moment is utterly and completely satisfying for the child. And as long as the approval to take into account the future moment cannot yet be given because of the child’s limited consciousness of the future, we would realize this [unification] by avoiding everything that—​which because it does not intrude into the moment—​could excite the opposition of the child. If on the other hand the child gives his or her agreement or consent, and no opposition to taking the future into account has to be taken into consideration, we recognize the satisfaction of the moment in this act of agreement itself. In this case, the life of the child, even when it is interrupted in a period of education, is one that is ethically treated as an end [in itself], and the pedagogical influence is the satisfaction of their very way of being [Dasein]. Either the satisfaction lies directly in the moment or in the agreement. All of education is a series of such moments of satisfaction, with anyone giving way to the next. But we cannot be silent about the fact that the formula we have just presented appears to suffer from an internal contradiction that must be eliminated. We can think of the time in which the child is already aware of the future, though in a way that they cannot take on fully but [that] sets their trust in those who are providing guidance: in this way, an intimation of the goal arises in the child. Pedagogical practice would actually not require

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anything more of that which appears as the mere satisfaction of the moment; the pedagogical influence itself offers satisfaction through the way the future is found in the spirit [Seele] of the child. The most immediate satisfaction of the moment through the present itself occurs when the pedagogical influence is interrupted. For the life of the child does not consist [only] of numerous moments [of education, i.e., ones] in which the pedagogical influence dominates. But such [non-​pedagogical] moments are not part of our investigation. If now in opposition to the moment in life we [just] consider[ed], we look at an earlier moment in which the future is not yet found in the child, then we cannot assume that satisfaction is provided through the pedagogical content of the moment. The satisfaction of one’s entire life activity, as it is directly related to the [present] instant [den Augenblick] in time will be the main focus without taking the future into account. According to this, we do indeed have two different periods in this connection [in how the child views the future]. Moreover, we cannot overlook [the fact] that there isn’t a clear and distinct moment in which the future also enters into consciousness. It seems therefore as if we would need two different formulae. The first would consist of two parts/​aspects: This moment is realized in terms of what offers satisfaction as a preparation for the future and of what offers satisfaction in the present. The second [formula] would only have one part or aspect: The moment is realized [only] as the satisfaction of the present. Nevertheless, education should be whole and complete, and every moment, inasmuch as it can be isolated, should be accounted for by the same formula. Moreover, if we consider that these two periods in life [as described above] are not distinctly separated, then, in relation to the fulfillment of our task, one and only one formula with the same content is to be postulated. How can we now arrive at a solution? The relationship between the first beginnings and the further development of education, where there is the assent of the child for the future, necessarily becomes one that, in the progression of education, is severed: [It is separated] into a practice that is oriented to the future and to the immediate satisfaction of the present. [This separation] is not present at the beginning of education, but [the two moments are] inextricable. The separation of these two moments happens gradually. It is a continuous development and presents itself completely when the consent of the child to take the future into account is given. Whether a specific gradation has to be assumed here, or whether education, like life itself, represents a gradual transition, has yet to be addressed. Here, we first have to achieve some clarity about this in itself. We call “play” or a “game” in the broadest sense that which, in the life of the child, offers satisfaction in the very moment without regard to the future. On the other

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hand, [we call] “exercise” the activity directed toward the future. If therefore education were to be consistent with the moral goal, our theorem must be as follows: In the beginning, exercise [has to be present] exclusively in play. However, gradually both [play and exercise] become separate to the degree to which the child develops an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is. The latter we have referred to above as the consent of the child. We also find this theorem implied in the language of the ancients. It is but one and the same word that refers either to exercises which indicate something playful or to those which hint at something more serious. Music and some physical activity [μουσική, γυμναστική] are both: playful and serious exercises, a light exercise of playing and a serious undertaking. In this way and from this perspective, we would have then liberated education from any contradiction and have made it consonant with the common moral obligation. Furthermore, the child would be treated as human in every single moment. However, it remains to be asked whether our solution—​that in the beginning, exercise has to be present exclusively in the play—​is actually possible. This question can be answered as follows: First, everything that we would refer to with the expression “play” or “game,” inasmuch it is an activity, can only be an activity consisting of one specific practice or of several related and therefore united practices. Because of that, play activities are already exercises in themselves as it is a law of all human activities that every activity becomes easier through repetition. From what has become easier, one proceeds to something difficult. Imagining play to be in this way progressive, it appears at the same time to always be an exercise. Second, every human capacity is something that develops over time. And the human consciousness is complete only if it is of the same character [i.e., developing over time] and also expresses this. If one is conscious of one’s development, this is the simultaneous satisfaction of both the present and future. In fact, the human begins in a state of non-​consciousness, and the first occurrences of consciousness are fleeting moments. However, as soon as this imperfect form disappears and moments begin to connect with each other, a certain form of comparison of these more or less connected moments will have to emerge as well. [Further] consciousness has to follow, too, and growing out of this will be a consciousness of human capacities as being under development. Inasmuch therefore as play in its design is exercise as well, it is nothing but the complete satisfaction of the consciousness of the child in the present, because while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities. Before we now develop our theory further, we still have to ask:

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24. To What Extent Do All the Different Pedagogical Influences Form a Unity? Or to what extent they contain in themselves a specific reason for division and diversification? This question can be answered from different perspectives. The perspective that lends itself most naturally is the anthropological one. However, here this is the easiest one to be dismissed as the answer is self-​evident. The pedagogical influence is directed toward the whole life of the child. Like life itself, it therefore constitutes a unity, which decomposes into a plurality of functions which are related to each other and which are all objects of pedagogical activity. This now appears to provide the basis for the functional division of the whole [pedagogical] operation. The relation of all those different functions to life as a whole—​inasmuch they are the object of the pedagogical influence—​needs to be demonstrated. This, however, can be only done later. Another perspective is to ask whether the pedagogical influence constitutes a unity or whether it is differentiated in relation to the diverse additional external factors that exert an influence on the child, and whose diversity should therefore also govern the part of the child’s life which is controlled by education? Earlier, I have referred to the notions of co-​influence and support with regard to the character of the pedagogical influence, and, in opposition, I have also referred to counteraction.33 This is now the place to take up and answer the question whether or not there [actually] are such different influencing activities. Because if this really is the case, then we would be confronted with two different pedagogical activities with opposing characteristics. If this [specific] difference in activities had no foundation, then we wouldn’t have any reason for such a general distinction. If we were to imagine a person being immersed in human society from birth without there being an intentional and consistent influence upon him or her, then this person would be, in a chaotic way, at the mercy of the momentary impressions. Those affecting the mind of this child are in this case oblivious to any specific principles. And no answer could possibly be given to the question of what the result of such influences would be. [But] if the people in whose environment the individual is in this way exposed (to all impressions) have reached a certain level of intellectual and

33

See (p. 45), above: “Nevertheless, we have to say that passivity [on the part of education or the educator] is never pure, and that there is always a co-​or counterinfluence, and self-​activity is never excluded from this.”

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moral development, then even without pedagogical activity, a result would emerge that is better than one [alternative: an outcome] produced by a pedagogical influence that always has to struggle to counteract the influence of an immoral and mis-​educative environment on the child. One difference lies within the domain of practical skills. These would be neglected if there were no pedagogically guided exercise or practicing. An instructional regime would be needed to achieve proficiency in those skills. It is for this reason that the development of skills is often regarded as the sole purpose of education. However, if a person led a completely unregulated life, he or she would develop certain inclinations gradually over time since the[ir] intellectual aptitudes would also not be restrained. And if they strengthened to a certain degree, the person him or herself would establish and engage in a regime of exercises. [The person would establish] a connection with those functions that he or she particularly wants to develop—​a nd in this way, develop sets of skills. We call this [activity] auto-​d idactical. The main difference would be that where specific aptitudes in a person can be found such [aptitudes] would evolve even without education. However, this development would take place later than in those cases where there are pedagogical influences. And only those who are missing such aptitudes would fall behind. If we were however to assume that the environment does not represent such a high level of development [one in which desired results can emerge even without a pedagogical influence], then no one would deny that influence in a pedagogical sense is necessary. Without such an influence, no satisfying result could be achieved. The younger generation would mirror the moral imperfection of the older one, and [its own] imperfection would enter as the result of such imitation. The human being always begins with imitation, and it is only to the degree that independence is achieved, that imitation finds a counterweight in self-​determination. But before this moment had been reached, imitation would generate results that would be very difficult to overcome by one’s own efforts. From this, we can at least gather that many different perspectives on the undertaking of education are possible. If one were to assume that education in the actual sense would be unnecessary where the community is developed to a higher and more reflected level, then one would be forced to say that education is necessary only where a lower level [of development] engenders something equally low. Education would then consist solely in counteracting, and the only duty it would have is to counteract the immoral and to compensate for the detrimental influences of the environment. Everything else would develop on its own.

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The other perspective is as follows: If one were to assume that even under the most favorable circumstances a great disadvantage prevails if there is no intentional influencing, and that every progress is dependent upon exercise, then we are confronted with a second set of pedagogical activities. Because if the notion of exercise is considered in its full breadth, then one would [have to] readily admit that it refers not only to the technical field [of skills and abilities] in the narrow sense. [Rather, the notion of exercise] applies to the entire realm of free activity that can be enhanced through it. By its nature, self-​consciousness is something that both evolves and as such gains visibility by living together. In considering this, one also has to admit that such development can be externally constrained or supported. One can thus advance [two] contradictory cases. Education can be devoid of any counteractivity if it offers the highest degree of support for the self-​ development of that which is to be considered the core [Seele] of human nature. However, education can also be presented as purely counteractive. Both presuppositions [of exclusive support and exclusive counteraction] are not based on the practical realities of education but on its ethos. We contrast them [practicalities and ethos] in the following way: From one perspective we act according to the maxim that education should and must be nothing but the awakening and the support of the Good in preparation for the [child’s] entry to larger circles of life and moral engagement and for the development of personal characteristics. The suppression of Evil would then be a natural effect of this. From the other perspective we [should] act according to the maxim that education should and must be nothing but counteracting, understood as the suppression of Evil. The seeds for the Good in its universal and individual character are contained in the human him-​or herself, and they would certainly grow if only education was comprehensively counteracting that which is objectionable. What is this actual difference separating these two maxims? One seems to be based on the assumption that Evil is innate; the other assumes the Good is innate. Because the idea that the suppression of Evil is the natural result of evoking the Good would obviously presuppose that Evil was emerging only secondarily. And on the contrary, the idea that the Good would emerge by itself if Evil were suppressed presupposes that there already exists a natural tendency toward Evil and toward the acceptance of perversions, and that in order to suppress them one would need to oppose those tendencies. We cannot engage those theories in and of themselves and cannot answer the question about the innateness of Good or Evil. We do, however, consider both those maxims purely with regard to what they can achieve for pedagogy.

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Pedagogical activity then relates in a special way to what is innate in the child and to what is influencing the child from outside. In the beginning, we cannot discriminate between these, and they diverge only gradually. Only later does the personality of the child become relevant as a factor in itself—​ one that clearly differentiates itself from that external influence which would claim to be pedagogical. If this happens, however, the difference is already in play. In our field, therefore, any basis for deciding to support one or the other theory is lacking. There may be some who support one presupposition, and others supporting the other. Nothing further can be derived at this point, except that education needs to be composed of positive activities—​activities which co-​influence and support what emerges from the inside and what penetrates from the outside. But [this composition] also [includes] counteraction against obstacles, whether they be innate or emerge later. However, another difficulty arises. If we were to assume that both kinds of activities—​supporting and constraining—​are two very distinct elements and moments of education, we would end up being completely perplexed because in every given moment one could do either one or the other. And if we don’t find a rule for choosing between one and the other in a specific moment, theory gives way to pure arbitrariness. Still, we do have to accept this combination as it is the nature of education to be a combination of both activities: Supporting and counteracting must be merged. We must see each on its own as insufficient. Nevertheless, we must define a specific relation between both and discover a rule for deciding, which one needs to prevail in any given moment. That is the main problem we must solve. And the solution can only be a theoretical one.

25.  How Do Supporting and Counteracting Relate to One Another? Let us start with some general remarks. If many courses of action are possible, it is not an obligation restricted to pedagogy alone but a general ethical task to determine which is the right one. The moral obligation of all humans also breaks down into manifold parts and activities in every moment of life I can do either one thing or another. And it is ethics that must decide the right thing [to do] in every moment. We therefore now must adopt here a theorem from ethics. Common moral activity has its origin in the human will. Perceived as the actual moral drive toward morality, [this drive] aims at the totality of all morality and not at something particular. However, if an action should arise, it happens based on something in particular. We arrive at a specific action by

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relating this general will to something specific. The general will must adopt a certain direction, and this is achieved by a certain stimulation, a summons and request which appears to be external, in opposition to the most inward power of the will. Every action is therefore shaped by two different factors—​ an inner and an outer.34 If we adopt this [theorem] for our field, then we have arrived at a general decision with respect to all the particular cases in pedagogy. We admitted that pedagogy is always confronted with something already in the child. That with which pedagogy is confronted is, both in general and regarding the particular moment, the external summons or prompt. If we contemplate this in relation to the whole life course—​that is, as something temporal, as a becoming—​then we have to admit that whatever the child becomes (notwithstanding its education in every moment) also consists of two factors: the internal [and innate] life force and that which exerts influence from the outside. This is what is given and to which education relates. However, whenever one is confronted by a particular duality in a realm that is characterized by temporality, achieving an absolute equilibrium is impossible[. Consequently,] education will thus sometimes need to take into account more the internally driven activity of the child, and other times the influence that is or has been exerted on it from outside. Because Good and Evil can result from innate activity as much as from external influence, we have to presuppose it to be possible that innate activity or innate development contains a demand for an influence that is at times supporting, at others, constraining. And in the same way regarding an external influence on the child, [types of] pedagogical activity that are sometimes supporting, sometimes constraining will be required. In theory, however, we now have nothing more to do than to introduce both counteracting and supporting pedagogical activities and to substantiate their mutual interrelationship; we then have to leave it to life itself to decide what should be done from moment to moment. Theory works only in the same way as a reflective awareness [besonnene Bewußtsein35] does for practice. Since when something is done with a truly reflective awareness in life, the full complexity of the task at hand is taken into consideration—​and not just the necessity of the moment. This difficulty—​arising not only from this contradiction but from all similar contradictions—​would therefore be solved by stating that what needs

Compare with: Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2002). Lectures on philosophical ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 169. 35 This is the German term used to translate the Greek Sophrosyne (σωφροσύνη), meaning prudence, discretion, moderation (see Plato’s Charmides). 34

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to be done in every single moment, [whether] support or counteraction, depends on the challenge that the specific moment brings. Earlier, we developed a different opposition and established for pedagogy the dual obligation of delivering the child to the larger community of life as a perfectly capable and independent agent on one hand [i.e., education’s universal direction], and on the other hand of developing their individual characteristics [i.e., education’s individual direction]. We reconciled this opposition by establishing that one side must be part of the other one, and that every pedagogical activity [needs to achieve] both at the same time—​only in different respects. But it is without a doubt important [first] to know: How do the two forms of a pedagogical activity—​ supporting and counteracting—​relate to the two obligations of the universal direction and the individual direction of education? We have to presuppose that Evil is not an innate part of one’s individual character. Within this [character], there cannot be anything in and for itself that would make counteraction necessary. We have already been working to establish this from another perspective. If we were to assume the opposite, we would need to suppose a different primordial relation of all humans to Good and Evil. Our awareness bridles at this, since this opposition [of Good and Evil] is as universal as the notion of human nature. Everybody’s natural inclination toward singularity [in their] existence does not require any counteraction; instead, it demands only supportive activity. Education would be allowed to counteract only that which is constraining the development of individual singularity. In contrast, in the other realm, where education educates for the larger community of life, a two-​sidedness [i.e., simultaneous support and counteraction] is prevalent—​w ith a specific emphasis on counteraction. Everywhere in larger communities, we find institutions which embrace counteraction against that which is evil even with regard to those who are otherwise not being educated. The reason that the state must introduce penal laws is because the individuals delivered to it are insufficiently capable [to meet the state’s expectations]. The same is true with regard to the church and everything that should evoke repentance and atonement, just as in shared social life we find common principles of praise and censure, approval and disapproval. Every single disapproval that an individual must suffer refers back to the time of education when everything that might later turn out to be troubling had to be counteracted. Education therefore must exercise this counteractivity so that it is not then the law that restrains the young person when they become part of [common social] life. It is in this [common social] realm, and not the other [individual] realm of education, in which the most counteraction is to be found.

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We now need to undertake another comparison similar [to the one above, comparing support and interaction and the universal and individual directions of education]. We have developed above the opposition of momentary satisfaction and this [present] moment’s relation to the future. And in respect to these two elements we [now] ask how the two forms of education—​counteracting and supporting—​stand in relation to the sacrifice of moment[ary satisfaction]. We stated that at the beginning of education, the satisfaction of the moment and its relation to the future are one and the same. The closer education comes to its endpoint, the more this identity disappears and both—​ the immediate satisfaction of the moment and that which is oriented to the future—​d iverge. In this regard, counteraction is obviously only possible where the efficacy of the formula [represented by the division of the pedagogical influence into support and constraint] appears to be constraint. If therefore the satisfaction of the moment and the future orientation for the child are in contradiction—​ [even] to the degree that one may be sacrificed for the other—​education needs to present itself as counteraction. If both sides diverge [rather than conflict], there is no reason for counteraction.

26. How Do the Two Forms of Education [Support and Counteraction] Relate to the Other Factors That [Externally] Influence the Child? We presupposed that besides education, there are many influences upon the child that partially agree with and partially counteract education itself. It is also certain that whatever cannot be achieved through education has to be left to those external influences. The influences, which for example originate in the natural environment, can however only affect the actual corporeality inasmuch as it is animalistic. In this regard, it is not the difference between Good and Evil but between the harmful and the beneficial that is relevant. Let us put this aside for now, however. We will [instead] consider only those influences originating from human society and coming from individuals. Individuals are members of the larger communities of life. Insofar as they are members, they also are representatives of these [communities]. If, however, the moral realms to which they belong were perfectly formed from a moral point of view, and if the individuals were influencing the younger generation entirely in the spirit and purpose of the[ir] communities, then education would not have to counteract anything—​except that which originates within the child him-​or herself, and which opposes this education. However,

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everybody readily agrees that if all influences originating from external circumstances were perfect, there would also not be the need for any counteraction regarding the inner development of the child, since the individual is nothing but an infinitely small part in relation to the whole, and [under perfect conditions] the smaller is overwhelmed by the larger even without special provisions. Indeed, we cannot find such presupposed perfection in our lives, given that human life is a mere approximation of it [such perfection]. But what we can infer from this premise is that the more perfect the organization of the larger communities of life are, and the greater the harmony is between the whole and its individual members, the less education needs to exercise any counteractivity, and vice versa [i.e., the less counteractivity is needed in education, the more perfect society will be]. Our task and the general state of those moral realms of life are therefore closely connected to each other. To the extent to which counteracting decreases due to the perfection of the community, the more education takes the form of support. Moreover: The greater the perfection of the general state, the less it is necessary that support is intentional and planned, because between large and morally perfect communities of life, i.e., between church, state, communal life, and domains of knowledge, there must be a harmony; all share the same morality. Presupposing that such a state exists, then the influence upon the younger generation would be nothing but the emanation of this morality—​one that can persist without theory and method. The influence would be the interaction of the older generation with the younger one in accordance with the idea of morality. The perfection of this human community rests upon two moments: First, on the perfection of the form [of the community itself], of the national constitution [and] institutions; and second, on the appropriate relation of the individual to the whole. The more those two are in balance, the more perfect the general state [of affairs becomes]. Under the condition of absolute perfection, education as a specific activity for which there is a theory could cease to exist. If, however, we were to descend from this highest point of perfection, a lack of balance between these two moments [i.e., perfection of form and relation of individual and whole] would soon become manifest and education would again become necessary. Now, in what relation do the two forms of education stand to the two moments? The less the individuals relate to the whole in an appropriate way, that is, the greater the discrepancy between individuals and the idea of the whole becomes, the more counteraction is needed. And the more the general state lacks in perfection, the more necessary it becomes for the younger generation to be equipped with something the mass of the people is lacking for

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the general state to gain in perfection. This, however, will be part of the side [of education] that provides support.

27.  W ho Should Educate? Given that we must [first] search for and identify various relations that need to be taken into consideration regarding education, and that we then have [yet] to determine how education is to be organized appropriately regarding those relations, we now face a new difficulty: If we are stating that the imperfect relation between individuals and the whole makes education necessary as a form of planned counteraction, then the question arises: From whom should this counteraction come? We would need to assume that within every [older] generation, there is a group of people who do not manifest this discrepancy [between self and whole]. It is these people who should undertake education because only they can exercise counteraction [in a way] that is appropriate. But what if [we take up the other possibility of education as support, i.e., if] we assume that guidance consists in supporting the inner [geistige] activity so that which leads to the improvement of institutions is implanted in youth? Who then should undertake education? In this case, too, there would need to be a select few in the [older] generation who could envision something that is better but not yet achieved. And it is these chosen few who would have to educate. The first group of people who should teach would be distinguished by their willpower inasmuch they don’t stand in divergence from [i.e., in imperfect relation to] the whole. The second group [whose relation to the whole is not perfect, but who can envision something better] would be distinguished by their knowledge. For the present, we can assume that where one [i.e., either willpower or vision] exists to the highest degree, the other is not completely absent. If a two-​sided education is necessary because neither the organization of the whole nor the relation of the individuals to the whole is perfect, then this becomes possible only under the presupposition of [the existence of either] group [of these] distinct [kinds] of people. It can, however, be taken for granted that those who will be selected can only come from the educated and not from the brute and uneducated. But who should recognize the excellent ones? Whoever recognizes them in fact already undertakes educative activity. Who, then, should educate? The human individual is born into a family, and his physical existence necessarily requires support and counteraction against all that which is disadvantageous for their tender life right from the start. This [support and

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counteraction] is provided by the parents, primarily the mother, and secondarily the father. Therefore, it is here that the beginning of all education lies, and it seems to be natural that wherever education begins, it also continues. Education originally belongs to the household, and therefore it is the parents who guide the whole process. That is everything if matters are considered in and of themselves. But in order to go beyond too narrow a perspective, however, we also now want to assume that the family is part of human association, of a civil society, and of a religious community. From this perspective, a view that completely contradicts what has been said above could be developed. Even if the future generation belongs to the family as originating from within it, the state still could argue that this generation is born for the state, and that it therefore is the state that has to determine if and to what extent parents should be granted leadership in education. If there now is a division between the individuals and the idea of the whole, the parents themselves could be trapped within this division. In this case, they would be unable to exercise the necessary counteraction. The state could allow the parents to take part in education only to the extent to which they are free from this division [between individual and state, and to the degree that they] able to recognize that which is better. The same would be true with regard to the religious community, and it is only the general human association [i.e., the sphere of communal life] as the least ordered form of sociality that would have no expectation other than that the youth should become part of this human association as soon as possible. How should we now balance these different expectations? Let us consider the [two opposed] one-​sided measures. At first, we can assume that the state and the church withdraw [from educating] and leave education to the parents as their [institutional] demands contradict those of the parents and cannot be reconciled with them. State and church therefore abstain from doing their utmost, with the state only counteracting, through [its] laws, those deficits that result from a flawed education. If now there is a separation of the educated from the uneducated, and also of the pious and the impious, it would be most certain that the latter, the uneducated and impious, would spoil education, even if the former would benefit from it. The discrepancy would grow even bigger. Secondly, the opposite one-​sided position can most advantageously be taken up from the side of the state—​ since a [similar] scenario regarding the church would be self-​explanatory. If education is left to individual families, some of them would comply with this duty, others not at all. Even if it were possible to be certain from

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the outset about which would provide a good education and which not, it still is impossible to leave the children of the former in the education of their families, and to deliver the others to the education of the state. Such a division would unsettle the general state of things. To prevent that, the state would also need to withdraw the right to the education of the children from the first group. In this case, it would be the best to hand over the children to the state right after their birth, as Plato suggests in his Republic. Then the specific interest of parents in [their] children would also disappear as there wouldn’t be a household anymore. The connection of men and women would be only a temporary one, governed by the law of the state. A central element of human life would be lost, and morality would be counteracted in the most substantial way. We therefore cannot be consoled by either of [these] two extremes. They must be bound together. We recognized something earlier from which we can now take counsel: Even if education represents a whole from beginning to end, it still is naturally separated into two periods. The physical care that starts with the beginning of life [and] that is by nature in the hands of the parents, continues throughout the first period and decreases only gradually. In the first period, education belongs to the household. In the second period, a new task arises, and needs become prevalent which require support. Parents alone cannot undertake the task and meet all [of] the[se] needs. At this point, the state takes on its role in education and offers the necessary support. At a minimum, the state has to appoint those who will fulfill their task in supporting parents, or, at a maximum, to totally relieve parents of the task of education in the second period. Notwithstanding occasional modifications, our general state of affairs is founded upon a balance [of these two possibilities]. There is no sharp line between those two periods, and in the same way there is neither a predetermined degree to which the public [education] influences private education in the first period, nor a specific degree to which the parents influence public education [in the second]. If we were to arrive at a decision about this, then [our] task would be to contemplate public life and to consider different forms of state and household. This, however, would be a political matter, which is very necessary and important, but would lead us beyond the limits we set [for our discussion here]. I cannot see any solution other than to end our discussion at this point and to say that we have to connect our theory of education with currently existing forms [of education]. The continued development of the theory will eventually shed more light on this uncertain point. However, before we can present the theory in its general maxims, we still have to consider an important question:

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28. If and to What Extent Is Education the Same for Both Sexes? If we were wanting to give an answer to this question even in only a general sense, we again have to take into account the twofold purpose of education: to develop the capacity to live in larger social communities as well as to develop personal individuality. Regarding the latter, there is no great difference between the two sexes,36 so that the principles one follows to develop male individuality are also applicable to the female. Even if the difference between the natures of the sexes were so profound that differences could also be inferred for personal individuality, the general maxims for the treatment of this individuality would have to remain the same. With regard to the former, the capacity for public life, matters present themselves very differently. Females seem not to be involved in public matters; it seems they are less interested in such affairs. Regarding the church, it seems to be the general opinion that women’s religiosity is stronger than that of men, but in the contemporary state of culture, almost all religious communities follow mulier taceat in ecclesia [Women should remain silent in the churches; 1 Corinthians 14:34]. For general public life, nothing more specific can be determined without adopting a certain perspective regarding space and time [from which] one can see the greatest differences. There are communities and states within which females are excluded from public life as much as from direct participation in general governmental and clerical affairs. However, in others one can find women dominating public life, to the degree that they retreat from the other two [governmental and ecclesiastical affairs]. Even though the final decision as to which way is generally the best lies outside of our field of discussion, we still must not leave those matters completely unsettled. Since education and the state of public life are continuously influencing each other, if the relation of females to the public life were completely undetermined, we would lack a measure to determine the maxims for female education. Let us try to approach this point from a different angle. If we assumed that difference in the sexes are absolutely fundamental, we would have to distinguish between their corporeal and mental sides. With regard to the corporeal side, the difference is manifest at birth and even before, although the functions which are specific for those features become apparent only later. The mental [geistige] difference which cannot be denied no matter how much education attempts to eliminate it, is [something] also given right from the

We deliberately use the term “sexes” in a somewhat antiquated sense here.

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beginning but [that] becomes manifest only gradually. As long as it has not yet become manifest but can be only inferred from the differences in bodily appearance, education does not actually relate to it. We can therefore say that during a specific period of life, the difference between the sexes does not present itself in such a way that education has to become something different for either. There is a period during which education can be the same for both sexes. This is, however, not to be taken as absolute. Even if we earlier ignored actual physical education, the more we consider its application, the more we have to take into account the corporeal side of education. If then there is a corporeal difference between the sexes, and if physical education has to relate to this difference, then those differences have to be accounted for in the actual treatment of the children, even in the earliest period of education. We therefore limit the scope of our assumption that this earliest education has to be the same for both sexes, inasmuch as we say that the more it focuses upon the corporeal, [the more] it ceases to be common [to both of the sexes]. What is the basis for this difference, and to what degree is the education of the female different from that of the male? The female sex is hardly present in the public life of the state. However, the household is the original organic element of the state and its necessary foundation; the state itself is nothing more than an aggregation of households. The welfare of the state depends on domestic life. If we now say that the value of women with regard to the civic life is limited to their domestic activities, the interest of the state in them is not abolished as a result. They do not stand out within the state, but the same is true for a large number of men who have an occupation. The difference of the sexes can be subsumed under the difference of their occupations. The female sex has a specific occupation within the state. The withdrawal [of women from the public life of the state] is therefore restricted to the state having no interest in initiating a course of development among females necessary for those destined to become leaders in the state. The same can be said regarding the church community. Because what is necessary for the specifically female occupation cannot be addressed in the first period of life, it cannot generally be stated that female education must different even in that period where those who are suited for a higher education are not yet separated from the others. Since we need to distinguish education of the same type from education that is joint [i.e., co-​ed] what has been said above about education being not of a different type [for the different sexes] does not imply that it is necessarily one of both [sexes] together. We can add to this. Inasmuch as the woman plays an important pedagogical role in the household, and at the beginning even dominates in providing

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education, this has to be considered to be a leadership activity in relation to the whole [state;] it is of even greater importance in that the beginning of all education, which lies completely in the hands of the mother, is a correct one. So far, we have discriminated between two levels of education [a period of joint education and a period where the sexes are separated, which at the same time means a distinction between a general education and higher education] and at the same time[, we have] assumed every demarcation between the two to be completely arbitrary. If this is the case, then we have to presuppose that there will be many occasions when pedagogical elements which would actually belong to the latter period of higher education occur in part in that period in which there is not yet a distinction between the two groups. If now education is not only one of the same type but is also a joint education for both sexes, then it will be impossible to prevent females from becoming acquainted with these elements. If, however, education is not shared in this way, then all those elements which belong to the higher level of education will be absent [from female education]. However, indications of and connections to the higher level always become manifest already in the first period. Since in the first period [of education] leadership falls predominantly to women, and since therefore mothers have at least to be aware of these connections, it would be desirable that females come in contact with that which is particular to this higher education. If we further assume that everything academic belongs in the second period, whereas the preliminary preparations for this already take place in the first, we will have no reason to exclude women from those preliminary exercises. In this way, differences are gradually minimized. Finally, we have to ask: Is the retreat of the female sex from civic life something essential and natural, or is it contingent and arbitrary? It is not easy to answer this question. The view which contradicts our own custom and constitution finds its eloquent defenders not only just now, but right from the start. But this question lies beyond the scope of our discussion. However, since we have already approached the answer that emerges by assuming the opposite, we cannot really refrain from attempting to find a solution. We must consider two important phenomena. The first has its basis in nature, the determination of the female sex regarding procreation. Pregnancy, birth, and the initial nourishing [of the baby] make it necessary to abstain partially from participation in public life. In this way, the public life of females is restricted by nature to some extent. The second phenomenon is historical. If we look back at the gradual development of the human species, we find in the earliest cultural development that the female is repressed almost to the point of complete servitude. In contrast to this, wherever higher education found its way [into the

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culture], such inequality decreases. As long as culture keeps developing, we have to assume it to be natural and necessary that inequality decreases and the absence of females [from public life] gradually ceases to exist. We cannot set any necessary demarcation other than the one nature sets itself. For that reason, the variety of relations of women to public life must be considered a result partially of national custom and partially of the different states of education. What is the result from all of this? A very vague one. Only one thing is certain: There will be a period of education in which the difference between the sexes does not have to be taken into account—​only insofar as it is incumbent on corporeal differences. And, furthermore, that different levels and grades can be envisioned for the participation of the women in that which supports the development of the men. Our theory thus must relate to the current state of affairs—​but in a way that it either counteracts what is currently not in accordance with the idea of morality or supports that which is. Regarding the higher level of education, consequently, the following question has to be considered: How is female education to be arranged so that on one hand nothing is attempted which is inhibited by the natural predetermination of women, and on the other hand, that females are aided as much as necessary for the improvement of their situation and of their influence on the future generation. [This has to be done] so that if it were the nature of things that inequality decreases over time, education does not stand in its way. Beyond this, we cannot venture further using only general terms. As education is one [i.e., forms a unity] from its beginning to its end, we would have to present numerous futile repetitions if we were now to consider its different periods and gradations. To circumvent this, we will present [in the sections that follow] all those general maxims which are valid for all periods and each level at the start. Then we will continue by differentiating education by individual periods and explore these in sequence.

Interpretations and Discussion

1.  Schleiermacher’s Pedagogy: A Thematic Commentary M ichael Wink ler , F r iedr ich-​S chiller-​University, Jena

Abstract This thematic commentary covers the principal aspects of Schleiermacher’s 1826 lectures on education, highlighting their relevance today—​a ll while making use of a newly published transcript of this event. It traces how Schleiermacher developed a particular reflective mode of inquiry independently from any examination of education at the turn of the century, and how he brought this to bear on education in his lectures on this subject starting in 1813—​a nd ending with his most fully developed lectures from 1826. This chapter gives special consideration to how Schleiermacher’s lectures worked to establish education as a discipline—​specifically in terms that are historical, that position education in relation to other disciplines (above all, religion and ethics), and that emphasize its integrity as a theory. In this context, this chapter emphasizes the inextricable interdependence of pedagogy and both social and individual factors, meaning that the opportunities for the thoroughgoing change and reform of education are structurally limited. As the chapter concludes, education must constantly engage and re-​engage its “basic problem:” “that education has to do with human beings who are already developing themselves and on whom influence has to be exerted in a justified way.”

Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy have a special place in the history of thinking about education in the broadest sense of the term. It is not an exaggeration to see them as epochal, at least as far as Schleiermacher’s methodical analytical approach and system of thought are concerned, even though they were for a long time largely forgotten (Oelkers 1979, p. 78). They are therefore of fundamental importance for pedagogy,1 both from a disciplinary and professional point of view. At least this seems to be the case, given that a history of the reception of Schleiermacher’s pedagogical writings has yet

Today those lectures are understood as the basis of a professional theory of social education. See: Czarny (2014).

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to be written: In the 19th century, Schleiermacher’s pedagogy was mainly taken up with theological questions. As early as 1871, Platz’s volume featuring Schleiermacher’s educational theory (prepared for his early edition of Schleiermacher’s Collected Works) appeared within the “Library of Pedagogical Classics” edited by Hermann Beyer. This suggests that Schleiermacher’s work at least gained attention within teacher training for higher education institutions. At the beginning of the 20th century Schleiermacher’s educational thinking was mainly perceived in the context of—​as Reble (1935) calls it—​ his philosophy of culture, before those in Human Science Pedagogy turned their attention to the lectures during the Weimar era, likely as a result of Dilthey’s advice. In addition to the writings of the pedagogical followers of Fichte as well as the works of Niemeyer, Trapp, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Fröbel, Schleiermacher’s lectures mark the beginning of a modern, explicitly scientific2 reflection on pedagogy. At the same time, these lectures create their own approach both to their method and substance, thus separating pedagogy definitively from theology and philosophy (Sünkel 1964). In this way, pedagogy was established as a science interested in history and society which took as its starting point the tensions that education faces in bourgeois society, a society organized around the freedoms of the middle class. In this context, these tensions arise from the contradiction between a critical examination of changing social and cultural conditions on the one hand and the unavoidable need to introduce the young generation to the simple realities life on the other.3 In this context, Schleiermacher’s basic ideas are of more than just historical interest. Rather, they document a way of thinking about pedagogy that remains valid for a general understanding of education. What’s more, reading Schleiermacher’s lectures still offers surprises and unexpected inspiration today: they trigger insight. This is all the more valid in view of the current availability of previously unknown textual sources.4 Among other things, these highlight how Schleiermacher’s involvement in educational policy development provides a decisive empirical basis for his theory.



See the discussion of the word Wissenschaft in the translators’ introduction. (Trans.) This is shown instructively by the research of Steffen Kleint (2008). 4 In the form of recently published editions of Schleiermacher’s multiple series of lectures on education. See translators’ introduction. Note that in this chapter, I make use of Sprüngli’s transcript, which was first published in the Kritische Gesamtausgabe II Abteilung (Vorlesungen) Volume XII in 2000. 2 3

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1. Education as Wissenschaft The versions of the lectures available so far go back to the edition of Schleiermacher’s Complete Works which was edited by Platz; it was also the basis for later text editions.5 Apart from those editions which only offered fragments of the lectures, the version published by Platz is associated with shifts and displacements. This is of course less true of the lectures of 1813–​ 1814, which are based on Schleiermacher’s handwritten notes, but it is already clear in the lectures of 1820–​1821, which were only available in excerpts. The result was that the latter lectures were assigned a specific thematic focus that did not do justice to the breadth of their structure; it did not at all negotiate the elements of counteraction and punishment,6 but already presented pedagogy in its broadly systematic context. Postscripts to those lectures suggest that a more comprehensive treatment of pedagogy was already emerging for Schleiermacher (see: Schleiermacher 2008). In this paper, reference will be made primarily to the 1926 lectures, the most fully developed version of Schleiermacher’s thoughts. Both the version edited by Platz as well as a set of notes made by one of his students, Sprüngli (now included in a new edition of Schleiermacher’s work) will be referenced in this chapter. Perhaps Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy have still not yet been adequately reconstructed. This is not only due to the rather difficult question of their textual basis. It arises above all from the factually focused yet open minded method of thinking developed and realized by Schleiermacher himself. He opposes the dogmatism that can be typical of teaching and prefers to set in motion thinking itself, on the one hand structured by its own principles, but on the other hand always open to the real situation that pedagogy always faces. Scholars have consistently been struck by the proposition that a universally valid pedagogy is not possible (see: pp. 37-​40, above), while Schleiermacher himself actually makes some fundamental progress in this direction. He wanted to develop and establish a method of reflection characteristic of pedagogy. Thus, Schleiermacher aims at possibilities for pedagogical thinking which, although they arrive at basic determinations regarding their object, are by no means designed for fixed interpretive closure. The lectures attempt to develop an awareness of pedagogy and its meaning but are also to be read as illustrating a method of pedagogical reflection—​reflection that is critical, hermeneutical as well as dialectical. Based on the elementary facts and structures of pedagogy, this method offers a way of thinking that

Including the one translated here; see translators’ introduction. (Trans.) See (p. 75) above, where Schleiermacher discusses support and counteraction. (Trans.)

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connects these characteristics with problems and phenomena both historical and contemporary. To put it paradoxically: Schleiermacher does not provide pedagogy with a system in the long term by giving it a permanent discursive form, but provides a permanent stimulus to thinking, with neither completion nor conclusion, but nevertheless with a particular certainty in reflection. This attempt to offer, basically eidetically, the contours of a representational understanding of education and at the same time to maintain openness can be seen as the reason for numerous 20th century studies on Schleiermacher’s pedagogical thinking in general and his pedagogical lectures in particular. In recent decades—​and in view of the movement of educational research toward the empirical—​one can speak of an even unusual continuity and breadth in Schleiermacher’s reception.7 Making reference to Schleiermacher serves as an antidote to the constrictions of educational study, but without having to give up the idea of an orientation informed by contemporary social science. By reconstructing the individual steps in Schleiermacher’s argumentation, it is possible to deal with broad areas of pedagogy as a science. Only Pestalozzi and Herbart seem to have aroused greater interest in research on the history of ideas and theory of scientific pedagogy. And although the latter two figures have been read internationally, the lack of translations of Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy have up to this point stood in the way of a similar reception of his work.

2. The “Rationality” of Pedagogy Schleiermacher lectured on education three times, in 1813–​1814, 1820–​1821, and in 1826. The reasons for his academic involvement with such theorizing are only a matter of speculation. Since education as a scientific discipline—​ with the exception of Trapp’s controversial tenure in Halle, which he gave up in 1783—​had no place of its own at the universities, professors of philosophy or theology were obliged to give at least irregular lectures on this topic. Usually, they were rather reluctant to do so. This is despite the fact that Herbart demanded a particular horizon for pedagogy and famously, advocated the use of pedagogical “conceptions…intrinsic” to pedagogy (Herbart 1806/​1896, p. 83). Admittedly, the situation today is not very different, except that those involved in education want to see themselves as social scientists or to associate themselves above all with sociology and psychology. Schleiermacher dealt regularly with broadly pedagogical topics—​ beginning with the reviews for the Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung (The

E.g., see: Bartel (2012), Czarny (2014), Mielityinen (2009).

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General Literary Journal of Jena) and extending to numerous expert opinions, statements as well as sermons. His work On religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799/​1988) was conceived as an educational-​t heoretical blueprint and critically examined utilitarian and technically oriented Enlightenment pedagogy. In addition, his drafts on ethics regularly contain references to pedagogy. His treatise Über den Beruf des Staates zur Erziehung (On the State’s Calling to Education; 1814/​2011) discusses when and to what extent a state must intervene in an education and training system to regulate it, and how the state must then be restricted in its activities. In this context one finds formulations encountered almost word for word in Schleiermacher’s lectures, such as the one about the end of education: “Education…should deliver the individual as its ‘work’ to the communal life of the state and the church, to free, convivial social intercourse, and to the [community of] reflection and knowledge” (above, p. 46).8 It is also here that he develops the complicated relationship between the two sides of education, namely individuality and collectivity. The lectures of 1813–​1814 were captured only in the form of handwritten notes; Schleiermacher’s own lecture notes are unfortunately missing. Schleiermacher had planned the lectures to take place over 49 hours. They begin with the debate about the academic status of pedagogy. This, he said, requires a connection with scientific debate, but must reflect practical matters as well. The exposition of the object of investigation, i.e., pedagogical facts or realities, if and insofar as these are to be understood scientifically, is in line with ethics, Schleiermacher asserts. But at the same time, he points out that these have their own rationality, because pedagogy justifies its own reality.9 To speak of a “rationality of pedagogy” means, on the one hand, that for Schleiermacher, the basic task of pedagogy is to establish an order from which the human subject can initially gain something like subjectivity, sovereignty, and autonomy. In view of the complexity and heterogeneity of the surrounding social and cultural world (and working beyond conservative and

The text originally quoted by Winkler is from the Sprüngli transcript and reads: “For when education is completed, the individual is handed over to the state as its citizen, that is, as capable of acting as a living organic part of the whole and of taking up any particular position within it.” (2017, p. 144). (Trans.) 9 In the tradition following on Schleiermacher, the factual “givens” of pedagogy, of adults being with children to “bring them up” are considered as a realm in many ways separate from other realms of life such as work, governance and scholarship. Using terms provided by Schleiermacher, the pedagogical realm is seen as being marked by the responsibility of the older generation for the younger, and the intention of the older to influence the younger in such a way as to “improve” them—​i.e., to ultimately give them autonomy. (Trans.) 8

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progressive accounts of this [dis]order) this is the principal challenge for pedagogy. The challenge consists in the fact that under these social and cultural conditions, people should develop freely and, in this way, arrive at consciousness of themselves. Schleiermacher knows that the separate domain that pedagogy carves out from this (dis)order is not utopian but can only be justified in terms of what is practical and ordinary. It arises through the tension between a social and cultural life that appears fragmented and thus untidy, and what can nevertheless be brought into the context of the child’s experience in pedagogy that supports an educational path to independence and self-​reliance. This is even clearer in his 1826 lectures, where Schleiermacher refers to the importance of the family, which is only touched upon in 1813–​1814. For Schleiermacher, however, the “rationality” of pedagogy means on the other hand that there are aspects of education that are not negotiable. This leads to traits that in the 20th century would have first brought him the reproach of being authoritarian, and later perhaps would have been approved as authoritative: “The Rule,” he states almost rigidly in his 1813–​1814 lectures that in order to make obedience easier for children, one must give them reasons is null and void; for giving reasons means to dispense with obedience. There is also the risk that this may not be convincing; children are still very little able to grasp reasons. (2017, p. 318)

In view of the complexity of our lives, prohibitions cannot always be imposed in principle, nor can they be merely negative. What is needed is rather a positive instruction that enables the correct action. Indeed, later, in the lectures of 1826, Schleiermacher’s discussion of the basic pedagogical practice of “support” (as opposed to “counteraction”) is based on this insight.

3. The Development of Schleiermacher’s Ideas in the 1813–​1814 Lectures As early as 1813/​1814 Schleiermacher renounced an anthropological justification for pedagogy (i.e., one based on a specific conception of human nature) in favor of one placing emphasis on a theory of practice. He situates this approach between the generality of ethical theory on the one hand and the specificity of possible situations of the individual human being on the other. However, his discussion of these possible situations results in this first lecture on pedagogy having a specifically technical character; it remains closer to practical considerations. However, skepticism about practical recommendations was already spreading at this time; practical advice was seen as hindering an appropriate and substantive understanding of education in a larger

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sense. For example, is such an understanding compatible with practical advice regarding beauty and morality? Accordingly, everything moral and beautiful does not seem to be the object of education and only as such the practice of knowledge and skills remains. But everyone will admit that there is something wrong with a [purely] technical process that would awaken a virtuous disposition, and that one would seem ridiculous if one claimed to be in possession of a method for inculcating good taste. Yes, in contention with such a procedure a natural and justified opposition would arise in the child. This is because the outwardly imposed illusion prevents the emergence of genuine elements from inside (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 275). Thus, in its everyday spontaneity, pedagogy is faced with the choice between Scylla and Charybdis, namely between a “lax education” and a “pedantic and hard education” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 275). A conscious pedagogy can therefore only absorb and order what it finds in the world; it cannot force an entirely new way of life. “Pedagogical innovations are therefore actually a measure of illness” (p. 442). Nevertheless, Schleiermacher discusses the “means” of education in his 1813–​1814 lectures, so he is still undecided as to how the theory of education can and should look if it does not want to lose sight of everyday practice. It seems as if at this early stage, he already wanted to formulate a theory of an art, a Kunstlehre, although he does not explicitly embrace the aim. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher had by this stage already sharpened his method such that he could consistently utilize it in later lectures. In 1813–​ 1814 he also gave priority to formal academic theoretical structure, which as a general form of thinking offers a “framework” for the recognition of empirical reality.10 One can sense the influence of Herbart’s concept of pedagogical tact (see: Herbart, 1802/​2022) in these lectures as well, although Schleiermacher makes no explicit reference to it. In any case, Schleiermacher elaborates a framework, unfolding its facets through three basic perspectives which become decisive for all of his pedagogical thought; practically speaking, they form three “problem-​formulations” which must be present in pedagogical awareness: Formally, the first thing that emerges is the aspect that shows itself as the continuum between individual distinctiveness and social and cultural generality. Accordingly, people are dependent on a common sensibility, or—​ as 20th century sociology points out—​on a social habitus which is always

10

The metaphor of the “framework of rational activities,” for instance, is encountered multiple times in those lectures.

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manifest only individually, as a kind of “individual generality” (individuelle Allgemeine; Frank 1985).11 The point is not that the individual is somehow imperfect in embodying a broader social and cultural generality; the opposite is true: Schleiermacher identifies a “feeling of need in the educating generation” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 264); he assumes a fundamental human will to be educated. However, the “pedagogical intention”12 cannot or must not be based on the “chimera” of ideals. It may be that given circumstances do not meet with the approval of the educator, but this only leads to the “task of attracting enough strength and freedom to the student to be able to override this” (p. 264). A second perspective then opens up via the relationship between situational conditions and the process of education. This is treated in different stages. Schleiermacher develops this perspective throughout the time remaining in these specific lectures from 1813–​1814. At the same time, he retains the individual case as a central principle. This, however, then leads him here to ask about the possibility of being able to discover continuity in the living process of change or education. Thirdly, he refers to the tension in what education is able to achieve, referring on the one hand to “the training of nature” and on the other, “the training into the moral life” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 416). Here Schleiermacher identifies the contemporaneous educational theme that serves as the basic motivation for all of his lectures, namely the question of socialization of the individual. In this process (natural) individuality is not abandoned, but rather allows the individual to grow as a condition for the possibility of being able to influence one’s situation freely and confidently. Education has the task of releasing one’s own individuality. It is here that the autonomy of the child—​a theme of central concern in 1826—​fi nally comes to the fore: “It is easier to achieve order if children place value on independence, if they want to change things themselves: then order is made to become the condition. Those who like to be served seldom find this order” (p. 318). In one important respect the lectures of 1813–​1814 differ markedly from the two later ones. The later lectures are marked by resolutely democratic, even egalitarian tendencies regarding questions concerning the orientation of the educational system toward the community. Schleiermacher discusses this as a problem of the differences that arise in the relationship between the ancestral and the innate: they can and should disappear when, in an

Frank bases his reflections on Schleiermacher; in pedagogy above all, it is clear how the notion of an individual generality is actually applied. (Trans.) 12 For a discussion specifying the “pedagogical intention,” see the chapter by Lewin in this volume. (Trans.) 11

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ideal bourgeois state, only “personal difference” decides. In a parenthetical aside Schleiermacher himself comes to this radical insight: “One can also imagine a complete disappearance of innate difference, but only at the same time as [one imagines] a perfect democracy” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 267). Inevitably, debates that are still being held in the 21st century, but which give more weight to the educational system than Schleiermacher ever thought possible, come to mind. Pedagogy must acknowledge that inequality is its starting point. It must face up to this; and it will only finally succeed if equality is given in social life. “Our common people are largely still raw, i.e., left to their own devices, they regress. Children will also regress, and therefore one must give as much space as possible to the common life” (p. 319).

4.  1826: Educational Theory Comes of Age The lectures of 1826 represent the most mature stage of development in Schleiermacher’s pedagogical thinking. Such a judgment may be misleading, however. For the quality of the notes or transcripts fluctuates, and Platz has constructed an ideal text with continuities and explanations that can hardly be attributed to Schleiermacher. Even Sprüngli’s notes are only convincing to a limited extent, especially as they remain fragmentary. Certainly, Schleiermacher continued to rely on his notes in his lectures, especially since he admitted, at least for his lectures on psychology, to occasionally lecture “from hand to mouth.” There are clear similarities between individual figures of thought in all the lectures, but Schleiermacher arranges them differently. What is striking, however, is how in 1826 he leaves behind the explanatory context regarding the academic status of pedagogy that marks the earlier lectures. What is new and original about 1826, however, is that he now presents a fundamental and comprehensive theory of pedagogy—​and also how he presents it. This is a theory that asserts its relevance within a broader system of scientific disciplines, and that also takes into account the conditions, possibilities, and limits of its own theory of science. In this general and theoretical mode, Schleiermacher takes up a type of reflection that he first established around 1800. His attention is now focused on presenting a comprehensive theory that could legitimize and at the same time already carry out the project of a scientific study of pedagogy—​not least in order to ground pedagogical practice and endow it with scientific prestige. Schleiermacher’s intention, in short, is to give pedagogy academic status. At the same time, there was increasing pressure for what could be called the “professionalization” of pedagogical practice—​exerted by ever growing numbers of formally appointed schoolteachers. At this time, in their speeches and

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writing, Fichte and other engaged pedagogues began using the term “educational science” or “education studies” (Erziehungswissenschaft) in order to make their scientific intentions clear (Schmied-​Kowarzik & Benner 1969). What is the reason for this great interest in pedagogical questions? Is it possible to identify a particular social and cultural constellation of problems that focused attention on education and teaching? Of course, we can only speculate on the answers. In the background, there were several motives that encouraged the emergence of a new type of reflection about education. Pedagogy had gained a social status that meant that it now demanded rigorous academic treatment. Although theoretical works were not widely circulated, the years around 1800 are rightly identified as critical in the development of the field (see: Brachmann 2008). Schleiermacher’s lectures also exercised a subtle effect, as transcripts of them were in circulation. Wichern and Fröbel, two early 19th century scholars of education, had certainly heard of Schleiermacher. In addition, contemporaries probably already interpreted the preoccupation with educational questions as a specifically German phenomenon, as compensation for the relative political weakness of the bourgeoisie in the German speaking world. The rise of the citoyen or the middle class in central Europe was never marked by an irrevocable political event like the French or American revolutions. Indeed, one could say somewhat cynically that in central Europe, the class struggle was principally fought not on the barricades, but in the schoolyards and through competition for final grades. This frames another problem for initial philosophical and educational reflection. For the transition from traditional to bourgeois society was perceived as a massive break with tradition—​including with those traditions which gave education its conventional form. Ruptures in social practice, however, were already making the tasks and structures of educational action stand out. This was (and remains) especially prominent when people’s circumstances are particularly precarious and given that the promises of a better future implied in education are put into question. In his speeches about religion, Schleiermacher describes the misery and cruelty associated with the new social conditions. Additionally: In the constellation around 1800, a new conception of history emerges, first regarded as progress through enlightenment, then more cautiously as the experience of change, finally as a kind of rising and falling. In the process, this historicity of life processes must be linked with the life story of the individual; the idea of a history relevant to all people is replaced by that of individual development and biography. This in turn is increasingly conceived of in terms reflecting the emergence of modern biology—​a tendency particularly reflected in Fröbel’s organic metaphors. All

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this requires new formulation and a deepening of the understanding of pedagogy, because neither continuities nor the continued existence of traditions are to be expected. Nor can the slowly growing influence of developmental psychology be ignored in accounts of one’s own and others’ life changes. Finally, the influence of early Romantic circles, of which Schleiermacher is known to have been a member, was having an effect. Apart from their radical criticism of education, which Schleiermacher shared as the author of the Athenaeum,13 they addressed interpersonal relationships as a “private” continuation of the revolution in the public sphere (e.g., Beiser 2003; Seigel 2005), while recognizing that even the individual genius can hardly escape community and custom. The problem of the sociality of people had to be considered anew. This is because in the transition from the ancient regime to bourgeois society, old normative obligations fell away and new ones took their place. Individuals see their individuality as a reference to themselves and must learn to decide and act out their inner motives and convictions, out of freedom and yet committed to morality. In practical terms the social conditions certainly changed only slowly, but in the social-​ philosophical context the problem became increasingly urgent. Basically, it is a question that Kant conceives of abstractly as the “sociable unsociability” of people (Kant 1784/​1991),14 but which in concrete terms is the greatest challenge for education: “How do I cultivate freedom under constraint?” (Kant 1803/​2007, p. 447) A pedagogical theory can no longer escape this. It is equally concerned with the position of the individual as free and social, as well as with sociality, which does not abolish individuality, but is part of the realm of self-​ determination. In his “Speeches on Religion” Schleiermacher sees this in almost secular terms, namely as re-​ligio, as a “reconnection,” and refers to feeling as a precondition of the social. Others speak of moral sentiments as a condition for the possibility of designing a market based society (e.g., Smith 1759). The problem arises of how the human individual can live individually or monologically and how this form of life can, should, or even must

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A Romantic literary magazine. Kant saw society as being formed through various antagonisms, among them the tension between the human desire for association and for isolation: “The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, insofar as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-​governed social order. By antagonism, I mean in this context the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up” (1784/​1991, p. 44). (Trans.)

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at the same time engage sociably. For individuality proves to be important in a social context that is already differentiated in terms of spheres of action; Schleiermacher grasps this in the relationship between attitude (Gesinnung) and skills (Fertigkeiten), which must be consolidated in individual development. Pedagogy now provides a contemporary vocabulary through which social problems are defined and their solutions found. Thus education and later Bildung are ascribed a humane, indeed, a humanity producing task. At the beginning of the 21st century, as at the beginning of the 20th before it, this hypertrophy of educational purpose is only reaffirmed. Pedagogy had already achieved extraordinary status during the Enlightenment, which now, around 1800, produced a more or less comprehensive theory of human life. For leading figures like Lessing (author of The Education of the Human Race, 1780/​2005), education’s humanization of the human animal, its realization of distinctly human perfectibility, and its securing of human progress are part and parcel of the social self-​interpretation upon which a general theory of pedagogy is to be based. Education and teaching on the one hand, and economic success and social progress on the other, were closely connected, and the actors involved claimed an elevated status. Schleiermacher himself mentions in his lectures that public education has gained a central function in society, meaning that teachers no longer had to work outside of the school to survive. In the Sprüngli transcript, this is stated as follows: the elementary school teacher must be the most educated and developed man among the people, but it is not necessary for him to belong to any other circle because his activity must be claimed for the people. If one must freely assume that the growing generation is becoming more progressive, it is precisely this surplus which the elementary school teacher has in his power (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 800; see above, p. 80).

5. Positioning Pedagogy as a Discipline Basically, pedagogy itself became a general fact and a common phenomenon, a universal task and achievement, one understood as grounded in human nature. It was no longer specialized, related to a particular class or a particular family that happened to have a tutor. The need for a general pedagogical theory or an account that organizes knowledge comprehensively and systematically was therefore obvious, and the large number of works that took up this challenge are not surprising. Schleiermacher himself examines various possibilities or perspectives for such an academization of pedagogy.

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5.1.  First Perspective: The Historical The first perspective is offered by the history of pedagogy as it reaches back to antiquity. Schleiermacher regularly cites the practices of early societies, above all the ancient thinkers to whom he owes his own techniques of argumentation—​insofar as they help to address modern pedagogical conditions. Remarkably, religion does not play an overarching role in his analysis; in the lectures he discusses the functional importance of pedagogy for religion and recognizes the special importance religion can have for growing up. But he does not ascribe to religion any normative predominance. Like other educational theorists, he refers to treatises that were considered canonical because they had become available internationally, such as John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Rousseau’s Emile; or on Education.

5.2.  Second Perspective: Pedagogy’s Relation to Other Disciplines A second perspective arises through the possible relation of a scientific pedagogy with other disciplines. One alternative is to think of other sciences as fundamental, so that pedagogy itself could be regarded as derived from them. Another was to see them as interdependent neighbors, and thus outline their relationship to one another. Herbart called for pedagogy to be viewed separately from other sciences, but nevertheless saw it as dependent on ethics and determined by psychology in terms of its techniques. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, opted for a concept of coordination. In both the 1813/​1814 lectures and again in 1820, his focus was primarily on the relationship of pedagogy to (practical) philosophy, and in particular to religion and ethics as moral doctrine. In 1826 he chose a closer relationship to ethics, which he conceived as a comprehensive social philosophy. For Schleiermacher, ethics refers not normatively, but descriptively to the entire human life process in its inner dynamics. Schleiermacher justifies this development in his thinking with the idea that all of human practice and the reality of life itself must be consciously shaped and therefore must be understood through pedagogy. This becomes politically important in view of social inequalities whose reduction requires its own social shaping, as is indicated in the Sprüngli transcript: “we will say again that the only answer is exclusively pedagogical and again the high political importance of our theory emerges” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 574). This inevitably differentiates the practice of education from other practices because it is only education that offers a way to functionally enable further ethical development. In the version of the lectures translated here, this reads as follows:

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If we ask how long the older generation continues to exercise influence on the younger, we realize that in general, there is no clear limit. But there will always be a coexistence of the two temporally separated generations, [a coexistence] in which the older does not simply influence the younger, but in which both work together toward one goal. To the same degree that this shared activity increases, the influencing of the older generation on the younger decreases. And in the end [this one-​way influence] ceases to exist. That is when education itself stops. In any case, every large mass of people forms a common social and cultural [geistige] existence. When this develops to a certain point, a living whole comes into being—​the state. This continues to exist simply through human activity, since it is only a complex of such activity. As long as the state remains the same [as a political entity] and does not exclude [the possibility of] its eventual perfection, its social and cultural [geistige] activity will intensify. Then, the [complex of human] action must also remain the same in its kind, itself rising toward perfection. Communal life in the state is so significant that from a certain perspective, it includes all moral activity. And even if we cannot share this particular perspective, we must admit that it is necessary to have a theory that reveals how the goal [toward which communal life strives] is to be reached—​so that the state might continue through generational changes, and its enterprise flourish. (pp. 27-​28)15

This same passage is recorded as continuing slightly differently in the Sprüngli transcript: [E]‌ducation must be closely connected with the interlocking of the generations in a state; as a trained science it must exist alongside it. It is impossible to separate what happens from one individual to the next from what happens in life as a whole. Here is the point of view for the subject under discussion, a science purely related to ethics, coordinated by politics. (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 550; see p. 28, above.).

5.3.  T hird Perspective: Theory in Itself A third perspective is characterized by the claim to theory and the development of one’s own theoretical conception of the topic at hand. Schleiermacher expressly emphasizes that it is not practical suitability that determines the value of a theory. It is true that as early as 1820 he began to refer to “theory” rather than to anything else in characterizing his project. In 1826, however, the reflexive approach of theory becomes important. This approach is directed toward a description and analysis of given, historical and practical

This passage differs from the corresponding text in the Sprüngli transcript in that it is more detailed and elaborated and does not present its claims in the form of competing theories. The version from Sprüngli also ends by emphasizing that the gradual perfection of the state also implies a greater influence from the older to the younger generations. (Trans.)

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conditions. This is about the examination of decisions within the process of thinking and investigation, specifically those decisions related to educational action. To again quote from Sprüngli, theoretical verification enables reflection in the context of general theory, but must be connected—​as we would say today—​w ith “empirical case references:” Our life shows that the whole business of education is again divided in this way. One point is the universal one; the other is the individual side of education. [The idea is to] develop that by which one emerges in the same way as the other so that [the individual] is different from all others. We do not have enough data to decide how these tasks relate to each other or which ones we should be subordinate to the other. (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 568)

6. From Theory to Practice In his theory of education Schleiermacher first constructs an abstract object that orders thought and experience.16 Strictly speaking, he designs a model from which the educational state of affairs can be understood in principle and also in concrete terms by integrating the findings of experience. This theory is based on a wide range of experience gained in his educational activities and functions. The large number of expert opinions, statements, drafts, and even of curricula authored by Schleiermacher resonate in these lectures. He took a broad and intensive look at the debates about education and teaching, while also taking up memories from his time as a tutor and from his own dealings with children. All the while, he makes use of relevant publications from his time. Although many motifs, insights, and considerations are encountered in all three lectures on pedagogy, the one from 1826 is the most rigorously composed and comes closest to the claim of a systematically independent presentation. Admittedly, he only rarely references authors and sources—​ besides the thinkers of antiquity, who are naturally familiar to him. The

It should be noted that Schleiermacher also lectured on psychology, which he understood as “a phenomenology of the soul” and as „laying …the cornerstone for all other branches of knowledge” (Meier 2019, p. 80), including pedagogy itself. Schleiermacher’s psychology is also marked by its integration of soul with the body, and by its emphasis on continuous change and development, on “life” in general as its principle subject matter. Schleiermacher’s psychology “ultimately means nothing more than… a discipline that seeks to recognize the living, individually appearing human in his innermost being” (p. 1) within the tension between individuality and “identity with others, consequently [also] as a ‘social fact’ ” (p. 29). Indeed, Schleiermacher’s psychology is tantamount to an account of Bildung itself—​conceived as a holistic process of personal, intellectual, emotional and social development.

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philanthropists and their educational reforms17 were certainly present in his mind, as he explicitly reminds his audience of Basedow in 1820. It is remarkable how Schleiermacher—​in modern terms—​takes up socially and sociologically relevant facts, including structural and institutional contexts. He also thinks broadly in terms of developmental psychology. This enables him to discuss the connection between family and institutional school systems and also to pay particular attention to language development. The lectures of 1813–​1814 and 1820 still seem to focus on the practical suitability of the theory. However, in 1826, a basic criterion of professionalism comes to the fore, namely the most comprehensive possible awareness of what one does in one’s field of activity. The listeners know of the reality of pedagogical actions as well as of the consequences of relevant decisions. From a methodological point of view, the lectures of 1826 engage in criticism in the strictest sense of the term: Schleiermacher outlines, in refined theoretical terms, the object and the field of thought—​to both introduce it and to then navigate within it. He moves constructively, not defining, but sketching the basic elements and relationships that must be taken into account when talking about education. Within this construction, he analyzes conditions and possibilities as tensions and alternatives which in principle are decisive but can be discussed in terms of their possible consequences. Formally speaking, theory grasps the distinguishing features of education. It is about determining its central characteristics and structures, about its tensions and possibilities, and last but not least, about making the processual dimensions of education clear. It has to do with development and change, with a beginning and an end, with continuity and breaks, with changes in its “object.” People do not remain themselves in their educational process; they become something different—​something that must be taken into account by those who work in educational practice. In terms of content, Schleiermacher’s pedagogy clarifies the education of this subject, a clarification in which the concept of the bourgeois subject is to be understood both politically and individually. Schleiermacher has in mind a society that follows the model of possessive individualism as it was discovered with Locke (see: MacPherson 1973); it is connected with the concept of property and is pragmatic. This is particularly clear in the Sprüngli transcript: “The youth should therefore be delivered so that they are able to manage their property for themselves and

The philanthropists represent a movement begun by J.B. Basedow which sought to educate based on a “love” (philo) of “humans” (anthropo). Inspired by the Enlightenment as well as by Rousseau, the philanthropists advocated for and put into practice non-​religious educational programs that were based in faith in humanity’s intrinsically good nature. (Trans.)

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in connection with the whole—​w ith what in common life is called practical apprehension” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 86). Practical understandings of life and the development of morality are closely related. Speaking individually, such understandings could be articulated as a response to questions such as the following: How can an individual be educated who is aware of himself, who in principle is entitled to freedom and autonomy, but who is nevertheless committed to a society and to the common spirit—​w ithout being entirely conformist? How is it possible for a person to act as they see fit and yet remain in accordance with the whole to which they have not submitted? Schleiermacher wants to understand such practical matters, but at one point (at least in the Sprüngli transcription) he sounds a note of resignation: “The theory, however, should be directly applicable, should not set up anything for which there is no connection to the given, but should not make the present an irrevocable archetype, should work toward affirming the value of the conditions at the lowest level” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 764). His normative tendency consequently arises from the fact that he does not necessarily consider the bourgeois way of life desirable, but nevertheless sees it as the ideal against which society is to be measured. Theory finds its object in this case in terms of the basic problem of all pedagogy. This consists in the fact that education has to do with human beings who are already developing themselves and on whom influence has to be exerted in a justified way. It is about the child, about the young person as the subject of education, who Schleiermacher himself archly characterizes as the “subject of education” (above, p. 45)—​i.e., as both a subject and an object—​who in the future will approve of what has been experienced as education. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, the precondition of the self-​ developing human being cannot, strictly speaking, be influenced. It must instead be presupposed. This is a fact which limited the fantasies of production and creation as they marked Enlightenment education. Schleiermacher refuses any Enlightenment metaphors of production: education should produce no “new man,” nor should it seek to make children “fit” for the future. He also remains cautious about any idealized states that are to be achieved through pedagogy, whether in individual or social contexts. As early as 1820, Schleiermacher broke away from ethical or religious justifications in his pedagogical thought, even those that committed themselves to achieving a state of human satisfaction. Given the differences separating his own ethical system from those of religion, he doubts the possibility of such a justification. Instead, on the one hand, he emphasizes the function and performance of education in the ethical realm—​i.e., in broadly social and historical processes.

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On the other hand, he directs his gaze to the subject, to “internal changes in the subject” and to the ways this subject is affected from outside. But the most important point probably lies in Schleiermacher’s understanding of pedagogical action. It is quite counterintuitive, at least if and insofar as one assumes an understanding of action that reckons with the person or figure of the educator. Schleiermacher, however, does not have a technical understanding of action. For him, education succeeds only if action is established and organized as a type, as a specific practice with its own dignity. It is about arranging a framework, a setting, in which the child forms him or herself in confrontation with their circumstances. The function and performance of education is practically always realized in connection with historical and social processes within which the life of the human species takes place. This is a comprehensive process of change. Schleiermacher ties this in with the basic figure of his ethics, according to which the human practice of life takes place as a union of reason and nature—​ a union with an open outcome. Although this tends to be based on an ideal state, it can fail—​and therefore requires ethical counsel and reflection as well as reassurance regarding possible practices that can prevent failure. There is the possibility of an outcome in some form of utopia, but reason and nature, practice and history are to be understood like tangents meeting in infinity. Therein lies the rationale for examining the types of action that are decisive for pedagogy and politics. Whether the highest good of human processes will be realized depends on the fact that life practice is experienced as a good way of life, one that qualifies the human way of life positively. Schleiermacher here takes up a thought that can be considered Aristotelian and confirms his departure from Plato (see: Follak 2005)—​namely understanding action in a society that is differentiated into separate spheres. But how can the practice of education be identified and then analyzed? This cannot be managed by relying merely on experience, nor can it be achieved by focusing on current practical needs. Such points of contact remain accidental, and nothing has really changed in this regard to this day. Schleiermacher first notes such arbitrariness and randomness in the work of the tutor, and subsequently, of the schoolteacher. On the other hand, one needs theoretical certainty in the strict sense of the word to understand events in such a way that they can be organized.

7. Schleiermacher and Our “Non-​Genetic Heritage” First of all, social and historical processes are a decisive factor. The experience of history and historicity serves as a starting point. Education emerges

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when the historical process is structured. This can be achieved through generational sequences or lineages, which can be understood as an abstract, but nevertheless experiential finding: People are born and die, people produce offspring, generational succession and generational relations show themselves as a structure that makes visible an order of time and action. Schleiermacher thus emphasizes the fact of physical finitude, which is countered by a much longer-​lived culture and social organization based on human practice. He thus refers to what in educational literature is called “non-​genetic heritage” (Winkler 2006) and is associated in evolutionary biology research with the concept of the “ratchet effect” (Tomasello 1999). For example, the invention of a specific social practice, i.e., the invention of education, allows the human species to further build on the level of development it has already reached. This occurs by means of our non-​genetic heritage, enshrined in cultural artifacts of all kinds; any genetically given heritage is actually lost with the death of the members of the genus or is passed on by birth. However, everything that has been gained historically beyond this in the ethical process of life must be passed on directly through an artificial process. Pedagogy thus connects the young generation to artificial artifacts, to culture, and to a given society. This does not succeed as an automatism, but requires conscious activity, which, however, is by no means be determinative. Anything less would fall short of the requirements of an open ethics. Education must not lead to the younger generation becoming a reflection of the older but must be set up in such a way that the younger generation itself determines how it shapes its present and future. This generation should not simply be handed over to society but should have the opportunity to enter it freely. Schleiermacher, by the way, articulates this in 1820 in the middle of his lecture series of that year. The formulation remains almost identical, but in the version of the 1826 lectures translated in this volume, Schleiermacher moves it near the beginning: What is the starting point for this lecture? Humankind is made up of individual beings who live through a certain cycle of existence on this earth before leaving it. And this happens in a way that those who are in this cycle at the same time can be divided into an older and younger generation, with the older being the first to leave this earth. However, when we look at humankind in terms of the large masses that we call peoples [or nations], it is clear that over generations, things do not remain the same. Instead, there is a rise and fall in every aspect [of the welfare of nations] that is important to us. However, in looking at the life of a people, we cannot tell exactly whether the first half leads to a high point and

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the second half to a low point, or whether we are confusing the two altogether. (p. 24)18

Nevertheless, the intergenerational relationship is by no means a positive starting point for the theory. Schleiermacher is identifying a problem, one which must be redefined historically and socially through reflection and educational action. Recourse to generational relations assists a discussion of the possible consequences of education for the progress of the species. Schleiermacher thus refers to the first and perhaps even decisive ethical challenge that education must face: A significant part of the activity of the older generation extends toward the younger, and it is less complete or perfect, the less aware the older generation is about what it is doing and why it is doing it. Therefore, there has to be a theory that is based on the relation of the older generation and the younger, one that proceeds from the question: What does the older generation actually want with the younger? To what extent does the action [of the older] correspond to the [given] goal, the result to the [original] action? This relationship between the older and the younger, and the obligations of the one to the other, form the basis on which we will build everything that lies in the scope of our theory. (p. 24)19

These questions are necessary because the continuity of society and culture represents a fundamental condition for the continued existence of the human species and even more so of its (ethical) progress. But this progress is by no means guaranteed. There is no natural anthropological mechanism involved. Rather, progress relies on conscious pedagogical activity, as is highlighted in the Sprüngli transcript: If we start from the relationship between the educating generation and the generation to be educated, what is given is a transfer of what has been in the life of the educating generation to the generation to be educated, so that they take up the experience and the history of the immediately preceding generations. While one generation is being educated, there are still significant remnants of the tradition that the educating generation has taken up, a tradition that includes two generations… How should intentional pedagogical activity relate to this? (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 770)



The version translated in this volume differs from the Sprüngli transcript again in that it is more elaborated; it also begins by asking the reader “to look at the object from a different angle,” rather than announcing the starting point for the lectures (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 547). 19 The Sprüngli transcript also asks “why” the older generation wants what it wants (of the younger; Schleiermacher 2017, p. 547). 18

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At this point Schleiermacher sees it as the school’s responsibility to create a historical consciousness, and thus to establish a culture of remembrance that creates identity and extends to the events that affect and determine the present. Moreover, the generational relationship is still connected to a politically relevant difference that has a guiding effect in Schleiermacher’s “politics:” The masses that form a generation can be divided into ruling and ruled classes, a “distinction that comes immediately after education, so it must be prepared for [in] education” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 745). Here, Schleiermacher seems less a progressive, but instead a sober, realistic observer of social conditions that are much more reactionary than revolutionary in nature. However, this cannot be decided unambiguously; for later in the Sprüngli transcript (and in the one translated here), Schleiermacher emphasizes the egalitarian character of all education: Education, however, is always an equalizing principle, counteracting the inequality developing from another side; it is equalizing as far as it is uplifting. The main point of view we started from was the direction of the whole generation around the rulers an d governed. The difference is only relative because in every form there is already a ruling principle, and absolute heterogeneity is already abolished. (p. 797; e.g., above, p. 56)

8. R eceptivity, Spontaneity and Self-​Activity Only after and, to a certain extent, below—​or even more precisely, within—​ this ethical-​anthropological structure does the concrete context of conditions become apparent within which pedagogical action can be grasped. A second perspective that Schleiermacher now takes up for the development of his theory is how effects can be achieved in individual human beings who are always changing themselves, prior to the influence of others. Is there actually a possibility of pedagogical action and its effect, or does not everything actually arise from the educational process of the subject itself? In fact Schleiermacher lays out a whole tableau of such questions. He is also aware of this and notes the difficulty of striving for a theory which is to describe action in terms of its effects. Strictly speaking, Schleiermacher is calling into question the concept of education as a whole—​fi rst as it is familiar in everyday life, then as it is articulated in Enlightenment pedagogy and finally as it appears assuming that a possible decline in cultural and social development must be countered. The first problem is that education is premised on the subjectivity of the young person. They must presuppose their own educational process and come to terms with it. It is impossible to educate if change does not happen through subjects themselves; therefore, the change always refers back to individuality.

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All ideas must therefore be rejected according to which education—​as is still done naively to this day—​is carried out as an attempt by the educator to exert influence on the student. Instead, the student is the living subject who has always been acting, which—​as Schleiermacher emphasized many times in 1826—​is to be seen as free. The subject of education always constitutes itself through its own activity, which is directed outwards, in which external influences are simultaneously absorbed: Spontaneity and receptivity, again as articulated in the Sprüngli transcript, are the forms of action, the “free movements” of the subject in its sensual life practice. Here the most general psychological basis offers a dichotomy, the relative contrast between spontaneity and receptivity, self-​activity and receptivity. We represent this in life as it first appears through the activity of the senses as a general representation of receptivity, because through this the human being actually becomes receptive to something within himself and also through free outward movements, through free kinesthetic activity. This spontaneity is the activity by which one produces something or realizes something from one’s mind. [It is a matter of] only a relative contrast, because… without self-​activity, all impressions are lost. But this does not prevent that… contrast in which everything can be summarized, the whole system of skills stands under this contrast. (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 652; see p. 45, above)

However, anyone who does not understand the precondition of living subjectivity can still exert influence; but this influence is only, as Schleiermacher emphasizes in the version his lectures translated here, a mechanical one that is exercised only through adaptation and ultimately through violence: Humans are beings that carry in themselves the sufficient ground for their development from their start to their completion. This is already in the idea of life, especially of life of the spirit [Geist] and intellect. Where there is no such internal ground, there is no change in the subject, or only change of a mechanistic nature.20 (above, p. 24)

But then: How does the student behave according to his given nature, how does his natural singularity and individuality relate to the influences from outside, from others? What does this mean above all in view of the natural differences that exist between all people and those that arise from social conditions? How does education deal with these differences? Finally, Schleiermacher takes up what Kant had labeled as unsociable sociability: The inner tensions implied in a society of individuals not only occupies Schleiermacher intensively, but also marks a central theme, at least in his pedagogical theory. This then unfolds between self-​activity and the activities that

The Sprüngli transcript contains nearly identical phrasing.

20

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are based in the entirety of the ethical, that is, in the historical social process of life. As a result, these forms of activity characterize individual subjectivity as that of a social individual, as the Sprüngli transcript makes clear: On the other hand, the first point is the free movements of life, so far away from the arbitrariness that manifests itself in this. Then what is the end of it if we think of its continuance? It is all outwardly directed activities of man that determine his part in the common task of the human race, in the continuing formation of the world and the mastery of the human spirit. Here we will be able to say the same thing again as before. From the starting point we have described these activities as ones where self-​activity dominates. But when we think of this final result, the individual must necessarily engage in the total activity of the others; it appears mainly under the form of receptivity that one lets oneself be determined by the totality, so that in many cases the first impulse to such activity appears under the form of such agreement. (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 653)

Schleiermacher sees quite clearly that there is—​ to put it a little paradoxically—​a contradictory interconnection here, one which characterizes pedagogy in all modern societies. Pedagogy must deal with differences in the context in modern terms: it must not only formally ensure inclusion in recognition and promotion of all heterogeneity, but it must also ensure that it is the individual subjects themselves who relate to this community, who have taken it on as a part of their attitude, and who yet preserve their individual proficiencies.

9. Education as Support This paradox shows the complexity of what is unfolding. At the same time, not only do the limits of intentional pedagogical action become clear, but instead, a concept of education is introduced which refers to a way of life in which people are educated by having experiences. This is the basis of Schleiermacher’s strong advocacy of education as support (as opposed to counteraction and punishment). In fact, it forms a systematic core in his thinking (Brachmann 2002), one more important than the opposition of counteraction and protection, because they “isolate the child in a certain way” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 597). Counteraction refers “to a sick condition” (p. 608), either of the subject himself, who then needs a doctor, or of the conditions that lack moral quality. Schleiermacher’s concept of education thus becomes more modern and realistic, one could even say sociological or socio-​pedagogical. On the other hand, the human subject’s own contribution to his or her own development is also clearly evident in comparison to purely mechanical effects.

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Seen in this light, one can also see here a withdrawal of the claim to the effectiveness of education, at least if this is claimed to be an intentional event carried out by persons. In contrast to the claims of Enlightenment pedagogy, a view that is in some respects more relaxed, perhaps even disillusioned, emerges with Schleiermacher. It is the good intentions of educators, not their aspirations and efforts for the concrete child, that occasion pedagogical events. At the same time, it is the child subject him or herself who has to get used to the order (e.g., of school). This can be seen as resignation to the power of social conditions or as an insight into the barriers that education faces. In any case, however, pedagogy follows the child’s development, i.e., it presupposes insight into the child’s growth and remains skeptical of attempts to accelerate or discipline. Pedagogical attention is directed to ensure that children do not lose their happiness and that the same is true for youth: “Here now the ethical character, the gradual habituation to order must take place in such a way that the happiness of youth does not decrease but increases” (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 722). The cheerfulness of the child or adolescent expresses free choice and the increasing activity of will that the young person has in their living conditions. What becomes decisive is that they develop the awareness and the linguistic abilities to deal with these conditions, so that it is possible for them not only to orient themselves and in this respect to consciously organize their educational processes, but also to give their consent to common life practice: We have seen earlier that in the first stage there was little or no particular will, this will only emerge with the particular expectation. In this lies the fact that from an activity a particular result arises. But all certainty of expectation depends on order. The more a certain activity of will develops during this time the more the order has to appear to the child as something welcome, and this becomes less a matter of compulsion the more the child joins his own activity of will. (p. 723)

The question of the child’s consent is the central pedagogical theme in Schleiermacher’s lectures of 1826. It is similar to the expectation that Herbart sees as addressed to the child. 21 And indeed, one can reproach Schleiermacher for now putting a conservative element more explicitly at the center of the pedagogical process, since he rejects all disciplining, but

21

For Herbart, this is the expectation that the child discovers and takes up as their own challenges leading to their development and the growth of their character: “This rise to self-​conscious personality ought without doubt to take place in the mind of the pupil himself, and be completed through his own activity; it would be nonsense if the teacher desired to create the real essence of the power to do it, and to pour it into the soul of his pupil” (Herbart 1806/​1896, p. 61). (Trans.)

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expects the child to first develop the willingness to agree to given arrangements. Although “the expression of the individual’s personal character” is the task of education, Schleiermacher also emphasizes that the state receives the individual from the hands of the educators as someone who is “formed in analogy” to others. But the continuation of this same sentence remains ambiguous: “so that they can be integrated into the life of the whole as something already proper to it” (above, p. 53). Does this mean, then, that the goal of education is an unmistakably unique individual or is should this person be one who has made the norms and laws of the state his own, freely taking them as his inner principle? This ambivalence must remain—​w ith this openness itself constituting a moment characteristic of education.

10.  Sociality and Subjectivity The basic structure of the lectures of 1826 follows quite strictly the exposition of the subject of pedagogy, i.e., the justification of its necessity in the context of the historical process, the development of the generational relationship in its relation to our “non-​genetic heritage” on the one hand, and the perspective on the individual subject in its developmental process within social and cultural conditions on the other. This exposition continues in the unfolding of those practices in which the subject forms itself at any given moment, toward freedom, in the acquisition of abilities and skills as well as the development of an attitude which is doubly determined: it is at once common spirit and self-​consciousness. One can thus speak of an interweaving of structural or situational considerations with those who address the process of education and upbringing—​a ll in a way that in fact takes up the formation of the subject as a reference point for reflection on and organization of the educational process. Schleiermacher consequently examines the conditions, possibilities, and limits that arise for pedagogical action with regard to the subject. And he does this in conjunction with a careful consideration of the subject’s developmental process in relation to the different social spheres which at once form the context and the foil for this process. Up to now, the four spheres of family, religion, sociability, and science have been considered sufficient and decisive; in their fourfold form they marked the essential social spaces within which the educational process takes place. Recent research suggests, however, that this process is more likely to start out from spaces that are relevant to socialization, making family and school more decisive in the educational process, while

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religion, sociability, and science should be regarded as more ideal spheres. Schleiermacher obviously also works rigorously to understand the basic structures that can change historically; the weight of the spheres he cites can vary, at least in pedagogical terms. In this way, his view is directed to the practice in the given moment of life in which the subject is to be improved. Schleiermacher grasps this moment of life as play or a game embedded in the situation, one which nevertheless has its own rules that imply a moment of practice. In this regard, however, he hardly follows the philosophical-​ a nthropological understanding of play developed by Schiller before him, but rather one encountered in contemporary educational literature. Once again: Schleiermacher’s consideration is based primarily on the ethical dimension of the event, i.e., on the constitution and development of sociality and thus on individuals’ social capacity for action. This refers to a capacity which for Schleiermacher is closely bound to freedom and to the subjective consciousness of both the circumstances and the subject itself, and which is based on the ability to speak and thus on the possibility of being able to articulate oneself in the world. Whether and to what extent pedagogy can accompany and organize this process of increasing autonomy is examined in two arcs of tension: the tension between the beginning and end of education and between the individuality and society. Both are linked by reference to the progress of the subject’s educational process, which Schleiermacher (with all due caution) summarizes as occurring in three periods in the lectures that follow on the introduction provided here. Delineated crosswise to Schleiermacher’s mapping of the education of the subject in three periods is the investigation of the respective spheres in which the individual subject moves both spontaneously and receptively. The second tension can also be characterized as one between the individual subject itself and the object of appropriation. Schleiermacher examines the extent to which the relationship between general sociality and the specificity of the spheres of life is reflected in this tension. In Sprüngli’s lecture notes, by the way, the spheres of family, religion, church, social life, and science lose the importance they had otherwise been accorded (i.e., in the Platz version translated here). Over the course of Schleiermacher’s lectures on education, they also become less important and much more intermingled. The subject has to cope with the structural tensions within and between the spheres in order to be able to progress at all in its educational process. In addition, the periods differ in the extent to which they leave behind the private sphere, primarily characterized by love, immediacy, and diffusion.

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At the same time, the public sphere, the formally regulated, ultimately even legally ordered state becomes decisive, which in the end leads to free independence, a condition in which the subject has found and perceived his position in society.

11. Conclusion: Dreams and Limitations Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy, especially the ones from 1826, are regarded as classical texts for the theory of education. One cannot avoid them, at least not if one strives for a critical understanding of pedagogical events and thus wants to develop a higher awareness of them—​events and practices that are indispensable and yet only to a limited extent to be controlled and organized. Education cannot break out of a given society; it does not succeed in creating the new, producing a Prometheus or perhaps a Faust. Thus, we cannot escape the insight which holds back and relativizes all pedagogical exuberance: Namely, that it is essentially by merely living among humans that the same thing must come about to a lesser degree, something which is achieved to a higher degree by the intentional pedagogical influences. This has a general validity, and one could only say that in detail nothing of what is not in their sphere of influence is known—​that is if one assumes that pedagogical effects essentially consist in giving greater intensity to what happens by itself through life itself and its order and context. (Schleiermacher 2017, p. 786)

For better or for worse, pedagogy must understand and accept this. In almost literal agreement with Schleiermacher, Emile Durkheim will raise this principle of immanence to become the theorem of pedagogy. Nevertheless, educators and politicians still dream today of being able to improve a society through education—​or at least to compensate for its fatal shortcomings, if not to eliminate them. Schleiermacher would have been quite skeptical about this: One cannot step out of a given society or ignore it as a fact of life; this is not possible, no pedagogy will succeed in this, even if it is aware of the task of having to and wanting to contradict what goes against its own demands for a society or a culture. Those who reflect on education must be aware of the historical and social process of human life. They must ask themselves what happens in this process and what influence it has on those who enter it—​who are formed in this world, with its values, norms, rules, and practices, if not also determined by it. Educators and politicians may dream of the improvements that pedagogy can bring about by educating the younger generation. But they dream of it without taking children and young people into account as subjects who

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determine and shape their own educational processes. The fact that they still dream of this, that they do not see the end of education as an opportunity to give individuals freedom and independence, leaves them quite perplexed—​at least as Schleiermacher would judge the situation, if he does not also simultaneously remind them that pedagogy would be dangerously damaged if it were to become an instrument of political rule. Schleiermacher’s lectures take the given conditions seriously and remind us that they cannot be reduced, and—​perhaps even for this reason—​t hat they always apply to the autonomy of the subject.

References Bartel, F. (2012). Die Entstehung des Erziehungsdenkens bei Schleiermacher. Ergon. Beiser, F.C. (2003). The Romantic imperative. The concept of early German Romanticism. Harvard University Press. Brachmann, J. (2002). Friedrich Schleiermacher: Ein pädagogisches Porträt. Beltz. Brachmann, J. (2008). Der pädagogische Diskurs der Sattelzeit. Eine Kommunikationsgeschichte. Klinkhardt. Czarny. M. (2014). Friedrich Schleiermacher und die Sozialpädagogik. Eine Rekonstruktion unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der strukturtheoretischen Professionstheorie. Ergon. Follak, A. (2005). Der “Aufblick zur Idee.” Eine vergleichende Studie zur Platonischen Pädagogik bei Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Natorp und Werner Jaeger. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Frank, M. (1985). Das individuelle Allgemeine. Textstrukturierung und Textinterpretation nach Schleiermacher. Suhrkamp. Herbart, J.F. (1802/​2022). Introductory lecture to students in pedagogy. In N. Friesen (Ed.), Tact and the pedagogical relation: Introductory readings. (pp. 25–​ 37). Peter Lang. Herbart, J.F. (1806/​1896). The science of education: Its general principles deduced from its aim. D.C. Heath & Co. Kant, I. (1784/​1991). Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose. In H.S. Reiss & H.B. Nisbet (Eds.), Kant: Political writings (pp. 41–​53). Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1803/​2007). Lectures on pedagogy. In I. Kant (2007). G. Zöller & R.B. Louden (Eds.), Anthropology, history and education (pp. 434–​ 485). Cambridge University Press. Kleint, S. (2008). Über die Pädagogik F.D.E. Schleiermachers. Theoriebildung im Spannungsfeld von Kritik und Affirmation. Peter Lang. MacPherson, C.B. (1973). The political theory of possessive individualism. From Hobbes to Locke. Oxford University Press. Meier, D. (2019). Schleiermachers Psychologie. Eine Phänomenologie der Seele. Nomos.

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Mielityinen, M. (2009). Das Ästhetische in Schleiermachers Bildungstheorie. Theorie eines individuellen Weltbezugs unter Einbeziehung der Theorie des Ästhetischen bei Schiller. Ergon. Oelkers, J. (1979). Die große Aspiration. WBG. Reble, A. (1935). Schleiermachers Kulturphilosophie. Stenger. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1799/​ 1988). On religion: Speeches to its cultured despisers. Cambridge University Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1814/​2017). Über den Beruf des Staates zur Erziehung. In A. Bolder, H. Bremer, & R. Epping (Eds.), Bildung für Arbeit unter neuer Steuerung (pp. 283–​299). Springer. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2008). Pädagogik. Die Theorie der Erziehung von 1820/​21 in einer Nachschrift. C. Ehrhardt & W. Virmond (Eds.). De Gruyter. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2017). Vorlesungen über Pädagogik im Sommer 1826. In Beljan, J. et al. (Eds.), Friedrich Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Vorlesungen: Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht. (pp. 543–​857). De Gruyter. Schmied-​ Kowarzik, W., & Benner, D. (1969). Prolegomena zur Grundlegung der Pädagogik II. Die Pädagogik der frühen Fichteaner und Hönigswalds. Henn. Seigel, J. (2005). The idea of the self. Thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventeenth century. Cambridge University Press. Smith, A. (1759). The theory of moral sentiments. Andrew Millar. Sünkel, W. (1964). Schleiermachers Begründung der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft. Henn. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press. Winkler, M. (2006). Kritik der Pädagogik. Der Sinn der Erziehung. Suhrkamp.

2.  The Educational Awareness of the Future1 David L ewin, University

of

Str athclyde , G lasgow

Abstract The following discussion centers on one particular element of Schleiermacher’s lectures, the relation to the future, by focusing on the section: “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?” (see above, pp. 65-​71). Firstly I ask: “What does it mean to be oriented to the future?,” distinguishing between any generally pedagogical influence that prepares for the future, and pedagogical influences designed specifically to raise awareness of the future. In section two, “Are we all interested in the future?,” I discuss the transition from immersion in the present to thinking about the future, and the extent to which this transition is part of growing up. Section three, Becoming Concerned, considers how this transition is practically achieved and ethically justified by discussing some practical illustrations in the form of vignettes. The fourth section then relates the foregoing discussions to more contemporary practices that encourage us to Be in the now, practices that are justified by criticisms of the tendency to habitually focus on the future. The overall discussion is framed by Schleiermacher’s ethical concern: whether sacrificing the present for the future in the life of the child is justified. I argue that, in Schleiermacher’s view, the question presupposes a false opposition of present and future and that, in the end, no sacrifice is necessary.

1. W hat Does It Mean to Be Oriented to the Future? “Please get on with your homework!” calls the mother to her twelve year old. The child is absorbed in playing a computer game and ignores the mother’s call. What should the mother say or do next? Should she offer some incentive (“I will raise your pocket money if you complete all your work this week”), appeal to the child’s sympathy (“it worries me that you will fall behind”), encourage the child to think about a further future (“if you don’t

I am grateful to Norm Friesen and Karsten Kenklies for reading and commenting on versions of this chapter.

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do your maths you will regret it later because you won’t be able to get into college”), switch off the computer, or maintain a dignified silence? Every parent or educator faces this kind of question all the time, and though the answers and their rationalizations may vary, the questions endure. They are questions very much of our time, as well as being questions at the forefront of Schleiermacher’s concerns in those lectures. Almost all responses of the mother share one feature: they attempt to remove the child from her/​his absorption in the present moment. Schleiermacher’s reflections here begin with the disarmingly simple observation that every pedagogical influence entails an inhibition of the child’s desire: “every predominantly pedagogical moment would be an inhibiting one” (above, p. 66). Pedagogical influence entails an external influence inhibiting what is otherwise inherent in the child, namely, immediate satisfaction in the present moment. In this chapter I want to show that this observation, and the questions that follow, are distinctively educational. Such educational considerations do not, of course, belong only to Schleiermacher, can be found in more recent educational theory. But the widespread concern for educational optimization results in a tendency to overlook the significance of the notion of time, and particularly the future, for education. Neil Postman, for instance, argued that a concern for the future was increasingly absent in our educational thinking: To Rousseau, education was essentially a subtraction process; to Locke an addition process. But whatever the differences between the two metaphors, they do have in common a concern for the future. Locke wanted education to result in a rich, varied, and copious book; Rousseau wanted education to result in a healthy flower…a concern for the future is increasingly missing from the metaphors of childhood in the present day. Neither Locke nor Rousseau ever doubted that childhood could exist without the future oriented guidance of adults. (Postman 1994, p. 60)

The possible responses of the mother to the child who is reluctant to switch off the computer game and get on with homework share something with the educational views of Rousseau and Locke: they are future oriented, whether or not the specification of that future is precise. Alongside the practical issues of how one might encourage future orientation, we might consider this to be an issue of philosophical anthropology: does being future oriented fulfill important criteria of being human? Is an awareness of the future something essential to achieving mature adulthood, or can human beings live quite well without this? Can activities that involve mere delight in the present be educational? What justifications ought to be given for bringing children out of delight in the present and into the future? It is this last question that is central to Schleiermacher: “Every pedagogical

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influence presents itself as the sacrifice of a present moment for a future one; and it raises the question whether or not we are justified in making this sacrifice” (above, p. 66). It appears, at first, to be a matter of sacrifice because pedagogical influence begins without the explicit consent of the child. Schleiermacher takes for granted that the child’s orientation to the future can be subject to educational influence. I will discuss two different ways of interpreting this idea. On the one hand, the concept of education depends upon a future oriented intention: in its most general sense, education entails an intention to improve someone, an intention that imagines a future condition. This first notion is expressed by Kenklies (2020) as follows: “[t]‌here is no education without ἐσχατον (eschaton: a final end) as education is what we intentionally do in order to arrive at a different, in some respect better state of being” (p. 3). Teaching someone a skill is related to such an end inasmuch as the person being taught (i.e., the student) learns to be able to do something tomorrow that they could not do yesterday. In this sense, all education, like any form of intentional activity, is future oriented. Thus, education is here called preparation (for the future). However, there is a more specific sense in which students can be oriented to the future by education: where educational influences seek to raise awareness of the future. In this second case the student is not just prepared for, but encouraged to think about possible futures, to become oriented toward the future. This idea that has recently been popularized through the notion of future mindedness (Allen 2019; Seligman et al. 2016). Here the educational content is less the knowledge, skill or disposition that prepares than it is the awareness of the future itself. The mother who encourages the child to get on with their homework might well discuss the consequences of various actions and decisions with the child, thereby encouraging the child to become aware of their own future. We can elaborate these different notions of future relatedness by considering who it is that imagines the future of the child: in the first case, the parent or teacher imagines some change to be good for the child, and so teaches them how to tie their shoelaces, for instance; in the second case, the children themselves think about their own future, and realize that being able to tie shoelaces will result in a better future. Whether or not the student would “spontaneously” begin imagining possible futures, it seems that adults (e.g., parents and teachers) are often inclined to encourage this future awareness in children by presenting various possible consequences as inducements to act: “if you don’t put your shoes on, we can’t go to the park, and we will be stuck in doors all day!” As the above example of the mother and the child

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suggests, in practice, these two ways of becoming future oriented are often hard to distinguish shading almost imperceptibly into each other. Schleiermacher claims that “it is truly the nature of the pedagogical influence to be oriented toward the future” (above, p. 68). I interpret this being “oriented toward the future” as the first form of preparation. Where the adult, the parent or educator (i.e., the influencer) intends to prepare the child (i.e., the influencee) for the future, they see certain influences as being beneficial to the influencee. This raises the important issue of justification: is the influencer right that such influence is beneficial, and, even if we agree that it is, on what basis is the influencer justified in determining this on behalf of the influence? In other words: What happens if the influencee disagrees, or otherwise resists the influence? Before attempting to answer this question, it is worth noting something about the question itself: that justification for educational influence is of central importance for Schleiermacher. Why is justification for educational influence considered to be so important? The pedagogical relation could be regarded as one in which the adult simply knows better than the child, especially a very young child, what is good for them. Such a view does not satisfy Schleiermacher. But for many English readers education is understood as something that does not require explicit justification because the concept of education is thought to refer only to influences that are good, as R. S. Peters (1966, p. 25) put it: “[I]‌t would be a logical contradiction to say that a man [sic] had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better.” Peters represents an Anglo-​A merican tradition of educational theory which often interprets the concept of education normatively, a context in which education requires no ethical justification. This is in contrast to the concept of influence, where no such normative sense is implied. Influence can be good or bad and so deliberate influence is generally in need of justification. We might accept some concepts of bad education, but on the whole, we reserve other terms for this: from excessively paternalistic forms of influence (instilling and inculcating) to outright imposition (indoctrinating and brainwashing). To the ears of English speakers, the concepts of brainwashing or indoctrination describe forms of intrinsically unjustified influence just as education often describes intrinsically justified influence. The fact that Schleiermacher concerns himself so much with justification leads to certain considerations that seem somewhat removed to English speakers: namely the justifications for interrupting the state of being immersed in present satisfaction. In what follows I use the term education in this more descriptive sense and often refer to educational influence to keep this in mind.

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The notion of educational influence suggests that something is perceived to be in need of change or improvement, something that the influencee may not (yet) perceive. Thus, educational influence “appears at every single moment in opposition to the desire of the person to be educated” (above, p. 66) and therefore requires some justification. In seeking justification, we could say that an educational influence, unlike the influence of an advertisement, is intended to benefit the influencee, while an advertiser might be indifferent to the good of the influencee, thinking only of their business. Even where there is an intention to benefit the influencee, it is not uncommon that the influencee does not perceive this. This does not mean that Schleiermacher needs to define “the Good” in his lectures. Indeed, it is important to note that he leaves the Good undefined. On what basis, then, should the influencee accept, or consent to influence? Why should it matter if the influencee consents or not, as long as the influence is for their own good? Consent cannot be the sole criterion here because, as Schleiermacher acknowledges, consent cannot reasonably be expected from some influencees (e.g., very young children). These questions are important partly because they point to practical educational problems that many of us (as parents and educators) regularly deal with, but also because they elaborate the central ethical problem of education that underpins Schleiermacher’s lectures. This ethical problem is most directly raised by the question “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?” (above, p. 65). It is not just that we sacrifice the present for the future, but that, as educational influencers, we appear to do so on behalf of others: influencees. We see in Schleiermacher a dialectical argument that seeks to reconcile the opposition between living in the present moment and being encouraged to think about the future, such that “at the end, there will be no opposition … to overcome” (p. 68). To be sure, this begins with the general recognition that any pedagogical influence appears to entail sacrificing the present, not just those that encourage the child to think about their own future. Indeed, that is why I have distinguished the general future orientation of all forms of educational influence from influences that are concerned with developing awareness of the future. Becoming aware of the future takes on a particular significance here because it is partly in this awareness that justification is found, but it is only a partial answer since there are cases where such awareness cannot reasonably be expected. It is worth noting that Schleiermacher’s discussion can be related to diverse debates by considering how our educational orientation to the future tends to be interpreted in variously psychological and instrumental terms. It is not hard to find relevant psychological discussion of forms of motivation

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(Deci and Ryan 2000), of delayed gratification (Carducci 2009), or of developmental stages where future mindedness is thought to be a developmental achievement (Seligman et al. 2016). Future mindedness seems to be fundamental to any notion of instrumentalism which is defined in terms of the relation between means and ends, and provides the general structures for thinking about the means through which children are, or can be, prepared for the future and for useful employment (where awareness of the future may or may not be important). Despite these diverse approaches, systematic pedagogical consideration of how, why, and on what justification we influence children with respect to the future are not as common as one might imagine, partly because as just argued, the conception of education is taken to be “good.” In contrast to these approaches, I take Schleiermacher’s approach to be distinctively educational inasmuch as Schleiermacher sees pedagogy, by its nature, as oriented to the future. The most interesting and pressing cases of justification here are where the influencee cannot give explicit consent to external influence. In this sense Schleiermacher presents a set of specifically educational observations and concerns that arise out of the pedagogical relations between those who educate and those who are educated: it is of the nature of educational influence that it cannot be fully consented to in advance.

2. Are We All Interested in the Future? The trash movie masterpiece Plan 9 from Outer Space opens with the following pronouncement: “We are all interested in the future, for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives” (Wood 2011, 0:0:20). Although the logic here seems hard to fault—​it describes the future as the place (or time) where, indeed, we all will live—​it seems that such a statement reflects a broadly “Western” linear temporality in which priority is given to the future because of a unidirectional view of time in which the past is gone. It has been argued that only since the Enlightenment did the Western tradition take the future to be something open to us to form and shape, and thus it became possible to speak of our “discovery of the future.” Furthermore, it is suggested that medieval European societies did not have a concept of an open future, and that the very idea of the future as full of possibility is a product of modernity (Hölscher 1999; Zirfas 2014). Thus, we should be cautious: where contemporary discourses around future mindedness present this as a central, even essential, human virtue, we might wonder how this notion operates, where it comes from, and whose interests it serves. It might be naïve to imagine that, at least as adults, we can just “be in the moment,” or

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entirely suspend our habitual future mindedness. Any such suspension would seem to be short lived, and probably illusory. It seems almost impossible to imagine human life in general without planning, hoping, anticipating, and ultimately building the future. Yet we might be equally suspicious of a view in which the present moment only achieves substantial meaning in relation to the future that is to come. Do we continually sacrifice our present for the future? Is there any value in the present moment if it is not directed toward some anticipated future? I take one of Schleiermacher’s interests to be the fact that children appear not to begin with any awareness of the future, and that such an awareness must be formed because it is in this emerging awareness that part of the justification for pedagogical influence arises. There certainly does seem to be a time in children’s lives when they are absorbed in being in the present moment. For Schleiermacher the activity of childhood is firstly characterized by “play” which “offers satisfaction in the very moment without regard to the future.” He describes play in contrast to “exercise,” “the activity directed toward the future” (above p. 70). The more exercise and play can be aligned or united (e.g., in the form of educational toys), the less the child would experience being directed toward the future as a sacrifice. The predominance of play in early childhood education suggests that this is well understood. Educators should, as far as possible, seek activities which require no sacrifice of the present because “all of our life activity manifests consistent opposition to such… practice” (p. 66), that is, of sacrificing the present for the future. While children are especially oriented to play and the “presentism” that characterizes it, Schleiermacher’s point is also that all human beings share this orientation to some extent. Schleiermacher points out that we don’t just nourish ourselves “by mere ingestion” (p. 66) with food, we occupy ourselves with enjoyable and sociable meals. While adults exist in both present and future orientation, it seems that the young child can only exist in the present moment and has to learn that future orientation. If children do not want to do their homework, eat their vegetables, or practice scales on the piano why should they? Why should they abandon present satisfaction for some unknown future that they are told will be better? Of course, any unknown future may never be realized. In Emile, Rousseau warns also against sacrificing the present for the future: Of all children born, half, at the most, reach adolescence… What, then, must be thought of that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens the child with chains of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know not what pretended happiness which it is to be believed he will never enjoy! (Rousseau 1762/​1979, p. 79)

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Without explicitly referencing Rousseau, Schleiermacher similarly states that “the time of education is characterized by the highest level of mortality, making the sacrifice of an early moment for a later one lose any relevance for those who die early” (above p. 67). The subsequent reduction in infant/​child mortality should not lead us to suppose that we are now justified in sacrificing the present because the future is more likely to be realized. It seems for Schleiermacher we cannot “play” for all of our lives, and that we must engage in exercises which are directed toward the future. How does Schleiermacher overcome the apparent contradiction between the present and the future? Where we encourage awareness of the future in the child, we introduce a gradual separation of the practices that achieve an immediate satisfaction in the present from practices that are directed toward the future (above p. 70). In order for the educator to be justified in separating the child from immanent satisfaction, Schleiermacher says any separation must be gradual; justification requires the satisfaction in one thing to be replaced by satisfaction in another. The source of satisfaction may change, but the satisfaction itself is constant, and so it is possible to avoid the sacrifice of satisfaction itself. A different kind of satisfaction is derived by the child when they become aware that their future will be better than the present. This is, in fact, rather complex. While children are often impatient to become grown up, to become a “big boy or girl” we would probably resist identifying this desire for the future with the kinds of abstract or instrumental forms of future orientation implied in the appreciation that knowing how to tie shoelaces or pass exams will be of future benefit. The adult will appreciate the future benefit of acquiring certain knowledges, skills, and dispositions that the child probably does not. Still, we encourage children to acquire these things and do so by the use of various forms of persuasion known to the art of the parent. Such persuasion mostly seeks some form of consent. Thus, a kind of consent for the educational influence of the child can be obtained (above p. 70). But this consent is not the complete answer to justifying the apparent sacrifice of the present since, as Schleiermacher acknowledges, such future awareness and consent is unlikely to be present in the younger child: “the [young] child lives entirely in the present, not for the future, and they therefore cannot participate in this purpose, and cannot have an interest in it for the development of their own individual character” (above p. 66). And yet Schleiermacher later says that “the child develops an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is” (above p. 70). By exercise Schleiermacher means activities which are directed toward the future. Even play, through repeating certain actions, goes some way to prepare the child, and so “play activities are already exercises” (above p. 71).

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But it seems that not all exercises are play because some activities that direct children to the future require them to cease what we are currently doing. There is a complex dialectic here between the satisfaction that can be derived through the pedagogical relation (i.e., trusting the parent or teacher) and developing an appreciation of the exercise for what it is. Clearly this does not happen overnight, but the gap (and how it is traversed) is worth discussing in more detail: the gap between the younger child who is not aware of their future and cannot give consent to influence, and the older child who is aware and can give (or may not need to give) consent because they learn to appreciate the apparent sacrifice of the present. As suggested earlier, for Schleiermacher, it is not sufficient to simply assert that the educator knows what is in the interest of the child and leave it at that. We can now see why this is the case: because such an assertion would not offer the ongoing satisfaction to the child necessary for influence to be justified. In order to explore how this gap is bridged, I will elaborate the transition from play to exercise through three vignettes.

3. Becoming Concerned If it is true that education is firstly future oriented in a general sense and secondly that it encourages an awareness of the future in the child, then it can be said to follow a temporo-​educational logic. According to this logic, the awareness of the future does not exist in the young child, or does so only in nascent form, as a potential to be realized. How is that potential realized? The everyday activities of parents and educators (that encourage children to think about the future) testify to the fact that we generally act as if awareness of the future exists in potentia: it can be formed within the child because children are generally capable of developing this. But with Schleiermacher we ask how such influence is achieved and justified. How does this justification depend upon the consent of the influencee? It is inevitable that the child does not begin consenting to the separation of play and exercise. Let us try and focus on the separation by moving through three stages: Three vignettes that illustrate the formation of future orientation and that suggest certain justifications. *** Vignette 1: the child at play: “Daddy, look at my train track!” “That’s great. Can you make an even bigger one?” “Yes. But I am going to play with this.”

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Vignette 2: exercise through trust: “Miss, why do we have to do this trigonometry stuff? It’s really boring!” “I know this may not seem useful right now, but you will thank me one day, I promise.”

Vignette 3: exercise through insight: After learning piano for 2 years, Laura says to her herself, “I am starting to realize that learning those scales is paying off. I will practice more!” *** Here a relation between present and future is framed within three different educational contexts: namely parenting, schooling, and (self-​)education. Recall that Schleiermacher distinguishes play and exercise in the following way: We call “play” or a “game” in the broadest sense that which, in the life of the child, offers satisfaction in the very moment without regard to the future. On the other hand, [we call] “exercise” the activity directed toward the future. (p. 51)

In the first case, the state of play can be characterized as embodying an immanent relation between present and future: play is its own pleasure and requires nothing additional for justification. Note, however, that the adult says, probably without too much thought, “can you make a bigger train track?” encouraging a sense of aspiration and development which, in this case, the child seems content to ignore. As the child grows up, parents and educators find themselves encouraging the child with greater urgency to consider future possibilities that are opened up or closed down by present activities. Typically, educators will encourage children not only to engage in play, but also in exercises. Initially, parents and educators might encourage exercises through fun—​exercise and play being, then, practically indistinguishable. But as education goes on and becomes more abstract, normally within institutions we call schools, educators find themselves presenting exercises not always framed in the forms of play. Trigonometry may be fun if well taught, but after some time the educator will probably refer to more abstract ideas requiring a certain discipline and application—​to what Schleiermacher calls exercise. These exercises may be justified in terms of future payoffs. Here we see the space between play and exercise starts to become opened up. The child, now in school, is not engaged in play but in future oriented exercises: math exercises directed toward a future good. The educator uses perhaps a familiar, though not necessarily persuasive justification: “I know

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this may not seem useful right now, but you will thank me one day, I promise.” Whether the child is persuaded will depend in part on the relationship between the educator and child. By reference to a promise, the principle of trust grounds the relationship between the educator and student. It seems that stronger bonds make the commitment of trust easier to make. Following practice of certain exercises, it is hoped that the child will become aware of the “formative value.” The initial attitude of trust (a kind of leap of faith [see Lewin 2014a]) allows a certain satisfaction in the present to come from something that initially appears to be an exercise, because the trust in the educator is experienced as a kind of “immediate satisfaction of the present” (above, p. 70). Play and exercise seem to merge and, as Schleiermacher puts it, “[t]‌he more these two interpenetrate, the more ethically perfect the pedagogical activity becomes” (p. 68). This form of trust gradually develops into something like consent which, later, gives way to an intrinsic insight on the part of the child herself who now seeks out the work of practice and exercise, recognizing the value therein, even though it is not directly “play.” This brings us to the third vignette. Now the child reflects on the piano exercises that contribute to her development as a pianist: the developing child sees for herself that the exercises done in the present will result in a future payoff, and so play and exercise are shown again to merge. At first sight this might appear to be the sacrifice of the present for the future, but in fact, because the child sees the value in their practice, there is an immediate satisfaction in the moment of this insight that need not be postponed. The student no longer needs to trust the educator for she derives sufficient satisfaction in her piano exercises simply from the knowledge that those exercises are developing her playing ability. The basis for the unity between play and exercise is no longer trust in the educator, but a “consciousness of human capacities as being under development” (above, p. 71). The child’s orientation to the future is grounded in insight that makes the present efforts intrinsically satisfying, even though they are simultaneously future oriented. This elaboration of the formation of a relation to the future gives an impression of something more linear and systematic than is likely to actually take place, so must be understood as only a theoretical outline of a complex set of practical processes. These vignettes show a familiar progressive path from (1) having no awareness of the future, with an adult seeking to inculcate one, to (2) having a relation to the future encouraged by someone else, and gradually accepted (or perhaps rejected) on trust, to (3) realizing an awareness of the future by and for oneself. The educational trajectory can be seen in the shift from the child for whom only play is desirable (and for its own sake), to being convinced or

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motivated to accept that sometimes it is worthwhile postponing present fun for a future benefit (which is a form of present satisfaction), though relying on the promise of the adult (or perhaps rewards and punishments), to a third more “developed” understanding, in which the child now sees exercise as worth undertaking in relation to their own future projects and developing self. Note the principle here that the projects now belong to the child herself. Although I use the term developed with caution, it signals that the commitment has become internalized. This internalization may be interpreted in terms of the idea that the heteronomous awareness of the future payoff has become absorbed and integrated in the child, and so that awareness has become established as autonomous and robust. Where this autonomy is the goal, it can be (and has been) used to justify all sorts of sacrifices of the present. But this is not quite Schleiermacher’s view. Schleiermacher does not allow this sacrifice, even for the future payoff of the autonomous subject. This linear account leaves a good deal more to explore. One problem for educational theorists is how the transition from trust in, and recognition from, an educator to autonomous insight (i.e., from 2 to 3) is to be practically achieved and ethically justified. If the student relies on, and trusts in, the educator to turn to something that (without the proffered recognition of the educator) is not immediately appealing, what process or shift is necessary for the student to see for herself the value in the exercises over play? How does the student shift from a state of dependency, of having future projects defined by parents, educators, and wider society, to one of independence? Does such a shift spontaneously happen, through ongoing maturation, or does is require particular conditions, circumstances or interventions? In the terms of Schleiermacher’s lectures, this question concerns the child’s consciousness of human development itself since it is through the emergent consciousness of the value of the exercises that they become immanently worthwhile “[i]‌nasmuch therefore as play in its design is exercise as well, it is nothing but the complete satisfaction of the consciousness of the child in the present, because while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities” (above p. 71). For Schleiermacher, satisfaction needs to be sustained throughout the different stages of education, from play to exercise, if that education is to be ethically justified. Trust, or love for the teacher can be an ethical bridge if the student experiences the interruption of play as a new form of satisfaction derived from the relationship of trust or love. Without constant satisfaction we have an unjustified sacrifice of the present for a future that may never come, or that may be other than hoped for. We could also say that an embryonic form of consent

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is present as the trust that the young child places in the educator, trust that provides some kind of satisfaction. Thus far, I have examined firstly the fundamentally future related nature of pedagogical influence, and secondly the influence toward becoming aware of the future. I have been particularly interested in the latter partly because it is the development of this future awareness that provides one obvious justification for pedagogical influence but the most challenging ethical issues arise with those unable to consent the pedagogical influence. Nevertheless, the movement toward consent is important and is evident when it is expressed in terms of the enhanced self-​activity of the “influencee:” becoming aware of one’s future entails the formation of agency, itself a key justification for pedagogical influence. However, a critical reading might view this process of becoming future aware as an internalization of “future mindedness” which reflects a kind of post subjectivation in which the self is constructed to service the instrumental needs of social order, needs which require subjects to take up an awareness of the future in order to serve it. In other words, there might be limits to how far into the future our awareness should be encouraged to go (Kenklies 2020) or how much our awareness ought to be absorbed by thoughts of tomorrow. Here I can only acknowledge these critical concerns in general, though I now turn to consider efforts to mitigate the imperative of the future through practices that encourage us to be in the present.

4.  Be in the Now Having children sitting “mindfully” for short periods is said to improve their disposition in all sorts of ways: from concentration to anger management, from reading and math scores to general stress and anxiety (Albrecht et al. 2012). While practices of mindfulness are quite ancient, often related to Buddhist meditative traditions (Ergas 2014; Vetter 1988; Gethin 2011), the most influential definition of contemporary secular mindfulness that has been adopted by programs of mindfulness in schools is probably that of Jon Kabat-​Zinn who, though trained in Buddhist meditation, prefers to define his program of Mindfulness-​Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) in scientific rather than religious terms (Wilson 2014, p. 35). Zinn defines mindfulness as “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (Kabat-​Zinn 2003, p. 145). It is little wonder that this kind of antidote to the malaise of late modernity, where stress and anxiety seem to make us incapable of enjoying the present moment, has wide appeal. Indeed, mindfulness is enthusiastically embraced by educational institutions

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and governments seeking a corrective to the mental health crises that attend modern educational practices (Meiklejoh 2012). But clearly such efforts to put mindfulness to use are in danger of instrumentalizing the very activity designed (at least in some contexts) to suspend, resist or subvert the totalizing influence of instrumentalization. In any case, Zinn’s definition of mindfulness is interesting since it should immediately strike the educator as addressing something very practical and educational, namely paying attention on purpose. Educators are in the business of purposefully drawing the attention of students to certain things. Although a complex idea, a great deal of what we call teaching could be boiled down to the arts of directing and shaping attention (Lewin 2014b). It can appear that the practice of paying attention in mindfulness is not the same as the educator demanding that the children pay attention, but systematically distinguishing these forms of directing attention is no easy task (Lewin 2018; Ergas 2018). Zinn’s definition highlights not only paying attention on purpose, but also refers to the object or referent of attention: “the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (Kabat-​Zinn 2003, p. 145). The directive to be in the present moment, and to practice “being here,” addresses a problem that some say is made more acute by the pace of the modern world, and the ubiquitous presence of media and entertainment taking us out of the present moment (Stiegler 2011; Lewin 2016). In the instrumental, neoliberal conditions of our culture, our relation to the present is almost always shaped by an orientation to the future. It is a general incapacity to be in the present as the present that many practitioners of mindfulness regard as a danger to our mental and spiritual health. The encouragement to be in the moment and to think about the future appear to be opposed. There are, however, different ways of reconciling them. First, the instrumentalism that structures modern Western forms of secular mindfulness suggests that, whatever else mindfulness is, it is also very much oriented to, and by, the future. Any activity directed at improvements of the self are teleological in the sense outlined earlier. However, it is this very instrumentalist “appropriation” of Eastern spiritual traditions that worries so many who are interested in the place of mindfulness in contemporary educational discourse (Hyland 2009; O’Donnell 2015). Leaving that debate to one side, there is a more interesting sense in which these encouragements to be in the present for the future can be reconciled. This is a sense which is implied in Schleiermacher’s analysis: to be mindful is not to be disconnected from time in a timeless now, but to be very much located in the temporality of the present moment: the present is only present by virtue of its integration of past and future. Equally, satisfaction in the present does not mean never

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giving thought to the future. Awareness of the future, at least in some measure, seems to be an essential component of present satisfaction. Schleiermacher’s analysis of play and exercise appears initially to create an opposition between the two where the present must be sacrificed for the future if the child is to grow up. But this is not, in the end, necessarily a kind of sacrifice. Schleiermacher considers various possibilities: the child may die before seeing any return on the “investment;” alternatively, satisfaction in the present and the future may be merged by making play of any exercise. Schleiermacher is able to mediate the apparent opposition by using an approach discussed earlier in the three stages of the development of the relation to the future. The formation of our awareness of the future can be interpreted as an arc beginning with the identity/​unity of both (play and exercise), moving through a separation (defined here through trust), and returning as a transformed kind of identity/​unity (insight) where play and exercise are once again indistinct. At no point is satisfaction in the present sacrificed, rather the “object” from which satisfaction is derived changes. The idealized process unfolds through the continued affirmation of the child’s present satisfaction though transferred onto less immediate objects, allowing the child to experience their own relation to the future. One might say, therefore, that through play the child learns how to self-​educate by becoming aware of their own future and how their present actions influence their future, or as Schleiermacher puts it: “while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities” (above p. 71). In this way the child develops a capacity to see the “play” in “exercises” and thereby to derive an immediate satisfaction: this immediacy comes from the act of imagination that allows the future to be present. Awareness of how present actions shape the future, and how future possibilities are imminent in those actions are modes of being in the present. Encouraging adults to interrupt their habitual orientation to the future and to embrace the present through forms of mindfulness might be justified by the idea that adults see for themselves that their focus on the future results in a poor relation to the present. But it is not obvious that children, in general, share the problems for which mindfulness is meant to be the solution. Before the child’s awareness of the future is interrupted by practices of mindfulness, that awareness must first be established. Awareness of the future must be constructed before it can be deconstructed. It seems that mindfulness may be as much about locating us in time as interrupting time. Moreover, if we consider mindfulness as being continuous with other activities which require disciplined attention (the mindfulness or attentiveness employed when learning a musical instrument, or pretty much any learning), then mindfulness is

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really being attentive, being aware, taking care. And consciousness of one’s own development is very much part of this kind of attentiveness and care. This suggests an interpretation of mindfulness as a process of embracing relations to past and future in the present moment, or as seeing the present being constituted by the past and the future.

5. Conclusion In this chapter I have discussed Schleiermacher’s ideas concerning the formation of a relation to the future. Not only must we recognize that all education prepares for the future, but more significantly that the realization of an awareness of the future within the child seems to be an important part of education, and more particularly, for the justification of educational influence. The child participates in their own formation (becoming a self-​ educator) through the awareness that they develop of the future and how their actions have consequences. For Schleiermacher, satisfaction needs to be sustained throughout the different stages of education, from play to exercise, if that education is to be ethically justified. Otherwise, we have an unjustified sacrifice of the present for a future that may never come, or that may be other than hoped for. An embryonic form of consent could be defined as the trust that the young child’s places in the influencer, trust that provides some kind of satisfaction. Even where the immediate satisfaction of play is interrupted, that satisfaction is replaced by a “new” satisfaction derived from something else: e.g., the recognition that the child acquires in doing what the educator asks or expects. The child may delight in pleasing their teacher even when engaged in exercises that are “in themselves” anything but delightful. Thus delight (or satisfaction) is present in exercise. How this sustained satisfaction through recognition is achieved within the complexities of modern educational contexts (e.g., large classrooms where pedagogical relations are harder to maintain) is a difficult practical problem. Where children experience little satisfaction in their day-​to-​day schooling, we must wonder whether the influence is justified. The relation of theory and practice is itself another vital theme within the earlier sections of Schleiermacher’s lectures and are beyond my scope. In the conditions of contemporary society, the notion that we must be encouraged to think about the future looks somewhat different. Notions of future mindedness have a pathological undercurrent where we risk losing our relation to the present moment beyond it servicing future needs, as though we live in the conditions of present satisfaction by being mortgaged for a tomorrow that never seems to arrive.

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It is not clear how far a concern for the future is essential for human existence or to what extent it is a good thing. And if it is generally good, is it natural, or is it learned, and if learned, how, to what end and, crucially, with what justification? Perhaps more important than any answers we might find in Schleiermacher’s texts are the educational questions that he sets for himself crystallized in the central question: how is educational influence justified?

References Albrecht, N.J., Albrecht, P.M., & Cohen, M. (2012). Mindfully teaching in the classroom: A literature review. Australian Journal of Teacher Education, 37, 1–​14. Alhadeff-​Jones, M. (2017). Time and the rhythms of emancipatory education: Rethinking the temporal complexity of self and society. Routledge. Allen, S. (2019). Future-​mindedness: A white paper prepared for the John Templeton Foundation by the Greater Good Science Center at UC Berkeley. https://​w ww.temple​ ton.org/​w p-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2019/​0 4/​W hi​te_​P​aper​_ ​Fut​u re-​M ind​edne​ss_​L ​R _​ FI ​NAL.pdf Bloom, A. (1979). Introduction. In: J.J. Rousseau (Ed.), Emile; or on education. Basic Books. Bredow, R. v. (2006). Living without numbers or time. http://​w ww.spie​gel.de/​intern​atio​ nal/​spie​gel/​bra​zil-​s-​pir​a ha-​t ribe-​l iv​ing-​w ith​out-​numb​ers-​or-​t ime-​a-​414​291.html Carducci, B.J. (2009). Basic processes of Mischel’s cognitive-​a ffective perspective: Delay of gratification and conditions of behavioral consistency. In B.J. Carducci (Ed.), The psychology of personality: Viewpoints, research, and applications (pp. 443–​4). John Wiley and Sons. Deci E., & Ryan, R. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25(1), 54–​67. Dewey, J. (1963). Experience and education. Collier. Ergas, O. (2014). Mindfulness in education at the intersection of science, religion, and healing. Critical Studies in Education, 55(1), 58–​72. Ergas, O. (2017). Reconstructing “education” through mindful attention: Positioning the mind at the center of curriculum and pedagogy. Palgrave Macmillan. Ergas, O. (2018). Reply to Lewin. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 37(3), 323–​327. Friesen, N. (2020). “Education as a Geisteswissenschaft:” An introduction to human science pedagogy. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 52(3), 307–​322. Gethin, R. (2011). On some definitions of mindfulness. Contemporary Buddhism, 12(1), 263–​279. Greteman A., & Wojcikiewicz, S. (2014). The problems with the future: Educational futurism and the figural child. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 48(4), 559–​572.

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Hayman, G., & Huebner, B. (2019). Temporal updating, behavioral learning, and the phenomenology of time-​consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42(E254), 1–​69. Doi: 10.1017/​S0140525X19000517. Hyland, T. (2009). Mindfulness and the therapeutic function of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 43(1), 119–​131. Kabat-​Zinn, J. (2003). Mindfulness-​based interventions in context: Past, present, and future. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10(2), 144–​ 156. Doi:10.1093/​ clipsy/ ​bpg016. Kakkori, L. (2013). Education and the concept of time. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 45(5), 571–​583. Doi: 10.1111/​j.1469-​5812.2011.00838.x. Kenklies, K. (2012). Educational theory as topological rhetoric: The concepts of pedagogy of Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31(3), 265–​273. Kenklies, K. (2020). Dōgen’s time and the flow of otiosity—​exiting the educational rat race. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(3), 617–​ 630. Doi: 10.1111/​ 1467-​9752.12410. Lewin, D. (2014a). The leap of learning. Ethics and Education, 9(1), 113–​126. Doi: 10.1080/​17449642.2014.890319. Lewin, D. (2014b). Behold: Silence and attention in education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 48(3), 355–​369. Lewin, D. (2016). The pharmakon of educational technology: The disruptive power of attention in education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 35(3), 251–​265. Lewin, D. (2018). Review of reconstructing “education” through mindful attention: Positioning the mind at the center of curriculum and pedagogy, by Oren Ergas. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 37(3), 315–​321. Meiklejoh, J., Phillips, C., Freedman, L.M., Griffin, M.L., Biegel, G., Roach, A., & Saltzman, A. (2012). Integrating mindfulness training into K-​12 education: Fostering the resilience of teachers and students. Mindfulness, 3, 291–​307. Doi: 10.1007/​ s12671-​012-​0 094-​5. Mischel, W., & Ebbesen, E.B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16(2), 329–​337. Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science, 244(4907), 933–​938. Nevins, A., Pesetsky D., & Rodrigues, C. (2009). Piraha exceptionality: A reassessment. Language, 85, 355–​404. O’Donnell, A. (2015). Contemplative pedagogy and mindfulness: Developing creative attention in an age of distraction. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 49(2), 187–​202. Peters, R.S. (1966). Ethics and education. Allen and Unwin. Postman, N. (1994). The disappearance of childhood. Vintage Books. Rappleye, J., & Komatsu, H. (2016). Living on borrowed time: Rethinking temporality, self, nihilism, and schooling. Comparative Education, 52(2), 177–​201. Doi: 10.1080/​ 03050068.2016.1142736.

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Seligman, M.E.P., Railton, P., Baumeister, R.F., & Sripada, C.S. (2016). Homo prospectus. Oxford University Press. Stiegler, B. (2011). Taking care of the youth and the generations. Stanford University Press. Urbaniak, J., & I, E. (2016). The dynamics of God’s reign as a hermeneutic key to Jesus’ eschatological expectation. HTS Theological Studies, 72(1), 1–​9. Vetter, T. (1988). The ideas and meditative practices of early Buddhism. Brill. Vial, T. (2013). Schleiermacher: A guide for the perplexed. Bloomsbury. Vlieghe, J. (2015). Traditional and digital literacy. The literacy hypothesis, technologies of reading and writing, and the “grammatized body.” Ethics and Education, 10(2), 209–​226. Wells, H.G. (1913). The discovery of the future. B.W. Huebsch. Wilson, J. (2014). Mindful America: The mutual transformation of Buddhist meditation and American culture. Oxford University Press. Wood, E. (2011). Plan 9 from outer space. Youtube https://​w ww.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​ Ln7W​F78P​olA. Zirfas, J. (2014). Gegenwart. In Wulf, C. & Zirfas, J. (Eds.), Handbuch Pädagogische Anthropologie (pp. 363–​373). Springer.

3.  Entering the Circle. Schleiermacher and the Rise of Modern Education Studies K arsten K enk lies , University

of

Str athclyde , G lasgow

Abstract Next to Johann Friedrich Herbart, Schleiermacher is seen as one of the founding fathers of a modern discipline of Education Studies. Indeed, his lectures on pedagogy from 1826 (a part of which is presented in this volume) present a form of reflecting on education that is completely new. Nowhere is this more visible than in the first sentence of this lecture series. Through an analysis of this opening line and a comparison of it with other opening sentences of earlier seminal texts on education—​namely Locke and Rousseau—​t his chapter shows how it is only with Schleiermacher that a modern hermeneutic understanding of Education Studies is realized in academic reflections on education.

1. Introduction: First Sentences First sentences have what I call “an angle of lean;” they lean forward, inclining in the direction of the elaborations they anticipate. First sentences thus have content in prospect […]. Even the simplest first sentence is on its toes, beckoning us to the next sentence and the next and the next, promising us insights, complications, crises, and, sometimes, resolutions. Stanley Fish (2011)

Indeed, first sentences are special sentences: They set the tone, they invite and, at the same time, set expectations for what is to come. In one-​way or another, they provide the foundation for everything to follow. This is not only true for novels or other types of writing but often also for speeches and oral presentations: Readers as much as listeners are to be directed in a certain way through the very first sentence of the written or spoken word. Especially what we might call “programmatic” texts or speeches very often rest on their first sentence: It’s frequently the first sentence that lets us know

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in which direction the argument will develop. It might therefore not come as a surprise that a comparison of the initial sentences of three seminal texts in pedagogical discourse reveals more than just superficial differences attributable to authorial vicissitudes or the different times and circumstances under which they were written: They reveal fundamental differences that mirror the fundamentally different positions the authors assume toward education and educational thinking. Of course, differences of the kind shown below should never be overestimated, they hardly can be taken to represent differences between the entire oeuvres of certain authors, let alone whole cultures or traditions of thought. They are, after all, only three texts that to some extent stand on their own and for themselves. This is especially true when we talk about pre-​modern texts which have a specific and often troubled history of transmission and, in addition, are generally discussed in translation. However, looking at opening sentences might sensitize readers to perceive certain variances in educational thought, and it needs to be left to the individual to decide if those differences can be understood as representations of something far more complex than just the individuality of the texts which they introduce. This chapter discusses the opening sentences of three different seminal pedagogical texts: J. Locke’s Some Thoughts concerning Education of 1693, J.-​J. Rousseau’s Émile ou De l’éducation of 1762 and Schleiermacher’s lectures Grundzüge der Erziehungskunst (Outlines of the Art of Education) of 1826. In exploring those, the chapter draws attention to certain differences which might indeed represent more than those that one would naturally expect to separate three random texts. Introducing three texts written in three different periods of educational thought and three different contexts, these first sentences shed some light on new ways of educational thinking introduced by Schleiermacher: the originality of this way of thinking lies perhaps not so much in what Schleiermacher says about education but how he says it. Drawing attention to the ways of reflecting on education, this chapter aspires to provide insight into the origins of what subsequently became known as the academic discipline of Education Studies—​an academic discipline in its own right.

2. Theoretical Considerations: The Hermeneutic Foundation of the Circle Looking at Locke, the first example listed above, one instantly recognizes that a certain direction is being set: “A Sound Mind in a sound Body, is a short, but full description of a Happy State in this World: He that has these

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Two, has little more to wish for; and he that wants either of them, is but little the better for any thing else” (Locke 1693, p. 1) It is with those words that John Locke begins his essay Some Thoughts concerning Education, published 1693 in London. What Locke is attempting here seems very obvious. Since that the title already gives away that the text will concern itself with education, the first sentence introduces an ideal state of being for humans which, not surprisingly, will function as an image for what education is to aspire to. Leaving open the possibility that a person might not have yet achieved this state of being (the ideal, so to speak, is not necessarily natural), education is already alluded to here as providing the means to achieve this end. This is the expectation that the first sentence raises in the reader—​an expectation that is indeed satisfied by further reading. At least two aspects are interesting here: Firstly, education seems to be defined predominantly by the specific goal that is to be achieved. To discuss education, in other words, means to discuss its goals, its purpose. And, secondly, on a more fundamental level, it seems that a treatise on education can actually start with a discussion of the goals of education. In other words: a new concept of education can be introduced by introducing a new goal for education and, perhaps, a new method of education (or, to use an all too frequently shunned word in the Anglophone world: a new didactic). This is the scope in which education can and should be explored here with Locke: discussing education means discussing purposes and methods of education. Looking at the second example, things appear slightly different. “Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l’Auteur des choses; tout dégénere entre les mains de l’homme.” (Rousseau 1762, p. 1) (“Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; but everything degenerates in the hands of man.”) Those are the words with which Jean-​Jacques Rousseau opens his hugely influential treatise Émile ou De l’éducation, published for the first time 1762 in Amsterdam. Again, the book title itself suggests that the text will concern itself with education. However, unlike Locke, we are not immediately confronted with a specific ideal state of being which then proves to be the goal of education. That is not to say that Rousseau’s opening assertion does not contain a specification of a state that will turn out to be the goal of education. It does this, however, in a much more indirect way: By introducing the idea of an ideal state which has been lost through human interference, it leads one to guess that it will be the purpose of education to either reverse this process of falling from grace, or to shape education in a form that does not allow for this loss in the first place. Both are possible, but we are not told what this ideal state would be, except that it is a godly state—​it is both an original and good state. So, in comparison to Locke, what Rousseau lacks in detail he makes

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up by metaphysical weight; whereas Locke will talk on a very pragmatic level about purposes and methods of education, Rousseau will embed his theory of education in a substantial metaphysical frame without which his theory cannot be conceived (a fact that is commonly ignored by those who think Rousseau’s so-​called child centered pedagogy could easily be secularized and be used independently from its metaphysico-​t heological foundations). As in Locke, we can see in Rousseau that here the very notion of education (if we accept for now a rather hasty translation of l’éducation as education) seems unproblematic: A reader can easily be confronted with a new metaphysical foundation, with a governing principle out of which everything else will be inferred. Much in the same way that Locke, apparently without any difficulty, infers from a defined (or newly introduced) purpose a wide range of further specifications for education, Rousseau assumes that his reader can simply follow him in his alleged reinvention of education through his implied introduction of a bold metaphysical foundation. Both Locke and Rousseau, then, assume that a discussion of education consists of a discussion about purposes and their justification: Whereas Locke has a more pragmatic (one might say: empirical, given that most of his musings are based on an empiricist epistemology) approach in establishing what such a purpose of education could be (and he does introduce a very clear purpose of education), Rousseau is more metaphysical, and he will remain a lot more vague throughout his treatise than Locke. Nevertheless, neither see any problem in assuming their readers know what they are talking about. Even though they might intend to completely change their readers’ minds in matters educational, it seems they do not have a conception of how such a discussion, a communication between themselves and their readers, might be possible at all; their texts are in this sense not self-​reflective: the educative character of their own writing is not explored. This changes with Schleiermacher, and this change is already recognizable in the very first sentence of his lectures Grundzüge der Erziehungskunst. Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy that he gave to students at the University of Berlin in 1826 start with one of the most famous sentences in the German speaking world of Education Studies (Erziehungswissenschaft): “One must assume we are all familiar with what is commonly called education” (above, p. 21); Was man im allgemeinen unter Erziehung versteht, ist als bekannt vorauszusetzen). Even though this looks at first glance like a very simple and almost innocent sentence, it represents a fundamental change in the way educational thinking is conceived. With it, reflection on education can be said to become self-​reflective, i.e., self-​conscious in a modern sense.

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These few words give expression to a range of concerns which will be explored in the following sections: ‒ They refer to the necessary conditions that enable Schleiermacher to talk to his audience and to be comprehensible for his students. ‒ They refer to the hope that the necessary conditions of communication are met even though this can be proven only in the process of communication without becoming absolutely certain at any given point in time. ‒ They refer to the inevitable conditions that restrict what Schleiermacher is going to introduce as reflections on education and pedagogy. ‒ They refer to his students’ actual level of comprehension educational matters at the beginning of the reflective explorations of his lectures and by implication, also references the possible level of comprehension of educational matters at the end of the reflective explorations of his lectures. ‒ They also open his musings on education and pedagogy to the wider methodological questions of how those kinds of reflections are possible and to what end someone would engage in such reflections.







2.1.  T he Possibility of Publicly Talking and Theorizing about Education “One must assume” that we are familiar with the word “education.” Indeed, as a lecturer who sets out to talk about education, Schleiermacher must assume that his audience has at least a basic understanding of the word “education” (and, of course, of all the other words he is using in his speech). And not only does there have to be a basic understanding of the word—​it has to be to at least to some extent a shared understanding. Enshrined in the word “commonly,” Schleiermacher declares this shared understanding to be a form of shared knowledge which is knowledge precisely because it is shared: “If the knowledge stands the test of public communication, we have to regard that reasoning as knowledge in which we also presuppose the identity of the process of reasoning within all” (Schleiermacher 2001b, p. 129)1 without this (preliminary) knowledge, communication would be impossible. In presenting this as a condition that must necessarily be met, Schleiermacher accepts that reflecting on education to an audience (in oral or in written form) rests on an assumption of a shared understanding of

All translations from the German are my own; emphasis is always as in the original.

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the meanings of words. Whatever Schleiermacher sets out to explore in his lectures, he accepts that his students come and indeed must come with a pre-​existing understanding of the words he is using; on a basic level, his students need to understand what he means when he is talking about “education.” In this special case—​t he case of the word “education”—​h is students need to know which practices he is referring to when using the word “education.” Based on the insight that every discussion aspiring to enlighten people takes on a dialectical form trying to first establish and then to overcome antagonisms, Schleiermacher establishes the conditio sine qua non for such a discussion in his Dialectics: “Conflict in general presupposes the recognition of the identity of the matter of discussion, and therefore also the general referring of reasoning to being” (p. 19). Schleiermacher accepts that he cannot start a kind of public reflection without this kind of pre-​g iven referential understanding on the side of his students: whatever he is aspiring to say about education rests in its comprehensibility on the original comprehension of his students. He cannot start completely from scratch; reflection on education will always have to be a reforming of an original understanding, and it can never be an introduction of something absolutely new. In this, Schleiermacher’s reflections on pedagogy seem different to his explorations of religion. There, he seems to adopt a much more pessimistic outlook on what he thinks his audience would know about “religion:” I wish I could present religion to you in some well known form so that you might immediately remember its features, its movements, and its manners and exclaim that you have here or there seen it just this way in real life. But I would deceive you. For it is not found among human beings as undisguised as it appears to the conjurer, and for some time has not let itself be viewed in the form peculiar to it. (Schleiermacher 1996, pp. 18–​19)

Indeed, assuming such an unfortunate state of affairs, Schleiermacher begins his explorations into religion with a more or less negative description, by stating what religion is not, relying on a more or less vague feeling in his audience to judge his assertions. Talking about education, Schleiermacher seems less concerned with such ignorance: he assumes that everybody commonly understands what he refers to with the notion “education.” It appears, at least for Schleiermacher, that the notion “education” enjoys a more widely shared understanding than the word “religion”—​ which is maybe not that surprising given that all have been subjected in one-​way or the other to education (and, just like today, this seems to generate the commonly shared feeling of being entitled to having a strong view on education).

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2.2.  T he Assumption of Successful Communication about Education A shared understanding of the word “education” is a precondition for the public discussion of educational matters. Schleiermacher has to assume that his audience does, in a very general sense, know what he is talking about and what he is referring to when discussing this notion. However, even though this is indeed a prerequisite for a successful communication (and therefore for an enlightening lecture series), the mere mention of this condition betrays a certain hesitation: Schleiermacher remains very aware of the fact that even if he has to assume that there is shared understanding, to have any justification for starting to talk at all, there is no guarantee that this is actually the case. As in all communication, Schleiermacher knows that one must assume the existence of intersubjective understanding in order to engage in communication in the first place but that one should be ready to accept a breakdown of this communication at any moment (caused by a misunderstanding), and that even the apparently successful continuation of communication is not a proof of an existing intersubjectively congruent understanding: Just because interpretations on both sides exist does not mean that they are identical or even broadly consistent. Manfred Frank, one of the leading German experts in reviving recent interest in Schleiermacher and in editing and republishing his works, has called this the “hypothesis about the schematization of the experiential material through the other members of a reasoning or language community” (Frank 2001, p. 38). In this sense, public reflections on pedagogy remain an adventure and a challenge as much as any communication: Founded on the hope of an intersubjective understanding, it is only the presence of an ongoing process of communication (and maybe of living and acting together) that can, if not prove, then at least point toward the possibility that people do actually understand each other in some way. However, for this hope to be realistic, communication (even as public theorizing) has to rest on acts of conscious interpretation. In other words, communication needs to incorporate hermeneutic acts on both sides of the communicational divide (which is one of the reasons Schleiermacher was so interested in hermeneutics and why he is now seen as the founder of modern hermeneutics).

2.3.  T he Limitations of Publicly Talking and Theorizing about Education Pointing out conditions of oral communications is tantamount to drawing attention to the limitations of these very communications. It was only much later that the enabling and at the same time restricting characteristics of

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language, i.e., its discursive structures, have been described, acknowledged., and appreciated in a more thorough way: Through his poststructuralist musings about power, for example Michel Foucault and, later, Judith Butler, have both pointed out that power is not something that can or should be demonized (as it so often is). For both, it is obvious that structures of power restrict the possibilities of subjectification, of becoming a subject, but in doing so they enabled this very subjectification in the first place. Restricting and enabling go hand in hand. The question then arises: In what way does Schleiermacher acknowledge that the very conditions that allow for communication to happen in the first place also restrict this communication? The most obvious acknowledgment of this simultaneous enabling and restriction Schleiermacher can be seen in his decision to start with the initial understanding of his audience and to then gradually develop and reform(ulate) this understanding. Far from being convinced that a discussion on pedagogy can pretend to charter unknown territory right from the start, Schleiermacher designs his lectures as a gradual unfolding of an argument that accepts a starting point presented in the (allegedly commonly shared) understanding of “education” and the commonly shared notions used to refer to educational matters (such as “education” itself as well as “teacher,” “student,” etc.), just to slowly draw out what could possibly be ingrained in those notions and what they (can only) mean on a higher level of understanding, thereby gradually introducing the new language of theory which he calls the language of “pure reflection” (reines Denken) in his Dialectics of 1822 (Schleiermacher 2001b; especially § 4). Often referring to historic examples, Schleiermacher reveals his explorations to be bound to a tradition of educational thinking and practice (or in today’s language: discourse) which is thereby vindicated as enabling and exposed as restricting at the same time. For Schleiermacher, both theoretical and the nontheoretical ways of understanding (i.e., utilizing either theoretical notions or pre-​ reflective untheoretical ones) are not exclusive to each other but coexist. But notions (and types of propositional knowledge) are discriminated by their purpose for referencing in general: The theoretical reference is born out of love for the world and knowledge in itself; nontheoretical notions are representative of instrumental human tendencies, i.e., the use of notions and knowledge for a certain purpose, and it is only the former that Schleiermacher sees as “pure reflection.” The difference, then, lies not in us having a continuous area of imperfect perceptions which are opposed by a series of perfect ones, i.e., some being very much common whereas others being more elevated. As a matter of fact, our

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reflections are of two kinds: one where the reflection is an end to itself, and another where reflection is a means to another end. (p. 103)

Learning to theorize therefore does not mean to simply unlearn former ways of knowing by replacing them with some form of pure reason. Instead, it means to slowly add yet another layer of understanding—​i.e., another way of talking about the world—​to existing understandings of the world. And it is to acknowledge that both layers can never be completely separated from each other: whatever new understanding gradually arises, it will always arise out of existing understandings and it will therefore always be influenced by it. Of course, both, Locke and Rousseau very consciously place themselves into a tradition as well: by stating an apparently obvious fact about the ideal state of being human, Locke draws attention to the discussion around the actual characteristics of this state of ideality; Rousseau’s dictum on the fundamental “goodness” of all things as they are created positions itself very openly against the then widely shared assumption that we are all tainted by Original Sin—​as Rousseau very openly admits in his discussion with the Archbishop of Paris (see: Rousseau 2013). Both Locke and Rousseau are participating in an ongoing debate and assume positions already available within those debates; they are not independent from such debates (or discourses, as Foucault would have it). However, Schleiermacher goes further by acknowledging that it is indeed not only the structural positions within the discourse that are pre-​existing but the very words we use are loaded with meaning and associations that are not ours when we start to use them (very much in the same way that later Lacan, based on Lévi-​Strauss, acknowledged that language precedes and forms us inasmuch our unconscious is itself linguistic). There is a reason why philosophers tend to try to invent their own words in attempting to express something that leaves common semantic structures that are part of our world. The language Schleiermacher uses enables him to express something and enables him to project a shift in meaning. The most famous example for this shift in meaning is probably his redefinition of the notion of education: Starting his lectures based upon a commonly shared understanding of this word (as some sort of teaching that parents, private tutors, and school teachers engage in), he changes this meaning in course of the lectures when he reformulates education in a much broader sense as the endeavor on the part of the older generation to “form” the young generation by the older generation. However, acknowledging that his definition has to start with the commonly accepted to be then changed only step by step, Schleiermacher accepts that whatever he presents as his unfolding argument will always be bound by its origin in common understanding. Pointing in a similar direction, Schleiermacher’s Dialectics asserts that any

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sort of discussion can proceed only if participants speak the same language (Schleiermacher, 2001b, § 2). The same is expressed in the lectures on pedagogy of 1826: “It [the theory] is therefore limited to the domain of one [specific] language, and not similarly applicable to other language domains” (p. 40, above). Whatever theory will be developed, in other words, it will be valid only for the language realm in which it is formulated and to which it is bound, and therefore it can and will never be radically different or new—​at least in the most extreme senses of these words.

2.4.  T he Beginning and Goal of Reflecting on Education The first sentence in Schleiermacher’s 1826 lecture series introduces a paradox: if the audience of the lectures (and, subsequently, its readers) are generally already familiar (bekannt) with education, what then are the lectures going to explore? What are the lectures going to offer, and to what degree will it be educational? Indeed, it is the very word “familiar” that opens up the possibility for the lectures to be educational itself. Attentive listeners (and readers) can hear an echo here as the word recapitulates a distinction that one of the most influential philosophical contemporary with of Schleiermacher, G.W.F. Hegel, famously introduced in § 31 of The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and that Schleiermacher was most definitely aware of: “What is ‘familiarly known’ is not properly known, just for the reason that it is ‘familiar’.” (Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt.) With regard to Hegel, Rosen (1982) explains this as follows: In the first place the contrast between what is bekannt and what is erkannt expresses the contrast between what we know at first hand and what we have only descriptive knowledge of—​ l ike the contrast of our knowledge of the “look” of anger in someone’s face and the information that they are angry. But, in the second place, there is a quite separate distinction between something which is known “only” implicitly (and hence not with full clarity) and what is fully explicit … Both the bekannt and the erkannt are forms animated in the virtues of the Scientific consciousness. But while one of these forms of consciousness is in the form of Vorstellung (and therefore, in some way, only imperfectly self-​aware) the other—​Thought—​as Absolute Knowledge is completely self-​t ransparent. (Rosen 1982, p. 56)

However, one notable difference separating Schleiermacher from Hegel is that for Schleiermacher, there cannot ever be a full reconciliation of reason and nature just as for Schleiermacher, there cannot ever be Absolute Knowledge or absolute self-​transparency: for the Protestant theologian Schleiermacher, human reflection will always be limited, and even though we can be (and

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are) on the way to ever greater clarity, we will never arrive at an endpoint of perfection, at absolute unity of reason and nature. Even if Schleiermacher has to concede some preliminary knowledge in his audience (and readers) in order for them to be able to follow him on the intellectual journey that is his lecture series, he is adamant in his conviction that this level of understanding can (and needs to) be changed to be superseded by those who are to become professional educators: for something to be familiar is not nearly enough. But we first need to know what the features of this “mere familiarity” are before they can be changed. And as a next step, it would be necessary to ask why such a change is desirable. However, before the reason for change is explored, the change itself needs to be characterized. The exploration of both, the character of this change and the necessity for a change—​a qualitative and quantitative increase in knowledge of education—​are related to Schleiermacher’s Dialectics. Indeed, his lectures on pedagogy can be seen as nothing other than the type of dialectical discussion he envisioned and presented in his texts on Dialectics from 1814 and 1822 (i.e., in Schleiermacher 2001a & 2001b; see also the chapter by Friesen in this collection). To gain insights into the change Schleiermacher hopes to induce in the knowledge of his audience, we need to understand what he perceives Dialectics to be and what he sees it as capable of achieving; it is here where we not only understand what kind of change is possible, but why such change would be of any value. Of course, this chapter cannot be the place to engage with a lengthy discussion of Schleiermacher’s Dialectics in general (e.g., see: Rieger 1988), or to consider the role of the dialectical discussions in Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy (i.e., the relation of pedagogical theory and pedagogical practice in particular, see: Kenklies 2012); so only a few remarks will hopefully be sufficient to point us in the right direction.

2.5.  T he Purpose of Reflecting As has already been stated, Schleiermacher envisions a sort of development through continuous reflection for his audience. To understand this further, we need to better grasp what “reflection” means here. In his Dialectics, Schleiermacher distinguishes between three types of reflection: pure reflection, occupied reflection, artful reflection (reines Denken, geschäftiges Denken, künstlerisches Denken) (Schleiermacher 2001b, p. 5). Pure reflection arises from the pure will to know; it is reflecting in and for itself. Occupied reflection is reflecting to achieve something else; it is reflection not for itself but to achieve a given purpose. Artful reflection, like pure reflection, is reflection for itself and not for another purpose, but it differs

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from pure reflection in as much as it finds its criterion of evaluation soleIy in the individual and in the momentous pleasure that it offers to the reflecting subject (whereas the pure reflection finds its evaluative criterion in the extent to which it produces insights which are universally, i.e., intersubjectively, valid). Looking at these three forms of reflecting, Schleiermacher continues to describe his dialectics as the Kunstlehre of “pure reflection”—​as a kind of instruction manual that introduces the general principles according to which one has to proceed in order to arrive at real, i.e., intersubjectively valid, knowledge. In Schleiermacher’s words, a Kunstlehre is: “any sort of instruction that explains how to proceed in an orderly manner with certain activities in order to arrive at a given goal” (p. 13). On other occasions, Schleiermacher uses the notion of theory (Theorie) to describe the same sort of reflection which he here refers to as Kunstlehre (p. 74) and it might be futile to attempt to draw a systematic distinction between the two: we seem to be looking at the moment in history when the notion of theory gradually assumes its modern meaning as a set of coherent and valid statements. However, what can be seen in his book Dialectics is the way, Schleiermacher himself envisions how to arrive at general principles for reflection. In that sense, the book Dialectics is not so much a compendium of rules for reflecting but an example that shows those rules being enacted (they demonstrate the rules by showing how to reflect according to them). This way of reflecting then is what is usually called dialectical, according to Schleiermacher: The book Dialectics presents its argument in dialectical form. In the same way as the Dialectics is then the Kunstlehre for the art of reflection, Schleiermacher’s Pedagogy is meant to be the Kunstlehre/​T heorie of the art of educating, and the Pedagogy as lectures proceed in the way demonstrated in the Dialectics, i.e., dialectically. As such, the Pedagogy as Kunstlehre or theory has the aim to dialectically develop and present the rules and principles according to which the practice of education has to proceed to achieve a certain goal. This goal is to turn it from a humble and more or less unreflected pre-​existing practice—​and one that is based on simple notions and, if any, only incoherent principles—​into a reflected practice that follows a set of rules and principles consistent with the standards set by pure reflection. It would then become a Kunstlehre or theory that basically follows the Platonic dictum that correct action follows from true knowledge. With regard to the notion of familiarity, this means: For the audience (and the reader), education changes from being merely “familiar” (bekannt) into something that is “known and understood” (erkannt). As such, this process of reflection and the enacting of a reflected practice is part of the greater

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human (and therefore forever fallible) endeavor to unify nature and reason (for much greater detail, see: Kenklies 2012). Thus far, we have looked at the very first sentence of Schleiermacher’s lectures in order to understand how much reflection on education can be said to have entered a new—​even historically unprecedented—​phase with his musings. Far from being a reflection that begins completely anew, Schleiermacher has embraced the idea that the kind of reflections presented in his lectures are always enabled and also limited by the periods and results of reflection that preceded one’s own endeavors. Reflection never fills a blank slate but always only transforms what is already there. In conceding as much, Schleiermacher exposes the inherent hermeneutic quality of theoretical reflections in the way they always rest on what has been given before: every theory has to work with and through those hermeneutic prejudices and preunderstandings (Gadamer 1989) that allow for this theory to exist in the first place. Every act of theorizing has to become conscious of its own foundations, its own starting points—​ it has to become self-​conscious, i.e., self-​reflective: Theorizing thus means to jump into a hermeneutic circle of reflecting on and with what has been given before, and every theory, in general or on pedagogy, therefore becomes part of the hermeneutic circle of human (self-​)interpretation. And this circle itself has its beginnings in the times of our ancestors and in the moment when they became self-​conscious beings. This circle, further, is one—​at least for Schleiermacher—​w ithout end, but in a process of eternal reformulation. The question then arises: How is this practice of reflecting now institutionalized? The next section will therefore look into the ways in which Schleiermacher describes institutionalized practices of reflection, i.e., institutions of (higher) education, of which his lectures on pedagogy are a part.

4.3. Practical Considerations: The Enacting of the Circle For Schleiermacher, the university represents a natural place for the organized endeavor of reflection. Situated between what he calls “schools” and “academies,” it is the university that attempts to awaken the spirit of reflection in those who are interested and capable of this way of relating to the world. Schools are responsible for training one’s basic faculties and transmitting foundational knowledge, and academies are highly specialized academic institutions in which experts for the specific fields and disciplines. However, it is the universities that have the task of educating students in academic ways of reflecting: “[T]‌hrough it [i.e., the university] the scientific spirit is to be awakened in young people and raised to clarity of consciousness” (Schleiermacher 1991, p. 23). (The German word for science, Wissenschaft, refers to nearly all

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fields and disciplines studied at universities, not just to the natural sciences.) It is therefore not so much the transmission of a collection of facts (however true they may be) that characterizes the aspiration of university teaching—​ something that is predominantly the task of schools—​but the awakening of a certain academic attitude and the capacity to act in accordance with this attitude. This is reflected in the fact that students generally spend less time at university than at school: The situation is not that they [the students] do not require more time to learn everything but learning how to learn can be accomplished in a shorter time. That is, only one moment is actually spent at the university, only one act is completed: the idea of knowledge, the highest consciousness of reason, awakens in the person as a regulative principle. (p. 17)

But how is this to be achieved? Are we to conclude that Schleiermacher’s lectures are what he imagines to be the starting point for those who wish to become professional educators? We have to remind ourselves that for Schleiermacher, professional educators have to acquire what he calls a Kunstlehre or theory of education that organizes their educational practice. For this to happen, they have to engage in the kind of reflections that Schleiermacher undertakes or performs in his lectures. However, those reflections are not and cannot be separated from the much wider realm of reflection: in order to be able to reflect insightfully on education, one has to be able to reflect on the whole world in a way that fits academic purposes. In other words: theories of education are already one of the specialized fields of reflection which can only be engaged in after having become acquainted with more general principles of reflecting on the world. And it is probably not surprising that for Schleiermacher, it is philosophy that takes pride of place as the general introduction to academic thoughts: “The scientific spirit is awakened by philosophical instruction” (Schleiermacher 1991, p. 19), and: That is, the most general subject matter is common to all; all begin with this, and only later do they divide themselves within the domain of the particular, as in each person one’s distinctive talent is awakened and along with this one’s love for that occupation wherein one can especially exercise it. Everything begins, therefore, with philosophy, with pure speculation, and whatever belongs propaedeutically to that as a transition from school to university. (p. 27)

Schleiermacher proceeds to lay out what is commonly known as Studium Generale: philosophy, philology, ethics, fundamental theory of nature, natural philosophy, history, mathematics, and geography. Only after completing these general studies are students allowed to proceed into more particular

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areas, such as the arts of the cultural development of the state (i.e., political studies) and of the human beings inhabiting them (Education Studies). That means that Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy rest on a broad foundation not only of factual knowledge but, much more importantly, practiced academic reasoning (the necessity of which becomes immediately visible when attempting to read those pedagogical lectures with first year students). However, even though these lectures represent a more specialized application of faculties of reasoning, they still follow the general principles outlined above (and identified as dialectical), which Schleiermacher understands to be fundamental to all academic inquiries and therefore to all academic teaching: [T]‌wo elements are indispensable in this kind of discourse and comprise its distinct nature. One I choose to call the popular kind: the exposition of whatever condition in which the listeners presumed to find themselves, the art of pointing out to them what is problematic in it and painstakingly [pointing out] that what is not known amounts to nothing. This is the true dialectical art, and the more strictly dialectical it is the more popular. The other I would call the productive kind. Here the teacher must have all that is to be said emerge in front of the listener, not simply recounting what one knows but reproducing one’s own coming to know, the act itself, so that the listeners are not constantly gathering mere information but are directly perceiving the activity of reason in bringing forth knowledge and are perspicaciously continuing that activity. (adapted from: Schleiermacher 1991, p. 29)

It can easily be seen how the two principles outlined here are aimed at the teaching of a method of reasoning and reflecting rather than on teaching facts of knowledge. They start with becoming conscious of one’s own prejudices to then gradually moving toward a better understanding (this is why we can justifiably call this a “hermeneutical” understanding of academic reasoning). They then proceed by demonstrating the different, sometimes opposing positions on a given matter (thereby enacting a sort of dialogue between different positions) to come to some kind of position by either refuting some earlier positions or by reconciling them on a more abstract level (which is why this can justifiably be called a “dialectical” approach to academic reasoning). Whatever practical purpose academic lectures have in the end (with regard to pedagogy: providing the correct Kunstlehre to successfully engage with the practice of educating) they are part of the general human endeavor of gradually developing an interpretation of the world which then leads to a new practice within it. As such, their main focus lies in the development of the general capacity to interpret reasonably rather than to teach an apparently reasonable

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but pre-​existing interpretation. Unlike so many contemporary universities, especially when it comes to initial teacher education, Schleiermacher offers an alternative to statements about teaching that present themselves as apparent facts. Instead, he understands teaching at university as a teaching of (more or less) stable methods to gather forever precarious knowledge whose tentativeness demands a concentration on acquiring methods of producing and evaluating statements rather than accepting them as apparent facts.

4.  Epilogue: Education Studies as Hermeneutic Academic Discipline With Schleiermacher’s lectures on pedagogy, the academic discipline that reflects on education, i.e., Pädagogik (Pedagogy) or in its more modern form Erziehungswissenschaft (Education Studies), enters modernity: here we can see educational reflections gaining self-​ awareness or—​ consciousness. Not only do these reflections offer certain concepts of education, of their anthropological and ethical foundations, of educational goals, methods, agents, institutions—​t hey also reflect on the conditions of the possibility of the reflections themselves, on their necessary preconditions, on their own nature, their limitations and possibilities. We can see how Schleiermacher outlines this new way of engaging in educational reflection, how he understands his own version of Education Studies as an academic discipline, specifically as a hermeneutic project. This is expressed above all in the way Schleiermacher’s method acknowledges that it can only participate in an already existing conversation and that it has to use the notions passed down through history even though it aspires to gradually change the general understanding of education and with it the meaning of those notions. But for this to occur, these initial meanings first have to become obvious for those engaging in this kind of reflection. With Schleiermacher, we jump into the circle of reflection, and through this, we become aware that those kinds of reflections represent not just a circle, but a spiral whose constant turning seems to move forward in its introducing of ever-​changing interpretations of the world and of what can be deemed to be “educational” in it. His optimism that this ever moving spiral of interpretation does indeed move forward, i.e., toward the desirable goal of the unity of nature and reason, also characterizes his theory as modern theory. And it is just one little step from here to acknowledging that this movement is not a movement forward in any meaningful sense but nothing but an eternal play of signification where one interpretation replaces another one without end; from here, it is but a small step into postmodernity. Schleiermacher didn’t go this far but he did indeed go as far as any devoted Christian probably could

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go. And in this, he is certainly a lot more modern than many others are and have been.

References Fish, S. (2011). How to write a sentence and how to read one (EPub Edition). HarperCollins. Frank, M. (2001). Einleitung. In F.D.E. Schleiermacher (2001), Dialektik. Vol. 1: 1814 etc. M. Frank. (Ed.) (pp. 10–​136). Suhrkamp. Gadamer, H.-​G. (1989). Truth and method. Revised second edition. Continuum. Hegel, G.W.F. (1807). System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Joseph Anton Goebhardt (G.W.F. Hegel. [1931]. The phenomenology of spirit, 2nd ed. Macmillan). Kenklies, K. (2012). Educational theory as topological rhetoric: the concepts of pedagogy of Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31(3), 265-​273. Locke, J. (1693). Some thoughts concerning education. A. and J. Churchill. Rieger, R. (1988). Interpretation und Wissen. Zur philosophsichen Begründung der Hermeneutik bei Friedrich Schleiermacher und ihrem geschichtlichen Hintergrund. de Gruyter. Rosen, M. (1982). Hegel’s dialectic and its criticism. Cambridge University Press. Rousseau, J.-​J. (1762). Émile ou De l’éducation. Jean Néaulme. (Rousseau, J.-​J. (1911). Emile or On Education. J.M. Dent and Sons.). Rousseau, J.-​J. (2013). Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings (1763). C. Kelly & E. Grace (Eds.). Dartmouth College Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1808/​1991). Occasional thoughts on universities in the German sense. Trans. T. Tice & E. Lawler. EMText. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1996). On religion: Speeches to its cultured despisers. Cambridge University Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2001a). Dialektik. Vol. 1: 1814 etc. M. Frank (Ed.). Suhrkamp. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2001b). Dialektik. Vol. 2: 1822. M. Frank (Ed.). Suhrkamp.

4.  Schleiermacher’s Educational Theory in the Context of the Debate on Vocational versus Liberal Education R ebekk a Hor lacher , University

of

Zur ich

Abstract This chapter discusses Schleiermacher’s work in developing educational reforms in the Prussian state, focusing on his writings of the first two decades of the 19th century. It is meant as a contribution to the debate about the relationship between liberal and vocational education and, by that, to the much broader debate on the impact of education and schooling on the making of future citizens. It is argued that Schleiermacher’s emphasis on education as a social fact, his recognition of the fundamental sociability of every human being and his notion of national education distinguish his concept of education from that of his contemporaries. In this historical reading, Schleiermacher’s lectures and his other writings on education and Bildung become much more than just a—​more or less convincing—​contribution to the „correct‟ understanding of education and Bildung (e.g., see: Winkler 2008) or to the establishment of education as an academic discipline (Sünkel 1964; Hopfner 2018). They become one specific answer to the much discussed question of the role of education and schooling in the early 19th century, a place and time in history in which education and schooling came to be seen as crucial in the making of future citizens, revolving around the concepts of national, liberal and vocational education.

In 1810, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was appointed director of the Wissenschaftliche Deputation (Scientific Deputation), the advisory board for the Ministry of Education in Berlin. At that time, i.e., during the occupation of Prussia by French revolutionary troops, a broad discussion about the reformation of elementary and secondary education as well as drafting of corresponding curricula took place. The debates accompanying these developments were highly controversial, as education and schooling were

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key policy for both the progressive and the conservative political parties of Prussia. In 1816—​after the “liberation” from the French troops in 1813 and the Congress of Vienna in 1814/​15, paving the way for what was to be called a “Restoration”—​the advisory board was dissolved. This has been characterized as a step backward in the process of secularization and as a setback for compulsory schooling, both of which had aimed at pure, nonutilitarian education of all (intellectual) powers of the students. Moreover, it was claimed that the dissolution of the advisory board would reopen the divide between academia and the (political) administration and cut off the schools from scientific progress. Accordingly, these developments are interpreted to have led to a situation in which the attempts of the advisory board to establish a “public sphere”—​comparable to the French model which allowed for a discussion of schools and educational affairs—​were prevented (Fuchs 2008, p. 489; Beljan et al. 2017, p. LIV). Following this interpretation of historical events, Schleiermacher’s educational attempts and his related theory are set in a political context in which Schleiermacher stands for progressivism, while the political opposition signifies the conservative counterpart (see: Fuchs 2008, pp. 479–​480). Starting from the aforementioned historiographical narrative, this chapter discusses Schleiermacher’s educational attempts, focusing on his writings of the first two decades of the 19th century. It is not aimed at contextualizing Schleiermacher’s concept of education within the political controversy between the progressive and the restorative political parties (see e.g., Lohmann 1984, pp. 24–​38) or as a specific concept of Bildung, but as a contribution to the debate about the relationship between liberal and vocational education and, by that, to the much broader debate on the impact of education and schooling on the making of future citizens (Tröhler 2016). It is argued that Schleiermacher’s emphasis on education as a social fact, his recognition of the fundamental sociability of every human being and his notion of national education underline the differences between his concept of education and the German tradition of Bildung,1 even though Schleiermacher shares some of its educational principles, such as the subdivided school system. In this historical reading, Schleiermacher’s lectures and other writings on education and Bildung become much more than just a—​more or less convincing—​contribution to a “correct” understanding of education and Bildung (e.g., see: Winkler 2008) or to the establishment of education as an

The German tradition of Bildung is conceptualized here as a conglomerate of notions of introspection, self-​reflection and inwardness, and as a way to release education from any social constraints (see Horlacher 2016, pp. 7–​4 4).

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academic discipline (Sünkel 1964; Hopfner 2018). They become one specific answer to the much discussed question of the role of education and schooling in the early 19th century, a place and time in history in which education and schooling came to be seen as crucial in the making of future citizens, revolving around the concepts of national, liberal, and vocational education. This chapter starts with an outline of the historical context in which Schleiermacher worked as a member of the Prussian Scientific Deputation. The so-​called Prussian reform policy is of particular interest here: it aimed at both elementary and secondary schools, included teacher training, and generally pursued the objective of reforming the state through education and schooling. The second section discusses some drafts for national education of the first decade of the 19th century and positions Schleiermacher in these discussions. These debates are of importance because the keyword “national education” was used not least to propagate a nationwide, state organized elementary education. This is an education, however, which was not understood as a value per se, but as a possibility for (re-​)establishing the nation, or a necessary national feeling or national consciousness. Subsequently, the third section focuses on the debates on general or vocational education, considering how these discussions, especially in the German or Prussian context, were linked to the question of the pupils’ social status. The fourth and concluding summarizes the debates and positions Schleiermacher’s ideas on education within a larger discussion on (liberal) education or Bildung, vocational and national education.

1. School Reforms in Prussia The first half of the 18th century was characterized by an increasing number of publications on educational and school related issues, not only in the German states. In fact, some of the discussions on schooling and education were not merely theoretical; they were also put into practice in reform projects such as the Philanthropinum in Dessau (see: Oelkers & Tröhler 2014; Horlacher 2021). These discussions were accompanied by the question of whether the state should play a role in matters of education and schooling and if so, which, and they were often carried out under the rubric of “national education.” The term “national education” referred to the definition of what a “nation” is, or to the definitions of “the German,” “the French,” or “the English,” serving as distinguishing characteristics of the various “nations” and encompassing the “entire people.” The hopes for education and schooling relating to the debates on national education seemed to materialize in Prussia after the death of Friedrich II (1712–​1786) under the reign of his nephew, King

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Friedrich Wilhelm II (1744–​1797), in the sense that the new king started to give financial support to various school reform projects (Jeismann 1996, p. 77). One year after the new king’s coronation, Karl Abraham von Zedlitz (1731–​1793), the minister responsible for the church and schools, submitted various Vorschläge über das Schulwesen in den königlichen Landen (Proposals regarding the schools in the royal lands), which suggested establishing a higher authority for the administration of the schools and presented a plan for the reorganization of the entire school system (Zedlitz 1787, p. 98). With the establishment of an administrative authority, schools were to be liberated from direct governmental dependency and put on a “reasonable” basis, as decisions were not to be taken according to individual preferences, but based on specialist knowledge (Zedlitz 1787, pp. 99–​100). One crucial task of the new authority was to supervise and regularly evaluate the existing schools, since only such measures were expected enable schools to meet the constantly changing requirements (p. 101). One of these requirements was that school should be subdivided into three different strands if it was to achieve its overall goal of “making people better and usable for their civic lives” (p. 102). Not only was it said to be “unfair to let the farmer grow up like a beast” and “let him memorize phrases which are never explained to him.” It was also considered a “folly to educate the future tailor, carpenter or grocer in the same way as a future conciliary councillor or school principal; teaching Latin, Greek, and Hebrew to everyone, entirely omitting the knowledge they need, or reciting this knowledge in a way which is incomprehensible and useless to them” (pp. 102–​103). Therefore, the declared goal was to offer separate school types for farmers, the middle class (Bürger), and scholars, which could best meet their respective professional needs by using different curricula. Scholarly literature usually labels this concept as “estates school” or “enlightened utilitarian education,” as it helped to preform the individuals’ future role in society and to secure an estates based system of social order (e.g., Berg 1980, p. XIII; Brachmann 2008, pp. 465–​470; Fuchs 2008, pp. 479–​480). Besides, this concept was strongly based on social “usefulness,” whereby “usefulness” is not to be understood merely as “shaping,” but can also be seen as an improvement of the current living situation and employment opportunities of a large part of the population which had to deal with significantly changing economic conditions. Along with religion, reading, and mechanics, the “rural or farmers’ schools” were also expected to teach some knowledge of natural history and biology, as these subjects were to help not only with cattle breeding and agriculture, but also to prevent farmers from explaining cattle plagues and crop failure as “witchcraft” (Zedlitz 1787, p. 104), instead of seeing

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them in a “reasonable” or “enlightened” way, i.e., as incidents which may be explained by science. Moreover, widespread alcohol abuse was to be tackled with “dietetic medical rules”, and the “knowledge of the state constitution” served to facilitate contacts with the authorities (p. 104). First and foremost, however, “industrial activities” were to be exerted in these schools, i.e., spinning, straw plaiting, and the like, by which the adolescents could—​ besides getting practice of useful activities—​be kept away from debauchment (p. 105). Additionally, it was necessary to establish actual teacher training seminars (p. 106). Their graduates were to be paid adequately, thus being able to live on their main occupation (teaching) without having to seek additional income (see: Horlacher 2020). In Zedlitz’s opinion, citizens’ schools (Bürgerschulen) were in particular need of reformation, since they focused very strongly on the Latin language and thus did not offer a curriculum adjusted to actual needs (Zedlitz 1787, p. 108). Instead of Latin, Greek or theology, the subjects to be taught were religion and Christian morals, reading, calculating, writing, bookkeeping, natural history, metrology, mechanics, practical physics, history, and geography. Moreover, one always had to make sure that the knowledge which was taught in these subjects bore reference to the students’ life realities (p. 111f.). Urban schools, too, were to foster industrial activities, but here, the cultivation of silk and spinning of wool was preferred to the cotton spinning and straw plaiting of the rural schools (p. 112). Concerning the training of teachers who were required for these new urban schools, Zedlitz did not consider the situation as dramatic as he had with respect to the training of teachers for rural schools, since the existing secondary schools already had an appropriate training program which would provide for a sufficient number of new teachers for urban schools. The upper secondary schools, which according to Zedlitz included grammar schools, Latin schools, pedagogiae (i.e., academies for knights) and universities, were aimed at the nobility, the military elite and tradesmen as well as at the classical professions and scholars. Zedlitz, who was a nobleman himself and who had been trained at the Dom Brandenburg knight academy (founded in 1704), was for the most part content with the condition of these schools, although he pointed out that the—​statutorily-​regulated—​refusal of some schools to make changes was problematic (Zedlitz 1787, p. 114). He also claimed that there were too many of those schools, as a majority of their pupils was in fact not in need of a scholarly education, but would be much better prepared for their future professions if they attended one of the newly devised urban schools. Zedlitz’s school concept thus preferred a clearly subdivided, estates based school, whose curriculum was clearly oriented toward

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future professional activities. School was not aimed at an idealistic or neo-​ humanist “liberal education of the human being,” but at professional competency within a clearly segregated estates system. Any possible ambitions for social advancement of an urban middle class were prevented in the sense that the schools designated for it were obligated to have a vocationally oriented curriculum. Whereas the first part of Zedlitz’s proposals—​concerning the establishment of a school authority—​was followed up under his successor, the pastor Johann Christoph von Woellner (1732–​1800), an economic patriot and a skeptic of Enlightenment, the second part of his proposals—​the establishment of a tripartite school system—​ came to nothing for the time being (Neugebauer 1985, pp. 191–​208). At the end of the century, Woellner’s successor, minister Julius Eberhard Wilhelm Ernst von Massow (1750–​ 1816), resumed the school reforms, at least with the Lutheran schools of Prussia (Schneider 1996, pp. 135–​136). Massow’s explicit viewpoint was that schools were responsible for the education and instruction of children, and he connected the quality of a particular education with the “welfare” of a state, while also stating that this objective was only to be achieved by “national education” (Schneider 1996, p. 136). While the widespread introduction of rural schools and teacher training for them was put into practice after 1806, thus expressing a broad consensus on the need for improved rural schools, a larger debate arose on the right balance between liberal and vocational education. This debate continued throughout the 19th century. These discussions were always linked to a very specific idea of education, school, and formation (Bildung), whereby Bildung was considered to be much more than mere appropriation or the result of the appropriation of a school subject, or even the pursuit of a certain educational ideal (Horlacher 2016, pp. 45– ​47). Bildung implied ideas of individual perfectibility, of completeness, and of the aesthetic harmony of the soul; it was part of the debates on the “essence” versus the “particular” of schooling and education and was always placed in sharp contrast with “mere knowledge.” As Bildung was associated with the aesthetic harmonization of the soul, which was to be achieved through ancient aesthetics and philosophy, learning and mastering Greek and Latin was an important part of instruction, which in turn had a socially stratifying effect: learning Latin and Greek was only possible for a small minority. On the other hand, this prioritization severely limited the cultural significance of the natural sciences and technical knowledge, which, in contrast to the significance of the educated soul, were understood to be inconsistent with the true German national character.

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2. Schleiermacher and National Education In the context of Prussian school reforms, which included both elementary education and grammar school as well as “contemporary” teacher training, Schleiermacher was appointed to the Scientific Deputation in February 1810, which had been newly established by the Prussian authorities and which was entrusted with the reorganization of the public schools (Beljan et al. 2017, p. XXI). In this function, Schleiermacher was mainly concerned with the reform of higher education and university. However, he also commented on the reform of elementary education. The debates and reform proposals which were put forward in this commission are also to be located in the context of “national education,” since they were concerned with turning the inhabitants of the Prussian state into loyal Prussian citizens with and through schooling (they were usually subjects with no political rights). In his deliberations, Schleiermacher neither followed a “philanthropic-​enlightened concept of utility” nor a “neo-​humanist educational concept” as an ideal of public schools; he rather advocated a liberal concept of the state, which understood education primarily as a task of the private sphere (Schleiermacher 1814/​ 2002, pp. 130–​133). Although scholarly literature normally links the subject of “national education in Prussia” to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s (1762–​1814) Addresses to the German Nation (1808/​2009; see: Johnston 1990, pp. 49–​51; Levinger 2000, pp. 97–​101), Fichte was not the only one and certainly not the first one to deal with the subject of “national education” in Prussia.2 Johann Friedrich Zöllner (1753–​1804), a Berlin pastor who was appointed to the Oberschulkollegium3 by Massow in 1800, and who had initiated the question of “What is Enlightenment?”—​ made famous through of Immanuel Kant’s answer in 1783—​had already written an extensive treatise on this subject in 1804, which had also been reviewed by Schleiermacher in the Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung (General Literary Journal of Jena,

In this much-​d iscussed publication, which was based on Fichte’s lectures at Berlin University, Fichte postulated, among other things, a “new education,” with whose help the nation—​a fter the defeat of Napoleon and the associated losses of eastern and western territories, as well as the loss of the status as a major power—​could regenerate and regain its splendor. Whereas previously, education had mainly been a “formation of class,” Fichte claimed to have developed in his Addresses a “national education” (Fichte 1808/​2009, p. 22), which no longer reproduced traditional social conditions, but produced “new people” who were oriented toward the future. 3 As an institution, the Oberschulkollegium was the predecessor institution of the Educational Department (Sektion für den Kultus und den Unterricht, founded in 1809) within the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. 2

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Schleiermacher 1805/​1995). In this treatise, Zöllner dealt with “education as such” and with “national education,” concentrating principally on “public educational establishments” (1804, pp. xi, 5). Zöllner deemed three concepts to be decisive: language, origin, and shared convictions. The aspect of language was also to become a central concept in Schleiermacher’s educational considerations (Frost 2006). In his review, Schleiermacher not only regretted that Zöllner was not able to publish the originally planned second part, which was to render the general deliberations of the first part in greater specificity (Zöllner had died in September 1804), but he also recognized many issues worthy of discussion in Zöllner’s expositions (Schleiermacher 1805/​1995, p. 5). In addition, he interpreted the publication as an expression of the official Prussian view on the reformation of public schooling, i.e., of Massow’s planned school reform, since Zöllner had been a member of the Oberschulkollegium, the board being in charge of developing “a general plan of education and instruction for all schools in Prussia” (Patsch 1995, p. XXX). However, much more explicitly than in his review of Zöllner’s National Erziehung (National education), Schleiermacher expressed himself in his lecture Über den Beruf des Staates zur Erziehung (On the calling of the State to Education), which he held before the Prussian Academy of Sciences in December 1814—​a text in which Schleiermacher attempted to clarify the relationship between the state and education in principle. He did not deduce this clarification from ideal principles, but tried to base it on the historical, social, and cultural reality of his environment. Schleiermacher assumed that although all European states were dealing intensively with the issue of education, he knew that the concrete organizational forms and also the hopes as well as expectations which were associated with education (and schooling) were quite different. Whereas for some people education was a means to “awake from a long lasting dullness and crudeness,” for others, education (and schooling) was a way to preserve the status quo (Schleiermacher 1814/​ 2002, p. 127). This empirical finding now led him to the actual question of his lecture, namely “whether it is in the nature of things that the state rules and organizes the business of education, and to what extent?” (p. 128). Schleiermacher did not want to answer this question either historically or normatively. Instead, he claimed to clarify it systematically by classifying “the states themselves and the perspectives which they had been able to assume.” Thus “a means to the understanding of the different theories” was to be offered, and that he was to outline “how one could perhaps be applicable under such circumstances and the other among others” (Schleiermacher 1814/​2002, p. 130). The question of the relationship between the state and

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education was thus detached from a historically, empirically, and socially bound conditionality and answered “in principle.” In this context, this answer was not intended to be elaborated exhaustively in terms of content, but as a generally valid guideline for concrete answers in different historical settings. The starting point of Schleiermacher’s considerations, which were necessary to clarify this question, was the assumption that the state and education were two noncongruent concepts, since the state refers to the relationship between adults, whereas education refers to the one between generations (Schleiermacher 1814/​2002, p. 130). Then again, the notion of “state” could be subdivided into two “classes,” i.e., be understood in two different ways: as a “negative class” and as a “positive class.” The “negative” class indicates a state which limits itself essentially to the protection of freedom and the prevention of abuse (p. 131). The positive concept of the state in itself has a “creating, forming, and guiding power,” its underlying question Schleiermacher pointed out is the question of how closely linked the state and education are to be seen. This question was for Schleiermacher closely linked to the purpose of education: “everything that man has to do on earth” shall “be created … through the state and it [shall] form and guide the entire activity of man” (p. 132). The extent to which the state interferes with education or regulates it varies historically. Adapted to Prussia’s concrete situation, Schleiermacher thought that the state had to retire from direct educational activities and make sure that direct governmental influence declined in favor of autonomous “educational” institutions or agents. Moreover, Schleiermacher differentiated between private and public education, although he did not associate this differentiation primarily with the state, but with the social interactions of individual families or social groups or associations with each other, which varied from case to case. Therefore, the more visible the social interactions between families were, the more “public” was the corresponding education (Schleiermacher 1814/​2002, p. 135). Subsequently, Schleiermacher was interested in the question of how such variable forms of social interaction, each of which implied different forms of education, could be harmonized in a public context. He discussed this question by taking the example of culturally different groupings or “clans” which found themselves in a relationship of power imbalance to each other. Schleiermacher’s concrete point of interest was: in what ways is the educational model of the ruling class to be applied to those ruled by this class, or what would happen if the “originally subjected clan had morals and education which were too noble for the situation into which it [the subjected clan] was precipitated by the fusion of the two parts” (p. 138). How can two cultural entities which are independent

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from each other be combined into a new, comprehensive unit? In the case of Prussia, a state which had yet to define and consolidate itself, these considerations meant that the state had to be responsible for education if it did not want to take the risk of having “the love for the clan and district antagonize the love of the homeland and the people” (p. 142). He also pointed to the fact that the state could not leave education in the hands of the church, because the church “tied its endeavor to connect people within a higher spiritual unity to the personal feeling of the individual and to the most general feeling of human nature, without playing a substantial role in the formation of a greater national unity” (p. 142). This feeling first had to be established by education; it had in fact to be turned into an “innate” feeling. This could be achieved by public schools which were open to both sexes. In Schleiermacher’s view, the basis as well as the limits in the relationship between education and the state were thus defined: the point was to establish “a higher potency of society and of its conscience” through education. All other justifications and purposes were not admissible in his view. Unlike Zöllner, Schleiermacher did not argue for national education from an economic perspective, but based his deliberations on social preconditions (see: Schleiermacher 1813-​/​14/​2017, p. 259).4 However, in contrast to Fichte, who had also argued that a particular national consciousness was to be created by education, Schleiermacher did not connect this national consciousness to a national salvation or rebirth. He rather understood national consciousness as a prerequisite for a state which was no longer a state of classes and would following this logic, offer different school types for different social classes. But which was a “modern” state in the sense that it defined itself as a “national state,” whereby the state had to establish the nation through schooling.



This chapter refers to the first edition of Schleiermacher’s Lectures on Education of 1814, which were held before the Congress of Vienna and thus derive from a comparable political and social context as the educational and education policy writings discussed here. The 1826 Lectures on Education, of which the introduction is translated in this volume, date from the period after the Congress of Vienna, a period of conservative restoration in Prussia. Even though the later versions of Schleiermacher’s Lectures have not been rewritten in principle, they have been reformulated and substantially expanded, representing a changed political and social situation, and thus mirroring a different perspective of Schleiermacher’s educational thoughts.

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3. Vocational or Liberal Education? Even though the national state had replaced the class based state at least on a rhetorical level, it was not necessarily associated with a school “for all;” quite the opposite. The question of the “right” organization of schools and the curricula relevant for them was intensely debated; such debates were often conducted with reference to the relationship between vocational and liberal education. Was vocational education derivative of liberal education or was liberal education to be understood exclusively as a preparation for academic training and thus also as a marker of social distinction? This question had not been answered by Schleiermacher’s definition of the relationship between state and education as a framework for his concept of national education. Concretely, the question remained open as to what extent national education preferred by Schleiermacher was conceived as an education based on the estates system, since Schleiermacher’s school was segmented into different school types, which were not to be understood as specific, future oriented vocational training, but as educational programs reproducing the estates system. Answers to these questions are offered by two of Schleiermacher’s statements in the context of his work as a member of the Scientific Deputation: first, in the Entwurf der wissenschaftlichen Deputation zur allgemeinen Einrichtung der gelehrten Schulen (Draft of the Scientific Deputation for the general establishment of learned schools) of September 3, 1810 (Schleiermacher 1810/​ 2017), and second, in his comment of July 10, 1814 to Johann Wilhelm Süvern’s (1775–​1829) Gesamtinstruktion (Overall Instruction) of February 7, 1813 (Schleiermacher 1814/​2017). In his preliminary remarks of the “Draft for the general establishment of learned schools,” Schleiermacher, as a member of the Scientific Deputation, emphasized that regulation and a stricter surveillance of these schools were to be welcomed, since their present quality, which was based on random or individually motivated efforts, was not sufficient anymore. He claimed that state regulation was a good option to increase the quality of schools and instruction. However, it should also be noted that the methodological discussions and the subsequent suggestions for improvement generally dealt with elementary education instead of more advanced schooling, although Schleiermacher assumed that developments which proved to be convincing in the field of elementary education would soon also gain a foothold in the learned schools (Schleiermacher 1810/​2017, p. 109), which allowed advancement to university. Following these considerations, Schleiermacher stated that school no longer “simply aims at teaching the youth a certain mass of knowledge or practicing skills mechanically”, but that schools also had to

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promote the “development of the intellectual powers” (p. 110), which applied in particular to the learned schools, since these were intended as a preparation for university (p. 111). In following this purpose, the learned schools were to restrict themselves to those lesson contents which may be described as “universal,” meaning contents which “want to elevate to science” (Wissenschaft) or which do not refer to a concrete subject matter. “Everything which could give [these schools] a reputation of being specialized in one or another particular estate must be removed from the learned schools” (p. 112). Thus, the learned schools were not oriented toward any particular form of economic usability or professional ability, but toward a concept of liberal education, which was considered as explicitly free of purpose and thus as fundamental and universal. Subjects at learned schools were to include both the classical languages and science, i.e., history, geography, natural science, natural history, and mathematics, since all these subjects were to be understood as a preparation for a philosophical university education. Another reason why this curriculum was important was the fact that the learned schools were at the same time intended as higher schools for the cities, which meant that the curriculum also had to meet the expectations of merchants and traders, i.e., people who were rooted in the “cultivated world” (Schleiermacher 1810/​2017, p. 116). Although the classical languages were in fact considered as a “self-​evident” part of the curriculum of the learned schools, there is again an explanation why they were indispensable in a learned curriculum: a man who only knows his native language would remain “a glebae adscriptus5 in his mental state” (p. 116). Even if the learning of contemporary foreign languages was not to be neglected—​in this case French, as it was the most common foreign language in the Prussia’s context—​the examination of the classical languages was of particular importance. Since they were not determined by political circumstances, they were also the only means by which “a pure judgment of taste” could be achieved (p. 116). Beauty or aesthetics, a central dimension of education, was thus closely tied to the curriculum of the learned schools. Whereas Schleiermacher easily determined the ultimate purpose of the learned schools, there were several open questions when trying to determine

The term glebae adscripti (literally: those who belong to the clod) was used in the Roman Empire to describe persons whose social status was located between that of freemen and slaves. They were not allowed to leave their estates without the consent of the lord of the manor. This status was also passed on to their descendants. In the Middle Ages, the term was used to refer to villeins and bondsmen and also generally to those persons whose profession or other circumstances tied them to their current situation.

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the transition from elementary to learned schools. These questions were closely linked to the educational goal envisaged for the learned schools. One concrete question to be clarified was whether these learned schools should continue their education based on the content taught at the elementary schools, or whether they should offer their own elementary courses. Schleiermacher—​at least for the moment—​argued in favor of an institutional separation of these two school types, since all the subjects of the learned schools also had elementary components and the existing elementary schools were not yet re-​organized to a degree that they could meet the requirements of the learned schools (Schleiermacher 1810/​2017, p. 112). Four years later, Schleiermacher was asked to comment on the Overall Instruction6 for the entire Prussian school system, which had been put together by Johann Wilhelm Süvern (1775–​1829). He disagreed with two aspects in Süvern’s concept: the “value of the classical languages” and the “relationship between the educational institutions of lower order and the lower departments of the institutions of higher order” (Schleiermacher 1814/​ 2017, p. 234). In accordance with the ideas he had already formulated in 1810, he wanted to see the classical languages taught exclusively at those schools which prepared for university, since the classical languages could only prove their educational content in those who regularly studied the works of the classical authors. All other pupils would benefit sufficiently from the value of these writings if, for example, they “merely” encountered them in history lessons (Schleiermacher 1814/​2017, p. 235). In order to make the educational content of ancient languages fruitful, an intensive and long term examination of not only the contents of the texts but also of the language itself, which was considered to have educational potential per se, was required. Schleiermacher’s second criticism was aimed at the proposition that the lower section of the learned schools was to be regarded as equal to the upper section of the urban schools. He contradicted this firmly, stating that not only did the lesson plans used by these school types for the same subjects



The Prussian State Councilor of the Educational Department, Süvern, had joined the two drafts of the Hauptinstruktion über die Einrichtung der öffentlichen allgemeinen Schulen des preussischen Staates (Main Instruction on the Establishment of the Public General Schools of the Prussian State) together with Ludwig Bernhard Christoph Natorp’s (1774–​1846) Besondere Instruktion über die Einrichtung der Elementarschulen (Special Instruction on the Establishment of Elementary Schools) to form a Gesamtinstruktion über die Verfassung der Schulen (Overall Instruction on the Constitution of the Schools) and submitted them to the Department on February 7, 1813, with the request that they be passed on to Schleiermacher for appraisal (Beljan et al. 2017, p. XLVII).

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differ considerably, but above all because these two schools represented entirely different objectives, and because a student who attended a school type which was not appropriate for his future profession actually received an unsuitable education (Schleiermacher 1814/​2017, p. 238). In saying this, Schleiermacher disassociated himself from his 1810 Draft of the Scientific Deputation for the general establishment of learned schools, in which he had stated that assimilating the curricula of the learned schools to those of the urban schools was at least partially possible. Now, he advocated a clear, institutional separation of school types, justifying the differing curricula with the requirements and expectations of the ensuing school type (university) or professional field (urban and elementary schools). Like Zöllner, Schleiermacher clearly argued in favor of a highly subdivided school system. Additionally, this system focused on a clear future perspective varying from case to case, which is why the curricula also had to differ considerably. Liberal education in the sense of developing intellectual powers was reserved for grammar schools or the Gymnasium, although the pupils of the urban schools were confronted with similar learning contents, which were then used rather as a means, whereas on elementary school level they were even described as “pretense.” Only in Gymnasiums was the scientific form conceived as a purpose (p. 239). This concept of the relationship between liberal and vocational education, for example, differed clearly from Pestalozzi’s understanding of liberal and vocational education, although Pestalozzi and his method were repeatedly referred to in very positive terms in the written papers of the Scientific Deputation (e.g., Schleiermacher 1814/​2017, p. 122). Pestalozzi had developed his notion of the method as a concept for a harmonious, efficient, and easy to learn educational theory in a book entitled Die Methode, eine Denkschrift (The Method, a Memorandum, 1800), where he formulated a plan for “psychologizing the teaching of humans” (Pestalozzi 1800/​1998, p. 103). Here, “psychologizing” meant two things: first, that teaching methods should take into account “the nature of [the child’s] mind,” which is to say that there should be an awareness of cognitive developmental psychology; and second, that the social situation of the future adult should be taken into account when the child is being taught, which is to say that one should teach to the individual “situation and circumstances.” This twofold adaptation of teaching to the cognitive as well as the social dimensions of life was supposed to produce “inner satisfaction with itself” (p. 103) in the educated individual. Teaching is to be attuned to the “nature of mind” and to promote the development of the individual’s creative forces, as they are the basis on which progress is built. In Pestalozzi’s view, the development of one’s creative forces follow a certain scheme which is identical for everyone. The objects, however,

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which promote the development of these forces, differ and derive from the actual living conditions of the individual child. Pestalozzi assumed that learning, and thus the overall development of the creative forces, takes place only with recourse to the specific social and historical context of every single being. Therefore, it is not the specific school subjects which are the crucial point in Pestalozzi’s educational theory, but the individual’s opportunities to develop its creative forces. Hence, Pestalozzi’s method was at the same time both general and individual: general as to the idea of developing the creative forces, and individual as to the means of development. His notion of liberal education was not in opposition to his notion of vocational education but the ineluctable basis for any vocational education.

4.  Conclusion These insights into Schleiermacher’s reflections on education and schooling, which essentially refer to writings between 1805 and 1814, provide a multifaceted picture of two major themes of his time: national education and the question of vocational and liberal education. While Schleiermacher’s views differ distinctly from both an “enlightened” and a “romantic” concept in terms of national education, he is in agreement with a Prussian majority opinion on the question of liberal and vocational education when it came to a clearly segregated curriculum for the three different school types. He also shared the conviction of education through aesthetics, which in its pure form could only be conveyed in the Gymnasium—​t his being quite the opposite of Pestalozzi’s convictions, who advocated liberal education as the basis of all vocational education, which is why his idea of education can only be compared to a limited extent with a German educational ideal. However, Schleiermacher’s idea of education and schooling cannot simply be understood as a formulation of “German education theory” in some unproblematic sense. His assumption of the social conditionality of education and his statement on the roles of education and state indicate that his view differed from an idea of education and schooling which considered education in absolute terms, and that he understood it more as a historical and empirical event. For Schleiermacher, education was a concrete activity in a specific social, societal, and temporal context which has an “ultimate ethical purpose” and a teleological orientation (see: Brachmann 2002, p. 26). Even a characterization of Schleiermacher’s definition of education as “romantic” applies only to a limited extent. It is true that he relies not only on reason, a characteristic typical of “enlightened education,” but also on art and aesthetics as a means of education. Schleiermacher asserted that it was his aim to educate people

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to adopt an attitude on the basis of which they could and—​above all—​want to act sensibly. However, Schleiermacher’s idea of organizational and procedural dimensions in education does not really fit in with a Romantic idea of education, since a Romantic education does not concern itself with concrete institutions, organizations or procedures per se (see: Beiser 1998, p. 297). These interpretations as well as the discomfort associated with them can certainly be confirmed on the basis of the present explanations, although it must be noted that the question of whether Schleiermacher’s understanding of education and schooling is “Romantic,” “educational-​philosophical,” “enlightened,” “progressive.” or “conservative” is actually wrong, since these are attributions which are applied to concrete debates or developments from a certain historiographical perspective. It seems much more interesting to read Schleiermacher’s positions as contributions to a debate concerning itself with the question of how the nation could be created through education and schooling and how this creation should be reflected in the school curriculum. In fact, in his strong support of a clearly tripartite school system or his conviction that the classical languages contained special educational potential, he shared many educational-​philosophical convictions of his Prussian contemporaries. However, he differed from the convictions which had become predominant in German language educational historiography by linking education to political and social events and trying to justify education non-​ idealistic terms. Schleiermacher can thus neither be integrated in a debate on educational theory that makes its argument on the basis of Bildung, nor can he be separated from it. Within the debates about education and schooling in the first decades of the 19th century, he must rather be understood as a voice which shared certain convictions with some of his contemporaries while disagreeing with others. However, the subsequent question of interest is not why he shared certain convictions while rejecting others, but rather how his answers were exchanged with those of his contemporaries. If his function as a member of the Scientific Deputation is taken as a standard, his concepts were—​at least until the dissolution of the Deputation in 1816—​at least politically quite deliberate. In addition, the partial translation of Schleiermacher’s lectures of 1826 which is presented here may also be used as an occasion to take a historical approach to that time of German language educational history and to read Schleiermacher’s lectures as a text in context, without drawing conclusions for the present and without wanting to judge Schleiermacher or his concepts morally or normatively, and certainly not trying to fit them into the political debates of the Prussian period of reformation and restoration or classifying them as progressive or conservative. Especially the strong support

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of a subdivided, estates based school must be in fact regarded as a conservative if not restorative position, although allowing for all social classes to have a concrete “socially productive” future did include progressive aspects. Numerous studies have shown that in the attempt to allocate educational concepts political attributions are of limited value, and that they obscure the decisive historical fields of tension instead of providing answers to questions.

References Beiser, F.C. (1998). A romantic education: The concept of Bildung in early German Romanticism. In A. Oksenberg Rorty (Ed.), Philosophers on education. New historical perspectives (pp. 284–​299). Routledge. Beljan, J., Ehrhardt, C., Meier, D., Virmond, W., & Winkler, M. (2017). Historische Einführung. In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 2. Volume 12: Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht. (pp. XVII–​L XXXIX). De Gruyter. Berg, C. (1980). Einleitung. In C. Berg (Ed.), Staat und Schule oder Staatsschule? Stellungnahmen von Pädagogen und Schulpolitikern zu einem unerledigten Problem 1787–​1889 (pp. IX–​X XVIII). Athenäum. Brachmann, J. (2002). Friedrich Schleiermacher. Ein pädagogisches Porträt. Beltz. Brachmann, J. (2008). Schleiermachers Kritik an der Aufklärungspädagogik. In A. Arndt, U. Barth, & W. Gräb (Eds.), Christentum –​Staat –​Kultur. Akten des Kongresses der Internationalen Schleiermacher-​Gesellschaft in Berlin, März 2006 (pp. 459–​474). De Gruyter. Fichte, J.G. (1808/​2009). Addresses to the German nation. Cambridge University Press. Frost, U. (2006). Sprache und Erkenntnis bei Schleiermacher. In N.J. Cappelørn, R. Crouter, T. Jørgensen, & C.-​D. Osthövener (Eds.), Schleiermacher und Kierkegaard (pp. 29–​51). De Gruyter. Fuchs, B. (2008). Das Verhältnis von Staat und Erziehung nach Schleiermacher. In A. Arndt, U. Barth, & W. Gräb (Eds.), Christentum –​Staat –​Kultur. Akten des Kongresses der Internationalen Schleiermacher-​ Gesellschaft in Berlin, März 2006 (pp. 475–​494). De Gruyter. Hopfner, J. (2018). Erziehung als wissendes Werden und werdendes Wissen. Schleiermacher und die Pädagogik auf ihrem Weg zur Wissenschaft. Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 94(3), 357–​369. Horlacher, R. (2016). The educated subject and the German concept of Bildung: A comparative cultural history. Routledge. Horlacher, R. (2019). Vocational and liberal education in Pestalozzi’s educational theory. Pedagogía y Saberes, 50, 109–​120. Horlacher, R. (2020). Teachers and teaching. In D. Tröhler (Ed.), A cultural history of education in the Age of Enlightenment (pp. 131–​145). Bloomsbury.

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Horlacher, R. (2021). German educational thought: Religion, rationalism, philanthropism, and Bildung. In T. Gilead (Ed.), A History of Western Philosophy of Education in the Age of Enlightenment (pp. 125–​149). Bloomsbury. Jeismann, K.-​E. (1996). Das preußische Gymnasium in Staat und Gesellschaft. Klett-​Cotta. Johnston, O.W. (1990). Der deutsche Nationalmythos. Ursprung eines politischen Programms. Metzler. Levinger, M.B. (2000). Enlightened nationalism: The transformation of Prussian political culture, 1806–​1848. Oxford University Press. Lohmann, I. (1984). Lehrplan und Allgemeinbildung in Preußen. Peter Lang. Neugebauer, W. (1985). Absolutistischer Staat und Schulwirklichkeit in Bandenburg-​ Preußen. De Gruyter. Oelkers, J., & Tröhler, D. (2014). Die Pädagogik. In H. Holzhey & V. Mudroch (Eds.), Die Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Band 5: Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation Schweiz Nord-​und Osteuropa (pp. 764–​818). Schwabe. Osterwalder, F. (2008). Die Methode Pestalozzis –​Wahrnehmung, Ordnung und Erlösung. In F. Osterwalder (Ed.), Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi –​Schriften zur “Methode” (pp. 7–​4 2). Pestalozzianum. Patsch, H. (1995). Historische Einführung. In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 1. Volume 5: Schriften aus der Hallenser Zeit: 1804–​1807 (pp. VII–​CXXVIII). De Gruyter. Pestalozzi, J.H. (1998). Die Methode. Eine Denkschrift Pestalozzi’s (1800). In Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi: Sämtliche Werke, Volume 13 (pp. 101–​ 122). Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1995). Rezension von Johann Friedrich Zöllner: Ideen über National-​ Erziehung (1805). In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 1. Volume 5: Schriften aus der Hallenser Zeit: 1804–​1807 (pp. 1–​25). De Gruyter. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2002). Über den Beruf des Staates zur Erziehung (1814). In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 1. Volume 11: Akademievorträge (pp. 127–​146). De Gruyter. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2017a). Entwurf der wissenschaftlichen Deputation zur allgemeinen Einrichtung der gelehrten Schulen. In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 2. Volume 12: Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht (pp. 108–​171). De Gruyter. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2017b). Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik im Winter 1813/​14. In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 2. Volume 12: Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht. (pp. 259–​324). De Gruyter. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2017c). Schleiermachers Votum vom 10. Juli 1814 zu Süverns Gesamtinstruktion vom 7. Februar 1813. In Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section 2. Volume 12: Vorlesungen über

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die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht (pp. 234–​255). De Gruyter. Schneider, M. (1996). Julius Eberhard Wilhelm Ernst von Massows Beitrag zur Bildungsreform in Preußen (1770–​1806). Peter Lang. Sünkel, W. (1964). Friedrich Schleiermachers Begründung der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft. Henn. Tröhler, D. (2013). Pestalozzi and the educationalization of the world. Palgrave Macmillan. Tröhler, D. (2016). Curriculum history or the educational construction of Europe in the long nineteenth century. European Educational Research Journal, 15(3), 279–​797. Winkler, M. (2008). Schleiermachers Beitrag zur preussischen Erziehungsreform. In A. Arndt, U. Barth, & W. Gräb (Eds.), Christentum –​Staat –​Kultur. Akten des Kongresses der Internationalen Schleiermacher-​ Gesellschaft in Berlin, März 2006 (pp. 497–​516). De Gruyter. Zedlitz, K.A. Freiherr von (1787). Vorschläge zur Verbesserung des Schulwesens in den königlichen Landen. Berlinische Monatsschrift, 10, 97–​116. Zöllner, J.F. (1804). Ideen über national-​ Erziehung besonders in Rücksicht auf die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten, Part 1. Realschulbuchhandlung.

5.  Accentuate the Negative: Schleiermacher’s Dialectic Nor m F r iesen, Boise State University

Abstract Schleiermacher is of the conviction—​however unusual it sounds today—​that education is not a matter primarily for logical analysis, normative judgment or even for empirical investigation. Education as a discipline, according to Schleiermacher, does not answer primarily to rules of logic, to fixed norms and values, or to matters of empirical fact. Education, in other words, is adequately addressed neither through normativizing critical analysis, nor through empirical investigation and assessment—​ a rguably the two dominant discourses in educational research today.1 Education for Schleiermacher, as Schmied-​Kowarzik (2008) writes, “is neither a normative nor an empirical discipline, but is instead a practical one which is concerned with the uncovering of dialectical interconnections…” (p. 61; emphases added).2 Schleiermacher himself puts it thusly: “Our observations here are not speculative but are in the strict sense of the word theoretical.” And the “strict sense” of theory—​captured in the ancient Greek theoria3 —​“relate[s]‌” above all “to a specific practice,” as Schleiermacher himself goes on to explain (above, p. 29; emphases added).

Education for Schleiermacher is a practical activity that relates to theory as a way of making dialectical interconnections. Schleiermacher’s is a dialectic only in the broadest sense of the term, for example, “any systematic reasoning… that juxtaposes opposed or contradictory ideas and usually seeks to resolve their conflict” (Merriam Webster). This chapter explores Schleiermacher’s dialectic as a central characteristic of his thought and writing—​particularly as it

E.g., see: Friesen 2019. This and all other German sources are translated by the author. 3 Theoria refers simultaneously to “viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life,” and to activity (specifically of the soul) that is related to praxis. See: Peters (1967). 1 2

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is manifest in the introduction to his lectures Outlines of the Art of Education. Those specific lectures are rife with phrases suggesting contradiction and juxtaposition. They also illustrate various ways in which tension or opposition can in the end be transformed—​through processes of extension, elaboration, accentuation, combination or “relativization” (Hoffmann 1929, p. 54). Examples of phrases that suggest dialectical processes in Schleiermacher’s lectures include:

• “We therefore have to combine both sides, and only in this way can we find the right solution” (above, p. 49; emphasis added). • “One can thus advance [two] contradictory cases” (p. 73; emphasis added). • “The more both [conservation and improvement in society] can be achieved, the more the contradiction disappears” (p. 50; emphasis added). • But if one were to assume such [a set of] differences, one would have to introduce a [further] specific differentiation. (p. 55; emphasis added). • “Either we have to combine both or have to distinguish between the two” (i.e., the universality or individuality of education; p. 54; emphases added).

As these examples show, Schleiermacher is constantly working with contradictions, with opposed pairs of concepts, sides, or cases. He is frequently introducing, advancing, distinguishing, and defining these oppositions, often with the ultimate aim of “combining” them in an integrative manner that leads to their “disappearance.” At other times, Schleiermacher simply looks to further specific “differentiations” or he simply concludes that a given opposition cannot be overcome. Schleiermacher’s dialectic clearly does not trace a pattern of thesis, synthesis, antithesis that may be familiar from Marx or Hegel: His dialectic is not simply a purely formal or structural “procedure” through which he constructs a system that then leads to a final synthesis (e.g., to the universality of world spirit or to a classless communist society). Instead, as some have noted, Schleiermacher’s dialectic follows a rather different, a “looser” or more “flexible” course (Hoffmann 1929, pp. 56). Schleiermacher’s dialectic is also arguably inextricable from his way of writing—​and as he himself suggests—​his own general way thinking as well. One result of such an adaptable, even personal dialectic that mixes form and content is that even the most devoted Schleiermacher scholars have referred to his lectures on education as a “paradoxically… difficult classic,” one characterized by a “meandering style through which [Schleiermacher] tests

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varying positions…” (Winkler 2000, p. viii). Such writing, Winkler continues, “demands a certain determination” from its readers (pp. vii, x). In reading the lectures translated here, in other words, the twists, turns, and idiosyncrasies of Schleiermacher’s dialectic means that it can be at times challenging to recall or reconstruct exactly where Schleiermacher has been, and where he is going. In the hope of mapping Schleiermacher’s dialectical path, this chapter highlights a number of dialectical processes and patterns in Schleiermacher’s lectures and explains how Schleiermacher develops his conclusions—​his “theorems” and “maxims”—​from them. Speaking more specifically, this chapter provisionally sees Schleiermacher’s dialectic as being manifest in three ways in his lectures: (1) as a style or disposition for both his thought and communication; (2) as a methodical process for analysis; and (3) finally as a structure for organizing this process and presenting its results. This chapter thus considers Schleiermacher’s dialectic as style, process, and structure by working deductively and using a range of examples from his lectures. At the same time, though, it recognizes that these three ways in which Schleiermacher’s dialectic is manifest resist differentiation. The three are, in the final analysis, inseparable. Referencing a number of scholars of Schleiermacher and his dialectic, this chapter breaks down how his at times almost inscrutable, at others, positively artful, dialectical thinking wends its way through the most complex and vexing but perennial challenges and contradictions of education and educational thinking. Finally, this chapter also highlights how the method, structure, and style of the introductory part of his lectures is particularly suited to Schleiermacher’s practical concerns about pedagogy.

1. The Basic Characteristics of Schleiermacher’s Dialectic As a philosophical method, Schleiermacher understands dialectic as “the principles of the art of doing philosophy”—​as the “organon” or instrument “for all science or inquiry” (Schleiermacher, 1996, p. 1).4 As both style and process, Schleiermacher sees dialectic as “a display or demonstration [Darlegung] of the fundamentals for engaging artfully in dialogue in the realm of pure thought” (p. 412). Schleiermacher also describes the “product” of his dialectic as “a work of art” providing “something individual [i.e., the particularity



As we point out in Schleiermacher’s lectures, “science” or Wissenschaft includes both the natural sciences as well as any other academic endeavor—​including the human sciences, the social sciences, etc.

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Figure 5.1:  Hegelian dialectic sees thesis and antithesis (e.g., bourgeois and proletariat) combining to form a thesis (socialism).

Figure 5.2:  A dialogical dialectic can be understood as the oscillation between contradictory points of view, leading to the resolution of both in a common understanding.

of a given text] within which what is general [i.e., the issues considered dialectically] is directly presented” (p. 4). As already suggested, Schleiermacher’s “practical” dialectic does not typically follow the triadic pattern familiar from Marx or Hegel’s systems (Figure 5.1). Hegel in particular—​whose grand system was outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit almost 20 years before Schleiermacher’s lectures—​ was enormously influential in Schleiermacher’s time (see Chapter 3, above).

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Common to both Hegel and Schleiermacher, however, is what in dialectical language is called negativity. This refers to difference and opposition that both thinkers saw as the generative foundation for thought itself. And also like Hegel, Schleiermacher generally works toward the resolution or reconciliation of such difference and opposition—​toward what is known dialectically as “positivity.” But distinctly unlike Hegel or Marx, Schleiermacher does not trace out some grand dialectical narrative of either spirit or labor as a kind of self-​propelling force that would bring history itself to its final resolution. Although Schleiermacher still harbors some utopian belief in human perfectibility, he instead is confined in his lectures to the perhaps humbler domain of educational practice. And he does this all while “maintaining a careful distance from any addiction to or dependence on systems (Systemsucht)” as he himself put it (as quoted in Hoffmann 1929, p. 42). In her now neglected Weimar era text, Dialectical Thought in Education (Das dialektische Denken in der Pädagogik), Erika Hoffmann describes the non-​Hegelian, dialogical nature of Schleiermacher’s dialectic by emphasizing that it …is not as it is for Hegel. [It is not] the self-​movement of an idea that divides itself into two and searches for its [own reunification], and for which the individual being is simply a stage to be overcome… Instead, dialectic [for Schleiermacher] always remains the activity of a living, limited, historical person… For all this, however, [Schleiermacher’s dialectic] is not simply [a collection of] idiosyncratic thoughts, but really the leading of a discussion between those who think differently, [a process] which attempts to bring contradictory viewpoints—​as the incomplete condition or state of its knowledge—​one step closer on the path to agreement. The first step in this direction is the pure accentuation of the opposition. (Hoffmann 1929, p. 44)

In these and many other senses, Schleiermacher’s thought can be said to be dialectical in the sense of the Greek root for dialectics, techne dialektike, which means “the art of dialogue” (Danner 2006, p. 195). When understood in this way, however, dialogue does not refer simply to any type of conversing or sharing, but rather to an exchange that has the character of a debate or dispute, one in which contradictory perspectives are contrasted with a view to their eventual resolution (see Figure 5.2). H.-​G. Gadamer, whose own hermeneutic masterpiece Truth and Method is deeply indebted to Schleiermacher’s work, characterizes dialogue specifically as a process that is oriented not to the personality of the debaters but as a “test” of the subject matter at hand: To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires that one

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does not try to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. (2006, pp. 360–​361)

If the idea of dialogue as a sustained inquiry into or a “test of” a topic at hand appears reminiscent of Socratic dialogue, then it is not by chance. The term “dialogue” here—​as with so many other words (e.g., theory) in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary—​has a distinctly Greek, even Platonic inflection.

2. Dialectic as Style Schleiermacher’s dialogical dialectic is something that, as mentioned above, is deeply connected with his writing style, his own habits, dispositions, and personality. Schleiermacher gave expression to this in a 1789 letter to his father, admitting that it is [only] with doubt that I began to think; and however much I have read and reflected since, I have always believed that testing and trying out, [that] patient listening to all witnesses and parties is the only means to reach sufficient grounds of certainty. [It is the only way] to establish a clear boundary for those things on which one must take a stand, in speaking and answering with another person… [things] which one cannot leave undecided, at the cost of one’s own sense of rest and satisfaction. This is how I [can] calmly view the contest or play of the philosophical and theological “athletes,” without having to declare myself to be for the one or the other—​or to set aside my freedom as a gamble in favor of one or the other. And it can never fail that I do not learn something from each side. (as quoted in Hoffmann 1929, p. 42)

Schleiermacher here sounds relatively humble, rather unlike some of his romantic contemporaries (e.g., J.G. Fichte) who can be said to have placed themselves at the center of their philosophies. His patience and willingness to listen and to doubt his own knowledge—​as well as to learn from others—​can be understood as a description not only of his own personality, but also of what he is undertaking in his 1826 lectures On the Art of Education. Except that instead of “patiently listening” to what one side or another has to say, in most cases, Schleiermacher can be said to articulate two counterposed positions himself. He also typically does this without initially “having to declare” himself “for the one or the other.” In other words, Schleiermacher can be said to put opposed positions in relation to one another, and to foster a kind of simulated dialogue between them: Just as he would earlier imagine himself “calmly viewing” the “contest or play” of great intellectual “athletes”—​w ithout “having to declare” himself “for the one or the other”—​in his lectures, he generally opposes two positions from a relatively neutral position. And in so doing, it seems, he never fails to gain or “learn something from each side.”

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Schleiermacher’s varied but consistently agonistic dialectical style can also be seen as fitting both for his own time and for the pedagogical subject matter of his lectures. Writing during the time following the French Revolution (1789), the subsequent Reign of Terror (1793–​1794), and the Napoleonic conquests in Western Europe (roughly up to 1806), conflict, contradiction, paradox, and ambiguity appear to have been the norm. As one recent scholar remarks: More forcefully than any other theorist of education of his time, Schleiermacher saw the many fault lines in modern bourgeois society, ones that despite this society’s promise of freedom and equality before the law, left millions of people of both sexes and from all classes in servitude to… the most mechanical and undignified work. (Graf 2018, p. 1)

Of course, contradiction, paradox, and ambiguity are hardly foreign to our own postmodern times, and this suggests that broadly dialectical approaches like Schleiermacher’s might be as relevant now as they were centuries earlier. Indeed, the texture of our contemporary language and experience—​one where we are told, for example, to constantly “expect the unexpected”—​suggests that we, too, might consider dialectics as a form directly applicable to the intrinsic indeterminacy of our times. In his book on Forms and Nature of Dialectics (Form und Wesen der Dialektik) Robert Heiss concurs: The texture of forms belonging to language are richer than those of any [linear] logic. In the multiplicity of its movements, the flow of language is not the servant of the laws of construction or consequence that logic has developed. […] Language constantly operates to both subordinate and super-​ordinate. It gives emphasis to certain lines [of thought], while developing others in parallel in the form of afterthoughts, asides [and] digressions … (1959, pp. 122, 115)

Our language itself, Heiss is saying, can be seen to have its own inherently dialectical character. Riddles, catch-​22s, as well as brain teasers and aphorisms all give expression to the paradoxes that we might see as mirrored in our own lives: We live in the best of times and the worst of times;5 at a time when we are told, for example, that “change is the only constant.” These and other paradoxical expressions and idioms highlight our era as a vexed and conflicted one—​one certainly much more prone to friction and change than continuity and stability. It is therefore no surprise, as Heiss continues, that …for dialectical thinking there is no fixed and independently valid reality; for this thinking, truth is something that is in motion, changing and subject to

As the opening line in Dicken’s 1859 novel, A Tale of two Cities, describes the time of the French Revolution.

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modification… For dialectical thought, the truth [often] takes the form of ambiguous and contradictory expressions and conditions, which [dialectics] views as concealing their own veracity. (p. 170)

Broadly dialectical oppositions and tensions confront us in the most common, everyday thought and language—​and arguably with particular force when thinking and speaking about education. Perhaps above all in teaching, we must deal constantly with ambiguity and change, with conflicting interpretations and possibilities in our actions, thoughts, and observations. For example, we must negotiate the need to praise and simultaneously to challenge students—​a part of what Schleiermacher refers to as “support” and “counteraction” (e.g., above, p. 75). We must also work to reconcile individual interests with those of a class of students as a whole—​or what Schleiermacher refers to as “individuality” versus “universality” (e.g., p. 52). We must continually decide between questions of equity and possible inequity in our treatment of students—​something Schleiermacher discusses extensively in terms of equality and inequality (e.g., p. 54). Such contradictory or broadly “dialectical” situations are common in everyday pedagogical experience, in working with students young and old. Regardless of their familiarity, such situations tend to be ignored in the vast majority of scholarly research and writing on education which—​to perhaps overgeneralize—​can be said to follow a linear rather than a dialectical logic. To think of education in terms of student “achievement” or “success,” or while using the language of “learners,” “learning” or “cognition” is to think in ways that have a much greater affinity with what Heiss referred to as logical “laws of construction or consequence,” above, than with those of opposition and contradiction. Learning, cognition, and instruction, for example, are typically seen as processes that are to be “encouraged,” “facilitated,” and “optimized” not only through appropriate action and interaction, but through (typically closed) systems of goal setting, implementation, execution, and evaluation. At the same time, though, it is not difficult to see in pedagogical experience oppositions and contradictions of various kinds lurking behind this surface. For example, anything actually “learned” has some form of “ignorance” as its diametric inverse, and accomplishments on the cognitive level are accompanied by effects, reactions, and struggles that remain embodied and generally unconscious and noncognitive. Perhaps most self-​evidently, anything that can meaningfully called student “achievement” or “success” is bound to the idea of failure—​out of dialectical necessity. Thus, although “dialectics” may initially sound rather foreign to education and pedagogy, this is certainly not because of any lack of conflict and contradiction in our reflections on education or within pedagogical experiences and action.

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As Schmied-​Kowarzik puts it, “the dialectic” can be said to “lie… in the practical educational situation itself.”6 If these situations and experiences are themselves dialectical, Schmied-​Kowarzik continues, it follows that “pedagogy must attempt to live up to this in its thinking.” It must be able to do this “namely so that the educator is able to view this educational situation in such a way as to experience guidance for their educational decisions in practice” (2008, p. 18). Education, in other words, answers to practice—​not to practice as it can be summarized or generalized, for example, in best-​or evidence-​based “practices,” but practice in all of its vicissitudes, situatedness, and specificity, in its own failures and accomplishments, its ignorance and its wisdom. It is in this sense that Schleiermacher insists on the “dignity of practice” early on in the text translated here, and that he asserts: “The dignity of practice exists independently from theory… [and] theory only makes practice more conscious” (above, p. 26). Working toward a heightened awareness of practice in all its concrete contradictions can be seen as Schleiermacher’s task in his lectures On the Art of Education. However, it is perhaps easiest to begin with two relatively brief and simple numbered aphorisms on the subject of education that Schleiermacher wrote between 1813 and 1821. Just as the everyday idioms mentioned above bring to the fore the contradictory nature of our own era and its forms of expression, the oppositions featured in these aphorisms provide relatively simple examples of the contradictions that mark educational experiences—​ones that are all too easily papered over in theories of “processes” and their “optimization.” One of Schleiermacher’s aphorisms brings this to the fore with special clarity: 8. General Maxim: Being a child must not inhibit one becoming a person; and becoming a person must not inhibit being a child. (Schleiermacher 2000, p. 202)

As in many other moments in his dialectic, Schleiermacher is here giving heightened expression to a particular opposition—​namely one between the processes of “being a child” and of “becoming a person.” Neither of these processes, Schleiermacher makes clear, should stand in the way of the other. At the same time, even the briefest reflection on this statement reveals its own literal impossibility: If the first part of this aphorism is true (being a child must not prevent one from becoming an [adult] person), then the second



A number of commentators (see also: Tice, Hoffmann) describe Schleiermacher’s dialectic as directly corresponding to oppositions and tensions in “reality” itself. Although I represent this problematic perspective in this paragraph, I prefer to locate oppositions and tensions in educational experience and reflection.

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part (becoming a person preventing one from being a child) must be false. Regardless or perhaps because of this contradiction, this general “maxim” is arguably compelling for concrete practice: A child’s childhood is to be preserved, while at the same time, it should not be over-​protected, or allowed to stand in the way of inevitably becoming a fully adult person. A second aphorism which immediately follows develops this opposition further—​specifically by extending it: 9. In general, being a child is expressed through play; becoming a person [is expressed] through practice and exercise. Play is “anti-​exercise” if it destroys the feeling of measure and order. Exercise is “anti-​play” when it does not occur in a cycle, or when it does not lead to completion. (Schleiermacher 2000, p. 202)

This aphorism extends the opposition of being a child and becoming an adult at least one step further: It associates the state of childhood with play, with the process of becoming a person with practice or exercise. However, instead of emphasizing the difference separating the one from the other, Schleiermacher suggests the possibility of the mutual compatibility of play and practice or exercise. He indicates that types of play which specifically integrate measure and order may be compatible with exercise—​particularly when exercise itself “does… occur in a cycle or… lead[s]‌to completion” (emphasis added). By first extending, and in this particular sense, accentuating the opposition, Schleiermacher can be seen to then reformulate it in a way that leads to mutual compatibility, even reconciliation between its contradictory terms. This initial accentuation of an opposition is a common preliminary step in Schleiermacher’s dialectic specifically when it is considered as a process, as is done below.

3. Dialectic as Process Schleiermacher’s initial definition and subsequent extension of a particular opposition is typical of the process represented by his dialectic. The style of Schleiermacher’s dialectic—​as the formulation and succession of these two maxims shows—​is ultimately inseparable from his dialectic as process. My extended examination of Schleiermacher’s “dialectic as process” in this section falls into two main parts: The first provides a close reading of how he again takes up the question of play and exercise, of being a child and becoming an adult person in the introduction to his lectures. This analysis focuses on the dialectical method or set of techniques used by Schleiermacher in addressing one specific section of his lectures, which is titled: “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment” in the life of the child “for another?” (above, p. 65;

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see also Chapter 2 in this volume). My close reading of this section goes paragraph by paragraph, sometimes sentence by sentence, and I advise readers to consult closely with Schleiermacher’s original text. In this second part of my examination of Schleiermacher’s “dialectic as process,” I use his discussion of “equality” and “inequality” as well as of the “individual” and “universal direction of education” (see especially p. 54) to illustrate what I refer to as Schleiermacher’s dialectical methodology.7 Instead of reading “closely”—​sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph—​this second section takes a step back from Schleiermacher’s individual words to identify the processual elements that arguably undergird them.

3.1.  Schleiermacher’s Method: A Close Reading To understand Schleiermacher’s dialectic specifically as a process, it is helpful to continue with the example of the tension between exercise and practicing on the one hand, and of play on the other. By asking the question, “is one allowed to sacrifice one moment” in the life of the child “for the sake of another?” Schleiermacher is getting at the eminently practical concern that children tend to live in the present moment and that education often requires the sacrifice of this moment for one in the future. (“The [young] child lives entirely in the present, not for the future, and they therefore cannot participate in a purpose… that encourages something to appear that has not yet come into appearance;” above, p. 66). We tell our children that what we ask them to do is “for your own good.” A present pain is often justified by the “good” of some future gain. Acknowledging this tension between present and future in practice, Schleiermacher begins by asking whether such a “sacrifice” can be justified in theory. This is in itself a question that is, of course, framed in heightened dialectical form from the start, specifically in the opposition between a moment in the present and one in the future. Schleiermacher develops this dialectical opposition first by considering it further in the light of what he had been discussing in his lectures up to this point: Namely, the question of how the goal or direction of education can be understood both in “individual” and “universal” terms. He connects the opposition of individual and universal with present and future by, in effect, by aligning the present moment with the individual, and the future one with the universal. He explains: We “need to differentiate between behavior that is an expression of the personal individuality of the child” on the one hand,

In referring to this as Schleiermacher’s methodology, I understand methodology as a kind of science of method that simultaneously highlights how a particular method unfolds.

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and on the other, “practice that relates only to the state [and] church”—​or to what is broader or universal: Given the orientation of the child to the here and now, Schleiermacher observes, he or she simply “cannot desire such a practice that relates only to state, church and so on” (above, p. 65). Such a combination of two pairs of opposites—​ in this case, present and future, individual and universal—​not only connects different parts of Schleiermacher’s lectures together; this combination can also be said to accentuate the negativity inherent in the opposition of present and future (see Figure 5.3, stage 1). We see that the present is aligned with the child in his or her specificity or individuality, and that the demands of the future moment are often those that are general, that are aligned with the interests of the society or state as a whole. This accentuation of opposition allows Schleiermacher to move to a second step in his dialectical treatment of the present and future. Here, he engages in a more precise description and qualification of “present moment” and its significance. Schleiermacher turns to the examples of dining together with others versus simply or animalistically “consuming” food, and of the integral relation of any one moment in one’s life to all of the others. He does this in order to show at least three things: (i) that a “moment” which resists being sacrificed for the future can be experienced both collectively and individually, (ii) that such an experience is not necessarily just confined to a moment, but can be extended over a period of time, and (iii) that the isolation of any moments whatsoever in life is a violation of the “whole” it constitutes, both in collective and individual terms. Again, Schleiermacher is engaging here in the accentuation of difference and negativity—​in this case, by giving more precise definition to the scope and possibilities implied in the opposition of present and future moments with which he began. In the 7th to the 9th paragraphs of this same section, Schleiermacher works toward still further precision by redefining the terms of his opposition. He also tests, from an “ethical perspective” (above, p. 68; i.e., according to the ethical requirements of everyday practice), their mutual exclusivity. This begins with his alignment of the future with the idea of what he calls “pedagogical influence” on the one hand, and on the other, the present with the temporal awareness of the child (i.e., their focus on the present and resistance to future priorities). He concludes that this opposition, so defined, is one that is mutually exclusive: On the one hand, one cannot “suspend the pedagogical influence because of the [child’s] opposition” and on the other, “it is truly the nature of the pedagogical influence to be oriented to the future” (pp. 67-​68). As a result, Schleiermacher heightens his newly redefined opposition by explaining that in order to be truly ethical in nature,

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pedagogical activity would have to be diminished to the point where satisfaction is granted in the moment. But in this case, we just would have displaced the difficulty and contradiction elsewhere. Or in other words: we would have asserted that for pedagogical activity to be morally perfect, it has to be technically imperfect [i.e., without influence]. (above, p. 68)

Schleiermacher is simply saying that in order to avoid sacrificing the present for the future, it appears (at this point in his dialectic) either that pedagogy or its influence be “morally imperfect,” or that there effectively be no pedagogical influence at all (see Figure 5.3, stage 2). This leads him to conclude that what he had been trying to do earlier—​seeing whether pedagogy could occur without a sacrifice of the present, or whether such a sacrifice could be minimized in some way—​w ill not work: There must be “a unification” of present and future moments in pedagogy—​a unification, as Schleiermacher says, “in which no sacrifice occurs.” “[E]‌very pedagogical moment that, as such, is related to the future has to provide satisfaction for the individual as he or she is [in the moment]” (p. 68). All of the three paragraphs that follow this particular discussion (above, pp. 69-​ 70) consist of further attempts to discover how such a relation between, or a practical unification of present and future can be achieved. First, Schleiermacher imagines this as happening through the child’s “trust in those who are providing guidance” or their “agreement or consent”—​ with “the satisfaction of the moment” being manifest through “this act of agreement” (p. 69). But Schleiermacher notes that this is contrary to his earlier observation that “the child lives entirely in the present, not for the future,” and that such an agreement would only make sense when “the future… enters into [the child’s] consciousness” (pp. 66, 69). But with this, something new emerges in Schleiermacher’s dialectical process or technique: Namely, it becomes apparent that the child moves gradually from one stage—​in which they are not aware of the future—​to another—​in which this awareness is emerging. Schleiermacher now recognizes that this “developmental” distinction forms yet another opposition that must be addressed in his dialectic. For as things currently stand, he says, it means that “we would need two different formulae” or answers: One for the very young whose awareness of the future is lacking (i.e., where “the moment is realized [only] as the satisfaction of the present;” above, p. 70), and a second for those slightly older who already have some comprehension of the future in relation to the present (Figure 5.3, stage 3). But this, too, is insufficient for Schleiermacher: He says it not only runs counter to his overall goal of developing one formula for or approach to education, but that it is also contradicted by the fact that these “two

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periods in [the] life” of the child “are not distinctly separated” (above, p. 70). The child transitions only gradually from a temporality focused exclusively on the present to one that acknowledges the future; and such a gradual change cannot be adequately accounted for by positing two “distinctly separated” stages. The way that Schleiermacher deals with this is ultimately not by looking to principles “from the realm of pure thought” (Schleiermacher, 1996, p. 412) but by developing principles reflecting the particular circumstances he is considering. This adaptive moment in Schleiermacher’s dialectic is based on the gradual nature of human development, and it introduces a type of distinction or differentiation that is rather different than the relatively fixed diametric oppositions that we have been discussing so far. It is a question of interrelated degree or gradation, of simultaneous de-​/​escalation of the two factors that are in only relative opposition. Erika Hoffmann refers to this process as “relativization:” The relativity of opposites is inseparable from the idea of [human] development, and the solution is found in the temporal displacement of the two moments constituting an opposition. At the beginning… the first is dominant [but] is gradually eclipsed by the second. The idea of development relates to the growing child who becomes an adult as a nonrecurrent historical event… and consequently, only oppositions related to the gradations separating child and adult are relevant to it. (p. 54)

The contradiction of the present and future moment in the life of the child, of course, is precisely an opposition of this kind. And the process of the “relativization” of awareness of present and future allows Schleiermacher to find a way to address their opposition. Schleiermacher does this first by insisting that—​at least early in a child’s development—​t he pedagogical influence is only to be realized “as the satisfaction of the present” (above, p. 70). Anything less would represent a failure of ethical standards (or of what Schleiermacher elsewhere refers to as “the Good”), or it would violate either the nature of pedagogy or of children themselves. Later, but only gradually, pedagogy becomes a “practice that is” more overtly “oriented to the future” (p. 70). (As stages 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 5.3 suggest, this relativization—​represented by the rising arc—​remains important for the remainder of Schleiermacher’s dialectic in this section of his lectures.) However, before exploring this relativization further, Schleiermacher introduces two further key opposites familiar from his aphorisms, above, that we now consider in greater detail: Spiel, “play” or “game” on the one hand, and Übung, “exercise” or “practicing” on the other:

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We call “play” or a “game” in the broadest sense that which, in the life of the child, offers satisfaction in the very moment without regard to the future. On the other hand, [we call] “exercise” the activity directed toward the future. (above, p. 70)

In keeping with his recognition of the gradual development of the child’s awareness of the future, Schleiermacher explains that his “theorem” now “has to be as follows:” In the beginning, exercise [has to be present] exclusively in play. However, gradually both [play and exercise] become separate to the degree to which the child develops an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is. (above, p. 70).

In other words, in the earliest childhood, all exercise (or deliberate teaching, e.g., toilet training) has the character of a game; and just as the child’s future orientation develops gradually, so too does the degree to which exercise is separated from play and games. In keeping with the general pragmatic orientation of his dialectic, Schleiermacher also works out a couple of related matters of practical detail by focusing on two types of activity in particular: “Music and some physical activity are both: playful and serious exercises, a light exercise of playing and a serious undertaking. In this way and from this perspective, we would have then liberated education from any contradiction” (above, p. 70). These two opposed elements, play and “serious” exercise, combined with the opposition of the present and future moments, can be said to represent the resolution of Schleiermacher’s original question about the sacrifice of the present for the future. Rather reminiscent of today’s efforts to “gamify” the curriculum—​m ixing play and serious “learning” to engage and motivate students—​Schleiermacher presents these two opposed ideas as models for pedagogical activity. However, because Schleiermacher has examined these carefully through his dialectic, we can not only see the potential value of this solution in concrete practice, but also the central challenge of such gamification—​to reconcile present oriented play with future oriented exercise. We can also see the general pedagogical limitation at work here—​namely, the intrinsic future orientation of all pedagogical influencing. Inasmuch therefore as play in its design is exercise as well, it is nothing but the complete satisfaction of the consciousness of the child in the present, because while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities. (above, p. 71)

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The result, in other words, is not a final resolution of all of tension and conflict on the level of dialectical process and technique. It is instead an ethically and situationally responsive resolution—​and at least a diminution of the tensions involved—​on the level of practice. It preserves the unavoidable future orientation of pedagogy without violating the enjoyment of the youngest child. It accomplishes this with the acknowledgment that educational thought and practice involve not only diametric oppositions, but also the gradations and differences of degree that are part of the child’s and young person’s development. This overview of Schleiermacher’s discussion of “sacrificing the present for the future” thus shows a number of important characteristics of Schleiermacher’s dialectic in general: (a) That the oppositions considered in Schleiermacher’s dialectic often involve not just a single pair of opposites, but at least two in association. The central opposition of present and future is paired or juxtaposed in this section with a number of others, ranging from “individual vs. universal” through “play vs. exercise.” (b) Schleiermacher’s dialectic concludes not with a direct synthesis of thesis and antithesis, but in a manner reflecting the nature of the subject matter itself: Although the synthesis can here be seen to be provided by the combination of the gradual nature of the child’s development together with different degrees to which play and exercise can be combined, Schleiermacher also suggests that the original tension manifest in the question of present and future is never completely eliminated and may well persist into adulthood (e.g., in efforts to maintain a “work/​life balance”). (c) That through Schleiermacher’s dialectic, opposed terms and the nature of their opposition are explored and refined, heightening the opposition in question or giving rise to still further oppositions. For example, the present, above, is given further definition in relationship to the example of the extended “present” or moments of dining (as opposed to animalistic “feeding”).

3.2.  Schleiermacher’s Methodology As described above, the question—​“is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?”—​can be seen to be answered by Schleiermacher in a particularly Schleiermachian way: Namely, through the combination of two pairs of general oppositions: the opposition of the present and the future and the

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Figure 5.3:  Adapted from Danner (2006), this diagram shows how Schleiermacher’s original opposition of the present and future is developed by being extended, reformulated and transformed in five stages. This happens, for example, by this opposition initially being linked to the opposition of individual and universal. Schleiermacher develops this

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further by aligning the present with the child’s temporality or orientation to the present, and the future with pedagogy’s emphasis on preparation. The key to the resolution of these various ways of opposing present and future, however, is introduced in terms of a dialectical “technique” particularly suited to education—​the gradual development of a “sense” of the future in the young (indicated by the ascending arc in stages 3, 4 and 5). This gradual development allows the growth of the child’s awareness of the future to occur in parallel with a growing acceptance of exercise as something that becomes ever more separate from play or games.

opposition of play and exercise—​w ith the developmental gradations in temporal awareness mediating the two. The idea of Schleiermacher’s dialectic unfolding through the combination of pairings of opposites, as identified by Erika Hoffmann (1929), can be said to constitute the methodology of Schleiermacher’s dialectic: While it may not always be immediately recognizable in his execution of this dialectic, it is arguably how the dialectic is carried out. As Hoffmann herself puts it, it represents a “law of thought” for Schleiermacher that “stands parallel to Hegel’s three-​ step” process—​ something without which Schleiermacher’s work “could not be called dialectical” (pp. 45–​46). Hoffmann describes the combination of two pairs as forming an “X,” with “the point at which the four [i.e., the two pairs of opposites] intersect,” being the point of their “coincidence [or] consummation” (1929, p. 46; see the solid lines in Figure 5.4). Hoffmann goes further than this, saying the elements in either of the two oppositions can also be joined “across pairs” (as shown by the dotted lines in Figure 5.4): “One pair of [the two pairs of] opposites encompasses both sides of other,” Hoffmann explains, with each element being “bound” together with the others to create a “mixture which encompasses all possibilities” (p. 46). In other words: Either implicitly or explicitly, Schleiermacher’s juxtaposition of any two opposites can be seen to encompass six pairings—​two diagonal, two horizontal, two vertical—​w ith each ideally seen as a particular moment in the dialectical process. Hoffmann continues: “Schleiermacher finds in this “quadra-​ rhythm” [Viertakt] of thought the intersection of two …pairs of opposites, each of whose sides subsumes under it the other sides of the other pair…” (p. 48). Through the inclusion of any pair of oppositions like present and future, play and exercise, in other words, the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal pairings of the four terms—​as well as the tensions between them—​can each be said to subsume or contain the others within it. Pairings such as future and play or present and exercise, for example, can be regarded as containing within them all of the other oppositions present in the configuration. Certainly, the resolution of the opposition of future and play or present and exercise would represent the resolution of all of the other oppositions involved—​and could

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Figure 5.4:  Example from “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?” showing the pairings of two intersecting opposites, “present vs. future” and “exercise vs. play.” Just as enjoyment of the present eventually needs to be reconciled with preparation for the future, so too does exercise need to be reconciled with play. According to Schleiermacher, these two reconciliations occur through the growth of the child, who gradually “develops an appreciation for the exercise [as a preparation for the future] and rejoices in it for what it is” (above, p. 70). Meanwhile, as the vertical dotted lines suggest, the present can be seen to exist in a particular kind of relation and tension with exercise. Similarly, play that “offers satisfaction in the very moment without regard to the future” (p. 70) clearly stands in tension with the future.

also be taken as characteristic of Schleiermacher’s own resolution for these contradictions. Further examples of this quadrilateral arrangement abound in Schleiermacher’s introduction. For example, Schleiermacher’s famous question for understanding the scope of the field of education as a whole—​“ What does the older generation actually want with the younger?” (above, p. 24)—​ can be seen as establishing a foundational opposition between old and young that then reappears in combination with a range of further oppositions. This foundational opposition resurfaces in Schleiermacher’s discussion of the collective versus the individual nature of education. In this particular case, the configuration of older and younger, together with collectivity and individuality serves only a momentary, heuristic function: Schleiermacher briefly considers whether, in the case of education, older and younger, educator and those being educated are encountered individually or as a group. His answer as it relates to the older is clear: “We…assume that the generation that educates is a collectivity and can be regarded as a unity” (p. 38). (This collectivity is embodied in elements such as the curriculum and even the school building itself—​both are constructed and maintained through collective taxation.) However, thinking especially of very young children, Schleiermacher observes that “the generation that is to be educated is not at all a unity. Instead, the earlier we view it[, the more clearly it] it breaks down into individuality” (p. 38)—​arising typically within the home with parents, caregivers, and family. When the opposition of the young and old are intersected by that of individuality and collectivity, in other words, the older generation almost always appears always as collective, whereas the younger moves gradually from being influenced individually (e.g., by their parents) to being influenced as a collectivity. (The generational difference, in still other words, is subsumed to the opposition of individuality and collectivity.) The

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result is not a complete resolution of the tensions between either opposition, but again, a modest “relativization”—​a realization of the gradual reduction of tension between individual and collective as the young develop. Schleiermacher can be said to introduce a more sophisticated approach to this quadratic configuration specifically with the opposition of equality and inequality—​something he covers over a substantial part of his introduction (above, pp. 54-​65). As in the case of his discussion of “sacrificing the present for the future,” the opposition of equality and inequality is introduced in close connection with the opposition that Schleiermacher had been considering previously, individuality and collectivity. In this particular part of his lectures, “collectivity” is recast by Schleiermacher as universality, specifically as it is embodied in the state. And Schleiermacher refers to individuality and universality, thus opposed, as “directions” or broad goals or emphases for education to orient its own efforts. Together with equality and inequality, this opposition can be seen as forming a quadrilateral configuration (Figure 5.5). Also, like his treatment of the moments of present and future, Schleiermacher begins his discussion of inequality vs. equality (and individuality vs. universality) with a simple question: “Are people equal or unequal in relation to the individual and universal direction of education” (p. 54)? With this, Schleiermacher provides the basis for the ten pages of discussion that follow. These ten pages are structured through the following hierarchically ordered section titles:

1. Are People Equal or Unequal in Relation to the Direction of Education [toward the State, toward Individuality]? 2. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Universal Direction [of Education]? 3. What would be Implied for our Task by: i. Presupposing the Equality [of all People with Regard to all Directions of Education]? ii. Presupposing the Inequality [of all People with Regard to all the Directions of Education]?

Figure 5.5:  Schleiermacher’s configuration of oppositions in his consideration of equality and inequality as presuppositions for educating.

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(a) Assuming that inequality is inherited (b) Assuming that inequality is individual… 4. The Task of Education insofar as it must Proceed from Existing Inequality 5. Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Individual Direction [of Education]

Under the first title “Are People Equal or Unequal in Relation to the Direction of Education?” Schleiermacher provides a two paragraph overview of a number of possible permutations for his quadrilateral. He begins by restating his opening question in this section first from “the side” of the state and second, from “the side” of “individual personality.” And here and elsewhere in this discussion, he asks specifically about people’s relation to collectivity and the state, and their relation to individuality: “Within a state [Volk],” Schleiermacher asks, do all people relate to the communal spirit [geistigen Zusammenhang] or the idea of the state either the same or differently? And, viewed from the other side: Do all people relate to the idea of the individual personality the same or differently? (above, p. 54).

Here, Schleiermacher can be said to view the configuration of equality vs. inequality and universality vs. individuality first from the “side” or the perspective of equality—​and then switching to the opposite side or perspective, inequality. (Logically speaking, inequality cannot be adequately considered without invoking it opposite, at least implicitly.) Initially, Schleiermacher emphasizes universality or the state, asking whether people all relate to the state in the same way. Next, he emphasizes individuality, asking whether all people share the same relation to “individual personality.” This leads him to conclude that if the relations of people to both individuality and universality were marked by “identity”—​i.e., if all people related to them in the same way—​t hen an educational “system based upon a fundamental equality of all humans would be the result” (p. 54). However, Schleiermacher warns that when “taking the side of inequality”—​assuming that people relate to the state differently—​education would produce very different results. It would be impossible “that one [person] could reach the same level of development in all respects as another” (above, p. 54). This, in turn, would produce “an aristocracy of inner potentialities and form-​ability [Bildsamkeit]” (p. 54). Some people would have the potential or ability to be formed in relation to the state, to collectivity and

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universality—​ while others would lack this capacity to varying degrees. Something similar would happen, Schleiermacher predicts, if one were to take “the side of” individuality—​rather than collectivity: some would not distinguish themselves as individuals from the group while for others, “real individual… characteristics would evolve” (p. 54). These consequences, however, seem to persuade Schleiermacher that his initial assumption of fundamental equality is just too simple: After a historical examination of equality and inequality in Greek slave holding societies (considered under the second section title, “Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Universal Direction?”), Schleiermacher concludes “that equality can be understood in different ways” (p. 56): Effectively, people can be seen to be born equal in their promise and potentiality and then be made unequal through “external circumstances.” But Schleiermacher still sees this as a form of “equality” nonetheless (p. 56). So in section 3 a), titled “Presupposing the Equality” of all people, he again takes the side or perspective of equality (so defined) in his dialectic. Education, he proposes, can respond to the circumstances that render children unequal in one of two ways: It can either follow the individual and the “aristocratic principle,” with those favored by external circumstances being developed to their full potential, or it can affirm universality and realize what Schleiermacher calls the “democratic principle,” developing everyone exactly to the same extent. However, in all of the sections that follow 3 i) (excluding section 5 “Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Individual Direction”), Schleiermacher emphasizes the universal rather than the individual direction of education—​a lthough he certainly doesn’t propose that those with special abilities should be held back for the sake of a kind of an “absolutized” equality. But again, Schleiermacher’s analysis of equality to this point appears (at least to him) to be too simple. The differences that separate individuals arise, as he now recognizes, not only from external circumstances. Instead, Schleiermacher now clearly sees that there are forms of inequality that precede “all external circumstances and any education” (p. 57). Inequality, as Schleiermacher now acknowledges, can arise “based on one’s individuality” and it can also have arise from one’s social standing, that is, it can

Figure 5.6:  The quadrilateral seen from the perspective of “inequality… regarding both directions of education” (i.e., individuality and universality). These emphases are evident in Schleiermacher’s lectures in sections 3 i), 3 ii), 3 ii) a), 3 ii) b), and 4.

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be “a matter of” one’s class “inheritance.” In the case of this further bifurcation of the element inequality, in his dialectic, Schleiermacher’s priority is not individualistic, to maintain a distinction between the inequalities of individuality and of class membership. Instead, as he says, he wishes to “render them irrelevant,” and he expresses this through the following question: “Can we extract something universally valid from both presuppositions [regarding the origins of inequality] to render them irrelevant within the pedagogical realm” (p. 57)? In other words, however inequality arises—​through individuality or social standing—​education should have the power to rise above it. In order to do this, Schleiermacher introduces two still further subordinate sections: 3b i) “Assuming that inequality is [socially] inherited” and ii) “Assuming that inequality is individual…”. In Schleiermacher’s dialectic, in other words, any one set of oppositions, can give rise to still further pairs of oppositions, illustrating what Hoffmann refers to as the “quadra-​rhythm [Viertakt]” of Schleiermacher’s dialectic. Through careful consideration of both the assumption that inequality is a matter of social inheritance and of underlying individual differences, Schleiermacher concludes We have truly found something generally valid for all the cases and presuppositions [discussed above], a theorem that takes into account both presuppositions of equality and—​collectively and individually inherited—​inequality: Namely that education should support the inner powers that develops within those who are to be educated… [And that it should treat any inequalities] as something that should be gradually receding. (above, pp. 60-​61)

The presuppositions that Schleiermacher is referring to here are outlined in the titles of 3b and the two subsections listed under it, namely: Presupposing the Inequality [of all People with Regard to all the Directions of Education]?

i. Assuming that inequality is inherited ii. Assuming that inequality is individual…

And what Schleiermacher is saying in relation to all three of these possibilities is that education should support each child to their full potential regardless of the type of inequality that they might bring to it. Moreover, because those undergoing education do in fact bring a range of possible forms of inequality with them, education must work to ensure that such equalities are indeed ones that recede gradually over time.

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In section 4, “the task of education insofar as it must proceed from existing inequality,” Schleiermacher’s emphasis is on the word “must.” His work with the quadrilateral juxtaposition of equality vs. inequality and individuality vs. universality has shown that education must indeed deal with a number of different kinds of inequality. Opening this fourth section, Schleiermacher puts this as follows: Even if education should strive toward a decrease in inequality—​from which the possibility arises for its complete elimination—​even then education must presuppose existing inequality and must bring its particular methods to bear on this inequality. (above, p. 54)

Schleiermacher considers how this should be done given that some types of inequality will appear at the beginning of a child’s education, and others only later. His ultimate solution, the main method that education can “bring to bear on this inequality,” as he says, is one we are all familiar with today, namely one that assumes “that education has been organized at two different levels, with elementary education being a more general education,” and subsequent forms (e.g., middle and high school) be “more specialized” (p. 54). Schleiermacher warns, however, that such a solution can do significant harm both to those with and without special abilities: “The judgment of the educating generation therefore has to be as cautious and certain as possible,” he emphasizes, “and it has to proceed from the clearest premises, so that such errors cannot occur” (p. 54). What Schleiermacher is doing in these sections, then, is different from the examples provided previously in this chapter: He is not simply superimposing one opposition on another to see how any two terms relate (as he arguably did with present vs. future and individuality vs. universality). He is also not reconfiguring oppositions in order to “relativize” them in a particular way (as he did with “present vs. future and game vs. play”). In these sections, subsections (and subsubsections), as Schleiermacher himself puts it, he is literally “taking the side” (p. 54) or the perspective of one or more of the terms in this four-​sided configuration and understanding how at the three other terms relate to it (Figure 5.6). Finally, in the section “Equality or Inequality with Regard to the Individual Direction” (section 5, above), Schleiermacher considers individuality as itself a type of inequality. He also recasts individuality in German more specifically as Eigentümlichkeit, which emphasizes to peculiarity and singularity in addition to individuality. And unlike other forms of inequality discussed above, Schleiermacher deems this particular form to be a desirable

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one. He concludes his consideration the type of inequality represented by “individuality” as follows: If education aspires both to the development of individuality—​inasmuch as it is given—​a nd to the capacity for the greater good of the community, then it is of the utmost importance for the organization of education to determine how both [of these aspirations] relate to one another. (above, p. 65)

In other words: Schleiermacher is not done in considering the opposition of equality and inequality, universality and individuality specifically from the perspective of inequality. However, before he can continue with such consideration, Schleiermacher says: “we won’t be able to reach a fruitful decision about this until we have answered a different question” (p. 65). This different question is the one about sacrificing “one moment for another,” discussed above. To summarize this particular overview of the process of Schleiermacher’s dialectic—​both in his discussion of inequality and elsewhere—​one can say that it reveals a remarkable mixture of repetition and variation. At some points, this can be traced quite precisely in terms of taking one corner in his quadrilateral configuration (e.g., inequality) and then another, and then viewing the other through terms from its perspective (e.g., equality, universality, and individuality; see Figure 5.6). At others, it can again end up reflecting the contours of the subject matter with which Schleiermacher is dealing, for example, with the “relativization” called for by the gradual nature of the development of the “younger generation” in his conception of education. In his “Remarks on Schleiermacher’s Pedagogy,” Otto Friedrich Bollnow references Hoffmann in saying that while “the intersection of two pairs of opposites… has often been regarded as characteristic of Schleiermacher’s pedagogy, this should not be understood too schematically.” Bollnow continues: “Schleiermacher remains much more adaptive in its implementation, [following a] diversity of ways” to achieve the “dissolution of opposites” (1986, p. 739). In other words: Although Schleiermacher certainly seems to proceed from oppositions—​and from their superposition and combination in pairs—​t he way that he does this varies quite widely from one instance to another:

(a) Sometimes such oppositions proliferate, leading toward further and different juxtaposed oppositions (e.g., to new bifurcations of inequality);

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(b) Other times, these oppositions can be extended or recast to give further definition and accentuation to the negativity found in any one opposition (e.g., in developing the opposition of present and future to become the present orientation of the child vs. the future orientation of pedagogy when considering it in relation to individuality vs. universality); (c) At still other times, Schleiermacher’s dialectic simply provides ways of exploring the multiple relations between given sets of oppositions (as is also illustrated in taking the side of inequality, just above).

In addition, the final results of any superposition of opposites is equally varied in nature:



(a) It can result in the “binding” or “relativization” of oppositions and their negativity, as Hoffmann suggests (and as illustrated “present vs. future and game vs. play”); (b) It can also lead Schleiermacher to “distinguish between [any] two [opposites] and to say that one will be good for some objects of education, and the other for others”—​as Schleiermacher says of individuality and universality (above, p. 54); (c) It can simply be brought to a relatively rapid end, as illustrated in the example “equality vs. inequality and universality vs. individuality” and the fact that Schleiermacher abruptly turns from his examination of this quadrilateral to the question of the sacrifice of the present for the sake of the future.

A number of these varied results of Schleiermacher’s dialectic were illustrated at the outset of this chapter through the brief list of phrases suggesting the dialectical character of his lectures. A similar uniformity in variation is evident when Schleiermacher’s dialectic is considered specifically as a form of organization and presentation, the final category of analysis in this chapter. The process represented by Schleiermacher’s dialectic can be said to appear—​as some contemporary scholars have put it—​as a kind of “reflective contingency management” (Raithel, Dollinger & Hörmann, 2009, p. 127): In constantly working with two pairs of superimposed opposites, first exploring one type of definition, extension or emphasis and then another, Schleiermacher can be said to be considering possibilities for education under conditions of significant uncertainty. He was doing this at a time not only when political conditions are changing, but (as will be shown below) when there were uncertainties about both the makeup of human

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beings and of the common “Good” that education itself is to pursue. At such a time Schleiermacher regards “the formulation of prescriptive solutions for pedagogical problems” as inappropriate, as Raithel et al explain. Instead, Schleiermacher sought to point out “possibilities for orientation in the face of thoroughly conflicted options” (p. 127). A similar emphasis on contingency and uncertainty is also evident in now considering the structure of Schleiermacher’s dialectic.

4.  Dialectic as Structure In defining Schleiermacher’s dialectic in terms of the processes of the (re-​)definition, extension, relativization, and variation of two (or more) pairs of opposites, this chapter has already introduced what it takes to be the core element of the structure of Schleiermacher’s dialectic: The quadrilateral configuration formed by the various relations between two pairs of opposites. However, some Schleiermacher scholars have gone much further than this. They have endeavored to show how such structures and their variations can be extended beyond specific passages in his introduction to highlight the dialectical cohesion within his “theory of education” more broadly. One such attempt at a “macro-​scale” mapping of Schleiermacher’s dialectic was undertaken by Ernst Lichtenstein, who included an “overview of the construction of Schleiermacher’s theory of education” in his edited volume, Schleiermacher’s Selected Pedagogical Writings (Ausgewählte pädagogische Schriften), and in his 1968 article “Schleiermacher’s Pedagogy” (Schleiermachers Pädagogik). The version presented here (Figure 5.7) has been modified to reflect more closely the contents of the introduction and linked to relevant page numbers in this lectures whenever possible. Lichtenstein’s overview of Schleiermacher’s theory of education as a whole begins with the statement that it is depicting education “as an ethical art based on [human] nature.” This characterization is then linked to two statements on the upper far left and far right sides of Figure 5.7, which frame the diagram as a whole. These refer to:

• the “uncertainty of… anthropological fundamentals” (p. 36; e.g., self-​ activity, individuality) • “the idea of the Good” (whatever form it might take)

Both of these require some explanation: “Anthropological” and “anthropology” are terms that reappear a number of times in Schleiermacher’s lectures, and refer simply to the philosophical

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study (-​logy) of “human nature” (anthropo-​; e.g., see: Balibar, 2016; Ricoeur 2016; Plessner 2019). Often in his lectures, Schleiermacher refers to “anthropological foundations” or “fundamentals,” generally remarking that education broadly, or a particular opposition more narrowly, “needs to take into account the uncertainty” of these foundations (e.g., p. 37). Sometimes these uncertainties have to do with factors that may have since been illuminated—​ but generally not entirely settled—​by contemporary medical science or psychology. Examples of this include Schleiermacher’s speculation on whether adult pedagogical influence might “begin in the womb, if only one knew what to do and to avoid” (p. 30), or where he refers to “differences within human nature which cannot immediately be perceived after birth” (p. 61). Although we know today, for example, about things like the significance of music for fetal development or about infant “temperament types” (e.g., Rimm-​K aufman & Kagan 2006), these and other “anthropological uncertainties” in Schleiermacher’s lectures still bring with them uncertainty today. Regardless, what is important is that Schleiermacher views these and many other concerns regarding human nature from a speculative, philosophical, and broadly cultural perspective—​rather than from a more narrowly empirical, scientific one. He sees these, in other words, in the way they are still viewed today in philosophical anthropology. And whereas medicine and psychology view these matters in their particulars, philosophical anthropology sees them in their cultural generality, for example, regarding humans as both confined by their evolutionary, biological nature, but also capable of transcending it to become both free and responsible. Schleiermacher’s reference to “the idea of the Good”—​as that which is just, valuable, and desirable in itself—​again follows Plato and is closely linked to Schleiermacher’s anthropology. Like Plato, Schleiermacher understands the pursuit of knowledge and thus of education itself as something that “should accomplish the formation of the human according to the idea of the Good” (above, p. 39). This “Good,” then, serves as the ultimate criterion, an ethical or normative criterion, by which all actions and decisions in education are to be judged. But he also acknowledges that “the Good” is understood in different ways in different societies. For example, in Plato’s Republic, this Good is clearly the good of the collectivity, of the state. On the other hand, in educational discourse today, the Good can arguably be said to appear to be tacitly defined almost exclusively in economic terms, even in terms of efficiency for its own sake (e.g., Guthrie 1980; Cloninger 2013). In anthropological terms, such views of the Good would correspond to an understanding of the human as homo economicus, homo technicus or homo faber—​t he human being as a rational optimizer of value, as a tool user or as a creature whose goal or

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Figure 5.7.  “Overview of the construction of Schleiermacher’s Theory of Education.” Adapted from Lichtenstein (1959/​1968). Note: “Taking up the world in oneself and presenting oneself in the world” comes from a part of Schleiermacher’s lectures (2017, p. 285) that is not translated here.

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“Good” is to master nature. The question of the Good, in other words, is closely bound up with what it means to be human. If we can indeed be characterized as homo faber, or say, homo ludens (see: Huizinga 1949), than what is “good” for us will be a result either of our productive or our playful nature. Of course, Schleiermacher leaves the question of what the human is in the final analysis largely open and undefined. This means that his conception of the Good represents another point of uncertainty in the overall dialectical structure of his lectures—​one upon which the final resolution of a number of oppositions and questions depends. As Karsten Kenklies suggests in Chapter Three in this volume, Schleiermacher’s suspension of any predetermined definition of the normative ends of education presents a move that is relatively rare or largely unknown in English language scholarship. This absence has produced a range of psychological and other approaches to education that arguably confuse or conflate what education “can” do and what it “should” be doing. They do not clearly separate education’s practical possibilities from what they expect of it. For example, whether education’s goal is defined as self-​fulfillment, optimized learning or some definition of socio-​economic “success,” we need to ask not only whether education should see such results as education’s ultimate aims—​what it should do—​but also whether these are compatible with what it actually can do. Perhaps more narrowly, we also need to consistently ask whether certain prescriptions for teaching and learning—​ whether they are called “constructivist,” “personalized” or something else altogether—​are accounts of learning and teaching actually are, of what they can be like, or of what, in some ideal world, they should be? To return to Lichtenstein’s diagram, Schleiermacher next raises two specific questions to help in “defining our task further,” namely: “What should be accomplished through education?” And: “What can be accomplished through it?” (above, p. 29; See the third line of text in Figure 5.7). Given that education is both an inescapably anthropological (i.e. human) and normative (i.e., is ethical and oriented to the good) undertaking—​w ith the contingencies that all this entails—​Schleiermacher again is separating his open question of the normative in education from that which might actually be possible in or through it. Just because education or any other art can do something does not mean that it also should do it. Schleiermacher, in other words, is asking both both after education’s moral direction and after its practical capacity. This distinction between the normative and what we might call the technical dimension of pedagogy—​and how these separately shape and limit what we can meaningfully say about education, can be seen as a particularly valuable contribution of Schleiermacher’s lectures to English language discourses.

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But in posing these two opposed questions about the normative “should” and the practical or technical “can” of education, Schleiermacher can be seen to be pointing toward yet another opposition. This is one that—​like the opposition between the normativity and (im)possibilities of education—​ can be said to broadly shape and limit educational discourses today. This is the opposition between the omnipotence and impotence of education—​as noted in the very next (fourth) line of Lichtenstein’s diagram. To oversimplify greatly, the evident tendency today is to err on the side of education’s omnipotence. As I have argued elsewhere (Friesen 2019), at least in the US, scholarship that is either critical and affirmative of contemporary educational policies, priorities and practices broadly assumes that education is indeed able to accomplish precisely what it wants to do—​if not even more. In the case of affirmative—​often quasi-​experimental research—​t he significant power of education is generally of unquestioned benefit; for the other, critical scholarship, this power (at least as it is currently exercised) is seen as significantly harmful. Again oversimplifying, the diametrically opposed critical and affirmative perspectives differ only in the way that they view the effective omni-​ or “quasi-​potence” of education: For one, it is of unquestioned benefit, while for the other, it is of significant harm. So how does Schleiermacher answer his own question about the omnipotence and impotence—​about the practical limits and possibilities of education? Similarly, how does he understand the ethical scope of education—​given the widely varying ways that “the Good” may be understood in a particular society, and “anthropology” may also be defined? Perhaps unsurprisingly for Schleiermacher, these questions can only be answered by Schleiermacher by posing still further questions, specifically one about the limitations and possibilities of education in general, namely: “Is one allowed to make anything one might want of a person through education?” And additionally, “…given the nature of education, can it accomplish such things?” (above, p. 32) Although Schleiermacher admits that anthropological uncertainties make a conclusive answer to these questions impossible, he provides a response in the form of particular term, “self-​activity,” one that was also used by Dewey and that is still current in German discourse to this day. “Self-​activity” refers to “activity arising from one’s own [i.e., the child’s own] impetus and goal setting.” It is activity, moreover, that “can occur spontaneously or be elicited by the teacher” (Böhm & Seichter 2018, p. 430). Schleiermacher emphasizes that this self-​activity needs to be addressed in education through two particular practices or responses: “First, self-​activity would have to be evoked or elicited, and second, it would have to be guided” (p. 37, emphases added).

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These two stages—​the first of bringing out individual spontaneity and the second guiding it (presumably in socially helpful ways)—​can be seen to be positioned broadly in parallel with the opposition that Schleiermacher turns to next—​and that forms the substantial mid-​section of Lichtenstein’s diagram. This is the opposition of the individual and universal directions of education and their association with what Lichtenstein identifies as the task or responsibility (Aufgabe) of education. Having discussed the opposition of the individual and universal at some length above [section 2. B], I will only emphasize here that Schleiermacher further restates or reformulates this opposition, as shown in Figure 5.7, in the form of “the expression of the individual’s personal character” on the one hand and his or her “correspondence with the moral whole to which he belongs” on the other (above, p. 53). And Schleiermacher’s treatment of this opposition—​which, as explained, involves bringing it into relation with a number of other oppositions, above all equality and inequality—​indicates that individuality and universality are ultimately irresolvable and irreducible in education and pedagogical practice. It is perhaps as a result of this irreducibility that they so dominate the mid-​section both of Schleiermacher’s lectures and of Lichtenstein’s diagram. Under the rubric of “the design of education” provided by Lichtenstein are included not only the opposition of present and future, play and exercise but also the opposition of “support” and “counteraction” (see p. 71 in Schleiermacher’s introduction). Again, as both the diagram and Schleiermacher’s own language make clear, these oppositions are closely tied to the way that a given society and education system understands both “Good” and “Evil”—​w ith one to be supported and the other to be counteracted. And again, Schleiermacher sees this differentiation as being one that can only be addressed or “solved” in practice—​in terms of “the challenge that the specific moment brings,” as he puts it (p. 79). Schleiermacher then goes on to give rather more attention to the ways in which support and counteraction can be realized in practice. But this is only to be found in the lectures that follow the introductory one translated and discussed here. It is these later lectures—​ mapped out in the lower left corner of Lichtenstein’s diagram—​t hat Schleiermacher explores ways of supporting the child in particular being explored in the context both of institutional (i.e., school) education and of the educational moments that arise in everyday life. In the first case, Schleiermacher focuses on the furtherance, training, and exercise of specific abilities, while in the second he emphasizes awakening and reinforcing a general ethos. Schleiermacher also considers how these specific and more general types of support occur both in the specific stages of schooling and in the general life of the school. In so doing, we see Schleiermacher

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turning to questions that would have been pressing on him as a member of the “Prussian Scientific Deputation”—​someone responsible for reforming schools and developing university policy in the Prussian state (see Chapter 4 by Horlacher). Overall in this diagram, it is possible to see how individual pairs of oppositions often give rise to further oppositions and also often work in parallel with one another. Of course, there are also multiple instances where one opposition is traversed by other pairs of terms: The question of what is possible and desirable in education is brought into relation with education’s impotence and omnipotence; individuality and universality undergo similar processes in relation with ethics and anthropology on the one hand, and with equality and inequality on the other. Schleiermacher’s discussion of support and counteraction, moreover, can be said to be mostly concerned with its relation both to the present and future moments in the experience of the child on the one hand, and to universality and individuality on the other. The overall dialectical structure of Schleiermacher’s lectures can thus be seen to be one constituted by the superposition, proliferation, and interlacing of pairs of juxtaposed opposites. Depending on what one prioritizes as a reader, these interlinked structures can be said to appear and intersect in what might be described as a profusion of identifiable combinations and configurations—​a ll in relatively loose interconnection. For example, prioritizing the opposition between what education can and should do could have the result of highlighting one set of oppositions (e.g., omnipotence vs. impotence, Good vs. Evil, support vs. counteraction); prioritizing, say, the individual vs. the universal directions of education (as shown above) ends up highlighting questions of equality and inequality, whether arising from social inheritance or other circumstances.

5. Conclusion: The Dialectical Character of Educational Reflection Whatever oppositions may be prioritized or downplayed in a given reading Schleiermacher’s lectures, the elements of the structure of Schleiermacher’s dialectic that are brought to the fore are, of course, never entirely separated from the process that Schleiermacher’s dialectic also represents. While the relationships highlighted in Lichtenstein’s diagram can certainly be viewed as forming a structural whole, understanding their meaning and function remains incomplete without simultaneously comprehending them in sequence—​ i.e., without seeing their permutation and proliferation as a process, unfolding over time. Structure and process can thus be seen as

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inextricable in Schleiermacher’s lectures just as much as style and process are. At least in some senses, then, style, structure, and process blend together to the point of becoming indistinguishable. The style of Schleiermacher’s maxims, of the examples of everyday “dialectical” statements provided at the beginning of this chapter, manifests a kind of symmetrical, chiastic, mirror image structure that is clearly reflected in the Lichtenstein diagram. And the unity of this structure together with process and style is hardly limited to Schleiermacher but should be seen as common to the dialectical method itself—​whether it be practiced by Hegel, Marx, or even Freire.8 Schleiermacher’s dialectic is illustrative of a similar inseparability of method and object that is also a feature of dialectics more broadly. As Robert Heiss explains, in general (for example in quantitative and qualitative educational research) it is assumed that “method as an instrument or a path can be separated from and [made] independent” from its object. Quoting Hegel’s own Encyclopedia, Heiss continues: “For dialectic, this separation disappears. It is instead maintained that in dialectical thought, method is something that ‘cannot be differentiated from its object and content… both coincide directly’ ” (1959, p. 133) Of course, this is manifestly the case for Schleiermacher’s dialectical account of education as much as it is for Hegel’s treatment of the “world spirit.” But the contours and idiosyncrasies of education and pedagogy as subject matter—​for example, its inalienably normative, developmental, intergenerational character—​can be said to make the coincidence of object and content still more direct and conspicuous. Consequently, the task, the simultaneously practical and theoretical work of education remains for Schleiermacher one of holding opposites in balance, of decreasing the tension between them, and also of sometimes paradoxically accomplishing two diametrically opposed aims at the same time—​often in the rather unstructured domain of practice. This applies, for example, to the moments of the present that are not to be sacrificed to those of future, just as much as it does to fostering the development of a child’s “individual character” while supporting their correspondence to the “whole to which [they] belong” (above, p. 53). Thus, despite the sometimes abstract nature of the “theory of education” outlined by Schleiermacher, its close connection to educational practice repeatedly underscores the paradoxical, contradictory character of education as a practical field. Such contradictions can be as relatively trivial as hesitating in burdening a student with a discouraging grade, or

E.g., Schmied-​Kowarzik, in his 2008 Das dialektische Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis in der Pädagogik, focuses on the dialectic of these three figures, as well as on Schleiermacher’s own unique version of the same.

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as profound as recognizing (and celebrating) the many moments in education which point to the pursuit of a more general human good, rather than one directly reducible to economy or efficiency. It can also range from very concrete discussions and designs for the “gamification” of curriculum through to the ways that even the most well intentioned of educational reforms seem to inevitably navigate an ambiguous path between the possibilities of what education can do and what it actually should accomplish. To think in these ways, to reflect dialectically, is to “accentuate the negative” and to dwell in negativity in one’s own thoughts. It represents a “lingering with the negative,” as Hegel famously put it (1807/​2018, p. 21). It is in the oppositions of the kind that Schleiermacher defines and in their resonant negativity, this chapter argues, that a great many insights in education, its relation to the state, its role in social justice and its basis in the always unpredictable vicissitudes of practice can be arguably most readily gained. Finally, although theory can help direct reflection and awareness to form such insights, Schleiermacher reminds us that dialectics—​like any theoretical endeavor, however complex and demanding it might be—​has its limitations. The best that theory can do is to help us frame, analyze, and (hopefully) reconcile some of these oppositions, or more generally, to trace some of the broader contours, possibilities, and limitations practice. The rest is up to practice itself, in all of its infinite, living variation. As Schleiermacher puts it in the introduction to his lectures translated here, when we reach this limitation in the world of theory, we then have to leave it to life itself to decide what should be done from moment to moment. Theory works only in the same way as reflective awareness does for practice. Since when something is done with a truly reflective awareness in life, the full complexity of the task at hand is taken into consideration—​a nd not just the necessity of the moment. (pp. 57–​58)

This is clearly Schleiermacher’s hope in giving his famous lectures on the “Outlines of the Art of Education,” back in 1826. It is this same project, we believe, that still urgently remains to be pursued further in educational thought, reflection, and practice.

References Balibar, E. (2016). Citizen subject: Foundations for philosophical anthropology. Polity. Böhm, W., & Seichter, S. (2018). Wörterbuch der Pädagogik, 17th ed. Ferdinand Schöningh. Bollnow, O.F. (1986). Einige Bemerkungen zu Schleiermachers Pädagogik. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 32(5), 719–​741.

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Cloninger, K. (2013). In pursuit of “the good life” or “the good job”? In D.M. Callejo Perez & J. Ode (Eds.), The stewardship of higher education (pp. 109–​131). Sense. Cuban, L. (1986). Teachers and machines: The classroom use of technology since 1920. Teachers College Press Danner, H. (2006). Methoden geisteswissenschaftlicher Pädagogik. Reinhardt. Friesen, N. (2019). Educational research in America today: Relentless instrumentalism and scholarly backlash. Erziehungswissenschaft, 30(59), 77–​83. doi: 10.3224/​ezw. v30i2.09. Graf, F.W. (November 19, 2018). Das Ende der Erziehung ist die Eigentümlichkeit des Einzelnen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. https://​w ww.faz.net/​a ktu​ell/​karri​ ere-​hoc​hsch​u le/​schl​eier​mach​ers-​pae​dago​g ik-​das-​ende-​der-​erzieh​u ng-​ist-​d ie-​eigent​ ueml​ichk​eit-​des-​einzel​nen-​15890​817.html Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/​2018). The phenomenology of spirit. Cambridge University Press. Heiss, R. (1959). Wesen und Formen der Dialektik. Kiepenheuer und Witsch. Hoffmann, E. (1929). Das dialektische Denken in der Pädagogik. Beltz. Lichtenstein, E. (1959). F.D.E. Schleiermacher: Ausgewählte pädagogische Schriften. Ferdinand Schöningh. Lichtenstein, E. (1968). Schleiermachers Pädagogik. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 10(3), 343–​359. Peters, F. (1967). Greek philosophical terms: A historical lexicon. New York University Press. Plessner, H. (2019). Levels of organic life and the human: An introduction to philosophical anthropology. Fordham University Press. Ricoeur, P. (2016). Philosophical anthropology. Polity. Rimm-​ K aufman, S., & Kagan, J. (2006). Infant predictors of kindergarten behavior: The contribution of inhibited and uninhibited temperament types. Behavioral Disorders, 30(4), 331–​347. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​019​8742​9050​3000​409 Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1996). Dialectic or, the art of doing philosophy: A study edition of the 1811 notes. T.N. Tice (Ed., Trans.). Scholars Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2000). Aphorismen zur Pädagogik: Kommentierte Studeinausgabe vol 1. M. Winkler & J. Brachman (Eds.) (pp. 202–​211). Suhrkamp. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (2017). Vorlesungen über die Pädagogik und amtliche Voten zum öffentlichen Unterricht. Walter de Gruyter. Schmied-​Kowarzik, W. (2008). Das dialektische Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis in der Pädagogik. Kassel University Press. Available: http://​w ww.uni-​kas​sel.de/​upr​ess/​onl​ ine/​frei/​978-​3-​89958- ​412-​7.vollt​ext.frei.pdf Winkler, M. (2000). Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–​ 1834). In B. Dollinger (Ed.), Klassiker der Pädagogik: Die Bildung der modernen Gesellschaft (pp. 75–​ 99). Springer.

Contributors

Norm Friesen Norm Friesen, Professor at the College of Education, Boise State University, specializes in pedagogy, educational technology, and qualitative research. He has worked as a visiting researcher at the Humboldt University (Berlin), the University of Vienna, the University of Göttingen, the University of British Columbia (Canada), and held a Canada Research Chair position at Thompson Rivers University from 2006 to 2014. Besides earning a degree in Information Studies at the University of Alberta and undertaking Postdoctoral work in Science and Technology Studies at Simon Fraser University, Friesen studied German and philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Friesen has translated and edited Klaus Mollenhauer’s Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing (Routledge, 2014) as well as Existentialism and Education on the thought of Otto Friedrich Bollnow (Palgrave, 2017). He is also the author of The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media (Johns Hopkins University press, 2017). He has published eight books (three solo-​authored monographs) and over 100 peer reviewed articles and book chapters. His work has been translated into German, Chinese and Spanish. Rebekka Horlacher Rebekka Horlacher is senior researcher at the University of Zurich and lecturer at the Zurich University of Teacher Education. She received her Ph.D. in 2002 on the Shaftesbury reception in Germany and Switzerland in the 18th century. Her research interests include the history of schooling and curriculum, the age of Enlightenment, and methodology. She is the co-​editor of

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the six-​volume Letters to Pestalozzi (2009–​2015), published a comparative cultural history The Educated Subject and the German Concept of Bildung (Routledge, 2016), and is a member of the Editorial Board of the bilingual Journal Bildungsgeschichte. International Journal for the Historiography of Education. She is currently working on the history of school subjects, on comparative perspectives of schooling in Europe and on 18th century educational theory. Karsten Kenklies Karsten Kenklies, Dr.phil., studied History of Science & Technology & Art, Philosophy, Education Studies at University of Jena/​Germany and St. Andrews/​Scotland. He received his Dr. phil. in 2007 (Social Pedagogy and the Ethos of Reason: The Foundation of Education in the Platonic Dialogue Nomoi). Formerly Professor at the University Duisburg-​Essen (Chair History of Pedagogy) and the University of Jena (Chair Comparative Pedagogy), he is now Senior Lecturer at the University of Strathclyde/​Glasgow. Research Fellow at Tamagawa University/​Tokyo, Japan, Kenklies is the cofounder of ExET (www.exet.org). His research focuses on systematic structures of theories and practices of education in the context of the History of Ideas, of Science, Philosophy and Art (from antiquity to the present, along exoteric & esoteric lines of tradition); intercultural pedagogical dialogue, especially with East Asia. His publications include: Science as an Ethical Endeavor: Robert Fludd and the Reform of Education in the 17th Century (2005); Social Pedagogy and the Ethos of Reason: The Foundation of Education in the Platonic Dialogue Nomoi (2007); (with R. Koerrenz et al.) History of Pedagogy (2017); (co-​editor with A. Blichmann) Jewish Pedagogical Culture as Modern Tradition (2015); (co-​editor with M. Waldmann) Queer Pedagogy (2016); (co-​editor with K. Imanishi) Enlightenments: Modernization in Europe and East Asia (2016); (co-​editor with D. Lewin) East Asian Pedagogies (2020); and (co-​editor with N. Friesen) F.D.E. Schleiermacher’s Outlines of the Art of Education. A Translation and Discussion (2022). David Lewin Dr. David Lewin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy of Education at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. With a background in Theology and Religious Studies, as well as a brief career in Computer Science, his work engages with topics at the intersections between philosophy of education, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of technology. Alongside numerous journal articles and

Contributors

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chapters, he is author of Technology and the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge Scholars, 2011) and Educational Philosophy for a Post-​secular Age (Routledge, 2016) and co-​editor of a number of books: (with Todd Mei) From Ricoeur to Action: the Socio-​Political Significance of Ricoeur’s Thinking (Continuum, 2012); (with Alexandre Guilherme and Morgan White) New Perspectives in Philosophy of Education (Bloomsbury, 2014); (with Simon Podmore and Duane Williams) Mystical Theology and Continental Philosophy: Interchange in the Wake of God (Routledge, 2017); (with Karsten Kenklies) East Asian Pedagogies: Education as Formation and Transformation Across Cultures and Borders (Springer, 2020). His current research focuses on conceptualizations of pedagogical representation and reduction with a particular focus on Religious Education. He co-​leads the ‘Experiments in Educational Theory’ research group based at the University of Strathclyde (www.exet.org) and is project lead for the ‘After Religious Education’ project (funded by Culhams St Gabriels Trust). Michael Winkler Michael Winkler, Dr. phil. Dr. habil. Univ. Prof. em., studied Pedagogy, German, History and Philosophy at the University of Erlangen-​Nürnberg. He received his Dr. phil. in 1979 on History and Identity (on the Pedagogy of Friedrich Schleiermacher) and his Habil. In 1986 (Theory of Social Pedagogy). He was Professor in Berlin (University of the Arts), Kiel (Christian-​A lbrechts-​University), and Graz (Karl Franzens University), and from 1991 was Chair for General Pedagogy and Theory of Social Pedagogy at Friedrich-​Schiller-​University Jena. In October 2018 he retired. He has been Guest Professor in Vienna and Graz. Today he is teaching at Protestant University Dresden, ARGE Social Pedagogy, Social Management in Vienna (Cooperation with Sigmund Freud University). His research and editorial projects focus on the pedagogy of Friedrich Schleiermacher (e.g.. Volume KGA Sect. II, Volumes 12 and 13), the history and theory of pedagogy, the theory of social pedagogy, child & youth services, family education, and inclusion. His latest publications include: (Ed.): “Reform as Production” (Baden-​Baden: Ergon 2020), re-​publication “A Theory of Social Pedagogy” (Weinheim-​ Basel: Beltz-​ Juventa 2021), “Poetology of Social Pedagogy” (Weinheim-​Basel: Beltz-​Juventa 2022).

Index

ability,  see aptitudes activity,  see self-​activity adult,  see older generation ancient(s)  see Greek, Latin, classical animal, animalistic  12, 30, 66, 78, 188, 192 antagonism,  see dialectics anthropology (also, human)  12–​13 (definition),  15, 34–​37 (passim),  71, 94, 108, 109, 114, 120, 154, 203–​ 204, 206, 207, 209 uncertainty of  13, 36, 37, 203–​204 aphorism  183, 185–​186, 190 aptitudes (Anlagen)  36–​37, 50, 52, 57, 65, 72–​73 aristocracy  54, 56–​57, 61, 62, 197, 198 art, education as (see also: Kunstlehre and dialectic as art) 13(defined),  13–​14, 24–​25, 26, 27, 29, 41, 42, 95, 132, 150, 179, 181, 203 arts (school subject)  23, 153, 171 attention,  see consciousness autonomy  of pedagogy as a discipline  23 of the one being educated  45, 46, 55, 93, 93(n9), 96, 105, 114, 116, 130, 165 awareness,  see consciousness Bildsamkeit (formability) 10 (definition),  36, 54, 197

Bildung (formation)  9–​10, 11, 17, 18, 26(n9), 51, 100, 103(n104), 157, 158(n1), 159, 162, 172, 214 biology  12–​13, 34, 98–​99, 107, 160, 204 birth, born, infancy  30, 52, 57, 61, 72, 81, 83, 85, 107, 204 capacity,  see aptitudes church (see also: religion)  6, 28, 32, 46–​47, 48, 49, 57, 65, 77, 79, 81, 83–​84, 93, 114, 160, 166, 188 classical (education)  161, 168–​169 collectivity, community (see also: state, religion, politics)  5–​6, 11, 25, 28, 31–​32, 35, 39–​41, 45–​51, 54, 67, 76–​79, 93, 102, 188, 195–​197 combine, combination,  see dialectic consciousness  45, 76, 94, 101, 107–​109, 112(n22), 114, 129, 133, 142, 151–​ 152, 154 and/​of the future  7, 16, 65–​71, 71, 119–​135, 189–​191, 194 and theory/​pedagogy  8, 24, 26, 76, 104, 108, 115, 148, 185, 211 national  159, 166 self-​consciousness, self-​ awareness  26(n9), 17, 45, 66–​67, 73, 113, 130, 154 contradiction, see dialectic

218 counteraction (see also: support)  6, 8, 16, 32(n13), 44–​45, 53, 56–​57, 60, 72–​81, 86, 91, 94, 109, 111, 184, 208, 209 curriculum  17, 103, 157, 160–​162, 168–​172 dialectics  dialectic(al) (opposites, opposition) as art  153, 179 combination, unity in  7, 8, 36, 49, 53, 54, 75, 178, 180, 188, 191–​192, 194–​195, 201, 209 contradiction, contrast (also, negativity)  18, 30, 35, 44, 45, 47–​ 50, 51, 53, 57, 59–​60, 62, 66, 68, 70–​71, 73, 78, 81, 90, 111, 126, 169, 177–​191 (passim),  195, 210 as dialogue  153, 179, 181–​182 dignity (of practice, pedagogy)  5, 8, 10, 26–​28, 52, 106, 185 education (Erziehung)  starting point  29–​30, 44, 46, 52 ending point  29, 32, 39, 44, 46–​47 impotence of  5–​6, 33–​34, 36, 202, 207, 209 omnipotence of  5–​6, 33–​36, 207, 209 relation to politics  5, 23, 27–​28, 31–​ 32, 56–​60, 82, 101–​102, 109, 115–​ 116, 158, 172–​173 forms of,  see support, counteraction universal vs. individual directions in  54–​58, 64–​66, 75–​77, 187, 196–​200, 207, 209 educator (also, parent, teacher)  8, 14, 35, 38, 45, 67, 72(n33), 79–​82, 96, 106, 110, 112, 113, 115, 119–​135 (passim),  149, 152, 185, 195 empirical  18, 90, 92, 95, 103, 142 vs. speculative methods  6, 37–​38, 63, 164–​165, 171, 177, 204 Enlightenment  31(n12), 93, 98, 100, 104(n17), 105, 109, 112, 124, 162, 163–​164

I ndex equality (also, inequality)  35, 38, 54–​65, 57(n29), 85–​86, 97, 109, 183–​187, 196–​209 inherited  57–​65, 57(n29), 197–​199 ethics, ethical  2, 16, 32, 34, 45–​46, 50–​52, 111, 153, 204 of/​a nd education  5, 6, 12, 14, 27–​29, 37–​39, 41–​48 (passim),  67–​69, 75, 89, 93–​94, 101–​102, 106, 107–​109, 112, 114, 119–​135 (passim),  154, 171, 188, 190, 192, 203, 207–​208 (passim)  Evil, that which is  32, 44–​45, 49(n25), 74, 76–​78, 209 exercise (see also: play)  7–​8, 70–​73, 125–​130, 132–​134, 186–​195, 207, 208 Fichte, J.G.  11, 21(n2), 90, 98, 163, 163(n2), 166, 182 freedom  10, 11, 40, 46–​48 (passim),  55, 59, 73, 90, 96, 99, 105, 110–​115 (passim),  165, 183 future (vs. present)  7–​8, 16–​17, 18, 65–​ 71, 77–​78, 105, 119–​135, 187–​196, 200–​202, 208–​210 games,  see play Geist (spirit; also, geistig)  11–​12 (definition),  22(n3), 25, 27, 30, 32, 44, 54, 58, 59, 60, 63, 80, 83, 102, 119, 197 generations  5–​6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 24–​ 31, 38–​39, 41, 46–​48, 49–​52 (passim),  57, 62, 73, 78–​80, 86, 90. 93(n9), 96, 100, 102, 107–​109, 113, 115, 147, 165, 195, 200, 201, 210 Good, the (see also: Evil)  5, 6–​7, 32, 37–​ 40 (passim),  44–​48 (passim),  57, 61, 62, 74–​78 (passim),  106, 122–​ 124, 134–​135, 141, 147, 190, 202, 203–​209, 210 Greek (ancient, classical;  see also: Plato) language, terminology  12, 13, 29(n11), 43(n20), 70, 76(n35) 160, 161, 162, 177, 181, 182, 198

Index Hegel, G.W.F.  11, 18, 148, 178, 180–​ 181, 194, 210–​211 Herbart, J.F.  10, 90, 92, 95, 101, 112(n22), 139 hermeneutics  1, 2, 17, 18, 24(n7), 91, 139, 140, 145, 151, 153, 154, 181 human, humanity,  see anthropology impotence (of education),  see education inequality,  see equality instruction  9, 14, 22–​23, 35, 63, 72, 94, 150–​152, 162–​169, 184 Kant, I.  11, 31(n12), 99, 99(n14), 110, 163 Kunstlehre  13–​14 (defined),  24–​25(n7), 95, 150–​152, 153 Latin (language)  13, 160, 161, 162 Locke, J.  17, 101, 104, 120, 140–​ 142, 147 maxim  15–​16, 26, 37, 39, 42, 43, 56, 61–​6 4, 74, 82–​83, 86, 179, 185–​ 186, 209 nation, nationality (also, state, Staat)  23, 26, 41–​43, 46, 52–​59, 79, 85, 157–​ 159, 162–​167, 171–​172 negativity,  see contradiction norms, normativity  99, 101, 105, 122, 113–​115, 177, 186, 204, 206, 210 uncertainty of  41, 45, 49, 202–​206 omnipotence (of education),  see education pedagogy (Pädagogik), pedagogical  1, 5–​6, 9–​16, 19, 24, 28, 31–​38, 40, 42, 44–​46, 48, 56–​57, 59, 65–​76, 78, 84, 89–​115, 119–​131, 134, 142–​ 154, 179, 184–​185, 188–​192, 199, 202–​206, 208, 210 universal validity of  37–​40, 46, 115 perfection (also, imperfection)  27–​28, 44, 48, 51–​52, 73, 78–​79, 102, 102(n15), 149

219 personality  43(n20), 54, 74, 112(n22), 181–​182, 197 Pestalozzi, J.F.  90, 92, 170–​171 Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes)  11, 148, 180 Plato, platonic  23, 26, 50–​51, 81, 106, 150, 182, 204 Platz, K.  3–​4, 16, 18, 90–​91, 97, 114 politics (also, political)  5, 15, 17, 23, 27–​ 28, 31–​32, 39, 56, 59–​60, 82, 98, 101–​102, 106, 109, 116, 153, 158, 163, 166(n4), 168, 172–​173, 202 practice (also, practical)  8, 10, 13, 18, 23, 24(n6, 7), 26, 28–​29, 33, 42, 57(n29), 62, 65–​76, 93–​106, 104(n17), 110, 112, 114, 120–​123, 125, 128–​134, 146, 149–​153, 159–​162, 177, 179–​181, 185–​192, 206–​211 preparation  16–​17, 70, 74, 85, 121–​122, 167–​168, 194–​195 present,  see future Prussia (German state; see also: nationality)  157–​159, 162–​166, 166(n4), 169–​174, 169(n6) psychology (also, psychological)  34, 92, 97, 99, 101, 103(n16), 104, 110, 123, 170, 204, 206 public (vs. private)  21–​23, 26, 39, 59, 62–​63, 82–​85, 99–​100, 114, 143–​ 145, 158, 163–​165, 169(n6) realm (of church, state, knowledge, social intercourse)  11–​12, 18, 23, 26, 28, 28(n10), 32–​34, 46–​47, 47(n22), 49–​50, 54–​55, 57, 65, 67, 77, 79, 81–​84, 93, 93(n9), 102, 114, 160, 188 reflection  23(n5), 46, 47(n22), 91–​93, 97, 103, 106–​108, 113, 115, 142–​ 154, 184–​185, 185(n6), 209, 211 religion  2, 89, 93, 98–​101, 105, 113–​ 114, 144, 160–​161 revolution  49, 49(n25), 98–​99, 183, 183(n5) French  49(n25), 98, 157, 183, 183(n5)

220 Romanticism  99, 99(n13), 171–​172, 182 Rousseau, J.-​J.  104(n17), 120, 125–​126, 141–​142, 147 science, scientific (Wissenschaft, wissenschaftlich)  12, 14, 21(n2), 23, 23(n5), 26, 37, 28, 47(n22), 90, 92, 97–​98, 102, 113, 151, 161, 168, 179, 179(n4), 187(n7), 204 self-​activity  10–​11 (definition),  36–​ 37, 45, 46 sexes (i.e., male, female)  82–​85, 82(n36), 166 sociality (also, social)  11–​13, 22(n3), 27, 31, 41, 46–​47, 50–​51, 57(n29), 66, 77, 81–​82, 89–​115, 89(n1), 99(n14), 102(n16), 157–​173, 158(n1), 163(n2), 166(n4), 168(n5), 179(n4), 198–​199, 209, 211 society  13, 22(n3), 25–​27, 41, 46–​48, 49(n25), 61–​62, 72, 78–​80, 90, 98–​ 101, 99(n14), 104–​111, 114–​115, 124, 130, 134, 160, 166, 171, 178, 183, 188, 198, 204, 207–​208 spirit,  see Geist Sprüngli, J.  16, 91, 93(n8), 100–​110, 102(n15), 108(n19, 20) 110(n21)

I ndex state,  see nation support (see also: counteraction)  16, 32, 32(n13), 37, 42, 45, 53–​54, 61, 67, 72–​82, 85–​86, 91(n6), 94, 111, 160, 172, 184, 199, 208–​210 teacher,  see educator theology  1–​2, 18, 90, 92, 161, 182 theory (also, theoretical)  4–​16, 21(n1), 24(n7), 21–​34, 43(n20), 37–​54, 57, 62, 71, 74–​85, 89(n1), 89–​110, 115, 120, 122, 134, 142–​154, 157–​158, 170–​172, 177, 182, 185, 187, 203–​ 205, 210–​211 universal, universality  12, 16, 29, 37, 39–​41, 46, 48, 52–​57, 64–​65, 74–​77, 91, 100, 103, 150, 168, 178, 184, 187–​188, 192–​202, 207–​209 unity,  see dialectic vocational (education)  157–​172 women,  see sex Zedlitz, K.A.v.  161–​162

Norm Friesen and Karsten Kenklies General Editors Paedagogica publishes original monographs, translations, and collections reflecting the thought and practice long known, for example, as le pédagogie in French, pedagogía in Spanish, and Pädagogik in German. Pedagogy in this sense starts with the influence of one person or group on another—often an older generation on a younger. Pedagogy is not just about school or college, but interpenetrates many spheres of human activity, forming a domain of practice and study in its own right—one that is ethical in its implications and relational in its substance. This pedagogical tradition has been developed over hundreds of years, for example, by John Amos Comenius (Komenský), JeanJacques Rousseau, Johann Friedrich Herbart, Maria Montessori, and Janusz Korczak. For additional information about this series or for the submission of manuscripts, please contact: [email protected] or [email protected] To order books, please contact our Customer Service Department: [email protected] (within the U.S.) [email protected] (outside the U.S.) Or browse online by series: www.peterlang.com