Europe and the Migration of Christian Communities from the Middle East 3447119187, 9783447119184

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Europe and the Migration of Christian Communities from the Middle East Edited by Martin Tamcke

GÖTTINGER ORIENTFORSCHUNGEN

SYRIACA Band 65

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

G Ö T T I N G E R   O R I E N T F O R S C H U N G E N I. R E I H E:  S Y R I A C A Herausgegeben von Martin Tamcke Band 65

2022

Harrassowitz Verlag · Wiesbaden

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Europe and the Migration of Christian Communities from the Middle East Edited by Martin Tamcke

2022

Harrassowitz Verlag · Wiesbaden

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über https://dnb.de abrufbar. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the internet at https://dnb.de.

Informationen zum Verlagsprogramm finden Sie unter https://www.harrassowitz-verlag.de © Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 2022 Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen jeder Art, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und für die Einspeicherung in elektronische Systeme. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck und Verarbeitung: docupoint GmbH Printed in Germany ISSN 0340-6326 eISSN 2749-3288 ISBN 978-3-447-11918-4 eISBN 978-3-447-39341-6

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Inhalt/Content Martin Tamcke Vorwort/Preface .............................................................................................................

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Martin Tamcke The Religious Fragmentation Migrates ..........................................................................

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Heleen Murre-van den Berg Rewriting Global Orthodoxy Oriental Christians in Europe between 1970 and 2020 ..................................................

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Lars Klein No Place for “Arabs and Turks”? German public discourse about the conflict in and migration from Syria, 2015–2019 ..................................................................................

31

Liubov Fadeeva, Ekaterina Burmistrova Migration and Radical Right Movements in Europe ......................................................

41

Ertuğrul Şahin Minoritäten im Islam ......................................................................................................

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Kai Merten New Home Europe Memories of the arrival of the first Syrian Orthodox Christians in Germany ................

59

Jan Gehm Microhistory of a Syriac Orthodox Community in Germany The example of the Syriac Orthodox congregation in Herne from 1961 to 2021 ...........

67

Matija Miličić The Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands Shedding light on overlooked European Coptic diasporas .............................................

79

Gaétan du Roy Coptic Traditions’ Digitization in Francophone Europe ................................................

91

Harutyun G. Harutyunyan Migration and Integration of Armenian-Orthodox Christians in the Historical and Modern Diaspora ...........................................................................

99

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

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Inhalt/Content

Christopher Sheklian “Their Compatriot St. Servatius” Armenian emplacement in Maastricht ............................................................................ 111 Sevgi Çilingir The Issue of Historical Christian Minorities in EU-Turkey Relations The case of Armenians ................................................................................................... 125 Martin Tamcke Minority, Cosmopolitan, Migrant, Stateless Person? Petros Markaris’s attempt at explaining his own identity ............................................... 139 Habtom Yohannes Some Reflections on the “abä-nefs” WhatsApp of an Eritrean Priest Queshi-Afwerki .............................................................................. 145 Baby Varghese Europe and Migration of Christian Communities from India ......................................... 161 Leonard Stinsky, Hanna Holthuis, Paul Seebaß, Leonie Wingberg Flight, Eviction and Hostage Holding of Assyrian Christians from the Valley Goran A personal report by Abdo Mirza ................................................................................... 167 Sinem Abka The Integration Trajectory of Orthodox Greek Refugees in Mainland Greece ............... 173 Natalia Zhurbina The Integration Policy of Russia towards the Migrants’ Children: Challenges and Prospects An example of migrants from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia ............................... 183 Sevgi Çilingir Challenges of Religious Conversion in an Asylum Setting Conversion to Christianity during the European migration crisis ................................... 195

Anhang/Appendix ..................................................................................................... 209 Sinem Abka The EU’s Impact on the Changing Status of Greek Minorities in Turkey (PP-Presentation) ............................................................................................................ 211 Hermann Teule Der Stellenwert des Studiums des östlichen Christentums ............................................. 221

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Content/Inhalt

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Grußworte/Greetings Bischof Armash Nalbandian ........................................................................................... 225 Rade Kisić ...................................................................................................................... 226 Alla Alkushina ................................................................................................................ 227 Martin Tamcke Abschiedsrede/Farewell Speech ..................................................................................... 229 Martin Tamcke Schlusswort .................................................................................................................... 235

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Vorwort Seit Jahrzehnten wandern christlich-orientalische Migranten verstärkt nach Europa bzw. Deutschland aus. Die vorliegende Sammlung von Beiträgen einer kleineren Arbeitstagung („Religious fragmentation as factor of conflict, 23.–24. April 2019) und einer Konferenz zu „Europe and the migration of the Christian communities from the Middle East“ vom 27.– 29. September 2021, die zugleich verbunden wurde mit dem Festakt zu meiner Verabschiedung in der Aula der Georg-August-Universität zu Göttingen (daher die entsprechenden Beiträge im Anhang). Pioniere der Forschungen zur Migration der christlichen Gemeinschaften aus dem Orient (etwa Kai Merten) kommen hier nun ebenso zu Wort wie Doktoranden besonders des benachbarten Forschungsprojektes an der Radboud-Universität zu Nijmegen (Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: Oriental Christians in Europe, 1970–2020) unter Leitung von Professorin Heleen Murre-van den Berg. Die Konferenz bemühte sich Themen des Umfeldes (etwa die rechtliche Stellung der religiösen Minderheiten im Islam) mit einzubeziehen. Einige Vorträge konnten aus unterschiedlichen Gründen nicht in die Veröffentlichung aufgenommen werden. Dennoch dokumentiert der Band die gegenwärtigen Bemühungen um wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt dieser Migrationsbewegung und soll hiermit Interessierten zugänglich gemacht werden, auch wenn die politischen Umstände erhebliche Ausfälle zur Folge hatten, die nicht zu verhindern waren. Wir glauben aber, dass der Band auch in dieser Form einen wichtigen Beitrag leistet zur Migration der orientalischen Christen, ihren Beweggründen und ihren Versuchen, sich in den für sie neuen Gesellschaften der Zielländer ihrer Flucht einzufinden. Ein besonderer Dank gilt Dr. Egbert Schlarb für die mühevolle Erstellung der Druckvorlage und für seine Geduld beim Entstehen des Bandes. Martin Tamcke

Göttingen, September 2022

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Preface Christians from the Middle East have been migrating to Europe, and Germany in particular, for decades. This anthology is a collection of essays and articles from a small conference on “Religious Fragmentation as a Factor of Conflict” that took place from 23–24 April 2019, and a conference on “Europe and the Migration of the Christian Communities from the Middle East” held from 27–29 September 2021, which coincided with the official ceremony to celebrate my retirement at the assembly hall of the Georg August University of Göttingen (corresponding articles can be found in the appendix). In this volume pioneering research on migration among Christians from the Middle East (by Kai Merten for instance) is published alongside the work of postgraduate students, particularly from the neighbouring research project at Radboud University in Nijmegen (Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: Oriental Christians in Europe, 1970–2020) conducted by Heleen Murre-van den Berg. The conference endeavoured to include matters of overall environment (such as the legal status of religious minorities in Islam). Some presentations could not be incorporated into this publication for various reasons. And yet this volume documents current efforts to further academic research on this particular form of migration and offers these insights to interested readers, despite the absence of a significant number of contributions due to political circumstances. We believe that this volume is an important contribution, nonetheless. It chronicles the migration of Christians from the Middle East, their motives, and their attempts to find a place in society once they arrive in a new country. Special mention and thanks must go to Dr Egbert Schlarb for creating the final manuscript for this volume and for his patience during this process. Martin Tamcke

Göttingen, September 2022

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

The Religious Fragmentation Migrates Martin Tamcke The religious fragmentation of societies from Egypt to Iraq has a longstanding tradition of coexistence. In times when a peaceful coexistence failed, pogroms, massacres, and genocides ensued, which targeted religious minorities such as Christians. The tense and unstable structure of this religious fragmentation was intentionally exploited during recent wars and upheaval. On the one hand, by secularists or regimes who wanted to prove the danger posed by Christians, Alawites, Yazidis, and Druze – should Islamists seize power. On the other hand, by Islamists and ISIS who wanted to show that the West – the “other” – is vincible by vicariously displacing and degrading Christians. The actual knowledge about the lives and doctrines of these religious minorities is often limited and overshadowed by mechanisms of social exclusion and established stereotypes. Some of which have been part of societal conditioning on both sides for centuries and these preconceptions follow them into migration. This brings about consequences, which require serious attention. It is a subject of heated debates, whether there is indeed a religious factor contributing to the tensions and wars in the Middle East, and if so, how religion is involved specifically. In the wake of Islamist activities, the press often calls numerous acts “cases of religious violence”, seemingly without questioning the actual motivation behind the tragic events. When Christian prisoners are asked to convert, when Christian houses in Mosul are marked as such before ISIS invades and addresses Christians in particular, when Yazidis are persecuted, when crucifixes are pulled from churches. There are without a doubt numerous other incidents that could be added to this list. The question is, are these cases of violence motivated by religious principles or do these examples rather show how religion is exploited to act as a deterrent – as a means of ethnic rather than mere religious cleansing – a means of cultural cleansing? With regard to extremists it is openly discussed, whether their utilisation of religion can be described as misguided and whether it is sufficient for more moderate or even liberal voices to argue that members of ISIS are extremists, not Muslims. The reasons to act against Christians are by no means new. They are the result of a longstanding unstable coexistence of the two religious communities in that region. Historically, the status of Christians as second-class citizens can be traced back to treaties of protection that were followed by the millet system, which undoubtedly had an effect on the religious fragmentation in the region, an effect that is visible to this day. Secular experiments could not overcome the effects of these longstanding living arrangements. And Christians have actively participated in many of these experiments: socialist and communist movements, the Arabic revival, as well as the advent of Arabic nationalism. Such experiments promised – at least to the intellectuals among them – a future outside of religious fragmentation on the basis of a united state, a nation, an idea, a social order that granted equal rights and access to higher

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

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offices of state to all people regardless of their denomination. They hoped that secular laws would replace the Sharia laws that governed, amongst other things, matters of personal law, such as marriage and family law. It seems that efforts of this kind have reached their limits in the region. Contrary to expectations, the Arab Spring has led to an even greater fragmentation in most countries and increased alienation between religious communities. And it is not the western spectators who are most exasperated by this situation, but the local population. Secular experiments in the region often failed due to inadequate implementation, a lack of penetrating effects, and the dual demands that should have followed from a secular approach and from those who opposed them owing to their religious affiliations. At the moment, it seems like attempts at secularisation do not have a great chance of success. The propaganda that is currently used to increase and exploit the religious fragmentation will certainly affect the situation. It remains to be seen, whether their slogans have a lasting effect. It is possible that some of their rallying cries, like “Christians into the sea”, could have originated in government circles, in order to make minorities believe that only Assad's government can keep them safe. The frightening alternative would be Islamism. But it is also possible that some hate campaigns were initiated by Islamic fundamentalists who wanted to pave the way for driving out Christians. There is misrepresentation on both sides: there are those who paint an overly harmonious picture of a trouble-free history of coexistence and, on the other end, there are those who emphasise the conflict and cast Christians exclusively in a victimised role. Both versions are one-sided and give a distorted view of the situation, sometimes with a political agenda, like for example the writing of Egyptian-born Jewish author Bat Yeor. These writings make sweeping accusations against the Islam. They question the integrity of Christians who abandoned their native language in favour of Arabic and accuse them of collaboration. The reasons behind Oriental Christians migrating to Europe, America, and Australia are still to be determined, but certain facts speak for themselves. Since the US invasion of Iraq, the Christian population has been reduced to a quarter of its former size. Many Syriac Orthodox Christians of Tur Abdin in southeast Turkey migrated to Europe during the conflict between Turkey and the PKK. From 1961 onwards Germany attracted migrants to enter the country, promising work as Gastarbeiter (guest workers). Today, a hundred times more Syriac Orthodox Christians live in Sweden and Germany alone, compared to the small community that remains in Tur Abdin. Claims made by the Syriac Orthodox Metropolitan of Mount Lebanon that 70% of the Christians have left Syria due to the civil war should be taken with a grain of salt. These claims are politically charged and probably intend to highlight the situation of the Christian minority. Nonetheless, it is true that a large part of the Christian population fled Syria. Not all of them have left the country under such dramatic circumstances as did those who fled from ISIS in Mosul or south of the Khabur, where ISIS forces took entire Christian villages of Assyrians prisoner. When I visited a refugee centre near Beirut, Lebanon with my students, they were very interested in whether these young refugees would be able return to their home region south of the Khabur once ISIS had been defeated. The refugees replied in the negative. They had the impression that they were not welcome in that part of the world. A few months later, they were gone. They had left for Australia. It was striking how their people's history of trauma affected their decision process. The massacre of 1848 in the Kurdish Mountains surrounding the then seat of the Patriarch in Konak/Qodchanis/Kotschannes; the genocide of 1915 in southeast Turkey and on

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

The Religious Fragmentation Migrates

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Iranian soil near Urmia; the Simele massacre committed by Iraqi forces in 1933 – all these events are part of the collective Assyrian memory. Add to this the experience of inadequate legislation concerning basic human rights and living space that religious minorities such as the Assyrian Christians face on a daily basis. Migration is not necessarily religiously motivated, as in refugees following the desire to live as full members of a society that allows them to practice their specific form of religiousness freely and live it openly. Occasionally, there is no religious motivation whatsoever. Such is the case with Sargon Boulus. Born into a family of Assyrian refugees on 19 February 1944 close to the Habbanya lake near Baghdad, he later moved to Kirkuk in Northern Iraq with his family. In 1962 he went to Baghdad, in 1967 he crossed the IraqiSyrian border on foot and – with no money or identification – reached Beirut, where he took an active part in the revival of the leading Arabic literary magazine. From 1969 on he lived in the United States of America most of the time. After a long illness he died on 22 October 2007 in Berlin. Sargon Boulus wrote his poems in Arabic, a language he had learned from his mother amidst a family speaking “Syrian”. His life was marked by seemingly irreconcilable differences even previous to his arrival in America. On the one hand there were the early days of suffering for his family as refugees (his father was a carpenter, ironed laundry and worked as a traditional healer), they were living in a makeshift clay and tin hut, in which four families lived separated only by sheets hanging on ropes. This stands in stark contrast to his life as a professional who translated the works of poets of the Beat generation into Arabic. The man who said about his emigration to the United States that it gave him the opportunity for a new dream. The migration to America, however, did not put an end to the past, he did not simply leave his home behind in Iraq. “I never left Iraq. As far as you may go, you will return to the same sources, to their origins in childhood and in relatives, to drink from them. You do not stop returning to the past while living in the present.” A crucial experience during his childhood was his first encounter with English women. The British occupying forces in Iraq had gathered the Assyrians close to their military base in Al Habbaniya, after their accommodations had repeatedly been the target during pogroms. Sargon Boulus’s father was among those working for the English. He often brought his son to the English camp. “My father used to work for the English and one of my first and very cherished memories is when as a kid my father used to take me to the place of his work, which was a camp where only the English lived with the Iraqi workers (mostly Assyrian). We used to see these English ladies in summertime among their flowers and lawns, a totally different woman from the women that I knew like my mother, my sisters and the other women in my family. Here was another type of image of humanity, let’s say, and I was like sneaking a view through the trees, from far away into these gardens. For me, I think now, that’s a vision of paradise, paradise meaning something very flowery, full of colour.” The cultural distinctiveness of the West fascinated him and found his approval. While his own Christian oriental culture, surrounded by Islamic culture, seemed restrictive, the western world appeared to be liberated. His emotional ties to the West led him to follow his yearning for paradise. He travelled through the desert on foot, without a passport, was incarcerated as an illegal migrant in Beirut, and finally, with the help of the American embassy, he departed for America, never to return permanently to Iraq or the Middle East. Asked about how he could just leave his Arab home, he replied “I believe it is the imagination. When I read something, I can imagine it. My reading has filled me with dreams. I fol-

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

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lowed my imagination.” Belonging to two worlds is a familiar feeling for most oriental Christians from early childhood on. The desire to emigrate to the United States and Europe has increased even after the US occupation of Iraq, even though, at the same time, Christians all over the country feel disillusioned with the United States. The wish to emigrate has not grown smaller. The difficult situation for Christians in the Middle East and their orientation towards the United States occasionally finds its expression with explicit references to hell and paradise. Hell, that is Baghdad, the Iraqi home. America is paradise. The Latin Archbishop of Baghdad, Jean Benjamin Sleiman, who was born in 1946 in Lebanon, uses the metaphor “paradise” repeatedly in his book on the situation of Christians in his country. “Since ancient times the West has been taken for a kind of paradise, a place of retreat and refuge.” The relocation to a distant country, chiefly the United States, is getting increasingly difficult. People are starting to lose hope that emigration is still possible. At the same time, the pressure against Christians is increasing in their own country, because they are seen as secret allies of the Americans. “While Christians in Iraq are being discriminated against ever more vehemently, the ‘paradise’, into which they want to emigrate, moves further and further away from them every day.” But it is precisely because of the increasing difficulty to leave the country that people become more hopeful to be among the few who succeed to emigrate. “To escape the ‘lost paradise’, one is willing to use all means necessary to reach a new ‘paradise’ like the USA, considered the ‘promised land’ par excellence.” Experiences of religious fragmentation stay in the background and are merely the starting point of migration. The descendant of a genocide survivor of 1915 might use religious terms to express his yearning in contrast to his actual reality, even though he is not particularly religious himself. It is very difficult to evaluate reports of tension between Christian and Muslim migrants in German refugee accommodations. In some cases, state governments had to intervene. There have been indications that certain conflicts were brought over to Germany from the Orient, albeit transformed. Balci’s novel Arabboy shows this quite explicitly. She is adamant that she, a Kurdish-born, has gathered her information first-hand during her time as a social worker in Berlin. Similar patterns can be found in literature by Muslim migrants in Germany and in observations by Christian minorities from the Orient. It is not surprising that migrants come bearing this kind of emotional and psychological baggage. There are already attempts at treating trauma. But how can Christians talk about the situation without fear? How can they report on genocide or pogroms without causing controversy and get into conflicts with fellow Muslim migrants from the same region? How can Armenians, Aramaeans, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Pontic Greeks speak of their historical “baggage” – past genocides that date back a hundred years – without facing denial or even retaliation, which would make them victims once again? In order to act responsibly among these religious minorities from the Orient it requires knowledge that is rarely found in their countries of origin. It is a knowledge that has to be established together with refugees from these communities as a significant factor with historical roots. A first step could be to explore migrant literature that deals with this subject – literature that is traditionally used to pass on and reform this knowledge. The new setting will bring about new narratives. The process of exploring these narratives together to the benefit of a religious coexistence will surely affect everyone involved.

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Rewriting Global Orthodoxy Oriental Christians in Europe between 1970 and 2020 Heleen Murre-van den Berg 1. Introduction In June 2017 I was part of group that visited the Rum Orthodox Balamand monastery (near Tripoli, Lebanon), and after speaking to some of its monks, we had some time left to visit its store – a store, I discovered when preparing this contribution, that supports a FB-page that rather adequately captures its riches, including a huge icon collection, clerical clothing in all colours and sizes, rosaries, incense, crosses, a wide range of foodstuff (mostly selfproduced by the monastery) and of course a considerable book collection.1 I was fascinated by the collection, because I started to realize how these shops – which one finds in varying sizes in monasteries, parish churches and online, in the Middle East as well as in the countries of migration – provides important insights in what Orthodoxy is today. That is, these shops might be read as showcases of how Orthodox Christians intend to fashion their world with ‘Orthodox’ matter, with objects that in one way or another add to the ‘Orthodox’ content of their lives, be they books, rosaries or a local honey cured by the monks. At the time, I had already started to work on a collection of the Syriac Orthodox bookshop in the Netherlands. This collection – also online – grew out of the publishing work of the first metropolitan of North-western Europe, Mor Julius Cicek, who founded the Bar Ebroyo Press in Glane. His work was continued by the current metropolitan, Mor Polycarpos (in office since 2005), whereas the online shop also sells books that are published elsewhere (morephrem.com). I had started to compare the current book collection with what the Syriac Christians (both Syriac Orthodox and Church of the East) had produced in the past, to see how migration had affected the way their literary heritage was transmitted.2 The sight of the books in the Balamand store confirmed that indeed recently published books and pamphlets would make a great source for studying contemporary Orthodox communities in the Middle East and elsewhere. What this shop impressed on me, though, was that the study of texts should not merely be about authoring, publishing and reading, 1 2

Monastery Balamand Store: www.facebook.com/monasterybalamandstore (28.07.21). Heleen Murre-van den Berg, Language and Religion in the (Re)Making of the Syriac Orthodox Communities in Europe, in Birgit Meijer/Peter van der Veer, Refugees and Religion. Ethnographic Studies of Global Trajectories, London 2021, 179–197, www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/ refugees-andreligion-ethnographic-studies-of-global-trajectories/ch10-texts-language-and-religion-in-the-making-ofsyriac-orthodox-communities-in-europe; Chapter DOI 10.5040/9781350167162.0019).

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

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but also about selling, circulating and putting on display. That is, it should be about the textual and visual cultures that together showcase what Orthodoxy could or should be – at least in the eyes of those maintaining and visiting these shops. One more thing struck me when visiting this particular store. This was the amount to which a lot of what was on sale was in fact less distinctly Rum Orthodox than one might expect. The layout and illustration of the children’s books, especially, very much adhered to international styles. Despite the fact that the images in the icon section were distinctly ‘Rum’, the way they were framed summoned ‘Lebanese’ (the cedar tree), or generic ‘Christian’ styles. I started to see the many resemblances between the visual culture on display in this particular Rum Orthodox shop with what I came across in stores of the Copts, the Syriac Orthodox or the Maronites. Sometimes these resemblances were literal, in the sense that the same devotionalia – perhaps cheaply produced in China – were for sale, sometimes it was more of a family resemblance where similar objects with slightly different lettering or images were customized to a specific context. This set me thinking about inter-Orthodox and inter-Christian borrowing, wondering about how these new imaginaries travel: physically because books and other objects are imported or ordered from stores and locations in the Middle East, and virtually because images travel online in all directions: it has never been easier for book publishers to find suitable illustrations for Christian books. It is these three elements, the importance of texts in contemporary Orthodox communities, the textual and visual cultures of which these are part, and the vibrant and apparently increasing exchanges between various Orthodox communities, that provided the starting point for what became the ERC-funded project about Oriental Christians in Europe that started in October 2019 at Radboud University.3 In the current contribution, after briefly introducing the project and some of its findings, I will share some initial thoughts on how to interpret these findings. Such an interpretation should include the ramifications for the study of global Orthodoxy and global Christianity, as well as the study of religion in general, in Europe and worldwide. Not incidentally, these are all topics that owe much to the inspiration of Martin Tamcke.4

2. Oriental Christians in Europe between 1970 and 2020 It was a deliberate choice to concentrate on a distinct sub-set of the wider family of Orthodox churches, which in addition to the Eastern Orthodox churches coming out of the East Roman Byzantine tradition, includes what is today called the Assyrian Church of the East. 3 Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: www.ru.nl/ptrs/research/research-projects/rewriting-global-orthodoxy/ (28.07.2021). I am very grateful to the team members that are invaluable in addressing the many questions and complicated topics we try to address: Elise Aghazarian (project assistant), Habtom Yohannes, Matija Miličić and Jan Gehm (PhD’s), Gaétan du Roy and Christopher Sheklian (postdoctoral researchers) and Emmanuel Chamilakis and Wessel Stoop (IT developers). 4 The current contribution was written as keynote for the POWERS Conference ‘Europe and the migration of Christian communities from the Middle East’ organized by the Georg-August University in Göttingen, marking the retirement of Prof. dr. Martin Tamcke. For more information on the project, please contact the author ([email protected]) or check the project website (note 3). The author wholeheartedly thanks Martin Tamcke for his help and inspiration over many years of cooperation.

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

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In the past century, the Oriental churches have increasingly positioned themselves as a subgroup of the Orthodox churches, like, for example, in the context of the World Council of Churches.5 They have good historical and theological reasons for doing so, tracing their histories to those parts of the fourth-century church, mostly in Egypt and Syria, that rejected the way in which the Council of Chalcedon (451) decided the church should speak about the divine and human natures of Christ. Traditionally referred to as ‘Monophysite’, today the Oriental or ‘pre-Chalcedonian’ churches usually describe their position in this debate as ‘Miaphysite’, emphasizing the one unified human-divine nature of Christ in theology and liturgical practice. The actual churches with distinct hierarchies known to us today – the Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Malankara churches – are of a later date, but they continued to recognize each other as part of an oppositional tradition that resisted the demands of the powerful Byzantine church. This shared history, however, did not automatically make for close cooperation over the centuries. Each of these churches developed distinct regional, ethnic and linguistic characteristics, and oftentimes their relationships were influenced – as were the theological debates of the fifth and sixth centuries – by political considerations that positioned them against each other. The relationship between the Armenians and the Syriac Orthodox, for example, suffered from quarrels regarding the shared use of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, whereas similar discussions – in Jerusalem and in the homelands – took place between the Copts and the Ethiopians. Nevertheless, such quarrels and misunderstanding did not diminish the sense of a shared theological heritage that puts them, especially in broader ecumenical context, closely together. There is an additional reason to take these churches together in the current project. This is the way in which their migration to Europe displays a number of communalities, even if there are distinct stories to tell for each of these churches. Migration to Europe for most of the members of Oriental churches started modestly in the 1950s and 1960s, and accelerated from the 1970s onwards. It is this period, between 1970 and 2020, that constitutes the focus of this project. The history of the Armenians in Europe partly fits into the ‘recent migration’ scheme, though their European history reaches further back and includes mercantile settlements from the medieval period onwards, in Central and Eastern Europe centres and in cities such as Venice, Vienna and Amsterdam. The survivors of the genocide of 1915, which targeted Armenian and Syriac/Assyrians Christians in what today is Turkey, were settled in the Middle East (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt) and in the America’s. From Egypt, groups of Armenians ended up in France, making for new Armenian communities in Europe after most of the early communities had disappeared. From the late 1960s onwards, Copts, Syriac-Orthodox and Tewahdo’s (shorthand for those from the Ethiopian and Eritrean Tewahdo Orthodox churches) started to migrate to Europe in considerable numbers. By now, there is a considerable body of scholarship to build upon, including the work of Atto, Bakker Kellogg, Hämmerli, Schmoller and McCallum.6 Similar groundwork, by Bernal, 5

Website World Council of Churches > Church families: www.oikoumene.org/church-families (28.07.2021). Note that the website of the Middle East Council of Churches www.mecc.org/ churches; (27.07.2021) prefers to distinguish between ‘Orthodox’ and ‘Eastern Orthodox’; the Copts, Armenians and Syriac Orthodox are listed as ‘Eastern’. 6 Naures Atto, Hostages in the Homeland, Orphans in the Diaspora. Identity Discourses Among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the European Diaspora (PhD Leiden University), Leiden 2011; Sarah Bakker Kellogg, Ritual Sounds, Political Echoes. Vocal Agency and the Sensory Cultures of Secularism in the

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Hepner and van Doorn-Harder, amongst others, has been done regarding Oriental migrations to the America’s and Australia, which provides a good comparative starting point.7 Initially, migration was mostly tied to labour opportunities. This included high demand in the UK for well-educated Egyptian doctors and engineers, as well as demand for unskilled industrial labour mostly in countries such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, filled up mostly by Turks and Moroccans. Among the Turkish nationals were significant numbers of Syriac Orthodox and Armenian Christians. Already in these early years of labour migration, the difficult position of Christians in the region due to local and regional conflicts or to societal discrimination more generally played a role in the decision to seek opportunities elsewhere. From the 1980s onwards, war, violence and discrimination increasingly stimulated Christians to leave the region. Often, the US would be the preferred location, but a combination of sometimes more navigable asylum regimes in combination with the pull-factor of communities that already had been formed in various European regions, made for a steady stream of migrants that chose Europe over the US or Australia. Over these past fifty years, all churches have set up one or more European dioceses. Many websites, some centrally organized, others maintained by individuals, provide insight in the web of communities and organizations.8 Many of these bishoprics and parishes maintain active community centres that organize Sunday schools and youth activities, alongside other groups for the education and integration of lay members of every age group. The Copts and the Syriac Orthodox have also established monastic communities, which double as the seat of a bishopric. Like the Balamand store in the introduction, parish churches and monasteries often have shops that sell books and devotionalia such as icons, crosses, rosaries and incense. It is the books and pamphlets that have become our main source for understanding the way in which Oriental churches position themselves in European societies. These books, whether they are sold in church shops, handed out at special occasions, brought by travelDutch Syriac Diaspora, in: American Ethnologist 42 (2015), 431–445; Maria Hämmerli/Jean-François Mayer, Orthodox Identities in Western Europe, Migration, Settlement and Innovation, London 2014; Sara Lei Sparre/Alistair Hunter et al., Middle Eastern Christians in Europe. Histories, Cultures and Communities, Aberdeen 2015; Andreas Schmoller, Middle Eastern Christians and Europe. Historical Legacies and Present Challenges, Wien, 2018 and the special issue introduced by Fiona McCallum Guiney, Middle Eastern Christian Identities in Europe, in: Masriq & Mahjar 8 (2020), DOI: 10.24847/v8i1. 7 Victoria Bernal, Nation as Network. Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship, Chicago, 2014; Nelly van Doorn-Harder, Copts in Context. Negotiating Identity, Tradition, and Modernity, Chapel Hill/NC 2017; Tricia Redeker Hepner, Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean Diaspora, in: Identities. Global Studies in Culture and Power 10 (2003), 269–293. 8 See, e.g., for the Copts, www.coptic.org/europe.htm (28.7.2021); the Armenians: www.belleville armenianchurch.org/orig/armtoday23.php (28.7.2021); the Ethiopians: https://www.liquisearch. com/ethiopian_orthodox_tewahedo_church/bishops (28.7.2021); the Eritreans: https://eotcs.se/e/ about-the-diocese/ (28.07.2021); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrean_Orthodox_Tewahedo_ Church#Patriarchs_and_bishops_of_Eritrea (28.7.2021); the Syriac Orthodox, who maintain several transnational ecclesiastical websites (see e.g. https://syriacpatriarchate.org/ (28.07.2021) and https://syriacorthodoxresources.org/ (28.7.2021) do not seem to have a page devoted to the European dioceses. The best available list seems to be the one on the Wikipedia page: https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Dioceses_of_the_Syriac_Orthodox_Church#The_Syriac_Orthodox_Church_in_ the_twentieth_century (28.7.2021).

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ling family members, or sold and bought via online shops, are a key part of the way in which Christians of these Oriental traditions fashion their religious and communal lives. These publications cover a wide range of genres, including photographic reprints of manuscripts that were brought from the homelands, reprints of theological and liturgical texts, colourfully edited translations into European languages, newly written books for children and adults, and online publications or apps that the faithful use to be reminded of their daily prayers. A large segment of this corpus consists of publications that take up earlier texts such as liturgies, theological essays and saints’ lives. These are re-edited, sometimes translated into European languages and published in relatively cheap formats. Others are written especially for the new European context. Educational materials that are devised for Sunday schools or religious education in regular school settings make up an important part of the corpus. In the project we collect as many of these materials as possible and include their metadata in an Open Access database.9 As indicated in the introduction, the texts are collected not only for their contents. We are as much interested in understanding how these texts are being used and how they contribute to the formation of Oriental Christian communities in Europe. Part of this formation takes place via the actual theological and educational content, but we assume that this also takes place via the look and feel of these publications on the one hand, and via the larger textual practices of which they form a part on the other. We ask, therefore, who is buying and reading these books, who is handing them out, and to whom. Are books used for educational purposes, for personal edification, for showing off one’s erudition and learning, or are they put on display to show to family and friends that one is an active believer? These different uses do not exclude each other, and we therefore take into account the whole spectrum of textual practices, from the actual reading and studying to the symbolic and performative usages of texts and material publications. As important are the visual practices that are closely interlinked with the textual practices. How do these books look, what images are being used, what colours dominate the publications? Is there a specific ‘Coptic’ way of formatting these publications, or should one speak of an ‘Orthodox’, ‘Oriental’, or ‘Middle-Eastern’ way of doing this?10 Therefore, what these churches produce needs to be interpreted and understood at a number of levels, first in the context of the history and contemporary situation of the individual churches, second, as part of an Oriental or Orthodox tradition, and third, as part of contemporary textual and visual culture more broadly. Put differently, the constitutive elements of each image and their hybridization could potentially elucidate how Oriental Christians position themselves in contemporary Europe. So what does the imagery tell us about the imaginaries that are being formed, transformed and transmitted? Though it is too early to generalize regarding the contents and origins of this corpus, our collection so far allows for a number of tentative conclusions that are worth sharing in order to elicit critical discussion. Before discussing these, let me start with three preliminary observations.

9 We expect this collection to be open to the public in the autumn of 2021; see for updates, see the website of Rewriting Global Orthodoxy at Radboud University (note 3). 10 In this respect we build in particular on the framework proposed by David Morgan, The Sacred Gaze. Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice, Berkeley 2005.

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The first of these is that the vast majority of materials that we came across so far are of a relatively recent date. This is not to say that what was produced in the 1970s to about 2000 is necessarily all lost, but it is – not surprisingly – no longer easily available in bookshops and websites.11 We will need, therefore, to access other types of collections, private or otherwise, in order to get a better sense of the production of this early period. The second observation concerns the origins of the publications. Initially, the project aimed to limit its basic source material to what was produced in Europe. Soon it became clear, however, that a considerable number of publications that circulate among the European communities is actually produced elsewhere. This seems to be particularly true for the Coptic and Tewahdo communities. In the case of the Copts, the Egyptian publishing houses remain an important source for new materials, even though the European communities have started to produce their own materials. In addition, materials that were published in Australia, the UK and the United States circulate in Europe. In case of the Tewahdo communities, the materials found in Europe include publications originating in Ethiopia and Eritrea, in Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States, with so far very little being done in continental Europe. For the Syriac Orthodox, European countries (Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, but also Austria and Spain) are crucial as to the production of new books, even though incidentally one comes across older publications done by Syrian, Turkish and Lebanese publishing houses. For the Armenians, Armenian publishers remain important, though the churches in Europe have initiated and published a range of materials. At first sight, these differences in publishing activities in Europe align with the varying levels of cultural and political power of the church in the homelands: the stronger they are at home, the more textual materials from the homeland are used in the churches abroad. Presumably, however, also particular trajectories of migration, differing educational levels of migrants, the opportunities on offer in the host countries in addition to the success or failure of individual ventures, explain part of these differences. The third preliminary observation concerns the gradual increase of the importance of digital and online publications. The study of the online Oriental Christian world was not intended to be part of the project, but the many ways in which online and print interact forced us to take this digital world into account when speaking about writing, reading and distribution. The online world is important in at least four domains of the activities of the Oriental churches in Europe: that of streaming and publicizing religious gatherings, such as the Sunday liturgy and lectures and Bible studies by religious leaders (mostly YouTube), that of online stores that sell books and other objects, that of specific apps and WhatsApp groups intended to support Christians in their daily religious lives, and finally social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) where people connect on the basis of family relations, religion, ethnicity, politics or other specific interests. Whereas for the time being these online activities do not seem to affect the number of book publications, they do seem to cut into the success of paper journals and magazines.

11 At this point (9.7.2021): 32 before 2000, 34 from 2000 to 2010, 95 from 2011 to 2021 (and a couple with unclear dating).

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3. Imagining a transnational European Oriental community This textual corpus embodies the confluence of explicit and less explicitly articulated ideas that allows us to better understand how these churches situate themselves in the European context. These ideas are embodied in the sense that their physical presence allows them to be bought, gifted, circulated and destroyed, but also embodied in the sense of presenting colours, images, symbols, smell and touch that express how those that belong to these churches experience their Christian faith. The study of this embodied literary heritage allows us to better understand the way in which Oriental Christians imagine their future in Europe. Such ‘imaginations’, rather than be interpreted merely as unconnected individual expressions, can be seen as constituting ‘social imaginaries’ in the Taylorian sense that function as guiding ideas for the further development of these communities.12 These imaginaries, as a social system that envisages how the community should function, are particularly relevant when describing migrant groups that have to do without officially sanctioned social imaginaries as provided by the state and state institutions. Appadurai describes these imaginaries as fluid ‘ideoscapes’ that transcend local boundaries and thus are not restricted to Anderson’s ethnic or national communities.13 These imaginaries employ media in all its forms (and thus borrow from and interact with global ‘mediascapes’), and allow migrant communities to situate themselves in a particular local context as much as position themselves as a part of a transnational community. What is particularly relevant for us here is a further step taken by Meyer when she prefers ‘aesthetic formations’ over Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’. 14 She argues that aesthetic considerations are crucial in the imaginaries that contribute to the formation of communities, be they ethnic, national, religious or other. This is a particularly fruitful take which inspires us to combine the study of theological, pedagogical and historical reflections in the publications with an analysis of the aesthetics of printed and online materials. Both, then, should be situated in a wider context of visual and textual cultures within the respective communities and in the context in which they are created. These imaginaries, notably, are not merely the result of past imaginaries adapted to new circumstances, but in turn create new realities that guide the struggles and ideals of the communities. Meyer further observes that such imaginaries, as created by migrant communities, spill over to the public sphere, where they may complement and strengthen, but also unsettle and contest, imaginaries that are already present. 15 Indeed, the imaginaries of the Oriental Christians, like those of other newcomers in Europe, have already become part of the pub12 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham/NC, 2004. 13 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis 1996, 33; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1983. See also Laurens Ten Kate/Ernst van den Hemel, Religion, Community, Borders. Tensions and Interactions between Religious, Cultural and National Imaginaries in Neoliberal Times. An Introduction, in: Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society 5 (2019), 259–281, on the potential of social imaginaries to cross the boundaries of ethnos and state. 14 Birgit Meyer, From Imagined Communities to Aesthetic Formations. Religious Mediations, Sensational Forms and Styles of Binding, in: Id., Aesthetic Formations. Media, Religion and the Senses, New York 2009, 1–30. 15 Ibid., 17ss.

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lic domain, in the form of new or refurbished church buildings, as public rituals commemorating events such as the 1915-genocide, as books and religious objects, and as websites and social media presence. For the most part, these public performances are near invisible, not easily spotted by those focused on the older and more powerful imaginaries that dominate the public sphere. Or, if they are visible, they are easily conflated with those of other migrants, e.g. when Oriental Christians are conflated with Muslims from the same region, on the basis of racialized interpretations of Islam and Christianity.16 When looking at the materials collected so far, against the background of observations and conversations with various members of these churches and earlier studies on these communities, three important elements of the emerging European Oriental imaginary can be distinguished. The first of these concerns the cluster of ideas that is considered to be part of being modern. Most of these are explicitly acknowledged and positively valued as part of contemporary European (or ‘Western’) culture, even though aspects of it were and are also present in the homelands (where they often were styled ‘Western’ even if most proponents would be regional and local actors).17 These include the high value that is attributed to both secular and religious learning for men and women alike, the acceptance of the secular state as the best option to guarantee freedom of religion, the ideal of strong organizational structures that holds its leaders accountable, a clear separation between secular and religious organizations, and the generous use of modern means of communication and other technical niceties. This technical modernity not only stimulates the usage of modern media in all its forms, but also appropriates its aesthetics, especially in productions that are geared towards the youth. To this list of undisputed ‘modern’ achievements that are part and parcel of what we encounter in the world of publications as much as in the churches we visit, one should add a number of explicit values that are not always recognized as part of ‘modernity’ but which, in line with scholars such as Keane, can be seen as part of ‘Christian moderns’.18 These include first and foremost the strong emphasis on writing and publishing in Christian circles. To be more precise, this is not about the writing and circulating of books as such, which has been an important aspect of Christianity in general and ‘Eastern’ Christianity in particular since early times, but about the way religious literacy has become a prerequisite for all believers rather than for a select few, monks, bishops and a few parish priests or deacons. Even if we should assume that many of the books and pamphlets are not actually read in any detail, the fact that so many publications are produced and distributed suggests that this type of religious literacy is considered essential for contemporary believers. This is a fairly recent development though it builds on the changes of the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries. Mostly under the influence of Catholic and Protestant missionaries the circle of 16 Kellogg, Ritual Sounds, and Candace Lukasik, Economy of Blood. The Persecuted Church and the Racialization of American Copts, in: American Anthropologist 123 (2021), 1–13. 17 One might think here of Eisenstadt’s ‘multiple modernities’: Samuel Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization, in: The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 24 (1999), 283–295; and Id., Multiple Modernities, in: Daedalus 129 (2000), 1–29 – though for now it seems that Oriental Christians tend to attribute ‘modernity’ fairly uniformly to Europe and the West rather than to what has happened in their homelands, both the positive and negative aspects of it. 18 Webb Kean, Christian Moderns. Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter, Berkeley 2007.

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readers and writers was gradually extended, if not always in practice, certainly as an ideal to strive for.19 Most of the publications that we come across presuppose this ideal in one way or another. Whether it is to help teaching children the languages of the church (Syriac, Armenian), whether books are sold that teach the ‘teaching of Christ’ in a basic catechism, whether traditional texts, including the Holy Liturgy, are translated into European languages in order for the lay to be able to read them – all of this, whether actually successful or not, transmits the message that it is important that individual believers know what they are doing, and why they are doing it. What is more, this type of personalized knowledge is gradually becoming a crucial element of being a sincere and authentic Oriental Christian, something that in the past depended mostly on the consistent way in which the daily practices of prayer and fasting were maintained. None of this is actually presented as ‘modern’, but rather as the only authentic way of being a Christian – Oriental or otherwise. This take on how to be a Christian is underlined by the type of imagery that is being used in educational materials. Perhaps the best example of this is the use of a specific modern Jesus painting for a small Syriac Orthodox catechism.20 This painting of Jesus by Warner Sallman is hugely popular in Protestant and Evangelical circles and has gained circulation far beyond its origins.21 Whether those who devised the booklet were necessarily aware of it, this type of Jesus figure (and its many variations) suggest resonance with ‘personal faith’ in the way it is perceived in Protestant and Evangelical circles. Whereas we come across many examples of images and styles that are appropriated from non-Oriental Orthodox traditions, the vast majority of publications explicitly position themselves in a specific Oriental tradition. The easiest way of doing so is to use the specific scripts that characterize each of these traditions, the Ethiopian, Armenian, Syriac and Coptic alphabets, as the only, or as an addition, to parts of the publications in European languages. Despite the difficulties for younger generations to read these scripts, they continue to signpost the unique literary heritage of each of these traditions. The same is true for the ‘icons’, whether these are icons in the Eastern Orthodox sense or not.22 All churches employ their own iconography to illustrate modern publications, though they occasionally borrow from the other Orthodox traditions. The illustrations vary from reproductions of ancient images derived from manuscripts to those of icons that were painted by contemporary artists. The old and venerable tradition is further underlined by making use of traditional decorations and colour schemes, especially in books intended for liturgical or devotional use, with decorated dividing bands, images of crosses, and the use of red as the main sup19 Heleen Murre-van den Berg, Scribes and Scriptures. The Church of the East in the Eastern Ottoman Provinces (1500–1850), Leuven 2015. 20 Patriarch Mor Ignatios E. Barsaum I, Yulfono Mshiḥoyo (transl. by Mor Philoxenus H. Dolabanu from Arabic to Syriac), Glane 1984; see website More Ephrem bookshop: https://morephrem.shop/index. php?route=product/product&path=42&product_id=154 (30.7.21). 21 Morgan, Sacred Gaze, 155–157. 22 The Oriental churches lack a developed icon theology as present in the Eastern Orthodox churches, and currently the churches seem to adopt slightly different discourses in how they position themselves here; more research is needed here, for an introductory overview see Christine Chaillot, The Role of Images and the Veneration of Icons in the Oriental Orthodox Churches. Syrian Orthodox, Armenian, Coptic and Ethiopian Traditions, Münster 2018.

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porting colour. Finally, photographs are often used, mostly those of dignitaries in full clerical garb, or of new church buildings in the lands of migration and ancient churches and monasteries in the homeland. These images, stressing the old and venerable traditions of these churches, suggest that in addition to the mostly implicit acceptance of modern religious frameworks, the Oriental imaginary include aspects that are apologetic and sometimes antagonistic to Western society and Western churches, rejecting the kind of religious modernity that in their opinion characterizes much of Western Christianity. Phrases such as: ‘We are old and have not changed anything’ not only bring to mind longstanding rivalries between the Orthodox churches, but position the Orthodox against today’s Western churches that have changed many things.23 Similarly, extensive references to the persecutions that Christians, in the recent and more remote past, endured in their homelands, serve to distinguish their form of Christianity from that of the liberal and lax West. By doing so, the authors capitalize not only on the discontents in European Christianity, but they also provide the churches with a rhetoric of venerability and purity which fits perfectly in both secular and religious understandings of European history. For some, in Europe and elsewhere, this ancient ‘Oriental’ heritage provides inspiration for those who search for forms of Christianity untainted by colonialism and recent innovations, leading to individual or even mass conversions.24 For others, these imaginaries become useful in the political realm, especially when violence against Christians is portrayed a[caused by Muslims only.25 Mostly, however, the political implications of these narratives are not explicated, left to be unpacked by Western interlocutors rather than stated explicitly, in order to avoid having to choose between various allies in the political realm that do not necessarily agree on this topic. This also seems to be the case with another discourse that has conservative and rightwing connotations, which in some Orthodox and other conservative Christian circles is referred to as ‘family values’.26 This refers to a moral order that is not necessarily intended to be anti-European or anti-modern, but which might easily be perceived as such, especially from the perspective of liberal elites in the host countries. In comparison to similar discussions among the Eastern Orthodox that have sought and gained public resonance, the discussion over these themes in Oriental Christian circles has been mostly internal. Bishops 23 See, e.g. the text on the cover of Hegoumen Vader Arsenious El Baramousy/Diakon Anton Mossaad, Een Altaar in Egypte. Kroniek van de Koptisch Orthodoxe Kerk, Amsterdam 2008: “[de] Koptische Orthodoxe Kerk is oud en nieuw tegelijkertijd; oud omdat zij een Apostolische Kerk is, opgericht door de Heilige Marcus de Evangelist, zij bewaart traditioneel het Apostolisch geloof zonder afwijking. Zij is nieuw vanwege de levende Jezus ...” [the Coptic Orthodox Church is old and new at the same time, old, because she is Apostolic and founded by the Apostle Saint Marc the Evangelist, she keeps the faith unchangingly. She is new, because of the living Jesus]. 24 At the moment, conversions to Oriental Christianity in Europe are limited, mostly though not exclusively in the context of marriage. For discussions of conversions to Oriental and Eastern Christianity, see Anna Hager, When Ephrem meets the Maya. Defining and Adapting the Syriac Orthodox Tradition in Guatemala, in: Hugoye 23 (2020), 215–262; Oliver Herbel, Turning to Tradition. Converts and the Making of an American Orthodox Church, Oxford 2013. 25 Lukasik, Economy of Blood. 26 Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church as moral norm entrepreneur, in Religion, State & Society 44 (2016), 132–151, DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2016.1194010; Michael Suslov, Digital Orthodoxy in the Post-Soviet World: The Russian Orthodox Church and Web 2.0, Stuttgart 2016.

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and youth leaders emphasize the importance of starting a Christian family, and to steer away from casual sex and homosexual relationships. These themes return in educational publications, and, in a more circumvent way, in the Lives of the Saints. These stories, which in new translations seem to be particularly popular in all traditions, can be understood as promoting the importance of a pious and all-encompassing Christian lifestyle, without explicitly addressing what, in the opinion of bishops and priests, is wrong with liberal Western lifestyles. Perhaps such prudent ways of addressing these issues have to do with the way in which the clergy is not eager to counter their European allies head on, though their caution might also be explained from opposition to such conservative norms from within the communities themselves. Finally, the social imaginaries that are being developed among the Oriental Christians are simultaneously local and transnational. On the one hand, a good part of the publications explicitly positions themselves in the lands of migration, by using the language of the host countries and by referring to the particularities of the local Oriental community. Increasing numbers of books are produced in Europe and discuss the history of dioceses, monasteries and parishes in Europe, address and acknowledge the European – or particularly Dutch, German, Spanish etc. situation – in which they find themselves. A good example of this are educational materials produced for German schools, in German, and which refer to Luther and the Lutheran church, Muslims and Jews in ways that are fully cognizant of the particular German context.27 On the other hand, the materials reflect the ongoing transnational connection of these churches. In many religious books, one finds an imprimatur of one kind or another, such as the explicit blessing of bishop and patriarch, often with images, prefaces and official stamps.28 This suggests that religious books are not supposed to be distributed without this explicit connection to the hierarchy which in most cases is located outside Europe. At the same time, this practice indicates that indeed local publishers continue to recognize this transnational hierarchy as their own. Additionally, as material objects the books testify to the transnational scene, with many of those available in Europe being produced elsewhere. Whatever their local connections, the communities are in touch transnationally and exchange goods and ideas. These transnational exchanges also pertain to the important topic of the relationship between religious, national and ethnic forms of identification. These work out rather differently from church to church, though in all of the churches the transnational ethno-religious identities as developed in the home countries seem to be preferred over explicitly localized European and hyphenated identities. At the same time, we note considerable differences in the way these older ethno-religious identifications are fit to deal with the potential tensions between ethnic and religious interpretations, as well as with nationalist activism based on these identities. Further research is needed to see to what extent the Oriental churches display different dynamics from those in the Eastern Orthodox churches. There, the nationalism of the home countries strongly influences the way the different Eastern Orthodox juris27 Josef Önder, Auf dem Weg zum Glauben. Syrisch-Orthodoxe Religionslehre, Glane/Losser 2019, 203– 213. 28 See, e.g., Anon./Anba Maximos. Shifāʾan li-l-Marḍā (maʿa Bāqa ʿIṭriyya min Siyar Qiddīsīn Aṭṭibāʾ) [Healing the Sick (with a Special Collection of Biographies of Healing Saints)], Wadi el-Natrun 2015, 7; Gabriel Aydin, Syriac Hymnal According to the Rite of the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch, Cumberland/RI 2017, 10s.

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dictions function alongside each other in what some call the ‘Diaspora’.29 The term, however, is disputed as it tends to portray the migrant communities as perennially dependent on the jurisdictions of the homeland, and as homogenizing the different ways in which migrant communities relate to their home countries. Among the Oriental churches, however, the term seems to be relatively uncontested, not only because the dynamics between home and host countries are different, but perhaps also because it is felt to adequately express the sense of loss and exile that pervades many of the publications.30

4. Global Orthodoxy, global Christianity What does the above mean for the study of Global Christianity? For many years, Prof. Tamcke himself, and many others beside him, has taken pains to connect the history of the Eastern and Oriental Churches with those of Christianity in general – not merely with ‘Western Christianity’ as its perennial other, but with the dynamic religious world that is usually referred to with the term ‘Global Christianity’ or World Christianity. These attempts have been successful, in so far as overviews of global Christianity since the early 2000s routinely include Christianity of the Middle East and North-Africa.31 In a similar vein, mission studies, which for many years was the exclusive domain of missiologists working on Africa or East Asia, has developed a strong subfield with excellent studies on the Middle East. These studies, to which Tamcke himself contributed, show how important it is to look not only at the encounter of Christian missions with non-Christian religions, but also that with other forms of Christianity.32 Finally, as referred to above, Middle Eastern 29 Victor Roudometof, Globalization and Orthodox Christianity. The Transformations of a Religious Tradition, New York-London 2014, Lucian Leustean, Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century Oxford, 2014; Berit Thorbjørnsrud, “The Problem of the Orthodox Diaspora”. The Orthodox Church between Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Universality, in: Numen 62 (2015), 568–595. 30 There is a wide literature on the concept of ‘diaspora’, see e.g., Stéphane Dufoix, Diasporas, Paris 2003/Berkeley 2008; from the Oriental churches only the Armenian case is discussed often, see, e.g., Tsolin Nalbantian, Armenians Beyond Diaspora. Making Lebanon their Own, Edinburgh 2020 (with an excellent bibliography); Khachig Tölölyan, The Nation-State and Its Others. In Lieu of a Preface, in: Diaspora. A Journal of Transnational Studies 1 (1991), 3–7. For the other churches the term is often used (see the references in notes 5 and 6), but usually without further conceptual discussion. 31 David Chidester, Christianity. A Global History, London 2000; Diarmaid MacCulloch, A History of Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, London 2009; Douglas Jacobsen, The World’s Christians. Who They Are, Where They Are, and How They Got There, Malden/Oxford 2011; Martha Frederiks/Dorottya Nagy, World Christianity. Methodological Considerations, Leiden 2021. 32 Among others: Eleanor H. Tejirian/Reeva Spector Simon, Conflict, Conquest and Conversion. Two Thousand Years of Christian Missions in the Middle East, New York 2012; Andreas Feldtkeller/Uta Zeuge-Buberl, Networks of Knowledge. Epistemic Entanglement initiated by American Protestant Missionary Presence in Nineteenth-Century Syria, Stuttgart 2018; Inger Marie Okkenhaug/Karène Sanchez Summerer, Christian Missions and Humanitarianism in The Middle East, 1850–1970. Ideologies, Rhetoric, and Practices, Leiden 2020, 110–129; for pre-2009 publications (including many by Tamcke) see Heleen Murre-van den Berg, The Study of Western Missions in the Middle East (1820–1920). An Annotated Bibliography, in: Norbert Friedrich/Uwe Kaminsky/Roland Löffler, The Social Dimension of Christian Missions in the Middle East. Historical Studies of the 19th and 20th Centuries, Stuttgart 2010, 35–53.

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and Oriental Christians were included in migration studies, another field to which Tamcke has contributed. This provides a strong base for one of the main questions that we hope to tackle in the current project, that of how these migration communities are part of global and transnational interactions among Eastern and Oriental Orthodox churches as well as among Christianity in its widest sense. From the perspective of our sources there are two important domains of interaction, that of visual and literary cultures, and that of organizational structures. As indicated above, our initial study of the literature that is produced and circulated by the Oriental churches suggests interaction at all levels. As to the contents of the publications, we encounter similar genres, similar emphases on children’s education, and a shared appreciation of the lives of the saints and historical narratives. Visually, we note similar types of images and similar designs in books, websites and social media pages. In most of these cases, it is difficult to prove that there has been actual borrowing, even more so because in many cases these similarities reflect common historic and contemporary sources. As indicated above, our corpus shares a clearly recognizable aesthetic that blends religious imagery from a wide variety of sources, with materials from outside the Oriental and Eastern Orthodox traditions alongside basic imagery and designs that originates mostly in manuscript culture. The resulting style is rather eclectic and incorporates elements from Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical traditions, as well as elements that seem to originate in popular youth culture. In the next phase of the project, we will study the various elements of the aesthetics of this corpus, relate it to the contents, and thus contribute to a better understanding of how these imaginaries have evolved and contribute to the formation the Oriental communities in Europe. These imaginaries evolve against the background of actual cooperation between the various Oriental and Orthodox churches in Europe. In the Netherlands, the Oriental and Eastern Orthodox churches have formally self-organized in order to be able to apply for government subsidies for theological education and for the right to appoint Oriental and Orthodox pastors in the government position in the military and the penitentiary system.33 Sweden boasts a similar inter-Orthodox Seminary, Sankt Ignatios.34 YouTube channels provide examples of less overtly political intra-Oriental gatherings. One of these is a choir meeting that was hosted by the Coptic church at St. Mary’s Cathedral in Amsterdam. Choirs from the Coptic, Syriac Orthodox, Tewahdo and Armenian churches performed for a mixed public that included several clergy, with the Coptic bishop abuna Arseny presiding over the meeting and the Syriac Orthodox bishop Mor Polycarpos as the most prominent guest.35 The majority of the choir members were young women and a few men, with older singers among the Armenian and Coptic choirs. Each sang hymns from their respective liturgical 33 OZI (Orthodox Zendende Instantie), http://orthodox.nl/ (29.7.2021), OKIN (Orthodoxe Kerk in Nederland), https://orthodoxekerk.net/ (29.7.2021) and SOKIN (Samenwerkingsverband van Oriëntaals orthodoxe Kerken in Nederland), http://sokin.nl/ (29.7.2021) together in OZI-websites. 34 Sankt Ignatios Folkhögskola: www.sanktignatios.org/ (29.7.2021). Travel restrictions due to the pandemic has prevented us from more in-depth comparison with other European countries. 35 See YouTube channel of the youth organization of the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Syrisch Orthodox Jongeren Platform www.youtube.com/watch?v=X762K3FlIgY&t=409s (29.7.2021); linking to the channel of the Koptisch Orthodox Bisdom van Nederland, www.youtube.com/channel /UC64AfrFCoUxIFvLxg3lIbhg (29.7.2021).

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traditions in a variety of styles, acapella or accompanied by musical instruments, drums with the Tewahdos, an oud with one of the Syriac Orthodox groups, a qanun and a flute with the Copts, and an electronic organ with the Armenians. The choirs sang in many different languages, whereas the introductions to each performance, usually by someone from the choir, were in Dutch. The final cheerful sing-along performed by the Coptic choir used both Arabic and Dutch. Oriental Christians have also started to participate in local and national ecumenical organizations. This is a logical step, considering their longstanding participation in organizations such as the Middle East Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches. At the same time, these organizations are struggling to capitalize on their cooperation in times when ‘ecumenical dialogue’ seems more acceptable than ever while fewer churches are committed to actually cooperate concretely. From the perspective of migrant churches, these longstanding organizations often seem to focus on problems that are not necessarily those of the newcomers. For that reason, most Oriental churches in the Netherlands joined SKIN (Samen Kerk in Nederland) which is better attuned to the situation of migrant Christians from outside Europe.36 These initial findings suggest that we need to study the history of Oriental (and Eastern) Orthodox Christians in Europe simultaneously through the lens of their distinct denominational histories (with due attention to local and regional varieties within the trajectory of particular churches) and through that of their contemporary entanglements – locally, nationally and transnationally. These entanglements and thus mutual influences include the whole range of other churches Oriental and Middle Eastern churches, Eastern Orthodox churches, Protestant, Roman Catholic and Evangelical-Pentecostal influences. What the Oriental churches will become in the European context is the result of these intra-Christian influences as much as it a reaction to the wider inter-religious and religious-secular encounters.

5. Rewriting global Orthodoxy Does all of this indeed add up to a ‘rewriting’ of both Oriental Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy more generally? So far, I believe it does, and not only in the sense that Orthodoxy in its widest sense has been reinventing itself in the past decades. Indeed, in the late twentieth century many thought that due to the combined impact of instability in the Middle East and Northeast Africa and the forced secularization of Eastern Europe, Orthodoxy would gradually decline and give way to the combined forces of secularism and Evangelical and Pentecostal movements. Despite these predictions, however, Orthodoxy has found ways to renew itself, by allying itself with conservative and traditionalist movements all over the world and by foregrounding its ancient roots in early Christianity. As importantly, it has started to use the lands of migration as a spring board for developing yet other creative forms of Orthodoxy – Oriental and Eastern – in the twenty-first century. It is here that the Orthodoxy is rewritten, in the literal sense of the rewriting and republishing of crucial parts of the ancient literary heritage, but also in the metaphoric sense, in that Orthodoxy now more than ever 36 SKIN: https://skinkerken.wixsite.com/skin (29.7.2021).

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situates itself among other Christian and non-Christian traditions, and among and as part of national and ethnic groups that, though Orthodoxy was not part of their history, are willing to consider this as a viable and convincing way of being part Christian. This means that we urgently need to rewrite the history of Oriental and Eastern Christians by fully including the developments of the recent period, in the homelands and in the lands of migration. Our esteemed colleague, prof. Tamcke, has set us an excellent example.

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No Place for “Arabs and Turks”? German Public Discourse about the Conflict in and Migration from Syria, 2015–2019 Lars Klein 1. Introduction The article at hand starts with a recollection of the Sarrazin-debate of 2009 following. It does so, because that debate resonates with quite a few developments and discussions that are imminent now: Back then it was written that the Sarrazin-debate had to be considered a surrogate discussion about German identity.1 In retrospect, the debate signals a turn towards populism and it accelerated the theoretical debate about “postmigration” as part of Critical Migration Studies. Following a sketch of the Sarrazin-debate, it will be examined in a case study in how far a populist rhetoric has spilled over to mainstream reporting on the war in – and migration from – Syria. The analysis will show in how far the concept of “postmigration” offers a proper angle to analyse the situation of migrants from Syria in Germany.

2. Recap of the Sarrazin debate: Racism against “Arabs and Turks” Berlin in the early 2000s was still suffering from a huge dept. For many it seemed a clever choice, when the Governing Mayor, Klaus Wowereit, coined the famous slogan “Berlin – Poor but Sexy”. He had installed Thilo Sarrazin as Senator of Finance in 2002. Upon leaving his position for a seat in the directorate of the German Bundesbank six years later, Sarrazin gave an interview with the “European cultural magazine”, as it calls itself, “Lettre International”. It was part of a special issue entitled “Berlin on the couch”, which was explicitly meant to discuss different visions of Berlin. Sarrazin’s vision carried the emblematic title “Klasse statt Masse. Von der Hauptstadt der Transferleistung zur Metropole der Eliten“.2 In the interview, Sarrazin does what the title promises, he concludes that Berlin was not an industrial city, had nothing to offer except culture and tourism. He sketched Berlin as city of the elite, in which its mass universities should be replaced by elite universities. 1

Naika Foroutan et al., Deutschland postmigrantisch I. Gesellschaft, Religion, Identität, Berlin 2014, 9– 17, 15. 2 Frank Berberich, Klasse statt Masse. Thilo Sarrazin im Gespräch, in: Lettre International 86 (2009).

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He also understood that in a city of culture, not everybody could contribute. It is here that Sarrazin arrived at the racist core of his vision. He held that too many children were born into poor families, but not in order to conclude that poor families needed help to overcome their situation, but to speak of a “Kosovo strategy” on the side of these poor families aiming to make up ever larger numbers of society – a cloying version of the fear of “foreign infiltration” that keeps on floating in right-wing populist circles and found its echo in the idea of “population exchange” during the summer of migration in 2015. The number of “Arabs and Turks” rose “due to wrong policy”, Sarrazin added, with them having “no productive role” to play in society “other than selling vegetables on the market”. Sarrazin was again not discussing integration, but suggested they might find a spot in Cologne or elsewhere.3 A survey conducted in 2009 found that 51% of Germans polled agreed with Sarrazin’s claim that large parts of the Arab and Turkish population was neither willing nor able to integrate.4 A sentence often heard in the debate on the following debate on the interview was one like “it has to be allowed in this county to say …” or the finding that Sarrazin might have overdone it, was but right in essence. That again is a recurring trope in populist rhetoric. It is an interesting aspect of this scandal that Sarrazin was a prominent member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) back then, which in a dragging procedure finally suspended his membership in 2020. When he gave the interview and wrote his book(s), though, he was understood to that also as member of the SPD, so that the weekly “Die Zeit” concluded the Social Democrats were playing with right-wing ideas while the CDU was working towards constructive integration models, namely Armin Laschet in his position as first ever Minister responsible for Integration in North Rhine Westphalia.5 That masks the fact that the Christian Democrats were struggling to find their position in the party system and with defining what conservatism means for them. Angela Merkel had moved the CDU to the center, a dozen prominent Christian Democrats left their positions, or politics altogether, among them Roland Koch or Friedrich Merz – who made a comeback only ten years later to cover the right spectrum of the CDU, for example, in the “Zukunftsteam” of Armin Laschet, when he ran for Chancellor in the 2021 election. Upon the huge echo that his interview found, Sarrazin published the much-contested book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (“Germany does away with itself”) two years later in 2011.6 He stressed that the facts and figures he had worked with were not disputed and that they backed his findings. At the same time, he admitted that sometimes he could not find the statistics he was looking for, so he made them up. He used those figures that came closest to what he thought the situation was and if no one disagreed with him, he had established those figures to which there were no real statistics available.7 This strategy found his 3 4 5

Berberich, Klasse statt Masse. ZEIT ONLINE, dpa, Reuters, Sarrazin gerät stärker unter Druck, in: Zeit Online vom 11. Oktober 2009. Jörg Lau, Unter Deutschen. Die Integration der Ausländer ist viel weiter, als Thilo Sarrazins törichte Worte vermuten lassen, in: Die Zeit vom 8. Oktober 2009. 6 Thilo Sarrazin, Deutschland schafft sich ab. Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen, München 2018. 7 Tobias Kniebe, Debatte, in: SZ-Magazin vom 11. März 2010; Naika Foroutan, Sarrazins Thesen auf dem Prüfstand. Ein empirischer Gegenentwurf zu Thilo Sarrazins Thesen zu Muslimen in Deutschland, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2010, https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/5745/ christensen.pdf?sequence=1 (23.10.2021), 9.

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resemblance in the “alternative facts” that Donald Trump liked to argue with. And where the Washington Post had found 30,573 lies to counter, Naika Foroutan and her team have written a 70-page report to correct Sarrazin’s figures of his first book. Foroutan, Professor for “Integration Research and Social Policy” at Humboldt University Berlin, was one of those migration scholars who objected most forcefully to Sarrazin. She and others have shown that what seemed to be a discussion of economics and city branding in essence was a racist sorting between those who deserved their spot in society and those who did not; between those that yielded profit and those that costed money. Foroutan therefore highlighted in a later publication what could have been concluded from the Sarrazin debate already: that what we had to deal with was the “racism of the establishment”. Stereotyping, xenophobia, racism, attempts to safeguard resources cannot be attributed to the so-called “losers of modernization or globalization”, the poor and lowincome classes. Foroutan points out that 55% of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)-voters had achieved their A-Levels, 44% earned more than 3,000 EUR per months.8 Similar conclusions were drawn by the Sociologist Gurminder Bhambra when analysing how Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. She too did not find proper evidence in claims that it was the losers of globalization making themselves heard, but concluded instead that the privileged white middle class struggled to safeguard their relative privileges.9 Class then was “not the operation of a race-neutral economic system, but part of an economic system which is deeply racialized”.10 Such an approach also links to the research on populism by Norris and Inglehart. They have found that economic explanations do not suffice to explain the success of populist parties, and complemented it with their model of a “cultural backlash”.11 This was the atmosphere in the early 2010er years in Germany: Populism was established in the political and public debate, conservatives struggled to position themselves towards immigration and integration, and in parts of the society we have a largely undifferentiated discussion of migration from the Middle East. The right-wing populist demonstrations “Pegida” started in 2014. Since the very name of “Pegida” suggest that “Patriotic Europeans” see their “Abendland” threatened, suggests that turmoil can spread from the Middle East to Europe, just as migrants are perceived as threat and largely overrated in number. We can thus also expect this to feature in the reporting. Whether a support in society for stereotypes and racism against “Arabs and Turks” meant to problematize migration from Arab countries and whether religion mattered here, will be analysed in the next step.

8 Naika Foroutan, Die postmigrantische Perspektive. Aushandlungsprozesse in pluralen Gesellschaften, in: Marc Hill/Erol Yıldız, Postmigrantische Visionen. Erfahrungen – Ideen – Reflexionen, Bielefeld 2018, 15–27, 17. 9 Gurminder K. Bhambra, Brexit, Trump, and ‘methodological whiteness’: on the misrecognition of race and class, in: The British Journal of Sociology 68 Suppl. 1 (2017), 214–231, 221. 10 Ibid., 227. 11 Pippa Norris/Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge 2019.

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3. Reporting the War on Syria in Germany: Not following the populist debate, but problematizing immigration If we turn from the Sarrazin-debate to migration from Syria, we can formulate as hypothesis that the populist debate has had an influence on how the war and those fleeing the war have been reported. What could further be expected was a link between Muslim refugees and problems with integration. In order to test that, data will be used that have originally been gathered for the opening conference of the Powers-Network in Jordan in 2019. That was done with the help of the Nexis database as available at the University of Göttingen. For the German media, it includes a number of newspapers, TV stations and magazines. It does not include the most important quality newspapers, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”. So the three papers were chosen to represent the spectrum of reporting, the conservative “Die Welt”, the liberal “Der Tagesspiegel “and the left “taz, die tageszeitung”. All of these are available all over Germany and read all over Germany, while the “Tagesspiegel” was at the same time clearly rooted in Berlin. Given the high number of reporting on the war in Syria, the keywords “Syria” and “War” were supplemented in three separate searches by “religion”, “Islam” and “Christianity”. The time frame was not chosen so to cover certain events, but to get an idea of current reporting in early 2019. Reporting was surveyed back to June 2016, with an in-depths analysis of the year prior to the conference the material was collected for, that is Mid-January 2018 to Mid-January 2019. 3.1 First take: General findings So how was, based on our limited sample, the conflict in Syria framed? It is one first finding based on the numbers of reports alone that the conflict in Syria did not seem to be framed as religious conflict. Only a smaller part of articles in all three papers addressed “Religion”, “Islam” and/or “Christendom”. 1000 841

Die Welt

823

800 600

523

515

400

25

88

130 24

71

109 17

46

71

81 16

200 46 0

2015

2016

Syria and War

… and Christianity

2017 … and Islam

2018 … and Religion

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900

Der Tagesspiegel

748 682

800 700 600 500

399

376

400 300

156

112 43

23

200

108

76

12

54

43

89

59

20

100 0

2015

2016

Syria and War

2017

… and Christianity

2018

… and Islam

… and Religion

die tageszeitung

846 778

1000 800 600

477

434 400

82

129 22

15

64

106 10

33

56

18

79

200 35 0

2015

2016

Syria and War

… and Christianity

2017 … and Islam

2018 … and Religion

What we can also tell, if we look at the figures alone, is that the number of total reports dropped over time and that the mentions of religion decreased largely in correlation to that drop. It “largely” correlated, because there are exceptions, which will be addressed further down. What did readers of the papers with different political profiles learn about the role of religion in the war in Syria? It could be found that the more conservative a newspaper, the more often religion was made an issue, 78 “Welt”, 65 “Tagesspiegel”, 55 “taz”. In the search that asked for “Islam” more concretely, there were 79 articles in “Die Welt”, 70 in “Der Tagesspiegel” and 67 in “taz” from January 1, 2018 to January 17, 2019. It was the “tageszeitung” that saw the sharpest increase in mentions of “religion” in 2018.

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It is this increase that did not seem obvious, so this time span was further looked into. The articles were clustered according to the frame chosen. Every article was mentioned once only, according to the dominant frame. Again, no frame stood out, but the following ones could be defined:

- Religion as relevant for the war in Syria (5 “Welt”, 9 “Tagesspiegel”, 9 “taz”); - “Persons posing a threat to public safety” (“Gefährder”) in Germany: They are addressed in all papers, interestingly enough more so in the “taz” (11) than in “Die Welt” (9) or “Der Tagesspiegel” (7). The articles here dealt with court rulings on how to deal with “Gefährder”, rather than “Gefährder” themselves, which explains the interest of the “taz”. We also find articles on the attack on the Christmas Market in Berlin. - Terrorist attacks: 4 in “taz”, 3 in “Die Welt”, 2 in “Der Tagesspiegel”, while 3 out of 4 articles on attacks outside Germany could be found in the “taz”. - ISIS: An issue for “Der Tagesspiegel” (10) much more than for “Die Welt” (3) or “die tageszeitung” (2). The other contexts in which religion was mentioned concerned the Middle East as a region (5-4-5), politics towards the Middle East (2-2-5). Articles on Turkey (8-7-4) include articles on elections in the country, in which Syria was an issue. The situation in Afrin (4-6-2) and the role of Turkey as well as protests by Kurds abroad. Other actors and countries discussed were Israel (8-7-4). Articles on Israel also mention Syria in relation to Gaza, for example. Most of these articles on Israel could be found in “Die Welt”, which might be ex-

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plained by the editorial policy of its owner Springer, which traditionally pays special attention to Israel. The role of Russia in Syria, also during the Olympic Games was also addressed (3-1-5). Especially given the decision on a withdrawal, it is surprising that only a few articles dealt with the United States (4-4-2). A dominant issue for all three newspapers was the situation of refugees. How were refugees received, how was their integration going? While that was an issue, interestingly enough there were altogether more articles on the situation of refugees in Europe and the world than there were on their situation in Germany. Those articles often concerned the situation of migrants from the region from their own perspectives and could be found more often in the “taz” than in the to others. 3.2 Second take: Mentions of “Christ*” In a second take, it was now looked into those articles in particular that included the word “Christ*”, since the situation of Christian migrants from the Middle East was the topic of the conference for which this paper was prepared. In the first part of the article at hand it was established that there was a populist debate on migration to Germany, which was facilitated also by the publications of Thilo Sarrazin and the subsequent debate, as well as, for example, the demonstrations of “Pegida”. Finally, given the fact that the conservative profile of the Christian Democratic Party was disputed, we could also expect politicians to pay special attention to the fate of Christians in the conflict. All newspapers also often address the cultural sector. “Die Welt”, for example, features a conversation with two Jewish Rappers about the role of religion in their work and the music of other Hip-Hop artists in Germany12. In terms of general reflection, the “Der Tagesspiegel” uses its op-eds on Christian holidays to reflect upon religion and conflicts13 or even to examine the usefulness of religion, given the conflicts in Berlin that can be ascribed to religion – and concludes that it is generally good and healthy to believe in something.14 When delimiting the search and looking for the word “Christ*”, it can be found that in most cases in all three newspapers, Christendom is mentioned next to other religions. We can see that in 2016 there has been a lot of attention for the city of Aleppo and its Christian population and heritage. “Pegida” did not feature relevantly in the reporting on “Syria”, “War” and “Religion”, which is surprising.15 That can in turn mean that whatever the protestors of “Pegida” were 12 Thore Barfuss, „Ich als Jude hätte diese Zeile niemals gerappt“. Rapper Sun Diego und sein Kumpel Salah Saado über Antisemitismus-Vorwürfe gegen Kollegah und jüdisch-muslimische Freundschaften, Die Welt vom 10. April 2018. 13 Caroline Fetscher, Aufbruch zum säkularen Tempel. Ein großer, politischer Traum: Frieden und Versöhnung, auch zwischen den Religionen. Was wäre dafür notwendig?, in: Der Tagesspiegel vom 24. Dezember 2017. 14 Claudia Becker, Die Angst vor dem Glauben. Nicht nur wegen des islamistischen Terrors ist die Skepsis gegenüber dem Islam groß. In diesen Sog geraten sowohl das Christen als auch das Judentum. Religion gilt vielen als rückwärtsgewandt. Ein fataler Fehler, in: Der Tagesspiegel vom 10. April 2017. 15 “Pegida” is mentioned in three articles, but in passing and one of them being the satirical column “Die Wahrheit” in the taz.

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concerned with, was not the war in Syria and its consequences, not even with regard to migration from the country. The same is true for attempts to use the prosecution of Christians in Syria for domestic reasons. Right-wing populists in fact did appeal to an end of the persecution of Christians, but their attempt to coin the label “Christenverfolgung”, allegedly used in order to link it to other forms of persecution, only featured once in the 198 articles of the sample.16 Concern about the further escalation and destruction of the country stand in contrast to what was reported on twice at least, namely the visit of a group of AfD politicians to Syria and Russia in 2018, which left them to state that everything was quite alright in Syria and people could now return.17 The said discussion among Christian Democrats (CDU) to support immigration from “Christian Western cultural circles” was indeed subject of three articles. It was addressed in a debate between the then Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance and later Federal Minister of Health, Jens Spahn and Cardinal Woelki, Arch-Bishop of Cologne. While Spahn considered the approach “perfectly alright”18, while Woelki criticized it sharply. He said that this preferential treatment would mean to contribute to the work of right-wing populists and to a further polarization of the society.19

4. “Postmigrant Society”: Attempting to overcome a “Migrantization” of public discourse Although the analyses cannot be compared as such, these results fit to what the “Medienanalyse Flucht + Migration” has found. It has analysed media reporting on flight and migration for the years 2016–2020 and found what the sample at hand does support, namely that the reporting was “largely accurate”. But it also held that there was a tension between reporting on immigrants as having suffered from war and flight and immigrants framed as security threat for Germany.20 It is here that a link can be found of Muslim refugees who take their religion with them, which is not necessarily compatible with German or European values, and that they take their conflicts with them, so import lots of problems. 16 Ricarda Breyton, "Missionieren muss erlaubt sein". Markus Grübel ist Regierungsbeauftragter für Religionsfreiheit. Wie er Glaubensfeindlichkeit in Deutschland erlebt - und warum er nichts dage-gen hat, wenn Muslime den Koran verteilen, in: Die Welt vom 19. Dezember 2018. 17 Heiko Werning, Rechte Zirkustruppe erlebt ihr Damaskus, in: die tageszeitung vom 9. März 2018; Matthias Kamann/Pavel Lokshin, AfD-Tours im Dienste der Innenpolitik. In den vergangenen Wochen sind rechtsnationale Politiker nach Syrien und Russland gereist. Dass sie von dort nur wenig Kritisches berichten, hat einen Grund, in: Die Welt vom 20. März 2018; Matthias Kamann/Pavel Lokshin, Mit "Blex-Tours" zu Assad und Hasspredigern. AfDler bereisen Syrien und ernten parteiintern Kritik, in: Die Welt vom 7. März 2018. 18 Robin Alexander/Ulf Poschardt, "Diesmal geht es um Existenzielles". Jens Spahn (CDU) und Manfred Weber (CSU) raufen sich zusammen und formulieren Ziele für die Union: ein klares Profil in der Flüchtlingspolitik – und eine schärfere Wahlkampfstrategie, in: Die Welt vom 28. September 2016. 19 N.N., Politik Kompakt, in: Die Welt vom 28. September 2016. 20 Marcus Maurer u.a., Fünf Jahre Medienberichterstattung über Flucht und Migration 2021, www.stiftungmercator.de/content/uploads/2021/07/Medienanalyse_Flucht_Migration.pdf.

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The reporting on the war in Syria largely indeed addressed the conflict in Syria itself and less so the way this conflict was seen from Germany – be it by politicians, artists and/or migrants from the region living in Germany. This means in turn that we can assume, on the basis of the smaller sample here, that not too many articles discussed Christian migration to Germany in the specific context of the war in Syria. We can also see that religion is not problematized too much in the reporting on the war in Syria. We can see attempts by both Christian Democrats and AfD to make religion an issue, but we can also see that these attempts did not resonate much, since only one of the newspapers picked the respective attempt up and in a neutral, if not negative way. The next question was then whether reporting on migration from Syria picked up negative attitudes towards Muslims. We can see here that in terms of the topics of the reporting at least (terrorism, “Gefährder”, societal conflicts), migration is problematized. The research for the article at hand shows that there is a big concern about societal conflicts after migration, and that is, deepened by migration. Most of these articles concern antisemitism. The sample, however, was not meant to show which other frames could have been used, since it has a particular focus on religion, not immigration. An article published by “Der Tagesspiegel” describes how “right-wing circles” foster the idea that antisemitism is a matter of migrants.21 This position was refuted in a personal account of a Jewish person. The author recalled that it was often said migrants brought anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli positions with them to Germany, but maintains herself that this would hardly be an issue would it not be met by a larger part of German society that subscribes to and supports these attitudes.22 This supports criticism voiced by scholars of “postmigration”, who claim that migration is over-emphasized, as Foroutan writes. She adds that migration is understood to be the explaining a whole range of problems in society23, it surely works, but not understood to help overcoming this situation. The reporting in the quality newspapers analysed for the article at hand overall tried to explain the conflict in Syria with its background, tries to give people from Syria a voice. It does not pick up on a polarization of positions on the conflict itself and migration from the conflict zones. It does, however, show an overall concern with the problems for cohabitation with migrants from the region. “Postmigration”, in turn, has to be considered, as Hill and Yildiz state, an epistemological turn, a break with a division between migrant and non-migrant,24 a “discursive approach 21 Raed Saleh, Schluss mit der Selbsttäuschung. Rechte politische Kreise wollen die Debatte um Antisemitismus auf Flüchtlinge beschränken. Wie wir Judenhass wirklich bekämpfen können. Es gibt drei Möglichkeiten, etwas zu tun: Verbote, Appelle und Aufklärung Am Anfang des Tolerierens steht oft das Verstehen, das Kennenlernen Unter dem Deckmäntelchen des vermeintlichen Anti-Antisemitismus stecken Reaktionäre und Neonazis, in: Der Tagesspiegel vom 29. April 2018. 22 Susanne Krause-Hinrichs, Und plötzlich ist mein Jüdischsein Thema. Antisemitismus ist mir, Jahrgang 1964, vor allem als Geschichtsthema begegnet: in der Schule oder in der Biografie meiner Familie. Das ändert sich gerade. Was heißt das eigentlich für mich?, in: Der Tagesspiegel vom 16. September 2018. 23 Naika Foroutan/Coşkun Canan/Benjamin Schwarze, Deutschland postmigrantisch II. Einstellungen von Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen zu Gesellschaft, Religion und Identität, Berlin 22015, 10–23, 14. 24 Marc Hill/Erol Yıldız, Einleitung, in: id., Postmigrantische Visionen, Erfahrungen – Ideen – Reflexionen, Bielefeld 2018, 7–10, 7.

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against the ‘migrantization’ and marginalization of people who see themselves as an integral part of society”25 and have to be considered exactly that.

25 Anna Meera Gaonkar et al., Introduction, in: id., Postmigration. Art, culture, and politics in contemporary Europe, Bielefeld 2021, 11–42, 19.

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Migration and Radical Right Movements in Europe Liubov Fadeeva, Ekaterina Burmistrova 1. Introduction The problems of right-wing movements cause a contradictory reaction in the intellectual environment. Many intellectuals treat this problem with a fair amount of disgust. They evaluate the study of the rights-wings as an unworthy occupation. Another position is represented by those scientists who offer the concept of illiberalism as a research tool. They consider it as an important trend of our age characterizing “by rejecting multiculturalism and minority rights in favour of a majoritarianism that either advances an essentialist definition of the nation, or accepts multiethnicity but is prone to assimilation policies”.1 Marlene Laruelle explains that illiberalism is not synonym of far right because “illiberal movements do not want to remain a marginal countercultural position; on the contrary, they hope to become the new mainstream”.2 The purpose of the paper is to analyse the position of far right to migration in order to verify them as illiberal movement.

2. The ideological background of the far-rights migration agenda Usually the right-wings parties used to characterize mass migration as a threat to socioeconomic stability and cultural unity in Europe. As noted by Mudde, migration, crime and corruption are the key problems for the radical right.3 The growing popularity of radical right ideas in post-war Europe is traditionally associated with mass migration and the development of multiculturalism. In post-war Europe radical right ideas became popular at the beginning of the 1970s, when it became clear that those migrants who arrived to Europe in the 1950-60 are not going to leave. Rita Chin in “The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History”4 suggests that the emergence of multicultural Europe took place in the 1950s when European countries were in need of labour forces. However, despite the huge influx of immigrants, politicians did not care about their problems, and their employers had all the responsibility for the existence of migrants in European society. This continued until the 1980s, when Islam became incompatible with European identity, since it was during this period that gender equality 1

Marlene Laruelle, Illiberalism. A Conceptual Introduction, in: Illiberalism Studies Program Papers. April 5, 2021, 5. 2 Ibid., 6. 3 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, Manchester 2000. 4 Rita Chin, The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History, Princeton 2017.

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became an integral part of the European value picture. However, even then, only a small number of politicians were ready to discuss the long-term residence of immigrants in European countries, not to mention their impact on society. The European radical right emphasized that the failed policy of multiculturalism is the source of many of the problems in modern society. The lack of integration of immigrants into the new society, the growth of social stratification, as well as the growth of crime are recognized among the negative results of multiculturalism. The main attention of the radical right was not focused on the general migrant, but on migrants arriving precisely from Muslim countries. Of particular importance for the antimigrant rhetoric of radical right was the idea of “Eurabia”. The implications of this concept, popularized in the book by Bat Yeor “Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis”5, was that after the 1973 oil crisis, Europe entered into close cooperation with the Arab world, which resulted in the penetration and increased importance of Islam in the economic, political and cultural space of Europe. At the same time, the initial premise of the concept was that the initiators of this dialogue were European, in particular French, political elites who decided to sell Europe to the Arabs in exchange for oil. The end result of this collaboration for Europeans is the «dhimmitude» in which non-Muslims are placed in a subordinate position to Islam, becoming second-class citizens. The idea of “Eurabia” fits perfectly into the mainstream of the radical right discourse, emphasizing the threats of migration and pointing out the corruption of governments that are ready to give Europe to Muslims for personal gain. The term “Eurabia” has taken root in the discourse of the right-wing radical parties in Great Britain, Netherlands and Belgium, which declared that the issue of preserving Europe and European values is becoming a matter of the physical survival of Europe. The idea of “Eurabia” was logically continued in another popular radical right concept the theory of Great Replacement. This theory was developed by R. Camus. He notes the tendency for non-white Europeans to have more children than white Europeans, resulting in demographic changes that threaten all European culture.6 The only way for him to save France and Europe is to end immigration and send immigrants and their children back to their countries of origin. This term has also become a part of radical right discourse and began to be used by politicians. For example, in Austria Heinz-Christian Strache, ViceChancellor of Austria in 2017–2019 and former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, actively opposed “replacement migration” (“Bevölkerungsaustausch”)7. Replacement migration, according to the radical right opinion, is part of a plan to destroy Europe: from political feminism, which influenced fertility in Europe, to replacing the European population with refugees from the Middle East.8 It should also be noted that radical rights operate not only within individual European countries, but also try to work together. An example of this interaction was the coordinated struggle of the radical right with the Global Compact on Migration, evidenced in activity on social networks, YouTube and online petitioning. 5 6 7 8

Bat Yeor, Eurabia. The Euro-Arab Axis, London 2005. Renaud Camus, You will not replace us!, Plieux 2018. Strache spricht von „Bevölkerungsaustausch“: www.heute.at/s/heinz-christian-strache-fpoe-spricht-vonbevolkerungsaustausch-52112882. Eva Herman zur UN-Studie: Bevölkerungsaustausch durch Flüchtlinge? www.youtube.com/watch? v=3b2rh0oZF4s.

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3. What is changing? For a long time, far-rights were considered to be outsiders of political life. However, if we take into account the results of the latest European sociological surveys, it can be noted that the rhetoric of protecting Europeans from external encroachments of migrants enjoys relative support in society. Based on European Social Survey data we can see that migrants are primarily perceived by Europeans as competitors in the labour market, as an unnecessary burden on social security systems and public resources (for example, on the education and health care systems). Research data shows that Europeans are much more loyal to migrants with a high level of education and qualifications.9 Moreover, the regions in which the largest number of uneducated migrants live is characterized by an increase in xenophobic sentiments: for example, in French 2016 elections, the right-wing National Front received the greatest support in those regions where immigrants of non-European origin with a lower level of education lived. 10 In general, sociological investigations fix that Europeans are more inclined to have a negative attitude towards migrants. The 2015 International Organization for Migration survey data show that 52% of Europeans consider it necessary to limit the number of immigrants to European countries.11 This trend continues, e.g. a study conducted by the Eurobarometer in 2018 showed that 40% of Europeans see immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity and a report by the International Organization for Migration, released in 2020, draws attention to the persistence of anti-immigrant sentiments in European society.12 It should also be noted that there is a tendency that radical right trying to create a new image. Conventional wisdom suggests that once a far-right party enters the political mainstream, it begins to self-moderate in an effort to broaden its appeal. Such has been the case in France, where Marine Le Pen has tried to rebrand her far-right National Rally (formerly the National Front) into a more palatable choice – a process that has involved expelling the party’s founder and her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, as well as turning away from much of his xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric. (The party’s other policies, including its nativism and Islamophobia, remain intact.) The 144 Presidential Pledges, the official party program of the French National Rally, states that in order to defeat the threat of terrorism and disrupt the networks of Islamist fundamentalists, it is necessary to “ban and dissolve organizations of all kinds associated with Islamist fundamentalists … To expel from the country all foreigners associated with Islamist fundamentalism” [Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 6]. The program also reflects the fact that the main content of the restoration of French freedoms and the protection of women’s rights is «the fight against Islamism, which takes away the fundamental women’s freedoms» [Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 4].

9 Findings from the ESS Immigration: www.europeansocialsurvey.org/findings/blog/essblog 0007.html. 10 Anthony Edo/Yvonne Giesing/Jonathan Öztunc/Panu Poutvaara, Immigration and electoral support for the far-left and the far-right, in: European Economic Review 115, June 2019, 99–143. 11 How the world views migration, IOM 2015, 8. 12 Results of special Eurobarometer on integration of immigrants in the European Union https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-europeanunion_en.

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One can trace the tendency according to which the radical right associates the problems of the migration crisis and the spreading Islamism with the threat to the well-being of European women and their rights. In the party program of “Alternative for Germany” for 2017 election campaign it was explicitly stated that the party “strongly opposes the practice of the Islamic faith, which is directed against a free democratic rule of law, against our laws and against the Christian humanistic basis of our culture”.13 Pointing out that Islam is not typical of Germany, German radical right point out that the values of Islam are incompatible with the European system of values. During 2017 election campaign the struggle of radical right with one of the symbols of Islam, the burqa, was becoming a symbol of opposition to Islam in relation to its attack on women's rights. The German radical right were calling for a ban on the wearing of the burqa in public places, as it not only hinders the coexistence of Muslim women in German society, but “as a religious and political symbol of the subordination of Muslim women to men, it is incompatible with the integration and equality of women and girls, as well as with the free development of the personality”.14 In 2021 party program the whole section of the program is devoted to Islam. The focus of the new program is shifting and it is now noted that migrants who have integrated into German society and recognize fundamental rights become “valued members of our society”15.

4. The re-branding of migration agenda In addition to creating a new image, modern European radicals are also trying to refine their movement by inventing new progressive-sounding terms that hide traditional right-wing concepts associated with nationalism and rejection of immigrants. Joe Mulhall from organization “HOPE not Hate” notes: “They have created a new language and lexicon for the European far right.”16 Members of the movement try to use “soft”, camouflaged versions of terms in their speech, which could save rhetoric from direct comparisons with the negative connotations of radical formulations. For example, the British radical right do not talk about mass deportations – they talk about “reimmigration”; they say “we are not racists, we are ethnopluralists”17, which makes it possible to be more attractive to a wide audience, supporting the idea of the uniqueness of each culture and its right to defend its own identity.

5. AfD’s representing of Muslims The image of the migrant as an enemy of the nation has remained key for right-wing radicals during their election campaigns for several years now. 13 14 15 16

Alternative for Germany Party program 2017, 53. Ibid., 55. Alternative for Germany Party program 2021, 84. As quoted in: G. Corera, Is there a growing far-right threat online?, The BBC, 2019, July 8th. URL: www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48830980. 17 The Official Account of the Identitarian Movement in England, 2019, July 8th. URL: https://twitter.com/GID_England/status/1148260093869400064.

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The posters used by them during election campaigns of various levels, both national and European, are a vivid illustration of the positions of the German right. For example, during the 2017 campaign special attention was drawn to posters that captured the rounded belly of a pregnant woman with the words “New Germans? We’ll make them ourselves” (“Neue Deutsche? Machen wir selber”) and a poster depicting two girls in bathing suits with the words “Burka? We prefer bikinis” (“Burkas? Wir steh’n auf Bikinis!”). This approach to campaigning drew some criticism, but the recognition of the posters and the breadth of publicity were worth the backlash. The AfD campaign for the 2019 European Parliament featured posters depicting Jean-Léon Gérôme’s “Arabian Concubine Market”, in which darkskinned men view a fair-skinned slave woman for sale. On top of the painting was the call “To prevent Europe from becoming Eurabia” (“Damit aus Europa kein Eurabien wird!”), which emphasized the contradictions between European values of respect for women and the Islamist patriarchy. In electoral campaign 2021 “professional designers have helped the party to construct sophisticated anti-Islam images by divorcing progressive gender ideas from their liberal core”: commercial designers and far-right party activists together construct a shared visual repertoire for political mobilization, drawing on cultural images, mainstream references, and efficient propaganda materials that hold a strong resonance with popular audience.”18

6. The German part of Identitarian movement in the European Union The European values are associated with certain values, such as social equality of all society, an orientation towards peaceful development, and respect for democratic institutions. However, with the help of radical right, European identity turned out to be not connected with the processes of European integration. Denying the role and importance of the European Union for European countries, right-wing radicals speak of the need to protect European values, truly civilized values, opposing them to the “barbaric” values of Islam. An important direction in this vein was the movement of Identitarians, who clothe ideas that, in fact, border on Nazism, in an intellectual and attractive shell for Europeans (especially young males). Identitarian movement is a movement uniting conservative-minded youth. The heart of their movement, the Blue Narcissus magazine became the mouthpiece of German Identitarians, the editor-in-chief of which is the activist and former karate fighter Felix Menzel. This youth magazine, the main purpose of which is “to cover controversial issues of politics, culture, historiography and youth”19. The editorial board of the magazine is characterized by conservative positions, in the centre of their rhetoric are reflections on “the alternatives to Islamization and alienation of Europe, the decline of the state system and political parties in Germany.”20 The main platform around which German Identitarians are united is the 18 Nicole Doerr, The Visual Politics of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Anti-Islam, Ethno-Nationalism, and Gendered Images, in: Social Sciences 10 (2021), 1–15, 13. 19 Impressum/Datenschutz: www.blauenarzisse.de/impressum/. 20 Interview mit Felix Menzel: https://sezession.de/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/interview-mit-felixmenzel_ weinen-oder-kampfen.pdf.

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Identitäre Bewegung Deutschlands (Identitarian Movement in Germany) website. It is noteworthy that this association goes beyond online activism and organizes street actions. One of their most notable actions was related to the way representatives of the movement climbed the Brandenburg Gate in 2015 and hung a poster “Safe borders – safe future” on it.21 This behaviour drew attention to the group in the media, and almost everyone in Germany started talking about the Berlin Identity Unit. They call their main goal “learning lessons from the past and not spiralling into exaggerated nationalism, but it also means not falling victim to this masochistic self-hatred, either.”22 Despite the active activity both on and off the network, German Identitarians do not claim a place in the political life of the country, but they actively support the “Alternative for Germany”. Such a link between young Identitarians and the titular radical right parties of the country is also characteristic of France, where more and more interconnections between Identitarians and the National Front have been observed lately. In general, the Identitarian movement contributes to the popularization of right-wing radical ideas and the maintenance of discussions about European identity in the youth space.

7. The Identity and Democracy as illiberal movement The Identity and Democracy party and then parliamentary faction in European Parliament was created in 2019. Its predecessor was the European party the “Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedoms”, MENF was formed in 2015 by a number of nationalist and farright parties from EU member states, and the group “Europe of Nations and Freedoms” in the European Parliament, which emerged in 2015, as a result of the merger of MEPs from the “Freedom” parties from Austria and the Netherlands: “Vlaams Belang” (Flemish Interest, Belgium), “Lega Nord” (Northern League, Italy), “Kongres Nowej Prawicy” (Congress of the New Right, Poland) and “Front National” (National Front”, France). In 2019, the Pan-European party “Identity and Democracy” was created, which is characterized by a commitment to national values and interests. The priority of the group is defined on its web-site: “For the ID Group, national identities should be embraced, respected and preserved. That’s why it opposes uncontrolled mass immigration and the possible EU accession of a non-European country like Turkey.”23 “We don’t want Mehmed and Mustapha to become Europeans”, summarized by Marcus Willinger. The Identity and Democracy party met on May 29 and 30 in Lisbon to define the contours of another Europe. Party leaders discussed during round tables on “A new model of European cooperation” and “How nations can stop massive and illegal immigration”.

21 German rightists scale Brandenburg Gate to protest immigration: www.reuters.com/article/us-europemigrants-germany-farright/german-rightists-scale-brandenburg-gate-to-protest-immigrationidUSKCN1120H1. 22 Identitarian movement – Germany’s ‘new right’ hipsters: www.dw.com/en/identitarian-movementgermanys-new-right-hipsters/a-39383124. 23 www.idgroup.eu/identity.

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In plenary session at the 24th of September 2021 Harald Wilimsky criticized the “State of the Union, bankruptcies, bad luck and mishaps, a certain amount of climate hysteria and a migration policy : that increasingly deprives Europe of its identity!”24 At the beginning of December the right-wing populist leaders meet in Poland on the invitation of Jarosław Kaczyński who proposed joint meetings to discuss the common issues, “such as protecting the sovereignty of member states and the stance on illegal immigration”.25 Poland’s ruling party Law and Justice (PiS) is a member of another European parliament faction but its leader concerns the cooperation of conservative forces who “support Europe, but another”. Le Pen tweeted that the leaders are united by their desire for “a Europe of nations to give back to the peoples of Europe their freedom and their sovereignty.”26 The declaration is corresponding with the main trend of far right to demonstrate some liberal values keeping the anti-migrant motto of their programmes.

8. Conclusions Migrants have traditionally been at the centre of attention of far-right movements. The image of the migrant as an enemy of the nation has long been a constant one for the radical right and serves as a pillar of their identity formation through the dichotomy of “us” and “them”. The migration crisis, which led to a clash between European and “non-European” values, was a catalyst for the formation and awareness of a European identity in modern times and consequently led to an increase in the popularity of the radical right idea, which relies on the protection of European values in its rhetoric. Denying the role and importance of the European Union for European countries, radical right advocate the protection of European values, truly civilizational values in their opinion, in opposition to the “barbaric” values of Islam. An important trend in this vein has been the Identitarian movement, which puts ideas that in essence border on Nazism into an intellectual shell that appeals to Europeans. Linked to this trend is the right's desire to update its agenda by introducing elements of liberalism and inclusiveness, as can be seen in the “de-democratisation” of the French right and the German right's presentation of itself as a relevant alternative to the existing regime. If we compare the positions of the right and the principles of illiberalism, it turns out that there are many similarities: the rejection of multiculturalism, the essentialist approach to the nation. The main trend is that they hope to become the new mainstream. They use for that purpose set of methods and technologies. History shows that the success of radicals is often associated with their underestimation. The loss of AfD votes in the last elections 24 https://twitter.com/IDParty_/status/1441345503808004097. 25 www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/warsaw-summit-european-populist-far-right-partiesoppose-eu-federalisation/. 26 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/le-pen-orban-other-european-174103788.html?guccounter=1&gu ce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly95YW5kZXgucnUv&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAF69VDmf7Nvd7Qqyi4 M15X-hTQyNdmN5AeaFwUPsUBGyRF0HR9aFYmXcfTWxkVQWdniE2IBYOOhndk3F7I9i_ HAfwXKvRYi3d-Rvz9ympDKB0cekNuXOZwovM_ZVcvm892h3N9Zp14klxXLA7DD_8ghJ6XV e2dh28G-IAC-phRp.

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should not lead to euphoria that the danger has passed. Right-wing radicals know how to change and unite. There remains a need for careful analysis of their programs and activities as part of the illiberal movement.

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Minoritäten im Islam Ertuğrul Şahin 1. Allgemeine Anmerkungen Wenn in Medien, Politik oder in der Öffentlichkeit im Westen von Minoritäten im Islam gesprochen wird, sind hauptsächlich die Probleme der nichtmuslimischen Minderheiten gemeint. Die Rede ist von der Verletzung ihrer Menschenrechte, Unterdrückung, Verfolgung, Ermordung u.v.m. und weitestgehend der Überpolitisierung der Islamdiskurse seit gut zwei Jahrzehnten geschuldet. Der inhaltlich-diskursive Fokus intensiviert die Wahrnehmung, dass es die Verletzung der Minderheitenrechte in außermuslimischen Teilen der Welt kaum gäbe. Der Eindruck ist kaum zu bändigen, dass die Minderheitenproblematik das Alleinstellungsmerkmal der muslimischen Länder und des Islams wäre. Diese verbreitete, öffentlich-mediale Wahrnehmung hat drei grundsätzliche Defizite in der Problemdiagnose, die dem Minderheitenthema nicht angemessen sind und somit zur Lösung bestehender und in Teilen gravierender Problemlage nicht beitragen können. 1. Die Minderheitenproblematik ist kein Alleinstellungsmerkmal der muslimischen Länder. Überall auf der Welt, von den USA bis China, von Russland bis Südafrika gibt es Verletzung der Menschen- und Minderheitenrechte, die insgesamt in die Reflektion und Analyse aufgenommen werden müssen. Hier sei an die aktuelle Unterdrückung und Vertreibung der Muslime in Myanmar oder in China erinnert. Die einseitige Betrachtung führt unvermeidlich zur überhöhten, apologetischen Abwehrhaltung. 2. Sie ist auch nicht einzig und allein eine Problematik religiöser Gruppen. Die Auffassung von Minderheiten muss auch in theologisch geführten Diskursen auf die ethnischen, kulturellen und unterschiedlichen sozialen Gruppen und Milieus wie Gender und Geschlecht mit gleicher Intensität ausgedehnt werden. In der Gesamtdiagnose darf die Einbeziehung der Notlage der Minderheiten innerhalb derselben Religion (innerislamisch, innerchristlich etc.) auch nicht fehlen. 3. Die Minoritätenproblematik ist nicht nur ein religiöses, politisches oder juristisches Phänomen. Sie hat eine soziopsychologische Dimension, die durch ein multikausales Faktorenbündel (destruktive Geschichtsschreibung, Nationalismen, Fremdenhass, Existenzängste etc.) strukturell verursacht sein kann und in formal-institutionellen Analysen oft übersehen wird. Sie ist nicht minder relevant und drückt sich im umfassenderen gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Minderheiten aus. Hierzu gehören soziale Diffamierungen und Ausgrenzungen, die die lebensweltliche Chancengleichheit und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe verhindern. An der Bezeichnung „Ausländer“ lässt sich dieser Aspekt exemplifizieren und in den Benachteiligungen bei der Arbeits- oder Wohnungssuche beispielhaft aufzeigen.

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Um einer unzulässigen politischen Überladung und dem Missbrauch des Religiösen – schließlich der Offenbarung und der heiligen Schriften – vorbeugen zu können, dürfen diese Dimensionen nicht vernachlässigt werden. Im Hintergrund folgender Überlegungen und Ausführungen liegt der Gedanke, dass das Verständnis der religiösen Quellen und insgesamt die Religionsauffassung sowie die religiöse Praxis der ständigen Wandlung unterworfen sind. Infolge dessen können sie ohne die Erkundung der Historizität und Kontextualität nicht nur der Offenbarung, sondern auch ihrer Auslegungen nicht erfasst werden. Nach diesen allgemeinen Anmerkungen bietet sich an, drei Analyseraster zum Status der Minderheiten im islamischen Kontext und dem aktuellen Umgang in islamischen Ländern zu berücksichtigen: 1. Die philosophisch-ethischen Grundsätze, 2. das Regelwerk der Scharia bzw. das kanonisierte Recht der Jurisprudenz (fiqh) und 3. das historische Erbe bzw. die geschichtliche Entwicklung.

2. Philosophisch-ethische Grundsätze Die Kernbotschaft der Offenbarung, die man als den „Kategorischen Imperativ des Islams“ bezeichnen kann, lässt sich in philosophisch-ethischen Grundsätzen mit einem universalistischen Charakter subsumieren. In aller Kürze sollen drei Prinzipien angesprochen werden, die die Grundlagen für Menschen- und Minderheitenrechte bilden. Die Gleichheit der Menschen geht sowohl aus dem Koran hervor als auch aus der späteren Lehre und Praxis. Wenn ich es behaupte, meine ich, dass andere Deutungen und Verlautbarungen und die negativen Anteile des historischen Erbes, die es ohne Zweifel auch gibt, nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen sollten. Diese koranische Position, wie ich sie verstehen möchte, wurde von vielen Gelehrten der philosophischen und mystischen Denkrichtungen vertreten. Die Menschheit wird durch die koranische Kernbotschaft angesprochen, auch wenn viele andere Stellen die entstehende kleine Gemeinde der muslimischen Gläubigen ansprechen. Diese inklusivistisch anmutende Sicht, in der sicherlich der Aufruf zum monotheistischen Glauben (tauḥīd: Einheit und Einzigartigkeit Gottes) zentral ist, betrachtet die Menschen ohne Ausnahme vor Gott gleich. Dass die Ungläubigen oder Andersgläubigen später anders behandelt wurden, ändert an diesem Grundsatz nichts. Es ändert auch nichts daran, dass die Ungläubigen (mušrikūn) ständig zur Rechenschaftspflicht ermahnt werden. Grundsätzlich gilt: Die Ermahnung ist in der Hauptsache auf die jenseitige Rechenschaft bezogen und nicht auf diesseitige. Die Koranstellen, die den Zwang in der Religion verbieten und auf die die Muslime bei jeder Gelegenheit verweisen, deuten darauf hin. Der Grundsatz wird untermauert durch die ursprüngliche Bedeutung der Umma, die aus den Koranstellen mit unterschiedlichen Verwendungszusammenhängen des Begriffs und aus der Praxis des Vertrags von Medina herausgelesen werden kann. Auch die Überlieferungen vom Propheten deuten darauf hin, so auch nachdrücklich seine historische Botschaft (Abschiedspredigt) mit den Worten: „O ihr Menschen! Euer Gott ist der eine, gleiche Gott! Auch euer Vater ist ein- und derselbe! Ihr seid alle aus Adam hervorgegangen, und Adam ging aus Erde hervor! Vor Gott ist jener von euch der Beste, der am gottesfürchtigsten ist. Es gibt keine

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Überlegenheit der Araber über Nichtaraber und der Nichtaraber über Araber, ebenso wenig der Schwarzen (Roten) über die Weißen oder der Weißen über die Roten, es sei denn, sie seien gottesfürchtiger! Wisset, dass ich euch dieses kundgetan habe! Gott, du sei mein Zeuge! Daher ist ein jeder von euch Anwesenden verpflichtet, jenen, die nicht anwesend sind, dieses zu überbringen.“ Nächstenliebe: Die Liebe und Achtung der Schöpfung Gottes können im Ausdruck der Nächstenliebe wiedergegeben werden. Hierfür gibt es unzählige Überlieferungen vom Propheten (hadīth), die die Grundlage des berühmten Spruchs vom großen Mystiker Rumi bilden: „Ich liebe das Geschöpf um des Schöpfers willen.“ Dieses ethische Prinzip ist ohne Zweifel zu den zentralen Handlungsmaximen im Umgang mit allen Menschen zu zählen. Gerechtigkeit: Sie gilt als das grundlegendste Ordnungsprinzip in der Gesellschaft. Trotz aller unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Verständnisse in den Schulen der Glaubenslehre (‘aqīda) ist es so zentral, dass es als die Gerechtigkeit für alle Menschen verstanden werden muss. Weitere ethische Prinzipien: In allen Überlieferungen – zumindest in sunnitischen, aber auch darüber hinaus — sind ethische Prinzipien kanonisiert worden, die für alle Menschen gelten: Schutz des Lebens, Schutz des Glaubens, Schutz des Verstandes, Schutz der Ehre und Schutz des Vermögens. Der muslimische Menschenrechtsdiskurs in unserer Gegenwart konnte und kann über diese Prinzipien nicht hinwegsehen, auch wenn in diskursiven Details unterschiedliche Positionen vertreten werden und die praktische Umsetzung in muslimischen Ländern alles andere als normkonform ist. Betrachtet man die konkrete juristische Kanonisierung einzelner Handlungsfelder, die geschichtliche Entwicklung und die frühere und gegenwärtige gesellschaftliche Praxis – auch die des Propheten (sunna) – näher, kann sicherlich ein anders Bild entstehen. Hierfür ist dennoch eine nüchterne und reflektierte Betrachtung notwendig, die die historischen Kontextbedingungen stärker ins Blickfeld rücken muss.

3. Status der Minoritäten in der islamischen Geschichte und im Regelwerk der Scharia1 In islamischen Quellen der ersten Generationen finden wir kein Regelwerk, welches ein Minderheitenkonzept nach unserem heutigen Verständnis, in dem die individuellen Rechte als die kollektiven im Vordergrund stehen, anbieten könnte. Die koranische Offenbarung, die als interaktive Kommunikation zwischen dem Sender und Empfänger, daher in ihrer Sprache unter den Zeit- und Kontextbedingungen der arabischen Halbinsel des 7. Jh.s verstanden werden sollte, redet in konkret adressierten Aussagen von denjenigen, die vor Ort zu treffen sind: Gläubige, Ungläubige bzw. Polytheisten (mušrikūn) und Glaubensgemeinschaften (ahl al-kitāb/Leute der Schrift).2 1

Der Hinweis auf die doppelte Bedeutung des Begriffs ist immer angebracht, wenn über die Scharia gesprochen wird: 1. Scharia als der rechte Weg zum Gott, 2. das islamische Recht der Jurisprudenz. 2 Darüber, welche Religionen bzw. Glaubensgemeinschaften außerhalb der Christen und Juden zu den Leuten der Schrift (ahl al-kitāb) gehören, wird bis heute gestritten.

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Die Aussagen des Korans zu den Schriftbesitzern sind ambivalent bzw. so mehrdeutig, dass bei jedem Vers genau nachgeschaut werden muss, welcher Offenbarungsanlass möglicherweise dahinterstand. Während an einzelnen Stellen die religiösen Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Leuten der Schrift und Muslimen betont werden (z.B. Koran 3:64 und 29:46), wird an anderen Stellen deutlich gemacht, dass viele Angehörige der Schriftbesitzer „Ungläubige“ sind. Ähnlich zum Heilsuniversalismus im Christentum wird unter muslimischen Gelehrten bis heute diskutiert, wie dies genau zu verstehen ist, ob sie z.B. mit ins Paradies gelangen oder nicht. Hier lässt sich auch eine Unterscheidung zwischen mekkanischen und medinensischen Suren machen. Während die mekkanischen Suren in der Hauptsache den monotheistischen Gottesglauben betonen und keine konkreten Angaben über den gesellschaftlichen Status machen, werden die späteren medinensichen Suren in dieser Hinsicht konkreter. In Sure 9:29 wird zum Kampf gegen diese Ungläubigen aufgerufen, bis sie den Tribut (ğizya) entrichten. Die ğizya deutet bereits auf die Kontextbedingungen in Medina hin, wo der Vertrag von Medina vorliegt. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die medinensische Vereinbarung durch die Offenbarung als gesellschaftliche Gegebenheit angenommen wird, ohne sie aber als unveränderlich zu erklären. Eine weitere Ausführung der einzelnen koranischen Verhältnisbestimmungen zwischen Muslimen und Leuten der Schrift erübrigt sich hier mit dem erneuten Verweis, dass die einzelnen Offenbarungsanlässe und Ambivalenzen zwischen den Versen sowie die Ambiguität der einzelnen Verse ins Visier genommen werden müssten. Die Praxis des Propheten und der ersten Generationen lassen den Schluss zu, dass der Umgang mit „Anderen“ im ethischen Zeichen der koranischen Botschaft aber unter den Gegebenheiten des historischen Kontexts praktisch gestaltet wurde. Sowohl die Abkehr des Propheten von den Bräuchen der ahl al-kitāb als auch sein Versuch der vertraglichen Abmachungen mit den Leuten der Schrift deuten mehrfach auf diesen doppelten, ethischpraktischen Focus hin. Die Praxis der ersten Kalifen sah nicht anders aus. Unter dem ersten Kalifen Abū Bakr (reg. 632–634) kam z.B. der Vertrag zwischen ihm und den Christen in Nadjran, im heutigen Grenzgebiet zwischen Jemen und Saudi-Arabien, zustande. Aus den erhaltenen Formen des Vertrags geht ausdrücklich hervor, dass die Christen vor Beleidigungen geschützt und nicht erniedrigt werden sollen. Der Vertrag von Nadjran zeigt, wie sich Muslime und Christen in der Anfangszeit ihrer Koexistenz zu verständigen suchten. Bereits zu Zeiten des Propheten gab es Kontakte, einen theologischen Austausch und die Verständigung darüber, dass jeder bei seinem Glauben bleibt. Sie erklärten sich bereit, ein Vertragsverhältnis einzugehen, in dem ihre Rechte und Pflichten – inkl. finanzieller Abgaben – bestimmt werden sollten. Auch die Ahndung und die Folgen der Vertragsbrüche verdeutlichen eher die Spuren der Zeit als die unveränderlichen Bestimmungen eines Regelwerks. Ein bekanntes und viel beachtetes Beispiel hierfür ist der Umgang des zweiten Kalifen ‘Umar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb mit Juden, der von der Praxis des Propheten abwich. ‘Umar hatte die Abgabe der Almosensteuer an Juden mit der Begründung abgeschafft, dass die Muslime zahlenmäßig stark genug geworden seien, weshalb es nicht mehr notwendig sei, die Bindung und Unterstützung der Juden dadurch sicherzustellen. Diese und spätere Vertragspraktiken und Umgangsformen belegen eindeutig die Zeitgebundenheit (Partikularität) einzelner Handlungen und Regelungen: Die Verträge wurden zwischen den „Siegern“ und „Besiegten“ abgeschlossen. Sie reglementierten die Pflichten der Besiegten (Minderheit) und brachten doch ihre Rechte unter Schutz. Betont werden

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muss ist also ein Werdungsprozess, in dem die Verhältnisse zu anderen Religionen und Gruppen stetig aufs Neue gestaltet wurden. Beim Thema der Minoritäten sollte auch eine weitere Entwicklung nicht übersehen sehen werden. Sowohl der innermuslimische Zwist als auch die rasante Verbreitung des islamischen Glaubens (auch durch die Expansion der Herrschaftsgebiete) brachten neue Herausforderungen und religiöse und soziale Fragen mit sich. Bereits in der Phase der ersten Kalifen führten politische (Stammes-)Konflikte wie der Anspruch auf das Kalifenamt zu innermuslimischen Spaltungen (Schiiten und Sunniten etc.), infolge derer eine neue Minderheitengruppe entstand. Die Rede ist von innermuslimischen „Minderheiten“ in zweifacher Hinsicht: 1. diejenigen neuen Muslime, die außerhalb der Herrschaftsgebiete lebten, und 2. diejenigen, die (politische) Gegner sind und fortan als Abtrünnige (munāfiqūn, hārğiten etc.) genannt und bekämpft werden. Die genannte Entwicklung hatte zur Folge, dass ab dem 11. Jh. ein spezifisches Rechtsgebiet (fiqh al-aqallīyāt) entsteht, das als „Islamisches Minderheitenrecht" zu verstehen und in zwei Richtungen zu trennen ist: Muslimische Minderheiten außerhalb des islamischen Gebiets (dār al-hạrb/Gebiet des Krieges) und außermuslimische Minderheiten innerhalb des Gebiet unter einer islamischen Herrschaft (dār al-islām). Die spezifische Kanonisierung des islamischen Minderheitenrechts ist unmittelbar mit der ebenso strikten territorialen Trennung des islamischen von dem des nichtislamischen Gebiets verbunden. Begründungen, den dauerhaften Aufenthalt von Muslimen und seine Voraussetzungen unter nichtmuslimischer Herrschaft zu rechtfertigen, gingen in Teilen auch heute noch von diesem territorialen Konzept aus. Um den Status der muslimischen Minderheiten außerhalb der islamischen Territorien zu bestimmen, gab es allerdings über die Jahrhunderte hinweg ständige Versuche, das außerislamische Gebiet genauer zu bestimmen. Die Unterscheidung des klassischen islamischen Rechts ist auch nicht bei der einfachen Teilung geblieben.3 Bei den Nichtmuslimen in Minderheitensituation innerhalb des islamischen Gebietes ging es darum, das Verhältnis zu ihnen und die Koexistenz auf der Basis der vertraglichen Vereinbarungen zu bestimmen. Im Grundsatz hat sich der Status der Schutzbefohlenen (die sog. ḏimmī) durchgesetzt. Die Schutzbefohlenen werden zur Zahlung eines Tributs (ğizya) verpflichtet und als Gegenleistung von Militär-bzw. Kriegsdiensten befreit. In beiden Fällen gilt die Zugehörigkeit zum Glauben (zur Glaubensgemeinschaft) für den Minderheitenstatus als das maßgebende Kriterium, wobei – oder gerade deshalb – der Begriff Minderheit (also aqallīyā) für Schutzbefohlene (ḏimmī) umstritten geblieben ist. Mit Bezug auf den koranischen Wortlaut und auf die Sunna sind die Bezeichnungen „Schriftbesitzer“ (ahl al-kitāb) oder „Verbündete“ (ahl al-ḏimma) geläufig. Wollen wir beim Begriff der Minderheiten bleiben, müssten wir sie im strikt islamischen Sinne als eine Gruppe oder Gemeinschaft verstehen, deren religiöse Traditionen Grundlage für ihr Gemeinschaftsgefühl sind und die innerhalb der islamischen Gesellschaft neben der muslimischen Mehrheit eine eigene soziale Einheit darstellen. Ein Rechtskonzept für die Minderheiten auf der Grundlage der Abstammung, Sprache, Rasse usw. hat sich nicht entwickelt. Der Status der Schutzbefohlenen hingegen wurde und wird von Muslimen (Rechtsgelehrten) vielmehr als Garantie für die Rechte der Minderheiten im Sinne der koranischen Gebo3

Zu nennen sind andere Modelle wie „Gebiet des Vertrages“ (dār al-ahd), „Gebiets des Waffenstillstandes“ (dār al-sụlh)̣, „Gebiet der Gerechtigkeit“ (dār al-‘adl) oder „Gebiet des Glaubens“ (dār al-īmān).

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te angesehen, also als Garantie dafür, dass ihre religiöse und kulturelle Autonomie und Identität bewahrt und sie vor jeglichem Assimilationsdruck geschützt sind. Als Begründung wird weiter ausgeführt, dass sich eine friedliche und gerechte Koexistenz aller gesellschaftlichen Gruppen nur auf der Basis der Wahrung der spezifischen Merkmale von Minderheiten verwirklichen lasse.

4. Das Erbe der jüngeren Geschichte Darüber, ob und inwiefern diese friedliche und gerechte Koexistenz in der langen Geschichte erreicht wurde und dauerhaft war, kann man nach wie vor heftig streiten. Mit Udo Steinbach lässt sich dennoch resümieren, dass die Muslime im Zuge der Expansion keine systematische Islamisierung betrieben haben. Nur so lässt sich es erklären, dass das Christentum über einen sehr langen Zeitraum in Teilen des Reiches die Mehrheit stellte. Dennoch ist es anzunehmen, dass wirtschaftliche (mögliche hohe Steuerbelastung der Schutzbefohlenen) oder auch politische Erwägungen viele Christen und Juden zum Übertritt zum Islam bewegt haben könnten. Der Status des Schutzbefohlenen erscheint aus heutiger Sicht sicherlich als weitgehende Einschränkung ihrer Rechte. Sie waren sozusagen Bürger zweiter Klasse. Andererseits kann ihre Stellung für die Verhältnisse bis zum 19. Jh. im Vergleich zum christlichen Europa (erinnert sei an die innerchristlichen Konflikte, Religionskriege oder Kreuzzüge, Feindseligkeiten zwischen der byzantinischen Staatskirche und den europäischen Invasoren) als weitgehend besser eingestuft werden. Eine relativ freie Religionsausübung, ihre weitgehende Eigenständigkeit in rechtlichen Belangen, ihre wirtschaftlichen Entfaltungschancen, ihre wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten, gar die Beschäftigung als hohe Amtsträger u.a.m. lassen sich historiographisch belegen. Im sog. Millet-System des Osmanischen Reiches genossen z.B. die Christen der unterschiedlichen Konfessionen und die Juden freie Ausübung der Religion und Respektierung ihres Rechts. Wir wissen aus Dokumenten z.B., dass die christlichen und jüdischen Religionsführer die Ansprech- und Verhandlungspartner der osmanischen Verwaltung im Sinne der Vertragsabschließung mit den Schutzbefohlenen waren. Das 19. Jh. gilt aus der Sicht der Minderheitensituation sowohl als Katastrophe als auch als Neuanfang. Angesichts des in Europa fortschreitenden Nationalismus mussten die Minderheiten neu definiert und ihr Status und ihre Rechte neu verhandelt werden. Auch im arabischen Raum wurde eine Bewegung von christlichen Arabern sichtbar, die das nationale Erbe des Arabertums hinter dem Stillstand der Osmanen wieder sichtbar machen wollte und alsbald die muslimischen Araber ergriffen hatte. Hierdurch entstand etwas, was die islamische Geschichte in dieser Form nicht kannte: Die Annäherung und Verbrüderung der christlichen und muslimischen Araber in der national-ethischen Identität. Schließlich war das relativ friedliche Zusammenleben, also die bestehende Symbiose seit Jahrhunderten zum Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jh.s prekär geworden. Der Verfall des osmanischen Reiches ließ eine neue Weltkarte im Nahen Osten entstehen, die heute in noch größerem Ausmaß zu Lasten der Minderheiten von Konflikten und Krisen belastet ist. Nationalismen, jüdisch-palästinensischer Konflikt, religiöser Radikalismus und westliche Invasionen in islamischen Staaten können zu den Faktoren gezählt werden, die die neue Lage der Minderheiten enorm belasten und verschlechtern.

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Diese kurze Schilderung der Entwicklungen der jüngeren Geschichte (19./20. Jh.) dürfte ausreichen, die aktuelle Minderheitenproblematik in den muslimischen Ländern gezielter anzusprechen und solche Fragen erneut zu stellen: 1. Kann die katastrophale Lage dem Islam zu Last gelegt werden, obwohl viele andere Faktoren dazugekommen sind? 2. Inwiefern gilt die Scharia noch als Grundlage und in welcher Konstruktion? 3. Wie können der Umgang und die Lage der Minderheiten (Minderheitenrecht) deutlich verbessert werden? Allenfalls gibt es in der Gegenwart unterschiedliche Rechtssysteme in der islamischen Welt, auch wenn viele Länder die Scharia als Grundlage präsentieren. Viele haben ebenso säkulares Recht übernommen oder zumindest inkorporiert. Diese Fragen können hier nicht ausführlich behandelt werden. Anhand der Verbesserungsversuche, die den Geist des Vertrags von Medina wiederbeleben wollen, sollen die Breite des Problems und die Notwendigkeit eines grundlegenden Perspektivenwechsels geschildert werden.

5. Versuche, eine islamische Menschenrechts-Charta zu entwerfen und die Minderheitenrechte voranzubringen Auch auf der internationalen Ebene gab es Versuche von muslimischen Länder mit Bezug auf die internationalen Entwicklungen, ihre Rechtsysteme und auch die Minderheitenrechte anzupassen: Die Kairoer Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Islam von 1990 ist die bekannteste muslimische Deklaration mit dem ausdrücklichen Verweis auf die Scharia. Sie wurde durch die Organisation der Islamischen Konferenz als das islamische Pendant zur Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte verabschiedet. Die Liga der arabischen Staaten gab wenige Jahre später die Arabische Charta der Menschenrechte von 1994 (2004 überarbeitet) heraus. Beiden Erklärungen vorausgegangen ist die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Islam aus dem Jahr 1981, die vom Islamrat von Europa mit Sitz in London deklariert war. Grundsätzliche Probleme in diesen Erklärungen und in Rechtsaufassungen der einzelnen Länder bestehen weiterhin im Verständnis der kollektiven gegenüber den individuellen Rechte und in der Beschneidung der Minderheitenrechte aufgrund der wie auch immer konzipierten Scharia. Anhand der Wiederbelebungsversuche des Vertrags von Medina lassen sich die Komplexität und Schwierigkeit aufzeigen und diskutieren. 5.1 Wiederbelebungsversuche des Vertrags von Medina Der Vertrag bzw. das Dokument von Medina war lange Zeit in Vergessenheit geraten. Nach einer längeren Phase der Vergessenheit in der muslimischen Welt nahm zuerst Muhammad Hamidullah den Vertrag von Medina wieder auf und verhalf ihm zu seiner Aktualität im zeitgenössischen islamischen Diskurs. Seitdem ist der Vertrag immer wieder zum Anhaltpunkt für interessante Diskussionen gemacht worden. In den 1990er Jahren, lange vor der Marrakesch-Deklaration von 2016, ist z.B. in der Türkei eine lebhafte Diskussion über das Dokument entstanden, in die neben religiösen auch säkulare und linke Intellektuelle involviert waren. Neben religiös bestimmten Begriffen und Themen wie die Bedeutung und Funktion der Scharia und Umma wurde konfrontativ über die Zivilgesellschaft, die Menschen-, Bürger und Minderheitenrechte, die Möglichkeit eines pluralen Rechtssystems, das Zusammenleben in der pluralen Gesellschaft u.v.m. debattiert. Zwangs-

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läufig musste der Fokus auf die Frage nach dem „Souverän“ gerichtet werden: Wem gebührt die Souveränität, wem steht die politische Autorität zu und welcher Platz ist der Religion (Islam/Scharia) einzuräumen? Ali Bulaç, der das Dokument von Medina zuerst publikmachte,4 vertrat die Meinung, dass der Islam keine totalitäre Religion und auch keine Theokratie sei und daher keinen Anspruch auf die politische Herrschaft formuliere. Von der im Dokument von Medina Mohammad zugeschriebenen Stellung ausgehend argumentierte er, dem Islam stehe lediglich die Funktion eines Schlichters (gemeint ist eine Beratungsinstanz) und nicht die des Souveräns zu. Der Islam sehe ein pluralistisches Herrschaftssystem vor, an dem die gesellschaftliche Vielfalt partizipieren könne.5 Diese Position wurde von religiösen und säkularen Kreisen scharf attackiert. Mehrere islamistische Intellektuelle wiesen ein politisches Gemeinwesen ohne Gesetzgebung, die aus der Offenbarung heraus dem Islam zustehen müsse, zurück und warfen ihr vor, den Islam in die Ohnmacht zu befördern und der westlichen Demokratie zu opfern.6 Die Fortsetzung der Diskussion hätte die Frage erörtern müssen, welcher Bedarf an einem Schlichter noch besteht, wenn ihm jegliche Herrschaftsgewalt und dadurch das gesellschaftspolitische Gewicht aberkannt werden. 5.2 Marrakesch-Deklaration von 2016 Das in aller Kürze wiedergegebene Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung über das Dokument von Medina zeigt eindrücklich, welches breite Spektrum von Themen und Fragestellungen aufgenommen werden muss, um es in der Komplexität des (postmodernen) Zeitalters aktualisieren und mit der außerreligiösen und außerislamischen Welt kommunizieren zu können. Die Unterzeichnenden der Marrakesch-Deklaration sind sich anscheinend dessen bewusst, wenn sie von der Wiederbelebung der „Prinzipien“ der Charta von Medina sprechen. Diese stünden mit der Charta der Vereinten Nationen und der Universellen Erklärung der Menschenrechte im völligen Einklang. Die in der Erklärung genannten wenigen „Regelungen in Form von Prinzipien einer verfassungsrechtlich-vertraglichen Bürgerschaft“ (constitutional contractual citizenship)7 stellten „eine geeignete Basis für nationale Verfassungen in Staaten mit muslimischer Bevölkerungsmehrheit“ dar. Insofern ist der Aufruf an die Politiker und Entscheidungsträger in muslimischen Ländern folgerichtig, „die notwendigen politischen und gesetzgeberischen Schritte zu ergreifen, zwischen den Bürgern eine verfassungsvertragliche Beziehung zu etablieren“. Schließlich sollen diese Schritte, so eine weitere Aufforderung, „den gerechten Umgang mit religiösen Minderheiten“ ermöglichen. Solche Erklärungen entstehen auf der Grundlage des kleinstmöglichen Konsenses. Dass die formulierten Appelle der Deklaration aussichtslos sind, zeigt bereits die nüchterne Lektüre des Textes. Gleich zu Beginn ist von der Autorität legitimer Regierungen die Rede, die gegen „kriminelle Gruppierungen“ in Schutz genommen wird. Welchen Sinn hat es, von 4 Vgl. Ali Bulaç, Medine Vesikası Hakkinda Genel Bilgiler, in: Birikim 38, Juni 1992. 5 Vgl. Ali Bulaç, Islam Niçin Bir Teokrasi Değildir?, in: Kitap Dergisi, 58–60, Februar 1991; Ders. Medine Vesikası Üzerine Tartışmalar (2), in: Birikim 47, März 1993, sowie Ders., Medine Vesikası Üzerine Tartışmalar (2), in: Birikim 48, April 1993. 6 Vgl. zur Kritik: Ihsan Süreyya Sırma, Medine Vesikasının Mevsukiyeti ile llgili Bazi Verlier, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi, Vol. 5, Winter 1994; Ahmet Ağirakça, Medine Vesikasının Değeri, in: Haksöz 23, Februar 1993; M. Sait Çekmegil, Bir Ictimal Mukavele; Medine Vesikası, in: Panel 48, März-April 1993. 7 Genannt sind die Freizügigkeit, das Recht auf Eigentum, die gegenseitige Solidarität und Verteidigung wie auch die Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz.

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Regierungen verfassungsvertragliche Schritte zur vollständigen Bürgerschaft der Minderheiten zu erwarten, wenn sie sich selbst durch ihre Bürger nicht legitimieren lassen? Werden diese in den allermeisten Fällen autoritären Königshäuser und Regierungen jemals zulassen, dass die religiösen Minderheiten am Entstehungsprozess des Verfassungsvertrags gleichberechtigt teilhaben können, wenn sie die Teilnahme nicht mal ihren Glaubensbrüdern und -schwestern gewähren? Wird der Umgang mit den Minderheiten gerecht, wenn sie zum entscheidenden ersten Schritt – Verfassungsvertrag – nicht zugelassen sind? Die Ratlosigkeit der Verfasser der Deklaration ist offenkundig: Ohne über die Konsequenzen nachzudenken, wollten sie offensichtlich auf die moderne Benennung nicht verzichten, die den Vertrag von Medina zum Rang einer Staatsverfassung aufwertet. Im Übrigen: Die aufgerufenen Regierungen müssten vermutlich als ersten Schritt einen Konsultationsrat von islamischen Gelehrten und Intellektuellen einberufen – oder eine solche internationale Kommission akzeptieren –, weil diese ja ein Rechtskonzept der Bürgerschaft im erwünschten Sinne erst entwickeln sollen, wie es in einem anderen Appellsatz zum Ausdruck kommt. Die Gelehrte und Intellektuelle bekommen in der Tat eine Mammutaufgabe, da das Rechtskonzept „in der islamischen Tradition und auf den islamischen Prinzipien wurzeln sowie die globalen Veränderungen mitberücksichtigen“ solle, das dann noch in die nationalen Verfassungen einfließen müsse. Eine aufmerksame Durchsicht der Deklaration kann noch weitere kritische Fragen formulieren. Die islamische Welt hat bereits die oben genannten Erfahrungen mit den Erklärungen für Menschenrechte, die sich sowohl auf die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte als auch auf die eigene Tradition und islamischen Prinzipien (Scharia) beziehen. Abgesehen von erheblichen Einschnitten mit Bezug auf die Scharia ist ihre Umsetzung in der politischen und juristischen Praxis der einzelnen Staaten sehr dürftig geblieben. 5.3 Ist der Vertrag als Vorbild für ein modernes und alternatives Gesellschaftsmodell zu sehen? Der Vertrag von Medina ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, dass der Prophet sein staatsmännisches Handlungsgeschick unter jeweiligen Kontextbedingungen zum Einsatz brachte, um soziale Konflikte zu lösen, für Ordnung und Frieden zu sorgen und eine Gemeinschaft zu bilden. Aus dem Wortlaut ergibt sich jedoch kein Regelwerk, das ohne zeitgemäße Deutung einsetzbar wäre. Möglich und sinnvoll ist die Herleitung von Prinzipien, von denen auch die Marrakesch-Deklaration ausgehen möchte. Die Benennung allgemeiner Grundsätze allein reicht allerdings bei weitem nicht aus, weil diese der zusätzlichen Klärung für die Gegenwart bedürfen. Hinzu kommt die Knappheit der aus dem Vertrag ableitbaren Prinzipien, weshalb die gegenwärtig erhobenen Ansprüche unbegründet und unberechtigt bleiben, aus dem Vertrag von Medina den vorbildlichen Umgang mit einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft, menschenrechtlichen Freiheiten, Minderheiten und Andersgläubigen herauslesen und in ihm das Vorbild für ein modernes und/oder alternatives Gesellschaftsmodell entdecken zu können. Die Gegebenheiten und Anforderungen der Gegenwart sind viel zu komplex, so dass jede solche Behauptung zuerst nachvollziehbar erklären muss, ob überhaupt und wie strukturelle und funktionelle Parallelen zwischen der Gemeinschaft damals und der Gesellschaft heute gezogen werden (können). Erklärungsbedürftig werden auch die Vermittlungs- und Verflechtungsversuche zwischen den Traditionsbeständen und den gegenwärtigen Erfor-

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dernissen sein, zumal die unvermeidbaren Abweichungen von der Scharia aufgrund unterschiedlicher Verständnisse enorme Überzeugungskraft erschöpfen müssten. Ein kritischer Blick auf die islamische Geschichte wird schnell erkennen, wie vielfältig solche Kombinationen ausgefallen sind, die aber nicht durchgehend eine Ambiguitätstoleranz genossen, sondern auch mit härtester Gewalt bekämpft wurden. Der der Marrakesch-Deklaration zu entnehmende Zeitgeist dürfte sich mit dem später entwickelten Status der Schutzbefohlenen für religiöse Minderheiten nicht zufriedengeben, falls die Aufforderung zum gerechten Umgang auf der Basis einer verfassungsvertraglichen Bürgerschaft ernst gemeint ist. Es darf heute weiterhin bezweifelt werden, ob jemals ein tragbarer Konsens z.B. über den Status der Abtrünnigen oder über die Gleichberechtigung der Anders- und Nichtgläubigen erzielt werden wird.

6. Schlusswort 6.1 Die Erneuerungs- bzw. Reformnotwendigkeit des islamischen Rechts ist notwendig! Eine Reform ist allerdings vom Scharia-Verständnis abhängig, also von der Frage, wie verbindlich das religiöse Recht sein kann und darf. An diesem Punkt treffen sich zwei grundunterschiedliche Geisteshaltungen (auch Spaltungen) aufeinander, die keine Lösungen zulassen: - Scharia ist maßgebend, weil Gottes Gesetz, - Scharia ist historisch, kontextgebunden. Jegliche innerislamische Diskurse, Aktualisierungsversuche oder Lösungsangebote, die ein Staats-, Rechts- oder Gesellschaftsmodell zum Ziel haben, stecken somit in einem großen Dilemma. Dieses entsteht, wenn einerseits jegliche Begründungen aus der Vielfalt und Ambiguität der Text-, Scharia-, Traditions- und Geschichtsdeutungen heraus zulässig sein müssen, andererseits aber noch kein – politisches oder juristisches – Methodenangebot in Sicht ist, um den notwendigen politischen Grundkonsens – z.B. über den „Verfassungsvertrag“ – herstellen zu können. Solange dieses Dilemma nicht gelöst wird, kann der notwendige Basiskonsens in Grundsatzfragen auch nicht erzielt werden. Ohne diesen Basiskonsens kann von einer klar umrissenen, inhaltlich gesättigten und umsetzungsfähigen Alternative zu anderen (westlichen) Gesellschafts- und Bürgerschaftsmodellen keine Rede sein. Um ein alternatives islamisches Rechts- und Gesellschaftssystem entwickeln zu können, bedarf es zuerst einer Diskursethik, die unerlässlich ist, um die vielfältigen Begründungen und Geltungsansprüche in einem friedlichen Austausch- und Aushandlungsprozess miteinander wetteifern zu lassen. Eine letzte Schlussfolgerung: 6.2 Globale Anstrengung für Gerechtigkeit Ohne Gerechtigkeit auf globaler Ebene wird es keine Überwindung der Menschenrechtsund Minderheitenprobleme in der islamischen Welt auf absehbare Zeit geben, wenn überhaupt.

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New Home Europe Memories of the arrival of the first Syrian Orthodox Christians in Germany1 Kai Merten “Some only notice when they are abroad what they have in what they call their home, with everything that is associated with it: people, customs, landscape, food and climate. In order to understand the situation of migrants, one should realize how much depends on these factors.”2 This quote was originally said by the Protestant pastor Andreas Krone, who lived in India with his Indian wife for several years. Regarding the recent flow of refugees, he continues: “They have lost everything - except for one thing: their cultural identity. With that they come to us. Isn't it understandable that they hold onto it like a railing, looking for security and orientation in it? But this is exactly where the difficulty begins when it comes to integration.”3 It is precisely this process of integration that can be clearly observed among Syrian Orthodox Christians in Germany. In my lecture I would like to name and explain some of the factors that played a role in this.

1. Brief historical overview The first Syrians came to Germany with the guest worker movement, probably since the early 1960s. After the recruitment stop at the end of 1973, immigration to Germany was only possible either through family reunification or through an application for asylum. Never1

2

3

The following article is mostly based on my earlier studies, which are published in: Die syrisch-orthodoxen Christen in der Türkei und in Deutschland. Untersuchungen zu einer Wanderungsbewegung (StOKG 3), Hamburg 1997; Die Integration von Ausländern in Deutschland am Beispiel der syrischen Christen, in: Heidi Tuorila-Kahanpää, Tradition und Zukunft 1. Kurzfassungen der Vorlesungen in der Vorlesungsreihe des Sprachenzentrums 1996 (Jyväskylän Yliopiston Kielikeskuksen Opetusmonisteita, No. 10), Jyväskylä 1997, 32–40; Die Bedeutung des Tur Abdin für die Zukunft der syrischen Christen in der Diaspora, in: Martin Tamcke/Andreas Heinz, Zu Geschichte, Theologie, Liturgie und Gegenwartslage der syrischen Kirchen. Ausgewählte Vorträge des deutschen Syrologen-Symposiums vom 2.– 4. Oktober 1998 in Hermannsburg (StOKG 9), Hamburg 2000, 425–446. In addition, I made use of my contacts to Syrian communities and obtained information in personal conversations. Andreas Krone, Von der Schwierigkeit, in der Fremde heimisch zu werden. Kulturelle Identität angesichts von Migration und Integration, in: Deutsches Pfarrerblatt 1 (2017), 28.33–35, 28; in the original German: „Manche merken oft erst in der Fremde, was sie an dem haben, was sie ihr Zuhause nennen, mit allem, was damit verbunden ist: Menschen, Gepflogenheiten, Landschaft, Essen und Klima. Um die Situation von Migranten zu verstehen, sollte man sich klar machen, wie viel an diesen Faktoren liegt.“ Ibid., 33.

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theless, the migratory movement continued unabated. It even intensified, especially from 1979 onwards, due to the unstable political situation in Turkey at the time. In the 1980s, the wave of immigration to Germany rose to a historic high, which is related to the military coup of 1982 and even more to the fierce fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army at the time. By 1989 almost all villages with a low Christian population were completely abandoned by Christians. The first Syrian Orthodox priests came to Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1977 Mor Julius Jeshu Çiçek was appointed Patriarchal Vicar for Central Europe and two years later Archbishop. In 1984 he moved into the newly founded St. Ephrem-der-Syrer-Kloster in Glane-Losser, Holland, near the German border. In 2000 the Jakob-von-Edessa-Kloster opened its doors in Warburg. Archbishop Mor Philoxenos Mattias Nayis has resided there since 2012. There are currently around 100,000 Syrian Christians living in Germany (according to their own information). They have around 50 pastors and around 70 parishes. In addition, there are a number of cultural associations of various types.

2. Factors of integration Today, the vast majority of Syrian Christians in Germany are very well integrated. Most of them have German citizenship. A number of factors played a role in this process. 2.1 The declared goal of successful integration The Syrian Orthodox social worker Davut Aslan writes: “The Arameans live in Germany in the certainty that there is no possibility of returning home for them. […] They see their future in Germany or in the European Christian countries. They adapt quickly to the new living conditions. They want to live ‘as Christians among Christians’.”4 Unlike Muslim Turks, Christian Syrians never found it difficult to part with Turkish citizenship, to which they had never had an emotional connection. They loved and still love their homeland because it is their homeland, but for them that has nothing to do with the Turkish Republic as a state. This can exemplary be seen in the name changes the Syrians made on the occasion of their naturalization. Purely Christian first names were banned in Turkey, and since Ataturk first introduced mandatory surnames, most Syrians also had Turkish surnames. Now was the time to change that. For example, Gevriye became Gabriel or Isa Jeshu. The Turkish surnames were translated literally into Aramaic. However, there were also Syrians who deliberately gave their children who were born in Germany Western first names so that they would not be noticed as strangers. Others, on the other hand, insisted on using the old Syrian names in order to preserve the memory of their lost homeland. For example, I once had two Syrian girls in a class at school. One was called Nancy, the other Tigris.

4

Davut Aslan, Leben in der Diaspora, in: www.stephanus-gt.com/index.php?option=com_content &view=article&id=23&Itemid=23 (18.01.2017).

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Also, the Syrians started buying homes earlier than most Turkish guest workers. In the second generation of Syrians in Germany, there already was a trend towards self-employed professions or academic education away from being typical industrial workers.5 2.2 The language The young and younger Syrians speak perfect German these days. They have passed through the German school system and are successfully completing their studies. In many families, German is also spoken at home. That is why more and more Syrians are now warning, conversely, that their own language, the spoken Turoyo or the Syriac used in worship, might get lost, even more in writing than verbally. Along with the language, one's own cultural roots are increasingly being lost. Syrian youths could ask their bishop: “Am I still an Aramaic, even if I barely understand Aramaic?”6 That is why the Syrian Orthodox Church and the cultural associations have made greater efforts to offer mother tongue lessons in their own rooms or – If possible – In state schools. 2.3 The Church The self-image of being a Christian has played a major, if not the decisive, role in the declared goal of successful integration. This is why many Syrians were all the more disappointed when they realized how secular Germany actually was. For them, the Christian faith was the defining and distinguishing feature in Turkey, so that at first, they hardly understood why the Christian faith played such a minor role in the everyday life of the average German. The Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate recognized very quickly that it was necessary to provide pastoral care for the believers in Europe and to build up church congregations. This became possible because over time there were more and more priests among the migrants. Actually, this happened against the will of the church because it rightly feared that this would encourage the Syrians who stayed behind to emigrate as well. Nevertheless, the church also used the opportunity to commission the priests with the founding of congregations in Germany, also in order to steer the development of church structures in an orderly manner. These parishes soon became an important factor in integration; on the one hand, they were a piece of home where the service could be celebrated in the usual form and language, where people could also meet in their free time and cultivate their own culture. On the other hand, through ecumenism, they were the gateway to the local German congregations. Contacts were made quickly, since at the beginning all Syrian congregations were guests of German congregations. The Syrian Orthodox Church now even has its own integration officer. In addition, the curriculum for Syrian mother tongue teaching on a primary level explicitly names integration as a focus of teaching (section 2.2 e) of the curriculum).7 5 6 7

Cf. Aslan, Leben in der Diaspora. Hüsnü Acar, Syrisch-orthodoxe Jugendliche in Deutschland, in: Tamcke/ Heinz, Zu Geschichte, Theologie, Liturgie, 409–419, 413. http://religion.bildung-rp.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Syrisch_Orthodoxe_Religionslehre _Primarstufe_HS.pdf (18.01.2017).

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The monasteries that had meanwhile been founded in Europe also became - according to Orthodox tradition – centres of church life at the same time. Some of the training of priests and deacons takes place there. Ecumenical and scientific encounters, meetings and conferences are also held there. But they also offer everyone the opportunity to simply come to the monastery and take part in monastic life for a while. As with the Protestant and Catholic Churches, it remains a challenge to continue to involve the younger generation in the Church; because the Syrian Orthodox Church is changing more slowly than many young Syrians are demanding, whose concerns increasingly resemble those of their peers in Germany. Questions from young Syrians to the archbishop at the time make that more than visible: “When will the alleged equality between men and women finally be filled with content? Do I have to go to church every Sunday? The clergy intervene very much in worldly tasks and determine our everyday life. How can the two be separated? I would like to spend a little longer outside in the evening. Isn't it unfair that my brother is allowed to, but I as a girl am not?”8 2.4 The cultural associations In addition to the church, the cultural associations should of course be mentioned as an important factor. They have set themselves the goal of preserving their own language, culture, history and tradition. They do this primarily with music and dance groups as well as with native language lessons, but sports - especially soccer, of course - are very important as well. In addition, they offer special women's groups and maintain meeting centres where people simply meet after work or in their free time, drink tea together, play games and discuss day-to-day events. Organizationally, these clubs are mostly divided into two groups. The so-called Assyrian movement was established earlier, especially in Sweden, but also elsewhere. In Germany, the first Assyrian association was founded in 1971 in Berlin. In 1979 the Central Union of Assyrian Associations in Germany (Zentralverband der assyrischen Vereinigungen in Deutschland e. V.) was created based in Augsburg. These Assyrian associations are often politically active. They involved intensely in public relations work. The Assyrian associations describe themselves as non-denominational but are traditionally closer to the Apostolic Church of the East. The Syrian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, has repeatedly and clearly distanced itself from the Assyrian movement and urged its believers to not cooperate with it. The reason for that is, on the one hand, the very political commitment that the Syrian Orthodox Church has always rejected, and on the other hand, the emphasis on the alleged Assyrian origin, i.e. the pre-Christian, thus “pagan” past. The second group are the Syrian-Aramaic associations. In 1977 the first association of this kind was founded and in 1985 the Federation of Syrian-Aramaic Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany (Föderation der syrisch-aramäischen Vereine in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.) based in Gütersloh. These associations also see themselves as non-denominational but are in turn close to the Syrian Orthodox Church and often with it closely.

8

Acar, Syrisch-orthodoxe Jugendliche, 413s.

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There also is an association of Syrian Orthodox academics. Scientists of Syrian origin and language who deal with their own history, religion and culture, mainly from the fields of theology, religious studies, history, sociology and the like, meet there. 2.5 The social structure The social structure turned out to be rather problematic, a hindrance to successful integration. In their countries of origin in the Middle East, the Syrians mainly live in Kurdishdominated areas. Kurdish society, on the other hand, consists of a complicated tribal system9 in which Christians are also integrated. Therefore, belonging to a family or extended family determines the social position and the rights and duties of the people. The priest has the greatest reputation, but not always the greatest power. In Germany, too, the Syrians are again gathered in certain places. However, this is not only due to the initial entry as guest workers, but also to the desire of the Syrians to bring their social structures from Turkey to Germany. Only rarely are there more than three villages of origin that come together in one place in their new home. Of course, social boundaries were also maintained this way, e.g. between townspeople and villagers or between certain occupational groups or between rich and poor. In areas where today several Syrian communities are close together, e.g. in Gießen, it is easy to observe how the places of origin have organized themselves in separate communities, often not overcoming social boundaries, too. In some cases, there are also language barriers since some of the Syrians speak Arabic as their mother tongue, so that these groups form their own communities. The old way of thinking about extended families is linked to questions such as who makes the decisions for the community, who sends delegates to higher-level committees, on whom may the priest be dependent, up to who becomes ordained archbishop. The traditional reputation as well as the size and financial strength of a family and its connections to other families play an important role. This can even result in divisions within a certain congregation, which can lead to the emergence of new congregations within the same place. Several years ago this happened e.g. in Wiesbaden. However, these culturally determined structures are gradually beginning to soften among German Syrians of the third and fourth generation. This applies to other things, too, such as the equality of men and women and the free choice of partners and careers for children. The last point in particular was important to maintain the old social contacts, because a marriage also meant a connection between two extended families, so that by a marriage arranged by the parents, alliances between families were established and strengthened. Furthermore, the successful integration and the better schooling of the younger generation led to fundamental upheavals in the usual social structure, because the head of the family, who had mostly grown up in Turkey, was neither linguistically, intellectually nor mentally able to cope with the demands of modern Western society, so that "the old" were very soon dependent on the help of "the young", be it as an interpreter when dealing with authorities, or be it simply with the knowledge of what works how in Germany. This development in turn almost led to a factual reversal of the situation, that the honour still belonged to the head of the family, but the decisions were more likely to be made by those who were more 9

Cf. Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State. The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, London-New Jersey 1992.

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familiar with modern Western society. This rejection of the social structure was even more evident in girls than in boys, since the different values had a stronger impact on them. The same problem also emerged in the church parishes, where those priests who had been trained in their old homeland were no longer able to meet the new needs, especially of the younger people. However, there is now a new generation of priests in service who themselves grew up in Germany. In the meantime, a generation change has also taken place in more and more Syrian families, so that the responsible Syrians are now usually fully up to the requirements mentioned, although the old social structures have partially been preserved. It goes without saying, for example, that Syrian girls and women receive a good education and are allowed to study. Nevertheless, marriages between Syrians and non-Syrians are still the exception. 2.6 The relationship with German neighbours Everyday life in the neighbourhood of Syrian and German families usually goes smoothly. At most, certain social role expectations on the part of the Syrian extended families can make more intensive friendships with Germans more difficult, because these role expectations are not communicated and are mostly unknown or incomprehensible to the Germans. However, it has happened in several places that German residents have resisted the construction of a Syrian community centre in their neighbourhood. From a Syrian perspective, it was impossible to understand why the Germans did not differentiate between them, the likewise Christian Syrians, and the Muslims, and why the Germans were just as much against building a Syrian church as they were against building a mosque. But for the respective residents, the arguments put forward were not religious, but cultural, e.g. the mostly sprawling and long festivals with several hundred guests, which meant parked streets, a lot of hustle and bustle and a lot of noise. From time to time, Protestant and Catholic neighbouring communities or organizations noticed with astonishment that the Syrians placed value on intensive contact as long as they were dependent on financial aid. However, as soon as they were able to tackle a project on their own, they broke off contact or reduced it to a minimum. The relationship with Muslim or Turkish neighbours is usually portrayed by the Syrians as relaxed, even if more intensive contact is also not sought. On the one hand, they share a common awareness of living in Germany as people with a foreign background; on the other hand, relations are still strained by the history and fate of Christians in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic. However, the Syrians have far less reservations about the Turks than the Armenians.

3. Conclusion Despite their successful integration, I am observing a new love for Tur Abdin, especially among the younger Syrians, whom they mostly only know from the stories of the ancients. It is now possible to travel freely to southeast Turkey and even get back land that had to be left behind when emigrating. There is an increasing tendency to use these legal options, although very few Syrians return permanently, instead building houses there as second homes or as a kind of summer residence.

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Stuart Hall writes: “These people develop strong ties to their places of origin and to their traditions, but without the illusion of being able to return to the past. They are forced to get along with the cultures in which they live without simply assimilating and completely losing their own identities. […] They had to learn to assume at least two identities, to speak two cultural languages in order to translate and mediate between them.” 10 In my opinion, this description applies very well to the situation of Syrian Orthodox Christians in Germany today.11

10 Stuart Hall, Kulturelle Identität und Globalisierung, in: Karl H. Hörning/Rainer Winter, Widerspenstige Kulturen. Cultural Studies als Herausforderung, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 393–441, 345: „Solche Menschen erhalten starke Bindungen zu den Orten ihrer Herkunft und zu ihren Traditionen, jedoch ohne die Illusion, zur Vergangenheit zurückkehren zu können. Sie sind gezwungen, mit den Kulturen, in denen sie leben, zurechtzukommen, ohne sich einfach zu assimilieren und ihre eigenen Identitäten vollständig zu verlieren. […] Sie mussten lernen, mindestens zwei Identitäten anzunehmen, zwei kulturelle Sprachen zu sprechen, um zwischen ihnen zu übersetzen und zu vermitteln.“ 11 I owe many thanks to Helene Hild who translated this article from German into English.

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Microhistory of a Syriac Orthodox Community in Germany The example of the Syriac Orthodox congregation in Herne from 1961 to 2021 Jan Gehm This year 2021 marks the 60th anniversary of the labour recruitment agreement (1961), with which Turkish foreign workers, among them many Syriac Orthodox Christians, found a new home in Germany. The President of the Federal Republic of Germany Frank Walter Steinmeier delivered a speech on this occasion of the anniversary of the recruitment agreement at Bellevue Palace on September 10, 2021.1 In his speech, Steinmeier emphasized the importance of this agreement for German history, the role of immigrant Muslims in today’s society, and their belonging to Germany. Furthermore, he described the people who had come from Turkey as a “non-homogeneous group” manifested particularly in different religious affiliations. In this speech, he publicly mentioned that Christians and different religious denominations were also among the guest workers and that they were not just exclusively Muslims. This is truly remarkable because the connection between Turkish guest workers and a Christian religious affiliation was rarely drawn in the past. The Syriac Orthodox parish in Herne, Wanne-Eickel, in the heart of the Ruhr area, is one of many parishes established by guest workers from Turkey. At the same time, the parish is the result of different developments of this movement. Through attendance at church services during my studies I have already gotten to know the community. With this experience in mind, I conducted further research to study and record the history of the Syriac Orthodox community in Herne.2 After previous visits, it became clear that the parish wished to be more visible in society and emphasize its Christian tradition. In several face-to-face meetings with priest Samuel Gümüs and church council president Adnan Mermertas, the interviewees brought up how multi-faceted and varied the parish’s history has been. Despite the pandemic, I conducted interviews with Adnan Mermertas, who has been involved in the community since its establishment in the early 1970s.

1 Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier at a discussion event to mark the 60th anniversary of the German-Turkish recruitment agreement at Bellevue Palace on Sept. 10, 2021, www.bundespraesident.de/ SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2021/09/210910-Anwerbeabkommen-D-R.pdf;jsessionid=66FF1B49 4EBB97035A7A22091F3D67A6.1_cid361?__blob=publicationFile. 2 The present article resulted in the context of the research project “Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: Oriental Christians in Europe between 1970 and 2020” under the leadership of Prof. Heleen Murre-van den Berg at Radboud University Nijmegen. The project is sponsored by the European Research Council (ERC). It runs from Oct. 1, 2019, to Sept. 30, 2024.

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The following chapter outlines the history of the Syriac Orthodox community in Herne, from its beginnings as foreign workers who came from Turkey to work in Herne and the surrounding area to an established church community that has grown to the present day. Today the congregation is no longer composed only of first generation Syriac Orthodox Christians from Turkey but also following generations born and raised in Germany. In addition, the parish currently consists of Syriac Orthodox Christians from various countries in the Middle East, such as Syria or Iraq. Last but not least, good ecumenical cooperation of the local Protestant and Catholic churches with the Syriac Orthodox community favoured the developments of the community in Herne. It also became clear that several generations are affected by the community’s history, who either found a new home here or never knew any other home than the parish in Herne. The small quantity of in-depth research on the heterogeneous elements of foreign worker movement (like the Syriac Orthodox) leaves a lot to be desired. Some examples of detailed academic considerations of the topic in the German context include Kai Merten’s dissertation about Syriac Orthodox Christians in Turkey and Germany (1997)3 and Simon Birol’s essay (2016)4 on Syrian Orthodox migrant workers. This article intends to contribute a microhistory of a Syriac Orthodox parish, which scholars often overlooked in researching foreign workers’ history and newly-established religious denominations in Germany. Adnan Mermertas emphasized that Syriac Orthodox Christians struggled for many years to achieve today’s structures.5

1. Microhistory A micro-historical approach concentrates on individuals or small social groups to capture social and mental realities that are difficult to illustrate in the larger context. The beginnings of microhistory originate in the 1970s, especially in the Italian context, most importantly Carlo Ginzburg with his work The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller (1976) and Giovanni Levi’s Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist (1985). With the investigation of a smaller object it is possible to provide evidence for the developments in larger units. “The point is to make the normal, otherwise intangible, accessible through an extraordinary source.” 6 Typical sources for microhistory are egodocuments like autobiographies, diaries, life stories, interrogations, letters, witness examination et cetera. Many of these of kinds of documents of micro-history fall into the category what is known as grey literature. Levi emphasizes that microhistory reacts to the prob-

3

Kai Merten, Die syrisch-orthodoxen Christen in der Türkei und in Deutschland. Untersuchungen zu einer Wanderungsbewegung, Hamburg 1997. 4 Simon Birol, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen in Deutschland, in: Thomas Bremer/Assad Elias Kattan, Orthodoxie in Deutschland, Münster 2016, 235–251. 5 At this point, I would like to extend cordial thanks to him for sharing his vast knowledge on the parish and to get material and written sources which testify the various stages of the history of the parish in Herne. 6 Otto Ulbricht, Mikrogeschichte. Menschen und Konflikte in der Frühen Neuzeit, Frankfurt-New York 2009, 21.

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lem of how to acquire considerable “knowledge of the past”7. It is apparent that with this approach, only a limited range of material is observed, from which general valid statements cannot be inferred. However, on the other hand, with this approach, a greater precision of observation is gained. The outcome of a macro historical approach would not lead to the same result. The change of scale uncovers connections that would be overlooked in a macro historical approach.8 Therefore, the Syriac Orthodox community in Herne represents an excellent starting point for the study of the history of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Germany. There is a small range of material that documents the development of the Syriac Orthodox Christian community, including a few documents from the parish itself and some interview accounts of representatives of the community. Nevertheless, these offer not only raw data on a Syriac Orthodox parish story but also shed light on how this community negotiated their place in the German society. It helps us to understand how individuals or the group managed to create and maintain communal bonds in a local community. This analysis on the local level can be linked with other examples of parishes in Germany and Europe. Moreover, it opens up the horizon to investigate broader questions like the relations between the state and Syriac Orthodox migrants and with other social actors like churches or organizations, as well as topics like the media representation of Syriac Orthodox Christians and the legal status of foreign workers in post-war Germany. All that adequately conveys the different connections that can explain social processes with a certain regularity and a sizeable variable part. Finally, I note that there are two possible misunderstandings about microhistory9: first, microhistory does not imply that we deal with a “small” or futile research object, and second, that macro- and microhistory are to be seen independent from each other. The practice of microhistory is not about reducing the size of the object of research but about trying to find the right focus, fitting the research object and the level of analysis that also speaks to the larger questions at stake to the object. First, I will describe the general background of the Syriac Orthodox Christians including a closer look on their migration to Europe. In the next section the focus is on the congregation in Herne, detailing the specific developments and challenges of this congregation. Third, the background history of the Syriac Orthodox Christians will be connected to their home countries and their receiving countries. I will conclude by showing how the community building of the 70s is fundamental to understanding later church structures of the Syriac Orthodox in Herne.

2. Migration of Syriac Orthodox Christians to Germany and Europe The home of many Syriac Orthodox Christians who came to Europe is southeast Turkey which is also known as Tur Abdin, usually translated as “Mountain of God’s servants”. 7

Giovanni Levi, On Microhistory, in: Peter Burke, New Perspectives on Historical Writing, University Park/PA 2001, 110. 8 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting (transl. Kathleen Blamey/David Pellauer), Chicago 2004, 210. 9 Ulbricht, Mikrogeschichte, 33.

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There, the members of this community predominantly lived in small villages. Larger cities in the region are Mardin, Midyat, and Nusaybin (Syriac: Nisibin). Here, prominent monasteries and churches are located, for example, Mor Gabriel Monastery (Qartamin), close to Midyat or the “Saffron Monastery” (Deir ul-Zafaran), which served as the seat of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch from 1160 until 1932. Syriac Orthodox Christians have been rooted in this area for many centuries.10 In addition to Turkey, Syriac Orthodox Christians have historically lived in Iraq in the Nineveh Plains near Mossul, in Syria in Homs and Aleppo, and the north-eastern parts of the country Al-Hasakah and in parts of Lebanon and Israel.11 The story of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Europe started in 1961 with the labour recruitment agreement (Gastarbeiterabkommen) between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey.12 Syriac Orthodox Christians, like Muslims, understood it as a chance to find work and improve their economic situation. Istanbul was a stop for the foreign workers and the starting point of their journey. They set off from Turkey to Germany and other European countries like the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden.13 The movement did not stop with individual families who set out to Europe. Through visits of the migrating workers to their old home, the remaining Syriac Orthodox Christians came to know about the possibilities in Europe. They registered at the local recruitment offices in Mardin and Diyarbakir. From the beginning, they wanted to come to Germany not only to improve their economic situation but also to escape difficult socio-political circumstances in Turkey.14 Usually, they came to Europe through chain migration, with the excellent prospect of a lucrative workplace. Until today, in some regions of Germany a dense population of Syriac Orthodox Christians can be found. However, it was not always possible for members of the same village or relatives to settle in the same region right from the beginning. The political regulations of the German legislation on foreign labour law intended to distribute new migrants over different cities. For instance, a brother of a foreign worker who had just come from Tur Abdin was not able to move in with his brother who had lived in Duisburg for ten years. According to the law, the authorities allocated him to another city at first. After a few years, though, families were allowed to reunite and move to the same place. Since the 70s of the last century, Syriac Orthodox Christians mainly came as political refugees who wanted to leave Turkey and other countries of the Middle East because of increasing political repressions and accompanying economic problems. They started to apply for asylum. When the admission of foreign workers to Germany was stopped as a consequence of the oil crisis in 1973, Sweden became the preferred destination for many Syriac Orthodox Christians.15 There, the procedure for granting asylum was often faster and more promising than in Germany. Until today, Germany and Sweden remain the two European

10 See Martin Tamcke, Die Christen vom Tur Abdin. Hinführung zur Syrisch-Orthodoxen Kirche, Frankfurt/M. 2009, 169; Wolfgang Hage, Das orientalische Christentum (Die Religionen der Menschheit 29,2), Stuttgart 2007, 130. 11 Tamcke, ibid., 15. 12 See Merten, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen, 98. 13 See Birol, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen, 239. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., 239s.

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countries where most Syriac Orthodox Christians reside, approximately 100,000 faithful in each country. For the Netherlands, the number of 30,000 faithful is estimated.

3. The Syriac Orthodox congregation in Herne When Syriac Orthodox foreign workers everywhere in Europe settled and created structures similar to find orientation in their new environment, the Syriac Orthodox Christians in the Ruhr area founded a base in Herne that heralded a new era of their church life in the vicinity. In the Ruhr area, many Syriac Orthodox Christians settled, particularly in Duisburg, Essen, and Herne. This particular regional distribution resulted mostly from chain migration following earlier migrations related to labour opportunities. In this way, Herne became the ecclesiastical centre of the Syriac Orthodox community in the Ruhr area. The migration of the Syriac Orthodox to Europe can be divided into phases. Naures Atto proposed a classification which broadly divides the Syriac Orthodox migration to Europe into three main phases:16 The first phase (1965–1975) is marked by migration because of work. The second phase (1975–1984) encompasses mainly political refugees who come to Europe. Family reunions characterize the third phase (1984–2009). To describe the congregation’s history in Herne, these three phases of migration, from foreign workers to refugees and family reunions, have to be kept in mind. But it only can be followed roughly because it does not match with all dates of the community in Herne. The information on the historical developments of the congregation in Herne comes from interviews with founding members of the congregation, among others with Adnan Mermertas and the priest Samuel Gümüs. Furthermore, parts of the history of the congregation are documented on social media, such as Facebook. Other parts of the history are recorded by groups or individuals or found in written documents. These include the autobiography of Adnan Mermertas, who came as one of the first Syriac Orthodox Christians to Herne.17 In addition, a few publications deal with the parish in Herne: local newspaper articles on the community, a report of the local heritage society “Heimatverein” of WanneEickel,18 and a booklet that the parish printed on the occasion of the consecration of St. Peter and Paul church in Herne on October 20, 1991.19 These sources provide information on selected points and far-reaching developments of today’s congregation. This literature can be classified as grey literature. A common definition of grey literature is presented by David Wood as “literature which is not readily available through normal book selling channels, and therefore difficult to identify and obtain”20. This so-called grey literature tries to

16 Naures Atto, Hostages in the homeland, orphans in the diaspora: identity discourses among the Assyrian/Syriac elites in the European diaspora, Leiden 2011, 144. 17 Adnan Mermertas, Grenzüberschreitungen: Ein syrisch-orthodoxer Christ zwischen Orient und Okzident, Glane Losser 2014, 109. 18 Frank Sichau, Sakralgebäude und religiöse Kunst in Wanne-Eickel und Herne. Der Emscherbrücher 2000, Herne 1999, 63. 19 Gründungsheft zur Einweihung, St. Petrus und Paulus Kirche Wanne-Eickel, 20. Oktober 1991. 20 David Wood, Grey Literature. The role of the British Library Lending Division, in: Aslib Proceedings 34 (1982), 459–465, 459.

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reconstruct history and connect some developments in the Syriac Orthodox migration to Europe with the community in Herne. 3.1 The first Syriac Orthodox foreign workers in the Ruhr area (the 1960s) The presence of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Herne begins with the first foreign worker, Ibrahim Atlas, who came from the city of Midyat in southeast Turkey to Germany in 1961.21 From his arrival until around 1970, he brought about twelve families to Germany. He helped them to find jobs in the Heitkamp construction company. Besides the construction sector, Syriac Orthodox Christians also worked in the textile industry and for the German national rail company. Most of the guest workers worked as unskilled workers. Some of these former unskilled workers continued their education and studied after work, which opened new professional possibilities. Workers often sent their wages home to support their families, wives, and children, or parents in Turkey. Legally, family reunification was regulated by the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz), which came into force in 1965. After the recruitment stop between 1973–1979, foreign workers gradually brought their wives and children to live with them.22 After the recruitment stop of foreign workers family reunification was the only authorized way to immigrate to Germany. Initially, religious life in the new environment proved to be challenging since the Syriac Orthodox Christians living in Herne did not have the resources to acquire a church building or pay for a priest. Even though priests from Tur Abdin visited the Syriac Orthodox Christians in the diaspora once in a while, this did not fulfil their religious needs. Other ways had to be developed to practice their religion away from home. Therefore, Syriac Orthodox Christians, who did not want to wait for a priest from Tur Abdin, sometimes made use of Catholic or Protestant churches, priests and rites for baptisms or weddings.23 For them, the official ecclesiastical act was more important than their own church affiliation. In these official acts, one encounters a type of practical ecumenism24 between Syriac Orthodox and Protestant and Catholic Christians to which scholars so far have devoted only scant attention. 21 Ibrahim Altas is the uncle of Adnan Mermertas, who is one of the founding members or the congregation in Herne. Mermertas talks about the beginnings in an interview and how his uncle brought his parents to Herne. They brought their 15 years old son Adnan Mermertas to Germany in 1971 in the context of the family reunion. 22 Carolin Butterwegge, Von der „Gastarbeiter“-Anwerbung zum Zuwanderungsgesetz, in: Klaus J. Bade/Jochen Oltmer, Normalfall Migration. Deutschland im 20. und frühen 21. Jahrhundert (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Zeitbilder 15), Bonn 2004, 127–132. 23 Josef Önder, Die syrisch-orthodoxen Christen. Zwischen Orient und Okzident, Tübingen 2015, 52. 24 By practical ecumenism, I mean mutual cooperation between the clergy and faithful for example receiving sacraments regardless of their religious affiliation. In general, ecumenism is considered as cooperation between Catholics and Protestants to understand each other better or intensify the relations. Often ecumenism is also mistaken as the Christian-Muslim dialogue. In 1984, the Syriac Patriarch Mor Ignatius Zakka I. Iwas and Pope John Paul II formulated a joint declaration that authorized their clergy and faithful to receive the sacraments of penance, eucharist, and anointing of the sick in the other church. Nevertheless, the declaration only allows it when access to their clergy cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, before this declaration came into force, Syriac Orthodox faithful have practiced this practical ecumenism in Protestant and Catholic churches.

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After ten years of Syriac Orthodox presence in Herne, in 1972, the community was able to secure the use the Catholic St. Lawrence’s church (St. Laurentius Kirche) in WanneEickel for their ecclesiastical activities. The church complex also functioned as the location for community events like conventions or festivities. In addition, once a week, a Syriac Orthodox language class and religious education took place here.25 However, initially, due to the lack of available priests, services were not held regularly. Bitris Ögünc, the first priest ordained in Midyat26 for permanent service in Germany, was in charge of the congregation in Herne from 1972 until 1975. He simultaneously held responsibility for other congregations in Germany. Ögünc lived in Augsburg and was employed and financed by the social service Caritas as a social worker.27 Additionally, the congregation was also served by dayroyo (monk) Isa Cicek who lived in the Netherlands. He celebrated the marriage of Adnan and Ayhan Memertas in Herne in 1978.28 Services were held irregularly every month or bimonthly. On special solemnities of the church, like Easter or Christmas et cetera, the faithful would also attend liturgies of other Syriac Orthodox congregations, for example services in the Dutch city of Hengelo. The transnational ties of the community to places and members in other countries became evident. In the following years, different priests were in charge of the congregation in Herne. From 1975 until 1978, the Syriac Orthodox Christians in Herne were ministered by the priest Ablahad Kis Afrim, who was working in southern Germany and supported by the monk Isa Cicek. At the end of the 1970s, the priest Josef Harman, who was working in North Rhine-Westphalia, was, among other parishes, responsible for the church work in Herne.29 In the ecclesiastical acts and the congregational events in St. Lawrence’s church, one can identify the beginnings of what would later become the parish. However, there was no constituted parish with its own church and legal recognition that existed at this moment. 3.2 The establishment of associations (the 1970s and 80s) During the oil crisis, the economic situation worsened, and workers were not needed in Germany anymore. The German government declared the end of the recruitment of foreign workers (Anwerbestopp) in 1973. It became increasingly difficult for Syriac Orthodox Christians to come to Germany. Thus, migration for work was no longer an option. In the second phase of Syriac Orthodox migration, from 1975 until 1984, Syriac Orthodox Christians tried to escape the increasing repression in their home countries. Though they now had to seek asylum rather than apply for working permits, nonetheless the movement to Germany did not subside after the recruitment stop. From 1976 onwards, Syriac Orthodox Christians no longer came to Herne exclusively from the geographic region of Tur Abdin. They also came as refuges from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria30 escaping the political and eco25 Gründungsheft zur Einweihung, St. Petrus und Paulus Kirche Wanne-Eickel, 20. Oktober 1991, 23. 26 Gabriele Yonan, Assyrer heute – Kultur, Sprache, Nationalbewegung der aramäisch sprechenden Christen im Nahen Osten – Verfolgung und Exil (Reihe pogrom), Hamburg 1978, 171. 27 See Christiane Lembert-Dobler, Religiöse Identität. Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen in der Diaspora, in: Augsburger volkskundliche Nachrichten 9 (2003), 6–27, 14. 28 Interview with Adnan Mermertas. 29 Ibid. 30 Adnan Mermertas reports on these developments as co-initiator of the Syriac Orthodox ethnic association in Herne that helped the recently arrived Syriac Orthodox Christians from these countries, to orient

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nomic situation in their homelands. Even though some Syriac Orthodox Christians had already settled down in Germany, a considerable part of the refugees were seeking asylum in Sweden since the system in Germany was extraordinarily complicated.31 In the 1970s, the community in Herne had no stable structures to organize its members. The congregational life took place by informal meetings that were organized through word of mouth. Even though foreign workers and their families would visit each other frequently and stay in contact, a legal framework facilitated the ability to allow the Syriac Orthodox Christians to organize themselves and meet each other on an organizational level. In 1976, a group of Syriac Orthodox students in Bochum (Yusuf Öz, Adnan Mermertas, Nebil Altas, Nayil Altas Yusuf Altas, Sabri Acer, Albert Sevinc) founded a registered association, using the legal category of an association (e.V.) or, more precisely, an ethnic association (Volksverein).32 The Syrisch Aramäische Volksverein in Wanne-Eickel e.V. was established for two main reasons: first, as a meeting place for the community. They needed an institution to meet, use and learn the Syriac language, and preserve culture and tradition. Second, the students wanted to establish a contact point for refugees that could help them with questions about asylum or that would help with translations, support them at governmental agencies and provide advice in questions of family reunification. Through this registered association there was an official institution Syriac Orthodox people could address. Other associations established earlier for Turkish foreign workers to provide support, such as the social service Türk Danış of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (the workers’ welfare union), were rejected by the Syriac Orthodox foreign workers. Since the target group of the social service was primarily Turkish foreign workers with a Muslim background Syriac Orthodox Christians did not feel addressed by these contact points and therefore refused to consult it. Similar registered associations were founded in many cities in which Syriac Orthodox families were living.33 Examples in North Rhine-Westphalia are: Syrianischer Volksverein Tur Abdin Gütersloh 1979 e.V., Syrischer Volksverein Tur Abdin Delbrück 1979 e.V. and the cultural association Turo d‘Izlo (Mount Izlo) Suryoye Gronau e.V. established in 1987. However, the Syriac ethnic associations did not play the role of the administration for the congregation or a church but are created a meeting space that people would visit to keep the community alive. Besides the Syriac Orthodox ethnic association in Herne, other groups were also founded in which members of the community could participate in different joint activities. In 1976, with the establishment of Aramäische Sprach- und Religionsschule (Aramaic language and religious school) a learning opportunity for community members with language and religious education in Herne was created. In addition, a group for folklore that would perform at municipal events on integration was founded in the same year. An essential element connecting the scattered community were the local football clubs. These clubs were usually affiliated with the ethnic and cultural associations, which were themselves in Germany. 31 Birol, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen, 239s. 32 Adnan Mermertas reports on the founding of the Volksverein as one of the initiators of the Syrisch Aramäischen Volksverein in Wanne-Eickel e.V. 33 According to my interlocutor Mermertas this association was the first. But more research is needed to explore this.

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the responsible bodies.34 In 1979 the football club FC Suryoye 79 e.V. was founded in Herne. The club played regularly against other Syriac Orthodox football clubs of other congregations in tournaments. These forms of the organisation helped to bring the Syriac Orthodox Christians together who were scattered all over Germany and maintain social cohesion via sports.35 In May 1980, for the first time a football tournament where four Syriac Orthodox football clubs played against each other took place in Paderborn. At this tournament, the FC Suryoye 79 from Herne played against other Syriac Orthodox football clubs in North Rhine-Westphalia like FC Paderborn, Turabdin Gütersloh and Aramäer Ahlen. These football clubs were closely interwoven with the ethnic and cultural associations, and they were the place where people did sport activities together and lived their identity precisely as Syriac Orthodox Christians in diaspora. Today, the football clubs in some Syriac Orthodox congregations are still gladly accepted and have won numerous members.36 Until the 1980s, some Syriac Orthodox Christians considered returning to their old homeland to continue their old lives. However, the situation in southeast Turkey, Iraq, and Syria did not improve, so that the people did not see their stay in Germany as a temporary episode any longer. Instead, they wanted to spend their future life here. Most families and relatives were already in Europe and had steady jobs, children were born here, and new structures with associations, groups, and the developing congregations kept the community together. The centres of both their family life and their ecclesial community had moved to Europe, and the people had found a new home where they could live their old traditions, language, and religion. They were able to practice their religion without restrictions from the state.37 In April 1980, another important event in the history of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Herne took place. The Syriac Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, Mor Ignatius Jacob III, came from Damascus to Herne and visited the faithful during his visit to Germany.38 This event was seen by the Syriac Orthodox of Herne as a sign of appreciation for their community. It also underscores the transnational connection of the diaspora with the old homeland and its Patriarch. 3.3 The purchase of St. Peter and Paul church in Herne (1990s) In the 1990s, a new chapter in the history of the Syriac Orthodox Christians in Herne began. The community learned that the Evangelical-Methodist St. Paul’s church in Herne had been forced to sell their church building since the number of members of this congregation was decreasing so they set out to buy the building to make their own permanent church. The purchase of this church was made possible with financial support from the Protestant regional church and the Catholic diocese. Notwithstanding, the Syriac Orthodox congrega34 Önder, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen, 56. 35 Ibid., 57. 36 F.e., the Aramäer Gütersloh soccer club exists since 1987. In the beginning, the club consisted of 20 members. In 2017, about 150 members belonged to the club. A booklet on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the club documented its history. 37 Although Syriac Orthodox Christians did not face persecution or restrictions in Europe like Turkey, internal conflicts sparked in the diaspora. Regarding the organization and future of the community, disputes arose among secular and ecclesiastical agents. One example is the name debate with Assyrians, Arameans, or Syrians. 38 Samul Gümüs, Die Syrisch-Orthodoxe Kirche von Antiochien in Herne, in: Sichau, Sakralgebäude, 63.

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tion procured a big part of the purchase price itself through donations of its members. Finally, St. Paul’s church was bought by the Syriac Orthodox congregation in 1990. Before the church was consecrated, they had been searching for a full-time priest for the congregation. On April 21, 1991, Samuel Gümüs, born in 1964 in Midyat, was ordained in the Catholic St. Lawrence’s church to serve in the new Syriac Orthodox church. After this, St. Peter and Paul’s church in Herne could finally be consecrated on October 20, 1991, by the Syriac Orthodox Archbishop Julius Cicek. Thereby, an entire official Syriac Orthodox parish was established. Since then, the official congregation Syrisch-orthodoxe Kirche in Wanne-Eickel e.V. is listed in the register of associations of the local district court in Herne. Notably, the Syriac Orthodox church St. Peter and Paul emerged from the ethnic association Syrisch Aramäischer Volksverein in Wanne Eickel e.V. that was founded in 1976. The ethnic association (Volksverein) with its members bought the church and the land belonging to it and appeared afterwards as Syrisch-orthodoxe Kirche in Wanne-Eickel e.V. It changed its official name and its legal status. In the booklet that was issued to commemorate the consecration, the church’s purchase and consecration are described as a “reward for the long and hard work”39 of the congregation in Herne “with the help of God, the sister churches and their congregations.” It states that, “henceforth the Syriac Orthodox Christians in Wanne-Eickel and the surrounding area have a home to preserve, with the help of God, their identity, religion, culture, and the Aramaic language.”40 Since that time, the funding of the congregation and the personnel has been covered by membership fees and donations. Voluntary social services are supported today in the congregation by a youth group and a women’s group. As is customary in all Syriac Orthodox congregations, a parish council also decides on administrative and financial issues.41 According to Samuel Gümüs, the priest of the congregation, approximately 65 Syriac Orthodox families lived in Herne in 1999.42 3.4 Further developments of the Syriac Orthodox St. Peter and Paul’s church in Herne (2000s) Since then, the congregation has grown continuously. Since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011 and the invasion of the terror militia “Islamic State” in 2014 in the north of Iraq, Syriac Orthodox Christians again came to Germany, mainly from Syria and northern Iraq, bringing new members to the community in Herne as well. In March 2015, the priest Samuel Gümüs was ordained as Chorepiskopos (churoyo), the highest-ranking priest (in German his designation is Dekan) after 24 years of service in the congregation in Herne. For this occasion, 1,500 guests from Germany and abroad came to Herne. In addition, renovations on St. Peter and Paul church have been conducted over the last ten years. A church hall was erected, and the church and churchyard were renovated. Great efforts were made to let the church correspond with the standard of Syriac Orthodox churches of the “homeland”. The church interior is modeled upon the classical Syriac

39 40 41 42

Gründungsheft zur Einweihung, 24. Ibid., 24. See Önder, Syrisch-orthodoxe Christen, 56. Ibid., 63.

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Orthodox church three-part structure.43 It consists of a chancel (qdush-qudshin) which is separated with a curtain (sathro), a choir (qestrumo) and a nave (haiklo). Today, 250 families who live scattered over the whole Ruhr region officially belong to the congregation.44 The Holy Mass is celebrated in various languages during religious festivals like Christmas or Easter. Accordingly, the church service in Herne is held in German, Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and Syriac. It is necessary to use these languages since the Syriac Orthodox Christians in Herne originate in a range of Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, different generations are part of the congregation now, and for some the first language is no longer Turkish or Arabic but German. The congregation in Herne participates regularly in official events of the municipality and thus is visible to the public. In March 2021, the Syriac Orthodox St. Peter and Paul church participated as the “fifth stop” in an integration project called Wanne InterkulTOUR. At this intercultural walk across the district, the congregation presented itself and informed the participants about its history and current situation.45

4. Conclusion The congregation of the Syriac Orthodox St. Peter and Paul's church in Herne vividly illustrates trends among the Syriac Orthodox community in Germany and all over Europe. It serves as an example for many other Syriac Orthodox church foundations. Even though national contexts (such as Sweden, the Netherlands, or Germany) have a significant bearing on the development of local churches, similar Pan-European patterns can be found. Through the micro-historical approach, we have seen the different stages of the development of the community in Herne. Its origins are not well documented anywhere, and if so, only in fragments. With the help of grey literature like scattered documents and contemporary witness accounts, this chapter sketched some crucial developments. The research also spotlights other Syriac Orthodox communities and their entanglements and reciprocal interactions. For example, the founding of Syriac Orthodox football clubs in several cities highlights the mutual developments within the Syriac Orthodox community in Germany. The case of Herne shows the gradual evolution from individuals who came as foreign workers from formerly marginalized village communities in the Midyat area of southeast Turkey to an established and legally recognized Syriac Orthodox parish in Germany. It also became clear that various events, such as the influx of Syriac Orthodox migrants in the Herne community from the Middle East, were changing the formerly purely Turkish Syriac Orthodox community. They established structures to organize themselves better socially and politically to support the newcomers. A village community expanded into a congregation of Syriac Orthodox Christians from different regions. Institutional structures such as ethnic and cultural associations, church councils, youth and women’s groups, religious education 43 Gabriel Rabo, Der Kirchenbau und seine innere Ausstattung in der syrisch-orthodoxen Kirche, in: Jobst Reller/Martin Tamcke, Trinitäts- und Christusdogma. Ihre Bedeutung für Beten und Handeln der Kirche. Festschrift für Jouko Martikainen, Münster 2001, 51–65. 44 The information is taken from an interview with Samuel Gümüs. 45 Wanne InterkulTOUR. Ein interkultureller Spaziergang durch Wanne-Süd, www.herne.de/Stadt-undLeben/Integration/Wanne-InterkulTour/ (29.07.2021).

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at public schools, and teaching at the local congregation are examples of establishing a church within the German context and adapting to local cultural customs. These trends also underscore the position of the Syriac Orthodox community worldwide as a religious group that has evolved into a transnational community. The foundation of a Syriac Orthodox diocese with its own Archbishop in 1997 and the subsequent granting of corporate status under German public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) in 2018 provided the church with the same legal privileges as enjoyed by Catholic and Protestant churches as well as other faith communities. By doing so, they have adapted successfully to the local sociopolitical circumstances. If one turns one's gaze to the old homeland of the Syriac Orthodox Christians, the situation looks completely different. In southeast Turkey, the fundamental status of Syriac Orthodox Christians as citizens is repeatedly called into question, and there is a legal dispute over church property on which there are claims from the state. A few months ago, the Syriac Orthodox abbot Bilacen of the Mor Yakub Monastery in Izlo mountain was sentenced to prison for allegedly supporting PKK fighters.46 Contrary to the restrictions in the homeland, new opportunities for Syriac Orthodox Christians have emerged in the diaspora. Subsidizing the teaching and fostering the Syriac language in both schools and the church are examples of how the German state allowed the church to flourish. The new context opened up the possibility of discussions and publications on the massacres of Syriac Orthodox Christians under the Ottoman Empire.47 For Syriac Orthodox Christians living in Europe favourable opportunities arose like getting well-paid jobs, organizing themselves in associations and churches, talking and publishing without restrictions about any topic. However, at the same time, the success story involved the scattering of the diaspora over different parts of Europe or the world. They are mourning the loss of their old homeland in Tur Abdin and trying to keep the memory of their splendid past in their parishes and countless publications alive.

46 Türkei: Gefängnisstrafe für Abt eines syrisch-orthodoxen Klosters, www.kathpress.at/goto/ meldung/2007820/tuerkei-gefaengnisstrafe-fuer-abt-eines-syrisch-orthodoxen-klosters (07.04.2021). 47 See Naures Atto, What Could Not Be Written. A Study of the Oral Transmission of Sayfo Genocide Memory Among Assyrians, in: Genocide Studies International 10 (2016), 183–209, 195.

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The Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands Shedding light on overlooked European Coptic diasporas Matija Miličić 1. Introduction The Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria expanded its territorial and ecclesial boundaries over the last six decades. Waves of Coptic1 migration from Egypt (and to a lesser extent from Sudan and Libya) to North America, Australia and Europe led to the establishment of numerous Coptic churches and thus contributed to the creation of a transnational Coptic Church. Although migration had already commenced in the mid-20th century and advanced during the reign of Pope Kyrillos VI, it was during Pope Shenouda III when the Coptic Church started to expand considerably outside Egypt. Today, Coptic ritual activities are performed in the Coptic mahgar2 (‫ﻣﻬﺠﺮ‬, land of immigration)3 across all continents and continue to shape the religious lives of many ‘migrant’ Copts. The largest Coptic (Orthodox) communities outside of Egypt are those in Englishspeaking countries, mainly in the USA and Canada. Accordingly, those communities are well-known both within the transnational Coptic Church and among scholars (Coptic and non-Coptic alike) who deal with Coptic diasporas in their research. By contrast, there is a large lacuna in Coptic studies and other related disciplines when it comes to research on the Coptic Orthodox communities in Europe. Many of these communities, smaller in their size and younger in their existence are usually overlooked among researchers. Little is known about their histories, activities, and current communal developments. The first Coptic parishes in Europe were established in the 1970s. Since then, many of these communities have significantly grown and new ones have emerged. Consequently, today many European cities, such as London, Berlin and Rome, host a Coptic church. Both Coptic clergy and lay members of the Church have contributed to the development of their newly born parishes in different European countries by acquiring church buildings, actively maintaining and performing various religious practices and providing different social, spir1 2 3

Here, I will not make a distinction among different denominations of Copts (i.e. Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant). As Orthodox Copts represent the absolute majority, and are also the focus of my study, in many parts of the paper I will simply use “Copts” or “Coptic” to avoid repetition. Romanization of the word in Egyptian Arabic vernacular. Otherwise mahjar (if Romanization of Modern Standard Arabic is followed). Although the term ‘diaspora’ is highly contested, here, I will use it interchangeably with “the land of immigration” when referring to expatriate communities of Copts around the world.

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itual and educational services to the members of the community (e.g. Sunday school education). In addition, finding themselves in religiously pluralistic and diverse societies, leaders of Coptic Orthodox churches in Europe have inevitably established ecumenical relations, with both local and other migrant churches. In this paper, I will present a brief overview of the history of Coptic migration waves to Europe, the establishment of the first Coptic communities on the continent, as well as an outline of their principal activities and recent trajectories. My focus will then shift to the Coptic Orthodox communities in the Netherlands and their textual practices, a subject that holds a central place in my own PhD research project.4 Textual practices represent one of the core activities of the Coptic community in the Netherlands. These practices refer to a wide range of activities concerning the ways Dutch Copts approach and deal with different forms of texts, as well as motivations for writing and publishing such texts. These may include translating ritual books, writing brand new texts and educational materials for children, engaging in digitization of earlier publications, among other things. The Coptic Church in the Netherlands aims to preserve its tradition in a new home, but, like any other church in the Coptic diaspora (or, in reality, any other migrant church), it faces numerous issues and challenges posed by migration. Analyzing the textual practices of Dutch and other European Copts can reveal how the Church sees itself in a new society, how it deals with the questions of adaption and innovation, and how it seeks to preserve the Coptic tradition across different generations. Although the findings are currently at a limited level, this paper will try to shed light on the textual practices of Dutch Copts as an essential activity that can help us better understand how the community experiences changes. More generally, it will contribute to the field by placing European Coptic diasporas into the discussion and underline the importance of studying these diasporas as part of a larger Coptic transnational community.

Fig. 1 St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Church in The Hague. Photo MM

4

The PhD project is part of a large research project called “Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: Oriental Christianity in Europe between 1970 and 2020”, supported by a European Research Council (ERC)-Advanced grant. See more: www.ru.nl/ptrs/research/research-projects/rewriting-global-orthodoxy/.

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2. The Coptic Orthodox Church in Europe First contact between Europe and the Coptic Orthodox Church occurred several centuries ago, with the arrival of Catholic and later Protestant missions to Egypt. Under British rule, the Copts (and their compatriots) became more familiar with migration to Europe. In the early decades of the twentieth century, many Egyptian students earned opportunities to pursue their higher education in British universities. Copts capitalized on these opportunities and advanced in their academic and professional careers across Great Britain. Increasingly, contact with European nations (mainly Britain and France) and their cultures, together with political developments in the country (e.g. colonial rule, nationalist movements, religious revivals, among others), familiarized Copts with possibilities for education and professional advancement in different Western countries.5 By the 1950s and 1960s, Copts started migrating to Europe in greater numbers, as was the case with other Coptic waves of migration. The United Kingdom was one of the first destinations, which probably explains why today it hosts the largest Coptic community in Europe. The UK is also where the first Coptic liturgy was conducted in 1954.6 During the Nasser era, many Copts who emigrated to the UK were highly skilled professionals, especially those who studied medicine and moved to different British cities in order to complete their medical training. After graduating and completing their specializations, the National Health Service sent graduates to wherever their expertise was needed. This partly explains the geographic diffusion of the Coptic community across the UK, which is now organized under three dioceses and numbers more than 20,000 members.7 In the 1970s and 1980s, immigration to Europe intensified as more middle-class Copts were able to emigrate due to the intifāḥ (“open door”) policies implemented by President Anwar al-Sadat. The main reasons for Coptic emigration from Egypt were largely shared by all Egyptians who considered migration: first, pursuit of a better education and professional advancement and second, to escape poverty, economic decline and political instability. However, as the Islamic movement in Egypt intensified and brought on an increase in interreligious conflict, Copts had additional motivation to emigrate, as many of them faced persecution and discrimination.8 In addition to the United Kingdom, Copts mostly immigrated to Western European countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands. Most of these communities flourished at the end of the twentieth century and have considerably grown ever since. It is difficult to provide reliable estimates of the number of Copts in Europe because religion is not part of the official state census in many European countries. Egyptian Copts, therefore, simply fall into the category ‘Egyptians.’ Moreover, those who became naturalized in their new countries and whose children were born outside Egypt are often 5

Fuad Megally, Migration, Coptic, CE 1620b-1624b, in: The Coptic Encyclopedia 5, https://ccdl. claremont.edu/ digital/collection/cce/id/1385/rec/1. 6 The Coptic Orthodox Church Centre UK, The Coptic Church in the UK, www.copticcentre.com/thecoptic-orthodox-church/the-coptic-church-in-the-uk/ (2021-05-26). 7 Alistair Hunter/Fiona McCallum Guiney, The Quest for Equal Citizenship. Middle Eastern Christian Narratives of Migration and Inclusion in the United Kingdom, in: Mashriq & Mahjar 8 (2020), 1–39, 8. 8 Nora Stene Preston, Multiple Choice? Language‐usage and the Transmission of Religious Tradition in the Coptic Orthodox Community in London, in: British Journal of Religious Education 20 (1998), 90– 101, 91.

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legally recognized as “British,” “Italian,” “Dutch,” among others. Thus, rough estimates of the community sizes usually come from Coptic immigrant churches. The first Coptic parishes in Europe were established in England, France and Germany. The first church in England was founded in 1974 when the Copts bought a Protestant church in Kensington, London. The church was dedicated to St. Mark, founder of the Coptic Church according to the Coptic tradition, and consecrated by H.H. Pope Shenouda III in 1978.9 In his own words, St. Mark Church in London represents “the mother church of all Coptic Orthodox Churches in United Kingdom.”10 When it comes to France, the first priest was ordained in 1975 in Marseille, followed by the ordination of more priests in other French cities, including Paris and Toulon. Germany obtained its first Coptic church in 1975 in Frankfurt, and in the following two years, churches were established in Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Munich, Hamburg and Hannover. Coptic communities in Europe grew with an accelerated migration towards the end of the century, resulting in the foundation of more parishes. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Copts acquired new places of worship in many other European countries, including Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, and Greece.11 Most often, Copts purchased abandoned churches or monasteries from the local communities, whether Catholic or Protestant, and in some cases from other Orthodox denominations (as is the case with the Coptic church in Berlin which had previously belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church).12 If Coptic communities are not able to purchase a church, either due to lack of resources or various legal regulations, parishioners will rent a church building from another denomination. For instance, in Spain, where the local Catholic church does not sell its buildings, the Coptic Diocese rents several churches, usually under a contractual obligation of as much as a hundred years.13 In addition to obtaining churches, the Coptic Orthodox Church has invested in establishing various cultural centers and Coptic monasteries across Europe. Monasticism, as one of the central pillars of the Coptic tradition, was brought to the continent and many Coptic monks now devote their lives to spirituality, surrounded by forests and mountains across Europe. Some of the European Coptic monasteries can be found in Scarborough, England, Kröffelbach and Höxter in Germany, Milan, in Italy, Ronchères in France, and Lievelde, in the Netherlands. Today, the Coptic Orthodox community in the UK is considered the largest, with thirtytwo parishes in both the United Kingdom and Ireland.14 France hosts more than fifteen parishes and its members are represented by dioceses of northern and southern France (Coptic Orthodox Church in France), and by the French Coptic Orthodox Church (Coptic Orthodox Church of France).15 The Coptic Orthodox Church in France encompasses parishes consisting of migrants of Coptic Egyptian origin and thus still maintains its Egyptian and Arabic character. On the other hand, the Coptic Orthodox Church of France, headed by metropoli9 Coptic Orthodox Church Centre UK, Coptic Church in the UK. 10 St. Mark’s Church Coptic Orthodox Diocese of London, Who We Are, https://stmark.org.uk/who-weare/ (2021-07-15). 11 Al-Banna, Al-Aqbāṭ fī Miṣr wa-al-Mahjar, 172–174. 12 Ibid., 174. 13 Personal communication with a cleric of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Spain. 14 Coptic Orthodox Church Centre UK, ibid. 15 Le Patriarcat d'Alexandrie, Eglise copte-orthodoxe, in: Coptica free, http://coptica.free.fr/presentation _synthetique_de_l_eglise_128.htm (2021-05-26).

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tan Abba Athanasios, is largely gathered around the local French population interested in the Coptic rite.16 In Germany, there are nine churches but one can find more communities that are not centered around those already-established parishes.17 Certain estimates suggest that there were around 12,000 Copts in Germany in 2016.18 Italy19 is home to a large Coptic community, led by two bishops who are based in the two largest Italian cities, Rome and Milan. The Coptic Orthodox Church in Switzerland is organized according to the lingocultural division in the country. German-speaking parishes (Verein der koptisch-orthodoxen Kirche in der Schweiz) have their local seat in Dietlikon, near Zurich, and are part of the Diocese of Austria and German-speaking parts of Switzerland. Francophone Copts in Switzerland (Association de l’Église Copte Orthodoxe de Suisse romande) are centered around the town of Meyrin and are officially under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Southern France and French-speaking parts of Switzerland, with its seat in Geneva.20 In addition, in recent years we have witnessed the rise of new communities, such as those in Spain and Hungary. In Spain, Copts mainly centered along the Mediterranean coast and the community numbers around a thousand believers.21 In Hungary, the Church community, which numbers around 100 families, obtained its first church only in 2011, and has been organized under the Central European Coptic Orthodox Diocese since 2017, seated in Budapest.22

Fig. 2 Icons of Jesus Christ and St. Marina in the Virgin Mary and St. Mina Coptic Orthodox Church in Badalona, Spain. Photo MM

16 17 18 19

Angela Bernardo, Ricostruire una comunità, la Chiesa copta ortodossa in Europa, Roma 2020, 113. Emily Jane Carter Hein, The Semiotics of Diaspora, Ann Arbor/MI 2013, 12. Fouad & Barbara Ibrahim, Kopten in Deutschland, 219. In general, Italy hosts a large Egyptian diaspora. According to a source from 2018, there are around 120,000 Egyptians in the country, https://brill.com/view/title/57389. 20 Bernardo, ibid., 126s. 21 Óscar Salguero Montaño, Iglesias orientales en España, Madrid 2020, 271–294, 285. 22 Tamás Farbaky, Negotiating Identities. The Case of the Coptic Orthodox diaspora in Budapest, 2020, 32.

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Coptic Orthodox churches in Europe maintain close relations with one another. There are yearly seminars and conferences organized by Church leaders, including youth meetings. Every year, the European youth conference is held in the last week of August, hosted by a different country each year. During this event, young Copts, accompanied by bishops and priests, take part in various social and spiritual activities and discussions. For instance, they participate in joint liturgies, Bible reading sessions, and prayers, as well as in discussions about the youth’s role in the Church and take trips to local sights. The organizers of the conference, which has taken place since 2001, aim to adopt a “Christian and modern manner” throughout the event.23 In 2007, the Netherlands hosted the youth meeting, named “Europe Youth Mission 2007,” where around 550 young Copts from all over Europe gathered for a four-day event.24 The last conference was held in Italy in 2019, attended by around 600 Copts. Another recent initiative of the Coptic churches in Europe is The European Academy for Coptic Heritage (TEACH). This Academy was founded in 2019 in the United Kingdom and functions as a learning platform that aims to preserve and transmit Coptic heritage by offering multiple courses in Coptic history, music, language, theology, and many other aspects of Coptic culture. The lessons are given online and mainly in Arabic, English and French, with a possibility of introducing German, Dutch and Italian in the future. The academic board of TEACH mainly consists of several European bishops, priests and lay Coptic professionals.25

3. Coptic Orthodox Communities in the Netherlands The Dutch Coptic Orthodox community is fairly small, but increasingly expanding. Coptic migration to the Netherlands started in the 1960s, when a few families arrived to the country to pursue higher education that landed them high-profile jobs at universities and banks. The following wave occurred in the 1970s when many Coptic students came to the Netherlands for summer jobs, mostly in agriculture, factories and car sales. Some of them returned to Egypt, while others sought possibilities to continue their lives in a new country. The third wave of migration took place in the late 1980s, when the Coptic Orthodox Church was officially established in the Netherlands. After the Second Gulf war, many Copts migrated from Iraq and the Gulf to Europe, including the Netherlands. The group mainly consisted of young Copts who sought a better life, with social, political and financial stability.26 The first Coptic Orthodox church in the Netherlands was established in 1985 in Amsterdam, marking the official ‘birth’ of the Dutch Coptic community. For almost a decade, the church in Amsterdam was the only Coptic church in the country and Father Arsanious was the only priest responsible for the whole community. The establishment of the Coptic community in Amsterdam allowed for an increase in number of Copts in the country in the following years. The existence of a stable parish in Amsterdam encouraged more Copts to 23 H.G. Bishop Arseny welcomes European youth to EYC 2014, https://www.copticworld.org/ articles/3459/ (2021-06-04). 24 Bishop Anba Arseny, Magazine al-Tariq/De Weg, “Europe Youth Mission 2007”, 18. 25 TEACH, About Us, https://teach.eu.com/local/staticpage/view.php?page=about (2021-06-25). 26 Personal communication with a cleric of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands.

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move to the city (and its surroundings) and settle around the church.27 The community significantly grew in the 1990s and early 2000s when more churches were purchased and more priests were sent to the Netherlands by Pope Shenouda III.28 Today, there are more than ten priests who serve a total of nine Coptic Orthodox churches in the Netherlands, and specifically in Amsterdam, the Hague, Eindhoven, Utrecht, Assen, Leeuwarden, Kapelle, Leidschendam and Bussum.29 In addition, there is a Coptic church in Antwerp, Belgium, which is under the jurisdiction of the Dutch Coptic Orthodox Diocese. In the east of the country, a Syriac Orthodox church in Enschede is used by the local Coptic community, and in Lievelde, the Copts established the Coptic monastery of the Virgin Mary and St. Theodore of Amasea in 2015. Holy Virgin Mary church in Amsterdam (Koptisch-Orthodoxe kerk van de Heilige Maagd Maria) serves as the seat of the Diocese. The Diocese was established in 2013 when the pioneering priest Arsenious was consecrated as Bishop Arseny. Fig. 3 Holy Virgin Mary Coptic Orthodox Church in Amsterdam, seat of the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of the Netherlands. Photo MM

It is difficult to make an exact estimate of the number of Copts in the Netherlands since the state census does not register religious or ethnic denominations among its citizens. According to some earlier estimates, there were around 2,000 Copts in the Netherlands at the end of the twentieth century30, while a later source suggests that this number increased to 4,000 Coptic believers by 2005.31 Another projection states that there were around 6,000 Copts in 201032, while the official website of the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of the Netherlands estimates about 10,000 Copts (even though it is not clear when this information was last updated).33 Although we do not know the exact numbers, projections 27 Al-Anbā Arsānī, Shamʿa Muḍīʾa, 61. 28 Bishop Anba Arseny, Magazine al-Tariq/De Weg, “Oprichting van Nieuwe Kerken en de Komst van Priesters,” 27. 29 Koptisch Orthodox Diocese van Nederland, Koptische Kerken in NL, www.koptischekerk.nl/koptischekerken-in-nl/ (2021-05-20). 30 Puk de Wit, Koptische visies op de Egyptische maatschappij, in: Het Christelijk Oosten 49 (1997), 345– 353, 347. 31 Nelly van Doorn-Harder, De Koptisch-Orthodoxe Kerk, Utrecht 2005, 161. 32 Lepoeter, Een Koptisch-Orthodoxe Kerk in Zeeland, 10. 33 Koptisch Orthodox Diocese van Nederland, Het Koptisch Orthodoxe Bisdom van Nederland,

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suggest that the Coptic community in the Netherlands is increasing. The largest Coptic parishes are located in the biggest cities – Amsterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven and Utrecht. When it comes to the geographical diffusion, the majority of the Copts live and are members of the churches in the central-western Netherlands (approximately corresponding the conurbation of Randstad34). The majority of Dutch Copts are self-employed or work in tourism and different fields of the hospitality industry. Some of them work as building contractors, doctors, engineers, pharmacists and bankers.35 According to the official website of the Diocese, the Coptic Church in the Netherlands is actively involved in ecumenical relations and thus keeps close ties with other churches in the Netherlands. The Copts cooperate with local Protestant and Catholic churches, as well as with its “sister” Eastern and Oriental Orthodox. In 2005, the Coptic Church became part of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands (de Raad van Kerken in Nederland), which unites mostly churches from the mainline Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions, in addition to a number of Evangelical and Orthodox churches.36 Additionally, the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of the Netherlands is a member of the Alliance of Oriental Orthodox churches in the Netherlands (Samenwerkingsverband van Oriëntaals orthodoxe Kerken in Nederland, SOKIN), with Bishop Arseny as its chairman, and a pan-Orthodox organization named Orthodoxe Zendende Instantie (OZI). The OZI functions as a meeting point for administrative cooperation among member-churches and aims at increasing the visibility of Orthodoxy in the Netherlands. 37 Interaction and cooperation among Orthodox churches in the Netherlands is also realized through education and research, and specifically through St. Irenaeus Orthodox Theological Institute (St. Irenaeus Orthodox Theologisch Instituut), located at Radboud University in Nijmegen. St. Irenaeus Institute offers courses at under-graduate and graduate levels, and conducts research in both Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy.38 3.1 The Dutchification of the Coptic tradition The Coptic community in the Netherlands aims to preserve and follow the teachings, principles and rituals that constitute the Coptic tradition. The Dutch Coptic Orthodox Diocese pays a great deal of attention to retaining the authentic church and community organization, to convey the structure, atmosphere and visual aspects of the Mother Church outside Egypt. This continuity is reflected in efforts to conduct the holy liturgy according to the Coptic Orthodox rite, providing baptism, marriage and funeral services to its members, decorating and organizing the churches “in a Coptic manner” by hanging icons of Coptic saints, having the altar face east, install wooden decorations and Coptic inscriptions, among other things. In addition, Sunday school lessons and hymn singing classes for children are organized, as well as various other social and spiritual activities to unite different generations. Beyond local parish services, the Netherlands is one of several European countries where the Coptic monastic life is preserved and nourished in the diaspora. The Coptic Orwww.koptischekerk.nl/over-ons.html (2021-05-25). 34 Randstad (lit. ‘rim city’) is a conurbation consisting of the four largest cities in the Netherlands – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, and their surrounding areas. 35 Al-Anbā Arsānī, Shamʿa Muḍīʾa, 49. 36 Raad van Kerken in Nederland, Lidkerken, www.raadvankerken.nl/organisatie/lidkerken/ (2021-07-10). 37 http://orthodox.nl/ (2021-07-10). 38 St. Irenaeus Orthodox Theologisch Instituut, https://irenaeus.nl/ (2021-07-10).

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thodox monastery in Lievelde in the province of Gelderland was established in 2015, when the building of a previously Catholic monastery was purchased. The monastery opened its doors to three monks in early 2016.39 Additionally, the Diocese acquired a building for its Coptic cultural center (Dutch: Koptisch Cultureel Centrum), which was officially established in 2007 and is located next to the church in Amsterdam. The center incorporates two chapels, two halls, twelve Sunday school classrooms, student apartments, youth club rooms, a gym, cafeteria and the church shop.40 The building of the Coptic cultural center is an important meeting point for the members of the local community. Overall, all Coptic churches in the Netherlands represent places for socialization among parish members, places where their Coptic identity can be communally expressed at least once a week. Although Copts in the Netherlands tend to uphold traditions rooted in the contemporary Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt, they are certainly not immune to changes, adaptations and innovations. One of the central examples of the diaspora developments concerns the liturgy. The liturgy in the Coptic churches in the Netherlands is usually conducted in three languages: Arabic, Coptic and Dutch. In some churches, such as the Holy Virgin Mary church in Amsterdam (which has the largest congregation in the country), services are divided based on the target generation and are conducted in three different chapels. The first service is in Arabic (with Coptic elements) and is directed towards the senior population; the second is performed in the three languages and thus is suited for a mixed audience, while the third service is solely in Dutch and is meant for the youngest members of the community. Although the Church provides Arabic lessons to second and third generation Copts, many of them are not fluent or cannot read Arabic. Sunday school is also given in Dutch to cater to younger congregants. In this way, the Church accommodates the needs of its youth (often seen as “the future of the Church”) to be able to pass down the Coptic tradition and Christian values in a language they fully understand. Aside from the youth, translations of the liturgy (and of books and other materials) are also meant for converts to the Coptic Orthodox faith, mostly through marriage. The number of converts, however, remains low.41 Dutch Copts also innovate through hymnology. The traditional Coptic melodies are preserved while some parts of the text (and sometimes wholly) are translated into Dutch. In the words of a priest, one of the main tasks of the Coptic Church in the Netherlands is to create a balance between Christian and Coptic Orthodox values, on the one hand, and Western, more liberal values, on the other. This balance on issues of education and upbringing for the youth encourages young Copts to integrate into Dutch society while still retaining their “Coptic identity.” 42 These are the challenges facing the Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands, which is negotiating changes by adapting and innovating various elements of its tradition and practices, which are now acquiring a Dutch vesture. 3.2 Coptic textual practices in the Netherlands Textual production and activities in their widest sense have a long tradition within the Coptic Orthodox Church. The textual practices of the Copts in “the land of immigration” depict 39 40 41 42

Lepoeter, “Een Koptisch-Orthodoxe Kerk in Zeeland”, 11. Bishop Anba Arseny, Magazine al-Tariq/De Weg, “Koptisch Cultureel Centrum”, 24. Van Doorn-Harder, Koptisch-Orthodoxe Kerk, 163s. Personal communication with a cleric of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands.

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the Church’s position vis-à-vis its changing traditions and illustrate various developments within the community. These textual practices reflect a variety of trends in the contemporary Coptic literary scene. These trends include the import and circulation of various textual materials from Egypt and other Coptic ‘diasporas,’ writing new texts in different genres, translating and publishing books and booklets in Dutch, and increasingly asserting an online presence. In addition, the ways Dutch Copts see and utilize different forms of texts reveal the Diocese’s strategies and motivations to maintain spirituality, and transmit heritage and teachings of the Coptic Orthodox Church within its evolving community. These can be recognized in the ways the Church designs the Sunday school curricula, how it approaches the question of digitization, or how often the Church should publish new textual materials. Fig. 4 Bookshop of the Archangel Michael and St. Antonios Coptic Orthodox Church in Eindhoven. Photo MM

The textual and literary practices of the Copts in the Netherlands commenced with the establishment of their Church in 1985. Most of the Coptic churches in the country have church shops where different textual materials are sold. It is difficult to make an estimate of how many books have been published by the Dutch Coptic Orthodox Diocese. However, a 2010 issue of the official magazine of the Diocese presented a list of twentyfour publications, all in Dutch.43 The textual practices of the Copts in the Netherlands are another practice that is acquiring a Dutch dress. The young Coptic community of the Netherlands began translating and publishing various textual materials in Dutch at an early stage. Some of these early publications include ritual books, which are used on a regular basis in the church to represent one of the fundamental sources for an active religious life. These include the Holy Liturgy according to St. Basil (the first translation was published in 1976, even before the foundation of the first church) and Agbeya (the Book of Hours). In addition to ritual books, publishing activities of the Dutch Coptic community include translations of books about the doctrine, theology and spirituality of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Among these are books by Pope Shenouda III, which, along with original editions in Arabic and English, abound in bookstores of Coptic churches across the country. The Coptic Church in the Netherlands also publishes its bilingual and bimonthly magazine, 43 Bishop Anba Arseny, Magazine al-Tariq/De Weg, “Nederlandstalige Publicaties”, 22.

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called al-Tariq (‫)ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻳﻖ‬/De Weg (The Road), which was established in 1985. Over the years, the magazine has featured multiple sections covering different genres and contributions by both Coptic lay members and the clergy, including a fixed section by Pope Shenouda III until his death in 2012.44 Members of the community interested in reading the magazine can receive a new copy in their mailbox. Recently, the Diocese has decided to digitize the magazine and upload new issues on its official Facebook page. This trend has become more common in the recent period and relates to the questions of accessibility, flexibility and financial matters. For instance, an increasing number of prayer books, Bible excerpts and Sunday school lessons are created as PowerPoint presentations, which are uploaded on the church websites or sent via different social media networks among members of the community. Consequently, these materials are easily accessed, modified by church leaders or Sunday school instructors, and shared within the community. Fig. 5 French, English and Dutch books in the bookshop of the St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church in The Hague. Photo MM

Overall, the textual production in the Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands is still modest and largely depends on the materials published in Egypt, which explains the prevalence of Arabic books found in church bookshops. During my visits to several Coptic churches in the Netherlands, I was told that physical books are losing their prominence among the community members, especially among the youth (a development seen among the Dutch youth more generally), who either solely make use of ritual books in the church or reach out to various online platforms when it comes to reading or learning. Many church goers, both the youth and adults, have been increasingly following the liturgy and reading psalms on their smartphones, whether in Arabic, Dutch or English. This has inevitably changed the traditional nature of ritual textual practices, in churches or elsewhere. However, even with an increased online presence where more and more books are digitized and made available for free, traditional textual practices are still defying the move to digital publications and other online resources. The slowly growing numbers of publications produced by the Coptic community in the Netherlands suggest that there is every reason to believe that these books will remain a significant part of many church bookshops and persevere as an integral part of the religious practices of the Church and its members. Whether in 44 Ibid.

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the form of books on the shelves of the church bookshops, a magazine that is delivered to the believers’ home addresses or as digitized texts on church websites and social media networks, Coptic textual materials certainly prove to be an important part of the daily lives of many members of the Coptic Orthodox community in the Netherlands.

4. Conclusion Copts in Europe are an overlooked diaspora. Existing scholarship on the diaspora Copts has largely concentrated on the communities in North America and Australia, and has wrongfully neglected the growing communities in Europe. Some of these diasporas already have well-established parishes, while others have only recently emerged and started to develop. These new waves of Coptic migration have contributed to the ongoing expansion of the Coptic Orthodox Church globally. As a result, new communities have been established in the recent years (such as those in Spain and Hungary) and today, many European countries host at least one Coptic church. Studying European Coptic diasporas can reveal strategies and dynamics of recent waves of emigration from Egypt and demonstrate conditions of establishing and organizing new communities in the contemporary times. Exploring Coptic presence in Europe will unveil transcontinental networks among the churches (e.g. at the ecclesial, ritual, administrative, and organizational levels) and thus bring to light possible mutual influences among them. In addition, Coptic churches in Europe display a high level of linguistic diversity when it comes to their ritual and textual practices. A visitor to a Coptic church in Europe can attend the liturgy in Italian, purchase a book by Pope Shenouda III in German or spot wooden inscriptions of psalms in Spanish. These developments depict Copts’ adaptation to the local needs and environments, as well as changes in the traditional visual culture of the Coptic Orthodox Church. The Coptic Orthodox Church in the Netherlands counts almost forty years of existence. Commencing with one church and one priest in 1985, Dutch Copts today have ten parishes and a monastery. Although the community is small compared to those in North America and Australia, the Coptic Diocese of the Netherlands is growing, with a couple of new churches established in the last several years. The Coptic community of the Netherlands is highly active; church leaders participate in ecumenical meetings, both at the national and continental level; the Church organizes numerous spiritual and cultural activities for its members, as well as for the members of other Oriental Orthodox churches in the country (such as joint meetings of youth choir groups). Additionally, many Copts are active through several groups founded by the Church, whose members organize and participate in various religious and social activities, such as Bible readings, singing, traveling, and helping those in need. The Coptic Orthodox Diocese of the Netherlands fosters monastic life and pays special attention to its youngest members though Sunday schools. Additionally, the Church is expanding its textual production with an increased number of translations of Arabic and English books, continuation of publishing its bimonthly magazine, and by closely considering the needs for digitization. Taking a closer look at the activities and practices of the Copts in the Netherlands will ultimately help us better understand how this immigrant church is preserving and transmitting the Coptic tradition and identity, as they undergo the process of Dutchification.

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Coptic Traditions’ Digitization in Francophone Europe Gaétan du Roy Today many Copts live outside of Egypt. The largest groups are present in North America and Australia, but Europe is also a land of migration for many Egyptian Christians since the 1970s. This paper presents a first problematization of ongoing research about Coptic communities in Francophone Europe, principally France, Belgium, and Switzerland. This investigation is part of a larger project about Oriental Christians in Europe approached through the lens of their textual practices.1 The goal of the project is to address the history of those “diasporas” (see below), by studying the texts they read and produce but also the ways in which they relate to those texts. In this perspective texts are considered not only from the point of view of their content but also in relation to their materiality, to their usages and to their iconicity, i.e., their symbolic value.2 Books, pamphlets, magazines, Bibles, and increasingly digital texts of all kinds are produced, illustrated, sold, venerated, in diaspora contexts. They sometimes generate profound attachments from the people who use or possesses them. I am here inspired by Laurent Thévenot’s approach of the role intimate attachments to common objects (which he calls “common-places”) can play in creating communal links.3 Those common-places can be places, poems, human beings, certain types of food, and in the case that occupies us here, books and texts. These objects are indeed important actants of religious groups’ communal life.4 That is why I argue it is worth unpacking the different aspects of texts’ social life, how they are used, interpreted, touched, kept, but also what they do to a religious community, like the French Coptic community. How many people are concerned by this study? France would, following some estimations, account for a population of 40,000 people but some studies give the number of 250,000.5 This shows how uncertain these numbers are. We know however that there are twenty parishes and one monastery in France.6 Other Francophone countries host smaller groups, like in Roman Switzerland with around 200 families 7 (two churches in Roman Switzerland and three for the German-speaking part), and more or less the same in Belgium (all 3 churches are in Flanders but the Leuven church is also frequented by Francophones). 1 2 3 4

5 6 7

See Heleen Murre-van den Berg’s contribution to this volume. James W. Watts, Iconic Books and Texts, Sheffield-Bristol 2013. Laurent Thévenot, Voicing concern and difference from public spaces to common-places, in: European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 1 (2014), 7–34. I borrow the term actant to Latour’s actor-network theory. He defines an actant as “something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general. The actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of an action. Bruno Latour, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications, in: Soziale Welt 47 (1996), 369–381, 373. Beatrice Nicolini, The Copts in Italy. Migration and Generosity, Leiden 2020, 590. www.chretiensorientaux.eu/copte-orthodoxe. www.rts.ch/info/monde/2854584-menace-sur-les-eglises-coptes-de-suisse-et-du-monde.html.

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The estimated number of Copts in France probably constitutes an overestimation which is impossible to verify as ethnic and religious statistics are forbidden in this country. It is important here to precise in which sense I use the much-debated concept of diaspora. I suggest, with Delphine Pagès-Karoui, to understand it as a process rather than a substance to avoid reifying the term.8 This author uses different criteria to compare Muslims and Copts living outside Egypt: dispersion, strong links with the country of origin, inter-polarity, selfconscience of the group unity, collective memory, a strong organization system, and the will to return. Inter-polarity, self-conscience, collective memory, and organization are weak among Egyptian Muslims, which leads Pagès El-Karoui to conclude that there is probably nothing such as an Egyptian diaspora, but she shows that Copts meet all the criteria allowing to call them a diaspora.9 Each of these criteria would need to be investigated and related to one another to better understand the communal dynamics among Copts in Europe. Interestingly a study of interconnections between Egyptian websites abroad confirmed this difference between Christian and Muslim Egyptians and has shown that the only significant and sustained interconnections between websites located in different Western countries, concerned the Copts.10 These interactions were studied by automatically tracing the references to other Internet pages on each website. Coptic communities, like elsewhere in diaspora, must deal with the difficult question of languages when it comes to preserve their traditions and perform their religious rituals. Their mother tongue is generally Arabic but increasingly, in the new generations, French. Copts need therefore to integrate French into their religious daily experience, by singing, reading, praying in French, during their ceremonies. This involves a need for texts in French, either produced directly in this language, or translated from Arabic and sometimes English. Some of those are written and printed in Europe, but most of them are still originating directly in Egypt. The Coptic patriarchate produces for instance translations in different languages. The situation is further complicated by the presence of Coptic, a dead language for centuries, which mainly survived in the liturgy. Nobody really speaks Coptic, but its symbolic importance is nonetheless strongly affirmed by many community members. Recent investigations have even shown that some Copts (in this case in Germany) claim Coptic as their mother tongue, rejecting Arabic as a sort of foreign language imposed by the Muslim conquerors of Egypt since the seventh century.11 In brief, Egyptian Christians living in diaspora must deal with at least three languages, and, in a country like Belgium, it can even be four.

8 Delphine Pagès-El Karoui, Égyptiens d’outre-Nil: des diasporas égyptiennes, in: Tracés, 23 (2012), https://journals.openedition.org/traces/5552. 9 She also mentions that the Copts do not frequently use the term in Arabic, as shatat it is too strongly connected to Jewish realities and also used to describe Palestinian outside Palestine – and thus Coptic authorities have always avoided using it as it could be considered as an accusation by Egyptian authorities. 10 Marta Severo/Eleonora Zuolo, Egyptian E-Diaspora. Migrant Websites without a Network?, in: Social Science Information 51 (2012), 6; https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018412456772. 11 Emily Jane Carter Hein, The Semiotics of Diaspora. Language, Ideologies and Coptic Orthodox Christianity in Berlin, Germany (PhD, University of Michigan), 2013.

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Fig. 1 Snapshot for the Facebook page of the Coptic Church of Antwerp

I will use an ethnographic vignette to highlight some of the questions raised by the religious uses of those different languages in relation to digital medias and Coptic self-perception. On Sunday 8th of August 2021, I was attending the holy mass in Nogent-sur-Marne, one of the ten parishes located around Paris. This church falls under the jurisdiction of Bishop Mark, who in 2018 was consecrated as the Bishop of Paris and the North of France, one of the two bishoprics in the country. The mass was held in a church shared with a Catholic community but in which the internal space had been arranged to fit a Coptic ceremony: a portable wooden iconostasis was installed just before the altar.

Fig. 2 The removable iconostasis in Sainte-Marie du Val Church

The liturgy that day was performed in Coptic, Arabic and French. The sermon was given in Arabic and then translated and summarized in French. One of the deacons was following the liturgy on an iPad whose screen image was projected simultaneously on two tvmonitors hanged on the lateral walls of the church. This projection consisted of a book’s

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pdf divided into three columns, one for each of the three languages used that day. The deacon struggled to scroll down in time, and to adjust the text to allow the faithful to follow the ceremony. The deacon was sometimes late his manipulations, others on time. When the priest read the Arabic text of the life of the saint honoured that day from the Synaxar, he did it on his smartphone and then translated the story in French directly from Arabic. Many of the attendees were also using their phones to follow the liturgy, maybe through the app Eklisia recently set up by the bishopric and offering versions of most liturgical texts necessary to find one’s way in the holy mass. At some point the priest, wanting to help me follow the liturgy, handed me a printed French version of the Agbiya (the hour’s prayers, Fig. 3). Biblical readings were all read from printed Bibles lying on the pulpit in Arabic and in French. The French parts were recited following the traditional melody used for the Coptic liturgy. Fig. 3 A picture of the book the priest gave me that day. The translation was prepared by the Saint Mina and Mercurius Monastery in France, but printed in Egypt by Saint-Mina Monastery (Lake Mariout)

What I described here is the great diversity of the materialities of texts that today constitutes the Coptic religious life, with an increasing presence of digital devices, smart phones, several kinds of files (pdfs, mp4 and plenty of other formats), computers, tv-screens, microphones… which are however not specific to European diasporic contexts. I had observed the same phenomenon in my fieldwork in Cairo between 2006 and 2013.12 Even in Egypt’s capital where thousands of Coptic religious books are easy to find and relatively cheap, people use the Internet to find texts, images and downloaded pdfs. They also watch religious preachers on YouTube and comment on religious subjects online, particularly on Facebook where a lot of information circulates, and many debates happen. People also increasingly use applications to know which saint is celebrated that day, when to pray and when to fast. In Cairo, however, all this happens in a context of strong communal ties, in which religious identity is inherited and upheld legally (the personal status law is controlled by the Church), in which also the social pressure to be an active member of one’s parish is very strong. In Europe, the situation is different as Copts are a small minority, and religious ties are in competition with plenty of other values and group identities. Intermarriage (with spouses coming from other Christian denominations, atheists, or even other religions) is also more common in Europe. All that makes the perpetuation of the religious group (the di12 For similar observations, see Angie Heo, The Political Lives of Saints. Christian-Muslim Mediation in Egypt, Oakland 2018.

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aspora) a real challenge, which needs constant efforts from Copts involved in community affairs. My current project thus intends to look at the digital practices of French-speaking Copts and what they do to religious texts and more widely to religious traditions. What does it change in concrete religious practices, does it grant more self-confidence to believers in the reappropriation of Coptic texts, does it undermine the authority of priests? Digitalization is known for provoking changes on reading practices, on authority recognition, and on the very concept of authorship.13 It also accentuates the portability of religion - before essentially possible through small images and objects - with the possibility of carrying a real library in one’s pocket. Does all this, leads automatically to a strong individualization among the faithful? This research is thus concerned with those inflections in religious practices linked to the digital age. I would like to investigate how these changes are perceived by the faithful because the actual use of digital texts does not automatically mean that people fully embrace those changes and attribute the same value to those virtual texts. Roger Chartier, a historian of early modern Europe, has shown that printed books had been considered as inferior to manuscripts long after their invention.14 Digitalization also initiates changes as to the relation to other diasporas and to Egypt, the symbolic and hierarchic centre. Questions arise regarding the homogenization of texts used in each diaspora language. For example, a Coptic priest I met in Paris was preoccupied by what he described as the insufficient quality of translations. He thus considers necessary to revise them all, but at the same time he envisages this task as a lengthy process necessitating many religious and philological skills. This idea is largely due to a certain suspicion vis-à-vis the Arabic text itself which brings the French clergy to the idea that they should go back to the Coptic versions of those texts to produce a valid French translation. Another problem lies in the tension between the will to improve the quality of translations and the discipline of learning and embodying the texts by performing them during liturgy. It appeared clearly in a message of Bishop Youssef from the Diocese of Southern United States that was widely circulated on social medias. “As the Coptic Orthodox Church continues to grow in the diaspora, updates to inaccurate translations can be inconvenient. It is not easy to re-learn common hymns when the translations change, and the Coptic Reader team fully sympathizes with this dilemma. However, the very real translation errors need to be corrected to ensure that future generations are keeping the Coptic faith, prayers, and rites unchanged.”15 Other initiatives probably accelerated and flourished because of the pandemic. A website called The European Academy for Coptic Heritage (TEACH), which is still under construction, announces that its content will be available in six languages, including French and Arabic. It also envisages courses about different aspect of Coptic tradition.16 In Australia and 13 See Heidi A. Campbell (ed.), Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, London-New York 2013. 14 Roger Chartier, La main de l’auteur et l’esprit de l’imprimeur, Paris 2015. 15 October 5th 2021. 16 https://teach.eu.com.

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North America, even more active diaspora centres are located, especially when it comes to text production, mainly publishing in English. In Australia, which had already seen innovative efforts to increase Coptic presence on the Internet and social media, Saint Shenouda Press distinguishes itself by its professionalism and its marketing approach, reaching potential consumers via Facebook and organizing Zoom seminars with priests and lay people involved in the Church. They particularly target the youth and have started publishing books in French and German. After visiting their website, I received adds for spiritual books in French on my Facebook page.

Fig. 4

The French Coptic web is still made of various initiatives which seem largely independent from each other.17 A Coptipedia, which was created recently, offers a broad introduction to the Coptic church through a sort of anthology on different subjects: church history, liturgy, and the opinion of different clerics on contemporary social issues.18 Various websites offer selections of texts, generally belonging to the same categories: church history, liturgy, spirituality, and, inevitably, texts written by the late Pope Shenouda. There are also two official websites, one ran by Metropolitan Athanasius offers many rubrics almost all under construction, but already gives access to la Voix de Saint-Marc, a short newsletter published by the French Coptic church19 and to a list of French Coptic parishes; the other is the website of bishop Mark which shows a clear will to use all the possibilities offered by digital media. The page is still under constructions but already gives access to a lectionary in French, Arabic, and English. It also tries to connect different initiatives, offering links to Coptipedia and to Facebook groups of Coptic social care initiatives in the Paris region. Under the rubric BiblioCopte, many texts are available, among them liturgical books but also spiritual books (all in French). In this category, it must be noted that the website offers excerpts from the late Matta al-Maskîn, who had been marginalized by the previous patriarch.20

17 http://eocf.free.fr/index.html; http://coptica.free.fr/. 18 https://coptipedia.com/. 19 It is composed of around 5 pages and has existed since 1974. http://www.eglise-copte-orthodoxe-defrance.fr/. 20 https://copte.fr/.

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Fig. 5

I hope to have shown in this short overview the importance of studying religious texts both as carrying a rich content but also as actants in people’s social life. Those common-places, to borrow Thévenot’s concept, play a great role in creating and nurturing communal links. I hope, after further investigations, to be able to contribute to a better understanding of those dynamics and to the rich field of (e-)diaspora studies. Religious texts are also a good site to investigate what digitalization does to writing and reading in religious contexts and how these evolutions affect the building of communal ties in a diasporic context. I would like to open the toolbox of tradition practitioners, i.e., approaching their use of religious texts: where did they find them, how do they speak about them, which concrete material versions of those texts are being used? Through this ethnography of texts, I am searching to observe the way in which Coptic groups take shape and perpetuate a sense of belonging in European contexts.

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

© 2022, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11918-4 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-39341-6

Migration and Integration of Armenian-Orthodox Christians in the Historical and Modern Diaspora Harutyun G. Harutyunyan1 1. Historical diaspora Due to its geographical location between the ancient eastern and western civilizations, Armenia often became (un-)fortunately a crossroad both for the trans-regional traders as well as foreign invaders. It seems likely that this unique position was one of the main reasons for early migration of Armenians towards other countries. Speaking about the period of antiquity, one of the primary triggers for leaving the homeland and traveling to the different territories was the ‘international’ trade. The traditional Silk Road, which was not far away, was one of the most well-known routes for moving around the civilized world of those times. Besides that, the culture of Hellenism and the protected roads of the Roman Empire (or at least most parts of it) allowed several courageous entrepreneurs to travel around and make useful contacts with several new settlements. The common usage of Greek language within the intellectuals and traders of the ancient world together with the mainstream polytheistic belief in multiple gods and goddesses, were also very helpful drivers for the longterm migrating communities. Many Armenians had decided to settle down in different parts of the Mediterranean region by the first centuries of previous and common eras. However, several pioneers were also taking the risk to travel via Persia to the far East, to make profitable deals in India and China. The well-known connections between different localities through the mobility of individuals and their caravans in the 7th c. AD was well documented in the texts of Armenian historian Anania Shirakatsi. According to his work Ashkharhacuyc (old arm.: Geography) there were already good relations between Armenian cities such as Shirak, Dvin, Nakhchivan and for example Egyptian Alexandria, far eastern Balkh (in ancient gr. Baktra, in the Balkh province of today’s Afghanistan) and metropolises such as Constantinople, Antioch, Athens and Rome.2

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This paper shows the development of the Armenian diaspora through different epochs and indicates the major challenges of current migration. I would like to acknowledge once more the supportive invitation by Professor Martin Tamcke and Mr. Lorenz Garbe, who made my presentation during the last enriching conference at Coptic Orthodox monastery in Höxter-Brenkhausen possible. Many thanks also to the participants of our panel discussion on “Migration, Flight and Integration”, who gave me significant input for accomplishing this article in a solid historical perspective. Cf. Robert H. Hewsen, The geography of Ananias of Širak. Ašxarhacʻoycʻ, the long and the short recensions, Wiesbaden 1992.

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With the proclamation of Christianity as the state religion in Armenia and the Roman Empire in the 4th c. one destination was strongly favoured by pilgrims and settlers.3 That was, of course, the Holy City of Jerusalem. Even nowadays everyone who travels to Israel can witness the large number of old Armenian churches and monastic complexes there. The presence of an Armenian quarter downtown and the historical Armenian Patriarchate at St. Jacobs monastery, which manages the holy sites in Jerusalem and those outside of it (i.e. in Bethlehem) is very intriguing for many guests.4 The average tourist is often amazed by this ‘strange’ fact and seeks to find the explanation for such an immense presence of ArmenianOrthodox Christians in the Holy Land. However, church historians know that this presence dates from the late antiquity and early medieval period, initially as Armenian parishes, which developed gradually into an independent patriarchal seat. 5 From that point huge numbers of pilgrims from Armenia visited Jerusalem in the next centuries and probably several thousand decided to stay and work there for the rest of their lives due to the longterm activities of their church leadership. Many of those who were traders, profited from the non-stopping groups of travellers and pilgrims of all Christian confessions and of the Abrahamic religions. This indicates the fact, there was also some kind of interreligious and intercultural communication, which certainly wasn’t always an easy one. Yet, there were also other reasons for leaving the homeland, factors such as wars and invasions. Persian, Byzantine, Arabic, Mongol, Seljuk, and Ottoman conquests affected the lives of Armenians throughout the last 1800 years. Once cities and villages were destroyed, the Armenian population was forced either to stay as a dependent minority and pay the high taxes or to depart to somewhere else with the hope of a peaceful future. One of the foremost and well-known examples for such migration started after the conquest of Ani, the capital of Bagratidian Armenia in 1045. This city was so magnificent that the eyewitnesses called it “the city of 1000 churches and 40 gates”.6 But once the Byzantinian forces occupied and destroyed it and the Armenian kingdom was over, an immense migration of people scattered in different directions. Therefore, this event can be compared literally with the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem by the Roman army (2nd c. AD), after which many Israelis left their country and founded new communities in the Jewish diaspora all over the Roman empire. In the case of Armenians, people were escaping by several routes. Some of them went north, settling down either in Georgia or moving even further to the regions of the Slavs and entering from there to Eastern Europe. However, the vast majority escaped to Cilicia and settled down on the northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, which became the new ‘promised land’ for their enforced exodus. In around 1080 the prince house of the Rubenid dynasty was established in this area which developed to the famous kingdom of Cilicia in

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Cf. Krzysztof Stopka, Armenia Christiana. Armenian Religious Identity and the Churches of Constantinople and Rome (4th–15th Century), Wydawnictwo 2016. 4 Cf. Sylva Manoogian, The Calouste Gulbenkian Library, Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1925– 1990. A Historical Portrait of a Monastic and Lay Community Intellectual Resource Center, Los Angeles 2013. 5 Cf. Assadour Antreassian, Jerusalem and the Armenians, Jerusalem 1977. 6 Tadevos Hakobyan, Anii patmutyun, hnaguyn zhamanaknerits minchev 1045 t. [arm.: The History of Ani, from Ancient Times Until 1045], Yerevan 1980, 214.

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the 12th c., known better in the western academic world by the name Little Armenia.7 This was a success story thanks to good relations with the crusaders, who were often passing through this area during their campaigns from Europe to the Holy Land. Such contacts positively affected the economic growth of the country and influenced the cultural and religious exchange between Armenian-Orthodox Christians and the Roman Catholic Church.8 However, during the reign of the representatives from the Lusignian royal house, Cilicia couldn’t defend itself successfully against the permanent attacks of Mongols and Mamluks anymore.9 Therefore, Armenian last kingdom disappeared in 1375 and gave another wave for the migration. The population of Cilicia started to depart to Cyprus, Greece, Venice, France, and other European countries. Nevertheless, the head of Armenian Church, Catholicosate of Great House of Cilicia remained for more than six centuries in this area, and it was only after the tragical massacres during the Genocide in Ottoman Empire that a move was made from Sis (today’s Kozan at Adana province in Turkey) via Syria to Lebanon, reestablishing its new patriarchal seat in Antelias.10

2. Modern diaspora There is no clear timeline of when the historical or ‘old’ diaspora was somehow completed and when the so-called modern or ‘new’ one started to function instead. Many historical sources indicate that with the beginning of the modern epoch, the number of Armenian communities increased in central and western Europe. The rapid progress in technologies and new colonial trade routes made the resettlement for many professionals and transcontinental traders very attractive. One of the main proofs for this thesis could be the news about an early printing of Armenian books. This happened just seventy years after Johannes Gutenberg invented the technology of printing with movable type, the very first text in Armenian was issued at Venice in 1512. But it is also worth mentioning that the Armenian alphabet was already printed as a specimen as early as in 1486.11 Out of several thousands of languages of the day, Armenian became, with this, one of the earliest and the second nonEuropean language (after Hebrew), to appear in printed form.12 It is remarkable that the Armenian merchants, who were already established with their ‘firms’ in Smyrna, Italy, France, and Spain did their shipping with the Dutch vessels and opened warehouses at Amsterdam in the 16th c.13 They influenced the further extension of the trade between the Netherlands and the Near East. Among the ships sailing under the 7 Cf. Richard G. Hovannisian/Simon Payaslian (ed.), Armenian Cilicia. UCLA Armenian History and Culture Series. Historic Armenian Cities and Provinces, Costa Mesa/CA 2008. 8 Cf. Jacob Ghazarian, The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia During the Crusades. The Integration of Cilician Armenians with the Latins, 1080–1393, Richmond 2000. 9 Cf. Frederic Luisetto, Armeniens et autres chretiens d’orient sous la domination mongole. L’Ilkhanat de Ghazan 1295–1304, Paris 2007. 10 Cf. Seda Parsumean-Tatoyean, The Armenian Catholicosate from Cilicia to Antelias. An Introduction, Antelias 2003. 11 Cf. The Armenian Research Center, Celebrating the Legacy of Five Centuries of Armenian-Language Book Printing, 1512–2012. University of Michigan-Dearborn 2012. 12 Cf. John A. Lane, The Diaspora of Armenian Printing 1512–2012, Amsterdam 2012. 13 Cf. Vahan M. Kurkjian, A History of Armenia, New York 1958, 470.

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Dutch flag there were even some owned completely by Armenian traders.14 Thanks to the good connections with Dutch East India Company, Armenians could also make very profitable arrangements in Asian countries. India became one of the top examples for that. There are records of Armenians in there, dating as far back as 1497. Later during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1571–1629), thousands of Armenians mostly from Julfa were forced to resettle in Persia. First, the Shah wanted to use their knowledge and professional skills in Ispahan. Armenian colonies were also established by his order in such important cities of India as, for example, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras but also in Ceylon.15 The numerous church buildings and graveyards in these places indicate the existence of rich Armenian communities there. They were creating a vast network of trade, and many of them went even further east, to Singapore, Java, and China. At the second part of 17th c. Armenians founded an influential center at Calcutta, registered by the English administrator of East India Company, Job Charnock (c. 1630–1692). Some eyewitnesses were testifying that the development of that city as an early modern business mart has been credited to Armenians rather than to western Europeans.16 One confirmation for this statement is the creation of the famous Armenian College & Philanthropic Academy, which still exists.17 However, as in the previous epochs, the reason for migrating so far away from the homeland was not only the trade and profit, but the instability of Armenian territories in the first place. Nowadays many commentators especially from Turkey (but also from Germany) try to propagate about the so-called ‘peaceful co-existence’ between different ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire. In some cases, and probably in the small rural communities it might be true. But what about the periods of active military conflicts between Turkey and Persia, Persia and Russia or Turkey and Russia, when Armenians were forced to choose between the opposing sides? Once some of them started even slightly to support one of the ‘opponents’, the governing side couldn’t forgive that to the whole community. The ongoing massacres in the second part of the 19th c. and beginning of 20th c. in the Ottoman Empire witness about the vast increasement of collective hostility and toxic paranoia, which culminated with the deportations and Genocide of Armenian population in 1915-1923.18 Therefore, starting from the 19th c. and especially during World War I large waves of enforced migration brought Armenians again to the known and unknown places. Countries like Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt welcomed thousands of refugees from Anatolia and Cilicia. Eastern and western European countries accepted the next waves. But at that point one of the popular destinations was also the USA: “[A]fter the massacres in 1895 and the following years, there was an Armenian exodus on a large scale from Turkey towards 14 As Kurkjian mentions in his work: “There is in the archives of The Hague today a letter, dated 1568, addressed to the States-General, concerning some dispute between the Dutch consul of Aleppo and the Armenian merchants of that city. The address is written in Armenian characters, but in the Italian language. The beginning of the letter, the complimentary introduction, is in classic Armenian, but the main body of it is in the dialect of the Persian Armenians.” History, 470. 15 Cf. ibid., 469. 16 Cf. ibid., and Mesrovb Jacob Seth, Armenians in India, Calcutta (1895) 1937. 17 Cf. Armenian College & Philanthropic Academy, http://armeniancollege.edu.in edu.in/about/acpahistory/ (21.11.2021). 18 Cf. Martin Dorn, Verbrechen an der Menschlichkeit. Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und seine Ursachen, in: Martin Tamcke, Leben nach Völkermord und politischer Pression. Armenien, Göttingen 2015, 23–36.

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the far-off American continent. This immigration swelled by thousands of new refugees in the wake of Turkish atrocities during the First World War.”19 However the quality of their life on the new continent wasn’t so easy-going as we can imagine it now. As in the previous periods, Armenian-Orthodox Christians were very eager to build their own house of God as quickly as possible. Hence, the church of Our Saviour in Worcester, Massachusetts, built in 1891 became one of the first Armenian churches in North America. According to one of the testimonies, the construction of this “small church gave the Armenians of Worcester a measure of respect from the larger community not previously given. One man recalled that his father was no longer beaten at the wire mill after the church was built.”20 A decade later we can see that many Armenian migrants were developing their own businesses and getting important positions in the community. Their lifestyle shows, on one hand, that they are almost completely integrated in the Western society.21 On the other hand, the nostalgic feelings about their lost home country (and later also about the general ignorance of their demands on justice on the international level), were saddening their everyday life immensely. Probably one of the best examples of such dichotomy we can find in the texts of the second-generation American Armenian writer, William Saroyan. The following quote from him became very popular not only in America, but also in the other corners of Armenian worldwide diaspora. Almost every Armenian knows this by heart, because it was so often published in different booklets, calendars, community websites, and social networks: “I should like to see any power of the world destroy this race, this small tribe of unimportant people, whose history is ended, whose wars have all been fought and lost, whose structures have crumbled, whose literature is unread, whose music is unheard, whose prayers are no longer uttered. Go ahead, destroy this race. Let us say that it is again 1915. There is war in the world. Destroy Armenia. See if you can do it. Send them from their homes into the desert. Let them have neither bread nor water. Burn their houses and their churches. See if they will not live again. See if they will not laugh again. See if the race will not live again when two of them meet in a beer parlor, twenty years later, and laugh, and speak in their tongue. Go ahead, see if you can do anything about it. See if you can stop them from mocking the big ideas of the world, you sons of bitches [sic!], a couple of Armenians talking in the world, go ahead and try to destroy them.”22 Despite all challenges, the quick development of Armenian parishes in the USA and in European countries shows the strong motivation and commitment of their members. Alone the example with the above-mentioned Church in Worcester, Massachusetts indicates how effectively the local community was growing: It was rebuilt in 1952 and renovated completely in 2005 according to the best traditions of Armenian architecture. In the same way many other parishes developed their own structures and built new churches, community centres and schools. By the end of the 20th c. the Armenian Apostolic Church had 40 dio19 Kurkjian, History, 473. 20 Margaret DiCanio, Memory Fragments from the Armenian Genocide. A mosaic of shared heritage, New York 2002, 85. 21 See for examples the photos of Armenian families from those times i.e., Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection, Portrait of the Armenian American Gazarian family in Boston (1908), https://tessa.lapl.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/photos/id/75431/rec/1 (21.11.2021). 22 William Saroyan, Inhale & Exhale, New York 1936, 437s.

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ceses with several hundreds of parishes worldwide. The number of countries where Armenians were settling down increased as well. The Armenian community in the USA quickly became the largest in comparison with other countries. More than a million Armenians moved there during the 20th c. In second place was, for several decades, France with almost half million people. There are no clear statistics but today the Armenian community in Russia seems to be the biggest one worldwide, with three million people. According to several interview statements of the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, there are now more Armenians living in Russia than in the Republic of Armenia itself.23 At the current times some other destinations seem to become also attractive for the young professionals, i.e., Canada, Australia, and different EU-countries. The reasons for such a rapid growth of the Armenian diaspora especially in the last 50 years are very complex. But the following disastrous events increased the numbers of Armenian migrants towards western countries drastically: Civil war in Lebanon, the Iranian revolution, the collapse of the USSR, war in Iraq, the first war in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Arab spring and the general economic destabilization in Middle East, ongoing civil war in Syria, the escalation of armed conflicts with Azerbaijan and the second war of Nagorno Karabakh. All these tensions force even today thousands of Armenians to leave their homeland or their regions in the historical diaspora to find on the first place a peaceful life elsewhere

3. Meeting repats One significant fact remains, often neglected in presentations and research papers, that there was and is not only a migration towards other countries, but also a contra process of repatriating. Therefore, I would like to show here four examples concerning ‘returned’ Armenians in the 20th and 21st centuries. The first case was related to the declaration of the first Armenian Republic (1918–1921) immediately after the World War I. Most of the people who moved to this ‘new’ independent state or better to those provinces in the northeastern part of the historical Armenia, were refugees from the lost provinces of Western Armenia - survivors of the Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. They escaped from the massacres in their homeland like from the cities of Van, Sasun, Mush, Adana, and Sis but also many other Armenian districts. One of the foreign press publications from those days quotes the following public declaration at the beginning of these tragic events: “For about the last month Kurds and the Turkish population of Armenia have been engaged in massacring Armenians with connivance and often with help of ottoman authorities. Such massacres took place about the middle of April, at Erzerum, Dertchan, Egin, Bitlis, Sassoun, Moush, Zeitun, and in all Cilicia. Inhabitants of about 100 villages near van were all assassinated. In town itself Armenians’ quarter is besieged by Kurds. At the same time ottoman government at Constantinople is raging against inoffensive Armenian population. In face of these fresh crimes committed by turkey the allied governments announce publicly to the

23 On the statistic of Armenians in Russia cf. Aza Babayan, More Armenians Get Russian Citizenship, in: Radio Liberty Armenia (October 26, 2021), www.azatutyun.am/a/31530758.html (27.11.2021).

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sublime port that they will hold all the members of the ottoman government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally responsible for Armenian massacres.”24 Most of the survivors lost several relatives during the incredibly long march. How terrible their suffering and how hard their way of deportation was, is described in many presentations of the eyewitnesses.25 Many Armenian refugees settled down either in the second biggest city of Armenia, Alexandrapol (later Leninankan in Soviet time and nowadays Gyumri in the region of Shirak) or in the neighbouring villages. It is interesting that the dialect of this region till current times represents a mixture of Eastern and Western Armenian languages. The adaptation to the new place was certainly not easy, because there were no state resources at all to take care of these marginable groups. The Holy See of Etchmiadzin and the parish churches were taking care only for the widows and orphans.26 Even nowadays the families who live in the current Republic are speaking about their ancestors who came from the western Armenian provinces.27 The second wave of repatriation was organized by the government of the Soviet Armenian Republic mostly in the first decade after World War II. There were special propaganda events with trained agitators from the USSR, who were visiting the Armenian communities especially in Iran, Lebanon and Syria and inviting them to repatriate to their home country. In some but very few cases this happened also in the Armenians parishes in Greece, France, and some other western countries. Usually, these kinds of events were accompanied with a fashionable cultural event, which was at the same time very well-prepared emotional and ideological PR. Soviet movies and radio programs were presented there, and grand promises were given about the ‘lightful and progressive future’ of the new Armenia. There were also special study programs for young professionals, who were invited to study in the universities and technical colleges of Yerevan with state scholarships. In addition, the Soviet media was putting many efforts to publish only about the positive sides of the communist regime. As we know, there was nothing critical or even slightly negative about their own environment or social-political life in the newspapers and journals from those times. However, once those who had been convinced by these tactics moved in and were settled by the government in different areas of the republic, the hard reality and communist autocracy was an unpleasant disappointment for most of them. There was even a well24 Government H.M., In Common with the Governments of France and Russia, Monday Morning Papers (23 May 1915, PRO, FO371/2488/63095). 25 Cf. The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Eye-Witnesses, www.genocide-museum.am/eng/ eye_witnesses.php (27.11.2021). 26 Cf. The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Photo archive on the Activities of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadin, www.genocide-museum.am/eng/TempExh_RESCUE_OF_ARMENIANS-2.php (27.11.2021). 27 F.e., in my own family we know that both sides of my grandfathers have escaped from Mush. The one from my father’s side, Hovhannes Harutyunyan was born literally on the way of their family escape journey. When he turned 70 years old in 1986, we as his grandchildren asked him, when was his birthday exactly? His answer shocked me very much, because he didn’t know this and never celebrated a birthday party in his life. He heard just later from his mother that “there was a rain” on the day he was born, and their family was “somewhere in the fields on the way to escape to the North”. We were so confused after his story, and asked him to show us his passport. It was a red soviet document. Nothing was written about the month, date, or place of his birth indeed. There was just information about the year, which was 1916.

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known joke about one diaspora Armenian, who came with euphoric feelings and started to kiss the ground in the airport of Yerevan. He was so excited about being back at his homeland that didn’t even see the big holes on the road, which were full of mud. Suddenly, he fell into one of such holes and started to cry and curse loudly. People ran to help him. There was even a policeman who asked why he was cursing so badly. The diaspora Armenian tried to teach him: “In my country, there are always little red flags near roadworks, in order that the citizens don’t fall into such holes”. The police officer looked at him with curiosity and replied: “Well, didn’t you see the big red flags on the border, on your entrance to this country?!” Besides the practical difficulties in the daily routine, they also faced negative clichés about the diaspora Armenians from their local neighbours. The classical term spyurqahay (“an Armenian person from the diaspora”), wasn’t really in use at that time. Instead, another ironic word akhpar (the short version from the Western Armenian word akhparik: “little brother”) became their collective nickname on the street and in the workplace. Used by most of the local population, this underlined the separation between ‘us and them’. It is likely that the different Western Armenian dialect, Christian lifestyle and connection to the Church rituals, knowledge of foreign languages, cooking and hardworking traditions were astonishing to many Soviet citizens, who weren’t aware of such a diversity before. It was therefore not a surprise later, that the first people who started to think about migration to the western countries at the end of 1980-s and beginning of 1990-s were exactly from the mentioned repats. Many of them of course had relatives or friends abroad, who were telling them about their progressive businesses and good financial conditions in the developed countries. But the truth is, that most of them were just fed up with the strict regulations and the unpleasant side of Soviet Armenia. Therefore, as with many other migrants they decided to leave and develop their career and private life in a better context of the civilized world.28 The third case of moving to Armenia could be observed immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when many young Armenians from the diaspora started to move to Armenia to support their country. Of course, these were not such large groups like during the two previous waves. However, these unique people were coming according to their own free will and motivation. They knew exactly what was happening in their homeland and therefore, most of them were dedicated to stay there despite all challenges and to do something for their national state. Many of them volunteered for social and educational projects, which was something new for the post-soviet context. Some of them participated in the first war at Nagorno Karabakh (1992–1994) and lost their lives there.29 Others opened their own businesses in different sectors and helped to develop the damaged economy. For many lo28 During my own university studies in Switzerland and Germany (1998–2008), and professional career in Germany and Canada (2008–2019), and several visits to USA and other western countries I have personally met many migrant Armenians from the mentioned group. All of them told almost the same story, that their parents or grandparents initially believed in communist propaganda and moved to Soviet Armenia either for patriotic or ideological reasons. The feeling of being cheated and betrayed came to them once they were already ‘in’ and the iron carton was closed behind them. Therefore, once the emigration laws became a bit easier, they applied immediately for the traveling documents and left Armenia. 29 Cf. Markar Melkonian, My Brother’s Road. An American’s Fateful Journey to Armenia, London 2005.

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cals, this was again a big surprise, because no one could understand why someone should leave a developed country and move to this unstable place which had so many challenges. Therefore, a new suspicious image about the so-called ‘spies from the west’ started to circulate in the society. Nevertheless, the patriotic idea of ‘coming back to their roots’ and being there for their own homeland, was still attractive for some Armenians from the western countries. Since this was not a big group of idealists and patriots, most of them got integrated very quickly to the context of independent Armenia and adopted Eastern Armenian dialect together with other cultural nuances. They also became good examples for all those Armenians, who started to move to their homeland in the following decades. As already mentioned, the economic and political situation in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt forced people of the historical diaspora to become repats. This idea about not being an expat anymore, remained there in the mind of many diaspora Armenians for decades.30 Therefore it came to its culmination after the peaceful revolution of April-May 2018, as several thousands of diaspora Armenians decided to return and support their new democratic government. This can be called the fourth wave, which was very intense but sadly very short one. At the beginning every observer was amazed by these positive pictures. Even the European experts and international media specialists were astonished at seeing such intensive changes in such a short period.31 On the other hand, some critics were comparing this movement with overreacting messianic expectations. The famous speech of new leader, premier minister Nikol Pashinyan, when he called NagornoKarabakh also a part of historical Armenia or his decision to resettle the ‘occupied’ territory with those Armenian families in social needs, who were coming as refugees from Syria and Lebanon, was classified as a provocation by the Azerbaijani government and their ally Turkey.32 Finally, due to the negative consequences of Covid 19 pandemics and the last disastrous war in Nagorno-Karabakh (September-November 2020), and also the permanent attempts of inner political destabilization from the side of the previous regime members, Armenia unfortunately became an unsafe safe destination. Only very few people from the diaspora still want to move to this place with a long-term perspective. On the contrary, most of the residents wish to migrate either towards USA, Canada, and EU-countries or at least to Russia, which is of course a tragedy and humanitarian catastrophe for such a small republic.

30 Cf. RepatArmenia Foundation, https://repatarmenia.org/en/about-us/who-we-are (27.11.2021). 31 Cf. Silvia Stöber, Armenia, a textbook case of a peaceful uprising, in: ZOiS Spotlight 21/2018, https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight/archiv-2018/armenia-a-textbook-case-of-a-peacefuluprising, first published 06.06.2018, (27.11.2021). 32 The “list of provocations” by the Armenian side was later completed and published on the internet by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, online: https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/6865/view (06.10.2020). About this and the challenges with last war in Nagorno-Karabach cf. also Nadja Douglas, Escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in: ZOiS Spotlight 36/2020, https://en.zoisberlin.de/publications/escalation-of-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict (27.11.2021).

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4. Conclusion: Current migration and integration The assassination of an Armenian journalist Hrant Dink on the 19th of January 2007 in Istanbul, who was a Turkish citizen, protestant Christian, public speaker, and writer of several articles on peace and reconciliation, became the shocking symbol of intolerance shown towards Armenian intellectuals in Turkey down the centuries. Thirteen years later, the capturing, torturing, and killing of more than 200 Armenian civil hostages and prisoners of war by Azerbaijani army during and even after the last war in Nagorno-Karabakh,33 unfortunately became the confirmation of the historical and collective trauma from the Genocide of 1915. Therefore, many Armenians continue to leave their homeland. As in the previous centuries they want to find a safer place for their children and grandchildren. Since the topic about current migration and integration is too large and can’t be covered in one subchapter, I will conclude this article just with several general facts: 1. According to different sources there are between 9–12 million Armenians in the world now. 2. Only about 3 million of them are living currently in the Republic of Armenia. 3. Migration is going on, especially to the USA, Canada, EU-countries, and Russia. 4. The Armenian Apostolic Church now has more than 50 dioceses worldwide. 5. Cultural unions and other organizations are registered in more than 80 countries. 6. Unification day of the most communities and cultural associations is on the April 24, which is the Memorial Day of Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Turkey. 7. Successful integration has been observed in most of the host countries. 8. Multiple challenges have been detected by the second and third generations of diaspora Armenians, i.e. - questions by the cultivation of cultural heritage, - difficulties by learning of mother language, - struggle by keeping the national identity and moral values, - increasing numbers of intercultural and interconfessional marriages, - critical approach towards the classical traditions and religious doctrines, - not much interest in remaining an active member of Armenian-Orthodox Church. The final points in this list indicate that there are serious questions concerning the principle of remaining an Armenian Christian in the foreign context. My previous research in Germany shows that the Armenian community there is making enormous efforts to raise its next generation within the traditional belief and national value system. 34 However, the young generation who were born and educated for example in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Cologne, or other German regions, do not always want to follow the wills and wishes of their parents. Therefore, there are many cases of complete integration and assimilation in the postmodern globalized society with no intention of returning. It seems that individualism is becoming the richest monopolist and probably the only winner of the current paradigm. It is also noteworthy to mention that all Armenian church leaders and parish activists, with whom I have spoken in Germany, were evaluating the 33 Cf. Ashkhen Arakelyan, Sadistic Pleasures. Silent Crimes of Azerbaijan, Yerevan 2021. 34 Cf. Harutyun G. Harutyunyan, Armenische Kulturvereine und Kirchengemeinden in Deutschland, in: Thomas Bremer, Orthodoxie in Deutschland, Münster 2016, 251–277.

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mentioned ‘natural process’ as a very negative fact. This critical attitude sounds as a prophetic warning for the next generation. But at the same time, it makes the moral break between the community leadership and the young members much deeper, which increases the distance between old and new generations. The question of how the Church and community in the diaspora should deal with this challenge, remains open. For the conclusion of this presentation, we may sum up that during their history Armenians were forced directly (or sometimes indirectly) to leave their homeland. Unfortunately, the same tendency can be observed in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the border regions of Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Ararat and Tavush. Their main wish was/is to live, work, and create in a peaceful atmosphere. Many young Armenians have grown up in the western world, get university or college degrees and become highly qualified professionals. Some of them are likely to be tired from the historical trauma because their families have stayed in a collective state of burnout for more than a century. Countries like Germany accept most of these people and give at least residency permits, because every developed state makes its own economic and demographic profits from such families with good workers and their educated children. So, finally, if we look through the eyes of a pragmatic realist at this complex case, there is a clear win-win situation for both sides: Armenian migrants get their safety in the developed states and the last ones get a group of lawful professionals, educated youth and stable taxpayers. However, in my opinion, one important question remains open: Who will then take care of the traditional Armenian territory (or whatever is left now from it) with its ancient Christian heritage if creative minds will constantly migrate from there? The answer to this question should be given both by the young Armenians and the developed countries, who are influential members of the current international community.

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“Their Compatriot St. Servatius” Armenian emplacement in Maastricht Christopher Sheklian 1. Introduction On May 15, 2016, the Armenian community of Maastricht dedicated a traditional Armenian cross-stone (khachkar) to St. Servatius on the grounds of the Basilica of St. Servatius. Known as Sint Servaas in Dutch, Servatius was the Bishop of Tongeren in the fourth century. He died in Maastricht in the Netherlands and the basilica is the traditional site of his burial. According to his vitae, St. Servatius, the patron saint of Maastricht was in fact born in historic Armenia. Hence, the Armenian “Ani Foundation” and the community around the Surp Karapet (St. [John the] Forerunner) Armenian Apostolic Church dedicated the khachkar “to the city of Maastricht by the local Armenian community in memory of their compatriot Saint Servatius.”1 Fig. 1 Inscription of the Khachkar at Sint Servaas Basilica in Maastricht Photo CS

Yet St. Servatius has no cult following in the Armenian Apostolic Church. Despite his position as a prominent Western Bishop and revered saint of Limburg, he has not found his way into Armenian spirituality or literature. When the Armenian community of Maastricht, the most recent of the three largest and stable Armenian churches in the Netherlands, held a symposium on St. Servatius in 2012 and then dedicated the khachkar in 2016, they made themselves legible to their Maastricht compatriots by inscribing themselves into 1

Translated by the author from the inscription, see fig. 1.

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the history of the city already entangled with Armenia through its patron saint. Through these events and a consistent emphasis on the connection between St. Servatius and Armenia, the Armenians of Maastricht emplace themselves into the city through both metaphorical and literal inscriptions into the hagiography of the city’s patron saint. In what follows, I first sketch the life of St. Servatius, his association with the city of Maastricht, and the emergence of a strong veneration of the saint in the area. Then, I offer a brief history of the Armenian community of Maastricht and the Netherlands more broadly. Turning to the events organized by the community in the past decade and to initial ethnographic fieldwork at Surp Karapet conducted as part of the ERC-funded project “Rewriting Global Orthodoxy” at Radboud University, I describe the techniques of emplacement deploying the veneration of St. Servatius.2 I conclude with some reflections on how these techniques are a potentially broader method of using shared saint veneration to help Middle Eastern Christians place themselves in the fabric of European society.

2. St. Servatius of Tongeren, Patron Saint of Maastricht St. Servatius enters the historical record through the accounts of synods and councils of the fourth century. In his Chronicle, the historian Sulpicius Severus (approximately 363–420/5) mentions a bishop Servatius present at the synod of Rimini in 359 CE.3 Similarly, according to the great Bishop Athanasius of Alexandria, (295–373), a bishop Sarbatios shows up at the synod of Serdike in 342 CE. Athanasius mentions the name Sarbatios another time “in the context of his defence against the accusations that he was not loyal to Constantius.”4 While there have been doubts “raised as to the historicity of Servatius” and we cannot be sure that the Servatius of Sulpicius Severus is the same as the Sarbatios mentioned by Athanasius, even without later traditions and texts “we would be fairly certain that there was a bishop Servatius of the Tungri in the fourth century” based on these contemporary texts.5 Whatever the historicity of these early texts, there is “no doubt that legends grew up around a certain St. Servatius in the first two centuries after the bishop’s death.”6 These legends relate that he was the Bishop of Tongeren (Tongres) in present-day Belgium, and that he also preached in Maastricht, where he died on May 13, 384.7 After these early oral legends that surely shaped later vitae, we find Bishop Servatius again in the writings of Gregory of Tours (ca. 540–594). Gregory of Tours, sainted bishop of that city, is one of the most important historians of the period, offering important accounts from the region of Gaul and beyond. In his Glory of 2 3 4 5 6 7

“Rewriting Global Orthodoxy,” accessed July 30, 2021, www.ru.nl/ptrs/research/research-projects/ rewriting-global-orthodoxy/. Under the direction of Prof. dr. H.L. (Heleen) Murre-van den Berg. Cf. Frans Theuws/Mirjam Kars (ed.), The Saint-Servatius complex in Maastricht: The Vrijthof excavations (1969-1970), Bonn 2017, 37. Ibid., 37. Ibid., 36s. Kim Vivian/Ludo Jongen/Richard H. Lawson, The Life of Saint Servatius. A Dual-Language Edition of the Middle Dutch Legend of Saint Servatius by Henrich von Veldeke and the Anonymous Upper German Life of Saint Servatius, Lewiston-Queenston-Lempter 2006, xx. The date of his death “had early on been established” but the year was a later calculation, cf. ibid.

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the Confessors, he provides the story about the later bishop Monulf who built a church dedicated to a holy predecessor whose “grave never became covered with snow” during the invasion of the Huns. Gregory fills out of the story of this bishop in his History of the Franks, naming him as Aravatius. Later scholars have identified his Arvatius with St. Servatius. Today’s magnificent Basilica of Saint Servatius in Maastricht is usually identified with the magnum templum that Bishop Monulphus (Monulf) built in honor of Servatius.8 The archaeological layers of building make it difficult to declare definitively that the basilica is built on the supposed site of the grave of St. Servatius initially erected by Bishop Monulphus. “Excavations by the town archaeologist in the basilica of St Servatius have revealed a number of late antique and early medieval structures that are difficult to interpret.”9 Whatever the direct archaeological connection between the current basilica and the grave church built by Monulphus, the sixth century bishop “elevated and translated a saint, built a magnum templum for him, ‘commissioned’ a convenient legend or two and commissioned a grandiose epitaph.”10 With Bishop Monulphus’s building and Gregory of Tour’s history, the veneration of St. Servatius and his connection with the city of Maastricht was definitely cast. It on the basis of Gregory’s writings that “in the course of the next five centuries, a vita of St. Servatius was constructed. At every stage new elements were added to Gregory’s brief accounts.”11 While the life of St. Servatius was being elaborated as part of an oral tradition built upon the earliest references and Gregory of Tour’s accounts, the basilica named for the saint emerged as an important site for the bishops of the region. “In the eighth century, a monasterium was attached to the cemeterial basilica of St Servatius.”12 Over time, the monastic order of St. Servatius grew in importance and influence. “In the course of the 11th century the canons of the Chapter of St. Servatius felt a growing need for a complete hagiography of their patron saint.”13 Fig. 2 Entrance to the Basilica of St. Servatius, Maastricht, Photo CS 8 Cf. Frans Theuws, Maastricht as a Centre of Power in the Early Middle Ages, in: Mayke De Jong/ Frans Theuws/Carine Van Rhijn (ed.), Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2011, 170. 9 Theuws, Maastricht, 166. 10 Theuws/Kars, Saint Servatius Complex, 39. 11 Ibid., xx-xxi. 12 Theuws, Maastricht, 193. 13 Vivian/Longren/Lawson, Life of Saint Servatius, xxii.

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Already in the tenth century, Heriger of Lobbes (ca. 950–1007) added a fascinating element to the tale of St. Servatius, creating a link of kinship between Servatius and Jesus Christ himself. Then, “between 1066 and 1088 Jocundus penned the first ‘official’ hagiography of St. Servatius,” whose Actus sancti Servatii provides a full biography of the saint. New miracles and events appear in Jocundus’s Actus for the first time, notably “the story of Charlemagne gaining a glorious victory over the Saracens of May 13 (St. Servatius day) thanks to the intervention of Maastricht’s patron saint.” “There can be no doubt that Jocundus incorporated this episode at the request of the canons of the Chapter of St. Servatius in Maastricht.” St. Servatius emerged from this Latin vitae officially a saint, and a saint connected intimately to the Holy Roman Emperor and the city of Maastricht.14 Jocundus’s account and embellishments provided the definitive account and the starting point for subsequent vita of St. Servatius. Most notable among these is the Servaaslegende, the Legend of Saint Servatius, penned by Heinrich von Veldeke at the end of the twelfth century. Von Veldeke’s account, one of the first pieces of literature written in vernacular Dutch, in the Middle Dutch of the Limburg region of Maastricht. Crucially for our purposes, in von Veldeke’s Middle Dutch vitae of St. Servatius, we learn that “His father lived in Armenia. His piety was quite evident. The holy child later always showed by his good works that he knew God. He had been born as a consolation to the Armenians, and as a chosen vessel of the Holy Spirit. He gave good evidence of that. He was given to the Armenians as a mirror.”15 St. Servatius’s link with Armenia was thus indelibly forged in the first vernacular account of his life, written in Limburgese Middle Dutch in the around 1170. While von Veldeke’s translators note that “There is some confusion in the Latin sources about the region of birth of Servatius,” suggesting that “the Latin word ‘Aramaic’ (a Semitic language) was probably read as ‘Armenian’ (a region in the southwestern part of the Black Sea)”, the link between Armenia and St. Servatius stuck.16 This tenuous link, first found in Jocundus and reiterated by von Veldeke, has been challenged by modern historians. Yet Armenian historians Kahyiguian and Yevadian connected Servatius’s name to an Armenian noble dynasty mentioned in two ancient Armenian histories. With this linguistic evidence, they argue that the Armenian link to Servatius should be secure.17 St. Servatius is of paramount importance for the history of Maastricht. Frans Theuws argues that “without Servatius, Maastricht would probably have remained a place of little significance, a small fortress on the river Meuse protecting the bridge on the road from Tongres to Cologne. The very fact that this insignificant place emerged as a key centre in a vast region is an indicator of the power of the saint. Even today Servatius is vital to the selfimage and identity of the citizens of Maastricht. Some see Servatius as one of the mythical city founders of early medieval Europe.”18 If this is the case, then the link between Servati14 15 16 17

Vivian/Longren/Lawson, Life of Saint Servatius, xxii. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 232, n. 12. George K. Khayiguian/Maxime K. Yevadian, Saint Servatius d’Arménie: Premier évéque de Maastricht, Lyon 2012, 27–33.81. 18 Theuws, Maastricht, 155.

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us and Armenia likewise connects Armenia and Armenians to the history of Maastricht and to its contemporary self-image.

3. Armenians in the Netherlands and Maastricht Armenians, an ancient people indigenous to what was often called “the Armenian highlands” of Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus, have long lived outside this historic homeland. The autocephalous Armenian Church, the Hayots Ekeghetsi, often called the Armenian Apostolic Church, is intimately linked to this long history of the Armenian people both in the homeland and in dispersion. Christianity became the state religion of the ancient Kingdom of Armenia under the Arshakuni (Arsacid) Dynasty, traditionally in 301 CE. Within a few generations, the Catholicos, the head of the Armenian Church, was not under any other Metropolitan, and through the theological vicissitudes of the fourth to eighth centuries the Armenian Apostolic Church developed a distinct Christian rite. 19 Today recognized as one of the “Oriental Orthodox” churches, the Armenian Church is the main Christian denomination of most Armenians in the small post-Soviet Republic of Armenia and among the vast worldwide Armenian diaspora. Considered one of the paradigmatic diasporas, Armenians were present in Athens and Jerusalem by the fourth century at least.20 In addition to large-scale movements in the tenth to twelfth centuries to other parts of Anatolia, clerical and later merchant diasporas emerged across the world.21 Of particular note is the extensive network of merchant Armenians originally from the town of Julfa in present-day Nakhichevan.22 Shah Abbas I of Safavid Persia forcibly displaced the already well-connected “trade diaspora” to the outskirts of Isfahan in the context of Ottoman-Persian wars in 1603-4 CE.23 From New Julfa, they emerged as a formidable trade diaspora dispersed throughout the world, with particularly important outposts in Madras and later Calcutta.24

19 The long history of the Armenian people and the Armenian Apostolic Church is well beyond the scope of this paper. Among the excellent introductions to Armenian history, Bournoutian’s two-volume A History of the Armenian People is particularly informative and accessible. George A. Bournoutian, George A.: A History of the Armenian People, Vol. I Pre-History to 1500 A.D., Vol. II 1500 A.D. to the Present, Irvine/CA 1993.1994. Patriarch Malachia Ormanian’s The Church of Armenia remains a wonderful primer on the history and doctrine of the Armenian Apostolic Church. On the conversion and hierarchy, see Malachia Ormanian, The Church of Armenia. Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy Literature and Existing Condition, London 1955, 3–13. 20 Cf. Khachig Tölölyan, Rethinking Diaspora (s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment, in: Diaspora 5.1 (1996), 9. 21 Cf. Bouroutian, History of the Armenian People I, 75–132. 22 Cf. Vazken Ghougassian, The Emergence of the Armenian Diocese of New Julfa in the Seventeenth Century, Atlanta 1998. 23 Cf. Sebouh Aslanian, Trade Diaspora versus Colonial State: Armenian Merchants, the English East India Company, and the High Court of Admiralty in London. 1748-17752, in: Diaspora 13.1 (2004), 42. 24 On the early emergence of the Julfa network, see Edmund K. Herzig, The Rise of the Julfa Merchants in the Late Sixteenth Century, in: Pembroke Papers 4 (1996), 305-22. On the Julfa network more broadly, in addition to Ghougassian cited above, see Sebouh D. Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa, Berkeley 2011.

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Amsterdam, one of the most significant port cities of the seventeenth century, played prominently in the network of the New Julfa Armenians. Armenian merchants had already made their way to Flanders and other regions of present-day Belgium and the Netherlands beginning in the twelfth century.25 They are first accounted for in Amsterdam itself between 1560 and 1565 CE.26 The population of Armenians, mostly Julfa Armenians, grew during the seventeenth century. Often, these Julfa merchants show up in the historical record during this century through judicial records related to business disputes.27 By the 1660s, the community in Amsterdam lived largely around the area of the Nieuwe Markt (New Market), especially Monnikenstraat, Koningstraat, Dykstraat, Keizerstraat, and Boomssloot,28 though “the Armenian community of the city never crested above 80 residents at any given time and seems to have averaged around fifty in the 1680-1690 period.”29 An Armenian church dedicated to the Holy Spirit (Surp Hoki) was consecrated on this last street, Boomssloot, on September 20, 1715.30 Earlier, the Armenian community had rented a chapel for prayer services, which they called Surp Karapet (after St. John the Forerunner).31 After the building was approved by the municipality on October 26, 1713, however Surp Hoki became the first Armenian church built and owned by Armenians in Western Europe.32 During the eighteenth century, the population of Armenians in Amsterdam declined, driven in part by shifting trade routes and the emergence of British colonial rule in India that side-lined the Julfa merchants.33 In 1874, well after the last priest had left the church and closed the doors, the Armenian Apostolic church in Amsterdam was sold.34 Only a handful of Armenians, including some who had married into Dutch families, remained. For nearly one hundred years, there was no community of Armenians in the Netherlands to speak of. During those two centuries of an early modern Armenian presence in Amsterdam, the Armenians of the city distinguished themselves in the history of Armenian print.35 Mattʿēos 25 Cf. Aṛakʿel Sarukhan, Hollandan ew Hayerě: ZhZ-ZhTʿ darerum [Holland and the Armenians in the 16th-19th Centuries], Vienna 1926, 43–45. 26 Ibid., 45. 27 Ibid., 46–51. 28 Ibid., 52. 29 Sebouh David Aslanian, The ‘Quintessential Locus of Brokerage’. Letters of Recommendation, Networks, and Mobility in the Life of Thomas Vanandets’I, an Armenian Printer in Amsterdam, 1677– 1707, in: Journal of World History 31.4 (2020), 663. 30 Sarukhan, Hollandan ew Hayerě, 154. 31 In 1663. Cf. Sarukhan, Hollandan ew Hayerě, 148. 32 Ibid., 149. 33 Aslanian, Indian Ocean, 202–214. For an overview of the Armenian community in Amsterdam, see René Bekius, The Armenian Colony in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Armenian Merchants from Julfa before and after the Fall of the Safavid Empire, in: Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, London 2011. 34 Sarukhan, ibd., 163. 35 Cf. Meliné Pehlivanian, Mesrop’s Heirs: The Early Armenian Book Printers, in: Eva Hanebutt-Bez/ Dagmar Glass/ Geoffrey Roper (ed.), Middle Eastern Languages and the Print Revolution. A crosscultural encounter (A catalogue and companion to the Exhibition), Westhofen 2002, 56. On the connection between the merchants of New Julfa and the printing in Amsterdam see Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Merchant Capital and Knowledge: The Financing of Early Printing Presses by the Eurasian Silk Trade of New Julfa, in: Treasures in Heaven. Armenian Art, Religion, and Society. Papers Delivered at the

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Tsaretsʿi established one of the earliest Armenian printing presses in the world in the city, preparing the book Jesus, the Son for printing in 1660.36 Tsaretsʿi commissioned the famous Dutch “punchcutter of the renowned Elzevir printing office” Christoffel van Dijk to craft Armenian printing types in 1658.37 Tsaretsʿi died before the printing of Jesus, the Son was completed and there was a hiatus in Armenian printing until the arrival of Oskan Erewantsʿi. During Erewantsiʿ’s residence in Amsterdam from 1664 until 1669, he printed sixteen books.38 The crowning achievement of the Amsterdam Armenians printers in this era was the first full printing of the Bible in Armenian in 1666 by Erevantsʿi.39 After a short hiatus, a second period of printing activity occurred under the direction of the Vanandetsʿi family in the 1690s.40 Thus, the Armenians of the Netherlands played a prominent role in the history of the Armenian book and printing.41 This legacy outlasted the actual early modern Armenian presence in the country. Fig. 3 Title Page of the Voskean Bible Printed in Amsterdam, 1666 (Collection of the Zohrab Information Center) Photo CS

It is not until after 1950 that Armenians return to the Netherlands in any number of note. The catastrophic 1915 Genocide at the hands of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress under the cover of World War I resulted in massive Armenian migration to Europe and the Americas.42 Yet, few Armenians during the immediate aftermath of the Genocide came to Amsterdam or oth-

36 37

38 39 40 41

42

Pierpont Morgan Library at a Symposium Organized by Thomas F. Mathews and Roger S. Wieck, New York 1998, 59–69, and Sebouh D.Aslanian, Port Cities and Printers. Reflections on Early Modern Global Armenian Print Culture, in: Book History 17 (2014), 58–64. Cf. Vrej Nersessian, Catalogue of Early Armenian Books 1512-1850, London 1980, 25. Cf. Edmond Schütz, The Oscanian and Vanandian Type-Faces of the Armenian Printing Office in Amsterdam: (Christoffel Van Dijk–Nicholas Kis of Tótfalu and the Forerunners), in: Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientarium Hungaricae 42 (1988), 161–220. This article traces the details of these Armenian types, later types made in the city, and the subsequent history of these famous Armenian types. Cf. Sarukhan, ibid., 83. Cf. Nersessian, ibid., 24–29. Cf. Aslanian, Quintessential Locus, 667–673. On the idea of the “history of the book,” see Robert Darnton, What is the History of Books?, in: Daedalus 111.3 (1982), 65–83. Aslanian, in many of the works cited here, has done the most in the recent years to develop the history of the book within the Armenian context. In addition to those works cited here, Aslanian’s forthcoming Early Modernity and Mobility. Port Cities and Printers Across the Armenian Diaspora, 1512–1800 promises to be a wealth of information on the topic. Earlier works on Armenian printing, especially in Armenian, begin with Zarbhanalian’s 1895 History of Armenian Printing. On this earlier literature on Armenian printing, see Schütz, Oscanian Type-Faces, 162. Outside of the Armenian-language work on Armenian printing and other pieces cited here, the work of Raymond Kévorkian in French is the most complete. See Raymond H. Kévorkian, Catalogue des “incunables” arméniens (1511–1695), ou Chronique de l’imprimérie arménienne, Genéve 1986. On the Armenian Genocide, see Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”. A History of the Armenian Genocide, Princeton 2015.

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er parts of the Netherlands, preferring France in Europe.43 Rather, it was in the 1950s and 1960s, through the guestworker program that encouraged single male workers to fill in gaps in the postwar workforce that Armenians migrated alongside other citizens of the Republic of Turkey.44 The more populous and established Syriac Christians, also hailing from Turkey during this period, have been more amply studied than the Armenians.45 Armenians from Turkey, though, broadly followed the same patterns of migration as their co-citizens. In particular, Armenians who migrated during this period settled in the eastern Twente region of the province of Overijssel, especially the city of Almelo. Since this wave of migration in the 1960s, the Armenian population of the Netherlands has grown.46 Initially, Armenians from Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, and Greece added to the population. Later, after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenians from the postSoviet Republic of Armenia and from Russia also came to the Netherlands. In more recent years, they have been joined by additional migrants and refugees from Syria and Iraq. According to the website of the Pontifical Legation of Western Europe, the portion of the Armenian Apostolic Church which oversees the Netherlands, currently “there are approximately 25,000 Armenians living in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, mainly in Amsterdam, Almelo and Amersfoort. Fewer families live in other cities of the country, such as Hague, Dordrecht, Leiden, Rotterdam, Maastricht, Assen, and elsewhere.”47 43 This large community has produced its own literature and written much of its own history. For a recent history of a portion of this French-Armenian community, see Boris Adjemian, Les petites Arménies de la vallée du Rhône. Histoire et mémoires des immigrations arméniennes en France, Lyon 2020. For the history of Armenian literature in France, including a brief overview of the Armenians in France, see Krikor Beledian/Christopher Atamian, (Trans.)/Barlow Der Mugrdechian (ed.), Fifty Years of Armenian Literature in France, Fresno/CA 2016. 44 The phenomenon of “guestworkers” (gastarbeider in Dutch) is better studied in the German context than in the Dutch one. See, for instance, Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, Cambridge 2007. While the programs both in Germany and the Netherlands originally encouraged workers from Italy, Spain, and Greece, the Republic of Turkey quickly became one of the most fervent senders of labourers. Through bilateral agreements encouraging migration for work, citizens of the Republic of Turkey came to both countries in large numbers during the 1950s and 1960s. On the specifics of Turkish migration to Europe during this period (including the Netherlands, where a bilateral agreement was signed on August 19, 1964), see Ahmet Akgündüz, Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974. A Multidisciplinary Analysis, Farnham/UK 2008, 61. On the tensions produced by Turkish presence from the guestworker program, see Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany, Durham-London 2008. 45 See, for instance, Jan Sukkink, De Suryoye: een verborgen gemeenschap (PhD diss.), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 2003, and Naures Atto, Hostages in the Homeland, Orphans in the Diaspora. Identity Discourses Among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the European Diaspora, (PhD diss.), Leiden University 2011. For a concise overview of Syriac migration to the Netherlands, see Sarah Bakker, Fragments of a Liturgical World. Syriac Christianity and the Dutch Multiculturalism Debates (PhD diss.), University of California Santa Cruz 2013, 6–9. See also her more recent work Sarah Bakker Kellogg, Perforating Kinship: Syriac Christianity, Ethnicity, and Secular Legibility, in: Cultural Anthropology 60.4 (2019). 46 To my knowledge, there is no definitive account of the recent and contemporary history of the Armenians in the Netherlands. Scattered journalistic pieces have appeared, but there is no academic treatment of which I am aware. Much of the following information comes from the website of the Pontifical Legation of Western Europe, under whose jurisdiction the Armenian Church in the Netherlands falls. See www.armenian-church.eu/en/regioncategories/nitherlands-en/. Some information is taken from the websites of the individual churches and organizations, and will be cited accordingly. 47 Cf. Pontifical Legation of Western Europe: Armenians in the Netherlands, www.armenian-

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Several of these localities support Armenian churches, political parties, educational endeavors, cultural centers, or some combination of these institutions. In Amsterdam, over one hundred years after the Surp Hoki church was sold, the Armenians there were able to buy the building back and renovate it. It was reconsecrated as an Armenian Apostolic Church on November 29, 1986. A permanent priest has been attached to the church since then, with the same priest serving since 2010.48 In addition to the church, in Amsterdam the “St. Grigor Naregatsi” Cultural Foundation is led by Vahan Avagyan. There is a “St. Gregory Narekatsi” Sunday School, a Women’s Union, and a branch of the AJO (Armeense jongeren organisatie) youth organization. The church has about 500 parishioners.49 Almelo, in the industrial region of Twente bordering Germany that attracted guestworkers of Turkish citizenship, is the other large Armenian community in the Netherlands. The number of Armenians in the area is around six thousand. Armenians in the area first purchased a school building, using one of the halls as the church sanctuary, in 1991. In 2002, from the sale of that building, the Armenians of Almelo built their own church. Consecrated in November of 2003 as St. Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Church, it is the only Armenian church in the Netherlands with the distinctive and recognizable Armenian church architecture. 50 In addition to the church, the Armenians of Almelo boast a robust and varied communal life: an AJO “St. Gregory the Illuminator” Youth Union, a Women’s Union, a “St. Mesrop Mashtots” Sunday School divided between Eastern and Western Armenian groups, and the “Zartonk” dance ensemble.51 Fig. 4 Interior of the Surp Karapet Armenian Apostolic Church in Maastricht, Photo CS church.eu/en/regioncategories/nitherlands-en/ (28.07.2021). 48 Cf. Armeens Apostolische Kerk Amsterdam: Sinds 1700 Jaar Ondergaat een Levend Land en een Levendig golk Het Waarheidslicht van Christus, www.armeensekerk.org/onze-kerk-2/ (28.07.2021). 49 Cf. Pontifical Legation of Western Europe: Amsterdam, www.armenian-church.eu/en/region/ amsterdam/ (28.07.2021). 50 Surp Hoki in Amsterdam, while also built by Armenians, was not built in the distinctive Armenian style. The other church buildings used by Armenians throughout the country (whether owned or rented) are former Catholic or Protestant churches. 51 Cf. Pontifical Legation of Western Europe: Almelo, online: www.armenian-church.eu/en/region/almelo/ 28.07.2021. The distinction between “Eastern” and “Western” refers to the major dialects of the Armenian language. Western Armenian predominates among the diaspora Armenians hailing from the former Ottoman Empire while the Eastern dialect is state-sponsored dialect of the Republic of Armenia, dominant there and among other Soviet and post-Soviet diasporas. Teaching Sunday School in both dialects suggests a varied parish with members from many different parts of the Armenian world.

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Maastricht is the third major centre of Armenian life in the Netherlands. While there are regular services and a secure church building (as well as the “Urartu” Foundation) in Hertogenbosch and occasional services in Arnhem, Assen, Eindhoven, Heerhugowaard, Roosendaal, and Utrecht, only in Maastricht does the Armenian community also have a consecrated church building.52 The Surp Karapet Armenian Church, named for St. John the Forerunner and in commemoration of the name of the first Armenian church in the Netherlands, is a former Catholic Church, the Church of Ascension, on loan to the Armenians since 2012. On January 26, 2013, the church was consecrated as an Armenian Church by Archbishop Norvan Zakarian with the consent of the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Roermond.53 The newest of the three main Armenian churches in the country, Maastricht counts about 2500 Armenians living in the region, and has a Sunday School, Women’s Union, Armenian dance club and football team. Maastricht is also home to the “Ani” Armenian Foundation.54

4. Armenian veneration of Servatius and techniques of emplacement Officially registered as a foundation with the Chamber of Commerce on November 25, 1999, the Armeense Stichting ANI has placed the Armenian connection with St. Servatius front and center since its inception. Their website declares that the foundation chose Maastricht as the location for tits activities in South Limburg not only because “the majority of the Armenian community lives” there, but also because Maastricht is a special city for Armenians because St. Servatius lived there.55 In addition to supporting Armenian language and culture and their efforts coordinating with the Surp Karapet Church, another important priority for the ANI Foundation is “the development, participation and integration of our community in Dutch society.” Participation and integration occur through involvement in civic events. A major mode of involvement, though, has been through the connection between Armenians and St. Servatius. In fact, the ANI Foundation was crucial to the dedication of the kachkar in 2016. They were also the organizers of the March 10, 2012 symposium, “Saint Servatius the Armenian.”56 This symposium was the first major event to publicly emplace the Armenians of Maastricht into the city through an association with St. Servatius. Notably, the Surp Karapet Church was already on loan at that time but had not yet been consecrated as an Armenian Apostolic Church. While the ANI Foundation had already been around for over a decade, the community and church were moving into a new phase around 2012 and 2013. At the same time that a permanent church building was finalized, the Armenians of Maastricht 52 Cf. Pontifical Legation of Western Europe: Armenians in the Netherlands, www.armenianchurch.eu/en/regioncategories/nitherlands-en/ (28.07.2021). 53 Cf. Armeens Apostolische Kerk Maastricht, Over Surp Karapet, www.surpkarapet.com/over-de-kerk. html (28.07.2021). 54 Cf. Armeense Stichting ANI, Armeense Stichting ANI, www.animaastricht.nl/ (28.07.2021). 55 Cf. id., Over de stichting, www.animaastricht.nl/de-stichting.html (29.07.2021). 56 Armeens Apostolische Kerk Maastricht: Sint Servatius/ Servaas, www.surpkarapet.com/sintservatius.html (29.07.2021).

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made the connection between their community and the patron saint of the city explicit through the symposium. Present at the symposium were Archbishop Norvan Zakarian, the Armenian primate of the Diocese of France, the Catholic bishops of Roermond and Hasselt, the Armenian ambassador to the Netherlands, and the Dutch Minister of Immigration, Integration, and Asylum. Speakers included a local church historian and deacon, the French-Armenian historian Maxime K. Yevadian, and Dutch Armenologists Theo van Lint (Oxford) and Joseph Weitenberg (Leiden).57 The event emplaced the Armenians in Maastricht and the Netherlands more broadly by emphasizing shared history and culture. All of this was done through the context of St. Servatius. Maxime Yevadian, one of the authors of the book Saint Servatius d’Arménie: Premier évaque de Maastricht, through both the book and his presentation at the symposium, made the strategy of emplacement that uses St. Servatius explicit. In the talk and in the book, Yevadian (and his co-author, the late Georges K. Khayiguian) use Armenian historical sources to connect the name Servatius to an ancient Armenian noble family.58 By offering this connection publicly, after a broader history of St. Servatius offered by a local historian and theologian, Yevadian connected the history of Maastricht to the history of the Armenians. Later in the day, Yevadian presented the book to the Dutch Minister of Immigration, Integration, and Asylum.59 After literally writing the Armenians into the history of Maastricht, that written record was offered to a representative of the Dutch government, suggesting the full integration of Armenians into Dutch society and history through that inscription into history. Both the long history of Armenians in the Netherlands and their integration were the topics of other speakers at the symposium. Prof. van Lint traces the “social, cultural an literary developments of the Armenians” while Prof. Weitenberg discussed the Armenians in the Netherlands. According to Leo van Leijsen, writing for the blog of the Katholieke Vereniging voor Oecumene (Catholic Association for Ecumenism), Weitenberg stressed that Armenians and Dutch belong to the same cultural circle. Van Leijsen found the “western” sounds of the musical program later in the day a sonic confirmation of “the fact that Armenians are culturally European.”60 Based on these statements and assessments, the use of St. Servatius as a springboard to help emplace Armenians in the history of the Netherlands and the city of Maastricht was highly successful. The inscription on the khachkar at the Basilica of St. Servatius suggests how powerful emplacement through reference to St. Servatius can be. As with the symposium, the small ceremony dedicating the cross-stone on May 15, 2016, emphasizes the place of Armenians in the city of Maastricht and the history of the Netherlands.61 Hence, for the Armenians of Maastricht, St. Servatius not only offers a point of commonality, a shared saint to venerate, or even a way to make themselves visible or legible. It is also a mode of inscribing them57 Leo van Leijsen, Sint Servaas de Armeniër, in: Katholieke Vereniging voor Oecumene, www.oecumene.nl/nieuws-blogs/blogs/71-sint-servaas-de-armenier (29.07.2021). 58 Khayiguian/Yevadian, Saint Servatius d’Arménie, 27–33.81. 59 Cf. van Leijsen, ibid. 60 van Leijsen, Sint Servaas de Armeniër. 61 The dedication of the khachkar is available to view on the YouTube Channel of the ANI Foundation: www.youtube.com/watch?v=msEFwo-MBrY&t=247s

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selves into the very history of the city, a way of emplacing the Armenian community and Armenian Christians locally. As with Yevadian’s book and presentation, Armenian emplacement in Maastricht takes place through inscription, both metaphorical and literal. In the very inscription on the khachkar connecting the Armenian community to Maastricht through “their compatriot” St. Servatius, Armenians have written themselves into the city.

Fig. 5 The Unveiling of the Khachkar dedicated to St. Servatius at the Basilica of St. Servatius in Maastricht, May 15, 2016 (Armeense Stichting ANI’s Youtube Channel)

Accomplished literally through the writing of history and the metaphorical integration when Yevadian’s textual artifact was handed to the Minister of Integration, with the khachkar the Armenians accomplish a monumental inscription into the very built environment of the city. Such a mode of emplacement deploys techniques of saint veneration shared between the Catholic and Armenian Apostolic Churches. It creatively deploys an aspect of the Armenian liturgical tradition, the erection of memorial khachkars, 62 to commemorate a saint that is not officially venerated in the Armenian calendar. For the Armenian Apostolic Church, sainthood is essentially a liturgical designation marked by inclusion in the liturgical calendar and certain portions of the liturgy. While not a remembrance in the official Divine Liturgy, the Mass of the Armenian Apostolic Church, erecting a khachkar to St. Servatius does at least incorporate him into the liturgical life of the Armenian Church. Thus, the inscription accomplished by the Armenians of Maastricht is bi-directional: they write themselves into the history of the city while simultaneously elevating the status of St. Servatius among Armenians. 62 There are many works about the artistic tradition of khachkars. See Facoltà di architettura del Politecnico di Milano and the Accademiá delle scienze di Yerevan, Documenti di architettura armena/Documents of Armenian architecture, Vol. 2 Khatchkar, Milano 1977. For a recent and beautiful introduction to many examples of Armenian khachkars around the world, see Khatcherian, Khatchkar.

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Creatively deploying the liturgical and ecclesial traditions of the Armenian Apostolic Church around the veneration of saints, the Armenians of Maastricht deploy a remarkable technique of emplacement. They use the local history of saint veneration and the existing built environment of the city in tandem with liturgical and artistic practices from the Armenian Christian tradition to forge links between the city and their community. This work is not merely intellectual but involves literal inscription and monumental intervention into the physical city. While St. Servatius, as the patron saint of the city is emphasized, my initial ethnographic fieldwork with Armenians in Maastricht suggests that this technique has broader applications. One Armenian resident of the city mentioned the potential Armenian background of Odo van Metz, an eighth century architect who designed buildings for Charlemagne in nearby Aachen and of Macarius of Ghent, associated with the Belgian city. The techniques of emplacement exemplified in the veneration of St. Servatius may therefore have broader applications.

5. Conclusion: Oriental Orthodox hagiographic emplacement in Europe Emphasizing shared hagiography and saint veneration has been a successful technique for the integration of Middle Eastern Christians into Europe. For instance, the great Syriac St. Ephrem, who is also one of the doctors of the Catholic Church, provides a point of commonality and a legible reference for Syriac Christians in Europe. Similarly, the declaration of the Armenian St. Gregory of Narek as doctor of the Catholic Church in 2015 has led to a flurry of activity around the saint – a remarkable development given that St. Gregory of Narek lived his entire life outside of communion with the Church of Rome.63 Both of these examples demonstrate a general strategy of emphasizing shared connections between the major Christian denominations of Europe and the smaller churches of Middle Eastern Christians. Saints, especially the relatively uncontroversial shared saints of the early Christian Church, are an obvious connection. Specifically for the smaller churches of the Oriental Orthodox branch of Christianity, many of which are only recently emplaced in Europe, finding shared connections is an important strategy for gaining recognition and visibility.64 Less known and often recent arrivals in Europe, Oriental Orthodox Christians, like the Armenians of Maastricht, do not have the resources even of the larger churches in the Eastern Orthodox family like the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, appeals to shared saint veneration are an important strategy for increasing visibility. The Armenians of Maastricht, though, might offer a more specific technique of emplacement. More than emphasizing an already shared history or highlighting a saint both churches already venerate, the Armenian community of Maastricht has worked to forge this connection. Moreover, they have done so through an inscription into the history and geog63 For an introduction to St. Gregory of Narek written explicitly with a broader Christian and Catholic audience in mind after his canonization by the Catholic Church, see Michael Papazian, The Doctor of Mercy: The Sacred Treasures of St. Gregory of Narek, Collegeville/MN 2019. 64 On the importance of the “external recognition” for Middle Eastern Christians, see the 2020 special issue of Mashriq & Majar, especially Fiona McCallum Guiney, Middle Eastern Christian Identities in Europe, in: Masriq & Mahjar 8.1 (2020).

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raphy of Maastricht – metaphorically, through the historical connection between Servatius and Armenia, and literally, through textual production and monumental construction altering the built environment of the city. These techniques of emplacement, what we might call hagiographic emplacement, suggest a rich and fruitful way for Armenians and other Oriental Orthodox Christians in Europe to locate themselves in their European homes. My ongoing ethnographic research with the Armenian community of Maastricht hopes to develop our understanding of these techniques of hagiographic emplacement and to consider the broad implications for using hagiography as a method of forging connections across communities in Europe.

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The Issue of Historical Christian Minorities in EU-Turkey Relations: The Case of Armenians1 Sevgi Çilingir 1. Introduction Turkey officially recognizes non-Muslim minorities that were under a special status during the Ottoman Empire: The Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities. In addition to individual human rights that provide religious freedoms and ensure non-discrimination, these groups were granted certain rights as a community since the foundation of the Republic. However, negative public attitudes and discrimination persisted, resulting in continued emigration and demands for reform by the communities. Since its acceptance as eligible for membership, Turkey has been closely monitored by the EU to determine its progress in its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, formulated to ensure that its political, economic, administrative and institutional structures comply with EU standards and the country is ready for membership.2 The situation of Turkey’s historical Christian minorities is related to this monitoring process, through the political criteria ensuring a democratic regime that guarantees human rights and protection of minorities, and the evaluation of the candidate’s capacity to adapt to EU Common Foreign and Security Policy - including relations with states with connections to these minorities, such as Greece and Armenia. This study aims to present a long-term overview of the EU’s evaluation of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy choices regarding the Armenian minority in Turkey. The methodology rests on content analysis of progress reports published by the Commission since 1998 to inform the Council, member states and the candidate state as a basis for membership negotiations. Since the Commission makes use of various sources of information (Turkish government, European Parliament, inter-state and non-governmental organizations), these reports provide reliable material for discerning the EU’s institutional position on the situation. The findings are evaluated in relation to the changes in EUTurkey relations over time.

1

This paper was developed from the author’s presentation at the workshop “Religious Fragmentation as a Factor of Conflict”, Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany, 23.–24.04.2019. 2 European Commission: Accession criteria, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/ glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en (27.06.2021).

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2. The Armenian minority in Turkey Turkey is a secular, centralized state that provides constitutional guarantees for human rights on the basis of the individual. Accordingly, it does not officially recognize minorities or minority rights, with the exception of historically established non-Muslim minorities. In the Ottoman Empire, Jews, Greeks and Armenians had had a special standing with the state, with certain rights and obligations as religious communities, through the millet system. During the disintegration of the Empire, which took about a century of continuous state of internal and external war, most of the ethnic and religious minorities pursued independence or autonomy, or gave support to such movements. This history culminated into hostilities prior to and during World War I and the following War of Independence that created the Republic. In this context, whereas the Jewish community was perceived by the new state as “harmless”, especially Armenians and the Greek Orthodox were stigmatized as “traitors”.3 Their minority rights were guaranteed by Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923, between Allied Powers and Turkish Republic. Constitutionally, the Republic was a secular state built upon a civic model of citizenship. However, with a predominantly Turkish Muslim population, the understanding of nationhood had an ethnoreligious component, which was problematic for non-Muslim minorities.4 The clauses on the protection of minorities in Lausanne Treaty (Sect. III, Art. 37–45), which were to be overseen by the League of Nations (Art. 45), guaranteed nondiscrimination and provided some privileges and exemptions. Turkey agreed to facilitate the use of their own language in courts (Art. 39). In addition to freedom to use their language and profess their religion, they were guaranteed equality in establishing charitable, religious and educational institutions (Art. 40). They were allowed to use their own language as the language of instruction in their community primary schools (Art. 41).5 The treaty allowed the implementation of their customary family law (Art. 42).6 The minorities were not to be “compelled to perform any act in violation of their faith”, including the observance of “weekly day of rest” (Art. 43). However, the treaty limited minority status to non-Muslim citizens. Moreover, the Allied Powers’ insistence on privileges, reinforced the previous perceptions that urged discriminatory tendencies, despite the inclusive citizenship model.7 Until the 2000s, Lausanne Treaty remained to be the only legal document that pro3

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This perception was informed by Armenian uprisings prior to and during World War I, Greek uprisings in the 19th century that led to the establishment of Greece as an independent state, and the clash of Turkish and Greek armed forces during Turkish War of Independence following World War I, while the Jewish community did not pursue separatism or became involved in violence. Yeşim Bayar, In pursuit of homogeneity. The Lausanne Conference, minorities and the Turkish nation, in: Nationalities Papers 42 (2014), 114s.117. Ibid., 108s. The “Unity of Education Law” of 1927 limited the use of these rights. During the following decades, non-Muslim minorities faced obstacles in the field of association, such as lack of foundation status and limitations on assets and financial resources. Ramazan Erhan Güllü, Lozan Antlaşması sonrası Türkiye’nin azinliklara yönelik politikalari, in: Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi 7 (2018), 284–286. As the new Republic legislated a secular civil law (1924), the minorities renounced this right. The law allowed religious marriages in addition to official marriage, but religious authorities were not able to judge on matters such as divorce and inheritence. Ibid., 275–278. Bayar, Pursuit, 118–121.

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vided for minority rights. Even in its limited scope, the educational and linguistic clauses were not fully implemented and restrictions were put in place for religious foundations.8 Although they were officially recognized as minorities and some of their rights were guaranteed in the new state, most of the Christian population had already fled or put through forced migration. Estimates vary greatly, due to differences in the categorization of the groups.9 1914 estimates show that the historical non-Muslim minorities made up of over 17% of the population (around 3 million), while Muslims comprised 82% (around 15 million). The Armenian Orthodox were the second largest group, after the Greek Orthodox. Over 1 million in number, they made up around 6% of the Ottoman population and lived in all provinces, concentrated around Istanbul and in some Central, Eastern and South Eastern provinces. 10 The total Armenian population of the Empire (including the Catholic and Protestants) before World War I was estimated around 2.1 million by the Patriarchate, and around 1.5 million according to Ottoman state records.11 The mass deaths of Armenians around the time of their deportation in 1915, officially acknowledged by the Turkish state as a result of “serious inter-communal conflict, perpetrated by both Christian and Muslim irregular forces, complicated by disease, famine, and many other of war’s privations” but not genocide,12 combined with refugees who fled the war, reduced the Armenian population drastically, especially outside of Istanbul. By 1927, the number of Armenians - including the Catholic and the Protestant - within the territories of the Republic is estimated to have been around 140,000. Due to continuous emigration and/or miscalculations in the 1927 census, the population was reduced further by 42% until 1935.13 The insecurity of the remaining population continued during the 1940s and 1950s, causing emigration. During World War II, non-Muslim minorities were put under discriminatory taxation, confiscation of assets, forced military service and forced labour. 14 The 1955 massacre that mainly targeted the Greek Orthodox population, affected all nonMuslim minorities in terms of lives, livelihoods and trust in the state and the society.15 An 8 Gözde Yılmaz, Is there a puzzle? Compliance with minority rights in Turkey (1999–2010), in: KollegForschergruppe (KFG), Working Paper Series 23 (January), The Transformative Power of Europe, Freie Universität Berlin 2011, 12. 9 In some data from the Empire period, Armenians were treated as a whole. In others, they were divided into Armenian (Orthodox), Armenian Catholic, and Protestant (without giving ethnic background). In the data from the Republican period, categories included Christian religion, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Armenian language in addition to Armenian (probably for designating the Armenian Orthodox religious group). 10 The calculations for 1914 were based on the 1905 census and published in 1920 by the Ottoman state. Orhan Sakin, 1914 nüfus istatistiğine göre Ermeni cemaatinin nüfusu, http://turksand armenians.marmara.edu.tr/tr/1914-nufus-istatistigine-gore-ermeni-cemaatinin-nufusu/ (27.06.2021). 11 The Patriachate made its estimate in 2012, the Ottoman state’s estimate was calculated from data provided in the period 1912–1914. Muammer Demirel, (2005). Türkiye’de Kalan Ermeni Nüfus, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 21(2005), 479–492. 12 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021). The Armenian Allegation of Genocide: The Issues and the Facts. www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts. en.mfa. 13 Demirel, ibid. 14 Ramazan Erhan Güllü, Lozan Antlaşması sonrası Türkiye’nin azinliklara yönelik politikalari, in: Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi 7 (2018), 268–298, 283s. 15 Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet dönemi azınlık politikaları ve stratejileri bağlamında 6-7 Eylül olayları, Tarih

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official survey conducted for Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs estimated that by 2014, 99.2% of Turkey’s population were Muslim, and non-Muslim religious beliefs comprised only 0.4% of the population.16 Currently, Turkey’s Armenian population is concentrated in Istanbul and comprised of Christians (Armenian Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants), previously converted Muslims and labour migrants from Armenia. Their total number is unknown.17 The Armenian civil society estimates that the Turkish Armenian minority population is around 40,000 and declining, due to continued emigration.18 The Armenian Orthodox Church is autonomous in its religious affairs. However, developments in the legal protection of the community remains insufficient. Discriminatory treatment, hate speech and crimes continue. The categorization of the events of 1915 remains unresolved, which puts a strain on Turkey-Armenia relations as well as Turkey’s relationship with its Armenian minority.

3. EU-Turkey relations EU-Turkey relations have a long and complicated history. Since the Republic, Turkey had been ruled by a political elite that saw Westernization as the only route for modernization and development. Turkey was oriented towards the West in foreign policy as well. Bordering Soviet Union and determined to stay in the Western Bloc, Turkey joined international organizations created by Western powers during the Cold War. Accordingly, Turkey applied for partnership with the EEC in 1959 and signed an association agreement in 1963. However, the relations improved slowly and staggered numerous times. A decade after Turkey’s membership application (1987), the EU found it eligible for membership (1997) and declared it as a candidate country (1999). In the meantime, based on the previous partnership agreement, Turkey entered a customs union with the EU (1995). The accession process started in 2005, with numerous setbacks. In addition to the association framework and membership process, bilateral agreements were made in the fields of asylum and border control (2013, 2016).19 Turkey’s EU membership is officially bound upon its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, propounded for the Eastern enlargement in 1993. These accession criteria require candidate countries to adapt to the EU politically and economically, before membership.20 With the prospect of full membership (1999), this conditionality triggered Europeanization in Turkey, with a rigorous program of economic liberalization and democratization. Since Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul 2005. 16 Sarp Özer, Türkiye’de dini hayat araştırması, www.aa.com.tr/tr/yasam/turkiyede-dini-hayatarastirmasi/141424 (27.06.2021). 17 Hrag Papazian, Türkiye’deki üç farklı Ermeni kimliği, www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/16758/turkiye-deki-ucfarkli-ermeni-kimligi (27.06.2021). 18 Karatabanoğlu, Seda: Ermeniler neden Türkiye’yi terk ediyor? Türkiye‘de ne kadar Ermeni kaldı? https://tr.euronews.com/2019/04/08/ermeniler-neden-turkiyeyi-terk-ediyor-turkiye-de-ne-kadar-ermenikaldi (27.06.2021). 19 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı: Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Önemli Tarihler (1959–2019), www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/birimler/kpb/kronoloji-trkce-ocak2020.pdf (27.06.2021). 20 European Commission, Accession Criteria.

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2002, Turkey has been governed by conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP), whose domestic and international policies changed over time. Coupled with developments within the EU, EU-Turkey relations did not follow a straight path during candidacy. Turkey was excluded from the Eastern enlargement of 2004 and debates started in the EU about offering Turkey alternative ways of association besides full membership. Accession negotiations were partially suspended, only a year after they started (2006). The loss of credibility on the part of the EU and the concerns of the domestic elite over sensitive policy areas, slowed down the impetus for reforms. From 2005 to 2010, the reform process slowed down.21 Europeanization was not abandoned, but it became “selective”, depending on the issue and policy area.22 Overall, EU-Turkey relations since 2005 are described by the literature as de-Europeanization, meaning “the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations”,23 which accelerated in the 2010s.24 In this period, the EU faced a financial crisis and a refugee crisis. Despite continued economic liberalization, Turkey de-democratized, in response to widespread public unrest in the early 2010s and an attempted coup in 2016. Although both the EU and Turkey went through transformations that staggered the membership process, economic, political and security concerns keep both sides engaged at various levels. In 2015 and 2016, accession negotiations restarted and EU-Turkey summits of head of states or governments started to be held regularly. New cooperation mechanisms were put in place to manage the refugee crisis. However, especially since 2017, overshadowed by disputes in burden-sharing on asylum, differences in foreign policy and security priorities regarding the Middle East as well as criticisms about the state of human rights and the rule of law in Turkey, relations have been soured to the point of calls for the suspension of Turkey’s accession process and funding, by EU institutions that take part in the decision-making process of the EU’s external relations and enlargement.25

4. Research design The study inquires the evaluation of the situation of the Armenian minority by the EU through a content analysis of progress reports, issued annually by the Commission since 1998, a year after Turkey was found eligible for membership. Named as country reports after 2016, they have been published every year except 2017. They provide a structured source that enables the detection of changes of the EU’s perception of Turkey over time. The Commission is an institution peculiar to the EU, reflecting its supranational characteristics. Commissioners are nominated by member states, but their responsibilities are to21 Buket Ökten Sipahioğlu, Shifting from Europeanization to de Europeanization in Turkey. How AKP instrumentalized EU negotiations, in: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 48 (2017), 52. 22 Gözde Yılmaz, From Europeanization to de-Europeanization. The Europeanization process of Turkey in 1999–2014, in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies 24 (2016), 87–94. 23 Senem Aydın-Düzgit/Alper Kaliber, Encounters with Europe in an era of domestic and international turmoil. Is Turkey a de-Europeanising candidate country?, in: Southern European Society and Politics 21 (2016), 6. 24 Yılmaz, ibid.; Sipahioğlu, ibid. 25 European Council: Turkey, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/turkey/ (27.06. 2021).

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wards the EU as a whole. Tasked as the guardian of the founding treaties, it initiates EU law and monitors its application, while decision-making is conferred upon the Council representing member states – and the Parliament – representing the people. Compared to Council and Parliament publications, the Commission’s annual reports are relatively impartial. They are less likely to reflect member states’ positions or the attitudes of political groups that form the Parliament. The reports are informed by various resources, such as legislative amendments, declarations made by the government, court cases related to the topics of the EU acquis, and reports by various domestic and international stakeholders, such as professional and civil society organizations. By presenting the state of affairs in relation to membership requirements, they form the basis of negotiations for both the EU and the candidate country. The situation of Turkey’s minorities is related to this monitoring process. Copenhagen political criteria require the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”, as well as the ability to fulfil obligations that would be taken on with membership.26 By that token, the candidate should follow the principles of Common Foreign and Security Policy. It should have peaceful relations with its neighbours and should have resolved international disputes before membership. Turkey’s relations with Cyprus, Greece and Armenia, which are related to its Greek and Armenian minorities, have also taken place in progress reports. The content analysis covers not only the sections of the reports specifically about minorities, but also these related fields. A similar study was published in 2014, that analysed the coverage of Armenia and Armenians in progress reports. However, the study is focused on TurkeyArmenia relations, rather than the Armenian minority, and it treats the minority issues as a sub-category of this relationship.27 This study will contribute with its minority focus and its coverage of more recent reports. The study examines the reports from 1998 to 2018. Content search and coding was aided by QDA Miner Lite program. First, the use of the words Armenia and Armenian were searched for in the documents. In addition to these terms, the terms 1915 and genocide were also searched for, since the events are central to Armenian collective memory and continue to affect both Turkey-Armenia relations and the situation of the minority in Turkey. After finding out the placement of the terms with respect to the areas covered by the reports, the articulations were coded as one of three positions: supportive of Turkey (+), critical of Turkey (-), or neutral (0).28 The recurrence of the articulations as well as the posi-

26 European Commission, Accession Criteria. 27 Barış Özdal, Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye – Ermenistan ilişkilerini nasıl okuyor? İlerleme raporları itibariyle genel bir analiz, in: Yeni Türkiye Ermeni Meselesi Özel Sayısı Cilt V, 20 (64), Yeni Türkiye Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara 2014, 3843–3852. 28 The articulation (a phrase comprised of a report or argument, as part, whole, or group of sentences) was coded as (+) when the Commission drew attention to legislative reform, improved relations or inclusive speeches or actions of officials and institutions. They were coded as (-) for arguments that there was no progress or there was a retreat, Turkey was not fulfilling its legal obligations, state officials or institutions displayed indifference or engaged in harmful actions. Code (0) was used to mark in instances where the Commission gave information on events or legislative changes without qualifying them as beneficial or harmful to the membership process.

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tions of the Commission (+/-/0) were counted for each year, to determine the changes in the density and direction of the arguments.

5. Findings The reports covered both Armenia as a state (ARM) and Armenians as a minority (Armin). The following table shows the instances of articulations and their direction (+/-/0). Mentioning of 1915 events were coded under either one or the other, depending on the context of the argument. Table 1: Articulations about Armenia and Armenians in the reports Years

ARM+

ARM-

ARM0

Armin+

Armin-

Armin0

2001–05

2001-18

2014/ 15

2000

2002

1998

2002–05

2004–18

2000/01

2007–10 2014/15

2007

2003–08

2009–18

2011 2013 2015–18

Times mentioned per year*

1–6

1–3

1

1–6

1–8

1

Total

21

28

2

47

46

14

51

107

*Excluding the years when Armenia or Armenians were not mentioned at all Armenia was mentioned every year since 2001 and the Armenian minority was covered by every report except 1999. The omission in 1999 is not surprising, since the reports were less comprehensive before 2000. The minority was mentioned twice as much as Armenia. This was expected, since evaluations on domestic law and policy comprise the majority of the texts. Rather than assuming a neutral position (i.e., reporting events such as new laws or international agreements without commenting on them), the Commission made either positive or negative arguments about Turkey’s performance. Criticisms took place almost every year. However, it appears that the Commission sought to strike a balance in its evaluations. The total number of criticisms and supportive arguments were very close. Although there were no reports since 2000, in which the Commission did not criticize Turkey at all, the instances where the Commission made only criticisms in a report without any supportive arguments were rare.

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The reports were between 60–190 pages long and were generally comprised of three main parts that evaluated Turkey’s situation with respect to the political criteria, economic criteria and obligations of membership (OBLI). The political criteria were usually divided into two sections: democracy and rule of law (DRL), human rights and protection of minorities (HRPM). HRPM was further divided into civil and political rights (CPR), economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR), and protection of minorities (PM).29 OBLI became more detailed when the accession negotiations started (2005), with subsections of the EU acquis in many fields, including foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) and judiciary and fundamental rights (JFR).30 In 2018, the structure changed, combining political criteria and the related OBLI sections under a single heading,31 while FSDP remained under the OBLI part. In the 20-year period, issues related to the Armenian minority were mentioned within the political criteria and various sections of OBLI. They were covered predominantly under HRPM, as well as JFR and FSDP under OBLI. The reports occasionally covered Armenians within the DRL section of the political criteria, as well as information society and the media – Chapter 10 of OBLI, which remained open for negotiations, even after they were suspended in many other areas. Besides these sections, Armenia/ns were mentioned once under two other chapters of OBLI: external relations (Chapter 30, in the context of trade policy), and justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24, in comments about landmines at Turkey’s borders). Some issues were covered under more than one heading: education, language, freedom of expression and association, and the events of 1915. The following sections present the developments that were covered, in line with the reports’ categorization of issue areas.

6. Relations with Armenia Turkey’s relations with Armenia were mainly covered by the FSDP sections of the reports, under evaluations of Turkey’s bilateral relations. Since Armenia was included in EU neighbourhood policy, and Turkey was expected to develop good relations with its own neighbours, this was important for the membership process. Shortly after the dissolution of Soviet Union, the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region became a source of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has brought the two countries to armed conflict in 1990s and 2020. Although Turkey took part in multilateral platforms for regional cooperation that included Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute resulted in the cutting of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia (1993). In mid29 This was a subsection of HRPM, following CPR and ESCR, with or without a specific heading. There were general statements about minorities, non-Muslim minorities or Christian minorities, as well as the Armenian minority. If the argument covered the Armenians, it was included in the coding which will be presented in the following sections. 30 The terminology was changed in 2005. For the purposes of this study, the new terminology is used to cover the former contents. 31 2018 Report covered political criteria under the name “Fundamentals First”. Here, HRPM-related negotiation chapters (23 and 24 of OBLI) were evaluated under the heading of “rule of law and fundamental rights”, following the evaluation of democratic institutions and public administration.

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2000s, Turkey and Armenia started a normalization process, yet the international protocol agreed upon (2009), was suspended by the Armenian government (2010). The protocol was officially declared null and void by the Armenian Parliament in late 2010s. 32 Another source of dispute between the two countries have been the events of 2015. While Armenia designates the events as genocide, Turkey does not acknowledge the atrocities as such. As part of its normalization approach, Turkey offered setting up of a joint historical commission (2005), and the Prime Minister issued condolence messages for the commemoration day (April 24, 2014, 2015).33 The reports included developments and setbacks in the normalization process, supporting Turkey for the steps it took and criticizing it when the process stagnated. In every report that included Armenia, the Commission presented the closing of borders as a problem that needs to be solved. However, the Turkish Armenian minority were never mentioned in the evaluations under the sections about Turkey-Armenia relations. The developments regarding 1915 events were covered in separate sections about minorities and Turkey’s foreign policy. Likewise, the Commission did not mention Armenia in its evaluations about minorities. In other words, in the case of Armenians, the Commission took caution in evaluating minority protection without including its international dimension.

7. Civil and political rights Under the HRPM and JFR sections,34 the situation of the Armenian minority was mentioned not only in the context of minority rights, but also civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. As regards civil and political rights, Armenians were mentioned in the context of the following issues: • Freedom of religion (+/-) • Freedom of expression (+/-) • Freedom of association (-) (only 2008) • Freedom of assembly (+) As the general coverage of the reports, the Commission provided both criticisms and support to Turkey’s policies and legislation. However, positive and negative arguments were not balanced for every issue. Placed in the texts between the developments related to the Greek Orthodox minority and Christian minorities not recognized by law (i.e. Assyrians and Protestants), Armenians’ freedom of religion was an issue area where the Commission

32 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı: Türkiye – Ermenistan siyasi ilişkileri, www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistansiyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa (27.06.2021). 33 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı: 1915 olayları ve Türk-Ermeni uyuşmazlığı, www.mfa.gov.tr/1915-olaylari-veturk_ermeni-uyusmazligi.tr.mfa (27.06.2021). 34 Before it became a negotiation chapter (23, under OBLI since 2005), JFR issues were covered by Justice and Home Affairs policy section of OBLI and did not comment on minorities. Human rights and minority issues were mainly covered in HRPM sections (political criteria). Between 2005-2013, selected issues such as important court cases were explained in the JFR sections as well. Between 2013-2018, JFR became more detailed and most of HRPM issues were evaluated here. This study presents the findings about rights and protection, from the combination of the two (HRPM and JFR).

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continuously criticized Turkey. The problems depicted under freedom of religion are presented below. Table 2: Armenians’ freedom of religion in the reports Issue Legal personality and property rights

+

-

2015/16

2002–2014

Limitations on non-Turkish clergy

2002–2005

Training of clergy in Turkish universities

2002, 2009–2016

Internal management of foundations

2005

Hate speech and crimes Opening religious services in Van province

2010–2018 2010–2012

Repairing of the church and starting religious services in Van (prohibited since 1915), as well as the acknowledgement of the legal personality and property rights of the religious community were welcomed. However, according to the Commission, the latter should have been granted long before. Problems regarding the clergy also continued for a long time. Moreover, the Commission reported that not only Armenians, but also other non-Muslim minorities, became targets of hate speech and crimes, and the state did not protect them enough. In 2013, Armenian Church itself became a target. The Commission reported that legislative developments were slow and there were obstacles to the implementation of law in the field of religious freedom. Table 3: Armenians’ freedom of expression, association and assembly in the reports Issue

+

Public debate on the Armenian issue

-

2005, 2009–2014

Prosecution of journalists and writers

2005/06, 2010/11, 2013

Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council

2008

Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day activities

2010–2015

Since the Turkish state does not acknowledge the events of 1915 as genocide, public debate had been severely limited on this sensitive issue. From 2005 onwards, the Commission covered events of 1915 in its reports every year (42 times). It did not use the term genocide. The terms “Armenian issue” or “tragic events of 1915” were preferred. The Commission usually both criticized and supported Turkey within the same paragraph, and most of the

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comments were supportive (25). In addition to Turkey-Armenia relations, the events were covered as part of freedom of expression. Under freedom of expression, whereas the Commission approved of the opening up of the public debate, it also stressed the prosecutions of intellectuals (novelist Pamuk and journalist Dink) as a counter-tendency in this field.35 Under freedom of assembly, the allowing of “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day” activities of civil society organizations was welcomed, but this lasted for a short period (2010–2015).

8. Economic, social and cultural rights The reports’ coverage of the Armenian minority was limited in this field. The legal personality and property rights of religious community organizations were mentioned in this section, as well. Here, the main problem stated by the Commission was the properties of the Greek Orthodox community, rather than the Armenians. After ECHR rulings, the property rights of the Armenian religious organization were restituted (2007–2009) and it gained foundation status (2012), all of which the Commission supported. Regarding cultural rights, the main criticism of the Commission was related to the Kurdish community and centred upon the use of minority languages. Until 2007, the Commission did not criticize Turkey in relation to the Armenian minority. It only noted that Armenians, like the other minorities recognized via Lausanne Treaty, had legal protection in this field. From 2007 onwards, the Commission criticized, as well as supported Turkey regarding the facilitation of the use of Armenian language. The language issue was also covered in the sections about the protection of minorities.

9. Protection of minorities All of the reports mentioned the legal status of non-Muslim minorities recognized via Lausanne Treaty and mostly focused on the sociological minorities not recognized by Turkish law. Armenians, like the Jewish and Greek Orthodox communities, were stated as relatively advantageous. Moreover, the problems of the Armenian minority comprised a much smaller segment of the reports, compared to those faced by the Greek Orthodox and nonrecognized minorities. Like in other fields, the Commission made both negative (19) and positive (15) statements, as well as neutral articulations (10) for the situation of the Armenian minority. From 2003 onwards, they were covered separately in every report and the Commission used both critical and supportive arguments within the same section. The following table presents the main issues.

35 Turkish Penal Code includes a clause (Art. 301) that defines abasing the state and its institutions as a crime. Despite amendments within democratization attempts, the concept has been preserved and used to persecute intellectuals of various ideological dispositions.

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Table 4: Armenians’ minority rights and protection in the reports Issue

+

-

Education Teachers’ adequacy in the minority language

2004/05

Discrimination in the school system Minority school administration and enrolment

2003, 2009 2004, 2011/12

2005, 2012

2011

2018

State support of minority schools Heritage Destruction of heritage sites and monuments

2013

2012/13

Recognition/Acknowledgement Legal personality and properties of the Patriarchate 1915 events condolence message from Prime Minister

2018 2014, 2015

Expression Print media and broadcasting (allowing and support)

2009, 2013

2013

2010–2018

2010–2018

Justice Dink case Armenian-Turkish soldier murder case Hate speech (instances, judicial response)

2013 2013, 2016

2012, 2014, 2016

Like in the other areas, the Commission usually made both positive and negative remarks. Education was the focus of the sections on minority protection. Although Lausanne Treaty guaranteed recognized minorities to establish and administer, enrol and acculturate students in their community schools, there were problems with implementation. The main problem was the facilitation, rather than the permission. According to the Commission, Turkish education system was inadequate for producing teachers proficient in Armenian. Like with the clergy mentioned above, the lack of university departments and qualification mechanisms prevented the successful implementation of the rights. The Commission also pointed out that although Armenian students could attend their community schools to learn about and reinforce their ethnic and religious heritage, religious education provided in the regular school system did not adequately cover minority religions. This problem was not specific to the Armenian minority, but they were affected as well.

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Especially in the 2010s, reports focused on another issue area: hate crimes. Hrant Dink, an Armenian Turkish journalist and the director of the Armenian community newspaper Agos, was previously covered in the reports when he was being prosecuted for his political views. He was assassinated by an extremist in 2007. All reports from 2010 onwards covered the trial, which included probable accomplices and security authorities of the time, and lasted for more than a decade (2021). The Commission followed the developments and made both supportive and critical remarks about the trial process in the JFR sections of the reports. Instances of hate speech and problems in their prosecution were also noted in the 2010s. In 2011, an Armenian Turkish citizen was killed during his military service. After the decision that it was not an accident but manslaughter, the judgement did not categorize it as a hate crime (2020). This event was only mentioned in one report (2013). It was not followed up. Mostly covered under freedom of expression, the minority protection sections also mentioned the opportunity provided for print media and broadcasting in Armenian as positive developments. However, when considered together with other remarks about freedom expression, it appears that for the Commission, whereas public space was opened up for the use of the language and debate about “sensitive issues”, freedom of expression was not always guaranteed and the state could not adequately protect Armenian citizens from prejudice and hatred.

10. Conclusion With the goal of uncovering how the EU evaluated Turkey’s treatment of its Armenian minority and whether its position changed over time, this study analysed the framing of the issue by the EU Commission in its progress reports for a 20-year period. The most important finding is that the Commission sought to give a balanced overview of the situation in Turkey that contributed to its positioning as an impartial actor in the membership process. Even when specific issues and reports are taken into account, with a few exceptions, the Commission often included both positive and negative evaluations, with a similar density. It also refrained from relating the minority question to Turkey’s relations with Armenia. The only common issue mentioned in both categories was the events of 1915. Even then, the articulations were placed separately in the foreign policy and minority-related sections. This may be interpreted as a result of the structure of the reports that divided issues into specific policy areas. However, whereas numerous minority issues were mentioned in multiple sections, there was no overlap with sections regarding Armenia as a country. A more likely explanation is that the Commission separated the two subjects, in order to prevent the spill over of the stalemate between Turkey and Armenia into minority rights, which are essentially about human rights and citizenship. The Armenian minority was mainly covered in the context of human rights and protection of minorities. The Commission noted that the minorities included in Lausanne Treaty were in a better position than non-recognized minorities. Moreover, Armenians were reported to encounter less problems than the Greek Orthodox minority. Nonetheless, legislative developments were found to be slow, and implementation problems continued, especially in the fields of religious freedom, freedom of expression and education.

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EU membership requires continued reforms in many policy areas, including human rights and protection of minorities. Since most of Turkey’s political reforms in the past decades were triggered by EU conditionality, and this conditionality weakened to the point of deEuropeanization, a similar progression was expected in the field of minority affairs in the case of Armenians. In the progress reports, Turkey’s performance on the protection of its Armenian minority was not criticized until 2005 (during Europeanization, 1999–2005) as much as it was in the following years. However, this might not be the result of objective conditions. After all, the reports became more detailed in 2005, when negotiations that require specific amendments in line with the acquis, officially started. If the issues about the Armenian minority followed the general direction of EU-Turkey relations, one would expect a slowing down of reforms (during selective Europeanization, 2005–2010), and a deterioration of conditions in the 2010s (during de-Europeanization, 2010–). Whereas some problems were brought forward and faded without and note of resolution (i.e. proficiency of teachers in the minority language, limitations on the appointment of clergy that are not citizens, the killing of the Armenian Turkish soldier), others were kept on the agenda for much longer (i.e. prosecution of intellectuals, hate crimes). Even in those cases, positive developments were noted as well. In sum, although the study clarifies the general deficiencies in and progress of the protection of the Armenian minority as perceived by the EU, the findings do not offer any coherent direction in Turkey’s policies and implementation. This may be due to the lack of such direction, implying that “selective Europeanization” continues in this field. However, before drawing that conclusion, it is important to underline the limited focus of the study. Changes in minority protection are not limited to the Armenian community. Furthermore, many of the problems reported here were part of a general overview regarding multiple areas of human rights. Studies that include other minorities, or focus on developments within a specific policy area, could provide clearer results.

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Minority, Cosmopolitan, Migrant, Stateless Person? Petros Markaris’s attempt at explaining his own identity Martin Tamcke Intellectuals with a Middle Eastern Christian minority background often seem rather detached when it comes to the situation of their people. It might be that they have already outgrown their former circumstances, because they had to re-evaluate the relationship they had to their people in the course of migrating to a new country. Their circumstances changed in terms of the pressure they had to endure as a member of a minority. A pressure they were largely exempt from following their migration, which gave them an entirely new perspective on their own identity. At the same time, these intellectuals are far too often called upon to serve as specialists for the concerns of their people, albeit having only limited insight themselves. Their perspective has already been vastly different from the perspective of their fellow believers before they migrated. On 9 May 2014 the Greek-German-Turkish writer Petros Markaris was awarded the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, he did not receive the decoration in Berlin, it was awarded to him by the ambassador Peter Schoof in the German embassy in Athens instead. He took the issues and conflicts between Germany and Greece that resulted from the financial crisis and playfully incorporated them into his writing, helping German readers understand how people in Greece, and particularly Athens, were affected by the crisis.1 Markaris has lived in Istanbul, Berlin, and Athens. At first glance, he unites these three cities as his hometown. When questioned about his sense of belonging, he explains: “Greece is my linguistic homeland, but if you asked me where I belong, I would say: to Europe. I am a ‘European’.”2 This step away from national identities and towards an identity that incorporates all three – for Markaris Turkey means the country's minorities who are aligned with Europe – seems to be a viable solution. Yet, he denies this identification when he describes his family history in his autobi-

1

2

Petros Markaris is awarded the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. A short and instructive overview about his person: https://de.linkfang.org/wiki/Petros_Markaris; Andreas Fanizadeh, Krimi-Autor Petros Makaris. Ein Grieche aus Istanbul, https://taz.de/Krimi-Autor-Petros-Markaris/ !5445050/ (a literary review of his novel “Offshore. Ein Fall für Kostas Charitos” on the occasion of the Frankfurt Book Fair in 2017. Translated from Greek into German by Michaela Prinzinger, Zurich 2017). This quote is from a nondescript two-page article that was accessible on the internet, yet was irretrievable at a later date. The quote was used as the closing line of the article. In German it reads: „Griechenland ist zwar meine sprachliche Heimat, aber wenn ich antworten sollte, wo ich hingehöre, würde ich sagen: nach Europa. Ich bin ‚Europäer‘.“

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ography. A typical scene in his autobiography captures how he can draw a direct line from his adolescence to old age under the identity marker “cosmopolitan”. “When I took the subway funicular as a high school student and exited the Tünel on the Grand Avenue of Pera, which connected Pera (Turkish Beyoglu) and Galata (Turkish Karaköy), and crossed it towards Taksim Square, the former central square of Istanbul, I heard six different languages all at once: Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Sephardic Jewish, Italian, and French. My ears catch exquisite diversity every day. The Greeks used to consider Constantinople and Alexandria the two major centres of Hellenism, and they still do. The two cities were cosmopolitan centres which drew the envious eyes of other European capitals at the time. This meant that I did not grow up in the isolated community of a village, but as a cosmopolitan.”3 For Markaris being a cosmopolitan means nothing more than growing up surrounded by different cultures and languages. It seems significant that cosmopolitanism and the centres of Hellenism seem to form a union. And that, of course, in an urban environment. But this exaggerated observation about himself does not hold true. It is not just the community in a village that suffers from isolation, the same can be true for different cultures coexisting in a large city like Istanbul. And it seems like Markaris realised this right after he described himself as a cosmopolitan. “But appearances can be deceiving. The pleasures of diversity are not limited to languages. Only the languages mixed, all ethnicities lived separately alongside each other, not blending, isolated and always afraid of the other stealing their tradition, their history, and their sacred treasures.”4 The fear of excessive foreign control was primarily directed at the dominant Turkish culture, but for a long time it was also directed at Greeks in the city, and within the Eastern Orthodox minorities the dominance of the Armenians was perceived as a threat. The theft that Markaris felt the members of minorities were preparing for was threefold: theft of traditions – everything that a minority could publicly share and had to exceedingly retreat for; theft of history – it was about more than churches being turned into mosques, it was about narratives that would be rewritten with a different agenda, and about historical fact that would be purposefully changed; theft of religion – a crucial element in the existence of any minority in this megacity, be it the Syrians, Armenians, Greek, or the Jews. A Syriac Assyrian narrative might be attributed to the Syriac Orthodox tradition, thereby suppressing the rival community. The Armenian Patriarchate 3

Petros Markaris, Wiederholungstäter. Ein Leben zwischen Istanbul, Wien und Athen, Zürich 2008, 29s. German quotation: „Wenn ich als Gymnasiast mit der kleinen unterirdisch verlaufenden Standseilbahn vom Tünel auf die Große Pera-Straße gelangte, welche Pera (türkisch Beyoglu) mit Galata (türkisch Karaköy) verband, und sie in Richtung Taxim-Platz überquerte, dem damals zentralen Platz Istanbuls, hörte ich sechs Sprachen gleichzeitig: Türkisch, Griechisch, Armenisch, sephardisches Jüdisch, Italienisch und Französisch. An meine Ohren drang täglich eine lukullische Vielfalt. Stets betrachteten die Griechen Konstantinopel und Alexandria als die zwei großen Zentren des Griechentums, und das tun sie heute noch. Die beiden Städte waren kosmopolitische Zentren, auf die viele große europäische Metropolen der damaligen Zeit neidvoll blickten. Folglich wuchs ich nicht in der isolierten Gesellschaft eines Dorfes auf, sondern als Kosmopolit.“ 4 Ibid., 30. German quotation: „Doch der Augenschein trügt. Denn die lukullische Vielfalt beschränkte sich auf die Sprachen. Nur die Sprachen vermischten sich, im Übrigen lebten alle Ethnien nebeneinanderher und nicht ineinander aufgehend, abgeschottet und mit der Furcht, der andere, der Fremde, könnte ihnen ihre Traditionen, ihre Geschichte und ihre heiligen Kostbarkeiten stehlen.“

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was established as a result of such state-driven rivalries.5 The conquerors saw it as a counterweight to the Greeks. Markaris’s first remark is that minorities do not want to become integrated. “They each live separate lives from the others, in their own microcosms, unable to see themselves as autonomous parts of a multi-ethnic whole, and they feel obliged to defend everything that they once deemed sacred – first their religion than their language.”6 Religion and language were therefore not only symbols of their own historic genesis, but also signifiers of their values and the bedrock of their resilience. They were basic identity markers. Markaris is rather reserved in his description of this connection, his view is sober and observational. Marriages to a (Muslim) Turk would hit a minority family “like a catastrophe”7. And such reactions were not limited to Turks, the same was true for marriages between Armenians and Greeks. Markaris distances himself from the Greeks in particular, who “consider themselves guardians of the Byzantine legacy with its churches and its ecumenical Patriarchate,” and felt superior to other ethnicities. “They not only looked down on the Turks, but also on the Armenians and the Jews. This only increased their isolation.”8 It is hardly surprising that Markaris claims the Greeks who left Constantinople/Istanbul and migrated to Greece had a similar opinion of the Greeks living in Greece, and thereby distinguished themselves again.9 In some extreme cases the desire to stand out extended into the realm of linguistics – a continuation of a practice that had begun in Turkey. “In Istanbul you distinguished yourself publicly through the use of Greek, in Athens you did the same with Turkish.”10 In such an “enclosed minority”, he had “struggled to breathe” and had searched for a way out.11 Markaris’s father was Armenian, his mother Greek.12 Markaris himself went to school on Chalki for six years. All secondary schools taught in German.13 He never spoke his father’s native language Armenian. He explains this in great detail. His grandfather’s maid from Andros had asked whether her niece could join the household staff.14 When she arrived his father fell in love instantly and they married against his grandfather’s wishes, who subsequently disinherited his son. The son moved into a two-bedroom apartment and never spoke a word of Armenian again. His children grew up speaking Greek, he learned the language as well, and they ultimately moved into his wife’s family home on Chalki. 5 Markus Rahn, Die Entstehung des Armenischen Patriarchats von Konstantinopel (StOKG 20), Hamburg 2002. 6 Markaris, Wiederholungstäter, 32. German quotation: „Jede von ihnen lebte losgelöst von den anderen in ihrem eigenen Mikrokosmos, unfähig, sich als autonomen Teil eines multiethnischen Ganzen zu begreifen, und fühlte sich verpflichtet, alles, was ihr heilig war, zu verteidigen – zuerst die Religion und dann die Sprache.“ 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 33. German quotation: „Sie blickten sich nicht nur auf die Türken herab, sondern auch auf die Armenier und die Juden. Das trug noch mehr zu ihrer Isolierung bei.“ 9 Ibid., 35. 10 Ibid., 36. German quotation: „In Istanbul stellte man die öffentliche Abgrenzung durch das Griechische sicher, in Athen durch das Türkische.“ 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 37. 13 Ibid., 38. 14 Ibid., 38–40.

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Markaris occasionally takes offence at the “minority’s way of thinking and living”,15 despite clearly coming from a minority background of Constantinople himself. Minorities were avoiding to “identify with the majority just like the devil is avoiding holy water.”16 They were a “deeply nationalistic group, which has a reactionary obsession with protecting their own values and defending them tooth and nail against ‘dilution’ by mainstream moral concepts. Until at some point, they consider themselves an independent form of existence and head for collision course with mainstream society.”17 But only a few pages later in his autobiography it becomes clear that his reserved stance on minorities does not mean he lacks sympathy or identifies as a Turk. Is it surprising that Markaris has said in public readings that he has no associations with terms like “motherland” or “homeland”? People in Greece cannot understand this and ask him, whether he is not ashamed of saying he has no homeland. But Markaris persists: “Which is supposed to be my motherland? Me, a Hellenised Armenian, who was brought up speaking German as a Greek of Constantinople? Which homeland, pray tell? I have never thought of Turkey as my home, because they have treated me like a foreigner and called for my ‘Turkification’, if I wanted to be recognised as an equal, with equal rights, which should be a basic right for any citizen of a well-governed country.”18 It is self-evident that he does not consider Turkey his homeland, nor does he identify in a nationalistic sense as a Constantinople Greek. His simple explanation is: “Hellas is my linguistic home.”19 Markaris considers himself anti-clerical and critical of the church, he thinks of himself as secular and politically involved. His relationship to the Turkish majority became fractured when the state gained access to the possessions and estates of wealthy Greeks through a wealth tax in 1942.20 In January of 1943 the auctions began, where those who could not pay had to sell their property and were sent to Anatolia for forced labour. His father could escape this fate by getting a loan, which meant that he was deep in debt. His knowledge of the consequences of the Cyprus conflict in the shape of the Greek exodus is part of a collective memory.21 Markaris knows about the pressure of the Turkish government. He perceived the states politics at the time as a sign of un15 Markaris, Wiederholungstäter, 41. 16 Ibid., 35. 17 Ibid., 35. German quotation: „… eine zutiefst nationalistische Gruppierung, die mit reaktionärer Besessenheit ihre eigenen Werte verteidigt, sich mit Zähnen und Klauen dagegen wehrt, ihre Wertvorstellungen durch die Mehrheit ‚verwässern‘ zu lassen. Bis sie sich schließlich als eigenständige Existenzform begreift und auf Konfrontationskurs mit der Mehrheitsgesellschaft geht.“ 18 Ibid., 40. German quotation: „Welches Vaterland sollte ich also haben? Ich, ein hellenisierter Armenier und in der deutschen Sprache aufgewachsener Konstantinopler Grieche? Welche Heimat, bitte schön? Die Türkei habe ich nie als meine Heimat empfunden, da sie mich als Fremden behandelte und meine ‚Türkifizierung‘ forderte, wollte ich als gleichwertig und gleichberechtigt anerkannt werden, was zum selbstverständlichen Recht eines jeden Bürgers in einem wohlregierten Land gehört.“ 19 Ibid., 42. 20 Ibid., 69s. For the Pogrom 1955 see: Dilek Güven, Nationalismus und Minderheiten. Die Ausschreitungen gegen die Christen und Juden der Türkei vom September 1955) Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 143), München 2012; Ülkü Agir, Pogrom in Istanbul, 6./7. September 1955. Die Rolle der türkischen Presse in einer kollektiven Plünderungs- und Vernichtungshysterie, Berlin 2014. For the “tax” in 1842: Günter Seufert, Religiöse Minderheiten in der Türkei, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 12. Juni 2008 (www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/31145/religioese-minderheiten-in-der-tuerkei/?p=all). 21 Markaris, Wiederholungstäter, 33.

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willingness to integrate, a conscious obstruction of a “multi-religious and multi-cultural society.”22 “They either wanted them to assimilate – like the Kurds – or get rid of them – like the Constantinople Greeks, which they equated with the Greeks from Greece.”23 And yet, Istanbul remains more than his place of origin. “Istanbul is the closest thing I have to what you call a home.”24 Everything there reminds him of his childhood and his youth. Life on an island, however, left him feeling isolated. On later visits to his now neglected school, he gets angry with the frightened Coptic guard, who is concerned about letting in this former student without permission.25 The memories cut deep, and they are not abstract, but concrete. They melt with the smells of the narrow streets of the fish market.26 Istanbul was “unique”, it was the “centre between the Orient and the Occident.”27 But at the same time, there is this persistent sensory pleasure for the nose. “For me it has remained the city of smells. In Istanbul each region, each district has its own aroma.”28 Markaris knows the significance of the region but remains sceptical. He recognises its minorities, but never felt he had a part among them. His identity is poly-polar. Aside from his Armenian heritage he was strongly influenced by the time he spent with the Greeks in Constantinople and in Greece, and Germany is a part of his multicultural reality. He does not deny his Armenian background, but he does not speak the language. He does not deny his linguistic home in Greece, but his emotional connection to Istanbul/Constantinople remains strong regardless. His support for Germany’s new-found openness can be seen in his knowledge of the German language, but he decided against making Germany his permanent home after all. Markaris is unusual among the members of the Christian minority of the Middle East, yet his connection to them is visible in his references and in his attempts to define his own identity. Some of his affiliations simply cause internal conflict. That might be characteristic for an intellectual who will not submit to the collective memory of a Christian minority in the Middle East, yet whose entire life is determined by it. A Cosmopolitan he is only insofar as his identity fit the ethnoreligious mosaic of Istanbul, not because said identity is a world-encompassing one. He should rather be understood as a multi-polar individual, a person who has to reconcile several identities within himself. This is a daily struggle, and it might be his passion for writing crime novels that leads him to unearth the effects of his psychological influences time and time again, and that helps him find an independent voice outside, yet through the influence of the collectives.

22 Markaris, Wiederholungstäter, 31. 23 Ibid. German quotation: „Sie wollte sie entweder – wie die Kurden – assimilieren oder – wie die Konstantinopler Griechen, die sie mit den Griechen in Griechenland gleichsetzte – loswerden.“ 24 Ibid., 41. German quotation: „Istanbul ist der Ort, der für mich dem Begriff Heimat am nächsten kommt.“ 25 Ibid., 72. 26 Ibid., 80. 27 Ibid., 79. 28 Ibid., 80.

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Some Reflections on the “abä-nefs” WhatsApp of an Eritrean Priest Queshi-Afwerki Habtom Yohannes 1. Introduction In August 2017, my iPhone informed me that my telephone number was added to a WhatsApp-group called “ኣበ-ነፍሲ” abe-nefsi. Abe-nefsi is the Gəʿəz-word1 for “father of the soul”. Gəʿəz is the liturgical language of both Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Churches. In the vernacular languages of Ethiopia (Amharic and Tigrinya) and Eritrea (Tigrinya) it is respectively abe-nefsi and abä-nefs. Nay-nisha-abo (ናይ ንስሓ-ኣቦ) in Tigrinya and yensiha-abat (የንስሓ-ኣባት) in Amharic, which means “father confessor”2, are also used to refer to the abe-nefsi. In remainder of this article I will use the Gəʿəz term abä-nefs. The abä-nesf behind this eponymous WhatsApp group is mariegeta aboy-qeshi Afwerki Tesfatsion,3 an Eritrean priest who have been serving the Eritrean community in The Netherlands and in other European countries since 2002. I know märigeta qeshi Afwerki personally and we had indeed exchanged our telephone numbers during one of the religious ceremonies, funerals, baptisms and marriages, we together had attended in The Netherlands. I accepted the inclusion to the abä-nefs WhatsApp group silently out of respect and curiosity. The fact that a Tewahdo priest in his seventies created a WhatsApp group to serve the Tewahdo-community in The Netherlands intrigued me. When aboy-queshi Afwerki included my number to the abä-nefs WhatsApp group in 2017, I was not aware that I would join the European Research Council Project: “Rewriting Global Orthodoxy: Oriental Christians in Europe between 1970 and 2020”, two years later, and study the textual practices of the Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo4 Churches 1

Gabriella F. Scelta/Pilar Quezzaire-Belle, The Comparative Origin and Usage of the Gəʿəz writing system of Ethiopia, 2001, 50–58, www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Comparative-Origin-and-Usage-ofthe-Ge%27ez-of-Scelta/aec1844a73ea690b780a44252150a6754d4ec951. 2 https://eotcmk.org/e/nature-of-relation-between-father-confessor-and-spiritual-child/. 3 Qeshi in Tigrinya and Ques in Amharic are the Tewahdo-titles for priest or reverend. Mariegeta is an Amharic conjunction of two words: mari “leader” and geta “master”. Märiegeta is an office and title within the Tewahdo Church given to someone who has completed a full course of traditional education. Märigeta is the leading church cantor and in a way the conductor, as he assigns who should present a qéne piece, and decides which are the hymns to sing. Source: https://en.sewasew.com/p/marigeta. – The naming convention for personal name in Ethiopia and Eritrea does not have family names. It typically consists of an individual personal name and a separate patronymic. Traditionally for both Ethiopian and Eritreans, the lineage is traced paternally. I will use aboy-queshi Afwerki in the remainder of the article. Aboy means father. When one addresses a priest it is common to address the priest as aboy irrespective of the age of the priest. 4 Tewahido in Gəʿəz, Tewahdo, Tewahedo in Amharic and Tigrinya refers to to the Miaphysite or pre-

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in Europe during the last fifty years.5 As part of this project, my research objective is to study the textual praxis of the Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Christians during the aforementioned period and understand how this praxis has been shaping the selfidentification of the diasporic Tewahdos in their endeavour to establish themselves in the European societies, while maintaining strong connection with their home countries. Part of the textual practices of the Tewahdos have been taking place through the internet and social media. The abä-nefs WhatsApp of aboy-queshi Afwerki is a case study of this textual praxis on the internet and in the social media. In the next pages I will explain the importance of the abä-nefs in the Tewahdo Church in general and the diasporic Tewahdo faithful in particular. First I will give a brief introduction about the arrival of Eritreans and Ethiopians to Europe since the 1970s. In the second part I will explain the genesis of the abä-nefs WhatsApp group of aboy-queshi Afwerki. I conclude that the main objective for starting the abä-nefs WhatsApp group has been spiritual as well as material. He launched the abä-nefs WhatsApp immediately after he lost the struggle for power within the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church in Rotterdam. The abä-nefs WhatsApp helped him to maintain contacts with his supporters and to campaign for his cause: I am the legitimate leader based on the constitution, Qaläe-Awadi, ቃለ-ኣዋዲ, the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church synod in Asmara, Eritrea.

2. Tewahdos in Europe Starting in the 1970s tens of thousands of Ethiopians and Eritreans, most of them Tewahdos, started to arrive in Europe as refugees.6 In that year a coalition of leftist soldiers and students toppled the “ancienne régime” of the last Tewahdo emperor, emperor Haile Selassie and “his” patriarch, Abune Theophilos.7 What followed was Red Terror that fundamentally transformed the Ethiopian theocracy: the emperor, the patriarch and more than sixty dignitaries: ministers, parliamentarians and governors were executed.8 The new rulers intensified the internal wars against various rebel groups, including the Eritrean liberation fronts who succeeded to secede Eritrea from Ethiopia on May 24, 1991 de facto; and on May 24, 1993 de jure. War of Independence or Cessation – depending on the narration one adheres

5 6 7 8

Chalcedonian Christological position of the Ethiopian, Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church. It literally means “became one” or “united”. Miaphysitism holds that in the one person of Jesus Christ, Divinity and Humanity are united in one “nature” (physis), the two being united without separation, without confusion, and without alteration, www.britannica.com/topic/miaphysitism. www.ru.nl/ptrs/research/research-projects/rewriting-global-orthodoxy/. Assafew Bariagaber, Political Violence and the Refugee Situation in the Horn of Africa, Burlington/VT 2006, 35–52; Gaim Kibreab, Refugees and development in Africa. The case of Eritrea, Trenton/NJ 1987. Stanislav Mezentsev, Politics and Religion in the Formation of the Ethiopian Statehood, in: Politics and Religion Journal 15 (2021), 65–82. Haile Larebo, The Orthodox Church and the state in the Ethiopian revolution, 1974–84, in: Religion in Communist Lands 14.2 (1986), 148–159; Oyvind M Eide, Revolution and Religion in Ethiopia. The Growth and Persecution of the Mekane Yesus Church 1974–85, Oxford 2000; Messay Kebede, Ideology and Elite Conflicts. Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution, Lanham/MD 2011.

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to – lasted thirty years. The separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia was followed by the split of the Orthodox Tewahdo Church into an Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church (EtOTC) and an Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church (ErOTC), when the later attained its autocephaly in 1998.9 The first generation Tewahdo refugees who arrived in Europe were leftist oriented students from the urban cities like Addis Ababa and Asmara. They were not much interested in religion. While pursuing their higher education, they kept close contacts with various revolutionary movements back home. During Sunday afternoon meetings, Eritrean and Ethiopian students came together in various European cities to discuss the situation in the home country after devouring leftist books and magazines in Amharic and Tigrinya; often written by the different revolutionary fronts inside secret locations in the Eritrean and Ethiopian fields. I was a member and at one time a chairman of an Eritrean-group in the Netherlands. Being religious and talking about religion was perceived as reactionary at that time. Religion in general and the Tewahdo church in particular were considered as a feudal instruments of oppression, anti-modern, in the hands of consecutive Ethiopian kings and emperors responsible for the subjugation of the masses. This started to change after 1991. In that year a coalition of Ethiopian and Eritrean liberation fronts defeated the communist military regime in Ethiopia. Eritrea gained its independence on May 24, 1993 after TPLF-dominated10 Ethiopian coalition forces took power in Ethiopia. In this period, the focus of the diaspora started to shift from the host countries towards the countries of origin and from revolution to religion. The incremental shift from revolution to religion, which merits a thorough study, was reinforced by the new flow of refugees from both countries during and after the 1998–2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea: and by the increased repression in especially the latter. In contrast to the urban refugees of the 1970s, the new refugees of the ninetieth were predominantly from the rural areas. Many deacons, priests and relatively younger and older people came with the latter influx. The average age of the old comers was around forty. The Ethiopian and Eritrean revolutions failed to deliver. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideologies, both the Dergue, and the majority of Ethiopian and Eritrean rebel groups were adamant to eradicate religion from both countries; a project that has failed to criticize because of various reasons. After 1991, Eritreans and Ethiopians started to visit their home countries; others returned to live there permanently or for a limited period. Most of those who returned to the countries of origin with the intention to stay there permanently, returned to Europe and the United States of America in disillusionment. The largest group returnees were Eritrean refugees from Germany with the assistance of German Government. I met some of these returnees in Asmara in 2000. They were totally disappointed in the new revolutionary leaders. I met some of them while they were preparing to return to Germany and other European countries. The disillusioned returnees, those who chose to stay in Europe and regularly visit Ethiopia and Eritrea and the new refugees started organizing their own religious meetings in Eu9 Ancel Stéphan/Giulia Bonacci/Joachim G. Persoon, The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church and the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church. In Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge 2014, 532–554. 10 TPLF: Tigray Peoples Liberation Front.

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rope. They hire and sometimes buy churches and other buildings to worship. The number of Eritrean and Ethiopians increased due to new refugees, family reunion and birth. There are no reliable statistics about the exact number of Tewahdos in the diaspora. There are only estimations. There are about 1 million Tewahdos in Europe and probably the same number in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zeeland. It is even more a hazardous task to have an exact number of Eritreans and Ethiopians in the diaspora. Eritreans born before the emergence of Eritrea as a nation- state on May 24, 1993 are all registered as Ethiopians. My birthplace in my passport is still Asmara, Ethiopia. I can’t change it to Eritrea, a country that didn’t exist before May 24, 1993.

3. A priest and a tabot makes a Tewahdo-Church In the Tewahdo tradition a group of believers is recognized as parish on two basic conditions. They must have 1) a Tabot (ታቦት), representing the Ark of the Covenant, which serves as the equivalent of the altar in Western churches; and have 2) an ordained priest or bishop; since the Tabot can only be touched by someone with the rank of priest or higher.11 A deacon is not allowed to touch even a cross that lays on the Arc of the Covenant let alone the Tabot itself. No liturgy can be conducted in any Tewahdo church where the Ark is absent. The Ark of the Covenant is not functional without a priest or someone with a highest rank than a priest. For example, a group of Eritrean Tewahdos in two cities of the Netherlands, Amersfoort, and Zwolle, hold church services every two weeks because they have to share one Tabot between them until the one in Amersfoort, Kudus Cherkos Church, gets its own Tabot from Asmara. Another important function of the priest - like in other Oriental and Eastern Orthodox traditions- is related to the sacraments, seven mysteries, of the Tewahdo church: 1) Baptism, 2) Confirmation, 3) Holy Communion, 4) Ordination, 5) Matrimony, 6) Penance and 7) Unction of the Sick. These sacraments can be performed only by a priest and a bishop except for the sacrament of ordination which can only be conferred by a bishop. These mysteries are derived from the five “pillars of mystery” of the Tewahdo church: 1) Trinity, 2) Incarnation, 3) Baptism, 4) Holy Communion and 5) Resurrection. The sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Communion are performed together. Penance is directly related to another command of the church that every Christian must have a father confessor or soul father. In Gəʿəz it is called abä-näfsi (ኣበ-ነፍስ), In Tigrinya abo-nefsi (ኣባ-ነፍሲ) and nay nisha-abo (ናይ ንስሓ-ኣቦ), and in Amharic yänǝsǝḥa-abat (የንስሓ-ኣባት), yänǝfs-abät (የነፍስ-ኣባት) and yänuzaze-abät or abä-nuzaze (የኑዛዜ- ኣባት ወይ ኣበ-ኑዛዜ). Confessions and remissions are performed only by bishops or priests.12 The church encourages every Christian to have a “father confessor” and to confess regularly. 13 Traditionally every household in Eritrea and 11 Graham Hancock, Sign and the Seal. The Quest for the Lost Ark of the Covenant, New York 1993; Abuna Mekarios/Tibebu Shiferaw, The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. Faith, Order of Worship and Ecumenical Relations, Addis Ababa 21996; Joachim G. Persoon, The Planting of the Tabot on European Soil. The Trajectory of Ethiopian Orthodox Involvement with the European Continent, in: Studies in World Christianity, 16.3 (2010), 320–340. 12 Mekarios/Shiferaw, ibid., 43. 13 www.tewahdo.org/Pdf/Sschool/KidsBook_G6-8.pdf: “I. Two steps of confession: 1. Repentance and

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Ethiopia has an abä-nefs. For various reasons, the diaspora Tewahdo replicates these traditions. My parents had one: aboy-qeshi Ghebru, father priest Ghebru. He was responsible for the spiritual well-being of the whole family: from wedding, birth, illness, confession, conflict-resolution, holy communion, death and even after death.14 During baptism of the new born – males on the 40th day after their birth and females on their 80th day15 – the abä-nefs gives the child what we call in Täwahedo “your priest’s name” (ስም-ቀሺኻ/ኺ ወይ የቄስ-ስም” sim-qeshi or yekes-sim in Tigrinya and Amharic respectively). It is the same as the “baptismal name” here in the West. Every sacrament for the baptized is conducted using this name, in this life and in the afterlife. God, angels, and saints know the person only through the name given to him or to her by the abä-nefs, spiritual father. In normal circumstances, every Christian with a “baptismal name, sim-qeshi” has automatically abä-nefs. The baptismal name is directly linked to one of the angels or saints that are commemorated in the Tewahdo tradition in churches and at private homes. For example, a child born around one of the 33 feasts in a year of St. Mary is named Teklemariam (plant or seed of Mariam), Habtemariam (wealth of Mariam), Kidanemariam (covenant of Mariam) or Letemariam (daughter of Mariam). If one of my parents or siblings were sick or when there was a celebration at home, I used to go to the house of aboy-qeshi Ghebru to convey the message from my parents. Aboy-qeshi Ghebru had no landline telephone let alone a modern handheld iPhone at that time. My parents celebrated different saint’s and angel’s day. After my parents died, my second oldest sister continued this tradition. Later, aboy-qeshi Ghebru passed away, and their son, who succeed his father as a priest became the new abä-nefs of my sister. Very often the patron angel or saint of parents and their abä-nefs passes automatically from parents to children; like the institution of priest passes from father to children. There is an innate connection between parents, children, saints, baptismal name and the abä-nefs. This tradition continues in the diaspora. There are people who continue to commemorate the saints and angels of their parents and grandparents in Europe.

confession to God. This must be done regularly; preferably daily. 2. Confession to the church represented by the priest to hear from him the word of forgiveness and acceptance (the absolution). This also must be done regularly with a specified frequency as agreed with the abä-nefs, the father of confession. 14 “According to this, our church prays and presents a Psalm of Praise for the dead from the moment of death up to the laying down in the grave, from home upto the church. The commemoration for the dead is from the day of death up to a year and beyond: 1) on the day of death, 2) on the third day, 3) on the seventh day, 4) on the twelfth day, 5) on the thirties day, 6) on the fortieth day, 7) on the eighties day, 8) in the sixth month and 9) a year after the day of death.” Cf. Mekarios/Shiferaw, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, 88. Last year I was talking to an Eritrean Tewahdo priest in Germany, who belongs to the reformist wing of the church in exile. While talking we found out that my nephew, a deacon, who died seven years ago was a very good friend of him. Then he told me: “I just spoke to the daughter of your nephew who asked me to come and pray for her father who passed away seven year ago.” 15 www.stmym.org/post/why-do-we-baptize-boys-on-the-40-days-and-girls-on-the-80-days.

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4. Abä-nefs and diaspora As we have seen, the abä-nefsi is very important in the Täwahedo church. He is the intermediary between on the one hand the higher hierarchy of the church leadership and the lay people; and on the other hand, between God and the faithful. He is also the one who makes the Ark of the Covenant, the Tabot, thus, the church, operational by exercising his main duty: the celebration of the Eucharist (ቅዳሴ, Qedase), after the church is consecrated by a bishop. The abä-nefs masters the non-vernacular church language Gəʿəz, the liturgy, and related rules of the church. The abä-nefsi is the interpreter of Gəʿəz to the masses. Another important duty of the abä-nefsi is to be the father confessor by arranging deals with specific individuals and families. All these makes the priest the carrier and conveyer of religion, tradition, culture, and history. The diaspora experiences the presence of the priest, his vestment, and the Eucharist with its init incense and icons, as console for the loss of community, family, and country. However, there are also various complaints about the clergy, the abä-nefsi and their growing and uncontrollable power at home and in the diaspora, especially amongst those who are traditional, less educated, and not well-integrated in the host communities. Due to various historical and traditional trajectories, women seem more susceptible to this influence. The pious are dependent on the priest for one or more of the seven sacraments. Equally important as the seven sacraments are the ceremonies for the sick, and for the dead during and after burial. Only ordained priests and deacons led by the abä-nefsi can perform these rites. A deceased family member buried without these ceremonies called tselote-fithat (ጸሎተ-ፍትሓት) torments the relatives with a feeling of guilt and shame. The same is true for the omission of every rite after the burial. For all these, the faithful is dependent on a priest, preferably abä-nefs.16 “The order of priesthood is conferred either after marriage or after becoming a monk. He can perform all the sacraments except, conferring Ordination, consecration of the Holy Oil used for sacrament of confirmation, consecration of the altar, the Ark of the Covenant, new church and new vessels. If he becomes an ordained monk, and so celibate, he can attain the rank of bishop, but if he is married, he will be limited to the rank of priesthood. A priest is ordained by the laying of hands and the breath of a bishop.”17 The training of a priest can take up to eight years, four years as a deacon and another four years before one is ordained as a priest. However, there are no transparent institutional mechanisms to control the conduct of the abä-nefsi towards his “spiritual children”. In general, the Tewahdos have more confidence in the clergy than in politicians. They believe that the power of the priest transcends any authority on this earth. This is also one of the reasons why successive Ethiopian and Eritrean revolutionaries and governments entice the Tewahdo church with the aim of exerting political influence on the believers at home and in the diaspora.18 Before the arrival of Tewahdo priests and the Tabot to Europe, 16 Mekarios/Shiferaw, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, 87–89. 17 Ibid., 41. 18 Serawit Bekele Debele, Religion and politics in post-1991 Ethiopia. Making sense of Bryan S. Turner’s “Managing Religions”, in: Religion State & Society, 46.1 (2018), 26–42; Tricia Redeker Hepner, Religion, Repression, and Human Rights in Eritrea and the Diaspora, in: Journal of Religion in Africa, 44.2 (2014), 151–188; Marta Torcini Corazza, State and Religion in the Constitution and Politics of Ethiopia, in: European Journal for Church and State Research 9 (2002), 351–395.

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the Tewahdo used to frequent churches with similar images, icons, liturgy, and incense. The first choice were the Oriental churches and in case there were none in the host countries, the Tewahdos visited one of the other Eastern Orthodox Churches for one of the seven sacraments. In cases where both were absent, they joined the Catholic Churches. They hardly went to protestant churches for these churches miss the icons, the incense and the vestments.

5. The abä-nefs-WhatsApp as part of the digitalization of Tewahdo In the previous part, I have explained, albeit very briefly, when, and why Ethiopians and Eritreans started to arrive in Europe. I also have described the importance of the abä-nefs for the well-being of the individual believer, the community, and the church. In the following, I will sketch the growing digitalization of the Tewahdo using the abä-nefsi WhatsApp group. Even old priests of the Tewahdo church have been mastering digital communication for various reasons. For this purpose I borrow the definition of digitalization from Brennen and Kreiss: “digitalization is the way many domains of social life are restructured around digital communication and media infrastructures”.19 The last years, well-researched books, articles and dissertations have been published regarding the increased digitalization of Eritrean and Ethiopian diasporas: Bernal’s eloquent Nation as Network (2014),20 Tewelde’s Chatroom Nation (2020),21 Zere’s Social Media in Exile (2020)22 and Skjerdal’s Journalists or activists?(2011)23, to name but few of the growing literature that convincingly elucidate how diaspora from both nations have been exploiting the internet and the new media to the maximum in their endeavour to keep their dislocated imagination and their imagined communities alive and together. They have been using the new media to create virtual nations and churches that are transnational, kept together across sovereignties by longing and belonging to a common heritage. Less explored is the increased digitalization24 of the Tewahdo diaspora churches. In Religion and Cyberspace, Hosjgaard and Warburg write: “By 2004, the number of religious web pages had grown considerably worldwide. There were then approximately 51 million pages on religion, 65 million web webpages dealing with churches, and 83 million webpages containing the word God.”25 It is not clear whether these webpages also include the social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp and Instagram. Compared to 1991 when 1,7 webpages were covering religion, the increase in 2004 has been astounding. Since then the cyber space has become more religious. The Tewahdos, 19 Scott Brennen/Daniel Kreiss, Digitalization, in: The International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy, 2016, 1–11. 20 Victoria Bernal, Nation as network. Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship, Chicago 2014. 21 Yonathan Tewelde, Chatroom Nation. An Eritrean Case Study of a Diaspora PalTalk Public, Athens/OH 2020. 22 Abraham Zere, Social Media in Exile. Disruptors and Challengers from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan, Athens/OH 2020. 23 Terje S. Skjerdal, Journalists or activists? Self-identity in the Ethiopian diaspora online community, in: Journalism 12.6 (2011), 727–744. 24 Nick Couldry/Andreas Hepp, Conceptualizing Mediatization. Contexts, Traditions, Arguments, in: Communication Theory 23.3 (2013), 191–202. 25 Morten Højsgaard/Margit Warburg, Religion and cyberspace, London 2005.

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old and young, male, and female, clergy and lay people have been increasingly restructuring their textual praxis around digital communication and media infrastructures. It is transnational, easy, quick and interactive. Their dislocation to the West has been a blessing in disguise. Modernization and relative affluence of those in the diaspora have helped them to master the cyberspace and its technologies on the one hand and to make those who have stayed behind in the countries of origin share in this modernization by sending money, knowledge and cyber equipments like computer and handhelds. In this way the global Tewahdo community and those who have stayed behind are intertwined into a very diversified transnational Tewahdo community. The place where you live, the internet connectivity and the relative affluence has enabled European Tewahdos to create their own virtual church services, upload and download books, messages, hymns, icons, images multiple times around the world. For the transnational religious community, the internet has served its purpose very well; especially since the outbreak of the corona epidemic on December 13, 2019. As mentioned earlier, almost every Tewahdo parish in mainly the diaspora has its own webpage and one or more social media accounts. Add to this, the individual and group social media pages, where various religious texts, images, hymns, news, and announcements are shared; then one can imagine how the internet have been shaping a Tewahdo community in accelerated transformation. I know families and individuals in the Netherlands who don’t go to church here but follow their beloved clergy from Switzerland via Facebook and YouTube. Different abä-nefs have their own groups on WhatsApp, Messenger, Telegram and Viber to tend after their flock. The abä-nefs can live in the Netherlands while his “spiritual children” live scattered in different European countries. I know an Ethiopian Tewahdo monk serving in Amsterdam, who uses Zoom to teach young Tewahdo children the liturgical language Gəʿəz and other religious courses before organizing an official ordaining ceremony somewhere in Europe for all those who have been following the course and their family members. The ordaining ceremony for deacons is then streamed live across the world. The participants are scattered around the world. The course language is the Ethiopian official language Amharic. While preparing for this article, I received a link from one Eritrean abä-nefsi in Sweden, since he couldn’t answer all my questions about this and related topics: https://yohannesneseha.org/. It has a Telegram Group with 10.604 members. It is a multimedia-website with links to Telegram and Youtube. If any Tewahdo around the world wants to have an abä-nefs, then those behind the site can help to bring the diasporic Tewahdo with a Tewahdo abä-nefs. One can contact them via email, telephone or email. I did write them an email message and they assured me that they are based in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. The website uses Amharic, English, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, Spanish, French, Swahili, German, Italian, Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Dutch, and Turkish languages. The fact that the moderators use different languages, shows their interest in the diaspora. It also says something about the interest of the diaspora in the institution abä-nefs.

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Fig. 1 “Join our Telegram group for our series of lessons and to find answers to your questions” in Amharic. They use various languages to reach the new generation in the diaspora.

Fig. 2 Figure 1 in English

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Fig. 3 The Confession of John, Telegram group with 10.604 members. “If you have any questions after reading our educational articles about confession, the Tewahdo religion and about the Holy Communion; then you can ask any questions on the same website: yohannesneseha.org

Fig. 4 One can scroll down on their page to find a telephone number, an email address and their YouTube channel.

Confessing your sin regularly is very essential for the Tewahdos. There is a saying in Tigrinya: ዝብኢ ካብ ዝበልዓካስ ዝብኢ በሊዕኻ ምንዛዝ; better to eat a hyena and confess afterwards (to abä-nefs) than to be devoured by a hyena. When I was living in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, I encountered an Eritrean man from a village in Eritrea. He is a son of a Tewahdo priest. He was studying in Asmara for a while before he fled to the Sudan. Let me call him Aron. Aron was looking for abä-nefs in Khartoem. When I asked him why he was looking

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for abä-nefs, Aron replied: “I want to confess my sins. I have eaten meat in Khartoum that probably is slaughtered by a Muslim.” The Tewahdos are not allowed to eat any meat that is not ritually prepared by a Tewahdo. One of these rules is that the throat of the animal must not be cut from the body, while the Muslims cut the throat in a single swipe. Tewahdos are prohibited from eating meat slaughtered by Muslims, and Ethiopian and Eritrean Muslims are not allowed to eat meat prepared by Tewahdos. Not all generations adhere to these rules. There has been a gradual change since the 1970s because of education and revolutions. Yet there are still Tewahdos in Europe who adhere to these rules and still refuse to eat meat that is not ritually prepared. Just recently, my wife and I helped a Tewahdo couple in the Netherlands with preparing short texts in Tigrinya and Dutch; one for chicken and one for sheep. With these texts the man regularly goes to a nearby farm and shows a Dutch farmer the texts we prepared on the couple’s request. Food that is ritually prepared for weddings, commemoration of saints, baptisms, death, remembrance of the dead, tezkar (ተዝካር) and the like must be blessed and officially opened by the abä-nefs. If the abä- nefs is not present, then another priest with the consent of the abä-nefs can perform the service. In Europe the abä-nefs crisscrossed cities and countries on the invitation of the “spiritualchild/family”. The expenses are covered by the host. In addition to the expenses, the abänefs also receives an unknown amount of allowances and material gifts by those who receive the service of the abä-nefs There are spiritual fathers who either refuse or give what they have received to the church or the poor; but no higher church hierarchy controls this. The arrangements are made ad hock with all the advantages and disadvantages of this tradition. The aura of authority that surrounds the institution of abä-nefs is often much stronger than that of any political or societal function. Whether this authority have increased or decreased in the diaspora is a topic that should be researched in conjunction with the textual practices of the Tewahdo. So far, I have not found any Tewahdo text that regulates the relationship between abä-nefs and the spiritual child, except books that stress the importance of having abä-nefs and the value of regular confession.26

26 D. T. Mearo, ቤተ ክርስትያንን ኣዕኑዳን, The Church & It’s Pillars, Addis Ababa 2009. I bought this book for the ERC-project last year, during an Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church meeting of the synod-in-exile in the Coptic Orthodox Church of Amsterdam. It is written in Tigrinya by a deacon who lives in Addis Ababa. It is published there. The cover image is the Holy Trinity Orthodox Cathedral of Addis Ababa. In the second page it carries the mobile number of the deacon and his email address. Chapter 5 from page 95–114 address the Mystery of Confession, one of the seven mysteries of the Tewahdo. In the first pat it defends confession and in the second part it explains why it is important to have a confession father. This wing of the current Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church in exile are considered reformists by their followers while the synod in Asmara perceives them as heretics. Yet, I haven’t seen any difference on this point.

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Fig. 5 This Tewahdo icon of the Trinity is the profile picture of abä-nefs aboy-qeshi Afwerki. Märigeta, master-leader is given to a learned, däbtära in in the Orthodox Tewahdo Church.

6. The abä-nefsi WhatsApp of aboy-qeshi Afwerki Abä-nefsi Afwerki Tesfatsion is a typical Tewahdo priest with traditional white clergyvestment (ልብሲ, lebsi), the turban and the Tewahdo cross in his right hand. He reminds me of the abä-nefs of my parents, our house in Asmara, the late aboy-qeshi Ghebru. Aboy-qeshi Afwerki is one of the first Tewahdo priests to serve the Eritrean community in the Netherlands. He also travels to other European countries to conduct various religious ceremonies for individuals and churches. I have known him for more than two decades in the Netherlands. Since 2017, I follow him on social media: Facebook, YouTube and his abä-nefs WhatsApp; see fig. 5 and 6.

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The abä-nefs WhatsApp of märigeta aboy-qeshi Afwerki was launched on 6 August 2017. I have been part of this WhatsApp group ever since. The profile picture, see figure 6, shows an image that should represent Jesus Christ; an image with clearly European influence27(Yonatan, 2019) with the text: ኣነ ሕያዋይ ጓሳ እየ።, a verse from John 10:11 “I am the good shepherd” but without mentioning the source. Under “Subject” there is no mention about the purpose of this WhatsApp of the Tewahdo religion, only abä- nefs in Tigrinya/Gəʿəz: ኣበ-ነፍስ. The number of members has increased exponentially since it was launched almost five years ago. Now and then some people leave the abä-nefs WhatsApp group without giving any reason. Abä-nefs Afwerki adds also new members regularly. The contents comprise images, texts, audios and videos. Until January 10, 2022, I have counted 503 documents, images and media links uploaded in this WhatsApp group. The most posts by the abä-nefs are about commemoration of saints, angels and holy days. Regularly he posts what the fasting-period is about, the beginning and the end date and an encouragement to fast. He also explains in text the meaning of the specific fasting period. After the fasting period closes, he posts a congratulation text. Most of the texts are in Tigrinya and sometimes in Gəʿəz with Tigrinya translation. The congregation in the WhatsApp group responds with Amen and “May God make us listeners of the Word of Life”. The Tewahdos claim to have the strictest fasting regime. Laypeople are encouraged to fast 180 days a year, while the clergy fast up to 252 days. 28 Not very often, but sometimes the abä-nefs posts also a link to a YouTube channel where you can watch him or a companion of him explaining the fasting period or the meaning behind a religious occasion. Fig. 6 The profile picture of the WhatsApp Group abä-nefsi with more than 150 members. The image is Jesus Christ but the Tewahdos prefer to refer to this image as Medhane-Alem (መድሃኔ-ኣለም), the saviour of the world.

27 Yonatan Tewelde, The Impact of European Christian Imagery on Contemporary Orthodox Tewahedo Iconography in Eritrea, in: Northeast African Studies 19.2 (2019), 91–110. 28 www.ethiopianorthodox.org/english/calendar.html; Abba Paulos Tzadua/Peter Strauss, The Fetha Nagast, Durham/NC 2009.

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Fig. 7 Based on the “liturgical-exchanges” in the WhatsApp Group between the abä-nefs and the virtualcongregation, the majority are dormant followers, who react now and then with one or more “Amens” and with “May God make us listeners of the Word of Life” in Latin and Gəʿəz alphabet; and sometimes in Tigrinya written in Latin alphabet. I have erased the telephone number and names for privacy sake.

7. Abä-nefs WhatsApp as a virtual church and instrument of struggle for power I have spoken to “abä-nefs” queshi-Afwerki several times. On October 26, 2021, I had a long interview with him via WhatsApp. Abä-nefs Afwerki was the main priest of Debre Genet Kidane Mehret Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church in Rotterdam between 2002 and August 2017. He was sent to Rotterdam by the Eritrean government supported synode of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church in Asmara to serve Eritrean Tewahdos in The Netherlands on the request of a group of Eritrean residents of Rotterdam. The church was registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce as the Foundation “Stichting Eritrese Orthodoxe Tewahdo Kerk in Nederland (SEOT) on August 20, 1993. In 2016 a difference on the position of the “abä-nefs”queshi-Afwerki -as an employee or church leader- and how the church should be registered -as a church, a foundation or an association- drove a wedge between the governors of the church and abä-nefs meriegeta queshi-Afwerki Tesfatsion. The case was brought before a Dutch court. The abä-nefs and his supporters invoked Article 62 of the Qaläe-Awadi, ቃለ-ኣዋዲ, the Constitution of the Eri-

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trean Orthodox Tewahdo Church, as his defence that the leader of a church must be a priest and thus that he is the right one to lead the Debre Genet Kidane Mehret Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church in Rotterdam. The governors of the church, supported by the majority of the church members, recognized queshi-Afwerki as the spiritual leader on the payroll of the church but not as the leader of the church. They defended their position using the “statute”, the constitution, of the Chamber of Commerce in Rotterdam. The Dutch court ruled in favour of the governors of the church. Qeshi-Afwerki took the Tabot of the church with him until the governors forced him legally to return it back to the church. Furtehrmore the court prohibited the abä-nefs from going to the Debre Genet Kidane Mehret Church in Rotterdam. Some of the followers of queshi-Afwerki left with him but had no church at that time to start their own church. Queshi-Afwerki: “my main concern has been the believers. I am called to serve the people and accordingly the synod sent me to The Netherlands. I am not here for my own wellbeing. After some thought I decided to launch an abä-nefs WhatsApp Group to remain in touch with those whom I serve as abä-nefs and other contacts whom I think are interested to follow the Tewahdo-religion. My son, a deacon, is well trained in information and communication technology. He helped me launch the abä-nefs WhatsApp, gave me some training and since then I am operating the WhatsApp all by myself. WhatsApp can never replace the church but born of necessity it has proven its quality for me and my followers. I have been sharing various constructive materials with the faithful. They react positively and they regularly ask me for prayers and advice on various topics. For rituals like baptisms, marriages and funerals I have been using the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church of St. Michael in Leiden since I know the priest there personally.” After almost five years struggle, the synod of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church decided in favour of abä-nefs Queshi Afwerki and suspended the only Eritreans owned church in the Netherlands, the Debre Genet Kidane Mehret Church in Rotterdam and excommunicated its leadership in the letter of the synod of 05 May 2021 (number 02/92/08). The synod accused the current leadership of the aforementioned church of repeated intransigence to implement the orders given to them by the synod to change the status of the church from foundation to a church under the leadership of a clergy as article 62 of the Qaläe-Awadi stipulates. In the letter with number 02/93/08 of the same date, the synod addresses a letter to the five governors of the church – four men and one woman – with a copy to different institutions of the church, the ministry of religious affairs of Ertirea and the Eritrean Embassy in the Netherlands: “starting the date of this letter you are excommunicated. The Holy Synod would like to inform you that you won’t get any spiritual assistance in any church. Any priest who give you spiritual assistance against this decision will be dealt with heavy spiritual measures.” Abä-nefs queshi Afrwerki was jubilant about this decision. He disseminated all the letters of the synod via his abä-nefs WhatsApp. Many of his followers congratulated him and they interpreted the development as the “will of God”. This decision was followed by another letter from the chairman of sub-diocese of the Netherlands of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Chuch, Liqë-Tiguhan Queshi Samson Maekel. The letter of October 28, 2021 was addressed to all the faithful and clergy, deacons, teachers of the Sunday School of Debre Genet Kidane Mehret Church in Rotterdam: “based on the decision of the synod we urge you all not to go to this church starting the date of this letter; since this church is outside the umbrel-

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la of the holy synod. The office of the sub-diocese of the Netherlands has provided an alternative church to fill this gap. Starting from coming Saturday, October 30, 2021, you all are welcome to come to Schepenstraat 69, 3039 NC, Rotterdam.” The church is “De Prinsenkerk”, a parish of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (Protestantse Kerk in Nederland). On Sunday the owners, the Protestants, use it and on Saturdays the Tewahdos hire it. I attended this service, where I met abä-nefs queshi Afwerki and queshi-Samson Maekel. In the middle of the church a mobile holy of hollies was erected with Tewhado icons on both sides of the entrance and the unique Tewahdo image of the three old men that represent the trinity was placed on the top of the entrance to the holy of the holies. At the end of the service the chairman of the sub-diocese nominated five members of a provisional management of which one woman as treasurer- under the leadership of queshi-Afwerki. In the afternoon I went to the excommunicated church at Larikslaan 184 in Rotterdam, a very big church, a former St. Paulos Catholic parish. The governors and the members of the church were gathering in a side hall of the church talking about the new development. They were disappointed but seemed “determined to continue worshipping God even without a priest”. For some four or five Sundays there were no liturgy in this church. Those who were serving in the church withdrew after the above mentioned excommunication letter of the synod. Some of the faithful withdrew as well. However, the majority of the faithful support the governors who refuse to give in to the pressure of the synod. They were looking for clergies and deacons who are committed to serve them despite the dire warnings from the synod. Asked whether abä-nefs queshi-Afwerki is to stop with his WhatsApp now he has his own parish in Rotterdam: “No, I am not going to close the abä-nefs WhatsApp. I opened it to serve the people after I was thrown out of the Larikslaan 184. I will continue to use it beside the church. In this way I can inform the members and other interested groups on various religious topics. Even after we hopefully open our own website, I will continue to use the abä-nefs WhatsApp. It has served us well during the last five years.” As far as reconciliation is concerned with my former church, I hope the governors will come to their senses after the decision of the synod as the highest authority of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church. According to my latest information, the excommunicated church at Larikslaan 184 has found clergies and deacons who want to serve them on the terms of the governors of the church.

Concluding Remarks The abä-nefs-WhatsApp of queshi-Afwerki is an example of the increasing modernization, digitalization of the Ethiopian and Eritrean Tewahdo Churches in Europe in their endeavour to serve the dispersed faithful. However, a closer look at why the abä-nefs WhatsApp was launched in 2017, immediately after queshi-Afwerki was thrown out of the church, shows that spirituality: to serve the faithful and materiality: struggle for power are so intertwined that it is difficult to untangle the main objective of such projects.

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Europe and Migration of Christian Communities from India Baby Varghese 1. Introduction In this brief presentation, I shall focus on the experience of the Malankara Orthodox Church, which will be representative of other Christian communities of Kerala. India has a total population of 1,300 million (in 2020), of which 2.3% (27.8 million) are Christians. About one fourth of them are living in the state of Kerala (South West India). Kerala has a population of 33.4 million and 18.4% of them are Christians (more than 6 million). There are seven main Christian communities in Kerala: Catholics: 1. Syro-Malabar Church (2.3 million), following East Syriac liturgy, 2. Syro-Malankara (400,000), following West Syriac liturgy, 3. Latins (900,000). Non-Catholics: 4. Malankara Orthodox Church (800,000), West Syriac liturgy, 5. Malankara Syrian Orthodox Church (500,000) under the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch, 6. Mar Thoma Syrian Church (400,000), reformed Syrians, following, anglicanised West Syriac liturgy, 7. Church of South India (200,000), and various Pentecostal and other groups. All these Churches have large number of believers living in almost all parts of India, especially in the Major cities of India. All Christian communities have diaspora outside India: Australia, New Zealand, Malyasia, Singapore, Persian Gulf, Africa, Europe, UK, USA and Canada. The figures given in this paper are not official, as the Churches or the Government have not kept a record. The statistics found on Websites should be taken with great caution.

2. Communities from Kerala In the case of the Christian communities of Kerala, we can find both the tendency to migrate and to emigrate.1 In the case of the oil rich countries of the Persian Gulf, Indians,

1

In our discussions we use the words migration and emigration as synonymous. The French word émigré has its origin in the 18th century, originally denoting a person escaping the French Revolution.1 It is the past participle of the French word émigrer which means to emigrate. Thus the dictionaries put a distinction between migration and emigration. To Migrate means to move to a new place or country in order to

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.

Asians or others have migrated seeking works depending on their education or skills. So return migration is a common phenomenon, which has become usual since the political developments in the 1990s (e.g. invasion of Kuwait) and the Covid-19 pandemics (since March 2020). Some professionally qualified employees such as doctors, nurses, engineers or IT professionals have migrated to developed countries like USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand (onward migration). But Indian Christian communities in the developed countries have a different history. During the British colonization (before 1947) there were many Indian migrant workers in the former British colonies. Good number of them opted for “onward migration” to UK, USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. Some African countries expelled Indians living there (e.g. Uganda) or others willingly made “onward migration” to UK or elsewhere. Many migrated with the intention to return migration to spend the retired life in India. But the second generation wanted to settle permanently in the host countries for reasons that are obvious. So the parents also had to settle with their children in the host countries. Thus migration led to emigration. In fact, this happened almost always in the case of the Indians living and working in other parts of India. This distinction is important to understand the experience of the Indian Christian communities living in Germany or in other European Countries.

3. First Indian Christian communities in Germany Following the Independence of India (in 1947), Indians had a preference to go to United Kingdom. Germany was not a favourite destination mainly because of the language problem. However, visiting priests or theological students made contacts in Germany which opened ways for Indians to migrate to Germany as nurses. I think the Catholics were the first to make such contacts thanks to the German organizations like Caritas or Missio (of course several others). But the Catholic organizations naturally promoted the migration of the members of the Syro-Malabar, Syro-Malankara or Latin Churches. For the Malankara Orthodox, Mar Thoma or other non-Catholics, contacts with the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) – thanks to the meetings of the World Council of Churches (WCC) – was the factor for the origins of their communities in Germany. I shall quote the example of the Malankara Orthodox Church. In 1960s, there were a few families of nurses working in hospitals in Germany. Malankara Orthodox Priests doing higher studies in theology in Germany occasionally celebrated Eucharist for these families. In that sense the first congregation started to function in Düsseldorf in 1969. Metropolitan Mathews Mar Coorilos (later H.H. Catholicose Baselios Marthoma Mathews II) contacted Sarepta, Bethel, Bielefeld, and discussed the possibility of sending 10 girls every year to study nursing or to send trained nurses to work in German hospitals. The first trained nurse reached Bielefeld in 1970 with her family, followed by the first batch of nurses. In 1972, first batch of nursing students reached. Only 32 girls in three batches (1972–73) could come to Bielefeld, as there was a change in the German Government policy. However, these girls got married in India, and their spouses arrived in Germany. The main problems find work. To emigrate on the other hand, means to leave one’s own country in order to settle permanently in another. See Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd revised edition 2006.

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for the spouses were twofold. As the labour laws of the Government changed, the spouses did not find works corresponding to their qualifications or training at home. Language was another problem. Most of them had only basic knowledge of German, with which they could not communicate. EKD had some projects for their integration by offering language courses which were soon discontinued. This caused problems in family. Some spouses were unwilling to do unskilled jobs (in Restaurants, shops or elsewhere) and returned home to continue their former jobs. Children were raised in India with the fathers and sent to schools in India. This broken family system had serious consequences The first Vicar (Fr. Korah Varghese) was appointed in 1973 with his residence in Bielefeld and regular services were held at the Missionshaus in Bethel, in Hamburg, Cologne and Bonn. Every year the Church members living in France, Switzerland, Austria, and other European countries met in Missionshaus, Bethel and celebrated the Holy Week. Regular Sunday and Holy Week celebrations were held for more than two decades. In 1990s the congregation faced a major challenge. Some families opted for return migration to settle in India (some returned as their spouses and children were already in India) or others onward migration to USA or Canada. Since 1990s, several IT professionals came to Germany with their families and returned home after the expiry of their contract or opted for onward migration to countries like USA or Canada. Since 2010, Indian students are coming to Germany to pursue their higher studies. It is not likely that they will settle down here (‘emigrate’). They will probably emigrate to USA or Canada if opportunities are available. Now about 150 people meet for online prayer meetings of the Orthodox Congregation.

4. Other European countries United Kingdom and Italy are the two European countries with the largest number of Indian migrants/ emigrants. In addition to them, there are significant numbers of Holders of passports of these countries (PIO: Persons of Indian Origin). According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Germany has an Indian population (Non Resident Indians: NRI) of 140,000. Germany is 16th in the list with Indian presence. USA: 1,280,000; UK: 351,000, Italy: 169,000 (in 2016: mostly from Punjab; 48,000 Indians are in Lombardy). Though Italy has such a large Indian community of migrants, Christians represent only 4.6% [ Indian Migrants in Italy: Sikhism 64.4%; Hinduism 22%; Christians 4.6 % (Catholics 3.7%; other Christians 0.9%)].

5. Migrants from Kerala in Europe (including Christians) UK: 45,264; Ireland: 10,642; Germany: 5864; Austria 3784. [Majority of them are Christians, mainly Catholics]. This may be compared with Kerala migrants in other countries: USA: 84,000 (400,00 live in New York or around); Canada: 30,000; Australia: 53,200; New Zealand: 6,000. Malankara Orthodox Church members: Germany: 150 members.

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USA and Canada: 25,000 (high estimate); 150 priests and 125 Congregations. (30 priest are from the Second generation). UK: 950 families and Ireland: 250 families, total 1,400 families (5,000 members). 42 parishes/congregations, served by 22 priests (15 in UK and 7 in Ireland]. About 6 of the parishes have their own church.

6. Syrian Christians of Kerala and migration/emigration A Majority of the Indian Christians living outside Kerala or India are Syrian Christians. [The ancients Christians of St Thomas were called Syrian Christians, by the Europeans missionaries, most probably by the Dutch, to distinguish the ancient Christians from the newly converted Christians by the Catholic missionaries. Moreover, since the early centuries they were using Syriac as their liturgical language]. Migration was part of their culture. Internal migration was a regular phenomenon. As good number of the Christians were engaged in spice trade, they moved to the rural areas. Likewise, those who were engaged in agriculture moved to the inner regions in search of land for cultivation. This internal migration got momentum in the 20th century and many moved to the Muslim dominated north Kerala, or to Karnataka. This internal migration of Syrian Christians continued until 1960s. We have evidence that local rulers sometimes invited Christian merchants to come and settle in their towns to promote trade. The best example is the origin of the Christian community in Trichur. In 1796, the King Saktan Thampuran of Cochin brought 52 Christian families of merchants to Trichur. In 1812, the king gave them the piece of land where the St Mary’s Church (residence of Metropolitan Mar Aprem of the Church of the East) stands. The only recorded internal migration for political reason took place in the last decades of the 18th century. In 1789, Tippu Sultan, the Muslim ruler of Mysore invaded North Kerala and thousands of Hindus were converted to Islam by force. This explains the presence of large number of Muslims in that region. Tippu came to the south as far as Alwaye, and the monsoon floods prevented him to invade further south. Thousands of Hindu and Christian families moved to the South to the former kingdom of Travancore (south of Cochin). This has contributed to the increase of the number of Syrian Christians in the southern part of Kerala. We have evidences that Syrian Christians from “Mesopotamia” or Persia have emigrated to India probably for trade. Two such emigrations are commemorated in popular songs and recorded in later sources (since the middle of the 18th century). The first emigration was led by “the merchant Thomas of Jerusalem/Cana” in 345 AD. He was accompanied by 72 families. Later sources claim that he was sent by “the Catholicose of the East” (or the Patriarch of Antioch according to the Syrian Orthodox faction in India). The Knyanaya Community (both Catholics and non-Catholics), claim their origin to this emigration. The second emigration had taken place in 823 led by Mar Sapor and Mar Parut who were sent by the “Catholicos of the East”. A reliable account of the presence of “bishop from Persia” is found in the Christian Topography (c. 535) by Cosmas Indicopleustes (or Indian Voyager), a merchant from Alexandria. Apparently he visited the Islands of Socotra and Sri Lanka. Cosmas proudly speaks of the spread of Christianity all ‘over the world’. He wrote that in “Male (Malabar?) where pepper grows, and [in] a place called Kaliana, there

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is a bishop appointed from Persia”.2 This may probably refer to the presence of a migrant community. However, we have evidences for the presence of Jews, Armenians and the Manichaeans (from Persia) in the important port cities on the western coast of India. We have practically no information regarding the internal migration of these communities and their origins. According to the secular historians of Kerala, majority of the Kerala population consists of people migrated from elsewhere. This also perhaps throws light on the culture of migration/emigration of the Syrian Christians of Kerala.

2

Christian Topography, Book III, 65 (SC 141), 502–504.

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Flight, Eviction and Hostage Holding of Assyrian Christians from the Valley Goran A personal report by Abdo Mirza Leonard Stinsky, Hanna Holthuis, Paul Seebaß, Leonie Wingberg On the basis of the escape report “Barfuß sind wir an den Chabour gekommen, barfuß sind wir gezwungen wieder zu gehen” by Abdo Mirza, we asked ourselves the following questions: What does Abdo Mirza want to achieve with his report? And what is his intention? This essay aims to answer said questions. In order to do so, we will firstly address the history of the Assyrians, followed by an analysis of the report of Abdo Mirza. We then finally investigate its classification and intention.

1. The roots of the Assyrians When thinking of the origins of the Assyrian people, the Neo-Assyrian Great Empire in the 8th century BCE comes to mind. At its prime, the empire reached from Mesopotamia to Egypt. It was the centre of the world, the most dominant power in the Ancient Near East, until the conquest of the Babylonians at the end of the 7th century BCE. Despite the decay of the New Assyrian Empire, Assyrians still exist almost 2500 years later. They ethnically identify with the New Assyrian Empire and call themselves its progeny. The majority of Assyrians today are no longer polytheistic, but Christian and belong to the Assyrian Church of the East. This development reaches as far back as the 4th century, yet the many deities from the New Assyrian period are still an important cultural asset of the Assyrians today. The history of the Assyrians is a story of suffering, culminating in the genocide by the “Young Turks” in 1915. Before 1915, nearly 500,000 Assyrians lived in the old settlement areas that were part of the Ottoman Empire. The horrible incidents of 1915 caused the Assyrians to both flee and fight for their space in various political constellations. They founded an Assyrian army and fought alongside the Allied Powers against the Central Powers. After Russia withdrew from World War I in 1917, the Assyrians fought on their own against Turkish, Kurdish, and Persian forces for an extended period. A little bit later, they joined forces with the British to fight against the Ottoman Empire. They defended their settlements until 1918 but were eventually forced to withdraw in July. In the course of the withdrawal, nearly 10,000 Christians lost their lives. At the end of the war, most of the Assyrians lived in the Bakuba refugee camp near Baghdad. After the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Assyrians, as well as many others, hoped for their own independent state. The Assyrians wished to return to the area of Nineveh,

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where they felt at home due to their history. Yet, the British and the French did not comply with these wishes. Instead, the different ethnic groups in the region were played off against each other by the colonial powers, resulting in a fight between the Assyrians and Kurds in 1919. The colonial powers secured their own power through this, but thereby sowed distrust and contempt among the groups. Despite the support of the British for a sovereign Assyrian state, the request was officially rejected by the League of Nations in 1925. After the end of the British mandate, the situation became increasingly dangerous for the Assyrians. No solutions were found with the Iraqi government. Attempts to flee to Syria failed as well. Incitements by Arab and Kurdish tribes against the Assyrians increased and in 1933 the first looting of villages in north-eastern Semile took place. In this process, 60 of 64 Assyrian villages were destroyed and the Assyrians were ordered to gather in Semile. Women and children under the age of 10 were sent home. The Iraqi military then murdered between 350 and 700 Assyrians. The Arab and Kurdish tribes were allowed to loot the villages. For the Assyrians, this event went down in history as the “Semile Massacre”. In only ten years, a total of almost 3000 Assyrians were murdered. It was not until the end of 1933 that the massacre of the Assyrians was discussed at the League of Nations. Resettlement was a long-standing issue with little support from the various nations. At first, Brazil agreed to take in 20,000 Assyrians, but later withdrew their offer. Proposals to settle in Niger or Gambia were rejected by the Assyrians. In 1934, France agreed to allow the Assyrians to settle in Syria at the Chabour River. It was not until 1937 that the League of Nations decided that they were allowed to stay there permanently. Among the thirty-four Assyrian villages, that were established at the Chabour River in the Al-Hassake region, was Tal Goran. Leonard Stinsky

2. Main aspects of Abdo Mirzas report In the now following second part of our presentation, I will explain the main aspects of Abdo Mirzas report. We decided to examine this one, since it is, as we know, the only detailed eyewitness report of the captivity under the Islamic State in 2015 and the later escape of the Christian hostages from Syria via Lebanon to Germany. The subjective descriptions and feelings allow a deeper insight into what has been experienced and gives an idea of the direct consequences and influences, which otherwise remain to be guessed. Abdo Mirza was captured on February 23, 2015, with twenty other hostages, including his then seven-year-old daughter Maryam, his 92-year-old father with his two sisters and his brother with his son. His wife Ishtar, who was heavily pregnant at that time, fled three days before the attack with her two youngest children to her parents’ home village in Tal Tamar, which was on the other side of the river. The experiences of Abdo and Ishtar Mirza were written down after their escape to Germany with the help of the German reporter and pastor Franz-Rudolf Müller and Charli Kanoun, the chairman of the Assyrian cultural association in Saarlouis (Saarland). Abdo Mirza starts his report by explaining the Assyrian religion, the everyday life and the religious rituals and festivals. During his whole report he refers to the more than fifteen

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hundred years of suffering of the Assyrians, which has been handed down to them in story by their ancestors. Faith plays a major role in Mirza’s report, which has unified the Assyrian people for centuries and gave them hope even in captivity.1 He describes how the Assyrian population settled in the villages at the Chabour river in the Al-Hassake region in northern Syria in 1934 and how their people were disappointed in their hopes for the once promised independent state. Since late 2010 and early 2011, the residents of the settlements felt changes in their country, such as an increasing threat since more and more Muslims became radical and joined the terrorist group of the Islamic State. But not only the radical terrorists scared them. The Kurdish militias increasingly controlled the settlements by setting up checkpoints on the main road connecting the villages, in order to keep Arab and Muslim men from continuing their journey. Ishtar Mirza was about to give birth to her fourth child and fled three days before the attack to Tal Tamar on the other side of the Chabour with her two youngest children.2 Maryam wanted to still get something at their house in Tal Goran, so that she stayed with her dad a bit longer before they planned to follow Ishtar. Abdo Mirza gathered up all his courage during the armed attack and was able to briefly speak to an IS leader he knew, Abu-Ali. The family members of his men had been working on Mirzas fields for many years, everybody got along well and each respected the other. Abu-Ali hissed nervous that there was nothing he could do for them but assured him in a whisper and without the supervision of others that he would take special care of his family. He kept his word, since the 21 hostages from Tal Goran were the first of a total of 250 Christians who were ransomed.3 Eleven-year-old boys among the terrorists carried machine guns and shouted hateful slogans.4 Abdo Mirza recognized men from different countries among the jihadists, among them Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya. He also identified a German doctor who worked for the IS and took care of the terrorists. All hostages were divided according to their gender and put in different buildings. The uncertainty about what happened and was still happening to his family, especially to his daughter in captivity, was torture for Abdo Mirza. After eight gruesome days in which they were forced to watch videos of decapitations and cruel torture over and over to get them Islamised, they were finally ransomed. The condition of the IS for the release was, that somebody of the hostages was a “voluntary messenger” to bring a message to the bishop Mar Aprem from Al-Hassake, who had previously ransomed all 21 hostages, and would come back thereafter with the bishops reply to the IS. Under force Abdo Mirza decided to be said messenger. He delivered the claim of the terrorists that the same ransom should be paid for every further hostage to the bishop. As a 1 Right at the beginning he describes the building of a new church in Tal Goran, which was built under very difficult conditions, and how the community grew closer together as a result. 2 Cf. Abdo Mirza, „Barfuß sind wir an den Chabour gekommen, barfuß sind wir gezwungen wieder zu gehen“. Flucht, Vertreibung und Geiselhaft der assyrischen Christen aus Tal Goran (Al-Hassake, Nordsyrien). Persönlicher Bericht des Abdo Mirza und seiner Familie, Münster 2019, 69. 3 Cf. ibid., 29. 4 Cf. ibid., 36.

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pledge, Abdo Mirza had to leave his daughter and aunt in the hands of the IS, while the other 18 hostages were already set free. After successfully delivering the message, Abdo Mirza was once again asked to convert to Islam, so that he could live freely with his family in the Islamic State. He politely refused and was finally allowed to leave with Maryam and his aunt. Abdo Mirza fled with Maryam and his other relatives to Al-Qamishli, where his wife was staying with their younger children already. The small apartment was made available by a Christian family. Maryam was allowed to go to a Syrian Orthodox school that provided extra care for traumatized children. The family knew that they had to leave Al-Qamishli, since it was still in Syria. Many Assyrians had already fled to Lebanon or larger cities in Syria as the war got worse and there was no end in sight.5 From their friend Ishmael they learned about contacts with the Assyrian communities and groups in Germany. Abdo Mirza got in contact with Charli Kanoun, the chairman of the Assyrian Cultural Association in Saarlouis. Charli Kanoun spoke to the political leaders and organized for all 21 hostages to be able to travel to Germany, as long as all of the hostages unanimously agreed to his offer. The decision to leave their home country was difficult, but since for now everything seemed hopeless in Syria, they finally accepted. Meanwhile, Charli Kanoun took care of everything necessary in Germany. He contacted the federal government of Saarland and other Assyrian Christians in his community to help and organize apartments, administrative procedures and psychological help. To everyone’s disappointment, only the 21 hostages received a visa for Germany. Ishtar Mirza did not get one for her and the three other children: Mirna (*2010), Butros (*2014) and Mira (*2015), neither did one of the other family members of the hostages. The embassy employees suggested that all of the hostages should already leave the country and that the family members could quickly follow them a few weeks later with a family reunification visa. According to their information, this should take a maximum of three months. The Assyrian Cultural Association in Germany also encouraged them in many phone calls and promised help, such as looking for accommodation, language courses and dealing with authorities. A psychologist had already been found for Maryam. After careful consideration, the family finally decided to leave the country. On September 4, 2015, 20 of the former hostages flew to Munich and were warmly welcomed by many Assyrian compatriots. A male hostage was unable to come along since due to post-traumatic disorders his doctors advised him not to fly. The days, weeks, and months in which the family was unable to see each other grew longer and longer. After 19 months and an intense bureaucratic struggle Abdo Mirzas family was reunited in Germany. In the meantime, Abdo Mirza’s father, who never wanted to live in Germany as he did not want to leave his homeland and yet longed to see his grandchildren one last time, passed away. Hanna Holthuis

5 Cf. Mirza, „Barfuß“, 58.

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3. Analysis of Abdo Mirza’s personal experience Now to the last chapter of our presentation: An analysis of Mirza’s personal experience and his report, as well as possible intentions of it. In analyzing the text, we proceed in the following manner: Firstly, we examine the text and the story of escape, described in it, based on push and pull factors. Secondly, we examine the text using Jan Assmann’s oral-history-method and considering the possible intention of the text. A brief conclusion summarizes our results. We begin by analyzing Mirza’s personal experiences. Many reports of refugee experiences are examined in terms of push and pull factors. What were the reasons for leaving the home country? Why did they go to Germany and not to another country? We also want to examine this report according to these factors: The strengthening of the Islamic State and the resulting hostage-taking, as well as displacement of the Assyrians, is the push factor for Mirza and his family. They were no longer safe and had no hope to feel safe again in this place in the near future. The pull factors were that Mirza and his family had contact with Charlie Kanoun and the Assyrian Cultural Association of Saarlouis e.V., thus the contact to Germany was established. In their eyes Germany was a safe country, where they did not have to expect persecution. In addition, it was important for Mirza and his wife that their daughter, who had been affected by the hostage-taking, was able to receive psychological care. This example clearly shows that dealing with trauma is often only possible in a country, where one can live safely. All of this was assured by the German contact. Unfortunately, sorting into push and pull factors is far from sufficient to capture the emotional ups and downs of the family and their struggle with the decision to travel to Germany separately. For example, it does not acknowledge how difficult it was for Mirza to leave his Christian wife with no money in a predominantly Muslim country. The disappointment over the postponement of the family reunification was tremendous. Mirza’s homesickness should not be underestimated either. Let us now turn to the question of the possible intention of the text: At the beginning it is important to note the following: Mirza emphasizes that the report is a subjective narration of his and his family’s escape story. From the very beginning, he does not claim any historical or presentational accuracy. It would therefore not be very useful to analyze his report measured against these criteria. If the report is examined from the point of view of oral history, in the understanding of Jan Assmann, Mirza’s personal story can be seen as part of a large, orally transmitted cultural heritage of the Assyrians. Jan Assmann’s method of “oral history” further defines the memory of people. In said method, Assmann distinguishes between communicative and cultural memory. While the communicative memory is especially created by the constant communication with other people, the cultural memory defines the identity of a group. Cultural memory uses fixed points, e.g., fateful events. An interesting point of Assman's theory implies that experiences of cultural memory can be related to the present. As experiences from the past are “refreshed” and new points of reference in the present can be made, comparisons between the past and the present are possible.

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In the report of Abdo Mirza, it is evident that historical events are very important for him and his people and have shaped their history. The important issues are the following: First, the ancestry from the ancient oriental people of the Assyrians, Chaldeans and Arameans. Second, the Assyrian religious history, respectively the peculiarity of the Assyrian Christians, their worship, and their early secession in the fourth century. Third, the genocide in 1915 and the ensuing decades-long exodus, which might be seen as still ongoing. Fourth, the Semile massacre in August 1933. Fifth, the more recent history of the Chabour River. For Mirza, these points have shaped the cultural memory of the Assyrians. It is precisely the narrative of past persecutions that he repeatedly links to the current situation with the IS. In this context, one topic is taken up again and again: The longing for a safe place, a home. This longing is also, according to Mirza, an essential part of the cultural memory of the Assyrians. He himself points out at the beginning of this story that it is important that the events he recounts will not be forgotten. He thus places his report in the cultural memory of the Assyrians. There is one more possible intention, that also made the report relevant in the context of our seminar: The report is about a religious minority, which is living in small groups all over the world, yet they all refer to the same cultural heritage. Like many other religious minorities that are scattered, the Assyrians must continually struggle for recognition of their religion. This is the focus of the report, since no matter where the Assyrian people settled, they had to fight. Even here in Germany a lot of educational work seems to be required before the Assyrians can live their cultural heritage freely. This educational purpose might be another intention of the text.

4. Conclusion The report of Abdo Mirza allows a very good personal insight into the culture of the Assyrians for all readers. It is not only a text, that serves the memory of following Assyrian generations, but also one that should cause acceptance and understanding by Non-Assyrians. Paul Seebaß, Leonie Wingberg

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The Integration Trajectory of Orthodox Greek Refugees in Mainland Greece Sinem Abka 1. An overview on reciprocal exchange of populations This study aims at examining the integration trajectories of the Greek immigrants who were forced to leave Turkey and move to mainland Greece by the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations which was concluded in 1923. Since the process through which the people who were subjects of the population exchange is significant in understanding the whole story of their trajectories, presenting a very brief historical overview leading to the conclusion of the Convention together with some conceptual descriptions are important to be able to present the main frame of this study. 1.1 The process leading to the population exchange The Greco-Turkish War broke out in 1919 after the end of First World War (WW I) and lasted around 3 years. The rival group of the WWI, namely the Entente Powers encouraged Greece to place its forces in İzmir (Smyrna). After landing its forces in İzmir on 15 May 1919 Greece expanded its control towards western and north western part of Anatolia in a short period. This attempt by Greece was of significant importance as it was considered as serving both to protect its minority in Anatolia and to fulfil its irredentist target of the Megali Idea which refers to creating a state of two continents and five seas. Although the Greek forces advanced in the first phases of war, their victory did not last very long because the Turkish army under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made a successful stand against Greece at the Battle of Sakarya and the war was officially ended when İzmir was recaptured by the Turkish forces in 1922 which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Turkish side.1 Greece had to leave İzmir, East Thrace and the cities where it landed forces in Western Anatolia to Turkey upon being entirely defeated. Once the Greco Turkish War was officially ended the two sides of the conflict searched for ways to re-regulate the relationship between them as well as to re-shape the demographic structures of the newly built nation-states. It was an important step in terms of formulating the future of their individual states after having lived under the Ottoman Empire for centuries. This attempt to re-shape the boundaries by considering the homogenous demographic structure was organized under the observation of the League of Nations. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos was supporting the idea of population exchange in 1

Georgios Kritikos, The Agricultural Settlement of Refugees. A Source of Productive Work and Stability in Greece, in: Agricultural History 79 (2005), 322.

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order to acquire the human resource to be used both for Hellenising Macedonia and Western Thrace and for consolidating the security of northern and north-eastern parts of Greece.2 Upon the request coming from Venizelos for ‘exchanging Greeks of Turkey to the Turks of Greece’, The League of Nations commissioners initiated an investigation on the subject matter. Fridtjof Nansen who was the then high commissioner for refugees was requested to carry out the research on how to organize a reciprocal migration between two nations. Upon request, Nansen submitted a report to the League of Nations supporting the idea of reciprocal population exchange based on religion. He believed that exchanging populations would be beneficial for both countries in terms of re-regulating the relations and homogenizing the nations. The elites of both Greece and Turkey were also aiming to create homogenized ethno-religious nation-states corresponding to the needs of modern European models. Accordingly, Nansen in his report introduced the definition of the religious groups who were to be subject to forced migration were identified as ‘Turks being Muslims in Macedonia and Thrace’ along with ‘Greeks being the Orthodox Christians of Anatolia’ regardless of the language they were speaking. Therefore, he justified his recommendation for several reasons. Firstly, during the years of Balkan Wars many Greeks already migrated to Greece and those who had to stay in Turkey were still planning to move. Turks were in the same way attained their own faith and already moved to Turkey to escape from war. Accordingly he believed that people's ongoing tendency towards migration would result in bigger economic and administrative problems unless this was regulated carefully by the governments.3 Besides, the possibility of Greeks and Turks coming together to live in peace in the same neighbourhood was removed by the brutal events of the Greco Turkish War years. Finally, this proposal of exchanging populations based on religion would generate a permanent solution for the remaining disputes between the two groups after the war years. Considering the people who were uprooted but not yet left their motherland, particularly those who were in the Black Sea region supporting the Greek irredentist groups during the Greco Turkish War, the provision of reciprocal exchange of populations was a great opportunity to be able to migrate carefully. On the other hand, the Orthodox Christians who were speaking Turkish and well integrated into the society of interior parts of Anatolia found this idea tragic since they were forced to leave their motherlands where they were feeling deeply attached to.4 1.2 Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations The Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations was finally concluded on 30 January, 1923 after the long lasting negotiations between the governments of Greece and Turkey. During the negotiation process the Turkish delegation did not favour the idea of exchanging the Muslims of Western Thrace since they constituted the majority 2 3 4

Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, Economic Consequences following Refugee Settlement in Greek Macedonia: 1923-1932, in: Renée Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean. An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey, New York-Oxford 2004, 65. Sarah Shields, The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange. Internationally Administered Ethnic Cleansing, in: Middle East Report 267 (2013), 4s. Richard Clogg, Yunanistan’ın Kısa Tarihi. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, İstanbul 2013, 105.

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of the population in the region whereas the Greek delegation was hesitant to remove its minorities in Istanbul in order not to destroy Greek existence from the old capital city of the Roman Empire. Accordingly, these two groups of minorities were excluded from the forced migration and those who were subjects of the population exchange were specified under Article 1 of the Convention: “As from the first of May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory Exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.”5 This convention is important by international law on the grounds that it constitutes the first compulsory population exchange in modern history.6 Nonetheless, the fact that religion is determined as the main component of the populations to be exchanged had caused various problems in both countries because these immigrant groups featured different cultural and linguistic characteristics unique to the region where they came from.7 These different characteristics mainly brought about integration problems due to the fact that the constituents other than religion such as language and national consciousness were not considered while a nationally homogenized state was established.

2. The reflections of the population exchange in the host society The Greek Orthodox population of Turkey flew to Greece by using the land route, sea way and the railway from the regions including Black Sea, Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia. 8 Despite the quantitative discrepancies in the total number of refugees who fled to Greece and Turkey, the compromised numbers of refugees are approximately 1.5 million consisting of 1.2 million Greek refugees from Anatolia to Greece9 and of 350 thousand10 of Muslims from Greece to Turkey. These numbers indicate that Turkey was an emigration country while Greece was under the influx of large numbers of refugees. In fact, the number of Greek refugees made up 20% of the total population, consisting of 5 million people, in Mainland Greece.

5 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923: www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi_-convention-concerning-the-exchange-of-greek-and-turkishpopulations-signed-at-lausanne_.en.mfa (20.10.2021). 6 İhsan Erdem Sofracı/Melike Kayam, Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi ve Ekonomiye Olan Etkileri, in: Çukurova Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, 23 (2019), 189. 7 Hüsamettin İnaç/Betül Yazıcı, Yunanistan ve Türkiye’nin Mübadele Politikalarının Sosyopolitik Analizi, in: Journal of Social, Humanities and Administrative Sciences 4 (2018), 188. 8 Ibid., 189. 9 Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger. The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey, Cambridge 2006, 46. 10 Ibid., 55.

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Demographically the Orthodox Greeks who were subject to the exchange were well educated as well as had professions in trade, handcrafting or agriculture.11 They were mostly from the urban areas and constituted the bourgeoisie class in Turkey. Hence, their exodus to Greece had a negative influence on the Turkish economy. Nevertheless, each group was disparate with regard to the language, customs and affluence depending on which part of Anatolia they came from. In other words, these diverse characteristics differentiated the refugee groups not only from the locals in Mainland Greece but also within themselves. The conditions in Greece in the aftermath of the population exchange were not different for Greek refugees than those in Anatolia during the Greco Turkish war. Basically, the native population did not welcome refugees despite sharing the same ethnic and religious bonds.12 Therefore, their settlement in Greece during the 1920s gave rise to bilateral hostility between the locals and newcomers. The main reasons which triggered the antagonism between the two groups have been categorized under four headings including the failure of Refugee Settlement Commission to well organize the settlement of the refugees, the increscent economic rivalry, cultural diversities between locals and refugees and finally the clashes in the political tendencies.13 2.1 The impact of Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) The RSC was an international body which was established by the League of Nations to be responsible primarily for the resettlement of the Greek refugees. The funds allocated by the League of Nations to the Greek government were required to be transferred to the RSC to be used for the resettlement projects. The Commission operated from 1923 to 1930 with the aim of employing refugees in a productive working environment. In this sense they paid their main attention to establishing refugees in rural areas and providing them with the essential tools for agricultural activities to encourage them for cultivation. Encouraging their agricultural activities was perceived as crucial in terms of protecting the socio-economic patterns unique to the society as well as of contributing to the national economy by the increased agricultural productivity. The RSC was prudent in land distribution considering the characteristics unique to rural Greece as well as the size and the quality of the fields in order to prevent potential jealousies. By the intention of making every refugee family a landowner, the parcels and houses left behind by the exchanged Muslims were distributed to the refugee families which in turn sheltered a considerable number of newcomers. As a result, the potential polarization of the refugees was avoided and the economic productivity was increased by the strategies followed carefully by RSC. However, the positive outcomes of the policies were insufficient in preventing rivalries between the locals and the newcomers as well as the uprisings of locals against the government. This was mainly by virtue of the drastic land reforms made up of the expropriation of private lands instead of sacrificing the state lands for the 11 Sofracı/Kayam: Türk-Yunan, 190–194. 12 Özlen Işık, Yunan Tarihinin Suskunluk Noktası: Anadolu’dan Yunanistan’a Göçen Rumlar, in: KÖK Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi 12 (2010), 78–80. 13 Michael B. O’Sullivan, The Greek Inter War Refugee Crisis as a Cause of the Greek Civil War. 19221949, in: Historical Perspectives. Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, 12 (2010), 47.

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use of the refugees.14 The evacuation of locals from the expropriated lands for the resettlement of newcomers stimulated a number of slaughters in northern Greece where refugee presence was intense. For instance, the refugees were massacred as well as their houses and properties were looted by the locals during the remarkable events of Serres in 1924.15 Similar incidents erupted in Plevna where locals and refugees quarrelled for the distributed fields. 2.2 The impact of increscent economic rivalry As being a war-weary and poverty-stricken country, Greece suffered from absorbing the influx of a high number of refugees. Accordingly, the plan for rural resettlement of the newcomers was hardly implemented by the RSC due to the fact that Greece, despite having an agricultural society, was already dependent on foreign capital and its food supply was met by the support of other countries. The unemployment rate was high and so the newcomers were perceived by the locals as the possible competitors in the labour market.16 Therefore, the refugees were not welcomed by the locals although they were sharing the same ethnicity and religion. During the early years of the population exchange most of the Greek refugees were obliged to live in the camps built up at the outskirts of big cities including Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki. The conditions at the camps were so dreadful that forty to fifty refugees were dying every day due to the epidemics, food shortages and medicine scarcity. Whereas the abandoned estates of emigrant Muslims were used for the settlement of the prosperous refugees, those with lower or no properties were left behind to live in refugee housing districts located in shanty towns.17 The political representatives urged the Greek government to find new funding resources to be used during the resettlement and employment process of the refugees in order to prevent the reactions of the native population against the newcomers. These efforts for suppressing the uprisings throughout northern parts of Greece produced the expected results after the government compromised on new financial assistance to be provided by the banks in the United Kingdom along with the United States. The RSC and the Greek politicians set up a plan for resettling the refugees in rural areas since most of the newcomers were skilled in agriculture and could continue cultivation in these regions. The new funding resources were allocated accordingly because this plan would also be beneficial for the recovery since farming and agricultural activities were the important elements of the economy.18 Providing the newcomers with better life conditions in country life in turn triggered the economic growth of Greece. Besides, it also prevented the newcomers from looking for alternative ways to move to the towns. These positive outcomes convinced the policy makers and RSC members that the plan worked properly. However, the distribution of the abandoned lands of Muslims within the refugee groups frustrated the landless farmers of the native population that exacerbated the arising tension between the locals and refugees. Fur14 15 16 17 18

O’Sullivan, Inter War Refugee Crisis, 47–49. Işık, Yunan Tarihinin, 83. Kritikos, Agricultural Settlement, 321s. O’Sullivan, ibid., 50. Kritikos, ibid., 323.

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thermore, the rural resettlement and agricultural establishment of the newcomers posed a threat against the social and political parameters of the society. 2.3 The impact of cultural diversities The total number of 1.2 million Greek refugees, particularly women and children were to be absorbed and integrated into the society. The imbalance in the gender and age distribution was due to the fact that a considerable number of men either died in battle or were captured by the Turkish soldiers.19 The newcomers were culturally different from the locals in terms of linguistic and customary characteristics. Linguistically, they were mostly speaking Turkish or those who were speaking Greek were using different dialects that the native population couldn't understand. Hence, the exchange of populations during the 1920s not only resulted in the change of faith from Islam to Christianity but also the language switched from Greek to Turkish particularly in the northern parts of Greece. The linguistic change in the society was so deep that the locals needed to adapt themselves to the transformation in some parts where the presence of newcomers was intense.20 It was not just the language differences yet the locals didn't recognize the newcomers as their compatriots though they were sharing the same religion and ethnicity. They were looking down on the refugees due to their different cultural habits and insulting by using such descriptions as ‘Turkish Seeds’ or ‘Yoghurt-baptized Orientals’.21 On the other hand, the refugees thought that the locals were antisocial and antagonistic not only towards the newcomers but also one another. Since the refugees had developed close-knit communities in Anatolia, the socially distanced characteristics of the locals were unfamiliar to them. Besides, the Greek Orthodox Christians under the legacy of the Ottoman Empire had built up a separate identity by the sense of superiority to other minority groups, due to their connections with the Orthodox Church in Istanbul. They maintained this sense of superiority to other groups, including the native population, once they were resettled in Greece. The continuation of this sense increased the social distance between the two groups.22 Moreover the cultural differences and social distance between the two groups even led to the physical violence and abuses towards the newcomers by the native groups.23 2.4 The impact of clashes in political tendencies The arrival of a huge number of refugees triggered the concerns of native population regarding the possibility of growing support for radical political ideologies. During WWI, Greece was already a politically divided country between the two groups including the supporters of Venizelos and the proponents of monarchy. The refugees were sympathetic to Venizelos believing that he was trying to survive the Greeks of Anatolia from the calamities left behind the war through his project of reciprocal population exchange. Essentially what Venizelos was trying to achieve was to use the refugees as a human resource in order to Hellenize the eastern parts of Greece. In his mind, a more Hellenized society would help 19 20 21 22 23

Ibid., 335. Clark, Twice a Stranger, 223. Clogg, Yunanistan’ın Kısa Tarihi, 105–107. O’Sullivan, Inter War Refugee Crisis, 52. Clark, ibid.

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him to create an ethnically homogenized nation-state.24 However what Venizelos and the international decision-makers neglected was the fact that the Greeks from Anatolia lived under the legacy of the Ottoman Empire for more than five centuries which resulted in their remoteness from the cultural components unique to mainland Greece and difficulties during their integration into the society.25 On the other hand, those who were the supporters of the dynasty propagated against the arrival of Greeks from Anatolia and convinced the native population about the fact that Venizelos tried to create a fanatic group of supporters by bringing refugees to Greece.26 Accordingly, the propagations against the newcomers as well as the intensified ethnic divisions between the two groups led to the political conflicts and instability which were referred to as National Schism between the Republicans and Monarchists. Despite the political instabilities occurred once refugees arrived in Greece, their presence in the political arena is believed to be influential in terms of introducing new political perspectives to the existing system.27 Venizelos began to lose his popularity among refugee groups when the Treaty of Ankara was signed between the governments of Turkey and Greece in 1930. Within the context of the Ankara Agreement the governments concluded that the Greeks from Anatolia would not be granted compensation for their estates and properties they left behind although they were guaranteed by Venizelos earlier. Therefore, the disappointed group of refugees looked for new political alternatives and some of them changed their directions towards radical parties. Those who turned towards radical parties, particularly the Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, KKE) were the urban refugees who were living in the slums in urban areas and alienated from the refugees who were resettled in rural areas, who assured their financial income and security did not tend to support communism. This new establishment of political preferences shifted from being based on the division between the refugees and locals into the basis of class divisions between the proletariat of the urban areas and little bourgeoisie of the rural areas.

3. The impacts of Greek refugees on socio-economic structure of Greece Although the role and the impact of the newcomers are mainly open to bitter arguments and criticisms, their contributions to the Greek economy, society and politics cannot be denied. First of all, the newcomers were particularly regarded as an economic asset for the country due to their entrepreneurial spirit. They principally supplied the labour resources crucial in terms of industrialization of the country in its development process. Refugee women from Anatolia in the same way contributed to the rise of new industries in towns such as carpetweaving and silk making. Thus, Greece in a short time became a major export rival of Turkey in these new industrial products.28 Additionally, some of the refugees also made im24 25 26 27 28

Kontogiorgi, Economic Consequences, 65. O’Sullivan, Inter War Refugee Crisis, 51. Işık, Yunan Tarihinin, 79. O’Sullivan, ibid., 54. Sofracı/Kayam, Türk-Yunan, 190–194.

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portant contributions to the growth of the internal market by the valuables and the capital they brought from Turkey. 29 The efforts of RSC in resettling the refugees in rural areas also worked very well in terms of contributing to the improvement of agriculture and establishment of the appropriate infrastructure. The newcomers brought new techniques such as flood prevention, drainage and fallowing from Anatolia which in turn resulted in an impressive increase in the agricultural products including cereals, wheat crops, tobacco as well as grapes and figs. Other new agricultural products including clover, red beet and opium poppy were also introduced by them.30 However, the expected and more productive results could not be obtained since some refugees were resettled in areas where cultivation was inconvenient or the land allocations were managed regardless of the agricultural skills or geographical familiarities of the refugees. However, there were still shortcomings in the agrarian sector and the damages occurred in the economy despite their impressive contributions to the development of Greece. Their primary damage to the economy arose due to the influx of a huge number of people into the country. Firstly, due to the rising population the production of wheat and flour did not meet the consumption in the country which urged the authorities to import over half of these products. Secondly, the borrowed loans for the use of resettlement projects worked well in the short run but led to the bankruptcy of the Greek state in 1932 due to the difficulties faced during the reimbursement process.31 Finally, due to the cultivation of fields more effectively the lands for grazing became scarce and expensive for the shepherds which damaged the stock breeding culture in the country.32 Politically, new arrivals granted political advantages for Venizelos by providing him important support until 1930. They also served his target of creating an ethnically homogenized nation-state by increasing the percentages of Greek population in the region of Macedonia and Western Thrace where the presence of Muslims was more intense before the arrival of refugees. For instance, in the region of Macedonia the population was made up of 42.6% Greeks before the population exchange. This percentage rose to 88.8% in the population census of 1926 which means that the cultural homogeneity was largely succeeded by the resettlement of the refugees in these areas.33 Culturally, the refugees brought their own cuisine and the way of cooking unique to Anatolia and made Greece a famous country with its unique and delicious food including moussaka, baklava, dolmades, etc. They also contributed to the art, particularly to Greek music by integrating special instruments like oud and developed already existing Rembetika music by inserting special sounds like amanes.

29 30 31 32 33

Kontogiorgi, Economic Consequences, 64. Kritikos, Agricultural Settlement, 332s. Kontogiorgi, ibid., 63.67. Clark, Twice a Stranger, 223. Eftihia Voutiria, When Greek Meet Other Greeks: Settlement Policy Issue in the Contemporary Greek Context, in: Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean, 147.

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4. Discussions on the integration process of refugees The integration process of Greek refugees into the locals took a long time due to their attachment to the lost lands of Anatolia. The antagonism between the locals and the native population due to various reasons discussed above also played an important role in their reluctance for adaptation. However, once the native population was convinced that the refugees were serving the political and socio-economic interests of Greece, they created a more moderate environment in terms of acceptance of the newcomers by taking important steps forward. These steps led to the creation of a network where the locals and the refugees manage and resolve their problems.34 On the other hand, there are three main factors which played a role in convincing and facilitating the integration of refugees into the native population. Firstly, being a member of the same religious community was an important factor in promoting their integration process. The religious affiliation of the two groups allowed intermarriages of the second or third generations which in turn helped the people to reduce their cultural differences. Secondly, the role of politics was crucial in creating a sense of attachment to the Greek nationstate. The incidents of the Second World War, particularly the campaign conducted by the Greek army against the Italians encouraged the native population and refugees to fight shoulder to shoulder and led to the rise of national unity.35 Finally, the enrolment of the second and third generations of refugees in the schools in mainland Greece provided them a chance of being taught about Greek history, language and culture that led them to create a common Greek identity. Consequently, the newcomers have never completely abandoned the traditions and the cultural heritage inherited from Anatolia despite their adaptation to their Greek identity in time. They renamed the regions where they were resettled by using the names of their abandoned lands. Today, a lot of districts still keep these names belonging to Anatolian regions through the impact of refugees. Besides, the love and nostalgia for the motherland were transmitted to the second and third generations of refugees. They still keep this belongingness by affiliating to the associations representing the Anatolian refugees. Therefore they carried on feeling Anatolia as their motherland and were kept being called ‘refugees’ despite decades passed away.36

5. Conclusion The integration process of Greek refugees who were subjects to the reciprocal population exchange was a bitter experience which was discussed from multidimensional perspectives in the literature. Their experience was regarded as bitter as the newcomers were exposed to discrimination and maltreating by the locals due the several reasons including the economic rivalry they created in the society, the reforming policies followed by RSC for their resettlement, ideological differences and the distinct cultural characteristics they brought from 34 Clark, Twice a Stranger, 229. 35 Ibid., 231s. 36 Shields, Population Exchange, 6.

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Anatolia. Nonetheless they made important contributions to the society, the economy and the culture of Greece. They did not only increase the production of agricultural products but also introduce the country with the new products such as grapes and figs. Their technical know-how made a great improvement in cultivation which in turn helped the national economy to progress. Culturally, they made Greece a well-known country with the cuisine and cooking techniques unique to Anatolian refugees. Despite having difficult times from 1923 onwards they could finally adapt into the main society by the 1930s. Apart from the role of their valuable contributions to the Greek state, some main factors including a common religious affiliation, experiencing common political trajectories as well as the role of education had a great impact on their integration process. The differences dissolved through the intermarriages which were enabled by the shared religion. Moreover, the political conjuncture promoted the nationhood of locals and refugees by fighting together against a common foe. Notwithstanding, the refugees have never really abandoned their sense of belonging to the Anatolian lands. They have always kept their memories and the sense of belonging alive by transmitting their stories, traumas and the nostalgia to the following generations in order not to cease their attachment to the Anatolian lands.

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