Europa: verso quale integrazione? 8846437012

Citation preview

EUROPA: VERSO QUALE INTEGRAZIONE ? EUROPE: WHAT KIND OF INTEGRATION?

a cura di/edited by Giuseppe Casale

FrancoAngeli

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/europaversoquale0000unse

J lettori che desiderano informarsi sui libri e le riviste da noi pubblicati possono consultare il nostro sito Internet: www.francoangeli.it e iscriversi nella home page al servizio “Informatemi” per ricevere via e-mail le segnalazioni delle novità o scrivere, inviando il loro indirizzo a: “FrancoAngeli, viale Monza 106, 20127 Milano”

EUROPA: VERSO QUALE INTEGRAZIONE ? EUROPE: WHAT KIND OF INTEGRATION? a cura di/edited by

Giuseppe Casale

FrancoAngeli

Fondazione Cassa La presente pubblicazione è stata realizzata grazie al contributo della di Risparmio di Genova.

tutL’editing di questo volume é stato curato dalla dottoressa Adriana Santoro alla quale ti gli autori rivolgono un sentito ringraziamento.

Copyright © 2001 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy Edizione

IEEE

ENT

OMS

Anno

TE

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

E vietata la riproduzione, anche parziale o ad uso interno 0 didattico, con qualsiasi mezzo effettuata, compresa la fotocopia, non autorizzata. Per legge la fotocopia é lecita solo per uso personale purché non danneggi l’autore. Ogni fotocopia che eviti l’acquisto di un libro è illecita ed è punita con una sanzione penale (art. 171 legge n. 633/41). Chi fotocopia un libro, chi mette a disposizione i mezzi per fotocopiare, chi comunque favorisce questa pratica commette un furto e opera ai danni della cultura. Stampa: Tipomonza, via Merano 18, Milano.

INDICE / INDEX

PREFAZIONE / FOREWORD

poso

SEZIONE I

ASPETTI ECONOMICI / ECONOMIC ISSUES

Fabrizio BALASSONE and Daniele FRANCO Fiscal Federalism and the Stability and Growth Pact: A Difficult Union

13

Luca BELTRAMETTI Is There a Need for a European Coordination of National Welfare System? A Preliminary Survey

40

Valérie BERENGER L'Intégration Européenne et la Protection Sociale: Vers Quel Type de Convergence?

50

Raffaele BOLDRACCHI Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: An Important Step Toward the Achievement of a Common European Administrative Space in the Framework of the EU Integration Process, with Particular Reference to the Czech Republic

82

Robert BOTTEGHI Hétérogénéité Administrative Locale et Intégration Européenne: Handicap Ou Opportunité pour le Citoyen? (Le cas de l'espace public transfrontalier franco-italien)

91

Alberto CAPACCI Natural and Cultural Regions in Europe

100

Giuseppe CASALE Defence of Common Interests and Creation of a Common European Conscience Through the Community Budget

106

Stefania DI BONO Integrazione Europea e Federalismo Fiscale: il Contributo dei Teorici Italiani di Finanza Pubblica nel Secondo Dopoguerra

113

Eric GASPERINI Théories des Biens Collectifs et Place des Economies Nationales

130

dans l’Union Européenne

Miroslav N. JOVANOVIC

140

Why Eastern Enlargement of the European Union Won't Be Fast Adele MAIELLO 1 Diritti delle Donne in Europa: Quale Fattore di Integrazione?

168

Alberto MAJOCCHI La Debolezza dell’Euro e le Prospettive di Sviluppo dell’ UEM

190

Ugo MARANI The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank and the Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate

202

Franco PRAUSSELLO Country Specific Shocks and Interregional Insurance Schemes in the EMU

248

Carlo SECCHI, Francesco PASSATELLI and Carlo ALTOMONTE

269

Institutional Refors, Economic Governance and European Constitution Victor UCKMAR L'Armonizzazione Fiscale come Condizione per il Rilancio dell'Economia Italiana

273

Dario VELO From the European Monetary Governance to the European Economics Government. A Minister of Finance for Euro Area Member Countries

284

SEZIONE II

ASPETTI SOCIALI E STORICI / SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ISSUES

Barrie AXFORD

and Richard HUGGINS

291

The Network Polity and European Integration: Intimations of PostTerritorial Space

Gianfranco BETTIN LATTES L’Identita Europea e le Giovani Generazioni. Osservazioni Empiriche sugli studenti

305

Christian BIDEGARAY Opinions Publiques Européennes et Intégration

334

Jacques FONTANEL L’Avenir de la Défense Européenne

348

Brooke JEFFREY Canadian Federalism as an Instrument of Political Integration: Myth and Reality

366

Francesco MUNARI

406

Direttive e Armonizzazione

Maria PELUSO From Representatives to Diversity in Public Administration: Politics of Inclusion In a Complex Society

416

Everett PRICE Federalism: Reflections upon the Canadian Experience

429

Giancarlo ROVATI Cultura politica e Valori europei:alcuni elementi per una analisi

458

comparativa

Martin SINGER Central Authority and Regional Power in China: Are There any Lessons for the European Union?

475

Reeta Chowdhari TREMBLAY Shared Sovereignty. Lessons from the Indian Experience

480

Danilo VENERUSO Closed Borders and Open Borders. The Italian Situation in the European Evolution

488

Giulio VIGNOLI The Role of Minorities in the European Integration Process

494

CONVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE EUROPA: VERSO QUALE INTEGRAZIONE? Genova, 5-6 luglio 2000 Nizza, 7 luglio 2000

Prefazione

E’ passato oltre un anno da quando il Convegno cui si riferiscono gli atti di questo volume è stato tenuto. Sembra un tempo lunghissimo, ma è poca cosa se comparato con la lentezza con cui purtroppo procede il processo di integrazione Europea. E’ per questo che le analisi compiute, i giudizi espressi, e gli auspici allora formulati conservano ancora tutta la loro attualità, e la loro pubblicazione

costituisce, ne sono certo, un contributo prezioso alla comprensione dell'Europa. Di questo ritardo editoriale, tuttavia, quale promotore e coordinatore del Convegno, chiedo scusa a tutti i Relatori, e specialmente a quelli che per primi mi hanno dato il testo scritto della loro relazione. Il Convegno ha avuto come obiettivo quello di discutere il processo di integrazione Europea al fine di contribuire alla elaborazione concettuale volta ad individuare le possibili soluzioni istituzionali verso cui sta andando l’Europa: Federazione? Confederazione? Entità sovranazionale a geometria variabile in funzione delle diverse aree di competenza (monetaria, fiscale, sociale, militare, rappresentanza estera, ecc.)? Hanno partecipano al Convegno esperti di diverse aree disciplinari (economica, storica, politologica, giuridica) come l’approccio eminentemente culturale del dibattito e la complessa natura dell’argomento richiedevano. Ogni Relatore, partendo dal proprio angolo visuale e dalle proprie esperienze personali, ha focalizzato la sua attenzione su aspetti di fondo dell’integrazione Europea nella

prospettiva del suo allargamento. Sono state anche analizzate in confronto alla situazione sociale e politica dell’ Europa esperienze storiche di federalismo e devoluzione di poteri di altri paesi come il Canada, la Cina, l’India. La materia è era e resta di estremo interesse in in un momento in cui a tutti i livelli si stanno ancora dibattendo le riforme istituzionali che costituiscono il nodo cruciale per il futuro dell’UE e che, in quanto tali, meritano di essere ampiamente discusse anche in ambito accademico.

L’iniziativa si è collocata nel quadro della collaborazione scientifica e didattica in essere fra la nostra Facoltà e l’Università Concordia con la quale sono in corso altri scambi

di docenti

e stanno

per esser

avviati

scambi

di studenti,

e ha

rappresentato il coronamento di un’idea nata nell’estate del 2000 con i Colleghi del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell’Università Concordia di Montreal (Canada), dove ebbi l’onore, come Adjunct Professor, di tenere un corso sull’integrazione Europea.

Al Convegno hanno aderito come partner la Facoltà di Diritto ed Economia dell’Università di Nizza Sophia-Antipolis (Francia) e il Centro Espace-Europe dell’Università di Grenoble, nonché il Centro Studi Euro-Atlantici dell’Università

di Genova. Ai fini di una maggiore chiarezza espositiva le relazioni qui pubblicate non seguono lo stesso ordine con il quale sono state presentate al Convegno, bensì si è voluto suddividerle in due distinte sezioni, una economica e l’altra socio-storico-

politica, seguendo un ordine alfabetico. Il Convegno si è svolto sotto il patrocinio della REGIONE LIGURIA. Hanno contribuito finanziariamente alla sua realizzazione: la FONDAZIONE CASSA DI RISPARMIO POLITICHE

DI GENOVA, €

dell’Università

l’ATENEO GENOVESE

il DIPARTIMENTO

di Genova,

DI

E IMPERIA,

SCIENZE

il RETTORATO

la FACOLTÀ

ECONOMICHE

DELL’UNIVERSITÀ

E

DI SCIENZE

FINANZIARIE

DI NIZZA,

e la

COMMISSIONE EUROPEA AZIONE JEAN MONNET, che ringrazio tutti sentitamente anche a nome degli altri convenuti. Genova, settembre 2001

«Giuseppe Casale

10

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE EUROPE: WHAT KIND OF INTEGRATION? Genoa, 5-6 July 2000 Nice, 7 July 2000

Foreword

More than one year has elapsed since this conference took place; although this may appear quite a long time, it is a very short period in the long march of the European integration process as such, the analyses, the opinions expressed, the wishes and prescriptions set down here are still relevant, and their publication still presents, I am sure, a worthwhile contribution to a nuanced understanding of the integration process in Europe. For this editorial delay, however, as a promoter and co-ordinator of the initiative, I must apologise to all the speakers, and especially the ones who sent their paper promptly. The Conference was aimed at discussing the process of European integration in order to canvass which institutional solution is more likely to be adopted for Europe: Federation? Confederation? A supranational entity whose making is characterized by different rates of progress or a variable geometry according to distinct policy and administrative areas (monetary, fiscal, social, military, etc)? Experts

in different

disciplines

(economics,

history, law, political science)

participated in the meeting, as was appropriate to a cultural approach to the complex nature of the subject. Analysis of the historical experiences of federalism and devolution of power in countries such as Canada, India, China and others were presented and brought to bear upon the European social and political context. Each presentation, starting from its own perspectives and experiences, focused upon different aspects of and major issues affecting European integration, with regard both tc the present Union and the entity resulting from the expected enlargement. The theme of the Conference was of all the greater interest at a time in which the discussion on institutional reforms was entering in the agenda of many European

political bodies, and Europe was on eve of the introduction of Euro as a common currency in twelve countries of the Union. These issues are still crucial for the future of the EU and deserved to be widely discussed in the academic arena too. For better thematic clarity, the papers published do not follow the same order as they were presented at the Conference, but have been divided in two sections, an

11

economic one and a historical-political one. Within each section papers are organised alphabetically by speaker. The Conference initiative was due to the existing cooperation between the University of Genoa (Italy) and Concordia University of Montreal (Canada) in the scientific and teaching sector, which is ongoing through further exchanges of Lecturers; student exchanges are now being planned. More specifically, the Conference is the result of a project born in Summer 2000 among the Colleagues of the Political Science Department of the Concordia University where I had the honour to visit as Adjunct Professor, teaching a course on European integration. Also the Faculty of Economics and Law of the University of Nice, SophiaAntipolis, the Centre Espace-Europe of the Grenoble University and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies of the University of Genoa were participants in the Conference The Conference was sponsored by the REGIONE LIGURIA, and benefited from the financial support of the FONDAZIONE CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI GENOVA, l’ATENEO GENOVESE E IMPERIA, the UNIVERSITY OF GENOA, the FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, the DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SCIENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GENOA, the RECTORSHIP OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NICE, and the EUROPEAN COMMISSION ACTION JEAN MONNET, who I sincerely thank also on behalf of all participants.

Genova, September 2001

Giuseppe Casale

12

SEZIONE

I

ASPETTI ECONOMICI / ECONOMIC ISSUES

cow

MIT,

©

ae

ww

2%

PEER

CORRE

ve

des

M

ee an ne D ed. font:pi

npSante l'ho: co:

gsècontes 53 4 Dynit Lie ot dita

vai à cPBraal

++ ae

Li esc

|

the

ret were “Srudias of ine Lmivarséty | Srurel AMOAODA DIMOMODS

xTh 9 Chand neni wed spons

M der Evo

ail D

fi

Moser): support of de sonnazzatò Gata li crabe i pe i nn SR GENOVESE E RGA, fin RIVIVE Gira! the Bri CAL MOEN,

the REPARTMENTOP aceto

EC ONDES OF TNO, Li te

MON E A

LOMINLE

au i etti of ail porti queto

De aero

te

ACTION

#

SND PIRANCEAR

pali (ONE CONS

.

GR

ORM

yt, whe È sincere) 6 ra

FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: A DIFFICULT UNION Fabrizio BALASSONE and Daniele FRANCO’ Bank of Italy Research Department

1. Introduction

During the 1990s, the degree of fiscal decentralisation in EU member States increased: a process to enlarge the responsibilities of local governments in the management of public expenditure and taxation was set in motion in countries not organised on a federal basis!. During the same years, budget rules aimed at guaranteeing the soundness of the public finances of EU member States and ensuring margins for counter-cyclical policies were defined and introduced at the European level. These rules are based on the consolidated budgets of general governments. The existence of different levels of government is not taken into account. The interaction between these two developments has not yet been adequately examined. This paper proposes a first analysis of the compatibility between the degree of decentralisation decided at national level and the budget rules introduced at European ievel. In highlighting the allocative advantages of local autonomy, traditional theories of fiscal federalism stress the need to guarantee both control of national public finances and the possibility of carrying out counter-cyclical policies at the national level. To that end, the introduction of limits on transfers from the central government and on recourse to market financing by local governments is necessary.

* Paper presented at the conference on “I controlli di gestione delle Amministrazioni pubbliche”, held in Perugia at the S.A.DI.BA. (Banca d’Italia) on 2 and 3 December 1999, and at the conference on “The design of institutions in times of rapid change”, held in Messina on September 2000. Paper also published in the review Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche, (1999), vol. XVII, n. 2-3, edited by Domenico Da Empoli. The opinions expressed in this paper do not in any way represent the Bank of Italy. The authors would like to thank Raffaella Giordano, Giuliana Maurizi and Stefania Zotteri for

their helpful comments. ' In this paper, the term federalism has been attributed a broad meaning. With regard to the significance of the term federalism and the classification of the various institutional structures that can be defined federal, see for example Brosio (1996), Forte and Cerioni (1996) and Patrizii (1998). 13

These constraints must be flexible, in relation to cyclical events and to the need to spread the burden of public-sector investment over several generations. These theoretical indications have been confirmed by the legislation adopted in many countries. When regulating the activities of local governments, it is unusual to rely solely on market action, i.e. penalisation in terms of higher interest rates, which would affect the most indebted governments. Variations of the so-called golden rule are often applied. Despite placing constraints on indebtedness, the possibility to compensate possible overshoots over several financial years is almost always permitted: on an annual basis the constraints apply ex ante but not ex post. The launch of the Monetary Union posed a problem for fiscal regulation at the European level. The solutions adopted in several countries with federal structures are more flexible than the rules defined in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact: the rules are defined in relation to numerical parameters that also have to be observed ex post; flexibility is envisaged only in connection with exceptional cyclical events or others beyond the control of governments; a monitoring procedure was introduced that provides for the formulation of multiyear financial programmes and the possibility formally to recommend corrective measures during the course of the year and to impose monetary sanctions in cases of default. These rules apply to national States; there is no reference to local governments in the Union documents. Although the operations of all levels of government are relevant to compliance with the regulations, which refer to general government, in fact it is the central government that is responsible for compliance and for paying any penalties in the event of violation. Without suitable regulation, local governments that have the possibility to take on debt could free-ride on the back of central governments. More generally, a potential conflict exists between the constraints placed on national public finances and the flexibility allowed to decentralise public finances. : In those countries°that are already organised on a federal basis and in those in which reforms are underway to increase the degree of decentralisation, the need to conform national rules to the new European context is strong. The level of domestic flexibility must be made compatible with the lower level envisaged in the Stability and Growth Pact; the asymmetry between the responsibilities assigned to the central government and those assigned to regional and local governments must be corrected. The analysis conducted in this paper demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling full enjoyment of the allocative benefits of fiscal decentralisation with full utilisation of the margins for counter-cyclical policies offered by compliance with the Pact. In considering possible solutions, particular attention is addressed to the solution outlined in Italy in the Domestic Growth Pact; it is pointed out that such solution will need to be improved. The second section of this paper briefly examines the propositions which have gained a wide consensus in the literature on fiscal federalism, comparing theoretical

14

precepts with the practical solutions adopted in countries with federal structures. The third section first summarises the European regulations on public-sector budgets and then examines their implications for regulating the relations among the various levels of government at the national level. The fourth section analyses the solution adopted by Italy in the context of increasing decentralisation of responsibility for expenditure and revenue.

2. Fiscal federalism and budget constraints The current structure of national States is the result of a long process of aggregation and disaggregation of different jurisdictions, which over time have yielded some fiscal prerogatives while maintaining others. In recent decades a clear tendency to decentralise responsibility for expenditure and taxation has emerged in many countries (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Wildasin, 1997).

Economic theory also offers reasons favouring decentralised forms of government. Responsibility for the management of services should be entrusted to that level of government whose jurisdiction comes closer to the area in which the services are provided. In this way, supply could be adjusted to the needs and preferences of the citizens of each region, thus allowing closer monitoring of the conduct of elected representatives and competition among local governments to the benefit of citizens*. The expenditure functions assigned to each level of government affect the allocation of sources of tax receipts and financial relations between central and local governments. This section examines the implications, in terms of instruments for controlling

indebtedness in situations of decentralised finance, of two types of federation: the first type resembles a union of sovereign States (similar to the institutional structure of the European Union); the second is closer to the prescriptions of economic theories on fiscal federalism’. The solutions adopted by the leading federallystructured countries are also analysed.

2.1 Budget constraints in a situation of radical federalism Let us consider a situation in which local governments enjoy absolute autonomy in matters of public expenditure, taxation and recourse to debt. In this context, the stability of monetary and financial conditions represents a public good to which all local governments contribute by maintaining sustainable budget positions. There is an incentive for each local government to exploit the benefits accruing from the

? For a critical analysis of these indications, see Fausto (1996 and 1999). 3 The distinction made in this paper is comparable to the more common confederations and federations.

15

one between

discipline of others without itself complying with the rules (free-riding). This creates a double cost for the other entities: the free-rider’s excessive indebtedness can put pressure on interest rates to rise; it can also result in bankruptcies requiring bail-outs*. Before all else, we must ask if market regulations can avoid these kinds of situation. For regulations to be effective, certain conditions have to be met (Lane,

1993): a) no government body should have privileged access to the market; b) the market must have access to all the information necessary to evaluate the financial reliability of each body; c) the bailing-out of troubled bodies must not be allowed; d) mechanisms to ensure that entities react to market signals must exist. These conditions are both very strict and unlikely to obtain simultaneously. In particular, the reaction times of decentralised fiscal authorities may be excessively long, for example when administrators work to short time horizons. It is also difficult to ensure absolute credibility of the ban on bail-outs. Finally, evaluation of the financial situation of a body could be hindered by “creative accounting”. Consequently, it may be useful to supplement market rules with the means to control the overall indebtedness of a federation’s members. Excluding administrative controls, which require local governments to obtain prior approval of their financial strategies from central governments and which by their very nature are incompatible with a federal structure, two solutions may be considered: a) collective management of indebtedness; b) the introduction of rules (balanced budget, pre-fixed ceiling for the total deficit, golden rule) and sanctions for non-compliance. With co-operative solutions, all levels of government must be involved in formulating the objectives of economic policy and be responsible for their attainment.

However,

these

solutions

do

not

eliminate

the

incentive

for

opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, co-operation may require protracted negotiations, especially when a large number of bodies is involved, to the detriment of the effectiveness of economic policy. The introduction of rules also raises various problems, such as the credibility of their rigorous application, in particular for the management of bail-outs, and the possibility of efficient monitoring to avoid forms of “creative accounting”. For these reasons an eclectic approach appears useful, one that combines rules with forms of co-operation based on peer pressure. Such an approach must in any case keep account of the need to allow margins of flexibility in order to offset

4

oie

cl

4

Somewhat similar problems arise in regard to regulating taxation policies so as to avoid fiscal competition; in other words, the introduction of preferential tax treatment in order to attract tax bases. On this subject, see for example Smith (1996).

16

cyclical effects on the budget without adopting pro-cyclical policies and to deal with exceptional circumstances that impact on the recourse to debt’. Considerations of tax-smoothing and inter-generational equity may justify the funding of certain activities through limited recourse to debt. The problem is especially acute in the case of public-sector investment. The realisation of major projects requires a substantial temporary increase in total expenditure; without recourse to debt, this implies a peak in taxation, the intensity of which may lead to the projects being abandoned. In addition, since the benefits of the project may be spread over a long period of time, financing it through taxation would lead to an unfair division of the burden among generations‘.

2.2 The economic theory of fiscal federalism The beyond the key The the

literature on fiscal federalism is very extensive. A complete survey is the scope of this paper and we will therefore limit ourselves to summarising propositions on which there seems to be broad agreement. main advantage of a federal structure is increased efficiency resulting from

decentralization

of allocative

functions.

On

the

other

hand,

a

central

government can perform the functions of redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation more efficiently’. The crucial element in the production of public goods is the territorial range of the benefits: each public service should be produced and financed according to the preferences of the citizens residing in the area that enjoys the benefits. This area may coincide with national boundaries or it may be limited to a particular region. The fact that political processes are needed to disclose the citizens’ preferences justifies the existence of several administrative jurisdictions’. The redistribution function could also be interpreted as a local public good (Pauly, 1973), with each community being allowed to decide its own level. However, the analogy with the allocative function no longer holds if the effects on the citizens’ choice of domicile are considered: where capital and labour are highly

° The solution adopted by the European Union includes these features (see Section 3.1). $ See Balassone and Franco (1998) and the references therein. For an analysis of the problems connected with public-sector investment within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact, see Balassone and Franco (2000). ? The principal bibliographical reference is Musgrave (1959). For an updated discussion of the problem of the allocation of expenditure functions, see Ter-Minassian (1997). 8 One difficulty arises from the fact that it is rare for public services to coincide with territorial divisions: theoretically, it could be necessary to provide as many jurisdictions as there are services to be produced. There are also problems in relation to free-riding and the difficulty of expressing preferences (see Olson, 1965, and Arrow, 1951). Solutions to these problems have been suggested (for example, Tiebout’s “voting with the feet”, 1956). The classic reference on the optimal size of jurisdictions is Buchanan (1965); for an updated analysis, see Cornes and Sandler (1995).

17

mobile, significant differences in redistribution levels may cause “the rich to flee the poor and the poor to chase the rich” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984, p. 514). A centralised authority for stabilisation is justified by the risk that the impact of built-in stabilisers and expansionary or restrictive measures decided at local level may be diminished or annulled if jurisdictions are closely integrated in economic terms”. The co-ordination of decentralised stabilisation policies may also be hindered by incentives for local authorities to behave as free-riders. By virtue of the functions assigned to it, the central government should have access to the tax bases that are more mobile, more sensitive to cyclical factors and less uniformly distributed. A rigorous interpretation of this criterion would allocate the lion’s share of tax bases to the central government. Progressive income tax, capital transfer and gift duties affect the distribution

of income

and wealth.

Moreover,

income

tax is

particularly sensitive to the cycle, as is sales tax. Finally, corporate income tax should be allocated to the central government so as to avoid distortions in choosing where to locate productive activities’. Local governments would retain only property tax and public utility charges'': the former affect tax bases that are not very mobile; the latter permit full application of the benefit principle. This implies that the revenue sources allocated to local governments may be insufficient to finance the expenditure relevant to the functions assigned to them. It may become necessary to make transfers to decentralised bodies or allow them a share of the central government’s tax revenues. If qualitative and quantitative standards affecting the local production of public services are imposed at national level, the need for forms of financial support may increase. Separating the responsibility for expenditure and its financing weakens the costbenefit relationship associated with public services, reducing the allocative advantages of a decentralised system'. In addition, transfers not subject to predefined limits do not encourage efficient management”; central governments’ financial support to local administrations has often been cited as one of the factors underlying the excessive growth in public expenditure'*. In some circumstances,

* The importance of these considerations for the allocation of stabilisation functions in the European Union tends to increase as the markets gradually become more closely integrated. '° The assigning of mobile tax bases to decentralised governments also risks encouraging fiscal competition; (see, for example, Smith, 1996).

'' The difficulty of evading taxes on natural resources makes them suitable to decentralised levels of government. However, the fact that the central government is responsible for their allocation among the different jurisdictions argues in favour of their attribution to the latter. - See, for example, Buchanan (1967) and Oates (1972). The structuring of transfers so as to provide useful incentives is one of the most complex elements in the theory of fiscal federalism. Cullis and Jones (1992) offer a review of the budget constraints determined by different types of transfer. # King (1984) examines explanations of the so-called “fly-paper effect” (i.e. the fact that an increase in central government transfers causes an increase in local public-sector expenditure that is greater than that which would result from an equivalent increase in

18

increases in local government spending can jeopardise macroeconomic stabilisation measures Carried out by central governments. Controls on the managerial efficiency of local authorities and limits on transfers and revenue-sharing are necessary. Just as controlling the indebtedness of local governments in conditions of “radical federalism” cannot be rigid, nor can controls on transfers. There must be margins to offset the effects of cyclical swings or exceptional events on the budget and to permit tax-smoothing measures. One possibility is to allow recourse to debt, but this raises the problems already indicated in Section 2.1.

2.3 Fiscal federalism in practice Reference to western nations provides a wide range of arrangements for the allocation of expenditure and revenue functions and for controls on local government indebtedness. At the end of the 1980s, the share of central government outlays in total publicsector spending ranged from 41% in Canada to 95% in Paraguay (Ahmad et al., 1997). The allocation of expenditure functions among the different levels of government partly reflects theoretical indications: in several cases the territorial range of the benefits seems to be the criterion; (most countries assign defence, foreign affairs and international trade to the central government but local transportation, firefighting and city police services to local governments.) Central governments are generally responsible for redistribution. However, responsibility for particularly important expenditure functions, such as healthcare and education, is not predominantly assigned to any given level of government. The contribution of local governments’ own revenues to total public-sector revenue also varies greatly: in the early 1990s, in the industrialised countries, it ranged from 3% in the Netherlands to 49% in Canada (Norregaard, 1997). The solutions adopted are often based on theoretical indications: in general, property taxes are assigned to local governments, while corporate taxation is assigned to central governments (in relation to the different degree of mobility of the respective tax bases); income and sales taxes are assigned to the central government, on account of their sensitivity to the cycle and of the redistributive function of income tax.

There are three means of covering any imbalances between local governments’ revenues and spending: sharing in central governments’ tax revenues; transfers; and indebtedness. The importance of controlling local government spending is

confirmed by widespread dissatisfaction with the utilisation of funds transferred

personal income); see also Oates, 1979. For the implications of programmes in which the benefits are geographically concentrated and financing is met by general taxation, see Weingast et al (1981).

19

from central governments (Ter-Minassian, 1997): varying kinds of organisational structures have been criticised, from “conditional” transfers for healthcare and

transportation utilised in Italy, to unconditional transfers for Medicaid and support of large families in the United States, to transfers based on full reimbursement of expenses for healthcare and higher education in Canada. Recourse to debt is generally permitted. The industrialised countries rarely rely on market regulation alone; Canada is the only country that does not have provisions to limit the provinces’ debt or other central government controls”. Brazil had relied on market regulation in the past, but in 1996 it introduced controls

following the rapid accumulation of debt by the local governments. The market model was also not effective in Argentina. In Australia and the Scandinavian countries, central and local governments co-operate in defining the objectives for national public finance. Pre-determined regulations are in force in the United States, Spain and Switzerland. Germany utilises a combination of rules and cooperation. The rules generally limit the total deficit, permit indebtedness for certain objectives only or set a ceiling on expenditure for interest payable. The constraints on indebtedness generally apply ex ante: possible overshoots may be compensated for in subsequent financial years'’. Direct administrative controls are particularly widespread in non-federal States.

3. European legislation

tax

regulations

and

their

implications

for

national

3.1 European balance sheet regulations The model of European Union created by the Treaty of Maastricht is similar to the radical federalist system described in 2.1 above: member States have retained virtually total sovereignty in questions of expenditure and taxation. A simple formalisation of the no-rules risk - The risk of free-riding posed by a Monetary Union without budgetary rules!’ can be represented in terms of simple games such as “prisoner’s dilemma” or “hawks and doves”.

5 The Canadian experience seems to suggest that there are large lags in the effects of market controls: despite a significant deterioration in its rating and a subsequent increase in risk premium, the debt of the Canadian provinces consistently increased for years before corrective budget policies were introduced (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997).

This, for example, is the case of the United States; for a detailed analysis, see McGranahan (1999). For references to this risk, see among others: Canzoneri and Diba (1991), Allsopp and ae : meee Artis and Winkler (1998), Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) and Flandreau et

al.

È

20

For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose there are only two member States (I and J) and that the game is perfectly symmetrical. The tax regime of each State produces a benefit (B) and carries a cost (C) - with B>C - and the benefits are divided equally between the two States, so that the outcome for each is B-C provided both are co-operative. If one country is not co-operative it will incur no costs but will continue to receive its part of the benefits produced by the other’s cooperation (with the result B/2), while the other country will reap B/2-C only. If both countries are not co-operative, each will obtain D (Fig. 1). If the order of possible outcomes is B/2>B-C>D>B/2-C the game is a prisoner’s dilemma. If the order of possible outcomes is B/2>B-C>B/2-C>D the game is hawks and doves. In the prisoner’s dilemma the uncooperative strategy wins over the co-operative strategy (by guaranteeing a better outcome regardless of the other player’s strategy) so that both countries have an incentive to adopt it. An equilibrium is thus the result of both countries adopting an uncooperative strategy. In hawks and doves there is no dominant strategy (non co-operation gives higher utility when the other player is co-operative but not when he is not); the game yields two equilibria in pure strategies; both imply the defection of one or the other players. Fig. I - A general game at EU level (1)

undisciplined Country J

disciplined

(1) The outcome obtained by Country J is shown beneath the diagonal dotted lines; that obtained by Country I is shown above.

In this context sanctions (S) may change the result to make the co-operative strategy dominant (Fig. 2). In the above example the sanction must comply with the stricter of the two restrictions: S>D-(B/2-C) and S>-(B/2-C).

21

Fig. n. 2 - À sanction is introduced Country I

ses undisciplined

undisciplined

DST. ae int

COUNTY TM

disciplined

The

solution

disobedience

adopted

Sir

i

D-S

airs Biasi

- The

problem

has been addressed

B/2-S temas xe! Be le

Mer

i250

disciplined UNE.

Te B-C

Earn

of potential

at the European

out

incentives

for fiscal

level and a series of rules,

procedures and sanctions has been identified. Specifically, the Treaty of Maastricht sets quantitative ceilings for the government deficit and the public debt (of respectively 3 and 60% of GDP) and envisages sanctions for wayward States; the Stability and Growth Pact approved in Amsterdam in June 1997 spelled out the objectives, control procedures and sanctions in greater detail*. The Pact commits member States to pursue the medium-term objective of “a budget close to balance or in surplus”. The European Council later clarified that this objective should be achieved over the duration of the economic cycle”. The Pact may thus be considered as an attempt to reconcile counter-cyclical policies and sound public finances”’. Each State must define a budgetary target for the neutral phase of the cycle. In practical terms this means defining a cyclically-adjusted budget balance”! around which the unadjusted balance fluctuates by virtue of built-in stabilisers and discretionary measures, if any. The further this balance lies below the 3% ceiling,

!8 For a review of the reasons adduced for introducing the Pact and an analysis of its potential macroeconomic implications, see European Winkler (1997) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998).

Commission

(1997),

Artis

and

This interpretation is supported by the Resolution of the European Council of 16-17 June 1997, in Council Regulation n. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 and in the Opinion of the Monetary Committee of 12 October 1998, later adopted by the Council.

°° Balassone and Monacelli (2000) emphasise the risk that the rules concerning the debt hinder the reconciliation proposed in the Pact.

°! We use the definitions given by the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission:

budget corrections apply only to automatic reactions (i.e. those determined by current legislation). For a methodological review of the methods for estimating structural balances, see Banca d’Italia (1999).

22

the greater is the margin available for counter-cyclical policies without incurring excessive deficits”. The choice of a medium-term target for the neutral phase of the cycle is dictated mainly by three factors: a) the depth of expected recessions; b) the elasticity of the budget in relation to the cycle”; c) the size of the discretionary measures that may be taken to enhance the impact of built-in stabilisers. Past experience suggests that in the majority of EU countries a cyclically adjusted deficit of between 0 and 1% of GDP should make it possible for built-in stabilizers to become fully operative without incurring a risk of overshooting the 3% ceiling (Buti et al., 1998) ”*. Any State with an excessive deficit is required to adopt corrective measures according to a fixed timetable. Failure to comply brings sanctions. Specifically, the country must pay a non-interest-bearing deposit equal to 0.2% of GDP plus one tenth of the difference between the 3% ceiling and the actual deficit (up to a maximum of 0.5% of GDP). For each successive year that the deficit is judged to be excessive only the variable component of the sanction must be paid”. Should the excessive deficit persist, the deposit is converted into a fine after two years“. To the monetary costs of sanctions must be added their consequences in terms of loss of reputation, which could translate into the inclusion of a higher risk premium in yields on government securities. The approach taken is therefore actually less flexible than the solutions adopted in some federally structured countries: a) the rules are defined on the basis of established numerical parameters; b) ex post compliance with the parameters is required each year;

2? The Treaty establishes that the deficit may not exceed 3% of GDP unless (a) exceptional circumstances obtain (these may include a recession leading to a reduction in real GDP of at least 2%; (b) it is close to 3%; (c) the overshoot is absorbed in the short term. These three conditions render the 3% ceiling particularly strict (see Buti et al., 1997). 23 The term “elasticity” is commonly used in preference to the term “semi-elasticity” to indicate the ratio between the absolute change in the deficit/GDP ratio and the percentage change in GDP.

4 These figures are based on European Commission estimates for the period 1960-1997 (a maximum output gap averaging 4 percentage points; average budget elasticity equal to 0.6). The choice of medium-term target should reflect the need to cover adverse circumstances other than those connected with the economic cycle (e.g. increases in interest rates), to reduce the public debt and to deflect pressures on spending generated by demographic trends. On this point, see the Opinion of the Monetary Committee of 12 October 1998, later

adopted by the European Council. 25 The fixed component

is intended to discourage excessive deficits, while the variable

component is an incentive to limit their amount. The German Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, had initially proposed a deposit equal to 0.25% of GDP for each point - or fraction thereof - between the actual deficit and the 3% ceiling. This would have produced discontinuities in the application of sanctions and could, furthermore, have pushed the latter to politically unacceptable heights.

26 If no corrective measures are adopted, the sanctions can be applied in the same year in which the deficit is judged to be excessive.

23

c) margins of flexibility are envisaged only in connection with exceptional cyclical events (established ex ante as a decline in GDP) or in any case events beyond the governments’ control; d) no margin of deficit is specifically reserved for investment expenditure”’; e) monitoring procedures are envisaged, starting with an announcement of targets in special multi-year programmes (whose consistency with the rules is evaluated) and continuing with a mid-year examination of public finances and ex post verification of results; f) peer pressure is strengthened by the European Council’s power to make formal representations to governments of the need to adopt corrective measures during the year;

g) non-compliance triggers the application of h) overshoots must be rapidly dealt with; excessive deficit persist. The public nature of the whole procedure control exerted by the market on governments’

pre-established monetary sanctions; sanctions increase as situations of

can contribute to the efficacy of the budgetary policies.

3.2 Implications of national legislative frameworks The above rules apply to national governments. More specifically, compliance with budgetary rules is evaluated in respect of general government as defined in the European System of Accounts (ESA), i.e. including central government, local governments and social security funds*. EU documents do not assign specific responsibilities to local governments. While compliance with the rules involves the behaviour of all levels of government, it is effectively the central government that is held responsible and that bears the costs of non-compliance. It is, in fact, the European Council that ensures co-ordination of the general economic policies of the member States and it is a representative of each member State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that member State to sit in the Council”. Obviously, each member State is free to define the necessary procedures and regulations to ensure coordination between different levels of government. To understand the consequences of this asymmetry in a scenario in which decentralised levels of government enjoy some measure of independence in their budgetary policies, another example based on games may be helpful. Let us 7 No distinction is made in the Treaty between current and capital expenditure for the purposes of determining the deficit. The volume of capital expenditure is included only pees the relevant factors to be borne in mind when deciding whether there is excessive evt.

5 See Article 2 of the Protocol on procedures for excessive debt. See Articles 145 and 146 of the Treaty establishing the European amended by the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992.

24

Community,

as

suppose that there is only one local government agency (LG) and that fiscal compliance by both local (LG) and central (CG) governments produces a benefit B at cost C, which is split equally between the two levels of government. Let us then suppose that the same benefit can be produced by CG’s fiscal compliance alone, in which case, while the benefit is split equally between CG and LG, the cost C is borne wholly by CG. Lastly, let us suppose that LG’s compliance does not produce any benefit by itself (the cost C of this fruitless effort is borne entirely by LG) and that the outcome when CG is non-compliant is D. Fig. 3 - The federal game at national level

Local Government

undisciplined undisciplined

Central Gov. disciplined

The table of outcomes for this game is shown in Fig. 3. LG’s dominant strategy is undisciplined — this situation can be interpreted as an extreme example of the incentive problem encountered in a federation in which the responsibilities for expenditure and taxation are separated. According to the arrangement of outcomes, CG may find it expedient either to comply or not to comply (the outcomes of the two equilibria resulting from CG’s choice are indicated in bold type): the general government may turn out undisciplined, or CG may ensure compliance while LG plays the free-rider. If DC) in the event of LG being undisciplined would alter the matrix, as shown in Fig. 4, making LG’s dominant strategy to co-operate and shifting the equilibrium to one of full co-operation (in bold type).

25

Fig. 4 - The effects of control over local deficits Local Government

undisciplined undisciplined

disciplined D-C

D

Central Gov.

disciplined

B/2-C

B/2-C/2

Monetary Union introduces two modifications with respect to the matrices in Fig. 3 and 4: a) the cost of fiscal co-operation increases because the definition of co-operation is narrower than that used at the national level (in terms of both sanctions and the reference period for defining co-operation); b) the pay-off of strategies change, on account of the externality generated by the choices of other member States. Let us suppose that the new cost level is K (K>C) and that the externality is such as to determine an expected increase in the outcome achieved by CG in the event of non co-operation (from D to D+E) while leaving unchanged the outcome achieved by CG in the event of co-operation”. The new game table is shown in Fig. SL Fig. 5 - The federal game at national level after EMU

(without “European” sanctions) “

Local Government

undisciplined Central Gov.

disciplined

30

Cre

In other words it is assumed that an uncooperative State will benefit from other States’ cooperation while not being penalised by their defection, whereas a co-operative State will not only benefit from other States’ co-operation but also bear the cost of other States” defection. .

26

.

In this environment the effect of national controls (the sanction H) may be cancelled by the higher cost of discipline (if K>2H, LG’s dominant strategy becomes “undisciplined””). Moreover, the combined effect of the higher cost of cooperation and of the changed outcome determined by externalities may render undisciplined the dominant strategy for CG too (if D+E>B/2-K/2). Again there are two possible equilibria (in bold type in Fig. 5): general government may turn out to be undisciplined (a situation consistent with that described in Fig. 1 in Section 3.1 above), or CG may ensure overall discipline while LG free-rides. The sanctions envisaged in the Pact can be explained as a means of preventing some States (those where the equilibrium of the federal game at national level implies non co-operation) from free-riding at the expense of others. If sanctions are borne only by CG, the prevention of free-riding at EU level will not solve the problem at national level: a review of national controls is also needed (sanction H). This outcome is shown in Fig. 6, in which the sanction introduced in the Pact (S,

S>D+E+K-B/2) affects only the outcome that can be achieved by CG, which is obliged to allow LG to free-ride in order to ensure overall co-operation. Fig. 6 - The federal game at national level after EMU (with “European” sanctions)

Local Government

undisciplined

undisciplined Central Gov. disciplined

To

conclude,

the

Pact

increases

the

need

for

mechanisms

to

control

decentralised governments. If the constraints are not tightened the CG must offset LG’s behaviour. inadequate:

Two

considerations,

in particular, could render national rules

a) European regulations are generally speaking more restrictive than those adopted at national level; the resulting higher costs of co-operation could lead to national penalty systems becoming inadequate and to a conflict between the constraints on national public finances at the European level and the flexibility allowed to decentralised institutions at the national level. For example, the level of local government investment prior to the Pact in countries applying the golden rule may determine excessive deficits; b) the allocation of responsibility for compliance with EMU fiscal rules among central and local governments and of the possible costs incurred because of non compliance is asymmetrical; in the absence of adequate national rules, local

21

governments that are able to contract debts could act as free-riders on the back of the central government.

3.3 Possible solutions

In principle three strategies appear possible: the duplication of European rules at the national

level; the amendment

of existing

legislative

frameworks;

the

introduction of a market for “deficit permits”. Extending the Stability and Growth Pact to the national level - This solution poses several problems: a) if the bodies to be disciplined are too small in economic terms, it could be difficult to measure GDP and in any case the meaningfulness of available data (in regard to mobility of factors of production, for example) would be affected; b) the high number of bodies involved could make monitoring particularly costly. The evaluations needed for the cyclical adjustment of budgetary data could be especially problematic, as could those necessary for a case-by-case examination of “exceptional” circumstances to justify excessive deficits; c) the financing of local investment expenditure through local taxation could pose particular problems, especially where unusually costly projects could lead to expenditure peaks. The extension of European rules to the larger decentralised governments only (i.e. in Italy, the Regions) could be a solution provided smaller decentralised governments have only limited autonomy; otherwise the cost of adjustment would

merely be shifted from the central government to the larger local governments. Adapting existing regulations at the national level - This approach cannot take the form of an introduction of administrative controls on the indebtedness of decentralised governments. As stated earlier, this solution would be in clear conflict

with the spirit of a federal set-up. Amendments would have to be aimed at allowing recourse to debt financing for both structural reasons (e.g. public-sector investment) and cyclical reasons (e.g. the absorption of cyclical effects on the budget). Control systems in place in some States address these two aspects by setting flexible ceilings to the deficit: on the one hand the ceilings exclude capital expenditure (the golden rule); on the other hand they are applied only on an ex ante basis and if the deficit overshoots the ceiling the overshoot can be compensated in subsequent financial years: in some cases (e.g. some American States) the deficit overshoot must be financed through recourse to specially constituted “rainy day funds”, without recourse to the market*!.

3! See McGranahan (1999) for the US experience. 28

In the new scenario created by European regulations, these solutions appear most easily adaptable to structural aspects, in other words the financing of investment, while the cyclical aspect appears more complex. In both cases credible sanctions would have to be established to deal with non-compliance. With regard to the structural aspect, adoption of the golden rule would have to be flanked by an overall ceiling on investment expenditure by local governments. When setting this limit, the need for the overall cyclically adjusted general government budget to be in balance or close to it would have to be taken into account: any deficits allowed to decentralised units would have to be compensated by a general government surplus with a generous enough margin to allow for the counter-cyclical measures. Moreover, rules would have to be drawn up to define the criteria for allocating among decentralised bodies the overall deficit allowed for investment programmes. To this end, given the difficulties of defining an adequate reference parameter (population, amount of infrastructure, overall receipts, etc.) a co-operative approach could be contemplated. By involving decentralised governments in the process of defining overall budgetary targets, they would acquire greater responsibility for behaving consistently with the pursuit of the targets set and reaching agreement on the allocation of resources. The peer-pressure incentive for compliance generated in a co-operative framework could be strengthened by allocating any sanctions handed down by the EU among those agencies responsible for overshooting. With regard to the absorption of cyclical effects on the budget, the application of ceilings that are valid only ex ante is clearly in contrast with European legislation, which as we have seen is based on ex post limits. On the other hand, the introduction of strict budgetary constraints that are valid ex post is problematic, since it would distort the allocation of resources (to the detriment of the more flexible expenses) and force decentralised units to adopt pro-cyclical policies. The establishment of rainy day funds could be a solution, though it would imply a review of the ESA accounting rules for calculating budgetary indicators. Under current rules transfers of resources to such funds are not included among the disbursements that comprise net indebtedness, nor is the use of such resources included among receipts; in neither case do movements of money through these funds alter the size of the deficit. The accumulation and use of these funds would have to be entered respectively under expenditure and receipts in the General government account; only in this way would their use avoid overshooting the 3% threshold”.

A market in deficit permits - The thesis that the problems of externalities might be solved by creating appropriate ownership rights and allowing free trade in them

32 These operations would nevertheless have to be excluded when evaluating cyclically adjusted budgetary positions. 29

was first put forward by Coase (1960). Casella (1999) suggested taking this approach to the question of fiscal discipline within the EMU. Comparing the negative externality produced by members running excessive deficits to that of pollution, this article suggested using the machinery developed in environmental economics”. With reference to the Italian domestic stability pact (Section 4), the Commissione Tecnica per la Spesa Pubblica (an experts’ committee on public expenditure) raised the possibility of introducing a system of deficit permits for local and regional governments in its 1998 paper. Once the overall ceiling’ on permits and their initial allotment is set, market incentives would produce, through free trade, the most efficient allocation in relation to the financial needs of the various governments in any given year. The total volume of permits issued could be related to the national economic cycle, so as to allow both a “structural” margin for investment and a variable margin to absorb the cyclical impact on the budget. Deficits above the amount fundable by the permits would result in a cut in the permits assigned the following year. The financial market could also be involved in the discipline by prohibiting borrowing or bond issues lacking debt permit coverage. The system described is subject to three main difficulties. First, efficacy requires that the deficits of the various governments generate the same externality and are thus perfect substitutes. But the risk of triggering a financial crisis is not uniform across governments. If this risk were the function of a single variable, e.g. the level of debt, then one would merely have to make the value of the deficit permits of the governments inversely proportional to their stock of debt. However, the risk depends on a number of factors”, and determining the value of the permits held by each government is complicated. Second, the efficiency of the market in permits depends on how competitive it is. This makes the mechanism ill-suited to situations in which the number of governments is small (within the EMU there wquld be just eleven players, and vastly different in size at that) *. Finally, there is no easy solution to the problem of determining the initial allotment of permits. The possible criteria (GDP, population, etc.) would produce greatly differing allocations. If the demand for permits exceeded the supply, then

*> Creating a market in pollution permits was first suggested by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968). This original contribution generated a vast literature; for a discussion of the benefits and limitations of the approach see Baumol and Oates (1988). The ceiling is needed to prevent the sort of problems cited in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 in relation to the possibility that financial markets can prevent excessive build-up of debt. For instance, the degree of exposure of the banking system, the degree of international openness, and so on. See among others Eichengreen and Portes (1986), Kharas (1984), Hernandez-Trillo (1995), Cantor and Packer (1996). The problem could be attenuated by a continuous double auction market (a system used in many financial markets); see Friedman and Rust (1993).

30

the countries with an allotment greater than their requirement would enjoy positional rents. The first two objections appear more cogent for a permit market among member States at EMU level than for one among local governments within each country. Presumably the risk connected with each entity’s deficit is more uniform within than between countries: the size of the governments is smaller, and in many cases they have only recently acquired the power to issue their own debt. The number of market operators would be vastly greater. Of course, so extensive a market could entail higher administrative costs. The third difficulty, which is strictly political, would be encountered at the national

level

as

well.

It would

be compounded,

at least initially, by local

governments’ problems in adapting to the new machinery for the allotment of resources. Apart from these difficulties, the permit system seems better suited to financing investments than to buffering the budgetary effects of the business cycle. In the investment area, trading in permits could certainly contribute to greater efficiency in resource allocation. The financial needs connected with investment projects could be planned, and the realisation of works modulated, as a function of available resources. As to the cyclical effects, however, the initial allotment would necessarily be based on forecasts of national economic developments; the emergence of a discrepancy in the course of the year could result in over demand for permits, which would penalise the governments of areas where cyclical performance was especially poor. An overview - Each of the three solutions has drawbacks. Replicating the Stability Pact at national level is impeded by lack of the necessary data. Leaving room to buffer cyclical effects on local government budgets without compensating action by the central government (which would give local governments an incentive for opportunistic behaviour) requires solutions that are inconsistent with the ESA95 accounting rules. The formation of a deficit permit market faces the difficulty of finding an equitable criterion for the initial allotment of permits and that of the dubious ability of local governments to adapt to the new context.

In light of these problems, a combination of actions could usefully be evaluated. a) A domestic stability pact would appear to be feasible for the larger local government bodies (in Italy, the Regions), for which the problem of lack of data is solvable. b) The need to spread investment costs over a number of years could be addressed (albeit with the difficulties recalled above) by recourse to either market mechanisms or the application of rules. c) To buffer cyclical effects, the best solution appears to be the institution of reserve

funds.

As

noted,

however,

this would

European rules for national accounts.

31

require

the revision

of the

4. Italy: the domestic stability pact Some EU countries are faced with the necessity of adjusting relations between central and local government to the new European framework. Measures for budgetary co-ordination between the various levels of government are under study in Austria, Belgium and Germany. Italy has taken a first step in this direction with the domestic stability pact introduced with the 1999 budget. This action was all the more necessary as a result of the decentralisation begun in the early 1990s. Decentralisation has brought a gradual transition from “derived” regional finances, in which virtually the entire regional budget consisted of rigidly earmarked central government transfers, to fundamentally “autonomous” financing, with revenues derived from regional taxes and percentage shares in certain central government taxes and their allocation increasingly left to regional decision.

Decentralisation - The main steps in regional decentralisation have been: the attribution to the Regions of health service contributions and automobile taxes in 1992; the abolition of state transfers (except for those for the health fund, for

natural disasters and for purposes of major national interest), offset by the assignment to the Regions of a share of the excise tax on petrol and the institution of an equalisation fund (1995); the attribution to the regions of a new tax (the regional tax on productive activities, IRAP) and of a personal income tax surcharge (1997); the assignment of additional responsibilities under the “Bassanini” Law (1997-98). Finally, Law 133/1999 envisages the abolition of health fund transfers, the assignment to the Regions of new shares and surcharges in central government taxes (petrol excises, VAT, personal income tax) and the redefinition of the financing and utilisation of the equalisation fund”’. Local government autonomy has also been enhanced. The main changes have been: the institution of the municipal real estate tax (1992); the reorganisation of minor local taxes (1993); the abolition of the municipal tax on professional activities and those on municipal concessions, offset by a share in IRAP (1997); the reorganisation of the system of central government transfers (enacted in 1996, with implementation however postponed to 2000); and the institution of a municipal surcharge on personal income tax (1998).

37 The resources should come from shares in central taxes and be distributed, after a

transitional period in which allotments are to be based on past spending, according to fiscal capacity. The system of earmarking is to be phased out after a transitional period in which the Regions will be required to allocate to health an amount consistent with their per capita share in the financing of the health service established at national level.

32

The transition to more pronounced forms of decentralisation has become a major political issue. The possibility of a federal reform of the Constitution has been broached by a number of observers*. Within this general framework, before the domestic stability pact, the limits on

local authorities’ borrowing were set by a “golden rule” (borrowing to finance current expenditure was prohibited) with an indirect ceiling (debt service could not exceed 25% of own revenues). Frequently, however, there was unlimited year-end coverage of deficits (in the health and transport sectors, for instance) by the central government. The emerging trend in institutional arrangements implied: a) a comparatively high degree of decentralisation; b) high sensitivity of local government revenues to the economic cycle; c) relatively lax constraints on indebtedness. The analysis set forth earlier shows the risks that such arrangements entail for the observance of European budget rules. The domestic stability pact - The domestic stability pact is designed to involve the Regions and other local authorities in the effort to attain the objectives for general government budget under the European Stability and Growth Pact’. The domestic pact requires local bodies to reduce deficits and their stock of debt‘°. The deficit referred to (DI) is the difference between total revenues (E) net of state transfers (T) and total expenditure (S) net of investment (K) and interest payments

Mm‘:

DI=(E-T)-(S-K-I) The definition differs widely from the European definition (DE), which is simply the difference between total revenue and total expenditure: DE=E-S

38 See for example Buglione (1998), Fausto (1996), Forte and Cerioni (1996), Giarda (1996), Forum CEIS (1995). * See Ferro and Salvemini (1999). # Pica (1999) notes “the anomalous use of the word ‘pact’: the word assumes the existence of a forum in which local governments can agree (have the power to agree) on their conduct, bargaining with the central government. [Actually, however] ... state law ... constitutes [a] concrete means of coercion in the desired direction, not consent freely decided” (pp. 1-2, our translation). 4! Revenues are net of the proceeds of sales of financial assets and gross of the proceeds of sales of real estate assets. The same standard is used to calculate the deficit for European purposes. 33

The two definitions also differ in accounting rules. The domestic stability pact adopts a cash basis, while European rules, based on ESA95, refer to the accruals principle. The target for the first three years of the domestic pact, beginning in 1999, is an

annual reduction in the total deficit of local governments equal to at least 0.1% of GDP. In the absence of data on local GDP, the contribution of each district is

proportional to the level of primary current expenditure (S - K - I)”. The local governments’ accounts will be monitored in the course of the year for consistency with the annual target. However, no sanctions for non-compliance are provided. The State-Region and State-Commune conferences will decide on any corrective measures. In 1999 the only consequence of detection of a potential overshoot was the proposal to increase the size of the reduction planned for 2000. If Italy is sanctioned under the excessive deficit procedure, the fines will be

levied on the entities that failed to meet their targets, in proportion to the part of the overshoot for which they are responsible. An evaluation - The domestic stability pact is essentially a rule imposing deficit reduction on local authorities. It is based on an extended version of the “golden rule” (interest payments too are excluded from the deficit®) with an indirect ceiling (the previous law limited the deficit to a level that would produce debt service payments not exceeding 25% of own revenue“). In practice, carrying annual deficits forward appears possible. The eventual correction of yearly budget overshoots is entrusted to a co-operative mechanism (the conferences). This set of rules is marked by a series of inconsistencies and lacunae: a) while the objective is deficit reduction, each government’s contribution is correlated not with the deficit but with primary current expenditure. Thus if one region’s budget is balanced or in surplus while another’s is in deficit but the primary expenditure of the former is greater than the latter’s, it would paradoxically have to make a larger contribution to the adjustment; b) ultimately, the aim of the pact is to contain the relevant deficit for European purposes (DE). Taking a different budget variable (DI) as an intermediate ” The total correction, estimated at about 2.2 trillion lire, was divided among levels of

government in proportion to total expenditure (S). The resulting targets for the individual categories of government were translated into specific objectives for each entity. For the Regions, the reduction was set at 1% of primary current expenditure in 1998. For municipalities and provinces it was put at the larger between 1.1% of primary current expenditure in 1998 and 3% of the current-programmes deficit for the year. The latter was calculated by each government body by augmenting the 1998 deficit by 80% of the nominal GDP growth forecast for 1999. : However, the rule restricting market borrowing to cover only investment spending remains; consistency between the two rules would have to be ensured by state transfers. Another limit is implied by the need to reduce the stock of debt. But no sanctions are provided if the debt increases. Moreover, the relevant definition of debt is not sufficiently well defined, increasing the scope for “creative accounting”.

34

objective makes it impossible to estimate the implications of local government targets for observance of the European rules. Specifically, it could be that the difference between the two balances (K + I - T) records an increase that more than offsets the reduction in the pact’s reference balance (DI); c) usually the golden rule excludes only investment spending from the reference deficit. Interest expenditure always forms part of the balance, the aim being to amortise the cost of public works over a number of years and thus share the burden among the generations that enjoy the benefits; d) though the pact sets the objective of reducing local government debt, it introduces no machinery to assure its attainment. Reduction of the pact’s reference deficit (which excludes major budget items, including interest expenditure) does not actually guarantee that net new borrowing will diminish. Furthermore, the debt ceiling imposed by the previous legislation based on the ratio between debt service and own revenue seems a weak instrument given increasing local taxation powers and relatively low interest rates; e) the pact divides a possible European sanction among the various government authorities in proportion to the share of the overshoot for which each is responsible. This formulation does strengthen the incentive for deficit reduction, but it also has certain undesirable characteristics. It would be better

to impose sanctions for failure to achieve the deficit objective even if Italy were not fined at the European level. Apart from the fact that such conduct constitutes free-riding, failure to punish it could narrow the scope for national counter-cyclical measures within the 3% ceiling. Moreover, if the overshoot is confined to a small number of governments, the size of the fine could be too large for credibility. Certain features of the pact, moreover, appear ill-suited to strengthen Italian discipline consistently with the observance of European rules: a) even if recouped in the years following, any local government budget overshoots must be made good immediately by the central government; b) the problem of cyclical effects on local budgets is not dealt with (at a time when the devolution of tax base makes local government budgets more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions).

5. Conclusion

Our analysis underscores the problems inherent in the combination of increasing fiscal decentralisation within the EU member States with rules set at European level to guarantee sound public finances at national level and leave scope for counter-cyclical policy measures. Specifically, we highlight the difficulty of reconciling full achievement of the allocative advantages of fiscal decentralisation with full exploitation of the scope

35

for counter-cyclical policy action offered by compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. We have noted: a) the reduced flexibility of the European approach compared with solutions adopted in federally structured States; b) the asymmetry between the responsibilities laid on national and local governments by European rules (compliance with the rules depends on the conduct of all levels of government, but de facto it is the central government that is answerable to the EU and that must pay the price of non-compliance); c) the consequent need for stricter controls over local governments to prevent free-riding; d) the difficulty of finding fully satisfactory solutions. Devising appropriate solutions is hard for a number of reasons: a) the mechanical extension of the Stability and Growth Pact is feasible only for the larger local bodies; b) allowing local bodies to amortise investment expenditure over a number of years entails significant problems, whether market mechanisms or predetermined rules are used; c) the best way of buffering the effect of the economic cycle on local government budgets, i.e. the use of a reserve fund, requires revision of the EU’s rules for national accounts. In the course of the 1990s, Italian institutional arrangements moved to a relatively high degree of decentralisation, marked cyclical sensitivity of local government revenues and lax constraints on indebtedness. This set of arrangements could impede compliance with European budgetary rules. The domestic stability pact is a first step towards a solution. Essentially, it is a rule requiring local governments to reduce their deficits. Our examination has revealed a number of problems that require some fine-tuning of the mechanism: a) while the objective is deficit reduction, individual contributions are not correlated with that variable but with primary current expenditure; b) the adoption of a different budget variable as an intermediate objective precludes prior estimation of the implications of local government targets for the observance of European rules; c) the pact has an anomalous golden rule that excludes interest spending from the reference deficit;

d) while setting the objective of reducing local government debt, the pact introduces no machinery to assure its attainment; e) a local authority’s failure to achieve its objective is punished only if Italy is subjected to a European sanction, which could narrow the scope for countercyclical measures within the 3% ceiling; f) local government budget overshoots, even if recouped in subsequent years, must be made good by the central government in the year they are incurred; g) the problem of cyclical effects on local budgets is not addressed. At the time of its introduction the EU Stability and Growth Pact gave rise toa © wide debate. Many participants stressed that it provides no “reward” for countries that are “virtuous” during cyclical expansions, achieving budget balance or surplus. Bean (1989) observes that «The problem with the pact as presently framed is that it

36

is all stick and no carrot; rewarding good fiscal behaviour in booms rather than, or in addition to, punishing bad behaviour in slumps would surely make better sense» (p. 106). Paraphrasing this critique, one might say that Italy’s domestic pact as it presently stands is “neither stick nor carrot”.

References Ahmad E., Hewitt D. and Ruggiero E. (1997), “Assigning Expenditure Responsibilities”, in Ter-Minassian, (ed.) (1997). Allsopp C. and Vines D. (1996), “Fiscal Policy in EMU”, National Institute Economic Review, 4, pp. 91-107.

Arrow K. J. (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York. Artis, M. J. and Winkler, B. (1997), “The Stability Pact: safeguarding the credibility of the European Central Bank”, CEPR Discussion Paper, 1688, August. Artis, M. J. and Winkler, B. (1998), “The Stability Pact: Trading-off Flexibility for Credibility?”, in A. H. Hallett, Hutchinson M. and Hougaard Jensen S. (eds.), Fiscal Aspects of European Monetary integration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Balassone F. and Franco D. (1998), “Investimenti pubblici e patto di stabilita e crescita: é opportuno introdurre la Golden Rule?”, Politica Economica, XIV, 3, pp. 345-376. Balassone F. and Franco D. (2000), “Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the Golden Rule”, Fiscal Studies, forthcoming. Balassone F. and Monacelli D. (2000), “EMU fiscal rules: is there a gap?”, Temi di Discussione, forthcoming. Banca d’Italia (1999), Indicators of structural budget balances, Rome. Baumol W. J. and. Oates W. E (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge University Press. Brosio G. (1996), “Federalismo politico e federalismo fiscale”, in Giardina E., Osculati F. and Rey M. (eds.), Federalismo, Franco Angeli, Milan. Buchanan J. (1965), “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, Economica, February. Buchanan J. (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, Chapel Hill, University of Carolina Press. Buglione E. (1998), “Istituzioni e autonomia finanziaria in Italia”, in Buglione E. and Patrizii V. (eds.), Governo e governi, Giuffré Editore, Milan. Buti M., Franco D. and Ongena H. (1997), “Budgetary policies during recessions -

Retrospective application of the Stability and Growth Pact to the post-war period”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 63, 4, pp. 321-366. Buti M., Franco D. and Ongena H. (1998), “Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14, 3, pp. 81-97. Cantor R. and Packer F. (1996), “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. Canzoneri M. and Diba B. (1991), “Fiscal Deficits, Financial Integration and a Central Bank

for Europe”, Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, pp. 381-403. Casella A. (1999), “Tradable deficit permits: efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union”, Economic Inquiry.

37

Coase R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Costs”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp 1-

44. Commissione Europea (1997), “Economic policy in EMU”, Economic Papers, n. 124-125. Commissione Tecnica per la Spesa Pubblica (1998), Razionalizzazione e semplificazione dei documenti e delle procedure contabili, Documento n. 3, ottobre.

Cornes R. and Sandler T. (1995), The theory of externalities, Public Goods, and Club goods, Cambridge University Press. Crocker T. D., (1966), “The structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems”, in The Economics of Air Pollution. Cullis J. and Jones P. (1992), Public Finance and Public Choice analytical perspectives, Mc Graw-Hill, London. Dales J. (1968), Pollution, Property and Prices, Toronto University Press. Eichengreen B. and Portes R. (1986), “Debt and Default in the 1930s: Causes and Consequences”, European Economic Review. Eichengreen B. and Wyplosz C. (1998), “Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?”, Economic Policy, April, pp. 67-104. Fausto D. (1996), “Il federalismo fiscale: un falso rimedio nel caso italiano”, Economia

delle Scelte Pubbliche, n. 2-3, pp. 175-196. Fausto D. (1999), Note sulla teoria economica del federalismo fiscale, mimeo. Ferro P. and Salvemini G. (2000), “La riforma della pubblica amministrazione e la rilevazione di informazioni per il rispetto dei vincoli del patto di stabilità interno”, Queste Istituzioni, forthcoming. Flandreau M., Le Cacheux J. and Zumer F. (1998), “Stability without a Pact? Lessons from the European Gold standard, 1880-1914”, Economic Policy. Forte F. and Cerioni E. (1996), “Proposte teoriche ed operative per il federalismo fiscale in Italia”, in Giardina E., Osculati F. and Rey M. (eds.), Federalismo, Franco Angeli, Milan. Forum CEIS (1995), Federalismo, fisco e governo dell’economia, Perugia. Friedman D. and Rust J. (eds.) (1993), The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, Addison-Wesley, New York. Giarda P. (1996), “Alcune proprietà di un sistema di federalismo fiscale”, in Giardina E., Osculati F. and Rey M. (eds.), Federalismo, Franco Angeli, Milan. Hernandez-Trillo F. (1995), “A Model-Based Estimation of the Probability of Default in Sovereign Credit Markets”, Journal of Development Economics. Kharas H. (1984), “The Long-run Creditworthness of Developing Countries: Theory and Practice”, Quarterly Journal of Economics. King patent Fiscal Tiers: the Economics of Multi-level Government, Allen&Unwin, London. Lane T. (1993), “Market Discipline”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 40, March, pp. 53-88. Mc Granahan L. (1999), State budgets and the business cycle: Implications for the federal balanced budget amendment debate, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, mimeo. Musgrave R. A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy, Mc Graw-Hill, New York. Musgrave R. A. and Musgrave P. B. (1984), Public Finance in Theory and Practice, Mc Graw-Hill, New York. Norregaard J. (1997), “Tax Assignment”, in Ter-Minassian, eds., (1997). Oates W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. Oates W. (1979), “Lump-sum Intergovernmental Grants Have Price Effects”; “in ~ Mieszkowski P. and Oakland W. H. (eds.), Fiscal Federalism and Grants in Aid, Coupe Papers in Public Economics, Urban Institute, Washington DC. dei M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press

A.

|

38

Patrizii V. (1998), “Rappresentanza ed efficienza in un sistema di governo a più livelli”, in Buglione E. and Patrizii V. (eds.), Governo e governi, Giuffré Editore, Milan.

Pica F. (1999), Fatti ed opinioni in materia di “federalismo fiscale” italiano, mimeo. Smith S. (1996), “European Integration and Local Government Finance”, in Pola G., France

G. and Levaggi R. (eds.), Developments in Local Government Finance, Edward Elgar. Ter-Minassian T. (ed.) (1997), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, IMF -— Washington. Ter-Minassian T. and Craig J. (1997), “Control of Sub-national Government Borrowing”, in Ter-Minassian (1997). Tiebout C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, October. Weingast B. R., Shepsle K. A. and Johnsen C. (1981), “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: a Neo-classical Approach to Distribution Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 4, pp. 642-664. Wildasin D. E. (ed.) (1997), Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations, Cambridge University Press.

39

IS THERE A NEED FOR A EUROPEAN COORDINATION OF NATIONAL WELFARE SYSTEMS? A PRELIMINARY SURVEY Luca BELTRAMETTI University of Genoa, Italy

1. Introduction

Europe is the area in which welfare systems have reached the greatest size and are performing the widest range of tasks. Yet national social policies exhibit important and long lasting differences. Demographic and socioeconomic factors often determine a mismatch between the tasks that welfare systems are able to perform and the actual needs of the European societies. In particular, the aging of population and the transition towards a post-industrial and knowledge-based economy set similar challenges to many European countries. In principle however, the very fact that domestic welfare systems largely face the same difficulties and will probably move in the same direction does not imply the call for a coordination of policies at the EU level. The simple desire to harmonize the final outcomes in terms of social protection by itself does not imply either coordination or the use of the same policy instruments: if different countries exhibit different initial conditions, harmonization

of outcomes will require country specific policies; harmonization of policies is likely to yield increasingly differentiated outcomes (Boeri, 2000a). Opponents to coordination thus point at the fact that, until a full equalization of levels of economic development has occurred, the adoption of a common welfare model would be an obstacle to, not a precondition for, convergence. This is seen (Boeri,

2000b) as a strong case for maintaining EU-level decision-making on social policy reform under unanimity rule. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the harmonization of welfare policies can be regarded as a goal by itself: Boeri notes that in some fields like active employment policies the exploration of different policy designs could be globally rational. This point of view reflects the more general problem of determining the optimal levels of exploration vs. exploitation in contexts where the uncertainty about environment characteristics and effectiveness of different policy instruments is pervasive. Of course, the harmonization of final outcomes in welfare programs would not be a desirable goal should preferences about the size and the nature of welfare programs differs across Europe. Indeed, Corneo (2000) analyzes survey data from

40

the US, West Germany and East Germany and finds that individual attitudes towards political redistribution are different in each country (area). Furthermore, Bertola et al (1999) also argue that the competition among different welfare systems can spur efficiency and stimulate domestic governments to remove obsolete rules they might have inherited from the past. From the “political” point of view it can also be noted that - unless the convergence of income and of social parameters has already occurred - a hypothetical unified European Welfare system would inevitably perform a systematic redistribution across countries. A low degree of geographic correspondence between taxpayers and recipients could dramatically reduce the political support to any welfare program. On the contrary, the call for coordination of European welfare policies crucially depends on the existence of spillover effects in these policies. The presence of important externalities of the national social policies on the others’ welfare could provide a case against the unanimity rule in EU-level decisions. Actually, the most impressive results in policy coordination have occurred in fields where spillovers are extremely strong: barriers to trade, factor mobility, exchange rates... These phenomena have up to now affect welfare issues only indirectly. There is an increasing interest in asking whether a process of gradual convergence of national welfare systems towards a common European model will occur: for instance the document of the Portuguese Presidency (2000a, p. 13) for the recent Lisbon Summit of the European Council states that «a process of cooperation is beginning with a view to the modernization of social protection policies, with due regard for national differences»; the Portuguese Presidency (2000b, p. 9) conclusions argue that «... policies for combating social exclusion should be based on an open method of coordination...». Indeed, since risks are better pooled at larger scales, it should be more efficient

to implement social insurance policies at the EU scale; on the other hand economic integration may reduce the need for social protection if local shocks are better buffered by more extensive market interactions (Bertola et al., 1999); furthermore, “developments in financial markets can reduce the need to provide social insurance within each country’s borders at the same time as they make it possible for domestic residents to diversify away local sources of risk” (ibidem, p. 60-61). The paper will offer a quick review of the main arguments that are being put forward in this debate and is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the indirect effects on welfare policies that were determined by the monetary unification process that culminated in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact; we also discuss the limitations that this process set to future welfare

reform. Section 3 analyses the main spillover effects associated with current welfare policies and briefly discusses the need for a coordination process directly affecting welfare policies.

4]

2. The “Maastricht approach” Both the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact emphasize the negative spillovers that too generous welfare programs could determine through excessive borrowing requirements by the national governments. Indeed, the attempt to meet the Maastricht criteria has forced many countries to reform their welfare programs (mainly unbalanced pension systems) in order to curb public expenditure. Limits on fiscal deficits prevented negative spillovers via interest rates (high public demand for capital). It is often argued that this process may have led to a “race to the bottom” in cutting social expenditure: if we admit that there is a socially optimal level of social protection and that low levels of social protection can create a favorable climate for foreign investments and growth, then competition among countries on the ground of welfare policies can lead to forms of “social dumping” implying a general welfare loss. Data seem to reject this hypothesis: the social expenditure as a percentage of GNP has increased in the period 1980-1996 in all the 9 European countries for which comparable data are available but Ireland and Luxembourg'; the average value increased from 23.8% in 1980 to 26.4% in 1996 (our elaboration on Eurostat,

1999, table C1.4, p. 67). If we consider the period 1990-1996 the average social expenditure as a percentage of GNP for the 11 countries of the Euro area’ increased from 24.4% to 27.4%; most noticeable, this figure has increased in all countries but Ireland (a modest reduction from 18.2% to 18.1%) and the Netherlands (from the record high 31% to 29.4%) (Ibidem). It should also be noticed that in the period

1990-1996 the average EU-11 figure increased as a percentage of GNP for every single component of social expenditure’. Boeri (2000a,b) too finds that there is no uniform across-the-board tendency towards reducing social welfare provision across Europe and points at three trends: i) a reduction of the system of job-guarantees offered to employees; ii) a reduction in generosity of public pension schemes; iii) an increase in generosity of social assistance. In sum, the fiscal constraints set by the monetary union process did not imply an overall sacrifice in social expenditure but probably determined a significant incentive to rationalize such expenditure.

' These 9 countries are the following: Belgium, Denmark, (West) Germany, Spain, Ireland,

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria. 2 Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,

Portugal and Finland. ; pa care, disability, old age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion.

42

2.1 À false argument One could ask which the implications of this “Maastricht process” on future reforms of welfare programs are. As is well known, whenever a Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension scheme is scaled down (the contribution rate is reduced for workers while current pension benefits are paid and accrued to date pension rights are recognized) the scheme incurs a transition period in which it runs significant deficits. Of course the size of these deficits depends upon the maturity of the scheme and the size of contributions’ reduction‘. In other terms, these deficits are associated with part of the implicit “pension debt” being paid back (part of the implicit pension liabilities

becomes explicit).

.

It has therefore been argued (see e.g. Bertola et al., 1999, p. 70 and Boldrin et al., 1999 p. 4) that the constraints on fiscal deficit set by the Stability and Growth Pact could be relaxed as far as such deficits are the direct consequence of a (partial) transition from PAYG to funding. This could allow to implement a smoother transition. More broadly, this type of argument can be stated as follows: a) we could have an efficiency gain from a (partial) transition out of PAYG towards funding; b) the public debt is equivalent to unfunded pension liabilities; c) a+b imply that if we finance such a transition by issuing new public debt, then we can obtain efficiency gains without any substantial change in the stance of fiscal policy;

d) the Maastricht and Stability and Growth parameters thus provide an undesirable obstacle preventing efficiency improving reforms. This ultimately derives from an inappropriate exclusion of unfunded pension liabilities from public liabilities; e) it could therefore be wise to allow countries to exceed their deficit/GNP constraint provided that the excess deficit arises from “virtuous” policies of transition from PAYG towards full funding. Indeed, the European “Stability Pact” sets rules that refer to the concepts of fiscal deficit and (explicit) public debt and do not consider any measure of the public sector “net worth”. It is therefore self-evident that the (even partial) transition from PAYG to funding is very unlikely under the fiscal targets that are currently set by the Stability Pact. On the contrary, policies of this kind could be implemented within a European coordination of pension policies (see Section 3); such a process would probably imply a change in the current views about indicators of fiscal stance. 4 For instance, Castellino and Fornero (1997) refer to Italy and imagine to reduce the

compulsory contribution rate for new entrants in the labor market from the current 32% to 25%; they estimate that such a step would generate a 2% of GNP increase in public deficit within 40 years.

43

Opposition to this type of reasoning usually rests upon the idea that such a transition does not necessarily deliver efficiency gains from the macroeconomic point of view: proposition “a” is said to be false. The discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper (for a critical review, see Beltrametti, 2000).

However, I believe that - no matter whether proposition “a” is true or false the reasoning does not work because proposition ”b” is false (Beltrametti, 1996a, b). The supposedly too narrow definition of public debt’ is indeed consistent with the stated goals of the Stability and Growth Pact. The main analogy between the unfunded pension liabilities associated with the operating of a public, PAYG, pension scheme and the public debt refers to the fact that in both cases we have a promise to pay in the future made by the State; such promise predetermines the allocation of (part of) the future income. Both concepts are associated with inter and intra generational redistribution of resources. However, there are substantial differences between the two concepts. From the economic point of view’, all the differences can be traced back to the fact that the pension debt is not tradable and its “subscription” is compulsory. The fact that the market price for these “assets” is missing implies measurability problems for both economists and agents themselves’. The compulsory participation to a PAYG and the non-market ability of pension assets jointly imply that the management of pension liabilities is much easier than the one of the public debt. It is so under at least three points of view: i) the yield of pension assets is under the control of the State while the rate of return on bonds is under the control of the market. There can not be any link between participants’ opinions about the sustainability of the pension scheme and the costs of running it. The impossibility of arbitrage implies that the State can offer different rates of return to different groups of agents; there is also the possibility for the State to selectively repudiate the outstanding liabilities (see Bohn, 1992, p. 45); P ii) all the holders of pension assets are domestic residents and there can not be interest rate shocks from abroad;

iii) the State can predetermine the future allocation of pension assets thus preventing the possibility of coalitions in favour of its repudiation. As first noted by Samuelson (1958) a PAYG pension scheme plays an economic role that exhibits important analogies with the role of fiat money. Indeed ° The pension debt is usually defined as the present value of future pension benefits less the present level of future pension contribution to be received/paid by the living generations. From the legal point of view it can be argued that different contractual forms characterize the two concepts. 7 Economists face an observability problem: they cannot use prices in order to learn about agents expectations; agents face a computability problem: prices do not convey information to them; the “as if” hypothesis becomes harder to be put forward in order to cope with the possibility that only part of the agents are fully rational and informed. This is especially true

as far as active workers are concerned; of course, in the case of retirees the observability of

the current pension benefits strongly reduces the measurability problem.

44

both money and a PAYG allow agents to transfer consumption intertemporally and both institutions work as long as each generation conforms to them on the expectation that also the following will. While both pension liabilities and fiat money rest to some extent on the State enforcing them with its power, on the contrary the public debt arises when the State decides not to use its very own power of collecting taxes and printing money. While both pension liabilities and fiat money can come into existence as a consequence of some authority’s sudden (arbitrary) decision, on the contrary the public debt grows as a stratification of deficits. In other words, while the public debt can grow only if there is a current deficit, it is not so with pension liabilities and money. In the case of both pension liabilities and fiat money there is a form of seigniorage that is exploited in some way by the State: in the case of pensions the Government gains the gratitude of the first generation of retirees (who did not pay social security taxes during their working lives); in the case of fiat money the story is well known. Finally, we note that while the dynamics of both pension liabilities and money is pro-cyclical’, on the contrary the dynamics of the public debt tends to be anti-cyclical. In sum, if we admit that public debt and pension debt are substantially different concepts, it makes sense to set different rules as far EU coordination is concerned: it seems sensible that the Stability and Growth Pact does not assimilate pension debt to public debt. We have noted that the pension debt exhibits some analogy with money: however, while the effects of a demagogic use of the power of printing money manifest in the short run, on the contrary the effects of demagogically generous pension promises occur with a much longer lag. This latter point provides an argument in favour of the separation of the political power from the responsibility of setting the rules for the pension system; in other words, one could imagine that a European, independent authority charged with the responsibility of keeping the public pension systems sustainable could improve the credibility of national schemes.

3. What next? (Looking for spillovers) 3.1 Public pensions There is a point of view that is symmetric with respect to the “Maastricht” one: if we accept the idea that PAYG pension schemes depress national saving, then national pension policies can have negative spillovers via capital formation. This logic contrasts with the Maastricht criteria approach: in this case the spillover effect attains not to the demand for but to the supply of capital (Beltrametti and Bonatti, 1997, 1999; Casarico, 1999; Pemberton, 1999). According to this point of

8 In all the definitions discussed in Beltrametti (1996b) the size of unfunded pension liabilities increases with the rate of growth of wages.

45

view the transition from PAYG towards full funding would determine positive effects on EU partners in terms of increased supply of capital. In these models the transition towards full funding generates a positive externality on other countries via the impact on world interest rates. It is therefore possible that the transition towards funding is not viable for each single country but would be convenient for all countries provided it is done in a coordinated way. Positive spillover effects of welfare policies can also arise from domestic policies aimed at increasing the level of social cohesion and the stock of human capital. Furthermore, different levels of social security contributions across European countries can distort the allocation of labor among countries and sectors’. Up to now this aspect has probably played a modest role in determining labor mobility within the EU; things may change in the future. In particular, this could be true for workers living near the national borders, for highly specialized and mobile professionals and for people working in multinational firms. Obviously, should the opt-out choice characterize high-income workers, then the redistributive capacity of pension schemes and their sustainability would be at risk. Economic integration increases opt-out opportunities for individuals: the factors that are more heavily taxed by progressive social security schemes (that is, capital and skilled labor) are also very mobile: it is therefore increasingly difficult to enforce the compulsory participation in a welfare program unless some degree of cooperation at the EU level is reached. Breyer and Kolmar (1995) show that, not surprisingly, the minimum coordination requirement for PAYG pension schemes in an integrated market (like the European Union) is highly dependent on the degree of labor mobility. Of course, a high level of social security contributions per se does not imply an incentive to opt out of a scheme: much depends on its perceived fairness and on the expected return from social security contributions relative to market alternatives. Bertola et al. (1999, p. 73) note that «the current tendency to reform pensions in the direction of actuarial fairness... favors mobility across EU countries». It should be noted however that some kind of ex post redistribution might be appreciated by participants in a pension scheme: for instance, this may be the case for departures from actuarial fairness in the direction of an insurance against the risk of failure in professional career. Finally, coordination can be displayed not only at the level of macroeconomic policies but also at the more “modest” level of administrative techniques and production of statistics: Boeri (2000a) suggests that the European Commission should impose a greater transparency in the management of social expenditure and the widest disclosure of the hypothesis made in future social expenditure forecasts;

? For instance, it is often argued that in Italy there is a movement out of dependent jobs towards self-employment that is in part determined by high contribution levels for dependent labour relative to the self-employed.

46

the Commission should also set common standards in measuring unfunded pension liabilities and in building generational account models.

3.2 Supplementary pensions The imperfect portability of pension rights among different national schemes can reduce labor mobility; this could in particular be the case of pension funds, due to different fiscal treatment and costs in transferring an individual position to a pension fund in a different EU country. Harmonization of the fiscal treatment obviously is an important condition for the full portability of pension fund vested rights and thus for pan-European pensions. Constraints on portfolio allocation of pension funds should be eliminated in order to guarantee capital mobility. Competition in the pension fund industry should be enhanced by eliminating the remaining national barriers (for a review of the implications of administration costs on pension funds performance, see Beltrametti, 2000). Economies of scale are known to be important in the pension fund industry. The European dimension of supplementary pensions is acknowledged by the European Commission who has recently made a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision. In particular, this proposal sets rules concerning cross border affiliation, information to be given to the members and beneficiaries of the scheme, disclosure of investment policy principles, information to be provided to and powers of intervention of the competent authority, investment rules’, management and custody. This proposed regulation is aimed at making pension schemes to function as efficiently as possible and to be able to benefit from the advantages of the single market and the Euro; adequate protection of members obviously remains at the center of interest. In fact, (Herbertson and Orszag, 1999), there is at present no single system of sales authorization or regulation in Europe; a number of different approaches are used to insure the solvency of pension funds.

3.3 Opting-in Very generous welfare benefits can determine opting-in phenomena: poor individuals are likely to be attracted by generous welfare systems. In general, whenever foreign workers are not excluded from the benefit of some welfare

19 In particular, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark have very stringent asset allocation rules.

47

program, the migration of workers may create difficulties. It is often verified that the social acceptance of redistributive welfare programs crucially depends on some degree of correspondence between the population paying contributions and the population receiving the benefits. Bertola et al (1999, p. 69) note that «while essentially all fiscal legislation is allocated to national authorities on a subsidiarity basis, the European Court of Justice is empowered with striking down national rules that discriminate among European citizens. Thus, not only the tax base, but also the beneficiaries of social policies are not under complete control of national policy makers». This fact can cause serious problems to any national welfare program: «ex-ante and ex-post redistribution (that) is part of the system’s design: the identity of taxpayers and recipients is a necessary element of any (national) social contract» (p. 70).

This type of problems is intrinsically linked to the problem of the financing of public services. For instance, as far as higher education and health care are subsided by local authorities domestic citizens using these services actually pay twice: once as tax payers, once as users of the particular service. On the contrary, citizens from other countries pay just once (as users). The risk of free riding is therefore real against countries/regions whose authorities have generous policies subsiding public services. It seems worth noticing that these problems can arise not only when the quality of services in one country is particularly high or when the cost of services is highly subsided but also when both the quality and the level of subsidy is similar. I refer to the possibility that means testing in the provision of such services has a different extension across countries: high-income citizens have in principle an incentive to “shop for services” where the use of means testing is moderate.

References Belen L. (1996a), // debito pensionistico in Italia, Il Mulino, collana “Studi e ricerche”,

Bologna. Beltrametti L. (1996b), “On the meaning of unfunded pension liabilities” paper presented at the VIII Meeting of the Italian Society of Public Economics held in Pavia (Italy) on October 4 and 5, 1996; appeared in Italian as: “Le passività implicite in un sistema pensionistico a ripartizione in equilibrio finanziario”, in Muraro G. and Da Empoli D. (a cura di) (1997), “Verso un nuovo stato sociale.

Tendenze e criteri”, Franco Angeli,

Milano, pp. 345-363. Beltrametti L. (2000), “Ripartizione e capitalizzazione: i termini del dibattito”, relazione per la discussione presso il Gruppo di lavoro per il mercato sociale del Cnel.

Beltrametti L. and Bonatti L. (1997),“On Pension Policies in Open Economies” Discussion Paper n. 6, Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Trento.

48

Beltrametti L. and Bonatti L. (1999), “Is the International Coordination of Pension Policies Desirable?”, revised version of the paper presented to the European Economic Association Congress, 1998, Berlin, September. Bertola G., Jimeno F., Marimon R. and Pissarides C. (1999), “Welfare Systems and Labour Markets in Europe: What Convergence before and after EMU?”, paper presented at the

Conference “Welfare and employment in United Europe”, organized by the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, 1999, Genoa, July 3% Boeri T. (2000a), Uno stato asociale, Laterza, Bari. Boeri T. (2000b), Social Europe: Dramatic Visions and Real Complexity, mimeo.

Bohn R. (1992) “Budget deficits and government accounting”, in Carnegie- Rochester Conference on Public Policy, 37, pp.1-84. Boldrin M., Dolado J., Jimeno J. and Peracchi F. (1999), “The Future of Pension Systems in Europe. A Reappraisal”, paper presented at the 20° Economic Policy Panel Meeting, Franckfurt, 1999, April. Breyer F. and Kolmar M. (1995), Does the Common Labor Market Imply the Need for a European Public Pension System?, mimeo. Casarico A. (1999), Pension Systems in Open Economy, mimeo. Castellino O. and Fornero E. (1997) “Privatizzare la previdenza modalita e limiti”, Politica economica, n. 1, pp. 3-25.

sociale?

Condizioni,

Corneo G. (2000), “Inequality and the State: Comparing US and German Preferences”, Diskussionsbeitrag n. 2006, Fachbereich Wirtschafwissenschaftent, Osnabriick European Round Table of Industrialists (2000), “European Pensions. An

Reform”, Brussels. Eurostat (1999), “Social Protection. Expenditure and oe Norway”, 1999 edition.

Universität

Appeal

for

European Union, Iceland and

Ferrera M. (1998), “The Four Social Europes: Between Universalism and Selectivity”, in Rhodes M. and Meny. Y. (eds.) (1998), The Future of European Welfare: a New Social Contract?, Macmillan, Basingstoke. Ferrera M., Hemerijck A. and Rhodes M. (2000), “The Future of Social Europe. Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy”, Report prepared for the Portuguese

Presidency of the European Europe; Summary version available at: http://www.mts.gov.pt/presidencia/c_globaliza_liv_futuro_uk.htm. Herbertson T. and Orszag M. (1999), /ssues in European Pension Reforms: Supplementary Pensions, mimeo. Pemberton J. (1999), “Social Security: National Policies with International Implications”, Economic Journal, 109, pp. 492-508. Portuguese Presidency of the European Union (2000a), Document from the Presidency, Special Meeting of the European Council “Employment, economic reforms and social cohesion — towards a Europe based on innovation and knowledge”, Lisbon, 2000, 23-24 March, available at: http://www.mts.gov.pt/presidencia/pres_uk.htm. Portuguese Presidency of the European Union (2000b), Presidency Conclusions to the Special Meeting of the European Council “Employment, economic reforms and social cohesion — towards a Europe based on innovation and knowledge”, Lisbon, 2000, 23-24 March; available at: http://www.mts.gov.pt/presidencia/conc_uk.htm

Rhodes M. and Meny Y. (eds.) (1998), The Future of European Welfare: a New Social Contract?, Macmillan, Basingstoke. Samuelson P. A. (1958), “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money”, in Journal of Political Economy, 6, pp. 467-482.

49

L’INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE ET LA PROTECTION SOCIALE: VERS QUEL TYPE DE CONVERGENCE? Valérie BERENGER Université de Nice - Sophia Antipolis, France

1. Introduction

La protection sociale obligatoire identifiée à l’Etat-Providence renvoie aux deux champs d’intervention étatique: l’assurance sociale et l’assistance sociale. Ainsi, en dépit de leur diversité, les systèmes de protection sociale européens délivrent des revenus de remplacement pour compenser la perte de revenu professionnel, des prestations de complément pour aider les ménages à faire face à certains risques sociaux et des revenus d’assistance. Ils satisfont ainsi simultanément les fonctions d’assurance, de redistribution, d’épargne obligatoire et d'indemnisation. La diversité des systèmes de protection sociale des pays membres est très frappante lorsqu’on se place dans une perspective européenne. Bien que l’on cherche traditionnellement à en opérer une typologie par référence aux modèles bismarckien des assurances sociales et beveridgien de la sécurité sociale nationale en tenant compte de la base des droits aux prestations, cette classification se révèle caduque car rigide et statique. Les systèmes de protection sociale ont dû, pour répondre à de nouveaux besoins ou combler certaines lacunes, intégrer des éléments appartenant à chacun des deux modèles. Ces évolutions ont donc accru la complexité et l’opacité des systèmes. Cette diversité explique dans une certaine mesure leur exclusion du champ de l’harmonisation. D'ailleurs, à ce titre, la position de la Commission reste quelque peu ambiguë. Le Traité de Rome ainsi que l’Acte Unique ne font pas directement allusion à la protection sociale. Ils incarnent clairement l’idée que la question sociale devrait être le résultat, la conséquence du fonctionnement du marché unique. Bien que le Traité de Maastricht ainsi que la Charte sociale des droits fondamentaux visent à introduire un volet social dans l’Europe économique, la protection sociale n’est pas directement concernée. La Commission européenne préconise certes depuis ces dernières années une convergence des objectifs des différents systèmes mais il ne s’agit là que de recommandations. Erigés dans un contexte national, les systèmes de protection sociale se sont développés dans un contexte économique et démographique favorable jusqu'aux années ‘70. Mais, depuis ils sont confrontés à de nouveaux défis liés au

50

ralentissement de la croissance, à la persistance du chômage, à la perspective du vieillissement démographique et à l’arrivée à maturité des régimes de retraites. La transformation de l’environnement économique et social a contribué à mettre en avant la contrainte financière et à poser en des termes préoccupants la question du coût de tels systèmes. Mais, ces pressions sont vraisemblablement renforcées par l’achèvement du marché et la construction de l’Union Monétaire. On peut de ce point de vue s’attendre à ce que la protection sociale de même que les politiques de réformes fiscales soient à l’avenir au centre des débats. Cet article a précisément pour objet de rendre compte des implications des mesures adoptées dans le domaine économique et monétaire sur la protection sociale. Bien que les systèmes nationaux conservent leur autonomie en matière de politique sociale, la question se pose de savoir dans quelle mesure l’autonomie et la diversité des systèmes sont compatibles avec la construction d’une zone économique et monétaire. Les mesures économiques et monétaires visant à renforcer l’intégration des économies ne conduisent-elles pas au danger de voir la protection sociale de plus en plus instrumentalisée comme un sous-ensemble de la politique budgétaire, de la politique d’emploi et des différentes tentatives d'harmonisation fiscale? L’absence de coordination dans ce domaine ne fait-elle pas courir le risque d’une harmonisation des systèmes, d’une convergence vers un type nouveau d’Etat Providence? Afin d’apporter des éléments de réponse à ces interrogations, nous choisissons dans un premier temps de développer notre argumentation en faisant abstraction de la diversité et en particulier du ‘différentiel social” existant entre les pays membres, tout au plus, nous nous contenterons d’évoquer la distinction relative au

cadre budgétaire dans lequel les systèmes fonctionnent. Cette approche nous permettra de rendre compte des liens entre le financement de la protection sociale et la politique budgétaire d’une part et l’emploi d’autre part. Il s’agira de faire un état des lieux des critiques adressées à l’encontre du financement par répartition et de ses sources de financement. Enfin, nous nous placerons d’un point de vue intra-européen et nous tiendrons compte de la diversité des systèmes pour souligner les implications de l’absence de coordination en matière fiscale et sociale sur les systèmes nationaux. Nous illustrerons chacun des points développés en tenant compte des évolutions factuelles des différents systèmes du point de vue des dépenses, de leur modalité et de leur structure de financement afin de mettre en lumière les orientations de certaines réformes mises en œuvre depuis ces dernières années.

51

2. Finances publiques et protection sociale: incidence de la discipline budgétaire imposée par Maastricht et pérennisée par le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance Dans cette section, nous proposons d’appréhender les aspects relatifs au financement de la protection sociale dans un contexte global à savoir celui de la politique budgétaire et de la dette publique. Par ce biais, nous tentons de montrer en quoi l’état des connaissances concernant le rôle et les effets de la politique budgétaire, qui influence d’ailleurs les orientations données à la politique économique, ne sont pas sans incidence sur le diagnostic des difficultés auxquelles sont confrontés les systèmes de protection sociale ainsi que sur la nature des réformes qui peuvent en découler. En d’autres termes, il s’agit d’insérer les critiques adressées à l’encontre des systèmes financés selon le principe de la répartition au sein même des débats relatifs à la politique budgétaire afin de souligner le rôle joué par le financement de la protection sociale comme instrument proche ou substituable des instruments de financement de la politique budgétaire. Nous pouvons ainsi identifier deux grandes périodes: la première couvre la phase d’instauration des systèmes jusqu'aux années ‘80 qui, d’ailleurs, représentent un moment clé pour les gouvernements des pays européens. La seconde période se caractérise par la montée en force des contraintes budgétaires et par la remise en cause de l’efficacité de la protection sociale.

2.1 Une articulation cohérente entre l’économique et le social’ Instaurés dans la période qui a suivi la seconde guerre mondiale, les systémes de protection sociale se sont développés dans un contexte économique et démographique particulièrement favorable. Quelle que soit la logique a laquelle ils se rattachent, ils ont participé à la croissance économique et cette dernière a permis de les financer. Ainsi, la croissance des revenus réels au cours des années ‘50 et

‘60 et le nombre accru des cotisants ont procuré, dans le cadre des régimes par répartition, des recettes permettant d'étendre la couverture à de nouveaux risques à de nouvelles catégories de population, d'améliorer le niveau des prestations par des mesures de revalorisation et d’indexation favorables. Mais, l’instauration et l'extension des systèmes se sont produites dans un contexte dans lequel les finances publiques connurent, d’un point de vue aussi bien académique que pratique, des bouleversements profonds qui furent impulsés par la publication de la Théorie Générale de J. M. Keynes. Une approche fonctionnelle des finances publiques prend le relais des principes classiques et reconnaît alors -

! Titre inspiré de N. Richez-Battesti (1998), La Sécurité Sociale, A. Colin. p. 10

52

ouvertement les fonctions de stabilisation et de redistribution de la politique budgétaire. Les idées keynésiennes vont servir à justifier les mesures de redistribution des revenus et l’existence même des systèmes de sécurité sociale’. Au cours de cette période, le financement de la protection sociale était perçu sous l’angle de ses avantages et non de ses coûts induits qu'ils soient directs ou indirects. Les principales préoccupations concernaient la définition du cadre budgétaire’ dans lequel les systèmes de protection sociale pourraient fonctionner. L’objectif recherché était au contraire de compléter les lacunes des systèmes d’assurance sociale ou de sécurité sociale universelle en intégrant des prestations universelles pour les premiers et des prestations liées aux gains antérieurs pour les seconds. Dans les pays de tradition anglo-saxonne, l’incapacité de remédier à la pauvreté a nécessité la création de prestations spéciales destinées à certaines populations cibles. De même, des régimes complémentaires de retraite versant des prestations proportionnelles aux revenus ont été introduits pour compenser le faible niveau des pensions de vieillesse uniformes du régime national de retraite. Enfin, les systèmes qui se sont développés sur une base professionnelle ont été complétés par l'instauration d’allocations permettant d’assurer une protection minimale a l’ensemble des citoyens. Ces deux modèles se sont ainsi mutuellement influencés au profit de modèles hybrides. Dans ce contexte, la protection sociale a pu être utilisée comme instrument de relance de la demande, l’efficacité étant assurée ici par le jeu du multiplicateur. Or, cet effet est d’autant plus fort que la redistribution des revenus est effectuée en faveur des catégories sociales les plus défavorisées en raison de leur forte propension à consommer au regard des catégories disposant de revenus plus élevés. En pratiquant via le système de protection sociale une redistribution verticale des ressources, les pouvoirs publics peuvent élever la propension moyenne à consommer de la collectivité. Ils peuvent ainsi exercer une action favorable sur la demande, l’activité et l’emploi. La redistribution horizontale ou intergénérationnelle, rendue possible par le principe de financement par répartition, répond aux mêmes objectifs dans la mesure où ce dernier procède à des transferts

? L'influence des thèses keynésiennes apparaît clairement dans son ouvrage, Full Employment in a Free Society, (1944) et dans le rapport de W. Beveridge (1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services, qui a servi de base à l’élaboration du système de Sécurité Sociale. Pour W. Beveridge, ce système allait de pair avec une politique de plein-emploi. Cité par P. Rosanvallon (1992), La crise de l'Etat Providence, Seuil. > Les débats aux Etats Unis qui ont justifié le choix du financement de l’assurance sociale selon le principe de la répartition et par des prélèvements à affectations spéciales sont l'illustration même de la tentative d’établir un compromis entre les finances classiques et les finances keynésiennes. Ainsi, pour les partisans des thèses keynésiennes, la répartition pourrait jouer un rôle dans l’atteinte des objectifs de la politique conjoncturelle. Pour les défenseurs du modèle des finances saines, la répartition représentait un moyen de limiter les coûts inscrits au budget de l’Etat au titre des dépenses sociales et de préserver ainsi le dogme de l’équilibre budgétaire.

53

entre groupes d'individus: actifs et inactifs se caractérisant par des propensions à consommer respectivement plus faible et plus élevée. L’élargissement des régimes publics de retraite atténue ainsi les risques d’une épargne excédentaire et d’une insuffisance de la demande globale. Ces transferts sont d’ailleurs particulièrement importants lors de l’instauration des régimes par répartition. La protection sociale peut aussi avoir un impact plus structurel. Le versement des cotisations permet dans le cadre des régimes d’assurance sociale l’octroi de droits à prestations. Les cotisations représentent un salaire indirect ou différé qui a modifié profondément la structure du revenu disponible des ménages. En outre, la généralisation de la couverture aux différentes couches de la population a eu une incidence sur la répartition primaire des revenus en permettant un partage des surplus liés à la croissance économique et aux gains de productivité. Au cours de cette période, l’idée qui prévalait était que les progrès sociaux étaient conditionnés par la croissance et que les premiers favorisaient cette dernière. La protection sociale peut en outre jouer un rôle contra-cyclique et participer à la régulation conjoncturelle car les recettes et les dépenses évoluent selon des dynamiques indépendantes. Les recettes sont fortement sensibles à la situation conjoncturelle‘; leur niveau dépend du taux de croissance économique, démographique et du niveau de l’emploi. Les prestations offrent en revanche un comportement relativement plus inerte à la conjoncture, elles dépendent de facteurs plus structurels tels que les règles de calculs et d’indexation choisies. Elles subissent également l’incidence de facteurs exogènes qui jouent plutôt dans le sens de la hausse que de la modération: le vieillissement démographique, l’arrivée à maturité des régimes de retraites, la montée et la persistance du chômage qui accroissent les besoins de transferts et accentuent le ralentissement des ressources. Les dépenses sociales ont ainsi tendance à augmenter même lorsque les recettes stagnent, elles peuvent ainsi agir sur la stabilisation de la demande sans qu'aucune intervention discrétionnaire des pouvoirs publics ne soit nécessaire. Mais, le principe par répartition qui dicte l'équilibre financier entrave l’alternance de déficits en période de récession et d’excédents en période d’expansion nécessaire pour assurer l'efficacité de l’effet stabilisation. Dans le même temps, les évolutions divergentes entre les recettes et les dépenses rendent difficile le respect de la contrainte financière. De ce fait, le déficit a tendance à être chronique et à s’autogénérer. Il peut en résulter un endettement structurel nécessitant des ajustements tant sur les recettes que sur les dépenses ou, à titre exceptionnel, le recours à l'emprunt. Jusqu'au premier choc pétrolier, la rapidité de la croissance avait permis l’équilibrage des recettes et des dépenses. Mais depuis, l’équilibre ne se réalise plus spontanément de sorte que des mesures de rééquilibrages ont été nécessaires pour éviter que les déficits potentiels ne se transforment en déficits excessifs. Jusque dans les années ‘80, les ajustements ont principalement pris la forme 4

: D x . Ce qui . est particulièrement le cas pour les systèmes d’assurance sociale.

54

d'augmentation des cotisations ce qui a contribué à alourdir la pression fiscale et sans doute à l’endettement de l’Etat.

2.2 Les nouvelles orientations de la politique économique: implications de la construction de l’Union économique et monétaire

les

A partir du milieu des années ‘80, les déficits des comptes sociaux ont pris une dimension plus structurelle. A partir de cette date, la volonté de construire progressivement l’Union Economique et Monétaire impose un type nouveau de “policy mix” qui, d’ailleurs, contribue à exacerber les problèmes de financement des systèmes de protection sociale.

2.2.1 Les nouvelles orientations de la politique économique

Le survol de l’évolution de la politique macroéconomique depuis les années ‘80 permet d'identifier plusieurs phases’. Ainsi, l’efficacité des politiques macroéconomiques keynésiennes est contestée sur le plan analytique sous l'influence des thèses formulées par les économistes libéraux sur le thème de la neutralité de la dette publique et mise en question par les observateurs face à leur impuissance à enrayer et à surmonter la crise des années ‘70. Elles seront ainsi abandonnées au nom de la lutte contre l’inflation. Mais, cette période est surtout marquée par le projet de la construction de l'UEM. La recherche de la stabilité des changes des monnaies impose une convergence, un alignement des politiques monétaires sur celle de l’Allemagne. Au début des années ‘90, en raison de l’élimination des entraves à la libre circulation

des capitaux combinée à la fixité des parités, la politique monétaire devient unique et restrictive. Mais, parallèlement, la conjugaison des contraintes imposées par l’environnement

économique

(faible

croissance,

désinflation,

niveau

élevé

de

l’endettement et des taux d’intérêts réels) et de la prégnance de l’idéologie libérale vont conduire à des tentatives de maîtrise des dépenses publiques et de stabilisation de la part des prélèvements obligatoires dans le PIB. Ce changement de stratégie à l'égard de la politique budgétaire ne mettra pas en cause les dépenses de la protection sociale au cours des années ‘80. Globalement, les efforts de stabilisation et de réduction des dépenses publiques ont été compensés par la croissance des dépenses de transferts à caractère social sauf dans les pays anglo-saxons où la protection sociale est plus limitée. Ce qui montre que la forte implication de l’Etat a rendu les dépenses sociales plus incompressibles et qu’il n’existe pas a priori de relation entre l’ampleur des déficits et la mise en œuvre de politiques sociales

$ J. L. Biacade (1998), “Politique budgétaire et politique monétaire en Europe occidentale”, Les Cahiers Français, La Documentation française, n. 284, pp. 69-74.

55

restrictives. Pourtant, cela ne signifie pas que la contrainte budgétaire n’ait pas joué de rôle. Enfin, les tentatives opérées du côté des prélèvements obligatoires se sont traduites essentiellement par une modification de leur structure. Tandis que les budgets publics ont pu bénéficier d’un court répit du fait de la reprise à la fin des années ‘80, le gonflement de la dette publique liée à la récurrence des déficits et à l’alourdissement de sa charge, de même que le niveau atteint par les prélèvements obligatoires réduisent les marges de manœuvre de la politique budgétaire et lui interdisent toute action sur la conjoncture. L'évolution des dettes publiques et précisément la solvabilité de l’Etat sont, depuis les années ‘90, au centre des débats de politique économique. La mise en perspective des implications d’un endettement excessif de certains pays membres dans le cadre d’une union monétaire aboutissent dans le cadre du Traité de Maastricht à définir les conditions permettant d’assurer la convergence des politiques économiques. Ces dernières se caractérisent par la montée en force des contraintes budgétaires. Pour accéder au club des pays membres de l’Union, le déficit doit être comprimé à 3% du PIB, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, et la dette publique doit être stabilisée à une valeur de référence de 60% du PIB. En outre, le Traité interdit la monétisation de la dette publique et les transferts budgétaires entre Etats pour soutenir l’activité dans un pays affecté. Le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance pérennise et durcit cette discipline. Les politiques budgétaires restent soumises à l’obligation de convergence afin d’éviter que tout dérapage ne vienne remettre en question l’objectif de stabilité des prix et des changes’. Le Pacte incarne l’orientation donnée à la politique économique: celle d’une politique budgétaire de plus en plus circonscrite et subordonnée à la politique monétaire. Elle trouve certes des justifications sur le plan théorique. Selon le modèle Mundell-Fleming, en régime de change fixe et dans l’hypothèse de mobilité parfaite des capitaux, la politique budgétaire retrouve son efficacité sur la demande interne car elle engendre moins d’éviction par les taux d’intérêt et par les taux de change. La mise en œuvre de ces règles rigides a pour objet l'élimination des externalités qui peuvent se produire lorsque les politiques budgétaires divergent entre les pays en Union monétaire. En imposant aux différents pays de maintenir un bas niveau de déficit structurel, le but recherché est aussi de permettre de dégager des marges de manœuvre en cas de difficultés conjoncturelles. Or, les critères de Maastricht ne visent pas une coordination véritable des politiques budgétaires et occultent dans ce sens les fonctions de stabilisation et de redistribution de la politique budgétaire. Pourtant, l‘éventualité de chocs asymétriques qui devrait augmenter du fait de l'intégration et de la spécialisation croissante des économies peuvent appeler à une coordination accrue. Les règles de fonctionnement de l’Union monétaire et l’absence de coopération © peuvent de ce point de vue avoir des effets néfastes en matière de stabilisation ° P. D’Arvisenet (1999), La politique conjoncturelle, Dunod, Paris, pp. 106-126.

56

conjoncturelle’. Ainsi, face à un choc de demande, un petit pays ne pourrait ni dévaluer, ni baisser ses taux d’intérêt. En outre, il est probable qu’il butera très vite

sur la contrainte des 3% de déficit. Il y aura alors de fortes chances que le chômage augmente et que ce petit pays ne trouve alors plus aucun intérêt à rester membre de l’Union. La fonction de redistribution de la politique budgétaire nous amène à souligner les implications des contraintes budgétaires sur le financement de la protection sociale.

2.2.2 Les incidences directes et indirectes de la rigueur budgétaire sur le financement de la protection sociale

L’assainissement des finances publiques imposé par Maastricht a des effets directs mais également indirects sur le financement des systèmes de protection sociale pouvant aboutir à une réduction de leurs objectifs de redistribution au nom du respect de la contrainte financière. Le protecole annexé au Traité et fixant les valeurs de référence en matière de finances publiques et de dette publique précise que le terme “public” recouvre tout ce qui est relatif au gouvernement général, c’est à dire l’ensemble des entités fournissant des services non marchands et financés par des prélèvements obligatoires*. Il faut donc considérer que les finances de la Sécurité Sociale et celles de la protection sociale obligatoire appartiennent au champ des finances publiques et qu’à ce titre, leur déficit doit être résorbé afin de ne pas trop compromettre le rapprochement des économies. Les politiques de rigueur adoptées au titre du budget de l’Etat comprennent des mesures restrictives en matière sociale comme la mise en œuvre de mesures permettant une maîtrise du rythme de croissance des dépenses sociales. Du côté des recettes, les contraintes tiennent à la

difficulté d’alourdir la pression fiscale et pourraient être de nature à impulser un rapprochement de la structure de financement des différents pays membres. Néanmoins, le respect des critères de convergence ainsi que la politique de lutte contre l'inflation et la stabilisation des changes peuvent entraîner des effets récessifs sur la demande augmentant ainsi les besoins de transferts provenant de la protection sociale et accroître l’effet de ciseaux entre les recettes et les dépenses. Mais dans le même temps, tandis que les pays pouvaient faire face à des chocs en faisant varier le taux de change pour compenser l’absence de flexibilité sur le marché du travail, la perte de cet instrument rend la flexibilité nécessaire. Or, la

protection sociale est précisément accusée d’être un facteur à l’origine de rigidités.

7 P. Artus (1998), “Débrider la politique budgétaire européenne”, Sociétal, février. SR. Pellet (1995), “Les modes de gestion de la trésorerie de la Sécurité Sociale confrontés à l’évolution du droit financier européen”, dans Les Finances Sociales; Unité ou Diversité?, Loic Philip, Economica, p. 101.

SI

La mise en lumière des effets indirects repose sur la prise en compte des éléments du débat théorique à l’origine de la remise en cause de l'efficacité de la politique budgétaire et des thèses formulées à l'encontre du principe de financement par répartition des systèmes. Le principe de la répartition constitue un enjeu important du point de vue des finances publiques. Précisément, la croissance des dépenses de vieillesse et de santé résultant du vieillissement démographique représente un défi que devront relever les différents pays dans un contexte marqué par la poursuite des efforts menés en vue de stabiliser les finances publiques conjugué au fait que les économies devront affronter la concurrence. Ces deux contraintes soulèvent évidemment la question des coûts des régimes sociaux sur le budget de l'Etat’. Le diagnostic des difficultés de financement effectué dans cette perspective est influencé par la façon d'appréhender la politique budgétaire et impose de dépasser le cadre de la simple analyse des effets économiques des modalités de financement”. A ce stade, le problème qui est en cause est celui de la spécificité des régimes publics au regard des finances publiques et précisément du cadre budgétaire dans lequel fonctionnent les régimes. Bien que cette spécificité n’apparaisse pas dans le cadre des systèmes de prestations universelles financés directement par le budget de l’Etat, elle est à l’origine de réflexions et de remise-en cause pour les régimes d’assurance sociale où les cotisations sociales représentent la principale source de financement et où le financement budgétaire n’est jamais que subsidiaire. Bien que les dépenses de l’assurance vieillesse soient considérées comme des charges publiques et qu’il soit difficile de contester le caractère obligatoire des cotisations sociales puisqu'elles constituent des prélèvements obligatoires, ces dernières sont des prélèvements à affectation spéciale et ne répondent donc pas au principe de l’impôt. Ce type de système s’est constitué autour du principe de la contrepartie directe. En théorie, les recettes provenant des cotisations et les prestations forment les composantes d’un système unifié autonome du budget de l'Etat. Ces considérations ont fait l’objet de débats aux Etats-Unis lors de l'instauration du système de Sécurité Sociale et, plus récemment, elles ont justifié la réforme du régime public des retraites''. A l’heure actuelle, elles représentent le sous-bassement des modèles de protection sociale préconisés par la Banque Mondiale et le FMI, d’ailleurs, déjà appliqués dans certains pays d'Europe

° Ce problème est posé en termes assez préoccupants dans les analyses de l'OCDE. La poursuite des efforts en matière de réduction des déficits et de stabilisation de la dette . publique dépendrait des mesures mises en œuvre dans le cadre des régimes de retraites. a Répartition versus capitalisation. Pour plus de détails voir V. Berenger (1998), “Interrogations théoriques sur l’équivalence des systèmes de financement de la retraite en termes de finances publiques”, Thèse de Doctorat, Nice, pp. 231-379.

58

Centrale et Orientale”. Enfin, en Europe, depuis les années ‘90, un certain nombre

de travaux théoriques d’auteurs allemands et américains tentent analytiquement de rendre compte des liens directs et indirects entre l’endettement de l’Etat et les systèmes de retraites. Dans le cadre de ces réflexions, l’autonomie du système est remise en cause en soulignant l’inadéquation entre le principe de l’assurance et le financement selon le principe de la répartition de tels systèmes. Les propositions de réformes qui en découlent visent l'introduction de mécanismes de concurrence pour résoudre la contrainte financière et accroître l’efficacité des systèmes. La menace qui pèse sur les systèmes de protection sociale en Europe est bien celle d’une adaptation des systèmes sociaux afin qu’ils entravent le moins possible le fonctionnement du marché au nom de la flexibilité et de la contrainte budgétaire de l'Etat. Dans ce qui vient, nous proposons de mettre en lumière l’articulation entre la politique de dette publique et le financement du système d’assurance sociale par répartition pour ensuite souligner l’influence de cette relation sur la nature des solutions préconisées pour résoudre les problèmes de financement. Le gonflement de la dette publique associé à la récurrence des déficits budgétaires a amené les économistes à se soucier davantage des répercussions à moyen et long terme de la politique budgétaire et à lui attribuer un rôle explicatif dans la diminution de l’épargne privée et dans le ralentissement de l’accumulation du capital. Contrairement à la tradition keynésienne, l’impact de la politique budgétaire sur le secteur privé est abordé en tenant compte de l’incidence de la dette sur la contrainte budgétaire intertemporelle des agents. La question est examinée en terme de redistribution de la charge de l’emprunt entre les différentes générations. Pourtant issues du même cadre analytique, les réponses apportées à cette interrogation seront surtout conflictuelles et certaines déboucheront sur des recommandations relatives à la mise en œuvre de politiques de l’offre. Que la neutralité de la dette soit ou non défendue, ces thèses traduisent un changement d’attitude à l’égard de la façon de concevoir les objectifs de la politique budgétaire et du caractère bon ou mauvais d’accroître l’épargne nationale. En raison de l’importance accordée aux effets du budget sur la redistribution intergénérationnelle, ces thèses suggèrent une quatrième fonction du budget aux côtés des fonctions qui lui sont traditionnellement reconnues. Le budget y apparaît comme un instrument permettant d’opérer des transferts intertemporels de ressources et en ce sens d’affecter le taux d’épargne national de manière réversible. Cet objectif tend d’ailleurs à supplanter à l’heure actuelle les autres fonctions car les mesures budgétaires sont instaurées au regard de l’atteinte des objectifs de réduction des déficits budgétaires à long terme. L’accent mis sur les aspects de long terme de la politique budgétaire et sur la solvabilité de la contrainte budgétaire intertemporelle de l’Etat contribue a la 12 Vv. Berenger (1999), “L'enjeu social de l'intégration de la Hongrie dans l’Union Européenne: réflexions sur la réforme du régime des pensions”, Journées d’Etudes sur “L’ économie hongroise et l'extension de l’Union Européenne”, Nice.

59

remise en question non seulement de l’efficacité de la politique keynésienne mais de la signification des déficits tels qu’ils sont traditionnellement mesurés. Un certain nombre d’économistes! s’emploient d’ailleurs, depuis quelques années, à dénoncer l’inadéquation entre les définitions comptables et économiques des déficits publics. Dans le cas général où l’Etat s'engage à réduire les impôts prélevés sur les générations courantes et à accroître les impôts sur les générations futures,

la

redistribution

intergénérationnelle

effectuée

se

traduit

par

une

augmentation des déficits reportés. Mais, ces mêmes analyses soulignent que l’Etat dispose de moyens plus subtils que le recours explicite à l'emprunt pour effectuer de tels transferts. Aussi, l'exemple pris pour remettre en cause ces mesures est le financement des retraites publiques par le principe de la répartition. En effet, appréhendé dans une optique de long terme et comparé à un système qui serait hypothétiquement neutre d’un point de vue actuariel, le fonctionnement des régimes par répartition peut être identifié à une politique de financement déficitaire par l’emprunt ou de dette publique qui n’apparaît pourtant nullement visible dans les comptes publics. En effet, l’instauration de la répartition se caractérise par le versement de transferts gratuits aux premières générations de retraités sans qu’elles aient pour cela cotisé au préalable. Ces transferts leur permettent d’ailleurs de bénéficier d’un surcroît de consommation. Les prélèvements effectués sur les actifs qui ont permis de financer ces transferts donnent lieu dans le cadre de l’assurance sociale à l’acquisition de droits à pensions et représentent une dette implicite du régime de retraite auprès de la génération des actifs. Pour obtenir le remboursement de cette dernière, le régime de retraite doit s’adresser à la génération suivante qui en contrepartie obtient un droit de créance virtuelle sur la production de la génération suivante. Dans l’hypothèse où le taux de croissance de l’économie est supérieur au taux d'intérêt du marché, la caisse de retraite mène un “jeu de finance à la Ponzi” se caractérisant par la possibilité de couvrir l’emprunt initial par de nouveaux emprunts. Dans le cadre de ces hypothèses,

la dette initiale est transmise

ad infinitum

entre

les

générations successives sans qu'aucune d’elle n’ait à subir le coût de financement de l’emprunt initial. Néanmoins, les différentes générations participant au processus ne font pas l’objet d’un traitement identique. Ce sont les générations les plus âgées au moment du démarrage du régime de retraite qui sont les principales bénéficiaires d’un tel système car elles obtiennent des taux de rendement largement supérieurs au taux de croissance. Les générations futures ne bénéficient pas de tels transferts en raison de l’extension de la période de cotisation et le taux de rendement maximum qu’elles peuvent obtenir, toute chose égale par ailleurs, correspond au taux de croissance de l’économie. Les facteurs pouvant précisément remettre en cause le fonctionnement d’un tel processus sont le ralentissement de la ÉD: Kotlikoff, A. J. Auerbach et J. Gokhale (1994), “Generational Accounting: a Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8(1), pp. 73-94. et J. Gokhale, B. Raffelhüschen (2000), “Population Aging and Fiscal Policy in Europe and in the United States”, CESifo, Working Paper, n. 237, pp. 1-17.

60

croissance et la diminution du nombre des cotisants du fait du vieillissement démographique et de la montée du chômage. L’inversion de ces trends impliquerait une augmentation du prix des prestations pour les générations futures d’actifs se traduisant par une diminution du taux de rendement obtenu sur les cotisations. En d’autres termes, à législation inchangée, cette analogie rend compte du fait qu’en raison de l’absence de réserves financières, à terme, les cotisations ne seraient pas

suffisantes pour couvrir les droits à pension. De ce point de vue, le financement des pensions futures exigerait un relèvement des cotisations ou une réduction des prestations ou, en dernière analyse, le recours à d’autres types de recettes. Cette dette correspond aux engagements pris par les pouvoirs publics envers les retraités sans avoir prévu à cet effet les fonds pour les financer. Dans cette perspective, la répartition n’opère pas un simple transfert de ressources entre les actifs et les retraités mais entre les cotisants actuels et les cotisants de demain. Sur la base d’une telle analogie, les conséquences du vieillissement démographique sur l’équilibre de tels systèmes sont mises en lumière en soulignant les besoins de financement futurs considérables qui seront nécessaires pour assurer le financement des pensions. Cette même analogie sert à rendre compte de la menace que représentent les engagements pris à l’égard des futurs retraités pour la poursuite de l’effort de stabilisation des déficits budgétaires. Ces menaces ne sont pas seulement d’ordre financière, elles sont également d’ordre économique. En effet, depuis le début des années ‘70, les thèses formulées par un certain

nombre d’économistes libéraux'* à l’encontre des dépenses publiques et des déficits publics se transposent assez facilement pour mettre en évidence le coût des systèmes de protection sociale et remettre en question leur efficience et leur efficacité. Ainsi, les régimes par répartition pourraient avoir d’éventuels effets secondaires défavorables sur l’épargne, l’accumulation du capital et la croissance; ce qui pourrait dans certaines circonstances se traduire par des coûts sociaux considérables. En outre, ils créeraient des distorsions sur les comportements d’offre de travail. Enfin, les aspects redistributifs des systèmes font l’objet d’interrogations. En dépit de l’importance des masses consacrées à cet objectif, les dépenses sociales n’auraient pas réussi à réduire significativement les inégalités de revenus, à éliminer la pauvreté et à faire reculer l’exclusion sociale. La thèse du hasard moral est ici transposée pour souligner qu’une protection sociale trop généreuse déresponsabilise les individus et accroît leur dépendance vis à vis du système. Elle nuirait à l’esprit d’initiative et n’inciterait ni au travail, ni à l’épargne. Ainsi la croissance des cotisations que nécessiterait le financement des prestations serait à l’origine d’effets désincitatifs et d’inégalités entre les générations. L’avenir de la protection sociale et plus particulièrement des régimes de retraite poserait dans cette perspective un problème à la fois d’équité intergénérationnelle et d’efficacité économique dont la résolution risque sans doute !4 R. J. Barro (1974), “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, /.P.E., vol. 82, pp. 10951117; M. Feldstein (1974), “Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital Accumulation”, J.P.E., vol. 82, pp. 905-926.

61

d'être conflictuelle. Manifestement, de nombreuses propositions de réforme tendent à privilégier l’objectif d'efficacité. Mais la perspective des difficultés que posera le financement des déficits futurs des régimes d’assurance sociale dépasse le cadre de l’analyse des effets comparés des mécanismes de répartition et de capitalisation. Elle soulève le problème de l'adéquation du financement du système par des prélèvements à affectation spéciale pour satisfaire des objectifs conflictuels. Par là-même, elle pose à terme la question de l'intégrité financière de l’assurance sociale par rapport au budget de l'Etat. On découvre de ce point de vue que l’assurance sociale est un thème à plusieurs facettes qui se reflète dans la multiplicité des solutions proposées pour en alléger la charge future. Le point de départ des réflexions réside dans l’idée que l'assurance sociale satisfait simultanément deux objectifs conflictuels. Le premier objectif est d’assurer l’indépendance financière et un niveau de vie adéquat aux inactifs âgés. Dans le cadre des régimes d’assurance sociale, le financement par des cotisations prélevées sur les salaires et le versement de prestations sans conditions de ressources reposent sur un principe de justice allocative selon lequel les participants doivent gagner leurs droits à pension. L’analogie à l’assurance est délibérée. Or, la corrélation entre les prestations et les cotisations est loin d’être aussi stricte que celle qui découle de l’application des standards de l’assurance et cela tient à la présence d’un autre objectif. Le système est également redistributif. Cette redistribution s’opère non seulement entre les générations mais aussi entre les agents appartenant à une même génération. Les prestations sont en ce sens progressives. Précisément, l’augmentation des taux de cotisations rendue nécessaire du fait des évolutions démographique et économique risque de provoquer des tensions entre ces deux objectifs. La combinaison de ces deux objectifs est qualifiée de contradiction de sorte qu’à la mixité qui caractérisait le système, les propositions de réforme tendent à privilégier les extrêmes. En filigrane de ces propositions se pose le problème de la finalité et des caractéristiques institutionnelles de l’assurance sociale: le système de sécurité sociale est-il conforme aux principes généraux de l’assurance ou ne représente-t-il pas en fait qu’un système de transfert des revenus, à moins qu’il ne participe de ces deux conceptions? Le système doit-il être transformé en un pur système de transfert des revenus avec un financement prenant en compte les capacités contributives et des prestations versées sous conditions de ressources? Est-ce que la réforme du système nécessite la séparation des objectifs de redistribution et d’assurance et de redéfinir les rôles respectifs du secteur privé et du secteur public dans l’atteinte de ces objectifs? Les réformes accordant un rôle actif au côté assurance visent à resserrer le lien entre les prestations et les cotisations. Elles préconisent pour la majorité d’entre elles le recours à la capitalisation. L'introduction de la capitalisation peut être opérée par une privatisation totale ou partielle des régimes ou par la création d’un

62

fonds de réserve dans le cadre du régime par répartition pour en assurer la solvabilité. Les arguments utilisés par les libéraux" pour justifier la privatisation se fondent sur la mise en lumière des inefficiences induites par un système qui assume simultanément deux fonctions au moyen d’un seul instrument à savoir les cotisations sociales. En tant que programme de transferts, l’inefficience de l’assurance sociale résulte de l’absence de règle d’attribution des prestations sous conditions de ressources. Les transferts ne sont pas forcément attribués à ceux qui en ont le plus besoin. C’est à l’Etat que devrait incomber l’objectif de redistribution ou du moins d’assistance. L'objectif d’assurance ou d’épargne devrait, quant à lui, être assumé par les assurances ce qui permettrait de renforcer le lien entre les cotisations et les prestations. Cette redéfinition des rôles permettrait, selon leurs auteurs, d’éliminer les sources de gaspillage lié au versement de transferts inutiles et à l’inefficience du secteur public en tant qu’assureur et résoudrait ainsi les problèmes financiers résultant du maintien du système par répartition et des cotisations sociales. Elle contribuerait au maintien de la solvabilité de l’Etat. L’attrait pour des régimes fondés sur l’obligation individuelle tient au fait que le coût n’en apparaîtrait pas directement dans le budget de l’Etat. Même lorsqu'ils doivent être complétés pour suppléer les lacunes du marché ils se révéleraient moins coûteux. Selon ses partisans, la privatisation ferait peser la responsabilité de la protection sur les individus. Les transferts seraient plus équitablement distribués car mieux ciblés et le recours à la capitalisation augmenterait le taux d’épargne, ce qui serait favorable a la croissance économique.

Néanmoins,

les

effets

attendus

d’une

telle

solution

sont

trés

contestables car la transition vers un tel système imposerait de lourdes charges au budget de l’Etat. En outre, une telle substitution ne s’avére pas souhaitable

en

terme d’équité. La privatisation partielle vise les mémes objectifs que la solution que nous venons d’évoquer. Néanmoins, la composante d’assurance serait assumée par des régimes publics et obligatoires. Les cotisations devraient satisfaire le principe de l’équivalence actuarielle en accumulant des réserves financières et les aspects non contributifs des prestations seraient éliminés (comme la progressivité). Il s’agit de réduire le champ de l'assurance publique pour accroître et encourager le développement des mécanismes privés d’assurance. Enfin, une solution moins contestable mais qui n’est pas sans soulever un certain nombre de problèmes serait d'envisager le recours partiel à la capitalisation au sein des régimes par répartition. Elle consisterait en la création d’un fonds de

!5 P. J. Ferrara (ed.) (1985), Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform, Cato Institute, Washington D.C.; J. Marmor and J. Mashaw (eds.) (1988), Social Security. Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis, Princeton University Press.

63

réserves!. Il s’agirait de demander à la population actuellement en activité de cotiser plus qu’il n’est nécessaire pour le financement des pensions des retraités actuels. L’excédent de cotisations servirait à constituer des réserves qui permettraient à la génération suivante de cotiser moins que ce qui aurait été nécessaire en l’absence de réforme. Les cotisations ainsi prélevées devraient être investies en bons d’Etat, elles pourraient servir à racheter une partie des bons détenus par les agents privés ce qui libérerait des ressources pour l'investissement et la croissance. Mais, si la solution est a priori séduisante, le problème est que l’efficacité d’une telle mesure dépend de la méthode d’investissement des surplus laquelle repose d’ailleurs sur un ensemble de contraintes macroéconomiques qu’il s'agirait de préciser'’. Le fonds a de fortes chances d’être court-circuité par les besoins de financement de l’Etat dans un environnement où ce dernier serait soumis au respect de la contrainte budgétaire. Bien que cette solution permettrait d’assurer l'indépendance financière du système au regard du budget de l’Etat, l’utilisation faite par l’Etat des excédents de cotisations risque d’aggraver et de réduire les marges de manœuvre des régimes publics à terme. Cette analyse révèle que dans un contexte où l’Etat cherche à assainir ses finances publiques, il peut être tentant d'envisager une réforme en profondeur des régimes de pensions afin d’éliminer les pressions qu’ils risquent de faire peser à long terme sur la poursuite d’un tel objectif. Si la privatisation totale n’est pas envisageable compte tenu de ses coûts sociaux et économiques, cela n'empêche pas d’envisager des régimes privés complémentaires pour compenser des réductions éventuelles des pensions versées par les régimes de protection sociale. Le développement de régimes à cotisations définies s’inscrirait dans cette logique. De plus à la différence des systèmes à prestations définies, ils favoriseraient la mobilité du travail, objectif recherché dans la perspective de l’achèvement de l’Union. Néanmoins, l’accent mis sur la contrainte financière conduit à occulter les coûts que pourraient induire d’un point de vue macroéconomique de telles mesures. Dans un environnement où la tendance est à une politique monétaire restrictive par crainte d’une fuite des capitaux et à l’assainissement budgétaire, on peut craindre que la capitalisation n’accentue les effets déflationnistes. Les réformes les plus récentes mises en œuvre dans les pays membres se caractérisent par plusieurs tendances communes": le ciblage des ressources disponibles sur les plus démunis, le renforcement du côté assurance en liant les prestations

aux

cotisations,

une

tendance

à

constituer

des

réserves

et

1 M. Feldstein (1976), “The Social Security Fund and Capital National Accumulation”, dans Funding Pensions: Issues and Implications for Financial Markets, Conference Series n. 16, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, pp. 32-71.

'7 V. Berenger (1998), op. cit., pp. 498-516.

8 Drees (ed.), “La Protection Sociale dans les pays de l’Union Européenne”, Chiffres Repères, collection études et statistiques, La Documentation française, pp. 102-132.

64

l’encouragement au développement des fonds de pensions pour les retraites complémentaires. Les mesures d’ajustement destinées à consolider financièrement les régimes par répartition ouvrent la voie au recours à la capitalisation. En effet, ces mesures ont trait au recul de l’âge de la retraite pour l’accès d’une retraite à taux plein, à la réduction des prestations par une modification des règles de calcul et d’indexation des pensions. Ces différentes mesures visent une réduction des prestations. On peut également constater une tendance au ciblage des prestations par l’imposition des prestations, l’instauration de seuils de revenu dans les pays à prestation uniforme et par la réduction des possibilités de cumul des prestations. En outre, on observe des tentatives de déplacer de l’Etat vers les particuliers la charge du versement des retraites qui se traduit par l’encouragement au développement des fonds de retraites à cotisations définies pour les retraites complémentaires. Les réformes à l’œuvre ouvrent la voie à d’autres formes de financement: les plans de retraites privés. Cette volonté se manifeste d’ailleurs clairement par la mise en œuvre d’avantages fiscaux pour aider le développement des régimes complémentaires. La mise en perspective des liens entre financement de la protection sociale et finances publiques a permis de montrer que les critères de convergence peuvent à terme avoir une incidence profonde sur les modalités de financement et les finalités des systèmes de protection sociale. Le respect de la contrainte budgétaire pourrait conduire à une certaine convergence des systèmes du point de vue de leur principe de financement.

3. Financement de la protection sociale et emploi En quoi la construction de l’Union monétaire est-elle susceptible d’influencer les sources de financement des systèmes de protection sociale et par là-même le niveau et la nature de la protection offerte”? L'analyse des liens entre protection sociale et finances publiques a été menée en soulignant le rôle joué par la protection sociale en tant qu’instrument de la politique économique et en identifiant la répartition à une politique de financement déficitaire par l'emprunt. Mais le lien entre finances publiques et protection sociale conduit également à considérer les sources de financement de la protection sociale. Le taux de prélèvement obligatoire par rapport au PIB est un indicateur certes partiel du degré socialisation des revenus et de la redistribution. Mais depuis les années ‘80, dans un contexte marqué par le ralentissement de la croissance et la montée du chômage, le niveau des prélèvements obligatoires dans le PIB n’a cessé d’augmenter dans l’ensemble des pays européens. Ces évolutions ont évidemment donné un regain de vigueur à la contestation libérale. S'appuyant sur la thèse de Laffer, un certain nombre d’économistes partagent l’idée qu’il existerait un seuil 65

socialement admissible aux prélèvements sans parvenir clairement à le justifier. Ce seuil aurait été atteint voire dépassé de sorte que la progression des prélèvements pourrait être en partie la cause de l’affaiblissement de la croissance et du chômage. C’est ainsi que de nombreux pays ont cherché à réduire ou du moins à stabiliser la part des prélèvements obligatoires dans le PIB. Cependant, les efforts menés dans ce domaine ont été partiellement couronnés de succès car la plupart des pays ont été confrontés à la nécessité de réduire les dépenses publiques et les déficits budgétaires. Mais si le niveau des prélèvements agit sur la croissance, l’emploi et la compétitivité, leur structure joue également un rôle explicatif important. Bien qu’il existe des disparités dans la structure des prélèvements obligatoires entre les différents pays membres, la part des prélèvements assis sur le travail représente au niveau communautaire plus de la moitié de l’ensemble des prélèvements obligatoires. Ces prélèvements qui constituent la principale source de financement des systèmes de protection sociale reposent sur des cotisations sociales pour la plupart des pays et sur l’impôt sur le revenu pour les autres. Ces aspects ont incité les Etats membres à se préoccuper davantage des liens entre protection sociale et création d’emploi. Cet intérêt pour ce thème se justifie en outre, à l’heure actuelle, par la mise en œuvre des directives issues du sommet

du Luxembourg sur l'emploi. La persistance du chômage de longue durée, l’exclusion sociale et la pauvreté qui l’accompagnent ont amené les dirigeants des différents pays à prendre conscience de la nécessité d’envisager une régulation d’ensemble de la politique économique et sociale. Ils ont décidé d’accompagner le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance par une coordination de leurs politiques économiques où la recherche d’un niveau élevé d’emploi figure parmi les objectifs prioritaires. Le processus de Luxembourg introduit certes les premiers jalons de l'Europe Sociale, jusque là parent pauvre du processus d’intégration, dans la mesure où il repose sur la mise en œuvre d’une stratégie commune de lutte contre le chômage de longue durée. Il suggérerait par la-méme la reconnaissance de la complémentarité entre progrés économique et social. Mais, la coordination et la convergence des politiques de l’emploi reposent sur un ensemble de mesures qui peuvent avoir pour effet non seulement de réduire l’autonomie des systèmes nationaux mais d’en affecter profondément la logique et le niveau des prestations servies. La protection sociale est impliquée dans cette stratégie car la réduction de la pression fiscale sur les emplois peu qualifiés et l’activation des prestations figurent parmi les instruments permettant d’atteindre les objectifs affichés. Le lien entre protection sociale et emploi nous conduit naturellement à envisager quelques-uns des arguments évoquant la question de l’incidence des sources de financement sur le coût de la main d'œuvre, l'emploi et le fonctionnement du marché du travail. Dans ce débat, datant d’ailleurs des années :

‘80, les cotisations employeurs et de manière générale la protection sociale font l’objet d’un discours très négatif suggérant que cette dernière serait un facteur de rigidité du marché du travail. Plusieurs propositions de réformes découlent de cette

66

analyse pouvant justifier un recours accru à la fiscalisation partielle dans les régimes se finançant principalement par les cotisations et impliquer par là-même un rapprochement de la structure des prélèvements. Mais, la protection sociale a également une incidence sur l’emploi par le biais des prestations versées. La remise en cause de leur efficacité a débouché sur la mise en œuvre d’un certain nombre de mesures dans l’ensemble des pays membres qui traduisent une évolution dans la conception de la notion de risque social. Les cotisations sociales sont présentées comme un facteur d’alourdissement du coût du travail et comme un frein à la compétitivité. Elles favoriseraient la substitution du capital au travail et handicaperaient les entreprises utilisatrices de main d'œuvre. Selon ces arguments, la nature du financement de la protection sociale aurait une incidence sur le coût de la main d’œuvre. La protection sociale serait en partie responsable du maintien d’un taux de chômage élevé en Europe. Néanmoins, la relation entre protection sociale, coût de la main d’ceuvre, emploi et chômage est complexe. Il convient de la saisir avec précaution. Elle peut faire état de conclusions différentes selon que l’analyse porte sur la comparaison entre différents pays à un moment donné ou qu’elle concerne des évolutions au cours du temps ou à un moment donné à l’intérieur d’un même pays. En outre, les résultats dépendent de l’indicateur choisi pour rendre compte du lien entre protection sociale et coût de la main d’œuvre. Faut-il tenir compte de la part des cotisations sociales dans le coût total de la main d’ceuvre, de la part des prélèvements pesant sur le travail dans le coût total du travail, de l’évolution de la part du coût du travail dans le chiffre d’affaire des entreprises, ou du coût du travail par unité produite? La part des cotisations sociales dans le coût de la main d’œuvre ne permet en aucun cas d’établir une corrélation significative entre financement de la protection sociale et écarts de coût de la main d’ceuvre'’. Elle indique uniquement le principe qui préside la logique de financement du système de protection sociale. Les cotisations sociales ne sont qu’une composante du coût du travail, il faut tenir compte de la structure du coût du travail et en particulier des autres prélèvements portant sur le travail comme l’impôt sur le revenu. L’ensemble de ces prélèvements détermine le coin fiscal ou l’écart entre le coût total de la main d’ceuvre et le salaire net perçu par le salarié. Lorsque la comparaison concerne des pays de niveaux de protection sociale comparables, la relation n’est pas confirmée. Ainsi, la France et le Danemark se caractérisent par des coûts de la main d’œuvre équivalents mais dont les structures sont très différentes. En France, les charges sociales élevées sont compensées par des salaires directs plus faibles. En revanche, au Danemark, les cotisations employeurs sont faibles mais les salaires directs sont comparativement plus élevés et plus lourdement ponctionnés par les impôts pour financer notamment la protection sociale. En revanche, si la comparaison porte sur des pays de niveaux 1% A. Euzeby et C. (1983), “Modalités de financement de la sécurité sociale, coût de la main

d'œuvre et emploi dans les pays industrialisés de marché”, dans Sécurité sociale: quelle méthode de financement?, BIT, Genève, pp. 53-114.

67

de développements différents, alors il est certain que, par rapport à des pays où le coût de la main d’ceuvre est faible, le niveau des charges sociales peut expliquer l'écart des coûts de la main d'œuvre. Enfin, les analyses menées en longue période révèlent que l'augmentation des cotisations employeurs n’aurait pas d’incidence sur la part salariale rapportée à la valeur ajoutée brute”. Néanmoins, pour un pays donné, un niveau élevé des coûts non salariaux peut être défavorable à l'emploi et provoquer une modification des prix relatifs des facteurs de production. Selon les enseignements de la théorie néoclassique, les prélèvements sociaux auraient pour effet de créer des distorsions de prix sur le marché du travail et d’entraîner un déséquilibre économique générateur de chômage. Les cotisations employeurs augmenteraient le coût du travail et provoqueraient une diminution de la demande de travail pour un taux de salaire fixé. Un prélèvement sur les revenus des salariés freinerait l’incitation à travailler car ce qui compte pour le salarié c’est le salaire net de cotisation et d’impôt sur le revenu. Il en résulterait un déplacement de l’offre de travail. Les prélèvements sociaux auraient pour effet de creuser l’écart entre ce que versent les entreprises et ce que touchent les salariés. Le taux de salaire net et le niveau de l’emploi s’établiraient de ce fait à un niveau inférieur à celui qui serait atteint s’il n’existait aucune entrave au fonctionnement du marché. D'ailleurs, la distinction entre les

deux types de cotisations revêt une importance certaine lorsque le salaire est un salaire administré comme le salaire brut minimum. Un alourdissement des charges sociales peut être une cause d’élévation du coût de la main d’ceuvre qui peut favoriser le développement du chômage classique et le maintien du chômage keynésien. La poursuite de l’objectif de maximisation des profits dans un contexte caractérisé par un ralentissement de la demande peut avoir des incidences macroéconomiques très négatives. Les entreprises chercheraient à réduire leur coût par des suppressions d’emplois; le travail étant la variable d’ajustement. Mais, la hausse du chômage a un coût budgétaire. Son financement nécessite une hausse des cotisations tandis que le nombre des cotisants diminue. En particulier, l'augmentation des charges sociales qui en résulte élève le coût du travail. Le coût du chômage se répercute sur les autres entreprises qui peuvent de ce fait être incitées à délocaliser une partie de leurs activités intensives en main d'œuvre. L’élévation du coût du travail est susceptible, dans ce contexte, de favoriser le développement de l’économie informelle et du travail non déclaré notamment si les cotisations financent des prestations non contributives”. Dans ce même ordre

d'idée, les cotisations sociales sont au centre du thème relatif à la compétitivité qui

est cependant trop souvent identifiée à la notion de productivité et réduite aux seuls écarts de prix et de coûts. Une hausse du coût du travail lié à un alourdissement des charges sociales a une incidence directe sur la compétitivité dans la mesure où les coûts déterminent les prix de revient. Mais, cette incidence peut s’opérer de~ À J. M. Dupuis (1994), Le financement de la protection sociale, PUF., p. 82. Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, Livre Blanc: Croissance, Compétitivité, Emploi, Chap. 9, “L’effet des prélèvements obligatoires”.

68

manière indirecte car l’augmentation des coûts peut avoir pour effet de diminuer ou d’annuler les bénéfices potentiels anticipés par les entreprises et donc de freiner l’investissement et de retentir défavorablement sur l’emploi. Dans un contexte d'ouverture croissante des économies sur l’extérieur, une augmentation des charges sociales peut créer des tensions inflationnistes susceptibles d’entamer la compétitivité notamment s’il s’agit d’un secteur concurrencé et d’entraîner une dégradation des soldes commerciaux et des pertes d'emplois. Ainsi, la concurrence des pays à bas salaires donnerait lieu à des gains très inégalement répartis. Les travailleurs peu qualifiés en seraient les premières victimes, tandis que les travailleurs qualifiés profiteraient d’importations à bas prix. Mais, l’incidence de ces inégalités dépendrait des modes de fonctionnement du marché du travail et ne Justifierait pas nécessairement un glissement vers la flexibilité. Néanmoins, la compétitivité dépend d’autres facteurs que les seuls écarts de coûts de la main d'œuvre et de prix tels que la productivité, la formation et le niveau de qualification de la main d’œuvre, la qualité des réseaux de distribution, les variations du taux de change, etc. Le coût du travail par unité produite serait de ce point de vue un indicateur plus fiable que les précédents même s’il n’inclut pas l’ensemble des facteurs évoqués. L'efficacité des prestations sociales et plus particulièrement des prestations chômage est également contestée. La protection accorderait trop d’importance aux revenus indirects au détriment des salaires directs, L’octroi d'avantages sociaux trop généreux serait responsable de la persistance du chômage de longue durée. Pourtant, la protection sociale a longtemps été considérée comme un facteur d’emploi en permettant aux demandeurs d’emplois d’être plus efficaces dans leur recherche. Elle est désormais accusée d’être un facteur de rigidité au fonctionnement du marché du travail. Elle affaiblirait l’effort et l’esprit d’initiative et développerait une dépendance des individus au regard du système en rendant moins attractif le travail. Elle impliquerait des coûts sociaux non justifiés qui résulteraient du phénomène du hasard moral et qui seraient supportés par la collectivité. Ainsi, la mise en œuvre de conditions plus strictes pour l’accès aux prestations à l’instar de l’activation de certaines prestations peut être considérée comme un moyen visant à inciter les individus à rechercher plus activement un emploi et à transférer une part du coût du chômage de la collectivité vers les individus. Les différents arguments que nous venons d'évoquer tendent à suggérer que la protection sociale et, en particulier, les cotisations sociales représenteraient une

charge dans l’absolu sans tenir compte du statut particulier des cotisations et de la logique de fonctionnement de la protection sociale. Les recettes et les dépenses sont analysées comme s’il s’agissait de deux systèmes distincts, dans lesquels les prestations sont une composante d’un système de transferts de fonds, tandis que les cotisations sont une composante des recettes de l’Etat. Ces dernières se voient appliquer les mêmes critères qu’à l’impòt sans prendre en considération l'élément prestation.

69

En fait, il ne s’agit pas de remettre en question ce type de prélèvement mais plutôt de s’interroger sur les objectifs des dépenses qu'ils servent à financer. Certaines cotisations sociales donnent droit à des versements proportionnels aux sommes versées, elles ont le statut d’assurance et non d’impôt. Mais, au cours de

ces dernières années, les systèmes de protection sociale ont dû faire face à de nouveaux besoins en élargissant leur finalité à la solidarité par une extension de la couverture offerte à des non salariés et par une augmentation de la part des prestations non contributives. Le lien entre les cotisations et les prestations loin d’être ténu serait profondément remis en question. Les fonctions d’assurance et de solidarité tendent ainsi être opposées dans les débats portant sur la réforme de la protection sociale alors même que cette dernière est profondément imbriquée à la première en raison du caractère contraignant et public de l’assurance sociale. Cette opposition est utilisée pour préconiser une séparation des fonctions qui reposerait sur une adaptation des sources de financement aux prestations servies. Dans la mesure où les prestations non contributives ne sont pas fonction des revenus des bénéficiaires et qu’elles ont pour finalité de garantir un minimum social à la population, on reste dans une logique d’assistance justifiant un financement par des recettes fiscales”. Ceci justifierait la fiscalisation partielle de certaines prestations et la recherche d’une combinaison fiscale plus neutre ou plus favorable au coût du travail et a l'emploi. Les arguments précédents sont certes à nuancer mais n’excluent pourtant pas que, sous certaines conditions particulières, un allégement des cotisations sociales aurait un impact favorable sur l’emploi et la compétitivité. Cet effet dépendrait de l’élasticité de la demande de travail par rapport aux variations du coût de la main d’ceuvre, de l’absence de contrainte de débouchés, des moyens mis

en œuvre pour compenser la perte de recettes induites par la réduction des charges sociales et de l’absence d’effets de substitution et d’aubaine”. Ainsi, dans une optique clairement libérale, l’allégement du coût du travail et donc une réduction du chômage pourraient être obtenus par une suppression des cotisations employeurs qui serait partiellement compensée par une augmentation du salaire net. Du côté de la protection sociale, les moins-perçus seraient pris en charge par le budget de l’Etat, et ce supplément de charges serait absorbé par une maîtrise ou une réduction des dépenses publiques (sociales)*. Par conséquent, les salariés qui souhaiteraient un niveau de protection plus élevé, seraient incités à se tourner volontairement vers des mécanismes passant par le marché en souscrivant des polices d’assurances privées ou des fonds de pensions pour les retraites.

* A. Euzéby (1996), “Les impôts et le financement de la protection sociale”, dans Impôts et

Réforme Fiscale, La Documentation française, n. 274, pp. 43-54.

A J. M. Dupuis (1994), op.cit. dh M. Dupuis (1995),“Les enjeux du financement de la protection sociale”, CERCAssociation, Acte de la journée d’étude consacrée aux “Prélévements Obligatoires” reproduit dans Problèmes économiques, n. 2493-2494, pp. 61-65.

70

|

L’allégement des charges sociales et du coût du travail s’effectueraient dans ce cas en flexibilisant la protection sociale et en réduisant sa part obligatoire. Il s'agirait de réduire l’élément public de la protection sociale en le réservant aux catégories de population les plus démunies pour remédier à leur imprévoyance naturelle et d’inciter les plus fortunés à se couvrir à titre complémentaire. Il n’est pas utile ici d'évoquer le caractère injuste d’une telle mesure” et ses effets incertains sur l'emploi, l'épargne et la croissance. En revanche, si on raisonne à recettes et dépenses publiques inchangées, alors la réduction du coût du travail nécessite une réforme de la structure de financement de la protection sociale et de manière plus vaste une transformation de la structure de la fiscalité. Le problème porte alors sur le choix du prélèvement qui pourrait remplacer une partie des cotisations sociales. Cela suppose de rechercher l’avantage d’un tel prélèvement par rapport aux cotisations et à d’autres impôts. Ce choix serait déterminé en prenant en considération l’impact d’un tel changement du point de vue de la justice sociale, de l’efficacité, de la croissance et son adéquation avec les principes du système de protection sociale. D’un point de vue économique, ce prélèvement devrait corriger les distorsions provoquées par les cotisations sur l’emploi et les coûts relatifs des facteurs. Il devrait peser le moins possible sur les capacités d’autofinancement et améliorer la compétitivité. Enfin, il pourrait agir dans un sens favorable à la relance en contribuant notamment à la croissance de la propension à consommer. Or, il n’est pas certain que toutes ces contraintes soient compatibles entre elles. D'un point de vue théorique, ce transfert de charge sur le budget de l’Etat ne pourrait étre obtenu qu’en alourdissant la pression fiscale pesant sur les ménages. L’augmentation des prélèvements exercerait un effet récessif sur la demande mais favoriserait l’augmentation des taux de profit et donc la relance de l’investissement car les entreprises connaitraient une nette amélioration de leur compétitivité. L’augmentation des exportations compenserait alors la diminution de la consommation privée. Cette derniére pourrait a terme augmenter en raison de la réduction du chômage. Ainsi, plusieurs types de prélèvements sont généralement proposés comme instruments de lutte contre le chômage et de financement des prestations non contributives. Le premier concerne la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA). Dans la mesure où elle grève les importations et exonère les exportations, elle permettrait de faire supporter une partie du financement de la protection sociale aux pays à faibles coûts de main d'œuvre. Elle serait équivalente à une dévaluation. Mais, l’assiette de la TVA comme celle des cotisations porte sur les revenus du travail car l'investissement en est exclu. En outre, dans la mesure où elle est répercutée dans les prix à la consommation,

elle représente un prélèvement sur la consommation

finale. Une augmentation de la TVA aurait pour effet de réduire le pouvoir d’achat

2° Cf. supra à propos de la privatisation.

ae

des ménages mais en contrepartie elle améliorerait la compétitivité des entreprises sauf si les entreprises ne répercutent pas la diminution du coût du travail en abaissant le prix des exportations. Or, cet effet a de fortes chances d’être annulé. Il est en effet peu probable que les ménages acceptent une baisse durable de leur pouvoir d’achat. De plus, si les salaires sont indexés sur les prix à la consommation, alors la hausse de la TVA conduira à une hausse du coût du travail

susceptible d’enclencher une spirale de croissance prix-salaire. En effet, les entreprises tenteront de répercuter les hausses de salaires dans les prix de vente. En outre, du point de vue de la justice sociale, la TVA ne tient pas compte des capacités contributives. Elle est par nature anti-redistributive parce qu’elle touche essentiellement les ménages utilisant leur revenu dans une optique de consommation. Mais, une augmentation de la TVA est difficilement envisageable car les Etats membres sont incités à réduire son taux dans le cadre du processus d'harmonisation fiscale. En outre, la réduction des taux de TVA sur les services à

forte intensité de main d'œuvre figure parmi les lignes directrices du processus de Luxembourg sur l’emploi. Enfin, en raison de ses effets inflationnistes, une hausse de la TVA irait à l’encontre de la poursuite de la politique de désinflation. L’imposition des revenus du capital’ est une autre solution évoquée. Elle permettrait un élargissement de la base de financement. Mais, leur assiette étant étroite et plus variable du fait de la mobilité du capital, une augmentation plus forte de leur taux serait nécessaire pour compenser la réduction des taux de cotisations sociales. Cette taxation n’est autre qu’une taxation de l’épargne. Selon certains économistes, elle pourrait créer des distorsions dans les choix intertemporels des ménages. Elle découragerait l’épargne et entraînerait une élévation du taux d'intérêt. Elle risquerait de ce fait de conduire à un niveau d’investissement moins élevé, à une baisse de la productivité du travail et à un niveau de chômage plus élevé. En outre ces effets peuvent être amplifiés si on admet que l’accumulation du capital exerce des externalités positives. Le recours aux taxes écologiques, déjà mis en œuvre dans la plupart des pays du Nord de l’Europe, pourrait être utilisé pour compenser les pertes de recettes induites par l’allégement des cotisations sociales sur les bas salaires. Ces prélèvements se fondent sur le principe du pollueur payeur dans la mesure où s’agit de mettre à contribution les activités ou pratiques qui sont susceptibles d’engendrer des externalités négatives. Mais, un certain nombre de réserves sont émises à leur sujet. Le rendement de tels prélèvements peut être très variable car il dépend de l'évaluation des dommages potentiels, de l’évolution de la technologie et de la modification des comportements. De ce point de vue, il semble difficilement envisageable de faire asseoir durablement le financement de certaines prestations

# D. Maillard (1995), “Financement de la protection sociale: quel est le probléme?”, Chroniques économiques de la SEDEIS, septembre.

(2)

sur ce type de prélèvement. Pourtant, la Commission européenne préconise leur recours pour compenser les baisses de cotisations. Enfin, la compensation financière pourrait être réalisée par l’impôt sur le revenu ou par le développement de prélèvements hybrides dont le produit serait affecté au financement de prestations spécifiques. L’impòt sur le revenu porte sur une assiette plus large que les cotisations et serait d’un rendement meilleur. En outre, toute chose égale par ailleurs, la fiscalité serait rendue plus progressive ce qui favoriserait la redistribution et la demande. De même, le recours à des prélèvements proportionnels reposant sur une assiette plus large que les seuls revenus du travail serait de nature à réduire le coût du travail et à favoriser la création d'emplois. Néanmoins, dans tous les cas, si des mesures d’allégement du coût du travail peuvent avoir un impact positif sur l’emploi et la compétitivité, ce n’est qu’au prix d’une diminution du pouvoir d’achat et de la consommation des ménages à court et moyen termes. L'évolution de la structure de financement des systèmes de protection sociale depuis les années ‘90 illustre de manière indirecte les liens étroits existant entre la protection sociale et l’emploi ainsi que la fiscalité. Pour l’ensemble des pays européens, elle se caractérise par une croissance de la part des contributions publiques, une diminution de la part des contributions employeurs et par une augmentation de la part des cotisations à la charge des personnes protégées”. Cette évolution rend compte d’une diversification des sources de financement et d’une certaine convergence des structures de financement des différents systèmes de protection sociale. Ainsi, les pays où les cotisations représentent la principale source de financement font appel de manière accrue à la fiscalité et tendent à déplacer les charges sociales des employeurs vers les salariés. Une tendance opposée se manifeste dans les pays où les prestations ont toujours été financées par la fiscalité générale et où les cotisations n’ont qu’un rôle marginal. Ces changements s’inscrivent dans une orientation commune, dans l’ensemble des pays de l’Union, qui vise l’adaptation des systèmes de protection sociale dans un sens plus favorable à la fiscalité sur le travail et une meilleure adéquation entre les objectifs et les sources de financement de la protection sociale. Dans les différents pays, cette adaptation s’est effectuée par la mise en œuvre de mesures prenant des formes certes variées selon le contexte institutionnel, politique, économique et social propre à chaque pays. Ces mesures ont concerné à la fois les bénéficiaires et les employeurs. Le passage de mesures passives aux mesures actives s’est caractérisé par l'instauration de mécanismes incitatifs pour responsabiliser les individus et éliminer les distorsions induites par certaines prestations sur les comportements d’offre de travail. Ils se sont traduits par l'instauration de conditions plus strictes pour l’accès aux prestations, parfois par la 2? G. Amerini (2000), “La Protection Sociale en Europe”, Statistiques en Bref, Population et conditions de vie, Eurostat, février. Les “personnes protégées” se composent des salariés, des travailleurs indépendants, des retraités et autres personnes.

73

réduction du montant de ces dernières”, par le versement de minima sociaux assortis de l’interdiction de refus d’emploi sans raison valable, et par une tendance

au ciblage” des dépenses vers les personnes qui ont le plus besoin d'assistance. S'agissant des mesures concernant les employeurs, les réformes ont surtout été axées sur l'embauche des chômeurs de longue durée et des titulaires de bas salaires et de faible qualification; elles ont reposé sur le développement de subventions salariales mais surtout sur une réduction sélective des charges sociales. Ces allégements ont évidemment un coût qui n’est pas intégralement supporté par le budget de l'Etat et qui pèse d’un poids non négligeable dans le déficit de la protection sociale. Les Etats membres ont donc été contraints de rechercher de nouvelles sources de financement avec une tendance à affecter les recettes de certains prélèvements” au financement des minima sociaux et à recourir à des taxes pesant sur les ressources naturelles. Ce rééquilibrage entre les diverses sources de financement a pour corollaire l’autonomisation des fonctions d’assurance et de redistribution de la protection sociale. Le principe de l’assurance ou de la contrepartie directe entre les prestations et les cotisations est introduit dans les systèmes à forte fiscalisation et renforcé dans les systèmes relevant des assurances sociales. En revanche, la redistribution qui fait appel à la solidarité nationale est réalisée par la fiscalité. Les prestations non contributives tendent ainsi à être définies comme une composante d’un système plus large de transferts de fonds réalisé par le budget de l’Etat (ou des administrations publiques). Ces tendances devraient à l’avenir se poursuivre car, depuis le sommet de Luxembourg de 1997, les Etats membres se sont engagés dans une stratégie commune de coordination de leur politique d’emploi reposant sur des objectifs partagés. Afin d’atteindre en particulier l’objectif d’employabilité, les différents Etats membres sont incités à poursuivre leurs efforts pour réduire la fiscalité pesant sur le travail et les coûts non salariaux. Selon la ligne directrice 14, les mesures mises en œuvre pour parvenir à cet objectif ne devraient pas remettre en cause l’assainissement des finances publiques et l’équilibre financier des systèmes de

28 C'est le cas de l’Allemagne en 1994 et en Suède en 1996. Pour plus de détails se référer ac VE 2 du rapport élaboré par la Commission européenne sur la Protection Sociale (1995).

°° Le ciblage a évidemment pris des formes spécifiques selon les pays: imposition de

conditions de ressources (cas du Royaume-Uni qui a prévu l’instauration d’une allocation de demandeur d’emploi pour remplacer le système actuel d’indemnisation du chômage), instauration de seuils de revenu (Allemagne, Pays-Bas, Italie et Espagne pour les allocations familiales), limitation des possibilités de cumul des prestations (Grèce et Italie pour les retraites).

3° En France, la création de la CSG (contribution sociale généralisée) et de la CRDS

(contribution au reniboursement de la dette sociale) représentent une première étape de la fiscalisation de la protection sociale. Les recettes perçues par la CSG sont destinées à financer le minimum vieillesse. La Belgique prélève depuis 1994 une contribution similaire: la contribution sociale personnelle.

74

protection sociale. Dans cette perspective, le recours aux taxes sur les activités polluantes et à d’autres mesures fiscales est vivement préconisé. Mais, la stratégie qui sous-tend la mise en œuvre du processus de Luxembourg consiste à instrumentaliser la protection sociale. De ce fait, elle peut être de nature à modifier profondément la logique et la philosophie des systèmes en place. Elle pourrait en effet ouvrir la voie au rôle dominant des mécanismes de concurrence passant par le marché et accroître le risque de “dumping social” notamment si les réformes sont menées dans des contextes macroéconomiques nationaux diversifiés. En effet, le recours a la fiscalité vise certes 4 rendre les systémes de protection

sociale plus cohérents en adaptant les modalités de financement a la nature des prestations servies. Mais, la séparation des objectifs d’assurance et de solidarité qui en découle présente plusieurs dangers. Elle conduit a établir une ligne de démarcation entre les actifs bénéficiant de l’assurance et les inactifs n’ayant d’autres recours que l’aide sociale. Elle peut aboutir a réintroduire l’assistance aux plus démunis et à créer ainsi un dualisme au sein de la société en stigmatisant ses récipiendaires. Mais, le recours à la fiscalité présente également le danger de faire dépendre le financement de certaines prestations de considérations budgétaires et politiques. Ainsi, en tant que composante d’un système de transferts plus général de fonds,

certaines prestations

seraient en concurrence

directe avec

les autres

programmes de dépenses de l’Etat. De ce fait, elles pourraient être les premières victimes d’un renversement de l’échelle des priorités notamment si l’Etat est tenu de respecter une certaine discipline en matière budgétaire. En outre, de manière plus globale, le niveau même de certaines prestations pourrait être menacé, en particulier, si les gouvernements s’appuient sur le retour de la croissance et les effets bénéfiques attendus sur l’emploi de la réduction du coût du travail pour compenser les pertes de recettes induites par les allégements. Mais, la pire des menaces serait alors celle d’une déviation vers un système résiduel. Mais, la mise en œuvre des réformes portant sur la fiscalité du travail restent subordonnées aux orientations de la politique économique et au contexte macroéconomique. Ainsi, l’allégement de la fiscalité portant sur le travail peut avoir des incidences sur les systèmes de protection sociale qui résultent simplement de son application à des pays caractérisés par des différences institutionnelles concernant la fiscalité, les systèmes de protection sociale, les modes de fonctionnement du marché du travail et confrontés à des évolutions divergentes de leurs indicateurs macroéconomiques réels et nominaux. Un pays dont le contexte serait caractérisé par une croissance moins élevée de son PIB, une augmentation prévue de son déficit budgétaire, un faible taux d’emploi, un fort taux de chômage et un niveau élevé de ses prélèvements fiscaux, ne disposerait certainement pas des mêmes marges de manœuvre qu’un pays dont les indicateurs seraient de signes opposés. Les priorités ne sont sûrement pas les mêmes pour ces deux pays. Pour le premier pays ou groupe de pays, l’allégement des charges sociales et la nécessité de respecter les critères de convergence en matière budgétaire pourraient rendre nécessaire une réduction des dépenses sociales ou is

exacerber les problèmes de financement des systèmes de protection sociale. En revanche, un pays ou groupe de pays qui profiterait d’un net redressement conjoncturel et de surplus budgétaires disposerait de quoi dégager les contreparties financières des mesures d’allégement de la fiscalité sur le travail pour assurer l'équilibre des systèmes de protection sociale. De ce point de vue, en raison de contextes macroéconomiques nationaux diversifiés, l'application des lignes directrices du processus de Luxembourg peut contribuer à accroître ou à réduire les contrastes entre les systèmes nationaux de protection sociale. Mais, dans tous les cas, ces réformes structurelles réduisent l’autonomie des systèmes nationaux. Ces

solutions doivent donc être appréhendées dans le contexte du marché unique et de l’unification monétaire.

4. La diversité des systèmes de protection sociale face à l’intégration économique et monétaire Jusque là, nous avons négligé la diversité des systèmes de protection sociale pour cibler notre réflexion sur l’incidence des contraintes imposées par les mesures économiques et monétaires sur le système de protection sociale. Désormais, il convient d’adopter un point de vue intra-européen afin de nous interroger sur les conséquences d’une absence d’harmonisation ou du moins de coordination sur les systèmes de protection sociale. Aux pressions exercées par l’orientation de la politique budgétaire et par la mondialisation s’ajoute une autre contrainte: la concurrence intra-européenne dans le contexte du marché unique. Dans une perspective large, on parvient à identifier des caractéristiques communes aux systèmes européens permettant de définir un modèle social européen que l’on distingue du système américain ou japonais. En revanche, d’un point de vue européen, la protection sociale prend des contenus et des formes divers dans les différents pays en fonction de leur histoire, de leur environnement économique, social et politique. Ils se différencient sur plusieurs aspects: l’organisation, le financement, la structure des prestations et la couverture des risques,

l’éligibilité

aux

prestations.

Sur la base

de ces

différents

critères,

la

Commission européenne dépasse la typologie traditionnelle des deux modèles de protection sociale et regroupe les pays membres en quatre blocs. Ces différences se reflètent dans le coût des systèmes et en particulier dans la part du PIB que les pays membres consacrent aux quatre grands risques: chômage, maladie, vieillesse, famille (charges familiales). En 1997", les dépenses publiques de protection sociale représentent en moyenne 28.2% du PIB. La Grèce, l'Espagne, l'Italie, le Portugal, Luxembourg et l’Irlande consacrent un pourcentage de leur richesse inférieur à cette moyenne. Le Danemark suivi de la Suède et la France forment le peloion de tête avec des dépenses représentant respectivement 33.7% et

*' G. Amerini (2000), op. cit. 76

31.4% et 30.8% du PIB. Mais, les différences entre les pays peuvent être appréciées en considérant les dépenses de protection sociale par habitant en standard de pouvoir d’achat (SPA) ce qui permet de tenir compte des divergences entre pays en matiére de pouvoir d’achat. De ce point de vue, le classement précédent n’est plus totalement valable. En effet, on observe que c’est le Luxembourg qui dépense le plus. Le Portugal et la Grèce enregistrent ici les niveaux les plus bas. Ces écarts résultent de multiples facteurs: démographiques, sociaux, économiques, institutionnels. On ne saurait évidemment tirer quelque conclusion que ce soit sur la générosité des systèmes à partir de ces chiffres. Cette hétérogénéité se reflète également dans la structure de financement des systèmes. Ainsi, en référence à la solidarité professionnelle, les assurances sociales

sont essentiellement financées par des cotisations sociales patronales et salariales. Les cotisations sociales sont prédominantes en France, Belgique, Espagne, PaysBas, Allemagne et Italie. En revanche, dans les systèmes de sécurité sociale, les

recettes proviennent essentiellement de l’impôt. C’est le cas notamment du Danemark, de l’Irlande, de la Norvège et dans une moindre mesure du RoyaumeUni, du Luxembourg et de la Suède. Mais ces structures peuvent évoluer comme nous l’avons évoqué. Par souci de clarification, nous proposons de réduire les disparités des systèmes de protection sociale à ces deux indicateurs. Nous tentons de souligner l’incidence du marché unique et de l’unification monétaire sur l’autonomie et la viabilité des systèmes nationaux de protection sociale. Selon le schéma néoclassique, en raison de la mobilité accrue des facteurs, le

marché unique devrait impliquer une convergence progressive des niveaux de productivité, des coûts et des revenus. La convergence réelle résulterait de la convergence nominale. La coordination ne se justifierait donc pas car le libre jeu du marché devrait conduire de facto à une forme d’harmonisation. Or, il s’agirait

plutôt d’une concurrence sociale (au même titre que la concurrence fiscale) qui pourrait découler de l’organisation économique actuelle. Le marché unique inciterait fortement les ménages à comparer leurs systèmes sociaux. Les pays les plus généreux pourraient attirer la main d’ceuvre la moins qualifiée. Cette migration accentuerait les pressions sur les budgets sociaux. Les pays pourraient alors être tentés de réduire les dépenses sociales face à l’impératif de compétitivité. Mais, dans le même temps, la main d’œuvre qualifiée n’accepterait de migrer dans les pays moins avancés que si elle peut y bénéficier d’un niveau de protection comparable. Une convergence pourrait de ce fait découler de la dynamique du marché unique. Mais, l’hétérogénéité des structures de financement et de manière plus générale de la fiscalité augmente le risque de dévaluation sociale. Compte tenu des masses financières en jeu, le financement de la protection sociale n’est pas sans incidence sur le coût de la main d’œuvre et la compétitivité relative des pays. Alors qu’en régime de changes flexibles, l’utilisation du taux de change permet de corriger l’absence de flexibilité sur le marché du travail, l’unification monétaire supprime UL

cet instrument d’ajustement et en reporte la charge sur les mécanismes de prix. A la rigidité des changes correspondrait la nécessité de la flexibilité sur le marché du travail”, Dans cette perspective, l’impératif de compétitivité pourrait faire jouer les écarts de coûts salariaux (directs et indirects). Ces derniers auraient une incidence directe sur les coûts de production, l'investissement et les choix de localisation des activités. Ces effets pourraient en outre être renforcés par les risques liés à l’absence d'harmonisation fiscale qui inciterait certains pays à adopter des stratégies agressives en matière fiscale pour attirer les facteurs plus mobiles du fait de la disparition du risque de change. La délocalisation des activités pourrait accentuer les difficultés de financement des pays les plus généreux lesquels pourraient être contraints au regard de l’objectif de compétitivité de s’aligner sur les pays les moins regardants du point de vue social. Mais l’intégration peut à l'inverse jouer à l’encontre des pays dont les coûts salariaux sont les plus faibles. Ils pourraient être soumis à une pression à la hausse des rémunérations supérieures à la productivité qui pourraient engendrer des tensions inflationnistes”. Cependant, il n’existe pas de corrélation évidente entre la croissance des coûts salariaux et les performances du commerce extérieur à long terme car ces écarts de coûts ne tiennent pas compte de l’évolution de la productivité qui dépend entre autre de l’efficacité et de la formation de la main d’ceuvre. Ils reflètent en ce sens des différences dans les conditions de travail et le rôle de la protection sociale en tant que facteur d’emploi que l’on tend à l’heure actuelle à omettre en la présentant comme un facteur de rigidité. En outre, les mouvements migratoires passés entre les pays du Sud de l’Europe vers le Nord n’ont pas entraîné une uniformisation des salaires et des conditions de travail*. Néanmoins, la mise en place du processus de Luxembourg pour lutter efficacement contre le chômage révèle que la protection sociale est un volet auquel s'applique la politique de flexibilisation sur le marché du travail. Cette dernière repose sur une activation des prestations et un allégement des charges sociales sur les bas salaires. Elle accentue les contraintes financières des systèmes pouvant certes conduire à un rapprochement de leur structure de financement mais également à une remise en cause profonde de certains acquis sociaux compte tenu de la rigueur imposée aux politiques budgétaires. Ces menaces sont en outre renforcées par le fait que la concurrence fiscale entre les pays membres, en l'absence de coordination, pourrait conduire à une paupérisation du secteur public et à une érosion de la capacité redistributive des gouvernements nationaux". Les

È N. Richez-Battesti (1998), op. cit. M. Berthiaume (1995), “Le risque de dumping social”, dans Les politiques communautaires, La Documentation française, n. 264. Sì Cazes (1995), “L’Europe Sociale”, dans Les politiques communautaires, La Documentation frangaise, n. 264, pp. 73-78. ~ En effet, si les facteurs mobiles de production ne peuvent plus étre imposés, certains facteurs moins mobiles comme le travail non qualifié et la consommation risquent d’étre plus lourdement taxés.

78

tentatives déjà menées en matière d’harmonisation des fiscalités indirectes ont un impact indirect sur la protection sociale. Dans un certain nombre de pays, les recettes de type fiscal représentent une part non négligeable des sources de financement des systèmes sociaux. Le rapprochement des taux occasionnerait des pertes de recettes pour les pays dont le taux est supérieur à la norme. Ces derniers seraient alors contraints de rechercher de nouvelles recettes ou de réduire les dépenses. Enfin, les autres menaces pesant sur l’autonomie des systèmes de protection sociale nationaux proviennent de la dynamique de l’élargissement de l’Union à des pays de niveau économique décalé par rapport à celui des Etats membres actuels. Les réformes de la protection sociale mises en œuvre dans un certain nombre de pays d'Europe de l’Est pourraient conduire à des normes inférieures à celle des Etats membres.

D'ailleurs, en raison de la faiblesse de leurs coûts salariaux et

sociaux, ces pays concurrencent déjà certains secteurs de l’industrie et des services. La rigueur budgétaire, la mise en œuvre de conditions fiscales requises pour l’Union monétaire, la convergence des politiques d’emploi et la dynamique de l’élargissement de l’Union accentuent la crise des systèmes de protection sociale. Les différents pays risquent de rencontrer des difficultés croissantes en matière de financement d’autant que le processus d’intégration est susceptible de faire apparaître de nouveaux besoins sociaux. Ces contraintes réduisent l’autonomie des politiques sociales nationales. Les ajustements et les réformes mis en œuvre dans les différents pays ces dernières années traduisent manifestement l’influence de ses contraintes sur les systèmes de protection sociale. Bien que les réformes visent une maîtrise des coûts des systèmes tout en recherchant à maintenir et à satisfaire leurs objectifs fondamentaux, un certain nombre d’entre elles traduisent pourtant une tendance à instrumentaliser la protection sociale dans le but d’instaurer un cadre favorable au libre jeu du marché. Dans ce contexte, les systèmes de protection sociale seront confrontés à deux défis majeurs: favoriser la croissance tout en maintenant les acquis sociaux. Il est peu probable que la recherche de l'efficacité soit compatible avec l’objectif de redistribution dans un contexte de rigueur. Ces difficultés croissantes peuvent à ce titre conduire par nécessité à faire jouer le principe de subsidiarité et à définir les contours d’une politique sociale commune.

Références Aaron H. J., Bosworth

B. P. et Burtless G. (1989), Can America Afford to Grow Old?

Paying for Social Security, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. Amerini G. (2000), “La protection sociale en Europe”, Statistiques en Bref, Populations et conditions sociales, Eurostat, février.

Artus P. (1998), “Débrider la politique budgétaire européenne”, Sociétal, n. 64. Asimakopulos A. (1989), “Financing Social Security-Who Pays?”, Journal Keynesian Economics, vol. 4, pp. 655-660.

79

of Post

Auerbach A., Gokhale J. et Kotlikoff L. (1994), “Generational Accounting: a Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, n. 8, pp. 73-94. Barro R. J. (1974), “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, J.P.E., vol. 82, pp. 1095-1117. Berenger V. (1998), “Interrogations théoriques sur l’équivalence des systémes de financement de la retraite en termes de finances publiques”, Thése de Doctorat, Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis. Berenger V. (1999),“L’enjeu social de l’intégration de la Hongrie dans |’ Union Européenne: réflexions sur la réforme du régime des pensions”, Journées d’Etudes sur “L’économie hongroise et l’extension de l’Union Européenne”, Nice. Biacade J. L. (1998), “Politique Budgétaire et Politique monétaire en Europe Occidentale”, Les Cahiers français, La Documentation française, n. 284, pp. 69-74.

Breyer F. (1989), “On the Intergenerational Pareto Efficiency of Pay-as-You-Go Financed Pension System”, J.I.T.E., vol. 145, pp. 643-658.

Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, Livre Blanc: Croissance, Compétitivité, Emploi, Chapitre 9 “L’ effet des prélèvements obligatoires”. Cazes C. (1995), “L'Europe Sociale”, Les Cahiers français, n. 264, pp. 73-79. Commission européenne (1995), La protection Sociale, rapport de la direction générale de l'emploi, des relations industrielles et des affaires sociales. D’Arvesinet P. (1999), La politique économique conjoncturelle, Dunod, Paris. Diamond P. A. (1965), “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model”, A.E.R., vol. 55,

pp. 1126-1150. Drees (ed.), “La Protection Sociale dans les pays de l’Union Européenne”, Chiffres Repères, collection études et statistiques, La Documentation française, pp. 102-132. Dumont J. P (1998), Les systèmes de protection sociale en Europe, Economica, Paris. Dupuis J. M. (1994), Le financement de la protection sociale, Que Sais-je?, n. 2915, PUF. Dupuis J. M. (1995), “Les enjeux du financement de la Protection Sociale”, CERCAssociation, Actes de la journée d'étude consacrée aux «prélèvements obligatoires». Euzeby A. et C. (1983), “Modalités de financement de la sécurité sociale, coût de la main d’ceuvre et emploi dans les pays industrialisés de marché”, dans Sécurité Sociale: Quelle méthode de financement?, BIT, Genève, pp. 53-114.

Euzeby A. (1996), “Les impôts et le financement de la protection sociale”, Cahiers Français, La Documentation française, pp. 43-54. Feldstein M. (1974), “Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital Accumulation”, J.P.E., vol. 82, pp. 905-926. 2 Feldstein M. (1976), “The Social Security Fund and National Capital Accumulation”, dans “Funding Pensions: Issues and Implications for Financial Capital Markets”, Conference Series n. 16, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, pp. 32-71. Feldstein M. (1997), “Transition to a Fully Funded Pension System; Five Economic Issues”, N.B.E.R. Working Paper, n. 6149, pp. 1-24. Ferrara P. J. (ed.) (1985), Social Security: Prospects for Real Reform, Cato Institute, Washington D.C. Gokhale J. et Raffelhüschen B. (2000), “Population aging and Fiscal Policy in Europe and the United States”, CESifo W.P., n. 237, p. 1-15. Herce J., Sosvilla-Rivero S. et Lucio de J. J. (1998), “A time-series examination of convergence in social Protection across EU countries”, Working Paper 98-10, pp. 1-14. Maillard D. (1995), “Financement de la Protection Sociale: Quel est le Probléme?”, Chroniques Economiques. de la Sedeis, septembre. Marmor J. et Mashaw J. (1988), Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis, Princeton University Press. Palley T. (1998), “The Economics of Social Security: an Old Keynesian Perspective”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 21, n. 1, pp. 93-110.

80

Pestieau P. (1996), “Politique sociale, redistribution et intégration économique”, Actualité

économique, Revue d'analyse économique., vol. 72, n. 3, pp. 275-289. Philip L. (1995), Les finances sociales: Unité ou Diversité?, Economica, Paris.

Richez-Battesti N. (1998), La Sécurité Sociale, A. Colin, Paris Rosanvallon P. (1992), La Crise de l'Etat Providence, Seuil, Paris. Samuelson P. A. (1975), “Optimal Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model”, International Economic Review, vol. 16, pp. 539-544. Sauron J. L. (1997), “Le conseil extraordinaire du Luxembourg des 20 et 21 novembre 1997 pour l’emploi: Synergie des politiques communautaires et intégration des politiques nationales, ou la résurgence de la planification à la française”, Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, n. 413, dec., pp. 649-655. Stein B. (1980), Social Security in Transition, The Free Press, Macmillan, New York, London. Sterdyniack H., Fourmann E. et al. (1994), “Lutter contre le chômage: des politiques macroéconomiques traditionnelles à la réduction du temps de travail”, Revue de l'OFCE, Obs. et Diag. Eco., n. 48. Verbon H. A. .A. (1988), On the Evolution of Public Pension Schemes, Academisch Proefschrift Offsedruckkerij Kanters B.V., Alblasserdam. World Bank (1994), “Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to protect the Old and Promote Growth”, Policy Research Bulletin, vol. 5, n. 4.

81

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON IN THE SPACE ADMINISTRATIVE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK OF THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC Raffaele BOLDRACCHI" 1. Foreword The process of European integration is now reaching a turning point and the debate over the future of the European Union is gaining momentum. The present inter-governmental conference (IGC) is negotiating some important changes to the EU Treaty and, at the same time, the demand for a “first European Constitution” is growing among some of the most important European leaders in order to take decisions about the Union’s final shape. The rapid growth of international trade and the emergence of global financial markets have produced the globalisation of production, markets, labour and technology in a wide range of sectors. The members of the European Union have to develop a closer integration by which the EU members could become economically and politically brought together. This integration process could make a difference in a challenging and fast changing global economy, by modifying member States policies and establishing general rules that will constrain the member States behaviour. x This EU integration process requires the definition of a set of principles for the establishment of a “European Governance” system based on common rules aimed, inter alia, at the strengthening of the economic competitiveness of an enlarged Europe. The EU leaders are presently engaged in the process of drafting a “Charter of Fundamental Rights” to define the fundamental human rights for the whole of the EU citizens, adhering to a specific request made by the European Council of Cologne (June 1999). The final draft should be discussed during the next meeting of the European leaders in Biarritz (October 2000). This is a positive step, although the European Convention on Human Rights and the laws of the members States are already exhaustively defining such a list of human rights.

* Since1996, R. Boldracchi is a member of the “External Monitoring & Assessment Unit”

for the PHARE Programme. European Commission.

Its opinion does not necessarily reflect the ones of the

82

It is however impossible to conceive the establishment of a “European Governance” system without reaching consensus on a common set of rules and principles valid for the public administration at “Union-wide” level. The development of an effective and efficient public administration system has indeed a specific relevance in view of the establishment of a “European Administrative Space — EAS' that could become part of the first European Constitution. According to the OECD’, the EAS should be intended as «the set of common standards for action within public administration which are defined by law and enforced in practice through procedures and accountability mechanisms». The issue of a common administrative law, for all the sovereign States integrated into the European Union, has been debated since the setting up of the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty has created the “Office of the European Ombudsman” with the mandate to make inquiries about possible instances of “maladministration'” in the activities of Community Institutions and bodies. Its activity builds on the principle that “the administration exists to serve the citizens and not vice versa”. No common

agreement exists, however, on the

definition of a common set of principles ruling the public administration, and the on going debate generated by the perceived need for a “First European Constitution” could also address the important issue of the setting up of a common “European Administrative Space”. In any case,

whatever

the institutional

framework

conceived

for the “New

Europe” will be, it will need to take the on-going EU enlargement process into consideration. À “New Europe” enlarged to the ten candidate Countries of Eastern and Central Europe* will indeed require the establishment of a closer co-operation among the member States in order to reach consensus to implement some major changes to the existing organisational structures of the European Institutions. On the other hand, the candidate countries have to develop an institutional framework capable to implement the “Acquis Communautaire”(the acquis) and to enable a market economy to function effectively. This paper deals with the complex institutional framework in which the European Union - simultaneously with the implementation of the on going integration process - presently carries out the eastward enlargement. The paper ' SIGMA Paper (1998), “Preparing Public Administration for the European Administrative Space”, OECD, n. 23, Paris.

? Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 3 SIGMA Paper (1999), “European principles for Public Administration”, OECD, n. 27, Paris. * The European Ombudsman proposed the following definition of maladministration: “Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it”. See SIGMA-Public Management Forum (2000), “The EU Ombudsman and Good Administration”, vol. VI, 1.

> SIGMA-Public Management Forum, “op. cit.”. $ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.

83

describes the strategic relevance and complexity of the on going reform of the public administration implemented by the ten candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The second part focuses on the main phases of the reform process, and the reform strategy developed by the Government of the Czech Republic is described as an example of the reform trends presently existing in the Region. Finally, some conclusions on how the reform process could contribute to the establishment of a “European Administrative Space” are submitted for consideration and discussion.

2. Reform of Public Administration and the Accession Strategy In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council first established general criteria for accession. It covers stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law (...) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the ability to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. The ability to fulfil the obligations of membership was also identified as a crucial issue. In June 1995, the Cannes European Council welcomed the White Paper on “Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the Internal Market of the Union”. The document clearly defined the legal and administrative implications of the internal market for the candidate countries. It implied that the main challenge of the associated countries did not only lie in the approximation of their legislation to the acquis, but also in «(...) adapting their administrative machinery and their societies to the conditions necessary to make the legislation work (...)». In December 1995, the Madrid European Council concluded that the harmonious integration into the European Union of “Central and Eastern European” States would require the adjustment of their administrative structures. To be effective within the enlarged European Union, future members must indeed be able to address Union-wide issues, by involving their entire government and administration. They must have a professional and well-trained civil service; effective policy-making and inter-ministerial co-ordination systems; a wellperforming judiciary, and comprehensive financial planning and control mechanisms. Future members also must integrate and adopt the 31 Chapters in which the entire acquis has been divided, and be able to implement the Community directives and policies effectively. All the Central and Eastern Europe countries - with the exception of Albania, Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - have deposited their application for membership and have already concluded association agreements. The ten candidate countries have a number of challenges on the road to full integration, which previous entrants do not have to face. The simultaneous process of transition to the rule of democracy and to the market economy as well as the preparation for the eventual “EU accession” creates

84

an additional burden on the administrative capacities of candidates countries. This is particularly true in comparison with Greece, Portugal and Spain — which joined the European Union in the 1980s — but is also true in comparison with Austria, Sweden and Finland — which joined the European Union in 1995. The growing body of EU Law adds significantly to the workload of preparing for accession, at times straining the capacity of Central and Eastern European administrations to manage the formulation, approval, implementation and control of policy and legislation. The acquis not only comprise all the European Union law inscribed under the first pillar of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and interpretations of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, but all the intergovernmental agreements that are in the second and third pillars of those Treaties as well. Moreover, the acquis is not static, and applying the acquis of today is not sufficient. Candidate countries must organise their administrations so as to be able to fulfil an evolving acquis when they will become members of the Union and to allow their market economy to compete with the ones of the other EU members. According to the joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union “SIGMA” (i.e.: Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European countries), «(...) /nsufficient administrative and judicial capacities in new member States could impede progress of the European construction». No acquis exists however for the establishment of a standard system of national Public Administration. The targets and orientation for Public Administration are consequently less distinct and none of the 31 Chapters into which the acquis has been subdivided actually tackles the Public Administration issue.

3. The four phases of reforming public administration in Central and Eastern European Countries Looking at the different stages of development, it is possible to identify some common stages of development in the process of public administration reform for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, since its start between 1989 and 1990*. During the initial phase of transformation the old legal, political, social and economic orders are replaced by new structures. The institutional framework is changing due to the emergence of multi party systems; to regular elections at national, regional and local level; to the overhaul of public sector institutions; to the formulation and partial implementation of more or less radical economic reform programme. At this stage the results are varied and often fragmentary. 7 SIGMA-Public Management Forum (2000), “Administrative capacities for EU membership”, vol. VI, 1. 8 Nuffield College (1997), “Strategic Options for Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe”, University of Oxford, (UK), August.

85

Volatile voting patterns, unstable coalitions and conflict of power between existing governmental institutions are common as privatisation programmes incomplete and institutional arrangements and re-arrangements short-lived. Presently, all the ten candidate countries have successfully passed the transformation phase. Among the Balkan countries, only the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Croatia have partially completed the transformation phase. Albania is still in the transformation phase and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has never started it. The transformation phase is followed by the consolidation one. Increased political stability is supportive of a more systematic and effective approach to the transition to the market economy. Whilst the political and institutional framework still remain affected by unsolved constitutional issues, the programme of economic transformation began to show first encouraging results concerning the development of the private sector. Less erratic voting behaviour supports the expectations of continuity, proving to be expedient to stimulate, attract and sustain in the countries the utmost necessary foreign direct investments. This phase emerges as being conducive to a more rational approach at evaluating and reforming the public sector. Among the candidate countries, only Romania and Bulgaria are still in the process of consolidation, although the Bulgarian Government is approaching the end of this phase. The stability referred to is expedient for the implementation of a medium-term approach that - differently from the ad hoc measures adopted to start the transition process towards the market economy under the above mentioned phases of reform - led to the third phase of modernisation. This phase is characterised by the perceived need to reform the institutional arrangements seeking “best practice” as well as to secure the implementation of various policies. Unresolved problems and newly emerging deficiencies suggests, finally, a redefinition of the public sector, its extent, role and institutional make-up. It became increasingly clear that the private sector would, in the long run, produce sustainable results only if based on a

comprehensive and binding legal framework supported, regulated and controlled by an efficient and reliable public administrative sector. Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic are in the process of completing this modernisation phase. A fourth phase, partially overlapping with the modernisation one, is that of adaptation towards the best practice of the public administration sector as observed in Western environments, as well as towards the requirements brought

about by the EU accession process. The administrative capacities as well as the regulatory instruments (Approximation of legislation) needed in order to adopt and implement the acquis, requires enormous legislative, institutional and procedural adjustment to be made by the applicants countries and this adaptation process has been given a high priority in the countries concerned. The National Administrations are progressing with the adoption and implementation of the 31 Chapters of the acquis at a different speed. So far, Estonia and Czech Republic (13 chapters opened), Slovenia (12 chapters opened), Hungary and Poland (11

86

Chapters opened), are the most advanced’ among the candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The four stages of “transformation”, “consolidation”, “modernisation” and “adaptation” have to be considered placing the necessary attention into the different “starting point” having characterised the ten candidate countries in terms of specific legacies, state traditions or indeed different administrative cultures. Attempts at generalizing specific findings are made difficult by the simple fact the candidate countries are still at very different stages of their administrative development.

National

context,

state traditions, administrative

cultures, etc. are

often too different to allow for comparable responses. Convergent problem structures may prevail, but differentiated responses are called for. There is a tendency to place over — emphasis on issues of central government at the expenses of an under-estimation of the need to build up regional capacities. Moreover, it appears that improved processes of horizontal co-ordination are urgently needed. A specific characteristic of some of the candidate countries is not only that cooperation or even communication channels between and among ministries remain under-developed, but also that a basic understanding of the need to establish and

maintain such processes with other levels of government is lacking. The most advanced countries (i.e.: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland

and Estonia) have gone through this development process although, so far, no candidate country has fully achieved the results expected by the end of the adaptation phase.

4, The reform of public administration in the Czech Republic In its 1998 Regular Report”, the Commission pointed out the lack of progress made in public administration reform (PAR), stating that «(...) the Czech Republic has recognised the PAR as a priority but has not yet taken the necessary steps to translate that political commitment into concrete actions». The absence of a “Civil Service Law”, low remuneration, and the lack of civil service-wide training, impeded — according to the Report — the development of a modern and effective

administration, capable of applying the acquis. The Government recognised the need for a reform of public administration since the early 1990s and the Government resolution N. 202, March 1998 reiterated the commitment to the reform. In 1999, the Government approved several documents providing a basic framework for the public administration reform, among them “Concept of Public Administration Reform” and the “Concept of the ? Among all the countries aspiring for EU membership, Cyprus opened 16 Chapters, Malta opened 7 Chapters, Slovakia opened 6 Chapters, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania opened 5 Chapters, Bulgaria opened 4 Chapters. (Source: European Commission — May 2000).

10 The Commission’s 1998 Regular Report on the Progress Made by the Czech Republic towards membership in the EU.

87

Training of Public Officials”. In March 2000 the Government approved the proposal of the “Civil Service Law”. In January 2000, the “Act on the Establishment of Higher Territorial Self-Governing Units” came into effect, providing the basis for the reform of territorial administration decentralisation. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approved a package of laws enabling the transfer of competencies to regional authorities. Since the largest part of the Public Administration system is the territorial administration, the strategic goals and legislative support are related, as a priority, to the reform of territorial administration and subsequent reform of government. The Transition Phase of Public administration reform will start after the elections to regional councils (November 2000). By this date the regional state administration and self-government bodies will have been established. All other changes will be connected with the transfer of competencies from central state administration to regional state administration and self-government, and with the incorporation of some special state administration authorities in the territory into the general competence bodies. In accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Concept of Public Administration Reform proposes to retain a twotier model of self-government: municipality and region. Also thanks to the support provided by the EU-PHARE Programme, that allocated Euro 5.6 million to support the reform since 1992, the Government of the Czech Republic has registered substantial achievements in, mainly, the development of the infrastructure of decision-making and resources on which reform efforts depend. The Concept of Public administration reform is based on four main topics: Orientation on the Citizen and further democratisation of public administration - Achievement of European standards - Establishment of a professional civil service - Efficiency of public administration. In the light of the Czech Republic’s intention to progress its EU accession as quickly as possible, there is however a need for urgency. Specific administrative adaptations and innovations have to be introduced to meet EU requirements. An efficient and well-trained civil service is necessary if negotiations with the EU are to be successfully completed and the country’s interests successfully pursued subsequently. In a recent technical paper, the World Bank concludes, about the Public Administration Reform in the Czech Republic: «(...) the Czech Republic’s public administration is functioning reasonably well by candidate country standards, but still fall short of EU member country standards. In the area of human resource management, a number of weaknesses are apparent". (...)». In summary, the strategy recently developed by the Government represents a sound agenda for the reforms needed both to implement the acquis and to develop the public administration generally. However, there is still need to make considerably progress in implementing the reform — particularly in the field of à World Bank (2000), “Ready for Europe. Public Administration Reform and EU Accession in Central and Eastern Europe”, Technical Paper, n. 466, May.

88

Civil Servant management and training - and is unlikely that such a progress could be achieved before 2002-2003.

5. Conclusion

The on going process of EU integration is carried out in parallel with the historical process of enlarging eastward the Union and the candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe are facing an extremely complex dual challenge. They have to implement an effective transition towards democracy and market economy and, on the other side, they have to adjust their administrative structures in order to ensure the harmonious operation of the EU policies after accession and to actually implement their legislation. The reform of the public administration has a strategic relevance, not only vis-à-vis the implementation of the acquis, but also to enable a market economy to function effectively and with an increased transparency of the legislation regarding the legislation on Internal Market issues. Reform of public administration is notoriously difficult and slow. Partly, that is because of its nature: it has a high potential for political disagreement; it affects the public very directly; and it involves trying to produce change at a deep level in large organisation, which may be at best apathetic and at worst hostile towards the process. À general consensus exists among the democratic states about the basic factors of success for any sound and modern reform of the public administration. It’s encompassing the principle of reliability and predictability (legal certainty); openness and transparency; accountability and, finally, efficiency and effectiveness”. The most advanced countries among the “ten Candidate Countries” are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. They are in the process of completing the difficult phase of reforming their public administrations in order to adjust their legislative, institutional and procedural system to the one of the EU. This adjustment process is presently carried out with the full commitment of the respective Government and is based — as in the case of the Czech Republic - on pillars well on line with the above-mentioned principles. The first countries admitted to join, in a few years, the Union should have developed — also thanks to the support provided by the European Commission - a modern and effective public administration systems capable to effectively contribute to the establishment of a common European Administrative Space. Adequate strategies have been developed, learning from the experience of the most advanced countries, and are under implementation. This is however a difficult and slow political process and it is unlikely to such a process will completed for two or three years. The non-compliance with the principle of transparency and effectiveness required by a European Administrative Space could negatively affect the readiness 12? SIGMA-Public Management membership”, vol. VI, 1.

Forum

(2000),

89

“Administrative

capacities

for

EU

for an integrated and enlarged Europe. The need to reform the public administration is however not limited to the candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe. All the EU member States should be invited to review and to assess the performances of their public administration vis-à-vis the need to ensure the transparency and effectiveness of the administrative procedures as a tool to support, inter alia, the economic competitiveness in a global economy. For those countries where the effectiveness and efficiency of Public Administrations are inadequate, the process of reform should be speeded up as a matter of urgency. Non-compliance with the principle of transparency and effectiveness required by a European Administrative Space could negatively affect their readiness for an integrated and enlarged Europe.

References SIGMA Papers (1998), “Preparing Public Administration for the European Administrative Space”, OECD, n. 23, Paris.

SIGMA Papers (1999), “European principles for public administration”, OECD, n. 27, Paris. SIGMA-Public Management Forum (2000), “The EU Ombudsman and Good Administration”, vol. VI, 1. SIGMA-Public Management Forum (2000), “Administrative capacities for EU membership”, vol. VI, 1. NUFFIELD COLLEGE, (1997), “Strategic Options for Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe”, University of Oxford (UK), August. WORLD BANK Technical Paper (2000), “Ready for Europe. Public Administration Reform and EU Accession in Central and Eastern Europe”, n. 466, May. x

90

HETEROGENEITE ADMINISTRATIVE LOCALE ET INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE: HANDICAP OU OPPORTUNITE POUR LE CITOYEN? (LE CAS DE L'ESPACE PUBLIC TRANSFRONTALIER FRANCO-ITALIEN) Robert BOTTEGHI Université de Nice — Sophia Antipolis, France

1. Les territoires frontaliers en Europe: des espaces de questionnement sur le type d’intégration territoriale européenne Lorsqu’est abordée la question du type d’intégration en Europe, on fait généralement référence aux grands débats classiques sur la construction européenne. Ils portent sur l’opposition traditionnelle entre la construction fédérale et celle de l’Europe des patries, entre la communauté dirigée par la Commission et la coopération intergouvernementale. Ces débats sont aussi anciens que le Marché Commun. Progressivement les médias et une partie de l’opinion publique se sont intéressés à cette question mais elle est encore largement l’apanage de cercles restreints. Paradoxalement, au cours de cette dernière décennie, de manière indirecte, des

acteurs locaux et des citoyens sont confrontés à celle-ci dans leur vie quotidienne. Ce sont les acteurs publics des collectivités locales des territoires frontaliers (frontières intra-communautaire). Pourquoi? Depuis le début des années 1990, une initiative communautaire (PIC Interreg) a mis en relief cette question du type d’intégration européenne à l’échelle de la gestion publique territoriale'. Cette initiative a fonctionné tout à la fois comme un révélateur, un stimulateur et souvent comme un amplificateur de situations paradoxales telle que la coopération transfrontalière de proximité entre les entités publiques infra-étatiques des Etats de l’Union Européenne. A leur début, les coopérations transfrontalières se sont établies sur la base de bonnes relations de voisinage, d’affinités culturelles ou identitaires et/ou historiques, sur l’utilité de rapprochement afin de bénéficier d’aides financières, voire sur la nécessité de se regrouper pour “faire masse critique”. Dans un deuxième temps et progressivement apparaît la question de fond: “quel est le sens

' Communauté Européenne, Programme d'initiative communautaire Interreg, C(90), 1562/3 du 30.08.1990.

91

de l’action commune entre collectivités territoriales situées dans deux systèmes politico-administratifs différents?” En effet cette ligne de discontinuité que constitue une frontière intracommunautaire, qui dans de nombreux cas sépare des bassins de vie quotidienne (en cours d'intégration rapide pour les acteurs socio-économiques de la sphère du privé) où les ruptures physiques sont de moins en moins perceptibles, porte en elle une forte connotation anthropologique. Pour chacun des Etats contigus, à la frontière ou au confins sont attachées des traditions historiques, un ordre symbolique, des représentations collectives et en particulier un “paysage territorial” de nature et d’expression différente’. Les collectivités territoriales dans leur ordonnancement, dans la répartition des

compétences, des moyens humains et financiers, des pratiques en particulier culturelles, sont de nature profondément hétérogène. Le cas de la frontière franco-italienne est ici intéressant à étudier comme “espace frictionnel” entre deux visions et deux traditions de la République et de leurs ensembles territoriaux. L’auteur de cette contribution est un praticien d’un de ces “laboratoires d’action-recherche” que constituent les lieux de coopération transfrontalière de proximité entre collectivités publiques (frontières franco-italiennes terrestres et maritimes). De par sa fréquentation assidue des universitaires français et italiens, 1l privilégie tout à la fois une approche pluri-disciplinaire et interculturelle*. Le présent document n’a pas vocation a exposer une thése mais a interpeller les chercheurs afin qu’ils se préoccupent d’un nouveau champ d’ investigation. Cet engagement est d’autant plus important que l’on trouve trop peu de travaux sur ce theme et que les quelques écrits disponibles sont principalement des témoignages ponctuels. Or une expérience qui n’est pas “portée au langage” demeure aveugle, confuse et incommunicable.

Aujourd’hui dans cette communication noys nous limitons a poser deux interrogations: o l’hétérogénéité administrative locale est-elle un handicap à l’intégration territoriale européenne? e l’intégration territoriale européenne est-elle stimulée et enrichie par l’hétérogénéité administrative locale? ? M. Foucher (1994), Fronts et frontières: un tour du monde géopolitique, Fayard, Paris; D. Nordman (1998), Frontières de France, NRF Ed. Gallimard. i teo (1998), “L’unité d’Etat: entre indivisibilité et pluralisme”, Revue de droit public, 5/6. n. ‘ R. Botteghi (1995), “Du développement local aux financements communautaires”, Actes des rencontres européennes “Discontinuité et cohésion des territoires frontaliers”, Nice,

Janvier; “Territoires frontaliers: discontinuité et cohésion”, Sciences de la société, n. 37;

“Politique d’aménagement d’un euro-territoire franco-italien”, Université Lille II - CRAPS septembre, 1996; Les directives territoriales d’aménagement (DTA), Le contenu de la DTA des Alpes-Maritimes — La prise en compte du transfrontalier. “Le mouvement dans les esprits préfigure celui dans l’espace”, CNRS, UNSA — Valbonne, février, 2000.

92

2. L’hétérogénéité administrative locale: handicap à l'intégration du territoire européen? L’émergence du “fait transfrontalier” dans le champ des collectivités infra étatiques est un phénomène récent (début 1990) et inégalement réparti dans l’espace national. Ce “fait transfrontalier”° dans son acception actuelle trouve son origine dans le double mouvement quasi simultané de la construction européenne et de la décentralisation de l’autonomie locale. Le premier mouvement s’exprime localement par la mise en œuvre à partir des années 1989/90 du programme d’initiative communautaire Interreg. Au travers de cette initiative la Commission Européenne s’est fixé comme objectif “d’assurer la cohésion de l’espace européen, à faire que les frontières nationales ne soient pas un obstacle au développement équilibré et à l’intégration du territoire européen”. Sa démarche vise à intégrer les deux systèmes nationaux de gestion de la procédure et considère sa zone d’intervention comme homogène. Le second mouvement est une combinaison complexe de déconcentration des politiques d’Etat, de mise en œuvre du principe de subsidiarité, de recherche de nouvelles relations entre l’Etat et les collectivités territoriales et de formes d’alliance entre ces dernières. Cependant la décentralisation en France et l’autonomie locale en Italie sont de nature constitutionnelle fort différentes. Elles expriment une vision de l’unité de l'Etat,

de

la cohésion

nationale,

du

pluralisme

et de

l’indivisibilité

de

la

souveraineté, du territoire historique opposé. Dans la tradition française la cohésion nationale exige que soit assurée une certaine uniformité du droit’. L’exigence d’uniformité sur le territoire national trouve son ancrage dans le principe fondamental français de l’unité de l’Etat... et donc de ce territoire. Tandis que la vision actuelle en Italie intègre des préceptes fort différents tel que le fédéralisme administratif, la subsidiarité et le “présidentialisme” pour les Régions qui désormais ont fait l’objet d’un grand transfert de compétences de l'Etat. Comme en Espagne, l'Italie ne conjugue pas l’unité nationale avec l’homogénéité territoriale. Pour reprendre une formule d’actualité, les deux nations

° R. Botteghi, “op. cit”. © La notion de “fait transfrontalier” est ici utilisée pour manifester l’imprécision actuelle dans le langage des praticiens et des chercheurs de la notion de “transfrontalier”. 7R. Botteghi, “Elements de comparaison de gestion des services publics locaux en France et en Italie”, Université Paris X — Nanterre — CRIX (Centre de Recherche sur l’Italie Contemporaine). In “Italie, années 1990”, Civilisation de l'Italie contemporaine, n. 7 et 8,

1995/6. è H. B: Hubrecht (1998), “Quarante ans après, un Etat garant de la cohésion nationale”, Revue de droit public, n. 5/6.

93

vivent dans une “République plurielle”. L’hétérogénéité administrative (à des degrés divers) intra-nationale est un fait courant. Les collectivités territoriales de ces espaces frontaliers contigus sont situées dans un environnement de “préceptes constitutionnels” non homogènes. Elles sont en conséquence confrontées à un double enjeu. e “Penser leur territoire” dans l’espace pertinent de la vie quotidienne: le bassin de vie ou d’emploi transfrontalier. Pour l’entreprise, le banquier, le commerçant, le consommateur,

le citoyen

ou l'électeur dorénavant (droit de vote pour les Européens aux élections locales), une frontière intra-communautaire exerce de moins en moins de fonction de séparation, de dissociation ou de protection. L'intégration

européenne homogènes

se réalise progressivement

et ces espaces

de vie deviennent

et non uniforme (l'identité, la langue, la culture constituent des

éléments spécifiques). “Gérer et administrer” une partie du territoire dans des systèmes politicoadministratifs hétérogènes. Chaque collectivité territoriale agit dans le cadre d’un droit public national et d’un droit public international qui encadre les relations transfrontalières?. Cette problématique est accentuée par une certaine intégration des formes et méthodes des politiques publiques dans des Etats comme la France et l’Italie par exemple. Ce que l’on nomme désormais: la “territorialisation” des politiques publiques qui vise à mettre en œuvre une vision globale du projet collectif et une relation contractualisée sur le moyen terme". La fonction de différenciation que joue la frontière éclaire la question de l’hétérogénéité administrative locale dans le territoire européen.

e

Certains

trouveront

là, la cause

de la faiblesse

d'engagement

direct

des

collectivités publiques dans le programme Interreg et donc un frein à l’intégration européenne. Les évaluations de ces politiques et l’observation continue de la pratique attestent que l’engagement de ces collectivités s’est réalisé au coup par coup, sans information préalable sur les réalités du voisinage, sans formation des autorités ou des professionnels, sans connaissance réciproque et sans méthodologie. D’où des résultats mitigés et aléatoires.

° L. Balmond (1996), “Quelques réflexions sur la coopération transfrontalière francoitalienne”, Actes séminaire sur la coopération franco-italienne, Université de Nice — IDPD, Ceral, octobre; Y. Luchaire (1995), “Le cadre juridique francais de l’action extérieure des collectivités territoriales, Le droit appliqué à la coopération interrégionale en Europe”, LGDJ, Paris; Accord du 26 novembre 1993, entre le gouvernement de la République francaise et le gouvernement de la République italienne concernant la coopération transfrontalière entre collectivité territoriales; Convention-cadre européenne du 21 mai 1980, sur la coopération transfrontalière des collectivités ou autorités locales. V. Poiter (2000), “République et territoires”, La Gazette, 17 avril.

94

On a refait de la géographie et on a mis en construction un vrai discours sur un projet commun. Pour la France, l’Etat, au cours de cette période, limitait son action à la mise en œuvre des accords internationaux passés dans les années ‘80 (accord de Madrid de 1984) et suscitait un tout premier outil tel que la Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT). Il n’affichait pas de stratégie formelle et s’exprimait peu sur le sens de l’action. En Italie, le système de répartition des fonctions et pouvoir étant différent, l'Etat central a assumé ces obligations dans la mise en œuvre des accords internationaux (Rome, Traité franco-italien 1994) et ce sont les Régions qui, comme institution ont porté la problématique transfrontalière territoriale. La question de l’hétérogénéité administrative se pose de manière antinomique dans les deux Etats et leur vision de l’intégration européenne en découle. L’autonomie législative des Régions italiennes, la constitution de 1947 au caractère pré-fédéral, les lois récentes (lois Bassanini) et le débat politique public sur le “fédéralisme administratif” pose en terme très ouvert la question du type d'intégration européenne et de l’hétérogénéité administrative locale. Il s’agit presque d’une réalité courante pour toutes les collectivités publiques italiennes. En contre point la situation française est tout à fait différente. Au cours des années ‘90, en France, domine la vision d’une construction intergouvernementale de l’intégration européenne. La “souveraineté législative” n’est pas partagée par l'Etat; la pratique de l’unité et de l’indivisibilité de ce dernier limite tout mouvement visant à engager une “discrimination positive du droit” pour faire face à des situations spécifiques. La loi nationale est toujours très complète et fort détaillée et laisse peu de place aux règlements, qui autoriserait la prise en compte des adaptations locales. L’Etat est en position de retrait, d'observation et ne veut pas affronter cette hétérogénéité administrative locale. Il va même plus loin, considérant que cette situation constitue un “système protecteur” du territoire national et trouvant par là une réponse appropriée à la question de la “confrontation transfrontalière” qu’il privilégie naturellement à celle de la coopération. La conséquence de cette situation est d’entraîner une “externalisation des maîtrises d’ouvrage transfrontalières”. Les collectivités locales françaises ne pouvant pas trouver dans la “boite à outils française” les instruments nationaux appropriés à leur projet, ayant à leur côté un Etat “sans projet”, vont rechercher leur maîtrise d’ouvrage dans le dispositif du pays voisin, qui semble plus apte a gérer cette hétérogénéité administrative.

!! “Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière”, Actes du colloque de Biarritz, 2000.

95

e

Fe Deux cas pour illustrer ce mouvement: Pays l’Euro-cité de e l’observatoir de GIEI le nole, franco-espag frontière la pour whe

Basque a son siège à San Sebastian (E);

e

pour la frontière franco-allemande, le projet “Eurozone” (zone d’activités transfrontaliére franco-allemande entre le Land de Sarre, le Département de la Moselle, les Villes de Forbach et de Sarrebruck) porté par la société de promotion économique de la ville de Sarrebruck (GIU: Gesellschaft für Innovation und Unternehmensforderung mbH) en attendant un groupement local de coopération transfrontalière.

Ces processus sont récents et les exemples en nombre limités certes. Il convient de poursuivre l’observation et d’approfondir la confrontation entre praticiens et chercheurs.

3. L’intégration européenne stimulée et enrichie par l’hétérogénéité administrative locale L’hétérogénéité administrative locale est une donnée objective, peut-être intangible. Elle peut apparaître comme un handicap à l’intégration territoriale européen,

mais

aussi

comme

un

atout,

une

richesse

dans

la construction

européenne. La prise en compte d’une “Europe territoriale plurielle” éclaire la coopération transfrontalière de proximité des collectivités locales d’une autre lumière. La vision d’une coopération transfrontalière dont l’objet est “d’effacer la frontière” porte en elle l’objectif d’une homogénéisation de la gestion locale. Elle cherche une réponse rationnelle et globalisante à la question de l’hétérogénéité administrative locale. Elle vise à assumer seule l’échec des propositions conduisant clairement à l’Europe politique, à réduire les fractures engendrées par l’intégration de l’économie qui se réalise par des voies complexes et tortueuses. Les premières analyses des pratiques locales indiquent une autre voie dans laquelle la prise en compte de cette hétérogénéité constitue un facteur d’enrichissement et de stimulation de l’intégration européenne. Un des desseins fondamentaux du “fait transfrontalier” est d’assurer une recomposition territoriale utile à la définition d’une échelle pertinente (par exemple en matière de service public de proximité) capable d’assurer cohérence et continuité de l’action publique. La globalisation économique engendre le renforcement des mouvements identitaires au sein des populations. La démocratie locale constitue fondamentalement un moyen fort pour le citoyen d’exprimer cette identité, de la préserver voire de la promouvoir. Les modes de gestion locale sont une des composantes de ces cultures territoriales et la recomposition territoriale de l’Europe pose des questions fondamentales qu’il convient de traiter dans le temps.

96

Ces questions tournent autour des concepts de peuple, d’Etat-nation, d’unité, de souveraineté”,

de solidarité,

de sécurité,

de liberté.

Elles

débouchent

sur

la

question la plus difficile de la construction européenne: le sens politique de l’Europe, les droits fondamentaux des Européens, le sens du vivre ensemble. Vaste champ de recherche interdisciplinaire qui s’ouvre là. A l’exemple de la géopolitique qui s’est déjà engagée dans cette voie et a retenu comme champ d'investigation les coopérations transfrontaliéres et interrégionales!?, Les mécanismes de solidarité des Etats sont de finalités et de natures souvent opposées. Toute volonté de recomposition territoriale au niveau européen devra les prendre en compte. Ce fut le cas lors de l’élaboration du schéma de développement de l’espace communautaire (SDEC). Sa déclinaison dans les documents normatifs nationaux pour les territoires frontaliers devra affronter les enjeux suivants: e celui de la création de “mécanisme de régulation”; e celui de créer le cadre juridique et normatif autorisant la collectivité territoriale voisine à participer en tant que telle à la “vie administrative” du territoire contigu. Dans ce domaine aussi il faudra que la recherche se dote des moyens d'observations et d’analyses.

4. Conclusion: L’espace public frontalier est un lieu de recherche, d’innovation pour une autre intégration européenne, l’intégration territoriale L’analyse des premières expériences de terrain montre que les solutions qui permettraient de résoudre cette apparente contradiction entre “intégration et hétérogénéité” seront originales. Comme pour de nombreuses matières, rien de ce qui s’est fait, de ce qui a marché dans la construction européenne ne correspondait à un schéma préétabli. La pratique nous montre que deux écueils sont à éviter. - Le premier est celui d’un discours qui érige le cas ponctuel en exemple. Sous l'influence de la démarche de développement local dite “bottom up” et sous la pression locale de “l’impérieuse nécessité du concret”, les acteurs locaux

-

glissent trop souvent dans leur expression de la notion de cas vers celle “d’exemple exemplaire” et donc introduisent la notion de reproductibilité. Il y a là un vrai débat de méthode. Le deuxième consiste à se confronter presque exclusivement sur les notions, les concepts et à rechercher dans des abstractions issues de nos uniques cultures nationales les réponses à ces questions.

12B. Badie (1998), Un monde sans souveraineté, Fayard, Paris.

13 (1999), “Nationalisme Régionaux en Europe”, Revue Hérodote, n. 95, 4ème trim..

97

En attendant peut-on se contenter de gérer au jour le jour, en espérant que quelques bricolages institutionnels permettront de franchir les obstacles, sans ouvrir un vrai débat sur les finalités de la démarche avec des outils interculturels adaptés? La coopération transfrontalière de proximité constitue un champ de recherche pertinent pour: e la production de connaissances à partir des pratiques locales, en matière d’intégration territoriale européenne; e la production d’outils et de méthodes indispensables aux acteurs locaux pour construire leur futur. Le mouvement de l’intégration européenne tel que les populations le vivent en territoire frontalier implique une “refondation des fonctions de la frontière” dans le champ de la gestion publique locale. De

nouveaux

mécanismes

de

régulation,

d’autres

formes

de

solidarité

territoriale, d'expressions diverses de la continuité et de la cohérence se font jour dans un système d’hétérogénéité administrative. Cet enjeu interpelle l’université et la recherche sur les questions suivantes: e la capacité à imaginer, créer un appareillage technique et juridique s’appuyant sur une parfaite connaissance des systèmes politico-administratifs contigus; e la volonté de capitaliser, formaliser la connaissance pour la communiquer et la diffuser;

e

la capacité a faire émerger les compétences responsabilité collective.

indispensables

à la prise de

Références Badie B. (1998), Un monde sans souveraineté, Fayard, Paris. Balmond L. (1996), “Quelques réflexions sur la coopération transfrontalière francoitalienne” Actes séminaire sur la coopération franco-italienne, Université de Nice-IDPD — Ceral, octobre. Botteghi R. (1995), “Du développement local aux financements communautaires”, Actes des rencontres européennes, Discontinuité et cohésion des territoires frontaliers, Nice,

janvier. Botteghi R., “Eléments de comparaison de gestion des services publics locaux en France et en Italie”, Université

Paris X - Nanterre

- CRIX

(centre de recherche

sur l’Italie

contemporaine). In “Italie, années 1990”, Civilisation de l’Italie contemporaine, n. 7 et 8, 1995/96. i Communauté Européenne, Programme d'initiative communautaire Interreg, C(90), 1562/3 du 30.08.1990. Foucher M. (1994), Fronts et frontiéres: un tour du monde géopolitique, Fayard, Paris.

98

Grewe

C. (1998), “L'unité de l’Etat: entre indivisibilité et pluralisme”, Revue de droit

public, n. 5/6. Hubrecht H. B. (1998), “Quarante ans après, un Etat garant de la cohésion nationale”, Revue de droit public, n. 5/6.

Luchaire Y. (1995), “Le cadre juridique français de l’action extérieure des collectivités territoriales, Le droit appliqué à la coopération interrégionale en Europe”, LGDJ, Paris. (2000), “Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière”, Actes du colloque de Biarritz. Nordman D. (1998), Frontières de France, NRF, Ed. Gallimard. Potier V. (2000), “République et territoires”, La Gazette, 17 avril. (1999), “Nationalismes Régionaux en Europe”, Revue Hérodote, n. 95, 4ème trim. Sciences de la société, “Territoires frontaliers: discontinuité et cohésion”, n. 37.

“Politique

d’aménagement

d’un

euro-territoire

franco-italien”,

Université

Lille II,

CRAPS, septembre 1996.

Les directives territoriales d'aménagement (DTA). Le contenu de la DTA des Alpes-Maritimes, - La prise en compte du transfrontalier, “Le mouvement dans les esprits préfigure celui dans l’espace”, CNRS, UNSA - Valbonne, février 2000.

99

NATURAL AND CULTURAL REGIONS IN EUROPE Alberto CAPACCI University of Genoa, Italy

From whatever point of view one looks at the territory of Europe, it is impossible to identify any clear geographical criterion upon which to separate it from Asia. The two continents - or subcontinents, to use Suess’ expression - are joined together over thousands of kilometres: an enormous distance which has made it impossible to define anything other than conventional divisions. According to a long academic tradition dating back to the beginning of the 19" century, the Urals represent the most reasonable dividing line between Europe and Asia. The question has always been and remains highly complex. Apart from the limitations of their geo-morphological structure, the Urals could never suffice to mark a division along the whole of the contact area because they come to an end in the steppes. Nor can river basins or other geological features provide acceptable bases for a separation between Europe and Asia. Rivers that rise in areas considered either European or Asian flow side by side into the White Sea, the Black Sea and the Aegean. The same types of rock with the same geology are present on both sides of whatever borderline one cares to imagine. As Chabod points out, Europe cannot be reduced to a simple geographical expression; it is rather a cultural product of the formation of societies and of the economic development, which these societies have produced by using their resources and organising their territory. For this reason this “cultural Europe” has often changed both its form and size, expanding or shrinking in close relationship to the processes that have driven historical events. So neither mountains nor rivers can offer satisfactory solutions to the various attempts to identify in territorial terms what Humboldt defined as: an enormous, complex peninsula of Asia. However, the general cultural image of Europe - in terms of its customs and the common perception people have of it — makes it appear today a totally different entity from Asia. This is certainly not simply a question of habits of thought. So where does this perception spring from? There is at least one important feature which can serve as the starting point for any attempt to identify the geographical and physical nature of Europe: its morphological variety understood both as the structure of the land as opposed to the sea (and thus the fact that it is a peninsula) and its orographical complexity, that is, its intricate succession of mountains and plains. Both these points make the European territory quite different from that of Asia.

100

As a peninsula Europe is much broader and more complex than the other large Asian peninsulas. The problem remains what hypothetical boundary could possibly unite a point in the north with one in the south on a geographical map. Clearly the choice of these lines must take into account specific political situations which may shift any such boundary, according to each individual case, to the east or the west. To address the problem in terms of land and sea is not as banal as it may appear because such an approach focuses attention on the fundamental characteristics of the European territory, that is, its structure and its oceanity. However we define

physical Europe, its oceanity index (in other words, the relationship between coastal and surface development) is the highest of all the continents. The sea penetrates very deeply into the emerging land and this gives rise to a particular series of sea basins, which include the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Irish Sea, and

in certain respects even the English Channel. Closeness to the sea brings with it a series of important consequences, the main one being the effect on climate. Moreover, in the case of Europe oceanity is an additional factor further to a latitudinal position, which generally mitigates the thermal situation. Minimum and maximum temperatures - annual, seasonal and daily — are relatively low and, above all, diverge little from one another. In other words, the thermal anomaly it enjoys (that is, the difference between actual annual average temperature and that calculated in relation to its latitude) is positive, with average temperatures, especially in winter, higher than those in other parts of the world. What is more, in certain conditions closeness to the sea leads to atmospheric moisture which is sufficient to produce well-distributed rainfall. This results in an almost total absence of arid zones or long periods of drought. The effects of oceanity also give rise to possibilities of access to specific resources and determine the use of water as a preferential channel of communication. Technological development makes the advantages of oceanity important to varying extents, but the possibility of using waterways in internal relations must be considered one of the pre-conditions that have made for Europe’s particular economic and political development as compared to other continents. Apart from the obvious impact of coastal morphology, another crucial factor is the internal relationship between mountains and plains. In general one could consider the European territory flat in the north-north-east (as a continuation of the great Siberian plain), and ruffled marginally by mountainous reliefs to the south. When

looked

at in detail, however,

the situation

turns

out to be much

more

complex. The principal mountainous formations are as it happens irregularly positioned. The consequences of this orographical complexity are a series of particular contrasting situations which can be seen in some significant examples within the European geopolitical framework (Hungary, Montenegro, Andorra). The orographical situation also has effects on the river network, which, as we all know, has been of fundamental importance in the economic and thus sociopolitical development of many of the areas under consideration.

101

Schematically Europe could be divided into two major natural regions that differ in terms of morphology, economic use and settlements: the plain and the mountains. The plain occupies central western Europe, the part to the east and south of the Carpathian Mountains and the western section of the Fenno-Scandinavian peninsula. It covers a vast and almost continuous region. In its turn it can be subdivided

into two large blocks

which cover

the Iberian, Italian and Balkan

peninsulas and, in the far north, the Scandinavian area. The presence of large and small plains and numerous river valleys multiplies the effects of this morphological variety. It would be reasonable to think that the human organisation of the European territory must also have followed two different evolutionary lines: one, which is more uniform and is peculiar to the plain, and another which is necessarily less homogeneous and is peculiar to the mountains. It becomes immediately clear, however, that such a correspondence simply does not exist. We find forms of rural, industrial or service economy both in the mountains and in the plains. Apparently similar life-styles coexist in both sectors, while within each of them we encounter differentiated situations sometimes at only short distances from each other and in very similar environmental conditions. The same cultures are often to be found in forms indistinguishable from each other in the plains and in the mountains, while radically different cultures coexist in the same environments.

These considerations lead us to conclude that division into regions on a natural basis is not a factor of differentiation, or that the divisions thus far proposed are too schematic. Indeed, the traditional division of Europe into large natural regions is very complex and in many ways unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it divides up areas which, at least in some respects, are unitary, while it puts together others which, for a whole series of reasons, ought to be considered as distinct. The French region, for example, general includes France, Belgium and Luxembourg. But what distinguishes the Belgian from the Dutch territory? Or again the French plain from the German plain. Not only does this division completely fail to respect linguistic differences, since it assigns to the French region some areas (such as Alsace) in which French is not the most commonly spoken language among the population. Similar points can be made about other areas: Germany and Poland, for example, are in no way distinguishable from a strictly geo-morphological point of view. But Poland is not counted as part of the German region, which however does include Denmark, which has had his own history and is culturally speaking much closer to the Scandinavian area. The problem springs from the attempt to marry up two aspects which, in Europe as in almost no other part of the world, fail to fit together: the geographical and physical definition on the one hand and the socio-cultural and political definition on the other. Not even when we are dealing with naturally definable areas, such as islands: and peninsulas, is the result satisfactory. One need only think of the different regions of Britain or again of the complexity of the Iberian Peninsula. The British region unites areas which present very differing forms of settlement and economic

102

development, as well as three distinct religious confessions, four linguistic forms and conflictual internal relations. The Iberian Peninsula is internally diversified in terms of history and culture between Portugal and Spain. And even within Spain itself strong feelings of separate identity survive in the Basque country and Catalonia. If the physical regions are difficult to delimit and political regions on the other hand are all too easily marked by boundaries, a division into cultural regions presents particular difficulties and is more difficult to achieve. First of all, it would be necessary to establish beyond question which elements combine to define a culture and thus a “homogeneous cultural region”. Even at this early stage one encounters difficulties and inconsistencies. Even conceding that only certain items of evidence, such as language and religion, need to be taken into consideration, this by no means resolves all the problems. The first problem to deal with is the scale of analysis. If one settles for a continental scale, from the Urals to the Atlantic, the exceptions are minimal. Almost everywhere the languages spoken are Indo-European and Christianity is the professed religion. The exceptions are few and far between. In terms of language the overall picture is more coherent. To the west of a hypothetical line from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea (the so-called the Pont-Baltic isthmus) the only non-Indo-European languages are Basque, Hungarian, Turkish and Maltese. To the east we must add Finnish, Estonian and the languages spoken by the Lapps and the Samoyeds, the Turko-Tatar languages of the Bashkirs and the Kazaks, the Mongolian language of the Kalmucks and the Caucasian languages. Most of these exceptions are on Russian territory and concern only a very small share of the European population. As far as religion is concerned, the only non-Christian groups are Muslims in the Balkan Peninsula (Bosnians, Albanians, Turks) and in the area around the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, and some primitive religions in northern Russia and the lower Volga. The overall Christian character of Europe emerges very clearly. However, it is not possible to talk about Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Protestants in the same breath, and this for a series of reasons, not least of which is the fact that if a

group belongs to a particular religious confession this had to do with its intention to distinguish itself from others. So it is necessary to broaden the scale of analysis and consider the main religious confessions, but the result of this would be to lose

that territorial continuity that is synonymous with effective regionalisation. Catholicism covers the west and south of Europe including Ireland and more or less extensive parts of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and the Ukraine. Within this area there are, however, also conspicuous islands of

reformed religions. In a mirror image the central northern sector is prevalently Protestant, but with interspersed Catholic areas. The Orthodox area is perhaps more compact, though not without discontinuity and special situations. In no case

103

does the religious divide follow reasonable natural divisions and only rarely does it correspond to political divisions. Not even the main language families correspond clearly to physical or political geography. The most widely spread families are Romance, Germanic and Slavic. The Romance languages extend throughout the entire south-west sector, but a substantial group, Rumanian, is separate from it. The Germanic family (northern, north-western and central Europe) and the Slavic family are more compact, but within the latter there are German, Hungarian and Rumanian groups. Other less substantial Indo-European languages are the Baltic, the Celtic as well as the Greek and the Albanian languages. One need only reduce the scale of analysis slightly to notice that each of the literary languages is different from the others of the same family and that within each it is possible to identify dialects, which at least at certain times in the past have had their distinctive cultural identity. So in order to reach an acceptable level of regionalisation it is necessary either to accept the distinction into large groups or on the other hand to move down onto more local levels. In neither case it is possible, however, to make the regions thus defined perfectly contiguous or to make the linguistic divisions shadow the political ones. Here too we are dealing with a problem of scale. Consequently, one needs to recognise

that in Europe,

even

to the west

of the Ponto-Baltic

isthmus,

it is

practically impossible to line up physical regions, cultural regions and political regions. The question of the relationship between geographical environment and economic development in Europe is too broad and complex to be dealt with here. However, it is very important to emphasize that the European territory is internally highly differentiated and perhaps especially in terms of types of production and economic

systems. The industrial sector, which had its cradle in Great Britain,

today shows signs of serious crisis. The same problems of dependence on heavy industry affect major cities on the North Sea and the Baltic (for example, Newcastle, Hamburg, Bremen and Gdansk). In the same area, on the other hand,

recent attempts at innovation have produced positive results in the most advanced industrial sectors. It should not be forgotten that here fishing still has an important role to play. In Mediterranean Spain, next to an industrialised region like Catalonia we find Andalusia, an agricultural region with its own particular situation. Bavaria has flourishing industries but also a well-developed agricultural sector and a dynamic service sector. Italy has both a highly industrial north and a traditionally agricultural south, but the industrial agglomerates of Lombardy have grown up side by side with the vast agricultural expanses of the Po Plain. These examples show how in Europe all possible combinations

can be found, often at short distances

from each other and inside the same State. This differentiation, which might Suggest that the European territory is completely inhomogeneous, can still today © prove to be not so much an index of fragmentation as an extremely important factor making for cohesion. The extraordinary multiplication of economic and productive situations has for a long time led to intense and essential relations of

104

complementarity. One need only think of the exchanges between the mountains and the plain, such as for example the transfer of hydroelectric power and food goods, and of the intense commercial exchanges between north and south Europe over the course of history. The great importance of these complementary relations in economic terms is not limited to the result that Europe has a vast range of goods, processes of transformation, alternative systems (a situation which is synonymous with general affluence). More important in some ways is the fact that the relations of complementarity must take place through exchanges and channels that run throughout the European territory. These movements obviously do not only involve goods; it is not only materials that are on the move. For these exchanges to happen it is necessary to mobilise not only infrastructure but also complex relationship models and systems which establish stable contacts between the regions involved. Since it is a phenomenon which has a long tradition and covers a broad area in a way which is not matched in other parts of the world, it is no paradox to conclude that precisely the radical “productive autonomy” of the various regions has been one of the essential pre-requisites of the development towards integration — a concrete integration of things and people who are constantly on the move and whose lives depend on that movement — of the European territory.

References Arena G. and Palagiano C. (1990), L'Europa occidentale, Utet, Torino. Cerreti C., “Un’idea d’Europa”, in Lizza G. (editor) (1999), Geografia della nuova Europa, Utet, Torino, pp. 25-58. Chabod F. (1971), Storia dell'idea d'Europa, Laterza, Bari. Cole J. (1993), The Geography of the European Community, Routledge, London-New York. Hooger L. (editor) (1996), Cohesion Policy and European Integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Labasse J. (1991), L'Europe des régions, Flammarion, Paris. Levy J. (1997), Europe. Una géographie, Hachette, Paris. Lizza G., “L’Europa tra regionalizzazione e globalizzazione”, in Lizza G. (editor) (1999), Geografia della nuova Europa, Utet, Torino, pp. 97-165. Mendras H. (1997), L'Europe des Européens, Gallimard, Paris. Rhodes M. (editor) (1995), The Region and the New Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester. Sellier A. and Sellier J. (1995), Atlas des peuples d'Europe occidentale, La Découverte, Paris. Zerbi M. C. (editor) (1991), Europa: grande spazio, Vita e Pensiero, Milano.

105

DEFENCE OF COMMON INTERESTS AND CREATION OF A COMMON EUROPEAN CONSCIENCE THROUGH THE COMMUNITY BUDGET Giuseppe CASALE University of Genoa, Italy

1. Introduction

Considering any supranational process of integration, it is usual to distinguish between an institutionalist approach and a functionalist approach. Accepting this distinction, they say that the first intention of the founder fathers of Europe was to proceed by an institutionalist approach in order to create directly a supranational political entity. Very soon, however, they realized the difficulties to go forward on this ground, so they and their heirs had to make do with a step-by-step proceeding along a functionalist approach. In our time, both on political and academic circles, the necessity to resume the political soul of the European integration became more and more evident. What I am here maintaining is that, if we intimately consider the

matter, there is no substantial difference between institutionalist and functionalist approach, as far as any economical or practical common interest hides the pursuit and the safeguard of moral and ethical objectives. In other words, it is through the pursuit of common practical interest that people defend common moral and ethical values, and grow up a common conscience of belonging to the same group. Then the problem today is to envisage the functional matter more suitable to be handled in common at supranational level in order to create a common political conscience in all citizens of the member State of belonging to Europe. In my opinion, the fields in which these matters, besides the monetary one already accomplished, to be considered are: i) the military defence (with the creation, as a minimum instance, of a common task force to be employed abroad in crisis areas); ii) the foreign policy (with the creation, as a minimum instance, of a common diplomatic delegation and structures); iii) and finally the fiscal area, with the institution of some kind of a federal tax (possibly on personal basis intended to be substitutive and not additional to the existing state and local fiscal burden). In this paper I will limit to consider some political implications of the issues strictly related to the community budget and finance. The EU budget represents a little more than 1% of the total gross national product (GNP) of the fifteen European countries. It is necessary to consider the “power of resistance” in the phase of implementation of the Community policies, power of which are supplied the member countries and that derives from more political than juridical issue,

106

despite the activity pursued by the European Court of Justice since the seventies in order to impose the respect of the Community regulations’. Just through this long and delicate process of mediation between different national interests and the limited Community sphere of action, we can mark out a historical evolutionary route of struggle for the budget power in the attempt to assume the direction of the European society. Such struggle, in the history of the Community took place in two fronts: the first concerns the conflict between member States and the Community, the second considers the rivalry among different Community institutions to decide which of them would have power on budgetary matter: the Commission, the European Council or the European Parliament. The struggle for the attribution of the budget authority has experienced an evolution which is the summary of the history itself of the European integration’.

2. Economic means and political purposes All sciences are instrumenta! to know their corresponding fields of research, with the aim at defining the rules in order to submit them to the purposes of people according some specific goal. Economics, too, as a science, is the science of means

and not of purposes. The purposes are to be assumed as postulates. They can be good or bad, and there are rules more or less effective in order to attain them.

Hence, a means (such as important as money) could be chosen by different States in view of some strictly technical results whose pursuit is consistent, on a more general background, with a common political purpose. Some times, it can happen, also, that the political effects of a common technical means could eventually turn out inconsistent with those expected. Normally, however, several subjects decide to share a means only in order to move together towards the same direction. Once all are aboard, it is necessary to

proceed, willy-nilly, in the same direction; nevertheless, it is always possible to change one’s course, that is to bring changes to one’s objectives, in order to do them more homogeneous to those of one’s travel companions. This is just the point when it is necessary to have an identity of views and hence of government, and to pass

from

pursuing

common

economic

interests

to the creation

of common

political conscience. As we said, in 1951 the Founders of the first European Economic Community were given two possible ways: or to achieve immediately the political unit, with ' A rather deplorable case of not observance of the Community regulations is Italy, convinced Europeanist country but, according to the recent statistics of the European Commission, relegated to the third from last place in the list of the most virtuous countries in the taking in ofthe directives. ? In this sense, see D. Strasser (1991), “Le finanze dell’ Europa”, EUR-OP, Brussels, pp. 1538.

107

the consequent political, economic, social and psychological repercussions to the European population; or to take into account the profound structural diversity of member countries, and carry out a progressive and graduated integration, aiming to balance the economic differences through the creation of a common economic interests area, the common market, and then to tighten up the political unification. With the Treaty of Rome it was wisely chosen this second way. The summary of this new process is brilliantly expressed in the historical declaration dated by May 1950 by Robert Schumann, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France: «...Europe cannot be made suddenly, neither following a single plan. It will be rather made through little concrete results, that will create solidity in fact between European peoples». From the other hand it is necessary to remember that Europe and the whole world, having had a terrible experience of the World

War II, broken in

Europe just because of big economic problems and of nationalistic claims, had reconquered the sovereignty on the respective territories and the idea of having to alienate such sovereignty to a Federal State generated among the statesmen more scepticism than approval. As a result it was easier for European countries to produce a partial renunciation of the dogma of the indivisibility of the sovereignty in some well-defined sectors to be able to run and interfere into the affairs that their partners had trusted to the common management, in view of the enlargement of their sovereignty. Hence the process of integration, mainly economic rather then political, started not as a progressive erosion of the power of the national States, but as a more effective and democratic division of such power among European, national and local levels. In this context, the Community budget becomes a tradeoff between the national and supranational sovereignty. Moreover the States are not only protagonists of the formation of the policies at the level of the EU, but they play also the main role in their implementation. The decisions and the approval of such policies take place in Brussels; their practical implementation is £ carried out within the member States. Another relevant characteristic of European integration is that the Community policies, in most of cases, are of regulation kind, whose cost does not falls on the

Community budget, but on the States and on the subjects belonging to the EU. All this explains the clear prevailing at the Community level of regulation policies compared with redistributive ones, primarily implemented through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds.

3. The community budget: some epistemological questions It must be considered that are the policies that determine the budget, not the budget that determines the policies. The budget, viewed as decisional process of acquiring and allocating funds, is an instrument of managing choices and resources ? See N. Moussis (2000), Guida alle politiche dell'Unione Europea 2000, Milano, p.9.

108

that are formed on the basis of the political mechanisms. In principle this instrument should be neutral with respect to the policies and to the represented reality. In fact it can affect this reality at least in two senses. First of all because it makes it explicit, which is clearly highlights the limits and possible inconsistencies, provoking on this basis a confrontation on the choices made or to make. Secondly, because through the procedures with the help of which the budget is formed and managed, it turns out that it can influence not only the times, but also

the type and size of the policies pursued. The budget of an institution (public or private), therefore, is not a simple formal element.

As it happens for the budgets of single countries, the elaboration and the approval of the EU budget, though relatively modest in the quantitative aspect, provoke particularly big and intense discussions among the European institutions, even though, unfortunately, remains unobserved to the public opinion. Within EU, through the budget processing, it is always discussed what the Union is, what it makes, how it should make it, who draws the benefits from it,

who supports its costs, and so on. One must not wonder of that the budget is as substantially also to the EU, a reflection of the policies pursued, how they must be interpreted in terms of priorities for the allocation of the resources. In particular, the budget supplies indications about the direction, the ways, times and in what fields there will take place the expenses of the organisation; supplies information about the subjects that contribute to finance the intervention policies, supplies therefore an exact outline of who contributes and who obtains. In short, the budget is an instrument of confrontation and, very often, of disagreement.

4. The evolution of community budget The financial Community system has undergone, from its very creation, a slow but continuous evolution. The first twenty years put the foundation for the search of a delicate inter-institutional balance and of a financial autonomy, characterized by the process of unification of the financial instruments and by birth of the system of own resources. But the badly hidden desire of the States to take advantages on the national level often generated misunderstandings and incidents that have negatively influenced en route the Community budget. Up to 1970 the European budget was sustained only by the contributions of the States and the control they exercised was very rigid. The savage contrasts between the two branches of the budgetary authority (Council and Parliament) constituted and constitute even today a factor of the permanent political tension in the financial sector‘, because of which any proposed innovation causes reciprocal suspicions and * Particularly unambiguous was a statement by Delors during a speech to the European Parliament in 1992: «(...) each Head of government has considered the proposal (...) as a big store from which he could pick up what was interesting for him, putting aside the rest».

109

it is just the budget to undergo these turbulences. The main problem of the budget has always been a shortage of income compared to the objectives to pursue. The own resources introduced by the reform of 1970 were constituted of customs duties, of agricultural levies (later called traditional own resources) and of a resource founded on a harmonized Value Added Tax (VAT) basis. The traditional own resources became already effective since the period of 1971-1975, while the VAT resource, owing to the difficulty to define a common

basis for all the States, was introduced in fact only since 1979. The outlined increasing of revenue has been eroded from the very beginning by the decreasing of the revenue from the traditional own resources, while the yield of VAT has undergone modest economic growth due to the stagnation and to the world recession. The other factors that imbalanced the common financial equilibrium already precarious were the reinforcement of the existing policies, the creation of new ones, the incapability to contain the expenses for the CAP and the accession of countries with agricultural and underdeveloped economy like Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Moreover, the attention in those years was paid to the pressure of the United Kingdom, to the problem of the imbalances deriving from its own financial contribution to the Community. The modifications of the European Council of Fontainebleau of 1984 turned out to be insufficient again’. The budgetary imbalance remained enlarged owing to the growing adoptions of expenditure policies, very often not foreseen, to the devaluation of Dollar in 1985 and to the dropping of the international prices for raw materials that determined increasing of expenses for the financing of repayments to export. The decision of European Council of Brussels in 1988 (Delors Package I) that foresaw the introducing of the new resource or “the fourth resource” based on the GNP (to guarantee a better correlation between contributions to pay and tax-paying capacity) and of a global maximum of own resources for the financing of the Community expenses (set in 1988 to 1.15% with the possibility of rising up to 1.2%) attempted to re-organize the Community finances, trying to introduce major elements of contributive equity for the members countries. But Delors’ remedy based on the financial prospects that continued with the adoption of the second Package in 1992 (extension of the global maximum revenue from 1.2% to 1.27%), had found already an obstacle in the ambitions of the Community in Maastricht in 1992 (where the term Community was transformed into Union) with the expectation of an increase of the intervention policies not only on the intra-community level but also on the world level. The final adoption in 1999 of a political agreement concerning the so-called Agenda 2000, sets new objectives of Community policies in the framework of a 5

.

.

. In that occasion it was decided to increase the maximum ceiling for the VAT resource contribution to 1.4% and to grant the UK a compensation mechanism. .

,

110

new financial outline for 2000-2006 respecting the budgetary discipline also in the prospects of further enlargement of the EU. As it is known, the Agenda 2000 defined new priorities for agricultural policies, reformed the Structural Fund, and introduced the Cohesion Fund and other financial instruments of pre-accession of the candidate countries. In the light of these new ambitious objectives, the idea of the financial autonomy is developing in the Community environment, and several reforms have been proposed.

5. The growing of the net-budget-balance dispute As for the budgetary imbalances, owed to the effect of financing budget rules and of the expenses decisional process, many countries judge their net balance too heavy vis-a-vis that of the others. The notion of net-budget-balance generated and still generates, at Union and local level, remarkable and vivid discussions in the assessing the advantage and

disadvantage of each members States. At first sight, the-net-budget balance is nothing else that the difference between the payments made by a member State to the EU budget and the Community expenses towards this State (that is the difference between the amounts a State pays and what it receives). If the payments to the EU are bigger than the payments received from the EU, the country has a net fiscal charge (being a net tax-payer), and, vice versa, if the payments to the EU are smaller than those received from the EU, the country gets a net fiscal aid (being a net recipient). Nevertheless, this simple calculation of the net-budget-balance poses difficulties in assessing the amount of the payments from the side of revenues and that of expenditures. The European Commission does not consider the mere concept of net-budget-balance very remarkable, but single States give it much importance to accept the degree of their contribution. That means that, as far as the GNP resource is the only clear national contribution to the Community budget based on no other fiscal revenue of the member States, the European budget is doomed to be always object of great dispute and inadequate to become a real federal instrument to use in order to coordinate and stabilize the national economies in relation to the internal and external economic fluctuations. Nevertheless, the missing functions of the Community budget get compensated from the European policies of regulation that are not expenditure policies but contributes to the formation and to the control of a determined juridical framework (one should think of i.e., the policy of competition, environment, monetary policy) whose impact changes according to the legislative and productive structures of each member country. On the other hand, the creation of the single currency, that could signify the beginning of the anti-cyclical function for the European budget, has only

LI

introduced a wider coordination of the fiscal policies with the Stability and Growth Pact and the loss for the member States of the fiscal and monetary levers in case of negative shocks’.

6. Some conclusive remarks

The renewed Europeanist enthusiasm with the achievement of the reorganization of the Community finances by the so-called “cure Delors” and the always growing consciousness of the national governments to make the Community an important actor in the economic and political world scenery, brought in February 1992 to the reformulation of the EMU and of the acceleration of the integration itself. The reform of the internal market (free circulation of capital, goods, launch of the single currency) constituted also the basis of a renewed common interest to managing the European policies through an adequate Union budget. The well-known criteria of Maastricht for the participation at the final stage of the EMU stress the necessity to coordinate and centralize the economic policies, according to the principle of subsidiarity, in order to reinforce the dimension of the economic integration and to hinder the distortions of the markets and possible asymmetrical shocks’. The Community budget, because of economic and social cohesion, through its re-distributive policies, had to become a cardinal and qualifying element of this new integration stage. Undoubtedly, the challenge of the enlargement of the European Union up to the countries of the East will pose, in spite of the optimistic reports of the European Commission about the adequateness of the items of the community budget‘, the necessity for the revision of the financial structure of the Union. It would be rather difficult to define now the end result of this integration process, but it seems rather likely that it will be beneficial to all the State involved. The main expected advantages are those of an improvement in market efficiency, in external commerce cooperation between States, in the Euro’s standing on international market. All those results are mostly economic in nature, but it would be unwise not to see that the underlying goal of any of these economic benefices is inherently political too, and, in accordance with the title of this paper, its pursuit is bound to improve a common European conscience. ° The positive aspects of the creation of optimal currency areas are evident in: P. De Grauwe (1987), “International trade and economic growth in the European Monetary System”, in European Economics Review, and R. Mundell (1961), “A theory of optimum areas”, in American Economic Review. 7 See in this sense T. Padoa-Schioppa (1987), Efficiency, Stability and Equity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

8 See European Commission, (1993), Stable Money, Sound Finances. Community Public Finance, in “The perspective of EMU”, EUR-OP, Brussels, and European Commission, “Financing EU Budget”, EUR-OP, Brussels, 1998.

112

INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA E FEDERALISMO FISCALE: IL CONTRIBUTO DEI TEORICI ITALIANI DI... FINANZA... PUBBLICA... NEL... SECONDO DOPOGUERRA Stefania DI BONO Università di Pisa, Italia

1. Dopo la fine del secondo conflitto mondiale l’idea di unire l’Europa dal punto di vista economico e politico pareva essere un obiettivo possibile; infatti, negli anni del secondo dopoguerra risultava. evidente che solo riavvicinando i sistemi economici degli Stati europei era possibile costruire una pace duratura tra gli stessi. Anche tra gli economisti si aprì in quegli anni un ampio dibattito sul tema dell’integrazione economica: in questo lavoro s’intende sottolineare l’importanza delle posizioni espresse sui temi fiscali di maggior rilievo da parte di alcuni tra gli esponenti più significativi del pensiero finanziario italiano. I due principali problemi di natura fiscale che nacquero nel progetto d’unificazione elaborato nei primi anni ‘50, riguardavano la ripartizione dei compiti e dei tributi tra Ente sovranazionale e singoli Stati, nell’ipotesi di creazione di una Federazione europea, e la necessità di individuare forme di armonizzazione fiscale tra i Paesi aderenti, nell’ipotesi di formazione di un’area comune di libero

scambio di beni e servizi. Com'è noto, il progetto di creazione di una Federazione europea e il relativo dibattito sulle funzioni e i tributi da assegnarle, rimase confinato ai primi anni ‘50, poiché la via scelta per avviare il processo di integrazione fu quella dell’integrazione economica per settori, che culminò con l’entrata in vigore del Mercato Comune Europeo nel 1958. Successivamente il processo d’integrazione proseguì tra fasi di accelerazione e momenti di stasi, fino ad arrivare alle tappe fondamentali degli anni ‘80 e ‘90, che hanno portato alla nascita dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria (1990) e alla firma del Trattato di Maastricht (1992). Il progressivo accentuarsi delle forme di integrazione economica tra i Paesi europei, sul finire degli anni ‘90, ha portato ad una fase che alcuni economisti definiscono “pre-federale’’. In questo contesto ci è sembrato particolarmente interessante rivisitare il contributo, su temi ancora oggi di grande attualità, di alcuni esponenti di rilievo del pensiero finanziario italiano.

' Vedi Maré, Sarcinelli (1998), pag.100.

113

2. Nei primi anni ‘50 il dibattito sulla costruzione di una Federazione europea esce dal circolo ristretto dei sostenitori della federazione per ragioni ideali o politiche e viene affrontato anche tra gli economisti’. L’interesse per il tema dell’unità europea è testimoniato dai numerosi Convegni che si tennero sull’argomento, e precisamente: il Convegno di Milano sugli “Aspetti storici, giuridici ed economici del problema dell’Europa” (1952), il Convegno di Venezia su “L’unità europea” (1952) e il Convegno di Genova sui “Problemi economici della Federazione Europea” (1953). È soprattutto in quest’ultimo Convegno che il dibattito sui temi economici assume una forma strutturata; infatti, esso fu organizzato in varie sezioni dedicate

rispettivamente agli scambi e alla politica commerciale, alla politica monetaria, ai problemi della finanza federale, ai problemi della mobilità del lavoro e delle autorità specializzate nell’ Europa federata. Nella sezione dedicata ai Problemi della finanza federale sono presenti le Relazioni di studiosi di primo piano quali C. Cosciani, F. De Voghel, H. Laufenburger, A. Scotto e B. Visentini. Il dibattito ha come tema centrale la definizione di un sistema di finanza federale in cui viene delineato il rapporto tra l’Ente sovranazionale e i singoli Stati. Ciò comporta la definizione delle funzioni da affidare alla Federazione e quelle da riservare ai singoli Stati e corrispondentemente la definizione dei modi di finanziamento di tali funzioni. Tra le diverse posizioni possiamo distinguere quella di coloro che sono favorevoli al finanziamento della Federazione attraverso i contributi dei singoli Stati (ad esempio B. Griziotti)’ e quella di coloro che si esprimono, con varie articolazioni, a favore di un sistema di imposte federali da affiancare a quelle dei singoli Stati (Cosciani, Scotto ed altri). } Anche rispetto ai compiti da affidare alla Federazione le posizioni risultano variamente

graduate:

si va

all'organo sovranazionale

dalla

posizione

di chi,

come

Visentini’,

solo i compiti legati alla eliminazione

riserva

delle doppie

imposizioni e delle discriminazioni fiscali negli scambi tra i Paesi membri, a chi

individua un complesso sistema di funzioni e di entrate da distribuire tra gli Stati e la Federazione. In questa prospettiva più ampia e articolata risultano particolarmente interessanti le posizioni di Cosciani e Scotto°, espresse compiutamente nelle Relazioni presentate al Convegno di Genova.

iPer un'analisi del pensiero degli economisti italiani sull’ Europa vedi Gioli (1997).

Per i riferimenti vedere rispettivamente AA.VV. (1953).

‘ Vedi AA.VV. (1952b), pp. 914-915. * Vedi Visentini (1953), pp. 287-290. ° Vedi Cosciani (1953a) e Scotto (1953).

114

AA.VV.

(1952a), AA.VV.

(1952b),

3. Cosciani distingue tra un periodo iniziale nel quale alla Federazione dovrebbero essere affidati compiti limitati riguardanti gli scambi internazionali e la difesa e un periodo successivo nel quale «alla Federazione potranno essere affidati compiti più ampi, ma ciò sarà possibile quando la coscienza federalista si sara opportunamente diffusa tra gli europei». Egli sostiene che sin dall’inizio la Federazione ha diritto di imporre determinati tributi, ma essi devono essere delimitati da una Costituzione federale, che fissi la ripartizione dei compiti tra essa e i singoli Stati; l’autore si dichiara anche contrario al principio della ripartizione della spesa federale tra i vari Stati in base a quote o contributi precedentemente stabiliti, poiché i Paesi potrebbero mettere in discussione la spesa federale al momento di dover effettivamente contribuire ad essa. A tale proposito è interessante ricordare che taluni autori sono invece favorevoli ad un finanziamento attraverso i contributi dei singoli Stati sostanzialmente per ragioni di semplificazione amministrativa, come risulta ad esempio dalla posizione espressa da Griziotti al Convegno di Venezia. Per Cosciani, quindi, i poteri della Federazione, delimitati da una Costituzione Federale, devono, nella fase iniziale, essere limitati al minimo e precisamente alla

politica del commercio estero e alla difesa; corrispondentemente, le imposte da affidare alla Federazione sono quelle collegate alla disciplina degli scambi internazionali: i dazi doganali, le imposte di fabbricazione e i monopoli fiscali sui prodotti interni. L’autore afferma esplicitamente che in questa fase la Federazione non ha poteri per quanto riguarda la redistribuzione del reddito e della ricchezza e pertanto le imposte con fini redistributivi, l’imposta sul reddito e quella sulle successioni, devono restare di competenza dei singoli Stati. Cosciani si dichiara esplicitamente in disaccordo con la posizione espressa da L. Einaudi in alcuni suoi scritti sull’argomento*, nei quali questi afferma la necessità di affidare alla Federazione anche l’imposta sul reddito con fini redistributivi. Einaudi, com’è noto, rappresenta un riferimento fondamentale per il

federalismo in Italia. Nel suo pensiero la nascita di una Federazione europea rappresenta il modo per superare il mito dello “Stato sovrano”, per eliminare le cause di attrito tra gli Stati e scongiurare il pericolo di nuove guerre, ed inoltre è un modo per ripristinare il libero scambio di merci e fattori produttivi tra i Paesi europei. Dei suoi numerosi scritti dedicati all’idea federalista, alcuni riguardano esplicitamente i problemi economici della Federazione? e consentono di delineare il sistema finanziario che l’autore prevedeva.

7 Vedi Cosciani (1953a), p. 218. 8 Vedi Einaudi (1943) e Einaudi (1944). ? Per un’analisi del pensiero di Einaudi su questo tema, vedi Di Bono (1997).

b15

La diversa posizione di questi due autori riguardo alle imposte da affidare alla Federazione riflette una diversa idea di Federazione europea: per Einaudi, convinto sostenitore delle ragioni, anche politiche, del federalismo, i compiti della stessa si spingono fino al riconoscimento della funzione redistributiva. Per Cosciani, invece, che affronta i problemi fiscali della Federazione nella sua fase iniziale, l’estensione

delle funzioni al campo redistributivo sarà possibile solo in una fase successiva quando vi sara stato un avvicinamento tra le situazioni economiche dei vari Paesi e quindi dei loro sistemi fiscali. Nella relazione di Cosciani è presente anche una parte relativa ai problemi legati alla diversa struttura fiscale dei vari Stati, che potrebbe causare spostamenti da uno Stato all’altro di consumi o di attività produttive e alla eventuale necessita di una loro armonizzazione. L’autore sostiene che è necessaria una revisione dei sistemi tributari per due ragioni: in primo luogo, perché la Federazione applicherà imposte di fabbricazione e monopoli fiscali uguali per tutti gli Stati, ma anche per eliminare gli ostacoli derivanti dall’esistenza in uno stesso mercato di sistemi tributari troppo diversi. Il problema dell’adeguamento degli ordinamenti fiscali non presenta però particolare urgenza o gravità poiché: per le imposte indirette, l’alternativa alla loro parificazione è rappresentata dalla facoltà di rimborso delle imposte pagate per le merci esportate e di tassazione all’entrata per le merci importate (principio di tassazione alla destinazione); per le imposte dirette, le imposte sul reddito e quelle di successione, la loro diversità non è tra le cause maggiori di discriminazione economica tra i Paesi.

4. Il quadro più completo e articolato delle funzioni e dei compiti da assegnare alla Federazione europea viene delineato nella Relazione presentata da Scotto al Convegno di Genova. ; L’analisi di Scotto parte da un esame della realtà esistente in alcune Federazioni all’epoca gia costituite da tempo (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Svizzera, USA, Venezuela ed altre), al fine di confrontare alcuni dati relativi alla

loro estensione territoriale, alla popolazione, ecc., con quelli riguardanti l’eventuale Federazione europea quale sarebbe risultata dall’unione dei sei Stati (Belgio, Francia, Germania, Italia, Lussemburgo, Olanda).

Successivamente analizza com’è organizzata nelle Federazioni già costituite la ripartizione del potere fiscale tra Stati e Federazione ed effettua un confronto su come siano mutati la ripartizione dei compiti e delle entrate dal periodo iniziale ad un periodo successivo nel quale ormai la Federazione si è affermata. Da questa analisi risulta che il peso dei dazi doganali (che rappresentano le imposte trasferite per prime alla Federazione) sul totale delle entrate della stessa, tende a diminuire, mentre le imposte sul reddito assumono un peso sempre più rilevante sul totale delle entrate dei governi federali.

116

Nell’analizzare l’attribuzione delle funzioni all’Ente sovranazionale e agli Stati membri individua, tra i compiti da attribuire alla Federazione, quelli riguardanti le funzioni primarie dello Stato (difesa, rapporti con l’estero, giustizia), poi quelle che delimitano il territorio nazionale (poste, telegrafi, gestione autostrade, conservazione delle risorse naturali); accanto a queste Scotto pone «tenendo conto dei progressi tecnici realizzati dalla politica economica negli ultimi anni'» la politica anticongiunturale. Questa impostazione costituisce indubbiamente un elemento di novità rispetto all’elaborazione teorica raggiunta in quegli anni in Italia, perché, da un lato sottintende un’idea più articolata e compiuta di Federazione europea, e dall’altro individua correttamente il livello di governo più elevato come quello più idoneo per svolgere la funzione anticongiunturale in modo efficiente. Per quanto riguarda le imposte da affidare alla Federazione, escludendo i contributi da parte dei singoli Stati, che la renderebbero troppo dipendente da questi, Scotto esamina varie possibilità, e, pur riconoscendo che una determinazione tassativa delle imposte sembra prematura, afferma che il sistema

tributario migliore sarebbe quello nel quale alcune fonti di entrata sono assegnate esclusivamente alla Federazione, altre esclusivamente agli Stati, cioè un sistema di

imposte autonome federali e statali su cespiti distinti. Ne risulterebbe un sistema nel quale i tributi da assegnare in via esclusiva alla Federazione sono i dazi doganali e le accise ad essi collegate, mentre i tributi da assegnare agli Stati sono rappresentati da alcune imposte sui consumi, che non interferiscono con la politica commerciale della Federazione, e le imposte di successione, che sono strettamente collegate alle tradizioni di ciascun paese. Per quanto riguarda le imposte con maggior gettito quali le imposte sul reddito, sulle società e sul giro di affari, l’autore ritiene che andrebbero affidate alla Federazione le imposte sui redditi, sia quelle personali e progressive, che quelle sulle società, mentre le imposte su terreni e fabbricati e quelle sulle imprese di piccole dimensioni si presterebbero ad una applicazione statale. Nella parte della sua Relazione dedicata ai problemi inerenti all’eliminazione degli ostacoli

fiscali

all’unità

del mercato

europeo,

Scotto

si chiede,

in via

preliminare, se la differenza nella pressione tributaria nei vari Paesi influenzi il volume degli scambi tra di essi. Sebbene il tradizionale teorema di Pantaleoni risponda in senso negativo al quesito, Scotto, tenendo conto delle ipotesi di partenza piuttosto ristrette del teorema e soprattutto del fatto che in esso non si tiene conto del modo in cui lo Stato può impiegare il gettito delle imposte, afferma che «quand'anche i prelievi avvenissero in modo proporzionale ai redditi, non ne seguirebbe la irrilevanza del gravame

tributario

per

i costi

comparati

in quanto

questi possono

essere

sensibilmente alterati dal modo in cui lo Stato impiega il denaro prelevato... E’ ovvio che, a parità di altre condizioni, l’azione alteratrice dei costi comparati sarà

10 Vedi Scotto (1953), p. 276.

117

tanto più profonda quanto più alta è la pressione fiscale e che conseguentemente una parificazione della pressione fiscale tenderebbe ad accrescere il volume degli scambi». Scotto affronta anche il problema della divergenza nella composizione tra imposte dirette e indirette e delle difformità, sia nell’imposizione indiretta che in quella diretta presente nei vari Paesi, concludendo che, per unificare il mercato

europeo,

è urgente soprattutto

l’eliminazione

delle difformità

tra le imposte

indirette, poiché esse alterano i costi comparati dei prodotti, ma che l’unificazione

è necessaria anche per i tributi diretti, perché essi incidono sulla distribuzione dei fattori produttivi (lavoro e capitale)". Quindi il riferimento principale di Scotto è riconducibile al criterio di neutralità dell’azione statale sui costi comparati “naturali” dei prodotti, come risulterà evidente anche nei suoi scritti successivi sull’argomento.

5. Il dibattito sulla eventuale costituzione di una Federazione suo livello più elevato nelle relazioni presentate al Convegno più ripreso negli anni successivi, poiché la via scelta per dell’Europa dopo il conflitto, non fu quella del federalismo,

europea raggiunse il di Genova e non fu la riorganizzazione bensì quella di una

integrazione per settori (il cosiddetto neofunzionalismo)". "

Il primo passo fu la costruzione di una autorità sovranazionale che riguardava la produzione e il commercio del carbone e dell’acciaio (CECA). La proposta fu presentata

dal Ministro

degli Esteri francese

Schuman,

e intendeva

dare una

risposta ai problemi esistenti tra i due principali produttori di carbone in Europa, la Francia e la Germania. All’iniziativa aderirono immediatamente anche l’Italia e i tre Paesi del Benelux, (Belgio, Paesi Bassi, Lussemburgo),

e con il Trattato di

Parigi nel 1951 nasceva la Comunità Europea del Carbone e dell’ Acciaio. Il suo funzionamento avveniva attraverso alcuni organi denominati:

l'Alta

Autorità, che la gestiva, di fatto, l'Assemblea parlamentare, i cui membri erano nominati dai Parlamenti dei Paesi partecipanti, la Corte di Giustizia, il Consiglio dei Ministri, con funzioni di collegamento tra i Governi nazionali e l’Alta Autorità, e un Consiglio consultivo, con rappresentanti dei sindacati, consumatori, ecc. Tale

schema di funzionamento costituì un punto di riferimento anche per i nuovi organismi che nacquero successivamente. Negli anni successivi fu tentata anche la costruzione di una Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED), anche questa volta per iniziativa del governo francese. Ma la costituzione di una difesa comune toccava un ambito molto delicato dei rapporti tra i sei Paesi aderenti alla CECA;

infatti, costruire un esercito comune

significava

anche stabilire la nascita di un potere politico sovranazionale responsabile delle

'' ibidem, p. 259. 2 ibidem, p. 264. '3 Per un’analisi storica del processo d’integrazione europea vedi P. S. Graglia (2000) e R. Santaniello (1998).

118

forze armate e quindi anche della politica estera. Per questa ragione e per i contemporanei mutamenti dello scenario storico mondiale, il Trattato non venne ratificato da alcuni Paesi e il progetto di una comune difesa europea decadde. Il fallimento della CED segna anche il punto di svolta dell’approccio “istituzionale” all’integrazione europea. Negli anni successivi l’avvicinamento tra i Paesi europei avverrà attraverso un metodo basato sull’integrazione economica che, passando attraverso l’abbattimento delle frontiere doganali e l’affermazione del principio della libertà di movimento di merci, persone e capitali, condurrà ad un graduale avvicinamento degli stessi. Il punto fondamentale per la costruzione della Comunità Economica Europea fu individuato nella creazione di un mercato comune. I negoziati per la sua costruzione si conclusero nel 1957 con la firma dei due Trattati di Roma (per l’istituzione della CEE e dell’EURATOM), che entrarono in vigore il 1° gennaio 1958. Secondo questo schema il mercato comune doveva tradursi nella costruzione di uno spazio economico all’interno del quale vi era libero scambio di beni, servizi e fattori di produzione. I quattro principi fondamentali erano rappresentati dalla libera circolazione delle merci, dei lavoratori, dei servizi e dei capitali.

I problemi fiscali che sorsero con la nascita del Mercato Comune furono trattati sia da Cosciani' sia da Scotto" in diversi lavori. Cosciani sottolinea nel suo principale lavoro dedicato all’argomento, Problemi fiscali del mercato comune", che nel Trattato istitutivo della CEE il problema fiscale non viene affrontato direttamente, ma considerato solo per gli effetti negativi che potrebbe avere sulla libera concorrenza dei prodotti nei sei Paesi del mercato comune. Secondo i principi contenuti nel Trattato lo strumento fiscale non deve

creare

distorsione

nel commercio

dei sei Paesi; il rimborso

al momento

dell’esportazione delle imposte pagate dai prodotti nazionali e il diritto compensativo sulle importazioni non sono considerati distorsivi se non eccedono le imposte effettivamente pagate all’interno. L’autore individua la soluzione del problema fiscale nelle due possibilità di tassazione presso il paese di destinazione o tassazione presso il paese di origine. La tassazione all’origine consentirebbe di tassare ogni bene dove viene prodotto e ciò comporterebbe l’abolizione delle frontiere e la creazione di un mercato unico ma, si dovrebbe prima procedere all’armonizzazione dell’imposizione. Questo vale soprattutto per le imposte indirette, ma si applica anche alle imposte dirette che, rendendo diversa la remunerazione dei fattori produttivi, li

spingerà dove sono meglio remunerati. Cosciani comunque sostiene che la necessità dell’armonizzazione delle imposte dirette è meno urgente in quanto la '4 Per un’analisi del pensiero di Cosciani su questo tema vedi Di Bono (1994).

'5 Per un’analisi del pensiero di Scotto su questo argomento vedi Pochini (1994).

16 Vedi Coscani (19582).

119

mobilità dei fattori di produzione è poco elevata (all’epoca in cui Cosciani scriveva). Comunque, poiché il problema dell’armonizzazione risultava di non facile soluzione nel breve periodo, si poteva optare per il principio di tassazione presso il paese di destinazione, purché fosse correttamente applicato. Anche Scotto si occupa in diversi scritti” dei problemi fiscali del Mercato Comune. Il suo pensiero si sviluppa a partire dal criterio di neutralità dell’azione statale sui costi comparati naturali; in particolare, è necessario che in ciascun paese il sistema finanziario non abbia effetti distorsivi sui costi comparati naturali, quelli, cioè, che si verificherebbero in assenza di attività dello Stato. Ciò richiede che la

struttura della spesa pubblica e del prelievo, nei vari Stati, risponda a criteri di generalità e uniformità a livello territoriale, di categorie sociali e di attività produttive. Il concetto di neutralità è di guida all’autore anche per definire il problema dell’armonizzazione nel Mercato Comune

Europeo. Anche

se, a suo avviso, non

sorge la necessità che i Paesi europei unifichino i loro sistemi tributari, essi dovrebbero comunque tenere presente questo criterio guida nelle loro decisioni di politica economica. In una prospettiva di lungo periodo il criterio di tassazione nel mercato di origine appare il più idoneo per regolare gli scambi internazionali, ma una visione più aderente alle difficoltà contingenti lo spinge ad accettare il criterio della tassazione nel paese di destinazione, almeno in una fase iniziale.

6. La costruzione del Mercato Comune Europeo fu dunque il primo passo sulla nuova via scelta per l’avvicinamento dei Paesi europei: quella dell’integrazione economica. Ma già nei primi anni ‘60 assistiamo da parte della Francia ad una politica di irrigidimento nei confronti dei compiti della Comunità Economica Europea, che si manifesta attraverso l’opposizione a dotare i suoi organi decisionali di autonome fonti di finanziamento. Questo atteggiamento si manifestò attraverso la sistematica assenza dalle riunioni comunitarie e portò al riconoscimento del diritto di uno Stato membro ad opporsi alle decisioni prese a maggioranza dal Consiglio della Comunità ove queste decisioni contrastassero con “interessi vitali” del paese. Sebbene l’integrazione economica tra i sei Paesi cominciasse a dare i suoi frutti con l’abolizione delle barriere doganali (nel 1968) e la Comunità si rafforzasse sul

piano organizzativo, negli anni ‘70 vi furono nuove difficoltà rappresentate dalle due crisi energetiche del 1973 e del 1979, che portarono alcuni Paesi ad adottare misure protezionistiche per controbilanciare le conseguenze di tali crisi.

7 Vedi Scotto (1959) e Scotto (1961). 120

Il processo di integrazione comunque proseguiva; nel 1972 nacque il “serpente monetario” e successivamente (nel 1979) il Sistema Monetario Europeo, con funzione di stabilizzazione tra i cambi delle diverse valute. Nello stesso anno si tennero le prime elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo, che per la prima volta veniva votato direttamente dai cittadini della Comunità. Negli anni ‘80, caratterizzati da problemi di recessione e disoccupazione, vi

furono nuovi tentativi di rafforzare la struttura organizzativa della Comunità e di riequilibrare i rapporti tra Parlamento, Commissione e Consiglio dei Ministri, per dare maggiore peso all’organismo rappresentativo (il Parlamento), ma il progetto fallì perché non approvato dai singoli governi. Ma è con la firma dell’Atto Unico del 1986 che si assiste ad un rilancio nel processo di integrazione europea. Esso venne sottoscritto dai 12 Paesi che facevano ormai parte della Comunità ed è importante per diversi motivi: innanzi tutto introdusse alcune modifiche procedurali che snellirono i processi decisionali, inoltre fu meglio precisato il concetto di “mercato interno” ed infine fu riconosciuta la necessità di accompagnare la convergenza delle economie con la creazione di istituzioni economiche e finanziarie comuni. Alla fine degli anni ‘80 maturò anche il progetto di Unione Economica e Monetaria (UEM) che prevedeva tre fasi, l’ultima delle quali, tuttora in corso, porterà alla adozione della moneta unica nel 2002. Ma è agli inizi degli anni ‘90 che viene segnata un’altra tappa fondamentale nel processo di integrazione europea con la firma del Trattato sull’Unione Europea (TUE), firmato a Maastricht nel 1992. Attraverso questo Trattato, che integrava e sostituiva in parte 1 trattati precedenti, furono poste in essere nuove regole per favorire il graduale avvicinamento dei Paesi membri attraverso livelli determinati di inflazione,

rapporto deficit/PIL, rapporto debito/PIL. Inoltre, il successivo Patto di Stabilità e Crescita del 1997 previde sanzioni finanziarie per i Paesi che si fossero discostati dai parametri stabiliti. Furono anche costituiti due nuovi organismi, uno per la politica estera e sicurezza comune (PESC) e uno per la Cooperazione in materia di giustizia e affari interni (GAI). Quindi negli anni ‘90 la Comunità Europea diventa Unione Europea, si dà degli obiettivi precisi e un percorso ben delineato per attuare anche un’unione monetaria e giungere ad una moneta unica governata da una Banca Centrale Europea. Alcuni Paesi, come la Francia e l’Italia, più sensibili ai risvolti sul piano sociale e dell’occupazione, derivanti dall’applicazione delle regole per la stabilità economica e monetaria, proposero di affiancare al Patto di Stabilità e Crescita, un Patto sulla crescita e l'occupazione per affrontare proprio quei problemi che non erano stati affrontati nel Trattato sull’Unione Europea. Ma tale proposta non fu accettata e nel Trattato di Amsterdam (1997) vi fu solo l’inserimento di una “Carta sociale”, dedicata ai problemi del lavoro e dell’occupazione.

121

7. Osservando la storia dell’integrazione europea (qui riportata necessariamente in termini sintetici) così come si è andata delineando dagli anni ‘50 ai giorni nostri, risulta evidente che essa è proceduta a sbalzi, con momenti di accelerazione seguiti da periodi anche lunghi di immobilismo. La fase che stiamo attraversando attualmente è indubbiamente di grande vitalità; l'accelerazione imposta negli anni ‘90 con il Trattato di Maastricht e la costruzione dell’UEM hanno condotto l’Europa ad una fase che alcuni economisti definiscono “pre-federale” e nella quale può essere possibile la costruzione di una Federazione europea. E’ accaduto cioè che le forme di integrazione economica sempre più stretta tra i Paesi europei, la nascita dell’Unione monetaria, degli organismi per la Politica estera e di sicurezza comune e per la Cooperazione nella giustizia e negli affari interni, hanno posto le basi affinché anche l’Europa possa evolversi verso un modello federale. Riacquista allora rilevanza il tema di cui si erano occupati i teorici italiani di finanza pubblica nel secondo dopoguerra, quello cioè dei rapporti finanziari tra i diversi livelli di governo. Lo schema teorico di riferimento è rappresentato dalla teoria del federalismo fiscale elaborata negli anni ‘60 da Musgrave e Oates. Il punto di partenza classico è la distinzione fatta da Musgrave delle tre funzioni fondamentali dello Stato in campo economico: allocativa, redistributiva e stabilizzatrice. Compito fondamentale della finanza pubblica è decidere il livello ottimale di governo a cui affidare le diverse funzioni"*. L’obiettivo della funzione di allocazione è quello di trovare il livello di governo più efficiente per la produzione di beni e servizi pubblici; in questo caso l’ottima allocazione richiede che i servizi pubblici vengano offerti e il loro costo ripartito secondo le preferenze delle aree che ne beneficiano. Se tutti i beni pubblici fossero puri, l’offerta potrebbe essere fatta a livello centrale, ma così non è e, soprattutto per i beni pubblici locali, l’estensione del beneficio differisce da un luogo all’altro. Affidando quindi l’attività allocativa al più basso livello di governo vi è più elevata coincidenza tra coloro che sopportano la spesa per la produzione dei servizi pubblici e coloro che ne godono i benefici (assenza di spillover effects). Inoltre i governi locali, disponendo di maggiori informazioni, riflettono meglio le preferenze degli individui riguardo alle diverse politiche di spesa. La funzione di stabilizzazione, che riguarda l’utilizzo della politica monetaria e fiscale per controbilanciare le fasi espansive o recessive del ciclo economico, è svolta in modo più efficiente dal governo centrale. Infatti, esclusa la possibilità per i governi locali di utilizzare la leva monetaria, risulta poco efficiente anche l’utilizzo della politica fiscale in quanto, ad esempio, i

Di Musgrave (1959), Oates (1968), (1972), (1977).

122

benefici di una manovra di espansione del reddito, basata su un aumento della spesa pubblica, ricadrebbero solo in minima parte all’interno della giurisdizione. Anche per la funzione di redistribuzione ci sono ragioni a favore del suo svolgimento a livello di governo centrale; infatti, essendovi elevata mobilità di

individui e capitali all’interno del territorio nazionale, se i singoli governi subcentrali intraprendessero politiche di redistribuzione attraverso imposte progressive sul reddito e trasferimenti, determinerebbero un diverso carico fiscale nelle varie zone, che porterebbe gli individui ricchi a spostarsi nelle aree con minore tassazione e quelli poveri a concentrarsi nelle aree con maggiori trasferimenti, portando al fallimento della politica redistributiva.

Il governo centrale, invece, può attuare con maggior successo questa politica perché le possibilità di mobilità verso l’esterno degli individui sono molto più limitate. Strettamente legata alla ripartizione delle funzioni è l’attribuzione delle imposte ai vari livelli di governo. In particolare, secondo Musgrave” al governo centrale andrebbero assegnate le imposte progressive, le imposte su basi produttive mobili, e le imposte applicate su basi imponibili che si distribuiscono in modo diseguale tra le varie giurisdizioni come quelle sul reddito e le risorse naturali. Andrebbero invece assegnate alle giurisdizioni locali le imposte su basi imponibili scarsamente trasferibili (ad esempio sugli immobili) e le imposte sui consumi, oltre a quelle che si ispirano al criterio del beneficio: prezzi pubblici e tariffe per i beni pubblici prodotti localmente.

8. Tornando agli autori che abbiamo analizzato nella prima parte di questa relazione, possiamo chiederci: qual è stato il contributo sul tema dei rapporti finanziari tra diversi livelli di governo dei teorici italiani di finanza pubblica nel secondo dopoguerra? Su questo tema la posizione di Scotto appare particolarmente interessante, se letta alla luce della teoria del federalismo fiscale di Musgrave-Oates, di cui sembra

anticipare alcune conclusioni. Ciò è riconosciuto anche in un saggio” sulla sua opera scientifica, pubblicato nel 1993, dove si afferma che “alcuni elementi anticipatori della pur successiva teoria del federalismo fiscale” sono contenuti in un lavoro di Scotto, pubblicato nel 1952, dal titolo Prime linee di un contributo alla teoria della finanza locale". Ci sembra quindi interessante sottolineare come la riflessione teorica svolta dall’autore negli anni ‘50 intorno al tema dei rapporti finanziari tra diversi livelli di

governo, gli abbia consentito di individuare alcune soluzioni tipiche della teoria del daMusgrave (1983).

20 Fossati (1993). 21 Scotto (1952).

123

federalismo fiscale: quando, ad esempio, include tra le funzioni da far svolgere all’autorità sovranazionale quella anticongiunturale o quando riconosce la necessità di affidare le imposte sul reddito (personale e delle società) all’Ente sovranazionale. Riteniamo interessante sottolineare anche la posizione di Einaudi, che, seppur espressa in un periodo precedente a quello di cui ci stiamo occupando (esattamente nel 1944), individua tra le funzioni da far svolgere all’autorità sovranazionale

quella redistributiva, con una visione quindi estremamente attuale dei compiti del livello più elevato di governo. Per quanto riguarda la posizione di Cosciani, essa si pone in una prospettiva più limitata, in quanto analizza i compiti della Federazione nella fase iniziale della sua costituzione. Ne risulta pertanto che i compiti ad essa affidati sono assai più limitati (commercio estero e difesa) e corrispondentemente le imposte da assegnarle sono quelle relative agli scambi internazionali (dazi doganali e imposte di fabbricazione). Affidare le imposte sul reddito, che per questo autore hanno anche fini redistributivi, ai singoli Stati, sottintende la necessità di lasciare un compito così importante ancora sotto il controllo dei singoli Stati e portarlo in ambito federale solo in un momento

successivo,

quando

la loro struttura economica

e

sociale sarà divenuta più omogenea e sarà quindi possibile anche un avvicinamento dei rispettivi sistemi fiscali.

9. Riguardo all’altro tema rilevante nel processo di integrazione economica tra gli Stati, quello dell’armonizzazione

fiscale tra gli stessi, la posizione di Cosciani,

quale emerge nei suoi scritti più recenti sull’argomento, è che questa sarà pienamente attuabile quando i sistemi economici dei vari Paesi si saranno avvicinati; infatti, poiché il sistema tributarig di ogni paese dipende dalla situazione economica esistente nello stesso (reddito nazionale pro-capite, struttura

produttiva, ecc.), solo quando questi dati diventeranno simili sarà possibile anche l’armonizzazione dei rispettivi sistemi tributari. Per quanto riguarda la posizione di Scotto su questo tema, egli sostiene che il problema della parificazione delle pressioni fiscali e quindi dell’uniformità dei sistemi tributari in un mercato unificato, va posto in termini di coordinamento delle azioni esercitate dai singoli Paesi nel campo della finanza pubblica (prelievo e spesa) sui costi comparati naturali. Quindi, anche il concetto di armonizzazione all’interno del mercato unico europeo viene filtrato attraverso il principio di neutralità dell’azione fiscale sui costi comparati naturali. Nella situazione attuale l’armonizzazione tra i sistemi fiscali dei Paesi europei incontra ancora notevoli difficoltà; infatti, il loro avvicinamento comporta un costo

per gli Stati, sia in termini di adeguamento a nuove norme, sia di adeguamento dell'apparato amministrativo. Inoltre vi sono resistenze da parte degli stessi a

124

privarsi dell’autonomia in campo tributario e, di fatto, a tutt'oggi l’armonizzazione tra i Paesi dell’Unione europea non si è realizzata in modo soddisfacente. La progressiva integrazione dell’economia europea e la liberalizzazione nei movimenti di capitale (che si estende con lo sviluppo delle comunicazioni per via telematica ad una integrazione su scala mondiale) ha introdotto elementi nuovi nei rapporti tra gli Stati e i propri cittadini; infatti, il tradizionale rapporto di scambio tra Stato (fornitore di servizi) e cittadino-contribuente risulta modificato dal fatto che sempre di più i cittadini di uno Stato utilizzano servizi prodotti in uno Stato diverso dal proprio. Questa nuova situazione favorisce comportamenti strategici sia da parte dei contribuenti sia da parte degli Stati. I primi tendono a spostare la loro attività (realmente o solo nominalmente) negli Stati in cui il sistema fiscale è meno oneroso, e gli Stati, per attrarre nuova materia imponibile e quindi maggiori entrate, perseguono spesso politiche tributarie concorrenziali. In particolare questo problema si è verificato anche nell’Unione europea dove, a fronte di una progressiva integrazione del mercato dei beni e dei capitali, è mancata una politica comune riguardo alla tassazione delle basi imponibili più mobili, quali i redditi da capitale e i profitti. Ciò ha portato a vere e proprie forme di “concorrenza” tra i Paesi europei per quanto riguarda la tassazione dei rendimenti dei capitali e dei profitti. L’analisi di questi problemi è ulteriormente complicata dal fatto che, nel dibattito attuale, le posizioni degli studiosi?’ non sono convergenti: da un lato vi sono coloro che ritengono accettabile la “concorrenza” tra Stati per sviluppare le proprie economie attraverso l’aumento del gettito, ricollegandosi agli effetti benefici

della concorrenza,

dall’altro

vi sono

coloro

che ritengono

importante

mantenere il rapporto tra i cittadini e il proprio Stato escludendo la possibilità per i contribuenti di uno Stato di pagare le imposte in un altro. Nell’analisi di questi problemi resta comunque una sorta di “approccio preanalitico” che divide gli economisti tra quanti ritengono accettabile la concorrenza tra Stati per aumentare il proprio gettito e sviluppare le proprie economie e quanti ritengono che l’integrazione europea passi attraverso l’armonizzazione tra i diversi sistemi fiscali.

10. «Allo stato attuale l'alternativa evidente che l'Europa ha di fronte è tra il definitivo ripiegamento verso la dimensione di grande mercato, di una vasta zona di libero scambio e l’ulteriore avanzamento verso una struttura federativa*». Queste parole sembrano riassumere in termini efficaci la situazione che si è venuta a creare in Europa sul finire degli anni ‘90. La progressiva attuazione del processo di integrazione economica, le cui tappe fondamentali si ritrovano nella 22 Per un esame delle varie posizioni vedi Bordignon, da Empoli (1999). 23 Ibidem, Introduzione.

24 Marè, Sarcinelli (1998), Introduzione, p. XII. 125

nascita del Mercato Unico (1986), dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria (1990), e

nell’obbligo di adeguarsi alle regole di stabilità determinate nel Trattato di Maastricht (1992) ha portato a forme sempre più strette di unione tra i Paesi europei. In questo contesto e in un momento in cui la soluzione di tipo federalista potrebbe essere possibile, ci è sembrato interessante riproporre il contributo di alcuni esponenti del pensiero finanziario italiano sui problemi fiscali che nascono nell’ipotesi di costruzione di una federazione. Il loro contributo in tema di rapporti finanziari tra Ente sovranazionale e singoli Stati, pur risalendo ai primi anni ‘50, appare ancora interessante sia per la completezza dell’analisi svolta, sia per l’anticipazione di elementi innovativi che troveranno sistemazione teorica solo successivamente. Riteniamo interessante sottolineare innanzi tutto la posizione di Cosciani, che riferendosi ad una fase iniziale del progetto di Federazione, individua per essa solo compiti limitati (scambi internazionali e difesa) e, corrispondentemente, le attribuisce solo le imposte collegate alla disciplina del commercio internazionale (dazi doganali, imposte di fabbricazione). L'autore suppone esplicitamente che, in questa fase, la Federazione non abbia potere per quanto riguarda la redistribuzione del reddito e pertanto le imposte con fini redistributivi (imposta personale sul reddito e sulle successioni) debbano restare di competenza dei singoli Stati. Esse potrebbero essere portate in ambito federale solo in un secondo momento, quando sarà acquisita una coscienza federalista. A tale proposito è interessante anche ricordare il dissenso che l’autore esprime rispetto alla posizione di Einaudi, favorevole invece ad affidare immediatamente alla federazione l’imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche, proprio per attuare una politica redistributiva

all’interno della stessa. Sul tema dei rapporti finanziari tra diversi livelli di governo, la posizione più innovativa risulta quella di Scotto. Nel prefigurare il sistema finanziario della Federazione europea, il suo ragionamento si sviluppa sia sul piano dell’astrazione teorica che nella puntuale analisi della realtà esistente in alcune Federazioni già costituite. Ciò gli consente di cogliere sia gli aspetti salienti delle realtà osservate, sia di elaborare un sistema di funzioni e imposte da distribuire tra la Federazione e gli Stati. L'elemento che ci è sembrato di maggiore interesse nell’analisi di Scotto è l’avere inserito, tra le funzioni da affidare alla Federazione,

anche l’attuazione

della politica anticongiunturale, in accordo con quanto verrà successivamente affermato nella teoria del federalismo fiscale. Questo ci è sembrato un elemento innovativo, sia perché tiene conto dell'ampliamento delle funzioni dello Stato che,

superando il modello classico di “finanza neutrale”, è chiamato a svolgere anche una azione di regolazione e controllo del sistema economico, sia perché individua nel livello di governo più elevato quello più idoneo a svolgere la politica di stabilizzazione del sistema economico.

126

Ma al di là ed oltre gli aspetti tecnici del problema trattato la posizione di questi studiosi ci sembra ancora oggi interessante per il contributo dal punto di vista politico e ideale. Il loro insegnamento, anche in questo senso, risulta di guida a tutti coloro che credono che solo ponendo il problema in termini politici, o comunque con una notevole spinta di idealità, sia possibile realizzare pienamente l'Europa unita.

Riferimenti bibliografici AA.VV. (1952a), Atti del primo Convegno di Scienze Politiche e Sociali sugli aspetti storici giuridici ed economici del problema dell'Europa, aprile 1952, Milano. AA.VV. (1952b),“L’unità europea”, Atti del 6° Convegno di studi di economia e politica industriale, (Venezia, giugno 1952), Rivista di politica economica, luglio-agosto.

AA.VV. (1953), “Actes du congrès international pour l’étude des problèmes économiques de la fédération

européenne”,

(Genova,

settembre

1952), Economia

Internazionale,

febbraio-maggio. Bordignon M., da Empoli D. (1999), Concorrenza fiscale in un'economia internazionale integrata, F. Angeli, Milano. Bureau D., Champsaur P. (1992), “Fiscal federalism and European economic unification”,

American Economic Review, maggio. Cosciani. C. (1953a), “Dépenses publiques et contributions de l’Europe fédérée”, Economia Internazionale, febbraio-maggio. Cosciani C. (1953b), “Probiemi fiscali della Comunità europea del carbone e dell’acciaio”, Bancaria, settembre. Cosciani C. (1958a), Problemi fiscali del mercato comune, Giuffrè, Milano. Cosciani C. (1958b), “Aspects fiscaux de l’unification économique européenne”, Public Finance, vol. XIII. Cosciani C. (1980), “La politica di armonizzazione fiscale delle comunità economiche europee”, Tributi, gennaio-febbraio. Courtin R. (1948), “Le problème de l’union économique européenne”, Revue d'Economie politique, vol. LVIII. Cressati C. (1992), L'Europa necessaria. Il federalismo liberale di Luigi Einaudi, Giappichelli, Torino. D’Alauro O. (1959), /] Mercato Comune Europeo ed altri saggi di politica economica, Tip. Fusi, Pavia. Di Bono S. (1994), “Aspetti fiscali del processo di integrazione europea in C. Cosciani”, in Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994). Di Bono S. (1997), “I problemi fiscali della federazione europea 1944-1953”, in Gioli G. (a cura di) (1997). Einaudi L. (1943), “Per una federazione economica europea”, Movimento Liberale Italiano, Roma; rist. in Einaudi L. (1986). Einaudi L. (1944), “I problemi economici della federazione europea”, Nuove Edizioni di Capolago, Lugano; rist. in Einaudi L. (1986). Einaudi L. (1952), “Tipi e connotati della Federazione. Discorrendo di Comunità europea di difesa”, .in Einaudi L. (1956).

127

Einaudi L. (1956), Lo scrittoio del Presidente 1948-1955, Einaudi, Torino. | Einaudi L. (1986), La guerra e l’unità europea, rist. (1948), Il Mulino, Bologna. Faucci R. (1994), “Vecchio e nuovo nel federalismo di Einaudi”, in Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994). on ;

Ferrari Aggradi M. (1958), Europa, tappe e prospettive di unificazione, Editrice Studium,

Roma. Fossati A. (1993), “L’opera scientifica di A. Scotto”, Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze, n. 4. Gerelli E., Majocchi A. (a cura di) (1993), Unità economica e monetaria europea: politica fiscale e vincolo di bilancio, F. Angeli, Milano. Gioli G. (1994), “I progetti di unificazione europea nel pensiero degli economisti inglesi e italiani”, in Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994). Gioli G. (a cura di) (1997), L'Europa e gli economisti italiani del novecento, F. Angeli, Milano. Magliulo A. (1993), “Economia e politica dell’integrazione europea in Italia (1941-1958)”, Rassegna economica, n. 4, poi in Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994). Marè M., Sarcinelli M. (1994), “The European Union: how to assign the functions of government?”, Banca nazionale del lavoro Quarterly Review, dicembre. Marè M., Sarcinelli M. (1998), Europa: cosa ci attende?, Laterza, Bari.

Morelli U. (1990), Contro il mito dello stato sovrano. Luigi Einaudi e l'unità europea, F. Angeli, Milano. Musgrave R. (1959), The theory of public finance, Mc Graw Hill, New York. Musgrave R. (1969), “Theories of fiscal federalism”, Public finance, vol. 24, n. 4. Musgrave R. (1971), “Economics of fiscal federalism”, in Fiscal Doctrine, Growth and Institution, Collected Papers of Musgrave R. (1986), New York University Press, New York. Musgrave R. (1983), “Who should tax, where and what?”, in McLure C. (a cura di), Tax Assignment in Federal Countries, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Camberra. Oates W. (1968), “The theory of public finance in a federal system”, in Oates W. (1991). Oates W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace, New York. Oates W. (1977), “An economist’s perspective on fiscal federalism” in Oates W. (1991). Oates W. (1991), Studies in fiscal federalism, Edward Elgar, Aldershot. Padoa-Schioppa T. (1987), Efficienza, stabilità ed equità: Una strategia per l'evoluzione del sistema economico della Comunità europea, Il Mulino, Bologna. Padoa-Schioppa T. (1993), "Il federalismo economico e la comunità europea", // Mulino, n. 3 Pochini S. (1994), “L'integrazione economica nel pensiero dei teorici italiani di finanza pubblica nel secondo dopoguerra”, in Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994). Rimini L. (1993), “La funzione redistributiva in uno stato federale e il finanziamento della Comunità”, in Gerelli E., Majocchi A. (a cura di) (1993). Roggi P. (a cura di) (1994), Quale mercato per quale Europa. Nazione, mercato e grande Europa nel pensiero degli economisti dal XVIII secolo ad oggi, F. Angeli, Milano. Scotto A. (1952), “Prime linee di un contributo alla teoria della finanza locale”, in Studi in memoria di Gino Borgatta, Istituto di cultura bancaria, Rivista Bancaria-Minerva Bancaria, Milano. Scotto A. (1953), “Spese pubbliche e tributi nell’Europa federata”, Economia Internazionale, febbraio-maggio. i Scotto A. (1959), “Problemi fiscali del mercato comune nei confronti di un’associazione tra i Paesi dell’OECE”, Relazione presentata al IX Convegno di studi di economia e politica industriale, Sanremo, novembre 1958, Rivista di politica economica, gennaio-febbraio.

128

Scotto A. (1961), “Collettività locali e costruzione dell’unità europea. Profili economicofinanziari”, Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze, n. 4. Scotto A. (1962), “Unione doganale”, in Valsecchi A., Stammati G. e Ceccarelli L. (a cura di) (1962), L'integrazione economica europea all’inizio della seconda tappa, Jandi Sapi, Roma. Stammati G. (1952), “A proposito dell’unità europea”, Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze, I. Visentini B. (1953), “Sui poteri iniziali da attribuirsi alla Federazione Europea in materia tributaria”, Economia Internazionale, febbraio-maggio. Wheare K. C. (1949), Del governo federale, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano.

129

THEORIE DES BIENS COLLECTIFS ET PLACE DES ECONOMIES NATIONALES DANS L'UNION EUROPEENNE Eric GASPERINI Université de Nice — Sophia Antipolis, France

1. Introduction

Le développement exceptionnel de la science économique aux cours du vingtième siècle et l’immense effort fait pour affirmer le caractère “scientifique” de la discipline ont conduit les chercheurs à ignorer ou éviter d’évoquer certaines questions qui leur paraissaient hors de leur champ de compétence. De nombreux problèmes économiques européens permettent certes que s’exercent les talents des économistes; ainsi les questions monétaires, financières,

de concurrence et de formes de marchés, les comparaisons d’appareils productifs, les fiscalités sont souvent abordées avec pertinence. Mais beaucoup de questions européennes ressortent pour de nombreux et brillants économistes davantage d’autres domaines des sciences sociales et se trouvent de fait exclues des champs de recherche de l’économie. C’est notamment le cas des questions portant sur les fondements de l’Union Européenne (pourquoi faire une Union?) et sur les évolutions possibles (élargissement/approfondissement) au coeur du présent ouvrage qui semblent bien faire partie de celles laissées en suspens par les économistes parce que trop politiques, institutionnelles, et difficilement susceptibles de développements “scientifiques” au sens du moins où l’entendent une majorité d’économistes. Le sucés récent de “l'Economie Politique Internationale” vient en partie modifier ces façons de voir et d’étudier les phénomènes de relations économiques internationales. Il nous parait très encourageant pour l’avenir d’une discipline qui mêle si subtilement les facteurs politiques et économiques de voir peu à peu s’affirmer sa reconnaissance académique. Même si sa légitimité nécessaire (qui passe par son inscription, au-delà de la recherche, dans les programmes d’enseignement) est surtout avérée dans les universités nord américaines, encore modestement représentée dans certains pays européens et, hélas, fort peu en France. Gérard Kebabdjian (1999) note avec justesse dans l’introduction de son petit (et récent) ouvrage consacré aux théories de l’économie politique internationale que «le paradoxe est à son comble quand, sur des questions intéressant au premier

130

chef les Européens, les seuls chercheurs susceptibles d’une approche non technique se trouvent être des auteurs américains!». Le présent article se situe aux marges de cette Economie Politique Internationale, qui nous parait si nécessaire, et des travaux portant sur les problèmes d’action collective généralement définis dans notre discipline comme constituant l’économie publique. Comme le lecteur le sait sans doute, ces questions, qui ont tout à gagner à être posées dans un cadre international, sont développées autour des deux notions clés d’externalités et de biens collectifs. Dans l’un et l’autre cas l’Europe constitue une occasion remarquable de réfléchir sur les recherches menées et de proposer quelques avancées. Sur ces points, comme sur bien d’autres, l’Europe pose aux chercheurs de passionnants défis théoriques. Notre angle d’attaque concerne ici la question des biens publics locaux et internationaux. Au moment où citoyens et hommes politiques s’interrogent sur de nouvelles répartitions des tâches entre les multiples institutions de l’Union Européenne il nous semble que la science économique a aujourd’hui quelques sérieuses propositions à avancer qui méritent à tout le moins d’être discutées. Nous sommes même convaincus que l’économie est plus apte qu’on ne l’estime parfois à fournir des instruments utiles à la résolution d’au moins quelques-unes des questions en débat.

L’exposé suivra le plan suivant: nous commencerons par définir brièvement ce que sont les biens publics avant d’insister sur les contributions mettant en évidence l’importance des biens publics globaux, ceux «dont les bienfaits franchissent les frontières» (Inge Kaul). Ces travaux ne doivent cependant pas nous faire perdre de vue que de très nombreux biens et services collectifs sont produits et consommés dans un espace très restreint, de proximité, celui de la ville, du district, au mieux de la région. On les définit comme des biens publics locaux. Ils représentent la meilleure part des actions collectives efficaces auxquelles il faut songer. Les Etats ont, depuis leur fondation, joué un rôle essentiel dans la production de biens publics. C’est leur légitimité et sans doute leur raison d’être. Mais les acteurs privés n’ont presque jamais été absents de ces activités. De nombreux biens collectifs proviennent de l’activité d’acteurs privés cependant que les agents publics ont souvent été producteurs de biens et services privés. Il n’est pas sûr que cette confusion des attributions ait toujours été favorable aux agents. Elle s’est largement établie dans un espace de référence qui était celui de la nation. L’échelle des interventions s’est cependant progressivement modifiée et le niveau national a sans doute perdu une grande part de son intérêt. D’une part le mouvement de décentralisation a accéléré la production régionale voire locale de biens publics, d’où la montée en puissance des collectivités locales. D’autre part il s’est peu à peu avéré qu’un cadre élargi permettait une production et une allocation plus efficientes de certains d’entre eux.

131

C’est pourquoi les recherches économiques sur les biens publics et sur la manière dont ils sont produits sont importantes et peuvent avoir de considérables conséquences sur les façons de concevoir l’organisation future de l’Union Européenne. Les analyses récemment développées fournissent des pistes d’un très grand intérêt sur la façon dont devraient être conçues les productions les plus efficaces de biens et services publics. L'Etat national, longtemps présenté comme le créateur et le gestionnaire “naturel” de bien publics a dores et déjà perdu beaucoup de ses prérogatives. Les institutions locales d’un côté, les communautaires de l’autre semblent être les cadres logiques dans lesquels naîtront désormais ces biens économiques particuliers, accessibles à tous sans discrimination ni exclusion. Il reste néanmoins du chemin à parcourir pour disposer des outils nécessaires à des programmes opérationnels. Pour l'essentiel les réflexions disponibles demeurent en effet cantonnées au niveau des concepts et des idées. Elles sont nécessaires et primordiales. Elles ne répondent certes pas pleinement aux attentes des élus et des praticiens. Notre conclusion suggérera donc quelques orientations de recherches à mener qui permettraient aux économistes de remplir plus complètement les objectifs assignés à leur discipline: participer au progrès des connaissances certes mais aussi fournir des préceptes d’actions à mener.

2. Les multiples échelles spatiales de production de biens publics Le caractère public d’une fourniture de bien ou service correspond d’abord à la nature de l’organisme prestataire. Le droit peut être ici un utile auxiliaire pour définir le statut des institutions concernées. On se rend cependant très vite compte que cette caractéristique est peu utilisable. Les Etats, régions, villes ou autres agences publiques (même intergouvernementales) offrent aussi des biens privés. De leur côté des acteurs juridiquement “privés” peuvent être fournisseurs de biens collectifs, parfois à leur corps défendant lorsqu'ils produisent des externalités. Les économistes ont alors été conduits à proposer deux propriétés caractérisant les biens publics: la non exclusivité et la non rivalité. Il s’agit là en effet de caractéristiques opposées à celles des biens privés. L’impossibilité d’exclure des bénéficiaires rend très problématique la production de tels biens par des acteurs privés qui auraient le plus grand mal à en percevoir le prix alors même que les produire ou les gérer lorsqu'il s’agit de biens naturels, a un coût, souvent élevé. Mais en même temps le fait que chacun puisse y avoir accès sans en priver les autres est une puissante source de productivité ou de bien être. Les exemples ne manquent pas, qu’il s’agisse de plaques de noms de rue, d’un phare maritime, de dispositifs de défense collective, de justice. Il s’agit là de biens publics purs. Une quantité considérable de biens publics n’a pas entièrement ces propriétés. Ils peuvent alors faire l’objet d’un fractionnement, d’un péage, d’une sélection. De

132

plus les effets d’encombrement et de saturation introduisent d’importantes limites au principe de non rivalité. Les biens sont alors impurs ou qualifiés de quasi-biens publics. Ils sont, à n’en point douter, les plus nombreux. Le cas du service d'éducation est exemplaire. Généralement assimilé à un bien collectif, l’enseignement public peut être doublé et concurrencé par un service privé très semblable. Dés lors qu'il ne s’agit pas de biens collectifs parfaitement purs, force est de reconnaître que les arguments théoriques ne permettent guère de trancher entre ce qui doit ressortir de l’initiative publique ou privée. Les écoles de pensée, qui s'opposent vigoureusement sur ces points, le font donc en partie sur des bases idéologiques. Libéraux et étatistes, pour simplifier, auront simplement des visions différentes et opposées de ce que l’Etat doit (ou peut) produire. Plus modestement notre propos se limitera à tenter de définir des échelles spatiales pertinentes d’intervention sans prétendre pouvoir trancher entre “choix de société” et donc vouloir répartir ce qui est du ressort de l’Etat et ce que le marché peut correctement assurer. Souvent le débat se développe sur le thème du dosage public/privé. Car la difficulté et parfois l’impossibilité d’assurer une régulation satisfaisante par le seul marché permettent de comprendre que les Etats, pris au sens large, soient contraints de s’engager dans la fourniture de certains de ces biens particuliers, parfois indispensables. Beaucoup de biens collectifs nécessitent des financements conséquents. Les impôts sont alors une réponse adaptée à l’impossibilité d’une facturation individuelle ou à l’importance des resquillages possibles. Ils existent aussi des biens publics dont le coût de production est faible ou nul. Le droit, les normes, la monnaie, indispensables éléments d’un système économique, n’exigent que des moyens limités eu égard aux avantages qu’ils génèrent. Seule une autorité collective est véritablement en mesure de les fournir. Une fort abondante littérature s’est attaquée à ces questions depuis les années cinquante aux Etats Unis d’abord (Samuelson 1954, Musgrave 1959, Buchanan et Tullock 1962, Olson 1965, Buchanan Europe. Pour la France on consultera Kolm

1967/1968) 1965, Besson

puis, plus tardivement,

en

1966, Terny 1967, Jessua

1968 ou encore Wolfelsperger 1969. En une vingtaine d’années on peut estimer que la question a été convenablement traitée, autour de quelques thèses solidement argumentées, qui ont accompagné la remarquable extension de l’économie publique.

3. Qui produira les Biens Publics Globaux? On attribue généralement à Charles Kindleberger (1988) la paternité de l'extension de l’analyse des biens publics à l’ordre international. Il existe en effet une catégorie de biens que les Etats eux-mêmes n’ont pas intérêt à produire et pour

133

lesquels ils peuvent, tout comme les agents privés être tentés par des comportements de free riding. Le secteur des biens environnementaux est souvent pris en exemple. On consultera par exemple l'excellente thèse d’Emmanuel Ouyahia récemment soutenue à Nice sur ces questions qui illustre parfaitement l’impeccable logique qui conduit à ne rien faire. Mais la conception et la gestion d’un système monétaire international,

ou

l'établissement

régional,

d’accords

commerciaux

de

libre

échange, le maintien de la sécurité internationale (cf. la contribution de J. Fontanel) sont autant d’autres cas de biens publics internationaux. Certains de ces biens sont peu coûteux à mettre en oeuvre. C’est le cas des si nécessaires dispositions de droit économique international, ou des indispensables règles prudentielles des banques. D’autres nécessitent des moyens infiniment plus importants et posent donc d’épineuses questions de financement. Que l’on pense aux organisations internationales, à l'OTAN,

à l'ONU,

à l'OMC.

Le projet de

taxation mondiale des capitaux dit “Tobin tax” constitue un remarquable cas d’école d’un bien public global avec ses typiques difficultés de mise en oeuvre et les inévitables free riders qu’il ne manquerait pas de susciter. La thèse de Kindleberger,

séduisante,

consiste

à montrer

que l’absence

ou

l'insuffisance de tels biens publics internationaux permettent d’assez bien expliquer les phénomènes de crises internationales. Il n’a sans doute pas entièrement tort. Ces travaux connaissent aujourd’hui des prolongements très riches au travers du concept de Biens Publics Globaux. Par ailleurs l’irruption sur la scène internationale de nombreuses zones régionales fait émerger la notion de Bien publics régionaux (les régions étant définies comme des ensembles de nations). Les biens publics globaux constituent-ils pour autant un concept “révolutionnaire”

comme

le

soutient

Inge

Kaul,

directrice

du

bureau

du

développement du PNUD? Un concept utile à n’en point douter qui remet en cause la division longtemps admise entre questions nationales et internationales. La santé, la stabilité financière, le contrôle des lois du marché ne sont pas seulement

des problèmes de souveraineté nationale. La non maîtrise, à un niveau global, de ces phénomènes est en effet susceptible d’entraîner pour chaque agent, pour chaque économie d’importantes externalités négatives. Les exemples que l’on peut citer sont nombreux: le sida, les monnaies asiatiques, la crise russe sont des maux globaux appelant en réponse la production de biens publics globaux. Des dispositions nationales seraient de peu d’effet ou très nettement moins efficaces. Reconnaissons toutefois que, pour l'instant, les analyses sont encore insuffisamment précises. La terminologie reste vague et floue et les techniques permettant de faire apparaître et de gérer ces biens globaux encore très imprécises ‘ et aléatoires. Voila donc des domaines dans lesquels devraient s’exercer fortement et rapidement les expertises économiques.

134

Car, comme Inge Kaul, après d’autres le reconnaît, les bonnes intentions ne suffisent pas pour produire des Biens Publics Globaux efficaces et adaptés. Le protocole de Montréal (1987) sur la réduction des émissions de CFC afin de préserver la couche d’Ozone est sans doute l’un des rares cas de démarche réussie. Cas exemplaire certes mais cas isolé d'initiative qu’il conviendrait de multiplier. Souvent les stratégies de production de Biens publics globaux sont à inventer entièrement en tenant compte de la grande diversité de cas possibles. Certaines actions sont en effet simplement additives comme justement le contrôle des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Celles la peuvent donc sans trop de problèmes être encore développées dans le cadre ancien des souverainetés nationales. D'autres seront d’autant plus efficaces qu’elles seront ciblées par exemple sur les maillons les plus faibles d’une chaîne. C’est le cas par exemple du Sida en Afrique, des phénomènes monétaires en Russie ou en Asie, du terrorisme international ou de la lutte contre les flux migratoires clandestins. Dans beaucoup de cas enfin l’efficacité est liée à la mobilisation de moyens permettant de franchir des seuils. La recherche fondamentale, certains programmes médicaux, sur le génome par exemple, le développement d’énergies nouvelles sont quelques exemples connus d'initiatives dont ensuite la planète entière devrait pouvoir profiter. Ne nous leurrons pas. Sur toutes ces questions “globales” les progrès seront lents et les Etats continueront longtemps à se comporter comme des acteurs privés. Ils demeureront des passagers clandestins chaque fois que les gains collectifs issus de la production de Biens Publics Globaux ne pourront leur être refusés. Ii est donc fort à craindre que, sauf lorsque la sécurité ou la paix intérieure seront menacées, la possibilité effective de produire des biens publics globaux ne relève de l’utopie. Il est cependant de la responsabilité des chercheurs de souligner inlassablement l'intérêt et les gains collectifs de bien être qui résulteraient d’une coopération renforcée au niveau mondial pour la production de tels biens et services.

4, Les Biens Publics Régionaux posent-ils moins de problèmes? A défaut de pouvoir avant longtemps s’entendre globalement, les Etats passent des accords régionaux. Ceux ci sont en constante progression et fournissent aujourd’hui de remarquables occasions de produire des biens publics à un niveau intermédiaire généralement qualifié de régional. Région est entendu ici dans le sens courant de groupement limité d’Etats liés par des accords ou des structures communes. L’unification des règles au sein d’une Zone régionale peut s’avérer être une mesure efficace. A l’intérieur du périmètre défini par les accords les comportements de passagers clandestins des Etats disparaissent ou sont atténués.

135

Tout dépendra évidemment de la solidité et de l’étendue des dispositions acceptées; une simple Zone de libre échange, par exemple, sera moins contraignante qu’une Union économique et monétaire plus rigoureuse. Indiscutablement la production de certains biens publics sera favorisée. Grâce à la mobilisation des ressources d’un budget commun il devient plus aisé de financer leur production. Aux conséquences habituellement reconnues à la formation de zone régionales il y a bien lieu d’ajouter un effet de création de biens publics. Des situations très diverses peuvent se rencontrer. Dans une simple zone de libre échange, de type NAFTA, ou ASEAN, les biens publics régionaux, s’ils sont identiques aux biens publics globaux qui pourraient être produits, risquent d’apparaître comme très inférieurs à ceux ci puisqu'ils ne concernent qu’un espace économique restreint. Le multilatéralisme demeure de ce point de vue conceptuel supérieur au libre échange régional. Par contre les Biens publics communautaires conçus dans le cadre d’une Union devraient généralement surpasser les biens publics nationaux en raison du très connu effet de dimension. Il n’y a a priori aucune raison de penser que ces biens, dans leurs conditions de production, soient fondamentalement différents des

biens privés. Ils sont donc comme eux soumis aux effets d’échelle. Mais ce thème mérite d’être exploré de façon plus approfondie. Jean Marie Siroën (2000) donne dans l’intéressant petit ouvrage qu’il a récemment rédigé un aperçu des domaines dans lesquels l’avantage d’une production régionale parait le plus évident. Il cite l’élargissement des marchés, la meilleure cohérence des infrastructures

de transport (cf. aiguilleurs du ciel), l’élimination des duplications (programmes de recherche civils et militaires), les gains d’échelles grâce aux séries longues (Airbus), les avantages liés à l’harmonisation et à la standardisation des normes, le pouvoir accru de négociation (PAC?) la meilleure efficacité de macro politiques coordonnées (SME).

1

On pourrait sans peine allonger la liste ce que ne se privent pas de faire, à juste titre, les documents communautaires européens.

Il est cependant honnête de considérer que la production commune de biens publics régionaux peut comporter aussi quelques inconvénients. Difficile à évaluer, on ne peut négliger le “préjudice moral” que peut générer auprès des citoyens, des élus, des firmes, une perte de souveraineté nationale. On a souvent, à propos de l’Europe, évoquer l’allongement des circuits de décisions (facteur de retard et d’inefficacité) et la perte de bien être pouvant résulter d’une standardisation trop poussée. Ces intuitions acceptables demandent toutefois à être examinées de prés et reconnaissons que les outils de mesure et d'évaluation sont médiocres et peu adaptés. Plus problématique est la question des inégalités de traitements entre Etats, qui n’est pas à exclure et renvoie aux procédures de sélection et de choix des biens communautaires (ainsi que les grilles de financement). Les pays ne sont sans doute

136

pas traités de la même façon, mais se greffent ici de multiples problèmes d’équité, de niveau de développement, de poids politique. Et les dispositifs les plus rigoureux (Maastricht, Amsterdam) ne parviennent pas véritablement à éliminer les comportements de resquillage. Le plus bel exemple est actuellement le cas anglais qui réussit (pour combien de temps?) à être “in” et “out” dans l’Union Européenne et hors de la zone euro! Ainsi, malgré des difficultés et les imperfections (euro faillures?) une zone régionale intégrée apparaît bien adaptée à la fourniture de biens publics. Et je dirai qu’elle l’est d’autant mieux que seront par ailleurs produits d’autres biens publics dans un cadre lui plus restreint, celui généralement qualifié de local.

5. La montée en puissance des Biens Publics Locaux Les conditions de production de ce type de biens ont été étudiées plus tôt sans doute en raison des mouvements de décentralisation qui ont caractérisé la plupart des nations développées. Leur étude ne peut cependant être séparée de celle des biens produits une échelle différente. Ce n’est pas comme l’indiquait récemment l’ancien ministre français Claude Allègre dans un article d’opinion “un autre problème” que ces biens publics locaux mais bien l’autre face d’une même question. De nombreux travaux d'Economie Publique locale (P. H. Derycke et Gilbert, 1988) alimentent depuis longtemps la réflexion qui abordent les différents aspects de ces biens locaux. Quel volume optimum produire, comment les financer, comment évaluer les demandes, les impacts, sont autant de thèmes permettant de définir les contours multiples des réponses possibles. Nul doute que ces biens très nécessaires ne se multiplient dans un futur proche et constituent peut être la part la plus considérable des biens publics. Il reste cependant du travail pour les chercheurs. Car sur presque toutes les questions on ne dispose encore que d’éléments partiels et imprécis. Quels attributs pour une justice locale, quels pouvoirs de police, quelles politiques en matière d'éducation, quelles responsabilités d'aménagement et de développement des territoires, quel périmètre pertinent pour la culture, pour l’action éducative, sociale.

Il importe de mieux connaître les spécificités culturelles et économiques locales et, si l’on veut maximiser le bien être des agents définir pour chaque type de biens publics l’espace le mieux adapté à sa production et à sa gestion. Devons tous boire la même

bière, consommer

les mêmes

fromages, chasser les mêmes

méthodes?

C’est la une autre façon de traiter le principe de subsidiarité, mais cela justifie aussi le maintien de niveaux multiples ayant chacun leurs fonctions spécifiques. A la limite leur élargissement peut même être défendu. Les notions de Communautés, de pays ont sans doute un bel avenir si ces nouvelles structures sont capables de devenir d’authentiques et efficaces producteurs de biens publics locaux.

137

6. Conclusion

Face à une mondialisation débridée dont les conséquences positives et négatives ne sont pas simples à évaluer l’économiste peut contribuer à cette solide prise en compte des réalités, à la définition plus claire des relations et des attributions de chaque agent collectif. En terme de production de biens collectifs il nous parait évident que pris en tenailles entre des initiatives supra nationales légitimes et plus efficaces et les justes revendications des entités infra nationales fort capables de produire aussi des biens publics les Etats-nations ne seront plus bientôt que des coquilles vides ou ne répondant plus qu’à d’autres logiques. Dès lors nous pouvons considérer que leur disparition n’est qu’une question de temps (pas le trop long, celui des épisodes). A la question “vers quel type d’intégration évoluera l’Union Européenne?” nous pensons donc pouvoir répondre, à partir des travaux portant sur les biens collectifs, qu’une entité tutélaire centrale beaucoup plus présente et forte se combinant avec des entités locales multiples et adaptées a de fortes chances de s’imposer bientôt. L'Europe constitue bien pour les spécialistes en sciences sociales un magnifique défi théorique. Elle constitue une exceptionnelle occasion d’amorcer une reconstruction de celles ci qui passerait par l’acceptation des dimensions normatives de ces disciplines, par l’affirmation de l’importance d’un contenu descriptif fort, un meilleur équilibre entre les hypothèses théoriques générales et les investigations empiriques et une large ouverture réciproque entre disciplines complémentaires.

Références Alesina Alberto et Wacziarg Romain (1999), “Is Europe Going Too Far?”, CarnegieRochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December. Alesina Alberto, Bagir Reza et Easterly William (1999), “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November. Alesina Alberto, Spolaore Enrico et Wacziarg Romain (1997), Economic Integration and Political Disintegration, September. ava Alberto et Wacziarg Romain (1997), Openness, Country Size and the Government, ay. Kaul Inge (1999), Global Publics Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st century, Oxford University Press, New York. Kaul

Inge

(2000),

“Bien

publics

globaux

,un

concept

révolutionnaire”,

Le

monde

diplomatique, juin, pp. 22-23. Kebabdjian Gérard (1999), Les théories de l'Economie Politique Internationale, Ed du Seuil Coll Point économie.

138

:

Kindleberger Charles (1988), The international economic order. Essays on financial crisis and international public goods, Wheatsheaf Harvester. Milner Helen V, “International Political economy: beyond hegemonic stability”, Foreign Policy, n. 110, (La revue Foreign Policy contient souvent de remarquables analyses: cf. www.foreignpolicy.com). Sandler Todd (1997), Global Challenge. An Approach to Environmental, Political and Economic Problems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Siroën Jean Marie (2000), “La régionalisation de l’économie mondiale”, Ed. La Découverte,

n. 288. Je n’ai pas repris explicitement ici les travaux anciens et très connus auxquels on pourra cependant utilement revenir tels que: Samuelson 1954, Musgrave 1959, Buchanan et Tullock 1962, Olson 1965, Buchanan 1967/1968. Pour la France on consultera Kolm 1965, Besson 1966,Terny 1967, Jessua 1968 ou encore

Wolfelsperger 1969.

139

WHY EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WON'T BE FAST Miroslav N. JOVANOVIC * UN Economic Commission for Europe

1. Introduction

The objective of this article is to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the potential enlargement of the European Union (EU)'. Ten countries with economies in transition, the Czech Republic, “Luxembourg group”), Bulgaria,

Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia

(the (the

“Helsinki group”), and two market economies, Cyprus and Malta, negotiate full membership with EU?. The article focuses mainly on the economic dimension of the but the specific terms are enlargement. The general terms for enlargement are known, being negotiated. Prior to any further enlargement, EU will have to settle two internal issues. First, in accordance

with the Maastricht Treaty, the Union

became

an Economic

and

Monetary Union (EMU) for 11 member countries on 1 January 1999. The second issue is institutional change. EU has to change its organizational structure in preparation for the decades to come when it is expected to enlarge and even double the number of its member countries. This article begins by looking at the strategic goals of EU. It then examines the economic structure in the acceding countries. Entry criteria and cost and benefits that may come from EU enlargement are analysed in separate sections. The conclusion is that the acceding transition countries do not satisfy most of the economic criteria for * Un ringraziamento particolare va a Marina Rossi per il suo valido contributo, mai richiesto ma sempre presente. I have benefited from discussions with many friends and colleagues, but I owe special gratitude to Lisa Borgatti, Giuseppe Casale, Constantinos Lycourgos, Judith Shapiro, Constantine Stephanou, Marcus Weiand and Ana Yturriaga. Statistical material from Eurostat was kindly supplied by Francis Lefort, Carol van Mechelen, while the UN/ECE sources were Judith Shapiro and “Economic Survey of Europe 2000” (hitp://www.unece.org/ead hhtp). An early version of this paper was presented in at Intercollege, Nicosia (May 1998), Academia Europea, Bressanone (September 1998) and the European Summer School, Spetsae, Greece (1998, 1999 and 2000). The views expressed are my own and do not reflect the position of the organization for which I work. ' The European Union is referred to as the organizational habitat for European integration that started with the Treaty of Rome. ? The EU does not make any formal distinction among the 12 countries that negotiate membership.

140

EU entry at the moment. Some of these countries may in the future need to invest a lot of effort, time and money of their own to comply with the economic requirements for full membership.

2. Priorities of the European Union The European Union is at an important turning point. On the political front, it was unable to solve the neighbouring Yugoslav black hole. In the economic field it is not capable of creating new jobs and reducing unemployment. EMU is the Union’s major project for the 1990s. Therefore, the EU member countries are trying hard to reach the goal prescribed by the letter of the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, there is a political determination to enlarge EU. In order to face all

those challenges, EU has to change. However, it is not yet known what shape the new EU will take in the future. It is possible that it may change beyond recognition. The stakes are therefore quite high. A series of bilateral inter-governmental conferences between EU on the one hand and each of the six countries from the Luxembourg group started on 31 March 1998 with the goal of negotiating enlargement of EU. The same type of negotiations started with the six Helsinki group’ of countries (including Malta) on 15 March 2000. EU started on 14 February 2000 the Inter-governmental Conference on the institutional reform in order to accommodate the new members. It is expected that this conference would complete its work in December 2000. While there is no question about Cyprus and Malta being market economies (one of the conditions for EU membership), there are still certain concerns about the acceding countries with economies in already long transition process‘. The economic transition towards a market-based system and decentralized decisionmaking gives the transition countries the advantage of being fully included in the international trading system, which is based on market forces. However, the success of integration of the transition economies into the international trading system depends on at least two variables. The first is the transformation of their economic system into a liberal market one, while the other hinges on the openness of EU and other western markets for goods and services.

e

At present, EU has four general strategic priorities: the creation of the Single European Market was the objective for the 1985-92 period. Following that, ongoing goals include making rules more transparent and effective, as well as removing the remaining and new market distortions.

> Turkey got only the title of a candidate country. This country will have to carry out significant political reforms before going much further in the accession process. 4 The transition process has three features: liberalization, stabilization and modernization. It is much longer and costlier than foreseen at the end of 1980s, when all these changes started to take place.

141

These

e e

e

areas

include

telecommunications,

taxation,

competition,

company

statute and the environment in order to deliver the full benefits of the Single European Market to the citizens; monetary integration is the major new project and goal of EU in the 1990s till 2002; institutional reform of EU must precede any future enlargement. The same holds for the reform of the EU policy in agriculture; if all goes well with the previous three goals, enlargement of EU will be the priority project for the Union in the first decade(s) of the new century. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of parallel negotiations on the institutional

reform

and

enlargement

of EU.

Nonetheless,

the institutional

reform and its ratification will have to precede the actual enlargement of EU.

3. Economic structure of the candidate countries

The acceding 12 countries would bring 106 million additional consumers into EU. However, some of those countries are so small that the EU economy would

hardly notice their entry. As for the level of development measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power standard (PPS), acceding countries are at a lower level of development than the EU average (Tab. 1). However,

there are five distinct

groups of potential entrants. Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are in the group of relatively developed potential entrants. Classified in the descending order, the other groups consist of Hungary and Slovakia (with GDP a half of EU average);

then Estonia

and Poland;

Lithuania

and Romania;

and

Latvia

and

Bulgaria (with GDP a quarter of EU average). If there were no change in policy, the countries would be eligible for a large share of EU regional funds. This is particularly relevant for Poland and Romania because of their large population and relative “backwardness” measured by the GDP per capita.

142

Tab. 1 - GDP per capita at purchasing power standard and population in EU and candidate countries in 1998

GDP per capita, € PPS

Netherlands

35,497 23,995 22,759 22,507 22,437

Population in million

0.4 53

ee sie Sel 82.0 ay

20,526 Spain

| 100 ven

Cyprus 13,721 Czech Republic

Sa

Estonia

RA 0.3

9,664 9,263

Lithuania

Dei rali dior ee

LS

ee

1

Source: Eurostat (2000).

The economic structure of the acceding countries shows that services are the predominant economic sector (Tab. 2). The same is true for EU. However, there are concerns regarding agriculture. The contribution of this sector to the GDP in

the acceding countries is much higher than is the case in EU. In Bulgaria, for example, it is five times the EU average.

143

Tab. 2 — Structure of GDP in candidate countries and the EU

ne,

|

Ske

Agriculture

in 1998 (per cent)

Structure of GDP in %

0

66e]

2

SIE

I CONOR

ae

ai

Pie

ae Turkey pil zo ra do16,1je WARN

bre sl

56.5

* including energy and construction. Source: Eurostat (2000). Note: Figures do not always add up to 100 because of the different statistical record of construction, water, energy, fisheries and hunting.

The situation in the labour market of the acceding countries is uneven (Tab. 3). The unemployment problem is on average as pressing in Poland and Hungary as it is in EU. Apart from Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, other candidate countries have a significantly lower unemployment problem as recorded by the official statistics. As for the sectoral structure of employment,

38%

of labour force in

Romania is employed in agriculture. This is more than seven times the EU average. Around a quarter of the labour force in Poland and Bulgaria is in agriculture. This is five times the EU average. A quarter of Poland’s labour employed in agriculture contributes less than 5% to the GDP. This compares with figures of 5 and 2%, respectively, in EU(15). If labour migrates to the cities, this may increase productivity in Polish farming. However, if there are no new jobs in manufacturing and services sectors to absorb such an inflow, significant tensions may take place in society.

144

Tab. 3 - Unemployment rate and share of agriculture in total employment in EU and candidate countries in 1998 Count lesi&

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hunge Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland

Unemployment Rate %

12.2 1.58

|14 ae era SO Sate AE Mes Cato a. teeta li e

= in

2 mlalwlwolu 6=

10.4

Romania

10.3

Slovakia

15.6

Slovenia

14.6

Turke

6.3

lella A 38.0

1220

* in 1997. Source: UN/ECE (2000) and Eurostat (2000).

4. Entry criteria “Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union” (Article O of the Maastricht Treaty). That is the only Maastricht Treaty based (sufficient) condition for a country to be considered for full membership of EU. In addition, there are several other necessary and tacit, economic and political requirements for

entry. These were formally defined during the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. The potential candidate country must fulfil three conditions. It must have a functioning market economy, a democratic political system and accept, implement and enforce the acquis communautaire. First, apart from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, not a single transition country had a fully functioning market economy even before they became centrally planned countries (van Brabant, 1996). Entry into EU, in particular an early entry

by transition economies, could cause a serious external shock for any transition country. Their economies are not yet fully adjusted to the market type economic system and their manufacturing and services sectors are still fragile. Early entry into EU without a full macroeconomic stabilization and modernization of the 5 The unresolved question is what are the European States? Are those the ones that are the members of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (include among others Canada and Uzbekistan)? Does religion matter?

145

output structure may be disastrous. Countries that pass through the “transition phase” would not be able to withstand strict rules for competition with EU producers in most industries. Transition fatigue is apparent in these countries. It is obvious in the return of the “recycled” communists to office. Therefore, the entry into EU in a distant future needs to be thoroughly thought through and coupled with profound preparations on both sides. The second condition is that the prospective country has a stable democratic political system. This means a multi-party Parliament; rule of law and respect for human and minority rights. It also includes good neighbourly relations and no territorial disputes. With regard to the last, not a single transition country passes the test. The Northern part of Cyprus is still occupied. Nor do certain EU countries fare well here: just consider Northern Ireland. However, the advantage is that they are already in EU. The European Union is interested in resolving pressing problems in the region. There are, however, some signs that the prospect of EU membership may ease tensions, as happened with Hungary and Romania in 1996 or Greece and Turkey in 2000. EU needs to assist transition countries in order to create peaceful and prosperous neighbourhood for itself in the future. The question no longer is whether transition countries need to be incorporated into EU. The question is the cost of expansion of EU to the existing members, as well as when and how long the enlargement may take? The third condition relates to the acquis communautaire or Community patrimony, the whole body of the established EU laws, policies and practice. The acceding country must accept, implement and enforce that set of rules®. The belief that skilful national diplomacy and bargaining may provide better deals for the acceding countries is false. EU entry is just the beginning, not the end of the story. The acquis communautaire consists of around 90,000 pages of EU legislation. The only possibilities for negotiation are the length of the adjustment period and the size of funds that may help its implementation. Agenda 2000 (1997), as the EU’s overly optimistic plan for action in the medium term, is clear on this point. The new EU member country is expected to apply, implement and enforce the acquis communautaire upon accession. In order to safeguard EU competition rules, those measures that relate to the Single European Market should be applied immediately upon accession’. No derogations will be allowed to the new entrants. However, there may be certain transition measures for a limited period of time. Many EU companies are against any transition period for their competitors from the acceding countries, as they fear social and environmental dumping. ° The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ended the Thirty Years’ War. The Treaty established principle that the States are free to do whatever they like within their own borders example, choice of religion). This was strongly undermined by the NATO attack Yugoslavia in 1999. However, only those measures that have external implications are concern of foreigners. The acquis communautaire is a clear demand for harmonization. European Commission (1997), p. 52.

146

the (for on the

The European Union is already a two-speed organization. Countries that are in EMU

form one tier, with Britain, Denmark, Greece and Sweden forming another.

The same holds for the countries that are members of the Schengen agreement on the free movement of foreigners. Adding up another tier by derogations or opt-outs to the acceding transition countries would complicate the operation of EU and imperil free competition in the Single European Market. Hence, according to Agenda 2000 this shall not happen’. The acceding country’s record in the implementation of existing commitments will be partly used by EU to judge the capacity to take on the obligations of membership’. The fourth, tacit, requirement is that entry should not imperil the EU’s financial resources, nor should widening of EU risk deepening of the integration process. If there are no changes in the EU policies and if the original four Visegrad countries enter EU, various estimates state that the annual transfers from EU to those countries would cost the EU budget around €50 billion a year'°. That is about a half of the entire annual budget for EU(15). However, all estimates have to be taken with a lot of reserve, as one does not know the new shape of EU and its reformed policies and final details of entry conditions. The entry of the Eastern European transition countries need not worry the EU Mediterranean countries for at least another decade. The most developed of the “new democracies” lag behind the “poorest” EU countries (Portugal and Greece) in economic terms. Southern EU countries need not fear in the medium term the accession of select transition countries in EU and the potential “exodus” of jobs to Central and Eastern Europe because of lower wages there". If firms were looking for low-cost production, then China and India may be superior long-term choices than the transition countries in Europe. If relatively low wages were the determining factor for the location of production, then EU would be flooded with cheap goods from those countries. Factors such as productivity, the capital stock and stability often play a more decisive role for investors than differences in nominal wages. The Southern EU countries are well ahead of the transition countries in those matters. There was (and perhaps still is) a confusion that external trade policy including integration affects the aggregate level of employment. Trade only increases competition, improves allocation of resources and dwindles the clout of several privileged, monopolistic and entrenched interests. Therefore, trade widens opportunities for the vast majority of players and can assist them to join the group of prosperous countries. It alters the geography of production and the structure of employment within different economic sectors. Trade influences the overall

8 European Commission (1997), pp. 44, 51 and 134. 2 European Commission (1997), p. 45.

19 A short survey of select studies is given by Baldwin (1995).

!! With 18 million EU citizens out of work in 2000, the sensitivity of the issue does not come as a Surprise.

147

standard of living and the kind of jobs available, rather then making them available". The problem with such debates about the employment effect of trade liberalization (in the countries with the developed and stable economies) are based on “a fallacy of composition, that the effect of productivity increase in a given industry on the number of jobs in that industry is very different from the effect of a productivity increase in the economy as a whole on the total number of jobs” (Krugman, 1998, pp. 16-7). The negative impact of jobs going “south” on a large scale has not materialized in practice and the net effect on the US job market might have been even positive. The most important argument about the employment impact of the eastern enlargement of EU has, unfortunately, not yet made its way into the public consciousness. It also put certain academic debates on the wrong foot. The Eastern enlargement may create new or keep the existing “higher quality” jobs in EU. Isolated and highly publicized stories about the closure of a firm due to the enlargement are not typical for the whole EU economy. Those stories need to be seen in the context of the big picture. Because of the start of EMU in the majority of EU countries, the average unemployment rate over the coming years will be toa large extent what the European Central Bank wants it to be. The bank may pay little or no regard to the situation in the EU trade balance with the acceding transition countries. In order to assist prospective transition countries, the Essen Summit of 1994 outlined the “pre-accession strategy” of EU. The key element is the assistance to the select group of transition countries. The prospective member countries committed themselves, among other things, to approximate their legislation to that of EU. The gap in the political, economic and social organization and development between EU and the potential new members has to narrow, otherwise the new members may not assume the full set of obligations and enjoy all the benefits of membership. Europe Agreements, a structured dialogue and the Phare Programme are the major tools of the “pre-accession strategy”. In addition, the Cannes 2 A similar debate on trade liberalization with Mexico and the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was going on in the United States (US) in the early 1990s. In spite of strong opposition by the US presidential candidate Ross Perot regarding the free trade agreement between the US and Mexico and a loss of jobs in the American economy (“giant sucking sound” of jobs moving south [The Economist, 18 September 1993, p. 51]), only 117,000 Americans have applied for the benefits offered to workers displaced by the free trade agreement. If compared with the 1.5 million who lose their jobs each year from factory closures, slack demand and corporate restructuring (The Economist, 5 July 1997, p. 17), the cost of adjustment to the agreement by the US does not

seem too high. Free trade with Mexico might have destroyed some jobs in the American textile industry which is “labour intensive”, but it created new ones in electronics or

aeronautics. '? There are concerns that the acceding transition countries do not always have the institutional capacity to absorb the financial opportunities provided by the Phare Programme. To obtain funds (aid), the acceding country has to make reforms and submit

148

Summit (1995) endorsed the White Paper, a reference document that can guide the prospective member countries through the labyrinth of EU legislation in order to make the task simpler. In addition, in order to ease the potential entry, EU opened the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) in 1996. That is a one-stop shop for information and technical/legal advice on EU legislation, enforcement and infrastructure. The European Commission sent a 200-page questionnaire to the potential member countries in order to assess their eligibility for membership. The answers constituted an important input into the preparations of formal opinions about eligibility for entry. Apart from the opinion about the eligibility of each country, the Commission is in charge of preparing three other documents. The first one deals with the impact of the enlargement on EU, the second considers the financial framework, while the third, a composite document, is to offer a general assessment. All the necessary conditions for entry into EU reveal that the Union has very high discretionary powers and flexibility in selecting would-be members.

5. Costs and benefits 5.1 Acceding countries Transition economies share political, security and economic reasons for joining EU. Politically, the transition countries have a still young and relatively fragile democratic system. Fragility comes from unfulfilled grand hopes that the change for the better towards a market-type democratic system can take place in a relatively short period of time and at a relatively modest cost. Although the immediate threat of armed conflict is not highly likely, there is still apprehension regarding the division of “spheres of influence” between the West and Russia. The Central, Eastern European and Baltic States obtained their freedom from the “Eastern bloc”. They have concerns both about preserving their independence and about “losing” that independence to the West. As for the economic issues, there are important gains for the acceding countries from entry of EU. e The major benefit for the transition countries is secure access to the huge market of EU. This is particularly relevant for the goods that are “sensitive” for EU (farm products, textile, steel, chemicals) as the acceding countries have comparative advantage in the production of those goods. Entry would mean a

sensible projects to EU. As the submitted Polish projects were ill prepared, EU cut €34 million off the planned aid of €212 million for that country for 1998 (The Economist, 6 June 1998, pp. 37-8). As the cut of funds to a Phare country happened for the first time ever, EU sent a strong signal to the acceding transition countries that they need a serious institutional overhaul if they want to meet the high EU criteria.

149

kind of “insurance policy” that the EU trade regime would remain open for their exports. The second gain would be the possibility of the migration of labour into the rest of EU following the specified adjustment period. This may, however, have a two-edged effect. If the educated and the experienced leave the transition countries, the productivity in the “transition region” would suffer and funds for the education of experts would be lost. A relatively tight labour market in the rest of EU(15) would prevent such a scenario. In addition, experience has shown that labour migration (wars apart) takes place chiefly when labour cannot find employment in its country of origin. e A third benefit from entry includes access to the structural and other funds of EU. This would all give an impetus to the strengthening of the market system (van Brabant, 1996).

e

5.1.1 Structural aid and the geography of production

All gains from the entry of EU are not without risks. In some cases, the costs are quite serious. Transition countries still have fragile economies that would be exposed to fierce competition in the Single European Market. Adjustment troubles are well known even for the relatively advanced transition economy of the former East Germany after the Anschluss of 1989. Gross annual transfers from the western part of the reunified Germany to the east were around 170 billion-DM during the 1990s (Tab. 4). Such massive aid to the former East Germany will be necessary for at least another five years in order to adjust its economy and catch up with the rest of the country. There were certain results regarding this “catch up” process (Tab. 5). However, the financial cost was immense. There remains a question if such massive aid is necessary in the medium and long term. Aid may kill local incentives to adjust and it may create a structurally dependent economy out of the former East Germany, as was the case with the Italian Mezzogiorno. If the relatively advanced eastern part of the reunited Germany needs such massive transfers, one trembles

to think about the potential transfers to other acceding

transition countries".

‘* If the rules on regional aid from EU are not changed, then such type of aid to the acceding

transition countries would transfer resources that are equal to 10-20% of the new members’

GDP. That is far more than 3.5% of GDP that Greece received in 1996 (The Economist, 3

August 1996, p. 28). Agenda 2000 limited the level of annual structural and cohesion aid to 4% of the recipient country’s GDP (European Commission, 1997, p25):

150

Tab. 4 - Annual public financial transfers* from western to the eastern part of Germany 1991-1997 in billion-DM

Transfer CP 199 sianENT [EGross nea a TN LT T0 ei oe Le baTS le * Including social insurance. Source: Herausgeber BMI, Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit, Berlin, 1998. Tab. 5 - Convergence indicators for East Germany 1991 and 1996 (West Germany = 100)

Average monthly wages

Gross Net Productivity Total economy Manufacturing and construction

Source: Economic Commission for Europe (1997), Economic Survey for Europe in 19961997, United Nations, New York, p. 30.

The amount of funds transferred to the eastern part of the country is a controversial issue. The German Bundestag reported in 1999 that “The new German

Government,

with regard to the costs of eastern reconstruction,

which

come out of the budget, will emphasize those transfers which particularly benefit the development of East Germany. The former Government always followed the course of ‘big numbers’ and presented the costs for the new Ldnder in most impressive high numbers, thus giving rise to the impression that in the past years up to 100 billion-DM was transferred towards the reconstruction”. The indiscriminate totalling of all transfers from the budget for the eastern regions gave rise to erroneous conciusions on part of the public with regard to the costs for the reconstruction

itself. This can be seen, for instance, taking social

expenditure as an example. State benefits to which every citizen in both east and west is entitled - children’s allowance, student grants, etc - if he/she meets the

requirements, cannot be included in the reconstruction transfers for the new Lander, because they are based on the overall obligations of the State towards all its citizens. Also, costs which the Government incurs in carrying out its duties, such as the costs of infrastructure for defence, should no longer be connected to the costs of eastern reconstruction. The consequent enormous expenditure was to a large extent responsible for the public criticism of the “price of unity”. If the assistance

is, however,

calculated

in accordance

151

with the actual benefit for the

reconstruction, it becomes clear that with a GDP of 3.1 trillion-DM Germany can

shoulder the burden. For the reconstruction, only those costs should be counted which specifically promote the development of the new Länder. Such costs can be divided into five categories, the pillars of eastern reconstruction. In 1999, these where as follows: e promotion of innovation, R&D 3.2 billion;

e

promotion of the regional economy 2.6 billion;

e

infrastructure 18.9 billion;

e

job creation 13.7 billion. To the above can be added the special payments agreed under the Solidarity Pact which amount to 14 billion-DM. In 1999 40 billion-DM was set aside for the “reconstruction” (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999, p. 10). None the less, the amount is still huge compared to the available funds for the EU applicant countries. Bearing in mind all these issues, one may ask if the acceding transition countries are not, perhaps, aspiring to do too much too soon? One does not know where the funds to accommodate the adjustment of the acceding transition countries could come from. The Maastricht criteria for EMU require budgetary cuts throughout the EU. The Cannes Summit (1995) allocated “only” €6.7 billion to the Phare Programme for the period 1995-99. Therefore, most of the funds should come from the acceding countries themselves or from foreign loans. As for the period 2000-2006, there is a decision to keep the limit for spending for all EU activities on the level of 1.27% of the total GDP of the 15 member countries. This limit is combined with strict constraints on the national public expenditure that are related to EMU. However, Agenda 2000 earmarked €45 billion for the period 2000-2006 (a kind of mini Marshall Plan) as the preaccession aid to the acceding Luxembourg group of countries. During that time, acceding countries will be granted €1 billion a year as structural aid plus €0.5 billion a year for agricultural development'’..The future negotiations about financing of EU expenditure will be more difficult than was the case in the past. EU member governments will argue against an expansion of the EU budget during times when they are making unprecedented efforts at home to cut spending in order to qualify for and stay in EMU. In theory, economic integration may, but will not necessarily, bring greater benefits to the regions/countries that lag behind the centre of economic activity in their development. However, if production linkages (forward and backward) are strong and internal to an industry such as in chemicals or financial services and imperfect competition prevails, economic integration would trigger agglomeration tendencies. If those linkages were not limited to a relatively narrow industry group but are strong across industries and sectors, integration would produce agglomeration tendencies in select spots. If labour is not mobile, the whole process would tend to open up new and widen the existing regional wage differentials

'° European Commission (1997), p. 25 and 53. 152

(Venables, 1996). Although this may produce deindustrialization tendencies in the peripheral regions, it does not mean that integration is not desirable. For instance, education and regional policies increased the attractiveness of Spain as a location for various manufacturing industries, as discovered by EU and foreign investors. Dispersion of industries takes place in the case with high cost of trade. When this cost is reduced, agglomeration can take place as demand in distant places can be met by exports. When the cost of trade approaches zero (as is the case in writing computer

software

in Bangalore,

India

and

the

use

of Internet),

footloose

production may be dispersed and located according to the availability of the specific resource inputs. On the one hand, “globalization” of certain industries (integrated international production) reduces the weight of physical proximity between various production units, as well as between producers and consumers. On the other hand, the “global” success of various industries depends on the strength of the local cluster (computers in Silicon Valley, chemicals in Basle, finance in London and New York, numerous clusters in northern Italy, to mention just a few

examples). Success, like many other things, also appears to cluster. Some may argue that an active regional policy is necessary, in EMU. The flow of emigrants would discourage the entry of new businesses into the region which would further weaken the economic position of the area in question. Nonetheless, such a vicious circle does not yet exist in EU. What seems likely to be the case in EU is that the regional disparities were slowly narrowing until the early 1970s; this was followed by a decade-long period of widening the regional gaps; and than a stabilization of regional gaps between member countries". As for the structure of industrial geography of production in EU and relying on the study by Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000, pp. 46-7), the conclusion is that the EU countries became more specialized from the early 1980s than was the case before. This confirms the theoretical expectations by standard, neo-classical and new theory of economic integration. However, a new pattern of industrial production is emerging in EU. The major features of this divergence process in the geography of industrial production in EU are the following: e the process is slow and does not provoke great adjustment costs. There was no clear effect of the Single European Market Programme on the reallocation of manufacturing production and specialization; e there was a certain convergence among the geography of production in the EU countries towards the EU average during the 1970s, while from the early 1980s, these countries were diverging from the average. This is a general sign of increased national specialization in EU. The most remarkable national change

'© Economic history of integrated States such as US points to the fact that integration is associated with regional convergence, which predominates over economic divergence in the long run. This process is rather slow, around 2% a year, but it is sustained over a long period oftime (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, p. 154).

153

e

e

e

in the geography of production was the spreading of relatively high technology and high skill industries towards Ireland and Finland; availability of highly skilled and educated workers is becoming an increasingly important determinant for industrial location. National economic policies concerning investment, industrial change, R&D, mobility of people and knowledge, investment in human capital (education) that develops and extends skills, experience and organizational competencies of the most important factor is crucial for the efficiency side of the economy; and regional and social matters also play a role; not all industries follow the same path as a reaction to economic integration. Some of them concentrate, while others spread (contrary to the expectations of the neo-classical theory that all industries would be affected in the same way). Several forces, therefore, propel such changes in the structure of production. Strong functional intra-industry linkages (high share of intermediate goods from the same industry and/or the need for a large pool of highly skilled labour and researchers) stimulate agglomeration. Where these functional linkages are weak, this acts as an incentive to spread production; while “economic integration” made the US geography of industrial production more similar (less specialized) since 1940s, integration in EU has experienced a growing disparity (increasing specialization) in the manufacturing production. This slow process in either region does not show signs of abating. The forces that drive this process are still unknown;

e e

agglomeration tendencies towards the central locations became pronounced for industries that use a lot of intermediate inputs; high returns to scale are weakening as centripetal (agglomeration) forces.

5.1.2 Acquis communautaire

more

3

Economic transition towards a market-type system is a lengthy and costly process. To accept and to implement a continuously evolving acquis communautaire is costly not only for the new members, but also for the countries that are already in EU. Being less developed, the acceding transition countries have both a lower financial capacity and higher requirements to incorporate the EU tules. Many things are highly regulated in EU. They include not only health, environment

and

consumer

protection,

but

also

safety

at

work

and

social

standards”. Many of those issues do not directly increase productivity. With an out-of-date capital stock, there is a dilemma in the acceding transition countries. Should they invest scarce capital first into upgrading output potential or do something else or both (in what proportion)*? 17

It is: true that not all the measures are to be accepted and implemented by the newcomers before entry. 8 The entry of NATO may postpone both the economic adjustment and the EU entry. Most

154

The cyanide spill in Romania in February 2000 was the worst ecological disaster since the Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986). It reminded everyone about the gravity of the problem in the acceding countries”. The environmental dimension of the acquis communautaire has 320 pieces of “green” legislation”. To implement those laws could cost the 10 acceding countries as much as €120 billion’. Tab. 6 provides information on a part of these costs that deal with water,

air and waste standards in EU in the five acceding countries. EU will offer certain funds to these countries to ease the financial burden to meet the entry criteria, but

most of the funds will have to come from the new member countries themselves”. Can these costs be compensated for by the potential benefits that would come from the entry? If so, how can one measure that? How long would it take? Is such an investment justified at this moment? Public opinion polls in transition countries rank care for the environment much lower than health care, education, security and

the economy”.

of the investment in the military forces is not producing direct value added which can be consumed or exported. Investment in this sector crowds out investment in other sectors because of the necessary coordination and harmonization with other NATO partners. If this continues, the Americans will guide political, military and other types of European integration. 1? Agenda 2000 states that the environment is a major challenge for enlargement (European Commission, 1997, p. 49). 20 There are discussions among Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and

Sweden about a possible creation of an “Eco-Schengen” Group with the aim at coordinating the implementation of the existing legislation and introduction of new laws that have an impact on the environment. ?! European Voice, 24 September 1998, p. 15. 7? Compliance with those standards refers to all member countries of EU. For example, the privatized British water industry is expected to spend around $60 billion between 1989 and 2004 to bring its water supply network into line with EU directives (The Financial Times, 6 October 1997, p. 18). 2 A survey (by the author) of the “Luxembourg group” countries, carried out in 1998, revealed that these countries know how much they can get from EU funds, but they had no

estimates about the cost of the application of the acquis communautaire. The situation in Cyprus was different. The government has an estimate about the financial cost of the application of the acquis communautaire, but did not know the volume of funds that it may get from EU in order to meet the conditions from the acquis communautaire,

155

Tab. 6 - What will cost to reach environmental standards for accession (€ billion)

(maximum)

EDEN Ee Ss CENTRE ISTE ET NE Le ee DES TELI 3.3 CORRI TU ME T ET goLE ns La lm Vale fe Ls

maximum)

per capita

927

oe a Source: Parlement européen, “La politique de l’environnement et l’élargissement”, Fiche thématique, n. 17, Luxembourg, 23 March 1998, p. 15.

Following these data and in comparison with EU(15), several acceding transition countries are not only worse off by a degree, but they still constitute a distinct class by themselves (Bauer, 1998, p. 11). The difference between the economies of the transition countries and that of EU(15) is still huge. According to Agenda 2000, EU does not expect any major problem regarding the adoption of the acquis communautaire in the southern part of Cyprus. However, there is a need for the alignment of regulations and practices in the financial sector. Income per capita in the northern part of the country is just one third that of the southern part. Another issue is the predominance of the public sector in the economy of the northern part of the country”.

5.1.3 Economic and Monetary Union

The theory of international monetary integration is based on criteria which include factor mobility, openness of the economy, similar rates of unemployment, diversification of the economic structure, coordination of economic policies and comparable rates of inflation between the integrating countries (Jovanovic, 1998, pp. 170-185). The Maastricht Treaty brought conditions for EMU that are not known in the theory of monetary integration. A sceptic might say that this is the reason why EMU may work! In any case, if transaction costs are significant and if there is a danger that comes from the exchange risk, then EMU can give an additional impetus to the expansion of the intra-EU trade. The Maastricht criteria for EMU are the following: e a high degree of price stability (low inflation); e sound public finance position (budget deficit of maximum 3% of the GDP); e national debt of less than 60% of GDP;

*4 European Commission (1997), p. 54. 156

e

no devaluation within the exchange rate mechanism for at least two preceding years; e national interest rate needs to be within the 2% margin of the three best performing countries. The criteria for EMU may create barriers for the accession to EU for many transition countries for a long time in the future. Agenda 2000 states that each acceding country is expected to apply, implement and enforce the acquis communautaire upon accession. In order to safeguard EU competition rules, those measures that relate to the Single European Market should be applied immediately upon accession”. Being out of EMU, a new member country’s currency may be the target for a speculative attack on the currency market which the country may not be able to withstand. The country may alter the rate of exchange. By doing so, trade flows and free competition in the Single European Market could be jeopardized. Hence the need for the acceding countries to join EMU. The four EU member countries that are currently out of EMU should not be taken as precedents for the acceding countries. The “four” are already EU members and the Union has no declared intentions to enlarge the non-EMU tier in EU, on the contrary. Tab. 7 - Government deficit/surplus and national debt in candidate countries 1997-99 (% of GDP) % of GDP Budget deficit (-)/surplus (+)

SITO Cyprus Czech R. Estonia

eg ae] * Source: Eurostat (2000). * Estimate.

Source: UN/ECE (2000).

25 European Commission (1997), p. 52. IS,

National debt

Tab. 8 - Growth rate and inflation in acceding countries and the EU in 1997-99 (%)

RES Tres 255 eal 2 6 .8 RTE dais 2.6 3 5 | 10826 | 222 | 04 | [Bulgaria | -70 | 35 | 26 4.5 5 RTS 0 FARSI 22 PT 4 EE i EN lia bom eal LIZ 4.5 9 . | 86 | 39 [Latvia 5 Tn] aml tt ease mem etc ee à 16 4 mere Rici Bu ran 5.4 aber RR4 4 ME ed A OR A lS Ln 3 8 ii ll at lis UE na US 2.8 EN 848) CT ES REIN eo Source: Eurostat (2000) and UN/ECE (2000).

If the macroeconomic

situation remains stable in the future, the Luxembourg

group of acceding countries would not have very big problems to satisfy most of the loosely interpreted Maastricht criteria for the EMU (Tab. 7 and 8, respectively)*. Apart from the Czech Republic, all Luxembourg group of countries are growing economies. However, compared to the EMU requirements, all but Cyprus fail the price stability test. Inflation is still high and persisting compared to the EU criteria for a single currency. »

5.1.4 Agriculture

Farm gate prices in the acceding transition countries were on the average within a range of 40 to 80% of the EU level, which is guaranteed by the Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)”. If CAP prices apply directly in the acceding transition countries, that would give a strong boost to output of both crop (cereals, oilseeds and sugar) and livestock production, together with milk. At the same time, an increase in prices of farm goods in the acceding transition countries may provoke social tensions. These price hikes would hit hard social groups such as the retired

°° Some of the Maastricht criteria are loosely interpreted as national debt was over 120% of the GDP in 1997 both in Belgium and in Italy, but both countries were permitted in 1998 to enter the EMU from the start, even though the Maastricht norm is 60%. gl European Economy (1997a), p. 8.

158

and the unemployed, unless their income situation is improved. However, it would be difficult to convince the acceding countries not to increase farm production, unless they can see clear signs that CAP is changing prior to their entry. One thing is clear: enlargement of EU cannot easily proceed without a prior change in CAP. A deep reform of CAP will test the actual seriousness of EU about enlargement. Reform of CAP represents one of the most serious challenges for EU. It will have consequences both on the internal operation, external economic relations and enlargement. Proposals of March 1998 may bring the most thorough reform of CAP since its inception in the mid-1960s. It is planned to cut intervention prices for farm goods up to 30% from the 2000-01 season. The eastern enlargement would also introduce a practical problem on how to operate country-specific transitional arrangements. If, for example, alignment of the prices of agricultural products between EU and Hungary takes place at a different rate from alignment of prices in Poland, it would be necessary to impose tariffs, not only between the acceding countries and EU(15), but also between the acceding countries themselves”. The introduced of CAP in the 1960s was an instrument for the security of food supplies and a means for the protection of income of farmers. As food shortages were eliminated and EU started disposing of surpluses and as farmers’ income were safeguarded on the average against unfavourable developments, the EU concern shifted towards food safety and protection of the environment. This last concern is of great importance, as the acceding transition countries have a legacy of serious environmental damage.

5.2 European Union The European Union is generally interested in enlargement for various political, security, ecology and economic reasons. What, however, the acceding countries would specially contribute to the Union’s economy is less easy to discern. The entry of 13 candidate countries (including Turkey) would increase the EU population by 45%, but its GDP only by 6.9% at current prices and by 16% at PPS (Tab. 9). The corresponding percentages for 1999 were 6.7 and 15.8, respectively. Is the “eastern” market with cheap labour and certain possibilities for investment an opportunity or a threat? Germany and Austria fear that eastern enlargement would set off an annual inflow of more than 300.000 immigrants”. A flexible way to mitigate this fear would be to allow a greater degree of mobility first to the people from specified (frontier) regions of the acceding countries to go to other neighbouring regions in the current EU member States.

7 European Economy (1997a), p. 25. 29 The Financial Times, 25 May 2000, p. 2.

159

Tab. 9 - Total GDP at current prices and in purchasing power standard in acceding countries and the EU in 1998

EU (15

% of EU (15)

7,585.6

hot rase Bb

|

7,586.7

oe del ue he IEEE =

Source: Eurostat (2000).

It should be remembered that European integration started in the early 1950s, not for economic reasons, but rather to preserve peace. The political goal was to make war between Germany and France impossible through economic means. The southern enlargements of EU, although costly in financial terms, had the objective of stabilizing democracy in Greece, Spain and Portugal following a period of dictatorship. Identical arguments can be used regarding the eastern enlargement of EU. As for Cyprus, reunification of the country and a reduction in tensions in the

eastern Mediterranean region may be some of the goals. Stability and predictability at the eastern border is in the interest of EU. If the EU wants to play a role in geopolitics, then eastern enlargement has to take place. Enlargement is not a charity. It is in the EU’s self interest. Ecological and certain economic factors also apply. In addition, modernization of the transition economies may create and keep certain high technology jobs in manufacturing and services in EU(15). The potential economic and political gains for EU need to be combined with at least two economic costs that are often mentioned. e

First is the need to finance the adjustment of the acceding countries to the.

acquis communautaire and to the Maastricht criteria for EMU.

In a situation

with serious austerity measures in the EU countries, the question is, where the

funds would come from?

160

e

The second cost could come from the (potential) loss of jobs and business in the “sensitive” manufacturing industries and in agriculture in EU because of the penetration of goods from the East. There may be strong lobby pressure on policy makers to slow down eastern enlargement and/or request compensations from EU. This second “cost” may be exaggerated. Owing to Europe Agreements, sensitive manufactured goods from the acceding countries now enter EU mainly free of tariff and quantitative restrictions. The major continuing barriers are chiefly anti-dumping measures. In addition, exports of sensitive products from the acceding countries to EU have not expanded relative to other products since the 1980s. Hence, one should not expect a surge in acceding countries’ exports of sensitive manufactured products to EU as a consequence of further integration of these countries with the Union (Brenton and di Mauro, 1998, p. 303).

When EU last accepted ‘’poor countries” (Spain and Portugal in 1986), the European Community, as it was then called, was not a single market for goods, services, capital and labour. EU deepened integration and EMU was introduced in 1999. Even though Spain and Portugal were “poor” countries, they were market economies.

With this in mind, even the chances of the most advanced transition

countries seem bleak for quite some time in the future, unless or until the entry rules change or the economic situation in the acceding transition countries improves. EU has few incentives and limited funds to accept countries with economic structures that are significantly different from its own. Such an attitude may seem hypocritical since the West has spent almost half a century encouraging those countries to join the free market and democratic world. Applicant countries need also to exercise patience. An “optimistic” timetable, if “all goes well”, meaning smooth negotiations of perhaps around a decade and an adjustment process of another decade including ratification in each Parliament of the current 15 member countries of EU, it would take the most advanced transition countries some 15-20 years to become full members of EU (Jovanovic, 1997a, p. 368)”.

A clear message to the acceding countries came from the top of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Enlargement in March 2000. These countries should not attach too much importance to the date of accession, but rather to the essential issue: quality of the accession, i.e. the respect of the accession criteria. The enlargement should take place in such a way as to be beneficial both to the existing EU member countries and to the acceding countries. In addition, EU after enlargement has to remain strong. After all, Spain negotiated its membership over seven years, while the Luxembourg group is in its third year of negotiations. The Commission will recommend the access only if the acceding country can

°° Long run growth projections predict that it may take around 30 years (one generation) for the Central and East European countries to catch up with the income levels in low-income EU countries (Fisher, Sahay and Végh, 1998, p. 28). 3! Agence Europe, 14 March 2000.

161

respect rights and duties from the first day of accession”. Such clear and open messages contribute to the departure of a part of enthusiasm among the acceding countries for a fast entry. The ongoing Inter-governmental Conference on the institutional reform of the EU raises new doubts among the acceding countries. These countries fear that the accession is made subject to new conditions or that something is being plotted against them from which they will be disqualified. Expectation fatigues is becoming obvious. The overriding goal of EU is to safeguard the efficient operation of its Single European Market. This means that a multi-speed EU needs to be avoided as much as possible. Thus, there may be a sufficiently long pre-accession period tailored to the individual conditions of each new country in order to absorb the acquis communautaire. This would eliminate the need for the unnecessary post-entry transition period. However, all this is highly speculative, as the acquis communautaire will be very different in the year 2010 from what it is in today. Only in 1999 the acquis communautaire was “enriched” by 2,820 regulations. To make matters worse, more and tougher rules are on the horizon. It is true that most of them have a limited time duration. However, the new member countries have a

race against ever-shifting goalposts. This would not be a problem for Cyprus as Agenda 2000 does not expect any major obstacle regarding the adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis communautaire in the southern part of the country”. Inter-governmental conferences are legal necessities in EU. The reason is that EU outgrows old treaties as it adds new members and new functions. The ongoing Inter-governmental Conference faces the most thorough political reform of EU since its creation. It will have to deal with a number of political minefields on the way to preserving unity with diversity in and expansion of EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not provide the expected solution of fundamental issues (institutional organization) that are linked with the forthcoming enlargement. it just postponed the solution for the future. The shadow of the Amsterdam “success” may follow EU in the time to come. Has EU reached its limit? The Amsterdam experience may provide EU with new inspirations to try out something new and, potentially, create new grounds for European integration as envisaged in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome. Spain, France and Austria (with tacit support from a number of other countries) are explicitly cautious about the enlargement of EU. Spain has two national fears that can be substantiated. First, there may be an inflow of cheap fruits and vegetables from the East in EU(15) which can risk Spain’s market share for these goods. Second, expenditure from generous structural funds would be directed eastwards to the detriment of the beneficiaries in Spain. France has reservations about the overall capacity (among other things) of the acceding countries to take all -

a Agence Europe, 28 March 2000. dì European Commission (1997), p. 54.

162

the obligations immigrants.

that come

from EU

membership.

Austria

fears an inflow of

6. Conclusion

À plethora of agreements that EU has with the acceding transition countries offer improved access to the EU market. These technical agreements are a paradise for lawyers and consultants. However, such a variety of arrangements may complicate life. What may happen in the future is that EU would wish to place the glut of agreements with a single one, at least for the distinct groups of advanced acceding countries. These economies may be moving slowly towards the European Economic Area. Nonetheless, there is a lot of anxiety in the relations between EU and the acceding countries as there are still a number of economic and political risks and uncertainties. This is why the acceding countries now have a partnership with EU instead of membership. The major EU project for the 1990s was EMU. Assuming that EMU will not fall apart, reforms of CAP, regional spending and EU institutions are on the priority list for the following decade. Only once this all is done, enlargement may proceed. However, this does not rule out the possibility to have enlargement included as a project in the forthcoming decade. The key procedure in EU that all member countries move together (or not at all) is not easy to apply always even among the current 15 member States. It does not seem to be operational in an enlarged EU. So, would “flexibility” make the enlarged EU of around 30 countries more manageable? Would flexibility, i.e. multi-speed organization of EU, make it more viable? Would it strengthen or make EU loose? The European Union as we know it is finished. However, what will come out of the Inter-governmental Conference is not yet known and may not be known until the very last moment of negotiations, as has usually been the case in the past. As a rule, when France and Germany and perhaps another larger EU country reach an agreement during the very last minutes of negotiation, then they pull others into the deal**. Only once the exact terms for the entry are known, one is able to make an analysis about the potential (high) costs of eastern enlargement of EU. Consideration of the issue of timing and terms of the new enlargement of EU is highly speculative”. Entry depends on the political will (and the funds) of the EU countries. However, the funds and the political will existed even when Spain and Portugal were negotiating entry with EU, but their entry took several years more than expected and almost an additional decade to get up to full speed with the rest 34 Recall that revisions ofthe Treaty have to be legally unanimous. 35 Once the Treaty is revised, it needs to go through the national Parliaments for ratification, even through referendums. Memories about the difficulties ratification with the Maastricht Treaty are still quite fresh.

163

of EU. In addition, the Iberian enlargement of EU was technically and economically much simpler than the potential accession of transition countries. Hence, all official statements about (very) early entry into EU, by around the year 2005, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. The European Union is becoming a more and more complicated place. The Union finds ways to interfere directly not only in the composition of governments of member States, but also in the leadership of individual national parties. Many people question the wisdom of surrendering additional sovereign rights to a supranational administration. Enthusiasm for integration is loosing momentum. The resignation of the European Commission in March 1999 left a mess behind it, which added to “Euroscepticism”. There are various alliances within EU. The principal Franco-German (including the Low Countries) alliance is somehow weakened by the other ones which still do not have strong either economic or political muscle. None the less, the Scandinavian countries harmonize their posture, Spain and Portugal often act together, while Britain allies with anyone that wants to slow down the process of integration. À possible eastern EU tier of a group of countries with similar histories and goals may add an important new factor that may contribute to the watering down of the leading Franco-German integration axis. This may slow down the entire integration process. It is just what Britain wanted in the post-Second World War period from outside EU and did from within after the entry in 1971. Is it necessary to move very fast with the eastern enlargement? It may be true that the acceding transition countries have “no other way” but to join EU. It is also true that they have survived a “big boom” adjustment following the transition process. However, the “big boom” was a one-time affair. Integration in EU is a constantly evolving process. Unless the acceding transition countries are well prepared, they may face similar problems to those that Germany encountered with the absorption of the eastern part of the country. The forthcoming enlargement of EU will be the best-prepared enlargement to date. However, enlargement of EU is a highly charged political process that cannot be predicted with accuracy. Europe can be divided into six groups of countries that move at six speeds. The first and fastest group includes the 12 EU countries that take part in the EMU. The second set of three EU countries includes the ones (Britain, Denmark and Sweden) that do not (yet) participate in the EMU. The third circle consists of the EU countries members of the Schengen agreement. A fourth group contains ten candidate countries with economies in transition from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus and Malta which all individually negotiate full entry of the EU. Within this group one may single out Bulgaria and Romania as the ones with the slowest speed. Turkey is in the fifth group. It has only the title of a candidate country. In the sixth unit are other European countries, mainly in the Balkans and East of Poland and Romania. European integration has always been based on the political decision to secure peace and liberty in Europe. That is the purpose of EU, although many observers 164

have forgotten it. European integration is to mitigate the impact of old rivalries and replace them by mutual economic advantage and social prosperity. The forthcoming enlargement would not bring EU extra efficiency or growth, neither will it create new jobs. Its basic objective is to give a certain support to friendly countries and governments in their reform and general stabilization process. European integration has always been in the hands of national elites. That is why the Treaties on which European integration is based are complicated and incomprehensible to the man in the street. When the national elites decide to defend Europe from various challenges, in particular external ones coming from both West and South, the eastern enlargement of EU may gain momentum. The major importance for the national elites in EU countries is now to regain popular backing for the process of European integration. Therefore, the forthcoming enlargement of EU deserves support, but speed is not so important as mistakes could be paid with a longer-term loss of confidence in European integration. Festina lente! (Hurry, slowly!)

References Avery G., and Cameron

F. (1998), The Enlargement of the European

Union, Sheffield

Academic Press. Baldwin R. (1995), “The eastern enlargement of the European Union”, European Economic Review, pp. 474-481.

Barro R. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1991), “Convergence across states and regions”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 107-182. Bauer P. (1998), “Eastward enlargement — benefits and costs of EU entry for the transition countries”, /ntereconomics, January/February, pp. 11-19. Braunerhjelm P., Faini R., Norman V., Ruane F. and Seabright P. (2000), “Integration and the Regions of Europe: How the Right Policies Can Prevent Polarization”, CEPR, London. Brenton P. and Di Mauro F. (1998), “Is there any potential in trade in sensitive industrial products between the CEECs and the EU?”, World Economy, pp. 285-304. Briilhart, M. and Torstensson J. (1996), “Regional integration, scale economies and industry location in the European Union”, CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 1435. CEPR (1992), “Is Bigger Better? The Economics of EC Enlargement”, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London.

Davenport M. (1995), “Fostering integration of countries in transition in central and eastern Europe in the world economy and the implications for the developing countries”, UNCTAD, ITD/7, 31 October 1995. Deutscher Bundestag (1999), Jahresbericht 1999 der Bundesregierung zun Stand der Deutschen Einheit, Drucksache 14/1825, 10 Oktober 1999, Economic Commission for Europe (1996), Economic Bulletin for Europe, United Nations, New York. Economic Commission for Europe (1997), Economic Survey of Europe in 1996-1997, United Nations, New York.

165

Economic Commission for Europe (1998), Economic Survey of Europe 1998 No.3, United Nations, New York. | Economic Commission for Europe (2000), Economic Survey of Europe 2000 No.1, United Nations, New York. European Commission (1997), Agenda 2000 for a Stronger and Wider Union, European Communities, Luxembourg. European Economy (1997a), “The CAP and enlargement”, n. 2. European Economy (1997b), “Towards a Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe”, n. 5. Fisher S., Sahay R. and Végh C. (1998), “How far is eastern Europe from Brussels?”, /MF Working Paper, WP/98/53. Hertel T., Brockmeier M. and Swaminathan P. (1997), “Sectoral and economy-wide analysis of integrating central and eastern European countries into the EU: implications of alternative strategies”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, pp. 359-386. Jovanovié M. (1997), European Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects, Routledge, London. Jovanovié M. (1997a), “Probing leviathan: the eastern enlargement of the European Union”, European Review, pp. 353-370. Jovanovié M. (1998), International Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects, Routledge, London. Jovanovié M. (1998a), “Does eastern enlargement mean the end of the European Union?”, International Relations, pp. 23-39. Jovanovié M. (1999), “Where are the limits to the enlargement of the European Union?”,

Journal of Economic Integration, pp. 467-496. : Jovanovié M. (2001), Geography of Production and Economic Integration, Routledge, London. Keuschnigg C. and Kohler W. (2001), “Eastern enlargement of the EU: how much is it worth for Austria?”, Review of International Economics, forthcoming. Keuschnigg C. and Kohler W. (2000), “Eastern enlargement of the EU: a dynamic general equilibrium perspective”, in Using Dynamic General Equilibrium Models for Policy Analysis, (eds. Harrison G., Hougard Jensen S., Haagen Pedersen L. and Rutherford T.), Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 119-170. Kohler W. and Keuschnigg C. (2000), “An incumbent country view on eastern enlargement of the EU, Part I: A General Treatment”, University of Linz, Department of Economics, Working Paper 0025, November. Kohler W. and Keuschnigg C. (2000), “An incumbent country view on eastern enlargement of the EU, Part II: The Austrian Case”, University of Linz, Department of Economics, Working Paper 0026, November.

Krugman P. (1998), The Accidental Theorist, Norton, New York. Lintner V. (1995), “The economic implications of enlarging the European Union”, in The Economics of the New Europe, (ed. N. Healey), Routledge, London, pp. 170-187. Mayhew A. (1998), Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Midelfart-Knarvik K., Overman H., Redding S. and Venables A. (2000), “The location of European industry”, mimeo. Nicolaides P. (1999), “The economics of enlarging the European Union: policy reform versus transfers”, /ntereconomics, January/February, pp. 3-9. Puga D. and Venables A. (1997), “Preferential trading arrangements and industrial location”, Journal of International Economics, pp. 347-368. Theophanous A. (1996), The Political Economy of a Federal Cyprus, Intercollege Press, Nicosia.

166

van

Brabant Economia Venables A. Economic

J. (1996), “Remaking Europe - the accession of transition economies”, Internazionale, pp. 507-531. (1996), “Localization of industry and trade performance”, Oxford Review of Policy, pp. 52-60.

167

I DIRITTI DELLE DONNE IN EUROPA: QUALE FATTORE DI INTEGRAZIONE? Adele MAIELLO Università di Genova, Italia

1. Introduzione

In questo contributo sarà inizialmente trattato il tema della parità fra donne e uomini e del come esso riceva stimolo e promozione dai trattati, dai programmi e dalle diverse attività delle istituzioni europee. In una seconda parte poi si analizzeranno taluni aspetti della posizione della donna nella società europea, cercando di capire se la combinazione delle tante eredità culturali che si sono trovate affiancate e a confronto nell’UE sia suscettibile, in questo ampio e particolarissimo settore, di una modifica positiva che nasca dalla comparazione reciproca e dalle regole comuni. Essere donne in Europa ha naturalmente tutte le valenze legate ai temi della cittadinanza, delle relazioni sociali ed economiche sia fra uomini e donne, sia fra i diversi soggetti sociali; ma poiché parlare di tutto non è possibile, in questo contesto, desidero scegliere qualche connotato significativo, frutto del dibattito contemporaneo, su cui appuntare l’attenzione per cercare di capire il senso della possibile integrazione e dell’eventuale progresso comune. Di questi evidenzierò i punti caldi, vale a dire gli indicatori di una difficile integrazione e quelli che invece sono suscettibili di un’evoluzione tale da promuovere l’integrazione. È

2.L’Europa La presenza dell’Europa nella vita delle italiane è diventata un fatto importante non tanto dai Trattati del 1957-58, quanto da 20 anni dopo, quando la legge 903/1977 sulla “Parità di trattamento tra uomini e donne in materia di lavoro” escluse finalmente ogni discriminazione in base al sesso nei rapporti di lavoro. Tale legge derivava da un lato dai presupposti posti dallo Statuto dei lavoratori del 1970, che finalmente tutelava i diritti dei lavoratori come gruppo e come individui e riconosceva loro una più ampia sfera di diritti, non solo nell’ambito della produzione,

ma

anche

in quello

della

società

civile,

ma

derivava

anche

da

un’espressa pressione della Comunità Europea, la direttiva 117 del 1975, ex art. 119 del Trattato CEE e la 207 del 1976. Da quel momento in poi tutto cambiò, non tanto in forza della legge 903/77, che si era mostrata presto inadeguata ad

168

affermare

la

parità

sostanziale

nel

lavoro

fra

uomini

e

donne,

quanto

dall’approfondimento del concetto di eguaglianza e delle modalità per il suo perseguimento. In questi anni, infatti, il dibattito si è arricchito ed ora quello che è cambiato è anche il punto di vista con cui si considera la presenza della donna nella società, vale a dire non più un elemento debole da difendere, quanto piuttosto una risorsa umana su cui investire. La legge 125/91 è stata un’antesignana nel cercare di risolvere il problema della “parità sostanziale”, come abbiamo già visto. Dal 1975 (Città del Messico) in poi, molti consessi internazionali, perlopiù promossi dall'ONU, hanno affrontato la tematica dei diritti della donna (A. Grecchi, 1995). La Comunità prima e l’Unione Europea poi hanno piuttosto creato presso l’ex- DG.V un’Unità per le pari opportunità, tuttora molto attiva, e poi commissioni, reti e programmi intesi a promuovere l’integrazione, che sicuramente non è un fatto acquisito. Il lavoro di tutte queste strutture, formali e informali, si è

in parte concluso non riuscendo a mutare la situazione di fondo, anche perché strumenti deboli e parziali. Di conseguenza, se a tutt'oggi permangono delle grosse differenze culturali che possono accomunare i problemi delle donne dei paesi dell’ Europa

Meridionale,

che

si sono

addirittura

riunite

in associazioni

che

sottolineano tale appartenenza, abbiamo anche sotto gli occhi dei cambiamenti in settori importanti come la presenza delle donne nella rappresentanza politica a livello europeo che segnala forse cambiamenti che non attengono più ad antichi retaggi culturali, ma a moderne strumentazioni legislative. In tal senso il confronto, l'emulazione e la collaborazione che risultano dalla comune coabitazione nella nuova casa europea, sono particolarmente produttive, tanto più che il principio delle pari opportunità ha conosciuto una sempre maggiore importanza nella programmazione dell’Unione ed oggi è uno dei pilastri principali su cui si basano tutte le sue politiche.

2.1 La Commissione per i diritti della donna del Parlamento Europeo Si può partire con la descrizione della struttura che istituzionalmente, nel Parlamento Europeo, si occupa dei problemi della donna per avere un’idea iniziale dei temi su cui negli ultimi 16 anni si è appuntata l’attenzione sia del dibattito relativo ai diritti della donna sia del legislatore nazionale ed europeo. La “Commissione per i diritti della donna” è stata creata, dal Parlamento Europeo, nel 1984 ed è composta di 41 membri e 34 sostituti (legislatura 1994-99). Si riunisce ogni mese ed organizza udienze su diversi argomenti. Il suo principale obiettivo è di garantire la tutela delle conquiste comunitarie e lo sviluppo delle pari opportunità tra donne e uomini. Le sue funzioni sono di elaborare relazioni sulle

proposte della Commissione

in tema di diritti delle donne e di monitorare la

corretta applicazione delle direttive già in vigore in materia di parità.

169

Dall’elenco delle competenze abbiamo anche un’idea di che tipo di integrazione si sta perseguendo nell’UE e quali possono essere i punti caldi della stessa.

e e e e e

e

Definizione e sviluppo dei diritti delle donne dell’UE avendo come riferimento le risoluzioni del Parlamento Europeo. Applicazione e perfezionamento delle direttive relative alla parità dei diritti delle donne ed elaborazione di nuove direttive. Politica sociale per l’occupazione e per la formazione di donne e ragazze, misure de adottare per la lotta contro la disoccupazione femminile. Politica dell’informazione e degli studi concernenti le donne. Valutazione delle politiche comuni sulle donne e gli effetti del mercato unico sulla popolazione femminile. Problemi connessi all’attività professionale delle donne e al ruolo familiare. Le donne nelle istituzioni dell’Unione. Questione femminile nel contesto internazionale (ONU, OIL, ecc.). Situazione delle donne immigrate e delle partner dei lavoratori immigrati, nel quadro della legislazione europea legata al mercato interno. Statuto delle donne che sono contemporaneamente cittadine europee e cittadine di paesi non europei.

2.2 Il Trattato di Amsterdam (1997) Dal momento in cui, nel 1997, il Trattato di Amsterdam è diventato la nuova base dell’Unione Europea, nel progetto d’integrazione europeo è stata confermata l’importanza del principio delle pari opportunità, si sono aperte nuove possibilità di progresso. La parità, che esisteva già in nuce, nel Trattato costitutivo della CEE, all’art. 119, è stata riaffermata nell’art. 2 del nuovo Trattato ed ha costituito, da

quel momento in poi, un principio fondante dei Trattati firmati successivamente nell’ambito dell’Unione. Sempre lo stesso Trattato di Amsterdam ha poi assegnato all’Unione, nel suo art. 3, il compito di eliminare le diseguaglianze basate sul sesso in tutte le sue attività. Si è trattato di un sostegno necessario per progredire nella strategia del mainstreaming. Il successivo art. 13 sembra poi permettere un’azione appropriata per combattere ogni discriminazione basata sul sesso, ampliando il campo d’azione dell’art. 119 del Trattato di Roma, sopra ricordato, e fornendo alla “parità” una specifica base giuridica. Questa disposizione tratta dei problemi chiave legati all’impiego e sottolinea il diritto degli Stati membri di prendere delle misure atte ad assicurare dei vantaggi specifici al sesso sottorappresentato al fine di permettergli più facilmente di seguire un'attività professionale o al fine di prevenire e di compensare gli svantaggi nelle carriere professionali. E’ lo : strumento delle “azioni positive” già presente in quasi tutte le legislazioni nazionali europee la cui utilità viene in tal modo riaffermata.

170

Il 16 settembre 1997 il Parlamento Europeo si espresse a favore della Comunicazione della Commissione relativa ad “Incorporare le pari opportunità fra uomini e donne in tutte le politiche e attività dell’Unione”. Nella stessa data il Parlamento esaminò varie forme di discriminazione e di violenza contro le donne che si frappongono alla realizzazione delle pari opportunità. In quell’occasione furono adottate risoluzioni sul trattamento delle donne nella pubblicità e della necessità per una campagna di “tolleranza zero” nei confronti della violenza contro le donne. Infine, nel dicembre 1997, a seguito dell’impressione enorme creata in Europa dalla crescente povertà e disoccupazione, lo stesso Parlamento adottò una risoluzione sul traffico delle donne a scopo di sfruttamento sessuale. Sottolineando come la violenza colpisca profondamente la vita delle donne e impedisca loro di raggiungere una vera eguaglianza, esso sollecitò Commissione e Consiglio a indicare il 1999 come “Anno Europeo d’azione per combattere la violenza contro le donne”, proposta adottata poi nella sessione plenaria del 2 aprile del 1998. Intanto,

a Lussemburgo,

nel novembre

dello stesso anno,

in occasione

del

summit sull’impiego, i capi di Stato e di Governo dell’Unione si erano accordati su di una nuova strategia europea dell’impiego, arrivando al riconoscimento ufficiale che la situazione delle donne sul mercato del lavoro meritava un’attenzione particolare. L'occupazione delle donne dunque è apparsa un elemento strategico atto a far crescere l’occupazione generale nell’Unione sia per assicurare l’avvenire della stessa Unione, sia per consentire il funzionamento dei suoi sistemi di welfare. Al di là delle questioni di principio, il problema delle pari opportunità è stato visto quindi, soprattutto, come una questione di interesse economico. Tale convinzione

ha comportato una nuova strategia per l’impiego uno dei cui pilastri portanti è diventato principio delle pari opportunità assieme allo spirito d’impresa, alla “impiegabilità” e all’adattabilita sul mercato del lavoro. In tal modo il mainstreaming è diventato un connotato cruciale per la politica dell’Unione ed in tal senso si è fatta più forte la pressione per un mutamento dei principi e delle politiche nazionali. Ma il mainstreaming vuol dire porre le donne al centro delle attenzioni delle politiche attuate o da attuarsi dai governi, di conseguenza una tale scelta, sia pur motivata da una necessità economica è diventata una scelta politica di principio (A. Maiello, 2000). Altro strumento per l’affermazione del suddetto principio è stato il “dialogo sociale” sia a livello generale fra la Confederazione Europea dei Sindacati (CES) e l’Unione delle Confederazioni Europee dell’Industria e dei datori di lavoro (UNICE) e il Centro Europeo dell’Impresa Pubblica (CEEP), sia a livello settoriale. La Commissione ha offerto il proprio sostegno tecnico e finanziario alle parti sociali qualora queste accettassero di sviluppare interconnessioni in rete e scambi europei sul tema della parità. A tal fine un Protocollo Sociale è stato annesso al Trattato di Amsterdam che grazie alla consultazione fra i partner sociali sopra individuati ha portato alla firma di due accordi quadro: 1) sui congedi parentali (Direttiva 96/34 del 3 giugno 1996); 171

2)

sul lavoro part-time (Direttiva 97/81 del 15 dicembre 1997).

Il IV Programma d'azione europeo per le donne e gli uomini (1996-2000) ha i presentato 5 obiettivi principali: pari le promuovere per sociale e economica vita della attori gli tutti 1) mobilitare opportunità; 2) promuovere le pari opportunità in un settore in fase di cambiamento; 3) incoraggiare una politica che riconcili famiglia e vita lavorativa per le donne e per gli uomini; 4) 5)

creare condizioni che facilitino l’esercizio dell’eguaglianza dei diritti; sostenere l’aumento, il monitoraggio e l’affermazione di attività che realizzino

le suddette finalità. In particolare poi l’azione Impiego-NOW (New Opportunities for Women) 1994-99 è stata basata sull’esperienza del NOW precedente che ha dimostrato che misure specificamente previste a favore delle donne hanno aiutato lo sviluppo di nuovi approcci nella formazione e nell’orientamento. L’obiettivo specifico del NOW appena terminato è stato quello di: e ridurre la disoccupazione fra le donne; e migliorare la condizione delle donne che già lavorano; e sviluppare strategie innovative per rispondere ai mutamenti nell’organizzazione del lavoro e nei requisiti professionali richiesti, con un’attenzione particolare alla riconciliazione fra lavoro e vita familiare. In pratica si è sperato che tale azione producesse una partnership reale fra enti locali, servizi del pubblico impiego, associazioni private femminili e partner sociali, evolvendosi in una forma di “cooperazione sociale” che durasse oltre il periodo finanziato dall’iniziativa NOW. Nel dicembre 1997, su proposta della Commissione, il Consiglio Europeo aveva poi adottato delle linee guida per l’impiego, i cui obiettivi principali includevano il rafforzamento delle politiche delle pari opportunità. Tali linee guida si sono riflesse in misure pratiche e hanno dovuto essere incluse in piani di azione nazionale elaborati dagli Stati membri ogni anno. Per quanto riguarda l’atteggiamento della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia Europea, esso ha conosciuto un’evoluzione positiva, da quando, col caso

Kalanke, C-450/93, si era ritenuto che la politica delle “azioni positive” contravvenisse l’art. 2 (4) sulla parità di trattamento della Direttiva 76/207. La Direttiva prevede la possibilità di realizzare “misure atte a promuovere le pari opportunità fra uomini e donne rimuovendo le diseguaglianze esistenti che colpiscono le opportunità per le donne nell’accesso all’impiego, la promozione e la formazione vocazionale”. L’11 novembre 1997 però la Corte riconobbe, nel caso Marschall, C-409/95, che la suddetta Direttiva autorizzi gli Stati membri ad

assumere misure a favore delle donne per migliorare la competitività sul mercato del lavoro e realizzare la propria carriera su di un piano di parità con gli uomini. In

172

tal modo le donne con le stesse qualifiche dei loro competitori uomini possono essere preferite nelle promozioni in aree in cui siano sottorappresentate, di modo da ridurre una diseguaglianza di fatto. Il Consiglio ha poi adottato una Direttiva a riguardo, il 15 Dicembre 1997, secondo la quale compete all’accusato di discriminazione diretta o indiretta l'onere della prova di non aver infranto il principio dell’eguale trattamento. Fino a quella data era a carico della donna l’onere della prova di esser stata discriminata. Al momento la speranza è che non si rimanga a livello di quote, ma si faccia un passo avanti riconoscendo e promuovendo competenze e capacità già presenti o irrisolte e inespresse o ancora da formare e, soprattutto, trasformando il rapporto di tutti, uomini e donne, coi propri ritmi di vita e di lavoro e di conseguenza nei loro rapporti reciproci. Il fatto che il tema delle pari opportunità sia diventato elemento indispensabile, attuare i diversi programmi d’azione europei, indica che la convinzione circa la sua importanza è passata dall’UE ai singoli governi nazionali e quindi alle istituzioni territoriali e da esse ai singoli progetti. La parallela crescita dell’autoconsapevolezza delle donne si spera faccia il resto per evitare che da elemento formale la parità diventi elemento sostanziale della quotidianità, almeno in Europa. Dall’analisi dei progetti italiani approvati nel periodo 1996-99 risultano cofinanziati dalla Commissione Europea - DG.V un buon numero di progetti, 34, tra cui 23 sono nuovi, mentre 11 hanno carattere pluriennale e sono stati rinnovati. Loro promotrici sono state prevalentemente le associazioni e le organizzazioni sindacali, le cosiddette ONG, seguite dagli Enti pubblici e dalle imprese. Le regioni del Nord hanno avuto 12 progetti approvati, 6 il Centro e 5 il Sud e le isole. Nell’organizzazione del partenariato transnazionale ben 16 progetti hanno coinvolto la Gran Bretagna,

11 la Danimarca, 3 l’Austria, 3 la Grecia, altri Stati

membri sono stati coinvolti pur se in misura minore. Considerando gli obiettivi prioritari dei progetti realizzati in Italia nel periodo 1996-99 si constata che: e 10sono sulla promozione delle pari opportunità nell’economia che evolve; 5 sulla partecipazione equilibrata di donne e uomini al processo decisionale; 4 sul mainstreaming;

2 sul rafforzamento delle condizioni per l’esercizio dei diritti alla parità; 2 sulla mobilitazione degli attori socio-economici e la promozione dell’informazione. Invece nessun progetto italiano ha interessato l’area della conciliazione tra vita professionale e vita familiare, mentre questo è un obiettivo molto presente specie nei paesi del Nord Europa. E la questione è intrigante, perché non significa certo che in Italia le donne si sentano sostenute in maniera particolarmente soddisfacente dai servizi offerti dallo Stato, ed a conti fatti sono quelle che lavorano il numero di ore di lavoro giornaliero più alto di tutte in Europa. Il fatto poi che le proposte italiane si siano prevalentemente concentrate su tematiche economiche (12 su 23) potrebbe forse indicare che è il settore

179

dell’economia, ad esempio nella promozione dell’imprenditoria femminile, quello in cui l’Italia ritiene di poter trovare spazi di crescita immediata e proficua; in tal senso i legami con la Gran Bretagna, ad esempio, sono particolarmente importanti. I temi dell’empowerment, del mainstreaming e della parità sono quei classici temi tesi all’affermazione della presenza femminile nei centri decisionali e nelle tematiche politiche, e sono presenti, sia pure in misura minore, perchè sono parte del grande dibattito apertosi in sede internazionale dagli anni ’80 in poi. Per la singolare assenza di progetti per la conciliazione di vita professionale e familiare, vista l’arretratezza della situazione italiana, si potrebbe ipotizzare che il tema è fra i

più scottanti per il mutamento di fondo dei rapporti fra i sessi, e pur costituendo uno dei nodi della modernizzazione della presenza della donna nel mondo del lavoro in maniera serena ed equilibrata è ancora difficile ad affrontarsi in maniera strutturale e non episodica.

3. Problemi di integrazione I problemi che intendo trattare qui si collocano all’interno dei seguenti temi più vasti: la partecipazione politica; la cittadinanza; il lavoro; la famiglia; il welfare .

3.1 La politica: le recenti elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo Sappiamo che nel mondo le prime donne ad ottenere il diritto di voto sono state le neozelandesi nel 1893, ma in Europa il primo paese a riconoscere tale diritto è

stata la Finlandia, nel 1902. In Italia le donne lo hanno ottenuto quasi in sordina nel 1945, nell’Italia non ancora del tutto liberata, e lo hanno esercitato tutte per la

prima volta nel 1946. Ma una cosa è il diritto di voto e l’altra è la partecipazione attiva alla vita politica e poi la reale possibilità di essere elette. A questo punto vediamo che sul piano della presenza delle donne fra le elette nei Parlamenti dei diversi paesi europei i dati ci confermano una presenza più massiccia delle donne non tanto là dove è stato più antico il riconoscimento del loro diritto di voto, quanto nei paesi con una società più avanzata ed economicamente equilibrata. Così se in Finlandia, dove le donne votano dal 1902, la loro percentuale in Parlamento è la più alta dell’Unione, il 39%, e in Norvegia, dove votano dal 1918, si passa al 38%, in Irlanda, dove il diritto di voto delle donne è stato acquisito nel 1918, le donne sono

presenti solo per il 12% in Parlamento, una percentuale non dissimile, e solo di poco superiore a quella dell’Italia (voto nel 1945), dove le donne sono presenti in Parlamento con un misero 9,9%. : Se vediamo poi gli ultimi dati a nostra disposizione relativamente alle europarlamentari elette esse sono in totale 187 (2152), pari al 30% (34,3%) degli

174

eletti, che sono 626. Questo totale cela perd una forte divergenza tra i paesi del Nord e del Sud dell‘Unione Europea. Infatti sono significativi in tal senso i risultati delle elezioni del 1999, con presenze femminili sul numero degli europarlamentari eletti che rappresentano in percentuale (Tab. 1), e il paragone con le elezioni del 1994, Sono dati che non hanno bisogno di molti commenti. Risultano evidenti le disparità nella rappresentanza che riflettono quella nei singoli Parlamenti nazionali o nelle amministrazioni degli enti locali, dove le percentuali non presentano scostamenti di rilievo. Le donne in media, nei paesi dell’Europa meridionale, sono

ancora poco presenti nella politica e le divergenze ci parlano di differenze non solo quantitative, ma fortemente qualitative fra i paesi del Nord e quelli del Sud Europa, nel senso che là dove sono gli uomini ad avere in mano il potere decisionale le istanze del mondo femminile non sono prese in considerazione in maniera adeguata ed apparirà qui evidente quando tratteremo del welfare. Però le cose stanno cambiando anche in taluni paesi dell’Europa meridionale a questo riguardo. Nonostante che tutte le Costituzioni nazionali degli Stati membri prevedano un diritto uguale di cittadinanza per uomini e donne, in realtà tale principio per essere davvero operante ha dovuto conoscere delle forme di rafforzamento che, ad esempio nel caso della Francia, sono arrivate addirittura ad un emendamento della Costituzione francese, realizzato nel 1999, relativo alla presenza femminile nella

rappresentanza politica della popolazione francese. Se la presenza francese femminile è superata da Svezia e Finlandia si può dire che è perché queste sono tradizionali roccaforti dell’equilibrio di genere nella rappresentanza politica, mentre, per un paese come la Francia, che, al contrario, in politica ha una tradizione decisamente maschilista, è un vero exploit, da attribuire direttamente e

forse anche indirettamente (per il clima di cambiamento che in questo caso ha creato nel paese) al partito socialista di Jospin (10 donne su 22 seggi e 5 ministre). Anche Schroeder e Blair si sono circondati di una nutrita compagine femminile sia al governo sia nel Parlamento. La vita politica italiana sembra invece refrattaria ad una vera apertura alle donne. La realtà dell’impetuoso ingresso delle donne nella sfera della vita pubblica non sembra che riesca a farle entrare nelle direzioni dei partiti e, di conseguenza, in Parlamento. Infatti le italiane sono solo 10 nell’Europarlamento, con un arretramento di 2 unità pari a -2,3%. Chi ha fatto un grosso balzo in avanti è la Francia, che ha

portato le sue eurodeputate dal 29,9 al 40,2%, ma le sorprese (vista la tradizione di maschilismo politico francese) non finiscono qui; mentre Svezia, Danimarca e Finlandia hanno visto decrescere le loro rappresentanti (la Svezia addirittura del 4,5%) sono altri due paesi dell’Europa meridionale a veder aumentare la loro rappresentanza femminile, Spagna e Portogallo. Si tratta sempre di paesi dove sono stati adottati piani strategici e azioni per il riequilibro della rappresentanza. Se dunque per questi paesi il riequilibrio si è iniziato a produrre, ciò non è stato vero per l’Italia dove il problema della difesa della rappresentanza femminile è stato

175

soggetto ad attacchi molteplici, invece che a sue difese. In questo caso si vede che l’esser parte dell’UE non è stato uno stimolo per il cambiamento. Il problema della rappresentanza politica appare essere uno dei più difficili da integrare, poiché comporta un cambiamento nei sensi di appartenenza € nei sentimenti di fiducia negli individui. Mentre l’appartenenza all'Europa può cambiare a parole l’atteggiamento dei governanti dei singoli paesi, è poi la popolazione che deve dare forti segnali di disponibilità al nuovo, che in questo caso è l’accettare la rappresentanza politica femminile come una necessità imprescindibile per uno sviluppo equilibrato di una società. Si tratterebbe però di un “attentato” troppo diretto e con effetti immediati ad una delle principali roccaforti del potere in Italia gestiti ancora quasi totalmente dagli uomini ed è comprensibile che non bastino gli esempi stranieri a suscitare l'emulazione o gli auspici per un empowerment espressi in ogni occasione, dalla Conferenza ONU a Pechino dal 1995 in poi. Nel nostro paese non basta nemmeno la creazione di un Ministero delle Pari Opportunità per imprimere una forte spinta al processo. Tanto più che lo stesso Ministero, nato debole con poche dotazioni finanziarie ed inizialmente in competizione/conflitto con un altro ente che già da tempo esisteva presso la Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, vale a dire la Commissione Nazionale per la Parità e le Pari Opportunità, oggi ha pensato bene di includere nel concetto di “pari opportunità” tutte le diversità presenti nel paese, come l'omosessualità o l’appartenenza a paesi extracomunitari. E° un modo per aumentare i compiti di una struttura che, se già faceva poco, ora probabilmente fa ancora meno per le donne italiane. L’Europa forse può, con gli esempi positivi che offre, contribuire, sia pure molto moderatamente, ad un cambiamento fortemente connotato culturalmente. Un

qualche spiraglio in tal senso ce lo può offrire l’analisi di qualche contenuto del diritto di cittadinanza.

3.2 La cittadinanza: le donne soldato

Sotto questo titolo voglio trattare brevemente di un diritto nuovo che in Italia è venuto a colmare un divario fra il nostro paese e gli altri paesi dell’Unione Europea e che attiene direttamente al diritto di una piena cittadinanza, che comprende il diritto per ognuno di difendere anche con le armi il proprio paese. La Gran Bretagna è stato il primo paese europeo ad istituire il servizio militare femminile negli anni ‘30, prima della seconda guerra mondiale. Era una logica conseguenza del voto dato alle donne nel 1919 ed era inteso come

servizio volontario, come

anche quello degli uomini. Si trattava di una concezione del servizio nazionale che si scostava molto da quello dei grandi eserciti nazionali di leva, di cui l’esempio più importante forse è quello della Francia. In Francia sembra farsi strada la convinzione che il concetto di cittadinanza non debba più astrarsi dalla differenza di genere, ma postuli questa differenza come 176

fondante una democrazia reale. L’idea non nasce certo dal voler colmare uno svantaggio restando all’interno della stessa logica, ma di cambiare le regole — abbiamo visto addirittura la Costituzione e l’alto numero delle ministre — e far entrare nel gioco la presenza paritaria delle donne e della loro differenza, che emerge nell’agire politico quando le donne non sono una sparuta minoranza in assemblee e governi maschili, ma quando sono una componente numericamente consistente, che tenda ad avvicinarsi alle percentuali della loro presenza negli altri campi della vita pubblica. La Francia pero nel caso del servizio militare ha inteso dare a quello delle donne un connotato diverso da quello degli uomini, il connotato della volontarieta. Dalla fine della guerra le donne erano state immesse come volontarie in tutti i servizi di operazione. Si trattava di un lascito della recente guerra, perché le volontarie avevano partecipato alla Resistenza oppure erano state volontarie dell’Africa Settentrionale o avevano appartenuto alle Forze armate francesi di liberazione. Fino al 1962 prestavano servizio disarmate. Con tre leggi successive, nel 1970, 1972 e 1973, il settore è stato ristrutturato. Le donne, sempre volontarie,

ora partecipano anche alle azioni armate, svolgono un servizio di durata pari a quello di leva degli uomini. Non devono essere sposate e con figli e devono godere dei diritti civili (D. Pacces, 2000). In Italia solo il 20 ottobre 1999, dopo anni di discussioni e di dibattiti, è stata varata la legge che prevede l’istituzione del servizio militare volontario femminile. L’Italia è stata l’ultima dei paesi dell’UE ad istituirlo e con questa legge il paese si è messo nel trend più avanzato relativo al tipo di sviluppo da dare ad un esercito europeo e della discussione circa l’opportunità di abolire l’esercito di leva nazionale. Infatti se si pensa che un esercito europeo debba avere i connotati della volontarietà e quelli della professionalità - ambedue caratteristiche che si sono volute riconoscere alla partecipazione delle donne italiane a tale diritto - ciò è visto anche come ovvio stimolo all’abolizione dell’esercito di leva (R. Savarese, 2000;

V. Spini, 1997, 2000). Se per molti paesi del Nord Europa l’esercito è già composto di professionisti, ciò ha comportato e comporterà più problemi per i paesi con la leva obbligatoria. Ad esempio, per un paese come la Francia, dove l’esercito è chiamato la “Nazione in armi”, il problema è sentito fortemente come un mutamento storico culturale di grande momento (G. Devoto, 2000), se pensiamo al contributo dell’esercito nazionale alla trasformazione rivoluzionaria dello Stato e contemporaneamente al senso dello Stato francese. Già forse meno sentita come un fatto di partecipazione popolare è la leva in Italia, dove l’esercito è stato spesso usato per reprimere i moti del lavoro e quelli popolari in genere, ma dove il servizio militare è anche stato un grande promotore di acculturazione dei giovani che mancavano di altre occasioni, di unificazione umana ed anche linguistica degli Italiani. L’apertura al servizio alle donne può porre il problema dell’abolizione del servizio di leva come un fatto di maturità e di modernità. In tal senso quindi l’appartenenza all’UE è stato un fattore propulsivo.

Lay

3.3 Il lavoro: occupazione, disoccupazione, segregazione Anche il mondo del lavoro femminile vede disparita fra i paesi europei, che negli ultimi anni sembrano ridursi grazie a diversi fattori: la generalizzata crescita dell’educazione fra le donne; l’importanza crescente del terziario come fonte di occupazione; il processo di globalizzazione. Nel 1996, nell’ambito dell UE le donne rappresentavano il 40% della popolazione attiva (Commission Européenne, Direction générale de l'emploi, des relation industrielles et des affaires sociales, unité V/D.5, 1998) . Si trattava di una percentuale in aumento rispetto all’ultima rilevazione del 1993 che influenzava l’aumento generale del tasso di lavoro dell’Unione in maniera determinante. La forte crescita del tasso di attività femminile era stata particolarmente marcata in paesi come l’Irlanda o la Spagna (dove è comunque sempre inferiore alla media), ma era stata negativa in Danimarca, Finlandia e Svezia, che comunque rimanevano

paesi superiori alla media. Il tasso fra paesi a tasso d’occupazione femminile forte e debole si era quindi ridotto considerevolmente. Tale considerazione può condurci a pensare che esista un trend di omogeneizzazione europea, non solo fra donne di diversi gruppi di paesi, ma anche fra donne e uomini. Infatti, per quanto riguarda i tassi d’attività delle giovani donne e dei giovani uomini (15-24 anni), il tasso d’attività di ambedue ha continuato a cadere. Per quanto riguarda i settori d’impiego, poi, continuando secondo una tendenza ormai pluri-decennale, la crescita riguarda il settore dei servizi e gli impieghi atipici, soprattutto il lavoro temporaneo, notturno o nel fine settimana. E si tratta da sempre di settori a impiego prevalentemente femminile, almeno per quanto riguarda i servizi, mentre il declino dell’impiego agricolo e industriale è legato alla contrazione dell’impiego maschile. Visto che il numero

medio

di ore di lavoro è diminuito,

la crescita del tasso

d’impiego non si è tradotta in una crescita parallela del volume del tempo di lavoro, in particolare per il lavoro femminile. Per quanto riguarda il confronto internazionale dobbiamo rilevare che però, per quanto concerne l’Italia e il Lussemburgo, la crescita dell’impiego nei servizi non si è realizzata. La discriminazione fra i generi resta una componente fondamentale del mercato del lavoro in questi paesi, richiedendo fortemente politiche nuove e complesse atte a sopprimerla;

infatti le azioni positive in tal senso, nonostante

l’importanza

del

principio che esse contengono non sono spesso che fatti isolati e dispersi che, prive di un programma-quadro di riferimento, non sono riuscite ad ottenere un impatto significativo. Nell’insieme dell’Unione il tasso di disoccupazione maschile è aumentato, dal 5,6% al 6,6%, fra il 1992 e il 1996, mentre il tasso di disoccupazione femminile

per un gruppo d’età identico si è abbassato dal 32 al 28,8%; nello stesso periodo variava quindi fra il 29% della Spagna e il 45% del Lussemburgo. Nella maggior parte dei casi le donne sono state più esposte degli uomini alla disoccupazione (il 43% rispetto al 23%) e tale scarto è particolarmente marcato in Spagna, Grecia Italia, Irlanda e Lussemburgo dove più del 50% delle donne è assente dal mercato

178

del lavoro. In particolare è interessante notare che le giovani donne sono più assenti dei loro coetanei maschi dal mercato del lavoro (57% rispetto al 50%). Le differenze fra paesi sono impressionanti e lo sono soprattutto per quanto riguarda le donne. Infatti i tassi d’inattività delle giovani donne variano dal 29% in Danimarca al 70% in Belgio (la media è 57%); abbiamo dunque paesi in cui il differenziale di rischio è molto elevato, come in Belgio e in Italia, dove i tassi di disoccupazione

sono due volte superiori a quelli degli uomini e tali percentuali non sono molto cambiate nelle due ultime rilevazioni a nostra disposizione. Bisogna contemporaneamente aver presenti talune avvertenze nel leggere le statistiche per dare il valore che meritano le informazioni che esse ci forniscono. Anche qui il caso è culturale. Ad esempio, l’alta presenza della categoria “casalinga” — nel senso dell’autodefinizione scelta dalle donne per indicare la propria posizione lavorativa - può tenere basso un tasso di disoccupazione femminile mentre maschera con tale dato la reale (bassa) dimensione della presenza delle donne in generale sul mercato del lavoro. Quindi un aumento del tasso di disoccupazione in paesi come la Finlandia, dove la presenza delle donne sul mercato del lavoro è sempre stata alta, non vuol necessariamente dire che in tale paese la situazione dell’occupazione femminile peggiori di più rispetto ad un altro, come l’Irlanda, dove il numero di casalinghe è, e continua ad essere, tradizionalmente alto e quindi

impedisce una crescita evidente del tasso di disoccupazione femminile. In Italia siamo in mezzo al guado per quel che riguarda l’identità professionale delle

giovani

donne.

Si hanno

ancora

casi, come

la Liguria,

in cui esse

si

considerano ancora “casalinghe” prima di trovare un lavoro, nonostante l’elevato livello culturale medio. L'esempio dei paesi europei più evoluti può essere di stimolo, così come le iniziative promosse dall’Unione Europea, come i patti territoriali per l’impiego per la selezione dei quali, assieme all’“eccellenza del partenariato locale”, prevale l’approccio dell’impatto positivo sulla creazione d’impiego ed in esso le pari opportunità costituiscono un elemento di valutazione specialmente positivo. La maggior parte delle statistiche sul lavoro dimostra che le donne sono meno attive degli uomini. In Italia trovano lavoro 37 donne su 100 uomini e, come in altri paesi dell’Unione Europea sono, invece, più esposte dei colleghi maschi alla disoccupazione: ogni 100 disoccupati ci sono 218 disoccupate in Italia; 151 in Germania; 66 in Gran Bretagna. Nei paesi più arretrati le donne naturalmente lavorano, ma sono lontane dall’essere economicamente autonome, quanto nei paesi

del Sud del mondo (e talune regioni dell’Europa meridionale appartengono a tale tipologia) il lavoro femminile è sottorilevato perché nella maggior parte dei casi non si tratta di lavoro salariato e pur non costituendo un lavoro in senso proprio, pesa comunque in modo significativo sulla loro condizione. Nonostante in tutti gli Stati dell’UE le leggi garantiscano la completa parità, le retribuzioni sono spesso diverse. In Italia tra i quadri superiori gli stipendi maschili sono più alti di quelli femminili del 25%. Anche in Finlandia - il primo paese che ha dato il voto alle

179

donne e dove le donne sono in media più istruite degli uomini - le retribuzioni femminili raggiungono meno dell’80% di quelle maschili. La tendenza delle legislazioni di tutti i paesi è di migliorare il rapporto fra l'occupazione femminile e quella maschile. Tutti i paesi europei si sono dotati di leggi che promuovono la parità delle opportunità, che ora non vuol dire solo lavoro indiscriminato, ma opportunità di formazione continua ed appropriata e di carriera. Il settore del lavoro, pur riscontrando delle differenze profonde da paese a paese è uno di quei settori in cui i diversi paesi europei non entrano in competizione reciproca, anzi tendono a seguire l’esempio di quelle che il linguaggio europeo chiama “le buone prassi”, metodi di lavoro da propagandare sia all’interno di ciascun paese sia fra i paesi membri. La legge italiana 125/91 è stata un’antesignana per l’adozione del principio base delle pari opportunità, individuando e sanzionando la necessità del raggiungimento della parità sostanziale grazie all’eliminazione delle condizioni di handicap iniziale che nel lavoro le donne possono subire in quanto tali, creando addirittura dei diritti diseguali a favore delle donne per superare il divario di possibilità iniziale, nello studio, nell’inserimento nel lavoro, nei settori di lavoro e nella carriera, tramite

l’attuazione di azioni tese o a risarcire un danno eventualmente subito o a promuovere un progresso o scelte diverse da quelle legate alle tradizioni che governano il posto della donna nella società e nel mondo del lavoro. Al di là delle leggi, che talvolta possono esprimere solo le buone intenzioni dei governi, il settore del lavoro delle donne, con la sua insistenza sulla formazione e

la flessibilità, è poi uno di quelli più avanti nel seguire le necessità derivanti dai mutamenti del mercato del lavoro, senza perdere di vista la difesa dei diritti della

persona umana (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ufficio del Ministro per le Pari Opportunità, 1999), laddove invece per quanto riguarda il lavoro in genere, quelle che vengono definite come “le leggi della globalizzazione” tendono a disconoscere i diritti dei lavoratori interessati. Per,tutte le donne europee il lavoro è inteso come un diritto della persona e non come necessità come che sia. Un passo in avanti per tutti, compresi gli uomini. C’é un altro aspetto dell’occupazione femminile che sta mutando: la settorializzazione del lavoro. Fino ai giorni nostri le strutture degli impieghi maschili e femminili sono state diverse: la connotazione femminile di una professione o la sua femminilizzazione sono state per lo più considerate come il segnale di una sua svalutazione. Al tempo stesso si è notato come il lavoro delle donne rispecchiasse molto spesso le loro mansioni familiari tradizionali: nell’industria i settori del tessile, del cuoio, delle calzature, dell’abbigliamento sono i più femminilizzati (63% in UE); nel terziario i settori più femminilizzati sono i servizi domestici (92%), la sanità (74%) e l’insegnamento (64%).

La connotazione femminile di alcune professioni finora è stata correlata alla minore qualificazione richiesta o derivava dalla tradizione. La femminilizzazione delle professioni, in quanto tale, può esser spiegata essenzialmente con la 180

motivazione che conciliare vita professionale e vita familiare pud sembrare più facile nel caso di alcune professioni rispetto ad altre (ad esempio l’insegnamento). La femminilizzazione inoltre può corrispondere ad una situazione “di recupero”, come nel caso della professione medica in cui in ogni paese europeo si sta conoscendo un uguale trend di crescita della presenza femminile. Osservando i casi della Francia e dell’Italia vediamo che a Parigi fu nel 1868 che la prima donna si iscrisse alla facoltà di medicina. In seguito la femminilizzazione della professione medica è stata lenta: un secolo dopo, nel 1968 le donne erano solo il 14% dei medici in Francia; nel 1987 il 24%, nel 1994 il 31%. In Italia le donne medico iscritte all’albo erano, nel 1951 il 3%, nel 1981 il 17,7% e nel 1987, il 22,8% di coloro che esercitavano la professione. L'incremento è certamente stato più tumultuoso in Italia, e ciò è dovuto alla crescita moderna del nostro paese, che

negli anni ‘60 ha rapidamente superato il gap che lo separava dagli altri più avanzati paesi europei, dove la crescita della società era cominciata da più lunga data e aveva conosciuto maggiori difficoltà ad affermarsi. L’esempio degli altri paesi europei e le spinte della Comunità Europea per l’Italia sono state fondamentali in questo campo (J. Veron, 1999). Oggi c’è addirittura chi pensa che la femminilizzazione di una professione non possa essere più considerata come segno di una diminuzione del suo valore, anche perché sono intervenuti dei mutamenti strutturali in molte delle antiche professioni tipicamente femminili, grazie alla tecnologia (è il caso, ad esempio, dell’uso del computer nel lavoro d’ufficio) e anche ai mutamenti del mercato del lavoro. I parametri di valutazione delle professioni stanno mutando, eliminando spesso la femminilizzazione fra gli handicap della professione. In Italia comunque il tasso di femminilizzazione di taluni settori continua ad essere molto elevato e continua a mantenere il carattere di segregazione di sempre, soprattutto in quei settori o tipologie lavorative caratterizzati da retribuzioni medie significativamente più basse rispetto ad altre situazioni, ed è segnatamente limitato nelle posizioni gerarchiche alte. Inoltre, a parità di altre condizioni, una lavoratrice percepisce un salario che è in media circa il 9% più basso di quello di un lavoratore. L’evoluzione strutturale della forza lavoro a livello mondiale vede la partecipazione femminile al mercato del lavoro nei paesi europei essere una forza in controtendenza rispetto all’utilizzo di mano d’opera immigrata. Se oggi in Europa le donne costituiscono i due terzi dell’aumento delle nuove forze di lavoro, permane però in buona parte dei paesi europei un nodo da risolvere: la conciliazione tra lavoro e famiglia e questo tema è stato all’ordine del giorno del semestre appena scaduto della Presidenza portoghese.

3.4 Welfare: obsolescenza di un modello Il welfare state — o “Stato sociale” - é stato un prodotto della creatività britannica. Introdotto, grazie alle elaborazioni di J. M. Keynes , negli Stati Uniti 181

della Grande Depressione, le misure strutturali di sostegno sociale da parte dello Stato che esso prevedeva si estesero all’Europa del dopoguerra e si disse che avessero avuto l’effetto di sostituirsi sia al sostegno familiare sia alle regole del mercato, che ne venivano addirittura spiazzate. Il cosiddetto “Stato sociale” era basato su taluni assunti fondamentali legati sia all’economia sia alla cultura corrente, che concernevano il ruolo centrale della famiglia nella riproduzione sociale. In primo luogo era legato all’idea di una piena occupazione maschile e prevalentemente del capofamiglia: sia il salario privato sia quello “sociale” erano, essenzialmente, un “salario familiare”, che si supponeva servisse a tutta la famiglia e non solo al lavoratore che lo percepiva, di solito il padre. In quest’ ottica la madre doveva fornire l’assistenza sociale che veniva remunerata dal reddito del marito e dalle provvidenze sociali a lei destinate. A completare i punti chiave di questo sistema assistenziale si deve rilevare che esso era il prodotto di una società il cui ciclo vitale era del tipo industriale “fordista”: l’uomo che lavorava senza far carriera o facendone poca per tutta la vita e che poi veniva pensionato con una pensione bassa; la donna che, se lavorava in giovane età, smetteva di farlo al massimo con la maternità e che si occupava della crescita dei figli e di tutti i servizi di cui la famiglia — sia come singoli sia come unità - avesse avuto bisogno. Esisteva dunque, in questo sistema, una divisione di compiti fra la famiglia e lo Stato in cui le provvidenze che quest’ultimo offriva venivano ad assumere un carattere decisamente sussidiario rispetto all’assistenza globale di cui la famiglia necessitava, perché di essa si occupava quasi totalmente la donna. Il passaggio ad una società del terziario e, comunque, post-industriale ha mutato i bisogni e ha fatto emergere la debolezza del sistema basato su quel tipo di welfare. L’occupazione industriale si è diversificata e ridotta a favore di una diffusione dell’occupazione nel terziario dai connotati molto differenziati, fra i quali in particolare i tempi dell’impegno lavoratiyo rispetto ai tempi della vita. Ciò vuol dire che, se nel welfare tradizionale di tipo industrialista l’assistenza veniva data all’inizio della vita (nascita, infanzia e scuola) e alla fine (pensione), la dinamicità dei ritmi di vita impliciti nella società post-industriale e terziaria ha mutato i bisogni e introdotto il concetto di flessibilità anche nel settore del welfare (G. Esping-Andersen, 1999). Oggi, come linea di tendenza, gli stessi paesi che hanno adottato quel tipo di welfare “laburista” o socialdemocratico — dalle forme più avanzate dei paesi scandinavi a quelle minimali dei paesi dell’Europa meridionale come l’Italia hanno da tempo iniziato ad introdurre innovazioni negli schemi di protezione sociale, cercando però di salvaguardarne le finalità, in quanto elemento distintivo del “tipo di società” ancora apparentemente dura a morire e che sta esprimendo grosse difficoltà di adattamento. In tal senso i provvedimenti per la maternità, la difesa dei disoccupati, ed il sistema pensionistico, in cui le donne sono le utenti più numerose e più deboli, sono fra i più importanti, ma sono anche quelli che Kanno incontrato maggiori ostilità nel mondo economico o anche fra gli elettori. E’ sorta

182

una discussione tuttora infuocata sul come rivedere quegli schemi di protezione per renderli adeguati sia alle mutate condizioni economiche dei paesi europei, sia ai modelli sociali e culturali in essi ancora imperanti. Il principio di cittadinanza ha un ruolo fondamentale nei modelli di welfare state, che però non può essere confuso con il diritto generalizzato ad accedere ai benefici. Nei sistemi di welfare “ibridi” (basati sulla cittadinanza e sul lavoro) come quelli sviluppatisi nei paesi Sud europei, tra cui l’Italia, la riaffermazione del principio di cittadinanza è perciò un elemento d’indirizzo da seguire per gli interventi di riforma, come in parte sta avvenendo nel campo dell’assistenza sociale, ma, se il criterio di delimitazione dei bisogni ammessi al sostegno è poco selettivo

e non

si dota

di un preciso

obiettivo,

i risultati rischiano

di essere

deludenti, perché mentre i sostegni hanno inevitabilmente un peso modesto, aumentano comunque gli oneri per sostenere il sistema, con possibili ripercussioni sulla sua stessa legittimazione. Si è quindi cercato di ridefinire i soggetti, i loro diritti e i loro bisogni. Il cambiamento di maggior rilievo è avvenuto fra le donne, in tutti i paesi europei (L. Pennacchi, 1999). Esse sono state le protagoniste dell’espansione del terziario e sono esse ad aver sperimentato le più nuove forme di impegno lavorativo temporale (come il part-time o il lavoro interinale) e spaziale (come il telelavoro). La loro disponibilità al cambiamento ha anche implicato non certo l'accettazione di una costante marginalità e subalternità nel mondo del lavoro — come spesso l’adozione di tali forme di lavoro sembrava significare - ma invece è stata espressione di un’apertura a nuovi orizzonti, che prevede non solo l'interruzione per la maternità o per processi di orientamento, riorientamento, formazione

e aggiornamento,

ma

anche

il fare carriera

e ottenere

posizioni

economiche importanti e non subordinate a nessun altro reddito prodotto in famiglia. In questo caso l’assistenza offerta dal sistema tradizionale di welfare non è più sufficiente, ancorché appaia onerosa ed obsoleta. I primi a cercare di dare delle risposte adeguate ai nuovi bisogni sono stati i paesi scandinavi, che hanno differenziato i tipi di assistenze cercando di aggiustare i sussidi ai bisogni della “classe media” con costi peraltro enormi, perché hanno affiancato tale provvidenze al sistema pensionistico tradizionale destinato ai vecchi

protagonisti della società industriale in estinzione. La tendenza del nuovo sistema è di offrire un sostegno durante l’arco di tutta la vita e per tutti i casi che si presentano. Le donne hanno risposto positivamente a tale offerta e tale risposta nei tre paesi scandinavi è emblematizzata dal tasso di partecipazione complessiva delle donne al mercato del lavoro: 84% che si discosta pochissimo da quello delle donne con figli piccoli, 82% circa, e dal calo nettissimo di quello delle donne che, con la maternità, interrompono la loro attività lavorativa. L’aver inserito questa logica nel sistema di welfare ha anche introdotto una serie di bisogni e di voci sempre meno standardizzate e costose e vi ha introdotto una logica “di mercato”. I sistemi laburisti europei di welfare sono stati al tempo stesso i più e i meno in grado di adeguarsi alle nuove esigenze della società post183

industriale. E’ nel campo dei servizi assicurativi che tali sistemi hanno mostrato le loro debolezze. Da un lato, nei paesi cattolici, il mutamento di ruolo della donna

nella famiglia ha incontrato molti ostacoli culturali non ancora superati. A conseguenza di cid il carico di impegni assistenziali per la famiglia e per la donna non è mutato ed anzi si è venuto ad aggiungere all’impegno lavorativo costante. E° questo il caso dell’Italia. Relativamente ai sostegni alla famiglia, in considerazione del fatto che la perdurante e diffusa mancanza di autonomia economica delle donne e dei giovani ed il cresciuto costo della casa contribuiscono a spostare in avanti l’età matrimoniale. Età al matrimonio. L’istruzione e l’urbanizzazione, che sono elementi chiave della modernizzazione di un paese, condizionano l’età del matrimonio, così che, anche in Italia,

nell’arco di un decennio la percentuale di nubili che si sposano entro i 20 anni è diminuita di circa un terzo: erano il 16,5% di quelle che prendono marito, sono diventate il 5,9%, e la differenza di età fra i coniugi è diminuita diventando dal 3,1 anni nel 1984 al 2,8 anni nel

1994. In Francia, già negli anni ’60, la differenza d’età fra i coniugi era di poco superiore ai due anni. Nel 1994: In Islanda e in Svezia ci si sposava a 28 anni

3

In Germania a 27 anni

In Italia a 26,5 anni In Austria a 26 anni

In Polonia, Ungheria Repubblica Ceca a 22 anni In Bulgaria a 21 anni

;

Lo stesso discorso vale anche per gli uomini. Si tratta dunque di un connotato generalizzato del comportamento nuziale dei giovani, non solo “europei, se dobbiamo credere alle statistiche ufficiali. Fonte: J. Veron, 1999.

Passando al sostegno alla maternità, dobbiamo rilevare che si sta ridefinendo in Italia come parte del contenuto del diritto di cittadinanza della donna, e non più come servizio alla persona senza un riconoscimento ai suoi diritti, concezione che era congeniale ad un impianto “laburista” di welfare basato principalmente sul lavoro retribuito. Ma non basta. Nonostante l’elevato reddito pro-capite e l'elevato livello sociale medio, l’Italia ha il tasso di fecondità più basso al mondo (1,2 figli per donna in età fertile). Tale valore è minore di quello necessario per un equilibrio demografico e non corrisponde ai desideri espressi sull’argomento dalle giovani donne in diverse indagini conoscitive. La maggiore partecipazione delle donne al mondo del lavoro corregge in parte gli effetti negativi dei tassi di dipendenza economica. Le politiche sociali dovrebbero pertanto favorire l’espansione dei tassi

184

di occupazione per continuare a mantenere, nel corso del tempo, i livelli medi di benessere sociale attuali. In Europa e, in particolare nei paesi scandinavi, i tassi di occupazione femminile e i tassi di fertilità sono invece i più elevati. In questi paesi non esiste incompatibilità tra la scelta di essere madre e quella di partecipare attivamente ai mercati

del lavoro.

Si è notato,

anzi,

che

ad un

aumento

dell’occupazione

femminile corrisponde un aumento del tasso di fertilità e le percentuali di partecipazione al mercato del lavoro delle giovani madri le abbiamo appena viste. In Italia la parita non é stata ancora raggiunta nella divisione dei ruoli e delle responsabilità all’interno della famiglia. E’ alla donna che compete la cura dei figli e degli anziani, in più deve confrontarsi con l’ostilità dell'ambiente esterno alla sua partecipazione nel mercato del lavoro. A ciò si aggiunge il problema dei costi dei figli e delle scelte e dei vincoli che la famiglia pone agli individui. Il problema è poco studiato, eppure vari elementi, fra cui la caduta della natalità ai livelli più bassi del mondo, non solo europeo, suggeriscono che, a fronte dei mutamenti socio-economici che si sono verificati nel nostro paese, c’è un urgente bisogno di affrontare i problemi economici e sociali della famiglia e, contemporaneamente, di rimettere in discussione le politiche attualmente esistenti, anche alla luce sia del disinteresse del legislatore - che, non a caso, è preponderantemente un maschio sia della mancata estensione del diritto di rappresentanza anche ai minori. In genere le famiglie con bambini hanno risorse insufficienti e scarso accesso ai servizi, verso i quali le risorse sono state lesinate. Ciò ha reso problematico o scoraggiato la partecipazione femminile al mercato del lavoro, come mostrano i tassi di attività femminile generalmente più bassi in Italia che negli altri paesi industrializzati. Nelle politiche familiari italiane è stata privilegiata finora la possibilità di permettere alla donna solo lo svolgimento del proprio ruolo di madre in caso di maternità, al di fuori di una visione longitudinale o di ciclo di vita caratterizzata da un alternarsi di scelte flessibili tra “non attività per il mercato” (famiglia) e partecipazione al mercato del lavoro. Il modello italiano di politica per la famiglia, se confrontato con quello degli altri paesi UE, emerge come un modello residuale o sussidiario basato su di una

visione conservativo-tradizionalista della famiglia e delle sua funzioni. In pratica il welfare e, in genere, le politiche pubbliche appaiono finalizzate a rimediare situazioni insostenibili, piuttosto che a prevenirle. La famiglia in quanto tale non è al centro delle politiche pubbliche né delle preoccupazioni del legislatore. In Italia, come ha rilevato uno studio comparato internazionale, lo sviluppo dei programmi e la qualità di risorse destinate nei bilanci pubblici a favore delle politiche per la famiglia appare inversamente proporzionale alla retorica delle discussioni sul suo ruolo, importanza e funzioni. A riguardo, il nostro paese spicca non solo perché figura al penultimo posto, prima della Grecia, della graduatoria dei paesi UE per le risorse destinate ai programmi di spesa per la famiglia, ma perché mostra anche una quota di spesa 185

sociale destinata alla famiglia pari a meno della metà di quella destinatavi dalla Germania, Francia e Gran Bretagna. I ritardi dell’Italia emergono evidenti: ad esempio nel confronto con la Francia, dove il 99% dei bambini compresi fra i 3 e i 5 anni frequenta gli asili nido e le scuole materne aperte dalle 7 di mattina alle 7 di sera, pagando delle rette fortemente sussidiate, o il sostegno economico alla famiglia in Francia appare molto più articolato di quello italiano, con prestazioni differenziate che cercano di adattarsi al massimo alle caratteristiche e ai diversi bisogni delle famiglie (allocations familiales, complement familial, allocation de salaire unique et mère au foyer; varie majorations e prestazioni specifiche come allocations frais de garde, allocations rentré scolaire; allocation orphélin, parent isolé, prénatales, postnatales,

adoption, éducation speciale, ecc.). In termini di spesa la quota sulla spesa sociale è più elevata dell’8% rispetto all’Italia. Altro esempio interessante ci deriva dalla detassazione delle famiglie con figli in vigore in Germania. Insomma il confronto con gli altri paesi europei in questo settore particolarmente arretrato dell’Italia sottolinea come non servano l’esempio e le “spinte” europee per cambiare di fondo un aspetto culturale profondamente consolidato anche da una situazione economica e politica particolarmente statica, per non parlare poi dell’influenza fortissima che la presenza fisica del Vaticano in Italia esercita sulla sua politica e sul costume a tutt'oggi. Con ogni probabilità si può pensare che saranno le necessità economiche impellenti del paese, pressato dalle spinte della “globalizzazione”, a far mutare tradizioni e dipendenze e quindi anche risposte istituzionali. A questo punto quello che avrà contato non sarà stata l’Europa con le sue istituzioni, ma il contesto mondiale ove ora tutti si muovono,

volenti o nolenti. Concentrandomi sulle misure di inserimento nel mercato del lavoro come esemplari del funzionamento delle relazioni fra modelli alternativi, la scelta di creare un’alternativa o integrazione ai sostegni passivi del reddito è stata una di quelle scelte attuate in comune nei diversi paesi europei che hanno privilegiato la creazione di nuovi strumenti nell’ambito di un principio costante di assistenza e, in tal modo, hanno anche trovato risposte articolate ai nuovi bisogni e ai nuovi soggetti come i giovani e le donne (P. Bosi, 1999). Per raggiungere obiettivi oggettivamente contrastanti come ad esempio il sostegno ai giovani e alle donne per avviare una propria attività, l’agevolare la mobilità di lavoratori a tempo indeterminato o il sostenere i disoccupati di lunga durata con rischio di espulsione dal marcato del lavoro, molti paesi negli ultimi anni hanno introdotto modifiche significative nei loro sistemi di sostegno al reddito e negli incentivi per l’inserimento al lavoro, seguendo vie solo in parte simili, che hanno ormai assunto l’identità di veri e propri modelli alternativi. La scelta comune dei diversi paesi europei interessati è stata quella del confronto, per definire appropriate combinazioni di strumenti d’intervento. Va precisato

che, in ogni caso,

all’interno

di questi differenti

modelli

un

elemento comune è rappresentato dall’obiettivo di alleggerire l’onere finanziario 186

dei sostegni attraverso ogni possibile forma di inserimento lavorativo anche temporaneo. Per questa funzione un ruolo chiave è svolto dalle strutture, pubbliche o private, che erogano servizi di formazione e orientamento e che, oltre al compito di agevolare l’incontro domanda-offerta, spesso sviluppano progetti di lavoro particolarmente adatti alle caratteristiche delle persone da inserire. Il sistema delle politiche attive del lavoro comporta però un adattamento alle condizioni economiche ed istituzionali in cui operano i mercati del lavoro. E’ proprio questo che contraddistingue i diversi schemi d’intervento cui si è accennato. In particolare, nei sistemi in cui la determinazione dei salari è tendenzialmente

lasciata alla contrattazione

sembra emergere redditi di lavoro “minimum wage”. organizzata o di

individuale, come

nel Regno Unito,

una tendenza a garantire i lavoratori più deboli troppo bassi, con sussidi, agevolazioni fiscali Al contrario, dove, per effetto di una presenza un legislatore attento, i differenziali salariali

dal ricevere e norme del sindacale più risultano più

contenuti, come in Francia e in Germania, l’inserimento delle fasce deboli che, con

minor flessibilità salariale hanno maggiori probabilità di restare escluse, è tendenzialmente caricato su incentivi che operano sulla quota degli oneri diretti. L’Italia sta considerando tali modelli, tenendo presente che comunque sono tutti ispirati al principio di sostituire il “welfare delle garanzie” con il “welfare delle opportunità”. E’ evidente che in un campo come questo non è l’uniformità delle soluzioni la risposta possibile e vincente, ma la rispondenza a principi simili da attuarsi con strumenti diversi, a seconda delle diverse tradizioni della cultura del

lavoro e dei connotati del suo mercato. L’ingresso massiccio delle donne senza particolari tradizioni di lavoro, ma con nuovi bisogni e nuove potenzialità professionali, in questo mercato ha stimolato sicuramente questa ricerca. La serie di temi che ho voluto qui raccogliere ci ha indicato come il cammino per un’uniformità in meglio della posizione della donna nelle società nazionali di appartenenza ed in quella europea in generale sia ricco di ostacoli derivanti sostanzialmente da due ordini di motivi: la persistenza di tradizioni e di culture e la competizione del mercato globale. L’Europa come organismo politico ha scelto di puntare al superamento del problema economico: le donne sono una forza lavoro sempre più qualificata ed indispensabile in un mondo in cui chi vincerà la partita sarà chi avrà in mano il know-how. La sfida dell’Unione Europea è stata quindi quella di mettere la società europea di fronte ad un dato di fatto di tipo economico: la crescente e, alla fine si spera, alta partecipazione femminile a tutti i mercati del lavoro nazionali nell’ambito dell’Unione Europea da parte delle donne. A questo punto potrà sembrare che la partita sia stata vinta, ma lo sarà solo a metà se non cambiano

anche le mentalità e le culture. Quest'ultimo obiettivo è più ambizioso e di più lungo periodo, però, a mio parere, non c’è dubbio che far circolare le persone,

stabilire contatti di lavoro strutturati, far studiare i giovani in istituzioni scolastiche di altri paesi europei sia pure per brevi periodi, crea circolazione anche di idee e di modelli di comportamento e di vita che tanto più si imporranno, quanto più

187

stimoleranno le migliori potenzialita degli individui, all’insegna della libera scelta. E l’Europa sembra muoversi secondo questo percorso.

Riferimenti bibliografici Bosi P., “Terze vie, modelli di welfare e riforme”, in Quaderni di Info (nuova serie), (1999),

“Perché il welfare state? Sviluppo economico ed istituzioni della cittadinanza sociale”, a.V, nn.15-21, 15 agosto-15 novembre, pp.149-162.

Commission Européenne, “L’égalité des Chances pour les femmes et les hommes dans l’Union européenne”. Direction générale de l’emploi, des relation industrielles et des affaires sociales, unité V/D.5, Rapport annuel 1997, Luxembourg, 1998.

Devoto G., “La professionalità delle forze armate: condizione di efficienza verso un esercito europeo, in Quaderni di Info, “Oltre la leva”, op. cit., pp.18-22. Esping-Andersen G., “Pubblico, privato, solidarietà intermedie”, in Pennacchi L. (a cura di) (1995), Le ragioni dell'equità, Bari.

Grecchi A. (1995), Pari opportunità. Il diritto la cultura, Milano. Maiello A. “Introduzione”, in C/OFS/FP, “Donne d’Europa, Ricerca sulle pari opportunità in Liguria”, Genova, 2000.

Pacces D., “Donne soldato. Storia di una legge molto attesa”, in Quaderni di Info, (2000), “Oltre la leva. Forze armate professionali, aperte alle donne. Rinnovamento del servizio civile”, a.VI, nn.1-4, 15 giugno-1 marzo, pp. 73-81. Pennacchi L., “La sinistra di fronte alla tesi dell’incompatibilità tra welfare state, sviluppo economico, capacità di generare occupazione”, in Quaderni di Info, “Perché il welfare state?”, op. cit, pp. 9-32. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ufficio del Ministro per le pari opportunità, IV Programma d’azione per le Pari Opportunità, I.F. (1999), “L’impatto della flessibilità sul lavoro delle donne”, Sintesi del rapporto finale, Roma, luglio. Savarese R., “L’ingresso delle donne nelle forze armate”, in Quaderni di Info, “Oltre la

leva”, Spini V., donne “Oltre

op. cit., pp.53-55. 1 “L’istituzione di forze armate professionali di servizio militare volontario per le e di un servizio civile volontario per ragazze e ragazzi”, in Quaderni di Info, la leva”, op. cit., pp.7-17.

---, Donne soldato, Firenze, 17 gennaio 2000

Veron J., // posto delle donne, Bologna, 1999, (ed. franc. 1997).

188

—

mm | —

m

UJOL auu0g +661

PO6I (Y

SSP IU +661 aUUO(Djjau

+

_

EIPUEIUIA

189

ÿ

N | —

6661/L/61 17 100101830 Jurna j4vdoina “MMA OJIS [DP DAS] 19149UNU DG +

“Eux

TT

8'E%

661

| 2uu0q%

SEA Ieri Easel6] 6661066610]

1UNUO/) / % Ip

6661

je

aU01ZD]S182] ajuapa9a4d a ul vjjanb 2107170 *

| iurmon | suu0g | ol

© 2UUO( /

S

6661

1 '

Cal RG nm na

v

Ml)

OIUAUDJAD4 02d01n7 ‘6661

Ù

% | 2uuog%

‘QUI ] —

=

+

wy

LA DEBOLEZZA DELL’EURO E LE PROSPETTIVE DI SVILUPPO DELL’UEM Alberto MAJOCCHI Università di Pavia, Italia

1. La debolezza dell’euro

Nei mesi che hanno seguito l’avvio dell’Unione Monetaria il fatto che più ha attirato l’interesse degli osservatori è stata la continua e progressiva diminuzione del valore esterno dell’Euro, sia nei confronti del dollaro, sia verso lo yen. Dopo la lunga asfissia dell'economia europea determinata dalle rigide politiche adottate da diversi paesi per rientrare nei parametri di Maastricht, la svalutazione dell’Euro ha rappresentato certamente un fattore espansivo che, accompagnato da una politica monetaria sostanzialmente non restrittiva, ha favorito la ripresa della produzione e,

sia pure con qualche ritardo temporale, dell’occupazione. Si è così determinato in Europa un policy mix relativamente favorevole ad una ripresa dello sviluppo, certamente non a seguito di una scelta politica consapevole, ma per una dinamica propria del mercato non ostacolata dal comportamento responsabile della Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) in una situazione caratterizzata dall’assenza di tensioni inflazionistiche. Questi effetti positivi rischiano tuttavia di essere messi in pericolo per il concorso di due fattori. Il primo, più sostanziale, riguarda l’impatto inflazionistico determinato dalla crescita dei prezzi all'importazione a seguito della svalutazione dell’Euro. La BCE, il cui primo obiettivo è costituito dalla stabilità dei prezzi, ha già provveduto ad un leggero rialzo dei tassi per mostrare al mercato la propria determinazione a perseguire una politica anti-inflazionistica. Ma, in questo modo, rischia di indebolire la ripresa che si è appena avviata e che deve ancora consolidarsi, soprattutto in termini di creazione di nuova occupazione. Ma ancora più rischiosa per il mantenimento di un policy mix favorevole alla crescita è l’impatto che la riduzione del valore esterno dell'Euro può esercitare nei confronti dell’opinione pubblica, soprattutto in Germania, dove la classe politica era riuscita ad ottenere il consenso per la rinuncia al marco soltanto con l'assicurazione che la moneta europea sarebbe stata comunque una moneta forte come il marco. In conseguenza, cresce la pressione sulla BCE affinché adotti ulteriori restrizioni monetarie al fine di garantire una rivalutazione dell’Euro. Su questo punto si deve osservare che le giustificazioni che vengono correntemente avanzate per spiegare la svalutazione dell’Euro appaiono, nella sostanza, gravemente carenti. In particolare, la tesi più diffusa è che la diminuzione 190

di valore dell’Euro è giustificata dalle differenti prospettive di crescita dell'economia europea rispetto a quella americana e dai maggiori profitti attesi dalle società americane, soprattutto nel settore della new economy, rispetto all’Europa. Dati questi differenziali di sviluppo si sarebbe determinato sul mercato un

forte

flusso

di

investimenti

diretti

verso

il mercato

americano,

che

contribuiscono pesantemente all’indebolimento dell’Euro. Questo fattore è certamente importante e reale, ma non appare adeguato per una spiegazione piena del fenomeno in quanto, mentre è significativo per giustificare il rialzo del dollaro, non contribuisce a spiegare il rialzo ancor maggiore dello yen, dato che in Giappone la situazione dei fondamentali dell’economia appare meno brillante rispetto all’area Euro. Ma anche rispetto al dollaro è necessaria qualche ulteriore considerazione. L’economia americana attraversa una fase di crescita eccezionale, sia per le dimensioni che per la durata. Vi sono tuttavia elementi di preoccupazione che non vanno sottovalutati. In particolare, la crescita appare stimolata da una fortissima espansione dei consumi e, sebbene il tasso di disoccupazione sia sceso a livelli estremamente bassi, non appaiono ancora tensioni inflazionistiche. Questo fatto si spiega principalmente attraverso due fattori: in primo luogo, il rafforzamento del dollaro riduce il prezzo delle importazioni, ma soprattutto la crescita delle importazioni di beni e servizi attenua la pressione sulla produzione interna americana. Ne consegue tuttavia necessariamente un forte squilibrio della bilancia commerciale, che dovrebbe raggiungere su base annua l’enorme cifra di 400 miliardi — contro i 50 miliardi del 1992. Questo squilibrio è finanziato solo in parte da investimenti diretti provenienti dall’estero — pari a 130 miliardi nel 1999 — e per la quota residua da investimenti di portafoglio. In questo settore prevalgono ormai gli acquisti di obbligazioni emesse dalle imprese private, che ammontano a 230 miliardi di dollari nel 1999 e sono raddoppiati negli ultimi tre anni, mentre gli acquisti di azioni da parte dei non residenti hanno raggiunto, sempre nel 1999, i 95 miliardi. Lo squilibrio crescente nella bilancia commerciale non pone dunque, per ora, problemi rispetto alla stabilità del dollaro — che tra l’altro rappresenta un fattore essenziale per mantenere nel tempo questo flusso di finanziamenti dall’estero - in quanto viene largamente finanziato attraverso le importazioni di capitale dall’Europa e dal Giappone, che presentano invece una bilancia commerciale attiva. L’equilibrio a livello mondiale che si viene così a stabilire è tuttavia largamente precario in quanto un mutamento delle aspettative può farlo crollare con conseguenze assai gravi non solo per l’economia americana. Se, infatti, nel mercato si afferma la convinzione che il disavanzo è insostenibile nel lungo periodo, una politica monetaria molto più restrittiva da parte della Banca Centrale americana diventa inevitabile. La stretta monetaria, nel breve periodo, potrà attirare maggiori investimenti esteri ma, nella misura in cui essi sono principalmente determinati dall’esistenza di un differenziale nelle prospettive di crescita e di profitti futuri fra l’economia americana e quella europea, condurrà poi rapidamente 191

a un loro drastico ridimensionamento nella misura in cui le restrizioni monetarie freneranno la crescita del PIL americano. In definitiva, l’equilibrio attuale del mercato mondiale appare instabile e destinato a sfociare in una situazione di crisi. L’indebolimento dell’Euro favorisce nel breve periodo la ripresa dell’economia europea, ma l’assetto del mercato finanziario internazionale che ne risulta non appare fisiologico. A regime, il sistema monetario internazionale é in equilibrio e opera a favore di tutti i sistemi del mercato mondiale se i paesi più forti economicamente hanno una bilancia commerciale attiva — ossia effettuano esportazioni nette verso il resto del mondo — e al contempo finanziano il disavanzo del resto del mondo con esportazioni di capitali. L’Europa oggi soddisfa la prima condizione, ma non la seconda, in quanto i capitali europei vanno a finanziare il disavanzo americano, e non le esigenze di sviluppo del Terzo Mondo. Ma, mentre è impossibile controllare la direzione del flusso di investimenti europei, che è prevalentemente determinato dal mercato, si

può agire sul valore dell’Euro e sulle prospettive di crescita dell’economia europea. Da questo punto di vista occorre rilevare che si va diffondendo sempre di più la consapevolezza che, dietro alla perdita di valore dell’Euro, sta soprattutto la debolezza politica dell'Europa, che non è in grado di assicurare un governo efficace dell'economia europea. Il mercato percepisce questa debolezza e si interroga sulla capacità della classe politica di portare. a compimento le riforme istituzionali necessarie per garantire un efficace supporto politico alle decisioni della Banca Centrale Europea.

2. La natura politica del problema Già in occasione del Consiglio europeo di Torino del 21 marzo

1996, che ha

dato avvio alla Conferenza Intergovernativa per la revisione del Trattato di Maastricht conclusasi con l’approvazione del Trattato di Amsterdam, è apparso evidente che il punto decisivo riguarda la possibilità di adottare misure destinate a realizzare una radicale modifica istituzionale, capace di garantire al contempo democraticità e trasparenza nel processo decisionale e capacità di governo dell'economia europea. In particolare, si tratta di ottenere un radicale rafforzamento del pilastro economico dell’Unione economica e monetaria in modo tale da garantire la possibilità di avviare a livello europeo un’efficace azione di politica economica per promuovere lo sviluppo dell’economia, la competitività della produzione industriale europea e, soprattutto, l’assorbimento della disoccupazione. Con l’avvio della Conferenza che deve portare alla revisione del Trattato di Amsterdam in vista dell’allargamento ai paesi dell’Europa centrale e orientale che si dovrebbe concludere in occasione del Consiglio europeo di Nizza - si è riaperto il dibattito sul modello di integrazione europea che si intende perseguire. E’ un fatto che nell’opinione pubblica nel corso degli ultimi anni si è andata

192

diffondendo pericolosamente un’idea di Europa che viene associata meccanicamente alla riduzione delle garanzie di protezione sociale, all’aumento dei livelli di prelievo e, in conseguenza, al peggioramento delle condizioni di vita di larga parte della popolazione. E’ chiaro che questa percezione tende a far diminuire il consenso popolare rispetto al completamento del processo di unificazione,

mettendo

in pericolo

ulteriori

avanzamenti

sulla

strada

della

trasformazione dell’Unione in un vero e proprio Stato federale, dotato di poteri limitati, ma sovrano nell’ambito delle competenze riconosciute dai Trattati istitutivi dell’Unione. Appare quindi opportuno cercare di chiarire quali siano le reali alternative sul tappeto nell’ambito della Conferenza intergovernativa in modo tale da: a) prevedere l’esito che probabilmente si determinerà nel corso del processo di revisione del Trattato di Amsterdam; b) mettere in luce le implicazioni che discendono prevedibilmente dal modello di unificazione che verrà prescelto. In definitiva,

si tratta di analizzare

le conseguenze

economico-sociali

del

passaggio dall’Europa di oggi - che possiamo definire l’Europa di Tietmeyer all'Europa di domani - l’Europa di Delors o del modello renano, - con la consapevolezza che questo passaggio non è automatico né garantito, in quanto dipende dalla volontà politica che si manifesterà nell’ambito della Conferenza intergovernativa. In realtà, ci sono molti equivoci intorno ai reali contenuti dell’Europa dell’Unione monetaria, che derivano da una disattenta o prevenuta lettura dei testi dei Trattati. D’altra parte, in molti casi questa disinformazione è colpevolmente promossa dalla classe politica in quanto è ormai divenuta prassi comune che tutti i provvedimenti restrittivi vengano presentati all’opinione pubblica come legati al vincolo europeo, per evitare di pagare il costo politico di provvedimenti impopolari, anche se necessari. Si tratta allora di ribadire che l’Unione monetaria

rappresenta un notevole passo in avanti sulla strada dell’unificazione europea e costituisce un prerequisito per poter avviare le politiche destinate a garantire un significativo miglioramento del livello di benessere per tutti i cittadini europei. Con questa affermazione non si vuole tuttavia sostenere che l’Unione politica è destinata a nascere meccanicamente dal ventre dell’Unione monetaria, né che la via

definita a Maastricht per giungere all’Unione monetaria sia da ritenersi del tutto adeguata e priva di costi. Il problema è un altro e si può chiarire facilmente qualora si introduca un’ulteriore distinzione - ovvia, ma spesso trascurata. In

effetti,

la costruzione

dell’Unione

monetaria

ha

sostanzialmente

un

significato costituzionale, in quanto modifica il quadro generale di riferimento per lo sviluppo dell'economia europea. E da questo cambiamento costituzionale discendono conseguenze che rappresentano di per sé un fattore positivo di progresso per l’insieme dei cittadini europei. Basti pensare al fatto che ormai non è più possibile utilizzare lo strumento del cambio per modificare la competitività relativa delle diverse produzioni nazionali. Cade quindi l’ultima barriera che ha consentito in passato di isolare il mercato interno, ovvero di promuovere una

193

crescita artificiosa delle esportazioni e/o di restringere la quantità di beni acquistati all’estero. Ma da queste nuove regole del gioco discendono automaticamente altri importanti effetti. Ad esempio, ne consegue la necessita - indipendentemente dai parametri di Maastricht - di provvedere a una riforma dei sistemi di welfare nella misura in cui in passato si è provveduto a sostenere con un finanziamento in deficit - trasferendone l’onere a carico delle generazioni future - meccanismi di tutela eccessivamente generosi ovvero incompatibili con le muove condizioni che caratterizzano la struttura economico-sociale dei paesi europei. Non è più possibile quindi garantire la pace sociale attraverso la creazione di moneta, ma si deve provvedere alla formazione del consenso necessario per sostenere le politiche di redistribuzione. D'altra parte, il rispetto di limiti alla crescita della spesa pubblica viene a dipendere non dalla fissazione di criteri arbitrari che risentono necessariamente delle condizioni della congiuntura politica, ma da un insieme di decisioni decentrate

in un quadro di federalismo

fiscale, in cui ogni livello di

governo determina il mix ottimale di prelievo e di spesa per soddisfare nella misura più adeguata le preferenze della collettività amministrata. E infine, nel nuovo quadro istituzionale non è possibile riassorbire i deficit accumulati in passato attraverso un’accelerazione del processo inflazionistico: i debiti si pagano con il risparmio, ossia attraverso una contrazione dei consumi presenti o futuri. Ma le riforme istituzionali - e la creazione della moneta europea si colloca in questo contesto, - mentre rappresentano una condizione necessaria per conseguire certi risultati positivi, non sono tuttavia di per sé sufficienti per conseguirli. Nel nuovo quadro monetario si possono fare buone o cattive politiche. Occorre quindi sottolineare con forza che spesso nel dibattito politico si confondono i risultati di cattive politiche con gli effetti derivanti meccanicamente dal rispetto dei parametri di Maastricht. E questa confusione, che certamente nel breve periodo può rappresentare un utile strumento di supporto per le classi politiche al potere, costituisce nel lungo andare un fattore di debolezza in quanto l’opinione pubblica si disaffeziona di Maastricht, mettendo in pericolo il raggiungimento stesso dell’obiettivo. In realtà, la principale debolezza di Maastricht non è affatto legata alla definizione dei criteri che sono stati adottati per definire chi aveva il diritto di entrare nell’Unione monetaria, ma discende dal fatto che lo sviluppo dell’Unione monetaria non si accompagna con uno sviluppo parallelo del pilastro economico dell’Unione, nel quadro di un rafforzamento a carattere federale delle istituzioni europee.

In effetti,

la riduzione

del

disavanzo

del

settore

pubblico

-

e la

conseguente contrazione del debito in quota del PIL - ha rappresentato in questi anni di avvicinamento all’Unione monetaria un obiettivo largamente condiviso di politica economica. Il problema reale è di evitare che l’insieme delle politicherestrittive condotte nella determinazione di rispettare i vincoli di Maastricht possa avere un impatto eccessivamente deflattivo sull’economia europea in assenza di una politica concertata a livello europeo di sostegno dell’attività produttiva e 194

dell’occupazione. E su questo punto qualche ulteriore considerazione pud essere utile. Se si vuole andare all’essenziale, il punto debole di Maastricht é di natura politica. Si è preso atto - con eccessivo realismo, forse - dell’impossibilita di giungere rapidamente alla trasformazione in senso federale delle istituzioni dell’Unione, tenendo presente la posizione contraria del governo inglese. Si è quindi deciso di far precedere l’Unione monetaria al completamento dell’Unione politica. In conseguenza, si è stabilito che durante la fase transitoria - le tre fasi che precedono il varo della moneta unica - si doveva realizzare il processo di convergenza delle economie europee, sulla base dei parametri fissati a Maastricht. Diversamente da quanto è avvenuto nel caso dell’unificazione monetaria tedesca laddove la convergenza è stata promossa ex post dalla gestione della politica economica del governo federale tedesco e, in particolare, attraverso un consistente

flusso di risorse dai Länder più ricchi a quelli più poveri della Germania orientale si è deciso di fissare limiti rigidi da rispettare ex ante per consentire l’accesso dei diversi paesi membri all’Unione monetaria. E questa decisione non è stata priva di costi. In effetti, le economie europee sono ormai estremamente interdipendenti e quindi una riduzione della domanda in un paese membro esercita un impatto significativo sul resto dell’economia europea in misura legata all’ampiezza della propensione all’importazione. Si manifesta quindi un rafforzamento reciproco dell’impatto deflattivo su ciascuna economia. Ma se si riduce il tasso di crescita dell’economia di un paese membro, diventa più difficile conseguire gli obiettivi di riduzione del disavanzo in quanto si contrae il gettito fiscale e aumenta l'ammontare della spesa per la protezione sociale. La flessibilità automatica del bilancio tende in conseguenza ad ampliare le dimensioni del disavanzo, richiedendo quindi un ulteriore sforzo di contenimento della spesa e di aumento dei livelli di imposizione. Su questo punto è tuttavia necessario fare ulteriore chiarezza, per evitare che questa affermazione possa essere utilizzata in modo equivoco contro l'Unione monetaria. Fitoussi ha rilevato correttamente che «non è la costruzione europea che, da vent'anni, è all'origine dei nostri problemi, né un eccesso di Europa, ma una mancanza d'Europa». In realtà, nel corso degli anni ‘80 vi è stata una minore convergenza in termini reali delle economie europee rispetto ai decenni precedenti. La convergenza si è poi avviata in termini nominali, senza che si manifestasse un riavvicinamento del tenore di vita e del tasso di occupazione. «// fatto è — osserva ancora Fitoussi - che l'Europa ha funzionato più come uno strumento per realizzare la disinflazione che come un mezzo per favorire la crescita. I paesi europei si sono serviti dell'Europa per importare la virtù tedesca. Se ciascuno persegue questo obiettivo isolatamente, non ci si deve stupire se non è stata messa

in atto alcuna strategia collettiva in vista della crescita. L'Europa è divenuta, di fatto, il garante della moneta e, come tale, ha ben funzionato come è dimostrato dalla convergenza nominale che è stata conseguita».

195

Di fronte a questa situazione si manifesta una reazione sbagliata nella misura in cui non é possibile assistere passivamente all’ulteriore deterioramento dello stato dell’opinione pubblica europea, di fronte prima al progressivo estendersi della disoccupazione e all’inasprimento conseguente delle tensioni sociali e, una volta avviata la moneta unica, al suo progressivo indebolimento. Si tratta quindi di avviare al più presto una politica alternativa che si fondi su una profonda revisione istituzionale che consenta di avviare un’effettiva politica di sviluppo dell’economia europea e di sostegno dell’occupazione. Si tratta in sostanza di portare a compimento la trasformazione in senso federale delle istituzioni comunitarie. E’ questa la via di uscita reale dall’impasse in cui sembra sia precipitato il processo di unificazione europea. Ma, prima di valutare la natura della soluzione proposta e le conseguenze che ne possono derivare, é opportuno valutare sinteticamente anche le caratteristiche del modello alternativo di integrazione flessibile che è da tempo oggetto di attenzione da parte del governo inglese e che ha trovato di recente il sostegno anche di un gruppo significativo di economisti.

3. L’Europa dell’integrazione flessibile L’idea che nessun paese possa impedire agli altri Stati membri che desiderino procedere ulteriormente sulla strada dell’integrazione europea è alla base del patto implicito sottostante al progetto di Unione definito a Maastricht. E, in effetti, già il Trattato lo prevede ufficialmente quando assume che solo gli Stati che abbiano rispettato i criteri di convergenza stabiliti dall’articolo 109J possano essere ammessi a partecipare alla terza fase dell’Unione monetaria. E ugualmente, sebbene l’Unione si sia posta l’obiettivo di rafforzare la coesione sociale e di promuovere l’istituzione di un’Unione economica e monetaria e l’avvio di una politica di difesa comune, il Trattato ha riconosciyto, sia pure con modalità diverse,

che la Gran Bretagna e la Danimarca possano utilizzare la clausola di opting-out senza impedire peraltro che gli altri Stati membri procedano lungo questa strada. In realtà, l’idea di un’Europa a più velocità attraversa tutta la storia dell’integrazione europea. Le tappe successive attraverso cui è passato il processo di allargamento della Comunità hanno dimostrato in modo inequivocabile che la formazione di un’avanguardia ristretta non ha mai avuto lo scopo di escludere dal processo di integrazione i paesi più recalcitranti, ma di garantire la possibilità di avviare un’Unione più stretta tra coloro che desiderano procedere in questa direzione. Diversa è invece l’idea di un’Europa alla carta. Come ha osservato correttamente il Club di Firenze, «apparentemente questa formula non fa che enunciare una regola di buon senso, laddove privilegia un approccio intergovernativo, considerato più leggero del metodo comunitario, per permettere una più facile convergenza di quegli Stati determinati a progredire nel processo di integrazione. (...) Ma a una lettura più attenta si rileva che questa soluzione si

196

sforza innanzitutto di preservare lo status quo, in nome di una concezione antiquata della sovranita nazionale e di motivazioni conservatrici da cui trapela la volonta di rimettere in questione persino alcuni dei risultati raggiunti finora dal

metodo comunitario». L’ipotesi di un’integrazione debole è stata elaborata in Gran Bretagna già nel settembre 1993 attraverso la proposta di Costituzione europea del gruppo denominato European Policy Forum. L’obiettivo primario della riforma istituzionale è quello di far convivere, grazie all’introduzione di una maggiore flessibilità, interessi divergenti introducendo una distinzione fra ciò che è essenziale mantenere a livello comune e le politiche per cui si manifestano opinioni difformi.

La

base

comune

è costituita

nella

sostanza

dal

mercato

interno,

includendovi le politiche commerciali e quegli aspetti delle politiche industriali, della concorrenza e di regolamentazione che sono già di competenza dell’Unione. La sorveglianza macroeconomica, il Patto di Stabilità fiscale e l'indipendenza della Banca Centrale ne costituiscono pure elementi essenziali. Il Trattato dovrebbe poi prevedere delle regole per la creazione e la modifica di forme aperte di partnership, con accordi specifici con i paesi partecipanti che intendono aderirvi. In particolare, nella base comune non dovrebbe essere inclusa nessuna area di competenza del secondo o del terzo pilastro, ossia relativa alla politica estera e della sicurezza ovvero agli affari interni e giudiziari. In ogni caso, per avviare una nuova partnership è necessario l’accordo di tutti i membri dell’Unione per evitare che essa interferisca con il funzionamento della base comune ovvero danneggi le altre partnership esistenti. Questa ipotesi risponde in modo inefficace alle esigenze di differenziazione che sono una caratteristica dell'Europa a più velocità. Essa, infatti, rischia di mettere in pericolo un certo equilibrio fra le diverse politiche che si è andato costruendo nel tempo con grande fatica e che consente a tutti i paesi di compensare costi e benefici dell’appartenenza all’insieme comunitario. E’ chiaro, infatti, che sarebbe

inaccettabile per molti paesi una situazione in cui alcuni Stati membri scegliessero di partecipare unicamente alle politiche da cui traggono un evidente vantaggio, mentre si ritirano da quelle politiche che si traducono per essi in un costo netto. I danni che il principio del “giusto ritorno” ha prodotto in passato sono ormai evidenti. Si tratta quindi di trovare una soluzione diversa al problema della differenziazione, che consenta di procedere senza mettere in pericolo la conservazione dell’acquis communautaire.

4. L’Europa del nucleo duro La scommessa della differenziazione ha senso soltanto se essa permette agli Stati di rafforzare la loro cooperazione, andando al di là delle sole politiche comunitarie organizzate intorno al mercato interno. In questa prospettiva, già nel 1993 il comitato parlamentare della Cdu/Csu ha presentato un documento sulla 197

“responsabilità della Germania in politica estera e i suoi interessi”, in cui si rileva che, qualora una riforma istituzionale si riveli impossibile, «la conseguenza necessaria dovrà essere l’estensione della geometria variabile, e cioè una densità di integrazione variabile con la formazione di un nocciolo duro». Un anno dopo un nuovo documento di riflessione della Cdu tedesca (documento Schaüble-Lamers) ha rilanciato il dibattito sulla politica europea, affermando che «nonostante le difficoltà giuridiche e pratiche, l’idea di geometria variabile o di un'Europa a più velocità dovrebbe essere istituzionalizzata nel Trattato o in un documento quasicostituzionale:

in caso

contrario,

l’Unione

resterà

limitata

alla cooperazione

intergovernativa che conduce a un'Europa alla carta». E’ essenziale - aggiunge il documento - che «nessun paese possa opporre il suo veto e bloccare gli sforzi degli altri paesi più decisi ad accrescere la loro cooperazione e integrazione». L'idea forte di questo documento è quella del nucleo duro (Kern Europa): in Europa vi è un gruppo di 5 paesi (Germania, Francia, Benelux) che hanno la possibilità di soddisfare i criteri di Maastricht. Questi cinque paesi, insieme alla Danimarca

e all'Irlanda,

dovranno,

da

un

lato,

impegnarsi

a realizzare

un

coordinamento ancora più stretto nel campo della politica monetaria e fiscale; d’altro lato, «essi dovranno convincere tutti gli altri paesi membri dell'UE - in particolare l’Italia, che è uno stato fondatore, ma anche la Spagna e naturalmente la Gran Bretagna - della loro incondizionata volontà di includerli più strettamente nell'Unione non appena avranno superato i loro attuali problemi». Questo documento, che non rappresentava ufficialmente la posizione del governo tedesco, è stato poi ripreso nel memorandum della Cdu del giugno 1995 e di fatto rifletteva da vicino gli orientamenti del cancelliere Kohl. In sostanza, per la prima volta è apparso con chiarezza che esiste un gruppo di paesi che, con la leadership tedesca, sono comunque decisi ad andare avanti oltre la moneta unica anche se gli altri paesi per il momento non sono in grado di seguirli. Questa posizione è risultata importante perché, da un lato, ha eliminato definitivamente l’idea che era possibile “rinegoziare Maastricht” - ossia i vincoli stabiliti dal Trattato come prerequisito per l’Unione monetaria; d’altro lato, ha indebolito fortemente la posizione del governo inglese, che guidava il gruppo di paesi ostili ad un avanzamento del processo verso uno sbocco federale e che sfruttava abilmente il potere che gli derivava dal principio di unanimità che presiede alla riforma dei Trattati. Lungo la stessa linea dell’integrazione forte si colloca il Club di Firenze. In contrasto con la tesi dell’integrazione flessibile, si ritiene infatti che la scommessa della differenziazione può risultare vincente se consente agli Stati più propensi a rafforzare la loro cooperazione di avanzare con la speranza che i paesi che non possono o non vogliono unirsi a loro possano comunque farlo in un secondo tempo. Se dunque l’ipotesi di un accordo unanime dovesse fallire, solo la decisione : di procedere comunque da parte di un gruppo di Stati desiderosi di avanzare in un numero significativo di settori chiave - al di là dell’insieme delle politiche comunitarie organizzate intorno al mercato unico - potrà consentire all’Europa di

198

preservare il dinamismo necessario per completare l’Unione economica e monetaria, avviare la gestione comunitaria della politica estera - completata in futuro dalla creazione di un sistema di sicurezza comune - e il rafforzamento della cooperazione in materia di sicurezza interna. E’ in questo quadro destinato a raggiungere la forma istituzionale di un vero e proprio Stato federale che sara finalmente possibile attivare le politiche economiche necessarie per sostenere un processo di sviluppo dell’economia europea e la ripresa dell’ occupazione.

5. Il futuro dell’Unione economica e monetaria

Il problema del rafforzamento istituzionale dell’Unione europea è ormai sul tappeto. I risultati della Conferenza intergovernativa (CIG) che si è conclusa con la firma del Trattato di Amsterdam sono generalmente considerati del tutto insoddisfacenti. E° ormai comune la consapevolezza che è impossibile dare avvio al processo di allargamento nei confronti dei paesi dell’ Europa centrale e orientale con le attuali istituzioni e mantenendo in numerosi settori la regola dell’unanimità. Ma il mandato che ha ricevuto la nuova CIG è di fatto limitato ai left-overs di Amsterdam, che riguardano il numero dei commissari, la possibilità di estendere i settori in cui si decide a maggioranza qualificata, e non all’unanimità, e la ponderazione dei voti in seno al Consiglio. Ma non sembra che le prospettive della CIG, che dovrebbe concludersi con il Consiglio europeo di Nizza del 7-8 dicembre 2000, siano favorevoli ad un esito positivo del processo di riforma. Per quanto riguarda il governo europeo dell’economia, la proposta più importante sul tappeto finora era quella del governo francese, che ha avanzato l’idea di dotare il Consiglio dell’Euro di una capacità formale di decisione esecutiva nei settori rilevanti della politica macroeconomica e di imporre il voto a maggioranza qualificata per permettere al Consiglio Euro di legiferare in materia economica e fiscale, dopo aver regolato definitivamente la questione della ponderazione dei voti, e inoltre di nominare un membro del Consiglio Euro-11 incaricato di rappresentare unitariamente gli undici paesi che fanno parte dell’area dell'Euro. Al contempo, l’idea di estendere anche al settore fiscale la decisione a maggioranza,

sostenuta

dalla Commissione,

incontra

le tradizionali

resistenze,

principalmente - ma non soltanto - da parte del governo inglese e su questo punto, come su molti altri, la CIG appare paralizzata da veti incrociati e incapace di procedere verso l’elaborazione di soluzioni efficaci. Si tratta comunque di proposte minimaliste, del tutto inadeguate rispetto al problema che si intende risolvere. E prova ne è il fatto che il mercato continua a scommettere sulla debolezza della politica economica europea, e quindi penalizza il valore esterno dell’Euro. La situazione si è finalmente rimessa in movimento con il discorso che il ministro degli esteri tedesco Joschka Fischer ha tenuto il 12 maggio 2000 all’Università Humboldt di Berlino in cui, sia pure esprimendosi a titolo personale — ma ha subito ricevuto il sostegno del Cancelliere Schroeder, - ha ripreso la

199

vecchia idea del nucleo duro, già espressa in passato dai responsabili di politica estera della Cdu nel documento Schaiible-Lamers. Fischer parte dall’osservazione ovvia - che l’allargamento rende indispensabile una riforma radicale delle istituzioni europee: in un'Europa di 23-28 membri, con le regole attuali è del tutto impensabile di conservare neppure il livello minimo di capacità decisionale che sussiste oggi in Europa. E la risposta che Fischer propone è semplice: si tratta di passare dal sistema di tipo confederale che vige attualmente nell’Unione a un sistema di tipo federale, «con un Parlamento europeo che eserciti il potere legislativo

e un governo,

pure

europeo,

che eserciti

effettivamente

il potere

esecutivo all’interno della Federazione. Questa Federazione dovrà fondarsi su un Trattato costituzionale». Dopo aver sottolineato che gran parte delle obiezioni che possono essere avanzate contro questo disegno possono essere facilmente superate attraverso l’utilizzo del principio di sussidiarietà, Fischer fa riferimento al modello costituzionale tedesco con una seconda camera che rappresenti gli Stati. Ma il punto più rilevante della sua analisi risiede nella critica del metodo monnettiano che ha governato finora il processo di costruzione dell’Unione europea. In conseguenza, anche sulla base di analisi avanzate recentemente sia da Delors che da Giscard d’Estaing e Schmidt, Fischer mette in evidenza il dilemma fondamentale di fronte a cui si trova la classe politica europea: «o la maggioranza degli Stati membri tenta il salto nella piena integrazione e si mette d’accordo su un Trattato costituzionale europeo che porti alla creazione di una Federazione europea, ovvero, nel caso contrario, un piccolo gruppo di Stati membri costituirà un’avanguardia, vale a dire un centro di gravità che comprenda gli Stati pronti ad avanzare sulla via dell’unificazione politica». E il motore di questo processo non potrà non essere la stretta cooperazione franco-tedesca. Nel discorso di Fischer si ritrovano dunque gli elementi essenziali già contenuti nell’idea del nucleo duro, ma con maggiore «consapevolezza dell’obiettivo da raggiungere e del motore politico del processo destinato a sboccare nella costruzione di una Federazione

europea.

Evidentemente,

è difficile al momento

attuale ipotizzare i possibili sbocchi dell’iniziativa assunta dal Ministro degli Esteri tedesco: in Francia vi sono state posizioni favorevoli, ma è nota la tiepidezza del

Primo Ministro Jospin sul tema europeo e le posizioni ostili di altri membri importanti del governo. Le reazioni inglesi e dei paesi scandinavi sono state del tutto negative, mentre l’Italia, come spesso avviene, ha mantenuto una posizione di

benign neglect. Ma ormai un dato è certo: la questione non solo della Federazione, come obiettivo finale del processo di unificazione europea, ma anche del metodo per raggiungerlo - ossia la costruzione di un nucleo duro, fondato sull’area dell’Euro e disposto ad avanzare anche se gli altri paesi non sono d’accordo - è ormai sul tappeto e i governi, impegnati nello sterile esercizio della CIG, non’ potranno non tenerne conto.

Anche le prospettive dell’Unione economica e monetaria dipendono dall’esito di questo processo politico. Tutti gli osservatori concordano sul fatto che il 200

risanamento finanziario portato avanti in questi anni, anche sulla base dei vincoli di Maastricht e nella prospettiva del Patto di Stabilità e di Sviluppo, ha ormai creato in Europa,

anche

nei paesi

deboli,

una

cultura

della

stabilità.

E, al di là

dell’ossessione anti-inflazionistica che ha dominato il dibattito sul policy mix da portare avanti in Europa, sempre più si diffonde la convinzione che l’Unione economica e monetaria debba ormai promuovere con decisione una politica volta a favorire lo sviluppo e a portare decisamente l’economia europea sul terreno della new economy, avviando a soluzione il drammatico problema della disoccupazione. Ma la debolezza dell’Euro, e la conseguente ripresa di una dinamica moderatamente inflazionistica attraverso l’aumento dei prezzi all’importazione, rischia di portare di nuovo a una stretta monetaria da parte della Banca Centrale Europea, con effetti negativi sulla produzione e sull’occupazione. E’ ormai opinione diffusa che la dinamica dell’Euro non sia dominata da fattori economici, ma soprattutto da fattori politici. Il mercato percepisce con chiarezza la debolezza di un’economia europea priva di governo nei confronti dell'economia americana, dove il governo è intervenuto con energia in questi anni per promuovere lo sviluppo attraverso un mix efficace di politica fiscale e monetaria. Il destino dell’Euro è quindi nelle mani della classe politica europea, che deve decidere al più presto se seguire la via indicata da Fischer, ovvero abbandonarsi nuovamente all’esito scontato di una CIG strutturalmente incapace di prendere le decisioni indispensabili per garantire un futuro all’economia europea. In questo caso, a molti anni di distanza, la signora Thatcher vedrà finalmente avverarsi il suo

sogno di un’Europa trasformata in un libero mercato senza governo e alla mercé di un’egemonia americana sempre più incapace di garantire un governo efficace dell’economia mondiale.

201

THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND THE EURO-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE Ugo MARANT University of Naples - Federico Il, Italy Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

I. The aim of the research is the evaluation of the exchange rate of the Euro after the first six months of its existence. The task is not easy because it is not possible to test empirically the validity of a comprehensive scheme of the effects of the launch of the Euro: nowadays we possess about one hundred daily observations of the external value of the European currency. In principle it would be possible to create a “virtual framework” extending to the past the possible determinants of the value of the Euro using the ECU as a proxy and creating a European Central Bank (ECB) using the weighted data of the central banks adhering to the Eurosystem. It would then be easy to simulate, for example, a “reaction function” of the ECB and to check the effects of its conduct on the financial markets and the response of the exchange rate of the Euro against, for instance, the US Dollar.

This conceptual experiment, shared by many researches, tries to depict potential scenarios after the European Monetary Union’, and to evaluate the main effects of new monetary policy on the financial and product markets. Nevertheless it is well known that such procedures conflict with the outcomes of the “Lucas critique”: they assume the estimated parameters of the model would be invariant when altering the monetary policy tule, in our case the birth of the ECB. It follows that predictions from these exercises are unreliable’. Our research will try, therefore, to evaluate the effects of European monetary authorities’ conduct on the exchange rate of the Euro utilising statistical information from the beginning of the Eurosystem. The main interpretative hypotheses of the research can be summarised in the following points: "I am very much indebted to Carlo Altavilla and Luigi Landolfo for key technical assistance. I would like to thank, without implicating in any way, Paul De Grauwe, for discussions and precious suggestions; Giovanni Pittaluga for the helpful comments; the Department of Economics of the Catholic University of Leuven, where I was visiting fellow in the academic year 1998-99. The paper benefited from presentations at the University of Genoa, Leuven, Naples and Rome. Usual caveats apply. ' See Bagliano et ai. (1999). Several financial institutions use such time series to forecast monetary aggregates and interest rates in the Euro Area. The difficulty to predict effects of economic policy in the presence of major regime changes is emphasised in United Nations (1999).

202

i, the evolution of the Euro external value is strictly connected with the agents’ confidence on real, financial and foreign exchange markets; ii. the ECB monetary policy strategy influenced negatively (or at least neglected) the agents’ confidence and expectations already affected by cyclical conditions of European economy; ii. the resulting portfolio reallocation determined a short-term capital outflow in favour of US Dollar denominated assets and, hence, an Euro depreciation. The consistency of the whole framework will be checked by the use, first, of descriptive statistic on variables as the Industrial Sentiment, the Interest-Rate Spread, the Implied Volatility of exchange rates, the Risk Reversal, and,

subsequently, by the building of a Structural Autoregressive Model.

II. The evolution of the external value of a currency depends, in principle, on the interactions between the whole domestic stance of economic policy, the expectations of the agents operating in the financial, exchange and product markets and the economic policy of the “Rest of the World”. In the case of the exchange rate of the Euro these interactions must be connected with a further policy issue, i.e. the statement of the Maastricht Treaty on the relative powers of the Council of Ministers and the ECB to determine the exchange rate regime’. We shall discuss in short this issue aiming at emphasising the undivided responsibility of the ECB in the present conduct of Euro exchange rate policy. In principle the role of the Council of formulating general orientations for exchange rate policy may lead to conflicts about desirable monetary policies. It is well known that the European Central Bank announced a strategy based on the control of the monetary aggregate M3. This strategy has no probability, except by chance, to be achieved by the ECB if the general orientations by the Council on the exchange rate policy are exogenous to the ECB. The system can actually work only in a situation of absolute agreement on the “hierarchy” of the final targets of the economic policy and of complete accord

between the Council of Ministers and the ECB. The orientations for the exchange rate, pertaining de jure to the Council, should de facto be determined simultaneously with the setting of monetary targets*. Only in such a framework the institutional commitment to price stability could be achieved’. 3 The Maastricht Treaty states: «... the Council, acting by a qualified majority either on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the ECB or on a recommendation from the ECB, may formulate general orientations for the exchange rate policy... These general orientations shall be without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability». 4 The peculiarity of the Maastricht Treaty is not the commitment of distinctive powers on the exchange rate to two institutions because this happens in the institutional relations between the Treasury Minister and the Central Bank in many western countries. The

203

The

hypothesis

of a connection

between

ECB

monetary

policy and the

evolution of the Euro exchange rate can be stated if we assume that, at the present,

the ECB is the principal agent responsible of the management of the Euro and that the ECB will give, in future, a stringent interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty; accepting general orientations by the Council only if they are strictly consistent with the control of the monetary aggregates’. The conclusion is that we can study the effects of ECB conduct on the Euro value excluding the probabilities of “external political pressures”. Many clues support, actually, these assumptions: first, there is a problem, as we stressed, of consistency between the pegging of the exchange rate and a successful control of the monetary aggregates; second there is no unambiguous meaning of 997 the concept of “real misalignment”.

III. It is clear that the attempt to find a relation between monetary policy and the value of the exchange rate for an institution born only six months ago is very troublesome and can give rise to several misunderstandings. We think, however, that the effects of the monetary strategy of the ECB on the Euro external value can help to examine crucial issues, such as the roots of the reputation and the credibility of a new born institution, the role of private operators’ confidence in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the complex nature of the relations between interest rate and exchange rate. In the next sections we shall discuss the basic features of the monetary policy of the ECB; the theoretical underpinnings of this strategy and the likely connections with the evolution of the exchange rate of the Euro, whose trend has been regularly weakening, as we can see in see Fig. 1°.

peculiarity comes from the statement of relative powers of two super-national, i.e. Union, institutions. ° Consequently the Council, acting in the direction of consistent relations with the ECB, decided on December 1997 to give general orientations only in the case of a “real misalignment” of the Euro. 3These are the evaluations by De Grauwe (1997) and Eichengreen (1998). From a strictly theoretical point of view a misalignment implies a deviation of the real exchange rate from its underlying equilibrium value. The problem is that the notion of equilibrium value, both in the theoretical models and in the policy measures, refers to several notions of the equilibrium value of the exchange rate. For example, the following notions of equilibrium are possible: (i) the overall equilibrium of the Balance of Payments; (ii) the equilibrium on Current Account;

(iii) the value that does not boost speculative attacks on the foreign exchange market; (iv) the value that is consistent with the achievement of price stability; (vi) the value that allows the end of a “beggar thy neighbour” dispute at international level. Figures are reproduced at the end of the text.

204

IV. The theoretical pillars of European monetary authorities’ conduct that have been restated in several official publications of the ECB give the first step of our analysis”. Its conduct can be ascribed to the conventional theory on monetary policy", which, jointly with the main restatements", can help us to build a simple model of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. The overriding priority is given by the price stability. Officially the target is pursued assigning money a prominent role. In such a case the ECB period loss function should be indicated by the equation (1): 1

(1)

L, = -2 (Am, — Am*)?

where Am, denotes the (log) quantity of money growth and Am" the moneygrowth target’. The loss function in (1) can be considered a “strict money targeting” in the sense that the central bank varies the level of the instrument variable, i.e. the rate of interest, in the case of every deviation of money growth from the target growth. Actually the ECB pursues a “pragmatic money targeting” because it decided to follow a practice of “interest rate smoothing'” and the price stability is pursued evaluating the inflationary impact of a broad category of financial and real variables'*. Hence monetary policy does not react mechanistically to money growth deviations. The ECB decided not to pursue a strategy of inflation targeting. The effects of this decision have been largely discussed both for the efficiency of the targeting both for its implications on the issues of the transparency and the accountability of the new central bank".

? See Bean (1998); European Central Bank (1999a) and (1999b), the Monthly Bulletin and

the speeches of President and Members of Governing Council of the ECB.

19 See McCallum (1999) and Wyplosz (1999). '' Svensson (1999). 12 The monetary aggregate selected as a reference indicator is M3. 13 A central bank chooses a smooth path of the interest rate when there is a partial adjustment to the variables included in the reaction function and the smoothing is reflected by the presence of the lagged interest rate in the central bank’s rule. See Clarida et al. (1999), p. 54. The rationale of interest rate smoothing is discussed in Goodhart (1998) and Woodford (1999).

'4 Angeloni ef al. (1999) group potential indicators into five broad classes: “gap” measures; labour cost measures; exchange rates and international prices; asset prices and survey-based measures of expectations. 15 The first issue is discussed by Mishkin (1998); Rudebusch and Svensson (1999); Svensson (1999). The second issue is discussed by Buiter (1998); Buiter (1999); Castren (1999); Faust and Svensson (1999); Valila (1999).

205

It is important for our discussion to emphasise that the money targeting, whatsoever is its version, does not determine a lower bound for the inflation rate'® and this limitation has, as we shall see, crucial effects, on industrial confidence in

the case of a decreasing rate of inflation. The equation (2) describes the equilibrium on the money market: Mi

(2)

Kiÿs —

— Pi =

khiRit

M

where a stable demand is supposed to depend on the nominal interest rate and output.

This stability, which has been questioned by several authors because of the uncertainty in Eurosystem money and financial market, is supposed to prevail in the medium term as outcome of an appropriate money supply policy build that can avoid the insurgence of a “Goodhart Law” phenomenon”. The EMU-wide aggregate demand is contained in the equation (3): (3)

Ve =

GE, A+,

—

OR,

—

E,Am:1)

+

V.

The equation (3) is an “expectational” IS whose value depends on an instrumental short-term nominal interest rate and on inflation expectations. Precisely y, denotes the log of output, E, is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time f, 7 ,:, is the inflation rate at time #+/, nominal interest rate at time ¢ and V, is a stochastic term".

R, is the

The short-run assessments on aggregate demand are, according to the ECB, less important than the key medium-run links between the price stability, real economic growth, and the rate of unemployment’. These links work on the demand side

'© The only explicit lower bound for inflation is given, according to the ECB, by the exclusion of the deflation from the definition of price stability. Svensson calculates that price stability for the ECB “below 2%” seems to be an inflation target of 1.5%. This value is determined from an estimated trend growth of real GDP 2-2.5% per year and an assumed trend decline in velocity of 0.5-1%. But the rate of inflation of the Euro Area is today well below 1%. For similar calculations see von Hagen (1999 a).

'’ The position has been held by Issing, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, who, referring to the German experience, writes: «... supply and demand effects cannot be clearly distinguished... the money supply process may also influence the relationship between the money stock and the trend of GNP, and its stability. If the central bank’s policy rule remains unchanged... the empirical “money demand” parameters should be more stable». Issing (1997), pp. 76-7. More recently Coenen and Vega (1999) presented estimates that support the ECB’ view on a stable money demand in Euro Area, while Arnold and de Vries (1998) emphasise that the EMU changes in monetary policy and money demand could invalidate the forecasts of EMU-wide money demand stability. !8 A more complete specification of the aggregate demand equation could include the real exchange rate, (s — p + p,) as in Monticelli and Tristani (1999), and the unanticipated government expenditure shock, (g, — E, g;+1), as in McCallum (1999). Issing (1999).

206

through the positive effects on the confidence of investors given by reliable definite prices. Stable prices, further, minimise the inflation risk premium in long-term interest rates, thereby stimulating investment and growth”. The aggregate supply is given by the equation (4): (4)

n=

ME: Am.)

+

PO:

—y*)

+

uy

a traditional “expectations-augmented” Phillips curve. The last equation is the ECB reaction function:

(5)

R, = MC — x*)

that reflects the role assigned to the inflation target in interest rate variations. The basic points, if we relate the framework to ECB conduct, are that this conventional model’! does not need a money-demand equation, such as the equation (2). It merely determines the amount of money, but no money term, m,, or real balance term, m, - p,, appear in the IS relation. Further, if we consider the monetary aggregate of the Loss Function in the equation (1) as an official target rather than an operative guide-line”, we can conclude that, in synthesis, the actual conduct by the ECB, is laying on the conventional theory on monetary policy”, that sets an “expectational” IS-type relation, the equation (3), a price-adjustment equation, the equation (4), and a monetary authorities’ reaction function, the equation (5). It means that the findings of a likely connection between the ECB conduct and the exchange rate of the Euro must not focus the growth of monetary aggregates, because they are not central in the transmission mechanism from monetary policy

2 The benefits of price stability for real economic growth and employment are summed up in European Central Bank (1999a), p. 40.

21 The same conclusion on the current relevance for the actual central banking of this conventional model have been achieved by Clarida et al. (1999) and Goodfriend and King (1997). The first label this model as “New Keynesian”, the second “New Neoclassical”.

22 This means that the actual loss function of the ECB, as Svensson argued”?, could be given by the equation (1a):

(1a)

L, = (x,- xt)

Svensson labels the case of a formal statement of the monetary aggregates supremacy as an “inflation targeting in disguise”. See Svensson (1999). «The fact is that actual central banks in industrial countries conduct monetary policy in a manner that is more accurately depicted by writing R, rather than m, as the instrument or operating variable». McCallum (1999 Apr.), p. 24. «Under an interest rate policy, one can use the LM equation to determine the effects of policy changes on the stock of money, but one need not employ it for any other purpose». Kerr and King (1996), p. 51.

3 See McCallum (1999) and Wyplosz (1999).

207

to the external value of the European currency™, the consistency of the mainstream theory with the founding of a new-birth reputed and credible central bank, aware of the effects of its own conduct on the level of economic activity, the inflation rate and the exchange rate.

V. If the ECB actual strategy can be related to the principal propositions of the main-stream analysis it is necessary to start from its founding issue, i.e. the issue of monetary policy time consistency”. It is useful to recall the major conclusions reached by the conventional framework moving from the time-consistency constraint: i. the central bank credibility is founded on policies that are consistent with earlier plans and announcements

and, hence, on the ability to precommit to

policies;

ii. this commitment implies the preference for a rule instead of discretionary policies that is the only way to achieve the “minimum” inflation rate; iii. the rate of inflation is minimised because the rule avoids the insurgence of an inflationary bias, that arises from the central bank’s desire for an unemployment rate below the natural rate joined with its inability to credibly commit to a low inflation rate;

à

iv. the rules and the elimination of the “inflation bias” determine the reputation and the credibility of the central banker that would be lost if he deviates from the “minimum inflation” solution;

v. the reputation of the central bank is safer if its preferences differ from those of the elected government; hence it is optimal that the government appoints a central banker who places greater relative weight on the inflation objective than does society as a whole; | vi. this kind of appointment defends the independence of central bank and grants a lower average inflation and a greater real economy performance.

VI. The debate originated from the distinguishing features to be related to a reputed and credible central bank is now enlarging and deepening”. 4 It is not by chance that no appraisal of the conduct of the ECB regards the degree of achievement of the monetary aggregate M3. «President Duisenberg’s comments on ECB Council meetings commonly paid little, if any attention to monetary developments, instead they focused on short-term interest rates and exchange rate movements. This creates the impression that the Council itself largely disregards the variables that allegedly are at the centre of its strategy». von Hagen (1999a), p. 10. Following the pioneering paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977) the well-known seminal contributions are Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Alesina and Summers (1993). An excellent analytical review of this literature is contained in Walsh (1998). For an exposition of the ECB conduct using the Barro-Gordon model and Rogoff’s contribution see De Grauwe (1999).

208

For our purposes we shall regard the issues pertinent to clarify the relationship between the ECB monetary strategy and the evolution of the Euro exchange rate. The first and more puzzling issue is the concept of credibility. The notion of credibility included in the benchmark model is strictly connected with the time consistency”. The time consistency issue arises from the belief in a systematic inflationary bias in the behaviour of the central bank: the latter desires to stabilise output around a value that exceeds the economy’s equilibrium output”. But this belief neither is supported from a theoretical point of view, nor is recent history kind to the view that central banks suffer from an inflationary bias”. In addition if we investigate the credibility issue, we find that in the ruling literature the notion is related to a “precommittment” and/or “strong aversion to inflation”: the loss of reputation, hence, arises if the central bank deviates from the

low-inflation solution. Following Blinder, we can instead suppose that “a central bank is credible if people believe it will do what it says’. It means, in our opinion, that credibility, and hence reputation, depend on more complex, and perhaps, cogent conditions such as: i. the referral to a specific model of the working of the monetary policy when the central bank announces its final targets; ii. the implementation of measures consistent with the underlying model; ili. the public’s subjective confidence that the goals could be, in principle, achieved. In a different but similar way Vickers argues, correctly, that monetary policy must be conducted in a complex and not mechanical way”'. In our opinion, if we consider the first semester of ECB conduct, it is possible

to state that the condition i. was perhaps satisfied; the condition ii. was partially satisfied; the condition iii. was unsatisfied. 2° Forder, for example, criticises the alleged relationships between independence and inflation. See Forder (1998). 7 We accept the definition by Walsh: «A policy is time consistent if an action planned at time £ for time t+1 remains optimal to implement when time f+1 actually arrives». See

Walsh (1998), p. 323. 28 The reasons

can be based on the presence of labour-market distortions, monopolistic

competitive sectors, and political pressure on the central bank. 29 «... the monetary authorities of many countries, especially in Europe, have displayed a willingness to maintain their tough anti-inflation stances to this very day, despite low inflation and persistently high unemployment. Whether or not you applaud these policies, they hardly look like grabbing for short-term employment gains at the expense of inflation». Blinder (1998), p. 41. McCallum thinks inappropriate to presume that a central bank would, in the absence of a tangible precommittment, inevitably behave in an “inflationary bias fashion”. See McCallum (1997).

3° Blinder (1999), p. 4, and Blinder (1996). l Vickers states that the conduct of monetary policy works from a “core model”, “assumptions and judgements” and “other models” to arrive through “forecast” and “other issues and policy judgements” to “policy”. See Vickers (1999).

209

If the ECB and the Council members theoretically agree with the Blinder’s notion of credibility, it is not sure the ECB is conducting a monetary policy strategy consistent with its declarations”. For example the interest rate cut on April 1999 was not justified by the money growth that was exceeding the target value; further, the official positions of the ECB Council on the weakening trend of the Euro against the US Dollar have been confusing and conflicting”. The accent on price stability as a primary root of credibility and reputation for a new born central bank according to the European monetary authorities is relevant because the policy implication of this belief is a disinflation target achieved through a peculiar and, as we shall see, risky strategy.

VII. The discussion of the previous sections aimed to emphasising how the ECB monetary strategy was set up consistently with the assumptions of the mainstream literature on central banking. The question we raise regards, generally, the matching of these assumptions for a new-born institution and particularly, the specific strategy, i.e. a strict or pragmatic money growth targeting. The dispute is not directed against the goal of price stability in itself. This goal is the institutional commitment of the Maastricht Treaty; the historical duty of a central banker™; the resolute condition by Bundesbank to confer its powers to a European institution”; the hope by the Eurosystem to inherit the credibility of the Bundesbank”. The real problems are connected with the dangers of this specific monetary strategy in a phase of recession of the Euro Area (Tab. A) existing at the start of EMU and inspired by the Maastricht policy mix of monetary and fiscal restriction, as it is presented in Fig. 2°’.

*? The ECB conduct has been evaluated as “an exercise in confusion”. See von Hagen (1999a), p. 8. The Economist (1999a) writes that the ECB «... has often failed to speak with a single consistent voice. This has sown and hurt its fragile credibility... Clearly, the ECB’s top brass are still learning how to communicate with the markets». 3 «Another indication of the ECB’s weak commitment to its own strategy is the fact that its president sometimes argues that the Bank would intervene in the case of exchange rate misalignments, and yet denies that the ECB pursues an exchange rate target via-a-vis the Dollar. As long as the Bank refuses to explain what would be an appropriate equilibrium exchange rate, or by what criteria the Bank would assess the existence of misalignments,

such opaque statements can only create confusion». von Hagen (1999a), p. 10. The importance of price stability as a nominal anchor for the monetary authorities is reaffirmed in Haldane and Quah (1999).

35 Krugman (1998a).

È Svensson (1999) and von Hagen (1999b). See De Grauwe (1998). Jackman (1999) stresses the effects on the European rate of unemployment of the participation in EMU. Solow (1999) discusses the connections between the monetary policies and unemployment in Europe in the last decade.

210

Tab. À — Euro Area. Real Economy Indicators (Annual Percentage Changes)

Source: Eurostat

The choice of monetary targeting, within a framework of tight monetary stance, has the outcome of a gradual reducing of the price increases without the definition of a lower bound for the inflation rate*. The absence of a lower bound of prices has, in a climate of recession and falling prices, harmful effects on the expectations of the agents. Keynes, first, understood the relevance of the problem: «lf the reduction of money wages is expected to be a reduction relatively to moneywages in the future, the change will be favourable to investment, because...

increase the marginal efficiency of capital; whilst for the same

reason

it will

it may be

favourable to consumption. If, on the other hand, the reduction leads to an expectation,

38 «... what we appear to have is a range of inflation rates deemed consistent with price stability. The floor could be 0% HICP inflation or something a bit higher. The range is not symmetric or otherwise centred. There is no value of inflation rate inside the range such that, if inflation were to threaten to go below (above) it (over a horizon for which policy could be expected to influence it) there would be a presumption that policy would be relaxed (tightened). So we know what it is not (an inflation target), but we still don’t know exactly what it is». See Buiter (1999), p. 16.

211

or even to the serious possibility, of a further wage-reduction in prospect, it will have efficiency of capital and precisely the opposite effect. For È it will diminish the marginal ‘ 9 will lead to the postponement of investment and of consumption?’».

Thus the specific situation of the Euro Area and the relevance of a “Keynes effect” establish the supremacy of inflation targeting on monetary targeting and, perhaps, this phenomenon has been neglected by the critics of the ECB strategy”. The clear-cut definition of an inflation-forecast targeting as an intermediate target is useful not only for the transparency and the accountability of the central bank, but for private agents too who are, therefore, aware of the bottom value of

the nominal anchor for their decisions both on demand and supply sides*'. In the Euro Area the industrial producer’s prices have been falling in the first quarter of 1999, and the phenomenon,

as we can see in Tab. B, holds for manufacturing

intermediate goods and capital goods. The problems raised by Keynes, and in the British tradition, by the Bank of England emphasise the crucial issues of the central role of expectations and of confidence in the major markets, the real, the financial

and the foreign exchange markets. The ECB, in its actual conduct, neglected these issues although they are crucially present in the conventional literature and formally recognised by the central European institution”.

3 Keynes (1936), p. 263. It is right to remind two features of Keynes approach modified in the present EMU context. The first is that Keynes refers to money wages and not to prices reductions; this is the result of Keynes choice in the General Theory to deflate nominal quantities in terms of unit of wage. The second is Keynes reflects on a reduction of prices instead of a reduction of inflation. Nevertheless the relevance of the assessments is invariant. It is interesting and, perhaps, unexpected to find a Similar reasoning in the last Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, when it deals with the issue of the consequences of declining prices. «The achievement of price stability, and the likelihood of sometimes having to conduct monetary policy when prices are actually falling, poses a number of questions for central banks. Among these is whether an explicit objective for price stability is useful to prevent a decline in prices from generating extrapolative expectations offuture price decline». «... episodes of declining prices are... likely to be of concern to the extent that they last long enough to engender expectations of continuing price falls». BIS (1999), p. 77 and p. 81, Italics added. An opposite position to Keynes’ view on the effects of falling prices is contained in Pigott and Christiansen (1998).

* An accurate review of the implications and difficulties of falling prices for corporate

planning is contained in The Economist (1999c). It is not by chance that the introduction of inflation targeting by the Bank of England and the consequent lowering of the inflation rate did not raise the same troubles as in the Euro Area. See King (1999a). Haldane and Read (1999) test the credibility of the new monetary | regime in the United Kingdom in 1992 through the assessment of yield curve movements. The advantages of the strategy of inflation targeting are stressed, evaluating the conduct of the ECB, by Deutsche Bank (1999b).

” See, for example, Issing (1999). 212

Tab. B — Industrial and Commodities Prices in the Euro Area (Annual Percentage Change)

pren dt

Total

:

exc. Construc.

Intermediate Goods

1998 Q1

1999 Q1

-4,9

0,2

Source: European Central Bank

The agents’ expectations and confidence are pivotal in a twofold respect: first, central bank credibility is itself an important part of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; further, a central bank must be aware of all the possible effects of its strategy on markets expectations. As regards the first issue we leave the assumption that the credibility of a central banker could be reduced to a time consistent rule. If we agree with the more articulated evaluations, i.e. by Blinder and King, it is clear that the central bank must be aware of its degree of credibility among the private agents as a part of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy”. This means that if monetary policy is aiming to reduce permanently the inflation rate the scenario of “perfect credibility” would arise if the private sector recognises and fully believes that the announced deflationary policy will occur as planned and the monetary authorities are able to ensure, in presence of consistent behaviour of the agents, that price stability is accompanying with a recovery of

4 The steps of Issing deductions are remarkable. He agrees with the definition by Blinder of credibility. Hence Issing argues that «Central bank credibility will enhanced (impaired) if there is a close (loose) correspondence between its words and deeds». Issing’s conclusions, however, are not in favour of a more transparent explanation of the modus operandi of the ECB, but in the direction that «... that central banks must choose their words very carefully». Issing (1999), p. 24.

213

aggregate demand and production. If both the conditions are satisfied the costs can be reduced to a trivial amount and the “sacrifice ratio”, i.e. the input costs associated with disinflationary policies, is insignificant. In the case of the ECB a full credibility is far from being reached and there is no sign, except for the very last period, that the lowering of the inflation rate is coincident with an improvement of real activity“. More generally Jackman recently writes: « ... the forward looking approach to inflation expectations built into many BarroGordon style models...does not accord with the evidence. Whether this is because people are not initially convinced that the new institutions will deliver what is promised of them, or whether there are deep initial forces which take time to work through, is

unclear. But evidence... suggests that where countries have experienced unemployment during the process of adjustment to the single currency, unemployment is likely to persist rather than melt away in the new regime*»,

high such

So far we have discussed the role of central bank credibility as a piece of the transmission mechanism of the monetary theory. A further problem concerns the role of expectations about the future course of the economy following policy actions and announcements”. The central feature is the confidence with which 4 There is evidence that central bank independence per se does not ensure a more favourable “sacrifice ratio”. See United Nations (1999). An evaluation of the costs of disinflationary policies in the US by the Federal Reserve Board/World Model in case of perfect and imperfect credibility is contained in Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams (1997). Goodfriend (1993), reviewing the disinflation process in the US, reflects on how fragile the central bank credibility is and how potentially costly it is to maintain. Petlow and von zur Muehlen (1999) estimate, in a forward-looking model, the costs of learning a new rule of monetary policy that could be substantial. Martin and Salmon (1999) examine the empirical importance of uncertainty for monetary policy-making in the United Kingdom and they conclude that the optimal rule accounting for pardmeter uncertainty results in a less aggressive path for official interest rates than when parameter uncertainty is ignored. The literature that uses cross-country data to study the empirical relationship between inflation and economic growth reached inconclusive results. See Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999). King (1998) stresses the relations between credibility, predictability of policy and serious learning by both economic agents and the central bank. Huh and Lansing (1999) show how the rise in the interest rate during the Volcker’s disinflation period in the US was the result of the interactions between adaptive expectations and partial credibility.

* The ECB Monthly Bulletin of July 1999 confirms that the overall output figures do not

indicate improvements across all major categories of productions. See European Central Bank (1999c). Gerlach and Scnabel (1999) discuss the potential utility of the Taylor rule as a benchmark for setting a counter-cyclical monetary policy in the EMU Area. Deutsche Bundesbank (1999) expresses an opposite view, emphasising the shortcomings in the design of the Taylor Rule.

siSee Jackman (1999), p. 3, Italics added. A wise view is contained in the Report prepared by the guidance of the Monetary Policy Committee. The British banking” and a deep-rooted conception let the MPC argue largely via its influence on aggregate demand and has little

214

Bank of England staff under the tradition on the “art of central that the monetary policy works direct effect on the trend path of

these expectations are held because the latter affect the prices and the quantities on the product market, the financial market and the foreign exchange market. Specifically monetary policy influences expectations of participants in the financial market and in the “... other parts of the economy via, for example, changes in expected future labour income, unemployment, sales and profits”. The policy implication of this interpretation of the transmission mechanism is that the direction of a monetary shock is hard to predict and can arise opposite paths. The introduction of expectations in the modern textbook presentation could help us to understand the working of the transmission mechanism”. Returning to the simple model of the ECB monetary strategy, let us restate and modify inconsiderable the expectational IS schedule:

(3a)

VEE A

Our

Let us simplify the aggregate supply equation: (4a)

™% =

$2101 -y*)

Finally we use a “Fisher equation” to explicit the relation between the nominal interest rate, R,, and the real interest rate, r,, in the equation (6): (6)

Ry =r;

HE

Combining the equations (3a), (4a) and (6) we obtain:

(7)

Vira y

te

OR

SNE

OTe

Loney)

The crucial point in equation (7) is that expected future output has a greater than one — for-one effect on current output and it is magnified by the value of $, and 07, i.e. the parameters that link, respectively, the interest rate to the aggregate demand and the output to inflation. When, for instance, decreasing output is expected in future, it will be accompanied by a decreasing inflation rate, because the Phillips curve working. With the consequent lower expected inflation at date ¢ the real interest rate will be higher and aggregate demand will be lower at a particular nominal interest rate. supply capacity. See Bank of England (1999a). More recently King reinstated the real effects of monetary policy in the short run and that: «... a central bank has “constrained discretion” about the horizon over which to bring inflation back to target; that is, a choice about how to trade-off variability of output against variability of inflation. This choice... reflects a choice about whether inflation or output should bear the strain of the initial impact of any shock. And it is at heart of public debate over monetary policy». See King (1999b), p. 13, Italics added.

48 Bank of England (1999a), p. 6. # We follow the approach by Kerr and King (1996). 215

Hence the “policy multipliers” depend crucially on the assumptions on inflation and output expectations by consumers and investors”. In the case of the Euro Area the ECB probably overlooked the importance of firms expectations whose declining trend is depicted in Fig. 3 and the interrelated connections among confidence, output and prices are clearly visible in Fig. 4”. An additional problem is provided by the consideration that neither can confidence be confined to a single market, for example the product market, nor can private agents be thought of as operators in a specific market. If we suppose the existence of an agent whose portfolio assets are split between real, domestic financial assets and foreign financial assets, it follows that the degree of confidence in the real market affects the confidence and the behaviour of the same agent in the internal and external financial markets.

VIII. Following this interpretative hypothesis we assume that the external value of the Euro is the last effect of the portfolio’s asset substitution from real and financial domestic assets to external financial assets. More precisely the increasing weakness of the Euro against the Dollar is the upshot of a declining confidence of agents in the product and financial Euro markets in the Euro Area” and of consequent portfolio investments in Dollar denominated assets”. The role of confidence is not stressed in the three major models of the exchange rate, the monetary model, the overshooting model and the portfolio balance model. Nonetheless, it is possible that confidence and expectations deriving from the fundamentals or from news about fundamentals affect the exchange rate, even if the fundamentals themselves do not influence the exchange rate in the manner suggested by the three major exchange rate models“. The Bank for International Settlements actually shares this view: .

°° «Thus, consumption and investment theory suggest the importance of including expected future output as a positive determinant of aggregate demand. We will consequently employ the expectational IS function as a stand-in for a more complete specification of dynamic consumption and investment choice». Kerr and King (1996), p. 55. An equivalent emphasis can be found in Bank of England (1999a), p. 8. ! The usefulness of business surveys in forecasting output movements in the European Area is established in Santero and Westerlund (1996). The severity of monetary stance is confirmed by Deutsche Bank that considers, for all the period of existence of the Eurosystem, average three months money market rates well above those calculated using its own version of Taylor Rule. See Deutsche Bank (1999c). Common sense connects the depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the Dollar with the relative contingent vigour of the US economy. This is the official statement by the ECB and its president Duisenberg (see for example Duisenberg 1999) and it is to some extent authentic. But the crucial problem is the rationale of this statement. |

® According to the latest data published by the ECB, in the first six months of 1999 the

portfolio investment account showed net outflows totalling EUR 91.5 billion, compared with ECU 56.4 billion in the first half of 1998. See ECB (1999d). di Hopper (1997).

216

The Euro’s introduction on 1 January 1999 prompted strong demand for the new currency, which brought about an appreciation against the dollar... Very shortly after, however, market participants refocused on the uncertainty about economic growth and persistently high unemployment rates affecting a significant part of the Euro Area. The steady depreciation of the Euro between January and April 1999 can be explained by the divergent trends in economic activity in the United States and large parts of the Euro Area... Although the amount by which the ECB decided to ease monetary policy on 8 April took market participants by surprise, the Euro hardly moved against the dollar in the following days’.

IX. The next step in evaluations of the effect of the ECB monetary policy on the agent’s confidence concerns the European financial market. We utilise, for this end, the term structure of interest rates as an indicator of market expectations of the stance of monetary policy. The idea is that the central bank affects directly the short end of the yield curve, while the long end will be indirectly affected through the influence on long-term expectations on inflation and real activity“. If monetary policy is capable of altering agents’ long-term expectations, a predictive power has to be recognised to the long-term nominal interest rates and to the yield curve spread”. More specifically an increase in the central bank rate or a perceived hard stance of monetary policy tends to reduce the yield curve spreads and to flatten the yield curve; moreover the extent of flattening of the yield curve could be related to the credibility of the central bank move. The yield curve spread that it is usually examined corresponds to a forward interest rate from three months to ten years into the future”. The utilisation of this indicator for the Euro Area is shown in Fig. 5: the trend of the overnight rate, which we assume as proxy of monetary policy direction”, is

5 BIS (1999), p. 109-110. Italics added. Earlier Financial Times (1999a) and, surprisingly, the International Monetary Fund stated a similar opinion. «... the depreciation of Euro since its introduction reflected... uncertainties about economic prospects in the Euro-Area... /t was particularly important at the early stages of the ECB, in view of the uncertainties in the outlook for the Euro Area and the global economy, that the public understand and have confidence in the monetary framework». See IMF (1999), p. 3. Italics added.

# See Estrella and Mishkin (1995). 7 The Bank of England macroeconometric model of the UK economy specifies the longterm nominal interest rates given by short-term interest rates and the difference between expected inflation one year ahead and the inflation target. See Bank of England (1999b).

# The ten-year interest rate can be decomposed into expected real interest rate and expected

inflation components. The former could be associated with the expectations of future monetary policy and, hence, with future real growth; the latter may be informative, too, about future growth. See Estrella and Mishkin (1996). # It would

be correct to utilise the repurchase rate, i.e. the rate on main

refinancing

operations by the ECB. But the Governing Council decided a fixed rate tender procedure that was from January to April 1999 3% and, after, was lowered to 2.5%. Hence we use the

EONIA, (“euro overnight index average”) as the closer variable to the repurchase rate. The

217

opposite to the direction of the spread. It could be argued that in the first six months of Eurosystem’s working the overnight rate rise has been followed by a reduction of the spread value®. The opposite movements of the two variables could not help to confirm the hypothesis that the disinflationary policy by the ECB could have produced a lowering of confidence in the European financial market, emerging as a diminishing difference between long and short-term interest rates. A further analysis of the term structure of interest rates curve can help us to ascertain the existence of two problems: the first is connected with movements in the yield curve at the time of the launch of the Eurosystem and the ECB; the second relates to the effects of the initial manoeuvres of new monetary authorities on the financial market. For what concerns the reaction of financial agents to the new monetary regime the experience of United Kingdom can be helpful. It is opirtion of the Bank of England‘ that in a framework of fully transparent and credible policy, institutional and/or operative monetary changes will not be a source of instability of the yield curve, because there will be no news in monetary policy itself”. Actually the yield curve does shift following policy changes. These movements can be ascribed to different information the private sector has from the monetary authorities: there are the possibilities of imperfect credibility, in case of effects of private information on policy targets and imperfect transparency, in the case of a different understanding

working of fixed rate tender as a floor for the price of liquidity to banks is explained in De Grauwe (1999). °° The literature on the importance of the term structure of interest rates for monetary policy is very extensive and can be related to two issues. The first debates the relation between the stance of monetary policy and the yield curve; the second discusses the validity of the yield curve as a predictor of agents’ confidence and recession. Fleming and Remolona (1999) find that the announcements impose large shocks on the expected future interest rates. Bernard and Gerlach (1996) stress the utility of the yield curve to predict recessions, especially for German and US spreads. Goodfriend (1998) finds in the US case serious pitfalls in using the yield curve in the outlook for the economy. Deutsche Bank (1999b) does not consider the yield curve an alternative indicator in comparison with the real short-term interest rate.

*! Considerations that follow utilise the arguments by Haldane and Read (1999). °° The argument is simple and straightforward. Assume, as previously, that the monetary policy rule is given by equation (a):

(a)

R, = HT, — 2*)

(B)

Rij = Ei(i+;)

Equation (8) describes the link between forward interest rates and the expected path of future official rates:

where, R,,j is the j-period forward interest rate, E, denotes the expectations of private agents based on information up to time period ¢, and R,+ j is the official interest rate © prevailing at time £ + |. Hence the yield curve depends on market’s guess about actual and expected official rates. If some of the terms in the rule of equation (a) will alter, i.e. 7* or 4, the yield curve will jump.

218

of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by the private sector®. The conclusions are that the degree of transparency affects inversely the movements of short-maturity interest rates, while the degree of credibility is likely to show up in smaller movements in longer-maturity interest rates®. We can examine the evolution of European yield curve in light of British experience, analysing jointly Tab. C, that contains information on the values of the main interest rates at different maturity in period January-June 1999. The main results from the interest rates values could be summarised in the following assessments: during the period January-June we observe a high volatility of the curve before and after the reduction by the ECB in April of the official discount rate; furthermore the movements seem less dampened for the longermaturity rates, particularly the five and ten years interest rates. Utilising the methodology proposed by Haldane and Read, we could suppose that the European financial market signalled a problem of imperfect credibility of monetary authorities®. Tab. C — Euro Area. The Term Structure of Interest Rates

Es

Pi

Source: ECB and De Nederlandsche Bank

3 See Haldane and Read (1999), p. 173. % Haldane and Read show that in the UK experience yield curve jumps were numerous and significant between 1984-1992 against the dampening of the shifts after the introduction of the inflation targeting regime. °° «... [when] the market does not completely believe that the monetary authorities will adhere to their announced targets, there is a problem of imperfect credibility. Alternatively, the targets themselves may be imprecisely specified. In both case, monetary policy embodies news, because the public are learning about the true targets of the monetary authorities through their monetary policy actions». See Haldane and Read (1999), p. 173.

219

It is possible to observe that the lowest steepness of the yield curve is exhibited in the period January-March 1999, at the beginning of the Eurosystem; during these months the curve is flatter than in May 1998, the period in which agents” confidence on the goods market begin to fall and than in May-June 1999, when the lowering of the repurchase rate by the ECB had positive effects on the yield structure, particularly on the longer-term interest rates, raising the spread between ten year and three month interest rates. Finally we can use the framework discussed above to verify the effects of the main monetary events in the Eurosystem examining the response of the yield curve when the ECB started operating, at the beginning of January, and when the ECB decided, on April, to lower the repurchase rate. Tab. D summarises the empirical results. The first column shows the observed response values of different-maturity interest rates to the launch of Eurosystem and to official setting of the repurchase rate by the ECB; the second column shows the observed response values of the same rates to the variation of discount rate on the last April*. The final column shows the difference of the response between the two events. Tab. D — Yield-Curve Response (Yanuary-June 1999) Average Interest Rate Response 4 Jan. — 7 Apr.

Average Interest Rate Response 8 Apr. — 30 Jun.

Change in Response since 8 Apr.

-0,1697

-0,33267

-0,16297

5 Years

-0,0715

0,14308

0,21458

10 Years

-0,008006

0,2215

0,22956

Source: European Central Bank

As regards the rates’ average response to the birth of ECB it is useful to remember that the first column shows the interest rate response on January 4 in comparison with the reference values of 25 December 1998. Previously, on 3 December, all the national central banks of the States adopting the Euro from the 66

.

:

.

‘

The values of the columns are obtained using the dispersion measure: 1

n

x= RE

(x; — Xo)

where x is the value shown in the columns, x; are the observed values and xo is the reference (average) value. In the first column xo is the last official value published by ECB, 25

December, 1998, of different-maturity interest rates before the launch of Eurosystem; in the

second column x, is given by the values of the same rates on 7 April, the day before the variation of official discount rate.

220

start of Stage Three decided to lower their key central rates to 3% (with the exception of Italy), and later, on 22 December 1998, the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the first main refinancing operation of the Eurosystem would have been at a fixed rate tender of 3%. The settlement of this operation took place on January 7 1999”. Hence the latter data can be considered the beginning of a real operational Euro-financial market. This is the reason to verify the response in this specific day. The official repurchase rate on 7 January was 3%, while the Euro Area repurchase rate, weighted with national GDP, has been estimated, at the end of December 1998, at

3.09%*. In the end the difference of the repurchase rate before and after the Eurosystem launch is negligible and amounts to 0,09%. In this sense the rates response can be considered the effect of the new monetary institution, and in effect the interest rates maturity register significant variations. In particular, over the period 4 January-7 April, the one-month interest rate registers an average decrease of —0,1697, that is the biggest response in different-maturity interest rates. The smallest response is shown in the ten-year rate, while three-month and five-year rates present similar average responses. The second column of Tab. D shows the response of some components of the yield curve to the decrease of repurchase rate to 2.5% decided by ECB on 8 April 1999. The figure indicates a different behaviour in comparison with the movements at the beginning of the year. In this occasion while the short-term rates decline, though of by a lesser amount than the key central bank rate, the five years and ten years rates increase. The figures clarify some key findings: first, both the events, the launch of the Eurosystem and the monetary policy shock on April, are characterised by bigger movements in short-maturity interest rates. If we refer to the distinction settled by Haldane and Read between imperfect transparency and imperfect credibility, we could conceive that the ECB is still suffering a lack of transparency, presumably about the actual inflation target of monetary authorities. There is, however, a difference between the two episodes: the monetary decisions

of April were approved to the financial market: the upshot is, certainly, an U-turn of interest rates spread immediately after 8 April, as possible to check in Fig. 7. It is not possible to assess now whether the flatness of the yield curve is, in the European case, a useful indicator of future economic growth®; nevertheless the reactions to monetary policy and the co-movement with the evolution of industrial sentiment allow the curve to be considered an helpful indicator of actual and past confidence in the financial market.

€? The chronology of the events and the daily decisions are reported in European Central Bank (1999a).

68 See Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (1999). °° Dotsey (1998) considers the spread a less useful indicator in the recent years to predict real growth. In the same direction Deutsche Bank (1999b) thinks the real short-term interest rate a more powerful indicator than the yield curve.

221

X. The explanation of the gradual depreciation of the Euro against the Dollar can be found in the relative business cycle conditions in the two economies and, as we mentioned in the previous paragraphs, this is the explanation suggested by the Eurosystem official institutions. Such an explanation is in our opinion right as far as it concerns the short run, but these institutions did not support the explanation by proper theoretical clarifications. In principle a rationale foundation to the statement could be found applying two opposite approaches”. The first approach is given by a Fleming-Mundell model in a case of a fiscal expansion within a framework of a small economy and “relatively” high capital mobility assumptions: under this hypothesis when the real product of a country rises following the expansionary fiscal policy, the worsening trade balance is more than offset by the net capital inflows caused by the increase of domestic interest rate above the world interest rate. A second possible approach is given by the Current Account Monetarist (CAM) model’! that assumes the stability of the demand for money function, the purchasing power parity and the law of one price in asset markets. By these assumptions

the CAM

model

shows

how, ceteris paribus,

an increase

of real

income in the domestic economy relatively to the “world” economy determines an appreciation of national currency”. It is clear that both the assumptions of the Fleming-Mundell approach and of CAM model are not fitting the actual position of European and US economies. The Bank for International Settlements provides, perhaps, a more fruitful approach for International Settlements. The BIS thinks that the steady depreciation of the Euro can not be imputed to the divergent trend, by itself, in economic activity in the United States and large parts of the Euro Area; the divergent trend of relative real growth is relevant as far as it affects agents’ confidence in the two markets”. The evidence seems to suggest that an iñterest rate differential between interdependent economies is only a necessary condition; the sufficient one is that.a growing economy is able to attract foreign capital from the sluggish one only if in 7 A clear comparison between the Fleming-Mundell model and the monetary approach is contained in Kenen (1996).

71 See Frenkel et al. (1980). ” The central feature of CAM model is the log-linear equation: Ss=

(m

—

my)

-

Ap +

Ayyw

—

Pw R,

+

PR

where s is the exchange rate, m, y, R the domestic values of money, output and interest rate, while m,, yw, Ry are the same variables referred to the “World Economy”. «The Euro’s introduction... prompted strong demand for the new currency, which brought about an appreciation against the Dollar... Very shortly after, however, market participants refocused on the uncertainty about economic growth and persistently high unemployment rates affecting a significant part of the Euro Area». See BIS, p. 109, Italics added.

222

.

the latter the status of industrial sentiment and financial market’s confidence sets capital free to move towards the growing economy whose bonds and shares are more profitable. The relative evolution of sentiment and confidence could, in our opinion, explain huge capital movements for a given interest rate differential between two differently growing economies. Actually capital outflows from the Euro Area towards the US have been, as we shall argue later, very volatile and have not been strictly connected to interest rate differentials and covered interest parity, as represented in Fig. 8. From Fig. 8 it is possible to observe that the maximum negative values of the interest rate differential and covered parity are reached in June, but in the same month portfolio investment of the Euro Area showed net outflows bigger than the previous months when the interest rate differential was lower”. The phenomenon is visible in Fig. 9 that includes the values of industrial sentiment, the interest rate differential and net portfolio investment in the Euro Area. It is clear that, in presence of a favourable circumstance given by the higher return on US Dollar denominated assets, the capital outflows fluctuated in closer connection with the evolution of industrial sentiment”. The exception is in April, when the ECB lowered the repurchase rate: the immediate effect was broad capital outflows

from

the Euro

Area;

the monetary

relaxation,

however,

helped the

recovery of real confidence and, after a month, net capital outflows began to decrease. We can conclude that the status of domestic goods and financial markets determine, in the presence of an advantageous interest rate differential, the external value of a currency, as the Euro value indicates in the first two quarters of 1999”. What we do stress is that the weakness of the Euro is the result of the peculiar effects of ECB conduct on agents expectations in the presence of disadvantageous relative returns for European assets, but we do not claim the actual value of the

Euro is a problem in itself. Several circumstances help the Euro Area to benefit from, or at least not be damaged by, the depreciation of its currency against the US Dollar”: the Euro zone is relatively self-contained; large economies, especially Germany and Italy, increase their exports; the depreciation is supposed to partially offset the deflationary bias of the ECB”. In addition empirical estimates” show an 74 See European Central Bank (1999d). 75 In the same period compared with the strong interest by issuers in international bonds denominated in Euros, demand by asset managers for such securities seems to have been subdued. Some doubt on a growing share of Euro in international private assets is contained in McCauley (1999). 76 The role of interest rate expectations and, therefore, of confidence on the financial market is also considered, in addition to the rate differential, in the econometric model of Deutsche

Bank for forecasting the Euro-US Dollar exchange rate. See Deutsche Bank (1999d). The Bank of England ascribes the recent partial recover of the Euro to agents rising confidence and better forecasts for growth. See Bank of England (1999c). 77 See Financial Times (1999b). 78 Krugman (1999).

223

excessive exchange rate volatility, as the Euro has been experiencing, does not produce certain effects on international trade; a real trade-off does exist, however,

between smoothing the movement of the exchange rate and interest rate stability. The weakness of the Euro is a problem if we consider the currency value as a result, ceteris paribus, of actual confidence and for its consequences on forward expectations of financial markets”. Actually recent literature stresses the importance of “market sentiment” on exchange rate determination‘. This approach considers the existence of serious flaws in the principal models of exchange rate, that is the monetary model, the overshooting model and the portfolio balance model. The major flaws are ascribed to the relevance conferred to current fundamental economic variables: money supplies, interest rates and output levels of countries”. Actually economic fundamentals are supposed to influence not directly the exchange rate but indirectly through the effects they have on market participants expectations and confidence, ie. how they interpret the values and/or announcements of fundamentals®. It follows that a monetary policy measure does not have an unambiguous significance for the agents“ and give paradoxical results®. Following in substance the “market sentiment approach”, more recently, the conventional wisdom that high interest rates stem capital flight and currency depreciation has been disputed*. Unorthodox effects on capital flows are connected with the risk premium: «If raising interest rates increases the probability associated with a default on outstanding debt, the result can be a worsening of the country’s capital account 7 Scheide and Solveen (1997). 80 «... others see it as a part of the ECB’s job to avoid exchange-rate swings because they make it tougher for businesses to plan... The nervousness of financial markets is such is such that they seize on bad news and ignore the good-early this month, the Euro barely budged when figures were published showing quarter-on-quarter growth for the Euro-Area of 0.5% than expected. The market’s attitude makes it unlikely that intervention would have much effect». The Economist (1999b). 8! Hopper (1997) gives a plain exposition of the “market sentiment approach”.

# Really the most sophisticated portfolio balance contributions include the influence of subjective variables, more or less connected to the agents’ confidence,

such as the risk

disliking or the reluctance to accept very volatile returns. See, for a representative example, Lewis (1988). # This alternative view allows a partial efficacy to the “news approach”, whose pioneer studies are Branson (1983) and Edwards (1983). = The same assessment is stated by Bank of England (1999a). *° A significant experience is provided by the exchange rate of Swedish krona in the early 1990s. Although the Swedish Central Bank raised the short-term interest rate to 500% the result was a depreciation of the national currency. The Swedish experience is mentioned byFinancial Times (1999a) to confirm the uncertain effects of interest rate policy on the Euro exchange rate.

#6 Pakko (1999). 224

position... A country facing capital flight due to a crisis of confidence might therefore be plunged into a situation in which reducing interest rate might be the appropriate 8? ».

The results of this approach depend crucially on the postulated relation between interest rates and probability of default, that is the explicit phenomenon of a lack of confidence in real and financial evolution in country markets. If we link the foregoing arguments to the Euro case it is necessary to link the evolution of capital outflows from the Euro Area with the external European currency value, assuming expectations and confidence of private operators jointly affect the two phenomena. The Fig. 10 and 11 show the tendencies of portfolio investment of the Euro zone for the total net flows, in Fig. 10, and for the main components, i.e. shares,

bond and money market instruments, in Fig. 11. At a glance we can ascertain that net capital flows are, with few exceptions, constantly negative since the launch of Eurosystem, and, from Fig. 11, the trend regards both equities and bonds. The role of market sentiment and expectations in the currencies market can be examined making use of the techniques utilised by the Bank of England to extract information from the “over-the-counter” currency options markets*®. The basic point is that option prices provide a picture of the market views on their future evolution. The first use is the evaluation of implied volatility of option prices, which can be considered a measure of the degree of uncertainty that the market attaches to future movements in the exchange rate over the remaining life of the option. Fig. 12 shows one and three-month implied volatility for Euro-Dollar. Both measures have been decreasing since the launch of European Monetary Union and we can affirm that, from the middle

of February,

the Euro-Dollar

exchange

rate was

perceived practically without uncertainties. Fig. 13 shows the co-movements of decreasing values of implied volatility and, hence, of uncertainty on the foreign exchange market and of the Euro depreciation, presumably as market participants began to focus the financial effects of real growth divergence between the United States and the Euro Area”.

#7 See Pakko (1999), p. 2, Italics added. Pakko quotes two eloquent statements by Sachs (1998) and Krugman (1998b). The former writes: «Investors do not gain confidence when short-term rates are pushed to dozens per cent», while the latter writes: «I have heard some people propose...: if you cut interest rates this will strengthen the economy, and the currency will actually rise. This is as silly as it sounds».

88 Cooper and Talbot (1999) give a meaningful contribution. Recently the Federal Reserve too utilises information from options market to analyse agents’ behaviour in foreign exchange operations and the course of the US Dollar. See Federal Reserve Board (1999a) and (1999b). # «Over [the first] quarter [1999] the implied yield spread between September three-month Eurodollar and Euribor futures contracts widened 49 basis points, to 232 basis points». See Federal Reserve Board (1999b), p. 396.

225

Using the currency options prices, risk reversal suggests the probabilities attached to Euro value variations against the Dollar. Fig. 14 gives the time series of the three-month risk reversal: as it is possible to see the tendency is quite similar to the implied volatility one. The market starts from large and positive risk reversal, i.e. it shows higher probabilities attached to a large appreciation of Euro, and, on February, goes into expectations skewed in favour of a significant depreciation. The most remarkable exception is given in the period that follows the reduction of the repurchase rate by the ECB, reinforcing the view that the monetary policy relaxation could strengthen the Euro external value. A further support for the value of risk reversal as a proxy for expectations of the future exchange rate is given by Fig. 15 that gives the data on risk reversal against the Euro-Dollar spot rate and confirms a similar co-movement.

XI.” The utilisation of a synthetic tool as the Vector Autoregression Models (VAR) can be used to check the validity of our framework. The subject of interest in the following is to evaluate the VAR models designed to analyse the monetary policy transmission on the exchange rate in the Euro Area. It is well known that the VAR system makes few assumptions about the underlying structure of the model, letting the data determine the model”. In our case the assumptions have been adequately specified in the previous paragraphs; now we want to verify that European monetary policy affects the Euro value through the agents responses on the product, financial and foreign exchange markets. Hence the VAR model has been utilised in two ways: the first one examines the effects on the operators confidence in the single markets; the second one analyses directly the effects on the Euro, using as proxy of monetary policy stance the overnight rate”. In order to use VAR models for measuring monetary policy shocks in an open economy the identification problem, in our case the problem of the simultaneous feedback between the policy rate and the exchange rate has to be initially solved. In other words it is necessary to separate the monetary policy authorities endogenous reactions to the exchange rate movements from the exogenous monetary shocks”. A monetary policy shock is identified as the disturbance term in the equation

(8)

% This paragraph was written jointly with Carlo Altavilla. ?! A clear exposition of an helpful application of VAR models and how the Bank of England uses them to produce forecasts and to examine the effects of economic shocks is contained inBank of England (1999b). As we warned previously the overnight rate is not a monetary policy instrument; nevertheless it is the closest variable to the institutional instrument, the repurchase rate. See Favero and Bagliano (1999).

* See Christiano er al. (1998).

226

(8)

X, = f(£2,)

+

0x6;

where X, is the monetary authorities’ instrument, fis a linear function representing the monetary authorities’ feedback rule, 42, is the monetary authorities information

set and 0 €, is a monetary policy shock. To proceed, we represent our VAR model as:

(9)

Vt = Dipi1 + Dapia + css

+ DpPt-p + Ut

and precisely the column-vector y, is given by: (9a)

=y; =)

[OVv,

SPREAD,.'

AIS;

ARR,

AEXR;)

In the equation (9a) OV is the overnight rate in the Eurosystem, considered as a proxy of monetary stance, SPREAD is the Euro Area interest rates spread between ten year and three month interest rates, JS denotes the Industrial Sentiment, RR is the Euro-Dollar Risk Reversal, used as expectations on the exchange rate, while

EXR is the Euro-US Dollar exchange rate. The three last variables are considered as first differences; hence AEXR is the

Euro-Dollar exchange rate appreciation. For each variable the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test is following reported: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests of Unit Root Series

Test Statistic

95% Critical Value

OVD SPREAD

The above results display how the non-stationary behaviour of industrial sentiment, risk reversal and exchange rate disappear when the first difference is taken: the three variables are I (1). On the other hand the overnight rate and the spread seem to be stationary. After the ADF test, we selected the VAR order. Both the Akaike Information

Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) selected the order 1. In the light of these a VAR (1) model has been selected.

221

Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 120 observations from 1 to 120.

Order of VAR = 6. List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: Overnight — Spread(10y-3m) - Industrial Sentiment - Risk Reversal -Exchange rate.

Adjusted LR test LR test -=---- ween

Order LL 726.5274

AIC 630.5274

SBC 499.6128

710.0230

630.0230

520.9275

CHSQ(16) = 33.0087[.007]

25.9980[.054]

700.3784

636.3784

549.1019

CHSQ(32) = 52.2980[.013]

41.1905[.128]

691.1200

643.1200

577.6627

CHSQ(48) = 70.8147[.018]

55.7744[.206]

679.6783

647.6783

604.0401

CHSQ(64) = 93.6982[.009]

73.7977[.188]

1 671.6830

655.6830

633.8639

CHSQ(80) = 109.6887[.015]

86.3920[.293]

60.7950

60.7950

0

60.7950

=

CHSQ(96) = 1331.5[.000]

1048.7[.000]

In order to solve the identification problem we first transform the equation (8) in its moving average representation:

(9) where

yi=

€(L)u,

E(L) = D(L)!

As we have not yet introduced any economic structure the equation has to be transformed in a structural moving-average representation of the form: (10)

Mira

P(L)E,

where €, is a vector of serially uncorrelated structural residuals. To obtain such a structural form we have to impose 25 restrictions. Ten of these restrictions, i.e. #(# — 1)/2 restrictions, derive from the constraint that exogenous shocks have to be orthogonal to each other, while the residual n(m + 1)/2 restrictions are identified by the Cholesky

decomposition”. By these assumptions it is possible to analyse the dynamic response of y, to a monetary shock. So we tried to measure the time profile of the effect of

2 By this procedure five restrictions are generated by imposing unitary coefficient on the principal diagonal, while the last n(m — 1)/2 restrictions are obtained setting the elements above the principal diagonal of the Wa matrix equal to zero.

228

innovations on the future state of the dynamic system through an Orthogonalized Impulse Response Analysis. The results are shown in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. The evidence from impulse response analysis permitted to identify that the transmission of a 1% shock hitting the overnight rate at time ¢ on the exchange rate at time f+j lead to a depreciation of the Euro against the Dollar. The Risk Reversal response confirm its predictive power over the exchange rate while the interest rate spread seems to have a strictly inverse movements respect to the overnight rate. Finally, the decrease in industrial sentiment proves the negative reaction in real market expectations in response to a restrictive monetary stance. Moreover, we analyse an impulse response to a permanent monetary shock, i.e. a stable increase of the overnight rate. The main difference between a temporary and a permanent shock, whose effects are shown in Fig. 18 and Fig. 19, is that the latter has a stronger effect on the steady-state rate of the variables. The difference is both in timing and in magnitude. The permanent shock produces a huge divergence of the spread from its steady state. Moreover, the initial appreciation of the exchange rate in response to a temporary shock now disappears. The results of the VAR models are consistent with the assumptions of the research: in both cases a monetary tightening is associated with lower confidence in the three markets and lead to Euro depreciation.

XII. In conclusion we can sum up the whole framework and the principal contentions of the research. The aim of the research was the evaluation of the exchange rate of the Euro after the first six months of its existence and the roots of its initial weakness. The main hypothesis is that the ECB has an undivided responsibility, for given international

conditions,

in the actual

management

of Euro,

without

external

political pressures. For our purposes we present a simple summary model of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, where the overriding priority is given to price stability. This goal is pursued assigning, officially, money a prominent role. Actually the central bank pursues a “pragmatic money targeting”, a procedure that allows the ECB not to set a lower bound for the inflation rate. This peculiarity has adverse consequences on market confidence in a case of recession and decreasing inflation rate. Generally the conduct by the ECB has been connected with the conventional theory on monetary policy that includes an interest rate instrument, an IS relation and a price-adjustment equation. In such a case we raised the issue of whether the conventional model is well-suited to determine the behaviour of a new central bank that has to gain reputation and be aware of the effects of the transmission mechanism of its monetary policy.

229

The most puzzling issue is the concept of credibility. The notion of credibility included in the benchmark model is strictly connected with time consistency. The ECB is interpreting the time consistency exclusively as a problem of behaviour consistent with the goal of a minimum, not predetermined, inflation rate. Such a conduct has, in a climate of recession and falling prices, bad effects on the expectations of the agents, and does not help to create a broad based credibility. These problems, raised firmly by Keynes, emphasise the issues of the crucial role of expectations and confidence in the real, financial and foreign exchange markets. In the case of the Euro Area the ECB probably overlooked the importance of agents expectations or how the degree of confidence in the real market affects the confidence and the behaviour of the same agents in the internal and external financial markets. The next step was the evaluation of the monetary policy consequences on financial market. We utilise the term structure of interest rates and the yield curve as proxies of market expectations. The results are that currently the European financial market signals a problem of imperfect credibility of the monetary authorities. Finally we analyse directly the roots of the Euro’s external value. The prevailing version of Euro weakness against the US Dollar is found in the relative business-cycle conditions in the two economies. The evidence seems to suggest that interest rate differentials are only a necessary condition, because a growing economy is able to attract foreign capital from a sluggish one only if in the latter the status of industrial sentiment and financial market’s confidence set capital free to move towards where bonds and shares returns are more profitable. Moreover the “market sentiment approach” disputed, recently, the conventional wisdom that high interest rates stem capital flight and currency depreciation and we think the paradox is meaningful for the Eurosystem. Without fail net capital flows are, with few exceptions, negative since the birth of European Monetary Union and it discloses a declining confidence on foreign exchange markets likewise on product and financial markets. The sentiment and expectations in the currencies market has been examined extracting information from the currency options markets and prices, and particularly through the values of risk reversal. The major findings are that the market starts from large and positive risk reversal, i.e. it shows higher probabilities attached to a large appreciation of the Euro, and that gradually moves towards expectations skewed in favour of a significant depreciation. The most remarkable exception is given in the period that followed the reduction of the repurchase rate by the ECB, reinforcing the view that monetary policy relaxation could strengthen the Euro external value and permanent capital Saabs are not a mechanical response to an easier monetary stance. The last step was the building of a Structural Vector Autoregressive Model to check the validity of the assumed relation between the monetary policy and the Euro exchange rate, according to a transmission mechanism based on three

230

variables representative of the confidence on real, financial and foreign exchange market, respectively the industrial sentiment, the interest rates spread and the risk

reversal. The results of the tests are not inconsistent with the assumptions of the research. The results concern

a short period, i.e. the first semester of 1999, and, of

course, can not be considered, in any way, conclusive. Nevertheless they suggest that the outcomes of monetary policy, in particular if we refer to a new institution, are more difficult to foresee than is commonly supposed.

References Alesina A. and Summers L. (1993), “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, n. 2. Angeloni I., Gaspar V. and Tristani O. (1999), The monetary policy strategy of the ECB, Typescipt, February. Arnold I. and de Vries N. (1998), “The EURO, Prudent Coherence?”, 7???

Bagliano F., Favero C. and Franco F. (1999), “Measuring

Monetary Policy in Open

Economies”, CEPR Discussion Papers, n. 2079.

Bank for International Settlements (1999), Annual Report. Bank of England (1999a), “The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy”, The Monetary Policy Committee, (www.bankofengland.co.uk). Bank of England (1999b), “Economic Models at the Bank of England”, Bank of England. Bank of England (1999c), “The International Environment”, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, August. Barro R. J. and Gordon D. B. (1983), “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, n. 1. Bean C. (1998), “Monetary Policy Under EMU”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, n. 3. Bernard H. and Gerlach S. (1996), “Does The Term Structure Predict Recession?”, The International Evidence, Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper, n. 37. Blinder A. S. (1996), “Central Bank in a Democracy”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Fall. Blinder A. S. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, The MIT Press. Blinder A. S. (1999), “Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?”, NBER, Working Papers, n. 7161.

Branson W. (1983), “Macroeconomic Determinants of Real Exchange Rate Risks”, in Herring R. J. (ed.), Managing Foreign Exchange Risk, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Brayton F., Levin A,. Tryon R. and Williams J. C. (1997), “The Evolution of Macro models at the Federal

Reserve

Board”,

Federal

Reserve

Board,

Discussion Paper Series, n. 1997-29. Buiter W. H. (1998), “Alice in Euroland”, Journal of Common

Finance

and Economics

Market Studies, Annual

Lecture, South Bank University. Buiter W. H. (1999), Six Months in the Life of the Euro. What Have We Learnt?, Utrecht,

June.

231

Castrén O. (1999), “Accountability of the ECB and a Government’s Incentives to rebel

against the Common Monetary Policy in EMU”, Bank of Finland, Discussion Papers, n. di Christiano L., Eichenbaum M. and Evans C. (1998), “Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned And To What End?”, NBER, Working Papers, n. 6400. Clarida R., Gali J. and Gertler M. (1999), “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming. Conen G. and Vega J. L. (1999), “The Demand for M3 in the Euro Area”, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series, n. 6.

Cooper N. and Talbot J. (1999), “The Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate in 1998: Views from Options Markets”, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, February. De Grauwe P. (1997), The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford University Press. De Grauwe P. (1998), “The Risks of Deflation in the Future EMU: Lessons of the 1990s”, CEPR Discussion Papers, n. 1834. De Grauwe P. (1999), The Economics of Monetary Integration, forthcoming. Deutsche Bank (1999a), “ECB Interest Rate Outlook”, EMU Watch Special Issue, n. 74. Deutsche Bank (1999b), The ECB’s Monetary Policy: Pretence and Reality, EMU Watch, n.

76. Deutsche Bank (1999c), “What’s Cooking, Deutsche Bank Research”, Frankfurt Voice, n.

57: Deutsche Bank (19994), “Research Topic, Deutsche Bank Research”, Research Topic, June. Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), “Taylor Interest Rate and Monetary Conditions Index”,

Monthly Report, April. Dotsey M. (1998), “The Predictive Content of the Interest Rate Term Spread for Future Economic Growth”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Summer. Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (1999), Eurozone Indicators, September, (http://www.dresdnerkb.com/Euroland+Economic+Indicators/home.htm). Duisenberg W. (1999), “The Euro: The New European Currency”, Speech at a Conference organised by The Economist, Rome, March, (http://www.ecb.org). Edwards S. (1983), “Floating Exchange Rates, Expectations, and New Information”, Journal of Monetary Economics, n. 11. Eichengreen (1998), “European Monetary Unification: A Tour d’Horizon”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, n. 3. ; Estrella A. and Mishkin F. S. (1995), “The Term Structure of Interest Rates and Its Role in Monetary Policy for the European Central Bank”,.VBER Working Papers, n. 5279. Estrella A. and Mishkin F. S. (1996), “The Yield Curve as a Predictor of US. Recessions”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, June. European Central Bank (1999a), Monthly Bulletin, January. European Central Bank (1999b), Monthly Bulletin, February. European Central Bank (1999c), Monthly Bulletin, July. European Central Bank (1999d), Euro Area Balance of Payments (monthly developments in June 1999), Press Release, August, (http://www.ecb.org). Faust J. and Svensson L.E.O. (1999), “The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy”, NBER, Working Papers, n. 7152. Favero C. and Bagliano C. (1998), “Measuring Monetary Policy with VAR Models: An Evaluation”, European Economic Review, pp.1069-1112. Federal Reserve Board (1999a), “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations”, Federal Reserve Bulletin, March. Federal Reserve Board (1999b), “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange. Operations”, Federal Reserve Bulletin, June. Financial Times (1999a), “Europhoria fizzles out”, 5 March. Financial Times (1999b), “Much ado about little”, 14 July.

232

Fleming M. J. and Remolona E. M., “The Term Structure of Announcement Effects”, Bank for International Settlements, Working Papers, n. 71. Forder J. (1998), “The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources”, European Journal of Political Economy, n. 14. Frenkel

J. A., Gylfason

T. and Helliwell

J. F. (1980), “A Synthesis of Monetary and

Keynesian Approaches to Short Run Balance of Payments Theory”, Economic Journal, n. 90. Gerlach S. and Scnabel G. (1999), “The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU Area: A Note”, Bank for International Settlements, Working Papers, n. 73. Goodfriend M. (1993), “Interest Rate Policy and the Inflation Scare Problem: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Winter.

1979-1992”,

Goodfriend M. and King R. G. (1997), “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.

Goodfriend M. and King R. G. (1998), “Using the Term Structure of Interest Rate for Monetary Policy”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Summer. Goodhart C. (1998), “Central Bankers and Uncertainty”, LSE Financial Markets Group, Special Paper, n. 106.

Haldane A. and Quah D. (1999), “UK Phillips Curve and Monetary Policy”, Bank of England, (http://econ.Ise.ac.uk/dquah/). ne and Read V. (1999), “Monetary Policy and the Yield Curve”, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, May. Hopper G. P. (1997), “What Determines the Exchange Rate: Economic Factors or Market Sentiment?”, Business Review, September/October. Huh C. G. and Lansing K. J. (1999), “Expectations, Credibility, and Disinflation in a Small Macroeconomic Model”, Journal of Economics and Business, forthcoming.

International Monetary Fund (1999), “IMF Executive Board Discusses the Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro Area”, Public Information Notice, n. 99/37, April. Issing O. (1997), “Monetary Targeting in Germany: The Stability of Monetary Policy and of Monetary System”, Journal of Monetary Economics, n. 39. Issing O. (1999), “The ECB and its watchers”, The ECB Watchers Conference, Frankfurt, June. Jackman R. (1999), “Wage-Setting Behaviour in a Monetary Union. A Role for the European Social Partnership?”, Paper prepared for the Conference “Possibilities and Limitations of Monetary Policy”, Austrian National Bank, June. Johnson K., Small D. and Tryon R. (1999), “Monetary Policy and Price Stability”, Paper prepared for the Conference “Possibilities and Limitations of Monetary Policy”, Austrian National Bank, June. Kenen P. B. (1996), The International Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kerr W. and King R. G. (1996), “Limits on Interest Rates Rules in the IS Model”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Spring. Keynes J. M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Mac Millan, Edition of 1967. King M. (1998), “How Should Central Banks Reduce Inflation? Conceptual Issues”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

King M. (1999a), The MPC Two Years On, Belfast, May, (www.bankofengland.co.uk). King M. (1999b), “Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old”, Paper prepared for the Symposium on “New Challenges for Monetary Policy” Jackson Hole, August, (www.bankofengland.co.uk). Krugman P. (1998a), The Euro. Beware of What You Wish For, December, (http://web.mit.edu/krugman). Krugman P. (1998b), “Will Asia Bounce Back?”, Speech for Credit Suisse First Boston, Hong Kong, (http://web.mit.edu/krugman).

233

Krugman P. (1999), The Euro, Living Dangerously, July, (http://web.mit.edu/krugman). Kydland F. E. and Prescott E. C. (1977), “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy, June. Lewis K. (1988), “Testing the Portfolio Balance Model. A Multi-lateral Approach”, Journal

of International Economics, n. 7.

Martin B. and Salmon C. (1999), “Should Monetary Policy-Makers Do Less?”, Bank of England, Working Papers, August. McCallum B. T. (1997), “Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence”, Journal of Monetary Economics, n. 39. McCallum B. T. (1999), “Recent developments in monetary policy and analysis: the role of theory and evidence”, NBER, Working Papers, n. 7088. McCauley R. N. (1999), “The Euro and the Dollar, 1998”, Open Economies Review, n. 10.

Mishkin F. S. (1998), “International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes”, Institute For International Economic Studies, Seminar Papers, n. 648.

Monticelli C. and Tristani O. (1999), “What does the single monetary policy do?” A SVAR Benchmark for the European Central Bank, European Central Bank, Working Papers, n. 2 Pakko M. R. (1999), “Do High Interest Rates Stem Capital Outflows?”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research Division, Working Papers, n. 99-0022.

Pigott C. and Christiansen H. (1998), “Monetary Policy When Inflation is Low”, OECD Economics Department, Working Papers, n. 191. Rogoff K. (1985), “The Optimal Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, n. 4. Rudebusch G. D. and Svensson L.E.O. (1999), “Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data”, NBER, Working Papers, n. 7179. : Sachs J. (1998), “Making it Work”, The Economist, 12 September. Santero T. and Westerlund N. (1996), “Confidence Indicators and Their Relationship to Changes in Economic Activity’, OECD Economic Department, Working Papers, n. 170. Scheide J. and Solveen R. (1997), “Should The European Central Bank Worry About the Exchange Rates?”, Kiel Working Papers, n. 800. Solow R. M. (1999), “How Cautious Must the Fed Be?”, in Solow R. M. and Friedman B. M., Inflation, Unemployment, and Monetary Policy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussets. i Stockman A. C. (1998), “New Evidence Connecting Exchange Rates to Business Cycles”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Spring. Svensson L.E. (1999), Monetary policy Issues for the Eurosystem, May, (www.iies.su.se/leosven). Tetlow R. J. and von zur Muehlen, “Simplicity versus Optimality. The Choice of Monetary Policy Rules when Agents Must Learn”, Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics, Discussion Series, n. 10.

The Economist (1999a), “Sailing in Choppy Waters”, 26 June. The Economist (1999b), “Pushing the Euro, Pulling the Yen”, 17 July. The Economist (1999c), “How to Live with Falling Prices”, 12 June.

isn Nations (1999), Economic Survey of Europe, Economic Commission For Europe, n. Valila T. T. (1999), “Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited”, International Monetary Fund, Working Papers, n. 2. Vickers J. (1999), “Economic Models and Monetary Policy”, Speech to the Governors of the NIESR, March, (www.bankofengland.co.uk). von Hagen J. (1999a), EMU: The First 100 Days, typescript, May. von Hagen J. (1999b), “Money Growth Targeting by the Bundesbank”, Journal of Monetary Economics n. 43.

234

Walsh C. E. (1998), Monetary Theory and Policy, Cambridge, Massachussets. Woodford M. (1999), “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia”, NBER Working Paper, n. 7261. Wyplosz C. (1999), “Economic Policy in EMU: Strategies and Institutions”, German-French Economic Forum, Bonn, January.

[ ] Bernanake B. and Mihov I. (1995), “Measuring Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper, n. 5145. [1] Eichembaum M. and Evans C. (1995), “Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of monetary policy on real exchange rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economic, pp. .975-1009. [3] Hamilton J. (1994), Time series analysis, Princeton University Press. [4] Hendry D. F. (1996), Dynamic Econometrics, Oxford University Press. [S] Leeper E. M. (1997), “Narrative and VAR approaches to monetary policy: common identification problems”, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming. [6] Liitkepohl H. (1991), “Introduction to multiple time series analysis”, Spinger- Verlag. [7] Rudebush G. D. (1996), “Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR Make Sense?”, Temi di Discussione n. 269, Banca d'Italia.

[ ] Bernanake B. and Mihov I. (1995), “Measuring Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper, n. 5145. [ ] Christiano L., Eichenbaum M. and Evans C. (1998), “Monetary Policy Shocks: what have we learned and to what end?”, NBER Working Paper, n. 6400. [1] Eichembaum M. and Evans C. (1995), “Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of monetary policy on real exchange rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economic, pp. 975-1009. [2] Favero C. and Bagliano C. (1998), “Measuring Monetary Policy with VAR models: an evaluation”, European Economic Review, pp. 1069-1112.

235

Fig. 1 - The Exchange Rate Euro-US Dollar (Daily Observations, January-June 1999) I

080 Jand Jan25 Feb1

Feb22 Mar15

Mar22

4prl9 Magi0

Mag17 Mag28

Jun? Jun14 Jun25

Source: Financial Times

Fig. 2 — Euro Area. General Government Fiscal Policy Position 1990/1998 (percentage of GDP) a0

$B

‘Primary Surplus

Lames"

A

eee

7.0 Source: European Central Bank

236

Fig. 3 - Industrial Sentiment observation)

in the Euro Area (January

1998 - June

1999; monthly

18

ENS:

Jan98

Mar98

May98

Jul98

Set98

Nov98

Source: Dresdner Kleinwort Benson Limited

Fig. 4 - Euro Area Industrial Variables

Ind. Sentiment

Source: Dresdner Kleinwort Benson Limited

254

Jan99

Mar99

Mayg99

Jun99

Fig. 5 - Euro Area. The Overnight Rate and the Interest Rate Spread (January-June 1999)

Vo.

05

January

February

—

March

Overnight Rate

Apni

May

June

------- Spread (10y-3m)

Source: Nederlandsche Bank

Fig. 6 - Euro Area Interest Rate Spread (10y-3m) (weekly observation)

Jan8

Jan22

Feb5

Feb19

Mars

Mari9

Apr2

Source: Nederlandsche Bank

238

Apr16

Apr30

May14

May28

Junii

Jun25

Fig. 7 - Euro Area an US. Interest Rate differential and Covered Interest parity (daily observations; January-June 1999) 0,5

0

dm bs

sand

ti Feb1

Feb15

Mar

Mens

VI

Marx

|

te

Apt

2

Apri

ayl0

-0,5

a

1,5

-2

Mayz4d

PV

ee

ae

Jun?

Junzi

ss Mito

——

rE-ru.s

+

CI.P.(E-ru.s-Fd)

AAA Lu

26

eee

A

=

/

C7

Source: Financial Times

Fig. 8 - Euro Area. Interest Rates Differential, Industrial Investment (monthly observations; January-June 1999)

Sentiment

and Portfolio

10

—

Ind. Sent. (right scale) -------

Portfolio Investment ——

Int. Rate Diff. (right scale)

Source: European Central Bank; Dresdner Kleinwort Benson; Financial Times

239

Fig. 9 - Euro Area Portfolio Investment (Euro billion; net Flows)

lan98

Mar98

e

ay 98

\ RSR -10

Jul98

Sep98

\

NT

-40

Source: European Central Bank

240

re

Mar99

May99 Jun99

v ELEC Li

È

CRAN

Verdi

I

\/

V

Fig.10 - Euro Area. Portfolio Investment Items Equity 30 20 10 opens

Mar98

98

Mar99

May99 Jun99

-10 -20

-30

-40 Bonds

me

Money Markets Instruments

15

10

> we

5

0 A Ja

gar98

May98

Jul98

:

-10

241

Mar99

May99 Jun99

1 Month

Fig. 11 — Euro-Dollar January-June 1999)

and 3 Month Implied Volatility (Daily Observations;

3:5 Soe

2.5 2:0

15 1.0

;

O:5:=

n

0.0 ÿ

SCANIA January

February

——

CRANIO

March

April

] Month

—

Implied Volatility

-----

May

June

3 Month

Implied Volatility

Source: J. P. Morgan

Fig. 12 —Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate and Implied Volatility Bee Observations; JanuaryJune 1999)

2 January

——

ante

BS

SA re February

March

Exchange Rate

April

en

: May

------ Implied Volatility

Source: J. P. Morgan

242

no

Fig. 13 — Three-Month Euro-Dollar Risk Reversal (January-June; Daily Observations)

17.5 15.0 12.6 10.0 75 5.0 25 00

SESIA

sn Sag

|le

-5.0 January

February

March

April

May

June

Source: J. P. Morgan

Fig. 14 — The Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate and the Risk Reversal (Daily observations; January-June 1999)

January

February

——

March

April

Exchange Rate

May

------- Risk Reversal

Source: J. P. Morgan

243

June

Fig. 15 — Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to One SE Shock in the Equation for the Overnight Rate industrial Sentiment

—

e

——

Days after shock

Spread

Days after shock

Risk Reversal

]

4

LQ

Oays after shock

15

20 i)th

244

Fig. 16 — Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to One SE shock in the equation for the Overnight Rate Exchange Rate

0.00064 0.00048 0.00032 0.00016

-0 00000 -0 00016 -0 00032

-0 00048 Days after shock

245

Fig. 17 — Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to a permanent Shock in the Equation for the Overnight Rate Industrial Sentiment

0.000

-0,005 -0.010 -0.015 -0.020 -0.025 -0,030 -0,035 Days after shock

Spread

Days after shock

Risk Reversal

=

1

5

10

15

Days after shock

246

20

35

Fig. 18 — Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to a Permanent Shock in the Equation for the Overnight Rate Exchange Rate

0.0000

-0.0025 -0.0050 -0.0075 -0.0100 -0.0125 -0.0150

-0.0175 -0.0200

1

$s

10

15 Days after shock

247

20

25

COUNTRY SPECIFIC SHOCKS AND INTERREGIONAL INSURANCE SCHEMES IN THE EMU Franco PRAUSSELLO University of Genoa, Italy

1. EMU sustainability and the role of the EU budgetary policy The birth of the single currency has been accompanied by a number of studies focusing on the stability and sustainability of the EMU, especially in the presence of possible asymmetric shocks hitting a country, or a single region in the monetary Union (Salvatore, 2000). It is widely believed that among the conditions ensuring the capacity of the new monetary building to work smoothly, without any major impediments, the existence of an interregional public insurance scheme at the European level can perform an outstanding function (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1991). Indeed, alongside factor mobility and input price full flexibility, an income and consumption smoothing device can offset the effects of a country specific disturbance, subduing the incentive to leave the monetary union for a member region hit by the asymmetric shock (Srensen and Yosha, 1998). A strand of recent literature has emphasised the large contribution given by the budgetary policies, mainly at a national level, to the risk sharing process of the costs arising from country specific shocks (Arreaza et al., 1998). In this framework it is worth focusing on the role played by the Union budgetary policy, with the specific aim to consider its possible function in offsetting the negative consequences of asymmetric shocks. There is a general agreement about the fact that given its reduced size, the Union budget has had so far a weak impact as a stabilisation tool, through counter-cyclical resource transfers to the member countries. Nevertheless, the larger than generally thought redistributive effects of the Union structural funds have been stressed too (Bini Smaghi and Vori, 1993). Compared with the risk sharing needs arousing from the sustainability of the EMU how can be assessed the impact of the budgetary policies of the Union: will they have a sufficient weight to offset in an acceptable measure the effects of region specific shocks, and if not will it be possible to devise new mechanisms in order to improve the interregional insurance schemes within the EMU? And, in more general terms, what are the functions of the EU budgetary policy in the . framework of the final stage of EMU? A last issue on which this paper is focused concerns the ensuing dangers of a possible collapse of the EMU, should the use of

248

the Union budget really prove ineffective in coping with regional specific shocks, after the birth of the single currency.

2. The evolution budgetary policy

of the budget

size and the functions

of the EU

Since the introduction of the Community’s own resources system in 1970, the EC expenses have been experiencing a sustained increase, in line with the expansion of the EC interventions in new areas, ranging from the regional policy to the structural and cohesion aids. Nevertheless the total size of the EC budget has always been rather limited altogether in relative terms, not exceeding the 1.5% of the Community’s global GDP. As a matter of general knowledge, it has never been approaching, not even at a distance, the average dimensions of a national budget. From 1970 to 1980 it rose from 0.74 to 0.80% of the EC’s GDP and in the Nineties it has been further developing from 0.96 to a ceiling of 1.27% in 1999 and to the present times (EC, 1994). Under these circumstances it has been hardly performing in a well-balanced manner the typical functions of a national budget, according to the Musgrave’s taxonomy (1985), based on the effects of the policy measures. At the end of the Eighties, in spite of the widening of the contributions by the establishment of the fourth source of income, in a nutshell the EC budget features were as follows: “important allocation, no stabilisation, functions” (Molle, 1991, p.77).

and

small

redistribution

and

external

The subsequent reform of the structural funds, starting in 1989, strengthened the redistributive function, but possibly not the stabilisation one. Indeed, with the

interinstitutional agreement struck in 1988 a new set of constraints on the flexibility of the EU budgetary policy has been introduced, hampering its use as a stabilisation mechanism. From this standpoint the implementation of such an agreement has had a negative impact, increasing the differences with a standard national budget. Since then, not only the EU budget has been going on to be constrained by the cumbersome adoption procedure, the absence of a true fiscal sovereignty on the revenue side and the no-deficit rule as far as expenses are concerned, but ceilings to the expense capacity of the EU have been fixed. Moreover, the thin manoeuvre room for revising the estimated expenses laid down in the framework of the medium term financial guidelines has been progressively reduced: from 0.03 to 0.01% between the European Council of Brussels in 1988 and that of Edinburgh four years later. As a result, the increased impact of the EU budget size as a policy tool as compared to the previous decade has been at least partially offset by a new set of limitations in its use as a discretionary instrument of macro-economic policy at a European level.

249

3. The allocation and redistributive functions of the EU budget A well known difficulty in assessing the different functions of a public budget according to the Musgrave’s categories (1985) is the lack of a direct and clear link between each of them and the traditional functional distribution of public expenses or type of revenues, as described in any not specially reclassified public finance document. The presence of interwoven effects stemming from one kind of revenue or expense may therefore compound the analysis. The scope of the stabilisation policy is especially hard to be ascertained, owing to the fact that no single income or expense can be affected to it, but stabilisation effects are a normal consequence of any budgetary measure. This is the reason why, other things being equal, these effects are a function of the budget size. For the EU as such a case of a policy giving rise to multiple effects is given by the agriculture interventions, which can exert not only allocation but also redistributive consequences among regions. At the same time we can employ the size of the EU budget as a broad measure of its stabilisation effects on the European economy as a whole. In this framework, the main function of the EU budget has traditionally been to help to optimise the use of the economic resources within the Community, i.e. aimed at producing allocation effects. This is also true, for an important part of the measures taken to support the backward regions in the framework of redistributive policies takes the form of actions devised to improve the local supply conditions (EC, 1993). According to the MacDougall Report (EC, 1977), as late as in the Seventies the Community based its finance virtually only on expenses pertaining to the allocation function.

In 1977, for instance, with a total weight of 0.70%

of the

EEC’s GDP, the bulk of the European budget was devoted to the supply of goods and public services, alongside with the activities of regulation. More than two third of the expenses concerned the economic services in the field of manufacturing, energy and agriculture production (the latter with a share of 0.47% on the EEC’s GDP, i.e. for more than two thirds of the European budget), whereas the items general services and social services absorbed a share of 0.1%. The expenses within the redistribute function had a minor role: again in 1977 the regional policy and the employment policy lines accounted respectively for only a 0.03 and a 0.05%. Fifteen years later, after the launch of the single market programme and the reform of the structural funds, the scope for the redistributive function of the EU budget had been increased, even if its more relevant effects continued to be the

allocation ones. A new document on the public finance of the Community, known as the Report Stable Money, Sound Finances, casts a new and deep light on the budgetary policy instruments of the EU (EC, 1993). In relative terms, the interventions aimed at supporting the agriculture . production nad been reduced in comparison with the huge efforts devoted to the sector in the first years of the Common Agriculture Policy, but remained

250

nevertheless the first item in the EU budget, with a share of 54% (1992 data). At the same time, the other expenses linked to the improvement of the resource allocation within the European market concerned mainly the research policy and the item “other (minor) policies”, with shares of 3.3 and 1.3%, alongside with administrative costs. The measures on account of the external policy involved expenses having a weight of 3.5%. As to the redistributive expenses, the interventions channelled through the structural funds in favour of the less advanced regions amounted to about one third of the budget (31.6%). The financial aid received by countries like Ireland, Portugal and Greece had a valuable impact, representing more than the 2.5% of the local GDP and the 75% of the public sector investment. According to the Report Financing the EU, published by the Commission in October 1998, the net contributions obtained by the poorer member countries from the whole EU budget range respectively from 1.28 and 3.12% of gross national product for Spain and Portugal to 4.13 and 4.84% for Greece and Ireland (EC, 1998a; Peel, 1998).

Considering the two categories of the expenses devoted to the allocation and distributive functions together, in 1992 the European budget had a weight of 1.11% of the EU’s aggregate GDP. As far as the revenue side is concerned, the redistributive tools at work are of

several kinds and include the possible transfers among member countries due to the system of own resources, the reduction of the VAT contribution basis at 50% of

the national GDPs, benefiting the member countries whose consumption share is higher, and the compensatory mechanism in favour of the United Kingdom (Peffekoven, 1994).

4. The stabilisation function of the EU budget It is generally admitted that within the EMU the lost autonomy by the member countries in terms of monetary and exchange rate policy has to be compensated by an increased efficiency of other adjustment tools, above all in order to smooth the income and consumption effects linked to the occurrence of asymmetric shocks. Alongside structural improvements in the functioning of the input markets, in the short run the participation constraint to the monetary Union rests on a greater flexibility of the national fiscal policy and the existence of a risk sharing mechanism at the Union level, working through the EU budget. According to a possible interpretation shocks are set to become less country specific, both for the termination of the diverging monetary, exchange rate and budgetary policies, which in the past acted as amplifying factors (EC, 1998b), as well as for the long run higher correlation between the country outputs, following the increased trade flows due to the EMU (Frankel and Rose, 1997). In contrast with the Commission’s view, works based on Krugman’s analysis of the US experience (Krugman, 1991), maintain that regional specialisation within the EMU 251

will strengthen the probability of an asymmetric shocks occurrence. In particular, taking into account a large amount of diversifiable regional risk as in the United States, Srensen and Yosha (1998) do not expect country specific risks to totally evaporate in the EU, corroborating Krugman’s view. In a foreseeable future the Union will therefore have possibly to cope with the upsurge of asymmetric shocks, resorting to the short-term automatic stabilisers at hand. As far as the existence of an insurance system at the Union level is concerned, acting as a risk sharing mechanism against the costs due to the loss of the national monetary autonomy, we know that in general terms the stabilisation effects provided by the EU budget are weak. The structural reasons that hamper its stabilisation function to work are clearly listed in the Report Stable Money, Sound Finances: it is limited in size, it cannot be run in deficit and, due to the medium

term programming in which it is cast, it is not enough flexible to act as a countercyclical device, having by contrast a pro-cyclical bias owing to the link between its ceiling and the Union’s GDP (EC, 1993). According to the same document, the Union as such has indeed no automatic stabiliser or other tool able to offset regional shocks. Yet the redistributive effects stemming from the Union expenses are not negligible, whereas a recent literature has provided a number of interesting estimates about the stabilisation effects produced by the EU budget. As already hinted, Bini Smaghi and Vori (1993) maintain that the EU redistributive policy has a far more important impact than generally perceived and that the income redistribution between regions helps easing the effects of stabilisation on the poorest countries hit by an adverse shock. In 1990, compared with an amount of 481 dollars for the US, the per capita transfers in the EC averaged 223 dollars, with per capita transfers to poorer countries like Ireland approaching the same size order of the sums channelled to the less advanced US States by the federal budget. But the argument misses the point because these transfers, however sizeable, are not unconditionally provided in response to a region specific shock through a flexible and automatic instrument, acting as a counter-cyclical mechanism, as it is the case with the US federal budget. As useful benchmarks for an assessment of the stabilisation impact due in any case to the working of the Union policies some estimates on the smoothing effects observed in the US and other federal countries are currently quoted. For the US these estimates range from a 10% of the initial shock absorbed by the federal government (von Hagen, 1992) to a final smoothing impact on the order of 40% (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs,

1991), but both results can be considered biased, the

former underscoring some important features of the US experience, the latter linking the stabilisation function to an equation based on the redistributive effects of the federal policies (Majocchi, 1997). In the case of Germany, by the mechanism of the horizontal Finanzausgleich, a regional State can succeed in offsetting an adverse shock beyond the threshold of 40% (EC, 1993). An average

estimate for the experience of the federal countries can be found in Pisani-Ferri et

252

|

al. (1993), according to whom the compensation of a regional shock is included in a range of 20-30%. As to the impact of the EU budgetary policies in terms of absorption of a region specific shock, a very rough estimate based on the VAT share transferred to the EU leads Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) to maintain that the weight of the stabilisation process involved in the presence of EC taxes is close to nil. With an average tax rate of 0.5%, a region suffering a one-dollar adverse shock reduces its payment to the EU only by half a cent, against 34 cents in the case of the US. Less rough results are provided in the framework of the recent literature aimed at studying the smoothing mechanisms at work through the government deficits. The share of income and consumption smoothed through the channel of the international transfers among member countries of the EU, including the sums coming from the structural funds, is found to be in the order of 3 to 7%. In detail,

in the period 1971-93 in a aggregate of 8 member countries the fraction of shocks absorbed by international transfers amounted to 3% and, interesting enough, in the sub-period 1980-93 to 5%; but for a larger number of countries: 11 (Arreaza et al.,

1998). Moreover, for a group of 6 EU countries, the smoothing effect via the component of the international transfers during the Eighties seems to have increased: to 7% in the period 1981-90. In average, the share of shocks to the per capita gross state production smoothed through the EC fiscal institutions can be assessed at most a half of the offsetting impact of the federal government policies in the US, i.e. in the order of 5 against 13% for the United States, justifying the authors’ comment that should the EU wish to imitate the US, “then the size of the

budget has to increase dramatically” (Srensen and Yosha, 1998, p. 33). Nevertheless these estimates are possibly biased by a high degree of data heterogeneity and deserve a more complete and satisfactory method of inquiry.

5. National and EU policy tools within the EMU So far, the inquiry concerning the evolution of the Union’s budgetary policy has highlighted the limited role of the EU budget in offsetting the negative impact due to the possible occurrence of asymmetric shocks within a region member of the monetary Union. Under these circumstances, shocks originating after the completion of the EMU could require, in order to be successfully contrasted, some

major changes in the rules of the Union and the lack of a common response (for instance because the no bailout clause is differently interpreted) could be considered as a signal of the intrinsic malfunctioning of the new monetary building. If deep enough, such crises could be lethal for the project at least in the medium run. After a possible collapse, perhaps the phoenix of the monetary Union could resurrect, but only a generation later, as it happened for the failure to transform the monetary snake in the first Seventies in a fully-fledged monetary Union at the end of that decade.

257

The sustainability of the EMU could be put at jeopardy also by the policy stance on which the new monetary building has been based. The chosen form of the EMU implies indeed a virtual euthanasia of the economic policies both by the Union authorities and by the member countries. According to a heterodox interpretation (Fitoussi, 1997a, b), the assumptions upon which the European governments have founded the EMU are those of the macroeconomic irrelevance of unemployment, which has to be curbed through structural reforms of the labour markets, and of the purely macroeconomic nature of inflation along with that of the populist temptation for an elected government to act against the price stability, which commands the devolution of the responsibility of the monetary rule to a fully independent central bank. Hence the abdication by the European governments of their responsibilities of macroeconomic regulation, contrasting with the experience of the US government, which does not renounce to use the full range of macroeconomic tools, through budgetary, monetary and exchange rate policies. Even though such an interpretation is not accepted, it is a fact that in the framework of the EMU the degree of autonomy enjoyed by national authorities in the regulation of the economy is close to nil. In the run up to the launch of the Euro, the Maastricht criteria have cast a straitjacket on the national policies in order to achieve an ex ante convergence, as an allegedly necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the sustainability of the EMU. Both monetary and budgetary policies have been bent to the constraints of low inflation and public debt stability, whilst the exchange rate movements inside the EMS have been practically frozen. After the final death of the national monetary sovereignty at the start of the third stage of the EMU, the residual degrees of freedom of national authorities in the field of budgetary policy have been reduced by the enforcement of the Stability Pact, whose generalised system of fines will possibly oblige the member countries to run budget surpluses, in order to acquire a sufficient fiscal flexibility to treat a recession without infringing its rules. In these conditions the capacity by national authorities to adjust to a real shock affecting the balance of payments between member countries has been greatly reduced as well (Paganetto, 1996). A demand shock in the form of a shift of consumers preferences from the goods of a country to the partner’s or a supply shock in the shape of a productivity gap between the two could be in principle adjusted by the socially soft mechanisms of monetary and exchange rate measures or by measures of income policy. Also the fiscal tool could be employed as a stabilisation device, with similar results. But of course within the EMU

the first

two tools are completely absent, whereas the flexibility of the budgetary policy is very limited. Alternatively, assuming rigid labour market conditions, only the hard adjustment mechanism of recession and unemployment has been left, as in the gold standard system, with its high costs in terms of foregone production and. unemployed factors.

254

6. The standard theory of adjustment in a monetary Union Things could nevertheless work, if the degrees of freedom lost by the national authorities following the EMU were offset by new elbow room gained at the Union level, or if other conditions would be at hand, allowing altogether to restore a soft adjustment mechanism. According to the standard theory of adjustment in conditions of monetary union, based on Mundell’s analysis of optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961), we know that automatic re-equilibrium effects as a consequence of asymmetric shocks would imply high labour mobility and wage flexibility, or the existence of a centralised fiscal and welfare system at the union level, working by automatic built-in stabilisers (De Grauwe, 1997). Unfortunately, in the case of EMU the latter is today virtually completely non-existent and will possibly be absent for a long time ahead. The wish of some member countries to build an economic government of the Union is going in the right direction, but at present it is no more than a petition of principle. As far as the former ones are concerned, in general terms, the degree of flexibility of labour markets in the single national markets is not high, but at the European level it is much lower, owing to the very low propensity of the European workers to migrate across countries. In the EU the share of the workforce employed in a member country different from that of origin is estimated at less than 1% (Puga, 1996). The plausible conclusion is that by shifting to the EMU, the member countries have suffered a net loss in terms of availability of socially acceptable tools of adjustment, with possibly also a net loss in terms of welfare. In fixed and

irrevocable exchange rates a regional deficit induced by an asymmetric shock would be followed by a downward pressure on national prices. If the reduction of wages turned out not to be feasible, not least for political reasons, a higher level of unemployment would follow, according to the outdated mechanism of the gold standard.

7. A biased Stability Pact From the technical point of view the wrong decision has been to put at the centre of the Stability Pact agreement too heavy a bias towards the need to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies at the expenses of their flexibility (Fitoussi et al., 1999)'. The late mention of the goal of growth at the signature of the Pact at the Amsterdam Summit is a simple fig-leaf, that does not change its nature. Indeed, the general rule of the agreement is that the use of the instrument of the public debt by national authorities in order to cover a budget imbalance has to be

' Another major bias of the Stability Pact could consist in obliging countries reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio during cyclical downturns to adopt a pro-cyclical budgetary stance (Balassone and Monacelli, 2000).

255

strictly regulated (in the limit of 3% of GDP) and that the countries breaching the

Pact have to be penalised by a system of automatic fines. The amount of the latter

ones can be sizeable (up to the 0.5% of GDP) and only a severe recession (with a decline by more than 2% of GDP) can avoid the penalty. As far as our recent experience of an economic downturn is concerned, it has been shown that during

the 1990-93 recession period of the six European countries experiencing increases in the budget deficit by more than 3% of GDP only three (Finland, Sweden and the UK) would have been spared a fine, with a drop of GDP more than 2%, the other

three (France, Portugal and Spain) not being able to avoid the penalties (De Grauwe, 1996). The results of a wider study go in the same direction: in the period 1961-96 on 24 instances of a recession of more than 0.75% of GDP, the ceiling of

3% in the budget deficit would have been infringed in 18 cases, considering an initial level of the latter at 2% , i.e. a prospective deficit size that could be expected to occur in the period when the Euro had to be introduced (Buti ef al., 1997). By contrast the loss of the exchange rate and of the interest rate tools should have required an increased flexibility for the policy instruments retained under the control of national authorities. In order to cope with the new constraints of the EMU and to be able to deal successfully with an adverse shock, the room for manoeuvre of the national budgets had to be widened, if we exclude the first best

alternative to use the European budget as an adjustment instrument. In the past the loss of some national policy tools without a European compensation has increased the instability of the European economy, as we learned from the abolition of capital controls in Italy, which possibly contributed to the uncoupling of the Lira from the EMS two years later. In the absence of a full support of the DM-Lira parity by the Bundesbank or of an alternative European guarantee, that tool was probably vital for Italy in order to cope with the EMS constraints. Moreover, the control by member countries over their own fiscal policies can be considered as an element strengthening the resistance of the European Central Bank against pressure for a bailout (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 1996). According to a cynical view, in practice the Stability Pact will become a dead letter owing to the impossibility to raise among member countries the two third majority that is necessary to implement it when needed, i.e. during a recession presumably affecting a large number of countries, which could coalesce against it, in order to avoid to be fined. Its virtue would simply have been to convince a eurosceptical public opinion in Germany that the Euro was set to be as strong as the DM and the whole EMU construction would be inflation-proof and safe from the danger to become infected by unsustainable public debts. But if this cynical but perhaps optimistic interpretation would prove to be incorrect on the field, the stability of the EMU would be at risk.

256

8. A possible breakdown of the EMU In case of an adverse regional shock a strict enforcement of the Pact could be followed by an important resource transfer at the expenses of low-income regions within the Union. Not only the declining region could not be helped by the functioning of automatic fiscal stabilisers, as it happens in the relationships between each member country and its sub-national regions, but it would be paradoxically penalised in a period of difficulties. Try to anticipate what would come to pass if, say, in a time of recession and soaring unemployment Portugal or Greece would be obliged to pay a sizeable share of their income to the Union services. In a sense the automatic fiscal stabilisers will be reversed, increasing unemployment and GDP contraction. At the same time pressures would grow to induce the European Central Bank to relax its monetary policy, jeopardising its independence. From the political standpoint all this would be an explosive mix. The lack of accountability of the new Central Bank and of democratic control on the EMU process would become more and more difficult to be accepted by public opinions, releasing a dangerous mistrust flow towards the whole European integration process. Under these circumstances, as a reaction to a rigid stance by the ECB, an extreme option could emerge to cut the link with the EMU, re-introducing “temporarily” or in “controlled conditions” a national currency, as in the past the monetary ties between members countries were often cut off in the experiences of the first European snake and the EMS. An old taxonomy made by Corden (1972) between full monetary union and pseudo-monetary union, the latter being a union where the ancient national central banks always exist and can recover their autonomy if necessary, could be rejuvenated.

9. An increased flexibility of the budgetary policy Before going on in our analysis it is necessary to gain a deeper insight into a specific point, in order to check if really the constraints introduced by the Stability Pact could not be at least partially offset by an increased flexibility of the budgetary policies within the Union through alternative means. If such were the case, the prospects for a smooth functioning of the EMU could be judged brighter. So far, concerns were raised as to the sustainability of the EMU, in a framework of strict application of the Maastricht criteria, in the run up to the introduction of the single currency, and of the principles laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact in its aftermath. On one side one could wonder whether the drastic limitations put by the Maastricht Treaty to the monetary and fiscal policies of the members States could have in principle heightened the convergence costs in terms of foregone production and lost employment for the future member countries, producing negative

257

externalities for the starting EMU as a whole. In fact the latter concern proved to be fallacious. On the other side doubts were expressed about the capacity of the Union as such to provide the public good of the system stability in case of adverse shocks particularly affecting some of its regions, after the achievement of the single currency goal. In a fully-fledged economic union the adjustment of the declining region could be greatly helped by the automatic built-in stabilisers provided by the existence of a centralised fiscal system. A stage that the EU could perhaps reach in a more or less distant future, but to day surely out of sight in the present situation of a limited European budget. Neither could an asymmetric shock be cured by a devaluation, that in a monetary union is by definition excluded. Awaiting for an uncertain long period upgrading of the labour mobility and flexibility within the Union, the only options left are a fiscal reaction by the single member State affected by the adverse shock or a real contraction of its national product and employment, possibly partly smoothened by the use of income policy instruments’. Nevertheless, whereas the abdication of the monetary sovereignty implied in joining the monetary Union would have called for an increased room of manoeuvre for the fiscal policy, the Stability Pact highly reduces the degrees of freedom for the latter, introducing a system of penalties on the divergent country. Hence the possible emergence of an extreme scenario, where a damaged member country decides to withdraw from the EMU, reintroducing anew its national currency, thus giving origin to a breakdown danger for the monetary Union as a whole. Against the background of such results it is worth to deepen the reflections about the means able to insure a sufficient degree of flexibility in the budgetary policies of the Union, in order to avoid a possible early crisis of the EMU.

10. The flexibility of the budgetary policies in the run up to the EMU As far as the period preceding the beginning of the third stage of the EMU is concerned, the degree of flexibility of the fiscal policies within the EU seemed to be quite low. At a European level the preconditions which could make the current budgetary tools of the Union a viable instrument of regional adjustment simply did not exist. The constrained seize of the European budget, the limited scope for a progressive contribution by the member regions, the rule of the permanent fiscal balance,

the absence

of built-in

automatic

stabilisers,

the

characters

of the

expenses, are all elements that do not allow the Community budget to play a

? In general terms, the economic model put at the basis of the Maastricht Treaty implies that: the growth within the EMU has to be fostered by supply side reforms, not least in the European labour market (Secchi, 1998). Nevertheless, the risk is that an asymmetric shock occurs before these reforms are achieved.

258

meaningful role as a stabilisation mechanism, helping to smooth the regional imbalances originating from asymmetric shocks. In their turn, the national budgetary tools were constrained by the need to achieve the ex-ante convergence conditions required by the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, even in this framework it was possible to identify some tools aimed at increasing the flexibility of the budgetary policy. First of all we had a limited number of opportunities, offered by the existing legislation. And secondly it was possible to find new devices. On the front of the national budgetary flexibility, as far as the former was concerned, it had to be remembered that the two budgetary criteria founding the exante convergence required in order to be admitted into the circle of the EMU member countries could be interpreted, according to the Maastricht Treaty, in a way allowing national authorities to cope with unforeseeable asymmetric shocks. This provided their impact was sufficiently low to let the criterion of public deficit in the neighbouring of the reference value and that of the public outstanding debt on a sufficiently decreasing course, according to the Art. 104C. At the same time, on the European front the small unused margin of the own resources mobilised by the Union budget (0.12 against a ceiling of 1.27% of the Union’s GDP), if promptly employed for a common intervention in a single region, could have had a non negligible impact, offsetting about a 10% of the shock adverse consequences on the regional economy. Among the new tools that could have been devised in order to increase the budgetary flexibility within the Union in the run up to the EMU’s third stage, it is possible to quote, among others, two specific proposals, focused on the national side of the fiscal policies: 1) a more comprehensive interpretation of the Maastricht criteria based on the idea of a possible compensation between them, and ii) a transitory coexistence of the Euro as a common currency and national currencies for late comer member countries (Praussello, 1997). As to the first suggested tool, a global achievement concept of the Maastricht criteria could have been justified by the letter of the Treaty itself, allowing for a compensation between the convergence conditions. It could therefore be possible to reconcile the flexibility of national economic policies with the global orientation of the EU towards macroeconomic stability. According to this interpretation, a would-be member country of the EMU could gain budgetary flexibility by achieving outstanding results in the field of monetary policies. If necessary, such an increased flexibility of the national fiscal policies could have been used in order to cope with an asymmetric shock occurring in the run up to the EMU’s final stage (Olsem, 1997). The second proposal was based on the idea that after the start of the third stage of the EMU the late comer countries could have an interest to adopt the Euro as a common currency for the payments among themselves and with the core countries employing the Euro as a single currency. From the technical point of view the European Central Bank would have had to manage two different systems of

259

interbank payments and compensation: one for the countries having adopted the Euro as a single currency and one for the pre-in countries. By retaining their national currencies linked to the Euro by a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, the latter could have applied to the traditional tools of adjustment, modifying if necessary their parities to the Euro, of course in a framework of progressive convergence with the rest of the Union. In such a way, within the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty the flexibility both of their budgetary and monetary policies could have been increased (Gnos, 1997). It should be added that this type of coexistence between the Euroes as a common and a single currency could have been be useful as well in the future Euro zone in the relationships between the EMU and the outward countries, e.g. the Mediterranean countries or the future candidates countries to the Union in Central and Eastern Europe.

11. The flexibility of the budgetary policies in the aftermath of the EMU According to the method followed by the Council of Ministers in projecting and implementing the European monetary unification, after the start of the final stage of the EMU the stability of the new system needsto be made safe from the crisis factors originating from the budgetary and debt policies by the members countries. The presumption is that a country following an expansive debt path produces external costs for the rest of the monetary Union, both in the form of crowding out effects on the European savings market and in the form of an undesired

strengthening of the external value of the Euro. Even if a recent technical literature has expressed some criticism about the relevance of such externalities, the need to introduce a number of limits to the autonomy of the national budgetary policies has gained ground in the official circles of the Union (Majocchi, 1997). Hence the signature of the Stability and Growth Pact, that constraints the flexibility of the national fiscal policies through a system of semi-automatic heavy penalties. Nevertheless, in the absence of a sufficiently large European budget acting as a centralised fiscal system in the relationships between the centre and the regions of a monetary Union, the danger is that a country struck by an asymmetric shock could be tempted or obliged to break the fiscal discipline of the Union, resorting in extreme cases to the reintroduction of a national currency. As far as the budgetary policies are concerned, at the heart of the new monetary building lies therefore a contradiction between the need of a European level system stability and the need of a national budgetary flexibility, that can be scarcely

3 In any case the “outs” had to overcome the difficulties linked to the coordination of their economic policies with those followed by the members of the Euro zone (Marini, 1996).

260

overcome. To grant a higher degree of fiscal flexibility to the national authorities beyond the limits laid down in the Stability Pact would mean to favour a fiscal irresponsible behaviour by the member countries, with possible negative externalities on the Union as a whole. At the same time to interpret in a rigid way the rules of the Stability Pact, or even to render them more stringent, would make an adjustment through national tools more difficult, increasing the probability of a breach of the European discipline. In both cases the stability of the EMU would be put at jeopardy. Against this background the means to introduce more budgetary flexibility in the system could be judged only one-sided. If we consider, as we are obliged to do, the constraints of the Stability Pact on the national policies as a matter of fact, that is not possible to neglect, but at best to interpret in a lax manner, the only ways out left would be in direction of the European level. Nevertheless in the reality a limited degree of fiscal flexibility could be achieved also at a national level by managing a balanced or possibly a surplus budget during a cyclical upswing, in order to be able to switch to a deficit not exceeding the 3% limit during a recession. But of course this state of affairs could entail some costs in terms of foregone production and lost employment from their potential levels. Whether the member countries of the EMU in next years will be able to achieve this Copernican revolution for some of them, running in normal times a surplus budget, is an open question. Doubts are above all legitimate for the more recent converts to the merits of financial stability, whose public opinion seems reluctant to bear new costs in order to belong to the Union, after the perceived high “sacrifices” encountered for joining it, during the convergence process leading to the EMU qualification. On more general terms our assessment is that the different possible sources of budget flexibility, which are at hand in the present institutional setting, both at the national and at the European level, are possibly not strong enough to ensure a smooth treatment of future adverse consequences deriving from region-specific shocks in the final stage of the EMU.

12. The likelihood of a breakdown scenario

Having ascertained that the constraints introduced by the Stability Pact cannot be sufficiently offset by an increased flexibility of the budgetary policies within the Union, we can conclude that a breakdown scenario cannot in principle be excluded.

But how likely is it? Unfortunately its probability is nearer to one than to zero. Recently a lot of research has been produced in order to highlight the possible future course of the Euro, depending on the number and characters of the first wave EMU member countries, the past evidence of interest rate policies followed by the US and the European countries, the degree of independence of the ECB, the

261

influence of the “German” or the “French” parties‘, among other things (Begg et al., 1997). The scope of this paper does not allow treating in full extent this issue. But it is likely that the most independent central bank in the world will necessary, at least in a first period, follow a rigid stance, adopting a tight monetary policy, both to acquire reputation and to convince the market that the no bailout clause will never be discarded, even though it is in essence timely inconsistent. At the same time we have seen that the constraints of the Stability Pact will arguably push the member countries to perform too a cautious fiscal policy, managing to run a budget surplus, that for countries reducing their debt-to-GDP ratio can be quite large. This could rise the probability of an adverse regional shock to happen and to widen its effects after its occurrence (Praussello and Marenco, 1999). Furthermore, in the long run a single European currency will widen the income and employment gaps between a core and a periphery within the Union, as happened in the past experience of the US, according to Krugman’s view (Puga, 1996; Groom, 1998), and this will in its turn increase the probability for a backward region to be hit by an asymmetric shock.

13. Means to strengthen the EMU sustainability | Of course, remedies for these prospective and likely dangers for the stability of the EMU can be devised, and it is possible that the Union will take some measures in this direction in the next future. Doubts can nevertheless be raised about the (scarce) political will by the national governments to suggest and the (ineffective) institutional method to decide and to implement them, after the new failure of the intergovernmental mechanisms shown by the poor conclusions of the conference for the constitutional reform of the Union laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. In order to be effective, remedies have to cope with the main faulting lines of the EMU structure, under the Maastricht rules and the Stability Pact agreement; in

short the inefficient and unbalanced fiscal design put at the heart of the new monetary building. What is needed is a new and sustainable distribution of powers in the fiscal field between the regional and the Union levels. Side reforms, such as a new set of measure for an increased flexibility in the labour markets at a Union level, would turn out to be at best a necessary but non-sufficient conditions for a smooth and stable working of the EMU.

* According to a traditional view, the divide between the “German” and the “French” Parties could be identified in the following way: whereas the French policy makers have been long insisting on the need to establish a European economic government, through the coordination of the national budgetary policies, in front of the independent European Central Bank, the German ones have been above all preoccupied to defend the full autonomy of the European Central Bank.

262

The first best solution would be to set up a centralised European fiscal and welfare system, activating a Union wide mechanism of automatic stabilisers through net transfers of resources into the regions hit by an adverse shock. It has to be remembered that in the case of the US the federal budget can offset the regional effects of a shock up to a size of 40% (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1992). This would imply the creation of a common and independent European centre of decision, i.e. a fully-fledged European government, perhaps in the context of the establishment of a federal core among a limited number of member countries. That ought to be the true meaning of the much debated European economic government of the Euro-area, not that of a simple strengthening of the co-ordination of national and independent economic policies in the framework of the European Council, according to the Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty. Mimicking a well-known quotation, co-ordination is not government. In the current misunderstandings between the “French” and the “German” parties about the European economic government, the former has not yet understood this, whilst the latter is forgetting that in front of the Bundesbank there was not a loose co-ordination centre of independent regional policies run by sovereign Laenders but a fully-fledged federal government and a real Parliament. From the technical point of view the task is not beyond the Union’s reach. According to the analysis disclosed in the document Stable Money, Sound Finance (EC, 1993), in order to get the wished stabilisation and redistribution effects it is no

more necessary to expand the European budget to a limit of 5-7% in the context of a full monetary Union, according to the requirements of the MacDougall Report (EC, 1977). A European budget of only about 2% of the Union GDP is now considered sufficient, and the additional resources from the current size of 1.2%

could simply be transferred from the national level, without a net tax increase to the charge of European taxpayers. If this goal turned out to be politically feasible, it would be possible to reduce the regional impact of an exogenous shock in a measure ranging from 20 to 30% , as it happens in economies endowed with federal structures (Pisani-Ferri et al., 1993). A second best solution could consist in establishing a regional stabilisation mechanism aimed at adjusting the adverse consequences of asymmetric shocks, according to a specific suggestion made in the above mentioned document. In the presence of a sizeable gap between the Union and the regional unemployment rate, the regional economy would receive automatically an unconditional resource transfer, without reimbursement obligation (Majocchi and Rey, 1993). With a global amount of a mere 0.22% of the Union GDP the regional stabilisation fund could achieve a stabilisation capacity of 18-19% of the shock impact, assuming an 1% transfer of the regional GDP (Italianer and Vanheukelen, 1993). About the technicalities of this proposal, see European Commission (1993). Here it should be stressed only two points concerning the operation of a Regional Stabilisation Fund (ERSF) and its financing. In order to be effective the Fund’s

263

intervention have to be fully automatic and not discretionary, depending on an inefficient decision-making procedure, based on compromise agreements within the informal Council of the Euro. As to the necessary financial means with which it had to be endowed, these could be obtained both from the unused margin on the present own resources and the establishment of new resources transfers to the Union level: e.g. by applying to part of the seigniorage gains deriving from the issue of the single currency, with estimated total earnings of about 0.65% of Union’s GDP in 1989, or other fiscal instruments. Among the latter one could list the carbon tax, already proposed by the Commission in a recent past, or a new solidarity regional income tax, producing a resource transfer between European regions, along lines of fiscal compensation alike to those of the German Finanzausgleich. The endowment of the Fund could be supplied by resources coming proportionally -or progressively- from all European regions, and should be redistributed only to those of them, which were affected by asymmetric shocks. In principle also the most advanced regions could benefit from it, in cases of adverse country specific disturbances. Considering that the Union’s own resources for the period 2000-2006 will not exceed the old ceiling of 1.27%, the financing of the Fund up to the size of 0.22% of EU GDP could be obtained by an extra contribution of 0.10% beyond the mobilisation of the current unused margin on the effective budgetary resources amounting to 0.12% of Union’s GDP. Probably the best suited means of financing from the technical point of view would be to employ a part of the seigniorage gains: a resource that by definition had to be added to the European budget, owing to the difficulties arising from an imputation of these earnings to the different EMU

member

countries.

Nevertheless,

from

the political

point of view,

the

introduction of a transfer based on the principle of a Finanzausgleich system at a European level would be more apt to stress the necessary solidarity links among the European regions. .

14. Co-ordination of the budgetary policies and fiscal federalism In this paper we have tried to assess the impact of the budgetary policies of the Union, to check whether after the launching of the Euro their use can resist the dangers of instability for the new monetary building following the occurrence of asymmetric adverse shocks. The conclusions of our analysis confirm that their weight is not sizeable enough in order to offset in an acceptable measure the effects of region specific shocks. The risk sharing requirements arousing from the sustainability of the EMU need a much stronger stabilisation tool than that provided by the limited extent of the present EU budget. Compared with the working of the stabilisation devices at hand in the US and other federal countries, | the impact of the Union’s budgetary policies is negligible. Nevertheless this state of affairs could be an intentional one. 264

Indeed, the lack of a central mechanism at the Union level aimed at the absorption of region specific shocks is sometimes described as a deliberate choice by the founding fathers of the EMU, who had in mind a long set of inefficiencies attached to this system and preferred to assign to the market the task to provide the insurance schemes needed against the costs of the monetary Union (Giovannini, 1990). But in fact the private insurance markets are not able to perform this task, owing to adverse

selection and moral

hazard

issues (Sala-i-Martin

and Sachs,

1991). By contrast the role of the public budget in smoothing income and consumption among countries has been found to be outstanding (Arreaza et al., 1998). From this standpoint the constraints introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact give origin to a hard-to-solve contradiction. Its rules are needed in order to sustain the monetary stability but at the same time the budgetary flexibility is a necessary tool to cope with region specific shocks (Majocchi, 1997). Under the Stability and Growth Pact discipline an increased flexibility of the national budget in form of a balanced medium term budget can be achieved (Praussello, 1997), but the co-ordination of the national budgets among them and

with the EU policy is not an easy task. The institutional rules, upon which the co-ordination of the national budgetary policies is based, possibly in the framework of the “Euro 11 Council”, are hardly compatible with the technical characters of an interregional risk sharing mechanism at the European level. At the same time the choice not to raise the 1.27% ceiling of the EU budget on the Union’s GDP, even in front of the extra investments needed to enlarge the Union towards East and South, implementing the lines disclosed in the programme Agenda 2000, creates a new constraint’ (Commission Européenne, 1997; Secchi, 1998). Under these circumstances, the tensions stemming from future asymmetric disturbances will imperil the stability of the monetary Union, or push towards the increase of the EU budget size, fostering the introduction of fiscal federalism tools at the European level (Praussello, 1999). The long term stability of the EMU asks for the existence of an offsetting mechanism of the future asymmetric shocks hitting the less advanced regions belonging to the Euro-area, and this beyond a possible, limited increase of the flexibility of the existing budgetary policies within the Union, which has anyway to take account of the constraints introduced by the Stability Pact. The first best solution would undoubtedly be the establishment of a system of fully-fledged fiscal federalism in a framework of political integration: an ideal but probably long term solution, that is worth nevertheless remembering in order to fix the final goal of a future Union’s path. A short term and more manageable measure could be the launching of a Regional Stabilisation Fund (ERSF), according to the proposals first presented by

$ On the possible reforms of the EU budgetary policies fostered by the impending Union’s enlargement see, Trupiano (2000).

265

the Commission in 1993. The Fund could transfer automatically unconditional resources to regions suffering deep recessions with a heavy unemployment burden, offsetting about a 20% of the shock adverse consequences. The general conclusion of this paper is that in the aftermath of the Euro launch, the new monetary building of the Union is a fragile one. The virtual euthanasia of economic policies in the EMU, as far as the principles laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact can be truly followed by increased constraints on the use of budgetary measures by member countries, can indeed put at jeopardy the sustainability of the whole monetary Union. Should the sketched ways out aimed at heightening the EMU sustainability prove not to be politically feasible, in case of an adverse regional shock an extreme option could emerge, in which a severely hit member country could be tempted to cut off the links with the EMU, reintroducing a national currency. Whether the EMU could then avoid spill over effects and survive as such is an open issue. In any case its credibility and stability would be deeply affected.

References Arreaza A., Sorensen B. E. and Yosha O. (1998), “Consumption Smoothing Through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries”, NBER Working Paper, n. 6372. Balassone F. and Monacelli D. (2000), “EMU Fiscal Rules: is There a Gap?”, Banca d’Italia, Temi di discussione del Servizio Studi, n. 375, July. Begg D., Giavazzi F., von Hagen J. and Wyplosz C. (1997), “EMU. Getting the End-game Right”, CEPR, Monitoring European Integration 7, London, February 28,. Bini Smaghi L. and Vori S. (1993), “Rating the EC as an Optimal Currency Area”, Temi di < “Budgetary Policies During Recessions. Retrospective Application of the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ to the Post-War Period”, EC Economic Papers, n. 121. Commission Européenne (1997), Agenda 2000, 1. Pour une union plus forte et plus large, mimeo, DOC/97/6, Corden W. (1972), “Monetary Integration”, Essays in International Finance, April. De Grauwe P. (1996), “An Unbalanced Agreement”, Financial Times, December 12. De Grauwe P. (1997), The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Eichengreen B. and von Hagen J. (1996), “Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: is There a Tradeoff between Federalism and Budgetary Restrictions?”, NBER Working Paper, n.

Buti

discussione, Banca d’Italia, n. 187, January. M., Franco D. and Ongena H. (1997),

SISI European Commission (1977), Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration (MacDougall Report), Brussels, Luxembourg. European Commission (1993), “Stable Money, Sound Finances. Community Public Finance in the Perspective of EMU”, European Economy, 53.

European Commission (1994), The Budget of the EU, Brussels, Luxembourg.

266

European Commission (1998a), Financing the EU, Brussels, Luxembourg. European Commission (1998b), Growth and Employment in the Stability-Oriented Framework of EMU, mimeo, 11/33/98-EN. Fitoussi J. P. (1997a), “Europe: la fin d’une histoire”, Le Monde, 28 août. ; Fitoussi J. P. (1997b), “Europe: le commencement d’une aventure”, Le Monde, 29 août. Fitoussi J. P. et al. (1999), Rapport sur l'état de l'Union européenne, Fayard, Paris. Frankel K. and Rose A. (1997), The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, mimeo, University of California, Berkeley. Giovannini A. (1990), “European Monetary Reform”, Brookings papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 217-19. Gnos C. (1997), Achieving Exchange Rate Stability in Europe: a Proposal for Extending the Euro 's Role, mimeo. Groom B. (1998), “Single Currency May Widen Employment Disparities”, Financial Times, September 8. Italianer A. and Vanheukelen M. (1993), “Proposals for Community Stabilization Mechanisms: Some Historical Applications”, European Economy, Reports and Studies, nes: Krugman P. (1991), Geography and Trade, Mit Press, Cambridge. Majocchi A. (1997), “Dalla crisi al patto di stabilita europea”, invited paper presented at the IX Scientific Meeting of the SIEP “L’aggiustamento della finanza pubblica negli anni ‘90 e le prospettive nel 2000”, University of Pavia, mimeo. Majocchi A. and Rey M. (1993), “A Special Financial Support Scheme: Need and Nature”, European Economy, Reports and Studies, n. 5. Marini G. (1996), “Moneta unica e coordinamento delle politiche”, in Paganetto L. (a cura di), L'economia mondiale e l'Italia. Il “cantiere” Europa: vincoli e opportunità, Forum CEIS/Q8, Università Torvergata, Roma. Molle W. (1991), The Economics of European Integration, Aldershot, Dartmouth. Mundell R. (1961), “A Theory of Optimal Currency Area”, American Economic Review, 51,

pp. 657-665. Musgrave R. and Musgrave Hill, Auckland.

P. (1985), Public Finance in Theory and Practice, McGraw

Olsem J. P. (1997), Overcoming Eurosclerosis through Global Achievement of Maastricht Requirements, mimeo. Paganetto L. (1996), “Il ‘cantiere Europa’: vincoli e opportunità: Un’introduzione”, in Paganetto L. (a cura di), L'economia mondiale e l'Italia. Il "cantiere" Europa: vincoli e opportunità, Forum CEIS/Q8, Università Torvergata, Roma. Peel Q. (1998), “Scene Set for EU Budget Row”, Financial Times, October 8. Peffekoven R. (1994), Die Finanzen der Europaeischen Union, BI Taschenbuch Verlag, Mannheim. Pisani-Ferri J., Italianer A. and Lescure R. (1993), “Stabilization Properties of Budgetary Systems”, European Economy, Reports and Studies, n. 5, pp. 511-538. Praussello F. (1997), “Flexibility of the Budgetary Policy, Report on the working sub-group 2 on the Euro”, paper presented at the meeting of the Jean Monnet Chairholders, Brussels, 11.17, mimeo. Praussello F. (1999), “Euro-Governance and the Process of Regional Adjustment within the EMU”, The European Union Review, 4, n. 3, pp. 53-63.

Praussello

F. and

Marenco

M.

(1999),

L'economia

mondo

fra globalizzazione

e

regionalizzazione, ECIG, Genova.

Puga D. (1996), “The

Rise and Fall of Regional

Inequalities”,

Centre for Economic

Performance, LSE, November.

Sala-i-Martin X. and Sachs J. (1991), “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States”, NBER Working Paper, n. 3855.

267

Sala-i-Martin X. and Sachs J. (1992), “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas”, in Canzoneri M., Grilli V. and Masson P., Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Salvatore D. (2000), “The Present International Monetary System: Problems, Complication, and Reforms”, in Savona P. (ed.), The New Architecture of the International Monetary System, Kluwer, Boston, Dordrecht, London. Secchi C. (1998), Verso l'Euro, l'Unione Economica e Monetaria motore dell'Europa unita, Marsilio, Venezia. Srensen B. E. and Yosha O. (1998), “International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification”, Temi di discussione, Banca d’Italia, n. 327, February. Trupiano G. (2000), “La riforma del bilancio europeo”, Ause International Summer School on European Integration, Venice, July 20-22, mimeo.

von Hagen J. (1992), “Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union. Evidence from the US”, in Fair D. and De Boissieu C., Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated Europe, Kluwer, Boston, Dordrecht, London.

268

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION Carlo SECCHI, Francesco PASSARELLI and Carlo ALTOMONTE

Luigi Bocconi University of Milan, Italy

After forty years on the road of integration, the European Union (EU) is at a turning point. Having undertaken the highest possible degree of economic integration, i.e. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the new challenges ahead require a radical change of the very same mechanisms at the basis of the integration process. The nature of these challenges is both internal and external. On the internal side, the set up of EMU has generated a push towards integration in new areas and under original modalities at two levels at least. 1) At the European level, it is interesting to analyse the evolution of the international macroeconomic picture in the last months, with the devaluation of the euro with respect to the US dollar, notwithstanding the fact that the economic fundamentals of the two areas are substantially equivalent in terms of pros and cons (an higher growth rate of the US economy is compensated by its larger current account deficit with respect to the EU). This is a situation which many observers have attributed to the lack of “credibility” of the euro in terms of its political background; in other words, the European Central Bank (ECB), on the contrary of the US Federal Reserve, seems to lack a political counterpart able to clearly set the course for EU economic and international policy. As a result, EMU pushes for more efficient decision-making mechanisms within the EU governing bodies (Euro-11 Council) and for a greater co-ordination between the first pillar (the European Community, developed through decisions implemented at the Community level) and the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy, implemented at the inter-Governmental level).

2)

Another mounting challenge derived from the creation of EMU is related to the role of national member States. In a system where the European level of economic governance is now operational, through the euro and the internal market, and where the principle of subsidiarity is increasingly implemented through a devolution of powers to the local bodies, member States are asked to exercise economic governance at the national level through efficient and smooth processes, contributing to an harmonious development of this complex

269

system of decision-making. If they fail to do so, then political pressures could arise from the citizens asking for political reforms: the recent changes incurred in the formation of the Chamber of Lords in the United Kingdom, the reform of the presidential mandate in France, and the attempt of Constitutional reforms in Italy are witnessing this renovated feeling of reform in the working of national States in order to render them apt to their new role within EMU. This renewed sensitivity is also further emphasised by the external challenge the EU is currently facing, i.e. its enlargement to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Such a process will put at strain the decision-making process, risking paralysing any working of a Union with 20 or 25 members. In order to react to this challenge, member States called in February 2000 for an InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) due to end its works with a new Treaty to be signed at Nice in December 2000. In particular, the ICG was originally conceived to solve three issues inherited from the Amsterdam Treaty which could pose problems in the working of an enlarged Europe: the abolishment of the requirement of unanimity in favour of qualified majority voting in the decisions of the Council still subject to this procedure; the reform of the each member State’s weighting of votes in the Council; the number and functions of European Commissioners.

However, mounting pressures on a more ambitious reform coming from the European Commission, the European Parliament and, increasingly, the public opinion, forced the European Council held in Feira in June 2000 to include also the issue of “reinforced co-operation” in the IGC Agenda. In particular, the European Council

called for a reform,

in a more

flexible direction,

of the institutional

mechanisms today allowing member States, which choose to do so, to cooperate more closely in certain policy areas inside the Union, even if others decide not to participate. Capitalising on this enhanced sensitivity stimulated by those internal and external forces, the debate has gone even further, finding positive echoes also in

the official pronouncements of European leaders: today the debate is open on the possibility of designing a European Constitution. This achievement could be at the basis of the turning point in the integration process advocated at the beginning. Speculating on such a possibility, it appears that the European Constitution could represent a fundamental passage in order to solve the institutional inadequacies of the Union, at least on three levels:

e

political: the Constitution pinpoints the very root of legitimacy of collective decision making-rules in the Union, as well as the basic principles of the integration process; it states rights and obligations of the European citizenship; it limits and clarifies the different levels of governance, providing them with political legitimacy; it determines the assignments accruing onto European, national and regional Institutions, together with their policy responsibilities; it defines the nature of the participation to a federal EU core, specifying the

270

direction in the attribution of responsibilities (from the citizens to the different government levels);

e

juridical: it creates a hierarchy of norms, which allows an ordering of the present corpus iuris of European laws, nowadays articulated on different, intercrossing levels. The Constitution enables also a better specification of the personal, political and economic rights, through the predisposition of a Charter of fundamental rights; in doing so, it encourages the participation of EU citizens to different levels of government;

e

economical: by giving an order to the division of powers and responsibilities, the Constitution is likely to promote an efficient allocation of resources, solving in particular market failures linked to the production of public goods and to the redistribution

of their costs;

it also allows

to overcome

allocation

biases

generated in regional markets by phenomena of harmful competition subsidisation in the economic activities (tax issues, labour markets,...).

or

With this respect, the adoption of the guiding principle of subsidiarity is a tool through which identify a weighting criteria based on the different levels of competence, in order to solve potential conflicts among different goals of governance. Through this principle, it is possible to generate also at the constitutional level a clear division of powers and responsibilities, preserving at the same time the diversities and the different degrees of involvement of national and regional governments in collective decision-making. The implementation of a new, clear-cut division of powers is fundamental in order to raise credibility to the newly established juridical apparatus and to assign roles and responsibilities to the local levels of government. However, when dealing with the project of a European Constitution, it seems evident that the separation of powers has to take place along two, orthogonal, directions: a horizontal one, at a functional level, and a vertical one, at the geographical level. The functional separation among the three powers is the one typical of national constitutions, its objective being the guarantee and the credibility in the defence of rights and in the promotion of political participation. At the European level, such a separation would put order in the current mixed bowl of institutional and juridical procedures created in fifty years of life of a new, experimental, integration process. The vertical separation of powers is related to the identification of the different levels of competence

of the European,

national

and

local

institutions,

with

a clear

delineation of their roles and powers. In this sense, the European Constitution is not the a posteriori outcome of an historic attempt of organising an existing power, as it is the case for national constitutions; rather, it is an a priori tool through which politically create and operate a new raising cultural identity: the European one.

271

The recognition of this historic dynamic means an overcome of the intergovernmental vision of the European integration, with a radical change in the approach to the problem. The European Constitution cannot be born as another form of economic integration (as the EMU or the Single Market), through a blank delegation of powers from local governments to the national ones. If this would be the case, the centrality of the citizens would not be taken in due consideration, and

hence the emergence of this new identity would not be adequately recognised. In addition, the typical problems of the decentralised forms of federalism would arise: the juridical uncertainty on the delegation of responsibilities by the national governments; the necessity of preserving the unanimity rule in voting procedures (Coase bargaining); the tyranny of the majority with respect to minority local governments, in the case of scarce mobility of citizens among member States; the tyranny of the minority in the areas where subsidies or taxes are relevant, through forms of harmful competition. As a result, also from a theoretical point of view, studying the traditional forms of coalition currently employed in EU decision making it is unlikely that governments are able to effectively agree onto the assignments of a newly created central government, especially if bargaining costs are there, without being the preferences of national governments on the different outcomes of the bargaining common knowledge, and with scarce enforceability of the agreements. All these issues point therefore to the fact that the EU Constitution has to emerge “from the bottom”. The assignments to local governments have to follow local needs, promoting the political participation of citizens and the constant monitoring of the action of their representatives. Rules whose effects apply mainly at a local dimension require a local level of government. Where instead the government is able to contribute to the production of non-congested public goods or goods characterised by increasing returns, the most efficient level of competence is the European one. There are various economic and social policy areas where positive and negative spillovers among member States are extremely relevant. These areas positively mark the borders of competence of the future political Union. The currently envisaged solution of “reinforced cooperations” (Art. 43 of the TEU) reflects instead an inter-governmental logic, whose limits have been previously analysed. Such a solution does not recognise the historic opportunity of marking a political discontinuity in the process of creation of a future European Political Union.

272

L’ARMONIZZAZIONE FISCALE COME CONDIZIONE PER IL RILANCIO DELL’ECONOMIA ITALIANA Victor UCKMAR Università di Genova, Italia

1. Da ogni parte, e non solo nell’ambito bancario, s’invoca la riduzione della pressione fiscale, condizione autorevolmente ribadita dal Governatore della Banca

d’Italia come elemento per lo sviluppo dell’economia, slogan subentrato a quello della riduzione dei tassi bancari (la cui attuazione, peraltro, non sembra sia stata

sufficiente per indurre gli imprenditori agli investimenti). In effetti, secondo i dati da ultimo pubblicati' la pressione fiscale rilevata in Italia, pari al 43,5% è fra le più elevaie d’Europa (Spagna 34,2%; Regno Unito 37,1%; Germania 37,1%; Paesi Bassi 41,0%), con l’avvertenza che tale percentuale

deve essere integrata da alcune considerazioni. 1) Evitiamo la statistica “alla Trilussa”: il nostro ordinamento tributario prevede regimi differenziati; a parte le agevolazioni ed esenzioni, certe categorie di

' Classifica secondo l’OCSE (da Corriere della Sera, 7 novembre 1999) dei paesi dell’Unione Europea che fra il 1979 e il 1988 hanno registrato il maggiore aumento della pressione fiscale in percentuale (fra parentesi la differenza tra il 1979 e il 1998). 1979

ITALIA

Germania

Paesi Bassi

26,8 (+16,7

22,4 (+12,5 23,3 (+10,9 36,7 24,9 40,2 32,2 44,5 39,8 49,0 42,2 29,8 45,0

(+10,2 (+8,8 (+5,0 (+4,9 (+4,8 (+4,5 (+4,0 (+2,9 (+2,5 (+1

37,8 (-0,7

44,5 (-3,5

35,0 (+6,0

273

1998

redditi (quali quelli da capitale e dall’agricoltura) subiscono un prelievo di gran lunga inferiore al 43,5%; e si hanno evasioni ed elusioni per cui chi non rientra in tali... oasi, è soggetto ad una tassazione assai superiore al 43,5%: tipico è il caso dei redditi di lavoro autonomo che subiscono la progressività integrale e sono colpiti dall'IRAP (l’imposta che ha “sostituito” l’ILOR, che peraltro non gravava tali redditi!). 2) Percentuale superiore nella pressione fiscale si riscontra in paesi del Nord Europa, ma quanta differenza nei servizi pubblici! I contribuenti italiani debbono sopportare costi che nei citati paesi sono sostenuti dallo Stato (sicurezza, trasporti, scuole, assistenza sanitaria, ecc.) e quindi a ben calcolare

il carico deve essere maggiorato delle spese per servizi che lo Stato non fornisce in modo adeguato. 3) In venti anni la pressione fiscale è aumentata di circa 18 punti, sforzo che mai si è riscontrato

in alcuna

parte

del

mondo,

attraverso

uno

sconquasso

dell’ordinamento di cui ancora oggi soffriamo. Pertanto è ben comprensibile l’invocazione di una riduzione dell’onere fiscale, e sembra di moda l’auspicio di una “armonizzazione” nell’ambito europeo.

2. Come è noto il Trattato di Roma aveva posto fra i primari mezzi per l’attuazione di un mercato comune la garanzia della libera concorrenza, con l’eliminazione delle distorsioni e fra le prime quelle di natura fiscale. Possiamo dire che le resistenze alla creazione di un’Europa unita (non erano valsi fino allora né i movimenti idealisti, né quelli politici) furono superate per effetto della previsione di un mercato libero, allargato ad oltre trecento milioni di consumatori, ottenibile

con l’abbattimento

delle frontiere fiscali. Tale mercato

unito fu parzialmente

ottenuto, nell’immediato, con l’abolizione dei dazi doganali fra gli Stati membri,

l’istituzione di una tariffa doganale comune, la sostituzione dell’imposta a cascata sulla cifra d’affari con un’imposta sul valore aggiunto non gravante sugli imprenditori e con caratteristiche comuni per tutti gli Stati. Non fu dato peso al fatto che nulla era disposto per le imposte dirette, se non un generico riferimento alla “armonizzazione”, espressione in effetti priva di concreto contenuto giuridico, da alcuni interpretata come raccomandazione all’uniformità delle disposizioni, da altri come impegno ad evitare contrasti e da altri ancora, e credo fossero nel giusto, come postulato contro le distorsioni economiche. All’armonizzazione faceva riferimento l’art. 99 disponendo che “la Commissione esamina in qual modo sia possibile armonizzare, nell’interesse del mercato comune, le legislazioni dei singoli Stati membri relative alle imposte sulla cifra d’affari, alle imposte di consumo e ad altre imposte indirette, ivi comprese le misure di compensazione applicabili agli scambi fra gli Stati membri”. “La Commissione sottopone proposte al Consiglio che delibera all’unanimità”. A mio avviso la materia relativa alle imposte dirette poteva ben rientrare nel

disposto dell’art. 100, secondo cui “il Consiglio, deliberando all’unanimità su 274

proposta della Commissione, stabilisce direttive volte al ravvicinamento delle disposizioni legislative, regolamentari ed amministrative degli Stati membri che abbiano un’incidenza diretta sull’instaurazione o sul funzionamento del mercato comune”. Nonostante che l’espressione “ravvicinamento” fosse più stringente che quella generica di “armonizzazione”, la Comunità dedicò l’impegno soprattutto alle imposte indirette (fra l’altro con l’emanazione di sette direttive concernenti l’IVA) del tutto trascurando il “ravvicinamento” delle legislazioni in materia di imposte dirette.

3. Per un ventennio la situazione stagnò; ma sembrò rimuoversi per effetto del rapporto Cockfield che portò all’Atto Unico del 17 febbraio 1987 con il quale furono riaffermati i principi dettati dal Trattato ribadendosi (art. 8A) che “il mercato interno comporta uno spazio senza frontiere interne, nel quale è assicurata la libera circolazione delle merci, delle persone, dei servizi e dei capitali”, disponendosi a tale fine (art. 99) che “il Consiglio, deliberando all’unanimità su proposta della Commissione e previa consultazione del Parlamento europeo, adotta le disposizioni che riguardano l’armonizzazione delle legislazioni interne relative alle imposte sulle cifre d’affari, alle imposte di consumo e alle altre imposte indirette, nella misura in cui detta armonizzazione sia necessaria per assicurare l’instaurazione ed il funzionamento del mercato interno” entro il 31 dicembre 1992. Per rendere effettiva tale realizzazione la Commissione programmò l'emanazione di circa 300 direttive, secondo un preciso calendario, per l’abolizione,

entro

la data prefissa,

delle

barriere

fisiche,

tecniche

e fiscali.

L’impegno fu concentrato sull’imposta sul valore aggiunto, con eliminazione dell’applicazione alle frontiere e con l'avvicinamento delle aliquote e così pure per le accise. Per quanto riguarda le imposte dirette, se poteva ritenersi che rientrassero nella previsione di “ravvicinamento” delle legislazioni, così come previsto dall’art. 100 del Trattato di Roma,

tale tesi è stata stroncata giacché con l’art. 18 dell’Atto

Unico l’applicabilità dell’art. 100 è esclusa per le “disposizioni fiscali” (residue rispetto a quelle contemplate dall’art. 99), le deliberazioni debbano essere prese all’unanimità, anziché a maggioranza come per le disposizioni in altre materie. In effetti fu predisposto un solo provvedimento di rilievo, l’adozione di una ritenuta del 15% sui redditi di capitale, uniforme in tutti gli Stati della Comunità e ciò per evitare la distorsione nei flussi dei capitali. Sennonché la direttiva non fu adottata e ciò anche in conseguenza dell’esperienza che preoccupò il Governo tedesco: essendo stata introdotta la ritenuta d’acconto del 10% (in sostanza anticipando la preannunciata direttiva comunitaria) si era verificato un notevole deflusso di capitali verso il Lussemburgo. Come è noto specie per l’impulso del Commissario Monti il proposito di introdurre regimi uniformi (tassazione alla fonte

272

ovvero segnalazione all’ Amministrazione di appartenenza del percipiente) è nuovamente emerso, ma nel corso della riunione della Commissione europea agli inizi di dicembre 1999, è naufragato ancora una volta specie per l’opposizione del Regno Unito. Nel quadro delle previsioni dell’Atto Unico, furono adottate le note direttive del luglio 1990 sui dividendi nei rapporti fra società madre e società figlia e sulle operazioni di fusione, scissione, concentrazione, ed il regolamento del settembre

1990 per l’istituzione di un procedimento arbitrale nelle controversie per la determinazione del transfer 's price, ma sempre con riguardo a rapporti fra società collocate in due diversi paesi della Comunità: in Italia, paradossalmente si ha un regime “interno” differenziato, di massima in pejus rispetto a quello comunitario. Nessuno dei provvedimenti riguardava quindi l’“armonizzazione” ovvero, rectius, il “ravvicinamento” delle legislazioni interne in tema di imposte dirette. L’atteggiamento della Comunità fu indubbiamente ispirato dagli Stati membri che avevano adottato al loro interno un ordinamento tributario competitivo per le relazioni internazionali e sensibile all’avvertimento US tax reform challenges Europe. Fra i primi l’Inghilterra: ben noto è lo slogan vogliamo un'Europa delle libertà e non dei regolamenti. E in materia fiscale fu addirittura pubblicata la guida UK as a tax haven!

4. La Commissione sembrò porre attenzione alle problematiche derivanti dalle imposte dirette come fattore di distorsione nella concorrenza nominando un’apposita Commissione (la c.d. Commissione Ruding) per accertare “gli orientamenti in materia di imposizione fiscale delle imprese nel quadro del perfezionamento del mercato interno”. Erano state formulate le seguenti domande: 1) “le differenze d’imposizione fra Stati membri provocano distorsioni nel mercato interno, in particolare per quanto riguarda le decisioni di investimento e la concorrenza? Sono state oggetto di particolare attenzione le distorsioni considerate discriminatorie, come il trattamento dei dividendi di fonte estera?”

2) “nel caso in cui si producano, tali distorsioni possono essere eliminate dal libero gioco delle forze di mercato e dalla concorrenza fiscale fra Stati membri, oppure è necessario un intervento a livello comunitario?” 3) “qualora si ritenesse necessario un intervento a livello comunitario, quali misure specifiche occorre prendere per eliminare o attenuare le distorsioni?” Il Comitato Ruding riscontrò che “le differenze principali nelle imposte sui redditi d’impresa tra gli Stati membri si riferiscono alla natura del sistema delle imposte sulle società, alle aliquote fiscali applicate, alla definizione della base imponibile oltre ai vari tipi di agevolazioni fiscali, alle ritenute alla fonte sui flussi di reddito all’estero e al modo in cui sono previste esenzioni per la doppia imposizione per quanto concerne le entrate derivanti da attività transfrontaliere. Tra i vari paesi esistono anche differenze importanti nelle imposte sulle società prive di personalità giuridica e sul patrimonio netto”.

276

Il Comitato Ruding ha espresso l’avviso che l’aliquota per la tassazione del reddito di impresa deve essere in un range dal 30 al 40%, con un’uniformità dei criteri per la determinazione della base imponibile. Sennonché, secondo quanto riferito dalla Commissione delle Comunità europee (27 luglio

1992, sec.

92, 1118 def.), le conclusioni

del Comitato

sono

state

attenuate e così riassunte: “Il Comitato di riflessione ritiene che non sia necessario né possibile introdurre a breve termine un sistema comune di imposta sulle società. Tuttavia a lungo termine i progressi dell’integrazione ed in particolare l’instaurazione dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria renderanno necessario un tale sistema per garantire la neutralità fiscale nella scelta delle strutture giuridiche delle società, dei metodi di finanziamento e della localizzazione degli investimenti e per permettere la creazione di un efficiente mercato europeo dei valori mobiliari. La maggioranza dei membri del Comitato è favorevole ad un sistema di sgravio della doppia imposizione a livello del beneficiario dei dividendi”. E ancora più attenuate, addirittura sfuggenti, sono le considerazioni della Commissione sul rapporto Ruding: “In generale la Commissione condivide l’impostazione del Comitato per quanto riguarda la problematica posta dal coesistere nella Comunità di sistemi di imposta sulle società molto diversi. Ritiene che sarebbe utile avviare nella Comunità un dibattito sulla scelta di un sistema comune di imposta sulle società, analogo a quello già avviato in sede OCSE e nella maggior parte dei paesi industrializzati. Tale dibattito dovrebbe prendere in considerazione, oltre ai sistemi applicati negli Stati membri e nei principali paesi terzi, le riflessioni in corso nelle diverse sedi nazionali ed internazionali (Tesoro americano, imposizione del cash flow, sistema ACE, ecc.)”. E quindi tutto è rimesso a studi futuri, senza alcuna presa di posizione circa il

ravvicinamento - e neppure l’armonizzazione membri per quanto concerne le imposte dirette.

- delle legislazioni

degli Stati

5. Neppure il Trattato di Maastricht, sottoscritto il 7 febbraio 1992 con l’istituzione dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria ha introdotto novità per quanto riguarda l’applicazione delle imposte dirette. Per quanto riguarda l’Unione Economica gli effetti fondamentali dovevano consistere: nel mercato unico;

nel coordinamento delle politiche economiche degli Stati membri; nelle politiche strutturali e di sviluppo regionale; in più incisive politiche a protezione della concorrenza; in una più oculata gestione dei bilanci pubblici. er ie? a

277

L’Unione Monetaria si fonda essenzialmente: nella fissazione irrevocabile di parita di cambio; sulla totale convertibilita delle monete;

sulla liberalizzazione dei movimenti di capitale; sull’integrazione dei mercati finanziari, fino all’adozione di una moneta unica; sulla creazione di un unico Istituto monetario. CARE STASI

Alcuni autori hanno rinvenuto, implicitamente, negli artt. G (5) e G (25) delle norme che riguardano la tassazione delle società, ma non certo verso l’armonizzazione ed il ravvicinamento delle legislazioni. Come è noto il Trattato ben lungi dal prevedere interventi nel campo fiscale (non è facile comprendere come si possa arrivare ad un’Unione senza attribuire ad essa un proprio potere impositivo) ha imposto alcuni parametri (inflazione 3/3,50%; disavanzo pubblico non oltre il 3% del PIL; debito pubblico non superiore al 60% del PIL; tasso di interesse attorno all’8%). Indubbiamente per l’osservanza dei parametri sul “disavanzo” e sul “debito pubblico” i singoli Stati devono utilizzare la leva fiscale, ma con provvedimenti che di per sé non comportano “armonizzazione” o “ravvicinamento”. Quindi anche per effetto del Trattato di Maastricht è precluso all’Unione dettare norme per il ravvicinamento delle legislazioni interne anche se si riconosce che determinano distorsioni fra le più evidenti la spinta delle imprese nazionali ad “uscire”, o il rallentamento alle imprese straniere ad entrare in un mercato “interno” ove l’ordinamento tributario sia deteriore rispetto a quello di altri Stati dell’Unione. Eppure è ben certo che la localizzazione degli investimenti è anche, e talvolta soprattutto, in funzione dell’assetto tributario. Il Commissario Monti si è impegnato, fra l’altro proponendo l’introduzione di un “codice di condotta”, per eliminare o ridurre i regimi fiscali di favore per attrarre investimenti stranieri (regimi frequentemente attuati dai paesi a noi concorrenti). Ma non si è tenuto conto che le distorsioni possono derivare da regimi di sfavore per le imprese come è il “caso”Italia!

6. L’assetto dell’ordinamento tributario italiano è deteriore rispetto a gran parte di quelli degli altri Stati membri dell’Unione determinando gravi distorsioni ai danni dell’economia nazionale e delle imprese italiane, le quali, ancora prima che italiane sono europee e quindi legittimate a pretendere di essere tutelate contro le distorsioni derivanti dall’assetto interno. Autorità, studiosi, operatori denunciano la

mancanza di certezza, equità, efficienza e trasparenza nella legislazione, nell’amministrazione e nella giustizia, che pure sono essenziali per un appropriato sistema, anche sotto il profilo “concorrenziale”. Per giunta in un quadro di finanza pubblica drammatico: basti considerare che la pressione fiscale è al limite della sopportabilità e l’indebitamento ha superato i due milioni di miliardi.

278

Legislazione La struttura

dell’ordinamento

riforma degli anni agricola e quando spregevoli (tuttora, detrazione, almeno riconosciute nella

è, in molti

aspetti, anacronistica:

risale alla

1971-1973, frutto di esperienze e studi propri di un’economia il profitto era... peccaminoso e i redditi di capitale erano in violazione degli artt. 3 e 53 Cost., non sono ammesse in per i contribuenti privati, le spese e le perdite, solo in parte tassazione di capital gains); ancora forte è l’influenza

dell’“autarchia” così che le operazioni internazionali, in e out, sono penalizzate; endemico è il ritardo nell’attuazione non solo delle direttive, ma addirittura dei

regolamenti comunitari (com’è avvenuto per il GEIE): numerose sono state le sentenze di condanna della Corte di Giustizia pronunciate nei confronti dell’Italia e in buona parte in materia tributaria. La situazione peraltro è migliorata a seguito dell’emanazione annuale delle leggi di adozione dei provvedimenti comunitari. Non sono ancora state attuate norme per la tassazione del “gruppo” nella sua unità; non

sono

state introdotte

all’interno

misure

che dovremmo

attuare

nei

rapporti transnazionali comunitari, per quanto riguarda la ristrutturazione delle imprese, i rapporti fra società madre e figlia, le riduzioni dell’imponibile laddove il fisco lo aumenti nei confronti di altro soggetto partecipante al rapporto (per esempio la rettifica di un ricavo o di una plusvalenza). Il legislatore italiano è rimasto pressoché sordo anche alle “raccomandazioni” comunitarie a favore delle piccole e medie imprese. La complessa legislazione (che in parte era stata “aggiustata” con il testo unico imposte dirette del 1986) negli anni 1990-1995 era peggiorata, sia per la massa e farraginosità dei provvedimenti emanati che per l’abuso della decretazione d’urgenza. La produzione legislativa improvvisata, estemporanea, di pessima tecnica accresce le difficoltà di interpretazione e di applicazione: il Sindacato autonomo dei lavoratori finanziari ha denunciato che i funzionari devono dedicare oltre il 15% del loro tempo solo per leggere (ben maggiore è il tempo per capirli) le norme legislative, i regolamenti, le istruzioni, le circolari, le risoluzioni, le note o gli interventi (talvolta ... sconvolgenti!) del Secit. E il contribuente, che non può

neppure avere il conforto di una meditata dottrina e della giurisprudenza (che non si forma anche a causa dei condoni), non ha neppure la tranquillità che può derivare dai rulings pressoché ignorati dal nostro ordinamento. Già questo determina incertezze e sperequazioni. Ma le sperequazioni sono addirittura

codificate

giacché, per limitarci all’IRPEF,

si riscontrano

differenze

addirittura nell’ambito delle singole categorie di reddito (regime catastale e reddito effettivo per gli immobili, ritenuta e non ritenuta, regime ordinario e forfettario, diversità di aliquote; quale ragionevolezza ha la discriminazione negativa per la tassazione degli interessi da depositi bancari, rispetto a quella degli interessi dei titoli di Stato? ecc.). Le incertezze nell’interpretazione delle norme tributarie sono risolte negli ordinamenti più evoluti con l’istituto del ruling: da noi lo abbiamo introdotto con

279

molta prudenza e limitatamente ad alcune fattispecie; probabilmente si è maturato il tempo per generalizzarlo. Per quanto riguarda i redditi di impresa, che in base all’art. 52 tu. i.d. dovrebbero essere determinati con i criteri “civilistici”, gravi sono le distorsioni tutte intese a far anticipare il pagamento dei tributi. Ne è un esempio tipico la normativa in merito alla deducibilità delle svalutazione e degli accantonamenti su credito, ponendo il limite dello 0,50% del valore dei crediti iscritti a bilancio: la quota delle valutazioni eccedenti tale limite può essere recuperata in sette anni a

partire dall’esercizio successivo. Come è stato rilevato dall’ABI questo sistema, riscontrabile solo nell’ordinamento italiano, comporta un triplice ordine di penalizzazione a carico delle banche italiane con un onere valutato, per il 1998, in Lit. 317 miliardi:

e

una prima “perdita finanziaria”, connessa al rimborso per quote di imposte versate in eccesso in precedenza a fronte delle svalutazioni;

e

una

e

seconda

“perdita

finanziaria”,

connessa

alla quota

di accantonamenti

eccedente il limite dello 0,50% e recuperabile solo al momento dell’emersione delle perdite; una terza “perdita finanziaria”, determinata dalla mancata deducibilità ai fini IRAP degli accantonamenti ammessi in deduzione ai fini IRPEG. Discriminatoria,

con

aspetti

di incostituzionalità,

è la determinazione

nei

confronti delle imprese bancarie, di un’aliquota per l’IRAP più elevata rispetto a quelle previste per le altre imprese. Il che si aggraverebbe laddove fosse accolta una recente proposta del Governo che dispone un aggravio delle aliquote nel caso vi fossero da coprire perdite degli istituti previdenziali. Amministrazione Il prof. Cosciani, padre della riforma degli anni 1971-73, si dimise da presidente dell’apposita Commissione, per la mancanza di concreti provvedimenti e previsioni per adeguare l’amministrazione alle nuove necessità operative. La

situazione addirittura peggiorò allorquando, a distanza di pochi anni, fu agevolato l’esodo e così molti dei migliori funzionari passarono ad altre attività; per oltre un decennio è rimasto stagnante un progetto di legge, che finalmente è stato varato ma, sembra, con scarsi risultati, fra l’altro in gran parte ispirato a criteri burocratici: l’Amministrazione finanziaria è da considerare una azienda da gestire anche con criteri di efficienza e di managerialità. E così permangono gravi difetti e lacune sia per la struttura centrale sia per quella periferica, sul grado di responsabilità e di indipendenza dei funzionari, sulle caratteristiche operative (non basta comprare i computers, occorre personale in grado di utilizzarli), sulla gestione delle informazioni; sul ruolo del Secit, ecc. Un’amministrazione inadeguata non è in grado di osservare e far eseguire neppure la migliore normativa. E ciò va a scapito non solo del gettito, ma dei | contribuenti corretti e anche dell’immagine del paese; uno degli elementi

280

caratterizzanti il buon ordine, secondo le ricerche di raffronto operate in sede internazionale, è il funzionamento della “macchina” fiscale.

L’amministrazione che non funziona non solo premia gli evasori, ma danneggia gli onesti che si vedono notificare accertamenti cervellotici fatti a tavolino con il “tampone”, che non riescono a ricevere adeguate informazioni di comportamento ed ottenere, e comunque a distanza di anni, la restituzione di imposte eccedenti il dovuto. Giustizia La situazione per anni drammatica, sia per il numero delle controversie pendenti, sia per i difetti del sistema, con la recente riforma va migliorando nell’attesa, peraltro, che si faccia un passo decisivo con la nomina di giudici a tempo pieno.

7. Se questa é la situazione, posto che anche a seguito delle innovazioni dettate dal Trattato di Maastricht non solo non ci sono più speranze di interventi, ma anzi sono state introdotte preclusioni all’intervento dell’Unione europea nella legislazione concernente l’imposizione diretta, il nostro legislatore deve assumere con urgenza provvedimenti per ottenere certezza, efficienza, trasparenza ed equità. Ma per ottenere questo è necessario agire simultaneamente sulla legislazione e sulla amministrazione; non si può raggiungere il risultato di un “fisco ordinato” e concorrenziale anche sul piano internazionale (o quanto meno non distorsivo) se la legislazione non è ricomposta e l’amministrazione non è organizzata. Un perfetto assetto giuridico è vano se non si ha un’amministrazione in grado di gestirla; ma vale anche la reciproca, e cioè un’ottima amministrazione non è in grado di gestire un pessimo sistema giuridico. Il Consiglio Nazionale dell’ Economia e del Lavoro nel passato ha dedicato un notevole impegno per contribuire al miglioramento dell’amministrazione, con grandi difficoltà giacché la riforma introdotta con la legge 27 marzo 1992, n. 287 è del tutto inadeguata soprattutto perché non si considera che l’amministrazione finanziaria deve essere gestita soprattutto con criteri aziendalistici per quanto in particolare concerne le responsabilità, l'efficienza e l’economicità. E’ significativo che molti Stati, e per primo il Regno Unito, hanno affidato la riorganizzazione ad istituti specializzati nella consulenza aziendale. Ma l’organizzazione è necessaria anche per predisporre la legislazione: la riforma degli anni 1971-73 fu realizzata in gran parte ed in tanto breve tempo attraverso l'Associazione Italiana fra le società per azioni, attorno alla quale operavano eminenti studiosi e valenti funzionari.

8. Si deve dare atto che negli ultimi mesi notevole è stato lo sforzo per cambiare rotta (pur nella consapevolezza delle difficoltà derivanti dalla situazione che si è

281

determinata nel ventennio decorso), e quindi riordinamento della legislazione e delle procedure, adeguamento della pubblica amministrazione, considerazione per il contribuente che deve essere portato dal rango di “suddito” a quello di “cittadino”; significativi sono stati la compensazione allargata di crediti e debiti, l’autoregolamentazione dell’ Amministrazione, lo Statuto del contribuente che dovrebbe essere di imminente introduzione. Peraltro è stata innescata una bomba ... dirompente della quale pochi si sono accorti perché impegnati nelle dichiarazioni dei redditi cui ha fatto seguito il meritato periodo vacanziero. Mi riferisco all’art. 35 della legge collegata alla finanziaria del 1999 con il quale è stata conferita al Governo la delega (siamo passati in materia tributaria dall’abuso dei decreti legge all’abuso delle leggi delegate: negli ultimi tre anni ben 30 leggi-delega, contenenti 178 deleghe!) a “emanare entro dodici mesi dalla data di entrata in vigore della presente legge, uno O più testi unici che accorpino, anche in codice tributario, le vigenti norme per materia, senza modificarle, con il solo compito di eliminare duplicazioni, chiarire il

significato di norme controverse e produrre testi in cui la materia sia trattata”. Spero non sia l’ennesima dichiarazione di volontà per introdurre anche in Italia un codice tributario (già avanzata con l’art. 47, R.D.L. 1936, n. 1639) e che non è mai stata concretizzata. Ma la novità, e questo sì che è la novità dirompente, è che tra i

principi e criteri direttivi dettati nel 2° comma dell’art. 35, si prevede: “a) semplificazione e razionalizzazione delle disposizioni in materia tributaria, in modo da riservare alla disciplina con norme primarie, nel rispetto dell'art. 23 della_Costituzione, le sole materie riguardanti le fattispecie imponibili e i soggetti passivi e le misure dell'imposta”. In sostanza l’esecutivo verrebbe ad appropriarsi del potere di dettare, attraverso regolamenti, le norme sostanziali in materia tributaria. Il cammino è irto di difficoltà - oltre che per le esigenze di gettito a fronte di spese difficilmente comprimibili e sempre con l’incombenza di un debito pubblico che va sempre crescendo - anche perché a mio avviso non è stato prioritariamente costituito (come da tempo fu auspicato anche in sede CNEL) un organismo permanente e qualificato al quale affidare la ricerca ed il drafting (ho sempre in mente il Joint Committee on Taxation), tanto più necessario, assai indispensabile,

se il Parlamento, per la delega di cui ho detto poc’anzi, verrà sostanzialmente esautorato dal legiferare in materia tributaria. Tema estremamente delicato che dovrà essere esaminato ex funditus. Nel contempo, anche per non arrivare sempre in ritardo rispetto all'evoluzione mondiale, occorre tenere in considerazione le preoccupazioni che si manifestano,

fra gli studiosi ed i politici anche d’oltre Oceano, per effetto della “globalizzazione”: principalmente il fantasma del disappearing the taxpayer che, secondo le previsioni americane, per il prossimo secolo potrebbe determinare l’eliminazione delle imposte dirette (anche per evitare la sperequazione a favore — dei titolari di rendite finanziarie di facile occultamento e delle imprese che si

282

collocano all’estero) e l’accentuazione della tassazione sui consumi interni e sui patrimoni. Indubbiamente l’aspirazione generale è la riduzione della pressione fiscale: per noi sono un miraggio l’adozione di una flat rate tax del 17%, come stanno proponendo i Repubblicani per il loro programma di Governo, e la riduzione del prelievo per 483 miliardi di dollari con l’auspicio dello smantellamento dell’ Internal Revenue Service: Forbes (nel proporre la flat rate del 17%) è giunto ad auspicare «Take this monster, kill it, put a stake through the heart and make sure it never rises again to terrorize the American people».

Senza essere tanto... cruenti potremmo iniziare con l’ammodernare alcuni istituti. 1) Far coincidere realmente la normativa fiscale per la determinazione del reddito di impresa con quella civilistica. 2) Adottare un regime di holding competitivo con quello lussemburghese/olandese: il Governatore della Banca d’Italia ha recentemente denunciato che sono giacenti all’estero in paradisi fiscali 38.000 miliardi. Il moralismo, in materia fiscale, ha scarso successo: non è più produttivo adottare provvedimenti che non inducano a collocazioni al di fuori del territorio? 3) Il sistema bancario negli ultimi anni si è orientato verso la gestione di patrimoni con scarsa attenzione agli investimenti produttivi; questo, secondo l’opinione comune, è dovuto alla scarsa dimestichezza con siffatte attività e la mancanza

di adeguata capacità per decidere sulla base di progetti. Ma il fisco potrebbe costituire

uno

stimolo

introducendo,

come

avviene

all’estero,

un

regime

adeguato per le venture-capital. Praticamente le nostre banche non hanno partecipato ad un mercato che nel 1998 è stato di 7 miliardi di dollari per l’Europa e di 12 miliardi per gli Stati Uniti. 4) La nostra economia necessita, soprattutto, di uno sviluppo tecnologico, ottenuto in altri paesi attraverso le royalty companies. 5) Attribuzione di crediti d’imposta miranti allo stesso scopo, specie per lo sviluppo della tecnologia e del commercio elettronico. Con sempre maggiore frequenza sono lanciati messaggi, da una parte per propugnare una riduzione del prelievo fiscale, e dall’altra per sollecitare investimenti anche da parte dello Stato. Le due richieste sono contrastanti, ma vanno bilanciate: la ricerca e la formazione sono essenziali per lo sviluppo del paese, che secondo quanto accertato dall’organo di controllo per il cambio “2000” (“Glitch-Prone at its best, Rome Trembles at York-Italy seems Least prepared in Western Europe”, Herald Tribune, 11 dicembre

1999) l’Italia, almeno sotto tale

profilo, sarebbe in una situazione non migliore del Perù e dell’Honduras!

283

FROM THE EUROPEN MONETARY GOVERNMENT TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMICS GOVERNMENT A MINISTER OF FINANCE FOR EURO AREA MEMBER COUNTRIES Dario VELO University of Pavia, Italy

1. Introduction

A number of indications lead us to feel that Europe is on the eve of breaking new ground towards a Federal disposition. Enlargement to Central Eastern European countries and the Mediterranean is becoming ever more necessary, and this sets us before the problem of reviewing decisional community mechanisms. Success in monetary unification will in turn favour the development of better government on behalf of the European Economy. The international order which is being outlined puts Europe in a position of new responsibility, which will consequently call for EU institutional reform. The history of the integration process demonstrates that Europe has made its way, step by step towards a more complete disposition, only when matured problems have made such progress necessary and realistic. Progress in European integration requires widespread approval in order to overcome obstacles, which the past and present lie in the way of the future. This kind of consensus may only coagulate in the presence of realistic solutions to unpostponable problems. e This does not diminish the importance of long-term plans (to be carried out over an extensive period), which are to generate and guide necessary energy into new development. “Monetary wisdom” should then utilise such energy to its best at the right time, in the most suitable way. It would therefore be concentrated on focusing on the present objectives as they come to light, enabling the general process to make headway. Another point that the history of integration has illustrated is the continuity over the years of the role held by each individual country every time progress in the integration process has been discussed. France and Germany have always taken initiative, every project has always been opposed by England and has eventually been supported - decisively though late - by Italy. Enlargement to the new members of the European Union has led to the arrival of new actors on the scene, but the above mentioned counter-positions have kept to their basic validity.

284

This interpretation may be completed by underlining the fact that though England has never taken part in the initial phase of a new project, it has joined in at a later date, when the latter has proven successful. It is therefore right to ask ourselves how past experience can best help us to understand the present and more specifically guide us in evaluating possible progress to be made today in Europe, towards a better structured federal disposition (if this, as it appears, is the long term plan followed by the foundation to date, in the European integration process). Facts appear to show that a French/German project is emerging, based on strengthened co-operation between countries which wish to develop common politics without necessarily involving those countries which are contrary or just less interested in such a project. There is a proposal regarding strengthened cooperation in Economics in this project, in order to support the European monetary government with European economic know-how. These two areas may be examined separately so as to gather a serious of implications. It is evident that the two projects actually represent two aspects of one reality, which is the real matter in question.

2. Re-enforced co-operation, Europe in concentric circles, variable geometry: attempts to define order to counter-positions between countries which are in the central system and those considered on the outskirts The proposal to create a re-enforced co-operation system in Europe puts forward new elements as well as those regarding continuity of past experience. Both aspects deserve attention. Continuity may be identified by comparing the re-enforced co-operation project with the past experimentation of integration logic of variable geometry and European models in concentric circles. Such solutions may differ between them, but they have all had problems in common. At the root of the continuity component, we find the counter-position between central system countries and those on the outskirts, which have not been fully involved in the integration process. The central system countries have supported the integration process, searching for a balanced order. The countries on the outskirts have slowed the integration process down and have tended to privilege objectives which differ from those regarding integration balance. There are aspects which differentiate the various re-enforced co-operation projects that are of no less importance between some of the EU member countries. Counter-position between central system countries and those on the outskirts has not always been concentrated on strategic options. In some cases, important objectives have been identified at the core which are able to guide the integration 285

process on a long-term scale. In other cases, specific problems and contingent interests have been identified. It is admissible to make an appropriate evaluation of the aspects regarding continuity and differentiation, in other words, it is incorrect to interpret one trend

as a central phenomenon and the other as something of lesser importance. The integration process has been influenced by both aspects, which must be kept in mind in order to understand solutions to problems as they are identified and selected. The fundamental elements are certainly at the root of the continuity aspects, which emerge every time the chance to redefine the integration process or break new ground arises.

3. From the European economics government

monetary

government

to

the

European

Re-enforced co-operation has made it possible to achieve a historic objective, which is that of the Monetary Union. The decision to establish a Monetary Union was made unanimously, but we are

able to define this agreement as the first example of “de facto” re-enforced cooperation, thanks to the identification of two distinct groups of countries involved: those ready to give up their monetary “sovereignty” and those who preferred to postpone taking this decision. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that only eleven countries have the right to take part in decision-making regarding the functioning of the Monetary Union. The field concerning the Euro does not coincide with that of the European Union, but with central system countries and some other countries drawn by the strong will to integrate. The constitutional features of the European Central Bank have made for a smoother initial set off of re-enforced co-operation, with the decision to establish a Monetary Union. The federal characteristic of European development has been confirmed in a federal type statute for ECB. Perhaps it would be right to acknowledge the fact that the institutional characteristics decided on for ECB have contributed to enhancing the federal style of the community system. The federal order has been re-enforced by transferring the authority to mint money from the national authorities to a functional, independent, European authority like ECB. Monetary power has neither been transferred to the Commission, nor to European Parliament, nor to any other political authority. The independence of ECB guarantees that the monetary system will be run with the utmost care favouring its value stability. This choice is in line with the fundamental constitutional principle at the base © of European development, represented by the subsidiarity principle. Neutralisation of this monetary system brings out the importance of fiscal politics. Neutralisation

286

of this money is bound to support the development of fiscal federalism together with the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. It is therefore clear how the Monetary Union managed to get off the ground with a re-enforced co-operation system. The eleven members of the Monetary Union did not try to concentrate the power related to the creation of European money in their hands, but actually gave up their monetary sovereignty in favour of a functional authority which acts in the interest of the European Union as a whole. The real power gained by the eleven countries which founded the Monetary Union is to be seen in their self-promotion as central system countries. The four countries that have not joined as yet, have maintained their monetary sovereignty, even though this is becoming more and more of an illusion, as they have taken on the role of peripheric countries. A similar solution would only be advisable in the case of the European economic government, if such objective did not require centralisation of fiscal power on a European level. The problem which comes to light here, is whether it is possible to have a European government without a substantial increase in the federal budget. This is of crucial importance and must be clarified.

4. The community budget and the European economic government The plan to establish an economic government and increase the community budget beyond a set threshold have been overlapping objectives which have come to coincide in the European political-economical debate. Most economists and European authorities support the idea that only a significant increase in the community budget can seriously favour a policy of development, - or more generally, an economic policy - on a European level. The clearest and most coherent of these may be identified in the Delhors Plan. At a theoretical level one may wonder whether this is the European version of the historical American New Deal experience. From this point of view, it is admissible to wonder what influence the Keynesian ideology and the state and centralising tradition have had in supporting this development. From an historical point of view, the Delhors Package was a failure. The reasons behind this failure need to be understood in order to verify whether structural or simply contingent (and therefore by definition more variable) elements are responsible. In order to guide our thoughts, it is worth noting that reference to re-enforced co-operation can be useful. It is evident that such a method cannot guarantee a significant increase in the European budget and therefore the creation of a European economic policy based on the centralisation of fiscal power. It is hardly feasible to imagine that a few of the European countries accept fiscal responsibility for a European spending policy which will spread its beneficial effects throughout Europe. The contrast between the expenses covered by just a

287

few countries and then advantages to be gathered by all member countries is politically unacceptable. An increase in the European budget can only be fruit of a decision involving all member countries, in other words, as things stand at present,

only the fruit of a unanimous decision. It does not appear practical (or at least if so, only relatively) for the transfer of responsibility to functional authorities to be repeated on an economical level. This transfer was achieved successfully at monetary level with ECB. This approach has been followed and has borne positive fruits, but only with just a limited impact. My example refers to the role taken on by EIB and ERDB as European project financers. The two financial institutions have favoured the development of coherent European policies, both in home affairs and towards neighbouring countries, without needing to increase the community budget. Their independence has made it possible to disburse financing transparently, according to pre-defined criteria referable to correct financial logic. The success achieved stands to confirm the importance of this option, particularly in the case of EIB. As this method can favour the achievement of a European economic government, the two financing institutions - or other such realities which may be created under a similar logic - should take on a wider scale and see modification of resource allocation criteria. The two institutions would be used unnaturally in an attempt to reach objectives other than those originally planned and for which they had been created. The problem is that, when speaking of the European economic government, one implies a political dimension which may not be given up, that makes the possibility of achieving such a government impractical by means of functional authority development. The latter may play a complementary role of great importance, but not of substitution. Therefore,

the

question

arises

as

to

whether

the

European

economic

government may be followed tracing the re-enforced co-operation method (meaning that it would not be necessary to increase the community budget). This would represent a turning point compared to the traditional approach to the problem, developed on a European level.

S. Subsidiarity and re-enforced co-operation The alternative to increasing the community budget is to co-ordinate fiscal policy. This may be done in the re-enforced co-operation area, between countries which accept such an objective and are compatible with subsidiarity development. The critical point in this alternative is to know whether co-ordination of fiscal policy can offer an adequate solution in order to affirm a European economic government.

288

During the European construction phase, national policy was co-ordinated between countries, thanks to orientation ability in the order of international economics. In this framework, convergence of home policy was so great as to appear natural, without the need for any intervention. The crisis in international order has created the need for management aware of co-ordination/unification in home affairs. It is a question of evaluating (under regulations in force at present) whether international order has a degree of stability which is strong enough to create reasonable co-ordination of home policy, or whether the instability risk is such that greater unification of home policy is therefore necessary, confirming European policy with a high level of decisional centralisation. This goes for all sector policies, though at different levels and all the more so for economic policies directly related to impact on “governance” system. The ideas which can guarantee co-ordination effectiveness in fiscal policy in a framework of re-enforced co-operation are: increasing world stability in a globalisation framework and increasing European stability in the Monetary Union framework. Without going into an in-depth analysis of such theories, we may presume that their interdependence could re-enforce each of them with an evolving approach. European and international stability may favour the structuring of co-ordination in fiscal policy in order to support the development of fiscal federalism and therefore of the subsidiarity principle. This implies the transfer from a “negative co-ordination” (Stability Pact) to a “positive co-ordination” (search for a shared and articulated society project). The objectives followed with such a transformation make the nature of the integration process itself and the model of European society which it tends towards, the focus of debate. Here, it is worth asking which tools are eligible to support this process (under the present regulations in force) and determine an effective form of co-ordination in economic policy.

6. A Minister of Finance for the Euro field

The heart of the problem is to identify a coherent solution with two types of bond: a solution which may fit into the framework of re-enforced co-operation, and be able to respond adequately to the need to support the European Monetary government with a European Economic government. This definition guides the consideration towards a specific European sector made up of the Euro area. It is necessary to find a solution for member countries, which does not burden them with the costs of non-member countries. The solution may be found in the co-ordination of fiscal policy of Euro area countries,

with the election of a Minister

Council Ministers.

289

of Finance,

selected

from the Euro

The greater the stability between the countries that participate in the Euro area, the more effective the solution is likely to be, compared to those remaining countries which decide not to give up their monetary sovereignty. A decision taken like this creates significant institutional problems. It does not refer to the Commission, but to Euro Committee.

European institutional balance is based on several rules, the most important of which regards the relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament. Giving importance to the Euro Committee and more generally to re-enforced co-operation, sets us before the problem of a new relationship with the European Parliament or a part of it. May we go back for a moment to a proposal made by us a few years ago, which foresaw the possibility of specializing the European Parliament in Brussels, holding plenary assembly with all the representatives of member countries, therefore making it a centre for institutional dialogue between European Parliament and Commission. Parallel to this, the European Parliament in Strasbourg was to become specialised too, holding assemblies only for members of those countries which participated in re-enforced co-operation, making it a centre for dialogue between European Parliament and re-enforced co-operation organisms. À similar solution is open to the idea that central system countries are willing to make progress towards greater political unity, respecting co-operation agreements taken on a community level.

290

SEZIONE II

ASPETTI SOCIALI E STORICI / SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL ISSUES

i st

sale

urta ; 0

giri

- ec

“a=i

:

plant

mass

VIEe ste À

ad

ER

ie

ki |

wife. CARE

"a

DES YW CO

mao

DTA

us

Pea 1

i?

ver |

AON 560%

Rina, base poss tow ca

aieAE conta 2

dea:

cir “n

+

vk

ps tas dle”:

LAÀ

ù

onal | Ss),

I

!

de

vai.

ie ie I

"Soe Burns PU

i cinte) ba eae Pima hat no, 2 tise

te rm" i

oe 1

dv frs Teens! par

uz

I

va

À « cru He|

DI Arda

ve

LL hors

er gusarm,! >

| na x

Ai ds dhe WON è

jissi “sparata aaycanna

THE NETWORK POLITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: INTIMATIONS OF POST-TERRITORIAL SPACE Barrie AXFORD and Richard HUGGINS Brookes University of Oxford, United Kingdom

1. Introduction

In the global age the idea of a united Europe remains elusive, even when applied narrowly to the European Union, which, depending on your point of view, either stands as the most audacious experiment in post-territorial governance in the modern world, or just a tribute to advanced multi-lateralism. This elusiveness stems in part from the vagaries of what is still a completely partisan enterprise, the product of political agendas that continue to traffic different visions of European unity. In part it springs from the protean qualities of the wider European and global environments in the past decade or so. But it also demonstrates the fact that the assumed logics of European integration have been problematised by major changes taking place in world-wide rationalistic culture where, until recently, territoriality was the most powerful constitutive rule (Axford and Huggins, 1998; Meyer et al, 1997; Anderson, i996). These changes are conveniently summarised as the impact of globalisation upon nation-state autonomy and upon national definitions of value, but also upon the prospects for both super and supra-statist models of regional integration, where these are still rooted in territorialist assumptions about the nature of rule. In this paper we will examine the idea of a European network polity, which is de-spatialised, multi-layered and multi-nodal, and based upon networks of interaction which are local, regional, national, European and global in scope. The discussion that follows takes place at a fairly high level of abstraction, but that is defensible given that the main concern of the paper is to encourage different imaginings of European unity’.

' In other work we have sought to exemplify the idea of a network polity in Europe by reference to the concept and programmes of the European Information Society. See our chapter in D. Smith and S. Wright (eds.) Whose Europe?: the turn towards democracy, Sociological Review Monograph, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, pp. 173-207.

291

2. What Europe? As part of a renewed commentators,

(Anderson,

a united Europe,

interest in “re-imagining” 1996;

Ruggie,

1993)

revisited

have

Hedley

some Bull’s

reflections on the prospects for a “new medievalism” (1977) in which the concept of territorial sovereignty has little meaning and where authority is exercised jointly and severally by states, by regional and world authorities and by a host of formal and informal

global, trans-state and sub-state actors.

In such a political order,

loyalty is shared rather than exclusive and identities are either multiple or hybrid. There is also a growing willingness to describe some developments in transnational politics as avatars of non or post-territorial governance, thereby conjuring the image of a postmodern state or polity in Europe. Other less exotic, but possibly more idealistic interpretations, refer to the prospects for a post-Westphalian, or a cosmopolitan model of European governance (Goodman, 1998). All such imagery is appropriate in a world where modern institutions and cultural practices are everywhere under challenge, but, as we shall see, the idea of a postmodern polity, or of governance without territorial government, leaves moot important questions about what sort of polity and what kind of identities can subsist in a post-territorial, postmodern “space of flows”. In other words, the social morphology of the postnational polity in Europe remains moot. Yet, in his well-known analysis of the “unbundling” of statist sovereignty in Europe, John Ruggie intimates that the EU may be the world’s first postmodern form of transnational governance (1993). Ruggie’s interpretation of the EU as a “space of flows” rather than a territory to be governed or regulated in the conventional sense of these terms was a timely reminder not to confuse the construction of de-spatialised networks and communities or neo-communities with the processes of nation and state-building characteristic of the transition from premodern to modern societies. A strong reading of Ruggie’s account depicts Europe — even “united” Europe - as a space created and reproduced through transnational, regional and local networks of interaction, involving, for example, cultural, commercial, scientific, financial and educational actors and interests. The same

model of radical interdependence across borders is glimpsed in Manuel Castells’s rather allusive discussion of the “network state” in Europe (1998), while for Michael Mann (1998, pp. 184-207), “Euro”, as he puts it, is really just a web of interaction networks, composed of multiple, overlapping and intersecting networks of,

for

example,

technical

specialists,

Euromanagers,

businesses,

Socrates

exchange students, even football hooligans. Mann’s Euro lacks overall internal cohesion of the sort standard in most territorial states and it also cannot effect external closure. One need not agree fully with any of these accounts to recognise that new forms of spatial practice are emerging to interrogate received definitions of and prescriptions for the organisation of political, economic and cultural space. In practical terms these forms are part of a dynamic re-shaping of world-society

292

through the opportunities they provide for re-imagining and re-enacting the scale of social organisation, and because of the scope they offer for re-defining the behaviour and possibly the identity of divers actors. In the hackneyed antinomy between intergovernmentalist and integrationist visions of unity, Europe is still relatively ordered politically and emotionally through the competing claims of national and European or supranational jurisdictions, competences and identities, while the whole debate is bracketed intellectually by the still dominant imagery and “inarticulate major premises” of territorial rule. These premises, as James Caporaso says (1996) have acted as a conceptual grid informing both theoretical and practitioner discourse on European integration. At the same time it is important to remember that even if it is possible to define Europe as an intersubjective web of connections and reciprocities tying the continent together in complex fashion, it is not, and probably never can be, just that. Let us carry this point a little further, as a way of demonstrating the complexities of re-imagining Europe. The processes of globalisation and of regional integration have relativised identities by penetrating or dissolving the boundaries around relatively closed systems, and by creating trans-societal and post-territorial discursive spaces and networks of relationships along the time-space edges of existence. Along the way, important transformations may be in train; for example, in signifiers such as locality, and in the key associations of citizenship and nationality (Axford, 2000). Because of these shifts, it is now less clear what constitutes a political community, nor what factors define various statuses and identities under it. A more prosaic, but still powerful reminder of this putative transformation in the architecture of governance and the conduct of democratic politics, is provided by James Rosenau (1998, 30). He too is exercised by the notion that legitimate systems of rule can be exerted and maintained even in the absence of established legal and political authority, and across, even regardless of, conventional borders. In his account,

what musters as global governance is very disaggregated, with multiple centres of authority and a growing number of skilful and well-resourced players, (Rosenau and Fagen, 1997). Rosenau’s model of global governance is, of course, at one with

more nuanced accounts of the EU as a “multi-level” and multi-agency polity or one characterised by the “new governance”, both of which trade on the greater pluralism and relative statelessness of the EU (Hix, 1998; Marks, 1993). Of course, it is still unclear whether any version of “governance without government” amounts to, or should be considered as a simulacrum of a democratic polity and civil society. When it comes to the crunch, such descriptions may be no more than convenient metaphors for a world in turmoil, but they do emphasise the fragility of territorial boundaries and identities and the burgeoning forces of both localism and globalism. In fact, very few treatments of European unity from within the established political science paradigm do, more than flirt with the notion of a postmodern polity. More common is a robust neo-liberal interpretation of the boundary dissolving power of economic transactions, seen in the pristine logic of the Single

293

European Act. The issue of spatial transformation is usually skirted, with any notionally “postmodern” features being treated just as instrumentalities (Smith, 1997). Of course, whole-hearted postmodernist accounts abjure any holistic idea of “Europe” at all, purporting to see the world in general “branching into fractal nets” (Luke, 1995). For example, Timothy Luke’s work on postmodern geographies and on the impact of new technologies upon sovereign spaces consists of a sustained anti-realist diatribe in which various de-nationalised agents are prime movers in the creation of “neo-world orders”, each made from rearranged glocal space. The outcome is a more dynamic, more interconnected, yet more fragmented and fluid milieu for enacting authority and managing flows of influence from multiple sources, than can be contained by the Euclidean geometry and identity spaces of territorialised or super-territorialised modernity. To reiterate, in these radical positions a “united” Europe would be no more than a “space of flows”, pace Ruggie, or a de-territorialised space where the logic of market opportunity, to quote Richard Falk (1998), no longer coincides with the logic of territorial loyalty. Even so, Ruggie is suitably cautious on the prospects for a de-territorialised politics and de-territorialised governance, describing a Europe deconstructing into a non-territorial space of flows, which also subsists with the more conventional space of places. In a space of flows, concerns about identity, or the charge of being seen as inauthentic in some way or other, are less salient than in the rough and tumble of usual politics, because identities are no more than the sum of shifting preferences or whim. Governance now appears as the management of mutable expressions of interest and of difference.

Borders

too, so crucial to the political and cultural

landscapes of the modern world, “melt into air” to borrow a phrase. As Philip Schlesinger and Nancy Morris opine, one might easily draw the conclusion that the spaces of most collective identities have already become “de-territorialised”, due to migration and the creation of electronic communities, and that borders - to taste and imagination, as well as around jurisdictions» are all relativised (1997, 23). But in Europe, as elsewhere in the world, borders continue to matter. Ethno-territorial

disputes, even civilizational conflicts, have proliferated in the wrack of Soviet hegemony and there is a growing commitment to orthodoxies which celebrate exclusion and appeal to the secureness of closed communities against the depredations of any number of demonised others, or of mere strangers. Even within the post-historical core of “Euroland” policies on refugees and asylum seekers vitiate claims to inclusion. So places and borders count, along with the identities and symbolism attached to them. When discussing the appropriateness of labels like post-national or postmodern in relation to the political and cultural morphology of Europe and European unity, it is as well to remember that we should not reduce places (localities, any territories) to spaces through which meanings flow. Many people, including those already routinely engaged in transnational flows and networks Euro-lobbyists, Green activists, commodity brokers, even Jobbing academics - may

294

enact intense and visceral identities as locals and nationals and continue to behave as though “real” culture is fully the property of particular territories and bounded societies (Axford, 2000). Because of this the more grainy reality is that older frameworks of collective identity continue to exist alongside new, de-territorialised spaces and flows, including transnational mediascapes, finanscapes and ethnoscapes (Appadurai, 1990). The tortuous processes of European integration, as Schlesinger and Norris argue, produce «dislocations in these diverse modes of collective being - older and newer - bringing about new problems of socio-cultural coherence, as well as ushering in new opportunities for affiliation» (1997, 23). In other respects the idea of or prospects for a postmodern, post-territorial polity in Europe run up against issues which go to the heart of the democratic project. First is the objection that the anti-categorical flavour of postmodernism is inimical to the “imaginary presuppositions” of liberal democracy itself (McLennan, 1995, 93). The

argument

here is that a true demos

can not subsist in a post-

territorial space of governance, where the emphasis is on shifting identities and difference, and there is no sense of belonging to a common endeavour, nor, in Europe, the moral currency and cultural and social capital with which to build one. Second, the claims that a networked Europe might constitute a post-national space of governance leaves some commentors lamenting the alleged loss of community that results at a national level, a loss that subverts both liberal and communitarian

strains of democracy. The “thin” but universalist political identities of liberal democracy and the “thick” particularisms of communitarian ideology are said to be compromised where there is no community of fate or affect, no jumble of meanings that tie people to a particular place and a particular culture. In other words, undone by the very rootlessness of a de-spatialised, networked polity. Third, the prospects for active and practical citizenship, central to republican traditions of democracy, are held to be undermined because of the logistical and resource problems of ensuring effective participation by non-elites in a postnational politics; and fourth, even in the fluid and mutable

difficulties remain about criteria for inclusion directionality of flows of influence across them.

world of networks,

and exclusion

and about

the

3. The concept of a post-national, post-territorial polity in Europe In realist accounts of international relations the ontology of actors is given and the world ordered through the rational and self-interested motivations and behaviour of autonomous state actors. In such accounts, integration is the product of enduringly intergovernmental relations between independent states, whose collective behaviour corresponds to a kind of rational anarchy. In a recent tour-deforce, Hirst and Thompson (1999) have recourse to neo and micro-realist arguments to shore up the idea of the independent nation-state surviving the

pressures

of the worldwide

culture and practice of economic 295

neo-liberalism.

ly also adopt what is really a macro-realist stance on the location of Confusingthey the EU as somewhere between a supra-territorialist entity and a dense network of transactions and interdependences among still powerful state actors. Variations on the realist theme found, for example, in liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravscik, 1993) also continue to stress the importance of key state actors to the integration process, through their bargaining strategies and in respect of convergence in key areas of policy, such as market liberalisation. In all such accounts territoriality remains the dominant discourse. By contrast, neoliberal variants and functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to European integration (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991) stress “low politics” as an important dynamic of international relations. The “low politics” of European integration is predicated on the power of economic and functional integration to effect ever closer union, against the “high politics” of state autonomy and sovereignty. The “spillover” from pragmatic accommodations by various actors to shifts in the locus of decision-making, or to the growing density of routine

communications

and

other transactions

across

borders,

leads

to a

community of interest and affect based on strengthened European institutions and a greater sense of European identity. Curiously, “low politics” in the guise of citizen action has been hard to find in the constitutive account of actually existing integration in the EU and its predecessors, which is almost a textbook case of topdown bureaucratic elitism and high politics. There is some evidence that this situation is changing, and that forms of sub-politics, from localities, citizen groups,

social movements and more assertive expressions of public opinion, such as occurred in Denmark in the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and the vote over membership of EMU, are beginning to enact a European polity “from below”. With the possible exception of some neo-functionalist positions and those labelled “transactionalist” (Deutsch, 1953), all the preceding models work within a

territorialist paradigm, even where they advocate or predict a European entity which is above the nation-state. Of late, the study of European integration and of the European Union in particular has taken a*rather different slant, where the conceit is to depict the EU as an interesting variant of the genus state, complete with a functioning political system, albeit one which is only relatively institutionalised, centralised and differentiated, by comparison with the classical models of the recent European past (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Hix, 1998). This

relatively stateless entity is understood by some (Majone, 1996) as a form of “regulatory state”, probably federal in demeanour and best typified by the United States in the days before the New Deal. More in line with our argument is the widely canvassed treatment of the EU as a form of “new governance” (Marks, 1993; Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). In

this “new orthodoxy” (Hix, 1998, 41) the EU has become a unique system of “multi-level governance” (Marks, 1993). The use of the term governance again underlines the lack of any necessary relation to territorial state models, while still implying the existence of robust political and policy processes in which state, nonstate sub-state and trans-state actors all play a part. But the real charge in the new

296

governance model of European unity is that it elevates governance beyond, rather than simply above the state to the most definitive feature of the new polity. Both territorial and functional interests and constituencies operate through more-or-less open policy communities and networks, and the regulation of the borderless economic space created by the internal market in Europe provides the dynamic for a more “polycentric and non-hierarchical” form of governance (Jachtenfuchs, 1997, 40, and 1995). As Hix notes (1998, 40), «with no clear hierarchy of power and competence anywhere in this process, this is “governance without government”» (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Which judgement is plausible, primarily because, as Rosenau says (1998, pp. 40-47) in de-territorialised spaces of governance, it is still possible to discern functional equivalents for those institutions and practices characteristic of territorial polities and democracies. These are visible in the decentralization of power and decision-making authority to intra-state regions and localities; in the kind of transnational private interest government exercised by NGOs; in the scope for the emergence of global and European publics through the activities of social movements and epistemic communities; through the networking of localities and “natural” economic zones across borders (Ohmae, 1992) and in the capacity for electronic communications both to compress the world and enlarge the scope for citizen interaction and participation. Equivalent it may be, but this sort of governance is still unlike any state-centric, hierarchical and compliance driven model of rule. Most telling of all, it does, or may, signal the ways in which a postterritorial state or polity (Caporaso, 1996) might not just subsist, but prosper as a democratic endeavour. For all that, the difficulty with imagining a post-national polity is that much of the evidence currently available is not systematic, although this is beginning to change (see, for example, Kohler, 1998 and Boli and Thomas, 1997) to the extent that there are now available some proper intimations of supra-territoriality. First, is the sense that, however defined, borders can no longer be seen as enclosures that

are effectively policed by nation-states. Just to rehearse the point: the state as the guardian of defence and guarantor of societal values and collective identity, has been hollowed out, in the hackneyed, but apposite, expression, and many of its functions extra-territorialised. Because of this there is no reason to believe that a European Union made in the image of a territorialised state would be any more successful in policing its borders, leaving aside the vexed question of where these would be located (especially in the context of a “wider” Europe) and (in the case of culture) how they might be defined. Second, much power, especially in the form of capital, flows across borders and through places (Castells, 1996). In the European Union, it would be a simplification, but still a recognisable truth, that while constitutional law remains largely national the economy and some aspects of economic law have become Europeanised (Jachtenfuchs, 1997, 6). According to Baumann (1998, 9) much power has become “emancipated from politics”, which he takes to be resolutely national. While this dichotomy is

297

plausible, it is over-simplified. A more complex rendering of the impact of regional and global integration on the political community that is, or was, the nation-state, would be to argue that the growing salience of transnational processes and institutions is weakening, or at least altering scope and competence of statist government. They are also affecting meaning of citizenship within states (Falk, 1998). This is an interesting argument, one predicated on the decline of national traditions of citizenship as a direct result of the increase in bonds of interest and solidarity across borders, and on the loss of social capital and hence of motivation, within them (Putnam, 1995; Boyte, 1996).

Elites in general, are more and more likely to create links and solidaries across borders as well as, maybe rather than, within them. Other citizens, concerned either

to resist or augment the effects of Europeanisation and globalisation increasingly follow suit, organising locally, nationally and transnationally. Arguably, political and economic elites are able to act more effectively at the European level, while this much less true of social movements,

some organised interests, such as trade

unions and consumer groups, and various public interest groups. In either case, it is vital to avoid slippage into neo-functionalist determinism and retain the sense that these are negotiated and contingent adjustments on the part of reflexive actors. Third, the construction of a non-state citizenship is being effected already through EU policy and treaty provisions (Soysal, 1995; Wiener, 1997). This remains a contested area, one which captures the tensions in the national-postnational dichotomy. Citizenship of the EU is granted to those who hold the nationality of a member state. However, the rights attached to the status of Citizen of the European Union, which extend to local voting rights based on residence, are rights irrespective of nationality, and thus instantiate the principles of supra-territoriality. The emergence of transnational networks of activists of the sort canvassed, notably, by Richard Falk, point up the tensions between the claims of citizenship and those of nationality, and between the notion of a procedural citizenship based on rights and the substance of a citizenship basèd on participation - low politics again. Networks also contribute to the formation of transnational public spaces and the prospects, at least, for a form of transnational discursive citizenship, although

here too it could be argued that the gap between deliberation in the form of communicative rationality and the sort of purposive discourse that denotes a practical citizenship, may be wider in the post-national polity than in bounded national systems. Paradoxically, organised transnationalisation is often fuelled by enduring concerns with the protection of particular identities which may be local or national, as well as ethnic in origin (Kastoryano, 1998). Fourth, there has been what Sidney Tarrow calls a marked “Europeanisation of conflict” (1995) through the agency of Euro-groups and transnational movements, where the locus of conflict is shifted to the Community level. For example, in Italy, a growing | concern with immigration from North Africa is perceived as a European, rather than an Italian problem, stemming form EU policies that have turned Europe into a world space. Resolution is sought at the European level of governance, not

298

elsewhere. By the same token the scope for transnational governance in the shape of policy networks and communities is enhanced greatly by the willingness of corporate and other actors to engage with European institutions as regulators and major allocators of value. The question remains as to how far this engagement Europeanises actors, and what this means, as opposed to simply altering their behaviour. Finally, there is the space and time devouring capacities of electronic communications and networks and the opportunities they provide to imagine new spaces of governance and sociality. Castells’s monumental exegesis on the “network society” (1996 and 1997a and b) is perhaps the most complete statement on the importance of information technologies in the spread of networks throughout the entire social structures of bounded societies and beyond, but the thesis is also common currency among those who discern “postmodern geographies” in the networks and flows of the information age (O’Tuathail, 1998). In O’Tuathail’s wonderfully polemical account of the demise of territorialist narratives, “telemetricality” has remade the “bonds, boundaries and subjectivities of actors, societies and polities, as they have unfolded across global space” (1998,

6). How do these ideas map onto the European context?

4, The network polity in Europe The de-territorialisation of the functions of governance and the growth of transborder communities and networks in Europe point towards an embryonic postterritorial polity. This emergent polity displays elements of the new governance, but its most characteristic feature is that it is a postmodern space of flows, of communities without unity, increasingly pluralistic, open and founded on networks. Of course, interest in networks is now widespread across the social sciences and beyond. There is no complete agreement on what constitutes a network, although it is generally understood that a network is an open structure, sometimes with a set of relatively stable relationships, but sometimes not. These relationships are of a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature. Networks have no common or central principle of organisation and they are not reliant on functional integration for their survival. Where they involve human agency, networks are usually peopled by those who share a common interest and perhaps a common identity. Castells notes that networks have nodes and not centres and peripheries, and these can be linked through both symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships. In terms of the architecture of governance, networks look very postmodern. In the study of European integration much of the work done by political scientists has centred on the phenomenon of policy networks. Within this genre a divide exists between those studies which treat network analysis as a gloss on the study of interest mediation, or which see policy networks as a functional solution to the coordination problems of modern societies, and those which see networks as

299

a new form of governance much akin to the “governance without government” perspective (Borzel, 1997). As Borzel indicates, this latter approach is not exercised by whether the nation-state is getting stronger or weaker, but with the transformation and the “Europeanisation” of the state, in which it commutes from actor to arena. The Europeanisation of the territorial state is seen as a process which de-borders action and fragments the state. In this process, policy networks are seminal actors (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). As a model for contemporary governance in Europe the policy network model captures the indeterminate nature of the European Union as a system of rule. However, we need to travel beyond even the more radical model outlined above in

order to grasp the utility of the network model as a metaphor for a post-national polity. In part this is a matter of widening the scope of inquiry, of recognising the ubiquity of all sorts of networks in European and global space. It is also necessary to treat with networks as collective actors rather than just arenas for interaction, as

potential contexts for the transformation of identities and as expressive as well as instrumental.

5. The network metaphor and post-nationalisation Processes of Europeanisation and globalisation move through the negotiated and often contingent articulation between local subjects and more encompassing flows and structures. The growing complexity of these articulations at least intimates the possibility of disorder, rather than the functional closure required by most models of nation and state-building and contained in the idea of “stages” of integration, since the connections reveal new sites for potential conflict and new opportunities for structuration and transformation. Tim Luke has it that “moving from

place

to

flow,

terrains

to

streams,

introduces

non-perspectival,

anti-

hierarchical and disorganisational elements into traditional spatial/industrial/national notions of sovereignty” (1995, 127). So notions of a united Europe, or of the EU as a web of interconnectedness do not, cannot describe

a featureless, anodyne field. Rather, it is possible to discern multiple configurations or several versions of Europe (Axford, 2000) which, at least for the time being, coexist. United Europe partakes of some elements of state-centred coordination, a hint of supranationalism and a growing amount of non-hierarchical, cross-border networking. The latter Europe is seen particularly in the growing reach and density of networks and flows: of goods between nations, through migration, business and tourism, as well as in the post-national politics of INGOs and the cyborg cultures of “organisationless” transnational corporations which, through strategic networking, show a “single face” to the world. Such interconnections connect : Europe in a visible and perhaps a measurable way, but do so mainly because they are redefining the experiences and perceptions of more and more actors. Thus the

300

taxonomic status of a “European” company could lie more in its management style and corporate culture than it does in objective measures of Europeanness, such as the proportion of its operations and employees abroad. In this milieu, the European becomes the cognitive frame of reference for many actors in many domains, although it remains less so in matters of culture and meaning. The networked Europe created out of the intersection and entwining of these multiple configurations is disordered, perhaps chaotic in the sense suggested by Jonathan Friedman (1997). In it ontological certainties are themselves relativised, and as we have argued, constitutive rules, even hegemonic scripts like that of territoriality are increasingly challenged through the transformative capacities of trans or de-nationalised agency. As a metaphor for such a world, the imagery of transnational networks is entirely appropriate. So the advantages of network analysis for reimagining Europe are obvious. For one thing, it affords a more systematic picture of the organisation of social relations than is possible in any purely postmodernist account, where only the discursive practices of individual actors are deemed relevant. In network analysis, both the frames of meaning used by actors and the circumstances in and on which they act are admissable. This admissibility involves understanding the reflexive relationships between the actor and a notionally external world, which is both natural and social. We say “notional” to emphasise the point that actors enact their environments, but as suggested above, this does not mean that the external world is

simply a mirror of “internal” identity or consciousness, as in autopoietic systems. Ulf Hannerz says that the global ecumene is a network of networks where individuals and groups are drawn into “a more globalised existence” (1992, 47) and the morphology of networks facilitates this shift. Arguably, but without any trace of neo-functionalist determinism, the same is happening in Europe. In the first place, networks can be intra and inter as well as trans-organisational, and can cut across more conventional units of analysis to clarify linkages which exist between different personal and institutional domains (Axford, 1995, 78-82). Most appropriate to the European and global setting, networks can structure social relationships without constraint of place or the need for co-presence. Much of the recent work done by cultural anthropologists addresses the ways in which local and global social relationships are articulated and either reproduced or transformed by sustained or fleeting encounters. By contrast, in the field of International Relations the interest in networks, most pronounced in the study of international regimes, has stemmed largely from a concern with the problems of cooperation in a world still governed by the rational anarchy of the international system of states. More recent and theoretically impertinent work does look to explore the ways in which global instabilities are challenging the bordered world of states, having regard for the burgeoning number of “post-national mobilizations” (Shapiro and Alker, 1995) that are both the product of that instability and which subvent it. The network perspective draws attention to those increasingly widespread and diverse forms of transnational mobilization found in networks, whether of business

301

men and women, of exchange students, or of pen pals and diasporas, whose relationships (pace Hannerz) may be either long-distance or involve a mixture of presence and absence, of coming together and moving apart, of brief encounters on the telephone, or extended dialogues, or many-to-many exchanges on the Net. The strength of the network metaphor is that it captures the openness of social relationships which do not involve just economic or market exchanges, and are not just governed by administrative rules, the systematic use of power, or the constraints of place. In this it shares some of the anti-categorical fervour of postmodernist positions. The network idea, perhaps we should say the network ideal,

stresses

complementarity

and

commitment,

as

well

as

accommodation

between participants, in which the key entanglements are reciprocity and trust, both attributes necessary in building communities. This does not mean that power and conflict are absent from networked relations, which are unlikely to be entirely pacific. Doreen Massey (1995) cautions the need to be aware of the powergeometry present in de-spatialised social relations, and this is a pertinent reminder that the organisation of diversity in the networked polity, is often quite brutal, attesting to great asymmetries of power. This noted, the network metaphor affords insights into a Europe becoming more integrated, while acknowledging that the processes of integration are “more pluralistic, decentralized and mutable” (Marcus and Fisher, quoted in Hannerz, 1992, 36) than is often assumed. Network analysis portrays a looseness and diversity which go some way to capture the inchoate character of current Europeanisation and globalisation, and offers a glimpse of the diverse contexts through which a more acute consciousness of the Europe and the world is occurring for many people. Indeed, the very looseness and inchoateness of the globalised, post-hegemonic world itself accelerates the dissolution of bounded and autonomous nation-states and territorial geo-politics. The postmodern feel of this liminal. environment is palpable, as the borders between the domestic, the international and the global implode, to reveal “configurations of people, place and heritage (which) lose all sense of isomorphism”, to quote Appadurai (1996, 46). Geography, as Latour (1993) has opined, now becomes a matter of association and connectivity, not space. For him the globalised world is made up of “actor-networks” consisting of collectives of humans, cyborgs and technologies, which quite confound received wisdom about territories and the subjects and objects under their dominion. Policy makers in the EU have already shifted to a model of community which recognises pluralities of interest and identity and the irrepressible flow of communications, thereby deconstructing Europe and re-creating it as a web of discursive spaces, joined by networks and those who people them (1998, 5.2). But the uncomfortable fact is that the integration project tables all these versions of European unity as viable and even compatible. In itself, this is witness enough to the ambivalence and ambiguity that informs new millennium discourses on European unity. Perceiving ‘ a different sort of European unity in the networks and flows of e-commerce,

302

heritage tourism and cyber-activists is also a reminder of the staying power of old imaginaries and older fictions.

References Anderson J. (1996), “The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern Territorialities”, Environment and Planning — D, Society and Space, 14, pp. 133-53. Appadurai A. (1990), “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy”, in Featherstone M. (ed.), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity, Sage, London. Appadurai A. (1996), Modernity at Large, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Axford B. (1995), The Global System: Politics, Economics and Culture, Polity, Cambridge. Axford B. (2000), “Enacting Globalisation: Transnational Networks and the Deterritorialisation of Social Relationships in the Global System”, .Protosociology, special issue on Towards a Sociology of Borderlines, pp. 115-41. Axford B. and Huggins R. (1998), “European Identity and the Information Society”, in Brinkhuis F. and Talmor S. (eds.), Memory, History and Critique: European Identities at the Millennium, ISSEI/MIT Press, CD-ROM. Badie B. and Birnbaum P. (1983), The Sociology of the State, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Barber B. (1984), Strong Democracy, Yale University Press, Boston. Baumann Z. (1998), “Europe of Strangers”, ESRC Transnational Communities programme Seminar Series, 24. Boli J. and Thomas G. (1997), “World Culture and the World Polity: A Century of International NGOs”, American Sociological Review, 62, pp. 171-90 Boyte H. (1996), “Beyond Deliberation: Citizenship as a Public Work”, PEGs Conference, Chicago. Bull H. (1977), The New Medievalism, OUP, Oxford. Caporaso J. (1996), “The European Union and Forms of State”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 1, pp. 29-52. Castells M. (1996), The Rise of the Network Society, Blackwell, Oxford. Castells M. (1998), End of Millennium, Blackwell, Oxford. Deutsch K. (1953), Nationalism and Social Communications: an Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, MA, MIT Press, Cambridge. Falk R. (1998), “The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalisation”, paper to The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research. Friedman J. (1996), Transnationalization, Socio-politics Disorder and Ethnification as expressions of a declining Global Hegemony, Unpublished. Goodman J. (1998), “The European Union: ReConstituting Democracy Beyond the NationState”, in McGrew A. (ed.), The Transformation of Democracy, Polity/Open University Press, Cambridge. Hannerz U. (1992), “The Global Ecumene as a Network of Networks”, in Kuper A. (ed.), Conceptualising Society, Routledge, London. Hirst J. and Thompson G. (1999), Globalisation in Question (2ed.), Polity, Cambridge. Hix S. (1998), “The Study of the European Union: The new Governance Agenda and its Rivals”, European Journal of Public Policy, 5, 1, pp. 38-65.

303

Jachtenfuchs M. and Kohler-Koch B. (1996), “Einleiung: Regieren im Dynamischen Mehrebensystem”, in Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europaische Integration, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, pp. 15-44. Kastoryano R. (1998), “Transnational Participation and Citizenship: Immigrants in the European Union”, WPTC,- 98 - 12. Kenis P. and Schneider V. (1991), “Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinising a New Analytical Toolbox”, in Marin B. and Mayntz R. (eds.), Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt AM, pp. 25-59. Keohane R. and Hoffman S. (1991), The New European Community: Decision-Making and Institutional Change, Westview Press, Boulder.

Latour B. (1993), On Actor-Network Theory: À Few Clarifications, Unpublished. Luke T. (1995), “World Order or Neo-World Orders”, in Featherstone M. er al (eds), Global Modernities, Sage, London.

Majone G. (1996), “A European Regulatory State?”, in Richardson J. (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, Routledge, London. Mann M. (1998), “Is there a Society called Euro?”, in Axtmann R. (ed.), Globalisation and Europe, Pinter, London.

Marks G. (1993), “Structural policy and Multilevel Governance in the European Community”, in Cafruny A. and Rosenthal G. (eds.), The State of the European Community 11: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 391410. Marks G., Hooghe L. and Blank K. (1996), “European Integration in the 1980’s: StateCentric vs. Multi-Level Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, pp. 34178. Massey D. (1995), “A Global Sense of Place”, in Massey D. (ed.), Space, Place and Gender, Polity, Cambridge.

O’Tuathail G. (1998), Re-Thinking Geopolitics, Routledge, London. Rosenau J. (1998), “Governance and Democracy in a Globalising World”, in Held D. and Archibugi A. (eds.), Re-/magining Political Community, Polity, Cambridge. Rosenau J. N. and Czempiel E. O. (1992), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ruggie J. (1993), “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations”, International Organisation, 47, 1, pp. 149-74. Shapiro M. and Alker J. (1995) (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows — Territorial Identities, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Soysal Y. (1994), The Limits of Citizenship in the Contemporary Nation-State System, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Tarrow S. (1995), “The Europeanisation of Conflict: Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective”, West European Politics, 18, 2, pp. 223-51. ee A. (1eee European Citizenship Practice: Building the Institutions of a Non-State, ew Yor

304

L’IDENTITÀ EUROPEA E LE GIOVANI GENERAZIONI. OSSERVAZIONI EMPIRICHE SUGLI STUDENTI Gianfranco BETTIN LATTES Università di Firenze, Italia

1. L’appartenenza nella teoria sociologica e nell’universo giovanile La categoria d’appartenenza è stata declinata nel lavoro di concettualizzazione compiuto dalla sociologia classica, in stretta connessione con i processi di transizione alla modernità che hanno attraversato le società europee tra il XIX e il XX secolo. Fin da subito ne è stato evidenziato il carattere problematico e multidimensionale. La forma moderna dell’appartenenza si caratterizza, infatti, per la necessità di compenetrare per lo meno due aspetti in apparenza contraddittori: l’identificazione con una collettività e il pluralismo delle cerchie sociali e dei ruoli, il cui progressivo incremento caratterizza i processi di mutamento delle società moderne'. Secondo i’impostazione della teoria classica è l’appartenenza allo Stato nazionale che permette di compensare questa pluralità endemica di elementi interni al sentimento di appartenenza. Lo Stato nazionale per un verso istituisce una società che ha dimensioni molto più ampie della comunità, ma che al medesimo tempo consente di interconnettere un ampio numero di individui attraverso sentimenti di lealtà e di identificazione (oltre agli interessi materiali). Da questo

Sono sinceramente grato a Marco Bontempi e ad Enrico Caniglia per aver discusso con pazienza e passione il testo di questo paper che riflette la ormai pluriennale comune esperienza di ricerca presso il Centro Interuniversitario di Sociologia politica di Firenze. ' In questa linea Talcott Parsons aveva sottolineato appunto che «l’integrazione dei membri di una società implica una zona di interpenetrazione tra il sistema sociale e quello della personalità» (Parsons, 1975, 58). Ora, secondo Parsons, le logiche di interpenetrazione devono potersi sviluppare in un contesto relazionale che vincola gli individui ad uno specifico ambiente, sia fisico che sociale, poiché è dalla condivisione di forme culturali nel relazionarsi all’ambiente che è possibile definire il sistema sociale. Da un’altra prospettiva, però, Parsons si era interrogato sulla possibilità dell’esistenza di rapporti di lealtà nei confronti delle diverse collettività all’interno delle quali imembri rivestono uno o più ruoli, osservando che «l’incremento del pluralismo dei ruoli, è la principale caratteristica dei processi di differenziazione che sono alla base delle società moderne. Pertanto la regolamentazione della lealtà dei membri verso la comunità stessa e verso varie altre collettività è il problema principale per l’integrazione di una comunità sociale. (...) Una comunità sociale è costituita da una rete complessa di collettività intersecantesi e di lealtà collettive» (/bid., 62-63).

305

punto di vista cittadinanza.

lo strumento

dell’integrazione

principe

viene

ad essere

la

Lo sviluppo delle istituzioni della cittadinanza ha permesso, infatti, l’articolazione dell’appartenenza e delle lealtà anche al di fuori degli ambiti relazionali particolari, separando i tre fattori che anticamente erano incardinati nella struttura del sentimento di appartenenza: la religione, l’etnicità e la si separano queste tre dimensioni territorialità. Nelle società moderne non Parsons reciprocamente, perdendo di centralità sociale, tuttavia Talcott e astratta mancava di sottolineare il rischio per questo tipo di solidarietà fratture istituzionalizzata nella cittadinanza di essere «gravemente compromessa da regionalistiche, specialmente quando queste coincidono con divisioni etniche o religiose. Molte società moderne si sono disintegrate proprio per questi motivi?». Il carattere spaziale del radicamento come condizione dell’appartenenza costituisce un aspetto centrale nella strutturazione delle identità collettive. In questa linea già Georg Simmel aveva indirizzato l’analisi sulla relazione tra struttura spaziale delle relazioni sociali e identità sociale’. Simmel declina una sociologia dell’appartenenza a partire da una lettura spaziale delle logiche interne alle relazioni sociali; infatti, il radicamento territoriale conferisce alle formazioni

sociali una unicità che è anche esclusività rispetto a forme sociali simili. Il sentimento di appartenenza allo Stato nazionale consiste propriamente di questi elementi;

infatti,

l’identità

nazionale

si

costituisce

anche

a

partire

dalla

configurazione spaziale delle relazioni e dalla relazione tra ambiente e società nel perimetro della società-nazione*. È a partire da questi spunti classici che è opportuno interrogarsi sui possibili sviluppi di un sentimento di appartenenza in chiave sovranazionale come conseguenza e/o condizione del compimento dei processi di integrazione istituzionale e sociale in corso nell’Unione europea. Le riflessioni di Simmel, pur nella loro immutata fecondità, evidenziano bene la difficoltà per il pensiero classico, ivi comprendendo anche Parsons, di concepire forme dell’appartenenza extrastatuali che non fossero tipicamente politico-simboliche, come il cosmopolitismo illuministico o religioso, come la fratellanza universale, ma comunque sempre riconducibili al livello dell’esperienza e della scelta dell’individuo. Riflettere dunque sulle condizioni della formazione di sentimenti di appartenenza verso istituzioni sovranazionali a carattere non universale significa porre, innanzitutto, un problema teorico tutt'altro che secondario. Simmel ci ? Ibidem., 74. * In un saggio del 1897 aveva osservato che un importante fattore «della continuità degli esseri collettivi è la permanenza del suolo sul quale essi vivono. L’unità, non solo dello Stato, ma della città e di altre associazioni, viene riferita anzitutto al territorio che serve da substrato durevole di tutti i cambiamenti» (Come si conservano le forme sociali, in Mongardini, 1975, 45). * È in questa stessa linea che Simmel osserva che «il tipo di relazione tra gli individui che lo Stato crea, o che crea lo Stato, è talmente collegato con il territorio che un secondo Stato contemporaneo sul medesimo territorio è un concetto impensabile» (Simmel, 1989, 526).

306

insegna che le forme dell’appartenenza sono strettamente connesse con il grado di astrazione contenuto nelle relazioni sociali che strutturano la collettivita di riferimento; in questo senso i processi di integrazione europea possono essere considerati come transizioni delle relazioni sociali ad un livello di astrazione maggiore. Da un punto di vista sistemico si può dire che la costituzione di un macrosistema è resa possibile solo da un processo di differenziazione interna che separa ulteriormente le dimensioni istituzionali dalle relazioni sociali concrete, conseguendo una forma di integrazione che è ancora più astratta di quella statuale, a sua volta prodotta, secondo l’osservazione di Parsons, dall’astrazione dei processi integrativi etnici, religiosi e territoriali. La formazione dello Stato nazionale ha, infatti, prima ridotto ad un livello secondario le identità etniche e linguistiche tipiche dell’epoca feudale, successivamente — come ha mostrato Granet — lo Stato

si è costituito come centro di governo dei destini degli individui in seguito al suo svincolamento dalla religione e allo sviluppo della secolarizzazione delle istituzioni religiose. In questa linea la formazione di un’unità sovranazionale come l’Unione europea rappresenta il superamento - in senso astratto - dell’ultima forma delle appartenenze, quella spaziale-territoriale che ha caratterizzato la formazione degli Stati moderni. Alla luce di queste riflessioni si può ipotizzare, allora, che l’unica forma possibile che potrà assumere l’appartenenza all’Unione europea sarà quella istituzionale. Il grado di astrazione incorporato nelle relazioni sovranazionali è facilmente rinvenibile anche soltanto quando si osservi il percorso esclusivamente economico che ha contrassegnato lo sviluppo dei processi di integrazione nell’ Europa dell’ultimo mezzo secolo. Inoltre se i temi della cittadinanza europea costituiscono oggi oggetto di un intenso dibattito, la composizione delle forme nazionali della cittadinanza rimane ancora un compito gravoso e di difficile soluzione. In questo quadro si inscrivono gli sforzi degli organi dell’Unione europea di lasciare ai singoli Stati membri la regolazione normativa dei gruppi etnico-linguistici e più in generale delle forme di comunità e associazione fondate su sentimenti di appartenenza, concentrandosi sulla legiferazione e la difesa dei diritti degli individui (nelle loro diverse articolazioni: umani, di consumo, ecc...). Anche quando si consideri il sentimento di appartenenza all’Europa dal punto di vista non più strutturale, ma culturale è chiaro che l’immenso patrimonio culturale che caratterizza la cultura europea può essere definito europeo proprio quando si prescinda dalle peculiarità nazionali. In questa chiave, dunque, la storia e le tradizioni dell'Europa occidentale difficilmente potranno costituire uno specifico sentimento di appartenenza all’Unione europea in quanto forme culturali prodotte nell’alveo delle appartenenze territoriali premoderne e moderne con una portata e valenze universali, ma non, in senso stretto, continentali.

L’integrazione europea segna dunque il proprio di deterritorializzazione dell’appartenenza che apre nuove e problematiche circa le possibili modalità politica a livello europeo e lo sviluppo di una 307

sviluppo attraverso un processo al medesimo tempo prospettive di articolare la rappresentanza cultura civica come sostegno

necessario alla legittimità procedurale delle istituzioni. Alla luce di queste riflessioni si può allora ipotizzare che i sentimenti di appartenenza difficilmente avranno le caratteristiche di intensità e coinvolgimento peculiari all’identità nazionale nella storia dello Stato moderno, caratterizzandosi piuttosto per forme di lealtà astratte e specifiche. Una soluzione, che non intacca il carattere prevalentemente giuridico-formale dell’attuale processo europeo, ma che cerca — facendo leva proprio su questa dimensione — di compensare l’assenza di radicamento storico-territoriale del sentimento di appartenenza, è stata avanzata da Jürgen Habermas nel modello del “patriottismo costituzionale” (Habermas, 1992). Per il sociologo tedesco, da sempre molto attento alla questione dell’unificazione europea, la costituzione di una collettività europea è possibile attraverso la condivisione da parte degli europei di un insieme ristretto di valori, regole e procedure, in breve, di una Carta costituzionale europea. Habermas teorizza, in altre parole, due livelli di appartenenza: il primo, più astratto e concernente valori universalistici e procedure democratiche, contenuto in una carta costituzionale; il secondo riguarda invece la propria etnia e nazione di appartenenza, ed è il risultato della storia particolare dei popoli europei. Il punto è che tra i due livelli non esiste necessariamente una contrapposizione, né il primo è troppo necessariamente astratto per poter creare un sentimento di appartenenza. Da un lato, quindi, ogni europeo può sentirsi vicino ad una collettività in un certo senso giuridica e non concreta come quella costituita attorno alla Comunità europea, e nello stesso tempo non perdere i legami con la propria collettività “naturale” - la nazione o l’etnia. Dall’altro lato, il primo livello assicurerebbe un minimo di coscienza collettiva, alla Durkheim, e di solidarietà tra

gli europei, in grado di costituire una base culturale su cui edificare la solidarietà e la partecipazione a livello europeo in mancanza di una comune identità culturale. In altre parole, la fedeltà ad una Carta costituzionale europea fornirebbe gli elementi per la formazione di una identità civica europea, che appare necessaria per la costruzione di un processo democratico»a livello europeo. Infatti, questa prospettiva, affiancando una cittadinanza europea a quella su base nazionale, dovrebbe riuscire a favorire l’allargamento della democrazia che oggi appare esclusivamente legata all’ambito dello Stato nazionale. Si tratta di una prospettiva di indubbio interesse, poiché si confronta con quello che oggi costituisce sicuramente il principale problema dell’Europa unita. A tutt'oggi, l’Unione europea appare costituita da organizzazioni internazionali che sono per loro natura non democratiche, in un senso puro; la rappresentanza e la partecipazione democratica restano ancorate allo Stato nazionale, mentre la “diplomazia, non la democrazia” governa i meccanismi decisionali delle istituzioni europee (Mancini, 1998). L’ipotesi di Habermas è stata tuttavia fortemente criticata. In primo luogo, si è

sostenuto che la condivisione di una Carta costituzionale è ancora troppo poco per formare una coscienza collettiva e un sentimento di appartenenza. Habermas lascia in secondo piano la funzione integrativa che sottende al funzionamento delle

308

istituzioni e delle procedure democratiche e che costituisce principalmente una condizione ineliminabile della solidarietà sociale. Un lungo filone di ricerche sociologiche ha individuato, invece, proprio nella condivisione di una storia comune,

di una

cultura

comune,

in altre parole

nell’esistenza

di un

ethnos

condiviso collettivamente una delle principali condizioni per l'affermazione e per l’efficacia di un sistema democratico. La democrazia non si realizza esclusivamente attraverso l’instaurazione di regole e procedure istituzionali, ma richiede anche l’esistenza di una collettività omogenea dal punto di vista simbolico-culturale. Lo Stato-nazione ha offerto una condizione eccezionale per il realizzarsi delle democrazie moderne grazie appunto al fatto di basarsi su una collettività con una storia, una lingua e una cultura comune, in altre parole una collettività etnica che si sintetizza con il termine “nazione”. Nello Stato-nazione moderno l’appartenenza è dunque il lascito sociologico di una storia e di una cultura comune, ed è ciò che crea il substrato necessario per la cittadinanza democratica. Prima ancora che l’equilibrio istituzionale e la razionalità dell’assetto costituzionale, questa dimensione prettamente culturale, la nazione, è ciò che ha

consentito e consente il funzionamento e la stabilità delle attuali istituzioni democratiche. Nel caso dell'Europa naturalmente questa condizione dell’omogeneità culturale manca ancora del tutto. L'Europa è essenzialmente un insieme di nazioni diverse. L’idea della storia e della cultura comune nata nel medioevo è in realtà una “mezza verità” che serve ben poco allo scopo di giustificare e affermare l’esistenza di una identità collettiva tra i popoli europei (Mancini,

1998). Una Costituzione

europea,

con una solidarietà esclusivamente

giuridica e del tutto sganciata da una cultura comune, potrebbe rivelarsi ancora un debole mezzo per realizzare un sistema democratico a livello europeo. Senza la presenza di un ethos politico democratico l’Unione europea non è altro che un’impalcatura di leggi senza un’autentica carica identitaria, un’entità politica priva di integrazione civica (Rusconi, 1996). A questo tipo di obiezioni si è in genere risposto ricordando, in primo luogo, che esistono diverse democrazie che si fondano su società non culturalmente ed etnicamente omogenee, ma plurietniche. Quello che è accaduto in Europa, la correlazione tra nazione e democrazia, per Habermas è esclusivamente una contingenza storica e non un legame sociologicamente necessario. In secondo luogo, gli attuali processi migratori profilano per il futuro degli Stati europei la fine della loro tradizionale omogeneità culturale: le società nazionali europee sono destinate ad essere sostituite con società fondamentalmente multiculturali. La scissione

tra democrazia

e omogeneità

storico-culturale,

tra demos

ed ethnos,

sembra costituire ormai una necessità da cui dipende lo stesso futuro della democrazia europea’. Ma la nascita di un’opinione pubblica europea si scontra con $ Tuttavia, se l’esempio nord americano testimonia la capacità dello Stato moderno di restare democratico e di adattarsi alla trasformazione dell’ambiente sociale in termini multiculturali,

non si può dimenticare che esistono difficoltà particolari per quanto riguarda |’ Europa unita. Due eminenti giudici costituzionali tedeschi, Grimm e Kirchhoff, hanno giustamente

309

parecchie e gravi difficoltà. Innanzitutto, l’assenza di una lingua comune impedisce la formazione di un dibattito politico diffuso socialmente a livello europeo. Ancora una volta emerge con chiarezza il problema dell’omogeneita culturale. In secondo luogo, mancano delle agenzie di mediazione tra istituzioni europee e i cittadini, che siano in grado di articolare il dibattito, di diffonderlo e di renderlo comune nei diversi Stati. I partiti e i gruppi di pressione tendono, infatti, ancora ad agire e a essere sostanzialmente legati alla loro base nazionale. Un processo di allargamento degli orizzonti sociali e culturali è dunque un dato fondamentale. Anche se appare possibile fondare su un demos e non su un efhnos un regime democratico, certe condizioni sociali ed extragiuridiche sono pur sempre imprescindibili per produrre la necessaria coesione. Segnali di cambiamento in questa direzione vengono proprio dalle giovani generazioni. Sono oggi numerosi i giovani che cominciano ad assumere, di fatto, e nella quotidianità, l’Europa come uno spazio dei propri interessi, lo spazio nuovo entro cui muoversi liberamente per i motivi più diversi. Sono, infatti, le nuove generazioni che più di tutte si troveranno a sperimentare, anche in chiave di cultura civica e di legittimazione politica, i temi procedurali ed economico-istituzionali che, fino ad oggi, hanno “fatto l'Europa”. La sociologia della condizione giovanile ha messo in luce - ormai da un paio di lustri - l’inclinazione delle nuove generazioni a forme di appartenenza multiple. Le trasformazioni dell’identità sociale giovanile agiscono infatti nella direzione di destrutturare la configurazione gerarchica tradizionale delle identità, anche territoriali, aprendola a sentimenti di appartenenza plurali. Si tratta, in altri termini, di un senso di appartenenza multipla che non sembra strutturarsi in modo significativo intorno ad un nucleo rigidamente definito e a punti di riferimento nettamente delineati. Questo aspetto indica che - in un modo che si potrebbe definire postmoderno - per molti giovani l’appartenere è un elemento importante della propria identità, senza però comportare una strutturazione forte delle relazioni gerarchiche tra i diversi centri di appartenenza: si percepisce il sentimento di appartenenza a molte dimensioni, ma non si sente di appartenere a qualcuna in un modo più marcato di altre. In questa linea è stato osservato che i giovani italiani hanno un sentimento di appartenenza nel quale «realizzano il loro rapporto con il territorio in modo flessibile e articolato, componendo, organizzando, riaggiustando le principali definizioni dell’ambito territoriale a misura delle loro esigenze cognitive e pratiche. Una sorta di “logica del bricolage” che permette, fra l’altro, la coabitazione di identità e di sistemi locali, peraltro tanto specifici e differenziati come quelli proposti dalla realtà e dalla storia italiana» (Diamanti, 1997, 147). All’interno di questo quadro l’Europa si colloca però ancora in una posizione troppo marginale. Le nuove generazioni si trovano oggi in una fase di transizione che, se da un lato rompe le strutture identitarie e di appartenenza tradizionali, . irrita RISI RL SENI e en me, rege à a O sottolineato come la democratizzazione dell’Europa richieda la formazione di un’opinione pubblica europea, che sia in grado di discutere, avanzare riflessioni e costruire consenso attorno a progetti unitari.

310

aprendole a forme plurali e segmentate, dall’altro lato mostra ancora una netta preferenza per il legame territoriale piuttosto che per il sentimento più astratto della cittadinanza europea. Una conferma di questi orientamenti viene anche dall’ultima indagine lard. Se 9 giovani su 10 condividono la costruzione dell’unità e dunque legittimano i processi di integrazione europea, il tema dominante dell’appartenenza non sembra caratterizzarsi in termini di radicamento. Insomma, l’Unione europea

nel momento in cui viene legittimata lo è in quanto cornice istituzionale delle identità nazionali, o, come è stato osservato «l’Europa non è ancora (ammesso che lo possa mai divenire in futuro) per i giovani una “patria”, un contesto di riferimento identitario. È invece considerata una “casa comune” per gli stati e le “patrie” — nazionali e locali — che ne fanno parte» (Diamanti, 1997, 159).

2. Le forme delle appartenenze territoriali e l'appartenenza all'Europa Quando abbiamo domandato agli intervistati del nostro campione di studenti’ a quale ambito geografico sentivano di appartenere di più in assoluto fra quelli indicati nell’elenco “il mio comune”, “la mia regione”, “l’Italia”, “l’Europa”, “il

mondo”, l’italia è risultata l’ambito di maggiore identificazione in termini di appartenenza (35%), seguita nell’ordine dal mondo (21%; ambito che nella postmodernità appare carico di significati simbolici ed ideologici), dal comune (20%; ambito più vicino alla vita quotidiana delle persone), dalla regione (16%) e per ultima dall’Europa (9%). Se consideriamo poi anche l’intensità delle suddette appartenenze espressa nell’interrogativo “quanto sente di appartenere a ...” si nota $ Nota metodologica. L’analisi delle rappresentazioni della democrazia nella cultura politica giovanile è basata sui dati di un’indagine, realizzata nel biennio 1997-1998 nell’ambito di un più vasto programma di ricerca sulle trasformazioni della cultura politica in corso di svolgimento presso il Centro interuniversitario di Sociologia politica di Firenze. L’indagine, tramite questionario autocompilato, è stata condotta su due campioni di giovani. Il primo campione era costituito da 1352 studenti di dodici atenei italiani (Milano, Genova, Pisa, Firenze, Perugia, Roma, Napoli, Cosenza, Bari, Catania, Palermo e Sassari), il secondo campione da 594 disoccupati di diverse città italiane (Genova, Firenze, Perugia, Roma,

Napoli, Catania). Per un sotto-campione degli studenti un questionario analogo è stato somministrato anche ad un genitore. Per quanto riguarda la composizione dei campioni, è utile richiamare alcune informazioni di base. Il campione degli studenti è composto per il 59,2% di donne (dato in linea con la prevalenza di donne nella popolazione universitaria nazionale); l’età media è di 22 anni; due terzi degli intervistati sono iscritti nelle Facoltà di Sociologia e Scienze Politiche, un terzo proviene da altre facoltà (Economia e Commercio, Giurisprudenza, Architettura, Agraria, Ingegneria, Scienze Naturali); inoltre, il campione si divide in due gruppi uguali per quanto riguarda il titolo di studio secondario conseguito (una metà ha la licenza liceale, un’altra metà un diploma tecnico). Il campione dei disoccupati è costituito in misura pressoché uguale di donne e uomini (rispettivamente 52,8% e 47,2%); sono prevalenti i giovani in possesso di licenza di scuola secondaria, ma non mancano laureati (12,2%), mentre quelli in possesso del solo diploma di scuola dell’obbligo sono il 13,3%. Il sotto-campione dei genitori degli studenti è composto da 845 persone.

311

un andamento abbastanza omogeneo a quello ora citato: emerge come prevalente l’intensità dell’attaccamento all’Italia (86,8 %), seguito nell’ordine da quello alla regione (73,7%), al mondo (69,0%), al comune (67,8%), all’ Europa (65,0%). Le percentuali ovviamente sono il risultato della somma degli intervistati che hanno risposto “molto” + “abbastanza” rispondendo a tutte le voci della lista degli ambiti territoriali (Fig. 1). Il senso di appartenenza verso tutti gli ambiti finora considerati è intenso, ma soprattutto si può parlare al riguardo di appartenenze multiple, orientate cioè simultaneamente verso più dimensioni (per molti giovani, come si è già detto, l’appartenere comunque è un aspetto importante della formazione della propria identità). Tra gli studenti universitari l'attaccamento nazionale e quello locale sono complementari, non si escludono, anzi coesistono con un buon grado di intensità e

si combinano anche con un’importante apertura cosmopolita. I giovani realizzano il loro rapporto con il territorio in modo flessibile, in modo da far convivere tra loro identità specifiche e differenziate; connettono i loro attaccamenti familiari e locali a quelli nazionali e cosmopoliti, muovendosi dagli uni agli altri senza contraddizioni: passano con una certa indifferenza dal cosmopolitismo dei valori, delle relazioni e delle comunicazioni al localismo familiare, amicale, professionale

e del tempo libero. Assai diverso è invece il caso dell’appartenenza all’Unione europea. L’identità europea, ancorché indicata all’incirca dai 2/3 dei giovani come “importante”, è comunque quella che riceve in assoluto il minor numero di consensi e che rappresenta l’ambito di appartenenza “più rilevante” soltanto per un 9% degli studenti intervistati. E° un dato che fa riflettere per la sua esiguità e sembra in aperto contrasto, oltreché con il tradizionale e sbandieratissimo europeismo degli italiani, con la configurazione sociologica di questo segmento del mondo giovanile che, per formazione culturale, dovrebbe essere assai aperto alle appartenenze di livello extranazionale. Una possibile interpretazione è che in questi ultimi anni, in contemporanea con il processo di integrazione europea, sia in corso un processo che potremmo definire di deculturalizzazione del contenuto dell’idea di Europa. Nelle more del processo di europeizzazione economico-istituzionale l’idea di Europa sembra essere investita da una profonda trasformazione in forza della quale vengono poste in secondo piano le tradizionali connotazioni di tipo valoriale e culturale a vantaggio di una connotazione più contingente che la qualifica nell'orizzonte identitario dei giovani sempre più come spazio economico e politico-istituzionale svincolato da riferimenti etico-culturali profondi, che coinvolgono l’identità di neo-cittadini. Si tratta di un processo, per certi versi, paradossale ma che meriterebbe di essere indagato in modo adeguato alla sua complessità. Sarebbe utile verificare, ad esempio, quanto incida in questa trasformazione la tematizzazione dell’Europa fatta dai media. La deculturalizzazione dell’idea di Europa viene indicata indirettamente anche dal | bassissimo livello di identificazione con l’Occidente e con il Cristianesimo, le due dimensioni culturali da secoli costitutive dell’idea di Europa e che gli studenti

312

collocano agli ultimi due posti nella scelta delle appartenenze prioritarie con rispettivamente un 5% per l’Occidente ed un 4% per il Cristianesimo. Gli aspetti dell’unificazione europea che ricevono maggiori consensi sono quelli economici ed organizzativi, ad esempio la moneta unica e l’attribuzione di maggiori poteri al Parlamento europeo: l'Europa è soprattutto quella monetaria ed istituzionale, non è un contesto di riferimento identitario né una patria (i giovani si pensano “italiani in Europa”, o al limite ‘fiorentini, romani, genovesi e così via in Europa” piuttosto che “europei ”’). Un aspetto rilevante del discorso sociologico sulla politica giovanile riguarda il tipo di legame che è possibile rintracciare tra le appartenenze territoriali e le forme dell’identità civica. Alcune recenti ricerche (Diamanti, 1997) hanno evidenziato come l’identità civica dei giovani sia influenzata dall’appartenenza territoriale. Si tratta di un elemento che già la teoria politica ha da tempo messo in luce. Il concetto di partecipazione, infatti, oltre ad indicare la possibilità di prendere parte ad una decisione, comprende anche nel suo campo semantico il significato di “fare parte”, “essere parte” di una collettività e/o istituzione (Cotta, 1979). Di conseguenza quando il senso di identificazione verso un’unità territoriale è intenso, ne risulta rafforzata anche la disponibilità a partecipare ai processi politici che la caratterizzano. La partecipazione assume in questo caso la forma di un processo simbolico, prima che strumentale, con cui i singoli individui esprimono l’appartenenza-identificazione alla medesima collettività (Pizzorno, 1966). Un’appartenenza territoriale forte tende quindi a favorire lo sviluppo di identità civiche di tipo partecipativo, in cui è considerevole il coinvolgimento nelle istituzioni e nei processi politici che costituiscono la sfera pubblica dell’unità territoriale. Al contrario, un debole sentimento di appartenenza favorisce un atteggiamento ‘“impolitico” o più distaccato rispetto all’ambito pubblico, qualunque esso sia, cittadino, regionale, nazionale o extranazionale. Queste indicazioni teoriche suggeriscono che le forme dell’appartenenza dei giovani costituiscono una dimensione di analisi importante per comprendere le modalità della cultura politica nelle giovani generazioni. Dai dati della ricerca emerge, in primo luogo, come sia possibile distinguere nei giovani tre diversi atteggiamenti verso l’appartenenza. Gli ambiti di riferimento considerati nella ricerca sono quelli classici delle forme dell’appartenenza politico-territoriale, disposti in un ordine che va dall’ambito più circoscritto e più vicino al mondo vitale del giovane, il comune, per allargarsi via via ad ambiti territorialmente più ampi

come

la regione,

la nazione,

l’Europa,

il mondo.

La

prima

modalità

dell’appartenenza è quella dell’“indifferenza”. I giovani “senza radici” o meglio “indifferenti ” sono quelli che manifestano uno scarso senso di identificazione territoriale rispetto agli ambiti considerati. La seconda modalità è invece rappresentata dalla “elezione” tipica dei giovani che esprimono un forte sentimento di appartenenza verso una sola tra le cinque identità territoriali considerate. Infine, la terza modalità è quella del “pluralismo” che indica la tendenza a sviluppare un senso di appartenenza plurimo, vale a dire verso più di una identità territoriale 313

senza alcuna particolare predilezione. La Tab. 1 illustra come si distribuiscono i giovani del nostro campione (studenti e disoccupati) rispetto a quest’aspetto dell’appartenenza. Tab. 1 - Tipi di atteggiamento verso l’appartenenza territoriale (in %)

tr sait mare a | Studenti ls Indifferent [Blettiviarog acpicn fem owgoigboa astice DIET RE PRES EE

Oi

Come si pud vedere in entrambi i gruppi di giovani si registra un consistente atteggiamento di appartenenza. In particolare prevalgono i giovani “pluralisti”, vale a dire la tendenza a sentirsi parte di più di una identità territoriale. Considerevole è anche la quota di giovani che sente di appartenere ad una sola identità territoriale. Decisamente bassa è invece la percentuale di giovani che non evidenziano alcun sentimento di appartenenza verso comune, regione, nazione, Europa e mondo. Si nota anche chiaramente come esista una significativa differenza tra gli studenti e i giovani disoccupati. Presso i disoccupati la percentuale di “indifferenti” è di quasi dieci punti più alta rispetto agli studenti. Nei due gruppi si distinguono, quindi, un chiaro atteggiamento di appartenenze plurime (gruppo degli studenti), e un atteggiamento più marcato verso la non appartenenza (gruppo dei disoccupati). Evidentemente la condizione di disoccupazione inibisce o tende a mettere in crisi i sentimenti di appartenenza. In realtà se distinguiamo i disoccupati in base al livello di istruzione, l’impatto della disoccupazione si riduce drasticamente”. In altre parole, disaggregando il campione dei disoccupati rispetto al livello di istruzione, ci si accorge che la condizione di disoccupato incide su quell’aspetto peculiare della cultura politica cheŸ l’appartenenza territoriale meno di quanto ci si potesse aspettare. Su questo punto si può ipotizzare che un livello di istruzione più alto funzioni come una sorta di “correttore” rispetto agli aspetti porta disaggreganti che la condizione di disoccupazione politicamente inevitabilmente con sé. Gli aspetti politicamente critici della disoccupazione si riscontrano, infatti, quasi esclusivamente nei giovani meno

istruiti, che mostrano

tassi pericolosamente elevati di assenza di una qualsiasi forma di identificazione territoriale, mentre appaiono del tutto contenuti e quasi inesistenti nei giovani più istruiti. Riguardo all’appartenenza all’Europa, va sottolineato come l’appartenenza all’ Europa sia in generale più forte tra gli studenti. Chi si sente di non appartenere per nulla all’Europa è presso i disoccupati esattamente il doppio che negli studenti. 7 Infatti, se presso i disoccupati poco istruiti gli “indifferenti” sono oltre il 43% presso quelli laureati o diplomati il livello degli indifferenti cala sensibilmente, rispettivamente al 12% e al 25%. Nello stesso tempo, l'atteggiamento “ pluralista”, se per i disoccupati poco istruiti è presente nel 35% di loro, in quelli laureati sale al 50%.

314

Ma ancora una volta i disoccupati con un livello di istruzione più elevato mostrano tassi più simili agli studenti. Anche in questo caso, cioè, le percentuali diverse rispetto agli studenti si spiegano soprattutto con la presenza nei disoccupati di giovani con un livello di istruzione più basso, piuttosto che come effetto della condizione di disoccupazione. L’appartenenza territoriale costituisce una dimensione importante della legittimazione delle istituzioni politiche. In questo senso — come abbiamo visto — la letteratura teorica riconosce il carattere problematico della relazione tra appartenenza e legittimazione del processo integrativo europeo. Dal punto di vista empirico diviene dunque importante e necessario esplorare questa relazione nelle giovani generazioni italiane, facendo luce, in particolare, sugli elementi di intersecazione tra le rappresentazioni della democrazia e le forme in cui si declina l’appartenenza. Tab. 2 - “Quanto si sente di appartenere all’Europa? "(in %)

DRE Niente Poco

Totale

RUNERET

Studenti CLETO ee end

ee Lreomarel eee

3. Le rappresentazioni della democrazia nel mondo tipologia orientativa ed un’apparente digressione

giovanile:

una

La rappresentazione della democrazia costituisce sicuramente un elemento importante della cultura politica di un individuo e contiene elementi assai significativi rispetto all’identità civica che lo caratterizza. La ricostruzione empirica di una (o di più d’una) rappresentazione sociale della democrazia ci sara utile per entrare in sintonia interpretativa con la pluralità di significati che inevitabilmente assume oggi il “concetto” di democrazia nel mondo dei giovani e soprattutto per verificare se esiste una rappresentazione della democrazia che produce più di altre un grado di maggiore identificazione con l’Europa. In particolare, nell’ambito della ricerca dedicata al tema e in corso di svolgimento presso il Centro interuniversitario di Sociologia politica basata su questionario, una domanda aperta “Che cosa è per lei la democrazia?” intendeva sondare quale fosse il patrimonio di valori e di “fenomeni” che entrano a far parte della rappresentazione della democrazia del giovane. L'elaborazione dei nostri dati ha consentito di individuare sei dimensioni che si rintracciano nella quasi totalità delle risposte dei giovani e che costituiscono,

in un certo senso,

i mattoni

con cui

vengono costruite le rappresentazioni sociali della democrazia. L’espressione di

315

queste definizioni si propone o in una forma articolata, sfumata, poliedrica oppure in maniera netta, monotematica e marcatamente unilaterale”. La prima rappresentazione della democrazia, in ordine di importanza, insiste

sulla connessione tra democrazia e libertà, detto meglio sulla libertà di espressione in generale, e dunque non solo politica, che viene tutelata e realizzata dalla democrazia. E’ questa la definizione della democrazia intesa come “sistema delle libertà”. Per questo gruppo di giovani che appare comparativamente quello di maggiore consistenza (40,4%), la democrazia diventa quindi soprattutto un’occasione di libertà esistenziale e di autodefinizione del proprio stile di vita. Democrazia significa, ad esempio, “essere liberi di manifestare i propri modi di pensare, di vivere, di essere”. L’attenzione si concentra sull’autodeterminazione

della propria vita quotidiana; l’impegno è nella costruzione della propria identità personale, senza che si manifesti alcun coinvolgimento nella sfera politica istituzionale. La seconda rappresentazione ha come suo nucleo centrale l’assetto politicoistituzionale della democrazia e viene denominata rappresentazione “procedurale”. La democrazia viene rappresentata essenzialmente come l’insieme delle procedure che assicurano il normale svolgimento della vita politica. Democrazia “è un sistema politico in cui il potere di prendere decisioni viene dato tramite libere elezioni in cui il popolo esprime le sue preferenze con un voto libero”. In queste risposte (20,1%) la rappresentazione della democrazia appare decisamente slegata dai valori sociali e civili, si riduce infatti a “un sistema per arrivare a prendere decisioni”. In altre parole, per una parte non piccola della popolazione studentesca si evidenzia un’immagine della democrazia come un contenitore vuoto, anche se

funzionale per la convivenza. Non si può non notare come questa immagine “fredda” della democrazia rifletta certe tendenze più generali, tipiche del vissuto della cultura politica moderna, volte a circoscrivere la democrazia alle regole collaudate della convivenza pacifica, nonché a delegare i problemi della vita pubblica ad una sfera istituzionale autonoma, configurata ad hoc e concepita come un insieme di procedure neutre rispetto ai valori che hanno costruito la rappresentazione originaria della democrazia moderna. Il terzo caso è quello che identifica la rappresentazione della democrazia con l’esperienza di una partecipazione diretta ai processi politici. La rappresentazione coglie l’elemento di appartenenza e di impegno responsabile del singolo nella sfera pubblica, un aspetto che la democrazia dovrebbe realizzare fin dai suoi progetti originari. Quando si parla di “democrazia come partecipazione” si propone una 8 Va sottolineato che il 71,5% delle definizioni date è ad una dimensione mentre il 28,5% è a più dimensioni. Sembra di potere affermare che la palese inclinazione ad una definizione monotematica non è l’esito automatico del modo di porgere il quesito ma corrisponde ad un effettivo carattere unilineare della rappresentazione che gli intervistati in una quota ‘ consistente manifestano a proposito della democrazia. Questo dato sembra implicare che il soggetto ha rielaborato in maniera seria il tema, lo ha investito di catessi e vuole porgerne una definizione mirata a delinearne il nucleo centrale e a metterne in ombra aspetti complementari e periferici.

316

definizione di democrazia che si sovrappone essenzialmente con l’immagine di un coinvolgimento personale (e di tutti) nei processi politici e che implica, almeno nelle risposte, il 13,1% degli studenti. In questa rappresentazione, che è speculare alla precedente, si rintraccia la tradizione di intenso impegno politico di base che era propria della cultura politica della sinistra italiana per lo meno fino agli anni Ottanta. — La quarta rappresentazione è quella dell’eguaglianza, ossia della democrazia intesa come un sistema volto alla realizzazione delle condizioni di eguaglianza e di parità di trattamento. Questa rappresentazione, dichiarata dal 10,4% dei giovani, si riferisce più ad una visione “sociale” che ad una visione “liberale” della democrazia, identificando quest’ultima con lo Stato sociale o comunque con una società giusta che si preoccupa di offrire condizioni diffuse di pari opportunità. La quinta rappresentazione allarga ulteriormente il campo di valori e di significati che vengono compresi nel fenomeno democrazia. Vi troviamo riferimenti alla democrazia come abolizione di ogni discriminazione (ad esempio, “tolleranza e rispetto per tutte le differenze”). La democrazia viene identificata con un valore superiore o con un interesse condiviso per la comunità; la democrazia diventa la ricerca del bene comune, in diretta continuità con una concezione cara

alla tradizione politica europea. La democrazia diventa soprattutto sinonimo di solidarietà: “il poter sperare in un futuro, nel benessere generale, che porta le persone a dialogare di più o ad essere più solidali, ad esprimere le proprie idee insieme agli altri. Perché questo significa confronto e crescita pacifica”. Ma emergono anche il “rispetto dell’ambiente” e la “tolleranza”. Rispetto a queste risposte possiamo parlare di una concezione aperta della democrazia oppure, in un senso ancora più ampio, di una concezione valoriale della democrazia, in cui il fenomeno democratico viene ricondotto all’universo dei valori tipici di una concezione pestmoderna della democrazia che è ancora in fieri nella cultura politica europea. Questo tipo di rappresentazione emerge infatti solo nel 4,3% delle risposte. Un discorso a sé merita l’ultimo gruppo di risposte, che includono due orientamenti di segno assai diverso: le risposte che parlano della democrazia come sistema irrealizzabile - la democrazia come utopia - e che confluiscono nel sottotipo più numeroso (circa l’8%), e quelle che contengono riferimenti polemici e chiaramente antidemocratici (un po’ meno del 5%). I due tipi di risposte sono accomunati dal fatto che gli intervistati prendono le distanze dalla democrazia e ne danno una rappresentazione in termini non positivi. A questo proposito vanno subito fatte due osservazioni. Le risposte del primo tipo non evidenziano un rigetto della democrazia in sé, come progetto sociale e politico, quanto invece una critica severa rispetto alle modalità effettive della sua realizzazione in Italia. Ciò dimostra ancora una volta come sia diffuso un certo grado di sfiducia verso le manifestazioni istituzionali della democrazia. Si tratta di sfiducia nella sua realizzabilità ma non certo di un rigetto radicale degli ideali democratici. Le risposte del secondo tipo, le risposte più esplicitamente antidemocratiche in cui si

317

mette in discussione la positività del gioco democratico e l’importanza della libertà, sono invece relativamente poche tra i giovani e riecheggiano il più delle volte una visione ispirata dall’ideologia marxista.

4. Le rappresentazioni della democrazia e le appartenenze territoriali Le rappresentazioni della democrazia costituiscono un indicatore significativo, anche se non certo l’unico, del tipo di cultura civica che un individuo possiede. Nel caso dei giovani abbiamo visto come il fenomeno più interessante che emerge dai dati relativi a quest’aspetto della cultura politica è sicuramente offerto dall’allargamento del concetto di democrazia ben oltre la sfera della politica intesa in modo tradizionale. Questo elemento di orientamento “politico” sui generis viene evidenziato dall’alta percentuale di giovani che possiede una rappresentazione della democrazia priva di riferimenti alla politica istituzionale e alla partecipazione e ricca,

invece,

di riferimenti

alla libertà

individuale.

La

democrazia

viene

identificata con la libertà personale, con la possibilità di esprimere pienamente la propria individualità, con la libertà realizzativa di un proprio stile di vita. Altri gruppi di giovani (che abbiamo chiamato rispettivamente “solidaristi’ ed “egualitari”) insistono nell’esprimere la loro rappresentazione di democrazia articolandola sugli elementi della solidarietà e dell’eguaglianza delle opportunità, tralasciando anch’essi qualsiasi riferimento alla politica. L’assenza di elementi strettamente politici e la centralità attribuita alla dimensione “esistenziale” della democrazia favorisce in questi giovani il formarsi di un’identità civica radicalmente diversa rispetto al modello tradizionale di civismo tipico della storia politica europea.

Si tratta di un modello

di civismo,

come

viene recentemente

suggerito da Ulrich Beck, che si nutre della soggettività dei giovani e che si esplica in forme di impegno modellate sull’autoaffermazione e sull’appagamento individuale piuttosto che essere basate sull’appàrtenenza alle organizzazioni e sullo spirito militante di “abnegazione” (Beck, 2000). Il modello classico dell’identità civica, quello incentrato sul significato più strettamente politico del civismo e sul rapporto con le forme politiche istituzionali ufficiali si individua specificatamente nel gruppo non troppo esteso dei “partecipazionisti” e dei “proceduralisti” cioè dei giovani che indicano elementi politici di stampo tradizionale nella loro definizione di democrazia. Il ragionamento svolto fino a questo momento risulta utile per inquadrare nella maniera più proficua possibile il tema che più ci interessa in questa sede, vale a dire quello relativo all’appartenenza verso l’Europa. Nel complesso le diverse rappresentazioni della democrazia non incidono in maniera cruciale sull’atteggiamento che i giovani manifestano verso l’Europa. Si conferma, infatti nettamente la tendenza a sentirsi “abbastanza” identificati con l’Europa. Tuttavia, alcuni dati appaiono di indubbio interesse, soprattutto rispetto al rapporto tra identità civica e senso di appartenenza. Dato per assunto che, comunque, la dichiarazione di appartenenza all’Europa non è particolarmente frequente, la

318

domanda a cui si vuole dare risposta è: quale tipo di identità civica si collega all’appartenenza all’ Europa? O, più direttamente, un dato tipo di rappresentazione della democrazia produce un orientamento d’appartenenza all’Europa più marcato di altri tipi di rappresentazione? In altre parole, quale significato, politico e non, assume il sentirsi di appartenere all’Europa presso i giovani italiani? Illustriamo rapidamente i dati per individuare gli elementi che possono servire a spiegare il senso della relazione tra rappresentazioni della democrazia e appartenenza europea. Innanzitutto, i “proceduralisti” mostrano il più elevato livello di appartenenza all’Europa (il 27% di questi dichiara di sentirsi “molto” appartenente all'Europa). E’ questo il gruppo più europeista di tutti. Nei “partecipazionisti” la percentuale cala al 20%. I “libertari” rappresentano la categoria di giovani che si sente meno di appartenere all’Europa. I “libertari” manifestano una maggiore appartenenza all’Italia (dichiarano di appartenere “molto” all’Italia il 55%), mentre solo il 19% dichiara “molto” e ben il 33% si sente di appartenere “poco” all’ Europa (Tab. 3). Interessante il caso dei giovani “critici” verso la democrazia. I “critici” costituiscono il gruppo che mostra la percentuale più alta di giovani che non si identificano

“per niente” con l’Europa (9%), ma, tuttavia, la percentuale di chi

dichiara “molto” è piuttosto consistente (25%). Ciò si spiega con il fatto che in questo gruppo confluiscono soggetti con un elevato grado di sfiducia verso le istituzioni politiche (la democrazia appunto), che si traduce in un elevato livello di “non appartenenza”, ma anche soggetti che pur esprimendo diffidenza e scetticismo verso la democrazia, spesso identificata con il sistema politico-partitico italiano, pur sempre investono di fiducia il progetto di unificazione europea. Fermo restando che esiste un elemento di crisi nell’identità civica di questi soggetti, occorre tuttavia precisare che solo in una parte di essi la sfiducia verso la democrazia si traduce in un rifiuto di un qualsiasi legame e di una qualsiasi forma di solidarietà sociale e politica, un rifiuto che si estende poi automaticamente anche

all’ Europa. Per altri esistono, invece, possibilità di recupero al legame sociale e politico attraverso modelli di appartenenza innovativi stimolati da eventi, come appunto il progetto di unificazione europea, che sembrano allora in grado di sanare la disillusione causata dall’esperienza in altri ambiti di appartenenza.

319

Tab. 3 - Rappresentazioni della democrazia (studenti in %)

e intensità dell'appartenenza

Léo ccna | 39 | Proceduralisti | 8 | 26 [Partecipazionisti| 6 [29 | 45 55 LS CL ET Ba42

E

all'Europa

RÉ EINS

49

Solidaristi

ist

46

ei

Cou ere eee

41

4

Le sei rappresentazioni della democrazia illustrate nel paragrafo precedente possono, per ulteriore comodità di analisi, essere qui aggregate in quattro gruppi principali. Il primo gruppo è costituito dalle rappresentazioni composte esclusivamente da riferimenti alla politica. Esistono naturalmente all’interno di questo gruppo differenze significative rispetto all’identità civica, più legata al coinvolgimento diretto nel caso dei “partecipazionisti”, connessa con le istituzioni e le procedure ufficiali per i “proceduralisti”. Entrambi, tuttavia, in virtù del riferimento alla politica come dimensione di convivenza nella società democratica, esprimono una forma di identità civica di tipo tradizionale. Il secondo gruppo raccoglie le rappresentazioni che contengono soltanto riferimenti ad elementi sociali e culturali e non di tipo politico. Tra questi spiccano naturalmente i “libertari”. Il terzo gruppo può essere definito “misto” poiché è costituito da rappresentazioni della democrazia che mettono insieme elementi semantici provenienti dalla sfera politica e anche dalla più ampia sfera sociale e culturale. Un gruppo a sé è invece rappresentato dalle risposte che esprimono sfiducia e critica verso la democrazia. Ogni gruppo implica un ben preciso modello di identità civica. All’interno di questi modelli di identità civica viene profondamente ridefinito anche il significato che assume l’appartenenza agli ambiti territoriali. La rappresentazione “libertaria” della democrazia si lega ad un ridimensionamento del senso di appartenenza territoriale, che si traduce nell’emergere di un tendenziale sradicamento come esperienza tipica di un segmento importante del mondo dei giovani ed in particolare degli studenti. Per i “figli della libertà”, come li chiama appunto Beck, la crisi di un significato strettamente politico-istituzionale della democrazia si traduce in una perdita di importanza dell’appartenenza territoriale, oppure in una radicale riscrittura del suo senso fondamentale. Nello stesso momento in cui la concezione della politica e dell’identità civica si trasforma e travalica 1 suoi tradizionali confini semantici e sociologici promuovendo così un processo di adattamento della cultura politica democratica, nei giovani si fa strada la propensione ad avere appartenenze plurime. Le appartenenze cessano di essere

320

esclusive, ma si sovrappongono negli stessi individui. I dati della Tab. 4 mostrano chiaramente che i giovani con rappresentazioni della democrazia di tipo sociale/culturale presentano una quota di soggetti caratterizzati da sentimenti di pluriappartenenza più alto rispetto a coloro che possiedono rappresentazioni esclusivamente di tipo “politico” (55% contro 49%). Un forte legame verso l’appartenenza ad una precisa identita territoriale si rintraccia, invece, nei giovani che, nelle loro rappresentazioni della democrazia, valorizzano le procedure, le istituzioni e la partecipazione. Questi giovani manifestano un modello di identita civica che mette insieme appartenenze forti ed esclusive con forme di partecipazione istituzionale e ufficiale secondo lo schema classico della teoria politica accennato all’inizio. I giovani con rappresentazioni “politiche” della democrazia sono “elettivi” per il 36%, contro il 29% dei giovani con rappresentazioni “sociali/culturali”. Un caso a sé e assai rilevante è costituito poi dai giovani “utopici” e “critici”, vale a dire quelli che evidenziano un chiaro atteggiamento di sfiducia verso i valori democratici, oppure che apprezzano la democrazia come progetto ideale ma che si mostrano scettici e critici verso le sue “forme realizzate”. Presso questi giovani l’identità civica appare pericolosamente poco matura, e questo tratto caratteristico si riflette puntualmente nell’atteggiamento verso l’appartenenza. I giovani utopici e critici sono quelli che mostrano un più alto livello di “indifferenza” vale a dire non sviluppano alcuna forma di appartenenza politico-territoriale. Ad una cultura civica non pienamente sviluppata, anzi quasi assente, si associa immediatamente un debole senso di appartenenza. Questo dato è chiaramente in linea con le ipotesi classiche circa il rapporto tra appartenenza e cultura civica: il debole sentimento di appartenenza territoriale si accompagna alla perdita di importanza dell’identità civica. Tab. 4 - Rappresentazioni della democrazia e forme di appartenenza (studenti, in %)

Indifferenti | Elettivi

_|_Pluralisti

procedurale partecipativa Sociale e culturale: uguaglianza, libertà, solidarietà

Mista: politica e sociale-culturale

[Negativac utopica

|

TECO

17 |

26K

In sintesi, esistono tre modi con cui prende forma il rapporto identità civica e appartenenza: il modello “classico” che lega un’identità civica tradizionale con un’appartenenza territoriale di tipo esclusivo; il modello “postmoderno” in cui l’identità civica viene riformulata radicalmente, soprattutto allargando la sfera e i significati della politica, e che si collega ad un atteggiamento di appartenenza a più 321

ambiti territoriali; il modello “marginale”, in cui l’identità civica appare di basso

profilo, e nello stesso tempo si smarrisce, forse pericolosamente, il sentimento di appartenenza ad un ambito territoriale. Gli ultimi due modelli costituiscono entrambi uno scostamento rispetto al modello tradizionale che collega strettamente identita civica e sentimento di appartenenze, che abbiamo chiamato “modello classico”. Tuttavia va sottolineata una differenza cruciale. Nel caso del modello “postmoderno”, tipico dei giovani “libertari” ci troviamo di fronte ad una riformulazione della cultura civica e del significato dell’appartenenza; nel caso del modello “marginale” ci troviamo di fronte piuttosto ad una avvisaglia di crisi degli stessi valori democratici. Si tratta di una differenza che ci aiuta a chiarire perché buona parte della letteratura sulle forme e sulle recenti trasformazioni della politica giovanile (Giddens, Beck, Touraine)

insista nel dare rilievo alle novità, spesso

assai dirompenti e difficili da armonizzare con i nostri modelli classici di cultura civica, che si registrano nel campo dei rapporti con la sfera pubblica, e le assuma come elementi di sostanziale rinnovamento della politica. Questa letteratura sociologica fa riferimento essenzialmente agli elementi specifici del modello che abbiamo chiamato “postmoderno”, composto da una cultura civica “impolitica”, più che “apolitica”, e da appartenenze multiple. Tale distinzione ci permette di cogliere, nello stesso tempo, quegli elementi di crisi, rappresentati dai giovani sfiduciati verso la politica e privi di un qualsiasi sentimento di appartenenza, che sono contestualmente rintracciabili nel mondo giovanile odierno e che non sono comunque sempre di sicura e di agevole interpretazione.

S. Le basi valoriali e sociali delle universitari e dei giovani disoccupati”

appartenenze

degli

studenti

A questo punto sembra di un certo interesse integrare l’analisi sugli orientamenti di appartenenza dei giovani evidenziando l’incidenza di alcuni aspetti valoriali e politici finora trascurati ma cui si fa comunemente ricorso da parte degli addetti ai lavori. Il primo degli aspetti da considerare riguarda la relazione tra la collocazione sull’asse destra-sinistra e la scelta dei riferimenti di appartenenza. La collocazione politica degli intervistati sulla scala sinistra-destra (Fig. 2) comporta delle sensibili differenze nelle appartenenze territoriali. Gli studenti di sinistra (più cosmopoliti) hanno una maggiore propensione a scegliere l’ambito mondo e quello europeo rispetto agli altri studenti. Gli studenti di centro e quelli di destra sono invece nettamente più propensi alla scelta dell’ambito Italia (un ambito usualmente più tradizionale). La regione è più scelta tra gli intervistati di destra. Esiste, poi, una relazione tra le forme dell’appartenenza e l’orientamento valoriale materialismo/postmaterialismo’ che merita indagare per completare il *

n

, A n è AR, Ringrazio Andrea Spreafico per l'elaborazione dei dati commentati in questo paragrafo, 7

oltreché per un insieme di suggerimenti tipici di un giovane, promettente, studioso europeo.

322

quadro dell’analisi (Fig. 3). Gli studenti postmaterialisti si distinguono nettamente per la tendenza cosmopolita; l’ambito “mondo” viene scelto in una percentuale tre volte superiore a quella dei materialisti, doppia è quella per l’Europa. Anche le intensità confermano questa tendenza. I soggetti più istruiti, come gli studenti universitari, hanno degli orientamenti di valore più confliggenti con l’idea di nazione: sono meno disponibili a difendere la patria, hanno un minore orgoglio nazionale, sono più postmaterialisti (atteggiamento cui è associato quello pacifista) e favorevoli a una prospettiva cosmopolita, di sapore utopico e a volte dalle premesse anti-istituzionali. Questa prospettiva trova le sue origini nella socializzazione delle giovani generazioni, avvenuta in contesti incomparabilmente più favoriti rispetto al passato, sia in termini di benessere economico che di pace e di sicurezza; a ciò bisogna aggiungere la crescita dell’individualismo narcisistico e del consumismo propagandato dal sistema dei media, intrinsecamente indifferenti ai confini nazionali. I materialisti hanno invece una tendenza doppia dei postmaterialisti a scegliere l’ambito nazionale, ambito più tradizionale e maggiormente legato alle esigenze di sicurezza materialiste, storicamente funzionale alla loro tutela. Anche entrambi gli ambiti locali sono maggiormente connessi ad un atteggiamento valoriale e materialista. Il gruppo dei “non identificabili” o, se si preferisce, dei “misti” si trova “a metà strada” tra gli altri due

rispetto a tutti gli ambiti. L’atteggiamento postmaterialista e quello materialista hanno inoltre una netta colorazione politica: il primo è prevalentemente associato a posizioni politiche di sinistra (i due elementi si possono così sommare nello spingere verso atteggiamenti cosmopoliti), i materialisti sono soprattutto di destra ed in secondo luogo di centro (materialismo e posizioni di centro-destra si associano spesso alla scelta dell’Italia come ambito prediletto). Tre quarti del campione è comunque favorevole al mantenimento di un’Italia unita ed indivisibile. Per quanto riguarda il rapporto tra appartenenza religiosa ed appartenenze territoriali (Fig. 4), gli atei si distinguono per un attaccamento estremamente elevato agli ambiti sovranazionali (mondo ed Europa, il mondo è addirittura preferito a tutti gli altri ambiti'°). I cattolici hanno una maggiore propensione a preferire l’Italia (quelli praticanti anche il comune; i non praticanti hanno appartenenze lievemente più ampie dei praticanti): in genere, quindi, la fede religiosa sembra associarsi a sentimenti nazionalisti; dove essa viene a mancare,

come nel caso degli atei, l'appartenenza alla nazione diminuisce e ci si apre di più anche all’Europa.

° All’enfasi materialista sulla sicurezza fisica ed economica si contrappone quella postmaterialista verso l’autorealizzazione, la libera espressione e la preminenza delle idee, la partecipazione a una società meno impersonale, la qualità non materiale della vita (cfr. Inglehart, 1997).

10 Nonostante l’apertura della religione cattolica al mondo, gli atei sono quelli che vi fanno

più riferimento.

323

Una dimensione importante, ma assai poco studiata, nella formazione dell’identita e del sentimento di appartenenza europea è costituita dai processi di socializzazione intergenerazionale che trovano nella famiglia un punto istituzionale essenziale del loro sviluppo. In particolare merita una riflessione la specifica configurazione delle differenti modalita generazionali di declinare il sentimento di appartenenza. L’intensita del sentimento di appartenenza all’Europa nei padri degli studenti universitari italiani e nei rispettivi figli risulta molto simile, con una preferenza più spiccata da parte dei figli. Il 68% dei figli e il 64% dei padri affermano di avvertire molto o abbastanza questo tipo di sentimento. L'identità europea è però la più debole rispetto alle identità legate agli altri ambiti geografici. Dovendo indicare l’identità in cui maggiormente si riconoscono, solo il 9% dei padri e il 10% dei figli scelgono quella europea. Per entrambi l’identità dominante rimane quella nazionale. Più di un terzo dei giovani e dei loro padri la considerano l’identità in assoluto più sentita. Il confronto tra le generazioni mostra in effetti un mutamento intergenerazionale significativo: nei figli le identità localistiche — pur restando forti — si indeboliscono lasciando tendenzialmente il passo ad una rappresentazione di tipo cosmopolita dell’appartenenza. Il fatto però che in questa ridefinizione delle identità in chiave universalistica da una generazione a quella successiva,

la dimensione

europea venga

esclusa evidenzia

ancora

una volta il

carattere problematico che si percepisce nella determinazione dei contenuti dell’integrazione europea. Si noti, in particolare, che l’allontanamento dei giovani dalle identità territoriali localistiche e da quella nazionale avviene a favore di una modalità dell’appartenenza — quella cosmopolita — che rifiuta per definizione, superandone i condizionamenti, la stessa dimensione territoriale. Diversamente da quanto ci si attenderebbe, la propensione alla multidimensionalità del sentimento di appartenenza risulta essere, nel nostro campione, maggiormente diffusa tra i genitori: sono i padri che compongono più spesso diverse identità territoriali, mentre i figli appaiono più “coerenti” e meno disponibili a conciliare identità localistiche e Cosmopolite. Si tratta di differenze che non capovolgono, tuttavia, le tendenze di fondo, possono però essere spiegate se si accoglie l’ipotesi che l’identità personale e le rappresentazioni valoriali si costruiscono e si associano lungo il corso di vita. La coscienza europea dei figli si caratterizza - nel confronto con i genitori anche per una maggiore rilevanza di eventi di rilevanza continentale che hanno fatto presa su di loro nella fase della socializzazione politica. Non è un caso, infatti, che eventi critici come la caduta del Muro di Berlino e la guerra nella exYugoslavia abbiano avuto una rilevanza molto maggiore nei figli al fine della formazione della loro coscienza civica. Diverso è invece il significato attribuito alla formazione dell'Europa unita; sebbene anche questo processo sembra abbia colpito più i figli dei padri, la fiducia nelle istituzioni europee è un dato che avvicina di nuovo le due generazioni, anche perché entrambe si ritrovano nell’esprimere una sfiducia maggiore nei confronti delle istituzioni politiche nazionali.

324

In definitiva sembra di poter dire che anche l’elaborazione-trasmissione dell’identità europea procede in ambito familiare secondo linee già confermate dalla ricerca sui processi di socializzazione politico-valoriale: la trasmissione dai genitori ai figli ha successo soprattutto per gli orientamenti maggiormente polarizzati. Sono infatti i padri più europeisti e quelli meno europeisti ad esercitare sui figli una influenza rilevante nella formazione del loro orientamento più o meno pro-Europa.

6. Un rapido confronto Italia-Francia" Parlare di un tema complesso come l’identità europea e della sua faticosa formazione nel mondo dei giovani comporta sicuramente l’esigenza di sviluppare delle indagini di carattere comparativo. In questa sede pare opportuno presentare un esempio dell’utilità di quest’approccio verificando in una maniera assai descrittiva convergenze e divergenze che riguardano i giovani italiani e i giovani francesi (studenti e giovani disoccupati) (Recchi, 2000). In primo luogo va osservato che rispetto alle appartenenze, i giovani francesi non evidenziano un profilo sostanzialmente diverso rispetto agli omologhi italiani, anche se esistono alcune significative differenze. I giovani francesi appaiono molto più “elettivi” di quelli italiani. Infatti, mentre i giovani italiani si caratterizzano per una marcata tendenza alla multiappartenenza, vale a dire tendono a sviluppare sentimenti di appartenenza verso più di un ambito territoriale, i giovani francesi, al contrario, appaiono adottare un atteggiamento di chiara preferenza verso un solo ambito. La percentuale dei giovani che si sentono nello stesso tempo europei e membri del proprio comune, europei e membri della propria regione, europei e cittadini del proprio Stato, in Italia è pressoché il doppio di quanto si registra in Francia. E° probabile che ciò dipenda da un differente modo di percepire l’appartenenza che contraddistingue le culture giovanili dei due paesi". Il tipo “pluralistico” di appartenenza territoriale proprio del caso italiano costituisce cioè un chiaro indicatore

di

un

debole

sentimento

di

legame

individuo/territorio,

iscritto

profondamente nella storia sociale italiana, piuttosto che un elemento tipico della postmodernità e come tale tendenzialmente universale. In Francia, un paese dove la relazione individuo/territorio è sempre stata particolarmente forte, si registra, al contrario, un forte atteggiamento “elettivo’ e un più basso grado di pluriappartenenza. Il Si fa qui riferimento ai dati dell’archivio Ciuspo, relativi alla ricerca, in corso di svolgimento e coordinata dallo scrivente, “The Integration of Young People into Working Life and the Future of Democratic Culture in Southern Europe”, finanziata dalla DG XXII dell’Unione Europea (conv. n. 98-10-EET-00200). '2 Nel caso dei giovani italiani, la tendenza alla multiappartenenza «fa pensare che nessuna appartenenza sia così forte da escludere le altre» (Cavalli, 1994, 7), mentre presso i giovani francesi l’appartenenza si struttura in termini particolarmente intensi e dunque in forme mutuamente autoescludentesi.

325

Per quanto riguarda l’appartenenza all’Europa l’intensità, misurata attraverso la somma di chi dichiara di sentirsi di appartenere “abbastanza” e “molto”, è presso gli studenti pressoché uguale nei due paesi. Tra i giovani disoccupati dei due paesi si segnala, invece, una significativa differenza. A differenza di quanto succede in Italia, le difficoltà di ingresso nel mercato del lavoro si traducono in Francia in una sorta di rigetto più radicale dell’identità e dell’esperienza europea. Tuttavia, va subito precisato che il giovane francese senza lavoro è in genere un soggetto che ha abbandonato presto la scuola e che proviene in prevalenza dagli strati medio-bassi della società. La configurazione sociologica complessiva del campione francese dei giovani disoccupati appare quindi assai diversa rispetto all’equivalente campione italiano”. Quest'ultimo presenta infatti al suo interno, accanto ad una quota di soggetti poco istruiti, una quota significativa di soggetti con un livello di istruzione elevato (laureati e soggetti iscritti all’universita), un dato in sintonia con l’alto tasso di disoccupazione intellettuale che costituisce uno dei tratti specifici della situazione nel nostro paese. Ancora una volta sono il livello di istruzione e l’appartenenza di classe a determinare il livello di europeismo dei giovani, o quanto meno l’influenza della condizione di disoccupazione si somma alle variabili relative al capitale sociale e alla provenienza sociale. Questo risultato della ricerca comparata Italia-Francia appare in piena sintonia con l’ipotesi, assai diffusa nella ricerca sociologica, che postula un forte legame tra europeismo e “centralità” sociale. Tale relazione è particolarmente forte in Francia, dove i giovani più europeisti sono quelli di estrazione altoborghese e quelli che possiedono un livello di istruzione più elevato. In Italia il nesso tra estrazione sociale medio/alta e livello di istruzione da un lato, e un più forte sentimento di appartenenza all’ Europa, esiste ma non si riscontra con la stessa intensità. In Italia, a differenza della Francia, l’europeismo è un atteggiamento diffuso anche presso soggetti che provengono da ceti medio-bassi, anche se non con la stessa intensità che si registra in quelli medio-alti. Un/altra significativa convergenza tra Italià e Francia riguarda la collocazione politica e l’atteggiamento ideologico. Anche presso i giovani francesi, chi si colloca a sinistra appare più predisposto verso l’appartenenza europea. Come in Italia, tra i nostri “cugini latini” i sentimenti di appartenenza all’Europa calano drasticamente tra chi si colloca al centro e a destra. Inoltre, sempre in sintonia con i dati italiani, il giovane europeista francese manifesta un impegno politico più alto

© Per una descrizione del campione italiano si rinvia alla Nota metodologica , inserita supra nel par. 2. Il campione francese è composto da 907 giovani, di cui 609 studenti e 298

disoccupati. L’80,1% ha tra i 18 e i 23 anni, il 19,9% tra i 24 e i 30 anni. Le giovani sono

sovrappresentate rispetto alla popolazione (62,5% del totale), ma il 60,4% dei disoccupati sono maschi. Infine, i disoccupati sono stati campionati nella regione di Parigi (città e banlieues). Tra gli studenti, il 75,7% è iscritto a facoltà di scienze umane, sociali e politiche di atenei o istituti superiori parigini, il restante 24,3% studia negli Institut d’Etudes Politiques di Grenoble e Lille. La ricerca francese è stata condotta da M. Cacouault e da A. Muxel del Centre d’étude de la vie politique frangaise (Cevipof) di Parigi.

326

della media e un atteggiamento progressista rispetto a diverse questioni sociali (immigrazione, eutanasia, liberalizzazione delle droghe ecc.). Una divergenza significativa si registra invece rispetto alla fiducia verso l’Unione europea. I giovani italiani attribuiscono all’Unione europea un grado di fiducia più alto che alle istituzioni politiche nazionali e locali. In Francia la percentuale di quelli che danno fiducia all'Europa è invece più bassa. Ancora una volta sono i giovani senza lavoro che accordano un livello più basso di fiducia, quasi che attribuiscano la responsabilità della loro condizione al processo di unificazione europea. Nel complesso, si deve concludere che l’europeismo sia in Francia che in Italia

nasce all’interno della stessa base sociologica e culturale. Il ritratto sociologico del giovane europeista, francese e italiano all’inizio del Duemila, è sintetizzabile nei seguenti tratti: un’estrazione sociale medio-alta, un livello di istruzione elevato, un marcato orientamento politico a sinistra ed un atteggiamento sociale chiaramente progressista.

7. Per una conclusione provvisoria Giunti al termine di questo excursus empirico ci si deve domandare: la costruzione di un’identità europea passa attraverso un contributo essenziale delle nuove generazioni? Una risposta positiva ad un interrogativo di questo genere sembrerebbe ineludibile. Tuttavia proprio la rassegna dei dati esposta fino a questo punto introduce più di un elemento di sconforto. Ciò proprio in un’ottica previsiva, anche se gli studiosi di fenomeni sociali sanno benissimo che quando si parla di orientamenti politici e di valori dei giovani si può sempre applicare una sorta di teoria della reversibilità perché niente è più instabile ed aleatorio di quanto riguarda il mondo dei giovani. L’instabilità è un dato endemico a questo segmento della società, in naturale evoluzione, anche quando affida l’affermazione di una sua

identità al superamento di stadi di crisi in aperta dissonanza con lo status quo. Vero è che le ricerche citate ed anche quella che qui è stata sommariamente presentata dimostrano che questa generazione sembra essere in controtendenza: si parla, non a caso, di stato di moratoria e di silenzio dei giovani e perfino di “generazione invisibile” (Diamanti, 1999). In linea generale si può dire, e non si tratta certo di una novità, che la gioventù rappresenta da tempo un punto di riferimento importante per la elaborazione di un quadro socio-politico europeo capace di reggere la sfida del nostro tempo. Già nel 1951, al momento della costituzione della Comunità del Carbone e dell’Acciaio, era stata avviata, sotto l’egida del Consiglio d’Europa, una “campagna per la gioventù” finalizzata al coinvolgimento dei giovani nella creazione dell’Europa. Poi, a partire dal 1985, è stato promosso un programma quinquennale “Jeunesse pour l’Europe” che adotta una prospettiva squisitamente culturale e politica. I giovani, infatti, vengono incoraggiati a concepire l’Europa come un dato 327

fondamentale del loro ambiente storico e sociale. Vengono stimolati ad assumere coscienza del ruolo che possono svolgere come cittadini nella costruzione dell’Unione europea; vengono educati a comprendere il dato storico-strutturale della “diversità” come dato tipico della società europea di ieri e di oggi che deve essere valorizzato al meglio. In altri termini gli attori istituzionali che promuovono il processo di integrazione europea da molti lustri affidano alle giovani generazioni il compito di far mettere radici all’idea d’ Europa. I dati italiani e i dati francesi sui giovani contemporanei ci mostrano, invece, con poca ombra di dubbio che il cammino da fare è ancora lungo. I giovani non sembrano davvero essere gli alfieri di un progetto di ridefinizione delle appartenenze collettive che, in tempi medio-brevi, consenta di sostituire (perfino di affiancare) il sentimento di appartenenza alla nazione con una impegnativa identificazione con l’Europa. Gli effetti della variabile età indiscutibilmente si intrecciano con altre variabili nell’inibire un ruolo trainante ed innovativo dei giovani come portatori di una mentalità europea. E’ comunque altrettanto indiscutibile il dato secondo cui i giovani rappresentano un campo di studio di rilevante interesse per monitorare i processi di trasformazione dell’identità territoriale e politica e dunque per prevedere le direzioni del mutamento che una società sovranazionale come l’Unione europea sta intraprendendo. Questo paper vuole solo testimoniare, in maniera abbastanza documentata, la delicata fase che i giovani stanno attraversando su una questione così specifica e cruciale del nostro tempo. La ricerca può forse offrire una piattaforma conoscitiva utile ad impostare un progetto politico di ridefinizione della cittadinanza nella società europea del Terzo millennio; a questo compito siamo tutti chiamati, giovani e meno giovani.

Riferimenti bibliografici Ahrendt D. (1998), Young People's Attitudes to the European Union, European Commission, Bruxelles. Belot C. e Tournier V. (1998), “Les jeunes, l’Europe et la nation”, in Bréchon P., Cautrés B. (a cura di), Les enquêtes eurobaromètres. Analyse compareé des données sociopolitiques, L'Harmattan, Paris. Bettin Lattes G. (1995), “L’idea di Europa”, in Id. (a cura di), La societa degli europei, Monduzzi, Bologna. Bettin Lattes G. (a cura di) (1999), Giovani e democrazia in Europa, Cedam, Padova. Cavalli A. (1994), “I giovani italiani e l'Unione Europea”, Quaderni lard, n. 2.

Cotta M. (1979), “La partecipazione politica”, in Rivista italiana di Scienza politica, 9, n. 1. Crouch C. (1999), Social Change in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. | Diamanti I. (1997), “L’Italia: un puzzle di piccole patrie”, in Buzzi C., Cavalli A. e de Lillo A. (a cura di), Giovani verso il Duemila, Il Mulino, Bologna.

328

Diamanti I. (a cura di) (1999), La generazione invisibile. Inchiesta sui giovani del nostro tempo, Edizioni Il Sole-24 Ore, Milano. Dogan M. (1999), “ La dinamica delle generazioni e il declino dei valori tradizionali ”, in Bettin Lattes G. (a cura di), op. cit. Eurobarometro (1999), Public Opinion in the European Union. Report number 51, European Commission, Bruxelles. Eurostat (1997), Les jeunes de l'Union Européenne ou les âges de transition, Luxembourg. Galland O. (1996b [1993]), “La gioventù in Francia, una nuova età della vita”, in Cavalli A. Galland O. (a cura di), Senza fretta di crescere. L'ingresso difficile nella vita adulta, Liguori, Napoli.

Girault R. (1994), “Les trois sources de l’identité et de la conscience européennes au XX siècle”, in Girault R. (a cura di), /dentité et conscience européennes au XX siècle, Hachette, Paris. Gubert R. (1992), “Introduzione”, in Gubert R. (a cura di), L'appartenenza territoriale tra ecologia e cultura, Reverdito, Trento. Habermas J. (1992), “Cittadinanza politica e identità nazionale. Riflessioni sul futuro dell'Europa”, in Id., Morale, diritto, politica, Einuadi, Torino. Inglehart R. (1997), Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, economic and political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Mancini F. (1998), “Per uno stato europeo”, in // Mulino, n. 377. Muxel A. (1996), Les jeunes e la politique, Hachette, Paris. Ortega F. (1999), “I giovani non sono (tutto) quel che sembrano. Sul cambiamento culturale della gioventù spagnola”, in Bettin Lattes G. (a cura di), op. cit. Parsons T. (1975), Sistema politico e struttura sociale, Giuffré, Milano. Pizzorno A. (1966), “Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica”, in Quaderni di Sociologia, n. 3-4. Recchi E. (2000), “Il senso di appartenenza all’Europa e l’identità territoriale dei giovani in Italia e in Francia”, Facoltà di Scienze politiche “Cesare Alfieri”, mimeo. Rusconi G. E. (1996), “La cittadinanza europea non crea il popolo europeo”, in // Mulino, n. SÌ Segatti P. (1999), “Quale idea di nazione hanno gli italiani? Alcune riflessioni sull’idea italiana di nazione in una prospettiva comparata”, in Bettin Lattes G. (a cura di), op. cit. Simmel G. (1989), Sociologia, Edizioni Comunità, Torino.

Simmel G. (1975), “Come si conservano le forme sociali”, in Mongardini C. (a cura di), // conflitto della cultura moderna, Bulzoni, Roma Spreafico A. (2000), “Appartenere alla comunità. L'appartenenza socio-territoriale tra teoria e ricerca”, Facoltà di Scienze politiche “Cesare Alfieri”, mimeo. Tomasi L. (a cura di) (1998), La cultura dei giovani europei, Franco Angeli, Milano

329

T Vpisuapuy, ayap ezusuazavddy nuora; Yap Quaprgs LWMISMMIUR ROR IUD (87U0S AUP omy BUT OdSNID PEUT) coLfbeady (0002

I Si

06

PUS []QUE

330

Fig. 2 - Le appartenenze degli studenti universitari secondo la collocazione politica Fonte: Archivio Dati CIUSPO (Elab. A. Spreafico 2000)

studenti di sinistra al mondo

____al mio comune 20,3%

25,6%

alla mia regione

al'Europa /

13,7%

10,4%

all'Italia 29,9% studenti di centro PROS

al mio comune

16,8%

17,9%

all'Europa

7,0%

alla mia regione

16,1% 42,1%

all'Italia

studenti di destra

15,7% al mondo,

-al mio comune

17,5% all'Europa-

3,9% alla mia regione

19,2% è

43,7% all'Italia —

331

Fig. 3 - Appartenenze e Valori Fonte: Archivio Dati CIUSPO (Elab. A. Spreafico 2000) ambiti appartenenza territoriale postmaterialisti al mio comune 17,5% al mondo.

35,7%

alla mia regione

13,6%

all'Italia

21,8%

ambiti appartenenza territoriale Non identificabili al mio comune

al mondo

30.3%

18,3%

all'Europa-

8,9% alla mia regione

15,4%

x

ambiti appartenenza territorale materialisti 12,1%

al mondo al mio comune

20,7%

alla mia regione

è

:

43,6% all'Italia

332

17,9%

0910789

somos

333 JJUAUIES21109 IS

09110789 UOU

QDIZ) Y

pISU0I BJ

‘on81d

VsuUPusAOddy yer Dro PP

CIAO HOG AIO OdS

01611

aju891181d

Fig 6 -

0318

90Yooudy (0002

PZUPURADAAD2]DLA0RALM

edon3,j2a

818118

|b opuo W rR Bye BIW 3U01691 |B OW 109 aun ezuaus)iedde

o

OPINIONS PUBLIQUES EUROPEENNES ET INTEGRATION Christian BIDEGARAY Université de Nice — Sophia Antipolis, France

1. Introduction

Quelle peut être l’attitude de l’opinion publique a l’égard de la construction européenne telle est l’objet de cette communication qui débutera d’ailleurs en s’interrogeant sur l’existence d’une opinion publique européenne, tant l’observation semble montrer qu’elle n’existe pas vraiment mais que se juxtaposent des opinions nationales que, par convention, on feint d’appeler opinion européenne. La méthode Monnet consistant à remettre à quelques techniciens le soin de faire progresser l’intégration par des techniques économiques et des procédures ignorées du grand public ne se prêtait d’ailleurs pas aisément à l'émergence d’une opinion publique européenne. Aussi les questions communautaires n’ont-elles entraîné des mouvements d’opinion qu’assez tardivement à l’occasion de quelques grandes avancées vers une vision plus politique de la construction européenne: élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct, Acte Unique, Traités de Maastricht puis d’ Amsterdam, . Toutefois, même dans ce cas, la construction européenne ne semble pas

notamment.

déclencher un enthousiasme démesuré dans les chaumières. Pour expliquer cette relative apathie de l’opinion, Léon Lindberg et Stuart Scheingold ont avancé l’idée que la construction de l’Europe était laissée aux bons soins de l’élite par une opinion publique témoignant d’un désintérêt bienveillant à l’égard de l’intégration européenne, intérét qui s’accroîtrait ou diminuerait selon l’évolution de la conjoncture. Cette thèse du consensus permissif' semble toujours valide, que l’on observe les différentes consultations des européens ( référendums et élections) ou

que l’on examine les résultats des sondages “Eurobaromètres” qui sont menés régulièrement depuis de très nombreuses années. Les votations révèlent une adhésion limitée (paragraphe 2), les enquêtes d'opinion une ignorance bienveillante (paragraphe 3).

! Léon Lindberg et Stuart Scheingold (1970), Europe 's Would be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

334

2. Les votations: une adhésion limitée

Sous le titre de votations les juristes rassemblent les consultations référendaires et les élections de représentants. Ces deux types d’opération sont en effet conduits au niveau européen au sein des différents Etats-membres. Tous révèlent davantage une neutralité bienveillante plus que l’enthousiasme.

2.1 Les référendums En théorie la consultation des peuples sur la construction de l’Europe devrait pouvoir fournir une bonne indication de l’état de l’opinion mais l’on sait qu’il n'existe pas de procédure référendaire européenne et que seuls certains Etats membres disposent de ce moyen de démocratie semi-directe. Dès lors la consultation de la population s’effectue dans un cadre national et mêle des considérations sur le devenir de l’Europe avec des enjeux purement domestiques. De surcroît la pratique référendaire n’est pas généralisée en Europe et revêt des formes tantôt consultatives tantôt décisoires qui en affectent la portée. En toute hypothèse qu’ils refusent ou admettent l’intégration à l’Europe, les référendums traduisent un certain embarras.

2.1.1 Les référendums négatifs ne sont pas clairs

En théorie ils expriment un net désaveu de la part des populations à l’égard de la construction européenne. Tel est le cas des référendums norvégiens (1972 et 1992) et suisse (1992). Pourtant des doutes subsistent. L’hostilité des Norvégiens ne fait pas de doute mais l’opinion publique semble avoir été fortement perturbée. Ainsi en 1972 le parti majoritaire était singulièrement divisé et en 1992 malgré l’accord des formations politiques sur 88,5% de votants 47,7% ont voté “oui” et 52,5% “non”.

Le référendum suisse du 6 décembre 1992 est encore plus difficile à interpréter (50,3% de “non” pour 78,3% de votants). En effet non seulement les partis politiques helvétiques étaient fort divisés mais en outre s’est créée une double division de voix entre d’une part la Suisse alémanique et italophone (majoritairement hostile à l’entrée de la Suisse) et la Suisse romande et les deux demi-cantons bàlois (favorables) et d’autre part une nette distinction entre les grandes villes majoritairement favorables et le reste du pays.

335

2.1.2 Les référendums d’adhésion traduisent un certain scepticisme Ils ont marqué les étapes des opinions envers les Communautés puis envers l’Union européenne.

a) Les référendums relatifs à l'adhésion aux Communautés européennes.

Le Danemark et l’Irlande ont donné des réponses claires puisqu’en 1972 le

“oui” l’a emporté mais si au Danemark le “oui” atteint 63,3% avec 90,1% de

votants, le Groenland en a profité pour refuser de participer aux Communautés européennes. En revanche les référendums français (1973) et britannique (1975) ne peuvent être interprétés aussi aisément. En France le référendum répondait davantage à des opérations de politique intérieure (ouverture du Président Pompidou en direction des Centristes) qu’à des motifs européens. Dans le même sens le référendum organisé en 1975 au Royaume-Uni, tentait de mettre un terme aux divisions internes des deux partis de gouvernement Conservateurs et Travaillistes qui tour à tour avait adopté des positions louvoyantes sur la participation de la Grande Bretagne à l’aventure européenne.

b)

Les référendums d’adhésion à l’Union européenne. On peut reprendre semble-t-il la même démonstration pour les référendums organisés à l’occasion de l’adhésion de l’Autriche, de la Finlande et de la Suède à l’Union européenne en 1994. Cette ouverture impliquait des révisions constitutionnelles importantes pour chacun de ces pays aussi soit de manière obligatoire (Autriche) ou simplement consultative (Finlande et Suède) fallait-il consulter les populations. | Partout les résultats furent positifs mais il semble difficile d’en tirer une conclusion claire quand on constate le désavèu que les électeurs ont manifesté quelques temps après lors des élections pour le Parlement européen. Moins de la moitié des électeurs suédois se sont rendus aux urnes alors qu’ils sont ordinairement 90% à voter. En Finlande un quart des électeurs ont négligé le scrutin et plus de 40% des voix sont allées à des candidats anti-européens. En Autriche, un tiers des électeurs sont restés chez eux le jour du vote. Dès lors si l’on additionne les votes en faveur des candidats anti-européens et le taux de non-participation, en 1996 l'Autriche exprimait son désaveu par 52%, la Finlande 66% et la Suède 83%. (Anton Pelinka [1997], “Pourquoi l’Europe est victime de son succès”, The Philip Morris Institute For Public Policy Research, Bruxelles, avril).

336

2.1.3 Les référendums sur l’approfondissement restent hésitants L’approfondissement de la construction européenne tant par l’Acte Unique que par le Traité d'Union européenne a entraîné de réelles hésitations de la part des européens.

a)

L’Acte Unique européen. L’adoption de l’Acte unique semble s’étre faite en catimini. En effet rares sont les populations qui ont été consultée: Danemark (référendum consultatif) et Irlande et encore dans ce dernier cas la consultation référendaire n’a pu se faire qu’après que la Cour Suprême ait examiné deux recours en contestant la légitimité. En revanche le référendum italien de 1989 semblait s’engager plus nettement dans la transformation de la Communauté européenne en une Union effective, mais c’était un référendum di indirizzo.

b)

Le Traité sur l’Union européenne. La portée de ces référendums était ambiguë, s’agissait-il surtout de monnaie unique ou de citoyenneté européenne? Ici encore le référendum n’a pas été envisagé ni utilisé de manière uniforme. En toute hypothèse, l’absence de clarté du Traité sur l’Union européenne n’a fait qu’obscurcir le processus de ratification proposé aux peuples européens. Le “non” danois par 50,7% contre 49,3% de “oui” sur 82,9% de votants a retenti comme un véritable coup de tonnerre. Il a fallu reconnaître aux Danois un statut particulier pour que le oui l'emporte lors d’une deuxième consultation par 56,7% contre 43,3% sur 86,3% de votants.

La France n’a pas été très loin de l’attitude du Danemark et la révision de la Constitution nécessitée pour la ratification du Traité a clairement mis en évidence la division des formations politiques et de l’opinion (52,5% de “oui” contre 48,95% de “non” sur à peine 69,68% de votants). Quant au référendum irlandais il ne pouvait être compris que dans le contexte de l'interdiction constitutionnelle de l’avortement et des menaces soulevées contre elle par la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice (affaire Grogan, du 4 octobre 1991) et nécessitant une révision constitutionnelle. La révision liée à la ratification du Traité sur l’Union européenne a fait l’objet du référendum du 18 juin 1992 qui a conclu positivement par 69,05% de ”oui” contre 30,95% de

non”

sur

un

taux

de

57%

de

votants,

mais

ces

résultats

peuvent

difficilement être détachés du problème moral de l’avortement.

Ainsi comme on le voit les consultations référendaires sont loin d’apporter une réponse claire. Tenues à l’échelon européen les élections européennes ne donnent guère davantage de satisfaction.

337

2.2 Les élections au Parlement européen Tenues au suffrage universel depuis 1979 ces élections ne permettent d’apprécier clairement l’évolution des opinions publiques. Le jeu est faussé l'enjeu électoral est plus national qu’européen, les partis politiques de chaque en contrôlent le déroulement, leurs résultats sont peu lisibles, aussi n’est-il surprenant qu’une part importante de l’électorat s’en désintéresse.

pas car Etat pas

2.2.1 Des enjeux nationaux

Comme les élections intermédiaires, les élections européennes, ne peuvent pas être séparées des problèmes nationaux qui les structurent. Elles peuvent être l’occasion d’un vote sanction contre la politique gouvernementale ou une contestation des partis dominants plus que l’expression d’un choix politique pour l’Europe. Election sans grand enjeu domestique l’élection européenne permet de sanctionner sans grand risque les partis au gouvernement. Si l’on en croit les sondages régulièrement effectués, deux tiers environ (55 à 60%) des électeurs se prononcent pour des motifs nationaux contre à peine un tiers (20 à 30%) pour des motifs européens. Il faut reconnaître, en outre que le choix offert aux électeurs est délicat car l’offre électorale est très émiettée. En France par exemple les électeurs voient s’affronter 11 listes en 1979, 14 en 1984, 15 en 1989 et 20 en 1994 et 1999,

Or, dans le même temps le nombre de listes capables de rassembler plus de 10% des électeurs inscrits ne cesse de diminuer: 3 en 1989 (listes Veil, Mitterrand,

Marchais), 2 en 1984 (listes Veil et Jospin), 2 en 1989 (listes Giscard d’Estaing et Fabius), 1 en 1994 (liste Baudis), aucune en 1999. i De surcroît un nombre croissant d’électeurs portent leurs voix sur des listes hors système:

12% d’entre eux en 1979, 14% èn 1984, 18% en 1994 et 49% en

1999.

2.2.2 Un contròle partisan Loin d’être le fait d’euro-partis offrant aux électeurs des candidats groupés sur des programmes européens, la confection des listes est le fait des état-majors des partis nationaux qui établissent leur stratégie en vue des élections de premier rang (“first order elections”) auxquelles les élections européennes servent de répétition “à blanc”. Ainsi en France, les élections européennes de 1994 n’ont pas tant permis de contrôler l’activité des députés européens sortants que servi de deuxième tour au. référendum: de Maastricht de 1992 et de tour de chauffe pour les présidentielles de 1995. Autant dire que la réponse électorale manquait de clarté!

338

La citoyenneté européenne n’est ici qu’une citoyenneté qui se superpose à la citoyenneté étatique et ne peut s'exprimer qu’à travers un Parlement jugé mineur et composé d’élus de seconde zone. En fait, presque vingt ans après l’introduction du suffrage universel dans la construction européenne, force est de constater que les élections européennes ne permettent pas d’apprécier clairement l’évolution des opinions publiques. Le jeu est faussé tant du point de vue de la consultation que du point de vue de la réponse apportée.

2.2.3 Des élections peu lisibles Loin de répondre à des questions concernant l’Europe, les élections européennes servent le plus souvent de test de popularité en grandeur nature aux hommes politiques nationaux. En France, comme certains l’ont dit, les élections européennes sont des “présidentielles du pauvre”. Mais leur efficacité est douteuse. Ainsi la notoriété européenne de certains hommes politiques comme Jacques Delors, Raymond Barre ou Valéry Giscard d’Estaing ne les a pas conduits à se porter tête de liste ni permis de structurer un électorat présidentiel efficace - d’où leur renoncement à se présenter à l’élection présidentielle française en 1995. Les têtes de listes sont donc réservées à quelques hommes liges et la confection de celles-ci reste déterminée par des calculs partisans. L’élection à Strasbourg est ainsi un tremplin ou une bouée de sauvetage pour les élus nationaux. Un tremplin, quand il s’agit de s’affirmer ou de prendre pied dans la vie politique locale et/ou nationale (cf. l’exemple de Philippe Douste-Blazy ou de Jean-Marie Le Pen), une bouée de sauvetage ou une session de rattrapage, pour les professionnels politiques victimes d’un accident de parcours.

En toute hypothèse, les électeurs sont marginalisés puisqu'ils ne peuvent pas intervenir dans la confection des listes ni de sanctionner la façon dont les députés sortants et la Commission de Bruxelles se sont acquittés de leur mission (“party irrelevance” selon Robert Ladrech’). Ils se trouvent ainsi déconnectés du jeu politique. Loin de porter sur des enjeux européens, leur vote est “l’occasion de porter une appréciation sans frais sur la politique mise en oeuvre par le gouvernement de leur pays”. et leur choix électoral n’a aucune incidence directe sur la composition des délégations françaises à Strasbourg ni sur leurs missions. Il n’est donc pas étonnant qu’ils s’en détournent volontiers.

? Robert Ladrech (1993), “Social Democratic parties and EC integration: Transnational party responses to Europe 1992”, European Journal of Political Research, 24 (2) August, pp.195Dia 3 Patrice Collas (1994), “L’Union européenne en marche vers le régime parlementaire?”, Revue politique et parlementaire, 970, mars-avril, pp. 34-48.

339

2.2.4 Une désaffection significative de l’opinion

L’abstention ne cesse de progresser et les derniers résultats des élections de 1999 ne manquent pas d’être inquiétants. Qu’on en juge d’après ces pourcentages: e Abstentions en 1999:

fon en Ju [rome] [ee on 76,7 |70,1 |69,9 |61,7] 54,8 | 51 | 51 ag A TA I I

150,6 149,6 |49,2 | 44 |35,6 |35,6 TARA I CO DA E | Se 13!

En France la progression de l’abstention est significative e Abstentions:

1979

1984

1989

1994

41,5%

1999

43,2%

De surcroît; alors que le nombre d’électeurs inscrits dans notre pays a augmenté de 14% entre 1979 et 1999, le nombre des votants a décru à peu près dans les mémes proportions. Ainsi en France, lors des derniers européens assiste-t-on à: * Une atomisation de la représentation: Liste

Liste

Liste

Liste

Liste

-

Laguiller

Frangois | Frangois | Nicolas

Krivine

Hollande | Bayrou | Sarkozy | Devilliers

sièges | sièges

g

2

l

sièges

sièges

Pasqua

: fee

sièges

Liste

St.Josse | Le Pen

sièges | sièges

Or, avec un éparpillement redoutable des voix les listes suivantes

* N'obtiennent pas de sièges: a

0,41%

0,01% 0,01%

0% Pets sett: ÀRCE 340

Pas étonnant alors si les partis du système sont désertés. Si l’on regroupe les résultats obtenus par les diverses formations constituant la gauche et la droite de gouvernement et qu’on les additionnent on constate qu’elles ne représentent aujourd’hui pas plus du tiers de l’électorat.

1989

1994 2D1

Gauche de Gvt en % des inscrits

18%

15%

en % des inscrits

24%

18%

19%

en % des inscrits

42%

33%

37%

33%

Enfin, chaque élection permet de mettre en lumière un phénomène de cens caché. Sont davantage favorables à l’Europe les hommes, les moins de 54 ans et les personnes ayant fait des études ou diplômées de l’Enseignement supérieur (catégories regroupant les cadres et les professions intermédiaires). Sont en revanche hostiles à l’Europe plutôt des femmes ou des personnes de plus de 54 ans, titulaires du Bac ou moins, (catégories regroupant les ouvriers, employés, retraités et sans emplois). Comme on le voit l’adhésion des européens à l’intégration ne ressort pas clairement des consultations directes par des mécanismes électoraux. Cette apathie ne révèle en fait qu’une assez grande méconnaissance des mécanismes et des institutions liées à l’intégration, comme en témoignent les enquêtes d’opinion.

3. Les enquêtes d’opinion: une ignorance bienveillante Depuis plus de 25 ans la Commission européenne fait effectuer des enquêtes régulières pour étudier l’état et l’évolution des opinions publiques européennes selon la technique des sondages et désignées sous le nom d’“Eurobaromètre”. Ces enquêtes concernant plusieurs pays européens, dont le nombre va croissant avec l’élargissement de l’Europe «contribuent en premier lieu à renseigner diverses directions générales et services de la Commission, au nom de celle-ci et pour son compte»: (explication officielle). En fait, ces enquêtes permettent d’éclairer les décideurs sur l’état d’esprit des citoyens européens tout en leur servant aussi à se justifier quand les réticences des opinions semblent l’exiger. En toute hypothèse ces enquêtes sont le seul moyen de mettre en lumière une opinion européenne sur des problèmes communs aux pays membres et présentent l’avantage de fournir une réponse aux institutions européennes sans susciter les difficultés que peut entraîner une consultation électorale.

341

À la lecture des résultats de ces enquêtes, on découvre que le consentement des européens relève davantage de la résignation que du volontarisme enthousiaste et que leur connaissance des institutions communautaires est encore plus faible que celle qu’ils ont du système politique auquel ils appartiennent. |

3.1 Un consentement sans conviction

L’adhésion à l’Europe reste moyenne, car sa personnalité est mal identifiée.

3.1.1 Une adhésion moyenne À 25 ans d’intervalle on considère

+ L’appartenance à l'Europe:

Ni bonne ni mauvaise

1973

Mais pendant ce temps l’opinion a connu des oscillations entre une satisfaction élevée (63% en 1975) mais seulement 53% dans les années 1976-80 puis de nouveau 50 à 65% de satisfaits entre ‘81 et ‘87 pour chuter à 58% en moyenne par pays à partir de l’année 1988. En fait l’attitude des sondés est très dépendante de la conjoncture si la satisfaction est forte (72%) au printemps ‘91 avec la baisse du chômage et la réunification de l’ Allemagne, elle chute fortement au printemps ‘97 (46%) avec la guerre du Golfe, la Yougoslavie, la vache folle etc...

* Bénéfice éprouvé à raison de l'appartenance de son pays à l'Europe: Ne sait pas 23%

342

* Regrets si le pays dont on est membre quittait la construction européenne:

On notera que les indifférents représentent plus d’un tiers des sondés - chiffre qui ajouté à celui des soulagés de voir leur pays quitter la construction communautaire ne peut laisser indifférent. Il faut également ajouter que le nombre des indifférents varie d’un pays à l’autre et que le poids de la conjoncture peut être décisif, Typique à cet égard est la réponse des habitants des Länder de l'ex Allemagne de l'Est:

1990 1996

‘efits d’ enue aus d apparel: à l’Europe unie

Regie si le pays! quittait l’Europe unie

hearers

3.1.2 Une identité à éclipses

L'identité de l’Europe est faible et évolutive car cette construction ne fait que se superposer à l’appartenance nationale. Si l’on prend des moyennes on voit que près de 45% des sondés se sentent parfois ou souvent européens quand 51% déclarent ne se sentir jamais européens. Environ 80% des sondés s’estiment d’abord membre de leur pays (33% se sentent uniquement national et moins de 50% national puis européen) alors que 20% des sondés se sentent prioritairement européens (10% européen puis national, 10% seulement européen). Mais les opinions publiques, même favorables, restent dans une prudente expectative car elles font davantage confiance aux institutions nationales qu’aux institutions européennes et dans chaque hypothèse, davantage aux instances délibératives qu’aux instances de décision.

343

+ Degré de confiance à l'égard des institutions: Parlt.national

Parlt. euro.

Gvt national

Commission

Cons. des M.

fia A a (nsp)

14

12

confiants

51

54

3.2 Une vision floue de l’intégration européenne Les Européens manifestent une assez grande méconnaissance des institutions européennes et une égale ignorance des politiques communautaires.

3.2.1 Assez grande méconnaissance des institutions

On demande à ceux qui se disent intéressés par l’Europe: * Avez vous lu ou entendu récemment quelques chose? Sur le

Sur la Court de

Sur la

Sur le Conseil

Parlement

Justice

Commission

des Ministres

dise P

[wep sbAlon milano 200s sel sermtd Biyeauf Yaw Lioni) bh email Mais 22% parlent du Conseil de l’Europe qui n’est pas une institution communautaire! : En fait les sondés projettent leur vision nationale sur les institutions européennes d’où une hiérarchie des institutions européennes tout à fait erronée. Arrive en 1 le Parlement européen, en 2 la Commission et en 4 ou en 5 le Conseil des Ministres alors que c’est lui qui impulse les décisions. En témoigne encore une enquête de 1999, * Joue un rôle important dans l'Union:

La Banque Centrale Mais le Conseil des Ministres est quasiment inconnu du grand public. Les Luxembourgeois, les Néerlandais et les Suédois sont ceux qui le connaissent le

344

mieux, mais à peine 31% des Britanniques estiment qu’il a un rôle important contre 57% qui sont sans opinion (comme 52% des Allemands et des Autrichiens).

Un sondage en 10 questions administré en 1996 permet de mesurer le degré d’ignorance des citoyens européens:

ee n Commission

87%

13%

86%

24%

l'Europe

84%

16%

européens

81%

19%

Qui exerce en ce moment la

a Européenne de l’Union

74%

26%

Paraissent les mieux connues les données suivantes:

Savent Ville abritant les institutions

ae

preere]

Couleurs du drapeau Nom de la future monnaie

Mais l’ignorance du public est démontrée à l’évidence par tous les sondages portant sur le budget de l’Union. En témoigne comme les années précédentes l’enquête suivante de 1999: + Part réelle ou supposée des dépenses budgétaires: Part réelle de ces dépenses dans le budget

Les frais structurels

7% Ne savent pas

345

31%

Tout ceci démontre le déficit d’information qui affecte la connaissance des institutions européennes. Quand on demande aux Européens quel est leur degré d’information on obtient des résultats surprenants. * Se sentent: Trés bien

Assez bien

Pas très bien

Plutôt mal

informé

informés

informés

informés

29%

32% soit 1/3

19%

66% soit 2/3

Ce déficit d’information est caractéristique de certaines institutions comme la Cour de Justice des Communautés. + Selon les personnes interrogées la Cour de Justice est: Très bien ou Assez bien TRE iare,Mz connue

Ars, Pas très bien connue

. Pas bien connue du tout

76% Mais les sondés hésitent quant au comportements a adopter a son égard. Ainsi 50% des personnes interrogées estiment qu’il faut lui obéir contre 20% qui sont de l’avis contraire et 20% qui hésitent. Ceci conduit cependant a des contradictions flagrantes entre l’opinion des habitants d’un pays et le comportements réel de celui ci à l’égard de la construction communautaire. Des contradictions flagrantes apparaissent entre le nombre de condamnation prononcées par la CJCE pour manquement d’Etat et l’opinion de ses concitoyens - qu’elle soit favorable ou hostile à l’obéissance envers la CJCE. * Attitude à l'égard de la CJCE:

arrêts de la CJCE

Nombre de condamnations en manquement d’Etat

de la CJCE

Nombre de condamnations en manquement d’Etat

Belgique

0 346

3.2.2 Flou artistique sur les politiques communautaires Tendance constante des consultations de l’opinion, cette ignorance se manifeste encore malgré les progrès accomplis à Maastricht et Amsterdam. En 1992 en pleines négociations pour la ratification du Traité de Maastricht, 80% des sondés ne connaissaient pas du tout le trait ou peu. De même en 1995 à peine 33% pouvaient citer 12 à 14 membres de l’Union européenne. En 1996 60% des enquêtés n’avaient pas entendu parler de la conférence intergouvernementale qui était pourtant en pleine activité. Mais ici encore les opinions sont fluctuantes. En ce qui concerne l’Euro, si 33% pensaient en 1993 qu’il entrainerait plus d’inconvénients que d’avantages, ils ne sont plus que 28% à le penser en 1999. A l’automne 1999, 60% lui sont favorables et 32% hostiles. En matière d'intégration, 55% ont le sentiment que beaucoup ou un certain nombre de choses ont été réalisées au cours des dernières cinquante années, 34% estimant le contraire. Plus de 50% pensent que l’appartenance à l’Union est une bonne chose et que leur pays en bénéficie. 31 estiment que non. Les plus critiques sont l’Autriche, la Suède et le Royaume Uni. En ce qui concerne la Politique Extérieure de Sécurité et de Coopération, les opinions sont stables: 2/3 des citoyens européens estiment que les pays membres devraient avoir une politique étrangère commune, 3/4 qu’il faudrait une politique de sécurité et de défense communes. Quant à l’élargissement, seulement 28% estimaient en 1998-99 que l’accueil de

nouveaux membres devait être une priorité, 47% jugeaient au contraire l'élargissement allait coûter plus cher à leur pays et 35% pensaient l’élargissement entraînerait une croissance du chômage.

que que

Si l’on dit que l’opinion est femme, beaucoup reste encore à faire pour la séduire et l’on peut craindre que les conférences de Biarritz et de Nice ne suffisent pas à modifier fondamentalement l’attentisme des Européens. Toutefois, à voir les résultats calamiteux du dernier référendum français et la relative lassitude des opinions nationales à l’égard de la classe politique, ne faut-il pas s’interroger davantage sur le fossé qui se creuse entre les élites dirigeantes et les populations, à un moment où la mondialisation semble placer les décisions fondamentales hors d’atteinte des citoyens ordinaires, de leurs représentants nationaux et même d’une Union européenne dont l’identité laisse perplexe quand l’Euro ne cesse de se déprécier par rapport au dollar?

347

L'AVENIR DE LA DEFENSE EUROPEENNE Jacques FONTANEL Université “Mendes-France” - Espace Europe Grenoble, France

1. Introduction

Dès le début du processus de construction de l’Europe, les propositions de défense commune étaient présentes, mais le projet d’une Communauté Européenne de Défense fut rejeté par la France en 1954. Lorsque l’Allemagne Fédérale adhéra à l'OTAN, fondée sur l’hégémonie et la garantie de la dissuasion nucléaire des Etats-Unis, l’idée même d’une Union de Défense Européenne (UED) devenait utopique, notamment dans la perspective du conflit entre les pays occidentaux et le Pacte de Varsovie. Autour de l'OTAN, ciment principal de la solidarité militaire européenne, se sont alors développées des formes de défense très hétérogènes. Malgré les importantes évolutions des tactiques militaires de la guerre froide qui, sur le long terme, s’inscrivent plutôt dans des faits historiques d’importance mineure, cette donne n’a que peu évolué jusqu’à la dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie et l’effondrement de l’URSS. Avec l’importance des coûts du désarmement, l’unification allemande et le départ des troupes américaines d'Allemagne, la coopération en matière de défense est redevenue possible,

souhaitable et parfois souhaitée. Cependant, en 1990 les stratégies de défense des pays européens étaient encore incompatibles. Si la France avait depuis longtemps choisi la voie de l’autonomie partielle avec le développement de projets nationaux, notamment nucléaires, et l’appartenance au Pacte Atlantique, l’Allemagne n’entendait pas s’inscrire dans une stratégie similaire, et surtout elle souhaitait être traitée d’égale à égale en matière de haute technologie militaire. Ainsi, les discussions sur les matériels standardisés, applicables à toutes les stratégies des Etats européens, se heurtèrent aux intérêts stratégiques, militaires et industriels des

Etats. Dans le cas du choix entre le Rafale et l’avion EFA, la France a privilégié sa propre industrie, alors que les Britanniques s’engagèrent dans un projet indépendant des Etats-Unis, témoignant ainsi à la fois de la volonté d’une plus grande indépendance en termes de matériels militaires et d’une prise en compte des intérêts économiques nationaux. Si l’UEO (Union de l’Europe Occidentale) s’est, pendant un temps, proposé comme un pilier régional de l'OTAN, les réactions des . Etats aux conflits européens des Balkans montre l’extrême difficulté d’une position commune, compte tenu du poids de l’histoire et des réticences des stratèges nationaux à réduire leurs degrés de liberté. Or, il n’existe pas d’Etat puissant qui ne

348

dispose de sa propre armée. L'Europe n’est pas un Etat, elle ne pourra le devenir que si ses armées ne font qu’une. Or, l’hétérogénéité des politiques de défense est telle que l’Europe reste d’abord et avant tout un ensemble économique performant, qui ne s’est pas encore donné les moyens d’une politique de sécurité commune et indépendante de la puissance militaire hégémonique de ce début de XXIe siècle. C’est en partie pour cette raison que l’Europe reste un “nain” politique, alors même que ses composantes expriment parfois certaines velléités de puissance et de force. La défense européenne met en oeuvre des considérations économiques importantes, lesquelles s’averent parfois décisives dans les choix nationaux. Avec la réduction des menaces fondées notamment sur les stratégies de dissuasion par la terreur, les Etats cherchent, dans un contexte de déficit budgétaire, à réduire leur

effort militaire, soit par la réduction des budgets correspondants, soit par la mise en place d’accords industriels et de défense avec les Etats de l’Union. Il en résulte le renforcement de l’intérêt des gouvernements pour une défense européenne commune, a priori moins coûteuse que la somme des dépenses militaires nationales nécessaires. Cependant, les forces économiques nationales (industriels, personnels, régions “mulitarisées”) de la défense cherchent à conserver, voire développer leurs activités. Dans ces conditions, leur soutien dépend aussi des avantages qu’elles pourront en retirer, à court ou à long terme. D’où une résistance très forte pour les industries faiblement situées dans la concurrence internationale ou européenne, qui retarde ou peut faire capoter l’idée même d’une communauté européenne de défense. La théorie du “Public Choice” s’applique largement dans le cadre de cette décision politique d’un intérêt stratégique, mais aussi économique et technologique fondamental pour ie devenir de la société européenne. Pourtant, l’Europe devrait s'engager progressivement vers une économie des forces et la rationalisation des équipements et des achats militaires, en évitant que les règles, issues de compromis douloureux, ne conduisent à une surproduction de matériels ou à la mise en oeuvre d’armes relativement inadaptées aux objectifs fixés par chaque Etat de l’Union. Les stratégies des Etats s’inscrivent dorénavant dans un contexte de globalisation croissante, et de ce fait le cadre européen est de plus en plus adapté aux considérations stratégiques d’aujourd’hui, d’autant que les problèmes opérationnels ne semblent plus insurmontables. Il convient alors de s’interroger sur les fondements d’une UED, sur la production de la puissance militaire, sur les études de coûts et d’achats de matériels et d'évoquer les implications politiques de la mise en place de cette institution.

349

2. L'intérêt de l’Union Européenne de Défense (UED) L'Union Européenne de Défense est une alternative totale ou partielle de la défense de chaque pays européen, fondée à la fois sur une nouvelle lecture des menaces de chaque nation et sur les nécessaires restrictions budgétaires. Concernant les choix économiques, plusieurs décisions doivent être prises, compte tenu des contraintes stratégiques. La réduction des budgets nationaux suppose soit la recherche d'économies d’échelle (lesquelles favorisent l’existence de nouvelles contraintes et servitudes en matière de sécurité), soit l’acceptation d’une diminution des forces nationales au bénéfice de l’hégémonie américaine. L’UED constitue une solution intéressante, qui connaît déjà quelques développements et qui suppose la mise en place de critères pour le partage des coûts.

2.1 L’UED, un objectif complexe Les contraintes budgétaires ont toujours eu une influence importante sur les choix stratégiques. Ainsi, l’effort militaire souffre de l’effet “yo-yo”, avec des augmentations substantielles suivies de réductions plus ou moins importantes. Avec la décision du gouvernement américain d’augmenter progressivement ses dépenses militaires, il est probable que l’Europe adoptera une “politique suiviste”, après plusieurs années de réduction progressive des budgets de défense. S’il a existé une vraie pression pour le développement des fameux dividendes de la paix et les coupes dans le budget concernent des programmes d’équipement complets, le retour à la croissance a rendu plus laxistes les choix des Etats vers de nouvelles formes de défense et de puissance, concernant notamment les guerres intraétatiques. Il ne faut pas oublier pour autant les nouvelles menaces à l’horizon, susceptibles de remettre en cause le processus de désarmement, comme le terrorisme. È Avec les nouvelles formes de menace issues de la fin de la guerre froide, il est difficile de déterminer les armements nécessaires pour y faire face, compte tenu des “effets de patrimoine” (il faut conserver les matériels dont on n’est pas sûr qu’ils soient obsolètes) et des “effets d’inertie” inhérents aux choix, sur le long terme, de

la recherche et des engagements concernant le développement des équipements. Aujourd’hui, la mesure des risques conflictuels de l’Europe est délicate, et il est alors nécessaire de rechercher de nouvelles capacités de mobilité et de flexibilité pour faire face aux nouveaux risques stratégiques. L'Europe ne peut pas exercer son influence sur tous les théâtres d’action du monde, car elle ne dispose pas de moyens de transport (par air et par mer) nécessaires au déploiement rapide des forces blindées. Cette “paupérisation” relative des forces militaires européennes reste inquiétante, alors que l’union seule est susceptible de dégager les moyens nécessaires au développement d’une défense commune efficace. La dépendance à l'égard des Etats-Unis suppose la satisfaction de deux conditions. D’abord, les

350

Etats-Unis devraient continuer à supporter le fardeau des forces d’intervention dans le monde. Or, les forces américaines stationnées à l’étranger représentaient et le budget militaire américain affecté aux objectifs de l'OTAN voient leur influence diminuer, dans le sens d’une moindre participation. Ensuite, il faut accepter la dépendance, ce qui n’est pas difficile à choisir pour le Bénélux, mais certainement politiquement impossible à accepter officiellement pour la France. Or, alors que la défense nationale de chaque pays européen semble de moins en moins efficace, la protection américaine est de moins en moins intéressante, compte tenu de l’effondrement du système soviétique. L'Union Européenne ne peut non plus s'engager dans la voie de la neutralité, compte tenu de ses obligations avec l'OTAN, notamment celle concernant l’aide systématique à tout membre agressé. Malgré une histoire tourmentée, l’Europe est sur le point d'accepter une défense commune,

malgré

les réticences

nationales.

D'ailleurs,

depuis

les accords

de

Maastricht, la Commission de la Communauté Européenne a développé son action en matière de défense.

2.2 L'état de la coopération militaire européenne actuelle La coopération militaire européenne, élargie à l’ensemble du continent, peut prendre plusieurs formes, comme la notification des mouvements de troupe, l’échange

de

personnels

militaires,

les

alliances,

les

commandes

militaires

intégrées, les décisions d’achats communs et d'équipements standardisés ou la mise en place d’infrastructures communes. Ces formes de coopération existent déjà en Europe, laquelle connaît une véritable prolifération des organisations de sécurité. Les Etats appartiennent ainsi à plusieurs coalitions. Si l’Union Européenne coordonne la politique étrangère, elle n’exerce qu’une influence réduite en matière de défense, au bénéfice principal de l'OTAN. D’après le Traité de l’Union Européenne, les Etats membres de l’UEO se proposent de former une identité européenne de sécurité et de défense. Cependant, l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale cherche à prendre de l’importance, notamment en renforçant le pilier européen de l’Alliance Atlantique, mais elle n’a pas toujours satisfait ses objectifs. Son rôle opérationnel n’en a pas moins été élargi, avec une coopération plus étroite concernant notamment la logistique, le transport, la formation et la surveillance stratégique, les unités militaires relevant directement de l’UEO ou la mise en place d’une cellule de planification. Il n’en reste pas moins que les souverainetés nationales en matière de défense restent déterminantes, avec la neutralité de l’Irlande, de la Finlande, de la Suède et de l'Autriche, le statut particulier des forces nucléaires, les accords bilatéraux

d’assistance militaire ou l’exception danoise. L’UEO vit une dualité permanente, dépendant de l'OTAN sur le plan opérationnel et de l’UE au plan politique. L'Organisation sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (OSCE), qui comprend l’ensemble des Etats européens comme membres, exerce un rôle 351

croissant. Le Conseil de Coopération Nord Atlantique (CCNA), organisme consultatif et coopératif créé fin 1991, marque l’institutionnalisation des rapports entre les membres de l'OTAN, les pays neutres observateurs de l’UEO, les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, les Etats membres de la CEI ainsi que la Macédoine, l’Albanie et la Slovénie. L'OTAN met l’accent dorénavant sur la gestion des crises. Le Partenariat pour la Paix, structure contractuelle placée sous l’autorité du Conseil Atlantique, propose la transparence des plans et budgets nationaux de défense, leur contrôle démocratique, le développement de relations de coopération militaire avec l'OTAN, notamment pour les activités de planification, d’exercices

communs et de formation et le maintien des moyens nécessaires aux opérations menées sous l’autorité des Nations Unies et/ou sous la responsabilité de l’OSCE. La recherche d’une doctrine de défense commune et de l’interopérabilité des forces est clairement exprimée. La coopération militaire en Europe est dorénavant inscrite dans les nouvelles mœurs sécuritaires. Les entraînements communs des troupes allemandes, britanniques et italiennes pour le Tornado sont fréquents. Même si système de commande intégré insiste sur l’hégémonie américaine, il existe dans l'OTAN de larges échanges d’information et des exercices de commande intégrés étendus parfois aux pays n’ayant pas accepté le principe. Ainsi, les AWACS opèrent ensemble pour les 13 pays de l'OTAN, la Grande-Bretagne et la France opérant séparément. Il existe des tentatives de standardisation et d’interopérabilité des procédures et équipements. Le Groupe du Programme Européen Indépendant cherche à coordonner les achats de défense. Le problème, c’est que chaque nation souhaite que ses partenaires soient concernés par l’intérêt collectif, mais elle souhaite pour elle-même une grande liberté d’action. Les forces de l’Europe (dont plus de 70% dépendent de la France, du Royaume-Uni et de l’Allemagne) dans leur ensemble restent encore inférieures à celles des Etats-Unis. L’UEO représente une formidable puissance militaire; mais les Etats-Unis souhaitent maintenir leur suprématie sur la sécurité européenne, et c’est là l’un des obstacles majeurs de PUED.

2.3 Le partage des coûts d’une alliance européenne Soit une alliance des n Etats face 4 un ensemble de menaces communes, mais

aussi a des menaces spécifiques (internes ou externes), et disposant d’une grande indépendance dans leurs décisions concernant les forces nationales de défense. Dans ce cas : e dans chaque pays i, les forces armées F peuvent fournir une protection commune Ai, ou/et une protection nationale spécifique Di; e les dépenses militaires Mi définissent le coût de production des deux types de défense Ai et Di;

352

® e e

la production nationale Yi est normalement consacrée aux dépenses militaires Mi ou aux dépenses civiles Ci; la sécurité nationale Si dépend des menaces 7i, des forces nationales Di et de la somme des forces alliées Ai pour répondre aux menaces communes; finalement, le bien-être de chaque Etat dépend de la sécurité, des dépenses civiles Ci et de la population Ni. Ces cing relations peuvent étre résumées ainsi:

Fi = Ai+ Di Mi = Mi(Ai, Di) Yio =uMi+"Ci Sie

av

Sit

een,

Dil)

Wi = Wi(Si, Ci, Ni)

Une réduction des menaces accroît la sécurité, elle diminue le bénéfice marginal

des forces armées et elle réduit les dépenses militaires. Cependant, la taille des forces ennemies dépend des décisions alliées. Les modèles de course aux armements montrent ainsi qu’un accroissement coopératif des dépenses militaire peut conduire à une situation pire pour l’alliance. Les n alliés doivent décider des forces Fi, des dépenses militaires Mi et donc, indirectement, des dépenses civiles

Ci. Les interactions peuvent être de type non-coopératif de Nash-Cournot - chaque pays considère la position des alliés comme une donnée - ou de type coopératif de Lindahl - les pays choisissent conjointement les forces (et les coûts afférents) mises à la disposition de l’alliance. Ces deux comportements supposent des provisions privées (forces nationales) plutôt que collectives (forces alliées). e

e

Les dépenses de défense d’un pays bénéficient à ses alliés. Avec l’internalisation des externalités, ayant pour objectif d’accroître les dépenses et les bénéfices joints, les pays partagent le fardeau de la défense. La production du pouvoir militaire s’inscrit dans le champ théorique du monopole naturel. L'union ne conduit pas à une simple addition, elle provoque aussi des économies

e

d’échelle

substantielles,

en favorisant la réduction des

coûts, la standardisation et l’interopérabilité. La réalisation de cet avantage suppose, au niveau européen, la mise en place de forces européennes communes (sinon uniques). Les services armés ont le monopole de la violence militaire. Les Etats sont en situation de monopsoneur, étant entendu que les exportations militaires font aussi l’objet de contrôles et d’accords gouvernementaux.

La part du PNB choisie par chaque pays en matière de défense dépend du prix des forces armées, de la population, des alliances et de l’étendue des menaces. Si les membres de l’Alliance (type UEO) suivent une conduite de type Nash-Cournot, cela conduit à augmenter substantiellement les dépenses militaires, par rapport à

353

une conduite coopérative, à niveau de sécurité équivalent. Par contre, McGuire et Groth (1985) ont confirmé la difficulté à mettre en évidence des résultats significatifs de réduction de coûts consécutifs aux accords de coopération. Les jeux non-coopératifs favorisent une corrélation négative entre les dépenses militaires des alliés, certains compensant les changements opérés par l’un ou plusieurs partenaires, alors que les jeux coopératifs supposent l'inverse, les alliés ajustant leurs dépenses ensemble. L'application des jeux non-coopératifs semble avoir été la règle (Murdoch et Sandler, 1990) et les allocations de dépense de l'OTAN ont toujours été sous-optimales, même si aucune nation n’exerce réellement le statut de passager clandestin dans l'OTAN (Hilton et Vu, 1991). Olson et Zeckhauser (1966) ont montré, ceteris paribus, que les grands pays européens portaient une charge plus élevée que les autres, qui ont alors une attitude de “passager clandestin”. La défense constitue alors un bien public, avec ses caractéres de non-rivalité et de nonexclusion, notamment dans le domaine nucléaire. Les analyses économétriques de Palmer et Souchet (1994) donnent les résultats suivants. D’abord, l’appartenance à plusieurs alliances ne modifie pas vraiment la conduite sécuritaire d’un Etat. Ensuite, si dans l’ère pré-nucléaire, les alliés à la grande puissance avaient des dépenses militaires importantes et complémentaires, le nucléaire a modifié cet effet, suggérant l'apparition de “passagers clandestins”, une réduction des efforts nationaux et l’émergence du concept de biens collectifs internationaux (Brauer, 1999). Enfin, le nucléaire a eu pour effet de réduire les dépenses des petites puissances, au détriment de celles des grandes puissances. Pour Khanna et Sandler (1996), l’avantage des petits pays de l'OTAN s’est terminé dès 1967. Les bénéfices (calculé par les indicateurs de la croissance économique, de la protection des frontières exposées et de la population) sont proches des coûts, ce qui signifie un faible niveau de sous-optimalité. Ils concluent qu’il n’est donc pas nécessaire d’accroître le niveau de coopération entre les alliés de l'OTAN. Ce qui revient à dire, dans le cadre de cette quasi optimalité que l’UED n'est pas vraiment nécessaire. La formation d’une UED peut aussi bien accroître que réduire le bien-être de l’Europe, selon les réponses stratégiques qu’elle provoque à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur de sa zone d’exercice. Pour Oneal (1990), jusqu’en 1990 la coopération est plus faible dans l’UEO qu’à l’intérieur de l'OTAN, mais les fardeaux nationaux de défense connaissent une moindre variance. En supposant que l’existence d’une UED ne modifie pas la courbe de demande, elle exerce néanmoins une influence sur les prix, par une amélioration de la gestion des personnels et des choix des matériels. Cependant, l’UED est aussi un prélude à un retrait des Etats-Unis, conduisant à d’importantes

réductions de l’apport financier des Etats-Unis, de l’ordre du tiers de ses obligations actuelles de l'OTAN. Ce qui peut conduire à maintenir les dépenses militaires actuelles, comme prix de l'indépendance par rapport aux Etats-Unis. Ayanian (1992) a montré que, malgré la menace de conduites de type‘‘passager clandestin”, il existe des externalités positives aussi bien pour les Etats-Unis que pour l’Europe dans l’existence de l'OTAN. Pour Jones (1992), l'alliance réduit les 354

coûts des mécanismes d’ajustement de l’assistance mutuelle, en combattant les excès bureaucratiques que les Nations ont progressivement développés. Cette analyse devrait cependant être atténuée, car l’alliance elle-même secrète des coûts bureaucratiques croissants. Actuellement, les dépenses militaires des pays européens ont incontestablement diminué et les petits pays ont été souvent amenés à accroître ou à maintenir leurs dépenses militaires, conduisant ainsi à un gommage progressif de leur comportement de “passager clandestin”.

3. Les choix des matériels

La rationalisation de la production et des achats se heurte à de sévères problèmes d’information et d’incertitude, concernant notamment les spécifications exactes (de quelles armes a-t-on besoin?), la faisabilité technologique, les conditions économiques (coûts et temps) et les réponses stratégiques et tactiques adaptées aux menaces. L'Europe n’a pas eu vraiment de solidarité en matière de production d'armement, et s’il existe un marché des armes substantiels entre les pays membres de l’UE et les Etats-Unis, le marché intra-communautaire reste insuffisant, bien que croissant. La littérature sur les jeux de l’achat est importante. Elle souligne les contraintes économiques de l’achat, l’importance des procédures des choix et la nature particulière du marché industriel de l’armement.

3.1 Les contraintes économiques de l’achat Les choix des armements sont souvent effectués à partir d’informations qui relèvent bien souvent d’un pari économique et militaire. Généralement, sur cette base fort incertaine, des coûts de revient moyens constants sont établis et, sauf pour

la procédure des prix fixés, on définit une marge bénéficiaire pour les entreprises concernées. Les surcoûts sont nombreux et importants (allant parfois jusqu’à 4 fois le coût

initial),

du fait de la faible

incitation

à la réduction

des coûts,

des

changements de projet d’une période à l’autre et des améliorations techniques nécessaires et non programmées. e

L’aversion au risque est importante, compte tenu des incertitudes de ces opérations qui sont susceptibles de remettre en cause l’ensemble des actifs des firmes. Le Ministère de la Défense est neutre du point de vue du risque, mais il doit le prendre en charge, compte tenu des impératifs de la défense nationale que ne veulent pas assumer les firmes. Il est nécessaire alors de trouver un compromis entre le risque majeur assuré par l’Etat et la responsabilité économico-technologique de la firme, afin d’éviter le gaspillage de l’argent public, au profit d'intérêts privés. La renégociation est courante compte tenu des changements de technologie et des changements des menaces. La procédure

DD

des prix fixés peut difficilement être retenue, car elle est susceptible de conduire la firme à la banqueroute, compte tenu d’investissements élevés au départ et des aléas économiques représentés par l’obsolescence et les coûts de la recherche. Le Ministère de la Défense ne peut en outre être laissé dans l’expectative concernant la réalisation d’une arme jugée essentielle pour la sécurité nationale. Or, l'application de la théorie du “public choice” s’applique dans ce secteur de l’économie, avec le passage des cadres de la fonction publique vers l’entreprise privée et vice versa. Un système comparable avec celui des assurances, de type bonus-malus,

pourrait dans certains cas réduire cette aversion au risque des

firmes d’armement. La sélection adverse caractérise la situation dans laquelle un Etat dispose d’un avantage d’information concernant une variable exogène, c’est-à-dire non directement maîtrisée par elle-même. Les Etats-Unis ont souvent bénéficié de cet avantage. L’aléa moral intervient lorsqu'une action d’un agent n’est pas observable par le principal (ou le mandant). Dans ce cas, les intérêts des deux “partenaires” peuvent être contradictoires. Ainsi, l’intérêt de la production de l’industriel n’est pas toujours contrôlable par le Ministère de la Défense. Dans le système des prix fixés, si la qualité ne peut pas facilement être gérée (les performances dans les conditions de combat ne sont pas toujours analysées avec précision), la firme a une incitation à réduire les coûts en sacrifiant la qualité. L’entreprise peut-elle tricher sur la qualité ou sur les coûts, pour l’expression de son avantage optimal? Le plus bas abjudicateur (dit aussi le meilleur offrant) n’est pas nécessairement le producteur aux coûts les plus faibles, car il peut être purement ignorant des difficultés du projet ou penser que le Ministère de la Défense compensera les surcoûts engagés. A l’inverse, le prix apparaît parfois comme le signal de la qualité. Dans ces conditions, il est nécessaire de mettre en place des procédures d’information parfois coûteuses pour limiter les excès. Les rentes d’information peuvent être extraites des contrats à prix fixés. La recherche de contrats optimaux pose toujours le problème de la nature et de l’étendue de l'information (Tirole et Laffont, 1986). Pour empêcher les détenteurs d’informations privées d’exploiter leur situation privilégiée au détriment du bien-être collectif, les modalités de l’échange doivent être modifiées, éloignant ainsi l’économie de la situation de concurrence parfaite. Il faut alors faire appel aux contrats optimaux de second rang. Il s’agit d’inciter le bénéficiaire d’une rente d’information à ne pas l’utiliser à ses propres fins, et pour ce faire établir des sanctions suffisantes pour faire intervenir son aversion pour le risque. Il est tentant de construire des procédures de prise de décision rationnelles élaborées, ce qui est fortement illusoire.

356

3.2 Le processus d’achat Ces procédures changent substantiellement en Europe (De Cecco et Pianta, 1992), dans le temps et dans l’espace. Après une période de soutien de l’industrie d’armement nationale, le Royaume-Uni applique une approche plus libérale, faisant appel aux marchés internationaux. Par contre, la Délégation Générale pour Armement avait pour objectif, en France, des mener une véritable politique industrielle, régionale et technologique, avec d’importantes relations avec l’extérieur. Cette procédure est aussi contestée aujourd’hui, même si elle reste globalement

dominante.

Avec

les privatisations,

le Ministère

de

la Défense

n'intervient plus pour soutenir, coûte que coûte les technologies militaires nationales, à l’exception du nucléaire. La question qui se pose est de savoir si les industries d’armement répondent effectivement aux besoins de défense moderne et si elles ne sont pas trop coûteuses. Malgré les déclarations politiques et la viabilité discutable des monopoles nationaux, les actions de l’IPEG ne sont pas encore décisives. Elles se heurtent à plusieurs écueils, comme l’acceptation d’une production d’armes standardisables et interopérationnelles acceptables par les militaires, la rationalisation de la R&D et de la capacité de production, le maintien de formes concurrentielles et la promotion de structures capables de contrôler les coûts et la qualité. L’alternative à une agence européenne est un marché commun, fondé sur l’offre et la demande, avec des prix fixés pour les contrats et l’établissement de normes pour lutter contre la menace, à terme monopoliste, des importations américaines. Cette situation n’est pas toujours politiquement acceptable et elle pose des problèmes d’équité et de lobbying.

3.3 Le marché industriel de la défense L'industrie

de

la défense

surproduction,

de

mise

en

connaît

place

de

aujourd’hui modèles

plusieurs

problèmes

de

internationaux

communs,

de

souveraineté à plus ou moins long terme et de représentation nationale de la force militaire.

e

La surproduction se caractérise par l’importance excessive des entreprises du côté de l’offre sur un marché partiellement réglementé. On a pu parler d’exportations paupérisantes pour qualifier certaines exportations d’armes réalisées à des prix trop faibles par rapport aux coûts engagés (Fontanel, 1995). On assiste, avec la réduction des dépenses militaires, à la fermeture de certains

marchés et à l’internationalisation de la production (Hébert, 1995). Ce qui conduit à l’augmentation des prix unitaires des matériels (en l’absence notamment d'économies d’échelle) et à une recherche de nouveaux matériels favorisant l’obsolescence

des produits existants, afin de relancer le marché

350

industriel de la défense. Les firmes d’armement ont été restructurées, avec des

mouvements (nationaux et internationaux) de concentration, des collaborations internationales,

e

la création

de filiales

à l’étranger,

la “civilisation”

de la

production et l’application de la R&D civile. L’alternative est d’importer des Etats-Unis, mais les Européens doivent se prémunir d’un monopole des prix des Américains. La mise en place de modèles internationaux d’armement est un facteur important pour l’UED, avec l’essor des économies d’échelle, l’accroissement

des bénéfices du fait même de la coopération et la réduction des coûts de transaction. Il faut établir une charpente institutionnelle d’incitations susceptibles de conduire à l’amélioration de la productivité et non à la recherche de rentes pour les organisations. Cette politique n’est réalisable que si les Etats exercent les mêmes stratégies, ce qui n’est pas encore le cas de l’Europe. Il ne reste donc que les accords industriels, les coopérations en matière

e

e

d’achat

ou

la volonté

de

rechercher,

autant

que

faire

se

peut,

l’interopérabilité des forces. La souveraineté des Etats est réduite par l’interdépendance économique et politique. Il existe encore des intérêts purement nationaux, mais ils se réduisent. La décision de souveraineté (fortement limitée par l’existence de traités ) permet à un pays à se déclarer en guerre. Les Etats européens se mettent trop rarement d’accord sur les grandes décisions stratégiques (Fontanel, 1998). Les monopoles supposent des rentes et des incitations à investir des ressources pour acquérir ces rentes. L'industrie de la défense peut aussi capturer la politique industrielle à son profit. Ces arguments s’appliquent aussi bien pour les producteurs que pour les services armés. Il existe des rivalités internes (armées, air, etc.), et un grand lobbying. Pour la mise en place d’une UED, il est nécessaire de déterminer une structure de régulation appropriée, contrôlée démocratiquement. *

4. La production du pouvoir militaire La question est aussi de savoir par quel processus les forces sont transformées en pouvoir et comment la capacité militaire est susceptible de maintenir la sécurité. Les inputs sont quantitatifs (taille ou caractéristiques des forces), mais aussi qualitatifs (surprise de l’attaque, moralité des intervenants, bonne gestion de la négociation ou du conflit, entraînement des forces et qualité de la logistique). L'union conduit à l’émergence d’effets productifs positifs, mais il est à la fois nécessaire de tenir compte des spécificités des coûts militaires et des transformations des structures industrielles de la défense.

358

4.1 Les effets productifs de l’Union L'Union conduit au développement des économies d’échelle, au dépassement des seuils et au relèvement des capacités et à une transformation des structures des forces. e

Comme le disait Voltaire, Dieu est du côté des gros bataillons. Les plus grandes dimensions ont des effets plus que proportionnels sur la probabilité de la victoire. La destruction d’un opposant réduit aussi le coût de la guerre d’usure. L’UED pourrait fournir des gains non négligeables à chaque Etat par la nonagressivité de ses alliés, unis dans un même concept de défense. Avec la “civilianisation” des matériels et de leurs intrants, une réduction des coûts

substantiels pourrait en résulter. Il s’agirait en l’occurrence de réduire les coûts unitaires croissants de la R&D,

d’accroitre

les séries et de lutter contre les

monopoles. Cependant, ce processus ne peut réellement être entrepris que si l’industrie de l’armement devient réellement compétitive. Le modèle britannique, d’inspiration néo-libérale, propose la recherche de la rentabilité maximum (value for money), la concurrence, mais aussi le maintien des capacités technologiques de la nation. Les coopérations internationales sont susceptibles,

dans

certaines

conditions,

d’obtenir

les économies

d’échelle

nécessaires. D'ailleurs le nombre de partenaires dans les projets a singulièrement augmenté depuis 1960, passant par exemple de 2,1 à 3,5 pour les réacteurs et de 2,5 a 3,4 pour les missiles (De Vestel, 1995), en méme temps

e

e

que se développaient les “champions nationaux” qui limitaient le nombre de firmes nationales concernées par l’armement. Les critères d’économie et d'efficacité sont affirmés, en même temps que le critère de “juste retour”, dans une période de crise, est maintenu, malgré le développement des réticences. Le véritable dilemme de l’internationalisation reste le choix entre l’européanisation ou la coopération transatlantique. La production du pouvoir a de cruelles indivisibilités; sous un certain seuil, peu de bénéfices peuvent être obtenus. Pour que la dissuasion soit efficace, au moins un sous-marin nucléaire doit être en opération à tout moment, ce qui requiert en réalité une force d’au moins 4 sous-marins, si l’on veut bien tenir compte de la maintenance, des réparations et des repos obligatoires. Ainsi le bénéfice marginal d’un seul système est quasiment nul en-dessous d’un certain seuil, puis il devient positif, puis retombe avec un autre niveau de taille. Réduire les budgets a les mêmes effets que la croissance des coûts, affaiblissant ainsi les pays qui se situent alors en dessous des seuils nécessaires pour certaines formes d’armes. Les membres de l’UED disposent de structures d’armes relativement différentes, de qualité ou de quantité d'équipements ou de forces nucléaires ou conventionnelles. La Grande-Bretagne est intégrée dans l'OTAN, elle dispose de volontaires, ses armes nucléaires sont obtenus à bas prix auprès des Etats-

5939

Unis. La France est plus indépendante, elle a dépensé probablement six à sept fois plus d’argent pour développer ses propres forces nucléaires, réduisant du même coup son budget pour les forces conventionnelles, pourtant moins chères et plus propices à l’exportation. En ce qui concerne les forces nucléaires, la France et la Grande-Bretagne fournissent une dissuasion minimale contre une attaque isolée, mais celle-ci reste insuffisante pour une dissuasion étendue à l’UED et ne fournit pas de substitut à la garantie nucléaire américaine. La qualité est onéreuse en matière militaire. Bien que les comparaisons soient controversées, les capacités furtives semblent doubler les coûts unitaires. Les conflits en matière de prise de décision sur la question conduisent souvent à un compromis dans lequel la qualité est jugée bien trop élevée eu égard aux avantages obtenus (Rogerson, 1990). Les choix sont délicats. L'OTAN a souvent choisi la solution “mieux, mais moins”, alors que les forces soviétiques

préféraient la devise “moins bien, mais plus”. La division

du travail

à l’intérieur

de l’UED

doit

être revue,

avec

une

spécialisation des tâches et un commandement unifié. Mais les réticences nationales restent dominantes.

4.2 Les fonctions de coûts militaires Le coût total dépend des quantités produites, des coûts fixes, du prix des fournitures, mais aussi de la fonction d’apprentissage (Arrow, 1962 et Lichtenberg, 1989). Les avantages en matière de défense sont nuls en dessous d’un minimum de forces disponibles. La vraie question est la suivante: comment peut-on calculer concrètement la “production de défense” et savoir lorsque celle-ci s’avère trop ou pas assez chère, par rapport à des risques difficilement chiffrables? Les directeurs de projet sont trop peu incités à économiser les frais fixes ou à résister à la tentation du “platiné-or”. L’excès des bénéfices sur les coûts constitue une rente qui peut être extraite par les directeurs de projet en situation de quasi-monopole. Avec une information imparfaite, il est difficile pour les acheteurs de distinguer les caractéristiques des matériels qui sont essentielles aux objectifs de défense qu’ils se sont fixés, de celles qui n’ont qu’une efficacité militaire et stratégique limitée, malgré le coût élevé de leur achat. Les difficultés de la collaboration réduisent l’importance des gains, car il est connu que les coûts croissent avec la racine carrée du nombre de pays participants et le temps de réalisation avec la racine cubique. Si ces formules ne sont pas toujours attestées, elles présentent cependant une réalité, même si la collaboration est souvent moins chère que la production nationale. Il existe un rapport de force. entre les nécessités militaires et les industries d’armement. Les militaires ont des exigences de matériels dépendantes de leur rôle et de la stratégie développée: les projets collectifs conduisent à des instruments moins bien adaptés aux exigences

360

de nombreuses lignes de production et des contrats aux producteurs les moins productifs. La tendance est toujours d’acheter national et la collaboration est seulement une alternative. Quand le choix national n’est pas possible, on cherche à produire sous licence ou à recourir à l’importation à l’étalage, souvent moins chère. Avec la vente du siècle gagnée par les F16 américains, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Danemark et la Norvège ont formé un groupe pour produire, sous licence, 1000 nouveaux avions d'attaque. Selon Hartley (1988), il en aurait coûté 34% moins cher si ces pays, au lieu de les construire eux-mêmes, avaient importé ces appareils. Le pouvoir des lobbies nationaux est plus grand quand les coûts fixes et les effets d'apprentissage sont plus importants (avions, navires, chars). Les composantes, les sous-systèmes ou les armes légères sont souvent importées, car c’est dans ce domaine que les gains sont les plus faibles et que les pays européens sont compétitifs pour l’exportation aux Etats-Unis. Etant donné les économies d'échelle, l’acceptation des achats compétitifs et des achats centralisés, c’est une

économie globale de l’ordre de 20% qui pourraient être réalisée globalement, pour l’ensemble des pays européens, selon des structures de gains d’ailleurs très diversifiées.

4.3 Estimation paribus

des avantages

macroéconomiques

de l’Union,

ceteris

Une étude engagée par Keith Hartley et Andrew Cox (1992) pour le compte de la Commission des Communautés Européennes (DGIII) a estimé les coûts de la désunion européenne dans le domaine des achats de défense. Elle est fondée sur des

analyses et modèles économiques intégrant la concurrence, les monopoles et le commerce international, notamment. Elle estime le coût des industries nationales d’armement et de la recherche d’autarcie, même partielle, notamment dans le

domaine de la R&D. Elle montre qu’il existe de nombreuses duplications de capacité, alors que les Etats-Unis offrent un très large marché unique, permettant l'émergence des économies d’échelle. Plusieurs conclusions ont ainsi été faites, sur la base de quatre principaux scénarios, résumés dans le Tab. 1.

361

Tab. 1 - Les principaux résultats concernant les gains annuels industrielle en matière d'armement (Hartley et Cox, 1992)

de la coopération

Gain annuel en milliards d’ECUs

Scénarios Marché compétitif libéralisé

5,5 à 7,0

Achats communs par une Agence centralisée

8,4 à 10,9

Libéralisation limitée (non appliquée au nucléaire, à la cryptographie et aux agents anti-toxiques et radio-actifs)

5,3 àj 6,6

Compétition pour les petites et moyennes armes, les grands projets en collaboration sur la base du juste retour

6,5 à 7,6

Compétition pour les petites et moyennes armes, les grands projets en collaboration sur une base compétitive

7,4 à 9,3

Libéralisation

de

l’ensemble

des

25,0 soit 0.5% du PNB de

achats

publics dans l’Union Européenne

Les raisons

de telles économies

l’Union Européenne

sont les suivantes.

D’abord,

les coûts de

développement seraient absorbés par les plus longues séries, diminuant ainsi le coût unitaire. Ensuite, les effets d'apprentissage sont souvent élevés, notamment dans l’industrie aérospatiale. Les experts les estiment dans une fourchette de 4 à 22% du coût total. Les coûts de fonctionnement pendant le cycle de vie varient de 1,25 à 5 fois les coûts d’équipement initiaux. Il faut donc fenir compte dans les achats de ces différences

de coûts

d'utilisation.

Enfin,

de nombreux

facteurs

d’inefficacité

pourraient être réduits, notamment les rentes de monopoles, la protection et l’aide gouvernementales pour les industries nationales, la fabrication de produits similaires en excès, les faibles échelles de production, ou l’utilisation de contrats sous des formes non compétitives.

Plusieurs études empiriques ont complété les analyses. Pour un avion de combat le coût de production unitaire est de 40 millions d’écus pour 250 unités, de 32 millions d’écus pour 1000 unités. Pour les hélicoptères le gain pourrait être de 30 à 40%. Pour les navires, passer de 1 à 6 unités devrait permettre un gain unitaire de l’ordre de 20%. Les effets d’une compétition accrue au niveau européen conduit à une réduction de 10 à 20% des coûts unitaires, voire 15 à 25% avec une ouverture

sur le monde. Enfin, les économies d’échelle sont estimées à 12% lorsqu'il y a: doublement de la production. Pour les systèmes aériens, les économies d’échelle et

les effets d'apprentissage sont estimés respectivement à 15% et 5%. Dans le court terme, il en résultera un accroissement de la compétition, une réduction des prix, de

362

nouvelles coopérations. Dans le long terme, les restructurations sont susceptibles de conduire à de nouveaux monopoles ou cartels. C’est pourquoi les experts proposent une compétition avec les autres industries d’armement dans le monde.

5. Conclusions

Il existe quatre tendances lourdes en matière d’industrie d’armement depuis la fin de la guerre froide, à savoir la recherche de coopérations afin d’augmenter les séries et développer les économies d’échelle, la rationalisation des efforts de R&D par la coopération, le développement des coopérations des programmes, afin de répondre à la loi d’Augustine sur la multiplication des coûts des matériels et l’essor de la compétition. La France fait le pari de l’européanisation de la défense, avec la promotion de la “préférence européenne”. Elle considère qu’elle dispose d’un avantage militaire sur ses partenaires, notamment dans le cadre du nucléaire, et elle espère en recevoir compensation. Cependant, la fin de la régulation administrée devrait, assez rapidement, gommer cet effet (Hébert, 1995). Le Royaume-Uni préfère une coordination des politiques nationales à une intégration, alors que l’Allemagne soucieuse de la symbiose des productions militaires et civiles et particulièrement efficace dans les technologies duales souhaite ouvrir les marchés de défense européens à la concurrence. Les autres pays sont plutôt soucieux de ne pas être tenu à l’écart des grandes décisions et ils insistent sur la règle du “juste retour”. La question de la reformulation de la défense européenne nouvelle suppose deux considérations, l’une d’ordre politique, l’autre d’ordre économique. L'Europe doit-elle avoir une défense commune et celle-ci doit-elle se faire avec les EtatsUnis? Comment utiliser les économies d’échelle disponibles au double niveau stratégique et de la production pour réduire le fardeau des armes en situation de paix? La question politique est très controversée. Elle peut s’exprimer autour de l'OTAN (avec la présence américaine) ou avec l’UEO (qui réduit la domination américaine). Cependant, cette dernière perspective implique un accroissement du fardeau de la défense de l’Europe, car le retrait des Etats-Unis conduirait à modifier les conditions de la défense européenne, notamment dans les systèmes de surveillance par satellite, les systèmes AWACS et les systèmes électroniques. II s’agit donc de donner des réponses économiques aux choix entre monopoles ou concurrence, autarcie ou ouverture, séparation ou intégration, équipements ou personnels, centralisation ou concertation. Si le désengagement américain en Europe est inéluctable, ceteris paribus, une recherche de défense européenne devrait être entreprise dans les années qui viennent, assurant au moins, sinon plus, la pérennité d’une Europe unie.

363

Références Aben J. et Daures N. (1993), “Chalks vs. guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario”, Defence Economics, 4,4, pp. 353-364. ACOST (1989), Defence R&D: A National Resource, Advisory Council on Science and Technology, HMSO, London. Arrow K. J. (1962), “The Economic implications of Learning by doing”, Review of Economic Studies. Augustine N. (1975), “One plane, one tank, one ship: Trend for the future?”, Defense Management Journal, April, pp. 34-40. Ayanian R. (1992), “Force deployment and the production of security: why is the United States in NATO?”, Defence Economics, 3.2. Bénichou M. (1993), “L’avenir des industries liées à la défense”, La Documentation française, novembre, Paris.

Barron D. et Besanko D. (1988), “Monitoring of performance in organisational contracting, the case of defence procurement”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics. De Cecco M. et Pianta M. (1992), Amministrazione militare e spesa per armamenti in Europa, Il Mulino, Bologna. Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale (1996), “Le point sur la défense européenne”, Suffren Analyse, n. 3, juin. Fontanel J., Humm A. et Smith R. (1987), “Capital Labour Substitution in Defence Provision”, in Deger S., West R. (eds.), Defence security and development, Frances Pinter, London. Fontanel J. et Smith R. (1990), “The impact of strategy and measurement on models of

French military expenditure”, Defence Economics, 1,4, pp. 261-274. Fontanel J. et Ward M. (1990), Les exportations d'armes et la croissance économique, Ares XII, Grenoble, pp. 86-98. Fontanel J. (1993), Economistes de la Paix, ECO+, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, Grenoble. Fontanel J. (1995), Organisations Economiques Internationales, Masson, Paris.

Fontanel J. (1995), “Economics of disarmament”, in Handbook of Defense Economics, Hartley and Sandler editors, North Holland, Amsterdam. : Fontanel J. (1995), Les dépenses militaires et le désarmement, Publisud, Paris. Fontanel J. (1998), L'avenir de la défense européenne, Ares, Grenoble. Gambles I. (1989), “Prospects for West European Security Cooperation”, Adelphi Paper 244, International Institute for Strategic Studies. Garfinkel M. (1989), “Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium”, American Economic Review. Hartley K. (1983), NATO Arms cooperation, George Allen & Urwin, London. Hartley K. (ed.) (1994), “The Economics of Disarmament: Special Issue”, Defence and Peace Economics, 5(2). Hartley K. et Cox A. (1992), “The costs of non-Europe in defence procurement”, The Commission of the European Communities DGIII, July. Hébert J. P. (1990), L’effort militaire français et ses retombées sur l'économie, ARES, XII, 1990-4, Grenoble. Hébert J. P. (1995), “Production d’armement, Mutation du système français”, Les études de la Documentation française, Paris. Heisbourg F. (1989), “The British and the French Nuclear Forces”, Survival. Hilton B. et Vu A. (1991), “The McGuire Model and the Economics of the NATO ‘ Alliance”, Defence Economics. Jones P. R. (1992), “Inefficiency in international defence alliances and the economics of bureaucracy”, Defence Economics, 3.2.

364

Khanna J. et Sandler T. (1996), “Nato burden sharing: 1960-1992”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 7. Laffont J. (1987), “Towards a normative theory of incentives contracts between government and private firms”, Economic Journal.

Laffont J. et Tirole J. (1986), “Using cost observation to regulate firms”, Journal of Political Economy. Lichtenberg F. (1989), “How elastic is the government’s demand for weapons”, Journal of Public Economics. McGuire M. et Groth C. (1985), “A method for identifying the public good allocation process within a group”, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Murdoch J. et Sandler T. (1990), “Nash-Cournot or Lindahl behaviour, an empirical test for

the NATO allies”, Quarterly Journal of Economics. North D. (1991), “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives. Oneal, J. (1990), “NATO defence burdens 1950-84”, Journal of Conflict Resolution. Olson M. et Zeckhauser R. (1966), Economics and Statistics, 48(3).

i

“An

economic

theory

of alliances”,

Review

of

Oneal J. (1992), “Budgetary savings from conscription and byrden sharing in NATO”, Defence Economics. Palmer G. et Souchet A. (1994), “Security, autonomy and defense burdens: the effects of alliance membership

in the 19th and 20th centuries”, Defence and Peace Economics,

53: Rogerson W. (1990), “Quality and quantity in military procurement”, American Economic Review. Salmon T. C. (1994), The limits of the European Integration Process, Castelgondolfo, June. Sandler T. (1993), “The economic theory of alliances”, Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sandler T. et Hartley K. (1995), The Economics of defence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. SIPRI Yearbook (1996), World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Smith R. (1980), “The demand for military expenditure”, Economic Journal.

Smith R. (1989), “Models of military expenditure”, Journal of Applied Econometrics. Smith R. (1990), “Defence procurement and industrial structure in the UK”, /nternational

Journal of Industrial Organization. USACDA

(1996), “World

Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers

1995”, Library of

Congress, April. Ward M. D. et Lofdahl C. L. (1994), Toward a political economy of scale: European integration and disintegration, University of Colorado, August 8. Walker

W.

et Gummett

P. (1989),

“Britain

International Affairs.

365

and

the European

Armament

Market”,

CANADIAN FEDERALISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION: MYTH AND REALITY Brooke JEFFREY Concordia University of Montreal, Canada

«Federalism is perhaps the most easily under (and by the same misunderstood), of all concepts of integration theory». Anthony Smith The Politics and Economics of the European Union

token

«Federal systems are no universal panacea, but in many situations they may be... the only way of combining, through representative institutions, the benefits of both unity and diversity. Experience indicates that countries with a federal form of government have been difficult to govern, but then, it is usually because they were difficult countries to govern in the first place that they adopted federal political institutions». Ronald Watts

Intrastate Federalism in Canada

1. Introduction Undergraduate classes in Canadian federalism are routinely regaled with the story of a mythical United Nations essay coïnpetition on the subject of the elephant. Despite several excellent entries from other countries - the Chinese student’s submission on “The Elephant and the Meaning of Life”, the British finalist describing “The Elephant’s Role in Empire-Building”, the American entry on “How to Build a Bigger and Better Elephant” and the classic French essay on “The Love Life of the Elephant” - it is naturally the Canadian essay which takes first prize, with its rivetting analysis of “The Elephant: A Federal of Provincial Matter?” Trite and politically incorrect as the “elephant” joke may be, it serves to underline two fundamental truths of contemporary Canadian politics. First, federalism is a deeply-entrenched element of Canadian political culture and, second, it is currently viewed as a problem. The fact that neither statement would _ have been true for much of the country’s history is striking. It is also highly revealing of the impact of several other elements of the political system which many Canadians mistakenly consider to be part and parcel of a federal system,

366

such as a parliamentary system of government, a bicameral legislature with an unelected upper chamber, and a first-past-the-post electoral system. This paper argues that the effects of these unrelated elements of the political system, as well as the virtual absence for much of the country’s history of even the basic elements of nation-building - such as national identity and citizenship projects - have been directly responsible for the current situation. The “federal fact” is now so pervasive in Canada that it is almost impossible to address other important aspects of the political process without considering this reality. Virtually no policy issue is addressed without consideration of its federalprovincial implications. Issues are defined in terms of jurisdiction, and considerable political and academic capital has been expended in the past fifteen years on various proposals to re-align jurisdictions through constitutional reform. Increasingly when federal government policies prove ineffective or constitutional reform proposals fail, it is the federal system itself that is seen to be defective. In addition, two new political parties have emerged at the national level in the past decade - the Bloc Quebecois separatists and the western protest Reform party with platforms based primarily on criticism of the federal status quo. More recently, and partly in response to this development, the academic discourse on other issues such as citizenship and cultural diversity has become imbued with the vocabulary and constructs of the federalism debate. It is increasingly being argued, for example, that not only provincial jurisdiction but citizenship rights should be asymmetrical, and designed to reflect different group realities’. Underlying these developments is the unstated assumption that federalism has “failed” to achieve political integration in Canada. Yet, apart from the dubious thesis of Kymlicka and other members of the so-called “Canadian school” that measures to promote greater diversity will actually encourage integration, alternative instruments of integration have rarely been proposed to complement or shore up the federal system. Instead, it is widely believed the only solution to the perceived problem is to modify the federal system itself. Ironically, it is also widely believed this objective can only be achieved through a further decentralization of powers to accommodate an even greater degree of structural diversity or “asymmetrical” jurisdictions, with certain provinces and notably Quebec having a considerably greater range of powers than others. In a federal State that is already one of the most decentralized in the world, as admitted even by prominent Quebec separatists’, this is not the most obvious approach to achieving political integration. Nor is it likely to succeed. This paper argues the problem with the prevailing mindset in Canada is, first, that it fails to recognize the practical limitations of federalism as an instrument of political integration and, second, that it fails to recognize the important role played by other political and historical realities in hampering political integration - such as ' See for example the recent work of W. Kymlicka (1999), Multicultural Citizenship, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston. ? Speech by former premier Jacques Parizeau, Le Devoir, March 1, 1999, p. A-1

367

the virtual absence of an overarching national project for more than one hundred years, and the complications posed for federalism by a parliamentary system of government and first-past-the-post electoral system. It also argues there have been significant negative consequences for the integration process flowing from a dramatic right-wing policy shift at both the national and provincial levels in recent years. Lastly, the paper argues the wrong lessons have been learned from the failure of recent efforts at constitutional reform. It is not that federalism has “failed” to achieve political integration. On the contrary, it has succeeded to a

remarkable degree in spite of structural problems in other aspects of the political system, many of which have hindered rather than encouraged integration, and in spite of the recent de-integrative policies of a right-wing federal government. The following sections attempt to demonstrate the relative importance of these various other factors for political integration. Taken together, they provide compelling evidence for the argument that a broad range of policy instruments is necessary in addition to federalism in order to achieve meaningful political integration in a complex plural society such as Canada. The paper then briefly explores the potential significance of these findings for the European Union another complex plural society with a surprisingly similar set of conditions and problems, including a late start to the launching of its overarching European identity and citizenship projects - as it grapples with the issues of “deepening vs. broadening” and the democratic deficit in its implementation of Agenda 2000.

2. Unrealistic expectations? Federalism as scapegoat From the point of view of classic federalist theory, Canada in 1867 presented a nearly ideal situation for the choice of a federal system of government. With a large territory and a geographically-located minority, as well as the obvious military and economic advantages accruing from the formation of a larger political unit to counteract its powerful neighbour to the south, Canada’s choice of a federal system was both logical and appropriate. It was also taken in full knowledge of the experience of the United States with a federal system that allocated many essential powers to the States - a system which, at the time of the Confederation debates in Canada, was engaged in a vicious civil war. Many analysts describe the American Civil War as the most influential factor in the decision of the framers of the constitution to ensure a strong central government fortified with residual powers and a number of override provisions’. Yet the constitution of the new State was also expressly crafted to devolve cultural, educational and religious matters to the subnational unit in which the minority resided, a key element of any federal project. Indeed, more than 120 years . later the leader of the opposition Liberal Party in the province of Quebec, Jean 3 Robert Vipond (1991), Liberty and Community, SUNY Press, Albany.

368

Charest, referred to these constitutional guarantees when speaking to an international gathering of the Forum of Federations. Declaring that the survival of French Canadians had been ensured rather than endangered by their decision to participate in a federal State. Charest specifically singled out the maintenance of the provincial civil law code and constitutional guarantees of linguistic and religious freedom as well as the use of both official languages in Parliament and the courts, and guaranteed minority representation in major political institutions such as the courts and the upper chamber of the federal legislature, as an exemplary demonstration of the merits of the federal concept to protect and promote the cultural minority*. It is true that according to Wheare’s legal/institutional approach Canada’s federal system was missing at least one important characteristic of a classic federation, namely an amending formula. The significance of this lacuna would become obvious over time, but few other observers were willing to go so far as

Wheare did at the time and declare that Canada was actually a “quasi-federal State”. | Indeed, Canada’s federal system was accepted by other theorists because Canada functioned as a federal State from the beginning. Authors who emphasized this approach, such as Livingston and Riker, had no difficulty in describing Canada as an operational federal State‘. Furthermore from the point of view of political culture, Stein and others have argued that a federal mindset existed in Canada from its earliest days, despite the expectation of some of the Fathers of Confederation to the contrary. Constraints of time and space prevent all but the most cursory overview of the evolution of Canadian federalism, and inevitably some important nuances will be lost. However, for the purposes of this paper the argument can be made that there have been four basic periods in federal-provincial relations, only the last of which has been problematic. Put another way, major conflict within the federal system is a recent development, and one which in many respects could have been avoided. As Stevenson has outlined in considerable detail, much of first hundred years saw little serious conflict in the federal system. A predictable amount of jockeying for jurisdiction occurred between centralists such as Macdonald and those supporting a “provincial rights” interpretation of certain provisions, in which the role of the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as the final court of appeal was often counterproductive - many argue by misinterpreting the constitution - but there was little or no public consciousness of federal-provincial conflict or federal “problems” for most of the first century’.

o Speech delivered November 7, 1999, Mt. Tremblant, Quebec.

SK. C. Wheare (1963), Federal Government, (4" ed.), Oxford University Press, London, p. 18. 6 See for example W. Riker (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance, Little Brown, Boston.

7 Garth Stevenson (1989), Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity,

369

This so-called “dual federalism” era was essentially one in which the two levels of government in the federation separately went about their business. Both governments and citizens were otherwise occupied with the practical aspects of the national expansion westward and little intergovernmental consultation was either necessary or desirable. With the advent of the Great Depression and two World Wars, the provinces were more than ready to allow Ottawa to play a strong central role in holding the country together. The coalition national government of the war years and the close federal-provincial cooperation throughout the period made it one of extended federal-provincial harmony. The expanded economic growth enjoyed by Canada in the immediate post-war era - similar to that experienced in the rest of the western world - led to a period of government activism and renewed public enthusiasm for state intervention in the economy and society. Ironically, it was at this point that a potential problem could have emerged with the federal system. Like other western liberal democracies, Canada was facing increased citizen demands for government intervention in the area of social policy, to create the programs and policies of the welfare state. Difficulties arose because the jurisdiction for these matters was clearly provincial, yet the provinces did not have the constitutional ability to raise the substantial revenues required financing them. The federal government, by contrast, had sufficient funds but no authority to intervene,

as a decision

of the JCPC

had

already demonstrated by thwarting the first attempt of the King administration to implement a program similar to Roosevelt’s New Deal. Lacking an amending formula, the problem of jurisdictional/financial imbalance could not be addressed constitutionally either. Yet this did not prove to be a barrier to reform. Instead, Canadian federalism proved itself to be as adaptable

and flexible as Friedrich had predicted*. Unable to move constitutionally, but with ample resources at its disposal, the federal government engaged the provinces in administrative negotiations, which resulted in a series of joint cost-sharing programs that, taken together, created the Canadian welfare state. They also contributed greatly, albeit unintentionally, to the evolution of national identity. In exchange for its financial assistance the federal government, and Canadians, were

assured a national system with minimum standards, while each province was fully responsible for administering the programs. It did not take long for political analysts to refer to this uniquely Canadian compromise as the era of “cooperative federalism”. It was during this second major period in Canadian federalism that Canadians began to focus on the concept of federal-provincial relations, but on the whole they viewed the process as a technical one which was of little interest to anyone but bureaucrats and politicians. Although there were undeniably minor conflicts over the details of various programs, the so-called “golden era” of cooperative. federalism was one of considerable federal-provincial good will. This period was

oe hk ee ee eee Gage Publishing Co. Inc., Toronto. Carl Friedrich (1968), Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Praeger, New York.

370

also one which emphasized bureaucratic expertise (leading some analysts to refer to it as the era of “administrative” federalism), and as such it is important to note that the Canadian public service of the day was highly credible, being widely viewed as both competent and professional. Needless to say, from the point of view of those concerned with political integration the period also enhanced the attachment of citizens and governments to federalism itself through the function of intergovernmental relations as well as the social programs it delivered. By the end of the 1960’s the number, level and frequency of intergovernmental meetings and standing federal-provincial committees had increased exponentially and most Canadians understood the importance of the federal system for their well-being, if not the details of its operation. This high-water mark of nearly three decades of cooperative federalism was, perhaps inevitably, followed by a transition period as federal resources began to decrease, provincial costs for administering the social programs began to escalate, and the country was plunged into severe recession. Although these same problems in financing the welfare state were facing other liberal democracies in the early 1980’s, they were compounded in Canada by an unusual combination of geographic and demographic anomalies - such as the presence of the suddenlyimportant energy sector almost exclusively in one province (Alberta), and the rapid decline of the economically crucial Atlantic coast fishery - and by the aggressive province-building tactics of various provincial premiers. The emphasis on provincial identity, which ordinarily would have been impossible to promote, (given the artificial provincial boundaries and lack of any distinct culture in a specific province outside of Quebec), was rendered feasible by the almost total absence of federal nation-building policies. This province-building tactic, in turn, led to escalating federal-provincial disagreement on programs and funding, as well as an increasingly politicized atmosphere. This combination of factors led to the third period in intergovernmental relations, known as “executive federalism”, in which provincial premiers and the Prime Minister met in public to debate issues but rarely resolved them, and then adjourned to closed-door sessions at which deals were brokered, a system unlike the cooperative era when it was the bureaucrats who would meet in private to iron out the details of programs on which all of the politicians had previously agreed in public, almost always after lengthy debate in their respective legislatures. The new era therefore represented a dramatic shift in the policy process from the legislative to the executive branch of government, as legislatures were generally informed of decisions after the fact. (Students of the current European integration process will no doubt recognize similarities with the ongoing debates over the appropriate role of the European Parliament). However as late as 1982 it was still possible to achieve results through federalprovincial negotiation. Despite the growing conflict between the two levels of government over scarce revenues, the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau

371

successfully accomplished the “repatriation” of the constitution, including the adoption of an amending formula and an entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with the support of nine of the ten provinces and all national political parties. Even more significant was the overwhelming public support the project enjoyed, which allowed Trudeau, as he himself said, to “go over the heads of the premiers to the people” and ignore the political posturing of certain premiers. Indeed, Trudeau used the process to re-assert his vision of the federal government protecting a “national” interest, declaring at a press conference after a meeting with the premiers that the federal government “speaks for Canada”. Meanwhile

the amending

formula

of the new

constitution,

which

in most

instances required the consent of some 7 provinces with 50% of the population, was widely viewed as an appropriate compromise. The concept of a direct veto for any province had been avoided but the formula effectively ensured that, in reality, amendments would rarely succeed without the support of Quebec. (The merits of this model, as compared to the unanimity formula proposed in the failed Meech Lake Accord which would have resulted in 10 vetoes, may be instructive in terms of the current dilemma of the European Community as it attempts to move from the veto model to a more general use of QMV). Then in 1984, with the election of the Conservative Party at the national level after nearly twenty years in opposition, and with a novice politician as the new party leader and Prime Minister, the tone and tenor of federal-provincial relations deteriorated further very rapidly. On the one hand, perceived conflicts between the federal and provincial governments increased substantially on a range of policy fronts; on the other, the public was becoming increasingly aware of this conflict and beginning to perceive it as a systemic problem rather than one of personalities. Particularly in light of citizen involvement in the 1982 constitutional process, the

executive’s increasing domination of the policy process at the expense of even legislative involvement was becoming increasingly unpopular. Political scientist Donald Smiley’s critique of executive federalism highlighted these concerns. «My charges against executive federalism are these», he wrote, «First, that it contributes to undue secrecy in the conduct of the public’s business, second it contributes to an unduly low level of citizen participation in public affairs, and, third, it weakens and

dilutes the accountability of governments to their legislatures and to the wider public’, This heightened conflict in intergovernmental relations, however, was neither

inevitable nor necessary. Although the Mulroney government began its term of office with pledges of renewed cooperation and consultation with the provinces, it quickly proceeded to make a number of unrelated policy decisions that served to ° For more detail see for example A. Cairns and C. Williams (1985), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada, vol. 33, RCEUC, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

D. V. Smiley, “An Outsider’s Observations on Intergovernmental Relations Among Consenting Adults”, in R. Simeon (ed.) (1979), Confrontation and Collaboration: Intergovernmental Relations in Canada Today, IPAC, Toronto.

372

alienate most provincial governments, from the CF-18 contract fiasco to the introduction of the GST. Even more important for the future of federal-provincial relations was its decision to unilaterally revise the provisions of the various costsharing programs with the provinces and severely reduce the federal contributions to these programs without warning. Meanwhile Mulroney was strongly motivated by a desire to accomplish further constitutional reform, which he believed necessary to “accommodate” the province of Quebec, despite the overwhelming evidence of public disinterest in another round of constitutional negotiations so soon after the 1982 patriation exercise. This determination to impose a constitutional solution on a virtually non-existent problem led directly to the current negative view of federalism held by many Canadians. Public opinion polls in 1985 revealed that even Quebeckers did not identify constitutional reform among the top ten issues facing their provincial government, nor were they enthusiastic about the prospect when directly questioned. Nevertheless for the next eight years Canadians were exposed to an even more extreme form of “executive federalism” which they came to view as unaccountable, lacking transparency, and motivated by partisan politics. After innumerable closed-door meetings the Prime Minister and the premiers became known as the “eleven white men in suits”, a reference to their perceived lack of representativeness and legitimacy. The

result,

as

mentioned

above,

was

not

one

but

two

failed

efforts

at

constitutional reform - the so-called Meech Lake Accord (1987-90) and the Charlottetown Accord (1992) - both punctuated by uncharacteristically vitriolic public debate, the flagrant scapegoating of groups of citizens opposed to the proposals and displays of elite disdain that left the public cynical and resentful. Failure to consult meaningfully with Canadians on the Meech Lake process (exemplified by the Prime Minister's infamous “Not one comma can be changed” rejection of amendments to the package) led to such public anger that the

government concluded a national referendum was necessary for the second attempt, the Charlottetown Accord, to.ensure public support. All of the resources of the federal government and the premiers who supported the Accord were thrown into the referendum campaign in order to ensure its success. Nevertheless the referendum failed, largely as a result of a single intervention by former Prime Minister Trudeau opposing the agreement. Voter exit polls revealed it was Trudeau’s arguments about the potentially negative consequences of the Accord for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the “minimum national standards” principle that were key determinants for voters rejecting the proposal. In the aftermath of the Accord’s demise there was a widespread view that federalism itself was in crisis. For an entire generation born after the golden era of cooperative federalism this is perhaps understandable, as the last two decades have undeniably involved considerable federal-provincial tension. A referendum sponsored by the separatist government of Quebec in 1995 initially reinforced this

373

concern, although the failure of the Bouchard government to acquire the support of even 50% of the population on a deliberately vague question referring not to separation but to “sovereignty-association” - a term which more than half of those voting “Yes” interpreted to mean they would retain their Canadian citizenship, passports and currency, and receive the benefits of national social programs suggests the concern was exaggerated. Moreover public opinion polling since the referendum defeat has tracked a steady decline in support for separation, falling to

less than 40% in 1999. As political economist Albert Breton among others has argued persuasively, a certain degree of creative tension between the two levels of government is very likely inevitable in any federation and, depending on how the tensions are handled, can quite possibly be seen as a positive element of the system, reinforcing plurality and democratic values. Seen in this light, many of the problems associated with Canadian federalism in the past twenty years, and especially with the concept of executive federalism, arguably have been caused more by political incompetence than systemic flaws. In addition, while the past decade has seen numerous proposals by academics and opposition politicians to “reinvent” the federal structure to solve its perceived “problems”, many of the issues which they are addressing are in reality not part of a federal system. Instead, while they have certainly complicated the evolution of Canadian federalism, their adoption as part of the machinery of government was neither necessary nor inevitable for the operation of a federal system. Among the most significant of these are the unelected second chamber (the Senate), the firstpast-the-post electoral system and the parliamentary system.

3. Other institutional issues

While a great deal of criticism has been directed at the Canadian Senate in the past thirty years, the tendency was to focus on its perceived failings in representing regional interests at the national level. Yet numerous studies have concluded it is the unelected nature of the Senate which is both extraordinary and counterproductive to political integration, particularly since it has had the effect of diminishing the legitimacy of the national legislature as a whole. In addition, the Prime Minister’s formal role in appointing new Senators has further reduced the credibility of the institution, as political opponents routinely criticize new appointees on partisan grounds regardless of their qualifications. Because Senators appointed at any age are assured tenure until the age of 75, the public perception of Senate seats as lucrative lifetime appointments has only worsened this credibility problem". 3 Virtualiy all functioning federal States possess a second chamber, but so do the !! Canada West Foundation, “Taking a Look: Public Opinion on Senate Reform in Alberta and Canada”, Calgary, September 1998.

374

vast majority of unitary liberal democracies. The fundamental difference is that none has adopted a selection procedure similar to Canada’s. Of the 58 countries analysed in the study prepared for the Irish government based on the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) survey of 1997, some 24 States used a form of direct election, a further 17 employed an indirect method of election and the remainder a combination of the two”. Canada’s unique position is reinforced by the fact that the incumbents of second chambers elsewhere are uniformly subjected to fixed terms of office while Senators in Canada, originally appointed for life, still continue to serve from the date of their appointment until mandatory retirement at age 75. Indeed, as Russell points out in a definitive study of upper chambers for the British Royal Commission examining reform of the House of Lords, the Wakeham Commission, Canada is “the only western industrial country having a wholly appointed upper house”. Britain has recently moved to establish a new selection process for the House of Lords (on which the Canadian Senate was modelled) in light of the recommendations of the Wakeham Report, and at least a portion of the positions in the British second chamber are to be elected. The consequences of this Canadian “democratic deficit” are obvious. Although the Senate was expressly created to represent regional interests in the national legislature, the relevance of its actions have decreased dramatically in the post-war era as Canadians came to regard its appointed, lifetime membership as undemocratic and unaccountable. Put another way, one of the few elements of the political system which was introduced to enhance the operation of federalism has actually come to be regarded as a drawback, and federalism itself has paid the price in the public image. A similar situation exists with respect to the national election system. The firstpast-the-post (FPP) system is undeniably democratic, but its legitimacy is being increasingly called into question in a geographically large political unit with a sparse and widely dispersed population in some areas and a highly concentrated urban population in others. Another important factor has been the presence of three or more political parties when most other countries using this system, such as the United States, have only 2. In recent years the heightened urban/rural split between central and western Canada and the emergence of two new political parties at the federal level — leading to a five-way race in many ridings - has only served to heighten the perceived imbalance brought about by the FPP. With elections rarely producing a winner with majority support, Canadians were long accustomed to national governments being elected with 45% of the popular vote and also to minority governments. In recent years, however, more extreme examples of the FPP imbalance have emerged at both the national and provincial levels. In Quebec and British Columbia, for instance, recent provincial

'2 Coakley and Laver (1997). 1 M. Russell (1999), “Second Chambers Overseas: Research Branch, London.

375

| A Summary Analysis”, Parliamentary

elections have resulted in governments being formed by a political party which received less of the popular vote than an opponent. At the national level, the Chretien Liberals have formed majority governments in the past two federal elections with only 41 and 38% of the popular vote respectively, while the Conservative Party was reduced to two seats in the legislature in the1993 election despite the support of nearly one in five Canadians. The significance of this problem has, of course, been heightened by the problem of the unelected Senate. In other federal States and notably Australia, (a federation often considered to represent the closest historical and political realities to the Canadian system), an electoral system of proportional representation (PR) is employed to elect members of the upper chamber precisely because PR is widely viewed as the most equitable method of enhancing regional representation. Finally, there is the issue of the parliamentary system of government itself. The choice of this system was never in doubt - given Canada’s colonial heritage and the distaste of its founders for the American system of government - but with the decision to adopt a federal system as well, the Fathers of Confederation were essentially moving into uncharted waters. The established federal systems of Europe and the United States had chosen a congressional model, and the political format of Australia had yet to be determined in 1867. More than one hundred years later, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the confrontational nature of the parliamentary system, and the consequences of cabinet responsibility, have posed additional problems for the successful operation of a federal system. As Canadian political scientists Ron Watts and Donald Smiley concluded in their seminal work for the Macdonald Commission: «It has proved difficult to reconcile the principle of cabinet responsibility to the popularly elected first (lower) chamber with that of an equally powerful second chamber.

Consequently,

in Commonwealth

federations

the second

chambers

have

generally been weaker in constitutional authority,.political influence and prestige. Their effectiveness in counterbalancing the majoritarian bias of central institutions has

therefore been relatively limited *». Despite their obvious significance, it is difficult to determine the independent impact that these three other aspects of the political system would have had if there had been a concerted effort on the part of national political elites to engage in nation-building and citizenship projects. Unfortunately, this was not the case. In fact, it is the virtual absence of many of the standard policy instruments utilized by other liberal democratic regimes to promote political integration that is most noteworthy about the first hundred years of the Canadian experience with federalism.

'* R. Watts and D. Smiley, “Intrastate Federalism in Canada”, RCEUC, vol. 37, p. 53. 376

4. Sins of omission: the hundred-year hiatus in nation-building Few historians would disagree that Canada is an artificial construct, overcoming not only cultural diversity but the natural north-south pull of geography and economics to form a massive political unit spanning an entire continent. Flying in the face of logic, its borders organize the country along an east-west axis and include vast areas of uninhabited northern tundra. Defying geography, it unites mountainous terrain, prairies and densely forested areas as well as the northern and maritime regions. Defying demographics, it occupies the second-largest geographic area in the world with less than one-tenth of the population of its physically smaller but hugely powerful neighbour to the south, and some 90% of its population is clustered in a narrow strip no more than 300 kilometres wide along the American border. Compared to other federations Canada’s origins are unique and, in several respects, may be instructive for the current process of European integration. One of Canada’s longest-serving Prime Ministers, W. L. Mackenzie King, once declared the country “has too much geography and not enough history”, a reference to the lack of common experience and culture which would normally serve to bind citizens together as happened centuries earlier in many European States. Even among the federations of the New World, however, Canada’s situation stands out. Unlike Australia, Canada’s borders are not self-evident. Unlike the United States,

Canada did not achieve statehood through a defining war of independence which served to forge the ties that bind. And, although all three federations were peopled through immigration, only Canada has experienced linguistic and cultural diversity comparable to the European Community. Given the geographic and cultural challenge faced by the Canadian Fathers of Confederation, it is even more significant that the primary - and apart from the illfated Senate some would argue the only - formal instrument of political integration envisaged for the new State was a federal system of government. Indeed, the absence of virtually all other traditional integrative measures, both minor and substantial, is striking. Perhaps the most obvious sins of omission were the standard trappings of a state. Surprising though it may be to the outside observer, the new country which emerged in 1867 did not possess either a flag or a national anthem of its own. Despite (or perhaps because of) the dramatic examples of nation-building following the French and American revolutions, such self-evident symbols of national identity as the Marseillaise and the Star-Spangled Banner were not adopted in Canada. Instead, with stunning disregard for the origins of some 25% of the population, Canada’s founders opted to retain two blatant symbols of its British colonial past, the Union Jack and “God Save the King”. In the same vein the British monarch remained the Canadian head of state. The newly-created post of his/her representative in Canada - the Governor-General was filled by a succession of British appointees from the minor aristocracy until

SIC

1952,

when

the first Canadian-born

Governor-General,

Vincent

Massey,

was

appointed. A similar lack of concern with the symbolic aspects of nation-building resulted in the residents of Canada remaining British citizens for nearly one hundred years, until the adoption of the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947. Although not unique it is certainly noteworthy - especially from a European perspective - that Canada’s borders were not finally settled until several decades after its creation, with new territories being added to the fledgling country in stages. While British Columbia joined the federation in 1873, the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan did not enter until 1905, and the province of Newfoundland officially became part of Canada only in 1949, after a hotlycontested referendum campaign. (More recently the division of the former Northwest Territories and the creation of the new, aboriginal-dominated territory of Nunavut in the eastern Arctic in January of 2000 suggests the process is not yet complete). More striking still is the fact that Canada’s independence from its former colonial master was achieved in stages. Until the end of the First World War, nearly sixty years after Confederation, Canada was independent only with respect to domestic policy. Canadian relations with foreign countries were negotiated by the British Foreign Office in London. With the loss of nearly 1% of the Canadian population during the war, however, neither the Canadian people nor their leadership were prepared to remain an appendage of the British Empire. The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, demanded separate representation at the peace conference and separate representation for Canada at the League of Nations which was established in its aftermath. This was followed by a series of Imperial Conferences leading to the Balfour Declaration of 1926, granting all former British colonies independence in foreign affairs, and the Statute of Westminster in 1931, formally ending the British Parliament’s ability to legislate for Canada on matters of foreign policy. Even the constitution - a document generally viewed as a source of pride and a unifying force in other countries - did not inspire citizen affection for the new State. The umbilical relationship between Canada and its colonial past was all too evident in several aspects of the original constitution, which was known for more than one hundred years as the British North America Act, 1867. (It was renamed at the time of repatriation in 1982, apparently with an overdue eye to the implications for national unity, as the Constitution Act, 1867). Among the most glaring omissions from the original constitution were two elements which would traditionally be considered essential for establishing national identity - a meaningful preamble, outlining the values, ideals and beliefs of the new State, and a list of fundamental rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by all citizens. While the absence of an equivalent to the Marseillaise or the StarSpangled Banner may not have been critical to the evolution of a Canadian national identity, the lack of stirring equivalent to the American Declaration of Freedom or the French Rights of Man was a far more serious drawback.

378

Generations of Canadians had no conception of what “truths” they held to be “selfevident”. Indeed, with the constitutional text describing Canada’s independence as “expedient” and “conducive” to “promote the interests of the British Empire”, and turgid prose invoking a “constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”, it should hardly have been surprising that very few Canadians could recite even one line of their constitutional document. For a variety of reasons too complex to elaborate here, the constitution also did not provide for its own amending formula, but rather required Canadian parliamentarians to petition the British monarch for any changes they wished tc implement. Similarly, disputes over jurisdiction were originally required to be resolved in Britain, by that country’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was not until 1949 that the Canadian Supreme Court became the final court of appeal. And it was only in 1982, more than one hundred years after Confederation, that the Canadian constitution was finally “repatriated” and a domestic amending formula adopted. Lacking such obvious symbols of national identity it was perhaps understandable, but certainly unusual, that Canadians gradually turned their attention to a concrete set of national policies and programs in order to find some symbolic expression of their identity. In fact their attention was attracted almost from the beginning by the economic policies of the first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald. Macdonald’s “National Policy” was “an explicit attempt by Canadian governments of the late 19Ÿ century to enhance the economic integration of the country”. In the absence of other more traditional integrative measures, however, “to a certain extent it was almost as important for its symbolic contribution to Canadian nationalism... as for its contribution to Canada’s economic development'®”. First outlined in Macdonald’s Conservative Party campaign platform in 1878, the National Policy was an effort to fulfill the commitments of the Confederation bargain. The three planks of the National Policy included the establishment of an east-west transportation network, (culminating in the symbolic driving of the “last spike” in the railway linking the westernmost province of British Columbia with the rest of the country in 1885), the recruitment of immigrants from Eastern Europe to populate the western regions of the country, and the adoption of a protective external tariff system to promote the development of Canadian industries. As one prominent student of Canadian national identity has noted these three planks, taken together, “became the basis for Canada’s economic and political development for the next fifty years”, promoted and expanded by successive Liberal and Conservative governments alike!. Over time the initial sponsorship of a state-owned railway expanded to include !5 Jackson and Jackson (1986), Politics in Canada, Prentice-Hall, Scarborough, p. 62.

18 Craig Brown, “The Nationalism of the National Policy”, in P. Russell, (ed.), Nationalism in Canada, pp. 155-63.

17 Jackson and Jackson, op. cit., p. 61.

379

more modern modes of transportation - still a crucial factor for economic development in so large a country - with the establishment of Air Canada and Petro Canada, the state-owned oil production and distribution company, as crown corporations. Along similar lines the area of communications, and later telecommunications, policy also became a focus of state-sponsored economic and cultural development with the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the National Film Board and Telesat Canada. An even more important aspect of this functional approach to political integration was the development of the welfare state. Once again inspired by

developments in the immediate post-World War II era, and enjoying unprecedented economic prosperity, successive Canadian governments introduced comprehensive national programs to provide welfare and unemployment insurance benefits, post-secondary education funding and universal medicare, family allowance and pension plans that came to be referred to collectively as the “social safety net”. Originally intended to alleviate abject poverty and mitigate against the worst effects of any future economic downturns like the Great Depression, the concept of the social safety net evolved over time into a policy whose primary objective was to provide a minimum standard of living and equality of opportunity for all Canadians as a right of citizenship. In this context the universality of many of the programs was crucial, providing an explicit guarantee to the middle-income citizens who funded the bulk of these programs through their taxes that they, too, were potential beneficiaries. (Also crucial was the concept of “minimum national standards”, an approach which ensured that the mobility of citizens would not be hampered by widely differing levels of service in different provinces, but at the same time allowed sufficient flexibility for provincial governments to exceed those minimum requirements and/or provide somewhat different delivery mechanisms if they chose). As Banting has outlined in detail, the overwhelming attachment of Canadians to the social safety net was due in no small measure to the role it played in providing them with a sense of community and social cohesion, and additionally in enabling them to distinguish themselves from Americans". Countless public opinion polls have confirmed this analysis over time. In 1987, for example, some 90% of Canadians again identified “the quality and availability of health care” as one of the most important distinguishing features of national identity. This dual advantage was also enjoyed by the regional development and constitutionally-guaranteed equalization programs, which were at the heart of successive federal government’s efforts to minimize regional disparity. Over time not only the Atlantic provinces but on several occasions the prairie provinces and British Columbia, whose regional economies were heavily dependent on primary.

'* K. Banting, “Social Citizenship and the Multicultural Welfare State”, in Cairns et. al.

(eds.) (1999), Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism: Perspectives, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal.

380

Canadian

and

Comparative

resources rather than manufacturing, and therefore subject to “boom/bust” cycles, were the recipients of federal transfer payments from “have” to “have not” regions. Not only could Canadians take pride in knowing that the fortunate regions of the country were sharing the wealth with their fellow citizens in economically depressed areas - once again reinforcing their self-image as a caring and compassionate society - but each region also understood that, in the event of economic downturns, they too could become a “have not” beneficiary of the system. This also was seen as part of the Confederation “bargain”, and an important element of national identity. In sum, the various social programs of the Canadian federal government came to perform an equally important function as instruments of political integration. For some 87% of Canadians in 1981, they were among the most important reasons why Canada was “the best country in the world in which to live”. As such, they greatly moderated the negative impact of the lack of formal symbols of national identity and citizenship. Valuable as these alternative symbols of national identity proved to be, they had emerged gradually over time and were informal. The province-building efforts of Quebec

and

Alberta,

on

the

other

hand,

had

been

both

deliberate

and

increasingly effective. Yet when national politicians finally concluded more deliberate and formal action to encourage political integration would be desirable, their attempts to introduce traditional national symbols after such a lengthy hiatus were, to put it mildly, controversial. They were also very late in coming. As the following section demonstrates, almost all of the symbols and values with which Canadians currently identify did not emerge until fifty years ago.

5. Early nation-building efforts The first of the belated attempts to provide Canadians with concrete symbols of national identity was undertaken in 1958 by a Conservative Prime Minister, John G. Diefenbaker, who was committed to the idea of introducing a Canadian Bill of Rights. Until then, as mentioned above, the rights and freedoms of Canadians had

been ill-defined as merely “similar to those of the United Kingdom” and coming within the scope of British common law. Like many others, Diefenbaker had become concerned with civil liberties as a result of the events of the Second World War. Moreover Canada was highly supportive of the attempts of the newly-created United Nations to draft a Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion human rights conventions. (In fact a Canadian, John Humphreys, was among the authors of the original document). Moreover with the major role played by Canadians in the Second World War it appeared that Canada had “come of age” as a country and Canadians were suddenly conscious of their potential role as a “middle power” in the larger world. Nevertheless, as former Justice Walter Tarnopolsky has outlined in detail, there

381

was not insubstantial opposition to the idea of an express listing of rights among some members of the Canadian political elite, notably by those who preferred the British approach over what they perceived to be the “American” concept of a Bill of Rights. Conversely there were also critics who believed a mere statute would be of little value. They argued instead for a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, although with no constitutional amending formula they recognized this would likely be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Diefenbaker persevered, however, and in the end the Canadian Bill of Rights became law on August 10, 1960”. Four years later Diefenbaker's successor, Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, launched a second initiative, the adoption of a distinctive Canadian flag.

Although the concept received enthusiastic support in principle from a majority of Canadians - due in part to the consultative approach of the government in which a design competition figured prominently - there was a small but vocal minority of anglophone Canadians committed to the British Union Jack. The famous “Flag Debate” of 1964 was not without controversy, but the Maple Leaf flag, which was ultimately adopted quickly, became a hugely popular symbol of Canadian identity. Many attribute its success to the government’s careful attention to the views of its francophone minority, since the red maple leaf had been used independently as a symbol by both French and English Canadians long before Confederation. Not only did public opinion polls confirm its overwhelming popularity, but it soon became the symbol of choice for Canadian manufacturers to identify their products and the pride of Canadian tourists abroad. Similar efforts by Pearson in 1967 to establish a national anthem met with greater opposition, however, and also with somewhat less popular success in the first few years. After one hundred years the devil was predictably in the details. Although the music eventually chosen had been written by a French Canadian in 1880 and was already well-known, the decision to finally adopt “O Canada” as the official anthem during Canada’s centennial year was fraught with difficulties. There was little doubt that most Canadians were eager to replace “God Save the Queen” with a more meaningful piece, but debate raged initially over alternate choices and then, once the decision was made, over alternative lyrics, since both

the English and French versions of the text (which had little in common to begin with) were considered by many to contain politically offensive phrases. In a classic Canadian compromise that citizens of many multilingual European States would no doubt find amusing, the formal introductory ceremony “solved” a further debate over which language should come first by having two choirs sing the two versions simultaneously. Nevertheless with the passage of time and the exposure of a new generation to the text, the anthem came to be a well-established item of national identity, recognized not only by Canadians but internationally. Along with these various symbolic gestures, the Pearson government contributed two more broadly-based aspects to the national project. The first was

? W. Tarnopolsky (1975), The Bill of Rights, McLelland and Stewart, Toronto. 382

the emerging image of Canada at home and abroad as a “middle power” and an international peacekeeper. Pearson himself had contributed to the peacekeeping image as a former diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, and Canadians were quick to adopt the concept as part of their political culture. Public opinion polls repeatedly demonstrated that the image fit particularly well with the preconceived notion that Canadians were less aggressive and more civil than Americans. As a result, they were extremely supportive of Pearson’s efforts to employ the Canadian military in peacekeeping efforts abroad under the auspices of the United Nations, including stints at the Suez Canal and in Cyprus. The second general initiative of this type was an examination of Canadian citizenship in light of new and emerging trends in Quebec - such as the francophone majority’s sudden awakening to the possibilities of using provincial power for cultural self-determination through the so-called Quiet Revolution - and the rapid evolution of the rest of Canada from an anglophone British tradition into a multicultural, multiracial society. Having called for the creation of royal commission to study these developments while he was still Leader of the Opposition during the Diefenbaker government, Pearson moved quickly in 1963 to establish a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The culmination of these early integrative efforts was a series of governmentsponsored events to mark Canada’s one-hundredth anniversary. To complement the yearlong centennial celebrations the country hosted its first international exposition, an event that came to define a generation of Canadians and enhance their sense of national identity. Expo 67, which was deliberately held in the home of the linguistic minority in Montreal, Quebec, not only served to bring together Canadians from all regions of the country, and to integrate French and Englishspeaking Canadians, but also to enhance their image of their country as an independent player on the international scene. Numerous studies have identified the critical role which this event played in the development of national consciousness,

which

one

analyst

has

referred

to

as

a “mood

of national

euphoria”. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was in the immediate aftermath of this brief and somewhat unexpected affirmation of Canadian independence that a decade of intensive and deliberate nation-building took place under the leadership of a new Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

6. Trudeau’s national project During his time in office Lester Pearson used other informal methods to further political integration, including the active recruitment of high-profile French Canadians from Quebec to run for office under the banner of the Liberal Party and

20 R, Fulford (1967), “This Was Expo”, in Saturday Night, November 6. 383

serve as MPs and cabinet ministers. His most conspicuous success came in 1965, when he convinced three well-known Quebecers to run under the Liberal banner and come to Ottawa. The so-called “Three Wise Men” were labour leader Jean Marchand, the best known of the group, as well as journalist Gerard Pelletier and a young lawyer and academic, Pierre Elliott Trudeau. All three were elected easily and were soon in the cabinet. In 1967 Pearson appointed Trudeau as Justice Minister and he became an overnight sensation with the Canadian public, partly for his handling of criminal code reform provisions which modernized the justice system, and partly for his personal charisma and youthful, sophisticated image. More than anyone else in Canadian politics at the time, he reflected the new confidence and enthusiasm that Canadians felt in terms

of their national identity in the aftermath of Expo 67. The following year, with neither Pelletier nor Marchand prepared to run for the Liberal leadership when Pearson retired, Trudeau was reluctantly convinced to put his name forward as the “French Canadian candidate” in a party with a tradition of alternation of the leadership between the two official language groups. The result was entirely predictable. As many analysts have concluded, willingly or not Trudeau was in the right place at the right time”’. Trudeau’s election as Prime Minister in 1968 was noteworthy for the fact that, as an academic and sometime journalist who had written extensively before assuming public office, he had already articulated a well-known and welldeveloped set of ideas about the role of the State, the merits of federalism (and the evils of nationalism) and the nature of citizenship. His most important work was a book published the year of the election, a collection of essays entitled Federalism and the French Canadians. In it he provided a crystal-clear indication of the direction in which Canadians could expect him to take the country under his stewardship”. From his writings and his public statements it was apparent that Trudeau had come to Ottawa with a mission. Along with fis two compatriots he intended to ensure that French Canadians took an active role in the federal government and had a greater influence on the national policy process, after decades of provincial isolationism under former Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis and the nationalist element of the Catholic Church. In particular Trudeau was committed to an agenda of political integration through the development of a pan-Canadian national identity and, secondly, to the enhancement of what Canadian historian Michael Ignatieff has referred to as “civic nationalism’. Because these nation-building and citizenship projects were seen as the antidote to what Trudeau perceived to be the stifling ethnocentric nationalism prevalent in Quebec, the stated objective of the new PM was to “put Quebec in its place, and its place is within Canada, with all *! See for example

R. Gwynn

(1980), The Northern

Magus, McClelland

and Stewart

Toronto; or G. Radwansky (1977), Trudeau, Macmillan, Toronto.

= PE; Trudeau (1968), Federalism and the French Canadians, Macmillan, Toronto. M. Ignatieff (1994), Blood and Belonging, Penguin Books, Toronto.

384

the advantages and all the influence to which our province is entitled”. Put another way several years later, his objective was “to make Canada the distinct society”, rather than Quebec, as the francophone sovereignist minority would have liked. To achieve this objective the Trudeau government soon introduced a number of concrete measures. The first was official bilingualism, something which virtually all other linguistically plural democracies - and notably successful federations such as Switzerland - had implemented much earlier, and which had been one of the key recommendations

of the report of Pearson’s Royal Commission,

tabled in 1966.

The Official Languages Act was introduced in 1968. Its emphasis was on achieving institutional bilingualism in the federal public service, and the provision of services to citizens in the official language of their choice. At the same time an Official Languages Commissioner was created as a sort of Ombudsman, to receive and review citizens’ complaints, and to conduct independent annual studies evaluating the performance of the federal bureaucracy. Through separate programs administered by the government’s Secretary of State Department, funding was also established for second language training - so that francophones in Quebec could learn English and anglophones in the rest of the country could learn French - and for the education of official language minorities in their first language. It is important to note these policies were enthusiastically supported by the federal opposition parties. Conservative Party leader Robert Stanfield, for example, not only defended bilingualism in some parts of his native Atlantic Canada where it was not immediately popular, but went so far as to refuse to sign the nomination papers of a Conservative candidate who had publicly opposed the policy. Although there was certainly a measure of public and bureaucratic resistance initially, generally due to an inaccurate understanding of the implications of the policy for the lives of individual bureaucrats or citizens, particularly in the outlying areas, on the whole it was well-received from the beginning. It also proved extremely successful in practice. Within a short period of time English Canadian children were being registered for French immersion classes in large numbers, and the spillover effect from federal bilingual announcements eventually led to many private sector businesses - especially in areas such as the tourism sector -- volontarily operating in both official languages. Countless polls demonstrated that bilingualism had become an important element of national identity almost overnight. Between 1971 and 1981 the number of bilingual Canadians increased by 27%, more than twice the rate of population growth. In 1981 some 3.7 million Canadians described themselves as bilingual, more than one-third of whom claimed English as their first language, thereby disproving the separatist argument that francophones were simply becoming more familiar with English of necessity. As Gregg and Posner point out in their massive demographic survey of Canada, The Big Picture, by 1983 some 56% of Canadians identified bilingualism as one of the most important elements of Canadian identity, and an equal number also emphasized its utility in serving to distinguish them yet again from Americans.

385

À companion policy to official bilingualism was multiculturalism, an initiative introduced by the Trudeau government to integrate the increasingly diverse culturally, ethnically and racially - population brought about by an expansive immigration policy’. Unlike the American assimilationist policy and the Australian exclusionary approach, the emphasis of Canadian immigration policy was on integration rather than assimilation, with the concept of the “cultural mosaic” rather than the American “melting pot”. In practice this meant supporting the preservation of cultural heritage, but also ensuring the provision of official language training and other immigrant settlement services and, as the nature of immigrants changed, the establishment of a race relations program to minimize discriminatory practices and promote enhanced group understanding. Like bilingualism, the official multicultural policy was demonstrably effective in shaping national identity. By 1983, some 74% of Canadians agreed with the statement that “One of the best things about Canada is the way we welcome people of different cultures, races and religions into our society”. One of the last measures of the Trudeau government in 1984 was to appoint a special parliamentary task force to examine the situation of the growing number of visible minorities in Canadian society. The report of that task force, Equality Now, provided a lengthy list of recommendations covering everything from education to communications and housing policies, designed to ensure the swift and smooth integration of each of the new waves of visible minority immigrants Canada was attracting. Recognizing the very real pressures being placed on existing facilities, the report specifically recommended increased funding for immigrant settlement and race relations programs, and the creation of a separate Ministry of Multiculturalism to provide a symbolic recognition of the importance of the unique policy approach Canada had adopted. While these two policies were certainly crucial to the nation-building project Trudeau was pursuing, they were only one aspect of his integration agenda. Another equally important aspect of his overall plan was to encourage a strong democratic civic culture through enhanced citizen participation in the policy process. His 1974 election campaign, which produced an overwhelming majority government, was fought on the theme of the “Just Society”. He elaborated on this theme throughout the campaign, speaking of the need for the State to ensure “equality of opportunity for all Canadians” by providing “the most help for the most disadvantaged”, and also to ensure that “the principles of democracy are widely understood, upheld and practised by citizens”. # Of course it should be noted that such an effort was particularly important given that, unlike the linguistic duality present in Canada from the beginning, the multicultural reality was not conducive to integration through a federal system, not only because there were many different waves of cultural minorities, but also because they were not geographically concentrated. Although there are many differences, the same point could also be made about Canada’s many aboriginal peoples. Indeed, the complexity of this latter element of Canadian pluralism is such that virtually no discussion of the issues relating to aboriginal peoples has been addressed in this paper.

386

=

Among the practical initiatives Trudeau proposed were additional social security measures and a Department of Regional Economic Expansion. More innovative was his decision to introduce an entire series of new programs in a newly-formed Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State Department, including directorates for Citizen Participation, Citizenship Promotion, and Group Understanding and Human Rights. Other programs in the branch supported the activities of ethnocultural groups, official language minorities, women’s groups, the disabled and aboriginal peoples. In addition to their educational and promotional functions to ensure citizens had adequate access to information about the government’s policies and activities, the mandate of each of these programs was to encourage the participation of all citizens in the political process, in many cases by providing start-up or operational grants to community-based organizations working with disadvantaged groups of citizens. The “level playing field”, Trudeau believed, could only be achieved with a measure of state encouragement and assistance. Many analysts have concluded that the true measure of the success of these initiatives was the degree to which the various citizen interest groups that emerged were able to criticize and/or force changes to legislation proposed in later years by the very government that was funding their efforts. Perhaps the ultimate example of such citizen input occurred during the legislative process involving the Trudeau government’s constitutional initiative of 1980 - a proposal to “repatriate” the constitution and entrench an amending formula and a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As part of the process the government established a special joint committee of Parliament to examine the draft proposal and hold public hearings which, for the first time ever, were to be televised. (It was later estimated by the public broadcaster that tens of thousands of Canadians observed the process daily). Over a period of several months the committee heard from some 97 individual and group witnesses in person, and received written testimony from an additional 163. At the end of this marathon series of hearings the government introduced a significant package of amendments to its proposal, distributing an annotated version highlighting which amendments had been made at the suggestion of various witnesses. An additional series of amendments was introduced by opposition parties and accepted during clause-byclause debate and, at the end of the day, more changes were made after further

consultation with provincial premiers, who originally had been opposed to the government’s unilateral approach to the issue, but not to most of the contents of the package. The Charter itself went well beyond the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights which, in any event, had been found ineffective judicially due to its status as a simple statute, as some critics had foreseen at the time. Providing concrete expression of the values and beliefs normally found in a constitution, the Charter not only included numerous guarantees of individual rights and freedoms, but entrenched the Official Languages Act and provisions for official language minorities, recognition of the country’s multicultural heritage and aboriginal treaty rights, and provision for

387

affirmative action programs. Although there had certainly been contentious debate among premiers and the federal government during the process, the final package was supported by nine of the ten provinces (the separatist government of Quebec having rejected all offers of further consultation), as well as all federal opposition parties. With the Trudeau government holding 74 of the 75 seats from Quebec in the national legislature, it could reasonably argue that it also had the support of the citizens of Quebec, if not their provincial government. Far more significant in terms of political integration was the fact that individual Canadians, by a margin of more than four to one, wholeheartedly supported the federal government’s actions, the constitutional package as a whole and especially the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A national Gallup poll of June 1982 found that fully 80% of Canadians felt “the constitutional package will be a good thing for Canada”. In Quebec, only 16% believed it “will not be a good thing”, while 49% supported it and more than 62% supported the Charter specifically. As political scientist Alan Cairns of the University of British Columbia declared in testimony before a different parliamentary committee a short time later, «The constitution now speaks directly to citizens. It pulls them into the constitutional order. I would even go so far as to argue that we now have to think of citizenship as a constitutional category in the same way we think of the courts, legislatures, executive and administrators”*». Public opinion polls over the next decade confirmed Cairns’ conclusions, revealing consistently high support for the Charter among Canadians in all regions of the country. When the Trudeau government was eventually defeated in the federal election of 1984, after serving nearly sixteen years in office, it arguably left the country with a much greater degree of social cohesion and sense of national identity. The following spring, political commentator and journalist Richard Gwynn wrote in The 49" Paradox that Canadians had achieved.the “distinct society” Trudeau was hoping for: «Canadians are no longer simply not Americans», he concluded: «We have evolved into a people who are as fully North Americans as are Americans and yet, because of our political culture, are a quite distinct kind of North American... as unalike in (our) political cultures so that we are as distinct from each other as the Germans from the French”. Moreover the political elites had retained their traditional high level of credibility throughout this period. Indeed, when the Mulroney Conservative government took office in late 1984, Canadians were in a decidedly positive frame of mind about their country and its political leadership. In its annual year-end polling survey, a national magazine described “a snapshot of a nation in a state of grace”. The report of the Maclean’s/Decima survey, entitled “A Confident Nation Speaks Up”, found that 70% of Canadians believed “our system of government” 25 As cited in B. Jeffrey (1993), Strange Bedfellows, Trying Times: The 1992 Referendum, Key Porter, Toronto, p. 34. 2% R. Gwynn (1985), The 49" Paradox, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto.

388

was among the things which made Canada one of the best places to live, and an equal number believed Canadian politicians were “hardworking” and “principled”. Even in the midst of the global recession of 1980-81 which appeared to render national governments powerless and left ordinary Canadians reeling, some 49% of citizens still believed “governments have an important role to play in the economy” while more than 80% expected the government to continue its role of “ensuring social justice”. Although the 1980-84 period certainly witnessed an increased level of intergovernmental tension as well, it was widely perceived to be the result of various personality conflicts among the political elites, including Trudeau, and of certain specific policies of his government, rather than a general problem with the federal system. It was only with the election of a right-wing government intent on dismantling much of the social safety net, and on “restoring” Quebec’s place in the constitutional fold, that the concept of federalism as a major problem in Canadian politics became the pre-occupation of politicians and citizens alike.

7. Deconstructing Canada - The right-wing politics of de-integration Although its record has been widely criticized on economic and social policy grounds since its defeat in 1993, there has been little or no attention paid to the negative consequences for political integration which resulted from the unprecedented right-wing policies of the Mulroney government. Yet a case can be made that its aggressive dismantling of much of the welfare state and other important symbols of national identity, its lack of commitment to previous federal government policies on bilingualism and multiculturalism, and its blatant disregard for citizen participation in the political process, led to a major reversal of that integration process. A more apparent blow to national identity was the Mulroney government’s determination to achieve constitutional reform at all costs, which resulted in not

one but two failed attempts to amend the Constitution in less than five years and produced widespread national angst. It also left many Canadians believing the federal system was “broken” and their political elites were incompetent. Moreover it paved the way for the creation of two new national political parties - a Quebec separatist party and a western-based protest party - whose primary raison d'être was destruction of the federal status quo. While it can be argued that many of these outcomes were incidental to the purpose of the Mulroney government’s policies or, in some cases, the unintended consequences of them, there can be little doubt that others were the deliberate result of a dogmatic ideological commitment. Regardless of their intent, however, the effect of these policies was universally counterproductive to the nation-building project of the postwar era. This was demonstrably the case with the government’s economic policies,

389

which emphasized deficit reduction over job creation during an economic downturn, and chose social program expenditure cuts as the primary method to accomplish their objective. In its nine-year tenure the Mulroney government made a wide variety of incremental changes to most elements of the social safety net, including reductions to unemployment insurance payments and the tightening of eligibility rules, virtual elimination of the family allowance program, de-indexation and the “clawback” of middle and higher income seniors’ pension benefits. They likewise made drastic cuts to regional development programs, for example by reducing the budget of the Atlantic Opportunities program by 25% and the Western Diversification plan by $55 million. One of the most revealing indications of the impact of the government’s policies was the discourse that arose among supporters and critics alike. Simply put, the debate was elevated to a discussion of “the future of Canada”. This was most notably the case with the concept of “universality”. Aware of the public’s attachment to the social safety net and the principle of universality, Mulroney and his Finance Minister, Michael Wilson, first denied that the universality of social

programs would be affected by their measures. Critics, on the other hand, framed virtually all of their attacks on government policies around the threat of its elimination. When it became apparent that universality was indeed a thing of the past for several of the programs, the new reality was defended by Mulroney as a socially responsible measure “to place more money in the hands of those who need it most” and “to stop subsidizing the wealthy bank president with an annual income of $500,000.00”. Opponents, on the other hand, declared the myriad incremental

policy changes and deliberate obfuscation to be a form of “social policy by stealth” in which the public was not being consulted. | At the end of their mandate, the government’s own budget papers estimated there had been a saving of some $550 million annually as a result of the changes to the family benefits plan alone. Many benefits had been eliminated entirely for all but the lowest-income Canadians. Most significant from the perspective of political integration, the benefits of almost all of the social programs had been either eliminated or substantially reduced for the very middle-class citizens whose philosophical commitment to the social safety net was essential for its continued success. Meanwhile other aspects of the government’s deficit-reduction agenda had resulted in the privatization of a number of symbolically important crown corporations in the transportation and communications sectors, such as Air Canada and Petro Canada. There were significant funding reductions for others such as the passenger rail service, Via Rail. Many rural and regional lines were abandoned as a consequence, leaving outlying population centres with few transportation options. The public broadcaster, the CBC, not only suffered a series of funding cuts but also. had its mandate deliberately altered by Benoit Bouchard, the minister responsible for the agency and a former Quebec separatist who had been coopted by Mulroney to run federally for the Conservatives. To the surprise of those unfamiliar with his

390

background, Bouchard moved quickly to eliminate an offending clause in the corporation’s mandate “to promote national unity”, leaving many Canadians to question the future direction of the agency. At the same time the federal government was also moving to cut expenditures for the various social programs it financed through transfer payments to the provinces, including the Canada Assistance Plan (welfare), postsecondary education and, most important of all from the perspective of political integration, medicare. Beginning almost immediately after their election in 1984, the Mulroney government implemented a series of cuts to the projected amounts the federal government would have transferred to the provinces according to the pre-agreed five-year formula. Yet again, however, the government attempted to defuse the issue because of its political importance, insisting that federal funding was actually increasing - which it was, but not at the level previously agreed upon. By 1991 more than $2.6 billion in projected provincial revenue had been withheld from the provinces by what Finance Minister Wilson described as a “freeze on growth payments”. The premiers were vocal and aggressive in their criticism, charging that the federal government was in effect downloading its deficit-reduction agenda to them. Several began very public cuts to medicare on their own, while Quebec defiantly introduced an “illegal” series of user fees to offset the shortfall. Three provinces launched an acrimonious (and ultimately unsuccessful) court challenge, arguing the federal government did not have the right to unilaterally alter the terms of their agreement in mid-stream. There were significant consequences for Canadians’ perception of these important symbols of national identity. With the obvious shift in policy direction of the Mulroney government, polls suggested that many citizens began to question their own commitment to the values of tolerance, compassion and sharing which the social safety net had exemplified. A number of academic analyses, meanwhile, suggested that the consequences for national unity and a pan-Canadian identity were equally serious”. When the government announced in 1986 that it would begin negotiations with the United States to eliminate trade tariffs and other barriers to trade, Canadians

were dealt a further blow to their longstanding self-image as “not Americans”. They were also left to question the credibility of their political leadership, since the position of the Mulroney Conservatives during the 1984 election had been quite the opposite. “We will have none of it”, the then Leader of the Opposition had declared in answer to a question on free trade at the time. Two years later his government — which had already dismantled much of the transportation infrastructure of the country designed to maintain the east-west connection - was proposing to abandon the longstanding federal policy of using protective tariffs to 77 See for example S. McBride and J. Shields (1993), Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax; or R. Allen and G. Rosenbluth (1992), False Promises: The Failure of Conservative Economic Policies, UBC Press and New Star

Books, Vancouver.

391

promote a domestic manufacturing and industrial base. With two of the three elements of Macdonald’s National Policy now in tatters at the hands of one of his own successors, the federal election of 1988 became a

deeply divisive single-issue campaign on the merits of the free trade agreement (FTA), which the government by then had signed. Although the Mulroney government was re-elected, it was with only 43% of the popular vote as compared to the 52% received by the two other major federal parties, both of whom had opposed the FTA and had split the protest vote. Victory was also achieved at the expense of the credibility of the electoral system. Not only did the first-past-thepost system deliver the government a second massive majority with less than 50% of the popular vote, but the election campaign became an obvious battleground for the business community and wealthy individuals who supported the free trade agreement. The business elites poured substantial funds into a pro-FTA advertising campaign during the election period, an unprecedented event which benefited the Conservatives’ re-election directly, as a subsequent study by political scientist Jane Hiebert conclusively demonstrated. (Although a well-known phenomenon in the United States, such corporate financial influence had been previously unknown in Canada and was viewed with considerable alarm by most citizens, regardless of their partisan affiliation”). Macdonald’s legacy was not the only one to undergo revisions during the Mulroney era. In a similar fashion the nation-building exercise begun in earnest barely twenty years earlier by Pearson and Trudeau was also to suffer major reversals. Evidence of the Mulroney government’s dramatic change of policy direction could be seen with respect to the citizenship project shortly after it took office. Indeed, it had barely been elected when it was confronted with a variety of challenges to official bilingualism from a small minority of Quebec separatists and western radicals - challenges which would have posed no problem for previous federal governments or, indeed, for Mulroney’s Conservative predecessors, but which caused serious political problems for the new Prime Minister. Unfortunately, his government’s election victory had been due in no small measure to the unprecedented coalition of these two groups, which Mulroney himself had engineered. As a result he apparently believed he had little political room to manoeuvre if he was to avoid antagonizing his key supporters. Official bilingualism during the Mulroney years consequently suffered the death of a thousand cuts, damned with faint praise or ignored at the very time when solid proactive reinforcement from national political elites would have cemented its position as a fundamental value of Canadian political identity. Perhaps the most obvious example of the government’s lack of commitment to bilingualism was its failure to follow through on its election pledge to re-introduce a major package of amendments to the Official Languages Act which had been drafted by a parliamentary committee and tabled by the Trudeau government

*® J. Hiebert (1985), ‘Interest Groups and Canadian Federal Elections”, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, U of T Press, Toronto.

392

shortly before the election call. The package, which represented the first update of the legislation since its introduction nearly twenty years earlier, had been widely supported by all political parties prior to the election and was expected to receive speedy passage. Instead, worried about the reaction from his supporters among the Quebec separatists - even though the legislation affected only federal departments and bureaucrats - no further mention was made of the bill until the Commissioner of Official Languages himself, as an independent agent of Parliament, publicly criticized the government’s inaction and forced Mulroney to introduce the legislation. A watered-down version of the original bill was finally tabled in 1987 and passed shortly before the next federal election in 1988, over the public opposition of many of Mulroney’s western MPs. Even more significant was the fact that Mulroney’s cabinet minister responsible for the legislation, M. Lucien Bouchard, actually went so far as to assure the Quebec government that Ottawa would not enact the legislation “without first consulting Quebec”, nor would it attempt to “impose” official bilingualism on that province. (This latter comment proved particularly inflammatory, and was completely unnecessary since no federal government had contemplated such a measure,

which was

outside its jurisdiction. Bouchard,

another former Quebec

separatist recruited by Mulroney, went on to resign from cabinet and the Conservative party over the Meech Lake accord and founded the separatist national party, the Bloc Quebecois, before departing federal politics entirely for the Quebec provincial separatist party and the premiership of the province, a post he still holds).

This lack of enthusiasm was only one of several setbacks for the concept of official bilingualism. Perhaps even more damaging to public perception was the failure of the Mulroney government to take a leadership role in criticizing provincial violations of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing minority language rights. Chief among these was the Prime Minister’s refusal to criticize the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan for their defiance in the face of court rulings that they were providing insufficient assistance to official language minorities, and his subsequent refusal to criticize the Quebec premier for his decision to invoke the constitutional notwithstanding clause rather than amend language legislation in that province to comply with a court ruling on commercial signage. Once again Lucien Bouchard, as the federal minister responsible for defending language rights, instead added fuel to the fire. This time he stated publicly that minority language rights need not be identical across the country. He asserted there was nothing wrong with “asymmetrical” rights and suggested that greater protection should be afforded to the French-language minority outside of Quebec in any event, since they were “obviously in greater danger” than the Englishlanguage minority within Quebec. Mulroney himself remained conspicuously silent throughout the entire debate, apparently fearing a backlash from western supporters as well as the sovereignists in Quebec.

393

In some respects the Mulroney government showed a similar indifference to official multiculturalism, despite a large number of 1984 election pledges which had followed the same direction as the Trudeau government and previous Conservative leaders. In fact, the Mulroney campaign platform had enthusiastically promised to “promote public awareness of Canada’s diversity; promote programs designed to instill a greater appreciation of the unique racial, cultural and religious values which are held by Canadians of different origins”. Specific commitments were made to enhance existing legislation on hate literature, implement employment equity legislation (begun by the Trudeau administration) and promote minority representation in public media. The platform also specifically promised to “affirm the policy of multiculturalism as a policy for all Canadians” and “enact appropriate legislation to ensure stronger representation in cabinet through an appropriate ministerial base”. Few of these commitments were kept. Those that were implemented fell short of expectations. As sociologist Daiva Stasiulis of Carleton University concluded in a 1988 analysis of the Mulroney government’s record on multiculturalism, it had focused on small symbolic gestures such as the creation of a parliamentary committee and ignored many important areas - such as race relations and immigrant settlement - which had been specifically addressed in the recommendations of the Equality Now report. She noted that the government’s efforts had been “modest in scope and expenditure of resources”, and even the

minimal funding increases had been quickly eliminated during across-the-board expenditure cuts in succeeding years”. In terms of an adverse impact on political integration, however, a far more important development was the Mulroney government’s enthusiastic decision to recast multiculturalism as an economic rather than a social policy. This decision was communicated graphically by the minister responsible, Otto Jelinek, at a government-sponsored conference in Toronto in 1986. The Prime Minister himself was the keynote speaker at the “Multiculturalism Means Business” event, where the government was widely criticized by various ethnocultural community spokespersons for their “attempts to explicitly wed multiculturalism to capitalist morality” and veiled “threats to fund only those groups who showed an ‘investment’ in Canada*”. Stasiulis warned that «This new positive nexus between ethnicity and profit (which) favours the material interests of the most privileged class segments of ethnic communities sits uneasily beside... efforts to reduce ethnic inequality and racism. Concerned minorities might legitimately question whether (the government) will be willing to jettison the policy’s role in combating racism... in order to win the support of business». In the end, she concluded, «such proposals to turn language and culture into a commodity for foreign markets and investment -

D. Stasiuilis, “The Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed?”, in F. Abele (ed.), How Ottawa

Spends: 1997- 98, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, p. 102. Globe and Mail, April 11, 1986.

394

could be successful with a small minority of profit-minded immigrants, yet fail to mobilize the sort of broadly-based sentiments that have traditionally sustained public support for multiculturalism policy*'». The government’s enthusiasm for the economic approach to multiculturalism also coloured its approach to immigration policy and citizenship. In what many considered a contradiction in terms, the government

demonstrated an early and

determined commitment to retrench the expansive immigration policies of the previous forty years, thereby repudiating the third and final plank of Macdonald’s National Policy. In addition to a freeze on immigration quotas, the government also severely reduced the “family class” category which permitted entry on a variety of compassionate grounds and announced a “crackdown” on illegal refugees. At the same

time, however, the government

introduced a new

set of selection criteria

based on economic productivity including, the “business investor” and “business entrepreneur” categories. Two specific incidents served to highlight the underlying attitudes of the government towards immigration even more clearly. With Canadians’ image of themselves as a tolerant and compassionate society already being re-examined in light of the Mulroney government’s deficit-cutting assault on the social safety net, the image of their political leaders reacting in panic to the arrival of a handful of Tamil refugees in a leaky raft off the coast of Newfoundland in 1986 was not helpful. The same government which later refused to recall the legislature to debate important issues relating to aboriginal rights during an armed standoff at an Indian reserve in 1990 was quick to declare the arrival of the Tamils a “national emergency” and recall Parliament during its summer recess to pass draconian legislation authorizing their deportation. The second incident involved the right of Canadians practising the Sikh religion to wear turbans while serving in the national police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Despite internal memoranda predicting the legal appeal of the RCMP’s restrictive policy by a rejected Sikh recruit would be successful, and ample evidence of more permissive practice in other jurisdictions including Great Britain, Canadians were subjected to more than a year of inaction and thinlydisguised racist debate on the part of some of their political elites before the Prime Minister ultimately intervened to overturn the policy. Similar government hesitation was evident with respect to legislation that had been proposed in the last term of the Trudeau administration to enhance social cohesion and citizenship. When a revised version of the long-awaited employment equity legislation was finally tabled in 1986, for example, the government’s lack of enthusiasm for the measure was palpable and it pointedly contained no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Affirmative action programs, meanwhile, were viewed with outright distaste. Nowhere was this more evident than in the decision of the Mulroney government to ignore the report of a

3! D. Stasiulis. op. cit., p. 104.

395

parliamentary committee and the recommendations of its own bureaucrats concerning the coming into force of section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the spring of 1985. This was less than a year after the Conservatives had been elected but three years after the adoption of the Charter in the Constitution Act, 1982. A three-year delay had been built into the Charter specifically to allow both federal and provincial governments to ensure that none of their legislation contravened the provisions of the section. Federal bureaucrats had produced a detailed list of amendments which, when adopted, would ensure this was the case, but in the end

the government chose to reject most of the recommendations and took no action at all. Instead, it proposed to wait and modify its legislation on a case-by-case basis when specific provisions were successfully challenged by individual citizens through the judicial process. To add insult to injury, the government then eliminated the Court Challenges Program which would have provided funding for such citizen initiatives, claiming it was a cost-cutting measure. (This program had originally been introduced by the Trudeau government to enhance citizen access to the judicial system for official language rights-related complaints, and then had been expanded to encompass all of the Charter rights in 1982). Equally revealing of its disdain for citizen participation was the government’s aggressive approach to the many interest groups and non-governmental organizations whose input had been sought by previous federal governments in an attempt to level the policy playing-field, and whose very existence, in many cases, had been due to the proactive policies of those governments. These included women’s and ethnocultural groups, environmentalists and consumer advocates, aboriginal groups and a wide range of social action organizations concerned with poverty, discrimination and social exclusion. In a complete reversal of previous federal policies, the Mulroney government quickly reduced or eliminated any federal funding for these groups, and then moved to marginalise them further from the policy process by refusing to meet with them or respond to their requests. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet ministers also employed classic communications techniques to isolate these groups from ordinary Canadians, regularly dismissing them as “unrepresentative”, “extremists”, and “special interests”.

The impact of this right-wing policy shift on the process of political integration can be clearly seen once again in the results of public opinion polls. Support for bilingualism and multiculturalism declined throughout the decade and particularly in western Canada where the majority of federal MPs were Conservatives. On a broader scale, the 1991 Maclean’s/Decima year-end poll found that a third of those surveyed were ‘somewhat or much less proud to be a Canadian than a few years ago”, and fully 54% identified the policies of the federal government as the primary reason. The decision-making process adopted by the Mulroney government also became an issue for Canadians, and in the end proved to be nearly as important as the content of its policies with respect to its implications for social cohesion and

396

political integration. Having campaigned on an inclusive, consultative approach to policy-making, the Mulroney government soon demonstrated an authoritarian streak best exemplified by the Prime Minister’s memorable “not one comma can be changed” remark during the Meech Lake constitutional debates. The secretive negotiations leading to that deal also compounded the perceived problems of a lack of transparency and accountability. In addition, there were numerous occasions on which the longstanding federal rationale of governing in the national interest was replaced with a brokerage politics approach in which one region of the country was pitted against another. The status of the federal bureaucracy as a neutral, competent and professional public service was also called into question by Mulroney and his ministers notably during the infamous Al-Mashat affair - thereby undermining Canadians’ previously high levels of confidence in the bureaucracy”. The consequences of these two unprecedented developments were epitomized by the infamous CF-18 contract debacle, in which Canadians learned the Prime Minister had personally intervened to overturn a tendered contract procedure and award a major federal contract to a Quebec-based aerospace company despite an earlier bureaucratic decision to choose a different company which happened to be located in the province of Manitoba. (The government’s loss of popular support in that province and across the prairies in the 1988 election demonstrated graphically the importance citizens attached to this behaviour). It was the government’s approach to constitutional reform, however, which fatally damaged the traditional relationship between citizens and the political elites. As several analyses of the failed Meech Lake Accord have concluded, the authoritarian and uncompromising stance of the Prime Minister was crucial to its demise, and led inevitably to a further deterioration of the elite accommodation process. From his “role of the dice” and “not one comma can be changed” remarks ruling out committee amendments to his refusal to consult with opposing provinces and his rhetorical excesses - for example describing the passage of the Accord as “crucial to national unity” - Mulroney alienated rather than convinced Canadians of its merits. In the end, they simply did not believe his threats. Between June 1988 and September 1989 support for the Accord dropped from 54% to 35%. By May of 1990, just before its demise, fewer than one in four Canadians felt it would be “a

good thing” for the country, only 18% felt its failure would have negative implications for national unity, and even in Quebec barely 41% of citizens supported it”. Ironically, although Mulroney professed to have learned from the Meech experience, his subsequent actions on the constitutional file demonstrated that he 32 An excellent analysis of the Al-Mashat case can be found in S. Sutherland. 33 For more details on the process and its implications for elite accommodation, see for example M. Behiels (ed.) (1989), The Meech Lake Primer, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa; or B. Jeffrey (1993), Strange Bedfellows, Trying Times: The 1992 Constitutional Referendum and the Defeat of the Political Elites, Key Porter, Toronto.

397

had, at the very least, drawn the wrong conclusions. Determined to avoid the pitfalls of the lengthy three-year process Meech Lake had endured, and cognizant of the widespread calls for meaningful public consultation, he decided on a snap national referendum to validate his second attempt, the so-cailed Charlottetown Accord. Yet in the few weeks leading to the referendum vote Mulroney managed once again to alienate the majority of Canadians. Announcing the referendum in August of 1992, with polls indicating nearly 70% popular support in principle for the Charlottetown Accord, Mulroney immediately set a negative tone with his widely-reported comment that those who opposed the Accord would in effect be “enemies of Canada”. He then announced a formal coalition of political, business and media elites supporting the Accord, but this, too, alienated large numbers of citizens who felt the referendum was not a meaningful consultation exercise. Not only were they being asked to pass judgement on a fait accompli, but they were being intimidated by elites whom they no longer trusted to represent their interests. As support melted away the government’s tactics became increasingly aggressive and Mulroney’s rhetoric increasingly desperate. At the half-way mark, with the government’s internal polls indicating support falling below 50% in several provinces, Mulroney made a speech in Quebec City in which he reiterated that opponents of the Accord would be “not proud Canadians” and, for added effect, ripped up a copy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms while describing it as “not worth the paper it was written on” if the Accord failed, since Quebecers would feel “rejected” by the rest of the country once again and likely increase their support for secession. Rejecting this inflammatory language, Canadians in six of ten provinces, (including Quebec) voted against the Accord in the national referendum in October of 1992, while a virtually equal number of Yes and No votes were cast in a seventh. In the aftermath of the Accord’s defeat - and after nearly nine years of rightwing de-integrative social and economic policies - not only the Mulroney government but the entire set of political elites who had supported the deal, including provincial premiers, business and media elites, suffered a significant and demonstrable decrease in legitimacy, as did the political system itself. Comparisons with the polling data of a decade earlier are striking. In the 1993 Decima poll some 57% of Canadians described politicians as “unprincipled” and fully 65% believed them to be incompetent. Only 37% believed politicians could be “expected to do what was best for the country” and 45% believed politicians were “more likely to support the interests of big business rather than the public interest”. Meanwhile, the number of respondents who included “our system of government” as one of the best things about Canada had fallen from 70% to 58%. _ An Angus Reid/Southam poll in March of that year confirmed these negative findings. It revealed that a majority (57%) of Canadians believed “Canada’s political institutions are fundamentally flawed and must be reformed to keep the

398

country together”. Some 52% of those surveyed blamed the perceived weakening of national unity on “the actions of political leaders” and, in the clearest indication yet of their lack of confidence in the political elites, some 77% of respondents agreed that governments should be obliged to consult with citizens before implementing any major policy initiatives. As Gregg and Posner concluded, «the problems Canadians confronted at the end of the decade was that, with too few exceptions, they felt no institution could be relied upon to provide what previous generations expected as a birthright: the simple assurance that traditional values still had meaning™». Another finding of the Decima survey was that some 70% of Canadians were disenchanted with traditional political parties generally, and the Conservative Party in particular. It was therefore hardly surprising that the results of the 1993 federal election proved disastrous for the party. Although Brian Mulroney had resigned as leader in the spring of that year and a leadership contest had chosen a younger western-based woman as his replacement, the optics of the change were insufficient to make any difference. Reduced to 18% of the popular vote, the Conservative Party held only two seats in the House of Commons after having formed two majority governmenis in the previous nine years. Equally important as the decimation

of one

of Canada’s

major national

parties, however,

was

the

emergence of not one but two regionally-based protest parties in its place - the western-based Reform Party, with its extreme right-wing platform and thinlydisguised racist tendencies, and the Quebec-based separatist Bloc Quebecois led by Lucien Bouchard. This unforeseen result - widely viewed as a further reversal of the process of political integration - was accentuated by first-past-the-post electoral system, which rewarded the Reform Party with some 52 seats in Parliament despite the fact its share of the popular vote nationally was only 19%, or 1% more than the Conservatives’ popular vote. (This result, of course, was due to the concentration of Reform support in the west and the diffusion of Conservative support across the country.) The pattern continued in the 1997 election, when Reform obtained an almost identical level of popular support but nevertheless became the Official Opposition with 60 seats, due in large measure to the partial collapse in support for the Bloc Quebecois after the departure of its leader, Lucien Bouchard, for provincial politics. With its new found status as the Official Opposition and the adversarial nature of the parliamentary system providing Reform with a daily platform to express its views, the party’s influence on national politics was arguably far more significant than its low level of popular support warranted. Its negative focus on criticism of the political system and the traditional practices of the parliamentary form of government then reinforced the downward spiral of decreasing institutional legitimacy. At the same time its outright rejection of many of the fundamental # A. Gregg and M. Posner (1993), The Big Picture, McFarland, Walter and Ross, Toronto,

pp. 52-65.

399

values of the Canadian political culture - including the welfare state, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, official bilingualism and multiculturalism - and its unprecedented admiration for American politics and American political culture served to heighten the level of public uncertainty over Canada’s national identity and civic culture at the very point when outside pressures such as globalization were already placing considerable pressure on the system. Nevertheless Reform has remained an opposition party, and one with increasingly limited chances of expanding its core base of support, despite a change of party name (to the Canadian Alliance Party) and leadership. This is due in part to the negative reaction of the moderate majority of Canadians to its perceived extremism, but also to the efforts of the current federal Liberal government, which regained power in 1993 and has since restored a considerable measure of credibility to the political process as well as to the social safety net and the citizenship project. Among the first acts of the Chretien government was to resurrect the Charter Court Challenges program and voluntarily introduce a series of amendments to federal legislation in anticipation of citizen challenges, rather than waiting for unfavourable court decisions. In its first term of office the Chretien government also reinvested in the country’s transportation and communications infrastructure in a highly symbolic and popular cost-sharing program with the provinces. Perhaps most important, the current government has demonstrated a renewed commitment to the social safety net despite several years of deficit-reduction budgets. The Social Union Agreement negotiated with the provinces in 1999 was among the most obvious indications of the government’s determination to pursue long-term policies promoting social cohesion. Although much remains to be done to restore public confidence in specific social programs, and notably medicare, it would appear that Canadians have been convinced of the government’s commitment to them”. £ Moreover several of the government’s foreign policy initiatives - including Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s initiatives on land mines and the so-called Human Security Agenda, and Canada’s recent role as a member of the UN Security Council - appear to have restored Canadian’ confidence in their international role as middle power and peacemaker. It would also appear that a new era of more positive intergovernmental relations, now referred to as “collaborative” federalism, is underway, as outlined

by political scientists David Cameron and Richard Simeon in a recent article. As the authors note, the Social Union agreement represents a considerable achievement, breaking new ground for both levels of government. In particular, they draw attention to the fact that «It explicitly endorses the power of Ottawa to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction», while at the same time «ensuring that.

35 See, for example, F. Abele er. al. (1998), “Talking With Canadians: Citizen Engagement

and the Social Union”, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa, July; or J. Jenson

(1998), “Mapping Social Cohesion”, Canadian Policy Research Network, Ottawa.

400

new national programs will not be introduced or existing ones changed substantially without due notice and substantial provincial consent™». Last but hardly least, it is important to note that much of what has taken place over the past twenty years in Canada has been mirrored to a considerable extent in other western

liberal democracies,

whether federal or unitary in structure. Like

Canada, many of the European Community’s member States also experienced a shift to right-wing administrations in response to the economic crises of the eighties, and most have since returned to more centre-left governments concerned

with the consequences of fiscal restraint for social cohesion. As has been the case in Canada for the past fifty years, the European Community as a whole is increasingly being forced to cope with the cultural, religious and linguistic diversity resulting from immigration, superimposed on pre-existing pluralities. And, like Canada, the Community’s recent attempts to achieve greater political integration have come after a lengthy period of inaction in which the emphasis was on economic integration and there was an expectation that the “spillover effect” of intergovernmental programs would accomplish the same end automatically.

8. Implications of the Canadian experience for European integration If the above analysis of the Canadian experience has relevance for the current debate in Europe, and it would certainly appear that it does, it is surely in demonstrating, first, that the problems faced by the two polities are remarkably similar and, second, that while federalism is an extremely effective instrument of

political integration it is insufficient to accomplish this difficult task alone, especially in a complex plural society. Instead, Canada’s experience strongly suggests that federalism must be reinforced by a broad range of other integrative policy instruments, most notably by mechanisms to establish an overarching national identity and a culture of civic nationalism. Seen in light of these conclusions, the ongoing European debate over “what type of political integration” appears to be somewhat misleading. Although many appropriate mechanisms of political integration have been raised for consideration in the past several years - from a federal structure to a formal constitution, a charter of rights and democratic institutional reform - the current discourse on these options seems, (at least from an outsider’s perspective), to be dominated by an “either/or” approach which may well be counterproductive. Rather than focussing debate on the need to identify one ideal or correct choice, it can be argued that Etzioni’s “mixed scanning” approach of multiple, simultaneous remedies is more likely to achieve tangible results in a shorter period of time. Even within the current context of attempting to implement a narrow set of

36 D. Cameron

and R. Simeon (1999), “Intergovernmental

Citizenship”, Paper presented Ottawa, April 13, p. 18.

to the Canadian

401

Centre

Relations and Democratic

for Management

Development,

solutions, however, progress towards greater political integration appears to be dangerously slow. Since the drive for further political integration has, as in Canada, arisen long after many institutional and economic elements of the Community have been put in place, the need for a timely and concrete package of remedies would seem to be crucial if the momentum towards integration is to be maintained, an argument which Neunreither and Wiener, among others, have supported and enlarged upon in some detail”. For example, considerable debate has already taken place around the issues of the so-called “democratic deficit”, highlighting the need to enhance the credibility of the bureaucracy and the transparency of the decision-making process. These issues were formally recognized by the Dublin Summit declaration and the Amsterdam Treaty with their references to the concept of a “peoples’ Europe”. In practical terms these same issues were reinforced by the recent crisis of legitimacy of the European Commission. While the selection of Romano Prodi to lead the Commission may alleviate these problems in the short term, significant reforms will obviously be necessary to overcome the current perceptions of unaccountable and undemocratic leadership. Based on the Canadian experience with executive federalism and the unelected Senate, measures, which would have the effect of strengthening the powers of the European Parliament and legitimizing the Commission - perhaps including the election of the President -, would be most helpful in achieving this objective. Yet, as Marks, Neunreuther and others have outlined at considerable length, there is

little evidence that the current IGC process or the efforts of the Reflection Committee will lead to the necessary changes”. On a practical level insufficient attention appears to have been devoted to the social consequences of various economic policies related to the adoption of the common currency, despite the recognition in Amsterdam and then in Luxembourg that concrete policies to promote employment must be articulated to complement the fiscal policies required for convergence if social cohesion is to be maintained. Given the Canadian experience with right-wing policies of deficit reduction through the elimination of much of the social safety net, the need to promote social benefits as a universal right of citizenship in the Community appears self-evident. Yet, as French President Jacques Chirac himself recognized in a Summit statement in June of 1999, “Contrary to the historical tradition since the 19° century, Europe, the EU, is experiencing circumstances for the first time in which poverty is growing, expanding. And with that, there are all the phenomena this implies about marginalization and social exclusion of all kinds”. In a similar vein much discussion has taken place in the recent past on the need for an overarching European identity, yet little has emerged in practice. Apart from 37 Neunreither and A. Wiener (eds.) (2000), European Integration after Amsterdam, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

See for example Gary Marks er. al., "Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and Implications for

Legitimacy”, Schuman Centre 95/7.

402

the obvious and reasonably successful symbol of the Union itself as found on flags, little else has been done in nearly forty years. Having finally recognized that economic integration and its only real symbol - the Euro - will not produce affective support for the Community, (a conclusion likely to be reinforced by the upcoming Danish referendum), debate now appears to be focused primarily on the choice between a Charter of Rights and a formal constitution, rather than on what

values and beliefs should be entrenched in both. With a view to the Canadian experience, it would seem that both documents could serve as important symbolic statements on European citizenship, with the possibility of guaranteeing linguistic and ethnocultural rights as well as highlighting the role of the European Social Charter. Certainly this is the case made by Siedentrop, a strong supporter of the European Community, in his recent analysis of the lack of progress towards achieving a European identity”. It is also the case argued persuasively by Weiler on broader theoretical grounds, when he concludes there is a need for a “European

value-driven citizenship” which could, if necessary, co-exist with “a national organic-cultural one*”’. The “either/or” approach is also somewhat surprising since considerable theoretical and technical work has already been done on drafts of both documents, and the debate appears to be stagnating due to a lack of political direction at the highest levels rather than a lack of popular support‘. This support, and the integrative benefits of proceeding with both initiatives, are underlined in the recent publication by Bayrou and Cohn-Bendit, in which they conclude: «L’ Europe est un ensemble politique porteur des valeurs universelles et d’un modèle original de civilisation et de culture... Pour arracher l’Europe à l’enlisement, il faut l'intervention d’un nouvel acteur. C’est acteur nouveau, c’est le citoyen européen. Le citoyen européen reconnu dans ses droits souverains obligera les dirigeants européens à synthétiser un projet. autrement dit, l’Europe ne se forgera une volonté politique qu’en se donnant un espace public garant du débat démocratique...“».

Put another way by Canadian political scientist and student of European integration Chris Benedetti, «the political institutions of Europe are bound to endure perpetual dissent and mismanagement should the integration process continue down the path of functional convergence. without first confronting the inherent legitimacy problems. Furthermore... this lack of legitimacy will continue to undermine the linkages between individual citizens and decision-makers in the #12 Siedentrop (2000), Democracy in Europe, The Penguin Press, London.

# J. Weiler (1995), “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision”, European Law Journal, vol. 1, n. 3, November, p. 256. 4‘! Among these is the highly instructive, “A Constitution for the European Union?”, Robert Schuman Centre, EU! Working Paper RSC, No. 95/9, Conference Proceedings, May 12-13, 1994. #? F. Bayrou and D. Cohn-Bendit (2000), “Pour que l’Europe devienne une démocratie”, Strasbourg, June 13.

403

European Union». The importance of these factors has evidently increased in recent months in

view of public protests in a number of Community States, and the disquieting level of support for right-wing fringe parties in several recent national elections. Commenting on these developments in light of the impending presidency of France, the French ambassador to Canada indicated in a speech to the CanadaEurope Parliamentary Association on June 14, 2000 that the French presidency would focus on three objectives. Having identified social cohesion as the first priority, with the objective of promoting full employment and economic growth, he then indicated « The second thrust of our presidency will be to promote a Europe that is closer to citizens so that the construction of Europe is supported by public opinion... Thirdly, France’s presidency will strive to create the conditions for a stronger and more effective Europe ». Among these conditions the ambassador named:

reform of the Commission,

establishing QMV,

a “European

Charter of

Fundamental Rights” project, and the drafting of a “kind of constitution of Europe”. Promising as these objectives appear to be for European integration, they must naturally be placed within the context of institutional reform and enlargement, and here again the Canadian experience with federalism appears to be helpful. Certainly the recent proposals of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer“ appear, at least to a Canadian, to be moving in the right direction as opposed to the emphasis of President Chirac on a “two-speed Europe”, with all the negative consequences for political integration that the latter approach has demonstrated in the past“. Finally, and again with a view to the Canadian experience, a strong argument could be made that it is unwise to proceed with the enlargement of the Community until these issues of legitimacy, citizenship and identity have been resolved. The determination of Jacques Délors and his successors to proceed with broadening and deepening at the same time, while admirable, would appear to the outsider to be simply unrealistic. As Jovanovic and others have noted, the timetable for eastward expansion has not only been artificially determined, but has been crafted in response to outside pressures. As the Canadian situation demonstrates, political integration requires a concerted and multi-pronged effort over a considerable period of time. Meaningful and lasting political integration in the present European Community - arguably a far more complex political entity — can not realistically be achieved in a much briefer period and, until this “deepening” of the Community is

* C. Benedetti (2000), “Legitimacy and Democracy in the European Union: Challenges for Integration in the 21" Century”, Paper presented to the European Association Third Biennial Meeting, Quebec City, July 30.

Community

Studies

“J. Fischer, (2090), “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of

European Integration”, Speech delivered at Humboldt University, Berlin, May 12. * DaCook (2000), “Is Europe Integrating or Disintegrating?”, Globe and Mail, July 17, p.

404

i

achieved, further expansion of the membership would seem unadvisable but counterproductive and potentially destructive.

to be not only

References Behiels M. (ed.) (1989), The Meech Lake Primer, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa. Cairns A., Courtney J. er. al, Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism: Canadian

and

Comparative Perspectives.

Cairns A. and Williams C. (1985), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada, Royal Commission on Economic Union, vol. 33, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Gregg A. and Posner M. (1993), The Big Picture, McFarland, Walter and Ross, Toronto.

Gross Feliks (1999), Citizenship and Ethnicity, Greenwood Press, Westport. Gwynn R. (1980), The Northern Magus, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto. Ignatieff M. (1994), Blood and Belonging, Penguin Books, Toronto. Jackson and Jackson (1986), Politics in Canada, Prentice Hall, Scarbrough. Jeffrey B. (1991), Breaking Faith: the Mulroney Legacy, Key Porter, Toronto. Jeffrey B. (1993), Strange Bedfellows, Trying Times: The 1992 Referendum, Key Porter, Toronto. Jeffrey B. (1999), Hard Right Turn: The New Face of Neoconservatism in Canada, Harper Collins, Toronto. Kaplan W. (1985), Belonging: The Meaning of Canadian Citizenship, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal.

Kymlicka W. (1999), Multicultural Citizenship, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston. McBride S. and Shields J. (1993), Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax. Michelman H. and Soldatos P. (1994), European Integration: Theories and Approaches, University Press of America, New York.

Neunreither K. and Wiener A. (2000), European Integration after Amsterdam, University Press, Oxford.

O'Neill M. (1996), The Politics of European Integration, Routledge, New York. Siendentrop L. (2000), Democracy in Europe, Penguin Press, London. Stevenson Garth (1989), Unfulfilled Union, Gage Publishing, Toronto. Trudeau P. E. (1993), Memoirs, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto. Trudeau P. E. (1968), Federalism and the French Canadians, Macmillan, Toronto. Vipond Robert (1991), Liberty and Community, SUNY Press, Albany.

405

Oxford

DIRETTIVE E ARMONIZZAZIONE Francesco MUNARI Universita di Genova, Italia

1. Considerazioni introduttive

L’omogeneità degli ordinamenti giuridici, notoriamente, è fondamentale per l'integrazione: questo vale in tutti i campi, ma è senz’altro vero nel settore economico. Armonizzazione significa creazione di un sistema normativo ispirato a principi uniformi (quantomeno nella loro essenzialità, il che non vuol dire necessariamente unificazione normativa interna), conoscenza delle norme da parte degli operatori, quindi certezza dell’ambiente normativo in cui i soggetti comunitari operano ed effettuano le proprie transazioni, quindi facilitazione forte degli scambi ed integrazione dei mercati nazionali. Per altro verso, e come meglio vedremo innanzi, l’armonizzazione è fondamentale nella logica d’apertura e liberalizzazione dei mercati, perché rende omogenee le condizioni operative delle imprese, evita un’indesiderata “competizione tra ordinamenti” ed il rischio di forme di c.d. concorrenza al ribasso. Per questo, non stupisce che il Trattato CE abbia da tempo individuato nel ravvicinamento delle disposizioni (nazionali) uno degli obiettivi dell’azione comunitaria, sia pur “nella misura necessaria al funzionamento del mercato comune”:

così, infatti, recita l’art. 3H

CE. Quindi,

nella logica originaria del

Trattato, l’armonizzazione è “ancella” dell’integrazione dei mercati nazionali. In realtà, i motivi e gli scopi dell’armonizzazione sono noti, soprattutto per quel che riguarda la materia economica: l'armonizzazione è infatti necessaria al fine di realizzare il pieno godimento delle libertà fondamentali del Trattato, equiparando le condizioni d’accesso ai mercati nei vari Stati membri, e quindi rendendo possibile l’integrazione dei mercati nazionali. Per questo,

sul piano sistematico,

ad ogni libertà enunciata

dal Trattato

si

accompagnano previsioni relative al “coordinamento” delle disposizioni nazionali, e cioè, in senso improprio, alla “armonizzazione” delle stesse.

Ma con specifico riferimento proprio all’armonizzazione, il Trattato CE si è da tempo dotato di una disciplina molto precisa, e sempre più completa via via che il Trattato subiva le varie modifiche a partire dall’Atto Unico, a Maastricht, ad Amsterdam: il capo 3 del titolo VI del Trattato si occupa infatti specificamente del ravvicinamento delle legislazioni.

406

Quanto sopra ha assunto importanza soprattutto a valle e sulla scorta della nota giurisprudenza comunitaria varata fin dalla sentenza Cassis de Dijon (e cioé la nota formula combinata della rule of reason, ovvero il test di necessarietà, di non

discriminazione,

di proporzionalità

e non

duplicazione),

al fine

di evitare

l’introduzione, da parte degli Stati membri, di limitazioni alle libertà fondamentali

previste dal Trattato, funzionali alla protezione di quegli interessi imperativi propri dei singoli Stati membri che possono legittimamente ostare al pieno dispiegamento della libera circolazione delle merci, dei servizi e delle persone. Infatti, e sempre semplificando, solo fino a quando il legislatore comunitario non è intervenuto mediante regole di armonizzazione gli Stati membri possono avere spazi di intervento derogatori del godimento delle libertà fondamentali. Dopo l'armonizzazione, invece, il regime è fissato (sia pur nei principi) a livello comunitario, e gli obiettivi di liberalizzazione e integrazione dei mercati previsti a livello comunitario possono raggiungersi senza ulteriori restrizioni.

2. I “tipi” e le “tecniche” dell’armonizzazione comunitaria In sintesi, il Trattato conosce due essenziali tipologie di armonizzazione. Vi è, anzitutto, un’armonizzazione definita “negativa” la quale si sostanzia in un intervento statale “disapplicativo” di norme interne capaci di impedire la formazione e l’integrazione del mercato. In tale ottica, infatti, sono da leggersi tutte le disposizioni del Trattato che impongono agli Stati membri di astenersi dal mantenere in vigore una determinata legislazione o dal porre in essere una particolare azione. Esempio paradigmatico di tale strumento è rappresentato dalla formulazione originaria degli ex articoli 12 (oggi art. 25), oltre a 13 e 14, oggi ambedue abrogati, i quali oltre a fissare la regola di stand still imponevano una progressiva riduzione dei dazi doganali. È facile comprendere come tale sistema di integrazione possa essere efficacemente utilizzato solo in presenza di normative nazionali che (i) da un lato prevedono semplici limitazioni (od aggravi) ad un facere non nazionale e (ii) dall’altro intervengono in settori non “bisognosi” di regolamentazione sostanziale. Viceversa, il ricorso a tale strumento risulta inutilizzabile ogni qual volta le differenti legislazioni interne disciplinano fattispecie non solamente da un punto di vista strumentale alla loro circolazione (divieti di importazione, limitazioni all’utilizzo di beni o servizi non nazionali) ma anche da un punto di vista sostanziale in considerazione proprio della peculiarità della fattispecie sottoposta a regolamentazione. Relativamente a tale ipotesi risulta allora necessario non solamente un intervento omissivo da parte degli Stati membri (ovvero dei loro organi in sede di applicazione del diritto nazionale) ma anche una “azione positiva” a livello comunitario al fine di porre in essere una disciplina uniforme (quantomeno a livello di contenuti essenziali, ma sul punto si veda infra) capace di eliminare,

407

conseguentemente,

le divergenze

legislative

ostative

alla realizzazione

del

mercato comune.

Ma a prescindere dai tipi di armonizzazione conosciuti nel diritto comunitario, importanti sono anche le tecniche di armonizzazione. Al riguardo, la prassi ne conosce numerose tipologie, talora presenti anche all’interno della stessa direttiva. Si ha, infatti:

a) una armonizzazione completa, che non è unificazione del diritto (perché gli Stati membri sono vincolati ad un risultato, potendo raggiungerlo in vari modi), e in casi di che lascia tuttavia spazi di intervento agli Stati membri emergenza/eccezionali. E il caso, ad esempio, delle direttive in materia di additivi sui mangimi alimentari;

b) una armonizzazione opzionale, che consente all'impresa che intende offrire propri beni (o servizi) in Stati membri diversi da quello di origine di adeguarsi o alle norme comunitarie, o a quelle dello Stato membro di destinazione. È il caso, ad esempio, della direttiva sulle emissioni sonore dei veicoli a motore;

c) una armonizzazione parziale, che vale soltanto per gli scambi intracomunitari, e non invece per le transazioni domestiche (esempi, direttiva sul commercio di carni fresche, o vecchie norme in tema di spedizioni di rifiuti pericolosi);

d) una armonizzazione alternativa, ove la norma comunitaria prevede due modalità alternative di pervenire ad un medesimo risultato (trattasi invero di ipotesi piuttosto rara);

e) una armonizzazione minima, che è quella fondamentale, e per cui vale la pena soffermarvisi. .

Nella lunga battaglia svoltasi a livello di evoluzione del diritto comunitario tra liberalizzazione

e armonizzazione,

e

cioé

tra

coloro

che

richiedevano

una

preventiva armonizzazione del diritto nazionale quale condizione per l’apertura dei mercati e l’eliminazione di ogni restrizione al commercio intracomunitario, e coloro che invece — in forza del principio di diretta applicabilita del diritto comunitario stesso — escludevano tale forma di pregiudizialita, la sfida era perdente

per l’armonizzazione, avendo la Corte di Giustizia espressamente optato per la seconda

delle

due

alternative.

A

tale riguardo,

occorre

sottolineare

che

tale

impostazione era in effetti necessaria al fine di garantire effettivita al diritto comunitario (quantomeno a quello primario) in assenza di azione positiva da parte degli Stati membri in seno al Consiglio in ordine alla produzione di norme di armonizzazione. La diversa affermazione per cui la liberalizzazione del mercato avrebbe necessitato una previa armonizzazione delle legislazioni avrebbe viceversa

408

comportato (alla luce della lentezza della procedura decisionale comunitaria) la paralisi del processo integrativo. D'’altro canto, si erano viste le impossibilità pratiche di funzionamento dell’art. 94 CE (ex art. 100) (armonizzazione totale), sia per l’unanimità, sia per l’eccessiva ambizione di questo strumento. La svolta si ebbe così nel “famoso” Consiglio europeo di Milano del 1985, e col varo, in tale occasione, del programma del mercato unico/interno, dell’ Atto

Unico Europeo e del nuovo art. 95 CE: l’armonizzazione non doveva essere più totale, essendo sufficiente anche una armonizzazione minima, e all’unanimità degli Stati membri per l’adozione di norme di armonizzazione si era sostituito il criterio di maggioranza. Grazie a questo strumento è stato quindi varato un enorme programma di armonizzazione, larga parte del quale integra quell’acquis communautaire di cui parleremo anche in seguito, nel quale, tuttavia, e proprio in relazione

alla strettissima

relazione

tra liberalizzazione

ed armonizzazione,

la

produzione legislativa comunitaria ha conosciuto direttive basate sugli artt. 94 e 95 CE di differente tipologia: così, accanto a direttive di mera armonizzazione (destinate solamente a rendere più efficace il mercato unico), sono state emanate direttive di “armonizzazione con effetti liberalizzanti in materia di libera circolazione delle merci” (è il tipico caso del principio dell’equal burden, noto alla giurisprudenza Cassis de Dijon), di “armonizzazione con effetti di riconoscimento” (è il caso delle direttive in materia di riconoscimento dei diplomi al fine di accesso alle professioni), nonché di “armonizzazione con effetto liberalizzante in materia di servizi e stabilimento” (è il caso delle direttive che prevedono una disciplina uniforme relativa all’esercizio di una data attività).

3. In particolare, la c.d. armonizzazione minima Per la sua diffusione e la sua capacità di modificare sensibilmente le prospettive iniziali da cui muoveva l’originale progetto di omogeneizzazione degli ordinamenti nazionali, appare particolarmente importante, come si accennava, il fenomeno della c.d. armonizzazione minima: essa, com’è noto, presuppone che la norma armonizzatrice si occupi soltanto degli elementi essenziali di una determinata materia, fermo il diritto degli Stati membri di introdurre norme più stringenti nei confronti soprattutto dei soggetti stabiliti nei medesimi. Ma l’importanza dell’armonizzazione

minima sta nella circostanza secondo cui, una volta che un

soggetto/impresa comunitario abbia rispettato i requisiti minimi posti dal proprio ordinamento di origine per lo svolgimento di una determinata attività economica, egli può svolgere tale attività in qualsiasi altro Stato membro in forza del principio del c.d. mutuo riconoscimento, e fatte salve le eccezioni specialissime previste a livello di Trattato. Ad esempio, per quel che riguarda la libera circolazione delle merci, quanto previsto all’art. 30 CE (già art. 36): protezione della moralità pubblica,

dell’interesse

pubblico,

della

409

tutela

della

salute

e della

vita, della

proprietà intellettuale, del patrimonio artistico archeologico, ecc., ma senza che tali misure possano essere un mezzo di discriminazione arbitraria, né una restrizione dissimulata al commercio tra Stati membri. Sul piano strutturale e dei contenuti, una direttiva di armonizzazione minima risulta solitamente così configurata: a) si individua innanzitutto l’ambito di applicazione della direttiva stessa, e cioè la materia oggetto di armonizzazione; b) si identificano le restrizioni esistenti a livello di legislazione degli Stati membri che debbono essere soppresse in funzione del godimento delle libertà fondamentali; c) si individuano le modalità di espletamento delle attività di cui trattasi secondo, appunto, criteri di armonizzazione “minima” (o, nel caso di professione, si individuano i criteri di abilitazione “minima” dei soggetti interessati); e infine d) si individuano i casi in cui — di norma eccezionalmente — gli Stati membri possono introdurre ancora restrizioni al godimento dei diritti di svolgimento delle attività “armonizzate” su scala comunitaria, e le condizioni in presenza delle quali dette restrizioni sono consentite. Il fenomeno dell’armonizzazione minima implica, evidentemente, il permanere

di norme differenziate a livello di singoli ordinamenti nazionali, e quindi la possibilità di competizione tra i medesimi, in funzione degli “standard” minimi che ciascuno di essi intende porre in sede di attuazione delle direttive di cui trattasi. Il che, correlativamente,

determina

anche diversità nelle condizioni

di accesso

ai

mercati e/o alle professioni — e di svolgimento delle rilevanti attività post-accesso — per le imprese e per i cittadini comunitari e, conseguentemente, condizioni differenziate di competitività per i soggetti/imprese comunitarie a seconda del loro ordinamento di origine. Questa situazione può implicare anche la creazione di casi di c.d. discriminazione

a rovescio,

qualora

cioè, all’interno

di un

determinato

Stato

membro, l’esercizio di una determinata attività sia reso più difficile ai soggetti in esso stabiliti (a motivo delle più stringenti condizioni esistenti nello Stato medesimo) rispetto ai soggetti che, provenienti da altri Stati membri (in cui l’accesso al mercato e/o lo svolgimento delle attività armonizzate è soggetto a standard meno rigorosi), entrano in competizione coi primi fruendo del c.d. mutuo riconoscimento. Tali forme di discriminazione a rovescio non rilevano ai fini del diritto comunitario, trattandosi, secondo quanto ormai costantemente affermato anche dalla Corte di Giustizia, di conseguenze puramente “interne” dell’applicazione di principi e norme comunitarie. Tuttavia, stanti gli effetti sicuramente indesiderati a livello di Stati membri che subiscono tale discriminazione inversa, sono i giudici nazionali (specie a livello costituzionale) che, soprattutto negli ultimi tempi, hanno cominciato ad individuare rimedi di diritto interno volti ad eliminare tali discriminazioni, ad esempio applicando il principio di eguaglianza, tutelato a livello costituzionale, quale strumento per rimuovere dall’ordinamento interno vincoli normativi allo svolgimento di determinate attività economiche che, proprio a seguito dell’armonizzazione (e della liberalizzazione) avevano perso la loro ratio originaria per assumere

410

esclusivamente la natura di regola discriminante i cittadini rispetto ad altri soggetti comunitari. Al riguardo, va ricordata un’importante sentenza della nostra Corte Costituzionale in tema di norme interne per la produzione di pasta alimentare (assai più rigorose delle omologhe disposizioni in vigore in altri Stati membri), il cui effetto, a seguito di armonizzazione e liberalizzazione, con conseguente accesso sul mercato italiano di pasta prodotta in altri Stati membri sulla base di standard assai inferiori ai nostri, non era più la protezione dei consumatori e/o la preservazione di standard qualitativi elevati, ma finiva per discriminare esclusivamente i produttori italiani rispetto a quelli di altri Stati comunitari. Tale discriminazione inversa è stata considerata idonea ad integrare una violazione del principio costituzionale di eguaglianza e, come tale, sanzionata dalla Corte Costituzionale.

4. Gli effetti positivi dell’armonizzazione sistema comunitario

minima nell’evoluzione del

Ma al di là delle problematiche relative alla discriminazione inversa, cui si è appena accennato, non può esservi dubbio sulla circostanza che, sul piano comunitario, la procedura e gli istituti di cui all’art. 95 CE abbiano avuto un notevole successo. Le ragioni di questo successo possono essere così sintetizzate: a) in primo luogo, per il ricorso al particolare strumento giuridico della direttiva, che è un atto legislativo di natura teleologica, rispettoso sia (i) della sussidiarietà dell’azione comunitaria rispetto a quella degli Stati membri, sia (ii) della necessità di garantire agli Stati stessi un (più o meno) ampio margine di discrezionalità al fine di adattare, secondo autonome modalità di intervento, le necessità comunitarie con le peculiarità ed i bisogni nazionali;

b) in secondo luogo, per il meccanismo decisionale adottato: l’abbandono del sistema dell’unanimità in favore della maggioranza ha infatti “imposto” agli Stati membri quei ragionevoli compromessi che non sarebbero stati possibili partendo dal presupposto dell’esistenza di un diritto di veto su qualsiasi proposta. Tale essenziale dato strategico ha così consentito una cospicua produzione normativa, di cui ha in sostanza beneficiato l’obiettivo dell’integrazione comunitaria; c) in terzo luogo, per l’esistenza, all’interno di ciascuna armonizzazione minima adottata ex art. 95 CE, di un sistema

direttiva di di eccezioni

sollevabili ex post dai singoli Stati membri, le quali, consentono loro di sospendere il mutuo riconoscimento, al fine di tutelare particolari situazioni eccezionali, essendo tuttavia tale potestà assoggettata al controllo della Commissione e degli altri Stati membri, onde evitare abusi.

411

Tale più snella procedura ex post e caso per caso ha reso tra l’altro del tutto inutile la complicatissima procedura prevista ai paragrafi 4 ss. dell’art. 95 CE, procedura peraltro ulteriormente aggravata dalle modifiche alla disposizione di cui trattasi

contenute

nel

Trattato

di Amsterdam,

che

prevedeva

una

sorta

di

“eccezione anticipatoria” e con portata generale rispetto al varo di singole direttive di armonizzazione minima, la cui farraginosità e problematicità ha, in definitiva,

segnato in virtù membri singole salvezza Ma

l’insuccesso delle disposizioni qui accennate. Quanto sopra probabilmente soprattutto del principio di maggioranza, che spingendo invece gli Stati a negoziati “aperti” e “leali” in sede di predisposizione del testo delle direttive, ha anche escluso l’opportunità di impiegare la clausola di di cui ai paragrafi 4 ss. dell’art. 95 CE. non basta. Va ricordato

che l’armonizzazione,

nei settori più sensibili,

sanità, sicurezza, protezione, ambiente e consumatori, è sia espressamente prevista come obbligatoriamente basata “su un livello di protezione elevato”, sia, comunque, di carattere “minimo”, nel significato sopra chiarito, con la potestà, quindi, per gli Stati membri, di introdurre norme più stringenti, sia pur applicabili ai soli soggetti stabiliti.

5. Armonizzazione e integrazione europea La realizzazione del mercato interno è oggi un fatto compiuto. Ci si può tuttavia chiedere se, stante la ratio originaria dell’armonizzazione come veicolo per il completamento del mercato unico (art. 3H CE), la funzione ed il ruolo di tale

strumento si sia oggi esaurito. La risposta,

a mio

avviso,

è negativa:

ancora

una

volta, infatti, il diritto

comunitario è andato al di là delle aspettative e delle prospettive che, rispetto a L’ambito e l’estensione dell’armonizzazione hanno infatti generato — o quantomeno contribuito largamente a generare — un fenomeno molto importante, quello del c.d. acquis communautaire. Ma questo acquis, in realtà, ha assunto toni e colorazioni molto al di là di un semplice corpus di norme “necessarie al funzionamento del mercato comune”. Ha creato, in realtà, una coscienza comune, un corpo di diritti comuni che necessariamente incidono nei processi sociali, culturali e nella stessa creazione di

un fascio di diritti e doveri “europei”: questo emerge in modo evidente soprattutto dopo il 1992, quando cioè, raggiunto il mercato unico, la “missione” dell’armonizzazione doveva ritenersi conclusa. La portata di questo fenomeno si può osservare da un particolare angolo visuale: quello del singolo Stato membro e del cittadino che esamina l’evoluzione . del propriu sistema giuridico nel tempo, e progressivamente allo sviluppo del sistema comunitario. E questo vale, in particolare, per Stati come l’Italia: si pensi,

412

ad esempio, alla liberalizzazione dei mercati, o alle privatizzazioni: questi importanti sviluppi del nostro diritto dell’economia come sono generalmente percepiti come provenienti dal contesto europeo. E tuttavia, credo che la percezione dei predetti sviluppi come “necessaria al funzionamento del mercato comune” sia seriamente da escludersi. Ancora più emblematica é la disciplina relativa alla tutela dei consumatori, o

alle regole sulla sicurezza nei luoghi di lavoro, agli standard di sicurezza dei prodotti di largo consumo (elettrodomestici, giocattoli, materiali di costruzione, macchine, ecc.). Anche questo complesso e nutrito fascio di regole proviene dall’ordinamento comunitario, cambia sensibilmente il modo di essere e il modo di

vivere di tutti i cittadini, ma non viene affatto percepito come “necessario al funzionamento del mercato comune”, essendo ormai piuttosto incardinato in una “coscienza giuridica” europea che ritiene come fondamentale l’impiego di standard elevati a protezione delle persone, dei consumatori, dei lavoratori.

Potrei andare

avanti con molti esempi.

Si pensi al fenomeno

del mutuo

riconoscimento (che é il naturale pendant dell’armonizzazione), ed anzi, realizza di

per

sé una

riconoscimento

forma

di armonizzazione

sui generis:

il concetto

del

mutuo

è chiaro. Cosi, ad esempio, direttive sul mutuo riconoscimento

hanno posto dei parametri normativi che cambiano profondamente la cultura e la società, anche in settori che non sono immediatamente percepibili come “comunitari”: la direttiva 89/48 sul riconoscimento dei diplomi di istruzione superiore ha a suo tempo posto un principio chiave, e cioè l’obbligo degli Stati membri di riconoscere (in linea di massima) come equipollenti ai propri titoli di studio basati su percorsi formativi triennali. A distanza di qualche anno, tale principio è stato non solo recepito come funzionale al recepimento della direttiva, ma si è trasfuso in qualcos’altro: il corso di laurea triennale è diventato il parametro fondamentale per la riforma dell’università in Italia, perdendo quindi la sua valenza di norma funzionale al mutuo riconoscimento, per diventare principio puramente interno, ma al contempo comune a tutti gli Stati membri. Anche sotto questo profilo, quindi, non è sbagliato desumerne che l’armonizzazione genera effetti ed evocazioni ben più ampie del suo scopo “originale” di mero strumento di integrazione dei mercati.

6. La dimensione prospettica dell’armonizzazione Con qualche ottimismo, quindi, si può cominciare a pensare che l’armonizzazione e il corrispondente acquis communautaire — largamente realizzati grazie allo strumento della direttiva — siano diventati grandi, e si siano distaccati dalla lettera dell’art. 3H CE, per assumere, come detto, il ruolo di strumento forse

“umile”, ma centrale nella creazione dell’Europa. Qualche indizio sulla probabile verosimiglianza di quanto precede si comincia, del resto, a vedere.

413

Ad esempio, norme di armonizzazione sono previste anche in settori “nuovi

299

del diritto comunitario, che assai difficilmente possono considerarsi connessi al “mercato comune”, a meno di non accettare una concezione di “mercato” come sinonimo di “società”: le materie del nuovo titolo IV (visti, asilo, immigrazione e politiche connesse con la libera circolazione delle persone), introdotte dal Trattato di Amsterdam, debbono essere disciplinate prevedendo l’adozione di “misure” comuni per realizzare un corpo di norme europee in materie senz’altro importanti, e in prospettiva di importanza crescente. E se è vero quello che diceva la dottrina più attenta relativamente alle omologhe disposizioni dell’articolo 95 CE (ex art. 100A), in queste misure possono rientrare sia direttive, che regolamenti,

quindi

implicando o meno attività normativa da parte degli Stati membri, ed essendo possibile anche una armonizzazione non completa. Ma anche il nuovo testo del Trattato sull’Unione europea come modificato da quello di Amsterdam, sia pur in misura minore, conosce norme specifiche in tema di armonizzazione: in tema di terzo pilastro, cooperazione di polizia giudiziaria é in materia penale, le “norme

minime”

in materia di ravvicinamento

del diritto

penale degli Stati membri (artt. 29 e 31E CE), oltre alle “decisioni quadro” di cui all’art. 34, che sono in sostanza delle direttive, sia pur adottate all’unanimità (ma

qui non può dimenticarsi la debolezza dell’impianto di produzione giuridica del terzo pilastro rispetto al primo, tuttora assimilabile in sostanza ad una fonte di natura intergovernativa). Non solo. Il tema dell’acquis communautaire — che abbiamo visto essere un fondamentale risultato dell’armonizzazione — è diventato centrale in tutto il sistema UE, il cui Trattato, sia relativamente al primo che al terzo pilastro, ripetutamente considera il rispetto di tale acquis come parametro fondamentale dello sviluppo e della crescita europea (si pensi alle regole in tema di cooperazione rafforzata, molto citata in questi ultimi tempi, la quale non può comunque pregiudicare in alcun modo l’acquis communautarie riguardante tutti gli Stati membri). È questo un risultato eccezionale dell’azione comunitaria nei decenni, specie nell’ottica deli’allargamento dell’Europa a nuovi Stati, i quali, come si suole dire, entreranno in Europa solo a condizione di aver recepito, nei loro ordinamenti, e cioè nella loro coscienza giuridica — e sociale — quell’insieme di regole e principi la cui applicazione, gradualmente quanto inesorabilmente, ha avvicinato molto i cittadini e i popoli della Comunità e dell’Unione europea. In un periodo di grandi discussioni e grandi progetti sul futuro dell’Europa, forse talora così ambiziosi da essere difficilmente a portata di mano,

continuo a

ritenere che questo “umile” strumento dell’armonizzazione, tutto sommato, offra un servizio ... di sicura qualità per la causa europea.

414

Riferimenti bibliografici Adam

(1993),

“Il diritto

del mercato

interno:

l’art.

100A

e l’armonizzazione

delle

legislazioni”, Riv. dir. eur., pp. 681-725. Bailey (1999), “Flexibility, Harmonisation and the Single Market in EU Environmental Policy: the Packaging Waste Directive”, Journal! Of Common Market Studies, pp. 549SAI Baratta (1993), “L’equivalenza delle normative nazionali ai sensi dell’art. 100B del Trattato

CE”, Riv. dir. eur., pp. 727-763. Candelario Macias (1999), “L’armonizzazione del diritto concorsuale nell’ambito dell’ UE”,

Il diritto fallimentare e delle società commerciali, pp. 358-383. Capelli (1983), Le direttive comunitarie, Milano.

Comelli (1998), “L’armonizzazione fiscale e lo strumento della Direttiva comunitaria in relazione al sistema dell’IVA”, Diritto e pratica tributaria, pp. 1590-1616. Cordini (1993), “L’ambiente nel diritto dell’Unione Europea”, Dir. ec., pp. 69-82. Ehlermann (1987), “The Internal Market Following the Single European Act”, CMLRev., p. 370. Fichera (1997), “L’armonizzazione delle accise”, Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienze delle finanze, pp. 216-257. Forwood (1986), “The Single European Act and Free Movement”, European Law Review, p. 385. Gratani (1995), “Misure restrittive nazionali e misure di armonizzazione adottate a livello comunitario in campo ambientale”, Riv. giur. ambiente, pp. 51-54. Kur (1996), “Harmonization of the trade mark laws in Europe: results and open questions”, Rivista di diritto industriale, pp. 227-246.

Lewinski (1998), “A Successful Step towards Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Age: The new EC Proposal for a Harmonisation Directive”, European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 135-139. Pomelli (1998), “L’armonizzazione fiscale e lo strumento della direttiva comunitaria in relazione al sistema IVA”, in Diritto e pratica tributaria, p. 1590.

Rigamonti (1998), “Armonizzazione fiscale: la proposta di direttiva sull’imposizione minima effettiva dei redditi da risparmio”, // Diritto dell’Unione Europea, pp. 961-966. Saulle (1989), “L’armonizzazione in Europa: dal Trattato di Roma all’Atto Unico Europeo”, Rivista di diritto europeo, p. 321. Villani (1992), “Ravvicinamento delle legislazioni e mutuo riconoscimento nell’Atto Unico Europeo”, Jus, p. 180.

415

FROM REPRESENTATIVES TO DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS OF INCLUSION IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM Maria PELUSO’ Concordia University of Montreal, Canada

1. Introduction

Often when companies or governments have achieved levels of scale economy in their production process through expert systems, such as information technology and advanced logistic strategies, they turn their attention to Human Resources. Fully utilising their human capital helps to raise the level of efficiency, competitiveness, and the necessary innovation to retain leadership positions. An outstanding feature that identifies this era is the diversity of the global marketplace. Diversity in gender, demography, age, religion, culture, knowledge level, and disabilities. Organizations in both the public and private sectors are microcosms of this new socio-economic development. By managing diversity, organizations may increase corporate profits by enabling every employee to fully contribute and develop to his or her professional potential, that is, in line with corporate objectives. While globalization shrinks the work into one single global village it in no way standardises the various behaviour of its people in the different regions and countries. Diversity policies must be adapted to the realities of each region and country such as those in the European Union, NAFTA or any other aggregate trading or political cluster. A growing body of research indicates that like diversity, a corporation’s reputation has clear implications for its bottom line. For example, a recent study by Environics International found that 40% of consumers respond negatively to actions by a company perceived as not socially responsible. One in five also reported avoiding a company’s product or urging others to do the same on similar grounds. Among Americans surveyed, only 11% said they thought that focus of a company should be making money, creating jobs or paying taxes. By contrast, 35% said companies should set high ethical standards and work on creating a better society for all. Another new study by the Reputation Institute and Harris Interactive supports the idea that a visible commitment to communities and employees will pay "I am indebted to the fine work of Danald Lenihan in the presentation of this paper and many other studies done to measure the importance of diversity in both the public and

private sectors.

416

dividends when it comes to consumer loyalty and the public’s general opinion of a company. With this in mind, it is not surprising that many companies that score high marks for corporate reputation also earn accolades for their commitment to diversity. For example, in this year’s Fortune magazine list of the 50 “Best Companies for Minorities” there are several companies that also appear within the top 20 Reputation Institutes’ rankings. Some examples are Wal-Mart, Lucent, IBM, AT&T and Xerox.

There is a similar correlation between the names that appear on the Reputation Institutes’ rankings and those that appear on Working Mother’s Magazine’s “100 Best Companies for Working Mothers”. The working mother’s list is determined based on the women-friendly aspects of diversity, particularly a company’s leave policy for new mothers, its childcare programs and its work/life balance initiatives. What is significant is that IBM, Xerox, Lucent, etc. pop up again in several surveys on diversity and consumer satisfaction. The following paper addresses several ideas about diversity, democracy and consumer satisfaction. It has three principal tasks: 1) to explore the conceptual parameters of a culture of inclusiveness or diversity; 2) to suggest practical directions for research into the development of a new performance-based tool for promoting inclusiveness in public administration; 3) to pose some questions that may stimulate debate within the broader public policy community and move the discussions forward. The paper has three main parts. Section 2 and 3 are the most conceptual. They examine issues around promoting a culture of diversity or inclusiveness by analyzing two arguments in favour of diversity. Section 4 considers the current environment in the public administration Canada and why the timing may be good for a new approach to diversity.

2. The traditional approach to representativeness 2.1 Numbers as the key indicator Over a quarter century ago, the Government of Canada undertook to promote greater equality within its public service. Efforts have been focused on four main groups: Aboriginal people, women, persons with disabilities and visible minority people. A principal tool has been the Employment Equity Act. Since the beginning, the federal approach has relied heavily on counts of the numbers of people from the various target groups represented in public service jobs. Underlying it is the following question: does the number of Aboriginal people, women, persons with disabilities or visible minority people occupying positions in the public service correspond to their share of the population? On first blush, the numbers

as an indicator are attractive because it seems

simple, objective and democratic. First, we count what part of the population has,

417

say, a disability. Then we count how many persons with disabilities occupy positions in the public service. If the numbers are too far apart, we take steps to align them on the following democratic grounds. In a democracy, all citizens have an equal right to be heard by their governments. Insofar as their real needs are linked to membership in a social, cultural or racial group, their commitment to developing policies and programs that address these needs may not be shared by others or may be treated as such a low priority that it is never acted on. For example, while providing more funds for the new Aboriginal public television network could have significant benefits for Aboriginal communities in Canada, their members may ultimately worry that nonAboriginal decision makers will have other priorities, thus viewing the project as a good idea for another day - which never arrives. Some correspondence between population share and presence in position of authority - representativeness -- is indeed to guard against situations in which the special interests of subgroups are repeatedly, if inadvertently, trumped by those of the majority. Over the years, representation reflecting population share has become the key indicator of true equality in the public service. But is this kind of representativeness a reliable indicator of true equality? The answer is no, for at least two reasons. First, the criteria for deciding who is a member of these groups can be controversial. Who should be classified as a Status Indian, for example, is a subject

of serious debate. The same is true for persons with disabilities and visible minority peoples. Perhaps the only designated group where membership is clear is women. Moreover, persons can only be identified as a member of one of these groups if they choose to identify themselves as such. If achieving representation based on population share relies on government records, then it will be unclear just how many members of the public service really are from these groups. Second, even if representativeness could be determined with greater accuracy, numbers alone still would not provide a reliable measure of real equality. We can see why by considering a traditional problem in the theory and practice of democracy.

2.2 The argument from democracy: distinguishing between structure and culture It is now widely accepted that the principle of “one person, one Vote” is a lessthan-perfect guarantee of genuine democracy. For example, when a single individual controls too much of the press, he or she can use their influence to

interfere with fair an open public debate, say, by choosing to cover only the issues he or she regards as deserving of public attention. This not only distorts public debate, it undermines the legitimacy of the processes and institutions on which

418

democracy rests. In response, developed democracies now protect themselves from such distortions by regulating media ownership. Democracy thus assumes that citizens have a meaningful opportunity to voice concerns. Without this, public debate is not truly representative and the decisions that result are likely to reflect the interest of a minority rather than that of the general public. But democracy also assumes that citizens regard their public institutions and processes as fair. Without this, they will lack legitimacy. Ensuring the opportunity to voice concerns and nurturing the belief that they will be heard and duly considered are basic conditions of a healthy and effective democracy. Although the two are interdependent, they are not the same. One refers to how the institutions and processes of government are designed, the other to how attitudes and beliefs about them affect their use. One is about the structure of government, the other about the culture that pervades it. To be viewed as legitimate, democratic institutions and processes must be regarded as fair and equitable at both levels. Although the quantitative approach helps to ensure that the structure of government is representative, like the “one person, one vote” principle, it is less-than-perfect guarantee that the culture around

it will be. Why? Decision-making is public institutions like public services is a complex process with many forms. It can be more or less decentralized, more or less formalized,

open and transparent; involve more or less consultation with stakeholders or the general public. In most organizations decision-making processes are only partly codified, leaving ample room for judgements rooted in discriminatory attitudes. Even the most formalized practices, such as budget and auditing processes, program evaluation techniques, and procedures for policy development and review, have all sorts of informal practices attached that can affect the outcome. These can range from a regular lunch where “insiders” gossip, exchange views or cultivate a shared sense of humour, to the selective sharing or important background documents or information. Institutional practices thus serve as a bridge between an organization’s structure and its culture. They are middle ground where structure and culture meet and merge. Decisions to change them are usually the prerogative of a few senior employees, whose know-how constitutes the authoritative record of the organization’s corporate memory. Their beliefs and attitudes about what works, what is right or effective are viewed as the principal source of its capacity to get things done. This implies that an organization’s culture is a crucial factor in how its decisions are made. An effective decision maker is usually someone who understands “how things work around here” and can use that knowledge to get things done. Although organizations change over time, effective ones usually have a stable culture. Too much change absorbs vast amounts of manager’s time and energy. A certain amount of inertia - resistance to change is usually a healthy part of an

419

effective culture. Individuals who challenge the culture thus are easily seen as ineffective or a problem rather than innovative. This makes them less likely to be valued or praised by colleagues and less likely to be seen as leaders whose unorthodox views deserve attention.

2.3 Limitations of the traditional view Insofar as fairness and equity are an employment goal in the Public Service of Canada, this points to a Catch-22 and the danger of a debilitating selection effect. If an individual from a designated group is inclined to challenge those elements of the culture that disadvantage him/her, that person runs the risk of being labeled ineffective or a problem. On the other hand, if he/she accepts and works within the culture, this increases the individual’s chances of being perceived as effective and a leader. The system is thus titled toward the promotion of minority group members who are most like those (outside the group) who represent the status quo - typically, senior management. This, in turn, can undermine the legitimacy of such a person in the eyes of the group that they are supposed to represent. Hence the backlash against “oreos” in the US (blacks who are “white on the inside”) or “apples” in Canada (Aboriginal persons who are “white on the inside”). There are similar accounts of women who, in an effort to reach and fit into senior management, develop a “no nonsense, hard-headed” persona. As managers, they sometimes go to great lengths to prove that they can “make the hard decisions”, that they “refuse to suffer fools” or that they “have no time for sentimentality”. At the same time, those from Employment Equity groups who do make it into senior ranks without abandoning their differing attitudes and perspectives can face enormous pressures to conform to the existing culture. Recent studies have found that many end up leaving (they might say “being pushed out”) after only a short time. Of course, from the fact that the risk exists of selection effect or pressures to conform, we cannot conclude how far it is actually happening. Whether or how far it is, is a complex, empirical question. A first step in considering how to promote greater fairness and equity in public administration is to examine cases, anecdotes and testimonials in an effort to determine the extent of a selection effect or excessive pressures to conform. In summary, a careful examination of the democracy argument is not only important because it helps us sort out the right thing to do. It also exposes the gap between structure and culture. Moreover, by showing us that numbers alone are not a sufficient indicator to ensure a representative culture, it pushes us to reflect more

carefully on the relationship between three key organizational factors: e e

Structure; Culture;

420

e

The role played by institutional practices like budgeting or policy development in bridging structure and culture. Reflection on the relationship between these three things not only provides a second argument why diversity should be valued as part of the public service culture but suggests another strategy by which it can be promoted.

3. Toward a more inclusive view: the case for diversity 3.1 The argument from organizational effectiveness In recent years, advocates of a more equitable and fair workplace have changed their approach. First of all, they support a more inclusive view of employment equity that includes not only the four traditional groups of Aboriginal peoples, women, persons with disabilities, and visible minority people, but also other groups such as gays and lesbians, single parents or youth. The pursuit of inclusiveness is defended as a good business strategy rather than on democratic or other moral grounds. For example, Thomas and Ely argue that: «(Minority) groups and others outside the mainstream of corporate America... bring different, important, and competitively relevant knowledge and perspectives about how to actually do work - how to design processes, reach goals, frame tasks, create effective teams, communicate ideas, and lead. When allowed to, members of these groups can help companies grow and improve by challenging basic assumptions about an organization’s functions, strategies, operations, practices, and procedures».

In brief, Thomas and Ely provide results from their study to show that a more inclusive workplace promotes effectiveness by making the organization flexible, resourceful, innovative and dynamic. Second, they define inclusion in a way that differs from the Employment Equity approach. Rather than focus on specific groups that are disadvantaged, they adopt a more general view of inclusiveness. They call this condition diversity and define it as “the varied perspectives and approaches to work that members of different identity groups bring”. Finally, though careful non to reject the quantitative approach to representativeness, they view it as “merely the first step managing a divers workforce...” The goal is not to abandon a numbers-based approach but to complement it with the development of a culture that views diversity as an advantage.

421

3.2 Questions around implementation and measurement The arguments and cases presented by Thomas and Ely are compelling. They are also supported by other recent studies. Indeed, the view that promoting a culture of diversity is a good business strategy is fairly common among senior managers in countries like Canada or the US. Nevertheless, serious questions remain about how committed or methodical senior managers are in promoting inclusiveness or diversity. Anecdotes abound of managers who, notwithstanding theist ability to speak articulately on the subject, obviously have failed to appreciate how profoundly their own organizations and decision-making process remain in the grip of a culture of conformity. Others seem more aware of the subtle but important influences of such a culture, but are less sure how to create a new one. How does a manager establish a culture of diversity? Is there a reliable strategy? Does diversity contribute to effectiveness in the same way in all organizations? How do we know when we have it? As a first step toward answering these questions, at least two points can be made. First, suppose the concept of diversity is one day to supplement that of traditional employment equity groups in the Canadian Public Service, and be pursued because

it contributes

to effectiveness.

If so, a reliable

tool or clear

strategy is needed now to start moving us down the road, along with effective indicators to assess progress. It will not be enough for legislators or senior managers to declare that “diversity in pursuit of effectiveness” is the way of the future. We have already seen that, without a plan and reliable measures, even leaders with the best of intentions achieve little. We should recall here the management dictum that “What gets noticed. What gets noticed gets done”. Second, our earlier discussions of institutional practices suggest that the structure of such a tool and its measures is likely to be quite complex. This is in contrast to a numbers-based approach where the means to representativeness (for example, targets) and the measures of success (numbers based on population share) are simple and relatively clear. Why? We saw above that institutional practices are the principal means by which things get done in an organization. It is thus effectiveness that we want to improve through diversity. We also saw that these practices are bridges where the traffic of organizational structure and culture flows back and forth across the gap. Now it is well known that effectiveness is achieved in different ways in different situations and organizations, that what works well in one may not work well in another. If we want to use diversity to improve the effectiveness of institutional practices, then we need a tool that shows how and where standards can be introduced to change attitudes and behaviours that contribute to less effective practices. This raises three key questions: How do we set these standards? Where do we insert them into our practices? And how will we know when we have succeeded?

422

The issues raised by these questions are far-reaching. There is space here only to comment on one, albeit a critical one.

3.3 Contextualizing measures of effectiveness: private vs. public It follows from the above that how the attitudes and behaviours that characterize a culture of diversity contribute to the effectiveness of practices will differ from situation to situation, job to job, or field to field. This is not to say that the behaviours and attitudes that create a culture of diversity change. It is to say that how we view their impact on effectiveness depends on the situation. For example, in the private sector the basic measure of effectiveness is an increase in shareholder value, while in the public sector it lies in promoting the public interest. As a result, a decision, policy or program that is ineffective for one may be optimal for the other. Consider the following case. In a private sector organization, a decision to keep a planed merger secret may be appropriate so competitors do not gain in advantage. In government, a similar decision usually requires public consultation. As public organizations, governments are committed to transparency and openness in a way that private firms are not. The difference between the two decisions thus is determined by considerations that go beyond diversity. It reflects different commitments to promote public and private interest. Diversity is one condition that can affect how the conditions surroundings these commitments are viewed and how competing claims are weighed and acted on. The claim being advanced, then, is that diversity is a generic condition

of effectiveness,

however,

that gets defined.

Because

it is defined

differently in different situations, different measures are needed for the different sectors both for final outcomes and at the various stages of decision-making and implementation. The conclusion we should draw from this is that a tool for promoting and testing diversity must be sensitive to the kind of organization where it will be used. It must show senior managers how promoting new attitudes and behaviours will increase the effectiveness of practices in their organization. Such a tool will be complex. On the one hand, it must promote the (generic) attitudes and behaviours of diversity. That is, it must set the standards that will lead to change. On the other

hand, it must situate these within the structure and culture of a particular kind of organization, showing how these are to be applied to existing practices. As a result, the categories and rules that make up the tool will range in kind from the particular and concrete to the abstract. Further, they will need to be integrated in complex ways that map out a path for reshaping and evaluating key institutional practices. What are the prospects for developing a tool for promoting and measuring diversity in the public sector?

423

3.4 The Trinity Group and the European Network for Social Cohesion: a new tool? In recent years, two major initiatives have been under way that are aimed at developing such a tool in the private sector. The Trinity Group of North America includes representative from over a dozen major companies, including IBM, Ernst and Young and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. The European Network for Social Cohesion has similar caliber of membership from the EC. The ultimate goal of these projects is to develop a structure that can serve as an ISO-type set of standards for diversity. The Trinity Group has already developed a proto-type. It contains hundreds of categories, rules and standards that are integrated in complex ways. On first blush, the sheer complexity of the tool may sound daunting and raise suspicions. How did they fit all these rules and categories together? Will anybody be able to master the use of something that complex? After all, elaborate performance management systems have been developed in the past. All have been found wanting. What is different here? At least two things may have changed. First, the content and logical structure of the tool is the product of a collaborative effort among over a dozen major companies. In joining forces, they have created a larger pool of talent, experience, knowledge and capital from which to draw in developing the product’s content and structure. So, if the challenge is huge, so is the effort to rise to tit. Second, current computer technology has changed the rules of the game. It is now possible to create a single software package that contains the integrates large amounts of information at the stroke of a key. This means that the does much of the hard work of analysis and data integration. The result is a tool that is relatively simple to use but highly sophisticated in its response to a variety of business practices and situations. Certainly much remains to be done and the software package is regarded as only a prototype. But its developers are quick to point out that it is flexible, can easily be improved upon and could be adapted for other uses, such as the public sector. Thus we can expect to see new and more sophisticated versions evolve as the product gets used and experimented with in the workplace. The exciting prospect this raises is that we may be on the verge of a new generation of performance tool! What are the prospects for adapting the Trinity Group’s software package to help promote a culture of diversity within the Public Service of Canada? Here too there is reason to be optimistic. Indeed, this may be very good time to contemplate developing a new performance tool to promote a new culture. Both performance measurement and culture are much on the minds of senior managers.

424

4. The current public sector environment 4.1 The new approach to public sector management Over the last five years, new “results-based” planning and evaluation processes have been introduced in the federal government. They are supposed to leas to more coordinated, effective, transparent and accountable government. If there is a central idea here it is that government has become too focused on “process” (how it does things) and is not focused enough on “outcomes” (the results of what it does). The new approach is intended to correct this. The new approach to planning plays a critical role in government’s efforts to correct this. They do so in at least two ways. First, they commit officials to publicly evaluating and reporting on their policies and programs from the standpoint of the results they produce and the citizens they serve. Second, they require that officials produce and act in accordance with departmental plans that provide the following terms of reference: e aclear statement of the broad outcomes the department aims to achieve; e a clear statement of the core businesses in which it is engaged to achieve the outcomes; a clear statement of the specific objectives of its policies and programs; an analysis of how those policies and programs will achieve the objectives; an analysis of how the objectives, if achieved, will contribute to the broad

outcomes in the plan; e a list of performance indicators that will help assess the effectiveness of policies and programs in achieving their objectives and, ultimately, the outcomes. Taken together, the terms of reference in the plan provide a framework for (1) further planning at sub-departmental levels, and (2) evaluating the effectiveness of policies and programs. How does this make governments more coordinated transparent, effective or accountable? Evaluations are carried out by using the performance indicators in the plan to asses the results of a particular policy in achieving its objectives. Officials are expected to evaluate programs and policies regularly and to adjust them to achieve a better fit with the objectives and outcomes. Results-based management thus assumes a culture of continuous learning, innovation and improvement, a crucial

condition of an effective organization. To the extent that this information is public, the approach makes government more transparent and accountable. Moreover, by committing itself to government-wide outcomes, such as sustainable development, a department is supposed to contribute to a greater integration and coordination of the entire system. If individual departments pursue common goals, adopt the same performance indicators, and use the evaluation results to improve their policies, programs an approach to service delivery, a

425

natural integration and coordination of activity should result. This spreads the task of coordination

around

the system

and, at the same

time, encourages

some

decentralization with respect to policy making and program design and delivery. This departs from the traditional view that system-wide coherence is most effectively achieved from the top down by central authorities such as treasury boards, cabinet secretariats or departments of finance, who shape and maintain a

system of government through a combination of policy directives, rules and regulations. The old model requires a considerable centralization of decisionmaking authority that tends to be controlled by a small group of senior officials. Such groups are not known for their openness to diversity. Notoriously, they tend to be homogeneous and conservative. In contrast, the new decentralized approach allows for greater flexibility in policy making, program design and service delivery methods. In short, it encourages diversity in the way that key institutional practices are defined and executed.

4.2 Finding common cause Over the last five years, the federal government (along with virtually every provincial and most municipal ones) has invested a huge amount of time and resources in changing its basic planning and evaluating practices from an inputbased to a results-based approach. But this sort of management cannot be established by fist. Training employees to use results-based tools is not mechanical. Success requires a high level of personal commitment to the project. Employees must be willing to think through the tasks they undertake, admit and learn from their mistakes, use the tools to refine and improve good programs, and eliminate bad ones. In short, success requires the creation of a genuine learning culture. x The existing public service culture, however, remains rooted in the avoidance

of error. Public servants go to great lengths to avoid making or admitting error for fear of embarrassing the Minister. The result has been a culture that is conservative, secretive and hierarchical, a situation that poses a serious obstacle to the new results-based management. Its introduction therefore has been accompanied by renewed interest among its champions in organizational culture and the prospects for engineering a new, more inclusive culture. Diversity advocates should greet this as excellent news. As the effectiveness argument shows, diversity contributes to a more flexible, dynamic experimental and innovative - i.e. a learning - culture. It follows that advocates of a learning culture should also be advocates of diversity; they should

champion it as a central goal of results-based management and identify diversity as a key measure of their success in establishing the new regime.

426

—

Finally,

let us recall that we

learned

from the democracy

argument

that

diversity makes decision making more inclusive. Clearly, more inclusive decision-making is more democratic. Further, organizations that promote such decision-making within are more democratically accountable to their members and stakeholders. As improving accountability is one of the main goals of results-based management, we conclude that an explicit commitment to diversity would extend and deepen this accountability. In conclusion, the interests of those who advocate for a learning culture and those who advocate for diversity dovetail. This suggests that there is emerging an ideal environment in which to revisit the issue of diversity and perhaps, to experiment with the developing a new performance tool to promote it. This yields three more challenges for advocates of a more inclusive public service: e to promote a wider debate on the view of diversity as a key component of organizational effectiveness; e to forge a closer working relationship between champions of diversity and champions of a learning culture; e to investigate the prospects for developing a performance-based tool to promote a new, more inclusive culture in the public administration.

5. Conclusion: rising to the challenge Enthusiasm for promoting diversity as a public policy goal has waxed and waned over the years. Traditional approaches like Employment Equity have generated many debates and most public sector managers have strong views on the use of such strategies. Less attention has been given to creating a new culture. One reason is that it is a “soft” subject, one whose content is difficult to define and whose effects are hard to determine. Organizational culture is an amorphous thing. Developing an effective strategy to promote a representative culture is a tall order. In its absence, even senior managers with open minds and the best of intentions must rely on practices that perpetuate the existing culture. A call for change thus must be more than just a command that managers make the workplace

most

inclusive,

where

this is said to be something

other than

increasing the numbers. Most would regard this as highbrow management-speak is either over-intellectualized common sense or too vague to be acted on. If we want real change, we need a clearer understanding of why diversity is important, a strategy for promoting commitment to it, and, ideally, a tool for implementing it. This is no small challenge but, as this paper has suggested, we have some new ideas about diversity, what needs to be done and where to start. And there is reason for optimism that progress can be made. The new interest in results-based management creates a bridge between diversity advocates and those with an interest in organizational effectiveness. In addition, the work by the Trinity Group

427

and the European Business Network appear to be breaking a new ground. If a new generation of performance tools is emerging, this needs to be considered from the public sector’s point of view. We need to assess how much of that work is relevant to the public service, what parts can be imported, what parts need to be adapted

and how this adjustment can be made. This paper takes a first step in that direction by attempting to clarify some of the conceptual issues around diversity, poising some challenges that must be met to move ahead and providing a call for action. Much remains to be done. The bottom line is that diversity strengthens corporate reputation and helps build public trust in public administration and in government. After all, diversity affects both the workplace environment and emotional appeal of public policies — the very same indicators that have clearly been shown to be significant in the minds of consumers. There is no doubt that globalization and ongoing fundamental change in global cities and countries guarantees that certain the key elements of change — immigrants, the communities they form, the opportunities they create, and the diversity challenge they pose — will remain at or near the center of policy and political debates throughout the advanced industrial world well into the next century. Diversity will dominate public debate and engage all levels of government spilling across otherwise discrete policy domains (such as various economic and social policy realms), and will include — or at least affect — all of society’s constituent groups. It is my belief that thoughtful and measured responses to diversity in public and private administration will help establish the associated public policy goals of good governance and social peace. The long-term viability of many of our societies in the next century may be more contingent upon solving the issue of inclusion and diversity than most may appreciate. Seeking to understand better such critical concepts as “integration”, “membership”, “citizenship” in increasingly diverse metropolises — always in the context of a country’s unique history or traditions — promises to have the broadest possible appeal to a wide variety of stakeholders and constituencies. Policy makers, corporate executives, and politicians who want to understand better the issue of diversity and its effects on their portfolio — particular in the way they make critical decisions about the allocation of public resources — need to understand the relationships between diversity and democracy, between diversity and consumer satisfaction. It is hoped this paper provided a conceptual framework about diversity but ultimately provided an appreciation about how diversity can advance our democratic traditions of plurality and the freedom of ideas.

428

FEDERALISM: REFLECTIONS UPON THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE Everett PRICE Concordia University of Montreal, Canada

«... The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty... provides against servility, which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of combined opinion. In the same way, it promotes independence by forming definite groups of public opinion, and by affording a great source and centre of political sentiments and of notions of duty not derived from the sovereign will. Liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organisation... the co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation... and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism... The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society... A State which is incompetent to satisfy different races, condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them,

destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government. The theory of nationality, therefore, is a retrograde step in history... A great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity or preserve it by federalism...». Lord John Dalberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, 1862".

1. Introduction

The inspiration for the following reflections on the particularities of the Canadian federal system derives from two sources. On the one hand, it arises from the apparent failure of world leaders - political, intellectual, economic - to recognise the continued potency of nationalism and ethnicity as elemental ingredients in both international and domestic politics. The resultant tragic inefficacy of world powers to deal with such issues as the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, the catastrophic carnage defining the self-immolation of

' Cited in W. L. Morton, “Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History”, Approaches to Canadian History, p. 49. Also Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “La Nouvelle Trahison des Clercs”, in Le Fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française, Editions HMH, Montréal, 1967, p. 188 in passim.

429

Yugoslavia, and the deleterious self-destruction characterising the internecine struggles in Africa and Asia, can easily lead an observer of world politics to abject despair. In this regard, Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s characterisation of American foreign policy could as easily have been generalised to include all the major world powers. As Professor Moynihan stated: «American policy seemed at times incapable of conceptualizing a world in which states break up. As regards ethnicity in international politics, American policy persisted in getting it, wrong. (.) There has been and continues to be an inadequate understanding of what has made the world turn upside down. (.) There was enough of a knowledge base, both theoretical and practical, to make possible a sufficiently accurate anticipation as to what the present era would look like. Let us hold firm to that. The world does not defy understanding; and what can be understood can sometimes be modified. (...) The larger states and the various associations of states - and, clearly, the United Nations

itself - need to set about determination (...)”».

fashioning

responses

to

conflicts

concerning

“self-

We would do well to remember, however, that the hostility towards nationalism

as a doctrine for the proper organisation of world society seemed a logical perspective following the cataclysmic devastation wreaked by the two world wars, and in particular the world’s horror and incomprehension of the gross obscenity embodied by the German Nazis State-sponsored “Holocaust”. Nationalism gained pariah-like status as a retrograde concept destructive of the advancement of humanity; the latter now purported to inhere in either of the two ideological worldviews (capitalist/communist), both of which embraced technology and modernity as the vehicles for human progress. This post WW II faith in technology and concomitant hostility towards nationalism is best resumed in an interview given by Arnold Toynbee thirty-four years ago: 9 «Nationalism is the big enemy technology has made the world one, Technology can be used to better technology will be used to smash up

of the human race in present conditions, because while the habit of nationalism tries to keep it apart. mankind: but if we cannot get over nationalism, mankind».

? Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1993), Pandaemonium - Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 165-168 in passim. > Arnold Toynbee, interview in Playboy, June 1966. In 1965 Ernest Gellner argued that both Liberals and Marxists had posited the disappearance of nationalism. See (1965), Thought and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 147. For a succinct presentation of the Liberal position see Francis Fukuyama (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, Avon, New York. The Marxian assertion that Nationalism is a spent force is best argued by E. J. Hobsbawm (1990), Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge University Press

Cambridge, p. 163.

i

430

The second motivating reason for this reflection upon Canadian federalism comes from the growing evidence of ethno-linguistic divisions within established Nation-States. There is an increasing tendency for individuals to cling to their ethnicity or language or national heritage as a means of rendering meaning to their existence in a rapidly changing global technological environment. Thus, whether it be the sovereignist call for the devolution of power to, or the outright independence of, the Breton, Basque, Scot, Welsh etc.; or the African-American and Hispanic

quests for community recognition within Texas, Florida, California, and American society, the contemporary nation State is undergoing both internal and externai pressures to acknowledge and adapt to new societal realities. We agree with Ernest Gellner’s assessment that modernity has in fact reinforced nationalist tendencies and demands changes in both the domestic and international organisation of humankind. As Professor Gellner wrote: «Advanced industrialism may well lead, simultaneously, to greater ultimate political units, and to greater local autonomy: to what might be called cantonisation. Effective supranational authority may be dictated by the general development of technology ... (...)».

At the same time, however accompanying modernity:

he notes a decentralising “regional” tendency

«lf these two trends are really in operation, the consequence may eventually be that the advanced industrial world will once again, like the agrarian world of the past, be one in which effective political units will be either larger or smaller than “national” units

based on similarity of high culture. Just as once upon a time, city-states were sub-ethnic and empires were super-ethnic, so the agencies preventing nuclear and ecological disaster, controlling the drugs and arms trades and so on, will have to be super-ethnic, while the agency administering the school and welfare system may become subethnic*».

These observations lead us to suggest that the political structure susceptible of resolving the centrifugal and centripetal forces inherent within the contemporary global community must be federal in nature. Professor Moynihan would seem to concur with this perspective. As he states: «Stratified systems of governance, call it federalism where appropriate, are clearly a necessity if any order is to emerge from the proximate confusion».

4 Ernest Gellner (1997), Nationalism, New York University Press, pp. 106-107, in passim. > and, he continues: «... The great economic unions going forward in Europe and elsewhere put at risk the richness of the cultures that for ages have protected themselves behind castle walls and tariff barriers... The instinctive response to insurrection such as that in the Balkans will be to suppress distinctiveness, to drown it in subsidy and choke it with regulation... Niebuhr warns of collective egotism, Auden of collective egoism; however termed, it readily

431

The pertinence of examining the Canadian federal experiment derives from the fact that, from its very beginnings, Canada has had to confront these centralising and decentralising tendencies of the modern technological era, while at the same time elaborate a political structure capable of responding to the divergent nationalist and regionalist interests of its multi-communitary society. At first glance then, federalism would appear to represent a viable means for dealing with contemporary world problems. As Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau wrote: © «... L’immense citoyen, c’est de régionalement pour face aux problèmes

avantage du fédéralisme, c’est d’abord de rapprocher l’Etat du permettre qu’on légifère localement pour des besoins locaux, des besoins régionaux, et au niveau fédéral quand il s’agit de faire d’ensemble...°».

The fact that Canadians consciously created a federal system of government in order to deal with the fundamental problem of cohabitation in a multi-communitary society might perhaps suggest how federalism is susceptible of becoming a sort of pioneer - an explorer - of the seemingly impassable void that exists between nations as well as ethnic groups and a means of establishing some durable form of reconciliation, mutual respect, and recognition between them. One central premise, underlying these reflections, posits that Canadian civilisation can be viewed as having evolved historically from three fundamental contradictions, namely: a) the francophone community versus the anglophone community**; b) the centre versus the regions (or federal government versus provincial governments); c) Canada versus the United States of America. These three contradictions give essence to a distinct Canadian culture but they also constitute the driving force behind the development of nationalism and regionalism in Canada’. . Let us hope that the concision of these reflections does not militate against any possible light they may shed upon an understanding of federal unions, while scrupulously avoiding any ultra-crepidarian commentary concerning the European Economic Community. The following Abstract provides a résumé of the major elements of this paper. enough becomes destructive. But there is nothing wrong - everything right - with an intelligent, responsible self-respect, even self-regard. The challenge is to make the world safe for and from ethnicity, safe for just those differences which large assemblies, democratic or otherwise, will typically attempt to suppress». - Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 169, 172-173, in passim. ° Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “De la vérité et de la liberté en politique”, in J. P. Meekison (1968), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, Methuen Publications, Toronto, pp. 387-388. Note: This perspective is adopted from Herschel Hardin (1974), A Nation Unaware: The Canadian Economic Culture, J. J. Douglas, Vancouver, p. 12. **(sometimes this latter contradiction overlaps with b) as Québec versus the federal government);

432

2. Abstract

This paper addresses the fundamental problems of Canadian federalism that derive from the cohabitation of the country’s two founding European colonisers. It presents a tentative evaluation of the aptitude of federalism for surmounting the intrinsic problems associated with all multicultural societies, namely: to govern in such a manner as to satisfy all the different groups; to respect the regional and particular sentiments of these diverse groups; to facilitate their growth and assure them the freedom to develop and organise following their own respective values and aspirations; and finally, to maintain continuously the delicate equilibrium of the federal consensus upon which the unity of the country depends. Through studying the relations between the Canadian federation’s anglophone and francophone societies and their symbiotic influence in the creation of Canada’s contemporary multicultural and pluralist civilisation, one may perhaps bring some insights to the global problem of multinational coexistence within world society. The Canadian experience leads one to the following tentative conclusions. From 1867 until the 1960’s, Canadian federalism never seriously faced the problem of cohabitation between francophone and anglophone societies. To some extent, the domination of regionalist and nationalist passions upon Canadian politics prevented a realistic consideration of this problem. However, this incapacity of Canadian federalism derived from the respective socio-ideological heritages of these two divergent Canadian societies and cannot be attributed to the inherent structures of federalism. The Canadian experience demonstrates that the territorial solution of federalism may assure the protection of the particularities of divergent groups on a regional or provincial level. However, at the national level, federalism can only provide the mechanisms for permitting the protection of the divergent particularities of the member groups. It cannot ensure this protection by itself. In the final analysis, it is the proper dynamism of each group — their respective creative and innovative aptitudes in the face of the changing realities of the industrial and technological world — that determines if a group is able to effectively utilise the federal apparatus to advance its particular interests. The Canadian experience suggests that there is an essential precondition for a federal system to confront the problem of cohabitation in multi-community societies realistically. There must be some modicum of congruence amongst the respective values and aspirations of the various society members of the federation as they confront the social, economic,

and technological transformations

of the

global society. Moreover, their respective capacities to adapt and evolve in order to confront the demands of modernity cannot be too divergent.

433

The Canadian federal example appears to confirm the thesis of Professor William Riker® that the duration and the stability of federations depend more upon the character and the durability of their political party systems and less upon the formal constitutional structures of federalism. Canada’s federal experience appears to confirm Professor John Porter’s observation that federalism fosters a continuous fixation upon the dynamic of regionalism versus national unity rather than an ideological interaction between the forces of change and those of conservatism. Thus, it enables the ruling class to divert the attention of the masses from the social and economic circumstances of their human condition to the passions and emotional issues associated with regional and national distinctiveness’.

3. Federalism and Nationalism: The Canadian experience «... No man in his senses can suppose that this country can for a century to come be governed by a totally unfrenchified government... As they become smaller and feebler, so they will act as one man and hold the balance of power...So long as the French have twenty votes they will be a power, and must be conciliated». John A. MacDonald, 1867

Cited in Creighton Donald G., John A. MacDonald, vol. 1, p. 227.

«... Nous (les Canadiens anglais) ne pouvons pas jouer sur les deux tableaux. Ou bien nous restreignons la vie de la minorité a une province, auquel cas nous ne pouvons pas blamer les Canadiens-Français de placer cette province au premier plan; ou bien nous acceptons leur droit à leur langue et à leurs écoles où qu'ils soient. Sommes-nous, ou ne sommes-nous pas disposés à considérer le Canada comme fondamentalement bilingue et bi-culturel? Telle est la question que je vous laisse...». Murray Ballantyne, 1954 Cited in Trudeau “De libro, Tributo et quibusdam Aliis”, Le Fédéralisme et les Canadiens Frangais, p. 68 in citing “Le Devoir le 25 juin 1954”.

This first discussion piece presents a brief overview of the major factors leading to the adoption of a federal form of government in Canada. Essentially the argument advanced is that the fierce nationalist determination of the francophone community to preserve its distinctive collective identity in confrontation with anglophone society represents the determining element of Canada’s federal character. In fact, Canada was initially founded upon the coexistence of its two principal colonial settlers, French and English, who were both determined to preserve their hereditary traditions and maintain a certain fidelity vis-a-vis Europe. 8 William H. Riker (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little Brown and

Co., Boston.

? John Porter (1965), The Vertical Mosaic — an analysis of social class and power in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

434

From this vantage point federalism can be seen as a sociological phenomena wherein federal institutions constitute a manifestation of and a protection for the pre-existent federal nature of the society that from the outset forced the establishment of a federal form of government”. The unique character of Canadian federalism derives in no small part from the particular situation of the francophone community who represent a minority within Canada as a whole (roughly 25% of the total Canadian population of 30 million) but constitute a majority within the province of Québec (roughly 83% of a population of 7.5 million)". For if, as in all federal States, the national consensus must always take into account the particularities of all the member provinces, in Canada this consensus must also ensure equilibrium between the two principle ethno-linguistic groups. During the 1960’s the problems arising from Canada’s choice of establishing a bi-lingual, bi-cultural society, became so aggravated that some pundits began to question the very existence of the country. As the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Bilingualism and Biculturalism underlined: «... Les commissaires... s’attendaient bien a se trouver en présence de tensions et de conflits, ils savaient que ces difficultés furent monnaie courante durant toute l’histoire de la Confédération, et qu’elles sont normales dans un pays où coexistent des cultures. Mais ce qu’ils ont peu décelé est différent. Ils ont été contraints de conclure que le Canada traverse actuellement, sans toujours en être conscient, la crise majeure de son histoire».

'° This perspective follows the argument of W. S. Livingston, “A Note on the Nature of Federalism”, in Meekison, op. cit., pp. 20-30. For Livingston, federal institutions cannot, by themselves, give a precise idea of the federal nature of the society that birthed them. If one wishes to situate a federal political system in its proper perspective, then it is essential to highlight the diversities — social,

economic, cultural, political, historical, - that made the

adoption of a federal form of government necessary in the first place. It is pertinent, as well, to examine the other diverse mechanisms for expressing the federal society that are not revealed by a simple consideration of the formal juridical and constitutional aspects of the federation. !! Ministry of Industry, 1995, Statistics Canada, Quarterly Demographic Statistics, cat. No. 91-002 (April 1995). The designation of Canadians by “mother tongue French” by province is as follows: Québec 83%; New Brunswick 34%; Ontario 5%; Manitoba 5%; Prince Edward Island 5%; Nova Scotia 4%; Alberta 2.5%; Saskatchewan 2%; British Columbia

2%; Newfoundland 0.5%; Territories 3%; Canada 25%. Total provincial populations in 1995, with percentage of total Canadian population in brackets were as follows: Ontario: 11,004,800 (37%); Québec: 7,300,000 (25%); British Columbia: 3,719,400 (13%); Alberta: 2,726,900 (9%); Manitoba: 1,132,800 (4%); Saskatchewan: 1,017,200 (3.5%); Nova Scotia: 938,300 (3%); New Brunswick: 760,600 (2.6%); Newfoundland: 579,500 (2%); Prince Edward Island: 135,900 (0.5%); North West Territories: 40,000 (0.15%); Nunavut: 25,000

(0.09%); Yukon: 30,100 (0.1%); Canada: 29,409,900.

'2 “Rapport préliminaire de la Commission Royale d’Enquéte sur le Bilinguisme et le

Biculturalisme”, Imprimeur de la Reine à Ottawa, 1965, p. 5.

435

One hundred and sixty years ago, Lord Durham made his famous commentary on the situation in Canada in his Report concerning the Rebellions of 1837: «... I expected to find a contest between a government and a people: I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I found a struggle not of principles but of

races».

Thirty-eight years after this pronouncement, the Canadian federation was conceived as a means of resolving the antagonisms cited by Lord Durham. However, upon reading the commentary of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism one is forced to conclude that Durham’s observations remain valid. This can only be further reinforced when one recognises that since 1976 (a date marking the election of the first Québec provincial government dedicated to the separation of Québec from Canada - the Parti Québécois) there have been two Québec referendums (1980 - 59.5% voted against, and 40.5% for the government’s request to negotiate “sovereignty-association” with Canada; 1995 - 51% voted against independence for Québec and 49% voted for independence) and one national Canadian referendum 1993 - 55% voted against a new constitutional arrangement with Québec (the so-called Charlottetown Accord) 44% in favour. In light of the continual debate on this issue of Canada/Québec relations since the 1960’s, it would appear - on the surface at least - that each generation of Canadians must redefine the content and context of their existence in the pluralist, multicommunitary society that defines the essence of Canadian civilisation. If one is‘to consider federalism as a political system conducive to enabling different groups to coexist within the same State, by allowing each to conserve their particularities, one is obliged then to ask why the Canadian federal system has not entirely succeeded in achieving this goal? Part of the reason, one suspects, derives from the fundamentally differing value systems that characterised the English and French communities. When socitties differ dramatically in their respective capacities to confront change and adapt to the evolving possibilities presented by the “Age of Progress”, the more conservative of the communities will isolate itself behind the veil of nationalism in order to protect itself from the incursions - either real or imagined - of the more dynamic group upon its jurisdiction. The beginnings of French Canadian nationalism and the subsequent development of Canadian federalism are illustrative of this observation. It is impossible to understand the contemporary nationalist phenomena in Canada without first considering its historical roots. As the French historian Robert Lacour-Gayet observed in 1966: «... s’il existe aujourd’hui une nation qu’il est impossible de comprendre en ignorant d’où elle vient, c’est assurément la Confédération canadienne... |

© C. P. Lucas (1912), Lord Durham’s Report on the Afjairs of British North America, 3

vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, vol. 11, p. 16.

436

Consequently our reflections upon the nationalism-federalism symbiosis in Canada begins by recognising the development of French Canada as a distinct collectivity during the period of French domination 1605-1759 to illustrate that during this 150 year period a distinct society evolved that self consciously defined itself in terms of its language, its religion, its values and legal traditions inherited from France. With the arrival of the English after the fall of Québec in 1759, these elements of the francophone collective identity would come to constitute the bulwark of French Canadian nationalism until the 1960’s. In order to elaborate a theoretical premise to explore the development of traditional French Canadian nationalism let us consider the theory of Louis Hartz whose major ideas are contained in “The Liberal Tradition in America” and “The founding of New Societies”. As Professor Gad Horowitz states: «The Hartzian approach is to study the new societies founded by Europeans (the United States, English Canada, French Canada, Latin America, Dutch South Africa,

Australia) as “fragments” thrown off from Europe. The key to the understanding of ideological development in a new society is its “point of departure” from Europe: the ideologies borne by the founders of the new society are not representative of the historic ideological spectrum of the mother country. The settlers represent only a fragment of that spectrum. The complete ideological spectrum ranges - in chronological order, and from right to left - from feudal or tory through liberal whig to liberal democrat to socialist. French Canada and Latin America are “feudal fragments”. They were founded by bearers of the feudal or tory values of the organic, corporate, hierarchical community; their point of departure from Europe was before the liberal revolution. The United States, English Canada and Dutch South Africa are “bourgeois fragments”; founded by bearers of liberal individualism who have left the tory end of the spectrum behind them'®». '* Robert Lacour-Gayet (1966), Histoire du Canada, Fayard, Paris, p. 19. !5 Louis Hartz (1964), The Founding of New Societies, Longmans, Toronto.

18 (Note: for our purposes the article by Gad Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation”, in Hugh G. Thorburn (1967), Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Toronto, is sufficient to provide the basic thesis of Hartz). As Horowitz continues: «The significance of the fragmentation process is that the new society, having been thrown off from Europe, “loses the stimulus to change that the whole provides”. The full ideological spectrum of Europe develops only out of the continued confrontation and interaction of its four elements; they are related to one another, not only as enemies, but also as parents and children. A new society, which leaves part of the past behind it, cannot develop the future ideologies, which need the continued presence of the past in order to come into being. In escaping the past, the fragment escapes the future, for “the very seeds of the later ideas are contained in the parts of the old world that have been left behind”. The ideology of the founders is thus frozen, congealed at the point of origin.

Socialism is an ideology, which combines the corporate-organic collectivist ideas of toryism with the rationalist-egalitarian ideas of liberalism. Both the feudal and bourgeois fragments escape socialism, in different ways. A feudal fragment such as French Canada develops no whig (undemocratic) liberalism; therefore it does not develop the democratic liberalism

437

In the light of this thesis, we are advancing the argument that the conflict between French speaking and English speaking Canada must be considered in the context of their fundamentally different value systems (feudal fragment versus liberal bourgeois fragment) and not simply in terms of the religious, linguistic and cultural differences that distinguished the two societies. With the arrival of the English after the fall of Québec in 1759, these elements would coalesce into the French Canadian national identity making nationalism a central characteristic of politics within the province of Québec both in the federal and provincial spheres. Thus from the Hartzian perspective French Canada, founded before the triumph of Liberalism in France via the French Revolution, is a “feudal fragment” and to paraphrase Horowitz: «containing only one of the ideologies of France, it becomes a one-right-myth culture’ pre-Enlightenment Catholicism becomes the central ingredient of French Canadian Nationalism. Demanding solidarity, the feudal fragment considers all ideologies which diverge from the nationalist myth as illegitimate enemies of the nation'’».

Thus, the period of British domination (1759-1867) is characterised by a) the British attempts to consolidate its new North American possession in harmony with its other colonies and b) the francophone collectivity’s determination to survive as a distinct society in the face of the challenges presented by the overwhelming anglophone North American majority. In many respects, this theme of “survival” continues to dominate the contemporary politics and governmental policy initiatives of Québec at the provincial and federal levels of government. The two main sources of influence that gave French Canada its original distinctiveness were the French Administration and the Roman Catholic Church. The French Administration established New France as a colony of exploitation based upon the fur trade. This explains in part at least the reason for the low levei of emigration from France to the North American colony, since the colony’s role was to export raw materials to the mother country and import manufactured goods and services from the metropolis. Total immigration from France during the 150 which arises out of and as a reaction against whiggery; therefore it does not develop the socialism which arises out of and as a reaction against liberal democracy. The corporateorganic-collectivist component of socialism is present in the feudal fragment - it is part of the feudal ethos - but the radical-rationalist-egalitarian component of socialism is missing. It ee be provided only by whiggery and liberal democracy, and these have not come into eing.

In the bourgeois fragment, the situation is the reverse: the radical-rationalist-egalitarian component of socialism is present, but the corporate-organic-collectivist component is missing, because toryism has been left behind. In the bourgeois fragments “Marx dies because there is no sense of class, no yearning for the corporate past”. The absence of socialism is related to the absence of toryism». - Horowitz, pp. 54-56. In passim. Horowitz, op. cit. p. 57.

438

years of French domination is estimated at a maximum of 10,000. The English North American colonies to the south, based upon a colonial policy of selfsufficiency numbered a total population of 1,500,000 by 1759, confronting a francophone population of barely 70,000". The legacy of the French Administration can be briefly elaborated as follows: its mercantile policies based upon the fur trade ensured that the francophone population would be a minority community in North America dependent upon its own fecundity for survival. Thus, with only 10,000 immigrants over 150 years New France nevertheless had a population of 70,000 in 1759" making it a tightly knit indigenous community where many of its members represented third and fourth generation native born “habitants” with no experience of the European mother country. The seigniorial system of colonisation coinciding with the catholic parish reinforced this homogenous nature of the French Canadian community. With no democratic traditions, and a legal system based upon the “coutume de Paris”, the institutional structures of New France were distinctly different from those in the British North American colonies. The mass of the population were illiterate, rural, subsistence “habitants” whose major interlocutor and defender in

both the spiritual and temporal spheres was the local parish priest. The French elite comprising the military, administrative, and commercial classes were “français de passage” and returned to France after the conquest”. The Roman Catholic Church assumed, from the very beginnings of France’s colonization efforts, a temporal role in New France insofar as it organised the social services - schools, hospitals, care of the needy, orphanages

etc. Thus in

addition to its spiritual mission vis-a-vis the faithful it became the natural leader and protector of French Canada. This leadership role was further reinforced with the arrival of the British”. In Hartzian terms, the arrival of the British represents not only the juxtaposition of two societies differing in language (French versus English), religion (Catholic versus Protestant) and historical animosities inherited from Europe (Britain versus France); it also represents the confrontation between two differing value systems francophone “feudal fragment” versus anglophone “bourgeois fragment”. This paper argues that the multiple constitutional changes that mark this period of British domination - the Military Regime (1759); the Royal Proclamation Act (1763); the Québec Act (1774); the Constitutional Act (1791); the Rebellions of 1837 and the Act of Union (1840); the achievement of Responsible Government (1848); and the British North America Act (1867) - represent formal responses of

18 Jacques Henripin (1957), “From Acceptance of Nature to Control”, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XXIII, n. 1, February, p. 15. Ibid. 2 See R. M. Lower (1964), Colony to Nation, a history of Canada, Longmans, Toronto, pp. 36-44; also Mason Wade, “Les Canadiens-Frangais de 1760 à nos jours”, Le Cercle du Livre de France, 1966, translated from English by Adrien Venne, vol. 1, pp. 22-58.

2! Léon Gérin (1948), Le type économique et social des Canadiens, Montréal, pp. 102-104.

439

the Imperial power vis-à-vis the nationalist determination of French Canada to survive as a nation. As well, this period represents the determination of the traditional elites - ecclesiastical, political, and administrative - to maintain the founding values of the “feudal fragment” as the defining essence of the French Canadian Nation and, in effect, guard Québec from the “nefarious” influences of Liberal, Protestant, English Canada. It is the success of this determined struggle for survival by French Canada that obliges English Canada to accept a federal form of government for the new Canadian nation. Built upon an atmosphere of compromise and good will, Canada is originally perceived by French Canada as a bilingual biethnic nation where the values and languages of the “two founding peoples” would be respected and protected throughout the Canadian nation. Subsequent actions taken by the anglophone provinces and the federal government would destroy this ideal and create a two-nation concept of Canada amongst French Canadians wherein the Québec provincial government (the only one under the control of the francophone majority in Québec) would be increasingly seen as the only one responsible for the defence and development of francophone society.

4. The federal compromise and the French Canadians: formation of a “bi-ethnic” nation? Or a “bi-national” country? «... I regret every time I go back to my province, to find developing that feeling that Canada is not Canada for all Canadians. We are bound to come to the conclusion that Québec is our country because we have no liberty elsewhere...». Henri Bourassa, 1905 - House of Commons debates Cited in Joseph Schull, Laurier, the First Canadian Macmillan, Toronto, 1965, p. 453.

«... Je ne me sens pas dans mon propre pays, parce que lorsque je dis mon nom “Castonguay”, on dit: What ? What are you talking about?... Vous voyez, je suis une étrangère...» witness before “The Royal Commission of Inquiry on Bi-lingualism and Bi-Culturalism” Cited in The Preliminary Report, Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1965, p. 55.

For Québec, the principal difference between the old 1840 Act of Union and the new 1867 Federation derived from the fact that in the new Parliament francophones no longer had equal representation with their anglophone counterparts. However, francophones became the official minority federally and provincially the anglophone community within Québec attained the same official status. Seen from this perspective, the BNA Act appears less a document according certain concessions to a minority but rather more as a “bi-ethnic entente” where ~ each party receives certain fundamental rights that are partitioned equitably. What

440

is accorded to the francophone community federally and in the provinces outside Québec is given equally to the anglophone community within Québec”. The new federation established by the BNA Act in 1867 consecrated a compromise between equals, citizens of a single country, and British subjects. No longer was the Canadian situation one of conquerors and conquered that had existed one hundred and four years earlier. The French Canadian nationality was recognized as a wholly equal partner in the Canadian nation at the federal level and its growth and development following its own aspirations were assured within the province of Québec. Nevertheless,

the BNA

Act is weak concerning the situation of the French

Canadian minority within the Canadian nation as a whole. Other than article 133, giving the francophones the right to use their language in the federal courts, the only other protection afforded them by the BNA Act derives from Article 93 dealing with educational rights of religious minorities. Nowhere are the educational rights of linguistic minorities mentioned, although it is true that in 1867 the majority of Roman Catholics outside Québec were indeed francophones just as the majority of anglophones within Québec were Protestants.

2 Article 133 places the French and English languages upon an equal footing at the federal level in the Parliament and the Federal courts and in the Québec Legislature and Provincial courts. Article 93 places education under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces with the proviso that the educational rights of religious minorities in existence before 1867 (Protestant in Québec and Roman Catholic outside of Québec) must be safeguarded. If any provincial legislature violates these educational rights of religious minorities, the Federal government is empowered by 93,4 to force a provincial legislature to re-establish them. Québec had acceded to the demands of the anglophones in Upper Canada for proportional representation in the popularly elected House of Commons, but in return it received equal representation with Ontario in the appointed Senate (Articles 21, 22). Moreover, Québec became the pivot for representation in the House of Commons being guaranteed a minimum number of 65 seats (Article 51). Similarly the anglophone minority within Québec was assured representation in the provincial legislature by Article 80, which prevented any boundary changes in the electoral districts of the Eastern townships (where the anglophone population constituted a majority) without the approval of a majority of these districts. Article 92 permitted Québec to manage its own affairs and, coupled with Articles 129, and 93, gave it complete autonomy in religious, cultural, and educational matters. As well, Québec and the other provinces were accorded Constituent legislative powers insofar as they could amend their own constitutions and governmental institutions with the restriction that the office and functions of Lieutenant Governor could not be changed. (Article 92-1). The BNA Act contains no explicit reference in the domain of religious matters since, the Québec Act remains in vigor (Article 129) thus guaranteeing all Québec’s laws, customs and political guarantees preceding the BNA Act. Envisaging the future possibility that the other provinces might establish a uniform common legal system, Article 94 gives an explicit formal exemption to Québec in order to safeguard its legal and cultural particularities.

441

Thus one can see that the “bi-ethnic” federal compromise had within it a strong leaning towards a “bi-national” character in the sense that it represented an agreement achieved between the francophone representatives of Lower Canada, acting in their own interests, and the anglophone representatives from the other provinces. Consequently, the French minorities in the other provinces did not enjoy the same cultural recognition in the political, juridical, and linguistic provincial domains, as did their anglophone counterpart within the province of Québec. The Canadian federation therefore was susceptible of becoming a “bi-national” country wherein Québec would be the only territory favourable to the development and growth of French Canadian culture. Québec would thus become the only legitimate porte-parole for French Canadian society while the Federal government would represent the rest of Canada, dominated by the anglophone majority. The 1867 constitution, except for the dispositions dealing with French linguistic rights at the federal level, and the educational rights of religious minorities at the provincial level, presents few assurances that French Canadian culture would have the same possibilities as its English counterpart to express itself through the federal structures and grow throughout Canada. The “bi-ethnic” character of the Canadian federation depended therefore upon the maintenance of a political atmosphere of good will and cooperation between anglophones and francophones - a political atmosphere that had enabled the establishment of the Canadian federation in the first place. | To summarize our argument: the 1867 Canadian constitution, by its federal nature, consolidated the success of the francophone nationalist will in Québec to protect the collective identity of French Canadian society. Consequently, it would seem probable that the attitude of the francophone Québecois vis-à-vis the BNA Act could be influenced by the character and principle concerns of French Canadian nationalism in this era. i Jean Beetz” argued that French Canadians in Québec tended to see the constitution from a defensive and xenophobic pèrspective, because it represented a protection in those areas considered by the francophone elite of the day as essential to the maintenance of the French Canadian minority’s collective identity education, language, religion, civil code - against any interference by the anglophone majority. As Professor Beetz stated: «... the object is negative. The object consists in reducing the zones of contact between a majority that is too strong and a minority that is too weak, in those areas considered to be of vital importance, because one seemed to believe at this time that

such contact in these areas risked destroying the collective identity of the minority. Thus the minority is perceived, and in fact perceives itself, as being fragile and in need of legal protection in order to survive; ... its own dynamism was considered insufficient to tiJean Beetz, “Les attitudes changeantes, du Québec à l'endroit de la Constitution de 1867”, in L'Avenir du fédéralism canadien, edited by Crépeau P. A. and MacPherson C. B., (1965), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp. 113-138.

442

guarantee its survival. Moreover it is a question of survival and not one of life, or development or growth or flowering... The minority must remain turned in upon itself because one feared that any contact with outsiders would kill it slowly».

This defensive and xenophobic attitude of francophone Québecois vis-a-vis the Canadian constitution can be seen as a normal manifestation of French Canadian nationalism deriving from the long struggle waged by the francophone community, in a minority situation since its origins in North America, to maintain its collective identity in confrontation with the foreign culture of the North American anglophone Protestant majority that surrounded it. However, the immobility associated with this defensive aspect of French Canadian nationalism was a manifestation of the perspective of the francophone ruling classes - the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the bourgeois class of the liberal professions - who in associating their own class interests with those of the entire French Canadian community, struggled to maintain the status quo of the institutions and traditions inherited from the old French regime on which their domination of French Canadian society depended. Nevertheless, we are arguing that in 1867, there was nothing that might indicate that these retrograde tendencies of French Canadian nationalism would dominate the attitude of francophones towards the Canadian constitution. On the contrary, with the birth of the Canadian federation, French Canadians in Québec saw themselves as masters of their own destiny in those domains considered, as vital to

their collective existence. They had a crucial representation at the federal level since no federal government could pretend to maintain a stable majority without a significant number of representatives from Québec in its ranks. Moreover, the educational and religious rights of the Catholic francophone minorities were constitutionally protected. In sum, French Canadians could consider themselves on an equal footing with their anglophone counterparts in a federal bi-ethnic compromise. Thus if Beetz is right in stating that: «... the 1867 constitution assumes, in this initial phase vis-à-vis the Québecois collectivity, a sense that is above all juridical, static, negative, protective and ultimately folkloric, to avoid saying that it is devoted to anthropological conservation...”*».

This phenomena characteristics

in our

of the BNA

view

is not the result of any intrinsic

Act but, rather, is due to the consequences

federal of the

destruction of the bi-ethnic character and the spirit of cooperation inherent in the original federal compromise. For the attitude of French Canadian Québecois towards the Canadian federation and constitution would depend directly upon the attitude exhibited by the anglophone majority, at the federal level as well as at the provincial levels of politics, vis-à-vis the French Canadian minority.

24 Ibid., pp. 123-124, passim. 25 Ibid., p. 124. 443

We suggest that the actions of English speaking Canadians in the other provinces, as well as their conduct in federal politics deformed the spirit of compromise characterising the initial federal relations between the two ethnic groups. These actions provoked nationalist reactions within Québec that, by placing French Canadians once again on the defensive versus English Canada, enabled the francophone ruling class to further reinforce the static and xenophobic character of French Canadian nationalism and thus assure its dominant position over French Canadian society. The realisation of the Canadian federation represented the fruit of political compromise between the two ethnic groups of Upper and Lower Canada. This compromise was the culmination of a mutual recognition of the equal rights of each group in the earlier Union of 1840 and it was upon this basis that the francophone representatives accepted to enter the 1867 federal union. As Lord Carnarvon, in presenting the BNA Act before the British Parliament, stated: «... Lower Canada is jealous and justifiably proud of its ancestral customs and traditions. It is attached to its particular institutions and will never enter into a Union without the clear understanding that it will preserve them... The Custom of Paris is still the foundation of their Civil Code and their national institutions have been cherished by themselves and similarly respected by their English compatriots. Thus it is with these sentiments and under these conditions that Lower Canada is now consenting to enter

into this Confederation...”°».

Sir John A. MacDonald, first Prime Minister of Canada, has perhaps best stated the fundamental premise upon which the stability of the Canadian Federation depends insofar as harmony and cooperation between the two “founding peoples” constitute the keystone of that stability. Writing to an anglophone Québecois in 1856, he admonished: «... No man in his senses can suppose that this country can for a century to come be governed by a totally unfrenchified government... (a Lower Canadian British) must make friends with the French, without sacrificing the status of his race or language, he must respect their nationality. Treat them as a nation and they will act as a free people generally do - generously. Call them a faction and they become factious... As they become smaller and feebler, so they will act as one man and hold the balance of power... So long as the French have twenty votes they will be a power, and must be conciliated. I doubt much however if the French will lose their numerical majority in L. C. in a

hurry... I am inclined to think they will hold their own for many a day yet....?’».

It is important to emphasise

that the Maritime

delegates to the colonial

conference in London (which established the final text for the BNA Act) did not

°° The Report to the Senate on the British North America Act (1939) - O'Connor Report — Ottawa, King’s Printer, Annex 4, p. 87.

? D. G Creighton, John A. MacDonald, vol. 1, p. 227. 444

dispute the rights accorded to francophones in the new constitution. They demanded higher financial payments and guarantees for railroad construction as preconditions for their entry to the new federation but gave de facto recognition to the “bi-ethnic” provisions in the BNA Act that had been achieved through the Canadian compromise. Consequently the BNA Act guaranteed Québec the control over

its own

affairs

(Articles

92, 93, 94,

129) and

made

it the pivot for

representation in the federal House of Commons with the fixed number of 65 seats. Moreover, the provisions at the federal level, establishing French and English as the official languages in Parliament and the federal courts (Article 133) and, according intervention powers to the federal government if the provinces did not respect the educational rights and privileges of their religious minorities (Article 93-3, -4), might be seen to give implicit recognition to the principle of equality between the two “founding peoples”. However, Québec was the only province that was obliged to recognize Bilingualism at the provincial level in its legislature and judicial system (Article 133). Nevertheless, in 1867 Québec could be lead to believe that the measures guaranteeing the rights of confessional schools would allow the francophone minorities in the other provinces to keep their language and cultural rights in the same manner that they protected those of its own anglophone minority. In addition to these constitutional measures, it seems important to take into account the cooperative spirit animating the architects of the Canadian federal project: the French-English compromise represented a pragmatic attempt to resolve the fundamental problems confronting the province of Canada as well as those of all the British North American colonies. The new federation was established in a climate of good faith and reciprocity wherein each participant would respect the rights of their provincial minorities knowing that their counterparts would do the same, and where all would recognise, as a consequence, the mutual rights of each

of the two ethic groups at the federal level. This “consensus” had made the federation possible and was enshrined in the constitution. However, it could not be maintained without the climate of good faith and mutual respect that had nurtured it, and which each group was enjoined to maintain in order to assure the success of the federation. The fact that Québec and Ontario had, between them, 74% of the seats in the House of Commons meant that

any Federal party aspiring to power needed considerable support in both provinces (Québec 65 seats, Ontario 82 seats, total Canada 181). Thus,

francophones

had

reason

to believe

that no

change

in the federal

“compromise” could be achieved against their will, since a government could not remain in power without their support. They believed that the minority situation of the anglophones in Québec and that of the francophones in the whole of the country would serve as a counter-balance and that, as a consequence, good will and cooperation between the two founding peoples would allow Canada to be governed without either of the groups abusing power. The years following the creation of the Canadian federation would demonstrate the fragility of this initial spirit of

445

cooperation. The “bi-ethnic” consensus would disappear in a turbulent climate created by religious and ethnic antagonisms. Canada would increasingly assume an anglophone and imperialist countenance while Québec, becoming the only place where francophones could feel protected, would undergo through reaction, a rebirth of French Canadian nationalism. The continuous violations of the rights and privileges of the francophone minorities outside Québec made French Canadians increasingly suspicious of the federation and English Canada. Attempts would be made to maintain the federal consensus but these “biethnic” compromises, being achieved at the expense of French Canadians, left fissures in the original federal cooperative spirit. The “biethnic entente” of 1867 would be totally destroyed by Canadian reactions to historical events - the North-West Rebellions, the Boer War, the two World Wars,

Ontario’s Rule 17 abolishing French from its school system etc. - Canada divided along religious and racial cleavages that would create an almost unbridgeable chasm between francophones and anglophones. The federal spirit of cooperation would disappear before the onslaught of successive waves of religious and racial emotions enflamed by the passionate nationalist arguments of both ethnic groups. The renaissance of “ethno-religious” French Canadian nationalism represents the political consequence of the “holy war” waged between ultramontane Roman Catholics and “Orange” Protestants which in turn would fuel the “Imperialist” attitudes characterizing English Canadian nationalism. We are arguing that this nationalist revival would have an immense impact on the social, cultural, and political life of francophone Québecois society. A consideration of provincial politics in Québec demonstrates how the rupture in the “biethnic” entente in federal politics exerted a continual influence on the francophone attitude towards provincial politics in Québec. Québec provincial regimes would develop a tendency to exploit the racial and religious distrust between the two groups at the federal level in o?der to consolidate their domination of provincial power. By exploiting the francophone Québecois fears of seeing their traditions and culture disappear, they contributed to the social and economic inferiority of French Canadians in Québec. With the “ethnic question” being always primordial in Québec politics, the francophone population waited a long time before becoming conscious of the social and economic problems confronting their society. This reality, coupled with the conservative and religious character of traditional French Canadian nationalism, would contribute to the perpetuation of French Canadians’ social and economic inferiority within Québec and Canada. The creation of the Province of Manitoba in 1870 represents the last manifestation of a “bilingual/bicultural” perspective of Canada until the 1960’s. This latter date marked the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and, as well, the election of the provincial Liberal

government of Premier Jean Lesage, thus beginning the so-called “Quiet Revolution” in Québec. For, the Manitoba Act of 1870 established a new Québec

446

in the West thus giving to the Manitoba francophone catholic community the same rights as their counterparts in Québec as contained in the BNA Act”. However, from this point on the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect between the two ethno-linguistic communities that had fostered the birth of the Canadian nation was to be destroyed through the discriminatory actions of the anglophone majority both at the federal level and within the provinces outside of Québec. The destruction of this “federal consensus” of 1867 and the consequent geographical, political, and psychological isolation of Québec had an enormous impact on the social and political character of its internal provincial politics. Not only was traditional French Canadian nationalism reinforced to a point where it completely dominated the political perspective of the francophone population but the latter’s conception concerning the fundamental principles of democracy and the function of politics within a society were profoundly affected in reaction against the attitude of English Canadians towards them. On virtually all events and issues - the Riel Affair; the Manitoba School Question; the Boer War; the expedition of Québec Zouaves to defend the Pope; the creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta 1905; the Conscription crisis of World War; the Ontario School question and Rule 17; the Spanish Republican War; the plebiscite of World War Two; - French and English Canada were consistently divided. This enabled the francophone elite to reinforce the traditional values of French Canadian nationalism extolling the virtuous superiority of the nation through its loyal adherence to the Catholic, French, and rural-agrarian legacy carefully nurtured from the days of New France. Nowhere is this more succinctly stated that through the following excerpt from a discourse given by Father Paquet in 1902 entitled “La vocation de la race française en Amérique du nord”: «... nous ne sommes pas seulement une race civilisée, nous sommes des pionniers de la civilisation; nous ne sommes pas seulement un peuple religieux, nous sommes des messagers de l’idée religieuse; nous ne sommes pas seulement des fils soumis de l'Eglise, nous sommes, nous devons être du nombre de ses zélateurs, de ses défendeurs

et de ses apôtres Notre mission est moins de manier des capitaux que de remuer desidées; elle consiste moins à allumer le feu des usines qu’à entretenir et à faire rayonner au loin le foyer lumineux de la religion et de la pensée. cette vocation

28 Section 23 of the Manitoba Act 1870 provides for the equality of French and English in the Manitoba courts and legislature. «... les langues anglaise et française peuvent être utilisées indifféremment par une personne quelconque au cours des débats des Chambres de la Législature et ces deux langues devront être utilisées pour l’enregistrement des débats et la rédaction de procès-verbaux de ces Chambres et l’une ou l’autre de ces langues peut être utilisée par toute personne ou pour toute plaidoirie ou procédure, dans tout tribunal du Canada établi sous l’Acte de 1° Amérique Britannique du Nord, 1867, ou dans tout tribunal de la Province. Les lois de la législature devront être imprimées et publiées dans chacune de ces deux langues...». - Cited in Wade, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 483.

447

religieuse et civilisatrice, c’est, je n’en puis douter, la vocation propre, la vocation spéciale de la race française en Amérique... Laissons à d’autres nations, moins éprises d’idéal, ce mercantilisme fiévreux et ce grossier matérialisme qui les rivent à la matiére...”%».

This fidelity to a messianic and agrarian mission for French Canadian society was to remain part of the francophone conventional wisdom until the nineteen sixties. In spite of their policies favouring the industrialisation of Québec, the provincial liberal governments continued to remain loyal to their agricultural colonisation programmes”.

5. Conclusions «... All life is warfare, and it’s the continuing fight against the status quo that revitalizes society, stimulates new values and gives man renewed hope of eventual progress. The struggle itself is the victory... (For) Nobody owns the truth, and dogma, whatever form it takes, is the ultimate enemy of human freedom... People do not get opportunity or freedom or equality or dignity as an act of charity, they have to fight for it, force it out of the establishment. Reconciliation of opposing forces is a myth. Reconciliation means just one thing: when one side gets enough power, then the other side gets reconciled to it. The reliance on altruism as an instrument of social change is just self-delusion. No issue can be negotiated unless you first have the clout to compel negotiation. How do you ever arrive at consensus “before” you have conflict? In fact, of course, conflict is the vital core of an open society; if you were going to express democracy in a musical score your major theme would be the harmony of dissonance». Saul Alinsky - March 1972.

One can argue that federalism provided a modus vivendi for the anglophone Canadian elite and the francophone elite from-Québec to pursue their respective class interests within an understanding that neither group would interfere in the 2° Wade, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 554.

3° This attitude, seemingly paradoxical, if one considers that by 1930, four fifths of Québec’s population lived in an industrial urban economy tightly tied to the rest of Canada as well as with the international world markets (see The Rowell Sirois Report, vol. 1, p. 192) is explained by the fact that the francophone status quo seemed essential to the safeguarding of the individuality and cultural particularities of French Canadians. See for example André Siegfried 1937, Le Canada Puissance internationale, Armand Colin, Paris, (quatrième édition, 1947), pp. 106-114. The description that Professor Siegfried gave in 1937 for the reasons and goals of the Roman Catholic Church as well as the governments of Québec for keeping agricultural colonisation as fundamental policy is all the more significant insofar as he shared the opinion of the Québécois elite according to which French Canada could not survive unless the francophones continued to lead the simple and difficult life of the “habitant” as he wrote: «Si leur race doit survivre là-bas, c’est par l’acceptation d’une éthique sévère qu’elle y réussira, non pas par cette émulation du confort américan...», op. cit., pp. 113-114.

448

interests of the other. The Québec electorate, tending to perceive politics uniquely within the context of French-English relations at the federal level was slow to confront the fundamental social and economic problems within the province. From this, perspective nationalism and federalism relate to one another in a symbiotic manner but the dynamism of this symbiosis depends upon the aptitude of each group to confront the challenge of modernity. Thus, the traditional nationalist elite in Québec was able to sustain itself in power by focusing the attention of the francophone masses on the “English” menace. However, in so doing it became a retrograde and reactionary force preventing the francophone population from confronting the opportunities of the new industrial environment on an equal footing with its anglophone counterpart”. Having encouraged the implantation of foreign (in particular American) capital investment

into Québec,

the traditional elite introduced

the “Trojan Horse”

of

industrialisation and modernisation that would inexorably erode the fundamental agrarian values of traditional French Canadian nationalism and create the environment for the assimilation of French Canadian society to the liberal, capitalist, and consumerism values of English speaking North America. This apparent ideological unification of French and English speaking Canada lead some anglophone commentators into erroneous conclusions regarding their francophone counterpart’s intentions. Thus, Professor J. A. Corry was to write in 1958: «The relations of French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians have improved immensely in recent years. Much of both the decline in recriminations and the rise in generosity come from the meeting each year in national associations of one kind and another of relatively small numbers of persons of the two language groups who reach not only understanding but friendship. They recognise themselves and one another as

Canadians”).

?! The following quotation gives a bitter assessment of the effects of the traditionalists policies: «La petite bourgeoisie canadienne-frangaise doit à son idéologie de clocher de n’avoir pas été complètement balayée par l’offensive économique des Américains, au XXième siècle. Soutenue par l’un des clergés les plus puissants au monde, cette classe de professionnels, de petits industriels, de petits commerçants, et de petits financiers réussit à préserver et même à renforcer son rôle d’intermédiaire entre le peuple d’une part, et les détenteurs du pouvoir économique et la bourgeoisie canadienne-anglaise qui contrôle la politique fédérale, d’autre part. L’Etat provincial fut — (et demeure) — son instrument privilégié de domination et de trahison, un instrument de perpétuel marchandage et de vente aux enchères des richesses collectives, une entreprise de mystification des masses et d’abâtardissement de toute la vie politique québécoise. L'Etat du Québec n’est, depuis cent ans, rien de plus que la forme juridique de la dictature des couches les plus réactionnaires de la petite bourgeoisie canadienne-française et de leurs bailleurs de fonds de la rue Saint-Jacques sur l’immense majorité de la population québécoise». — Pierre Vallières (1969), Les Nègres Blancs d'Amérique, Maspéro, Paris, p. 42. 32 J. A. Corry (1958), “Constitutional Trends and Federalism”, in Meekison, op. cit., pp. 5758.

449

What the anglophone elite failed to understand was that while the new francophone bureaucratic bourgeoisie was now openly embracing the materialist values of the technological society it did not intend to become anglicize in the process. In fact, we now witness the Janus like nature of nationalism. For, if in the

past nationalism had represented a retrograde force that, while preserving traditional French Canadian society, it nevertheless was principally responsible for keeping it in a sclerotic and backward position vis-à-vis the opportunities within the new technological society and thus ensured the inferiority of French Canadians within both the state and private sector apparatus of Québec and Canada. Now, from 1960 onward, nationalism, - now self-consciously defined as Québécois nationalism to separate it from an old and anachronistic French Canadian Nationalism, - would serve as the vehicle to modernise Québécois society and enable the new francophone elite to assume the control and direction of “La Nation Québécoise”. The example of Québécois nationalism tends to sustain the observation of

Professor Gellner that: «The

impulsion

towards

nationalist

sentiment

in politics

has,

in our

view,

exceedingly profound roots in the lifestyle of modern man, which makes for homogeneity of a single high culture within any one political unit, and which condemns those not masters of the said culture, or unacceptable within it, to a humiliating, painful second-class status. This situation cannot but make men into nationalists, and it is better to try and deal with the conditions which engender nationalism than to preach at its victims and beg them to refrain from feeling what, in their circumstances, is only too natural to feel**».

For the modern Québécois elite, reinforcing the position of the French language and gaining control of the public and para-public state apparatus, would represent the means for catching up with the rest of technological North America while all the while ensuring its position of pre-eminence. This then engendered a reactive response at the federal level opening greater avenues for upward mobility for francophones in both the private and public sectors throughout Canada*.

+ Geliner, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 34 On another tangent that is, nevertheless, pertinent with regard to both French and English speaking Canada’s ability to survive as a distinctive independent nation State, the comments of George Grant are particularly salient:

«The impossibility of conservatism in our era is the impossibility of Canada. As Canadians we attempted a ridiculous task in trying to build a conservative nation in the age of progress, on a continent we share with the most dynamic nation on earth. The current of modern history was against us (....)». «Modern civilization makes all local cultures anachronistic. Where modern science has achieved its mastery, there is no place for local cultures. (...) Our culture floundered on the aspirations of the age of progress. The argument that Canada, a local culture, must disappear can, therefore, be stated in three steps. First, men everywhere move ineluctably toward membership in the universal and homogenous state. Second, Canadians live next to a society

450

Canadian Federalism has thus enabled the growth and development of French and English speaking Canada according to the respective values of their own communities. However, from an ideological perspective, it has in the eyes of many, created a rather monotonous and sterile political discourse that is constantly fixated upon the issue of national unity within the federation. Writing in 1965, Professor John Porter lamented: «(In Canada) a dissociative federalism is raised to the level of a quasi-religious political dogma, an a polarization to right and left in Canadian politics is regarded as disruptive... The major themes in Canadian political thought emphasize those characteristics, mainly regional and provincial loyalties, which divide the Canadian population. Consequently, integration and national unity must be a constantly reiterated goal to counter such divisive sentiments. The dialogue is between unity and discord rather than progressive and conservative forces».

and as he succinctly concluded: «lf there is a major goal of Canadian society it can best be described as an integrative goal. The maintenance of national unity has overridden any other goals there might have been, and has prevented a polarizing, within the political system, of conservative and progressive forces. It has never occurred to any Canadian commentators that national unity might in fact be achieved by such a polarization... Canada must be one of the few major industrial societies in which the right and left polarization has become deflected into disputes over regionalism and national unity...**».

Professor Porter’s commentary would seem unduly harsh when one considers that the primordial function of federalism is to ensure and celebrate diversity — the very diversity that engendered the adoption of a federal form of government in the first place. However, it does point to one critical element relating to the stability of the federal system namely: the fundamental role of political parties in ensuring the vitality of the federation. The Canadian experience would appear to sustain the thesis of William Riker. In his comparative study of federalism, wherein he sought to determine the fundamental conditions required for the creation and maintenance of a federal system, William H. Riker asserted that the survival of a federal State depended upon one primordial factor: the nature of relations developed in the political party system that develops within the federation. Defining a federal constitution as federal if it establishes two levels of government that each possesses a certain autonomy in its own domain, Riker emphasises that this type of constitution is

that is the heart of modernity. Third, nearly all Canadians think that modernity is good, so nothing essential distinguishes Canadians from Americans». - George Grant (1965), Lament for a Nation, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, p. 68, 54 in passim. 35 John Porter (1965), The Vertical Mosaic, an analysis of social class and Power in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp. 368-369 in passim.

451

always the product of a political entente achieved at a unique point in history. Moreover, he argues that two fundamental conditions are required for the realisation of such a federal entente: a common desire on the part of the negotiators to obtain a territorial aggrandisement without resorting to force, and their common interest to guarantee their security vis-à-vis a foreign neighbour. Once the federal entente has been realised, other factors appear upon the political scene and influence the federal system. Primary amongst these is the nature of the party system that evolves. As Riker states: «... Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional condition that controls the nature of the bargain... this is the structure of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variable intervening between the background social conditions and the specific nature of the federal

bargain?». This primordial importance accorded by Professor Riker to the structure of the party system within a federal State would seem to be justified. For, in essence, a federal system englobes a pluralist society and seeks to safeguard this pluralism while at the same time establishing a degree of unity at the heart of the State. Such a system must maintain equilibrium between the national social and political culture of the federation and the diverse provincial cultures. Once the federal entente has been achieved, the various particularities, seen at the social, cultural, economic, linguistic, ethnic, and political levels, lead each

member to perceive the federal link from a different angle. It is political parties then that assume the function of voicing these differences in a concrete manner. However at the same time, at the national level, political parties must establish the grounds for cooperation and compromise between the differing provincial interests. Thus, a federal political system encompasses two principle levels of political action. The autonomy of each level creates’ a constant tension between the centrifugal impetus of the interests and aspirations of the differing regions and the centripetal impetus of the national forces of federal unity. This inherent tension of a federal system tends to fixate the political life within the federation around a single axis whose two poles are centralisation and particularisation. This tension has become the central element of political life in the Canadian federation and it is manifested almost exclusively through the interaction between the political parties at the provincial and federal levels.

% William H. Riker (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little Brown & Co., Boston, p. 136.

452

6. The originality of the Canadian Federal System The Canadian federation aims above all to maintain the equilibrium between provincial rights and the global interests of the nation. The struggle to maintain this equilibrium does not take place within the formal structures of the federation but rather at the level of the political party system. As Steven Muller underlines: «It is more usual in federal systems to find this struggle, often less severe than it is in Canada, institutionalised within the federal apparatus itself. So it is in the United States, chiefly within the Congress. But not in Canada, where the federal parliamentary

institutions are unsuited to this purpose*’».

Thus, the fundamental importance accorded by Riker to the party system in a federal State is even more critical in the particular case of the Canadian federation. The Canadian parliamentary system lacks the formal institutions capable of maintaining the precarious balance between the particularistic interests of the diverse provinces and the global interests of the entire nation. Consequently, the role of political parties is further accentuated in the Canadian political system. As Bowie and Friedrich have underlined: «... le succés de la mise en place de gouvernements relativement stables par le système du Cabinet canadien semble dépendre, pour une large part, de l’existence de

partis forts exerçant sur leurs membres une discipline stricte?*».

The Canadian Cabinet system, in instituting executive responsibility before the legislative power, assumes that the government presents itself as a united force and thus obliges political parties to exercise a firm control over the members of the House of Commons. In such circumstances, the particular interests — regional, ethnic or religious, - find their expression at the federal level less through the formal structures of the House of Commons, but rather within the bosom of the

political parties. Moreover, the House of Commons, having its representation established roughly upon proportionality vis-a-vis the total Canadian population, does not aim to represent the particular interests of the Canadian provinces in an equitable manner. Moreover, the Canadian electoral system is based upon universal suffrage with single member constituency plurality voting and this, as Bowie and Friedrich underline: «... tend a encourager la croissance de partis plus vastes et moins nombreux, groupant des intérêts et des circonscriptions variées, et dépassant ainsi la frontière des provinces».

37 Steven Muller, “Federalism and the party system in Canada”, in J. Peter Meekison, (1968), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, Methuen, Toronto, p. 125.

38 Robert Bowie and Carl Friedrich (1962), Etudes sur le Fédéralisme, tome 1, Paris, p 26.

39

:

Ibid, p. 17.

453

Thus, the two major forces in conflict in the House of Commons are usually the majority party in government and the principal opposition party. Both of these parties, struggling within the determinants of the next election, try then to downplay any manifestation of divisive regional forces in order to be able to gain a majority in the Legislature. As Professor McLeod states: «... In a nation lacking unity or cohesion, the national political party becomes the shock-absorber of domestic conflicts... the principal task of the national political party is to discover some means of bringing the various regions and interests closer together...*%».

Consequently, the continuous and rigorous defence of the divergent and particular interests of the Canadian provinces tends to be assumed more by the provincial political parties rather than the federal parties. For these latter, anxious to obtain stable majorities that can only be achieved through political support that transcends provincial and regional boundaries, are constantly struggling to minimise the differences that separate provinces. However, in order to obtain a majority, federal political parties are, nevertheless, obliged to celebrate provincial particularities so that the provinces may feel associated in an effective and significant manner with the federal government. Thus, the possibility for the provinces to advance their respective interests and particularities on the federal level remain largely tied to the influence and position of authority exerted by their federal representatives in the forming of a government. This fact is valid for all the provinces, but is certainly crucial for the French-Canadian minorities and more particularly the Franco-Québecois. The division of Canadian society between the francophone and anglophone communities, accentuated by a territorial division, is a fundamental aspect of the Canadian federation. This division reveals the importance of French Canadians in the federal political party system. Moreover, this duality of Canadian society leads one to examine the rapport between the political situation of francophones in the Canadian federation and the influence of their federal representatives on the government in ensuring the acceptance of their cultural values within the federal organisation. The stability and efficient functioning of the Canadian federal political system depends narrowly upon its capacity to assure the French Canadian minority an effective participation within the federation. For, if the federation does not reflect, in a significant fashion, the particular values of its French Canadian minority, this latter, being a majority in the province of Québec, is in a position to provoke the destruction of the federal union“.

“° John T. McLeod, “Explanations of our Party System”, Canada, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, p. 329.

in Paul Fox (1966), Politics

‘The current Canadian House of Commons comprises three hundred and one (301)

deputies elected for a period of five years. The number of deputies from each province is approximately proportional to their respective populations. Insofar as the “ethno-linguistic”

454

However, over and above the primordial ethno-linguistic cleavage between the anglophone and francophone communities, regional divisions further accentuate the heterogeneous character of the Canadian population. The role played by Canada’s regional reality is so important in Canadian political life that any study of the federal political system is obliged to recognise what is commonly referred to as “Canadian Sectionalism”. This refers to the natural division of the country into five principal regions: a) the Maritime Provinces; b) Québec; c) Ontario; d) the Prairie Provinces; e) and British Columbia. Each of these regions possesses its own originality as well as its own particularities in the economic, social, religious, ethnic, and cultural domains that are all too often in direct contradiction with those

of the other provinces. This heterogeneity of Canadian society has prevented the formation of a vigorous sentiment of national collective consciousness, that might have been easily directed and manipulated, as has been all too often the case in other countries. The presence of such a fragmented electorate, such as that of Canada, makes it very difficult to organise the population into a national majority. National politicians find themselves confronting the constant challenge of finding the largest common denominator of common accord between the two so-called founding peoples of the federation, as well as between the main regional sectors. Consequently, all political parties that pretend to be national studiously avoid the adoption of a strict and coherent ideology. The success of a national policy resides in the elaboration of a general programme that is susceptible of reuniting a sufficient number of voters to win an election. As professor McLeod has emphasised: «The chief function of party in this country has always been to prevent new cleavages and to draw the divergent elements together into a majority by whatever means possible*’».

The Canadian experience with federalism suggests that, as a political system engendered by difference and pledged to sustain and celebrate that difference,

composition of the House of Commons is concerned, the French Canadian minority can count upon approximately ninety seats (sixty-nine from Québec and twenty-one from the rest of Canada). Since the majority in the House of Commons is one hundred fifty one, it is obvious that it is impossible for a national francophone political party to gain a majority. Thanks to their majority in Québec, Franco-Québécois could have formed a regional political party. (This is of course precisely, what the Bloc Québécois has done). However, such a party without a sufficient number of seats required for a majority, would lose all effective influence within the Canadian Cabinet system except in a particular circumstance where it might enter into a minority government that required the support of the francophone votes in order to stay in power. Thus, if political cleavages are drawn along “ethno-

linguistic” affinities, French Canadians would find themselves always condemned without hope to this powerless minority role confronting the English Canadian majority.

‘ McLeod, op. cit., p. 330.

455

federalism is an appropriate means for dealing with the contemporary issues of globalisation that no modern nation can ignore. Dependent upon tolerance and respect for others, federalism can create a dynamic culture of sophisticated understanding of diversity that is the sine qua non for individuals and their communities to celebrate the integrity of their uniqueness, and without which any resistance to the forces of global homogeneity is futile.

References Beetz Jean (1965),“Les Attitudes changeantes du Québec à l’endroit de la Constitution de 1867”, in L’Avenir du Fédéralisme Canadien, edited by Crépeau P. A. and MacPherson C. B., University of Toronto Press ,Toronto, pp. 113-138. Bowie Robert and Friedrich Carl (1962), Etudes sur le Fédéralisme, (2 tomes), Pichon et Durand-Auzias. Canadian Historical Readings (1967), Approaches to Canadian History, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Corry J. A. (1958), Constitutional trends and Federalism, in Meekison, idem. Creighton D. G. (1962), John A. MacDonald, 2 volumes, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Crépeau P. A. and MacPherson C. B. (1965), L'Avenir du Fédéralisme Canadien, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Fox Paul (1966), Politics Canada, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, Toronto.

Fukuyama Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, Avon, New York. Gellner Ernest (1965), Thought and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Gellner Ernest (1997), Nationalism, New York University Press. Gérin Léon (1948), Le type économique et social des Canadiens, Montréal. Grant George (1965), Lament for a Nation: the defeat of Canadian Nationalism, Carleton University Press, Ottawa. Hardin Herschel (1974), A Nation Unaware: The Canadian Economic Culture, J. J. Douglas, Vancouver. Hartz Louis (1964), The Founding of New Societies, Longmans, Toronto. Henripin Jacques (1957), “From Acceptance of Nature to Control”, CJEPS, vol. XXIII, n. 1, February. Hobsbawm E. J. (1990), Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Horowitz G., Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: an Interpretation, in Thorburn, idem. Lacour-Gayet Robert (1966), Histoire du Canada, Fayard, Paris. Livingston W. S. (1952), “A note on the nature of Federalism”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXVII, n. 1, March, pp. 81-95. In Meekison, idem. Lucas: (1912), Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, 3 volumes, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Lower R. M. (1964), Colony to Nation, a history of Canada, Longmans, Toronto. McLeod John T., Explanations of our Party System, in Fox , idem. Meekison Peter (1968), Canadian Federalism — Myth or Reality, Methuen, Toronto.

456

Moynihan Daniel Patrick (1993), Pandaemonium — Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford University Press, New York. Muller Steven, Federalism and the party system in Canada, in Meekison, idem. O’Connor (Rapport), “Le Rapport au Sénat sur l’Acte d'Amérique du Nord Britannique” (1939) (Rapport O’Connor), Ottawa - Imprimeur du Roi, 1939. Porter John (1965), The Vertical Mosaic — an analysis of social class and power in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. “Rapport préliminaire de la Commission Royale d’Enquéte sur le Bilinguisme et le Biculturalisme” — Imprimeur de la Reine — Ottawa 1965. Riker W. H. (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little Brown & Co. Boston. Rowell-Sirois (Rapport), “Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations 1939”, (Rapport Rowell-Sirois), Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1954. Siegfried André (1966), The Race Question in Canada, Carleton Library, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto. Siegfried André (1947), Le Canada: Puissance Internationale, Armand Colin, 4ème édition, Paris. Thorburn Hugh G. (1967), Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, Prentice Hall, Scarborough. Trudeau Pierre Elliott (1967), Le Fédéralisme et la Société Canadienne-Française, Montréal Editions, HMH. Wade Mason, Les Canadiens-français de 1760 à nos jours, 2 tomes, “Le cercle du Livre de France”, - 1966 Morton W. L., “Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian”.

457

CULTURA POLITICA E VALORI EUROPEI: ALCUNI ELEMENTI PER UNA ANALISI COMPARATIVA Giancarlo ROVATI Universita di Genova, Italia

1. Introduzione

Vi sono aspetti della cultura politica che mantengono una stabile durata nel tempo e aspetti che invece mutano con più rapidita, a seconda delle circostanze storico-politiche; al primo tipo appartengono gli orientamenti nei confronti dei valori fondanti della convivenza civile di un popolo, i quali vengono solitamente codificati in modo solenne nelle carte costituzionali; al secondo tipo appartengono invece le preferenze accordate ai soggetti politici (movimenti, partiti, leaders) e agli strumenti istituzionali che si propongono di interpretare (più o meno adeguatamente) questi valori. Nell’ambito della tradizione politica occidentale un posto emblematico é stato assegnato - non senza enormi contraddizioni - alla tutela dei diritti fondamentali dell’uomo, ai principi della liberta, dell’uguaglianza, della sovranita popolare e nazionale, della rappresentanza, della separazione dei poteri, costruendo su queste basi un modello ideale di “democrazia pluralistica”; la traduzione operativa di questa condivisa filosofia politica è stata peraltro assai differenziata nei singoli paesi, a causa delle specifiche dinamiche storiche e sociali, dando vita a molteplici forme di Stato, di governo, di sistema partitico ed elettorale. Per rendersi conto di queste dinamiche non è necessario andare troppo indietro nel tempo; basta guardare alle caratteristiche dei 15 Stati che attualmente aderiscono all’Unione Europea, o tener conto anche solo di quanto è avvenuto nell’ultimo decennio nel sistema politico italiano, sia a livello ideologico sia a livello pratico. Senza tener conto di queste trasformazioni - decisamente rilevanti tanto dal punto di vista istituzionale, che propriamente politico-elettorale - risulterebbe in effetti impossibile per qualunque osservatore comprendere ed interpretare i dati che emergono dai sondaggi d’opinione o dalle più impegnative indagini ricorrenti sugli orientamenti di valore degli italiani e degli europei, tra cui si segnalano le indagini promosse dalla Fondazione EVS (Evaluation Values System)' a partire dal 1980 e

La Fondazione è stata costituita a metà degli anni settanta da un gruppo di docenti delle Università di Leuven (Belgio) e di Tilburg (Olanda) sotto la direzione di R. A. de Moor e di J. Kerkhofs. L’originaria denominazione di European Values Systems Study Group

458

giunte nel 1999-2000 alla loro terza edizione. E’ ad alcuni risultati di queste indagini che farò per l’appunto riferimento, concentrando l’attenzione sui più recenti orientamenti europei ed italiani (Gubert, 2000)’. Anche se non è possibile scorgere nei dati raccolti all'inizio degli anni novanta i segnali di alcuni sviluppi politico-sociali successivi, è però vero che gli orientamenti di lungo periodo considerati ed evidenziati dalla ricerca EVS risultano tuttora utili per capire dilemmi e problemi del presente e del futuro (Kerkhofs, 1995). E’ il caso, ad esempio, di ricordare l’estensione del relativismo etico, che

nel decennio ‘81-91 è diventato maggioritario anche in Italia, malgrado si mantenga su livelli inferiori alla media europea (Gubert, 1992). Tale relativismo appare peraltro in singolare contrasto con la crescente aspettativa di moralità pubblica che contraddistingue la congiuntura etico-politica contemporanea (Rovati, 1995). Sotto il profilo religioso, avanzano ovunque le tendenze secolariste che si esprimono non tanto nel rifiuto del “trascendente” (Dio, un Essere superiore), quanto nella privatizzazione della fede e nell’abbandono della “religione di chiesa”, con riferimenti dottrinali oggettivi e specifiche pratiche sacramentali e devozionali. Cresce invero anche la domanda di senso, l’interiorizzazione e l'orientamento all’autenticità, come pure il superamento del ritualismo e del

formalismo religioso, ma questi orientamenti incontrano forti difficoltà a trasformarsi in fede esplicita e in stabili appartenenze religiose (Cesareo et al., 1995). E’ nell’ambito degli atteggiamenti ed orientamenti lavorativi che si manifesta con più chiarezza l’ascesa dei valori “post-materialisti”, legati al primato dell’espressività, della creatività e della qualità dei rapporti umani (Inglehart, 1971, 1993). Ugualmente in ascesa sono le forme di associazionismo volontario, sia in funzione ludico-ricreativa, sia in funzione “altruistica” a favore dei soggetti relativamente svantaggiati (mutuo aiuto, volontariato di solidarietà sociale) o dell’ambiente (associazioni ecologiche). In ciascuno di questi ambiti, gli italiani presentano una sostanziale “tipicità” rispetto agli altri concittadini dell’Europa (Capraro, 1995). Considerando gli orientamenti presenti con quelli di dieci anni prima, gli italiani risultano sicuramente incamminati verso la crescita dell’individualismo, dell’edonismo, del relativismo, della secolarizzazione, ma riescono anche a mantenere maggiormente (EVSSG) si è ora trasformata in European Values Study (EVS). Referente per l’Italia è Renzo Gubert, dell’ Universita di Trento, membro del Comitato Direttivo Centrale dell’EVS. ? Al momento, non sono ancora disponibili i dati sull’intero campione europeo relativi al 1999-2000; per quest’ultimo periodo mi limiterò pertanto a considerare i dati del solo campione italiano. La prima indagine del 1981 è stata condotta su nove paesi dell’ Europa occidentale (Gran Bretagna, Irlanda del Nord, Francia, Belgio, Germania occidentale, Olanda, Spagna, Danimarca, Italia) per un totale di 12463 interviste. La seconda indagine del 1990 è stata svolta su 10 paesi (Gran Bretagna, con identico approfondimento su l'Irlanda del Nord, Repubblica d’Irlanda, Francia, Belgio, Germania occidentale, Olanda,

Spagna, Portogallo, Italia.), per un totale di 15539 interviste. La terza indagine del 1999 ha coinvolto anche quasi tutti i paesi dell’Europa orientale, oltre a quelli dell’Europa occidentale già indicati.

459

in vita caratteri propri della “tradizione” (oggettivismo morale e religioso, relazionalità comunitaria, sentimento di appartenenza territoriale) che tendono a riemergere anche nel contesto postmoderno. “Resta da vedere se la specificità italiana tenderà a ridursi, per una omologazione con la cultura dei paesi dell’Europa centro-occidentale più modernizzata, o se verra invece alimentata da fenomeni di reciproca influenza tra le spinte post-materialiste e le permanenze ancora Vitali della tradizione” (Gubert, 1992: 578). Si tratta di questioni aperte, per chiarire le quali risultano utili proprio i dati della terza ricerca dell’EVS. L’insieme degli indicatori utilizzati nelle indagini EVS per esplorare le classiche dimensioni affettive, cognitive, e valutative della cultura politica’ (Almond — Verba, 1963; Almond - Powell jr., 1970) permettono di verificare in chiave transnazionale le somiglianze e le differenze tra i singoli campioni nazionali, considerati nel loro insieme o disaggregati in base al genere, alle classi d’età, al livello

d’istruzione,

cioè alle variabili

strutturali

cui sono

connessi

processi di socializzazione, vissuti generazionali, orientamenti valutativi altamente tipicizzanti (Gubert - Meullemann, 1997)‘. L’ipotesi che, in particolare, si vuole qui verificare è se l’appartenenza a classi di età omogenee (specialmente a quelle giovanili) e la somiglianza del livello d’istruzione possano identificare specifiche aree di omogeneità che travalichino, per così dire, i confini dei singoli Stati ed identifichino correnti culturali relativamente autonome e quindi potenzialmente più influenti di altri elementi macro-storici e macro-sociali. —

2. Il posto della politica: tra disaffezione e nuove forme di impegno Le informazioni sugli atteggiamenti ed i comportamenti politici degli europei nell’arco dell’ultimo ventennio documentano l’esistenza di orientamenti decisamente ambivalenti, oscillanti tra l’aperta presa di distanza dalla “politica” — allorché si guarda alla partecipazione elettoralè — e il permanere di aspettative particolarmente esigenti nei confronti della “politica” stessa - cioè in concreto degli attori politici (partiti e leaders), delle istituzioni (Parlamento, governo, pubblica amministrazione) e dei processi decisionali pubblici — allorché si guarda ad alcune valutazioni collettive. I sentimenti di “disaffezione” dalla politica hanno, da un lato, alimentato la delega o l’astensionismo, dall’altro lato hanno favorito l’adesione a nuovi movimenti e partiti politici a carattere principalmente

? Secondo la distinzione ormai classica introdotta negli anni sessanta il concetto di “cultura politica” comprende orientamenti “cognitivi” (riferibili al campo della conoscenza), “affettivi” (riferibili al campo delle passioni, delle emozioni e dei sentimenti) e “valutativi” (riferibili al campo dei giudizi di valore). A titolo esemplificativo, rinvio all’approfondito confronto tra gli orientamenti registrati in Italia e nell’area culturale tedesca, cui sono dedicati i contributi pubblicati nella rivista italotedesca Annali di Sociologia/Soziologisches Jahrbuch.

460

pragmatico, locale, etnico-nazionale. Tra i segnali di questi orientamenti vanno principalmente richiamati: a) il basso prestigio assegnato dall’opinione pubblica alle istituzioni politicoamministrative rispetto ad altre istituzioni sociali; b) la riduzione del consenso e della partecipazione nei confronti dei partiti tradizionali;

c) la nascita di nuove formazioni politiche. Con il rimescolamento della domanda e dell’offerta politica (Mannheimer — Sani, 1994) si sono di gran lunga ridimensionati i voti di appartenenza, hanno acquistato più peso i voti d’opinione, sono diventati più fluidi gli atteggiamenti e più imprevedibili i comportamenti elettorali (“Political Trend”, 1995-2000). I primi analisti della cultura politica hanno giustamente considerato l’interesse per le vicende politiche un indicatore essenziale della diffusione di una coscienza civica democratica e partecipativa; mettendo l’accento sulle funzioni integrative di questo elemento, ne hanno però sottovalutato il possibile significato polemico, dato che l’avvicinamento alla vita politica può subire una brusca impennata proprio in presenza di situazioni di crisi, di incertezza, di conflittualità sociale. Questa chiave di lettura mi sembra in effetti la più idonea per spiegare l’attenzione per le

questioni politiche nel corso degli anni ottanta e novanta, contrassegnati da situazioni di disagio, forme di protesta, volontà di cambiamento, piuttosto che dal supplemento di consenso verso gli assetti politico-istituzionali consolidati. Al di là delle marcate differenze di valutazioni sulla efficienza e l’efficacia dei rispettivi sistemi politico-amministrativi, il dato di fondo è che in tutte le nazioni europee il coinvolgimento cognitivo ed emotivo con la politica non è poi così “centrale” come vorrebbe il modello ideale del “perfetto cittadino” formulato su misura di ristrette élite sociali. A fronte delle interpretazioni che spiegano questo fenomeno

chiamando

in causa l’indifferenza, il qualunquismo,

l’apatia, sembra

legittimo ipotizzare che nei paesi industriali avanzati la diffidenza verso la politica si fondi sul rapporto fin troppo intenso con la macchina politico-amministrativa (si pensi alla frequenza delle scadenze elettorali o ai rapporti con la burocrazia) piuttosto che sull’estraneità, su forme cioè di “conoscenza ordinaria” più che su forme di “ignoranza”. Paradossalmente, l’estendersi della capacità di informazione

e di comprensione delle vicende politiche conduce ad una più estesa coscienza della “frattura” tra cittadino e politica, piuttosto che alla percezione di poterla colmare. In concreto, proprio l’estendersi dell’interventismo politico in ogni settore della vita sociale (economia, istruzione, salute, previdenza, assistenza) rende ogni

cittadino più cosciente del crescente scarto tra “immagini ideali” e “immagini reali” della politica (Rovati, 1990).

461

2.1 La fiducia verso le istituzioni politiche Un consolidato metodo per stimare il consenso dei cittadini nei confronti del sistema politico, economico e sociale in cui vivono consiste nel misurare il loro grado di fiducia verso le istituzioni più emblematiche. La fiducia da una misura della soddisfazione per le prestazioni strumentali erogate dalle singole istituzioni, esprime perciò una valutazione nei confronti della loro efficacia ed efficienza; la fiducia esprime però anche il supporto ideologico ed affettivo nei confronti del ruolo ideale e simbolico delle singole istituzioni, che è una delle condizioni della loro autorevolezza e funzionalità. Il dato di fondo evidenziato anche dalla ricerca EVS è che le istituzioni emblematiche del sottosistema politico-amministrativo godono in ogni paese europeo

di una

considerazione

sociale relativamente

bassa, con

oscillazioni

e

particolarità comunque significative. Gli italiani e il resto degli europei danno valutazioni e priorità assai differenti a seconda che si consideri il livello di fiducia massima o quella intermedia; l’ordine delle preferenze dipende peraltro in parte da considerazioni strumentali (relative cioè agli standard funzionali), e in parte da considerazioni ideologico-affettive. E’ verosimilmente del primo tipo la notevole fiducia dell’insieme degli europei il proprio sistema previdenziale; al secondo genere di motivazioni è invece riconducibile, ad esempio, la fiducia degli italiani verso la chiesa o la Comunità europea (Tab. 1). Tab. 1 — Grado di fiducia (molta + abbastanza) verso alcune istituzioni politiche o di pubblico rilievo U

1981

1990

48 ree dii Une strie?SZ ad]

55

4 Pere Pao esa

Meet gr ale34 vu) SISTEMA PREVIDENZA SOCIALE

Sottoponendo all’analisi fattoriale le risposte del campione italiano ed europeo ai

13

items

utilizzati

si

identificano

tre

dimensioni

sottostanti,

definibili

rispettivamente come “fiducia verso le istituzioni garanti dei diritti di cittadinanza civili, politici, sociali” (rappresentate dal sistema giuridico, dalla pubblica amministrazione, dal Parlamento, dal sistema previdenziale, dalla scuola); “fiducia verso le istituzioni sovranazionali e di controllo” (Nato, Comunità europea, grandi aziende, forze armate); “fiducia verso le istituzioni di contro-potere” (stampa e sindacati). La fiducia verso le istituzioni garanti dei diritti di cittadinanza, definibili per questa ragione come “democratiche”, è mediamente maggiore tra l’insieme degli europei che non tra il sottogruppo degli italiani. La situazione si ribalta nel caso delle istituzioni sovranazionali e di controllo, solo in parte riconducibili alla legittimazione democratico-elettiva; nei loro confronti sono gli italiani a nutrire maggiore fiducia rispetto ai concittadini europei. Le posizioni risultano invece assai simili nei riguardi delle istituzioni nate per esercitare un “contro-potere” rispetto ad altri poteri politici ed economici “forti”. In questi casi prevalgono atteggiamenti di moderata fiducia, sia da parte degli italiani che del resto degli europei. Gli atteggiamenti critici verso le istituzioni politiche potrebbero essere interpretate, almeno in parte, come un indice di (s)fiducia verso le istituzioni “democratiche”, così definite o perché direttamente legittimate dalla volontà popolare (come nel caso del Parlamento), o perché ufficialmente proclamantesi al servizio della collettività, piuttosto che di interessi particolaristici e corporativi (come nel caso della pubblica amministrazione, del sistema giudiziario o del sistema scolastico). In base a questa chiave di lettura si dovrebbe dire che la scarsa fiducia degli italiani verso le istituzioni garanti dei diritti di cittadinanza rappresenti un sintomo allarmante di “orientamenti antidemocratici” tanto più che contemporaneamente risulta più elevata la fiducia verso le istituzioni “non democratiche” e “autoritative” come le grandi imprese, la Nato, la polizia. La chiave interpretativa ora richiamata — di per sé non priva di fondamento — non mi sembra invero applicabile all’attuale contesto storico-sociale europeo ed italiano; più convincente mi sembra invece pensare che l’opinione pubblica contemporanea risulti più esigente piuttosto che apatica o addirittura refrattaria nei confronti delle istituzioni democratico-elettive. Allo stato attuale la crescita del sentimento critico non sembra sfociare tanto nel rifiuto delle procedure democratiche, quanto nella domanda di maggior efficienza, funzionalità, trasparenza delle istituzioni pubbliche e private. Questa interpretazione trova in effetti diretta conferma proprio nella terza indagine EVS, nella quale sono state inserite per la prima volta alcune domande sul sistema democratico, per via della partecipazione dei paesi dell’ Europa orientale di recente approdo alla democrazia pluralista. In mancanza dei dati europei complessivi, basti notare che il 90% degli italiani ritiene che il sistema democratico sia di gran lunga preferibile ad altri tipi di governo, con punte di maggior

463

“entusiasmo” tra gli adulti (30-59 anni, molto d’accordo: 46%) e gli anziani (60 anni e più, molto d’accordo: 45%), rispetto ai più giovani (18-29 anni: molto d’accordo: 36%) e nel Centro (47%) e nel Sud d’Italia (45%) rispetto al Nord (40%). Queste due particolarita non sono di poco conto, perché segnalano aree di “sofferenza” e di possibile “crisi”, tuttavia, nel complesso, le convinzioni democratiche degli italiani continuano ad essere decisamente salde (Gubert, 2000:

226) Decisamente convinti della validità e superiorità del sistema democratico, gli italiani sono però tutt'altro che soddisfatti del modo con il quale si realizza la democrazia in Italia. “Ben il 62% degli intervistati manifesta atteggiamenti di poca o di nessuna soddisfazione e solo 1’ 1% si dichiara soddisfatto. Il fatto non può non interrogare i politici di professione oltre che gli studiosi ed i commentatori. In parte ciò è una conferma del desiderio di maggior partecipazione — come emerge in sede di priorità delle mete politiche — ma in parte potrebbe essere un giudizio sulla poca democraticità del funzionamento delle istituzioni così come sono. E’ chiaro che posizioni critiche tanto diffuse lascino ampi margini alla disaffezione, tanto più che una parte degli italiani mostra una disponibilità non trascurabile a forme di governo “non democratiche”, da affidare a “tecnici ed esperti’ (molto + abbastanza d’accordo: 47%), a un “capo forte” (d’accordo: 15%), alle “forze armate”

(d’accordo: 5%)”. (Gubert, 2000: 231) (Tab. 2). Tab. 2 — Forme di governo preferite dagli italiani (nel 1999) Per governare l’Italia occorre:

(molto + abbastanza d’accordo anni

V219:

anni

sistema

politico ABS Snce

V217: affidarsi a degli esperti V216: un capo forte V218: le forze armate al potere

2.2 Partecipazione e impegno politico Gli atteggiamenti nei confronti della politica trovano il loro banco di prova nel coinvolgimento diretto con le sue concrete forme istituzionali, associative ed organizzative (partiti, sindacati, movimenti, ecc.) e con la disponibilità ad’ intraprendere azioni politicamente rilevanti. In un sistema democratico-pluralista, la partecipazione politica ha diverse modalità espressive e diversi gradi di intensità, potendo andare dal livello minimale della partecipazione elettorale alla più 464

impegnativa

assunzione

di cariche

politiche,

passando

attraverso

l’interesse

conoscitivo per le vicende politiche, il ruolo di simpatizzante, iscritto, attivista,

dirigente di un partito o movimento politico. Al pari dell’adesione ad un partito è ugualmente significativa la partecipazione a sindacati, associazioni professionali, movimenti collettivi finalizzati alla soluzione di problemi specifici (locali, ambientali, assistenziali), in quanto spesso operano come veri e propri gruppi di pressione. In tutti questi casi l’adesione risulta tanto più intensa quanto più implica responsabilità operative, tra cui la disponibilità a compiere azioni pubbliche di carattere convenzionale o non convenzionale, il cui caso limite è rappresentato da azioni apertamente illegali, come nel caso di azioni violente. La partecipazione alle diverse forme associative presenta sensibili differenze tra gli italiani e l’insieme degli europei principalmente per quanto riguarda i sindacati, le associazioni professionali, imovimenti femministi e i partiti; l’adesione a questi “corpi sociali intermedi” è tendenzialmente maggiore altrove; in Italia si registra peraltro anche una lieve flessione rispetto al passato, a conferma di uno stallo delle forme più tradizionali di militanza. La presenza di nuove sensibilità politiche è attestata dall’approvazione per quei movimenti collettivi che, soprattutto negli anni ottanta, hanno interpretato esigenze tipicamente post-materialiste, come quelle ecologiche, pacifiste, femministe, libertarie, antisegregazioniste.

Particolarmente significativa, sia dal punto di vista quantitativo che qualitativo, è la disponibilità dei cittadini italiani a compiere azioni che implicano forme di mobilitazione organizzata (non dunque puramente individuale), alcune delle quali pienamente legali — come la firma di petizioni o la partecipazione a manifestazioni autorizzate — ed altre invece di significato esplicitamente “trasgressivo”, come la partecipazione a boicottaggi di protesta, a scioperi non autorizzati (e perciò definiti “selvaggi’), all’occupazione di edifici. In base a ciascuno di questi indicatori, si può dire che il grado di partecipazione politico-sociale di tipo non convenzionale è maggiore tra gli italiani rispetto all’insieme degli europei, non solo in termini di propensione (disponibilità), ma anche in termini di attuazione pratica. Di queste tendenze si ha una sintetica documentazione attraverso il fattore che possiamo definire come “partecipazione politica non convenzionale”. Il profilo sociale di chi è più attivamente impegnato in questo tipo di attività vede in prima linea gli uomini piuttosto che le donne, i più giovani piuttosto che i più maturi per età, e infine i più istruiti.

Mentre le petizioni o il boicottaggio configurano un tipo di azione individuale che produce effetti aggregati assimilabili a quelli di “massa”, la partecipazione a scioperi, sit in, occupazioni implica una vera e propria azione collettiva, assimilabile al comportamento di gruppo o di movimento. E’ allora interessante notare che mentre l’insieme degli europei propende principalmente per quella che possiamo chiamare mobilitazione individualistica, gli italiani sono più orientati alla mobilitazione collettiva, sia in termini di comportamenti già concretamente intrapresi, che di propensione favorevole ad intraprenderli.

465

3. Problemi politici ed orientamenti ideologici Alla cultura politica dei singoli sono inscrivibili, come noto, tutte quelle aspirazioni, rappresentazioni, progetti che hanno a che vedere — direttamente o indirettamente — con l’organizzazione dei rapporti sociali e con la loro istituzionalizzazione; questo insieme di orientamenti risente in parte dell’influsso di tradizioni ideologico-politiche consolidate e in parte concorre a modificarle, introducendo nuovi bisogni, sensibilità, prospettive.

3.1 Competizione e solidarietà Da un punto di vista tipologico, il dibattito politico e sociale oggi in corso è riconducibile ad una serie di questioni ideologico-operative, comuni a tutte le società industriali avanzate e a tutti i loro sistemi politici, riguardanti il diverso mix da attribuire al rapporto tra stato-mercato, pubblico-privato, egualitarismomeritocrazia,

assistenzialismo-competizione,

solidarietà-efficienza,

tutela

degli

interessi forti-deboli. A tali questioni la ricerca sui valori degli europei dedica particolare attenzione attraverso una batteria di domande’ che invita gli intervistati a prendere posizione sulla seguenti alternative politiche: a) livellare i salari o incentivare l’impegno individuale; b) incrementare la proprietà privata negli affari e nell’industria o incrementare la proprietà dello Stato; c) attribuire maggior responsabilità agli individui o allo Stato; d) attribuire i sussidi di disoccupazione in modo selettivo o in modo incondizionato;

e) considerare la competizione un fatto tendenzialmente positivo o negativo; f) attribuire importanza al lavoro o alla fortuna ai fini della riuscita personale; g) ritenere che l’accumulazione della ricchezza avvenga sempre a spese di qualcun altro o contribuisca al benessere di tutti. Rispetto a ciascuna di queste alternative l’insieme degli europei si dimostrano principalmente orientati verso i tratti culturali che secondo una consolidata classificazione possono essere considerati propri degli orientamenti individualistici-meritocratici-competitivi, mentre gli italiani propendono, in misura più o meno accentuata, per orientamenti maggiormente collettivistici-assistenzialicooperativi. Le cause di queste tendenze medie — in ogni caso distribuite in modo differenziato entro ciascun campione nazionale in base alle variabili anagrafiche e socio-economiche — vanno ricercate non solo nell’ordinamento sociale vigente, ma Si tratta di 7 domande che invitano gli intervistati ad esprimere i loro orientamenti in base ad altrettante dicotomie lungo una scala di punteggio da 1 (più vicini alla prima alternativa) a 10 (più vicini alla seconda alternativa). 5

.

.

,

.

“ie

.

466

.

.

.

anche in vere e proprie tradizioni ideologiche, sedimentate nella storia e nella cultura dei singoli popoli. Non va trascurato in particolare il peso formativo ed orientativo che in Italia hanno avuto le tradizioni culturali cattoliche, da un lato, e quelle socialiste e comuniste, dall’altro, entrambi profondamente radicate nella

mentalità popolare e nelle élites con responsabilità educative, culturali, politiche. Queste stesse tradizioni politico-culturali hanno lasciato il segno anche in altri paesi dell’Europa continentale — a cominciare dall’area tedesca (Germania e Austria) — unitamente agli orientamenti politici basati sulla combinazione tra interventismo statale ed imprenditorialità privata, che risalgono all’epoca di Bismarck e che sono stati rinnovati nell’età della ricostruzione postbellica attraverso il modello dell’“economia sociale di mercato”, di cui è parte integrante il ruolo redistributivo dello Stato e il sistema della “cogestione” delle grandi imprese tra i datori di lavori e i rappresentanti dei lavoratori dipendenti (Ferrera, 1993). Il criterio ideale delle uguali opportunità di accesso ai diritti di cittadinanza economico-sociali, di cui il lavoro è parte integrante, viene fortemente ridimensionato, se non proprio interamente contraddetto, da gran parte degli europei nell’eventualità di una crisi occupazionale permanente; in caso di scarsità del lavoro si ritiene infatti giusto privilegiare i soggetti più “forti” (gli uomini, i giovani, gli autoctoni, i sani) piuttosto che quelli più “deboli” (le donne, gli anziani, gli immigrati, gli handicappati). Sottoponendo all’analisi fattoriale l’insieme di queste variabili, si ottiene un primo indicatore sintetico che privilegia gli “orientamenti individualisticomeritocratici” basati sul primato dell’individuale e del privato, rispetto al collettivo e al pubblico. Su queste posizioni i cittadini dell’Europa occidentale sono maggiormente schierati degli italiani. In evidente contrasto con la propensione indicata da questo fattore è l’indice sintetico di quello che possiamo definire l’“anti-solidarismo da crisi occupazionale” che vede in posizione più marcata il gruppo italiano piuttosto che quello dell’insieme degli altri gruppi. In queste risposte si manifesta verosimilmente un forte sentimento di vulnerabilità di fronte ai rischi di una crisi recessiva, sentimento che si unisce alla diffusa sfiducia nei

confronti della funzionalità del sistema di welfare. Resta il fatto che l’incremento delle situazioni di crisi economica provocano sentimenti di minaccia e di difesa che sconfinano nella propensione alla discriminazione e all’esclusione sociale. A questa inclinazione si sottraggono soprattutto i più giovani ed i più istruiti, verosimilmente perché i primi sono direttamente più colpiti dalla disoccupazione, mentre i secondi si sentono più sicuri di sé a causa delle maggiori credenziali formative e motivazionali in loro possesso.

$ Si tratta delle domande che esplorano l’accordo degli intervistati all’idea che in condizioni di scarsità di lavoro: a) “gli uomini dovrebbero avere maggior diritto delle donne ad ottenerlo”; b) “la gente dovrebbe essere obbligata ad andare in pensione prima del termine”;

c) “i datori di lavoro dovrebbero dare la preferenza agli autoctoni rispetto agli immigrati”; d) “non è giusto dare lavoro agli handicappati”.

467

3.2 L’alternativa liberta-uguaglianza Tra i valori che contraddistinguono la cultura politica del mondo occidentale europeo, nessuno ha un rilievo paragonabile a quello della libertà e dell’uguaglianza; nessuna epoca storica ha infatti vissuto queste due dimensioni con la stessa drammaticità dell’epoca moderno-contemporanea, che non a caso le ha iscritte tra le sue mete ideali qualificanti. All’origine di tale drammaticità sta la permanente dialettica (teorica e pratica) tra il riconoscimento dei diritti di libertà (personali e sociali) e il contemporaneo riconoscimento dei diritti di uguaglianza (civili, politici, economici) (Marshall, 1950). La faticosa convivenza di questi due principi-guida ha alimentato spesso soluzioni unilaterali, a vantaggio esclusivo talora degli individui, atomisticamente intesi (come nel liberalismo classico e nei sistemi capitalisti), e talora della collettività (come nel marxismo e nei sistemi collettivisti). Il primato già registrato degli orientamenti individualistico-meritocratici e individualistico-partecipativi della popolazione europea occidentale trova ulteriore conferma nella marcata preferenza per il valore della libertà (51%) piuttosto che dell’uguaglianza (36%); la differenza di vedute rispetto al campione italiano — che si connota per un sostanziale equilibrio di opzioni (42% per la libertà e 44% per l’uguaglianza) — raggiunge in questo caso livelli decisamente marcati e può essere assunta come uno dei tratti maggiormente distintivi delle differenti culture politicosociali nazionali.

3.3 Tolleranza e intolleranza sociale

Il ricorso ai tradizionali test che misurano il sentimento di vicinanza-distanza sociale consente indirettamente di ricostruire l’esistenza di pregiudizi e stereotipi (negativi o positivi) che, se da un lato sono frutto di rappresentazioni collettive piuttosto che di esperienze dirette, dall’altro possono ispirare atteggiamenti e comportamenti che portano alla tolleranza-intolleranza. La probabilità sempre più frequente, per chi vive in società metropolitane (cosmopolite, multietniche, multiculturali, permissive) di “avere come vicini di casa” soggetti aventi culture, religioni, costumi, stili di vita differenti e talora contrapposti conferisce alle risposte ottenute un valore predittivo sempre meno teorico e sempre più pratico. Poiché la probabilità dei contatti è in funzione del tasso di diffusione delle situazioni ipotizzate, è sintomatico osservare che gli italiani manifestano pregiudizi superiori alla media nei confronti di chi ha precedenti penali, mentre sono tipicamente degli europei continentali i pregiudizi nei confronti dei bevitori. L’insieme degli indicatori utilizzati identifica, in concreto, tre diversi fattori di intolleranza nei confronti delle “diversità etnico-religiose”, dei “comportamenti

trasgressivo-devianti”, dell’“estremismo-politico”. Il primo fattore sintetizza gli atteggiamenti espressi verso gli indù, gli ebrei, i musulmani, gli immigrati e i

468

lavoratori stranieri, le persone di razza diversa, vale a dire verso soggetti identificati da caratteri oggettivi. Il secondo fattore tiene conto principalmente dell’accettazione dei tossicodipendenti, delle persone affette da Aids, degli omosessuali, delle persone con precedenti penali, cioè di soggetti definiti da certe caratteristiche comportamentali. Il terzo fattore è catalizzato dal pregiudizio nei confronti degli estremisti di destra e di sinistra. Il rischio dell’intolleranza verso le diversità etnico-religiose risulta potenzialmente maggiore tra i più anziani ed i meno istruiti, sono invece meno avvertiti dai più giovani e dagli istruiti. Anche la presa di distanza da chi ha scelto comportamenti e stili di vita “a rischio” (per sé e per la collettività) è comparativamente diffusa con intensità massime tra i più anziani, e minime tra i più giovani e i più istruiti. Il pregiudizio negativo verso l’estremismo politico di sinistra e di destra è maggiore negli altri paesi, con punte più intense tra i soggetti di media età e quelli più istruiti; gli italiani sono assai meno sensibili a questo problema, in linea con le tradizioni ideologiche e politiche nazionali. Attraverso l’idiosincrasia per ogni estremismo si manifesta ulteriormente la spiccata propensione di gran parte degli europei per il moderatismo, cui concorrono in modo rilevante le caratteristiche del sistema istituzionale, del sistema elettorale e

del sistema dei partiti.

3.4 L’autocollocazione sinistra-destra

Malgrado le profonde trasformazioni intercorse nell’ultimo decennio e il progressivo stemperarsi di molte differenze programmatiche, l’alternativa sinistradestra continua ad essere usata sia nella competizione politica sia nella ricerche sugli orientamenti ideologici ed elettorali”. Le contingenze elettorali e la cronaca quotidiana forniscono, almeno in Italia, infiniti esempi di questa tendenza. I leaders delle vecchie e delle nuove formazioni politiche spendono ogni giorno gran parte delle loro energie per accreditarsi come rappresentanti della “sinistra”, del “centro”, della “destra”; gran parte della comunicazione politica gioca sugli stessi termini, anche solo per argomentare che essi sono inadeguati o superati. Dal punto di vista pratico, la polarità sinistra-destra assume significati assai mutevoli in base al contesto e alla congiuntura storico-politica di ciascun paese, con oscillazioni che possono andare dalla scelta di partiti “rivoluzionari” o “radical-riformisti” per le posizioni di estrema sinistra, alla scelta di partiti “ultraconservatori” o “reazionari” per le posizioni di destra, passando per posizioni moderatamente riformiste o moderatamente conservatrici per le intermedie 7 Malgrado la progressiva cautela degli studiosi di cose politiche, l’autocollocazione degli elettori lungo il continuum sinistra-destra continua ad essere un indicatore abbastanza discriminante e quindi utile per esaminare i differenti orientamenti politici ed il sistema di valori ad essi connessi.

469

posizioni di centro. Nel contesto italiano, ad esempio, il termine “sinistra” è cambiato profondamente nel corso degli ultimi 15 anni, fino al punto di veder drasticamente ridotti i suoi tradizionali connotati “di classe” ed “antisistema” a favore di quelli più genericamente “progressisti” o “riformisti”; analogamente in trasformazione è oggi il significato politico del termine “centro” — che tende a diventare

sinonimo

di liberal-democrazia,

di popolarismo,

di autonomismo,

di

federalismo — e del termine “destra” che tende a diventare sinonimo di liberismo nazional-popolare (Tab. 3). Tab. 3- Autocollocazione sinistra-destra: Italia ed Europa (valori % arrotondati, comprese le non risposte e i non so)

mére RITES

DETTO SH itil E

Sinistra

SESS RULES Sana7FARE Centro gerne mane PCencr

ee [ari ire EE fp atconreserene mesi ie soste Estrema destra destra [Estrema |

ess

Non risponde | NON S8ee een RE Mai dak

D se

Eater nee CAT RTS EEE RES ue lusadiri tater soi Hate Leu ate Fees fegfe ae IO RS ren! basco siena de pers aromi ender etd waters fr astfear wag hour ne ein Amare plies ore rpm) or en DCE de | 100 | 100 |

CURE EEE

12

4 2

|

Mentre sul piano strettamente politico-elettorale la polarità sinistra-destra identifica un campo di forze eterogenee e non rappresenta una sicura chiave di lettura per la comparazione tra stati differenti, questa variabile presenta correlazioni più lineari con le polarità ideologico-politiche analizzate in precedenza e può dunque essere assunta come un indicatore sintetico, empiricamente fondato, di visioni abbastanza strutturate della realtà politico-sociale. Non sorprende allora . che, in termini comparati, l’insieme degli europei si collochino maggiormente verso il centro-destra e gli italiani verso il centro-sinistra. Nel 1999 si registra

peraltro un sensibile spostamento degli italiani verso orientamenti di centro-destra,

470

a conferma dei cambiamenti intervenuti sul versante dei comportamenti elettorali e degli schieramenti politici. Dal punto di vista analitico si deve anzitutto notare che una quota oscillante tra il 17% (media in Europa occidentale) e il 25% (in Italia) degli interpellati non si riconosce nello schema sinistra-destra, o perché rifiuta di rispondere o perché non sa definire la propria posizione. Il moderatismo e l’idiosincrasia verso gli “estremismi” sono, in sintesi, i tratti tipici dei cittadini europei in età di voto. Anche in Italia prevalgono gli orientamenti di “centro”, ma la loro consistenza è inferiore rispetto ai valori medi; nel 1990 — ultimo anno comparabile — le simpatie degli italiani verso l’“estrema sinistra” restano abbastanza marcate (12%) rispetto al resto degli europei (7%) mentre risultano meno accette le etichette di “estrema destra” (5%), secondo un copione più volte documentato dalle ricerche italiane. In Italia il moderatismo (prevalente) si confronta con una consistente dose di “estremismo” di destra, ma soprattutto di sinistra, figlio della radicata tradizione ideologica e politica comunista (Rovati, 2000). Tra l’autocollocazione sinistra-destra e gli orientamenti ideologici ed operativi esaminati nei precedenti paragrafi vi è una relazione sistematica; merita anzitutto segnalare la correlazione diretta con l’alternativa libertà-uguaglianza, ove la libertà appare un valore tipico delle posizioni di centro e di destra, l’uguaglianza un valore tipico della sinistra (moderata ed estrema). Parimenti correlati con la polarità di destra sono gli orientamenti individualistici-meritocratici-competitivi, mentre quelli collettivistici-assistenziali-cooperativi si associano alla polarità di sinistra. La fiducia verso le istituzioni è, in generale, più avvertita da coloro che si collocano verso destra, piuttosto che verso sinistra, con la sola eccezione della

fiducia verso la stampa ed i sindacati ove le posizioni si invertono. L'approvazione dei

movimenti

di

protesta

(ambientali,

antinucleari,

pacifisti,

femministi,

antirazziali), come pure l’adesione a forme di partecipazione non convenzionali sono sistematicamente correlate con l’orientamento di sinistra piuttosto che di destra.

4. Osservazioni conclusive

L’analisi comparata degli atteggiamenti direttamente riconducibili alla cultura politica dà la possibilità di mettere in evidenza alcuni tratti di fondo del “carattere nazionale” di ciascun Stato aderente all’UE (Halman, 1995). Particolarmente marcate sono risultate anzitutto le differenze tra gli italiani e l’insieme degli europei nei confronti delle istituzioni rappresentative dei diversi sottosistemi (economico, politico, giuridico, culturale) che compongono la struttura societaria. Mentre gli italiani manifestano una debole fiducia nei confronti delle istituzioni politico-amministrative, i concittadini europei tributano ad esse una stima maggiore per ragioni riconducibili sia al riconoscimento delle loro positive prestazioni funzionali, sia al valore simbolico ad esse attribuito. Alla tendenziale

471

sfiducia nei confronti dell’apparato politico, corrisponde una rilevante fiducia degli italiani nei confronti delle istituzioni produttive (come le imprese) e di quelle a cui si riconosce un’importanza ideale (la Chiesa) o funzionale (l’Europa, la Polizia, la Nato). La generalità degli europei invece guarda con maggior cautela verso le istituzioni sovranazionali per il timore di veder ridotta la propria autonomia decisionale. L’identificazione dell’insieme degli europei con l’assetto politico-istituzionale del paese in cui vivono — ma il discorso andrebbe disaggregato analiticamente per cogliere le non poche differenze entro i singoli Stati e tra gli Stati — risulta meno contrastata di quanto non appaia tra gli italiani, a giudicare dalla propensione dei primi per le forme di partecipazione politica prevalentemente convenzionale e per quella maggiormente trasgressiva dei secondi. Gli italiani esprimono posizioni politiche più estreme, una maggior carica polemica verso lo status quo, un maggior orientamento al cambiamento radicale. Mi sembrerebbe peraltro semplicistico spiegare questa irrequietezza come esito dell’insoddisfazione o della protesta per le disfunzioni istituzionali, e ricondurla dunque ad una sorta di problemi funzionali;

non va infatti trascurato il peso dei conflitti ideologici che hanno a lungo caratterizzato la storia politica italiana, unitamente alla presenza di molteplici orientamenti particolaristici, difficilmente armonizzabili e governabili. La cultura

politica degli italiani riflette le tensioni ideologiche e istituzionali che connotano da tempo la società italiana e che neppure le recenti trasformazioni nel sistema dei partiti e delle alleanze di governo sono riuscite a modificare significativamente. La questione del lavoro, che, come noto, costituisce oggi la sfida prioritaria per ogni paese europeo, segna in profondità la coscienza collettiva degli italiani e degli europei, ma è soprattutto tra gli italiani che il timore della crisi occupazionale alimenta la tendenza a mettere in discussione il principio delle pari opportunità, che è uno dei capisaldi del modello universalistico di solidarietà. Attorno a tale questione potrebbero in pratica nascere vere e proprie reazioni collettive antisolidaristiche, coagulate dalle fratture tra gaPantiti e non garantiti, disoccupati “forti” e disoccupati “deboli”, aree regionali economicamente più sviluppate e aree meno sviluppate. Ciò che contraddistingue sinteticamente la cultura politica europea è il “moderatismo”, particolarmente evidente nella marcata idiosincrasia per ogni forma di estremismo politico, ma anche nella tolleranza per le persone appartenenti ad altra etnia e confessione religiosa o per coloro che tengono stili di vita privata non conformi a quelli della maggioranza. Poiché l’antiestremismo rappresenta un valore altamente condiviso, esso può anche alimentare reazioni di netta chiusura verso chi ne appare portatore e tradursi in decisi provvedimenti difensivi. Tra i valori maggiormente condivisi dall’insieme degli europei figurano gli orientamenti individualistico-meritocratico-competitivi che assegnano una funzione prioritaria . alla dimensione soggettiva e una funzione sussidiaria alla sfera statuale, che in ogni caso gode di elevata fiducia dal punto di vista funzionale e simbolico. Il moderatismo,

che

non

coincide

con

il conservatorismo,

472

ma

è piuttosto

una

modalita per realizzare riforme anche profonde, é favorito non solo dalle tradizioni ideologiche prevalse dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, ma anche da un sistema politico-istituzionale che attraverso la legislazione elettorale e la politica sociale è riuscito ad aggregare i consensi, con evidenti vantaggi competitivi per il sistema decisionale pubblico e privato, che in tal modo riesce a perseguire obiettivi ampiamente condivisi in tempi relativamente rapidi. In questo senso si può dire che il moderatismo europeo è orientato alla presa di decisioni, piuttosto che al loro rinvio. La compresenza di orientamenti contraddittori che tendono a bilanciarsi reciprocamente qualifica la cultura politica italiana principalmente per il suo eclettismo, che, mentre rende difficile il raggiungimento di sintesi politico-culturali stabili,

consente

di

far

convivere

orientamenti

altamente

differenziati.

Gli

orientamenti “moderati” — sostanzialmente prevalenti — debbono costantemente fare i conti con orientamenti “estremi” attraverso laboriosi processi di mediazione, dall’esito permanentemente incerto. Che l’eclettismo rappresenti un tratto di fondo della cultura nazionale è confermato dal fatto che tali orientamenti continuano ad operare anche all’interno dei nuovi schieramenti politico-ideologico formatisi con il passaggio al nuovo sistema elettorale semi-maggioritario (dal 1994 in poi). All’attivo di tale eclettismo vanno ascritte l’elevata capacità di adattamento e flessibilità, che producono i loro effetti virtuosi soprattutto a livello del sottosistema economico e culturale; di segno negativo sono invece gli effetti a livello del sottosistema politico ed amministrativo, in quanto l’eclettismo impedisce di prendere decisioni di carattere strategico in tempi accettabilmente rapidi; emblematiche sono a questo riguardo le difficoltà che l’Italia incontra nel campo delle riforme politico-istituzionali (ad es. la forma di Stato e di governo di cui tanto oggi si discute) o delle riforme economico-strutturali (ad es. la riforma pensionistica o le privatizzazioni delle imprese pubbliche). Da ultimo, si deve riconoscere che l’ipotesi della convergenza di posizioni tra i giovani non è risultata tanto forte da rappresentare un punto di unificazione transnazionale; meno marcata del previsto è risultata anche la convergenza su stili di vita sempre più naturali, post-consumisti e post-materialisti; verificata in modo soddisfacente appare invece l’ipotesi del revival dell’interesse per la politica in questa età di transizione, che mette alla prova la capacità di ogni paese europeo di coniugare le esigenze di una rinnovata competitività economica con quelle della estensione dei diritti di cittadinanza.

Riferimenti bibliografici Almond G. A. e Verba S. (1963), The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Almond G. A. e Powell G. B. jr. (1993), Politica comparata, Il Mulino, Bologna.

473

Capraro G. (a cura di) (1995), / valori degli europei e degli italiani negli anni Novanta, Regione Autonoma Trentino-Alto Adige/Università degli Studi di Trento. Cesareo V., Cipriani R., Garelli F., Lanzetti C. e Rovati G. (1993), La religiosità degli italiani, Mondadori, Milano. Gubert R. (a cura di) (1993), Persistenze e mutamenti dei valori degli italiani nel contesto europeo, Reverdito, Trento.

Gubert R. (a cura di) (2000), La via italiana alla postmodernità. Verso una nuova architettura dei valori, F. Angeli, Milano. Ferrera M. (1993), Modelli di solidarietà. Politica e riforme sociali nelle democrazie, Il Mulino, Bologna. Halmann L. (1995), “La misurazione dei valori e il problema della comparabilità”, in Capraro G. (a cura di), / valori degli europei e degli italiani negli anni Novanta, Regione Autonoma Trentino-Alto Adige/Università degli Studi di Trento, pp. 61-98. Kerkhofs J. (1995), “Il significato degli studi sui valori europei per il futuro dell’ Europa”, in Capraro G. (a cura di), / valori degli europei e degli italiani negli anni Novanta, Regione Autonoma Trentino-Alto Adige/Università degli Studi di Trento, pp. 23-38. Ingleheart R. (1971), “The silent revolution in Europe: intergenerational change in postindustrial societies”, in American Political Science Review, 65, 4, pp. 991-1017. Ingleheart R. (1993), Valori e cultura politica nella società industriale avanzata, Liviana, Vicenza. Ispo/Cra-Nielsen - Corriere della Sera, “Politica Trend”, 1995-2000, numeri vari. Mannheimer R. e Sani G. (1994), La rivoluzione elettorale, Anabasi, Milano. Marshall T. H. (1950), Citizenship and social class, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ; Mogardini C. (a cura di) (1990), Cultura e politica nell'Europa contemporanea, Ecig, Genova. Rovati G. (1990), “Trasformazioni di lungo periodo e immagini della politica in Italia”, in Mongardini C. (a cura di) (1990), pp. 89-103. Rovati G. (1992), “Partecipazione e scelte politiche”, in Gubert R. (a cura di) (1992), pp.

347-394. Rovati G. (1995), “Etica pubblica, etica privata”, in Cesareo et al., (1995), pp. 153-201. Rovati G. (1996), “La cultura politica degli italiani e dei tedeschi: elementi per un’analisi comparata/Die politische Kultur der Italianer und der Deutschen. Bausteine fur eine vergleichende Analyse”, in Annali di Sociologia/Soziologisches Jahrbuch, 13, 1997, III, pp. 245-303. Rovati G. (2000), “L’incerta scelta. Orientamenti ideologici e comportamenti elettorali”, in Gubert R. (a cura di) (2000), pp. 315-354.

474

CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND REGIONAL POWER IN CHINA: ARE THERE ANY LESSONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? Martin SINGER Concordia University of Montreal, Canada

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am delighted to be able to join you this morning at this important Conference on European integration. For myself and for my colleagues from Concordia University in Canada, this occasion also signals the inauguration of a formal partnership with our new sister university, University of Genoa. We look forward to many years of academic cooperation between our two universities. I want to personally thank Prof. Casale for his tremendous efforts and enthusiasm, both in organizing the Conference and in arranging for our participation in it. Let me begin my remarks this morning with the confession that I am neither a political scientist nor an economist nor a specialist on contemporary Europe. In fact, I am an historian of China with particular focus on the modern period. I began my study of China about 35 years ago and most of my work has dealt with Chinese students at home and abroad and their role in 20" century Chinese history. Today I have been asked to say a few words about China’s long political experience, particularly the tension between central authority and regional power. I will then speak briefly to whether China’s historical experience is at all relevant to European

integration in the 21° century. As many of you are probably aware, although Chinese history dates back 4,000 years, China was first made up of a number of semi-independent kingdoms under a dominant State in a feudal-like arrangement. It was unified under one ruler and one central government under the Qin Dynasty in about 200 B.C. For most of the next 2,200 years the Chinese political structure was dominated by a succession of “Emperors” or “Sons of Heaven” who in the 20" century were replaced first by a President, then by a General and during the past 50 years by a Chairman. Although the position of Emperor was a hereditary one, through a change in “the Mandate of Heaven” one dynasty periodically gave way to another for over two millennia. Both

Chinese

historians

and

Chinese

rulers

and

their

Confucian

officials,

influenced by the Chinese view of time as cyclical rather than lineal, noted a somewhat predictable ebb and flow of power during what came to be known as “dynastic cycles.” Over-simplifying, with a strong Emperor the central bureaucracy governed China firmly; the weaker the Emperor and the older the 475

dynasty, the more inevitably power flowed to the provinces, although authority always remained with the Emperor. The principal explanation for this ebb and flow of political power between the center and the regions in China lies in China’s geography. China has been an enormous country for two millennia. It is the third largest country in the world today. Its territory totals about 9.6 million square kilometers or about three times the size of the current 15-member European Union. Rivers (including two of the world’s longest) and mountains (including the world’s highest) divide China into distinct regions. Historically, some of the more remote regions have been particularly isolated and inaccessible. During World War II, for example, China’s complex geography made possible the separate existence of three governments — the Nationalist in remote Chongqing (in Southwest China); the Communist in remote Yenan (in North China); and the Japanese puppet government in the coastal regions and main inland population areas. In short, it would not be an exaggeration to say that geographically speaking, China is not naturally a country at all, but a collection of potentially distinct countries held together by political means. Another reason for the traditional ebb and flow of political power in China has been the enormity of the population. China has always been the most populous country in the world. Today’s population of 1.3 billion people is more than three times that of the current European Union. During the 19" century the population of China already exceeded 300 million, but the central government had fewer than 30,000 civil servants to govern the country and to control the population. Without a strong Emperor at the helm, the geographic regions, particularly those on the periphery of the Empire and some with populations larger than those of many European countries, naturally began to fall away from central control. Given its problematic geography and daunting population, how has China been held together for more than 2,000 years? Why has it not more frequently and more permanently fragmented into its geographically distinct sub-regions? While there is no one answer to such a question, I am going to identify in the next few minutes four factors which I believe help us to understand the Chinese experience. The Chinese language is the first factor that has held China together politically for more than two millennia. The Chinese language consists of many dialects, including Mandarin, Shanghainese, Hunanese, Cantonese and others. In traditional times it was often difficult or even impossible for Chinese speaking one dialect to understand Chinese speaking another dialect. Nevertheless, the written Chinese language has always remained the same for speakers of all dialects. Thus, an edict from the Emperor or a great work of Chinese philosophy or literature could be read by educated Chinese around the country regardless of their spoken dialect. Today, as a result of a government policy to teach the Mandarin dialect in schools across China, Mandarin Chinese is spoken by nearly one billion people, more than twice . the number of English-speakers worldwide. In short, communication (facilitated by a common language) has been and continues to be essential to national integration in China.

476

The ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the Chinese population is a second factor that has held China together politically for more than two millennia. The vast majority of Chinese (estimates run from 92% to 94%) are members of the predominant Han ethnic group. While China has many minority groups (totaling 6% to 8% of the population), they are widely scattered, including in some of China’s most remote areas. As a result, historically most Chinese have had a strong sense of ethnic identity that has promoted shared values and cultural pride. China’s conviction of its central place in the world led it to regard itself as the “Middle Kingdom” and outsiders as uncultured “barbarians”. This Sino-centric view in turn promoted a cultural conservatism that strengthened China as a political entity, at least until the modern period. China’s ideology (whether Confucianism or Marxism/Leninism/Maoism) is a third factor that has held China together politically for more than two millennia. China has always shown a preference for “totalistic” and pervasive ideological “packages” with political, social, economic and cultural dimensions. Among other things, this ideology has emphasized the vital role and paramount authority of the leader (the “Son of Heaven” or his contemporary equivalent at the macro level and the head of the family at the micro level); the rights of the group over those of the individual; the ideological role of education and the use of model emulation to emphasize core values; and a remarkable willingness to subordinate “rational” economic and technological goals to political and social priorities. China’s social structure is, in my opinion a fourth factor that has held China together politically for more than two millennia. Given the size of the population overall and the density of the population along the coasts and major rivers, Chinese governments have always relied on the social structure to support the political structure. In traditional China one of the Emperor’s secrets was that he had at his disposal an additional one million unofficial “bureaucrats,” bona fide degree holders who had passed the official examinations, but chose not to take up government positions. Instead, they returned to a comfortable life in the countryside where as the “gentry” they served as an invisible government and source of political, legal, moral and religious authority. In times of central government weakness, these gentry and their regional leaders exercised power in China. They always did so on behalf (but never in place of) the Emperor, who was the source of their legitimacy, but they did so at the expense of central power. At the same time, the Emperors maintained a “mutual responsibility” system that brought government control to the level of the family and the individual. In modern China there has been a continuing reliance on para-govermental organizations of all sorts to supplement the role of the official bureaucracy. On an official level, both the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army have for the past 50 years performed and continue to perform certain functions in lieu of or in supplement to the government itself. Other mass organizations — for women, for youth, for workers, for writers, for virtually all groups in society - are intended in part to ensure that every individual in China is enmeshed in a series of overlapping

477

relationships and affiliations that promote either support of or at least obedience to the policies and laws of the Chinese government. In times of central government weakness, these para-governmental and mass organizations, particularly at the regional and local level, appear to increase their power, but their authority and legitimacy flows from the central authorities and ultimately from the “leader” of the Chinese State. In the concluding section of my remarks, I will try to respond to our hosts who have asked me whether any of China’s experience is relevant to the European Union of the 21° century. As I indicated at the beginning of my remarks, I have no expertise in European affairs. That having been said, it appears to me that the relevance of the Chinese experience depends on the ultimate goal of the architects of the European Union. If their ultimate intention is to create a centralized European State or a “federation” of States to replace the existing autonomous States of the European Union, the Chinese experience (admittedly under very different circumstances) suggests that the multiple languages, ethnicities and cultures, ideologies and social histories of the current and prospective members of the European Union, would make such an effort difficult. At the same time, I assume that any attempt to abandon centuries, even millennia, of distinctive

national traditions would be met with a great deal of political resistance. Certainly, from the Chinese perspective, no amount of cost/benefit analysis would warrant such a radical change in national identities. What if the ultimate objective of the architects of European Union is to create a confederation of European States that respects the sovereignty of individual member nations and restricts cooperation to particular sectors, such as economic

cooperation? In that case, the Chinese experience would suggest that prospects for European Union could well be brighter. The key, from the Chinese perspective, would be the degree to which such cooperation would support or challenge the national beliefs, traditions and practices of the member States. As well, from the

Chinese perspective, any such confederation would be vulnerable as soon as the demands of confederation membership clashed with the fundamental national interests and traditions of the member countries. Another perspective on the Chinese experience, if it is indeed relevant for the European Union in the 21“ century, is that it highlights four areas that perhaps deserve the attention of EU architects, particularly in their dealings with future generations of Europeans. They could focus on the vital importance of communication to national integration, possibly with increasing emphasis on a common language or languages. They could work to create an over-arching European ethnicity and culture to complement traditional European ethnicities and cultures. They could foster the emergence of an inclusive, trans-national political ideology that reflects the situation in Europe in the 21° century. They could

propose a trans-national social contract between the European Union and the citizens of its member States.

478

I have tried to show, as historians are inclined to do, that at least in the case of China, history is full of continuities, as well as the obvious discontinuities. There

are certainly significant differences between the Chinese central government of traditional times and its attitude toward and dealings with regional power today. Nevertheless, I have tried to demonstrate that there are significant continuities that can in part be explained by language, ethnicity and culture, ideology and social organization. I have also tried to speak briefly about the future of the European Union from the limited perspective of Chinese historical experience. I only hope that my comments, coming from one who is not a specialist on contemporary Europe, have been of some interest to you. I am looking forward to the remainder of the Conference and to learning a great deal from all of you. As Dean of the Faculty of Arts & Science at Concordia University, I also look forward to the expansion of our academic cooperation with our new partner institution and colleagues who are here from other universities. Thank you and best wishes for a successful Conference!

479

SHARED SOVEREIGNTY: LESSONS THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

FROM

Reeta Chowdhari TREMBLAY Concordia University of Montreal, Canada

Europe is confronted with the complex and difficult issue of how to achieve integration without individual component states losing their sovereignty. This paper will deal with some conceptual arguments outlining shared sovereignty within a federation, drawing on the example of the Indian federation. The clamouring of regional units for increased autonomy and control over their sovereignty is, indeed, a product of the present global disenchantment with the hegemonic power of the federal governments. The response of several federations to the nuclear regions’ demands for an increased control over their political and fiscal jurisdiction has been varied. For example, it has ranged from a hesitant, but necessary, discussion of renewed federalism in Canada to an outright rejection of autonomy demands in India. The latter has denounced the ethnic- and religiousbased movements as being anti-secular, thus anti-nation. The Indian polity has been guided by three overriding unifying principles. These principles are: (a) the Indian Union is perpetual and no demand for secession would be entertained; (b) no religious considerations would form a part of the state agenda; and (c) India’s territorial integrity in relation to its borders and vis-a-vis its neighbours would at all costs be protected. Within this framework, while denying regional claims for autonomy and independence for the States of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and the North-East tribal communities, and yet at the same time accommodating

linguistic and minority demands, the Indian State has been unable to transcend the hegemonic concept of the nation-State and innovate structures for celebrating multiple cultural forms where recognition of different is combined with the rights of a full citizenry. In light of one of the most serious threats to Indian State from secessionists/nationalist movements, the Indian federalism has no choice but to redefine itself. Modern federalism, initially conceived as an unfinished business, has come to

be associated with the paradigmatic discourse of sovereignty which has, until now and in all parts of the world, dictated that sovereignty cannot be shared. Sight has been lost of Hamilton’s words during the United States Constitutional Convention that the future course of the American system «must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to

480

be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments'». Unfinished business has acquired the form of finished business. The discourse on sovereignty, as initially conceived by Bodin in the sixteenth century, has become the major frame of reference, which perceives a layered or hierarchial sovereignty as incompatible with a modern State. The capacity of the political leadership as well as that of the academic community to re-evaluate and re-articulate the concept of federalism has been largely circumscribed by the widely-accepted association of the concept of indivisible sovereignty with the notion of federation. This essay, while attempting a deconstruction of the concept of federation, will suggest that a discussion of the external and internal aspects of state sovereignty is extremely relevant for the conceptual explanation and re-evaluation of federalism. While the modern state’s right to defend its territory vis-à-vis other nations has remained

constant,

it is the

state-society

relations

which

have

undergone

tremendous transformations. The populace decries the state’s exclusive monopoly over the coercive forces. It reviles the institutions of the State which has come to exist for its own sake. No longer is the citizenry willing to gauge the legitimacy of the State by its ability to maintain law and order but it is beginning to demand the state’s willingness and capacity to be responsive. It will be suggested in this essay that shared sovereignty in a federal structure, though difficult to realize, is perhaps an appropriate response to the changed requirements of state legitimacy in the present civil societies. A quick review of the literature on federalism will reveal that over the years a systemizing theory regarding the definition of federalism has emerged. K. C. Wheare’s suggestion to view the two levels of government as coordinate has been viewed by scholars such as William Riker, Ivo Duchacek, Daniel Elzar etc. as exclusionary. Wheare’s simple test for locating a federal structure entails the simultaneous existence of sovereign authority of both the regional and general governments. He proposes that the following question should be asked to define a federal system: «Does a system of government embody predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities each of which in its own sphere is coordinate with the others and independent of them? If so, that government is federal». In this federal principle, other than the two levels of government, no additional autonomous relationship exists. Moreover, according to Wheare, the question of subordination of one or the other level of the government is not relevant, for such a kind of subordination or dependence implies either a confederal or a devolutionary system. Riker maintains that Wheare’s test, based on the notion of sovereignty and the requirements of formal juristic independence of both levels of government not only excludes most of the existing federations, but is also irrelevant given the stalemate and disaster implied in systems of coordinate

' The Federalist, n. 31. 2K. C. Wheare (1967), Federal Government, Oxford University Press, London, 33.

481

pairs of authorities’. Most writers have reacted to the legal-formalism implied in Wheare’s definition, which its criterion of independence of both the units and the union with a precisely defined division of functions. Recognizing a spectrum of federalisms, they have, instead, emphasized the process underlying these governments. William Livingstone describes federalism as a quality of society. For him, the institutions and constitutional principles provide only a rough guide to the pattern of instrumentalities and the essence of federalism lies in the society itself. The significant diversities of a society, which demand and receive recognition and protection by some instrumentality, can best be accommodated in a federal organization. Viewed this way, for Livingstone, federalism is not «an absolute but a relative term*». In the same vein, Carl Friedrich maintains that federalism is the

process of federalizing a political community and should not be viewed as a «static pattern or design, characterized by a particular and precisely fixed division of powers between governmental levels*». Ivo Duchacek, in his examination of twenty-eight existing federal systems through ten yardsticks, arrives at the conclusion that both the constitutional and extra-constitutional realities make it impossible to obtain coordinate and simultaneously autonomous units and union, as required by Wheare’s test of federal systems‘. Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elzar have pushed the concept of intermingling and cooperative federalism further. Among the multitudinous governments of the United States, virtually all of them, federal, state and some local governments, are involved «in virtually all functions... Functions of the American governments are shared functions’». The American system is described as a marble cake where there is no division of authority between constituent units and the central government but rather a mingling. Undoubtedly, with the rise of cooperative federalism, Wheare’s strict standards of sovereignty, coordinate status,

and independence of the two levels of government present problems in identifying Wheare-type federal governments. However, in expounding an inclusive definition of federalism, which is based on the “common usage” rather than “advocates usage” and is more or less “satisfactory”, Wheare’s critics have constructed rules of formation, albeit less rigid, but consistent with the established prevailing discourse of sovereignty, which pose problems. For them, sovereignty is indivisible and it is essential that it reside in one level of government. According to Riker, «real federations are always constructed so that in a crisis one kind of government can and does prevail. Sometimes it takes a civil war to discover where * See William H. Riker, “Federalism”, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsky eds. (1975), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 5, (Reading, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Massachussetts), pp. 101-104.

DE D pp.

caimitiad “A Note on Nature of Federalism”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 1-

4

:Carl Friedrich (1968), Trend of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Praeger, New York, 7. Ivo O. Duchacek (1970), Comparative Federalism, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, Ch. 7-9. 7 Morton Grodzins (1966), The American System, Rand McNally, Chicago, 7.

482

Î

the ultimate strength is; but that there is a stronger side is almost certain... If a system displayed the exact balancing between the centre and the states on which he (Wheare) insists, it would — in constant stalemate — be unable to act». Thus, the challenging task of a federal system simultaneously to have an indestructible union and indestructible units emerges as subservient to the state’s requirement of sovereignty and maintenance of law and order. Such an approach certainly makes it difficult for the regions, wanting to maintain their distinct identity on the basis of either language, religion or ethnicity, to negotiate control over their political choices at a time when federal hegemony is preponderant and when these regional units are questioning the legitimacy of the central government to make decisions on behalf of their constituencies. In their attempt to develop more inclusionary definitions of federalism, the above-noted authors have unwittingly expounded the Bodinian notion of indivisible sovereignty. Though the historical contexts are different, one can note the similarities of the argument of Bodin and of the process-oriented authors of federalism. In his Six Books of the Commonwealth, Bodin observes that there can only be one sovereign in a polity. «/f there are two, three or more, not one of them is sovereign, since none of them can either impose a law on his companions or submit to one at their instance». Moreover, for him, an alliance of different polities

is only possible if they agree to unite under the authority of one. «...An alliance of diverse city-states, exchange of goods, common rights, laws, and religions do not make the same state, but union under the same authority does». Underlining the problem of stalemate or friction, which Riker has noted in Wheare’s coordinate federal system, Bodin also suggests that «the greater the number of those that rule, the more opportunities are there for faction, the more difficult it is to arrive at any agreement, and the more irresponsible are the decisions taken». Bodin, in his critique of political communities with dual sovereignty, unequivocally stated that all States are transitory and instability is a chronic condition of civil society. Therefore, to ensure the political order and prevent the chaos associated with political change, the political authority must be centralized, absolute and indivisible. The modern authors on federalism have expressed a similar concern and have solved the problem by suggesting that federalism does not imply the idea of coordinate, co-equal or co-sovereign partners. Bodin’s doctrine of sovereignty — absolute, perpetual and indivisible = has emerged as the only frame of reference regarding a basic understanding of sovereign power. Tooley very perceptively observes that everyone writing after Bodin was influenced by his work and was to reproduce partial or complete arguments laid down by Bodin. For example, Samuel Von Pufendorf in his treatment of different forms of government declared all those States where sovereignty was fragmented to be irregular polities. He followed Bodin’s concept 8 Jbid., p. 105. ° Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, Abridged and translated by M. J. Tooley (1967), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 197, 194.

483

of indivisibility in order to define regular States. «The Regularity of a State we conceive to consist in this, that all, and each of the Members seem to be governed

as it were by one Soul; or, that the supreme Authority is exercised through all the parts of the State by one Will, without Division or Convulsions». On the other hand, the irregular governments are those, according to Pufendorf, «if which we neither

can

discover

any

one

of the three

regular

Forms

(i.e., democracy,

aristocracy, or monarchy), nor yet any proper Disease or Deviation; and which at the same time cannot, with due Exactness, be ranked amongst the systematic Models».

Johannes Althusius, who, Friedrich claims, has expounded a federal

theory of popular sovereignty, advanced an elaborate schema of alliance and the relationship between its different members. Though he clearly stated that an alliance implies a notion of a reciprocal covenant and that the incorporation of various bodies in the new system does not imply the dissolution of any part nor the abandonment of their right to freedom, ho nevertheless viewed, the sovereignty as residing exclusively in the State. Gierke describes Althusius’s notion of an organic society in which «the larger society is always composed of smaller societies as cooperative units, and only through them does it act upon their members; in which every smaller society, as a true and original community, draws from itself its own communal life and its own sphere of rights, giving up to the higher society only so much of this as is indispensably required for the attainment of its specific ends; in which, lastly, the State is otherwise generically of the same nature as its component societies and differs from them only in its exclusive sovereignty''». Historical views from Bodin onwards have dictated that effective, strong, and

coherent rule requires a national government. This national government is consistent with any claims to equality by any other government within the polity. While a consensus has prevailed regarding the tenets of sovereignty, and Bodin’s thesis has taken the shape of a paradigmatic discourse, the emergent concerns during and after the eighteenth century have been the protection of liberty, the requirement of political equality to achieve freedom and liberty, the protection of individual interests from the arbitrary exercise of power, the accountability of governors, and the creation of the best circumstances for all humans within which to develop their nature and express their diverse qualities. These concerns of the expanded citizenry bring into light an inherent contradiction between the sovereign State and the sovereign people. How ought one to reconcile the principle of indivisible, absolute and perpetual power to make laws with the concerns of the citizens for equality, freedom and participation? It is interesting to note that, as early as the sixteenth century, Machiavelli in The Discourses tried to resolve the dilemma inherent in the coexistence of the sovereign’s authority and the popular participation of a limited citizenry. He

'° Quoted in S. Rufus Davis (1978), The Federal Principle, University of California Press,

Berkeley, 55, 57.

È ai Na Gierke (1966), The Development of Political Theory, Howard Fertig, New ork,

l

484

distinguished between the crisis situation and normal times. While the strong rule of one man is essential for the creation of a well-ordered society, the best regime for the normal times was a republic. His preference for the republican form is evident in this passage: «... a republic has a fuller life and enjoys good fortune for a longer time than a principality, since it is better able to adapt itself to diverse circumstances owing to the diversity found among its citizens than a prince can do. For a man who is accustomed to act in one particular way, never changes, as we have said. Hence, when times change and no longer suit his ways, he is inevitably ruined”, In his reconciliation of these two, Max Weber developed one of the most significant definitions of the modern State. He assigns three major characteristics to it: territoriality, monopoly of coercion, and legitimacy based on the rule of law. Each nation-State is a part of a mutually interacting world-system and the fundamental job of each is to protect its territory. The State is the only legitimate institution which possesses the monopoly over the usage of coercion to protect its citizens from both internal and external violence. But this usage of force must be sustained by a belief of the citizens in the justifiability of the state’s actions. Thus, the legitimacy of the modern State, based on the rule of law, is its essential characteristic. By virtue of legality, while on the one hand the state officials are constrained in their actions, they can on the other claim obedience. However, what

is significant in Weber’s thought is the resolution of the tension between the sovereign State and the sovereign people in favour of might and power. In balancing the two, the concepts of authority and political accountability, Weber was to seek a method which would not imply the surrendering of too much power to the demos. His advocacy of democracy, under the social and political conditions of a modern bureaucratic society, had more to do with his conviction «that national

greatness depended on finding able leaders than on any concern for democratic values». Resolution of the tension between might and right or power and law in favour of the paradigmatic discourse on sovereignty has made Beetham observe that Weber’s restrictive interpretation of democracy stands «more at the starting point than at the conclusion of a series of developments in the theory and practice of liberal democracy in the era of mass politics and bureaucratic organizations, it is much more as a precursor than as an epigone that he should be understood". It is within this context of sovereignty, where the modern State exercises absolute and indivisible power and is the sole institution to enjoy the legitimate monopoly over the coercive forces, that the critics of Wheare’s coordinate federal

government appear to have taken an extremely short-sighted view. Following Weber, they have reconciled the tensions between the sovereign people and the sovereign State in favour of the latter. Though this may, as Riker and others have '2 Machiavelli, The Discourses, Bernard Crick ed. (1970), Penguin Books, Great Britain, Book 3, Ch. 9, 431.

13 Aibrow (1970), 48.

'4 Beetham, 19857.

485

stated, result in an efficient policy process and enable the State to deal with crisis situations authoritatively, it does not address the pressing fundamental requirement of the contemporary State, i.e. its legitimacy. The contemporary State has earned the epithets of remote, untrustworthy and coercive. There is a wide disjunction between the people who are supposed to possess formal control and those who exercise control, between the politicians who promise and the limited political input of the citizens. The state’s exclusive control of the coercive power is no longer considered legitimate by the populace. In other words, a process has begun which has delinked the state’s external from its internal sovereignty. While the Bodinian notion of absolute, perpetual and indivisible power of a nation-State vis-a-vis other nations remains acceptable to the populace, it is the internal relationship, between State and society, which have undergone change. The contemporary civil society demands that the basis of internal sovereignty be something other than coercion. The Weberian notion of restrictive political participation needs to be revised. Changes in the totalitarian systems in the past year or so document a changed political mood and suggest that the requirement of legitimacy has taken precedence over the state’s function of maintaining law and order. In this contemporary political environment, where the demands for diversity of power centres, a political arena characterized by openness, and the recognition of plurality loom large, the authors on federal systems need to re-evaluate their basic precepts. Though the existing assumptions and presumptions may still be applicable to the political system of the United States, these certainly have emerged as obsolete for most other existing federal systems. By providing an inclusionary definition of federalism, Riker and the others have given undoubted predominance to the federal government. Though Wheare’s strict legal and juristic definition suffers from some rigidities, it nevertheless presents a better opportunity to redefine federal systems and provides an outlet for popular participation. This allows one, for example, to consider the arrangements of shared sovereignty such as existed in the Mughal kingdom in India or in British India’s relationship with about 500 princely States. It also makes one open to the suggestions of Hanna Arendt who has described a political community as a council State, a new power structure based on a federal principle and composed of elementary republics representing the direct regeneration of democracy. The council State, which Arendt calls the people’s Utopia, will consist of local bodies where not only local but national matters would be discussed. The citizens participating in these bodies would not represent political parties but themselves expressing their wellconsidered opinions. In this kind of a system, debate and persuasion are the basis of power. But any consideration or experimentation with such a kind of utopia is only possible when the definition of federalism is freed from the paradigmaticnotion of sovereignty. One must remember that the Founding Fathers of the American constitution had been unable to resolve the questions of sovereignty and its location. They were able to present only the principle of duality articulated in a 486

single constitutional system. It was a constitution which recognized two distinct governments, each acting in its own right, each directly acting upon the people, each possessing certain authority in a limited domain of action. Federalism was certainly for the Federalists an unfinished business, a union of unfamiliar and unpredictable relations. The American Founding Fathers had no intention of creating a dogmatic notion of a federal government. A shift away from the current paradigmatic discourse on sovereignty will certainly make the modern federal polities more responsive to the constantly shifting political environment.

487

CLOSED BORDERS AND OPEN BORDERS. THE ITALIAN SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN EVOLUTION Danilo VENERUSO University of Genoa, Italy

Borders are not important in themselves, but for what they represent from a cultural point of view in the area where they are situated’. In the Middle Ages, they reflected relationships and plurality at various levels of entwinement, where on the one hand it is hard to identify and separate the aspects and relative religious, cultural, political, social and economic

powers

and on the other, it is hard to

identify their limits, where they overlap. In other words, it is difficult to establish where one begins and the other ends’. A border plurality has derived from these relationships, where the “small borders” - regarding those aspects considered being at the bottom of the medieval value classification - have ended up prevailing over the “great borders”. History tells us in fact that borders were mainly mentioned regarding duty, tollage, customs, and heavy taxes, in other words, concerning charges that people remembered the most and the longest, maybe even the more so in their collective imagination, due to the feeling of oppression, inevitability and annoyance, well expressed by the originally technical term of “harrying”, which etymologically defines any taxation. The situation evolved until it inverted its basic tendency at the beginning of the medieval crisis and consequently, the Sancta Romana Res Publica. The concept of an exclusive and absolute “monarchic” power (also and above all with the sense of “unique”), able to weaken the position of the Church as the source of “truth” and “good” in all aspects of life, was elaborated and presented by Machiavelli at the beginning of the 15th century, taking the place of relationships and plurality of | In general, this is to be seen mainly as far as the relationship between borders and cultural areas is concerned. C. Magris (1996), // mito asburgico nella letteratura austriaca moderna, Einaudi, Torino; E. Fasana (1998), Ai confini degli imperi: nuove linee, nuove frontiere, NE Padova; C. Magris (1999), Utopia e disincanto. Saggi (1974-1996), Garzanti ilano. ? Cf. G. Falco (1986), La santa Romana Republica. Profilo storico del Medio Evo, Ricciardi, Napoli, (tenth edition); W. Ullmann (1972), Principi di governo e politica nel Medioevo, Bologna; M. Dogliani “L’idea di rappresentanza nel dibattito giuridico in Italia e nei maggiori paesi eurcpei”, in P. G. Ballini (1997), /dee di rappresentanza e sistemi elettorali in Italia tra Otto e Novecento, Report on the third day of the “Luigi Luzzati” study, on contemporary Italian history (Venice, 17th November 1995), Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Venezia, pp. 7-41.

488

powers. This “strong”, unique power, exclusive and inseparable, which tends to exclude or emarginate other powers (especially that of the Church), therefore generates “strong”, well-marked borders, which are exclusive and significantly different from the “weak borders” of the previous historical period. In an attempt to put an end to the “strong border” phenomena, or even try to promote an inversion of the tendency, Restoration politicians met in Vienna after the fall of Napoleon (1814-1815) trying to contrast the danger of long term war following a model of “strong borders”, by creating “buffer countries”, which could somehow act as “weak borders” in the areas of Europe where greater religious, cultural and political conflict was present. So Switzerland interposed between the prevalently protestant North European countries and those of the Southern European, prevalently Catholic countries, while the Reign of Sardinia, consolidated in the Dukedom of Savoia and reenforced by the annexation of the territory once belonging to the Republic of Genoa, later joined by Luxembourg and the Netherlands (shortly to be further fragmented after Belgium became independent), make up a sort of “cordon sanitaire” against a feared extension of France towards Europe and the Mediterranean. With the coming of the revolutionary age, France had experimented the incredible grandeur which became known as the grande nation after the battle of Walmy (1792) that ended in victory. As statism grew, whether based on monarchic tradition or on the new principle of nationality, those “buffer countries” originally created with the intention of disengagement, found themselves on the contrary in situations of political rivalry, as can be seen in the role of Luxembourg in the outbreak of war between France and Prussia in 1870. The same goes for Belgium in the outbreak and development of the First World War. In fact the “strong countries” of the so-called “European Concert” began to think of how to intervene in simplifying politics in the Old Continent. In 1913 Germany began to take the idea of annexation of Belgium seriously, or even that of splitting it two ways with France. One year later, the First World War broke out thanks to the Austrian-Hungarian attempt to annex Serbia (in symbiosis with the German Empire), considered by them and by the Germans to be a barricade, obstructing their political ambitions in the direction of the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, the “strong countries” continued to affirm their power harming the “weak countries” and were consistent in their aim, though varying in method, at a time when countries claimed exclusivity even when based on National principles. This in turn was transformed after the “national revolution” in 1848, from a specification factor of a wider group (which may be Christianity from a religious

point of view or Europe from a secular point of view) into an exclusivism or neoabsolutism factor. In fact, it is here in the area of more “revolutionary” developments, in other words unilateral of the national principle, that country borders are considered “sacred national borders”, implying a holiness that only the borders of Christianity had been able to represent in the past. 489

Such development reached its peak after the principle of nationality revolutionary radicality in the aftermath of the First World War, therefore and total regarding international fascism. Various factors, including a economic protectionism, transformed countries in the “European concert”

achieved absolute growing between

the two wars into real “monads” armour plated in their economic self-sufficiency,

worried by nothing other than blocking off and barricading any possible opening which could offer communication with the outside world. Thus creating an “imaginary group feeling” which emphasises the function of boundaries and tends to present a border as a dividing wall which separates rather than something which creates a relationship between two civilisations, two populations. The passage from being a communication point to that of being a dividing line and even a separation does not come free. In fact it is the passage whereby the political dimension goes from a convergence function to that of divergence, denying the mission that modern countries have attributed themselves to having since the crisis of religion, which had favoured divergence for at least two centuries under strong antithesis between Reform and Counter-Reformation’. The evaluation of a border as a separation factor is further strengthened when radicalisation of the social factor is associated to radicalisation of the national factor. In other words, when the “national revolution” is associated or entwined with

the

“social

revolution”.

In such

case,

the

eastern

borders

of Poland,

Czechoslovakia and Romania become the borderline between two completely different, or even opposite worlds. The height and relentlessness of these authentic barriers show how they cannot be limited just to representing a specific territory, but must be transferred to wider horizons and to the conscience of the individual. In such way, not even the “strong powers” that express themselves via the “national revolution” and the “social revolution” would be able to promote and guarantee the kind of social aggregation represented by the cohabitation factor. The defeat of international fascism in 1945 put two political concepts face to face on a worldwide bipolar scale, where the democratic one - the “Girondist” method from the United States - defers to the relationship network, so typical of the Christian Middle Ages. The other, of socialist origin, follows the “Bolshevik”. Lenin method, representing continuity with the “strong powers” of the Jacobin method. In other words, the democratic concept favours the weak idea of borderlines, which therefore return to being what they were during the Middle Ages: communication, relationship and pluralist factors and instruments. However, the dividing and separation function of borders continues to maintain its validity thanks to bipolarity of the worldwide system.

> F. Meinecke offered some considerations on this point in (1930), Cosmopolitismo e Stato nazionale, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, as well as (1970), La ragion di Stato nella storia moderna, Sansoni, Firenze, (Italian translation).

490

Borders between the western world and the Communist world do not only keep up the separation function, already present at the time of state exclusivism, but even strengthens it, as can be seen by the importance given to political events which took place in the second half of the last century, influencing culture and public opinion. These events certainly belong to the separating border concept like the “Berlin bridge” (1948-1949), the “Berlin wall” (1961), the borderline between the two Koreas (from 1950 onwards) and the two parts of Vietnam (from 1954 onwards)}. However, international frontiers which are not eliminated (and have not been totally eliminated even today) take on a gradually weakening importance within the western half of the bipolar world. The difference can be noted especially as far as Italian borderlines are concerned. Defeat appears to open out onto a horizon of fearful isolation for our country. In the first half of 1947 cultural relationships (even before political ones) between two bordering European countries with a long history of strong bonds of every possible kind, like France and Italy, appeared permanently scarred by the inconsiderate effects of fascism, the war and its immediate consequences. The most important of these was the painful question of the contrast regarding the rectification of the Italian-French frontier in the Roja Valley. In September 1947 Briga and Tenda were to be handed over to France. In reality, the frontier at the time seemed more like two high walls of separation and contacts between the two were minimised and therefore few and far between’. By the end of the same year things had already changed significantly. France had taken on a noble and insistent battle at the end of 1947 in order to help Italy be considered and accepted as one of the high level West European countries. At the time many countries would have preferred to let Italy in through the back door and this was expressed by economic, political, cultural and social institutions which were forming throughout the western hemisphere (from the Marshall Plan to the extension of the Brussels Treaty and the negotiations for the Atlantic Treaty and NATO). France’s alliance quickly improved the relationship between the two bordering countries. i Shortly after, the Italian-French frontiers opened up and relationships grew until the provinces of Cuneo and Imperia (on the Italian side) and the Maritime # See a geographical representation of the division between the two blocks just a few months before the fall of the Berlin wall in (1989), Atlas of the straight baselines, Giuffré, Milano,

(second edition). Cf. D. De Angelis (1989), /talia-Francia anni Trenta-Quaranta, Tracce, Pescara; E. Costa Bona (1945), Dalla guerra alla pace. Italia-Francia (1940-1947), Angeli, Milano. As far as the difficult task of bringing together two countries and two populations, Cf. L. Senesi (1995), Francia e Vaticano dall'avvento al soglio pontificio di Pio XII fino alla disfatta francese (1939-1940), Nuova Immagine Editrice. $ Cf. E. Costa, op.cit.; M. Giovana (1996), Frontiere, nazionalismi e realtà locali: Briga e Tenda (1945-1947), Gruppo Abele, Torino.

491

Alps (on the French side) worked so closely together on the convergence process that they consider themselves a new entity together’. The situation was quite different on Italy’s eastern frontiers during those days. As in the West, even Italy’s eastern frontiers were under dispute, but more widely

spread and dramatically. However, on the contrary to what happens in the West, here the wounds did not heal thanks to Peace Conference resolutions. If anything they got worse and were subject to dangerous developments. They showed no improvement in 1948 when the break between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia came’. Until June 1948, an extremely strong, high wall of separation was erected east of Trieste, where mutual national rivalry added up to an ideological, political borderline of bipolar rivalry. After the break with Stalin and Tito, the bipolar wall was reduced, even though it was not fully eliminated, but the national wall remains and has even suffered a dangerous, acute growth between 1952 and 1954, when the city of Trieste was not returned to Italy. Together with the Italian Communist Party

- the principle opposition party - this created the risk of the outbreak of war’. After the problem of Trieste was resolved in November 1954", the reasons behind the creation of barriers and “closed” frontiers prevailed over those regarding communication on the eastern front with barbed wire, numerous police patrols, suspicion concerning frontier controls and minimised cultural exchange". It was necessary to wait until the Italian- Yugoslavia Osimo Treaty drawn up in 1975, in order to see an inversion of tendency.

For the first time after years of “cold war” (even though not directly linked to the bipolar division of the world), Italians and Slavics from the South started to get

? Cf. G. B. Duroselle and E. Serra (1998), Italia e Franvia (1946-1954), F. Angeli, Milano.

® Cf. V. Vidali (1982), Ritorno alla città senza pace. Il 1948 a Trieste, Vangelista, Milano. ? Cf. A. Santin (1974), Trieste 1943-1945, Del Bianco, Udine; R. Pupo (1990), Tra Italia e Jugoslavia. La questione di Trieste (1944-1954), Del Bianco, Udine; P. Spirito, Trieste a stelle e strisce. Vita quotidiana al tempo del governo militare alleato, by R. Sabatti (1994), Mgs Press Trieste; C. Novak Bogdan (1996), Trieste 1941-1954. La lotta politica, storica e ideologica, Mursia, Milano; A. S. Tokarev, Trieste 1946-1947 nel diario di un componente sovietico della commissione per i confini etnici italo-jugoslavi, by G. Cervani and D. De

Rosa (1996), Del Bianco, Udine; C. Tonel (1999), Trieste 1941-1947, Dedolibri, Trieste, 1 Cf. M. De Leonardis (1992), La “diplomazia atlantica” e la soluzione del problema di Trieste (1952-1954), Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli; R. Gruden, Trieste, ottobre

1954. Una cronaca parallela, by C. Giovanella (1997), Mgs Press, Trieste; P. E. Taviani (1988), Giorni di Trieste. Diario (1953-1954), Il Mulino, Bologna.

Cf. C. Belci (1989), Memorie di trent'anni (1945-1975), Morcelliana, Brescia; C. Schiffrer

(1993), Dopo il ritorno dell'Italia. Trieste (1954-1969), Del Bianco, Udine; C. Belci (1996), Quel confine mancato. La linea Wilson (1919-1945), Morcelliana, Brescia; M. Dassovich (1997), Dopoguerra a Trieste. L'esperienza e la testimonianza di un “optante”’ fiumano (1949-1996), Del Bianco, Udine.

492

©

to know each other and familiarise with a tendency that was underway and did not even run aground after the sanguinary Yugoslavian fragmentation in the nineties”. Even the Brenner frontier, which was briefly but dangerously somewhat strangled in the sixties, regained its natural communication function between the Continental and Mediterranean sectors of Europe, therefore becoming one of the main convergence factors between populations. I have briefly summarised a few points, which are to be examined in greater depth by historiography according to each sector and studying each territory individually. These points indicate that the history of frontiers cannot be expressed only following a geopolitical approach, as has been custom so far. The frontier question, seen from the widest possible horizon, may be considered as a focal point in the life of man, touching the spiritual and cultural strings as well as those regarding space and time. In fact, history itself shows us how the frontier question cannot be examined separately from the concept of relationships between people and groups, as well as towards the rest of the world. The complex and unlimited network of relationships created may be enriched and coloured by convergences and love or alternatively by divergences, diffidence and hatred.

'2 Cf. P. F. Palumbo, Atti dei congressi sulle relazioni tra le due sponde adriatiche: a) “I rapporti demografici e popolativi”, Edizioni del Lavoro, Roma, 1981; “I rapporti politici e diplomatici”, ibidem, 1988; c) “Le relazioni culturali”, ibidem, 1991; “Le relazioni economiche e commerciali”, ibidem, 1981; “Le relazioni religiose, chiesastiche e giurisdizionali”, ibidem, 1980; “Flussi commerciali e cooperazione economica tra Italia e Jugoslavia”, CEDAM, Padova s.d.; A. M. Calamia, P. Mengozzi and N. Ronzitti (1984), /

rapporti di vicinato tra Italia e Jugoslavia, Giuffré, Milano; P. Kleinoth (1986), Le coste della Jugoslavia viste dall’alto. I porti, le baie e gli ancoraggi, Mursia, Milano; A. Stele (1987), Trento, Bressanone e Trieste. Sette secoli di autonomia ai confini d'Italia, UTET, Torino; R. Pavia, “Città e territori del Medio Adriatico”, Colloquio internazionale di studio Italia-Jugoslavia, Milano; M. Dassovich (1991), Momenti di tensione a Trieste. Dagli accordi di Osimo alla scomparsa di Tito (1975-1980), Lint Editoriale associati, Trieste; Istituto per la storia del movimento di liberazione del Friuli-Venezia Giulia (1996), 77 confine mobile. Atlante storico dell'Alto Adriatico (1866-1992). Austria, Croazia, Italia,

Slovenia Mariano del Friuli, Edizioni della Liguria, (second edition). Regarding the question of Italy's eastern boundaries, you may find it useful to consult M. Cecovini (1991-1995), Dare e avere per Trieste. Scritti e discorsi politici (1946-1994), Del Bianco (three volumes), Udine.

493

THE ROLE OF MINORITIES IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS Giulio VIGNOLI University of Genoa, Italy

1. In 1948 the United Nations approved the International Declaration of Human Rights, but this document did not specifically mention minorities. We had to wait until 1966 to see the introduction of article 27 where minority rights were illustrated as well as the duties of the State which they came from. The problem of minority rights then took on particularly relevant importance with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. In 1992 the European Council claimed that one of the conditions necessary for the recognition of prospective candidate countries, which had once been part of multinational political blocks (such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia etc.), was that regarding the commitment taken to protect minority groups. As far as the European Convention on human rights is concerned, minority rights are not clearly expressed, though any kind of discrimination is forbidden and the right to mother tongue education is also specified. The European Charter regarding the protection of regional minority languages and the Convention framework on the protection of minorities only came into force in 1998. These documents were developed by the various European Council bodies. The Convention framework for the protection of national minorities came into

force on 1° March 1998. By September of the current year (2000) thirty-two member countries of the European Council had ratified this document, but a further eight still have to do so. Three countries have not accepted to take part in the Convention. These are Belgium (for feasible reasons), France and Greece (whose motivations are disputable and criticisable). In Belgium this question is well defined from a legislative point of view, as there are three (four) different official languages: French in Vallonia, Flemish in Flanders and German in German minority areas. Italian may be added to these as it is used by the most numerous non-autochthonal minority. Greece, with its short-sightedness and backwardness, insufficiently censured by the other European members, refuses to recognise a small Macedonian minority group of Slavic-speaking people. They represent what remains of a once numerous population, replaced after the First World War by the large Greek communities who were thrown out of the Near East (Smyrna etc.) by the Turks.

494

It may seem incredible, but France denies the existence of national minority groups as if the Basques, Bretons, Alsatians, Corsicans and Provençal within its frontiers did not exist at all. With the typical centralising approach of cultural backwardness, France denies any real independence, pushing these populations to the limit and even towards armed revolt, as we have seen over the last few years. Not only has the Corsican problem dragged on for many years, but the narrow-minded position has induced Basques and Bretons to draw attention to their problems by means of public demonstrations and dynamite attacks. Even the French Home Minister has resigned because he opposed government policy in which Corsica was to be allowed gradual legislative independence.

2. Returning to the Convention, this document offers the opportunity to each member country to adapt it to its own needs. The Convention does not even contain an exact definition of the word “minority”, which goes to show that the various countries have outlined their own definition. For example, Slovenia has only recognised Italian and Hungarian minorities because they are autochtone and has ridiculously denied this qualification to German minorities, most of whom were driven away and despoiled of all their possessions after the war by Slavic communists (as happened with the Italians) leaving them defenceless. This set off a contentious with Austria, which is still underway, but has been further aggravated by the fact that Centrist-Right wing political parties came to power in Austria and have since inferred a few counterblows at European meetings regarding the forthcoming entry of Slovenia in the European Union. One of the fundamental Convention normatives concerns the declaration of nationality, which is to be considered a personal question. This paper also guarantees the right to maintain one’s cultural identity (therefore maintaining one’s mother tongue, both spoken and written) for private and public use. This means that a person has the right to express himself in his mother tongue even during legal proceedings and is entitled to school education as well as nursery and school facilities where minority group languages are taught (as foreseen in visual bilingualism of place names where minority groups are present in their highest percentages). Moving on to the Charter concerning the protection of minority group languages (to be considered as the expression of a European cultural patrimony) we notice that it mainly concerns the defence of languages which are traditionally spoken in specific areas. Recognition of minority languages is often a political problem. For example, Ukraine does not recognise the language of the Ruthenian minority. Few people are aware of the fact that France keeps raising problems regarding the teaching of Corsican, Basque and Breton even now, in the year 2000.

495

3. France and Greece - both members

of the European community, (France was

even one of the founder members) - are highly criticisable in their approach. This is certainly not of constructive encouragement to East European countries who have been waiting anxiously to “enter Europe”, ever since the fall of Communism and have been trying to align their national legislation with those standards acceptable to the Community on the question of minorities which are already present in the country. I wish to point out that this is even more so, due to the fact that the minority group situation has already been cause of instability and crisis for a long time. All East European countries have problems concerning minorities on a national scale. At the moment there is an invective between Greece and Albania regarding the minority groups present in each of the two countries. Perhaps the most publicised at the moment is that regarding the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The three populations which make up Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croatians, Serbs and Muslims or Bosnians) have been unable to reach an agreement as yet and therefore continuous tension is present, repressed only by the presence of international military forces. The situation in Kossovo is known to all and does not therefore require explanation here. Vojvodina enjoyed independent status in the days when Tito was in power (similar to Kossovo) and had its own legislative assembly. Milosevic then eliminated this and both Hungarian and Rumanian minorities living there were badly oppressed. The Hungarian minority groups are a problem for all countries bordering Hungary, as it was deprived of almost one third of its territory after the First World War. Large minority groups of Hungarians are present in Romania (1,600,000 people approx.), Croatia (where there is also an Italian minority group which is being rapidly re-organised after years of slaughtering and persecution under Tito), Slovakia and others. In the Republic of Macedonia the Albanian minority represents almost one third of the population, reaching a majority presence in the area bordering Albania along Lake Ocrid. Furthermore, as the Albanian minority is more prolific than the Macedonians, this tendency may lead to an Albanian majority presence in future. There is a strong minority group of Turks (who were persecuted under communism) in Bulgaria as well as other groups such as the so-called “Pomachi” (Muslim Bulgarians). There are still German minorities (survivors of deportation and slaughtering on behalf of the Russian army) present in Poland and Romania (the so-called Saxon) and throughout the East, German farmers, craftsmen and traders were forced to. travel as far as Russia (such as the Volga Germans) for centuries, often on

invitation or summoned by the sovereigns of that time in those distant lands.

496

Minority groups of Russians are still present in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as a consequence of Russian politics, whereby for a certain period, these noble countries were obliged to belong to the USSR. This also goes for the Ukraine, where an extremely large Russian minority is present as a result of Russian policy, when the Russian government encouraged Russians to move westwards and occupy new territory. The situation is even more serious in the Republic of Moldavia (Moldova), where the Russian population has reached a majority presence along the frontier with the Ukraine and has rebelled against the government (after the breakdown of the USSR), proclaiming the Republic of Transdnestria, which has only been recognised by Russia. This was made possible because an important part of the Russian army (once the Red Army) was, and still is, located in that area. It was given the task (is this still true today?) of invading the Balkans in case of the outbreak of war with the Western world. The quartering of numerous troops with their families along the river Dnester for years and years has created ethnic mutation of the local inhabitants. As you can see there is a complex intertwining and sometimes explosion of problems, which must find a solution - at least in principle - before these countries are accepted in the European Union. For the time being we could set aside the evaluation of minorities in Turkey and the Russian Federation, which are extremely complex and a hot spot at present (just think of Chechenia and the Kurds), as these countries appear to be rather distant from a possible entry into the European Union.

497

era

a

vira

u

nina

dritti

%

à ds

ft

VO

uh

È

trot

Pie

ass

caroioni te orto op > È

M D arabe

n

humble Dress nent

.

: cut

uae

an EE

at

shied

2

201

POD

SR

ot

#

pa

adsvl) raevan of dake ea paiSal ener

ati

lo ag inwnoge né sigubat aldaog ban ae ad bn gine FyreAE DUREE ES Le = eric

die

fi Hater cet: TN

DRE

onl?

A

I

2

a

int dati vote entegrants obind

Nulled eck a) -deg Tr FAT “a

\ fealty

oes

7

T

ì

Behe tee

[

otra?)

epee

Mths

Mes ts

&è elty ans

Qui en = pet

oir’ | navarra

ay va

de

iri

A de > veld

AP aed

robes

CA

ay

7

'

À.

Ù te 4 4

fui TN

NES

Tai

dan

dpi

me

| Ala

;

*

Mary

pp

4

ws

i

(

iu 1

ne

i”

t

i

à iy

al

A Uve

|

» otsels

à.

de dork

?

‘

e :

|

= tering :

A enna

= 2

sa of te

de RUE

TT

simed site bb

asp” ‘infine teeter, Tanta

rali

voila oct gola è

. ossi

a

Pay

i)

VA eke

mq; wit

an.

Testi

“ace

au, use

ph rar tes i

Fouienlgre

lia & ty

up AT" has Li rad PCT

mave hill

rp

he te

2

~

sun

diparte pa guitare fa Gipi

ge

fx

DE

vena DT tia der RE A

US

sh

Po

La MO,

Bre

doi

bd ane’ aa

en)

i

L

dl

360. Economia 3 61. 1 Di 4. 5 TI 8 ox

Sezione 1 J. Johnston, Econometrica J. Lesourne, // calcolo economico Giorgio Basevi, Teoria pura del commercio internazionale G.B. Richardson, La logica della scelta. Introduzione alla teoria economica Jan Tinbergen, La politica economica H. Tuck, Principi di economia agraria Edward Shapiro, Teoria macroeconomica Michael Barratt Brown, /ntroduzione all’economia politica Janusz G. Zielinsky, La teoria della pianificazione socialista William R. Hosek, Frank Zahn, Teoria e politica monetaria e mercati finanziari

G.C. Archibald, R. Lipsey, Introduzione alla matematica per economisti, a cura di Maurizio Mistri Helmuth Frisch, Teorie dell'inflazione, a cura di Amedeo Levorato Oliver E. Williamson, Le istituzioni economiche del capitalismo. Imprese, mercati, rapporti contrattuali, a cura di Margherita Turvani Dominick Salvatore, Microeconomia: teoria e applicazioni David G. Pierce, Peter J. Tysome, Economia monetaria. Teorie, evidenza e politica Franco Volpi, Introduzione all’economia dello sviluppo Roberto Caparvi, Corso di economia delle gestioni bancarie Oliver E. Williamson, / meccanismi del governo. L’economia dei costi di transazione: concetti, strumenti, applicazioni

Giancarlo Di Stefano, Iacopo E. Inghirami, Luciano Marchi, Fabio Tarini, Conoscenze informatiche di base per l’economia Luciano Petrioli, Demografia. Fatti e metodi di studio della popolazione Luca Barbarito, L'analisi di settore. Metodologie e applicazioni Luciano Marchi, Daniela Mancini (a cura di), Gestione informatica dei dati aziendali

Stefano Pozzoli, La contabilità generale. Una introduzione Romilda Mazzotta, Esercizi svolti di ragioneria generale Roberto Caparvi, La nuova attività bancaria. Economia e tecniche di gestione Rosella Levaggi, Stefano Capri, Economia sanitaria Daniele Dalli, Simona Romani, // comportamento del consumatore. Teoria e applicazioni di marketing Alessandro Montrone, Elementi di metodologie e determinazioni quantitative di azienda Attilio Gardini, Giuseppe Cavaliere, Michele Costa, Luca Fanelli, Paolo Paruolo, Econometria. Volume primo Attilio Gardini, Giuseppe Cavaliere, Michele Costa, Luca Fanelli, Paolo Paruolo, Econometria. Volume secondo Silvio Bianchi, Lino Cinquini, Giancarlo Di Stefano, Michele Galeotti, Introduzione alla valutazione del capitale economico. Criteri e logiche di stima Fabio Pammolli, Modelli e strategie di marketing Gianluigi Guido, Economia e gestione delle imprese. Principi, schemi, modelli Amedeo Fossati (a cura di), Economia pubblica Michele Pisani, Appunti di contabilità generale ed applicata Giovanni Pavanelli, Valore, distrubuzione, moneta. Un profilo di stroria del pensiero economico Massimo Florio, La valutazione degli investimenti pubblici. I progetti di sviluppo nell'Unione Europea e nell'esperienza internazionale. Volume primo. Principi e Metodi di Analisi 362. Sezione 2 Angelo Pagani, // nuovo imprenditore Bruno Jossa, Progresso tecnico e sviluppo economico Franco Volpi, Profitti, imposta e investimenti Edward S. Mason, La grande impresa nella società moderna

Miro Allione, Le decisioni di investimento pubblico PIATT

Bruno Trezza, Teoria economica del consumo

Siro Lombardini, Alberto Quadrio Curzio, La distribuzione del reddito nella teoria economica

Alessandra Nannei, La politica degli investimenti B.J. McCormick, E. Owen Smith, // mercato del lavoro

Robert Theobald, // reddito garantito Francesco Forte, Gianfranco Mossetto, Economia del benessere e democrazia R.J. Ball, Peter Doyle, L’inflazione R.W. Clower, La teoria monetaria

Morris Bornstein, Economia di mercato ed economia pianificata Duccio Cavalieri, La politica dei redditi K.W. Rothschild, Potere ed economia Ignazio Musu, Lo sviluppo economico ottimale

Gianrocco Tucci, Economia dei trasporti Paolo Costa, Interdipendenze industriali e programmazione regionale Alex Hunter (a cura di), Monopolio e concorrenza

63. Sezione 3 Federico Caffè, I] pensiero economico contemporaneo, voll. I, II, III Federico Caffè (a cura di), / maestri dell’economia moderna Danilo Giori (a cura di), Sul modo di produzione asiatico

Robert Lekachman, Storia del pensiero economico contemporaneo Sydney H. Coontz, Lavoro produttivo e domanda effettiva Oscar Lange, Teoria marxista, economia politica e socialismo Oscar Lange, Modelli economico-matematici, econometria, statistica

Oscar Lange, Scienza economica e trasformazione sociale Eagly, D.D. Kurihara, R.L. Meek, J.J. Spengler, P.M. Sweezy, Eventi, ideologia e teoria economica. Le determinazioni del processo nello sviluppo dell’analisi eco-

PLIDUANW DE W.R. Allen, R.V. nomica D

Riccardo Faucci (a cura di), Gli italiani

e Bentham. Dalla “felicità pubblica” all’economia

del benessere. Vol. I. Saggi di L. Avagliano, M. Bertozzi, A. Camaiti, L. Costabile, S. Cremaschi, M.D.A. Freeman, R. Ghiringhelli, L. Gianformaggio, G. Gioli, A. Li Donni, M. Mori, D. Parisi Acquaviva, C. Perrotta, R. Petrini, V. Polignano, G. Vivenza. Vol. II. Saggi di

P. Bini, D. Cavalieri, F. Duchini, D. Fausto, A.M. Fusco, M. Gallegati, V. Gioia, W. Grass], F. Marcoaldi, C. Ottaviano, S. Perri, E. Pesciarelli, A. Petretto, E. Santarelli, G. Stefani Donato Di Gaetano, L’economia sovietica: uno sguardo dall’interno - Massimo Augello, Marco Bianchini, Gabriella Gioli, Piero Roggi (a cura di), Le cattedre di

economia politica in Italia. La diffusione di una diseiplina “sospetta” (1754-1900) Gabriella Gioli, Le teorie della popolazione prima di Malthus Andrea Villani, Gli economisti, la distribuzione, la giustizia. Adam Smith e John Stuart Mill Gianfranco Sabattini (a cura di), Economia al bivio. Seminari sui fondamenti dell’economia

politica Massimo M. Augello, Marco Bianchini, Marco E.L. Guidi, Le riviste di economia in Italia (1700-1900). Dai giornali scientifico-letterari ai periodici specialistici Gabriella Gioli (a cura di), L'Europa e gli economisti italiani nel novecento. Federalismo, integrazione economica, fiscalità Marcello Martinez, Teorie di organizzazione in economia aziendale. Dall’organismo al network Mariella Giura Longo, Contadini, mercati e riforme. La piccola produzione di merci in Cina

(1842-1996)

Francesco Rizzo, Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell’economia o l’economia della scienza

Gianfranco Sabbatini, Moneta e finanziamento del sistema economico

Gianfranco Sabbatini, // ruolo della “mano visibile dello stato” Nicoli Bellanca, Dinamica economica e istituzioni. Aspetti dell’economia politica italiana

tra Ottocento e Novecento Massimo M. Augello, Marco E.L. Guidi (a cura di), Associazionismo economico e diffusione dell’economia politica nell’Italia dell'Ottocento. Dalle società economico-agrarie alle associazioni di economisti. Volume primo 27:

Massimo M. Augello, Marco E.L. Guidi (a cura di), Associazionismo economico e diffusione

7

dell’economia politica nell'Italia dell’Ottocento. Dalle società economico-agrarie alle associazioni di economisti. Volume secondo . Sezione 4

James M. Buchanan, L’economia pubblica Carlo D’ Adda, // finanziamento dell’economia

Massimo Pivetti, Armamento di economia Stephen A. Marglin, Criteri per l’investimento pubblico Robert Aron Gordon, L'obiettivo della piena occupazione Lloyd Ulman, Robert J. Flanagan, Le politiche dei redditi nell' Europa Occidentale Alberto O. Hirschmann, / progetti di sviluppo Harold Lydhall, La struttura delle retribuzioni Bruno de Finetti (a cura di), Crisi dell'energia e crisi di miopia Francesco Masera, // mercato finanziario italiano nel quadro dei controlli pubblicistici e degli indirizzi comunitari Mario Draghi, Studi sulla produttività del lavoro, i salari reali e l’occupazione Guglielmo Chiodi, Sovrappiù e sfruttamento capitalistico. Un’introduzione agli schemi teorici di Marx e Sraffa Giovanni Pegoretti, Capitale finanziario, profitto, interesse Annamaria Simonazzi, Governi, banchieri e mercanti. La concorrenza fra i paesi industrializzati nei mercati dei paesi in via di sviluppo Nino Galloni, Problemi economici d'offerta, della moneta e del lavoro Gilberto Antonelli, Risorse umane e redditi di lavoro. Stereotipi, idee guida e analisi economica dell’offerta di lavoro eterogeneo in Italia Fausta Pellizzari, La teoria economica delle risorse naturali Giovanni Pegoretti, Risorse, produzione e distribuzione Bruno S. Frey, Economia politica internazionale Sandro Gronchi, Tasso di rendimento e valutazione dei progetti. Un'analisi teorica Francesco Carlucci, Saggi sulla congiuntura italiana degli anni ‘70 Franco Volpi (a cura di), Debito estero e sviluppo del Terzo Mondo

Giuseppe Garofalo, Equilibrio, razionalità, causalità. Ricerche sui fondamenti della teoria economica Geoffrey Brennan, James M. Buchanam, La ragione delle regole Franco Volpi, Fiamma B. Mersi, Crisi, aggiustamento e sviluppo. Il caso dell’Africa sub-

sahariana Gaetano Fausto Esposito, Sistema finanziario e informazione asimmetrica. Un’analisi sulla specializzazione degli intermediari creditizi Andrea Saba, // modello italiano: la specializzazione flessibile e i distretti industriali Gianfranco Sabattini (a cura di), Abraham

Wald e il «programma di ricerca» sull'equilibrio

Remigio Zanotti (a cura di), Rapporti Confidi 1984-1995 Andrea Villani (a cura di), La produzione artistica e culturale e i suoi attori. L'intervento

pubblico al tempo della democrazia e dello Stato Sociale Beniamino Moro (a cura di), Capitale naturale e ambiente Francesco Zaccaria, Conti pubblici: analisi di un risanamento difficile Beniamino Moro, Sviluppo economico ed occupazione Roberto Caparvi (a cura di), /l nuovo mercato mobiliare italiano Claudio Lucifora, Wiemer Salverda (edited by), Policies for low wage employment and social exlusion Giuliano Amato, Sabino Cassese, Giuseppe Turchetti, Riccardo Varaldo (a cura di), // gover-

46. 47.

no della sanità Matteo G. Caroli, // marketing territoriale Antonella Malinconico, Rischio di credito e Modern Portfolio Theory. Modelli innovativi per la gestione dei prestiti bancari Simona Romani, L’analisi del comportamento del consumatore per la determinazione del prezzo di vendita di prodotti e servizi Franco Spinelli, / costi dell'instabilità dei prezzi e del cambio. Le analisi delle Relazioni annuali della Banca d'Italia 1894-1998

48. 49.

Matteo G. Caroli, Globalizzazione e localizzazione dell’impresa internazionalizzata Antonio Ricciardi, L’outsourcing strategico. Modalità operative, tecniche di controllo ed effetti sugli equilibri di gestione Giuliana Birindelli, Silvia Del Prete, La creazione di valore nelle banche italiane. Profili teo-

rici ed evidenze empiriche

Giuliano Amato, Andrea Bonaccorsi, Sabino Cassese, Riccardo Varaldo (a cura di), Lo svi-

‘ luppo dell’economia digitale in Italia Luca Solari, Alessandro Zanon, La “quasi” fine della gerarchia. Organizzazioni come van-

taggio competitivo nella New Economy a Marcello Tedesco, // processo decisionale del consumatore. Effetti di contesto e implicazioni | di marketing Luigi Moschera, Analisi di teorie dell’organizzazione. Logiche e modelli per un confronto Giovanni Bianchini, Concorrenza regole strategia aziendale Gianfranco Mossetto, Marilena Vecco (a cura di), Economia del patrimonio monumentale

Andrea Moretti, Strategia e marketing delle organizzazioni culturali. Casi e materiali didatticl

Fabrizio Luciano Giuliana menti di Roberto

De Filippis (a cura di), Le vie della globalizzazione. Il Wto e la questione agricola Marchi, La frode nella gestione aziendale Birindelli, Angela Tarabella, La responsabilità sociale delle imprese e i nuovi strucomunicazione nell’esperienza bancaria italiana

Giacinti, Vittorio Tellarini, Salvini Ezio, Di Iacovo Francesco, Maria Andreoli, Ro-

berta Moruzzo, Dario Olivieri, Analisi e gestione economico-contabile per l'impresa agro-

zootecnica Mario Grasso, Analisi economica e ambientale Amedeo Fossati, Rosella Levaggi (a cura di), Dal decentramento alla devolution. Il federalismo fiscale in Italia e in Europa : Annalisa Cicerchia, // bellissimo vecchio. Argomenti per una geografia del patrimonio culturale

365. Sezione 5 Romano Prodi, Modello di sviluppo di un settore in rapida crescita Giorgio Fuà, Lo sviluppo economico in Italia, voll. I, II, III Frank M. Tamagna, Daniele Qualeatti, Sviluppo economico e intemediazione finanziaria. Il Mezzogiorno d’Italia: 1951-1972 Gianfranco Sabattini, L'occupazione femminile: il caso Sardegna Ada Becchi Collida (a cura di), L'economia italiana tra sviluppo e sussistenza Paolo Albani, Gianfranco Bazzigaluppi, Giorgio Carducci, Francesco Farina, Angiola Gerosa, Luigi Spaventa, Paolo Sylos Labini, Renata Targhetti Lenti, Giovanni Zanetti, L’andamento dei profitti nello sviluppo economico italiano Elena Granaglia, Per un nuovo intervento pubblico in sanità Bruno Dallago, Sviluppo e cicli nelle economie est europee Nicola Maria Boccella, 1! Mezzogiorno sussidiato. Reddito prodotto e trasferimenti alle famiglie nei comuni meridionali Nicola Rossi, Riccardo Rovelli (a cura di), Saggi di economia applicata. Il caso italiano Paolo Guerrieri, Pier Carlo Padoan, Un gioco senza regole: l’economia internazionale alla ricerca di un nuovo assetto Riccardo Parboni (a cura di), L'Europa nella crisi economica mondiale. Scritti di: K. Argingeon, M. Biagioli, J. Cornwall, C. Dell’ Aringa, W. Hager, A. Lipietz, L. Magnusson, J. Mistral, G. Ohlin, M. Omiccioli, R. Parboni, F. Peronnet, D. Seers, A. Singh, Ch. Stoffaës, L.

Turci, T. Ward Claudio M. Cesaretti, La programmazione in agricoltura. Il piano agricolo nazionale Silvio Goglio, Economia regionale e sviluppo economico Riccardo Parboni, Immanuel Wallerstein (a cura di), L'Europa e l'economia politica del sistema-mondo Ornello Vitali (a cura di), Caratteristiche strutturali della popolazione e delle abitazioni in Italia Bruno Dallago, L'economia irregolare. Economia «sommersa» e mercato irregolare del lavoro in sistemi economici differenti

Marcello Colantoni, Innovazione tecnologica e occupazione nel Mezzogiorno. Un'indagine mirata Paolo Guerrieri, Pier Carlo Padoan (a cura di), L'economia politica della cooperazione internazionale Antonio Perrucci, // processo di internazionalizzazione nei maggiori paesi Ocse. Un'analisi congiunta di commercio estero ed investimenti diretti esteri Paolo Guerrieri, Concorrenza imperfetta e politiche commerciali. Un approccio di economia politica internazionale Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, Frances Stewart (a cura di), Per un aggiustamento dal volto umano. Proteggere i gruppi vulnerabili e promuovere la crescita Daniele Ciravegna, / caratteri dell’inoccupazione. Determinanti dell’offerta di lavoro e rilevazione empirica della forza lavoro inoccupata Francesco Latella, Regioni arretrate e qualità dello sviluppo Marcello Natale (a cura di), Economia e popolazione. Alcuni aspetti delle interrelazioni tra sviluppo demografico ed economico Stefano Vona (a cura di), // commercio mondiale verso il 2000. Libero scambio o protezionismo? Massimo Egidi, Mauro Lombardi, Roberto Tamborini, Conoscenza, incertezza e decisioni economiche. Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca Carluccio Bianchi, Carlo Casarosa (a cura di), The Recent Performance of The Italian Eco-

nomy: Market Outcomes and State Policy Fondazione Cespe, Ires Cgil Campania, Isgo, L’ente locale come azienda. Razionalità economica, qualità, organizzazione nel settore pubblico Pedro Roberto Kanof (a cura di), Innovazioni tecnologiche: nuove opportunità per gli anni ‘90 Enzo Pontarollo, Raffaella La Rocca, Le trame della maglia, le strategie della moda

Turiddo Pugliese (a cura di), /{ polo industriale di Porto Marghera. I cambiamenti in atto Marida Bertocchi, Luciano Stefanini, Large scale economic and financial applications new tools and methodologies Maria Luisa Bassi, La gestione del debito pubblico Beniamino Moro, Gianfranco Sabattini (a cura di), Mezzogiorno: ristagno o sviluppo. Le esperienze regionali: il caso della Sardegna Martino Lo Cascio, Gianfranco Sabattini (a cura di), L'economia sarda nei rapporti econo-

mici internazionali. Prospettive d’integrazione, rapporto Ecoter/Ipre Lapo Berti, Claudio Donegà, Sesto San Giovanni, gli scenari del cambiamento

Lega nazionale delle cooperative e mutue - CLES, L’ultima finanziaria? Manovra di bilancio e politica economica

Arrigo Giovannetti, Pianeta uomo. Livello di vita e sviluppo demografico Michele Patané, Banche ed equilibrio di gestione Giulio Querini, Enrico Turri (a cura di), L’agroindustria nell’area mediterranea. Contributi all’analisi dei problemi strutturali Daniele Pace (a cura di), Il risparmio previdenziale ed ifondi pensione Francesco Latella, Mercati e istituzioni nel Mezzogiorno

Dario Frisio, Francesco Lechi, Alessandro Olper, Analisi delle scelte di politica agroindustriale: il caso bio-etanolo Alessandro Banterle, Processi di concentrazione delle imprese: un’analisi del settore agroalimentare italiano Giovanni Galizzi (a cura di), /l commercio internazionale dei prodotti agroalimentari Andrea Segrè, Agricoltura e società in economie dinamiche. Saggio sugli stimoli e adattamenti da espansione e da recessione Frank Müller, Analisi multivariata lineare. Teoria e applicazioni Carmelo Cannarella, Dal muro di Berlino al muro verde. L'impatto della riunificazione tedesca nel settore agricolo dei Lander orientali Paolo Savona, Carlo Jean (a cura di), Geoeconomia. Il dominio dello spazio economico Antonella Caiumi, Pierpaolo Pierani, Pier Luigi Rizzi, Nicola Rossi, Agrifit: una banca dati

54. 25

del settore agricolo (1951-1991) Aurelio Bruzzo, Corrado Poli (a cura di), Economia e politiche ambientali

Francesco Ferrari, Crescita intensiva, stazionaria, in regime di rendimenti tecnologici decrescenti

56. Sua

Magda Antonioli Corigliano, Enoturismo. Caratteristiche della domanda, strategie di offeri ta e aspetti territoriali e ambientali Davide Marino, Cristina Salvioni, Le risorse genetiche vegetali. Stato, valore economico, po-

litiche per uso sostenibile Dario Conato, Héctor Navarro, Patricio Lorente, Microimpresa e sviluppo. L'esperienza del Forum intermunicipale nella Provincia di Buonos Aires Fabrizio Onida, Gianfranco Viesti (a cura di), L'industria della Difesa. L'Italia nel quadro

internazionale Angelo Lombari, // bene salute tra pubblico e privato Lucia Vitali, Renato Brunetta (a cura di), Mercato del lavoro: analisi strutturali e comporta-

menti individuali

Ferruccio Pinotti, // Gruppo dei Sette. La cooperazione internazionale alla prova Margherita Scarlato, Internazionalizzazione, Mezzogiorno

istituzioni e sviluppo economico.

Il caso del

Accademia europea di Bolzano (a cura di), Agricoltura nell’arco alpino, quale futuro? Un bilancio dei problemi attuali e delle soluzioni possibili Antonio Cioffi, Alessandro Sorrentino (a cura di), La piccola azienda e la nuova politica agraria dell’Unione Europea. Problemi economici e strutturali Pier Carlo Padoan, Integrazione e sicurezza nel Mediterraneo. Le opzioni dell'Occidente Enrico Del Colle, Le aree produttive. Struttura economica dei sistemi regionali in Italia Marino Cavallo (a cura di), La gestione ambientale nelle imprese. Una ricerca sull’applica-

zione dell’ecoaudit e sui fabbisogni formativi nel sistema produttivo Dario Casati (a cura di), Evoluzione e adattamenti nel sistema agro-industriale Francesco Muzzarelli, Luigi Vannini, / prodotti frutticoli in chiave di marketing management. Posizionamento, missione, comportamenti di acquisto e consumo Oscar Marchisio, Ornella Pastorelli (a cura di), La progettazione giuridica del mercato: il caso cinese Francesco Castelli, I] servizio universale nelle telecomunicazioni.

Valutazione dei costi e fi-

nanziamento Salvatore Baldone, Fabio Sdogati (a cura di), Eu-Ceecs Integration: Policies and Markets at

Work Ennio Galante, Luca Lanini, Cesare Sala, Valutazione della ricerca agricola Antonio Piccinini, Gli agricoltori europei tra quote e mercato Antonio Saltini, L'agricoltura modenese dalla mezzadria allo sviluppo agroindustriale Paolo Giunti, Mario Rey, // federalismo possibile. Le relazioni finanziarie tra Regione ed Enti locali in Valle d'Aosta Gilberto Antonelli, Giovanni Guidetti, Riccardo Leoncini, Mario Nosvelli, Luisa Pombeni,

Luca Zamparini, Apertura dei mercati locali del lavoro e fabbisogno di risorse umane da parte delle imprese: i risultati di un'indagine campionaria nella provincia di Forlì-Cesena Renzo Gubert (a cura di), Il ruolo delle comunità montane nello sviluppo della montagna italiana Rita Cellerino, Venezia Atlantide. L'impatto economico delle acque alte Enrico Del Colle, La disuguaglianza retributiva. Analisi statistico-economica dei trattamenti retributivi in Italia e riflessi sullo stato sociale Paolo Crestanello, L'industria veneta dell’abbigliamento. Internazionalizzazione produttiva e imprese di subfornitura Mario Prestamburgo (a cura di), La politica agraria delle regioni italiane. Caratteristiche strutturali e tendenze evolutive Sergio De Angeli (a cura di), La trasformazione in banche delle società finanziarie Giorgio Panella, Sergio Ascari, Barbara Cavalletti, L’inguinamento dell’aria nelle aree urbane e i danni alla salute. Le politiche di controllo Magda Antonioli Corigliano, Strade del vino ed enoturismo. Distretti turistici e vie di comunicazione Dario Casati, Alessandro Banterle, Lucia Baldi, 7/ distretto agro-industriale del riso Rita Cellerino (a cura di), Economisti ambientali italiani Michele Guarini (a cura di), L'avvio della metodica di budget nelle regioni Carmelo Cannarella, Introduzione all’analisi agrosistemica nelle società europee postcomuniste

Oscar Marchisio, Ornella Pastorelli (a cura di), Continente Cina: la morfologia economica Paola Potestio, Struttura ed evoluzione dell’occupazione pubblica: un confronto regionale dai dati censuari

.

101. 102 . 103. .

105. . .

Roberto Fanfani, Elisa Motresor, La struttura sociale dell’agricoltura italiana verso il Duemila Enrico Del Colle, Gaetano Fausto Esposito (a cura di), Economia e statistica per il territorio. Introduzione all’analisi operativa delle economie locali Giancarlo Di Sandro, Analisi e pianificazione dell’impresa agraria Roberto Esposti, Franco Sotte (a cura di), Sviluppo rurale e occupazione Antonio Piccinini, Politica e agricoltura. La svolta europea del secolo ventunesimo Enrico Marelli, Giuseppe Porro (a cura di), I/ lavoro tra flessibilità e innovazione. Le tendenze del mercato del lavoro in Lombardia Sebastiano Fadda, Sviluppo locale, occupazione e implicazioni MIA una guida Euro Info Center (a cura di), 2000: l'Euro e l’impresa Paolo Garonna, Paolo Reboani, Sziraczki Gyorgy (eds.), Measuring Competence and Human Capital Simone Ceccarelli, Rischi e regolamentazione negli intermediari bancari e assicurativi Daniele Ciravegna, Sergio Favretto, Mario Matto, / nuovi centri per l’impiego tra sviluppo locale e occupazione. Il caso della Provincia di Alessandria Antonio Ricciardi, /nnovazioni finanziarie e riflessi sul bilancio bancario Andrea Arzeni, Roberto Esposti, Angela Solustri, Franco Sotte (a cura di), // sistema agricolo e alimentare nelle Marche. Rapporto 2000 Crisp, / servizi di pubblica utilità alla persona Giuseppe Sobbrio (a cura di), Efficienza ed efficacia nell’ offerta dei servizi sanitari

. Sergio De Angeli, Marco Oriani (a cura di), La securitization dei crediti bancari

. Stefano Pozzoli (a cura di), // controllo di gestione nelle aziende pubbliche. Il caso Azienda Regionale per il Diritto allo Studio Universitario di Firenze . Luciano Fratocchi (a cura di), Da periferia a centro di eccellenza. Profili gestionali del rapporto Headquarter-Subsidiary . CNCU, Il consumatore, soggetto emergente tra Stato e mercato 2. Maurizio Masi, // controllo di gestione nelle imprese di assicurazione . Gianni Geroldi (a cura di), Lavorare da anziani e da pensionati. Lavoro degli anziani e pratiche di welfarco . Matteo Caroli, Luciano Fratocchi (a cura di), Nuove tendenze nelle strategie di internazionalizzazione delle imprese minori italiane. Le modalità di entrata emergenti tra alleanze e commercio elettronico . Paolo Abbozzo, Biancamaria Torquati (a cura di), // settore lattiero-caseario umbro. Analisi degli aspetti tecnici ed economici . Ente Bilaterale Nazionale del Turismo, La formazione continua nel turismo al tempo dell’occupabilità. Riflessioni e strumenti da un progetto sperimentale . Fosco Valorosi (a cura di), Lo sviluppo del sistema agricolo nell’economia post-industriale . Antonio Giangreco, Resistence to change of middle managers. A Case Study of the Italian National Electricity Company (ENEL) . Fabrizio Berti, / versamenti spontanei dei soci nel bilancio d’esercizio . Giuseppe Bruni, Fabrizio Di Lazzaro, Giuseppe Gatti, /{ reporting della performance aziendale. Un'applicazione al settore delle aziende di pubblici servizi in Italia, Francia e Gran Bretagna . Sergio Finardi, Elena Moroni, Stati d'eccezione. Zone e Porti Franchi nell’economia-mondo . Andrea Bonaccorsi, La scienza come impresa. Contributi alla analisi economica della scienza e dei sistemi nazionali di ricerca

. Alberto De Toni, Roberto Grandinetti (a cura di), Conoscenze, relazioni e tecnologie di rete nelle filiere distrettuali. Il caso del distretto della sedia . Franco Rubino, Riserve tecniche e margine di solvibilità nelle imprese di assicurazione

. Stefano Pozzoli, Analisi della competizione e indicatori di controllo. Il sistema Coop . Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Milano, Verso una rinascita ambrosiana? Obiettivi, sfide e strategie del sistema economico-territoriale milanese: 100 protagonisti a confronto

127. Stefano Poeta (a cura di), L’analisi dei fabbisogni formativi e professionali del settore turismo 128. Giulio Cainelli, Roberto Fabbri, Paolo Pini (a cura di), Partecipazione all’impresa e flessibilita retributiva in sistemi locali. Teorie, metodologie, risultati | 129. Giuseppe Melis, L’impresa minore nei moderni canali di distribuzione 130. Carlo Filippucci (a cura di), Tecnologie informatiche e fonti amministrative nella produzione à di dati STR Maria Vittoria Lupò Avagliano (a cura di), L'efficienza della pubblica amministrazione. Misure e parametri 132. Mara Miele, Vittoria Parisi (a cura di), Atteggiamento dei consumatori e politiche di qualità della carne in Italia e in Europa negli anni ’90 155; Alessandro Montrone, // valore aggiunto nella misurazione della performance economica e sociale dell’impresa 134. Patrizio Bianchi, Marco R. Di Tommaso, Lauretta Rubini (a cura di), Le Alpi audaci. Piccole imprese e dinamiche industriali in estremo oriente

155) Silvia Gatti (a cura di), La valorizzazione delle produzioni tipiche. Gli itinerari enogastronomici dell’Emilia-Romagna 136. Stefano Stoffolani, Alessandro Sterlacchi, Istruzione universitaria, occupazione e reddito. Sve 138. 180 140.

Un'analisi empirica sui laureati degli atenei marchigiani Maria Luisa Bassi (a cura di), Le nuove regole del bilancio statale Roberto Esposti, Franco Sotte (a cura di), Le dinamiche del rurale. Letture del caso italiano

Enrico Corali, The italian natural gas market evolution Manuela Samek Lodovici, Renata Semenza (a cura di), Le forme del lavoro. L'occupazione non standard: Italia e Lombardia nel contesto europeo 141. Giovanni Galizzi, Renato Pieri, Paolo Sckokai, Roberto Amedei, Occupazione e formazione professionale nell’agricoltura lombarda. I risultati di una indagine campionaria 142. Pina Travagliante, Nella crisi del 1848. Cultura economica e dibattito politico nella Sicilia degli anni quaranta e cinquanta 143. Roberto Fanfani, Elisa Montresor, Francesco Pecci, // settore agro-alimentare italiano e l’integrazione europea 144. Crisp, Rilevazione e interpretazione economica del non profit 145. Carlo Fuortes (a cura di), / governo della città e lo sviluppo economico di Siena negli anni "90 146. Antonio Giangreco, La resistenza ai cambiamenti del management nelle strutture complesse.

147 . 148. 149. 150. 151 . 152 .

Il caso ENEL Luigi Fici, // controllo di gestione negli atenei. Dalla valutazione al governo aziendale Andrea Arzeni, Roberto Esposti, Franco Sotte (a cura di), Agricoltura e natura Andrea Giulivi, Marketing relazionale e comunicazione business-to-business

Provincia di Milano, Servizi per l’incontro tra domahda ed offerta di lavoro Crisp, Cooperative sociali e sviluppo economico in Lombardia Piergiorgio Reggio (a cura di), Passaggi. Giovani, transizioni ed Ente locale ss} Aa.Vv., Valutazione di costo-efficacia in sanità 154.Liano Angeli, Anna Carbone, Simone Severini, Agenda 2000: l’agricoltura grossetana di fronte alla nuova Politica agricola comune ISS Massimo Cecchi, Strategie e sistemi di controllo. Uno schema di analisi 156. Guido Modugno, // sistema informativo per il controllo di gestione dell’ente locale. Linee di sviluppo e aspetti contabili Love Giovanni Bronzetti, L’outsourcing uno strumento di pianificazione strategica. Analisi delle principali applicazioni nel sistema bancario italiano 158. Roberto Pinna, Presupposti determinanti dell’identificazione nell’impresa 150? Andrea Piccaluga, La valorizzazione della ricerca scientifica. Come cambia la ricerca pubblica e quella industriale 160. Provincia di Milano, Mercato del lavoro e politiche per l’impiego in provincia di Milano. Rapporto 2000 161. Gennaro Iasevoli, Competitività e posizione dominante dell ‘impresa nella filiera produttiva 162. Enrico Del Colle, La Pensione flessibile. Situazione e prospettive del sistema pensionistico italiano 163. Ente bilaterale nationale turismo, L'analisi dei fabbisogni formativi e professionali del settore turismo. Le regioni del Mezzogiorno

. Francesco Contò (a cura di), La dimensione rurale dello sviluppo. La multiformalita della provincia di Foggia ed in caso sub appennino dauno . Francesco Contò (a cura di), Trasformazioni economiche e competitività locale. L'esperienza del GAL

. Marilena Vecco, La Biennale di Venezia. Documenta di Kassel. Esposizione, vendita, pubblicizzazione dell’arte contemporanea . Giovanni Liberatore, Nuove prospettive di analisi dei costi e dei ricavi nelle imprese alberghiere . Giovanni Liberatore, Pianificazione e controllo delle aziende di trasporto pubblico locale. Problematiche di misurazione della performance . Stefano Pozzoli, // controllo direzionale negli enti locali . Donato Romano, Elisabetta Basile (a cura di), Sviluppo rurale: società, territorio, impresa . Luca Papi (a cura di), / sistemi di finanziamento dell’edilizia abitativa

. Marino Cavailo (a cura di), Per una globalizzazione responsabile. Qualità dello sviluppo e coesione sociale . Massimo Brusaporci, Massimo Farolfi (a cura di), Agroindustria, embiente e territorio. Me-

todi e strumenti per la conoscenza e per le politiche ambientali . Lanzara Riccardo, Michela Lazzeroni (a cura di), Metodologie per l’innovazione territoriale. Lo sviluppo di un progetto sperimentale nelle aree di Pisa, Benevento, Brindisi e Lecce . Fabio Fortuna, Corporate governance. Soggetti, modelli e sistemi . Massimo Cecchi, La procedura di consolidamento . Massimo Braganti, Niccolò Persiani (a cura di), // controllo di regolarità amministrativo-cul-

turale sulle procedure delle aziende sanitarie ed ospedaliere . Francesca Fauri (a cura di), Iniziative per l’occupazione: il ruolo dei fondi strutturali nella nuova strategia occupazionale dell’unione europea . Franco Prassuello (a cura di), La circolazione dell’euro e l’unione economica e monetaria

. Alessandro Musaio, // controllo dei costi e delle aree di responsabilità nelle aziende ospedaliere

. Dario Gregori, Gaetano Carmeci, Herwig Friedl, Anuska Ferligoj, Attilio Wedlin (a cura di), Correlated Data Modeling. . Giuseppe Casale (a cura di), Europa: verso quale integrazione?

2

7

=

os

7

_

2

niCR a

i

padA as

ry

wd

eer

ù

ie

ie nues

CR aie tic La

dro

è

Li

Di

6

>

ad

@

1a

APE

és

gti

4

.

it

va

x

z :

_

k

4

pu Bo d 1 cd 6

sì da va

8

data

DT

didè

So

or

Le

dy deme

oso =

vio

us

LR

drain ©

i —-

|

D

+»

SOI

del

ni

sa i

hago aperse

0

.

i

A

ali

mees

Lomé

a

|

we

car

se

Lo

acme

1h better

|

: ce

Li Soe tp agg Amerie mani

0e

sl

:

f

“cone

preda”

|

dits .

Été

Jil gees ah fret iii

im A ma nd ‘weat feet eve

te né

LE

fan

es ong

PE

ns

Y

pre =

des

aaa aaa) dry 2

uravoà, |

ee

éd

ne

ey1pe ea

Fer.

a

Was » er

rapide

i

|

|

aa

irons.

rs

na

LIT

Madee

nn.

.

7

7

|

al

a

»

7

nt

~

4

i

i

‘

x 2

È

6

00? a

n

i 0

4

À Ù

%

7

oe

7

i

Nel corso del Convegno cui gli Atti qui pubblicati si riferiscono si sono dibattuti i più importanti aspetti del processo di integrazione Europea nell’intento di fornire un contributo significativo al dibattito sulle possibili soluzioni istituzionali verso cui sta andando |’Europa: Federazione? Confederazione? Entità sovranazionale a geometria variabile nelle diverse aree di competenza (monetaria, fiscale, sociale, militare, rappresentanza estera, ecc.)? Hanno partecipano al Convegno esperti di diverse aree disciplinari (economica, storica, politologica, giuridica). Ogni Relatore, partendo dal proprio angolo visuale e dalle proprie esperienze personali, ha focalizzato la sua attenzione su aspetti di fondo dell’integrazione Europea. Sono state anche analizzate esperienze storiche di federalismo e devoluzione di poteri di altri paesi come il Canada, la Cina, l’India. La materia resta di estremo interesse in un momento in cui le riforme istituzionali costituiscono il nodo cruciale per il futuro dell'UE con l’introduzione dell’Euro e in vista del suo allargamento, e meritano di essere ampiamente discusse anche in ambito accademico. The Conference whose the proceedings are now published was aimed at discussing the process of European integration to canvass which institutional solution is more likely to be adopted for Europe: Federation? Confederation? A supranational entity growing by different pace or at variable geometry according to distinct policy and administrative areas (monetary, fiscal, social, military, etc.)? Experts in different disciplines (econornics, history, law, political science) participated in the meeting. Analysis of the historical experiences of federalism and devolution of power in countrics such as Canada,

India, China

and others were

presented.

Each

speaker,

starting from his own perspectives and experiences, focused upon different aspects of the major issues affecting European integration. The theme of the Conference is of all the greater interest in a moment in which the debate on institutional reforms are still crucial for the future of the EU after the introduction of Euro and in view of its enlargement, and deserved to be widely discussed also in the academic arena.

ISBN 88-464-3701-2

€ 26,00 |

9"188846"437013"