EU Peacebuilding Missions: Developing Security in Post-conflict Nations (Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict) 3031187687, 9783031187681

Citation preview

EU Peacebuilding Missions Developing Security in Post-conflict Nations

Kieran Doyle

Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict

Series Editor John D. Brewer, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

This series aims to bring together in one series scholars from around the world who are researching the dynamics of post-conflict transformation in societies emerging from communal conflict and collective violence. The series welcomes studies of particular transitional societies emerging from conflict, comparative work that is cross-national, and theoretical and conceptual contributions that focus on some of the key processes in post-conflict transformation. The series is purposely interdisciplinary and addresses the range of issues involved in compromise, reconciliation and societal healing. It focuses on interpersonal and institutional questions, and the connections between them.

Kieran Doyle

EU Peacebuilding Missions Developing Security in Post-conflict Nations

Kieran Doyle Edward M Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention National University of Ireland Maynooth, Ireland

Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict ISBN 978-3-031-18768-1 ISBN 978-3-031-18769-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18769-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Annette, Kate and Ruth, and all my family for their patience, encouragement, and support.

Series Editor’s Preface

Compromise is a much used but little understood term. There is a sense in which it describes a set of feelings (the so-called ‘spirit’ of compromise) that involves reciprocity, representing the agreement to make mutual concessions towards each other from now on: no matter what we did to each other in the past, we will act towards each other in the future differently as set out in the agreement between us. The compromise settlement can be a spit and a handshake, much beloved in folklore, or a legally binding statute with hundreds of clauses. As such, it is clear that compromise enters into conflict transformation at two distinct phases. The first is during the conflict resolution process itself, where compromise represents a willingness among parties to negotiate a peace agreement that represents a second-best preference in which they give up their first preference (victory) in order to cut a deal. A great deal of literature has been produced in Peace Studies and International Relations on the dynamics of the negotiation process and the institutional and governance structures necessary to consolidate the agreement afterwards. Just as important, however, is compromise in the second phase, when compromise is a part of post-conflict reconstruction, in which protagonists come to learn to live together despite their former enmity and in face of the atrocities perpetrated during the conflict itself. In the first phase, compromise describes reciprocal agreements between parties to the negotiations in order to make political concessions sufficient to end conflict; in the second phase, compromise involves victims

vii

viii

SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE

and perpetrators developing ways of living together in which concessions are made as part of shared social life. The first is about compromises between political groups and the state in the process of state-building (or re-building) after the political upheavals of communal conflict, whereas the second is about compromises between individuals and communities in the process of social healing after the cultural trauma provoked by the conflict. This book series primarily concerns itself with the second process, the often messy and difficult job of reconciliation, restoration, and repair in social and cultural relations following communal conflict. Communal conflicts and civil wars tend to suffer from the narcissism of minor differences, to coin Freud’s phrase, leaving little to be split halfway and compromise on, and thus are usually especially bitter. The series therefore addresses itself to the meaning, manufacture, and management of compromise in one of its most difficult settings. The book series is cross-national and cross-disciplinary, with attention paid to interpersonal reconciliation at the level of everyday life, as well as culturally between social groups, and the many sorts of institutional, interpersonal, psychological, sociological, anthropological, and cultural factors that assist and inhibit societal healing in all post-conflict societies, historically and in the present. It focuses on what compromise means when people have to come to terms with past enmity and the memories of the conflict itself, and relate to former protagonists in ways that consolidate the wider political agreement. This sort of focus has special resonance and significance for peace agreements that are usually very fragile. Societies emerging out of conflict are subject to ongoing violence from spoiler groups who are reluctant to give up on first preferences, constant threats from the outbreak of renewed violence, institutional instability, weakened economies, and a wealth of problems around transitional justice, memory, truth recovery, and victimhood, among others. Not surprisingly therefore, reconciliation and healing in social and cultural relations is difficult to achieve, not least because interpersonal compromise between erstwhile enemies is difficult. Lay discourse picks up on the ambivalent nature of compromise after conflict. It is talked about in common sense in one of two ways, in which compromise is either a virtue or a vice, taking its place among the angels or in Hades. One form of lay discourse likens concessions to former protagonists with the idea of restoration of broken relationships and societal and cultural reconciliation, in which there is a sense

SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE

ix

of becoming (or returning) to wholeness and completeness. The other form of lay discourse invokes ideas of appeasement, of being compromised by the concessions, which constitute a form of surrender and reproduce (or disguise) continued brokenness and division. People feel they continue to be beaten by the sticks which the concessions have allowed others to keep; with restoration, however, weapons are turned truly in ploughshares. Lay discourse suggests, therefore, that these are issues that the Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict series must begin to problematise, so that the process of societal healing is better understood and can be assisted and facilitated by public policy and intervention. The latest book in the Series on EU peace-building missions fits centrally into this approach, since after reviewing the history and development of EU encounters with peace-building, and evaluating their effectiveness, Kieran Doyle recommends that EU practitioners need to engage more fully with the people affected on the ground and implement local solutions. Coming from a background in International Relations, the author is fully aware of the terms of the theoretical debates within IR over ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’, ‘hybrid’, and ‘local-centred’ peace initiatives. The book, however, is not a discourse in theory. It is substantive in its focus with an ambition to shape policy, based on a considerable pedigree of work done by the Edward Kennedy Institute at Maynooth University in Ireland. Northern Ireland gets a nod in the book—for the EU was a substantial stakeholder and under-writer of the Good Friday Agreement—but the main focus of this book is on EU peace-building missions in Eastern Europe and the Horn of Africa. It offers the first dedicated assessment of the EU’s relatively recent engagements with peace-building and evaluates some of its major peace missions, making some significant policy recommendations. The war in Ukraine offers a serious test of the EU’s contribution to the international order as a peacekeeper and the author confronts this challenge despite the outcome being unknown and potentially further destabilising for member states and the global order. Kieran Doyle is a helpful critic of the EU’s peace-building mission, perceptive in his criticism, constructive in his evaluations, and wide-ranging in his policy recommendations. The so-called ‘local turn’ in IR theorisation of peacebuilding reflects well in these policy suggestions, with Doyle urging, among many other things, conflict mediation by local actors, understanding local contexts, addressing material inequalities and injustices, and

x

SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE

aligning with local values. The book ends with suggestions for mediation to end the conflict in Ukraine. By giving attention to the EU as an actor independent of other Western allies, especially the USA, the author isolates a stakeholder whose importance is likely to increase, especially if US politics remains under pressure to withdraw internationally under a resumed ‘American First’ policy. The value of Doyle’s argument for the Series, however, is that the EU must work alongside diverse local actors, give meaning to local cultural values and proffer solutions that balance peace-building with social change. As Series Editor, I therefore warmly welcome the latest addition to the Series. Belfast, UK August 2022

John D. Brewer

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge my colleagues in Maynooth University and the work of all my research colleagues and co-authors, firstly in the Improving the Effectiveness of EU Conflict Intervention Capabilities (IECEU) project, and in particular colleagues from Laurea University and Fincent. Secondly, I wish to acknowledge the contributions of the Gaming for Peace (GAP) project, particularly our colleagues from Trinity College Dublin (TCD). Both these projects were supported by Horizon 2020 funding. Thirdly, rich collaborations with colleagues from the German Federal Police Academy, North-Rhine Westphalian State Police, the Baden-Wuerttemberg State Police College, the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), when researching management and leadership of EU civilian missions have been very helpful. Finally, I wish to acknowledge Irelands Department of Foreign Affairs, and all those who support and participate on EU civilian peace-building missions, especially those who helped with this research.

xi

About This Book

The international system has changed significantly, and as Molnar and Vecsey (2022) observed, the liberal international order based on multilateral foundations has weakened, and despite the Lisbon Treaty’s goal of a stronger, more cohesive, more coherent, and more effective Union, the EU is struggling to become a credible international security actor. Although the Civilian aspect of the EU’s External Action is less known to the general public, but still represents a major part of the Union’s mission of securing its external environment and guaranteeing the welfare of its citizens. EU civilian peace-building missions evolved from the European Council meeting in Santa Maria Da Feira (2000), which set the objectives of using civilian missions in crisis response (including conflict prevention) and the means of implementation. At the time, their expressed intention was to (1) Improve the EU’s ability to save human lives in crises, (2) maintenance of basic public order, (3) prevention of further escalations of conflict situations, and (4) facilitate the return to a peaceful, stable, and self-sustainable situation, (5) manage adverse effects on EU countries, and (6) address related problems of coordination. However, the author observes a drift away from these original intentions, and that the ambition of EU Global Strategy 2016 is in danger of propelling an ‘organisational ego’ manifested through a shift from the EUs moral frame of reference of human security to emphasising state security. Current technically focused CSDP missions reinforce the power

xiii

xiv

ABOUT THIS BOOK

of elites or sub-elites and implement narrow mandates ostensibly designed to deflect adverse effects of humanitarian and political crises in the EU’s neighbourhood away from member states. This PIVOT critically examines civilian EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions majoring on their current unexploited potential to engage with host nations. While the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is essentially security oriented and relies heavily on Member States’ political choices, capabilities, and personnel support, there are greater opportunities within each mission to develop a deeper understanding and responsiveness to their context. This Pivot advises that future missions besides building state security capacity should emphasise increased societal engagement, thus providing micro insights, greater clarity, and know-how to connect with communities dealing with the aftermath of violent conflict or to act in preventing future conflicts. The author recommends a reconfiguration of missions, future emphasis on civil society peace-building elements with human security priorities, nurturing closer relationships and improved dialogic capacity with the host state, thus aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals –particularly Goal 16, which promotes peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels https://sdgs. un.org/goals/goal16.

Contents

1

Context for Common Security and Defence Civilian Missions Introduction Context Why Is This Study Important? Conceptualisation of Peace-Building Origins and Evolution of Common Security and Defence Policy Civilian CSDP Compact (2018) Legal Foundations of Current CSDP Intervention Capabilities CSDP and Impact of Lisbon Treaty 2016 Global Strategy Current Activities of CSDP EU Imperative Towards Security and Peace-Building Why are the EU Doing This Work? Evolution of Context for CSDP Conflict Interventions and Missions The Dynamic of Governance Within Conflict, Security, and Peace-Building—What Does Concepts of Security in Fragile States Look Like? Government: What Is it? What Constitutes a Strong Government?

1 2 2 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

17 17 xv

xvi

CONTENTS

How Does CSDP Connect with These Environments? Promotion of Human Rights Civilian Crisis Management Implications of Ukraine on the CSDP Environment Conclusion Bibliography 2

3

Civilian CSDP and Fitting in on the Ground Through an Integrated Approach Introduction Current Activities Categorisation of Current Missions (Adapted from University of Navarra, 2022) CSDP Mission Mandates EU Delegations What Is the Integrated Approach? EU Integrated Approach in the Horn of Africa—Example of Its Application Operational Context of Somalia in 2010 The Application of the EU Integrated Approach Assessment of Impact Coherence of EU Peace-Building Approach Conclusion Bibliography Theoretical Debates on Interventions and Multilateral Peace-Building Interventions Introduction Typologies of Violence Paradigms of Intervention Normative Power Within International Peacekeeping and Peace-Building Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building—Interacting with Local Communities Through CSDP Human Relations Paradigm and Peace-Building Humiliation Empathy and International Norms Empathy Challenges Norm-Setting

21 21 21 25 25 27 33 33 35 37 38 41 41 43 43 43 46 48 50 50 53 54 56 57 59 61 64 64 65 67 68 70

CONTENTS

4

5

xvii

Human Security and CSDP Operationalising a Peace Process Positions Interests Needs Maintaining Momentum Conclusion Bibliography

71 75 76 76 76 77 78 80

CSDP Mission Performance: An Evaluation Introduction Mission Planning and Mandate Implementation Legal Preconditions and Planning for Missions Assessments and Self Evaluation Competencies (of Mission Staff) Were Based on the Mandate and not the Context Internal Challenges of the EU Local Ownership and Relationship with Host Country Relationship as a Feature of CSDP Interventions Working with Local Actors Why Have CSDP Interventions Struggled to Live up to the EU’s Rhetoric on Local Ownership? Working with International Counterparts Civilian CSDP Missions and Multilateral Working with the UN Situational Awareness Is This Situational Awareness Improving? Leadership and Management of Missions Interoperability and Information Sharing Achievement of Objectives Conclusion Bibliography

87 87 89 89 92

Knowing the Ground: Developing Security Through Local Engagement Introduction Implementing a Mandate The Role of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Capacity in Understanding the Mission Environment

94 95 96 97 99 100 100 101 102 103 104 108 111 112 117 117 120 121

xviii

CONTENTS

What Is Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue (MND) Facilitation? Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in UN Activities The Role of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in EU Common Security and Defence Policy The Case for Expansion of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in CSDP Missions What Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Tasks Are CSDP Mission Member Actually Performing? Application of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in Security Sector Reform Conclusion Bibliography 6

‘Political Missions with an Operational Capability’: How Do We Continue? Introduction Context From Macro to Micro Interventions Establishment of Networks Proposal Application Within Ukrainian Conflict Conclusion References

Index

123 123 124 126 127 131 133 134 137 138 140 141 143 144 146 149 152 155

About the Author

Dr. Kieran Doyle is Lecturer in the Department of International Development, and Assistant Director of the Edward M Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention, Maynooth University. Dr. Doyle has been Irish representative on the Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) based in the European External Action Service, Brussels since 2013, and has also represented Ireland on the Academic Think Tank of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). His primary research and teaching interests lie in peace-building and practice-based learning, and has led Maynooth University teams in two EU research projects examining the effectiveness of EU conflict intervention capabilities. He also helped to establish, and was previously editor of the open access Journal of Mediation and Applied Conflict Analysis (JMACA) published online through Maynooth University. Since 2019, he is the nominated thematic expert adviser on mediation, negotiation, and dialogue to a preparatory committee of the European Council. Prior to his academic career, he served as an officer with the Irish Defence Forces and participated on operations in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans.

xix

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3 Fig. 3.1

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3

Current missions and operations (Source https://www. eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU-mis sion-and-operation_2022-new-layout-V2.pdf) Linkages between development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and peace-building Veron and Hauck in Connecting the pieces of the puzzle: the EU’s implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (2021) The integrated approach in the horn of Africa 2012–2016 Bloom’s Taxonomy for Cognition: Levels of operationalization of culture in V. Bados, Operationalization of culture in military operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC: Granada, 2010, s. 10 Legal framework for CSDP activities Interlinking dimensions in a civilian crisis management mission when implementing the mandate Word cloud generated from Kennedy Institute research on MND activity in CSDP Missions Benefits of application of MND in CSDP missions as reported in 2020 Kennedy Institute survey

35

42 45

63 90 120 129 130

xxi

CHAPTER 1

Context for Common Security and Defence Civilian Missions

Abstract Since 2003, the EU has deployed 37 missions and operations to fragile and post-conflict states. The majority of these missions have been staffed by civilian personnel, including police and human rights experts. This chapter introduces civilian missions as an instrument of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. It discusses their evolution as a tool for peace-building, their legal foundation and the impact of the Lisbon Treaty. The chapter examines the EU’s interest in global peacebuilding and its drive to be a global security actor while placing this ambition within the dynamic of governance of post-conflict fragile states. The chapter concludes with remarks on the recent crisis in Ukraine. Keywords European Union · Global strategy · Common Security and Defence Policy · Treaty of Lisbon · Post-conflict · Peace-building · Security · Intrastate · Fragile states · Civilian missions · Crisis response · Governance · Power · Capacity-building · White saviour · Normative influence · Local ownership

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_1

1

2

K. DOYLE

Introduction On 15 September 2021, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered her annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament. Regarding geopolitics, von der Leyen posited that Europe must learn how to act in, what she called, an age of “hypercompetitiveness”. She commented that the crisis in Afghanistan has highlighted a need for stronger cooperation with partners, including NATO, pointing to the fact that “there will be missions where NATO or the US will not be present, but where Europe should be”, calling for increased European capabilities where, On the ground, our soldiers work side by side with police officers, lawyers, and doctors, with humanitarian workers and human rights defenders, and with teachers and engineers. We can combine military and civilian with diplomacy and development—and we have a long history of building and protecting peace. As part of these efforts to strengthen the capacity to act autonomously, HR/VP Borrell gave an overview of the evolving Strategic Compass, which aims to strengthen a common European security and defence strategic culture where “the classic distinction between war and peace is diminishing” and that the world is “full of hybrid dynamics”. The four pillars of the Compass, action, security, investment, and partnerships, are designed to address this new hybrid reality and were adopted by EU member states in March 2022, in the course of the French Presidency.

Context In this highly interconnected and interdependent world, Western security and defence cooperation is seen as a crucial element of international contribution and demonstration of commitment to international order. While many developed countries and an increasing number of developing countries have started to show relative peace and stability, other countries such as Mali, Ethiopia, and Ukraine are embroiled in internal and interstate conflicts and crises. Despite efforts by regional and international security blocs and peace-building institutions, these conflicts and crises are not being prevented, contained, or resolved. Reducing the impact and contagion of violent crises is a priority area for the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which advocates resilience building and an integrated approach of EU policies and resources to mitigate and reduce conflicts and crises.

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

3

According to the EU Parliamentary Report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (2021)—notable among the threats facing the EU: – new and evolving threats emanating from state and non-state actors in a multipolar world, such as terrorism, the rise of authoritarianism, hybrid threats through hybrid warfare means such as cyberattacks, and the instrumentalisation of migration, disinformation, and foreign interference, which have blurred the lines between war and peace, increasing threats to natural resources, energy security, and climate change; – increased militarisation around the world, with recurring global power competition with an increasing military dimension and rising geopolitical tensions, an age of ‘unpeace’ characterised by hostile competition, reduced disarmament efforts and international arms control regimes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, and the use of chemical weapons; – a protracted unstable neighbourhood, both in the East and in the South; – instability and unpredictability on the Union’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, etc.), as well as its extended neighbourhood (Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.); – together with Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia pose both a direct and indirect threat to the security of the continent; stresses the inextricable link between internal and external security; acknowledges that active engagement in the neighbourhood is in the interests of the European Union; Prominent among these efforts is the European Union (EU’s) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instrument (Doyle & Desta, 2021). Deployed in response to host government invitation and, generally, the invitation of the UN Security Council, CSDP launches international missions and operations to fragile states, which develop Human Rights and Rule of Law capacity, while expressing the geopolitical ambitions of the EU and encouraging recognisable changes within these fragile and post-conflict environments. Prior to and since the launch of the EU Global Strategy (2016), CSDP missions had been involved in conducting training and capacity-building

4

K. DOYLE

programmes, mentoring and prosecutions, the rescue of 20,000 lives from the Mediterranean, helping to reduce piracy, and supporting capacitybuilding and policy formulations in fractious and violent environments. However, with the political and operational landscape changing rapidly, a period of hyperactivity referenced by von der Leyen draws many assumptions regarding the impact of future peace-building through CSDP missions into question. Consequently, security sector reform, enhanced policing, rule of law, gender equality, aspiration for human rights, and enhanced human security are the central tenets of the CSDP mission work. However, these apparently desirable features are continuously challenged due to competing tension between the national sovereignty of host nations and EU member states’ relationship with CSDP.

Why Is This Study Important? The global security system is perceived to be teetering on the edge. As the UN Secretary-General’s report, Our Common Agenda (UN, 2021), says: “Humanity faces a stark and urgent choice: breakdown or breakthrough”. Peace-building addresses the deep-rooted or structural causes of conflict and aims to build and support the local authorities in becoming peaceful, stable communities and societies at local and national levels (UNESCO, 2015). Peace-building intervention missions today have many aspects, and many of their tasks relate more to nation-building with a multiplicity of interdependencies in the field and a variety of connections to other aspects of the international effort. Mediation, negotiation, and dialogue capacity at the local level are found to be well-suited to short-term tension reduction (Kennedy Institute, 2021). However, how is this capacity best applied by the EU CSDP civilian missions where there are concurrent intergovernmental organisation (IGO) missions with differing mandates with the pressing strategic challenges of “coordination, local ownership and urgent activity” as identified by Angel Losada Ferandez, EU Special Representative for the Sahel Region (2019). Security, humanitarian work, and peace-building work are by their nature multidimensional and complex phenomena. The complex reality of security requires committed and capable people with the requisite knowledge, skills, and competences before entering the conflict, security, or peace-building area.

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

5

Renata Dwan, Chief of Policy and Best Practices in the UN Department of Peace Keeping Offices, New York, called in 2017 for an urgent rethink of the model of peace-building mission. She outlined her interest in rethinking the drivers of conflict, such as the impact of inequality rather than poverty. The bigger question was how do missions tackle the problem of lack of trust between the state and society? Dwan argued that in the future, more focus should be on the subnational level: building trust and positive emotion with the community. This PIVOT examines the effectiveness of CSDP missions through a critical examination of their capacity to engage with local societies, build trust, and coordinate activity to make an impact on the ground. The PIVOT argues that although the EU CSDP technologies and improved capacity to deter attacks are important, these capacities ultimately will not stop wars. A deeper understanding of fragile societies and their needs is required for the evolution of creative and farsighted policies capable of moving beyond the categories of status-seeking and opposition.

Conceptualisation of Peace-Building Peace-building is a complex term and can be undertaken through many approaches but often through the state power and ability to use or threaten legitimate violence, expressed by clear and fair laws, a trustworthy government and a judiciary, and command and control strategies. It can also be understood as a long-term process that requires the transformation of relationships. This means “understanding and dealing with why people are fighting in the first place and finding ways of moving things forward” (Conciliation Resources, 2022). A key facet of peace-building is reconciliation. Reconciliation can mean many things. According to Peace Insight (2022), reconciliation “incorporates the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, and accommodation between conflicting groups or people. It is therefore widely seen as very closely related to peace-building, and although some suggest it is the goal of peace-building, others argue it is better seen as a process”. There are also interpersonal understandings of reconciliation and political reconciliation. The first can be understood as bottom-up or grass-roots whereas the latter tends to be top-down. The grass-root approaches tend to have more transformative effects on the legacy of conflict, as they are undertaken with an understanding of the local context. The UN Capstone Doctrine of 2008, which looked at the Principles and Guidelines of UN peacekeeping operations, identified conflict prevention as the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep

6

K. DOYLE

intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering, and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. UN definitions of peace-building envisage “a range of measures to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It aims to address the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions”.

Origins and Evolution of Common Security and Defence Policy The concept of linking security interests first emerged in the aftermath of World War II, when in 1948, the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, also known as the Treaty of Brussels (Carrasco et al., 2016). This was followed by the formation of the military alliance known as the Western European Union (WEU). The post-Cold War years of conflicts and crises in the Balkans and the rest of the world led to the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that CFSP states “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (Carrasco et al., 2016: 18)

Following the crisis in Kosovo, the UK and France agreed at Saint-Malo in 1998 that the EU must have ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’. The EU Member States followed up in Helsinki in 1999 to build the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), were backed by credible military forces and appropriate decision-making structures (Carrasco et al., 2016). Envisaged within these instruments were civilian CSDP missions. The European Council meeting in Santa Maria Da Feira (2000) outlined the

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

7

overall objectives of the Union’s use of civilian missions in crisis response (including conflict prevention) in order to: (1) Improve the EU’s ability to save human lives in crisis situations (2) Maintain basic public order (3) Prevent further escalations of conflict situations (4) Facilitate the return to a peaceful, stable, and self-sustainable situation (5) Manage adverse effects on EU countries (6) Address related problems of coordination The priorities for the way in which these objectives would be met were set out in the same document. That is, through: . . . .

Police Missions Strengthening Rule of Law Strengthening Civilian Administration Civil Protection

These objectives envisage a connection of EU citizens, EU resources and capabilities to manage crisis situations and develop secure societies; an integration of experts from the relevant national administrations, interalia, providing specialist advice on police, judicial and penal aspects, civilian administration, humanitarian assistance as well as the interface between crisis management and development cooperation. Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ fei2_en.htm#an1

By 2003, the EU set out to have 200 judges and prosecutors prepared for crisis management operations for the rule of law that could be deployed within 30 days, establish a pool of experts in the area of civilian administration (including general administrative, social, and infrastructure functions) and provide civil protection teams of up to 2000 people, all deployable at very short notice. The first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission was launched in 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same year, the European Security Strategy (ESS) known as ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ was formulated, and later in 2008, the revised ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’ drew in the wider concept of “human security”.

8

K. DOYLE

In order to comply with its ambitious objectives, the EU adopted a step-by-step approach to develop its civilian crisis management capabilities, which entailed the definition of planning assumptions based on the scenarios, elaboration of capability requirements lists, assessment of national contributions, and identification of capability shortfalls. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG, 2008) was shaped by the experiences the EU had gained in the field, increasing the attention paid to training, staffing procedures, and mission planning, and added two new priorities to those identified at Feira: monitoring missions and support for EU Special Representatives. The CHG 2008 also emphasised the need for the Union to conduct simultaneous missions and highlighted two other focus areas for the EU: security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). The EU Member States then set an additional goal, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG, 2010), to continue the capability-development process and to synchronise it with the Military Headline Goal 2010. The CHG 2010 goal drew on experience in civilian crisis management of the EU and placed greater emphasis on civil-military cooperation besides a continued focus on improving readiness and deployability. It also identified other capabilities to be developed, such as making available additional experts on transitional justice, dialogue, and conflict analysis. The CHG 2010 also focused on creating Civilian Response Teams (CRT), a 100-person strong pool of experts prepared for rapid deployment.

Civilian CSDP Compact (2018) In November 2018, the European Council agreed to significantly strengthen the EU’s civilian crisis management through a series of practical commitments called the Civilian Compact. The first cluster of the Civilian CSDP Compact addresses capability development specifically and includes commitments on responsiveness and increasing Member State contributions to civilian CSDP, such as the commitments on seconded and contracted personnel and an increase in the representation of women in civilian CSDP missions at all levels. The compact outlines that developing civilian capabilities to meet national and European needs is a national responsibility. To implement their commitments, Member States work on the basis of National Implementation Plans. Progress is monitored through the Civilian Annual

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

9

Report on Capabilities and discussed with senior Member States’ representatives as part of the Annual Review Conference.

Legal Foundations of Current CSDP Intervention Capabilities The primary law of the European Union in this regard is the Treaties; the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which are together named the Treaties of the European Union. The Union’s international action is framed within principles, which have motivated its own creation, development, and enlargement, and which it promotes in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (Article 21 TEU). According to IECEU (2018), the Treaties framed, for the first time, all aspects of the EU’s external action within a common set of coherent principles and objectives and directs that the EU works to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security’. Article 41 (TEU) outlines the funding of CFSP and CSDP, and the policy is further described in Articles 42–46, in Chapter 2, Sect. 2 of Title V (‘Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy’), as well as in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14. The Council is assisted by a number of key planning and preparatory bodies and by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the direction of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In that context, the Union defines and pursues common policies and actions, and works for a high degree of cooperation and competence within areas of shared jurisdiction in all fields of international relations in order to: (a) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law; (b) preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

10

K. DOYLE

Pursuant to Article 47 TEU, “[t]he Union shall have legal personality”, clarifying years of academic debate as to whether or not it had this personality. In Article 42(1), ‘The common security and defence policy … shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. These missions are further defined in Article 43 of this Treaty: they “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” and may “contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”. While articulated differently in the Treaties prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, it arguably does not really impact on the possible nature of EU operations, including a wide range of crisis management operations, but merely spells out some of these tasks in greater detail. In addition, although the contrary is sometimes argued, ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’, embrace a tailored response, including peace enforcement and potentially high intensity operations involving combat. So far, the EU forces have not become engaged in combat. While it states that the European Union’s (EU’s) foreign policy, expressed in the Common Security and Defence Policy’s (CSDP) principal objectives are “the promotion and protection of human rights and support for democracy and the rule of law”, the Lisbon Treaty, in addition, stimulated the further development of CSDP through the inclusion of the notion of “political and military solidarity”, a mutual defence clause, and gave the role of leading CSDP to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

CSDP and Impact of Lisbon Treaty The language used in the Treaty of Lisbon encouraged a wide approach to security, clearly moving away from the more traditional approach of state security and focusing increasingly on the security of people. The first challenge to this approach, however, was the crisis in Libya, which started in 2011. Critical of the lack of momentum and reluctance to initiate

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

11

resolving the issue, France, alongside the UK, pressed for military intervention. Regardless of the rhetoric up to that point on a common foreign policy and the need to coordinate it with a human security doctrine, high-level political pressure prevailed, and military force was the chosen intervention tool for that international problem. Initial criticisms of the EU response should be somehow qualified, according to Stavridis (2014), especially when one observes the learning curve that EU foreign policy appeared to demonstrate, particularly compared to those of the Balkans in the 1990s or during the Iraq war in 2003. Following the Libyan crisis, the European Council meeting in December 2013 was the first post-Lisbon thematic debate on defence. Recognising post-Libya of the need to provide further strategic impetus to advance CSDP, heads of Member States identified priority actions for stronger cooperation, enhancement of defence capabilities and the defence industry, and improvement of the effectiveness, visibility, and impact of CSDP.

2016 Global Strategy The 2016 Global Strategy on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) articulated an ambitious geopolitical EU role in the world and puts forward common actions. Based on the EUGS’ definition of EU interests, principles, and priorities, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence responds to the “call for the EU to become increasingly credible in security and defence, especially through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)”. The proposed Level of Ambition aims to develop a stronger Union in security and defence, able to tackle threats and challenges effectively, with the right capabilities, tools, and structures to deliver more security for EU citizens. This level of ambition is achieved by reinforcing work by the European Defence Agency (EDA), Capability Development Planning through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and deepening defence cooperation, and the implementation plan states an obligation and “must contribute” (EUGS, 2016) to: (a) respond to external conflicts and crises, (b) build the capacities of partners, and (c) protect the Union and its citizens.

12

K. DOYLE

In fulfilling these three mutually reinforcing tasks, they should work closely with partners, particularly with the United Nations and NATO, while “respecting the autonomy of the EU’s decision-making processes”. Current Activities of CSDP It is obvious that the European Union and Common Security and Defence Policy continues to move ahead in recent years. Around 5,000 EU military and civilian staff currently work in CSDP missions and operations across the task spectrum listed in the Lisbon Treaty (art. 43 TEU) including: . humanitarian and rescue tasks; . conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; . tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; . joint disarmament operations; . military advice and assistance tasks; . post-conflict stabilisation tasks. All these may “contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”. Therefore, this broad notion of ‘crisis management’ covers different threats and the conflict cycle from prevention and intervention to peacebuilding. CSDP’s international operations and missions in third countries have achieved recognisable changes within the crisis locations they have been deployed to. Common issues that CSDP missions or operations have tackled are maritime security, border management, terrorism, organised crime, regional conflicts, and state failure (Doyle & Desta, 2021). Deployments up to date indicate a preference for civilian missions in low-risk security contexts affecting the EU, such as terrorism (anti-terror civilian mission in Niger), irregular migration in EUNAVFOR MED, and drug trafficking (Carrasco et al., 2016). EU has launched over thirty-seven missions and operations since 2003, ranging from large-scale military and civilian deployments to short-term support or deployments in support

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

13

of missions led by other international security actors. In 2021, there were 17 ongoing CSDP missions and operations—eleven civilian missions and six military operations—primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, 14 of which are deployed in parallel with UN missions. These civilian CSDP missions are host nation consent-based and focused generally on security, human rights, rule of law, and policing, while multidimensional and complex. Any civilian CSDP mission requires unanimity to be launched, although a variable number of EU Member States will take part and actively contribute to any particular mission. Some practical outputs by EU Missions reported in 2019 were: . Niger—co-developed a national strategy on internal security and train the trainer programmes . Mali—training police in investigation practices and helping military develop their organisational structures . Somalia—helping define Somali Maritime capacity-building coordination between the police and coast guard—helping define national defence strategy + collective military training . Mediterranean Sea—taking people off rafts, arresting smugglers, and handing them to Italians, decommissioning smuggler’s vessels . Indian Ocean—thwarting pirate attacks . CAR—National defence planning . Kosovo—justice integration, border management, civil registration, help the judicial system . Ukraine—help the Minister of Internal Affairs to develop a strategy . Georgia—set up a hotline to report violent behaviour and conflict . Palestine—develop manuals for border management and help to establish community policing . Libya—advice on border management

EU Imperative Towards Security and Peace-Building Conflict prevention is considered a key objective of the EU’s external relations and foreign policy, as according to the Lisbon Treaty, “the EU shall…preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security”. Given that the historical roots of the EU are linked to the

14

K. DOYLE

horrors of the Second World War, the idea of preventing further breakout of conflicts is by default at the very heart of the Union and its actions; thus, the EU prides itself as “a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity, and sustainable development” (EU, 2001). The implementation plan on security and defence is part of the followup to the EU global strategy on foreign and security policy (2016). The strategy is intended to guide EU foreign and security policy in the coming years. On the one hand, it aspires to protect the EU from insecurities and crises in the Union’s neighbourhood, and, on the other hand, it builds the capacities, security, and governance institutions of third countries where EU missions are deployed. Not without its challenges, Brexit, Right-Wing Politics, problems with the EU-wide CSDP strategy, financial and political will, its ad hoc nature, pooling and sharing imbalance, and the NATO or CSDP debates are some of the challenges CSDP has to grapple with. Security and defence planning is conducted in synergy with the work on the Commission European Defence Action Plan and in regards to the implementation of the joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the SecretaryGeneral of NATO.

Why are the EU Doing This Work? There are many fundamental problems in a fragile state and many issues that define fragility. Fragile states are states that are failing or at risk of failing with respect to authority and political cohesion, comprehensive basic service provision to its citizens, social cohesion, and legitimacy. The central authorities often lack the will, legitimacy or the capacity to define strategies and priorities for essential public goods and services for growth and independence and to implement them (Kaplan, 2009). In these environments, the state security apparatus is rarely perceived as the protector of the people, instead, it enforces violence on behalf of the dominant group or person that holds the reins of power. Around 2000 civilian experts currently work in 11 civilian missions, advising and training authorities in partner fragile states or states vulnerable to lapsing or relapsing into conflict in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, and the Middle East. In the EU’s view, they are a

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

15

tangible sign of Europe’s engagement in supporting stability and building resilience through strengthening rule of law and human rights.

Evolution of Context for CSDP Conflict Interventions and Missions The absence of a strong government has been a major factor in intra-state violent conflict (Atack, 2005). Although ethnic diversity can be central to civil conflict and rebellions mobilise among ethnic lines, civil wars tend to have structural roots fuelled by access to military hardware, poor postdecolonisation relationships, and unequal economic development and incomes. In newly established states, as witnessed in Europe, the education system can instal a national sentiment in young people and teach citizens relatable history, culture, and values (Gellner, 1983 and Hobsbawm, 1990). However, when many previously colonised African countries became independent, it was difficult to promote a sense of nationalism due to the partitioning of ethnic groups across borderlines and the assemblage of different ethnic groups sharing fractious histories and relationships. Internal post-colonial relations were often more fractious than during the nationalist struggle, leading to major divides and conflict within these new nations. Therefore, one should not assume that the violent conflict between some communities is due to ancient issues without examining alternative causal factors, especially when resources are scarce. On the surface, these may appear to be cultural clashes or indicative of a pattern of ongoing and historical incompatibility, but, in most cases, stem from the pursuit of power, wealth, and resources (Aapengnuo, 2010). Additionally, some theories propose that violence stems from factors such as religion or culture, but more thorough analysis generally uncovers that this can be a façade and used as a scapegoat in political environments. This is particularly relevant in the Troubles in Northern Ireland, which “derived from historical divides of power, land ownership and civil and political rights”, but can be applied to most cases (Crowley, 2018). Bowen (1996) highlights how our insistence on using the lens of “ethnic conflict” obstructs our capacity to identify the political instigators of violence. Often violence stems from leaders who incite this violence for their own political gain by using real or perceived scarcity as a tool. Bowen (1996) highlighted three mistaken assumptions made when citing

16

K. DOYLE

ancient tribal animosities as a main driver of violent conflict. These are that ethnic identities are unchanging and fixed for all their existence; that an ethnic identity motivates one to hurt or kill others not belonging to the same group; and that ethnic diversity inevitably leads to violence (Bowen, 1996). Attributing violent conflict to ancient tribal animosities or ethnic conflict is often an oversimplification and undermines practitioners’ abilities to mitigate effective efforts to build positive peace due to its failure to recognise root causes of direct violence (Aapengnuo, 2010). Pursuant to western influence, it was anticipated that new countries might want to adopt a democratic and neoliberal form of governance (Said, 1978): and in the mid-1990s, a comprehensive approach to neoliberal interventions was developed (Kriz & Cermak, 2014), founded on the Kantian assumption that the top-down approach of liberal democracy, the building of democratic institutions, and other attributes of a modern state (Sriram, 2008 in MacGinty, 2010) was a reasonable condition for peaceful coexistence and the prevention of conflict or its return. MacGinty (2010: 394) summarised this notion by saying, “Since liberal states do not go to war with each other, then the ‘solution’ to international aggression is to export liberal forms of state-building”. This linking of democracy and peace, while itemising how states should perform, became the new and most dominant political ideology that informed future international peace efforts (MacGinty, 2010), resulting in a very strong focus on international security and the containment of conflict (Cahill-Ripley, 2016). The concept of human security has evolved over the last 30 years to challenge traditional ideas of security. Traditional approaches to security prioritise the nation-state’s right to defend itself from external threats. Human security is a people-centred approach focused on the protection and empowerment of individuals. Human security also expands the scope of what constitutes a security threat to address economic, food, health, and environmental insecurity. While traditional approaches or state security focus on defending the state’s physical and political integrity from external threats as a way to ensure global stability, human security conceives of individual security as essential for national, regional, and global stability. This ideology was somewhat problematic, as different traditions and ideologies vying for power (Mamdani, 2001) dominate their society. The lack of conviction of state institutions and the absence of a strong new national identity lead to a permissive environment for insurgencies.

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

17

A newly independent state, without the coercive backing of the former imperial power and whose military capabilities are new and untested (Fearon, 1998), aligned with weak central government and institutions renders insurgency more likely. New states are, by definition, weak and the process of state-building is part of building a stronger state to satisfy the demands of its citizens and make the inhabitants see themselves as legitimate citizens who can make demands on the state (Hanlon, 2006).

The Dynamic of Governance Within Conflict, Security, and Peace-Building---What Does Concepts of Security in Fragile States Look Like? Government: What Is it? What Constitutes a Strong Government? Max Weber (1918) described the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. Government is understood to refer to the group of individuals and collectives (political parties, policymakers) who establish the structures which may result in structural or cultural violence and enforce their legislative power by granting police forces and military the legitimacy to utilise violence on their behalf. In short, Weber argued that conflict emerges over a struggle for as much dominance over other groups as resources permit. Which factors can be identified as contributing to the relative strength or weakness of a government? (Ahearne, 2022) – An ability or inability to maintain an unchallenged monopoly on the distribution of legitimated violence within their given territory. – Delivering or failing to deliver appropriate solutions for a rampant poverty problem—either relative or absolute. – Availability or absence of resources, determining the ability to quell violence and dissent where they erupt. – A reliance on the enforcement or misuse of legal or structural systems, or the violent enforcement of the status quo created by their unjust products and results. The criteria for classifying a government as either strong or weak is theoretically infinitely broad, depending on what is being assessed.

18

K. DOYLE

– – – –

Are they strong as in ‘tough on crime’? Do they enforce strong border controls? Do they have a consistent and successful economic policy? Are they effectively combating climate change using the resources of the state?

These four criteria have been chosen here as they directly relate to poverty and the outbreak of violence. When conceptualised in this way, it is hard to imagine a weak state, with a relatively impoverished majority (possibly as a result of structural or cultural violence implemented, tolerated, or encouraged by the state) not descending into the kind of relational, collective unrest. Fearon and Laitin describe a lack of government resources as one of the most reliable predictors of insurgency among a primed population. Tilly conceptualises violence as a form of discourse, in this case, between the population primed for violence and a ruling body that has failed them by failing to provide material resources or fostering an environment of social exclusion. Martin Luther King was not incorrect in this sense when he described riots as the language of the unheard. In conclusion, then, does weak governance and poverty inevitably lead to the outbreak of violent conflict? It is difficult to imagine a government that is either tacitly complicit by complacency or directly to blame for poverty and social exclusion, that relies on direct violence through the specialists (police and military) sanctioned to distribute legitimate violence and who fails to maintain the necessary monopoly on legitimate violence would not be vulnerable to collective violence within elements of their populations. The main arguments for advocating democracy and more equal societies with the introduction of policies that put human equality foremost seem to be mostly related to human health benefits. Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) identified that unequal societies are associated with high rates of social pain and adverse outcomes, including school dropout, teenage pregnancy, mental health problems, lack of social trust, high mortality rates, violence and crime, and low social participation. The Kennedy Institute research (2019) has identified several predictors or factors observable in the Northern Ireland conflict, which were notable in the emergence of other conflict situations. These factors included:

1

– – – – – – – – – – –

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

19

Historical grievances Previous tradition of violence in society Heavy-handed actions by security forces Capacity of leadership to motivate their communities Binary divisions within society (including religious, educational, cultural) without intersections Differing loyalties and hopes/visions within a state Atmosphere of fear justifying ‘getting retaliation first’ Lack of political power and voice in certain sections of society Unequal distribution of resources (housing, jobs) Young male population and masculine dominant culture Influence of civil rights movements and a general sense of oppression

For example, according to Transparency International (2021), corruption creates and fuels instability in countries at the bottom of the Corruption Perception Index through the consolidation of power elite structures and further isolation of those not among the elites from benefiting from the state infrastructures. Power elites were effectively channelling resources away from the wider population, which caused a situation where a large proportion of the populace felt excluded. Potential insurgents are more likely to prosper if the government and military, which they oppose are relatively weak, poorly financed, organisationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Despite genuine efforts to construct a state after independence, many new countries lacked the institutional agency where political leaders might formulate new rules and norms. The new leaderships inherited no institutions or traditions on which to build a responsive bond or social contract between citizens and the state. Even if economic collapse and war do not occur, building such a new political order poses immense challenges (Sogge, 2009). Neoliberal analyses of Africa’s declining political economies portray an emerging civil society of increased importance, taking the place of incapable or illegitimate state bureaucracies (Reno, 1997). The absence of engagement between the state and citizens brings about opportunities for populist leaders, or worse, a call to arms for groups or individuals. Armed young men at the bottom of patronage hierarchies quickly became powerful and those who arm and control such followers use this leverage to build their own commercial and political networks (Reno, 1997).

20

K. DOYLE

Limited statehood in authoritarian states reflects the continuity of oligarchy and repression. Colonial authorities previously appointed a small number of ‘evolved’ individuals for leadership positions, thus forming a new elite within these new countries. These individuals, therefore, had incentives to limit access to political offices and then allocated public goods strategically to protect and extend their tenure in office (Heilbrunn, 2006). This can be seen in many of the states in which the leader remains in office until they die or are ousted by the opposition or military. The democracy index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in 2021 observed this phenomenon, which it described as a “democratic recession” (Diamond, 2015). Fewer countries are proceeding to full democracy, while basic democratic norms are being eroded in many. Some autocratic and totalitarian regimes with a tightened grip on their own people are becoming emboldened to impose their will on others. Most pointedly, since the 1990s, the institutionalisation of liberal norms as a remedy for violent behaviours through the International Criminal Court (ICC), Chemical Weapons Convention, and Landmines Convention was propelled by like-minded leaders acting as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Price and Sinink, 2021). However, such momentum faltered with the escalation of violence between groups as a growing trend accompanying democratisation, the ascendancy of a variety of right-wing and anti-democratic governments, including those who seek to dismantle institutionalised commitments, for example, mooting the possibility of withdrawing from the ICC. Even political choices may reinforce the idea of “ethnic conflicts” due to the predominance of one ethnic group in power and when other ethnic groups feel a real or perceived threat of marginalisation or when they feel there is no place for redress or due process should grievances occur (Aapengnuo, 2010). When political arrangements lack legitimacy, citizens are then reluctant to participate in policy deliberations on their true views and interests, creating a divide between the citizens and the state that leads to very little change and the continuation of poverty, etc. A cycle of fiscal crises leads to expansion of the black market, declining tax revenues, and an absence of participation that together contribute to failure and collapse (Heilbrunn, 2006). The cause of intervention and the positive impact of democratic progress by neoliberal measures is not hopeless after all. Almost three decades after the genocide, Rwanda is now the 77th most peaceful

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

21

country in the world and was ranked in the five most improved countries on the 2019 Global Peace Index (Vision of Humanity, 2019). In 2003, the NRMD party, which was critical in organising the genocide was outlawed, and the new constitution eliminated reference to ethnicity. These changes show that violent conflict is not an inevitability predetermined by ancient hostilities, but rather, a specific set of political circumstances determines violence. This bolsters the theory that violent conflicts occur due to political failings and resource scarcity. It is these failings that motivate the EU within the context of the UN mandated missions to make interventions to encourage and support state institutions and to provide safe and secure environments while establishing fair political processes to manage and govern the states resources.

How Does CSDP Connect with These Environments? Promotion of Human Rights The objective of CSDP is to protect people from further abuses and address the structural, systemic conditions that give rise to human rights violations. A general improvement in the human rights situation is considered essential for the rehabilitation of war-torn societies. More important, the promotion and protection of human rights must aim to deepen a culture of human rights within a society, as an ongoing part of the nationbuilding and socio-political recovery process. As such, human rights promotion and protection contributes to the transformation of societal conditions that could potentially generate violence. Civilian Crisis Management In the EU, the concept of civilian crisis management refers “to the entire range of non-military instruments called for in crisis situations—whether pre or post-conflict”. The IcSP, which was established in March 2014 as the successor of the Instrument for Stability (IFS), has been the main financial instrument available to the EU in supporting security and peace-building activities.

22

K. DOYLE

The FPI service manages the financing of EU’s foreign policy activities by distributing funding to projects through the IcSP. The support can be short-term (crisis response) and long-term (stable situations) activities. . Short-term activities: assistance for development of democratic institutions, support for international criminal tribunals, promotion of international and independent media, help for victims of illicit use of firearms, and mitigating the impact of anti-personnel landmines on civilian populations . Long-term activities: assistance in the protection of critical infrastructure, fighting organised crime, countering terrorism, global and transnational threats, security, and climate change. Although the sheer frequency of CSDP missions and operations since 2003 has shown the expansion of the EU’s capabilities in type and reach of security tasks and the relationship with third countries and agencies (Smith, 2014), CSDP could be viewed as an example of opportunistic capacity-building in the neighbourhood, intended to help provide the EU with vital operational experience and to help raise the EU’s profile, and credibility, as a global security actor (Smith, 2014). According to a comprehensive review of EU Activities in 2011: the EU approach to peace-building evolved into a myriad of practices and concepts that included such diverse types of activities as dialogue and mediation (including preventive diplomacy), law enforcement and reform of the justice sector, tackling trans-regional and cross-border threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking of drugs and arms and human trafficking, piracy, democratization, elections and electoral reform, human rights, security aspects of climate change, and governance of natural resources in conflict.

The resulting picture was of iterative and gradual change rather than strategic coherence: The current EU peace-building approach is the result of evolving policy practices and not of a preconceived general policy. As a reaction to the international debates on peace-building, the EU adopted a mosaic of dispersed documents on specific priorities that later were progressively incorporated into EU’s activities. (Natorski, 2011)

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

23

Despite some internal system related and mission debates, and despite the challenges around the lack of political will among the EU governments, operational planning and intelligence capability issues, the use of “lessons learned” improved their performance (Smith, 2014). Hylke Dijkstra’s (2012) paper “Agenda Setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective” noted that the EU’s CSDP missions contributed to stability, peace deals, local capacitybuilding, and agenda-setting. Javier Solana, former Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and representative of CFSP, is particularly credited for his agenda setting roles at the time, especially in the Bosnia, Chad, and Kosovo missions and operations. These missions are linked closely with public diplomacy and raising of the EUs profile with the wider public in member and partner states. Ejdus (2017b) notes that when the then EU High Representative Federica Mogherini issued the Global Strategy in 2016, she stressed that the EU will “work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP” on “locally owned” Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in partner countries (EU, 2016: 26). Local ownership is promoted as one of the ways that CSDP has been able to achieve this, allowing the EU to strategically communicate its intentions in practical terms. As the EU is no “Virgin Birth” (Cameron & Islam, 2021) and the colonial history of member states is ever present, competitors are always ready to exploit this fact. In addition, Cameron and Islam (ibid.) feel that the contrite rhetoric does not reveal just how deeply embedded discriminatory ‘us and them’ mindsets and ‘white saviour’ narratives are in the EU’s foreign and security policies, attitudes towards migration and climate change, development cooperation and trade. Mitigation of ‘degenerative’ influences of other actors by increasing third country participation in CSDP missions and operations can increase its effectiveness and legitimacy and improve bilateral relationships (Bond et al., 2021). Deepening foreign policy co-operation with partners would also reduce the risk that some member-states might co-operate with partners outside the EU framework, potentially undermining European foreign policy. (Bond et al., 2021)

Serbia provides an interesting example of the complications of this aspect of EU policy. As a candidate for EU membership, Serbia demonstrates

24

K. DOYLE

its commitment to EU foreign policy alignment by consistently committing to CSDP missions and operations, including training on international human rights and the protection of civilians. However, Serbia’s participation does pose a question on the importance of the EU values. Given that the mandate mentioned the importance of adherence to International Humanitarian Law, how does the EU reconcile this with the Human Rights Watch’s annual report for 2020? There was limited improvement in protections of human rights in Serbia in 2020. Journalists faced threats, violence, and intimidation and those responsible are rarely held to account. Efforts to prosecute war crimes continued to focus on low-level perpetrators. People with disabilities continued to be placed and reside long term in institutions. Attacks and threats against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people continued. (HRW, 2021)

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has lent a new sense of urgency to this work in order to bolster EU normative influence in the Balkan region and diversion from ultra-nationalism. Recently, there has been huge amounts of work done in the region by the EU with state players and trade unions. Pan European Trade Union agencies have been trying to help all aspirant Balkan states to countenance for EU membership. A lot of the work involved setting up systems of Human Rights and Social Dialogue systems with a strong focus on Social Justice. As Smith (2014) notes, policy planning capacity and a more robust intelligence analysis capacity are crucial for the future of the CSDP. Smith posits that the local ownership strategy of the CSDP could give the EU a better intelligence analysis edge than other similar international agencies. Similarly, embedding human rights, gender equality, and thereby, human security within the principles and discourses of CSDP means it has the potential to flourish and be accepted in many parts of the world. According to Doyle and Desta (2021), the EU has seen some success in these endeavours to bolster state security and neoliberal process through its missions. This includes: . honest broker of peace between the parties of a conflict (Aceh) . Assistant to border management (Ukraine) . Adviser in justice reform (Georgia)

1

. . . .

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

25

Trainer of police and prison staff (Iraq, Afghanistan) Security sector reformer (Guinea Bissau) Security guarantor during elections (DR Congo) Peacekeeper on the invitation of a host country (North Macedonia)

Implications of Ukraine on the CSDP Environment Even since the evolution of CSDP, a different security situation with new causes for concern has emerged in the complex neighbourhood environment involving Russia, hybrid threats, and the Middle East. Perceived and real threats of terrorism, the current issues in the Sahel and the EU’s inability to maintain coherence during the Libya crisis and previously during the Yugoslavia crisis are leaving scars. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 represents a catastrophic breakdown in common security in the EU’s neighbourhood, which is a reminder of the fragility of international cooperation and respect for international law. It has resulted in a horrific loss of life, millions of refugees and displaced people, and global economic shockwaves. It is a terrible indicator of the uncertainty and lack of progress of liberal norms. Since 2014, the EU civilian mission EUAM (EU Advisory Mission) has worked closely with its Ukrainian counterparts to expedite a reform of the civilian security sector, promote liberal and democratic government, provide strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures in accordance with EU standards, and international principles of good governance and human rights. The liberal norms and protections promoted by EU’s missions to date in Ukraine are being explicitly challenged by Russian behaviours throughout the invasion; thus, a ceasefire, withdrawal of Russian forces and peace settlement between Ukraine and Russia is urgent in the interests of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.

Conclusion In summary, The EU has all elements/instruments “in-house”, and at a scale beyond other actors as

26

K. DOYLE

. The world’s largest trading block . One of the world’s largest donors of Development assistance . Deployment capability which includes: – – – – – – –

Diplomatic Security Defence Financial Trade Development Humanitarian aid

Proponents of CSDP missions say they allow greater multilateral opportunities and contributions to strengthening international peace and security, promulgate human rights and fundamental freedoms, and support conditions for sustainable development. However, it is obvious that the EU’s missions are occasionally deployed in situations where the EU cannot trust that the host nations aspire to the same values as the EU itself. The context of recent conflicts demands a more coherent and intergovernmental security response—deterrence of aggression, perhaps operating outside the UN aegis, but through coalitions of the willing or regional security organisations—on the one hand, but on the other demands the legitimacy bestowed by the international community and an ability to connect with, and help people at their most vulnerable. It is a delicate balance between self-interest and altruism. The EU is not NATO. The Union has wider capacity to combine military and civilian, along with diplomacy and development (EU, 2016) and the Global Strategy aspires that on this basis, soldiers work side by side with police, lawyers, medical, humanitarian workers, and human rights defenders, with teachers and engineers. In other words, CSDP seeks to use all the tools available to the Union, not just military force. Described by one commentator as the proverbial EU Swiss Army Knife to NATO’s Combat Knife, within its operational challenges, however, are major political obstacles, and the development of the EU’s approach is defined by experimentalism, enabled by repetitive intergovernmental processes and institutional learning in the framework (Karjalainen and Savoranta, 2021). In the State of the Union address, von der Leyen articulated that the problem was not in capability but in the political willingness to work together, as well as in knowing and understanding the environment in which these missions are deployed.

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

27

It is vital that we improve intelligence cooperation. But this is not just about intelligence in the narrow sense. It is about bringing together the knowledge from all services and all sources. From space to police trainers, from open source to development agencies. Their work gives us a unique scope and depth of knowledge. It is out there! But we can only use that to make informed decisions if we have the full picture.

Bibliography Aapengnuo, C. (2010). Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Africa Security Brief, no. 4 African Population and Health Research Centre. Accessible at https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/special-inspector-general-afghan istan-reconstruction-police-conflict-lessons-us-experience-afghanistan-june2022 Ahearne, E. (2022). Poverty and an absence of strong government make violent conflict inevitable. Unpublished Paper, Maynooth University. Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty. Atack, I. (2005). Ethics of Peace and War. Bond, I., Scazzieri, L., & Aydin, S. (2021). EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Co-operation with Neighbours: Mapping Diversity “Centre for European Reform. Bowen, J. R. (1996). The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Democracy, 7 (4), 3–14. Building a Tenet From Praxis—Finnish Institute for International Affairs. Cahill-Ripley, A. (2016, June). Reclaiming the Peacebuilding Agenda: Economic and Social Rights as a Legal Framework for Building Positive Peace—a Human Security Plus Approach to Peacebuilding. Human Rights Law Review, 16(2), 223–246. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngw007 Cameron, F., & Islam, S. (2021). History Matters for the EU’s Geopolitical Ambitions. http://aei.pitt.edu/103740/1/History_matters_for_the_ EU%E2%80%99s_geopolitical_ambitions.pdf Carrasco, M., Churruca Muguruza, C., & Alamillos Sánchez, R. (2016). Case Study: Common Security and Defence Policy. https://repository.gchumanri ghts.org/items/29e1a224-8373-475d-9265-88e119bf19df Conciliation Resources. (2022). What Does Peace-Building Involve? https:// www.c-r.org/who-we-are/whypeace-building/whatpeace-building#:~:text= Transforming%20relationships%20is%20key%20to,the%20state%20and%20ordi nary%20people (Accessed 23 June 2022). Council of the European Union. (2008). Civilian Headline Goal 2008, EU Council Document 15863/04, 7.12.2004. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/ doc/document/ST-15863-2004-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed 15 June 2015.

28

K. DOYLE

Council of the European Union. (2010). Civilian Headline Goal 2010, EU Council Document 14823/07, 19.11.2007. Accessed June 15th, 2015. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14823-2007-INIT/ en/pdf Council of the European Union, Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. (2010). Lessons and Best Practices of Best Practices of Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into CSDP Military Operation and Vivilian Missions. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST17138-2010-REV-1/en/pdf%20_blank Crowley, P. (2018). The Integral Nature of Ethnicity and Religion During Northern Ireland’s Troubles. Ethnic Studies Review, 41(1–2), 9–18. Dijkstra, H. (2012). Agenda-setting in the common security and defence policy: An institutionalist perspective. Cooperation and Conflict, 47 (4), 454–472. de Coning, C. (2020). Adaptive Peace Operations: Navigating the Complexity of Influencing Societal Change Without Causing Harm. International Peacekeeping, 27 (5), 836–858. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020. 1797500 Diamond, L. (2015). Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155. Doyle, K., & Desta, T. (2021). An Analysis of Common Security and Defence Policy’s (CSDP) Strategic Communication (StratCom). Journal of Politics and Law, 14(2). ISSN 1913-9047. Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Council of the EU, 9537/1/01 REV 1, 7 June 2001. Dwan, R. (2018). ‘Peace-building in a divided world presentation’ to IIEA, Dublin January 2018. Ejdus, F. (2017a). EU Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa University of Bristol Policy Briefing 45: July 2017 accessed online, https://www. bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/policybristol/briefings-and-reports-pdfs/ 2017-briefings--reports-pdfs/PolicyBristol_Briefing_July_2017_EUCAP.pdf Ejdus, F. (2017b). “Here is your mission, now own it!” The rhetoric and practice of local ownership in EU interventions. European Security, 26(4), 461–484. Ejdus, F., & Juncos, A. E. (2018). Reclaiming the Local in EU PeaceBuilding: Effectiveness, Ownership, and Resistance. Contemporary Security Policy, 39(1), 4–27. EU Global Strategy. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. European External Action Service, Brussels. https://eeas.europa. eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (Accessed 21 May 2022). European Union. (2001). Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts as Resulting From the Coreper Meeting 7 June

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

29

2001, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ en/misc/09537-r1.en1.html. European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy Published Online. Accessed 26 October 2022 at https://www.eeas.europa. eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf European Union. (2021). Parliamentary Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy—Annual Report (2021/2183(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels. European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2021). Yearbook of European Security (p. 111). EUISS. Fearon, J. (1998). Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 289–313. Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, 97 , 75–90. Ferandez, A. L. (2019). EU special representative for the Sahel Region (2019) in address to IIEA Dublin March 2019. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Géopolitiques (euro)-méditerranéennes. Heilbrunn, J. R. (2006). Paying the Price of Failure: Reconstructing Failed and Collapsed States in Africa and Central Asia. Perspectives on Politics, 4(1), 135– 150. Cambridge University Press. Hanlon, J. (2006). ‘Roots of Civil War: Tick ‘All of the Above’. In H. Yanacopulos & J. Hanlon (Eds.), Civil War, Civil Peace. James Curran. Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. https://euobse rver.com/opinion/151814 Human Rights Watch. (2021). World Report 2020 Published Online. Accessed 26 October 2022 at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_ download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf Institute of Economics and Peace. (2022). Positive Peace Report 2022, https:// www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/PPR-2022-web. pdf Johannsen, J. (2011). The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Premises, Ambitions, Limits (A Publication of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg: Volume 204, 2011), 57. Kakachia, K., & Lebanidze, B. (2021). Georgia on My Mind—The EU’s Reinvention as a Crisis Manager. Kaplan, S. (2009). Enhancing Resilience in Fragile States. Background Paper to the European Report on Development 2009. European University Institute.

30

K. DOYLE

Kriz, Z., & Cermak, P. (2014). Bosnia and Herzegovina Between Negative and Positive Peace: View from the Local Level. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 14(2), 4–36. Karjalainen, T., & Savoranta, V. (2021, October). The EU’s Strategic Approach to CSDP Interventions: Building a Tenet from Praxis. Finnish Institute of International Affairs Analysis, 11. Kennedy Institute. (2019). Peace-building—Progress and Prospects Seminar. Report on Seminar Conducted During the Visit of President of UN General Assembly and UN Ambassadors to Kennedy Institute, Maynooth University 29 November 2019. Kennedy Institute. (2021). Commissioned Report on Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue Skills in CSDP Missions to CIVCOMM, European Council. Losada Ferandez, A. (2019). EU Special Representative for the Sahel Region in an Address: The EU and Partnering for Peace in the Sahel Region’ Given at the Irish Institute of European and International Affairs 23 October 2019. MacGinty, R. (2010). Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace. Security Dialogue, 41(4), 391–412. Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond settler and native as political Identities: Overcoming the political legacy of colonialism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), pp. 651–664. Natorski, M. (2011). The European Union Peace-Building Approach: Governance and Practices of the Instrument of Stability (PRIF Reports, 111). Frankfurt. p. 159–179. https://doi.org/10.4000/cdlm.7767 Mediterranean Studies. Peace Insight. (2022). Transitional Justice and Reconciliation. https://www. peaceinsight.org/en/themes/transitional-justice-reconciliation/?location& theme=transitional-justice-reconciliation Price, R., & Sikkink, K. (2021). International norms, moral psychology and neuroscience. Cambridge University Press. Report of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. (2022). Reno, W. (1997). War, markets, and the reconfiguration of West Africa’s weak states. Comparative Politics, 29(4), (July 1997), 493–510. Said E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Pantheon Books. Smith M. E. (2014). Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy, CapacityBuilding, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change. Cambridge Press. Stavridis, S. (2014). “EU Incoherence and inconsistency over Libya”: Evidence to the Contrary. Sogge, D. (2009). Angola ‘Failed’ yet ‘Successful’. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE). Working Paper. Transparency International. (2021). Corruption Perception Index 2020. https:// www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index. Accessed online 26 October 2022.

1

CONTEXT FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE …

31

Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. Cambridge University Press. Tyyne, K., & Savoranta, V. (2021). The EU’s Strategic Approach to CSDP Interventions—Building a Tenet from Praxis, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki. UNESCO International Institute for Capacity-Building in Africa. (2015). Transformative Pedagogy for Peace-Building: A Guide for Teachers. UNESCO IIC/2018/ED/WS/1 REV 2. United Nations. (2008). UN Peace Keeping Operations—Capstone Document. https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20Capstone%20d octrine%20(2008)pdf United Nations. (2021). Our Common Agenda—Report of the SecretaryGeneral. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-rep ort/ Van der Lijn, J. (2009). If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 13(1–2), 45–71. Vision of Humanity. (2019). Positive Peace Index. https://www.visionofhuma nity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GPI019web.pdf#:~:text=The%202 019%20GPI%20reveals%20a,it%20has%20held%20since%202008 Weber, M. (1918) “Politics as a Vocation” Speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker and Humblodt, Munich. Accessed online 26 October 2022, http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/class%20readings/ weber/politicsasavocation.pdf Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2011). Greater Equality: The Hidden Key to Better Health and Higher Scores. American Educator, 35(1), 5–9. Zupanˇciˇc, R., & Pejiˇc, N. (2018). Limits to the European Union’s Normative Power in a Post-Conflict Society: EULEX and Peace-Building in Kosovo. Springer Nature. Zupanˇciˇc, R., Pejiˇc, N., Grilj, B., & Peen, A. (2018). The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and PeaceBuilding Mission. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 20(6), 599– 617.

CHAPTER 2

Civilian CSDP and Fitting in on the Ground Through an Integrated Approach

Abstract This chapter discusses the application of CSDP civilian peacebuilding within the context of the EU’s approach to regional issues and its categorisation of response. It examines the EU response to crisis in the Horn of Africa (2012–2016) and critically analyses the coherence of approach from mandate to implementation and internal coordination. Keywords Integrated approach · CSDP Instruments · Preventive diplomacy · Conflict prevention · Capacity building · Rule of Law · Monitoring · Mission and mandate · Interconnectedness · Somalia · Horn of Africa · Development support

Introduction Conflict prevention is central to the EU’s external relations and foreign policy, as according to Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty, “the EU shall…preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security”. As the historical roots of the EU are linked to the horrors of the Second World War, preventing further breakout of conflicts is by default at the very heart of the Union and its actions. The EU prides itself as “a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_2

33

34

K. DOYLE

respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development”. As a consequence of these ambitions, the EU references its relative post-World War II peace and prosperity, and the security of its member states, as a measure of its legitimacy as a peace-builder around the world. Most frequently encountered through a diplomatic network of around 140 Delegations that represent the EU and its citizens and ostensibly promote the values and interests of the EU, while demonstrating the capability to make instruments available in fragile states, including early warning systems of conflict, humanitarian assistance, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, political dialogue or development cooperation. Despite the EU being perceived predominantly as an economic actor, the scale of this ambition is significant; in total, 37 peace-building and crisis management missions and operations have been deployed in 3 continents since 2003, especially in the area of rule of law and governance. There is a developing operational capacity, and these missions and operations most often act in support of, or are co-located in with UN missions or offices in the host nation. Typical instruments and tools of EU preventive diplomacy deployed include: initial press communiqués; studies and inquiries; use of good offices and appointment of envoys; establishment of regional centres; offers of expertise and rapid release of funds for capacity development; deployment of missions for monitoring, fact-finding and investigation; and mustering diplomatic ‘groups of friends’. However, according to Banim and Pejsova (2017), within a broader conflict prevention framework, EU preventive diplomacy is also much more. It is about making the most efficient use of the multiple everyday interactions conducted through diplomatic channels, both public and private, by emphasising easing the tensions between potential conflict parties as a basic goal of diplomacy. This developing capacity for deployment and CSDP’s role in this interdependent and co-existing world can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it protects the EU from developing insecurities and crises in the Union’s neighbourhood, and on the other hand, it builds the security capacities of third countries where EU missions are deployed. Gender, human rights, and human security within CSDP are central and emphasised in achieving recognisable outputs within the crisis locations they have been deployed.

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

35

Fig. 2.1 Current missions and operations (Source https://www.eeas.europa. eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU-mission-and-operation_2022-new-lay out-V2.pdf)

In November 2018, the Council agreed to significantly strengthen EU civilian crisis management through a series of practical commitments called the Civilian Compact. Around 2,000 women and men work in the EU civilian CSDP missions. Working for security is seen as a tangible sign of Europe’s commitment to secure societies beyond its borders and at home (Fig. 2.1).

Current Activities Integral to the external relations of the EU, conflict prevention has also been part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (since 2009, the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP) aimed at strengthening its capacities in conflict prevention and crisis management. In the EU context, this concept of crisis management has been

36

K. DOYLE

primarily—but not exclusively—used in reference to military and civilian interventions within the framework of the CSDP. Primarily associated with short-term activities, CSDP instruments contribute to the so-called ‘operational conflict’ prevention. As stated, from 2003 to 2022, the EU has deployed 37 CSDP missions and operations. 23 of these deployments were civilian crisis management missions, and one civilian-military: completed civilian crisis management missions: These include such missions as: EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003–2012), EUPAT Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2006), EUPOL PROXIMA Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2004– 2005), Eujust Themis (2004–2005), EUJUST LEX in Iraq (2005–2013); EUSSR (Security Sector Reform) in Guinea Bissau (2008–2010), EUPOL DR Congo (2007–2014), EUAVSEC South Sudan (2012–2014), EUPOL Kinshasa DR Congo (2005–2007), AMM Monitoring Mission in Aceh/Indonesia (2005–2006), Support to AMIS II S (2005–2006). Sudan/Darfur.

There are 11 ongoing civilian crisis management missions including: EUAM Ukraine (since 2014), EUMM Georgia (since 2008), EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories, since 2006), EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories (since 2006), EULEX Kosovo (since 2008), EUBAM Libya (since 2013), EUCAP Sahel Mali (since 2014), EUCAP Sahel Niger (since 2012), EUSEC DR Congo (since 2005), EUCAP Somalia (Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania, since 2012 with a current focus on Somalia).

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

37

Categorisation of Current Missions (Adapted from University of Navarra, 2022) As stated, in 2022, the EU deployed 11 civilian missions (plus 7 military operations). Each CSDP mission has a different purpose and objective and categorised under three types of deployment by the University of Navarra (2022). The first type of mission referred to as EUCAP, are Capacity-Building Missions launched to support any specific aspect that a particular host state requests. For example, in the Sahel, where, since 2015, the EU operates CSDP civilian peace-building missions; EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, and where EU civilians (largely recruited as serving or retired police and military officers) have worked to “assist the internal security forces in reasserting the State authority across the country”. There are other such Capacity-Building Missions active, for example, in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Another type of mission is the so-called EULEX (Rule of Law Mission), launched “to support relevant rule of law institutions”. The EULEX Kosovo Mission, launched since 2008, has been the biggest mission within EU CSDP and has worked to establish systems that are effective, sustainable, and free from political interference while achieving international human rights standards. Closely connected with these Rule of Law missions are the Police Missions (EUPOL) that assist national police services or provide additional security in particular environments. This is the case of the current mission in Palestine, EUPOL COPPS, which supports Palestinian efforts to take responsibility for law and order within its territory. The last type of missions currently active are the Monitoring Missions (EUMM) and Advisory Missions (EUAM). The former was launched in Georgia in 2008 following a ceasefire agreement and supervises the fulfilment of the agreed rules between Georgia and Russia. The latter is designed to assist national authorities of a country to reform the civilian security sector and is currently deployed in both Ukraine (since the 2014 Crimean Crisis) and Iraq (where they advise officials from the National Security Sector and the Ministry of Interior since 2017.

38

K. DOYLE

CSDP Mission Mandates The missions’ mandates are in line and coherent with the EU’s selfgovernance definitions and pursue: – Promotion of democracy – Respect for Rule of Law – Universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms – Respect for human dignity – Equality and solidarity with respect to the UN charter of 1945 and International Law (Article 21 TEU). The missions under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) promote stability and build resilience through strengthening rule of law in fragile environment and provision of advice and training local partners in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, and the Middle East (Table 2.1). The EU has a Special Representative in almost every conflict region where the CSDP missions and operations were or are deployed. Furthermore, the delegations of the EU, which are generally present in the volatile area prior to the launching of the CSDP mission or operation, possess a lot of useful information and expertise. The Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Intervention (IECEU) research study (2018) observed that the value of this expertise had often not been considered to the extent it could have been. Noted in the same report was the relationship between the Commission and the EEAS, which was regarded as “not working in line, [with] too much independency and not interconnectedness”. That report alleges, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the intentions of mandates are often unrealistic, as they may be based on the false or distorted assumptions about the political, economic, cultural, and social situation in the area, perhaps exemplified best in EUPOL Afghanistan, where the mission attempted to nurture a community policing approach in what was effectively a war zone.

EULEX Kosovo

EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories

EUBAM Rafah

(continued)

Assisting Ukraine in security sector reform (including police and the rule of law); providing strategic advice for the development of effective, sustainable, and accountable security services Stabilisation, normalisation, and confidence-building measures; working with all parties to prevent any return to armed conflict, as well as to help make the areas adjacent to the Administrative Boundary Lines of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia safe and secure for the local population Assisting in institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior; professionalisation of the Afghan National Police, including the development of local training capacity and institutions; supporting improved interaction among Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice actors such as cooperation between police officers and prosecutors in criminal investigations Monitoring, verifying, and evaluating the performance of the Palestinian Authority with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing Point; contributing to Palestinian capacity-building in all aspects of border control; helping to build confidence and mediating between the conflicting parties; enhancing the PA capabilities for a quick redeployment to the Rafah Crossing Point and PA’s potential for future operating there (workshops, training sessions and study trips) Assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future State of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with the best international standards; supporting the reform and development of the police and judicial institutions Assisting and supporting the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary, and customs areas

EUAM Ukraine EUMM Georgia

EUPOL Afghanistan

Mandate (excerpts from selected previous and current mission mandates)

Selected missions and mandates

Civilian CSDP Missions

Table 2.1

2 CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

39

Supporting the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country’s land, sea, and air borders, capacity-building mandate at strategic and operational level through advising, training, and mentoring Libyan counterparts Improving operational efficiency of internal security forces and the officials at the ministries of defence and security; re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains; reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions; facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country Helping Niger’s security forces in achieving interoperability and developing their operating strategies; Strengthening the Nigerien security sector’s expertise in combating terrorism and organised crime; Improving the human resources training and logistics management policies; Supporting the development of regional and international coordination in the fight against terrorism and organised crime Enhancing maritime capacities of five countries (now mostly Somalia) in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles, and Tanzania), including counter-piracy and maritime governance; working with the main actors responsible for maritime security in each host country (coast guard, navy, civilian coastal police, prosecutors, judges and other actors; mission experts mainly provide advice, mentoring, and training) Support the reform of internal security forces to enable the CAR authorities to mitigate the current security challenges in the country. Provide strategic advice to the CAR Ministry of Interior and Public Security and to the Internal Security Forces and support the establishment of coherent and accountable security providers under full national ownership in accordance with rule of law and human rights principles

EUBAM Libya

EUAM Central African Republic

EUCAP NESTOR

EUCAP Sahel Niger

EUCAP Sahel Mali

Mandate (excerpts from selected previous and current mission mandates)

(continued)

Civilian CSDP Missions

Table 2.1

40 K. DOYLE

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

41

EU Delegations As stated, CSDP civilian missions are normally deployed in theatres where the EU has been already active before through other external action instruments (e.g., CFSP, humanitarian aid, development programmes). EU Delegations are hence a key reference point for CSDP operations in the field. The principal areas of work of EU Delegations include monitoring internal and regional politics and security affairs of relevance to EU interests, such as institutionalised political dialogue, electoral developments, human rights, governance, and security issues: enhancing relations and collaboration efforts with development partners and implementers at IO, bilateral, national, and civil society levels and enhancing the implementation of an EU comprehensive/integrated approach. For example, the mandate of the EUDEL in Somalia (2022) includes: – To promote the political and economic relations between Somalia and the European Union by maintaining extensive relations with Somali counterparts and increasing awareness of the EU, its institutions, and its programmes. – To inform the public of the development of the EU and explain individual EU policies. – To participate in the implementation of the European Union’s assistance programmes. Overview of the EU in the Horn of Africa: Synchronised and integrated approach to addressing challenges of the region (political, development, economic, migration, gender-based, and security aspects).

What Is the Integrated Approach? The implementation of integrated action implies that both civilian and military components work together in the same crisis scenario. Best understood through its animation, the objectives of the EU’s integrated approach appear not only to meet people’s immediate humanitarian needs but also to reduce risk, vulnerability, and societal degradation in the medium to longer-term (5 years +). Working in an integrated manner that prioritises prevention, addresses the root causes of conflict, and supports institutions for sustainable peace and development, an EU

42

K. DOYLE

mission aims to connect with other EU instruments to reinforce national and local systems and anticipate crises. The integrated approach is applied in a conflict-sensitive manner in all development, humanitarian, and peace-building fields, but at all times with the understanding that any initiative will interact with its environment and that such interaction will have consequences with positive or negative effects, particularly in conflict-prone areas. It is about minimising negative effects and maximising positive effects with the minimum ‘standard of Do-No-Harm’. It is a deliberate and systematic approach to ensure that the EU actors understand and minimise these negative effects (risks) and maximise the positive effects of its actions (opportunities) (Fig. 2.2).

Fig. 2.2 Linkages between development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and peace-building Veron and Hauck in Connecting the pieces of the puzzle: the EU’s implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (2021)

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

43

EU Integrated Approach in the Horn of Africa---Example of Its Application Operational Context of Somalia in 2010 Some key aspects of Somalia in 2010 • More than 25 years of civil war • Political, economic and social crisis • Lack of central governance, little government accountability, and a weak security sector • Rule of Law was not enforced • Corruption • Lack of wider public access to decision-making • Inter Regional/State Conflicts • Internal disputes (7 major clans) • Disintegration • Disputes with neighbouring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia) • Humanitarian crisis • Food insecurity (over 5 million people depended on aid) • Poor access to health care • IDPs (2,6 million) • Competition over natural resources • Piracy and Armed robbery at sea • Effecting the local fishermen • Effecting international trade • Effecting Food Aid • Transnational Organised crime • Domestic and Transnational Terrorism (training base for al Qaedalinked group Al Shabab) • Exploiting of marine resources in the Somali Territorial waters • Exodus of refugees from Somalia and through Somalia.

The Application of the EU Integrated Approach The global threat of terror and illegal activities coming from the Horn of Africa was perceived as inevitably affecting Europe unless challenged. Therefore, the EU’s approach to the regional issues (initially described as comprehensive and later as integrated) was outlined in the “Strategic

44

K. DOYLE

Framework for the Horn of Africa”, which the Council adopted on 14 November 2011, guiding the Union’s engagement in the region. The Strategic Framework set out how the EU pursued its approach in partnership with the region, particularly the African Union and key international partners. As part of these efforts, the EU appointed, in January 2012, a Special Representative to the Horn of Africa, Mr. Alexander Rondos, to actively contribute to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security, and development in the region. The ultimate goals and principles were: – The reduction/eradication of poverty and development of societal resilience, the adaptability of States, societies, communities, and individuals to political, economic, environmental, demographic, or societal pressures in order to sustain progress towards national development goals; – The support of the EU’s integrated approach should enhance the capacity of a State in the face of significant pressures—to build, maintain, or restore its core functions, establish basic social and political cohesion; nurture the capacity of societies, communities, and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful and stable manner. EU Rationale for Integrated Approach in the Horn of Africa: Based on a mix of self-interest and EU values, the integrated approach was then applied to the following advantage: • In geopolitical and strategic terms, when it comes to global trade, regional economic growth, and the overall stability of the region. • Ensuring the Red Sea route: protecting navigation from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. • Security of EU Citizens: Attempting to counteract the progress of violent extremism – Somalia is the ‘ground for jihadist and thereby origins for terrorist groups such as Al Shabab’. • Regional security and stability—The influence of the wider region on the Horn of Africa • Migration and forced displacement—reduction in the potential spillover effect to Europe. • A moral duty to prevent human suffering.

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

45

Therefore, the EU’s integrated intervention was premised on the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance, stability, and security for all people, as well as inclusive and sustainable growth and economic integration at regional level. Horn of Africa EU Regional Engagement was guided by • The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (2011) guides the EU’s engagement in the region • Council Conclusions on the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015–2020 • EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan The graphic demonstrates the comprehensive and synchronised contributions of the EU and its Member States to the multifarious aspects of the crisis in the Horn of Africa between 2012 and 2016, which promoted development cooperation, military cooperation, and diplomacy in a complementary way (Fig. 2.3).

Fig. 2.3 The integrated approach in the horn of Africa 2012–2016

46

K. DOYLE

This included military operations, EU Naval Force Atlanta, which deterred, prevented, and repressed acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, and EU Training Mission Somalia, which focused on tactical training for the Somali military. Specifically, the Civilian mission EUCAP Nestor aimed to support the development of ‘maritime security’ in the Horn of Africa/West Indian Ocean states, including counter-piracy and maritime governance. This required the mission to work with the main actors responsible for maritime security in each host country. Typically, this included coast guard, navy, civilian coastal police, prosecutors, judges, and other actors. Mission experts mainly provided advice, mentoring, and training. This included basic coast guard training and expertise in fields such as law drafting and the development of organisational structures. At its launch, EUCAP Nestor was mandated to work across the Horn of Africa (HoA) and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). At the end of 2016, following a strategic review of the Mission, activities now focus solely on Somalia (including Somaliland), and the mission is retitled EUCAP Somalia. The EU gave it a broader civilian maritime security mandate that did not focus only on piracy but also on other maritime challenges, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and human or arms trafficking. It also expanded its activities from training local people to fight against piracy to developing Somali maritime and law enforcement governance, institutions, and operational capabilities. The European Union Delegation to Somalia and the EUCAP Somalia have each supported the EU Integrated Approach vis-à-vis enhanced cooperation, deconfliction of efforts, and alignment of projects and implementations in support of the Somali Security Sector. The mission aspires to make Somalia a safer place for its people so that economic development can progress.

Assessment of Impact In May 2022, in his speech to mark the 15th anniversary of the headquarters for Civilian CSDP missions, HR/VP Borrell reviewed several key civilian crisis management missions. He assesses that.

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

47

Somalia still faces massive internal security challenges, but thanks to our CSDP efforts, piracy is no longer a major threat to international shipping off the Horn of Africa. This is a success story and we should not be shy to claim it. www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/speech-hrvp-josep-borrell-shaping-civiliancsdp-future_en.

According to the implications of a report by Frejus in a University of Bristol policy paper (2017), if the EU wanted to use EUCAP Somalia to make a discernible impact on Somali maritime security capacity, it should have: – focused on long-term capacity-building rather than the swift delivery of results; – strengthened its focus on building local capacities to deal with maritime crimes other than piracy that matter more to Somalis (e.g., illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, arms and human trafficking, and illegal waste dumping); – considered providing hardware (such as boats) required by local authorities to fulfil their own roles of countering maritime crime, together with appropriate training to use equipment, while also considering local absorption capacities; – undertook local needs assessments and appropriate follow-up activities as necessary to ascertain if training on its own was relevant and had sustainable results; – consider seconding additional advisors to meet the mission’s projected capacities, requirements, and responsibilities; – worked to address high turnover rates among staff and experts; and aspire to greater in-country autonomy and flexibility in the work of the mission. In July 2022, due to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Somalia, the EU is launching a Humanitarian Air Bridge to deliver emergency supplies to hard-to-reach areas which are no longer accessible by road. This will be a major logistics operation, with an estimated 50 to 70 flights needed. Flights carrying therapeutic nutrition and medical supplies for the EU’s humanitarian partner, Action Against Hunger, were delivered to Somalia’s south-western district of Elbarde, and more flights

48

K. DOYLE

will reach the regions of Baidoa, Luuq, and Wajid with supplies for humanitarian partners. At the moment of writing, Somalia is facing an extremely dire situation where the protracted conflict, high levels of fragility, and severe environmental stressors pave the way for a humanitarian crisis. Airlifting aid into hard-to-reach areas has been described as a crucial step, but also seen as a “drop in the ocean” when it comes to stemming the crisis and building the domestic capacities to adapt and mitigate these issues in the future.

Coherence of EU Peace-Building Approach EU peace-building is remarkably complex and inherently multifaceted, requiring coordination and integration across the various Directorates of the Commission, member states, coordination between military, security, and civilian elements, and the demands of institutions, politics, geography, culture, and language of each mission (Merket, 2016). EU humanitarian, development, and peace actors have their own mandates, principles, interlocutors, programmes, procedures, and methods. Development cooperation, for instance, prioritises ownership of the partner country and alignment with its strategies, while humanitarian assistance is based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which are central to establishing and maintaining humanitarian access and providing assistance and protection according to needs. Although the EU formally embraced this multidimensional and integrated approach to peace-building, emphasising long-term and integrated prevention activities addressing root causes of conflict, the development of policy has not yet resulted in a single coherent doctrine of peace-building. Indeed, Barnett et al. (2007) found that the European Agencies originally were more likely to avoid the term peace-building “in favour of alternative monikers such as civilian crisis management”. A report by the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in 2021 noticed that individual managers of CSDP peacebuilding missions are limited in their ability to provide innovative and dynamic leadership in missions because their job responsibilities are extremely politicised, and their decision-making requires a deep understanding of the political dynamics in the host country as well as in Brussels. And because internal management systems are complex and time-consuming, the intercultural setting can lead to misunderstandings.

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

49

The report concluded that communication skills and techniques in the language of the mission are essential. Frejus’s (2004) report on multi-agency working is pertinent. The message for professionals is that they have to work together in a more co-operative way. What this means in practice poses big questions as professionals are trained to operate in cadres of ‘expertise’, specialised in relatively small domains of knowledge though with great depth and highly developed skills. In a professional world of experts, individuals become keen on supporting their own fields and individual attachments. What the new governance and indeed model of peace-building demands from these professionals includes the ability to move beyond such fields, to learn and share knowledge and skills with each other. Police missions, in general, tend to be the most valuable in terms of analysis of the potential for interoperability as they are typically, as noted by Chivvis (2010), more staff-intensive than, for example, monitoring or rule of law missions. The more staff and equipment there is, the more potential there is also for enhancing interoperability. Other types of civilian CSDP missions (e.g., rule of law missions) may face an entirely different set of interoperability challenges such as, for example, the question of applicable law and the necessity for interoperability among CSDP staff coming from different legal systems and backgrounds (e.g., the difference between civil law and common law systems). GAP (2019) observed that while the evolution of peace-building programmes of the European Union is premised on liberal priorities of strong political democratic institutions built on elected political representation and a market economy as necessary conditions for establishing a lasting peace, the priority attached to individual missions for establishing institutions of government and rule of law, democratic liberal governance, and reforms to welfare and social justice varied. It could be concluded that at the outset of the Horn of Africa intervention, the Commission’s support was generally not geared to tackling the root causes of the conflict but to mitigating their consequences or provision of “classic” development support in a conflict context.

50

K. DOYLE

Conclusion The European Council, from the outset, has continuously highlighted the unique ability of the EU to “combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and human rights, as well as justice and migration” (EU Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 2014). Within this commitment, the Council also highlighted the need for a “coherent, coordinated, comprehensive and effective EU approach” involving multiple partners and stakeholders. The OECD (2012) found that these external actors that provide support to peace processes needed to incentivise collaborative leadership, support a learning culture, and improve institutional flexibility. The report at that time called on all peace missions to ensure that experts engaged in international support to peace processes complement expertise in a functional area with a broader and more varied skill set that includes strong interpersonal skills and the ability to see the bigger picture. Recruitment, training, and roster composition should reflect this.

The GAP (2019) scoping exercise on peace-building experiences revealed that shared exchange on missions was not sufficiently common practice between NGOs and the different IGO and state actors. Furthermore, GAP (2019) identified that narratives surrounding the catalysts for international involvement in particular missions were not shared internally at the operational aspect of the missions. Ambiguity still underpinned terms and actions associated with the delivery of EU peace-building work, and there was limited consistency in ensuring international actors understood each other’s approaches.

Bibliography Banim, G., & Pejsova, E. (2017). The EU and Preventive Diplomacy: From Policy To Practice. In Prevention Better Than Cure: The EU’s Quiet Diplomacy in Asia, pp. 7–20 (14 pages). European Union Institute for Security Studies. Barnett, M., Kim, H., O’Donnell, M., & Sitea, L. (2007). Peace-Building: What Is in a Name? Global Governance, 13, 35.

2

CIVILIAN CSDP AND FITTING IN ON THE GROUND …

51

Bristol’s Children Fund. (2004). University of the West of England, a Review of Partnership and Multi-Agency Working: An Inquiry Funded by the Bristol Children’s Fund (p. 10). UWE. https://skillsforjustice-ppf.com/home/ Council of the European Union. (2014). 3312th Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs, Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach 9542/14. Accessed 26 October 2022 at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142563.pdf Chivvis, C. S. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management. RAND Corporation. European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management. (2021, May 19). Workshop Report Setting Leaders Up to Succeed! https://www.coe-civ.eu/ kh/workshop-report-setting-leaders-up-to-succeed Gaming for Peace. (2019). Report on Summary SOTA in Evaluation, Soft Skills & Serious Games. https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 01/D2.1_Summary_SOTA.pdf Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Intervention (IECEU). (2018). EU Funded H2020 Research Project. Available Online at https://ieceu-project.com/ Merket, H. (2016). The EU and the Security-Development Nexus: Bridging the Legal Divide (p. 153). Brill-Nijhoff. Natorski, M. (2011). The European Union Peace-Building Approach: Governance and Practices of the Instrument for Stability, PRIF Report No. 111 (p. 2). Peace Research Institute. OECD. (2012). Improving International Support to Peace Processes (p. 52). OECD. University of Navarra. (2022). https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/theeu-civilian-crisis-management-procedures-structure-and-functioning Veron, P., & Hauck, H. (2021, June 21). Connecting the Pieces of the Puzzle: The EU’s Implementation of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. ECDPM Paper.

CHAPTER 3

Theoretical Debates on Interventions and Multilateral Peace-Building Interventions

Abstract This chapter explores extant theory and literature in relation to conflict, violence, and peace-building theory with a focus on intervention theory. It looks particularly at human relations theory and the developing literature on the role of culture, empathy, and humiliation in peace-building. The chapter also looks at the challenge of local ownership, norm-setting and revisits the theory and evolution of the notion of human security within EU policies. It examines how human needs influence the operationalisation of peace-building interventions. Keywords Intervention theory · Human needs · Social status · Intractable · Identity politics · Collective violence · Realist · Human relation · Systems paradigm · Normative power · Responsibility to Protect · Organisational culture · Espoused values · Cultural understanding · Human relations paradigm · Humiliation · Empathy · Transnational norms · Problem-solving · Local ownership · Human Security

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_3

53

54

K. DOYLE

Introduction Conflicts in countries arise for several reasons besides poverty. Most civil unrest emanates from ethnic and culturally titled divisions (Cortez & Kim, 2012; Tejpar, 2010), although conflicts are fuelled by various causes such as grievances, displeasure in governance, ethnicity, religious differences, poor social and political institutions; and inequalities in wealth distribution, undiversified economies, and inflation (Magomedoya, 2017). These reasons can be grouped into four key variables, which have been frequently mentioned notably, – – – –

insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions.

Insecurity speaks to situations where a group of people pursues conflict due to their own insecurities. Inequality relates to “differentials or deprivation across recognisable groups in society”, and can be seen in “political spheres, economic endowment, human assets, and social status”. Political and economic incentives can be seen in leaders who may be motivated by political goals or economic gains. “People in power tend to initiate conflict when they feel threatened, while those who are not in power positions often use conflict as a means to gain power”. As leaders cannot exist without followers, followers often have their own private agendas, such as greed or satisfying their own needs (Cortez & Kim, 2012). In addition, perceptions form a critical role in understanding conflict. Consequently, group identity and group cohesion can mobilise rebel groups. These groups can be swayed by differences in ethnicity, religion, inequalities, and grievances, which could be strengthened by histories, fears, and myths. People who have common objectives and cultures combine their strengths to defend their cultural sovereignty. It has also been found that political leaders may deliberately aggravate historical disputes to strengthen arguments and justifications for seeking to take control of a country or its resources. Failure of the social contract could also lead to conflict. This is based on the belief that people will accept state authority as long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions such as employment and income, and if these needs are not met, a level of conflict will erupt (Cortez & Kim, 2012). Eriksson

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

55

(2019) identifies that this complexity of relationships among stakeholders is a significant factor and that core identity is the internal inner-working model of an individual, rendering identity-based conflicts more likely to be classified as intractable. However, Burgess et al. (2003) argue that it is not the need for enemies and allies that make identity conflicts intractable but social status and privilege, the distribution of scarce resources, and irreconcilable moral differences. They pointed out that “when there is not enough to go around, these fights are likely to be especially bitter and destructive”, especially in cases when the control of the resource is considered prejudiced, for example, the ongoing annexation of land in the West Bank by Israeli settlers. Mulgan (2005) has criticised the focus on the so-called primordial nature of ethnicity and identity at the expense of critical engagement with the ascribed or socially constructed aspects of identity. He argues that “conflicts are never caused in any simple way by identity, culture, or economics. He argues that where resources are scarce, or there are strong historical memories of conflict, small events are more likely to inflame passions”. Likewise, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) argue that culture and Identity may be valuable in explaining the disposition of interests and supply of issues but do less well explaining why differences are intractable. According to Coate et al. (2017), identity and identity politics have now moved to the centre stage. They say that while loyalties are, at the same time, enduring, they remain relative and malleable (Coate & Thiel, 2010). Individuals are involved in different social relationships, each associated with differing identities. Frequently, identities such as culture, nation, religion, class, clan, and race compete for allegiance with that of the state. Identification of the “other”, which can appear threatening—also serve as a basis for association into groups (Martin, 2018). Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) argue that one of the reasons identity narratives retain considerable validity in popular opinion and remain the subject of recurrent reference by policymakers is because of their plausibility and intuitiveness. Different events and conditions may trigger and rouse different identities, which pose a problem for highly systemised organisations to adapt to and even fully understand. Interveners must be wary of the threat of misdiagnosis.

56

K. DOYLE

To understand the complex interdependence of the twenty-first century, international organisations need to think outside the box and blinders of state-centric and Western liberal ideological thinking. Economics and politics, for example, are not distinct spheres of reality. Western notions of non-governmental actors and of civil society are of limited utility for conceiving and analysing interdependence among the diversity of essential players in contemporary world affairs. This is not new thinking. Coate et al. (2017, p. X)

Typologies of Violence Charles Tilly (2003) classifies collective violence in the following ways: – Immediate physical damage to persons and/or objects. – involves at least two perpetrators and, – results from collusion or cooperation among persons who perform it. Tilly’s collective violence fit into the three typologies of violence identified by Galtung in his 1969 paper, Violence, Peace and Peace Research. These typologies are as follows: – Direct Violence: Physical or psychological action with a clear subject, perpetrator, and action. – Structural Violence: This can be understood as entrenched, governing societal systems, which result in outcomes resembling those of direct violence. – Cultural Violence: This involves the use of language, ideology, or religion to contribute to a culture of discrimination and prejudice. These typologies of violence help to clarify the links between violence and poverty. Structural violence, in particular, can result in the kind of structure which reproduces relative social poverty. Structural violence, where societal systems are brought to bear illicit, unequal, or disadvantageous outcomes is the necessary spark in the inception of violence, often working in tandem with cultural violence. Heinecken (2020) described the protests in the streets of South Africa as a clear indicator of a “rebellion of the poor”. Interestingly, protests and worker strikes were responded to with direct violence by specialist agents of the state, such

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

57

as the police and army. The use of violence by soldiers and police officers is a critical predictor of whether further violence might break out. As these authorities are sanctioned by the state and authorised to utilise violence as a tool to uphold the rule of the state (or the would-be state), their activities help to define strong governance in relation to conflict, where violence can be understood as a form of exchange, almost a mode of expression. Tilly’s relational explanation for the inception of violence matures into three distinct ideologies on the subject: “Idea people”, who argue that violence is caused by ideas absorbed from society by an individual, resulting in individual cases of violence. Tilly’s collective violence is resultant of these ideas propagating among groups. “Behaviour people”, who tend more towards biological explanations for violence. This evolutionary-psychological approach describes violence as an inherited trait selected via natural selection. “Relation people”, such as Tilly or Mead, who contextualise violence as an expression of dialogue between two groups. In the case study of South African miners’ strikes cited above, this dialogue is between the relatively impoverished workers, and their governments, who use the police as a proxy to legitimise the use of violence against them.

The crux of Tilly’s argument is that all three camps are compatible with a relational view of violence in this context. This perspective also fits into the typologies of violence, which can be understood as different methods of communicating between parties through violence. Ideas disseminate through the medium of relations, so both relational and ideological views on the cause of violence can be seen to work in tandem, at least, in collective violence.

Paradigms of Intervention Coleman et al. (2014) list 5 paradigms of Conflict Prevention, Intervention, and Post-Conflict Societal Reconstruction – Realist approach posits that resources and power are always scarce, and humans are flawed and have a will to dominate. Change is brought about by power expressed through coercive, command, and

58

K. DOYLE

control strategies. Assuming rational choices, strong action is needed to provide protections and stabilisations to offset uncertainties such as clear and fair laws, a trustworthy government and judiciary, a free press and activism to offset power imbalances and help to organise support and empower marginalised groups. The focus is on shortterm security needs and, in worst-case scenarios, an overreliance on strategies of threat and coercion. Assumptions about the inevitability of others’ aggression can limit response options and typically results in competitive dynamics and further entrenchment. – Human relations paradigm posits that human nature is mixed with equal capacities for good and evil. Different external conditions elicit altruism, cooperation or aggression, and violence through subjective psychological processes that influence perceptions, expectations, and behavioural responses. Change is most effective through plans targeting people, communities, and social conditions and is best mobilised through normative, re-educative processes of influence, and human contact. Human relations procedures include integrative negotiation, mediation, models of Alternative Dispute Resolutions design, including problem-solving workshops, sports clubs, etc., where positive models of human contact are promoted. These options work best where there is a priori acceptance of the values of reciprocity, human equality, shared community, and non-violence. Constructive use of these concepts in contexts that are void of these norms, such as the male superiority society in Afghanistan, and the laws, institutions, and values that regulate them present substantial challenges. Overall, their applicability is limited in situations where such values are not shared. – Pathology paradigm posits that conflict and unrest is a pathology that has to be diagnosed and treated. This orientation is based on the deficit model and focuses on what is wrong in a conflict system. Volkan (1997) recommends working collectively to ‘diagnose’ or uncover chosen psychological traumas and glories that maintain group identity. ‘Vaccination’ includes measures to reduce poisonous emotions such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace enforcement. ‘Healing’ involves concrete measures to reduce the potential of future violence, such as reconstruction, demining, and DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration). However, this model neglects positive responses like

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

59

altruistic and positive ethical behaviour and can therefore foster a negativity bias. – Post-modern paradigm posits that approaches to conflict are rooted in how we make sense of the world and the influence of metanarrative or myths in driving forward the conflict. Conflict emerges from the way parties define, subjectively, the situation. Conflict is less the result of incendiary action, scarce resources, or power struggles but more based on a sense of reality created through a process of social interactions. Power is essentially embedded in the assumptions and beliefs that the disputing parties take for granted. Avoiding clashes and managing conflict means to drag these assumptions into light through critical reflection, dialogue, and direct confrontation. This can happen through close examination of history lessons in school and the media in creating intragroup identities. This focus on intellectual rather than practical schisms means it can be difficult to apply in reality. – Systems paradigm such as that used by the Institute of Economics and Peace posits that intractable conflict reflects destructive patterns within social systems. Societal systems are made up of many actors, units, and organisations spanning the family, local communities, and public and private sectors. All of these operate individually and interact with other institutions and organisations, and each can be thought of as its own system within the societal system. Improvements can be made only when there are transformative shifts in the deep structure or pattern of organisation of the system (which resembles a non-linear and living cell). Intervention measures are interdependent and require careful sequencing.

Normative Power Within International Peacekeeping and Peace-Building The UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine (2008) identified UN peacekeeping as a technique used to preserve the peace, however, fragmented, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing peace agreements. According to the doctrine, ‘conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intrastate or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent

60

K. DOYLE

conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering, and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Peace-building, therefore, involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peace-building measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. (ibid.)

While the protection of civilians is paramount, the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) has become a central if not controversial issue, where states have a duty to protect citizens from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Molnar and Vecsey (2022) say that the characteristics of the EU’s geopolitical power have been analysed through a number of different realist or liberal-normative lenses. Realist critics draw attention to the lack of hard power tools. Since its creation, the European Union has been conceptualised as a sui generis international actor but not a great power in a classical sense, as it was created in opposition to the idea of great powers. It has been described as a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ power. As the European Union cannot be labelled as a hard or military power, some describe it as a ‘normative’ power. Over recent years, it has been conceptualised as an ethical or liberal power in international affairs. As a result of international wariness of using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a tool for military intervention and regime change, much of the focus has switched to strengthening the preventative dimension of R2P. These measures include the promotion of structural prevention by improving government capacity to govern in the manner of liberal democracy, security sector reform, and transitional justice. According to Jacob (2019), this ‘culture of prevention’ to prevent cycles of violence and conflict demonstrates a lack of appetite and political will in the current multilateral environment for taking collective action to halt imminent atrocities. Development of human rights and humanitarian concerns are important foreign policies for member states despite negativity as to

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

61

how much external interveners can actually achieve operationally. Therefore, the focus has shifted to building capacity for hosts’ resilience and withstanding the shocks that fragile states and governments undergo. Although the extant literature on member states’ rationale for participation in civilian CSDP missions is scant, interviews with strategic decision-makers in Estonia, Finland, and Ireland carried out by Lawrence, Jermalaviˇcius and Bulakh (2016) are informative. It found that Irish policymakers justified their participation in peacekeeping as more values-based than transactional, i.e., it was more about the why than what Ireland can gain. The report states in its executive summary: Irish decisionmakers tend to see peacekeeping, above all, as an essential component of values-based foreign policy, while Estonian decision-makers look for more tangible returns for their participation, ultimately, an expectation that their readiness to provide security will ensure that they themselves are not left alone in times of crisis. Finnish decision-makers also explain their contribution largely in terms of values but, much more than Ireland, justify it on the grounds of building the operational capability of the Finnish Defence Forces. It appears from these insights that the EU member states’ motivation for participation in overseas peacekeeping and peace-building missions largely derives from their own geopolitical motivators or operational preparation rather than an appetite for the obvious risks involved in forceful operations for human protection. Thus, this reflects Keohanes’ (1985) view that cooperation is not merely a function of common interests; it serves as an instrumental goal of states caught up in interdependent relationships. In this environment, international institutions take on importance because they reduce transaction costs, provide information, and thus reduce uncertainty; they make commitments credible. In this context, “The principal guarantors of compliance with commitments are reciprocity … and reputation”.

Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building---Interacting with Local Communities Through CSDP Ofstad (2014) states that peace-building, conflict resolution, humanitarian emergency missions, and development aid are all about influencing reality: therefore, a good understanding of the actual reality we want

62

K. DOYLE

to influence is essential. This understanding should include basic knowledge of the relevant host nation’s history, culture, traditions, and religion. Ofstad states that, unfortunately, this requirement is commonly neglected, and delegates are given little opportunity to acquire it and familiarise themselves with ‘connectors and dividers’ and what brings people together or divides their mission area before commencing their work. Edgar Schein’s model of understanding different organisational cultures is useful here to understand the impact of culture on a fragile state. Schein argued that if we really want to understand how culture works, we have to examine the deeply held assumptions that members of that culture share. This involves looking at three layers: – the first layer of behaviour and artefacts is the most obvious and comprises dress, architecture, and furniture of where people live and work – the second layer of ‘espoused values’ includes the stated values and codes of behaviour of a group of people – the third layer and the level of deeply held tacit assumptions is the most difficult to identify. Very often, they are so ingrained in people’s lives that they are not even aware of them, and yet they form the essence of their world’s view and their way of interpreting and doing things. The Gaming for Peace project (2019) identified an attempt to systematise the levels of operationalisation of culture in international interventions, the range of knowledge and skills demanded from different components specifically engaged in military peace operations. The range of cultural information and intercultural skills varies at different levels of the operation. Paradoxically, they identified that the lower the operational level, the higher the responsibility for correct interpretation of culture. The popular concept of cultural awareness that, in most of the literature, covers all levels is actually only the first stage of operationalisation of culture. The GAP project identified that the most comprehensive model of the type of skills demanded at various levels of the operation is based on Bloom’s Taxonomy for Cognition recommended in the executive report of the 2008–2010 NATO’s Multinational Experiment No 6, goal 4.3.

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

63

which is devoted to shaping cultural awareness for the purpose of military operations (Fig. 3.1). The importance of Bloom’s hierarchy rests on the creation of a scale to portray levels of a staff’s abilities to use culture operationally. At the base of the scale stands the ability to identify and describe a given culture, which equals cultural awareness (cultural understanding). Further on lies the ability to internalise the culture, i.e., the skill of taking the investigated object’s point of view as one’s own for better understanding of certain phenomena and threats, and accurate prediction. GAP reported that a profound analysis of political, strategic, and security culture along with socio-cultural dynamics is demanded at this level otherwise, the strategic goals set might be completely unrealistic, as it was in the case of Afghanistan, where the political system that was to be built was utterly contradictory to cultural realms of the region. It is essential therefore to carefully consider the prospective “fit” between a conflict and an intervention. Relevant factors include the intervener’s identity, image, overall relationship to the parties, and consider perhaps a problematic past. As such, the “fit” may emerge from historical relationships and be case-specific, but it will be most valuable if the intervener is legitimate in the view of the conflict parties and can develop and

Fig. 3.1 Bloom’s Taxonomy for Cognition: Levels of operationalization of culture in V. Bados, Operationalization of culture in military operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC: Granada, 2010, s. 10

64

K. DOYLE

make use of trusting relations and familiarity with the parties. Connectors such as identity and personal or institutional credibility can be highly case-specific; however, they cannot be manufactured solely from good will and the desire to contribute. For example, Italy’s historical links and geographic proximity motivated it to intervene in recent conflicts in Libya, albeit with disappointing results partly due to its own political instability, increased Middle Eastern and Russian involvement, and Italy’s disconnection at the time from the wider European intervention framework. Crocker et al. (2018, p. 75) argue that prospective peace-builders need to develop intimate linkages to the conflict parties; shape an inclusive mechanism that draws in and has a role for wider interested parties, and invests effort in “acquiring a thorough grounding in the culture and history of the societies in question”.

Human Relations Paradigm and Peace-Building Humiliation According to Lindner in Coleman et al. (2014), humiliation refers to feelings, acts, and systemic structures. The act of humiliation involves putting down, holding down, and rendering the other helpless to resist the debasement. The feeling of being humiliated emerges when one is unable to repel the degradation and deems it not just unwanted but illegitimate. What counts as humiliation and what leads to the consequences of humiliation is determined by emotional scripts or cultural environments, perhaps changing from one person to another or even within people themselves, depending on the time. The feelings of humiliation may acquire the characteristics of an obsession or addiction and may be viewed as the ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’ even leading according to Volkan (2004) to collective regression’. ‘Chosen traumas and linkage with traumatic events can be passed down through different generations in a given community. For example, the memory of the Holocaust in Israel or, to a lesser extent, Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland. These chosen traumas can have a powerful motivating effect on group identity and social cohesion’ (Volkan, 1997). Over time, the truth of the event can become lost in myth, but the event remains an identity touchstone linking generations together.

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

65

Conditions such as inequality, conflict of interest, or poverty are not automatically perceived as negative. As long as the actors accept justifications, such as divine order or karma, there is no automatic destructive element. Problems can be solved mutually and creatively. It is when feelings of humiliation emerge, which are not solved constructively, that cooperation fails, and in its worst case, violence erupts triggered by rage and led by acts of aggression meant to lessen pain and increase self-worth. Located at the core are what Lederach (2003) described as “the narratives of how people see themselves, who they are, where they come from and what they fear they will become”. Picking up on these emotions, relationships through qualitative approaches can be perceived as ‘soft’ and perhaps feminine. Lindner posits that listening deeply to indigenous peoples provides little prestige for the intervener. According to Martin (2018), humiliation is simply the experience of others pointing out to you, often repeatedly, that you are of low status. When someone has their low status highlighted in public repeatedly, they may feel shame and anger, which motivates them to improve or increase their status. Conflict intervention affects feelings of humiliation through the way it is managed. If managed in a condescending, patronising, and arrogant ways, even if done unwittingly, in societies that privilege honour and reciprocity, feelings of humiliation will undermine constructive cooperation (Grazhdani, 2019), for example, the reported lack of trust in recent years between EULEX mission and public administration in Kosovo. The essence of conflict intervention is that the conflict is addressed rather than neglected or perpetuated and done in a dignified way, even without humiliating the possible perpetrators of humiliation. In ‘The Decent Society’ (1998), Margalit calls for institutions that do not humiliate, and are decent global neighbours. Frederickson and Branigan (2001) offer the ‘broaden and build’ model. Rather than physical action, positive emotions and broadened perspectives facilitate changes in cognitive activity.

Empathy and International Norms Holmes and Yarhi-Milo (2017) note that both empathy and beliefs about a counterpart’s ability to empathise are critical to the process and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations. They define empathy as understanding another’s feelings rather than feeling them emotionally,

66

K. DOYLE

demonstrating a variety of conceptualisations among those working with empathy. Crawford (2014) argued that “the potential role of empathy in world politics is deep and wide” and that diplomacy, trade, communications, and cultural interaction are all opportunities to develop interpersonal and intergroup empathy. Crawford further argued that “empathy can be institutionalised in organisations like the European Union and other pluralistic security communities, and in doctrines like responsibility to protect”. Likewise, emotions like fear can be institutionalised, for example, what happened in the US on 9/11 in terrorist response policies, physical structures like fences and X-ray technologies. Price and Sikkink (2021) expand this, further claiming that transnational norms begin as moral intuitions but through a process of reasoning (alongside power and bargaining), in which the emotion plays a role but does not predominate, these norms are later institutionalised in international law and institutions. Crawford (2014) argues that diplomacy is an opportunity to develop interpersonal and intergroup empathy. Economic affairs, communication, and cultural interaction could facilitate the reduction or elimination of economic and political barriers and the formation of secure communities, which then increase empathy and identification. Crawford (ibid) observes that empathy was arguably institutionalised in the early stages of the European Union and other pluralistic and amalgamated security communities, as well as being the trigger for the institutionalisation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Marlier & Crawford 2013). The development of empathy, moral reasoning, and deliberative capacities are necessary for developing non-paternalistic institutions and practices of global governance. Herbert Kelman (1996) showed that empathy between antagonists can develop through contact, patient negotiation, or by accident. He developed processes that increase empathy during informal and formal negotiating processes by putting mid-level Israeli and Palestinian officials together in unofficial shared ‘problem-solving workshops not merely to produce a minimally acceptable political agreement, but to provide the basis for a stable, long-term peace and cooperative, mutually enhancing relationship that contributes to the welfare and development of both societies’ (ibid.). Dialogue about practical issues, Kelman found, was not possible until emotional issues were addressed. Parties who began with an antagonistic stance towards each other were able to engage

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

67

in a ‘transformation’ of their relationship. Kelman argues that elements of the problem-solving workshop approach can be integrated into prenegotiations and formal negotiations to enhance the diplomatic process. Yet, empathy, once evoked between individual negotiators, must be institutionalised, and this is where Kelmans’ problem-solving workshops seem to have failed to generate a larger impact. Experimental research and practical interventions in conflict situations by Staub (2011) also suggest the importance of both ad hoc and more institutionalised efforts to decrease dehumanisation and promote empathy.

Empathy Trevithick (2017) states that empathy also involves trying to understand, as carefully and sensitively as possible, the nature of another person’s experience, their unique point of view, and what meaning this conveys for that individual. It is a key interpersonal skill, a vital component of emotional intelligence, and an important soft skill. It aids our ability to understand others by being able to put ourselves in their shoes but also supports and fosters a sense of teamwork and shared goals. Salvoey and Mayer (1990) first explained emotional intelligence as a form of social intelligence, which involves a person’s ability to monitor not only their own but others’ emotions, to distinguish among them, and to use that information to inform responses and actions.12 The Gaming for Peace Report (2019) review of existing literature and studies indicates a lack of clarity and significant debate about definitional aspects and what aspects actually represent the key foci around soft skills in peace-building. This report also highlighted the centrality of empathy in all relevant matters. In tackling this, the review highlighted a number of approaches and centred on several key areas. Picking one—empathy, the evidence suggests is a very relevant soft skill for peace and conflict-related activities. For example, empathy facilitates a richer understanding of an individual’s experience, and this becomes particularly relevant in the context of peace-building in an operational sense. Gaming for Peace Report (2019) D2.1 Summary SOTA in Evaluation, Soft Skills & Serious Games

68

K. DOYLE

This report clearly states that when encouraging human rights and developing law enforcement capacity, there remains a lack of training and evaluation of interpersonal skills prior to deployment.

Challenges The concept of ownership originated in the field of development during the 1990s (OECD, 1995). Over the years, the local ownership principle became a new orthodoxy of international interventionism. The UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine (2008) recognises that it is extremely difficult to achieve meaningful local ownership, and says that, in reality, most international interventions often contribute to undermining local ownership by, for instance, employing local professionals who ideally should be in government or local civil society where they would have contributed to local capacity. It is challenging but important to also maintain the third success factor, namely credibility, throughout the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation. Missions have often lost credibility because they were unable to meet the expectations of local communities, both in terms of standards of ethical behaviour and performance. Some contributors to this UN study argued that it is only at the field level that the mission can establish meaningful partnerships with the local authorities and civil society, as well as the other international actors, and that the field level is thus the appropriate level for integrated assessments, planning, coordination, and evaluation. Others were sceptical of the degree to which the UN headquarters in New York would be able to devolve responsibility to the field and questioned the capacity of missions to manage the political implications of its actions or its relationships with other actors when these decisions are often ultimately made in the respective headquarters of the partners in question. It was clear from this consultation that finding the optimal balance between the field and headquarters was difficult to codify and that each situation was probably situation-specific. Over the years, three conceptual approaches to local ownership have crystallised (Donais, 2009). The first one is top-down as it construes local ownership to be a mere buy-in of domestic elites into externally designed interventions.

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

69

This approach is often associated with the liberal understanding of peacebuilding as the globalisation of liberal market democracy from the West to the rest (Paris, 2002). The second approach is bottom-up because it construes ownership as an indigenous authorship of reforms that does not require significant or any international intervention (Chopra & Hohe, 2004; MacGinty, 2008; Pouligny, 2006). This approach draws on communitarianism and its assumption that the community, not individuals, should be the ultimate source of moral values and legitimacy (Adler, 2005). From Adlers’ vantage point, if peace-building is to be legitimate and, therefore, sustainable, it needs to be locally driven and mediated by communities of practice acting between individual and state agency and social structures and defining collective meanings and social practices. The third approach is a middle ground between the previous two because it calls for a local–international consensus and combines international and local resources (Barnett & Zürcher, 2008; Donais, 2012; Hellmüller, 2014). Donais (2012), for instance, criticises both top-down and bottom-up approaches to local ownership as “incomplete strategies for building stable sustainable peace” (p. 13) and calls for a consensus building not only between locals and internationals, but also among the locals (p. 37). Finally, others have also called for a better balance between Western individualism and liberalism, on the one hand, and collectivism and communitarianism prevalent in more traditional societies, on the other hand (Hansen & Wiharta, 2007; Hellmüller, 2014). Why has the implementation of the local ownership principle proved so difficult in international interventions? Some studies, like most policymakers, find the roots of the difficulty in host states and societies. For example, it has been argued that ownership is easier to establish in areas where conflicts ended years or even decades ago than in conflict-affected states where the lack of local capacity requires a degree of international imposition (Chesterman, 2007; Hansen et al., 2008). This is compounded by the fact that locals themselves invariably have competing visions on how to move forward (Thiessen, 2014) and, in some cases, may even prefer international imposition (Krogstad, 2014). In 2016, an EU document on lessons from past interventions acknowledged that ownership is one of the key challenges of EU support to security sector reform (EU, 2016b), and most empirical investigations have documented problems in the implementation of ownership. The

70

K. DOYLE

UN, which pioneered the concept of local ownership, as von Billerbeck puts it, “has failed to realise local ownership in the broad way in which it is presented in discourse” (Billerbeck, 2016, p. 4). Such a poor implementation record is only partly due to a research culture in which “autopsying failure”, as Scheye and Peake note, might be “sexier than diagnosing success” (Scheye & Peake, 2005, p. 255). Such a strong record of implementation problems stems from the fact that operationalising local ownership, in practice, is, as Downes and Keane (2012) correctly remarked, one of the most complex challenges facing international assistance to peace and security (Downes & Keane, 2012). Even scholars who defend liberal peace-building admit that insufficient local ownership is one of its key challenges (Paris, 2010). Schmeidl and Pisa-Lopez (2002) said the current model of peacebuilding fails to include a gender perspective, and without this perspective, there is a danger that international interventions compound problems that are already there. Without the international intervention engaging and listening to women, Pisa–Lopez and Schmeidl’s document indicates that the current model is ‘elite focused’, working only with elites or groups who have access to weapons and merely offering ‘firefighting’ solutions without taking into account complexities on the ground. They suggest that national ownership requires adapting peace processes to local cultures and norms while also taking into account international law and normative frameworks. Intervening factors are also extremely important in identifying triggering events as well as for formulating policy options and mobilising effective response. They might provide the necessary information on entry points for external actors in supporting local initiatives trying to diminish violence or offering coping strategies and peaceful alternatives. Often these are performed by women’s organisations, which are not visible without a micro-level focus. Schmidt, S., and Piza-Lopez, E. (2002) Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action. Bern, Switzerland Swiss Peace Foundation

Norm-Setting Norm-setting can serve an important role in global politics. Beyond the more formal, legal considerations, norm-setting can establish which behaviours are openly condemned in multilateral fora; create political and

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

71

policy space for voicing public outcry or give a platform for the accounts of victims and survivors of specific forms of violence that may have gone unacknowledged; and contribute to a general movement to render certain forms of violence “morally toxic” (de Waal, 2019). Moreover, by default, peace-building and crisis management take place in difficult contexts where locals have little capacity and no agreement on how to move forward, which makes ownership very difficult (Hansen et al., 2008; Joseph, 2007). Finally, achieving ownership is challenging due to everyday habits and practices of imposition that are deeply ingrained in the international peace-building culture (Autesserre, 2014). In addition to universal obstacles to ownership faced by all (or most) international peace-builders, crisis management interventions of the EU are additionally hampered by the politics and policymaking of CSDP.

Human Security and CSDP Persaud in Collins (2013) explains the emergence of human security as the previous focus on national security was too limited in analysing the broad threats that currently exist. Conceptual change was needed as most of the cases of large-scale instability, destruction, and deaths do not result from state-to-state conflicts but from intra-state conflict and ‘natural disasters’. Human dignity and human rights are core values of any secure society. For the national security approach, real threats are to states by other states and in military form. Human security threats target citizens and their communities and emanate from multiple sources. The European Security Strategy (2003) was reflective of the changing security context after 9/11 and recognised the nature of the new threats within it, and outlined five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime. The ESS also recognised that such threats were global and not peculiar to Europe and that political insecurity in different parts of the neighbourhood and beyond—whether caused by failed states or non-state actors—needed a ‘people’ first-approach. Military power in its traditional form and use only exacerbated problems on the ground and, at worst, was largely ineffective in the face of new threats and challenges (suicide bombers, etc.).

72

K. DOYLE

The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (2004) is one of the key documents in establishing the EU’s approach to human security. According to the doctrine on human security, there are three reasons why the European Union needed to accept and develop the Human Security approach: – Moral reasons: This is based on ‘our common humanity’ and the argument that all human beings have a “right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened”. It maintains that Europe, as a rich power, is obliged to contribute to this common humanity. – Legal reasons: Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter call for the promotion of universal respect for human rights, and the EU’s Constitutional Treaty explicitly recognises the EU’s obligation to abide by these principles. – “Personal interest”: Europe cannot be safe if the rest of the World is not safe, as each of these concrete actions is mutually beneficial. This approach represents the security threats in a new light (for example, the possibility of the radicalisation of poverty moving in the direction towards terrorism has been emphasised) and is at the top of the political agenda. This doctrine defined Europe’s responsibility to act independently and, if necessary, to act outside the European borders to improve Human Security. This responsibility has been clearly expressed in the following statement: The EU approach to human security means that it should contribute to the protection of every human being individually, and not only to concentrate on defending its own borders, which is a characteristic approach for the national states.

The HS doctrine for Europe includes three elements: – Principles: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, effective multilateralism, and a bottom-up approach, which includes communication, consultation, dialogue, and partnership with the local population in order to improve the institution of

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

73

early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and sustainability, regional focus, clear and transparent strategic direction. – “A Human Security Response Force” composed of men and women, of whom, at least, one-third of them would be civilians. – New legal framework: the management of decisions for intervention and the operations on the ground as well, embedded in the domestic law of host states, the domestic of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. The two last elements have never been operationalised. In 2007, building on the results of the CHG 2008 and on the growing lists of ESDP crisis management experience, the EU adopted CHG 2010 to ‘help ensure that the EU can conduct crisis management in line with the European Security Strategy by deploying civilian crisis management capabilities of high quality with the support functions and equipment required in a short time-span and in sufficient quantity’. As far back as 2009, Sayigh stated that despite the official rhetoric on coordinated and concerted international efforts, the EU and its individual member states provided aid in a fragmented manner, selecting targets of their assistance mainly on the basis of their own strategic interests than host needs. According to Sayigh, adopting the technical support approach reflects “the narrow concern with developing operational counterterrorist capacity, and the corresponding absence of a comprehensive and deliberately transformative approach to security sectors and associated criminal justice systems”. In other words, at that stage, the situational awareness of the EU decision-makers took place through the lenses of counterterrorism as opposed to developmental needs. The report identified that focus on technical support in the security sector and criminal justice system has meant a lack of focus on democratisation efforts and internal host country political developments. In the SIPRI yearbook, Wiharta and Blair’s (2010) comments highlighted the developing political nature of the EU’s efforts in regard to its civilian agenda, with little attention at the time paid to tangible results. Equally, this overly politicised process has continued to overshadow the challenges of the EU’s decentralised approach to harnessing civilian capacity, which relies mainly on seconded staff that has been selected and provided by member states. This left field missions overly reliant on

74

K. DOYLE

member states’ contributions and, therefore, often under-staffed. Finally, after 2009, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty took centre stage and has subsequently become a significant focus for policymakers, taking scarce civilian capacity away from missions. EPLO highlighted in a paper also for SIPRI that one of the main concerns with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is the risk that the proposed integration of the civilian and military dimensions of EU crisis management strategic planning could lead to the absorption of the civilian dimension into the military dimension, meaning that the planning of civilian missions is not conducted by civilians with the relevant political, professional, and operational expertise. The increased militarisation of the CSDP could, in turn, have a negative impact on civilian crisis management. This was also emphasised by the European Peace-building Liaison Office. The philosophy underlying the EU’s approach to security, as outlined in the Security Strategy (2003), is that security can best be attained through development and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other. That’s why we focus on the holistic concept of human security. By promoting human rights and democracy, fighting poverty, confronting the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, and encouraging economic development, we are tackling inequalities and potential environmental, migration, and conflict threats. All of which could have a destabilising effect on European societies. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006a, 2006b) Speech by Ferrero—Waldner at “Protecting Europe’s Security, Protecting Europe: policies for enhancing security in the European Union” Conference, Brussels—30 May 2006.

The politicisation of the concept initially through the leadership of Ferrero-Waldner as European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy meant that human security had, at that time, penetrated or found expression in different ways—not just as a means of addressing insecurity and underdevelopment, but as a concept that would integrate often competing Human Security agendas within the EU, leading to better coordination and cooperation internally and on the ground (Christou, 2016). However, in subsequent years, the concept fell to the wayside of policymakers. Indeed, in the EU’s priorities for the 66th Session of the United

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

75

Nations (EU Priorities for the General Assembly, June 2011), only a procedural point signifying that Human Security was at a ‘low level’ was raised, and that generated some scepticism as to its vagueness of the term and what it added to the EU’s practice (Christou, 2016), and indeed what it meant in terms of operationalisation: The EU will continue to promote the concept of Human Security as a comprehensive, integrated, and people-centred approach in addressing interrelated threats to security, livelihood, dignity of people, and vulnerable communities. Further reflection is needed to identify the thematic areas in which this approach can best show its added value and concrete applications to achieve this objective. (EU Priorities for the General Assembly, June 2011)

Others have argued that human security as a concept was a top-downdriven process and that the language of human security fell off the agenda when key norm entrepreneurs left office. It seems unlikely, given the low salience of human security on the political radar and the fact that the EEAS is preoccupied with getting its strategic direction right in the coming years that the Human Security as a core narrative will feature in the EU’s security thinking, even though it is prominent in its everyday practice (Christou, 2016).

Operationalising a Peace Process Basically, a peace process is a managed step by step transition from war to peace involving both external and insider dialogue facilitation (Barnes, 2009; Paffenholz & Ross, 2015). To the public, it may come across as one event like the signing of the Oslo Accord 1993 or a product like the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement 1998; but it hides all the years of peace process work, dialogue, and negotiation going on behind the scenes to encourage the conflicting parties into a room for vital talks to begin and joint problem-solving and decisions to be taken. To respond effectively to conflict, some conflict resolution theorists and practitioners underscore the importance of cooperative, nonadversarial processes for problem-solving and relationship building, which are often conducted with the assistance of an external third party or mediator. These processes direct attention to underlying interests and

76

K. DOYLE

human needs (e.g., security, identity, bonding, control, development) beneath superficial positions and demands, and highlight the significance of culture in negotiating peace.

Positions When negotiators come to the table, they usually arrive with a full set of positions. Positions are what negotiators say they want; they are ambitions. They are usually presented as comprehensive solutions to the problem in question and tend to be expressed as concrete statements or narrow demands, often in specific dollar amounts. They can reflect posturing on the part of the negotiators, and they can sometimes be presented in extreme terms. In Hopmann’s (1995) competitivebargaining diagram, Points A and B, the best-case results for each side, are positions. One problem is that positional bargaining can contribute to the kind of win/lose competitive deadlocks described by Hopmann and others. According to Crocker et al. (2018), positions may acquire totemic status and may, deliberately or otherwise, constrain leadership flexibility, thereby contributing potentially to intractability.

Interests Interests are the fundamental needs that inform positions. Fisher and Ury identified that the basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions but in the conflict between each side’s needs, desires, concerns, and fears. Such desires and concerns are interests. Interests are “the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide”.

Needs Interests themselves can be further analysed and shown to represent even more fundamental component needs, a concept frequently illustrated with the following diagram: By this model, interests are conceived as means to an end. For example, one group might have an interest in a particular dam in order to satisfy their basic human need for water, or the same group might have an

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

77

interest in representative government to satisfy their basic human need for self-determination. In Kelman’s words, “International or ethnic conflict must be conceived as a process in which collective human needs and fears are acted out in powerful ways. Such conflict is typically driven by non-fulfillment or threats to the fulfillment of basic needs”.

Tangible and intangible needs. Where positions are stated explicitly, interests are often very difficult to uncover and name. While interests include easily identifiable physical needs, such as security, food, shelter, and economic well-being, they also include intangible needs, such as autonomy, self-determination, justice, equal treatment, and recognition, along with different forms of belonging, like ethnic, religious, national, or regional identity. In our conflict analysis, root causes are often difficult to determine because they are closely associated with these deep, often unexpressed interests and needs. It is difficult to compromise on interests or needs in any kind of bargaining. Kelman (1996) describes that exploration of collective needs and fears is particularly helpful in understanding why it is so difficult for parties to change course in conflicts. Fear of making concessions or accommodations which once made, may lead towards an outcome that will leave their very existence compromised. The problem-solving approach, with its emphasis on deeper exploration, better lends itself to addressing fundamental needs. According to Fisher and Ury (1981), joint problem-solving revolves around interests instead of positions. You begin by identifying each side’s interests—the concerns, needs, fears, and desires that underlie and motivate your opposing positions. Instead of negotiating over opening positions, different options are explored to meet interests in order to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Maintaining Momentum To prevent backsliding, peace processes must identify new narratives that individuals and communities can believe in. It must also be robust enough to withstand the actions of those with perceptual bias and hostility, who will rigidly hold on to a minority position, narrowly define the agenda, and sabotage efforts by others to negotiate (Maise & Burgess, 2003). It is here that the peace-builder’s principles of inclusivity and preparedness come to the fore. Inclusivity is not necessarily about bringing everyone to

78

K. DOYLE

the table but about ensuring you have canvased all views (United Nations, 2019). By canvasing potential spoilers, the intervener can better sculpt a strategy to mitigate the effects of their actions.

Conclusion To summarise, according to this review, the rationale for violence and conflict can be conflated into 4 possible contexts; – – – –

insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions.

From the various examples and literature, it is evident that violence is nearly always predicated on political choices or by leaders in pursuit of power or resources. Interveners must be conscious that the presence of past tensions between groups does not indicate a causation of current violence. Insecurity speaks of situations where a group of people pursues conflict due to their own insecurities. Inequality relates to “differentials or deprivation across recognisable groups in society” and can be observed in “political spheres, economic endowment, human assets, and social status”. Political and economic incentives can be seen in leaders who may be motivated by political goals or economic gains. Perceptions can be formed through group identity and swayed by differences in ethnicity, religion, inequalities, and grievances which could be strengthened by histories, fears, and myths. Failure of the social contract could also lead to conflict and people will not accept state authority if the state fails to deliver services and provide reasonable economic conditions. This complexity of relationship is a significant factor and core identity of the internal innerworking model of an individual, rendering identity-based conflicts more likely to be classified as intractable. Peace-building and crisis management by default take place in difficult contexts where locals have little capacity and agreement on how to move forward, which makes local ownership of peace initiative very difficult. This is compounded due to everyday habits and practices of imposition that are deeply ingrained in the international peace-building culture.

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

79

Macro interventions and large-scale state security interventions such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo focused on the first two drivers: insecurity and inequality. The change is brought about by powerful expressions of coercive, command, and control strategies. Within this paradigm of interventions are assumptions of rational choices by the host state actors, security interventions, and stabilisations to offset uncertainties and introduction of clear and fair laws, a trustworthy government and judiciary. Tackling the other drivers of conflict—private incentives and perceptions are best explored through the support of human contact and intersections; and recognition that the development of peaceful and accountable states takes time is difficult and suffers setbacks. The problem is that private incentives and perceptions cannot be easily understood from the outside. Very often, conflict is driven by the political calculations made by local leaders, based on their values and interests. The lack of progress has been based on ‘insufficient ownership’ of the peace-building process by local actors and not addressing these conflict drivers through micro-interventions. It is obvious from this review that it is difficult to generalise regarding intervening in any conflict and, therefore, difficult to achieve political scale in any intervention; however, there are indicators that foreshadow the use of violence and turn up frequently in post-conflict analysis. According to the literature, when encouraging social change, the degree of insight that external actors have into these indicators, and micro political calculations in their specific historic, socio-economic, political and behavioural context, leads to increased influence and reduced humiliation of the host state. The current impression of Human Security is that no single or at least common narrative exists, and there is no political desire to revive momentum as the concept may be perceived as too broad to operationalise.

80

K. DOYLE

Bibliography Adler, E. (2005). Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. Routledge. A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels. (2003, December 12). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Upload/78367.pdf. Accessed March 2013. Albrecht, U., Chinkin, C., Dervis, K., Dwan, R., Giddens, A., Gnesotto, N., & Schmeder, G. (2004). A Human Security Doctrine. Autesserre, S. (2014). Peaceland Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge University Press. Bados, V. (2010). Operationalization of Culture in Military Operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC. Barnes, C. (2009). Civil Society and Peace-Building: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace. The International Spectator, 44(1), 131–147. Barnett, M., & Zürcher, C. (2008). The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External State Building Reinforces Weak Statehood. Routledge. Barnett, M., Fang, S., & Zürcher, C. (2014). Compromised Peace-Building. International Studies Quarterly, 58(3), 608–620. Burgess, H., & Burgess, G. (2003). What Are Intractable Conflicts? https:// www.beyondintractability.org/essay/meaning_intractability Chesterman, S. (2007). Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970601075873 Chivvis, C. S. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management. RAND Corporation. Chopra, J., & Hohe, T. (2004). Participatory Intervention. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations, 10, 289–305. Christou, G. (2016). The European Union’s Human Security Discourse: Where Are We Now? http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/76144/1/WRAP_0484042-pais260116-the_eu_and_human_security_es_final.pdf Coate, R. A., & Thiel, M. (Eds.). (2010). Identity Politics in an Age of Globalization. First Forum Press/Lynne Rienner. Coate, R. A., Griffin, J. A., & Elliott-Gower, S. (2017). Interdependence in International Organization and Global Governance. International Studies Association and Oxford University Press. Coleman, P. T., Deutsch, M., & Marcus, E. (Eds.). (2014). The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (3rd ed.). Jossey Bass. Collins, A. (2013). Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford University Press. Cortez, A. L., & Kim, N. (2012). Conflict and the Identification of the Least Developed Countries: Theoretical and Statistical Considerations, Economic and Social Affairs CDP Background Paper No. 13 ST/ESA/2012/CDP/13. Crawford, N. (2014). Institutionalising Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy. International Theory, 6, 535–557.

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

81

Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., & Aall, P. (2018). The Changing Context of PeaceMaking. Routledge. De Waal, A. (2019, January 14). Mass Starvation Is a Crime—It’s Time we Treated it That Way. Boston Review. https://bostonreview.net/articles/alexde-waal-starvationcrimes/ Deutsch, M., Coleman, P., & Marcus, E. (Eds.). (2014). The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (3rd ed.). Wiley. Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peace-Building Processes. Peace & Change, 34(1), 3–26. Donais, T. (2012). Peace-Building and Local Ownership: Post-Conflict ConsensusBuilding. Routledge. Downes, M., & Keane, R. (2012). Security-Sector Reform Applied: Nine Ways to Move from Policy to Implementation (Policy Paper). International Peace Institute. Eriksson, J. (2019). Coercion and Third-Party Mediation of Identity-Based Conflict. Review of International Studies, 45(3), 387–406. European Peace-building Liaison Office.(2009, February 18). Statement on Civilian–Military Integration in European Security and Defence Policy. Brussels. http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO_Statement.pdf European Union. (2003). European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7 809568enc.pdf European Union. (2004). A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. https://www.eur oparl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/human_security_rep ort_/human_security_report_en.pdf European Union. (2016a). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Author. European Union. (2016b). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Elements for an EU-Wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform. Author. Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2000). Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. International Organisation, 54(4), 845–877. Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006a, May 30). Protecting Europe’s Security. Speech to conference on ‘Protecting Europe: Policies for Enhancing Security in the EU’. Brussels. Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006b, May 30). European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Speech /06/331 on The EU’s role in protecting Europe’s security at Conference on “Protecting Europe: Policies for Enhancing Security in the European Union” Brussels. https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vhb1jmnkuqyy/xr_nieuws berich/speech_ferrero_waldner_samenwerken

82

K. DOYLE

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Houghton Mifflin. Fredrickson, B. L., & Branigan, C. (2001). Positive Emotions. In T. J. Mayne & G. A. Bonanno (Eds.), Emotions: Current Issues and Future Directions. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. The Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Gaming for Peace. (2019). H2020 Project Funded from the EU Framework Programme. https://gap-project.eu/ Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. (2006). Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide. European Journal of International Relations, 12(1), 53–87. Grazhdani, D. (2019). Is EULEX a Step Back for International Rule of Law Missions? https://harvardilj.org/2019/08/is-eulex-a-step-back-for-int ernational-rule-of-law-missions/ Groom, A. J. R. (1988). Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher. Review of International Studies, 14(2), 97–115. Cambridge University Press. Hansen, A. S., & Wiharta, S. (2007). The Transition to a Just Order—Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict: A Policy Report (Research Report Series). Folke Bernadotte Academy. Hansen, B., Toft, P., & Wivel, A. (2008). Security Strategies and American World Order: Lost Power. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203888612 Heinecken, L. (2020). South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Military, Lost in Transition and Transformation. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, Springer. Hellmüller, S. (2014). Owners or Partners? A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Local Ownership. In Is Local Beautiful? (pp. 3–14). Springer Briefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace, 11. Holmes, M., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2017). (2017) The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits: How Empathy Shapes Outcomes of Diplomatic Negotiations. International Studies Quarterly, 61(1), 107–122. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/ sqw034 Hopmann, P. T. (1995). Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 542, 24–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048207 https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/978019 0846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-110. Accessed 20 July 2022. https://www.ipinst.org/2012/02/security-sector-reform-applied-nine-ways-tomove-from-policy-to-implementation https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jan/21/islamandbritain.comment1

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

83

Jacob, C. (2018). From Norm Contestation to Norm Implementation: Recursivity and the Responsibility to Protect. Global Governance, 24(3), 391–409. Jacob, C. (2019). Civilian Protection in the Context of Interventions. In N. Lemay-Herbert (Ed.), Handbook on Intervention and Statebuilding (pp. 198– 209). Edward Elgar. Joseph, E. (2007). Ownership Is Over-Rated. Sais Review, 27 , 109–123. Kelman, H. C. (1996). Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving. International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, 1(1), 99–123 (Billerbeck) 2016. Kennedy Institute. (2020). Unpublished report to Dept of Foreign Affairs on ‘Peace-building Seminar “Peace-building—Progress and Prospects’ Edward Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention, Maynooth University, 29 November 2019. Keohane, R. O. (1985). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press. Krogstad, E. G. (2014). Local Ownership as Dependence Management: Inviting the Coloniser Back. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 8(2–3), 105. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.901030 Lawrence, T., Jermalaviˇcius, T., & Bulakh, A. (2016). Soldiers of Peace. Estonia, Finland and Ireland in UNIFIL, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/ICDS_Report_Sol diers_of_Peace_December_2016.pdf Lederach, J. P. (2003). The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Good Books. Lindner, E. G. (2006). Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict. Praeger/Greenwood. Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace. Cooperation and Conflict, 43(2), 139–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/001083670 8089080 Magomedova, M. (2017, September 25). Determinants of External-Debt Crises. A Probit Model. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042887 Maiese, M., & Burgess, H. (2003). “Extremists and Spoilers." Beyond Intractability”. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.), Conflict Information Consortium. University of Colorado [online]. Posted: September 2003 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/extremists. Accessed 7 April 2022. Margalit, A. (1998). The Decent Society. Harvard University Press. Marlier, G., & Crawford, N. C. (2013). Incomplete and Imperfect Institutionalisation of Empathy and Altruism in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine. Global Responsibility to Protect, 5(4), 397–422. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 1875984X-00504003 Martin, M. (2018). Why We Fight. Hurst Publishers.

84

K. DOYLE

Molnar, A., & Vecsey, M. (2022). The EU’s Missions and Operations from the Central Mediterranean to West Africa in the Context of the Migration Crisis. International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies, 15(1), 2022. Mulgan, G. (2005, February 21). Talk Your Way Out of Conflict and Misery. The Guardian. OECD. (1995). Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris. Ofstad, O. (2014). Conflict Management in International Missions. Routledge. Paffenholz, T., & Ross, N. (2015). Inclusive Peace Processes—An Introduction. In Development Dialogue 2015 | Part 1 Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Paris, R. (2002). Peace-Building in Central America: Reproducing the Sources of Conflict? International Peacekeeping, 9(4), 39–68. https://doi.org/10. 1080/714002779 Paris, R. (2010, April). Saving Liberal Peace-Building. Review of International Studies, 36(2), 337–365. Pouligny, B. (2006). Peace Operations Seen from Below: U.N. Missions and Local People. Price, R., & Sikkink, K. (2021). International Norms, Moral Psychology and Neuroscience. Cambridge University Press. Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1989–1990). Emotional Intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9(3), 185–211 https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGGP24E-52WK-6CDG Sayigh, Y. (2009). “Fixing Broken Windows”: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen. https://policycommons.net/artifacts/430827/fix ing-broken-windows/1401890/ Scheye, E., & Peake, G. (2005). Unknotting Local Ownership. In A. Ebnöther & P. Fluri (Eds.), After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-conflict Societies. From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership. National Defense Academy and Bureau for Security Policy. Schmeidl, S., & Piza-Lopez, E. (2002). Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action. Swiss Peace Foundation. Staub, E. (2011). Overcoming Evil Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism. Oxford University Press. Tejpar, J. (2010). Economic Causes of Civil War: The Role of Global Economic Structures, FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency. Thiessen, C. (2014). Local Ownership of Peace-building in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable Peace and Development. Lexington. Tilly, C. (2003). The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge University Press. Trevithick, P. (2017). The ‘Self’ and ‘Use of Self’ in Social Work: A Contribution to the Development of a Coherent Theoretical Framework. British Journal of Social Work, 48(7).

3

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS …

85

UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine Report of the TfP Cedric de Coning, Julian Detzel and Petter Hojem1 Oslo Doctrine Seminar 14 and 15 May 2008, Oslo Norway. United Nations. (2019). United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation. Volkan, V. (1997). Bloodlines. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Volkan, V. (2004). Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror. Pitchstone Publishing. von Billerbeck, S. (2016). Whose Peace? Local Ownership and United Nations Peacekeeping. Oxford (online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 January 2017). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755708.001.0001 Weber, M., Owen, D. S., & Strong, T. B. (2004). The Vocation Lectures. Hackett Publishing. Wiharta, S., & Blair, S. (2010). Chapter 3. Civilian Roles in Peace Operations. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press. Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2011). Greater Equality: The Hidden Key to Better Health and Higher Scores. American Educator, 35(1), 5–9.

CHAPTER 4

CSDP Mission Performance: An Evaluation

Abstract Drawing on the author’s own research, this chapter critiques the performance of CSDP missions in relation to planning and mandate implementation, assessments and self-evaluation, in-theatre challenges, leadership and management of missions, interoperability and information sharing, and the achievement of objectives. The chapter concludes with assessment of the achievement of mission objectives, and emergent challenges for CSDP missions. Keywords Terroir · Peace–building · Norm-setting · Eurocentric · Reparational · Leadership · Multifaceted · Social skills · Problem-solving · Mediation · Problem-solving · Mediation · Negotiation and Dialogue · Mediation support · Peace processes · Facilitating Dialogue · Multilateral · Persuasion · Arbitrate · Negotiate · Exchange · Security Sector Reform · Northern Irish · Bosnia Herzegovina · Stabilisation · Conflict sensitivity

Introduction Conflict prevention is considered a key objective of the EU’s external relations and foreign policy, and according to the Lisbon Treaty, which © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_4

87

88

K. DOYLE

defines the objectives of the EU’s external actions, the EU prides itself as “a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development”. As an integral part of the external relations of the EU, conflict prevention is also engrained in EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP. The wide range of political, economic, and military instruments available to the EU as a supranational organisation gives the EU an effective platform to undertake and implement crisis management operations. The EU currently has 11 CSDP ongoing missions, ranging from support to security sector reform in the Central African Republic to monitoring of ceasefires in Georgia. The typical aspects of a CSDP mission naturally vary depending on the specific circumstances. According to the EEAS (2021), these eleven civilian missions are deployed in partner countries where they ensure border management, conflict prevention, combat organised crime and smuggling, reform national security sectors or monitoring the judicial system and the rule of law. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) serves as the common operational headquarters for the EU’s civilian CSDP missions. In November 2018, EU Member States agreed on a Civilian CSDP Compact aimed at strengthening civilian CSDP. Each EU mission works in the framework of a comprehensive approach in agreement and coordination with the EU Delegations in the same area and within the framework of EU regional policies. These missions have a particular focus and relationship with the host nation. While the concept of peacekeeping and peace operations, of course, has widened to include the return of refugees, the promotion of human rights, policing and monitoring elections, and aspects necessary to stabilise social order, CSDP missions generally do not necessarily participate in these horizontal (Lederach, 1997) tasks, helping them to remain focused on their agreed mandate. This chapter critiques the performance of CSDP missions in relation to: – – – – – – –

Planning and Mandate Implementation Assessments and Self Evaluation Internal in-theatre EU Challenges Host Country Impression Working with International Counterparts Situational Awareness Leadership and Management of Missions

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

89

– Interoperability and Information Sharing – Achievement of Objectives. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the emergent challenges of CSDP missions and an examination of how they can serve the interests of members, if EU member states manifest sufficient political will.

Mission Planning and Mandate Implementation Legal Preconditions and Planning for Missions The basic legal instrument governing each EU mission is a Council Decision adopted on the basis of Article 43 TEU in conjunction with Article 28 TEU (following the voting rules laid down in Article 31 TEU). It is significant that these are acts of the Union and not simply decisions adopted collectively by the Member States. Such decisions set out the mission and mandate, political control and direction, designate the head of mission, and, where applicable, location of headquarters: specify the command and control relations and contain provisions on the status of the mission, financial arrangements, participation of third States (i.e., non-EU Member States), relations with other actors, handling of EU classified information and the launching date and termination/duration of the operation. Articles 42 and 44 TEU also introduced the possibility of entrusting the execution of a task to a group of member states. The key reparatory body is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This Committee, under Article 38, exercises, under the Council, the political control and strategic direction of EU missions. The Council also delegate to them some decision-making powers (Fig. 4.1). Asseburg and Kempin (2009) implied that if the EU wishes to pursue a sustainable conflict prevention mission or operation with a long-term impact, it must ensure that the mandate, resources (both financial and human) and implementation strategy of each mission and operation are matched to the specific circumstances as well as the needs on the ground. In other words, the EU’s envisaged activity should be sustainable and long enough. On the other hand, it is necessary for the CSDP mission or operation not to be overambitious or lavish in terms of human and material resources. According to the IECEU research report (2018), such a lesson may have been observed in Kosovo, when it seems reasonable to ask whether so big efforts were needed—at the peak, EULEX had 3000 personnel—and the sustainability of such dynamics over long periods.

90

K. DOYLE

Fig. 4.1 Legal framework for CSDP activities

Devising the mandate is a challenge that has been well-documented since Asseburg and Kempin (2011), who described how the expertise of the EU agencies in the field, which are most familiar with the conflict zone, have often been overlooked by those Brussels-based institutions who have a primary say in the design of mission mandates. Despite that terrain-based institutions are subordinate, even in the process of the mandate planning, Asseburg and Kempin advocate for better use of their insights. Another aspect regarding mandates is that they have often been vague, particularly in earlier missions and operations (such as “to make a contribution to”), with unclear objectives and no specific benchmarks defined. Consequently, newer missions and operations have the so-called Mission Implementation Plans, which measure the change by comparing two states of situations over time. Mandates of newer missions are not as rigidly set-in-stone as in earlier missions, with eased procedures to change as a necessity for responding to changed circumstances on the ground (EU Council, 2016). Weak or out-of-date mandates prevented experts from working to their best because certain activities could not have been undertaken due to the inflexible mandates (Kuosmanen, 2015). Against this background, it is difficult to define and measure success. Furthermore, as noted by Asseburg and Kempin (2011), when referring to mandates, it is interesting to learn that lessons learned have not been really learned (or transferred to other experts) due to the fact that

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

91

“systematic ‘lessons learned’ processes and comparative situation analyses were woefully absent” up to that point. The IECEU report (2018) noted the absence of clear criteria for deciding the preconditions for deploying a CSDP mission or operation (e. g., number of deaths, degree of violence, region …) for almost 20 years of its existence. Due to the numbers of conflict prevention (and crisis management) actors in conflict- and post-conflict zones and the inherent complexity of such environments, the planning and coordinating of CSDP missions requires effective cooperation among various actors already at the planning phase. The UN and the OSCE are prominent among the “usual suspects with whom the EU cooperates from the very beginning while trying to address most or all of the phases of a conflict cycle”. An important lesson learned regarding planning is that there are almost never enough fact-finding exercises prior to launching the mission, particularly concerning; – the aims and objectives of the proposed effort, – evaluation of appropriate instruments with which to conduct the mission, – and decisions concerning the appropriate time frame in which the intervention is to be implemented. One of the reasons for that is that the EU still fundamentally lacked independent (common) intelligence capabilities. However, with the advent of the SIAC (Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity) at the European Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) as part of the civilian crisis management structures of the European External Action Service (EEAS, 2021), recent missions and operations have been better equipped with information about the local environment where the mission was to be deployed. In this regard, another important lesson the EU learned is that it is prudent to investigate thoroughly the willingness of the EU member states not only to approve the mission but also to contribute human, financial, or material resources. Another lesson learned, which is not surprising, is that the process of setting up smaller deployments usually proceeds more smoothly and quickly compared with larger deployments. The IECEU (2018) also revealed that planning phase is often superficial and needed more thought in order to link EU actions with other actors. Respondents also stated the importance of improved coordination among EU offices in the mission area.

92

K. DOYLE

More efforts should be put into planning capacities as well as into thinking how CSDP activities at best can contribute to the wider national and international efforts of peace-building and state-building. Better linkages with national actors, UN actors, regional actors, development banks, donors, civil society... Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

Assessments and Self Evaluation The IECEU report identified that there is potential for further development of informal practices of reporting and review, including discussions, cooperation within individual projects, etc. These informal practices can allow for more flexible responses that are more mission-specific and efficient. However, enhancing these informal practices is difficult as they are ad hoc and dependent on the individuals. The core material for reviewing civilian crisis management missions comes from their formal reporting practices. At the field level, civilian CSDP missions report to the CPCC at three-time intervals, all of which contribute towards lessons learnt: • Weekly operational summaries. • More analytical monthly reports focusing on progress in the current Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). • Six-monthly reports on the implementation of the missions’ mandate against its MIP. This last one is the most in-depth of the three reports and includes a review and possible changes to the missions’ current MIP, its contributors, and indicators, through a strategic review process. The report also includes a section on lessons learned, contributing directly to the broad CSDP lessons learned process. The six-monthly report is presented to the member states by the head of mission personally in the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The reporting practices of CSDP missions are strictly internal and as such do not include external contributors, although the reporting can include material from outside the mission. Within the missions, all departments, units, and offices typically take part in contributing material to the reports on MIPs they are charged with or contributing to. In addition to

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

93

this reporting practice, missions can also conduct internal assessments, which do not have a set form, falling more to the informal category. Notably, there was no specific guidance on format or structure to how missions include lessons identified in their reporting, leaving decisions on this to the missions and their heads. To facilitate the gathering of lessons from missions, a Civilian Lessons Management Application (CiLMA) is being developed based on the military lessons learned. Due to its cumbersome nature and lack of access by mission personnel, it had been left unused for the most part, forcing the extended use of ad hoc measures in gathering identified lessons. The main civilian CSDP review is conducted in a yearly cycle. On the HQ-level, the formal review systems in CSDP are standardised for the most part, with different CSDP structures focusing on particular areas of review. The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is tasked with gathering lessons from the political-strategic planning of civilian missions, while CPCC focuses on lessons on operational planning, conduct, and support of the missions. Combined with lessons gathered by the EUMS from military operations, these lessons are discussed in a two-level CSDP Lessons Management Group, composed of the heads of EU bodies relevant to developing best practices. As a subsidiary body, a Lessons Working Group consists of experts from these bodies tasked with discussing the details of lessons and producing joint recommendations. The results of the yearly lessons learned processes are collected into a formal lessons learned report and submitted to the PSC with input from EU delegations in the field. This report identifies five key lessons and includes specific recommendations on how to respond to these lessons. The PSC consults with its working groups on the report and, in line with this advice, endorses it, beginning the implementation of the recommendations. Although the lessons learned process is strictly intra-EU, participation in the process is broad, as it includes representatives from any EU body deemed a CSDP stakeholder as well as member states. Interoperability with external partners is complicated by limits of information sharing, as confidentiality or classification of documents and reports related to it are confidential and classified. The EU Parliamentary Analysis of CSDP Missions and Operations (2020) lamented that while missions regularly report to EU structures (e.g., the Political and Security Committee), there are currently few systemic, in-depth, and truly independent reviews of their performance,

94

K. DOYLE

and only a limited work has been done to identify and learn from the most important and actionable lessons that missions and operations can offer.

Competencies (of Mission Staff) Were Based on the Mandate and not the Context Two factors stand out in assessing EU missions operational work: the political imperative in Brussels and practical needs of the host country. For peace-building missions, the European Court of Auditors (2015) commented that while the process of deployment and administration was mechanical, the EEAS arrangements are now improving. Policy, strategy, structures, and the command and control for a crisis situation were being necessarily reformed. However, most of the EUPOL mission members interviewed in the IECEU report (2018) were unconvinced at how elaborate the ‘comprehensive’ approach for EUPOL Afghanistan really is. They did not see it live up to its claims in Afghanistan. This is explainable in general terms, as with most missions, they are political with an operational capability. On the contrary, the existence of EUPOL in Helmand was fruitful and effective, which was not, according to the IECEU report, as evident in Kabul prior to the winding up of the mission. In Helmand, EUPOL and the US worked together to build a provincial HQ for police. EUPOL provided training to the Afghan National Police (ANP) that was well designed and relevant. EUPOL had a pretty good image and reputation in Helmand; they had a good relationship with the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP), and when they told him they were leaving, he was unhappy, as they provided great support for the ANP. EUPOL also dealt with heads of districts; they knew everyone by name, based on friendship and good understanding. EUPOL has shrunk and works now at the strategic level. I’m unsure if they have the same understanding or knowledge.

One EUPOL Afghanistan mission member lamented the drift away from interacting with the host population: “EUPOL no longer does training and mentoring, which it was good at. Restrictions and constraints don’t allow it. Now that it has moved into the strategic area, it has nothing to offer other than advice. The relationship is changing”.

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

95

Internal Challenges of the EU The IECEU (2018) research indicated problems of coordination and cooperation between CSDP missions and EU delegations, also many challenges internal to CSDP were perceived to be related to the development of CSDP as an EU instrument and its relation to other EU instruments. EU CSDP instrument was initially launched as EU’s quick response to acute crises situations but have in recent years started to become active in roles that are more developmental by nature. EUPOL COPPS’s work in providing strategic advice in the security and justice sectors in the occupied Palestinian territories is an example of such activities. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s development work, humanitarian assistance, and trade relations were handled by EC delegations that were, at that time, under the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty that came into force in 2009 established the EU External Action Service in 2010, changed this setting, and put the EU delegations under the EEAS. The delegations were still handling development, humanitarian aid, and trade relations that are funded by and fall under the competencies of the EC. At the same time, however, the EU delegations received more political mandates related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy that was under the Council. Currently, the EU delegations have staff from three sources: the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and diplomats from the EU Member States. However, the CSDP missions and operations are not related to the EU delegations, but are directly led by EEAS structures in Brussels. Some respondents assessed that the current coordination and cooperation problems among CSDP missions and EU delegations were related to the ongoing formation of EEAS; it was suggested that some people in Brussels who had, for a long time, worked for the European Commission had resisted the changes that the Lisbon Treaty had introduced, and had hindering cooperation also at the field level. Others stated that CSDP missions should limit their work to immediate response—monitoring ceasefire or peace accords, providing material assistance and basic training—and not enter developmental work to which it had no capacity or skilled staff. In their opinion, the EU should acknowledge that EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah had completed their work in the OPTs and it was now time for other EU instruments to continue the work. Yet, the development of CSDP from quick impact tools to the quasi-developmental instrument was welcomed by others, and the current mismatches such as lack of development work skills should be fixed by making better use of contracted staff.

96

K. DOYLE

Local Ownership and Relationship with Host Country Relationship as a Feature of CSDP Interventions Local ownership is a principle of peace and state-building based on the premise that international interventions can lead to sustainable results only if there is a sufficient degree of local input, participation, and control. At this stage, there is almost universal consensus among policymakers that local ownership is a precondition for successful international support to peace- and state-building (Dursun-Ozkanca & CrossleyFrolick, 2012). It became not something that is merely desirable or politically correct, but as one UN document put it, it is seen as an imperative, an absolute essential, if peace-building is to take root (UN, 2010). According to Edjus (2017), the EUCAP Nestor project in the Horn of Africa conceptualised local ownership as a technology of international security “governmentality” interventions wherein external actors (the EU) employed a set of techniques with the aim of turning local agents into subjects, responsible for externally driven security sector reform agenda. Such an approach situated local ownership of CSDP operations within a wider context of emerging liberal security governance, and explained why it continuously faced implementation difficulties in semi-liberal or illiberal settings. The empirical record shows that EU interventions have mostly focused on local governments and top echelons in state administration. Instead of a genuine ownership over domestic reforms, the EU approach, as Vandemoortele demonstrates in the case of Bosnia, was to initiate the reform and define its parameters, and then delegate the implementation process (Vandemoortele, 2012). Furthermore, the EU has often prioritised stability over a genuine and broad-based ownership (Keukeleire et al., 2011). Moreover, CSDP police missions have overwhelmingly adopted the top-down approach, focusing on national institutions, while totally overlooking regional and local levels of policing (Moore, 2014). Referencing the case study presented above, and according to Edjus (2017), EUCAP Nestor struggled to achieve ownership because it implemented ownership as an externally driven top-down endeavour. Instead of negotiating on “the commonly agreed objectives and principles”, the EU designed the mission according to its own needs, interests, and resources and then tried to sell it to its local counterparts. As a result, the overall

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

97

degree of local ownership was low, while the impact on the local and regional capacity to fight piracy was either negligible or unsustainable. No matter how poor the local capacities were, a much more fundamental obstacle to ownership has been the fact that the EU designed the mission based on its own interests and resources without properly taking into consideration local realities. Interview in Edjus in “Here is your mission, now own it!” (2017)

This absence of local ownership was attributed to lack of proper engagement. It, therefore, took five years for the EU to basically accomplish the task that was supposed to be done by fact-finding and technical assessment missions: understand the local context and start talking to Somalis about the maritime issues that are relevant to them. Interview in Edjus in “Here is your mission, now own it!” (2017)

One EUCAP official in the Edjus study described the lack of readiness among the member states to fill up the posts: They use us simply to keep the flag in the sand. They are absolutely not interested in the local impact, only in the EU’s image in the world. This is just a show. If you want to make a real and tangible change, you need to invest much more time and resources.

Working with Local Actors An example from IECEU report (2018) describes that in Palestine, the EU and other donors needed to make a proper assessment of the situation to avoid the current imbalances in assistance that had led to competition between Palestinian judicial institutions, and not brought about any fundamental changes in the justice sector and that the EU is a political actor, and the largest donor, and that it should take clearer political stand in advancing democracy and human rights and be more creative in working with Gaza through EUBAM Rafah. The EU’s no-contact policy with Hamas at the time was seen as a mistake by a number of respondents as it prevented the EU from supporting intra-Palestinian reconciliation. The report mentions that the

98

K. DOYLE

primary focus on mandated mentoring could be restrictive as the Palestinian Authority’s higher officials were not keen on receiving ‘mentoring’ from international experts. In fact, some said that the only EUPOL COPPS staff member who could do mentoring in the Palestinian Civil Police was a rare expert who had served in the mission already for eight years and developed a very close working relationship with the PCP personnel. Respondents in that report indicated that, at that time, EUPOL COPPS lacked information and knowledge on what happens in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It was said that EUPOL COPPS seemed to pay no attention to human rights violations committed by the PA security forces: the use of excessive force by police against peaceful demonstrators during teachers’ strike, or that EUPOL COPPS was not aware of the needs of district police stations, and the difficulties police and judges encounter. While the scope of that research did not allow for assessing the level of local knowledge among EU mission staff, the perceptions of lacking local knowledge should be taken seriously as they impact the mission’s public image as an expert organisation with sufficient knowledge and understanding of local conflict context and society. A suggestion from the IECEU research recommendations was that CSDP civilian mission personnel should cooperate more with local stakeholders that are not just from the security or justice sector but work on issues related to SSR and JSR. The IECEU report states that such cooperation would widen international experts’ knowledge on local society and provide them with information and views on security and justice sectors that may differ from those presented by the mission counterparts. From an Afghan perspective, an EUPOL translator stated: EUPOL does not really know what is going on in Helmand or the rest of the country. I am not even sure they know what is going on in Kabul. One man I met stands out. He was from Northern Ireland’s police force and had a great understanding of Afghanistan, its people, and what they were going through. It is greatly important for internationals to get to know about Afghanistan. The Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOP) and all the Afghan National Police (ANP) called him ‘Haji Baba. In Helmand, he influenced the PCOP to get his officers into schools to advise the children on road safety, because there had been a number of car accidents involving kids. This was outside his work stream, but he was that type of man. He

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

99

made things happen and had a real feel for the community and opportunities for the police to positively engage with the community. He was always on the ground…. You could see they knew what we were going through.

Why Have CSDP Interventions Struggled to Live up to the EU’s Rhetoric on Local Ownership? It is true that part of this problem is universal and stems from challenges that are inherent to international peace-building efforts in general. First, if peace-building is defined as a diffusion of liberal norms and institutions, the rhetoric of ownership will only pay lip service to externally designed, top-down, and elite-centred projects that struggle to achieve legitimacy and sustainability (Jackson, 2011). Moreover, peace-building and crisis management by default take place in difficult contexts where locals have little capacity and no agreement on how to move forward, which makes ownership very difficult. Finally, achieving ownership is challenging due to everyday habits and practices of imposition that are deeply ingrained in the international peace-building culture (Autesserre, 2014). In addition to universal obstacles to ownership faced by all (or most) international peace-builders, crisis management interventions of the EU are additionally hampered by the politics and policymaking of CSDP. De Waal (2019) observed that some commentators felt that it is only at the field level that the mission can establish meaningful partnerships with the local authorities and civil society, as well as the other international actors, and that the field level is thus the appropriate level for integrated assessments, planning, coordination, and evaluation. Even with regard to the UN, there is scepticism of the degree to which the headquarters in New York is able to devolve responsibility to the field and questioned the capacity of missions to manage the political implications of its actions or its relationships with other actors, when these decisions are often ultimately made in the respective headquarters of the partners in question. It was clear that finding the optimal balance between the field and headquarters was difficult to codify and that each situation was probably situation-specific.

100

K. DOYLE

Working with International Counterparts Civilian CSDP Missions and Multilateral Working with the UN In December 2019, Ambassador Byrne Nason (Irish Ambassador to the UN and future representative on the Security Council), speaking at the Kennedy Institute, Maynooth University questioned the coherence of the role of the EU as on the ground where they are very significant actor, but needed greater coherence in peace-building which they were not achieving. Byrne Nason advised that the EU needs to communicate and engage more with what is happening on the ground before launching interventions. According to Marchesi (2012), the narrative that depicts the European Union as essentially or normatively prone to channel its policy through multilateral institutions conceals what is actually a clearly self-interested, instrumental, and rational behaviour by the various actors participating in the European foreign policy system, including member states and institutions. Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN, when and where it is obliged to do so by the context, when it is divided, inexperienced, or lacks resources and coherent policies of its own. A comparison of development and security policy seems to confirm this. Inter-organisational interaction varies from sector to sector, but the tendency to cooperate seems greater in the high politics security field, which is characterised by a weak role of supranational institutions, intergovernmental policymaking, diverging policy preferences of EU member states, and a high need for international legitimacy. The UN provides legitimacy for member states’ independent policies, status within the international system, and cover for possible intra-EU divisions. Cooperation with the UN is often more elusive on development policy, where EU supranational institutions have a stronger role and the pressure to coordinate the member states’ remaining independent policies is lower. Marchesi (2012) argues that EU—UN cooperation can be described as a result of opposing bids for legitimisation both on the world stage (member states) and at the internal EU level (European supranational institutions). Additionally, in the IECEU (2018) report, a barrier to effective coordination was that personnel did not always properly understand the mandates and roles of other international agencies and organisations operating on the ground. For example, the role of EU experts as advisers to the host country counterparts is to point out existing gaps and advise on how the Palestinian Authority could best benefit from donors’ assistance,

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

101

and this puts them into a very different position from an international aid worker whose key role is to ensure effective implementation of the program. Understanding the different mandates helps to manage expectations of what different organisations can do and their limitations. With little coordination between donors, and projects shaped more on what the donor countries can offer rather than the needs of Palestinians, the question of whether a car built from parts that come from different producers would function at all arises. EU missions work in identifying gaps and organising coordination meetings on topics such as community policing and prisons were identified as good and necessary initiatives to improve interoperability. A mission member interviewed for the report with extensive experience in Afghanistan believes there is room for progress. He states: “Communication and partnership is an area we can improve on. The international community works in silos. I worked on a project—code of conduct. I found out the UN had done exactly the same project before. It was repeat work”.

Situational Awareness Situational awareness in a CSDP peace-building missions was conceptualised at different levels by the IECEU study (2018); the politico-strategic level, which asked how the EU can best support the peace processes, and the operational level, which focuses on information gathering and understanding their operational environment, and how to adapt their activities to changing situations. The study identified that the two levels are intertwined, as on the one hand, CSDP missions are among the key sources of information for the EU decision-makers in Brussels and the Member States, and on the other hand, operational planning in the missions is much dependent on what kind of policy the EU decides to pursue. The IECEU Project identified that a lack of consultation with local actors and host nations can leave these missions open to accusations of a new form of colonialism (Only 2 of the 10 missions surveyed during the research systematically consulted with the host state authorities). This manifested in:

102

K. DOYLE

– Inadequate prior analysis and difficulties in ongoing evaluation limited the effectiveness of very often the meagre resources deployed (EUPOL Afghanistan). – Occasional tension and frustration for the host nation (EULEX Kosovo) as it seeks greater self-determination and self-governance. – Improperly prepared and motivated staff can lack the expertise for the ambitious mandates (EUPOL Afghanistan). – Inadequate coordination existed between military and civilian elements in the same region or country. For example, “The EU gives a lot of funds to Afghanistan, much of which is channelled through UNDP. Ultimately, the funds are channelled through four agencies EUSR, EUPOL, the Commission, and UNDP. It seemed the EU is channelling money into four different mandates”.

Is This Situational Awareness Improving? Firstly, as stated, the level of situational analysis is improving. As stated, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is the exclusive civilian intelligence function of the European Union and provides indepth analysis for the EU decision-makers. Its analytical products are based on intelligence from the EU Member States’ intelligence and security services. There are now over 140 EU Delegations (EUDEL) across the globe. Conflict analysis training and capabilities have dramatically improved, but while there are now incentives to produce a ‘pooling and sharing’ of hardware and knowledge, it was all quite nascent with national governments to truly share vital security-related information, for example, between national military intelligence services (NICs). Secondly, within the Institutions, serious tensions exist between military and civilian intentions, and there is no clear joint coordination cell operationalised yet. Current civilian CSDP missions and operations stop short of truly integrative CSDP with civilian, police, and military elements in one single mission under the direction of a civilian Head of Mission, thus limiting an integrated approach. While concrete recommendations can be made to strengthen CivMil cooperation, political will isn’t always coupled with realistic levels of ambition. Thirdly, national foreign policies and security issues expose tensions between this ‘intensive’ intragovernmental area, where we should be conscious of our neighbourhood and protective of our national

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

103

sovereignty. It would be naïve not to acknowledge that European social and economic issues aren’t a factor in interventions. European citizens benefit financially from the stability brought when missions and interventions are successful.

Leadership and Management of Missions A research report published in 2021 by the EU Centre of Excellence in Civilian CSDP Missions was carried out by a consortium of the German Federal Police Academy, North-Rhine Westphalian State Police, the Baden-Wuerttemberg State Police College, the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention, Maynooth University. The report surveyed the senior and middle management staff in 7 EU missions: The following challenges were prominent among the responses: • Managing staff who do not have the expected and required skills (lack of expertise); • Managing expectations of newly arrived staff (new personnel lacked a realistic understanding of how a CSDP mission works, and managers had to deal with this disappointment while maintaining team members’ motivation); • Frequent staff rotation (e.g., no proper handover possible; difficulties to maintain management structures/processes when staff changes; having to adapt leadership style because of new senior management team constellations); • Team conflict management: mediating between team members; interpersonal conflicts in the intercultural context. The research also found that despite an extensive supply of leadership training available, it is the unique context of civilian CSDP missions, which differs greatly from the non-crisis work context that is often lacking in preparation prior to deployment. The complexity of the context within which the mission functions poses one of the main challenges when leading personnel and managing the mission. The report states that the environment is highly politicised with a high degree of security risks to the

104

K. DOYLE

staff and to mission assets, which influences the decision-making processes and priorities. There is often a very quick turnover in staff with constant rotations and personnel not working in their preferred area of expertise. This causes unpredictability in staff morale that has to be managed in a constructive way. Civilian staff were often found to be working in a different area of expertise from their job at home in a vastly different international context. Often, they are deployed as advisors or mentors or to manage and monitor projects. The absence of the additional skills required of them in the mission can impact on the effectiveness of teams. Mission personnel comes from diverse cultural and professional backgrounds. Leadership and management styles differ greatly between military, civilian, and police experts and can sometimes clash. The intercultural setting can lead to misunderstandings. Communication skills and techniques in the language of the mission are essential. The report found that translating and adapting leadership and management skills and competences acquired in their national professional environment outside the mission context into the complex international context of a civilian CSDP mission is a principal challenge for leaders/managers in CSDP missions.

Interoperability and Information Sharing Interoperability is most evident in cooperation at the field-operational level as to how they relate to specific missions/operations or their segments. The most formalised and developed relationship in the field is the one with United Nations (UN), which is reasonable as EU (civilian) CSDP missions and operations are often deployed to countries with a UN peacekeeping or peace-building presence. The EU and the UN issued their first Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management in 2003 (it notes, for example, the handover of responsibilities from the United Nations International Police Task Force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a first practical example of cooperation and sets the framework for formal and practical cooperation in the field of crisis management). As noted by the EU Global Strategy, the “CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping through bridging stabilisation or

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

105

other operations. The EU will also enhance synergy with UN peacebuilding efforts through greater coordination in the planning, evolution, and withdrawal of CSDP capacity-building missions in fragile settings”. The 2007 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management was reinforced with the 2020 Framework Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations for the Provision of Mutual Support in the context of their respective missions and operations in the field (OJ L 389, 19 November 2020). This confirmed mutual commitment to cooperation and mentions some new concrete examples (e.g., exchanges between UN and EU Situation Centres and cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre). Further measures and documents covering specific aspects of the cooperation have been put in place with increased efforts to intensify mutually beneficial partnerships, inter alia, in civilian capability development through the Civilian CSDP Compact (2018). The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organisation and as such a relevant partner for the EU. All EU member states are participating states in the OSCE. While the relations between the organisations were already established (though on a more ad hoc basis) before the creation of the CSDP, the cooperation deepened afterwards, especially with EU’s engagements in civilian crisis management. From the operational perspective, civilian CSDP missions quite often operate in the same country as OSCE missions. Perhaps, most evident in the Western Balkan regions where both organisations have or have had a relatively strong field presence (e.g., Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, etc.). While, as noted by Stewart (2008), there might have been some indicators of overlap of goals and responsibilities between the EU and the OSCE, the relationship and coordination are developing through the years into a mutual reinforcing arrangements. As many civilian CSDP missions are taking place on the African continent, the relation and partnership EU-AU is also relevant. The cooperation is developed in the broader framework of EU-Africa Partnership. While the EU support to AU in the realm of security cooperation is mostly financial and advisory, primarily through establishment and funding (financed through the European Development Fund) of African Peace Facility (APF), there are also limited elements of on the ground mission cooperation that have elements relevant from the perspective

106

K. DOYLE

of interoperability (e.g., provisions for exchange of relevant restricted information between EU CSDP missions and AU, etc.). Overall analysis of the IECEU case studies points to good examples of cooperation between international partners while also addressing some persistent challenges. While the cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and deployments/representations of other international organisations were in general assessed as relatively positive, certain cases indicate that further improvements are possible. Based on the analysis of 8 case studies and 12 missions and operations, IECEU (2018) points to a weak intra-organisational mindset among the EU actors involved in CSDP peace-building. Competition for resources, position, and general lack of willingness to cooperate or work towards common goals hamper the realisation of interoperability. The need for such an integrated mindset is especially pointed out in the need to share information within CSDP civilian missions and military operations. Difficulties in creating a common mission-related intelligence gathering and sharing culture still prevailed at that time. The IECEU case studies noted consultations between EUBAM Libya and Frontex as well as EULEX Kosovo information sharing with Europol and Frontex and its role in facilitating the communication between those agencies and Kosovo actors. Van der Laan et al. comment that efforts have been taken recently to increase such cooperation. The potential of establishing a cooperation framework between CSDP and Eurojust was also explored. From the perspective of the EU integrated approach and need for better situational awareness, further reinforcement of information sharing and cooperation was beneficial for all EU actors involved. The general observation of the IECEU field studies is that cooperation with other EU actors in the area of the mission occasionally suffered from poor information exchange. Reports indicate that both EU and non-EU actors often blame the other side for the poor communication. This may (in communications with other international actors) lead to overlapping, repeating of same tasks or contradictory engagements with local actors, which potentially have negative implications (e.g., noted in IECEU of cases in EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, and EUBAM Libya). This is complicated, as pointed out in the IECEU report citing the EUPOL Afghanistan. Ultimately, this research indicates that the EU’s approach gave the impression to many in the international community, particularly the US, and also to most Afghans, that the EU did not know what it was getting into. This is because the Crisis Management Concept

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

107

excluded security, and did not factor in how the Afghan police could deliver ‘normal’ or ‘community’ policing in the context of a violent threat typified by the Taliban—a sophisticated insurgency that undermines the rule of law to achieve its goals. The report identified that human security embraces countering violence, gender inequality, and corruption simultaneously. Therefore, by not relating how civilian policing could help the Afghan police counter Taliban violence, it hampered its efforts in the other two. The case study on EUPOL Afghanistan suggested that “there is no clear division of labour within Afghan SSR”. It was considered that the international community “works in silos ”, which can lead to duplications of projects and initiatives or contradictions; the finding was shared also by interviewees at some other missions (e.g., EUPOL COPPS, EULEX Kosovo). The reviewed civilian CSDP missions cooperate on the ground with wide array of international actors, ranging from major international organisations to smaller NGOs and other actors. An interesting comment that was shared by some case studies is that the success of the coordination efforts on the ground was often much more dependent on personalities and personal contacts than formal structures (for example, referred to in a number of interviews at EUPOL COPPS and EULEX Kosovo). The case studies were able to identify some examples of good practices of cooperation. For example, EUPOL COPPS developed a Code of Conduct for the PCP through the joint program with UNDP in 2012–2014. This demonstrated how two organisations can cooperate by bringing together their respective strengths. The UNDP and EUPOL COPPS have a Memorandum of Understanding highlighting the areas of cooperation, and both organisations perceive each other as main partners. Another positive example was in EUBAM Libya, where the mission together with the United Nations planned and organised joint training trips. There are several mechanisms in the field to foster closer cooperation and coordination. EUPOL COPPS, for example, has a Technical Advisor role in two working groups (working groups on justice and security) at the Local Development Forum (LDF), which is part of the aid coordination system Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC). EULEX Kosovo established a well-working cooperation and coordination with other international actors (e.g., OSCE, UN, and NATO KFOR). Its cooperation with KFOR can be assessed as mostly working civ-mil relations based on the Joint operation procedures developed in cooperation with both organisations. While IECEU (2018) identified

108

K. DOYLE

certain challenges in communications when it comes to rapid response and authority, and responsibility over Kosovo counterparts in situations where both police and military units are necessary, the overall cooperation was assessed as mostly positive, and reinforced through the deployment of liaison officers.

Achievement of Objectives According to Johan Galtung (1969), the aim of peace-building is to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. Peace-building missions ultimately measure their effect on the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour of individuals and societies involved to encourage and optimise their commitment and involvement in political and leadership spheres (de Coning, 2020). In a conflict mediation and peace-building context, individual contributions, beyond donations or infrastructure building, is the area where the most impact has been identified (de Coning, 2020). For example, peace-building includes a variety of responses to a range of crisis situations and has recognised several key areas of expertise, such as negotiation (Kennedy Institute, 2021) and managerial skills (Topcu & Sigri, 2018). Ultimately, human expertise plays a crucial role in building stability, managing crises, and securing environments. EU missions are usually part of the wider efforts to prevent or even resolve the conflict(s) in question. The external goal attainment criterion must, thus, consider the EU mission in light of these broader efforts—by the Union and other actors involved. – Does it make a meaningful contribution to the EU’s integrated approach towards the conflict country or region? – Does it facilitate successful cooperation and coordination with international, regional, national, or local actors involved in preventing (further) violent conflict? – Does it strengthen peace-building, stabilisation, and/or security sector reform in the country? An EU mission is only effective in terms of its external goal attainment, when it fulfils its potential role within this wider conflict prevention process and contributes meaningfully to it, that is, through a positive and sustainable impact (however small) with regard to preventing (more) violent conflict.

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

109

According to Juncos in Fiott (2020), civilian CSDP has long suffered from the so-called ‘capability-expectation gap’ which refers to the EU’s relatively limited capacity to deliver on its foreign policy despite high expectations. Juncos (ibid.) also alludes to a ‘consensus expectation gap’, which stems from a lack of cohesiveness around collective decisionmaking. An EU Parliamentary Report to Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (2020) suggests that a key element of providing added value and grounding CSDP missions in local knowledge is to strengthen the EU delegations in the field, increasing not just conflict sensitivity (as already achieved under the Early Warning System), but also military expertise in order to provide more relevant, detailed, and actionable intelligence. There should also be a channel for fast-tracking warnings, expressing dissent with conventional wisdom and discussing ‘wildcard scenarios’ to better detect early indications of major surprises or sudden changes in foreign countries. A more critical assessment of CSDP civilian missions, specifically in Africa was advanced in a policy brief by Danish, Finnish, and Austrian authors as part of the IECEU project (2018). The authors criticised a lack of ‘realistic balance between the level of ambition and resources available’, insufficient ‘in-depth understanding of the situational context in which they engaged’, overambitious and rigid planning, and execution from the top “without establishing and sustaining local partnerships and contextual insights necessary to ensure a realistic and successful outcome”. Other missions fell short of quantitative goals, such as the number of police to be trained, partly because of insufficient or slow Member State contributions (e.g., EUPOL Afghanistan). A particular area of concern for some critics is whether CSDP missions are compatible with or undermine the EU’s support for core values and norms, such as a commitment to protection of human rights, sustainable development, peace, and democratic freedom. The question of whether some CSDP missions strengthen the power of authoritarian regimes over populations has been raised, or whether action against human traffickers has come to take precedence over humanitarian demands or protecting migrants destined for Europe from harm. Riddervold (2018) argued that “Sophia is not a humanitarian mission”, despite being “initially launched as a search and rescue mission”. Finally, while some missions could be considered a short-term success, but may have created longer-term unintended consequences.

110

K. DOYLE

Operations considered a success from the EU’s perspective, may not necessarily be seen as successful from the perspective of the partner state or conflict, as Peen Rodt (2017) points out. The IECEU (2018) study observed a negligible effect on Afghan National Police (ANP) capability after 10 years of deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan in the provinces and Kabul. This mission had the goal of creating a legitimate, accountable, and effective civilian police force that could protect the population from criminals and uphold the country’s rule of law. Success in creating a western-style police force was difficult to observe at that stage, and following the Taliban ascendancy in 2021, the ANP proved incapable of enforcing the law, protecting Afghan citizens from attacks of the Taliban and the Islamic State, and capabilities were since reorganised completely with the evacuation of many highly trained personnel. The weakness in the analysis prior to the deployment was remarkable, as Afghanistan was not a post-conflict country; it was a “conflict-paused” country (SIGAR, 2022). The events of mid2021 demonstrated that the international community’s narrow focus on training and equipping Afghan police, combined with its neglect of broader ministerial reform and its failure to integrate police and judicial sector reform, stunted the development of rule of law in an increasingly insecure Afghanistan. These factors, together with the lack of post-training monitoring and evaluation, created a situation in which newly trained officers were reintegrated into an unreformed, corrupt, and lawless environment. To compound this, the military-led NATO and the civilian-led EUPOL police assistance program prioritised different capabilities within the ANP (SIGAR, 2022). The IECEU (2018) report observes the gradual withdrawal of EU mission capabilities and inability to provide a consistent presence in the field, and retreat into Kabul, before eventually leaving the country entirely. More recently, the EU’s overall civilian engagement in the Sahel through two missions (the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)) are increasingly coming under pressure. EU parliamentary reports (2021) cite ongoing human rights abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including alleged war crimes committed by armed groups of the Malian armed forces and other G5 Sahel armed forces. The EU is deeply uncomfortable and deplores the impunity in this respect and underlines

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

111

that such ongoing crimes undermine European and international efforts to create a secure and safe environment and combat armed groups and terrorists. It stresses the increasing involvement of hostile actors in a region that is vital to EU security jeopardises the EU and Mali’s “common objective of human security, peace, stability, and sustainable development in the country”. Other actors (in this case, Russia) that do not necessarily share the same ethical principles as the EU and its Member States are willing to fill capability gaps, regardless of respect for the rule of law and international standards. The report goes on to say that there was a loss of credibility with local authorities, while hoping that these state agencies comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and are under democratic control. EU missions only rarely seek to prevent (more) violence through their own presence—either directly through containment or indirectly through deterrence. More often, they subscribe to theories of change, which propose that peace and stability will result from gradual changes in the society, security sector, distribution of power, etc., which they seek to bring about through external intervention. Either way, it is important to recognise that change can be negative as well as positive—and at times, continuity may be the best possible outcome. Regardless, Rodt (2017) maintains that EU missions should be assessed according to the extent to which they make a meaningful, positive, and sustainable contribution to preventing (further) violence. It is also important to question whether goal attainment really means high performance if the objectives were relatively unambitious or whether failure should be lamented if ambitious objectives were defined under difficult conditions.

Conclusion It appears on this evidence that the EU mission mandates can be highly ambitious and political, with a limited operational capability. They have a focus on building capacity or infrastructure with elites or middle-rank public servants who have often demonstrated little long-term commitment or engagement with the goals of the intervention. Effective EU actions also call for an acceptable degree of coherence between CSDP missions and other EU instruments, as well as good cooperation with other actors—in particular, other international organisations, partner states, and civil society organisations.

112

K. DOYLE

It is obvious that the EU’s ability to implement an integrated approach to conflicts and crises heavily relies on civilian CSDP and deep relations between missions and other EU actors and instruments on the ground. The IECEU research (2018) demonstrated that the longest-lasting impact of EU missions was made when people from the mission and host nation were connected over significant periods to carry out perhaps routine but relevant and ultimately normative activities. These apparently low-level relationships were reported by host nations as the most impactful and enduring. Coordination and collaboration among peace-building actors operating in a specific setting is thus key to harnessing the “peace dividend” of their work and mitigating the effects of “spoilers” who may well be instrumentalising the proliferation of peace-related actors (and the resulting fragmentation of the peace effort) to their benefit. There is also tension between the internal security aspects of the EU Global Strategy and the global peacebuilder role aspired to. The accusations abound that this is another version of NATO, but the EU integrated approach potentially brings much more capacity to the table. The greater and ultimate challenge will be how best these missions connect with the host nation and how they impact the culture and values of key actors within these societies.

Bibliography Asseburg, M., & Kempin, R. (Eds.). (2009). The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations (SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 14, Berlin). Asseburg, M., & Kempin, R. (2011). ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management Without Strategic. Planning Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15(1–2), 178–199. Autesserre, S. (2014). Peaceland Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge University Press. Banim, G., & Pejsova, E. (2017). Prevention Better Than Cure: The EU’s Quiet Diplomacy in Asia (p. 201). European Union Institute for Security Studies. Chivvis, C. S. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management. RAND Corporation. Civilian Headline Goal. (2010). Approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and Noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007 . http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ued ocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf. Accessed 31 May 2022.

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

113

de Coning, C. (2020). Adaptive Peace Operations: Navigating the Complexity of Influencing Societal Change Without Causing Harm. International Peacekeeping, 27 (5), 836–858. de Waal, A. (2019, January 14). Mass Starvation Is a Crime—It’s Time We Treated It That Way. Boston Review. https://bostonreview.net/articles/alexde-waal-starvationcrimes/ Dursun-Ozkanca, O., & Crossley-Frolick, K. (2012). Security sector reform in Kosovo: The complex division of labor between the EU and other multilateral institutions in building Kosovo’s police force. European Security, 21(2), 236– 256. Dursun-Ozkanca, O., & Vandemoortele, A. (2012). The European Union and Security Sector Reform: Current Practices and Challenges of Implementation. European Security, 21(2), 139–160. e.g., EU developed Guidelines on the Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (13609/07) which acknowledges the cooperation of UN and EU on the mission level and offers some concrete examples of positive steps towards higher interoperability. EEAS. (2021). Memo: Questions and Answers: Threat Analysis—A Background for the Strategic Compass. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/2020_11_20_memo_questions_and_answers_-_threat_analsysis_-_copy. pdf Ejdus, F. (2017a). EU Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa University of Bristol Policy Briefing 45: July 2017a published online at. Ejdus, F. (2017b). “Here Is Your Mission, Now Own It!” The Rhetoric and Practice of Local Ownership in EU Interventions. European Security, 26(4), 461–484. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017 Ejdus, F. (2017). “Here is your mission, now own it!” The rhetoric and practice of local ownership in EU interventions. European Security, 26(4), 461–484,https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1333495 Emma, J. (2008). Stewart Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan European Conflict Prevention. Contemporary Security Policy, 29(2), 266–284. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13523260802284126 EU Council. (2016, November 14). Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence–Council conclusions. Accessible at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclu sions-st14149en16.pdf. Accessed 26 October 2022. European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management. (2021h, May). Workshop Report “Setting Leaders Up to Succeed!”. https://www.coe-civ.eu/ kh/workshop-report-setting-leaders-up-to-succeed. European Court of Auditors. (2015). Special Report No 7/2015: The EU police mission in Afghanistan, Brussels.

114

K. DOYLE

European Parliamentary Research Service. EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Crisis Management. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etu des/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_BRI(2015)572783_EN.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016. European Union. (2020). Parliamentary Analysis of CSDP Missions and Operations. Brussels. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/ 2020/603481/EXPO_IDA(2020)603481_EN.pdf European Union External Action Service. (2015). Civilian Crisis Management. Accessed 11 July 2015. Gross, E., & Juncos, A. E. (2011). Introduction. In E. Gross & A. E. Juncos (Eds.), EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions and Policies (p. 5). Routledge. van der Laan, F. (2016). The Future of Police Missions. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. https://www.clingendael.nl/public ation/future-police-missions. Accessed 5 December 2016. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. The Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/civilian-crisis-man agement/index_en.htm, https://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/pol icybristol/briefings-and-reports-pdfs/2017-briefings--reports-pdfs/PolicyBri stol_Briefing_July_2017_EUCAP.pdf Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU). (2018). EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. Accessible at https://ieceu-project.com/ Jackson, J. H. (2011). Scholarship as Contribution to World Peace. Michigan Journal of International Law, 33, 9. Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st12730.en03.pdf Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UNstatmntoncrsmngmnt.pdf. Accessed 11 November 2016. Juncos, A. E. (2020). Beyond Civilian Power. In D. Fiott (Ed.), The CSDP in 2020 the EU’s Legacy and Ambition in Security and Defence. EU Institute of Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ CSDP%20in%202020_0.pdf Kennedy Institute. (2021). Report on Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue Facilitation in CSDP Missions. Delivered to EU Civilian Training Group, CIVCOM, Brussels Keukeleire, S., Mattlin, M. A., Hooijmaijers, B., Behr, T., Jokela, J., Wigell, M., & Kononenko, V. (2011) The EU Foreign Policy Towards the BRICS and Other Emerging Powers: Objectives and Strategies. European Parliament.

4

CSDP MISSION PERFORMANCE: AN EVALUATION

115

Kuosmanen, J. (2015). Repackaging Human Rights: On the Justification and the Function of the Right to Development. Journal of Global Ethics, 11(3), 303–320. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (p. 39). United States Institute of Peace Press. Marchesi, D. (2012). The Weak Link: EU-UN Cooperation and Effective Multilateralism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Unpublished Phd Thesis). Universität zu Köln. Moore, C. W. (2014). The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. Jossey-Bass. Paunov, D. (2015). Assessing the Success of EU-OSCE Co-operation: A Case of Mutualism? In IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014 (pp. 339–352). BadenBaden. Peen Rodt, A. (2017). Effectiveness in Operational Conflict Prevention: How Should We Measure It in EU Missions and Operations? Seminar Publication on Contemporary Peace Operations: From Theory to Practice (pp. 97–106). Riddervold, M. (2018). A Humanitarian Mission in line with Human Rights? Assessing Sophia, the EU’s Naval Response to the Migration Crisis. European Security, 27 (2), 171. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. (2016). https://eeas.europa. eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Accessed 7 December 2016. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. (2022). Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. https://www.sigar. mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-22-23-LL.pdf. Stewart, E. J. (2008). Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention. Contemporary Security Policy, 29(2), 266–284. Tardy, T. (2013). Partnering in Crisis Management: Ten Years of UN-EU Cooperation. European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief 30. http://www. iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30.pdf. Accessed 15 November 2016. Topcu, M. K, & Sigri, U. (2018). Leadership Training for Peace-Building Operations. Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies. UN. (2010). Identical Letters Dated 19 July 2010 from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. UN. University of Navarra. (2022). The EU Civilian Crisis Management Procedures: Structure and Functioning. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/theeu-civilian-crisis-management-procedures-structure-and-functioning “UNDP/EUPOL COPPS Joint Programme: Strengthening Police Accountability, Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight, independent evaluation

116

K. DOYLE

report.” https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/7143; in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Vandemoortele, A. (2012). Adaptation, Resistance and a (Re)turn to Functionalism: The Case of the Bosnian Police Restructuring Process (2003–2008). European Security, 21(2), 202–218. Van der Laan, F., van de Goor, L., Hendriks, R., van der Lijn, J., Meijnders, M. & Zandee, D. (2016). The Future of Police Missions. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. von Billerbeck, S. (2016). Whose Peace? Local Ownership and United Nations Peacekeeping (Oxford, 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 January 2017). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755708.001.0001

CHAPTER 5

Knowing the Ground: Developing Security Through Local Engagement

Abstract This chapter examines the challenges of implementing a mandate and the potential role for Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Capacity in understanding the mission environment. The chapter draws on research identifying the application of these skillsets within a CSDP mission environment, and provides examples of their application in security sector reform to the benefit of peace-building. Keywords Terroir · Peace-building · Norm-setting · Eurocentric · Reparational · Leadership · Multifaceted · Social skills · Problem-solving · Mediation · Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue · Mediation support · Peace processes · Facilitating dialogue · Multilateral · Persuasion · Arbitrate · Negotiate · Exchange · Security sector reform · Northern Irish · Bosnia Herzegovina · Stabilisation · Conflict sensitivity

Introduction Originally a wine term, the French word ‘terroir’ usually refers to the complex interplay between the natural elements of soil aspect and climate that influence any viticultural site. Experts say it gives food or drink its sense of place. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_5

117

118

K. DOYLE

However, the word can evoke something much more fundamental. According to Murphy (2022), Trubek observes that culture, in the form of a group’s identity, traditions, and heritage in relation to place, must also be part of any consideration of terroir. As Odoi (2005) recognised, the reality of every peace-building act reflects the wider political interests of a global political culture that are manifested in the mandate and composition of particular missions and deployments. Norm-setting can serve an important role in the fulfilment of the mission. Beyond the more formal and legal considerations, norm-setting can establish which behaviours are openly condemned in multilateral fora. It creates political and policy space for voicing public outcry or give a platform for the accounts of victims and survivors of specific forms of violence that may have gone unacknowledged and contribute to a general movement to render certain forms of violence “morally toxic” (de Waal, 2019). Within this context of political intersections, occupational and economic interests, and cultural differences, there are many circumstances that one can recognise how the discourse of power might impact within mission preparation and performance and how it can impact on trustful and mutually beneficial relations within the international community and within the host community in the wider framework of gender, class, and race relations. For most practitioners working on conflicts, pivoting to conflict prevention means stepping out of their own comfort zone and learning a new way of working, thinking, and acting more upstream (Faleg & Gaub, 2019). This human dimension of prevention aimed at fostering behavioural change needs sufficient investment in this process, otherwise mindsets will not be changed, and international actors run the risk of preaching the need for preventive actions in an overwhelmingly reactive arena. Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (2021) observes that contemporary conflicts are associated with multiple layers of disinformation or communication that peace actors need to cut through. Successful peace-building organisations must draw their analysis directly from a broad range of actors involved in conflicts and through long-term engagement in the places where they work. They cite, for example, that the success of the Columbian NGO Allianza Para la Paz is embedded in their knowledge of the region, along with their well-established ties with local actors and key institutional stakeholders. This first-hand information

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

119

facilitates looking “behind the curtains” and understanding the conflict dynamics beyond what is visible to the public at large. CSDP missions need to develop this level of granular understanding of local contexts and conflict dynamics. This chapter will expand on the thematic area of Working on Enhanced Communication and Trust-Building in CSDP missions, focusing primarily on a ‘facilitative’ approach. How can the EU align its work with SDG 16 to promote peaceful societies? From the outset, even preparation for peace-building and, more narrowly, peacekeeping, is at some level a politicised discussion. It can involve unpacking the dominant constructions of gender, particularly masculinities, which security forces often utilise, risking a sense of accusation and effectively causing participants to defend how they view the world. Also as stated, the EU peace-building is complicated by the advent of the notion of fortress Europe, particularly in the wake of the EU Global Strategy (2016) and the migrant crises of recent years. This global strategy emphasises the deployment of comprehensive civilian and military capabilities in an ‘integrated’ approach. For example, the EU’s current CSDP missions and operations in the Sahel Region of Africa all depend on dialogue to forge strong working relationships within the mission and with local and external stakeholders, including the UN, humanitarian agencies, and international NGOs, as well as the other security and community actors in the Mission area. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the EU’s actors understand and have responded to how a Eurocentric intervention impacts conflict dynamics and perpetuates the notion of creating ‘steady states’ in the European periphery. Recent media and political reports from the Sahel suggest that Mali and perhaps, CAR are using Russian mercenaries to fight jihadists in their countries (euobserver.com, 29 May 2022). Aspects of this alliance with Russia perhaps reflect a rejection of the previous colonial and perceived dictatorial relationship with EU states and, in particular, a rejection of France and anti-French “pan-Africanist” ideology. There appears to be reparational aspects to the relationship between host nation and EU civilian peace-building missions. How can the EU deal with the residual colonial aspect of their relations, while achieving the goals of their CSDP missions?

120

K. DOYLE

Implementing a Mandate Research during the Training Requirements Analysis on Leadership and Management of CSDP Missions (ZIF, 2021) identified that implementing mission mandate were multifaceted. The diagram below demonstrates these three interlinking dimensions in a civilian crisis management mission when implementing the mandate (Fig. 5.1). Self describes one’s personal experience with leadership and management as a manager as well as a member of a team under the leadership and management of others. It encompasses self-reflection and awareness of one’s own behaviour and the effects it has on others and vice versa, as well as one’s perceptions and conscious and unconscious biases and their influence on one’s attitude and analysis of a situation. Team/Organisation describes the team that one works with and the organisation, as well as understanding its strengths and weaknesses. Depending on one’s leadership position in the mission (strategic, operational, tactical), it includes, to differing degrees, the relevant institutions in Brussels. It encompasses organisational and cultural aspects that influence cooperation and communication styles. It enlightens managers of the importance of being aware of the needs of the team/organisation and designing processes accordingly to facilitate effective operation and the importance of the value of nursing relationships within the hierarchy at all levels. Context/World includes the wider context in which one is operating. This encompasses primarily the host country context and the overall international context in which the mission is deployed. It requires a profound understanding of the existing synergies and challenges in implementing the mandate. This dimension also includes other EU actors (e.g., EU Delegation, EU Special Representative, CIVCOM), member states in their role as EU members, and individual actors whose national interests can impact the functioning of the mission.

Fig. 5.1 Interlinking dimensions in a civilian crisis management mission when implementing the mandate

Mandate/Task

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

121

The three factors revolve around the specific mandate/task that is to be accomplished. The type of task directly influences the three dimensions and thus the leadership and management competence needed in any given situation. Therefore, in order to progress in implanting a mission mandate, one needs a multifaceted and multilevel appreciation of the environment and the personalities that one encounters.

The Role of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Capacity in Understanding the Mission Environment Goleman (1998) recognised the vital aspect of social skills, their necessity for bringing about effective change, and expertly building and leading teams. Decision-making in peace-building is seen as a dynamic process in which the interaction with the environment contains limited information and uncertainty (Crocker et al., 2018). Conflict resolution and negotiation skills, which include conflict management, problem-solving, and compromising, are, therefore, viewed as key interpersonal competencies. The ability to solve interpersonal conflicts as an important competence may also influence individual well-being in work environments and teams (Klein, 2009). According to Veron and Hauck (2021), activities to strengthen the resilience of communities and support conflict prevention efforts should be co- designed as early as possible with local partners to the fore. Governments and local authorities should be engaged meaningfully in order to strengthen national and local ownership and reinforce governments’ leadership and governance capabilities. Communities and community-based organisations, including civil society, should also be enabled to respond effectively. This includes investing in their capacities and funding these organisations in line with the localisation agenda. The expertise of local organisations/implementing agencies should be leveraged to alleviate any lack of capacity for understanding of the context. In 2012, a report by the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres appealed for personnel deployed to possess the skills of mentoring, advising, mediating, cooperating, and negotiation. Personnel were to use their knowledge, skills, methods, and capabilities not only to secure the peace but also to promote the resiliency of such peace to prevent the relapse into conflict. This included addressing the drivers of conflict while helping the national authorities and local communities

122

K. DOYLE

to strengthen or rebuild the capacity that will lay the foundations for sustained peace. With the obvious importance of local engagement and understanding of the environment, it is clear that Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue (MND) Facilitation is the unacknowledged yet vitally important capability of CSDP missions. Mission personnel engaged in volatile and unstable mission environments need to have this capability. The MND Concept acknowledges that CSDP missions are frequently engaged with local political and civil society actors in activities of a mediating and confidence-building nature. This provision recognises the activities of routine problem-solving that are pervasive in CSDP missions. These interactions typically involve fact-finding and problem-solving interpersonal interactions with others within the mission or the outside community. These interactions require listening and assessing a situation, persuading, seeking to resolve disagreements, or bringing others together to talk and settle issues on a daily basis. According to research carried out by the Kennedy Institute in 2020 for the EU Civilian Training Group, CSDP personnel are engaged in everyday dispute resolution in the field as a routine aspect of a civilian mission. Obviously, these missions and operations are deployed in volatile situations and seek to manage the situation by engaging with parties, factions, groups, and organisations in the mission area. Attainment of mission goals more often depends on having strong working relationships with parties on the ground. Civilian CSDP Mission staff are constantly engaged in major and minor problem-solving and the settling of routine disagreements in the course of their day-to-day work. This activity can cover the full range of interlocutors in the mission area, from state and local community representatives to engagement with staff from other international organisations or NGOs on the ground, to the inevitability of dealing with problems involving other colleagues and local staff members. It is clear that Civilian CSDP mission staff awareness, risk discernment, and competence in both serious and mundane dispute resolution encounter in the field could be decisive for mission success, decisive for the safety and security of mission personnel, and decisive for the reputation of the EU in the mission area and further afield. The ability of staff to negotiate and facilitate dialogue is the key enabler in this regard, and the CSDP Lessons Learnt Report (2016) is very clear in that regard and states that an ability to facilitate dialogue and interact at an operational level is fundamental to building of resilience. To possess this key enabler, mission staff should be competent in MND.

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

123

What Is Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue (MND) Facilitation? Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue (MND) Facilitation are processes whereby a third party assists two or more parties with their consent to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping to develop mutually acceptable agreements (Adapted from Bergmann, 2020). Mediation is now a familiar conflict intervention tool, as the statistic shows. Crocker et al. (2018) state that the likelihood of mediation attempts has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War, with 73% of civil wars using mediation attempts—compared to 24% of Cold War-era civil wars. The rise in mediated settlements, whereby third parties help disputants secure a negotiated outcome was one of the notable trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Determining how many intrastate conflict negotiations were actually assisted by third parties is a difficult task, as many of these attempts occurred in secrecy and/or have not been acknowledged publicly by the parties. However, the fact that the UN fields special envoys for ongoing conflicts around the world and many states, as well as regional and nongovernmental organisations, now make similar appointments indicate an explosion of the available supply of third-party mediators and facilitators of dialogue in conflict situations. Importantly, Beardsley et al. (2019) observed that mediation can be linked with reduced bloodshed in civil war, and concurrent efforts of dialogue and peacekeeping efforts reinforce one another, as each type of involvement makes an impact on reducing battlefield fatalities independently.

Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in UN Activities UN policy recognises that mediation is required throughout the process of implementing a peace agreement and that mission leadership is often involved in dispute resolution even if it is not part of their formal mandate. Source: United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, Report of the Secretary-General A/72/115 27 June 2017. UN senior leaders are expected to possess substantial negotiation and mediation expertise and have in-depth regional knowledge with requisite language abilities (UN: New York, 2009).

124

K. DOYLE

In UN terminology, mediation is generally equated with “peacemaking”, and thus differentiated from preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and ultimately peace-building. But mediation, in the broad version outlined here, goes far beyond brokering ceasefires with the aim of eventually reaching the basis for a peace agreement. For example, decades after the Good Friday Agreement, there is still a continuous need for mediation in Northern Ireland (especially within a new Brexit context)—in other words, mediation, negotiation, and dialogue do not stop once such an agreement has been signed, rather it entails a discrete set of tools and activities undertaken by peace-building actors.

The Role of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in EU Common Security and Defence Policy As stated in Chapter 1, Peace-building is a core precept of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Mediation, negotiation, and dialogue facilitation are recognised as tools for promoting this goal. This Peace-building precept arises from Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty, which sets out the parameters of EU action on the international scene. A specific Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Capacities (MND Concept) was adopted by the Council in 2009 and redrafted in 2020. These documents provide a policy basis for EU engagement in MND. Mediation is defined in the MND Concept as a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the support of an acceptable third party. Negotiation, the core activity involved in MND, is not defined in the MND Concept and may be understood as a discussion aimed at reaching an agreement. Dialogue is understood as an open-ended process, which aims primarily at creating a culture of communication and search for common ground, leading to confidence-building and improved interpersonal understanding. In the MND Concept, we see that mediation is considered in very broad terms, reflecting the great variety of ways in which the EU uses this tool at different levels and through different activities, from directly mediating to facilitating; funding or providing political and financial leverage; providing technical support; and promoting the wider use of mediation and dialogue by national and international actors.

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

125

In contrast to the UN approach, the EU MND Concept views Mediation as a formal process tool used by assigned mediation experts. In this regard, since the beginning of the century, the EU has been increasingly involved in directly supporting peace negotiations in inter- and intrastate conflict by assuming the role of a third-party mediator. Within the EEAS, the “Directorate of Integrated Approach for Security and Peace” supports all EU actors charged with making decisions in the pursuit of peace mediation. This emphasis on mediation and dialogue as a highlevel process has had notable successes in the past for the EU in Kosovo, Serbia, Philippines, Indonesia (Aceh), Kenya, and Georgia. This suggests that mediation and negotiation at the local level should be considered a specialised, professionalised skill, and the EU should only engage in formal mediation processes with personnel who are experienced and highly skilled in mediation and capable of delivering for the organisation. Implicit, therefore, in the current EU Concept is the notion that CSDP missions are only indirectly relevant to formal mediation efforts. If they play a role at all, it is a supportive role of building overall confidence among local actors. With regard to gender mainstreaming, the EU Council explicitly suggested: Crucially important for rebuilding the societal and political environment is the active participation of women and women’s groups at peace negotiation tables, democratisation processes, work of political parties and elections, in line with UNSCR 1325 […]. CSDP operations and missions should regularly meet with women’s group in order to hear their concerns, grievances, and demands, with a view to integrating issues, as relevant and appropriate, into ongoing mission planning. (EU Council, Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, 2010)

Mediation support has been described as “activities that aim to make mediation more effective”, including efforts “to create an enabling environment for mediation, support ongoing mediation processes […], support the implementation of peace agreements, and finally, capacitybuilding for mediators, conflict parties, and societies at large” (United Nations, 2017). From a narrower view, others have referred to mediation support as “activities that assist and improve mediation practices”,

126

K. DOYLE

such as training activities, developing guidance, research, as well as networking and engaging with third parties (Mediation Support Network, 2016). As these different notions show, mediation support may involve a broad range of activities and can be directed towards mediators in peace processes, the parties to a conflict, as well as the field as a whole, for instance through the development of practical guidelines (Lanz et al., 2017). The presupposition inherent in the EU MND Concept is that mediation specifically, as distinct from negotiation and dialogue, is a formal high-level process used by political actors and their specialised teams. In most contexts where CSDP missions are deployed, mediated peace processes will either be ongoing or just concluded, or the CSDP mission will form a part of efforts to lay the ground for peaceful settlement or may even directly oversee or implement parts of a peace agreement. However, there is no actual consideration given in the Concept to the notion that CSDP mission personnel might be required to engage in a formal mediation process.

The Case for Expansion of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in CSDP Missions Research produced in the Kennedy Institute (2021) for EU Civilian Training Group on the application of MND in Civilian CSDP indicates that despite its absence in mission mandates, mission personnel, including uniformed police, are regularly involved in these activities. Most common are negotiations and facilitating dialogue, particularly on issues relating to crisis management, mission mandate, multilateral working, freedom of movement, human rights and gender issues, and building trust and confidence. The report states that while only a minority of CSDP staff may be involved in formal or high-level MND processes, personnel at all levels would benefit from exposure to MND training. This is because MND involves an interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly, and we seek to use persuasion and avoid coercion.

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

127

What Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue Tasks Are CSDP Mission Member Actually Performing? During the Kennedy Institute research conducted with mission staff in 2021, respondents were asked to describe various application of mediation, negotiation, and dialogue facilitation skills during their deployments. Examples of MND tasks cited by respondents as performed while on CSDP civilian missions: – Facilitate general conversations/discussions among local populations – Design and manage a structured mediation process in the local population – Negotiate on violation of peace accords – Mediate between Rebels and Government – Provide information on conflict management processes to the local population – Facilitate freedom of movement between different localities – Facilitate MND and dispute resolution between members of the international community – Investigate and facilitate MND on non-violent grievances within the local population – Investigate murders/killings in the local population – Arbitrate (requested to make a binding decision settling a dispute between others in community disputes) – Mediate internal HRM issues within the mission – Manage mission security issues (as a function of job responsibilities) – Manage mission logistics issues (as a function of job responsibilities) – Facilitate debates and discussions between security forces and civil society representatives (in training and work) – Influencing the content of host nation legislation and constitution – Engage in direct negotiations with local political counterparts on issues concerning the Mission’s mandate – Deal with spontaneous confrontations in local population, e.g., dissatisfaction with government action or crime situation, calming down mob situation – Demobilisation issues and security sector reform – Diffuse tensions between different local security forces – Introduce agricultural development projects near a protected area

128

K. DOYLE

– Create and conduct mediation presentations and workshops for mission members and the local population – Negotiate around mission needs and response to COVID-19 – Facilitate general discussions between local populations re entry of state security forces after conflict and commencement of investigations re burial sites of victims of the conflict – Dissuade hunting in protected areas in a natural park – Transfer and interpretation of criminal evidence between different police forces – Arbitrate (requested to make a binding decision settling a dispute between business contacts) – Sensitise the local population to religious and cultural artefacts – Sensitise the local population to the intentions/motives of other international community actors – Improve relations between authorities in local police training facilities – Exchange of Prisoners of War – Exchange of information about missing people – Resolve disputes between local staff employed in the mission – Deal with disputes where international staff members were involved in security incidents (traffic accidents and so forth) – Negotiate SOMA (Status of Mission Agreement) with the host government – Mediate on behalf of IDPs with the local population (Fig. 5.2). The Kennedy Institute research (2021) categorised this current MND activity into four observable thematics that impact at the local level: 1. Crisis Management Issues (CM)—This refers to the management of ‘on the ground’ issues that prevent occurrences or further occurrences of violence and protect the lives of mission personnel. 2. Freedom of Movement, Human Rights, and Gender Issues (FHG)—This refers to mission work that facilitates human development or fulfilling human needs relevant to the host environment. 3. Issues relating to Mission Mandate and Multilateral working (MM)—This refers to the multilateral and political aspect of working with other IGOs, NGOs, and high-level representatives of the host government in a post-conflict environment.

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

129

Fig. 5.2 Word cloud generated from Kennedy Institute research on MND activity in CSDP Missions

4. Enhanced Communication, Trust Building (ECTB)—This refers to developing wider operational ‘on the ground’ capability, facilitating dialogue, and enhancing the positive reputation of the mission with representatives of local government and local communities. Occasionally, this involves conflict intervention instances internal to the mission staff. In addition, MND activities, broadly defined, were reported as an important aspect of the experience of a wide range of personnel on the Missions. Civilian CSDP Mission staff in the field recounted, as they had previously told Gourlay in 2010, that MND skills, broadly interpreted, are critical in their day-to-day activities. In essence, all CSDP staff need basic levels of MND competence to be operationally competent and able to interact with optimum levels of efficacy when dealing with disputes, conflicts, and disagreements across the whole range of circumstances arising in the multinational, multicultural CSDP Civilian mission environment. They

130

K. DOYLE

also need to understand and recognise circumstances when an additional and more specialised MND expertise from the wider EU family is needed to support the Mission. The Kennedy Institute research also found that MND interventions result in a variety of positive outcomes for the Missions. These outcomes range from mandate furthering outcomes, like increased leverage for mission personnel to increased trust and understanding between the Mission staff and relevant stakeholders in the mission area to perceptions of greater personal efficacy among staff from enhanced personal communications and problem-solving experiences gained from the MND activities (Fig. 5.3). Presently, only eight (8) appointments of the seventy-seven (77) general and specific functional profiles set out in the Force Generation Handbook for Civilian CSDP Missions have mediation or negotiation as part of their job description. Roles identified are Justice Adviser, Adviser/Expert, Coordination Cooperation Officer, Justice Adviser, Liaison and Coordination Officer, Gender Adviser, Procurement Officer, and Head of Project Cell/Project Manager. This represents an MND capability available to Missions of around 10% of personnel. However, all staff before recruitment are required to possess excellent interpersonal and communication skills, both written and oral. It is not clear how this interpersonal and communication skills capacity is assessed or whether this broad capacity is, somehow, deemed sufficient to address the overall need for MND capability within CSDP Civilian Missions.

1%

16% 15%

6% 14% 16% 15% 16%

Restoring broken relationships Resolution of legal dispute Developing greater trust Developing greater leverage greater understanding - local context Enhanced personal communication skills Enhanced problem solving capabilities No impact

Fig. 5.3 Benefits of application of MND in CSDP missions as reported in 2020 Kennedy Institute survey

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

131

Application of Mediation, Negotiation, and Dialogue in Security Sector Reform During the mediation of a peace agreement, the basic outline of future security arrangements and security sector reform are laid; often, it is important to create technical mechanisms that evolve during the implementation phase to take up new issues as they arise (Albrecht & Ehrhart, 2006). Therefore, it is crucial that these mechanisms include MND proficient personnel who understand how conflict scales up and scale down and can, therefore, help to shape the basis for successful Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) processes, which reduce the capacity for violence, while allocating resources to communities and providing alternatives in education and infrastructure that resonate with former combatants. This normative framework of DDR increases the potential of establishing well-defined structures at the outset (IOM, 2018), thus encouraging trust and commitment from victims and excombatants alike. Other notable security sector reform themes worth exploring and expanding further MND capacity include negotiation for change with local populations, managing dynamics of moving from military to police missions, adaptive leadership challenges, community-oriented postconflict security, separation of politics and security issues, separation of community-oriented policing and intelligence gathering, capacitybuilding and training of local security forces; exploring the interoperability of concurrent peacekeeping and mediation; climate change and security issues; and involvement of former combatants in post-conflict economic investment. Example of the application of mediation, negotiation, and dialogue (MND) in the design and implementation of security sector reform in peace processes. Finding accommodation on two distinct and separate aspects of the conflict was the purpose of the Northern Irish political negotiation process in the lead-in to the Good Friday Agreement (Kennedy Institute, 2019). Senior civil servants identified that the two distinct strands were (i) the political issues, which included constitutional issues, political structures, and equality (ii) security issues, which included: policing; decommissioning of paramilitary weapons; demilitarisation; and the role of political prisoners which were considered to ‘massively influence’ the negotiations

132

K. DOYLE

regarding fugitives. Negotiations were designed to address legacy issues, and most importantly, finding the disappeared and orchestrating cooperation with the authorities on this issue was core to the reconciliation processes. Negotiations on many of the latter issues were conducted in the background away from the formal negotiation table. Civil servants engaged in discussions with those who represented the security in order to find accommodations. The issue of legitimacy of the security, including the police forces, discrimination towards nationalist communities, and lack of community confidence in security forces was a critical factor in negotiations. Transition, from a militarised to a community-oriented policing strategy due to the deteriorated civilian and security relationships, confounded some of the adaptive challenges that emerged during the implementation phase and transition from conflict to a post-conflict context. Critical to the reconciliation was the issue of conflict stabilisation, including depoliticised and professional security forces that reflect the country as a whole, in order for economic recovery to emerge. Likewise, the same report identifies that the key phases of transition experienced by Bosnia Herzegovina included (1) the accord phase, (2) the stabilisation phase, and (3) the implementation phase. Within these phases of transition, the roles of institutions were critical, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UN), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the European Union (EU) in the transition from conflict to post-conflict contexts emerged as highly significant. In addition, Crocker et al. (2018) argue that the complexity of conflict situations and the growth of war and post-war economies have added to the traditional challenges faced by those working on security issues in these contexts. War economics and corruption present huge challenges (World Bank Report, 2011), particularly in protracted intra-state conflicts where both the government and non-state armed actors capture resources and the war can become self-financing and self-sustaining. Where there is “more to war than winning”, those benefiting from violence may have a vested economic interest in maintaining the conflict. The range of vested interests benefiting from the war economy challenges the assumption that there is a clear break between conflict and peace, and the assumption that societies can easily transform from war to peace. The ongoing power of paramilitary groups in some communities in Northern Ireland, and the links to organised crime (Jupp & Garrad, 2019), highlight

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

133

these challenges and provides some important lessons for other conflict situations. Research by the author during the IECEU project (2018) found that CSDP missions and operations have undergone significant changes over the last decades. Whereas in the early days of CSDP engagement, the focus was on civilian (police/rule of law) missions and military operations, nowadays, the 36 EU missions and operations conducted or ongoing in three continents encompass a broad mission types and instruments. It is evident from the IECEU research that security forces continue to have a central role in the implementation phase as societies potentially move away from militarisation. Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, as well as security sector reform (SSR), are two essential processes in stabilising a post-peace agreement situation. Both DDR and SSR typically require the support but not an imposition of the international community to assist this process.

Conclusion The EU 2020 on Mediation Concept suggests that CSDP missions have the potential to engage in mediation-relevant tasks below the Track I level and that, in doing so, they help to create conditions which are conducive to constructive Track I-level talks. This may be a very narrow and restrictive interpretation of how these tools may be used to further the mission objectives and build trust and cooperation with stakeholders on the ground. This contrasts with UN policy, which recognises that mediation is required throughout the process of implementing a peace agreement and that mission leadership is often involved in dispute resolution even if it is not part of their formal mandate. Source: United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, Report of the Secretary-General A/72/115 27 June 2017. As outlined, a key element of providing added value and grounding CSDP missions in local knowledge is to strengthen mission capacity to negotiate and facilitate dialogue in the field, increasing not just conflict sensitivity (as already achieved under the Early Warning System), but also expertise in order to provide more relevant, detailed and actionable intelligence. There should also be a channel for fast-tracking warnings, expressions of dissent with conventional wisdom, and discussing ‘wildcard

134

K. DOYLE

scenarios’ to better detect early indications of major surprises or sudden changes in host nations. MND is important for CSDP missions. Mission personnel engaged in volatile and unstable mission environments need to have this capability. The MND Concept acknowledges that CSDP missions are frequently engaged with local political and civil society actors in activities of a mediating and confidence-building nature. This provision recognises the activities of routine problem-solving and interactions at the local level that are pervasive in CSDP missions. These interactions typically involve problem-solving interpersonal interactions with others within the mission or the outside community and require listening and assessing a situation, persuading, seeking to resolve disagreements, or bringing others together to talk and settle issues on a daily basis.

Bibliography Albrecht, S., & Ehrhart, H-G. (Eds.). (2006). Security Sector Reform and Postconflict Peace-Building. United Nations University Press. Beardsley, K., Cunningham, D. E., & White, P. B. (2019). Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(7), 1682–1709. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718817092 Bergmann, J. (2020). The European Union as International Mediator. Palgrave MacMillan. Cooker, I., Scott, A., Sliwinska, K., Wong, N., Shah, S., Liu, J., & Schuster, S. (2018, July 21–25). Towards Robust Models of Cyber Situation Awareness. In T. A. Ahram & D. Nicholson (Eds.), Advances in Human Factors in Cybersecurity. Proceedings of the AHFE 2018 International Conference on Human Factors in Cybersecurity, Orlando, FL, USA, in Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Vol. 782, pp. 127–137). Springer. Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., & Aall, P. (2018). International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflict: The Changing Context of Peace-making. Routledge. Council of the European Union, Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. (2010). Lessons and Best Practices of Best Practices of Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Missions. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST17138-2010-REV-1/en/pdf%20_blank Devlin, C., Trochowska, K., Hyttinen, K., Clarke, J., McCready, P., Smith, R., Curristan, S., & Singleton, S. (2017). Deliverable 3.1 Regional Stakeholder Reports. GAP Gaming for Peace. H2020 Project Has Funded from the EU Framework Programme.

5

KNOWING THE GROUND: DEVELOPING SECURITY …

135

De Waal, A. (2019, January 14). Mass Starvation is a Crime—It’s Time we Treated it That Way. Boston Review. https://bostonreview.net/articles/alexde-waal-starvationcrimes/ EEAS Annual CSDP Lessons Report. (2016). https://data.consilium.europa.eu/ doc/document/ST-9159-2017-INIT/en/pdf EU Concept on Mediation. (2020). Concept on EU Peace Mediation. Brussels. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.en20.pdf EU Global Strategy. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. European External Action Service, Brussels. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Accessed 21 May 2022. EU Observer. (2022, May). New EU Military Missions in West Africa to Counter Russia Brussels. https://euobserver.com/world/155068 European Council. (2018). Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting Within the Council, on the Establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact. Available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14305-2018-INIT/ en/pdf. Accessed on 20 October 2022. European Union. (2018). Common Security and Defence Policy. Faleg, G., & Gaub, F. (2019). Iceberg Ahead! Rethinking Conflict Prevention. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation. (2021). Scoping Study: Global & International Peace Centres & Peace Education Bodies. Wicklow. https:// www.glencree.ie/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Glencree-Scoping-Study_ 2021.pdf Goleman, D. (1998, November–December). What Makes a Leader? IQ and Technical Skills Are Important, But Emotional Intelligence Is the Sine Qua Non of leadership. Harvard Business Review, 76, 93–102. Gourlay, C. (2010). Mediation and Dialogue as Tools for EU CSDP Missions, Initiative for Peace-building. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-sec urity-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csd p_en. Accessed 10 August 2020. Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention. (2018). https://www.ieceu-project.com/ International Organization for Migration. (2018). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Compendium of Projects 2010–2017 (p. 62). Geneva. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/ddr_compendium.pdf Juncos, A. E., & Blockmans, S. (2018). The EU’s Role in Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: Four Key Challenges. Global Affairs, 4(2–3), 131–140. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619

136

K. DOYLE

Jupp, J., & Garrod, M. (2019). Legacies of the Troubles: The Links Between Organized Crime and Terrorism in Northern Ireland. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678878 Kennedy Institute. (2019, November 29). Peace-Building—Progress and Prospects Seminar. Seminar Conducted During the Visit of President of UN General Assembly and UN Ambassadors to Kennedy Institute, Maynooth University. Kennedy Institute. (2021). Report on Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue Facilitation in CSDP Missions. Delivered to EU Civilian Training Group, CIVCOM, Brussels. Klein, C. (2009). What Do We Know About Interpersonal Skills? A MetaAnalytic Examination of Antecedents, Outcomes, and the Efficacy of Training. Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004–2019, 3950. Lanz, D., Pring, J., Von Burg, C., & Zeller, M. (2017). Understanding Mediation Support Structures. http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/ pdf/Mediation/swisspeace_MSS_study_18_Oct_Final.pdf Mediation Support Network. (2016). Encountering and Countering Temporary Impasses in Peace Processes, Discussion Points of the Mediation Support Network (MSN) No. 8 Siem Reap https://mediationsupportnetwork.net/dis cussion-points/. Accessed 26 October 2022. Murphy, G. L. (2022). https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2022/0426/1294332gaa-clubs-community-society-culture/ Odoi, N. (2005). Cultural Diversity in Peace Operations: Training Challenges (KAIPTC Paper, No. 4). O-2005, Occcasional Papers. Available at https://www.kaiptc.org/kaiptc-publication/cultural-diversity-in-peace-ope rations-training-challenges/. Accessed on 20 October 2022. United Nations. (2009, July). Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support: A New Partnership Agenda: Charting the New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. United Nations. United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, Report of the SecretaryGeneral A/72/115 27 June 2017. Veron, P., & Hauck, V. (2021, June). European Centre for Development Policy Management Paper. https://ecdpm.org/publications/connecting-pieces-puz zle-eu-implementation-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus/. Accessed June 11 2022. World Bank. (2011). World Development Report 2011, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank. Washington, DC. https:// web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr2011_overview.pdf Zentrum fur Internationale Freidenseinstatze (ZIF). (2021). Training Requirements Analysis on Leadership and Management of CSDP Missions (2021). Report to EU Civilian Training Group. Brussels Unpublished.

CHAPTER 6

‘Political Missions with an Operational Capability’: How Do We Continue?

Abstract This chapter discusses a current strategic deficit in EU peacebuilding and the attempt to promotion of neoliberalism through increasing state security in environments that have yet to reach a critical mass of citizens capable of responding to the change implications proposed in EU peace-building missions. The chapter suggests how the EU might improve its ability to connect with people through the CSDP missions, including how it might contribute to longer-term peacebuilding efforts on the ground in Ukraine, if the operational situation were to subside into a post-conflict situation. The chapter strongly advocates the expansion of mandates of CSDP civilian missions to incorporate mediation, negotiation, and dialogue facilitation, and future tasking of a significant element of personnel in missions to act as dedicated ‘societal observers’. Keywords Responsibility to Protect · Interagency cooperation · Security capacity · Shared space · Interdependence · Intra-state · Soft power · Micro connections · Implementation · State violence · Durable legacy · Conducting missions · Networks · Psycho-social · Societal observer · Intercultural competence · Ukraine · Peace-building · Societal entrepreneurship · Problem solving · Humanitarian aid · Societal observers · EU Global Strategy · Institutional ego · Normative · Capability gap · Openness · Mediation · Negotiation and Dialogue © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8_6

137

138

K. DOYLE

The resolution of conflicts should not be driven simply by security considerations, conflict resolution must address the vital matter of the root causes of the conflict, and thus aim not merely to silence the guns, important as this is, but to ensure sustainable peace. THABO MBEKI, former President of South Africa 12th Oct. 2020

Introduction The concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ or R2P has become central in controversial and political issues, where states have a duty to protect citizens from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This has evolved into an acceptable rationale for the international community to encourage and remind states of their obligations to respect international human rights and humanitarian law in international forums (Jacobs, 2018). Post-Libya wariness of operationalising R2P for regime change has now focused much on the preventive dimension of R2P. In the EUs case, this sentiment has found its expression in CSDP civilian peace-building missions which focus on host government capacity, security sector reform, transitional justice, and the avoidance of violence in the future. Peace-building missions are, by nature, complex and deployed in multidimensional, multi-phased, multi-lateral, and multi–level contexts (Lund, 2003, EUGS, 2016) and continuously dependent on interagency cooperation. The challenges in moving the conflict quickly from violence to the political domain and local ownership of CSDP missions are within a wider context of emerging liberal security governance, which seems to continuously face implementation difficulties in semi-liberal or illiberal settings. The advent of the EU’s integrated approach and the Global Strategy (2016) brought a noticeable increase in rhetoric and activity related to conflict prevention and peace-building at all levels, involving, among others, locals, international civil society, intergovernmental organisations, military, police, and diplomats. EU peace-building missions are often undertaken in the hope that they might help to bring or generate the conditions for more secure societies and, therefore, peaceful resolution of a conflict or stabilisation of a country, but this has never been their primary outcome. Their outcome has been to support development of security capacity in partner regimes

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

139

in countries of varying strategic importance to the EU member states and to demonstrate the credibility of the EU in matters of security and defence. This is challenging and self-limiting from a number of perspectives and ultimately, missions, whether through an inappropriate mandate or lack of resources, or historical tensions, invariably struggle to achieve sustainable change in the security forces of host countries, as witnessed in Mali and Afghanistan. The second challenge for EU civilian missions is that, especially since the expansion of ambitions through the EU Global Strategy in 2016, they are inextricably linked with the defence aspect of CSDP and protection of the security of the Union. It is difficult to separate the defence and military dimension from the EU missions, the expansion of EU Delegations, and EU Foreign policy. With the advent of the Global Strategy and the Ukraine crisis, the Union appears to have adopted the power politics paradigm of “If you want peace, prepare for war”, violence inevitably arises from human competitiveness and covetousness, and peace will be best achieved in the neighbourhood through the encouragement of an ambitious security capacity. For decades, it seemed that the lessons of Europe’s many wars and disasters, and the dream of a united Europe, capable of acknowledging its shared roots while rejoicing in its rich diversity, was a credible example for global peace-building. The conviction of the founders of the European Union envisioned a future based on the capacity to work together in bridging divisions and fostering peace and fellowship between member states and the wider neighbourhood. Conflict prevention should not be confused with conflict resolution, and, ultimately, defence capacity does not resolve conflict. On the contrary, aspiring to meet people’s fundamental needs through encouragement and greater focus on fair processes and government is a reasonable outcome for missions. Kennedy Institute research (2021) revealed that MND activity on Civilian CSDP Missions significant enhanced the capability of mission personnel to make a positive impact on the ground, and regularly contributes to positive outcomes for the mission and the host state. The most common MND activities during Civilian CSDP Missions encompass,

140

K. DOYLE

– facilitating general conversations or discussions between local stakeholders, – managing crisis of one sort or another, – dealing with freedom of movement, human rights, and gender issues and – interacting on an ongoing basis with stakeholders to enhance communication and build trust.

Context It is increasingly obvious that Lederach (1997) was correct when he identified that peace-building is a shared space where various actors need to build relationships and capacities ‘horizontally’ between the stakeholders, including conflict parties, and ‘vertically’ between the leadership and lower levels of the conflict society. Reaching an accord is hardly sufficient to build peace. Peace processes need to move quickly beyond top-level negotiations, and involve a much more comprehensive framework, interacting with multiple tiers of leadership and participation. In Lederach’s words, “peace-building efforts among the elite must be accompanied by efforts of mid-level and grassroots leaders”. As stated previously, humanitarian, development, and peace actors have their own mandates, principles, interlocutors, programmes, procedures, and methods. These need to be respected while all actors join up constructively in a people-centred approach. Edgar Schein’s model of understanding different organisational culture is useful. Schein argued that if we really want to understand the way a culture works, we have to examine the deeply held assumptions that members of that culture share. The challenge for peace-builders is how to develop and operationalise this cultural lens while recognising that conflict and emotion are increasingly obvious at the core of both problems and their solutions. Social emotions and how people treat each other are no longer defined and channelled by a few diplomats; they require a wider societal approach. With the increasing global interdependence, facilitation of inter- and intra-state relations through mediation, negotiation, and dialogue (MND) is a key aspect of the discernment of culture, and the integrated approach tool box and MND skills cover the entire nexus of security and development, potentially enabling and assisting with the whole range of potential crisis management tasks, promoting respect for

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

141

international law, gender sensitivity, protection of civilians, and principles of democracy, human right, and good governance. The “soft-power” afforded to the EU in the form of its civilian missions has been a unique global asset for the EU as a regional actor, and the EU cooperates with a large number of actors, third countries, and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is a growing emphasis. The larger the number of actors, the more the challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit the EU has on increasing interoperability. The more divergent EU practices are, the more challenging will cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to produce desirable outcomes. Moreover, to what extent is the transitional phase of moving from violence and militarisation to policing and ultimately the Rule of Law environment via CSDP civilian missions facilitated, understood, conceptualised, and disseminated? The reality is that peace-building will endure through the support of positive micro connections framed or carried within cultural outreach and implementation of the technical aspects of peace agreements. Greater emphasis is needed, therefore, on the nurturing impact of supportive psychosocial norms, while reassuring or challenging deeply held tacit assumptions facilitated through negotiated agreements. While most CSDP mission mandates generally exclude direct MND activities, UN policy recognises that mediation is required throughout the process of implementing a peace agreement (UN, 2017) and that mission leadership is often involved in dispute resolution even if it is not part of their formal mandate. Gourlay (2010), however, took the view that MND skills are particularly relevant at the field or tactical level, where EU personnel are directly engaged with local actors. This research extends Gourlay’s findings by categorising the types of activities that have benefitted from MND capacity.

From Macro to Micro Interventions The European Council meeting in Santa Maria Da Feira (2000) outlined the original objectives of the Union’s use of civilian missions in crisis response (including conflict prevention) and the means of implementation. This work envisaged integration of experts from the relevant state administrations, inter alia, providing specialist advice on police, judicial

142

K. DOYLE

and penal aspects, civilian administration, humanitarian assistance, as well as the interface between crisis management and development cooperation. There has been a shift away from the human security focus of the original missions, as expressed in Santa Maria Da Feira. The current models for EU peace-building missions based on planting a liberal government model could be interpreted as the power ambitions of the EU, which connect primarily with elites and have an overemphasis on state security capacity. Although these missions are increasingly well constructed and most often at the request of the UN, the outcomes of the model of CSDP mission intervention are flimsy, as demonstrated by experiences in Afghanistan and Mali, and are fraught with uncontrollable political variables. These macro interventions project neo-colonial and realist-type ambitions with images of powerful capacity to initiate, implement, and sustain attitudinal and mindset change and resultant incentives for elites in post-conflict environments. The deficit in this strategy is that the EU promotes neoliberalism in environments that have traditionally viewed the state as a Weberian power-based system and have yet to reach a critical mass of citizens capable of responding to the change implications proposed in EU peacebuilding missions. There is also the challenge of introducing a singlecultural model, and then link these environments, not just with the global economy but with the wider global security and arms industry. These initiatives are likely to create further divisions and conflict in the future. Drawing on Tilly’s description of state violence as a form of expression between groups within society, the problem for the EU is that having formed a relationship with the civil society through these governments, particularly in fragile states, they are now associated with any illegitimate state violence visited on civil society, conceivably using EU trained police as a proxy. If this happens, and as Tilly indicates, ideas disseminate through the medium of relations, so both the EU’s relational and ideological views will potentially be communicated in the minds of the wider civil society through the misapplication of state violence. As stated, recent events in Afghanistan and Mali have demonstrated that these capacity-building efforts can have little long-term effect and change in behaviours. After 10 years of deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan, the longest-lasting and most durable legacy of the EUPOL intervention observed in the minds of Afghans was the positive human connections built through local-level police mentoring at very outset of the mission (IECEU, 2018).

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

143

The GAP project (2019) identified that a deep analysis of political, strategic, and security culture, along with socio-cultural dynamics in conflict, is required, otherwise the strategic goals set for missions might be completely unrealistic, as exemplified by EUPOL in Afghanistan, where the political system built was utterly contradictory to cultural realms of the region. Mission personnel must also be able to predict second- and thirdorder effects of actions in political, economic, and social spheres for the region—and the whole global security environment. Moreover, the ability to predict and analyse new potential social movements and phenomena that will result from those decisions is also demanded, as alternative lines of action can be prepared in case negative phenomena of this nature occur. Inorder to predict future behaviour, CSDP personnel deployed must look into patterns of perceiving, thinking, and emotionally reacting to various situations. Counterintuitively, it is how individuals define situations that leads us to understanding their cultural components, not what they do in a situation (Schein, 1983). This author contends that it is our way of conducting missions rather than our ideas that determine whether the EU missions get to any level of understanding and normative influence in the societies where they are deployed. The current focus of CSDP missions is embedded in the assumption of rational choices, provision of societal protections needed, and stabilisations to offset uncertainties such as clear and fair laws, a trustworthy government, and judiciary. The behaviourist model of change, however, is generally most effective through planful targeting of people, communities, and social conditions and best mobilised through normative, re-educative processes of influence and human contact. This imbalance in approach needs to be addressed.

Establishment of Networks Reflecting on the IECEU report, particularly building of networks can strengthen the impact, organisational capacity, and overall visibility of the peace-building mission. Networks ensure that members are represented at local authorities, agencies, and at the international level. The network is a way to amplify the success of the outcomes of CSDP programmes, reinforce the social perception of their impact in the community, and amplify the advocacy concerns of individual organisations. It also allows for sharing of best practices, peer learning, and the provision of support for lobbying strategies.

144

K. DOYLE

Networks usually have a lead organisation or, at least, a representation placed in a geographical location of importance to the work of the network. The lead organisation is the point of reference for external actors to engage with the network, and it has the role of setting out the agenda and designing the strategic vision for the action of the network. In a peace-building context, networks are a key function because of the complexity of conflict-affected settings and so-called “protracted crises”: sustaining peace requires a multitude of like-minded actors undertaking their work with a variety of stakeholders and on various state and societal levels. However, very often, these types of relationship and knowledge are not exportable and take significant resources to generate and sustain, even though the approach on how to develop these networks can be shared and transmitted while maintaining constructive ties with local stakeholders and key actors, even virtually. If the EU wishes to align CSDP mission work with SDG 16 https:// sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16 promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels, then the author suggests creating and hosting of societal networks and nurturing whatever is working positively in fragile societies is an appropriate place to start.

Proposal The author proposes that the EU negotiates a more psychosocial interaction type of civilian CSDP mission with much more focus on mandates for cultivating depth of relationships and human security on the ground and understanding the potentials for and negating the drivers of future conflict. The author proposes the expansion of ‘Societal Observer’ or ‘Civil Engagement’ teams in each mission to support the current mission configuration and closely associate with the EU Delegation. These teams should interact with the civil society to provide local interventions and social support through discernment of Schein’s deeply held tacit assumptions and informing and shaping the future and longer-term CSDP deployments. Much in the spirit of military observer missions, these ‘Societal Observer’ modular elements identify with the behaviourist category or

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

145

model within a postmodern intervention. The general characteristic for these elements should be focused on creating networks and penetrating and assessing macro conflict drivers of: – – – –

insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions.

with a focus on: – Individual-level communications and understanding to purposefully increase normative influence – Negotiations with the maximum elements of diverse communities – Facilitation of exchanges and establishment of networks at the community, local, or interest-based representative level – Operations through questioning and reflecting rather than mentoring – Examinations and process of deeper cultural aspects, including values and economic aspects and citizen relationships with government – Identification of grievances and future blockages – Examination of discrepancies between communal and group grievances, narratives and anxieties, and the actual complex reality behind causal mechanisms of violent conflict through explorative discussions and facilitated dialogues. These teams could operate on multiple levels: local, district, provincial, national, sub-regional, regional, and international. At each level, information exchange can be organised between different stakeholders who then agree on a linkage to the next higher level. Intercultural competence is needed, as it enables socio-cultural analysis of the operational environment, complemented by intercultural creativity, which enables knowledge generation and actions which lead to a strategic impact. Other valuable skills will be: understanding the complexity of cultural contexts, an empathetic capacity to understand the impact of actions in a complex environment, and how cultural symbols can be used in direct and media communications to create common a group identity with the recipients.

146

K. DOYLE

These interactions should focus on applying Schein’s model of cultural layers to monitoring gateway factors identified previously in the Kennedy Institute (2019) report on conflict predictors. These predictors included: – Historical grievances. – Previous tradition of violence in society. – Heavy-handed actions by security forces, which undermine trust within society. – Capacity of leadership to motivate their communities. – Binary divisions within society (including religious, educational, cultural) without intersections. – Differing loyalties and hopes/visions within a state. – Atmosphere of fear justifying ‘getting retaliation in first’. – Lack of political power and voice in certain sections of society. – Unequal distribution of resources (housing, jobs). – Young male population and masculine-dominant culture. – Influence of civil rights movements and general awareness of oppression. Reflecting the recent research, the outcome of these interactions should be: – Increased number of general conversations or discussions between local stakeholders to seek local resolution and crisis management at the lowest level possible – improved access and freedom of movement, with enhanced awareness of human rights and gender issues at the local level – ongoing communication and dialogue processes to nurture engagement and trust between stakeholders with the purpose of providing the mission and EU Delegation with a wider understanding of the conflict dynamics and the conflict environment.

Application Within Ukrainian Conflict The Ukraine crisis in Europe meant that member states now increasingly look inward and reinforce a territorial defence approach—curtailing any hope than a holistic human security approach that puts the individual first

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

147

and that encourages military operations under civilian control can emerge as the core narrative for EU CSDP in the foreseeable future. In Ukraine, the EU is now seen as part of the problem, which limits its diplomatic influence at a political level with Russian authorities and Russian supporting communities. However, using Cloke’s (2022) suggestions on the potential for ‘societal engagement’ elements in Ukraine, and the findings of the Kennedy’s Institute on the role of increasing dialogical capacity in CSDP missions and facilitation of networks, one can think more broadly about situations like EU Civilian Mission in Ukraine (EU Advisory Mission) and how it might contribute to longer-term peace-building efforts on the ground in the future, if the operational situation were to subside into a post-conflict situation. For example, by: – Supporting the victims of violence and refugees—not only with provisions of material, medical, and humanitarian assistance, but also with emotional support networks, expressions of solidarity, trauma services, and reaching out in whatever ways they can. – Initiate and support dialogue with people on both sides, and help to initiate, design, and facilitate dialogues, storytelling and recounting of experience, empathy building, restorative circles, close encounters, conversations, and similar exchanges, especially with people from ‘the other side’. – Strengthening and supporting the role of the United Nations, the European Forum for Restorative Justice, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Mediators beyond Borders, and similar civil society mediative organisations. – Approaching, perhaps protecting, and assisting members of local mediation organisations in Ukraine such as the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation “ISKRA”, and creating opportunities for them to connect, communicate, and solve common problems. – Nurturing, maintaining, sharing approaches, and demonstrating value in trustful relationships between citizens and the state authorities in FCAS. – Understanding the local context and identifying where the EU has a meaningful capacity to deliver compared to other peace-building actors.

148

K. DOYLE

– Identifying and supporting social entrepreneurial projects to nurture meaningful engagements within all elements of the society. – Challenging stereotypes at the local level through developing bias awareness, challenging biases and prejudices that prepare the way for future violence. – Encourage examination of national differences, encouraging cultural diversity in their staffing, and assumptions that there is ‘only one’ way or set of interests. – Connect with and support in person and online, mediators and citizens of neighbouring countries help in building their skills and capacities in conflict intervention, and strengthen their conflict resolution ‘cultures’ to reduce the ripples of the Ukrainian conflict. – Seek to reduce political posturing at a local level, brinksmanship, war profiteering, and preparations for future aggression and genocide. – Identify opportunities for learning about the appropriateness of and shaping/locations of potential SSR/DDR interventions in the future. – Convene joint, collaborative problem-solving teams of professional mediators and negotiators from both sides to offer consensus-based suggestions and recommendations to the community leaders on both sides. – Speaking and writing in the languages of both countries about the power and effectiveness of a broad array of communication and conflict resolution processes, methodologies, and techniques, including non-violent communication, appreciative inquiry, restorative circles, political and public policy mediation, and many others. – Support the setting up of joint citizens assemblies, town hall meetings, or restorative circles and similar methods. As a peace-building mission, the EU needs to continue efforts to uncover the complex, hidden sources and support for war and violence in Ukraine. For example, ACAPs report published in May 2022 regarding the distribution of humanitarian aid in Ukraine is pertinent. The report highlighted that many coordination and parallel structures existed, some were fragmented and due to a lack of precise local knowledge emanating from the ground, there was a challenge in prioritisation and duplication of efforts.

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

149

Local and informal networks held together by social media were central to distribution but there is a lack of coordination between local and international responders. Information on people’s needs obtained from local responders, such as volunteers, would be a valuable source for bigger organisations (KII 25/04/022 a). Bureaucracy, language barriers, and a lack of capacity hinder national and local NGOs from plugging into the international system. Overall, there is a disconnect identified between the international humanitarian system and local responders, including local NGOs and first-time relief providers (such as volunteers), despite the willingness of responders to connect. Challenges include quantifying the impact of the volunteer response, ensuring sustainability when volunteers become burnt out, or a lack of resources and capacities to continue, and connecting the local volunteer networks to the international response to facilitate coordination and information sharing. The author suggests that there is a role for ‘societal observers’ within the EU mission staff to assist OCHA with maintenance of networks and information from the ground on the penetration and distribution of aid and resources. They may also play an important part in transitional and post-conflict justice investigations and reconstruction arrangements.

Conclusion This work is the first conceptualisation of how people deployed on civilian CSDP missions can use mediation, negotiation, and dialogue capacity to connect with local people as an aspect of their mandate. It suggests to the EU how it can better connect with SDG 16—“promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all and to the establishment of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. The realist ambitions of the EU Global Strategy (2016) and increased commitments and demands of deeper security cooperation necessity in the world presently have resulted in a wide variety of responses required to deal with the emergent security challenges, including those involving complex and multifaceted issues like population growth, energy competition, migration, environmental degradation, and climate change, all of which have both security and development impacts.

150

K. DOYLE

However, double hatting of personnel, on the one hand, as protectors of the union and, on the other, as credible advocates for liberal human rights in host countries will undermine trust and confidence in the EU’s commitment to cooperation and magnify other aspects of cynicism towards the EU and its member states. These include suspicions of neocolonialism, lack of insight into where common purposes may exist, and under-resourced and premature human rights rhetoric currently exposed throughout the missions. As stated, the wide ambition of EU Global Strategy 2016 is creating an ‘institutional ego’ manifested in this PIVOT where the EU must be seen as a credible security actor through ambitious mandates of missions and an increasing requirement for resources management. The author sees this as an ideological deviation from the security of humans to the protection of the state, diverting from the original purpose and mandate of EU peacebuilding intention, which spread the remarkable EU story. Perhaps, it is no surprise that the research cited in the Pivot indicates that sustained low level but informed engagements and creation of supportive networks have the potential of a lasting positive and normative influence on relationships. The European External Action Service now houses an increasing number of civilian “peace-building” capacities within its missions for several years. The changes in structure and emphasis following the advent of the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated’ EU interventions should be based on the realities of conflict, security, and development issues in our surrounding world and are necessary if one wants to foster sustainable and effective relationships. By expanding MND capacity, the EU can assist post-conflict countries in its integrated concept of expertise and resources to support conflict resolution and by working with other national and international security actors to improve MND knowledge and increase interoperability and common understanding. The fate of countries is in the hands of elites or leaders—not only those in charge of governments, but leadership at all levels of society. Nudging them towards peace must start by understanding what incentives they need to either block or drive change. This means redoubling efforts to engage with all actors on the ground, aligning all instruments behind the single goal of supporting sustainable peace, and accepting that not all change is possible at the same time. Where efforts have been most successful has been when they have focused on building on existing local capacity for peace. The challenge

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

151

for missions is encouraging how positive leadership that mitigates conflict drivers at the local level can be supported and integrated into the wider aspects of societal governance. Given the fact that peace-building has grown into a multidimensional phenomenon, effective training of peace-builders in nurturing empathy and communication is paramount. Capability gaps in peace-building have been a feature of modern peace-building missions. Operating effectively in missions requires the best of expertise and skill, and the EU as well as other organisations involved in crisis management, need to have the right mix of capabilities in terms of personnel, operations, and equipment. In her recent State of the Union speech, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, referenced that the EU has a sophisticated security and defence architecture, which has been trying to address the challenges. For von der Leyen, the fundamental issue is not the capability gap but why attempts to address them have failed in the past. She quoted Robert Schuman’s phrase: Europe needs a soul, Europe need an ideal, and the political will to serve the European ideal. (von der Leyen, 2021)

This quote cuts to the essence of what this PIVOT has argued. For the EU to become a strong geopolitical actor, it needs to follow its own strategic advice and increase its ability to help people where conflict impacts on lives daily. In order to understand and evaluate any ‘terroir’ and culture, the EU requires a basic stance of openness. By expanding the mandates of CSDP civilian missions to incorporate mediation, negotiation, and dialogue facilitation and tasking a significant element of personnel in missions to act as dedicated ‘societal observers’, the EU will improve its ability to connect with people through the CSDP missions. This will advance the goal of normative encouragement of European values, and ultimately protect the EU’s interests. But, most importantly, through the establishment of this capability, the EU will define itself as an empathetic geopolitical actor and build its agency on the ground, one footstep at a time. Otherwise, continual CSDP focus on encouragement of liberal democracy and state security, like most other external interventions, will continue to build without a foundation. Future research could elaborate on the legacy of EU member states colonialism and neo-colonialism in terms of influence on violent conflict between ethnic groups.

152

K. DOYLE

In the words of Robert Schuman, “Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”.

References Assessment Capacities Project. (2022). Thematic Report Ukraine bridging humanitarian response. https://doi.org/20220523_acaps_thematic_report_ ukraine_bridging_humanitarian_response_0.pdf Cloke, K. (2022). The war in Ukraine lessons for mediators. Journal of Mediation and Applied Conflict Analysis, 81(Summer). EEAS. (2019). The European union’s global strategy three years on, looking forward, Brussels. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_ strategy_2019.pdf EU Global Strategy. (2016). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. European External Action Service, Brussels. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Accessed 21 May 2022. European Council. (2000). Santa Maria Da Feira European Council Conclusions of the Presidency. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_ data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm. Accessed on 15 July 2022. Gaming for Peace. (2019). H2020 project funded from the EU framework programme. https://gap-project.eu/. Accessed 20 July 2022. Gourlay, C. (2010). Initiative for peace-building, mediation and dialogue as tools for EU CSDP missions Brussels. http://www.ieceu-project.com/. The IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention) HORIZON 2020. Jacobs, C. (2018). R2P as an atrocity-prevention framework, Concepts and institutionalization at the global level. In C. Agenda Jacob & M. Mennecke (Eds.), Implementing the responsibility to protect a future. Routledge. Kennedy Institute. (2019). ‘Peace-building—Progress and Prospects Seminar’ Report on Seminar conducted during the visit of President of UN General Assembly and UN Ambassadors to Kennedy Institute, Maynooth University 29 November 2019. Kennedy Institute. (2021). Report on Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue Facilitation in CSDP Missions. Delivered to EU Civilian Training Group, CIVCOM, Brussels. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (p. 39). United States Institute of Peace Press. Lund, M. S. (2003). Conflict prevention: Policy and practice in pursuit of theory. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857024701.n15

6

‘POLITICAL MISSIONS WITH AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY’ …

153

Schein, E. H. (1983). Organizational culture: A dynamic model (Working Paper). MIT. Smith, R. (2005). The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world. Penguin. United Nations. (2017, June 27). A/72/115. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ peacemaker.un.org/files/DPA%20Report%20REV9%20ENG%20WEB.PDF von der Leyen. (2021). State of the Union 2021—President von der Leyen’s speech. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/stateunion-addresses/state-union-2021_en. Accessed on 14 July 2022.

Index

A Afghanistan, 2, 25, 38, 58, 63, 79, 94, 98, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 139, 142, 143 Ambiguity, 50 Arbitrate, 127, 128 B Bosnia Herzegovina, 132 C Capability, 2, 7–9, 11, 17, 22, 23, 26, 34, 39, 46, 61, 73, 91, 94, 102, 105, 110, 111, 119, 121, 122, 129, 130, 134, 139, 151 Capability-expectation gap, 109 Capability gap, 111, 151 Capacity-building, 3, 4, 22, 23, 39, 40, 47, 105, 125, 131, 142 Civilian Compact, 8, 35 Civilian CSDP missions, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 35, 41, 46, 49, 61, 88,

92, 98, 100, 102–107, 109, 127, 129, 130, 139, 141, 149, 151 Civilian missions, 7, 12–14, 37, 46, 74, 88, 93, 122, 139, 141 CivMil, 102 Collective violence, 18, 56, 57 Common interests, 61 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 3–5, 8–12, 14, 21–26, 34–38, 47, 48, 71, 74, 88, 89, 91–93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101–106, 109, 111, 112, 119, 120, 122, 124–127, 129, 133, 134, 138, 139, 141–144, 147, 151 Communication, 49, 66, 72, 101, 104, 106, 108, 118, 120, 124, 130, 140, 145, 146, 148, 151 Conducting missions, 143 Conflict prevention, 5, 7, 10, 12–14, 33–35, 59, 87–89, 91, 108, 118, 121, 138, 139, 141 Conflict sensitivity, 109, 133

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. Doyle, EU Peacebuilding Missions, Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/110.1007/978-3-031-18769-8

155

156

INDEX

Context, 2, 5, 9, 12, 21, 26, 35, 49, 57, 58, 61, 67, 71, 78, 96–100, 103–105, 107–109, 118–121, 124, 126, 132, 138, 144, 145, 147 Cooperation framework, 106 Crisis management, 7, 8, 10, 12, 21, 34–36, 46, 48, 71, 73, 74, 78, 88, 91, 92, 99, 104, 105, 120, 126, 140, 142, 146, 151 Crisis response, 7, 22, 141 CSDP instrument(s), 3, 6, 36, 95 Cultural understanding, 63 Current missions, 35, 37, 39, 40, 92, 144

D Democratic recession, 20 Development support, 49 Do-No-Harm, 42 Durable legacy, 142

E Empathy, 65–67, 147, 151 Espoused values, 62 EU Advisory Mission, 25, 147 EUCAP, 36, 37, 40, 46, 47, 96, 97 EU Global Strategy, 2, 3, 11, 14, 23, 26, 104, 112, 119, 138, 139, 149, 150 EU missions, 13, 14, 34, 42, 88, 89, 94, 98, 101, 103, 108, 110–112, 133, 139, 143, 149 EUPOL, 37, 38, 94, 95, 98, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 142, 143 Eurocentric, 119 European Union (EU), 2–14, 21–26, 33–38, 41, 42, 44–50, 60, 61, 66, 69, 71–75, 87–91, 93, 95–106, 108–112, 119, 120,

122, 124–126, 130, 132, 133, 138, 139, 141–144, 146–151 Exchange, 50, 57, 105, 106, 145, 147

F Facilitating dialogue, 126, 129 Fragile states, 3, 14, 34, 61, 142

G Global Strategy, 2, 3, 11, 14, 23, 26, 104, 112, 119, 138, 139, 149, 150 Governance, 14, 16, 18, 22, 25, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49, 54, 57, 66, 96, 121, 138, 141, 151 Government, 3, 5, 15, 17–20, 23, 25, 43, 49, 57, 58, 60, 61, 68, 77, 79, 96, 102, 121, 127–129, 132, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 150

H Horn of Africa (HoA), 3, 40, 41, 43–47, 49, 96 Human expertise, 108 Humanitarian aid, 41, 42, 95, 148 Human needs, 76, 77, 128 Human relation(s), 58 Human relations paradigm, 58 Human security, 4, 7, 11, 16, 24, 34, 71, 72, 74, 75, 79, 107, 111, 142, 144, 146 Humiliation, 64, 65, 79

I Identity politics, 55 Implementation, 3, 8, 11, 14, 39, 41, 42, 46, 69, 70, 73, 74, 88, 89,

INDEX

157

92, 93, 96, 101, 125, 131–133, 138, 141 Inclusivity, 77 Information exchange, 106, 145 Information sharing, 89, 93, 106, 149 Institutional agency, 19 Institutional ego, 150 Instruments, 21, 25, 34, 41, 42, 88, 89, 91, 95, 111, 112, 133, 150 Integrated approach, 2, 41, 42, 44–46, 48, 102, 106, 108, 112, 138, 140 Intelligence, 23, 24, 27, 67, 73, 91, 102, 106, 109, 131, 133 Intelligence cooperation, 27 Interagency cooperation, 138 Interconnectedness, 38 Intercultural competence, 145 Interdependence, 56, 140 Interoperability, 40, 49, 93, 101, 104, 106, 131, 141, 150 Intractable, 55, 59, 78 Intra-state, 15, 71, 123, 125, 132, 140 Intra-state tensions, 6, 59

M Macro interventions, 79, 142 Mali, 2, 13, 36, 40, 111, 119, 139, 142 Maritime security, 12, 40, 46, 47 Mediation, 108, 123–128, 130, 131, 133, 141, 147–149, 151 Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue (MND), 122–127, 129–131, 134, 139–141, 150 Mediation support, 125, 126 Memorandum of Understanding, 107 Micro connections, 141 Mission and mandate, 89 Mission mandate, 38–40, 90, 111, 120, 121, 126, 141 Mission planning, 8, 125 Monitoring, 8, 34, 39, 41, 49, 88, 95, 110, 146 Multi-agency, 49 Multidimensional, 4, 13, 48, 151 Multifaceted, 48, 120, 121, 149 Multilateral, 26, 60, 70, 100, 118, 126, 128

L Leadership, 19, 20, 48, 50, 74, 76, 103, 104, 108, 120, 121, 123, 131, 133, 140, 141, 146, 150, 151 Legal, 10, 17, 49, 70, 72, 89, 118 Legal framework, 73, 90 Lessons learned, 23, 90–93 Liaison officers, 108 Lisbon Treaty, 10, 12, 13, 33, 74, 87, 95, 124 Local–international consensus, 69 Local environment, 91 Local ownership, 4, 23, 24, 68–70, 78, 96, 97, 121, 138

N Negotiate, 77, 122, 127, 128, 133, 144 Networks, 19, 34, 143–145, 147, 149, 150 No-contact policy, 97 Normative, 58, 70, 112, 131, 143, 151 Normative influence, 24, 143, 145, 150 Normative power, 59, 60 Norm entrepreneurs, 20, 75 Norm-setting, 70, 118 Northern Irish, 131

158

INDEX

O Openness, 151 Operational challenges, 26 Organisational culture, 62, 140 P Palestine, 13, 37, 39, 97 Peace-building, 2, 4–6, 12, 21, 22, 34, 37, 42, 48–50, 60, 61, 67, 69–71, 78, 79, 96, 99–101, 104–106, 108, 112, 118, 119, 121, 124, 138–144, 147, 148, 150, 151 Peace processes, 50, 70, 75, 77, 101, 126, 131, 140 Persuasion, 126 Piracy, 4, 22, 40, 43, 46, 47, 97 Police, 2, 7, 13, 17, 18, 25–27, 37, 39, 40, 46, 57, 94, 98, 99, 102, 104, 107–110, 126, 128, 132, 133, 138, 141, 142 Police missions, 7, 49, 96, 104, 131 Political imperative, 94 Political mandates, 95 Positive emotions, 5, 65 Post-conflict, 3, 10, 12, 21, 79, 91, 110, 128, 131, 132, 147, 149, 150 Power, 3, 5, 14–17, 19, 20, 54, 57–60, 66, 71, 72, 78, 109, 111, 118, 132, 139, 142, 146, 148 Predictors, 18, 57, 146 Preventive diplomacy, 22, 34, 58, 124 Problem-solving, 58, 66, 67, 75, 77, 121, 122, 130, 134, 148 Psychosocial, 144 R Realist, 57, 60, 142, 149 Regional engagement, 45 Reparational, 119

Resources, 2, 3, 7, 15, 17–19, 21, 22, 40, 43, 54, 55, 57, 59, 69, 78, 89, 91, 96, 97, 100, 102, 106, 109, 131, 132, 139, 144, 146, 149, 150 Resource scarcity, 21 Responders, 149 Responsibility to protect (R2P), 60, 66, 138 Rule of law, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 34, 37–40, 49, 88, 107, 110, 111, 133 S Security, 2–4, 6, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21–23, 25, 26, 33–35, 37, 40, 41, 43–45, 47, 48, 50, 58, 61, 63, 66, 70–77, 79, 88, 95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 111, 112, 119, 122, 127, 128, 131–133, 138–140, 142, 146, 149–151 Security capacity, 47, 138, 139, 142 Security sector reform (SSR), 4, 8, 23, 36, 39, 60, 69, 88, 96, 98, 108, 127, 131, 133, 138, 148 Security Strategy, 7, 45, 71, 73, 74 Sensitise, 128 Shared space, 140 Situational awareness, 73, 88, 101, 102, 106 Social skills, 121 Social status, 54, 55, 78 Societal entrepreneurship, 148 Societal observer(s), 144, 149, 151 Soft power, 60, 141 Somalia, 13, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46–48 Special Representative, 4, 8, 38, 44, 120 Stabilisation, 10, 12, 39, 58, 79, 104, 108, 132, 138, 143

INDEX

State violence, 142 Structural violence, 56 Supranational, 88, 100 Systems paradigm, 59 T Tangible needs, 77 Technical support, 73, 124 Terroir, 117, 118, 151 Theories of change, 111 Threats, 3, 11, 12, 16, 22, 24, 25, 63, 71 Transnational norms, 66 Treaty of Lisbon, 10

159

U Ukraine, 2, 3, 13, 24, 25, 36, 37, 39, 139, 146–148 UNDP, 102, 107

V Violent conflict, 6, 15, 16, 18, 21, 60, 108, 145, 151

W White saviour, 23