Equal Security: Europe and the SALT Process, 1969-1976 3515104534, 9783515104531

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Ralph L. Dietl Equal Security

h i s to r i s c h e m it t e i lu n g e n – b e i h e f te Im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft. Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben e.V. herausgegeben von Jürgen Elvert

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Winfried Baumgart, Michael Kißener, Ulrich Lappenküper, Ursula Lehmkuhl, Bea Lundt, Christoph Marx, Jutta Nowosadtko, Johannes Paulmann, Wolfram Pyta, Wolfgang Schmale, Reinhard Zöllner

Band 85

Ralph L. Dietl

Equal Security Europe and the SALT Process, 1969–1976

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung: Brezhnev-Nixon Summit (Washington-Camp David), 1973. Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Photographic Collection, Madison Building. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2013 Druck: Laupp & Göbel, Nehren Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-10453-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface …..…………………………………………………………………………

7

I.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Introduction …..……………………………………………………………… Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: The Prehistory …………………………… The Nixon Administration, Europe and Nuclear Arms Control …..………… NATO, Europe and the Preparation for the Preliminary SAL Talks ………… ‘Preliminary Talks’ and the Definition of Strategic Weapons .……………… A Limited First Agreement ..………………………………………………… The US Modified Approach: The Struggle for Adoption …………………… The May 20 Joint Declaration: The Common Platform ...…………………… The Path to Moscow: Europe and SALT I ...…………………………………

II.

WHAT IS PARITY? EUROPE, SALT II & THE VLADIVOSTOK AGENDA IN THE ERA NIXON-FORD, 1972–1976

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Introduction ..………………………………………………………………… From SALT I to SALT II: The Congressional Approval .…………………… A New Beginning: The Preparation of the Geneva Talks …………………… Beyond the Preliminary Talks: The Matrix for Strategic Arms Control ..…… SALT and the ‘Year of Europe’, 1973 .……………………………………… SALT and the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War ..………………………… SALT II and MBFR .………………………………………………………… Towards the Moscow Summit, June 1974 …………………………………… President Ford and the Avenue to Vladivostok ……………………………… Vladivostok: The SALT II Agreement Illusion ……………………………… NATO, MBFR and US Nuclear Weapons in Europe ...……………………… The SALT Track: Cruise Missiles, Backfire and NATO Europe …………… SALT II: The Last Stand of the Ford Administration ..………………………

105 109 115 127 132 141 156 172 182 193 200 206 216

III. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………

228

Abbreviations ...…………………………………………………………………… Bibliography .……………………………………………………………………… Index .………………………………………………………………………………

239 241 246

9 17 21 33 42 54 60 73 88

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This monograph on Europe and SALT during the era Nixon-Ford is the product of a wider research project of the author on ‘Nuclear Order 1968–1980s’. The research focus of the author has shifted from transatlantic defense relations to global and regional nuclear order in 2011. A first manifestation of this new research focus was a panel on ‘Nuclear Diplomacy – Nuclear Defense’ at the Alexandria Hilton SHAFR Conference 2011. The papers have been published in Historische Mitteilungen as a ‘Themenschwerpunkt’. The core focus of the wider project is on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The latter also forms the platform for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Art VI NPT imposed on the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) the obligation to seek ‘in good faith’ a limitation and reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals. The theme of the present volume, SALT and Europe, naturally emerges out of the NATO deliberations on nuclear sharing, the European Nuclear Option and the nuclear disarmament obligation of the NPT. The monograph ‘Equal Security’ looks at the compatibility of the strategic arms control of the superpowers with European détente and European unity. This volume thus does not recount the classic US narrative of the SALT process but focuses almost exclusively on the impact of SALT on NATO and the European Communities. SALT forced NATO Europe to organize in order to have a voice opportunity. NATO Europe thus was able to defend European security interests and to shape or structure the US SALT negotiation position. The focus thus is on the compatibility of the institutionalization of bipolarity and Western regional security. What was to be prioritized: systemic stability or Alliance solidarity? The narrative outlines the constant struggle of priorities, the clash of regional and national interests, the fight for equal security: the security of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also the security of NATO Europe. The difficult adjustement processes to the emerging new superpower framework with its repercussions on European Security, Atlantic solidarity and European Unity are described and analyzed on the basis of recently declassified European archival resources and the wide array of recently edited archival resources from both sides of the Atlantic. The outcome is a study that rebalances our understanding of the SALT process and of European unity. The present study offers a perfect platform for an understanding of Europe’s role in global and regional arms control and of the Euro Missile Crisis of the 1980s. The present volume is the first of two volumes on Europe and the SALT process. The second volume – SALT II and Europe during the era Carter 1976–1979 – is scheduled for publication in 2015. Both volumes will be of major interest for scholars from various fields in Contemporary History, International History and International Politics. This study would never have been possible without the support of Queen’s University Belfast. The university kindly offered me a sabbatical in the autumn

8

Preface and Acknowledgements

semester 2012 to write and complete the present monograph. I am indebted to numerous other institutions for their kind co-operation. The most important are the National Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew, and the Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin; the NATO Archive in Brussels, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington DC, the Archiv für ChristlichDemokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, and the Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung. Personally I am indebted to my family. My mother Marianne and my brother Peter always supported and encouraged my endeavour. My brother Peter furthermore commented on the final draft of my thesis with great dedication and skill. I am grateful for their constant and lasting warm support. My wife Ludmila created an environment that allowed my research project to progress and succeed. Her office for months turned into a ‘hub’ of my research. I thank Professor Dr. Jürgen Elvert for the kind inclusion of the current volume in the series of the Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft (HMRG). Last but not least, it is my pleasure to thank Dr Thomas Schaber and Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, who have been reliable and professional partners in publishing for almost two decades. Belfast – Esslingen – Samara May 2013

I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I & EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972 ‘The summit agreements began the establishment of a pattern of inter-relationships and cooperation in a number of different areas. This was the first stage of détente: to involve Soviet interests in ways that would increase their stake in international stability and the status quo.’1 Richard Nixon

1. INTRODUCTION The system configuration of the world during the Cold War was bipolarity. Bipolar orders are deemed stable in International Relations theory. The Cold War, however, led to constant frictions and confrontations. Marc Trachtenberg2 offers a clear and convincing explanation for the instability. The superpower control of the globe was not complete. The SU and the United States (US) had filled the vacuum that had emerged in Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Spheres of influences were established in line with Stalin’s predictions. The armies of the US and of the SU would export their social systems. Wherever the Red Army would be in control, communism would prevail. Whatever territory the US Army would ‘liberate’ would be integrated in the US orbit of capitalist market economies and Western democracy. One area, however, remained contested: Germany. Germany was occupied by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Allied Powers had a common obligation to administer the territory of the former enemy. Frictions were the result. Thus the unsolved German question was responsible for the instability of the Cold War – up to the Cold War settlement of the German question in the shadow of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This important interpretation remains contested. Another facet deserves attention: the factor Europe. A third tectonic plate existed during the Cold War: The ‘Old Continent’ in its institutionalized form. The United Kingdom (UK) as the third victorious party emerging from World War II originally had embarked on the formation of a European power bloc. The Western Union concept, however, failed due to the ever growing East West tensions. But the European nucleus survived as a subsys-

1 2

Richard Nixon, cit in C.L. Sulzberger, The World of Richard Nixon, New York: Prentice Hall Press 1987, 196. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement, 1945– 1963, Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press 1999.

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SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

tem in the Western partial order. The process of European unity of the ‘Six’ and of the ‘Seven’ was a process to obtain autonomy in common as an independent entity or ‘billiard ball’ in the international system. Europe aimed at multi-polarity and thus contested the structures of the Cold War, the division of Europe and the specter of a superpower ‘condominium’. A condominium perpetuated the division of the Continent and the subordination of Europe to an institutionalized bipolarity. Thus the instability was due to a revisionist Germany and a revisionist Europe. Both intended to limit the parallel ‘hegemonies’ of the superpowers in order to regain an independent position in world affairs. The final outcome of the contest had to have systemic implications: a change from bi- to multi-polarity.3 This study deals with the core ‘battle’: the institutionalization of bipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. With the Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty (PTBT/LTBT) of 1963 the superpowers had started to cooperate to preserve a stable – bipolar – world order. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was the breakthrough for superpower détente. The NPT was a blocking treaty, a static treaty, that aimed at the preservation of the status quo. The NPT aimed at the preservation of the system configuration of bipolarity: the common interest of the superpowers.4 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – which emerged out of Article VI of the NPT – offered the superpowers an option to create a condominium.5 The superpowers could extend the non-transfer clause of the NPT to nuclear delivery systems thus undermining the ‘European Option’ for a European deterrent preserved by the NPT. The superpower détente, however, was challenged by Europe. The Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) had embraced the NPT due to Article VI. 3

4

5

‘By establishing more definitely the existing line of division in Europe, the Soviet Union would generally stabilize its European position. […] a further more specific objective of the Soviet European policy will be to protect its own interests which may be threatened by the movement for a united Europe. An enlarged and successful Community would present numerous real disadvantages to the Soviet Union. […] The European development which causes the Soviet Government even more concern is the possibility that a separate European nuclear force may emerge […]. It is of course possible that in the longer term the Soviet Union might take a different view at the whole European question. It would in theory be possible for the USSR to welcome the creation of a genuinely independent Europe, since this would pave the way for the ultimate separation of North America from the European states […].’ Sir D. Wilson (Moscow)-Mr. Stewart, 14 Jul 1969, DBPO, Series 3, volume 1: Britain and Soviet Union, 1968–1972, No 36, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040910046 (access date: 15 March 2011). ‘Sperrverträge […] sind ihrer Natur nach statisch. Sie begünstigen das Bestehende […]’, Dr. Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 July 1969, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA–AA), B 21, 743, 22. Dr Ruete, Probleme der Ostpolitik und der europäischen Sicherheit, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 5f; Michael Meimeth, Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status Quo und friedlichem Wandel. Die Ära Georges Pompidou und Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 1990, 17.

Introduction

11

The latter demanded that the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) would work towards general disarmament and not a mere freeze of the status quo by way of arms control. Disarmament, i.e. arms reductions, meant a relative gain for Europe’s position in the international system. European deterrence per se aimed not at stabilizing bipolarity, but at overcoming bipolarity. The focus of the West-Europeans was on universal principles on the one hand and regional action on the other. The West-Europeans focused on contacts beyond the ‘Iron Curtain’ in order to create an all-European entity and to undermine in common the bipolarity of the superpower structure. Thus European and superpower détente were not necessarily compatible. For Europeans there was no possibility of a settlement of the German question in bipolarity. ‘Finlandization’ was not an option. A policy of neutralization or neutrality would have discriminated Germany and destroyed ‘Europe’ as a player on the global scale. There was only one avenue worth pursuing: the unification of Germany in a unified Europe. The West-German Ostpolitik, the European détente, threatened the institutionalization of a bipolar order by drawing Poland, Romania and other Warsaw Pact states closer into the European circle. Simultaneously European détente would challenge US leadership if both remained uncoordinated. A failure to harmonize European security interests with the national security interests of the US would have undermined Western solidarity and strength. The Harmel Report sought a remedy: it enhanced NATO's role in collective security beyond defense and deterrence to détente. European voice opportunity was the outcome. The US was obliged to consult NATO in East-West affairs.6 Alliance interests mattered: only a common approach to the SU guaranteed Western solidarity and bloc stability. Two battle lines are thus discernible: (1) the struggle for a safe and stable world order among the superpowers and (2) the intra-Alliance struggle on a vision for the future of Europe. Which of the ‘games’ was to be prioritized? Was global and European security compatible? In case the US prioritized her national security interests over European security the ‘Alliance’ threatened to disintegrate. In case the US prioritized global security Europe's security was endangered – yet again. This monograph on Europe and the SALT process in the Era Nixon-Ford deals with the impact of the institutionalization of the global nuclear order on European security. This book does not deal with the fight for a ‘European Option’ during the NPT negotiations7, but will focus on the impact of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of 1969–1976 on European security and the European Nuclear Option. What did SALT mean for Europe?8 What was the impact of SALT on Europe? Did SALT threaten to undermine or bolster European security and autonomy?

6 7 8

Ruete an alle diplomatischen Vertretungen. Betr. Europäische Sicherheit, 26 Mar 1968, PA– AA, ZW 107296. Ralph Dietl, ‘European Decision Making? The US, Nuclear Non Proliferation and the European Option 1967–1972’, Historische Mitteilungen 24 (2011), 43–89. Andrew Pierre, ‘Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America’, Foreign Affairs, 49 (1970–71), 283–301, 285.

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SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

What were the consequences for the European NWS and the European NNWS, and what were the consequences for Europe's place in the global nuclear order? The narrative will not focus on the US-Soviet SALT negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna or on the domestic decision-making on SALT in either the US or the Soviet Union. The diplomatic record of the negotiations is well captured in the excellent studies of Raymond Garthoff9, Gerard Smith10, Henry Kissinger11, John Newhouse12, Morton A. Kaplan13 and Mason Willrich & John Rhinelander14 for the SALT I process. The early SALT II process left fewer traces in the literature. This is highlighted by Garthoff in Détente and Confrontation. Strobe Talbott is the Master of the Game on SALT II.15 Thomas Wolfe’s RAND study offers further valuable insights.16 The Congressional Hearings uncover the domestic debate. Wanting are studies on the intra-Alliance debate, the US-UK bilateral SALT negotiations and ‘Europe's’ influence on and response to the SALT negotiations. This book offers the indispensable pre-history to the SALT II Treaty of 1979 and the emerging SALT III or START process; this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Euro Missile Crisis, since it uncovers the European agenda in the formative period of strategic arms control. The fight about Intermediate-Range Ballistic/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IR/MRBM) starts in 1970 – not during the Carter Administration. To comprehend European security during the Euro Missile Crisis and the role of arms control for the future of Europe, to comprehend the revival of the Western European Union and of European Arms cooperation in the 1980s it is indispensable to analyze the role of SALT I and the early SALT II process for both the European and the global nuclear order. This monograph is not a history of the SALT process. This is a study on the impact of nuclear arms control during SALT I and the early SALT II process on Euro-Atlantic relations. This is a study on shifts in the international system. It deals with a growing poly-centricity in the international relations of the 1970s, and a danger of dissolution of the Atlantic alliance. It thus deals with the challenge to connect political multi-polarity with the strategic bipolarity of the era.17 The

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994. Gerard Smith, Double Talk. The Story of SALT, Lanham: University of America Press 1985. Henry Kissinger, Memoiren, Band I, 1968–1973, Güthersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1979. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn. The Story of SALT, New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston 1973. Morton A. Kaplan (ed), SALT: Problems and Perspectives, Morristown N.J: General Learning Press 1973. Mason Willrich/John B. Rhinelander (eds), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, London: The Free Press 1974. Stobe Talbott, Endgame. The Inside Story of SALT II, New York: Harper & Row 1979; Id, The Master of the Game. Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, New York: Vintage Book 1988. Thomas Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishers 1979. Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. America’s Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984.

Introduction

13

growing parity between the superpowers undermined the ‘bloc’ architecture. Parity threatened to disaggregate the ‘West’ into two strategic theatres. The Atlantic bridge threatened to collapse due to (1) a growing ‘neo-isolationism’ in the US, that manifested itself in the demand for unilateral force reductions, and due to (2) an enlarging Europe with global interests and enhanced means. The preservation and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear weapons and nuclear strike forces mattered for NATO unity and European defense. SALT and the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks – that dealt with European theatre force reductions – touched on forward based systems (FBS). FBS are US systems stationed abroad with a capability to strike the SU proper. Any decision by the superpowers to remove US FBS from the European theatre would have had major repercussion on Atlantic unity, European integration, and the international system at large. US disengagement as a result of a US-SU arms control agreement would have demanded a rebalancing of the Western partial system, a ‘Europeanization’ of NATO or the use of the ‘European Option’ by the member states of the European Communities. Strategic arms control sets the framework. It freezes the relative position of any given player in the international system and within any partial orders – to utilize a phrase utilized by Volker Rittberger. The SALT process ‘institutionalized’ systemic bipolarity and threatened to relegate the ‘pentagonal structure’ of the NPT to a secondary position in a ‘multihierarchical system’ dominated in various degrees by the NWS.18 Nuclear defense questions thus followed a complex logic synthesizing mere survival with a status bias in a relative gains world. The relative position in the international system mattered – irrespective of regime formations. This study thus goes beyond Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in its ‘critique’ of arms control theory. Arms control was an important facet of normal politico-military relations. It followed the rules of international relations.19 Arms control is not beyond power politics but follows the logic of power politics. There is no contradiction between military strategy and strategic co-operation.20 Arms control is power-based regime formation.21 Arms control seeks long term survival thru stability and predictability – at

18 Richard A Falk, ‘Arms Control, Foreign Policy, and Gobal Reform’, Daedalus 104,3 (1974), 35–49; Heinrich Buch, ‘Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei SALT – Mitspieler oder Zuschauer’, in Helga Haftendorn/Wolf-Dieter Karl/Joachim Krause/Lothar Wilker (eds), Verwaltete Außenpolitik. Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1978, 115–134, 119. 19 Thomas Schelling/Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961, 4ff. 20 Thomas C. Schelling, ‘The Thirtieth Year’, Daedalus 120,1 (1991), 21–32, 23; F.A. Long, ‘Arms Control From the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies’, Daedalus, 104,3 (1975), 1– 13, 1f. 21 Harald Müller/Niklas Schörning, Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle. Eine exemplarische Einführung in die Internationalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 2006, 123.

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SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

its best and domination at its worst.22 It is a tool to be employed strategically to foster an environment in line with the core interests of the players involved. It serves a relative gains calculus. The logic of survival, security and domination applies. The Clausewitzian world remains untouched. Strategic arms control is the grand game of power politics. It is worth quoting in this context Schelling and Halperin: ‘Arms control can […] strengthen Alliances, collapse them, or make them unnecessary. It can create confidence and trust or can create suspicion and irritation. It can lead to greater world organization and the rule of law or discredit them. And it evidently lends itself to short term competition in propaganda.’23

This book focuses on the first game – the Alliance game. It looks at Alliance cohesion and world order. It looks at Europe’s response to and impact on the nuclear arms control policy of the Nixon-Ford Administration. President Richard Nixon in 1973 outlined ‘five’ objectives for the US-SU bilateral arms control. The fifth objective was to keep the security of ‘third parties undiminished.’24 The other objectives were the establishment of ‘essential equivalence’ between the superpowers; the maintenance of survivability of strategic forces; a modernization option that preserved strategic stability and verifiability. The four latter categories all had a major impact on the security of the European Allies. Essential equivalence or parity among the superpowers questioned the US nuclear guarantee; the survivability of US strategic forces had a direct impact on NATO strike force composition and development; the modernization question automatically involved transfer questions. Even verifiability mattered for European security.25 European security was always affected. Europe’s relative position in the international system depended on the outcome of the SALT process. All of the listed ‘objectives’ mattered for NATO’s future role in Western defense, for Europe’s place in the world, and Europe’s security and survival. ‘Equal security’ should not be limited to the superpowers. Optimal outcomes mattered for European states as much as for the superpowers. This book focuses on the intra-Alliance dimension of the bilateral Strategic Arms Control Talks. It focuses on mechanisms, caucuses and fora utilized by Allies (1) to defend European theatre positions, (2) to impact on the negotiation packages, and (3) to respond in common to challenges to European interests. The NATO SALT Experts meetings, the European SALT Experts meetings, and the bilateral Anglo-American SAL Talks in Washington DC form the bone structure for an analysis of the European share in the SALT I and SALT II processes. Both the European SALT Experts meetings and the Anglo-American SAL Talks were kept secret. The heads of the Disarma22 Colin S. Gray, The House of Cards. Why Arms Control Must Fail, Ithaca/NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, 8f. 23 Schelling/Halperin, 6. 24 Falk, 36. 25 Ibid, 36f; Stanley R. Sloan/Robert C. Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control. Challenges for US Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No 261.

Introduction

15

ment Departments of the Foreign Ministries gathered for the European SALT Experts meetings. The Anglo-American SAL talks involved staff of the UK Embassy in Washington and representatives from the Whitehall bureaucracy. Ministerial representation was omitted in order not to attract media attention. Thus the public was not informed about the consultation structures within the Atlantic framework. Even Allied governments were kept in the dark about the SALT network. A look at the main ‘theatre’ – the ‘back channel’ negotiations of Dr Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin – further underlines the secretive nature of SALT decision-making. Parts of the deliberations were unknown to the US SALT Delegation, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department – withstanding the elaborate US SALT machinery in Washington DC dominated by the National Security Advisor (NSA): Dr Kissinger.26 The Russian structures of decision-making for the SALT process were largely unknown outside of the SU and were first described in Aleksandr Savel’yev/Nikolay Detinov ‘The Big Five’.27 The SALT diplomatic process thus is to be distinguished from the ‘domestic’ game of public diplomacy and coalition formation beyond the core bureaucracies. The SALT Hearings – the domestic US debate, the public lobbying of interest groups, the information warfare within the Washington beltway and beyond on Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) and SALT – are not the focus of this study. The study focuses entirely on the diplomatic front, on intra-Alliance negotiations, and official ‘European’ channels to impact on the SALT process. This is reflected in the source base for the present study in classic diplomacy, strategy and arms control during the Nixon-Ford era. Any arms control measures of a ‘technical’ importance: technical measures to forestall accidental war, technical definitions, verification questions and mechanisms for crisis consultation or confidence building measures are not part of the narrative. These are by and large ‘apolitical’ measures dealing with crisis stability. They serve no ‘specific’ political purpose. All these aspects of arms control are not – or rarely – impacting on the division of power in the international system. Aspects thereof feature only in case they impact on the ‘geopolitics’ of arms control, i.e. the nuclear world or regional order. The monograph is divided into two main parts: Part I deals with the SALT I process and ends with the Moscow Summit Agreement of May 1972. Part II analyses the early SALT II process centered on the Vladivostok Accord of 1974. The study ends with the inconclusive debates on cruise missiles (CM), the ‘backfire bomber’ and European security. Offered is a history of Western Europe’s role in

26 Buch, 130; Lawrence Weiler, ‘Secrecy in Arms Control Negotiations’, in Id/Alan Platt (eds), Congress and Arms Control, Boulder/CO: Westview 1978, 157–183. 27 Aleksandr G. Savel’yev/Nikolay N Detinov, The Big Five. Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union, Westport/CN: Praeger 1995.

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SALT I and European Security 1969–1972

strategic arms control prior to the Carter Administration. Offered is a prehistory to the European security dimension of SALT II, the Euro missile crisis, and the dual track decision of NATO.

2. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: THE PREHISTORY The story of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks dates back to the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) Administration. The idea emerged in line with the negotiations for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1964 the Johnson Administration proposed to freeze the characteristics and numbers of delivery vehicles, both offensive and defensive.28 The initiative was in line with the Johnson Administration’s policy of self-restraint in offensive strategic nuclear weapons procurement. Johnson hoped that the US example would ‘induce a reciprocal Soviet restraint.’29 The US ABM deployment agenda30 let to a first US invitation to its peer competitor to discuss the limitation of ABM deployments. The US-SU Glassboro Summit of 1967 deserves to be mentioned in this context since Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, deemed any ABM deployments as destabilizing. The deployment of ‘thick’ ABM systems would generate arms races in offensive systems. Thus both sides should seek to limit ABM systems.31 The final breakthrough for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks came with the signing of the NPT in 1968. Johnson announced to start SALT negotiations in the ‘nearest future.’32 Simultaneously, the SU declared her willingness to embark on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in line with the NPT obligations.33 As mentioned in the introduction the Nuclear Non28 Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishing Company 1975, 108. 29 Richard Nixon, The Real War, New York: Warner Books 1980, 152. 30 Memo From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Special Assistant Rostow, 10 Dec 1966, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 171; Memo of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 19 January 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 176. 31 Raymond Garthoff, ‘SALT I: An Evaluation’, World Politics 31,1 (Oct 1978), 1–25, 5; Id, A Journey Through the Cold War. A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence, Washington: Brookings Institution 2001, 206ff; Gerard C. Smith, Disarming Diplomat. The Memoirs of Gerard C. Smith. Arms Control Negotiator, Lanham: University of America Press 1996, 170; Statement by Dr John S Foster to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 6 February 1967, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1967, Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1968, 54–56; News Conference Remarks by Premier Kosygin on the Glassboro Meeting, 25 June 1967, ibid, 268–269; Statement by ACDA Director Smith to the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Antiballistic Missile Deployment, 6 March 1969, in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1969, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970, 74–78; Memo from the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara and the President’s Special Advisor Rostow, 28 Aug 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 202. 32 Smith, Double Talk, 20; Greenwood, 118. 33 J.C.W. Bushell, Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: First Report of the Working Party, 8 Jul 1969, The National Archive, Kew (TNA), FCO 46/295;

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Proliferation Treaty contains an obligation in the Preamble and Art VI to stop the arms race and to seek general nuclear disarmament. The NPT thus sought to stop not just ‘horizontal’ but also ‘vertical’ proliferation. The arms race had to be contained and reductions started in order to pave the way to ‘general disarmament’. The NWS were obliged to pursue these negotiations in ‘good faith’, a fact that was highlighted in 1969 by US Secretary of State William Rogers and later confirmed by the International Court of Justice.34 It was indispensable for the validity of the NPT that NWS and NNWS alike would honor the compromise of 1968. The NNWS would adhere and relinquish their right to build nuclear weapons only under the condition that the NWS disarmed their nuclear potential.35 The final aim then and now was ‘global zero’. Thus a 'natural' order of the international system with equal rights for all states would re-emerge in the nuclear weapons free world of the future. The NNWS were not offering the NWS an eternal place in a global nuclear directorate. In case the NWS would not honor their obligation, the NNWS had a right to withdraw from the treaty.36 Europe sought to forestall a status quo bias of the NPT by emphasizing the strategic compromise. The NPT was supported only in case (1) peaceful use of nuclear energy was guaranteed; (2) Europe’s security was assured; (3) a commitment of the NWS to disarm was forthcoming, and (4) Europe’s process of unity remained unhindered.37 The path to re-establishing the equality of states in the international system had to be assured. The need to re-establish equality was highlighted during the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States convened on 29 August 1968.38 The historic compromise and its consequences were discussed in the US Hearings on the NPT. The compromise underlying the NPT then was an undisputed fact. The European powers had fought for the ‘European Nuclear Option’, for the ‘US interpretations’ to the NPT, and thus for NATO nuclear sharing and for a special status of EURATOM in verification. They intended to preserve Europe’s relative position in the world. They now refused to adhere to the NPT before a breakthrough in

34

35 36

37 38

President Nixon's Visit to London, February 1969, Nuclear Matters, Brief of the FCO, February 1969, TNA, FCO 66/109. Minute of the NSC Meeting, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5; Dr. Ruete, Probleme der Ostpolitik und der europäischen Sicherheit, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743. Memo of Conversation, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Secretary of State-Vice Chancellor of FRG, 8 Feb 1967, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 180. Dr Birrenbach, Die Auseinandersetzung um den Atomwaffensperrvertrag, Juni 1969, Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin (ACDP), 01-226-406; Memo of Conversation, Rusk–F.J. Strauß, 23 Jul 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 259. Dr Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 23. Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, September 1968, PA–AA, ZW 107296.

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nuclear disarmament was discernible.39 The ‘Europeans’ intentionally slowed down the NPT ratification process to guarantee ‘Europe’ a more equal status. Prerequisites for adherence applied: (1) the compatibility of the NPT with the Rome Treaties Establishing the European Community (EEC) had to be certified, and (2) the EURATOM-IAEA Agreement signed and implemented.40 More importantly – the NWS had to honor their obligation and to start the process of arms limitation with the aim of general disarmament. Arms reductions mattered: The UK repeatedly warned the US that without a break- through in arms control the European Community (EC) countries might not adhere to the NPT.41 This would be the end of the NPT. It is thus not surprising that the outgoing Johnson Administration started the process of Strategic Arms Limitation deliberations. It referred the question to the Alliance in a last minute action.42 On the 15 January 1969 US NATO Ambassador Harlan Cleveland tabled a document in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on ‘objectives and principles’ for future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.43 The US initiative would keep SALT on the North Atlantic Council agenda and thus safeguard the core achievement of the Johnson Administration: the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty of 1968. The incoming Nixon Administration was now bound to discuss SALT with the European Allies.44 Johnson originally had intended to start the SALT track earlier but could not do so due to the crushing of the Prague Spring by Warsaw Pact forces in the summer of 1968. In a time of heightened tensions in Europe it was deemed inopportune to work on a common approach to arms control with the Soviet Union.45 Alliance solidarity mattered. It is rare that an outgoing Administration commits a successor Administration on such an important matter. The opposite is commonly the rule. Options for

39 Dr Birrenbach-Dr Barzel, 8 April 1968, ACDP I 142-017; Letter from the Undersecretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense Clifford, 10 April 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 232. 40 Dr Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA–AA, B 21, 743, 25. 41 See also: Botschafter Schippenkötter, Genf an das AA, 3 Oct 1969, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1969, Nr. 308. 42 Paper on the Interagency Working Group, 31 Jul 1973, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 264; Memo From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant Rostow, 12 Aug 1968, FRUS 1964–1968 XI, No 267. 43 E.E. Tomkins to Lord Hood, Limitation of Strategic Missiles, 25 Jan 1969, TNA FCO 66/109; Smith, Double Talk, 20; Garthoff, Journey, 213ff. 44 Cromer-Greenhill, 19 Jan 1973, Annex: Interrelationship of Issues Between the US and W Europe, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 14, http//gateway.proquest.com/openurl?_ver= Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040950029 (access date 8 March 2011). 45 Roger P. Labrie, SALT Handbook. Key Documents and Issues, 1972–1979, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 1979, 8.

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change should not be forestalled. The procedure nevertheless had its merits. The Nixon Administration could probe the NATO Allies on a program that was not theirs.

3. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, EUROPE AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL SALT offered new hopes and challenges. Nobody, however, could expect a quick initiative of the Nixon Administration due to the importance of arms control for national security. New foundations had to be found for the relations with the East, with Europe and with the ‘Third World’ including China. The Nixon Administration faced three major challenges: the Vietnam War, the budgetary problem and the adjustment of Alliance relations to an emerging East-West regime. The US – so Kissinger – would follow a step-by-step pragmatism.46 The new Nixon Administration had first to devise her foreign policy approach and a new National Security Strategy (NSS) before initiatives in arms control could be devised. Arms control was an integral part of and subservient to strategic policy.47 Thus President Nixon first established a Study Group chaired by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to review the US military posture and the global balance of power.48 Technical studies had to support the work of the Packard Group to evaluate the impact of arms control on the national defense policy. The US national security policy – as well as the US arms control policy – had to forestall the emergence of a ‘first strike’ capability. Any ‘first strike’ capability was destabilizing. No ‘first strike’ capability was allowed to undermine the global balance of power. The US aim was not strategic ‘superiority’ but ‘sufficiency’.49 President Nixon defined ‘sufficiency’ as a capability that is sufficient to fulfill all tasks and purposes necessary for survival in the international system. The nuclear posture had to guarantee survivability, flexibility and penetrability. ‘Sufficiency’ was a form of parity that assured survival.50 Dr Kissinger once asked: ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers?’51 ‘Superiority is meaningless’ – so Kissinger. 46 Dr Birrenbach, Bericht über meine zweite Unterredung mit Professor Henry Kissinger am 7. Februar 1969, ACDP, I 433-143/1. 47 David S. Yost, NATO’s Strategic Options. Arms Control and Defense, New York: Pergamon Press 1981, 67; ‘I should like to make clear that I view arms limitation talks in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union [...]’, Nixon-Smith, cit in: Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 160. 48 National Security Study Memorandum, 21 Jan 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 2; Paper Prepared by the NSA, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 3; Minute of the NSC Meeting, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5. 49 Leiter Militärattachéstab, Deutsche Botschaft Washington. Die Militärpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten und ihre Strategie der 70er Jahre, ACDP I 433-139/3; Foreign Policy Report by President Nixon to the Congress [Extracts], 18 Feb 1970, US ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1970, Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1971, 20–32. 50 Nixon, Real War, 154f.; Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 150. 51 Paul H. Nitze, ‘SALT I: The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism’, Foreign Policy, 17 (Winter 1974–1975), 136–156, 136; Colin S. Gray, ‘The Strategic Forces Triad: The

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The US had to devise a national security strategy that would (1) protect US soil from attack; (2) free the US from the ‘Diktat’ of other players in the international system, and (3) protect US interests and wealth abroad. This was not a matter of numbers or parity or ‘superiority’ – but of requirements to match the aims.52 ‘Sufficiency’ assured a successful implementation of the national security strategy. The Interdepartmental Group for Europe in the meantime devised the first lines of a ‘Grand Design’ that highlighted the necessity in an ‘era of negotiations’ to cautiously combine deterrence and détente. Negotiations with the SU were not allowed to ‘jeopardize relations with our Allies who may be suspicious of our motives and [may] fear a US-SU condominium at their expense.’ The US had always to be aware that a failure to have the NATO Allies on board would make any promising looking superpower agreement ‘unstable’.53 Alliance affairs mattered. Alliance affairs had to be prioritized in national security affairs. Thus President Nixon decided to travel to Europe soon in order to prepare a common ‘Western’ approach to strategic arms control. Dr Kurt Birrenbaсh – a prominent member of the ‘Bundestag’ Committee on Foreign Affairs – was informed by President Nixon that the US would concert their actions closely with the Allies throughout the forthcoming bilateral US-SU arms control negotiations. A direct participation of European partners was to be envisaged in a later phase of the arms control process.54 The Nixon Administration, however, did not necessarily embrace a European preference. The President tried to de-emphasize the link with the NPT obligation that the Europeans cherished. The Strategic Arms Control Talks had to serve US national security. Stability and trust were the core principles for superpower détente. To pursue the NPT obligations might be counterproductive. The Secretary of State Rogers demurred. Stability was not enough: ‘we should proceed with good faith […] we are obliged to go ahead with talks, in good faith, language of treaty is clear.’55 Reductions had to be the aim. Thus differences concerning the approach to arms control persisted – within the Nixon Administration and surely within the Alliance. The selection of Gerard Smith as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) further widened ‘philosophical’ differences on the aims of SALT. What should be prioritized: global obligations, alliance affairs or bilateral superpower relations? President Nixon’s inaugural address was well received in Moscow. Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed ‘that his government had noted with interest President Nixon’s statement’ and ‘that his Administration looked forward to an era of nego-

52 53 54 55

End of the Road?, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Arms Control and Security: Current Issues, Boulder: Westview 1979, 191–208, 193. Earl C. Ravenal, ‘After Schlesinger: Something Has to Give’, Foreign Policy 22 (Spring 1976), 71–95, 73ff. Paper Prepared for the NSC by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe, 18 February 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 18. Dr Birrenbach, Gespräch Birrenbach-Nixon, 7 Feb 1969, ACDP I 433-143/1. Minute of the NSC, 19 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 5.

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tiations’.56 What would it entail? The President’s European Tour in February 1969 served Nixon to familiarize the Allies with the new US national security policy and strategy. This was the platform for the future US approach to strategic arms control. The Anglo-American Summit at Chequers focused on the new concept of ‘sufficiency’ that was to replace the concept of ‘superiority’. ‘Sufficiency’ mainly stressed the need to maintain the possibility of a second-strike capability, or in other words, the survivability of the US strategic tripod: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Strategic Bombers. Arms control – so President Nixon – surely had to be adjusted to the need to preserve the second-strike capability of the United States. The Nixon Administration thus had started technical studies on the National Defense Posture, Strategy and Policy. HMG agreed with the Nixon approach. The need to preserve the US deterrent power was indispensable to maintain Alliance cohesion. Mere parity would undermine the credibility of the US deterrent for Europe. Parity raised the fear of a ‘limited war’ in Europe. Under parity the superpowers cancelled each other out. This made a conventional or ‘limited nuclear war’ in Europe imaginable. The British PM Harold Wilson therefore at Chequers clearly stressed the importance to maintain at least the credibility of the overall Western deterrent power. The ‘West’ had to be superior. The Europeans had to stay convinced that there would be no ‘decoupling’ of US and European security.57 The worst outcome of arms control negotiations would be a ‘decoupling’ of US and European security interests. To forestall a ‘decoupling’, to forestall the success of a Soviet wedge driving strategy the US had to constantly re-assure NATO partners that the US nuclear guarantee stayed unaffected and Alliance superiority remained unchallenged. President Nixon’s conversation with French President Charles de Gaulle at Versailles on 1 March 1969 allowed a glimpse at the position of the Nixon Administration on defensive weapons. Nixon stressed the need for a National Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The US would proceed with Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) deployment. ABMs were necessary to protect the deterrent, to avoid a gap in the ‘development of the art’ and to enhance the US bargaining position in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.58 The ABM decision followed suit. On 14 March

56 Memo of Conversation. Ambassador Dobrynin’s Initial Call on the President, 17 February 1969, The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center: The Rise of Détente. Compiled for the International Conference: NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Détente, 1965–1972, Dobbiaco/Toblach, 26–28 September 2002, edited by Mircea Munteanu/Hedwig Giusto/Christian Ostermann – Section1, No 1 (unlisted but included): Online Resource: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-rise-detente. Memo from the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Toon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 18 Feb 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 16. 57 Record of a Conversation Between the Prime Minister and the President of the US During and After Dinner at Chequers on Monday, 24 Feb 1969, TNA FCO 66/109. 58 Memo of Conversation. De Gaulle-Nixon at Versailles, 1 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 13.

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President Nixon approved the ‘Safeguard’ concept to succeed ‘Sentinel’ – the ABM concept of his predecessor. ‘Safeguard’ was necessary (1) to protect US Minutemen Silos from the Soviet SS-9; (2) to offer protection against ‘Third Party’ nuclear forces and (3) against accidental firing of nuclear weapons.59 Simultaneously, Nixon approved a continuation of the testing of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV). The MIRV revolution – that multiplied warheads per delivery system by up to 12 – was giving the US an edge of 4:1 in warhead count over the SU in case the number of delivery system were equal. The US hoped for appropriations for both dynamic weapons systems – ABM and MIRV – in order to strengthen her negotiating position and to create the option for a zero deployment in case the SU reciprocated.60 NATO’s 20th Anniversary Washington Summit in April 1969 offered the US the right opportunity to inform the Alliance as a whole about the US approach to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The 11 April was a date to remember. It was the date of a specially restricted North Atlantic Council (NAC) session attended by NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers and the NATO Ambassadors.61 President Nixon started the debate to reassure the partners about the role of NATO. NATO seemed to be an ‘old fashioned’ concept, but was needed to negotiate from strength. Thus NATO communality was indispensable for any successful arms control negotiation with the SU. The Nixon Administration had inherited a commitment to ABM. The ‘Sentinel’ Program of the Johnson Administration, however, had a wrong focus: ‘area defense’ of US cities against a Chinese threat. The major threat the US faced was the vulnerability of her deterrent. The SS-9 with her high throw weight could pose a threat to the US Minutemen silos. The SS-9 was a Soviet ‘first strike’ counter force weapon. Thus the US had to protect the viability of her deterrent in addition to or in replacement of her cities. The focus had to move from ‘area’ to ‘terminal defense’. The new US ABM system ‘Safeguard’ thus focused on the protection of the deterrent – not on the protection of the US per se or the National Command Authority (NCA). This was in the national interest of the US and in the interest of Europe. Without a secure US deterrent force Europe's security guarantee would be infringed. The presentation of US President Nixon was well received. One ‘statement’ by the US President, however, shook the Alliance partners. Nixon had discarded the advice of PM Wilson and flatly told the NATO Allies that a

59 Memo from the President’s Special Assistant to the President Buchanan, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 24; Statement by President Nixon on Ballistic Missile Defense, 14 Mar 1969, in US ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1969, 102–105. 60 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 27 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 6; Memo from Director of the ACDA Smith and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson to Secretary of State Rogers, 9 Mar 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 20; C.B., Notes on Visit to the United States, Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297. 61 Record of a Meeting between President Nixon and NATO Ministers on April 11, TNA, FCO 66/110.

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strategic parity was emerging. The Dutch in particular were alarmed.62 Nixon instantly tried to allay emerging fears: the US ‘tripod’ was not in danger. Only the ICBM leg might suffer in case of a SS-9 first strike. The SLBM and Strategic Bomber Force would guarantee an effective second strike in any case. Furthermore, ‘Safeguard’ would enhance the survivability of the Minuteman III ICBM force. Italy’s Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni agreed with the need to preserve the deterrent but stressed the obligation arising out of the NPT. The public had to be assured that arms reductions would be ‘one of the essential preoccupations of the US policy.’63 The deployment of any new weapon system would just enhance the arms race. The US decision to proceed with an ABM defense system was not well received in London – either. HMG feared any ABM deployment: it would enhance the arms race and invalidate the penetration capability of the British nuclear forces. Both currents could invalidate the ‘European theatre’ deterrent forces.64 The UK reaction to the ‘Sentinel system’ deployment decision of 1967 had been ‘particularly sharp’. The UK had not been consulted by the Johnson Administration prior to the decision. The reaction to the ‘Safeguard’ announcement was more guarded – but critical. HMG sent the former Private Secretary to the British Minister of Defence Ivor S. Richard to Washington to explain the concern of HMG about the ‘Safeguard’ decision of President Nixon. ABM deployment would simply have the effect of encouraging improvements of offensive and defensive systems on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A new arms race was to be expected. The threat posed by the Chinese deterrent forces was not deemed serious in the UK and thus an argument based on a ‘China threat’ was unconvincing.65 A ‘light’ ABM could already invalidate the deterrent forces of ‘Third Parties’. A ‘thick’ ABM system would be destabilizing to the extreme. It would enable the protected party to knock out the retaliatory forces of a peer competitor by a ‘first strike’. However, there was one positive aspect of the new US approach: ‘Safeguard’ would leave cities unprotected thus offering the SU a ‘second strike’ counter city capability. Thus ‘mutually assured destruction’ might be guaranteed – a stabilizing factor. ABM deployment, however, was not the only Western European concern. The UK started to analyze the possible implication of a SALT agreement on offensive and defensive weaponry in Europe – so did the Germans, French and Italians. The possible implications for European security were far-flung and diverse. The ‘Eu-

62 Ibid – see also: Gedächtnisprotokoll über das Gespräch zwischen Bundesminister Dr Schröder und Mr Dean Acheson in dessen Wohnung in Washington am 12.4.1969 von 10 bis 11 Uhr, 12 Apr 1969, ACDP, I 483-283/3. 63 Record of a Meeting between President Nixon and NATO Ministers on April 11, TNA, FCO 66/110. 64 Christopher Irwin, ‘Nuclear Aspects of West European Defence Integration’, International Affairs 47, 4 (1971), 679–691. 65 A.E.D. Chamier-Sir E. Peck, Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, April 1969, TNA, FCO 66/110.

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ropeans’ thus demanded constant consultation by the United States. First and foremost the European Allies had to be informed whether a ‘limited’ or a ‘comprehensive’ Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement was envisaged. The Allies had to be made aware whether the negotiations were to embrace US ‘homeland systems’ or also US ‘stationed systems’.66 An insight into the scope of the talks would offer Europe the needed planning security – for their own analysis of the implications of superpower arms control for European security. Generally, the West-Europeans were concerned about (1) the maintenance of the Western integrated deterrent; (2) the impact on NATO assigned forces including the Sixth Fleet and the Polaris force; (3) the targeting of Soviet MRBM threatening Europe; (4) the impact of an ABM agreement on European deterrent forces and the AngloAmerican special nuclear relationship, and finally (5) the impact on the US nuclear and conventional defense contribution in the European theatre.67 All European Allies sought to limit the effect of SALT on SACEUR’s armory. NATO’s European theatre deterrent was untouchable. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) furthermore deemed a limitation of the Soviet MRBM force of necessity in order to forestall parity in intercontinental systems and an imbalance in regional systems. Such a development would enhance the threat of ‘limited wars’. It would undermine NATO’s strategy of escalation, and thus would foster a ‘decoupling’ of US and European security. The need to forestall ‘unequal security’ due to a regulated balance of intercontinental and an unaddressed imbalance in medium range systems was highlighted – in Helmut Schmidt’s ‘Strategie des Gleichgewichts’ published in 1969.68 HMG was less concerned with the imbalance in non-central systems but with the future of the UK deterrent – one of the listed European core concerns. UK’s ‘nuclear freedom’ was the key to the future European security order. The UK deterrent had to remain unrestrained since it was ‘the germ for a European nuclear alternative’ that insured European security in case US security would be decoupled from European security. Consequently, HMG focused on reassurances that the concept of NATO nuclear sharing and the Anglo-American nuclear relationship would remain unaffected by SALT. Nuclear transfers among NWS would have to remain permissible. HMG deemed it beneficial for Europe to maintain ‘several nuclear decision centers.’69 Sir Solly Zuckerman – the Science Advisor of the British PM – stressed another of the listed concerns: the impact of SALT on NATO strategy, NATO requirements and NATO planning. SALT would affect NATO strategy. It would

66 US-Soviet Talks on Limiting Strategic Nuclear Armaments: European and UK Security Interests, 30 Apr 1969, TNA FCO 66/110. 67 Ibid 68 Rolf Steinhaus, Soldat Diplomat. U-Bootfahrer, Zimmermann, Journalist, Ministerberater: Erlebnisse und Reflexionen eines Offizier der Kriegsgeneration, Herford: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft 1983, Chapter XI. 69 US-Soviet Talks on Limiting Strategic Nuclear Armaments: European and UK Security Interests, 30 Apr 1969, TNA FCO 66/110.

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impact on the work of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), on tactical nuclear weapons and the guidelines for the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. Thus the North Atlantic Council and the NPG had to be briefed about the arms control negotiations. This was a top priority: arms control could not be allowed to undermine the deterrent power, structure and doctrine of NATO.70 The UK NATO Permanent Representative Bernard Burrows presented the British views on SALT to the North Atlantic Council on 19 May 1969. The British bluntly stated that arms limitation talks should preserve – not threaten – European security. SALT had to ‘limit and reduce’ the scale of the US and Soviet deterrent forces ‘without disturbing the existing balance’ – in any world region. Thus the scope of the talks had to be decided upfront. A ‘comprehensive agreement’ that included a limitation of the Soviet MRBM and the NATO assigned forces – in addition to ICBM, SLBM, strategic bombers and ABMs – would be in line with the NPT obligation ‘to work for a cessation of the nuclear arms race’ and would in addition lead to a ‘reduction of the Soviet nuclear threat in Europe.’71 The negotiations, however, might be complicated thus a ‘limited agreement’ might have to be sought. In that case the danger of asymmetries had to be tackled – to assure balanced security for all. Burrows furthermore highlighted the destabilizing character of ABM systems. HMG hoped that an ‘elimination of their deployment’ would result from SALT.72 ABM deployments had to be forestalled to preserve Europe’s deterrent power. An ABM shield threatened to invalidate the penetration capabilities of the French and British deterrents.73 A worst case scenario seemed possible in case the superpowers embarked on a ‘no first-use’ policy for nuclear weapons during the SALT process. A ‘no use’ or ‘no first-use’ policy would undermine the US nuclear guarantee and NATO strategy. A ‘no first use’ policy would undermine NATO’s flexible response strategy by breaking the ladder of escalation from the conventional to the tactical nuclear to the strategic nuclear level. The ladder of escalation assured the credibility of the Western deterrent and an effective defense of Europe. All in all it was to be expected that the US ‘strategic nuclear guarantee for Europe will move further into the sphere of the abstract’.74 Europe’s security would be undermined by SALT – under almost any condition. The Europeans thus had to harmonize their positions. The UK had to act on Europe’s behalf to influence Washington in order to (1) forestall a ‘decoupling’ of European and US security, and in order to (2) preserve the long-term option of a

70 E.E. Tomkins, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 5 May 1969, TNA, FCO 66/110. 71 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Paper Presented by Sir B. Burrows to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 19 May [1969], TNA, FCO 46/295. 72 Ibid 73 Gesprächsprotokoll über das Europäische Abendessen in Brüssel am 13 November 1968 in der Residenz des britischen NATO-Botschafters an dem 8 NATO Verteidigungsminister und ihre Ständigen Vertreter teilnahmen, 13 Nov 1968, ACDP I 483-283/2. 74 C.B., Notes on Visit to the United States, June 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297.

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European nuclear defense structure. The UK felt obliged to actively explore the option of a future Anglo-French or European nuclear co-operation within the NATO framework. The UK had to be aware and test virtually all possible options for Europe. Whitehall thus considered it indispensable to harmonize negotiation positions within the Alliance framework prior to the US-SU SALT negotiations. Alas, machinery was needed. The Eurogroup was an option – but too public. The NPG was the prime multilateral forum available to discuss arms control and strategy. The French refusal to partake in the NPG, however, limited its utility.75 The UK finally decided to seek bilateral contacts – with Germany, France and the US throughout the negotiating process. The details still had to be worked out.76 Domestically, the British Cabinet Office had already established a ‘SALT Committee’ made up of representatives from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office to deal with the ‘International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy’. The Committee was chaired by Sir Robin Hooper. The UK’s Permanent Representative to NATO Burrows was asked to attend the sessions of the ‘Hooper Committee’. The staff the UK Embassy in Washington liaised with the ‘Hooper Committee’.77 The ‘Hooper Committee’ focused on the ‘European Interest’ in SALT on 23 June 1969.78 Two sets of interests were discernible from preparatory studies: (1) those connected with a peaceful world order, and (2) those connected with Europe’s relative position in the future world order. The Europeans hoped for a control of the dynamic systems – MIRV and ABM – to achieve both a peaceful nuclear order and a secure European position in the international system. ‘Horizontal’ non-proliferation would stop with ‘vertical’ proliferation. The outcome: a stable nuclear order, an end to the nuclear arms race, the formation of a platform for general global disarmament and a reduction of defense spending benefitting all parties: NWS and NNWS alike. All of the listed points had strategic implications for Europe’s role in the world. The core axiom for all considerations on European security, however, was the need to preserve Europe’s indigenous nuclear potential and NATO’s nuclear umbrella. Both layers of the Wes-

75 ‘Der französische Botschafter habe ihm erklärt, nach seiner Auffassung seien die NPGDiskussionen reine Zeitverschwendung und nur ein Aushängeschild.’, Gedächtnisprotokoll über das Vieraugengespräch zwischen BM Dr Schröder und Verteidigungsminister Healey in der Britischen Botschaft in Brüssel am 15.1. 1969 von 17.30 bis 18.30 Uhr, ACDP I 483283/2. 76 US-Soviet Talks on Limiting Strategic Nuclear Armaments: European and US Security Interests, April 1969, TNA FCO 66/69 ; C.H.D. Everett, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 6 Jun 1969 & European Interests in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, TNA, FCO 66/111; AngloFrench Nuclear Cooperation, June 1969, TNA, FCO 66/112; Gedächtnisprotokoll über den Abschiedsbesuch des Chefs des Stabes von SHAPE, General Parker, bei BM Dr. Schröder in der Anwesenheit von Flotten-Admiral Thomsen und Kapitän zur See Feindt auf der Hardthöhe am 17.1.1969 von 11.30 bis 12.30 Uhr, 17 Jan 1969, ACDP, I 483-283/2. 77 R.A. Sykes, SALT, 25 Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294. 78 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room B, Cabinet Office, Friday, 27 Jun 1969, 10 a.m., TNA, FCO 46/294.

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tern deterrent were indispensable for the defense of Europe as long as the Soviet conventional superiority lasted.79 The superpowers had to break the cycle. A SALT concept based on mere parity in central systems was not enough, it was even destabilizing. In case strategic nuclear weapons would invalidate each other, the Soviet MRBMs would continue to threaten Western Europe so would the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. Equal ICBM numbers would not allow the US – as under superiority – to target Soviet MRBM launch sites with US ICBM. The European NATO Allies thus had to assure that the SACEUR’s threat list – currently covered by SACEUR’s nuclear strike force and by ‘external’ non-assigned US strategic nuclear forces – would be adequately covered.80 Thus any SALT agreement was not allowed to interfere: (1) with the nuclear forces assigned to the SACEUR and thus NATO’s nuclear sharing system; (2) with the national nuclear deterrent forces of France and the UK, and with (3) US FBS that served both a conventional and a nuclear role in NATO’s defense strategy. The only viable alternative: Soviet MRBM and US FBS were to be included in a comprehensive SALT agreement. A prerequisite applied: the SALT agreement had to go beyond mere limitations and embrace massive reductions of the non-central systems. A mere limitation of the Soviet MRBM would have no positive affect for European security due to the fact that the Soviet MRBM force was able to cover the 300 strategic targets in Western Europe several times. To sacrifice the US FBS for a limitation of the Soviet MRBM thus was without merit. The same applied to a freeze on non-central systems. A second prerequisite applied: Europe had to forestall that a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would go hand in hand with a reduction of US forces in Europe. This would lead to a reduction of the tactical nuclear forces in Europe and would leave the current NATO strategy of controlled escalation crippled. Last but not least any tendency to contemplate a prohibition of the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons would finally destroy NATO’s flexible response strategy. Flexible response contained the element of deliberate escalation. Europe had to preserve Europe’s capability to escalate. The core aim for Europe was thus to obtain a SALT agreement that (1) reduced the threat to Europe, (2) did not limit SACEUR’s independent capability, and (3) did not limit Europe’s future nuclear defense options. Nuclear transfer should not be further restricted thru SALT in order not to forestall an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship with a European NPG.81 The recent strategic debates in NATO’s NPG had raised doubts about the US defense policy in Europe. The US – so a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) study – was clearly unwilling to commit to a NATO strategy involving an early

79 A.E.D. Chamier, European Nuclear Cooperation, 18 Jun 1969, TNA FCO 66/112. 80 Meeting of the NPG in London on 29th and 30th May 1969, Full Record of Discussion, 29 May 1969, TNA, FCO 66/113. 81 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy, European Interests in Soviet/U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Note by the FCO, 23 Jun 1969, TNA FCO 66/112; A.E.D. Chamier, European Nuclear Cooperation, 18 Jun 1969, TNA FCO 66/112.

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release of nuclear weapons.82 The meeting of the NPG in London of 29–30 May 1969 had indeed revealed US hesitation to support the Anglo-German NPG Study on the Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons. The British and German authorities opted for an early initial use of Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in order to forestall a massive use of tactical nuclear weapons at a later stage of escalation. According to US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird the paper was biased and ruled out a significant range of intermediate options – in particular ‘the extensive use of battlefield weapons either as an initial or follow-up measure.’83 Denis Healey clearly refuted the US position. ‘The European countries had no interest in a long drawn out war.’ 84 Massive use meant massive destruction. The US – so the British Defence Minister – had never explained to their Allies the rational for the existence of 7000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. They could serve only as a deterrent or selectively for early initial use to re-establish the deterrent power after the start of hostilities. Any battlefield use would leave Europe not defended but devastated. The collateral damage in case of massive use of theatre nuclear forces would reach after one day the civilian casualty rate of one year of fighting during World War II.85 The position of Secretary Laird hinted at a US policy to limit a war to the European theatre – irrespective of the cost for Europe. The US and the SU would remain sanctuaries. The war would be ended by massive use of tactical nuclear weapons. This was not deterrence, but a war waging strategy that disregarded European security interests. Secretary of Defence Healy clearly stated that the Europeans would create their own nuclear forces in case they lost confidence in the ‘Western’ deterrent.86 Another facet of the hidden ‘decoupling’ of European and US security surfaced during the NPG discussion on nuclear consultation procedures. The topic: the initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO. All parties agreed with the Athens Guidelines of 1962 which guaranteed a political control over the use of the deterrent. Political control assured a politically controlled escalation in line with NATO’s flexible response strategy – Military Committee (MC) 14/3. One problem emerged: The US – as described above – interpreted the escalation ladder differently than the Europeans. European insecurity was the result. Furthermore, the initial use of nuclear weapons – as foreseen in the controlled escalation of NATO’s ‘flexible response’ strategy – conflicted with the declared Soviet aim of a US-SU agreement on the ‘Prohibition of the First Use of Nuclear Weapons’.87 It was expected that the SU would attempt to commit the US to a ban on the ‘First

82 A.E.D. Chamier, European Nuclear Cooperation, 18 Jun 1969, TNA FCO 66/112. 83 Meeting of the NPG in London on 29th and 30th May 1969, Full Record of Discussion, 29 May 1969, TNA, FCO 66/113. 84 Ibid 85 Ibid 86 Ibid; A.E.D. Chamier, European Nuclear Cooperation, 18 Jun 1969, TNA 66/112. 87 Meeting of the NPG in London on 29th and 30th May 1969, Full Record of Discussion, 29 May 1969, TNA, FCO 66/113.

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Use of Nuclear Weapons’ during SALT. The NATO Allies thus tried to pre-empt a Soviet initiative. The NATO Allies insisted that the US would not accept any agreement, understanding or declaration to prohibit the ‘First Use of Nuclear Weapons’ as a confidence building measure. A bilateral US-SU declaration on the ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons would constitute a ‘decoupling’ of US and European security. It left NATO Europe unprotected. A ‘no first use’ declaration sacrificed the Alliance in favor of a ‘United States-USSR world directorate’.88 The European NATO Allies were up at arms to forestall a superpower condominium at Europe’s expense. The NATO Ambassador of the Federal Republic Wilhelm Grewe thus informed HMG that the FRG had established a High Level Committee on SALT and was seeking a firm co-operation link with London to make ‘Europe’s voice heard in the NAC. The FRG had instructed the German Delegation to raise in the NAC an inclusion of the Soviet MRBM in the US SALT negotiation package in order to assure equal treatment of those systems that threaten the US and those who threaten Europe. This was the ultimate reassurance against a ‘European theatre’ war conducted with unlimited systems.89 The British NATO Ambassador Burrows warned that the German initiative might not achieve the desired result but would lead to an inclusion of US and NATO’s FBS which might impact on all nuclear forces assigned to SACEUR and thus on the UK Polaris force. SALT thus would impact on NATO’s nuclear defense arm and ‘third party’ potentials. The ‘comprehensive’ approach might disarm Europe and enhance the chances of a condominium. The British NATO Ambassador Burrows thus urged Whitehall to educate the Germans about the advantages of a ‘limited approach’.90 Any limitation of the MRBM would not limit the Soviet damage capability. The existing Soviet overkill capacity would be preserved while Europe’s own armor, SACEUR’s nuclear sharing arrangements and NATO’s flexible response would be undermined by a comprehensive approach. This would destroy the second trigger of the Western deterrent. Anglo-German bilateral negotiations thus seemed indispensable to prepare the ‘European’ position before the upcoming NAC meetings. The first core question to be tackled was the scope of the SALT package. US information was to be expected on 30 June or at the latest on 8–9 July 1969.91 The NATO Council Meeting of 30 June 1969 provided little insights into the US negotiating position. US NATO Ambassador Robert Ellsworth outlined the firm pillars of the US SALT approach: (1) the US aimed at a freeze of strategic nuclear weapons and not at reductions; (2) NATO’s tactical nuclear armor would not be included in the bilateral negotiations while the (3) Soviet IR/MRBM would be

88 J.C.W. Bushnell, Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy, SALT: First Report of the Working Party, 8 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/295, 4, 5. 89 B. Burrows to FCO, Telegram No 397 of 28 Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294. 90 Ibid 91 J.P. Waterfield, SALT: British and German Divergence of View over Soviet MRBM Targeted on Europe, 30 Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294.

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included in the ‘comprehensive’ package on the same footing as ICBM.92 The Polaris assigned to SACEUR, a ‘Western’ medium-range system, would not be affected by the proposal since the US rejected reductions.93 Ellsworth finally reassured the Allies that the US did not seek to ‘seal the status quo’ by way of strategic arms control. The NATO Experts Meeting of 1 July offered little further insights. Dr Garthoff, the US representative, refused to answer any questions concerning MIRV or ABM. According to Dr Garthoff the Allies could not expect to gain a clear picture of the US negotiating packages before the next NATO Council meeting on 8–9 July. But, the whole time table might slip due to the ongoing preparatory work.94 The US sensed Europe’s fear of a US-SU condominium. Thus the Nixon Administration might have included MRBM reductions into the US negotiating package to allay European fears of an ‘unequal’ or unbalanced approach that left ‘Europe’ with less security than the United States.

92 B. Burrows to FCO, Telegram No 405, 1 Jul 1969, TNA, PREM 13/2569; Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: US Memorandum. Note by the FCO, 23 Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294; Minute of the Review Group Meeting. Review of Strategic Posture NSSM-3, 29 May 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 32. 93 Vorlage für den Bundesverteidigungsrat, 12 Jul 1969, AAPD 1969, Nr. 232. 94 B. Burrows to FCO, Telegram No 40, 1 Jul 1969, TNA, PREM 13/2569; R.A. Burroughs to R. Sykes, 1 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294; J.C.W. Bushnell, Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: First Report of the Working Party, 8 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/295.

4. NATO, EUROPE AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE ‘PRELIMINARY’ SAL TALKS The US moved slowly on SALT. This was due to the complexity of the subject matter. It was due to internal difference within the US on the future of MIRV and ABM technology. The positions of the White House and of Congress diverged extensively on MIRV and ABM deployment. The US presentation on the ‘Strategic Forces and Strategic Balance’ in the NATO Council had been shaped by the US review of the strategic posture. The Strategic Posture Document (National Security Strategy Memorandum, NSSM-3) was the guide on SALT.95 However, Gerard Smith – the chief of the US SALT delegation and director of ACDA – did not totally concur to prioritize NSSM-3. Smith pleaded for flexibility: NSSM-3 should not limit SALT negotiation options unduly. The National Security Advisor H. Kissinger remained firm and insisted that the report of the Interagency SALT Steering Committee (NSSM-28) should be nothing else but a continuation of NSSM-3. The strategic posture had to govern our SALT position. No contradiction was permissible.96 NSSM-28 listed possible options – a minimum, intermediate or comprehensive agreement. The former type was nothing but a freeze; the other agreement types would contain quantitative and qualitative measures, prohibitions or reductions. Smith especially pleaded for the possibility of an ABM ban and MIRV prohibitions in case the SU would reciprocate.97 The ‘Stop Where We Are Proposal’ (SWWA) of ACDA reflected the position of Smith. The ACDA suggested a comprehensive package which included a total freeze on quantitative and qualitative improvements of ICBM, all land and sea based strategic nuclear weapons, ABM launchers and radars in conjunction with a MIRV test ban, surface-to-air missile (SAM) upgrade ban and last but not least a MIRV prohibition. Thus the SU would not be able to obtain a counterforce capability by way of SS-9 deployments or MIRVing. The outcome would be appealing to the world, would stop the arms race and preserve mutual assured destruction.98 The Pentagon and the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), however, did not deem a comprehensive option feasible. Dr Kissinger, the National Security Adviser, sided with the military. Thus the Administration decided that the worked out options should not be considered as negotiating positions, but as mere illustrative examples. ‘General prin95 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: US Memorandum. Note by the FCO, 23 Jun 1969, TNA, FCO 46/294; Minute of the Review Group Meeting. Review of Strategic Posture NSSM-3, 29 May 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 32. 96 Minutes of the Review Group Meeting. NSSM 28 SALT, 12 Jun 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 17. 97 Paper Prepared by the Interagency SALT Steering Committee. Summary of NSSM-28 Report, undated, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 14. 98 Paper Prepared in ACDA. A Stop Where We Are Proposal for SALT (SWWA-Proposal), 11 Jun 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 16; Smith, Disarming Diplomat, 165.

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ciples’ had to be deducted from the exercises which would guide the ‘composition of concrete proposals’ – in Henry Kissinger’s words.99 Parallel to the internal deliberations on an approach to SALT the US started to engage the SU in the preparation of the upcoming SAL talks. Henry Kissinger reassured the Soviet Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin that US-Soviet relations would enter into a ‘constructive phase’ – a phase of ‘co-creation’ in today’s parlance. The US-Soviet security co-operation would depart from the old comprehensive ‘Geneva packages’ that had guided ‘Western’ East-West negotiations so far. The new approach would not make arms control negotiations dependent on progress towards German unification. German unification was an undertaking of the ‘very, very distant future’. Kissinger furthermore assured Dobrynin that the US recognized the special responsibility of the SU in Eastern Europe. Thus co-creation would be mutually beneficial. The US approach would be focused on the strategic balance. Redrawing the map of Europe was, indeed, a matter for the distant future.100 The US-SU ‘back channel’ negotiations thus had taken off before the SALT negotiations had even started. None of this was known to the European Allies. It only would have fuelled their fears about a US-SU condominium. SALT thus was a complex endeavor with multiple negotiation theatres that reflected the diverging priorities of all domestic and international parties involved. SALT was a multilevel game. The superpowers had to manage both domestic bureaucratic interests and their respective spheres of influences. Control of the information flow was needed to adjust the respective alliance systems to an ever more institutionalized East-West regime. Alliance partners had to focus on the intra-alliance game. Since the Europeans were not party to the superpower negotiations they demanded clear information and a voice opportunity. Information flows, however, were a policy following strategic guidance. Contents and timing was diplomacy. The NATO Council Meeting of 8–9 July 1969 offered some new guidance for European planning. Phil Farley – Gerard Smith’s deputy – informed the NATO Ambassadors that the US would offer a ‘comprehensive approach’ as indicated on 30 June. The US did not consider reductions. The US package would not affect NATO assigned nuclear forces. The US intended to deploy a ‘light’ ABM system due to a potential ‘third party’ threat or accidental threat. The presented models worked out by the US were ‘merely illustrations of possible options’. None of those would necessarily be put to the Soviets. These models would ease the elimination of components during internal and NATO deliberations and thus US decision making on viable alternatives. They were not options to be chosen by the Allies – either. Verification questions concerning MIRV testing were still studied

99 Minutes of the Review Group Meeting. NSSM 28 SALT, 12 Jun 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 17. 100 Dobrynin Memorandum of Conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the USA A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger, Aide to President Nixon, 12 July 1969, CWIHP, Rise to Détente, Section I, No 5 (listed).

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by a Special Committee. A MIRV ban might proof impossible due to verification problems.101 Thus one of the ‘dynamic systems’ might not be limited. The Allies were yet again dissatisfied by the US presentations. No clear picture of the US negotiating position emerged. The models were a strategic guidance – not more. Too much remained uncertain. The Cabinet Office deemed it necessary that HMG made her position heard before the US would finalize her negotiation position. The Cabinet Office Secretary thus prepared a statement to be made by HMG at the upcoming NAC meeting on 16–17 July 1969. The statement was forwarded to the Foreign Secretary, to the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister. The SALT statement to be tabled in NATO had to get across the red lines of HMG. Both a heavy ABM defense system and a removal of FBS were anathema to HMG.102 The NAC session of 16 July 1969 opened with the reading of the prepared statement by the British NATO Ambassador Burrows. The UK representative underlined the importance to maintain the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee for Europe. The SALT process should not give the SU the option to drive a wedge between Europe and the US. The risks for European security could be minimized in case (1) Alliance affairs were prioritized, (2) European security questions were taken into consideration, (3) Soviet IR/MRBM sites were targetted under the SACEUR’s stike plan, and (4) NATO’s strategic and tactical nuclear defense posture remained unaltered by the SALT process.103 Last but not least SALT had to serve global security, as well. An agreement that would allow the deployment of MIRV and ABM systems on a large scale ‘would not be regarded by the rest of the world as adequately limiting the strategic nuclear arms race’. Such a development would have negative repercussions on the stability of the NPT regime.104 Thus it was the prime task of the negotiating parties to limit ABM defenses and other dynamic systems. The German Ambassador – following instructions by the Federal authorities – agreed with the British analysis. He refrained from commenting on ABM systems but added that the FRG supported a comprehensive agreement that linked SALT with political questions. The Federal Government sought to apply the traditional ‘Western’ negotiating package that linked disarmament to European security and German unification.105 The French Representative’s message was clear-cut: SALT was a bilateral endeavor. The French Government would ‘in no way’ be committed by the outcome of SALT. Any impact of SALT on the force de frappe was neither permissible nor possible. Farley thanked the NATO representatives for their candid advice and support and

101 B. Burrows to FCO, Tel No. 423, 8 Jul 1969; B. Burrows to FCO, Tel No. 427, 9 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 66/113. 102 Sir Burke Trend to PM Wilson, 11 Jul 1969, TNA, PREM 13/2569. 103 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy, SALT: Draft United Kingdom Statement in the NAC on 16th July. Note by the Secretaries, 11 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/295. 104 Ibid 105 B. Burrows to FCO, Tel No 440, 16 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/295; Vorlage für Bundesverteidigungsrat, 12 Jul 1969, AAPD 1969, Nr. 232.

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assured the UK and the FRG that the concept of strict parity would be reexamined to assure that both US and European security would be served. The Deputy Director of ACDA closed the session and assured the Allies that the Nixon Administration would present the final negotiation position to NATO prior to the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.106 The British statement of 16 July had left a mark. Thus HM Secretary of Defence Healey decided at a meeting with officials from the MoD, FCO and the Washington Embassy to instruct the PM to follow up on the UK presentation by requesting a direct consultation link with Washington. The possibility to influence the negotiating position of the US had to be guaranteed to (1) forestall vertical proliferation, (2) assure European security and (3) Alliance cohesion throughout the process. A special Anglo-American communication back channel in line with the Anglo-American Executive Agreement of 1957 and the 1958 Anglo-American Nuclear Agreement was envisaged.107 The PM agreed. Harold Wilson used the refueling stop of President Nixon’s aircraft at Mildenhall Air Force Base on 3 August 1969 for a talk with President Nixon about US-UK nuclear relations and SALT. PM Wilson – according to his own account of the Mildenhall talks – told President Nixon that it would be ‘essential’ to consult on SALT due to ‘deep European anxieties’. ‘It was important to assure that no deal was reached which failed to provide for the fears of those European countries which were at the receiving end of MRBMs.’108

PM Wilson, furthermore, warned of the consequences of vertical proliferation for global stability. He finally turned to European nuclear cooperation. Currently no French requests for cooperation were pending. The UK Government would honor her promise to inform the US about any French initiative in this field. The British position on an Anglo-French nuclear cooperation for Europe was clear-cut. It was feasible only in case France reintegrated into the NATO military structure. This would entail French membership in the NPG. The US President thus assured that the US would uphold the nuclear special relationship.109 Richard Nixon furthermore agreed to honor the US obligation to inform HMG about any French request for nuclear cooperation with the United States. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Dr Kissinger suggested informal nuclear SALT talks as soon as the Soviet position on SALT had crystallized.110 An Anglo-American SALT executive committee took shape.

106 B. Burrows to FCO, Tel No 440, 16 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/295. 107 Record of Discussion in the Defence Secretary’s Room on Tuesday, 22 Jul 1969, TNA, FCO 46/296. 108 The Prime Minister Account of the Conversations With President Nixon at Mildenhall on Sunday, 3 Aug 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297. 109 Ibid 110 Visit of the President Nixon, Mildenhall, August 3, 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297; Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear French Policy. Minutes of a Meeting held in the Conference Room B on Wednesday, 6 Aug at 3 PM, TNA, FCO 66/133; Cabinet, International Aspects of

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The outcome of Mildenhall was far reaching. It opened up an avenue for the UK to obtain on a priority basis (1) technical data from the US about the strategic balance and the strategic weapons systems and (2) a full understanding of the political considerations underlying the US position on SALT. The latter information mattered. Without an insight into US overall strategy HMG would not be able to support the US negotiating position. The British position was clear. The UK had to be enabled (1) to offer the US a second ‘informed opinion’, (2) to support the US in NATO and other diplomatic foray, (3) to influence aspects of the US negotiating position and thus (4) to defend ‘any point of European concern.’111 The first Anglo-American SALT consultations were held on 22 October 1969. The Edward E. Tomkins-Gerard Smith talks were held in Smith’s office. Both parties agreed to keep the meeting secret. The UK delegation pressed the issue that the envisaged inclusion of the Soviet land-based MRBM should under no circumstances lead to a limitation of the SACEUR’s armor. Decisions involving SACEUR nuclear potential would have to be negotiated in a multilateral setting. Tomkins furthermore raised the possibility to involve the Germans to a larger extent into the US-UK deliberations either directly or indirectly – as in the NPG of NATO. This was rejected by Farley. ‘The US and the UK had shared intelligence on nuclear affairs for decades. An extension of the deliberations to third parties was just impossible. The other NATO Allies should not even be aware of this special line-up. Thus the US-UK SALT negotiations will be strictly secret and bilateral.’112

Shortly after the Anglo-American SALT machinery had been established the Soviet Foreign Minister Anatoly Gromyko announced the SU’s willingness to engage in ‘preliminary talks’ between the superpowers on SALT.113 The ‘preliminary talks’ were to commence on 17 November 1969 in Helsinki. The timing was ideal for the US. The Nixon Administration had fended off attempts by Congress

Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Anglo-American States Consultation. Note by the Secretaries, 27 Aug 1969, TNA, FCO 46/287; Secretary of State’s Visit to Canada and New York, 13–24 September 1969. Meeting with Mr. Rogers, SALT, 3 Sept 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297; Cabinet International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. Minutes of a Meeting held in the Conference Room B, Cabinet Office on Wednesday 24th September 1969 at 3 pm, TNA FCO 46/298. 111 E.E. Tomkins, SALT: Consultations with the Americans, 20 Aug 1969, TNA, FCO 46/297; Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Anglo-United States Consultations. Note by the Ministry of Defence, 19 Sep 1969, TNA, FCO 66/114; Cabinet. International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Anglo-United States Consultations, Background Brief. Note by the Secretaries, 10 Oct 1969, TNA FCO 46/299. 112 Record of a Meeting held in Mr. Gerard Smith’s Office in the A.C.D.A on 22 October 1969. SALT, 22 Oct 1969, TNA, FCO 46/300; R. Freeman to FCO, Tel No 2866, 22 Oct 1969, TNA 46/299; Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: UK/US Bilateral Consultations. Note by the FCO, 6 Nov 1969, TNA, FCO 46/300. 113 Memo from the President’s Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs Kissinger to President Nixon, 28 Sep 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 83.

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to guide the President’s hand on MIRV limitation by way of a MIRV testing ban. The US Government furthermore had won the Congressional battle against Senator Edward Kennedy for ABM appropriations. Thus the Nixon Government was unrestricted: negotiations from a position of strength were possible. Nixon – later highlights in his memoirs – the importance of this domestic victory: Without winning the ABM battle in the Senate the US ‘would not have been able to negotiate the first nuclear arms control agreement.’114 The Nixon Administration decided to use the ‘preliminary’ talks to test out the Soviet Union. The NSC worked out four options which reflected to a certain extent the ‘illustrative examples’ discussed earlier in the year. The options were presented to the National Security Council (NSC) on 10 November 1969. They deserve attention due to their delineation of the scope of the negotiations. Option I foresaw to freeze launchers of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), to limit ABM systems but to refrain from qualitative limits on ABM Research and Development (R&D). A ban on land based mobile systems was envisaged while MIRV development would not be restricted. Option II was in line with Option I but would permit land based mobile systems as part of a limited aggregate number of the strategic systems. Banned would be only land-based mobile IR/MRBM systems. Any further construction and relocation of IR/MRBM was prohibited. The other options were silent on IR/MRBM. Option III was similar to Option I. It, however, permitted to substitute SLBM for ICBM and vice versa. Both counted to the aggregate number of strategic weapons in addition to strategic bombers. Option IV was the most comprehensive package. It was close to Option I and III but banned in addition the development and testing of MIRV and prohibited qualitative changes. Three further varieties of the main options were presented.115 The options had been worked out due to negotiating purposes and differing domestic preferences. The US thus entered the ‘preliminary’ talks in Helsinki without a final decision ‘on the substance of the US negotiating position’.116 The US approach to the US-SU SAL talks made it impossible for the NATO Allies to offer clear guidance. The US strategy not to define a negotiation position excluded Allied participation in the negotiation process. European anxieties were thus bound to be high. Would the superpowers stop the ‘arms race’ or embark on MIRV deployment?117 Would the MRBM threat be tackled? Would NATO structures be affected? The only European power that could possibly influence the negotiations was the United Kingdom. The Anglo-American SALT Committee offered the UK options the other European Allies lacked. But the next bilateral USUK SAL talks were scheduled for January 1970. Thus the special link would re-

114 Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIV, No 88. 115 NSC Meeting: Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 37. 116 Defence Policy Department, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 7 Nov 1969, TNA, FCO 66/114. 117 Ibid

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main silent. Even the privileged UK was therefore anxious in November 1969. The conversation of Denis Healey with Elliott Richardson on 7 November was a case in point. Denis Healey warned Richardson that the US should not suggest any reductions of forces in Europe during the preliminary SAL talks.118 The Allies might accept a ‘new burden sharing’ but should not have the impression that the US commitment to the defense of Europe was waning. The consequences for the Alliance would be dear. ‘Looking into the […] future it was possible to visualize a situation […], in which we might be interested in a European nuclear force; that would be if the Americans made substantial reductions in their forces in Europe and at the same time weaken their nuclear guarantee.’119

President Richard Nixon addressed the NATO Defense Ministers, NATO Permanent Representatives of the NPG member states, the Secretary-General of NATO and the key NATO commanders who had gathered for a political breakfast at the White House on 12 November 1969. The US President had no illusions. Richard Nixon stated that NATO had been formed out of fear ‘and it was probably true that Alliances were held together more by fear of an enemy than by love between Allies. Now […] the fear quotient has obviously decreased as a bond in the Alliance and the question was whether there was enough will on the part of all members of the Alliance to continue their efforts in these circumstances.’120

Nixon’s statement captured the danger emerging out of the SALT process for Alliance cohesion. Strategic theatres differed. Interests diverged. What was to be gained by preserving Alliance unity? What was to be gained by a European Sonderweg? Only Alliance consultation, only voice opportunities and issue linkages could ease the formation of a common denominator or a common front. The US thus promised to consult, to deliberate, to negotiate and to co-decide! The British Secretary of Defence made instant use of the offered voice opportunity: he met Gerard Smith on 12 November and Henry Kissinger on 13 November for private talks. Denis Healey reviewed the success of the NPG consultations ‘which had laid rest to European aspirations for hardware solutions to the nuclear sharing problem.’121 Hardware models on nuclear sharing, however, could easily be revived in case the Nixon Administration followed the advice of Elliott Richardson – to reduce both US conventional force strength in Europe and the US nuclear

118 Extract from the Minute of Meeting Between Defence Secretary and Elliott Richardson on 7 November, TNA, FCO 66/114. 119 Record of Discussion Between the Secretary of State for Defence and Mr. Elliott Richardson on 7 November, 1969, TNA, FCO 46/300. 120 NPG. Record of Discussion at Breakfast with President Nixon on 12 November 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301; Record of Discussion Between the Secretary of State for Defence and Mr. Elliott Richardson on 7 November, 1969, TNA FCO 46/300. 121 Record of Breakfast Discussion between the Secretary of State for Defence and Dr. Henry Kissinger on Thursday, 13th November 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301.

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commitment to defend Europe.122 ‘The Europeans could not accept both these lines of argument simultaneously.’123 The Alliance would suffer. The British Minister of Defence finally requested Dr Kissinger’s opinion on a European Nuclear Force (ENF) – a hard ware solution of a kind. The response of the US National Security Advisor deserves to be noted: It was not in the US interest that the ‘United States should be the only nuclear power in the Western world.’124 A European force – so Henry Kissinger – would have to take the character of an Anglo-French trusteeship since a direct German involvement would be barred due to the NPT. The Administration would not push such a development but would ‘certainly listen to any proposals of this kind.’125 Healey then laid out HMG position: the formation of a ENF was feasible only after a return of France to NATO and after further progress in the NPG on nuclear decision-making. The ‘formation of a European nuclear component within NATO’ thus would have to be postponed ‘until the middle or late 1970s.’126 The US should not block the formation of a ENF in case France returned into the NATO fold. The conversation ended with a renewed plea of the UK to keep them informed about the SALT process – since the domestic ‘quarrel’ between the US Chiefs-of Staff and ACDA on MIRV, ABM and quantitative and qualitative limitations per se made it difficult to discern the US Government’s negotiating position. The UK should be in a position to support the US publicly and ‘with a clear conscience’. Kissinger agreed and offered a ‘back channel’ via ‘Hal’ Sonnenfeldt who would be able to advise HMG on the one position that mattered: the White House position on arms control.127 Lord Alun Chalfont took a firm line on SALT in his address to the First Committee, UN. Chalfont expressed European expectations from a different perspective. Chalfont stressed the importance of SALT for global security. SALT had global repercussions thus was in the interest of all – not just the superpowers. According to Lord Chalfont SALT and the NPT were bound together. Lord Chalfont’s speech draft even contained a passage that stipulated clearly that the NNWS ‘cannot be expected to bind themselves indefinitely to a self-denying ordinance’ in case the NWS did not deliver on their Art VI obligation to work ‘in good faith’ towards general disarmament. The passage was erased since it would possibly encourage the view that a breakdown of SALT would mean the end of the NPT

122 Alain C. Enthoven, ‘U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?’, Foreign Affairs 53 (1974–1975), 513–532. 123 Record of Breakfast Discussion between the Secretary of State for Defence and Dr. Henry Kissinger on Thursday, 13th November 1969, TNA FCO 46/301. 124 Ibid 125 Ibid 126 Ibid 127 Ibid; J.A. Thomson, SALT, 1 Dec 1969, TNA, CAB 168/277.

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regime. This was not intended. The superpowers, however, had to be totally alert of the fact that any disregard of global and regional interest would lead to a breakdown of both: the Alliance system and the global non-proliferation system.128

128 R.A. Sykes, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 17 Nov 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301.

5. ‘PRELIMINARY TALKS’ AND THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS The NATO Council Meeting of 14 November dealt with the growing European concerns about the implications of the SALT process for European security. The US recalled President Nixon’s statement of April 1969 that ‘we in America continue to consider Europe’s security as our own.’129 The ensuing ‘preliminary talks’ were to serve the US to discuss strategic options in order to elicit Soviet views on arms control. Furthermore, it is necessary to recall that SALT was restricted ‘to an effort to limit only the strategic forces of the US and the USSR.’ Soviet IR/MRBM forces were deemed strategic weapons and would be included. ‘Tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons of other nations are not included.’130 The Statement ended by stressing President Nixon’s aim to develop SALT as a ‘truly shared endeavor’ thus at any stage of the negotiations and in any case ‘directly affecting the interests of the NATO nations’ there would be ‘full and genuine consultation’.131 The Brussels NATO Ministerial Council of 3–5 December 1969 offered few insights into the preliminary SALT negotiations that had started on 17 November in Helsinki.132 The Allies, however, were given a first real opportunity to air concerns and to outline European interests. The major task of NATO was to assure that SALT would serve US, European and global security interests. Connected herewith was the task to study both the interface between arms control and defense and between strategic arms and tactical nuclear weapons in order to evaluate the impact of the SALT process on NATO strategy and the credibility of the ‘Western’ deterrent.133 The British arrived well prepared. The SALT Speaking Notes for the NATO Council Meeting reflected the Second Report of the ‘SALT Committee’ of the Cabinet Office. The notes focused on ABM and ‘sufficiency’. ABM defense shields were destabilizing European security: (1) they invalidate the European nuclear forces penetration capability; (2) they break the escalation ladder. Thus the Alliance could not easily escalate a European conflict into the strategic level. The consequence: a lacking deterrent power due to a missing escalatory threat. The outcome: an enhanced danger of limited European theatre wars. The second key point deserves equal attention: parity or ‘sufficiency’ would leave Eu-

129 Extract from United States Statement to the NAC on 14th November 1969, TNA, CAB 130/440; US Presentation to the NAC, 14 Nov 1969, TNA FCO 46/590. 130 Extract from United States Statement to the NAC on 14th November 1969, TNA, CAB 130/440. 131 Ibid 132 W.B.J. Ledwidge, SALT, 3 Dec 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301. 133 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, 3–5 December 1969, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 3 Dec 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301.

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rope virtually undefended. The ‘central systems’ would be limited according to the principle of a numerical or strategic parity. They thus will cancel each other out. The likely end result: an overall strategic imbalance or asymmetry. Imbalances among the non-regulated systems would now dominate. Threats would shift. The Soviet IR/MRBMs – i.e. the strategic weapon system that exclusively threatens Europe – would remain an ‘uncovered’ target since the US would not be able to cover all strategic systems that threaten the West but only those central systems that threaten the US. Thus security of the superpowers was purchased with insecurity for the Allies. Those ‘uncovered’ Soviet IR/MRBM forces threatening Europe thus had to be targeted by SACEUR’s European strike forces, i.e. nuclear forces assigned to NATO. Such a targeting would allow NATO to pursue a ‘damage limiting’ counter force strike in the case of an escalation to the strategic level. The SALT process might complicate matters. SALT might lead to a reduction of the nuclear forces assigned to NATO. This would finally undermine SACEUR’s Scheduled Strike Program (SSP), Europe’s counter-force capability and thus Europe’s security. As a consequence Europe’s deterrent power would wane and its damage limitation capability suffer. Europe’s triggering power would vanish. In case the ‘strategic armor’ of SACEUR would not be used in a counter force strike mode – as supported by the Continent – but as a theatre nuclear support in earlier stages of the conflict – as supported by the UK – a reduction of SACEUR’s nuclear armor might not undermine Europe’s capability to fight a theatre nuclear war. Europe, however, would have lost her ability to escalate the conflict to the strategic level. Furthermore, the deterrent value of SACEUR’s armor would wane. The US for their part might never escalate to the strategic level. There was a real possibility that a SALT agreement between the superpowers ‘was linked secretly to an agreement not to use nuclear weapons against each other’s territory first’. Such a superpower agreement would codify the creation of sanctuaries and thus automatically destroy the ladder of escalation of NATO’s flexible response strategy. The consequence: an unprotected Europe – without a US nuclear umbrella. In case the US would in addition plead for a high threshold for the first use of tactical nuclear weapons and reduce US forces in the European theatre – and thus damage NATO’s tactical nuclear defense – Europe would have been sacrificed.134 In case such a scenario was discernible during the SALT process Europe had to act to forestall an eternal ‘neutralization’ and discrimination. Denis Healey had indicated how Europe would re-act: a ENF was the answer.

134 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, 3–5 December 1969, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 3 Dec 1969, TNA, FCO 46/301; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: Second Report by the Working Party. The United Kingdom Approach to Further Consultations with the United States and in the NAC, December 1969, TNA FCO 46/302; Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. Draft Second Report by Working Party. Note by the Chairman of the Sub-Group, 31 Dec 1969, TNA FCO 46/302; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Second Report of the Working Party, 8 Jan 1970, TNA, CAB 130/440.

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The US Report to the North Atlantic Council on the ‘preliminary talks’ – the latter had terminated before Christmas – finally provided NATO Europe with the sought for information. The scope of the negotiations now emerged. The negotiating positions of both superpowers crystallized. The definition of ‘strategic weapons’ had dominated the ‘preliminary talks’. The SU defined ‘strategic weapons’ differently from the ‘West’.135 For the SU a ‘strategic weapon’ was any nuclear weapon that would be able to strike the homeland of the superpowers. ‘Strategic weapons’ thus would comprise strategic and lighter bombers ‘which by virtue of their deployment could perform strategic missions against the US or the USSR.’136 The definition raised the question of FBS in contrast to ‘home based systems’. FBS, i.e. US systems stationed in Western Europe or Japan and South Korea were able to strike the Soviet Union. The SU therefore demanded to define FBS as strategic systems. The latter point had been first raised by Vladimir Semenov – the head of the Soviet SALT delegation – on 26 November 1969.137 The SU by contrast exempted IR/MRBMs from their definition of strategic weapons due to the range limitation of Medium Range Systems. An IR/MRBM is not capable to strike US territory – just the US glacis in NATO Europe. Under the Soviet definition of strategic weapons – so Henry Kissinger – ‘their IRBM are not considered […]. This gives them an overwhelming advantage vis-à-vis Europe.’138 The Soviet definition of the scope of the negotiations shifted the question of European security center stage.139 Positive for Western Europe was that the SU did not to include ‘third’ party nuclear forces. The SU, furthermore, preferred a ‘light’ ABM shield to be able to cope with a ‘third country’ threat or ‘accidental usage’. This was a step into the right direction. Both parties agreed furthermore that the regulation of defensive weaponry had to be linked to a regulation on offensive weaponry. Any future agreement thus would be built around an offensive – defensive linkage which was deemed necessary to maintain a strategic balance. But ‘equal security’ – so the Soviet Union – demanded more than quantitative and qualitative restrictions namely geographical restrictions. The Soviet delegation thus widened the concept of protection against ‘third party strikes’ and ‘accidental usage’ to include ‘geographical limitations’.140 Thus nuclear aircraft and submarines in front positions should be withdrawn or limited in order to forestall accidental emergencies in patrol areas. Furthermore, in peace time strategic bomber

135 UK Delegation to FCO, Telegram 47, 29 Jan 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769. 136 US Progress Report to the NAC, [undated], TNA, FCO 46/590. 137 Smith, Double Talk, 90; Id, Disarming Diplomat, 162; Stephen M. Millett. ‘Forward-Based Nuclear Weapons and SALT I’, Political Science Quarterly, 98,1 (1983), 79–97, 81. 138 NSC Meeting Attended by British PM Harold Wilson, FM Michael Stewart and Ambassador John Freeman, 28 Jan 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 50. 139 Ibid 140 Philip J. Farley, ‘Strategic Arms Control, 1967–1987’, in Alexander L. George/Philip Farley/Alexander Dallin (eds), U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: OUP, 1988, 214–253.

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should be limited to flights over their national territories thus banned from Allied territory. The Soviet concept of ‘geographical limitations’ would directly impact on the US 6th Carrier fleet and on the UK Polaris force – both earmarked for NATO.141 Thus the US had rejected both: (1) the Soviet interpretation of ‘strategic weapon’ and (2) the principle of geographical limitations. But a further problem for NATO emerged out of the Soviet position on SALT. Moscow insisted on a prohibition of ‘substantial transfers’ to Allies to forestall a circumvention of a limitation of strategic weapons. The latter stipulation was meant to complement the nuclear nontransfer restrictions of the NPT. The non-transfer regime of the NPT on nuclear weapons thus would be extended from nuclear warheads to nuclear delivery systems such as missile systems and submarines. The latter Soviet initiative had clear repercussions for European security, as well. The Nixon Administration had rejected the Soviet idea of a transfer ban out of hand in order to protect the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements legalized by the interpretations to the NPT. The US also fiercely resisted any geographical factors. The question of the scope of SALT, the question of an inclusion of FBS under the definition of strategic weapons, however, stayed on the agenda. The Soviet negotiating position, that emerged from the preliminary talks, threatened (1) the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, (2) the emergence of a ENF, (3) the possibility of a European ABM system, and last but not least (4) NATO’s flexible response strategy that depended on US FBS.142 The ‘preliminary talks’ thus allayed few European fears – most fears remained, some were even enhanced. The definition of ‘strategic weapon’ threatened to involve SACEUR’s nuclear armor. The reported US position, however, was reassuring. But clarifications were needed. The UK instantly sought clarifications for the terms ‘strategic aircraft’, ‘third country’ and ‘transfer’. They all had to be clearly defined. Whitehall furthermore requested information about a possible ‘non-circumvention clause’ as debated by the superpowers. Finally, Whitehall inquired about the impact of SALT on (1) the Anglo-American Polaris agreement and (2) the F-4 ‘Phantom’ acquisition in light of a possible non-transfer clause.143 Europe and the UK had to stay alert. US strategic priorities became discernible after the preliminary talks, but questions remained. The US showed major interest to maintain the invulnerability of the strategic tripod. Secretary of Defense Laird even supported an independent second strike capability of any of the three pillars. Thus the US was to replace the Minutemen I & II with the Minuteman III and the Polaris with the Poseidon system. Both successor systems would have MIRV capability. The problem for the negotiations was the approach: should the US seek symmetrical or asymmetrical arms limitation, i.e. an approach of tradeoffs under a certain ceiling. The scope was the second major question: was a lim141 UK Del to FCO, Telegram 47, 29 Jan 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769. 142 US Progress Report to the NAC, [undated], TNA, FCO 46/590. 143 Rose to FCO, 6 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/590.

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ited agreement, verifiable by national means only, preferable to a broad or comprehensive agreement with on-site inspections? Finally, should quantitative or qualitative aspects dominate?144 MIRV and ABM could undermine ‘mutual assured destruction’ by offering one of the parties a first strike capability. A MIRV ban was difficult since MIRVing of delivery systems cannot be verified. MIRV testing could be verified, however. But it was to be assumed that the SU would not accept a MIRV test ban since the US had already a fully-tested MIRV system. The negotiations thus were likely to allow MIRV technology. ABM limitation seemed to be more promising. The SU had shown a respect for ‘Safeguard’ and thus an interest in limiting the US Ballistic Missile Defense capability.145 The focus of the superpowers would be on the dynamic systems. These general strategic considerations, however, were less important for Europe than (1) the definition of ‘strategic weapons’, (2) the MRBM & FBS regulation; (3) the raised but rejected geographical limitations question; (4) the non-transfer clause idea, and (5) the concept of a non-circumvention clause since all of them had a clear and direct bearing on Europe’s position in the world. Foreign Minister Michael Stewart thus advised PM Harold Wilson to heed the advice of the UK SALT Committee and to focus on harmonizing the AngloGerman position on SALT. ‘Unless the Germans and ourselves are seeing eye-toeye on SALT […] we cannot develop the common European view.’146 AngloGerman consultations followed suit. On 19 January Fritz Menne – the Head of the Disarmament Section of the German Foreign Ministry – consulted with the Foreign Office. The FRG feared that the SALT process might turn out to be similar to the NPT experience. There would be little open consultation and little common decision-making. The US just would merely inform the Allies. Menne highlighted that the FRG expects a ‘step-by-step’ approach of the superpowers to strategic arms control. It was to be expected that a limited agreement would emerge which would serve as a platform for a more comprehensive approach.147 The current agenda was too wide to make any progress.148 The Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense gathered on 21 January to further review the US Helsinki Report on the SALT ‘preparatory talks’ in preparation of the agenda for the upcoming US-UK Summit talks in Washington on 26–28 January 1970. HMG expected that the summit would not enhance HMG knowledge about the negotiations themselves. ‘Hal’ Sonnenfeldt had warned the British Alli144 Cabinet, International Aspects of Defence Policy. SALT: Second Report of the Working Party, 8 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/590. 145 Memo from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 23 Dec 1969, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 108; Midley to FCO, Telegram No 134, Meeting with Mr. Sonnenfeld, 15 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/590; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Second Report of the Working Party, 8 Jan 1970, TNA, CAB 130/440. 146 M. Stewart to the Prime Minister, SALT: Proposed Anglo-German Cooperation, 25 Jan 1970, TNA, [FCO 46/590]. 147 O’Neill, SALT, 19 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/590. 148 O’Neill to Chamier, 23 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/591.

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ance partner that President Nixon might not be briefed on the SALT negotiations and thus would not be able to engage into detailed debates on the Helsinki Report. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and Denis Healey finally agreed not to ‘engage the President into detailed discussion’149 but to enlist the President’s continued support for bilateral discussion on SALT.150 As expected the Anglo-American Summit offered little on SALT. Thus a European position on SALT had to emerge. The UK exempted one topic from the European deliberations: Anglo-American nuclear relations and any questions affecting the British deterrent – only. These topics were to be dealt with in the exclusive Anglo-American format. The latest Anglo-German Politico-Military Talks held on 10 February focused on ‘assured destruction’ or ‘assured survivability’. The Germans proposed a strategy debate as a platform for rational decisionmaking. The UK was unwilling to embrace the project due to its repercussions on NATO.151 Strategy was a matter for the NATO framework. The main European interest – according to the British Government – was to forestall ‘homeland protection’ of the superpowers. Homeland protection would mean a decoupling of the strategic nuclear level of conflict from lower levels of conflict with adverse consequences for European security. The British Study ‘SALT: Aspects of European Security’ even highlighted that ‘strategic arms control could either increase European security and reduce global security or vice versa but could not increase both.’152 A superpower agreement in all likelihood would destroy the US umbrella for Europe and makes ‘limited war’ more likely. The Europeans were left without a choice: Europe had to work for a general SALT agreement that banned both ABM and MIRV. This would guarantee ‘mutually assured destruction’ and the survivability of the European deterrent forces. The worst outcome: ‘Assured survivability’. The latter was de-stabilizing to the extreme – it created ‘first strike options’ and destroyed Europe’s deterrent. The NAC Council Meeting of 18 February 1970 started the preparatory cycle for the Vienna SALT Talks scheduled for 16 April 1970. The US indicated that the ideal European solution of an inclusion of MRBM in a limiting agreement and exclusion of FBS would not be obtainable. The SU would continue to argue that MRBM pose no threat to the US but were an essential part of the SU’s defense against ‘third parties’ which included both Europe and China.153 The choice thus was limited to including both or excluding both. The UK considered it indispen149 PM Visit to Washington, Background, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 Jan 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769. 150 Chamier ‘SALT’, 20 Jan 1970, TNA, FCO 46/590; PM Visit to Washington, Background, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 Jan 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769; Minutes of the Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, Wednesday 21st January 1970, TNA, PREM 11/1165. 151 SALT: Anglo-German Talks. Defence Policy Department, FCO, 6 Feb 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769. 152 SALT: Aspects of European Interests. The General European Interest in Strategic Arms Limitation, 10 Feb 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769 or FCO 46/591. 153 Special National Intelligence Estimate, 19 Feb 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 53.

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sable to maintain the dual-key arrangements within the Alliance thus an exclusion of both FBS and MRBM was possibly the better solution.154 An inclusion of US FBS might automatically radiate to include the US dual-key arrangements.155 The political and military effect would be extremely damaging for the Alliance. Gerard Smith kept a low profile during the NAC session. He indicated that the US had not decided on a firm negotiating position and was willing to consider European suggestions. NATO’s Secretary-General Manlio Brosio supported the official US stance – either there should be both FBS and MRBM included or both excluded. Denis Healey stressed the need to seek equal security for all. The latter referred to the Soviet negotiating position that sought equal security for both sides. Here it was applied also to the two entities that formed the ‘West’.156 ‘Exclusion of the MRBM might be [considered] by some Europeans as vaguely symptomatic of a narrow bilateral approach in the strategic balance, decoupled from the collective interests of the Alliance as a whole.’157

The NAC consensus broke with the suggested symmetry: the US had to remain firm on the MRBM. NATO had to consider possible side-payments to obtain an inclusion of the MRBM and exclusion of FBS. Having decided on the scope of SALT the debate shifted to the non-transfer question. The Belgian representative André de Staerke highlighted that NNWS who had signed the NPT ‘had a right to expect protection.’ This had been a sine qua non condition for the NNWS to accept the NPT. Europe had a withdrawal right from the NPT in case NATO’s protective shield disintegrated. Thus any non-transfer clause which hindered the modernization of NATO’s deterrent forces was not permissible.158 The US tried to allay the concerns of the Europeans. The US expected that the non-transfer of strategic systems or technical information to Allies would not be discussed in Vienna. The US had objected to non-transfer as an agenda item for the Vienna Round of the SAL negotiations. The US would firmly reject any non-transfer formula. The SU, however, might raise the issue again under a new heading. The SU rejected also the deployment of strategic systems on Allied territory.159 The non-transfer issue did not only affect the classic NATO nuclear sharing arrangements on the Continent but also the Anglo-American special relationship.

154 SALT: NATO Meeting on 18 Feb 1970. Brief for UK Permanent Representative, 18 Feb 1970, FCO 46/592. 155 SALT: NATO Meeting on 18 February, Background Brief, 18 Feb 1970, TNA, FCO, 46/592. 156 B. Burrows to FCO, Telegram 104, TNA, FCO 46/592; Special National Intelligence Estimate, 19 Feb 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 137. 157 The Relationship Between the Problems of Parity/Superiority/Sufficiency and US Aims in SALT and the Defence of Western Europe. Soviet IR/MRBM and US Nuclear Delivery Systems in the European Theatre, 2 Mar 1970, TNA, FCO 46/593. 158 B. Burrows to FCO, Tel No 104, TNA, FCO 46/592; Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 18 Feb 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 67. 159 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 18 Feb 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 66; Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 18 Feb 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 67 (Fortsetzung).

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The UK had decided not to discuss this issue in the wider NATO circle due to security constraints. HMG, however, needed a final reassurance by the US. This had already been a core aim of the Anglo-American Summit of 26–28 January 1970. Gerard Smith paraphrased the outcome of the summit in one sentence: ‘one of the points of most interest for the United Kingdom was the non-transfer proposal. The US, however, does not foresee that the Soviet non-transfer proposal will impact on the Amendment to the 1958 Anglo-American Bilateral Defense Arrangement currently under debate in Congress. The Mildenhall Agreement will not be negatively affected either.’160

The Mildenhall route of secret Anglo-American consultations promised a solution of the outstanding issues and problems. A MIRV flight test ban and the transfer ban might have repercussions on Polaris improvement testing. The UK depended on assistance to improve offensive weapons in order to enhance the penetration capability of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent. This issue was especially important in case an ABM protective shield would emerge. Thus the UK expected an official confirmation from the White House of the assurance secured from the US Embassy in London to the effect that the supply and support of the Polaris system was guaranteed.161 The Anglo-American consultations of 5 March focused not on the transfer question alone but on the wider picture, namely on possible implications of SALT for the UK deterrent, European security and any of the specific problems listed above. Both parties agreed that it was first and foremost of utmost importance that the SALT process should not break down. Thus topics that cannot be solved due to its technical or disputed nature should be temporarily exempted. A focus on a light agreement or a step-by-step approach – as discussed in the Anglo-German talks – were the avenue to be taken to forestall a deadlock. Thus the ‘AngloSaxons’ suggested that the MRBM problem might be tackled at a later stage, namely after an agreement on ICBM and ABM.162 The Anglo-American suggestion to limit the scale of the negotiations to key building blocks was not without influence. ACDA Director Smith outlined in a letter to President Nixon of 23 March 1970 that two possible avenues could be taken for the resumption of the negotiations on 16 April: (1) a rather simple quantitative agreement ‘freezing’ numbers on their current level or (2) a comprehensive arrangement including MIRV ban and qualitative limitations. Smith suggested starting out with a comprehensive approach since it was always possible to scale down. It might be

160 Extract from the Record of a Conversation Between the Foreign Secretary and the US Secretary of State, 27 Jan 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/769. 161 Background Brief on Agenda Items. UK/US Bilateral on 5 March 1970, 2 Mar 1970, TNA, FCO 46/593; Cabinet: International Aspects of Nuclear Policy. Briefs for UK/US Bilateral Discussions, Washington 5th March, 1970, TNA, FCO 46/593; see as well: John R. Walker, Britain and Disarmament. The United Kingdom and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. Arms Control and Programmes 1956–1975, Farnham: Ashton, 206–215. 162 Record of the Meeting held at ACDA on 5 Mar 1970, TNA, FCO 46/593.

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even advisable to aim at a temporary measure of an experimental nature.163 Paul Nitze suggested a third option, namely a reduction approach, in order to cope with the only important question: the Soviet SS-9 threat. MIRV should be taken entirely off the agenda.164 The US negotiating position emerged with the NSC Meeting of 8 April 1970 and the National Security Decision Memorandum 51 of 10 April 1970.165 Henry Kissinger instructed the delegation of how to use the agreed upon ‘SALT Options’ in Vienna. The US delegation was not authorized to discuss individual provisions of the options. Provisions could be discussed only in conjunction with ALL provisions of the respective option. The delegation must seek instructions from Washington to go beyond any option.166 The US had worked out following SALT options: Option A: The ‘Limited Agreement’ was considering an aggregate total of ICBM and SLBM of 1710. The SU had currently around 1560 strategic weapons and an ongoing construction program which might lead to an overall total of 2000 by mid-1970s. The aggregate total should allow the SU to construct up to the current US level of strategic weapons. One particular restriction applied – a SS-9 limit of 250 was foreseen in order to forestall a first strike capability of the Soviet Union. A limitation of ABM shields was envisaged with 1000 ABM launchers each. MIRV would not be limited. Furthermore prohibitions applied: there should be no mobile land based ICBM or IRBM and there should be a freeze for IRBM silos and strategic bombers. This option like any of the following options was worked out with the explicit understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of an agreement thru third parties.167 The devised ‘Comprehensive Agreements’ – Options B and C – differed from Option A mainly in relation to the ABM and MIRV stipulations. Two versions were worked out: Option B foresaw no MIRV limitation, Option C a MIRV prohibition. In both cases two ABM options could be chosen: (1) an ABM ban which entailed the destruction of the existing Soviet Galosh and the US Safeguard sites or (2) an ABM limitation to the National Command Authority. Option D – the ‘Reduction Model’ – was worked out on behalf of Paul Nitze as mentioned previously. The reduction model foresaw a reduction of the initial ceiling of 1700 by 100 launchers per anno for seven years. The ceiling thus would reach 1000 in the year 1978. The reduction model could be connected with the two ABM models – namely a ‘zero ABM’ solution or an ABM site to protect the National Command Authority only. New was the gradual disengagement from the ‘Safeguard’ ABM 163 Letter from the Director of ACDA to President Nixon, 23 Mar 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 57. 164 Minutes of NSC Meeting, 25 Mar 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 59; Michael Paul, Abrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle. Amerikanische Reduzierungskonzepte in SALT und START, 1969–1989, Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 1990, 85ff. 165 Kissinger, 578. 166 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 51, 10 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 68. 167 Ibid

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concept which had been introduced by the Nixon Administration to protect the US deterrent.168 Only Option A was broadly in line with the protection of Minuteman III sites and thus the concept of the defense of the deterrent force. Gerard Smith discussed the Options with President Nixon on 11 April. Smith highlighted that Option D would pose problems to the Europeans – it envisaged reductions except in one field: IR/MRBM. The President did not concur – thus all Options had to be considered.169 The US presented her ‘model’ concept to the NATO Council on 14 April 1970. Already on the 7 April the US had told the Allies that the US would reject (1) geographical limitations and the discussion of patrol areas for the Polaris submarines or strategic bombers; (2) would refuse the inclusion of FBS in the aggregate total and (3) reject a general non-transfer clause.170 The US presentation clearly indicated an embrace by the Nixon Administration of Option C of the SALT Options discussed above, i.e. a Comprehensive approach with ABM limitation and MIRV prohibition.171 The concept – as presented – was well received by the NATO Allies. It reflected European interests. The presentation of the US ‘models’ to the Soviet SALT Delegation at Vienna followed on 16–17 April 1970. A first ‘scandal’ emerged. Secretary of Defense Laird was shocked about the approach of the head of the US SALT delegation: Gerard Smith. Laird had received information via the Pentagon representative in the SALT delegation that Smith had omitted to present Option D to the Soviets.172 It was part of the ‘Kabuki-Spiel’ Kissinger highlighted in his memoirs – the prioritization of different approaches by the different US agencies.173 Gerard Smith favored Option C which had dominated the NATO presentation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon favored Option A. David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Paul Nitze supported Option D. The National Security Advisor considered Option B, i.e. a freeze of offensive weapons and a ‘light’ ABM the most realistic and promising avenue.174 Kissinger had advised President Nixon to present Options C and D and to embrace Option B as a fallback position since the SU would surely object the more far-reaching proposals. President Nixon had approved this approach on April 10. According to Kissinger the US delegation first tabled Option C later on also Option D. Gerard Smith thus had adopted a phased approach at Vienna

168 Ibid, No 68; Kissinger, 578; Garthoff, Journey, 257ff; Paul, 88 – see also David Callaghan, Dangerous Capabilities. Paul Nitze and the Cold War, New York: Edward Burlingame Book 1990, 341 whose account differs from the accounts offered by Kissinger, Garthoff and Paul. 169 Memo of Conversation. Meeting SALT Delegation With President, 11 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 69. 170 Staatssekretär Duckwitz and die Botschaft in Washington, 8 Apr 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 150. 171 Memo from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, 15 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 255; Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, 16 Apr 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 159. 172 Memo from Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Laird, 18 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 71. 173 Kissinger, 579. 174 Ibid, 580.

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that later embraced the ‘missing’ Option ‘D’.175 The SU responded instantly. Henry Kissinger recorded on 23 April the first Soviet reactions to the US negotiating position. Semenov favored a ‘broad approach’: the ‘aggregate total’ of strategic weapons should be composed of ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers. The latter had not been part of the US aggregate total. The SU furthermore insisted on a total freedom to mix and thus objected to sub-limits such as a special limit for ‘heavy’ ICBMs. The Soviet delegation embraced the concept of a ‘light’ ABM system since the Soviet ABM systems were already in their initial stages of deployment. A limitation to the NCA was feasible due to the geographic focus of the Soviet ABM defense structure on Moscow. Finally, Moscow embraced a MIRV production prohibition – R&D and testing, however, should remain possible for both negotiating parties. Qualitative restrictions were not foreseen. Finally, the negotiating partners had to retain total freedom to modernize and replace existing strategic nuclear weapons. One major disagreement persisted. The SU demanded that FBS should be counted against the aggregate total or alternatively moved from the forward into a backward position – a position from where the systems could not reach the Soviet Union.176 The Soviet response was in line with what the National Security Advisor had expected. Henry Kissinger had learned the Soviet key interests in his talks with the Soviet Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin prior to April 16.177 The avenue to pursue Option B, Henry Kissinger’s fallback position, seemed promising in case the FBS question could be settled. But, none of the alternatives proofed negotiable for the Soviet Union. Vladimir S. Semenov demanded that both delegations should ‘move away from their package proposals’ and proceed by categories – since an agreement on all categories or an agreement on an entire package was impossible. The platform for all further negotiations should be the definition of ‘strategic weapons’. The Soviet preference had consequences: the question of an in- or exclusion of FBS moved yet again center stage. A regulation for FB aircraft and IR/MRBM had to be found. The President of the California Institute of Technology (CIT) Harold Brown, a member of the US SALT Delegation, summed up the positions nicely in a letter to Henry Kissinger: ‘[…] we want the first unlimited, the second limited. They want the reverse. Possible acceptable outcomes: both excluded from the agreement; both limited to present numbers.’178

175 Ibid, 581f; Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 14 Jul 1970, TNA, PREM 15/289. 176 Memo from the President’s Assistant for NSA Kissinger to President Nixon. The Soviet SALT Proposal at Vienna, 23 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 72; Kissinger, 582; Botschafter Grewe, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, AAPD 1970, Nr. 217; Mr. Freeman to FCO, Telegram 1952, 26 Jun 1970, TNA, PREM 15/289; Negotiating Positions, Part II: Negotiating Positions and Possible Form of Agreements [undated], TNA, DEFE 24/770. 177 Kissinger, 581. 178 Letter from President of CIT Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, 20 May 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 78.

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The problem – the decision affected NATO. The US thus had to consult her Allies – yet again. A difficult intra-Alliance question thus arose for the US that urgentlydemanded settlement.

6. A LIMITED FIRST AGREEMENT In 1969 the FRG had decided on six ‘guiding principles’ for the SALT negotiations; (1) the preservation of deterrence; (2) preservation of the Alliance defense strategy; (3) indivisibility of American and European security; (4) rejection of the Soviet definition of strategic weapons; (5) no transfer prohibitions, and (6) no impact or changes of Alliance structures and procedures.179 This was the yardstick any superpower draft or US proposal was measured against by the Europeans. The definition of strategic weapons was one of the yardsticks. Where FBS and MRBM to be included? The Europeans preferred in descending order: (1) a reduction of MRBM without a quid pro quo on FBS; (2) a freeze of MRBM without a quid pro quo on FBS; (3) the unregulated status quo; (4) a freeze on MRBM and a freeze on FBS and (5) a reduction of MRBM and a reduction of FBS. The British – but also the President of CIT Harold Brown – deemed the unregulated status quo as the best option for both sides, i.e. an exclusion of non-central systems from the category of strategic systems.180 The UK left no doubt that FBS were to remain unregulated. ‘NATO’s theatre nuclear forces are inextricably linked with NATO strategy for the air/land battle in Europe and their inclusion in SALT would inevitably raise a number of wider [political] questions.’181

This link had been clearly underlined by the effort of the Venice Ministerial NPG Meeting of 8–9 June 1970 to work out a ‘General Strike Plan’ to replace the SACEUR’s Scheduled Program.182 The SU soon realized that the envisaged inclusion of the FBS would have a too strong bearing on the Euro–Atlantic balance. Semenov proposed to drop the inclusion of FBS – thus easing the US intra-Alliance position – in case the SU would be compensated thru a higher aggregate number of central systems.183 The US was neither able nor willing to accept the new Soviet position or to engage into a conflict with the NATO partners. The same verdict holds true also for the negotiation packages. It was clear that none of the four US Options presented so far were negotiable. The delegations thus started to devise the so-called ‘Vienna Option’. The ‘Vienna Option’ called for an initial agreement on ABM and ‘central systems’ only. IR/MRBM or CM limitation was to be deferred as the regulation of

179 Aufzeichnung des Botschafter’s Roth, 15 May 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 209. 180 W.F. Mumford, SALT: IR/MRBM, 26 May 1970, TNA, FCO 46/595. 181 Mumford to Tesh, SALT: IR/MRBM – Note by UK Official, 4 Jun 1970 revised, TNA, FCO 46/595. 182 Botschafter Grewe, Brüssel (NATO) an das AA, 10 Jun 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 260. 183 Memo from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, 6 Jun 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 80.

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FBS.184 The ‘Vienna Option’ formed the basis of a US modified approach that after long negotiations was tabled on 4 August 1970. The US modified approach dates back to deliberations between Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. Kissinger proposed to Dobrynin a freeze agreement on offensive systems and a ’light’ ABM agreement to protect the NCA. The two-tier proposal was not considered ‘limited’ enough by Ambassador Dobrynin. ‘Limited’ would be an ABM only approach, i.e. an ABM treaty without an agreement on offensive arms limitations.185 On 7 July Kissinger assured Ambassador Dobrynin that he would discuss the option of an ABM only agreement with the President. Dobrynin welcomed this information and assured the US National Security Advisor that a treaty ‘limited’ to defensive weapons could be signed in summer.186 President Nixon, however, objected – after careful study: ‘it was not permissible to separate the components of the SALT agreements. It was necessary to have a limitation of offensive weapons together with a limitation of ABMs.’187 Kissinger and Dobrynin thus started to consider Kissinger’s ‘limited’ agreement proposal – a proposal that excluded MRBM and FBS from an offensive weapons limitation agreement. The focus would be entirely on central systems. Dobrynin was well disposed and indicated that such an approach would not pose ‘insuperable difficulties.’188 The original approach, the comprehensive agreement, was a matter of the past. The US packages were now downscaled to a limited offensive-defensive agreement. The US Secretary of State informed the British PM on 12 July about the new step-by-step approach. The first agreement would focus on the central systems only. It foresaw a ceiling of 1900 offensive strategic weapons including strategic bombers. This was in line with the Soviet proposal. The old limit of 1710 offensive strategic weapons was to be maintained for ICBM and SLBM. Furthermore, a sub-ceiling of 250 ‘heavy’ ICBM was part of the ‘package’. No new hardened IR/MRBM silos would be allowed. The number of IR/MRBM would remain unrestricted. The same held true for FBS and CM. The silo clause was a protection to forestall the misuse of MRBM silos for ICBM. ABM would be limited to 100 to protect the NCA. The zero ABM option had been dropped. MIRVs were to remain unrestricted. Reductions – as envisaged in former Option D – were finally discarded. The Soviet principle of complete freedom to mix was adopted by the US. The US hoped that the limited approach would appeal to Europe – the low ABM limit would surely keep the European deterrent effective.189 The Spe184 Smith, Doubletalk, 146. 185 Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 10 Jun 1970, Memo of Conversation DobryninKissinger, 23 Jun 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, Nos 168, 171; see also: Elmor R. Zumwalt, Jr, On Watch, New York: Quadrangle. New York Times Book 1976, 351. 186 Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 9 Jul 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XII, No 179. 187 Ibid; Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 9 Jul 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 93. 188 Ibid 189 NSDM 69, 9 Jul 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 94; Record of the Prime Minister’s Talks with William Rogers, the United States Secretary of State, on Sunday 12 July 1970 at

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cial NATO Council Session of 13 July 1970 was a turning point in the SALT process. Using the words of the Dutch NATO Ambassador Hendrik Boon the US tested if the Allies would ‘be prepared to accept a limited agreement’ instead of the comprehensive agreement as negotiated so far. NATO now had to consider whether a limited agreement ‘took care of the security requirements of the Alliance.’190 There were indications that the new limited or modified US approach would leave Europe in an unfavorable position – particularly since MRBM were to be excluded from a limiting agreement. The Federal German NATO Ambassador Grewe raised the necessary question: how did the US envisage providing for European security, if the Soviet MRBM force would remain unrestricted. Western Europe’s NNWS depended on the US security umbrella. The given answer was convincing: the US did not envisage to limit MIRVs. The US warhead superiority would allow the US to target both Soviet ICBM and Soviet MRBM simultaneously.191 The long-term prospect for sure was less promising since the SU might have MIRVed strategic forces in four to five years’ time. The US Secretary of Defense Laird considered that the US had a four year advantage over the SU in MIRV technology. The US was totally aware of the fact that strategic parity would increase in theory ‘the dangers of sub-strategic conflict.’192 The reception by the Allied Governments thus was still questionable since the new proposal created in the long term parity among the superpowers while it preserved an imbalance on the substrategic level. Yet again – the ‘light’ ABM agreement at least should be well received: it gave the force de frappe and the UK deterrent forces a new lease of live. The circumstances might foster a renewed interest in forming an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship for Europe. But as things stood it was uncertain whether the US would be able to support a ENF project actively since the SU would ‘construe any American role in an Anglo-French force […] as violating the SALT treaty.’193 The Allied response to the US new proposal rolled in during the NATO Council meeting of 16 July 1970. The UK and the FRG had worked out a common SALT positions. The Anglo-German Staff Talks in Bad Ems of 10 July 1970 had focused on the MRBM question and its implications for European security. The SU – so the Bundeswehr – had 166 nuclear sites with 710 launchers and 1300 missiles. The 280 nuclear AFCENT, UK and French targets in Europe would be covered by the Soviet MRBM two and a half times. The FRG expected that the SU would direct 417 strikes against the 165 strategic targets in the Federal Repub-

190 191 192 193

Chequers, 12 Jul 1970, TNA, FCO 46/596; Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 14 Jul, TNA, PREM 15/289; Botschafter Pauls, Washington, an das AA, 11 Jul 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 304; Mumford to Hudson, 23 Jul 1970. SALT: Background Brief to Ministers, 23 Jul 1970, FCO 46/596. Davidson to the FCO, Tel No 399, 13 Jul 1970, TNA, PREM 15/289. Ibid Memo from the President’s Assistant on National Security Affairs Kissinger to President Nixon, 13 Jul 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 95. Ibid

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lic. The MRBM thus do provide the SU with an unrestricted first strike capability limited to the geographical theatre Europe. The US preserved the option of ‘maximum damage limitation’ in case the US would not be involved in a war limited to the European theatre. In retaliation the SACEUR’s FBS – the Polaris and the 6th Fleet assigned to SACEUR – would only be able to reach the Western part of the Soviet Union. A reduction proposal – that downsized MRBM and FBS – would destroy the retaliatory power of the SACEUR entirely and thus its deterrent value. Even a one-sided reduction of MRBM would in no way impair the first strike capability of the Soviet Union. A freeze proposal for non-central systems might disallow future nuclear sharing arrangements and modernization patterns. The recommendation of the German Armed forces thus was to take the whole issue off the agenda. Thus there was no firm opposition to be expected by the Government of the Federal Republic to a limited agreement as envisaged by the US.194 The Foreign Office totally concurred with the German analysis. The British NATO Delegation was informed that FBS could neither be restricted nor used as a bargaining chip to counter the MRBM threat. FBS had a wide variety of roles to play. Any limitation would limit NATO’s military options and would destroy NATO nuclear sharing arrangements established after a decade of intra-Alliance conflict. HMG supported exclusion – pure and simple – of both FBS and MRBM. The UK NATO delegation was furthermore advised to support a zero ABM option but concede to an NCA only approach. Finally, the UK NATO Delegation should embrace the no restraints approach on MIRV since a flight test ban might undermine Polaris testing on US missile ranges.195 The doyen of the NATO Ambassadors Belgium’s André de Staerke opened the SALT discussion at the NAC of 16 July 1970. He announced that the Belgian Government did not object to a continuation of the Vienna Talks on the basis of the new US negotiation package. Belgium, however, had some major concerns about the approach. The Soviet position left NATO with three options: (1) to accept the inclusion of MRBM and FBS which would undermine NATO’s defense strategy; (2) to insist on the inclusion of MRBM without a quid pro quo which would lead to the abortion of the SALT process or (3) to eliminate both MRBM and FBS from any arms limitation agreement. The exclusion of the MRBM was the best option but would create a psychological problem since the superpowers would limit the systems that target the superpowers while the systems that threatened Europe would not be limited.196 Italian’s Permanent Representative Luigi V. Ferrariis totally concurred with de Staerke analysis. So did the Dutch. Norbart furthermore considered it worthwhile to consider a clause in any preliminary SALT agreement that would bind the parties to continue strategic arms limitation

194 Steiff to Quinlan, Soviet Nuclear Medium Range Capabilities as Compared to Those of NATO, 10 Jul 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/770. 195 FCO to UK Delegation NATO, 15 Jul 1970, TNA, FCO 46/596. SALT: Report to Ministers, 3 Aug 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/770. 196 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 16 Jul 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 312.

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in line with the ART VI NPT obligations. The UK and the FRG concurred with André de Staerke and the views expressed by their European NATO Allies. The elimination of non-central systems from the SALT agenda was the best of the outlined options. The US responded instantly to the fears and suggestions expressed. The SACEUR General Andrew J. Goodpaster suggested a new targeting exercise in conjunction with the SAC in Omaha in order to assure the best target coverage possible. The re-evaluation should take account of the MIRV capacity available to target ICBM and MRBM equally.197 General Royal B. Allison furthermore indicated that the MRBM would be soft targets since the silos would be limited. Thus a MIRVed US launcher could easily target several of the soft targets. This would lower the threat to Europe. Gerard Smith further highlighted that this was one of the reasons why the US objected to a further hardening of the Soviet MRBM force thru a limitation of silos.198 Gerard Smith then turned to the NPT obligation. According to Smith there was a real chance to limit the arms race and to create a valid platform for reductions. The offensive weapons race could be limited, the ABM impact reduced and the threat emerging from MRBM contained. SALT thus might have the potential to reduce the cost for strategic weaponry which would allow the US to maintain their conventional potential on the European Continent and thus preserve ‘Western’ unity. De Staerke now intervened and re-emphasized his initial statement. The exclusion of the MRBM would have an especially grave impact in case it would be accompanied by a US force reduction in Europe.199 Such a parallelism would destroy Europe’s security entirely and pave the way to a neutralization of Europe. The deliberations on the new ‘limited approach’ were finalized during the NAC session on 20 July. Now all parties had received instructions from their governments. The European NATO allies repeated their concern about the elimination of the MRBM but accepted to proceed on the basis of the modified US negotiating position. The US thus proceeded and tabled the modified approach in Vienna on 4 August 1970 – as mentioned above. A more limited agreement thus was emerging from the negotiations. The embrace of the ‘limited’ approach to SALT was eased by the prospect of an ongoing arms control process that would benefit Europe’s security directly. The building bloc approach was not without dangers. The European NATO members remained concerned. The Italian government proposed a NATO Study on the consequences of a limited SALT agreement for European security. Italy and the Netherlands pleaded to include an escape clause into any ‘limited’ SALT agreement. The latter would allow a withdrawal in case the SU would embark on a modernization or expansion of her existing IR/MRBM potential.200 The Europeans furthermore had to adjust their di-

197 198 199 200

Ibid Ibid Ibid Gesandter Boss, Brüssel, an das AA, 20 Jul 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 323; Soviet Medium Range Missiles and SALT, 21 Jul 1970, TNA, FCO 46/596.

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plomacy to the building block approach and thus start to harmonize their approaches to SALT and MBFR. The definition for ‘strategic weapons’ adopted by the NATO alliance excluded forward based aircraft, IR/MRBM and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). It was thus to be expected that these weapons systems would be covered in the MBFR talks for Europe’s sub-strategic and conventional balance.201

201 Memo of Conversation, Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson-Ambassador Dobrynin, 9 Jun 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIX, No 26; Aufzeichnung Botschaftsrat Soenkens, Washington 14 Aug 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 392; Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, 18 Aug 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 399; Referat Deutschland, Außen und Sicherheitspolitik, Programmatische Darstellungen der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der F.D.P., FDP-Presse Stelle: Außenpolitik (Reden und Aufsätze, 1970–1972), 1525, Archiv des Liberalismus, Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung/Gummersbach.

7. THE US MODIFIED APPROACH: THE STRUGGLE FOR ADOPTION The Vienna negotiations ended on 14 August without any result. The SALT delegations decided to resume negotiations in Helsinki on 2 November 1970. The SU had to have time to study the ‘4 August Proposal’ – as the modified US approach became to be known.202 The US informed their Allies in October that they would not change the ‘4 August Proposal’. The Nixon Administration would await Soviet responses and counter-proposals. The SU had to drop the idea to limit FBS in the current negotiations. Moscow would have to agree on an aggregate ceiling of strategic nuclear weapons that exempted FBS.203 Furthermore, the USSR had to go beyond an ‘ABM only’ approach accompanied by a ‘Declaration of Understanding to Reduce the Risk of Accidental War’ as suggested by Ambassador Dobrynin on 25 June 1970.204 Both suggestions were anathema to Washington. An ABM only approach would break the offensive-defensive link necessary to maintain the strategic balance. The Soviet initiative to establish a concerted US-SU response to any provocation or aggression by a ‘third party’ was considered by Kissinger a ‘first class trap’. A US embrace of the Soviet concept of a bilateral consultation mechanism on the reduction of the risk of war threatened to undermine the European deterrent power. There was no deterrence without risk. An obligatory consultation mechanism and common superpower response to conflicts in the European theatre would undermine NATO solidarity and NATO’s strategy of escalation. The British had already indicated in August 1970 – at the time of the adoption of the Modified Approach – that a superpower condominium might be emerging. The ‘limited agreement’ that one-sidedly favored superpower interests could be the opening wedge to a US-SU dialogue on agreements ‘that might lead eventually to undertakings not to use nuclear weapons first against each other, which would effectively undermine the basis of the current NATO strategy.’205

A European theatre war thus could be ‘limited’ by the superpowers.206 The US had objected to the Soviet proposal already on 9 July 1970. But, the US Government had declared a willingness to consider a de-politicized agreement coping with purely technical accidents.207 The US diplomatic approach heightened tensions in the Alliance but eased the Soviet embrace of the US modified approach. The SU responded after months of deliberations. Foreign Minister Gromyko in-

202 203 204 205 206 207

Kissinger, 861; Smith, Doubletalk, 147, 151. Smith, Doubletalk, 183. Kissinger, 584, 592. SALT: Report on Progress to Date, 20 Aug 1970, TNA DEFE 24/770. Kissinger, 584f, 592. Ibid, 592.

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formed his homologue Rogers in October that the SU could indeed imagine a limited approach as a platform for broader agreements. President Nixon instantly demanded clarification. What did the SU mean with ‘limited’ agreement? In case the limited agreement the SU envisaged ‘dealt only with ABM, we could not accept it.’208 The SU had to embrace a limited agreement that was built on two legs: offensive and defensive weaponry. The SU furthermore had to start co-operating. The SALT process had to lead to a break through – in the foreseeable future. Procurement cycles mattered. US Secretary of Defense Laird had already declared at the NPG Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa of 29 October 1970 that there was a limited time window for success in arms control. The SU continued to deploy SS-9. Thus any US decision on new acquisitions could only be postponed for 6 to 12 months in order not to threaten US national security. Time was pressing. The change of government in the UK complicated matters. The US had to clear positions with the Heath Administration. The US expected continuity in Anglo-American relations on SALT. The new British Secretary of Defence Lord Peter Carrington was expected to arrive in Washington in November 1970. PM Edward Heath, Foreign Minister Sir Alexander F. DouglasHome and Lord Carrington had decided on 29 October 1970 on the future line to be taken on SALT by HMG. The ‘Big Three’ had decided against a direct participation of HMG in the future SALT negotiations. The Heath Government would follow the approach of the predecessor administration of Harold Wilson. The UK would stay outside the SAL talks ‘in order to maintain maximum freedom of action.’ The Heath Government was to protect HMG right to construct ‘Europe’ in case a superpower condominium would threaten. Upon arrival in Washington Lord Carrington was briefed on the SAL talks. The US would stand firm on the ‘August package’ for the duration of the Helsinki 2 Round of the SALT Talks. The US expected the SU to fall in line and embrace the offensive-defensive nexus. An ABM limitation was in the Soviet interest. The US was aware of British concerns over the ABM level. The US were also aware of the PM warning that ‘it was certain that Europe would want an ABM protection of her own’209 in case a zero ABM agreement was not forthcoming. The US was finally aware that ‘Europe’ demanded ‘equal protection’ or ‘equal security’. Thus Helmut Sonnenfeldt reassured HMG that the Nixon Administration had no ‘ideological resistance’ against the emergence of a European Defense Identity.210 Henry Kissinger indicated that the US sought a SALT agreement within one year. In case this was not achieved, the US would deploy ‘Safeguard’ with the help of the appropriations

208 Memo of Conversation: Rogers-Gromyko, 22 Oct 1970, CWIHP, Rise of Détente, Section I, No. 16. 209 Presentation of Ambassador Parsons on October 29 at Number 10, 27 Oct 1970, TNA, DEFE 24/771. 210 Ibid; Cabinet, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Note of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, on Thursday 29 Oct 1970 at 4.45 PM, TNA, PREM 15/289; Record of a Meeting held in the White House on 20 Nov 1970, TNA DEFE 24/772.

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obtained by Congress.211 The US – so Henry Kissinger – would also modernize her submarine force. The European Allies would – possibly – embark on the formation of a European Defense Identity in line with the Prime Minister’s publicized approach to a Europe de la defense. The Godkin lectures would serve Europe as a guide. The US was aware of the consequences of a failure. The time window for success was limited. The ‘limited’ approach of the August package already had nurtured interest in a ‘hedging’ approach among the European NATO members to make Europe’s voice heard, to keep the US engaged and finally to prepare for European ‘autonomy’ in case European security was not served by SALT. The French doubted that the US – notwithstanding her MIRV capability – would be able to protect Europe: just America. According to the French the US likelihood to use her strategic deterrent in defense of Europe was – zero. The NATO SALT consultations were a mere ‘placebo’ for the Europeans.212 European security demanded European concerted action – on arms control and on the construction of Europe. A European dynamic emerged while the Soviet stalled due to the modified proposal. Thus Washington took the initiative in the final stages of ‘Helsinki 2’ to overcome the stalemate. The SU had to embrace the building block approach of the US and to embrace the offensive-defensive link in phase one.213 The US phased approach foresaw: (1) an agreement on ‘central systems’ plus ABM followed by (2) an agreement on ‘non-limited’ systems. With the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ the US managed to break the deadlock: The wording of the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ thus deserves attention: ‘Only after all the main elements of an initial agreement on central strategic systems have been worked out, would we consider it possible to assess mutually satisfactory ways in which actions by either side relating to other nuclear delivery systems could be prevented from upsetting the strategic balance.’ 214 The US committed herself to future negotiations on ‘non-central’ or ‘non-limited’ systems in order to break the deadlock of the negotiations. This would allow a focus on ‘central strategic systems’ for the current cycle of negotiations – but meant an inclusion of MRBM and FBS in future stages of the SALT process. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ was meant to ease instant negotiations on offensive and defensive weapons. Shortly thereafter the ‘Helsinki 2’ round of negotiations lapsed for the Christmas break without any further progress or agreement

211 Visit of the Prime Minister to Washington, 16 Dec 1970. SALT. Brief of the FCO, 16 Dec 1970, DEFE 24/731. 212 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Menne, 10 Nov 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 535; Aufzeichnung, Präsident Pompidou’s Vorstellungen von einer Europäischen Konföderation, 23 Feb 1971, PA–AA, B 21, 743; Cabinet, Inter-Departmental Study on AngloFrench Defence Collaboration. Report on Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation, 4 Dec 1970, TNA, CAB 130/493. 213 Memo from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger to President Nixon, 10 Dec 1970, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 118. 214 Draft Memorandum for NATO. SALT: Forward Based Systems, 7 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289; Smith, Doubletalk, 186.

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on guiding principles.215 Backchannel diplomacy was setting in. Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin met on 9 January 1971. The US National Security Adviser told Dobrynin that the US ‘were prepared to make an ABM agreement only, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and provided […] there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land based weapons during the period of negotiations.’216

This meant that the SU had to freeze her SS-9 deployment program as long as the SAT negotiations on offensive weapons lasted. The rational of the US was clear: The US could not commit herself to an ABM agreement in case the offensive SS-9 force could be enhanced. A first strike capability of the SU could be the result. It was deemed indispensable that the strategic balance could not shift during and due to the SALT process. The term freeze was further defined on 23 January 1971. Freeze meant a quantitative freeze without impact on on-going modernization cycles.217 On 4 February Dobrynin indicated that the ‘Politburo’ had given its placet to connect an ABM Agreement with a freeze of offensive systems.218 On 10 February Dobrynin furthermore indicated Soviet agreement to keep the envisaged nexus between offensive and defensive systems. The parties agreed that in case both agreements would not be forthcoming at the same time the offensive systems would be ‘frozen’ until an agreement on both aspects of SALT had been reached.219 Thus no imbalances threatened. The SU preferred an ABM agreement limited to the protection of the National Command Authorities. Both parties, however, considered an asymmetrical approach which offered the US an ABM system to protect a missile site and to the SU the option to preserve the Moscow system.220 Thus back channel diplomacy opened an avenue in winter 1970/1971 to restart the SAL negotiations in Vienna on 15 March. The US modified approach would be the platform for the further SALT I negotiations by the delegations. The NAC Council Meeting on 15 January was an event. The European Allies focused on two major points of contention: The US ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ and the Semenov initiative to prohibit the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ had been tabled unilaterally by the US in the final stages of ‘Helsinki 2’; the ‘no first-use’ proposal had been tabled by Semenov in the final stages of ‘Helsinki 2’ as well. Both developments were of extraordinary importance for NATO’s future. André de Staerke focused on the latter. He clearly highlighted that the Soviet ‘threat reduction’ and ‘no first use’ initiatives of 1970 targeted the FBS of NATO. A withdrawal of the US FBS – as demanded by the SU – was a logic component of a wider threat reduction strategy. The Soviet package was less of a peace initiative than a wedge driving strategy since a withdrawal of FBS 215 216 217 218 219 220

Botschafter Pauls, Washington, an das AA, 28 Dec 1970, AAPD 1970, Nr. 617. Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 9 Jan 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XIII, No 90. Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 23 Jan 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XIII, No 103. Kissinger, 865. Ibid, 865. Memo of Conversation: Dobrynin-Kissinger, 10 Feb 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XIII, No 110.

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would destroy NATO defense structures and strategy and thus damage European security severely. De Staerke’s analysis was supported by de Ferrariis, the Italian Permanent Representative, who requested NATO support for (1) a US statement concerning ‘no first-use’ and (2) a NATO Military Committee study on a possible FBS-IR/MRBM trade-off agreement. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ – so the Allies – might trigger a new trend to include both MRBM and FBS instead of excluding both as had been decided upon by NATO with the adoption of the US modified approach of 1970. The non-central systems would just be introduced at a later stage of the SALT process. The implications of the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ for European security had to be established prior to the conclusion of a preliminary SALT agreement on central systems. US Ambassador James G. Parsons assured the Allies that the US would continue to search for a viable solution for the MRBM–FBS problem. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ was not enough. It was of major importance to forestall a ‘circumvention’ of a ‘limited’ agreement. The option to circumvent SALT by channeling resources into ‘non-limited’ systems had to be banned. Some treaty stipulation covering non-circumvention per se had to be forthcoming.221 The NATO Allies remained concerned about the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ and about the US flirtation with a ‘no first-use’ understanding. The former would have required NATO clearance since it affected NATO assigned US FBS. The latter was totally incompatible with NATO defense policy and strategy. The strong Allied reactions to US unilateralism were clearly registered by the US.222 The firm response of the NATO Allies is easy to explain. The Europeans could interpret the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ as a commitment to denuclearize Europe. Denuclearization was a traditional Soviet aim.223 Geographical limitations, a non-transfer regime and a MRBM-FBS trade-off targeted NATO’s defense capability. European security was at stake. These questions could not be dealt with in a bilateral framework – only multilaterally. The lessons for Europe were clear: (1) the US had to be reminded to consult prior to making suggestions to the SU with repercussions for NATO; (2) the Europeans had indeed to extend their co-operation to arms control to strengthen Europe’s voice. The immediate response – the NATO Allies engaged in medium and long-term planning on SALT. Europe now started to analyze systematically the possible consequences of the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ for European security. The US had succeeded to eliminate IR/MRBM and FBS from the current phase of SALT by way of selling a building bloc approach that would tackle non-central systems in the future. Consequently, European planning shifted focus: the non-central ‘building blocs’ of the ‘comprehensive agreement’ to be implemented in stages came under scrutiny. The Europeans analyzed the impact of the current outsourcing of questions from the SALT negotiations on European

221 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 15 Jan 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 16 222 Ibid, Footnote 9. 223 Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit Staatspräsident Pompidou, 25 Jan 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 31.

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security. The Allies furthermore had noted a statement by US Secretary of Defense Laird that hinted at MBFR as a forum for the follow-up discussion on ‘nonlimited’ or ‘non- central’ nuclear systems.224 This was the first official statement on a linkage by a US minister. Thus a linkage question emerged. Furthermore, SALT was not allowed to be circumvented pending an agreement on non-limited systems in other fora. A non-circumvention clause was needed – as highlighted by Parsons. The validity of SALT had to be tied-up with a prohibition to manipulate systems not covered by the SALT agreement.’225 The future planning thus was complex: it had to relate the current negotiations with the future phase of the SALT process and parallel processes such as MBFR. It was to be assured that Europe would not be unprepared and be able to react swiftly to future contingencies affecting European interests and security. This required organization. Simultaneously, Europe would insist on prior consultation, on timely information and a voice opportunity in decision-making. Trust was not enough. The US had undermined a NATO decision by tabling the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’. Would the US undermine NATO defense by embracing a ‘no first-use’ agreement? The NAC Council of 24 February 1971 was a watershed in intra-Alliance affairs on SALT. The Italian Representative Felice Catalano di Mellili openly criticized the US for having tabled the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ which opened an avenue towards the inclusion of FBS in the wider SALT process. FBS were a matter of the alliance as a whole – thus any formula had to be discussed in NATO.226 The US delegation – Smith, Garthoff and General Allison – sought to pacify the Allies. The US announced that the ‘no first-use’ proposal would not be of importance for the upcoming round of negotiations. Important, however, would be a discussion on the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ and FBS. The US now considered a ‘generalized formula’, ‘generalized clause’ or more ‘generalized approach’ to guard against circumvention of an agreement on central strategic systems by inhibiting each side from making substantial changes in non-central systems.227 The generalized clause by contrast to the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ would contain no firm commitment to negotiations on non-central systems. It would be a generic noncircumvention clause covering non-central systems.228 No obligations would arise. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ commitment to future negotiations on non-central systems thus might be circumvented. In conjunction herewith the US suggested the establishment of a SALT Consultative Committee (SCC) to deal with any problem emerging in relation to the future treaty. Envisaged was a low-key forum for 224 German Paper: Instructions on NATO Council on 24 Feb 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/772; Ministerialdirektor von Staden an die Ständige Vertretung bei der NATO in Brüssel, 9 Feb 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 56. 225 German Views on the Problem of Possible Upsetting of Strategic Stability by Manipulations of Non-Central Medium Range Nuclear Systems, TNA, DEFE 24/774 or FCO 46/699. 226 Peck to FCO, Tel No 56, 25 Feb 1971, TNA, PREM 15/389 227 Draft Memorandum for NATO. SALT: Forward Based Systems, 7 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289. 228 Ibid

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the negotiation of follow-up questions. The US did not envisage utilizing MBFR as a forum for negotiations on non-central systems. The issue raised by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was not a US Government position and not supported by the Nixon Administration. The reference to MBFR had been an off-the-cut statement by the Secretary and had not been cleared with the US Government. Procedures for possible follow-up negotiations on non-central system thus remain to be decided by the Allies. The generalized clause – as presented – raised new questions. According to Catalano a generalized clause might be utilized by the SU as a possible intervention mechanism. The SU might interfere into Western defense arrangements – modernization questions, re-enforcement questions, arms sales questions, transfer questions – by declaring the measures as conflicting with the SALT agreement. A lever for blackmail thus might emerge. The latter possibility had to be eliminated. All these questions needed to be studied in NATO, Wilhelm Grewe concurred. He ended the deliberations – so the record of the British Representative – with an interesting remark concerning a need for European concerted action.229 The NAC session was followed by a ‘NATO Experts’ Meeting. Raymond Garthoff, the Executive Secretary of the US SALT Delegation, sketched the US negotiation policy.230 The ABM agreement would be prioritized. The general linkage of offensive and defensive systems, however, would be maintained. Both agreements had to come into force at the same time. This was indispensable in order not to offer options for a ‘first strike capability’ which only a linkage could forestall. The linkage served furthermore as a ‘bargaining chip’ to obtain an offensive agreement since the SU was interested in ABM – only. The SU’s ABM position was the following: The ABM should be ‘limited’ to 100 launchers in order to cope with ‘third party’ threats and accidental usage. No mobile ABMs were to be allowed, ABMs could be stationed only on national territory and an ABM technology transfer ban would apply. Early warning radar systems would not be limited. The limitations thus would only affect the ‘Dog House’ but not the ‘Hen House’ radar systems of the SU Galosh BMD system. The former were controlling the interceptor rockets while the latter were merely early warning radar stations.231 The NATO Experts Session did not add to the debate raised in the NAC. The US NSC considered the US SALT approach on 8 March 1971. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thomas A. Moorer warned of getting involved in negotiations on FBS due to its major effect on NATO. ‘It will cause serious doubts among our Allies.’ ‘The nuclear capability we provide has been the cohe-

229 Peck to FCO, Tel No 56, 25 Feb 1971, TNA, PREM 15/389. 230 SALT: NATO Consultation. Statement by Raymond Garthoff at Informal Meeting of NATO Experts, 24 Feb 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/772. 231 F.K. Panton, SALT-FBS, 4 Feb 1971, TNA, FCO 46/696; W.F. Mumford, SALT: US-UK Bilaterals, 10 Feb 1971, TNA, FCO 46/696.

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sion to keep the Alliance together.’232 The US had to keep an eye on Alliance cohesion. An ABM deal by contrast could provide stability. A limited ABM agreement would be in the interest of France and of the UK – it would improve their nuclear capability. The US sensed that the drift first towards the ‘limited’ approach, thereafter to the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ and finally towards the ‘generalized provision’ had raised major questions and doubts in ‘Europe’. The ‘no first-use’ debate posed a further threat. It totally undermined the US nuclear umbrella. A multi-layered conflict was brewing. The alliance tensions discernible during the NAC meeting of 24 February 1971 came as no surprise to HMG. Whitehall was prepared to address any question on NATO’s future in the Eurogroup forum. One thing, however, had to be assured. Any possible transformation within NATO had to be tackled rationally due to a danger of the exploitation of divisive issues by the SU.233 European fears of superpower diplomacy were real. Europe was willing to defend her relative status in the international system – to defend the remaining options to enhance Europe’s relative position in the world. The UK had no illusion about NATO cohesion. According to W.F. Mumford the US does not envisage an overall Soviet attack – neither with nuclear nor with conventional weapons. The European assumptions and hopes that the US would release tactical nuclear weapons in time of contingency were mistaken. Europe might thus, indeed, consider developing a European Defense Identity around an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship.234 The UK had to lead Europe on defense. Any overt actions, however, would be considered by the US as a ganging up with the Continent and thus might negatively impact on the Anglo-American special relationship.235 The latter had to be omitted. The UK nevertheless revived dormant ideas about an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship for Europe. Lord Carrington informed HM Ambassador in Paris Christopher Soames on 2 March 1971 that defense talks on nuclear successor systems were forthcoming.236 Caution, however, was envisaged, due to (1) the Polaris sales agreement and (2) the executive agreement of 1957 that restricted contact with France in nuclear defense.237 The UK – so Edward Heath, Douglas-Home and Lord Carrington, who had gathered in 10 Downing Street on 5 March – was still dependent on the Polaris and US assistance for the Polaris Improvement Program.238 The UK thus had to sound out the US and the European Allies about options beyond warhead co-operation. HMG expected fur-

232 Minutes of the NSC Meeting on SALT, 8 Mar 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 137. 233 Douglas-Home, SALT: Meeting of the NAC, 19 Feb 1971, TNA, FCO 46/696; Draft Memorandum for NATO, SALT: Forward Based Systems, 7 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289. 234 W.F. Mumford, Visit to Washington. SALT Bilateral, 8 Mar 1971, TNA FCO 46/697. 235 Ibid; R.M. Tesh, SALT, 9 Mar 1971, TNA, FCO 46/697. 236 Meeting Between the Defense Secretary and H.M. Ambassador, Paris, 2 Mar 1971, TNA, CAB 164/901. 237 Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation, 4 Mar 1971, TNA, CAB 164/901. 238 Ellsworthy, Anglo-French Collaboration, 11 Mar 1971, TNA, CAB 164/901; Cabinet, AngloFrench Defence Collaboration, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Friday 5 Mar 1971, TNA, CAB 164/901.

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ther insights about options from the ‘Short and Long Term Working Parties on the Future of the British Deterrent’ established by the Secretary of State. The report was due 1 April 1971.239 The UK envisaged a step-by-step approach to AngloFrench cooperation in line with the step-by-step transformation of European security by the SALT process.240 The British PM in talks with Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt of 5–6 April 1971 underlined the ‘European’ interest to assure Europe’s voice in international affairs.241 Furthermore, both countries seemed to prepare for the contingency of a gradual US withdrawal from the ‘Old Continent’ that might result from the US approach to strategic arms control. A denuclearization of Central Europe should be omitted at any cost.242 The FRG thus already had agreed to store British nuclear warheads for the dual-capable Royal Air Force ‘Buccaneer’. France had to be informed about the enhanced British role in Europe’s nuclear defense to counter a waning US umbrella.243 The European current was strong – so the obstacles posed by the existing bilateral, Euro-Atlantic and global nuclear regime. The Italian and German Governments had started to sound out the options of a Eurogroup meeting to tackle arms control in common. Italy was especially interested in a European forum to study in common the implications of SALT.244 Italy had already during the recent NAC meetings pushed for the formation of NATO study groups in order to evaluate US decisions that might destroy the European balance. The UK, however, preferred bilateral approaches to the publicity of a multilateral forum.245 A first AngloItalian meeting emerged on 30 March 1971 in Rome. The agenda: the formation of a network of bilateral links among Italy, the UK, France, Germany and Belgium on NATO and European defense questions. The major aim: a concerted defense of NATO nuclear sharing and of the ‘European Nuclear Option.’246 The Rome Talks of 30 March were directed by Rinaldo Petrignani, the Head of the Disarmament Section of the Italian Foreign Ministry, with ‘sophisticated grasp of the subject.’247 The Italians focused on the implications of a non-transfer clause 239 UK Strategic Nuclear Forces. Short Term Working Party, [undated], TNA, CAB 164/902. 240 Message to President Nixon from the Prime Minister, [undated draft], TNA, CAB 164/902. 241 Aufzeichnung, betr. Besuch des britischen Premierministers in Bonn am 5–6. April 1971, PA–AA, B 2, 196. 242 Leiter des Planungsstabes, betr. Tätigkeit des Planungsstabes (Zum Begriff der Europäischen Sicherheit), 21 Jul 1971, PA–AA, B1, 472, 12ff. 243 Background Note on Defence Issues, April 1971, TNA, CAB 164/902; SALT and Possible Anglo-French Discussions, 22 Apr 1971, TNA, CAB 164/902; Cabinet, Interdepartmental Study on Anglo-French Nuclear Defence Collaboration. Draft for the Prime Minister, 13 May 1971, TNA, CAB 130/493. 244 Aufzeichnung für D/Pol zur Unterrichtung und Billigung deutsch-italienischer SALTKonsultationen. Betr. Wunsch der italienischen Regierung nach bilateraler Konsultation über SALT auf der Expertenebene, 2 Feb 1971, PA–AA, ZW 107258. 245 Rose, SALT, 11 Mar 1971, TNA, FCO 46/697; Palliser, European Defence Bilateral Talks, 22 Mar 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/773. 246 Anglo-Italian Talks, 29 Mar 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/775. 247 SALT: Anglo-Italian Bilateral, 30 Mar 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/773.

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for future European co-operation. Their focus of the deliberations was not on disarmament or principles governing arms control but on the implications of SALT on European security and the future of Europe. For example: a freeze that might be extended to FBS and MRBM or the generalized formula of the US might undermine European nuclear options. The scope of any non-transfer clause had to be urgently studied due to its repercussions on NATO nuclear sharing and the Anglo-American nuclear special relationship. A generalized clause might be used to suppress any form of assistance, modernization or cooperation on non-central systems.248 The British delegation concurred with the points raised by the Italians. The UK had already rationalized the consequences of a withdrawal of US FBS in a future phase of the SALT process. The European Nuclear Forces would gain in relative significance. The UK would come under an immense pressure to compensate for the withdrawn US FBS. The problem for the UK, however, was that 50% of her tactical nuclear weapons carried a US warhead. Furthermore, no US assistance would be offered to the UK due to the envisaged non-transfer clause which prohibited any ‘substantial transfer’. Thus a ENF had to emerge indigenously.249 The UK clearly indicated in Rome that the withdrawal of FBS and a signing of a ‘no first-use’ agreement by the US would have wide repercussions. A possible application of a non-transfer clause on assistance for tactical nuclear weapons would affect the NATO defense posture.250 The Italians clearly stated that the Soviet Union could thus use the non-transfer clause to limit options for a ENF.251 Furthermore, the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ or a phased approach as well as the generalized formula would threaten to predetermine regulations on FBS and thus possibly negotiations in the MBFR framework. All these were matters of vital concern to the Alliance.252 The Rome SALT meeting had been a success. Follow-up studies on European security emerged. The UK now commenced a major study on FBS. There was a dual focus: (1) a focus on the impact of the proposed – but not yet tabled – generalized provision on European security, and (2) a focus on the scope and impact of a possible FBS agreement. A FBS agreement or a generalized provision might limit US contribution to NATO’s defense. It would make increases of dualcapable US aircraft in Europe impossible, would undermine re-enforcement options, and would possibly undermine the sale of dual-capable systems to Allies. A FBS agreement or the generalized provision combined with a non-transfer clause would offer the SU a prime intervention mechanism to undermine NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. The provision of US dual-capable systems to NATO would violate both – it would constitute a ‘substantial transfer’ that threatened to

248 249 250 251 252

Ibid W.F. Mumford: SALT – FBS, 22 Mar 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/773. Anglo-Italian Bilateral Talks on SALT, 30 Mar, 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/773. Ibid Ibid

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circumvent SALT.253 There might even emerge a possibility for the SU to intervene into the Anglo-American nuclear special relationship – with the same argument.254 Further studies on the impact of a FBS agreement demanded a clarification of the vocabulary. The term FBS had never been clearly defined. FBS were de facto systems that might reach the SU proper but were not deemed strategic by the US due to range limitations that forestalled a direct threat to the US. FBS for the SU were the US aircraft in Europe, the US carrier fleet in the Mediterranean and the Nordic Sea. A follow-up agreement on non-central systems, however, had to cover all IR/MRBM, medium range bombers and CM of the SU that posed a threat to NATO Europe but not to the US.255 From a Western perspective a FBS agreement was de facto an agreement on non-central systems. A limitation or reduction of US FBS without a limitation of IR/MRBM was unthinkable for Europe.256 US willingness to accept a one-sided agreement would break NATO. The ‘compensatory’ solution, namely to count the FBS to the aggregate total and thus to reduce superior US central systems, was unacceptable to the United States. Counting FBS would undermine the central balance and US security. The ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ had to lead to ‘mutual reductions’ of non-central systems in a second phase. Thus central systems were linked to a limitation or reduction of non-central systems on both sides. The generalized provision, however, could allow the SU to tackle one-sidedly Western defense arrangements – a dangerous development. By embracing a generalized provisions ‘the Americans have taken the first step down a slippery slope and some fear that the Russians could exploit the vague terms of this kind of provision to object to almost any move of the US to improve their forward based systems in Europe or even to challenge the arrangements under which the US makes warheads, delivery systems, technology and other nuclear aid available to their Allies.’257

The UK thus considered it her task to discuss the issue of non-central systems confidentially with European Allies and bilaterally with the United States. HMG had to identify the implications for NATO’s defense policy. There were around 1500 dual-purpose aircraft assigned to SACEUR. A withdrawal of US FBS would reduce the number to 1100 dual-purpose aircraft in the European theatre. The reduction would remove a sizeable portion of SACEUR’s strike element – especially concerning long-range, all weather and night missions. The Soviet withdrawal option – also required the liquidation of forward bases which would make re-

253 Mumford, SALT: Forward Based Systems, 29 Apr 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/773. 254 Ibid 255 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Forward Based Systems (FBS), Apr 1971, TNA, FCO 46/699. 256 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Note by the United Kingdom Delegation, [undated, April 1971], TNA, FCO 46/699. 257 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Forward Based Systems (FBS), April 1971, TNA, FCO 46/699.

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enforcement and re-supply of withdrawn US units and dual-capable units impossible. The outcome would be a damaging blow to Europe’s confidence in NATO’s defense ability and in the US nuclear commitment. In case of a mutual commitment as under the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ the withdrawal would affect 500 medium bomber, 1000 light fighter bomber and 1400 Soviet missiles.258 The generalized provision would not entail a commitment to engage in negotiations on non-limited systems but would freeze the nuclear status quo beyond the central systems until a regulation was forthcoming. The likely outcome – so the UK SALT Committee – the SU would use the generalized provision to undermine modernization of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. The consequence: ‘a growing desire in Europe to develop to a greater extent nuclear weapons under European control.’259 In case Europe got the impression that the US would eventually agree to a limitation of her FBS, Europe would look towards UK and French nuclear leadership. In other words – the UK would have to replace the US FBS. A difficult endeavor since a SALT non-transfer clause would make it necessary for the UK to develop nuclear weapons independently from the US – with France. The US realized the unrest within the Alliance. The NAC on 17 May 1971 was bound to be rocky. The SALT follow-up agreements were on the agenda. Ron Spiers – the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs – thus tried to reassure the British Minister of Defence Lord Peter Carrington prior to the NAC session. Spiers assured Lord Carrington on 4 May 1971 that no-one in Washington is considering ‘to trade NATO for SALT’.260 Mr Spiers also assured the British Government that the Polaris Sales Agreement and the 1958 Defence Agreement ‘would not be affected by any ‘no transfer’ clause which might be included in a SAL agreement.’261 He furthermore, indicated a possible Congressional support for a European Defense cooperation based on an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship if such an arrangement ‘represented the collective wish of the Europeans.’262 Indeed, a limited ABM agreement benefited the French and British deterrence forces. Great Britain’s nuclear status and Europe’s nuclear defense would not be undermined.263 Thus, Foreign Minister Douglas-Home agreed with PM Heath not ‘to make unnecessary difficulties for the Americans’ over SALT.264 The UK, however, had to complete her SALT studies on FBS. Thus the first aim for the UK Delegation at NATO was to insist on full NATO consultation at all times; the second aim was to work towards a firm alignment with our European Allies in order to collectively make Europe’s voice heard. The UK, however, should not 258 259 260 261 262 263

Ibid Ibid, 14, 17. Meeting Between the Defence Secretary and Mr. R. Spiers, 4 May 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/774. Ibid Ibid Letter from the Permanent Representative to the NAC Ellsworth to President Nixon, 3 Apr 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 437. 264 Douglas-Home to Prime Minister, 10 May 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/774 or PREM 15/289 or FCO 46/699.

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appear to being obstructive. There would be no UK SALT initiatives in NATO. The forthcoming papers of the FRG and Italy concerning a tie-up of the agreement on central systems and non-central systems, i.e. the European rationalization of a phased comprehensive agreement, would cause the Americans enough concern.265 The UK would work with Europe outside NAC. HMG was flexible on the procedure to concert European interests on central and non-central systems. The FBS problem might have to be delegated to a specific forum, NATO studies were not adequate. Similar views were held by NATO Allies: André de Staerke preferred an institutionalized ‘Group of Experts’. The Eurogroup was another possible forum to develop a common platform on FBS. Italy pleaded for a European SALT Group in line with the Rome meeting. Another alternative: a network of bilateral European links.266 The UK and the Continent would start to defend their ‘Western’ and ‘European’ vital security interests by a formalization of the SALT contacts and institutionalization of their SALT planning. The SALT process clearly contributed to a wider discussion about a European Defense Community that had emerged with Britain’s renewed application for membership in the European Community. European theatre solidarity mattered. PM Heath told Bundeskanzler Brandt on 5 April 1971 that there were no current negotiations with Paris about an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship for Europe, but he envisaged a European NPG in case Europe would embrace defense – after Britain’s entry into the EC.267 Premier Minister Heath and President George Pompidou met in the Elysée on 20 and 21 May 1971 during his visit to Paris on 19–21 May. The Franco-British Summit was of extreme importance for the further development of Europe. It ended the ‘ice age’ in Anglo-French relations that had persisted since the French decision to leave the NATO military structure. Both countries realized the need to co-operate beyond the economy and to embrace the question of European defense. President Pompidou expected that the US would gradually withdraw from Europe. Arms control would pave the way. Arms control would guarantee that the Soviet threat would diminish at the same time. Thus Europe’s security might not be endangered as long as the US commitment to defend Europe would not be undermined. Troop numbers were secondary – armaments and strategy mattered. Heath concurred – and added that the Franco-German axis should be amended with an Anglo-French and an Anglo-German axis to stir the future enlarged Europe.268 Defense was part of the equation.

265 266 267 268

O’Neill to Chamier, 29 Apr 1971, TNA, FCO 46/699. Douglas-Home to UK Delegation NATO, Tel No 144, 17 May 1971, TNA, FCO 46/700. Deutsch-Britisches Regierungsgespräch, Bonn, 5 Apr 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 121. Record of a Conversation Between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic in the Elysée Palace, Paris, at 10 AM on Thursday, 20 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/2241; British Embassy Paris-Douglas-Home, 9 Jun 1971, TNA, PREM 15/2241.

8. THE MAY 20 JOINT DECLARATION: THE COMMON PLATFORM The US and the SU in the meantime had focused on the possible negotiation procedure to obtain a limited SALT agreement comprising defensive and offensive systems. The US envisaged (1) parallel negotiations and (2) parallel signatures of both an ABM treaty and an accompanying offensive systems ‘executive agreement’. This had been highlighted by Henry Kissinger in his ‘Oral Note’ to Ambassador Dobrynin.269 The SU agreed to a freeze on offensive weapons. The negotiations on offensive weapons, however, should only commence after the ABM treaty had been initialed. Finally – on 23 April 1971 – Dobrynin concurred to the principle of talks on offensive weapons before the finalization of the ABM agreement. Semenov, however, followed the traditional phased approach of the SU during the official delegation negotiations in Vienna. The ABM treaty had priority. The offensive weapons agreement would be negotiated in a second phase. On 4 May Semenov fell in line with Dobrynin and indicated flexibility to Gerard Smith.270 The final agreement was reached on 12 May 1971 between Kissinger and Dobrynin, and Nixon and PM Alexej Kosygin respectively.271 The new platform was announced on 20 May in a Joint Declaration published in Moscow and Washington: Both parties agreed to work out an agreement on ABM systems that was linked with a limitation agreement for offensive weapons. Both negotiations would be parallel processes. Neither would be finalized before the other although the ABM negotiations might be prioritized.272 The UK had been informed about the ‘20 May Understanding’ just 24 hours in advance of the press conference. NATO received a notification one hour before the announcement. The ‘20 May Understanding’ was the result of highly confidential back channel negotiations. NATO members had no prior indications about the negotiations – neither the SALT Delegation in Vienna.273 The Joint Statement broke the deadlock. The US limited approach had been embraced by the Soviet Union. The avenue to SALT I – so Henry Kissinger – was now open. The US had finally succeeded. A truly limited agreement was forthcoming that linked defensive and central offensive strategic systems. The core of the ‘20 May Understanding’ was a limitation of both: ABM and SS-9. The real novelty was the elimination of non-central systems from the agenda of the SALT I process. The Russians had not made the inclusion of FBS a condition for agreement on the Joint Declara-

269 270 271 272

Kissinger, 867. Smith, Doubletalk, 218. Kissinger, 870. Ibid, 871f. – Soviet Union Dinner for US Delegation to Celebrate 20 May Understanding, 26 May 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XIII, No 234; Smith, Doubletalk, 223; Garthoff, Journey, 254ff. 273 SALT: US/Soviet Statement, 21 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289.

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tion. According to the US interpretation the declaration exempted FBS from the future work program. ‘FBS are not included.’274 This has been the information given by Henry Kissinger to Lord George Rowland S. Cromer on 19 May 1971, i.e. on the day before the Joint Declaration. The Europeans remained guarded. The Joint Declaration or Statement had put the Presidential prestige on the line. The Nixon Administration had to succeed before the next election or would be punished by the electorate for failure to make SALT a reality. Allied interest might be sacrificed along the way. A sound skepticism prevailed in Europe. What was the price for the breakthrough? What linkages existed? The Europeans wondered about another significant event. The Tiflis Speech of General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of 14 May 1971 in which the General-Secretary indicated a willingness to embark on MBFR and to work ‘bilaterally’ towards a reduction of stationed foreign forces in Central Europe. The SU might thus have indicated a willingness to extend the SALT model of bilateral cooperation into the next phase of arms control. First bilateral US-SU contacts about the future MBFR route were already discernible. The consequences for the Alliance and European security would have to be evaluated. The Tiflis Speech had already killed the success of the Mansfield Amendment for unilateral US force reductions. This at least was a positive side-effect. The European fear of a simultaneous removal of US FBS and of US ground forces from the European theatre persisted. The dangers had shifted towards MBFR or phase 2 of the SALT process. No imminent threat was to be expected from the current SALT process.275 The current SALT phase was depoliticized. Allied stakes in the current phase of SALT were reduced to a minimum. Superpower control over the current phase of SALT was further enhanced. Challenges to strategic stability were ‘contained’. Hal Sonnenfeldt was correct: with ‘the SALT Agreement of 20 May a log jam has been broken in our relations with the USSR’. The US and the SU were now firmly on a new course – a course of co-creation and flexibility.276 Questions affecting the Allies had been temporarily excluded. 274 R.M. Tesh to Mr. Rose, 21 May 1971, TNA, FCO 46/700. 275 Staatssekretär Frank an die Ständige Vertretung bei der NATO in Brüssel, 21 Mai 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 181; see as well: ‘Kissinger’s view of a SALT-type approach of MBFR negotiations has prevailed […]’, Rose to Permanent Under-Secretary, 26 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938. See as well: Coit D. Blacker, ‘The MBFR Experience’, in George/Farley/Dallin (eds), 123–139, 125; Memo From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 15 May 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIX, No 49; Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of Defense Laird, Acting Secretary of State Johnson, and the Republican Congressional Leadership, 18 May 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIX, No 50; Interview with James Goodby, LC, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Interviewer: Charles Stuart Kennedy. Interview date: 10 Dec 1990, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections /diplomacy/index.html (last access: 3 May 2013) 276 Memo of Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for NSA Kissinger, 4 Jun 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XIII, No 250.

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The ‘20 May Understanding’ dominated the NAC Council of 27 May. Gerard Smith characterized the ‘20 May Understanding’ as a ‘turning point’ since it involved a sober recognition of the real options for a first strategic arms control agreement.277 The focus should be limited to ABM and ICBM. The talk was of ICBM only. SLBM seemed to have been neglected by Kissinger in his negotiations with Dobrynin.278 As regards FBS: Gerard Smith stressed that the ‘newly agreed framework would turn SALT discussions away from this area for the time being.’279 The news was well received. The German Deputy Permanent Representative Dr Walter Boss nevertheless counseled to continue to study the FBS problem ‘albeit at a more relaxed pace.’ The UK concurred. NATO now had a rational ‘breathing space in which to do a reasonable study.’280 The SALT negotiations were to resume on 8 July 1971 in Helsinki within the new limited framework of the ‘20 May Understanding’. According to the personal view of Gerard Smith the focus would be entirely on ABM and inter-continental land based systems. According to Hal Sonnenfeldt the US did ‘not expect to have to cover submarine launched weapons nor IR/MRBMS/FBSs.’281 The question of FBS – so Smith – would not arise in the negotiations for six to twelve months: ‘perhaps not until after agreement had been reached on an initial package. On the lines contemplated in the 20 May statement.’282 Sonnenfeldt expected that it was possible to ‘wrap up’ an agreement on those lines before the end of the year.283 Hal Sonnenfeldt furthermore indicated that Russia might have realized by now that the subject of FBS could not be tackled in a bilateral forum. Ron Spiers by contrast warned that there might be a possibility that the FBS would re-emerge before the conclusion of a SALT I agreement in conjunction with a possible withdrawal or generalized clause. The NATO Allies adjusted to the new framework. The focus of the NATO member-states now shifted to (1) the non-transfer clause and its impact on the Anglo-American special relationship and European security at large, and (2) on the completion of the FBS studies in order to assure a common standpoint the moment the FBS issue might re-emerge in a future phase of the SALT process. Staatssekretär Egon Bahr told Foreign Minister Walter Scheel that SALT had started out ambitiously with a comprehensive approach. The negotiations, however, had shown that more limited approaches were more promising. The FRG should thus develop a more positive and relaxed approach to the upcoming arms control

277 278 279 280 281

Peck to UKDel NATO, 27 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289. Smith, Doubletalk, 223. Peck to UKDel NATO, 27 May 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289. Ibid Visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger to London, 24–26 June 1971, Note of a Meeting Held in the Conference Room A, Cabinet Office, on Friday, 25 Jun 1971 at 3 PM, TNA, FCO 46/701. 282 W.F. Mumford, SALT: FBS, 11 Jun 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/774. 283 Visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger to London, 24–26 June 1971, Note of a Meeting Held in the Conference Room A, Cabinet Office, on Friday, 25 Jun 1971 at 3 PM, TNA, FCO 46/701.

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negotiations.284 MBFR would follow a similar approach – the approach of building blocks.285 Thus there was no immediate danger to European interests. The nexus of FBS reductions and US force reductions in the Central European Rapacki Zone, however, remained of vital importance for Germany’s and Europe’s future security. It deserved to be watched. The US was now focusing on three major questions: (1) the level of the ABM; (2) the nature of the offensive freeze, and (3) the duration of the initial agreements. The NSC on 30 June discussed all three questions. Concerning the ABM level three options were discussed: (1) a zero option; (2) a Washington-Moscow model, and (3) a Moscow-Minuteman model, which would allow the SU to preserve their Galosh system and the US to protect several Minuteman sites with a terminal defense ABM system.286 Secretary of State Rogers pleaded for a Moscow-Two Minuteman sites approach and a freeze on ICBM and SLBM. Thus the ‘20 May Understanding’ had to be extended to SLBM. The Joint Chiefs-of-Staff preferred four sites for each side with up to an aggregate of 400 launchers for each side. Out of the four sites only one site should be west of the Ural and east of the Mississippi respectively. All components of an ABM complex had to be within a radius of 100 km – later extended to 150 km. Early warning radar stations should be on an equal level. On the accompanying ‘Interim Agreement’: The Joint-Chiefs of Staff envisaged a total freeze – disallowing replacements for the time period of the Interim Agreement.287 The NATO Allies knew little about the NSC deliberations and the US negotiating position for ‘Helsinki 3’. The British Ambassador Lord Cromer informed the FCO about his consultations with Gerard Smith of 1 July 1971. Smith had informed him that no final negotiation position had emerged so far. Some key information was available: The original proposal of the US to allow four ‘Safeguard’ sites had been rejected by the Russian counterpart.288 Moscow had proposed 100 launchers on each side. Both sides envisaged constraints against mobile ABM systems. An agreement concerning a temporary freeze of central offensive systems had been achieved. The US would try to extend the freeze to SLBM. The latter weapon system – as everyone was aware – was not discussed during the time of the ‘20 May Understanding’. The US would insist to include SLBM. Finally, a generic withdrawal clause would emerge since the ‘20 May Understanding’ ‘finessed’ the issue of FBS. MBFR – so the informa-

284 Staatssekretär Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, z.Zt Washington, an Bundesminister Scheel, 16 Jun 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 209. 285 Gespräch des Staatsekretär Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, mit dem Abteilungsleiter im amerikanischen Außenministerium, Hillenbrand, in Washington, 16 Jun 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 210. 286 Minutes of the NSC Meeting, 30 Jun 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 170. 287 Memo of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer to Secretary of Defense Laird, 30 Jun 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 169. 288 Record of Conversation between Lord Cromer and Mr Gerard Smith on 1 July 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701.

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tion obtainable – would be the likely pocket for those follow-up negotiations. According to Smith any studies on FBS were at this juncture merely ‘academic’.289 The Europeans disagreed. They launched their academic exercise on FBS on 6 July 1971. This was the very same day the US presented their post 20 May negotiation position in the NAC. The US NATO presentation clearly reflected the new ‘limited’ approach of an ‘ABM Plus’ agreement, i.e. an ABM treaty linked to an ‘Interim Agreement’ for the freezing of ICBM and SLBM. All other questions had been dropped or relegated. Follow-up negotiations for a definitive offensive limitation agreement were to cope with all qualitative questions and non-central systems.290 SALT I thus was to be quantitative. The Europeans were not totally in agreement. A SALT agreement in stages was promising and problematic at the same time. The limitation of central systems at the expense of non-central systems in SALT I might allow a ‘decoupling’ of European and US security. A break in the escalatory ladder might be the result. Europe was yet again confronted with ‘limited war scenarios’. The original fears about a condominium persisted or reemerged. Europe had always pleaded for a phased comprehensive approach that included IR/MRBM. The European Allies therefore envisaged a tie-up of the limitation of central systems with non-central systems.291 European and US security had to stay firmly linked. The FRG clearly supported such a tie-up. A tie-up clause was the price for their embrace of the building bloc approach. This guaranteed that SALT I would not be the last word in strategic arms control; this guaranteed that the inequality between European and US security could not be frozen. The FRG furthermore recommended developing a matrix that embedded the entire SALT process, the MBFR process, the CSCE process into a network of strategic options. Europe had to prepare the moment the US presented building blocks of a ‘grand design’ that would possibly include SALT, MBFR, the CSCE and a new Euro-Atlantic balance. The FRG assumed that any US grand strategy would seek a settlement of the ‘European question’. SALT was just one facet of a wider puzzle. The political and geographical map mattered. Europe’s decision-making had to refocus on studying linkages. Europe had always to be alert about the options and dangers irrespective of the current theatre. The first European SALT Experts Meeting was scheduled for 6 July 1971. The UK was ‘academically’ well prepared. SALT was of prime importance for the future European policy of the United Kingdom. SALT affected all major facets of HMG foreign affairs: (1) the Anglo-American special-relationship, (2) the avenue into the EC, and (3) the transformation of NATO. HMG sought to establish a European point of view on FBS for phase II of the SALT process – or SALT II. SALT II was to directly impact on NATO defense plans and Britain’s regional and global policies.292 Europe had succeeded to eliminate FBS for the moment but

289 290 291 292

Ibid – see as well: Butler to Rose, 28 Jun 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701. Smith-Masefield, 14 Jul 1971, TNA, FCO 46/702. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektor von Staden, 28 Jun 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 219. SALT: Consultation in NATO, 21 Jun 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/775 and FCO 46/701.

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could not sit idle. The breathing space won by the ‘20 May Understanding’ had to be utilized constructively. Both substantial questions and question of procedures had to be tackled at the first SALT Experts Meeting. Structures and procedures had to be discussed; information had to be shared but no decisions made that limited options too early in the process. The scope of options had to be evaluated first. The UK sought to debate FBS with the US in the bilateral Anglo-American SAL Talks scheduled for 23 July 1971 before a common European position on FBS could be worked out.293 The UK was willing to act only in light of all available options. The latter would become discernible after the inaugural European SALT Experts Meeting and the forthcoming Anglo-American SAL Talks. Time was not pressing – momentarily. Furthermore the whole subject of FBS had to be addressed with caution. The term itself – as mentioned previously – had never been clearly defined within the Alliance. A debate on FBS in a follow-up context could mean non-central systems and would possibly include all types of tactical and other non-central strategic weaponry. Depending on the framework of the followup negotiations it might even lead to an inclusion of ‘third party’ systems and nuclear sharing arrangements. Thus any studies had to define different contingencies. All options had to be studied.294 Even a focus on the traditional Soviet SALT definition of US FBS posed multiple problems. The range issue was a variable characteristic. Flight patterns, height, speed, refueling, fuel levels and weapons load mattered in defining which dual-capable aircraft could be deemed a FBS that could strike the SU.295 The UK was seeking answers to all these ques- tions. The necessary definitional clarity should emerge from the Anglo-American Talks on FBS scheduled for 23 July 1971. The UK thus also demanded to be furnished with the text of any generalized provision any transfer clause that might emerge during this round of SALT since a connection of both could impact on future assistance for dual-key FBS and thus could prejudice future negotiations on FBS.296 The European SALT Experts Meeting of 6 July 1971 – organized outside the Western European Union (WEU) framework by the Italian government and chaired by Petrignani – was attended by all WEU member-states. The SALT experts of the Foreign and Defense Ministries of the seven WEU member states were supported by members of the NATO Permanent Representatives offices.297 The meeting was not entirely procedural. The German Representative Menne clearly outlined that the Europeans had to use the breathing space provided by the ‘20 May Understanding’ and the limitation of SALT I to central systems in order to deliberate about the future of non-central systems. The only positive outcome of the current SALT process from a non-central systems perspective would be some

293 Rose, SALT, 29 Jun 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701; Rose to Brimelow, 30 Jun 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701. 294 Forward Based Systems. Definitions, 24 Jun 1971, TNA, FCO 47/701. 295 Forward Based Systems, Political Aspects, Jul 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/777. 296 Ibid; UK Brief on FBS. Questions to Raise, [undated], TNA, DEFE 24/775. 297 Mumford, SALT: First Multilateral European Consultations, 8 Jul 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701.

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IR/MRBM restraints – concerning silo construction. The FRG still preferred a policy of non-inclusion of non-central systems to an inclusion of both FBS and MRBM but insisted on a clause tying in the validity of the agreement on central systems ‘to the non-augmentation of non-central systems’.298 Such a clause would undermine the extension of IR/MRBM. The German government considered the inclusion of such a clause into the present instrument of necessity due to the danger that the ‘ABM Plus’ agreement under negotiation might have no successor. There might never be a SALT II process or treaty. Thus the overall military balance could not shift due to manipulation of non-central systems. Furthermore, the tie-up was necessary in order to assure the deterrent ladder of escalation. The limitation of one system only would break the ladder of escalation and thus the deterrent power of the West. ‘FBS would be decoupled and the credibility of the Western deterrent […] consequently weakened.’299 The Italian and Belgian representatives supported the German position. Albert Willot – Counselor of the Belgian NATO Delegation – questioned the accidental nature of the coincidence of Brezhnev’s call for force reductions in Europe and the Joint US-Soviet decision to concentrate on ‘ABM Plus’. Willot sketched a possible scenario of US force withdrawals from Central Europe. The replacement of land-based FBS with seabased systems allowed a denuclearization of Central Europe. A SALT agreement that did not reduce the threat to Europe might be emerging. Petrignani synthesized the essence: SALT without a tying-up clause would (1) permit fluctuations in the non-central systems; (2) introduce a gap in the escalation ladder, and (3) create a psychological problem due to a policy that disconnects US from European security. The threat to Europe had to be considered as much as the threat to the US.300 The UK and the Netherlands did not concur. For them any inclusion of FBS into SALT might break the escalatory ladder due to its impact on SACEUR’s armor. An FBS exemption could not affect the ladder of escalation. The applied logic was faulty. The advantage of a general tie-up clause to maintain the military balance, however, was not disputed. Europe – so the UK – had to prepare for the hour when FBS would resurface. It might be that FBS would resurface in conjunction with the US attempt to include SLBM in the ‘Interim Agreement.’ This meant already in phase I of SALT. The Europeans thus should continue to concert their SALT positions. This was also necessary to enhance NATO consultation – which currently consisted only of briefings and a round of questions and answers. The European partners concurred. Petrignani was selected as permanent chair for the future European SALT Experts Meetings. The latter were to be scheduled in line with NAC sessions.301 A dissenting voice came from Mistral, the French Representative. The French Government objected to an institutionalization of a European caucus on SALT. This might be utilized by the SU in a possible wedge driving

298 299 300 301

German Delegation, SALT, Speaking Notes, 6 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938. Mumford, SALT: First Multilateral European Consultations, 8 Jul 1971, TNA, FCO 46/701. Ibid Ibid

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strategy. France thus prior to the inaugural session had decided not to partake in the future in the European SALT Experts Committee deliberations.302 France rejected to be drawn into superpower arms control. The existing occasional politicomilitary bilateral contacts were to be preferred. The very same day, the 6 July, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann declared that France would not partake in MBFR. The French force de frappe would have to remain totally unaffected by arms control negotiations since in case the US reduced their stationed forces and thus NATO’s nuclear potential, the French force de frappe would be the defense of last resort for Europe.303 According to this reasoning the option of a future Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship for Europe had to be preserved. The latter issue was currently under debate by Michel Debré and Lord Carrington.304 The US had been contacted by the UK to test the leeway for Anglo-French nuclear defense cooperation permissible under the NPT. The US, however, deemed the initiative not timely. The US response was clear: The Nixon Administration – so Solly Zuckerman, the Prime Minister’s Science Advisor – did not ‘wish to be concerned at this stage of our joining forces […] with the French.’ According to Zuckerman the US feared that any discussion of an Anglo-French trusteeship ‘might disrupt the current SAL talks and they would prefer to leave it until they had concluded the first stage of their [SAL] negotiations.’305 All parties agreed: neither the British nor the French nor the US wanted to create obstacles for the current round of SALT. The organization of the defense of Europe thus had to be tackled after SALT I had been successfully concluded. The European agenda was on the hold. The European SALT Experts agenda lingered due to the British strategy to await the results of the Anglo-American Talks to be held at the State Department on 23 July 1971.306 Phil Farley – Deputy Director of ACDA and Deputy Chief of the US SALT Delegation – first broached the issue of a no transfer clause. The ‘no-transfer clause’ under debate was limited to ABM systems. A no-transfer clause on offensive systems was not envisaged. Thus there would be no negative impact on either NATO nuclear sharing arrangements or Polaris improvement.307 Some inhibitions might apply.308 The US

302 Rose, SALT: European Consultation, 9 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938; Quinlan, SALT: Multilateral European Consultations, 9 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938; Rose to Palliser, SALT: European Consultation, 9 Jul 1971, TNA, FCO 46/702; Palliser to Rose, 20 Aug 1971, FCO 46/702. 303 Gespräch des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem französischen Außenminister Schumann, 6 Jul 1971, TNA, AAPD 1971, Nr. 233. 304 Cabinet, Interdepartmental Study on Anglo-French Defence Collaboration, Brief for Talks with Dr Kissinger, 15 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 130/493. 305 Zuckerman-Heath, 21 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938. 306 Speaking Notes, SALT: UK/US Bilaterals. FBS, 23 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938. 307 SALT: Record of Anglo/US Bilateral Discussions held in the State Department, Washington on Friday, Jul 23, 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/776 or FCO 46/702 or CAB 164/958. 308 Cromer to FCO, Tel No. 2525, 23 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/903; Press to Sir Burke Trend, 27 Jul 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938.

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statement on FBS was brief. FBS and the ‘20 May Understanding’ were incompatible. In case the question of non-central systems – FBS and IR/MRBM – emerged during the negotiations for a definitive agreement, the US would act in accordance with the ‘Helsinki 2’ commitment and table a generalized provision. All this, however, would not affect the ‘Interim Agreement’ currently under negotiation. Thus no formula for a generalized provision for the definitive agreement had been worked out – so far.309 The US did not object to the sweeping character of a generalized provision and did not expect one sided disadvantage. The generalized provision would only be used by either side in case a serious challenge to the central strategic balance occurred. The generalized provision was de facto a specific withdrawal clause.310 Farley, however, showed a great interest for the SALT planning exercises of the Europeans. Rationalizations of the future SALT process mattered. He therefore suggested institutionalizing again NATO Experts Meetings in conjunction with the NAC schedule. NATO SALT Experts could co-operate with the European SALT Experts on the future of FBS.311 The fact that the US did (1) exempt FBS from the current phase, (2) agreed to NATO Experts Meetings, and (3) embraced the European SALT negotiations made HMG defer the question of a personal letter of PM Heath to the President. The European SALT Experts Meeting of 6–7 October had to be awaited.312 HMG still feared that the FBS issue might resurface in the final phase of the agreement. The Nixon Administration envisaged finalizing the ABM and the Interim Agreements at a Summit in Moscow scheduled for May 1972. This would conclude the current phase of SALT.313 The ambitious negotiation agenda contained uncertainties. Time table pressures might force the US to compromise on FBS. The SU so far had rejected to include SLBM in the aggregate total. Now – a nuclear submarine was by nature a medium range weapon system in a forward position. HMG deemed it possible that the SLBM question might be linked with FBS.314 A lastminute FBS regulation would be disastrous for Europe. FBS thus were the topic of the European SALT Experts Meeting on 6 October – held a day prior to the scheduled NAC SALT session. The European SALT Experts Meeting was attended by the British, German, Dutch and Italian representatives. France had opted out – as announced. The Belgian and Luxembourg SALT experts were not avai-

309 SALT: Record of Anglo/US Bilateral Discussions Held in the State Department, Washington on Friday, Jul 23, 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/776 and FCO 46/702. 310 ‘Any manipulation by the two contracting parties of their non-central systems not covered by the SALT agreement, which would be essential as to upset the strategic stability would call the validity of the SALT agreement into question’, Mumford, SALT: Multilateral European Consultations, 28 Sep 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/777. 311 Ibid; Defence Department, FCO to UKDel NATO (Quinlan), 13 Aug 1971, TNA, CAB 164/938. 312 Tesh to Wiggin, 2 Aug 1971, TNA, FCO 46/702; Douglas-Home to Heath, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 4 Aug 1971, TNA, FCO 46/702 or CAB 164/938. 313 Rose to Permament Undersecretary, 26 Jul 1971, TNA, FCO 46/702. 314 M.D Butler, SALT, 8 Sep 1971, TNA, CAB 164/939.

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lable due to MBFR preparations. The SALT experts evaluated the strategic advantages of particular fora for a discussion of FBS. Italy, West-Germany and the UK agreed that FBS should not be discussed in MBFR. FBS should be dealt with in the SALT follow-up phase – bilaterally. A discussion of FBS in the multilateral forum of MBFR would automatically lead to a broadening of the agenda and ‘revive well-worn proposals for denuclearizing Europe.’315 The MBFR forum involved the danger that European owned dual-key systems would be drawn into the negotiations. SALT guaranteed a limitation of the negotiations to US-owned systems. The SALT forum excluded a denuclearization agenda. The willingness of the European Allies to forestall a possible Sondersicherheitszone in Central Europe paid off. The FRG started to back the UK’s line on ABM openly.316 The FRG pleaded for a low ABM barrier. Bonn supported HMG’s demand to take a firm line against Soviet intentions to broaden the ABM non-transfer clause to a general technology transfer prohibition for related technologies. The Anglo French nuclear force – ‘distant though such a concept may be’ had to remain effective and thus should not face a high ABM barrier.’317 The Europeans showed a clear readiness to pursue a hedging strategy in case core European interests were threatened. The Europeans sought to keep all options open that were necessary for a collective emancipation of Europe in the international system. The NPT options served as an example. Raymond Garthoff briefed the NATO Allies on 7 October 1971. Two ABM options were still on the agenda. The ‘zero ABM’ solution had been eliminated with National Security Decision Memorandum No 127.318 The US proposal to opt for either a 100 launchers ABM shield to protect the NCA or for a 300 launchers ABM shield to protect an ICBM site had no chance to be adopted by the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gromyko tabled a counterproposal in his talks with Nixon: The SU proposed to limit both sides to one ABM system in order to protect the NCA plus one ICBM site – each.319 The US by contrast was hoping for two ‘Safeguard’ sites to protect the Minuteman silos vs. the Moscow NCA. According to Garthoff the negotiations had started to embrace ABM technicalities – ABM radar coverage, the banning of sea-, space and mobile land-based ABM and the ABM non-transfer provision. Both parties agreed ‘that there should be no ABM transfer to, or deployment in third countries.’320 The wording of the US nontransfer formula for ABM systems was the following: ‘each party undertakes not to prejudice the viability or to circumvent the effectiveness of the agreement through transfer to third countries of ABM systems or their components limited

315 316 317 318 319 320

Visit of Mr. Debré: SALT, 13 Sep 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/776. M.E. Quinlan to Tenn, 8 Oct 1971, TNA, FCO 46/704. Ibid NSDM No 127, 12 Aug 197, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 192. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 201. SALT: UK Delegation Report of Points Made by Dr R. Garthoff, Secretary, US Delegation, at NATO Meetings on 7 Oct 1971, TNA, FCO 66/286 and CAB 164/939.

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under the agreement.’321 The SU insisted on an additional clause that prohibited a party to ‘render to other states technical or other assistance’ in the creation of ABM systems.322 The latter point was of major European interest. The nontransfer regime affected the European ABM option preserved in the NPT. The Europeans thus sought to commit the US not to give ground in the negotiations on non-transfer. Assistance must remain legal. Other points of contention were discussed during the 10th Session of the NPG at Brussels and the NAC Meeting on 17 November 1971. Secretary of Defense Laird announced that 130 Minuteman I missiles had been replaced by Minuteman III which increased the number of reentry vehicles of the US by 260. In all the US presently commanded over 2800 reentry vehicles and would command over 7000 re-entry vehicles in five years’ time due to MIRV technology. The W-German Minister of Defense Schmidt asked, if the increase in re-entry vehicles would allow the coverage of all Soviet IR/MRBM sites. The answer of Laird was wavering. He just responded that most but not all IR/MRBM sites were covered. The SACEUR General Goodpaster backed the US Secretary of Defense and assured the German Defense Minister that the next retargeting exercise would allow coverage of all Soviet IR/MRBM sites. The introduction of the Poseidon would even enhance the coverage capability of the United States. Thus the US would be able to target both Soviet ICBM and IRBM sites – in the near future.323 Helmut Schmidt and Lord Carrington both stressed the need of NATO to cope with the politically explosive question of the MRBM. The coverage of IR/MRBM thru US and NATO targeting was reassuring militarily but would have no politico-psychological impact. Other NATO problems threatened Atlantic unity: The differences of opinion on the follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons persisted. For the FRG a massive follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons was suicidal. No German Government would ever agree to it – so Schmidt. Laird’s response was clear-cut. The FRG had only one choice to accept a destruction of parts of her territory or to allow Germany to be conquered. Tactical nuclear weapons were indispensable – as well as the will to use them. This was a US perspective: the US military surely sought to limit any nuclear war to the European theatre – either by early use or finally by late but decisive massive use of tactical nuclear weapons.324 Lord Carrington offered a different rational for the deployment and usage of tactical nuclear weapons. The point was to use the weapons politically and not militarily.325 A ‘European’ political use – was the ‘initial use’ of tactical nuclear weapons as a warning shot to re-establish

321 Butler-Tesh, 27 Oct 1971, TNA, FCO 46/704. 322 Ibid 323 NATO NPG, Tenth Meeting Brussels, 26–27 Oct 1971. Strategic Briefing, 1 Nov 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/778; UK Record for the Tenth Meeting of the NATO NPG held in Brussels on 26– 27 October 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/778. 324 NPG, Follow on Use of Nuclear Weapons, 15 Oct 1971, TNA, FCO 41/814. 325 Ministersitzung der Nuklearen Planungsgruppe, 26–27 Oct 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 368; see as well: Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektor von Staden, 2 Nov 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 378.

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deterrence in times of aggression. What was needed was early use to end the war. Another political usage of tactical nuclear weapons deployment was to assure that no denuclearization was forthcoming. Thus Britain and France were in the process of stationing tactical nuclear weapons in forward positions in the Federal Republic. The decision for the FRG was a political one – since it would assure a European nuclear defense capability even in case the US withdrew her FBS. The deployment decision did not indicate a priority for tactical nuclear war. The opposite was true: The FRG had always preferred a NATO strike force to enhance NATO’s deterrent value and to forestall ‘limited wars’. The NAC of 17 November 1971 settled few but raised many new questions. Not only strategic questions such as the early and ‘initial use’ of nuclear weapons but the arms control agenda as well divided the Alliance. The Europeans were mainly interested in the question of (1) the non-transfer regulations in the future ABM treaty and (2) the inclusion of SLBM into the aggregate total of offensive weapons The SU – so Assistant Under-Secretary Clive Rose – ‘were misled by Dr. Kissinger at the time of last May’s Joint Declaration into thinking that the Americans would settle for an ICBM only freeze’ but ‘the Defence Department view that submarines cannot be dropped from the freeze had prevailed.’326

The background of the US internal dispute on the right negotiation position was a strategic procurement question. A pending decision on the construction of the new Trident made the inclusion of SLBM into a freeze agreement a necessity. An interim freeze agreement would keep the balance until Trident could be deployed in the late 1970s.327 In addition, the US submarine shipyards were currently installing launchers for MIRVed missiles into Polaris submarines, they thus were unable to embark on new construction programs.328 The SU had been made aware of the US position to include SLBM in the offensive freeze agreement in summer but so far refused to consider a limitation of SLBM.329 The SU was in the midst of a modernization and expansion cycle. Furthermore the envisaged parity of 41 submarines would operate to the SU’s disadvantage. There were four disadvantages to be taken into the equation: (1) US submarines operated from forward bases; (2) US submarines were still of superior quality; (3) SU submarines had to cross the NATO area to reach their patrol stations in the Atlantic; and (4) France and the UK had Polaris-type submarine forces.330 The Soviet refusal to include SLBM raised questions within the Alliance. The European fear was that the SU might try to link SLBM to FBS.331 The SU, however, opted for another avenue: asymmetry

326 327 328 329 330 331

Rose, SALT and the UK POLARIS Programme, 30 Nov 1971, TNA, FCO 46/704. Kissinger, 1195. Smith, Doubletalk, 274. Kissinger, 1194; Smith, Doubletalk, 252. Smith, Doubletalk, 323. Ibid, 330.

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in numbers.332 The forward bases of the US at Rota (Spain) and Holy Loch (Scotland) allowed the US a higher presence in the patrol area. To match the US presence in the patrol area compensations in numbers of submarines were indispensable – or alternatively a US retreat from Holy Loch and Rota. The SU envisaged that the US followed the Soviet example. The latter had relinquished her right of forward basing in places like Cienfuegos, Cuba. The US response was uncertain. Thus the danger emerged that forward bases will, indeed, be debated. The SU will insist on either compensation in submarine numbers or a regulation on forward bases and FBS.333 Tensions were rising. Thus the US stressed – yet again – the advantage of the emerging ABM Treaty for European security. The US negotiation position of a one-to-one ABM agreement with 100 launchers each – as Sonnenfeldt indicated – would pose no penetration problems for the UK deterrent. The inclusion of a notransfer clause into the forthcoming ABM agreement was of little importance. Furthermore, due to the low ABM level no assistance – beyond the agreed upon Polaris Improvement Program – would be necessary to preserve the viability of the UK deterrent forces. The UK only had to insist that a non-transfer clause would not be applied retroactively. The Polaris Sales Agreement in Art IV clearly provided that ‘future developments relating to the Polaris Weapon System, including all modifications thereto […] shall be made reciprocally available […].’334 President Nixon had furthermore indicated a willingness to support the ‘Super Antelope’ improvement program. Whitehall nevertheless insisted to address any interpretational questions preemptively. The PM was prepared accordingly. The briefs for the PM’s talks with President Nixon at Bermuda on 20–21 December 1971 were clear-cut. HMG was interested in maintaining the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship and the UK’s share in Western nuclear defense. The latter depended on the retention of the UK capability ‘to devastate Moscow (as well as other cities)’ irrespective of the future Soviet ABM system. The following threats to the retention of this capability existed: (1) an ABM level above 100 launchers and (2) a non-transfer clause on offensive weaponry in the current or any future cycle of SALT. HMG thus asked the US to forward to HMG any finalized non-transfer clause prior to signature. HMG furthermore demanded an uninhibited continuation of the Polaris Improvement Program. The actual decision on the Polaris Improvements was to be taken in 1972. A non-transfer clause hardly affected the Polaris Improvement Program but possibly undermined the option of

332 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Menne, 18 Nov 1971, AAPD, 1971, Nr. 399; Kissinger, 1195. 333 Butler to Tesh, 22 Dec 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/779; Rose, SALT, 23 Dec 1971, TNA, FCO 46/704; Smith, Doubletalk, 125; Zumwalt, 403. 334 CSA’s Visit to Washington: Brief on ABM Levels and Non-Transfer, 1 Dec 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/779.

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US assistance for an Anglo-French successor system for the Polaris.335 The alternative was the acquisition of the US Poseidon system. The Bermuda Summit should clarify whether a UK purchase of the Poseidon submarine was considered feasible prior to the emergence of a more generic non-transfer clause covering offensive and defensive systems as part of the envisaged definitive SALT agreement.336 The approach was impeccable. The UK expected further assistance and possibly a US offer for a successor system – otherwise Britain and France would have to develop a European deterrent. The British record for the Bermuda discussion between PM Heath and President Nixon on the aspect of Anglo-French nuclear co-operation had a very limited circulation. It was known only to the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Denis Greenhill. Accord to the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend President Nixon advised PM Heath not to ‘officially’ raise the question of Anglo-French nuclear co-operation in an election year – and prior to the completion of SALT I. In Nixon’s opinion HMG ‘should just do it and don’t tell anybody.’ One thing had to be assured: no leaks. The PM thus should limit contacts on Anglo-French nuclear cooperation to the French President himself.337 SALT was discussed by Clive Rose and Helmut Sonnenfeldt at Bermuda. Rose requested clarifications on SALT in order to assure that none of the SALT stipulation would infringe on the future Anglo-American nuclear special relationship. Sonnenfeldt saw no immediate threat. HMG, however, had to reckon with a non-transfer clause in a definite SALT agreement that might impact on the extension of the ‘components article’ in the 1958 Anglo-American Defence Agreement which was due to expire in 1974. Sonnenfeldt declared US willingness to engage into detailed discussion on the renewal. Finally, Sonnenfeldt assured Rose that the Moscow Summit did not foresee any debate about the involvement of ‘third party’ systems in the future SALT process.338 The UK thus was re-assured.

335 Talks Between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States at Bermuda on 20– 21 December 1971, TNA, PREM 15/289; Burke Trend-Prime Minister, Anglo-United States Nuclear Relations, 14 Dec 1971, TNA, CAB 164/940; Walker, 223ff. 336 Rose, No-Transfer and POLAIS Improvements Programme, 24 Nov 1971, TNA, DEFE 24/ 778. 337 Burke Trend-Prime Minister, Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation, 28 Jan 1971, TNA, PREM 15/787; Burke Trend quotes Nixon’s Bermuda statement in a letter to the Prime Minister of 17 Feb 1972: ‘If you want to talk to the French, get on with it but don’t tell anybody.’ ‘I don’t mind you talking to Pompidou. But don’t let it go any further; and don’t let any hint of this subject surface until the Presidential Election is over.’ Burke Trend-Heath, 17 Feb 1972, TNA, PREM 15/787. 338 Rose, SALT, 23 Dec 1971, TNA, FCO 46/704 and CAB 164/940; Burke Trend-Prime Minister, Anglo-United States Nuclear Relations, 10 Dec 1971, TNA, PREM 15/1361 and CAB 164/940; Talks Between The Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America at Bermuda, 20–21 Dec 1971, Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation, Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20–21 Dec 1971, TNA, CAB 164/940. Talks Between The Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America at Bermuda, 20–21 Dec 1971, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20–21 Dec

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Just days later, on 29 December 1971, President Nixon met with Bundeskanzler Brandt in Key Biscayne, Florida. Nixon made a clear statement: the Alliance did not have to fear a ‘Yalta’ at the Moscow Summit. The negotiations on SALT were not to affect NATO. There would be no bilateral negotiations on NATO defense issues. The SALT negotiations had proven difficult since they involved core issues of Soviet and US national security. This had not been the case during the NPT negotiations. The key to the emerging SALT agreement was a Soviet wish to limit ABM and a US wish to limit Soviet SS-9. This insight had been the basis of the ‘20 May Understanding’. SALT I was about central systems – only. The obtained parity in central systems – would now be defended on all levels: either by way of arms races in other categories or by an extension of arms control to noncentral systems.339 European Security was thus assured.

1971, TNA, CAB 164/940; Talks Between The Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America at Bermuda, 20–21 Dec 1971, Nuclear Matters, Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20–21 Dec 1971, TNA, CAB 164/940. 339 Gespräch des Bundeskanzler Brandt mit Präsident Nixon in Key Biscayne, 29 Dec 1971, AAPD 1971, Nr. 452; see as well the record of the meeting of President Nixon with President Pompidou. Pompidou highlighted the Soviet interest in a ‘Yalta-type’ settlement: Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores, 13 Dec 1971, 9:00 AM, William Burr (ed), The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow, New York: The New Press, 1999, 33–40, 36.

9. THE PATH TO MOSCOW: EUROPE AND SALT I President Nixon – who on 12 October had announced his intention to attend a summit in Moscow in order to finalize SALT I and to prepare the next phase in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) – considered the solution of the pending SLBM question a presidential task. Thus President Nixon had requested General-Secretary Brezhnev by letter of 19 October 1971 to work for a freeze in both major areas, defensive and offensive systems: ICBM and SLBM. The two countries had ‘a special responsibility for peace and progress’ thus the US would subordinate tactical advantages to global concerns of stability and equality.340 There was no immediate response. The SLBM remained a major bone of contention. The competition remained fierce. The US continued to insist on an SLBM freeze in the Interim Agreement. The SU continued to reject an extension of the Interim Agreement to SLBM. The US insistence had a clear rational. The Nixon Administration intended (1) to break the dynamic of the Soviet submarine building program, and (2) to forestall a linkage between SLBM and FBS in the envisaged definite phase of SALT. Furthermore an inclusion would offer the US a break to develop the Trident system. Trident was to be deployed after the Interim Freeze Agreement’s expiration. The US were aware that the SU could not easily fall in line: (1) due to geographical factors; (2) due to the French and British submarines, and (3) due to the strategic option to possibly hold SLBM in abeyance as leverage to obtain US concessions on FBS in later negotiations. Thus the US turned the SLBM question into a sine qua non provision – threatening to abandon SALT and thus the emerging ABM agreement. The latter served Soviet interests.341 The US suggested connecting a limit on modern SLBM with a possibility to replace aging ICBM. The principle: freedom of mix would apply.342 Equal aggregates were aimed at.343 A common understanding emerged after deliberations between Kissinger and Dobrynin on 18 November 1971. Both agreed that ‘legally’ the ‘20 May

340 Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 203; Letter from President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, 19 Oct 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 205. 341 Memo of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer to Secretary of Defense Laird, 28 Sep 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 200; Memo from Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 29 Oct 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 208; Editorial Note, 9 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 237. 342 Memo from Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 16 Dec 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 216. 343 Memo of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer to Secretary of Defense Laird, 6 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 234.

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Understanding’ left both parties free to include SLBM – although the focus had been on ICBM only.344 On 22 December 1971 Henry Kissinger listed the desiderata: all the pending questions seeking a final settlement prior to the May Moscow Summit. Seven unresolved issues had emerged from the US delegation’s report: (1) the SLBM issue, (2) the definition of the term ‘freeze’, and (3) the level of ABM launchers topped the list. Added were questions concerning radar limits and coverage, issues concerning the future SALT process, and the final formulation of the withdrawal question.345 The SLBM question was the key to success. The SU continued to balk for valid reasons. An SLBM limitation would break the SU building program while supporting the US Trident procurement program after the Interim Freeze Agreement. Thus Dobrynin proposed to possibly delegate the SLBM question to General-Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon during the Summit. Both had a personal stake in SALT I. The key decision-makers would have to settle the question in Moscow or to seek a solution in the next phase of SALT.346 The news that SLBM would be tackled by the superpowers at Moscow was delivered to the NATO Allies on 2 February 1972 by Gerard Smith. The European SALT Experts – the ‘Petrignani Group’ – gathered on the very same day in Brussels. The Europeans had already shifted focus: the ‘Petrignani Group’ prepared the ground for the possible discussion of non-central systems in the next round of SALT. The follow-up negotiations were presumed to take off after the US election in November 1972. Thus Europe had a time window of six months to prepare the agenda. The majority of the European Experts presented a clear-cut position for the second phase of negotiations: A generalized provision – as debated in 1971 – was considered the optimal solution for non-central systems. The ‘Petrignani Group’ confirmed their recorded opposition to a transfer of the FBS question to MBFR. The multilateral MBFR forum would make it impossible to limit the negotiations to US FBS – non-central systems of European NATO Allies would be drawn into the negotiations. A step-by-step denuclearization of Central Europe would be the result. FBS should neither feature in SALT nor in MBFR. SALT II should focus entirely on unregulated central systems and evade a regulation of non-central systems. A generalized provision was all that was needed to bracket central and non-central systems and to keep the balance. Willot – the Counselor of the Belgian NATO Delegation – partially objected. A FBSIR/MRBM linkage was a viable alternative to a generalized provision. A reduction of IR/MRBM was of major psychological importance. Furthermore, the danger of a ‘decoupling’ of central from non-central systems had to be tackled offensively. The option of a limitation of FBS in line with a possible reduction of cen-

344 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Dobrynin, 18 Nov 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 213. 345 Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 218. 346 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Dobrynin, 1 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 233.

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tral or non-central systems should not be discarded out of hand.347 The dissenting voice was recorded. The members of the ‘Petrignani Group’ agreed not to make further representations on the FBS issue prior to the May Summit.348 The European SALT Experts then briefly turned to the current SALT agenda. The Interim Agreement on offensive systems under no circumstances should contain a nontransfer clause. The ABM non-transfer regulation should not serve as a precedent for the Interim Agreement. The ABM non-transfer clause prohibited the transfer to other states or the deployment of ABM systems or their components outside the national territory. A non-transfer clause for offensive systems on these lines would undermine NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements as much as the special nuclear sharing arrangement of the Anglo-American special relationship.349 The SALT negotiations in Vienna ended on 4 February. They were scheduled to reopen in Helsinki on 28 March. The Anglo-American SAL Talks scheduled for 23 February allowed HMG a final chance to press the issue of an a priori clearance of a forthcoming non-transfer clause. HMG insisted on an option to review the treaty text on ABM transfer prior to insertion in the final draft.350 The UK’s anxieties were partially laid to rest on 23 February 1972. The AngloAmerican SAL Talks held at the ACDA Headquarter were a great success. Phil Farley could reassure his British counterparts that there had never been a proposal for a non-transfer provision in the Interim Freeze Agreement on offensive systems.351 There was no sign of the Russians raising a non-transfer clause in connection with offensive weaponry. There was, however, the real possibility that it would be raised by the SU in case the US insisted on the inclusion of SLBM into the aggregate total. The SU would have to take into the equation that SLBM were a nuclear weapon system utilized by NATO partners. Dr Garthoff added that the US would resist Soviet attempts to use the ABM non-transfer clause as a precedent for the Interim Agreement.352 An Interim Agreement of five years duration without a ‘non-transfer clause’ would offer the UK a window of opportunity to renew the 1958 Anglo-American nuclear agreement. A SALT II non-transfer provision would not retroactively apply to a revised and renewed Anglo-American

347 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Menne, 8 Feb 1972, AAPD 1972, Nr. 26; W.F. Mumford to Andrew Hockaday, Cabinet Office, 4 Feb 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/780. 348 J.D. Laughton to M. Quinlan, 18 Feb 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/780. 349 Ibid; see as well: Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Menne, 27 Mar 1972, AAPD 1972, Nr. 75. 350 J.D. Laughton, Gen I Report to Ministers: SALT, 11 Feb 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/780; Visit of President of France to the United Kingdom 18 and 19 March 1972: SALT. Brief by GEN 1 Official Working Party, 13 Mar 1972, TNA, FCO 46/823; GEN 1 Report To the Prime Minister. Visit of President Pompidou: SALT, 18 Feb 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/780. 351 Record of UK/US Bilateral Talks on SALT held at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington on Wednesday, 23 Feb 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/780. 352 Ibid; GEN I Report to Ministers: SALT: Implications for British Interests in the Light of the UK/US Bilateral Talks in Washington on 23 February 1972, TNA, FCO 46/823, see also: Walker, 232f.

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nuclear special relationship.353 The British argument was well received. Farley and Sonnenfeldt agreed to discuss the future of the Anglo-American nuclear relations with the United Kingdom. Farley, however, was not able to commit the US Government to an obligatory clearing of a non-transfer clause with HMG. He told the British delegation that he had not been briefed on the Bermuda Summit SALT deliberations. He was thus unable to verify information furnished by his British colleagues about a possible clearing procedure.354 The British Secretary of State remained concerned about the forthcoming SALT I treaty text. The draft ABM treaty foresaw that no party to the treaty ‘will assume any international obligation in the future which will conflict with the agreement’.355 In case a similar article would be inserted into the definite agreement on offensive systems, i.e. a SALT II treaty, US transfers of equipment to the UK or France would be prohibited. Such a prohibition would forestall a triangular nuclear arrangement – the indispensable prerequisite for a possible Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship. Any triangular arrangement – as debated in London – thus could only emerge prior to a definite SALT agreement. It was to be expected that a definite SALT agreement would contain ‘non-transfer’ and ‘no conflict’ clauses along the lines of the ABM treaty. Such a SALT II arrangement would prioritize SALT to any other agreements of the parties involved. Thus – so the rational of HMG – a definite SALT agreement should emerge as late as possible. This would create a window of opportunity for ‘Europe’ to unite. HMG finally foresaw that any further SALT agreements should not be allowed to put qualitative restraints on ‘third parties’ but possibly quantitative ones. Such a regulation would allow the US to continue to aid NATO Allies to improve the quality of their nuclear deterrent forces. At the same time the total number of Allied offensive weapon systems would be frozen.356 HMG bureaucracy assumed that the UK could live with four nuclear submarines – given that state of the art technology and penetration capability were assured. Improvement and replacement programs had to remain permissible. A UK Polaris-type submarine was stillborn, given an advanced ABM shield emerged. A submarine with ‘Super Antelope’ or ‘Poseidon’ systems – systems that required US assistance – by contrast would be able to overwhelm an ABM system of 100 ABM interceptor rockets such as the Moscow ABM defense system. The technical calculus: 15 ABM interceptor rockets per incoming missile were necessary to intercept a new generation state of the art SLBM. Only a low ABM level and clearly separated ABM centers disallowing a networked

353 Record of UK/US Bilateral Talks on SALT held at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington on Wednesday, 23 Feb 1972, TNA, FCO 46/824 or DEFE 24/781. 354 C. M. Rose to Andrew Hockaday, Cabinet Office, 29 Feb 1972, TNA, FCO 46/823. 355 Clive Rose to Permanent Undersecretary, SALT: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 1 Mar 1972, TNA, FCO 46/823. 356 Draft Letter from the PM to President Nixon, 9 Mar 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/781; GEN I: Report to Ministers: Situation at Resumption of Formal Negotiations and Implications for British Interests, [n.d., March 1972], TNA, FCO 46/824.

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Soviet ABM defense shield would guarantee the effectiveness of the current British deterrent forces.357 February 1972: The ABM level was still under negotiation. The US NSC recognized that the old ABM proposals were ‘not negotiable’. The US would have to embrace the Soviet position. The two parties would have to agree on a two-fortwo arrangement which would allow both sides one ICBM site and the NCA protection.358 A formula for the SLBM question was also emerging. Gerard Smith indicated flexibility with deadlines for the freeze of the SLBM. The originally envisaged deadline of 31 July 1971 would have given the SU around 700 submarine launchers the US 656. A slipping of the freeze date towards May to July 1972 would increase the base line for the Soviet submarine launchers. Henry Kissinger pleaded to slip the freeze date to 1972 which would mean a base line of 48 Yclass and H-class submarines. Furthermore the freedom to mix should allow the SU to retire old ICBM for new SLBM. That formula was devised to enable the SU to increase their submarine fleet above the base line of 48 to an upper limit of 62 submarines. This formula would allow a shifting of the deterrence force towards a sea-based deterrent force. In case the SU used the option provided to expand to 62 submarines the SU would achieve equivalence in the Atlantic – withstanding the geographical factors that favored the US. This formula had other advantages: it circumvented the question of an inclusion of ‘third party’ systems in an aggregate total and the forward basing issue that threatened Alliance affairs.359 President Nixon embraced the recommendation of his National Security Advisor with NSDM 158 of 23 March 1972. Richard Nixon indicated that the US would embrace a ‘two-for-two’ formula on ABM in case the Soviet Union reciprocated by embracing an SLBM freeze based on the indicated freeze date.360 The ABM sites were to be limited to 100 launchers. The freeze date was moved to correspond by and large with the actual signature dates of the forthcoming agreement. First indication of a Soviet willingness to finalize SALT I emerged in Helsinki shortly after the resumption of the negotiations – namely on 30 March 1972. General Konstantin Trusov indicated that the proposed ABM agreement and an interim freeze on ICBM would be ‘sufficient’. Gerard Smith sensed that ‘sufficient’ entailed a possibility to go beyond. Semenov concurred and replied to Smith: ’You have very good antennae’.361 The SU showed willingness to change

357 SAL Agreement and POLARIS Improvement, 7 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/782. 358 NSC Meeting on SALT, 17 Mar 1972, Issues Paper Prepared by the NSC, undated, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 239. 359 NSC Meeting on SALT, 17 Mar 1972, Memo for the Record, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 240. 360 NSDM 158, 23 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 243; Memo From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis Tucker to Secretary of Defense Laird, 27 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 244. 361 Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Smith to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 30 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 246.

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her position on SLBM due to the Nixon Administration’s embrace of the Gromyko approach on ABM.362 A basis for agreement was found. The ground was thus prepared for the secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Moscow in April 1972.363 In Moscow General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev got straight to the matter. The Soviet position was laid out to Henry Kissinger. On ABM: each of the parties would have the right to build two ABM sites. One to protect silos, one to protect the NCA. Each site would have a radius of 150 km and 100 interceptor rockets. On submarines: The SU was willing to include SLBM into the offensive freeze agreement under the condition that geographic factors, ‘third party’ systems and US forward bases were taken into the equation. Given these inequalities the platform of an agreement could not be equality of numbers. The US and her NATO Allies should be limited to 50 modern submarines with 800 SLBM launchers. This number includes 41 US submarines with 656 launchers. The Soviet Union should be allowed a limit of 62 modern submarines with a total number of 950 launchers to obtain strategic equality. The SU would reduce the number of old land-based ICBM to allow an increase of submarine launchers from the current base line of 48 to the upper limit of 62.364 The aggregate freeze number would thus stay unaffected. Freedom to mix would rule. Dr Kissinger termed General-Secretary Brezhnev’s proposal negotiable. The National Security Advisor, however, rejected to take ‘third party’ systems into the equation. References to ‘third parties’ in a bilateral agreement were out of the equation. The basis should be a gentlemen’s agreement that the US would accept a limit of 41 submarines. The SU – so Kissinger – might consider a unilateral statement that an increase of NATO strength beyond 50 would lead to an equivalent increase of Soviet submarine strength to keep the overall strategic balance.365 Brezhnev concurred – after he had obtained a reassurance that the figures discussed were agreed upon.366 The BrezhnevKissinger Talks ended with an agreement to settle SALT at the Summit in May on the outlined basis. A final point was agreed: the Interim Agreement would freeze offensive systems for five years. The US President was delighted: ‘superb job’ was his comment upon Kissinger’s return to Washington.367 The content was transformed into NSDM 164 of 1 May 1972.368 NSDM 164 asked the US delegation to finalize the negotiations on the basis of the Brezhnev-Kissinger compromise formula. Gerard Smith, the head of the US delegation, furthermore was informed that the SLBM deal had taken the French and British deterrent into the 362 Memo From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 7 Apr 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 253; C.J. Makins, to J.D. Laughton, 27 Apr 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/781. 363 Smith, Doubletalk, 370. 364 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 22 Apr 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 262. 365 Ibid.; Kissinger, 1194, 1217 366 Ibid 367 Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 267. 368 NSDM, 1 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 271.

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equation thus the SU would not insist on a formal reference to ‘third party’ systems or ‘to any commitment that forward bases would be on the agenda for the next phase of SALT.’369 The Moscow Summit was to conclude the first phase of SALT. The missing points were to be negotiated by the President’s team during the Summit. Technical points would be delegated to the SALT Delegation in Helsinki for instant adjustments. US Secretary of State Rogers was flying to Europe to reassure NATO partners. SALT I would neither include the question of FBS nor a general nontransfer clause. The European fears that the SLBM regulation would negatively impact on FBS were finally put to rest.370 The SALT I agreement was constructed around a last minute core compromise: The SU moved on SLBM, the US on ABM. The US had embraced the Soviet ‘two-for-two formula’ for ABM systems. The second Soviet site, however, would be east of the Ural thus not inter-netted with the Moscow site.371 The asymmetry in the offensive agreement was justified by Rogers on the basis of the Soviet construction programs and the clear advantage of the US in nuclear warheads. The advantage of the US on warheads was 3:1 due to US MIRV technology. The PM explained the asymmetry differently. He assumed – correctly – that Allied submarines had been taken into the equation. HMG was discontent. The US embrace of asymmetry might create problems in the follow up negotiations since the Soviets might see an entitlement to limit other parties’ systems. Any reference to ‘third party’ systems should be omitted in public statements by the US Government. This would keep the record clean.372 The new and final US negotiating package – the draft agreement – was transmitted to the NATO Allies on 5 May. The Europeans – content with the US position and draft text – focused on the immediate follow-up action to the US-SU SALT Summit. The NATO Allies expected to be briefed on the SALT I Agreement during the NAC Ministerial Meeting on 30–31 May. The Allies requested information on any new arms control initiatives emerging out of the Moscow Summit. All core interpretations and declarations should be made available by the US Government. The Europeans had to be well prepared since the NAC Ministerial Meeting of 30–31 May 1972 was to lay the foundation for the SALT II negotiations, the MBFR negotiations and CSCE. Europe had to be able to evaluate the overall strategy of the superpowers. The Soviet strategy of splitting US and European security, of undermining European integration and of eroding NATO had to 369 Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 6 May, 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 272. 370 W.F. Mumford to Andrew Hockaday, 27 Mar 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/781. 371 Record of the Discussion Between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the United States Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 10.15 a.m. on 4 May 1972, TNA, FCO 46/825. 372 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Douglas Home, SALT: Talks with Mr. Rogers, 8 May 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/782; SALT Background, Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 278.

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be kept in mind when evaluating the data emerging from the Moscow Summit.373 The preparatory work of the ‘Petrignani Group’ might pay-off. The European NATO Allies were on high alert and prepared to tackle any wrong sign coming out of the Brezhnev-Nixon talks. Nothing was allowed to undermine European security.374 The Europeans were not the only party that prepared for phase II. The US preparations for the Moscow Summit were concerned both with (1) the current agreement on SALT and (2) the future SALT process. It was to be expected that Brezhnev would seek agreement on guidelines for the SALT II phase. The ‘20 May Understanding’ had hindered the SU to raise the issue of FBS in the current cycle of SALT. The SU was expected to count FBS against the aggregate total when negotiating the definitive offensive weapons agreement. Other ideas that had emerged during the SALT I process would be tabled for final settlement – in particular an understanding on ‘no use’ or ‘no first-use’ of nuclear weapons. The SU would in all likelihood try to undermine NATO solidarity and possibly drive a wedge into the emerging US-China relationship by focusing on a joint US-SU approach to preserve peace. The US would have to resist the temptation of condominium but work towards a further reduction of central systems. The aim was to achieve an equal balance based on equal numbers of modern systems. Equal ceilings and qualitative controls would matter most. The US had to keep the focus on central systems to preserve the bilateral character of the negotiations.375 The US was totally aware that SALT I would succeed. But SALT II would be a difficult struggle since all issues bracketed by the ‘20 May Understanding’ would resurface. In addition the asymmetry of numbers would have repercussions in NATO and the United States. The White House thus expected a ‘massive rightwing revolt on SALT’376 that could only be coped with by way of preparation of the public and a quick ratification process. The latter would save the future SALT process. Both superpowers had to seek a quick resumption of negotiations after the Moscow Summit. President Nixon – accompanied by his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger – arrived in Moscow on 22 May. The same day Nixon and Brezhnev tackled SALT. Brezhnev lauded the forthcoming agreement but reminded Nixon that the agreement would not lessen the danger of war. Both countries had a responsibility to work towards an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, on the preven373 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel, (NATO), an das AA, 12 May 1972, ACDP 1972, Nr. 133. 374 Visit of the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, on 4 May 1972. Background to Visit, 19 Apr 1972, TNA, FCO 46/824; Clive Rose to Butler, SALT: Petrignani Group, 5 May 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/781; Introductory Remarks by Mr. Rose on the FBS Issue at the Meeting on 24 March 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/781; W.F. Mumford to J.D. Laughton, NATO Discussion of FBS, 18 May 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/782. 375 SALT Background, Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 278. 376 Memo from President Nixon to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, 20 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 286.

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tion of nuclear war. The SU had presented ideas that could serve as a blueprint for a future Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW). The issue had been discussed in April with Henry Kissinger. Such an agreement would lead to an invigoration of the international situation. Nixon’s response was cautious. This ‘peaceful bomb’ – so Nixon – would pose ’a very serious problem concerning consultation with our Allies.’377 Thus the White House would study the question quietly – without involving the bureaucracy from the outset. This was the only avenue to success. Nixon furthermore promised to take up the issue again during the summit – but not in a plenary. General-Secretary Brezhnev did not instantly turn towards the SALT agenda. Brezhnev highlighted that ‘The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA’, that had been worked out by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Kissinger in April 1972, were the most important document emerging from the negotiations – more important than SALT I itself. The former created a new reality in International Relations: a US-SU co-operation mechanism. The ‘condominium agenda’ was soon replaced by the outstanding SALT issues. The two parties on the following days focused on SLBM, ‘heavy’ ICBM and mobile land-based ICBM systems.378 The Brezhnev-Kissinger compromise formed the platform for the negotiations. Both sides agreed on the following ratio on SLBM: The SU would have 62 modern submarines and 950 launchers, the US 44 boats and 710 launchers. The US declared that it would not build three of the agreed upon submarines thus were actually freezing US submarines at 41. The new US Trident would not be deployed during the freeze period. In case it would deploy Trident the US would have to retire old systems to keep the ceiling agreed upon. Russia had the same right to replace older nuclear with new nuclear submarines. The US rejected the idea floated by General-Secretary Brezhnev to conclude a permanent SLBM agreement. Brezhnev feared that the US developed a new prototype during the freeze period. Having a pilot boat the production program would ‘go through the assembly line like pancake’.379 Brezhnev thus feared a renewed US drive towards superiority after 1979 – the end of the Interim Agreement. Nixon replied that it would be their common task to have a SALT II in place by then. ‘This agreement is hors d’oeuvre. Next comes the main course’ – SALT II.380 Brezhnev agreed after the base line of 48 modern submarines was agreed upon ‘to compensate for our [US] territorial advantages’.381 He repeated the line of agreement: The actual nuclear powered submarine number on the freeze date was 41 to 43 Y-type plus 6 H-type submarines. Retirements of 377 Editorial Note, 22 Mar 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 292. 378 Memo from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 23 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 293; Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Nixon, 23 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 295; Kissinger, 1218ff. 379 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Nixon, 23 May 1972, 7.20–9.55 PM, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 296. 380 Ibid 381 Ibid

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old ICBM or SLBM would allow construction of submarine beyond the base line of 48. The enhancement of the submarine fleet had to stop with the agreed upon upper limit for modern submarines for the SU, namely 62. The US by contrast would not retire any submarines nor build or deploy submarines during the period of the Interim Agreement. The US number was to stay at 41. The US would not build the three submarines – officially allowed. Nixon concurred. The US only rejected the formulation that the number of 48 had been granted due to geographical factors. The number was a mere outcome of the Y- and H-class submarine calculus. The latter issue was debated on 25 May between Smirnov, Gromyko, Dobrynin and Kissinger. Both parties finally agreed to the compromise, as finally presented by Gromyko and amended by the United States. Agreement was also reached that numbers would not have to feature in the SALT document itself but in the accompanying protocol – an integral part of the agreement.382 The SALT I Agreement as agreed upon on 26 May 1972 was composed of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons. The SALT I agreement was based on three key principles: (1) the maintenance of parity and renunciation of superiority; (2) the acceptance of mutual vulnerability, and (3) the link between offense and defense.383 The agreements were furthermore considered as a ‘substantial factor in curbing the race in offensive strategic arms’ in line with the NPT Art VI obligation to work towards a cessation of the nuclear arms race and to contribute to general and complete disarmament.384 The ABM treaty prohibited ABM systems except in two locations for each party. Testing in testing ranges was exempted. According to Article IX both parties were prohibited to ‘transfer to other states, and to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components.’385 Article X regulated that each party ‘undertakes not to as-

382 Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 24 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 302; Memo of Conversation, Smirnov-Kissinger, 25 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 303; Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, 25 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 307; Memo of Conversation, Smirnov-Kissinger, 25 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 308; Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Smith, 25 May 1972, FRUS 1969– 1976 XXXII, No 311, Memo of Conversation, Smirnov-Kissinger, 26 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 314; Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 26 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 315. 383 Condolezza Rice, ‘SALT and the Search for a Security Regime’, in George/Farley/Dallin (eds), 293–306, 297. 384 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 26 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 316. 385 Ibid

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sume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.’386 According to Article XI both parties were obliged to continue working for the limitation of strategic armaments. The ABM Treaty was of indefinite duration. The contracting parties were allowed to withdraw in case supreme national interests were affected. The Interim Agreement by contrast was an executive agreement that froze central systems as of 1 July 1972. It limited both fixed land-based ICBM and SLBM – according to the formula presented above. Article VII ruled that the parties would continue the process of the limitation of strategic armaments. The Interim Agreement duration was five years unless replaced earlier by a more ‘complete’ agreement on strategic arms. A withdrawal clause based on supreme national interests was added. The Protocol to the Interim Agreement laid out the SLBM regulation – including figures as agreed upon on the basis of the BrezhnevKissinger formula of early 1972.387 The SALT agreement was finalized with Interpretative Statements and Unilateral Declarations that clarified the treaty text or the negotiating position of the parties involved.388 What was achieved was a major step forward in superpower détente. The agreement rationalized the competition between the superpowers and thus laid a platform for future reductions. The US maintained a very advantageous position. Although the SU had a payload advantage – the US maintained a 3 to 1 advantage in warheads due to her MIRV program. MIRVing remained outside the scope of the treaty. SALT I furthermore put a lid on a very dynamic Soviet building program in SS-9 and submarines. The US kept the avenue open to deploy the superior US Trident submarine in case no definite agreement on modern central systems was emerging in the interim period.389 In case no definite agreement for offensive weapons was forthcoming the US reserved her right to withdraw from the ABM treaty – total freedom to arm would be re-established.390 The US finally succeed to keep other systems outside the scope of the agreement: the US FBS and long range bombers posed a real threat to the Soviet Union. The CM was not included either. The SU’s IR/MRBM program that threatened NATO Allies had been exempted as well. A price the US had to pay for keeping the FBS outside the scope of the agreement.

386 Ibid 387 Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, 26 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 318. 388 Approved Interpretation. SLBM Limitations and Replacement, 7 Jun 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 323; Roger’s Letter to the President on the ABM Treaty, 13 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783; Agreed Interpretations on Missile Accord, 13 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783. 389 Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig, 27 May 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 320. 390 US Delegation Statement, 9 May 1972, US Information Service, Agreed Interpretations on Missile Accords, 16 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783.

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US security was guaranteed. The SU had no chance to develop a first strike capability any more due to the limitation of heavy ICBMs. By contrast the SU did not have to fear a US first strike capability that might emerge from an area-defense ABM system of the US.391 European security was less served. None of the systems threatening the European theatre were limited or reduced.392 SALT, however, contained positive stipulations that limited a possible challenge to European security. The ABM system was light. Thus the European – French and British – deterrent forces were not invalidated. SALT I made it impossible to ‘inter-net’ the two ABM sites thus guaranteeing a British and French penetration capability.393 The unilateral statement of the US that the ABM treaty stipulations did not pose a precedent for any definitive agreement on offensive weapons was reassuring, as well.394 So was the fact that the Interim Agreement did not contain a non-transfer stipulation. The Americans thus successfully kept the option to preserve nuclear sharing and the special relationship open. The Interim Agreement’s duration was reassuring. The time period of five years provided a window of opportunity to regulate the special relationship and alliance affairs prior to the signing of a definitive agreement.395 Finally, the treaty did not refer to geographical factors, forward bases and ‘third party’ systems. Thus no precedent was made to include certain NATO systems or NATO assigned systems in a follow-on agreement. The negotiation record, however, mattered. Geographic factors could not be erased entirely: A statement by Henry Kissinger that explained the asymmetry in offensive systems with ‘our oversea base forces’ deserves to be mentioned in this context.396 This statement raised concerns in Europe. The Kissinger statement bolstered the Soviet position taken in her unilateral statement of 17 May 1972. The Soviet delegation had tabled a unilateral statement or interpretation that stipulated a right for compensation in case NATO Allies would increase their strategic submarine forces. The Soviet Statement of 17 May highlighted that the SLBM arrangement in the Interim Agreement only partially compensated for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of nuclear powered missile submarines of the US and the SU. The Soviet side believed that the ‘question of liquidating the American Missile Submarine Bases outside the US, would be appropriately resolved in the course of the follow on negotiations.’ The claimed ‘right’ to balance any in-

391 SALT: Note for the Prime Minister’s Visit to Copenhagen, 7 Jun 1972, TNA, FCO 46/826. 392 David S. Yost, ‘SALT and European Security’, in Id (ed), 110–137, 110. 393 First Phase SALT Agreements: Analysis. Annex B: SALT Agreements of 26 May 1972: British Interests. Russian ABM Defences, [undated, May 1972], TNA, FCO 46/826 or DEFE 24/782; see as well: SAL Agreement and POLARIS Improvement, 7 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/782; Meimeth, 18, Yost, SALT, 111. 394 US Delegation Statement, 13 Apr 1972, US Information Service, Agreed Interpretations on Missiles, 13 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783. 395 First Phase SALT Agreements: Analysis. Annex B: SALT Agreements of 26 May 1972: British Interests. Russian ABM Defences, [undated, May 1972], TNA, FCO 46/826 or DEFE 24/782. 396 Ibid

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crease of ‘third party’ forces was formally rejected by the US on 24 May 1972.397 A ‘right’ to compensate for US forward based SLBM submarines was rejected, as well. Contrasting interpretations remained on the record. The Europeans could be content – but had amble warning to stay alert. The SU would table the FBS question; the SU would furthermore re-engage with the question of a consultative mechanism to prevent nuclear war. A ‘no-first-use’ agreement lured. Both threatened NATO strategy and NATO solidarity. The European Allies thus decided to use the NATO Council Ministerial Meeting of 30– 31 May to defend their common position. The Europeans embraced the SALT package – since the freeze arrangement left the collective defense arrangements unaffected.398 Europe’s red lines had been defended. The Allies welcomed the SALT Agreement which – according to Pierre Harmel – ‘indicated’ that the NPT ‘was having lasting effects.’399 The superpowers had started to implement Art VI NPT and thus created a platform for reductions of the superpower arsenal. The NATO Allies, however, guarded against the view of the SU that concerted USSoviet action would be the key to European security. NATO unity mattered. The US concurred. The US could only express an opinion about European security but could not make any commitments that directly affected European security. The NATO partners finally insisted that MBFR had to be a multilateral endeavor on all accounts. The adoption of the Tiflis-type bilateralism by the superpowers was not agreeable. The SALT formula could not be used for European security.400 The Europeans gathered again in the ‘Petrignani Group’ on 16 June 1972 right before the final and complete briefing of the US on the SALT Agreement of 26 May 1972. The Europeans disliked that the SU in her unilateral statement of 17 May referred to the British and French nuclear potentials. Any attempt by the superpowers to regulate ‘third party’ affairs made continued vigilance necessary. The Europeans had to firmly co-operate in order to have a clear voice opportunity when ‘third party’ systems, transfer questions and non-central systems would be discussed in the future. The US had to be aware of the European red lines prior to negotiations about the European position in order to successfully forestall the gradual emergence of a US-SU condominium at Europe’s expense.401 Given the intraAlliance consultation mechanism continued to work well bilateral superpower SALT negotiations could proceed without damaging European interest.

397 SU Delegation Statement, 17 May 1972, US Information Service, Agreed Interpretations on Missiles, 13 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783; Aufzeichnung zur Unterrichtung der Minister. Betr. SALT. Hier: Die kürzlich unterzeichneten Abkommen. Inhalt und Bewertung, 31 May 1972, PA–AA, ZW 107290. 398 German Delegation, Brussels, Informal Working Paper. German Preliminary Views on the SALT Arrangements of May 26, 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/784. 399 Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held in Bonn on Tuesday, 30th May 1972, at 3.15 PM, NATO Archive Brussels C–R (72) 25, Part II. 400 Runderlaβ des Ministerdirektors von Staden. Betr. Ministersitzung der NATO in Bonn am 30 und 31. Mai 1972, AAPD 1972, Nr. 159. 401 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Hartmann, 20 Jun 1972, AAPD 1972, Nr. 176.

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The US finally presented the SALT agreement in all detail in the NAC on 16 June 1972. The Allies were reassured that the second strike capability had been preserved and no commitment made that affected Alliance relations. A more stable strategic balance had been obtained without negative repercussions on Alliance affairs.402 The asymmetry in numbers was compensated by the warhead superiority of the US. SALT, however, did not close-off all avenues for strategic competition, thus the US had to complete the task in a second phase of negotiations – as envisaged by the ‘20 May Understanding’.403 The next phase of SALT was to begin in October/November 1972. The US would focus on central systems – their reduction. The regulations of qualitative aspects would be addressed as – inevitably – the question of FBS.404 The Anglo-American consultations on 20 June 1972 further indicated that the future negotiations would ‘resume from the point reached when the agreement of 20 May 1971 intervened.’ Thus SALT II would be more comprehensive and embrace quantitative and qualitative aspects. The Director of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department Spiers expected a resurrection of the ‘August package’ and an almost immediate confrontation with the question of FBS.405 Rose responded that the ‘Petrignani Group’ was prepared.406 The academic studies would serve their purpose. SALT was the forum for a FBS agreement – not MBFR. The SALT avenue blocked a possible ‘denuclearization’ of Europe thru arms control. MBFR and CSCE would not touch upon European nuclear systems. Thus any ‘European settlement’ by way of SALT, MBFR and CSCE would not leave Europe unguarded. To the contrary – Europe’s relative position would rise with any reduction of the superpower potentials – as envisaged by Article VI of the NPT.

*** The SALT I negotiation record deserves attention. SALT further codified the global order of the NPT. With SALT an East-West regime was emerging where the superpowers concerted their vital interests – in nuclear affairs and beyond. The US and the SU clearly moved from competition to cooperation and co-creation or condominium.407 In the words of Richard Perle the superpowers sought strategic stability, i.e. attempted ‘to narrow the gap between first and second strikes, to mi-

402 Peck to Cabinet Office, SALT, 19 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783. 403 George Vest to Joseph Luns, NATO Secretary-General, 14 Jun 1972, Annex: President Nixon’s Transmittal Letter, 13 Jun 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/783. 404 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Hartmann, 20 Jun 1972, AAPD 1972, Nr. 176. 405 Record of Conversation Between Mr. C. M. Rose and Mr. R. Spiers (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department on 20 Jun 1972, TNA, FCO 46/826. 406 Ibid 407 Smith, Doubletalk, 470; B.J. Fall-Minute on President Nixon’s Visit to Moscow, 30 May 1972, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 1, No. 97.

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nimize the advantage of striking first.’408 The next step was a formal ban on firstuse of nuclear weapons – as proposed by the Soviet Union. During the SALT I negotiations the SU had declared an interest to prohibit nuclear war and to intervene in common in conflict regions to preserve international peace. Moscow furthermore sought a bilateral agreement to ban the ‘first-use’ of nuclear weapons.409 Superpower consultation would replace consultation among Allies. The superpower forum would be prioritized. Deterrence would be relegated. Wars would be limited in area and scope below strategic exchanges involving the superpowers and their territories.410 Systemic stability was the aim and the result of those initiatives. The US acted cautiously due to her Alliance obligations. President Nixon, however, during the Moscow Summit highlighted the common responsibility of the superpowers for world peace. Thus he recommended using power always to preserve peace instead of breaking it. The superpowers – so Nixon – had a common responsibility to influence ‘third parties’ in order to mitigate their behavior in international affairs.411 The US thus was much more willing to concert actions than the refusal of the Soviet projects indicated. The spirit had left the bottle; the US soon fell in line withstanding European fears and interventions.412 The SALT negotiation outlined in all clarity the two layered competition: The competition between the superpowers and the competition within the Alliance. The SALT I process was a ‘laboratory’. The take-off phase laid bare the problems inherent in a ‘comprehensive agreement’: the fears of a decoupling of US and European security, the problems of NATO cohesion, the problem of security by numbers.413 The achievement of strategic parity due to the SALT process automatically led to a decoupling of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons with a major impact on US-European affairs. A decoupling of US and European security was a factor that the European had to cope with. The US would use their strategic arm only in case US territory was threatened.414 A tactical nuclear option had to 408 Morton A. Kaplan, ’SALT and the International System’, in Id (ed), 1–25, 9. See as well: Richard Perle, ‘Superpower Postures in SALT: The Language of Arms Control’, in Kaplan (ed), 119–135. 409 Smith, Doubletalk, 462. On no first use and SALT, see: Nicole C. Evans, ‘A defensive orientation in Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear thought?’ International Journal 59 (2003– 2004), 207–220, 213ff; On ‘no first use’ in the future process see: Josef Joffe, ‘Nuclear Weapons, No First Use and European Order’, Ethics 95, 3 (1985), 606–618 and McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert McNamara, Gerard Smith, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs 60 (1982), 753–768. 410 Paul Buteux, ‘Theatre Nuclear Weapons and European Security’, Journal of Political Science 10, 4 (1977), 781–808, 798. 411 Kissinger, 1282. 412 Garthoff, SALT I, 6. 413 Kaplan, ‘SALT and the International System’, in Id (ed), 1–25, 9. 414 Schmoller-Haldy. Protokoll. SALT. Kolloquium mit Dr van Cleave (Washington, D.C), 14 Jul 1972, ACDP, I 44-183/2; See also: ‘The explicit recognition of parity by the US in the Moscow Agreements of May 1972 means that the US will not commit her strategic forces

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be preserved by Western Europe. This would entail a change of the nuclear doctrine and a shift of decision-making from Washington to NATO Europe since escalation to the strategic was unlikely. Europe furthermore might have to consider targeting the MRBM with indigenous French and British nuclear forces. Finally the FBS might be a wasting asset. The European’s thus had to try to link them with either IRBM or a reduction of the Soviet conventional superiority within the MBFR negotiations. Reciprocity had to be the guiding principle in order to obtain parity in the European theatre itself. In case this was not achieved SALT would foster global security or systemic stability at the expense of European security. Some years later, the Russian modernization of the IR/MRBM only triggered the inevitable: the Euromissile Crisis. Europe sought equal security for all. The Dual Track Decision was a logic outcome (1) given the unequal security established by SALT I and (2) given the ‘replacement cycle’ in strategic weaponry due after the expiration of the Interim Agreement in the late 1970s. Finally, SALT I provided the Europeans with the instrumentarium to deal with superpower arms control in a structured way. Obviously the US could not negotiate issues affecting NATO in a forum in which NATO Allies were not present.415 Thus a structured consultation mechanism, in NATO and beyond was necessary.416 The NAC, the NPG, Eurogroup and NATO Experts Meetings harmonized positions with implications for European security. The ‘Petrignani Group’ of European Experts instituted on Italian initiative turned into the kernel of European co-operation on strategic arms control – a cooperation that finally shaped Alliance and global affairs in the 1980s. Last but not least the SALT experience matters for a comprehension of the limitation of options in the international system, for a comprehension of alliance diplomacy and for an understanding of the power of planning and timing in the self-help system of international relations. SALT I was an example of a multi-layered diplomacy; SALT I was an example of a strategy to proceed by ‘building blocs’ in order to advance withstanding blocking issues. For Europe SALT I was a process of adjustments to the institutionalization of the bipolar world order of the superpowers. For Europe SALT I was an exercise in keeping options and avenues open for the future autonomous development of Europe. For Europe it was ‘important that nothing occur at SALT that would inhibit the unification of Europe or its eventual development of a joint nuclear force.’417 The ‘European Option’ so to speak was preserved – by way of NATO ‘nuclear against the SU except in response to a direct threat to her own survival. This being the case, there can be no way that the US can allow theatre nuclear weapons to couple her strategic forces to the defense of Europe’, Buteux, 798. 415 Kaplan, ‘SALT and the International System’, in Id (ed), 1–25, 21. 416 ‘From June 1969 through June 1972 after the signing of the SALT I Interim Agreement […] the SALT Delegation provided forty-five oral and written communications to the NAC, conducted twenty-two briefings of NAC by senior SALT delegation members, and held six detailed [NATO] expert meetings.’ Garthoff, Journey, 233. 417 Ibid, 23

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sharing’ and by way of an Anglo-French nuclear trusteeship for Europe.418 This entailed the preservation of a nuclear transfer policy as a platform for NATO’s dual-key arrangements and the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship.

418 François Duchêne, ‘A New European Defense Community’, 50 Foreign Affairs (1970–1971), 69–82, 76f.

II. WHAT IS PARITY? EUROPE, SALT II AND THE VLADIVOSTOK AGENDA IN THE ERA NIXON-FORD, 1972–1976

1. INTRODUCTION The principle of strategic parity had guided the SALT I process – parity in security not in numbers. ‘Equal security’ was the Soviet term. Meant was the formation and institutionalization of a genuine balance of power. ‘Strategic parity’ or ‘equal security’ stood for an agreement that guaranteed that neither side could obtain a ‘first strike’ capability that threatened the very existence of the respective other.1 The ABM treaty left ‘mutual assured destruction’ intact. The Interim Agreement stopped a dynamic Soviet building program and created an overall balance of terror. A stable strategic environment had emerged. The Nixon Administration thus requested Congressional approval for SALT I and for the continuation of the SALT process in line with the ‘20 May Understanding’ and the SALT agreement. The achieved ‘equality of security’ had to be extended to nonregulated central systems and to non-central systems in order to disallow a circumvention of the precious equilibrium. SALT I had regulated only the core balance of fixed IRBM and SLBM. The asymmetrical approach to offensive weapons systems had achieved a broad balance among the superpowers – irrespective of the inequality of numbers. This was due to (1) the provisional character of the offensive agreement and (2) the fact that the agreement knew only quantitative restrictions no qualitative ones. The MIRV advantage of the US equalized the throw weight advantage of Soviet delivery systems. A ‘definitive’ agreement would have to extend the balance to strategic bombers2, CM, air defense systems and non-central systems that had the potential to challenge the balance over time. Destabilizing technological developments had to be watched and considered in addition. Congressional scrutiny can be brutal. Alliance scrutiny even harsher. The interpretations of the achievement differed. The perceived aims of arms control dif-

1

2

Foreign Policy Report by President Nixon to Congress, 9 Feb 1972, in US ACDA (ed), Documents on Disarmament 1972, Washington: Government Printing Office 1973, 20–44, 36. News Conference Remarks by Presidential Assistant Kissinger and ACDA Director Smith: Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, 26 May 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 207–217, 209.

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fered. Was the US aiming at reductions in line with the NPT obligations? Did Washington seek a new world order or mere stability? Obtained was parity among the superpowers in central weapons systems. Whether an overall parity among the blocks of the Cold War had emerged was open to debate. From a Western European perspective the Western deterrent was endangered. Europe’s security was more precarious now than before the SALT process had started. Europe was more exposed than ever before during the Cold War. The parity among the superpowers destroyed the US nuclear umbrella. The Soviet sub-strategic and conventional superiority turned into an even bigger concern.3 For Europe a strategic parity limited to the superpowers meant that the superpowers cancelled each other out. The escalation ladder was broken. Europe was left bare and naked. Deterrence was undermined or challenged. Limited nuclear wars were the remaining option. The battlefield was Europe. The imbalance created by ‘strategic parity’ would remain until all major categories of weapons were regulated in SALT or MBFR. Equal aggregates of strategic, intermediate, tactical nuclear weapons and of conventional forces were needed to obtain ‘bloc security’ – a security for all: superpowers and their Allies alike. The ‘strategic parity’ in central systems thus had created unequal security for the US and Europe – a development with far-reaching repercussions for the Alliance. SALT I nevertheless was acceptable for Europe. It was a temporary measure. The definitive SALT II, however, had to tackle the inequality in security. The inequality was not allowed to persist. The European Allies feared a USSU condominium – a cooperation to regulate in common a new world order. The US ‘will make a deal at the expense of its NATO Allies.’4 According to the Europeans ‘the bilateralism may produce some kind of condominium in which they would become vassals rather than Allies.’5 Alliance interests would be subordinated under the new superpower regime.6 The European Allies had either to seek a revival of Atlantic defense cooperation or to re-conceptualize their role in the emerging new world order. The existing European options had to be maintained. The Alliance relationship had to be adjusted. The European experiment extended to defense policy and defense. The ‘European Nuclear Option’ considered. The superpower détente had to be challenged by a European détente in order to forestall a ‘neutralization’ of Europe in bipolarity. European détente and the enlargement of the Europe Communities – by the UK, Denmark and Ireland – offered an enhancement of the common relative position of Europe in the international system.7 Poly-centricity even multi-polarity could be the aim.

3 4 5 6 7

Memo of Conversation, Nixon-Pompidou, 13 Dec 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 158. Information Memo From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrandt) to the Secretary of State Rogers, 15 Nov 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 75. Ibid Meeting Between the Defence Secretary and the US Secretary of Defense, 27 Oct 1972, TNA, FCO 46/829. Memo of Conversation, Heath-Pompidou, 18 Dec 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 335.

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Concepts of regional and European order started to dominate the arms control agenda as soon as the MBFR negotiations complemented the SALT process.8 SALT, MBFR, Alliance and European policy were closely interlinked by way of the underlying concepts of regional and global order. Geographical factors moved center stage. The definition of ‘reduction zones’ was a highly political matter – not a matter of a rational or pure security calculus.9 The Soviet FBS agenda in SALT, the removal of US forward bases, US carrier units and the reduction of stationed US forces in MBFR hinted at a concept of a gradual ‘denuclearization’ of Central Europe. Once withdrawn a re-engagement of the US in the ‘European theatre’ was almost impossible; once withdrawn an escalation to the strategic level was almost unobtainable due to a missing trigger of US conventional forces or US tactical nuclear forces.10 In line herewith a limited aggression, a European theatre war, was becoming more likely – not less. The Europeans thus insisted on an exemption of NATO’s non-central systems from the SALT process and prepared the hour of a decoupling of the US and European security. Europe was to be built up as a more independent pillar within a renewed Alliance structure. Europe had to maintain the option to trigger a general nuclear war and fight a regional war. The arms control negotiations would structure European behavior. The arms control negotiations would decide the strategy to be chosen by Europe to assure Europe’ position in the international system. Decoupling was a choice of last resort. The US was aware of the problematique. US Senator Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson – the leading voice in defense from the Hill – had an explicitly European focus. His focus on equal numbers for the superpowers and an exclusion of the ‘third party’ potentials was an avenue to combine superpower parity with block superiority. Jackson’s security model was traditional. A preservation of the West will assure superiority. The price tag: a need to adjust the Alliance relationship to the new reality; a need to redefine the US-European Alliance relationship. The US had to adopt a firm line. European theatre systems had to be exempted from reductions. Such an approach would stabilize the Alliance, prevent a European ‘neutralization’ and provide block superiority. The US had to embrace the concept of a strong European partner in order to assure a strong Alliance instead of cooperating with the SU in a denuclearization of the European Continent. This ‘conservative model’ was prioritized also by the key European players: the UK and France. The ‘conservative’ model was gradually embraced by the Nixon Administration – as will be shown in this section of the study. The Alliance focus of Senator Jackson was contested. The ‘conservatives’ had to compete with the old Kennedy-Johnson ‘school’ that had commenced the institutionalization of bipolar-

8

Überlegungen zum Gesprächsvorschlag für Botschafter Sahm, Aspekte der europäischen Sicherheit, 6 Oct 1972, PA–AA, ZW 107303. 9 Memo of Conversation, Nixon-Pompidou, 13 Dec 1971, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 158. 10 Dr Birrenbach, Die USA in der nächsten Amtsperiode Richard Nixons, Reise in die USA, 29 September–7 October 1972, ACDP I 433-143/2 (1).

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ity. These ‘progressives’ clearly preferred an East-West regime in line with the NPT agenda and global principles. They banked on European détente to obtain a gradual transformation and a convergence of the systems. The old Henry Wallace liberal approach was well alive in the 1970s. This School of thought preferred a different model.11 The ACDA ‘arms controllers’ who had dominated the SALT delegation but not the SALT process were willing to disarm. ‘Superiority’ was detrimental to the process of arms control. East-West relations necessitated an absolute gains approach. The liberal arms controllers thus were willing to embrace ‘equal security’ as ‘equal block security’. This was a difficult concept: ‘equal numbers’ for the competing blocks meant either (1) lower numbers for the US or (2) a total ‘sale out’ of Alliance interests for the ‘general good’ of block stability. A sale out was likely for it would proof hard to sell to the US bureaucracy and public to accept lower numbers for the US. The ‘liberal’ school was seeking to preserve the rational bipolar world order and to sacrifice ‘third party’ nuclear potentials. The liberal’s preference for global ‘obligations’ vs ‘alliance obligations’ tilted clearly towards the former. By prioritizing global over European security ‘equal security’ was to be created in East West relations at the expense of the security of Alliance partners. This model was based on a prioritization that would leave ‘Europe’ neutralized and weak. The end result was: a divided or possibly united but denuclearized Europe and a US at par with the Soviet Union. The latter was the assumed price for world peace. Senator Jackson – surely could not agree. The stakes for Europe in SALT II remained high. Which of the two models would dominate? SALT would decide the framework for Europe’s further development. The Congressional Hearings would clarify options and dangers that Europe would have to face in the SALT II process.

11 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster 1995, 710.

2. FROM SALT I TO SALT II: THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL In a news conference in Moscow on 27 May – a day after the signing of the SALT accords – Henry Kissinger announced that the US and the SU ‘will try to convert the [interim] agreement into a permanent agreement […] we will try to include all categories of weapons not now included and may address the question of technological change.’12 ‘We do not expect there to be a very long interval. We think we have the momentum now.’13

The Administration hoped to have SALT I ratified before the summer recess of Congress. The follow-up negotiations for a definitive SALT Agreement on Offensive Weapons were scheduled for November 1972 – right around the US Presidential elections.14 The Congressional Hearings held in June/July 1972 witnessed a clash of the ‘schools’ described above.15 Arguments differed widely. Stanley Hoffmann – guided by the logic of strategic parity – hoped for a superpower regime to replace the arms race: ‘deterring the unthinkable and accumulating the unusable would continue to be as senseless as the holocaust itself.’16 A continuation of the arms race would leave 'the runners at the end of each phase in the same mutual relation but on a higher plateau of financial depletion and human absurdity.’17 Paul C. Warnke – a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under Lyndon B Johnson – thought that the US should not be concerned with the ‘existing mathematical edge’ – ‘nor should we be concerned about any attempts that the Soviet Union might make to add additional, useless numbers to their already far more than adequate supply.’18

An overkill capacity had been reached. ‘Mutual assured destruction’ was guaranteed. There would never be a ‘first strike’ capability emerging – for either side. The US thus could embark on the NPT agenda of force reductions and general disarmament without running a security risk. The White House did not concur. The overkill argument could not replace a national security calculus and strategy. What mattered was a nuclear deterrent posture that was sufficient for the implementation of the national security aims of the United States. ‘Sufficiency’ was not strategic parity. ‘Sufficiency’ was parity with an edge. The West at least had to 12 News Conference Remarks by Presidential Assistant Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 27 May 1972, in Documents on Disarmaments 1972, 217–229, 224. 13 Ibid 14 Remarks by President Nixon at Congressional Briefings: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 15 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 291–295, 293. 15 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, 21 Jul 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 506–515, 510. 16 Ibid, 510. 17 Ibid, 510. 18 Ibid, 511.

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have an edge. The ‘West’ had to be able to negotiate from a position of strength in order to be able to successfully maintain and extend the achieved parity. The US had to have bargaining chips ready at hand. This required a high military budget. Success in arms control has a price tag. It is not automatic. Secretary of Defense Laird made this entirely clear in his realist analysis of SALT. The US had ‘applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments’ and ‘laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and possible arms reductions in the future.’19 An important facet of this foundation was the fact that neither the ABM Treaty nor the Interim Agreement limited modernization.20 SALT I contained no qualitative restrictions. The interim freeze would inhibit the SU not the United States. The US did not envisage new deployments prior to 1977 but the SU did. SALT I had been successfully negotiated due to the fact that Congress had agreed to ‘Safeguard’, Poseidon and Minuteman III. SALT II ‘can only succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such programs as the Trident system, the B-1 bomber […] SLCM submarine launched cruise missiles and accelerated satellite basing of strategic bombers.’21

Furthermore, the US would have to enhance their intelligence and verification capabilities. ‘This is no time for complacency. This is not a time to cut back on those systems which are designed to maintain and preserve US strength’22 – a strength necessary to lead arms control negotiations to success. The threat potential of these regulated and unregulated systems would allow a favorable renegotiation of existing systems or a regulation of unregulated systems. President Nixon’s letter to the Senate of 13 June 1972 breathes the same spirit. The SALT I agreements – so Nixon – ‘do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to assure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.’23

The US had to bank on technological superiority to be able to cope with the numerical disadvantage on delivery systems frozen by the Interim Agreement for

19 Statement by Secretary of Defense Laird to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmaments 1972, 259–267, 260. 20 Ibid, 261. 21 Ibid, 262; Statement by ACDA Director Smith to the Senate Armed Services Committee: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 28 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 422– 429, 429. 22 Ibid, 263. 23 Letter from President Nixon to the Senate on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 13 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 286–288, 287.

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five years.24 Thus an additional defense budget was requested by President Nixon in order to preserve an edge thru modernization.25 Henry Kissinger’s defense of SALT I in the Congressional Hearings was balanced. SALT could not be isolated from US national security policy and US diplomacy. SALT was more than SALT I. SALT was a process. SALT was only the central facet of a ‘broadly based accommodation of interests with the U.S.S.R’. ‘It stands [...] linked organically to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.’ SALT thus was not a technical accomplishment but a political. Without a further accommodation of interests any arms control treaty would be breached and circumvented.26 Points of contention remained. The danger of circumvention persisted. The US had to address the core problem of the compatibility of bilateral strategic arms limitations with Alliance obligations. The Soviet definition of ‘strategic weapon’ – a weapons system capable to reach the homeland of the other superpower – had never been agreed upon.27 The definition entailed a demand to either (1) remove US FBS from Europe or to (2) count them into the aggregate total of strategic weapons. At the same time Soviet IR/MRBM forces threatening Europe remained outside of the scope of the definition and thus outside the scope of the SALT process. The Nixon Administration had opposed this definition from the outset – due to its prejudicial impact on Alliance relations. It drove a wedge between ‘our own security and that of the Europeans.’28 It would leave Europe under the threat of Soviet IR/MRBM while removing the nuclear threat to the superpowers. This was dynamite for alliance relations. The Allies had demanded not to compromise on FBS. A stalemate over the scope of the negotiations and the core definitions thus had emerged that was finally broken by the ‘20 May Understanding’ that had temporarily excluded all non-central systems from the SALT process.29 SALT I thus was incomplete. FBS were exempted, geographical factors eliminated – with one marked exception: the question of deployment characteristics had been taken into the equation for the SLBM agreement. ‘Because of the difference in geography and basing, it had been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.’30 The SU had more missile launchers, ‘but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same numbers of

24 Questions by Senator Percy and Replies of Secretary of Defense Laird on the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements, 21 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmaments 1972, 395–397, 397. 25 Questions by Senator Jackson and Replies of the Department of Defense on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 24 Jul 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 514–518. 26 Remarks by Presidential Assistant Kissinger at Congressional Briefing: Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 15 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 295–309, 298. 27 Ibid, 301. 28 Ibid, 301. 29 Ibid, 302. 30 Ibid, 307.

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launchers on each side. The US had a big advantage in warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on mega-tonnage.’31 Thus a strategic or politico-military parity emerged. But SALT I was only the beginning. ‘It is SALT II that is the key.’ The SALT process offered new prospects – prospects of future savings through arms reductions. ‘But you cannot get SALT II without entering SALT I’.32 The ‘strategic parity’ would have to be extended to other categories of weapons to create a platform for possible reductions. Kissinger hoped that an inclusion of strategic bombers in the aggregate total would balance the aggregate total in SALT II. It would codify the existing balance in a verifiable way. Such a move would simultaneously offer an opportunity to circumvent the question of FBS and non-central systems from the SALT process. FBS should neither be counted as strategic systems nor be withdrawn to backwards stations due to their NATO assignment for the defense of Europe.33 They served European security – not US security. Both Houses of Congress supported ratification of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty was approved by the US Senate on 3 August 1972. But Congress structured the future SALT process by way of the Jackson Amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 of 7 August 1972. The Jackson Amendment was not legally binding for the US Government. It was ‘a simple declaration of policy’ a guideline by Congress for the US Government in respect to the future SALT process.34 The Jackson Amendment demanded that the US Government had to seek numerical parity in offensive weapons in order not to stop the drift from superiority to parity to sufficiency to interim sub-parity. The US could not accept strategic inferiority without risking US national security. The second point worth mentioning: any limits discussed in SALT II ‘are confined to intercontinental strategic forces’. Jackson added in his press statement that Congress strongly supported the President’s policy not to ‘compromise the interests of our European Allies by including forces dedicated to their defense in the calculation of the overall U.S.-U.S.S.R strategic balance.’35 The House Foreign Affairs Report of 10 August finally supported all unilateral declarations submitted by the Nixon Administration.36 It considered any actions inconsistent with the unilateral statements accompanying the SALT I agreement as a ‘grave matter affecting the

31 Ibid, 307. 32 Memo from the President’s Special Counsel Colson to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig, 20 Jun 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 331. 33 Ibid, 306; Questions by Senator Percy and Replies by ACDA Director Smith on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 19 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 323–325, 324. 34 Alan Platt/Lawrence D. Weiler, Congress and Arms Control, Boulder: Westview Press 1978, 10. 35 Press Statement by Senator Jackson, 7 Aug 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 546. 36 Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting, 7 Jun 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976 XXXII, No 322.

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national security interests of the United States’.37 The US thus had a right to withdraw from the ABM treaty in case the Interim Agreement collapsed; it also had a right to withdraw from SALT I, if unilateral declarations were violated. The Jackson Amendment offered the Nixon Administration a firm backing for the future SALT process. It redefined the term ‘strategic weapons’. The Jackson Amendment talked of ‘intercontinental strategic forces’ as the subject area of SALT. According to Senator Jackson’s interpretation the Administration thus was advised not to compromise the interests of European Allies by including forces dedicated to their exclusive defense. The Jackson Amendment furthermore repudiated the Soviet unilateral statement of 17 May which declared a compensation right for the existence of British and French nuclear forces and for US forward bases. The Soviet declaration was incompatible with the Jackson Amendment principle of ‘United States-Soviet equality’.38 The Nixon Administration endorsed the Jackson Amendment. The Administration, however, refused to endorse interpretations of the Jackson Amendment given by Senator Jackson. The Nixon Administration intended to keep the needed room for maneuver to negotiate SALT II.39 The Jackson Amendment was anathema to the SU – and to the liberal arms control school in the United States. It was supported by the majority in the US Congress. The Interim Agreement was finally approved by the House on 18 August – with 329 to 7.40 The Senate by contrast stalled. Senator William J. Fulbright attacked the Jackson Amendment fiercely. The Amendment – so Fulbright – led to interpretative battles, enhanced arms spending and precipitated a continuation of the arms race with Moscow. Jackson retaliated: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – in contrast to the Arms Services Committee – had never addressed the important and strategic questions. The SALT I Interim Agreement would only slightly and temporarily stop the Soviet momentum. A follow-on SALT agreement thus had to assure equality of numbers ‘between the US and the Soviet intercontinental strategic forces’ comprising ICBMs, SLBMs and intercontinental bombers.41 The US could not safely rely on their ‘superior technology to make up for inferior numbers.’42 The MIRV advantage would not last – in the long run. SALT I did not limit Soviet R&D either. The Nixon Administration thus deserved support. The Administration also deserved support for its decision to exempt FBS from the negotiations. ‘These should not in

37 House Foreign Affairs Committee Report on the Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, 10 Aug 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 555–561, 560. 38 Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon on Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 10 Jun 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 267–286, 286. 39 Tebbitt to FCO, 10 Aug 1972, Revised Jackson Amendment, TNA, FCO 46/827; John B. Rhinelander, ‘An Overview of SALT I’, American Society of International Law Proceedings 67 (1973), 29–35, 31; Tebbit to FCO, 19 Aug 1972, TNA, FCO 46/827. 40 UK Embassy Washington to FCO, Tel No. 79, 21 Aug 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828. 41 Ibid 42 Ibid

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any event be counted in the intercontinental strategic balance.’43 To start counting forces for the defense of Europe against the aggregate total would split the Alliance.44 The US had to focus on three basics: (1) equal numbers of intercontinental strategic systems, (2) equal throw weight and (3) the exclusion of US FBS from the SALT process.45 Jackson clearly aimed at block superiority by insisting on parity among the superpowers. The argument was anathema to the liberal arms control school. The members of the latter now quoted Henry Kissinger who had stated that withstanding the inequality of numbers on regulated systems an overall parity existed, if unregulated systems and strategic factors would be taken into the equation. Senator Jackson – so his opponents – seemed to seek an advantage by bracketing US forces stationed in the European theatre. This was contrary to the Moscow Declaration of Basic Principles. The latter instrument contained the principle of ‘equal security’. Senator Alan Cranston suggested including the NATO Allies in the negotiations in order to find a solution for FBS. The SU had a right to be concerned about US FBS as much as the US about Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Jackson Amendment and Secretary Laird’s statements did cast a doubt on the Administration’s willingness ‘to bring the arms race under control’ and to seek – in good faith – general nuclear disarmament.46 The opposition embraced the concept of block equality: a nightmare for most Republicans, ‘Scoop’ Jackson Democrats and Europeans – alike. SALT I Interim Agreement was approved by the US Senate on 25 September. The ratification process was completed on 3 October 1972.47 Thus the avenue was open for the US and the SU to go one step further. In the words of President Nixon: ‘We must now move from the first step to the virtually important next step in which we consider the whole range of offensive nuclear weapons and try to find agreement between our two nations in that field.’48

43 Ibid 44 Senator Jackson, ‘Credible Deterrence in a SALT II Environment’, Military Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Bonn, November 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830. 45 Ibid; Makins, US Strategic Doctrine and SALT II, 19 Dec 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830. 46 UK Embassy Washington to FCO, Tel No. 79, 21 Aug 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828. 47 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 13 Sep 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 44; Memo of Conversation, Gromyko-Kissinger, 2 Oct 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 55. 48 President Nixon, 3 Oct 1972, Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXII, No 342.

3. A NEW BEGINNING: THE PREPARATION OF THE GENEVA TALKS While the battle was waging on the Hill first preparations for SALT II were taken. Negotiations on two tracks started: (1) the negotiations between the superpowers, and (2) the Alliance negotiations on SALT II. The Alliance game was to be prioritized. The US started the debate on the upcoming new SALT process at the NAC meeting on 30 June 1972. The US planning started from the following premises: (1) SALT I had created a platform and a time frame by freezing central offensive nuclear weapons for five years; (2) SALT II will not embark on arms reductions but will seek to limit all major central strategic nuclear weapons; (3) SALT II will not cover tactical nuclear weapons but might seek to cover IR/MRBM, and (4) SALT II will have a technical agenda. The US did not envisage dealing with specific political questions – such as NATO systems, European unity or German unification. The US would not attempt to seal the status quo in Europe via arms control.49 NATO would retain her tactical nuclear potential. Reductions could not occur. The US strategy was to keep European issues off the negotiation table – as far as possible.50 The Europeans remained nervous. A kind of ‘reversal of alliances was feared’ – as highlighted by James Goodby, the Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs, US Delegation NATO.51 The NATO Allies awaited the day the US would prioritize cooperation with the SU to cooperation with European Allies.52 The psychological situation in Europe was tense. The emerging MBFR agenda only heightened tensions and distrust. The European Allies feared a US grand strategy that left Europe unprotected and Germany discriminated. The talks between Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou on 3–4 July 1972 were telling. Brandt saw clear dangers in superpower bilateralism. Brandt considered it truly remarkable that Rogers and Gromyko when informing the FRG about the May Summit used almost the same choice of words to express that nothing had been discussed that affected ‘third parties’. A concerted public diplomacy was discernible. The US and SU regulated their information flows. Europe had to be alert. Pompidou con-

49 Entwurf. Sprechzettel für Botschafter Grewe. Die NATO Diskussion am 30.6. und 1.7., PA– AA, ZW 107290. 50 Ibid 51 ‘[…] that the United States was going through some kind of reversal of alliances. I mean, that’s what we heard at NATO in those days, 1973 and less so in 1974, that the United States was going through a process of dropping the relationship with the NATO Allies and shifting to a relationship, almost bordering on alliance with Moscow.’ Interview with James Goodby, LC, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Interviewer: Charles Stuart Kennedy. Interview date: 10 December 1990, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ index.html (last access: 3 May 2013) 52 Entwurf, Sprechzettel für Botschafter Schippenköter. Fragen einer deutschen Linie für die SALT Konsultationen, 2 Jul 1972, PA–AA, ZW 107290.

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curred. Geopolitically the situation was challenging. European security was endangered. Strategic parity neutralized the superpowers. The US would nevertheless seek to reduce US presence in the FRG and the United Kingdom. France – so the French President – would not support a US force withdrawal from Europe. France would not partake in MBFR. France would not support FBS reductions in SALT – either.53 In any case the French nuclear potential would remain unrestricted. Thus Europe could not be ‘denuclearized’. The impact of superpower détente on European security was not only raising concerns in France and the Federal Republic. The UK feared that the SU in particular would seek to involve the ‘other nuclear powers’ into the SALT process.54 The British Foreign Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home thus recommended commencing with the French a study on the effect of SALT on the European nuclear powers.55 The UK was obliged to keep all avenues open for a nuclear cooperation with France. The French card might be the only option left for the UK in case the superpowers embarked on a further restriction of nuclear transfers. Thus SALT had to be accompanied by an Anglo-French dialogue on nuclear defense. Staatssekretär Paul A. Frank of the Auswärtige Amt warned US Assistant Secretary David M. Abshire that the US grand strategy for SALT and MBFR should avert a US force withdrawal. A ‘Finlandization’ of Central Europe was unacceptable, a European nuclear option problematic. The formation of a ENF would lessen security. The latter would create tensions with the SU, with the US, and within Europe.56 Staatssekretär Frank advised to consider a New Atlanticism based on an institutionalized European-American dialogue.57 SALT thus had to lead to a parallel adjustment of the Alliance structures. The German-American Staff Talks in Washington scheduled for 17–18 July 1972 dealt with the specifics. The US negotiation position in SALT and MBFR and the US views on a linkage between SALT and MBFR.58 The Federal Security Council assumed that the upcoming round of talks would be challenging for Europe: The SU was expected to table a list of desiderata: (1) the inclusion of FBS in the aggregate total of strategic system; (2) the removal of US forward bases; (3) the inclusion of ‘third party’ systems in the overall strategic balance, and (4) a non-transfer clause that extended to technology transfer. The SU – so the German analysis – had two core aims: (1) to prevent circumvention, and (2) to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. The FRG thus had to establish an institutionalized bilateral dialogue with the US – to forestall damage to Germany, Europe and the Alliance at

53 54 55 56

Gespräche des BK Brandt mit Staatspräsident Pompidou, 3–4 Jul 1972, ADAP 1972, Nr. 196. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 13 Jul 1972, TNA, FCO 46/827. Ibid Gespräch des Staatssekretär Frank mit dem Abteilungsleiter im amerikanischen Außenministerium, 5 Jul 1972, ADAP 1972, Nr. 197. 57 Ibid 58 Roth, Gespräche in Washington am 17–18. Juli 1972 über SALT and MBFR, 13 Jul 1972, PA–AA, ZW 107303.

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large.59 The British already had a SALT instrument in place. The Anglo-American SALT Group talks were scheduled for 28–29 September 1972. The latter were preceded by bilateral MBFR talks in the White House scheduled for 22 September. The UK focused on (1) FBS, (2) ‘third party’ systems, and (3) a non-transfer clause for offensive weapons. Those three topics were of extreme importance for European security, nuclear sharing in NATO and for the Anglo-American special relationship.60 The US ability to assist NATO Allies in maintaining an effective nuclear defense posture had to be maintained.61 Simultaneously ‘third party’ potentials had to remain entirely unregulated by SALT.62 Attempts to limit Allied forces were not permissible. The UK was especially opposed ‘to having our forces discussed over our heads’.63 Garthoff informed the British Government that the procedure would follow the pattern of SALT I. There would be preliminary talks beginning on 21 November that would last up to Christmas. The preliminary talks would delineate the scope of SALT II. Detailed negotiation positions were to be expected in January 1973. No US position on the linkage between SALT and MBFR existed – so far. The latter point might be debated during the upcoming Anglo-American SAL Talks in Washington.64 The UK thus updated her studies on FBS.65 The SU might refer to the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ and the ‘20 May Understanding’ of the SALT I process which regulated that FBS would be moving center stage after all elements of an interim agreement on strategic nuclear forces had been reached. SALT I thus might oblige the US to tackle the question of how to cope with the Soviet demand to regulate FBS.66 Preparations had to be made. The British FBS studies distinguished between three options: (1) FBS would neither be discussed in SALT nor in MBFR; (2) FBS would be moved to MBFR, (3) FBS would be dealt with in SALT by way of a non-circumvention clause, and (4) FBS would be counted against the aggregate total. Case one was based on the assumption that Kissinger’s statement in the Congressional Hearings that the aggregate total could be extended to cover strategic bombers might allow to drop the issue of FBS and of

59 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten von Well, 21 Sep 1972, ADAP 1972, Nr. 284. 60 SALT: Anglo/United States Bilateral Talks, 20 Sep 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/785; SALT: Bilateral Discussions in Washington, 28–29 September 1972, [undated], TNA, DEFE 24/785; Menne, Haltung der europäischen NATO Partner zu den voraussichtlichen Problemen von SALT II, 23 Oct 1972, PA–AA, ZW 107290. 61 SALT: Bilateral Discussions in Washington, 28–29 September, December 1972, Brief on FBS, TNA, FCO 48/828. 62 SALT: Bilateral Discussions in Washington, 28–29 September, December 1972, Brief on Allied Nuclear Forces, TNA, FCO 46/828. 63 Ibid 64 W.J.A. Wilberforce-C. Rose, 11 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828. 65 FBS: Definitions and Role in NATO Strategy, 11 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828 or DEFE 24/785. 66 US/UK Talks on SALT: 28–29 September 1972. The FBS Issue, 19 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828.

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non-central systems altogether. Case two was originally aired by Secretary Laird. The statement of the Secretary of Defense, however, was rejected by the Nixon Administration and classified as a personal statement. Dealing with FBS in MBFR would create multiple problems since MBFR was about reductions, SALT about limitations. MBFR negotiations knew a geographic core and a wider flank regime. US FBS existed within and outside the geographical scope of MBFR. MBFR was a multilateral forum thus Allied dual-purpose weaponry might be affected.67 A generalized clause or non-circumvention clause approach – the third option listed above – was the preferred option of the ‘Petrignani Group’ of European SALT Experts. The Europeans backed the German non-circumvention formula: ‘Manipulation by the two contracting parties of their non-central systems, which would be so essential [sic] as to upset the strategic stability, would call the validity of the SALT agreement into question.’68

This formula would not require any definition of FBS. It applied to all non-central systems. Reciprocity was automatically agreed.69 Changes in the IR/MRBM posture thus would constitute a manipulation violating the SALT.70 The fourth option was the Soviet idea to count the FBS against the US aggregate total. The US had either to withdraw the FBS and to liquidate forward bases or accept that the US had lower numbers in ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers.71 The UK as her European partners preferred a focus on central systems. FBS should not become an issue in SALT II. The second best listed option was a generalized provision. The bilateral US-UK MBFR talks in the White House on 22 September revealed that the Nixon Administration stood steadfast to their negotiation position. FBS were no topic. According to Sonnenfeldt the Administration was inhibited by Congress to discuss FBS in SALT II.72 The Anglo-American SAL Talks that followed on 28 September were conducted by Farley, Garthoff and Spurgeon Keeny for the US. The latter served the US delegation as technical advisor for arms control. Clive Rose, V.H.B. Macklen and W.F. Mumford represented HMG. The parties first addressed the question of parity or ‘equality’ in the light of the Jackson Amendment. Farley confirmed the information that the administration considered a mere extension of the aggregate total to so-far uncovered central nuclear systems. This approach would be in line with the Jackson Amendment criteria of an equal aggregate total. The alternative was an agreement with qualitative restrictions and possible reductions. MIRV technology and throw-weight might have to be weighted. But qualitative measures do raise difficult issues of verification. A

67 Ibid 68 Ibid 69 SALT: Bilateral Discussions in Washington, 28–29 September 1972. Brief on FBS, 11 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828. 70 Ibid 71 FBS: Definitions and Role in NATO Strategy, 11 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/828. 72 Anglo-American Talks on CSCE and MBFR. The White House, Washington, 22 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/829.

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mere extension agenda had its own problems. Could the principle of the freedom to mix apply? Were sub-ceilings necessary? Did an extension of the aggregate total to strategic bombers necessitate a limitation on surface-to-air (SAM) defenses? Reductions were a NPT obligation. Arms reductions, however, would turn the FBS into a real strategic factor. According to Farley a reductions approach would require a settlement of the FBS question with its highly political implications for NATO defense arrangements.73 FBS was the keyword for the British Delegation. HMG pleaded to transform the FBS issue into a non-central systems question. HMG recommended not to delegate the issue to MBFR. There were too many geographical question involved. HMG preferred a generalized provision. But the best option was to omit the question of FBS entirely. The focus shifted to non-transfer. A linkage between a non-transfer clause and non-circumvention clauses might have severe repercussions for NATO and ‘third party’ Alliance systems. The UK could not agree to the Soviet unilateral statement of 9 May 1972. The SU could not refer to ‘third party’ systems to demand a higher aggregate total for the Soviet Union. This was not permissible in a bilateral negotiation. Any block approach, any compensatory scheme would adversely affect the ‘third parties’. The freedom of action of the Allied ‘third parties’ had to be preserved.74 Raymond Garthoff concurred. The US would not raise the issue of FBS in Geneva. The danger might be with the non-transfer clause. The US had unilaterally declared on 18 April 1972 that the non-transfer provision of the ABM treaty would set no precedent for a definitive agreement. The US statement remained unchallenged by the Soviet Union. Thus no immediate danger exists. Nevertheless the SU might revive some NPT-type language to extend the non-transfer regime of the NPT to delivery systems. The US and the UK thus would have to be forward looking and address transfer issues before a permanent agreement emerged. A further article of the ABM treaty deserved attention: Art X forced the contracting parties ‘not to assume any international obligations which could conflict’ with the ABM Treaty. A similar clause was to be expected in the definitive agreement for offensive weapons.75 The regulation of the problem of a British successor system for the Polaris nuclear submarine force would fall into this category.76 The latter thus had to be decided prior to a SALT II agreement. The US was willing to cooperate constructively with the UK on the preservation and extension of the nuclear special relationship and with the ‘Petrignani Group’ on SALT issues of European concern. The Nixon Administration showed a clear willingness to accept the European red lines in SALT and to extend the Anglo-American nuclear special relationship to a

73 Record of UK/US Bilateral Talks on SALT, 28 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830. 74 US/UK Talks on SALT: 28–29 September 1972, Remarks by Mr. Rose on the FBS Issue, TNA, FCO 46/830. 75 US/UK Talks on SALT. 28–29 September, No Transfer/No Conflict in SALT II, 19 Sep 1972, TNA, DEFE 28/785. 76 Record of UK/US Bilateral Talks on SALT: 28 Sep 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830.

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successor system prior to the signing of SALT II. The Soviet intention to use SALT II to dry-up US assistance for the UK deterrent by way of a non-transfer clause was undisputed. It was now up to the UK to use the window of opportunity and to decide on the successor system.77 Soviet ABM capabilities and cooperative options with either France or the US were already being assessed by HMG. The ABM Treaty challenged the UK deterrent over time. The adopted ABM formula – so the Long Term Working Party – would undermine the Polaris force of the UK, in case the SU built-up her Moscow ABM defense system to the limit. The Admiralty Board and the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee concurred: the UK had to improve the penetration capability of HM Polaris force to maintain a permanently available second strike force. The latter was especially valid in case a Soviet terminal defense system emerged that replaced the existing GALOSH ABM system. The need to enhance the penetration capability raised the question of the introduction of a successor system.78 Three options for a Polaris successor system crystalized in November 1972: Super Antelope, Poseidon, and the Hybrid an application of the Super Antelope re-entry vehicle to a Poseidon missile. All these systems would be able to overcome an exo-atmospheric ABM system for area defense. Currently no information about Soviet attempts for an endo-atmospheric ABM system for terminal defense was available. The Super Antelope had little capability to overcome a possible terminal defense system. The Chiefs-of-Staff and the Admiralty preferred the Hybrid followed by Super Antelope. The Hybrid required US assistance the Super Antelope allowed co-operation with France.79 Poseidon was a proven US system with MIRV technology. The US was not able to sell the MIRVed Poseidon system but the Poseidon missile. The Long Term Working Party clearly pointed out that the UK was dependent on US support in any case – even for Super Antelope.80 The decision was mainly a political one. According to the Long Term Working Party the UK deterrent had to (1) preserve UK independence and security; (2) serve European security, and (3) contribute to a European defense identity that included France. A decision on a successor system, however, had to be military sound to assure point 1. Thus US co-operation had to be assured in any case. Without US support the Polaris force would be ineffective within months: (1) the UK would have no targeting information, (2) the UK submarine force depended on US navigation aid and (3) the UK depended on US under-

77 First Phase SALT Agreements. Implications for the United Kingdom and Aspects Requiring Further Action, 14 Jul 1972, TNA, DEFE, 24/784. 78 The Way Ahead with POLARIS, 13 Oct 1972, TNA, DEFE 11/792; Response to the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 123, 2 Jul 1971, US Assistance to the United Kingdom Super Antelope Program, NSSM 123, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 344. 79 Ibid 80 UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Long Term Working Party, Third Report, 3 Oct 1972, TNA, DEFE 11/792; Strategic Nuclear Options, 2 Nov 1972, TNA, DEFE 11/792; The Effectiveness of the United Kingdom Deterrent. Note by Joint Intelligence Committee, 2 Nov 1972, TNA, DEFE 11/792; Response to the NSSM 123, 2 Jul 1971, US Assistance to the United Kingdom Super Antelope Program, NSSM 123, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 344.

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ground testing. The Anglo-French option was only promising in case France signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the NPT and re-integrated into NATO’s military structure. Under these conditions the US would support an Anglo-French deterrent force. A European deterrent based on an Anglo-French successor system furthermore had to meet the support of the Federal Republic of Germany.81 HMG thus had to carefully test the leeway with the US, France and the European partners before making a final decision on the successor system. The UK had to have a permanently unassailable nuclear deterrent force. As a consequence thereof Lord Carrington asked the PM to use the Debré visit on 20–21 November 1972 to discuss Anglo-French nuclear cooperation on successor systems. Simultaneously, the UK should test US willingness to support the Hybrid or the Super Antelope. The UK should utilize the channel opened with Henry Kissinger in March 1971.82 These informal Anglo-American talks should prepare an official approach by the PM during the Anglo-American Summit Talks of December 1972.83 The US was well aware of the implications of the procurement question. The successor system decision would impinge on a complex set of multilateral relationships. The decision was of relevance for the future of European defense. US help on any system would ‘make it less likely that the British would choose or would be able in the light of the prohibitions of the AEA […] to move towards European military nuclear cooperation.’84

For the Nixon Administration it was best to co-operate in order not to raise ‘doubt about [US…] assistance, especially in view of the British uneasiness about the non-transfer aspect of SALT II.’85 The US had to extend the special relationship into the successor stage of nuclear deterrence to forestall a possible ENF from emerging. The US had already indicated to Sir Burke Trend in July and Patrick Nairne in August 1972 that they were willing to discuss a purchase of the Polaris missile – as an alternative option for the United Kingdom.86 On a working party level the wedge had already been turned for a core decision in geopolitics and Alliance affairs.

81 Collaborative Actions. Long Term Working Party. Third Report, Annex E, [November 1972], TNA, DEFE 11/792. 82 Response to the National Security Study Memorandum, 123, 2 Jul 1971, US Assistance to the United Kingdom Super Antelope Program, NSSM 123, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 344. 83 Lord Carrington-Heath, 6 Nov 1972, TNA, DEFE 11/792; Response to the National Security Study Memorandum, 123, 2 Jul 1971, US Assistance to the United Kingdom Super Antelope Program, NSSM 123, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 344. 84 Response to the National Security Study Memorandum 123, 2 Jul 1971, US Assistance to the United Kingdom Super Antelope Program, NSSM 123, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 344. 85 Memo from William Hyland of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant on National Security Affairs Kissinger, 26 Jul 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 352. 86 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Schlesinger-Nairne, 10 Aug 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 355.

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While the Allies worked out strategic options to influence US SALT decisionmaking and to respond efficiently to contingencies for European security the SALT process had taken-off again. The US had started to prepare the ground for the resumption of the SALT negotiations scheduled for 21 November 1972. On 5 September 1972 Ambassador Dobrynin proposed to Henry Kissinger to make the Interim Agreement permanent. The suggestion was rejected. Thus Dobrynin asked about qualitative restrictions. The Soviet ambassador considered a staged approach with an interim qualitative agreement as a pre-cursor to a permanent qualitative agreement.87 These ideas travelled in the baggage of Henry Kissinger to Moscow. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow was scheduled for 11–15 September 1972. The National Security Advisor (NSA) was tasked to cooperate with Brezhnev to set the agenda for SALT II. The SU, however, showed little interest to work out a common approach for the SALT II process before a PNW was reached. General-Secretary Brezhnev lately focused almost exclusively on the no first-use agenda – well the banning of the use of nuclear weapons in international relations. The General-Secretary had contacted President Nixon on 20 July 1972 to remind him of their conversations at the Moscow Summit in May 1972 about the mutual non-use of nuclear weapons.88 Prior to the departure of Henry Kissinger to Europe and Moscow on 9 September 1972 Brezhnev contacted President Nixon again to stress the importance of a bilateral treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons among the two contracting parties. The General-Secretary outlined a hypothetical scenario of a conventional attack on the European Allies of one of the superpowers. He clearly indicated the right of collective self-defense with or without nuclear weapons. He supported a right to use nuclear weapons in fulfillment of existing treaty obligations. Simultaneously, however, the superpowers had to ‘proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing to increase the danger for our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons.’89 The SU thus sought a treaty banning the use of nuclear relations against the other contracting party. The Soviet approach was a frontal attack on Alliance relations. A nuclear conflict would always remain limited to the European theatre. The envisaged treaty would make an escalation to the strategic level an impossible or illegal option. The response of President Nixon was guarded. It was important to avoid ‘any formulation that carried an implication of a condominium by our two countries.’90 The formulation should not rule out nuclear war among the superpowers while keeping the option to use nuclear weapons against third parties. A treaty on the prevention of nuclear war

87 Dobrynin-Kissinger, 5 Sep 1972, FRUS 1976–1976 XXXII, No 340 or FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 34. 88 Letter from Soviet General-Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 20 Jul 1972, FRUS 1969– 1976 XV, No 15. 89 Message from the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon, [undated, September 1972], FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 35. 90 Ibid

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should not ‘appear to be legitimizing the initiation of war by conventional means.’91 Finally, a PNW agreement should enhance the security generated by the existing Alliance system and not undermine it. Given that this definitional framework applied the US was willing to proceed with the negotiation for a PNW. The US was well aware that the Soviet initiative targeted escalation – in other words NATO’s flexible response strategy. The early Soviet proposals for the non-use of nuclear weapons had been analyzed by the US – and her secret UK partner – since August 1972.92 General-Secretary Brezhnev and Henry Kissinger dealt with the ‘no use’ of nuclear weapons on 12 September in Moscow. Henry Kissinger clearly stated that the treaty was not allowed to ‘look as if the two most powerful nations are dictating to the world.’93 Both had Allies, both had treaty obligations. This very fact had to be reflected for a redraft that could be presented to the world. The idea to prevent nuclear war was a noble one, thus both countries should pursue the general concept. However, allies for decades depended on the nuclear umbrella provided by the superpowers. A bilateral agreement that banned the use of nuclear weapons between the superpowers would have ‘a profound significance for these countries.’94 The two could not permit the impression that the use of nuclear weapons is permitted against ‘third countries’. Kissinger was aware of the impact on NATO defense structures and strategy. Europe would be left virtually unprotected. The nuclear umbrella would vanish. Leonid Brezhnev fell in line. The SU was neither seeking a conventional option by way of a bilateral agreement on the non-use of nuclear forces nor did the SU intent to create the impression that the superpowers intended to rule the world. The SU was sincere. The superpowers, however, should not be ‘listening to the whispering of our Allies’. This would make progress impossible. An adjustment of military doctrines to the new reality, however, was indispensable.95 Momentarily there was no indication that the superpowers would bring their defense doctrine in line with a ‘no first-use’ provision. Neither in the US NSC nor in the NPG any signs were discernible to move towards a ‘no first-use’ philosophy. The debate on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO was about ‘initial use’ of tactical nuclear weapons and ‘follow-up’ usage of tactical nuclear weapons in the European theatre. The debate on smaller and cleaner theatre nuclear weapons was seeking to re-establish the use of nuclear weapons without having to accept unacceptable levels of collateral damage. On the other hand it could be argued that the introduction of smaller and cleaner nuclear weapons would break the escalation ladder. An Alliance ‘no first-use’ strategy was totally out of the equation. An ad-

91 Ibid 92 Note of Conversation at the White House at the 10 AM on 10 Aug 1972, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 93 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 12 Sep 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 41. 94 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 12 Sep 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 42. 95 Ibid.

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justment of the strategy towards a limitation of a nuclear war to the European theatre, however, was discernible. The debate on tactical nuclear weapons did not conflict with the policy of a prevention of nuclear war among the superpowers – to the contrary. It served a limited war option. It served the superpower’s interest to limit a possible war to the European theatre. 96 The Moscow talks had indicated an interest of the US to find a common denominator for a bilateral PNW. General-Secretary Brezhnev thus started to refocus on the future SALT process. The SALT II process could commence. Both parties briefly considered options of how to transform the interim into a permanent agreement. The preferred US option was a mere broadening of the coverage of central systems by the Interim Agreement. General-Secretary Brezhnev did not concur. SALT II had to take qualitative factors into the equation to obtain ‘equal security’. Geographical factors counted – air force bases in forward positions would have to be addressed, as well. The details, however, should be elaborated by the delegations in the preliminary talks commencing in November.97 After the re-election of President Nixon on 7 November 1972 the US complemented the information furnished to the Allies by Raymond Garthoff. Phil Farley informed the NAC on 15 November 1972 on the Nixon Administration’s approach to SALT II. The NSC Verification Panel considered the upcoming SAL Talks as exploratory. The US had neither developed a clear red line or negotiation position so far. The general aim was to transform the interim into a permanent agreement. Permanence required negotiations from a position of strength. The US would continue her Trident program, R&D and other modernization programs which would be an asset in the negotiation with the Soviet Union. The SU feared US qualitative superiority. This was an asset for the US. The US approach aimed at ‘equal aggregates of central systems’ and not at equal numbers in each and every category. Sub-levels or restrictions on the freedom to mix might emerge. The US would continue to defend European interests. US European theatre nuclear forces would be preserved. The FBS issue was to be tackled by way of a generalized clause. All this had been debated previously. André de Staerke inquired if the Soviet ‘Backfire’ bomber development might make an extension of the aggregates to strategic bombers attractive.98 The US answer was evasive. The extension of the aggregate total to strategic bombers was indeed under consideration. The negotiating position was to emerge after the exploratory talks. The NATO Allies were not entirely surprised about the evasive nature of the presentation. Henry Kissinger had expressed the view that ‘no substantial issues will be broached until the inauguration of the new United States Administration.’99 Thus the 100 days also applied to an extent to the re-elected Administration. Personnel and strategy decisions were still pending. The NAC session nevertheless was me-

96 97 98 99

Makins, No First Use, 3 Nov 1972, TNA, FCO 41/981. Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 12 Sep 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 43. Sitzung des NATO Rats in Brüssel, 15 Nov 1972, ADAP 1972, Nr. 375. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 13 Jul 1972, TNA, PREM 11/1365.

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morable. The Europeans clearly expressed their willingness to contribute more constructively to the SALT debate. Thus expert meetings should always be held. The W-German NATO Permanent Representative suggested distributing working papers in advance of the sessions. NATO consultation had to go beyond briefings to cooperative decision-making on aspects of European concern. The suggestion that the NATO Military Committee (MC) should study the FBS issue, however, was strongly rejected by the Netherlands. There was no need for any FBS study. There was no need to go beyond the generalized approach. The US concurred. Non-central systems were not a dynamic growth area and thus should just be dealt with by a generalized approach or provision. The US – so Farley – would value any European comments on US European theatre weaponry and the SALT and MBFR processes. The US concern was the MIRV-‘throw-weight’ linkage. Yet – a formula was still missing.100 The SALT II process opened on 21 November 1972 in Geneva. The delegations tried to delineate possible working agendas. SALT II had to tackle FBS. The SU showed scant interest in FBS in Europe’s central front but sought a regulation of carrier-based FBS in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific theatre. Forward based submarine systems were deemed of equal importance. The SU furthermore listed strategic bomber, MIRV-limitation and qualitative measures as core agenda points for the SALT II agenda. Phil Farley used the NAC SALT briefing of 15 December to comment on the Soviet proposals. The US was not willing to take up the Soviet definition of FBS. The US would consider Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) as FBS. This type of missile posed a direct threat to the US and thus would have to be included in any debate on FBS in case the SU insisted on a FBS regulation. Soviet IRBM might pose a threat to Alaska – as well. In case FBS would have to be tackled the US would seek to establish equilibrium in the European theatre. The US would defend NATO’s integrated defense structure. Thus any FBS proposal that threatens to undermine the NATO defense posture would be rejected.101 J.A. Thomson – the British Permanent Representative – took up the issue of FBS. He referred to the three FBS papers made available by the FRG, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The British paper focused on FBS in the SALT & MBFR context. FBS had to be dealt with in SALT. MBFR was about reductions. Reductions were not envisaged.102 The German Deputy NATO Permanent Representative Boss underlined the rationale behind the presented papers. The Europeans intended to contribute to a wider debate by analyzing the options for the SU and Alliance partners alike. The German Paper ‘Aspects of SALT II’ listed the likely Soviet desiderata: (1) FBS, (2) a non-transfer clause; (3) foreign bases; (4) the submarine forces of the UK and France, and (5) the non-use of nu-

100 Peck to FCO, Tel No 503, 17 Nov 1972, TNA, FCO 46/829; Draft Speaking Note, SALT: NATO Consultation on 15 December 1972, 1 Dec 1972, TNA, FCO, 46/830. 101 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 15 Dec 1972, Note 4, ADAP 1972, Nr. 406. 102 Ibid, Speaking Note for the UK Permanent Representative, NATO Council on 15 December 1972: SALT, TNA, FCO 46/830 and FCO 41/1130.

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clear weapons.103 The SU was expected to try to complement the NPT nontransfer regime from warheads to delivery systems.104 The withdrawal of US FBS and the introduction of a ‘no use clause’ for nuclear weapons either between the superpowers or in general might leave Europe vulnerable.105 NATO thus might deem it worth considering if Art V of the NATO treaty was compatible with ‘limited wars’. The NATO partners should furthermore note that given the triple danger to European security – emerging from SALT, MBFR and a US-SU ‘no firstuse’ agreement – it was utterly unimaginable to accept restrictions for the European deterrent forces. The British and Dutch SALT papers supported the WestGerman approach. The British and Dutch papers clearly outlined the natural linkage between FBS and NATO defense structures. This interdependence had to guide US planning on FBS. Unilateral decisions concerning FBS were not permissible. Even a generalized approach demanded clearance by the NATO partners since vital interests of NATO were at stake.106 Italy’s representative Catalano summed it up: Europe’s existence depended on FBS. The dependency on FBS had increased – due to the superpower parity in intercontinental systems – and would increase even further in case the Europeans adhered to the NPT.107 The French NATO Ambassador François de Rose concurred. He expressed his admiration for the three presented European discussion papers. Farley agreed with the British suggestion that the ‘Helsinki 2 Formula’ of 1970 might be utilized as a guidance to cope with the FBS question in SALT II. The US should – yet again – stipulate that FBS would be dealt with only after all questions concerning the central systems had been settled.108 The NATO SALT Experts Meeting that followed the NAC of 15 December tried to outline Soviet aims and intentions. According to Clive Rose the ‘tough’ FBS approach of the Russians was political by nature.109 Soviet strategy on FBS was not dictated by military concerns. The SU knew how to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. 110 The view was shared by Garthoff. But the strategic potential of US FBS was not to be neglected. According to US estimates the FBS had the potential to destroy 25% of the Soviet population or 90% of the Soviet IR/MRBM or 20% of the total land-based deterrent force. It might thus proof difficult ‘to come out of SALT without any agreement on FBS.’111

103 Graf Rantzau-Rose, 8 Dec 1972, Enclosure: Menne, Aspects of SALT II, TNA, FCO 46/830. 104 Ibid 105 National Intelligence Estimate. Problems in US-West European Negotiations, 14 Dec 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 86. 106 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 15 Dec 1972, Note 4, ADAP 1972, Nr. 406. 107 Ibid 108 Ibid; Draft Speaking Note, SALT: NATO Consultation on 15 December 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830. 109 C. Rose-Hockaday, 19 Dec 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/786. 110 SALT – NATO Experts’ Meeting after the NAC on Friday December 15, 1972, TNA, DEFE 24/786. 111 Ibid

4. BEYOND THE PRELIMINARY TALKS: THE MATRIX FOR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 7 December 1972 outlined the wider political landscape of arms control and European security. MBFR was the core focus theme. The French Foreign Secretary Schumann saw three major dangers emerging from MBFR. The MBFR arena was dangerous. It was dangerous ‘to create in the Central Area of the Alliance a zone which had [a] special legal or political status.’112 Such a development would put the future security of Western Europe at risk. MBFR should not include discussions on US FBS. MBFR reductions were to be limited exclusively to stationed US and SU forces. National forces could not be reduced. Any reduction of non-stationed forces would restrict the ability of the Europeans to develop and restructure their forces to meet the requirements of the future. At the end of the MBFR exercise Europe’s relative position in the international system had to be either preserved or enhanced. Thus Europe’s defense forces had to be augmented or frozen but not reduced. European theatre weaponry was of utmost importance due to the ‘strategic parity’ of central systems codified by the SALT process.113 US European forces were to be upheld – until Europe’s forces had been re-organized to assure her own defense. France would not lower her commitment to the defense of Europe. France would not be affected by MBFR.114 The UK was obliged to maintain a certain continental commitment under the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954.115 Thus would not reduce her forces either. A commitment by the FRG and the European partners to block reductions would allow the formation of a kernel for a more autonomous European defense capability. This calculus had to be present in all decision-making on European security – whether MBFR or SALT. The British totally agreed. France and the UK of Edward Heath shared a European vision. C.C.C. Tickell – the Head of the Western Organizations Department of the FCO – expressed what FM Schumann was driving at: ‘If reductions were to be made in Western European forces, the basis of any future European defence system could be eroded and we could find it more difficult to promote our aim of giving the enlarged Community a defence aspect.’116

It was thus the task of HMG to educate the NATO partners to view MBFR from a European security perspective and not under the prism of the principle of disarmament and force reductions. Furthermore, MBFR had to be seen ‘in the context 112 Peck to FCO, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, 7 Dec 1972, TNA, FCO 41/1130. 113 Ibid 114 C. Tickell, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), November 1972, TNA, FCO 41/1130. 115 Ibid 116 Ibid

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of the changing relationship between the United States and Europe.’117 The latter includes a commitment to enhance capabilities and to develop a future European defense structure. Thus reductions had to be confined to the stationed forces of the superpowers.118 The Anglo-French take on European security in a time-period of superpower détente entailed the need to preserve a European deterrent. HMG considered it her task to preserve the European center of decision-making in NATO. ‘In event of reluctance of the United States to cross the nuclear threshold this option would conceivably be exercised for Europe and NATO by Britain’119 or by Britain and France. This policy contained two subsidiary strategies. The UK had to work towards an Anglo-French nuclear successor system to replace the US as nuclear guarantor. The UK had to provide tactical nuclear weapons for the central front to assure escalation. The US bound by a possible ‘no first-use’ or ‘no use’ agreement with Russia might be inclined to limit a war to the European theatre thus possibly inviting conventional aggression. The UK thus worked towards an enhancement of the tactical nuclear forces in Europe. The stationing of RAF ‘Buccaneer’ in the Federal Republic was supplemented by a policy to support the European purchase of the Lance system. All those weapons served only one double purpose: to enhance the deterrent power of Europe and thus to assure the validity of the escalatory ladder.120 War fighting was not envisaged. The introduction of theatre nuclear forces (TNF) into battle was without utility since after nuclear exchanges the force ratio on both sides would stay un-altered. No side would win. Both sides would lose. TNF had to be used to indicate a willingness to escalate a conflict which would erase any possibly imagined gain thru aggression. This was clearly expressed by the British at the 15th Anglo-French Defence Staff Talks of November 1972. The UK thus supported the French Pluton deployment. HMG, however, requested a doctrinal integration of the French nuclear forces with those of the UK and the US. France would have to embrace the obligation of a defense of the FRG and thus amend the Gaullist shibboleth of the defense of French national territory. This would ease common planning and targeting cooperation within Europe and possibly NATO.121 The Carrington-Debré talks were to tackle the question of a European nuclear defense. Lord Carrington informed Debré about the forthcoming decision concerning a British successor system for the aging Polaris force. HMG considered a possible cooperation with France. Assured was that the future British delivery system would carry British manufactured nuclear warheads. The French did wel-

117 Ibid 118 Brief for Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks, [undated, December 1972], TNA, FCO 41/1130. 119 Kerr, Follow-on Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons, 10 Aug 1972, TNA, FCO 41/980. 120 Follow-on Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons, 22 Aug 1972, FCO 41/980. 121 15th Anglo-French Defence Staff Talks, Item 2: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, [undated], TNA, DEFE 11/640.

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com the furnished information. The British initiative was deemed timely given the current attempts by the SU to involve the French and British deterrent forces in the SALT process. The French Republic would resist any attempts by the superpowers to limit her nuclear forces. Debré advised HMG to have an eye on the non-transfer issue raised in SALT. In case the US and the SU embarked on a policy to close the European Nuclear Option the hour to work for an Anglo-French deterrent had come.122 France and the UK in any case had to preserve the option to cooperate on a nuclear weapons system for the 1990s. The Carrington-Debré talks of 12 November and the Chief of the Defence Staff Talks were remarkable due to the far-reaching communality in strategic analysis on arms control. Debré described France and Britain as the two pillars of European defense ‘which must be welded together’ for the greater strength of each and the benefit of Europe.123 General François Maurin – the French Chief of the Defence Staff – stressed the need to cooperate in both tactical and strategic nuclear forces. According to Maurin ‘command, control and the use of nuclear weapons in a tactical mode’ was ‘the key to European defence.’124 The way to advance towards an Anglo-French trusteeship for Europe was to prudently work towards more integrated defense procurement and to gradually familiarize the FRG with the emerging ‘European’ option. Currently, both countries had just to prepare the hour.125 The UK had to test her leeway in Washington. France and the UK had to try to control the arms control process. A common European platform had to be found by 1976. With the election of a Democratic Government into office US forces in Europe would be reduced. Europe thus had a target date to work with.126 Lord Carrington and Admiral Peter Hill-Norton were impressed by the emerging new defense orientation of France.127 NATO re-integration, however, still seemed to be out of equation for the French leadership. Superpower détente clearly impacted on European behavior. The ‘Old Continent’ was seeking to adjust to the process in order to ride the wave. The SALT process – with all its danger and uncertainties – welded old and new communalities. SALT and MBFR made the Europeans realize that ‘Europe’ was one strategic theatre. Europe was a Schicksalsgemeinschaft.128

122 Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation, 21 Nov 1972, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 123 Conversation with Debré, 12 Dec 1972, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 124 First Conversation with General Maurin, 12 December 1972, 14 Dec 1972, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 125 Manuscript letter from M. Michel Debré to Lord Carrington, 17 Dec 1972, TNA, FCO 41/1131, Second Conversation with General Maurin, 13 Nov 1972, TNA, PREM 11/1357. 126 R.J. Andrew, European Defence, 10 Jan 1973, TNA, PREM 15/2010. 127 R.J. Andrews-Lord Bridges, 9 Jan 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 128 ‘I believe that what is at the root of this is the impression of the European members of NATO that the Americans are now viewing the international scene increasingly in terms of their superpower relationship with the USSR, and that they may be prepared to subordinate the interests of their European allies to this. There is also a more specific fear that the Americans may have actually reached secret agreements with the USSR on matters like MBFR which are of legitimate concern to NATO as a whole.’ Lord Carrington-Heath, 29 November 1972,

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A US National Intelligence Estimate clearly indicated that European sensitivities would be touched upon in case a ban on the ‘first-use’ of nuclear weapons emerged. The same applied to US troop withdrawals. ‘US reductions would certainly put new life into recurring proposals for cooperative defence efforts among the Europeans.’129 But all the familiar problems of intra-European rivalries would remain. As long as the US did not challenge the integrated NATO defense structure or undermined Allied confidence in the escalation ladder NATO would fare well. Foray in superpower détente, however, would make the Europeans prioritize intra-European affairs over trans-Atlantic. First indications could be seen in the attempt of French President Pompidou to define a European identity that separated European from Atlantic interests.130 Europe asked for a new kind of partnership with the United States. The briefs by the British Ministry of Defence for the PM’s visit to Washington in February 1973 were telling: ‘In the long term our objective is to secure the emergence of a Western European defence entity with sufficient political coherence and military capability to aspire to a fair and equal partnership with the United States in the Atlantic alliance.’131

The UK had two tasks (1) to maintain US-European solidarity and (2) to enhance ‘political and military cohesion of the European members of the Atlantic alliance.’132 ‘The enlarged community should acquire an explicit defence identity’.133 Europe had to contribute to the management of the world. ‘Europe’s interests are world-wide and Europe must be correspondingly outward looking.’134 The French decision not to partake in MBFR strengthened French power in Europe. French forces would not be reduced. The latter fact would re-assure the Federal Republic. It would automatically revive Franco-German defense cooperation and thus served Europe. In case France, Germany and the UK managed to work in a European framework US primacy could be challenged. The US in order to be able to manage the rising challenge from within the Alliance would have to develop a strategy of how to combine superpower diplomacy with Alliance relations and thus also with European unity. A sizeable and premature US force reduction would call into question the validity of the US nuclear deterrent. The same holds true for a withdrawal of US FBS. Reductions should be focused on stationed troops only in order not to weaken European’s defense at home and abroad. The US had to forestall Gomulka or Rapacki-type plans and to preserve

129 130 131 132 133 134

DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4: http://gateway.proquest.com/ openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us&rtf_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040950013. National Intelligence Estimate, Problems in US West European Relations, 14 Dec 1972, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 86. Ibid Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington, 27 Nov 1972, TNA, FCO 46/830. Ibid Ibid Ibid

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the dual-key system as a bracket for the common nuclear defense of the West.135 Simultaneously, Europe had to embark on a European Capabilities Improvement Program to be able to fulfill the aspired role in the near future. Here are the roots of the ‘Year of Europe’ agenda.136

135 Betr. Reduzierung der einheimischen und Stationierungsstreitkräfte, 15 Jan 1973, PA–AA, ZW 107370; Cullis, FBS and SALT II, 17 Jan 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1001. 136 Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, 31 Jan 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XLI, No 88.

5. SALT AND THE ‘YEAR OF EUROPE’, 1973 Both the SU and the European Alliance members focused on pre-requisites for a further round of SAL Talks. The SU sought re-assurance thru an agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The latter would strengthen the super-power axis. The Europeans by contrast sought re-assurance by way of US support for European defense integration. A competition between two competing models for world order was underlying the agendas of both the SU and of the NATO Allies. The SU sought a condominium except by name in order to stabilize and institutionalize bipolarity; the Europeans sought to maintain or to extend the power of the European sub-system of the Atlantic system in order to preserve the option to overcome the bipolar structures of the world. Poly-centricity was their chosen aim. The US was torn between the competing conceptions and sought a synthesis. The actual SALT negotiations thus were overshadowed by a wider power game. SALT I had stopped the ABM threat the SU had feared. SALT I had broken the dynamic of Soviet offensive weapons deployment the US had observed with growing alarm. There was no urgent need to act – although a successor to the Interim Agreement was needed by 1977. Both parties sought to transform the interim into a permanent agreement. Both parties had explored options. Two starting positions had emerged: The US sought equal total aggregates of ICBM, SLBM and ‘heavy’ bombers. At the same time there should be an equal subceiling for ICBM and an equal throw weight for ICBM. The SU thus would have to give up her numerical and throw weight advantage in ICBMs so far guaranteed by the Interim Agreement. The SU sought to preserve the asymmetry in ICBMs and SLBMs guaranteed by SALT I but agreed to a regulation on bombers as a third central system. The SU furthermore insisted on the introduction of FBS. A compensation for US submarine bases in Allied territories was also demanded. The SU obviously sought to test whether the US was willing to prioritize EastWest co-operation over Alliance affairs. The US rejected the Soviet proposal out of hand.137 The US deemed the Soviet delegation’s approach to SALT II ‘propagandistic’ or plainly unbalanced. The Soviet mind was not focused on SALT but on the envisaged PNW. Two Soviet draft treaties emerged in ‘72.138 The SU sought a commitment for an EastWest regime. A PNW was such a commitment. It was in addition an achievable aim for the Brezhnev visit to the US scheduled for June 1973. The Soviet position

137 Draft Brief for Prime Minister Visit to Washington, SALT II, Result of SALT I, 17 Jan 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1001. 138 Brimelow-Greenhill, Operation Hullabaloo, 22 Jan 1973, Annex I & II: First and Second Soviet Drafts, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 15. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec:DBPO040950025 (access date: 8 March 2011).

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on superpower détente was made public by Ambassador Dobrynin. He told Henry Kissinger on 8 March 1973: ‘it was not easy to make progress on SALT II unless there was the nuclear treaty.’139 ‘Unless, Brezhnev, personally, gave an order, SALT would move very slowly.’140 Brezhnev had one overarching aim: the finalization of the PNW in order not to come home from Washington empty handed. General-Secretary Brezhnev contacted President Nixon in January 1973 to make sure that the bilateral non-use of nuclear weapons should apply also in cases when the Soviet Union and the US would be dragged into a nuclear conflict by ‘third parties’. Thus the superpowers would never engage in waging nuclear war among each others.141 The topic of ‘no first-use’ or ‘no use’ was that central for Western defense that the US decided to further concert actions with the United Kingdom. Kissinger contacted Sir Burke Trend to co-operate in the response of the United States. Sir Thomas Brimelow was delegated to assist the US in the drafting of the possible treaty text.142 The cooperation was code named ‘Operation Hullabaloo’. President Nixon informed PM Heath during his Washington visit on 2 February 1973 that the SU was pushing a treaty project to limit or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The SU insisted on a binding treaty form instead of a mere declaration. It was impossible to evade the situation since ‘Brezhnev’s personal prestige was now at stake on this issue.’143 ‘The US could not drag-out the issue, or could continue using it as a carrot ‘with which to draw the Soviet Union along, stage by stage […] in the hope that all other issues, MBFR, SALT II, CSCE […]’

might be solved or postponed until a favorable solution emerged.144 PM Heath agreed. The SU had to be satisfied but the treaty version had to be cleared of any damaging wording or commitment. The SU originally had envisaged using the treaty ‘to deprive NATO of the protection of the United States nuclear deterrent.’

139 Memo of Conversation, Dobrynin-Kissinger, 8 Mar 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 81. 140 Ibid 141 Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon, [undated, January 1973], FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 75. 142 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 379; Keith Hamilton, ‘Britain, France and the Year of Europe, 1973’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, 4 (2006), 871–895, 875. 143 Cabinet Office, Record of a Discussion at Camp David on 2 February 1973, at 4 PM, Operation Hullabalo, TNA, PREM 11/1365. 144 Brimelow-Greenhill Minute, Operation Hullabaloo, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 32 http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpous:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec: DBPO040950042 (access date 8 March 2011); ‘In his mind the prospect of the nuclear treaty would be a kind of carrot dangling perpetually just ahead of the Soviet donkey’s nose until the poor animal was finally lured into some suitable stable where it could not do much harm.’ Sir Burk Trend –Heath, Operation Hullabalo, 2 Mar 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1365.

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The re-drafts would have to erase any such dangers. Sir Thomas Brimelow had already analyzed the matter. HMG furnished a draft to the President.145 After the President and the PM had tackled the danger of a condominium connected with the PNW the focus of the Camp David talks shifted to the other core question: the role of Europe in the new world order. President Nixon stressed one point: ‘The critical decision for 1973 was to find a new concept of European defence.’146 It was the task of the year to adjust ‘European security’ to a changing international system. The interdependence of SALT and European security, well the impact of arms control on European security moved center stage. ‘Europe’ – so Kissinger – ‘really must stop being so suspicious about the risk of a bilateral deal’.147 In case ‘Europe went on pestering Washington on this issue, the US Government might be driven to the point where they had no alternative but actually to conclude a deal of this kind.’148 The Europeans had to learn to focus on the central systems not just the European theatre weapons. In case the SU would MIRV their SS-9 missiles, ‘their SS-11 would be released to be targeted entirely on Europe.’149 The impact on Europe would be instant. Thus central systems regulations mattered for Europe – too. The SALT process would in any case revolutionize European security and European security structures. President Nixon now tackled the core question. NATO policy and structures were not unchangeable. The US had to have a ‘really hard look at NATO’s basic strategy’.150 NATO had to be prepared to give up weapons systems it no longer required – in bargains with the Soviet Union. It was ‘essential to shift the inertia of NATO, which, left to itself, would merely go on as it was and as the military would like it to be.’151 ‘A complete rethinking of NATO strategy had to be achieved.’152 ‘This was a task for political leadership; […] these issues would welcome the co-operation of the British Government. We must try to recreate the wartime habit of getting together for really intimate and deep discussions – discussions which should range over the whole field of the problems, political, military and economic, which we face[ed] together.’153

145 Cabinet Office, Record of a Discussion at Camp David on 2 February 1973, at 4 PM, Operation Hullabalo, TNA, PREM 11/1365. 146 Record of a Discussion at Camp David on 2 February 1973, East-West Relations, TNA, PREM 11/1365. 147 Ibid 148 Ibid 149 Ibid 150 Record of a Discussion at Camp David on 2 February 1973 at 4 PM, East-West Relations, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No. 20, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec: DBPO040950030 (access date: 8 March 2011). 151 Record of a Discussion at Camp David on 2 February 1973, East-West Relations, TNA, PREM 11/1365. 152 Ibid 153 Ibid

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But there was no need to inform the Alliance about the common Anglo-American approach to world affairs. Nixon sought of an Anglo-American approach to superpower détente and to its consequences on Alliance and European affairs. Such an alignment would assure that a rational world structure would emerge. A propos special relationship: President Nixon agreed to help the UK with the improvement of the Polaris submarine force. The options of Super Antelope, the Hybrid (codenamed STAG) and Poseidon missiles had been discussed. The US indicated that the preferred Hybrid option had deficiencies. Washington thus offered the Mark III (Poseidon) warhead with a de-MIRVed Poseidon missile system (Option M). This system had both exo- and endo-atmospheric penetration capabilities. Nixon requested a reply as early as possible within 1973.154 The UK thus was offered a top missile system that would prolong the special nuclear relationship into the next generation of strategic missiles. It was for Britain to decide to accept the option or to seek assistance for the Super Antelope – a system that assured more prospects for a future Anglo-French nuclear cooperation. With the US offer the UK faced a dilemma. Co-operation in global planning necessitated adoption of the Option M. ‘The US made us an offer which may never be repeated; they might find it difficult to understand a decision to reject Option M, and […] if we reject it, they may not be able to facilitate any eventual program of collaboration with France.’155

At Camp David the first contours of a US ‘Grand Strategy’ became visible. The US envisaged cooperating with the SU on PNW. The US envisaged an adaptation of the NATO structures. The US thus focused on a renewal of the AngloAmerican special relationship in order to be better able to cope with European reactions to the upcoming PNW. The US thus had invited the UK to partake in ‘Operation Hullabaloo’. UK participation hindered a European reaction that might undermine both superpower détente and the envisaged Alliance transformation. The Soviet PNW proposal indeed raised most delicate and dangerous problems. Sonnenfeldt was appalled: ‘Obviously no piece of paper restricts us in wartime, but to create the impression in peacetime that we are limited to conventional conflict strikes at the heart of our nuclear guarantees for our Allies.’156

Even the UK which co-drafted the agreement was deeply concerned about the impact on the Alliance. Thus it was important (1) not to rush arms control, (2) not

154 Options for Improving the POLARIS Force, Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, [April 1973], [DEFE 11/792]. 155 Improvement of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, [April 1973], TNA, DEFE 11/792; Russia’s ABM Defences, [April 1973], TNA, DEFE 11/792, Area and Terminal Defence Systems, Note by DCA, [April 1973], TNA, DEFE 11/792. 156 Memo from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, 20 Feb 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 77; See also: Record of Conversation at the British Embassy, Washington on 5 March 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1365.

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to erode the European positions in SALT, but (3) to offer the European partners a new Atlantic vision. A new Euro-Atlantic partnership had to emerge in line with the emerging arms control regime to assure an adjustment of Western defense structures to the new framework. The SALT framework and its regional extension MBFR was to structure international relations for decades to come.157 The US and the Western Europeans thus had to discuss the factor Europe in the new world of arms control. NATO’s role was as affected by the new defense policy. France gradually re-engaged in defense debates in order to be able to influence outcomes. France showed an interest to discuss SALT II. Anglo-French Defense Talks of 9 February 1973 focused on the SALT process and its implications for Europe.158 Europe’s security was central. Arms control was not an exercise in numbers but decided the distribution of power. Claude Arnaud, the French chief delegate, thus underlined the fundamental character of the French objection to the reduction of national forces in MBFR. French forces were ‘untouchable’.159 The Europeans furthermore had to object to any ‘artificial’ dividing lines as a consequence of an arms control regime. Special security zones were incompatible with the idea of Europe. The Europeans could not be ‘restricted to move their forces within the area of the enlarged community.’160 The fundamental aim in MBFR and SALT was to preserve Europe’s strength and to obtain troop withdrawals by the Soviet Union. Troop withdrawals would loosen the grip of the SU on Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe would develop more autonomously and gravitate towards the free and institutionalized Europe. The British concurred. The representatives from both sides of the Channel agreed that the European Community should take on a ‘defence identity and become the kernel of a European defence system within the Alliance.’161 Both partners agreed to block arms control measures that threatened to undercut Europe’s option. ‘Europe’ could be built in case the FRG co-operated in its construction. PM Heath visited Bonn on 2 March 1973 to win West-German support for the MBFR line of France and of the UK. MBFR reductions had to be limited to stationed US and Soviet forces. Europe had to maintain her strength.162 The FRG should not waver. The German Foreign Secretary Scheel totally concurred and informed Georg Leber, the Defense Minister, that the FRG would support a reduction of stationed forces only. European countries would thus not object to US troop withdrawals and not urge reductions of their national forces. To

157 Dr Birrenbach, Militärische und militärpolitische Aspekte in den Ost-West Verhandlungen, 2 May 1973, ACDP I 433 177/1. 158 Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks, Paris, 9 Feb 1973, TNA, DEFE 24/786 or FCO 46/1001. 159 Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks, Paris, 9 Feb 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1149. 160 Ibid 161 C.C.C. Tickell-Ewart Biggs, 22 Feb 1973, TNA, PREM 15/2040. 162 Deutsch-britischer Regierungsgespäch, Betr. Besuch des Britischen Premierministers Heath in Bonn, 1–2 März 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 69.

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the contrary – Europe would use MBFR to enhance European cooperation in defense matters.163 Europe’s relative position in the world had to be preserved. The recent US approach to MBFR just underlined both (1) the interconnectedness of SALT and MBFR and (2) the politico-geographic dimension of arms control. MBFR was not just a technical exercise to extend strategic parity to noncentral nuclear systems and conventional forces in Europe. Highly political decisions about the future order of Europe were underlying the three options worked out by the United States. Of particular importance for strategic arms control were options II and III. Option I foresaw a common ceiling for stationed and indigenous forces. Option II proposed a reduction of stationed US and Soviet forces. Option III was an asymmetrical reduction proposal that foresaw the removal of a Soviet tank army in the East and a reduction of selected US FBS and tactical nuclear weapons – the F-4 ‘Phantom’ and PERSHING missiles – in the West.164 Option I was anathema to Europe. It blocked an enhancement of Europe’s position. Option III deserved attention since it opened an avenue to discuss FBS in MBFR. The US did not pre-decide on the options – but indicated that option II might be agreeable to both US and Europe. Kissinger and Luns – the SecretaryGeneral of NATO – met on 13 April to discuss the question of force reductions under strategic parity. A combination of US force reductions and Option III was problematic, a combination of European force reductions and Option III undebatable. Europe was to defend her relative position in the world. Collaboration of the superpowers to regulate Europe’s position in the world constituted a condominium.165 This would precipitate a European détente uncoordinated with the US and a renewed drive towards European unity in defense. The European response to the superpower rationalism would destroy the Alliance. A rational response was needed to align the institutionalization of superpower relations with European interests: Western strength had to be preserved by a new ‘strategic agreement’ among the Allies. Luns concurred. He briefed Kissinger on a recent conversation he had had with Egon Bahr. The latter had sketched a ‘grand design’ in line with the CSCE development of an all-European security order that would replace the existing block architecture. Luns was shocked by the ‘revelation’. Kissinger was in total agreement: Détente – so Kissinger – was not allowed to wreck NATO. Any nuclear or political architecture had to be formed around the North Atlantic Alliance. President Nixon told Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti on 17–18 April that the CSCE conferences should not be allowed to undermine the Atlantic Alliance. The Atlantic spirit had to be maintained: ‘if this is allowed to wither away,

163 Scheel-Leber, 2 Apr 1973, PA–AA, ZW 107370. 164 Dr Birrenbach, Militärische und militärpolitische Aspekte in den Ost-West Verhandlungen, 2 May 1973, ACDP I 433 177/1; Dr Birrenbach, Zwischenbilanz, MBFR/KSZE/SALT II/Amerikanisch-sowjetisches Nuklearabkommen, 15 Jul 1973, ACDP I-433 192/1; Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das AA, 27 Apr 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 120. 165 Memo of Conversation, Luns-Kissinger, 13 Apr 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIX, No 136.

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the Atlantic Alliance would be worth nothing, no matter what is written on paper.’ ‘There are […] forces in Europe and in the United States who would welcome [a] dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance.’166 Nixon termed this new current in US foreign policy thinking a neo-isolationist disease. If the US, the UK, France, the FRG and Italy would turn ‘parochial, each going its separate way’ there would never be hope for building a structure of peace, and ‘détente will tumble.’167 Andreotti raised the topic again on the second day of the conversations. He considered it necessary to possibly link developments in CSCE and MBFR with ‘the timing for the achievement of a Europeanization of the defence of Europe.’168 President Nixon assured that the US would keep their forces in Europe until an agreement in MBFR emerged. This would offer the West an opportunity to reconsider the defense structures within the partial order of the West. The commencing SALT II phase and the upcoming start of MBFR triggered the need to embark on a debate with the enlarged Europe about Euro-Atlantic relations. Henry Kissinger started the debate with an Address held at the Waldorf Astoria on 23 April 1973.169 Henry Kissinger addressed the need to devise a new Atlantic Charter to organize the ‘West’. Needed was a charter that connected the US, Europe and Japan. Needed was an alignment to cope with the growing polycentricity in international relations. Needed was a new spirit to revive EuroAtlantic relations in the ‘Year of Europe’. The initiative was multi-layered. The politico-military dimension in particular deserves attention here. The US and the SU were creating a framework to enhance global security. As a consequence new challenges for the Alliance arose. A rational defense posture had to be assured. Flexible response required adjustments. Consultation mechanisms had to be reviewed to cope with a changing environment. Unresolved issues such as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons had to be addressed.170 US force reductions had to be debated to guarantee a sound basis for the defense of Europe. The US forces would not remain as a ‘hostage to trigger’ but as part of an intelligible structure of Western defense. The upcoming MBFR negotiations would place US forces on a sound basis in line with the principle of ‘sufficiency.’ Europe’s involvement in arms control would educate the partners in the defense matters of the 1970s. The bilateral negotiations of the superpowers would always impact on ‘third parties’. It would not always proof possible for the US to consult but there

166 167 168 169

Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976 XXXIX, No 138. Ibid Ibid ‘The Year of Europe’, Address by Henry A. Kissinger, Department of State Bulletin, 68 (1973), 593–598. 170 Extract from Mr. Kissinger’s Speech, 23 Apr 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1192; NATO Defence Policy, Discussion with Dr. Kissinger [undated, 10 May 1973], TNA, FCO 41/1192.

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would be no substantial concessions without Alliance clearance. The USA cherished her membership in the Atlantic Alliance.171 The Pompidou Administration quickly informed the Federal German authorities about the French Government’s views on Henry Kissinger’s ‘grand design’. The Pompidou Administration agreed to the need to adjust and harmonize Alliance relations in a renewed transatlantic dialogue. But the French Government totally rejected the characterization of Europe as a power with regional interests. There should be no distinction made between the US and Europe. Both participate in East-West relations and both have wider global interests.172 The Gaullist France rejected an unequal distribution of power and tasks. The German Auswärtige Amt shared the analysis of the Pompidou Government. The FRG supported a dialogue with the US about a new trans-Atlantic order. Europe had to act as a unit to obtain an optimal Euro-Atlantic balance and optimal transatlantic structures.173 The German-American Summit of 1–2 May 1973 offered the Nixon Administration an opportunity to engage the FRG into a dialogue on the US approach to the SU, to Alliance reform and to European unity. The US promised to forward to Chancellor Brandt any studies and analysis on East-West relations and arms control. The US – so Henry Kissinger – had no intentions to cooperate with the SU behind their Allies back. No secret deals existed – contrary to the constant rumors about a Kissinger-Brezhnev ‘accord’ on the SALT II process. The US furthermore agreed not to speed the process of MBFR. The enlarged Europe should always have the time to use her infant European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism to consult on MBFR before further steps would be undertaken.174 This was a major success for Europe. Most of the points raised during the German-American Summit or in Kissinger’s Waldorf Astoria Address were reflected in the US Foreign Policy Annual Report: ‘United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s. Shaping a Durable Peace’ published on 3 May 1973. The report highlighted the progress made in superpower détente and the lacking adjustments in the alliance relationship.175 The restructuring of the alliances had to shift center stage in order not to hinder further progress in arms control. The definition of a new relationship with Europe and Japan was deemed in line with the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ that foresaw the delegation of responsibility to strategic partners. The security relation with both ‘Europe’ and

171 Premières observations sur le discourse pronounce le 23 avril 1973 par le Dr Kissinger, PA– AA, B 21, 747 172 Ibid 173 Betr. Wertung der Rede von Dr. Kissinger vom 23. April im Lichte der Gespräche zwischen Präsident Nixon und Bundeskanzler Brandt und Bundesaußenminister Scheel vom 1. und 2. Mai 1973. Bezug: Aufzeichnung der Politischen Abteilung 2 vom 27. April 1973, [undated], PA–AA B 21, 747; Beziehung Europa-USA, 21 May 1973, PA–AA, B 21, 747. 174 Gespräch des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Präsidenten, Kissinger, in Washington, 2 May 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 125. 175 Außenpolitischer Jahresbericht des amerikanischen Präsidenten vom 3. Mai 1973. Hier: Europäisch-amerikanisches Verhältnis, 9 May 1973, PA–AA, B 21, 747.

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Japan was sacrosanct. The US would never question the security or interests of their European partners – so the report. Even more importantly: the US declared that it would not subordinate Alliance interests to US-Soviet relations. The allegiances with the European partners would not be sacrificed to a peace initiative with the enemy. There was no higher aim than the strengthening of US partnerships.176 The Atlantic Alliance thus needed to be reformed. Vital questions to be addressed were ‘burden sharing’, ‘flexible response’, the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the common decision making among the nuclear powers. Communality of doctrines and concepts were the platform for an engagement of the SU in the MBFR forum or SALT. The report was conservative on ‘Europe’ or the role of Europe for Western defense but reflected Kissinger’s point that European unity was not an end goal but a means to strengthen the ‘West’.177 The US would have to focus on the Atlantic alignment before re-engaging in SALT in order to guarantee ‘bloc superiority’ when accepting parity in numbers. The US Foreign Policy Report – so Dr Birrenbach – allowed two different interpretations. Given the strategic parity the US might look at a more equal division of tasks and a strengthening of Europe’s conventional strength unregulated by SALT. Block superiority would be the end-result. The alternative or amending interpretation: the US was interested in enhancing and modernizing European theatre nuclear weapons in order to be able to ‘decouple’ the US from any nuclear threat. The introduction of small and clean nuclear weapons might support the latter strategy.178 The Alliance partners were keen to shed further light on Kissinger’s Waldorf Astoria Address and the President’s Foreign Policy Report. Lord Carrington tok the intitative during the NPG Session in Ankara. He proposed to task the Eurogroup to analyze the real implications for the Alliance and Europe emanating from the recent US statements of policy.179

176 Ibid 177 Fabian Hilfrich, ‘West Germany’s Long Year of Europe. Bonn Between Europe and the United States’, in Matthias Schulz/Thomas A. Schwartz, The Strained Alliance. US-European Relations From Nixon to Carter, Cambridge: CUP 2009, 237–257, 241. 178 Erstauswertung des außenpolitischen Jahresberichts des amerikanischen Präsidenten vom 3. Mai 1973. Die Formung eines dauerhafteren Friedens, 8 May 1973, ACDP I 433-189/4. 179 Record of a Discussion Between the Defence Secretary and Herr Leber, the Federal Minister of Defence at the Central Staff HQ, Ankara on Tuesday 15 May 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1002.

6. SALT AND THE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR The SALT negotiations had resumed in March 1973. The US proposal sought equal aggregate for ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber. The proposal thus extended the Interim Agreement to bombers and was setting equal ceilings. Equal ICBM numbers and throw weight were envisaged. As Raymond Garthoff correctly stresses – ‘this proposal was obviously not acceptable to the Soviet side’.180 A new proposal was hastily decided upon in early May in order to be able to agree on a platform for the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The new proposal envisaged an overall aggregate of 2350 ICBM, SLBM and strategic bomber launchers. The March proposal stipulations on equal numbers and equal throw weight were discarded. The US proposed a limited freedom to mix: a replacement or substitution between SLBM and ‘heavy bombers’ was allowed. ICBM numbers could not be increased.181 The US offered a non-circumvention clause in case the SU agreed to the ceiling as suggested. A MIRV test ban was tabled that would last as long as the negotiations on SALT II lasted. The proposal foresaw the possibility of a MIRV limitation for ICBM. SLBM would remain unaffected. The proposal was one sided – yet again. A MIRV test ban would limit only the Soviet Union. The US already had a partially MIRVed force. Soviet SLBM were too small to be MIRVed thus could not profit from a MIRV limitation for ICBM.182 The US proposal was also unacceptable for the NATO Allies whom the US informed at the NAC on 10 May 1973. US Ambassador Johnson had major problems to defend the US agenda. The inclusion of a non-circumvention clause into the US proposal raised discord within the Alliance. A non-circumvention clause will limit deployment options for FBS. Ambassador Johnson explained the decision to include non-circumvention in the US negotiating package as a response to the Soviet proposal of a phased withdrawal of FBS. A non-circumvention clause would allow limiting the Soviets to the aggregate total of 2350 launchers. The formula would forestall the inclusion of FBS into the aggregate total. The formula would guarantee a limitation of ICBM, SLBM and bombers. This – so Johnson – was – a major achievement since the SU had previously suggested a total prohibition of bombers of all types as carriers of nuclear weapons.183 The Dutch NATO Ambassador Dirk Spierenburg asked to interrupt the NAC session for 15 minutes in order to allow the partners to discuss the matter. The notion was moved by the NATO General

180 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 370. 181 Brief for the Secretary of State’s Attendance at the Eurogroup’s Ministerial Meeting on 6 June 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1002. 182 Ibid; Anglo-Italian Politico-Military Talks: SALT, 31 May 1973, TNA, DEFE 24/787; Briefs for the Prime Minister’s Talks with President Pompidou: SALT, 17 May 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1002. 183 Ibid, footnote 3.

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Secretary against the wishes of the United States. The Allies questioned the US rational: The US had promised to use a non-circumvention clause as a matter of last resort. Why did the US introduce a non-intervention clause in the first months of the negotiations?184 The Federal German Government assumed that the US sought to devise a bilateral understanding or declaration as a new platform for SALT II. The US sought an equivalent to the SALT I ‘20 May Understanding’ for the SALT II process. The latter would probably be tabled and agreed upon at the US-SU June Summit.185 The US seemed to conceal her real intentions. The US delegates were clearly insecure in their responses to questions by NATO Allies.186 The Allies were dissatisfied with the US consultations. The UK noted that the US had repeatedly scheduled SALT briefings on short notice. As a consequence no NATO SALT Experts Meeting was arranged. The European Allies had explicitly requested always to schedule a NATO Experts Meeting in conjunction with the NAC briefings. Ambassador Johnson furthermore read a prepared statement without making advance copies available to NATO partners.187 The whole presentation ‘gave the Council the feeling that they have been bounced.’188 London was particularly concerned about the state of affairs in NATO since the Americans ‘so far had made no move to inform other members of NATO about this draft declaration [on the Prevention of Nuclear War], despite ‘our’ urgings.’189 Another fait accompli without advance notice – i.e. a US-SU PNW agreement – might have serious consequences for the Alliance. The impression of a condominium and of a prioritization of US-SU negotiations over Alliance affairs were to gain new impetus. Threats of a decoupling lured in the background.190 The UK – and only the United Kingdom – was aware of both the drafting of a ‘Joint Declaration on the SALT Process’ and on the ‘Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War’ by the superpowers. Henry Kissinger had informed London about the drafting of a Joint SALT Declaration to be issued at the US-SU Washington Summit on 18–26, June 1973. The SU insisted on a stringent nontransfer clause as part of the Joint Declaration. The Soviet approach threatened to

184 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 10 May 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 132; Text of Mr. Alexis Johnson’s Statement on Non-circumvention to the NATO Council on 10 May 1973, [undated], TNA, FCO 46/1002. 185 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 10 May 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 132, footnote 2. 186 Ibid, footnote 2. 187 Rose, SALT: The Consultation with NATO, 21 May 1973, TNA, DEFE 24/787 – see also: First Sea Lord’s Visit to SACLANT Sea-Power Symposium, Subject SALT, [undated, June 1973], TNA, DEFE 24/788. 188 Ibid 189 Ibid 190 Brief for PM Heath, Talks between The Prime Minister and the President of France on 21–22 May 1973, 16 May 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 95, http://gateway.proquest.com/ openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec:DBPO040950105 (access date: 8 March 2011).

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undermine US-UK nuclear cooperation and NATO dual-key systems. In order to get the non-transfer clause withdrawn the US had agreed to a wider scope of SALT by introducing the non-circumvention clause.191 The latter point was made known to the FCO on the day of the NAC briefing by Ambassador Johnson. The observation of the German Representative Menne concerning the NAC session on 10 May that the US and SU possibly worked on a Joint SALT Declaration or Interim Agreement was totally accurate.192 The US-SU bilateralism was alarming for Western Europe. The UK thus had to consider a ‘hedging’ strategy to complement the ‘bridging’ strategy. The UK had to concert policies with France and Europe on SALT and European defense. A weakening of Europe meant a weakening of the position of the UK – even in case the UK would not be directly affected or even exempted. A UK without a viable partner was ease prey. A non-transfer clause would have hit the UK as badly as the Continent. Bipolarity had clear advantages for the superpowers. It was a manageable world order. For that very reason the SU sought to institutionalize bipolarity. The Soviet interest in a bilateral PNW was just an expression thereof. The end result: a condominium. A superpower condominium was unacceptable for the Allies.193 The European powers were about to embrace the NPT of the ‘US interpretations’. The NPT bargain between the NWS and the NNWS assured NATO’s nuclear guarantee, NATO’s nuclear sharing and the European Nuclear Option. These pillars of European security were challenged by a condominium. In case the US nuclear umbrella collapsed due to a US-SU Agreement on PNW the European Continental countries might not adhere to the NPT. In case the US umbrella collapsed the UK and France had to be able to form a nuclear trusteeship to assure Europe’s security. Thus a transfer clause was not allowed to limit or hinder a modernization of the national deterrent forces of France and the UK by way of US assistance. The PNW and SALT challenged the pillars of European security and Europe’s relative position in the international system. There was an obligation for Europe to speak out. The UK therefore considered reviving the ‘Petrignani Group’ of European SALT Experts.194 The UK thus deemed it necessary to erase any misperception in France that the UK had already decided for the Poseidon missile and given up on Anglo-French nuclear cooperation. Sir Christopher Soames – the UK Ambassador to France – had contacted the FCO in bewilderment since he had been told by Pompidou that the UK had decided on a successor system – information he could

191 Briefs for the Prime Minister’s Talks with President Pompidou: SALT, 17 Mar 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1002; Brief for the Secretary of State’s Attendance at the Eurogroup Ministerial Meeting on 6 June 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1002. 192 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 10 May 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 132 – footnote. 193 What is in SALT for Western Europe, [May 1973], TNA, FCO 46/1002. 194 Anglo-Italian Politico-Military Talks, 31 May 1973: SALT, TNA, DEFE 24/787.

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not comment on. The information proofed incorrect.195 PM Heath was concerned that Pompidou might labor under false information. The UK so far had just cleared options to obtain the Mark III warhead and Poseidon system.196 Information furnished by Schlesinger that the SU would possibly embark on a new ABM terminal defense system could tip the balance towards the more advanced US system instead of Super Antelope. The furnished information, however, could not be substantiated. According to British intelligence the SU had not embarked on a replacement of the GALOSH system with a ‘Sprint’-type terminal defense ABM. The danger of an emerging Soviet terminal defense system was therefore limited.197 Lord Carrington thus counseled to brief President Pompidou during the Anglo-French Summit on 21 May. The MoD simultaneously advised PM Heath to ‘seek a fuller understanding of the US attitude to a possible Anglo-French collaboration in preparation of the meeting with President Pompidou.’198 It was British policy to decide on a successor system in the light of the outcome of the summit deliberations with President Pompidou. Helmut Sonnenfeldt briefed the FCO on 18 May on the President’s National Security Advisor’s talks with French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert. The Nixon Administration was prepared to cooperate with France on nuclear defense matters either directly or through the United Kingdom.199 French defense autonomy was in the interest of the United States. A re-integration into NATO thus was no prerequisite for US-French nuclear cooperation. A well briefed PM Heath met President Pompidou on 21 May 1973 in the Elysée Palace. Nuclear cooperation featured on the agenda. PM Heath highlighted the dependence of Europe on the US in defense affairs. This created opportunities for the US to demand concessions from Europe in monetary or trade matters. Europe had to resist these linkages. Both areas had to be kept apart and discussed apart. The current focus had to be on defense matters – pure and simple. Pompidou agreed. The French President responded by sketching an impression of his: the US and the SU ‘were seeking a system that would enable both their countries to be protected from nuclear war.’200 For the US ‘Europe’ was just a theatre like the Far East or Middle East – areas in which the US intervened which, however, were not vitally connected with

195 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, 28 Mar 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357; R.J. Andrew to R.T. Armstrong, Future of British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 30 Mar 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 196 Future British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Speaking Note with M. Jobert, [undated], TNA, PREM 15/1357. 197 Area and Terminal ABM Defence Systems, Note by DCA, [undated], TNA, DEFE 11/792, Russian ABM Defences, [undated], TNA, DEFE 11/792. 198 Lord Carrington-PM Heath, Improvement of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent [undated], TNA, DEFE 11/792. 199 Tomkins (Paris) to FCO, 18 May 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 200 Record of a Conversation Between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic at the Elysée Palace, Paris, During the Morning of Monday 21 May 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357.

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US home defense. A European war – any European war thus would be limited to the European theatre. The US would seek to keep any war in Europe conventional. This would surely mean defeat. ‘There was of course the dream of a Franco-British nuclear force’ but even in a time span of 15 to 20 years the Europeans would not be able to equal the deterrent power of the Soviet Union. The US was aware of the strategic balance and was thus faced with one choice: (1) to retain nuclear equipped US forces in Europe or (2) to transfer nuclear weapons to European NATO Allies. The latter – a transfer – is gradually made impossible by the US own dealings with the SU in the NPT and SALT process. What remained for Europe was insecurity – or dependency on US FBS: the very systems currently under negotiation in the SALT II process. Given the parallel MBFR negotiation a formidable threat emerged for Europe. Italy, the Netherlands, the Danes would all follow the example of US conventional troop reductions. If the FRG was ‘disarmed’ in a special security zone, Western Europe turned indefensible. France distrusted MBFR. MBFR would make Germany into a kind of ‘neutral zone’ and thereby isolate the FRG from the West. PM Heath interdicted – exactly this was the core aim of the Soviet Union. The SU thus focused in SALT on the removal of the US FBS.201 Due to a failed arms control agenda Western Europe could end up indefensible. Western Europe thus had to forestall the withdrawal of FBS. Western Europe had to object to any weakening of European conventional forces. Europe had to focus on defense co-operation to allow gradual shifts in the EuroAtlantic balance. PM Heath now focused on the Godkin lectures and his known support for a ENF. The UK agreed with France that ‘Europe’ could not face the SU in the near future even if they would start a nuclear co-operation today. Both countries, however, had to prepare the future. The path would be eased in case France accepted the PTBT as a quid pro quo for US assistance in underground testing. France should possibly consider the British example. This might ease a common future in nuclear defense. The UK was now facing a decision on the renewal of her deterrent forces in order to cope with the major outcome of SALT I: the Soviet ABM defense shield. Several options were available: some based on purely British expertise and knowledge others based on substantial US assistance. No decision was taken. The UK has to consider the technical and political aspects of the decision with both France and the United States. President Pompidou took a rather laid back attitude. He stressed the adverse reactions an Anglo-French nuclear program would generate in the SU and the Federal Republic. An AngloFrench nuclear trusteeship for Europe was anathema to both. This, however, should not disallow technical cooperation among experts in order to prepare a successor system for the 1990s. ‘However, nothing had to be said about this in public.’202 Burke Trend advised PM Heath to inform President Nixon about the talks with President Pompidou. The agreement at Mildenhall so demanded. President Nixon furthermore was about to meet President Pompidou in Reykjavik on 201 Ibid 202 Ibid

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31 May 1973.203 PM Heath followed the advice of the Cabinet Office Secretary and offered President Nixon a synopsis of the conversation. Both countries had discussed the improvement of the Polaris system and had taken an Anglo-French collaboration into account for a future generation of the submarine based deterrent.204 Both parties envisaged to commence technical cooperation in 1975. The UK was obliged to keep this information confidential. The President, however, would be kept informed about the scheduled preparatory technical expert meetings. No major threat to US policy was emerging. France and the UK would individually seek US assistance in parallel processes and concert their technical cooperation for the future. Remarkable, however, was the analysis of US intentions. Both countries agreed that the US was aiming at a system to retreat from doomsday. Alliance commitments mattered – as long as no nuclear threat emerged for the homeland. The superpowers were seeking to limit nuclear war to Europe. Were they also seeking a ‘denuclearization’ of Europe? President Nixon at least seemed to share the French and British apprehension against MBFR. The US Government was not seeking to ‘denuclearize’ or neutralize Europe – to the contrary. The US themselves preferred to limit reductions to stationed forces.205 Europe’s strength thus could be preserved or even enhanced. This was beneficial for the West. It assured block superiority. The prerequisite: Europe had to remain unbound by superpower diplomacy. The European nuclear options had to remain in place. The US had to always remember that Europe was not party to the negotiations. This created an ‘institutionalized’ uncertainty. Europe constantly feared a form of abandonment a cutting of Europe’s development options by way of an East-West regime. The ‘no first-use’ agenda combined all possible fears for Europe’s standing in the world. The US thus had to adopt a cautious approach on PNW. Henry Kissinger in May 1973 flew to Moscow to secretly negotiate the PNW. President Nixon had furnished Kissinger with extraordinary powers to finalize the draft PNW agreement. Kissinger was not allowed to initial the text while in Moscow but could give Brezhnev assurance that the substance of the negotiated text would stand – except legal and language editing.206 Kissinger was furthermore tasked to draft the ‘Declaration on Principles on SALT Process’ to create a platform along the lines of the ’20 May Understanding’ of the SALT I process. The news from Moscow was not promising. Henry Kissinger alerted Washington on 7 May that the ‘Declaration of Principles on the SALT Process’ would have to be very general. There was little agreement about the scope of the negotiations. The SU

203 Nuclear Deterrent: Anglo-French Co-operation, 25 May 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1357. 204 Heath-Nixon, [undated, May 1973], PREM 15/1357. 205 Botschafter Freiherr von Braun, Paris, an das AA, Französisch-amerikanische Beziehungen, Treffen zwischen President Pompidou and Nixon in Reykjavik, 4 Jun 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 174; Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 7 Jun 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 183. 206 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 7 May 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 108.

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sought to include FBS in SALT II.207 General-Secretary Brezhnev ‘has shown no inclination to proceed with concrete negotiations.’208 Brezhnev proposed to work out the SALT Declaration on Principles at the summit itself.209 For Brezhnev the PNW was clearly the key to the summit.210 Kissinger confirmed the information furnished by Dobrynin that SALT would be dragged out until agreement on the PNW was forthcoming. The PNW agenda had to be prioritized. The PNW agenda was slippery. The SU sought to limit the ‘no use’ clause to the SU and the US. This gave the superpowers ‘a free hand to use nuclear weapons against third parties.’211 In case of an East-West conflict the superpowers would be prohibited from waging nuclear war against each other. Nuclear war with Allies of the superpowers, however, remained an option. During the Moscow talks the US NSA succeeded to broaden the formula. Alliance commitments mattered. The interests of ‘third parties’ – Alliance partners – were protected. Thus any attack on an Alliance member invalidated the PNW. As a consequence thereof no avenue was left for the contracting parties to use force or provoke confrontation in the European theatre without simultaneously breaking the accord. The Soviet Union thus acquired no free hand to launch a conventional aggression without running the risk that the US would use nuclear weapons in response.212 A second major change occurred: the proposed consultation mechanism had been revised and narrowed. The consultation provision on ‘third party’ conflicts was omitted. ‘We felt that this was another attempt at an US-SU condominium and a possible basis for Soviet intervention in such third party conflicts.’213 The consultation obligation was to arise only in those instances where a risk of nuclear war between the US and the SU threatened. The Moscow talks furnished a final draft. The draft PNW was adopted by the US with minor modifications. President Nixon, however, sent an interpretative note to Brezhnev in order to clarify that ‘we have not agreed to ban the use of any particular weapons but have taken a major step towards the creation of conditions in which the danger of war, and especially nuclear war, between our two countries or between one of our countries and others, will be removed.’214

207 Message from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, 8 May 1973, FRUS 1969– 1976 XV, No 110. 208 Ibid 209 Letter from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 13 May 1973, FRUS 1969–1973 XV, No 117. 210 Memo from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, 11 May 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 116. 211 Ibid 212 Ibid; Memo from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger to President Nixon, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 121. 213 Ibid 214 Letter from President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, 7 June 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 120.

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Henry Kissinger had warned the President that the SU would lean towards an interpretation that would keep the Soviet objectives intact: (1) the renunciation of ALL use of nuclear weapons; (2) an obligation of the super-powers to act as global policemen in crisis situations, and (3) common action in the UN. All this was against US interests. The US interpretation thus had to meet following points: (1) this was not a bilateral non-aggression pact but an agreement with multilateral obligations; (2) this was not a ban of the use of nuclear weapons but a statement of conduct to preclude war of any kind, especially nuclear war; (3) Alliance relations were fully protected. The Alliance had a right to use nuclear weapons in self-defense. Especially, the latter point had to be expressed clearly to GeneralSecretary Brezhnev. Both sides had to see eye-to-eye on interpretations in order not to invalidate the agreement on the day it was signed.215 Art II PNW clearly prohibited the use of force against the other party or their Allies. Any conventional attack would be a violation of the agreement and would allow the attacked party to use nuclear weapons in self-defense – this included first-use of nuclear weapons.216 General-Secretary Brezhnev was confronted with the US interpretation of the PNW at Camp David. The interpretations presented were in line with an earlier notification. Brezhnev agreed to the US interpretations on 21 June 1973 – the day before the signing of the PNW.217 The very same day the basic ‘Principles of Negotiation on Strategic Arms Limitation’ were signed by Brezhnev and Nixon. Both sides agreed to achieve a permanent agreement for offensive arms by the end of the year 1974. The document was otherwise void of content.218 The NATO Allies were still uninformed about the PNW. Henry Kissinger had just informed Egon Bahr in April and Jobert in May – in total confidentiality.219 The US Ambassador to NATO Donald Rumsfeld told the Allies on 21 June 1973 that the ‘Declaration on the Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation’ was the only agreement on SALT that would be signed at the BrezhnevNixon Summit. As Raymond Garthoff stresses – Rumsfeld was formally right – since the PNW ‘was not strictly speaking a SALT agreement’.220 The Europeans were kept in the dark. Neither Pompidou nor Brandt who gathered for a FrancoGerman Summit on 21–22 June 1973 seemed to be aware of the PNW. The Ger-

215 Memo from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kissinger, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 121. 216 Draft Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union, [undated, 22 June 1973], FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 122. 217 Memo for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Camp David, 21 June 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 127. 218 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 381. 219 Cromer to Brimelow, 7 March 1972; Brief for Heath, Talks Between the Prime Minister and the President of France on 21 and 22 May, 16 May 1972, Trend-Kissinger, Record of Meeting in the British Embassy, Washington DC at 9:15 on Monday 4 June 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, Nos 44, 95, 108, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver= Z39.88 2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec:DBPO040950054or950105or 950118. 220 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 381.

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man Defense Minister Leber highlighted his fear that the Brezhnev-Nixon Summit might lead to an elimination of the strategic nuclear potential by way of a possible ‘no first-use’ agreement. In case this proofed correct the conventional forces in Europe would gain a total new quality. If this proofed correct, the time for Europe to speak with one voice in defense affairs would have come. France and the FRG would have to engage in a debate on the future use of the French force de frappe for Europe’s defense and on the French forces stationed in Germany.221 A common European operative conception might have to be devised.222 Pompidou agreed that the Chiefs-of-Staff of both countries should continue to work on common European defense. France furthermore informed the German partner that French forces would be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons to respond to crises on any level. The Federal German Minister of Defense instantly inquired about the option of a consultation of the FRG on the usage of French tactical nuclear weapons. Leber envisaged a mechanism along the lines of the existing NATO procedures. The French Defense Minister Robert Galley considered it as self-evident that France would involve the FRG in nuclear decision-making in case French troops stationed in the FRG were to be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. This so far was not the case. As of this day all nuclear capable units were stationed in France.223 Galley promised to raise the issue of a consultative mechanism with President Pompidou but advised to keep total discretion about the fact that nuclear issues had been broached in the conversation of the ministers of defense.224 It is worth noting that Dr Alfred Dregger – the head of the CDU in Hessen – discussed Franco-German security cooperation in a parallel process while attending the WEU Assembly in Paris on 18–22 June 1973. In his conversations with leading Gaullists Dregger highlighted the raising of the nuclear threshold by the superpowers and its consequences for European security. He furthermore inquired about the ‘European option.’ According to Dregger it was worth considering German financial support for the force de frappe in case France would be willing to agree to a common targeting of the French nuclear forces.225 Donald Rumsfeld briefed the NATO Ambassadors in Brussels on 22 June 1973. The Allies were informed about the PNW. The latter instrument was signed on the very same day at Camp David. The NAC session in Brussels was described as ‘stormy’. Even the British NATO Ambassador criticized the PNW severely – due to tactical reasons. HM NATO Ambassador had been informed about ‘Operation Hullabaloo’ but instructed not to indicate that HMG was an insider and had

221 Notiz über das Gespräch Minister Leber/Minister Galley während des deutsch-französischen Gipfelgespräches am 21–22.6.1973, ACDP I 433-135/2. 222 Ibid 223 Ibid 224 Ibid 225 Dr Dregger to Helmut Kohl, Franz-Josef Strauß und Professor Carstens, 2 Jul 1973, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), NL Carstens 337/2 # 2.

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privileged information.226 The remarks by the Allies were extremely critical. De Staerke considered the PNW unwise. The PNW creates the impression of a privileged superpower relationship and of a ‘decoupling’ of nuclear and conventional defense. The PNW thus would revive the idea of a ENF.227 According to Garthoff’s account the West-German NATO representative was called out of the chamber by the US delegation to inform him that Chancellor Willy Brandt had been informed in advance.228 When Kissinger mentioned at the press conference on 22 June 1973 that Allies had been consulted about the PNW grumblings occurred. Secretary of State Rogers briefed the Ambassadors of the NATO Countries on 26 June 1973. The Belgian NATO Ambassador de Staerke asked the US Secretary of State to give evidence who had been consulted when about what. Secretary of State Rogers replied he was not aware what consultations Kissinger had been referring to in his press conference. According to Garthoff this was a correct statement.229 Rogers and ‘the State Department had been informed about it a few hours beforehand’ – before the signing of the PNW at Camp David.230 To make a long row short: the response of the Allies to the PNW was surely not ‘superb’ as Henry Kissinger told the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrej Gromyko on 23 June 1973.231 A first West-German and French analysis of the PNW emerged before the special meeting with NATO Ambassadors arranged by President Nixon in San Clemente, California on 30 June 1973. The PNW – so the Auswärtige Amt – was revolutionary and yet in line with previous developments. It was in line with the Moscow Declaration of May 1972.232 It codified the existing condominium. Both parties committed themselves to avoid confrontations that might lead to a nuclear war. The PNW did not challenge the collective right for self-defense and offered an opportunity to involve Allies into the consultations of the superpowers. The PNW, however, contained several dangers: an obligatory consultation among the superpowers codified a right of the superpowers to intervene into conflicts to avert real or imagined dangers for world peace. The PNW at least opened an avenue to concerted action of the superpowers in crises situations that had a potential to develop into a nuclear conflict (affecting one of the signatories). The superpowers in the last resort had taken over a commitment to avert nuclear war thus offering a

226 FCO-Peck, (UKDEL NATO, Tel Nos 245, 247), 18 & 20 Jun 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 131, http://gateway. proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri: dbpous:&rft_dat=xri: dpbo:rec:DBPO040950141 or -950146 (access date: 10 March 2011). 227 UK DEL NATO Tel 460, 21 Jun 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 4, No 140, http://gateway. proquest.com/ openurl? url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dpbo:rec: DBPO040950150 (access date 10 March 2011). 228 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 381. 229 Ibid, 382. 230 McLaren to Wiggin, Soviet Agreement, [undated, registry 10 July], TNA, FCO 41/1173. 231 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, 23 Jun 1973, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 130. 232 Erste Bewertung des Abkommens zwischen den USA und der UdSSR über die Verhinderung eines nuklearen Krieges vom 22 Juni 1973, 26 Jun 1973, PA–AA, ZW 107370.

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security guarantee to NNWS that nuclear weapons would not be employed (except in self-defense as a last resort). This would go beyond the security guarantees offered in conjunction with the NPT.233 A second point was deemed noteworthy. The superpowers were dedicated not to allow ‘third parties’ to act as a nuclear trigger for a general strategic nuclear war.234 The PNW thus challenged the French (and British) defense doctrine. The latter highlighted the importance of multiple triggers for Western security. Europe was left with a bitter choice: to either accept a high nuclear threshold or a decoupling of European and US security.235 Europe thus had to consider the consequences: was flexible response still valid? Was the ladder of escalation still intact? Did Europe have to accommodate and seek a NATO reform or does Europe have to develop the European Option?236 The French analysis highlighted the revolutionary element. SALT I had aimed at a regulation of the common vulnerability. The PNW codified common rules of conduct and patterns of behavior that would allow both superpowers not only to avert nuclear war among themselves but to intervene in common in any conflict that might develop into a nuclear conflict.237 This ‘right’ would exist irrespective of an involvement of vital national interests. Turning from the ‘political’ to the military aspect: the PNW forced a conventional defense concept on US Allies. It was not the first time that the US pressured a new defense doctrine on Allies but the first time in conjunction with the SU and without prior consultation of the Allies. ‘Flexible response’ is based on the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons and includes the risk of escalation to the strategic level. What would be left of the escalation ladder, if escalation was blocked to reach the strategic level? Given the codification of parity among the superpowers – Europe was thrown on the playtable in a gamble of the superpowers without prior consultation.238 HMG’s analysis of the PNW resembled the official US reading of the PNW. The positions of the FCO and of the Ministry of Defence, however, differed. The former was at ease with PNW. The Ministry of Defence was critical. The British highlighted that the PNW was aiming at a reduction of the risk of war. ‘It applies only to situations in which war has not broken out, and would indeed lapse if that happened.’ With the outbreak of a conventional war the PNW would not be ruling conduct any more. The PNW thus does not ban ‘the use, or the first use, of nuclear weapons which the Russians have long sought’ in order to make use of their conventional superiority.239 The PNW had raised major fears among the Allies – in particular the Germans and the French. The UK was able to ally the Germans

233 234 235 236 237

Ibid Ibid Ibid Ibid Betr. Französische Bewertung des amerikanisch-sowjetischen Abkommens zur Verhütung des Gebrauchs von Atomwaffen, 27 Jun 1973, PA–AA, B 21, 747. 238 Ibid 239 US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, [undated], TNA, FCO 41/1174.

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but not the French fears.240 The UK had told the German NATO Delegation that superpower consultation in emerging conflicts was in any way to be expected. Consultation was even envisaged in the NATO guidelines before the initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO.241 Nevertheless the repercussions on the Alliance were far from limited – military strategic and political repercussions were to be expected. The PNW agreement had been revised but not the foreign policy agenda of the superpowers. The US had ample possibility to set the record straight. President Nixon invited the NATO Permanent Representatives to the ‘Western White House’ in San Clemente on 30 June 1973. The President briefed the NAC about the US-SU Summit. He started by outlining that his remarks would constitute ‘an authoritative statement of US policy.’242 He recognized that there was a fear that the US might ‘make bilateral deals at the expense of the NATO Allies, and try to establish some sort of condominium.’243 These fears had no basis. ‘The alliance came first and would always do so’. The PNW posed no threat. He had told GeneralSecretary Brezhnev that no decision could be made that affected Alliance interests ‘without prior consultation with the members of NATO.’ He continued: ‘those political experts, who claimed to detect in it [PNW] a non-aggression-pact or an agreement to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons would have to burn their editorials and speeches.’244

America’s obligations to the Alliance were not affected. ‘The Agreement dealt with the conduct of the two super-powers in peacetime.’245 A use of force against Allies would pose a violation of the PNW and thus would negate any further obligations. The whole agreement had to be dealt with pragmatically. The US had no illusions. In case superpower relations changed for worse the whole endeavor would be just a piece of paper. Thus defense policy would follow the same old patterns until a new and lasting environment had emerged. NATO might be adjusted in the process but had to be preserved. ‘Many people regarded NATO as an old car with a lot of mileage on the clock, which should be traded in. A Declaration of Principles could give the alliance a new sense of purpose, and allow it once more the full support of domestic opinion.’246

The remarks of the President and of Dr Kissinger had a benevolent impact. NATO Secretary-General Luns thanked President Nixon for his stirring address. ‘He was 240 Ibid 241 B.L. Crowe, US-Soviet Agreement on the Avoidance of Nuclear Weapons, 29 Jun 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1173; J.M. Legge, US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 12 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1173. 242 Cromer to FCO, Summary of the President’s Remarks to the NATO Group, San Clements, 1 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1173. 243 Ibid 244 Ibid 245 Ibid 246 Ibid

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confident that any fears and uneasiness had been allayed.’247 Henry Kissinger admitted that the PNW had been drafted close to the chest, thus no adequate consultation had taken place. The US, however, had managed to turn a Soviet ‘no firstuse’ agreement into an agreement that controlled Soviet conduct. The SU had intended to separate conventional from nuclear war. This endeavor had not been successful.248 Any assumption that the SU might aggress without penalties due to a consultation obligation was baseless. An aggression constitutes a violation and frees the other contracting party from any obligations of the treaty.249 Alliance interests were assured. The visit of German Foreign Minister Scheel to Washington offered Kissinger a renewed option to discuss the PNW. Henry Kissinger offered the Foreign Secretary the US interpretation of the PNW – as discussed with General-Secretary Brezhnev. The interpretations had been ‘adopted’ by the General-Secretary.250 The concerns remained. The impression that the US had de facto withdrawn her nuclear umbrella remained widespread. The US strategy and policy indicated a marked retreat from the escalation principle underlying flexible response. The US sought a sanctuary. Dr Alfred Seidl – the Deputy Head of the Christian Social Union in the Bavaria Parliament – stressed the fact that the PNW erased the direct nuclear threat to both superpowers, erased a nuclear conflict among the superpowers and herewith erases the nuclear umbrella for Western Europe guaranteed by ‘flexible response’. The danger of a conventional or tactical nuclear conflict in Europe thus increased. The US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe could never be utilized to defend Europe. This would leave Europe devastated – a wasteland. The Europeans thus had to consider developing a ‘strike arm’ prior to a European federation. The Europeans had every right to withhold adherence to the NPT due to the waning NATO umbrella. Thus Europe would have total freedom of action to develop a ENF – unrestricted by the NPT. The Christian Democratic governed Länder thus would not support NPT adherence in the German Senate (Bundesrat).251 Sir Douglas-Home and Walter Scheel – the British and the German Foreign Ministers – briefly debated a ENF during their talks on 4 July 1973. Both Foreign Secretaries adopted an approach in line with the ‘European option’ of the NPT – a European Union which commanded over foreign and defense policy was the prerequisite for a European deterrent. France and Britain, however, could concert

247 Cromer to FCO, Briefing for NAC on Brezhnev Visit, 1 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1173. 248 Cromer to FCO, Alliance Consultation, 1 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1173; Botschafter Krapf, z.Zt Washington, an Bundesminister Scheel, z.Zt Helsinki, 3 Jul 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 214. 249 Botschafter Krapf, z.Zt Washington, an Bundesminister Scheel, z.Zt Helsinki, 3 Jul 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 214, Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das AA, 6 Jul 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 219. 250 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Brunner. Zusammenfassung der Gespräche von Bundesaußenminister Scheel am 12. Juli 1973 in Washington, 16 Jul 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 222. 251 Seidl-Strauß, 16 Jul 1973, ACDP 01 226-595.

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their actions.252 The Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks in London on 12 July 1973 further analyzed the PNW. According to the Deputy Political Director of the French Foreign Ministry Claude Arnaud ‘the Agreement’s primary significance lay in the institutionalization of a situation that had existed since the Cuban crisis.’253 The obligation under Art IV PNW to make every effort to avert conflict involving other countries ‘appeared designed to legitimize for the future the kind of Soviet American pressure which they had been covertly applied at the time of Suez.’254 ‘In future cases such pressure could be overt.’255 In American eyes the Alliance was no more than a safety net for use in cases where the Russians did not respect the new agreement. An almost identical evaluation of the consequence for the US was made by Minister without Portfolio and Chief Counselor of Chancellor Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr.256 The Europeans had to analyze the current in world politics. The French feared that the PNW had European repercussions. The PNW thus had to be discussed by the European Community. The notion had been moved by M. Arnaud (France) at the Political Directors Meeting in Helsinki on 5–6 July 1973. The European Community was tasked to study the consequences of the PNW for Europe’s future development.257 On 25 July 1973 an Expert Group of the Nine met in Copenhagen to study the US-Soviet PNW. The experts faced two very different interpretations: one furnished by the French, the other by the UK and Germany. The French refused to accept external evidence but focused only on the interpretation of the ‘treaty’ text itself. France had fundamental concerns and was unwilling to compromise. The French even saw a distinct ‘no first-use’ flavor in Articles I and IV PNW and the preamble.258 Belgium and Italy considered it necessary to demand an official US declaration that the PNW would not undermine NATO arrangements.259 The Germans were supporting British interpretations but supported the EC on a ‘Declaration of Principle on Atlantic Unity’ that included a stipulation that ‘the full panoply of NATO power would be deployed’ in case of an attack on Europe. Kissinger himself had proposed a declaration to

252 Ministerialdirektor van Well, z.Zt. Helsinki, and das AA, 5 Jul 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 218. 253 Anglo-French Politico Military Talks, 12 Jul 1973, Agenda Item III: US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 12 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1129. 254 Ibid 255 Ibid 256 Ibid – ‘For the US NATO would be a kind of a safety valve if cooperation with the Soviet Union did not work.’ Record of Conversation Between the Ministers of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Federal German Minister without Portfolio at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Tuesday 30 Oct 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1191. 257 Anglo-French Politico Military Talks, 12 Jul 1973, Agenda Item III: US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 12 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1129. 258 P.J. Goulden, Experts Group on the US Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 26 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1174. 259 Ibid

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that respect at the NAC special session at San Clemente.260 The net result of the EC Expert Group deliberations was an expression of misgivings about a superpower system that threatened to impose security decision on Europe and downgraded the Atlantic Alliance. The ‘Atlantic Declaration of Principles’ might ease the situation.261 The drafting, however, had to be a common endeavor that demanded European solidarity and unity. Europe had to negotiate as a block with the US.262 The UK faced a dilemma. Should the UK inform Washington about the deliberation of the Nine on the PNW or show European solidarity. Henry Kissinger would feel a breach of confidence if the UK – who had co-drafted the PNW – kept them in the dark about the European deliberations. France and the FRG on the other hand insisted on a European concerted approach to strengthen Europe’s defense identity. Knowledge about a breach of solidarity would harm the UK in Europe.263

260 261 262 263

Ibid US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 7 Aug 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1174. Bundeskanzler Brandt-Prime Minister Heath, 7 Aug 1973, TNA, ADAP 1973, Nr. 242. C.C.C. Tickell, US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 8 Aug 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1174.

7. SALT II AND MBFR The lack of consultation with the Allies on the SALT ‘Declaration of Principles’ of 21 June had caused genuine concern among the Allies.264 The content of the declaration was of lesser concern. The declaration was committing both parties to work out a permanent agreement for the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons and the ’subsequent reduction’ thereof. The target date was 1974. Both parties recognized ‘equal security interests’. Both parties promised to refrain from seeking unilateral advantages. Finally the Declaration highlighted that both quantitative and qualitative aspects were to be part of the SALT II endeavor.265 The Anglo-French Military Talks of 12 July witnessed a French interest to interpret the vague ‘Declaration of Principles’. The French were puzzled that 1974 had been chosen as a target date for SALT II. No clear rational for the time frame was discernible to both parties. The ‘Declaration of Principle’ was deemed a nondocument. The ‘Declaration of Principles’ document was best to be discarded.266 The focus of the Allies should be on (1) the ‘Atlantic Declaration’, (2) the US negotiating package as presented on 10 May by Ambassador Alexis U. Johnson as well as (3) the upcoming MBFR negotiations. The Europeans had to express their views on European security. Europe had to shape the ‘Atlantic Declaration of Principles’ as much as the SALT and MBFR negotiations. The Europeans had to insist on an ‘Atlantic Declaration’ that extended the obligation of the Alliance to assist a victim of aggression with all means available. This would counter any attempt to limit the conflict and to break the ladder of escalation. The ‘Atlantic Declaration’ thus should clearly indicate that the PNW did not undermine the twins of flexible response strategy and forward strategy. A confirmation of the US nuclear guarantee for Europe and of the US troop deployments in Europe had to be obtained. The latter would limit the negotiation options of the superpowers in SALT and MBFR.267 The new French Foreign Minister Jobert concurred. But more was needed – actions instead of words. The US proposal of an ‘Atlantic Charter’ had been raised by the US to allay fears of the European Allies that rightfully emerged due to the Brezhnev-Nixon PNW. The idea of an ‘Atlantic Charter’ was a placebo in order to lull the Europeans into a false sense of security and to prepare the next step in the formation of a superpower regime. The PNW erased the US nuclear umbrella for Europe. The US remained in Europe to defend her

264 SALT, [July 1973], TNA, FCO 41/1186. 265 NATO Principles of Negotiations on the Future Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 21 Jun 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1186. 266 Anglo-French Politico Military Talks: SALT, 12 Jul 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1003; SALT: Non Central Systems, 22 Aug 1973, TNA, DEFE 24/789; Secretary of State’s Visit to Washington, Brief: SALT II, 25 Jul 1973, TNA, DEFE 24/789. 267 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors von Well, 13 Aug 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 245.

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world system not Allied security. In case their interests would dictate a withdrawal they would withdraw.268 The Europeans had to assert themselves. Similar voices could be heard on the other side of the Rhine. The Brezhnev-Nixon Accord – so Dr Dregger from the CDU opposition – had turned Europe into a ‘glacis’ where conventional wars without fear of nuclear escalation could be waged. The nuclear defense by way of atomic demolition munitions – as propagated by the US in the NPG – would not trigger a response by the SU that endangered the United States.269 The US clearly sought to limit a war to the European theatre. The renewed interest of the US Secretary of Defense James R Schlesinger in conventional defense – as expressed in June 1973 – served the same purpose.270 The FRG – so Jobert – had to consider if the unity of Europe could be obtained only under a US nuclear umbrella. According to Jobert Europe could only be constructed if it emancipated herself from US domination. A European Identity could emerge only in contrast to the US.271 The Federal German Government had to show the same courage in her dealings with the US as during the time period when it devised her ‘Ostpolitik’. The constant German argument that the US was eternally needed for Europe’s defense was not valid. The common Anglo-French nuclear deterrent was able to destroy two-thirds of the SU – so the French Ambassador to the United Kingdom Geoffroy de Courcel. The US intended to destroy European unity – not to build it. It thus would be useless for the FRG to financially support the US thru offset payments. Better uses for European resources could be envisaged – since the future Europe would be defended by Europeans. This was totally in line with Dr Dregger’s plea to use West German resources to seek a French nuclear guarantee and to support the force de frappe.272 Thus Europe had to hold true to her aim to transform her relations into a European Union by 1980 – as envisaged by the European Communities273; thus Europe had to devise a European Political Union (EPU) and European Defence Community (EDC) headed by a European defense minister as suggested by President Pompidou in June 1973274; thus Europe had to concert her defense procurement and revive the WEU and FINABEL; thus Europe

268 Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretär Frank, 31 Aug 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 267. 269 Dr Dregger – Prof Dr Carstens, Betr.: Die nukleare Komponente der europäischen Verteidigung, 22 August 1973, BA, NL Carstens, 337/2 # 2. 270 Talks Between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on 6–7 October 1973, European Defence, Brief by the Ministry of Defence, September 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1195; Lord Carrington’s Visit to the United States: 2–5 August 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1187. 271 Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretär Frank, 31 Aug 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 267. 272 Dr. Dregger – Prof Dr Carstens, Betr.: Die nukleare Komponente der europäischen Verteidigung, 22 Aug 1973, BA, NL Carstens, 337/2 # 2. 273 Views of the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister on a European Nuclear Force, 8 Aug 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1195. 274 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Pfeffer, 6 Sep 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 275.

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had to defend her options in MBFR and SALT in order not to fall prey to the next step in superpower détente. Only action – not the ‘Atlantic Charter’ – would finally decide Europe’s place in the future world order. This nevertheless implied that Europe would show to be capable to negotiate – second order issues such as the ‘Atlantic Charter’ in solidarity. The French government on 3 October 1973 tabled a draft ‘Atlantic Declaration’ in the NAC. The French draft stressed (1) the indivisibility of Western defense, (2) the US commitment to maintain nuclear and conventional defense forces on the European Continent, (3) a commitment by all Alliance members to defend Europe in case of aggression with all means available, and (4) the positive impact of European defense co-operation for transatlantic security. The draft invalidated the impact of the PNW on Atlantic solidarity.275 The very same day the Federal German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the United Nations General Assembly announced Europe’s willingness to create a European Union by the end of this decade – an economic, monetary, political and defense union.276 The European Option was alive. It now had to be defended in the SALT and MBFR fora in order to be able to build Europe between the superpowers – to use a classic title by Anton W. de Porte. The German Government, however, doubted that Europe would be able to stand on her own in the near future. Europe could not replace the US – as a ‘security provider’ of hard security. This process would take a long time. This was clearly expressed by Egon Bahr in his talks with PM Heath on 29 October 1973.277 The FRG would ratify the NPT. Thus only the ‘European Option’ of the NPT mattered and no arrangements beyond the NPT. The European Nuclear Option required a European Union – it required a European Union with a Common Security and Defense Policy in today’s parlance. The current focus had to be on SALT and MBFR – on the preservation of options. In the meantime the focus had shifted towards the first order issues that had the potential to structure Europe’s path to unity: the SALT negotiations and the upcoming MBFR Talks. The former were about to take off on 25 September after having rested since 25 June. MBFR was to commence on 30 October in Vienna as agreed upon at the US-SU Washington Summit on 24 June 1973. The shadow of the upcoming negotiations made Dr Alfred Seidl contact Chancellor Willy Brandt on 10 September. He asked Willy Brandt to freeze the NPT proceedings in the FRG until a clear picture arose from the upcoming MBFR and SALT negotiations. The breakthrough of the SU in MIRV technology – as announced by Secretary Schlesinger on 16 August – would impact on SALT. The balance between quantitative and qualitative inequalities in SALT I was now a matter of the past.

275 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 8 Oct 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 315; French Draft for an Alliance Declaration, 12 Oct 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1190. 276 Dr Birrenbach, Zur europäischen Union, 12 Oct 1973, ACDP I 433-119/2. 277 Record of Conversation between the PM and Herr Egon Bahr at 5.00 PM on Monday, 29 Oct 1973, at 10 Downing Street, TNA, FCO 41/1191; M. Goulding, Herr Egon Bahr, 13 Nov 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1191.

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The US thus could only settle on equal aggregates and equal throw weight. The latter was unlikely. The repercussions for Europe thus were not foreseeable. Europe thus could not make unilateral commitments in advance of a more and more remote breakthrough in general disarmament.278 On 21 September 1973 Alexis Johnson briefed the NAC about the forthcoming SALT negotiation period scheduled for 25 September until 16 November 1973. The debate was structured by the ‘revelation’ of Secretary Schlesinger that the SU would be able to deploy MIRVed missile systems by 1975. The NAC session debated the repercussions of the successful Soviet MIRV test of July 1973 for the SALT process and its scope. Ambassador Johnson highlighted that the terms ‘essential equivalence’ or ‘equal security’ allowed for asymmetries. Thus the ‘Declaration of Principles’ of 21 June 1973 did not forestall asymmetrical approaches. The target date 1974 would automatically lead to an asymmetrical agreement. The US would accept an asymmetry in IRBM favoring the SU in case the US MIRV advantage could be frozen or regulated. In case MIRVing could not be frozen the US would insist on equal numbers on ICBM and equal throw weight. André de Staerke inquired if the asymmetrical approach would also apply to MBFR and to complex SALT-MBFR balances. Ambassador Johnson offered no answer. NATO Ambassador Rumsfeld added that the precious nexus between MBFR and SALT would be dealt with – as soon as an MBFR package and negotiation position had been devised and probed.279 The NAC deliberations were succeeded by a ‘Petrignani Group’ meeting of European SALT Experts headed by the Deputy NATO Permanent Representative Francesco Spinelli due to the departure of Petrignani from the Disarmament Section of the Farnesina.280 The MBFR agenda moved more and more center stage: The European Allies approached the topic under the following pre-condition: The result had to be in line with NATO’s ‘flexible response’ strategy. MBFR was neither allowed to undermine ‘forward defense’ nor the flexibility of defense nor the ladder of escalation. MBFR was neither allowed to undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance nor the development options of the European Community.281 Thus a special reduction zone limited to the territory of the two German states was not permissible. The Rapacki-model served as a model. The division of Europe into zones nevertheless remained problematic for European defense. Neither the development of the Alliance nor the process of European unification was allowed to suf278 Seidl-Brandt, Betr. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 1 Juli 1968 über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen, 10 Sep 1973, ACDP 01-226-595. Vgl. hierzu: Betr. Treffen Bundeskanzler Brandt mit Premierminister Heath. Hier: Beitrag BMVtg zur Gesprächsunterlage ‘SALT’, [September 1973], PA–AA, ZW 102476; D.E. Young, Extract from the Discussion between Minister of State for Defence and the US Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, 13 Sep 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1004. 279 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 21 Sep 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 288. 280 Future of the Petrignani Group, 26 Oct 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1004. 281 Vorlage des Auswärtigen Amtes und des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung für den Bundessicherheitsrat, 5 Sep 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 273.

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fer from arms control – as stressed by the German Permanent Representative Dr Krapf in the NAC on 10 May 1973.282 The ‘Western’ phased approach to MBFR foresaw reduction of stationed US and Soviet forces in phase I. The reductions would contribute to the creation of a common ceiling in phase II. The common ceiling was a ceiling for Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the core reduction area. The common ceiling concept envisaged a ceiling of 700 000 troops for each block within the MBFR reduction area.283 The MBFR concept of the Alliance originally dealt with ground forces. The phase I proposal envisaged a withdrawal of 29 000 US soldiers and 68 000 Soviet soldiers including a complete tank army and FROG and SCUD nuclear launchers. The US NATO Ambassador Rumsfeld indicated in the presentation of the position to the Senior Political Committee on 27 July that the US was prepared to include nuclear reductions as a make weight to secure Soviet acceptance ‘up to the limit of’ the original Option III offer of 1000 nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 ‘Phantom’ and 36 PERSHING.284 The US linkage of Option III with the agreed Alliance position was still unexplained. The ‘nuclear component’ to the MBFR agenda raised multiple questions. HMG demanded that the following topics had to be assessed as a matter of urgency: (1) the impact on the deterrent forces under SACEUR’s command, (2) the relationship of nuclear reductions in SALT and MBFR, (3) the MBFR reduction zone and FBS, (4) the impact on NATO air force dual-key systems, and finally (5) the allocation of the nuclear dimension by nation. Was the nuclear component limited to the US or did it include the nuclear forces of NATO partners? The linkage with the first phase of reductions seemed at least to indicate that the reductions would be entirely taken from US forces in Europe.285 Other questions could be added: was it possible to verify the withdrawal of warheads – by national means only or would the reduction area know a special verification regime? The creation of a special control regime for Central Europe was politically untenable. It would be equated with a discrimination of Germany. The SACEUR considered a reduction of 1000 warheads feasible due to the existence of 7000 nuclear warheads in the European

282 Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the NATO HQs, Brussels, on Thursday, 10 May, 1973 at 3.30 PM and Friday, 11th May 1973 at 10.15 AM, NATO Archive Brussels, C–R (73) 29. 283 Ibid; Draft Steering Brief for the British Delegation to the MBFR Talks, 11 Oct 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, No 9, http// gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_ dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040930018 (16 March 2011). 284 MBFR: The Nuclear Aspect, TNA, FCO 41/1212; MBFR – Mehew, MBFR Steering Group, A Nuclear Element. The US approach to a Nuclear Element, 24 Oct 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1212; Tactical Nuclear Weapons in MBFR, [undated, November 1973], TNA, FCO 41/1212. 285 MBFR: The Nuclear Aspect, [undated], TNA, FCO 41/1212; Draft Steering Brief for the British Delegation to the MBFR Talks, 11 October 1973, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, No 9, http//gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat= xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040930018 (16 March 2011).

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theatre.286 Thus an asymmetrical approach to the land force reduction package was feasible – according to SHAPE. Option III could be presented in phase I to obtain a massive conventional reduction of Soviet tank forces in the GDR. One organizational problem remained. The MBFR Working Group of NATO had no expertise in nuclear matters. Expert advice was indispensable to analyze the nuclear aspect of MBFR.287 The Alliance should be able to answer all the questions raised by an introduction of a nuclear component into MBFR by February 1974. The 14th NPG Meeting in The Hague of 6–7 November addressed both SALT and the nuclear component in MBFR. According to US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger it was inevitable that ‘NATO’s nuclear capability in Europe would come under discussion’ in MBFR. NATO ‘should do its homework as to what nuclear capability it wishes to keep’. The SU had already introduced the topic of nuclear armaments in MBFR.288 Secretary of Defense Leber raised the question of FBS and of forward bases. The SU would insist on their reduction. Mario Tanassi – the Italian Minister of Defense – inquired about the introduction of smaller and cleaner nuclear weapons and their impact on Europe’s defense. Schlesinger outlined the US interest in a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons for the European theatre. Questions of their employment doctrine, however, were of even higher importance. Questions of escalation and of command and control over tactical nuclear weapons would demand further attention.289 Finally, the question of ‘targeting’ had to be re-evaluated in line with a selective employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Flexible and select options were needed – in line with the NPG studies on ‘Initial-use’ and ‘Follow-on Use’ of nuclear weapons in Europe.290 The challenge for NATO was to find a formula of how to deploy without automatically triggering escalation while maintaining the option to deliberately escalate a conflict to the strategic level. Secretary Schlesinger highlighted that NATO had no ‘real’ doctrine for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. NATO had to study ‘constraint’ and its effect on a ‘decoupling’ of European and US security.291 It had also to study early combined use or early initial usage of nuclear weapons and its politico-military effect.292

286 MBFR: The Nuclear Aspect, [undated], TNA, FCO 41/1212. 287 Ibid 288 UK Record of the 14th Meeting of the NATO NPG held in the Hague on 6–7 November 1973, Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense on the Balance of Strategic Forces, TNA, DEFE 11/471. 289 UK Record of the 14th Meeting of the NATO NPG held in the Hague on 6–7 November 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1155. 290 Ibid 291 UK Record of the 14th Meeting of the NATO NPG held in the Hague on 6–7 November 1973. Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense on the Balance of Strategic Forces, TNA, DEFE 11/471. 292 UK Record of the 14th Meeting of the NATO NPG held in the Hague on 6–7 November 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1155.

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The Alliance had to engage in a total re-evaluation of its nuclear defense posture in the light of the forthcoming arms control negotiations. The Soviet MBFR proposal of 8 November only re-enforced the need to study the linkage between defense doctrine and arms control. The Soviet proposal focused on the same geographical reduction zone as the West: the FRG, the Benelux, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet proposal foresaw a phased reduction: (1) a symbolic reduction of 20 000 men for each side in 1975; (2) a reduction of 5% of all forces in the reduction zone in 1976; (3) and a reduction of 10% of all forces in the reduction area in 1977. The important feature: troops (indigenous & stationed) and their equipment should be reduced. This included army and air force units, artillery and nuclear capable missiles.293 The Soviet proposal expected block decisions on the distribution of the reductions among block members in phase I. Thereafter quota regulations for the different states applied. The Soviet proposal posed multiple problems. It foresaw a general reduction that applied to European forces as much as to stationed NATO forces. Both US tactical nuclear systems and the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) would be affected. It applied to US and UK nuclear weaponry in the reduction zone. The repercussions would be far-reaching. The Western approach was challenged. The US could not withdraw her troops from Europe as envisaged. Europe could not maintain or raise troop levels. These were particularly undesirable consequences. ‘The Europeans may wish in the future to increase their own arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, perhaps to compensate for American withdrawals.’294

The Soviet MBFR proposal furthermore raised the same questions as the US MBFR package due to its embrace of Option III.295 Thus an urgent debate on the linkage of SALT and MBFR, and on nuclear arms control and nuclear defense were needed. On 12 November 1973 another NAC SALT briefing was scheduled. US Ambassador Alexis Johnson informed the NAC about the latest Soviet SALT proposal. The SU envisaged a MIRV limitation reflecting the numerical division of the Interim Agreement. The Soviets suggested that a percentage of the aggregate total of the Interim Agreement should be allowed to be MIRVed. ICBMs and SLBM should be frozen on the level of the Interim Agreement. Parity in numbers should be established for heavy bombers. The SU furthermore demanded a timescale for the removal of US FBS from the European theatre. US FBS were to be removed and the bases liquidated within a timeframe of five years. Ambassador Johnson characterized the Soviet proposal as one-sided and disappointing. The Soviet rational was obvious – a preservation of the inequality of the Interim

293 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, 9 Nov 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 369; Visit of the Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence on 15–16 November 1973, MBFR Background, [undated], TNA, FCO 41/1134. 294 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in MBFR, [undated, November 1973], TNA, FCO 41/1212. 295 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, 9 Nov 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 369.

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Agreement should be extended to MIRVed systems. Parity was limited to the sofar unregulated weapons system of strategic bombers.296 According to the US the Soviet proposal did not meet the criteria of ‘essential equivalence’ as agreed upon in the ‘Joint Declaration’. The old imbalance would be preserved. The NAC session was followed by a meeting of the ‘Petrignani Group’ of European SALT Experts. The experts focused on the Soviet demand to remove FBS. The ‘Petrignani Group’ feared simultaneous negotiations of nuclear components in SALT and MBFR. Linkages could be made. Needed was a study on non-central systems in light of the parallel negotiations in SALT and MBFR. Turning to negotiation strategy: The European experts deemed it preferable not to seek a SALT agreement in 1974. The pressures to compromise would automatically affect FBS. The FBS issue had to wait until 1976. In 1976 the SU would be forced to act under the threat of a loss of her special status guaranteed by the Interim Agreement until 1977. Thus 1976 was the moment to obtain a favorable agreement on non-central systems. The US should best keep a low profile and seek no major agreements in 1974. The time was with the West. The European perspective on the future SALT process was to be communicated to the Nixon Administration. The US had furthermore to be reminded that SALT was a bilateral endeavor. European noncentral systems were not negotiable without European consent.297 The SALT Experts Meeting was followed by bilateral Anglo-French consultations. The French Secretary of Defense Galley expressed his uneasiness about the involvement of non-central systems in the arms control process.298 The double blow from Moscow – the Soviet MBFR and SALT proposals – revived the theme of European nuclear defense. Lord Carrington and Robert Galley – who met on 16 November in the British Embassy in Paris – tackled tactical nuclear defense options. Both parties had to evaluate whether Europe’s defense could be assured by way of tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons were an indispensable step in the escalatory ladder. Both countries should consider to work together more closely on tactical nuclear weapons and even to develop tactical nuclear weapons together. France concurred. Nuclear cooperation had to be intensified. Paris had reservations about EUROGROUP as a framework for the development and procurement of new delivery systems. The EUROGROUP was an instrument to persuade Europeans to purchase US equipment – as lately proven in the case of the Lance system.299 France preferred the WEU Standing Group or 296 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats in Brüssel, 12 Nov 1973, ADAP 1973, Nr. 373; SALT. Non-Central Systems. Note by the Ministry of Defence, [undated, February 1974], TNA, FCO 46/1157. 297 SALT Petrignani Group, 29 Nov 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1004; J.P. Mayne, SALT: Petrignani Group, 30 Nov 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1004; European Consultation on SALT: Non Central Systems, 5 Dec 1973, TNA, FCO 46/1004. 298 Visit of the Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, SALT Brief, [undated], TNA, DEFE 24/790. 299 Meeting Between the Defence Secretary and M. Robert Galley, French Defence Minister Held at the H.M. Embassy, Paris on Friday, 16 Nov 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1134.

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FINABEL. The latter framework should decide on new equipment needs in line with the changing strategic environment. Speed was essential. European cooperation on tactical nuclear weapon systems had to be speeded-up in light of the recent Soviet MBFR proposal. The Soviet aim was to utilize ‘MBFR as a means of extending controls over tactical nuclear delivery systems based in Europe.’300 A success of the Soviet strategy in MBFR and SALT would have disastrous consequences for Europe. The Soviet Union could freeze TNF and FBS – even achieve a removal of FBS. Thus Europe’s security in the last resort depended entirely on France and the UK. Only the UK and France could counter a threatening ‘denuclearization’ of the Central European theatre. The Anglo-German MBFR talks of 29 November 1973 were entirely dedicated to the study of Option III: the nuclear component in MBFR. The asymmetry of Option III complicated matters to the extreme. In case Option III would be tabled, qualitative instead of quantitative factors of arms control would start to dominate the agenda.301 The asymmetrical Western package also raised questions of reciprocity. Option III limited non-central systems in the West. It left noncentral systems in the East unaffected. Both parties did not reject a nuclear component in MBFR. An inclusion of a nuclear component, however, was a complicating factor. It created multiple politico-military problems. Both parties agreed that MBFR was not allowed to hinder Europe’s future development. France, the UK and the FRG had to cooperate closely to fend off dangers emerging out of the double arms control agenda. The latter dangers were clearly analyzed by the French Minister of Defense. Galley assumed that the SU had one major design, namely to obtain the withdrawal of the US troops from West-Germany in particular and Central Europe in general. Both the Soviet SALT and MBFR positions served this aim. The Soviet strategy was unlikely to succeed. However, one uncertainty remained. The SU could offer the US an advantageous MIRV deal. A limitation of the MIRV program that favored clearly the US could buy a removal of US FBS.302 The European SALT Expert Group gathered on 19 December 1973 in the Italian Delegation to NATO to concert actions on SALT and MBFR. The proceedings were dominated by a British presentation: ‘European Consultations on SALT: Non Central Systems’. The British paper deemed it advisable to define and earmark dispensable non-central systems. The Continental Europeans did not embrace the exercise. The suggestion to consider reductions of non-central systems was not without dangers. The preparations might be construed by the US Government as a shift in the European position. Preparations would ease a sell-out of

300 Discussion between the Defence Secretary and M. Robert Galley, French Defence Minister, Held in the Hotel du Brienne in Paris, on Friday, 16 Nov 1973, at 9.30 am, TNA, FCO 41/1134; C.C.C. Tickell, European Defence Co-operation, [undated], TNA, PREM 15/2040. 301 Anglo-German Discussions on the Nuclear Aspects of MBFR, 29 Nov 1973, TNA, FCO 41/1212. 302 Marc Ullmann, ‘Europe: Une defense a trois?’ L’Express, 26 Novembre-2 Decembre, 70–71.

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non-central system. According to Luigi Maria Fontana-Giusti Europe had to signal that it was important to keep FBS out of SALT and MBFR altogether. The inclusion of Option III in the first phase of MBFR was dangerous. It opened an avenue to entangle European nuclear systems in the future phases of MBFR. The European SALT Experts concurred and adopted the rigid approach recommended by Fontana-Giusti. Non-central systems were a matter for NATO to decide and prior to a common NATO position should not be tackled in arms control at all. 303 The European NATO Allies were backed by Senator Jackson. For Senator Jackson SALT II was to be limited to central strategic systems – period. FBS were beyond the scope of SALT. The staunch support by Senator Jackson was reassuring. Mixed signals emerged from Washington. The Nixon Administration’s concern about the ‘throw weight’ of Soviet missiles was constantly rising. A MIRVed Soviet ICBM force posed a formidable threat. Fear of a Soviet ‘first strike’ capability started to dominate US thinking on SALT. The US Government feared that the inequality in throw weight would offer a MIRVed Soviet ICBM force an edge. The consideration to possibly buy a MIRV limitation by way of a FBS reduction was a logic consequence. Senator Jackson rejected a bargain. The best option for the US was to keep the nerves and to stick to the Interim Agreement. The threatening expiration of the Interim Agreement in 1977 would create pressures on the SU to compromise. A sell-out of European interests was neither acceptable nor necessary. The rational was totally in line with European strategic thinking.304 The Whitehall bureaucracy nevertheless deemed it necessary to guard against US attempts to make FBS a bargaining chip in the superpower negotiations.305 The Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks of 30–31 January reflected about the options that the US might pursue to break the deadlock in the SALT negotiations. The negotiations in Geneva were about to resume in early February. Both sides speculated that the US might break the parity regulations of the Jackson Amendment and opt for a renewed asymmetrical approach in order to stop the Soviet MIRV program. Alexis Johnson had indicated that the term ‘essential equivalence’ offered the Administration a certain leeway. The SU had indicated willingness to adopt the US ‘equal aggregates’ in case concessions were forthcoming on FBS and ‘third party’ deterrent forces.306 France and the UK had to be prepared to fend-off attempts to involve FBS, ‘third party’ systems or a comprehensive non-

303 Record of an Informal Meeting on Wednesday 19 December 1973 in the Italian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 11 Jan 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1157; Kirk-Pellow, 29 Mar 1974. Enclosure: European Consultation on SALT: Non Central Systems. A Second Note, TNA, FCO 46/1158. 304 Anglo-French Defence Staff Talks, SALT Brief, [undated, 31 January 1974], TNA, FCO 46/1157. 305 Papers for an Incoming Government – Point 13: SALT, [undated, January 1974], TNA, FCO 46/1157; Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks, SALT, Paris, 30 Jan 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1157. 306 Anglo-French Politico Military Talks. International Conference Center, Avenue Kleber, Paris, Thursday 31 Jan 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1158.

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transfer regulation.307 Both countries also had to analyze the new twist in US strategic thinking. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s statement of 10 January on MIRV technology and retargeting deserved to be analyzed. Retargeting might have an impact on FBS and SALT. The US might indeed be tempted to give up FBS. The targets covered by FBS could be covered by US MIRVed ICBM. The qualitative advantage of the US – due to satellite intelligence and MIRV technology – offered the US totally new counterforce options. The US, however, had to preserve a MIRV advantage. A MIRV advantage and retargeting would allow coverage of Soviet European theatre systems in addition to the Soviet ICBMs. Selected strikes on Soviet territory were part of the new strategic flexibility. Thus a new-type of US nuclear umbrella was emerging that might allay European fears. The US possibly expected as a consequence a European flexibility on FBS. General Philippe Fleurot – Commander of the French Strategic Air Force – viewed the development with unease. The retargeting would allow the US to disengage from Europe. MIRVed ICBM could take over the role of tactical nuclear weapons. The consequence was that the US could extend the scope of arms control negotiations to tactical nuclear weapons. Only ‘mini’ nuclear weapons might stay in the European theatre. European attempts to replace the US with Anglo-French tactical nuclear weapons might be undermined due to the coverage offered by the MIRV. This could complicate deployment of European replacements.308 Similar views were expressed by Stanley Hoffmann during Congressional Hearings, the retargeting would not only enhance the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella but was being pursued in order to hinder the Europeans to establish an own European nuclear defense force.309 The Europeans feared US concessions. A limitation of Soviet MIRVed throw weight was in all likelihood deemed worth sacrificing traditional positions on FBS. Such a compromise would make retargeting work: targets once covered by US FBS would be targeted by the MIRVed US ICBM force. The ‘codified’ MIRV advantage was to be obtained by trading in US FBS for an asymmetrical MIRV limitation that favored the US. The Nixon-Brezhnev Summit scheduled for 27 June to 3 July 1974 might offer the US chances to stop the Soviet MIRV program.310 The US sought a ‘substantive agreement’. In case a permanent agreement could not be reached a new Interim Agreement would be forthcoming. Henry Kissinger was tasked to prepare the ground during his pilgrimage to Moscow in March 1974. The US was banking on Soviet concessions in arms control for US financial and economic support including grain shipments. In case the Soviets would not concede it was possible that the US needed additional bargaining power. This could lead to a sell-out of European positions on SALT. Since the US

307 Ibid 308 Ibid 309 Botschafter von Staden, Betr. US Verteidigungspolitik; hier: Hearings im Senat zum Thema Nuklearwaffen und Außenpolitik, 18 Dec 1974, PA–AA, ZW 107370. 310 Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das AA, 13 Feb 1974, AAPD 1974, Nr 47.

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could not deliver ‘third party’ potentials the focus would be on FBS and a US placet to a non-transfer regime.311 The UK – the entire ‘Petrignani Group’ – was well prepared for that type of contingency.312 The Kissinger-Dobrynin ‘back channel’ negotiations, however, remained unpredictable.313 The Europeans – so Whitehall – might be well advised to steer their diplomacy to link up with Senator Jackson in order to forestall a premature and unfavorable agreement. The British Foreign Secretary met with Secretary of State Kissinger on 26 February 1974 to discuss the US plans for the June Summit. Dr Kissinger told Douglas-Home in confidence that his view on SALT diverged from the official US position. He considered the equal numbers argument a non-starter. Thus a new approach was needed to stop the Soviet MIRV program before ‘it would become unmanageable.’314 The US had to act in 1974. The US had to offer the SU a trade-off. The Interim Agreement could stay for an extended time period and thus the unequal number of delivery systems. In return the US expected a Soviet agreement to limit the throw weight of MIRVed missiles and to exempt FBS. This would be the negotiating position in Moscow in March. In short: Kissinger’s approach to SALT was to extend the Interim Agreement and to negotiate a MIRV treaty. The official US SALT negotiating position would remain unchanged until a breakthrough in the ‘backchannel’ negotiations by Kissinger was achieved. Given a success in Moscow Dr Kissinger expected a bloody fight in Congress over an adjustment of the US negotiating position since a package of MIRV Treaty and Interim Agreement would maintain the unequal number of delivery systems.315 NATO would react negatively: due to a lack of consultation and an overall parity based on competing asymmetries.316 On the following day the NAC was briefed by Alexis Johnson on the official US negotiation package. The US envisaged an equal aggregate total of 2350 system with freedom to mix. The US was seeking to limit the throw weight for ICBMs with MIRVs and the aggregate throw weight of ICBM, SLBM and bomber. The US faced a SU that stood firm on her 9 October proposal. Moscow – as was known – had indicated a willingness to embrace an equal aggregate of 2350 delivery systems including bombers, ICBM and SLBM in case the US eliminated FBS and furnished a compensation for the French and Bri-

311 J.A. Thompson to K.T. Nash, 14 Feb 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1157. 312 Ibid; SALT – Non Central Systems. Note by the Ministry of Defence, [undated, February 1974], TNA, FCO 46/1157; International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room B, Cabinet Office on Monday, 11 Mar 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720. 313 C.J. Makins-M.E. Pellow, 21 Feb 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1157. 314 SALT: Implications for Western Security of the Present US Position in SALT II, 23 May 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720; Visit of US Secretary of State, SALT, 28 Mar 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1158. 315 Ibid; Meeting Between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the US Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, Tuesday, 26 Feb 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1157. 316 SALT: Implications for Western Security of the Present US Position in SALT II, 23 May 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720.

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tish deterrent forces. The SU furthermore had indicated a willingness to negotiate a MIRV limitation. The US now aimed at a MIRV limit for land-based delivery systems – only. The MIRVing of the US submarine force thus would remain unlimited.317 Ambassador Johnson was instantly confronted by the Europeans. The French NATO Ambassador de Rose highlighted that the Soviet insisted on the elimination of FBS in order to decouple European from US security. The US had always rejected to include FBS in their negotiations by stating that a withdrawal of FBS would leave Europe unprotected against Soviet MRBM. A shift seemed to be discernible. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s retargeting strategy undermined the classic US position. De Rose argued that in case the targets covered by FBS would in the future be covered by ICBM FBS would become unimportant for the defense of Europe. Alexis Johnson doubted that FBS could be replaced by other systems. The SALT delegation, however, was not informed about defense strategy. The NAC meeting was followed by both a NATO SALT Experts Meeting and a meeting of the ‘Petrignani Group’. The NATO Experts dealt with the Soviet modernization of ICBM. The experts assumed that the SU would be able to deploy MIRVed ICBM by 1975. Thus a SALT limitation of MIRVs had to come right away or never.318 According to the British Government the ‘Kissinger approach’ had one possible advantage. The logic behind SALT I had been that the asymmetry in offensive systems favoring the SU would be compensated by the US MIRV advantage. A preservation of the asymmetry in offensive systems while regulating MIRVs on the basis of equal throw weight would leave the US without a compensation for the inequality in offensive systems. Thus the US could demand that FBS and compensations for ‘third party’ systems might be taken from the agenda – once and for all times.319 In case the US insisted on equal aggregates and an unequal throw weight to preserve the US MIRV advantage necessary for the wider retargeting scheme FBS would have to be sacrificed. Time would tell. FBS would be an indicator of what strategy the US prioritized. The interface between SALT and MBFR had to be watched to be able to evaluate the US ‘grand strategy’. HMG furthermore needed information on the US reactions to the Soviet MBFR proposal tabled on 8 November. The nuclear component mattered. The trilateral US-UKFRG Talks on 18–19 March 1974 was to offer the European parties an opportunity to discuss the possible linkage between SALT and MBFR with the United States. The FRG feared that the SU would utilize MBFR in order to forestall the development of a European Defense Community. The SU would try to replace this option with a European security system that would discriminate Germany and

317 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats, 27 Feb 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 61; SALT: Implications for Western Security of the Present US Position in SALT II, 23 May 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720. 318 SALT Expert and Petrignani Group Meetings in Brussels, 27 Feb 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1158. 319 SALT: Implications for Western Security of the Present US Position in SALT II, 23 May 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720.

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undermine Europe’s development. The West was obliged to learn to think in structural and geopolitical terms. The West had to plan beyond phase I of the MBFR negotiations. Regional or national sub-ceilings would impact on the division of tasks in NATO and hinder the future development of a European defense organization. The European NATO members thus generally rejected national subceilings. MBFR was not to be allowed to create obstacles for the European Option.320 European unity had to be prioritized to MBFR.321 MBFR should not result in a retreat of the US from either an independent or a controlled European Continent. The outcome had to be a renewed transatlantic defense relationship in line with a wider arms control regime.322 The trilateral meeting should cope with both short term problems and long term developments in order to assure an optimal outcome of both the SALT and MBFR processes. The US-UK-FRG Trilateral Meeting held in Washington on 18–20 March reviewed the MBFR agenda prior to the departure of Kissinger to Moscow. The debate focused on Option III: the nuclear bargaining counter to be introduced to assure asymmetrical conventional reductions. The US had alerted the Allies that they might offer reductions in US nuclear systems ‘as an inducement to the Russians to accept more than proportionate reductions of Warsaw Pact forces to a common ceiling of 700 000.’323 Tickell indicated that the UK preferred nuclear reciprocity to a nuclear offer. The introduction of a nuclear component by the US in phase I was problematic since a nuclear component would place a ceiling on the US nuclear forces in the MBFR reduction zone in order to forestall re-entry of withdrawn systems into the zone. The Soviet nuclear forces by contrast would remain unlimited. It would be more logic to follow the Soviet approach of mutual nuclear reductions. Option III was not allowed to be the opening wedge for the involvement of dual-key systems and European national deterrent forces in phase II. The repercussions for the Alliance would be too dear. But the acceptance of the concept of a ‘common ceiling’ by the SU by way of Option III would be an a320 ‘The establishment of individual sub-ceilings on all direct MBFR participants would severely handicap, if not rule out the development of any West European defence entity or European defence community. The Allied framework proposal […] was designed to leave the European members of the Alliance free to combine, deploy and improve their forces, and even to increase them if the US total fell below the US sub-ceiling.’ Letter from Mr. Tickell to Mr Rose, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, http;//gateway.proquest.com/openurl? url_ver= Z39.88-2004& res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rtf_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040930020 (16 March 2011). 321 ‘We do not regard European forces stationed on European territory as in any way foreign, hence our preference for dealing separately with the US and the Soviet forces on the one hand and European forces on the other.’ Douglas-Home to Rose UKDEL Vienna No 34, 25 Feb 1974, Footnote 76/5 DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, No 12, http://gateway.proquest.com/ openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rtf_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO 040930021. 322 Staatssekretär Frank an die Botschaft in Washington, 12 Mar 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 86; see also: Gespräch des Botschafters von Staden, Washington, mit dem amerikanischen Verteidigungsminister Schlesinger, 11 Jul 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 210. 323 Cabinet, International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy. SALT: Non Central Systems. Note by the Secretary, 5 March 1974, TNA, CAB 130/720.

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chievement. The Director of ACDA Fred Iklé and Reginald Bartholomew – Director of the Department of Defense MBFR Task Force – countered that the nuclear package should not be interpreted as a precedent. It was a one-time offer. The reductions would not be problematic for the US since ‘Sergeant’ and ‘Honest John’ had to be removed in any case and be replaced by ‘Lance’. The withdrawal of old systems and their warheads had no impact on targeting.324 Problematic was the verification of Option III: warhead reduction is unverifiable; the dual capability of an aircraft is also not verifiable without inspection. Option III thus should be viewed as a sweetener or a gesture to ease a breakthrough in negotiations to obtain Soviet agreement to a ‘common ceiling’. The adoption of a ‘common ceiling’ was the ‘iron pole’ of the US approach to phase I. The British and Germans clearly highlighted that the introduction of a nuclear component in phase I had to be limited to US nuclear systems. Europe had to retain a free hand to increase her nuclear delivery systems. This option was necessary in case the US reduced their nuclear delivery systems in the MBFR guideline zone.325 Phase II should place no limit on European combat units with integrated nuclear capable systems. As a consequence the West had to accept that there would be no limit on Soviet Warsaw pact systems either.326 The MBFR agreement might, however, contain a general non-circumvention formula that would bind the Europeans and Warsaw Pact states not to increase their nuclear systems beyond a certain ceiling ‘unless they had just cause to do so.’327 A non-transfer agreement should be omitted since it would hinder the exchange of nuclear warhead and weapon information or the provision of nuclear systems under custodial arrangements from the US.328 The Europeans clearly took precautions to keep all nuclear options open if selected US FBS would be introduced in MBFR as a one-time offer for a ‘horse trade’ with the Soviet Union. The UK and the FRG pleaded not to extend Option III to ‘dual-capable aircraft’ or other nuclear systems of a purely tactical nature. The FBS per se should not be affected by the US approach. In case a generic FBS regulation would be forthcoming it had to be based on the principle of reciprocity. The Anglo-Italian Politico Military Talks held in the Farnesina in Rome on 5 April 1974 confirmed the position taken by the UK and West Germany. Italy demanded (1) that FBS should not be on the MBFR agenda, (2) that phase I should not involve European reductions, and (3) that phase I should not contain a

324 Record of a UK/US/FRG Trilateral Meeting on MBFR held at the ACDA Agency, Washington on Monday, 18 Mar 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1498; MBFR: Nuclear Aspects, [undated, 18 March 1974], TNA, FCO 41, 1498. 325 MBFR – The Nuclear Element, [undated, March 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1498. MBFR – Nuclear Aspects, [undated, May 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1498; Letter from Mr. Tickell to Mr Rose, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, http;//gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rtf_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040930020 (16 March 2011). 326 MBFR – The Nuclear Element, [undated, March 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1498. MBFR – Nuclear Aspects, [undated, May 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1498. 327 Ibid 328 Ibid

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freezing of European forces. Europe had to remain unbound. FBS could not be traded in. Both parties furthermore agreed that the retargeting exercise of the US would not replace the need for FBS. Both parties thus interpreted Schlesinger’s ‘retargeting’ not as a ‘decoupling’ but a ‘recoupling’ of European and American security. A US MIRV advantage was an advantage for European security. Europe thus should not oppose Schlesinger. He might be ‘the best friend Europe had.’329 Europe just had to forestall a usage of retargeting for a horse trade over European theatre nuclear weapons.

329 Record of the Anglo-Italian Politico Military Talks, Held at the Italian Foreign Ministry, Rome, on Friday 5 Apr 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1498.

8. TOWARDS THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, JUNE 1974 On 19 March 1974 an Anglo-American SALT Group meeting was held in the ACDA Agency in Washington DС. Also this meeting was held in preparation of the Kissinger talks in Moscow. The Nixon-Brezhnev ‘Declaration of Principles’ of June 1973 had set a target date for a permanent agreement – the year 1974. The UK was expecting that a phase of hard bargaining was lying ahead that might impact on European interests. J.A. Thomson – the Assistant Undersecretary of Defence in charge of the British delegation – considered the official US position unnegotiable. It was inconceivable that the SU would agree to equal aggregate numbers, equal throw weight and a throw weight limit for MIRVs. The focus thus should be on a new Interim Agreement as a substitute for the definitive agreement formally envisaged. A renewal policy would at least prevent the Interim Agreement and thus the ABM regime from lapsing. Thomson clearly sympathized with Kissinger’s unofficial approach – although this was not expressed explicitly during the session. For Kissinger the unequal numbers of the Interim Agreement were not too damaging given a MIRV edge was preserved. The US – so Sidney Graybeal – was mainly seeking to reduce the threat to the US Minuteman force. It was all about the combination of accuracy, MIRVs, yield and hardening. Thus either Soviet MIRVing was stopped or shelters for unregulated mobile land-based systems were developed. This would preserve the US advantage. The FBS issue would be pushed aside by the MIRV agenda. A successful MIRV agreement might even kill the FBS agenda. A linkage of SALT and MBFR should thus be omitted pending the outcome of the SALT process. The Allies had to forestall that a wedge could be driven between Europe and the US.330 The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met General-Secretary Brezhnev on 25 March 1974 in Moscow. The preparation of the US-SU Summit scheduled for June was on top of the agenda. Kissinger clearly highlighted the need to advance in arms control. Any slipping back was detrimental to superpower détente. The summit had to peak in a positive outcome.331 The US and the SU ‘have a very special responsibility to bring about peace among ourselves and peace in the world.’332 The Geneva negotiations were deadlocked. This visit had one aim: to revive the SALT process.333 General-Secretary Brezhnev concurred and outlined a need to eliminate FBS and forward bases. US land based FBS and carriers

330 Record of US/UK Bilateral Meeting on SALT at the ACDA Agency, Washington, on Tuesday 19 Mar 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1158; J.A. Thomson-Howard Smith, SALT: Implications for Western Security of the Present US Position on SALT II, Note by the FCO, 20 May 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. 331 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Brezhnev, 25 Mar 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 165. 332 Ibid 333 Ibid

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threatened the SU in the West and South up to the Ural or up to Tashkent. In case those FBS were not withdrawn, the SU had to develop similar systems. SALT I did not cover strategic aviation – neither bomber nor strike forces. A new formula was needed but it looked unlikely that a permanent agreement could be reached within the time frame envisaged by the Interim Agreement. Brezhnev suggested prolonging the Interim Agreement. The General-Secretary suggested drafting a declaration to be signed at the Summit. The declaration would stipulate the extension of the Interim Agreement; would highlight the continued endeavor to find a permanent settlement and would contain a regulation on MIRV. Brezhnev suggested a limit of 1000 MIRVed delivery systems either land- or sea-based. He furthermore proposed to amend the ABM Treaty and to limit the ABM defense to one site each. The package contained two more facets: (1) a ban on the modernization of strategic bomber forces, and (2) a ban of nuclear systems from the Mediterranean. Leonid Brezhnev went one step further. He proposed to amend the SALT agenda and to negotiate a moratorium on all underground nuclear testing. The General-Secretary envisaged 1 January 1976 as a target date.334 The suggested extension of the Interim Agreement was in line with Kissinger’s general concept to accept the asymmetry of SALT I in case a MIRV agreement was agreeable. The US Secretary of State faced one major problem. He had to find a regulation for the commissioning of the Trident submarine. The commissioning of the Trident was scheduled for 1977 – with the end of the Interim Agreement. He furthermore requested time to reflect about a limit of 1000 MIRVed delivery systems. Kissinger responded in the evening session of 25 March 1974. The MIRV advantage of the US made up for the imbalance in numbers in nuclear delivery systems. In case the US agreed on equal numbers of MIRVed delivery systems the SU would even surpass the US due to the greater throw weight of the Soviet ICBMs. The SU thus would have an advantage in number of missiles, in throw weight and in number of warheads by way of MIRVed delivery systems with greater throw weight. The end result would be a ‘first strike’ capability of the Soviet Union. The suggestion of the General-Secretary would force the US to stop their MIRV program and allow the SU to start deploying MIRVs up to a level superior to the US. A further problem had to be considered: the MIRVing of SLBMs. In case the SU would embark on MIRVing SLBM the US would have to count any SLBM as MIRVed since MIRV verification on submarines is impossible.335 Thus all submarines that can take a MIRVed SLBM missile would be counted as being MIRVed. The ‘Kissinger formula’ would force the SU to shift their MIRVs to submarines once a MIRVed SLBM was developed. This was a clear advantage: ICBMs were more accurate and thus a first strike weapons system, submarines only a second strike system. The consequence of the ‘Kissinger

334 Ibid 335 Ibid

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formula’ was a shift towards a defensive posture.336 In line herewith was the attempt by Kissinger to establish a sub-ceiling for MIRVed heavy ICBM. Such a regulation would yet again limit the first strike capability of the Soviet Union. On the 27 March Kissinger and Brezhnev sought to work out a compromise. The SU would MIRV 1000 the US 1100 delivery systems. Brezhnev closed the talks with a plea to discuss the suggestion with President Nixon. Both sides should focus on numbers and the submarine regulation in particular. A possible avenue for an agreement was discernible – disagreement, however, dominated. Dr Kissinger briefed the new British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan on his way back to Washington during a stop-over in London on 28 March 1974. The information furnished was basic. None of the packages were discussed with the British Foreign Minister.337 The negotiations continued in Washington. Foreign Minister Gromyko met President Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office on 12 April 1974 in order to push the Soviet proposal for a new SALT agreement. Gromyko highlighted the SU’s willing to implement the proposal as discussed in Moscow. The MIRV advantage of the US would be 1100 to 1000 MIRVed missiles. That meant – in any case – an advantage of 1000 warheads for the US given that US SLBM normally carries 10 warheads. President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger highlighted the difference in throw weight and the difference between sea-based and land-based deterrent forces which complicated matters enormously.338 No agreement could be reached. But the ‘Brezhnev proposal’ of March 1974 remained on the agenda. Secretary Gromyko and Kissinger met again in Geneva on 29 April to discuss MIRV figures. Foreign Minister Gromyko declared – yet again – that the SU would agree to an extension of the Interim Agreement. The SU would have to stand firm on the 1100 US to 1000 Soviet MIRVed delivery systems. The fact that ‘third parties’ of the Western Alliance were in command of strategic deterrent forces cannot be overlooked. Furthermore the FBS advantage of the West would allow no further compromises. The US counter proposal foresaw a replacement of the SALT I limits. According to SALT I the US was allowed 1054 ICBM and 656 SLBM. In case the Interim Agreement was extended a certain adjustment to the Interim Agreement was foreseen. The gentleman’s agreement worked out in Moscow in 1972 that the US would not go beyond 41 submarines out of an entitlement of 44 would have to be ended. The US should be allowed to build up to the limit the moment the Interim Agreement lapsed in 1977. The US would thus commission three brand new Trident submarines with 72 missiles. The US would, how-

336 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Brezhnev, 27 Mar 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 170; See also: Wolfe, 13; Strobe Talbott, Raketenschach, München: Piper, 1984, 25. 337 Record of a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the US Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger at the FCO at 2.45 PM on Thursday, 28 Mar 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1158. 338 Memo of Conversation, Nixon-Gromyko, Washington, 12 Apr 1974 & Memo of Conversation Kissinger-Gromyko, Washington, 12 Apr 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, Nos 173, 174.

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ever, honor her obligation to destroy old ICBMs in order to build up to the SALT I limit. The remaining 54 Titan missiles would be destroyed. This would give the US an advantage of 18 missiles. The land-based missiles would decrease by 54, the sea-based increase by 72. The outcome would be 1000 US ICBM and 728 SLBM. According to SALT I the SU had an allowance of 1409 ICBM and 950 SLBM or overall 2359. The US overall figure would increase from 1710 to 1728. The US proposed a ratio of 850 MIRVed Soviet delivery systems to 1100 US delivery systems. Out of the 1100 all 44 submarines would carry MIRVed SLBM. 500 ICBM were MIRVed. Thus the US was close to the proposed limit.339 An agreement would stop the US from MIRVing an additional 500 ICBM but allow the SU to start and complete the MIRVing of 850 of her ICBM – or SLBM in case the SU embarked on testing a MIRVed SLBM. Kissinger highlighted that to accept a limit of 1100 was a huge concession by the US. The SALT process remained stalled. Henry Kissinger alerted the public that a permanent agreement was not to be expected from the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The interpretations of what constitutes ‘essential equivalence’ momentarily were hard to bridge.340 Prior to the June Summit the focus of US national security policy temporarily shifted to the issue of retargeting. A strategy debate ensued that clearly impacted on arms control negotiations and thus on the SALT and MBFR process. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger declared at the NPG Ministerial Session in Bergen on 11–12 June 1974 that a new look at Western defense was needed. Europe had to enhance her defense effort. Any talk about a European reduction of forces was dangerous. The West had to face a more modern Soviet adversary. The SU had developed four new ICBMs and two SLBMs and had started testing MIRVs. The new generation of ICBMs would enhance the throw weight of the Soviet strategic forces even further. The impact on SALT was dramatic. The Soviet threat increased although the numbers were frozen. The US was not aiming to stay ahead in all categories but ‘essential equivalence’ had to be maintained. A Soviet superiority based on a combination of throw weight and MIRVing was to be forestalled. The US still had clear advantages which had to be developed: accuracy and MIRV technology might offer the US an edge in the arms race. The US had to prepare for the contingency of a failure of the SALT process. The upcoming US-SU summit would not revolutionize arms control or the strategic balance. A military revolution, however, was occurring at the very moment. The modern US strategic forces would allow a flexible counter force strategy. The use of strategic forces for mutually assured destruction was replaced by a flexible targeting of strategic forces. The chief beneficiary of the new US posture was Western Europe.341 The US had the option to target the economy, strategic forces, IR/MRBM

339 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, 29 Apr 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 178. 340 Secretary of State’s Visit to Herr Leber, Bonn 22 May, SALT Background Brief, [undated 22 May 1974], TNA, FCO 46/1158. 341 NPG: Ministerial Meeting, Bergen, 11–12 June 1974, Briefing on the Balance of Strategic Forces, TNA, FCO 41/1436.

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or cities and thus could flexibly select to inflict different grades of damage. The consequence: The SU would have to realize that strategic nuclear forces could be used for limited missions. ‘The Russians have to be made to recognize that their territory was not sacrosanct’.342 Any move against Europe might lead to a limited strategic response. IRBMS threatening Europe would be targeted by US ICBM. Europe thus would not have to fear a ‘decoupling’. The US had no disarming ‘first strike’ capability but an abundance of warheads due to her MIRV superiority. The danger of strategic parity in ICBMs for European security was thus less acute than assumed by Europe. The US umbrella remained a reality. The consequences were multiple. US MIRV advantage could replace IRBM or FBS or tactical nuclear weapons with a certain strike capability. Europe’s security thus depended on the MIRV advantage and not only on FBS who had mainly a political and not a military role. The Europeans welcomed the comprehensive briefing on retargeting.343 The Italian Defense Minister Andreotti focused on the European strike component and expressed a fear that FBS might become dispensable in US eyes due to the retargeting. Schlesinger highlighted that SACEUR’s targeting was not affected by the new US nuclear posture – it was complimentary. NATO, however, might have ‘in due course to re-examine the present holdings in US nuclear weapons in Europe.’344 The Poseidon system might ‘take over certain function within SACEUR’s General Strike Plan.’345 In other words, land-based systems might be replaced by sea-based systems due to possible arms control requirements and geographical zones of reductions – such as the MBFR guideline area. The retargeting was not targeted at the FBS but FBS might be removed in common with Warsaw Pact nuclear systems.346 A side note. The retargeting would surely not replace the ‘initial use’ of nuclear weapons or ‘follow-on’ usage of tactical nuclear weapons. The NPG Phase II Group Meeting in Brussels of 9–10 May 1974 clearly indicated that the UK and the FRG supported an early and decisive follow-on usage of tactical nuclear weapons in order to restore the deterrent by a very strong political signal while avoiding a general theatre nuclear war.347 Thus retargeting would never replace tactical nuclear weapons. They were needed to escalate a conflict. Retargeting just enhanced the credibility of the Western deterrent further. The threshold for selected strategic strikes with MIRVed ICBM, however, was markedly beyond the escalatory steps debated in the Trilateral Phase II Working Group for ‘follow-on’ use of tactical nuclear weapons. NATO envisaged an ‘initial use’ of nuclear weapons in

342 Ibid; UK Record of the 15th Meeting of the NATO NPG Held in Bergen on 11th/12th June 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1436. 343 Ibid 344 Ibid 345 Ibid 346 Ibid 347 J.M. Legge, NPG Phase II Meeting, Brussels, 9–10 May, TNA, FCO 41/1433; C.C.C. Tickell, Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 Aug 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1433.

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case of a Soviet aggression. The US would use nuclear weapons first in a conflict triggered by the Warsaw Pact. Possibly not with a strike on the SU, but with a strike on Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Schlesinger’s remark that the SU would not be a sanctuary, however, indicated that the US even considered strikes against the SU proper. This was no violation of the PNW. The latter would cease to be ruling conduct with the outbreak of war. Schlesinger’s retargeting and selective strike doctrine was putting European fears about the PNW to a rest. At the same time it raised fears about phasing-out or land-based FBS in Central Europe. There was no superpower conspiracy that left Europe unprotected; there was an adjustment of the nuclear defense posture to MBFR. The retargeting information initiative underlined the core importance of US MIRV superiority for European security. A decoupling had not to be feared by Europe. The US thus hoped to have more leeway to change the US defense posture in Europe in line with US arms control needs. The SALT deliberations at the NATO Ministerial Council Meeting in Ottawa on 18–19 June 1974 witnessed a vivid defense of SALT I by Secretary of State Kissinger. The advantages of SALT I were overpowering irrespective of the asymmetry in numbers of offensive systems. The US thus had not rushed into a disadvantageous arms control agreement for electoral reasons as was claimed by the Congressional opposition. The US had enhanced their advantage in nuclear warheads from 2000 to 7000 above the 2000 level of the Soviet Union. By contrast the SU had an advantage in un-MIRVed throw weight. It would be detrimental to the US, if the SU were allowed to MIRV their superior throw weight. The US core aim was to limit the Soviet MIRV program within the next 18 months. Thereafter the window of opportunity would close and Soviet deployment would ensue. The US negotiating package for the Moscow Summit was to limit the aggregate total of ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers to 2350. 2350 was the current Soviet limit for ICBM and SLBM. The SU position was to ban all bombers as nuclear delivery systems. The SU still demanded a withdrawal of FBS or a counting of FBS against the aggregate total. No compromise on FBS was in sight. The views on a MIRV limitation were as far apart. The prospects for the next US-SU summit were not too good. The US would seek an extension of the Interim Agreement coupled with an Agreement on MIRV. A Permanent SALT II Agreement would remain a task for the future. A general breakthrough in all categories was an utopia. Progress, however, was possible in the reduction of the ABM defense systems to one site for each side – as proposed by the General Secretary in March. The FBS issue would remain on the books until a definitive SALT II Agreement emerged. This ‘was a disturbing prospect for the Europeans’ but a reality.348 FBS would remain an Alliance issue for the foreseeable future.349 The Declaration of Ottawa – the final outcome of the ‘Year of Europe’ Initiative – eased growing European tensions about a possible MIRV deal with the SU at Eu348 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Ottawa 18–19 June 1974, 21 Jun 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. 349 Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektor van Well, 24 Jun 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 187.

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rope’s expense. The demonstrative Atlanticism: the confirmation of Atlantic unity and the re-affirmation of the US defense commitment were complementary to the retargeting initiative. The world witnessed an exercise in ‘re-coupling’. The ‘Atlantic Declaration’ was to be signed by President Nixon at the upcoming NATO Summit in Brussels of 26 June 1974. The latter was scheduled right before the Moscow Summit. NATO – so President Nixon in Brussels – was the platform for the policy of détente. Transatlantic unity was the key to success in arms control.350 The President’s rhetoric, however, could not replace consultation. The Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans and his Italian colleague Mariano Rumor spoke out for Europe. Arms control was not allowed to hinder Europe’s path to unity in security and defense matters. It was not permissible that MBFR would divide Europe. A special security zone in Central Europe was incompatible with European integration.351 The Europeans – although re-assured by the ‘Atlantic Declaration’ – clearly remained skeptical of superpower diplomacy and its consequences for Europe. The stop-over in Brussels, however, allayed some of the fears of a condominium and offered the US the necessary Alliance support for the Moscow Summit of 27 June to 3 July 1974.352 Breaking the deadlock on SALT without breaking the Alliance was the task. General- Secretary Brezhnev welcomed President Nixon and his ‘entourage’ in the Kremlin on 28 June 1974. Both parties first delineated the scope of the envisaged discussions. President Nixon thought that an agreement on ABM site reduction could be handled by the delegations. The focus of the negotiation was to be offensive weapons. The offensive weapons agenda was still clouded. The US and the SU had to achieve a breakthrough in order to forestall a return to unregulated competition after the Interim Agreement expired in 1977.353 SALT was mainly tackled on 30 June after the Summit had relocated to Oreanda on the Crimean Peninsula in the Ukraine – the Soviet Republic General-Secretary Brezhnev called his home. Henry Kissinger proposed an extension of the Interim Agreement coupled with a MIRV Treaty – as discussed in Moscow in March 1974.354 Brezhnev instantly highlighted the Soviet MIRV offer of 1000 Soviet to 1100 US MIRVed delivery systems. This had been the Soviet position in March and still was the Soviet MIRV position. Kissinger rejected Soviet stance out of hand. The US could MIRV 500 ICBMs in two years without an agreement. The US thus proposed 1150 US and 750 Soviet MIRVed delivery systems. In addition no heavy missiles should be MIRVed in order to control MIRV throw 350 Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on Wednesday, 26th June, 1974 at 10.30 AM, NATO Archive Brussels, C–R (74) 31. 351 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, ADAP 1974, Nr. 191; Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the NATO HQs, Brussels, on Wednesday, 26 June 1974 at 10.30 AM. NATO Archive Brussels, C–R (74) 31; Möckli, Daniel, ‘Asserting Europe’s Identity. The EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of Europe’, in Schulz/Schwarz (eds), 195–220, 218. 352 Memo of Conversation, Joint Leadership Meeting on the Moscow Summit, 10 Jul 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 200. 353 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Nixon, 28 Jun 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 186. 354 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Nixon, 30 Jun 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, No 190.

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weight. The US assumed that the SU would MIRV ICBMs only. A MIRVed SLBM could be introduced by the SU after the expiration of a MIRV agreement in the early 1980s. MIRV R&D was not prohibited during the interim period. The US offer was deemed beneficial for both parties. It would limit the US. Furthermore, the US would leave the unequal number of delivery systems of the Interim Agreement untouched. Brezhnev nevertheless rejected the offer as unequal. Kissinger responded by highlighting that given the present state of armaments on MIRV the US offer foresaw that the US would build only 100 the SU 750 MIRVed missiles. The US was at 1050 by the end of the year. The GeneralSecretary rejected to codify an US advantage in MIRV, FBS, forward bases and ‘third party’ forces. The Soviet advantage in aggregate numbers of ICBM and SLBM was countered by FBS. Thus MIRV limits should be co-equal or both sides had to re-engage with the issue of FBS.355 The talks remained inconclusive. Since no MIRV agreement was foreseeable the US refused to agree to a mere extension of the Interim Agreement. A new package agreement had to be sought. The Gromyko-Kissinger Talks on 1 July were a mere wrapping-up exercise. Both sides agreed to constructively work towards a New Interim Agreement valid until 1985 to be concluded in 1975.356 The Moscow–Oreanda Summit Talks were – by all means a failure. The Summit had atmospheric but little political importance. The ABM agreement was of little importance. No progress had been made to tackle qualitative or quantitative aspects of arms control. An avenue for further talks had been delineated – not more. Secretary of State Kissinger briefed the NAC on 4 July 1974. Kissinger started by stressing that the Moscow Summit had ended without a major achievement or breakthrough. The parties had tried to cope with qualitative aspects of arms control but had been unable to make any progress. It was thus unrealistic to expect an agreement within 1974 – as originally planned. The two parties had agreed to seek a new Interim Agreement that lasted for 10 years and would expire in 1985. Work on the New Interim Agreement would be delegated to the Geneva SALT delegation.357 The agreements signed at Moscow were of a secondary importance. The reduction of the ABM shield to one ABM complex each would release 1000 US warheads for other usage. Those 1000 warheads had been reserved to tackle ABM defenses and could now be retargeted. Thus US strategic flexibility – as sought for by Schlesinger – was to grow. This might be beneficial for Europe. Furthermore, the SU remained penetrable for smaller Western deterrent forces – a point especially noted by the British Permanent Representative’s report. This too was good news for Europe and the United Kingdom. Finally the time window for the Polaris Improvement program widened since no definitive SALT II agreement was in sight. This was of major importance for the UK. No decision on the Polaris

355 Ibid 356 Memo of Conversation, Gromyko-Kissinger, 1 & 2 Jul 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XV, Nos 194,195. 357 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 4 Jul 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 197.

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Improvement had been finalized due to the change of government back to Harold Wilson. Kissinger deemed the ‘Agreement on Underground Testing’ of limited interest. It mainly focused research on smaller and more accurate nuclear systems. ‘The Agreement on Environmental Damage’ and the Secret Protocols on the Working of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) were of a technical nature and of no major political importance either. The latter regulated the procedures for the dismantling and replacements of old nuclear weapons systems. The Protocols were kept secret since weapons characteristics were revealed in the documents.358 The US and the SU now had to cope with a massive increase of strategic nuclear weapons programmed for 1978/1979. The deployment was to follow the expiration of the Interim Agreement. Trident was ready to be commissioned by the late 1970s. The US would know in six to nine months, if the SU was willing to limit and reduce their nuclear forces – if not, deployment would proceed as envisaged after 1977.359 The US had nothing to fear. The SU would need 2000 missiles out of the 2350 missiles available under SALT I to knock out the US Minuteman ICBM force – one element of the US strategic tripod. The destruction of the Minuteman force meant that one quarter of the US warheads and one fifth of the US throw weight would have been eliminated. A ‘first strike’ capability of the SU was de facto impossible. The Soviet submarine force did not possess MIRVed missiles and was inaccurate. It was a pure second strike system. A possible shift towards a sea-based deterrent force as intended with SALT I thus was stabilizing.360 In his talks with Foreign Minister James Callaghan on 8 July 1974 Kissinger described the Moscow Summit as a set-back. The US originally had intended to extend the Interim Agreement to 1979 with slight amendments to accommodate three Trident submarines as discussed in March. The parties finally had agreed to a new 10 year Interim Agreement valid until 1985. The US would seek to press ahead with a MIRV treaty to accompany the New Interim Agreement. The US would not demand equality of numbers of delivery systems in order not to raise the FBS issue again.361 The new agreement would try to balance the Soviet advantage in numbers of missiles with an US advantage in MIRVed systems. The MIRV ratio was still disputed. The 1150 to 750 approach of the US had proven unacceptable. The West had to be prepared that the Interim Agreement might lapse without a successor agreement in place. The US was prepared to respond to any move of the SU in any field: ‘We are not in any trouble.’362 The Whitehall 358 Ibid; Peck, Tel No 348, Kissinger Briefing: Arms Control and SALT, 4 Jul 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. 359 Peck, Tel No 348, Kissinger Briefing: Arms Control and SALT, 4 Jul 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. 360 Botschafter Krapf (Brüssel, NATO) an das AA, 5 Jul 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 200. 361 Ibid 362 Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, in the FCO on Monday 8 July 1974 at 2.30 P.M, TNA, FCO 46/1159.

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bureaucracy noted a shift in the US position. Prior to the summit the US Secretary of State had stressed the need for a quick agreement since after 1975 control of the Soviet MIRV program would be unmanageable. In Kissinger’s words ‘a very serious situation would arise.’363 A Soviet first strike capability threatened. The argument had been reversed. Did the Nixon Administration recognize the merit of a threatening collapse of the temporary Interim Agreement?364 It might enhance US bargaining power. John A. Thomson visited Washington to discuss the new SALT strategy with ‘Hal’ Sonnenfeldt and Fred Iklé.365 The failure of the Moscow Summit dominated the agenda. What were the consequences of the set-back on arms control? The US would continue to work for a MIRV agreement. A MIRV solution remained the top priority. The MIRV-FBS nexus blocked progress. The FBS issue would have to be solved step-by-step. This might happen outside the SALT arena. The next generation of US fighter aircraft would not be dual-capable. The number of US dual-capable systems in Europe would thus shrink with the introduction F-14 and F-15. The threat potential by US carrier units would thus be reduced. The Soviet agenda of a ‘denuclearization’ of the Mediterranean would be served. The commissioning of the Trident with its long-range missiles was to ease a compromise on US forward submarine bases. Rota might be given up in due course.366 HMG furthermore gathered from the talks that the introduction of a nuclear package into MBFR might smooth a solution of the SALT process. The latter approach could be expected in October – during the next Kissinger visit to the Soviet Union.367

363 364 365 366 367

J.A. Thomson, SALT, 12 Jul 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. C.J. Makins-M.E.Pellow, 18 Jul 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1159. C.J. Makins-M.E. Pellow, 6 Aug 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160. Ibid C.J. Makins-M.E. Pellow, 5 Aug 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1498.

9. PRESIDENT FORD AND THE AVENUE TO VLADIVOSTOK President Gerald Ford who succeeded Richard Nixon after his resignation over Watergate made SALT a top priority in his foreign policy agenda. Henry Kissinger remained in charge of the SALT process. Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft – the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs – advised President Ford on 15 August 1974 to link SALT and MBFR. President Ford should offer to FM Gromyko – whom he would see in September – a new approach in MBFR. The old MBFR proposal ‘could not fly’ since it was unequal. The US should modify it by introducing a nuclear package as an add-on. The package of ‘Pershing’, F-4 ‘Phantom’ and 1000 warheads had been discussed in NATO for over a year. Now was the time to table it to get a common ceiling approved. The 1000 tactical nuclear warheads were dispensable – ‘We don’t have targets for the nukes anyway.’368 Simultaneously, the US had to take the initiative on FBS. This should be done bilaterally with the Soviet Union: ‘to do it in SALT causes alliance problems.’369 The US should push the SU to table the issue in MBFR. This would ease the path to a SALT II Agreement and offer the Alliance a voice opportunity in a multilateral forum. Kissinger furthermore counseled President Ford to seek a MIRV agreement. There was still a chance to come to an agreement. The combination of throw weight and MIRV posed a grave danger for the US Minuteman force. The US had pursued different strategies for a SALT II agreement – so far. The initial idea had been to seek a permanent agreement based on equal numbers of ICBM, SLBM and bombers. This concept had been dropped in favor of an extension of an Interim Agreement and a MIRV treaty. The US had encountered multiple problems: the common ceiling of 2350 was problematic for the SU. The SU still insisted on a withdrawal of all US FBS equivalent to 10-15% of the US nuclear striking force. A withdrawal required NATO approval. The SU furthermore had developed a new generation of ICBMs with MIRV capability which – as outlined above – posed a major threat to US and Allied security. The US attempts to limit MIRV ‘went through several successive stages’: (1) an interim freeze agreement; (2) a limited equal MIRV ICBM throw weight proposal, that would have left MIRVed SLBM untouched; (3) a separate asymmetrical MIRV agreement combined with a 2–3 year extension of the Interim Agreement; (4) a MIRV treaty for ICBM and SLBM, that did not fly since the SU did not have a MIRVed SLBM and preferred the accuracy of the land-based systems. The SU by contrast had sought a 1100 to 1000 limit with freedom to mix. The proposal had not foreseen sub-limits for ICBM or SLBM. The marathon had ended during the Moscow Summit with the US proposal of an extension of the Interim Agreement up to 1979 in order not to change the Interim Agreement but to accommodate for 368 Memo of Conversation, Ford-Kissinger, 15 Aug 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 17. 369 Ibid

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the Trident. A limit of 1150 MIRVed delivery systems for the US and 750 for the SU plus a ban on MIRVed heavy missiles had been proposed. The Summit had ended with an agreement to seek a New Interim Agreement that lasted up to 1985.370 The FRG was sending a high level delegation to Washington on 3–4 September 1974. The aim of the mission was to seek guidance on the approach of the new Ford Administration on arms control. The FRG feared an US initiative in MBFR. The FRG was engaging in preventative diplomacy: no obstacles should be created for a Western European Defense Co-operation and no droit de regard offered to the Soviet Union.371 The possible introduction of Option III into MBFR was the main issue of the deliberations. The FRG alerted the US that no NATO decision had been made on Option III. Usage of Option III needed NATO clearance. The US Congress seemed to support ideas to replace forward based strike aircraft with Poseidon targeting. Some US Senators preferred a change to a purely defensive ADM nuclear defense for Europe.372 Was the US planning a gradual removal of all strike elements from Central Europe? SALT and MBFR had to serve European security. German anxieties were not allayed during the bilateral deliberations. The FRG delegation reminded the US that any attempts to denuclearize the reduction zone step-by-step had to be averted.373 The German fears were shared by France. The French NATO Ambassador de Rose indicated a possible willingness of France to co-operate with the ‘Petrignani Group’ of European SALT Experts in order to forestall in common that FBS would be sacrificed. France would be disposed to co-operate, if the Europeans would pursue their own interests instead of ‘following a strictly US line’.374 France even suggested adding SALT to the agenda of the next Anglo-French Politico-Military Talks.375 The Europeans felt it in their bones that ‘SALT was becoming serious again.’376 HMG shared the German assumption that a tabling of Option III was forthcoming soon. Bartholomew had indicated at the US-UK-FRG Talks that a reduction of SHAPE’s nuclear capability was ‘tolerable’ for the United States.377 Thus

370 Memo From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, [undated, August 1974], FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 19; Meeting of the NSC, 14 Sep 1974, folder, NSC Meeting 9/14/1974, box 1, National Security Adviser’s NSC Meeting File, Gerard R Ford Presidential Library, http;//fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/ 0312/1552375.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:49). 371 For the main European question, see: Letter from Mr Rose to Mr Bullard, 4 July 1974, DBPO, Series 3, Volume 3, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004& res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040930025 (access date: 16 March 2011). 372 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, MBFR – Deutsch-Amerikanische Konsultationen, 11 Sep 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 258. 373 Ibid 374 Peck-Thomson, 25 Sep 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160. 375 Peck-Thomson, 16 Oct 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160. 376 C.J. Makins-M.E. Pellow, 27 Sep 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160. 377 MBFR – The Nuclear Aspects, [undated, September 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1499.

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Europe had to define her red lines. The red lines for a nuclear package were: (1) custodial arrangements should not be affected; (2) the European Option should be upheld; (3) the transfer of information and nuclear components should be unrestricted. European nuclear system would thus not be discussed in MBFR. Reductions had to be strictly confined to the US component.378 The UK deemed reductions of US systems detrimental. No vital threat emerged, however, as long as European systems remained unrestricted.379 For the FRG US FBS were of vital importance. A removal of US FBS would lead to a phasing-out of NATO nuclear sharing. NATO’s dual-key systems offered NNWS a kind of parity with the European NWS within the Alliance framework. The FRG faced either a step-by-step denuclearization or a battle for ‘European’ control over the UK and French nuclear forces in line with the European Nuclear Option. This was a difficult path to take. The best option was to fend off any substantial reductions of US nuclear systems in the European theatre.380 The worst case scenario for the Europeans was a US sell-out of European interests in order to obtain SALT MIRV limitation. The UK – at least – believed ‘that Kissinger would probably put the emphasis on getting maximum benefit in SALT out of the introduction of a nuclear package into MBFR.’381 The US would seek to get rid of the FBS issue to obtain a breakthrough in SALT that bought the re-election of President Ford in 1976.382 The US indeed viewed the FBS as a major obstacle to a MIRV agreement or a reduction proposal. FBS limited US package options. The US did not only debate new patterns of deployment in Central Europe to limit FBS but considered the option to give up forward submarine bases in Holy Loch and Rota – with the introduction of the Trident system.383 European resistance to dealings behind Europe’s back was guaranteed. The US briefed the NAC on the SALT process. It was the 17 October 1974. As agreed in the ‘Petrignani Group’ the German NATO Permanent Representative Franz Krapf tackled FBS head on. Krapf focused on the Soviet strategy to eliminate FBS. The SU sought to break the chain of escalation. The MBFR Option III should not ease the Soviet strategy. Any possible decision to withdraw FBS in SALT was utterly unacceptable for the Alliance. Krapf’s statement was supported by the British, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, Canadian and Turkish NATO Ambassa-

378 379 380 381 382 383

Ibid MBFR. The Nuclear Issue, 26 Sep 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1499. MBFR – The Nuclear Aspects, [undated, September 1974], TNA, FCO 41/1499. J.A. Wilberforce-C.C.C. Tickell, 2 Oct 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1499. Ibid Talking Points. NSC Meeting, Monday 7 Oct 1974 – 2:00 pm, folder NSC Meeting 10/7/1974, National Security Advisor’s File, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/ documents/0312/1552376.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:52).

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dors. FBS was a no go area.384 Alexis Johnson assured the Allies that FBS was not on the SALT agenda. Ambassador Johnson thereafter proceeded to present the ‘old’ US concept. Some novelties applied. The US sought ‘essential equivalence’ of the aggregate total of ICBM, SLBM and bomber. Washington aimed at a mutual phased reduction to a lower limit. The other core aims were still the limitation of the aggregate total throw weight and the limitation of MIRVed delivery systems by numbers and throw weight.385 Alexis Johnson announced the US aim to come to an agreement in 1975 – to be valid for a ten-year time period. There were multiple problems to be solved since the SU was aiming at a higher number of the aggregate total due to (1) the NATO nuclear powers, (2) the carrier based aircraft, and (3) the geographical factors that advantaged the US. FBS were just one facet of a much wider agenda. Alexis Johnson assured the Allies that he would brief Kissinger on the outcome of the NAC consultations. This would assure that Kissinger was aware of the NATO line prior to his departure to Moscow. The forthcoming Moscow Talks of Henry Kissinger might be able to achieve the longsought breakthrough necessary for a successful November Summit in Vladivostok.386 Ralph Earle further clarified the US approach in the NATO Experts Meeting that followed the NAC session. The concept of mutual phased reductions aimed at the establishment of a common ceiling with equal aggregate numbers, equal throw weight and equivalence in MIRVed systems (by taking account of numbers, RV vehicles and throw weight). The ten-year agreement option had been chosen to find an adequate MIRV solution.387 The furnished information remained limited. The US still were in the process of refining their negotiating package. In late October the world again looked to Moscow, where history could be made in case the superpowers were to agree not just to a limitation but to a phased reduction of central strategic systems. The US President forwarded the US negotiating package to General-Secretary Brezhnev days before Henry Kissinger started his new mission to the Soviet Union. President Ford in his letter sketched the envisaged mutual phased reductions of the aggregate total. The US suggested that the Interim Agreement remained valid until 1977 as originally foreseen. By October 1982 both parties should have 2350 strategic systems. No more than 300 could be heavy systems. In the interval 1977 to 1982 the aggregate total was allowed to rise temporarily to 2500 due to commissioning and replacement. By October 1983 the number of the aggregate total had to be reduced to 2200 and the number of heavy systems to 250. Both sides could not have more than 60% of their reduced aggregate total MIRVed, i.e. not more than 1320 delivery systems. There should be a MIRV ban for heavy systems, and air-to-surface missiles with a range ex-

384 Peck-FCO, TELNO 559: SALT Consultation, 18 Oct 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160; Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats, 17 Oct 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 301. 385 Sitzung des Ständigen NATO-Rats, 17 Oct 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 301. 386 Peck-FCO, TELNO 559: SALT Consultation, 18 Oct 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1160, 387 SALT Consultation – 18 Oct 1974, Presentation by Dr Ralph Earle, TNA, FCO 46/1160.

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ceeding 3000 km would be banned from deployment on heavy bombers.388 Helmut Sonnenfeldt advised the Secretary of State to consider playing the jokers – concessions on Rota and Holy Loch and Option III of MBFR. In case Option III was tabled, it had to be stressed that the US concession should lead to a removal of FBS from the SALT agenda.389 Option III should replace the FBS issue. Thus it would not be diplomatic to spell out what Option III entails – at least not in detail. This was negotiable.390 The Secretary of State resumed his negotiations in Moscow on 23 October 1974. Henry Kissinger explained the letter of President Ford to General-Secretary Brezhnev. President Ford’s letter started out by stressing the need to make the constructive relationship between the superpowers in arms control permanent and ‘irreversible’.391 He highlighted the general US concept – as sketched above – and in particular the need for a higher level between 1977 and 1982 due to restructuring of the forces on both sides.392 The US proposal was well received. The General-Secretary just intended to keep an unequal number of the aggregate total favoring Russia. Brezhnev envisaged 2400 delivery system for the SU and 2000 for the US as the final reduced number.393 The SU disliked the increase from 1710 to 2200 US delivery systems as foreseen in the US proposal given the reduction from 2350 to 2200 in Soviet systems.394 This would mean that the US would introduce Trident and keep Polaris missiles to come to an aggregate total of 2200. Kissinger concurred. The 1320 MIRV limit, however, would limit the commissioning of Trident to 10 submarines.395 The outlined proposal broke with the concept of ‘offsetting asymmetries’ and re-established a program of equal aggregates.396 The Soviet leadership did not embrace the US approach. The aggregate total had to be asymmetrical in any case. It had to take into the equation the existence of the French and British deterrent forces. Furthermore, the special limit for heavy missiles seemed to be one-sided. It targeted the Soviet SS-18. The sug-

388 Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership, [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 53. 389 Memo From the Counselor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt to the Secretary of State, 18 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 62. 390 Ibid 391 Ford-Brezhnev, 24 Oct 1974, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and the Middle East Discussions (Box 1– Oct 24–27, 1974 Kissinger-Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (2), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/%20documents/0331/ 1553993.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 13:14). 392 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 25 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 69. 393 Memo of the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, 25 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1974 XVI, No 70. 394 Memo From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, 25 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 72. 395 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 25 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 71. 396 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 495.

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gested sublimit for heavy ICBM was unacceptable for the General-Secretary.397 The General-Secretary tabled a counterproposal during the meeting on 26 October 1974. By the year 1985 – the end date of the 1975 Interim Agreement – both parties should have an aggregate total of 2400 delivery systems instead of 2200. The SU should be entitled to build up to the limit due to geographic and political factors. In the Interim period the US should not be entitled to do so but by 1985 might introduce new systems to obtain 2400 delivery systems and thus an equal standing. By 1985 both sides should have 1320 MIRVed systems. Both sides would be bound by the Interim Agreement until 1977 and thereafter would be allowed to commission 10 new submarine each – of the Trident and Typhoon class respectively. Any air-to-surface systems on bombers with a range up to 3000 km would count to the aggregate total. Kissinger accepted the proposal as a framework for further discussions.398 The proposal was a de facto freezing of the SALT I limit for the SU up to 1985. The Soviet 2400 limit in the transition period reflected the 2350 SALT I systems plus 40 heavy bombers and the US 2200 limit reflected the 1710 SALT I systems plus 400 heavy bombers. Secretary Kissinger agreed to discuss the proposal with President Ford and to accept it as the platform for the Summit in Vladivostok. He asked General-Secretary Brezhnev not to make the proposal public in order to give him and Dobrynin the opportunity to revise and refine the proposal without Congressional interference. This should be a matter of ‘back channel’ diplomacy. General-Secretary Brezhnev signaled his placet in case both sides could agree that the proposal would not be altered substantially. Kissinger assured the Soviet counterparts that the Vladivostok Summit was to be negotiated on a revised version of the General-Secretary’s proposal. Secretary Kissinger’s Moscow trip thus ended successfully. A first breakthrough was achieved – a major breakthrough was in sight.399 Secretary Kissinger cabled President Ford on 27 October 1974 that a platform had been agreed upon. The SU had tabled a major proposal that guaranteed equal aggregates as a final outcome in 1985 ‘but a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 throughout the process.’400 The final aggregate would possibly have to take the British deterrent force into the equation. An equal MIRV limit had been proposed. But a prohibition on the MIRVing of heavy missiles and systems was missing. The new platform should be kept secret. The latter would be ‘shredded by DOD’.401 For Kissinger the common understanding was offering a sensible platform for an agreement at Vladivostok. The proposal should not be destroyed before it could take shape. Thus 397 Memo of Conversation, 25 Oct 1974 – 11:05 AM to 1:28 PM, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and the Middle East Discussions (Box 1– Oct 24–27, 1974 Kissinger-Brezhnev Talks in Moscow(2), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/%20 documents/0331/1553993.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 13:14). 398 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 25 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 74. 399 Ibid 400 Memo of the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, 27 Oct 1974, FRUS 1969–1974 XVI, No 77. 401 Ibid

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Kissinger advised to keep the project outline totally outside the interagency process until it had been analyzed by the President and further progress achieved in the ‘back channel’ with Ambassador Dobrynin.402 Dr Kissinger’s trip to Moscow was briefly debated by Helmut Sonnenfeldt with Roy Hattersley, the British Foreign Minister, on 30 October 1974. The information the US furnished was not elaborate. Sonnenfeldt stated that MBFR had not been discussed in Moscow – against all previous expectations. The Russians had shifted focus: FBS had been deferred but a compensation for British and French forces was still under debate.403 The ‘Kissinger Team’ managed to keep the core elements of the Soviet proposal secret up to the Vladivostok Summit of 23–24 November 1974. Rumors about the prehistory popped up right after Vladivostok.404 The secret preparations allowed a successful summit in the Russian Far East. President Ford and General-Secretary Brezhnev managed to reach an agreement on SALT on the first day of the Summit. The SU agreed not to include FBS in a forthcoming agreement since President Ford indicated that the US was prepared to reciprocate by giving up the US base in Rota Spain in 1984.405 The US accepted an equal aggregate of 2400 and a MIRV limit of 1320 as discussed in Moscow in October. A freedom to mix would govern the agreement. Thus subceilings were not foreseen. The Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons of 1972 was to be maintained up to 1977 and integrated into the new accord. The agreement did not limit the throw weight, the amount of warheads or the yield. Furthermore, FBS were not part of the negotiated settlement.406 The Vladivostok Accord foresaw the signing of a new treaty in 1975 that would govern the SALT process until 1985. Both parties agreed to prepare a treaty based on the Vladivostok Accord for signature during the Brezhnev visit to the US in 1975. No obstacles were arising.407 President Ford – so Raymond Garthoff – was ‘euphoric’.408 SALT II would be signed in 1975. Henry Kissinger talked of a breakthrough in arms control. The Vladivostok Accord was considered the most important development in Strategic 402 Ibid 403 Record of the Conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Messrs Sonnenfeldt and Hartman of the Department of State at the FCO on Wednesday 30 Oct 1974, TNA, FCO 41/1437. 404 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 496. 405 Memo of Conversation, Ford-Brezhnev, 23 Nov 1974, 6:15 pm, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and the Middle East Discussions (Box 1– Nov 23–24, 1974 Vladivostok Summit (1), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov /library/%20documents/0331/1553995.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks (access date: 27 March 2013, 13:36). 406 Ibid 407 Memo für Staatssekretär Dr. Mann, Betr. SALT II; hier Ergebnisse des Treffens FordBreshnew, 23–24. November 1974, bei Wladiwostok, 28 Nov 1974, PA–AA, ZW 107360; Vladivostok Agreement, 24 Nov 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1162. 408 John Newhouse, Krieg und Frieden im Atomzeitalter. Von Los Alamos bis SALT, München: Kindler 1990, 366; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 497.

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Arms Limitation since 1972.409 What was achieved was a blueprint for a future treaty. The Vladivostok Accord was guidance for the SALT delegation which would resume work in January 1975.410 An analysis of the West German foreign ministry highlighted the weaknesses of the Vladivostok accord: Vladivostok was a purely quantitative agreement with not real qualitative components. A further development of MIRV technology was not restricted. The agreement did not foresee reductions: although the parties agreed to restart negotiations in the early 1980s with an aim to reduce strategic potentials. The common ceiling had remained too undefined. Land-mobile and air-mobile systems would have to be counted against the aggregate total which would possibly complicate the drafting process. The silence on FBS left this question in limbo. The Europeans might have to seek a clarification.411 The outcome of the Vladivostok Summit thus was still clouded in uncertainty. The US NSC talking points for the NSC Meeting on 2 December 1974 listed numerous weaknesses of the Vladivostok Accord: both the aggregate total and the MIRV level were too high. Neither throw weight nor MIRVed throw weight were limited. The high limits had made the ‘common ceiling’ possible.412 According to President Ford the Vladivostok Accord was a turning-point since the SALT process had finally shifted from non-equivalence to equivalence. Secretary Kissinger stressed in the NSC Meeting of 2 December the US achievements beyond the establishment of an equal aggregate: FBS were eliminated without US compensation.413 Kissinger assumed that the Allies would be impressed since the US had managed to eliminate FBS for the duration of the New Interim Agreement: 10 years.414 Noteworthy is the fact that President Ford’s offer to reciprocate by closing Rota was omitted in the report to the NSC. Raymond Garthoff’s account follows Kissinger’s example. Garthoff stresses the Soviet concessions. The SU had finally agreed to equal aggregates of ICBM, SLBM and bombers without a demand for compensation on FBS or geographic factors. For the first time in the history of strategic arms control a ‘common ceiling’ had been established.415 The

409 P. Mehew, SALT, 25 Nov 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 410 Ibid, Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 497. 411 Memo für Staatssekretär Dr. Mann, Betr. SALT II; hier Ergebnisse des Treffens FordBreshnew, 23–24. November 1974, bei Wladiwostok, 28 Nov 1974, PA–AA, ZW 107360; J.F. Mayne, SALT, TNA, FCO 46/1161; Edwin Brown Firmage/David J Henry, Vladivostok and Beyond: SALT I and the Prospects of SALT II, Columbia Journal of Transatlantic Studies 14 (1975), 221–267, 265. 412 Talking Points, NSC Meeting, 2 Dec 1974, box 1, folder, National Security Advisor’s NSC Meeting File, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library http://www.fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/%20 documents/0312/1552378.pdf" (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:56). 413 Minutes of the NSC Meeting, 2 Dec 1974, 10:40 am–11:35 am, http://www. fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/%20documents/0312/1552378.pdf, (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:57). 414 Ibid 415 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 497.

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Vladivostok Accord thus was seen as a watershed in arms control. A cap on all major strategic nuclear weapons had been negotiated. The next step would be reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus the outstanding questions and desiderata mentioned above were deemed almost as non-existent. They were deemed mere little obstacles to be ironed out. The draft would be written in days. All questions would be settled in months a treaty signed in summer.416 The SU – so Kissinger – had dropped her demand for compensations.417 Thus no European problem was in sight. The drafting of the Aide Memoire of the Vladivostok Agreement is worth noting due to the definitional problems that were soon to arise about the inclusion of CM. The definition of the aggregate total posed problems. The aggregate total contained land-based ICBM, sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with bombs or air-to-surface missiles up to a range of 600 km. In case a ‘bomber’ was equipped with air-to-surface missiles with a range of 600 km and more each ‘missile’ would be counted as one delivery vehicle and counted against the aggregate total.418 The Aide Memoire was finally adopted on 10 December. The US agreed not to further define the air-to-surface missiles with ranges above 600 km that had to be counted against the aggregate total. This was a major US concession. It meant that air-to-surface ballistic or CM of a range above 600 km had to be counted against the aggregate total.419 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger briefed the NPG Ministerial Meeting on 10 December – the day the Aide Memoire was finally agreed upon. Schlesinger put the achieved in perspective: (1) the SU had dropped their defense of the asymmetry in numbers of the Interim Agreement; (2) the SU had dropped compensations for geographic factors such as FBS; (3) the SU had dropped their demand for compensation due to the French and British deterrent forces and the Chinese threat. All these Soviet positions had been overtaken by the acceptance of an equal aggregate total. The adoption of a ‘common ceiling’ had relevance also for the MBFR negotiations.420 The European Allies thus should rejoice. The Russians had dropped their demand to include FBS due to the possibility to deploy similar systems in Warsaw Pact countries.421 The latter information was confirmed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt in a conversation with J.A. Thomson in the Hilton Hotel in Brussels on 11 December. Sonnenfeldt assured Thomson that the Russians did not drop the FBS in exchange for a US

416 Ibid 417 SALT and Non-Proliferation, 6 Dec 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 418 Aide Memoire, 10 Dec 1974, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/%20documents/0331/1553997.pdf#pagemode= bookmarks (access date: 27 March 2013, 13:45); Newhouse, Krieg und Frieden, 372. 419 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 497; Paul H. Nitze, ‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente’, in Hanrieder, 39–62, 50; Richard Burt, ‘The Scope and Limits of Arms Control’, in Id (ed), 67–85, 69. 420 Peck-FCO TELNO 683, 10 Dec 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 421 Ibid

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commitment to introduce a nuclear component in MBFR.422 HMG nevertheless hoped to be officially informed about the regulation on FBS. The NATO Allies needed to know the Soviet reasons for dropping the FBS and the state of play on a non-transfer clause. This information should be furnished by the US during the briefing of the NAC on the Vladivostok Accord on 12–13 December 1974.423 The NATO Ministerial Council met in a restricted session. Secretary of State Kissinger first reviewed the SALT position prior to Vladivostok. The SU had dropped the FBS issue already during his visit to Moscow in October 1974. The demand for compensation for the French and British deterrent system was dropped at Vladivostok. There had been no agreement ‘tacit or otherwise that the FBS should be dealt with in MBFR.’ The SU had dropped the FBS issue without comment.424 The German Secretary of Defense Leber welcomed the Vladivostok Accord. It would provide strategic stability. He expressed his relief that FBS had been eliminated from the SALT agenda in Vladivostok. He simultaneously pleaded not to table a nuclear component in MBFR. This would revive an already settled problem.425 The Belgian Defense Secretary Van Elslande doubted that FBS finally had been eliminated from the SALT process. Thus he inquired what aircrafts were dealt with at Vladivostok. Kissinger clearly underlined that only heavy bombers would count against the aggregate total. The Secretary of State confirmed the possibility that the SU was allowed to raise the issue of FBS again in the future process of SALT – in the post SALT II track i.e. after the expiration of a New Interim Agreement in 1985.426 Kissinger finally highlighted that Vladivostok was freezing the Soviet aggregate total and limited the development of MIRVs. So far the SU was not advanced in MIRV technology and not even had tested a MIRVed SLBM. Withstanding the parity in numbers by 1985 the US would always maintain a technological edge. The German Minister of Defense offered an analysis of the situation. He explained that the history of nuclear weapons had reached its third stage. Stage one was characterized by the US atomic monopoly. Stage two was characterized by an unequal nuclear competition that assured the viability of flexible response due to US superiority. Stage three was characterized by the parity of nuclear arsenals regulated by arms control regimes. A situation with new challenges had emerged. The conventional asymmetry had moved center-stage. NATO Europe faced a conventional superior Warsaw Pact.

422 Record of Conversation between Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr Thomson at the Hilton Hotel Brussels on 11 Dec 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 423 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC Brussels 12–13 December 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 424 Peck-FCO, TELNO 698, NATO Ministerial Meeting: Restricted Session, 13 Dec 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161; Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 14 Dec 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 374. 425 Ibid; Gesandter Boss, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 13 Dec 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 372. 426 Ibid

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The FRG thus pleaded to preserve the NATO triad of strategic, tactical and conventional weapons. The NATO conventional strength had to be enhanced and a tactical nuclear defense option maintained in order not to invite aggression.427 Neither component of the triad could be sacrificed in the MBFR process.

427 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 14 Dec 1974, ADAP 1974, Nr. 374; Dr Pfeffer, Betr. Neufassung der Erklärung des Herrn Bundesministers vor dem Bundestag am 19 Dezember zum Thema NATO Außenministerkonferenz, 17 Dec 1974, PA–AA, ZW 178585.

10. VLADIVOSTOK: THE SALT II AGREEMENT ILLUSION Vladivostok was neither a resounding success of US diplomacy nor the final breakthrough on the path to SALT II. Christopher Makins highlighted in a cable to the FCO that the common tale of Russian concessions surrounding the narrative on Vladivostok was mistaken. The Russian embrace of the aggregate total had to be viewed as a response to the US concessions at Moscow. The US had totally given up her official negotiating position which had been based on an equal aggregate in numbers, equal aggregate throw weight and equivalence in MIRV numbers and throw weight. The US had not achieved to limit throw weight and accepted a high MIRV level for both parties irrespective of throw weight limitations. Finally, there was no final assurance that FBS and the non-transfer questions were eliminated. There was just no agreement concerning these issues.428 Other issues were not closed as well: mobile land-based systems. The verification question remained totally unaddressed.429 Secretary of State Kissinger himself highlighted that the Vladivostok Accord required considerable ‘fleshing-out by negotiations on expert level’.430 Information on the Vladivostok Accord was still sparse. The Europeans in particular sought for a valid and logic explanation why the SU had dropped the FBS question from the SALT II agenda. The French NATO Ambassador de Rose feared a connection with the MBFR negotiations.431 The ‘Petrignani Group’ gathered on 14 January 1975 to ponder over the same question: ‘Why had FBS been excluded?’432 Da Rin – the Coordinator of the NATO and Disarmament Section in the Italian Foreign Ministry – assumed that the high aggregate ceiling contributed to the Soviet decision not to raise the FBS question again. The equality in MIRVed systems had further re-assured the Soviet Government. The high ceiling allowed the SU not to press for an instant compensation for the few French and British systems, for FBS or other geographical factors. Europe would have to expect more rough weather due to the forthcoming drafting of the treaty text. The negotiations were to recommence on 31 January 1975 in Geneva. John Thomson – British Assistant Under-Secretary of Defence – was less skeptical. There was nothing in writing on FBS but it was unlikely that the SU would re-open that subject. The task of the ‘Petrignani Group’ was done. The European SALT Experts should nevertheless continue to meet in order not to

428 C.J. Makins-M.E. Pellow, 16 Dec 1974, TNA, FCO 46/1161. 429 Ibid 430 Implications of the Vladivostok Accord for Strategic Arms Limitation Negotiations, [undated, January 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1270. 431 Peck-FCO, FBS and MBFR, 14 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267. 432 European Consultation on SALT. Record of the Informal Meeting on Tuesday 14 January 1975 in the Italian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 14 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267.

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create the impression that Europe was satisfied.433 Dr Andreae – the representative of the West German Defense Ministry – was puzzled by the development. He shared the skepticism of Da Rin and hinted at a secret superpower deal. He did not assume that FBS would be moved to the MBFR forum but would be dealt with outside SALT and MBFR.434 As a representative from the Defense Ministry Dr Andreae might have had information from the Pentagon about the replacement strategy for the FBS. The US envisaged replacing the dual-capable F-4 ‘Phantom’ with a purely conventional F-15. Thus US FBS would be withdrawn in the course of a military replacement cycle. This was a technical solution of a political problem. Da Rin refuted the idea of a ‘secret deal’. The question remained unresolved. The ‘Petrignani Group’ changed topic. The Vladivostok Accord was a brief document that focused just on core principles. The forthcoming SALT II Treaty would tackle technical details that might have strong repercussion for European security. The definition of weapons systems thus had to be taken up by the ‘Petrignani Group’ in the future. The questions of non-circumvention and a nontransfer clause were to remain on the ‘Petrignani Group’ agenda.435 The hoped for information on FBS was furnished shortly after the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva. The US briefed the NAC on 24 February 1975. Ambassador Johnson could clarify the FBS question. The SU and the US had agreed to shift the regulation to SALT III. The Vladivostok Accord was to contain no stipulations on FBS. The SU had retained the right to raise the issue in the follow-up negotiations for SALT III.436 The US admitted that the Vladivostok Accord left a multitude of other questions unresolved: the definition of heavy missiles, verification questions, the counting of ‘bombers’, the question of the inclusion of the Soviet medium range bomber ‘Backfire’ as a strategic weapon.437 Even worse interpretational problems had emerged: the major point of contention was the definition of air-to-surface missiles. The US defined air-to-surface missiles as air-launched ballistic missiles. The SU interpreted air-to-surface missiles to include both cruise and ballistic missiles.438 The drafting of the Aide Memoire had already witnessed a conflict over the definition of air-to-surface missiles. The Aide Memoire indeed did not specify air-to-surface missiles in any respect. The word ‘ballistic’ had finally been removed by the parties as Garthoff reports in Détente and Confrontation. The NAC briefing did not contain this piece of information. The question was presented by Alexis Johnson as an unresolved interpretative question – at least according to the record of the British NATO Representative. Thus it was disputed whether air-to-surface CM should be limited or counted

433 434 435 436

Ibid Ibid Ibid Peck-FCO, Tel No 83, SALT Consultation, 25 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267; J.A. Thomson, SALT, 25 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267. 437 Ibid 438 J.A. Thomson, SALT, 25 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267.

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against the aggregate total – not to mention sea- and ground-launched CM. CM could become the fourth – unregulated – leg of the US deterrent force. The regulation on air-, ground- and sea-launched CM thus had to be watched in the process of drafting of the SALT II Agreement. The presentation by Alexis Johnson did not go into any details of the Soviet draft treaty tabled on 1 February 1975. The Soviet draft treaty envisaged that ALL missiles of over 600 km range on bombers should be counted against the 2400 aggregate total: i.e. ballistic or CM. ALL such airborne missiles should be banned from aircrafts other than ‘heavy’ bombers. All CM with an intercontinental range, all sea-launched CM over 600 km and MIRV on air-to-surface missiles were to be banned. The US rejected the Soviet draft since it would ‘virtually bar’ CM deployments.439 Finally, the SU had tabled a rather comprehensive ‘non-transfer clause’ in line with the non-transfer stipulations of the ABM treaty. The US rejected the Soviet proposal taking recourse to the US unilateral declaration of 18 April 1972 that declared that the non-transfer regime of the ABM treaty was not meant to be a precedent for a treaty on the limitation of offensive weapons. The US upheld the position on non-transfer taken by Alexis Johnson on 15 March 1973 and Ambassador Rumsfeld on 2 May 1973. A non-transfer clause was only to be negotiated when the scope and nature of the treaty on the limitation of offensive arms had been decided.440 Johnson did say little about the ‘Backfire’ bomber question too. Possibly since the US position had not yet crystallized. Sonnenfeldt deemed it advisable not to attempt to count the Soviet medium-range ‘Backfire’ bomber in order not to revive the FBS issue. In case the US pressed on the ‘Backfire’ the FBS issue would re-emerge.441 The ‘Petrignani Group’ met on the very same day, at 2.45 in the afternoon to discuss the US briefing in the NAC. The NAC had been a sobering experience. The post-Vladivostok euphoria was a matter of the past. Da Rin and Thomson both highlighted the importance of the clarification on FBS. The non-transfer regime shifted center stage. The US had to remain firm. Thomson reported that Ralph Earle considered a rather general non-circumvention clause feasible. The non-circumvention clause would cover non-central systems as well. Such a wide ranging non-circumvention regulation might limit Soviet IRBM as well as US and European dual-capable aircraft. Thomson stressed that the Soviet MRBM forces were old and aging. They were less of an asset than the NATO FBS. A noncircumvention clause should be limited to regulated systems only. The non-

439 Memo From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hyland to the Secretary of State, 7 Feb 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No. 127. 440 European Consultations on SALT: No-Transfer, [undated, March 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1267; SALT II Statements on No-Transfer, [undated, April 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1268. 441 Memo From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hyland to the Secretary of State, 7 Feb 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 127.

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circumvention clause was to replace a non-transfer regime.442 The ‘Petrignani Group’ already had commenced to formulate a non-circumvention clause in a preparatory session on 18 February 1975. The drafting of the wording required major attention in order to forestall that non-regulated systems or non-limited systems would be affected. The CM for example should not be covered by a noncircumvention clause. The CM was a potential European deterrent option. Privileged assistance was feasible due to the special relationship that pre-dated the SALT process. The Europeans had to preserve the right to acquire the dualcapable CM. The latter offered Europe a splendid conventional strike option.443 Russia’s take on non-transfer and non-circumvention policy surely was aimed to hinder a development which allowed the FRG to acquire ‘cruise missiles with conventional warheads which were capable of penetrating ICBM silos.’444 The best option for Europe was to forestall both a non-transfer and a noncircumvention clause. This ‘Petrigniani’ position was upheld and confirmed in the session on 24 February 1975. The preparation for the ‘Petrignani Group’ session on 21 March 1975 and 17 April 1975 was structured by the headings ‘definitions’, ‘non-transfer’ and ‘noncircumvention’. The Italian paper clearly focused on weapons for the European theatre. It raised the issue of the SS-20 the new Soviet MRBM. The SS-20 had been tested successfully. It used the first two stages of the SS-16 ICBM. The SS-20 was currently tested for ranges of up to 1950 km but could be enhanced to 4650 km. The second issue of importance was the ‘Backfire’ bomber which threatened Europe. A limitation of the ‘Backfire’ would enhance European security – in case a limitation attempt would not revive the FBS issue.445 The Italian paper considered that the CM regulation of the Soviet draft treaty was undermining the future viability of the US FBS. The CM range of 600 km allowed the SU to target FBS while Soviet strike forces and MRBM remained out of the range of NATO CM. The Europeans thus might be well advised to ‘encourage a negative reaction on the part of the US.’446 The Italian paper concluded that the deployment of SS-20 as a MIRVed MRBM might require some rethinking on non-central systems and the regional balance.447 Nothing was allowed to hinder Alliance nuclear sharing and the European Nuclear Option or – in the words of the document – the

442 European Consultation on SALT. Record of an Informal Meeting at 2.45 P.M. on Monday, 24 February in the Italian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 24 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1267. 443 S.W.J. Fuller SALT: Petrignani Group Discussions, 1 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1408; European Consultation on SALT: Non Circumvention [undated, March 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1267. 444 Ibid 445 Note for the Next Meeting of the European Group of Experts, 18 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268. 446 Ibid 447 Ibid

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‘European unification and a collective European defence.’448 The transfer of nuclear weapons defined as warheads was adequately covered by the NPT. Nothing should hinder the transfer of blueprints, technical descriptions, electronic components, technology and the transfer of ‘hardware’ to NWS. The quantity of weapons systems might be frozen – but not their qualitative improvement.449 The ‘Petrignani Group’ reconfirmed on 21 March and 17 April its previous position that a non-transfer clause had to be dropped under any circumstances and a noncircumvention clause had to be limited to govern regulated systems.450 This would leave CM unregulated.451 The British delegation to the ‘Petrignani Group’ deemed it advisable to forward to the NATO Experts Group or the NAC proper the common ‘European’ interest as expressed in the recent European SALT Experts Meetings.452 The ‘Petrignani Group’ asked the Italian NATO delegation to request a NAC session that allowed the ‘Petrignani Group’ to present to the US SALT delegation the views of the European SALT Experts. US Ambassador Johnson scheduled a special NAC briefing session for 7 May 1975 to allow an exchange of views with the ‘Petrignani Group’. Alexis Johnson used the NAC session of 7 May 1975 to sketch the Vladivostok Accord and the progress made since November 1974. Both parties had submitted draft treaties and a common draft was in existence. The negotiations in Geneva were now proceeding in working groups to finalize a draft SALT II Treaty.453 The US preferred a SALT II Treaty without protocols and declarations. The core working area was ‘definitions’. Noteworthy was the SU’s attempt to establish a treaty clause that assured that FBS would be dealt with in SALT III. Ambassador Johnson’s vague statement was followed by a reading of the ‘Petrignani Group’ statement by the Acting Italian NATO Ambassador Spinelli. The focus of the statement was on non-transfer, non-circumvention, non-central systems and definitions. The Europeans recommended preserving US FBS. The flexibility of NATO so demanded. The Soviet non-transfer clause was to be rejected. The latter undermined US transfers to NNWS and NWS alike.454 The presentation was supported by most of the European NATO Ambassadors. Belgium and the FRG declared the statement represented the official view of their governments. The British NATO Ambassador supported the Italian declaration and stres-

448 Ibid; Note for the Next Meeting of the European Group of Experts (revised), 24 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268. 449 Ibid 450 No [sic!] European Consultations on SALT: No Transfer and Non-Circumvention, [undated, April 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1268. 451 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Andreae an die Botschaft in Washington, 9 May 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 111. 452 M.F. Pellew to J.Thomson, 15 Apr 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268. 453 Chris Romberg-Mark Pellow, SALT: No Transfer Provision, 15 May 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1269. 454 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Andreae an die Botschaft in Washington, 9 May 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 111, footnote 9 and 5.

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sed Europe’s interest in the regulation of the non-transfer question.455 The Netherlands’ Ambassador distanced himself from the ‘Petrignani Group’ statement. The statement was not representing the official view of the Dutch Government. The reception of the European presentation by the US was ‘somewhat chilly.’456 Alexis Johnson just stated that most of the European positions had been taken into the equation when drafting the US negotiating position. The brief NATO Experts Meeting that immediately followed the NAC dealt with the CM field. The US rejected the sweeping 600 km limit for all CM as proposed by the SU draft treaty. The Ford Administration considered adjustments of ranges according to the different characteristics and roles of air-, sea- and ground-launched CM. The US rejected the concept to limit all air-to-surface systems above 600 km. Only ballistic air-to-surface systems with a range above 600 km should be counted against the aggregate total. Other air-to-surface CM with a range above 600 km should not be counted against the aggregate total since they were mere bomber armament or penetration aids. A possible MIRVing of the SS-20 MRBM was not considered as destabilizing by the US. It would not ‘substantially alter the threat to NATO.’457 The ‘Petrignani Group’ gathered separately on the same day but decided not to push the agenda further. The US reception had been negative. The experts had done what they could. The European SALT Experts Group would now focus on GLCM.458 The US should be given time to finalize the draft treaty. Henry Kissinger met with Andrej Gromyko in Vienna on 20 May to revive the ‘high level diplomacy’ in order to speed the process on a draft agreement. The debate focused on a CM proposal by Henry Kissinger handed over to Ambassador Dobrynin on 10 May 1975. The US foresaw a clear-cut regulation for all types of CM. This was still a desideratum since the Aide Memoire was incomplete. The dividing line of counting CM would shift from 600 km to 3000 km. Air-to-surface missiles on heavy bombers with a range below 3000 km would not be counted against the aggregate total of 2400 only the delivery system, i.e. the bomber. Airto-surface missiles on heavy bombers exceeding the range of 3000 km would be considered a strategic weapon and independently counted against the aggregate total. The US was willing to adopt the dividing line of 3000 km to all CM – GLCM or SLCM. Thus all long-range CM would be counted against the aggre-

455 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Andreae an die Botschaft in Washington, 9 May 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 111, 456 W.N. Saxby, SALT: US Consultation with NATO Council, 7 May 1975, 13 May 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268. 457 Ibid; Chris Romberg-J. Thomson, Consultation on SALT, 12 May 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268; Memo From the Counselor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt and the Director of Intelligence and Research Hyland to Secretary of State Kissinger, 28 Mar 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 137; NSDM 285, 6 Feb 1975, box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald R Ford Presidential Library, http://fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/document/0310/nsdm285.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013 16:55). 458 Record of a Meeting of Certain European Experts on SALT, 7 May 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1268.

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gate total of 2400.459 Foreign Minister Gromyko reminded the US Secretary of State that the Aide Memoire to the Vladivostok Agreement foresaw that all air-tosurface missiles had to be counted against the aggregate total in case their range exceeded 600 km. The US attempt to define CM as a separate system was incorrect: ‘We believe it is necessary to stand by what was in the agreed aidememoire.’460 The regulation has to apply to all delivery systems ballistic or not. The SU furthermore rejected attempts to count the ‘Backfire’ bomber against the aggregate total. The ‘Kissinger formula’ to count any system as MIRVed as soon as it was tested was not agreeable either. The need to assure that none of the parties was transferring strategic nuclear weapons to other parties had furthermore to be tackled in the draft treaty. So far this had been omitted by the US in the drafting process. The Soviet Foreign Secretary concluded his statement with a reminder that FBS had been removed from the agenda in Vladivostok. The SU did not make a signing of SALT II dependent on the a priori settlement of the FBS issue. But FBS would be a topic in the post SALT II negotiating period.461 The SU had reserved the right to raise the issue for a final regulation in any subsequent negotiations.462 Kissinger upheld the US position. He furthermore highlighted the loopholes in the Aide Memoire. Carriers for CM were not defined. The Aide Memoire talked only of ‘missiles carried on bombers’. Even an extension of missiles to ballistic and CM would only cover air-to-surface missiles. Ballistic or CM carried on surface ships – for example – were not covered by the Aide Memoire.463 The meeting thus ended in a mere restatement of positions. No progress was made with one exception: Gromyko showed a willingness to commence reduction talks already in 1977. Both sides expressed their continuing interest in an accord on the lines of the Vladivostok Accord.464

459 Brent Scowcroft-Dobrynin, 10 May 1975, box 1, May 19–20, 1975, Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (2), Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and the Middle East Discussions, Gerald R Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/ document/0331/1553999.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:09). 460 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, 20 May 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 150. 461 Ibid 462 Ibid 463 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, Vienna, 20 May 1975, box 1, May 19–20, 1975, Kissinger-Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (2), Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle Eastern Discussions, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www. fordlibrarymuseum. gov/library/ document/0331/1553999.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:09). 464 Memo From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, 21 May 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No. 152.

11. NATO, MBFR AND US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE SALT and MBFR were interdependent. The Vladivostok common ceiling for strategic nuclear weapons raised hopes to obtain a common ceiling for conventional and non-strategic weapons in the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.465 The US Government had prepared Option III to assure Soviet approval of a common ceiling. Option III entailed a withdrawal of 1000 warheads from the European theatre. Simultaneously, the Nunn Amendment to the US Military Procurement Act of 1974 (Section 302) put a freeze on the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe until 30 June 1975 and demanded that the Secretary of Defense reported by 1 April 1975 on the ‘overall concept for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.’466 The Secretary of Defense had to review the US nuclear posture in Europe to obtain a platform for decision-making on stockpile reductions. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was to base his review on NPG studies, on data concerning US nuclear stockpiles and nuclear weapons systems in the European theatre. This exercise involved an analysis of Quick Reaction Alert Forces (QRA). The focus of the study was on warhead stockpiles in the Allied Command Europe (ACE). The nuclear stockpile was of major strategic importance for all dual-purpose weapons stationed in Europe. A reduction of the nuclear stockpile in Europe had direct repercussion on the mix of nuclear weapons in the European theatre. The force mix itself had a direct impact on strategy options of SACEUR and under the General Strike Plan.467 In the European theatre four types of nuclear forces existed: (1) ‘theatre nuclear strike forces’ including Polaris, Poseidon, Pershing, medium range bombers and strike aircraft; (2) ‘nuclear capable tactical battlefield weapons systems’ such as Lance and howitzers and ADMs; (3) ‘nuclear capable surface-to-air-missiles’ as Nike and Hercules and (4) ‘nuclear capable antisubmarine warfare weapons’. The report required a survey of NATO’s nuclear options given a stockpile of 7300 nuclear warheads in the European theatre. NATO divides warheads into battlefield and strike warheads. NATO counted 1400 Soviet targets threatening Central Europe: 1000 were targeted by NATO, 400 by the US strategic forces. The current holding of 2000 strike warheads in Europe assured comfortably coverage of the 1000 allocated targets. The 5000 battlefield warheads offered a range of options for a variety of delivery systems in line with a fully-fledged flexible response defense posture.468 Many response op-

465 Minutes. NSC Meeting, box 1, ‘NSC Meeting, 1/23/1975’, National Security Advisor’s NSC Meeting File, Gerald R Ford Presidential Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum. gov/ library/document/0312/1552379.pdf (accessed: 27 March 2013, 17:01). 466 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, United States Nuclear Warheads in Europe, 9 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1649. 467 Ibid 468 Ibid

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tions were not considered timely any more. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger agreed with Congress that the existing stockpile ‘was a strange hangover from the 1950s’. He deemed a reduction of the stockpile to 3500 warheads feasible.469 The review of the US nuclear posture in Europe was of major importance for the NATO Allies. Uncertainty about the scope and the impact of the reductions existed throughout NATO Europe. The NATO QRA forces had to remain unaffected by any war head reductions. The QRA comprised the Polaris, Poseidon, Pershing and the dual-capable strike aircraft. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Brown suggested changing the targeting of US strategic missiles in order to release NATO dual-capable aircraft in Europe from its nuclear role.470 The envisaged reduction of the dual-capable aircraft and their stockpiles was bound to raise questions in Europe. Such a measure would target NATO strike aircraft or ‘their participation in the nuclear role.’471 Even if the US envisaged reducing only US Air Force dual-capable aircraft the impact would be unpredictable since the stockpiles might be withdrawn with the US dual-capable aircraft. The existing NATO dual-key system thus might be undermined. The NATO Secretary-General thus reminded the Alliance that one ‘indispensable element of deterrence was the involvement of many nations in the nuclear task.’472 General Brown furthermore suggested that the nuclear stockpiles for US dual-based units should be removed from Central Europe and stored in the United States. Also the latter suggestion raised eyebrows among the European Allies. The removal of stockpiles from the NATO Central Region – de facto the MBFR reduction zone – would be compatible with the creation of special reduced zones in MBFR. Allies were even further disturbed when they learned that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger considered a relocation and consolidation of the nuclear stockpile a likely outcome of the Nunn Amendment. The SACEUR’s report on the nuclear aspects of the Nunn Amendment was furnished on 17 January 1975. The SACEUR concurred with General Brown: ‘It would be feasible and even advantageous to replace’ dual-capable aircraft by sea-based missiles. He highlighted, however, that the impact on the ACE stockpile would be minimal. The SACEUR and the NATO MC added that ‘a degree of participation’ of those countries with dual-capable strike forces should be maintained.473 The SACEUR backed Secretary Luns in his attempt to preserve NATO nuclear sharing for military and political reasons.474 The SACEUR – with strong support of the MC – rejected a relocation of the nuclear stockpile to the United States: ‘A return of needed warheads under emer-

469 470 471 472 473

Ibid Ibid Ibid Ibid Chiefs of Staff Committee. Defence Policy Staff. United States Nuclear Warheads in Europe. Report by the Director of Defence Policy, 30 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1649. 474 Chief of the Defence Staff-Secretary of State, 10 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1649.

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gency conditions’ would escalate a conflict and undermine rapid response.475 The SACEUR’s report was handed over to NPG for further deliberation.476 The UK looked at the Nunn Amendment with concern. For Whitehall repercussions of a reduction of the stockpiles on strategic options were not permissible. Nuclear sharing and tactical nuclear defense options had to be preserved.477 The importance of tactical nuclear forces ‘lies not so much in their operational effectiveness’ but in their contribution to deterrence, to escalation from the conventional to the strategic.478 One guideline thus applied: the warhead decision was not allowed (1) to undermine the deterrent value of the European strike forces, (2) to change the composition of the states who currently partake in the QRA or (3) to undermine tactical nuclear options.479 The UK furthermore supported SACEUR’s recommendation that ‘any decision to restructure nuclear weapons deployment in ACE should be taken entirely within the framework of MBFR negotiating options.’480 The UK was concerned that redeployment, relocation and modernization of the nuclear stockpile might foster a denuclearization. The Netherlands had withdrawn their F-104G from nuclear missions. The Dutch Lance system would be for conventional usage only. A further erosion of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement was unacceptable. European nations had to provide aircraft for QRA. The US plans to replace dual-capable aircraft with submarine based units or by way of a retargeting of the MIRVed ICBM force were politically and militarily questionable.481 The MIRV advantage that had given rise to the retargeting agenda at the beginning of the SALT II process was possibly undermined by the Vladivostok Agreement that offered the SU an equal number of MIRVed systems. Thus the US might not have the expected warhead superiority to cover with ICBM Soviet weapon systems targeting Western Europe. MBFR and nuclear cooperation moved center stage. President Ford invited the governments of the UK and the FRG to send representatives to Washington for tripartite negotiations on MBFR. A new approach to MBFR had to be decided. Henry Kissinger had indicated at the NAC Ministerial Council in December 1974 that the Allied position on MBFR so far had been ‘absurd’. The US now considered the time come to make use of Option III.482 On 23 January 1975 the US NSC dealt for the first time with MBFR. The NSC favored to make use of Option III to

475 Chiefs of Staff Committee. Defence Policy Staff. United States Nuclear Warheads in Europe. Report by the Director of Defence Policy, 30 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1649. 476 Ibid 477 Ibid 478 Ibid 479 Chief of the Defence Staff-Secretary of State, 10 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1649. 480 Chiefs of Staff Committee.Defence Policy Staff. United States Nuclear Warheads in Europe. Report by the Director of Defence Policy, 30 Jan 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1649. 481 Ministry of Defence, Chief of Staff Committee, United States Nuclear Warheads in Europe – The Nunn Amendment, Note by the Secretary, 12 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1266. 482 C.C.C. Tickell, MBFR: Possible Inclusion of Nuclear Weapons, 11 Feb 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1710.

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obtain the establishment of a common ceiling. The fact that FBS had been removed from SALT eased the initiative in MBFR. The idea to include West German forces in phase I reductions – as envisaged by the SU – was deemed counterproductive. The Soviet attempt to place limits on European forces was not embraced either. Both approaches would hinder a new burden sharing within the Alliance that delegated some of the defense options to the Europeans.483 Fred Iklé welcomed the British and West German delegations in the ACDA on 27 February 1975. The Europeans had a clear position on Option III. Option III would be offered in the ‘bilateral’ phase I of MBFR and thus effected only the superpowers. Option III was meant to buy a common overall ceiling. What forces would count against the ceiling was still undefined. The FRG – so Dr Ruth – had decided ‘at the highest level not to accept any reduction in German air force manpower in MBFR.’484 The FRG thus objected to any assumptions that the Option III F-4 ‘Phantom’ reduction could set a precedent. The unilateral US offer could not serve as an example for phase II reductions affecting the Europeans. The Germans were concerned that the dual-capable aircraft leg of the NATO nuclear strike forces could be reduced in case Option III was creating a precedent. The reductions of the US F-4 ‘Phantom’ itself were problematic for European security. C.C.C. Tickell – the Head of Western Organizations Department, FCO – reassured his German colleagues that the UK would be stationing nuclear tasked ‘Jaguar’ in the FRG by 1978.485 There were custodial arrangements which could not be easily affected by a withdrawal of warheads under MBFR or the Nunn Amendment. Tickell furthermore highlighted the need that any non-circumvention clause that might accompany Option III in Phase I of MBFR ‘should not be formulated in such a way that it prevented the Europeans from compensating for any conceivable unilateral US withdrawals of troops and equipment.’486

The Europeans were keenly interested in the phased approach which would leave European forces rather unregulated. The FRG highlighted once again that all reductions in phase I were purely American.487 The British suggested not to resort to strict national ceilings in the multilateral phase II of MBFR. The European collective defense option was to be upheld.488

483 Meeting of the NSC, 23 January 1975, 10:30 to 11:30 am and Talking Points. NSC Meeting, 23 Jan 1975, 10:30 am, box 1, NSC Meeting 23/1/1975, National Security Advisor’s NSC Meeting File, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0312/1552379.pdf (accessed: 27 March 2013, 17:01). 484 Record of Anglo/American/German Talks on MBFR held at the ACDA, Washington DC, on 27 and 28 Feb 1975, [undated, March 1975], TNA, FCO 41/1710. 485 Ibid 486 Ibid 487 MBFR (German Paper), 12 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1711. 488 Record of Anglo/American/German Talks on MBFR held at the ACDA, Washington DC, on 27 and 28 Feb 1975, [undated, March 1975], TNA, FCO 41/1710; MBFR (German Paper), 12 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1711.

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A British rationalization of the ‘Trilateral Talks’ highlighted in particular the need ‘to avoid prejudice to the particular interests of the European members of the Alliance, including their freedom to compensate for any unilateral withdrawals of tanks and nuclear weapons systems which other members of the Alliance might conceivably make in the future.’489

The European NATO members sought to reserve a right to circumvent a possible phase I agreement by compensating for US reductions. HMG intended to preserve its right to convert 30 British F-4 ‘Phantom’ deployed in the guideline area to an air defense role ‘and their replacement in the area by 60 Jaguar aircraft in the dual capable strike/conventional attack role.’490 The general attitude of the UK towards MBFR was reserved. C.C.C. Tickell wrote John A. Thomson that Option III was the last possible card for President Ford to play in arms control. ‘MBFR is a very dangerous negotiation […] Option III is a very dangerous part of it’. The UK could not hinder the introduction of a nuclear component into MBFR. The only valid strategy left was to ‘protect our long-term European interests.’491 The position of the French government concerning Option III was totally in line with the characterization by C.C.C. Tickell. MBFR was deemed extremely detrimental. In case of a limitation of European systems an irreparable damage would be done to European Unity. ‘Constraints on non-US NATO nuclear elements are unacceptable.’492 The cooperation of the two European nuclear powers – the UK within MBFR, France outside MBFR – was beneficial for Europe’s future standing. The latest US redraft of Option III took note of the European desiderata. The European Nuclear Option would not be blocked. There were to be no national ceilings. The US proposal would furthermore assure that a possible non-circumvention clause for the Phase I agreement would not affect European weapon systems.493 Even in the case the NATO Alliance had to accept a common ceiling on nuclear capable aircraft in MBFR the European Nuclear Option was not threatened. The Ford Administration informed HMG that the US would replace some of their nuclear capable aircraft with non-nuclear aircraft from 1977 onwards. The US redeployment would assure that some ‘additional ‘slots’ for British nuclear capable aircraft in the overall Allied total’ would be available from 1978 onwards.494 The UK

489 490 491 492 493

MBFR: Option III: Ceiling and Constraints, [undated, March 1975], TNA, FCO 41/1710. Ibid C.C.C. Tickell-J. Thomson, MBFR: Option III, 20 Mar 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1711. Chief of the Defence Staff-Secretary of State, August 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1716. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 2 May 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 101; Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Pfeffer, 13 May 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 114, Conversation with Signor Da Rin at the Italian Foreign Ministry, 7 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715; Peck-FCO, Tel No 300, MBFR: SPC Discussion of Option III, TNA, FCO 41/1714. 494 C.C.C. Tickell, MBFR: US Proposals on Option III, TNA, FCO 41/1716; MBFR – Option III. The Alliance Position Paper. Note by ACDS(POL) and AUS(D Staff), 24 July 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715.

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would thus be able to compensate for the US withdrawal. The West had only to assure that ceilings for NATO warheads would be kept ‘at a figure high enough to accommodate the requirements for British-manufactured warheads as well as those belonging to the US. This should provide the Alliance with the option of increasing holdings of European manufactured warheads in the event of further US warhead withdrawals after MBFR.’495

High ceilings offered the politico-military solution to reductions of US warheads or US delivery systems from the European theatre or MBFR reduction zone. The possibility of US unilateral withdrawals was highlighted by Colonel Wood in conversations with Major-General O.H. Abraham in the US NATO Delegation. In an ‘off the record’ statement Colonel Wood stressed that the USAF would withdraw another 72 of the dual-capable aircraft from Europe over and above the 54 F-4 ‘Phantom’ foreseen in Option III. The replacement would be non-nuclear F-15.496 The information was confirmed during a conversation of Major-General Abraham with Lt General Blanchard and US military experts on 7 July 1975. The US experts advised HMG to seek a written confirmation from the US that the 50 British ‘Jaguar’ aircraft could be indeed catered for by the US stockpile program.497 C.C.C. Tickell deemed the information worrying. It was difficult to understand why the US was not seeking a bargaining price in MBFR for a reduction of 125 dual-capable aircraft. Perhaps it was a bargaining chip of a kind.498 The US Embassy furnished HMG on 17 July a US Defense Department projection for the aircraft deployment in the FRG up to 1980. According to the projection the US would withdraw all 192 dual-capable aircraft from the FRG between 1976 and 1980. The dual-capable aircraft would be replaced by 36 A7, 48 A10 and 144 F-15 non-nuclear aircraft. The US withdrew the paper one day later on 18 July 1975 due to possible mistakes – since 48 nuclear capable aircraft might remain in the Federal Republic. C.C.C. Tickell requested a Ministry of Defense assessment of US motives for the redeployment plan.499

495 MBFR – Option III. The Alliance Position Paper. Note by ACDS (POL) and AUS (D Staff), 24 July 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715; Chief of the Defence Staff-Secretary of State, MBFR: Option III, August 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1714. 496 MajGeneral O.H. Abraham-C.C.C. Tickell, Notes on Conversations in US Delegation To NATO With Colonel Wood on Tuesday 1 July, 2 July 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1714. 497 MajGeneral O.H. Abraham-C.C.C. Tickell, MBFR: Discussion with US Experts on 7 July 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1714. 498 C.C.C. Tickell-Sir J. Killick, MBFR: Option III, 12 July 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715. 499 C.C.C. Tickell-Sir J. Killick, MBFR Option III, 23 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715.

12. THE SALT TRACK: CRUISE MISSILES, BACKFIRE AND NATO EUROPE On the 29–30 June a NATO Summit was held in Brussels. President Gerald Ford confirmed the US commitment to the Ottawa Declaration of 1974 and to an unwavering commitment for the defense of Europe. The Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt thanked the US President for the confirmation that the US would not unilaterally reduce US forces in Europe.500 The US and NATO nuclear guarantee was an important gesture for the Continental European member states of NATO. Even more so since the latter had just adhered to the NPT. The ratifications of the original five members of the EC had just been deposited between 2 and 4 May 1975.501 The nuclear guarantee was an indispensable part of the NPT bargain. It allowed adherence to the NPT regime. The NATO Brussels Summit itself focused on European détente and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). SALT and MBFR were hardly mentioned. The debate on SALT continued in other fora. The US-UK SAL Talks of 10 June 1975 were held in the Executive Building in Washington DC. The non-transfer questions topped the agenda. The US had never started debating a non-transfer clause. The US position was that all substantial topics had to be regulated before deliberations about the possible scope of a non-transfer clause could commence. One major point emerged: Sonnenfeldt indicated the need to eventually count the British sea-based deterrent forces against the US aggregate total in case the US succeeded in safeguarding transfers of nuclear weapon systems to the United Kingdom.502 The Soviet position – so Sonnenfeldt – that the parties should not circumvent an agreement through ‘third parties’ was intellectually defensible. The Russians thus might have the idea to count the UK deterrent forces against the overall total. The British representatives took note of the aforesaid and changed topic: a no-transfer provision might impact on improvement, replacement and servicing for the British submarine force.503 The Soviet non-transfer clause was unacceptable due to its sweeping scope covering systems, components, blueprints and technological descriptions. Sonnenfeldt agreed and returned to his opening statement. Sonnenfeldt highlighted that there was a possibility for the US to interpret the non-transfer regime as exempting the United Kingdom. A US unilateral declaration to that re-

500 Runderlaß des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Pfeffer, Betr. NATO Gipfeltreffen in Brüssel vom 29. bis 30. Mai 1975, ADAP 1975 Nr. 143. 501 Ibid – Belgium deposited the ratification on 1 July 1975. 502 Record of a Conversation about SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on Tuesday 10 Jun 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270 and FCO 46/1269; see also: Dr Harte-Mr Pellew, 17 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 503 Ibid; see also: SALT: No Transfer. UK and European Interests, [undated, June 1975], TNA, 46/1269.

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spect might be imaginable.504 Such a procedure would have consequences: The British might not be able to use the British deterrent as a kernel for a ENF. Sonnenfeldt deemed it imaginable that the SU exempts the existing British systems and their improvement. HM deterrent force might not even be counted against an aggregate total.505 ‘But fourth countries and composite institutions would be another problem.’506 The perspective developed by Sonnenfeldt caused concern. The foreseen strategy to preserve the special relationship was not compatible with the British strategy to keep all three lines of development open: (1) the option of a UK only deterrent; (2) the option of a European deterrent with US support and (3) the option of a European deterrent without US support.507 Keeping all options open automatically entailed the need to preserve the European dimension.508 The envisaged European layer was anathema to Sonnenfeldt. Hal Sonnenfeldt replied by expressing discontent about the ‘Petrignani’ initiative. The policy of the European SALT experts of ‘putting things on paper’ could well complicate inter-Allied relations. The result would be un-necessary rigidities in the negotiations. The US did not like the (1) pre-emptory tone of the ‘Petrignani Group’ paper nor (2) the approach to demand replies from the US nor (3) the expectation that the US ‘sign in blood’ to commit themselves to agendas in follow-on negotiations.509 Sonnenfeldt ended by expressing that ‘he wanted to enlist British help in toning down the character of this side negotiation within the Alliance.’510 Thomson replied that Europe disliked any non-transfer regulation. The US had to re-assure the Europeans that existing and future nuclear defensive systems could be procured. A nontransfer clause was to be void of any obligation for clearance of successor systems. A non-transfer clause was not to be allowed to furnish the SU a right to interfere in intra-Alliance relations.511 Jan Lodal – Director of the Program Analysis Staff, NSC – returned to the core theme: what is to be preferred a non-transfer clause or that British nuclear forces made with US assistance would be counted against the US aggregate total?512 The latter option would allow the US to furnish 504 Summary of SALT Discussions in Washington on 10 June 1975, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1270; SALT: No Transfer. UK and European Interests, [UK and European Interests, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1269. 505 Record of a Conversation about SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on Tuesday 10 June 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 506 Ibid 507 Ibid 508 Summary of SALT Discussions in Washington on 10 June 1975, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1270; see also: SALT: No Transfer. UK and European Interests, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1269. 509 Record of a Conversation about SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on Tuesday 10 June 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 510 Ibid – see as well: SALT II: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 10 Jun 1975. Background Brief, TNA, FCO 46/1269. 511 Record of a Conversation about SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on Tuesday 10 June 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 512 Ibid

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the UK any form of assistance since British nuclear submarines would be counted against the US aggregate total. NATO Allies would not have this option. In this model a non-transfer clause would be applicable only for non-counted deterrent forces. William G. Hyland – the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department – tabled a different US suggestion: a non-transfer clause ‘which applied only to non-nuclear weapon states’ – in line with the NPT example.513 Both US suggestions are remarkable initiatives given that the NNWS of the European Community had just ratified the NPT. The moment the NNWS had ratified the NPT the US commenced to undermine the European Nuclear Option by offering the UK a special status that blocked European co-operation and aligned the UK firmly with the US. The British reaction remained cautious: Dr Harte replied that counting British systems against the US aggregate looked feasible due to the high ceiling of the Vladivostok Accord. The British systems were not MIRVed either thus would not be counted against the most important sub-ceiling. But in SALT III reductions were envisaged. This would be the time the US would want to build up to the ceiling with own systems. The US suggestion furthermore destroyed in practice the theoretically existing ‘European Nuclear Option’. Lodal asked whether sacrificing a European Nuclear Option would be a ‘real problem’ for the UK.514 There was no answer given by HM Delegation. The British changed the topic to ‘European security’. Europe was threatened by the SS-20. HMG did not seek to re-engage with the topic of a general limitation of noncentral systems. Non-central systems were off-limits. HMG had to stress the overarching importance neither to freeze nor to reduce US FBS systems in Europe.515 The ‘Backfire’ bomber affected European security. The US policy to try to reduce categories of the aggregate total that threatened the US by pressing for the inclusion of the ‘Backfire’ was mistaken. In case the US pressured ‘Backfire’ the SU would in all probability not reduce central systems. The SU would seek to balance the ‘Backfire’ with US FBS. Thus US FBS would be limited – with all its military and political consequences.516 The CM was discussed as the last agenda point under the heading ‘European security’. CM existed since the Second World War. New technology turned this rather unattractive system into a prime first strike weapons due to its accuracy of 30 feet and the new guiding system. CM could serve European theatre forces as a penetration aid and would allow UK strategic bomber forces strike missions into the Northern and Southern Soviet Union – depending on the basing in England or Cyprus. A CM range of 1500 km was ideal for a European deterrent. Thus a CM range above 600 km – as envisaged by the

513 Ibid 514 Ibid; Summary of SALT Discussions in Washington on 10 June 1975, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1270. 515 Ibid; SALT II: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 10 Jun 1975. Background Brief, TNA, FCO 46/1269. 516 SALT II: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 10 Jun 1975. Background Brief, TNA, FCO 46/1269.

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US – was desirable for the European Allies.517 SALT II would not bind the Europeans legally. The Europeans, however, would either purchase CM in the US or seek technological assistance. In case CM would be regulated a non-transfer clause had to be omitted in order to assure possible European acquisitions of CM.518 In case CM remained unregulated a non-circumvention clause had to be limited to regulated systems only. Europe needs the CM option. This concluded the Anglo-American SALT deliberations of 10 June 1975. The rewritten record contains one interesting further analysis missing in the other documents. Dr Harte – of the British delegation – deemed it necessary to continue the co-operation with the ‘Petrignani Group’ on non-transfer. This cooperative endeavor was needed from the ‘point of view of European unity.’519 This step, however, might create problems with the US who ‘may be hoping to detach us from the other Europeans by offering assurances on UK/US nuclear exchanges.’520 Any non-transfer clause would affect both the UK and the European Continent especially in the field of CM. The latter could give the aging V-bomber force a new lease of life and Europe a possible conventional-nuclear strike option. The ‘Petrignani Group’ re-assembled on 18 July in the Italian Delegation to NATO on the request of the Federal Republic. Before the opening of the meeting the chairman of the meeting Eric Da Rin – Coordinator of the NATO and Disarmament Section, Italian Foreign Ministry – invited Dr Andreae and John Thomson to a preliminary talk. The German and British representatives – so the report by Thomson – witnessed an ‘outburst by Da Rin against the Americans.’ Da Rin reported about a private lunch he had had with Ralph Earle in Rome. Ralph Earle had clearly stated ‘that the Americans did not like the recent action of the Petrignani Group.’ The ‘Petrignani’ paper should never have been tabled ‘in public’ and Ambassador Johnson should ‘not be expected to answer questions under pressure.’521 Earle added further points that clearly must have hurt the Italian Representative. Thomson, Andreae and Da Rin agreed not to brief the ‘Petrignani Group’ on the ‘revelations’ of the preliminary talk. A calm Eric Da Rin opened the official meeting with the remark that US official reaction to the ‘Petrignani Group’ paper had been minimal. The Europeans had to follow-up on the core points made in the Petrignani paper but might momentarily better focus on IR/MRBM in light of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. Thomson – Assistant Under-Secretary of Defence & International Security – reported about an ‘informal’ talk with Sonnenfeldt and highlighted the emerging convergence of views

517 Record of a Conversation about SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on Tuesday 10 Jun 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270; Summary of SALT Discussions in Washington on 10 June 1975, [undated, June 1975], TNA, FCO 46/1270; SALT II: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 10 Jun 1975. Background Brief, TNA, FCO 46/1269. 518 SALT II: US/UK Bilateral Talks, 10 Jun 1975. Background Brief, TNA, FCO 46/1269. 519 Dr Harte-Mr Pellew, 17 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 520 Ibid 521 J.A. Thomson, European Consultation on SALT, 24 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 24/1270.

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between the USA and the European Allies on the points raised by the ‘Petrignani Group’. Thomson’s view was not shared by his Belgian colleague Willot. The Europeans ‘should not too readily assume that the Americans were in fact following the lines recommended in the Petrignani paper.’522 The Europeans had to adopt a wait and see position. Willot was supported by his Dutch homologue. The best policy was to keep a low profile but to continue preparing options. The core focus should be on a non-circumvention clause. The focus shifted back to Geneva and the superpower diplomacy. The SALT negotiations had just taken a new turn with the Kissinger-Gromyko talks in Geneva on 10 July 1975. Gromyko and Kissinger again had to tackle the CM question emerging from the ambiguous wording of the Aide Memoire. The Soviet position remained that all air-to-surface missiles – including CM – with a range above 600 km had to be counted against the aggregate total of 2400. According to Gromyko it was ‘suicide’ not to regulate CM. ‘It would be tantamount to building a dam against a stream and then letting the stream break through to left and right.’523 The outcome would be a new arms race that neither side needs. The Vladivostok Accord had to be expanded to cover or prohibit all types of CM. The SU wanted to see the Vladivostok Agreement succeed. Thus the SU accepted the ‘Kissinger Formula’ and would count all SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 against the MIRV total of 1320 since those types had been tested as MIRVed. This ‘counting principle’ applied even in cases when they would not be MIRVed.524 This Soviet offer, however, was conditional. It was linked to the agreement to regulate all CM above 600 km range. In other words the SU demanded that all CM on moveable platforms with a range above 600 km should be banned except air-launchedcruise missile (ALCM) on strategic bombers that would be counted against the aggregate total of 2400. Land-based intercontinental CM were to be banned but below intercontinental range allowed and not counted.525 All land-based mobile ICBM should be banned. Concerning the ‘Backfire’ the SU saw no valid reason to count a medium range bomber as a strategic bomber. Finally, the SU sought to prohibit all new type weapons including orbital fractional bombardment systems and space based systems.526

522 Record of a Meeting of the Petrignani Group on SALT in the Offices of the Italian Delegation to NATO, 18 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270, see also: H.T. Morgan, Conversation with Signor Da Rin at the Italian Foreign Office on 7 July 1975, 15 Jul 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1715. 523 Memo of Conversation, Gromyko-Kissinger, 10 Jul 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 159. 524 Ibid 525 Ibid; Memo From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, 11 Jul 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 160. 526 Memo of Conversation, Gromyko-Kissinger, 10 Jul 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 159; Sonnenfeldt/Hyland Memorandum, Gromyko Plan, 15 Jul 1975, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions (Box 1– July 10–11, 1975 – Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Geneva (1), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http://www. fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/ 0331/1554000.pdf (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:16).

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The signing of the Helsinki Final Act offered President Gerald Ford and GeneralSecretary Leonid Brezhnev an opportunity to meet in Helsinki. Both discussed on 2 August 1975 the Soviet SALT proposal of 10 July 1975. President Ford seemed to be rather optimistic about the SALT process. Gerald Ford highlighted in his conversation with Brezhnev that the latest Gromyko-Kissinger Talks ‘have moved a number of issues to a point where technicians in Geneva can work out the specifics.’527 The General-Secretary dampened the US President’s optimism. Brezhnev deemed it necessary to give the delegations some specific guidance: especially concerning CM. The US – so Gromyko – had accepted the proposal on land-based missiles of intercontinental range. They were to be banned. According to Gromyko the second agreed point was that air-to-surface missiles (ASM) on ‘heavy bombers’ should be counted against the aggregate total. ASM on other aircraft would be banned.528 The ‘Backfire’ should not be counted as a heavy bomber and thus would be banned as a platform for ASM.529 The US rejected the Soviet proposal. The ‘Backfire’ had to be counted against the aggregate total. The US offered sweetener such as 100 uncounted ‘Backfire’ bombers for out-of-area deployment as defense against China. The SU stood firm and rejected any counting of the ‘Backfire’ but proposed a commitment not to base ‘Backfire’ bombers in the Artic or to develop a tanker fleet for air refueling which was so far not in existence.530 The ‘Backfire’ debate continued after the Helsinki Summit. Few adjustments were considered. A ‘gray area’ regulation surfaced briefly. The focus, however, remained on the main track. The US now suggested discounting the first 250 ‘Backfire’ bombers from counting in case the SU recognized ‘Backfire’ aircraft as heavy bombers. Medium range and light bombers were to be banned from carrying CM with a range above 600 km.531 Andrej Gromyko’s mission to Washington in September 1975 did not start promising either. Gromyko’s opening was rather frank: ‘we believe that after Vladivostok you re-oriented yourselves and decided to open up a new channel of arms race.’532 But there were five points of possible agreement: (1) intercontinental range CM were to be banned; (2) ballistic missiles exceeding a range of 600 km on surface vessels were to be banned; (3) CM above 600 km on any aircraft except heavy bomber were to be banned; (4) deployment of all ballistic and CM on the seabed and ocean floor were to be banned; (5) the banning of space-based weaponry and orbital bombardment systems were agreed upon as well.533 No breakthrough during the Washington Talks was in sight. The Soviet Foreign Minister expected a new approach of the US on 527 528 529 530 531 532

Memo of Conversations, Brezhnev-Ford, 2 Aug 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 173. Ibid Ibid Ibid A. Reeve-M.E. Pellew, 16 Sep 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, 19 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 193; Memo from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, 25 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1975 XVI, No 197. 533 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Gromyko, 19 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 193.

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CM – as he had indicated to President Ford on the first day of his Washington Talks.534 Henry Kissinger thus between negotiating sessions met briefly with Ambassador at Large Alexis Johnson to discuss progress on SALT matters emerging from the deliberations with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The record is worth quoting. Henry Kissinger was totally dissatisfied with the US negotiating position and ‘strategy’. ‘Our position is impossible. Over the last 15 months we have made no concession. They made a massive concession on FBS in Vladivostok […]. We just keep on inventing things to put in an agreement.’535 ‘The Backfire issue is a fraud. If the Backfire is strategic then our FBS are strategic. Both can hit the other on a one way mission. [...] to try to include Backfire is an outrage.’536

Alexis Johnson agreed. To include the ‘Backfire’ into the aggregate total of 2400 would mean the SU would have to disarm even further while the US would buildup to the Vladivostok limits. Soviet agreement was unthinkable – even from a US negotiator’s perspective.537 Henry Kissinger adjusted the US negotiating position and tabled a new proposal on 21 September 1975. The US accepted the Soviet position to ban all ALCM beyond 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bomber. The limit for CM on heavy bomber was set at 2500 km. The number of heavy bombers with long range CM was set at 300 each. The US accepted the 600 km limit for CM on surface ships. The Soviet ‘Backfire’ and the US F-111 as well as medium range CM would be classed ‘hybrid’ or ‘gray area’ systems. Each side would have 300 ‘hybrid’ systems. ‘Hybrid’ systems would not count against the aggregate total of 2400.538 The Kissinger-Gromyko Talks were not able to break the deadlock. The US proposal to limit the range of ALCM on heavy bomber to 2500 or 3000 km was rejected by the Soviet Foreign Minister. The SU insisted on a shorter range since 2500-3000 km would offer the US attack options on Soviet territory. CM ranges for the ‘hybrid’ systems remained disputed as well. Last but not least aircraft delivery systems might be able to carry up to 20 CM. Thus should the delivery systems be counted or the missiles?539

534 Talks with FM Gromyko, September 18–21, 1975, Memo of Conversation, Ford-Gromyko, 18 September 1975, 4:30 PM, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and the Middle East Discussions (Box 1 – September 18–21, 1975. Talks with Gromyko), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, http: //www. fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0331/1554003.pdf. (access date: 27 March 2013, 16:23). 535 Memo of Conversation, Kissinger-Alexis Johnson, SALT, 19 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 194. 536 Ibid 537 Ibid 538 Memo of Conversation, Gromyko-Kissinger, 21 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 196; Memo from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, 25 Sep 1975, FRUS 1969–1975 XVI, No 197. 539 Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das AA, 9 Oct 1975, ADAP 1975, No 298.

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J.A. Thomson met with Lodal on the 20 October 1975 in the Executive Office Building in Washington. The agenda: a SALT briefing. Surveyed were the official negotiations in Geneva and the ‘back channel’ negotiations in Washington. The SU had tabled a non-transfer clause in Geneva on 28 August. The latter sought to forestall the non-circumvention of the agreement ‘through third parties or in any other manner.’540 The US expected that a general non-circumvention clause would finally replace the tabled non-transfer clause. This news might satisfy the ‘Petrignani Group’.541 The CM was the other major topic. Thomson stressed the European interest in an increase of the range limits for ALCM.542 Lodal responded by hinting at the GLCM. This weapon system remained unconstrained beneath an intercontinental range. The limits for SLCM by contrast might be regulated at 600 km or lower due to the fact that US cities were clustered along a 500 km strip from the coast. The last word on CM had not been spoken.543 The US might be tempted not to regulate CM at all due to its promising conventional and nuclear applications. An introduction into SALT would have the effect that a non-transfer clause would govern their deployment in the European theatre.544 Thus nonregulation was a promising approach for both the US and the European Allies. The hesitation of the US to introduce CM into the SALT process is well reflected in a letter of General-Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford on 27 October 1975. Brezhnev reminded the US President to transform the Vladivostok Accord into a concrete agreement. The progress was minimal. This was due to an ‘attempt by the US side […] to leave outside the limits of the Agreement […] a whole kind of weapons – cruise missiles.’ The latter were ‘capable to perform the same missions as are the weapons included by the US into the Agreement.’545

The attempt of the delegations to discuss limits on a set of weapons was thus undermined by the deployment of another type of weapons. A new channel of the arms race was opened – and the regulations foreseen were sparse. The recent proposal to allow up to 300 ‘heavy bombers’ for either party that were allowed to carry CM would mean that ‘above the 2400 strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon in Vladivostok between us, the sides could have thousands, literally thousands of units of weapons intended for striking the territories of the other. What kind of arms limitation is this?’546

540 Record of a Meeting on SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on 20 Oct 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270. 541 Ibid 542 Record of a Meeting on SALT held in the Executive Office Building in Washington on 20 Oct 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270 (Draft). 543 Ibid 544 Ibid; Aufzeichnung des Referats 220, 27 Oct 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 319. 545 Letter from Soviet General-Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford, 27 Oct 1975, FRUS 1969– 1976 XVI, No 212. 546 Ibid

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The 300 bombers could easily carry 6000 nuclear CM. Was the counting of ‘heavy bombers’ with ALCM against the 2400 a valid approach, or against the MIRV ceiling of 1320? The devised ‘hybrid’ class further complicated matters due to the introduction of long to medium range sea-based CM and medium range bombers. According to the Russians the limit should remain at 600 km for CM, and ‘Backfire’ bombers as well as the F-111 should remain outside SALT altogether. There was no need for a ‘hybrid’ class. The response by President Ford indicated that the negotiations had come to a stand-still. The introduction of a ‘hybrid’ class system was termed by the US President as a ‘US concession’ since ‘Backfires’ should be counted against the aggregate total.547 The SU rejected the proposal on 10 November 1975. In a second letter of 16 November 1975 President Ford asked Brezhnev to allow Secretary of State Kissinger to fly to Moscow to review US-Soviet relations and to possibly break the deadlock over SALT.548 The Soviet rejection had thrown the US arms control strategy off track. According to Sonnenfeldt the US had hoped for Soviet acceptance of the US plan. This would have allowed the US to table Option III in MBFR prior to a US-SU SALT Summit scheduled for January/February 1976. The expected outcome: SALT II and a fresh impetus for MBFR. The US approach now was shattered.549 President Ford thus took the initiative to send Dr Kissinger on a renewed mission to Moscow. The decision followed the dismissal of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on 1 November. The ‘cabinet reshuffle’ that did cost Secretary of State Henry Kissinger his hat as NSA was directly connected with the arms control agenda of the United States. The Secretary of Defense had been a critic of the SALT process and tended to side with Senator Jackson. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs at the Pentagon Harry E. Bergold indicated that Schlesinger prioritized Alliance affairs. Schlesinger’s focus had been on force modernization in Europe. Schlesinger had concentrated on retargeting and state of the art regional weapons systems: Pershing and Lance. He had focused on smart bombs and new radiation weapons. He had focused on CM and ‘European security’. Schlesinger shared the fears of the European Allies: i.e. the European concern on MBFR. MBFR was politically very dangerous. MBFR should be played slowly.550 The major problem for the US remained how to play Option III and how to assure that European

547 Letter from President Ford to General-Secretary Brezhnev [undated], FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 214. 548 Letter from President Ford to Secretary General Brezhnev, 16 Nov 1975, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 217. 549 Record of a Conversation at the State Department on 10 Nov 1975, Sonnenfeldt-Thomson, TNA, FCO 41/1720. 550 K.B.A. Scott-W.J.A. Wilberforce, 10 Nov 1975, TNA, DEFE 24/890.

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equipment would not be drawn into the MBFR negotiations from the outset.551 Sonnenfeldt shared the standpoint of the Europeans. Hal Sonnenfeldt assured Thomson that European equipment would be ‘involved only over his dead body.’552 The introduction of Option III would neither lead to a freeze of European nuclear systems nor to an involvement of European nuclear systems into MBFR. Furthermore, it was strategically not wise to play Option III without the hoped for breakthrough in the SALT process. The Option III initiative might be interpreted by the SU as a sign of weakness. Schlesinger’s successor Donald Rumsfeld was deemed to be more aware of the political importance of East-West negotiations. He was thus expected to go quicker on MBFR.553 The Soviet reaction to the dismissal of Schlesinger was positive. According to the US Embassy in Moscow Schlesinger’s departure was to make progress in SALT easier.554 The Soviet bureaucracy hoped that Kissinger’s influence would be strengthened by the reshuffle and the architect of SALT I would prevail.

551 Interpretations about the intentions behind the wider ‘MBFR agenda’ differ widely. James Goodby, Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs at the US NATO Delegation, reports in an oral history interview that ‘Kissinger made Ford believe that Schlesinger was out to denuclearize Germany without properly taking into account all the political factors’. The interpretation offered by Goodby hints at the planned withdrawal of US FBS stationed in Germany, i.e. the US modernization and re-deployment agenda beyond the withdrawal of F-4 ‘Phantom’ envisaged as part of MBFR Option III. The conflict surely was about (a) playing the MBFR Option III and (b) an evaluation of the possibility to replace US FBS in the reduction zone with either British nuclear-capable aircraft or US sea-based systems. The core dispute might have been about the form of a European nuclear defense structure. Did European security necessitate US FB dual-capable aircraft in the reduction zone itself? Goodby reports about a decision by the ‘Defense Review Committee’ to replace ‘old’ US FBS with dual-capable F-16 instead of conventionally armed F-15 right after Schlesinger was forced to resign. The information furnished by Bergold and Goodby are not necessarily contradictory – differences occurred over the prioritization of politico-geographic models and of technological options. Interview with James Goodby, LC, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Interviewer: Charles Stuart Kennedy. Interview date: 10 December 1990, http://memory.loc.gov/ ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html (last access: 3 May 2013). 552 J. A Thomson-Moreton, MBFR, 10 Nov 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1720. 553 K.B.A. Scott-W.J.A. Wilberforce, 10 Nov 1975, TNA, DEFE 24/890. 554 C.L.G. Mallaby-R.B Bone, 12 Nov 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1270.

13. SALT II: THE LAST STAND OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION The FRG produced a report on the state of the Alliance as a preparation for the NATO Ministerial Council meeting on 11–12 December 1975. The analysis clearly stated that the US-SU negotiations on SALT II were deadlocked. The major points of contentions were still the ‘Backfire’ bomber and the regulation of all classes of CM. It was to be expected that Secretary Kissinger would brief the Allies on SALT. There were three questions of European interest: (1) the nontransfer regime, (2) the regulation of CM, and related herewith (3) the preservation of the European option.555 The US authorities so far did maintain that no linkage between SALT and MBFR existed. It was generally assumed that without a breakthrough on SALT it might not be advisable to introduce a nuclear component in MBFR. The European implications of SALT and MBFR were currently reviewed in the Political Committee of the European Communities. The Ministerial Committee in Lucca held on 11–12 October 1975 had started a process to review the MBFR arms control negotiations in order to study the peculiar European interests. The Political Committee had met in Rome on 14 November 1975 where it had decided to review the implications of both SALT and MBFR without a direct interference into the negotiation positions of the parties involved.556 The ‘Petrignani Group’ of European SALT Experts finally had assembled on 10 December 1975 to harmonize the European positions before the NATO Ministerial meeting on 11–12 December 1975. The session opened with a review of the recent development in SALT. The US proposal of 21 September 1975 had been rejected by the SU on 10 November. The SU rejected the concept of a ‘hybrid’ class of weapons systems. Moscow did not waver on the ‘Backfire’ issue. The linkage between medium range bomber as a delivery systems and CM was the most important issue awaiting settlement.557 Guiseppe Nitti, John Thomson and Hellmuth Roth – the ‘Petrignani Group’ representatives of Italy, the UK and the FRG – all stressed their governments’ interest to keep the avenue for construction and deployments of CM in NATO Europe open. CM were a promising weapons systems – so the Representative of the FRG for Questions of Disarmament and Arms Control Dr Roth – and might in time replace the existing tactical nuclear weapons in the European theatre. Willot concurred. Thomson highlighted that CM might remain unregulated. Any agreement that banned CM would not leave the arena of Congressional scrutiny alive. The CM was vital for the West.558 The CM option was vital for Europe. Europe had to cross check any non-circumvention

555 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 26 Nov 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 357. 556 Ibid 557 Record of a Meeting of the Petrignani Group, held in the Italian Delegation to NATO at 1500 on Wednesday 10 Dec 1975, TNA, DEFE 24/890. 558 Ibid

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clause to keep the European CM option alive. The only dissenting voice came from the Netherlands: the CM was a US bargaining chip. The NATO Allies – so Wim van Eekelen the Director for NATO & WEU Affairs in the Dutch Foreign Ministry – should not insist on keeping a European CM option open.559 Van Eekelen’s position was in line with the US request to keep in particular German ‘enthusiasm for cruise missiles within sensible bounds.’560 The CM was without doubt a double-edged sword. British studies on CM stressed the growing Soviet fear that the ‘West’ might acquire a ‘first strike’ potential by way of CM deployments. Any quick deployment decision – especially in Europe – would kill détente instantly.561 Secretary of State Kissinger briefed the Allies in a ‘specifically restricted’ session of the NAC on 12 December 1975. He commenced with a statement that the colleagues should not brief the press about the contents of this meeting or the meeting itself.562 Dr Kissinger declared that he had postponed his travel to Moscow in order to assure the best preparation for his talks with the Soviet leadership. The latter was now scheduled for 20 January 1976. The SU had agreed to an aggregate total of 2400 at Vladivostok. The SU thus was obliged to disarm in contrast to the US. The US currently stood at 2100 units. The FBS targeted Russian strategic systems. The SU nevertheless agreed not to demand the inclusion of NATO FBS into the aggregate total. Subsequent to Vladivostok the SU had made another major concession – the adoption of the ‘Kissinger formula’ – that stipulated that delivery systems tested as MIRVs would have to count as MIRVed systems. This meant that Russian single warhead systems would be counted against the MIRV aggregate while ‘the 450 US Minuteman II, which could not well be distinguished by national verification means from the MIRVed Minuteman III would not be counted as MIRVed.’563 The ‘Backfire’ scheme was not rational. ‘Backfire’ could not reach the US except on one way missions and with refuelling two-way-missions ‘though there was no evidence yet of a tanker fleet for it.’564 The question that arose for the US was: did the US prefer a Vladivostoktype SALT II or no agreement at all. An insistence on ‘Backfire’ would raise the FBS issue. The ‘hybrid’ category did not fly. The SU rejected it. Turning to CM: CM were originally kept as a bargaining chip but developed into a valid fourth leg of the US deterrent. The problem was the counting of CM. According to Kissinger the US had 8000–9000 warheads for MIRVed ballistic missiles while ‘cruise missiles on heavy bombers could provide another 11 000 warheads.’565 This number 559 Ibid 560 J.A. Thomson-J.Killick, 19 Dec 1975, TNA, DEFE 19/273. 561 US Strategic Cruise Missiles: Implications of Development to the Deployment Stage, 29 Dec 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 562 Record of Dr. Kissinger’s Statement on SALT in Specially Restricted Session of the NAC on 12 December 1975, 22 Dec 1975, TNA, DEFE 24/890. 563 Ibid 564 Ibid 565 Ibid

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was not counting ship-launched, or land-launched CM. Kissinger explained that he did not understand the Soviet position not to restrict land-launched CM. Such a system would allow the US to deploy CM in Europe with a capability to strike the SU proper. The SU by contrast – with the possible exception of Cuba – had no possibility to strike the US with these systems. Worse even CM were unverifiable – even ranges could change thru additional fuel tanks. A rational avenue to regulate CM was to count them as MIRVed systems though the range of the counted systems should be closer to 2500 km instead of 600 km. A regulation of CM was rational and needed. Both the US and the SU labored under time constraints. In the West this might not be perceived. The US banked on her technological superiority. But was this the king’s road to security? In case SALT II would not emerge in 1976 the Interim Agreement would lapse in 1977. Congress might not react by enhancing the defense budget but by restricting it. Thus the best option for the West was to make SALT work – instead of hoping for an end of the strictures imposed on the US by the Interim Agreement. The NATO Ministerial Council of 12 December 1975 dealt with the linkage of SALT and MBFR. The linkage had become more pronounced since Schlesinger had left the Pentagon. The MBFR proposal had to be presented as a package in Vienna. But it was to be expected that Dr Kissinger would play the Option III card in Moscow in January – if suitable.566 The German Foreign Minister Genscher thus stressed that Option III depended on the Warsaw Pact adoption of the ‘Western’ phase I package: the common ceiling and the principles of US and SU reductions. National ceilings for European countries were ruled out.567 The West was not allowed to give the SU a possibility to single out the Bundeswehr as an object of reductions in Phase II.568 Jean Sauvagnargues – the French Foreign Minister – re-iterated France’s opposition to Option III. Option III introduced equipment into MBFR and changed the nature of the negotiations. Furthermore, a reduction by 1000 warheads could be only meaningful since it introduced a ceiling on nuclear systems in the European theatre.569 The ceiling on nuclear systems had to be mutual, however. He finally supported Genscher’s remarks on national ceilings. The latter were not permissible. Kissinger instantly replied that no national ceilings would be introduced for European forces. The US would not change its position on the common ceiling. The US rational for Option III was straightforward: The US never had targets for the 7000 nuclear warheads in Europe. Some warheads could be sacrificed in a bargain with the SU to reduce Soviet con566 Record of Meeting in the Minister of State’s Office, 10.30 AM, Monday, 1 Dec 1975, TNA, FCO 66/708; Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Roth, 5 Dec 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr. 370; J.A. Thomson, MBFR: Timing for the Tabling of the New Proposal, 10 Dec 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1720; C.M Rose to Killick, MBFR, TNA, FCO 41/1720. 567 Record of Discussion of MBFR in Restricted Session in the NAC on 12 Dec 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1720. 568 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 12 Dec 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr 381. 569 Record of Discussion of MBFR in Restricted Session in the NAC on 12 December 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1720.

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ventional strength. The US modernization and redeployment agenda might anyway require changes in the nuclear posture.570 ‘There was no Presidential decision in favor of the ‘denuclearization’’ of dual-capable aircraft.571 No further reductions of dual-capable aircraft were envisaged under the guise of modernization. But pressures from Congress could get unmanageable. Kissinger finally turned to the stockpile question. According to the Secretary of State there was no concept for NATO tactical nuclear weapons: ‘He himself had never seen any plan for using more than 100 of the weapons.’572 Warheads for tactical nu- clear weapons could easily be reduced. The Kissinger statement was ambiguous. The most important outcome of the NATO Council MBFR session neverthelesswas the decision to table Option III prior to the Kissinger visit as an element of an MBFR package. This approach destroyed options for selectivity in the presentation and thus any option to misinterpret the MBFR package.573 The ‘Option III MBFR package’ was introduced into the MBFR negotiations in Vienna shortly after the NAC Council – namely on 13 December 1975. The UK finally assured that the guidance to the delegations would include – from the outset – the European condition that non-US equipment could not be drawn into the negotiations.574 The Soviet reaction to the tabled package was negative. The leader of the Soviet delegation Oleg N. Chlestow stressed the asymmetry of the reductions. It was hard to imagine that the 1000 old warheads would make a difference. The US had for a long time planned to remove warheads – independently from the MBFR negotiations. Even more puzzling was the fact that the SU was not informed by the US whether the warheads would be from the strike forces warhead stockpile that supported the F-4 ‘Phantom’ – or mere tactical nuclear warheads or even warheads for the retired ‘Honest John’ and ‘Sergeant’.575 The SU and the Warsaw Pact member-states deemed the MBFR proposal utterly unattractive. The fact that NATO nuclear systems would be totally exempted and that a ‘common ceiling’ was connected to the offer were to assure that no breakthrough could be expected in the nearer future.576 The German Democratic Republic even demanded an instant rejection of the Western package. The Option III card had been played without effect. The Kissinger trip to Moscow was a last hope to obtain a breakthrough during the Ford Administration. A new approach was needed: the Ford Administration considered exempting the ‘Backfire’ bomber and CM from a Vladivostok based SALT agreement. A ‘limited agreement’ along the original Vladivostok Accord might break the deadlock. A second instrument for ‘hybrid’ or ‘gray area’ systems had to be worked-out

570 571 572 573 574 575 576

Ibid Ibid Ibid Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA, 12 Dec 1975, ADAP 1975, Nr 381. D.A. Logan-J.A. Thomson, 23 Dec 1975, TNA, FCO 41/1720. Botschafter Behrends, Wien (MBFR Delegation), an das AA, ADAP 1975, Nr. 390. Ibid

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right after a successful conclusion of the agreement on central systems. The US nevertheless continued to negotiate on the basis of a single agreement.577 The new proposal was handed to Ambassador Dobrynin on 14 January 1976. The outline was not revolutionary. Small adjustments of the recent agenda dominated. Heavy bomber with ALCM of a range of 600 to 2500 km were counted against the 1320 limit for MIRVed systems. The SLCM was limited to 600 km. Any surface ship with SLCM of a range of 600–2500 km was to be counted as a MIRVed system. GLCM would also be limited to a range of up to 2500 km. Wider ranges were generally banned. ALCM were allowed only on the 300 permissible heavy bombers. Concerning the ‘Backfire’ the US suggested not to count ‘Backfire’ bombers produced prior to the entry of force of a SALT II. ‘Backfire’ bombers produced thereafter would count against the aggregate total of 2400.578 The negotiations took off on 21 January 1976. The Kissinger talks with General-Secretary Brezhnev were overshadowed by the situation in Angola. Brezhnev firmly advised Kissinger to focus on SALT and not to complicate matters by undue linkages. The SALT process was complicated enough. The SU was not engaged in Angola. Cuba was the country to be addressed.579 The Vladivostok Accord deserved attention. It was more than a ‘piece of paper’.580 General-Secretary Brezhnev turned to the US proposal: He accepted the ALCM regulation. ALCM were to be counted against the 1320 ceiling of MIRVed systems. On SLCM the Soviet preferred a limit of 600 km – for both surface ships and submarines. The SU now proposed to ban GLCM above a 600 km range.581 The Soviet position on GLCM was now more restrictive. The US revolted. Only GLCM of intercontinental range should be banned. The SU inquired why the US saw little opportunity to limit them to 600 km. For what was a 2500 km range needed? The US did not furnish an answer.582 No agreement was reached on CM for surface ships and GLCM ranges.583 While Kissinger was negotiating in Moscow President Ford assembled the NSC to discuss the progress made in Moscow. President Ford considered that the Vladivostok-type SALT II Treaty or Interim Agreement should be concluded. A separate interim agreement was to deal with CM and bombers. The division of SALT II into two instruments might generate a breakthrough. This would allow the signing of a treaty for ballistic missiles before the elections in November

577 A Reeve-Pellew, 5 Jan 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1411. 578 Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership, [undated, 14 January 1976], FRUS 1969– 1976 XVI, No 243 – see also the somewhat mistaken report: Ramsbotham-FCO, Tel No. 209, 16 Jan 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 579 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 21 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 249. 580 Ibid 581 Ibid; Memo From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, 21 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 250. 582 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 21 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 251. 583 Message from the Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, 21 January 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 252.

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1976. Admiral James L. Holloway attacked the US position on SLCM on surface ships. The US had neither a program nor the ships for SLCM.584 There was no interest in a trade-off: ‘Backfire’ for SLCM on surface ships. A special ‘gray area’ regulation was without any basis. The US had neither interest in SLCM on surface ships nor the possibility to trade them in to obtain a ‘Backfire’ limitation. In brief, the US military had just declared ‘old’ briefing material for invalid and faulty. ‘The President was shocked’. Ford ended the meeting and left in anger. The result: there was no clear guidance for Kissinger in Moscow. Brent Scowcroft speculated about the interest of the JCS.585 The JCS and the Pentagon might prefer a collapse of the Interim Agreement that allowed a retreat from the ABM treaty. Kissinger was stranded in Moscow. On 22 January 1976 General-Secretary Brezhnev took up the US suggestion to negotiate an additional Interim Agreement for ‘gray area’ systems – SLBM and the medium range bomber. For Brezhnev the project was ‘absolutely unacceptable’. There was no issue to be discussed in a separate agreement.586 General-Secretary Brezhnev returned to the main-track of the SALT negotiations and confirmed the Soviet position on GLCM. GLCM had to be limited to 600 km. Furthermore, the SU would not agree to any reductions of the aggregate total. Reductions of the aggregate total were unconceivable as long as a whole class of missiles with thousands of new warheads was being introduced: the cruise missile.587 The two day negotiations in Moscow ended without a major breakthrough. There was no movement. In brief, the US package did not fly. The ‘Petrignani Group’ assembled on the 23 January 1975. The meeting was held prior to the NAC briefing by Henry Kissinger scheduled for the same day. The European SALT Experts deemed it necessary to erase the ‘Backfire’ issue from SALT. Putting restraints on the ‘Backfire’ would not alter the strategic situation in Europe. It was un-negotiable and would only risk repercussions on FBS. The Backfire, SS-20 and all other non-central systems should be erased from the SALT process.588 Europe security depended on the CM option. ‘The US had indicated that SALT should not prevent this, and the land-based cruise missiles had already been safeguarded by agreement with the Soviets.’589 Furthermore, a bilateral SALT agreement could not impose legal restraints on Europe. What mattered was the non-transfer clause. A CM technology transfer had to remain unrestricted. Nitti stressed the ‘great military interest in Europe in cruise missile possibilities’. Western Europe had to concert with the US about adequate range limits. The

584 Message from the President’s Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to Secretary of State Kissinger, 22 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 253. 585 Ibid; Message from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, 22 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 254. 586 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Kissinger, 22 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 256. 587 Ibid 588 European Group on SALT. Record of a Meeting on 23 Jan 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 589 Ibid

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German Representative Andreae agreed with Thomson not to press any further on the ‘Backfire’ issue due to its repercussion on FBS. The FRG supported a NATO study on CM. The potential importance of this weapon system for the European theatre merited further high level scrutiny.590 The Europeans thus had defined their approach to SALT and European strategic options before Henry Kissinger arrived in Brussels to brief the NATO partners about his Moscow talks. It was still the 23 January 1976. The information furnished was basic.591 The briefing contained the regulation on ALCM but was silent on the ‘new’ Soviet position on GLCM. The Soviet limitation of GLCM to 600 km was of major importance since it erased the European expectation to establish a NATO CM strike force. The Soviet reversal on GLCM seems not to have trickled through to the Europeans in January 1976.592 There is no indication in the British or German archival record. Still on 26 February 1976 no clear cut picture on the CM situation had emerged. Hal Sonnenfeldt talked of a situation that was ‘fluid and dynamic’.593 The US was aware of the European interest in CM and that any possible non-circumvention clause should not hinder deployment of this new weapons system. The chances for a SALT agreement were meager by early 1976. Raymond Garthoff indicated that SALT had virtually died in January 1976. The collapse of the SALT I Interim Agreement was taken more and more into the equation. President Ford and the Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld met on 26 January with Brent Scowcroft to discuss how to play SALT. Both the SLCM on surface ships and the GLCM question had to be tackled to meet European interests. According to Kissinger the Europeans ‘will hang tough […] on 2500 km on land-based.’594 A banning of CM above 600 km was unacceptable for ‘Third Parties’.595 The US could not cross the ‘Rubicon’. Washington had to keep in mind what Alliance solidarity demanded. The CM had a huge potential for the European theatre. The Ford Administration was stranded. It had to prioritize Allied interest. Torn between a comprehensive agreement and a division of SALT into two instruments the Ford Administration opted for the latter. President Ford briefed Fred Iklé on 16 February 1976 about the new line to be taken by the US on SALT. The US still considered the best avenue to detach any range issues for CM and the ‘Backfire’ issue from a SALT II agreement. The SALT II agreement would cover only one aspect of the CM agenda, namely that ALCM with a range of 600 to 2500 km were to be counted against the MIRV total of 1320. An Additional Interim Agreement valid up to 1979 would regulate the ‘gray area’. It would disallow test-

590 Ibid 591 Killick-FCO, Tel No 51, 23 Jan 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 592 Briefs for the Chiefs of Assessment Staff’s [sic!], Washington [undated, January 1976], TNA, FCO 46/1408. 593 J.O. Moreton-J.A. Thomson, 27 Feb 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 594 Memo of Conversation, Ford-Kissinger-Rumsfeld, 26 Jan 1976, FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 260. 595 Ibid

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ing of CM beyond a range of 2500 km; it would disallow deployment of sea- or land-based CM with a range above 600 km; it would prohibit an expansion of the ‘Backfire’ bomber production above the current rate and any configurations for long-range usage. The negotiations for a definitive regime for the ‘gray area’ would commence with the signature of SALT II.596 The chance that the SU reversed her position and adopted the proposal was limited. General-Secretary Brezhnev had already rejected the US project to divide SALT II into two instruments. Russia’s plea for one treaty was rational. It made circumvention less of a problem. Two instruments would allow the US to bind the SU on central systems and to forestall a regulation of ‘dynamic’ other systems that favored the West.597 CM remained the topic under debate: in Washington, Moscow and Brussels. The ‘Petrignani Group’ reassembled on 18 February 1976. The group discussed the option that the SU might table a non-transfer clause ‘specially relating to cruise missiles.’598 ‘It would be contrary to the spirit in which the Alliance operated if the Americans entered into a contract with the Russians not to supply arms to their European allies, and especially arms which might be mainly significant in conventional warfare.’599

Acceptance of such a clause by the Ford Administration – so J.A. Thomson – would have serious implications for transatlantic relations. In any case a notransfer clause would have to be limited to regulated systems. The CM so far was not regulated. The NPG in Hamburg had broached a similar topic. The Federal German Secretary of Defense Leber clearly stated that weapons deemed tactical among the super-powers due to range limitations were strategic for the European powers. For that very reason the British had warned the US not to accept range limitations in SALT which would foreclose European defense options.600 HMG was particularly interested in SLCM for SSNs.601 It was at least imaginable to use the CM also for a European or Federal German deterrent force with triple-key arrangements with French and British safety catches. ‘They would seem even with conventional warheads, to be an excellent means of selective first strike beyond the battlefield.’602 The US finally furnished the British Embassy in Washington with wider information on the Moscow deliberations. Roger Molander – NSC Staff – confirmed a piece of information previously furnished by J. Thomson that

596 Letter from President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, 16 Feb 1976 and Note of President Ford to Soviet Leadership, [undated] FRUS 1969–1976 XVI, No 263, 264 – footnote 16 February. 597 Summary of the Statement on SALT Made By the Deputy Political Director at the Quai D’Orsay in the Anglo-French Talks on Politico-Military Affairs held in Paris on 6 April, TNA, FCO 46/1409. 598 J.A. Thomson-Dr Harte, 20 Feb 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1408. 599 Ibid 600 Cruise Missiles and their Implications, [undated, March 1976], TNA, FCO 46/1408. 601 Ibid 602 Ibid

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the SU had countered the US proposal of a limit of 2500 km for the GLCM with a limit of 600 km. Molander underlined that the range issue had not been settled. Roger Molander clearly preferred the 2500 km range limit given the flight distance from the inner German border to the Western border of the Soviet Union of approximately 800 km. A 600 km range would assure that the SU could not be targeted from Western Europe. A 2500 km range by contrast allowed NATO to target Soviet targets from Western Europe – even from the United Kingdom.603 Europe thus could utilize CM as a strike weapon that could replace the traditional dual-key systems. A further piece of information might be worth mentioning when dealing with CM for the European theatre. A strategic CM could be fired from a ‘Lance tracked launcher’ as deployed in Europe. Any submarine could use 21-inch standard torpedo tubes to launch CM. An ALCM with a range of 1000 km could ‘stand-off’ beyond the range of Soviet SAM sites. The CM thus was indeed a potential ‘fourth leg’ – next ICBM, SLBM and bombers – for Western deterrence.604 CM was even a potential first-strike weapon. In 1975 research was under way to develop a Mach 3 CM and CM that could vary speeds to overfly SAM batteries.605 In any case a CM had a better survivability than a strike aircraft. The decisionmakers in the West realized the advantages not to regulate CM. In case CM were either banned or counted against the aggregate total disadvantages would occur. Counting of CM platforms against the MIRVed aggregate total would limit the Trident program of the US – a way superior deterrent. A ban of a certain weapon systems might be reflected in a non-circumvention clause. Thus the parties would not be allowed to transfer regulated or banned systems to ‘third parties’ in order to forestall circumvention of the treaty.606 The CM was the joker in defense strategy and arms control. The CM was a valuable ‘bargaining chip’ that just could not be given away for nothing. The US came more and more to the insight that European security mattered. Europe might need the CM to respond to the SS-20. This insight left an imprint on arms control in the 1980s. The approach of Senator Jackson to keep Western ‘block’ superiority – by keeping European options open – had its merit. The European approach to block non-central systems from bilateral arms control had its merit. Even the calculus to await the collapse of the Interim Agreement had its merit. Qualitative improvements were unconstrained by SALT I. Transfer prohibitions were limited to ABM systems. The US could utilize the pending threat of an arms race; the US could utilize the threat of a transfer of

603 A Reeve-S.W.J. Fuller, 26 Mar 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409; J.H. Hogg, Cruise Missiles, 31 Mar 1976, TNA, DEFE 19/176. 604 J.H. Hogg, Cruise Missiles, 31 Mar 1976, TNA, DEFE 19/176. 605 Ibid; R.V. Holley, Cruise Missiles, 25 Jun 1976, TNA, DEFE 19/176. 606 R.W. Renwick-W.J. Wilberforce, 14 Apr 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409.

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nuclear weapons to Europe to re-engage from a position of strength – a strength that benefitted US national and European security.

*** By early summer 1976 it was obvious that the Ford Administration would not be able to finalize SALT prior to a possible re-election in November 1976. The focus of attention shifted to the domestic arena. SALT turned into an election topic – first in the primaries and thereafter during the election campaign. Admiral Zumwalt, Richard Perle, Democrats and Republicans alike were questioning the SALT record, claimed Soviet breaches and US weakness. Henry Kissinger and the US delegation in Geneva continued to prepare the ground for a possible breakthrough after a Ford re-election – a re-election that fellow Republicans on the ‘right’ spectrum of the Republican Party did not necessarily support. The SALT agenda remained deadlocked. Neither side was willing to cave in. The few attempts to charge ahead were instantly stopped through bureaucratic inertia and domestic opposition. SALT should not be finalized in order to ease an election campaign. US national security demanded to wait. The US could not negotiate from a position of weakness. The SALT record for the remainder of 1976 was triste: little happened in strategic arms control. The positions remained unchanged. Alexis Johnson briefed the NAC on SALT on 15 April 1976. He was unable to say anything on ‘Backfire’ or CM. These issues were debated directly between the capitals. The SALT delegation was not involved. The NATO SALT Experts meeting followed the same pattern. Ralph Earle – the Deputy Head of the US SALT mission – rejected to comment on CM. The SALT delegation simply did not know the latest developments.607 Small steps and technical details dictated the agenda. Washington had shifted focus: the forthcoming election dominated the political life. The Republican Party Convention and the elections demanded the attention of the President. Moscow did not expect any progress before the elections in November 1976 either. The NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Ministerial Meeting of 15 June 1976 was utterly disappointing on SALT. Rumsfeld indicated that there ‘was not much new to report.’608 The SALT delegation tirelessly continued her work. It was mainly concerned with the apolitical but indispensable work of ‘definitions’. On matters of substance the flow of news trickling out of Geneva was sparse. The US toyed with a 600 km limit for both SLCM and GLCM.609 The SU re-engaged with FBS. The US SALT delegation first thought this would end the SALT process altogether. The Russians, however, indicated a FBS settlement in SALT III. The question of a non-circumvention clause was still awaiting a finalization. Ralph Earle told J.A. Thomson on 2 July 1976 that the US 607 J. Fuller-A. Reeve, 29 Apr 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409. 608 DPC Ministerial Meeting: Restricted Session: SALT, 15 Jun 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409. 609 J.A. Thomson-Sykes, SALT, 2 Jul 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409.

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Delegation ‘was not happy about the firm undertaking given to consult NATO about no-transfer and non-circumvention before making any proposal to the Russians.’610 Thomson remained unimpressed. The US was obliged to consult on these issues. Earle did not argue. Thomson declared that the statements of the ‘Petrignani Group’ on non-transfer and non-circumvention had to be accepted. The exact wording of a non-transfer clause would have to be cleared with the UK ‘before the Americans came anywhere near getting committed to a noncircumvention clause.’611 Non-transfer was an Alliance issue. Nothing was allowed to hinder or undermine NATO nuclear sharing; no obstacles should be created for ‘future plans for collective European nuclear defence’; no equipment transfer for conventional or dual-purpose weaponry should be restricted and no hindrance on NATO nuclear planning was allowed to occur.612 During the NAC briefing on 29 July 1976 Alexis Johnson acknowledged the importance of a common non-circumvention regulation. The issue of a non-transfer clause was to be co-decided before the finalization of the negotiations. The European NATO members would thus have to ‘exhume’ their papers on non-circumvention and non-transfer.613 According to Alexis Johnson a finalization of SALT II was still feasible before the Presidential elections – so speed mattered. The European NATO Allies did not share the optimism of Alexis Johnson.614 Hal Sonnenfeldt and Henry Kissinger sided with NATO Europe. Quite apart from ‘Backfire’ and the CM issue the non-transfer question alone needed weeks of deliberations. There was no chance for a success before the elections. The Federal German Government considered any attempts to ‘speed’ the negotiations as dangerous. SALT could not be finalized before the elections. A ‘breakthrough’ would generate an unwanted dynamic. There would be no adequate consultation with the NATO Allies on any subjects of European concern. London and Bonn agreed during Anglo-German Politico-Military Talks to task their US embassies to contact the Ford Administration and to remind the Administration that the US was under obligation to consult her NATO Allies before finalizing a SALT II Agreement. The Allies had to be given time to properly discuss and deliberate any part of the SALT text. The NATO Allies should furthermore be able to co-decide with the White House the presentation of the treaty to the US Congress and the media.615 Thus any move prior to November 1976 was totally out of the equation. Neither the US bureaucracy, nor the US opposition, the USSR or the NATO Allies deemed it appropriate to finalize SALT in an election year. For the SU it was unthinkable to embrace the 610 Ibid 611 Ibid; Record of the Petrignani Group Meeting Held on the 7 Apr 1976 in the NATO Headquarters Brussels, 7 Apr 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409; J.A. Thomson-Homer, 18 August 1976, TNA, 46/1409. 612 S.W.J. Fuller-J.A. Thomson, SALT: No Transfer/Non Circumvention, 10 Sep 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1409. 613 M.B. Williams, SALT. US Briefing to NAC, 6 Aug 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1411. 614 A. Reeve-W.J.A. Wilberforce, 17 Sep 1976, TNA, FCO 46/1410. 615 S.W.J. Fuller-A. Reeve, SALT, 21 September 1975, TNA, FCO 46/1410.

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concept of the Ford Administration of a phased approach. The main SALT instrument would be signed by the Ford Administration. A successor administration would be tasked to work out the Additional Interim Agreement on ‘gray area’ systems. This would leave the CM unregulated while ballistic missiles would be regulated. These uncertainties of an election year explain the SU’s steady refusal to consider a split of SALT II into two instruments. The SU could be trapped by agreeing to a prior regulation of central systems while leaving ‘gray area’ systems such as CM totally unregulated. There was not even a guarantee that a ‘gray area’ or ‘second’ instrument would ever emerge. On 20 September 1976 Averell Harriman – the Special Envoy of the Presidential candidate of the Democratic Party Jimmy Carter – met General-Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow to discuss US-Soviet relations and SALT. Brezhnev told Harriman that the latest Soviet proposal of 16 March 1976 still had not received a reply. Brezhnev thus doubted the proclaimed interest of the Ford Administration in progress on SALT. The SU could easily ‘detect that the American side in SALT was seeking to avoid any limitation on certain of its own types of arms such as the cruise missile’ while at the same time attempting to include Soviet weapons systems that clearly did not qualify as strategic weapons.616 Remarks by Harriman about an arms build-up in Europe were left unanswered. The SU had just commenced to modernize her equipment in Europe – this included conventional weapons and the SS-20. NATO Europe thus had a keen interest to preserve all European defense options: this included the cruise missile.

616 Memo of Conversation, Brezhnev-Harriman, 24 September 1976, FRUS 1969–1976, XVI, No 288.

III. CONCLUSION Strategic Arms Control is the grand chess game of the second half of the 20th Century. Strategic Arms Control is about order: world order. The superpowers sought to institutionalize East-West relations in order to stabilize the systemic stability of bipolarity and to relegate the pentagonal structure of the NPT to a secondary position in a multi-hierarchical or multi-leveled world order. The NPT disarmament obligation posed strictures on the superpower condominium but also offered options for the superpowers to bolster up a bipolar order by extending the non-transfer regime to delivery systems. In general mere strategic arms limitation would codify a superpower condominium. The result: ‘institutionalized’ bipolarity. The superpowers, however, were obliged not only to seek an end of the strategic arms race by way of limitations but also to work towards reductions of strategic weapons systems. Reductions would ease a re-balancing of the international order. Reductions enhanced the relative position of ‘third parties’ in the international system. Reductions would possibly even allow a revision of the system configuration. The NPT ‘bargain’ was just a manifestation of the diverging interests of the superpowers, the NWS and the NNWS. Superpower interests clearly diverged from ‘third party’ interests: those of NWS and NNWS. Superpower détente – superpower arms control – aimed at the preservation of the power political status quo by way of an institutionalization of bipolarity. European unity and European détente by contrast aimed at the revision of the status quo. Western Europe had to serve as a kernel for an all-European security order. European unity and détente aimed at dislodging the Cold War structures that divided the ‘Old Continent’. The final aim of European détente was a multi-polar world order with Europe as a security provider for the ‘Old Continent’. The superpowers sought to use the SALT process to institutionalize bipolarity, to fend off challenges by revisionist powers, to freeze ‘third parties’ into a secondary position and to codify a world order that benefitted first and foremost the superpowers. The principle of systemic stability served superpower interests. The institutionalization of bipolarity was a ‘defensive’ US national security strategy. The avenue of the Johnson Democrats to prioritize an East-West regime to NATO co-operation meant destroying an Alliance partnership in order to cooperate with the ‘enemy’ for the sake of systemic stability. The US defensive strategy offered the US a retreat from doomsday and the SU a sanctuary. ‘Strategic parity’ assured systemic stability, created ‘sanctuaries’ for the superpowers but enhanced the chances of sub-strategic or ‘limited wars’. Strategic parity stripped Western Europe of the nuclear umbrella provided by the superpowers. SALT created a balance in central systems but preserved an imbalance in non-central systems and thus shifting the danger of conflict to sub-strategic conflicts. The principle of ‘equal security’ applied to the superpowers but not to Alliance partners on

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the European Continent. European theatre security thus was undermined.1 The principle of strategic parity thus remained disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. ‘Sufficiency’ was parity with an edge. US Senator ‘Scoop’ Jackson was an outspoken critique of the principle of parity. Jackson advocated superpower parity by numbers. Equality by numbers assured Western superiority. Europe’s relative gains calculus had to be embraced by the US. ‘Burden sharing’ and enhanced European capabilities would preserve ‘Western’ superiority and help to win the Cold War. To dampen European ambition and to force Europe into a straightjacket for the sake of ‘global security’ meant to accept the division of the world instead of creating a coalition to win the contest. Senator Jackson thus was a prime ally of the European NWS and of NATO Europe. Both constantly demanded that the SALT process was to be kept strictly bilateral in order to preserve Europe’s defense options and overall Alliance strength. A ‘Europe’ unbound but aligned to the US was the winning ticket. Western solidarity would destroy systemic bipolarity. A corollary applied: The US had to discard the ‘global’ security approach and its underlying ‘grand strategy’ to solve the European and German question in bipolarity. The idea to unify Germany without a change of the system configuration had to be discarded. Arms reduction zones and the ‘denu- clearization’ of Central Europe sacrificed the Alliance partnership. Arms reduction zones destroyed the creation of a platform to dislodge the status quo. To dislodge the status quo had to be unifying strategic aim of both: the US and NATO Europe. Arms control can […] strengthen Alliances, collapse them, or make them unnecessary. It can create confidence and trust or can create suspicion and irritation. It can lead to greater world organization and the rule of law or discredit them.’2

Arms control is not detached from classic international relations. It is a world dominated by the relative gains calculus. It is a Clausewitzian world. Arms control always serves particular national security interests. Arms control strategies priori-

1

2

See the interesting conclusion by Robert Pfaltzgraff: ‘While there has been extensive European support for the principle of arms control at the strategic level, there is underlying apprehension that in seeking a more stable relationship with the SU the US might jeopardize West European interests. Many Europeans have often had serious reservations about an arms control process that, by limiting central strategic systems but not theatre-capable systems, might decouple the US strategic nuclear force from European security. Hence, even if the US had concluded agreements with the SU for ‘deep cuts’ in strategic systems below the Vladivostok guidelines […] the West European reaction would probably have been ambivalent. […] From a European perspective, such an [arms control] agreement, would have made sanctuaries of the homelands of the US and the SU, while signaling – rightly or wrongly – to European Allies that the US (and the SU) were preparing to fight any future war on the territory of Western Europe. It has been a continuous European objective to prevent this and to emphasize a deterrence strategy that maintains a low nuclear threshold and relies on the ability of the Atlantic Alliance to inflict unacceptable damage on the SU […].’ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, ‘Western Europe and the SALT II Treaty: An American View’, Fletcher Forum 4 (1980), 99–108, 100f. Schelling/Halperin, 6.

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tize selfish national interests – such as a condominium, a world directorate or an enhancement of the relative position of a country or ‘region’ in the world. The SALT record is ambiguous. SALT was about global order or world organization. SALT surely was not a bilateral endeavor for the common good of mankind. SALT was about hierarchies, domination, status and order. The Alliance prioritization was constantly challenged. European security interests were constantly endangered. Europe’s relative position in the world was under an enduring siege. The Alliance was a constant battleground. But Alliance interests and traditional security finally maintained the upper hand in the contest with the global security principles that guided the agenda of the ‘liberal’ arms controller. The security of ‘third parties’ remained undiminished. Therefore, the SALT process broke down. Europe’s defense options were upheld so was US potential superiority. The price: a set-back in superpower détente. It took three more years to align European security and global security interests to obtain a SALT II agreement. The latter, however, was never ratified. It took the ‘Second Cold War’ and the decision to deploy CM and Pershing II in Europe to balance European and global security. It was the ‘threatening’ imbalance between central and non-central systems that made NATO Europe insist on European defense options. The Ford Administration could not cross the ‘Rubicon’. The Ford Administration could not prioritize a USSU global ‘directorate’ to Alliance solidarity – an alignment that had preserved peace for over 20 years and US predominance in the international system. NATO Europe had a fair share in shaping strategic arms control. NATO Europe was the invisible ‘third party’ at the negotiating table. Alliance policy, coalition formations, penetration, hedging strategies assured that ‘equal security’ for Europeans and the superpowers alike was the guideline for the SALT diplomacy. ‘Alliance whispering’ – to speak with Brezhnev – kept the balance and preserved the West. A ‘liberal’ superpower condominium in line with a convergence strategy to East-West relations would have destroyed the ‘West’ and with it US predominance in the international system. It would have destroyed the liberal environment and core principles the US sought to defend. A superpower directorate would have triggered a European Nuclear Co-operation with major repercussions on East-West and intra-Alliance affairs. The end result: a world without crisis stability, a world without systemic stability. The SALT process was a ‘multi-level game’. The primary game was the negotiation between the superpowers on strategic arms control. The second level was the Alliance game on security and defense and the third level the domestic arena. The focus of this study was on the Alliance game. The domestic arena was discarded to a large extent. The above is a book on the impact of SALT on European security and on the ‘Western European’ imprint on the SALT process. The point of departure and reference point was the NPT ‘grand bargain’ between NNWS and NWS. The NNWS agreed to forego their right to acquire or produce nuclear weapons since the NWS agreed to work ‘in good faith’ towards general nuclear disarmament. Thus the ‘class system’ of the NPT would over time be replaced by equality of rights. The European NNWS and NWS alike thus demanded reductions of the superpower arsenal that would raise the relative position of

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Europe in the international system. The first intra-Alliance battle was about the ABM defense systems. NATO alliance members demanded a total elimination of ABM systems or a low level ABM shield that would not invalidate the British and French nuclear deterrent forces. The European deterrent forces had to maintain the capability to penetrate Soviet air-space. The second battle’ was a dispute about the scope of strategic arms limitation for offensive nuclear systems. The definition of ‘strategic’ weapon here was of central importance. The SU defined any weapon capable of targeting the other party as strategic. This definition comprised forward based US systems and home based intercontinental systems. NATO Europe demanded a limitation to central intercontinental systems thus exempting forward based US strike forces. The alternative: a comprehensive agreement that would cover central and non-central systems alike – US FBS in the West and IRBM in the East. Thus no imbalance would emerge that would make ‘limited war’ worth considering. The European Allies finally opted for a ‘limited’ central systems agreement that left FBS and IRBM untouched. US FBS were to be treated as an equivalent of the Soviet IRBM. This would preserve an unregulated balance on non-central systems. A withdrawal of the ‘strategic’ US FBS was deemed improper although the Soviet IRBM qualified only as a ‘sub-strategic’ weapons system that could not target the US proper. The US FBS were indispensable to maintain NATO nuclear sharing and a NATO strike force that targeted the Warsaw Pact potential. The NATO decision on FBS had a corollary: a non-transfer regulation was not allowed to undermine the Anglo-American special relationship, NATO nuclear sharing, and a modernization of NATO Europe’s strike forces or the European Nuclear Option as preserved by the NPT. The same applied to noncircumvention regulations. The third intra-Alliance battle was about a possible US-SU ‘no first-use’ agreement. Such an agreement was incompatible with Alliance obligations, with the ladder of escalation and thus with NATO’s flexible response strategy. A US embrace of a ‘no first-use’ doctrine would have totally undermined the nuclear guarantee or umbrella furnished by the United States. The latter was already questioned by the emerging parity in strategic systems. NATO Europe left no doubt that a prioritization of a US-SU condominium would constitute the end of the NATO Alliance. Any violation of European ‘red lines’, any destruction of European defense options, any undermining of the NATO umbrella and US security guarantee would lead to the formation of a European defense structure. France and the UK would have to replace the US as protector of Europe. Simultaneously, the NNWS of the European Community would not adhere to the NPT of 1968. In order to make their voice heard the Europeans established the ‘Petrignani’ Group of European SALT Experts. The UK-US SALT Working Group offered HMG a special link to influence US SALT decision-making to press British and European desiderata in Washington. The US NAC briefings and the NATO SALT Experts meetings were the necessary core structure for consultation and discussion on SALT. The NPG served as an additional forum for arms control. The ‘architecture’ worked. SALT I limited the arms race and created the platform for reductions as foreseen in the NPT. The asymmetrical agreement preserved a US

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MIRV advantage necessary for ‘Western’ defense. The SU maintained a numerical advantage but the dynamic of the Soviet building program was broken. At the same time the Interim Agreement offered the US the time needed to perfect the new Trident submarine scheduled for deployment in 1977. The ABM system that emerged was ‘light’ thus European deterrent forces were not invalidated by the SALT I Agreement. SALT I did not contain a non-transfer regulation for offensive weapons. The Interim Agreement thus provided the UK with a window of opportunity to improve her deterrent force before a non-transfer agreement in a SALT II agreement would emerge. The US FBS had been exempted from the SALT I process with the ‘20 May Understanding’. To sum it up neither NATO nuclear sharing nor the Anglo-American nuclear special relationship were endangered. NATO Europe could rejoice and focus on the up-coming challenges of the SALT II process while SALT I was to be ratified by the signatory powers. Reductions of central systems or a possible extension of the SALT process to non-central systems posed potential dangers for European security. Reductions were to force the SU to consider ‘third party’ systems, geographical factors and non-central systems to obtain ‘essential equivalence’, parity or equal security. European systems thus might be limited indirectly. The potential ‘threat’ was limited by US Congressional guidance for the Nixon Administration. Senator Jackson structured the SALT II approach of the Nixon Administration by way of the Jackson Amendment. Jackson redefined ‘strategic weapon’ to mean intercontinental weapon. This exempted de facto all non-central systems. Jackson furthermore demanded numerical equality. The SALT II process had to replace the linked and offsetting asymmetries with parity in all weapons categories under scrutiny. The Nixon Administration opted for a flexible approach that assured parity by way of a common ceiling but allowed certain offsetting asymmetries. It opted for what was termed ‘essential equivalence’. The initial US approach was basic: the US government intended to extend the agreement on offensive weapons from ICBM and SLBM to strategic bombers in order to codify a de facto existing essential equivalence. The US had a numerical advantage in strategic bombers that would offset the numerical advantages of the SU in the other central-systems. The SALT II process, however, was complicated by the SU’s insistence on a pre-condition: PNW. A further stumbling block was the Soviet firm insistence to preserve the unequal-numbers of the SALT I Interim Agreement and to amend it with equal limits for strategic bombers and MIRVed systems. The SU’s intention to now tackle problems that had been shifted to the SALT II process to ease an agreement on SALT I increased the headache of the US Government. The SU sought compensations for the US FBS, ‘third party systems’ and geographical factors. A comprehensive non-transfer regime complemented the Soviet approach. European core interests thus were getting entangled – yet again. The MBFR agenda on European theatre conventional arms control further complicated a complex matters. The SALT II track started after the re-election of President Nixon in November 1972. The Europeans instantly presented their red lines to the US to forestall a prioritization of a US-SU condominium over Alliance affairs. The Jackson Amendment served the same purpose: the preservation of block stability. The

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Nixon Administration had to be immunized against the siren songs of the SU. The latter had devised a wedge driving strategy that sought to break Western ‘block’ unity and thus superiority. The aim of the Soviet strategy was to ‘decouple’ European from US security. NATO Europe thus demanded to forestall a step-by-step ‘denuclearization’ of the European Continent. The US was asked to take a firm line on FBS. FBS had to be defended no matter what. The US furthermore had to object to an extension of the NPT non-transfer regime to nuclear delivery systems. Finally, the US must resist a reduction of NATO strike forces in the MBFR reduction area. The MBFR focus should be on superpower manpower. Reductions of FBS, NATO strike elements or tactical nuclear forces had to be totally omitted. The MBFR general ceiling had to cater for a compensation of withdrawn US troops and equipment through European troops or equipment. National sub-ceiling had to be omitted totally in order not to undermine European defense co-operation and thus the European Nuclear Option. The US had to focus on burden sharing. The burden would have to be shifted to Europe. Thus Europe would stay well defended and ‘Western’ superiority was assured. The Europeans thus demanded that the US preserved all European defense options while blocking a ‘decoupling’. An alert NATO Europe would not allow the US to follow the temptation of creating a condominium to solve the European and German question. NATO Europe refused to an institutionalization of bipolarity that sacrificed Europe’s development options. The US thus faced a major problem in SALT and MBFR since the Europeans clearly demanded to prioritize Western unity and Alliance affairs. GeneralSecretary Brezhnev naturally took the opposite position. Both superpowers had a special responsibility for global security and thus had to eliminate nuclear war. The SU thus made a PNW a prerequisite for re-engagement with the SALT process. The SU would block SALT II until a PNW had been worked out and agreed upon. What the SU envisaged was not necessarily a ‘no first-use’ agreement but an agreement that prohibited the use of nuclear weapons against the other party. It furthermore created an obligation to consult and to intervene in common to forestall nuclear wars. The right of collective self-defense with nuclear weapons in the European theatre by the Alliance systems would not be affected. The PNW thus clearly aimed at a ‘decoupling’ of European and US security. The implementation of the Soviet draft would create ‘sanctuaries’ for the superpowers and would cut off escalation thus undermining the US nuclear umbrella for Europe. This ‘peaceful bomb’ was political dynamite for Western unity. The US thus had to devise a ‘Grand Design’ to harmonize the East-West regime formation with Euro-Atlantic security. The design had three components: (1) a renewal of the special relationship with the UK; (2) a reassurance of NATO Europe by way of an ‘Atlantic Charter’, and (3) a re-formulation of the PNW agenda to forestall a ‘decoupling’ of Euro-Atlantic security and to ease a further arms control regulation. The Anglo-American Summit at Camp David in spring 1973 laid the foundation for the Alliance management. The UK was invited to partake in the redrafting of the secret PNW agreement. HMG was furthermore invited to partake in the adjustment of the Alliance structures and strategy to the new emerging East-West regime that was to emerge with SALT II. Support by the UK in Alliance management was

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assured thru an offer to extend the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship into the next generation of nuclear deterrence. This assured that no ‘European’ block would emerge that challenged the US as a consequence of unpopular sacrifices of European security interests made during the SALT II process. ‘Operation Hullabaloo’ served that very purpose. Having achieved this core alignment the US engaged with the PNW and in a parallel process also with the ‘Atlantic Charter' concept. The PNW surely had priority. The US transformed the PNW in such a way that any aggression on any Alliance partner was deemed a violation. The PNW was not governing behavior in times of war. In brief, the protection was extended to Alliance members thus ‘limited war scenarios’ were laid to rest. The PNW consultation obligation was restricted to conflicts that threatened to involve the signatory parties into a nuclear conflict. Thus no world directorate emerged. The US concept was embraced by the SU at the US-SU Summit at Camp David; so were the accompanying interpretations. The interpretations – yet again – stressed that the PNW was neither a non-aggression pact nor an agreement that banned the ‘first-use’ of nuclear weapons but an agreement that established a code of conduct in times of crisis. Alliance interests thus were safeguarded. The political fall-out of the PNW nevertheless was enormous. The Allies had been kept in the dark about the PNW agenda. The day the PNW was signed by the superpowers the NATO Allies were informed. The NATO Allies were presented with a fait accompli. British involvement in the drafting now proofed invaluable since the UK was able to allay fears of a superpower condominium. France remained totally opposed to the PNW. PNW undermined the ‘third party’ trigger function, destroyed the ladder of escalation and offered the SU a right to interfere in intraAlliance affairs. Given the parity in central strategic systems the PNW offered ‘Europe’ on a silver platter to the SU. Europe thus had to respond and to demand a security guarantee from the US that assured US assistance with all means necessary. Simultaneously, ‘Europe’ had to create defense structures and to enhance her capabilities. The PNW revived ideas about a ENF and thus questioned the wisdom of a ratification of the NPT by the NNWS of Europe. The US managed to allay the fears raised by the PNW at a special NATO session held at the ‘White House’ of the West in San Clemente. The PNW was a peace time instrument that ceased to govern behavior in times of war and thus could not impact on European defense or NATO defense strategy. The US willingness to include a security guarantee into the ‘Atlantic Charter’ and the Schlesinger retargeting strategy furthermore revived the US nuclear umbrella and thus eased the ratification of the NPT by the European Community member states. The Soviet ‘decoupling’ strategy had been fended-off. Other major problems for NATO Europe emerged with the tabling of the tough Soviet SALT and MBFR negotiation positions. The MIRV question moved center stage. The SU insisted on an extension of the Interim Agreement for ICBM and SLBM and parity for MIRVed systems and bomber forces. The US were not willing to keep the asymmetry of the Interim Agreement and to forego the advantage in MIRVed systems assured by SALT I. The US SALT approach demanded equal aggregate numbers, equal numbers of MIRVed systems and equal throw weight. This symmetric position,

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however, was deemed nonnegotiable. Henry Kissinger thus devised an alternative approach that adjusted to the asymmetries of the Interim Agreement by insisting on a US MIRV advantage as a compensation for the Soviet numerical advantage. Moscow stalled: the asymmetry in numbers and throw weight had been paid off by the Soviet agreement to exempt US FBS from the aggregate total of strategic systems as long as the SALT process did not embrace reductions. The SU insisted that all unregulated central systems had to be regulated on the basis of equality. This applied also to MIRVed systems. Kissinger on the other hand insisted on a MIRV advantage since the combination of numerical advantage, throw weight advantage and MIRV equality by numbers would give the SU a ‘first strike’ capability. Furthermore, the US ICBM retargeting strategy depended on a MIRV advantage. A MIRV advantage allowed a targeting of Soviet IRBM threatening the European theatre in addition to the targeting of the Soviet central systems. The US position was carved in stone: total equality or interlinked offsetting asymmetries that assured the US a clear MIRV advantage. NATO Europe thus started to fear a deal at the expense of European security interests. The US would keep a MIRV advantage at the expense of US FBS in Europe. This would deal a deadly blow to NATO’s nuclear sharing and to NATO cohesion. The recoupling of Euro-Atlantic security by way of re-targeting should not come at the price of a destruction of NATO nuclear sharing. European theatre nuclear strike forces were indispensable to forestall a gradual ‘denuclearization’ of Central Europe. A ‘denuclearization’ policy might be in line with some geo-political matrix of the superpowers but was totally unacceptable for NATO Europe. Neither the limitation or reduction of FBS in Central Europe nor the elimination of forward bases such as Rota or Holy Loch was negotiable from a European perspective. The ‘Europeans’ feared that the US would seek to break the SALT deadlock by concessions in other theatres that satisfied the Soviet Union. For that very reason the MBFR-SALT linkage had to be studied. The US might tackle FBS by way of Option III in the MBFR negotiations and thus negotiate away the FBS ‘obstacle’. The US had other options: a change in the defense posture in the European theatre could lead to a replacement of dualcapable aircraft with conventional aircraft such as the F-15. NATO Europe had to destroy these avenues to assure European security based on the concept of NATO nuclear sharing. NATO Europe needed an independent strike element in order to enhance deterrence power and credibility. The SALT II process took an unexpected turn in October 1974. The SU accepted equal aggregates. The concept of offsetting asymmetries disappeared in the drawers. General-Secretary Brezhnev embraced an aggregate total of 2400 strategic systems and 1320 MIRVed systems in case no throw weight limits or sublimits for heavy missiles were foreseen. The avenue to the Vladivostok Accord of November 1974 was thrown open. The high aggregate total and the high and equal MIRV total made the Soviet discard compensatory schemes for FBS and geographical factors. The SU even agreed to reduce the aggregate total to 2200 by 1985. The Vladivostok Accord was a watershed. An agreement on the basis of equal aggregate numbers emerged. However, the enthusiasm about the Vladivostok Accord waned quickly. Already the drafting of the Aide Memoire led to

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interpretational differences that were ‘papered over’ and re-surfaced in early 1975. There was no regulation for one class of strategic weapons: cruise missiles. There remained disagreements about the medium range Soviet ‘Backfire’ bomber and about the counting of bombers with cruise missiles. Were bombers who carry ALCM to be counted against the MIRV limit of 1320 or the individual CM against the aggregate total? For the Europeans puzzles emerged: The Europeans wondered about the price for the ‘exemption’ of FBS from the SALT II agenda. Did the US shift the question to MBFR? Did the US plan to change the US deployment structure? Did the US seek to use the Nunn Amendment to eliminate stockpiles for US FBS and NATO strike forces? The elimination of FBS made the ‘Petrignani Group’ focus on the question of non-transfer and non-circumvention. A non-transfer clause had to be omitted to safeguard assistance for a modernization or replacement of the NATO dual-key arrangements. A possible non-circumvention clause was to be limited to regulated systems only. Both of these points were deemed of vital European interest since weapons systems like the CM were of extraordinary importance for the future defense of the European theatre. In case the CM was to be regulated the US had to assure high numerical ceilings and wide ranges in support of Western European defense options. France, the UK, the FRG, all were keenly interested to preserve the option to either produce or procure CM without restrictions emerging from the SALT process. The US herself should not negotiate away the future fourth leg of the ‘Western’ deterrent. The CM was way too valuable a weapon system to be utilized as a ‘bargaining chip’ in a secondary game. The Soviet SS-20 IRBM deployment made it necessary to keep defense and bargaining options open. The ‘Backfire’ bomber question had a European security dimension as well. To count the ‘Backfire’ bomber against the aggregate total surely would serve US national interest by limiting other Soviet intercontinental systems that threatened the US. The ‘Backfire’ was by nature a European theatre weapon that did not menace the US home land. Any overdue pressure by the US to count the ‘Backfire’ against the aggregate total would backfire since it would lead to a re-surfacing of the FBS issue. The damage would be a European. A limitation attempt could not serve European security. The ‘Petrignani Group’ took the initiative to make NATO Europe’s voice heard. A statement was drafted and presented to the US delegation in the NAC that listed European desiderata: FBS, non-transfer, non-circumvention, CM and ‘definitions’. The European SALT Experts clearly outlined the red-lines for the Europeans. The US was extremely upset by the procedure since NATO Europe tried to force their hand on SALT and MBFR. The European initiative limited US diplomatic leeway. The US reacted. It tried to detach the UK from the European Continent. The US considered counting the British deterrent under the US aggregate total in order to be able to exempt the UK from a forthcoming non-transfer regime. The non-transfer regime would thus affect only the other European NATO member-states. Hyland proposed an alternative: to exempt NWS from the non-transfer regime of the forthcoming SALT II agreement. In this case the nontransfer clause would apply only to the NNWS. This was a remarkable move by

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the US. The Continental European members of the European Community had just ratified the NPT after six years of deliberations and fighting to uphold the European Nuclear Option. The US proposal aimed at destroying the European Nuclear Option – as clearly indicated by Lodal. The British SALT Group discarded the US suggestions on non-transfer. HMG deterrent served European security. The avenue to develop the European Nuclear Option foreseen by the NPT had to be upheld. European security was threatened by the SS-20, the ‘Backfire’ bomber and by a possible limitation and regulation of the CM. NATO Europe had to preserve nuclear sharing and future defense options. This entailed a need to discard a nontransfer clause and to restrict a non-circumvention clause to regulated systems. Europe thus preferred not to regulate CM – or even some types of cruise missiles. The policy of NATO Europe on MBFR served the same purpose: the so-called Option III was not allowed to affect European states. National ceilings for European countries were totally incompatible with European unity. Any other possible ceilings had to be that high that any US force reductions from the MBFR reduction area could be compensated by the Europeans themselves. In case the US reduced FBS systems the UK would have to maintain the option to replace US with British nuclear strike systems. The position of the SU was the total opposite. Foreign Minister Gromyko urgently pleaded to create a dam against the circumvention of the Vladivostok Accord. It was incomprehensible to build a dam for central strategic nuclear systems and to leave on class of strategic nuclear weapons unregulated – the cruise missile. All types of CM should either be limited to 600 km or entirely banned. One exception applied the ALCM with ranges up to 2500 or 3000 km that should be counted against the aggregate total as envisaged in the Aide Memoire. An alternative was to count heavy bomber with CM against the MIRV limit. The SU discarded any introduction of a hybrid class of systems to cater for CM and mediumrange bombers. The SU discarded the compromise suggestion to limit most CM at ranges way above 600 km. Gromyko confronted the US with the valid question why CM had to be limited at 2500 km instead of 600 km. The answer everyone knew. A 600 km limit would allow the SU to target US FBS in Western Europe. It would disallow NATO Europe and the US to strike at the SU proper. Thus the US insisted on wider ranges. The information that Gromyko had limited the formerly almost unregulated GLCM to 600 km was not even reported to NATO Europe for a long time due to feared repercussions. The Soviet suggestion undermined Europe’s defense options. The Ford Administration finally could not cross the ‘Rubicon’ and prioritize a US-SU agreement to Alliance security. The Ford Administration’s SALT policy de facto died in early 1976. NATO Europe could bank on the support by Senator Jackson, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and members of the ruling Republican Party close to Ronald Reagan. The last minute Cabinet reshuffle that led to the retirement of Secretary Schlesinger strengthened Kissinger’s arm temporarily. This prioritization of superpower détente over Alliance affairs, however, had no bearing on the SALT process. NATO Europe, ‘Scoop’ Jackson Democrats and Reagan Republicans prioritized negotiations from strength. An Alliance in disarray would undermine

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US bargaining power. In other words negotiations from strength necessitated a prioritization of Allied security interests. European strength mattered. European defense options mattered. Another factor mattered: technological superiority. The US had to maintain an edge in dynamic weapons systems. The CM was the weapon system of the future. The CM was the ‘bargaining chip’ of the future. An ‘institutionalization’ of bipolarity that undermined ‘European security’, stabilization of bipolarity that undercut European development options was neither assuring systemic nor crisis stability. An uncoordinated détente would trigger an erosion of the power of the ‘West’. Devolution of power heightened uncertainty and insecurity for all parties involved: the US, the SU and NATO Europe. Intra-alliance affairs thus had to be a co-equal to the ‘primary’ game of superpower détente. The SALT II breakthrough under President Jimmy Carter was accompanied by the ‘Second Cold War’ that possibly served as a bracket for a ‘West’ threatened by dissolution due to the renewed prioritization of ‘global’ security over Alliance affairs. The interdependence of European security and the SALT II process during the Carter Administration will be the theme of a followon study to be commenced the moment this volume is going to print.

ABBREVIATIONS ABM ACE ACDA ADM AFCENT ALCM ASM BAOR BMD EC/EEC CDU CSU CIT CM CSCE ENF EPC EURATOM FBS FCO FINABEL FRG GDR GLCM HMG IAEA IRBM ICBM JCS MBFR MC MoD MRBM MIRV NAC NCA NATO NPG NPT NSA NSC NSDM NSSM NSS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (System) Allied Command Europe Arms Control and Disarmament Committee Anti-Demolition Munitions American Forces Central Europe Air-Launched Cruise Missile Air-to-Surface Missile British Army on the Rhine Ballistic Missile Defense European (Economic) Community Christian Democratic Union, West Germany Christian Social Union, West Germany California Institute of Technology Cruise Missile(s) Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe European Nuclear Force European Political Co-operation European Atomic Energy Agency Forward Based Systems Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Chiefs of General Staff: France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic Ground-Launched Cruise Missile Her Majesty’s Government (UK) International Atomic Energy Agency Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Joint Chiefs-of-Staff (US) Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Military Committee (NATO) Minister of Defence (UK) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle North Atlantic Council National Command Agency North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Planning Group (NATO) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Advisor (US) National Security Council (US) National Security Decision Memorandum (US) National Security Study Memorandum (US) National Security Strategy (US)

240 NWS NNWS PM PNW QRA R&D SACEUR SAL SALT SAM SLBM SLCM SSN SSP SU SWWA TNF UK US WEU

Abbreviations Nuclear Weapon State Non-Nuclear Weapon State Prime Minister (UK) Prevention of Nuclear War (US-SU) Quick Reaction Alert Forces (NATO) Research & Development Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) Strategic Arms Limitation Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Surface-to-Air Missile Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Strategic Submarine Scheduled Strike Program Soviet Union ‘Stop-Where-We-Are’ (US SALT Proposal) Theatre Nuclear Forces United Kingdom United States Western European Union

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, KEW Foreign & Commonwealth Office Files (FCO) Ministry of Defence Files (DEFE) Prime Minister’s Files (PREM) Cabinet Files (CAB) POLITISCHES ARCHIV DES AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTES, BERLIN LIBRARY OF CONGRESS MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, WASHINGTON DC Paul Nitze Papers BUNDESARCHIV, KOBLENZ NL Carstens ARCHIV FÜR CHRISTLICH-DEMOKRATISCHE POLITIK, SANKT AUGUSTIN NL Birrenbach ARCHIV DES LIBERALISMUS, FRIEDRICH-NAUMANN STIFTUNG, GUMMERSBACH NATO ARCHIVE, EVÈRE (BRUSSELS)

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SECONDARY LITERATURE: Books, Editions and Memoires Burr, William, The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, New York: The New Press 1999. Callaghan, David, Dangerous Capabilities. Paul Nitze and the Cold War, New York: Edward Burlingame Book (Harper and Collins) 1990. Garthoff, Raymond, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 1994. Id, A Journey Through the Cold War. A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence, Washington: Brookings Institution 2001. Gray, Colin S., The House of Cards. Why Arms Control Must Fail, Ithaca/NY: Cornell University Press 1992. Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishing Company 1975. Kaplan, Morton A. (ed), SALT: Problems and Perspectives, Morristown N.J: General Learning Press 1973. Kissinger, Henry, Memoiren, Bd I., 1968–1973, Güthersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1979. Id, Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster 1995. Labrie, Roger P., SALT Handbook. Key Documents and Issues, 1972–1979, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 1979. Litwak, Robert S., Détente and the Nixon Doctrine. America’s Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Meimeth, Michael, Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status Quo und friedlichem Wandel. Die Ära Georges Pompidou und Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 1990. Müller, Harald/Schörning, Niklas, Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle, Eine exemplarische Einführung in die Internationalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 2006. Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn. The Story of SALT, New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston 1973. Id, Krieg und Frieden im Atomzeitalter. Von Los Alamos bis SALT, München: Kindler 1990. Nixon, Richard, The Real War, Los Angeles: Warner Books 1980. Platt, Alan/Weiler, Lawrence, Congress and Arms Control, Boulder: Westview Press 1978. Paul, Michael, Abrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle. Amerikanische Reduzierungskonzepte in SALT und START, 1969–1989, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 1990. Savel’yev, Aleksandr G./ Detinov, Nikolay N, The Big Five. Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union, Westport/CN: Praeger 1995. Schelling, Thomas/Halperin, Morton, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961. Smith, Gerard C., Double Talk. The Story of SALT, Lanham: University of America Press 1985. Id, Disarming Diplomat. The Memoirs of Gerard C. Smith. Arms Control Negotiator, Lanham: University of America Press 1996. Steinhaus, Rolf, Soldat Diplomat. U-Bootfahrer, Zimmermann, Journalist, Ministerberater: Erlebnisse und Reflexionen eines Offizier der Kriegsgeneration, Herford: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft 1983. Talbott, Strobe, Endgame. The Inside Story of SALT II, New York: Harper & Row 1979. Id, The Master of the Game. Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, New York: Vintage Book 1988. Id, Raketenschach, München: Piper 1984.

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Articles Blacker, Coit D., ‘The MBFR Experience’, in Alexander L. George/Philip Farley/Alexander Dallin (eds), U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988, 123–139. Buch, Heinrich, ‘Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei SALT – Mitspieler oder Zuschauer’, in Helga Haftendorn/Wolf-Dieter Karl/Joachim Krause/Lothar Wilker (eds), Verwaltete Außenpolitik. Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1978, 115–134 Bundy, McGeorge/Kennan, George/McNamara, Robert/Smith, Gerard, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs 60 (1982), 753–768. Burt, Richard, ‘The Scope and Limits of Arms Control’, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Arms Control and Security: Current Issues, Boulder: Westview 1979, 67–85. Buteux, Paul ‘Theatre Nuclear Weapons and European Security’, Journal of Political Science 10, 4 (1977), 781–808. Dietl, Ralph, ‘European Decision Making? The US, Nuclear Non Proliferation and the European Option 1967–1972’, Historische Mitteilungen 24 (2011), 43–89. Duchêne, François ‘A New European Defense Community’, Foreign Affairs 50 (1970–1971), 69– 82. Enthoven, Alain C., ‘U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?’, Foreign Affairs 53 (1974–1975), 513–532. Evans, Nicole C., ‘A defensive orientation in Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear thought?’ International Journal 59 (2003–2004), 207–220. Falk, Richard A., ‘Arms Control, Foreign Policy, and Global Reform’, Daedalus 104, 3 (1974), 35–49. Farley, Philip J., Strategic Arms Control, 1967–1987, in Alexander L. George/Philip Farley/Alexander Dallin (eds), U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988, 214–253. Firmage, Edwin Brown/Henry, David J, Vladivostok and Beyond: SALT I and the Prospects of SALT II, Columbia Journal of Transatlantic Studies 14 (1975), 221–267. Garthoff, Raymond, ‘SALT I: An Evaluation’, World Politics 31, 1 (Oct 1978), 1–25. Gray, Colin S., ‘The Strategic Forces Triad: The End of the Road?, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Arms Control and Security: Current Issues, Boulder: Westview 1979, 191–208. Hamilton, Keith, ‘Britain, France and the Year of Europe, 1973’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, 4 (2006), 871–895. Hilfrich, Fabian ‘West Germany’s Long Year of Europe. Bonn Between Europe and the United States’, Matthias Schulz/Thomas A. Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance. US-European Relations From Nixon to Carter, Cambridge: CUP 2009, 237–257.

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Irwin, Christopher, ‘Nuclear Aspects of West European Defence Integration’, International Affairs 47, 4 (1971), 679–691. Joffe, Josef, ‘Nuclear Weapons, No First Use and European Order’, Ethics 95, 3 (1985), 606–618. Kaplan, Morton A., ‘SALT and the International System’, Id (ed), SALT: Problems and Perspectives, Morristown N.J: General Learning Press 1973, 1–25. Long, F.A., ‘Arms Control From the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies’, Daedalus, 104, 3 (1975), 1–13. Millett, Stephen M., ‘Forward-Based Nuclear Weapons and SALT I’, Political Science Quarterly, 98, 1 (1983), 79–97. Möckli, Daniel, ‘Asserting Europe’s Identity. The EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of Europe’, in Matthias Schulz/Thomas A. Schwarz, The Strained Alliance. US European Relations From Nixon to Carter Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, 195–220. Nitze, Paul H., ‘SALT I: The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism’, in Foreign Policy, 17 (Winter 1974–1975), 136–156. Id, ‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente’, in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Arms Control and Security: Current Issues, Boulder: Westview 1979, 39–62. Perle, Richard ‘Superpower Postures in SALT: The Language of Arms Control’, in Morton A. Kaplan (ed), SALT: Problems and Perspectives, Morristown N.J: General Learning Press 1973, 119–135. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., ‘Western Europe and the SALT II Treaty: An American View’, Fletcher Forum 4 (1980), 99–108. Pierre, Andrew, ‘Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America’, Foreign Affairs, 49 (1970– 71), 283–301. Ravenal, Earl C., ‘After Schlesinger: Something Has to Give’, Foreign Policy 22 (Spring 1976), 71–95. Rhinelander, John B., ‘An Overview of SALT I’, American Society of International Law Proceedings 67 (1973), 29–35. Rice, Condolezza ‘SALT and the Search for a Security Regime’, in Alexander L. George/Philip Farley/Alexander Dallin (eds), U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988, 293–306. Schelling, Thomas C., ‘The Thirtieth War’, Daedalus 120, 1 (1991), 21–32. Sloan, Stanley R./Gray, Robert C., ‘Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control. Challenges for US Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No 261. Ullmann, Marc, ‘Europe: Une defense a trois?’ L’Express, 26 Novembre–2 Decembre, 70–71. Weiler, Lawrence, ‘Secrecy in Arms Control Negotiations’, in Id/Alan Platt (eds), Congress and Arms Control, Boulder/CO: Westview 1978, 157–183.

INDEX Abraham, O.H. Major-General (UK General) 205. Abshire, David M. (US Diplomat; 1970–73: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs) 116. Allison, Royal B. (US General USAF; Military Representative at the SALT Delegation) 58, 65 Andreotti, Giulio (I Politician; Feb 1972–Jul 1973: Prime Minister; Mar–Nov 1974: Minister of Defense) 137-138, 176. Andreae, Dr K.W. (D Diplomat; Executive Secretary, NATO International Staff) 194, 209, 222. Arnaud, Claude (F Diplomat; Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Political Director, French Foreign Ministry) 136, 154. Bahr, Egon (D Politician; Secretary of State in the Chancellery, Special Ambassador & Chief of the Federal German Policy Planning Staff until October 1969; 1969– 1972: State Secretary in the Federal German Chancellery; Dec 1972–1974: Federal Minister for Special Tasks; 1972– 1990: Member of the Federal German Parliament; 1974–1976: Minister of Economic Co-operation ) 75, 137, 148, 154, 158. Bartholomew, Reginald (US Diplomat; 1972–1974: Director, Policy Plans for National Security Council Affairs; 1972– 1974: Director of the Department of Defense MBFR Task Force; 1974–1977: Deputy Director US Department of State Policy Planning Staff) 170, 183. Bergold, Harry E. (US Diplomat; 1973– 1977: Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense European & NATO Desk) 214. Birrenbach, Dr Kurt (D Politician; 1957– 1976: Member of the Federal German Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee) 22, 140.

Blanchard, George S. Lt-General (US General; 1975–1979: Commander-in-Chief, US Army Europe) 205. Boon, Hendrik (NL Diplomat; 1961–1970: NATO Permanent Representative) 56. Boss, Dr Walter (D Diplomat; 1969: Deputy Head of the Foreign Policy Division in the Federal Chancellery; NATO Deputy Permanent Representative) 75, 125. Brandt, Willy (D Politician; Dec 1966–Oct 1969: Foreign Minister; Oct 1969–May 1974: Chancellor of the Federal Republic) 68, 73, 87, 115, 139, 148, 150, 154, 158. Brezhnev, Leonid I. (SU Politician; June 1963–Nov 1982 Member of the Politburo; Oct 1964–Nov 1982: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 74, 79, 88–89, 93, 95–96, 122–124, 132–133, 146–148, 152–153, 172–174, 178–179, 185–188, 211, 213–214, 220 –221, 223, 227, 230, 233, 235. Brimelow, Thomas (UK Diplomat; 1969– 1973: Deputy to the Permanent UnderSecretary; 1973–1975: Permanent UnderSecretary at the FCO) 133–134. Brosio, Manlio (I Politician; 1964–Oct 1971: NATO Secretary-General) 48. Brown, George S (Jul 1974–Jun 1978: US General, Chairman of JCS) 201. Brown, Harold (1969–1977: President of California Institute of Technology; SALT Delegate; 1977–1981: Secretary of Defense) 52, 54. Burrows, Bernard (UK Diplomat; 1966– 1970: NATO Permanent Representative) 27–28, 31. Callaghan, James (UK Politician; Mar 1974– Apr 1976: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; April 1976–May 1979: Prime Minister) 174, 180. Carrington, Lord Peter (UK Politician; Jun 1970–Jan 1974: Secretary of State for Defence) 61, 67, 71, 80, 83, 121, 128–129, 140, 144, 163.

Index Carter, James E, ‘Jimmy’ (US Politician; 1971–1975: Governor of Georgia; Nov 1976–Jan 1977 President-elect; 1977– 1981: President of the United States) 227, 238. Catalano di Mellili, Felice (I Diplomat; 1971–1979: NATO Permanent Representative) 65–66, 126. Chalfont, Lord Alun Arthur Gwynn Jones (UK Politician; 1964–1970: Minister in Foreign Office for Disarmament) 40. Chlestow, Oleg N. (SU Diplomat; Chief of the Legal Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; Chief of the MBFR Delegation) 219. Cleveland, Harlan (US Diplomat; 1965– 1969: NATO Permanent Representative) 19. Cranston, Alan (US Politician; 1969–1993: US Senate D-California) 114. Cromer, Lord George Rowland Stanley (UK Politician; Feb 1971–Mar 1974: Ambassador Washington, DC) 74, 76. Da Rin, Eric (I Diplomat; Coordinator of the NATO and Disarmament Section, Foreign Ministry) 193–195, 209. Debré, Michel (F Politician; 1968–1969: Foreign Minister; 1969–1973: Defense Minister) 80, 121, 128-129. De Courcel, Geoffroy C. (F Diplomat; 1962–1975: Ambassador to the United Kingdom) 157. De Gaulle, Charles (F Politician; 1959– 1969: President of the French Republic) 23. De Porte, Anton W. (US Author) 158. De Rose, François (F Diplomat; 1970–1975: NATO Permanent Representative) 126, 168, 183, 193. Detinov, Nikolay N (RU Author) 15. Dobrynin, Anatoly F. (SU Diplomat; 1962– 1986: Ambassador to the United States; Since 1971 Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) 15, 22, 34, 52, 55, 60, 63, 73, 75, 88–89, 97, 122, 133, 147, 167, 187–188, 198, 220. Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick (UK Politician; Jun 1970–Mar 1974: Foreign Minister) 61, 67, 71, 116, 153, 167. Dregger, Dr Alfred (D Politician; 1967– 1982 Chairman of the CDU Hessen) 149, 157.

247 Earle, Ralph (US Diplomat; Apr 1968–June 1969: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; June 1969–Nov 1972: Defense Advisor, Senior Civilian Representative of the US Department of Defense at NATO, Brussels) 185, 195, 209, 225–226. Ellsworth, Robert F. (US Diplomat; Jan– Mar 1969: Special Assistant to the President; May 1969–Jun 1971: NATO Permanent Representative; 1974–Dec 1975: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Dec 1975–Jan 1977: Deputy Secretary of Defense) 31– 32. Enthoven, Alan C (US Diplomat & Author; 1965–1969: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis) Farley, Philip (US Diplomat; 1969: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs; 1969–1973: Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency & Deputy Chief of the SALT Delegation) 34–35, 37, 80–81, 90–91, 118– 119, 124–126. Ferrariis, Luigi Vittorio (I Diplomat; 1967– 1971: NATO Permanent Representative; Chef of the CSCE Section of the Foreign Ministry) 57, 64. Fleurot, Philippe (F General; 1975–1976 Commander of the French Air Force & Strategic Forces) 166. Fontana-Giusti, Luigi Maria (I Diplomat; Counselor of the Embassy in Vienna (MBFR), NATO and Disarmament Section, Foreign Ministry) 165. Ford, Gerald (US Politician; Aug 1974–Jan 1977: President of the United States) 182, 184–186, 187–189, 198, 202, 204, 206, 211–214, 220–222. Frank, Paul A (D Diplomat; 1970–1974: Staatssekretär in the Foreign Ministry; 1974–1979: Chef des Bundespräsidialamtes) 116. Fulbright, J. William (US Politician; 1945– 1974: US-Senate D-Arkansas; 1959– 1974: Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) 113. Galley, Robert (F Politician; Apr 1973–May 1974: Minister of Defense) 149, 163– 164.

248 Garthoff, Raymond (US Diplomat & Author; 1969–1973: Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Executive Secretary of the US SALT I Delegation) 12, 32, 65–66, 82, 90, 117– 119, 124, 126, 141, 148, 150, 188–189, 194, 222. Genscher, Hans-Dietrich (D Politician; 1974–1992: Foreign Minister) 218. Goodby, James (US Diplomat; 1969–1971: Officer for Regional Politico-Military Affairs, European Bureau, State Department; 1971–1974: Counselor for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, US Delegation NATO; 1974–1977: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) 115. Goodpaster, Andrew J. (US General; April 1969–1974: Commander-in-Chief, US European Command; NATO SACEUR) 58, 83. Greenhill, Sir Denis (UK Diplomat; Feb 1969–1973: Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO) 86. Grewe, Wilhelm (D Diplomat; 1962–1971: NATO Permanent Representative) 31, 56, 66. Graybeal, Sidney (US Diplomat; Member of ACDA and of the Salt Delegation; 1972–: First Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Committee established by the SALT I Agreement) 172. Gromyko, Andrej (SU Diplomat; 1957– 1988: Foreign Minister) 37, 60, 82, 93, 96–97, 115, 150, 174, 179, 182, 198–199, 210–212, 237. Halperin, Morton (US Diplomat; Jan–Sept 1969: Member of the NSC Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) 13–14. Harmel, Pierre (B Diplomat; 1966–1973 Foreign Minister) 100. Harriman, Averell W. (US Diplomat; Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; 1976: Special Representative of President-elect Jimmy Carter) 227. Harte, Dr (UK Diplomat) 208–209. Hattersley, Roy (UK Politician; 1974–1975: Non Cabinet Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs) 188.

Index Healey, Denis (UK Politician; Oct 1964–Jun 1970: Minister of Defence) 30, 36, 39– 40, 43, 47–48. Heath, Edward (UK Politician; Jun 1970– Mar 1974: Prime Minister) 61, 67, 71– 72, 81, 86, 127, 133, 136, 144–146, 158. Hill-Norton, Peter (UK Admiral; 1970–71: First Sea Lord; 1971–1974: Chief of the Defence Staff; 1974–1977 Chairman of the NATO Military Committee) 129. Hoffmann, Stanley (US Author; Harvard University) 109, 166. Holloway, James L. III (US Admiral; 1973– 1974: Vice Chief of Naval Operations; 1974–1978: Chief of Naval Operations) 221. Hooper, Sir Robin (UK Diplomat; Cabinet Office, Head of the Cabinet Office SALT Committee or ‘Hooper Committee’) 28. Hyland, William G. (US Diplomat; 1969– 1972: NSC Operations Staff Europe; Jan 1974–Nov 1975: Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Nov 1975–Jan 1977: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) 208, 236. Iklé, Fred (US Diplomat; 1973–1977: Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 170, 181, 203, 222. Jackson, Henry M. ‘Scoop’ (US Politician; 1953–1983 Senator D-Washington) 107– 108, 112–114, 165, 167, 214, 224, 229, 232, 237. Jobert, Michel (F Politician; April 1973– May 1974: Foreign Minister) 144, 148, 156–157. Johnson, Lyndon B. (US Politician; 1964– 1969: President of the United States) 17, 19, 109. Johnson, U. Alexis (US Diplomat; Feb 1969–Feb 1973: Under Secretary for Political Affairs; 1973–1977: Ambassador at Large and Chief of the US SALT Delegation) 141–143, 156, 159, 162, 165, 167– 168, 185, 194–195, 197–198, 209, 212, 225-226. Kaplan, Morton A. (US Author, U Chicago) 12. Keeny, Spurgeon (1963–1969: NSC Staff; 1969–1973: Assistant Director of the Science and Technology at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA) 118.

Index Kennedy, Edward ‘Ted’ (US Politician: 1962–2009: US Senate D-Massachusetts) 38. Kissinger, Henry A. (US Politician; Jan 1969–Nov 1975: Assistant to the Secretary for National Security Affairs; Sep 1973–Jan 1977: Secretary of State) 12, 15, 21, 33–34, 36, 39–40, 44, 50–52, 55, 60–63, 73–75, 84, 88–89, 92–93, 95–99, 109, 111–112, 114, 117, 121–124, 133– 134, 137–140, 142, 146–148, 150, 152– 155, 166–169, 172–175, 177–182, 184– 191, 193, 198–199, 202, 210–212, 215– 222, 225–226, 235. Kosygin, Alexej (Soviet Politician; 1960– 1980: Member of the Politburo; 1964– 1980: Chairman of the Council of Ministers) 73. Krapf, Franz (D Diplomat; 1971–1976: NATO Permanent Representative) 160, 184. Laird, Melvin (US Politician; Jan 1969–Jan 1973: Secretary of Defense) 30, 45, 51, 56, 61, 65–66, 83, 110, 114, 118. Leber, George (German Politician; Jul 1972–Feb 1978: Minister of Defense) 136, 149, 161, 191, 223. Lodal, Jan M (US Diplomat; 1969–1970: Director NATO and General Purpose Force Analysis Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Member of the NSC Staff; 1973–1975: Director of the Program Analysis Staff) 207–208, 213, 237. Luns, Joseph (NL Politician; 1971–1984: NATO Secretary-General) 137, 152, 201. McNamara, Robert (US Politician; Jan 1961–Feb 1968: Secretary of Defense) 17. Makins, Christopher (UK Diplomat; 1971– 1975: First Secretary,UK Embassy in Washington DC) 193. Maurin, François (F General; Jun 1971–Jun 1975 Chief of the Defense Staff) 129. Macklen, V.H.B. (UK Diplomat; Member of the Ministry of Defence) 118. Menne, Fritz C (D Diplomat; 1968–1973 Legationsrat I. Klasse, Head of the Disarmament Section in the Foreign Ministry) 46, 78, 143.

249 Mistral (F Diplomat; Disarmament Section, Bureau of the Political Director, French Foreign Ministry) 79. Molander, Roger (US Diplomat; 1974–1981 National Security Council Staff) 223– 224. Moorer, Thomas A. (US Admiral; Chief of Naval Operations; Jul 1970–Jul 1974 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 66. Mumford, W.F. (UK Diplomat; Private Secretary) 67, 118. Nairne, Patrick: (UK Diplomat; 1965–1967: Private Secretary of Denis Healey; 1968– 1973: Deputy Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence; 1973–1975 Second Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office) 121. Nenni, Pietro (I Politician; –Jul 1969 Foreign Minister) 25. Newhouse, John (US author; Counselor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 12. Nitti, Giuseppe (I Diplomat; Counselor; Head of the Disarmament Section, Foreign Ministry) 216, 221. Nitze, Paul (US Diplomat; 1967–1969 Deputy Secretary of Defense; 1969–74 Member of the SALT Delegation; 1976 Organizer of the Committee of the Present Danger) 50–51. Nixon, Richard (US Politician; Jan 1969– Aug 1974 President of the United States) 9, 14, 19–25, 36, 38–39, 42, 47, 49, 51, 55, 61, 73–74, 85–89, 92, 95–97, 102, 105, 107, 110–114, 118–119, 121–122, 124, 133–135, 137–139, 144–150, 152, 174, 178, 181, 232. Norbart, (NL Diplomat; Deputy/Acting NATO Permanent Representative) 57. Packard, David (US Diplomat; Jan 1969– Dec 1971 Deputy Secretary of Defense) 21, 51. Parsons, James Graham (US Diplomat; 1970–1972 Deputy Chairman of the SALT Delegation) 64–65. Perle, Richard S (US Politician; Senior Counselor of Senator Jackson) 101, 225. Petrignani, Rinaldo (I Diplomat; Head of the Disarmament Section in the Foreign Ministry; Chef du Cabinet of the Foreign Minister) 68, 78–79, 159. Podgorny, Nicolai V (SU Politician; Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet)

250 Pompidou, George (F Politician; Jun 1969– Apr 1974 President of the French Republic) 72, 115, 130, 139, 143–145, 148– 149, 157. Reagan, Ronald (US Politician; 1967–1975 Governor of California) 237. Rhinelander, John (US Author) 12. Richard, Ivor Stewart (UK Politician; 19691970 Assistant to the Secretary of Defence and Secretary of the Army) 25. Richardson, Elliott L (US Diplomat; Jan 1969–June 1970 Undersecretary of State, Jan–May 1973 US Secretary of Defense) 39. Rittberger, Volker (D Author; Tübingen University, Germany) 13. Rogers, William P (US Politician; Jan 1969– 1973 Secretary of State) 18, 22, 61, 76, 94, 115, 150. Rose, Clive (UK Diplomat; 1969–1971 Counselor British Embassy Washington; 1971–1973 Assistant Under-Secretary FCO; 1973–1976 Head of the British MBFR Delegation) 84, 86, 101, 118, 126. Roth, Dr Hellmuth (D Diplomat & Colonel; Aug 1969– Director of Subdivision B, General Disarmament and European Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Nov 1969– Ambassador and Representative of the Federal Republic for Questions of Disarmament and Arms Control) 216. Rumor, Mariano (Italian Politician; 1973– 1974: Prime Minister; 1974–1976: Foreign Minister) 178. Rumsfeld, Donald (US Politician; 1970– 1973 Counselor to the President; Feb 1973–Dec 1974 US NATO Permanent Representative; Oct 1974–Nov 1975 Assistant to the President (Director, White House Office of Operations, White House Chief of Staff); Nov 1975–Jan 1977 Secretary of Defense) 148–149, 159–160, 195, 215, 222, 225. Ruth, Dr Friedrich (D Diplomat; Counselor in the Federal Chancellery) 203. Sauvagnargues, Jean (F Politician; May 1974–Aug 1976 French Foreign Minister) 218. Savel’yev, Aleksandr G. (RU Author) 15.

Index Scheel, Walter (D Politician; Oct 1969–May 1974 Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister) 75, 136, 153. Schelling, Thomas (US Author, Harvard U and U of Maryland) 13–14. Schlesinger, James R (US Politician; 1971– 1973 Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; Feb–July 1973 Director of the CIA; July 1973–November 1975 Secretary of Defense) 144, 157–159, 161, 166, 168, 171, 175–177, 179, 190, 200– 201, 214–215, 218, 234, 237. Schmidt, Helmut (D Politician; Oct 1969– Jul 1972 Minister of Defense; Jul–Dec 1972 Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, 1972–May 1974 Minister of Finance; May 1974–Oct 1982 Chancellor of the Federal Republic) 26, 83, 206. Schumann, Maurice (F Politician; Jun 1969– Mar 1973 Foreign Minister) 80, 127. Scowcroft, Brent (US General & Diplomat; 1972–1974 Military Assistant to the President; 1974–Nov 1975 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Nov 1975–Jan 1977 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) 182, 221–222. Seidl, Dr Alfred (D Politician; 1958–1986 Member of the Bavarian State Parliament; 1974–1977 Deputy Head of the CSU in the State Parliament; 1974–1977 Staatssekretär for Legal Affairs in the Bavarian State) 153, 158. Semenov, Vladimir S (SU Politician; 1955– 1978 Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister; 1968–1978 Chairman of the Soviet SALT Delegation for SALT I & II) 44, 52, 54, 63, 73, 92. Semyonov, Vladimir Semyonovich (=see Semenov) Smirnov, Leonid Vasilyevich (SU Politician; Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union) 97. Smith, Gerard (US Diplomat; Feb 1969– 1972 Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1969–1972 Chief of the US SALT I Delegation) 12, 22, 33–34, 39, 48–49, 51, 58, 65, 73, 75–77, 89, 92–93.

Index Soames, Christopher (UK Diplomat; 1968– 1972 Ambassador to Paris; 1973–1977 European Commission for Foreign Relations) 67, 143. Sonnenfeldt, ‘Hal’ (Helmut) (US Diplomat; Jan 1969–1974 Member of the NSC Operations Staff Europe; 1974–Jan 1977 Counselor of the Department of State) 36, 40, 46, 61, 74–75, 85–86, 91, 118, 135, 144, 181, 186, 188, 190–191, 195, 206–207, 209, 214–215, 222, 226. Spierenburg, Dirk (NL Diplomat; 1970– 1973 NATO Permanent Representative) 141. Spiers, Ronald I. (US Diplomat; Aug–Sept 1969 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs; Sep 1969– Aug 1973 Director of the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs; Chairman of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group) 71, 74, 101. Spinelli, Francesco (I Diplomat; NATO Deputy Permanent Representative, Member of the Ministry of Defense) 159, 197. Staerke, André de (B Diplomat; 1949–1976 NATO Permanent Representative with Ministerial Rank) 48, 57–58, 63–64, 72, 124, 150, 159. Stewart, Michael (UK Politician; Foreign Minister) 46. Tanassi, Mario (I Politician; 1970–1972 and 1972–1974 Minister of Defense) 161. Talbott, Strobe (US Author, Time Magazin) 12. Thomson, John A. (UK Diplomat; 1973– 1976 Assistant Under-Secretary of Defence & International Security) 125, 172, 181, 191, 193, 195, 204, 207, 209–210, 213, 215–216, 222–224, 226. Tickell, Crispin C.C. (UK Diplomat; 1964– 1970 UK Embassy Paris; 1972–1975 Head of the Western Organizations Department of the FCO) 127, 169, 203–205. Tindemans, Leo (B Politician; 1973–1974 Deputy Prime Minister; 1974–1978 Prime Minister) 178. Tomkins, Edward E. (UK Diplomat; 1970– 1972 UK Ambassador to the Netherlands; 1973–1975 UK Ambassador to France) 37. Trachtenberg, Mark (US Author; UCLA) 9.

251 Trend, Burke (UK Politician; 1963–1973 Cabinet Secretary) 86, 121, 133, 145. Trusov, Konstantin (SU General; Member of the Soviet SALT Delegation; Deputy to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments) 92. Van Eekelen, Wim (NL Politician; 1966– 1971 NATO Permanent Representative; 1974–1977 Director for NATO & WEU Affairs, Dutch Foreign Ministry) 217. Van Elslande, Renaat (B Politician; 1973– 1977 Foreign Minister) 191. Wallace, Henry (US Politician; 1945–46 Secretary of Commerce) 108. Warnke, Paul C (US Diplomat; 1967–Feb 1969 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) 109. Willot, Albert (B Diplomat; Counselor of the NATO Embassy; Representative of the Belgian Foreign Ministry at the European SALT Experts meetings; (Deputy-) Chef of the MBFR Delegation) 79, 89, 210, 216. Willrich, Mason (US Author, U of Virginia) 12. Wilson, Harold (UK Politician; Oct 1964– Jun 1970 Prime Minister; Mar 1974–Apr 1976 Prime Minister) 23–24, 36, 46, 61, 180. Wood, Colonel (US Colonel, USAF) 205. Wolfe, Thomas (US author, RAND) 12. Zuckerman, Solly (UK Politician; 1964– 1971 Science Advisor of the Prime Minister & Cabinet) 26, 80. Zumwalt, Elmo Jr. (US Admiral; Jul 1970– Jun 1974 Chief of Naval Operations) 225.

h i s t o r i s c h e m i t t e i lu ng e n

–

beihefte

Im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft, Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben e. V. herausgegeben von Jürgen Elvert. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Winfried Baumgart, Michael Kißener, Ulrich Lappenküper, Ursula Lehmkuhl, Bea Lundt, Christoph Marx, Jutta Nowosadtko, Johannes Paulmann, Wolfram Pyta, Wolfgang Schmale, Reinhard Zöllner

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISSN 0939–5385

16. Jürgen Elvert (Hg.) Der Balkan Eine Europäische Krisenregion in Geschichte und Gegenwart 1997. 367 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07016-4 17. Jens Hohensee Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74 Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa 1996. 324 S., 13 Tab., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-06859-8 18. Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg / Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg Der Aufruf „An die Kulturwelt!“ Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg 1996. 247 S. mit 13 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-06890-1 19. Armin Heinen Saarjahre Politik und Wirtschaft im Saarland 1945–1955 1996. 603 S. mit zahlr. Abb., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-06843-7 20. Arnd Bauerkämper (Hg.) „Junkerland in Bauernhand“? Durchführung, Auswirkungen und Stellenwert der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1996. 230 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-06994-6 21. Stephan Lippert Felix Fürst Schwarzenberg Eine politische Biographie 1998. 446 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-06923-6 22. Martin Kerkhoff Großbritannien, die Vereinigten Staaten und die Saarfrage 1945 bis 1954 1996. 251 S., kt.

ISBN 978-3-515-07017-1 23. Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Hg.) Europäische Innere Peripherien im 20. Jahrhundert 1997. 316 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07098-0 24. Gabriele Clemens Britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland (1945–1949) Literatur, Film, Musik und Theater 1997. 308 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-06830-7 25. Michael Salewski Die Deutschen und die See Studien zur deutschen Marinegeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Hg. von Jürgen Elvert und Stefan Lippert 1998. 361 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-07319-6 26. Robert Bohn (Hg.) Die deutsche Herrschaft in den „germanischen“ Ländern 1940–1945 1997. 304 S. mit 5 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07099-7 27. Heinrich Küppers Joseph Wirth Parlamentarier, Minister und Kanzler der Weimarer Republik 1997. 356 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07012-6 28. Michael Salewski (Hg.) Das nukleare Jahrhundert 1998. 266 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07321-9 29. Guido Müller (Hg.) Deutschland und der Westen Internationale Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Klaus Schwabe zum 65. Geburtstag 1998. 381 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07251-9 30. Imanuel Geiss Zukunft als Geschichte Historisch-politische Analyse und

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Prognosen zum Untergang des Sowjetkommunismus, 1980–1991 1998. II, 309 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07223-6 Robert Bohn / Jürgen Elvert / Karl Christian Lammers (Hg.) Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945 2000. 234 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07320-2 Daniel Gossel Briten, Deutsche und Europa Die Deutsche Frage in der britischen Außenpolitik 1945–1962 1999. 259 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-07159-8 Karl J. Mayer Zwischen Krise und Krieg Frankreich in der Außenwirtschaftspolitik der USA zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise und Zweitem Weltkrieg 1999. XVI, 274 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07373-8 Brigit Aschmann „Treue Freunde“? Westdeutschland und Spanien 1945–1963 1999. 502 S. mit 3 Tab., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-07579-4 Jürgen Elvert Mitteleuropa! Deutsche Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918–1945) 1999. 448 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-07641-8 Michael Salewski (Hg.) Was wäre wenn Alternativ- und Parallelgeschichte: Brücken zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit 1999. 171 S. mit 1 Kte., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07588-6 Michael F. Scholz Skandinavische Erfahrungen erwünscht? Nachexil und Remigration 2000. 416 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-07651-7 Gunda Stöber Pressepolitik als Notwendigkeit Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Öffentlichkeit im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914 2000. 304 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07521-3 Andreas Kloevekorn Die irische Verfassung von 1937

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2000. 199 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07708-8 Birgit Aschmann / Michael Salewski (Hg.) Das Bild „des Anderen“ Politische Wahrnehmung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 2000. 234 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07715-6 Winfried Mönch Entscheidungsschlacht „Invasion“ 1944? Prognosen und Diagnosen 2001. 276 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07884-9 Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Hg.) Innere Peripherien in Ost und West 2001. 188 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-07972-3 Peter Winzen Das Kaiserreich am Abgrund Die Daily-Telegraph-Affäre und das Hale-Interview von 1908. Darstellung und Dokumentation 2002. 369 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08024-8 Fritz Kieffer Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939 2002. 520 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08025-5 Michael Salewski Die Deutschen und die See II Studien zur deutschen Marinegeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts 2002. 252 S. mit 4 Abb., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08087-3 Jürgen Elvert / Susanne Krauß (Hg.) Historische Debatten und Kontroversen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert Jubiläumstagung der Ranke-Gesellschaft in Essen 2001 2003. 287 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08253-2 Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann / Jürgen Elvert / Birgit Aschmann / Jens Hohensee (Hg.) Geschichtsbilder Festschrift für Michael Salewski 2003. 664 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08252-5 Dietmar Herz / Christian Jetzlsperger / Kai Ahlborn (Hg.) Der israelisch-palästinensische

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Konflikt Hintergründe, Dimensionen und Perspektiven 2003. 246 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08259-4 Jürgen Elvert / Friederike Krüger (Hg.) Deutschland 1949–1989 Von der Zweistaatlichkeit zur Einheit 2003. 238 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08298-3 Alexa Geisthövel Eigentümlichkeit und Macht Deutscher Nationalismus 1830–1851. Der Fall Schleswig-Holstein 2003. 256 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08090-3 Alexander Sedlmaier Deutschlandbilder und Deutschlandpolitik Studien zur Wilson-Administration (1913–1921) 2003. 386 S. mit 5 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08124-5 Stefan Manz Migranten und Internierte Deutsche in Glasgow, 1864–1918 2003. VI, 317 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08427-7 Kai F. Hünemörder Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise und die Formierung der deutschen Umweltpolitik (1950–1973) 2004. 387 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08188-7 Christian Wipperfürth Von der Souveränität zur Angst Britische Außenpolitik und Sozialökonomie im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 2004. 473 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08517-5 Tammo Luther Volkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938 Die Auslanddeutschen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten 2004. 217 S. mit 5 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08535-9 Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann / Reinhard Wolf (Hg.) Raketenrüstung und internationale Sicherheit von 1942 bis heute 2004. 222 S. mit 3 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08282-2

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Frank Uekötter / Jens Hohensee (Hg.) Wird Kassandra heiser? Die Geschichte falscher Öko-Alarme 2004. 168 S. mit 6 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08484-0 Rainer F. Schmidt (Hg.) Deutschland und Europa Außenpolitische Grundlinien zwischen Reichsgründung und Erstem Weltkrieg. Festgabe für Harm-Hinrich Brandt zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 2004. 159 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08262-4 Karl-Georg Mix Deutsche Flüchtlinge in Dänemark 1945–1949 2005. 230 S. und 35 Abb. auf 29 Taf., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08690-5 Karl-Theodor Schleicher / Heinrich Walle (Hg.) Aus Feldpostbriefen junger Christen 1939–1945 Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Katholischen Jugend im Felde 2005. 413 S. mit 55 Abb., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-08759-9 Jessica von Seggern Alte und neue Demokraten in Schleswig-Holstein Demokratisierung und Neubildung einer politischen Elite auf Kreisund Landesebene 1945 bis 1950 2005. 243 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08801-5 Birgit Aschmann (Hg.) Gefühl und Kalkül Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf die Politik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts 2005. 239 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08804-6 Gerald Mund Ostasien im Spiegel der deutschen Diplomatie Die privatdienstliche Korrespondenz des Diplomaten Herbert v. Dirksen von 1933 bis 1938 2006. 343 S. mit 21 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08732-2 Ralph Dietl Emanzipation und Kontrolle Europa in der westlichen Sicherheitspolitik 1948–1963. Eine Innenansicht des westlichen Bündnisses. Teil 1: Der Ordnungsfaktor Europa 1948–1958 2006. 541 S., kt.

ISBN 978-3-515-08915-9 65. Niklas Günther / Sönke Zankel (Hg.) Abrahams Enkel Juden, Christen, Muslime und die Schoa 2006. 145 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-08979-1 66. Jens Ruppenthal Kolonialismus als „Wissenschaft und Technik“ Das Hamburgische Kolonialinstitut 1908 bis 1919 2007. 273 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09004-9 67. Ralph Dietl Emanzipation und Kontrolle Europa in der westlichen Sicherheitspolitik 1948–1963. Eine Innenansicht des westlichen Bündnisses. Teil 2: Europa 1958–1963: Ordnungsfaktor oder Akteur? 2007. 430 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09034-6 68. Herbert Elzer Die Schmeisser-Affäre Herbert Blankenhorn, der „Spiegel“ und die Umtriebe des französischen Geheimdienstes im Nachkriegsdeutschland (1946–1958) 2008. 373 S. mit 10 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09117-6 69. Günter Vogler (Hg.) Bauernkrieg zwischen Harz und Thüringer Wald 2008. 526 S. mit 14 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09175-6 70. Rüdiger Wenzel Die große Verschiebung? Das Ringen um den Lastenausgleich im Nachkriegsdeutschland von den ersten Vorarbeiten bis zur Verabschiedung des Gesetzes 1952 2008. 262 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09218-0 71. Tvrtko P. Sojčić Die ,Lösung‘ der kroatischen Frage zwischen 1939 und 1945 Kalküle und Illusionen 2009. 477 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09261-6 72. Jürgen Elvert / Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora (Hg.) Kulturwissenschaften und Nationalsozialismus 2009. 922 S., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-09282-1

73. Alexander König Wie mächtig war der Kaiser? Kaiser Wilhelm II. zwischen Königsmechanismus und Polykratie von 1908 bis 1914 2009. 317 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09297-5 74. Jürgen Elvert / Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora (Hg.) Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit 2009. 308 S. mit 8 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09333-0 75. Michael Salewski Revolution der Frauen Konstrukt, Sex, Wirklichkeit 2009. 508 S. mit 34 Abb., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-09202-9 76. Stephan Hobe (Hg.) Globalisation – the State and International Law 2009. 144 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09375-0 77. Markus Büchele Autorität und Ohnmacht Der Nordirlandkonflikt und die katholische Kirche 2009. 511 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09421-4 78. Günter Wollstein Ein deutsches Jahrhundert 1848–1945. Hoffnung und Hybris Aufsätze und Vorträge 2010. 437 S. mit 2 Abb., geb. ISBN 978-3-515-09622-5 79. James Stone The War Scare of 1875 Bismarck and Europe in the Mid-1870s. With a Foreword by Winfried Baumgart 2010. 385 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09634-8 80. Werner Tschacher Königtum als lokale Praxis Aachen als Feld der kulturellen Realisierung von Herrschaft. Eine Verfassungsgeschichte (ca. 800–1918) 2010. 580 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09672-0 81. Volker Grieb / Sabine Todt (Hg.) Piraterie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart 2012. 313 S. mit 15 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10138-7

82. Jürgen Elvert / Sigurd Hess / Heinrich Walle (Hg.) Maritime Wirtschaft in Deutschland Schifffahrt – Werften – Handel – Seemacht im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 2012. 228 S. mit 41 Abb. und 4 Tab., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10137-0 83. Andreas Boldt Leopold von Ranke und Irland 2012. 28 S., kt.

ISBN 978-3-515-10198-1 84. Luise Güth / Niels Hegewisch / Knut Langewand / Dirk Mellies / Hedwig Richter (Hg.) Wo bleibt die Aufklärung? Aufklärerische Diskurse in der Postmoderne. Festschrift für Thomas StammKuhlmann 2013. 372 S. mit 12 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10423-4