Englische und kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt [1 ed.] 9783428458288, 9783428058280

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Englische und kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt

Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur kontinental europäisch en und anglo-amerikanischen Rechtsgeschichte Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. H e l m u t

Coing

und Prof. Dr. K n u t

Wolfgang

Band 1

Nörr

Englische u n d kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt

Herausgegeben von

Prof. Dr. D r . h. c. mult. H e l m u t Coing und Prof. D r . K n u t Wolfgang N ö r r

D Ü N C K E R

&

H U M B L O T

/

B E R L I N

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Englische und kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt / hrsg. v o n H e l m u t Coing u. K n u t Wolfgang Nörr. — Berlin: Duncker u n d Humblot, 1985. (Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur kontinentaleuropäischen u n d anglo-amerikanischen Rechtsgeschichte; Bd. 1) I S B N 3-428-05828-3 NE: Coing, H e l m u t [Hrsg.] ; Comparative Studies i n Continental and A n g l o - A m e r i c a n Legal History

Alle Rechte vorbehalten © 1985 Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 41 Gedruckt 1985 bei Berliner Buchdruckerei Union GmbH., Berlin 61 Printed in Germany I S B N 3-428-05828-3

Vorwort M i t dieser Reihe soll eine Tradition fortgesetzt werden, die i n den beiden großen Rechtsfamilien des kontinentalen und des anglo-amerikanischen Rechts geschichtlich eher das Verbindende als das Trennende gesehen hat; w i r nennen nur Heinrich Brunner von der einen und F. W. Maitland von der anderen Seite des Kanals. Veranlaßt wurde die Reihe durch ein Forschungsprojekt, das i m vorliegenden Heft vorgestellt wird. Aber die Reihe soll auch allen anderen Untersuchungen offenstehen, die in beliebiger Methode Verbindungen zwischen den historischen Entwicklungen der beiden Rechtskreise herstellen. Die Reihe w i l l solche Studien, auch i n fremder Sprache, auf ihre Weise ermutigen. A l l e n Dank schulden w i r der Gerda Henkel Stiftung, die das Forschungsprojekt mit großem Interesse unterstützt. Die Herausgeber

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Das Forschungsprojekt: 'Anglo-American and Continental Legal History'

9

Knut Wolf gang Nörr The European Side of the English L a w : A Few Comments from a Continental Historian Helmut

15

Coing

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European C i v i lization — Possibilities of Comparisons

Reports on the eight Working

31

Groups

I. Towards a General L a w of Contract (J. L. Barton) I I . Case-Law: Reports and Records (J. H. Baker) I I I . The J u r y (A. Padoa Schioppa)

45 49 56

I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England (Ch. Donahue) V. Defamation, Privacy (H. Hübner)

63 72

V I . England and Continental Legal Literature (P. Stein)

77

V I I . The Courts and the Development of Commercial L a w (V. Piergiovanni) V I I I . Industrial Age and the L a w (H. Coing)

82 87

Das Forschungsprojekt: 6

Anglo-American and Continental Legal History'

Anfang 1981 wandten sich die Herausgeber an mehrere Rechtshistoriker des In- und Auslands mit folgendem Schreiben: Dear Colleague, Research i n legal history has been devoted mainly to the development of the different national systems of law. I n case historical research crossed the national borders, it usually remained w i t h i n the major groups or families of legal systems such as the Germanic laws of the early Middle-Ages, or the continental descendants of the Romano-canonical ius commune (within or without the impact of Natural Law), or the Common L a w on both sides of the Atlantic. The comparative aspect of legal history and especially the question of possible interrelations between the different national systems and corresponding 'families' has not found the same interest of scholars. There are many reasons to explain this fact, one of them certainly being the access to source material. But w i t h the progress achieved i n the field of national legal histories i t seems that time has come to give the comparative aspect a greater weight. I n this respect the historical relations between the continental Civil L a w and the English Common L a w are of special importance. They should shape a new field of study for the legal historian. Both systems of law existed side by side for many centuries i n the same cultural and political sphere, and certainly there have been more relations between both systems than we actually know. A n d even where direct relations between the systems have not existed, a comparison between their developments would be of great interest for the legal historian. But the subject, challenging i n its way, presents a series of problems. The main difficulty lies i n the knowledge of the sources: no scholar may claim to be familiar w i t h all or even a part of the relevant sources on both sides, English and continental. Other difficulties are caused by the well-known diversities i n the structure of the two legal systems, and i n the methodological approach. Thus, to w i n the shore, a closer cooperation between scholars of both sides seems necessary.

10

Das Forschungsprojekt ' A n g l o - A m e r i c a n and Continental Legal History'

To initiate such cooperation, i t seems advisable to organize a small conference of British, American und Continental scholars interested i n the field. Such conference should serve the purpose to discuss on the basis of one or two introductory papers: 1. possible precise subjects of research in the comparative field described above 2. the possibility to set up one or several groups of scholars from both sides to work i n common on such more detailed subjects. The Henkel-Foundation at Düsseldorf has given us a grant which w i l l enable us to pay the travel-costs and the maintenance i n Germany for such a conference. This conference would take place at Bad Homburg (near Frankfurt am Main) i n the building of the Werner Reimers Stiftung from March 17 to March 19, 1982. We take the liberty to ask you whether you would be interested and able to participate i n this conference . . . Die Resonanz auf diesen Brief war erfreulich. Fast alle angeschriebenen Kollegen sagten zu. Ferner trafen zahlreiche Themenvorschläge ein, die etwa nach folgendem Schema geordnet werden können: 1. The beginnings a) Anglo-Saxon Volksrecht compared w i t h other Germanic and w i t h Celtic laws b) The Normandy as one of the links 2. " L a n d and Contract" a) R u r a l and urban l a w b) The English Use and the fideicommissum c) Influences of continental doctrine on the English l a w of contract d) Agency and Stellvertretung 3. The court i n action a) The function of reported decisions b) Rules of proof Praesumptiones Fictions c) Appellate review 4. Canonists' and Civilians' matters (in whole or i n part) a) Parallels and differences i n Church courts b) W i l l and testamentum c) Defamation, Privacy d) C i v i l and canon l a w i n some maxims of E q u i t y e) Notaries public

Das Forschungsprojekt 'Anglo-American and Continental Legal History' 5. Commercial l a w a) The concept of ius gentium b) Courts of A d m i r a l t y i n England and elsewhere c) The Trading Companies and the development of commercial l a w d) Stoppage i n transitu 6. Legal literature a) Continental l a w books i n England, especially humanist literature b) Influences of continental legal science i n the 18th c. c) Forms of scientific literature 7. Continental conceptions and misconceptions of the English system i n the 19th c. a) The j u r y b) The role of Gneist c) Historians bridging the Channel: The Germanisten here, and M a i t l a n d there. A m 18. u n d 19. M ä r z 1982 f a n d das erste I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o l l o q u i u m on A n g l o - A m e r i c a n and Continental Legal History' auf E i n l a d u n g der Werner Reimers S t i f t u n g i n deren R ä u m e n i n B a d H o m b u r g statt. F i n a n z i e r t w u r d e d i e T a g u n g d u r c h die G e r d a H e n k e l S t i f t u n g (Düsseldorf). F o l g e n d e H e r r e n n a h m e n a n d e m K o l l o q u i u m t e i l : Dr. John H. Baker (Cambridge), Prof. J. Barton (Oxford), Prof. R. C. van Caenegem (Gent), Prof. H. Coing (Frankfurt am Main), Prof. Ch. Donahue (Harvard), Prof. R. Feenstra (Leiden), Prof. J. Gaudemet (Paris), Prof. R. H. Helmholz (Chicago), Prof. H. Hübner (Köln), Prof. D. Jenkins (Aberystwyth), Prof. S. K u t t n e r (Berkeley), Prof. P. Landau (Regensburg), Prof. J. H. L a n g bein (Chicago), Prof. D. Maffei (Rom), Prof. K . W. N ö r r (Tübingen), Prof. A . Padoa Schioppa (Mailand), Prof. P. Stein (Cambridge), Prof. S. E. Thorne (Harvard), Dr. U l b r i c h (Gerda Henkel Stiftung), Prof. W. W i l h e l m (Frankf u r t am Main). D i e T a g u n g l i e f nach f o l g e n d e m P r o g r a m m ab: Donnerstag, 18. März, V o r m i t t a g 9.15 bis 12.30 (Vorsitz: Prof. Coing) Eröffnung des Kolloquiums durch Prof. Coing Vortrag Prof. N ö r r : The European Side of the English L a w : A Few Comments from a Continental Historian Vortrag Prof. Coing: Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization: Possibilities of Comparisons Diskussion zu den Vorträgen Nachmittag 15.30 bis 18.00 (Vorsitz: Prof. Nörr) Diskussion über die von den Teilnehmern vorgeschlagenen u n d weitere Themen; Erörterung der B i l d u n g von Arbeitsgruppen

12

Das Forschungsprojekt 'Anglo-American and Continental Legal History'

Freitag, 19. März, V o r m i t t a g 9.15 bis 12.30 (Vorsitz: Prof. Thorne) Fortsetzung der Diskussion v o m Vortage Bestimmung der Themen und der Arbeitsgruppen Schlußwort

Die Vorträge sind i n diesem Heft abgedruckt. Es bildeten sich acht Arbeitsgruppen aus Rechtshistorikern beider Rechtskreise mit folgenden Themen und Teilnehmern (nach heutigem Stand) : I. Towards a General L a w of Contract J. L . Barton, Oxford (federführend); I. Birocchi, Cagliari; H. Coing, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n ; R. Feenstra, Leiden; J. Gordley, Berkeley; R. Helmholz, Chicago; D. Ibbetson, Oxford; U. Petronio, Rom I I . Case-Law: Reports and Records J. H. Baker, Cambridge (federführend); W. H. Bryson, Richmond; G. Dolezalek, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n ; F. Ebel, Berlin; G. Gorla, Rom; J. H i laire, Paris; K . W. Nörr, Tübingen; F. Ranieri, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n ; A. Romano, Messina; J. Th. de Smidt, Leiden; G. Vallone, Rom I I I . The J u r y A. Giarda, Mailand; Th. A. Green, A n n A r b o r ; P. Landau, Regensburg; J. H. Langbein, Chicago; A. Padoa Schioppa, M a i l a n d (federführend); B. Schnapper, Poitiers I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England Ch. Donahue, H a r v a r d (federführend); P. Erdö, Esztergan; C. de Glopper-Zuijderland, Utrecht; O. Hageneder, Wien; R. Helmholz, Chicago; I. Johanek, Münster; M. Kenefick, Zürich; F. Klein, Florenz; Α. Lefebvre-Teillard, Paris; M. Le jeune, Dundee; K . Lindner, Harvard; F. D. Logan, Brookline; A. Meyer, Bern; G. Minnucci, Siena; G. Pansini, Florenz; J. J. Robertson, Dundee; I. da Rosa Pereira, Lissabon; M. Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, Gent; J. Watt, Newcastle; J. Weier, Essen V. Defamation, Privacy Ch. Chêne, Poitiers; R. Helmholz, Chicago; H. Hübner, K ö l n (federführend); K . P . Nanz, K ö l n ; A. Pérez M a r t i n , Murcia; G. d i Renzo Villata, M a i l a n d V I . England and Continental Legal Literature R. Feenstra, Leiden; K . Luig, Passau; D. Maffei, Siena; D. Osler, O x ford; Ch. Rodgers, A b e r y s t w y t h ; Ν . Simmonds, Manchester; B. Simpson, Canterbury; P. Stein, Cambridge (federführend); W. Wilhelm, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n V I I . The Courts and the Development of Commercial L a w W . D . H . Asser, Bussum; H. Coing, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n ; D.R. Coquilette, Boston; K . W. Nörr, Tübingen; V. Piergiovanni, Genua (federführend); R. Savelli, Genua V I I I . Industrial Age and the L a w H. Coing, F r a n k f u r t am M a i n (federführend); W. R. Cornish, London; N. Horn, Bielefeld; A. Padoa Schioppa, Mailand; W. Rütten, Tübingen

Das Forschungsprojekt 'Anglo-American and Continental Legal History'

Der derzeitige Stand der Arbeiten ergibt sich aus den Berichten der Arbeitsgruppen, die i n diesem Heft abgedruckt sind. Diese Arbeitsgruppen stellen nicht die einzige Möglichkeit für Forschungen i m Rahmen des Gesamtprogramms dar; erwünscht ist auch eine individuelle Bearbeitung weiterer Themen durch die Beteiligten oder durch Dritte, gegebenenfalls auch Doktoranden. I n diesem Zusammenhang hat Dr. Giulio Silano (Toronto) die Bearbeitung des Themas 'Maxims in Equity and Their Relation to Roman and Canon Law' übernommen. Die Gerda Henkel Stiftung hat dankenswerterweise auch die Finanzierung der Zusammenkünfte der Arbeitsgruppen und der erforderlichen Archivreisen zugesagt. Während dieses Heft zum Druck geht, ist eine weitere (IX.) Arbeitsgruppe i m Entstehen, die sich dem Thema „Property, marriage, and succession" widmen wird.

K N U T W O L F G A N G NÖRR

T h e E u r o p e a n Side of the Englieh L a w : A F e w Comments f r o m a C o n t i n e n t a l H i s t o r i a n This paper consists of t w o parts. The first and longer part deals w i t h some not merely insular features of the English l a w f r o m the t w e l f t h to the seventeenth century. The second and likewise sketchy part i n dicates some influences of English l a w on the continent above all during the nineteenth century. I.

To begin w i t h , we should remember that English legal history during the Middle Ages and into the Tudor period is stamped by a certain dualism, which gave England both: an insular character as w e l l as a European face. The insularity is represented, obviously, by the Common L a w , w h i l e i t was the Church which was especially responsible for the European aspect of the English law. This dualism is w e l l expressed i n St. Germain's famous figures, the Student i n the Laws of England and the Doctor of D i v i n i t y . Being a part of Christian Europe England, too, was shaped b y the s p i r i t u a l and the temporal spheres, the former being governed by the canon law, but both controlled by the rules of medieval m o r a l theology. F r o m this i t is not surprising that the ideas of the l a w of nature (in its Thomistic sense), of equity, of conscience infiltrated, time and again, into the secular sphere, i n t o its courts and its law. As the case may be, the secular side also adopted rules f r o m the l a w of the Church, that is f r o m the canones and, according to the ius utrumque shaped by the canonists, f r o m the leges . These facts, however, are not to be considered impacts f r o m outside, i n fluences foreign or continental; but i t was a matter of internal relations between different branches of the legal system i n England, some of them being particularly English, some of t h e m representing the European ius commune which had crossed the Channel. Thus the ius utrumque as administered by the Church, joined England and the continent together. These characteristics of the English legal development appeared as early as the t w e l f t h century. Much attention has been paid to this

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K n u t Wolfgang Nörr

century by modern scholars on both sides of the Channel, since no other period, i t seems, had been more open to the learned laws. But Glanvill bears witness to the fact that England was already pursuing her own course for whatever reasons. This course was kept by Bracton's 'De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae', that veritable epos of the medieval English law. As to its continental side we may refer to a remark of Fritz Schulz that Bracton's book "has not an insular but a European character and must be studied w i t h i n the framework of the European legal literature of his time" 1 . These words are somewhat misleading. To be sure, Bracton had by his side the legista Azo, but at the same time he had Glanvill as w e l l w i t h all those pleas and writs (and Bracton, inherently, could not succeed i n joining Azo and Glanvill together into a seamless arrangement of the law). Bracton's purpose was to give the English law a scholarly shape and — to use an expression of his translator — a precise technical vocabulary; besides he inserted Roman concepts whenever he considered them appropriate to his topic; also he borrowed from the leges to develop the English law s t i l l further. The adopted Roman material, however, seldom remained unchanged; basic terms such as real and personal, or possessio , or exceptio, received a different connotation. Be that as it may, Bracton did not t h i n k of romanizing the English law i n the sense of superseding the native body of law, he never intended that the English common law be merged i n the continental ius commune. W i t h all its romanesque features Bracton's book retains its insular character. I t is this character that strikes the continental historian most the moment he turns to Bracton, at least i n the province of private law. The continental lawyer must bear i n mind that he w i l l not understand Bracton i f he cannot read the plea rolls, if he is not familiar w i t h the peculiarities of the writs and actions, of the pertinent rules of evidence and procedure, and he must know about land and fief, tenure and seize (being almost a little bit a Littleton). This insularity of Bracton's treatise is confirmed if we are contrasting it w i t h another contemporary treatise, the so-called Summa aurea composed by W i l l i a m of Drogheda, a senior socius perhaps i n Oxford. For this treatise, dealing primarily w i t h procedure, is a clear offshoot of the learned laws, hence fully familiar to the continental legal historian; it includes no more regional perticularities than are to be found i n similar treatises from other parts of Europe. The work of Bracton was an impressive success, at least judging by the number of copies which were circulating. But its effect on the pro1 A New Approach to Bracton, Seminar 2 (1944) 42. Quoted by S. E. Thome i n the introduction to vol. I, p. X X V n. 12, of his edition of Bracton's treatise, and i n the lecture: Henry de Bracton 1268—1968, 1970, p. 8.

The European Side of the English L a w

17

fessional training ceased as soon as the L a w French of pleading superseded the L a t i n of the text-books, and a new era was to begin when the bench recruited from the bar. As a result the learned laws no longer played a noticeable part i n the further development of the Common Law. The Common Law, henceforth, was growing hand i n hand w i t h the art of pleading as mirrored i n the Year Books. Maitland has said about the Year Books that " i n the way of intellectual products medieval England had nothing more purely English to show than its law reports, its Year Books" 2 , and the continental lawyer can do nothing but vigorously agree. I f asked about the main differences and intricacies which strike the continental legal historian, he would not point to the cult of precedents, nor to that appealing conception of considering the individual judge and not an impersonal legal text as an authority, nor to the inns of court which take the place of the universities, nor even to the m u l t i plicity of jurisdiction and its two tracks of law and equity, but he would t u r n to the Common L a w proper and emphasize its idiom, that is the forms of action and, above all, the mode of pleading, the "heartstring of the common l a w " according to Coke, and indeed the very core, i t seems, of the English way of shaping private law and of hiding it, so to speak, from the view of the lawyer across the Channel 3 . I t is true, these comments somewhat overstate the import of pleading, yet pleading renders difficult the access to the history of the Common Law, and not just for the continental historian, as i t seems. I t is, i n this context, not the rules of pleading as such, for they are comparatively easy to grasp, at least after studying Henry John Stephen's w e l l known treatise on pleading, w r i t t e n i n 1824, another witness by the way to the influence of modern continental methods, for which we may quote the author's preface; mentioning some previous treatises he continues: "The two works last mentioned (namely Chitty and Archbold) have left very little to be added to the stock of practical information on the subject of which they treat. But neither i n these nor i n any other publication has any attempt been hitherto made to develope systematically the principles of this science, or, i n other words, to explain its scope and tendency, to select from the mass of its various rules such as seem to be of a primary and fundamental k i n d — and to trace the connection of these rules, and show their bearings as part of a general scheme or system. I t is to this object that the present work is directed" 4 . Stephen, no doubt, succeeded i n his plan of presenting a perfect system of plead2

Introduction to S. S. 17 for 1903, p. 9. Cf. Nörr, Über Pleading i n den ersten Year Books, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 49 (1981) 349 ff. 4 A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading i n C i v i l Actions, ed. 1845, p. V I I . 8

2 Coing/Nörr

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K n u t Wolfgang Nörr

ing, but his s k i l l to a certain extent hides the main intricacies which lie, if I am not mistaken, i n the concrete application of these rules w i t h regard to the actions and defences, i n the manner pleading worked i n detail to develop a certain legal concept, generally i n the interplay of pleading and substantive law. A catchword, of course, is tentative pleading as far as the Year Book period is concerned; subsequently one has to turn, among other things, to the books of entries. As to them i t is comforting to read even i n an English legal history of today that their learning is difficult to extract 5 ; it is, however, less encouraging to learn from Winfield that "there is no duller reading i n the whole range of our law" 0 . Anyway, the continental historian should passably find his way through the pleading as reported in the modern editions of the Year Books of Edward I and Edward II. But for the later periods, when pleading was growing i n subtlety and mannerisms, becoming, to use Hale's words, "a piece of nicety and curiosity", the continental historian sometimes feels lost, and he would like to ask for help from an English lawyer. I n this respect some cooperation seems desirable, if the comparison of a given rule or doctrine of the Common Law is intended. I n order to discover i n the later Middle Ages some notable influence of the ius utrumque one has to leave the Common L a w courts and to t u r n to other jurisdictions 7 such as the Parliament i n criminal causes or the King's Council and its offshoots and above all, of course, to the Equity side of the Chancery. This jurisdiction, inconspicuous i n its origins, became a court that was largely framed by certain ideas of a moral or theological provenance, and ideas common to the medieval society. I n the wake of these ideas canonical procedure may have entered the Chancery, but another consideration is more likely, and quite a simple one. To the medieval mind procedure was primarily the law of a court and not so much the law of a land. So the Chancery could develop its own procedure independent of the Common Law, though some of its forms were adopted. The Chancery was free to look for the most suitable procedure and also to borrow from the neighbouring ecclesiastical courts; one advantage was the 'undivided' judge, for conscience and equity were no matters to be carried ad patriam. The chancellor's opportunity owes something to the dualism of averment and demurrer, j u r y and bench, fact and law, which is characteristic of the Common L a w and not nearly so distinct i n Romano-canonical procedure. As to substantive law, a promising topic seems to be the evolution of the use, especially since the thesis proposed by Salmond 8 has been 5 6 7

J. H. Baker , A n Introduction to English Legal History, 19792, p. 161. P. H. Winfield , The Chief Sources of English Legal History, 1925, p. 305. Cf. J. L. Barton , Roman L a w i n England I R M A e V 13a, 1971.

The European Side of the English L a w

19

recently revived and improved 9 that the doctrine of consideration i n the law of contract has its ancestor i n the idea of consideration as developed w i t h i n the law of uses. This leads us to the rise of Assumpsit i n the 16th century, where a connection w i t h the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over breach of sworn promises has been suggested 10 . Also w i t h regard to other subjects i t has been shown that the decline of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction has had some effect on the evolution of the law i n the Common L a w courts. These observations have taken us from the Middle Ages to the Tudor period. The question duly arises what influences, i f any, renaissance and legal humanism have exerted on the main branches of the English legal system, on Common L a w and Equity. This question has, for a time, been narrowed down, i n a way, by the famous thesis i n Maitland's Rede lecture "that i n the second quarter of the sixteenth century the continuity of English legal history was seriously threatened" by a reception of the Roman law. The discussion about this contention has grown (I beg your pardon) into a sort of a domestic difference which a continental historian should not meddle with. He may suggest two quite simple questions: Is there any direct influence of the spirit of the new era, and: is there an influence exerted by the civilians who were leaning upon the continental humanist literature as w e l l as on the medieval writing? The first question recently has been put w i t h i n a wider compass, on occasion of the edition of Spelman's reports. The editor has arranged certain headings, some of which we can use as a guide 11 . One heading is the literary form and method. There was a growing number of common lawyers attending the universities who brought along some humanist learning to the inns of court and to legal writing. Some writers were impressed by the Ramist method; thus John Perkin or Lord Ellesmere or Henry Finch were considerably affected by Ramism, as shown lately by Knafla and Prest 12 . Or, method 8 J. W. Salmond, L a w Quarterly Rev. 3 (1887) 173 f.; Essays i n Jurisprudence and Legal History, 1891, p. 213 ff. 9 B y A.W.B. Simpson , A History of the Common L a w of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 1975. Cf. also Baker , Origins of the 'Doctrine' of Consideration, i n : On the Laws and Customs of England, Essays i n Honor of Samuel E. Thome, 1981, p. 351; reviewed b y R. H. Helmholz , H a r v a r d L a w Rev. 95 (1982) 731 f. 10 Helmholz , Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, L a w Quarterly Rev. 91 (1975) 406 ff . 11 Baker , The Reports of Sir John Spelman, Introduction to vol. I I (S. S. 94 for 1977), 1978, p. 28 ff. 12 L. A. Knafla , L a w and Politics i n Jacobean England: The Tracts of L o r d Chancellor Ellesmere, 1977, p. 40 ff. — W. Prest , The Dialectical Origins of Finch's L a w , Cambridge L a w Jornal 36 (1977) 326 ff. The A r t of L a w and the L a w of God: Sir Henry Finch, i n : Puritans and Revolutionaries, Essays Presented to Christopher H i l l , 1978, p. 94 ff.

2*

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K n u t Wolfgang Nörr

books were published for the instruction of common law students as well, by authors such as Fulbecke or Dodderidge 13 . Another item is the historical approach. Its import and scale is somewhat at issue as the debate on Kelley's article shows 14 . No one, however, is questioning the favorable part played by the printing press i n the return to earlier English sources such as Bracton. I f we follow, for a moment, Bracton's influence i n later periods 15 i t is for political reasons that they read h i m again, or for reasons of mere legal doctrine as i n Coggs v. Bernard (1703)1®. When Holt cites Bracton at some length he, of course, is not echoing a humanist learning nor a belated romanization, but he takes Bracton as an authority of the Common Law, though confessedly an old one, i n order to reshape the law of bailments. A t h i r d point to consider is legislation as a means to improve society 17 . — Other aspects may be added, and some effect of the new spirit may be observable, but scarcely a sweeping one, at least to judge from that hero of the Common Law, Chief Justice Coke who seriously called Littleton's Of Tenures from some onehundred and fifty years ago "the most perfect and absolute work that ever was w r i t t e n i n any human science", an all too revealing document on the radius of the common lawyer's outlook. Fortunately, however, we need not generalize. The other, the European side, of the coin is stamped, since the Elizabethan age, by a thorough historical awareness, and by increasing dedication to the new scientific approaches. These currents are represented by common lawyers such as Matthew Hale, to mention but the recently most discussed among the major figures. Still, the question remains how the case law, administered by the very same men, was influenced by these movements, and especially whether the methods of law finding and law reporting have changed, and to what noticeable extent. The second problem we hinted at before, is the effect of the civilians and their works on the evolution of the Common Law. The foundation of the Regius chairs stood for a certain official recognition of the civilians' study. But their relation to the common lawyers was to suffer fatally from the constitutional struggles. Much attention has been paid lately to the civilians of the seventeenth and eighteenth century on 13 R . J . Terrill , Humanism and Rhetoric i n Legal Education: The Contribution of Sir John Dodderidge, Journal of Legal History 2 (1981) 30 ff. 14 D.R. Kelley , History, English L a w , and the Renaissance, i n : Past and Present 65 (1974) 24 ff.; the debate on this i n 72 (1976) 133 ff. Cf. also A.B. Ferguson , Clio Unbound: Perception of the social and cultural past i n Renaissance England, 1979, especially p. 259 ff. 15 See n o w D.E.C. Yale , O f No Mean A u t h o r i t y ' : Some Later Uses of Bracton, i n : On the Laws and Customs of England (supra, n. 8), p. 383 ff. 16 2 Ld. Raym. 909 = 92 E. R. 107. 17 Cf. G.R. Elton , English L a w i n the Sixteenth Century: Reform i n an Age of Change (Seiden Society Lecture), 1979.

The European Side of the English L a w

21

both sides of the Channel, that is to their writings, to their political attitudes and to the law courts to which they were attached. By and large the historians agree that the civilians played their part i n the communication w i t h the continent i n matters political, commercial, and military, whereas their contribution to the intramural development was altogether small, except i n the domains traditionally ruled by the ecclesiastical courts. I t is true, the civilians had been consulted by the Common L a w courts, and, what is more, they were employed w i t h the Chancery, especially as Masters, and they filled the prerogative (a royalist would say: the other prerogative) courts; but their impact on the substantive law as administered by the Common L a w courts and in Equity was rather slight compared w i t h the home-bred law (apart from due exceptions again such as matters shifting from the ecclesiastical courts to the Chancery). B u t w i l l this question ever be definitely settled? A l l o w me to quote as a witness of the intricacy, some remarks i n Turner's 'Equity redemption' (1931) about an unconscious application of theories of the Roman law: " I n the Roman system we have the theory that the pledge was but a security for money; we also find it, previous to its appearance i n Chancery, i n the common law. Doubtless the Chancellor knew of this Roman conception of the pledge, as did also the common-lawyer. Yet i t is more than probable that when they evolved the theory for their present purpose, they did not consciously adopt the Roman precedent, but rather applied what they thought was an English principle, perhaps unconsciously derived from the Roman system" 18 . These remarks are quite vague, but is i t possible to render them more conclusive? There seems to be little chance of that, and this, if I am not mistaken, on account of the language, of the terminology used by the common lawyers. How are we able to disclose civilians' doctrines i n a legal idiom so remote, despite Bracton's efforts, from the civilians' terms? The task would be a painstaking and minute one, and might prove fruitless. Up to now we have left out the evolution of the commercial law which was, at least for a few centuries, embedded i n the general European development. The access to this branch of the law is somewhat inconvenient mainly for two reasons. Firstly there was almost no court or type of court, and England was a jungle of jurisdictions, which had not been engaged i n mercantile matters, some longer, some less: all the local courts such as the courts of the boroughs, of the fairs, the courts of the Staple from Westminster to Limerick, and the courts i n the Cinque Ports of Sussex and Kent; and i n the headquarters the Council and the conciliar courts, above all the court of Admiralty, and the Chancery and last not least the common law courts. The second 18

Op. cit. p. 117.

22

K n u t W o l f gang N ö r r

inconvenience arises from the fact that the boundaries between the law merchant and the common law were constantly shifting during the centuries, and that w i t h results which were different from the continental model. The common law was from the beginning keyed chiefly to law-suits concerning matters of land and fief; thus, although the merchants generally had access also to the common law courts 19 , a separate mercantile law was growing out of local customs, i n maritime affairs enriched by the Rôles d'Oleron. I n order to follow the further development from the viewpoint of a continental historian i t is useful, perhaps, to distinguish roughly between three domains of the law merchant. 1. The law merchant i n relation to internal trade. Apparently i n this area the law merchant never was felt to be a stranger staying strictly outside the common law. Thus the only known medieval treatise on the lex mercatoria, which dates from about 1280 (and is passed on to us i n the L i t t l e Red Book of Bristol), styles the common l a w "mater legis mercatorie" which "suam filiam ex certis privilegiis et i n certis locis dotavit" 2 0 . Be that as i t may this section, i n the sixteenth century, was more or less absorbed into the common law and ruled by the common law courts. 2. The law merchant i n relation to foreign trade. I n this domain the decisive part was played by the court of Admiralty at its height under the Tudors and early Stuarts; Malynes' w e l l known treatise appeared i n 1622. The admiral's patents and the enactments of Henry V I I I gave to the court a wide jurisdiction, covering inter alia the main matters of foreign trade and shipping 2 1 such as bills of exchange or charter parties or average or insurance, and generally all contracts either made or performable abroad. The court was manned by civilians, who applied the continental doctrines. A second intermediary of continental mercantile law was arbitration, often preferred by the merchants, and more than once ordered by the Council; the merchants themselves acted as arbitrators, sometimes assisted by the civilians. A t h i r d factor was a k i n d of domestic jurisdiction conceded to trading companies. These judicial and arbitral bodies represent the first formative period of the English commercial law, a fact that is of some import to our subject. 19 Cf. for instance A. Beardwood t A l i e n Merchants i n England 1350 to 1377: Their Legal and Economic Position, 1931, p. 76 ff. 20 Quoted by Holdsworth I p. 539 n. 5; L. S. Sutherland, The L a w Merchant i n England i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., vol.17, 1934, p. 152; cf. P. JR. Teetor, England's Earliest Treatise on the L a w Merchant, American Journal of Legal History 6 (1962) 193. 21 Cf. R. G. Marsden, Introduction to S. S. 6 for 1892, 1894, p. 67.

The European Side of the English L a w

23

But the jurisdiction of the court of Admiralty over commercial causes did not last. The attack of Coke and his supporters is w e l l known as is the continuation and the end of the struggle: the court of Admiralty survived the critical year of 1641, but soon after the restoration 22 i t was confined to mere maritime matters, losing almost all of its previous commercial business except for certain cases of bottomry and hypothecation of the ship, ransom contracts and the like, and besides actions for mariner's wages. The bulk of its jurisdiction was seized by the common law courts, and the commercial law of the merchants and civilians was gradually merged i n the common law. Thus a second absorption of the law merchant took place. Henceforth foreign trade, too, was governed by the common law, and by Equity especially i n causes connected w i t h account 23 such as partnership. By the same token the common law was moulded into its modern shape. Thus the second formative period of the English commercial law, the period of Holt and Mansfield, means at the same time the renewal of the common law; the law of contract (in its broadest sense) gained an equal footing w i t h the law of land and fief. The commercial needs called forth some special fields of law such as negotiable instruments or insurance, beyond this they contributed to the shaping of some of the rules which govern the core of private law, for instance vicarious liability. These topics were developed i n the technical environment of the common law, even i n case the merchants and civilians had prepared the ground on continental lines. There might have been a continuity, but hidden behind a different reasoning and construction. We may quote Marsden: Before the common law courts "had finally established their supremacy, many points of maritime law that were afterwards painfully elaborated by the common lawyers had for at least a century been familiar to the civilians." The Westminster Courts elaborated this law "without much reference to the previous decisions of the Admiralty. These were probably treated as decisions of an inferior court that had no jurisdiction. Nevertheless the common law, w i t h tardy steps, followed the Admiralty i n many of its decisions, perhaps unconsciously, and certainly without acknowledgment" 24 . Tracing these lines presents some difficulties as i t seems. Continental thought might have entered the common law courts through mercantile custom, which the common law judges payed attention to. Its part i n the amalgamation has been shown by Street i n regard to bills of exchange 25 . 22 Yale, A V i e w of the A d m i r a l Jurisdiction: Sir M a t t h e w Hale and the Civilians, i n : Legal History Studies 1972, ed. D. Jenkins, 1975, p. 100 f. 23 Cf. for instance Yale, L o r d Nottingham's M a n u a l of Chancery Practice and Prolegomena of Chancery and Equity, 1965, p. 269 ff. 24 Introduction to S. S. 11 for 1897, p. 80.

24

K n u t W o l f gang Nörr

I n a case of 1621, it was said that "the custome of merchants is part of the common law of this kingdome, of which the Judges ought to take notice: and i f any doubt arise to them about there custome, they may send for the merchants to know there custome, as they may send for the civillians to know there l a w " 2 6 . For a long time the customs of the merchants had to be specially pleaded and, if necessary, to be proved. — A further question may be the role of the jus gentium as a title for the recognition of the foreign traders' customs and the pertinent continent a l doctrines, a question still unsolved (despite some general points in Mrs. Sutherland's study). 3. The law merchant i n relation to maritime matters. This section is only of marginal importance, since the court of Admiralty had lost almost all of its commercial jurisdiction to the successful common law courts. Thus the area of a particular maritime law as distinct from the common law is small i n comparison w i t h the subjects ruled i n the Ordonnance de la marine of 1681 and i n the relevant parts of the later continental commercial codes. The extension of the Admiralty's jurisdiction i n the Victorian reign lies outside the formative periods of the English commercial law. The fate of the commercial law, its integration into the common law, explains perhaps w h y the history of the English law merchant has not been written as yet, although England i n modern times was a trading nation. We have to gather the parts from various publications: from some important monographs 27 , from the valuable introductions i n the pertinent volumes of the Seiden Society, and from the informative sections i n Holdsworth's History, whose intention, however, was not to reproduce a coherent history of the commercial law. I n Holdsworth's as w e l l as, of course, i n Maitland's History we can find a good many references to the continental developments i n all fields of law, and the same applies to Plucknett's Concise History, which announced i t necessary "to place the history of English law i n its setting of canon, civil, and general European law i n order to show the intellectual influences which have moulded our own system; comparison w i t h other legal systems is therefore essential to the method here pursued". This view, however, has been recently abandoned, Milsom 25 The Foundations of Legal L i a b i l i t y , 1906, I I 347 ff. Cf. also J. M. Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments i n English L a w , 1955. 26 Vanheath v. Turner, Winch 24 = 124 E. R. 20. 27 Of recent studies w e mention Baker, The L a w Merchant and the Common L a w before 1700, Cambridge L a w Journal 38 (1979) 295 ff.; D.R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation I I , Boston L a w Rev. 61 (1981) 315 ff.

The European Side of the English L a w

25

and parts of his school have been become thoroughly insular again, expanding the Channel to an ocean vaster than the Atlantic. II.

Our observations on some continental flavour i n the English legal development can easily be continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth century; also the 'attraction of the civil law' (the title of a recent publication) 28 i n North America should be taken into account. But our heading — the European side of the English law — also implies another angle, the influence of Anglo-American law on the continental legal systems. Towards the end of the seventeenth century we may expect the beginning of an influence, corresponding to the general course which was turning England, i n many respects, into a model, or even an ideal for the continent. There is no need to repeat the fact that the so-called Glorious Revolution coincided almost exactly w i t h the repeal of the Edict of Nantes and the expulsion of the Huguenots who were to publicize English political and constitutional ideas and institutions all over Europe. Nor have we to repeat that the European Enlightenment had one of its main roots i n English philosophy. Even in art, since the late eighteenth century, England has been able to inspire the continent, if we think of the English landscape garden, or the gothic revival. The English influence on the continental law was neither coherent nor continuous; the premises of the spreading were divergent as were its modes and its results. Thus we cannot reduce the effects to a common denominator. From the inventory which does not exist we may choose and show, i n rough outlines, five opportunities for English legal influences. 1. The political and constitutional ideas as such are not the subject of this conference. But we should bear i n mind that according to the somewhat romantic view, the Common L a w as a whole ranked as a warrant for political and individual freedom. Also for this reason Blackstone's Commentaries have been translated into French and into German. As for the enthusiasm about English constitution may I cite an ironical footnote i n the preface of the German translation of 1822 where a less enthusiastic publication is compared to the advocatus diaboli i n case the canonization of the English constitution should be tried 2 9 . 28 P. Stein , The A t t r a c t i o n of the C i v i l L a w i n Post-Revolutionary America, V i r g i n i a L a w Rev. 52 (1966) 403 ff. 29 N. Falck, Vorrede zu: W. Blackstone's Handbuch des Englischen Rechts, i m Auszuge v o n John Gifford, aus dem Englischen von H. F. C. v. Colditz, Schleswig 1822, I p. V.

26

K n u t Wolfgang Nörr

I n the wake of constitutional ideas some concepts, inter alia, of judiciary and procedure spread to the continent and impressed many politicians and lawyers. English institutions were included i n a vast literature on procedural reforms w r i t t e n by more or less competent people. The most discussed institution was the English j u r y i n criminal as w e l l as i n c i v i l cases. A further topic was, for instance, the alternative: single judge or bench. English authors were quoted, most frequently Bentham; he was for some decades the fashionable authority. Bentham's significance, of course, was not confined to questions concerning the judicial system; a book on English influences should perhaps include a separate chapter on Bentham's role, successful or not, i n the continental discussions about l a w reform. From the literature on procedural reforms which focused on English institutions we shall mention only one French and one German example. Academic awards were, since the Enlightenment, a favorite means of encouraging suggestions on amendments. Thus the Académie des sciences morales et politiques launched competitions concerning the reform of procedure, once i n 1850 and again i n 1879. The theme of the latter competition was the historical comparison of French and English procedure i n order to gather suggestions de lege ferenda 30. The result of this competition was certainly not meagre judging by no less than six tomes of Ernest Glasson's Histoire d u droit et des institutions de l'Angleterre; yet i t was the voluminosity of a rather superficial description. — A lively place for reform discussions were the legislative bodies. Thus i n 1906 the Prussian Herrenhaus listened to an address of its member Franz Adickes, mayor of Frankfurt am Main, on judicial reforms, especially on the judiciary as a division of the c i v i l service 31 . His censure and his proposals were i n a w a y to carry on Gneist's endeavours, and they were based on observations of the Anglo-Scottish judicial scene. The address provoked a number of noteworthy studies on the English institutions, breaking off only w i t h the W o r l d War. 2. A t the beginning of our period England was on her way becoming the leading trading and seafaring nation. B u t u n l i k e economic theory, the influence of English l a w i n the domain of commerce was rather small at first. The Netherlands are the nearest example. For a century, between roughly 1680 and 1780, the two countries maintained generally close political and commercial relations, and the Netherlands had similar interests i n mercantile and maritime matters. Also, during the 30 Cf. Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques 112 (1879 II), p. 118. 31 Published as: Grundlinien durchgreifender Justizreform: Betrachtungen und Vorschläge unter Verwertung englisch-schottischer Rechtsgedanken, 1906.

The European Side of the English L a w

27

Stuart period, quite a few lawyers went into exile there. A n outside observer, perhaps, would expect some noticeable influence of English law. But he would be disappointed. The native as well as the continental tradition was too strong, and just lately strengthened by the new Natural Law school. I n the Dutch literature on commercial law, both doctrinal and practical, you can find far more references to German, French, Italian, or Spanish sources than to English ones. That is at least the result of the existing studies above all of Hecht 32 and of Lichtenauer 33 . Still, there are a few influences, for example i n the law of insurance 34 . I n 1800 a draft of assurantierecht was composed i n connection w i t h the planned codification, which occasionally uses Park's System of the law of marine insurance (a book which afterwards was even translated into Dutch) 35 . The French codes, of course, were little or not at all impressed by the Common Law. B y and large we may assume that the great codifications were more f i r m l y rooted i n their heritage than the statutes which had to settle specific and often new questions, and which were better prepared to look i n a l l directions for the best possible solution. A t any rate the statutes of the nineteenth century were w i l l i n g to adopt provisions of the English law, at least when the French codes had lost their overwhelming effect. This did not happen before the second half of the century. Afterwards, however, the English influence on continental regulations i n the fields of commerce became manifold and intense. A significant example, as has been pointed out recently, is the limited company 38 . The English Acts on joint stock companies since 1844 influenced the French legislation of the sixties and, partly directly, partly through the French regulations, the German reform i n 1870. There are many other examples, such as the check, the patent or the trade mark. I n a broad sense, the law of bankruptcy counts among the sections of commercial law. Although the German Konkursordnung of 1877 is based on the gemeine Recht and the Code de commerce, it is also 32 F. Hecht, E i n Beitrag zur Geschichte der Inhaberpapiere i n den Niederlanden, 1869; (Hecht-)Kohler, Niederländisches Handelsrecht i n der B l ü t e zeit des Freistaates, Z H R 59 (1907), 243 ff., 505 ff. 33 Geschiedenis van de wetenschap van het handelsrecht i n Nederland tot 1809, 1956, especially p. 15 ff., 47 ff. 34 C. van Nieveit, Bronnen van de Nederlandse codificatie van het zee- en assurantierecht 1798—1822, Diss. 1978. 35 B y J. van der Linden, 1814 (incomplete). — As to m a r i t i m e law and the translation of P. le Clercq, 1757, cf. Lichtenauer, p. 49 f. 36 Ν. Reich, Die E n t w i c k l u n g des deutschen Aktienrechts i m 19. J a h r h u n dert, lus Commune 2 (1969), 239 ff.; H. Coing, Rechtsvergleichung als G r u n d lage von Gesetzgebung i m 19. Jahrhundert, lus Commune 7 (1978), 168 ff.

28

K n u t Wolfgang N ö r r

enriched by regulations on the model of Anglo-American law, for instance w i t h regard to the Absonderungsrecht (preferential right of secured creditors). The motives of the Konkursordnung contain coherent summaries of the English and the North American law according to the Bankruptcy Acts of 1869 and 1867 respectively i n order to prepare the ground for the frequent references. 3. I n the second half of the nineteenth century a further opportunity presented itself, this time under the heading of the Privatautonomie. The practice increased i n formulating standardized contractual terms. English conceptions prevailed, for reasons w e l l known, i n maritime trade. Thus English charter-parties or bills of lading were used on the continent even in contracts without any relation to English trade 37 . Consequently the courts which had to construe the English standard clauses consulted the pertinent English textbooks and decisions. This applies at least to German courts such as the Oberappellationsgericht i n Lübeck which was the appelate court of the three Hanseatic towns, or since 1870 the court i n Leipzig. But also i n cases without any English stipulations, the practice of the courts at times was influenced by English conceptions, for instance i n regard to the liability of the shipowner for the tug's crew according to the maxim "the tug is the servant of the tow" 3 8 . A second item of Privatautonomie i n this field is the international unification of legal rules i n the shape of a lex contractus. Here, too, the English conceptions were predominant. The first example was the famous York-Antwerp Rules of 1864 and later, which settle some issues of the general average, thus constituting a kind of a modern Lex Rhodia de iactu. Private endeavours like these sometimes led to international conventions; i n this connection the Hague Rules (Brussels Convention 1924) should be mentioned which restricted the liability exemption clauses i n bills of lading, following the American Harter Act of 1893. 4. The English economical development was the laboratory for the whole continent, to quote an apt remark of L u j o Brentano 39 . Thus i n labour law considerable influences are likely. Among the branches of labour law the English factory laws (Arbeiterschutzgesetzgebung) exercised, it seems, the strongest influence on the continental legislation. 37 Cf. H. Wüstendörfer, Neuzeitliches Seehandelsrecht m i t besonderer Berücksichtigung des englischen u n d des internationalen Rechts, 1947, p. 27 ( w i t h references). 38 See, for example, L G Hamburg, Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung 1886 Hauptblatt, Nr. 8; R G 20. 84, 87 (1887). 39 L. Brentano, Z u r Geschichte der englischen Gewerkvereine (Die A r b e i tergilden der Gegenwart I), 1871, p. V I I .

The European Side of the English Law

29

May I just quote a comment of the economist Stephan Bauer, director of the International Labour Office i n Basel, later Geneva; alluding to the English model of the continental factory law he states: "This is the great process of the reception of the British labour l a w whose effect on mankind is at least as momentous as the reception of the Roman law of property and obligations" 40 . 5. As a last though not least category we should indicate that branch of legal comparison which did not confine itself to foreign legislation, but considered foreign conceptions and tenets i n order to reshape the doctrin of a legal institution. The point is, i n other words, the influence of English and American thought and institutions on the continental legal science. I should like to mention just two examples. First the private international law. I n this field a new era was to begin w i t h Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, of 1834. Story was the first to suggest the label Private International L a w 4 1 which was then introduced into German and French 42 . What is more important: Story's presentation of the subject-matter highly impressed the continental writers. I n France his conceptions were adopted by Foelix 4 3 . I n Germany his book was recommended by Mittermaier and, above all, consulted by Savigny. No doubt, Savigny's premise was different, but his exposition bears witness of a constant dialogue w i t h Story 4 4 ; and Story is the only author to be quoted i n Savigny's preface, surely a rare honour. A second example is trust. The pandectist Regelsberger, who devised the concept of the fiduziarische Rechtsgeschäft 45, was not yet aware of the English trust. The first to include the trust, if I am not mistaken, was the indefatigable Joseph Kohler i n an article on foundations (1890)46. 40 5. Bauer , Arbeiterschutzgesetzgebung, i n : Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften I, 19234, p. 403: „Das ist der große Prozeß der Rezeption des britischen Arbeitsrechtes, der an Tragweite f ü r die Menschheit mindestens so wichtig ist w i e die Übernahme u n d U m b i l d u n g des römischen Eigentumsund Obligationenrechts". — I am indebted to Dr. Rütten, Tübingen, for tracing this and the foregoing quotation. — Cf. also Th. Mayer-Maly, Die exemplarische Bedeutung des englischen Arbeitsrechts, i n : I n memoriam Otto Kahn-Freund, 1980, p. 563 ff. 41 § 9, ed. 1834, p. 9. 42 E. Zitelmann, Der Name »internationales Privatrecht 4 , Niemeyers Zeitschrift f ü r internationales Recht 27 (1918), 177 ff. 43 Cf. La Pradelle, A l'occasion d'un centenaire, Nouvelle Revue de droit internationale privé 10 (1943), 16 ff. 44 Cf. for example M. Gutzwiller, Der Einfluß Savignys auf die E n t w i c k lung des Internationalprivatrechts, 1923, p. 110 ff. 45 Regelsberger, Z w e i Beiträge zur Lehre von der Cession, A r c h i v f ü r die civilistische Praxis 63 (1880), 157 ff. Cf. Coing , Die Treuhand k r a f t privaten Rechtsgeschäfts, 1973, p. 35 ff. 46 Archiv für bürgerliches Recht 3 (1890), 228 ff., especially 269 ff.

30

K n u t Wolfgang N ö r r

A strong impulse came, i n a certain roundabout way, from the modern American trust and its relevant legislation 47 . The American events met w i t h a lively response of continental economists and lawyers. I n this context also the development and conception of the trust proper was noticed. I n Germany the fundamental comparative study 4 8 was written by Heymann i n 191049. But I am about to enter the domain of the following paper. Our remarks have been of a somewhat fragmentary nature, and so are not to be summed up. Each participant could easily complete and perfect this sketch which was merley a tentative approach to some of the questions lying ahead.

47 Cf. for example Emily Kempin, A r c h i v f ü r bürgerliches Recht 7 (1893), 334 ff. — See also Fritz Blaich, Die Rolle der amerikanischen Antitrustgesetzgebung i n der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion Deutschlands zwischen 1890 u n d 1914, Ordo 22 (1971), 229 ff. 48 According to W. Siebert, Das rechtsgeschäftliche Treuhand Verhältnis, 1933, p. 53 η. 1. 49 E. Heymann, Trustee u n d Trustee-Company i m deutschen Rechtsverkehr, i n : Festschrift Heinrich Brunner, 1910, p. 473 ff.

H E L M U T COING

Common L a w and C i v i l Law i n the Development of European Civilization — Possibilities of Comparisons — I. Whoever attempts to compare Common L a w and C i v i l Law w i l l immediately t h i n k of the famous book of Buckland and Mac Nair, Roman L a w and Common L a w (2nd edition 1965). I n the preface of the first edition 1936 the authors define the purpose of their book i n the following way: " I t (the book) is rather a comparison of some of the leading rules and institutions of the t w o systems."

These words show clearly, that the book has been meant as a study i n Comparative Law, and i n fact, we find in one of the paragraphs of the same preface an expert statement of this intention: " O u r belief is t h a t one of the m a i n j u r i d i c a l features of this century must be a big advance i n the comparative study of l a w . "

Such an intention implies that the study has to follow the canons developed by the science of comparative law generally, i. e. it has to compare different solutions to given problems of legal regulation. Indeed, the authors acknowledge expressly that they have intended to follow the method of comparative law: " O u r interest lies . . . i n examining the independent approach of the t w o peoples and t h e i r lawyers to the same facts of h u m a n life, sometimes w i t h w i d e l y different, sometimes w i t h substantially identical results."

I f one chooses this approach to a comparison between Common Law and C i v i l Law, one is completely free i n the selection of problems which one wishes to compare. I t may be a question of substantive law, for example the transfer of title under a sales contract, but i t can be also a more general question somewhat jurisprudention i n nature like actio and writ to quote the title of the well-known book of Professor Hans Peter.

32

Helmut Coing

One is also free i n the selection of the periods out of which the solutions to be compared are taken. Buckland and Mac Nair have taken the Roman L a w as developed i n antiquity (classical and Justinian) on the one side and modern English Common Law, under exclusion of American Law, on the other side. Of course, they could have chosen quite different periods, for example the solutions developed by the School of Pandectists i n Germany and the Common L a w of the 19th century — besides a possibility discussed by Buckland and Mac Nair i n their introduction. Of course, the results of the comparision would be quite different if such another term of comparison had been selected. Their remark, for instance, that Roman L a w had developed law of contracts but no general law of contract is quite correct, if antique Roman L a w is taken as the basis for the comparison. B u t i t would not be true if one considers the ius commune of the 17th century or, of course, that of the Pandectists. The same applies to the statement on page 60 (2nd edition): "The distinction of free-hold and lease-hold interests to exist i n Roman L a w . For, the t e r m of Years was not i n land at all: i t was throughout the Roman L a w only giving i n general no remedies proprietory or possessory

can hardly be said creating an interest a contractual right against the parties."

This is correct, if one compares locatio conductio of the classical times w i t h modern English law. B u t again, the result would be quite different, if the comparison would have been made w i t h the ius commune of, let us say, the 16th century. For, at that time ius commune knew, t h e so-called locatio

conductio

ad longum

tempus,

w h i c h was i n t e r p r e t e d

as a locatio conductio over 10 years at least, and this locatio conductio ad longum tempus gave the tenant for years dominium utile protected b y rei vindicatio

a n d actio

negatoria.

II.

I don't want to contend that such studies are not useful. The two books I mentioned, that of Buckland Mac Nair and that of Hans Peter, are evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, I want to suggest another and more historical approach for such comparative studies between Englisch and C i v i l Law. I should like to propose to give such comparative studies a concrete historical framework and to compare the legal solutions found i n both legal systems on the background of the development of European Civilization. 1. The term European Civilization calls for some brief remarks to clarify in which sense it is used here.

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization

33

First of all, I want to stress, that the term civilization is taken i n the broadest possible sense, including religious, philosophical, political ideas as w e l l as factual developments i n economy and society. Of course, I shall not t r y to develop before you what European Civilization substantially means. But some clarifications seem appropriate. a) The common foundations of our civilization are Christianity and greco-roman civilization of antiquity. The christian religion has reached Europe, if we take the word i n its geographical meaning, i n two forms. The eastern countries belong to the greek-orthodox church. Western and central Europe received Christianity from the Roman Church. This fact is fundamental for the understanding of European Civilization, even for the history of our legal institutions. I n the East the language of theology and higher education was Greek, up to 1453, the date of the fall of Konstantinopel. There was no interruption i n the tradition of greek literature and philosophy. I n the west, the language of educated men has been up to the 18th century L a t i n and for long centuries the peoples of the west had access to the treasures of the antique civilization only by L a t i n literature or L a t i n versions of Greek works. I t is due to this fact, that Europe is divided i n an Eastern and a Central and Western part, the dividing line being determined by the frontiers of the L a t i n and the Orthodox Church. Roughly, it goes from Venice to Leningrad, whereas countries like Hungary and Poland belong to the West. The division between the Orthodox and the L a t i n Churches became fundamental for the cultural division in Europe. As far as the influence of antiquity is concerned; it is important to stress the fact, that i n the West the tradition has been interrupted during the so-called dark centuries and that then, beginning w i t h the Carolingian Renaissance, a sequence of attempts followed to understand classical culture anew. I only mention here the development which Haskins has called the Renaissance of the 12th century and then the Humanism of the Quatrocento of the Italian Renaissance. b) European Civilization — it is well-known — has evolved i n a group of different nations, but, on the whole i n the same sequence of historical periods. A l l European nations have known the period of medieval feudalism w i t h its differentiation i n different classes (nob i l i t y and peasants), w i t h the power of the universal catholic church, w i t h the raise of towns and international commerce since the 12th century. They have then known the raise of the monarchical state, of the state as a bureaucratic organization headed by kings and princes since the 15th century. I mention the Tudor monarchy i n England, the french and the spanish monarchy. 3 Coing/Nörr

34

H e l m u t Coing

They went through the troubles of the religious scission i n the 16th century. They all had the age of reason i n the late 17th and the 18th century and finally they were confronted w i t h the process of industrialization and democratization; they had their liberal and their socialist movements. Certainly, i t is true that these developments did not take place at the same time i n all European nations. There are timelags. I t is wellknown for example, that the modern state as an organization has been developed much earlier i n such countries as Spain and France and also England than i n Germany. Industrialization began i n Great B r i t a i n at least i n 1780 whereas i n Germany i t began only 60 years later, around 1840. Still, there can be no doubt, that all Western nations went through the same evolution i n their ideological and their material culture. 2. Now what I have i n mind is to compare legal developments which took place i n most legal systems here to be considered, w i t h i n this general framework; or, to put i t more precisely, to ask the question how the problems the different periods of European development brought up, were solved i n both systems: the Common L a w system and the Civil L a w system. This approach I think has some important implications. a) Of course, such studies would remain comparative studies. But there are important differences between the studies here envisaged w i t h studies under the general canons of comparative law. There is, first of all, a restriction as to which periods can be compared. I f we assume that the development of European Civilization began when the European nations began to be formed, that means about the 10th and the 11th century, the time we have to take into consideration would be the centuries from that period up to our own century. A n t i q u i t y would be excluded as w e l l as the period of the Germanic states on the soil of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, we cannot select for our comparison periods which belong to different stages or phases of the European development. I t would be inconsistent w i t h this program for example to compare the English L a w of the 16th century to the Roman L a w as expounded by the Pandectist School of the 19th century. The comparison must be confined to the same stage of cultural development. Thus we can make comparisons between legal institutions during the time of the Ancien Régime or of the industrial development of the 19th century. But we must compare solutions which belong to the same phase i n the evolution of our European culture. b) There also is a restriction as far as the problems to be considered are concerned. What is of interest i n such a program, is how the same

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization

35

problems which had arisen i n a certain period of our development were solved by the different systems of law. To take an example, how the problem of religious freedom which appeared i n the Reformation period has been answered i n the Common L a w countries and on the continent. Or, how the problem of the organization of a capitalistic enterprise has been answered on the continent and i n England. c) Finally, i t seems important to stress the fact that i n such comparative studies one cannot simply compare the English Common Law w i t h Roman Law. Instead, we must distinguish on the Civil L a w side different legal systems. There is first the law which prevailed on the continent i n the 11th, 12th and 13th century; that was mainly feudal law and an enormous number of local customs and statutes. We have then beginning w i t h the rediscovery of Roman Law at Bologna and the following reception, the period of the ius commune, that is the roman-canon law of the continent as i t had been developed by the Italian and French scholars of the late Middle Ages and then had been accepted by the Italian countries, by southern France, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary and Poland and partly and rather late i n Sweden and Danmark. I t must also be taken into account that w i t h i n the ius commune different European nations took the lead i n different times. I n the Middle Ages Italy and France, i n the 16th and 17th century Spain, then the Netherlands and finally Germany. Also the degree of reception has not been equally. A special situation originated i n that part of France which we call pays de droit coutumier. Here, Roman L a w had been accepted only as so far, as it was considered corresponding to equity. That meant particularly, that the roman system of actions had been only partly accepted. Instead, the system of droit français was developed by the french courts after 1500. Then, as far as the 19th century is concerned, we have to reckon w i t h the Pandectist School of Roman Law, w i t h National Codifications, especially the influential french code, and new special legislation i n the field of economy. d) As an example of studies which I have i n mind, I should like to mention the book of Professor Heinrich Miteis 'Lehnsstaat und Staatsgewalt ' which gives a comparison of the political accomplishments of feudal law i n the continental countries and i n England. I could also mention the comparative consideration of Marc Bloch i n his book 'La société féodale'. Still, literature is not very great i n this field and one of the reasons for this situation seems to be that neither the ius commune nor the legal history of the 19th century has been sufficiently explored by continental scholars. There is a considerable gap i n our 9*

36

H e l m u t Coing

knowledge which does not exist, as far as I can judge, in England. Still the study of this 'modern dark age* has begun at least. There are the studies by Professor Langbein on criminal procedure and evidence, there are quite a few monographies on subjects of private law. III. Proposed Subjects of Study I am afraid I have abused your patience by these general considerations. Let me now submit you some concrete subjects which I fear would be interesting to study. 1. The development of a general law of contract. As is w e l l known, Common L a w has begun to develop a general law of contract since the 16th century. As I said, Buckland-Mac Nair remark i n their book on Roman L a w and Common L a w that whereas the Common Law has developed a general theory of contract, Roman L a w knew only contracts. Clearly, this statement is true for classical Roman Law. But it must be qualified if we consider the ius commune of the 16th and 17th century. To have created a general theory of contract is one of the great accomplishments of the period of the ius commune. The basis of this development was the maxim pacta sunt servanda, as stated i n Canon L a w (Dekretalen 1. 35. 1). This maxim meant, that all pacta were actionable; i t must lead to eliminate the distinction between stipulatio and pactum of classical Roman Law, and the special rules for contractus reales innominati of Justinian Law. Only exceptionally the maxim was introduced to the secular law by statute. This is true as far as I know only for Castilla where by a statute of 1386 the Canon L a w maxim was declared to be the law of the lands. Generally, the change was brought about by the Judiciary. French and Dutch decisions took the lead and as far as time is concerned, we have to consider the period around 1600. I n connection w i t h this development a general law of agency which also was missing i n classical Roman L a w as w e l l as i n Justinian Law was developed by the Continental courts. This development seems to have taken place somewhat later. I t belongs to the 16th and 17th century and the results were only clearly stated during the 18th century. I do not know which practical needs are to be seen as a reason for this development. But i t is interesting to note that an analogous development only somewhat earlier took place i n England and there of course also the development was led by the courts. A comparison of both these juridicial developments would be all the more interesting as we have certain indications that Canon L a w practice played a role

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization

37

i n both developments. As far as the continent is concerned this appears clearly by the fact that the Canon L a w theory of causa contractus was taken over by the C i v i l Law. 2. The second topic I should propose for a comparative study is a comparison between the English settlements and the mayorasco and jideicommissum on the continental side. The society of the Ancien Régime of the 16th, 17th and 18th century is aristocratic i n England as well as on the continent. I n England the aristocracy wielded a political power also. On the continent i t was politically subdued by the princes, but i t retained its social position. This was the basic compromise between prince and nobility during the Ancien Régime. I n Great B r i t a i n as w e l l as on the continent then the problem must arise how it was legally possible to maintain and secure the splendor familiae and that meant the economic basis of the elevated position of an aristocratic family, particularly their wells i n land. Land must not be alienated by transaction intervivos, i t must be kept together i n succession. The solution i n England was the settlement where the trust was used for these purposes. On the continent, we find on one side the Roman fideicommissum, especially i n France. I t made i t possible to bind the possessions of a family for four generations and to make the substance inalienable. Still further went the Spanish majorasco — here property is dedicated to a certain family — it is declared inalienable, a special line of succession is laid down, generally the Primogeniture. A l l these measures are not limited i n time. They are i n principle perpetual. This Spanish majorasco developed based on royal privileges i n 15th century Castilla and then spread w i t h the Spanish Empire. We find it i n all Spanish possessions in Italy, i n the Netherlands and also i n the German Habsburg countries, the German Empire. I t is characteristic that i n France i t appears only i n such provinces which formerly had belonged to the Spanish Empire, such as the Roussillon, la Franche-Comté and Flanders. I t h i n k it would be worthwhile to compare the details of these legal structures and i t would be necessary not only to base such study on text books and decisions but also to analyse individual documents. I think such a study would be an interesting contribution not only to legal history but also for social history. 3. Matrimonial Property Law. This topic is related to the second one and i n a certain sense a supplement to it.

38

H e l m u t Coing

Two institutions seem to be worthwhile to be compared i n this connection. a) The position of the married woman i n England determined by the doctrine of unity of person of husband and wife and on the continent b y t h e incapacité

de la femme

mariée

of F r e n c h l a w a n d t h e

tutela

of the husband over the wife i n most C i v i l L a w countries. b) The property relation between husband and wife. On the English side, one had to consider the property of husband on the goods of the wife and such institutes as Dower and Curtesy. As far as the continent is concerned, one should not look for Roman Law, because its system of separation of goods between spouses and the institution of the dos had significance only i n Italy and Southern France (Pays de Droit écrit) and perhaps for the upper and aristocratic class. Generally, we find instead what the French call the communauté and the Germans Gütergemeinschaft,, which, as Dumoulin has rightly observed i n the 16th century, is a partnership of a very special k i n d because the right of administration lies alone w i t h the husband. Again, I t h i n k this would be also an interesting contribution to social history. 4. Rationalistic criticism of legal traditions under the impact of the enlightenment of the 18th century would be another topic. I n the age of reason — around 1700 — a sharp criticism of tradition begins i n Europe. A criticism w i t h Paul Hazard has described i n his famous book 'La crise de la conscience européenne'. I n the famous 'Querelles des anciens et des modernes' i n the time of Louis X I V . one party has contended for the first time i n European history that the contemporary, the modern civilization was superior to the Greco-Roman culture of antiquity. On the continent this rationalistic attitude resulted i n a severe criticism, not only of medieval customary law traditions, but also of Roman law. For a long period, Roman L a w had been considered as ratio scripta, as w r i t t e n reason. Now, the critic said i t could be only accepted as far as i t was really reasonable. This is true, especially for France (one of the reasons certainly being the limited influence of the reception) but i t took also place i n Germany. Here, the school of socalled German law and natural l a w took the same position. Besides, both schools were often represented i n the same person. A n example is the influential author Thomasius. The result of this criticism was to a certain degree the emancipation of the contemporary, the modern law of the time from Roman traditions and a tendency to get r i d of institutes which had only a historical but

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization

39

not a rational basis. I n Roman law this applied especially to the system of actiones and exceptiones. I t made reforms possible which we find i n the Austrian and i n the Prussian Code (1811, 1794) and, of course, in t h e F r e n c h Code Civil

of 1804.

The British counterpart to this development seems to me the activity of Bentham and his school. Here we find the same mixture of sharp criticism of historical traditions and proposals for law reform. I f I am not mistaken quite a few steps of reform-legislation were introduced by the adherents of this school. I t is true that we have here a certain timelag between both systems, the English development beginning only at the end of the 18th century and reform legislation even later. 5. The Impact of Industrialization. The process of industrialization which took place i n 19th century Europe, has created many new problems for legal policy — problems which could not be solved by means of the existing traditional law. There is at first company law. Capitalistic enterprise asked for a new legal form. I t is well-known that at first one has attempted, i n England as w e l l as on the continent, to use the forms of partnership existing i n the legal tradition. Partnership i n English law, société en commandite

a n d société

au nom

collectif

o n t h e c o n t i n e n t a l side. B u t

by the middle of the century it had become clear that these solutions were not satisfactory and the company limited by shares was developed. The second example is mortgage law. Here the necessity of credit, especially for capitalistic agriculture, made a reform of the existing mortgage law, even of the totality of the Law of Property i n land necessary. On the continent we find at first the French system of conservateur des hypothèques , an official where mortgages could be registered to avoid their resolution by a change i n property. I n Austria and Prussia the land register (Grundbuch) developed.

begins to be

I n the middle of the century the French government organized the crédit foncier, the first great bank for agrarian credit. Another field where industrialization has resulted i n new legislation during the 19th century is Patent Law. Here again we find a broad European debate: turning on the question whether inventions should be protected at all as w e l l as on the procedure to be followed. French legislation (Statute of 1844) provided for patents to be given on simple application; British legislation for a thorough examination before a patent could be granted.

40

H e l m u t Coing

Finally, we have to think of labour law, comprising the organization of trade unions, such institutes as collective bargaining, labour protection and social security. I n the development of all these institutions, a new element appears. The solutions are laid down, it is true, by national legislation. But, this national legislation had its basis i n a discussion i n which representatives of all nations take part and which is based on comparative law. I t is i n the first decades of the 19th century, that the studiy of comparative law begins. I n 1819 we have the first comparative law journal, the French 'Thémis\ Some years later, the German 'Kritische Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslands' begins to appear. I t is typical that i n all these journals considerations of comparative law are combined w i t h proposals for legal reform. Studies i n comparative law become the basis of national reform legislation. As Great B r i t a i n at that time was the country where industrialization had made greatest progress, decisive impacts came from Great B r i t a i n to the continent. The study of these developments is especially interesting because it has bearing on our understanding of modern European economic law and, i n my view, is able to facilitate the necessary unification of economic law i n the European communities. IV.

Let me finish suggesting two subjects of a more general, I should say jurisprudential, interest. The first would be the question how far central courts had been instrumental i n establishing a unified system of law — a common law strictu sensu i n a country. Here one could consider at first the action of the royal courts i n England i n suppressing a local law during the Middle Ages and establishing the Common L a w during the Middle Ages. On the continental side i t would be interesting to look at the action of the Parlement de Paris i n imposing what i t called Droit français based on the coutumes de Paris on different local coutumes i n France. Furthermore, one could inquire into the action of the learned courts i n Germany during the reception time imposing the ius commune against the local law i n the 16th and the 17th century. A second subject which I would like to submit is the impact of the methods of fact finding for the formation of substantive law. As far as the Common L a w side is concerned, I am thinking of course of the introduction of the Jury-system, whose influence on the seperate development of English law Prof, van Caenegem has demonstrated so clearly. I f I follow the text book on British legal history, by Baker

Common L a w and C i v i l L a w i n the Development of European Civilization

41

the Jury-system had a very definite influence on the system of pleading and that again on the development of substantive law. On the continental side one would have to take into consideration the rules regulating evidence. I n Roman-canon c i v i l procedure the judge has to form his own judgement on the evidence before him. But he is bound by numerous rules as to its evaluation. There are first rules telling h i m under which conditions he has to accept a certain evidence as convincing (proving the fact) or not. Two witnesses e. g. make f u l l proof of the fact stated by them; one only half (semi plena) which calls for further evidence, neatly determined by law. Then there are numerous legal presumtions either absolutely binding (Iuris

et de iure)

o r Iuris

tantum.

A g a i n s t t h e f i r s t n o evidence t o t h e

contrary is admissable; the latter only have the effect to transfer the onus probandi (burden of proof).

Reports on the eight Working Groups

I . Towards a General L a w o£ Contract The first meeting of the study group Towards a General Law of Contract' was held at Merton College Oxford upon the 23rd. of March 1984. Those present were Mr. J. L. Barton from Oxford; Dr. Italo B i rocchi, of Cagliari; Professor Helmut Coing, of Frankfurt; Professor Robert Feenstra, of Ley den; Professor James Gordley, of Berkeley; Professor Richard Helmholz, of Chicago; Dr. David Ibbetson, of Oxford, and Professor Ugo Petronio, of Rome. Two papers by Mr. Barton upon the development of the doctrine of contract i n the English common law i n medieval and early modern times had already been circulated before the meeting. I n an introductory address Professor Coing defined the group's subject of research as the process by which the regime of specific contracts which s t i l l survives i n Justinan's compilations gave way to a unitary law of contract, founded upon the principle that l a w f u l agreements are i n general actionable, and the practical consequences of this process of unification. As examples of the problems which arose, he instanced the development of the principle that all contracts are bonae fidei, and the controversy upon the question whether an innominate contract were not to be deemed actionable before performance. For the purposes of this investigation, it would be desirable to compare the secular law before and after the change of doctrine, and to consider the part which may have been played by external influences, and more particularly by the canon law. The canon law was also of particular importance for the English development, which differed very materially from that of the Continent. Professor Helmholz delivered a paper upon the canonical practice i n contractual cases, principally i n Spain and i n England. The canonists had abandoned the civilian categorisation of contracts, and had developed the doctrine of causa as a criterion of distinction between the actionable promise and the promise not actionable. I n causes between laymen, a promissory oath was treated as i n principle necessary to make the promise a matter of ecclesiastical cognisance, and the ordinary remedy was to require the party to purge his soul by performing what he had sworn. The canonical doctrine of unjust enrichment was also wider i n scope than that of the civilians. The practice, so far as his researches had enabled h i m to judge, appeared to follow the theory

46

I. Towards a General L a w of Contract

pretty closely. A n action was treated as lying upon a promise as sworn to, since the oath was necessary to found the spiritual jurisdiction. The objection of absence of causa, or, more usually, of its generality and uncertainty, is commonly raised by the defendant, and the pleading is somewhat more formal i n Spanish than in English cases. Upon the question whether it were possible to speak of a specific English development, the speaker pointed out that an express acknowledgment of external influence is most unusual, and not merely i n England, but that terminology is of some importance. Thus i n the practice of the Chancery the source of the obligation is not Chancery practice, but equity and good conscience, and the distinction between requiring the party to pay damages for non-performance, and to purge his conscience by doing what he has promised is fundamental. I n the ensuing discussion, i t was pointed out that a number of very specific rules were taken over into the secular law: the right of the defamed party to a formal withdrawal of the imputation made against him, the right of the party injured by a breach of contract to treat the contract as at an end, and the claim of the possessor i n bad faith to an allowance for his expenses. I t was questioned how far the canon law might have played a material part i n the control of law by equity in the French courts of the time of the reception. One of the difficulties, at least i n the law of contract, was that the practice of the courts was not that of the texts, and the theoretical arguments for the enforcement of naked pacts are intended to justify a position which has already been reached. Mr. Ibbetson read a paper upon consideration and the theory of contract i n the England of the sixteenth century, i n which he stressed the practical importance of the idea of bargain as a means of distinguishing between those promises which would bear an action and those which would not, and emphasised that the principle of reciprocity is the clue to the development of those forms of accepted consideration which may seem at first sight exceptional or anomalous. Professor Petronio presented a discussion of the controversy between Connanus and Grotius upon the effect of the bare pact. I n his opinion, though they unquestionably differed upon the effect of a pact i n the law of nature, on the effect of a pact i n the law of man their opinions were much closer than has commonly been held. Alciatus had already suggested that the distinction between the bare pact and the innominate contract depended upon a factum Obligatorium. Connanus held the sinallagma to be the general ground of distinction between contracts and naked pacts, not merely i n the c i v i l law but i n the law of nature. Though Grotius denied that this was required by natural law, he also

I. Towards a General L a w of Contract

held that the civil law might and did refuse, for good reason, to enforce obligations valid i n the law of nature. Though the subtleties of the Roman law were rejected i n the German lands, an obligatory promise required not merely the consent of the party, but a just cause, which i t would have if i t were made w i t h the intention of making a gift, or of concluding some other type of contract. Similarly for Domat, a contract requires a cause, which is either a counter-prestation, a datio or factum, or a liberal intention. The abandonment of the Roman classification of contracts did not lead to the conclusion that mere consent is sufficient i n all cases. I t was not u n t i l Pothier that pact and contract become synonyms rather than distinct expressions. Dr. Birocchi presented an account of the doctrine of pacts i n the usus modernus, more particularly i n the L o w Countries and in Germany. By the end of the seventeenth century i t was accepted that a naked pact would bear an action. The rule was generally taken to be based upon the custom of the Germans, the distinction between pact and contract being one of those subtleties of the civil law which had not been received i n practice, though Mastertius was w i l l i n g to hold that even i n the Roman law the only naked pact was a merely jocular pact. The traditional explanation of the civilian distinction between pact and contract, that mere promises were too lightly made to be satisfactory evidence of intention, had been attacked by Alciatus, and was no longer acceptable. Upon one view, the distinction was a mere 'subtlety'. Thomasius ascribed the distinction between pact and stipulation to the influence of the patricians, who found it i n their interest to insist upon the use of formal words of whose validity or invalidity they were the sole judges. According to another opinion, less radical i n appearance, the true reason for distinguishing between a bare pact and a contract was that the parties to a bare agreement have not necessarily proceeded beyond the stage of negotiation. The later jurists are principally concerned to distinguish accurately between a concluded agreement and a preliminary negotiation, and to determine how far a pact to conclude a contract in the future might be actionable. I t could be contended, for example by Bodinus, that even i n the c i v i l law the naked pact would not bear an action because of its indeterminate character, and that a contrario, if the intention of the parties to be bound sufficiently appeared, and the agreement were sufficiently certain, i t might be actionable not merely by custom, but by the civil law. This requirement was variously formulated by different jurists, and sometimes very generally. Thus for Bastineller, a pact required utilitas, objectum, and forma. Of these, the most important was perhaps utilitas, which was the justification for the objective elaboration of the doctrine of cause. I n the time allowed it was impossible for the speaker to discuss

48

I . Towards a General L a w of Contract

this development i n detail, but it was the transformation of cause from the datio or factum of D. 2.14.7.4. to that element necessary i n the particular case to render a promise actionable which made i t possible to define every contract as a conventio cum causa, and to unify the law of contracts w i t h that of pacts. Professor Gordley gave an outline of the manner i n which the doctrines of the natural law influenced the modern development of the English law of contract: an influence which, he stressed, was more significant i n the nineteenth than i n the eighteenth century. The theory of the natural lawyers was founded ultimately upon the Aristotelian distinction between distributive and commutative justice, which led to the substitution of the distinction between contracts of liberality and contracts of commutative justice for the Roman classification. Though i t was generally accepted that promises are binding i n the law of nature, there were dissentient opinions, and the duty of performance was founded primarily upon the obligation of veracity. Thus for Cajetanus, what is promised is not due as a matter of justice, but a false promise is a lie. The four doctrines of the greatest importance for the English development were the doctrine of causa, the doctrine of mistake as to essence, the doctrine of equality of exchange, and the doctrine that certain terms are 'naturally' incident to particular contracts. Of these the last particularly was influential i n the elaboration of the common law. What is sometimes termed the ' w i l l theory' of contract is i n England an innovation of the nineteenth century, and is not attributable to the influence of natural law. Professor Petronio has agreed to produce an account of doctrine of the humanist school upon the relation between pacts and contracts for the forthcoming volume, and Dr. Birocchi w i l l treat the same problem i n the usus modernus . Dr. Birocchi has also consented to provide an analysis of the contractual decisions of one or more of the grandi tribunali. Professor Feenstra has volunteered to provide a similar analysis of the decisions of the courts of the L o w Countries, and also of those of France, i f time and his other commitments should permit h i m to include them. Professor Coing has kindly consented to provide a general account of the abandonment of the traditional doctrine of the naked pact. Mr. Barton, Professor Helmholz, Professor Gordley, and Mr. Ibbetson, are to prepare their respective contributions for the press. The group is to meet a second time i n the spring of 1985. I t is hoped that by the autumn of that year at the latest, all members of the group w i l l have their contributions revised for the printer. J. L. Barton

I I . Case-Law: Reports and Records* One of the principal differences between the work of English and Continental legal historians i n the past has been that English lawyers concentrate almost exclusively on case-law, jurisprudence, while their Continental colleagues concentrate on various forms of doctrine. I n recent years this difference has grown weaker 1 , as Continental legal historians have begun to look more and more at what courts were doing, and (in a smaller way) as English legal historians have begun to investigate the 'common learning* taught and handed down i n the inns of court 2 . English lawyers have always recognised two distinct sources of case-law: (a) the 'record', i n which a clerk of the court enrolled on parchment the process, pleadings and judgment in a case; and (b) the 'report', i n which a lawyer made a more or less verbatim note of the arguments which took place i n open court. I n England the record is of the highest authority as precedent. But the formulaic character of the plea rolls — kept i n L a t i n u n t i l 1733 — usually excludes any indication of the reasons for judgments, and therefore the record is sometimes of small or no value for the purposes of jurisprudence. The reports, on the other hand, were w r i t t e n i n the vernacular (law-French, later English), had no official status, were of variable quality, and often left out details whereby cases might be identified. Yet, by preserving the thinking which lay behind the stereotyped formalities of the plea rolls, they have been much more f r u i t f u l sources for the legal historian. The best legal history i n England makes use where possible of both kinds of material: the record to show precisely what was i n issue and whether it was resolved, the report to show the reasoning which led to the result. Often, however, reports and records have to be used independ* Since i t has not been possible for the group to meet, this i n t e r i m report has been w r i t t e n by the convening member on the basis of correspondence, published papers, and his o w n w o r k i n g paper. The other members of the group do not necessarily share any of the views here expressed. 1 The implications for comparative legal history have already been explored i n the pioneering w o r k by J.P. Dawson , i n : Oracles of the L a w , 1968, and b y Professor G. Gorla, i n numerous papers w h i c h are conveniently summarised (in collaboration w i t h Dr. L. Moccia ), i n : A Revisiting of the Comparison between Continental L a w and English L a w , Journal of Legal History 2 (1981), 143—156. 2 E. Thome , Readings and Moots at the Inns of Court, I (1952), Seiden Soc. 71; J.H. Baker , i n : Seiden Soc. 94 (1978), 123—137, 161. 4 Coing/Nörr

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ently. The rolls record many more cases than were reported, and yield not only information i n bulk about patterns of litigation but also interesting cases for which no report exists. On the other hand, although every report i n theory must correspond to a recorded case, the search for the record of a reported case is like looking for a needle i n a haystack. Continental legal historians i n the last few years have begun some major investigations into both records 3 und reports 4 , but for comparative purposes i t has to be acknowledged that the distinction between these two types of source is not necessarily the same as i t is i n England. For instance, the reports or quaestiones of Jean le Coq, relating to the Parisian parlement c. 1383—1398, are i n L a t i n and are for the most part as reticent about the reasoning process as the English plea rolls, while the corresponding record — kept by the greffier i n French — often gives the arguments of the advocates and citations to texts. This seems to reverse the English experience, and to make the records more useful for the study of jurisprudence than the reports. Moreover, some collections of decisions seem to be l i t t l e more than guides to leading cases i n the records, w i t h commentary, rather than verbatim reports by someone present at the argument 5 . I t seems, nevertheless, that many of the early-modern French® and Italian 7 decisions are much closer to the English concept of a 'report', giving the facts of the cases, the arguments on both sides, and even noting differences of opinion. So far as we know, no Continental historian besides Mme Boulet, who edited le Coq i n 19448, has collated a series of reports w i t h the 3 E. g., for the Parlement of Paris: P. C. Timbal , Les obligations contractuelles d'après la jurisprudence d u Parlement ( X I I I e — X I V ® siècles), 1973, 1977; L'exploitation des archives d u Parlement de Paris, Rechtsgeschichte u n d quantitative Geschichte, 1977, pp.23—35. For the Reichskammergericht: F. Ranieri, Versuch einer quantitativen Strukturanalyse des deutschen Rechtslebens i m 16.—18. Jahrhundert anhand einer statistischen Untersuchung der J u d i k a t u r des Reichskammergerichts, ibid. pp. 1—22; D i r i t t o comune e d i r i t t o locale nei p r i m i decenni della giurisprudenza del Reichskammergericht, i n : D i r i t t o comune e d i r i t t i locali nella storia dell'Europa: A t t i del Convegno d i Varenna, 1890, pp. 71—92; Die Inanspruchnahme des Reichskammergericht i n den ersten Jahrzehnten seiner Tätigkeit, Zeitschrift f ü r Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 4 (1982), 113—131. 4 See the survey articles and bibliographies i n H. Coing (ed.), Handbuch der Quellen u n d L i t e r a t u r der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, I I , pt 2 (1976), pp. 1113—1445. 5 E.g., France: Charles d u Moulin, Omnia opera (ed. 1681), I I , pp. 648—657 (apparently from Toulouse records 1444—1493), pp. 658—689 (apparently from Paris records 1269—1540). Germany: Joachim Mynsinger von Frundeck, Singulares Observationes I u d i c i i Imperialis Camerae (ed. 1563). (As to which, ;see Sabine Schumann, Joachim Mynsinger von Frundeck, 1983.) ® E. g., Pape, Marc and Boyer. 7 E. g., d'Afflitto, Capece and Grammatico.

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51

record; and u n t i l this has been done for other jurisdictions serious progress cannot be made towards comparison w i t h the English sources. I t is a high priority to find courts for which both reports and records survive 0 , and for editions to be undertaken — if necessary of selected cases only — w i t h a view to establishing the relationship between report and record under different systems of adjudication. T h e Four Traditions of Reporting

I t is possible to discern four separate traditions i n the history of European law reporting i n the medieval and early-modern period: (a) the English common-law tradition, which begins i n the 1260s and continues without a break from the 1290s, first w i t h the anonymous 'year-books' and t h e n (from the later fifteenth century) w i t h the w o r k

of named individuals 1 0 ; (b) the reports w r i t t e n by advocates i n the Parlement of Paris, of which only isolated specimens have come to light 1 1 ; (c) the decisiones Rotae, or reports of cases i n the papal audience court (Rota) at Avignon, which begin i n 1336, flourish i n the 1370s and 1380s, and then stop for over a century 1 2 ; and (d) the decisiones of supreme royal courts, and provincial rotae , which begin i n the later fifteenth century 1 3 w i t h Guy Pape (Grenoble) and Matteo d'Afflitto (Naples), and then spread northwards i n the sixteenth century across most of Europe 14 . 8

M. Boulet (ed.), Quaestiones Johannis Galli, 1944. Preliminary enquiries suggest that many of the records of the kingdom of Sicily have unfortunately been destroyed. Professor A. Romano is i n vestigating w h a t remains. For the records of the Parlement of Paris and the Reichskammergericht, see note 3 above. For the records of the Roman Rota, see Coing (ed.), Handbuch, I, at p. 854 n. 1. For the Magdeburg Schöppenstuhl, see note 18 below. The records of the Grand Conseil of Malines survive i n great quantity, and are being edited by Professor J. Th. de Smidt. 10 The earliest series i n p r i n t is: The Reports of Sir John Spelman (Seiden Soc. 93, 94, 1977—1978), covering the period 1502—1540. The w r i t e r is engaged on editions of the reports of John C a r y l l (from c. 1485 to 1522) and Sir John Port (from c. 1494 to 1536). I n each case the reports are collated as far as possible w i t h the records i n the Public Record Office, London. 11 Besides le Coq, t w o other collections have been edited: F. Olivier-Martin , Notes d'audience, R H D 46 (1922), 513—606; G. Naud , U n recueil de j u r i s prudence de la f i n d u X I V e siècle, Bibl. de l'école des chartes 121 (1964), 77—131. 12 See A. Fliniaux, Les anciennes collections de Decisiones Rotae, R H D (4th ser.) 4 (1925), 61—93; G. Dolezalek and K . W. Nörr i n Coing (ed.), H a n d buch, I, pp. 849—856; G. Dolezalek , Die handschriftliche Verbreitung von Rechtsprechungssammlungen der Rota, Z R G Kan. A b t . 58 (1972), 1—106. 13 A n intermediate w o r k i n the same tradition is Jean Corsier's Decisiones capellae Tolosanae, containing reports of a late-fourteenth century archiépiscopal audience court. 14 Over 400 collections are listed i n Coing (ed.), Handbuch, I I , pt 2, pp. 1113—1445. 9

4*

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There seems to be no direct relationship between (a) and (b), or between either of them and (c) or (d). England remained a jurisprudent i a l island, and the experiments i n Paris seem to have had no more than local significance. The t h i r d tradition began at Avignon w i t h the decisiones of Thomas Fastolf (d. 1361), an English auditor of the Rota , whose brother Nicholas was a serjeant-at-law and appears i n the yearbooks 15 . Although i t is tempting to speculate that Fastolf formed the idea of reporting cases through his awareness of Westminster practice, i t is clear that his decisiones owe nothing i n style or content to the year-books. They are i n L a t i n and follow the established style of argument as found i n the writings of doctors: indeed, it would be interesting to hear from a canon lawyer how far the style of these decisiones relates to gloss, lecture, disputation 16 and consilium 17. What was new about Fastolf's work was that i t set out not merely to teach and expound but to preserve for posterity the wisdom of a learned court, a college of doctors, which presumably spoke w i t h more authority than any individual canonist. I t was undoubtedly a similar motive which prompted the commencement of reporting i n the Parlement of Dauphiné at Grenoble and the Sacro Regio Consiglio at Naples. Several of the early reporters belonging to this fourth tradition expressly acknowledged their debt to the decisiones Rotae, which had circulated widely i n the fifteenth century and had been printed i n the 1470s. The fourth development, then, can be directly related to (c). Its timing can be explained not only by the invention of printing but also by the appearance of new secular courts dominated by learned judges, by the replacement of lay decision-making w i t h reasoned adjudication by doctors of law. I n that sense i t reproduces exactly what had already happened at (a) Westminster and (b) Paris, where from an earlier period there had been strong royal courts w i t h professional lawyers i n attendance. L a w reporting seems naturally to follow the emergence of courts of that kind. I n addition to these developments i n law reporting should be added a distinct case-law tradition, that of the Schoppen i n the mercantile 15 The English connection w i l l be discussed by the w r i t e r i n a paper to be delivered at the Seventh International Congress of Medieval Canon L a w i n Cambridge. There is some evidence that Fastolf was preceded b y W i l l i a m Bateman (d. 1355), founder of T r i n i t y Hall, and (like Fastolf) a native of N o r folk. 16 Boulet , Quaestiones Galli, X L V — X L I X , compares le Coq's quaestiones w i t h the academical disputations. 17 See G. Gorla, C i v i l i a n Judicial Decisions — A n Historical Account of I t a l i a n Style, Tulane L a w Rev. 44 (1970), 740—749. The published consilia are listed and discussed alongside the decisiones i n Coing (ed.), Handbuch, I I , p t 2, pp. 1113—1445. The French reporters Pape and Boyer also published collections of consilia.

I I . Case-Law: Reports and Records

towns of Lower Saxony. I n these towns a body of autonomous commercial law was developed through the practice of referring difficult cases to panels of experts, whose decisions were recorded 18 . Local Divergences

I f this general proposition can be assumed to be true, the group w i l l perhaps be more concerned w i t h the nature of local divergences, not only i n procedure but also i n the role of law reporting and the compilation of records. Attitudes towards 'precedent', the weight to be given to previous decisions as evidence of law or custom, varied from place to place and from time to time, as did the style and content of collections of reports. Here contrast may be more useful than comparison, but there is an overriding general question to be borne i n mind i n considering these divergences: were decisions published primarily for the benefit of local practitioners, or were they (like the decisiones Rotae which they emulated) regarded also as a contribution to the ius commune, perhaps incidentally satisfying pride i n local institutions by giving them an international standing? The answer to that question is partly revealed by the bibliographical history, but is more directly to be found i n the citations found inside the volumes themselves. L a w , Procedure and Legal Development

I t is obvious that i n every jurisdiction the character of law reporting w i l l be shaped by local procedure, and we s t i l l know too little about the different ways i n which questions of substantive law could be raised i n the course of lawsuits i n different jurisdictions. A n y comparison of law reporting w i l l therefore inevitably have to broach this wider problem of legal history. I n English law, for instance, there was a fundamental distinction between fact-finding (the task of the 'jury', not the legally trained judge) and the application of the law to the facts. Sometimes — indeed, usually — the whole of a dispute was left to the jury, so that no question of law arose at all. Some questions which the year-books report are purely procedural — questions about what to do, and how, rather than the application of rules to facts. Questions of law in the latter sense only arose when lawyers wished to narrow the issue to be left to the jury, or where the j u r y chose to find particular facts and leave the outcome to the court. The former was far more common, because the 18 See F. Ebel, Die Spruchtätigkeit des Magdeburger Schöppenstuhls f ü r Niedersachsen, Z R G Germ. A b t . 98 (1981), 30—55. See also Dawson , The Oracles of the L a w , pp. 158—176.

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business of determining the issue for the j u r y — 'pleading' i n the English sense — was conducted orally i n court, and assertions of fact could be put forward tentatively for discussion. Much of the argument i n the year-books is thus about whether a given set of facts could be pleaded — for instance, whether they would constitute a defence, or destroy a defence — and not about facts which had already been established by trial. I n the sixteenth century the procedure changed, and most legal discussion came to focus on facts which had either been found i n detail by a j u r y or confessed by a party taking his stand on the law. This procedural reverse has something to do w i t h the changing role of the judiciary, and an increased desire for reasoned decisions. I n that broad sense it may be related to the spread of law reporting across the rest of Europe at the same period. A t a more detailed level, however, the peculiarity of the English procedure may prove a stumbling block to effective comparison. The group w i l l at any rate need to compare changes i n the workings of the courts i n each jurisdiction w i t h which they are concerned. Another feature of the English year-books is that the medieval judges seem to have avoided as far as possible making decisions when the law was unclear. They preferred to leave everything to the jury, so that law and fact were not separated and consequently the court was not embarrassed by questions of principle. I n so far as pleading to a narrower issue was allowed, the decision reported i n the year-books was often a decision by the pleader rather than by the court: that is, a decision whether to j o i n issue i n the manner proposed or to t r y something else. When the parties admitted the facts (by 'demurrer') and asked the court to rule on the law, the judges showed themselves most reluctant to do so unless they thought the law was clear: and since the procedure was only appropriate where the law was unclear, the usual consequence of a demurrer was not a judicial decision but prolonged indecision. The courts would have justified such indecision by saying that if the law was unclear i t was better for the parties to settle their differences than to press for judgment. No one looked to litigation as a way of elaborating the law, any more than one watched chess games i n the hope of discovering more subtle rules of chess. The rules were there to begin with. So far as we can tell, however, this attitude disappeared i n the early sixteenth century. Courts were increasingly expected to decide doubtful cases and make law. They took a more positive approach, including the acceptance of majority decisions as conclusive, and procedures were developed which enabled more and more questions to be submitted to the judges. This change profoundly affected English case-law. I t can likewise probably be associated w i t h the new emphasis on the law-making role of superior courts i n the

I I . Case-Law: Reports and Records

Renaissance period: a phenomenon which i n other countries has sometimes been interpreted as a 'reception' of Roman law. I t would be instructive to know whether the procedural aspects of this phenomenon are common to different jurisdictions, and whether they can be understood without reference to the Reception 19 . I f the group is able to throw light on questions such as this, i t w i l l have made a considerable advance i n the history of jurisprudence. J. H. Baker

19 Professor F. Ebel describes a similar development i n the pronouncements of the Schöffen at Magdeburg: op. cit. i n last note, at 52—55. See also W. Kunkel , The Reception of Roman L a w i n Germany: A n Interpretation, i n : E. Strauss (ed.), Pre-Reformation Germany, 1972, pp. 263—281.

I I I . T h e Jury La ricerca è diretta a ricostruire la storia del procedimento per giurati nei principali paesi europei a partire dalla fine del Settecento. E' noto che la giuria costituisce uno degli esempi più significativi di trapianto sul continente di un istituto tipico della Common law . L'adozione della giuria da parte della Francia rivoluzionaria nel 1791, preceduta da un vasto dibattito iniziato nel periodo illuministico e proseguito intensamente durante i lavori dell'Assemblea Costituente, non puô essere adeguatamente compresa nelle sue peculiarità senza previamente conoscere i caratteri del Jury inglese nel Settecento: esso costitui infatti i l modello al quale i l legislatore francese intese ispirarsi, ed anche le successive vicende della giuria i n Francia, in Germania, i n Italia ed altrove nel corso dell'Ottocento debbono venir poste i n relazione con Tistituto elaborato dalla Common law. I saggi che compongono i l progettato volume certo non esauriscono la tematica della giuria: non solo restano d i necessità esclusi diversi paesi del continente nei quali pure la giuria venne introdotta, ma neppure è possibile, nell'ambito d i non moite pagine, procedere ad una ricostruzione compléta della storia alquanto intricata concernente la giuria dalla fine del Settecento airinizio del secolo attuale i n tre paesi del continente, Francia, Germania e Italia. L o scopo deirindagine è piuttosto d i sottolineare i profili essenziali deiristituto nel periodo considerato, nell'ottica d i una ricerca a più voci di storia giuridica comparata. A questo fine gli autori dei singoli saggi intendono affrontare tanto i problemi della giuria come struttura giudiziaria (scelta dei giurati, requisiti personali, presenza ο meno di giudici togati, ambito di competenza della giuria, appellabilità delle sentenze dei giurati ecc.), quanto i problemi d i carattere processuale inerenti al funzionamento della giuria (giudizio sul fatto e giudizio sul diritto, divisione dei compiti tra giudici togati e giurati, valutazione delle prove e libero convincimento dei giurati ecc.). I I quadro delle fonti si estende dai contributi dottrinali ai testi di riformatori e polemisti, dalle riforme legislative con i connessi lavori preparatori alla più significativa giurisprudenza coeva. I I saggio dei proff. Langbein e Green sulla giuria inglese alia fine del Settecento comprende due parti. La parte curata da John H. Langbein concerne The English Criminal T r i a l Jury on the Eve of the

I I I . The Jury

57

French Revolution. I I relativo Circulation Draft (52 cartelle) è già stato inviato dalTautore agli altri collaboratori. L a sezione I del lavoro esamina le diverse forme d i tribunali con giurati nelTInghilterra del tardo Settecento, nonchè la loro competenza riguardo alle differenti classi di reati. La sezione I I descrive la fase precedente al dibattimento (pretrial procedure), nella quale venivano compiuti gli accertamenti e raccolte le prove da sottoporre alia giuria. Vengono esaminati a questo riguardo: la considdetta private prosecution penale inglese; i l ruolo svolto dai giudici d i pace quali magistrati con poteri parziali d i esame; e Topera del Grand Jury nella decisione se autorizzare ο meno i l dibattimento. La sezione I I I è dedicata alia composizione della giuria; alle regole ed alla prassi concernenti le qualifiche per l'esercizio delle funzioni d i giurati; alia selezione tra g l i eligibili; al diritto d i ricusazione (challenge). La sezione I V tratta del procedimento di informazione della giuria e cioè di talune regole in tema di dibattimento e di prova. La sezione V prende i n esame la divisione dei poteri tra giudice e giuria, inclusa una trattazione preliminare della distinzione tra fatto e diritto (in merit ο alla quale si soffermerà i l contributo del prof. Green). Viene discusso i l controllo esercitato dal giudice sulla ricezione delle prove i n dibattimento, nonchè i suoi poteri d i commentare i l fatto e d i istruire la giuria sul diritto. L'accento viene posto sulla forte differenza esistente tra i l diritto ufficiale e la pratica i n merito alia sentenza, e cioè quanto alia natura e al grado di sanzione imposta in caso di colpevolezza. L a sezione V I contiene alcune osservazioni conclusive sul contrasto tra reati politici e reati ordinari nello sviluppo storico della giuria inglese. L a parte curata da Thomas Green intende trattare, come si è detto, dei problemi relativi alia distinzione tra fatto e diritto nel sistema della giuria del tardo Settecento. I I saggio del prof. Antonio Padoa Schioppa sulTintroduzione della giuria i n Francia verrà articolato i n due parti. Per conoscere la vicenda storica dell'innesto del j u r y nel processo penale francese (legge 16 e 29 settembre 1791) occorre tuttora rifarsi i n primo luogo a due opere fondamentali, vecchie d i circa u n secolo: l'Histoire de la procédure criminelle d i Adhémar Esmein (1882), e i l volume I de La justice en France pendant la Révolution d i Edmond Seligman (1901). La prima è perô rivolta a descrivere Tintera vicenda storica della procedura penale, la seconda ricostruisce nel suo insieme Topera di riforma del sistema giudiziario attuata dalla rivoluzione. Perciô i l problema specifico della giuria, pur trattato da entrambi gli autori, non

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poteva certo venir considerato i n t u t t i i suoi aspetti. D'altra parte lo stato della storiografia consente ormai di ricostruire con maggior compiutezza i l pensiero dei giuristi settecenteschi, ma soprattutto degli illuministi e dei riformatori che prepararono i l terreno per i l trapianto d i u n istituto estraneo alla realtà del processo francese di Ancien régime. La fonti a disposizione permettono oggi indagini p i ù complete, anche con riferimento ai cahiers de doléances del 1789 (parte I). I l dibattito degli anni 1789—1791 è d i grande ricchezza e comprende, oltre ai discorsi e ai lavori preparatori delle leggi principali, anche una fioritura d i opuscoli e brochures i n materia di riforme giudiziarie e di giuria, che debbono venir utilizzati per cogliere i molteplici aspetti delle riforme e per evidenziare i nessi tra la progettata giuria e i profili del processo penale, a cominciare dal problema cruciale del libero convincimento. Né è da trascurare i l materiale relativo al periodo della Convenzione (parte II). Ancor meno nota è la vicenda della prima applicazione del nuovo istituto: chi furono i giurati chiamati a giudicare dal 1792, quale Testrazione sociale, quali i p r i m i risultati del nuovo sistema processuale: si imporrebbero a questo riguardo ricerche d'archivio, sia per Parigi che per la provincia, le quali esorbitano dalla présente ricerca. Alcuni sondaggi, tuttavia, possono essere compiuti. V i è infine la serie delle riforme legislative dell'istituto della giuria, attuate a partire dal Code Merlin del 1795, attraverso la riforma dell'anno V I I I (studiata esaurientemente, quest'ultima, nell'importante monografia del Bourdon, del 1942), sino al Code d'Instruction criminelle del 1808: una tematica assai ricca, sulla quale le fonti abbondano, e per la quale è opportuna una messa a punto. I n conclusione, si puô tentare d i originariamente ci si propose d i fare zioni giudiziarie d i Ancien régime, e penale effettivamente signified) nella nica.

cogliere i l rapporto tra ciô che i n contrapposizione con le istituciô che l'introduzione della giuria Francia rivoluzionaria e napoleo-

I l saggio del prof. Bernard Schnapper su 'Le j u r y en France 1808— 1914' si articolerà i n due parti. La prima parte (Le j u r y e le libéralisme) copre la prima metà del secolo X I X , e prende i n esame anzitutto i l sistema napoleonico, sottolineando i condizionamenti subiti dalla giuria per opera del prefetto (quanto alla composizione), del présidente (nel dibattimento), nonchè i n materia di separazione tra questioni d i fatto e di diritto, di qualificazione del reato e infine per opera della corte. A l periodo della restaurazione e della monarchia d i luglio sono dedicati due capitoli: i l primo (L'émancipation du jury) tratta dei giurati come

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elettori censitari, dell'apologia del j u r y da parte dei liberali, e delle leggi introdotte i n materia di stampa e riguardo alle circostanze attenuanti con riferimento alia giuria; la questione della 'onnipotenza' dei giurati e quella dei mezzi tecnici a loro disposizione si inseriscono nella medesima logica. I l secondo capitolo (La perversité du jury) esamina le conseguenze derivanti dalla limitazione censitaria che governava la scelta dei giurati, tra le quali la particolare severità i n materia di reati contro la propriété. A l periodo breve ed intenso della seconda repubblica (1848—1852) è dedicato i l I V capitolo. La seconda parte (le j u r y mis en accusation) ricostruisce le vicende della giuria dal 1853 al 1914. U n primo capitolo, dedicato al Secondo impero, sottolinea le restrizioni alia giuria introdotte con le riforme del 1853 e del 1863, ispirate ai principi della tutela dell'ordine pubblico. A l lungo periodo della Terza repubblica dal 1870 al 1914 sono dedicati due capitoli; i l primo (Pour le jury) ricostruisce le vicende della legge Dufaure del 1872, l'evoluzione della competenza i n materia di stampa, la democratizzazione nel reclutamento dei giurati (legge sui giurati opérai del 1907, i l programma d i Gambetta e della sinistra i n tema d i giuria, i progetti del 1881—83, la apologia dell'istituto per opera d i G. Garçon). I l secondo capitolo (Contre le jury) ricostruisce invece g l i elementi d i critica formulati nei confronti della giuria durante i l medesimo periodo, distinguendo le critiche elevate i n nome della efficacia tecnica (separazione tra fatto e diritto, idea dello scabinato, questione dei reati passionali e dei reati politici e d i stampa) da quelle elevate i n nome della competenza, per precipua influenza della scuola italiana, ed espresse i n particolare da G. Tarde e da Saleilles. U n quarto capitolo esamina le influenze internazionali, quali emergono dal congresso d i Budapest del 1905. L a conclusione prende i n esame taluni aspetti salienti dell'istituto della giuria nel corso del présente secolo, siano alla riforma del 1935. I l saggio del prof. Peter Landau concerne i problemi connessi con l'introduzione della giuria i n Germania nel secolo X I X . I l punto di riferimento della storiografia è tuttora costituito dal volume di E. Schwinge, che risale al 1926; questa monografia esamina l'introduzione della giuria nella prima metà dellOttocento, con riferimento alla situazione della Renania, ove l'istituto si era mantenuto anche dopo i l passaggio della sovranità dalla Francia alla Prussia; chiude i l lavoro u n rapido esame delle discussioni svoltesi a Lubecca e all'assemblea nazionale d i Francoforte nel 1848. L a più recente monografia d i W. Hahn, del 1974, esamina, anche sulla base d i fonti d'archivio, i l movimento per Tintroduzione della giuria nel Baden con prevalente riferimento aile discussioni politiche relative. Nel complesso la letteratura storio-

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I I I . The Jury

grafica non puô pertanto, per quanto concerne la Germania, ritenersi soddisfacente. Una rinnovata considerazione storica del problema impone d i porre l'accento su taluni aspetti sin qui trascurati. Si impone innanzitutto di riconsiderare i l ruolo che poteva esercitare sul tema della giuria, sinora ricondotto essenzialmente alia influenza dell' ideologia liberale, la filosofia di Hegel, i l quale sin dal 1821 si espresse nella sua Rechtsphilosophie a favore della giuria, e f u seguito nella medesima direzione dall'allievo giurista Gans: sono elementi forse sin qui sottovalutati. L'insuccesso dei tentativi d i riforma prima del 1848 mérita a sua volta una indagine più approfondita. E' noto che, a parte i casi della Renania e del Palatinato, già sottoposti al regime napoleonico, una introduzione generale della giuria si ebbe negli stati tedeschi solo col '48. Quali le ragioni di questo ritardo, dal momento che non erano mancate discussioni i n merito alia giuria? Ci furono motivi di opposizione di carattere politico e motivi di opposizione d i carattere giuridico. Entrambi debbono essere analizzati. A parte i l caso del Baden, poco sappiamo sugli stati della Germania méridionale. Meriterebbe di compiere ricerche riguardo alle discussioni avvenute i n Baviera i n merito all'introduzione della giuria; ed anche d i considerare le ragioni per le quali nel Württemberg, dove pure esisteva una tradizione di tribunali scabinali fino al X I X secolo, non v i fu alcun movimento popolare per l'introduzione dell'istituto. L a svolta della scienza giuridica, avvenuta per opera dei criminalisti intorno al 1830, mérita d i essere considerata più da vicino. Rappresentativa è soprattutto l'opera d i Mittermayer, i l quale si pronunciô i n quegli anni i n favore della giuria, modificando la sua precedente opposizione. Quali le ragioni di questa svolta? Probabilmente decisiva f u la considerazione che anche attraverso i l procedimento dei giurati era possibile vincolare la decisione giudiziaria a precise regole legislative in materia d i prove. E' significativo che i l Mittermayer si sia richiamato al Code of evidence del Livingstone per la Luisiana del 1821. Più tardi lo stesso Mittermayer muterà nuovamente avviso, ma ciô non toglie valore a questa importante fase del suo pensiero e al preciso richiamo alle regole sulle prove del modello anglo-americano. Le influenze del diritto anglo-americano nelle discussioni sulla giuria meritano pertanto una rinnovata considerazione. D'altra parte i l modello seguito nel 1848 fu essenzialmente i l modello francese, e questo per una serie di ragioni, tra le quali fondamentale quella che consisteva nell'accettare i l principio del libero convincimento — la libera valutazione della prova — trascurando pertanto i principi concernenti la law of evidence. Singolare è anche i l fatto che rare siano state le

I I I . The Jury

61

discussioni approfondite sui profili tecnici deiristituto della giuria, forse perché, i n presenza di uno scopo di politica legislativa chiaramente formulato, quale era quello del libero convincimento, considerazioni d i ordine tecnico non avevano possibilità di accoglimento. I I saggio del Prof. Angelo Giarda riguarda la giuria i n Italia tra Ottocento e Novecento. L a ricerca si articolerà sull'esame degli sviluppi normativi concernenti la partecipazione popolare airamministrazione della giustizia nei processi penali a partire dai tentativi di introduzione della giuria operati con le costituzioni dei regimi politici instauratisi i n Italia a seguito della Rivoluzione francese, per giungere aile ultime modifiche relative alia competenza della Corte di Assise, introdotte con i l decretolegge 14 febbraio 1978, n. 31 (convertito dalla legge 24 marzo 1978 η. 74). La giuria popolare, auspicata dal pensiero prerivoluzionario, delineata nelle costituzioni di alcuni regimi repubblicani formatisi verso la fine del 1700 i n Italia e ribadita i n qualche costituzione dei p r i m i anni del 1800, non fu introdotta con la legislazione codicistica del Regni d'ltalia anche per la opposizione personale di Napoleone. L a giuria nei processi penali appariva per la prima volta nel contesto degli Stati italiani con la legge 26 marzo 1848 relativa ai reati d i stampa, ma veniva abolita poco dopo per essere reintrodotta con i l codice di procedura penale del 1859, delineata sistematicamente nelle norme deirordinamento giudiziario del 1865, nonchè del codice di procedura penale dello stesso anno ed era rielaborata con provvedimenti risalenti al 1874. Dopo le riforme del 1907 e del 1913 l'istituto della giuria veniva profondamente mutato nel 1931, allorchè era abolita la distinzione tra giudizio sul fatto e decisione sul diritto e Felemento popolare veniva assunto a far parte deirunico collegio "compétente egualmente a giudicare del fatto a del diritto e giudicante i n unico grado di giurisdizione". Un'importante riforma della Corte di Assise risale alia legge 10 aprile 1951 n. 287, che si ricorda i n particolare per Tintroduzione del giudizio di appello. La ricostruzione storica degli sviluppi normativi della giuria prima e della Corte di Assise poi terrà conto non solo delle componenti e dei fattori politico-sociali che hanno ispirato le numerose riforme che si sono susseguite nel tempo, ma anche dei problemi e delle implicazioni più strettamente tecnico-funzionali che hanno da sempre accompagnato l'analisi più strettamente 'giuridica' deiristituto, non adeguatamente approfondita dalla storiografia sul tema.

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I l gruppo d i ricerca ha progettato di riunirsi a Parigi nei giorni 7 e 8 settembre 1984 per discutere dei profili comparatistici della ricerca stessa. Si prevede di poter completare i l volume contenente i diversi saggi alia fine dell'anno 1985. A. Padoa Schioppa

I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England Briefly stated, the problem that the church court records group is addressing is this: Enough research has now been done on the workings of the medieval (pre-Tridentine) ecclesiastical courts of the L a t i n Church both i n England and on the Continent that we can discern striking patterns both of unity and of divergence 1 . The unity seems to reflect both the transnational character of the academic canon law and of the Church as an institution. We rarely find a sentence of an ecclesiastical court that violates a basic rule of law found i n the academic writers; we rarely find a court that does not seem to be applying one or another form of Romano-canonic procedure; and the patterns of geographical jurisdiction almost always reflect the familiar ideal type of the hierarchical church: pope, archbishop (metropolitan), bishop, archdeacon (frequently but not always), w i t h room for occasional decanal courts below the level of the archdeacon and for 'peculiars', jurisdictions exempt from one or more elements i n the hierarchy. A t the same time there are some remarkable divergences. The subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of the church courts varies markedly from time to time and place to place. Sometimes these divergences seem to reflect open or tacit understandings reached between the ecclesiastical and the secular authorities; sometimes they may reflect differences i n the underlying societies. A n example of the former might be the differing treatment of criminous clerks i n England 1 Compare, e. g., Donahue, Roman Canon L a w i n the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs. M a i t l a n d Re-Examined A f t e r 75 Years i n the L i g h t of Some Records f r o m the Church Courts, Michigan L a w Rev. 72 (1974), 647— 716, and R. Helmholz , Marriage L i t i g a t i o n i n Medieval England, Cambridge 1974, w i t h A. Lefebvre-Teillard, Les officialités à la vielle d u concile de Trente, Bibliothèque d'histoire d u droit et droit romain 19 (1973). Recent studies of particular medieval officialities include: S. Ollivant, The Court of the Official i n Pre-Reformation Scotland, Stair Soc. 34 (1982); R. Wunderli, London Church Courts and Society on the Eve of the Reformation, Speculum Anniversary Monographs 7 (1981); N. Adams and C. Donahue, Select Cases f r o m the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of Canterbury c. 1200—1301, Seiden Soc. 95 (1981); G. Dolezalek, Das Imbreviaturbuch des erzbischöflichen Gerichtsnotars Hubaldus aus Pisa, M a i bis August 1230, Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte 13 (1969); O. Hageneder, Die geistliche Gerichtsbarkeit i n Ober- u n d Niederösterreich: von den Anfängen bis zum Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts, Forschungen zur Geschichte Oberösterreichs 10 (1967).

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IV. Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England

and i n France i n the later Middle Ages 2 . A n example of the latter might be the large number of cases concerning informal, de presenti marriages i n England and the relative absence of such cases from the French records 3 . The problem is complicated by the fact that jurisdiction i n law and jurisdiction i n fact frequently differed; knowledge of a court's legal jurisdiction does not always tell the researcher what he w i l l find there. For example, by the fourteenth century the English church courts' jurisdiction over cases concerning lay debts (other than those pertaining to marriage or testaments) was not recognized by the secular courts and was hardly defended as a matter of law even by churchmen; yet the English church courts i n fact heard thousands of such cases4. On the other hand, the French church courts jurisdiction to hear de presenti marriage cases seems never to have been disputed, but i n fact they heard relatively few such cases. Not only does jurisdiction i n fact differ widely from time to time and place to place, but there are also wide differences i n the procedures employed. A great variety of procedures are encompassed under the broad heading 'Romano-canonic procedure'. Some courts seem to have heard practically no civil cases; some courts practically no criminal 5 . Some courts regularly employed recognizable variants of 'long form' procedure; others made use of summary procedures, and there are a bewildering variety of the latter, ranging from occasional consolidation of terms i n a procedure that otherwise follows the long-form ordo quite strictly to the one- or two-session hearings typical of criminal cases i n the English archdeacons' courts and the northern French diocesan courts®. Granted the state of our knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of what was actually happening i n the wide variety of English and Continental church courts i n the Middle Ages, it would be rash to attempt any definitive explanation of these similarities and differences i n jurisdic2 Compare, e. g., L. Gabel, Benefit of Clergy i n the Latter Middle Ages, S m i t h College Studies i n History 14 (1929) and Cheney , The Punishment of Felonious Clerks, English Historical Rev. 51 (1936), 215, w i t h R. Génestal, L e Privilegium f o r i en France, Paris 1929, and O. Martin, L'assemblée de Vincennes de 1329 et ses conséquences, Paris 1909. 3 See Donahue, The Canon L a w on the Formation of Marriage and Social Practice i n the Later Middle Ages, Journal of F a m i l y History (1983), 149—153. 4 See Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, L a w Quarterly Rev. 91 (1975), 406—432. 5 E. g., there seem to be no surviving records of c i v i l cases from the diocesan officiality of Châlons-sur-Marne (Donahue, Canon L a w and Social Practice, p. 154 n. 40) and v i r t u a l l y no records of c r i m i n a l cases from the consistory court of Y o r k (Donahue, Stubbs vs. Maitland, pp. 703—704). 6 See Adams and Donahue, Select Canterbury Cases, pp.57—59, 68—71; Lefebvre-Teillard, Officialités, pp. 71—83.

IV. Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England

tion and procedure. Before we can even begin to explain the differences, we must get a better comparative sense what was happening i n the church courts i n England and on the Continent. To do this we must know where the records are and what is i n them. Even when they are available, most archival descriptions are not adequate for our purposes. For example, someone who is examining the question whether there was a shift i n the proportion of marriage cases and other kinds of cases i n the church courts i n the late fifteenth century would not be advised to examine the 1480 register of the provincial court at Sens, the existence of which was noted i n a printed Inventaire published i n 18737. The register meticulously records each step i n the procedure of the cases but rarely tells us what the case is about. This last point leads to another reason w h y the content of the records must be described: What looks at first glance like differences among the courts may only be differences among the types of records kept or the types of records that have survived. A register may record only criminal cases, but that does not mean that the court heard no civil cases. There may have been a civil register, now lost, or i t may have been the practice, to keep records of the civil cases i n files of documents (libels, depositions, etc.) w i t h the acta w r i t t e n on the back 8 . The church courts records working group, then, is undertaking a preliminary survey of the surviving records of the courts of the L a t i n Church i n the British Isles and on the Continent prior to 1563. On the basis of this survey it may be possible to outline some answers, or possible answers, to the questions posed in the first part of this report. Even if that does not prove possible, the survey w i l l s t i l l be valuable, since i t w i l l show others where the material that may contain the answers may lie. We began by devising a format for the members of the working group to follow i n w r i t i n g their descriptions (Appendix 1). The format is tentative, and we would welcome suggestions for improvements. The format is not intended to be rigidly applied to all archives. Each country, indeed each officiality, poses a different problem. We might, for example, say that the only known surviving material from a given officiality is its statutes, published i n the sixteenth century, or we might simply refer to published work i n which the records of given officiality are listed. The important thing is to let scholars who are contemplating comparitive research know what is known, and what is 7 M. Quantin, Inventaire sommaire des archives de l'Yonne: Série G (Auxerre 1873), 2.70. 8 See Donahue, Stubbs vs. Maitland, p. 657 and nn. 56, 58, for the practice of the Y o r k consistory court i n this regard.

5 Coing/Nörr

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I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England

not known, about where the work can be done most fruitfully. A sample of adaptation of the format to a particular archive is appended to this report (Appendix 2). Not only is the format intended to be flexible, it is also an ideal that we know that we w i l l not always be able to achieve. I n some cases we w i l l have to work from notes or from printed material; i n many cases we w i l l have time only to look at the most promising documents i n detail while the rest w i l l have to be described broadly. Archives that we have visited w i l l be indicated i n the format by an asterisk (*); documents that we have examined personally w i l l also be so indicated. The source of the information about material we have not examined personally w i l l be indicated i n a bibliography that w i l l accompany each format. The preparation of a format implies a typology of records that are being described. The physical form of the document, though of some interest, does not have the primacy for the legal historian that i t does for the archivist. I t is rarely of much use for the legal historian to have documents classified according to whether they are charters, rolls, or bound registers. For the legal historian the most important information about a record is what is i n it, w h y i t was written, and w h y i t was preserved. I n the case of church court records, the probable answers to the second two questions can be used to provide a framework i n which the first is answered. A court record is either made up by an officer of the court or by (or on behalf of) a party to the case. The former type of record may concern only one case, e.g., a set of depositions or a processus , or it may concern a number of cases, e.g., an act book or a matricula. The latter type (libels, exceptions, etc.) almost always concern one case. The basic distinction for our purposes, however, is between a record that seems to collect everything or everything of one type of material that came before the court i n a given period of time and one that gives us everything or something about a particular case or group of cases, but w i t h no apparent attempt to cover all the business of the court i n a given period. We can therefore distinguish records organized along chronological lines from those organized on a case-by-case basis, and w i t h i n the latter category records covering a number of cases from those that deal w i t h only one case. Records that were preserved as part of a court archive do not have the obvious bias of selection that records preserved by a party to lawsuit have. For this reason our efforts w i l l focus on archives known to contain or believed to contain records that were preserved by a court.

IV. Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England

67

T h i s does n o t m e a n t h a t w e w i l l n o t l i s t u n d e r each j u r i s d i c t i o n deposits of records p e r t i n e n t t o t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t w e k n o w are p r e s e r v e d elsewhere. W e w i l l also be concerned w i t h o b v i o u s bias i n t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of records e v e n i n a c o u r t archive. F o r m u l a r i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , m a y i n c l u d e h i g h l y a t y p i c a l m a t e r i a l , as m a y records of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l disputes. T h e h i s t o r y of t h e archive m a y suggest t h a t at some t i m e a decision w a s m a d e to d i s c a r d c e r t a i n k i n d s of m a t e r i a l , o r t h e h i s t o r y m a y a l l o w us t o i n f e r t h a t no conscious s e l e c t i o n was made9. A s of t h i s w r i t i n g , a n u m b e r of d e s c r i p t i o n s are i n v a r i o u s stages of c o m p l e t i o n . T h e f o l l o w i n g lists t h e descriptions t h a t are a v a i l a b l e i n f i n i s h e d d r a f t f o r m ( g i v i n g i n o r d e r : t h e n a m e of t h e m o d e r n c o u n t r y i n w h i c h t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e t e r r i t o r y covered b y t h e o f f i c i a l i t y is located, t h e n a m e of t h e m e d i e v a l ecclesiastical p r o v i n c e i n w h i c h i t w a s located, w h e r e r e l e v a n t t h e n a m e of t h e m e d i e v a l diocese i n w h i c h i t was located, a n d t h e n a m e of t h e o f f i c i a l i t y ) : Belgium, Rheims, Cambrai, Diocesan officiality Belgium, Rheims, Tournai, Diocesan officialities France, A i x , Archdiocesan officiality France, Aries, Marseille, Diocesan officiality France, Bordeaux, Perigueux, Diocesan officiality France, Bourges, Mende, Diocesan officiality France, Embrun, Digne, Diocesan officiality France, Narbonne, Eine, Diocesan officialities France, Rheims, Beauvais, Diocesan officiality France, Rheims, Chalons, Diocesan officiality France, Rheims, Senlis, Diocesan officiality France, Rouen, Archdiocesan officiality France, Rouen, Bayeux, Monastic officiality of Cerisy France, Rouen, Monastic officiality of Fecamp France, Rouen, Monastic officiality of Montivillers France, Rouen, Monastic officiality of Pontoise France, Sens, Archdiocesan officiality France, Sens, Auxerre, Capitular officiality of St.-Julien-du-Sault France, Sens, Chartres, Archidiaconal officiality of Chartres and capitular officiality of the cathedral France, Sens, Paris, Diocesan officiality France, Sens, Paris, Capitular officiality of the cathedral France, Sens, Paris, Archidiaconal officiality of Brie France, Sens, Paris, Archidiaconal officiality of Paris France, Sens, Paris, Monastic officiality of Saint-Germain-des-Pres France, Sens, Sens, Capitular officiality of the cathedral France, Sens, Troyes, Diocesan officiality 9 Compare Adams and Donahue, Select Canterbury Cases, pp. 35—37 (surv i v i n g 13th c. Canterbury records not a random sample, biased i n the direct i o n of procedural and jurisdictional diversity) w i t h Donahue, Stubbs vs. Maitland, pp. 708—712 (surviving 14th c. Y o r k records may be a v a l i d random sample).

5*

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I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England

France, Trier, Verdun, Capitular officialities of the cathedral and of SaintGermain-de-Montfaucon Germany, Salzburg, Freising, Diocesan officiality Germany, Salzburg, Regensburg, Diocesan officiality Germany, Mainz, Augsburg, Diocesan officiality Italy, Siena, Archdiocesan officiality I t a l y , Siena, Massa e Populonia, Diocesan officiality Italy, Siena (?Rome), Montalcino, Diocesan officiality Spain, Tarragona, Barcelona, Diocesan officiality Appendix 1 Format for Archive Descriptions 1. Court Province, diocese, subdivision, name of the court, listed i n that order. I f the t e r r i t o r i a l reach of the court crossed diocesan boundaries, use the area i n w h i c h the largest part of the territory lay. I f substantially portions lay i n more than one diocese, use a l l names. Where boundaries changed d u r i n g the M i d d l e Ages, indicate as f u l l y as possible or give references. Queries may be necessary where the jurisdictional relationships have been inadequately studied. 2. Archive. The principal modern depository of records of the court, address, history of the archive. Other archives k n o w n to contain documents of or concerning the court may be listed summarily at the end of this section. 3. Records. I n each case list the archive reference number, its approximate extent (number of folios, number of separate pieces, etc.), the nature of the record, bracketing dates, content (nature of cases, nature of procedure, etc.), and note any peculiarities. To the extent possible list records i n the following order or include w i t h i n the contents notations as to the following: a) Records concerning a number of cases, made up b y a court officer on a chronological basis. These w i l l normally be i n registers or on rolls, but the key element is the chronological arrangement. The record may simply contain acta or minutes of w h a t happened on a given day, or i t may record, or have bound in, libels, depositions, etc. the presence or absence of such material should be noted. b) Records arranged on a case-by-case basis. aa) Concerning more than one case. These include the registers of processus (procès) that are found i n the south of France i n w h i c h an attempt is made to register all the acta and the documents i n a given case and then b i n d a number of cases together, or the registers that contain a particular type of item: registers of depositions, sentences, proxies, etc. bb) Concerning only one case. Distinguish processus — attempts to desribe an entire litigation — f r o m i n d i v i d u a l documents i n the process (cause papers, procédures ). I n either case describe the procedural contents: e. g., 'processus w i t h acta only', 'processus w i t h libels, proxies, depositions' etc. I n the case of i n d i v i d u a l documents describe their procedural nature — e. g., l i b e l s only', 'libels, depositions, and sentences' etc., and their current arrangement, e. g., 'documents i n no order', or 'single documents only',

I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England or 'documents arranged b y case', and i f the latter, whether this seems to have been done b y a modern archivist or whether i t was part of the original scheme, c) Post-Tridentine records. No attempt should be made to list a l l the holdings that date from after 1563, b u t the fact that a series of documents continues into the early modern period should be noted and brief general descriptions of the post-Tridentine holdings given. 4. Jurisdiction. A brief attempt to describe the extent of the court's j u r i s diction both as to persons and subject matter i n the periods for w h i c h records survive. This w i l l have to be impressionistic i n many cases. To the extent possible distinctions should be d r a w n between w h a t was normal and w h a t was occasional or rare. 5. Bibliography. A selective bibliography should accompany each heading, as appropriate. I t should include any study of the court a n d / o r records i n question, inventories, published or unpublished of the records, and any publication i n w h i c h the records are edited or transcribed. More difficult to find, but very useful, are general church histories or local antiquarian studies that discuss the institutions or officers of the church i n the area i n the relevant period.

Appendix 2 1. Bourges, Mende, officiality of the bishop. 2. * Archives départementales de la Lozère, 7, place U r b a i n V, 48005 Mende, France. The records of the officiality seem to have been acquired at the time of the establishment of the departmental archives i n the early 19th c. A fire i n the 19th c. destroyed substantial parts of the ancien régime holdings. Ferd[inand ] Andre , Inventaire sommaire des archives départementales antérieures à 1790. Lozère. Archives écclésistiques. Série G. (Nos. 1—1451), torn 1, Mende 1882, lists a l l documents f r o m the court k n o w n to me. I t is quite detailed and accurate. The fonds of the officiality are articles G. 922 through G. 968 i n the Inventaire. H. Latour , Guide des archives de la Lozère, 1979, is a model of its kind. 3. Chronological records: *G963. 186 fols, bound i n wood and leather, 12 quires. The original fols. 1 and 188 may have been used to bind. Fifteen loose documents (correspondence, positions, interrogatories, articles, etc.) now i n an envelope w i t h i n the book. 1268—1272. Register of cases. The first 7 fols, have entries arranged by date. On fol. lOr the clerk begins a new style i n w h i c h he attempts to gather together the processus f r o m a single case (including, at least i n some cases, the libel, positions, depositions, etc.) before going on to the next one. The effort is not notably successful. A number of b l a n k folios indicates that he sometimes overestimated how much space he w o u l d need, and frequent cross-references indicate that he also frequently underestimated. The cases are both c r i m i n a l and civil, largely secular. Debts and assaults predominate, but there are cases of rights i n land, inheritance, and at least one marriage case.

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I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England *G934.

126 fols., parchment binding, 3 large quires. 1340—1345. Register of cases. The book is largely, though not exclusively, made up of inquests i n c r i m i n a l cases and depositions of witnesses i n c i v i l ones. The c r i m i n a l cases involve a large variety of offenses, mostly by clerics. The c i v i l cases include marriage, testaments, m a r i t a l property, and debt.

I n d i v i d u a l documents: *G944. 116 fols. 1443. Processus i n a case between the cathedral chapter and a layman about a cens. *G945. 72 fols. 1448. A document made up on the basis of a search of nine registers of the court f r o m 1283 to 1448, extracting cases concerning royal and episcopal jurisdiction. Neither of the surv i v i n g registers is mentioned, suggesting that they were not part of the normal r u n of registers. •G960.

*G961. G922.

48 fols. 14th c. Formulary. Most of the items concern noncontentious jurisdiction (institutions, inductions, etc.) b u t some j u dicial matters. 15 fols. 15th c. Formulary. Sample orders to absolve excommunicates, etc. 6 documents. 1307—1322. Royal letters concerning jurisdiction.

G923.

5 documents. 1291—1320. Concerning jurisdiction, letter of Nicholas I V to Durantis.

G924.

2 documents. 1322—1325. Jurisdiction over married clerks.

G925. G926. G927. G928.

3 5 3 3

G929.

6 documents. 1390—1400. Royal and episcopal jurisdiction.

documents. documents. documents. documents.

1325—1328. 1132—1340. 1351—1357. 1354—1381.

including a

Royal and secular jurisdiction. Id. Id. Seignorial vs. episcopal jurisdiction.

G930— 1503—1729. Royal and episcopal jurisdiction. 932. G933. 2 documents. 1283—1339. One r o l l of condemnation of clerks by the official. Commission b y Durantis to judges i n a murder case. G935. Quire of 4 fols. 1344. Clerical defamation case. G936. G937 G938. G939. G940. G941. G942. G943.

Quire of 24 fols. 1347. A case of black magic attempted against the bishop b y one Sir Pepin (priest). Copy of G936. Quire of 34 fols. 1347. Case ( w i t h depositions) of assault during mass by a canon; appeal to Rome. Quire of 14 fols. 1347. Copy of G938. 3 documents. 1353—1361. Case documents (including a sentence i n a testament case). 3 documents. 1373—1397. T w o jurisdictional and one testament case. Quire of 38 fols. 1377. Cens case, i n v o l v i n g the clergy of the church of Mende and a husband and wife. Quire of 35 fols. 1427—1430. Complex case of murder of a clerk w i t h depositions.

I V . Church Court Records on the Continent and i n England G946— 1503—1791. Various ecclesiastical cases, c i v i l and criminal. A 957. couple of clerical fornication and adultery cases. The last is from the officialité of Uzès. G958. Quire of 14 fols. 1440 to 17th c. Monitoria and some 17th c. depositions. G959. 22 documents. 1341—1525. Miscellaneous orders including orders i n v o l v i n g debts. G964. 40 documents. 1264—1326. Miscellany of both secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. G965. Roll. 1390. A death sentence from the ?city court. G966. 4 documents. 1484 to 1786. Nominations of judges. G967— 5 documents. 1353 to 1354. Jurisdictional case against a royal of968. ficial. 4. This small, mountainous diocese possesses one of the oldest court books w h i c h survives from any European ecclesiastical court. I t was, of course, the see of W i l l i a m Durantis, the great proceduralist of the late 13th c. Prior to 1306 the seignorial jurisdiction of the bishop and his spiritual jurisdiction seem to have been exercised b y the same court, w h i c h employed Romano-canonic procedure. A f t e r the establishment of a secular royal court i n the area, the bishop's court continued to exercise a w i d e r range of jurisdiction than was normal i n France i n this period. The number of surviving documents concerning the jurisdiction of the court suggest a continual controversy during the 14th and 15th centuries over the extent of the jurisdiction of the court. Ch. Donahue

V . Defamation, Privacy Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit und seine Institutionalisierung ist i n der gegenwärtigen zivilrechtlichen Dogmatik von Interesse, nachdem insbesondere die deutsche Gesetzgebung sich grundsätzlich ablehnend verhalten und die Rechtsprechung Neuland betreten hat. Vornehmlich hat die Entwicklung der Massenmedien wie Presse, Rundfunk und Fernsehen Eingriffe i n das Recht der Persönlichkeit nicht nur zahlreicher, sondern auch sehr viel schwerwiegender gemacht. Dabei ergeben sich zum einen Probleme auf der tatbestandlichen Seite; hier geht es vor allem darum, einer grenzenlosen Ausweitung des Deliktstatbestandes ,Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung 4 entgegenzutreten. Zum anderen geht der Streit u m die Sanktionen der Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung weiter. Zwar ist für die deutsche Zivilrechtsdogmatik inzwischen geklärt, daß Eingriffe i n fremde Persönlichkeitsrechte zum Ersatz des dadurch entstandenen Schadens auch dann verpflichten, wenn dieser nicht vermögensrechtlicher A r t ist. Zweifelhaft ist jedoch, i n welcher Größenordnung der Schadensersatz bemessen werden soll. Hier bieten sich zwei Ansatzpunkte an: Einerseits aus der Perspektive des Geschädigten — wie schwer ist die ideelle Beeinträchtigung für i h n gewesen —, andererseits aus der Sicht des Schädigers — aus welchen Motiven ist die Persönlichkeitsverletzung erfolgt und welchen Nutzen hat der Verletzer daraus gezogen? K r i t i k e r der gegenwärtigen Judizierungspraxis und der dabei gewährten Schmerzensgeldbeträge verweisen vor allem auf die damit verbundene Kommerzialisierung der Ehre. Die Ähnlichkeit der Lebenssachverhalte, insbesondere die gleichermaßen einflußreiche Stellung der Massenmedien, bringt es m i t sich, daß diese Probleme nicht auf ein Land beschränkt geblieben sind. Vielmehr finden sich ähnliche Fragestellungen i n allen westlichen Rechtsordnungen. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist, daß viele Lösungsansätze, die i n der heutigen Dogmatik diskutiert werden, Ähnlichkeiten sowohl i n den kontinentalen Rechtsordnungen als auch i n denjenigen, die vom englischen Recht abstammen, insbesondere auch i n Amerika, aufweisen. Dies gibt Anlaß zu der Frage, ob sich i n der historischen Entwicklung wechselseitige Einflüsse zwischen dem kontinentalen und dem angloamerikanischen Recht nachweisen lassen. I m Anschluß an das römische Recht war schon i m Mittelalter, als sich die Problematik der Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung auf tätliche Angriffe einerseits und Beleidi-

V. Defamation, Privacy

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gungen und Schmähungen i n Wort und Schrift andererseits beschränkte, ein Bedürfnis nach rechtlicher Sanktion gegeben. Die vom ius commune i m weitesten Sinne ausgehende Entwicklung legte den Gedanken nahe, daß Lösungen eines Rechtskreises diejenigen des anderen beeinflußt haben könnten. Solche Erwägungen haben dazu geführt, daß i m Rahmen des Generalthemas ,Anglo-American and Continental Legal History 4 eine Arbeitsgruppe über ,Defamation, Privacy' gebildet wurde. Diese Arbeitsgruppe, deren Leitung Professor Dr. Hübner, Köln, übernommen hat, gehören Mitarbeiter aus den USA, England, Deutschland, Frankreich, Spanien und Italien an. Der äußere Gang der Arbeiten wurde zunächst durch vorbereitenden Schriftwechsel und Circulare sowie durch persönliche Diskussionen des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe mit einzelnen Mitarbeitern gefördert. I m März 1984 fand dann i n K ö l n eine Arbeitstagung der gesamten Arbeitsgruppe statt. Bei dieser Gelegenheit konnte auf der Basis vorbereitender Arbeitsberichte aller Teilnehmer eine intensive und fruchtbare Diskussion über die einzelnen möglichen Berührungspunkte zwischen anglo-amerikanischem und kontinentalem Recht auf dem Gebiete des Persönlichkeitsschutzes geführt werden. Hierbei, wie auch schon i n der Phase der Vorbereitungsarbeiten, hat sich die Besonderheit der Thematik dieser Arbeitsgruppe gezeigt, die sie insbesondere mit der Arbeitsgruppe ,Towards a General L a w of Contract' gemeinsam hat. Es stehen hier nicht nur historische Abläufe zum Vergleich, sondern es handelt sich u m ein dogmengeschichtliches Thema, das die Entwicklung einer speziellen Institution des Zivilrechts untersucht. Demzufolge ist i n zweifacher Weise vorzugehen: Zum einen müssen die Entwicklungslinien der Institution i n den einzelnen Ländern und Bereichen nachgezogen und aufgehellt werden, wobei zum Teil so gut wie keine Sekundärliteratur vorliegt. Zum anderen müssen die Strukturmerkmale der Persönlichkeits ver letzung (Tatbestand, subjektive Voraussetzungen beim Täter, prozessuales Verfahren, Zulässigkeit des Wahrheitsbeweises, Rechtsfolgen, insbesondere Unterlassungsanspruch) i n vergleichender Sicht untersucht werden. Gerade bei der zweiten Richtung ergeben sich spezifische Fragestellungen. Dies t r i f f t vor allen Dingen die i m geltenden Recht gezogene scharfe Trennung zwischen Zivilrecht und Strafrecht. Diese Aufteilung läßt sich für frühere Epochen, namentlich das Mittelalter und die frühe Neuzeit, nicht i n gleicher Weise treffen. Oft wurde i m Rahmen eines strafrechtlichen Verfahrens wegen Beleidigung oder übler Nachrede neben anderen Sanktionen auch die Zahlung eines Geldbetrages an den Verletzten verhängt. Auch dies ist streng genommen eine strafrechtliche Sanktion, die aber von ihrer Funktion her m i t dem heutigen zivilrechtlichen Schmerzensgeldanspruch des Verletzten vergleichbar ist.

74

V. Defamation, Privacy

Hinzu treten hoheitliche Aspekte des Persönlichkeitsschutzes. Schon i m späten Mittelalter, dann verstärkt zur Zeit des Absolutismus, bedienten sich Könige und Fürsten des bestehenden Instrumentariums zum Schutze der Persönlichkeit, um politische Kontrolle über ihre Untertanen auszuüben. Dieses Bedürfnis verstärkte sich, nachdem durch die Erfindung des Buchdruckes die massenweise Herstellung und Verbreitung politischer Schriften möglich wurde. Hier griff die Obrigkeit i m Sinne einer Zensur durch, wobei der Herrscher oft Angriffe auf seine Beamten und den hohen Adel als Angriffe auf sich selbst betrachtete. Vielfach wurden i n dieser Zeit auch neue Instrumente des Persönlichkeitsschutzes geschaffen. A l l dies führt dazu, daß i m Einzelfalle untersucht und entschieden werden muß, ob eine historische Erscheinung als primär strafrechtlich, als politisch-hoheitlich oder als i m engeren Sinne zivilrechtlich qualifiziert werden soll. Für die gegenwärtige Diskussion sind naturgemäß vor allem solche Rechtsfolgen von Interesse, die dem Verletzten einen Geldersatz oder Unterlassungsanspruch gewähren. Bei den bisherigen Arbeiten, die unter diesen Prämissen stattgefunden haben, zeichnen sich als mögliche Berührungspunkte zwischen anglo-amerikanischem und kontinentalem Recht vor allen Dingen folgende Bereiche ab: 1. Der wichtigste Berührungspunkt ist offensichtlich das kanonische Recht gewesen. Das Decretum Gratiani enthält eine ganze Reihe von Regelungen, die sich mit Persönlichkeitsverletzungen befassen. Es kann davon ausgegangen werden, daß das Dekret i n ganz Europa verbreitet war. I n England lassen sich bemerkenswerte Parallelen zum Dekret i n der Rechtsprechung der Kirchengerichte finden. Diese basiert vor allen Dingen auf der Constitution of Oxford von 1222, die die fälschliche Bezichtigung eines anderen als ein Verbrechen sanktioniert. A u f dieser Basis hat die kirchliche Rechtsprechungspraxis unter anderem auch einen Unterlassungsanspruch gewährt, der bis i n die Einzelheiten den Regelungen des Decretum Gratiani entspricht. Trotz dieser offensichtlichen Parallelen ist es sehr schwierig, eine direkte Beeinflussung des englischen Kirchenrechts durch das Dekret nachzuweisen, da weder die Constitution of Oxford noch die kirchlichen Entscheidungen Zitate oder Hinweise auf das Dekret oder spätere kirchliche Rechtsquellen enthalten. Für die Frage der Beeinflussung ist man daher auf Vermutungen angewiesen. 2. Noch unklar ist, i n welchem Umfang während der normannischen Zeit Beziehungen zwischen der Rechtskultur i n Nordfrankreich, insbesondere den Coutumes der Normandie und der Bretagne, und

V. Defamation, Privacy

75

dem englischen Recht bestanden haben. Immerhin lassen sich i n der Rechtsprache terminologische Ähnlichkeiten feststellen. Die zeitweilige Vereinigung von weiten Teilen Westfrankreichs mit England i m Königreich der Anjou-Plantagenet hat möglicherweise eine Rolle gespielt. Zwar erklären sich die Constitutions of Clarendon selbst für außerhalb Englands unanwendbar; andererseits ließe sich vermuten, daß i n dieser Zeit kontinentale Rechtsvorstellungen nach England gelangt sind. 3. Eine deutliche Parallele zwischen England und dem Kontinent, insbesondere Frankreich, zeigt sich dann wieder i n der Zeit des Absolutismus. Hier war es insbesondere der Gedanke der politischen Beeinflussung und Zensur, der zur Entstehung ähnlicher Erscheinungen geführt hat. Dies gilt namentlich für die ,Libel·, die i n Frankreich während der Religionskriege aufkamen. Zur selben Zeit wurde i n England die Überwachung von Persönlichkeitsverletzungen auf diesem Gebiet der Star Chamber anvertraut. Für eines der Hauptprobleme i n der englischen Entwicklung jener Epoche, der Frage, ob i n diesen Verfahren der Richter oder die Jury entscheiden sollte, gibt es freilich wegen der andersartigen Verfahrensstruktur auf dem Kontinent keine Parallelen. 4. Von besonderem Interesse auch für die kontinentalen Rechte ist die Untersuchung für die Zeit des Naturrechts und des Usus modernus. Entgegen der naheliegenden Vermutung haben die Klassiker des Natur- und Vernunftrechts auf die Fortentwicklung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes i n der Praxis keinen Einfluß gehabt. Eine gewisse, gleichsam negative Ausnahme hierzu bildet Wolff, dessen uferlose Ausweitung des Persönlichkeitsrechts i m 19. Jh. i n Deutschland den Anstoß dazu gab, das Persönlichkeitsrecht als ganzes i n Frage zu stellen. U m so größere Bedeutung für die Rechtsentwicklung hatte auf dem Kontinent der Usus modernus. Hierbei haben sich von Deutschland bis Spanien bis i n kleinste Details parallele Entwicklungen und Fragestellungen nachweisen lassen. Dies w i r d sicherlich — auch über den Rahmen des hier untersuchten Themas hinaus — Anlaß geben, sich i n erhöhtem Maße der gesamteuropäischen Bedeutung dieser bisher mehr i m Blick auf Deutschland und die Niederlande untersuchten Epoche bewußt zu werden. 5. Parallelen zeigen sich dann wieder i m 20. Jh. I n allen Bereichen war es vor allem die Rechtsprechung, die das Persönlichkeitsrecht i n seiner heutigen Form entwickelt hat. Gesetzliche Grundlagen für den Persönlichkeitsschutz gab es i m Zivilrecht praktisch nicht: § 823 I

76

V. Defamation, Privacy

BGB enthält so wenig konkrete Anhaltspunkte für ein Persönlichkeitsrecht wie A r t . 1382 Code C i v i l und seine Entsprechungen i n Spanien und Italien. Wie bereits angedeutet, erweist es sich immer wieder als außerordentlich schwierig, über auffällige Parallelen hinaus eine direkte Beeinflussung des anglo-amerikanischen Rechts durch den Kontinent und umgekehrt nachzuweisen. Die Hauptgründe hierfür mögen einmal in der unsystematischen Grundhaltung des englischen Rechts liegen. Es geht sehr viel mehr als die Rechtsordnungen des Kontinents, die auf die Regelungen des römischen Rechts über die luxuria aufbauen konnten, von Einzelfällen aus, die i n der historischen Entwicklung auftraten und aus denen Rechtsinstitute nur allmählich zusammenwuchsen. Die systematische Erfassung dieser Rechtsinstitute blieb demzufolge hinter der Praxis weit zurück. A u f der anderen Seite ist die englische Praxis i n noch geringerem Maße als die kontinentale bereit, systematischtheoretisch erarbeitete Konzepte zu übernehmen. Neben dieser methodischen Diskrepanz liegt ein weiterer Grund für die oben angedeutete Schwierigkeit i n der Eigenständigkeit des englischen Rechts. E i n eindringliches Beispiel hierfür ist die oben zitierte Rechtsprechung der mittelalterlichen Kirchengerichte. Es ist auffällig, daß — anders als auf dem Kontinent — weder die Constitution noch die kirchlichen Entscheidungen auf Quellen irgendwelcher A r t Bezug nehmen. Hierbei mag die Vorstellung eine Rolle gespielt haben, daß England für sein Recht zwar Anregungen aufnimmt, jedoch i m wesentlichen eigenständig, ohne Nachahmung irgendwelcher Vorbilder arbeitet. Unter diesen Prämissen steht die Untersuchung der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung i n der Entwicklung des Persönlichkeitsrechts weitgehend unter Beweisschwierigkeiten. Ganz offensichtlich bestand jedoch überall ein Regelungsbedürfnis. Das Persönlichkeitsrecht existierte i m Rahmen allgemein verbreiteter Wertvorstellungen. Dem haben die institutionellen Ausformungen i n den einzelnen Rechtskreisen i m Grundsätzlichen parallel Rechnung getragen. H. Hübner

V I . England and Continental Legal Literature The influence of one set of writers on another can be studied from t w o angles. The first is the bibliographical: one can look for evidence that the books of one group were to be found i n the libraries used by the other. The presence of books is, of course, not evidence that they were ever read, but when certain classes of foreign books are acquired i n a relatively systematic way by libraries, i t may be assumed that they were considered to be of some interest to the users of the libraries. Evidence of a rather stronger nature is to be found i n translations and annotated editions of foreign works. Scholars rarely undertake the labour of translation nor publishers the expense of publishing unless they believe that there is at least a potential market for the works so produced and published. The other main approach is to study the works of one set of writers to identify the situations i n which foreign writers have been used. Such usage may be explicit, as where the foreign writer is cited directly and the reference to the original source is quoted; or i t may be indirect, as when a doctrine known to have originated i n a foreign source is discussed, although without express reference to where the writer found it. The Legal Literature group is tackling the problem of mutual influence of English and continental w r i t i n g i n both these ways. The group met i n Cambridge, England, from 21—23 September 1983 to review progress and plan further action. Professor R. Feenstra (Leiden) and Professor D. Maffei (Rome) are leading an investigation into the presence of continental works i n English legal libraries, particularly the libraries of the four Inns of Court i n London and those of the Colleges of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, where Roman law was always taught 1 . A major problem is that i t is not always possible to discover at what date a particular book, mentioned i n a contemporary catalogue, was acquired by a library. I t may w e l l have reached the library many years 1 A useful tool is H. M. Adams, Catalogue of Continental Printed Books i n Cambridge Libraries, 1500—1600, of w h i c h the group has acquired a copy. The group also has a copy of J. N. Adams and G. Averley, Bibliography of Eighteenth century Legal Literature, 1982, w h i c h catalogues l a w books i n the m a i n legal collections i n England today.

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V I . England and Continental Legal Literature

after its publication. So a search is being made for old catalogues and for lists of books owned by lawyers at different periods. Sometimes such lists were made for the purpose of probate of the w i l l of a deceased lawyer and Dr. J. H. Baker (Cambridge), from the group on L a w Reporting, has provided useful information on the existence of such lists of collections which are now dispersed. For example, Sir W. Wyndham, a Judge of the King's Bench, who died i n 1668, although a common lawyer, had several canon law books, as w e l l as Grotius on War and Peace, i n his personal library. I n the case of existing libraries, old catalogues can sometimes provide a picture of when continental influence was greatest. Thus i n the case of the library of Lincoln's I n n i n London, a 1646 catalogue shows very few civil law books, whereas a catalogue of 1744 shows that there have been many acquisitions i n the previous century. But really large scale accessions are not noted u n t i l the nineteenth century. The library of T r i n i t y Hall, Cambridge, is the most important Cambridge College library for c i v i l law materials and has a catalogue of 1782. Sometimes colleges received bequests of collections of law books. Thus the collection of Sir Thomas Smith, first Regius Professor of C i v i l L a w at Cambridge, was left to Queens' College on his death i n 1577 and includes the main works of the principal legal humanists, such as Budaeus and Alciatus. A similar collection is the Skeffington bequest, which came to T r i n i t y College, Cambridge, i n 1582. On the other hand, the law books i n the library of the Prince Bishop of Wurzburg, which was sacked by Swedish troops i n 1631, and which was acquired by T r i n i t y College i n the following year, lay uncatalogued for a hundred years and seem not to have been used at all. Dr. D. J. Osier (Lincoln College, Oxford) has undertaken to continue this line w i t h a view to building up a comprehensive picture of the continental law books that circulated among cultivated English lawyers at different periods. A n important library for civil law, no longer i n existence, was that of 'Doctors' Commons', the College of Advocates practising i n the English civil law courts. The books were sold i n 1861, on the dissolution of the College, but a printed catalogue of the then holdings was published in 1818, although copies are very rare. The civilians of Doctors' Commons themselves produced a not inconsiderable literature on the civil law i n English, which had, as its primary aim, the imparting of information on the methods, systems and leading principles of the civil law to their colleagues. This has recently been studied by Dr. D. Coquillette 2 . He argues that the sixteenth century civilians tended to promote accommodation w i t h the common lawyers and were 2

Boston L a w Rev. 61 (1981), 1 and 315.

VI. England and Continental Legal Literature

i n fact pioneers of comparative law. I n the seventeenth century, h o w ever, the civilians became more defensive i n their attitudes, as they t r i e d to protect their hold on cases i n v o l v i n g the l a w merchant and maritime matters i n the Court of A d m i r a l t y against attempts by the common l a w courts to deal w i t h them. B u t their introduction into general legal t h i n k i n g of a grammar of general jurisprudence, derived f r o m the c i v i l law, had an important influence on leading common lawyers, such as Bacon, Seiden, Hale and Holt. This has yet to be f u l l y investigated. I t w o u l d be useful to study the 'New Pandect of the Roman c i v i l l a v / , published i n 1734 b y John Ayliffe, described by H. F. Jolowicz as "the most learned (English) Romanist before Buckland", w i t h a v i e w to comparing the authorities which he cites w i t h works then available i n libraries. The English civilians were familiar w i t h the form of the legal treatise. The common lawyers, on the other hand, produced very few accounts i n connected prose u n t i l the eighteenth century. Professor B. Simpson (Kent and Chicago) has shown 3 that the roots of the common l a w treatise are to be found i n the c i v i l l a w tradition. Common lawyers learned to look for fundamental principles behind the m y r i a d decisions collected i n their Digests of Cases and felt that their l a w also had its regulae iuris , which w o u l d provide some systematic structure for the discussion of the l i m i t e d rules to be derived from the cases. I n this t r a d i t i o n the latter were presented as illustrating principles which were themselves often suggested by c i v i l l a w writers. A p a r t from Blackstone's 'Commentaries', Simpson identified t w o monographs, — Charles Fearne on 'Contingent Remainders' (1772) and Sir W i l l i a m Jones on 'Bailments' (1781), which became models for future treatises. I t was Jones who called Pothier's doctrine of contracts " l a w at Westminster as w e l l as at Orleans". I n America Joseph Story was only able to "sell" his readers English l a w b y persuading t h e m that i t illustrated general principles of law, based on reason rather t h a n authority. A n area where there was m u t u a l influence between B r i t i s h and continental writers, particularly German, was n a t u r a l law theory, which is being studied by Professor K . L u i g (Passau). Leibniz was influenced by Bacon's 'Novum Organon' and the works of Hobbes and Cumberland were not only found i n German libraries but were frequently cited by continental writers on n a t u r a l l a w u n t i l the middle of the eighteenth century. Contrariwise there were numerous English editions of continental n a t u r a l l a w writers, especially Grotius and Pufendorf. Both Grotius' 'De iure b e l l i ac pacis' and Pufendorf's 'De iure naturae' were translated into English and went through several 3

Chicago L a w Rev. 48 (1981), 632.

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English editions, while of Pufendorf s 'De officio hominis et civis , no less than fifteen editions i n English were printed as w e l l as eight i n Latin. Even i n the middle of the eighteenth century Heineccius' 'Elementa iuris naturae et gentium' was translated into English as Ά methodical System of Universal Law' by G. T u r n b u l l (1763), whose notes and supplements to i t are being further studied. I t is true that natural law may be considered as belonging more to the area of philosophy than to that of law, but the fact that i n this field of study English and continental writers corresponded w i t h each other, quoted each other and thus formed a single 'school' must have created a climate of thought which influenced lawyers i n the more strict sense of the word. The direct interchange of ideas between British and Continental writers diminished i n the second half of the eighteenth century but can still be discerned i n particular areas. The most influential English legal treatise of modern times is the 'Commentaries on the laws of England' of Sir W i l l i a m Blackstone. Significantly Blackstone had tried to become Regius Professor of Civil L a w and may have regarded the Vinerian Chair of English L a w as "second best". Mr. N. Simmonds (Manchester) has undertaken to look for evidence of the influence of continental writers. Apart from an introductory reference to natural law as providing the justification for any systematic account of laws — which seems largely ornamental i n character — there is little express reference to natural law. Blackstone's ideology was Whig and the Whigs considered a system of law based on natural rights to be too radical. They preferred to explain law i n terms of its history — particularly by the traditional reference to 'the ancient constitution'. However Simmonds considers that a strong element of utilitarianism i n secular natural law theory, perhaps mediated through Francis Hutcheson and other Scottish philosophers, can be detected i n Blackstone (notwithstanding the hostility of Jeremy Bentham). I n certain areas of law the influence of continental legal literature can be traced i n judicial decisions. Mr. C. Rodgers (Aberystwyth, Wales) has been examining the decisions of the great eighteenth century judge, Lord Mansfield (Chief Justice, King's Bench 1756—1788), for evidence of recourse to continental writers, and has already found many direct citations. Where there was an international element, or where English law could be expected to reflect general principles of law, Mansfield was successful i n imposing a continental view, but i n purely native law he met w i t h resistance. I n commercial law, particularly i n cases of marine insurance, he encouraged reference to leading international works. Thus i n Goss v.

V I . England and Continental Legal Literature

Withers (1758), concerning average and total loss, one party relied on Grotius, whereas the other party based his argument on Bynkershoek, 'Quaestiones Juris Publici' and Mansfield i n his judgement weighed up the merits of both arguments. I n a later case, Mansfield relied heavily on Roccus' 'De assicurationibus', and distinguished the earlier case. The so-called uberrima fides principle, requiring the disclosure by the parties to an insurance contract of all material circumstances was derived from natural law writers, especially Pufendorf, De iure naturae, 9.8. Mansfield used the more technical works of Roccus, Loccenius and Colbert's 'Ordonnance de la marine' of 1681 as guides to the interpretation of insurance policies, so that such policies should not be understood differently in England from elsewhere. Sometimes such references were inevitable. I n cases involving the law of nations, such as the limits of sovereign immunity, he claimed that he had to have recourse to such writers as Grotius, Bynkershoek, and Wiquefort, on the grounds that there was "no English writer of eminence on the subject". Similarly in conflict of laws, Ulric Huber's chapter 'de conflictu legum' i n his 'Praelectiones Iuris Romani et Hodierni' was cited as the leading authority. Huber's doctrine, said Mansfield, "is founded i n good sense and upon general principles of justice. I entirely agree w i t h him". I n these cases, involving the law merchant or public or private international law, the rules of English law purported to be international. I n private law the situation was different. I n the law of contract Mansfield tried, on the basis of natural law authority, to eliminate or at least emasculate, the doctrine of consideration, arguing that a prior moral obligation could make a promise binding. He was not successful in this, but had somewhat greater acceptance when he tried to develop an English doctrine of quasi-contract on the basis of a presumed contract i n the situations i n which condictiones were given i n Roman law (Moses v. McFerlan, 1760). This seems to be derived from Pufendorf (de iure naturae, 4.13.5), and although greatly i n advance of its time, may be regarded as a sign-post for the cautious development of a doctrine of unjust enrichment later. Rodgers is now pursuing his investigations into Mansfield's private papers. P. Stein

6 Coing/Nörr

V I I . T h e Courts and the Development of Commercial L a w I I Gruppo di lavoro ha assunto come proprio oggetto d i studio i l rapporto esistente tra lo sviluppo del diritto commerciale ed i Tribunali chiamati a giudicare le nuove realtà giuridiche sorte nei porti, nei mercati e nelle fiere. Tale prospettiva puô essere molto utile nel comparare le esperienze dell'Europa continentale e dell'area anglosassone. I n modo diverso, ma forse più significativo, dell'evoluzione della dottrina giuridica, le vicende dei Tribunali continentali e inglesi competenti i n materia commerciale consentono di cogliere le realtà economiche e g l i interessi dei gruppi sociali che fanno sorgere e crescere i l fenomeno mercantile. Le sentenze di queste Corti, poi, sono elemento déterminante anche nello sviluppo della dottrina. Nell'Europa continentale l'organizzazione statuale accentrata che porta da u n lato a creare ο a favorire i grandi Tribunali centrali e, dall'altro, a ridimensionare le funzioni delle corporazioni, è pressocché coeva al nascere di una scienza autonoma del diritto commerciale. La giurisprudenza e le opere dei giuristi hanno pertanto un ruolo fondamentale nel processo d i assimilazione della nuova scienza ai sistemi giuridici predominanti. L'osmosi fra dottrina e giurisprudenza è costante: per l'ltalia, ad esempio, si hanno i casi di Scaccia, Casaregi, Ansaldo e Rocco, per non citare che i più importanti, che maturano gran parte delle loro teorie mentre sono giudici rispettivamente a Genova, Firenze, Roma e Napoli. Tra i l X V I ed i l X V I I I secolo si puô situare quello che è stato definito " i l periodo classico della scienza commercialistica europea" 1 , che ha avuto riflessi anche i n Inghilterra. Come afferma Coing, infatti, "Das Handelsrecht erfährt i n den Werken italienischer Juristen wie Stracca, Scaccia (beide 16. Jahrhundert) zusammenfassende wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung und gewinnt i n dieser Form auch i n den übrigen Ländern Einfluss, interessanterweise auch in England, wo 1629 Maynes' Lex mercatoria erscheint, ein Werk, das u. a. auch auf der Arbeit der Italiener beruht" 2 . 1 K . O. Scherner, Die Wissenschaft des Handelsrechts, i n : Handbuch der Quellen u n d L i t e r a t u r der neuren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, I I , 1.,

p. 800.

2 H. Coing, Die europäische Privatrechtsgeschichte der neuren Zeit als einheitliches Forschungsgebiet: Probleme u n d Aufbau, l u s Commune, 1 (1967), 18.

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83

I I processo di formazione della nuova disciplina è comune al diritto continentale ed a quello inglese, ma i l successivo inglobamento della materia nei canoni rispettivamente del Diritto comune e della Common L a w avviene i n tempi differenti. Per l'Europa continentale i l processo si svolge nei secoli X V I e X V I I , mentre per Unghilterra i l riferimento cronologico, normalmente identificato con l'opera di Lord Mansfield e, i n misura minore, di Lord Holt, è i l secolo X V I I I . A l d i là delle discussioni sulle fasi ed i modi della incorporation 3, i n tale processo i l rapporto con i Tribunali e le loro sentenze rimane fondamentale. Come affermato da Holdsworth, "The peculiar history of the L a w Merchant i n England is thus due to the peculiar history of the courts which have administered i t at different periods. I t is clear . . . that that history falls into three w e l l defined periods: the period when the L a w Merchant, maritime and commercial, was administered in local courts; the rise and development of the court of Admiralty and the settlement of its jurisdiction; the absorption of the commercial side of the Law Merchant into the common law" 4 . Fondamentale è, come si è detto, Topera di Lord Mansfield nell'ultima fase di questo processo 5. Nel primo Memorandum inviato ai componenti del Gruppo di lavoro si indicavano anche alcuni temi specifici che potevano formare oggetto di uno studio comparativo, quali gli strumenti del credito (soprattutto la lettera d i cambio), la banca privata e pubblica, la procedura e l'assicurazione. Inoltre per un Meeting da tenere a Genova nei giorni 20— 22 ottobre 1983 i componenti del Gruppo di lavoro sono stati invitati a predisporre un Memorandum sulle ricerche personali i n corso i n tema d i storia del diritto commerciale, onde poter scegliere un indirizzo per lo sviluppo futuro dei lavori. I I Prof. Piergiovanni ha trattato i l tema 'La Rota genovese e le Decisiones i n tema di assicurazione'. La Rota civile genovese, tribunale composto d i giuristi-dottori, nasce nel 1530 i n sostituzione di vecchie magistrature formate da mercanti e competenti per le cause mercantili: nella prassi di questa Corte la novità apportata dai giuristi-dottori consiste soprattutto nel tentativo di conciliare la consuetudine mercantile con la tradizione d i scuola. L'introduzione dal 1534 dell'obbligo d i motivazione delle sentenze consentirà di far circolare le decisiones , 3 Si vedano, da ultimo, J. H. Baker , The L a w Merchant and the Common L a w before 1700, The Cambridge L a w Journal 38 (1979), 295—322; D.R. Coquillette , Legal Ideology and Incorporation I : The English Civilian Writers, 1523—1607, Boston L a w Rev. 61 (1981), 1—89, e Legal Ideology and Incorporation I I : Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the literary battle for the L a w Merchant, 1607—1676, Boston L a w Rev. 61 (1981), 315—371. 4 W. Holdsworth , A History of English L a w , I, London 19567, p. 530. 5 Ibid., pp. 572—573; J. H. Baker (n. 3), p. 297.

6*

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una parte delle quali, nel 1582, otterrà l'onore della prima edizione a stampa. I n tema d i assicurazione le sentenze della Rota civile genovese pongono i n evidenza, al d i là d i alcune particolarità quali la speciale considerazione della 'barattaria' del capitano della nave, la sostanziale omogeneità con la prassi degli altri tribunali italiani dello stesso periodo. I l Prof. Coquillette ha presentato una relazione di sintesi del suo lavoro "since 1979 concerned on the influence of the civil law of Continental Europe on the development of Anglo-American law i n seventeenth and eighteenth centuries especially concentrated on the commercial law". A suo parere i 'Doctors' Commons' hanno avuto molto maggiore influenza d i quanto comunemente si ritenga: "these specialists, directly connected w i t h English University faculties where the Roman law curriculum s t i l l dominated, became a major source of innovation i n the commercial law of the seventeenth century, decades before Lord Mansfield". I l Prof. Coquillette ha inoltre comunicato che i l suo "present work is shifting to court records and the professional diaries and papers of prominant judges and practitioners": questo potrà i n futuro consentire la migliore conoscenza sia dei records d i alcuni tribunali (ad esempio g l i Admiralty records), sia la jurisprudence di grandi giuristi come Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Holt e Lord Mansfield. I I Dr. Asser ha tenuto una relazione divisa i n due parti. Nella prima parte ha svolto una serie di considerazioni i n tema di 'company law' e di 'partnership', con riferimento all'evoluzione di questi istituti commercialistici nel diritto e nella dottrina olandese e con richiami alia 'commenda', alia 'compagnia' ed alia tradizione che dal diritto romano al diritto medievale sta alia base di questi contratti. L a dottrina e la giurisprudenza civilistica e commercialistica europea ha dato rilevanti contributi alio sviluppo d i questi istituti, mentre nella pratica olandese dei secoli X V I I e X V I I I "important development took place particularly regarding joint stock companies". I I Dr. Asser ha ricordato che "The first company of that kind i n Holland was the Dutch East India Company . . . Its existence should be considered i n connection w i t h the development of the limited partnerships, which originated from a combination of the medieval 'commenda', i n which a capitalist provided money or goods to a merchant who conducted the business and who, in some cases, also invested capital, and the medieval 'compagnia', in which all partners were active. This combination resulted i n the 'societas per viam accommenditae', i n which the sleeping partners . . . were not fully liable to t h i r d parties . . . The Dutch East India Company became the immediate predecessor of the later j o i n t stock companies, the structure of which was also influenced by their English counter-

V I I . The Courts and the Development of Commercial L a w

parts" 6 . I I Dr. Asser ha anche annunciato la sua intenzione di continuare a studiare la posizione delle joint stock companies i n Olanda (sec. X V I I — X V I I I ) . Nella seconda parte della sua relazione i l Dr. Asser ha compiuto u n breve excursus sui Tribunali i n Olanda nei secoli dell'età moderna, ricordando la creazione d i una Corte Suprema e la posizione non autonoma della giurisdizione commerciale. Le Corti non motivano le sentenze e i giuristi suppliscono a questa mancanza con commenti alle decisioni delle Corti, mentre d i grande importanza conoscitiva diventano anche le allegationes delle parti. Da tutto questo materiale emerge la massima libertà d i combinare i risultati della pratica con i l diritto romano. Tra i suoi progetti futuri d i studio i l Dr. Asser inserisce anche l'esame della documentazione della Local Court di Amsterdam. I I Professor Nörr ha presentato una relazione dal titolo 'The Procedure in Mercantile Matters: Some Comparative Aspects'. Uno dei problemi fondamentali che sta alia base delle ricerche di storia del diritto commerciale consiste nella sua legittimazione nell'ambito del sistema giuridico, i n relazione al fatto che i l diritto commerciale si vuole talora fondato sulYaequitas (equity nell'esperienza inglese), ο sullo ius gentium, ο sulla consuetudine. Più in particolare per l'aspetto procédurale alcuni temi appaiono della massima importanza. Per prima è da tener presente l'esistenza di regole speciali nelle Corti mercantili, specialmente legate alia composizione delle Corti le quali, oltre ai mercanti, prevedono spesso la presenza di un giurisperito. Anche i n Inghilterra i mercanti non sono presenti solo nelle Corti locali ma si trovano — indirettamente — anche i n quelle centrali. U n altro punto di peculiarità riguarda la sommarietà del procedimento, riscontrabile sia nel continente che i n Inghilterra. Ancora tipiche del mondo mercantile sono le diversità i n tema di testimonianza rispetto alia procedura ordinaria. Viene infine i n rilievo la prontezza della esecuzione prevista nei procedimenti mercantili: esistono instrumenta immediatamente esecutivi, ed i n seguito Yinstrumentum guarentigiatum, che prevede inizialmente l'intervento del notaio. Si giunge perô a ritenere sufficiente la scrittura privata del mercante. Anche i n Inghilterra esistono prassi che sono notevolmente simili a quelle del continente. Le singole relazioni sono state seguite da discussione con interventi di t u t t i i partecipanti. 6 Queste considerazioni sono svolte i n u n volume recentemente pubblicato, W. D. H. Asser , I n solidum of pro parte, Leiden 1983.

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Si è poi passati all'esame dei programmi futuri del Gruppo d i lavoro: ha trovato generale consenso la proposta del Professor Nörr di rinunciare ad un tema d i studio comune e, tenendo come background comune i Tribunali ed i l diritto commerciale, assecondare le scelte d i studio individuali che dovranno sfociare i n articoli da raccogliere i n un volume. I Partecipanti si sono impegnati ad inviare i manoscritta al Professor Piergiovanni entro i l mese di Ottobre 1984. I temi da trattare sono i seguenti: 1. I I Dr. Asser imposterà i l suo studio su due temi: a) Jurisdiction i n commercial matters i n Nederland; b) Survey of integration of commercial practice (custom) into Roman Dutch Law about Partnership. 2. I l Prof. Coquillette preparerà uno studio about 'The influence of the Law Merchant on Common Law Courts', con una particolare attenzione, per l'aspetto di diritto sostanziale, alia evoluzione del ' B i l l of Exchange'. 3. I l Prof. Maffei ha avanzato la possibilité, con riserve derivanti da precedenti impegni d i pubblicazione, d i inserire un suo lavoro sul Santerna, identificato nel giurista portoghese Pedro de Santarem, vissuto nella seconda metà del secolo X V ed autore del primo trattato sulle assicurazioni (la cui redazione viene anticipata di vari decenni). 4. Lo studio del Professor Nörr verterà su 'Some Comparative Aspects of Procedure i n Mercantile Matters'. 5. I I Prof. Piergiovanni tratterà i temi: a) Nascita e competenza della Rota civile genovese; b) Decisiones della Rota genovese i n materia di assicurazione. 6. I I Professor Savelli contribuirà con uno studio su ' I l dibattito de cambiis nella pubblicistica genovese (secoli X V I — X V I I ) ' . V. Piergiovanni

V I I I . Industrial Age and the Law I.

Die Arbeitsgruppe verfolgt ein doppeltes Ziel: 1. Die Entwicklung darzustellen, welche die Lösung bestimmter durch die Industrialisierung hervorgerufener Probleme i n der Gesetzgebung und i m Rechtsleben einzelner Länder gefunden hat, mit dem Ziel, diese Entwicklung zu vergleichen, 2. zu prüfen, wie weit in der Entwicklung der entsprechenden rechtlichen Institutionen die Rechtsentwicklung anderer Länder eine Rolle gespielt hat. Die zweite Aufgabe macht es notwendig, nicht nur die parlamentarischen und ähnlichen Materialien genau zu prüfen, sondern auch die Literatur der Zeit, die sich mit rechtspolitischen Fragen beschäftigt, namentlich auch die rechtsvergleichenden Zeitschriften, welche Informationen über das betreffende ausländische Recht enthielten. Die Rechtsvergleichung hat bekanntlich i m 19. Jahrhundert gerade i m Zusammenhang mit der Anpassung des Rechts an die neuen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse begonnen. II.

I m einzelnen sollen die folgenden Themen behandelt werden: 1. Gesellschaf tsrecht Es sollen folgende Fragen untersucht werden: a) freie Bildung von Kapitalgesellschaften mit Haftungsbeschränkung oder Notwendigkeit einer Konzession b) das Problem der beschränkten Haftung. Hierzu sind auch die der Freigabe der Kapitalgesellschaften vorhergehenden Versuche, eine beschränkte Haftung auf dem Weg über Kommanditgesellschaften und ähnliches zu erreichen, zu untersuchen. c) Die Entwicklung der A k t i e als Instrument der Finanzierung über den Kapitalmarkt einschließlich des Problems der Übertragung der Aktien.

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d) Die Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft. Hierzu sind insbesondere auch Statuten und soweit möglich, die bei der Konzessionserteilung von den Regierungen verlangten Normativbestimmungen zu prüfen. M i t einzubeziehen sind naturgemäß auch die Bedingungen, unter denen eine beschränkte Haftung gewährt wurde, wie sie insbesondere i n der englischen Gesetzgebung zunächst entwickelt worden sind. Die Untersuchung soll länderweise geführt werden und zwar übernehmen Frankreich und Deutschland Professor Horn, Belgien und Italien Professor Padoa-Schioppa, Großbritannien Professor Cornish. 2. Schwerpunkt Hypothekenrecht und Grundkredit Zwei Probleme sind zu untersuchen: a) Die Entwicklung von Grundregistern und ähnlichen Einrichtungen, welche den Zweck verfolgen, die Publizität der Rechtsverhältnisse an Grundstücken zu sichern. Hier ist insbesondere auch zu prüfen, wieweit den Registern öffentlicher Glaube beigelegt worden ist, d. h. unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen der Inhalt der Register als rechtlich maßgebend fingiert worden ist. b) Das Problem des Zuganges der Landwirtschaft zum Kapitalmarkt über börsenfähige Papiere oder durch Zwischenschaltung von besonderen Hypothekenbanken. Die Fragen sollen untersucht werden für Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien, einbezogen werden soll das Torrenssystem in Australien. Die Bearbeitung von Frankreich und Deutschland w i r d Professor Coing, von Großbritannien Professor Cornish übernehmen. 3. Arbeitsrecht Untersucht werden soll die Frage des collective bargaining (Tarifvertragsrecht). Einbezogen werden soll die Frage der Koalitionsfreiheit für die Gewerkschaften und der Fabrikausschüsse. Die Frage soll i n diesem Falle über das 19. Jahrhundert hinaus in unser Jahrhundert verfolgt werden, i n Deutschland etwa bis 1920. Als Länder sollen untersucht werden: Großbritannien und Deutschland. Die Bearbeitung soll sich weitgehend auf den bereits publizierten Ergebnissen und publizierten Quellen aufbauen. Deutschland w i r d von Dr. Rütten, Großbritannien von Professor Cornish untersucht.

V I I I . Industrial Age and the L a w

III. Hinsichtlich des Vorgehens wurde verabredet: Die Mitglieder der Arbeitsgruppe werden ihre Arbeiten so ansetzen, daß sie bis Ende 1984 ein Manuskript vorlegen können. Sie werden dabei i n Kontakt miteinander bleiben. Nach Fertigstellung der Manuskripte soll eine neue Besprechung stattfinden, welche die endgültige Redaktion für die Veröffentlichung festlegen soll. H. Coing